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Title: Women’s organizations remain at the front line of the crisis response in Myanmar
Description: "In Rakhine State, Myanmar, the productive fields are left unharvested. Normally teeming with agricultural workers—the majority of whom are women and girls from the local villages—the fertile landscape has become another deadly battlefield. Landmines, planted after the military coup in 2021, are causing soaring numbers of civilian casualties. Women and girls who dare to venture into rural fields alone, also face threats of sexual violence. A UN Women survey of 2,200 women in Myanmar found that half of them were afraid to leave their immediate neighbourhoods. In Rakhine and Kachin States, the risks of violence are associated with shrinking mobility of women and girls. But staying at home has its own challenges. Rates of gender-based violence (GBV) are growing in households, as tensions rise over severe hunger and poverty. “There are no opportunities and no income, so the women and girls are beaten,” says Win*, a representative of a local women’s organization in Myanmar. The lifeline: Only local partners can reach women and girls impacted by GBV At a time when women and girls desperately need humanitarian support, external borders have been closed to international humanitarian workers. Instead, it is local women-led and women’s rights organizations and other local actors that have stepped up to shoulder the delivery of critical services to crisis-affected communities, often at great personal risk. Since 2021, UN Women has supported 91 local women’s organizations in Myanmar through training on leadership, representation, advocacy skills, and awareness raising on humanitarian decision-making mechanisms and processes, contributing to increased access to tools and resources available in humanitarian planning and response processes and mechanisms. The work has been carried out in partnership with UNFPA, through a grant from the Central Emergency Relief Fund (CERF). More than 30 per cent of that funding has directly supported local women-led and women’s rights organizations. Without them, says Rowena Dacsig, programme specialist for UN Women Myanmar, women and girls in Myanmar would be missing their last remaining lifeline. Beyond the military checkpoints of Kachin and Rakhine States, local women-led and women’s rights organizations have delivered critical services to women and girls who have experienced or are at risk of GBV, such as psychosocial counselling and humanitarian items like dignity kits, which include basic sanitary and hygiene supplies. Local organizations have also been supported by UN Women to provide livelihood services, including financial skills development training and agricultural activities to 4,094 GBV survivors and women at risk, many of whom are now responsible for household income and earnings as husbands and sons are recruited by armed groups. “Only those organizations which have local partners can carry on with their work”, says Dacsig. “Otherwise, the services to survivors and those at risk of GBV, including in internally displaced persons camps, would have ceased completely. Without these local partners, we’d be totally blind to the needs of women and girls in Myanmar because little to no information is coming out of these communities.” In return, she adds, UN Women and UNFPA have also supported local women’s organizations through trainings on topics such as protection against sexual abuse and exploitation, upholding accountability within affected populations, and conducting risk assessments and gender analysis to inform delivery of critical services, for example, in relation to protection and livelihoods. * Name has been changed to protect the privacy of the individual. About the CERF Global Grant for Gender-based Violence Prevention and Response The Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) is a United Nations emergency facility established in 2005 to enable humanitarian responders to deliver life-saving assistance whenever and wherever crises strike. In 2021, UN Women and the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) were allocated USD 25 million by the CERF Global Grant to strengthen the response to and prevention of gender-based violence in emergencies..."
Source/publisher: UN Women (New York)
Date of entry/update: 2023-08-16
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Title: Attacks on Health Care in Myanmar (26 July-08 August 2023)
Description: "Documented incidents 25 July 2023: In Myawaddy town, township and district, Kayin state, the house of a doctor was sealed and confiscated by the junta authorities. By the time of this attack, the doctor was not at his home after he went into hiding after being charged with the Counter-Terrorism Law. Source: Eleven Media Group 27 July 2023: In Wi Yaw village and village tract, Thaton township and district, Mon state, a sub-rural health centre, along with two monasteries, 13 civilian houses, and two vehicles were damaged due to the artillery shelling by the Myanmar military. Sources: Khit Thit Media and Irrawaddy Burmese As reported on 01 August 2023: In Kyet Su Kyin village and village tract, Yesagyo township, Pakokku district, Magway region, a doctor left the station hospital due to having frequently been questioned by the junta security forces, about whether he had provided health care to the local resistance forces. He was not affiliated with the Civil Disobedience Movement. Source: Radio Free Asia 02 August 2023: In Hpakant town and township, Mohnyin district, Kachin state, a 42-year-old medical doctor was arrested by the junta security sources from his private general practitioner clinic. He was accused of having employed a doctor affiliated with the CDM at his clinic, having promoted the CDM, and having provided health care to injured protestors in 2021. He was charged with Section 505 (A). He was not affiliated with CDM. Sources: Democratic Voice of Burma, Chindwin News Agency, Kachin News Group and Kachin News Group II 04 August 2023: In Dawei town, township, and district, Tanintharyi region, four civilians (two females and two males) were abducted by the junta security sources at the military hospital while they were seeking health care at the facility. The two men were detained at the local battalion of the Myanmar military, and the two women were at the local police station. Source: Delta News Agency 06 August 2023: In Mahaaungmyay town and township, Mandalay city, district, and region, the junta security forces and militia took away the materials from a private clinic which had been sealed and confiscated in April 2022. Source: Mandalay Free Press..."
Source/publisher: Insecurity Insight (Geneva) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of entry/update: 2023-08-15
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Title: Human Rights Situation weekly update (August 8 to 14, 2023) [EN/MY]
Description: "Human Rights Violations took place in States and Regions from Aug 8 to 14, 2023 Military Junta Troops launched airstrikes and dropped bombs in Sagaing Region and Bago Region from August 8th to 14th. Military Junta troops arrested almost 50 civilians and used them as human shields in Tanintharyi Region. Juna’s troops arrested 2 civilians and burnt and killed them in Kale Township on August 12th. They also destroyed the part of the Seikphyu Road which connects Pathein- Monywa Road. Pyusawhtee militias that work under the Military Junta are threatening the civilians in various ways and collecting money in Sagaing Region and Tanintharyi Region. 8 civilians were killed by the Military Junta troop within a week. A child died and 2 were injured by the Human Right Violations of the Military Junta..."
Source/publisher: Network for Human Rights Documentation-Burma
Date of entry/update: 2023-08-15
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Title: Myanmar: ICRC supports released detainees to reunite with their families
Description: "Being separated from your loved ones is a heavy burden to bear and many detainees deal with this every day. Often, the hope of being reunited with their families one day helps them cope with their tough circumstances. But upon release, many of them find their journey back home difficult because of high transport costs and unstable security conditions in some areas. Through the Safe Return Home programme, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in Myanmar supports released detainees to reach home in a safe and dignified way. Our teams meet with the released detainees and provide them with money for transport, allowance for food and temporary accommodation besides necessary information. Between January and June 2023, we supported 1,487 people after their release from detention, helping them to reunite with their families. It is a small but significant support for those who are re-entering society. "After being released from detention in Malaysia, we were sent back to Myanmar. We quarantined for seven days in Yangon before returning home to our villages by buses, motorbikes and boats," says U Thein*, who received support from the ICRC. A new chapter Being able to embrace their loved ones is often the first step towards a new start for those who are released. "This is a new beginning in many ways," says Ko Min*, as he looks forward to returning to his village in Rakhine State. Ko Min plans to rebuild his home and support his community when he gets back. He shares that his village was severely affected when Cyclone Mocha hit Myanmar in early May 2023. "Some people in my community were farmers, some were daily wageworkers, and some were fishermen. The cyclone destroyed all our means of earning livelihoods. I am just thankful that my family is safe even though it has been a very difficult time," he says. Despite the continued suspension of visits to prisons, the ICRC in Myanmar provides some support to inmates and their families through services such as helping families clarify the whereabouts of missing relatives when they are believed to be detained, helping families travel to prisons and safely deliver parcels to their loved ones and helping released detainees return home safely..."
Source/publisher: International Committee of the Red Cross (Geneva)
Date of entry/update: 2023-08-15
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Title: Myanmar: Landmines / ERW Incidents Information (January - June 2023) [EN/MY]
Description: "According to recent monitoring of landmine and explosive remnants of war (ERW) incidents during the first six months of 2023, a total of 556 casualties have been reported nationwide. This figure represents 143% of the total casualties reported in 2022 (390 reported). Breaking down the figures by region, Sagaing Region had the highest number of casualties, accounting for 40% of the total. Bago and Shan followed with 12% and 6% of the total, respectively. The remaining regions, including Ayeyarwady, Chin, Kachin, Kayah, Kayin, Magway, Mandalay, Mon, Rakhine, Tanintharyi and Yangon, contributed to 41% of the total casualties. Children make up 20% of the total casualties from landmine and ERW explosions across the country. It is important to note that these figures only reflect civilian casualties..."
Source/publisher: UN Children's Fund
Date of entry/update: 2023-08-10
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Title: Myanmar Emergency Update (as of 31 July 2023)
Description: "HIGHLIGHTS According to the UN, an estimated 1,927,200 internally displaced people (IDPs) were reported across the country, including 1,599,200 displaced after 1 February 2021. In the North-West, displacements continued following frequent airstrikes and arson attacks. Some 48,000 cyclone-affected people still require humanitarian assistance with urgent repairs needed on over 9,000 damaged or destroyed shelters. In Chin, Magway and Sagaing, humanitarian access became increasingly difficult due to the escalating conflict. In Rakhine and Chin (South) States, 150,000 shelters remained in poor condition in Rakhine State after Cyclone Mocha. Explosive remnants of war and debris as well as saltwater contamination and poor drainage and sanitation are immediate challenges that have elevated the risk of malaria and waterborne illnesses such as dengue and acute watery diarrhea in several Townships. In Kachin and Shan (North), persistent clashes saw many people flee their homes in search of safety within Kayah State or across the Thai border, leaving many at heightened risk of indiscriminate attacks and shelling, arbitrary arrest and abduction. Access to basic services, including healthcare and education, was extremely limited for new IDPs. Food security was another significant concern with access to livelihood areas reduced due to movement restrictions imposed by armed actors, concerns that farmland had been contaminated with unexploded ordnance as well as fears of forced recruitment. In the South-East, clashes, airstrikes and indiscriminate and targeted shelling were reported in Kayah, Kayin, Mon and Shan (South) States and Bago (East) and Tanintharyi Regions. The destruction of civilian infrastructure in villages and IDP sites, including homes, hospitals, schools, and places of worship, continued to be pervasive. The alleged use of civilians as human shields in Kayin and Mon States and Tanintharyi Region have also been reported..."
Source/publisher: UN High Commissioner for Refugees (Geneva) via Reliefweb (New York)
Date of entry/update: 2023-08-09
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Title: Myanmar: Displaced families find safe space in new sustainable homes
Description: "Once a joyful and beautiful place where children played and families enjoyed normal days, surrounded by lush nature, traditional homes, livestock and farms, many areas of Kachin State in Myanmar have now become silent and empty spaces scarred by armed conflict. The people in Kachin had not anticipated they would be forced to leave their homes and seek shelter in internally displaced camps. Yet over 100,000 people have been displaced for more than ten years in the state. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in Kachin is dedicated to helping communities who have faced trauma, lost their livelihoods and lived in cramped temporary shelters as they fled violence. We work to address their urgent needs, improve their living conditions and relieve their suffering. In late 2022, the ICRC constructed 63 homes for families who relocated to Hka Garan Yang village in Sumprabum township and the Sadung Na Sar resettlement site in Waingmaw township. Our goal was that the families move to a new location where they can live safely and sustainably. We started our work by helping the families register their land ownership and then built adequately spacious homes equipped with bathrooms and private toilets. We also installed solar power systems in every home for cost-effective and sustainable electricity supply and set up a small-scale gravity water system to provide them with clean water. "There's a saying that reflects our experience – 'It's always darkest before dawn'. We faced many harsh challenges before relocating here. But now we have a durable home with a kitchen, solar lighting, fresh water supply and a toilet. Things are better now." - Mrs. Lahpai Ja Ring, whose family moved into a new home as part of the ICRC's resettlement project. She adds that since they have a safe space to live, they can better utilize their potential and pursue their dreams. Even though they have relocated to a new environment, the families have quickly adapted and settled in. Our teams have also provided them with support to improve their livelihood activities such as rearing livestock and farming. "We have seen how happy and satisfied the families are since they have moved into their new space. We also helped them transition out of their previous status as internally displaced people and reintegrate into a more normal life," said Guillaume Binet, an ICRC staff member in Kachin State. Binet adds, "we also plan to build a primary school at the Sadung Na Sar resettlement site." As conflict continues and the challenges multiply, our teams remain committed to helping communities across Kachin State overcome the difficulties. Every family deserves to have a home to call their own. In two townships of Myanmar’s northernmost state, we help 63 families to take their first steps towards rebuilding their lives..."
Source/publisher: International Committee of the Red Cross (Geneva) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of entry/update: 2023-08-09
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Title: Report of the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar (A/HRC/54/19) [EN/AR/RU/ZH]
Description: "Human Rights Council Fifty-fourth session 11 September–6 October 2023 Agenda item 4 Human rights situations that require the Council’s attention Summary The present document is the fifth report submitted by the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar to the Human Rights Council pursuant to resolution 39/2 of 27 September 2018. It covers the activities carried out by the Mechanism between 1 July 2022 and 30 June 2023. Four years after it began operations, the Mechanism continues to actively monitor and investigate the deteriorating situation in Myanmar. Armed conflicts substantially intensified during the reporting period. The Mechanism reiterates its previous assessment that there is strong evidence indicating that serious international crimes are being inflicted against the people in Myanmar. With no foreseeable end to the violence, the work of the Mechanism to facilitate justice and accountability is more relevant and necessary than ever. The Mechanism has made consistent and notable progress in fulfilling its mandate. It significantly increased the amount of first-hand testimonial evidence collected, by conducting several investigative missions to refugee camps and other locations and by carrying out screenings and in-person interviews with witnesses, survivors and defectors. The Mechanism also continued to collect additional evidence, such as photographs, videos, audio material, documents, maps, geospatial imagery, social media posts and forensic evidence. By the end of the reporting period, the Mechanism had collected millions of information items, and engaged with over 700 sources and information providers. The evidence collected will enable the Mechanism to continue building case files and analytical products to prove individual criminal responsibility for serious international crimes in Myanmar. The Mechanism is sharing evidence it has collected and its analysis for use in ongoing judicial processes. During the reporting period, the Mechanism completed three major analytical reports to be shared with national and international courts or tribunals, focusing on the structure and reporting lines within the Myanmar military; the failure of Myanmar authorities to investigate or punish sexual and gender-based crimes; and the organized spread of hate speech content on Facebook by the Myanmar military before, during and after the 2017 “clearance operations”. The Mechanism made significant strides in expanding and diversifying its collaboration with civil society organizations, which make critical contributions to its work owing to their access to on-the-ground information and contacts with potential witnesses. In the second quarter of 2023, the Mechanism held its first civil society dialogue, bringing together representatives from relevant civil society organizations to deepen partnerships and strengthen processes for ongoing cooperation and information-sharing. The civil society dialogues will be a regular and important component of the Mechanism’s increased engagement and collaboration with civil society organizations..."
Source/publisher: UN Human Rights Council (Geneva) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of entry/update: 2023-08-09
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Title: Coping with water scarcity: Solidarités International’s intervention in Pauktaw camps in 2023 (Letter #1 May 2023)
Description: "This document presents the situation of the population in Pauktaw Internally Displaced People (IDP) camps and SOLIDARITÉS INTERNATIONAL’s intervention to ensure continuous access to water during the water scarcity period. SI started operating in Rakhine State during the emergency phase following cyclone Giri in 2010. It then responded to the humanitarian crisis resulting from the two waves of inter-communal violence in 2012. Since February 2013, SI has been working in Pauktaw IDP camps (ANYC, NC1, NC2, KNP) and village (ANYV) hosting Rohingyas, providing Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) services. In the camps, people are exposed to harsh climate and very poor land with limited access to water, which greatly reduces their access to livelihoods and prevents them from meeting their basic needs. Due to geographical, hydrogeological, and climatic parameters, 25,812 Rohingya displaced in Pauktaw township suffer from annual potable water scarcity. The water shortage occurs during the dry season from midApril to early rainy season in June. They are located in low coastal plains on islets surrounded by brackish and salt water, and thus highly exposed to floods and cyclones. In addition, its hydrogeological characteristics led to groundwater depletion and saltwater intrusion in several areas. During the dry season, potable water is also not available. Although climate change could increase rainfall, it will become less predictable. The main areas’ water source is rainwater collected in ponds, with an average rainfall of 4.5 metres per year. The seepage and evaporation lead to the loss of two-thirds of the water collected, hampering the ability to uphold basic humanitarian standards (15 litres per day and per person, as per Sphere Standards). The combination of demographic growth, influx of Rohingyas, and limited land availability suitable for pond construction in camps, results in the ponds drying up about 3 months a year. Improving rainwater harvesting and storage remains the most practical solution for increasing and optimizing the amount of water available after the monsoon..."
Source/publisher: Solidarités International (Paris) via Reliefweb (New York)
Date of entry/update: 2023-08-08
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Title: Human Rights Situation weekly update (August 1 to 7, 2023) [EN/MY]
Description: "Military Junta Troops arrested almost 60 civilians and used them as human shields from Tanintharyi Region and Sagaing Region from August 1st to 7th. Military Junta Troops launched airstrikes and dropped bombs in Pale Township, Sagaing Region on August 7th. Military Junta’s ships attacked with heavy and light artillery some villages which are located next to the Ayeyarwady River bank, between Katha Township, Sagaing Region, and Shweku Township, Kachin State. Military troops started targeting the youths and checked the civilians by going on the YBS buses in Yangon Region. The head of the prison that works under the Military Junta, beat, and tortured the political prisoners from Thayarwaddy Prison and Dike-U Prison, Bago Region, and held them in solitary confinement. A child died and a person was injured by the Military’s heavy and light artillery attacks within a week. Local Civilians from Sagaing Region, Magway Region, and Mandalay Region left their places and fled from the Military Junta raiding..."
Source/publisher: Network for Human Rights Documentation-Burma
Date of entry/update: 2023-08-08
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Title: Myanmar junta reducing Aung San Suu Kyi’s sentence is an empty gesture from a failing state
Description: "In a general amnesty announced on military television last week, Myanmar’s military junta removed six years from the jail term of Aung San Suu Kyi, the 78-year-old leader of the government removed by a coup in February 2021. This came a week after the junta moved her into house arrest following a year in solitary confinement. But it still leaves Aung San Suu Kyi facing a 27-year jail term on bogus charges. The junta also lopped four years off former president Win Myint’s sentence, and reportedly released more than 7,000 other prisoners. But we shouldn’t be persuaded that the junta has changed its stripes. It regularly uses mass amnesties in attempts to cultivate goodwill, either at home or abroad. But any major figures released in these amnesties shouldn’t have been locked up in the first place. The day before the amnesty, the junta extended its state of emergency for a fourth time, further delaying elections, due to relentless opposition to its February 2021 coup. The coup sparked ongoing and widespread violence, and shredded the military’s last claims to social esteem. This has left Myanmar impoverished, largely friendless, and without any clear plan for a positive future. Determined resistance The army’s top decision-makers, currently bunkered in the capital, Naypyidaw, struggle to maintain control of enough territory to seriously contemplate even a heavily stage-managed nationwide poll. Under these volatile conditions, people have been voting with their feet by fleeing abroad or taking up arms in a revolutionary mobilisation. The junta’s leader, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, reportedly told the National Defence and Security Council that elections couldn’t be conducted due to continued fighting in several regions. The reality for the generals in their fortified compounds is that any poll could further embarrass them – they cannot even reliably rig the national vote. Read more: As Myanmar suffers, the military junta is desperate, isolated and running out of options Many areas are off-limits to government forces, perhaps as much as half the country – which is Southeast Asia’s second-largest by land area. While aerial bombardments by regime aircraft might set back the resistance, the strategy is hardly a way to win hearts or minds. Inch by inch, the diminution of central government control raises questions about the country’s future. There’s increasing concern across the Southeast Asian region. An intractable civil conflict presents significant challenges for neighbours Thailand, China, India and Bangladesh. Diplomatic efforts to maintain Myanmar’s territorial integrity jostle with the discomfort felt almost everywhere about doing business with a blood-splattered regime. The regime tries to play the politics of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to its advantage. But even there, sometimes in the company of other autocrats, Myanmar now faces the ignominy of an “empty seat” at the political level. And almost nobody wants to shake hands with regime representatives. An unnecessary crisis It’s a precipitous erosion of what was, until the coup, a relatively positive story for most Myanmar people. Before the coup, the most problematic issue was the military’s abuses of the Rohingya, a Muslim ethnic minority living in westernmost Myanmar. Other issues – such as longstanding ethnic grievances and yawning economic inequality – were, at the very least, subject to open debate in the media and sometimes in the country’s 16 regional and national legislatures. That political and social infrastructure, and the emerging civil society it helped sustain, has now crumbled. It’s been replaced by violence, mistrust, terror and martial chauvinism. Read more: Military violence in Myanmar is worsening amid fierce resistance and international ambivalence Myanmar’s young talent now banned from universities, bravely disobedient in the faces of tanks and bullets, face dismal options: the mountains, the jungle, the border. Some lie low. Others still seek to fan the revolutionary spark. Many are now in jail, others dead. The military, of course, blames its opponents for the devastation its coup unleashed. That sad fact hides a tremendous political and cultural miscalculation. It’s unclear whether Myanmar can recover from the army’s self-inflicted wounds. Some speculate the whole system will collapse, making it impossible for powerbrokers to keep up the increasingly flimsy charade of state power. It has all the ingredients of a failed state. No way out The decision to abandon the proposed elections, followed by last week’s amnesty, is hardly a surprise. But it does reveal the fragility of the military system and the paranoia of the men in charge. It’s also further evidence that nobody can trust the junta. Not only has it broken the faith of the Myanmar people, it constantly tests the patience of foreign governments, even those that offer some sympathy for its self-sabotage. With Aung San Suu Kyi and other senior members of the democratically elected government still locked up, the reality facing the generals is they will never beat her at any election. They are still betting that eventually the world – and, most importantly, their near neighbours – will lose interest and allow some type of partial rehabilitation. Maintaining links with China and Russia is a key strategy. Still, there’s no obvious path to fuller inclusion in ASEAN while the generals unleash such violence against their own people. The extension of the state of emergency and postponement of hypothetical elections will further invigorate resistance forces hoping to steadily weaken the army’s grip on power. A pointless reduction in the jail sentences for Myanmar’s democratically elected leaders is unlikely to quell the fires of opposition now burning across the country..."
Source/publisher: "The Conversation" (Melbourne)
Date of entry/update: 2023-08-08
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Title: Myanmar on fire
Description: "Executive Summary To read the full report, download the PDF. Since the February 2021 coup, the Myanmar military has violently suppressed political opposition and used disproportionate violence against civilians. As the Myanmar military struggles to exert control over areas of resistance, persistent fires have been on the rise - likely as part of both the Myanmar military’s offensive against PDF groups, and their attempts to subjugate the civilian populations. This report by Myanmar Witness seeks to provide insight into this modus operandi of the Myanmar military by assessing data and specific case studies. This paper reviews what are alleged to be intentionally set fires in Myanmar, which has been a consistent feature of the conflict. Figure: Map showing all fire data collected and analysed by Myanmar Witness as of 31 January 2023. The use of fire has increased, resulting in the destruction of thousands of homes. As part of enduring monitoring of fire, Myanmar Witness observed a sharp increase in the number of fires being reported around Myanmar at the end of 2022 - with the largest change being an astounding 454% year-on-year increase in December. In every month observed between September 2022 and January 2023, Myanmar Witness collected more fire incidents than in the corresponding months in the previous year. Myanmar Witness has sought to understand this increase through investigation and analysis of fires in the months of September 2022 to December 2022. To understand this phenomena, Myanmar Witness has analysed large patterns of fires, turning these into case studies that demonstrate the potential systematic nature in which villages are being affected by fire. Myanmar Witness has found that these fires appear to happen in ‘clusters’, with repeated incidents in the same villages over time, as well as multiple simultaneous incidents in multiple villages in the same area. This is a pattern also observed in the wider fire dataset and in operations between September 2021 and January 2022, which can be read about in more detail in Myanmar Witness’ report, Civilian Harm. Myanmar Witness has collected 347 reports of fires during the period of September 2022 to January 2023. The team have then selected five case studies that are representative of trends observed across the wider set. In some of the selected case studies, fires seem to correlate with People Defence Force (PDF) activity and it is therefore a realistic possibility that they can be explained as retaliation for said activity by Myanmar’s Military. The case studies also demonstrate the way in which fire is used as a weapon, repeatedly destroying civilian infrastructure and objects indispensable to survival. Myanmar Witness identified a large cluster of fires across Sagaing at the end of November until mid-December 2022. These fires are linked to reports of Myanmar military soldiers and Pyu Saw Htee militia moving from village to village during this period, leaving a wake of charred destruction, and allegedly using human shields. Whilst the time and location of fires matches on the ground reports, Myanmar Witness has been unable to find conclusive imagery showing the presence of the Myanmar military and thus is unable to verify who is responsible. In addition to the widespread burning of villages, Myanmar Witness has identified claims and evidence of the destruction of food supplies including rice storage facilities, a sesame warehouse, livestock, and rice supplies. Myanmar Witness has been able to geolocate and verify several instances of food infrastructure being destroyed. Fires in January 2023 in 3 villages across Ye-U Township, Sagaing, resulted in the destruction of more than 100 houses, a historic Christian church and a number of other buildings. Some of these villages had suffered fires in the previous month, all allegedly perpetrated by the Myanmar military. Myanmar Witness has verified the locations and occurrence of fires at these sites, but is yet to find conclusive evidence of Myanmar military presence. Whilst there is a lack of conclusive evidence of the Myanmar military targeting civilians with fire, Myanmar Witness deems it highly likely that the fires identified in the below case studies were started by the Myanmar military. Myanmar Witness has identified and analysed considerable amounts of eyewitness testimony reported by local news media or by social media users which claimed the military or pro-military militias were responsible. The sequential and seemingly systematic use of fire in multiple villages, all in close proximity, and seemingly tied to PDF and resistance activity, adds weight to this conclusion. Additionally, Myanmar Witness has analysed footage showing military intent to burn villages in nearby areas, and has identified clear patterns of the use of fire by military units. It should also be noted that fires are markedly more common in areas subject to martial law and that have been subjected to SAC airstrikes in recent months. Since the Coup, Myanmar Witness has identified, investigated and verified footage relating to hundreds of fires in and around villages in Myanmar. As part of this data collection and monitoring, Myanmar Witness has produced several reports detailing some instances of these fires and the patterns they followed. These include: Civilian Harm: The impact of military operations in North-West Myanmar, Fire as a weapon in Sagaing and Burning Myanmar. Myanmar Witness also lays out these instances in the open-source Myanmar Witness Fire Map, making the data accessible for a wider audience to review..."
Source/publisher: Myanmar Witness
Date of entry/update: 2023-08-08
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Title: Press Release: War crimes by Myanmar military are more frequent and brazen – Myanmar Mechanism Annual Report
Description: "Geneva, 8 August 2023 – There is strong evidence that the Myanmar military and its affiliate militias are committing increasingly frequent and brazen war crimes, according to information collected and analysed by the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar (Mechanism) and outlined in its Annual Report released today. These war crimes include indiscriminate or disproportionate attacks on civilians from aerial bombing, such as the military airstrike in Sagaing in April 2023 that reportedly killed more than 155 people. There has also been an increase in the mass executions of civilians and detained combatants, and the large-scale and intentional burning of civilian homes and buildings, resulting in the destruction of entire villages in some cases. “Every loss of life in Myanmar is tragic, but the devastation caused to whole communities through aerial bombardments and village burnings is particularly shocking,” said Nicholas Koumjian, Head of the Mechanism. “Our evidence points to a dramatic increase in war crimes and crimes against humanity in the country, with widespread and systematic attacks against civilians, and we are building case files that can be used by courts to hold individual perpetrators responsible.” The Myanmar military has justified aerial bombings, including on schools and monasteries, as attacks against military targets. However, the Mechanism’s evidence indicates that the military should have known, or did know, that large numbers of civilians were present in or around alleged military targets at the time of some of these attacks. The Mechanism’s report explains that under international law, military commanders have a duty to prevent and punish war crimes committed by those under their command and failing to take reasonable measures to prevent and punish these crimes may make the commanders criminally responsible. The Mechanism notes that “repeatedly ignoring such crimes may indicate that the higher authorities intended the commission of these crimes.” In its investigations into the most serious international crimes committed in Myanmar, the Mechanism has collected information from more than 700 sources, including more than 200 eyewitness accounts, and additional evidence such as photographs, videos, audio material, documents, maps, geospatial imagery, social media posts and forensic evidence. The Mechanism continues to actively investigate the violence that led to the large-scale displacement of the Rohingya from Myanmar in 2016 and 2017. In particular, the report stresses the prevalence of sexual and gender-based crimes committed against the Rohingya at this time. “Sexual and gender-based crimes are amongst the most heinous crimes that we are investigating,” said Koumjian. “These were so pervasive during the Rohingya clearance operations that most witnesses we have interviewed have relevant evidence about this.” The Mechanism is sharing evidence, information, and analytical reports with those working on ongoing cases concerning the Rohingya at the International Criminal Court, the International Court of Justice and in Argentina. The Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar (IIMM or Mechanism) was created by the United Nations Human Rights Council in 2018 to collect and analyse evidence of the most serious international crimes and other violations of international law committed in Myanmar since 2011. It aims to facilitate justice and accountability by preserving and organizing this evidence and preparing case files for use in future prosecutions of those responsible in national, regional and international courts..."
Source/publisher: Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar
Date of entry/update: 2023-08-08
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Title: Commentary: Myanmar crisis highlights limits of Indonesia’s 'quiet diplomacy'
Sub-title: Indonesia aspires to be a great regional power and its attempt to play peacemaker in the Myanmar crisis is an early test of how it might fare, says this international relations lecturer.
Description: "BANDUNG, Indonesia: With regional power comes regional responsibilities - as Indonesia is finding out. The world’s fourth most populous nation aspires to be a “great regional power” by 2030, playing a stabilising role in Southeast Asia. It is getting an early taste of what that entails. As the current chair of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Indonesia has been called upon by international bodies, including the United Nations, to show leadership in resolving one of the region’s bloodiest conflict: Myanmar’s civil war. And progress has been slow. As a scholar of international relations and Indonesian foreign policy, I see the nation’s handling of the Myanmar crisis as an early test of how Indonesia could fare as the region’s great power. THE LIMITS OF “QUIET DIPLOMACY” The civil war between the military and the anti-military groups in Myanmar has claimed thousands of lives. It followed a 2021 coup that returned the country to military rule, with the junta embarking on a brutal crackdown of the opposition. Since then, the ruling generals have encountered fierce resistance from armed groups. In April 2021, a few months into the conflict, ASEAN leaders meeting in Indonesia’s capital Jakarta agreed to a Five-Point Consensus on Myanmar, calling for an immediate ceasefire, constructive dialogue between all parties, a special envoy to help mediate the conflict, humanitarian assistance from ASEAN and a delegation visit to Myanmar to facilitate the peace process. More than two years on, the first point of the Five-Point Consensus has still not been implemented, and chances of a ceasefire look remote under the current level of fighting. In May, Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi, responding to criticism over perceived inaction over the crisis, said Indonesia was relying on “quiet diplomacy”. Such a policy forms part of Indonesia’s attempts to balance the nonintervention principal of ASEAN - by which meddling in the domestic affairs of neighbouring states is unacceptable - with the need to address the internal crisis in Myanmar. But efforts to influence the behaviour of another state through discreet negotiations or actions have clearly not yet succeeded. It doesn’t bode well for Indonesia’s desire to be a stabilising factor in the region. In theory, Indonesia should be well placed to assume regional leadership. It is a member of the Group of Twenty (G20) gathering of richest nations and is poised to have the world’s fourth-largest economy within two decades. Its military is ranked the most powerful in the region. Added to this economic and military might is a willingness to assume the role of regional leader. Yet Indonesia’s calls for a ceasefire in Myanmar have fallen on deaf ears, in part because the warring parties know Indonesia is unwilling to punish Myanmar for failing to end the fighting. Any such punitive action would be deemed unacceptable under the ASEAN nonintervention principle..."
Source/publisher: "Channel News Asia" (Singapore)
Date of entry/update: 2023-08-07
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Title: ACLED Regional Overview Asia-Pacific: July 2023
Description: "India: Violence in West Bengal spikes during local elections Political violence in India's West Bengal state escalated substantially during local elections in July, more than doubling compared to the month prior. The increase contributes to 2023 levels of political violence in the state -- already well exceeding the total violence recorded for all of 2022. The increase began in anticipation of the panchayat (village-level government) elections held on 8 July, with violence driven by deadly inter-party clashes. In the weeks leading up to the elections, several candidates were physically prevented by the ruling Trinamool Congress (TMC) from filing nominations, forcing them to file at remote locations.1 Clashes were also reported between TMC and former TMC members who contested the elections as independent politicians. The dominant TMC won decisively, though repolling was held in several locations due to the violence that continued after the election results were announced. The degree to which governance in West Bengal is devolved gives substantial power to the panchayat, which in turn fuels local political contention that lends itself to high levels of violence during panchayat elections in the state.2 Back to Map Japan and South Korea: Planned Fukushima water release leads to increased demonstrations Demonstrations opposing the planned release of treated water from the crippled Fukushima nuclear power plant into the Pacific Ocean increased in Japan and South Korea in July. The treated water was used to cool the damaged reactors after an earthquake and tsunami destroyed the plant in March 2011. The Japanese government is expected to go ahead with the release plan starting in August, arguing that the slow release of the treated water is safe and is needed to allow for the plant's decommissioning.3 Despite a report by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) backing the release plan,4 demonstrators oppose the release, arguing that the treated water is still radioactive and harmful to both humans and the marine environment. There are particular concerns about the potential impact on the fishing industry in the region.5 The issue has led to demonstrations in Japan, as well as in South Korea where a recent survey found 80% of South Koreans oppose the discharge plan.6 Around 90 demonstrations against the release plan were recorded in Japan and South Korea in July, with the overwhelming majority of these events recorded in South Korea. The issue has been taken up by the opposition Democratic Party in South Korea, which organized a mass protest on 1 July to call on the South Korean government to oppose the plan.7 Other countries in the region, including China and some Pacific Island nations, have also condemned the plan, arguing that a consensus needs to be reached among countries in the region regarding the water.8 Back to Map Myanmar: Clashes in Kachin state increase Fighting increased in Myanmar's Kachin state in July, with more than four and a half times the number of battles reported in July compared to June. The increase was driven by clashes between the military and the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) and came after at least 1,000 military junta troops were moved into the region in early July.9 Heavy fighting began on 3 July as the military attempted to seize the village of Nam Sang Yang in Waingmaw township, located near Laiza, the headquarters of the KIA.10 Thousands of locals were forced to flee.11 The fighting continued throughout the month as the KIA defended the area by ambushing military reinforcements arriving from three different directions: Bhamo, Myitkyina, and Waingmaw townships.12 By the end of July, the military had resorted to airstrikes during clashes around Nam Sang Yang.13 Nam Sang Yang is situated on the strategically-important Myitkyina-Bhamo road, which the military aims to gain control over.14 Prior to the coup, fighting had previously flared in the area after the ceasefire between the military and the KIA ended in 2011. Back to Map Myanmar: Ongoing violence against political prisoners Political prisoners in Myanmar faced ongoing violence at the hands of the military junta in prisons across the country in July. In Bago region, the military removed 37 political prisoners from Daik-U Prison (also known as Kyaiksakaw Prison) on 27 June under the pretext of transferring some to Insein Prison and some to Thayarwaddy Prison.15 All 37 political prisoners subsequently went missing. According to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners, at least eight of the 37 missing political prisoners were killed.16 Prison authorities sent letters to the families of the deceased victims in early July stating that the prisoners were shot dead during an attempted escape after a prison transfer van overturned in a road accident. However, the families believe the military used the prison transfer as an excuse to execute them.17 Human rights groups have highlighted the danger for prisoners during such prison transfers.18 The deaths come as anti-coup protests in July marked the one-year anniversary of the executions of four political prisoners, including a former National League for Democracy lawmaker and a well-known pro-democracy activist. Since the coup, the military junta has subjected prisoners, detainees, and prisoners of war to beatings or other forms of severe torture that often results in death. ACLED records over 400 events of violence against individuals in the junta's custody since the coup. However, due to underreporting on the issue, this number is likely far less than the true scale of the violence. Back to Map Thailand: Demonstrations triggered after prime minister vote Despite the Move Forward Party (MFP) winning the 14 May general election, parliament blocked the MFP party leader, Pita Limjaroenrat, from becoming prime minister in July. On 13 July, Pita -- who was nominated by a coalition composed of MFP, the Pheu Thai Party, and other smaller political parties -- failed to secure the majority vote in parliament, before another parliamentary vote blocked any further nomination on 19 July. Simultaneously, Pita was suspended from his position as an MP due to a case involving his shareholding in a media company.19 The votes, along with Pita's suspension from parliament, were condemned by pro-democracy protesters. They called for the resignation of senators, including the 250 senators appointed by the military, accusing them of hindering the democratic process.20 Tensions persist as protestors decry the military's efforts to undermine the democratic mandate granted to the MFP and its coalition partners. Protesters continue to call for senators to resign, coalition unity, and adherence to promised policy proposals, including the MFP's pledge to reform the lèse-majesté law. More than 30 anti-government demonstrations were reported in July. The next vote for prime minister has been postponed until August, with the Constitutional Court reviewing the rejection of Pita's renomination.21..."
Source/publisher: Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project
Date of entry/update: 2023-08-04
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Title: Human Rights Situation weekly update (July 22 to 31, 2023) [EN/MY]
Description: "Human Rights Violations took place in States and Regions from July 22 to 31, 2023 Military Junta Troops launched airstrikes and dropped bombs in Sagaing Region and Shan State from July 22nd to 31st. A woman who died was hitted by a car and arrested by the Military junta in Shwepyitha Township, Yangon Region.Electricity was also cut off at the 31 villages in Kyaukdaga Township, Bago Region. Military Junta troops arrested over 100 civilians and used them as human shields in Sagaing Region and Tanintharyi Region. Also, about 9 civilians were arrested and killed by the Military’s junta in Magway Region and Sagaing Region. Local administrative authorities under the Military Junta troops threatened local people to attend the Pyusawhtee Military training in Kyunhla Township, Sagaing Region. Military Junta imposes Section 144 of the Criminal Procedure Code to impose curfews and restrict gatherings and freedom of movement in Muse TownshiShan State on July 29th. 11 civilians also died from the Military’s heavy and light artillery attacks within a week..."
Source/publisher: Network for Human Rights Documentation-Burma
Date of entry/update: 2023-08-02
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Title: The Myanmar Regime’s Hollow Gestures
Description: "Rumor: Myanmar State Counselor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and President Win Myint have been released from prison by the junta. Fact: Suu Kyi and Win Myint remain behind bars along with their cabinet members and thousands of other political prisoners. Myanmar’s descent into chaos and turmoil continues. The recent partial pardon of Suu Kyi, which saw her total sentence reduced from 33 years to 27 years, is appalling but laughable. Suu Kyi’s former economic adviser Sean Turnell, who was also jailed in Myanmar before his release last year, said it was meaningless. Indeed, they are cowards! On Monday, amid rumors and speculation about the forming of a transitional government and the release of several politicians including Suu Kyi, the regime held a meeting of the National Defense and Security Council (NDSC) and extended the state of emergency. This is the fourth time the regime has done so, violating the charter. But it was joined by all NDSC members, including Vice President Henry Van Thio, who has served continuously as second vice-president under the National League for Democracy government and now the junta. It is just a divide and conquer scheme: Henry Van Thio is also under house arrest. The state of emergency was initially declared in February 2021, when the military ousted the democratically elected government of Suu Kyi. However, the country’s 2008 constitution drafted under the guidance of the military states that an emergency can be declared for an initial period of one year and can “normally” be extended for a maximum of two half-year terms at the discretion of the military-dominated NDSC. The extension means the regime will continue to rule illegally and unleash its terror campaign in Myanmar, where an unprecedented armed rebellion has been taking place since the coup. At the meeting, the junta chief called for increased military operations in Sagaing Region as well as Chin and Kayah states, saying “terrorist” attacks are the worst there. Last week, hundreds of military trucks entered Kayah State, where resistance forces have taken control of the territory. More slaughter and air raids are expected there. Min Aung Hlaing has admitted that the regime has no control over 130 townships, with martial law imposed in nearly 50 townships in Yangon, Mandalay, Sagaing and Magwe regions, as well as Chin and Kayah states. The regime has responded to the growing resistance movement with indiscriminate air strikes, raids and arbitrary killings across the country. As of last week, the junta had killed more than 3,850 people, including those engaged in anti-regime activities and civilians killed in indiscriminate attacks, according to independent watchdogs. World’s tallest Buddha … and most downtrodden people Around the same time that the regime made the announcement that it would reduce Suu Kyi and Win Myint’s sentences, its murderer-in-chief Senior General Min Aung Hlaing offered up another carefully orchestrated news item to confuse the world and the media, holding a lavish ceremony in Naypyitaw to officially bless and open to the public the Maravijaya Buddha image, reportedly the world’s tallest. The gesture is absurd in light of the regime’s record. Since the coup, the Myanmar junta has caused the displacement of over 1.5 million people, scorched at least 70,000 homes, and killed more than 3,747 civilians. Dozens of detained activists and politicians have been executed, some hanged, as there is no rule of law in Myanmar. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, the regime has committed “sexual violence, mass killings, extra-judicial executions, beheadings, dismemberments and mutilations” and created an appalling humanitarian crisis, plunging millions into dire poverty. Millions of people in Myanmar need humanitarian assistance due to the economic crisis sparked by the coup, which has only brought more poverty and distress to the population. But in July, addressing the Human Rights Council in Geneva, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Turk said the military was engaged in a “systematic denial” of humanitarian relief to the millions of civilians in need of help. There is a terrible irony in the regime leaders’ building the tallest Buddha image to show that they are the defenders of the faith in Buddhist-majority Myanmar; the country’s people feel they are the smallest, most defenseless and least protected people in this part of the world. Neighbors making friends with junta The question now is who can act as a broker between the regime and the opposition and apply any pressure? Other than China and Russia, the regime has few friends. In July, Thai Foreign Minister Don Pramudwinai met with Suu Kyi during a secret visit to Naypyitaw, becoming the first international dignitary to be granted permission by the regime to meet her. However, the meeting has caused controversy, as it took place shortly before the start of an Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) foreign ministerial meeting. He described his encounter with Myanmar’s former State Counselor as “a good meeting”, going on to say that, in regards to the current situation in Myanmar, “She encouraged dialogue.” There has been no direct communication from Suu Kyi. The regime’s spokesman said the two met freely for more than one hour. Critics pointed out that Don has no right to speak for Suu Kyi, and no one can verify his claim that she has called for dialogue. The opposition remains fragmented but still wants to bring down the regime, despite having limited resources. Anyone seeking to appease the regime, or harboring the delusion that they can be successful in taming the wolf, will be surprised to see this meaningless and ludicrous gesture from the criminals in Naypyitaw. Last week, Chinese special envoy Deng Xijun arrived in Naypyitaw and met with regime leader Min Aung Hlaing. China is said to be increasingly concerned with the growing instability in Myanmar and was reportedly unhappy with the previous extension of the state of emergency in February. Whenever Beijing sends high-level delegations to Myanmar it is believed that they consistently and repeatedly raise the issue of Suu Kyi and her well-being. Some China-Myanmar watchers have even speculated that China wants to see Min Aung Hlaing removed. If it is true, this largely echoes the opinion of the majority of Myanmar citizens. Who would want to endorse, defend and prop up a murderous regime leader and his cabinet in this region? Nevertheless, China also wants to expand its business activities and resume its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects in Myanmar. This conflict of interest means Beijing cannot be viewed as an honest broker. Time to act It is time for China, the US, the EU, certain Scandinavian countries previously involved in Myanmar’s political transition process, and Myanmar’s neighbors to do more the resolve the country’s deepening crisis. Ironically, the Southeast Asian nation’s location between rivals China and India has so far rendered it more of an international blind spot than a strategic hot spot such as Taiwan or Ukraine. But it is time to wake up: Myanmar’s growing instability is in danger of spreading to its neighbors China, India and Thailand—and beyond, throughout the region. The surge in refugees, insurgency, arms smuggling, organized crime, trafficking, money laundering, online scams, illegal drug production and illicit trade since the coup is in danger of contaminating the whole region. No one in the region can escape Myanmar’s crisis. It will only get worse if we fail to stop it. All players should demand the immediate release of Suu Kyi and other detained leaders of the ousted government, as well as elected MPs and all other political prisoners. They should never have been put in prison in the first place. Western governments should continue to impose targeted sanctions and arms embargoes on military enterprises, junta leaders’ families and associated crony businessmen. Across ASEAN, elected MPs, prominent politicians, institutions, and civil society groups should keep up the pressure on their governments to do more on the Myanmar crisis, and continue to pressure companies that are assisting the regime. If ASEAN and the international community want to see a restoration of stability and peace in Myanmar, it is time to increase—not reduce—the pressure on the regime and support the democratic opposition..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update: 2023-08-02
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Title: Attacks on Health Care in Myanmar (12-25 July 2023)
Description: "Documented incidents 12 July 2023: At an IDP camp near former Daw Noe Ku village, Shadaw township, Loikaw district, Kayah state, a newly-built local clinic, a school, and some civilian houses were damaged in airstrikes conducted by the Myanmar military; one civilian was killed and three injured. Sources: Delta News Agency, Kantarawaddy Times and Radio Free Asia 12 July 2023: In Ye-U town and township, Shwebo district, Sagaing region, the local resistance forces used a drone armed with explosives to drop bombs on the traditional medicine hospital to attack the Myanmar military occupying the hospital. The drone was shot down by the Myanmar military. Source: Telegram 15 July 2023: In Ye-U town and township, Shwebo district, Sagaing region, the local resistance forces used a drone armed with explosives to drop bombs on the traditional medicine hospital to attack the Myanmar military occupying the hospital, reportedly injuring six soldiers. Sources: Khit Thit Media and Myaelatt Athan 16 July 2023: In Ye-U town and township, Sagaing region, the local resistance forces used a drone armed with explosives to drop bombs on the traditional medicine hospital to attack the Myanmar military occupying the hospital. Source: Myanmar Pressphoto Agency 16 July 2023: Near Mar Le Taw village and village tract, Sagaing township, district, and region, an ambulance transporting wounded junta soldiers was damaged when it was attacked by the local resistance forces using remote-controlled mines. Sources: Khit Thit Media, Myaelatt Athan and Myanmar Pressphoto Agency 19 July 2023: In Kawkareik town, township, and district, Kayin state, an artillery shell landed in the compound of a hospital but did not explode during an attack by a joint force of an ethnic armed organisations Klohhtoobor Karen Organisation and local resistance forces on junta security forces stationed at the hospital and checkpoints in this town. The hospital was functioning at the time of the attack. Sources: Eleven Media, Khit Thit Media and Popular News Journal 20 July 2023: In Pa Dar Nyay village, Nwar La Woe village tract, Loikaw township and district, Kayah state, three civilians who were wounded by artillery fires by the Myanmar military were not allowed to leave the village to seek health care as part of a continuous blockade on the area. Source: Myanmar Pressphoto Agency 21 July 2023: In Hpakant town and township, Mohnyin district, Kachin state, an artillery shell landed in the compound of the township hospital during armed clashes between the Myanmar military and a joint force of the KIA and local resistance forces. The hospital was functioning at the time of the attack. Source: VOA Burmese 22 July 2023: In Inn Da Rant village, Pa Lway Shwe village tract, Katha township and district, Sagaing region, a pharmacy and over 20 civilian houses were torched by the Myanmar military. Source: Khit Thit Media 22 July 2023: In Khin-U town and township, Shwebo district, Sagaing region, the local resistance forces attacked the Myanmar military and militia based at the township hospital, using firearms. The hospital was not functioning at the time of the attack. Around 40 soldiers have occupied this hospital for around one year before this attack. Sources: Democratic Voice of Burma, Khit Thit Media and Mizzima 23 July 2023: In Wetlet town and township, Shwebo district, Sagaing region, the local resistance forces used two drones armed with explosives to drop bombs on the traditional medicine hospital to attack the Myanmar military and militia occupying the hospital. The hospital was not functioning at the time of the attack. The town’s fire brigade office and police station were also attacked with armed drones. The attack reportedly killed at least two junta security force members and injured seven. Sources: Democratic Voice of Burma, Khit Thit Media and Myaelatt Athan 24 July 2023: In Myeik town, township, and district, Tanintharyi region, the local resistance forces issued a warning to five LNGOs forbidding them from delivering aid to or cooperation with the Myanmar military, accusing the LNGOs of using the vehicles to transport junta’s weapons. The LNGOs denied the accusation. Sources: Mizzima and Tanintharyi Times..."
Source/publisher: Insecurity Insight (Geneva) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of entry/update: 2023-08-01
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Title: Aung San Suu Kyi receives partial pardon from Myanmar's military junta but to stay under house arrest
Sub-title: Sky News understands the clemency will not fully pardon ousted civilian leader Aung San Suu Kyi - and that five charges against her have been dropped, while 14 remain.
Description: "Myanmar's junta says it has pardoned ousted civilian leader Aung San Suu Kyi for some of the offences she denies - more than two years after she was detained as part of a military coup. Sky News understands the clemency will not fully pardon her and that five charges have been dropped, while 14 remain. The Nobel laureate, who last week moved from prison to house arrest in the capital, Naypyitaw, has been in detention since the military seized power in a coup in early 2021. According to local media, Ms Suu Kyi was taken to a government building last Monday. She had spent a year in solitary confinement. However, speaking on Tuesday morning, her youngest son Kim Aris told Sky News: "It's important to take any news with a healthy level of scepticism. "Few days ago it was rumoured she was moved to home arrest. Sources suggest to me that she's still in prison." He added: "Also, given that all the charges against my mother are without any substance, any reduction in her sentence is completely meaningless. Ms Suu Kyi is appealing against the convictions for various offences ranging from incitement and election fraud to corruption. The 78-year-old denies all of the charges. Myanmar Radio and Television reported the pardons on Tuesday but an informed source said she would remain in detention. "She won't be free from house arrest," said the source, who declined to be identified due to the sensitivity of the issue, according to Reuters news agency. Read more from Stuart Ramsay for Sky News: Getting inside Myanmar was a risk worth taking Former President Win Myint also had his sentence reduced as part of the clemency granted to more than 7,000 prisoners, which reportedly saw prison terms reduced in a religious ceremony. The head of Myanmar's military council, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, granted the clemency order to reduce the sentences in five cases against Ms Suu Kyi in which she was convicted for violating coronavirus restrictions, illegally importing and possessing walkie-talkies and sedition, according to a report on state MRTV. The clemency was announced a day after Myanmar's military extended the state of emergency it imposed when it seized power from Ms Suu Kyi's elected government, forcing a further delay in elections it promised when it took over. Ms Suu Kyi, the daughter of Myanmar's independence hero, was first put under house arrest in 1989 after huge protests against decades of military rule. In 1991, she won the Nobel Peace Prize for campaigning for democracy but was only fully released from house arrest in 2010. She won the 2015 election, held as part of tentative military reforms that were brought to a halt by the 2021 coup..."
Source/publisher: "Sky News" (London)
Date of entry/update: 2023-08-01
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Title: In a meaningless gesture, Myanmar’s junta cuts Aung San Suu Kyi’s sentence
Sub-title: The leaders of the deposed democratic government shouldn’t be in jail at all.
Description: "Myanmar’s generals have long demonstrated an extraordinary capacity to remember everything, and to learn nothing. Sometimes this serves them well. Much of the world, when it thinks of Myanmar at all, neither remembers nor learns. So on Tuesday we see an announcement by Myanmar’s ruling junta that it is to reduce the prison sentences of some key officials of the democratic government it overthrew in February 2021. Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, State Counsellor of the government elected in a landslide in November 2020, had six years shaved off her 33-year sentence. Myanmar’s deposed President, U Win Myint, saw his sentence reduced by four years. Reductions in the sentences of other political prisoners are also likely in the offing. The sentence reductions come one day after the military junta extended the state of emergency under which it claims to rule, by a further six months. This was the fourth such extension, and in breach of its own constitution that limits such extensions to two. The junta is weakened by its inability to surmount the opposition to its rule, and even the extreme brutality it has resorted to has done little to consolidate control. Cynics, the ignorant, the gullible, and various vested interests in military rule in Myanmar will loudly exclaim this news as a positive development signifying real change. It is not. Neither Daw Suu, President Win Myint, nor any of the other political prisoners being ill-treated in Myanmar’s awful jails should be there at all. The charges they were convicted on are absurd, the judicial processes under which they were reached a travesty. This is all out of an old playbook in Myanmar. The junta is weakened by its inability to surmount the opposition to its rule, and even the extreme brutality it has resorted to has done little to consolidate control. Beyond Russia and (sometimes) China, the junta is without friends. Running out of foreign exchange, of troops to sacrifice, and of ideas beyond base instincts, the junta is attempting an old public relations game and hoping an exhausted and distracted world might fall for it. The past two-and-a-half-years of military rule in Myanmar has brought about unprecedented destruction, the death of thousands and the displacement of three million. Neighbouring countries once more host desperate refugees from Myanmar. Myanmar’s economy is in a state of collapse, with most people (in rural areas especially) reduced to little more than subsistence. The country has become a base for criminality – partly via the dramatic reinvigoration of the country as a producer of narcotics, partly via new cyber-crime hubs that constitute surely the one and only area of innovation in the country. Myanmar’s problems will not be solved by reducing the prison sentences on people who should never have been sentenced in the first place. Real change is possible in Myanmar, but it will not come from applauding meaningless gestures, as attractive as they might be as “click-bait”. As with such online temptations broadly, best not to hit the like button until there is truly something to be happy about..."
Source/publisher: "The Interpreter"
Date of entry/update: 2023-08-01
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Title: India-Myanmar border: Escalating human trafficking concerns
Sub-title: The instability in Myanmar has created a conducive environment for human trafficking at the India-Myanmar border with IT workers being made victims to it
Description: "The political upheaval in Myanmar following the military coup in February 2021 has created a complex and precarious situation for human trafficking between India and Myanmar. India shares a 1,642-km porous border with Myanmar. The instability, unrest, and power struggles within Myanmar have given rise to criminal syndicates that exploit vulnerable individuals and profit from illicit activities. As stated by V Muraleedharan, the Minister of State for External Affairs, more than 400 Indian men in fraudulent IT jobs are stuck in Myanmar. This issue was also highlighted by the recent tweet by Indian External Affairs Minister, Dr. S Jaishankar, after a meeting with his Myanmar counterpart H.E. U Than Swe during the Mekong Ganga Cooperation (MGC) gathering in Bangkok on 16 July. Concerns about human and drug trafficking were emphasised, calling for stronger collaboration among relevant parties to ensure the prompt return of trafficked victims. The instability, unrest, and power struggles within Myanmar have given rise to criminal syndicates that exploit vulnerable individuals and profit from illicit activities. To understand this concern, there is a need to examine the deteriorating human trafficking conditions along the India-Myanmar border post-coup and the challenges faced by authorities in combating this growing menace. Employment scam One of the most significant trends observed in post-coup human trafficking is the promise of fake IT occupations in Thailand, with salaries that seem too good to be true. According to reports, the syndicates’ modus operandi involves enticing IT-skilled youths with the promise of lucrative data entry careers in Thailand, with monthly salaries ranging from US$5,000 to US$8,000. These attractive job opportunities are advertised on social media platforms and through recruiting agents based in Dubai and India. The “recruits” (mostly belonging to the Indian state of Tamil Nadu) are then transported to Thailand using the visa-on-arrival facility. Upon arrival, they are taken to Mae Sot in Tak Province. Under the cover of night, they are made to cross the Moei River to illegally enter Myawaddy. Once in this remote bordering state, they are coerced into working as scammers within the facilities set up by the syndicates. One of the most significant trends observed in post-coup human trafficking is the promise of fake IT occupations in Thailand, with salaries that seem too good to be true. Fortunately, a significant number of those held captive have managed to maintain communication, and authorities are in contact with them. The harrowing tales of the rescued victims about not being provided proper food, sleep, or sanitary conditions have been quite disturbing. They were overworked and severely punished for not meeting appropriate targets. Challenges faced by Indian authorities The Indian government, particularly the Ministry of External Affairs, is confronted with multifaceted challenges in addressing human trafficking issues. The Myawaddy region, where the trafficking issue is the worst, is located within Myanmar’s Kayin province which shares a border with Thailand. In this remote area, armed militia groups hold greater control, limiting the influence of Myanmar’s military government. As a result, New Delhi encounters numerous intricate challenges in its efforts to rescue the stranded Indians. The lack of cooperation from the Myanmar authorities due to the ongoing political crisis hampers effective collaboration in tackling this issue. Additionally, the vast and difficult terrain along the border poses challenges in patrolling and securing the area adequately. Despite the daunting challenges, Indian authorities, along with the Indian missions in Bangkok and Yangon, have been actively working to rescue the victims and repatriate them to India. The collaboration between different agencies and law enforcement bodies has resulted in the successful rescue of 292 individuals who have been brought back to India through repatriation efforts. However, many still remain trapped. The Myawaddy region, where the trafficking issue is the worst, is located within Myanmar’s Kayin province which shares a border with Thailand. Bureaucratic and administrative delays also remain a major concern. The process usually involves the rescued victims crossing into Thailand. Upon reaching Thailand, the Thai armed forces detain them due to their illegal entry since the captives lack proper travel documentation to enter Myanmar, and their return to Thailand is also not legally recognised. As a result, Indian diplomats are faced with the challenging task of persuading the relevant authorities to recognise those rescued from Myanmar as victims of a human smuggling racket. This process involves extensive time and documentation efforts. Points of deliberation Enhancing collaboration between border control agencies and establishing direct communication channels between India and Myanmar can serve as a potent strategy to combat trafficking in persons and foster cross-border and regional cooperation. This was the very reason for the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) that was signed between India and Myanmar in 2019 for enhancing bilateral cooperation on the prevention, rescue, recovery, and repatriation of persons who have been trafficked. However, the toppling of the civilian government made it difficult to understand whether the military government will honour the MoU and the clauses set within it that includes ensuring speedy investigation and prosecution of traffickers and organised crime syndicates in either country, and also setting up Working Groups/ Task Forces to make efforts to prevent human trafficking. The solidification of legal frameworks to tackle trafficking also needs to be ensured. While both nations have enacted laws that criminalise trafficking and protect victims and have also ratified international conventions related to human trafficking, the current political instability hinders proper and prompt measures to ensure the safety and protection of trafficked victims. In this regard, improved coordination between India and Myanmar’s law enforcement agencies is essential to effectively combat trafficking. Joint operations and intelligence sharing can help intercept traffickers and rescue victims. While both nations have enacted laws that criminalise trafficking and protect victims and have also ratified international conventions related to human trafficking, the current political instability hinders proper and prompt measures to ensure the safety and protection of trafficked victims. Additionally, raising awareness about the risks of trafficking and educating potential victims about the signs of exploitation are crucial steps in combating this issue. A delay in the publication of the advisory on fake IT jobs was noted and, thus, such negligence in the future needs to be addressed. Dissemination of reliable information is critical to restrict the spread of trafficking networks from preying on individuals. Alongside rescue efforts, it is equally important to provide rehabilitation and support to the victims to help them reintegrate into society and rebuild their lives after such traumatic experiences. Proper psychological evaluation and treatment will be essential in this regard. Addressing this complex issue requires concerted efforts from both India and Myanmar, along with international cooperation, to ensure the safety and well-being of the victims and to combat this grave violation of human rights..."
Source/publisher: Observer Research Foundation
Date of entry/update: 2023-08-01
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Title: Myanmar junta pardons some Suu Kyi offences, but former leader still faces decades in detention
Description: "(CNN )— Myanmar’s ruling military junta has pardoned Aung San Suu Kyi on five charges for which she was previously convicted, reducing the lengthy sentences handed down to the deposed, democratically elected leader after generals seized control of the Southeast Asian nation. The pardon was announced by Aung Lin Dwe, the secretary of the regime’s governing body, and further details were confirmed by a source with direct knowledge of the case. The five charges pardoned include offenses against defamation, natural disaster laws, export and import laws and the country’s telecommunication law, the source told CNN. Myanmar’s military spokesperson Zaw Min Tun said Suu Kyi’s jail sentence would be reduced by six years, he said speaking to the media on camera on Tuesday. It’s unclear how many years Suu Kyi now faces in prison. The source CNN earlier spoke to with direct knowledge of the case said her sentence had been reduced by 9 years on Tuesday, and that there were prior reductions already made to the amount of time she would have to serve. Nonetheless Suu Kyi still faces the prospect of decades without liberty, an outcome that has permeated her long political career trying to bring democracy to Myanmar. As of the end of 2022, the 78-year-old faced a total of 33 years in jail, including three years of hard labor, for multiple convictions including electoral fraud and receiving bribes. Suu Kyi led Myanmar for five years before being forced from power and detained after her party was re-elected in a landslide election against military-backed opposition. Army general Min Aung Hlaing seized power at that time in February 2021, ending Myanmar’s brief experiment with democracy, imprisoning multiple opposition figures and plunging the impoverished Southeast Asian nation into a raging civil conflict that continues to this day. Battles between the military and resistance groups unfold daily across the country. Airstrikes and ground attacks on what the military calls “terrorist” targets occur regularly and have killed thousands of civilians, often including children, according to monitoring groups. Whole villages have been burned down by junta soldiers and schools, clinics and hospitals destroyed as a result of the attacks, according to local monitoring groups. Suu Kyi, who spent decades under house arrest during a previous military junta and has been a symbol of opposition to decades of military rule, has denied all of the charges levied against her – and rights groups and international observers say her convictions are politically motivated. As of Tuesday, Suu Kyi still faces sentences for 14 other offenses of which she was convicted, the source said. The announcement comes as Myanmar’s Supreme Court is set to hear appeals by Suu Kyi against multiple convictions over the next two weeks. The source told CNN those appeals will still go ahead. The United Nations Security Council last year called on the junta to release all political prisoners, including Suu Kyi and former President Win Myint..."
Source/publisher: "CNN" (USA)
Date of entry/update: 2023-08-01
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Title: Press Release: Myanmar (August 1, 2023)
Description: "France takes note of the announcement regarding the partial pardon granted to State Counselor Aung San Suu Kyi and President Win Myint. France renews its call for the release of all of the individuals being arbitrarily detained, in keeping with UN Security Council Resolution 2669. The ongoing detention of nearly 20,000 political prisoners does not allow the will of the Myanmar people to be sincerely, freely expressed, nor does it allow for a good-faith political process that includes all of the stakeholders, in line with ASEAN’s Five-Point Consensus, for which France once again offers its support. This process must include the National Unity Government; the historic leaders of the National League for Democracy, including State Counselor Aung San Suu Kyi; and the ethnic organizations..."
Source/publisher: French Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Date of entry/update: 2023-08-01
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Title: Burma Military Regime’s Ongoing State of Emergency
Description: "The United States is deeply concerned by the Burma military regime’s extension of the state of emergency, which comes as the regime plunges the country deeper into violence and instability. Since overthrowing a democratically elected government two and a half years ago, the military regime has carried out hundreds of airstrikes, burned down tens of thousands of homes, and displaced more than 1.6 million people. The regime’s widespread brutality and disregard for the democratic aspirations of the people of Burma continue to prolong the crisis. The United States will continue to work with our partners and allies to apply political and economic tools to hold the regime accountable. We continue to call for it to end its violence and atrocities, release those unjustly detained, allow unhindered humanitarian access, seek justice for survivors, and engage with all stakeholders to pursue a peaceful, just, and democratic future for Burma..."
Source/publisher: U.S. Department of State
Date of entry/update: 2023-07-31
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Title: Myanmar junta extends state of emergency, forcing delay to elections
Sub-title: Military-controlled government seemingly needs more time to organise new vote as it tackles protests and armed resistance
Description: "Myanmar’s military-controlled government has extended the state of emergency it imposed when the army seized power from an elected government in 2021, forcing a further delay in elections it promised when it took over. MRTV television said the National Defense and Security Council met on Monday in the capital, Naypyidaw, and extended the state of emergency for another six months starting on Tuesday because time is needed to prepare for the elections. The NDSC is nominally a constitutional government body, but in practice is controlled by the military. The announcement amounted to an admission that the army does not exercise enough control to stage the polls and has failed to subdue widespread opposition to military rule, which includes increasingly challenging armed resistance as well as nonviolent protests and civil disobedience, despite the army having a huge advantage in manpower and weapons. The state of emergency was declared when troops arrested Aung San Suu Kyi and top officials from her government and members of her National League for Democracy party on 1 February 2021. The takeover reversed years of progress toward democracy after five decades of military rule in Myanmar. The military said it seized power because of fraud in the last general election held in November 2020, in which Suu Kyi’s party won a landslide victory while the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development party did poorly. Independent election observers said they did not find any major irregularities. The army takeover was met with widespread peaceful protests that security forces suppressed with lethal force, triggering armed resistance that UN experts have described as a civil war. As of Monday, 3,857 people have been killed by the security forces since the takeover, according to a tally kept by the independent Assistance Association for Political Prisoners. The army-enacted 2008 constitution allows the military to rule the country under a state of emergency for one year, with two possible six-month extensions if preparations are not yet completed for new polls, meaning that the time limit expired on 31 January this year. However, the NDSC allowed the military government to extend emergency rule for another six months in February, saying the country remained in an abnormal situation. The announcement on Monday is the fourth extension. The state of emergency allows the military to assume all government functions, giving the head of the ruling military council, Senior Gen Min Aung Hlaing, legislative, judicial and executive powers. Nay Phone Latt, a spokesperson for the National Unity Government, an underground group that calls itself the country’s legitimate government and serves as an opposition umbrella group, said the extension of emergency rule was expected because the military government hasn’t been able to annihilate the pro-democracy forces. “The junta extended the state of emergency because the generals have a lust for power and don’t want to lose it. As for the revolutionary groups, we will continue to try to speed up our current revolutionary activities,” Nay Phone Latt said in a message on Monday. Monday’s report did not specify when the polls might be held, saying only that they would occur after the goals of the state of emergency are accomplished..."
Source/publisher: "The Guardian" (UK)
Date of entry/update: 2023-07-31
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Title: ASEAN must exclude Myanmar junta from all joint military exercises, Southeast Asian MPs say
Description: "JAKARTA – Parliamentarians from Southeast Asia expressed their grave concern today that ASEAN countries are still scheduled to hold counter-terrorism military exercises with the Myanmar junta in August and September. They called on ASEAN to exclude the illegal junta from all joint military exercises held by the regional bloc. “It would be utterly absurd for ASEAN countries to join the Myanmar junta in military exercises when the junta has consistently shown a lack of political will or interest in abiding by the Five-Point Consensus, notably ‘the immediate cessation of violence’,” ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights (APHR) Chair and member of the Indonesian House of Representatives Mercy Barends said today. “It is especially galling that these exercises are purportedly for counter-terrorism purposes as the junta has branded the democratically-elected National Unity Government and the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, as well as the People’s Defense Forces and various other pro-democracy entities, as terrorists,” said Barends. According to statements from the Russian Ministry of Defense as well as documents from ASEAN’s website, the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM+) Experts Working Group on Counter Terrorism is planning to hold a tabletop exercise in Myanmar in August as well as a field exercise in Russia in September. Myanmar and Russia have chaired this working group since 2021, following their appointment in 2020. “These exercises would only serve to increase the junta’s capacity to continue its campaign of murder and terror against the people of Myanmar. ASEAN must be unified in their condemnation of the escalating human rights situation and take action which makes clear that the Myanmar junta’s atrocities are unacceptable. One way to do this is by canceling these exercises and excluding the junta from all future joint military exercises and defense meetings,” said Barends. “If ASEAN as a bloc refuses to do this, then we call on ASEAN and ADMM+ countries to follow the example of the United States, Australia and New Zealand and boycott the training.”..."
Source/publisher: ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights
Date of entry/update: 2023-07-28
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Title: Myanmar’s revolution against repression
Description: "Myanmar moves from military coup to a civil war that is now a revolution. The junta’s bungled effort to turn the clock back by seizing power in February 2021 has been a bloody fiasco. The regime ‘controls’ less than half of Myanmar: it’s ‘too unpopular to control the countryside, yet too powerful to yield the cities’. And much of that ‘control’ is contested. Unable to impose its will, the junta is mired in failure—in its operations, its understanding and its standing. Calling it a ‘junta’ may be too kind, suggesting military competence and political dominance. Perhaps ‘mafia regime’ is closer. Myanmar’s wicked tragedy has completed the military’s journey from revered institution to reviled enemy. The extent of the regime’s failure on so many fronts is one of the few firm facts amid the fog of Myanmar’s war. While it still has the strongest military force (equipment, firepower and control of the air), the junta is fighting ‘on an unprecedented number of fronts’. The International Institute for Strategic Studies reports that the conflict rages in seven theatres which can be grouped into three categories: borderland resistance strongholds (southeast Myanmar, Kachin State and northwest Myanmar) central contested areas (the Dry Zone and lower Myanmar) non-aligned areas (Shan and Rakhine states). The conflict has blown away the old coup script (roll tanks, imprison politicians, enjoy power). Instead, the coup grasped government but not the country, sparking a war that proclaims revolutionary change. The shift ‘from coup to revolution’ was the title and theme of the annual Myanmar Update, a two-day conference at the Australian National University: ‘The military’s violent crackdown on what was initially a peaceful popular uprising provoked a near-countrywide revolutionary movement, which has brought together an array of different political, ethnic, and religious groups fighting for the shared goal of ending military rule.’ Chairing the politics session, an eminence of Australia’s study of Myanmar, Andrew Selth, quoted one of literature’s greatest opening lines: ‘It was the best of times, it was the worst of times, it was the age of wisdom, it was the age of foolishness, it was the epoch of belief, it was the epoch of incredulity, it was the season of Light, it was the season of Darkness, it was the spring of hope, it was the winter of despair …’ As Selth noted, Charles Dickens’s writing about the French revolution describes much about Myanmar’s revolution. My version of the big questions that confront Myanmar involves opposed scenarios: Will the revolt overthrow the military regime and remake the nation? Or will Myanmar fly apart, fragmenting along the fault lines of all those conflicts? The government-in-exile, the National Unity Government (NUG), offers a vision of federation, not fragmentation. The NUG’s foreign minister, Daw Zin Mar Aung, told the conference that the military can no longer win with its old divide-and-rule tactics: ‘This is no longer about the coup. It’s not about the military.’ She said the military was losing to the NUG’s vision of federalism, to move closer to the people and ‘undo the wrongs of the past’. The NUG’s representative to Australia, Tun Aug Shwe, told the conference that protests against the military in previous decades had aimed for dialogue and negotiation, release of political prisoners and parliamentary elections. Today, the revolution has two demands: ‘Eliminate the military leadership from Myanmar soil forever. Second, build the genuine federal democracy in Myanmar. Very focused. So previous revolution focused on the process level. But today people focus on the outcome, the end result.’ Myanmar’s military is smaller than commonly thought, according to an analysis by Ye Myo Hein, a global fellow at the Wilson Center. Dismissing estimates of a military headcount of 300,000 to 400,000, his alternative estimate of 150,000 personnel is ‘based on extensive interviews with military deserters and defectors, analysis of internal military directives and meeting notes, historical records of troop movements and sizes, and casualty counts from primary conflict data and military hospital records’. Ye Myo Hein concludes that of those 150,000 personnel, ‘roughly 70,000 are combat soldiers. At least 21,000 service members have been lost through casualties, desertion and defection since the coup. At this troop level, the Sit-Tat [military] is barely able to sustain itself as a fighting force, much less a government.’ Ye Mo Hein told the conference that the military can’t crush the resistance so it’s preparing for an ‘enduring and protracted war’ by seeking to tighten control over urban areas and strategic routes, launch frequent forays into resistance areas, and ‘divide and conquer’. He says that if neither side can achieve a ‘decisive victory’, Myanmar could shatter into a series of warring states: ‘If the regime remains in power, the conflict will drag and Myanmar could face a political black hole, potentially leading to balkanisation. While no signs of balkanisation are visible yet, the possibility cannot be ruled out if the conflict persists and political agreement remains elusive.’ The military has ceded ground and legitimacy. The regime has proved it can’t win. What’s yet to be established is if it can lose. Myanmar’s revolution has changed much. But it faces the opposed futures that Dickens identified in another era: ‘[W]e had everything before us, we had nothing before us, we were all going direct to Heaven, we were all going direct the other way.’..."
Source/publisher: Australian Strategic Policy Institute
Date of entry/update: 2023-07-28
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Title: Opinion - First came a bloody massacre. Then the junta silenced the mourners.
Description: "First came a bloody massacre. Then came digital snitches, arrests and prison — for those who mourned the deaths. On the morning of April 11, in a rural village in central Myanmar, a crowd gathered to celebrate the opening of a new administration building, built by the armed resistance to the military junta ruling the country. Suddenly, a military jet dropped two 500-pound bombs, one of them directly onto the villagers. When rescuers came to help the wounded, a combat helicopter sprayed the area with gunfire. In the evening, a military jet fighter conducted another airstrike. More than 175 civilians were killed, including more than 40 children, in the massacre at Pazi Gyi, the bloodiest day in the war between the military junta that seized power more than two years ago and the resistance. Word of the massacre spread rapidly on social media. On the same day, a young man, Willi Phyo, who lived in Mandalay and was a supporter of the resistance, changed his Facebook photo to black in sympathy for the victims. His protest was noticed by a channel on the social media platform Telegram. The channel is run by Han Nyein Oo, a pro-military social media figure, who acts as a spotter of dissent. It posted photos of Mr. Phyo, and pointed out to the authorities how to find him: “He lives on the ground floor of an apartment in front of elementary school, No. 17, 14th Street, 86th Street,” the Telegram channel reported. The Telegram channel also called out a television actress, Myat Thu Thu, who announced on Facebook that she would no longer live stream, out of grief for the villagers. Similarly, it called out a pop singer, May La Thanzin, who goes by “May Melody” and had posted a message of sorrow on a black background after the bombing. The next day, Ko Phyo was arrested. Then the actress and the pop singer were arrested. The pattern was repeated and again, all over the country, according to Radio Free Asia, which has compiled cases and provided details to The Post. The Telegram channel was a snitch line, tattling to the military junta about people who speak their minds online. The crackdown in Myanmar, or Burma, shows once again how authoritarian regimes are turning the digital revolution to their own ends. Once there was hope the internet would become a global force for freedom and openness. In some ways, it has. But it also has shown a dark underside as a tool of dictatorship. Follow Editorial Board's opinions Follow The Burmese generals seized power on Feb. 1, 2021, from a democratic government led by Nobel Peace Prize winner Aung San Suu Kyi, whose party had won a resounding victory in parliamentary elections the previous November. After months of peaceful protests, democratic forces coalesced into armed resistance. The ragtag resistance has been fighting an intense war with the military ever since, shoulder to shoulder with ethnic militias also fighting the army. The junta has responded with unremitting force to put down protest and resistance, attacking civilians from the air, burning down villages and killing thousands of innocent people. Some 24,005 people have been arrested for opposition to the junta, and 19,618 are still detained. The military has turned Myanmar back into a dictatorship, cutting short a brief and incomplete flowering of democracy. In a previous editorial in this series, we detailed how young people around the world were imprisoned by authoritarian regimes for merely posting freely on social media. This editorial adds a grim case study from Myanmar, where a digital war is being fought on top of a shooting war. The young pop singer, Ms. Thanzin, on July 7 posted a new profile picture, a real photo, her first post since April, to the relief of her fans. “Missing you,” she wrote to her 7.5 million followers. Telegram is widely used around the world to avoid snooping by authoritarian regimes. The founder, Pavel Durov, a reclusive Russian entrepreneur, had first created Vkontakte, a hugely popular Russian social media platform that looked like Facebook. It was subsequently taken over by oligarchs close to the Kremlin when Mr. Durov resisted taking down pages of opposition leader Alexei Navalny. Mr. Durov and his brother Nikolai then created Telegram in 2013 to be a secure, ad-free messaging app, and its popularity soared. Mr. Durov fled Russia in 2014. He now lives in Dubai. In 2018, the Russian authorities demanded that Mr. Durov turn over encryption keys to Telegram, seeking information about Ukrainian users. He refused. Russia’s internet censor, Roskomnadzor, launched a two-year effort to block the platform online, but failed. Mr. Durov’s defiance enhanced the platform’s reputation as a haven against dictatorship. Telegram now has more than 800 million active users and is second in popularity only to WhatsApp in online messenger apps. Mr. Durov wrote in a blog post in 2021, “Telegram is the first app to stand up to and, if necessary, pick a fight with a government.” He added in April, “Telegram’s mission is to preserve privacy and freedom of speech around the world.” The company says Telegram “played a prominent role in pro-democracy movements around the world, including in Iran, Russia, Belarus, Myanmar and Hong Kong.” Telegram says communications between users are completely private, but channels — such as the one in Myanmar — are public. In these channels, Telegram says it will take down content that is deemed illegal, such as pornography or advocacy of violence and terrorism. However, it will not remove material that reflects free speech. Telegram declares on its website: “For example, if criticizing the government is illegal in some country, Telegram won’t be a part of such politically motivated censorship. This goes against our founders’ principles. While we do block terrorist (e.g. ISIS-related) bots and channels, we will not block anybody who peacefully expresses alternative opinions.” Mr. Durov posted about Telegram’s mission on his channel, “In the past, countries like China, Iran and Russia have banned Telegram due to our principled stance on the matter of human rights. Such events, while unfortunate, are still preferable to the betrayal of our users and the beliefs we were founded on.” In Myanmar, though, the snitch channel is using Telegram to suppress free speech — by alerting the authorities to criticism. We asked Telegram whether this is consistent with Mr. Durov’s lofty principles. They replied that Telegram would remove “doxing” content when notified by users. Telegram is a magnet for users — Mr. Durov says more than 2.5 million users sign up every day — because it combines private messaging to individuals and groups, including a popular “secret chats” function, with public channels that can reach huge numbers of users all at once. It is also fast. This makes it appealing not only to those fighting for democracy but also to authoritarian regimes and their allies. Russian officials, including Russian President Vladimir Putin’s spokesman, Dmitry Peskov, use Telegram, the app they once tried to shut down. When the Russian invasion of Ukraine began, Telegram became the main channel for pro-Kremlin military bloggers to support the war. When the mercenary chieftain Yevgeniy Prigozhin began to complain in public about shortcomings of the Russian military, he broadcast his tirades in audio messages posted to Telegram and heard by millions. He also broadcast about his short-lived mutiny in June on the platform. Dictators constantly fear they will be overthrown. The digital age has brought them plenty of tools to cling to power. They can use online means to propagandize, to flood the zone of information, and they can pressure or change ownership of platforms to control the message. Dictators can also use force to coerce and block objectionable platforms or sites, or to erect barriers, such as China’s Great Firewall. They have the power to muster cyberwarriors to infiltrate the devices of their opponents, spy on them and to attack or destroy them. They can erect elaborate surveillance mechanisms to track people’s movements at the grocery store — or at a protest. They can reach beyond their own borders. But one of the most valuable tools an autocrat can have is the ability to zoom down to a granular level to locate individuals at odds with the regime. That is what the Myanmar Telegram channel is doing — picking out opponents one by one. Facebook has some 20 million users in Myanmar, a country of 53.8 million people. For many, Facebook is the whole internet, a source of news and information as well as social posting. The material gathered by Radio Free Asia shows that many of those who spoke out against the government did so on Facebook accounts. It is an enduring risk in dictatorships; those who are brave enough to speak out on social media also expose themselves — they put a target on their own back. The Telegram snitch line in Myanmar today has 54,500 subscribers. Informers are instructed where to send their report, and to “please make sure the address is accurate.” In war-torn Myanmar, details about arrests are sparse. But according to Radio Free Asia, in most high-profile cases, the charge leveled is based on Section 505-A of the penal code, alleging state defamation, sedition, incitement of public unrest and aiding “terrorism” by supporting pro-democracy groups, which were outlawed by the military junta as “terrorist organizations.” Some of the high-profile arrests are made public by the regime to instill fear in the population. After the massacre at Pazi Gyi, on April 19 a Burmese woman, Nilar Win, wrote in a Facebook post that she felt sorry for the victims of the massacre. The Han Nyein Oo Telegram channel soon posted screenshots of her lament — and asked the police for her arrest. She was arrested that day. The next day, Moe Htet, who owns a photography studio in Yangon, shared pictures of the airstrike victims online. She also changed her Facebook profile to black in mourning. The Han Hyein Oo Telegram channel urged the police to arrest her, providing screenshots of her post and providing her address. She was arrested. Also in Yangon, Cho Wint Mar Zaw spoke out in a Facebook post, expressing sympathy to families of the survivors of the massacre. The Telegram channel spotted her — and put her photo on the channel and asked authorities to detain her. She was arrested the next day, April 23. In May, the hunt snared a popular hip-hop singer, Byu Har, the son of a prominent musician, Naing Myanmar, who is best known for his pro-democracy anthem “Kabar Ma Kyay Bu,” written during a 1988 uprising against military rule. Based on the melody of “Dust in the Wind,” by American rock band Kansas, it was widely sung at anti-coup protests in recent years. According to Radio Free Asia, on May 23, Byu Har posted a video on Facebook, complaining about electricity shortages. Yangon has been stricken by power outages, lasting about five hours in the morning, and five hours in the afternoon or evening. “I want to tell the minister of electricity who is wearing that elegant uniform, and the employees under the ministry of electricity that you guys are all stupid fools,” the artist said in the video. Under the government of the deposed Aung San Suu Kyi, he added, “not only did we have enough electricity without any power outage, her government even lowered the rate of electricity bills.” He also lashed out at the junta leader, Gen. Min Aung Hlaing. “The guy who is governing the country is also a stupid incompetent fool himself,” he said. “You guys have no … skill at all. Even if a fool like me were to govern this country, I promise that we would have enough electricity with no power outages. … I am cursing at you because I don’t have the electricity. Got it? If you want to arrest me, just come.” The day after the video was posted, the Telegram channel urged the police to arrest the singer, calling him a “low class dog.” He was arrested the same day. Even mentioning the birthday of Aung San Suu Kyi is reason for being called out — and arrested. She is sentenced to 33 years after a trial on specious charges of corruption. On June 19, Kaung Khant Lwin, who lives in Yangon and works in a drugstore, posted a message on Facebook to celebrate Aung San Suu Kyi’s 78th birthday. He called her “our leader” and tucked a flower behind one ear, joining a “flower strike” that day to show solidarity with the jailed democracy icon. Flowers tucked into a bun have long been her signature look; on the protest day, many shops sold all their flowers. On Facebook, he included quotes from her famous 1990 “Freedom from Fear” speech, and he wrote his own testament: “Not being scared is not bravery. Doing the right thing despite being scared is bravery. I am also scared (as a human). But keeping in my mind that I have to do the right thing and then face it.” He was singled out the same day by the Telegram channel. It referred to him as a dog, and pointed to the address of the drugstore. About 130 people who participated in the “flower strike” were arrested that day, including Mr. Khant Lwin, and the Telegram channel cheered his detention. “A dog who supported the thieves by celebrating ‘The Dog Strike’ is now seized within an hour and had no time to run. [The police] were fast and reliable, we respect and salute.” Skip to end of carousel Also on the Editorial Board’s agenda arrow leftarrow right D.C. Council reverses itself on school resource officers. Good. Virginia makes a mistake by pulling out of an election fraud detection group. Vietnam sentences another democracy activist. Biden has a new border plan. The D.C. Council voted on Tuesday to stop pulling police officers out of schools, a big win for student safety. Parents and principals overwhelmingly support keeping school resource officers around because they help de-escalate violent situations. D.C. joins a growing number of jurisdictions, from Montgomery County, Md., to Denver, in reversing course after withdrawing officers from school grounds following George Floyd’s murder. Read our recent editorial on why D.C. needs SROs. Gov. Glenn Youngkin (R) just withdrew Virginia from a data-sharing consortium, ERIC, that made the commonwealth’s elections more secure, following Republicans in seven other states in falling prey to disinformation peddled by election deniers. Former GOP governor Robert F. McDonnell made Virginia a founding member of ERIC in 2012, and until recently conservatives touted the group as a tool to combat voter fraud. D.C. and Maryland plan to remain. Read our recent editorial on ERIC. In Vietnam, a one-party state, democracy activist Tran Van Bang was sentenced on Friday to eight years in prison and three years probation for writing 39 Facebook posts. The court claimed he had defamed the state in his writings, according to Radio Free Asia. In the past six years, at least 60 bloggers and activists have been sentenced to between 4 and 15 years in prison under the law, Human Rights Watch found. Read more of the Editorial Board’s coverage on autocracy and Vietnam. The Department of Homeland Security has provided details of a plan to prevent a migrant surge along the southern border. The administration would presumptively deny asylum to migrants who failed to seek it in a third country en route — unless they face “an extreme and imminent threat” of rape, kidnapping, torture or murder. Critics allege that this is akin to an illegal Trump-era policy. In fact, President Biden is acting lawfully in response to what was fast becoming an unmanageable flow at the border. Read our most recent editorial on the U.S. asylum system. 1/5 End of carousel Just before the birthday and protest, actress Poe Kyar Phyu Khin posted a video entitled “Daw Aung San Suu Kyi (Our True Leader)” to TikTok. She was arrested at her home in Yangon on the night of Aung San Suu Kyi’s birthday. Radio Free Asia reported that Telegram — Mr. Durov’s dream of defending free speech — has become a “form of military intelligence,” in the words of Yangon-based protest leader Nang Lin. “It may look like ordinary citizens are reporting people who oppose the military, but that’s not true,” he said. “It’s the work of their informers. It’s one of the junta’s intelligence mechanisms. In other words, it’s just one of many attempts designed to instill fear in the people.” In open societies, there are methods to counter the double-edged sword of social media. Disinformation and misinformation can be rebutted by rapidly leveraging openness and free expression. It is hard enough when the enemies of free expression use the right to free expression to spread their own misbegotten dictatorial message. But in Myanmar, once a nascent democracy now ruled by a ruthless military junta, the options are doubly hard. A lively independent digital news media is struggling and deserves support. Although Facebook has been criticized for allowing hate speech to be posted against the Muslim Rohingya minority in Myanmar, its continued presence also empowers people who want to resist the generals. The internet can be a force for democracy. The Telegram snitch channel is doing the junta’s work, and Telegram is complicit. Mr. Durov, a multibillionaire, has said that he stands for free expression and backs Telegram users against the state “no matter what.” It’s time for him to step up and defend these principles..."
Source/publisher: "The Washington Post"
Date of entry/update: 2023-07-28
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Title: What’s Next for Myanmar as State of Emergency Comes to an End?
Description: "With the junta’s six-month state of emergency expiring on Monday, Myanmar people and observers have one question on their minds: what’s next? One possibility is that the regime will again violate the Constitution to extend the emergency for another six months from July 31. The junta has so far extended it three times, most recently in February. The Constitution permits only two six-month extensions. An alternative option would be for the junta to form an interim government with retired generals to maintain its rule under the guise of a civilian administration. Speculation about Myanmar’s post-July 31 political landscape is being fueled by the junta’s recent political moves, as it struggles to quell a two-year-old nationwide popular armed resistance. On July 9, the regime allowed Thai Foreign Minister Don Pramudwinai to meet the imprisoned Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, making him the first foreign visitor to gain access to her since the coup in February 2021. Two weeks on, it reportedly transferred the civilian leader from prison to house arrest this week. She then reportedly met with Ti Khun Myat, the Lower House Speaker under her National League for Democracy (NLD) government prior to the 2021 putsch. She is also likely to meet Deng Xijuan, China’s special envoy for Asian Affairs, who is visiting the country. The regime’s spokesperson told Voice of America Burmese on Friday that he had no idea about these developments – from Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s house arrest to the meetings. This coming Tuesday, the junta is likely to announce an amnesty for political prisoners to mark the consecration of its new giant sitting Buddha statue. Some sources said the amnesty announcement would incorporate Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s house arrest along with the transfer of other NLD government leaders like President U Win Myint and Mandalay Chief Minister Dr Zaw Myint Maung from prison to home confinement. Yet for all these developments and more in the pipeline, analysts expect no meaningful changes in Myanmar after July 31. They point out that the transfer of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi from prison to house arrest is another tactic used by the junta to ease international pressure against its rule. The previous military regime that ran Myanmar from 1988 until early 2011 also allowed visiting foreign envoys to see her whenever it faced mounting international pressure. Some observers say the extension of emergency rule remains a strong possibility, given junta boss Min Aung Hlaing recently hinted to his Cabinet that “much remains to be done to restore stability and rule of law across the union.” However, analysts do not dismiss the possibility of an interim government being formed with ex-generals. But they said the chances were thin given Min Aung Hlaing’s well-documented craving for absolute power, which could be thwarted by an interim administration. Formation of an interim government would occur only if the regime boss recognizes he cannot control the current deteriorating situation in the country. And if that happens, Myanmar would still be under a military-guided transition for years to come. In other words, military rule would be here to stay..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update: 2023-07-28
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Title: Current Mass Atrocities Facing Civilians in Burma: Key Takeaways from Experts
Description: "By Madeleine MacLean On June 21, 2023, the US Holocaust Memorial Museum’s Simon-Skjodt Center for the Prevention of Genocide brought together Burmese civil society leaders to discuss the mass atrocities being committed against civilian populations by the Burmese military and what the United States can do to mitigate these threats and prevent future atrocities. Speakers included Myra Dahgaypaw, Senior Partnership Officer for International Justice and Accountability for the Unitarian Universalist Service Committee; Wai Wai Nu, Founder and Executive Director of the Women’s Peace Network; Gum San Nsang, President of the Kachin Alliance; and Rosalinn Zahau, Advocacy Team Member for the Chin Human Rights Organization. Tom Andrews, UN Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar, gave opening remarks. The following is a summary of the key points made by the speakers. Overview of Current Atrocities Facing Civilians in Burma The Burmese military is responsible for mass atrocities across Burma, including killings, arbitrary detention, the burning of villages, and the restricting of humanitarian aid and essential services. Different regions and minority groups have experienced unique harm. Kachin State had suffered mass atrocities at the hands of the military for a decade before the coup, including frequent burning of homes, airstrikes, and bombings. According to the Kachin Alliance, over 150,000 people have been displaced in the past ten years. The military is also responsible for the mass exploitation of natural resources and large-scale land grabs. The coup has exacerbated these dynamics and has increased the levels of violence against civilians. The human rights situation in southeastern Burma has also deteriorated drastically. Civilians live in a state of fear of being targeted by military attacks or arrested arbitrarily. About 4,000 civilians have been arrested and detained in the southern region alone, while about 1,000 civilians have been injured and over 300 have been killed. There are approximately 500,000 internally displaced people in Karen State alone. The military has blocked humanitarian assistance from reaching internally displaced people under the suspicion that the provisions are being taken to the resistance. Civilians in Chin State also suffered human rights abuses by the military prior to the coup that have only intensified since the military’s takeover. The military engaged in state-sponsored discrimination against religious minorities, including requiring non-Buddhists to apply for permission to practice their religion and taking children into the custody of state-run schools where they were forced to convert to Buddhism. According to Rosalinn Zahau, over 40,000 people were displaced even before the coup. After the coup, the civilians of Chin State were among the first to take up arms in resistance, and the military responded by sending large numbers of reinforcements. Fighting between the military and the resistance movement has intensified since then, and most of the state is currently under the control of resistance forces. Due to its lack of success on the ground, the military has resorted to airstrikes, from which civilians in Chin State do not have the capacity to protect themselves. Zahau reported that over 25 percent of the population has been displaced into neighboring countries, including India. The military also continues its history of violence and discrimination against the Rohingya people in Burma’s Rakhine State. Since the coup it has continued its policy of targeting Rohingya, including restricting their movement both within the state and across the country, issuing discriminatory “National Verification Cards,” engaging in abusive family check-in measures, and detaining Rohingya arbitrarily. The military is also systematically restricting Rohingyas’ access to food, water, and basic services. They have escalated the harm against civilians by denying humanitarian assistance to Rakhine State following Cyclone Mocha, which killed a disproportionate number of internally displaced Rohingya. Ms. Nu warned that the situation of the Rohingya people in Burma has not improved since the genocidal attacks six years ago, and she fears we will see future genocidal violence if the international community does not take action. Next Steps The speakers recommended a range of measures that the US can implement to support the protection of civilians experiencing mass atrocities: The US should accelerate the implementation of the Burma Act to provide comprehensive assistance to survivors of atrocities, and it should ensure that this assistance reaches Rohingya genocide victims and survivors. The US should provide assistance aimed at strengthening the capacity of communities in Burma to protect themselves. The US should convene a coalition of nations to increase the strategic coordination of actions to support human rights in Burma and stop the flow of money and resources to the junta. These nations should also enforce current sanctions against the military. UN member states should increase their contributions to the Myanmar Humanitarian Response Plan and the Rohingya Joint Response Plan, which Special Rapporteur Tom Andrews noted are currently only 14 percent and 22 percent funded, respectively. The US should provide an early warning system for airstrikes, as well as more communication and jamming devices. Challenges and Recommendations Many humanitarian organizations have had to leave Burma for neighboring countries in order to continue their operations, and as a result they may not have official registrations or access to bank accounts at the moment. This has created difficulty for the organizations to comply with USAID’s standard procedures. Ms. Zahau recommended that USAID employ an intermediate agency to handle these administrative steps, as it has done in the past. The panelists also emphasized the need for more comprehensive and coordinated sanctions. This includes sanctioning Burmese oil and gas, which is one of the military’s biggest sources of revenue, and sanctioning companies that provide military supplies like jet fuel. The panelists recommended that the US implement individual sanctions against not just the top military officials but lower level officials as well. Local communities have not seen regional commanders be held accountable, and sanctions against them would help provide a sense of justice. The US should also take on a greater leadership role in advancing justice through the international legal system. While the US has provided funding to the UN’s Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar, it should also provide and enhance support to the local organizations who are documenting the military’s atrocities. The US government can take action to hold military officials accountable by setting up an international criminal tribunal or building international support for referring Burma to the International Criminal Court, as well as helping develop a comprehensive justice process for addressing crimes by lower ranking officials. The US can also provide more diplomatic, political, and financial support to the current legal cases against the Burmese military, such as assisting with investigations and offering witness protection..."
Source/publisher: US Holocaust Memorial Museum
Date of entry/update: 2023-07-27
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Title: UNHCR Representation in Myanmar - Fact Sheet July 2023
Description: "Overview Rakhine State has experienced several waves of violence and displacement since the early 1990s. Among the most significant were intercommunal fighting between the Rakhine and Rohingya communities in 2012, an outbreak of violence that forced hundreds of thousands of Rohingya to flee to Bangladesh in 2017, and armed conflict between the Arakan Army (AA) and Tatmadaw which commenced in 2016. Thus, 708,000 people from different ethnicities, spread across camps, villages and displacement sites are in need of humanitarian assistance. Of this figure, 630,000 Rohingya live in particularly precarious conditions after decades of being denied basic rights, including citizenship, freedom of movement and access to basic services. About 157,000 Rohingya remain displaced including 147,000 in Rakhine’s central townships since 2012 and an additional 10,000 in northern townships since 2017. They remain highly dependent on humanitarian aid. In addition, there are presently 78,000 largely ethnic Rakhine people displaced by the AA-Tatmadaw conflict in 168 sites. UNHCR also monitors the welfare of 31,000 returnees from this conflict. UNHCR has been present in Rakhine State since 1994 and works under its mandate to protect and support stateless populations, returnees, internally displaced people (IDPs), and other vulnerable groups. With offices in Maungdaw, Sittwe and Buthidaung, UNHCR carries out an extensive range of work, from humanitarian assistance, to coordination of relief efforts, rights advocacy and promotion of sustainable longer-term solutions for all communities..."
Source/publisher: UN High Commissioner for Refugees (Geneva) via Reliefweb (New York)
Date of entry/update: 2023-07-27
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Title: Myanmar’s Southern Flames
Description: "Key Event Details Location of Incident: Three villages in Palaw Township (ပုလောမြို့နယ်), Tanintharyi Region (တနင်္သာရီ တိုင်းဒေသကြီး). To (တို) village [12.865942, 98.660944] Tan Shin (တန်းရှင်း) village [12.873319, 98.668229] Thin Gan Taw (သင်္ကန်းတော) village [12.877906, 98.671760] Date/Time of incident: 30 December 2022 Alleged Perpetrator(s) and/or Involvement: Myanmar Military Conclusions by Myanmar Witness Myanmar Witness documented 32 fire incidents in the Tanintharyi region during 2022. On 30 December 2022, the villages of To village, Tan Shin village and Thin Gan Taw village in Palaw township experienced fires and over 60 houses were reportedly set alight by the Myanmar military. Myanmar Witness verified the fires by geolocating and chronolocating user-generated content (UGC) showing the damage. Myanmar Witness has verified that at least 48 houses were set on fire in the villages of To, Tan Shin and Thin Gan Taw. Information gathered by Myanmar Witness suggests that Myanmar military are likely to be responsible for the fires. Summary Myanmar Witness’ ongoing fire monitoring recorded at least 32 cases of fires in Tanintharyi region (တနင်္သာရီ တိုင်းဒေသကြီး) during 2022. This report focuses on fires that happened on 30 December 2022, during which more than 60 houses were set on fire in three villages of Palaw township (ပုလောမြို့နယ်) in Tanintharyi region. Myanmar Witness verified that the fires occurred in To (တို), Tan Shin (တန်းရှင်း), and Thin Gan Taw (သင်္ကန်းတော) villages. Myanmar Witness concluded that the most likely perpetrator is the Myanmar military. Background and Context The military seized power and detained the officially elected government on 1 February 2021. Since then, the Myanmar military has repeatedly committed human rights violations such as arbitrary arrests and torture, setting entire villages alight, and mass killings across the country. In this report, Myanmar Witness investigates the three incidents that reportedly damaged or destroyed more than 60 houses in three villages during the last week of December 2022. Prior to this event, Myanmar Witness’ monitoring reveals that at least 29 other fire incidents occurred in Tanintharyi during 2022. As previous reporting indicates, civilian homes are overwhelmingly impacted during these events. Homes were destroyed during at least three separate fire incidents in the first three months of 2022, 20 incidents in April, May, June and July, two incidents in September and October, and four incidents in November. According to Dawei Watch, approximately 48, 7, and 14 houses were destroyed by the fire in To, Tan Shin, and Thin Gan Taw villages respectively in the last week of December. Through an in-depth investigation, Myanmar Witness has confirmed that at least 47 houses were damaged or destroyed by the fires. Methodology & limitations To read the methodology and limitations, download the PDF. Fires in Tanintharyi township during 2022 Burnt homes in Palaw Township Verifying the fires using geolocation Myanmar Witness identified 46 houses in To village, and one house in Tan Shin village, that were damaged or destroyed by the fires. Drone footage captured the period when To village was engulfed in flames and smoke (Figure 3; top). Myanmar Witness fellows were able to geolocate the footage to the village using satellite imagery (figure 3; bottom). During this analysis, Myanmar Witness scrutinised satellite imagery of the area over time. The house circled in white (figure 3) was not built in November 2021 (as it was not visible in the imagery from that period). This new house, along with the house circled in orange, which were both used during the geolocation, were completely destroyed by the fire. Myanmar Witness was also able to verify the extent of the damage on the ground using a video recording taken by two men driving a motorcycle through the destroyed village (source redacted due to privacy concerns). The footage was compared with satellite images to identify which houses were destroyed (figure 4). The route taken by the video recorders is shown with the red line, with the starting point of the video on the far right. The houses shown in yellow were damaged or destroyed by the fire, and Myanmar Witness was able to identify 40 damaged or destroyed houses. It is possible that more houses were destroyed, however these were not captured by the video footage. Between November 2021 (when the latest imagery of To village on Google Earth was taken) and December 2022, new houses had been constructed in the village. For example, this investigation revealed two destroyed homes which were not visible in earlier satellite imagery. The location of these two houses is outlined in orange (figure 4). Additionally, figures 5 and 6 show the geolocations of five damaged houses to To village. Perpetrators Myanmar Witness has previously and extensively reported on the use of fire by the military against villages with known anti-State Administration Council (SAC) links. In this case, when the drone captured footage of the three villages engulfed in smoke, a military convoy (outlined by the red box in figure 13) was visible near to the fires. Myanmar Witness can confirm that the vehicles in the convoy are commonly used by the Myanmar military and has identified this type of vehicles within other military activity (figure 14). For example, the three vehicles shown in red in figure 14, left, are the same as those shown in figure 14, top right. The seven vehicles shown in white in figure 14, left, are identical to those seen in figure 14, bottom right. Although there is no footage showing military personnel setting the fires alight, Myanmar Witness concluded that the presence of Myanmar military convoy in the vicinity of the fires increases the likelihood that they were the perpetrators. Conclusion In this investigation, the Myanmar Witness fellows investigated fires which led to the destruction of civilian homes in Palaw township, Tanintharyi region, on 30 December 2022. The location and time of the fires was verified using geolocation techniques (a location-based verification method) and chronolocation (a location-based time calculation method). According to reports, about 69 houses were burnt down. Myanmar Witness concluded that at least 47 houses were damaged or destroyed by the fires. Given the presence of a military convoy in the vicinity of the fires, Myanmar Witness deems that it was likely that the Myanmar military was responsible for the fires. This is in line with other documented military activity..."
Source/publisher: Myanmar Witness
Date of entry/update: 2023-07-26
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Title: Myanmar Human Rights Situation weekly update (July 15 to 21, 2023)
Description: "Human Rights Violations took place in States and Regions from July 15 to 21, 2023 Military Junta troops launched airstrikes and dropped bombs including fire bombs in Sagaing Region, Chin State, and Kayin State from 15th to 21st July. 12 civilians including 2 children died by the Military’s arresting and killing. They also burnt and killed 3 civilians from Kyaukdaga Township in Bago Region. Military Junta troops killed at least 12 local civilians from Sonechaung Village, Yinmabin Township, Sagaing Region on 21st June. The rumors came out that the Military Junta will arrest the CDMs in Pyay Township, Bago Region and they searched the houses. 2 civilians died and 1 was injured by the Military’s land mines within a week..."
Source/publisher: Network for Human Rights Documentation-Burma
Date of entry/update: 2023-07-24
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Title: Myanmar’s Democratic Future Must Start Now, With Ethnic Women Leading the Way
Sub-title: A federal system that is genuinely inclusive, sustainable, and democratic must include a prominent role for women from the country’s ethnic minority communities.
Description: "The decades-long struggle for a democratic Myanmar has been marked by many false dawns and untimely collapses, with the challenge of holding together a multiethnic and multicultural union often proving too much of a hurdle. The civil war has only worsened since the illegal coup in February 2021, and while the military junta’s rule is doomed to fail, it is clear that Myanmar must start working toward its democratic future now to ensure that peace, when it comes, is meaningful and lasting. Doing this will require reflection on why previous attempts have been unsuccessful. It is more apparent than ever that Myanmar’s pro-democracy movement must adopt bottom-up approaches moving forward – and this must start with ensuring the equal participation of women. In Myanmar, women have long faced discrimination due to laws, religious rules, and conservative social traditions. The onset of the civil war in 1948 brought concerns about women’s safety on the battlefield. However, following the military coup in February 2021, the role of women has undergone a transformative shift compared to previous decades. Women have taken prominent positions in the resistance to bring an end to the brutal military dictatorship, and are leading the humanitarian relief and emergency support efforts in conflict-affected areas. Over the decades, the women of Myanmar have been repeatedly told by men that establishing a democratic union must come before their calls to ensure gender equality. The Spring Revolution is no exception. Tragically, numerous women have lost their lives in battles against the Myanmar military. Additionally, many women in Myanmar find themselves single-handedly shouldering the responsibility of leading their families following the demise of male family members in the conflict. Despite the many obstacles placed before women throughout Myanmar’s history, they have prevailed by continuing to be advocates for peace, justice, and equality in their communities. Women continue to emerge as survivors of political and military conflict while stakeholders refuse to recognize their resilience and capabilities. Enjoying this article? Click here to subscribe for full access. Just $5 a month. This must change. The Myanmar military junta is undoubtedly the shared enemy of the people and the main obstacle to achieving long-term, sustainable peace and democracy. However, removing the junta from power is not the be-all-end-all of the struggle for a democratic Myanmar. As history has shown, the election of the National League for Democracy, led by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, was not enough to ensure respect for human rights, democracy, and federalism. The roadmap to a sustainable federal Myanmar requires dismantling patriarchal attitudes and beliefs that have held back women and ethnic people from having an equal say in government and public policy. The future of Myanmar must be rooted in equality; men and women in Myanmar should work together to pursue gender-forward policies which champion all groups and identities. As we strive for democracy, it is crucial to consistently implement measures safeguarding women’s lives, security, and rights. We must devise strategies that support the courage and leadership abilities demonstrated by women who have emerged during the ongoing resistance against the military junta’s brutal oppression. Women human rights defenders have been working toward this vision for decades, but its success also requires the willpower and commitment of men. While the resistance is ongoing, all members of the pro-democracy movement must begin unlearning harmful practices, many of which stem from Burmanization. Further, the promotion of harmful stereotypes which suggest women are indecisive and incapable of holding leadership positions must be abandoned. In the meantime, Myanmar’s human rights situation is volatile and rife with widespread and systematic violations of fundamental freedoms and civil liberties. The current conditions deprive civilians, including the most vulnerable, of their dignity and basic rights. An urgent and coordinated response is needed to end military impunity and promote democratic norms and values in the country. This can be achieved by establishing local governance systems in each state and region through a bottom-up, grassroots approach. A strong example of this approach and its adaptation is the Karenni State Consultative Council (KSCC), which recently established its interim executive committee, becoming the first state to form its governing body. The KSCC cooperates with local organizations to solve political problems and provide services. KSCC established an interim executive council (IEC) for the people of Karenni State, including women’s leadership and participation. The formation of the IEC is a clear example of how this equality-focused approach can work in this context. For federalism to be successful, what is happening in Karenni State must be replicated in the country’s other ethnic states, with their autonomy recognized by the National Unity Government. Local government administrations must have clearly defined policies, meaning there needs to be equal engagement of all stakeholders, including women. Doing so will ensure that the local governance structures established meet the needs of the people, including reliable and safe access to health care, education, legal services, and accountability mechanisms. Women across Myanmar are committed to these outcomes and have decades of experience working with armed actors, political bodies, and rights groups to provide security and protection for their communities. Therefore, to ensure long-lasting peace and security in Myanmar, it is imperative to recognize the resilience of women in the revolution and to protect their rights. Women must be supported in their various roles, including providing security and humanitarian relief for their communities. Further, their leadership and engagement are necessary for decision-making in local governance structures and through international diplomatic channels. The development of federalism and democracy in Myanmar will no doubt require the participation of the National Unity Government and the National Unity Consultative Council. But without the participation of other stakeholders, including women, youth, strike committees, and ethnic communities, there is no way that a democratic, federal Myanmar can be sustainable. The international community, including ASEAN, must recognize this and support and promote the participation of women in establishing local governance structures in Myanmar to ensure meaningful and lasting peace in the country..."
Source/publisher: "The Diplomat" (Japan)
Date of entry/update: 2023-07-24
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Title: Southeast Asian MPs and international CSOs denounce undemocratic elections in Cambodia, urge international community not to lend legitimacy to Hun Sen’s regime
Description: "JAKARTA – The farcical elections held in Cambodia must not be legitimized by the international community, Southeast Asian parliamentarians said in a press conference today, decrying the Hun Sen regime’s relentless attacks against human rights defenders and opposition parties prior to election day. “This year alone, Hun Sen and his regime have publicly threatened opposition supporters with legal action and physical violence, shuttered one of the country’s last independent media outlets, sentenced an opposition leader to 27 years imprisonment on ridiculous charges, and banned the sole viable opposition party,” said ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Right Co-Chairperson and former Malaysian member of parliament Charles Santiago. “Given all these blatant efforts to undermine free and fair polls, what happened yesterday in Cambodia can only be called ‘elections’ in the loosest sense of the word,” said Santiago. “In effect, it was yet another coronation for Hun Sen and his cronies.” The Cambodian general elections were held on Sunday, 23 July, with three parties participating in the vote. However, the country’s largest opposition party, the Candlelight Party, was barred from participating in the election on dubious administrative grounds in May. Human Rights Watch reported that numerous Candlelight Party members and supporters have been arbitrarily arrested and harassed in the run-up to the elections. After the polls closed, Hun Sen said that voter turnout reached 84 percent and state-affiliated media has claimed that the ruling Cambodian People’s Party is on course to win 120 out of 125 seats in the National Assembly. “These types of so-called ‘elections’ have increasingly become the tools of authoritarian leaders to consolidate their power, undermining elections as one of the core pillars of democracy,” said APHR Board Member and former member of the Indonesian House of Representatives Eva Kusuma Sundari. “The international community must not fall into the trap of legitimizing this pantomime.” In its pre-election assessment mission report, Asian Network for Free Elections (ANFREL) noted that the clear bias of the National Election Commission (NEC) combined with a deteriorating political situation has compromised “the integrity and credibility of the electoral process.” Its initial findings from monitoring election day were no different. “There is a serious question on the genuineness and electoral competitiveness of yesterday’s elections with the whole process from pre-elections to election day respecting any of internationally accepted election standards,” said ANFREL Executive Director Chandanie Watawala. The International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) also raised its grave concerns about the judicial harassment of opposition supporters and activists. “Whether the general election was free and fair has to be seen within the human rights and rule of law crisis in Cambodia. This crisis is being further entrenched by the intensified assaults against the rights to freedom of expression, peaceful assembly, association and political participation. In the lead-up to the elections, there were mass convictions of opposition party leaders on spurious charges, weaponization of laws that are non-compliant with human rights law and standards against human rights defenders, and acts of violence and incitement of violence against perceived political opponents with impunity,” said ICJ Associate International Legal Adviser Daron Tan. “At every step of the way, PM Hun Sen has violated the rights of civil society activists, independent media, political opposition figures while ensuring the full weight of the Cambodian state backs his party,” said Human Rights Watch Asia Deputy Director Phil Robertson. “This entire election was a charade designed solely to give Hun Sen and the CPP a justification to say that they are democratic when in reality they are presiding over a deepening dictatorship.” “We call on parliamentarians of democratic countries across the world to use their legislative mandate in parliament to unequivocally denounce the 2023 electoral exercise in Cambodia as undemocratic,” said Sundari. “We must pressure the Cambodian government to end all forms of political persecution and immediately and unconditionally release political prisoners. There must also be an independent investigation into human rights violations and electoral irregularities, with the aim of ensuring accountability.”..."
Source/publisher: ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights
Date of entry/update: 2023-07-24
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Title: Condemnation of the Yinmabin Massacre by the Genocidal Military Junta's Evil Forces in Myanmar
Description: "The National Unity Government of Myanmar (NUG) strongly condemns, in the strongest terms, the horrific Yinmabin massacre in Sagaing, Myanmar. The world must unite against the horrors unfolding in Sagaing, Myanmar. In the early hours of July 21st, 2023, around 2 am, evil forces, acting under the orders of the genocidal military junta's generals, carried out a heinous and tragic massacre in the village of Sone Chaung, in Yinmabin township. Under the cover of darkness, these malevolent forces infiltrated the village, armed with heavy battlefield weapons, and unleashed terror upon innocent villagers. Three individuals were arrested and brutally beheaded, while more villagers fell victim to their merciless brutality. As of now, the confirmed death toll stands at 14 lives lost due to this despicable act perpetrated by the genocidal military junta forces. Every passing day, we find it increasingly unbearable to hear about the brutal massacres, crimes against humanity, heinous human rights violations, and unthinkable genocide committed by the genocidal military junta with absolute impunity against the entire population of Myanmar. Over the last 27 months alone, the genocidal military junta in Myanmar has callously killed more than 4000 innocent civilians, including several hundreds of children, and unjustly arrested nearly 24,000 civilians, including the democratically elected President of Myanmar, U Win Myint, and Myanmar's State Counsellor, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. Moreover, 800 plus children have been among those arrested, and some 100 children were held as hostages to target their parents. Tragically, more than 800 children have lost their lives, and over 70,000 homes, including schools, hospitals, and places of worship, have been destroyed. The junta's actions of terrorism have forced nearly 2 million people into homelessness as refugees, and an astonishing 18 million people in Myanmar are in dire need of lifesaving aid, while 48 million people have been pushed below the poverty line. Additionally, several millions of children in Myanmar are on the edge of becoming lost generations, which will significantly affect generations to come. Moreover, the genocidal military junta has implemented their evil "four cuts" policies against the entire population of Myanmar, effectively using hunger, disease, starvation, death, and destruction as weapons of oppression. Despite the high cost that the people of Myanmar are paying, despite these crimes against humanity, the freedom, and federal democracy-loving people of Myanmar refuse to surrender or give up. They are fighting for freedom and federal democracy, which can only be implemented once the genocidal military junta is defeated and removed from Myanmar politics. The people of Myanmar have made it clear and loud that they no longer desire any form of brutal and genocidal dictatorship imposed by the military; what they yearn for is a truly inclusive federal democracy, for which they are sacrificing their lives every day in the face of these terrors of the genocidal junta. Regrettably, this Yinmabin Massacre atrocity marks just one of 144 similar massacres committed by the murderous junta over the last 27 months. The genocidal military junta skillfully hides behind a veil of secrecy, evading international scrutiny. It is imperative that the international community and Myanmar's neighbors should no longer keep silent about these heinous crimes happening next door within the global community of humanity. It is no longer just about international borders; it's about humanity collectively and internationally. We must take decisive action now! Reports from the United Nations reveal that the genocidal junta in Myanmar has engaged in a deadly trade of weapons, amounting to a staggering 1 billion US dollars, with five countries over the past 27 months alone. These weapons fuel their reign of terror and enable them to commit unspeakable crimes against humanity with complete disregard for human life. The international community must act decisively! We call for concrete measures to cut off the flow of money, weapons, and legitimacy to the genocidal military junta in Myanmar. The sooner the international community and Myanmar's neighbors respect and rally with the democratic will of the people of Myanmar by officially recognizing NUG and supporting the pro-democracy movement, the earlier we can end this reign of terror and establish federal democracy for peace and prosperity in Myanmar, the region, and indeed make this world a better place for ALL. Accountability is paramount! The NUG is resolute in holding all perpetrators accountable for their crimes against humanity and heinous human rights violations. We will pursue justice through international and national mechanisms, such as the International Criminal Court (ICC), International Court of Justice (ICJ), and universal jurisdiction laws. Domestically, we will seek justice through all available means. The genocidal military junta must face the consequences of their acts of crime against humanity. It is critical that the ASEAN leadership reviews and evaluates ASEAN Special Envoy roles and the ASEAN five points consensus on Myanmar. It is urgent that ASEAN coordinates an international coalition on the Myanmar crisis with like-minded countries and ASEAN partners. Additionally, it is crucial for ASEAN to implement its five points on Myanmar (2021) together with UN Security Council Resolution No. 2669 (2022) on Myanmar, comprising 10 points, and USA NDAA Burma Acts (2023), comprising 8 strategic points. These 23 points from ASEAN, the USA, and the UN Security Council on Myanmar must be implemented on the ground without further delays. Despite the heinous crimes committed by the genocidal military junta in Myanmar, the brave people of Myanmar remain unwaveringly committed to fighting for freedom, human rights, and federal democracy. Their resolute determination will undoubtedly lead to victory! Justice, Freedom, and Federal Democracy will ultimately prevail in Myanmar, making the region and the world a better place for ALL. Let us stand in unwavering solidarity with the loved ones, families, and villagers of Sone Chaung village, Yinmabin township during this heart-wrenching time, deliberately created by the genocidal junta and supported by their partners in crimes. Our thoughts and prayers are with the victims and their families. We, the National Unity Government of Myanmar, pledge to tirelessly work until justice is served, and peace and democracy are fully restored in our beloved nation and the region. As we stand together, united in purpose, we are confident that light will overcome darkness, and the dreams of a free, just, and federal democratic Myanmar will soon become a reality..."
Source/publisher: Ministry of International Cooperation Myanmar
Date of entry/update: 2023-07-23
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Title: The Day the Myanmar Junta’s Execution of Political Activists Shocked the World
Description: "Sunday marks the first anniversary of the deaths of veteran 88 Generation pro-democracy activist Ko Jimmy (Kyaw Min Yu) and former National League for Democracy lawmaker and hip-hop star Ko Phyo Zeya Thaw, who were hanged by the regime in Yangon’s Insein Prison on this day last year. Two anti-coup protesters, Ko Hla Myo Aung and Ko Aung Thura Zaw, met the same fate. The deaths of the four marked the first executions of political prisoners since 1989 and shocked Myanmar people and the international community; many governments had appealed for their death sentences to be commuted. Ko Jimmy and Ko Phyo Zeya Thaw, who were charged under the Counterterrorism Law, were allowed to meet their families on July 22, 2022 for the first time since their arrest. However, the meetings were conducted via Zoom, not in person. Their family members did not know it would be their last meeting with the pro-democracy activists, or that the two would be hanged the next morning. Their families only found out about the deaths on July 25 when the junta announced through its state-run newspapers that the executions had been carried out. Family members rushed to Insein Prison, but were not allowed to see the bodies, nor were they told when their husbands and sons were hanged. On July 27, pro-junta thugs including members of the military’s proxy Union Solidarity and Development Party and the ultranationalist Association for Protection of Race and Religion (known by its Burmese acronym Ma Ba Tha) stoned the houses of Ko Jimmy and Ko Phyo Zeya Thaw. Rallies in support of the executions were held in Yangon and Mandalay in the following days, with junta soldiers and police providing security for protesters. Prior to the executions, Captain Ohn Kyaw Myint, who plotted to assassinate the generals of the Myanmar Socialist Programme Party, and ethnic Chin student leader Salai Tin Maung Oo were the best-known cases of political dissidents being hanged in Myanmar. Ko Jimmy was 53 and Ko Phyo Zeya Thaw was 41 when the two made the ultimate sacrifice for the democracy struggle in Myanmar. According to the Assistance Association for Political prisoners, as of June 2023 more than 150 people including politicians, students and women had been sentenced to death since the putsch..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update: 2023-07-23
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Title: Myanmar Junta Kills 14 in Sagaing Massacre
Description: "Myanmar junta troops killed 11 civilians and three resistance fighters in Yinmabin Township, Sagaing Region, on Friday, according to residents. Troops stationed in Yinmabin town raided Sone Chaung village before dawn on Saturday and beheaded three Bo Tun Tauk People’s Defense Force members, who were guarding the village. They then killed 11 male villagers, the group said. “First, we found the bodies of the three fighters in the village center. The other bodies were spread around. Some had been tortured,” said a villager. Other villagers were taken away and their condition is unknown. The Irrawaddy could not independently verify the reports. The three resistance fighters were named Ko Pyae Phyo Tun, Ko Sai Thu San and Ko Nay Min Tun. The civilians killed were U Myo Myint Oo, U Kyaw Oo, U Yan Naing Soe, U Swe Gyi, U Aung Win Swe, U Naing Min, U Tote Kyi, U Lwin Moe Tun, U Htay Zaw, U Phoe Aung and U Aung Zaw Win, according to the resistance group. Pro-junta Telegram channels released the same names but said they were all resistance fighters. A funeral was held yesterday and the 14 bodies were cremated together. Dr Sasa, the National Unity Government’s minister for international cooperation, posted on Facebook that the Yinmabin atrocity was one of around 80 massacres committed by the junta since the 2021 coup. “The genocidal military junta hides behind secrecy, evading international scrutiny. But we cannot remain silent observers; we must take decisive action now,” he said. Dr Sasa, known by only one name, called on the international community to cut the flow of money, weapons and legitimacy to the junta. “Let us stand in solidarity with the loved ones, families and villagers of Yinmabin during this heart-wrenching time, deliberately created by the genocidal junta and supported by their partners in crime,” he said. In March at least four civilians in Kone village, Yinmabin Township, were killed by junta troops after they torched the village..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update: 2023-07-22
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Title: Villagers say 14 killed as Myanmar violence flares
Sub-title: Fighting increases in border states while junta continues to delay elections
Description: "Fighting between the Myanmar army and anti-junta rebels has flared up in recent days, with local people in one village saying on Saturday that 14 people were killed in a single raid. Deadly violence has engulfed Myanmar since the military deposed Aung San Suu Kyi’s civilian government in February 2021 and unleashed a bloody crackdown on dissent that has left thousands dead. The junta has been battling anti-coup “people’s defence force” (PDF) militias and long-established ethnic rebel armies that control large areas of territory near the country’s borders. A senior military source, speaking on condition of anonymity, told AFP that fighting had been going on in recent days in the states of Kachin, Karen and Kayah, as well as Sagaing and Magway regions. Two people from Sone Chaung village in Sagaing – a hotbed of opposition to junta rule – told AFP the army had killed 14 people in a raid in the early hours of Friday morning. The villagers, who both spoke on condition of anonymity, said the army came looking for PDF leaders. One said that six of the dead were PDF fighters, but the rest were civilians, and the bodies were found scattered over a wide area, apparently shot or cut down as they tried to flee. “Fighting and raids of PDF places in Sagaing and Magway regions are ongoing these days,” another military source said without giving further details. Access to the areas affected is extremely difficult for journalists, making it hard to independently verify local accounts. Earlier this month, the US secretary of state, Antony Blinken, told south-east Asian ministers that Washington and regional states must pressure the junta to put an end to violence and return to democracy. But diplomatic and economic pressure on the generals has so far had no effect. The junta, which justified its coup by alleging fraud in elections won by Aung San Suu Kyi’s party, has promised to hold fresh polls. But it has delayed them once, and earlier this month hinted it would extend the state of emergency and postpone polls again..."
Source/publisher: "The Guardian" (UK)
Date of entry/update: 2023-07-22
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Title: NUG Welcomes the EU's 7th Round of Sanctions Against the Genocidal Military Junta in Myanmar and Calls for Greater and Concrete International Actions
Description: "The National Unity Government of Myanmar (NUG) welcomes the European Union's (EU) seventh round of sanctions against the genocidal military junta in Myanmar known as the State Administrative Council (SAC). All the current EU sanctions, which apply to a total of 99 individuals and 19 entities, send strong messages to the terrorist military junta in Myanmar, but unfortunately, they are not enough. The strategic, greater, and concrete actions of the international community are absolutely required to end the crimes against humanity and to restore peace and democracy in Myanmar and the region. It is imperative that the sanctions list expands to thousands, targeting not only high ranks but also local and regional commanders of the military junta, Tatmadaw, and their cronies and supporters who are responsible for executing crimes against humanity and heinous human rights violations on the ground against the innocent civilians of Myanmar. Therefore, we call on all nations of the free world to show solidarity with the people of Myanmar by joining hands and taking decisive actions for the cause of freedom, democracy, peace, justice, stability and security in the region. This can be achieved by cutting off the genocidal military junta's access to finance, weapons, and legitimacy through international channels and supporting Myanmar to establish federal democratic governances. By targeting the junta's resources and strengths, we can effectively cripple their ability to continue their reign of terror and perpetrate crimes against humanity against the entire population of Myanmar. The Council of the European Union stated that: Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 29 thereof, having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, (1) On 22 April 2013, the Council adopted Decision 2013/184/CFSP (1). (2) On 31 January 2023, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy issued a declaration on behalf of the Union, strongly condemning the overthrow of Myanmar's democratically elected government by the Myanmar armed forces in blatant violation of the will of the people, as expressed in the general election of 8 November 2020. This illegitimate act reversed the country's democratic transition and led to disastrous humanitarian, social, security, economic, and human rights consequences. (3) The Union remains deeply concerned by the continuing escalation of violence and the evolution towards a protracted conflict with regional implications. The Union condemns the continuing grave human rights violations by the Myanmar armed forces, including torture, sexual and gender-based violence, the persecution of civil society actors, human rights defenders, and journalists, and attacks on the civilian population, including ethnic and religious minorities. (4) In the absence of swift progress in the situation in Myanmar/Burma, the Union has expressed several times its readiness to adopt further restrictive measures against those responsible for undermining democracy and the rule of law and for the serious human rights violations taking place in that country. (5) In view of the continuing grave situation in Myanmar/Burma, six persons and one entity should be added to the list of natural and legal persons, entities, and bodies subject to restrictive measures in the Annex to Decision 2013/184/CFSP. EU HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION: Article 1: The Annex to Decision 2013/184/CFSP is amended as set out in the Annex to this Decision. Article 2: This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union. Council Decision 2013/184/CFSP of 22 April 2013 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Myanmar/Burma (OJ L 111, 23.4.2013, p. 75). The following entries are added to the list headed ‘A. Natural persons referred to in Articles 5(1) and 6(1)’: Aung Kyaw Min Nationality: Myanmar/Burma; Date of birth: circa 1958; Place of birth: Myanmar/Burma; Gender: male; Function: Member of State Administration Council Aung Kyaw Min has been a member of the State Administration Council (SAC) since 1 February 2023. He is also the former Chief-Minister of Rakhine State. SAC is led by Commander in Chief Min Aung Hlaing, who took over the legislative, executive, and judicial powers of the State as of 1 February 2021, preventing the democratically elected government from fulfilling its mandate. As a member of the SAC, Aung Kyaw Min has been directly involved in and responsible for decision-making concerning state functions and is, therefore, responsible for undermining democracy and the rule of law in Myanmar/Burma. Additionally, the SAC has adopted decisions restricting the rights of freedom of expression, including access to information, and peaceful assembly. The military forces and authorities operating under the control of the SAC have committed serious human rights violations since 1 February 2021, killing civilian and unarmed protestors, and have restricted freedom of assembly and expression. As a member of the SAC, Aung Kyaw Min is directly responsible for those repressive decisions and for serious human rights violations. Kyaw Swar Lin a.k.a Kyaw Swar Linn, Nationality: Myanmar/Burma; Place of birth: Myanmar/Burma; Gender: male; Function: Quartermaster General of the Myanmar armed forces. Lieutenant General Kyaw Swar Lin was appointed as Quartermaster General in May 2020. It is the sixth-highest position in the military of Myanmar/Burma. The Office of the Quartermaster General is a department under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Defense and is involved in arms and military equipment procurement for the Myanmar Armed Forces. In addition, Kyaw Swar Lin runs the Myanmar Economic Corporation (MEC), which is one of the two major conglomerates and holding companies operated by the military, generating revenue for the Myanmar armed forces (Tatmadaw). As Quartermaster General, he forms part of the military regime that has seized power in a military coup and overthrown the legitimately elected leaders of Myanmar/Burma. Kyaw Swar Lin is, therefore, a natural person whose policies and activities undermine democracy and the rule of law in Myanmar/Burma and who provides support for actions that threaten the peace, security, and stability of Myanmar/Burma. Myint Kyaing a.k.a. U Myint Kyaing Nationality: Myanmar/Burma; Date of birth: 17.4.1957 Place of birth: Myanmar/Burma; Gender: male; Function: Union Minister of Immigration and Population.Myint Kyaing has been the Union Minister for Immigration and Population since 19 August 2021. Before that, he was Union Minister of Labour following the coup of 1 February 2021. He is a member of the State Administration Council (SAC), led by Commander-in-Chief Min Aung Hlaing, which took over the legislative, executive, and judicial powers of the State in a military coup on 1 February 2021. As a government Minister, he forms part of the military regime that has seized power in a military coup and overthrown the legitimately elected leaders of Myanmar/Burma. In his capacity as Union Minister, he carries out duties in support of the military regime's repressive immigration and population policy, such as restrictions for citizens to travel within the country, as well as the policy of the regime towards the minority of the Rohingya in violation of human rights. As Minister for Immigration and Population, he also participates in preparations for the elections announced by the military to legitimize the illegal coup of February 2021. Myint Kyaing is, therefore, responsible for undermining democracy and the rule of law in Myanmar/Burma and for providing support for actions that threaten the peace, security, and stability of Myanmar/Burma. Porel Aung Thein Nationality: Myanmar/Burma; Date of birth: 1960s-1970s (approx. 50 years old) Place of birth: Myanmar/Burma; Gender: male; Function: Member of State Administration Council. Porel Aung Thein has been a member of the State Administration Council (SAC) since 1 February 2023. He is also a member of a military-proxy party, the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP). SAC is led by Commander in Chief Min Aung Hlaing and took over the legislative, executive, and judicial powers of the State as of 1 February 2021, preventing the democratically elected government from fulfilling its mandate. As a member of the SAC, Porel Aung Thein has been directly involved in and responsible for decision-making concerning state functions and is, therefore, responsible for undermining democracy and the rule of law in Myanmar/Burma. Additionally, the SAC adopted decisions restricting the rights of freedom of expression, including access to information, and peaceful assembly. The military forces and authorities operating under the control of the SAC have committed serious human rights violations since 1 February 2021, killing civilian and unarmed protestors, and restricted freedom of assembly and expression. As a member of the SAC, Porel Aung Thein is directly responsible for those repressive decisions and for serious human rights violations. Pwint San Nationality: Myanmar/Burma; Date of birth: 13.7.1961 Place of birth: Myanmar/Burma; Gender: male; Function: Union Minister of Labour. Pwint San has been Union Minister of Labour since 19 August 2022. He was appointed by the State Administration Council (SAC), led by Commander in Chief Min Aung Hlaing, which took over the legislative, executive, and judicial powers of the State as of 2 February 2021. His position as the Union Minister for Labour was confirmed again on 1 February 2023. He was previously appointed as Union Minister of Commerce from the period of 3 February 2021 to 19 August 2022. As a government Minister, he forms part of the military regime that has seized power in a military coup and overthrown the legitimately elected leaders of Myanmar/Burma. Under his authority, workers' rights, especially the rights of workers affiliated with the opposition movement, are being systematically violated. As Minister of Commerce, Pwint San facilitated the importation of goods necessary to sustain the regime's power (e.g., fuel oil importation). Furthermore, through his national activities and international contacts, he contributes to further stabilizing the illegitimate power of the military regime. At the same time, the ministry under his authority aggravates supply disruptions within the country by imposing import controls and restricting the transfer of remittances. Pwint San is, therefore, a natural person whose actions, policies, and activities undermine democracy and the rule of law in Myanmar/Burma and who is engaged in actions that threaten the peace, security, and stability of Myanmar/Burma. Thet Khaing Win Nationality: Myanmar/Burma Date of birth: 13.7.1961 Place of birth: Myanmar/Burma; Gender: male; Function: Union Minister of Health. Dr. Thet Khaing Win has been the Minister for Health and Sport since 1 February 2021. He was appointed by the State Administration Council (SAC), led by Commander in Chief Min Aung Hlaing, which took over the legislative, executive, and judicial powers of the State as of 2 February 2021. His position as the Union Minister for Health was confirmed on 1 February 2023. Before the coup, he was the permanent secretary of the Ministry of Health and Sport. As a government Minister, he forms part of the military regime that has seized power in a military coup and overthrown the legitimately elected leaders of Myanmar/Burma. Under his authority, hundreds of doctors have been fired for political reasons and had their licenses revoked. He also rebuffed UN-OCHA's requests for expanded aid access amid the pandemic. Under his authority, private hospitals were urged not to hire doctors who refused to work in public hospitals under the military regime. Dr. Thet Khaing Win is, therefore, a natural person whose actions, policies, and activities undermine democracy and the rule of law in Myanmar/Burma and who is engaged in actions that threaten the peace, security, and stability of Myanmar/Burma. The following entry is added to the list headed 'B. Legal persons, entities, and bodies referred to in Article 6(1)': No. 2 Mining Enterprise (ME 2) Address: Ywargout Quarter, Pyinmana Township, Nay Pyi Taw, Myanmar/Burma; Type of entity: State-Owned Enterprise (SOE) Place of registration: Myanmar/Burma; Principal place of business: Myanmar/Burma; No. 2 Mining Enterprise (ME 2) is a state-owned enterprise (SOE) under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Conservation (MONREC) that also acts as the regulator for the sector of non-ferrous metals production and marketing. As such, the SOE is endowed with the power to grant permits and collect part of the tax on profits made by private companies that are either in so-called 'production-sharing contracts' or in joint ventures with ME. The Minister of Natural Resources and Environmental Conservation, U Khin Maung Yi, has been appointed by the State Administration Council (SAC), which took over the legislative, executive, and judicial powers of the State as of 2 February 2021. Since the military coup, the military regime has acquired control over and benefits from SOEs, including No. 2 Mining Enterprise. No. 2 Mining Enterprise is thus controlled by and generates revenue for the Myanmar armed forces (Tatmadaw), thereby contributing to its capabilities to carry out activities that undermine democracy and the rule of law. Moreover, No. 2 Mining Enterprise has taken part in and overseen various projects linked to violence by the Myanmar armed forces against civilian populations and the violation of their most basic rights, including through land confiscation and forced relocation. We strongly commend the EU's commitment to justice, human rights, and federal democracy, and highly appreciate their efforts. However, it is crucial for the international community and the free and democratic world to step up efforts for stronger, tougher, more coordinated, and targeted actions. The situation in Myanmar is dire, with the genocidal military junta perpetrating unspeakable crimes against humanity, violating the will of the people, and suppressing all forms of dissent. The brave people of Myanmar and Ukraine have been fighting and sacrificing their lives for the cause of freedom, justice, and democracy. It is imperative that the international community as a whole stands in solidarity with the people of Myanmar and Ukraine, who have been giving their lives for the cause of freedom from evil and striving for peace and prosperity to create a better world for all and future generations..."
Source/publisher: Ministry of International Cooperation Myanmar
Date of entry/update: 2023-07-21
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Title: Situational Overview of Older People’s Needs in Myanmar - June 2023
Description: "The latest report by HelpAge International, “Situational Overview of Older People’s Needs in Myanmar,” has revealed distressing realities faced by older individuals in the country. 72 per cent of older women and 54 per cent of older men report inadequate access to food. 60 per cent of older women and 52 per cent of older men are unable to access health services. 71 per cent of older people express feelings of worries, anxiety, and loneliness. 68 per cent of older individuals have less than a week’s worth of savings. The comprehensive study, conducted among 200 older people in May and June 2023 across 18 townships in six states and regions, presents a profound analysis of the hurdles older people encounter, emphasising the need for immediate action and targeted interventions to enhance their well-being. Hunger at their doorstep – challenges in food security There is a pressing concern of food insecurity among older people in Myanmar, with significant gender disparities. Access to sufficient food remains an uphill battle, as 72 per cent of older women and 54 per cent of older men reported inadequate access to food, while 79 per cent of all older people report compromising the quality of their meals. Socio-economic inequalities disproportionately impact older women, making it imperative to address financial constraints hindering their ability to afford food. “Even though I would like to eat, we have no food at home. Instead, I drink water at night to fill my stomach.” Healthcare on the brink due to inaccessibility Challenges persist in healthcare access for both older women and men in Myanmar. 60 per cent of older women and 52 per cent of older men reported an inability to access health services. Factors like safe access to health facilities, distance, service unavailability, and the affordability of medicines contribute to this divide, demanding enhanced healthcare support, with targeted interventions needed to address gender inequalities. “Medicine prices are too high, and I can’t afford them. Instead, I am taking traditional medicines, but in the long run, my health is deteriorating***.”*** Weathering mental health challenges 71 per cent of older people in Myanmar express feelings of worries, anxiety, and loneliness, with concerns primarily centred around health, income, and safety. Older women expressed higher levels of worries overall, while older men voiced heightened fears for their safety due the ongoing conflict in their areas. Addressing these mental health challenges necessitates fostering connections among older people and creating platforms for mutual support and knowledge-sharing. “People have become more friendly with one another, and neighbours are taking more care of each other”. Falling through the cracks: the precarious state of income security and borrowing Gender disparities are evident in income security among older individuals, underscoring the financial struggles faced by older women. 78 per cent of older women and 72 per cent of older men do not have a stable income source. A staggering 68 per cent of individuals have less than a week’s worth of savings, indicating a deteriorating economic situation. Moreover, relying solely on income often proves insufficient to cover living costs, leading older people to resort to borrowing money. immediate actions for improving older peoples’ well-being In response to the alarming findings, HelpAge International proposes targeted recommendations to address the pressing challenges faced by older people in Myanmar: Enhance food security: Allocate resources for tailored food assistance programs and support sustainable agricultural initiatives Improve healthcare access: Invest in better healthcare availability and affordability, along with age-sensitive care training for community workers Strengthen mental health support: Allocate funding for tailored psychosocial support, counselling, and awareness-raising efforts Enhance protection measures: Create safe spaces and implement training to prevent abuse and exploitation Promote gender equality: Adopt a gender-responsive approach, empowering older women economically Build local capacity: Provide training and support to local NGOs and community organisations to address older people’s needs effectively..."
Source/publisher: HelpAge International
Date of entry/update: 2023-07-21
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Title: Southeast Asian lawmakers call for justice, accountability one year after the execution of four Myanmar pro-democracy activists
Description: "JAKARTA – The Myanmar military must be held accountable for their continued mockery of the rule of the law, ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights (APHR) said today, marking one year since four political prisoners committed to the success of the pro-democracy movement in Myanmar were executed at the order of junta leader Min Aung Hlaing. Former lawmaker Phyo Zeya Thaw and three other activists – Kyaw Min Yu, known as “Ko Jimmy,” Hla Myo Aung and Aung Thura Zaw – were all sentenced to death in closed-door military courts during sham trials backed by junta-appointed judges. “The executions of the four activists was a gross miscarriage of justice and a grave loss for the pro-democracy movement in Myanmar. The fact that the military continues to sentence scores of people to death is evidence of their disregard for upholding any qualified measure of the law. ASEAN should take this for what it is – evidence of a brutal military regime with no intention of abiding by human rights principles, including the right to a free and fair trial. One year on, there has yet to be any justice for the victims’ families and the thousands of political prisoners detained,” APHR Chair and member of the Indonesian House of Representatives Mercy Barends said today. The junta intended the executions to send a strong message to the pro-democracy movement but their cruelty has only propelled activists to amplify their calls to the international community to go beyond condemning the brutal military regime and respond with tangible actions that hold the junta to account, including an immediate referral by the United Nations Security Council to the International Criminal Court. The situation in Myanmar remains volatile as the junta continues to torture, kill, arrest and detain people who resist their dictatorship. As indicated in the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar and other rights-based reports, crimes against humanity continue to be systematically perpetrated in the country by the junta. “We stand in solidarity with the Myanmar people and pro-democracy movement and their courageous stand against the illegal military junta. We echo their calls and urge the international community, including ASEAN, to take concrete measures to hold the junta accountable for their terrible crimes, including by supporting the legal cases in the International Criminal Court and the International Court of Justice as well as ongoing efforts to assert universal jurisdiction,” said Barends..."
Source/publisher: ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights
Date of entry/update: 2023-07-21
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Title: UNHCR Myanmar Operational Update, April - June 2023
Description: "KEY HIGHLIGHTS 96,550 people received core relief items comprising kitchen sets, blankets and sleeping mats, ensuring their basic needs were met. 95,950 people received shelter support for safe and dignified living conditions while in displacement. 11,900 people with specific needs benefited from cash assistance to meet their basic needs. POPULATION OF CONCERN 1.86 M Internally displaced people (IDP) living in Rakhine, Chin, Kachin, Shan, Kayin, Kayah and Mon States, and Bago (East), Tanintharyi, Sagaing and Magway Regions (as of 3 July 2023). According to UN sources, an estimated 1,5 million people have been displaced due to the resumption and intensification of clashes between the Tatmadaw and ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) and/or People’s Defense Forces (PDF) after 1 February 2021. 630,000 Estimated Rohingya in Rakhine State, of which some 147,400 are living in displacement camps as well as among the host community since 2012..."
Source/publisher: UN High Commissioner for Refugees (Geneva) via Reliefweb (New York)
Date of entry/update: 2023-07-21
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Title: China and the USA bid to win over the Myanmar junta
Description: "You’re the military dictator in Myanmar. You can have offers of friendship or condemnation; diplomatic relations or an appointment at the International Court of Justice; fighter jets or sanctions. Which are you going to choose? It’s not a difficult decision for Commander-in-Chief Min Aung Hlaing, head of the Tatmadaw – Myanmar’s military. He led the February 2021 coup, which deposed the democratically elected government of Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy. Since then, a nationwide armed insurgency by several ethnic groups has grown in intensity. The military leadership has reacted with increasing ferocity, including launching repeated airstrikes on villages and continuing the persecution of the Rohingya Muslims. China offers friendship, ambassadors and fighter jets, which is why it will win the tug of war for the minds, if not the hearts, of the junta based in Myanmar’s capital, Naypyidaw. There are about one million people of Chinese origin in Myanmar, many of whom are among the economic elite and have close ties with the military government. The Americans can’t even dream of such access. In June, Washington imposed its latest round of sanctions on Myanmar, targeting the defence ministry and two state-owned banks that it said were facilitating the junta’s weapons purchases (in this case, from Russia). The USA calls for an end to human rights abuses, a negotiated settlement of the conflict and, eventually, a democratic federal government. It holds out the carrots of diplomatic assistance in achieving these goals and investment after a return to democracy. The Americans would like to have Myanmar onside as part of its ‘pivot’ to the Indo-Pacific and to block Chinese influence. At times, the junta (in previous iterations) has shown an interest in economic partnerships with Western investors. However, it’s a tough neighbourhood with a lot going on, and there’s only so much ‘bandwidth’ in any country’s foreign ministry. Washington views Myanmar as a secondary regional issue and is reluctant to drop its insistence on a return to democracy. Conversely, Naypyidaw’s dictatorship won’t cede power and so believes it can’t rely on the democratic countries to dig it out of its economic crisis. Last year, the economy shrank by 18 per cent and the country is now suffering soaring inflation. Reluctantly, therefore, the junta looks to Beijing, which, in return, makes offers that Naypyidaw is in no position to refuse. July should see the completion of a survey assessing the environmental impact of a US$1.3 billion project to build a deep-water seaport and economic zone in the coastal city of Kyaukphu. Despite evidence that it will destroy natural habitats, fish stocks and livelihoods, the project will likely be approved. Once built (over 20 years), it will link Kyaukphu via road and rail across central Myanmar, up through mountainous Shan State and into the landlocked Chinese province of Yunnan 1,600 kilometres away. This link will give China direct access to the Indian Ocean, which will reduce both its shipping costs and its current reliance on the narrow and congested Strait of Malacca, through which most of its energy supplies pass and which it knows could be easily blockaded. Shan State, which borders Yunnan, has always been the gateway for Chinese influence in Myanmar. Its Kokang region, which used to be part of China, is hard up against the border and mostly populated by ethnic Han Chinese, of whom there are about 150,000. One of the numerous ethnic groups fighting the Tatmadaw is the MNDAA, which is based in Kokang. Interestingly, the group has been receiving Chinese-made weapons via Yunnan, which suggests that Beijing might be keeping a foot in both camps to secure its long-term interests in creating the Myanmar corridor to the Indian Ocean. Following its facilitation of the Saudi/Iranian rapprochement and offers to mediate between Russia and Ukraine, it also means President Xi can position himself as a potential peacemaker in Myanmar. Watching this with some alarm is India. It, too, won’t condemn the junta and has maintained diplomatic relations in a bid to prevent China from gaining too much influence. However, economically, it can’t match China’s firepower. Its GDP is around US$3.75 trillion, whereas China can boast above US$17 trillion. Myanmar? US$65 billion. Another easy choice for the Tatmadaw. An easy choice for China as well. It adds Myanmar to the short but growing list of countries it can count on for diplomatic support, it blocks the Americans, gets access to the Indian Ocean and further builds out its now global Belt and Road project..."
Source/publisher: Geopolitical
Date of entry/update: 2023-07-20
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Title: Four Takeaways from the ASEAN Summit
Sub-title: From Myanmar’s crisis to China’s activities in the South China Sea to relations with Russia, the Southeast Asia bloc is at the center of many key global challenges.
Description: "Foreign ministers from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) gathered last week in Jakarta, with a range of critical challenges to address. Chief among those issues was the crisis in member state Myanmar, which the bloc is divided on how to approach. China’s aggressive activities in the South China Sea were also a key topic at the summit, with Beijing and ASEAN pledging to reach an agreement on a long-stalled non-binding code of conduct. ASEAN’s regional centrality means that the bloc is often thrust into broader geopolitical issues. At the ASEAN Regional Forum that took place alongside the foreign minister’s meeting, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken and China’s top diplomat, Wang Yi, continued discussions on thawing U.S.-China ties. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov also attended the regional forum. ASEAN countries have largely condemned the invasion of Ukraine but have focused on their own interests in engagement with Moscow. USIP’s Jason Tower, Brian Harding and Alex Stephenson discuss how ASEAN countries are approaching Myanmar’s crisis and relations with Russia, where negotiations with China on the South China Sea stand, and the meeting between the top U.S. and Chinese diplomats at the regional forum. 1. Differences over Myanmar persist. Tower: ASEAN’s deliberations on Myanmar’s crisis demonstrated that divisions over how to address the military’s ongoing war against the Myanmar people are impacting the Southeast Asian grouping much more than ASEAN can influence the situation in Myanmar. As the current ASEAN chair, Indonesia has followed a low-key approach, attempting to build cautious dialogue with the country’s diverse resistance actors, including the National Unity Government (NUG) and several ethnic armed organizations. While this should be seen as a welcome step, China’s growing assertiveness and high-level engagements with the military regime since December 2022 have prompted Myanmar’s neighbors to introduce their own platform for engagement with the military regime, undercutting Indonesia as chair. Dubbed the “track 1.5” on Myanmar, this platform began convening in March of 2023 in Thailand, bringing together representatives of the military junta with all of Myanmar’s neighbors and most other mainland Southeast Asian countries. In the four months leading up to the ASEAN summit, this platform convened three times, mounting a campaign to overrule ASEAN’s decision made back in 2021 to suspend Myanmar’s participation in high-level ASEAN meetings at the ministerial level and above. While ASEAN ultimately rejected this move — keeping the junta out of the foreign minister’s meeting — China sent a strong signal of its preferences by inviting the junta’s minister of science and technology, Myo Thein Kyaw, to join a ministerial level China-ASEAN meeting on technology transfer overlapping with the ASEAN meeting on July 12. Further overshadowing Indonesia’s efforts as chair, Thailand’s outgoing foreign minister, Don Parmudwinal, revealed at the ASEAN summit that he had made a secret visit to Myanmar, where Min Aung Hlaing granted him access to the country’s imprisoned State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi. This came as a considerable surprise given that repeated requests by the United Nations special envoy, subsequent ASEAN chairs, the United States, China and countless other governments and envoys had been rejected. Additionally, there was no effort made to coordinate the meeting with the ASEAN chair or with other stakeholders. The move was interpreted by the NUG as a form of “hostage diplomacy,” with the Myanmar army leveraging its close relationship with the outgoing government of Thailand to manipulate both international and domestic perceptions of Aung San Suu Kyi’s views about the situation in country. As NUG Foreign Minister Zin Mar Aung pointed out, the way in which the meeting took place amounted to “nothing more than … cornering her to answer questions in the interests of her captor.” Many ASEAN states have voiced some level of agreement with the NUG in this regard. The joint communique from the foreign minister’s meeting indicated that “a number of ASEAN member states” viewed Thailand’s move as positive, implying that others do not share this view. Meanwhile, Singapore released its own statement demanding that the ASEAN chair be granted access to Aung San Suu Kyi, and pointing out that violence has only continued to escalate. China on the other hand seems not to share these concerns. On July 14, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs released a read out of Chinese foreign policy chief Wang Yi’s meeting with the Thai foreign minister on the sidelines of the ASEAN summit, commending Thailand for its “positive contributions to addressing the Myanmar issue.” 2. ASEAN countries have a tricky balancing act to play with Russia. Harding: ASEAN’s centrality in regional security architecture, with this year’s ASEAN chair hosting a series of major meetings, meant that Indonesia found itself at the center of geopolitics for the week, hosting Blinken, Wang and Lavrov, among others. ASEAN countries, which find themselves divided on many major geopolitical issues, have a range of views on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. While no parties welcomed the invasion of Ukraine, they have mostly sought to avoid the topic and instead have advocated for their practical interests such as the export of grain and related food prices. Indonesia, in its own unilateral capacity, has been the most active ASEAN member on the issue, with President Joko Widodo casting Indonesia as a potential “bridge for peace.” Jokowi visited Kyiv and Moscow ahead of Indonesia’s hosting of the 2020 G20 Summit and Defense Minister (and presidential candidate) Prabowo Subianto unveiled his own peace plan at the Shangri-La Dialogue, demonstrating Indonesia’s interest in playing a leadership role on the issue. This interest aligns with Indonesia’s longstanding “independent and active” foreign policy that is rooted in nonalignment and places Indonesia with a front-row seat in global affairs. Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi notably took the opportunity to convene a trilateral meeting with Wang and Lavrov, visibly putting Indonesia at the center of the table and perhaps idealistically trying to shape how these two powers engage each other and the world. 3. A code of conduct for South China Sea remains elusive. Harding: ASEAN and China have been negotiating a non-binding code of conduct for the South China Sea since 2002 and negotiations have been in a deep freeze since 2020. Last week, on the sidelines of the ASEAN Regional Forum, ASEAN and China announced an agreement to accelerate negotiations with the creation of new “guidelines.” While the announcement puts a good face on the issue, which was important to ASEAN chair Indonesia to mark the 20th anniversary of China joining ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, negotiations remain intractable. At issue is China’s ongoing, unlawful harassment of activities being conducted by Southeast Asian claimants in disputed waters ranging from fishing to energy exploration, and the freedom to conduct military activities. While ASEAN and China have agreed to another “reading” of a single draft, there are deep divisions about the contents, starting with basic issues of international law. Regional political dynamics also suggest that substantive progress is highly unlikely to accelerate. The most notable recent change in ASEAN-China relations relates to the foreign policy disposition of the Philippines since the inauguration of President Ferdinand Marcos, Jr. in July 2022. Whereas his predecessor, Rodrigo Duterte, discarded the Philippines’ victory in the Arbitral Tribunal under the U.N. Convention of the Law of the Sea at the Hague that declared China’s claims in the South China Sea unlawful in a gambit to warm relations with Beijing, Marcos has instead relentlessly shined light on China’s swarming of vessels within the Philippines’ Exclusive Economic Zone and aggressive confrontations by China’s Coast Guard. With the Philippines again at the vanguard of ASEAN’s pushback against China’s activities in the South China Sea, an ASEAN-China agreement seems as unlikely as ever. 4. The high-level thaw in U.S.-China relations continues. Stephenson: On the sidelines of the summit, Blinken met with Wang for the second time in less than a month. At a glance, the talks didn’t yield any breakthroughs. But assessing the meeting in isolation doesn’t do it justice. Regular and direct communication between a range of high-level officials will be necessary if any improvement is to be made in U.S.-China relations. To this end, Washington and Beijing have been building steady momentum, a trend which Blinken and Wang continued in Jakarta. Blinken’s visit to China in June set the stage for Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen and Special Presidential Envoy for Climate Change John Kerry to make similar trips only weeks later. Last week, Chinese Ambassador Xie Feng met with top American defense officials at the Pentagon, an important step towards the resumption of military talks, which have been frozen last August. This modest return to communication could help lower the risk of conflict at a volatile time in the relationship. Moreover, it will tee up a meeting between Biden and Xi later this year, which could expand opportunities for a greater “thaw” by providing the relationship with much needed direction. Ultimately, the Blinken and Wang meeting was a small yet significant step forward on the long road to détente. But building peace often requires workable minimums, not impossible maximums. Even in the absence of a flashy breakthrough, Washington's and Beijing’s agreement to keep talking is a promising sign..."
Source/publisher: United States Institute of Peace
Date of entry/update: 2023-07-20
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Title: Has China Invited Myanmar Junta Boss Min Aung Hlaing to Beijing?
Description: "Ties between China and the Myanmar junta are getting warmer, and diplomats and observers following the issue recently received a message that suggests the relations between Beijing and Naypyitaw could reach a new milestone soon with a visit to China by regime boss Min Aung Hlaing in September. Every China-Myanmar relations watcher knows that—if the news is true—it would be really mind-blowing for the junta leader, who has mostly been ostracized by Western democracies for his 2021 coup, and has even been banned from ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) capitals and excluded from their summits. Since then, Russia and China have turned out to be his allies, and Moscow has invited him for several official visits, but Beijing hasn’t. Following the coup, Min Aung Hlaing desperately tried to visit China to seek Beijing’s blessings for his regime. But his attempts were turned down by Chinese officials. What’s significant about the September trip—the message says—is he would be there at Beijing’s official invitation! But can China handle this hot potato? The Irrawaddy has not been able to independently verify the message that emerged in June, one month after Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang’s visit to Naypyitaw. Qin is so far the most senior Chinese official to see Min Aung Hlaing in more than two years since the takeover. Following Qin’s visit, regime spokesperson Major General Zaw Min Tun briefly visited China. Neither side made any announcement. Early this month, Min Aung Hlaing disappeared from public for a few days after a July 2 meeting in Yangon with officials from the Union of Myanmar Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry and associates to discuss national economic promotion. Asian intelligence sources and others in Naypyitaw said he flew to Guangzhou, southern China. The reason behind the visit was unknown. Obviously, Min Aung Hlaing is desperate to visit China to be received by high-ranking officials, and there is evidence to suggest that he will do whatever it takes to get invited. In May, Major General Yang Yang, acting director-general of the Intelligence Bureau of the Joint Staff Department of China’s Central Military Commission, met the junta’s No. 2 official, Soe Win, for talks on “cooperation between the two armies.” During the meeting, Soe Win reportedly proposed a resumption of the controversial Myitsone Dam project in Kachin State. In September 2011, then President Thein Sein suspended work on the Chinese-funded Myitsone Dam in response to a mounting public outcry over the project, which critics say threatens the source of the Irrawaddy River. The Chinese were upset with the decision. The surprise suspension was also interpreted as a cue to Western governments, including the US, to ease sanctions. In any case, if Soe Win raised this controversial proposal with visiting Chinese officials, analysts believe it indicates Min Aung Hlaing is desperate for further endorsement from Beijing, including an official visit. It will be a quid pro quo. But will Beijing buy it? For China, welcoming Min Aung Hlaing officially will be seen as an endorsement and the lending of full legitimacy to the brutal and totally condemned regime in Myanmar. China should think twice before inviting Min Aung Hlaing. Deep anti-China feeling Following the February 2021 coup, the Chinese Embassy in Myanmar faced daily demonstrations in which thousands of protesters demanded that their neighbor stop supporting the military. Despite widespread international condemnation of the coup, China called it merely a “major cabinet reshuffle” and said the takeover was an internal affair, provoking huge protests. At the time there were calls for a boycott of Chinese products and threats to China-backed projects and pipelines. There were also attacks on Chinese-owned factories in Yangon. Then there were attacks on China’s pipelines in Mandalay Region. At the time, Chen Hai, Chinese ambassador to Myanmar, came out to say that the current situation in the country was “absolutely not what China wants to see,” adding that China hoped all parties in Myanmar “could handle the current problem through dialogue and consultation properly and lead the country back on track as soon as possible.” Despite such anti-China sentiment among Myanmar people, Beijing hasn’t been totally alienated from the regime over the past two-and-a-half years. In 2023, China stepped up its most high-profile engagement with the Myanmar regime since the 2021 coup by sending Qin. Prior to his visit, there came the Chinese special envoy, Peng Xiubin, who is the director of the International Liaison Department of the Communist Party of China, as well as visits by senior officials of Yunnan Province. However, there have been no regime ministers separately invited by their Chinese counterparts to Beijing for direct engagements since the coup. Engagement between the two militaries has also been at a low level since the takeover, even though China is a major ally and arms supplier to Myanmar. Once Min Aung Hlaing sets foot in Beijing on an official visit, it will only fuel anti-Chinese feeling in Myanmar. There will be consequences. Myanmar opposition forces may attack Chinese projects in Myanmar and protests will likely take place in and outside of the country. Last time, after Foreign Minister Qin’s visit, anti-China protests broke out across Myanmar. Activists, student union members and general strike committees across the country launched an online campaign, sharing the message, “Hey China: stop killing Myanmar’s people by supporting fascist criminals,” in Chinese and English..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update: 2023-07-20
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Title: Open letter to parliaments on the need to denounce the sham elections in Cambodia
Description: "Your Honors, We, the ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights, are writing to express our grave concerns about the state of human rights and democracy in Cambodia. Despite hollow attempts to prove the contrary, Cambodia is continuing on its descent into authoritarianism, which is of great concern not only to the people of Cambodia and the region, but also to the international community. The situation related to human rights and democracy has drastically deteriorated in Cambodia in recent years, notably since Prime Minister Hun Sen used the country’s courts to dissolve the opposition Cambodia National Rescue Party (CNRP) in 2017. This occurred shortly after the CNRP demonstrated itself to be a real threat for Hun Sen’s Cambodian People’s Party in successive nationwide elections. This year alone, Hun Sen has openly threatened opposition supporters with legal and physical violence, while his regime has shut down one of the country’s last remaining independent media outlets Voice of Democracy (VOD), threatened to shoot a former opposition leader with a rocket launcher for any attempt to step on Cambodian soil, and sentenced former CNRP leader Kem Sokha to 27 years of house arrest on trumped-up treason charges. This is on top of the forced defection of political prisoners, through means such as depriving those them of desperately needed medical care as well as the prior years of mass trials for both opposition party members and activists, invoking actions taken by the Khmer Rouge to silence, shut down, and even kill anyone acting as a dissident. Earlier this month, the Cambodian National Election Commission (NEC) rejected the registration of the main opposition Candlelight Party for the upcoming July elections on administrative grounds, stating that not having their initial notarized registration document from 1998 prohibited them from running. In addition to this not being a requirement in last years’ commune elections, the document in question disappeared in 2017 when authorities raided CNRP headquarters, thus preventing it from being provided. This manufactured bureaucratic obstacle, designed to block the Candlelight Party from competing in the elections by any means possible, was then affirmed on May 25th by Cambodia’s Constitutional Council, essentially making this an unopposed election for the CPP. The amendment to the Election Law has further clamped down the freeness and fairness of the upcoming elections by prohibiting those who will abstain from voting in next month’s general elections from running as candidates in future polls. Furthermore, the new election amendment will impose criminal liability on citizens who disrupt and boycott the election. The government of Hun Sen appears determined to drive the final nail into the coffin of Cambodia’s democracy, which is guaranteed by the Paris Peace Agreements of 1991. Any elections held under the present circumstances cannot possibly be free and fair, nor should any government created from such elections be recognized as legitimate by the international community. While we appreciate the attention to the anti-democratic actions of the Cambodian government and the decision to not send official observers, the authoritarian nature of Hun Sen is not impacted by words or morality, only action. We therefore urge you to take stronger actions to deny legitimacy to the July elections as it is becoming increasingly clear that Hun Sen is intent on using the elections as just another tool to consolidate his power. We implore you to take action as parliamentarians to use your legislative mandate in parliament to unequivocally denounce the 2023 electoral exercise in Cambodia as undemocratic. Through legislative action, we implore you to strongly call out the Cambodian government to end all forms political persecution and immediately and unconditionally release of political prisoners, advocate for the reinstatement of a politically diverse and inclusive environment, and call on an independent investigation into human rights violations and electoral irregularities, with the aim of ensuring accountability. By taking legislative action, through a bill or resolution, condemning the human rights abuses of Hun Sen’s regime, you would join the global community in standing up for democracy and human rights, sending a clear message to the Cambodian government that its actions are unacceptable and will not be tolerated. Cambodia, as a member of the United Nations and a signatory to various international agreements and treaties, has an obligation to uphold democratic values and ensure free and fair elections. Unless the international community takes strong actions for the 2023 election, nothing will prevent Hun Sen from further solidifying his decades-long dictatorship. Your honors, as you yourselves have come to power in democratically-held elections with strong human rights protections, we are sure that you recognize and understand the importance of human rights and democracy to the prosperity and well-being of a nation. We have confidence in your commitment to these principles and hope that you will demonstrate that commitment by coming to the aid of the people of Cambodia..."
Source/publisher: ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights
Date of entry/update: 2023-07-20
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Title: Righting wrongs in Myanmar requires justice – not retribution
Sub-title: Degrees of culpability must be carefully weighed to stop justice turning into vindictiveness, while those claiming authority need to come clean about their own past deeds.
Description: "More than two years into Myanmar’s post-coup conflict, the question of justice looms large. Certainly, it cannot be expected from the military regime, the main perpetrator of the almost daily atrocities across Myanmar and the instigator of the crisis itself. Instead, hope lies with the resistance. However, the questions of what crimes to punish and who to hold accountable need to be carefully considered if justice is not to turn into vindictiveness. The military’s crimes are so outrageous that they demand accountability, but the resistance may be casting its net too widely in the search for culprits. In January the National Unity Consultative Council, the body coordinating resistance policy, issued a policy paper advocating that civil servants who went on strike to join the Civil Disobedience Movement should be rewarded when the revolution succeeds. More controversially, the paper states that government workers who have stayed in their jobs should be punished. Civil servants in the CDM have made enormous sacrifices and are rightly regarded as heroes, so it is fair to honour them. But nobody should be punished for not being a hero. The policy seemingly ignores that many people are in an impossible situation; family commitments and economic hardship often leave them with little alternative to keeping their jobs and following regime orders. Tarring these people as villains could drive them into the arms of the junta, if only to seek protection, and will make reconciliation harder after the conflict. It is also necessary to acknowledge that some members of the resistance are committing crimes, too. These certainly pale in comparison to those of the Tatmadaw and most of them would not have happened if the military had not thrown the country into chaos. But this doesn’t make them any less responsible for their actions. The most notorious of these crimes is probably the gruesome killings of seven young people in Sagaing Region by a local armed group affiliated with the National Unity Government, the parallel administration set up by lawmakers ousted in the coup. There are conflicting accounts of the incident, but all agree that members of the armed group based in Chaung-U Township apprehended the victims in August last year when they were scavenging in a village recently raided by the military, allegedly raping some females in the group before the massacre. The fighters were detained shortly after by the NUG-backed township administration body but released after one month. The NUG itself appears to have only heard about the case months later, in January this year, and it did not release a statement about it until May after some media reported on it. In the statement it called the killings unlawful and said it was “working to reveal the truth and to take legal actions”. But it is unclear what action, if any, has been taken against the perpetrators. The slowness and inadequacy of this response is troubling because it undermines the NUG’s claim to offer a more humane alternative to military rule. Despite publishing a military code of conduct that states that “captives shall not be tortured and murdered”, the parallel government seemingly fails to enforce this code even when the most egregious breaches occur. However, this may be less due to unwillingness than a straightforward lack of control over the troops it nominally commands. Although a highly mitigating factor, it is difficult for the NUG to admit to because it contradicts its claims of “effective control” over large swathes of Myanmar, which is key to its strategy of being recognised as the country’s legitimate government. But while it lacks the military’s hard power, the NUG has the clear moral high ground among the Myanmar public and much of the international community. Its words carry huge weight and are keenly listened to by millions. It must therefore choose them carefully. The Chaung-U killings were the actions of a rogue resistance group, but they took place amid a conflict where the military, and to some extent the resistance, have blurred the lines between combatants and civilians. The junta’s raising of local militias has muddied the situation, but many of the civil servants, military veterans and political party members assassinated by resistance groups would be considered civilians under international humanitarian law. Resistance groups often claim their victims have directly contributed to the arrest, torture and killing of their members, but there is little due process to establish the facts. Although the NUG’s military code of conduct forbids attacks on civilians without qualification, its leaders have given tacit approval for these assassinations or simply dodged the issue. Asked about this by The Diplomat, Acting President Duwa Lashi La offered a vague excuse, saying most of the victims “are like spies of the military” who are “destroying our policy”. The lack of clear red lines gives resistance groups licence to settle scores on the vaguest of pretexts and is particularly dangerous in such a decentralised movement. Some might argue that, while brutal, targeting the regime’s local minions will expedite its demise. But although the assassination campaign has led to some mass resignations of local officials, the practice also fuels a cycle of retributive violence that would be difficult to stop even after regime change. Frontier interviews with members of military families and veterans indicate that the assassinations have in fact tethered some people more closely to the military. But for the NUG to exert more moral authority, it also needs to look inwards. Several of its members are from the National League for Democracy, whose time in government coincided with the military’s brutal “clearance operations” against the Rohingya in Rakhine State, in 2016 and 2017. While the constitution denied it any control over the armed forces, the NLD participated in the cover-up of the atrocities in Rakhine through an international campaign of denials. In what appeared as a momentous break from these policies, the NUG announced in June 2021 that it would restore citizenship to the Rohingya, welcome back the refugees in Bangladesh and seek justice for them. Meanwhile, some members of the parallel government, which recently appointed a deputy minister from the minority group, have declared a change of heart. However, they have stopped short of acknowledging their complicity in what happened in Rakhine. “In 2017, few of our people raised their voices against the military’s genocide of the Rohingya people. Past military regimes’ narratives about the Rohingya were deeply entrenched in society. The junta still rejects the very name Rohingya, but we have learned,” wrote the NUG Minister of Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management Dr Win Myat Aye. From Win Myat Aye, these words are a deflection. As minister of social development, relief and resettlement in the NLD government, he accused the Rohingya of torching their own houses, despite overwhelming evidence that the military had done so, and oversaw the expropriation of the lands of those who fled to Bangladesh. In addition, it is disingenuous to claim that the military deceived the NLD and wider public about the Rohingya. Successive military regimes have indeed tried to scapegoat the Muslim minority, but the results of the 2015 and 2020 elections and the reaction to the 2021 coup show Myanmar society is hardly in thrall to military propaganda. If people believed the military’s lies about the Rohingya, it was because they were more than ready to do so. In any case, being hoodwinked by propaganda is not a valid excuse for complicity in crimes against humanity. If it were, those currently collaborating with the military regime could make the same argument. Although a standout example, the events in Rakhine are one chapter in a more than seven-decade history of conflict across Myanmar, and justice is key to any attempt to break the cycle of violence. Overthrowing the military alone will not achieve this aim. There are no easy formulas, but for real justice to be made, no victims can be forgotten and careful distinctions must be made between degrees of culpability. Direct involvement in atrocities should be punished, but political affiliation by itself should not be. And perhaps above all, a full reckoning over past crimes is required to build a new Myanmar..."
Source/publisher: "Frontier Myanmar"
Date of entry/update: 2023-07-20
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Title: Aung San Suu Kyi's son calls on governments to impose 'tougher sanctions' on Myanmar
Sub-title: Kim Aris has spoken to Sky News as a civil war rages in the country two years after his mother was removed as leader in a military coup.
Description: "International governments should impose "tougher sanctions" on Myanmar and restrict its military from accessing aviation fuel, the son of the country's ousted leader has said. Kim Aris' mother Aung San Suu Kyi was the head of Myanmar's government before she was arrested during a military coup in the country in 2021. He has spoken to Sky News after chief correspondent Stuart Ramsay and his team went undercover deep in the jungle in Myanmar to report on the civil war which has been raging in the country since the coup. They spent a month in Myanmar with resistance fighters, medics and volunteers who are fighting a war the military regime claims isn't happening. Asked why international governments are not speaking about the war in Myanmar as much as people in the country would hope, Mr Aris said: "Unfortunately, I think it's kind of an indication of the disinterest of people in what's going on on the other side of the world... Until people themselves start to get involved, the governments aren't likely to do anything." He added that governments have "condemned what's happening" but now need to take more meaningful steps. Asked what measures those might be, Mr Aris said: "Tougher sanctions would help, and making sure the military are restricted or completely cut off from aviation fuel and those kinds of things. "This would help immensely. "And just being able to get aid to the people who need it. At the moment, the military are cutting off all aid to everybody." Advertisement Mr Aris's call to restrict Myanmar's access to aviation fuel comes as the military is using fighter jets to bomb targets during the civil war. He cited a report from the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights which says China and Russia are the main suppliers of advanced weapons to Myanmar's military. 'No concrete news of Suu Kyi's whereabouts' Mr Aris grew up in the UK with his mother in the early years of his life and remained in Britain when she returned to Myanmar as a political figure who promoted democracy and human rights. He told Sky News the last time he spoke to his mother was before her government was overthrown more than two years ago. Mr Aris continued: "Yes. I haven't really received any concrete news about her whereabouts and I haven't had any communication with her since before the coup. "So despite my requests for official channels, I haven't received any response. "It is hard, but I'm kind of used to it, having lived with this most of my life." Myanmar's military rulers repeatedly imprisoned Suu Kyi under house arrest between 1989 and 2010 as they viewed her as someone undermining the peace and stability of the country. However, following her release from house arrest for the final time she became state counsellor, the title for the de facto leader equivalent to a prime minister, in 2016. Suu Kyi and other democratically elected leaders led a democratic experiment in the country before it was crushed by the military coup in 2021. Their government was overthrown and she was arrested alongside others..."
Source/publisher: "Sky News" (London)
Date of entry/update: 2023-07-19
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Title: Resistance and the Cost of the Coup in Chin State, Myanmar (March 2023)
Description: "Lead researcher: June Nilian Sang Contributors: Victor Biak Lian, Dan Seng Lawn, Adam Burke, Tabea Campbell Pauli, Nathan Shea, Rebecca Crisp Design: Deddeaw Laosinchai Executive Summary The violent crackdowns that followed the Myanmar military’s coup d’état in February 2021 led many civilians in Chin State, a region in the west which borders India and Bangladesh, to take up weapons and defend themselves. Suffering high numbers of arbitrary attacks on civilians, Chin State has seen hundreds of deaths and tens of thousands of individuals displaced in the past two years. Conflict continues as local groups resist the Myanmar military in the absence of any political solution or decisive military victory. Airstrikes and arson attacks by Myanmar forces have led to the destruction of thousands of civilian homes, religious and community buildings, and crops and livestock. The United Nations estimates that up to 54,000 people have been displaced within Chin State since 1 February 2021, and over 50,000 people have fled across the Indian border. Civilians in Chin State, both in military-controlled areas and territory ‘liberated’ by ethnic armed or resistance groups, lack proper access to food, education, health, and livelihoods services, further increasing the number of fatalities. Women, children, elderly people, and people with disabilities are particularly vulnerable. Political and geographic challenges have stymied a coordinated humanitarian response. Displacement of civilians is likely to continue in the medium term, including across the Indian border into Mizoram and Manipur. Direct access for international humanitarian actors has been severely limited. Local authorities and communities on the Indian side of the border, which share historical and kinship ties with Chin people, have played a significant role in providing support on the ground. Nevertheless, long-term solutions for aid, livelihoods, and future security of Chin populations are absent, leaving many uncertain around their strategies for survival. This report provides an update on the situation facing many communities along the Myanmar/India border. The data and insights, collected in December 2022, reveal the evolving landscape of armed and political actors and the shifting balance of power within Chin State. It also spotlights the situation faced by thousands of Chin civilians displaced by violence, seeking refuge along the India-Myanmar border. Its key findings, underpinned by detailed contextual analysis, provide evidence for humanitarians and development policymakers seeking to improve support to conflict-affected populations..."
Source/publisher: The Asia Foundation
Date of entry/update: 2023-07-18
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Title: Buddhist Kingship as a Source of Political Legitimacy in Times of Crisis in Myanmar
Description: "Despite the unerringly military nature of state control in Myanmar for decades, the junta has on several occasions — and especially in times of crisis — used ancient traditions and rituals of Buddhist kingship to legitimise its control, even endowing military officers with special religio-ritual characteristics. Niklas Foxeus tracks this phenomenon in its various contexts. In post-Independence Burma, starting from 4 January 1948, the model of Buddhist kingship to promote and defend Buddhism has repeatedly been employed as a source of political legitimacy, especially in times of uncertainty, contestation and instability. Although the circumstances have changed from one period to another, the ideology of Buddhist kingship has been a common denominator of political leaders of most governments: during the U Nu period (1948–62, with some hiatuses); the late Ne Win period (1962–88); the military dictatorship of SLORC–SPDC (1988–2011); and after the military coup of 1 February 2021, led by General Min Aung Hlaing. The model draws on the karmic path of Buddhism: improving karma through merit-making by giving alms and other donations to the sangha (monastic community); building or renovating pagodas, monasteries and the like, thereby enabling a rebirth in the heavenly world of the gods (nat-pyi) or as a wealthy human being in the next life (while those who commit misdeeds can be reborn in hell (nga-ye)), and so forth. In a more traditional understanding of society as mainly determined by karma from previous lives, everyone deserves his or her social position. The kings or — in a modern context, political leaders — have, similarly, earned the highest position in society due to their superior accumulation of karmic merit acquired in previous lives. Hpoun (‘power’ or ‘glory’) is obtained as a result of having a large store of karmic merit. As noted by Min Zin, hpoun is taken for granted and naturalised at most levels of Burmese society, from the family to the government; further, there are also certain signs of superior hpoun such as the ability to collect huge amounts of donations to host merit-making ceremonies on a grand scale; giving lavishly to monks; building imposing pagodas and monasteries, etc. Such acts will not only generate more favourable karmic merit but will also serve as a source of social prestige. A politically significant sign of such karmic power is being able to seize political power and maintaining it, or the appearance of white elephants as its embodiment (see below). This hpoun is therefore (as Min Zin points out) self-legitimating by its mere fact (certain signs or possession of power). What is needed is a public that will recognise its significance. As we will see, that may have changed in the contemporary period. Having committed misdeeds (especially military leaders), acts of merit-making are also performed to create a balance between the accumulation of merit and demerit. Many of the features above can be traced back to the so-called Asokan model of the Buddhist Indian King Asoka (r. 273–32 BC). There are thus three dimensions involved in, for instance, public performances by Buddhist leaders: display of karmic power (hpoun); generating karmic merit through Buddhist merit-making; social prestige. The performative spectacles of the military leaders have covered these three dimensions, with an emphasis on the first: to persuade the people of their possession of superior store of karmic merits from previous lives providing them with hpoun and a cosmic sanction to rule as a kind of Buddhist kings defending and promoting Burmese Buddhism and nation. * Shortly after independence, Burma was plunged into civil war with Karen and Communist insurgencies. At the same time, there were rumours, prophecies and expectations — from around the 1940s — that a righteous king would arrive who would protect and promote Buddhism. Moreover, there were also expectations that a Buddhist ‘world emperor’ (Burmese sekyā-watay-min; Pali cakkavattin) would appear, both figures, at times, seemingly fused in the popular imagination. The future king would inaugurate a prosperous era for Burma and Burmese Buddhism that would make it last for its prophesied remainder of about 2,500 years during the second half of the sasana era. In this unstable and tumultuous period, U Nu became prime minister and came to embody the expectations of a righteous Buddhist king who would promote Buddhism after a long hiatus of British colonial rule. Some regarded U Nu as a bodhisatta (a Buddha-to-be), like the Burmese kings, while others believed that he was the prophesised Buddhist world emperor. U Nu, however, combined this Buddhist imaginary with an essentially secular socialist ideology. Like a king in the Asokan model, he convened the so-called Sixth Buddhist Synod in 1954–56. He built pagodas, monasteries and even temples for the spirit-cults of the 37 Lords. As his Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League (AFPFL) party won three elections (1952, 1956, and 1960), it was clear that his persistent appeal to traditional Buddhist sensibilities resonated with most of the Buddhist population. In the 1960 elections, he even promised to make Buddhism the state religion. In contrast to earlier periods, the military leaders of the SLORC–SPDC government, which seized power in a coup in 1988 following a popular uprising, portrayed themselves as inheritors of the Burmese Buddhist warrior kings that had united the country, of whom there were grand statues in the new capital Naypyidaw, the ‘Abode of Kings’ (in 2005): King Anawrahta (1044–77), King Bayinnaung (1551–81), and King Alaungpaya (1752–60). To appease popular opinion, the military junta promised to hold multi-party elections in May 1990. The National League for Democracy (NLD) and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi won a landslide victory, but the military government refused to hand power to them. Later the same year, in August, monks organised a monastic boycott of the military. As it had annulled the Constitution of 1974, the military junta had no formal source of political legitimacy; it was essentially a military council ruling by decree. Without popular consent to rule, they began to focus more on Buddhist sources of legitimacy. They employed Buddhism as a kind of populist political legitimation strategy, and performed a ritual theatre in a performative manner to persuade the public about the notion that they are the rightful rulers of Burma/Myanmar, not merely defending the country and preventing its disintegration but also — like the historical Burmese kings — foremost in promoting and defending the Buddha’s dispensation (sasana), as well as Burman Buddhist cultural traditions and customs. In 1994, as noted by Juliane Schober, the military government borrowed a tooth relic from China and led a procession in royal style (with other rituals) in order to unify the divided public in their common interest of Buddhist merit-making. It was a performative spectacle in the emulation of pre-colonial royal Buddhist ceremonies that portrayed the generals as righteous rulers (dhammaraja) over the Buddhist realm. At this time, the military government repeatedly declared (in state-controlled media) that it had found white elephants. In traditional Buddhism, white elephants are seen as a cosmic confirmation of the hpoun of the ruler that confirms his political legitimacy and promises an era of abundant prosperity. It is one of the seven jewels of a Buddhist world emperor and thought to be able to bring rain and prosperity. There were also other cosmic signs that were meant to confer legitimacy on them. What people could not see on the ground in the economically mismanaged country at the time, they were thus assumed to see in such cosmological signs promising a prosperous future. Reportedly, it was General Than Shwe who first used white elephants as a source of political legitimacy since the monarchical period; nine white elephants were found during his rule. In one elephant stall, there is an inscription attributed to General Than Shwe saying: ‘White elephants are only found during the reign of a glorious king. It is an omen that augurs the country’s prosperity.’ * On 1 February 2021, General Min Aung Hlaing carried out a miliary coup in which the army seized power from the NLD, which had won a landslide victory in the general elections of November 2020. Although the military junta (titled the State Administration Council (SAC)) led by General Min Aung Hlaing claimed to seize power in accordance with the Constitution of 2008, it was, according to analysts, unconstitutional and illegal. Once again, Burma/Myanmar had a government ruling without popular consent. As during the former military junta rule, military leaders turned to Buddhism for political legitimacy. During the demonstrations that broke out following the coup throughout major parts of the country, initially led by a popular movement called the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM), General Min Aung Hlaing seemed to focus on Buddhist matters, namely finishing what he claimed to be the largest seated Buddha statue in the world, a project he began before the coup. In the months following the coup, while the streets were filled by demonstrators and clashes occurred between them and the police and the military, Min Aung Hlaing held several ceremonies and organised events to which monks were invited where they discussed the project devoted to his seated Buddha statue. Like his predecessors, Min Aung Hlaing made lavish donations to the monks and the Sangha; he performed — like military rulers of SLORC-SPDC — various magical rituals (yadaya-khye) intended to ward off dangers and mishaps predicted by astrologers and to help to maintain his power; and a white elephant was found that would confirm his hpoun. According to Ingrid Jordt, some/many Burmese people during the SLORC–SPDC period (1988–2011) were persuaded by some of the Buddhist cosmological implications of the performances and events during military governments confirming their hpoun and right to rule. However, the younger Generation Z seems to be more secular, or have at least adopted more secular attitudes demanding religion be separated from politics, including monks supporting their own cause. Moreover, they have mocked and ridiculed the generals and military rule by using humour, thereby rejecting their pretentions of legitimate claims to power. After the coup, the monk Sitagu Hsayadaw, formerly held in great respect by the people, became a kind of chief monastic advisor to Min Aung Hlaing, thereby providing him with legitimacy. As a result, his reputation has been tarnished and he has come to be despised by people belonging to the Opposition. He is criticised and ridiculed on social media. This public criticism of a famous monk is a significant change in comparison to earlier times. An important difference between U Nu and the military dictatorships is that he won elections and enjoyed popular support among the people. He did not portray himself as a warrior king but mainly as a pious Buddhist layman who sought to implement Buddhist principles in society as a kind of panacea for social, political, and economic problems — like disseminating loving-kindness to all living beings; avoiding killing living beings by the prohibition of using pesticides by farmers; and trying to refrain from using violence against insurgents. By contrast, the military seized power, and most people were/are opposed to their rule. In the absence of popular consent, they turned to Buddhism as a kind of populist political legitimation strategy and performed a ritual theatre in a performative manner to persuade the public about the notion that they are the rightful rulers of Burma/Myanmar. Their sincerity has — among Western observers and some Burmese people — therefore often been doubted, that is, that they are using religion instrumentally in a cynical manner. However, it is likely that they are more convinced than anyone else of the efficacy of their own rituals and the significance of various perceived signs of their greatness. Military leaders have turned to astrologers and cult leaders for various forms of divination and power-strengthening rituals (yadaya-khye). Min Aung Hlaing even claimed that his white elephant is superior to those of the generals of the former military junta; and maintained that his ruby — a symbol of royalty — is larger and of better quality than theirs, etc. The seated Buddha statue he is currently sponsoring will, he has claimed, be the largest one in the world. In this way, he seems to say that he is even more fit to be a righteous Buddhist ruler than the previous generals, because the cosmic signs are more persuasive. Yet, Min Aung Hlaing seems to enjoy less respect among the public than his predecessors. The public mockery of him reached unforeseen levels in the months following the coup in February 2021. Demonstrators carried portraits of him hanging from the gallows; photographs of him were strewn on the streets so that not only would the demonstrators trample on them but also soldiers and police, a very disrespectful act; slippers were seemingly sold with his portrait underneath them; and even toilet paper with his portrait was sold. On cartoons, he has been sometimes depicted as a short man wearing women’s high-heeled shoes that would make him taller. All these actions were a kind of popular mocking counter-discourse to any claim he could make to legitimate political power. Generation Z may be less likely to be persuaded by the public performances of Buddhist kingship and related cosmic sanctions than previous generations, probably a sign of the social and ideological transformations the country has undergone, especially in urban areas during the 10-year (2011–2021) experiment in democracy. * The views expressed here are those of the author and not of the ‘South Asia at LSE’ blog, the LSE South Asia Centre or the London School of Economics and Political Science. Please click here for our Comments Policy. This blogpost may not be reposted by anyone without prior written consent of LSE South Asia Centre; please e-mail [email protected] for permission. Banner image © Katsuma Tanaka, Bagan, Myanmar, 2021, Unsplash. The ‘Myanmar @ 75’ logo is copyrighted by the LSE South Asia Centre, and may not be used by anyone for any purpose. It shows the national flower of Myanmar, Padauk (Pterocarpus macrocarpus), framed in a design adapted from Burmese ikat textile weaves. The logo has been designed by Oroon Das..."
Source/publisher: London School of Economics and Political Science
Date of entry/update: 2023-07-17
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Title: Malaysia: Myanmar Refugee Activist Abducted
Sub-title: Urgently Locate, Ensure Safety of Thuzar Maung, Family Members
Description: "(Bangkok) – The Malaysian government should immediately prioritize a thorough and transparent investigation into the abduction of the Myanmar refugee activist Thuzar Maung and her family, Human Rights Watch said today. On July 4, 2023, unidentified men abducted Thuzar Maung, 46; her husband, Saw Than Tin Win, 43; her daughter, Poeh Khing Maung, 16; and sons Aung Myint Maung, 21, and Thukha Maung, 17, from their residence in Ampang Jaya, Kuala Lumpur, based on reports from witnesses and CCTV footage. Thuzar Maung, also spelled Thu Zar Moung, is an outspoken supporter of Myanmar’s pro-democracy movement. “We fear that Thuzar Maung and her family were abducted in a planned operation and are at grave risk,” said Elaine Pearson, Asia director at Human Rights Watch. “The Malaysian government should urgently act to locate the family and ensure their safety.” At about 4:30 p.m. on July 4, a car entered the gated community where the family lives. The driver told the security guards they were police. Two hours later, Thuzar Maung was on the phone with a friend, who heard her yell to her husband that unknown men were entering the house, before being disconnected. At about 7:10 p.m., the same car and the two cars owned by Thuzar Maung’s family were seen leaving the compound. Thuzar Maung’s phone and the phones of her husband and children appear to have been immediately turned off, as no calls have gone through since. CCTV footage at the guard booth captured the license plate of the “police” car, which Malaysian police have since identified as fake. The footage also captured a black-gloved hand of the driver of one of Thuzar Maung’s cars holding out the gate card to exit the compound. Vehicle logs show that the same car had entered the gated community on June 19. Thuzar Maung’s colleagues who entered the house on July 5 said there were no signs of robbery. Thuzar Maung is a long-time advocate for democracy in Myanmar and refugee and migrant rights in Malaysia. She serves as chair of the Myanmar Muslim Refugee Community and Myanmar Migrant Workers Committee and has worked closely with Myanmar’s opposition National Unity Government. She has over 93,000 followers on Facebook, where she posts criticism of abuses by Myanmar’s junta, which took power after a February 1, 2021 military coup. Her friends and colleagues expressed concern that she was targeted for her activism. The police in Kuala Lumpur have opened an investigation into the case. Thuzar Maung fled Myanmar for Malaysia in 2015 to escape growing violence against Muslims. All five family members are recognized by the United Nations Refugee Agency as refugees in Malaysia. “Foreign governments should press Malaysian authorities to quickly uncover the location of this family,” Pearson said. “Myanmar activists are apparently at risk even when they criticize the military junta from a country where they have sought asylum.”..."
Source/publisher: "Human Rights Watch" (USA)
Date of entry/update: 2023-07-17
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Title: Shwegu township under fire
Description: "Key Event Details Location of Incident: 13 villages in Shwegu township (ရွှေကူ မြို့နယ်), Kachin state (ကချင် ပြည်နယ်) Man Wein (မံဝိန်း) village [24.137754, 96.738591] Si Thar (စီသာ) village [24.128808, 96.745465] Man Nar (မံနား) village [24.126390, 96.745613] Tone Kauk (တုံးကောက်) village [24.136419, 96.753562] Si Thaung (စီသောင်) village [24.107611,96.746033] Man Hkar (မံခါး) village [24.117149, 96.737877] Si Maw (စီမော်) village [24.136141, 96.719658] Hing Kawng (ဟိန်ကောင်) village [24.131099, 96.724823] Si Mu Gyi (စီမူကြီး) village [24.153250, 96.739304 Si Mu Lay (စီမူလေး) village [24.149589, 96.732140] Nam Lang (နန့်လန်) village [24.157110, 96.719063] Nawng Let Gyi (နောင်လက်ကြီး) village [24.162870, 96.723030] Moe Kint (မိုးကင့်) village [24.131803, 96.711720] Date/Time of Incident: 24 March 2023 - 11 April 2023 Alleged Perpetrator(s) and/or Involvement: Light Infantry Division (LID) 88 ​​Infantry Battalion (IB) 10, IB 77 under LID 88 Myanmar Air Force (MAF) Kachin Independence Army (KIA) Shwegu People’s Defense Force (PDF) Summary of Investigation: Shwegu township is an area of known resistance and site of clashes between the local Kachin Independence Army (KIA), Shwegu People’s Defense Force (PDF), and the military. Multiple incidents were reported by social media users and local media in Shwegu between the end of March and mid-April including airstrikes, destruction of a medical facility, and ground battles. Myanmar Witness has fully verified damage and destruction to structures in five villages through the geolocation of user-generated content (UGC). Myanmar Witness partially verified fires in several other villages in Shwegu township between 24 March 2023 and 11 April 2023. Myanmar Witness also investigated claims that these attacks have resulted in the death and displacement of civilians in the township but have been unable to verify these occurrences. Executive Summary On 24 March 2023, it was alleged that Myanmar military forces clashed with KIA and PDF joint forces in Shwegu township, Kachin state. As a result of these clashes, which continued from 25 March 2023 to 11 April 2023, multiple villages - 13 were identified by Myanmar Witness - suffered air and ground attacks from the Myanmar military resulting in fires and the destruction of housing. Some villages experienced multiple fires within this time period. Myanmar Witness verified, through geolocation and chronolocation of UGC and FIRMS data, fires in 13 villages in Shwegu township between 24 March and 11 April 2023. Media sources reported that 12 villages were affected during the clashes, but Myanmar Witness has also identified fires in Moe Kint village. This could indicate that 13 villages were affected. Additionally, Myanmar Witness geolocated an alleged airstrike in Si Thar village; a site that the Shwegu PDF claimed the military had attacked. Myanmar Witness has geolocated additional footage which purports to show a medical facility having suffered damage akin to an airstrike attack in Si Thar village, suggesting that civilian infrastructure has been affected by the clashes in Shwegu. Myanmar Witness has identified content that indicates the presence of Myanmar military troops during and/or before the fires in Shwegu and around the affected area. Their presence was determined by cross-referencing location information from pro-Security Administration Council (SAC) media channels and social media claims related to SAC personnel presence and operations in the area. Background and Context Shwegu has experienced clashes between the military, the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), and local PDF since the military coup in February 2021. By June 2021, Myanmar Peace Monitor reported that roughly 6,000 civilians had fled from 42 locations in Mansi and Shwegu townships, Kachin state, due to clashes in the area. The Shwegu region borders three notably important conflict areas in Myanmar: Sagaing (part of the ‘dry zone’), Kachin, and Shan (Figure 1). Prior to the coup, Kachin was an area of prolonged internal conflict. Ethnic armed organisations have long sought autonomy over the state and control over its natural resources. Since the coup, the KIA has been one of the ethnic armed organisations actively supporting the development of armed resistance in the dry zone, such as Sagaing and Magway. In these areas, fighting between the PDF and the military is ongoing, with repeated claims that the military is targeting communities in areas of suspected PDF activity. Attacks impacting civilians have become more commonly reported and investigated by Myanmar Witness. For example, Myanmar Witness investigated an airstrike on a concert which reportedly killed over 80 people. Multiple media organisations have reported on the destruction in Shwegu between 24 March 2023 and 11 April 2023. Civilian houses in Nam Lang village were allegedly destroyed due to clashes between local defence forces and the military on 24 March 2023. On 25 March, BBC Burma reported that airstrikes had taken place in the villages of Nam Lang, Man Wein and Si Thaung. On 30 March 2023, Khit Thit Media reported that the SAC cut the internet and phone connections in Shwegu township. The military has historically used internet shutdowns to quell opposition, notably since taking power in February 2021 and — as Myanmar Witness has previously reported on — during the following months of anti-military protest. However, platforms such as Netblocks, OONI and IODA, which often report on communications blackouts, provide no indication that there was an internet shutdown, preventing Myanmar Witness from verifying these claims. Nevertheless, there is relatively little UGC associated with the fires in Shwegu, supporting the notion that some form of restriction on communication systems was in place. Since 30 March 2023 — when it is alleged that the military cut the internet connection — several villages were reportedly attacked by the military using airstrikes and arson, including: Man Wein, Si Thar, Tone Kauk, Si Thaung, Man Hkar, Si Maw, Nam Lang, and Nawng Let Gyi. The media generally report clashes in 12 villages in Shwegu, which resulted in fires. Myanmar Witness has partially verified fires in a further six villages using low-resolution satellite imagery analysis and FIRMS: Man Nar, Hing Kawng, Si Mu Gyi, Si Mu Lay, and Moe Kint. Myanmar Witness was able to verify: At least 13 villages suffered fire damage between 24 March and 11 April 2023. The destruction of the villages was verified through the use of Sentinel satellite imagery. The possible dates of fires were identified through FIRMS, which indicated that some villages may have been attacked multiple times. Four villages were badly affected by fire. The damage and destruction, as shown by UGC, was geolocated to: Si Thaung, Man Wein, Si Thar, and Nawng Let Gyi villages. Some structural damage was also verified in Man Nar village allegedly due to airstrikes. A building in Si Thar, allegedly a medical facility, was badly damaged during the timeframe investigated. The investigation walkthrough Myanmar Witness identified a cluster of fires in Shwegu township using the Myanmar Witness fire database, which were then verified using FIRMS and Sentinel. Following this, Myanmar Witness conducted an investigation to identify related UGC and reports via social media channels and official media sources, which led to further verification of the impact of the fires and destruction in five of the villages. Myanmar Witness cannot verify the exact number of houses destroyed due to the limited UGC and information. Multiple media sources claimed that the military were the single perpetrator responsible for the fires, setting them intentionally throughout the clashes with the KIA and PDF in the area. Myanmar Witness has been unable to verify these claims. Despite this, Myanmar Witness confirmed that fire incidents in Shwegu township were consistent with the locations where clashes between the military, KIA, and PDF were reported. The following section will provide information related to fires in the 13 villages. Fire incidents in five villages were classified as ‘fully verified’ as Myanmar Witness was able to identify and geolocate UGC associated with the fires and the destruction they caused (as per Myanmar Witness’ methodology). Incidents in the remaining villages were ‘partially verified’ using FIRMS and Sentinel data. Despite the verification of fire incidents and the resultant destruction, in all cases there is no evidence to conclusively say that the military was responsible. Lastly, the impact of the fires and clashes in the township was investigated, including the displacement and deaths of individuals. Myanmar Witness analysed satellite imagery from these locations and confirmed that the 13 villages had suffered from fire damage. Satellite imagery from 20 April 2023 (nine days after the clashes reportedly ended) demonstrates destruction in each village, some of which is considerable. Despite there being no related UGC of Si Maw, Hing Kawng, and Man Nar from 10 April 2023 to allow for the further verification of fires through geolocation, Myanmar Witness identified parts of these villages which appear to have active fires at the time when Sentinel satellite imagery was taken. This can be seen using Sentinel’s false colour filter on 10 April 2023 (Figure 7). Fires in five villages further verified using UGC Si Thaung Si Thaung village reportedly experienced fires more than once within the investigative timeframe. For example, the media reported the first fire on 25 March, however FIRMS didn't detect fire signatures that day. On the same day, a Shwegu Facebook page and the BBC posted images allegedly showing the aftermath of military attacks in Si Thaung, Si Mu Lay, and Man Wein. Myanmar Witness geolocated the images (Figure 8) to Si Thaung at 24.105928, 96.748044. Although there were claims of airstrikes in the area, the images posted by the Shwegu Facebook page are inconclusive. While some show destruction that is consistent with airstrike damage — houses have been completely destroyed with parts of the roofing and fencing broken — other images appear to show burnt flooring and material that could indicate fires where the houses were destroyed (Figure 9). Despite images of destruction to buildings, Myanmar Witness cannot fully verify the claims of an airstrike due to the lack of geolocatable features or verifiable evidence in these images, particularly of aircraft or munitions in the area. FIRMS detected heat signatures on 9 April; this is consistent with the destruction Myanmar Witness identified using Sentinel satellite imagery on 20 April. Sentinel imagery from 20 April 2023 shows ground changes, suggesting potential fire damage to Si Thaung. This indicates that the village could have been the site of clashes more than once between 24 March 2023 and 11 April 2023. Man Wein On 30 March 2023, Mandalay Free Press reported on an airstrike in Man Wein and claimed that almost the entire village was burned down after the airstrike. The military allegedly set fire to the village by hand. FIRMS registered a fire at around 0844 on 30 March 2023 in Man Wein. Myanmar Witness geolocated PDF drone footage that reveals that almost the whole of Man Wein was damaged by fire. Myanmar Witness geolocated this drone footage to around 24.137754, 96.738591. Using Google Earth’s measurement tool, Myanmar Witness estimates that a 60 m squared area of Man Wein was destroyed, as shown in the drone footage. This coincides with the Sentinel satellite imagery burn mark visible the day after the event on 31 March 2023 (Figure 10). Si Thar and Man Nar On 5 April 2023, the anti-military group Red Peacock media reported that Si Thar was hit by an airstrike, resulting in the destruction of the village’s hospital and fire damage to the adjoining village of Man Nar (Figure 11). FIRMS data shows multiple heat signatures in Si Thar and Man Nar villages on 5 Apr 2023, consistent with media claims that the military attacked these villages on these days. Both villages also appear to have suffered significant burn damage, evident through changes to ground coverage as identified using Sentinel imagery (dated 20 April 2023). Shwegu PDF posted footage on 6 April 2023, purporting to show the aftermath of the airstrike on the medical facility which Myanmar Witness geolocated to 24.128808, 96.745465 (Figure 12). Myanmar Witness also geolocated images of destruction to Man Nar village. Limited UGC showing the aircraft or munitions has made it difficult for Myanmar Witness to confirm the airstrike. Despite this, the damage to structures in Si Thar and Man Nar appears to be consistent with an air attack: buildings suffered structural damage (especially to roofing). Additionally, images posted online by Shwegu PDF indicate that there was fire damage and active fires. Nawng Let Gyi On 11 April 2023, Mizzima reported that the military set fire to Nam Lang and Nawng Let Gyi (for the second time). FIRMS also detected high heat signatures around Nam Lang on 11 April 2023. Myanmar Witness analysed Sentinel imagery (taken on 20 April 2023) and confirmed that both villages suffered significant ground changes which are consistent with burn damage. Myanmar Witness also identified and verified UGC from Nawng Let Gyi village, confirming the extent of the destruction (uploaded by a private account and the source has been redacted due to privacy concerns). Displacement and Victims Clashes causing displacement On 23 March 2023, The 74 Media reported that thousands of residents from the western side of Shwegu were seen fleeing Shwegu township at around 0800 local time, as the military was reportedly using heavy weapons in the area. Similarly, on 17 April 2023, Kachin News Group reported that around 10,000 people had fled Shwegu, with more than half of them living in surrounding jungles, where emergency medical aid and food were needed. Individuals supporting IDPs from Shwegu told the Kachin News Group that IDPs feared returning to villages in southeast Shwegu due to concerns about the military’s return. At the time of reporting, Myanmar Witness has not identified verifiable footage of IDP movement from the township. It’s likely that internet shutdowns and ongoing conflict could have hampered the documentation and reporting of these events. As such, these claims have not, as of yet, been verified. Deceased individuals PCT reported at least 17 known KIA/PDF soldiers were killed by the military during the clashes. On 19 April 2023, RFA also reported on casualties of the clashes, including that the bodies of ten individuals were found after the military convoy left Shwegu. The victims’ names and ages were shared online. The casualties reportedly aged between 22-60 years old. RFA also noted that these individuals had sustained injuries to their throats and gunshot wounds. MRTV uploaded images of three deceased individuals allegedly killed during the clashes; two of which were wearing military fatigues. The MRTV post alleged that these individuals were KIA/PDF personnel killed during clashes in the area. Myanmar Witness could not identify images of all of the deceased individuals. Graffiti Mandalay Free Press released Images online allegedly showing messages left on structures within Shwegu (although the specific village or location remains unknown). These messages contain profanities directed against the KIA and PDF (Figure 17). Myanmar Witness has reported on similar graffiti in other sites of conflict and have largely been considered an intimidation tactic. Munitions During the course of the investigation, Myanmar Witness analysed a video posted by local residents on Facebook on 12 April 2023, in which they claim that munitions from a military aircraft had been found in Si Thaung. Myanmar Witness cannot identify with certainty the type and model of the filmed ordnance nor the system that delivered it. At the same time, Myanmar Witness has identified some noteworthy details – reported below – which allow for an overall assessment that the ordnance filmed in the video was highly likely delivered by an aircraft. In the video, seven pieces of ordnance are visible. The seven pieces of ordnance appear to be identical apart from one, which has an additional tail kit with fins section still partly attached (Figure 19). Myanmar Witness believes that it is highly likely that the other six pieces of ordnance belong to the same model as the seventh but lack the additional tail kit, which may have been lost during flight or impact. The presence of add-on tail kits strongly suggests these rounds were re-purposed to be employed by aircraft. At the same time, the lack of suspension lugs on all of the bombs’ bodies indicates that these rounds could not have been attached to any aircraft pylons. The possibility that these rounds were fired by a rocket pod must be excluded, given the absence of a rocket motor and the fixed tail fins. For these reasons Myanmar Witness strongly believes that these seven rounds may in fact be sub-munitions, released mid-air by a larger, cargo-type bomb. An additional element which corroborates this thesis is the strong resemblance between the only surviving tail kit found in Shwegu township with other add-on tail kits allegedly found in the Kokang region of Shan State – following SAC airstrikes – and posted on Facebook on 28 December 2022 (shown below). On that occasion the add-on kits were found together with a large container-type bomb. Conclusion Myanmar Witness investigated a cluster of 13 fires in Shwegu township between 24 March 2023 and 11 April 2023. These fires coincided with claims online that the military was active in the area. All 13 fires were confirmed using FIRMS and sentinel satellite imagery, and five of the fires were further verified following the geolocation of UGC of the fire damage. As a result, Myanmar Witness is confident that multiple fires occurred in villages in Shwegu around the time clashes were taking place in the area. Myanmar Witness has also identified several allegations of airstrikes and claims related to munitions found in these attacks. It is claimed online that LID 88 and the Myanmar Air Force were responsible, causing destruction to medical facilities and close to places of worship. While this could not be verified, the munitions found were consistent with those used in other Myanmar Air Force attacks. This investigation has highlighted the destruction of civilian infrastructure and identified claims related to the mass displacement of individuals from the township as well as human casualties. Myanmar Witness will continue to monitor claims related to the human toll of fires. Abbreviations Ethnic Armed Organization/Ethnic Resistance Organisation - EAO/ERO Fire Information for Resource Management System - FIRMS Kachin Independence Army - KIA People’s Defense Forces - PDF Local Defense Forces - LDF Myanmar Air Force - MAF State Administration Council - SAC User Generated Content - UGC..."
Source/publisher: Myanmar Witness
Date of entry/update: 2023-07-17
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Title: Guide on International Justice Mechanisms for Humanitarian Actors working with the Rohingya
Description: "Legal Action Worldwide (LAW) is a non-profit human rights organisation led and managed by legal professionals. LAW works with individuals and communities who have suffered grave human rights violations to obtain justice. LAW’s Rohingya Crisis programme seeks to ensure meaningful Rohingya participation in the ongoing international justice mechanisms pertaining to their treatment in Myanmar. LAW represents more than 500 Rohingya clients, who are survivors of the 2017 “clearance operations.” One of the key pillars of our programme is our Survivor Advocates network who assist and support Rohingya community members, especially survivors of sexual and gender-based violence in the camps, and also provide legal information to the Rohingya about available mechanisms to seek international justice and accountability. This Guide provides information on the Rohingya crisis and the legal avenues available to Rohingya victims and survivors who want to bring the perpetrators in Myanmar to justice for international crimes committed against their people. The Guide also sets out an overview of the ongoing international justice mechanisms currently focusing on the crimes committed against the Rohingya mainly after 2010. It contains key messages, themes and practical tools to equip humanitarian actors to support the Rohingya and their pursuit for international justice. For ease of reading, the Guide uses a ‘Questions and Answers’ approach to provide humanitarian actors with clear information and explanations..."
Source/publisher: Legal Action Worldwide
Date of entry/update: 2023-07-16
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Title: The Myanmar Crisis continues to raise questions on ASEAN unity and centrality
Sub-title: The Thailand caretaker government’s decision to engage with the military junta in Myanmar has threatened ASEAN unity
Description: "The outgoing caretaker government of Thailand hailed the Thailand-led informal meetings to engage Myanmar—joined by representatives of a few members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and neighbouring countries, namely Laos, Cambodia, India, China, Brunei, and Vietnam, as well as Myanmar—on 19 June as successful, amidst growing criticisms from several quarters. Only Thailand, Laos, and Myanmar had sent their Foreign Ministers for this meeting. The invitation sent from Thailand read, “ASEAN should fully reengage with Myanmar at the leaders’ level.” The Thai Foreign Ministry statement read, “informal dialogue would not amount to a formal ASEAN meeting, the ministry said, but would help support ASEAN’s efforts to end the violence in Myanmar.” The talks held in Pattaya were boycotted by significant regional countries such as Indonesia (the current ASEAN chair), Singapore, and Malaysia, leading to seeming divisions within the bloc. Indonesia cited the lack of consensus among ASEAN members to engage with the regime leaders, while Singapore deemed it premature to engage with the junta at the summit level. The meeting received condemnation from Myanmar’s parallel civilian government, the National Unity Government, and over 300 civil society organisations and regional lawmakers. They viewed it as a clear violation of ASEAN’s consensus agreement to exclude junta representatives from high-level meetings. The meeting received condemnation from Myanmar’s parallel civilian government, the National Unity Government, and over 300 civil society organisations and regional lawmakers. Thailand’s decision to take the lead in organising these meetings signifies the caretaker government’s intent not to rely solely on the incoming government (that may change the current military policy towards Myanmar and align it with countries that support democracy) and ASEAN to address Myanmar-related issues. Thailand’s deputy prime minister and foreign minister, Don Pramudwinai, justified this choice by emphasising the belief that efforts to tackle the crisis within Myanmar should be smooth, given they share one of the longest borders of around 2,416 km. The organisation of these talks aims to prioritise Thailand’s best interests, particularly considering the direct impact of the issue on the borders, trade, refugee conditions, and overall business activities. Thailand’s bilateral approach towards Myanmar diverges from the position adopted by ASEAN. In November 2021, Thailand’s deputy prime minister and foreign minister publicly announced his visit to Myanmar, where he met with Min Aung Hlaing, the coup’s leader. On 22 December 2022, Thailand took the initiative to arrange a meeting with representatives from mainland Southeast Asian countries, including Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, and Myanmar. Another meeting involving stakeholders from Thailand and Myanmar occurred in April 2023. Notably, both of these later meetings included the participation of ministers from Myanmar’s military government, the State Administration Council (SAC). These engagements contradict the ASEAN Five Point Consensus (5PC), which ASEAN member states agreed upon in April 2021. These actions by Thailand reflect its interests, concerns, and historical approach to its mainland neighbours to sort its bilateral position. Thailand’s rationale for engaging with Myanmar Thailand considers itself the most impacted ASEAN member state regarding the situation in Myanmar. According to reports, Thailand hosts more than 20,000 displaced people and illegal migrants from Myanmar. Similar to other Southeast Asian nations, Thailand has not signed the 1951 Refugee Convention or its 1967 Protocol, which means it does not have provisions to recognise or protect refugees according to international standards legally. Furthermore, Thailand heavily depends on importing oil and primarily gas from the Yadana field located in the Andaman Sea off the coast of Myanmar. Following the 2021 coup, Thailand’s state-owned oil and gas company, PTT Exploration and Production, actively acquired the investments Chevron and Total divested from Myanmar. The caretaker government of Thailand’s decision to host the foreign minister of the Myanmarese ruling junta for an ‘informal regional peace talk’ not only drew criticism but is said to again bring to the fore the internal divisions within the ASEAN bloc. Thailand’s reliance on Myanmar extends to the labour sector, with a significant dependence on both formal and informal workers from Myanmar in various industries, including agriculture and fisheries, construction and manufacturing, and the service sector. In 2021, Thailand stood as Myanmar’s largest trading partner, and Thai businesses have a substantial presence in Myanmar, particularly in the food and beverage and pharmaceutical sectors. However, since the 2021 coup in Myanmar, border trade between Myanmar and Thailand has significantly declined due to the junta’s restrictions to prevent weapons from reaching resistance forces. According to Myanmar’s Ministry of Commerce, under the military generals, border trade has decreased from over US$4 billion in the 2019-2020 financial year to US$3.6 billion in the 2022-2023 financial year. Ongoing border conflicts frequently delay trade, while high taxes burden traders. For nearly two years, Myanmar’s military generals have been barred from senior-level meetings of the ASEAN for not living up to the agreement to start talks with the ousted civilian government led by now-jailed Nobel laureate Aung San Suu Kyi. Therefore, the caretaker government of Thailand’s decision to host the foreign minister of the Myanmarese ruling junta for an ‘informal regional peace talk’ not only drew criticism but is said to again bring to the fore the internal divisions within the ASEAN bloc. Critics have pointed out “it risks legitimising Myanmar’s military government and is inappropriate because it is outside the official ASEAN peace initiative, known as the five-point consensus.” But the question is, does it really present ASEAN as a fractured and divided organisation in this scenario? Even though most countries like Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore did not agree to participate in this gathering, the reason cited for not doing so was the same. All these countries wanted to stick to the decision taken at the ASEAN meetings of not engaging with the top leaders of the junta until the conditions laid down by the ASEAN are met, like the junta open to engaging with the civilian opposition government, scaling down the ongoing violence, among others. Problems with the 5PC The lack of progress of the five-point consensus (5PC) signed in an emergency meeting held in Jakarta in April 2021, two months after the coup, has led many to say that there is a need for the ASEAN to now look beyond the 5PC, but does that give Thailand (a fellow ASEAN member country) the pass for hosting these informal meetings and inviting the top officials like the Foreign Minister of the junta regime? This brings into question the unity and credibility of the ASEAN. Thitinan Pongsudhirak, professor of political science at Chulalongkorn University, has pointed out, “By riding roughshod over Indonesia’s leadership, Thailand is also undermining the ways that ASEAN works and the role of its chair.” Regardless of the fact (stated in the previous section) that Thailand appears to be the most affected country by the ongoing crises in Myanmar, given that Thailand itself is on the cusp of undergoing a change in government, with the new government (if it comes to power) having stated that they will be committed to the ASEAN’s 5PC, this move to engage with the military junta in Myanmar seems like a desperate attempt by the caretaker government to try and earn one last feather in its cap. Scholars like Zachary Abuza at the National War College in Washington, D.C., have stated, “Thailand’s caretaker government seems determined to continue advancing the political and economic interests of the Thai military and royalist elites.” Countries like Indonesia and Singapore will hardly ever endorse such meetings because ASEAN forms the main nucleus of their foreign policy outlooks. This year’s ASEAN chair, Indonesia, already has a lot on its plate, like the ASEAN community-building project, tensions in the South China Sea, the impacts of the Russia-Ukraine war, the growing United States-China rivalry, promoting the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific, and the planned accession of Timor Leste as ASEAN’s 11th member this year. But according to statements from the Indonesia Foreign Ministry, it is still “undertaking efforts with the office of the ASEAN special envoy to Myanmar to achieve an inclusive dialogue with all parties in the conflict.” While it cannot be denied that the ASEAN mechanisms like the 5PC and the various summits and meetings about the Myanmar crisis have not come out with any substantive progress, it also does not seem plausible for individual member countries to organise such informal meetings by completely side-tracking the ASEAN platform. Countries like Indonesia and Singapore will hardly ever endorse such meetings because ASEAN forms the main nucleus of their foreign policy outlooks. If not all ASEAN countries are on board with such arrangements, that again raises a finger on the whole notion of unity within the ASEAN. At a time when ASEAN centrality is being championed in the debates centring on the evolving dynamics of the Indo-Pacific, and there are constant efforts by countries like Indonesia and Singapore to ensure that the ASEAN remains relevant amidst the mushrooming of the many mini-laterals and plurilaterals in the region, these ‘informal secretive meetings’ will only feed into the ongoing narrative of the ‘fading of the ASEAN unity’. Critics of the ASEAN 5PC have said that alternate plans and drastic measures should be taken, like suspending Myanmar’s membership in the ASEAN or letting the United Nations deal with this issue. These measures seem overly severe, but if the ASEAN wants to implement any of these, the decision needs to be taken following the ASEAN way and the platform of the ASEAN itself to ensure the credibility of the ‘ASEAN centrality’ principle..."
Source/publisher: Observer Research Foundation
Date of entry/update: 2023-07-15
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Title: Myanmar Humanitarian Update No. 31 | 15 July 2023
Description: "This regular update, covering humanitarian developments up to 13 July, is produced by OCHA Myanmar in collaboration with the Inter-Cluster Coordination Group and UN agencies. Response figures are based on self-reporting by organizations to clusters. The next humanitarian update will be issued in August 2023. HIGHLIGHTS & KEY MESSAGES • Ongoing conflict and natural disasters are continuing to exacerbate humanitarian needs across Myanmar. • Nearly 1.9 million internally displaced people face precarious living conditions and urgently need critical and lifesaving assistance. • Two months have passed since Cyclone Mocha struck western Myanmar and expanded humanitarian access is desperately needed to support those affected. • After a brief suspension, humanitarians have been able to re-start their regular programmes in Rakhine, but the humanitarian cyclone response remains paused by the SAC. • Distribution, transport and import requests have all been resubmitted and are now pending approval. • Countrywide, restrictions on humanitarian access have increased in multiple states and regions, notably in the Southeast and Kachin, further impeding timely and efficient aid delivery to affected and displaced communities. • Sustained support, including financial assistance, from the international community is crucial to allowing partners to stay and deliver in challenging circumstances. • Six months into 2023, the combined $US886.7 million Humanitarian Response Plan and Cyclone Mocha Flash Appeals, remain critically underfunded, with only 17 per cent of the required funding received, as of 14 July..."
Source/publisher: UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (New York) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of entry/update: 2023-07-15
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Title: Human Rights Situation weekly update (January to July, 2023) [EN/MY]
Description: "Human Rights Violations Committed by Military Junta from January to June, 2023. Military Junta troops Committed 1222 times of Human Right Violations in 15 Regions and States within 6 months from January to June 2023. According to Social Media and News Media, they committed 30 types of Human Right Violations. Among those Human Right Violations, the Military Junta attacked with heavy artillery 292 times to the Civilians and their places the most. As a second, the Military troops burnt and destroyed the civilians’ houses and properties 281 times. Third, they arrested the Anti- Military activists who protested in various ways 259 times. The Military Junta Troop is targeting and attacking Civilians entire country and also destroying the Civilians’ houses and buildings by launching airstrikes 128 times. As the worst Human Right Violations, the Military committed massacres by launching airstrikes and dropping bombs on over 100 civilians including children, and all died at Bazigyi Village in Kanbalu Township, Sagaing Region on April 11th in 2023. Military Junta committed rape and kill over 8 women and a total of 12 women died within 6 months. 2 civilians from Yangon Region and 6 from Mandalay Region, a total of 8 were arrested and killed by the Thwaythout Force that works under Military Junta. They committed arresting the civilians, burning the people, raping the women, and using the locals as human shields along their matching area. Civilians fled to the safety of the Military 180 times within 6 months. The Military Junta troop has been still committing Human Right Violations in various ways since the coup on 1st February 2021..."
Source/publisher: Network for Human Rights Documentation-Burma
Date of entry/update: 2023-07-14
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Title: Myanmar’s Pro-Democracy Camp Faults Secret Meeting With Aung San Suu Kyi
Description: "The National Unity Government of Myanmar, led by opponents of the ruling junta, has criticized a recent meeting between Thailand's top diplomat and Aung San Suu Kyi, saying that it may complicate ASEAN's efforts to resolve the crisis in Myanmar. Thailand's foreign minister, Don Pramudwinai, has revealed that he met with the ousted Myanmar leader on July 9, and that she expressed her willingness to discuss with him further the issues in her war-torn country. Zin Mar Aung, the foreign minister of the NUG, expressed her disapproval, saying the Thai minister's actions were an attempt to parallel ASEAN's role in resolving the crisis. She said the Thai official's move calls into question the existing arrangement in which Western powers and the U.N. Security Council have pushed for ASEAN to play a central role in resolving the conflict, which has escalated since a military coup in February 2021. Five-point proposal Indonesia’s foreign minister, whose country is the current chair of ASEAN, stated at an annual meeting of ASEAN foreign ministers this week in Jakarta that ASEAN would continue to prioritize its five-point peace proposal. The proposal, developed in 2021, calls for a cessation of violence and brokered dialogue between the parties. The junta has faced widespread criticism for failing to implement its terms. Thailand's foreign minister is the only international official who has been granted access to Suu Kyi since the coup. He assured ASEAN officials at the meeting in Jakarta that Suu Kyi was in good health. In a statement released Friday, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken called on Myanmar’s military regime to “implement ASEAN’S five-point consensus” and to “support a return to democratic governance.” For more perspectives and insights, VOA conducted an interview with the NUG's Zin Mar Aung, via Zoom, on Thursday. This interview has been edited for length and clarity. VOA: Did Thailand's foreign minister discuss his secret trip to Myanmar with the NUG? According to multiple media outlets, he briefed his ASEAN colleagues about his meeting with Aung San Suu Kyi on Sunday in Myanmar during the bloc's foreign ministers' meeting in Jakarta. Has the NUG approached him directly about these matters? Zin Mar Aung, NUG foreign minister: No. We didn’t receive any direct communication from the Thai foreign minister regarding his meeting with Aung San Suu Kyi. The NUG has attempted to contact both the foreign minister and the Thai special envoy on Myanmar, but have received absolutely no response. We have often attempted diplomatic communication with Thailand's foreign minister on issues such as Myanmar's refugee crisis and the arrest and detention of migrant workers. The Thai foreign ministry has yet to respond to the NUG officially on any of these issues but continues to communicate with the junta regularly. VOA: According to Japan’s Kyodo News, Aung San Suu Kyi told the minister that she supports "dialogue without any preconditions" to address her country's ongoing issues. What is NUG's opinion on this? Zin Mar Aung: The first thing I'd want to point out is that the Thai foreign minister's comments about conveying Aung San Suu Kyi's views are inherently one-sided. She is a political prisoner with no freedom to communicate with the outside world. There were only two people at the meeting, so we have to take only his word for what was said. That is why we are skeptical that the Thai foreign minister or the junta would accurately convey messages from her that don’t fit their agenda. VOA: How does this meeting affect the NUG? Zin Mar Aung: The main issue is, due to the Thai foreign minister's visit, both ASEAN and the international community have become more confused when dealing with the Myanmar issue. Thailand stated that because it is Myanmar's ASEAN neighbor, it bears greater responsibility for the Myanmar issue. However, they actually try to go around the five-point consensus, rather than helping to implement it. Thailand's parallel track, outside of official channels, violates the ASEAN common agreement. Western countries and Myanmar's neighbors, such as India and China, have pushed for ASEAN centrality in resolving Myanmar's problems. NUG also have criticisms of the ASEAN, and we feel that ASEAN alone is no longer enough; however, the Thai foreign minister’s actions only serve to weaken it further. VOA: Secretary of State Anthony Blinken, while attending the ASEAN foreign ministers' meeting, stated that he would focus on attempting to end the crisis in Myanmar. However, there is also focus on the South China Sea dispute between China and ASEAN countries. So, do you think the U.S. is effectively putting pressure on ASEAN on the Myanmar issue? Zin Mar Aung: I must respond that it is ineffective. In the case of Myanmar, there is an ASEAN centrality policy that states that only ASEAN should take the lead in addressing the issue. It arose because powerful countries do not want to conflict with one another on the Myanmar issue. They went to ASEAN to avoid their conflicts. The Myanmar issue is simply one of several for world powers and ASEAN members. There are also regional issues, such as the South China Sea problem. There are also Indo-Pacific concerns to consider. For the U.S., Myanmar is simply a small component of their overall strategy; similarly, exerting pressure on ASEAN is only a small element of their overall strategy. As a result, the United States cannot exert significant pressure on ASEAN..."
Source/publisher: "Voice of America" (Washington, D.C)
Date of entry/update: 2023-07-14
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Title: National Unity Government Statement (6/2023)
Description: "1. The National Unity Government of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar considers the disclosures made by the Thai Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Don Pramudwinai, to the ASEAN Foreign Minister’s Meeting and to the press, of an engagement with the State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi on his recent trip to Myanmar contravene ASEAN’s authority, the ASEAN Five Point Consensus, and the role of the ASEAN Special Envoy. 2. In particular, the Thai Foreign Minister’s unilateral report of the alleged views and position of Aung San Suu Kyi are unacceptable and illegitimate, in view of her inability to not only receive factual and complete information, but to also speak freely and openly under her current arbitrary detention and solitary confinement. 3. We will continue to welcome all good faith efforts of the international community, including our neighbors, to promote a lasting and durable peace, justice and freedom, and the flourishing of a federal democracy in Myanmar, but we must stress that these outcomes will never be achieved by enabling, engaging, and cooperating with the illegitimate military coup council. 4. The ultimate goal of Myanmar’s Spring Revolution is the permanent removal and ending of all dictatorships that have become entrenched, persistent, and have oppressed Myanmar over the past 70 years, and to establish a federal democratic system free from the influence and remnants of dictators. 5. In order to successfully achieve this goal, various revolutionary forces and organizations with diverse representation have united and are working together hand-in-hand with the principles of collective leadership, collective responsibility, and enduring commitment based on equality. 6. As such, the National Unity Government, with a firm hold on the vision and values of a federal future, pledges to continue in our efforts to achieve these revolutionary goals established in line with the aspirations of the people, unwavering and unshakeable until victory..."
Source/publisher: National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update: 2023-07-14
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Title: Call for Concrete Actions from the International Community, the Free and Democratic World, on the Deepening Crisis in Myanmar
Description: "We have heard the powerful message and heartbreaking updates from the UN Special Rapporteur and the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. We urge you to take a few moments to listen to this crucial update and join us in taking decisive actions. Unless immediate actions are taken, the children of Myanmar are at risk of becoming a lost generation. Since the attempted bloody coup on February 1, 2021, the genocidal military junta has mercilessly taken the lives of over 800 innocent children, unjustly imprisoned more than 380 children as political prisoners, held 51 children hostage to pressure their parents, displaced over 660,000 children, left more than 5.8 million children in need of lifesaving aid, and deprived dozens of millions of children of their right to education. These unspeakable crises demand not mere resolutions, but concrete actions from the international community in the following areas: MONEY - We once again call on the international community, the free and democratic world, to take immediate action in cutting off the flow of international financing to the genocidal military junta, which fuels their fighter jets and arms their bomb factories. Please join the United States in sanctioning Myanmar's financial institutions, which serve as the main channels for cash flow to the junta's banks. Please join the European Union in sanctioning MOGE, one of the junta's primary sources of income, and join other nations in implementing an arms embargo and sanctioning all major financial contributors to the junta. WEAPONS - We once again call on the international community, the free and democratic world, to take immediate action in disrupting the flow of international arms into the hands of the genocidal military junta. The more weapons they possess, the more innocent lives are lost. It is vitally crucial to disable the genocidal military junta's weapon factories and dismantle their lethal bomb factories. LEGITIMACY - We once again call on the international community, the free and democratic world, to deny the military junta's illegitimate claim to power, as they are responsible for the murder of their own people. It is crucial to cut off all diplomatic engagements with the military junta's leadership. They, the murderers of Myanmar's people, should not represent the people of Myanmar at any level. These criminals must be held accountable for their crimes against humanity and serve their prison sentences. Furthermore, the people of Myanmar urgently require assistance in the following areas to restore democracy, peace, and stability not only in our nation but for the entire region: SANCTIONS - We once again call on the international community, the free and democratic world, to take immediate action by imposing coordinated, stronger, and targeted sanctions against the military junta. RECOGNITION - We once again call on the international community, the free and democratic world, to officially recognize the National Unity Government (NUG) as the sole legitimate democratic representative of Myanmar. SUPPORT - We once again call on the international community, the free and democratic world, to support the brave people of Myanmar in their courageous struggle against the genocidal military dictatorship. Stand with us in our pursuit of freedom and federal democratization, which is the only path to peace, prosperity, and stability not only for Myanmar but for the entire region. For the past 27 months, the people of Myanmar have endured crimes against humanity committed by the genocidal military junta. They face these atrocities not because of their actions, but because of their unwavering belief in freedom, federal democracy, and their refusal to accept injustice, tyranny, and brutal military dictatorship. Together, let us take a stand against these grave violations and work towards a future where the people of Myanmar can live in peace, dignity, and freedom. Our collective actions can make a difference and bring hope to the 54 million people of Myanmar who deserve a brighter and more just future..."
Source/publisher: Ministry of International Cooperation Myanmar
Date of entry/update: 2023-07-13
[field_licence]
Type: Individual Documents
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Format : pdf
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Title: လွတ်လပ်သည့် အပြည်ပြည်ဆိုင်ရာ ဒီမိုကရေစီနိုင်ငံများအနေဖြင့် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံရှိ ဆိုးရွားလာသောပဍိပက္ခအခြေအနေများအတွက် ထိရောက်ခိုင်မာသည့် အရေးယူဆောင်ရွက်မှုများလုပ်ဆောင်ရန် တောင်းဆိုခြင်း။
Description: "ကုလသမဂ္ဂအထူးကိုယ်စားလှယ်နှင့် ကုလသမဂ္ဂ လူ့အခွင့်အရေးဆိုင်ရာ မဟာမင်းကြီးရုံးက တင်ပြခဲ့သည့် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံရှိ စိတ်ကြေကွဲစရာအခြေအနေများနှင့် အားကောင်းသော သတင်းစကားများကို ကြားသိခွင့်ရခဲ့သည်။ဤအရေးပါသော နောက်ဆုံးဖြစ်ပေါ်လျက်ရှိသော အခြေအနေများကို အချိန်ပေးနားထောင်ပြီး ပြတ်သားသော အရေးယူမှုများပြုလုပ်နိုင်ရန် ပူးပေါင်းပေးပါ။ အရေးယူမှုများကို ချက်ချင်းမလုပ်ဆောင်ပါက မြန်မာနိုင်ငံရှိကလေးများသည် အနာဂတ်ပျက်သုဉ်းတော့မည်ဖြစ်သည်။ ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ်၊ ဖေဖော်ဝါရီလ ၁ ရက်နေ့မှစပြီး စစ်အာဏာရှင်ရဲ့ သွေးချောင်းစီးသော အာဏာသိမ်းရန်ကြိုးပမ်းခဲ့ကတည်းက အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စုသည် အပြစ်မဲ့ ကလေးသူငယ် ၈၀၀ ကျော်ကို သတ်ဖြတ်ခဲ့ခြင်း၊ ကလေးပေါင်း ၃၈၀ ကျော်ကို နိုင်ငံရေးအကျဉ်းသားများအဖြစ် မတရားဖမ်းဆီးချုပ်နှောင်ထားခြင်း၊ မိဘများကို ဖိအားပေးဖို့ရန်အတွက် သူတို့၏ကလေး ၅၁ ယောက်ကို ဓားစာခံများအဖြစ် ဖမ်းဆီးထားခြင်း၊ ကလေးပေါင်း ၆၆၀,၀၀၀ ကျော် အိုးမဲ့အိမ်မဲ့ ဖြစ်သွားရခြင်း၊ ၅.၈ သန်းကျော်သော် ကလေးများ အသက်ကယ်အကူအညီများလိုအပ်ခြင်းနှင့် ကလေး သန်းပေါင်းများစွာ ပညာသင်ယူဖို့ အခွင့်အရေး ဆုံးရှုံးခဲ့ရသည်။ မဖော်ပြနိုင်လောက်အောင် ဆိုးရွားသည့် အကျပ်အတည်းများအတွက် ညင်သာသောဖြေရှင်းနည်းလမ်းများမဟုတ်ပဲ အပြည်ပြည်ဆိုင်ရာ သက်ဆိုင်ရာအဖွဲ့အစည်းများမှ အောက်ပါကဏ္ဍများတွင် ပြင်းထန်ခိုင်လုံသော အရေးယူမှုများလုပ်ဆောင်ရန် အရေးကြီးပါသည်။ ဘဏ္ဍာရေး/ ငွေကြေး - လူမျိုးတုံးသတ်ဖြတ်နေသော အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စုအပေါ် အပြည်ပြည်ဆိုင်ရာ ဘဏ္ဍာငွေစီးဆင်းမှုများကို ဖြတ်တောက်ပေးပါ။ ၎င်းဘဏ္ဍာငွေများက စစ်တပ်၏ တိုက်လေယာဉ်များအတွက် လောင်စာဆီများနှင့် ဗုံးစက်ရုံကို အထောက်အကူပစ္စည်းများ ထောက်ပံ့ပေးခြင်းဖြစ်သည်။ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စုအတွက် ငွေကြေးလဲလှယ်ပေးသော မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၏ ဘဏ္ဍာရေးအဖွဲ့အစည်းများအပေါ် အမေရိကန်နိုင်ငံမှ အရေးယူဒဏ်ခတ်ပိတ်ဆို့သကဲ့သို့ အခြားသော အပြည်ပြည်ဆိုင်ရာနိုင်ငံများကလည်း ပူးပေါင်းပါဝင်ပေးပါ။ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စု၏ အဓိက ဝင်ငွေအရင်းအမြစ်များထဲမှ တစ်ခုဖြစ်သော MOGE ကို အရေးယူဒဏ်ခတ်ပိတ်ဆို့ရာတွင် ဥရောပသမဂ္ဂနှင့်အတူ ပူးပေါင်းပါဝင်ပေးပါ။ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီကို အဓိက ဘဏ္ဍာရေးထောက်ပံ့ပေးသူများနှင့် လက်နက်များစီးဆင်းမှုကို ဖြတ်တောက်သည့် အခြားနိုင်ငံများနှင့်အတူ ပူးပေါင်းပေးပါ။ လက်နက်များ - လူမျိုးတုံးသတ်ဖြတ်သော စစ်တပ်လက်ထဲသို့ အပြည်ပြည်ဆိုင်ရာမှ လက်နက်စီးဆင်းမှုကို ဖြတ်တောက်ပေးပါ။ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီပိုင်ဆိုင်ထားသည့် လက်နက်ပိုများလာသည်နှင့်အမျှ အပြစ်မဲ့သူများ အသက်ဆုံးရှုံးမှု ပိုမိုများပြားမည်ဖြစ်သည်။ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်၏ လက်နက်ထုတ် စက်ရုံများကို ပိတ်ပင်ပေးပြီး ဗုံးစက်ရုံများကိုလည်း ဖြိုဖျက်ပေးပါ။ တရားဝင်မှု - မိမိတို့ပြည်သူများကို အကြမ်းဖက်သတ်ဖြတ်သည့် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စု၏ တရားဝင်မှုရယူရန် ကြိုးပမ်းခြင်းကို လျစ်လျူရှုပေးပါ။ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ခေါင်းဆောင်များနှင့် သံတမန်ရေးရာ ချိတ်ဆက် ဆက်ဆံမှုအားလုံးကို ဖြတ်တောက်ပေးပါ။ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ခေါင်းဆောင်များက မြန်မာပြည်သူများကို မည်သည့်အဆင့်တွင်မှ ကိုယ်စားပြုရန် မထိုက်တန်ပါ။ ဤလူမျိုးတုံးသတ်ဖြတ်သည့် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စုသည် ၎င်းတို့ကျူးလွန်သော လူသားမျိုးနွယ်အပေါ်ဆန့်ကျင်သည့် ရာဇဝတ်မှုများအတွက် အပြည့်အဝ တာဝန်ယူ၊ တာဝန်ခံရမည်ဖြစ်ပြီး ထောင်ဒဏ်များ ကျခံရမည်ဖြစ်သည်။ ထို့ပြင် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံပြည်သူများသည် နိုင်ငံအတွင်းသာမက ဒေသတစ်ခုလုံးတွင် ဒီမိုကရေစီ၊ ငြိမ်းချမ်းရေးနှင့် တည်ငြိမ်အေးချမ်းရေးကိုပြန်လည်ထူထောင်နိုင်ရန်အတွက် အောက်ပါအကူအညီများ အရေးတကြီး လိုအပ်လျက်ရှိသည်။ အရေးယူဒဏ်ခတ်ပိတ်ဆို့ခြင်း - အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စုအပေါ် ပြင်းထန်သော ပစ်မှတ်ထားအရေးယူ ဒဏ်ခတ်ပိတ်ဆို့မှုများ နိုင်ငံတကာမှညှိနှိုင်းပြုလုပ်ပေးပါ။ အသိအမှတ်ပြုခြင်း - မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၏ တရားဝင်အစိုးရ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ(NUG)ကို အသိအမှတ်ပြုပေးပါ။ ထောက်ပံ့ခြင်း - လူမျိုးတုံးသတ်ဖြတ်သည့် စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ်ကို ရဲရင့်စွာ တော်လှန်တိုက်ခိုက်နေကြသည့် မြန်မာပြည်သူများကို ထောက်ပံ့ပေးပါ။ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံနှင့် ဒေသတွင်းတစ်ခုလုံးအတွက် လွတ်လပ်ရေး၊ ငြိမ်းချမ်းရေး၊ သာယာဝပြောရေးနှင့် တည်ငြိမ်အေးချမ်းရေးတို့ဆီဦးတည်သော တစ်ခုတည်းသောလမ်းကြောင်းဖြစ်သည့် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီရရှိရေးတိုက်ပွဲတွင် မြန်မာပြည်သူများနှင့်အတူ ရပ်တည်ပေးပါ။ လွန်ခဲ့သော ၂၇ လအတွင်းတွင် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စုက ကျူးလွန်သော လူသားမျိုးနွယ်ကို ဆန့်ကျင်သည့်ရာဇဝတ်မှုကို မြန်မာနိုင်ငံသားများက ခါးစီးခံစားခဲ့ကြရသည်။ ဤကဲ့သို့ရာဇဝတ်မှုများကို ခံစားခဲ့ကြရခြင်းသည် ပြည်သူများ၏ လုပ်ရပ်ကြောင့်မဟုတ်ပဲ လွတ်လပ်မှု၊ ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီအပေါ် ယုံကြည်ခြင်းနှင့် တရားမဝင်စစ်အာဏာရှင်များနှင့် ၎င်းတို့၏ အကြမ်းဖက်မှုများကို လက်ခံရန်ငြင်းဆန်ခြင်းကြောင့်ဖြစ်သည်။ ရာဇဝတ်မှုများကို မြေမြှပ်ပြီး မြန်မာပြည်သူများ ငြိမ်းချမ်းစွာ၊ သိက္ခာရှိစွာနှင့် လွတ်လပ်စွာ နေထိုင်နိုင်မည့် အနာဂတ်အတွက် အတူတကွ ခိုင်မာစွာရပ်တည်ရန် တိုက်တွန်းလိုပါသည်။ အားလုံးအတူတကွ ပေါင်းစည်းလုပ်ဆောင်ခြင်းဖြင့် တရားမျှတပြီး ပိုမိုတောက်ပသောအနာဂတ်နှင့် ထိုက်တန်သောမြန်မာပြည်သူ ၅၄ သန်းအတွက် မျှော်လင့်ခြင်းနှင့် ပြောင်းလဲခြင်းများယူဆောင်ပေးကြရန် တိုက်တွန်းလိုပါသည်။ လေးစားစွာဖြင့် ဒေါက်တာဆာဆာ ပြည်ထောင်စုဝန်ကြီး အပြည်ပြည်ဆိုင်ရာပူးပေါင်းဆောင်ရွက်ရေး ဝန်ကြီးဌာန အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ..."
Source/publisher: Ministry of International Cooperation Myanmar
Date of entry/update: 2023-07-13
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Title: Myanmar: Violence Against Health Care in Conflict 2022
Description: "OVERVIEW: The Safeguarding Health in Conflict Coalition (SHCC) identified 271 incidents of violence against or obstruction of health care in Myanmar in 2022, a decrease from 474 in 2021. In these incidents, 112 health workers were arrested and 27 were killed, undermining health care providers’ ability to maintain safe staffing levels to effectively meet patient needs. In addition, health facilities were damaged or destroyed on at least 46 occasions and raided 32 times, impacting the population’s access to health care. A total of 103 incidents were related to the ongoing political protests following the February 2021 military coup. The remaining 168 occurred in the context of armed conflicts that erupted before and after the coup. This factsheet is based on the dataset 2022 SHCC Health Care Myanmar Data, which is available for download on the Humanitarian Data Exchange (HDX)..."
Source/publisher: Insecurity Insight, Safeguarding Health in Conflict
Date of entry/update: 2023-07-12
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Title: ETC Singapore’s Myanmar divestment raises more questions for Singapore
Description: "The Singapore Exchange-listed company Emerging Towns & Cities Singapore (ETC) has announced an agreement to sell its controlling stake in the Golden City real estate development, built on land leased from the Office of the Commander-in-Chief (Army), Office of the Quartermaster General. The deal involves the sale of the ETC Singapore subsidiary DAS, which owns 70% of the Singapore company Uni Global Power. Uni Global Power own 70% of the Myanmar company Golden Land Real Estate Development, which is the developer of the Golden City project. The buyer is Grand Ally Pte Ltd, a private Singapore company set up in February 2023 and owned by key members of ETC who manage the Golden City project. Grand Ally is controlled by Li Bo, a Chinese citizen who is the Vice President of Sales and Marketing for ETC, and the company’s regional sales and marketing director for Myanmar. The other shareholder/directors are Lai Xuejun and Zhang Xiaoping, who are also Chinese citizens. ETC sold its stake in Golden City for S$4 million, which involved a loss of S$80.2 million, according to the company’s announcement. The fact that ETC’s sale involves related parties creates risks that the company may still maintain links to the Myanmar military through its personnel and shareholders. Justice For Myanmar asked ETC if Li Bo, Lai Xuejun and Zhang Xiaoping will continue to have a role and hold shares in ETC after completion of the sale but did not receive a response. As Grand Ally is registered in Singapore, Singapore will continue to be exposed to Golden City’s business with the Myanmar military, which is committing ongoing war crimes and crimes against humanity with total impunity. Through its campaign of terror against the people, the Myanmar military junta has so far murdered over 3,700, arbitrarily arrested more than 23,700, committed indiscriminate airstrikes and shelling, torture, sexual violence and displaced at least 1.5 million since the coup attempt in 2021. Justice For Myanmar urges Singapore Exchange Regulation to scrutinise ETC’s divestment to ensure that SGX has no further direct or indirect exposure to business with the Myanmar military. We urge Singapore to deregister Grand Ally Pte Ltd and to impose sanctions on the junta and its business interests. Singapore banks should ensure that they do not hold accounts for Grand Ally or support the Golden City project in any way. Governments should impose sanctions on Grand Ally Investments, its Myanmar partner, Jewellery Luck Group of Companies, and their owners and directors. Jewellery Luck Group of Companies owns 30% of Golden Land Real Estate Development through its subsidiary, Nature Link Company Limited. Under the sale, ETC will discharge itself from a loan facility between Golden Land Real Estate and the international banks ICBC, E.SUN, and the Myanmar crony bank, Kanbawza, which will continue to be exposed to the financing of the Myanmar military through the Golden City project. All banks should end their business with the Myanmar military and its associates. ETC’s road to divestment The sale comes after a February 25, 2021, Justice For Myanmar report into ETC’s payments to the Myanmar army and the implications for Singapore Exchange, which found that payments to the army included a US$6.8 million “land use premium” and annual payments of US$2.8 million. The deal is under a build-operate-transfer contract, where the army receives the building as an asset at the end of the maximum 70-year term. Total payments to the army over the full 70 years would amount to US$191.1 million. In response to Justice For Myanmar’s report, Singapore Exchange Regulation took regulatory actions against ETC on February 26 2021 and the company suspended trading. To address questions from the SGX regulator, ETC commissioned independent reviews into payments to the Myanmar military and its legal compliance. The independent review of transactions, carried out by Nexia TS for the period from October 2016 to February 2021, identified two payments to the Office of the Quartermaster General in 2018 and one in 2020, totalling US$5.035 million. According to the summary of findings, payments to the army were communicated “verbally and there were no formal written invoices”. The review also found that annual payments to the army were made in MMK using a below market exchange rate of 830 MMK to the USD agreed to with the quartermaster general’s office, although the reviewers noted that there is “no formal written agreement or notification”. ETC had kept the balance as an accrued land lease premium. In October 2021, Justice For Myanmar and the Australian Centre for International Justice published a legal memo from international law experts Felicity Gerry KC, International Criminal Court counsel, and Daye Gang of the Victorian Bar in Australia, which found that international law and guidance places due diligence obligations on the Singapore Exchange and possible liability on the Monetary Authority of Singapore and the Singapore Government for companies doing business with the Myanmar military. The legal memo found that Singapore has an international legal obligation “to investigate, prevent and cease transactions that amount to wrongful acts”, which are applicable to business transactions with the Myanmar military and its business interests, and that legal remedies would be “easily pursued and enforced” against SGX if the Myanmar military’s financial organs are found to be in breach of international laws and/or compliance regulations including international human rights and humanitarian law. In December 2022, ETC released an executive summary of its legal compliance review, after a follow-on engagement was commissioned to respond to the October 2021 legal memo following questions from Singapore Exchange Regulation. The review, conducted by Kelvin Chia Partnership, outlined steps for ETC to avoid being caught by unilateral sanctions, such as by avoiding company personnel who are US, UK or EU citizens; to pay the Myanmar military in kyat; to avoid business in the US, UK or EU; and to use third-party contractors in Golden City for the installation of any machinery from the US, UK or EU. ETC’s latest annual report shows a “partial payment” of 2.33 billion kyat (S$1.68 million) to the Myanmar army in 2022, which deepened ETC’s complicity in the Myanmar military’s atrocity crimes. Justice For Myanmar spokesperson Yadanar Maung says: “ETC is a longstanding business partner of the Myanmar military that is complicit in the junta’s genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. “ETC’s divestment was necessary but raises further questions that we urge Singapore authorities to address, including whether SGX will remain exposed to the Golden City project, and the fact that a private Singapore company will continue to bankroll the murderous junta. “We are heartened that Singapore Exchange Regulation has taken swift action against ETC over its business with the Myanmar military, and to issue sanctions guidance that strengthens the impact of Myanmar sanctions for SGX-listed companies. “It is a positive sign that Singapore authorities are investigating companies for possible links to the supply of arms and equipment to the Myanmar military, but Singapore needs to do far more to respond to the crisis in Myanmar and to prevent the Singapore companies from providing funds to the junta, including through imposing sanctions as it has done on Russia. “Governments must now sanction Grand Ally and its owners, who, together with Jewellery Luck Group of Companies, have chosen to continue to pursue business with the Myanmar army and finance its atrocities.”..."
Source/publisher: Justice For Myanmar
Date of entry/update: 2023-07-11
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Title: Press Statement on the Official Visit of Foreign Minister H.E. Daw Zin Mar Aung to the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste
Description: "The delegation led by H.E. Daw Zin Mar Aung, Foreign Minister of the National Unity Government of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar paid an official visit to Timor-Leste (East Timor) at the official invitation of the President of Timor-Leste from 1st to 5th July 2023. The purpose of the visit was to enhance relationships with countries in the region, build stronger and closer ties with neighboring countries and promote the role of Myanmar in regional organizations. During the official visit, the delegation led by Union Minister engaged in meetings with relevant officials including the President, the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste. The Delegation led by Union Minister attended the inauguration ceremony of the new government of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste which was held on 1st July 2023. During the ceremony, Union Minister and the delegation had the opportunity to meet with Timor-Leste’s government leaders, regional leaders and other relevant officials. In his speech, the President of Timor-Leste acknowledged and conveyed his greetings to Foreign Minister H.E. Daw Zin Mar Aung and U Linn Thant, the Representative to the Czech Republic of the National Unity Government. On 3rd July, Union Minister and the delegation had a cordial meeting and engaged in a discussion with H.E. Mr Jose Ramos Horta at his office for an hour. During the meeting, Union Minister presented the President of Timor-Leste with a portrait of State Counsellor H.E. Daw Aung San Suu Kyi as a token of remembrance. Following this, Union Minister and the delegation met with H.E. Ms Maria Fernanda Lay, the President of the National Parliament of Timor-Leste at her office. During the official visit to Timor-Leste, Union Minister and the delegation had a meeting with Foreign Minister H.E. Mr. Bendito dos Santos Freitas at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation of Timor-Leste and held discussions with other relevant officials on 4th July. Union Minister and the delegation also met with H.E. Mr. Kay Rala Xanana Gusmao, Prime Minister of Timor-Leste at the Prime Minister’s Office in the morning of 5th July. As Timor-Leste is a country that emerged from the people’s revolution and its national leaders are also representatives of the people, during the meeting with Union Minister, they warmly welcomed the delegation, wholeheartedly supported the Myanmar people’s revolution and shared their own experiences. On 5th July, Union Minister and the delegation were bid farewell by the relevant officials of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Lester. The official visit of the delegation led by the Union Minister concluded successfully, encompassing discussions on political agreements, including bilateral cooperation. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the National Unity Government has consistently prioritized fostering cordial relations with neighboring countries and regional countries since its establishment. The Ministry remains committed to further strengthening relationships and promoting cooperation as its foremost objective..."
Source/publisher: Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Myanmar - NUG
Date of entry/update: 2023-07-10
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Title: Urgent Statement: Extrajudicial Murders of Political Prisoners
Description: "On June 27, under the pretense of transferring them, the military removed political prisoners from Daik-U (Kyaiksakaw) Prison. 37 political prisoners have since gone missing. However, when concerned families of the political prisoners inquired at Daik-U Prison, the prison authorities repeatedly denied the whereabouts of these prisoners. On July 7, 2023, the Staff Officer of Daik-U Prison, Kyaw Zeya (A-3702) sent a signed letter to the family of Khant Linn Naing (aka Ko Khant, aka Let Wel), Prison Registration No. PaKha/22/00436, the son of Than Soe Naing, to inform them of his death. On July 8, Kyaw Zeya sent another signed letter to the family of Pyae Phyo Hein (aka Ko Pyae), Prison Registration No. DaU/22/00176, the son of Kyaw Oo, to inform them of his death. The letters stated that while transferring prisoners from Daik-U Prison to Insein Prison, a transport vehicle suffered an accident. Seizing the opportunity, the two of them (Khant Linn Naing and Pyae Phyo Hein) were alleged to have attempted escape. As a result, they were killed by the security forces who fired “warning shots” at them in an attempt to recapture. Despite the letters being dated as “June 29”, they arrived to the 2 families on only July 7 and July 8 respectively. However, in envelope provided to the wife of Pyae Phyo Hein, the letter inside the envelope was in fact addressed to Khin Moe Moe, the wife of the still missing Aung Myo Thu. According to this, there are clear grounds to believe the life of Aung Myo Thu is in danger. Prison transfers are but one of the excuses used, and according to events in recent months there are consistent reports of people being removed from prisons, being interrogated, and killed. On July 2, the family of political prisoner Sein Win was informed about his passing in Myingyan Prison that same day from gastrointestinal tract bleeding. However, prisoners inside the prison revealed that Sein Win had been removed from prison and interrogated. His family members also stated that bruises were found on his body from the time of his death. On June 7, Pyu Saw Htee militiamen went to the house of political prisoner Kaung Zarni Hein’s (aka La Pyae) mother and sister, and murdered them. Thereafter, on July 6, the junta forces killed political prisoners Kaung Zarni Hein and Kyaw Thura, according to reports from within the junta’s community. It is clear, these brazen murders of political prisoners in prisons violates not only domestic laws, but also international laws. Such killings mirror the unlawful and sadistic murders of the Jewish community by the fascist Nazi Germany during the World War II. Moreover, political prisoners removed from Daik-U Prison remain missing without a trace. It is currently unknown whether they are dead or alive. These actions overstep the procedures of prison, along with committing the heinous crime of unjust torture and illegal killings. This is also a blatant violation of the ASEAN Human Rights Convention. In Burma, the rule of law has been rendered void since the military junta coup by the supporting pillars of junta rule: the judges; soldiers; police; prison staff, who have intentionally perpetrated wrongful arrests, unlawful sentencings, illegal killings, torture and persecution of political prisoners in prisons, at the command of the junta. We, the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners, strongly condemn such unlawful killings and torture, we will do our best to ensure justice for all political prisoners who have been wrongfully imprisoned. All perpetrating parties must be held accountable for these acts. In addition to the above-mentioned crimes, the human rights violations, unlawful killings, and arbitrary torture that Burma experiences day after day are violations of international human rights law. These violations cannot be dealt with within the country’s judiciary at this time. Therefore, we strongly urge the international community to make a collective effort to take action through international judicial mechanisms. Since the unjust seizure of state power by the terrorist junta led by Min Aung Hlaing on February 1, 2021, there have been at least a total 3,757 people killed. 150 of them lost their lives in prison due to poor healthcare and ill-treatment, or tortured to death during interrogation. The numbers shown here were based on the data AAPP collected, the real number of fatalities could be higher..."
Source/publisher: Assistance Association for Political Prisoners
Date of entry/update: 2023-07-10
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Title: Widening Split Overshadows ASEAN’s Latest Push for Peace in Myanmar
Description: "The Myanmar crisis and implementation of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ peace plan for the country’s post-coup conflict is set to dominate the ASEAN foreign ministers’ retreat on Wednesday (July 12). One notable absentee will be junta foreign minister Than Swe, who has not been invited despite Myanmar’s membership in the regional bloc. The junta leadership has been excluded from ASEAN meetings since late 2021 after they failed to honor the peace plan, known as the five-point consensus. ASEAN ministers joining the meeting are expected to express their frustration and concern over the conflict, with many showing signs of ‘Myanmar fatigue.’ But Myanmar’s neighbor Thailand will likely maintain its policy of appeasing the junta. Thai foreign minister Don Pramudwinai flew into Naypyitaw on Sunday to meet with the regime’s senior leadership. Details of the meeting are unknown. Don plans to attend this week’s foreign ministers’ retreat in Jakarta, where he will be able to update other ASEAN members on his talks in Myanmar. Patience is wearing thin with a peace process that has failed to gain traction, and ASEAN is under pressure to find a solution for Myanmar. Stubborn generals have been unable to control vast swaths of the country despite waging a brutal military campaign against both armed and peaceful opposition to their rule. The majority of Myanmar citizens continue to oppose the regime following the military takeover in February 2021. Current ASEAN chair Indonesia is taking a hardline stance against Myanmar’s military rulers for failing to implement the five-point consensus, especially the points related to ending violence, humanitarian assistance and jump-starting political dialogue. ASEAN leaders reached the consensus for Myanmar during an emergency summit in April 2021, two months after the military staged a coup against the democratically elected National League for Democracy government. But the Southeast Asian bloc has since been heavily criticized for its inaction in pressing ahead with the five-point plan. As chair, Jakarta has also held several meetings with Myanmar stakeholders including the country’s shadow National Unity Government (NUG), its People’s Defense Force (PDF) armed wing and allied ethnic armed organizations (EAOs). “We have conducted 110 engagements, in the form of in-person meetings, virtual meetings, and phone calls, including my own face-to-face meetings with both the NUG and SAC [junta] foreign ministers on several occasions,” Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi said. But observers say the peace process has made little if any progress, citing the junta’s ongoing atrocities including deadly airstrikes against civilians. At the same time, ASEAN has been under pressure from its dialogue partners, especially the US, which wants to see the cessation of all violence against the Myanmar people. Washington has also imposed sanctions on junta leaders and two state-owned banks that the regime uses for international transactions, including for buying arms. The purpose is to cripple the military regime’s ability to wage war against civilians and the resistance. US Secretary of State Antony Blinken will meet with his ASEAN colleagues at the Post Ministerial Conference on Friday (July 14). He will then join the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the East Asia Summit (EAS), due on the same day, to discuss regional and international issues. Thailand’s concern with Myanmar crisis Thailand’s outgoing military-backed government stepped into the limelight on Myanmar again on Sunday when acting foreign minister Don Pramudwinai paid a secret visit to Naypyitaw prior to the retreat. In June, Thailand hosted highly criticized informal talks with Myanmar, Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, the Philippines, India and China to reengage with Myanmar’s military leaders. Outgoing Thai Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha argued that direct talks were necessary to protect his country, as the crisis has a direct impact on Thailand which shares a 2,416-kilometer border with Myanmar. The meeting was, however, shunned by ASEAN chair Indonesia as well as Singapore and Malaysia, driving a rift between the regional bloc’s member states. Of ASEAN’s 10 members, Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam are not democracies while Thailand’s outgoing government first came to power in the same way as the current Myanmar junta, via a military coup. There is deep frustration among ASEAN members as the conflict in Myanmar drags on into its third year with no end in sight. The regime has rejected a peaceful settlement in favor of brutal suppression of opposition forces. Jakarta is frustrated but has so far maintained a fairly balanced policy of engaging with stakeholders on both sides in Myanmar. However, this could change when Laos takes over the chair next year. There is concern among ASEAN democracies that Laos may lift the ban on Myanmar junta leaders and allow them to rejoin regional meetings. This move would likely cause an even deeper split in ASEAN. So far, ASEAN has come up with no effective ‘carrots’ or ‘sticks’ for Myanmar. In May, Indonesian President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo somberly acknowledged to fellow Southeast Asian leaders that no progress had been made to end the civil strife gripping Myanmar and renewed his call for an end to violence. He spoke after yet another deadly regime airstrike on the civilian population. Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim also voiced his frustrations, noting that about 200,000 people had fled to Malaysia to escape the tumult in Myanmar. Anwar called into question ASEAN’s rigid principle of non-intervention in its members’ internal affairs. “Yes, there is non-interference, but we will have to then have a new vision that could give us some flexibility in order to navigate and maneuver the way forward,” he said. So far, Myanmar’s military regime has successfully managed to hold two groups hostage – the people of Myanmar and ASEAN..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update: 2023-07-10
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Title: Human Rights Situation weekly update (July 1 to 7, 2023) [EN/MY]
Description: "Human Rights Violations took place in States and Regions from July 1 to 7, 2023 Military Junta troops arrested over 100 civilians from Sagaing Region from July 1st to 7th. Over 8 civilians died by the Military’s arresting and killing within a week and a civilian was burnt and killed in Khin-U Township, Sagaing Region. 7 civilians died and 6 were injured by Military junta troops in Sagaing Region on July 6th. A child also died and 2 were injured by the Military’s heavy and light attacks. Military Junta troops also arrested over 30 civilians within a week in Bago Region, Yangon Region and Tanintharyi Region. When youths from Yangon and Mandalay apply for a job offer that opportunity at Facebook, however the military arrests and recruits instead of getting the job..."
Source/publisher: Network for Human Rights Documentation-Burma
Date of entry/update: 2023-07-09
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Title: UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL 53rd session
Sub-title: ITEM 4 - Oral update of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar
Description: "The Republic of the Union of Myanmar, as represented by the National Unity Government, welcomes the oral update of the Special Rapporteur on Myanmar, Mr. Tom Andrews, as well as the Special Rapporteur's recent statements and conference room paper. In cataloguing the illegal military junta's atrocities, including its murder and maiming of children, the Special Rapporteur urged that the junta "be disabused of any notion that time is on its side, that it need only wait out a fickle and distracted world." It must be stripped of weapons, cash and legitimacy. Myanmar joins the Special Rapporteur in welcoming positive steps by States. These include Singapore's investigation of suppliers implicated in the transfer of weapons-related materials to the junta; the European Union's leadership in sanctioning Myanma Oil and Gas Enterprise; the United States targeting of junta-controlled banks; and Indonesia's continuing efforts as ASEAN Chair. Yet, as Mr. Andrew says, "more can and must be done". There must be a coordinated strategy of positive actions that are "proactive and targeted like a laser beam on undermining the junta's capacity to continue its attacks against the people of Myanmar." Myanmar, as represented by the National Unity Government, welcomes the Special Rapporteur's frank address of the dire, unconscionable and unacceptable situation of the Rohingya who, in the Special Rapporteur's words, "are being forced to make an impossible choice" between hunger and malnutrition in camps, junta atrocities in Rakhine, or the peril of unseaworthy vessels. Myanmar recognises the Rohingya as an integral part of our nation and as Myanmar nationals. We remain committed to addressing the root causes of the Rohingya crisis, to securing justice for the Rohingya, and to creating conditions conducive to their voluntary, safe, dignified and sustainable return to their homes. Tragically, as High Commissioner Turk today told the Council, these conditions for return "are still non-existent" Myanmar strongly supports the Special Rapporteur's urging of UN Member States to increase their contributions to the Humanitarian Crisis Joint Response Plan for the Rohingya in Bangladesh. We also echo Mr. Andrews' call on States to "shine the light of public attention" on Myanmar and to cultivate and sustain the international action that the Myanmar people "need and deserve". In closing, Myanmar expresses its deep gratitude to Mr. Andrews for his tireless commitment to his mandate and to the people of Myanmar.....၅၃ ကြိမ်မြောက်ကုလသမဂ္ဂ လူ့အခွင့်အရေးကောင်စီညီလာခံသို့ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံဆိုင်ရာ လူ့အခွင့်အရေးအထူးအကြံပေးပုဂ္ဂိုလ် မဟာမင်းကြီး Mr.Tom Andrews ကနှုတ်ဖြင့်တင်သွင်းသည့် အစီရင်ခံစာ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရအနေဖြင့် Mr. Tom Andrews ၏ နှုတ်ထွက်စကားဖြင့် တင်ပြမှုနှင့် ယင်းတင်ပြခဲ့သည့် နောက်ဆုံးထုတ်ပြန်ချက်များကို ကြိုဆိုလက်ခံပါသည်။ အဆိုပါတင်ပြမှုများထဲတွင် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်အား လက်နက်နှင့်ငွေသားထောက်ပံ့မှု၊ ယင်း အကြမ်းဖက်လူသတ်ကောင်တို့အား တရားဝင်အဖြစ် သတ်မှတ်ရန်ကြိုးပမ်းနေမှုများကို ဖယ်ရှားရမည်ဖြစ်ကြောင်းနှင့် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်အား လက်နက်နှင့် ဆက်စပ်ပစ္စည်းများလွှဲပြောင်းမှုတွင် ပါဝင်ခဲ့သည့် လူပုဂ္ဂိုလ်များအား စင်ကာပူနိုင်ငံတွင်စုံစမ်း စစ်ဆေးလျက်ရှိကြောင်းဖော်ပြပါရှိခဲ့သည်။ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံအတွက်အပြုသဘောဆောင်သည့် ခြေလှမ်းများကိုဖော်ဆောင်ရန်အတွက် မိမိအနေနှင့်လည်း အထူးကိုယ်စားလှယ်အဖြစ် ဆက်လက် ပူးပေါင်းဆောင်ရွက်သွားမည်ဖြစ်ကြောင်းဖော်ပြပါရှိခဲ့သည်။ ဥရောပသဂ္ဂ၏ ဦးဆောင်မှုဖြင့် အကြမ်းဖက်မင်းအောင်လှိုင်ဦးဆောင်သည့် စစ်အုပ်စုထံ ရေနံနှင့် သဘာဝဓာတ်ငွေ့မှ တဆင့် ငွေစီးဆင်းမှု များအား တားမြစ်ပိတ်ပင်မှုများပြုလုပ်နေပြီး အမေရိကန်အစိုးရအနေဖြင့် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စုထိန်းချုပ်ထားသည့် bank များအပေါ် ပစ်မှတ်ထား ပိတ်ဆို့ရန်ကြိုးပမ်းနေပြီး ဒေသတွင်းအနေဖြင့် ASEAN ဥက္ကဌ နေရာကိုရရှိပြီး ပိုမိုကောင်းမွန်သော အရွေ့ဖြစ်စေရန် အင်ဒိုနီးရှားနိုင်ငံက ကြိုးပမ်းနေကြောင်းဖော်ပြပါရှိသည်။ ရိုဟင်ဂျာများကိုလည်း မြန်မာနိုင်ငံသားများအဖြစ် အသိအမှတ်ပြုပါကြောင်းနှင့် ရိုဟင်ဂျာအကျပ်အတည်း၏ မူလဇစ်မြစ်အကြောင်းတရားများကိုဖြေရှင်းရန်၊ရိုဟင်ဂျာများအတွက် တရားမျှတမှု ရရှိစေနိုင်ရန်နှင့် ၎င်းတို့ဆန္ဒအလျောက် ဘေးကင်းလုံခြုံ၍ ဂုဏ်သိက္ခာရှိစွာ နေရပ်ပြန်နိုင်ရေး အတွက် အထောက်အကူဖြစ်စေမည့် အခြေအနေများဖန်တီး ပေးနိုင်စေရန်အတွက် ကတိပြုပါကြောင်းလည်းဖော်ပြပါရှိခဲ့သည်။ မဟာမင်းကြီးအနေဖြင့် နှုတ်ဖြင့်တင်ပြခဲ့သည့်ပြောကြားချက်များကိုဖော်ပြပါ စာစောင်တွင် မူရင်း English ဘာသာဖြင့်လေ့လာနိုင်ပါကြောင်း ပြည်သူသို့တင်ပြအပ်ပါသည်။ ..."
Source/publisher: Ministry of Human Rights
Date of entry/update: 2023-07-07
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Title: UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL 53rd session
Sub-title: ITEM 4 - Interactive dialogue the High Commissioner for Human Rights on the human rights situation in Myanmar
Description: "The Republic of the Union of Myanmar, as represented by the National Unity Government, welcomes the interactive dialogue on Myanmar with the High Commissioner for Human Rights as well as OHCHR's corresponding report on the situation of human rights in Myanmar. "Finally, Myanmar fully supports the High Commissioner's call on the Security Council to refer the situation in Myanmar to the International Criminal Court, and his call on the international community to cease and prevent the supply of arms, cash and aviation fuel to the junta as well as other means enabling it to wage war on the people. With the United Kingdom this month holding the presidency, the Security Council should formally place Myanmar on its agenda as a threat to international peace and security and adopt a follow-up resolution to 2669 (2022) that urgently addresses the junta's compliance failures with Chapter VII measures. In the High Commissioner's words, the Security Council must "exert maximum pressure to end this crisis".”.....53 ကြိမ်မြောက် ကုလသမဂ္ဂ လူ့အခွင့်အရေးကောင်စီသို့မြန်မာနိုင်ငံတွင်အမှန်တကယ် ကြုံတွေ့ရင်ဆိုင်နေရသည့် လူ့အခွင့်အရေးချိုးဖောက်ခံရမှုများဆိုင်ရာ အစီရင်ခံစာကို တင်သွင်းပေးခဲ့သည့်အတွက် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံဆိုင်ရာ လူ့အခွင့်အရေးအထူးအကြံပေးပုဂ္ဂိုလ် မဟာမင်းကြီး အား မိမိတို့ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရအနေနှင့် ကြိုဆို ထောက်ခံပါကြောင်းဦးစွာဖော်ပြလိုပါသည်။ High Commissioner တင်သွင်းခဲ့သည့်အစီရင်ခံစာတွင် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်အနေဖြင့် လူထုအပေါ် လိင်ပိုင်းဆိုင်ရာအကြမ်းဖက်မှု၊အစုလိုက်အပြုံလိုက်သတ်ဖြတ်မှု၊တရားလက်လွတ်ကွပ်မျက်မှု၊ခေါင်းဖြတ်သတ်ဖြတ်မှု စသည့် ရာဇဝတ်မှုမျိုးစုံကို ကျူးလွန်နေမှုများ ထင်ရှားကြောင်း ထည့်သွင်းဖော်ပြခဲ့သည်။ ထို့အပြင် မဟာမင်းကြီး၏ နောက်ဆုံးအစီရင်ခံစာတွင်မူအကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်က ကာလရှည်ကြာအသုံးပြုနေသည့် ဖြတ်လေးဖြတ်ဗျုဟာကို ဆက်လက်လုပ်ဆောင်နေပြီး နိုင်ငံတကာက ကူညီပေးမည့် လူသားချင်းစာနာမှုဆိုင်ရာဝင်ရောက်ကူညီခွင့်တွေကို မတရားသော အာဏာအသုံးပြု၍ ပိတ်ပင်တားဆီးထားကြောင်းကိုလည်း မီးမောင်းထိုးဖော်ပြထားသည်။ အစီရင်ခံစာထဲတွင် ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ်နောက်ပိုင်း အာဏာသိမ်းရန်ကြိုးပမ်းမှုဖြစ်စဉ်နောက်ပိုင်းမှာ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံဟာ ဆင်းရဲမွဲတေမှု ၂ဆ တိုးလာခြင်းအပါအဝင်ငွေကြေးဖောင်းဖွမှုတဟုန်ထိုးတိုးလာခြင်း၊ စားနပ်ရိက္ခာမလုံလောက်မှု၊ မလုံခြုံမှုနှင့် ကျန်းမာရေးစောင့်ရှောက်မှုဝန်ထမ်းများနှင့် ကျန်းမာရေး စောင့်ရှောက်မှုပေးသည့် နေရာများကို ပစ်မှတ်ထားတိုက်ခိုက်မှု စတဲ့ တိုင်းပြည်ဆုတ်ယုတ်စေမှု၊ရာဇဝတ်မှုကျုးလွန်မှုများကို ကျုးလွန်နေကြပြီး တိုင်းပြည်တိုးတက်မှုကို ဆယ်စုနှစ် ၁ခုစာလောက်နီးပါး ဆုတ်ယုတ်သွားအောင် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်ကကျုးလွန်နေကြကြောင်း စသည့်အချက်အလက်များ ထည့်သွင်းဖော်ပြခဲ့သည်။ မဟာမင်းကြီးတင်သွင်းခဲ့သည့် အစီရင်ခံစာအပြည့်အစုံကို အောက်ဖော်ပြပါ စာစောင်တွင် မူရင်း English ဘာသာဖြင့် လေ့လာနိုင်ပြီးတောင်းဆိုခဲ့သည့် အချက်များကိုလည်း ဖတ်ရှုနိုင်ပါကြောင်း ပြည်သူသို့ တင်ပြအစီရင်ခံအပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher: Ministry of Human Rights
Date of entry/update: 2023-07-07
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Title: EU releases €12.5 million for people in Myanmar and Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh
Description: "The EU has released an additional €12.5 million to address the humanitarian needs of people in Myanmar, as well as those of Rohingya refugees and their host communities in Bangladesh and the broader region. Food insecurity in refugee camps has reached alarming rates due to a massive funding gap that resulted in a reduction of food rations distributed to Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh. The situation is expected to become untenable by the autumn if no additional funding is mobilised by the international community. The humanitarian situation is also worsening in Myanmar due to an escalation of the conflict and to the consequences of Cyclone Mocha, which hit the country in May 2023. This new EU funding aims to respond to these pressing needs with an allocation of €7 million to ensure critical food assistance in Bangladesh; €4.5 million to provide food and health assistance in Myanmar and mitigate the consequences of the current funding gap; and €1 million to respond to the increasing protection needs of displaced people and refugees throughout the region, including in Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, and India. Background In 2017, more than 742000 Rohingya crossed the border to seek refuge in Bangladesh. More than 5 years after the large-scale violence forced hundreds of thousands of Rohingya people to flee Rakhine State in Myanmar, Bangladesh still hosts almost 1 million refugees. Rohingya refugees live in precarious and deteriorating conditions, with the majority located in congested refugee camps in Cox's Bazar, where they are entirely dependent on humanitarian aid. The vast majority of refugees in Bangladesh are women and children, many others are elderly people requiring additional aid and protection. The enormous scale of the influx has also put pressure on the Bangladeshi host communities and existing facilities and services. In Myanmar, following a military coup d'état in February 2021, the number of people in need of humanitarian assistance has risen from 1 million to over 18 million. Almost 90 000 people have fled Myanmar for neighbouring countries since the coup. Ongoing conflict and violations of International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law keep driving up the number of refugees and internally displaced people. The EU has been providing humanitarian aid to people in Myanmar since 1994, and in Bangladesh since 2002. In February 2023, the EU released over €43 million to address the humanitarian needs of people in Myanmar, as well as those of Rohingya refugees and their host communities in Bangladesh and across the region. Following cyclone Mocha's impact in Myanmar and Bangladesh, the Commission released €2.5 million in emergency humanitarian aid and supported the Myanmar Red Cross Society in delivering immediate assistance through the distribution of emergency shelter items, primary healthcare assistance, cash grants and hygiene kits..."
Source/publisher: European Commission
Date of entry/update: 2023-07-06
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Title: Myanmar in “deadly freefall” into even deeper violence, says Türk
Description: "Mr. Vice President, Excellencies, Distinguished colleagues, This Council has heard report after report on the human rights situation in Myanmar. With each successive update, it is almost impossible to imagine that the people of Myanmar can endure more suffering. Yet the country continues its deadly freefall into even deeper violence and heartbreak. A regime imposed by generals for the last two and a half years has snatched away the optimism that Myanmar’s people once held for peace, democracy, and a more prosperous future. Civilians live at the whim of a reckless military authority that relies on systematic control tactics, fear and terror. Civilians also bear the devastating brunt of the grotesque violence, including against older people, people with disabilities and infants. The situation has become untenable. We see a spiralling economy, worsening the poverty already endured by much of the population. Natural resources are being exploited at dangerous rates, causing irreversible environmental harm. The voices of civil society and journalists are being strangled. Arbitrary arrests, enforced disappearances and torture continue unabated. And the country’s minorities again face brutal attacks by the military in border regions, with increasing numbers of people crossing international frontiers in search of safety and protection. More than one million Rohingya remain in neighbouring Bangladesh where they live in the world’s largest refugee camp in deplorable conditions. The conditions for their return to Myanmar are still non-existent. The military continues to carry out atrocities in their home state of Rakhine, where they are denied citizenship. Mr. Vice President, Credible sources indicate that as of yesterday, 3,747 individuals have died at the hands of the military since they took power, and 23,747 have been arrested. These figures represent the minimum that can be documented and verified - the true number of casualties is likely to be far higher. Every day, the military’s ruthless so-called “four cuts” strategy continues to wreak destruction. Entire villages are razed and burned to the ground, collectively punishing civilians, by depriving them of shelter, food, water, and life-saving aid. Since the coup began, the military has scorched at least 70,000 homes across the country, 70 percent of which were in Sagaing region. Over 1.5 million people have been forcibly displaced with minimal access to humanitarian aid. Incessant airstrikes and artillery shelling are destroying homes and stealing lives. In the first six months of this year, my Office reported a 33 percent increase in indiscriminate airstrikes compared to the first half of last year, with rising attacks on civilian targets, including villages, schools, hospitals and places of worship. On 11 April in Pa Zi Gyi village in Sagaing region, up to 168 civilians, including scores of women and children, were killed in an air attack. Artillery attacks have also dramatically increased, with over 563 this year, representing already 80 percent of the total attacks last year. My Office also continues to document repeated violations of the most brutal forms: sexual violence, mass killings, extra-judicial executions, beheadings, dismemberments, and mutilations. This constitutes a complete disregard of the principles of international human rights and international humanitarian law. And it displays an utter contempt for humanity. Mr. Vice President, The report I present to the Council today focuses on the systematic denial by the military of life-saving humanitarian aid for civilians. They have put in place a raft of legal, financial, and bureaucratic barriers to ensure people in need do not receive and cannot access assistance. This obstruction of life-saving aid is deliberate and targeted, a calculated denial of fundamental rights and freedoms for large swathes of the population. This is being done in a situation where one-third of the entire population requires urgent help – including access to adequate housing, enough food and water, or employment. In mid-May, when Cyclone Mocha made landfall with devastating effect in Rakhine, Chin, Magway and Sagaing, the military actively prevented independent needs assessments, and obstructed access to information. They suspended all travel authorisations in Rakhine State, eventually allowing distribution of aid to resume if it was not cyclone-related. Importantly, all disbursements of Cyclone Mocha-related humanitarian aid remain frozen unless delivered by the military apparatus. They have threatened legal action against anyone reporting figures different to theirs on the number of Rohingya deaths, fixed by the military at 116, but believed to be higher. To date, because of lack of access, it has not been possible to confirm the number of Rohingya deaths and those of members from other communities. I deplore the direct attacks on humanitarian staff. Local organizations, which provide the vast majority of humanitarian aid, face the greatest risks in carrying out their work. Up to 40 humanitarian workers have been killed and over 200 arrested since the coup. The already fragile health system is now in disarray. Despite the efforts of grassroots organizations, a de facto ban on transportation of medicines and other medical supplies across large parts of Myanmar has resulted in lack of access to medical assistance. 15.2 million people are in need of urgent food and nutrition support. The price of food rose 177 percent in 2022, and the continued violence, land-grabbing and high risk posed by mines and unexploded ordnance has resulted in a marked decrease in food production. The need for unhindered humanitarian access throughout Myanmar has never been more urgent. I call on Member States to fund the Myanmar Humanitarian Response Plan and to provide direct and flexible funding for local organisations on the ground that are desperately trying to reach people in need. Mr. Vice President, In line with Security Council resolution 2669 I repeat the call for an immediate end to this senseless violence. Without delay, I also urge the authorities to release the 19,377 political prisoners detained throughout Myanmar, including deposed President Win Mynt and State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi. The path out of this crisis must be anchored in accountability for the grave human rights violations and other violations of international law that are occurring. I urge the Security Council to refer the situation to the International Criminal Court. Any political solution to this protracted emergency must include accountability. Regarding the one million Rohingya in Bangladesh, voluntary repatriation can only occur when conditions for safe, sustainable, and dignified returns to Myanmar are in place and when the full range of their rights will be respected and upheld. The Rohingya themselves must be at the centre of decision-making. Returns must only take place with their fully informed and truly voluntary choice. For its part, the international community must continue to provide support to host communities, including and notably in Bangladesh, and adequate protection for all people who are crossing international borders. I also appeal to all countries to cease and prevent the supply of arms to the military and to take targeted measures to limit access by generals to foreign currency, aviation fuel and other means that enable attacks on Myanmar’s people. This Council needs to consider how to bring to light the business interests that support the military and keep them afloat. Mr. Vice President, Among the numerous crimes perpetrated against the people of Myanmar, I was outraged to hear of the arrests of over a hundred people by the military on 19 June. Their crime was buying, selling, carrying, or wearing a flower to celebrate Aung San Suu Kyi’s 78th birthday. It is difficult to imagine that Myanmar’s people – who just two and a half years ago were looking forward to a better future – are being stifled by an oppressor which regards bearing a flower as a criminal act. For decades, the people of Myanmar have faced repression and isolation. But they have never stopped calling for their fundamental rights to be respected, nor have they ceased to make great sacrifices for a democratic future. I stand in solidarity with Myanmar’s people. I honour their extraordinary strength, spirit, and resilience as they endure day after day of crisis. I want to emphasise that the Rohingya are an integral part of Myanmar’s people and the future of the country. I remind the international community, the Security Council, ASEAN, and all Member States with influence over Min Aung Hlaing and the Tatmadaw of their responsibility to exert maximum pressure to end this crisis. It is of the utmost urgency that we restore all conditions necessary for Myanmar’s people to find a way out of the heartache, and to live their lives in freedom and safety. Thank you..."
Source/publisher: UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
Date of entry/update: 2023-07-06
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Title: Human Rights Situation weekly update (June 22 to 30 2023) [EN/MY]
Description: "Human Rights Violations took place in States and Regions from June 22 to 30, 2023 Military Junta troops launched an airstrike and dropped bombs in Chin State, Kayah State, Kachin State, and Sagaing Region from June 22nd to 30th. Over 9 civilians were injured and 11 died by the airstrike and civilian buildings were burnt within a week. Over 35 civilians were arrested as human shields in Salingyi Township and Khin-U Township, Sagaing Region. 6 children were also injured by the Military’s heavy and light artillery attacks. Military Junta troops raped and killed 2 women in Sagaing Region and also arrested and killed 18 civilians including 13 PDF Fighters. The Pyusawhtee troop which is under the Military Junta, also threatened the civilians from Kanbalu Township that they will occupy the houses and farms if the local civilians do not attend the Pyusawhtee military training..."
Source/publisher: Network for Human Rights Documentation-Burma
Date of entry/update: 2023-07-04
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Title: Attacks on Health Care in Myanmar (14-27 June 2023)
Description: "Documented incidents 14 June 2023: In Taw Kone village, Shar Say Bo village tract, Tantabin township, Taungoo district, Bago region, a local clinic, and a local school and its boarding house were damaged by artillery fire launched by the Myanmar military, injuring three boarding students. Source: Khit Thit Media 15 June 2023: In Pauk Ma village, Sar Taung village tract, Sagaing township, district, and region, a sub-rural health centre was destroyed in a two-day arson attack of around 300 civilian houses in this area by the Myanmar military. Sources: Khit Thit Media and Mandalay Free Press As reported on 16 June 2023: In Mese town and township, Bawlakhe district, Kayah state, junta health workers and other government servants had to flee from their duty station due to the takeover of the town by the local resistance forces and ethnic armed organisations, and airstrikes by the Myanmar military. Sources: Delta News Agency and Facebook 17 June 2023: In Wetlet town and township, Shwebo district, Sagaing region, the main building of the township hospital was damaged due to handmade-electroshock rocket missile attacks allegedly by the local resistance forces. The roof, ceilings, and windows of the building were damaged. There were no casualties. Source: Telegram 17 June 2023: In Tha Mee Hla (East) village, Ta Ku village tract, Tanintharyi township, Myeik district, Tanintharyi region, a combat medic officer and four soldiers of the Myanmar military were killed in the armed drones and ground attacks by the local resistance forces. The victim was not killed during a battle or during rescuing/attending the injured.Sources: Delta News Agency and Tanintharyi Times 19 June 2023: In Tamwe town and township, Yangon (East) district, Yangon region, the junta police raided a private pharmacy and arrested a male pharmacy employee for taking part in the strike marking the birthday of the ousted State Counsellor. Source: Democratic Voice of Burma 19 June 2023: In Mandalay city and region, a doctor was arrested by the junta security forces following his personal post on social media regarding the strike marking the birthday of the ousted State Counsellor. The victim ran his own private general practitioner clinic; he was not a government servant. Sources: Facebook, Irrawaddy and Mandalay Free Press 20 June 2023: In Oke Shit Pin town, Padaung township, Pyay district, Bago region, a doctor was abducted by the junta security forces following his social media post about the strike marking the birthday of the ousted State Counsellor. The victim ran his own private general practitioner clinic. Sources: Democratic Voice of Burma and Telegram 21 June 2023: At a military checkpoint in Yinmabin township and district, Sagaing region, a male aid worker of an LNGO was arrested by the Myanmar military. The LNGO delivered aid to IDPs and a charity clinic serving the people in three townships in Sagaing region. Sources: Facebook, Mizzima and Radio Free Asia As reported on 22 June 2023: At the military checkpoint on the highway connecting Monywa town and Mandalay town, near Nat Yae Kan village and village tract, Chaung-U township, Monywa district, Sagaing region, ambulances without recognised vehicle registration were not allowed to pass and patients had to be transferred to the buses; this added the cost to patient transport. Before the coup, the vehicles used by LNGOs in the process of registration were permitted for patient transport. Source: Democratic Voice of Burma As reported on 23 June 2023: In Tonzang town and township, Tiddim district, Chin state, the Myanmar military were based in the township hospital and high school. Source: Mizzima 23 June 2023: At the entry of Ohn Hne Chaung village, Let Pan Chay Paw village tract, Nyaung-U township and district, Mandalay region, a 60-year-old traditional medicine practitioner, who was also a member of the military political party, was found dead with gunshot wounds and knife-cut wounds. He was reportedly on his way back after delivering medical care in a nearby village. The junta accused the local resistance forces of this attack. Source: Myaelattathan 24 June 2023: In Bawlakhe town, township, and district, Kayah state, the local resistance forces and ethnic armed groups attacked the Myanmar military occupying the traditional medical hospital..."
Source/publisher: Insecurity Insight (Geneva) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of entry/update: 2023-07-03
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Title: Minister for Foreign Affairs Dr Vivian Balakrishnan's Written Replies to Parliamentary Questions, 3 July 2023
Description: "QUESTION Mr Dennis Tan Lip Fong: To ask the Minister for Foreign Affairs (a) whether the Government has data on the number of Singaporeans who have been placed under exit bans by the foreign countries they are living in; (b) if so, what is the total number of such persons for each of the last five years; (c) what is the breakdown of the countries involved; and (d) what are the top five most common reasons given for the exit bans. REPLY The Government does not have data on the number of Singaporeans who have been placed under exit bans by foreign countries. Foreign authorities do not have an obligation to inform the Government when exit bans are issued to Singaporeans. QUESTIONS Mr Vikram Nair: To ask the Minister for Foreign Affairs (a) whether the Government has investigated the allegations in the report by the UN Special Rapporteur claiming that Singapore-based entities had shipped US$254 million worth of supplies to the Myanmar military; (b) if so, what is the update; and (c) whether any actions are being taken. Mr Dennis Tan Lip Fong: To ask the Minister for Foreign Affairs (a) how many Singapore-based companies have been identified by the United Nations Special Rapporteur in Myanmar in the sale of dual-use items, raw materials and spare parts for military related uses in Myanmar; (b) what actions have been taken against such companies; and (c) what is the number of such companies against which actions have been taken. Mr Dennis Tan Lip Fong: To ask the Prime Minister in view of the report published on 17 May 2023 by the United Nations Special Rapporteur in Myanmar relating to Singapore companies or Singapore-based entities implicated in the sales of dual-use items, raw materials and spare parts for military related uses (a) how many cases involved Singapore-based banks in the financing of the transactions, including trade financing; and (b) what actions have been taken or are being taken against such banks. REPLY 1 Let me first make clear that the Singapore Government has not imposed a general trade embargo on Myanmar. We do not want to add to the suffering of Myanmar’s civilian population. In 2022, Singapore’s total bilateral trade with Myanmar was S$5.8 billion. The allegations in the May 2023 report by UN Special Rapporteur for Myanmar Thomas Andrews pertain to supposedly US$254 million worth of goods over a two-year period. Nonetheless, we take Mr Andrews’ report very seriously, and have requested him to provide specific and verifiable evidence to aid our efforts. An initial list of 47 entities were identified. More recently, another 91 entities were identified too. I seek Members’ understanding that this is an interim update as the investigations are ongoing. 2 First, nine entities are no longer registered with the Accounting and Corporate Regulatory Authority, which means that they can no longer carry on business or operate as legal entities in Singapore. This includes entities that were allegedly involved in the transfer of components and spare parts for fighter aircraft, equipment for the Myanmar Navy, as well as radios, research and equipment for electronic warfare. 3 Second, most of the 47 entities no longer have business facilities with Singapore banks. The banks will review the remaining accounts and take appropriate measures, including enhanced scrutiny to ensure that the transactions processed by these entities are not suspicious. Such measures would curtail their ability to continue with any undesirable business. 4 As Myanmar is on the blacklist of the Financial Action Task Force, financial institutions in Singapore have also been applying enhanced due diligence for Myanmar-linked customers and transactions that present higher risks. 5 Third, we are looking into specific details of the alleged US$254 million worth of “arms and related goods” that were shipped through Singapore-based entities to the Myanmar military. In Mr Andrews’ report, there were no indications that specific armaments were being transferred to the Myanmar military. Instead, under the category of “arms”, what was cited were only spare parts and equipment, without details of what these constituted. The other major categories of items covered in the report included “dual use supplies” which included items such as computers, electrical components, and medical equipment. Another category of items was “manufacturing equipment” which comprised items like welding machines and overhead cranes; and “raw materials” which covered items such as steel beams and aluminium ingots, pipes and valves, and fabric. 6 Members would appreciate from these descriptions that the items do not necessarily constitute “arms” or weaponry in its ordinary meaning. Many of them such as computers and medical equipment are also non-controlled items. It is difficult to isolate specific suspicious transactions from such broad categories. We are therefore seeking more details such as export transaction documents to ascertain how these transactions are connected to the manufacture of weapons in Myanmar, so that our checks and investigations can be more thorough, and effective based on objective evidence. At the same time, let me make clear that it is not the Singapore Government’s policy intention to block legitimate trade with Myanmar. Doing so would further set back the country’s development and exacerbate the suffering of the civilian population of Myanmar. 7 Finally, I would like to re-state categorically that the Singapore Government has not conducted any military sales to the Myanmar military in recent years, including during the period covered in Mr Andrews’ report – that is, between February 2021 and December 2022. Indeed, Mr Andrews himself reaffirmed in his report that “there are no indications the Government of Singapore has approved, or is involved in, the shipment of arms and associated materials to the Myanmar military.” 8 We will continue to work closely and constructively with Mr Andrews to seek specific, verifiable, and where possible court admissible information to advance our investigations. 9 In conclusion, let me reiterate that the Government remains committed to implementing our policy to prevent the transfer of arms and dual-use items which have been assessed to have potential military application to Myanmar, where there is serious risk that they may be used to inflict violence against unarmed civilians. We will not hesitate to take action against any individual or entity which contravenes this..."
Source/publisher: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Singapore
Date of entry/update: 2023-07-03
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Title: UNICEF Myanmar Humanitarian Situation Report No. 4: 1 May - 30 June 2023
Description: "Highlights: As schools reopen amid the devastation caused by Cyclone Mocha, more than 300,000 learners require educational support, and an estimated 1,246 schools are heavily damaged across Rakhine and the Northwest. With the compounding effects of the conflict and the impact of the cyclone, the humanitarian community is concerned about increasing reports of psychosocial distress among the affected population as worsening living conditions heighten anxiety due to the lack of access to basic services. UNICEF and partners delivered humanitarian WASH services and supplies to 233,848 individuals, 1,013 of them with disabilities and continues to disinfect water sources, rehabilitate sanitation facilities, and dewater the rainwater harvesting ponds flooded with seawater during the cyclone. During the reporting period, UNICEF and partners provided critical primary health care services to more than 98,000 people, reaching almost 4,000 children aged 9--18 months with the measles vaccine. With the resumption of routine immunization across the country, UNICEF and partners are supporting catch-up vaccination for 1.6 million children who missed their doses..."
Source/publisher: UN Children's Fund (New York) via Reliefweb (New York)
Date of entry/update: 2023-07-03
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Title: Assessment of child labour in the Yangon Region, Ayeyarwady Region and Kayin State
Description: "Children paying a high price for engaging in work in Myanmar Survey reveals poverty a main driver of child labour in Yangon Region, Ayeyarwady Region and Kayin State with dangerous work and long hours common. Yangon, Myanmar (ILO News) – A new report assessing the situation of working children in Myanmar shows the extent to which children are working to support their families and the high incidence of hazardous work they engage in. More than 70 per cent of working children interviewed in an assessment by ILO Myanmar’s Asia Regional Child Labour Project (ARC) in the Yangon Region, Ayeyarwady Region and Kayin State were working primarily due to financial challenges in their households. School closures due to the COVID-19 pandemic and the political crisis had also driven children to work, further exacerbating child labour. Even after schools re-opened, many children did not return to school due to safety concerns resulting from the political instability in the country. A third of children interviewed in the three areas were in domestic work with others primarily in agriculture, manufacturing, and wholesale and retail trade – many of whom were working long hours for low pay. The assessment also found that children were often performing hazardous work and dangerous tasks. Almost 90 per cent of children interviewed who were working in construction sector carried heavy loads and over 80 per cent worked long hours under the sun without a break. Many interviewed children reported that they experienced accidents and injuries, with minor injuries being the most frequent, followed by bruises, bumps and swelling. “More than half of working children in this assessment said they wanted to have an education if given the chance, reflecting the extent to which work has interfered with their aspirations to go to school. This situation has only been made worse since COVID-19 and the nationwide conflicts caused by political crisis.,” said Donglin Li, Liaison Officer and Representative, ILO Myanmar. Communities and employers in the three regions appeared largely unaware of the laws relating to the minimum age for employing children. Some employers, notably in the agriculture sector, indicated that they preferred to employ children because they can be easily controlled, paid less, and do not frequently complain. Others employed children who accompanied their parents to work due to safety concerns at home. To effectively address child labour issues in Myanmar, the report provides recommendations for appropriate awareness raising, advocacy and overarching key policy interventions to be pursued, when the situation allows. ILO’s ARC Project is a regional project implemented by the International Labour Organization (ILO) in Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, Nepal and Pakistan. The assessment released to mark the World Day Against Child Labour on 12 June 2023 was prepared with financial support from Foreign Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) of the Government of the United Kingdom..."
Source/publisher: International Labour Organization (Geneva)
Date of entry/update: 2023-07-02
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Title: China Looms Large Over Thailand's Move to Reengage With Myanmar Junta
Description: "WASHINGTON - A recent attempt by Thailand to reengage with Myanmar's junta appears to be aimed at creating an alignment with China, a close ally of the military regime in Myanmar, analysts said. On June 19, the outgoing Thai government of Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-ocha, a former general who seized power in a 2014 military coup, hosted informal talks for foreign ministers from member nations of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Myanmar's foreign minister, Than Swe, appointed by the military junta that seized power in February 2021, was among those who attended. Top diplomats from some other countries in the 10-member regional bloc, such as Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia, did not. In August 2022, foreign ministers from ASEAN member states had agreed to bar Myanmar's ruling generals from the group's meetings until they made progress on the so-called Five-Point Consensus reached in April 2021 to end the violence that engulfed Myanmar after the coup. Protests, a civil disobedience movement and fighting continue in Myanmar. As China is currently the second-largest aid provider to the Myanmar junta after Russia, Beijing may want the junta to restore order to stabilize the China-Myanmar border and the pipelines running through Myanmar into China, according to Paul Chambers, lecturer and special adviser on international affairs at Naresuan University in Thailand. Thailand, which is close to China diplomatically and geographically, has sought to take a similar stance, said Chambers. "[The] Prayut government would want to include China in any ASEAN negotiations concerning Myanmar," he said. Sek Sophal, a researcher at the Center for Democracy Promotion at Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University in Japan, said Thailand's military-backed government sees China as a key player in the Myanmar issue. The Thai government has continued to engage with Myanmar on a "business as usual" basis and has done "very little" to put pressure on the junta, Sophal said. When asked by VOA about the informal talks hosted by Thailand, the Chinese Embassy in Washington said they were not aware of the matter and referred the question to the Chinese Embassy in Myanmar or Thailand instead and received no reply. The United States called on Myanmar to comply with the Five-Point Consensus. "As the secretary noted, Burma's military regime has repeatedly carried out horrific, and extensive violence against the people of Burma since the February 2021 military coup," a State Department spokesperson said last week in an email to VOA. "We recognize and continue to welcome ASEAN's efforts to address the crisis in Burma. Given the regime's lack of progress on the Five-Point Consensus, we call on ASEAN members to hold Burma accountable for its actions," the spokesperson said. The U.S. Treasury Department last week imposed sanctions on Myanmar's Defense Ministry and two state-owned banks, the Myanmar Foreign Trade Bank and the Myanmar Investment and Commercial Bank. The measure freezes any assets of the sanctioned entities that are in the U.S. or controlled by a U.S. person. It also prohibits all transactions by U.S. persons or entities carried out within or transiting the U.S. that the targeted entities would benefit from. Chambers said that the U.S. could use its sanctions against Myanmar's junta and work with its ASEAN opponents, such as Indonesia, to slow down Bangkok's current cooperation with the junta. "The U.S. is aware that Thailand has, since at least 2013, followed a realist policy of hedging or 'creating balance' between Beijing and Washington," he said. After more than nine years of China-leaning rule under Prayuth, a surprise win by the Move Forward Party in the May 14 elections means Thailand is slated to have a new government installed in July, according to parliamentary procedure. Pita Limjaroenrat, who leads the left-leaning, progressive Move Forward Party, is the front-runner to become Thailand's next premier. He has been vocal about how he would shift Thailand's foreign policy direction, including its stance on Myanmar. "A stable Myanmar is a boon to the entire region, but if Myanmar sneezes, Thailand gets sick as well," Pita told VOA's Thai Service during an interview in April. Educated at Harvard and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Pita is known to have a natural affinity for the U.S. Analysts, however, say the Thai politician has to walk a fine line to engage constructively with China, given its economic clout and growing influence in Thailand's foreign policy. "Thailand might have to continue to bandwagon with China for its economic interests," although Thailand has reset its foreign policy to work with the U.S.-led Western countries, said Sophal. Chambers said a Pita-led Thailand would distance itself from China, work closely with Washington, and cease cooperating with the Myanmar junta..."
Source/publisher: "VOA" (Washington, D.C)
Date of entry/update: 2023-07-01
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Title: Myanmar: Dire humanitarian and human rights situation compounded by military’s restrictions on aid
Description: "DELIVERED BY Spokesperson for the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights: Ravina Shamdasani Myanmar’s overall humanitarian and human rights situation has deteriorated to alarming levels, exacerbated by the military’s strategy to prevent life-saving humanitarian aid from reaching those who desperately need it, a report published today by the UN Human Rights Office shows. Since 1 February 2021, UN Human Rights has documented how the military continues to prioritize its aims over all other considerations, including the urgent need of conflict-affected communities to receive life-saving assistance. Even when humanitarian workers have been permitted access, their ability to deliver aid has been strictly limited and controlled. The military has operated as if those providing aid are helping those opposed to their rule, rather than respecting their need for protection and facilitating their access and assistance to the civilian population in a time of crisis. The already dire situation on the ground has been compounded by the military’s restrictions on aid imposed in the aftermath of Cyclone Mocha in May, bringing further suffering and misery to wide swathes of the population in the west and northwest of the country. As the report makes clear, intentional obstruction or denial of humanitarian assistance may amount to gross violations of international human rights law, and serious violations of international humanitarian law. Aiming in part at cutting off support for its opponents, the military has employed its four-cuts strategy to kill and injure thousands of civilians while destroying goods and infrastructure necessary for survival, including food, shelter, and medical centres, the report says. Myanmar’s human rights and humanitarian crisis is massive. An estimated 1.5 million people have been internally displaced, and approximately 60,000 civilian structures have reportedly been burnt or destroyed. Over 17.6 million people, or one-third of the overall population, require some form of humanitarian assistance. Between February 2021 and April 2023, credible sources verified that at least 3,452 people had died at the hands of the military and its affiliates, and 21,807 individuals had been arrested. Notably, our report says the security situation has dramatically worsened for humanitarian workers since the coup. Aid providers are consistently exposed to risks of arrest, harassment or other mistreatment, or even death. Under international human rights law and international humanitarian law, populations-in-need are entitled to receive assistance to ensure the respect of their rights to food, shelter, and health. All parties must allow and facilitate unimpeded passage of life-saving relief to all those in need". In the context of armed conflicts, intentional obstruction or denial of humanitarian assistance may further constitute war crimes such as wilful killing, torture and other degrading treatment, starvation, and collective punishment. Such intentional denial can also constitute crimes against humanity such as murder, extermination, torture and other inhumane acts, or persecution, when committed in the context of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population. The UN Human Rights Chief will present the report to the Human Rights Council next week..."
Source/publisher: UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-30
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Title: Myanmar: Military’s obstruction of humanitarian aid could be international crime
Description: "The chief of OHCHROpens in new window’s Myanmar team, James Rodehaver, explained that since their February 2021 coup, the country’s military rulers have been instilling a “climate of fear” to subjugate the civilian population, restricting aid access and using “all means” at their disposal to clamp down on civil society. Brutal tactics He said the military’s tactics had included the use of heavy weaponry on civilian areas and airstrikes, the burning of villages, and the use of landmines to prevent those forced to flee from returning home. “Another thing that they have done regularly has been to burn food stores, crops and seed stores, to destroy medical facilities and to target medical workers.” The military imposed further restrictions on humanitarian assistanceOpens in new window in the aftermath of deadly Cyclone Mocha in May, Mr. Rodehaver said. Over 17.6 million people, or a third of the overall population of Myanmar need aid. OHCHR Spokesperson Ravina Shamdasani briefing in Geneva on the comprehensive human rights update for Myanmar, stressed that intentional obstruction or denial of humanitarian assistance may amount to serious violations of international law. Aid workers treated as opponents “The military has operated as if those providing aid are helping those opposed to their rule, rather than respecting their need for protection and facilitating their access and assistance to the civilian population in a time of crisis”, she said. She cited the military’s “four cuts” strategy outlined in the report “to kill and injure thousands of civilians while destroying goods and infrastructure necessary for survival, including food, shelter, and medical centres”. An estimated 1.5 million people have been internally displaced, and approximately 60,000 civilian structures have reportedly been burnt or destroyed, she said. Between the overthrow of the civilian Government and April 2023, credible sources have verified that at least 3,452 people had died at the hands of the military and its affiliates, and 21,807 individuals had been arrested. Dramatically worse “Notably, our report says the security situation has dramatically worsened for humanitarian workers since the coup. Aid providers are consistently exposed to risks of arrest, harassment or other mistreatment, or even death”, Ms. Shamdasani added. “In the context of armed conflicts, intentional obstruction or denial of humanitarian assistance may further constitute war crimes such as wilful killing, torture and other degrading treatment, starvation, and collective punishment”, she warned. Intentional denial can also constitute crimes against humanity, she continued, such as murder, “extermination, torture and other inhumane acts, or persecution, when committed in the context of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population.”..."
Source/publisher: UN Geneva
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-30
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Title: Situation of human rights in Myanmar since 1 February 2021; Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (A/HRC/53/52) (Advance Unedited Version)
Description: "Advance unedited version Distr.: General 28 June 2023 Original: English Human Rights Council Fifty-third session 19 June–14 July 2023 Agenda items 2 and 4 Annual report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and reports of the Office of the High Commissioner and the Secretary-General Human rights situations that require the Council’s attention Situation of human rights in Myanmar since 1 February 2021 Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights* Summary The present report, prepared pursuant to Human Rights Council resolution A/HRC/49/23, identifies trends and patterns of human rights violations in Myanmar between 1 February 2021 and 30 April 2023 with a focus on the human rights impact of the denial of humanitarian access. The report analyzes actions by all duty-bearers and finds that the Myanmar military is most responsible for the negative impact on the enjoyment of human rights and on delivery of humanitarian action. The report documents that the military has established an all-encompassing system of control based on instrumentalization of the legal and administrative spheres in Myanmar. Urgent and concrete steps are needed to ensure essential needs of all people are met, including food and healthcare, and to respect, protect and fulfil peoples’ fundamental rights. This report concludes with recommendations to all parties, including the military authorities, the National Unity Government’, and the international community. The present report was submitted after the deadline in order to reflect the most recent developments. I. Introduction and methodology In resolution A/HRC/49/23, the Human Rights Council requested the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to monitor and assess the overall situation of human rights in Myanmar, with a particular focus on accountability regarding alleged violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law and to make recommendations on additional steps necessary to address the current crisis and to present a written update at its 53rd session. This report presents findings from monitoring and documentation activities conducted remotely by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) between 1 February 2021 and 30 April 2023, examining trends and patterns in violations of international human rights law and, where applicable, of international humanitarian and criminal law. Paramount among these violations are the Myanmar military’s targeting of civilians, including by restricting access to humanitarian assistance for communities impacted by violence, armed conflict, and systematic discrimination against Rohingya, other minorities and perceived opponents of the regime. As denial of humanitarian access results in loss of civilian lives during violence and conflicts, as well as in long-term human rights consequences such as food insecurity and lack of medical assistance, this report is based on a holistic approach to civilian protection involving both immediate and direct harm from violence and conflicts, and medium- to long-term negative impacts on the ability of people to exercise their fundamental rights. Further affirming the critical importance of strengthening civilian protection and guarantees for meaningful humanitarian access, the United Nations Security Council in its resolution S/RES/2669(2022) of December 2022 on the situation in Myanmar reiterated “the necessity for full, safe and unhindered humanitarian access” while underlying “the need for scaled up humanitarian assistance to all people in need in Myanmar and to ensure the full protection, safety and security of humanitarian and medical personnel”. Furthermore, to address its concerns at the deteriorating humanitarian situation as compounded by increasingly challenging humanitarian access and attacks on humanitarian personnel, the Human Rights Council called on the military to exercise utmost restraint and ensure full protection of human rights of all persons in Myanmar. Similarly, the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) repeatedly called on Myanmar authorities to implement the Five-Point Consensus, cease violence, and ensure safe and timely delivery of humanitarian assistance. However, confirming findings from previous reports, the military has shown complete disregard for these attempts at addressing the human rights, humanitarian, and political crises flowing from the coup of February 2021 and the subsequent violent suppression of opposing voices. Additionally, the centrality of protection of human rights as a key priority in humanitarian action is highlighted in several key UN policy documents. These include the Secretary-General’s Call to Action for Human Rights and his Common Agenda which reiterated that the achievement of the goals of justice, peace, prevention, equality, and leaving no one behind are grounded in a system that has at its core the protection and promotion of human rights To ensure wide collection of data and verified information and support the participation and representation of different actors, OHCHR strived to engage as many interlocutors as feasible. It collected testimonies and information from primary sources, including victims and witnesses, and verifiable secondary sources – all of which underwent credibility assessment in accordance with OHCHR’s standard methodology. A total of 53 interviews with primary sources were conducted along with 43 formal consultations with partners and organizations through secure communication platforms. Moreover, OHCHR sought to gather information and data through the United Nations system and its existing mechanisms. It also submitted questionnaires to the Myanmar military, the National Unity Government, ethnic armed organizations, and relevant private companies. Throughout the documentation process, interlocutors consistently raised protection concerns confirming that fear of retaliation by the military for the peaceful exercise of fundamental rights permeates every aspect of life within and outside Myanmar. Widespread and systematic violations perpetrated by the military have created an environment where both Myanmar’s people and representatives of international organizations believe they are at risk of becoming targets for expressing opinions opposing military rule, sharing information, assisting people in need, and operating without military-issued authorizations, among others. For these reasons, and in full respect of the “do no harm” principle, this report does not present details that may lead to the identification of interlocutors, unless expressly authorized. Similarly, whenever necessary, geographical references are limited to the states and regions of Myanmar as identification of townships may result in retaliatory acts against individuals concerned. National and international interlocutors nonetheless provided a wealth of knowledge and information, although on numerous occasions cautioned OHCHR from publicly using them to avoid further military reprisals. Similarly, this sense of fear also extended to areas under the control of other duty-bearers from which only anecdotal information was received, not meeting the necessary standards for verification and inclusion in the report. Additional documentation efforts on denial of humanitarian access in areas outside military control are therefore necessary. The complexity of Myanmar’s humanitarian environment is characterized by the multiple needs of diverse communities in the various States and Regions, and the presence of multiple types of actors inside and outside Myanmar. For each individual situation and actor, there are different levels of access, challenges, and concerns. Rather than focusing on localized specificities, the report seeks to support accountability efforts by analysing broader patterns of actions and omissions by duty-bearers affecting the rights of people-in-need of life-saving assistance and essential services..."
Source/publisher: UN Human Rights Council (Geneva) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-30
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Title: Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar - Bulletin Issue 8, June 2023 [EN/MY]
Description: "MESSAGE FROM THE HEAD OF THE MECHANISM Over the past year, there has been a dramatic increase in violence in Myanmar. A military airstrike in Sagaing in April 2023 made global headlines but, unfortunately, this is just one of numerous attacks against the civilian population that the Mechanism is investigating. We have collected credible evidence of an array of war crimes and crimes against humanity committed across the country, including murder, rape, torture, unlawful imprisonment and deportation or forcible transfer. We are collecting this evidence while it is fresh, analysing it and preparing case files that can be shared with judicial authorities to hold perpetrators of these crimes responsible so that they will face justice While we gather and analyse evidence of serious international crimes committed since the military launched a coup on 1 February 2021, we remain focused on investigating earlier crimes and are sharing evidence, information and analytical reports with those working on ongoing cases concerning the Rohingya at the International Criminal Court, the International Court of Justice and in Argentina. Our work would not be possible without the cooperation of brave individuals and groups who share information and evidence with us, often at substantial risk to their own safety. Civil society organisations, in particular, provide the Mechanism with crucial information and connect us to witnesses and victims. The Mechanism hosted its first Civil Society Dialogue last month, and it was a privilege for my team and me to hear from those working on the frontline of efforts to gather evidence of serious international crimes and to support those most affected Our aim was to increase mutual understanding, and the participants left this meeting with a much firmer grasp of how the Mechanism works, and what it can and cannot do. My team and I also strengthened our understanding of the challenges that civil society groups face, and we are looking at ways we might adapt our work accordingly. Most of all, we heard their fears for their security, their trauma from all that they have experienced, and their frustration at not seeing justice served. As we explained to the Dialogue participants, the Mechanism is focusing all its efforts to ensure that there will be justice for these heinous crimes. We are collecting, preserving and analyzing evidence now so that it will be available for use by judicial authorities in the future. Serious international crimes have no statute of limitations – this means that there is no time limit for perpetrators to be prosecuted, and we are working to ensure that those responsible for these crimes will one day be held accountable..."
Source/publisher: UN Human Rights Council (Geneva) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-29
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Title: Assessment of the Availability, Accessibility, Acceptability, and Quality of Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights, Gender-Based Violence, and Mental Health and Psychosocial Support Services for Persons with Disabilities in Selected States in Myanmar
Description: "1 Introduction More than one billion people experience some form of disability globally. The disability prevalence rate is higher in developing countries and among marginalised groups such as women, older people, those in the poorest wealth quantile, and those living in rural areas. Persons with disabilities who belong to these groups are more likely to experience challenges accessing essential social services such as education, health, and employment, further pushing them to the margins of society. In Myanmar, the disability prevalence rate is 12.8 per cent, which is about 5.9 million people. According to the latest intercensal survey conducted in 2019, the country follows the global trend – disability prevalence is higher among women than men, older people, and those living in rural areas. Recognising that persons with disabilities in Myanmar face challenges in different spheres of life, hence the need to promote and protect their rights, the Government of Myanmar ratified the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) on December 07, 2011. The ratification of the CRPD paved the way to enact the Law on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in 2015 and the by-law/regulations in 2017. Nevertheless, marginalisation is still present among the members of the disability sector in Myanmar as they are less likely to receive education, gain decent employment, marry, or have access to various amenities and facilities enjoyed by those without disabilities. In particular, there is an urgent need to address the situation of women and girls with disabilities who experience discrimination at the intersection of their gender and disability. Their situation is further exacerbated by the country's Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic and the ongoing military coup d’état. Since 1973, the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) in Myanmar has provided continuous support to different target priorities, including sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR) and the prevention of gender-based violence (GBV). One key programme that promotes these priorities is the Women and Girls First (WGF) Programme. This multi-year and multi-donor initiative supports the integrated service delivery of SRHR and GBV response programming across humanitarian, peacebuilding, and development nexus. The Programme’s second phase (2019-2022) focuses on integrating SRHR, GBV prevention and response interventions, and mental health and psychosocial support (MHPSS) services to safeguard the rights of women and girls to access comprehensive services that are essential in achieving their rights. To ensure that persons with disabilities are not left behind in the delivery of integrated SRHR, GBV and MHPSS services, the UNFPA WGF Programme commissioned this study to identify the needs of persons with disabilities at the programme level. This study included identifying the barriers to and facilitators of the services delivered by the WGF Programme’s implementing partners and formulating recommendations to improve the disability inclusion component in the delivery of integrated SRHR, GBV and MHPSS services..."
Source/publisher: United Nations Population Fund
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-28
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Title: Incoming Thai government must enact refugee-friendly policies, Southeast Asian MPs say
Description: "JAKARTA – The incoming Thai government must heed calls from civil society to reform policies on refugees to be more compassionate and in line with international human rights standards, ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights (APHR) said today. “We support calls made by the Karen Peace Support Network and other locally-led civil society groups regarding Thailand’s policies on refugees and asylum seekers,” said APHR Chair and member of Indonesia’s House of Representatives Mercy Barends. “The incoming government must respond to the needs of refugees, uphold their human rights, and guarantee their safety.” According to data from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), there are over 90,000 Myanmar refugees living in nine recognized refugee camps along the Thai-Myanmar border. Refugees, some of whom have been stuck in limbo for years, are strictly confined behind fences and barred from seeking employment in Thailand. According to the Karen Peace Support Network, the current food ration is valued at approximately 300 THB or 10 USD per month. Meanwhile, human rights groups have repeatedly criticized Thai border authorities for sending those seeking refuge back across the border to Myanmar, where they are at risk of indiscriminate airstrikes, arbitrary arrest, torture, and worse. In the most recent high-profile case in April this year, Thai immigration authorities detained three members of a Myanmar opposition group that had crossed into Thailand to seek medical treatment and then handed them over to the Myanmar junta-allied Border Guard Forces (BGF). Witnesses say that BGF troops shot at the men after the handover. According to media reports, at least one of the men was killed, while the fates of the other two remain unclear. “The incoming Thai government must recognize that the junta’s treatment of refugees cannot continue. The new government must grant Myanmar asylum-seekers safe passage through the border and guarantee their access to humanitarian assistance. Refugees living in the camps in Thailand must be given access to educational and economic opportunities that will allow them to thrive outside the camps in various capacities,” said Barends. “Adding to the suffering of those who have already been forced from their homes by a murderous junta is unconscionable; any administration that claims to represent change must start by immediately remedying this untenable situation,” said Barends..."
Source/publisher: ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-28
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Title: Internal discord the greatest threat to Southeast Asian unity
Description: "As great power rivalry casts its long shadow over Southeast Asia, the imperative of regional unity grows more urgent. Yet diversity, divisions and disputes remain consequential features of the region that pose a significant threat to unity. Differences in cultures, languages, religions, historical experiences, political systems and developmental pathways have shaped Southeast Asia as it stands today. Geopolitically, these differences make the challenge of forging unity a particularly onerous task. During the Cold War, diversity manifested in the ideological division of Southeast Asia into communist and non-communist states. This division also assumed a geographical expression in terms of the divide between mainland (mostly communist) and maritime (non-communist) Southeast Asia. Yet the picture that emerges on closer inspection is far more complex. Among the communist mainland states were Chinese and Soviet clients, at a time when the Sino–Soviet split was at its height. While relations among non-communist maritime states were more harmonious, they were still fraught with residual suspicion and mistrust, much of which took the form of sovereignty disputes stemming from decolonisation projects. Since 2022, diversity has also manifested in regional states’ positions on the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Regional powers such as Vietnam (because of longstanding ties with Russia) and Indonesia (because of its foreign policy non-alignment principle) have taken restrained positions, whereas Singapore has openly condemned the invasion and imposed unilateral sanctions. Meanwhile, the military junta that seized power in Myanmar in February 2021 has unsurprisingly been one of Russia’s staunchest supporters. While other Southeast Asian states voted at the United Nations to condemn the invasion, they have avoided taking more robust stances. Then come divisions. One of the most pressing challenges to ASEAN cohesion is the Myanmar crisis. While ASEAN has strained to maintain a semblance of unity in its efforts to pressure the junta leadership in Myanmar, differences between member states on the issue diminished the prospects of the organisation resolving the crisis. In the lead-up to the ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Jakarta in February 2023, Thailand departed from the organisation’s formal exclusion of the junta from regional talks by reaching out to it in different capacities. Thailand hosted an ‘open-ended informal consultation’ with the junta in December 2022 that involved several other mainland Southeast Asian states. In February 2023, Thailand invited Myanmar to the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus meeting on maritime security that it co-chaired with the United States. Thailand’s visibly accommodative posture contrasts to those of several other ASEAN member states who continue to pressure the Myanmar junta to abide by the five-point consensus agreed upon at the 2021 special summit. Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim even reached out to his Thai counterpart on 10 February 2023, urging Bangkok to take a firmer stance against the junta. These divisions prevented ASEAN from issuing a joint statement on the second anniversary of the coup. Persisting fault lines in Southeast Asia have periodically given rise to diplomatic disputes and even low-key conflicts. For instance, in 2013, militants from the Sulu archipelago of the Philippines landed in the East Malaysian state of Sabah to assert the sovereignty of the historic Sulu Sultanate over that territory. The situation served as a reminder that the Philippine claim to the Malaysian territory of Sabah remains unresolved. On the Southeast Asian mainland, differences exist between Mekong riparian states over Laos’ unilateral move to build dams — with Chinese assistance — along sections of the river that pass Laotian territory. In maritime Southeast Asia, the Philippine move to submit their case against China over their South China Sea territorial disputes in 2013 to an international tribunal was described by a senior official from an ASEAN member state as an ‘unfortunate development’ and an ‘inconvenience to ASEAN’. Detractors have often criticised ASEAN for its inability to resolve differences between member states. This criticism betrays a fundamental misunderstanding of ASEAN’s intended role and limitations. Since its creation, ASEAN’s primary purpose has been to create a more conducive environment for cooperation among Southeast Asian states. It also seeks to manage their differences such that these do not hamper broader aspirations to enhance cooperation. Though ASEAN’s success on this score has been patchy, it was never envisaged to be the panacea for all the region’s problems. In that sense, it should be no surprise that member states have never used the mechanism of the High Council in Article 14 of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation. Dispute resolutions involving Southeast Asian states have usually come in the form of third-party mediation and efforts of international institutions such as the International Court of Justice. Southeast Asia has come a long way from the Cold War years when it was described as a ‘region of revolt’. Still, despite the attention on great power rivalry and its consequences for regional security, intramural conflicts persist. Unless Southeast Asian states can get their regional house in order, the challenge of fostering much-needed regional unity in the face of sharpening great power rivalry will grow more acute — as will the consequences of their inability to do so..."
Source/publisher: "East Asia Forum" (Australia)
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-28
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Title: Authoritarianism in the Modern World: Analyzing the Myanmar Crisis and Thailand’s Complicity
Description: "2,146 kilometers of landlocked demarcation is all that cuts through Myanmar and Thailand, two Southeast Asian nations that share a complicated, erstwhile rivalry that has evolved into a mutual bilateralism in the scope of current developments, with the incumbent Prayuth Chan-ocha regime cozying up to the likes of the Tatmadaw, Myanmar’s armed forces. These two countries are nothing alike; they do not share any linguistic overlap nor do they have any cultural heritages together, and they follow drastically different models of governance. In that sense, they are not complementary to each other, but centuries of warfare and geopolitical realities have shaped a new outlook. Once old foes, Thailand and Myanmar have now basked in a much more intimate and deeper bond, owing to the Thai government’s warmth towards the military-installed regime in Myanmar, due to similarities and parallels between the militaries of both nations, long-standing bastions of power and influence in politics, respectively. Since the Tatmadaw ousted the Aung San Suu Kyi-led government, the Prayuth administration has exercised a policy of soft diplomacy and engaged the Tatmadaw through peaceful politicking and appeasement behind the scenes. In this spirit of opportunism, minute realpolitik, and a much more drastic about-face of national fortunes, they have not only grown closer than ever, but this has also placed Thailand at loggerheads with the contradicting ASEAN doctrine of assertive, overt action condoning the Tatmadaw. Despite Thailand’s efforts towards an active role in the Myanmar peace process, the latest episode by Foreign Minister Don Pramuwinai to defuse tensions and bring an amicable end to the crisis only served to exacerbate an already fraught regional situation. To provide meaningful context, the Foreign Minister facilitated a series of talks between Thailand, ASEAN members, and envoys from the Myanmar junta, such as Myanmar’s foreign minister, Than Swe. In the end, several ASEAN members declined the invitation, embarrassing and thwarting Thailand’s efforts. The fact that the meeting was proposed and arranged only drew biting criticism and backlash. Professor Thitinan Pongsudhirak, a senior fellow of the ISIS (Institute of International Studies) at Chulalongkorn University, argues in an op-ed for the Bangkok Post that Don’s actions seem to be born out of desperation and that there is something much larger at play, presumably vested business interests or priorities that exceed national concerns. It is worth noting that this comes at a crucial juncture for Thailand, following the recent election that witnessed an unprecedented victory by the pro-democracy bloc, particularly the Move Forward Party, which has sought to orient Thailand back to the West and adhere to the ASEAN Five-Point agreement. In that sense, one has to wonder if this misadventure by the Prayuth government is part of something much more indicative in the realm of local politics, one that bypasses geopolitical concerns and delves into a more personal, ideological splinter within Thailand, which the recent election has irreparably carved. Herein, I address three critical takeaways that can be extracted from this strategic blunder and its implications within the framework of future foreign policy directives toward the Myanmar crisis. 1. Authoritarianism in Modern Context The Myanmar crisis is only a footnote in the discussion of authoritarianism in the globalized world, where diplomacy and commerce are shaped by affiliation with regional and intergovernmental blocs. It is an eclectic reverie of different nation-states with diverse economic, national objectives, and ideologies. Countries like Sweden and Finland have discussed entering NATO in light of the Russo-Ukrainian War, while entities like the United Kingdom have departed the EU. All of this is integral to contextualizing the spread and revival of authoritarianism and despotic regimes worldwide. Countries such as India, Hungary, and Russia have experienced democratic backsliding and upheaval, while European nations have turned increasingly nationalistic and right-wing, as seen in Italy. The 20th century observed a political realm shaped by allies and blocs against the backdrop of the Cold War. However, this trend seems to be changing as of late, with countries prioritizing national defense and economic recovery in the post-pandemic world. Germany, for instance, has ramped up its defense spending to its highest levels since the Cold War when it was West Germany. Meanwhile, nations like Venezuela, Iran, and Turkey have isolated themselves from the global community due to social unrest and uncertainty. In the 1990s, there were more democratic countries than authoritarian ones, but this trend has been upended. A pattern of despotic and increasingly autocratic regimes has emerged since the post-2007-2008 financial crisis and the coronavirus pandemic. Analyzing the Myanmar crisis and Thailand’s stakeholdership in it helps understand the connection to authoritarianism. To understand Thailand’s stance on the junta, one must examine the motives behind it. The obvious conclusion is that both countries have militarized natures and benefit from closer ties to prop up and aid each other in the event of a potential Chinese invasion of the Taiwan Strait. However, the real dissection of their relationship is much more nuanced. It is simply a relationship of convenience laced with appeasement and ignorance, part of the larger systemic global trend of authoritarian regimes elevating or supporting other like-minded regimes based on common objectives and similar ideologies. Thailand’s current rapprochement towards Myanmar overlooks a crucial and perhaps obscured problematic reality—the Rohingya refugee crisis and the exodus of migrants to Thailand’s borders. Thailand currently shelters 90,000 refugees, mostly those fleeing the sectarian violence in Myanmar. Issues such as statelessness and integration into society remain pervasive. A glaring fact is that Thailand has not signed the UN charter on Refugees and has recently proposed the now-suspended Torture Act. All of this suggests that Thailand is complicit in some manner by not taking an active hand in dealing with cross-border issues, and it ought to be much more compassionate. One can argue that Thailand is effectively damaging its global credibility by continuously supporting a regime that has shown little regard for human rights or respect for democratic institutions. Whatever stake Thailand has in this, it must not be transactional and purely manufactured out of greed. This may explain the Prayuth government’s reticence on the matter. Of course, one must also consider other factors and scandals, such as the recent uproar over a sitting senator’s business ties to the junta. Overall, it would be better to forget that Thailand and Myanmar form part of the Golden Triangle, the notorious hotbed of drug and crime productivity. With these points in mind, the incoming new pro-democratic administration must reboot its foreign policy initiatives, placing the human cost of crises and wars above other priorities. They should find a locus that allows Thailand to assert its regional strength without losing any leverage, and strive to eliminate the vested interests that foster this affair, particularly the links and business dealings with the junta. 2. The Way Forward 14th May 2023 saw a monumental tectonic shift in Thai politics with Move Forward leading the pack and winning the right to form a government first. While their prospects are bleak as of this writing, their policies and the coalition’s MOU on Myanmar must constitute a return to respectability for Thailand as a regional power after years of mismanagement and ineptness. After all, it is a potential for a restart in Thai attitudes toward foreign policy. The Prayuth government’s current flirtations with the Myanmar government are still a thorn in the side of the incoming coalition’s side. I examine for two reasons why the current government’s Myanmar imbroglio is in fact a political machination deliberately designed to be a chink in the armor for the pro-democracy camp. The first is to flaunt Thailand’s political strength in the region, positioning it as an active actor in ASEAN. However, this gambit has failed because the current government has yet to embrace the current political dynamic in which Thailand has little to no sway in the regional community. It is only a passive driver, unable to effect change to the likes of Indonesia. The current government’s credibility has only backfired from the day it assumed office. Authoritarian regimes thrive on legitimacy and Thailand is no different. From showcasing its global entry through last year’s APEC summit and other gaffes, Thailand has only demonstrated that it is a tiny player, a pawn in an ever-evolving dynamic – the tug of war against America and China for influence through subterfuge, soft power, and neocolonialism. With Move Forward’s Western outlook, Prayuth’s government-crafted blunder seems to have been a ploy, to place the new government on a collision course with the SAC to the extent where mobilization and brinkmanship will be possibilities, with catastrophic ends. Therefore, the onus is on the new government to immediately respond to the Myanmar crisis and that will involve engaging with the junta in ways unseen before in the bilateral history of both nations. 3. Refugees and Reassurance The refugee crisis in Myanmar has dominated popular memory through violent and startlingly graphic depictions portrayed in the media, as well as the persecution and genocide of ethnic groups, to the point where the ICC investigated the aforementioned actions taken against the Rohingya. After 2015, almost 900,000 people of Rohingya descent have fled Myanmar, displaced into neighboring countries. What is most grim is the Myanmar state’s denial of such violence and cleansing, almost tantamount to the conditions faced in apartheid or the Rwandan Genocide. This crisis has taken on a life of its own, transcending a national issue to a global concern that has led to a reevaluation of the treatment and eradication of ethnic minorities in other countries, such as the Uighur extermination camps or Darfur. While this crisis is largely isolated to Myanmar and is insulated, Thailand must be vigilant and willing to speak against this perpetuated injustice, this violation of human rights, and the recognition of the Rohingya as a population severely dispersed by the perils of war. It is not the time for compassion, nor is it time to be a passive bystander. For that, it is Thailand’s role as a neighbor and as an Asiatic power to bring awareness about this critical crisis, to call for accountability, and to portray the crisis in a manner that highlights the multifaceted impacts it has consequently wreaked on a minority group and, by extension, a national state that is interspersed with in-fighting and the re-emergence of a human rights, pro-democratic movement within the country that has captured the global imagination. If Thailand claims to be a democratic polity after the results of this election have been entertained, the responsibility should be placed on its shoulders to become more active in championing democratic ideals in the regional sphere, instead of supplicating and kowtowing to authoritarian regimes that have a lack of interest in following the rule of established law. These three points, I hope, have accurately captured the zeitgeist and future implications of Thailand’s Myanmar policy, and the reader finds this encouraging in the greater strata of things, that the new government will readjust current attitudes toward Myanmar to the point where other stakeholders can actively participate in the peace process without appeasing the junta or supplanting it through force. There is no perfect solution, nor is there a worse outcome. There is only an outcome that will be solely determined by the Myanmar people’s sheer will, and we, as a regional partner, must observe every development while distancing ourselves from the SAC..."
Source/publisher: Thai Enquirer
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-27
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Title: Myanmar: Cyclone Mocha - Operation update #2, Emergency Appeal No. MDRMM018
Description: "SITUATION ANALYSIS Description of the crisis Cyclonic Storm Mocha caused extensive devastation in the country, affecting regions already facing challenges due to civil unrest, armed clashes, a changing climate and a fragile economy. The cyclone brought about destructive storm surges, heavy rainfall, and flooding, impacting areas such as Rakhine, Chin, Magway, Ayeyarwady, Mandalay, and Sagaing. The State Administration Council responded by declaring natural disaster areas in Rakhine and Chin states. The Myanmar Red Cross Society (MRCS), as an independent humanitarian actor as enshrined in the Myanmar Red Cross Society Law of 2015, has a specific response role when a declaration of natural disasters is issued. According to analysis from MRCS’s branches, over 1,100,000 individuals from over 237,000 households are affected, with a large number of semi-permanent and temporary shelters damaged or destroyed, leaving over 200,000 houses in need of repair. Water systems, sanitation facilities, public and community infrastructure, including hospitals, clinics, schools, and religious buildings, as well as transportation infrastructure, suffered severe damage or complete destruction. Livelihoods have been severely disrupted with the loss of livestock and floods that impacted croplands. The cyclone's aftermath has led to increased prices of basic goods, and the situation has taken a toll on the physical and mental health of the affected population. Disrupted access to healthcare, medicine shortages, and the risks posed by landmines in flooded conflict areas further exacerbate the challenges. Urgent measures are required to protect and support unaccompanied children, the needs of women and girls and other populations in situations of vulnerability. The cyclone occurred within an already challenging humanitarian context in Myanmar. At the end of 2022, OCHA identified that over 17.6 million people would be in humanitarian need in Myanmar in 20231. Prior to the 1 February 2021 military intervention, Rakhine state already registered over 220,000 internally displaced people (IDP). In the past two years, through the end of April 2023, an additional 10,000 people were displaced within the state2. The MRCS, with support from the IFRC network, has maintained long-term programming in Rakhine state since large-scale violence erupted in the north of the state in 2012. Through its branch and community-level principled humanitarian actions, MRCS is a well-known humanitarian actor. Like all humanitarian actors, MRCS also has experienced challenges to maintain its continual access to communities in need and advocates with the relevant stakeholders based on its humanitarian mission. In the second week of June 2023, access to areas in Rakhine state for the cyclone response was temporarily suspended for humanitarian organisations, though previously planned and agreed humanitarian activities could proceed in line with usual processes. The authorities have indicated that actors’ Cyclone Mocha response activities must be coordinated with the National Disaster Management Committee and abide with the regular coordination with the respective line ministries. Aligned with its established functions enshrined in national law, the MRCS, with IFRC support, is engaged in humanitarian diplomacy to obtain access to reach populations in need within this response operation, as well as in the ongoing programmatic actions. The IFRC continues to support MRCS with strategic and operational guidance, as well as engaging with other humanitarian actors as needed, to strengthen the National Society’s capacities to remain and be perceived as an effective and efficient principled humanitarian actor. Summary of the response Overview of the host National Society and ongoing response The Myanmar Red Cross Society is an independent humanitarian organization that operates impartially and neutrally. Its role as an auxiliary to the state in the humanitarian field, operating in line with the Red Cross Red Crescent Fundamental Principles, is enshrined in the Myanmar Red Cross Society Law of 2015. The MRCS has a strong presence with over a thousand trained Emergency Response Team (ERT) volunteers and 44,000 members nationwide, including 7,994 core Red Cross Volunteers (RCV) active at the community level. The organization has 23 warehouses strategically located throughout the country to support preparedness and response efforts. It also has regional and state branches across the country, and a substantial presence in various operational hubs in Rakhine State, under the management of the MRCS Rakhine Operations Management Unit established over the past decade. During this reporting period, 962 volunteers were deployed to aid the most affected communities since the cyclone made landfall. The MRCS has established communication channels and built relationships with local authorities and communities in the affected areas through its local staff, volunteers, and branches. This enables them to reach vulnerable communities and provide immediate humanitarian assistance. Through its community presence, MRCS has access on the ground and has collected data as well as assessed the impact of Cyclone Mocha in Rakhine State and Magway and Ayeyarwady regions in particular. In anticipation of the cyclone, the MRCS activated its Emergency Operations Centre (EOC) one week before landfall and initiated preparedness measures and early actions well in advance. Prior to landfall, MRCS volunteers in the projected path and impact zone assisted with evacuations, conducted awareness campaigns, and gathered preliminary data. After the cyclone made landfall, on 14 May, MRCS branches mobilized their volunteers to engage in rescue operations, clear roads and debris, provide first aid and psychosocial support, and collect initial observations and data. MRCS also mobilized its existing operational resources to respond to the aftermath, deploying trained expert personnel to directly provide assistance and support services such as logistics and supply chain. As of 14 June 2023, MRCS has reached 147,142 people (28,694 households) with relief assistance, including shelter, livelihood support, clean water, and essential household items. A total of 4,650 individuals from 930 households received shelter assistance through distribution of tarpaulins, family kits and blankets. In the hardest-hit region of Rakhine State, MRCS distributed 549,210 liters of safe drinking water, along with 19,000 liters of domestic water to affected communities. To uphold the dignity of the affected communities, hygiene parcels for families, specialized hygiene kits for men, and dignity kits for women were distributed in various affected regions, including Rakhine, Magway, Yangon, Ayeyarwady, Bago, and Mandalay. Around 6,985 individuals were reached with these items. Additionally, MRCS distributed 112 sets of children's clothing to support affected children. MRCS's mobile health clinics in Rakhine have provided assistance to 1,616 individuals since it started on 17 May. Operational coordination meetings are regularly organized in collaboration with the IFRC, involving in-country partners and the ICRC, to provide technical and planning support to MRCS for the response. MRCS, IFRC and ICRC meet in Movement tripartite meetings at a strategic level. The regular tripartite security cell meetings are being used for regular risk analysis and security planning. Moreover, MRCS and IFRC are observers in HCT meetings and Cluster coordination as part of their external coordination efforts. IFRC together with MRCS have been actively engaging the IFRC network, both in-country and remotely, to work on a Federation-wide approach. The development of the Federation-wide Operational Strategy involved a shared leadership approach, drawing upon the expertise of the IFRC network and past experiences from drafting the Unified Plan and the ongoing New Way of Working. To ensure efficient communication and reporting, the monitoring and reporting mechanisms are also coordinated under one single reporting system, aiming to streamline communication and reporting channels between the MRCS and the IFRC network. In addition, the IFRC network had mobilized three rapid response personnel (surge) for the operation, including for the combined Myanmar Shelter/ NFI/ CCCM Clusterto enhance and complement the existing coordination structure. To ensure efficient communication and reporting, the monitoring and reporting mechanisms are also coordinated under one single reporting system, aiming to streamline communication and reporting channels between the MRCS and the IFRC network. In order to provide ongoing assistance to the MRCS in Rakhine state, which is most severely affected by cyclone Mocha, the IFRC Myanmar Delegation deployed a Senior Services Manager for two weeks and Senior Operations Officer for two weeks. Future deployments by IFRC country delegation staff are planned. Their presence allows for support to the MRCS, as well as participation in the coordination structures at Rakhine state level. The IFRC is contributing to MRCS-led collaborative efforts to develop and execute a comprehensive assistance plan..."
Source/publisher: International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-23
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Title: ASEAN’s planned military exercises led by Myanmar junta and Russian regime will deepen its complicity in the junta’s international crimes
Description: "Justice For Myanmar calls on the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM) to immediately cancel Myanmar junta and Russia led counter terrorism military exercises to be held in the coming months. The drills are being organised by the ADMM-Plus Experts’ Working Group on Counter Terrorism, co-chaired by the Myanmar military junta and the Russian regime, and will involve a tabletop exercise in Myanmar in August and a field training exercise in Russia in September. The working group held its final planning conference for the exercises in June in Khabarovsk, Russia, attended by all members of ASEAN and dialogue partners China and India. The USA, Australia, Japan, South Korea and New Zealand boycotted the meeting. The exercises will involve military training that coordinates a response to a simulated terrorist attack and will help the Myanmar military build the capabilities of elite troops engaged in a campaign of terror against the people. ASEAN’s practical assistance and support for the training of Myanmar junta troops makes the bloc further complicit in ongoing war crimes and crimes against humanity. Since the military’s illegal coup attempt on February 1, 2021, the junta has murdered more than 3,600 people, arbitrarily arrested more than 23,000, committed indiscriminate airstrikes and shelling, torture, and sexual violence, and displaced at least 1.5 million people. Since 2021, ADMM’s counter terrorism working group has been led by Major General Aung Myo Thant, Deputy Chief of the Myanmar military’s Armed Forces Training, and Major General Grigorii Tiurin of the Operational and Strategic Command of Russia’s Eastern Military District. Their co-chairpersonship ends this year. The working group is also used by the junta for propaganda purposes and to seek regional support for its attacks against the legitimate National Unity Government (NUG), People’s Defence Forces (PDFs) and Ethnic Revolutionary Organisations. For instance, a junta propaganda article on the December 2021 ASEAN counter terrorism meeting, hosted by the junta, reported on Aung Myo Thant’s speech, “highlighting… the terrorist activities of NUG and PDF, electoral fraud which led to the state of emergency declared by Tatmadaw to maintain the State affairs, efforts of Tatmadaw in various ways to peacefully find a solution on vote-rigging, the NLD government’s multiple rejections on the discussion and its intent to form a new government with controversial election results.” ASEAN has not only failed to take action in support of human rights and democracy in Myanmar but is actively aiding the junta’s criminal conduct through direct military support like the planned military exercises. This makes ASEAN complicit in the junta’s atrocity crimes. ASEAN is also impeding effective international action to resolve the crisis in Myanmar by acting as an institutional barrier that supports the junta by providing cover for its members and dialogue partners to enhance military cooperation and avoid taking action to protect the human rights of the Myanmar people and end the military’s impunity. Justice For Myanmar spokesperson Yadanar Maung says: “If the world needs anymore evidence that the Five Point Consensus has failed, ASEAN’s training of junta troops in “counter terrorism” should be the nail in the coffin. “ASEAN’s planned training of junta troops will make the bloc further complicit in the junta’s violent attacks against the Myanmar people. “Rather than helping to resolve the Myanmar crisis, ASEAN’s actions are worsening it and causing real harm. “The fact these military exercises are planned is testament to the shocking failure of Indonesia as ASEAN chair to uphold basic principles of democracy and human rights. “ASEAN must immediately cancel the exercises, ban the junta from all meetings and recognise and support the National Unity Government as the legitimate government of Myanmar. “If, under Indonesia’s leadership, the exercises do go ahead, Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines and the incoming Thai government should boycott the exercises and stand with the people of Myanmar in support of human rights and democracy.”..."
Source/publisher: Justice For Myanmar
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-22
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Title: Human Rights Situation weekly update (June 15 to 21 2023) [EN/MY]
Description: "Human Rights Violations took place in States and Regions from June 15 to 21, 2023 Military Junta troops arrested over 240 local civilians from Thayetchaung Township, Tanintharyi Region, Okpho Township, Bago Region and Sagaing Township, Sagaing Region and used them as human shields from 15th June to 21st June. Military Junta troops launched an airstrike and dropped bombs in Moebye, Shan State and Tamu Township, Saging Region. 3 civilians were burned and killed by Military Junta’s soldiers in Sagaing Region. The Military Junta strictly forbidden the “Flower Strikes” that were held on 19th June. The Military Junta arrested the peaceful protesters who participated in Flower Strike throughout the whole country. The Military Junta also arrested the people who post wishes for Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s birthday on social media. The Military Junta tortured and killed (7) civilians at interrogation..."
Source/publisher: Network for Human Rights Documentation-Burma
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-22
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Title: Nearly 1 million Rohingya refugees are facing precarious conditions in Bangladesh
Description: "In August 2017, a violent military crackdown against the Rohingya population in Myanmar led many to flee the country in search of safety. In Myanmar, the Rohingya – an ethnic, religious, and linguistic minority – have faced discrimination for over 40 years. In 2017, the violence escalated into genocide, with security forces killing thousands and burning down over 400 villages. The majority, nearly 1 million Rohingya, found refuge in Bangladesh’s Cox Bazar district and on the island of Bhasan Char. While the Rohingya refugees have escaped persecution from the Myanmar forces, life is difficult in the refugee camps in Cox Bazar and Bhasan Char. With 773,000 Rohingya located in Cox Bazar, and more than 30,000 in Bhasan Char, the scale of the influx of refugees has put a serious strain on services. The situation is getting more dire by the year due to the protracted nature of the humanitarian crisis and decreasing funding. Rohingya’s refugees are currently the world’s largest stateless population in the world, and most of them are still without formal refugee status. In Bangladesh, many are unable to access education or are able to earn an income, leaving them vulnerable to exploitation and serious protection risks. Living in refugee camps, they depend entirely on humanitarian aid. Tensions have increased within the camps but also with host communities to such an extent that, since 2019, Bangladesh has erected fences around the camps. Now the Rohingya are no longer allowed to own cell phones or access the internet. At the end of December 2021, many refugees were relocated to a submersible island, the island of Bhasan Char. To date, international NGOs have little information on the real living conditions of the Rohingyas in this location. BGD-WAR-ROHINGYAS Bangladesh is recognized as one of the most disaster-prone countries in the world: the climate crisis has further exacerbated the risk of natural hazards like cyclones, floods, landslides and earthquakes. Bangladesh has done a lot to mitigate the risk of climate disaster through the development of emergency preparedness mechanisms that have already saved countless lives during major disasters. Nonetheless, the frequency, severity and unpredictability of these disasters will only continue to increase as global warming, environmental degradation and population growth continue to escalate. This leaves the Rohingya population in the country at extreme risk and humanitarian needs are only going to continue to grow. DOCTORS OF THE WORLD ACTION FOR ROHINGYA REFUGEES Shortly after the massive influx of Rohingya into Bangladesh in September 2017, Doctors of the World (DotW) began medical treatment in camps. Our efforts have focused on strengthening the capacities of local associations with the aim of improving access to mental health and psychosocial care services and to better support victims of gender-based violence. We have provided training to the staff of numerous associations working in Cox’s Bazar. Since 2018, when the emergency response took hold, our support has shifted to outreach to people who need medical care but cannot get to clinics to help them access healthcare. We have also been working on awareness raising activities for disease prevention and health maintenance / promotion in the community, and nurturing community support mechanisms. DotW works with Rohingya volunteers so that they educate and empower their peers themselves. With many Rohingya struggling with trauma from their experience in Myanmar and many struggling with gender-based violence, our humanitarian mission has focused heavily on creating safe spaces that can provide healthcare as well as psychosocial support. Currently, four Community Resource Centers (in the camps and for the host populations) have been built: they constitute spaces of confidentiality and work to build trust and support people with specialized healthcare and mental health support. Furthermore, during Covid-19 epidemic, DotW and its partners put in place responses to the humanitarian emergency in Bangladesh, by organizing massive information and awareness campaigns for host populations. Through our work at Doctors of the World we have: Supported 56 community groups in terms of access to health and management of gender-based violence and people requiring mental health and psychosocial support, Accompanied 202 victims of gender-based violence with mental health and psychosocial support, Informed and educated 10,064 people about gender-based violence, sexual and reproductive health, and mental and psychosocial health. Nonetheless, there are still larger, more complex issues that are preventing Rohingya people from settling. Many cannot see clear prospects in their future and are spending their days in limbo, still longing to return home. Without a clear documentation status the Rohingya population is unable to leave the camps, receives education or finds work..."
Source/publisher: Médecins du Monde
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-22
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Title: Durable solutions to the Rohingya crisis in Myanmar
Description: "Panel discussion on durable solutions to the Rohingya crisis and to end human rights violations and abuses against Rohingya Muslims and other minorities in Myanmar 53rd session of the Human Rights Council Statement by Nada Al-Nashif, UN Deputy High Commissioner for Human Rights Mr President, Distinguished Panelists, Excellencies, Rohingya Muslims and other minorities in Myanmar have endured decades of persecution and systematic discrimination. Today, eleven years after the 2012 violence in Rakhine State, and six years after the 2017 military operations that killed thousands and displaced hundreds of thousands of Rohingya, more than one million languish in refugee camps in Bangladesh. An estimated 600,000 remain in Myanmar where they continue to be deprived of their basic rights. Meanwhile other ethnic and religious minorities, who had pinned their hopes on ceasefire agreements and the promise of a federal and democratic future for Myanmar, are now once again the victims of a new cycle of conflict. The military coup of February 2021 and violent repression in many parts of Myanmar have inflicted more suffering on minority communities, including Rohingya Muslims. In addition, last month Cyclone Mocha – the most powerful storm to hit the region in a decade – raged through the country. More than 100 Rohingya died while thousands had their homes shattered and their lives upended, rendering them even more vulnerable. The Myanmar military has the unequivocal obligation to provide full, safe and unimpeded humanitarian access to all persons in need. Instead, the military has put in place a system of physical and administrative restrictions on the conduct of humanitarian operations, including in assessing casualties and needs on the ground. People are reportedly living in forests and improvised shelters without any access to life-saving services, such as medicines and at times, food. Alarmed by the gravity of the worsening situation at the end of last year the Security Council adopted its first resolution on Myanmar in which it underscored the need to create conditions necessary for the voluntary, safe, dignified and sustainable return of Rohingya refugees and internally displaced persons. Sadly, those conditions do not yet exist on the ground. To achieve an inclusive future, the authorities in Myanmar must ensure a fully democratic, representative and accountable political system, repeal all discriminatory legislation, undertake inclusive and constructive dialogue aimed at national reconciliation, and implement measures that ensure the respect and protection of the human rights and dignity of each and every person without discrimination. A fundamental step is the full legal recognition of the right to citizenship of all Rohingya people and issuance to them of appropriate civil documentation, allowing for the full and equal access to basic services, including education and health, economic opportunity, and freedom of movement. Needless to say, any dialogue and deliberation about the future of the Rohingya – including any possibility for their return to Myanmar - must include their full, effective and meaningful participation, in all their diversity. Sustainable returns in line with international standards are impossible unless the human rights, freedoms and security of the Rohingya community are guaranteed. In the meantime, a large number of Rohingya continue to flee to safer countries, often taking immense risks, including dangerous sea crossings. According to UNHCR, more than 3,500 Rohingya attempted deadly sea crossings last year, 2022 – a 360 per cent increase compared to 2021. At least, 348 Rohingya died while making these sea crossings in 2022. I take this opportunity to express our solidarity with and support to Bangladesh for stepping up to provide refuge to more than 1 million Rohingya refugees through this protracted crisis. I also commend countries in the region, such as Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand for allowing safe disembarkation and provision of protection and humanitarian assistance to Rohingya who arrived by boat and I hope that would continue. I also acknowledge the significant pressure placed on these countries, notably Bangladesh, in their humanitarian efforts as well on humanitarian actors, in ensuring delivery of services to the camps in Bangladesh. Since March of this year, due to shortfalls in funding, the World Food Programme has had to sharply reduce food rations in the camps – twice – which has further compounded the refugees’ hardship. The 2023 Joint Response Plan for the Rohingya Humanitarian Crisis in Bangladesh is severely underfunded. I call upon the international community to provide robust and sustained support to Rohingya refugees. We must continue to build their** resilience and self-reliance**, which is fundamental. Ensuring access to education, lifelong learning, skills development and livelihoods in the camps is critical if the refugees are to move away from total dependency on humanitarian assistance, in order to be prepared to rebuild their lives in Myanmar, once they can return in dignity. In the face of the impunity enjoyed by the Myanmar military for past and present violations against the Rohingya, we fully support the ongoing accountability efforts at the international level. The application brought by the Gambia against Myanmar at the International Court of Justice is an important step in this direction, as is the continuing investigation of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court. I hope the Human Rights Council will redouble its support in the direction of accountability initiatives. To conclude, I urge the Council to give careful attention to the views expressed by the panel and to work collectively on a roadmap towards durable solutions – solutions that are anchored in the hopes and the human rights of Rohingya Muslims and other minorities..."
Source/publisher: UN Human Rights Council (Geneva)
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-21
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Title: End of Mission Statement: Thomas Andrews, United Nations Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar (Jakarta, Indonesia - 21 June 2023) [EN/ID]
Description: "UN expert urges coordinated action by Indonesia and other nations to address Myanmar crisis JAKARTA (21 June 2023) – The UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, Tom Andrews wrapped up a nine-day mission to Indonesia today by calling for coordinated action by Indonesia and others to address the deepening crisis in Myanmar. He expressed his appreciation to Indonesia for its support to the people of Myanmar and urged the country to play a bigger role in resolving the crisis both as current Chair of ASEAN and as a leader in Southeast Asia and on the world stage. “I came to Indonesia because the human rights situation in Myanmar is dire and getting worse, and because I believe that Indonesia is positioned to play a critical role in the resolution of this crisis,” Andrews said in a statement released today at a news conference in Jakarta. “I’m worried that the deepening crisis in Myanmar has become invisible to much of the world, and that some governments are beginning to think that the junta’s tyranny is inevitable. This narrative is exactly what the junta wants and needs to prevail,” he said. In meetings with Indonesian and ASEAN officials during his visit, Andrews noted that the world was looking to Indonesia and ASEAN for leadership in resolving the Myanmar crisis. “There are two different time zones when it comes to ASEAN and the crisis in Myanmar: one being the reality of the people of Myanmar who face daily attacks by junta forces and rapidly deteriorating conditions. The other is the world of ASEAN officials who caution that progress could take years, even decades,” the Special Rapporteur said. “The people of Myanmar do not have decades nor years – some do not even have days – for the junta to be held accountable,” he said. Andrews called on Indonesia to show continued leadership on Myanmar not only for the remainder of its ASEAN chairmanship, but beyond. “It is time to consider alternative options to break the deadly stalemate. I urge ASEAN to take measures to hold the junta accountable for its grave human rights violations and blatant disregard for implementation of the Five-Point Consensus. Even if ASEAN remains deadlocked, Indonesia should work with allies to isolate the junta and reduce its capacity to attack the people of Myanmar,” the expert said. During his mission, Andrews traveled to Aceh Province and visited a Rohingya refugee camp in Pidie District, where he heard directly from Rohingya who undertook dangerous boat journeys across the Bay of Bengal and Andaman Sea and disembarked in Indonesia. “What was overwhelmingly apparent is the extreme vulnerability of refugees with whom I met. Fleeing atrocity crimes in Myanmar, and facing increasingly dire conditions in Bangladesh, they carry with them deep trauma. They want and deserve a safer, more peaceful life.” “The Rohingya refugees recounted their harrowing experiences at sea. A woman told me that over 20 persons died on her boat and that they had to throw the bodies overboard. Another woman cried as she recalled the lack of food and water, and how she had to give her child seawater to drink,” Andrews recalled. The expert said he was inspired by the widespread empathy for Rohingya among Acehnese fishermen, local civil society groups providing aid and services, and UN staff working with the refugees. Andrews cautioned, however, that there remain many challenges for Rohingya refugees in Indonesia and the region. “Responsibility for the rights of the Rohingya, including their right to redress as survivors of atrocity crimes, rests primarily with Myanmar. But it also extends to the countries where they seek refuge and to the broader international community,” said Andrews. He emphasised that Indonesia is well-positioned to play a global leadership role to defend and support the Rohingya. ENDSMr. Thomas Andrews (United States of America) is the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar. A former member of the US Congress from Maine, Andrews is a Robina Senior Human Rights Fellow at Yale Law School and an Associate of Harvard University’s Asia Center. He has worked with the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs and parliamentarians, NGOs and political parties in Cambodia, Indonesia, Algeria, Croatia, Serbia, Ukraine and Yemen. He has been a consultant for the National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma and the Euro-Burma Network and has run advocacy NGOs including Win Without War and United to End Genocide. The Special Rapporteurs are part of what is known as the Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council. Comprising the largest body of independent experts in the UN Human Rights system, Special Procedures is the general name of the Council's independent fact-finding and monitoring mechanisms that address either specific country situations or thematic issues in all parts of the world. Special Procedures experts work on a voluntary basis; they are not UN staff and do not receive a salary for their work. They are independent from any government or organization and serve in their individual capacity..."
Source/publisher: UN Human Rights Council via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-21
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Title: Myanmar Authorities Must Ensure Full Legal Recognition of the Right to Citizenship of All Rohingya People, Deputy High Commissioner tells Human Rights Council - Council Concludes Interactive Dialogue with the High Commissioner on his Annual Report
Description: "The Human Rights Council this morning held a panel discussion on human rights violations against Rohingya Muslims and other minorities in Myanmar, hearing the Deputy High Commissioner for Human Rights say that the Myanmar authorities must ensure full legal recognition of the right to citizenship of all Rohingya people and issuance to them of appropriate civil documentation. Nada Al-Nashif, United Nations Deputy High Commissioner for Human Rights, said Rohingya Muslims and other minorities in Myanmar had endured decades of persecution and systematic discrimination. Today, more than one million were languishing in refugee camps in Bangladesh. An estimated 600,000 remained in Myanmar, where they continued to be deprived of their basic rights. The military coup of February 2021 and violent repression in many parts of Myanmar had inflicted more suffering on minority communities, including Rohingya Muslims. Ms. Al-Nashif said that to achieve an inclusive future, the authorities in Myanmar needed to ensure a fully democratic, representative and accountable political system, repeal all discriminatory legislation, undertake dialogue aimed at national reconciliation, and implement measures that ensured the respect and protection of the human rights and dignity of each person without discrimination. A fundamental step was the full legal recognition of the right to citizenship of all Rohingya people and issuance to them of appropriate civil documentation. Yasmin Ullah, Chair of the Board at Alternative ASEAN Network on Burma, said there were currently over 1.3 million Rohingya refugees worldwide lacking protection, legal status, and a way out of this plight. There needed to be recognition of Rohingya ethnic status. Citizenship alone granted Rohingya no protection. A truth commission would be a guide to how structural and institutional reform could take place to ensure no repetition of atrocities, violations of rights or discriminatory policy and practices could take place without accountability in Myanmar again. There should not be any repatriation without such a framework in place. Chris Lewa, Founder of the Arakan Project, said a permanent solution for the Rohingya to live peacefully in Myanmar would guarantee a sustainable return to their homeland. Despite numerous United Nations resolutions, no progress had been made. Following the coup in February 2021, the generals responsible for mass atrocities against the Rohingya were now de facto authorities. In this context, insistence on expediting Rohingya repatriation was disturbing, as conditions for a safe, voluntary return were not in place. Repatriation to Myanmar needed to be voluntary and should not be promoted until root causes were addressed and conditions for a safe return were in place. Kyaw Win, Executive Director of Burma Human Rights Network, said since August 2017, the Myanmar military had held a campaign of killings, mass rape and arson against the Rohingya in northern Rakhine State, killing thousands and forcing over 730,000 to flee to Bangladesh. The citizenship system was another clear violation of the human rights of Muslims in Burma. The Network called on the United Nations Security Council to end its inaction and refer the situation in Myanmar to the International Criminal Court or establish a separate criminal tribunal to investigate and prosecute the full spectrum of atrocity crimes in Burma. Mohshin Habib, Adjunct Professor at Laurentian University and Policy and Strategy Adviser at ASA Philippines Foundation, said Rohingya people had faced recurring military crackdowns and fled Myanmar in significant numbers in 1978, 1981, 1992, 2012, 2015, 2016 and 2017. These recurring crackdowns had devastated Rohingya lives and made them the world's most persecuted minority. During the August 2017 crackdown, Tatmadaw burned 300 Rohingya villages, vandalised 36,000 businesses and snatched valuables from 26,000 families. As a result, at least 800,000 Rohingya fled Myanmar and took refuge in Bangladesh, joining those who fled earlier. The three practical measures to repatriation were security, economic and education, and social capital theses. In the ensuing discussion, many speakers deplored discrimination, marginalisation and persecution of the Rohingya community, which had caused the forced exodus of the community. Speakers expressed deep concern about the human rights situation of the Rohingya. Thousands had been raped or killed and forced to flee their homes. The appalling, widespread violations of human rights, which could equate to crimes against humanity and war crimes, needed to cease, and perpetrators needed to be held accountable. There needed to be reform of the 1982 Citizenship Law in line with international standards. Other speakers said dialogue needed to be held between the Rohingya and the militia. The principle of non-interference in domestic affairs needed to be upheld. It was counterproductive to politicise the issue of internally displaced persons and to interfere in the domestic issues of Myanmar, including through International Criminal Court and International Court of Justice actions. Speaking in the discussion on Myanmar were Norway on behalf of a group of countries, Pakistan on behalf of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, Luxembourg on behalf of a group of countries, European Union, Kuwait, Australia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Türkiye, Bangladesh, Gambia, Costa Rica, United Kingdom, Venezuela, Senegal, Iran, South Africa, Russian Federation, Mauritania and Egypt. Also speaking were the Islamic Human Rights Commission, Human Rights Watch, Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development, International Bar Association, Lidskoprávní organizace Práva a svobody obcanučů Turkmenistánu z.s., iuventum e.V., INHR, and Association Ma'onah for Human Rights and Immigration. At the beginning of the meeting, the Council concluded the interactive dialogue with the High Commissioner for Human Rights on his annual report which began yesterday. A summary can be found here. Volker Türk, United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, in concluding remarks, thanked all delegations and non-governmental organizations for contributing to the debate, which had been constructive. There were two anniversaries this year, of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Vienna Declaration, which were opportunities to reflect on universality and indivisibility. Mr. Türk took note with appreciation all States that had reported cooperation with components of the human rights ecosystem and his Office. To achieve the Sustainable Development Goals, there could not be exclusion or stigmatisation of minority groups, including the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex community. The world needed to take a clear stance against racism, xenophobia and all other forms of discrimination. In the discussion, some speakers said the seventy-fifth anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights presented a valuable opportunity to take stock of opportunities and challenges and commit to improving and enhancing national frameworks in line with international human rights obligations. Some speakers were deeply concerned by the regression of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex rights in many countries. A number of speakers noted that climate change would continue to pose great threats to the human rights of both present and future generations. During the debate, speakers denounced human rights violations committed in many countries, regions and territories. Speaking in the interactive dialogue with the High Commissioner were Ghana, Cambodia, Burundi, Barbados, Trinidad and Tobago, Nicaragua, Ireland, New Zealand, Tunisia, Namibia, Honduras, Uganda, Hungary and Eritrea. Also speaking were Right Livelihood Award Foundation, World Federation of Ukrainian Women's Organizations, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, Every Casualty Worldwide, International Commission of Jurists, East and Horn of Africa Human Rights Defenders Project, Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development, Palestinian Initiative for the Promotion of Global Dialogue and Democracy, and Il Cenacolo. The webcast of the Human Rights Council meetings can be found here. All meeting summaries can be found here. Documents and reports related to the Human Rights Council’s fifty-third regular session can be found here. The Council will next meet this afternoon at 3 p.m. to hear the presentation of the report of the Secretary-General on the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the oral updates of the High Commissioner and his Office on Nicaragua and on Sri Lanka, followed by an interactive dialogue with the Independent Expert on protection against violence and discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity. Interactive Dialogue on the Annual Report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights presented his global update on his annual report on Monday, 19 June, and the interactive dialogue started on Tuesday, 20 June. Discussion In the discussion, some speakers, among other things, said the seventy-fifth anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights presented a valuable opportunity to take stock of opportunities and challenges and commit to improving and enhancing national frameworks in line with international human rights obligations. This was the time to collectively re-commit to respecting, protecting and fulfilling the human rights of all. States needed to work to ensure that the vision of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was realised for all persons, everywhere, in all their diversity. Cooperation between Member States and international human rights bodies played a crucial role in technical assistance and capacity building. Cooperation was a two-way process; it was imperative that human rights bodies worked together and engaged in constructive and genuine dialogue. Some speakers said that the Council had a crucial role in addressing shortcomings in the protection and promotion of human rights, which could only be achieved by engaging in open dialogue, working together constructively while respecting each other, and avoiding overpoliticisation. One speaker said there was a need to respond in diverse cultural contexts and called for the respect for the sovereign rights of countries as there should be no foreign interference in domestic affairs. Some speakers expressed deep concern at human rights violations around the world, despite the efforts of the Council and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights to address them. A number of speakers were deeply concerned by the regression of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex rights in many countries, expressing concern at legislation which restricted the rights of these people. States needed to promote and protect the rights of all people, regardless of their sexual orientation or gender identity. All States should take steps to address sexual and gender-based violence and remove barriers to sexual and reproductive health and rights. A number of speakers noted that climate change would continue to pose great threats to the human rights of both present and future generations. The Office was commended for providing technical assistance, including by helping countries with the development of policies on climate change mobility. The High Commissioner and his team were encouraged to pursue further efforts aimed at ensuring that States incorporated a human rights-based approach to frameworks which sought to address the negative impacts of climate change. Some speakers said the Council needed to take all possible measures to protect the rights of women, girls, and persons of diverse gender identities and sexual orientations, especially those from marginalised communities, in the face of increasing pushback against agreed language on gender and sexual and reproductive rights. Such roll-back was putting hard-won gains at risk, and along with it, the protection of the lives and rights of millions of people around the world. During the discussion, many speakers denounced human rights violations committed in many countries, regions and territories, noting situations of armed conflict; overpoliticisation; restrictions on the rights of linguistic and indigenous minorities; anti-homosexuality legislation; impediment of civil and political rights; the removal of indigenous populations; the shrinking of civic space; torture; violations against women and girls; and attacks on human rights defenders, lawyers, journalists and activists. Speakers urged the Office of the High Commissioner to promote universal respect for both individual and collective rights. The High Commissioner should ensure that all current and future Office field presences consistently recorded and periodically reported publicly on all casualties of armed conflict and violence occurring within their remit. The human rights pillar remained chronically underfunded, while the need for a well-resourced and effective international human rights framework continued to increase. Concluding Remarks VOLKER TÜRK, United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, thanked all delegations and non-governmental organizations for contributing to the debate, which had been constructive. There were two anniversaries this year, of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Vienna Declaration, which were opportunities to reflect on universality and indivisibility. All States needed to treat human rights on an equal footing. It was the duty of States to promote and protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms. However, there were certain statements that cast doubt on that consensus. The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights promoted all human rights stemming from the Charter of the United Nations. The Charter dealt with sovereignty issues. Human rights started at home. Issues needed to be examined from global, regional and national dimensions. Dialogue could not be empty formulas. There was a need for uncomfortable conversations for the sake of human rights. Cooperation and collaboration were imperative. Mr. Türk noted with appreciation all States that had reported cooperation with components of the human rights ecosystem and his Office. The High Commissioner had a duty to remove obstacles and promote the implementation of all human rights in all parts of the world. He expressed hope that all States would accept this role and cooperate with the mandate. He noted that the voluntary fund that dealt with Universal Periodic Review follow-up was in urgent need of support. Mr. Türk said his Office was in discussion with authorities of both countries to re-establish a presence in the Western Sahara territory. His Office continued to encourage the relaxation of unilateral coercive measures to support the most vulnerable segments of populations. Mr. Türk expressed his strong commitment to supporting small island States. Extra funding resources were required to provide sufficient support. Further, he said, the Office aimed to support and facilitate dialogue on the rights of indigenous communities. The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights aimed to strengthen its mandate. There were key issues that it would focus on in future, including accountability, transitional justice, and rights in the digital sphere. The Office would soon hold an event to assess its own functions. In closing, Mr. Türk said that to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals, there could not be exclusion or stigmatisation of minority groups, including the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex community. The world needed to take a clear stance against racism, xenophobia and all other forms of discrimination. Panel Discussion on the Measures Necessary to Find Durable Solutions to the Rohingya Crisis and to End All Forms of Human Rights Violations and Abuses against Rohingya Muslims and Other Minorities in Myanmar Opening Statement by the Deputy High Commissioner for Human Rights NADA AL-NASHIF, United Nations Deputy High Commissioner for Human Rights, said Rohingya Muslims and other minorities in Myanmar had endured decades of persecution and systematic discrimination. Today, more than one million were languishing in refugee camps in Bangladesh. An estimated 600,000 remained in Myanmar, where they continued to be deprived of their basic rights. The military coup of February 2021 and violent repression in many parts of Myanmar had inflicted more suffering on minority communities, including Rohingya Muslims. In addition, last month Cyclone Mocha – the most powerful storm to hit the region in a decade – raged through the country. The military had put in place a system of physical and administrative restrictions on the conduct of humanitarian operations. People were reportedly living in forests and improvised shelters without any access to life-saving food, medicine and services. At the end of last year, the Security Council adopted its first resolution on Myanmar, in which it underscored the need to create conditions necessary for the voluntary, safe, dignified and sustainable return of Rohingya refugees and internally displaced persons. Sadly, those conditions did not currently exist on the ground. To achieve an inclusive future, the authorities in Myanmar needed to ensure a fully democratic, representative and accountable political system, repeal all discriminatory legislation, undertake dialogue aimed at national reconciliation, and implement measures that ensured the respect and protection of the human rights and dignity of each person without discrimination. A fundamental step was the full legal recognition of the right to citizenship of all Rohingya people and issuance to them of appropriate civil documentation. Many Rohingya continued to flee to safer countries, often taking immense risks, including dangerous sea crossings. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, more than 3,500 Rohingya attempted deadly sea crossings in 2022, a 360 per cent increase compared to 2021. At least 348 Rohingya died while making these sea crossings in 2022. Ms. Al-Nashif expressed solidarity with and support to Bangladesh for providing refuge to more than one million Rohingya refugees, and commended countries in the region, such as Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand, for providing protection and humanitarian assistance to Rohingya who arrived by boat. Since March this year, due to shortfalls in funding, the World Food Programme had had to sharply reduce food rations in the camps twice, which had further compounded the refugees’ hardship. In the face of the impunity enjoyed by the Myanmar military for past and present violations and abuses against the Rohingya, Ms. Al-Nashif expressed full support for the ongoing accountability efforts at the international level. The complaint brought by the Gambia against Myanmar at the International Court of Justice was but one step in this direction. She expressed hope that the Human Rights Council would redouble its support in the direction of accountability initiatives. Statements by the Panellists YASMIN ULLAH, Chair of the Board at Alternative ASEAN Network on Burma, said she was a member of the Rohingya community who had to flee from violence and systemic oppression in Myanmar as a young child along with her family in 1995. Rohingyas had been driven out for decades under oppressive arbitrary policy and practices by Burmese authorities. There were currently over 1.3 million Rohingya refugees worldwide lacking protection, legal status, and a way out of this plight. Only a domestic change in Myanmar would lead to long term peace and success. However, the international community’s support in breaking through the barriers of silence on the atrocities committed against the Rohingya and ensuring that the community were never forgotten was vital. Ms. Ullah said she was working on solutions that would enable people from her community to have food to eat, education, medical treatment and tangible protections. There needed to be recognition of Rohingya ethnic status. Citizenship alone granted Rohingya no protection. Rohingya had been systematically erased and excluded from social, economic, and political participation as a collective ethnic group. Rohingya were being traded from refugee camps to concentration camps in their homeland. Rohingya needed to be acknowledged as an indigenous ethnic nationality of Myanmar throughout history and now. Myanmar needed a Truth and Reconciliation Commission as part of the transitional justice process. Since democratic transition in Myanmar occurred under circumstances of compromise and impunity, what had happened to Rohingya had recurred all over the country. Myanmar needed to be reformed at every level in all institutions. The 2017 genocidal campaign and the 2021 attempted coup were glaring evidence of what happened when there was no transitional justice plan during a transition period. Denial of truths and refusal to create institutional reforms had led Myanmar into further violations of fundamental rights. A truth commission would be a guide to how structural and institutional reform could take place to ensure that no repetition of atrocities, violations of rights or discriminatory policy and practices could take place without accountability in Myanmar again. There should not be any repatriation without such a framework in place. CHRIS LEWA, Founder of the Arakan Project, said a permanent solution for the Rohingya to live peacefully in Myanmar would guarantee a sustainable return to their homeland. Despite numerous United Nations resolutions, no progress had been made. Following the coup in February 2021, the generals responsible for mass atrocities against the Rohingya were now de facto authorities. In this context, insistence on expediting Rohingya repatriation was disturbing, as conditions for a safe, voluntary return were not in place. Citizenship and other root causes had not been addressed, and since the coup, the junta had arrested and sentenced more than 3,500 Rohingya for unauthorised travel. Durable solutions for internally displaced persons in Myanmar needed be a precondition before any repatriation started from Bangladesh. The bilateral pilot repatriation plan for about 1,100 Rohingya involved resettlement to 15 relocation sites, however, some families cleared for return were left without option to go back to their village of origin. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees had said that conditions were not conducive for a return in safety and dignity. There had been some positive developments in Myanmar. In 2021, the National Unity Government recognised the Rohingya’s entitlement to Myanmar’s citizenship, and appointed a Rohingya adviser, which was a breakthrough. The Arakan Army altered their rhetoric and formed Rohingya Village Committees, with mixed results. In August, Bangladesh granted permission for skills development activities. However, it was worrying that funding shortfalls had forced the World Food Programme to reduce monthly food rations in June. Even before these food cuts, 12 per cent of children were severely malnourished. It was recommended that the international community prioritise the Rohingya amid global challenges, and support international accountability. Repatriation to Myanmar needed to be voluntary and should not be promoted until root causes were addressed and conditions for a safe return were in place. Returnees should not be confined to ‘relocation’ sites. Efforts should also focus on improving conditions for Rohingya refugees in host countries. Alternative durable solutions such as resettlement to third countries and complementary pathways should be vigorously pursued. KYAW WIN, Executive Director of Burma Human Rights Network , said the Network had been documenting human rights violations in Burma. Since August 2017, the Myanmar military had held a campaign of killings, mass rape and arson against the Rohingya in northern Rakhine state, killing thousands and forcing over 730,000 to flee to Bangladesh. The situation had been neglected internationally and was getting worse and worse every day. The junta’s restrictions of movement of the Rohingya were clear violations of International Court of Justice provisional measures aimed at preventing genocidal acts against the Rohingya. The citizenship system was another clear violation of the human rights of Muslims in Burma. It limited Muslims’ ability to obtain citizenship and access basic State services. Hate speech was currently a dangerous phenomenon in Burma. The Network had documented over 600 incidents of hate speech against Muslims over the past year. Mosques and other religious sites had been destroyed. The 1982 citizenship law made every Muslim in Burma a foreigner. This law breached human rights more than any other law in the State. The international community had failed to acknowledge the illegality of this law. As long as the military enjoyed complete impunity for their actions, unyielding oppression of the Rohingya and other minorities would continue unabated. The time to close this impunity gap was now. The Network called on the United Nations Security Council to end its inaction and refer the situation in Myanmar to the International Criminal Court or establish a separate criminal tribunal to investigate and prosecute the full spectrum of atrocity crimes in Burma. States needed to impose targeted economic sanctions against the Myanmar military, and pursue international legal action against the junta. States and international companies needed to stop the supply and transfer of arms to the Myanmar military. Finally, Myanmar’s neighbouring States, including India, Thailand, Indonesia and Bangladesh, needed to devise a comprehensive regional response to the refugee crisis; provide protection, support, and humanitarian and legal aid to all refugees fleeing Myanmar; and authorise emergency cross-border aid to internally displaced people in Myanmar. MOHSHIN HABIB, Adjunct Professor at Laurentian University and Policy and Strategy Adviser at ASA Philippines Foundation, said Rohingya people had faced recurring military crackdowns and fled Myanmar in significant numbers in 1978, 1981, 1992, 2012, 2015, 2016 and 2017. These recurring crackdowns had devastated Rohingya lives and made them the world's most persecuted minority. During the August 2017 crackdown, Tatmadaw burned 300 Rohingya villages, vandalised 36,000 businesses and snatched valuables from 26,000 families. Research estimated that 25,000 people were murdered, 18,000 raped, 43,000 received gunshot wounds, and 116,000 were beaten, all inflicted by security forces under the control of the Myanmar authorities. As a result, at least 800,000 Rohingya fled Myanmar and took refuge in Bangladesh, joining those who fled earlier. The International State Crime Initiatives claimed that a leaked document adopted by the Myanmar regime in 1988 revealed the State Peace and Development Council adopted an 11-point “Rohingya extermination plan”, of which the first eight elements had been effectively instituted. The recent coup had made it impossible for a successful repatriation attempt. Meanwhile, the Bangladesh campsites had become the most densely populated area globally, causing environmental degradation and posing significant economic, health and reputational consequences for Bangladesh. There was also evidence of human and drug trafficking syndicates operating on the Bangladesh-Myanmar border, posing significant security risks and a broader regional geopolitical crisis risk. Although mindful of the United Nations Special Rapporteur’s 8 June 2023 recommendation to “immediately suspend” pilot repatriation of Rohingyas due to “serious risk” for their life and freedom, the durable solution still appeared to be eventually repatriating Rohingyas to Myanmar. The three practical measures to repatriation were security, economic and education, and social capital theses. Financial reparation would provide a primary financial means for Rohingyas required to repatriate, resettle and rehabilitate to restore their original state of economic life in Myanmar; 9.5 billion United States dollars were assessed as fair compensation as of June 2023. Discussion In the ensuing discussion, many speakers, among other things, deplored discrimination, marginalisation and persecution of the Rohingya community, which had caused the forced exodus of the community. Speakers expressed deep concern about the human rights situation of the Rohingya. Thousands had been raped or killed and forced to flee their homes. The appalling, widespread violations of human rights, which could equate to crimes against humanity and war crimes, needed to cease, and perpetrators needed to be held accountable. The rule of law needed to be upheld. Discriminatory ideologies, denial of citizenship and restrictions on movement were part of the root causes of the crisis. Diplomatic pressure needed to be asserted on the militia to cease the violence and persecution that they were committing in Myanmar. Genocide needed to never occur again. There needed to be reform of the 1982 citizenship law in line with international standards. Some speakers called for the implementation of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Five Point Consensus solution to the crisis. Member States and civil society needed to unite in their response to the dire situation of the Rohingya. Some speakers said that the junta was violating international decisions regarding Myanmar every day with impunity. Accountability and transitional justice measures needed to be introduced to prevent impunity and ensure accountability for abuses. The military regime had cracked down on the civil space in Myanmar, persecuting journalists and human rights defenders critical of the regime. The rights of journalists and human rights defenders needed to be protected. There were increasing numbers of refugees and asylum seekers fleeing Myanmar. Some speakers said that many Rohingya refugees were turned back by neighbouring countries, including Bangladesh. Those speakers called on all States to respect the principles of non-refoulement. Some speakers said there needed to be an immediate return of Rohingya from neighbouring countries under conditions ensuring the rights of returning Rohingya. Other speakers said that returns needed to be carried out on a safe, voluntary basis. Cuts to food rations for refugees provided by the World Food Programme were alarming. Such cuts had had a devasting effect. Speakers encouraged the international community to provide increased humanitarian support to reduce the burden on Bangladesh and to support it to provide shelter for the Rohingya. Some speakers expressed serious concern that the junta continued to block humanitarian access to Rohingya communities. Speakers called on the Myanmar militia to ensure full, unimpeded humanitarian access to Rohingya refugee camps. Movement restrictions also hindered the Rohingya’s ability to obtain such basic needs. Concrete steps were needed to aid Rohingya to obtain basic food, services and employment. Some speakers recalled that Cyclone Mocha had devastated the Rohingya refugee population, and called for increased support in response to the disaster. A number of speakers said the pilot repatriation project agreed between Bangladesh and Myanmar would help to address the crisis and ensure the voluntary return of the Rohingya to Myanmar. Other speakers said that the project would only deepen the crisis by allowing the military to commit further violations of the rights of the repatriated Rohingya. Some speakers said dialogue needed to be held between the Rohingya and the militia. Imposing outside solutions would not solve the crisis. Dialogue needed to be carried out based on existing bilateral agreements. The principle of non-interference in domestic affairs needed to be upheld. It was counterproductive to politicise the issue of internally displaced persons and to interfere in the domestic issues of Myanmar, including through International Criminal Court and International Court of Justice actions. Questions were asked on actions needed to ensure that this moment did not become a missed opportunity; on measures to improve the situation of Rohingya in Myanmar and in Bangladesh, especially in camps for refugees and internally displaced persons; on steps that developed countries could take to provide additional support to the Rohingya; on steps to support the safe repatriation of the Rohingya and other Muslims; on measures to ensure accountability for human rights violations and address their root causes, and to put an end to impunity; and on how the international community could ensure the participation and amplify the voices of the Rohingya in developing measures to address the crisis. Concluding Remarks NADA AL-NASHIF, Deputy High Commissioner for Human Rights, said there needed to be a focus on immediate support to Rohingya still in Myanmar, and any transition from the camps in Rakhine needed to be done in coordination with the camps themselves. They also needed to ensure that more humanitarian funds were invested in Bangladesh. There was a need to change the citizenship law and create durable conditions for the return of Rohingya, as well as increase resettlement pathways for the most vulnerable groups. Accountability options needed to be pursued. YASMIN ULLAH, Chair of the Board at Alternative ASEAN Network on Burma, said it was important to ensure that displaced Rohingya be cared for in a dignified fashion, understanding they were also humans. It was important that the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Five Point Consensus was expanded. Multiple conversations had been held with Indonesian institutions, and there was a commitment to ensure the Five Point Consensus expanded to include cross-border aid, and improve upon the existing women, peace and security framework. There were multiple ways to ensure Rohingya were centred in all these discussions. The Council needed to centre Rohingya in all conversations on Myanmar, and they should not be excluded. There could not just be lip service, there needed to be concrete plans and actions. The dictatorship and living under the junta regime for decades was a political and ideological issue. Transitional justice needed to be at the centre of all future plannings. Civil society groups were the foundation of Myanmar society. There should not be repatriation of Rohingya to go right back to the hands of the perpetrators. CHRIS LEWA, Founder of the Arakan Project, said building trust was necessary. The Rohingya advisor had no official position within the Cabinet of Myanmar; this was something which could be changed. There was significant follow-up which could be done to push the National Unity Government to take action on their words, including dialogue on how to amend the citizenship law. The Arakan army had a nationalist agenda and they needed to be open to undertaking reforms. There had been progress; the army had provided assistance to villages in the wake of Cyclone Mocha. It was still concerning to hear governments in the room discussing the repatriation project, as this should not happen. If Rohingya wanted to return, with informed consent, they should be able to do so. It was important that Rohingya were involved in meaningful dialogue, and that they were heard. There needed to be a focus on providing better conditions for Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh, Malaysia, and other countries. KYAW WIN, Executive Director of Burma Human Rights Network, said that since 1962, the military had been leading anti-Muslim policies that had led to the atrocities of today. After the 2021 revolution, people started to realise how the military had implemented those ideologies. In southern Burma, 70 per cent of the Muslim community did not have citizenship. This population could influx to neighbouring countries again, and there could be more mass atrocities. The international community needed to impose an immediate arms embargo against the military. The military was killing civilians in clear breach of international law. Impunity needed to end. Millions of refugees were struggling to survive. To end impunity, cases in the **International Court of Justice **and the International Criminal Court were important, and there were several other measures that could be taken in international fora. Members of the Rohingya community needed support to stand on their own two feet. Repatriations should not occur while conditions were unsafe for the Rohingya. The Rohingya had great potential but needed help. There were several villages in central Burma that had been burned to the ground. The people of Burma could not stop the military regime without the help of the international community. MOHSHIN HABIB, Adjunct Professor at Laurentian University and Policy and Strategy Adviser at ASA Philippines Foundation, said despite increasing polarisation in world politics, the international community continued to impose trade sanctions and embargos on Myanmar. However, these were not universal, and there were members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations that were not imposing such sanctions. These States needed to do more to put pressure on the military regime and support the Rohingya. International Court of Justice actions and other external measures could also add more pressure on the militia and lead to positive outcomes. Domestically, the Myanmar military regime needed to improve its human rights record by acknowledging past abuses and genocide against the Rohingya. They needed to recognise the Rohingya as an ethnic minority. Domestic and international recognition of the Rohingya and their rights, including their right to citizenship, was needed..."
Source/publisher: UN Human Rights Council (Geneva)
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-21
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Title: Bangladesh: Displaced within the world’s largest refugee camp
Description: "Cox’s Bazar in Bangladesh is home to the largest complex of camps hosting people displaced from neighbouring Myanmar. Many struggle to cope with lives within these scattered fenced-off areas where it can be hard to stay in contact and even reunite with lost family members. Sazida is cooking food for the extended family, while her husband, Mohammed Rafik, is busy with routine chit-chat with neighbours. Sazida’s in-laws are out to pick up their share of regular relief aid from the nearby distribution point within the fenced area. This is a stark reminder of the reality and why this late afternoon, that may seem to be a day like many others in Cox’s Bazar, is also a place where nothing is as usual, being home to the world’s largest refugee camp complex. Shaded from the burning sun, Sazida’s daughters Rashni (8) and Saika (4) are playing with their infant sister Joynab (8 months). They are still adjusting to their new shelter and home in Camp 8 West in Cox’s Bazar. This time, however, the change is for the better and has allowed them to improve their lives despite being displaced from their home country, Myanmar, visible in the distant horizon where the mountain peaks are seen. Sazida’s family fled from Myanmar in August 2017, when there was a crackdown with violence and persecution targeting the Rohingya – a Muslim minority from Myanmar. Hundreds of thousands of Rohingya fled to seek protection and safety in Bangladesh where they were received and have been hosted since then. Rashni was the only child that Sazida and her husband had at the time. It took them four days to reach Cox’s Bazar from Maungdaw from where they fled with other relatives and neighbours. The chaos and panic in the crowds fleeing for their lives and separated the small family from their relatives. At Camp 26 in Cox’s Bazar, Sazida, Rafik, and Rashni were allocated a basic shelter made from bamboo sticks and tarpaulin. They soon heard news of their relatives who had sought refuge at Camp 8 West. In the years that followed, Sazida gave birth in Cox’s Bazar to two more girl children. In January 2021, their world changed, Sazida tells, as this was when her husband had an accident: ‘It felt as if the entire sky dropped on my head.’ It happened when Rafik was at the market in the camp. He was inside a tomtom (small van for transport) when a minibus struck it. It caused him severe injuries and a fractured leg: ‘We were allowed to leave them camp for emergency medical help. Sazida took me to nearby Chittagong district for treatment with the doctor’s referral. I was unable to move for a long time and thought I would never be able to walk again. After six months, an NGO gave me a wheelchair, and I gradually started to move with it,’ tells Rafik. This accident not only affected Rafik, but also Sazida and the children. ‘Our main challenge was that it was too hard for us to collect relief aid goods from the centre. It was far from our shelter and with nobody to take care of the children, cook or bring water, and manage daily chores while we continue my husband’s treatment. He required care and medication. I was on my own in this and felt that I was surviving all alone,’ says Sazida. Change was needed to support her husband’s healing and recovery. Sazida needed help from the family, but they too were living in a camp that is also a fenced-off area, but she decided to discuss the matter with her father-in-law in Camp 8 West. ‘In July 2022, we decided that we would try to be relocated to Camp 8 West where my in-law's family was. And so, I went to a Camp-in-Charge and applied for permission to visit my in-laws. When this was granted, I went to apply for relocation. That was when I met DRC’s Protection Office at Camp 8 West and asked for help to guide the process,’ tells Sazida. DRC accompanied her to the authorities in Camp 8 West and after hearing her story, they requested DRC to investigate the situation and prepare a report. Her circumstances were described in the evaluation report and convinced local authorities of the need to start the process of relocation. ‘We tried our best to assist the family to relocate. With the instructions from Camp-in-Charge, we worked with colleagues from the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) to complete the application and permission procedure,’ says DRC Protection Officer Rawnakul Alam. Shortly after, Sazida and her family moved to Camp 8 West and joined their in-laws there in July 2022. ‘When I first learned of Rafik's accident two years ago, I cried and worried about his wife and kids. I prayed to Allah. Now that they are close by, I can see my grandchildren playing and my son is improving,’ tells Salamot, the father of Rafik. Rafik no longer requires a wheelchair. Instead, he walks cautiously while using a stick and is more at ease than previously. Sazida does not need to go for water or to pick up their aid rations since her brother-in-law is now there to assist her with the heavy lifting. The daughters play with their grandfather as new friends. ‘It's important to make the right decision, but it's also important to ask for the right assistance. I tried, and together we succeeded. Here, my husband receives the right care, and I no longer have stress and the same worries. I am grateful for my family's support as well as for DRC and other NGOs who helped with our relocation. My daughters are smiling, and it brings me the most joy right now,’ says Sazida..."
Source/publisher: Danish Refugee Council
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-20
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Title: Camp Closures: Current Status (April 2023)
Description: "Background In October 2022, this analytical unit reported several State Administration Council (SAC) orders to close IDP camps in Rakhine, Chin, and Shan States, with most deadlines given as the end of that month. Responses to the SAC’s closure orders, some of which were detailed in a November 2022 follow-up report, varied widely depending on context. In February, this analytical unit spoke to IDP camp leaders, residents, and other sources near IDPs about the status of several specific camps in Kachin State, who described mounting pressure from General Administration Department (GAD) staff to close IDP camps there. IDPs, camp leaders, and communities living in these four states proposed diverse theories about the SAC’s orders, including that the SAC wanted to cut off the potential flow of aid through IDP camps to the Arakan Army in Rakhine and (southern) Chin States; that the SAC wanted to disperse IDPs in order to undermine both the ability of Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs) to fight in Northern Shan State, and community support for those same EAOs; and that the SAC was moving IDPs as a tactic in negotiations about territorial control with certain EAOs in Southern Shan State. The SAC may also be attempting to reduce the official number of IDPs in order to posture to international observers that the situation in Myanmar is improving under the leadership of Min Aung Hlaing, and that the military is successfully consolidating control. In areas with current or potential camp closures — Rakhine, southern Chin, Northern Shan, Southern Shan, and Kachin States — key concerns reported by IDPs remain the continued tensions between armed actors in IDPs’ areas of origin or locations to which they might feasibly relocate. These tensions have persisted, posing the same challenges to returning or resettlement now as they have in the past, and in many cases perpetuating conditions that caused initial displacement — in some cases, over a decade ago. Over the course of discussions between this analytical unit and camp stakeholders since September 2022, tensions have remained high in Rakhine State, fighting is still ongoing between the SAC and Kachin forces in the Kachin State townships with the most IDPs, the SAC (sometimes alongside the Pa-O National Army) has continued to clash with Karenni forces near Southern Shan State’s border with Karenni State, and a medley of armed actors (including the SAC) have intermittently fought in Northern Shan State, where a diverse array EAOs jostle over areas of control. Other concerns reported by IDPs include unexploded ordnance (UXO) contamination, presence of armed forces near return or relocation sites, lack of arable land and other livelihood opportunities, destroyed homes and land, and a lack of support to rebuild lives. This update is based on a small set of the camps in Rakhine, Chin, Shan, and Kachin States, and findings should not be assumed to be comprehensive or representative. The value of the qualitative approach is in the context-specific knowledge it provides; this snapshot illustrates perceptions of community members from a broad cross section of the local context, and the range of responses taken by displaced communities to the developing situation. For further analysis, detailed response implications, and recommendations for humanitarian responders regarding the SAC’s push to close formal IDP camps across Myanmar, please refer to the first report in this series: Situation Update: Camp Closure Crisis..."
Source/publisher: Center for Operational Analysis and Research
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-20
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Title: The Heyzer Maneuver in Myanmar
Description: "Myanmar has seen the back of the sixth Special Envoy of the Secretary General of the United Nations since 1995. Noeleen Heyzer resigned her position in recent weeks, earlier than planned from her appointment in October 2021 and assuming her role in December of that year. What will be her legacy? Not much. A kind assessment could conclude she gave it the good old college try, but was reasoning with caged beasts. A realpolitik regard would argue she was doomed from the starting line, because those caged beasts cannot be reasoned with. What can we learn from Heyzer’s 20 months in the position? There isn’t much to labor over. The military State Administration Council (SAC) wasn’t interested in any form of international engagement let alone mediation, and absolutely nothing to do with conflict resolution. The efforts of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have been stuck since the signing of the Five-Point Consensus in early 2021, yet remain the lodestar of international efforts regardless of how adrift, capsized or sunk they are. Heyzer didn’t have much to work with. The entire “good offices” position of the envoy is mired in the past, with its mandate in the UN General Assembly, not completely with the Secretary General. There hasn’t been any serious reform of the role in close to 30 years, a point acknowledged by an in-depth study of the good offices mandate released by the International Peace Academy (IPI) over 10 years ago. One of the concluding points of that study from 2012 could have been written today: “There is no doubt that the UN carries a legacy of resentment or disappointment among many sides within Myanmar who have felt, for different reasons, that the good offices in the past did not sufficiently consider their interests. In the international donor community, while some acknowledge the potentially important role the UN can play in Myanmar, few seem to want the world organization to actually take the lead in coordinating international assistance to the country.” The failure of the UN to gain access to Cyclone Mocha-affected communities in Rakhine State, or conflict-affected displaced in Sagaing Region, poses crucially important questions on the efficacy of the UN to remain in Myanmar. With a weak and distracted Secretary General in António Guterres, a dysfunctional Permanent Five members of a divided Security Council (China, Russia, the United States, Britain and France), it’s a wonder Heyzer got any attention let alone the level of support she needed from her first day. Early on, she was roundly criticized for suggesting a form of “power sharing” in a Channel News Asia interview. Whether she misspoke or considered it a serious proposal and was compelled to walk it back following the furor, the damage of an unforced error was already inflicted. Her one trip to call on Min Aung Hlaing in August 2022 was an unmitigated disaster, with the SAC releasing details of their conversation that were not completely congruent with what her post-visit statement said. Following this envoy equivalent of road-kill, she was compelled to broaden her consultations to members of the resistance including the National Unity Government (NUG) and some ethnic armed organizations (EAOs), although this was an uncommon development. From the August visit until her resignation, she was dogged by criticism from all sides, much of it perhaps unfair yet reflecting frustration at ongoing violence and the trap of diplomatic language that compelled her to express “deep concern” at incessant SAC mass atrocities. Heyzer met with Chinese foreign minister Qin Gang on May 1, where he “stressed the need to act prudently and pragmatically to prevent the escalation of the conflict and spillover of the crisis, and expressed his hope that Madame Special Envoy will uphold an objective and fair position and play a role as a bridge.” Trips were also made to India, and all around Southeast Asia. Soon after the announcement of her stepping down, she visited with NUG Foreign Minister Daw Zin Mar Aung: a photo of them hugging was both touching and, one hopes, cardiac arrest-inducing in Naypyitaw. The Global New Light of Myanmar made its position on the UN clear in its June 16 opinion piece from Kyaw Myint Tun-Paris called “The Picture of Irrelevance.” It was vintage vitriol. While it may have been designed to condemn the UN system and international mediation efforts, it must also be seen as a good riddance to Heyzer and a glove slap to any replacement. “What breakthrough do they have to prove in recent memory? Where have they brought lasting peace? Name one! Under their watch record number of people have been forcibly displaced or stateless. So, what have they done? Is the world becoming more peaceful? These people should be given no role in finding solutions for the problems Myanmar is facing. Solutions for Myanmar will come from within and with the help, cooperation and understanding of the neighbours (sic) and friendly countries.” As if to pour salt on the wound, the paper also carried a report on a meeting with acting UN Resident Coordinator Ramanathan Balakrishnan and colleagues with three SAC ministers in Sittwe, still struggling for official access to assist over a month after Cyclone Mocha. What have we learned from the near three decades of special envoys? Precious little. The first, the polished Peruvian diplomat Álvaro de Soto served from 1995 to 1999, which started optimistically with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s release before dissolving into repressive military rule deadlock. He may have visited the country six times during his tenure, but he achieved little of note apart from the “concession” of meeting with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi on every visit. De Soto’s contribution to Myanmar may be slight, but his legacy as a UNSG special envoy is instructive for Myanmar. Resigning from his envoy role in the Middle East peace process, his frustration at being hogtied to conditions that limited engagement with key actors was reflected in his leaked End of Mission memo in May 2007 following his resignation: “the UN should resist the natural temptation of almost every government and intergovernmental institution to throw a committee or a czar, or in this case, an envoy, at a problem…(w)e are not in the lead, and the role we play is subsidiary at best, dangerous at worst.” A similar end of mission memo from Heyzer should be encouraged. Then the reptilian Razali Ismael from Malaysia (2000-2005) served at a relatively optimistic time following the release of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi in 2002, but any optimism was dashed with the mass killing of her supporters at Depayin in May 2003, and then the purge of his erstwhile partner, Military Intelligence chief and Prime Minister General Khin Nyunt in October 2004. He refused to renew his position in early 2006 because he had been not permitted to visit the country in two years. In a creepy two-step criticism of the then regime with pretension over his own performance, Razali said in an interview; “Progress has not been made towards any reconciliation. If there used to be any, that has now snapped with [Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s] continued house arrest… What possibility is there of further progress?… Still, there is no frustration as this was, after all, a noble effort… good at dodging things and stonewalling… We have been dealing with these [Myanmar military] people for a very long time now. We are familiar with their ways.” This wasn’t exactly an advertisement for institutional memory and adaptive engagement. Next came the former Nigerian ambassador to the United Nations, Ibrahim Gambari. The then ruling State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) should have recognized a kindred spirit in Gambari, after all he rebuffed the General Assembly when they condemned the execution of prominent environmental activist Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight other Ogani people in late 1995. Gambari faced a genuine domestic political deadlock in 2006, then the popular protests and the brutal crackdown of September 2007, Cyclone Nargis and the desperate days of the UN seeking access to affected areas and the timely visit of Ban Ki-moon (who visited again in April, with great fanfare and no progress). The Indian diplomat Vijay Nambiar enjoyed greater success, but he operated between 2010 and 2016 when the opening afforded him access, and even some EAOs welcomed his role in the peace process. Nambiar wasn’t completely astute: he asked Senior General Min Aung Hlaing to contribute Sit-Tat troops for UN peacekeeping operations in 2014 (a small number served in Liberia and South Sudan). Christine Schraner Burgener was appointed in April 2018 following the carnage of ethnic cleansing against the Rohingya in Rakhine State, was told by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi to stay out of the peace process and stick to Rakhine, where she could do little. Her post-2021 performance was strident in condemning the SAC, her calls with Vice Senior General Soe Win unresponsive, and her plaintive calls to visit Myanmar rebuffed by the SAC, but also over-stating her importance: “Clearly, I can imagine that he [Min Aung Hlaing] would not like to see me now in Myanmar because the people know me… and they would probably be very encouraged by my presence.” Despite pushing a much stiffer and determined UN response for an envoy, she was also criticized in Myanmar for perceived moral equivalency in condemning violence by all sides (the trap of neutrality in vocalizing opposition to violence, even grossly asymmetric state violence and atrocity). Kyaw Myint Tun-Paris summed up the past envoys in colorful fashion. “There have been appointments of those who were no longer wanted anymore close to the Ivory Tower in New York. Dump them all on Myanmar! There was one who was appointed so that frequent trips can be made to see family and relatives in a nearby country [likely Gambari]. Then, there was a lightweight who had no clues whatsoever about Myanmar [this could be any of them]. One promptly turned up at Davos soon after the appointment… Whether there is a need or not, they visit the country frequently and put out press statements just to show they are working hard and justify their employment. Attempts would be made to visit the country especially when their contract is up for extension.” Like carrion birds, potential replacements are circling. But any future appointment will face not just the same blend of SAC stonewalling or UN dysfunction Heyzer endured, but a witches brew of competitive engagement initiatives from predatory actors from China, India, Thailand and Japan through the Nippon Foundation, along with the frozen efforts of ASEAN, and the rumors of attempts from Switzerland, Norway, Finland and other deluded European states looking to forge a breakthrough. The competing “Track 1.5” efforts of Thailand has annoyed Indonesia, received no support from the rest of ASEAN, and is but the latest data point of dysfunction. Many of these efforts have some bit-part Myanmar players who have highly questionable legitimacy and political cachet. All of this incoherence benefits the SAC, who chortle at foreigners competing for pole position to appease them. For many in the international community have adopted a stance of mee-sa-ta-phet yay-mote-ta phet (holding the flame/torch in one hand and the firehouse in the other): effectively hedging their bets on who is going to “win” the conflict and be the side to ingratiate. There has been a plethora of post-coup shapeshifting amongst foreign actors, who prior to February 2021 sought to engage the Myanmar deep state and its many war criminals, and who—regardless of their affected ardor for the resistance now—will casually betray the revolution when the winds of opportunism shift. If another envoy is going to be offloaded on Myanmar, it will likely be another seasoned diplomat with similar skills sets to Heyzer. The candidates will resemble archetypes of international servants, but to the SAC a bevy of min-laung (pretender kings, or more accurately “imminent kings”) and their cohorts of pontificating min-sayar (king’s teacher, or advisor). There will be no “innovation”, “off-ramping”, “nuance”, or that absolute pearl of statecraft thinking, “fresh approach.” It’s almost certainly going to be some soiled version of what came before. But does it need to be? Is there a possibility of obviously needed reform? Ralph Waldo Emmerson wrote that “foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of small minds, adored by little statesmen”, which could aptly describe the current cohort of Western diplomats and donors working on Myanmar all conjoined by a dearth of clear thinking. There are four potential courses of action: in theory. In all likelihood the UN and P5 countries will shuffle on with an utter disregard for impact, progress or the interests of the people of Myanmar. But what if we entertain the potential for the self-straitjacketed global order to react differently, even with expectations on progress being as low as possible? First, consider a completely different candidate. Heyzer was deemed suitable in late 2021 because she was a consummate UN insider, who had sidled up to the generals before, and being Singaporean could “read their minds” more acutely. Many observers thought then as now, these qualities worked against her. The same calculation holds true. If you find merely a “new Noeleen” then we’ll all be concluding similar bleak assessments of dashed expectations in three years as we are today. Six very different envoys from Africa, Southeast Asia, Switzerland and Latin America have confounded calculations on whether outsiders or Asians are most effective. No one who actually wants the job should be considered, especially if it’s former US ambassador to the UN Bill Richardson or disgraced British politician Boris Johnson, should they put their hands up. A UN lifer obviously has little comparative advantage other than a more acute understanding of the UN’s internal defects, as Heyzer demonstrated (as did previous envoys). Former military officers elicit little respect either, as retired US general Wesley Clark found in 2010 when he co-chaired an Asia Society task force on engaging Myanmar, or most recently the lack of any discernable progress in engaging with the SAC from former Indonesian army general Agus Widjojo. Second, rewire an entirely new approach, with a new mandate directly from the Secretary General and a closer rapport with the SG’s office. The need for reform has been apparent for many years, but even tinkering with structures in the UN is seen as disruptive. If Heyzer’s failure should spur anything, it is the necessity for a genuine reimagining of the role, and what its long-term utility could be for the UN’s assistance to Myanmar. One dimension could be the total restructuring of the UN’s presence in Myanmar, discarding half of the operational agencies and paring down presence and operations to address immediate humanitarian and development needs related to livelihoods, health, education and emergency relief. This would alleviate the funding gap for donors who have already invested in multi-donor funds. The current leadership under Ramanathan Balakrishan needs to be radically reconstituted, and a balance sought between operational realities and high-level mediation efforts. Third, consider a collective effort of a contact group of multiple officials, expanding the team from a bare bones operation (although one I’m certain well remunerates the players regardless of their 1-0 scorecard) to multiple high-level actors. Nothing limply ineffectual like the “Group of Friends of Myanmar” that the UN tried before, following the 2007 demonstrations and crackdown, involving some 14 countries. However, this shouldn’t be a consortium of existing envoys or point people such as the Norwegian envoy, or Igor Driesmans, the European Union envoy, but a group of higher level officials who can interact with multiple actors. These consultations must be broad and inclusive, especially the resistance actors in EAOs, the NUG and emerging political forces such as the Karenni State Interim Executive Council (IEC) and new configurations such as the Sagaing Forum. However, just the convening of such a forum within the constraints of the UN is devilishly difficult with protocol, egos and above all competing state interests. Look at one collection of “Group of Friends” meeting memos from 2009, which echoes the impasse of 2023, and face up to the hard facts that change in Myanmar didn’t come about from outside pressure or support. Or, fourth, do nothing. Just inform the SAC that they’re not worth the trouble. Alleviate the diplomatic corps from having to expend energy on supporting labored interventions that have no chance of even minimal success. Clear the space for ASEAN to continue to fail. Stop investing in false hope in Myanmar; it might do the standing of the UN some good, but likely not. The Heyzer maneuver of early departure should be a call for reform and reengagement, to clear a clogged diplomatic passage. But it won’t be. David Scott Mathieson is an independent analyst working on conflict, humanitarian and human rights on Myanmar..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-20
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Title: Myanmar: Junta Blocks Lifesaving Cyclone Aid
Sub-title: Restrictions on Humanitarian Access, Supplies, Movement Threaten Millions
Description: "The Myanmar junta’s increasing obstruction of humanitarian aid in the month since Cyclone Mocha has put thousands of lives at immediate risk and endangered millions of people. The junta’s aid blockages have hindered every aspect of the cyclone response and turned an extreme weather event into a man-made catastrophe. Governments should press the junta to lift all restrictions on aid delivery without relenting on the need to hold junta officials responsible for their ongoing human rights abuses. (Bangkok) – The Myanmar junta’s increasing obstruction of humanitarian aid in the month since Cyclone Mocha has put thousands of lives at immediate risk and endangered millions of people, Human Rights Watch said today. Since the cyclone made landfall on May 14, 2023, junta authorities have refused to authorize travel and visas for aid workers, release urgent supplies from customs and warehouses, or relax onerous and unnecessary restrictions on lifesaving assistance. The persistence of Cyclone Mocha’s damage and resulting illness and deaths reflect the junta’s new as well as existing restrictions on aid. Donors, regional bodies, and the United Nations should press the junta to lift all restrictions on aid delivery without relenting on the need to hold junta officials responsible for past and ongoing human rights abuses. “The junta’s moves to block aid have turned an extreme weather event into a man-made catastrophe,” said Shayna Bauchner, Asia researcher at Human Rights Watch. “Donors should press the junta to drop their politically motivated obstruction and allow desperately needed aid to reach all cyclone survivors.” Cyclone Mocha was one of the strongest cyclones to ever hit the region, with maximum sustained winds of 250 kilometers per hour leaving a trail of destruction. The UN estimates that 7.9 million people were affected, with 1.6 million in need of urgent aid across 5 Myanmar states and regions, Rakhine, Chin, Sagaing, Magway, and Kachin. Hundreds were killed and hundreds of thousands of buildings damaged. Telecommunication outages have delayed outreach and needs assessments, further isolating communities. Human Rights Watch interviewed aid workers and people in affected communities who described how the junta’s failed relief response has been deliberate. Humanitarian aid staff, who asked that their names not be used for fear of junta retribution, told Human Rights Watch that since the cyclone, the junta’s access restrictions have hindered their agencies’ ability to conduct needs assessments, distribute relief supplies, and provide emergency medical care. Many aid workers, local activists, and villagers expressed the view that the junta was seeking to use the cyclone response to legitimize and bolster its control. On June 8, after weeks of appeals by humanitarian organizations for unrestricted access, the junta formalized its obstruction by issuing a blanket suspension of travel authorizations for aid groups in Rakhine State, reversing initial approvals granted in early June. The ban followed a letter requiring the UN and international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) to hand over all domestic distribution of relief supplies to junta authorities. Meanwhile, villagers have continued to report massive levels of unaddressed needs, including destroyed shelters, injuries and waterborne illnesses, malnourishment, and lack of access to food and clean water. “It is unfathomable that humanitarians are being denied access to support people in need,” the acting UN resident and humanitarian coordinator, Ramanathan Balakrishnan, said following the suspension. “Just when vulnerable communities need our help the most, we have been forced to stop distributions of food, drinking water, and shelter supplies. This denial of access unnecessarily prolongs the suffering of those without food to eat or a roof over their head.” The junta named 18 generals to oversee “rehabilitation processes” in disaster-affected townships, led by the junta’s deputy prime minister, Adm. Tin Aung San, and its minister of border affairs, Lt. Gen. Tun Tun Naung, both of whom are sanctioned by the United States, European Union, and Canada. The generals assigned to townships in Rakhine State include Brig. Gen. Sunny Ohn, who served as deputy commander in Rakhine State during the military’s 2017 campaign of crimes against humanity and acts of genocide against the Rohingya, and Lt. Gen. Aye Win, who led two investigations in 2017 that covered up military atrocities. The junta’s actions have been felt by those in need. “The junta isn’t doing anything on its own and won’t let international organizations help,” a Rohingya man from Thae Chaung camp in Rakhine State told Human Rights Watch. “Why they’re doing that, I don’t understand. Children are suffering. We need shelter, we need food, we need medical support. The monsoon season is just starting. We fear more rain.” The junta’s interference in relief operations disregards multiple international calls regarding humanitarian aid, most notably the five-point consensus from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the December 2022 UN Security Council resolution, which urged “full, safe and unhindered humanitarian access.” The junta’s grave violations of international human rights and humanitarian law have only increased since the December resolution. The Security Council should urgently pass a follow-up resolution instituting a global arms embargo, referring the situation to the International Criminal Court, and imposing sanctions on the junta leadership and military-owned businesses. The global humanitarian response has received only 15 percent of the US$887 million needed for the year, $333 million of which is earmarked for the cyclone response. Donors should increase funding while seeking ways to channel aid through local civil society groups, rather than through junta authorities, given the military’s track record of corruption and misuse of disaster assistance funding and material. Effective aid delivery hinges on engaging local partners that have the networks and experience to navigate a difficult environment, Human Rights Watch said. “Governments seeking to help the people of Myanmar facing this or future humanitarian crises need to recognize that the military junta will only be a dangerous obstacle to reaching that goal,” Bauchner said. “The lives of countless thousands of people across the country are at risk because of generals who are determined to maintain their tight grip on power at any cost.” Humanitarian Catastrophe Since the February 2021 military coup, Myanmar’s junta has carried out a nationwide campaign of crimes against humanity and war crimes, deliberately blocking aid from reaching millions at risk, as a form of collective punishment. The blockages sustain the military’s longstanding “four cuts” strategy, in which the armed forces maintain control of an area by isolating and terrorizing the civilian population. One week before Cyclone Mocha, the UN Children’s Fund, UNICEF, reported that “humanitarian access continues to deteriorate because of bureaucracy, multiple checkpoints, movement restrictions, conflicts and roadblocks.” The number of people needing assistance in the country has grown from 1 million before the coup to 17.6 million, according to the UN, with almost half the population now living below the national poverty line. About 1.2 million people displaced by conflict and insecurity were living in areas affected by the storm. Since the coup, the junta has arrested hundreds of local aid and healthcare workers. In October 2022, it imposed a new Organization Registration Law requiring domestic and international organizations to register with the junta and submit quarterly updates on their activities, with criminal penalties of up to five years in prison for failing to comply. The law prohibits organizations from direct or indirect contact with any opposition groups, and requires organizations seeking to deliver emergency disaster relief to obtain approval from local junta administrators by submitting information on funding, materials, and proposed projects. The junta’s obstruction of aid violates international human rights law obligations regarding the rights to life, health, and shelter. All parties to an armed conflict are obligated to facilitate rapid and unimpeded impartial humanitarian assistance to all civilians in need, and are forbidden from withholding consent for relief operations on arbitrary grounds. Expert guidance commissioned by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) states that in exceptional situations, such as when a country is unlawfully impeding lifesaving assistance, international organizations may, without the country’s consent, “conduct temporary humanitarian relief operations to bring life-saving supplies to a people in extreme need, when no alternatives exist,” and when they would not “seriously impair the territorial integrity of the state.” Inadequate Warning Authorities were effectively detaining about 600,000 Rohingya in camps and villages when the storm hit Rakhine State, having long denied them freedom of movement and other basic rights, amounting to a system of apartheid. Rohingya told Human Rights Watch that while local junta authorities made evacuation announcements a few days before the cyclone, they provided little support to find shelter or transportation, and did not adequately communicate the storm’s risks. Some Rohingya said they tried to take shelter at Sittwe University and in other concrete buildings but returned home because the sites were full. “Authorities made an announcement about an incoming cyclone but they didn’t tell us how devastating it could be,” a Rohingya man living in Rakhine’s Dar Paing camp said. “They just told people to leave their homes, but didn’t say where to go. No one from the junta or NGOs came to help move people. So people stayed in their shelters and were injured or died. We thought it would be like the other storms we face every year. We never realized it would be so catastrophic.” From Rakhine State, the cyclone moved inland to the country’s northwest, where the civilian population has faced military attacks, displacement, movement restrictions, and internet shutdowns for over two years. Villagers from Matupi, Kanpetlet, and Mindat townships in Chin State, all under martial law, reported that the junta closed major roads after the cyclone hit. In Sagaing and Magway Regions, where almost a million people have been displaced by airstrikes and fighting since the coup, flooding has destroyed large swathes of farmland, while shifting landmines and unexploded ordnance increased the risk to villagers. Post-Cyclone Blocking of Aid The junta’s restrictions on access, movement, banking, and the import and transport of critical nutrition, housing, and medical supplies have hindered every aspect of the cyclone response. In early May, in preparation for the cyclone, international agencies submitted travel authorization requests for pre-approval, a highly bureaucratic and arbitrary process. For weeks, the junta delayed issuing new travel authorizations and visas for emergency relief staff and experts, leaving many groups reliant on local partners and existing field staff who themselves were affected by the cyclone. Following negotiations, some travel authorizations were issued in early June, only to be revoked in the June 8 order blocking all existing access for aid groups in Rakhine State. “The humanitarian access situation in cyclone-hit Rakhine State has deteriorated,” OCHA reported on June 9. “The suspension of access in Rakhine brings a stop to activities that have been reaching hundreds of thousands of people.” Humanitarian staff reported that some access requests were briefly approved by state-level junta authorities before being overturned by the junta in the capital, Naypyidaw. OCHA, which is coordinating the emergency response, submitted a detailed two-week plan for the transport and distribution of supplies in Rakhine and Chin States to junta authorities in Naypyidaw the week of May 22. After weeks with no response, OCHA reported on June 9 that “initial approval for humanitarian distribution and transport plans across 11 townships have also been rescinded.” On June 7, the junta issued a letter to the UN asserting that beyond Yangon, Myanmar’s largest city, all domestic distribution of relief supplies would be managed by the relevant state-level junta authorities. The junta has claimed that it is overseeing an extensive, effective disaster response. Junta spokesman Maj. Gen. Zaw Min Tun told the BBC that the junta “has allowed local and international organizations helping recovery efforts in line with rules and regulations.” A junta diplomat in Thailand claimed baselessly in an opinion article that the junta’s early warning system and relief efforts have demonstrated its “management capability, efficient action, and ability to plan long-term.” Residents from coastal Rakhine State said there was no support for search-and-rescue operations after the storm. “How many are still missing, no one knows,” the man from Thae Chaung camp said. “I saw many bodies afterward. I attended ten funerals including two of my relatives. The junta could have evacuated us to buildings in town, but they did not. If the diaspora hadn’t sent some assistance after the cyclone, many more Rohingya would have died.” Local aid workers told Human Rights Watch about new roadblocks and increased scrutiny at military checkpoints, amplifying the risk of arbitrary detention, harassment, and confiscation of supplies. Junta officials have blocked staff from transporting food, housing materials, and medical goods between townships, at times demanding they turn the supplies over to the junta. The authorities have also exacted bribes at Sittwe airport from staff bringing in cash and supplies. The junta’s General Administration Department has denied local activists’ requests to collect aid for storm victims. “The INGOs and NGOs are unable to provide assistance to us,” a man from Sittwe said. “The junta authorities told them that if any humanitarian wants to help us, they have to work with the junta. It makes it difficult for them to help us independently. So we are suffering. We do not have shelters now, or any aid.” On May 23, junta officials detained and interrogated five ethnic Rakhine aid workers transporting relief supplies from Sittwe to Ponnagyun township for alleged connections with “illegal” media outlets. They released the aid workers the following day. On June 2, officials arrested eight aid workers at a junta checkpoint in Mrauk-U while they were trying to distribute supplies. The Arakan Army, an ethnic armed group, along with its political wing, the United League of Arakan, has requested international support for its relief efforts, having strengthened its control across central and northern Rakhine State since the coup. Local activists expressed concerns that the junta was using the cyclone response to regain a foothold in the state, by both enforcing restrictions to undermine the Arakan Army’s efforts as well as reinforcing junta troops through its own minimal outreach. On May 19, the junta threatened to take legal action against media reporting “false news” about the cyclone, including reports with higher death tolls. The statement claimed that 97 people died, and only because they had refused to be evacuated by the junta. The opposition National Unity Government tallied more than 450 deaths. Shelters Destroyed Humanitarian agencies said that in camps and villages in low-lying central and northern Rakhine State, nearly all shelters were damaged or destroyed, along with latrines, wells, and other infrastructure. “All of Sittwe is damaged,” a Rohingya man said of the Rakhine State capital. “It looks like a graveyard.” About 140,000 Rohingya have been confined to camps in central Rakhine State since 2012, sheltered in bamboo longhouses designed to last just two years. For more than 10 years, the authorities denied aid agencies’ requests for adequate land and resources to improve safety in the flood-prone former paddy fields and low-lying coastal areas where the camps sit. Fewer than half of all camp shelters had received any repair over the past two years. The resulting damage has been massive, with most Rohingya interviewed by Human Rights Watch saying that shelter is their greatest need. Many people who lost their houses have been living in tents made of debris along roads, in paddy fields, or in other overcrowded and ad hoc displacement sites. Markets have begun to reopen but prices for building materials and food have skyrocketed. “So many Rohingya in the camps are living under an open sky,” the man from Dar Paing camp said. “My shelter was fully destroyed but we survived. People are using htamein [skirts] as temporary roofs. No one is coming to help us.” In the northwest, roadblocks and ongoing fighting are preventing people from reaching towns to buy building materials, while local aid workers have been blocked at checkpoints from moving supplies and cash. Food Aid Withheld A humanitarian agency reported that “80 per cent of households surveyed in Rakhine stated their communities and neighbors are struggling to access food.” Residents of some camps and villages in Rakhine State said they had received small rations of rice, beans, and oil from junta officials following the cyclone. “But it was finished after two days,” a man said. Some villagers reported being charged for rice and roofing sheets delivered by local junta officials to cover “transportation costs.” Others have relied on community donations to avoid starvation. Aid workers said that the supplies distributed by junta officials – extremely limited in scope, without consideration of communities’ needs – appear to be little more than a propaganda opportunity, with photos splashed across state media. Local media reported that a military ceremony allegedly providing supplies to survivors in Matupi township was nothing more than a photo op, with junta officials leaving with the aid that they were photographed distributing. The World Food Programme had been distributing food assistance but, even prior to the June 8 suspension, the organization was facing dwindling supplies, transport restrictions, and difficulty reaching northern Rakhine and the northwest due to lack of travel authorizations. “Wider access for distributions is urgently needed, along with permission to transport humanitarian supplies from in-country warehouses and into Myanmar from other countries,” OCHA reported. Cyclone flooding has caused massive destruction to paddy fields, seed storage, livestock, and other means of agricultural and fishing livelihoods, exacerbating the vulnerability of populations already facing losses due to conflict and the country’s economic freefall. The coup triggered widespread infrastructure collapse and a severe devaluation of the Myanmar currency, leading to increasingly dire banking and supply chain crises and shortages of food, medicine, and other essentials. The UN Food and Agriculture Organization estimated that about 327,000 hectares of agricultural land were affected by flooding, and at least half of all fishing equipment in Sittwe was damaged or destroyed. Disease, Damaged Health Facilities Communities have been reporting outbreaks of diarrhea and skin infections, particularly among children, while health workers warn of heightened risks of waterborne and communicable diseases in the weeks ahead. “We’re facing a shortage of drinking water,” the man from Dar Paing camp said. “During the cyclone, the sea water entered our ponds. We are still tasting water like salt.” The cyclone caused significant damage to hospitals and clinics, compounded by the junta’s severe restrictions on health care. Rohingya in Sittwe and Pauktaw camps reported little to no access to mobile health services. “So many injured Rohingya still need medical attention,” a man from Sittwe said. “Some kind doctors came from Yangon to help us, but it’s not enough.” “Health partners continue to face persistent challenges in accessing the most severely affected areas,” OCHA reported on June 9. “Wider access is crucial to effectively extend health services, allocate resources, and carry out early warning and outbreak investigations.” Following the suspension of its travel authorizations, Médecins Sans Frontières (Doctors Without Borders or MSF) Myanmar tweeted: “This will desperately hurt communities as we will be unable to open primary healthcare clinics, facilitate emergency referrals or provide much needed emergency relief items. People impacted by the cyclone … will continue to suffer enormously if this decision is not reversed.” The UN reported that “the impact of Cyclone Mocha will deprive more children and pregnant and lactating women of access to timely and lifesaving nutrition treatment and support, contributing to increased morbidity and mortality.” Humanitarian agencies reported that the junta is denying access to even assess nutrition needs and disseminate guidance on feeding infants in emergencies. Rates of severe acute malnutrition have spiked this year, yet only nine percent of children in need received lifesaving nutrition treatment in the first quarter of 2023, with assistance “severely hampered by access constraints, restrictive humanitarian space, displacement, and uncertainty around the importation of nutrition therapeutic products.” For 2 years, junta authorities refused to provide customs clearance for 77 cases of medicine, healthcare equipment, and nutrition supplements. Urgent Need for Protection “Increasing protection risks require urgent attention,” OCHA reported, “including threats to safety and security, unexploded ordnance (UXOs), sexual and gender-based violence, loss of civil documentation, looting, extortion, and robbery. New negative coping mechanisms observed include borrowing money at high interest, and children begging for food due to the lack of job opportunities, which might lead to child labor, exploitation, and abuse.” OCHA also reported cases of suicide attempts, “primarily among women and girls who were affected by the cyclone and are experiencing psychological distress after the storm.” Landmines and improvised explosive devices that may have been dislodged by landslides and flooding pose an ongoing risk, especially as people clear debris in previously safe areas. Myanmar was one of only a handful of states to use antipersonnel landmines in 2022, with casualties spiking since the coup. Over 60 percent of landmine incidents in the first quarter of 2023 took place in areas affected by Cyclone Mocha, and landmine contamination has been reported in almost 300 villages since the storm. On May 24, one person was killed and five were injured by a landmine in Hakha, Chin State, where post-cyclone landslides had been reported..."
Source/publisher: Human Rights Watch (USA)
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-20
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Title: Thai Election Winner Reaffirms Commitment to Peace in Myanmar
Description: "The leader of Move Forward, Pita Limjaroenrat, who won the recent Thai general election, says he is committed to ASEAN-led solutions for Myanmar and distanced himself from the outgoing government’s talks with Myanmar’s junta this week. Thailand’s military government hosted informal talks with Myanmar’s regime on Monday, dividing the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Myanmar’s regime has been excluded from high-level ASEAN meetings since late 2021 after the junta failed to follow the bloc’s five-point peace plan. Thailand invited all 10 ASEAN members to the closed meeting of foreign ministers but the current chair Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore shunned the event. Myanmar’s junta-appointed foreign minister, Than Swe, and representatives from Laos, Cambodia, India, China, Brunei and Vietnam attended Monday’s meeting. Following the meeting, Pita said in a statement that Move Forward is closely monitoring developments in Myanmar and prioritized the issue as a top concern. He referred to divisions caused by the talks within ASEAN and reaffirmed Move Forward’s commitment to the bloc’s five-point peace plan. “As one of the founding members of ASEAN, we attach high importance to unity among ASEAN members and to upholding principles of democracy and human rights as enshrined in the ASEAN Charter,” Pita stated. He said engagement must be inclusive, multi-layered and appropriate to help Myanmar stabilize. Pita said Move Forward’s coalition government plans to create a Myanmar Inter-Agency Task Force controlled by the Prime Minister’s Office which will coordinate efforts and seek solutions to Myanmar’s challenges..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-20
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Title: International Day for the Elimination of Sexual Violence in Conflict
Description: "On June 19, 2008, the 15-member United Nations Security Council passed resolution 1820 and designated the day as the International Day for the Elimination of Sexual Violence in Conflict. This resolution strongly condemns the usage of sexual violence during times of war and conflict, considering it a dangerous tactic and strategy that undermines international peace and stability. Mainly women and LGBTQI people fall victim to conflict-related sexual violence. However, some men and young men are not exempt from that. Sexual violence is the result of power imbalance, gender inequality, and the culture of impunity. The victims of sexual violence are both armed actors as well as many innocent civilians. Sexual violence in conflict is not an unavoidable by-product of wars and conflicts. It can be prevented through specific strategies, such as plans, military orders, Code of Conduct, communications procedures, and operation guidelines. Research demonstrates that conflict related sexual violence (CRSV) does not occur in every war and conflict with the same magnitude and prevalence. By implementing effective guidelines and operations with strong political will, it is possible to decrease and address sexual violence. All warring parties involved in the conflict must uphold the international humanitarian law during armed conflicts. This is also a pressing matter for Myanmar. CRSV should not be perceived as an inevitable part of active armed conflicts. At this time, the National Unity Government and all armed actors must prohibit and prevent it. To effectively support survivors, concerned stakeholders, local NGOs, and CSOs need multisectoral assistance. International development partners must provide timely and adequate resources in the manner that aligned to the local situations. This type of assistance would enable survivors to reclaim their fundamental rights. All survivors have the human right to receive survivor-centered services, live a life free from violence and threats, and access justice. Civic space has been shrinking across the country since February 2021. When CRSV cases happen, those who tirelessly work on them are civil society women's groups. On this day, we would like to take this opportunity to honor these women human rights defenders, frontline workers and first responders, for their important work to help the survivors, despite the danger and risk that could fall on them. It is mandatory for the international justice mechanisms to hold Myanmar’s military, or Sit-Tat accountable for systematic, widespread and pervasive sexual violence and gender-based crimes that they have committed in armed conflicts for decades. Myanmar military and Myanmar Security Forces have been designated in the UN list of parties that have committed widespread and systematic patterns of sexual violence since 2018. It is also necessary to hold perpetrators of all kinds accountable for sexual violence directly or indirectly linked to armed conflicts regardless of their kinship, political party affiliation, ranks in an army, or socioeconomic strata. All perpetrators must be held accountable without partiality to end impunity. We must act urgently to impose immediate and severe punishments for sexual violence crime perpetrators as we continue to build our path towards a Federal Democratic future. Enhancing response mechanisms can be achieved through a survivor-centered approach and seeking guidance from women's and human rights groups. A just and equal future can only be achieved when armed organizations and women's groups collaborate. Sexual violence in conflict is not just a women's issue or a concern solely for survivors; it is a Myanmar’s societal issue. Sexual violence during conflicts shatters mutual trust and represents a misuse and abuse of power. To rebuild trust, a comprehensive societal approach, in accordance with the international definitions and standards, should be adopted..."
Source/publisher: Women Advocacy Coalition Myanmar
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-19
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Title: Myanmar: Cyclone Mocha Situation Report No.5 (As of 16:00 15 June 2023) [EN/MY]
Description: "This more comprehensive product now replaces the daily Flash Updates that were previously issued by OCHA Myanmar on Cyclone Mocha. This Sit Rep is produced by OCHA in collaboration with the seven operating humanitarian clusters and their sub-working groups in Myanmar. The humanitarian response section is not necessarily reflective of all humanitarian interventions undertaken on the ground but rather those voluntarily reported by partners. HIGHLIGHTS • The approval of the distribution and transportation plans for the Cyclone Mocha response in Rakhine and Chin remains pending. Significant conditions, imposed by the State Administration Council, remain in place for the replenishment of relief supplies from outside the country and some have not yet been approved. • After humanitarian access was temporarily suspended in the cyclone-affected Rakhine state on 8 June, the UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator (RC/HC) a.i released a statement on 12 June, urging the State Administration Council to urgently re-instate the initial approval that was granted and allow life-saving assistance to resume. • Meanwhile, efforts are underway to engage with the de facto authorities at the Nay Pyi Taw and regional level to try and expand access to people in need. This included high-level engagement with Union ministers by the RC/HC ai and UN agencies in Sittwe. • Despite the humanitarian access restrictions, aid organizations have been delivering vital assistance to cyclone-affected communities where they have authorizations and supplies. More than 144,000 affected people have received shelter and other essential relief items in Rakhine and other areas since the cyclone. However, only a fraction of damaged and destroyed shelters have reportedly been repaired, leaving thousands of people without a proper roof over their heads during the monsoon season and exposing them to overcrowding and lack of privacy in the few shelters that remain functional. • Food assistance has reached almost 380,000 affected people in Rakhine alone. • Nearly 12,500 people in Rakhine, the Northwest, and Kachin have received healthcare. Nutrition assistance has reached more than 7,000 children under 5 and more than 1,500 caregivers in 8 priority townships in Rakhine. • Some 70 contaminated ponds in Ponnagyun, Rathedaung, and Sittwe townships were successfully de-watered. • More than 300 child-friendly spaces were rebuilt in Rakhine and the Northwest, and more than 34,000 children and caregivers received psychosocial support and psychological first aid services. • Continued financial support for the US$333 million Cyclone Mocha Flash Appeal is required to ensure timely procurement of vital supplies to address the needs of affected communities. According to the Financial Tracking Service, as of 16 June, only $21.7 million in additional funds has been received. SITUATION OVERVIEW One month on from Cyclone Mocha, the unexpected retraction of initial approval for cyclone distribution and transportation plans and the temporary suspension of existing travel authorizations (TAs) for humanitarian organizations in Rakhine by the de facto authorities, has impacted the humanitarian response across the state. This sudden decision has exacerbated the already dire living conditions of the cyclone-affected population as heavy rains and flooding from the monsoon season continue to impact areas already severely affected by the cyclone. After humanitarian access was temporarily suspended in the cyclone-affected Rakhine state on 8 June, the RC/HC a.i released a statement on 12 June, urging the State Administration Council to urgently re-instate the initial approval that was granted and allow life-saving assistance to resume. The RC/HC a.i. and his delegation also met with the Union Ministers in Sittwe on 15 June and held extensive discussions on possible modalities of support to cyclone affected people in accordance with humanitarian principles, and about the importation of supplies into Myanmar. At the request of the de facto authorities, UN agencies in Sittwe also met with the relevant state officials and Union Ministers on 13 June. Engagement is expected to continue. Despite the access limitations and the temporary suspension of regular activities for a week from 8 June, humanitarian organizations have reached an increasing number of people in need since the cyclone where they have authorizations and supplies. Shelter and relief items have been provided to more than 144,000 people in Rakhine and other areas, while food assistance has reached nearly 380,000 people in Rakhine alone. Healthcare services were provided to nearly 12,500 people in Rakhine, the Northwest, and Kachin, and nutrition assistance reached more than 7,000 children under 5 and more than 1,500 caregivers in 8 priority townships in Rakhine. Additionally, 70 contaminated ponds in Ponnagyun, Rathedaung, and Sittwe townships were successfully de-watered, and more than 300 child-friendly spaces (CFSs) were rebuilt in Rakhine and the Northwest. Psychosocial support (PSS) and psychological first aid (PFA) services were provided to more than 34,000 children and caregivers. Humanitarian actors are hoping to continue to explore various avenues to scale-up their operations beyond their existing regular activities. Cyclone impacted communities have been calling for such a scale-up to supplement the ongoing efforts by the local authorities, private donors and civil society organizations. The centralization of decision making on TAs for the cyclone response, however, has now put that expansion on hold. Engagement at the Nay Pyi Taw and regional level will continue, with the aim to identify modalities for predictable and timely access to cyclone-affected areas in Rakhine and Chin to address the immediate and longer-term needs of the affected communities. Scaled-up financial support is also urgently required to facilitate the timely procurement of vital supplies. According to the Financial Tracking Service (FTS), as of 16 June, US$21.7 million in additional funds has been received against the $333 million Cyclone Mocha Flash Appeal..."
Source/publisher: UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (New York) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-19
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Title: Rethinking Independence in a Time of Revolution
Description: "January 4 was the 75th anniversary of Myanmar’s independence. Although the military regime went out of its way to hold lavish celebrations, the response among much of the population — at home and abroad — was significantly more muted. That is not surprising, given widespread popular resistance to the 1 February 2021 military coup and criticism of the regime’s brutal actions since then. The persistence and strength of this revolutionary sentiment compels a closer look at the ways in which Burma’s independence in 1948 was both partial and exclusionary. Today, there is a deep sense among many people that the current revolution needs to be not only political but also social and cultural, challenging the categories and political norms that have harmed marginalised groups and constrained democratic possibilities. Are there ways to use this anniversary to learn from the past without feeling obligated by it, to support the efforts that open up wider possibilities for Myanmar’s future and reject those that would reinforce the political exclusions of its past? We offer four areas where this revolutionary-minded lens compels more thorough re-thinking of key aspects of Myanmar’s political dynamics. First is a reconsideration of the fundamental presumption of ‘Independence’ — the nation-state model; the second is a critical assessment of what Independence in 1948 actually constituted and what perspectives were left out; third is a return to the Left-leaning economic critiques of Independence and the effects of their comparative absence today; and finally, fourth, we look at တိုင်းရင်းသား (taingyintha), one of the key categories of belonging in contemporary Myanmar, to show how its persistence suppresses alternate notions of community and perpetuates élite-driven identity politics. Questioning the Nation-State Norm Immediately following the 1 February coup, the initial public discourse was about a ‘return to democratic government’. But as the revolution gained momentum and needed more broad-based support, its political aspirations had to expand to include more groups. At the same time, its scope also expanded, incorporating not just a more robust sense of federalism but addressing broader systemic inequalities as well as more radical proposals (like the complete abolition of the armed forces). But ground realities present a more sobering and complicated picture: both the United Wa State Army (UWSA) and Arakan Army (AA) are asserting their territorial control and pushing for a level of political autonomy that resembles an independent state. Some major ethnic armed organisations such as the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) and Karen National Union (KNU) are providing space and support for multi-ethnic youth fighting against the military, while smaller ethnic organisations — as well as some leaders within these larger groups — have remained close to the regime, preferring to maintain the status quo through the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement. These dynamics point to a scenario of ‘fragmented sovereignty’ with local ethnic military leaders deciding the fate of a significant percentage of the population who call Myanmar home. Meanwhile, the international community appears unwilling to robustly support the revolutionaries, with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) predictably constrained by its Five-point Consensus. Reflecting on Myanmar’s independence under these circumstances requires a willingness to think outside of the Westphalian nation-state box, and the presumption that international borders are sacrosanct. Even today, as tens of millions of Myanmar people resist the military coup, there are reasonable and persistent differences in their visions of what they are fighting for. Even those who have recently opened up to robust conversations on federalism might balk at fully independent Wa or Arakan States, as fear-mongering framings of ‘Balkanisation’ have been a part of Burmese political discourse since before military rule. It is also the case that a post-Westphalian or post-Myanmar discussion might feel like it dismisses the sacrifices made by so many for Independence, and the investments that many people have in their Myanmar identity. But the persistent distrust between leaders of various groups, and between leaders and the populations they claim to represent, shows that the situation demands a new imagination of what independent Myanmar could look like. Independence for Whom? Instead of imagining Burma’s declaration of independence in 1948 as a simplistic rejection of British colonial rule and the restoration of indigenous rule, we can look back even further, to critically assess the centralising, assimilationist project of previous Burman kings: Bodawpaya violently annexed Arakan in 1784, strengthening a dismissive discourse about Rakhine cultural and religious practice and provoking a lasting hostility of Rakhine people toward Burman rule; looking even earlier, Alaungpaya’s conquest of the Irrawaddy Delta in the 1750s set off an ethnic Burman migration to the area that effectively made Mons and other groups a minority by the 19th century. Burma’s independence addressed none of these historical dynamics of assimilation, appropriation and exclusion. From the perspective of some occupied populations, it merely presented an opportunity for a majority group to take control of a territory that had already been forcefully brought together by successive colonising powers (first, the Konbaung kings, then the British), perpetuating the fiction of it being a coherent political entity. In fact, 1948 is only considered a meaningful or complete moment of independence from a particular set of standpoints. Non-Burman responses ranged from hesitant and conditional acceptance (as laid out in some of the clauses of the Panglong Agreement of 1947) to justified fear that they were simply trading a relatively benevolent colonial master for a more hostile Burman one. There is an important parallel here with the present moment. While labels like the ‘Spring Revolution’ can be a useful shorthand for what has been happening in Myanmar for the last two years, presenting a unified sense of the resistance movements foregrounds an overly-simplistic narrative. Instead of presuming that solidarity automatically emerges through a shared enemy, more effective descriptions of the current struggle see solidarity as something that is achieved gradually and provisionally, through the hard work of groups on the ground, seeking to build alliances across differences of identity, but also of interest. This likely requires a much stronger economic critique. The Need for Economic Revolution At the time of Independence, Left-leaning critics argued that full political liberation from colonial rule was impossible unless it was accompanied by a socialist economic revolution that could resist the neo-colonial domination of a global capitalist system, where influential actors often sought to actively undermine aspiring socialist states. Today, not only are the dynamics of economic dependence amplified in ways that constrain new actors, new states would be heavily dependent on resource extraction and probably driven by the existing economic interests of entrenched élites. In this context, it is likely that newly-created political entities would end up being heavily militarised and autocratic, not necessarily a better solution than the present. The road to independence in the 1940s featured disjunctures between groups that seemingly pitted ethnic interests against class interests. For example, although the saophas (traditional hereditary leaders in the Shan States) represented Shans at Panglong, their positions and influence were being increasingly challenged by other groups, including the youth of the Shan State Freedom League (SSFL). Although a Leftist ally of the Burman-led Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League (AFPFL) that was pushing for independence, the SSFL was denied a role at Panglong. Rather than see this as a clash between ethnic and economic interests, we might instead take a critical view that sees both class and ethnic identities as potentially meaningful for people, but also exploitable by élites with their own interests, a lesson that remains crucially important for alliance-building in today’s movement. Frustratingly, virtually none of the current revolutionary leadership — among Ethnic Revolutionary Organisations (EROs) or the National Unity Government (NUG) — are explicitly talking about the need for an economic revolution to complement a political one. Instead, they are primarily focused either on ethnic rights and federalism or on opposition to the military government. But across the country, at the grassroots, people are much more conscious of the ways in which their oppression emerges from political factors and predatory neo-liberal capitalism. This is consistent with the critique put forward by social movements that were becoming more prominent before the coup, focused on land rights, workers and farmers rights, and opposition to mega-projects and destructive Special Economic Zones (SEZs). Continued economic collapse after the coup has simply reinforced this sentiment, but it is not emphasised sufficiently in public discourse around the revolution partly because it poses a threat to many established actors and their economic interests and partly because élites continue to dominate that discourse. Challenging Élite Discourses Without the coup, it’s possible that Myanmar’s political discourse might have continued in a generally reformist manner, under successive National League for Democracy (NLD) governments. When Daw Aung San Suu Kyi labelled the post-1988 movement ‘Burma’s second struggle for independence’, it had only the modest goal of ending military rule. But the 2021 coup has made a revolutionary approach not just more thinkable and more imperative; it feels almost inevitable. Ten years of a quasi-democratic experiment gave people a sense of the benefits of freedom but the coup radicalised many, turning them away from gradualist, reform-minded alternatives to try to break free from the constraints of established categories and norms in politics and society. Abolition of these categories is a complicated task. To take one example, တိုင်းရင်းသား (taingyintha; lit., ‘natives of the country’) is a term that denotes a kind of belonging and connection to the territory, but it has been used by successive military governments to distinguish officially recognised ethnic groups from those designated as ‘foreign’. In this way, it has provided some protection for those fortunate enough to be included, even as it has excluded others and helped justify widespread complicity in the face of the Rohingya genocide. But the spectre haunting taingyintha is the history of Burmanisation: it offers belonging only on the terms of a dominant Burman and Buddhist national identity and can likely never offer a genuinely inclusive ground for solidarity. Fortunately, potential alternatives have arisen from the struggle itself. In the early days of the revolution, with the spontaneity of an almost leaderless, bottom-up revolt against the coup, it was mostly Gen-Z youth across the country who expressed their unequivocal rejection of the dictatorship. In doing so, they also called for addressing other social hierarchies, starting with gendered hierarchies in the ထဘီ (htamein; sarong-like wraparound garment worn by women) movement and for mass apologies for atrocities done to the Rohingya people. The movement went on to call, for the first time, for solidarity with ethnic Chinese, Muslims, and people of all classes and identities in society. The masses acknowledged this fight and named it ‘လူမျိုးဘာသာမခွဲခြား မြန်မာနိုင်ငံသား’ (lumyo-batha-ma-khwe-cha-myanmar-naigantha; lit., ‘Myanmar citizens without any differentiation based on race or religion’). But as the revolution grows more protracted, the real politics of the struggle on the ground have an impact on the political subjectivities of all the resistance forces. Progressive and transgressive discourses like these get pushed down by a romanticising of the taingyintha ideal, which does not change the terms of belonging but simply rebrands EAOs as Ethnic Revolutionary Organisations (EROs). It is imperative that the ongoing struggles and sacrifices of these communities be recognised, but it is equally imperative to do so without reinforcing the constraining, dominant ideas that have supported previous Burman-led military regimes. * At the 75th anniversary of independence, the way the dominant discourses were re-asserted by élites is telling: the regime is using the old playbook with its narrative to save the country and save Buddhism. The corresponding discourse from some revolutionary actors is also to harden ethnic difference, portraying the NUG-led resistance as simply a Burman vs Burman civil conflict and entrenching claims based on more rigid ethnic identities. In fact, these two discourses are two sides of the same coin, as they are essentialising identity categories following the state-driven logic of taingyintha. Myanmar’s moment of partial independence in 1948 displayed a similar parallel in its dominant discourses and the ones that sought to portray political belonging in ways that captured a more complex range of salient identities and dynamics. Grassroots and youth groups in the current revolution offer an opportunity to reclaim the spirit of independence not only as liberation from oppressive rule but also from norms that have constrained the ability of people in Myanmar to imagine a more just and inclusive political community. * The views expressed here are those of the author and not of the ‘South Asia at LSE’ blog, the LSE South Asia Centre or the London School of Economics and Political Science. Please click here for our Comments Policy. This blogpost may not be reposted by anyone without prior written consent of LSE South Asia Centre; please e-mail [email protected] for permission. Banner image © Saw Wunna, Yangon, 13 May 2021, Unsplash. The ‘Myanmar @ 75’ logo is copyrighted by the LSE South Asia Centre, and may not be used by anyone for any purpose. It shows the national flower of Myanmar, Padauk (Pterocarpus macrocarpus), framed in a design adapted from Burmese ikat textile weaves. The logo has been designed by Oroon Das..."
Source/publisher: London School of Economics and Political Science
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-19
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