Human Rights and international relations
Individual Documents
Description:
"Data collected by Insecurity Insight shows that since the military coup on 01 February 2021 and 04 June 2026 at least 1,943 incidents of violence against or obstruction of access to health care took place across Myanmar:
equivalent to one attack on health care every day for more than five years
65% of these attacks were attributed to the Myanmar Armed Forces (MAF)
175 health workers were killed and 932 arrested
health facilities were damaged on at least 509 occasions
So far this year, at least seven health workers were killed by explosive weapons. Five health workers were killed in three incidents involving MAF airstrikes: two occurred at prisoner-of-war detention facilities under the control of opposition forces in Rakhine and Yangon, while the third involved the bombing of a hospital located in areas under the control of the PDF in Sagaing. A further two health workers were killed in two separate roadside landmine explosions reportedly attributed to opposition forces in Bago and Magway regions.
View the incidents on our interactive map. Download the data. Updated every Monday and includes information on weapons use, perpetrators and effects. For data enquiries, please get in touch. Data is continuously updated and numbers may change if/ when further information is made available. See here for methodology..."
Source/publisher:
Insecurity Insight (Geneva) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2026-07-03
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"Myanmar has been in crisis since 1 February 2021, when the military (Tatmadaw) overthrew the democratically elected government. This coup sparked widespread protests and armed resistance, leading to a severe political, economic, and humanitarian crisis. The military regime, known as the State Administration Council (SAC), has responded with brutal force, resulting in thousands of civilian deaths and widespread human rights abuses. As of March 2026, approximately 3.7 million people are internally displaced across the country—a dramatic increase from roughly 300,000 pre-2021—with cross-border displacement projected to rise toward 5.2 million in 2026. In attempt to seek international legitimacy, the military held general elections in three phases over December 2025 and January 2026 for the first time since the coup. The overwhelming majority of seats were won by the pro-military Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) and saw SAC chairman Min Aung Hlaing elected as president in April 2026. The elections have been widely denounced as neither free nor fair. Despite the transition to a quasi-civilian presidency, armed clashes have continued in multiple parts of the country, including Sagaing, Magway, northern Shan, Kayah, Kayin, Kachin, and Rakhine. The Arakan Army (AA) now controls all but three of Rakhine State's 17 townships, while resistance forces including the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) have consolidated influence across parts of central and southeastern Myanmar. The UN's 2026 Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan (HNRP), released 10 December 2025, projects over 16 million people will require humanitarian assistance this year. Recovery from the March 2025 earthquake remains slow, with an estimated 3.5 million tonnes of debris and reconstruction hampered by insecurity, shortages of heavy machinery (43%) and labour (40%), and limited access. Many affected communities, particularly in Magway, Sagaing, and Mandalay, continue to live in temporary shelters, while essential services remain disrupted. Approximately 24,200 houses were damaged (24% completely destroyed), and 132 health facilities were damaged—half in Mandalay. The Rohingya crisis continues to worsen, with the junta's blockade of Rakhine preventing international aid delivery since late 2023, leaving hundreds of thousands of IDPs with severely limited assistance. On 10 December 2025, a military airstrike destroyed Mrauk-U General Hospital, killing at least 33 people and injuring 76-80—one of the deadliest attacks on healthcare in the conflict. Chronic poverty now affects over 80% of the population; the World Bank projects GDP will contract 2.0% in FY2025/26 with inflation remaining above 20%, and market disruptions have deepened food insecurity nationwide. The 2026 HNRP appeals for approximately $890 million but reflects severely constrained funding and narrowed operational space, forcing agencies to prioritize only 2.6 million people with the most severe needs for life-saving support.
Key Insights
Myanmar's humanitarian crisis continues to deepen amid persistent conflict, economic collapse, and the lingering impacts of the March 2025 earthquake. An estimated 16 million people—nearly one in three citizens—are projected to require humanitarian assistance in 2026, as conflict-driven displacement, natural disasters, funding shortages, and humanitarian access constraints exacerbate vulnerabilities nationwide. The 28 March 2025 earthquake remains a defining event in the humanitarian landscape. Official figures from SAC confirm 3,770 deaths and over 5,000 injuries, with the Early Recovery Cluster reporting over 24,200 houses damaged (24% completely destroyed), 4,857 apartments affected, and 132 health facilities damaged. An estimated 3.5 million tonnes of debris blocks roads and markets, with clearance impeded by shortages of heavy machinery (43%) and labour (40%). Nearly three-quarters of the most affected townships continue to face critical shelter and livelihood gaps—64% of communities reported job losses and 30-31% reported damage to crops and workplaces—while disrupted water systems (44% of groundwater sources contaminated) have fueled outbreaks of cholera and dengue.
2. Following the junta-run general elections held over December 2025 and January 2026, as well as ceasefires between the regime and some ethnic armed organizations in northern Shan, the number of armed conflict incidents has gradually decreased. Nonetheless, air and ground offensives continue in the Central Dry Zone, as well as Rakhine, Kayah, and Kayin States. The new government's 100-day roadmap announced on 21 April 2026, which invites resistance groups to enter peace talks and to surrender, have not been widely accepted. Between January and November 2025, the military conducted 2,165 airstrikes, up from 1,716 in all of 2024. On 10 December 2025, a military airstrike destroyed Mrauk-U General Hospital in Rakhine State, killing at least 33 people and injuring 76-80—prompting UN, WHO, and Amnesty International condemnation and calls for investigation as a possible war crime. IDPs have reached approximately 3.7 million people as of March 2025, with projections indicating it could rise further through 2026. The Arakan Army now controls all but three of Rakhine's 17 townships, while resistance forces have captured extensive border areas in the southeast. Attacks on healthcare are widespread: Insecurity Insight recorded 1,815 attacks on health care between February 2021 and November 2025, with WHO verifying 67 attacks in 2025 alone. Access restrictions, including the junta's blockade of Rakhine since late 2023, continue to endanger civilians—particularly Rohingya communities facing persistent protection risks, restricted mobility, and limited access to aid.
3. Humanitarian access remains severely limited by insecurity and deliberate obstruction. The 2026 HNRP appeals for approximately $890 million but reflects severely constrained funding and narrowed operational space, prioritizing only 2.6 million people with the most severe needs at a cost of $521 million. Partners reached some 6.3 million people at the end of 2025, but access constraints—including roadblocks, landmines, telecommunications blackouts, and the Rakhine blockade affecting 600,000 IDPs—force reliance on low-profile, community-led delivery modalities. WFP warns that hunger has reached "unacceptable" levels, with over 400,000 young children and mothers surviving on nutrient-deprived diets of plain rice or watery porridge.
4. The Food Security Cluster estimates about 12 million people face moderate-to-severe food insecurity in 2026, driven by conflict, displacement, rising food and fuel prices, reduced market access and supply-chain disruptions. September 2025 analyses reported "Serious" to "Critical" Global Acute Malnutrition in multiple conflict-affected townships, notably in northern Rakhine, Kachin, Sagaing, southern Shan, and Kayah—with nutrition and treatment services suspended or operating at minimal capacity due to access constraints. Economic conditions continue to deteriorate: the World Bank projects real GDP will contract 2.0% in FY2025/26, with inflation remaining above 20%. Rising poverty and fear of forced conscription have driven male migration, leaving women, girls, and older people as household heads. More than four in ten households identify lack of income as their top challenge, and 83% of internally displaced families can meet half or less of their basic needs. The convergence of conflict, disaster, and economic decline continues to erode coping capacities, pushing Myanmar further toward a protracted humanitarian emergency with no signs of de-escalation.
5. International condemnation has intensified following the 10 December 2025 airstrike on Mrauk-U Hospital. The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights called for an investigation, warning the attack could amount to a war crime. WHO's Director-General condemned the strike as among dozens of verified attacks on healthcare in 2025. Amnesty International and the Burma Human Rights Network have urged the UN Security Council to refer Myanmar to the International Criminal Court, impose an arms embargo, and authorize emergency cross-border humanitarian aid. Peace negotiations remain effectively stalled: resistance leaders and the National Unity Government publicly rejected Chinese-brokered terms for northern Shan State. The junta cancelled voting in over 67 townships where it cannot secure control, while nationwide "silent strikes" signalled popular rejection of the military's December 2025 elections. EU and Australia have declared the vote "not credible" amid junta repression. The junta denied responsibility for civilian casualties, accusing "terrorists" of being targeted, while humanitarian organizations stated that the pre-election environment has driven further escalation rather than de-escalation.
6. After taking office on 10 April 2026, president Min Aung Hlaing announced a 100-day program inviting resistance groups — both NCA signatories and non-signatories, including People's Defense Force (PDF) units — to enter peace talks by 31 July 2026. However, the Karen National Union (KNU), All Burma Student's Democratic Front (ABSDF), and the Chin National Front (CNF) quickly rejected the offer, with the KNU stating it has no intention of negotiating under frameworks linked to military rule, underscoring the deep erosion of trust between the junta and resistance forces..."
Source/publisher:
Data Friendly Space via Reliefweb (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2026-06-09
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Type:
Individual Documents
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Education in Burma/Myanmar - general, Food Security and nutrition in Burma/Myanmar, Human Rights and international relations
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"Myanmar is in the midst of a momentous political and economic transition, the outcome of
which will have ramifications not only for the country itself but also for the rest of Southeast
Asia and much of continental Asia. This volume has provided an in-depth survey and analysis
of the many cultural, political and economic shifts currently underway and the key challenges
that the country faces. It is now therefore worth considering what a successful transition in
Myanmar might look like.
There can be little doubt that for most people in Myanmar, and for the country’s many
supporters elsewhere in the world, a successful transition will result in a prosperous and peaceful
democracy: many of its people took to the streets demanding democracy in 1988 and electoral
support for the National League for Democracy (NLD) was overwhelming in both 1990 and
2015 (Ardeth Thawnghmung 2016). However, as with all political concepts, the form and function of democratic rule is heavily contested. In Myanmar, the military’s roadmap to ‘disciplineflourishing democracy’, put into practice with the 2008 constitution, reserves a quarter of
legislative seats for serving military personnel, mandates direct military appointments to the
executive and allocates the Tatmadaw a key role in many aspects of national governance. Such
enduring military dominance does not satisfy most definitions of democracy. Nevertheless, with
the gradual loosening of constraints on political debate and the NLD government coming
to power in 2016, Myanmar is becoming more democratic than at any point in the past half
century. Whether the transition can continue in this democratic direction is still unclear.
A fundamental component of any transition to a democratic society is adherence to international norms relating to democracy and a broad portfolio of human rights in the political, civil,
economic, social and cultural realms. The political reform process underway in Myanmar therefore has major implications for the country’s economic and cultural future. Genuine respect for
democratic norms and human rights should lead to a more equitable and ecologically sustainable
model of economic development. It should also support the recognition and respect of social and
cultural diversity, whether based on ethnicity, sexual orientation, ability or gender. Democracy,
human rights, sustainability and equitable economic development are often treated as separate
issues, but this is usually the result of applying unduly narrow definitions. More comprehensive
visions of sustainable and just states provide useful insights on the interdependence of these issues
(Eckersley 2004). In 2015, Myanmar finally signed the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), which sets out a range of state obligations in these areas.
A democratic, just and sustainable future for Myanmar therefore relies on the notion of
inclusion. An inclusive polity, economy and society do not discriminate on the basis of religion,
ethnicity, gender or sexual orientation. With ongoing civil conflict in Myanmar’s north, east
and west, and the religious tensions between Buddhists and Muslims in much of the country,
this may seem like a utopian vision, but it remains a precursor for any truly liberal or social
democratic state.
Political and economic inclusion is generated by adherence to human rights norms but it is
also necessary for any successful strategy of sustainable development. Inequality in Myanmar is
significant and there is a growing global recognition, even in institutions such as the IMF, that
inequality and neoliberal economic models can stifle the full potential of economic development
(Dabla-Norris et al. 2015; Ostry et al. 2016; Wilkinson and Pickett 2009). Myanmar’s natural
resources and agricultural development provide avenues for addressing poverty throughout the
country but only if such development is achieved through ecologically sustainable strategies that
respect the rights of ethnic minority and local communities in decision-making. Policies that
promote free, high-quality education for all, particularly in ethnic languages, not only improve
understanding and tolerance of difference but also provide the human capital for future economic development ( Jolliffe and Mears 2016; Lall and South 2013).
Political inclusion is possibly the most significant issue facing Myanmar, with questions of
ethnicity a key contributor to historical and contemporary conflicts. Ethnicity feeds directly
into Myanmar’s unresolved citizenship crisis (Holliday 2014). As Walton (2013) has shown,
many in the ethnic Bamar (Burman) community are oblivious of the systematic marginalisation
of other ethnic cultures, languages and religions. This unacknowledged privilege is not, however,
unique to the Bamar community, as some ‘accepted’ national ethnic minorities also receive
unacknowledged privilege and reinforce the marginalisation of other minority communities.
The key document in this area is the 1982 Citizenship Law, which set out the country’s 135
officially designated ethnic groups, the ‘national races’. The law was passed during military rule
under Ne Win, which was opposed by the NLD and many ethnic groups for its authoritarian
and chauvinist practices. While arguing that laws made under Ne Win were unjust and illegitimate, in the new political climate many ethnic minority activists have been happy to cite and
promote this law to justify the exclusion of other minorities, notably the Muslim Rohingya in
Rakhine State, although this is part of a broader scapegoating of Muslims throughout Myanmar
(Cheesman 2017; van Klinken and Su Mon Thazin Aung 2017). There is no easy political
solution to the issue of inclusion in Myanmar but a useful first step could be the technical separation of ethnicity from eligibility for citizenship (see Farrelly 2016).
An intermediate point for the transition currently underway in Myanmar might, therefore,
see the law redrafted to remove ethnicity as a primary determinant of citizenship. There are of
course significant political impediments to implementing such a change but, just as the concept
of federalism is, for the first time, being openly debated in Myanmar, the emergence of a new
definition of citizenship, founded on liberal values rather than arbitrary and often ethnologically
dubious categorisations, should not be entirely ruled out. Such a shift would take courage on
the part of Myanmar’s democrats to make the necessary adjustments in what is currently a rigid
set of social expectations about ethnic belonging.
In government, the NLD has made efforts to promote what they consider neutral language
on sensitive ethnic issues, particularly the Rohingya. Their terminological revisions have caused
consternation among ‘nationalist’ Buddhists, and have also been opposed by some Rohingya
themselves. There were reports that Muslims in Rakhine State townships refused to accept new
government-issued national verification cards, or ‘green cards’, as part of a citizenship verification
pilot programme because their race and religion were omitted ( The Myanmar Times, 16 June 2016). These Muslims wanted their ethnicity listed on the card both to emphasise their identity and
because they thought its absence could reduce their chances of eventually gaining citizenship.
There is, in such cases, a lack of trust between ethnic minorities and the government due to
deep-seated historical animosities. While the NLD government generates much more goodwill
than its predecessors, there are obvious challenges when it comes to contentious ethnic and
religious fault lines. The removal of ethnicity and religion from government identification cards
is, however, a worthwhile ambition for a pluralist democracy. The official diminution of ethnic
classification may be possible if supposedly discrete groups accept that they are all, fundamentally, the same.
An attempt to reduce communal tensions came with the government announcement in
mid-2016 that it would use the religiously determined, but ethnically neutral, terminology of
‘Buddhist community in Rakhine State’ and ‘Muslim community in Rakhine State’ in stateowned publications ( The Irrawaddy, 21 June 2016). The previous USDP government commonly
referred to the Rohingya as ‘Bengalis’, a pejorative and ethnologically suspect term. Under the
NLD government these tentative steps towards more ethnically neutral governance were shaped
by the need to balance the competing demands of local nationalists and external critics. In
championing such difficult changes, the NLD were encouraged by their landslide triumph at
the 2015 election in the face of large-scale ‘nationalist’ Buddhist protests, including exhortations
by prominent monks not to vote for the leading democratic politicians. Even with that popular
mandate, the NLD’s efforts have foundered amongst the Buddhist majority of Rakhine State
who continued to insist on identifying their Muslim neighbours as ‘Bengali’.
The NLD attempted to placate international criticism on the treatment of the Rohingya by
the appointment of an international advisory commission in August 2016, led by former UN
Secretary General Kofi Annan (Reuters, 24 August 2016), and by October the situation in
northern Rakhine State was relatively stable, despite the ongoing incarceration of over 100,000
Rohingya in internally displaced peoples (IDP) camps. On 9 October 2016, however, coordinated armed attacks on three border posts near Maungdaw township in northern Rakhine State
killed nine Myanmar police officers and eight assailants ( The Myanmar Times, 10 October 2016).
As a result, the region again became heavily militarised with widespread allegations of Tatmadaw
abuse of the Muslim community and an exodus of 70,000 Rohingya to Bangladesh (OHCHR
2016; 2017).
On 24 August 2017 the commission delivered their final report, which included comprehensive and productive recommendations on pathways to peace in Rakhine State. The NLD
government quickly committed to implement the recommendations ‘to the fullest extent, and within the shortest timeframe possible’. In the early hours of the next morning, militants
attacked 30 police posts and an army barracks in northern Rakhine State, resulting in a brutal
military operation which the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights labelled ‘a textbook
example of ethnic cleansing’. At the time of writing over 400,000 Rohingya had fled across the
border to Bangladesh in the three weeks following the attacks. The outlook for the Rohingya
and peace in Rakhine State is now even more bleak (Simpson 2017a).
Broader concerns by ethnic minorities over the NLD as primarily a Bamar party were reinforced around the one year anniversary of the NLD government over a bridge-naming dispute
in Chaungzon, Mon State. The government insisted on naming the bridge after the Bamar
General Aung San, Aung San Suu Kyi’s father, while the Mon ethnic community were in
favour of a more locally sensitive name. By-elections for parliament were held on 1 April 2017
to replace government appointees, including for the seat surrounding the bridge, and to fill
several seats left vacant due to civil conflict in Shan State during the 2015 elections. The dispute
resulted in a 17 per cent collapse in the NLD vote in Chaungzon and they lost the seat.Similarly, in Shan State the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD) won all six previously empty seats with a negligible NLD vote registered in several electorates. The tactical
voting in ethnic areas that delivered the NLD its landslide in 2015 is unlikely to be repeated
(Simpson 2017b).
Ethnic concerns fed into broader dissatisfaction with the performance of the NLD and Aung
San Suu Kyi in their first year in office. Little progress was made on the peace process, despite
Aung San Suu Kyi expending considerable political capital in this area. Furthermore, there
were relatively few detailed plans for development with Aung San Suu Kyi continuing to promote a ‘socially conservative ideology of radical self-sufficiency and laissez-faire relations
between the state and society’ (Mary Callahan, Nikkei Asian Review, 29 March 2017), arguing
citizens should muster ‘courage’ and ‘self-confidence’ rather than rely on government action or
support; an exhortation unlikely to be received with equanimity in ethnic areas facing off
against the state’s military. The NLD was undoubtedly left a shambolic economic legacy by the
previous USDP government and the military operates independently, but the government
came to power with unprecedented goodwill and it is striking how this has metamorphosed
into an aloof sense of entitlement within the NLD.
One sector with which the NLD needs to engage further is civil society. Since the opening
of political space in Myanmar it has been apparent that civil society is not always civil, with
chauvinist ‘nationalist’ movements becoming more prominent. Nonetheless, civil society is an
essential component of any thriving democratic system and it has a pivotal role to play in
engaging community and government stakeholders. Civil society provides an outlet for
pursuing cultural goals, as well as political ones, and provides mechanisms for minorities or
groups unable, or unwilling, to enter the formal political process. There are concerns that the
NLD government does not consider civil society an active partner in the transition, since it
lacks the electoral legitimacy of the NLD. It would be a missed opportunity, and do little for
democratic development, if local activists were merely expected to follow the lead set by
elected politicians (Simpson and Smits 2018).
After decades of military rule, a free media in Myanmar will also be crucial for the development of a vibrant, inclusive and democratic society but here again the NLD’s record is mixed.
The rapid expansion of newspapers and news outlets in the country under the USDP government was welcome and there have been some moves by the NLD to continue relaxing restrictions on the media. For politicians and government officials, however, there is still a need to
embrace the scrutiny offered by journalists, even when it proves uncomfortable. The media, including its rambunctious online elements, should be considered an essential component of
democracy rather than an impediment to smooth national development. Unfortunately, journalists and political activists continued to be arrested and jailed under residual legislation, such
as section 66(d) of the 2013 Telecommunications Act, during the NLD’s first year in office
(Simpson 2017b). The ongoing difficulties and restrictions in reporting on civil conflicts, particularly in Rakhine State, demonstrate that there remain clear limits on press freedom in the
country (Brooten and Verbruggen 2017).
Free and fair elections are a key component of successful democracies and the 2015 election
was, given Myanmar’s recent history, undoubtedly a success by almost any measure. However,
Myanmar’s first-past-the-post electoral system, while delivering the NLD a useful majority, is
actually not the best system for pursuing inclusive democracy. A system of proportional representation, with preferential voting, would result in more representative and inclusive legislatures
(Dryzek and Dunleavy 2009). If Myanmar’s parliaments are seen as accurately reflecting the will
of all communities, ethnic groups are more likely to pursue their interests through democratic
means rather than armed struggle. A related factor in the potential success of Myanmar’s transition is the continuing centrality
of Myanmar’s military in the country’s political and economic life. While the NLD government
gains most of the media attention for its activities, it still only governs with the acquiescence of
the Tatmadaw. The military may have receded from the frontline of government but it remains
a powerful force that, under its own 2008 constitution, is an autonomous institution, free from
civilian control or oversight. The military clearly runs its own operations in the restive ethnic
regions. The assassination in January 2017 of Ko Ni, a key legal adviser to the NLD, at Yangon
International Airport reinforced the views of some that military subterfuge was consciously
undermining the government. That he was the NLD expert on understanding and challenging
the military-authored constitution, as well as being one of the few prominent Muslims in
political life, cast further doubt on hopes that Myanmar had entered a new more liberal and
democratic era.
While the constitution ensures that the military plays a dominant role in Myanmar’s politics,
its role in Myanmar’s economy is much less formalised, but no less significant (Ford et al. 2016;
Jones 2014). To consolidate democratic rule the NLD must also democratise economic
development; if the poor see continuing inequality and little material gain from democratic rule
they may be inclined to accept more authoritarian options in future if they come attached with
promises of economic relief. During the first year in office Aung San Suu Kyi focused almost
exclusively on the peace process at the expense of economic development; in reality, the two
goals are interdependent.
Finally, the transition inside Myanmar will inevitably be shaped by events in the wider world
as the country continues to embrace international society. External actors are increasingly present in Myanmar as major foreign powers, corporations and INGOs look for opportunities in
what is an emerging site for regional competition. Aung San Suu Kyi rightly insists that the
Myanmar government, not international actors, will decide on the country’s policies both big
and small. Nevertheless, no country is immune to the pressures of globalisation, and Myanmar
will certainly need to account for many transborder considerations.
To build a modern democratic state, political leaders in Myanmar will need to effectively
manage a daunting set of interrelated challenges. As well as establishing robust foundations for
democracy inside the country, they will be forced to balance external influences seeking leverage at a time of national vulnerability. It helps that the elected NLD government claimed a
strong popular mandate to improve the economy and increase political participation but inadequate state resourcing is likely to remain a persistent constraint. As Myanmar continues its
transition towards a more inclusive government and society it remains far too early to claim that the nascent process has been a success.
Source/publisher:
Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Myanmar via Academia
Date of entry/update:
2026-05-23
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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"After decades of mismanagement and direct military rule, Myanmar’s contested transition to a
more democratic government has rapidly shifted the outlook in this significant Southeast Asian
nation. Since 2011, the removal of Western sanctions and new foreign investments have resulted
in high rates of economic growth and an expanding middle class, albeit from a very low base. In a
result unthinkable a few years earlier, former political prisoner and Nobel laureate Aung San Suu
Kyi and her party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), formed a national government
in early 2016. However, despite significant political and economic reforms since the liberalisation
process commenced, the transition to civilian rule remains constrained by the military’s 2008
Constitution, which guarantees that it operates unfettered by civilian oversight. As a result,
although some ethnic conflicts have abated, others continue to fester and new conflicts have
erupted. With a daunting task ahead the NLD government has made some progress in removing
the vestiges of repressive military-era laws but many remain untouched and some of the practices
of the new government provide unwelcome reminders of the country’s authoritarian history.
This timely Handbook describes the political, economic, and cultural dimensions of this
crucial period of transition in Myanmar. It presents explanations for contradictory trends,
including those that defy some of the early narratives about the comprehensive transformation
of Myanmar. The Handbook also considers the impact of major environmental, strategic, and
demographic trends which help underscore that Myanmar’s development will be an ongoing
task. In addition to introductory and concluding chapters by the editors, the body of the Handbook is divided into seven core sections:• Fundamentals
• Spaces
• Cultures
• Living
• Governance
• International
• Challenges
Written by an international team of scholars, with a mix of world-leading established academics
and talented emerging researchers, the Handbook provides a rigorous scholarly overview of Myanmar’s politics, economics, and society. As Myanmar opens to Western businesses and
government agencies, this is an invaluable reference book that will provide a foundation for
further research and offer the first port of call for scholars, students, and policy makers working
on Myanmar and Asia.
Adam Simpson is Director of the Centre for Peace and Security at the Hawke Research
Institute and Senior Lecturer in International Studies at the University of South Australia. He
is also Adjunct Research Fellow at the Centre for Governance and Public Policy at Griffith
University, Australia.
Nicholas Farrelly is an Associate Dean of the College of Asia and the Pacific at the Australian
National University and Director of the ANU Myanmar Research Centre.
Ian Holliday is Vice-President and Pro-Vice-Chancellor (Teaching and Learning) at the
University of Hong Kong..."
Source/publisher:
Routledge Handbook via Academia
Date of entry/update:
2026-05-19
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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"1. We welcome the announcement of the release of more than 4,000 prisoners on
17 April 2026, in conjunction with Myanmar’s New Year.
2. In particular, we welcome the release of U Win Myint, viewing this as a positive
step towards inclusive national dialogue among all parties in Myanmar.
3. In this regard, we encourage the release of the remaining prisoners in Myanmar,
including Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, in the spirit of genuine reconciliation and
peace.
4. We also welcome the grant of amnesty to ASEAN nationals and look forward to
their safe and prompt repatriation, as well as those who remain in detention,
especially those who are victims of human trafficking and other transnational
crimes.
5. We reaffirm our commitment to assisting Myanmar, as an integral part of ASEAN,
to achieve a peaceful and durable solution to the political crisis in the country that
is Myanmar-owned and Myanmar-led. We also reaffirm our united position that
the Five-Point Consensus remains as the primary reference to address the
political crisis in Myanmar, and called for immediate cessation of violence,
especially against civilians and public facilities, and urged all parties involved to
take concrete action to immediately halt indiscriminate violence, denounce any
escalation, exercise utmost restraint, ensure the protection and safety of all
civilians and create conducive environment for the delivery of humanitarian
assistance. We reiterate the continued relevance of the role of the Special Envoy
of the ASEAN Chair on Myanmar in engaging all parties concerned in an
inclusive national dialogue..."
Source/publisher:
Association of Southeast Asian Nations
Date of entry/update:
2026-04-24
[field_licence]
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"Attacks on Health Care in Myanmar:
Insecurity Insight identified at least 1911 incidents of violence against or obstruction of health care in Myanmar since the military coup on 01 February 2021 and 30 March 2026. Over 70% of these incidents were attributed to the Myanmar Armed Forces (MAF) and Myanmar police. Health facilities were reportedly damaged or destroyed 493 times, 174 health workers were killed and 909 arrested.
Since 2024, makeshift health facilities have been damaged or destroyed by MAF aircraft, drone, and artillery strikes on 27 occasions, nearly half of which occurred in Sagaing region. Over a quarter of these 27 incidents were recorded between January and March 2026. In one incident on 30 March, a makeshift hospital in Sagaing’s Monywa district, providing care to around 50 patients, was destroyed by bombs dropped by two Myanmar military fighter jets in the afternoon. At least seven people were killed, including three patients, and 20 were injured. The facility had been operated for two years by health workers affiliated with the civil disobedience movement, with support from the exiled government.
View the incidents on our interactive map. Download the data. Updated every Monday and includes information on weapons use, perpetrators and effects. For events descriptions and data enquiries, please get in touch. Numbers may change if or when further information is made available. See here for methodology.
The publicly reported incidents below are not a complete nor a representative list of all incidents that affected the provision of health care in Myanmar between 01-14 April 2026. The incidents have not been verified through ground investigations. There is a delay in reporting incidents due to our open source verification protocol.
02 April 2026: In Nyaung Pin Thar village, Monywa township, Monywa district, Sagaing region, a makeshift hospital and at least eight houses were damaged by at least 12 bombs dropped from six Myanmar military fighter jets. The hospital buildings, including an operation theatre, and equipment were damaged. Since early 2022, the hospital has been operated by CDM-affiliated health workers and with the support of the exiled government. Sources: Democratic Voice of Burma, Khit Thit Media, Mandalay Free Press and Myaelatt Athan
As reported on 06 April 2026: At the airport in Sittwe town, township and district, Rakhine state, medicines were reportedly confiscated from air travellers by the junta police. One- or two-month supplies of medicine items for personal use were also confiscated. There has been a shortage of medicine in Sittwe since the armed clashes started in this area. Source: Western News Agency
As reported on 06 April 2026: In Tigyaing town, Tigyaing township, Katha district, Sagaing region, a traditional medicine hospital was occupied by the Myanmar military. Source: Kachin News Group
11 April 2026: In Au Mi Hta village, Bu Tho township, Hpapun district, Kayin state, two buildings of a local hospital - funded by some aid organisations - were damaged by two bombs dropped by a Myanmar military fighter jet. One of the buildings was newly built as an outpatient department. Sources: Karen Peace Support Network, Khit Thit Media, and Salween Press
12 April 2026: In Ywar Thit village, Myingyan township, Myingyan district, Mandalay region, a makeshift hospital was damaged by a drop-bomb attack by the Myanmar military, using armed drones. On the same day, the hospital building and almost all other houses in the village were torched by the Myanmar military**. Source:** Khit Thit Media..."
Source/publisher:
Insecurity Insight (Geneva) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
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2026-04-24
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"Overview
The following overview has been generated using the information available up to April 24, 2026. It provides a synthesized summary and key insights into the crisis based on the most recent data accessible at that time.
Summary
Myanmar has been in crisis since February 1, 2021, when the military (Tatmadaw) overthrew the democratically elected government. This coup sparked widespread protests and armed resistance, leading to a severe political, economic, and humanitarian crisis. The military junta, known as the State Administration Council (SAC), has responded with brutal force, resulting in thousands of civilian deaths and widespread human rights abuses.
As of December 2025, approximately 3.6 million people are internally displaced across the country—a dramatic increase from roughly 300,000 pre-2021—with displacement projected to rise toward 4 million in 2026. Intensified clashes continue in Sagaing, Magway, northern Shan, Kayah, and Mandalay, where junta forces have launched renewed ground and air offensives ahead of military-run elections starting December 28, 2025. The Arakan Army now controls all but three of Rakhine State's 17 townships, while resistance forces including the Karen National Liberation Army have consolidated influence across much of central and southeastern Myanmar. The UN's 2026 Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan, released December 10, projects over 16 million people will require humanitarian assistance.
Recovery from the March 2025 earthquake remains slow, with an estimated 3.5 million tonnes of debris and reconstruction hampered by insecurity, shortages of heavy machinery (43%) and labour (40%), and limited access. Many affected communities, particularly in Magway, Sagaing, and Mandalay, continue to live in temporary shelters, while essential services remain disrupted. Approximately 24,200 houses were damaged (24% completely destroyed), and 132 health facilities were damaged—half in Mandalay.
The Rohingya crisis continues to worsen, with the junta's blockade of Rakhine preventing international aid delivery since late 2023, leaving hundreds of thousands of IDPs with severely limited assistance. On December 10, 2025, a military airstrike destroyed Mrauk-U General Hospital, killing at least 33 people and injuring 76-80—one of the deadliest attacks on healthcare in the conflict. Chronic poverty now affects over 80% of the population, the World Bank projects GDP will contract 2.0% in FY2025/26 with inflation remaining above 20%, and market disruptions have deepened food insecurity nationwide. The 2026 HNRP appeals for approximately $890 million but reflects severely constrained funding and narrowed operational space, forcing agencies to prioritize only 2.6 million people with the most severe needs for life-saving support.
Key Insights
1. Myanmar's humanitarian crisis continues to deepen amid persistent conflict, economic collapse, and the lingering impacts of the March 2025 earthquake. An estimated 16 million people—nearly one in three citizens—are projected to require humanitarian assistance in 2026, as conflict-driven displacement, natural disasters, and funding shortages exacerbate vulnerabilities nationwide. The March 28 earthquake remains a defining event in the humanitarian landscape. Official figures confirm 3,745 deaths and over 5,000 injuries, with the Early Recovery Cluster reporting over 24,200 houses damaged (24% completely destroyed), 4,857 apartments affected, and 132 health facilities damaged. An estimated 3.5 million tonnes of debris blocks roads and markets, with clearance impeded by shortages of heavy machinery (43%) and labour (40%). Nearly three-quarters of the most affected townships continue to face critical shelter and livelihood gaps—64% of communities reported job losses and 30-31% reported damage to crops and workplaces—while disrupted water systems (44% of groundwater sources contaminated) have fueled outbreaks of cholera and dengue.
2. Conflict has escalated dramatically ahead of junta-run elections starting December 28, 2025. The military has intensified air and ground offensives, conducting 2,165 airstrikes between January and November 2025—up from 1,716 in all of 2024. On December 10, a military airstrike destroyed Mrauk-U General Hospital in Rakhine State, killing at least 33 people and injuring 76-80—prompting UN, WHO, and Amnesty International condemnation and calls for investigation as a possible war crime. Total displacement has reached approximately 3.6 million people as of late 2025, with projections indicating it could rise to 4 million in 2026. The Arakan Army now controls all but three of Rakhine's 17 townships, while resistance forces have captured extensive border areas in the southeast. Attacks on healthcare are widespread: Insecurity Insight recorded 1,815 attacks on health care between February 2021 and November 2025, with WHO verifying 67 attacks in 2025 alone. Access restrictions, including the junta's blockade of Rakhine since late 2023, continue to endanger civilians—particularly Rohingya communities facing persistent protection risks, restricted mobility, and limited access to aid.
3. Humanitarian access remains severely limited by insecurity and deliberate obstruction. The 2026 HNRP appeals for approximately $890 million but reflects severely constrained funding and narrowed operational space, prioritizing only 2.6 million people with the most severe needs at a cost of $521 million. Partners reached some 5 million people in the first nine months of 2025, but access constraints—including roadblocks, landmines, telecommunications blackouts, and the Rakhine blockade affecting 600,000 IDPs—force reliance on low-profile, community-led delivery modalities. WFP warns that hunger has reached "unacceptable" levels, with over 400,000 young children and mothers surviving on nutrient-deprived diets of plain rice or watery porridge.
4. The Food Security Cluster estimates about 8.5 million people face moderate-to-severe food insecurity in 2026, driven by conflict, displacement, rising food and fuel prices, reduced market access and supply-chain disruptions. September 2025 analyses reported "Serious" to "Critical" Global Acute Malnutrition in multiple conflict-affected townships, notably in Northern Rakhine, Kachin, Sagaing, Southern Shan, and Kayah—with nutrition and treatment services suspended or operating at minimal capacity due to access constraints. 4Economic conditions continue to deteriorate: the World Bank projects real GDP will contract 2.0% in FY2025/26, with inflation remaining above 20%. Rising poverty and fear of forced conscription have driven male migration, leaving women, girls, and older people as household heads. More than four in ten households identify lack of income as their top challenge, and 83% of internally displaced families can meet half or less of their basic needs. The convergence of conflict, disaster, and economic decline continues to erode coping capacities, pushing Myanmar further toward a protracted humanitarian emergency with no signs of de-escalation.
5. International condemnation has intensified following the December 10 airstrike on Mrauk-U Hospital. The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights called for an investigation, warning the attack could amount to a war crime. WHO's Director-General condemned the strike as among dozens of verified attacks on healthcare in 2025. Amnesty International and the Burma Human Rights Network have urged the UN Security Council to refer Myanmar to the International Criminal Court, impose an arms embargo, and authorize emergency cross-border humanitarian aid. Peace negotiations remain effectively stalled: resistance leaders and the National Unity Government publicly rejected Chinese-brokered terms for northern Shan State. The junta has cancelled voting in thousands of wards where it cannot secure control, while nationwide "silent strikes" signalled popular rejection of the military's December elections. EU and Australia have declared the vote "not credible" amid junta repression. The junta denies responsibility for civilian casualties, accusing "terrorists" of being targeted, while humanitarian organizations warn the pre-election environment is driving further escalation rather than de-escalation..."
Source/publisher:
Data Friendly Space via Reliefweb (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2026-04-24
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Education in Burma/Myanmar - general, Food Security and nutrition in Burma/Myanmar, Public Health, Human Rights and international relations
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"For Immediate Release
Today, the Network for Human Rights Documentation-Burma (ND-Burma) releases Rights-Based Reform: ASEAN Five Years on from the 5-Point Consensus. This latest briefing paper calls attention to the lack of meaningful action by ASEAN, specifically the 5-Point Consensus (5PC), which has failed in its credibility and implementation. The people of Burma reject the 5PC and have repeatedly called for its reform. ASEAN must acknowledge the reality that the junta has never intended to adhere to the 5PC. As violence continues to wage in the country, urgent action and attention by the regional bloc is long overdue.
The 5PC is based on five key pillars: a halt to the violence, inclusive dialogue, mediation through a special envoy, and unrestricted access for humanitarian aid. Five years later, civil society organizations continue to call for a response that acknowledges the people's aspirations, including by ensuring that the military junta is denied any position of power, authority, or legitimacy. The junta’s relentless violence and deliberate attacks on democratic forces undermine protections for vulnerable groups. It is also indicative of their refusal to adhere to calls to end the ongoing air and ground strikes.
The military junta has continued to escape accountability for its actions. The lack of international response has only encouraged the regime to violate the human rights of ordinary people, perpetuating the cycle of impunity. A new approach by ASEAN is urgently required. In this latest briefing paper, ND-Burma members reiterate the ongoing calls by civil society for ASEAN to sever all ties with the terrorist junta and provide protection and support to all those affected by the regime’s ongoing human rights violations and the weaponization of humanitarian aid. Additionally, the paper calls on ASEAN to pursue justice in Burma by holding the military accountable for perpetrating war crimes and crimes against humanity, and to prioritize justice and accountability under international law.
Moving forward, ASEAN needs to work with partners to increase pressure on the junta to end ongoing attacks on civilians. At the same time, it should expand humanitarian access through local civil society networks that support vulnerable groups. The 5PC must be reformed and not accepted as the sole tool for holding the junta accountable. Active efforts are essential to protect civilians, secure the release of political prisoners, and allow the free flow of life-saving humanitarian aid through cross-border channels to reach all areas without restrictions.
While ASEAN shares the concern of the people when it comes to stability, this cannot be achieved by a military regime that bombs its citizens and imprisons critics. True stability is only possible by supporting Burma’s pro-democracy movement, listening to their needs, and setting conditions that protect civilians while allowing real political participation..."
Source/publisher:
Network for Human Rights Documentation-Burma
Date of entry/update:
2026-04-24
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"Subject: Open letter from Myanmar, regional and international civil society organizations to ASEAN to End Myanmar Military’s Violence, Advance Accountability and Operationalize Cross-border Humanitarian Aid
Excellencies,
We, the undersigned 201 Myanmar, regional, and international civil society organizations (CSOs), submit the following recommendations to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to address the Myanmar military-created polycrisis and to support the diverse people of Myanmar in achieving a peaceful and sustainable future grounded in federal democracy, human rights and accountability.
The following concrete actions have become increasingly urgent, as March 2026 became the deadliest month for civilians in Myanmar since the illegal coup attempt began in February 2021. In March 2026 alone, junta violence killed 518 civilians and non-combatants.
Non-Recognition of the Junta’s Illegitimate Political Structures and entities
ASEAN must formally state that it considers null and void the junta’s immensely violent and exclusionary sham electoral process. An estimated 10.5 million voters were excluded, while another 11 million boycotted the polls. The votes cast amounted to only half of the votes in the 2020 elections, which the military sought to overturn. ASEAN must reject the legitimacy of the military-led façade government, the “parliament,” and the representatives emerging from it. In addition, ASEAN must bar junta representatives from attending all ASEAN meetings. It is not a coincidence that March 2026, the month the junta’s “parliament” convened, was the deadliest month in more than 5 years.
Support for Locally Led, Cross-Border Humanitarian Mechanisms
Urgent action is required to address the intensifying humanitarian crisis caused by the junta’s violence and its denial of humanitarian access to affected populations, which are concerns raised by the UN Human Rights Council. More than 3.7 million people are internally displaced, while acute food insecurity remains at catastrophic levels, affecting an estimated 12 million people in 2026. Since 2022, approximately 1,853 healthcare facilities have been attacked, exacerbating the humanitarian crisis. Cooperation with the junta and its agencies has only served to worsen this crisis in regional human security. We call on ASEAN to:
Ensure humanitarian access initiatives that bypass the junta and its systems,
Enable direct support to local Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) and Community-based Organizations (CBOs), and
Facilitate cross-border aid delivery in consultation with and through ethnic resistance organizations (EROs), the National Unity Government (NUG) of Myanmar, and trusted CSOs, CBOs and networks.
Immediate Measures to Halt the Flow of Aviation Fuel and Weapons
Aerial and other attacks on civilian targets have continued unceasingly. Since the February 2021 coup attempt, there were 65,978 armed clashes and attacks against civilians, which killed 17,871 civilians in 328 townships out of 330 townships in Myanmar.[1] The junta has carried out 9,794 aerial bombardments, including 7,330 airstrikes, 1,305 drone strikes, 820 paramotor attacks, and 339 gyrocopter assaults. These have resulted in 4,853 documented deaths and the destruction of over 1,200 civilian structures, including schools and religious sites, and countless homes.[2] If ASEAN is serious about reducing conflict, it needs to:
Impose restrictions on weapons and aviation fuel supply chains, as well as the logistical arrangements that deliver the supplies enabling aerial attacks,
Disrupt and/or interdict regional transit of weapons and aviation fuel that facilitate the junta’s airstrike capacity, and
Ensure that no ASEAN Member State serves as a conduit for resources used in attacks against civilians.
Support for International Accountability Mechanisms
ASEAN Member States should actively support international justice initiatives focused on Myanmar, including the exercise of universal jurisdiction in Timor-Leste and Indonesia, to address serious violations of international law and advance accountability for atrocity crimes. This is critical in halting impunity, building public trust, and halting recurrence of these crimes. ASEAN must commit to implementing the June 2025 ILO Resolution under Article 33 of the ILO Constitution to combat forced labor linked to the conflict, including forced conscription, coerced labor in military controlled areas, and labor exploitation in scam centers.
Advancement of an Inclusive, Legitimate Political Process
To build confidence and engagement in a genuinely inclusive and credible political process, we call on ASEAN to:
Ensure the ASEAN Special Envoy’s engagement and facilitation efforts are grounded in human rights, justice and accountability, as outlined by the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC),
Center democratic actors, including the NUG, SCEF, EROs, and civil society, in ASEAN’s efforts, and
Ensure that cessation of violence and atrocities, a halt to forced conscription, and the immediate and unconditional release of all political prisoners in Myanmar, are prioritized in the Special Envoy’s engagements and efforts.
Now five years after the Myanmar military’s violent and illegal and unlawful coup attempt in 2021 and the adoption of the 5PC on 24 April 2021, ASEAN’s responses remain fundamentally inadequate to address the Myanmar crisis. Ever since Min Aung Hlaing signed the 5PC in Jakarta, the military junta has demonstrated no political will whatsoever to implement the 5PC. Instead, the junta has escalated violence with complete impunity, while exploiting diplomatic engagement to try to normalize its unlawful coup attempt and manufacture political legitimacy. Absent serious enforcement, accountability, and inclusivity, the ASEAN 5PC remains a dead letter that the Myanmar military continues to ignore as it commits ongoing atrocity crimes.
We welcome the principled stance taken by ASEAN under its previous Chair, Malaysia, in rejecting the junta’s sham electoral process and expressing concern over ongoing atrocities. These efforts mark an important step towards aligning ASEAN’s response with international human rights standards.
Now that the Philippines has assumed the 2026 ASEAN Chairmanship, we call for strengthened leadership, policy continuity, and decisive action. We urge the ASEAN Chair and Special Envoy, Ma. Theresa Lazaro, to build on this precedent by formally rejecting not only the junta’s staged elections but also the illegitimate governing structures recently established in Naypyitaw. Instead, the Philippines should focus on advancing a people-centered approach towards Myanmar that is grounded in human rights, accountability, justice, and inclusivity.
Central to this approach is the unequivocal demand for the immediate and unconditional release of all political prisoners, including State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and President U Win Myint.
Excellencies,
The situation in 2026 represents a critical inflection point that directly challenges the commitments of the ASEAN to regional peace, security, and stability, as well as its legal and moral responsibility to protect the people of Myanmar as part of its commitment to people-centric ASEAN.
Following the junta’s violent, fraudulent and exclusionary sham elections, conducted between December 2025 and January 2026, it has moved to establish parliamentary structures dominated by internationally sanctioned military individuals and loyalists. This is a deliberate strategy to institutionalize military rule under the guise of “civilian governance.”
Meanwhile, Myanmar’s human security emergencies are increasingly intersecting with regional security concerns. Junta-controlled areas have become hubs for transnational criminal activities, including human trafficking and online scam operations, posing direct threats to ASEAN citizens and undermining regional stability.
We express grave concern that ASEAN’s current approach:
Risks legitimizing the illegal military junta and its attempted rebranding under post-sham election structures, including the sham parliament and institutions dominated by military-backed actors such as the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP),
Fails to halt the junta’s ongoing violence against civilians or advance accountability for atrocity crimes,
Excludes democratic actors and grassroots voices in implementation of the 5PC, and
Fails to prevent member states’ direct or indirect complicity in the junta’s continued atrocities and escalation of violence.
Ensuring the cessation of violence, as outlined in the 5PC, including the immediate and unconditional release of all political prisoners, is not only a moral imperative but a necessary precondition for any meaningful political resolution. Without this, any claims of dialogue, reconciliation, or legitimacy remain fundamentally flawed.
As ASEAN Chair, the Philippines faces a defining moment: to stand with the people of Myanmar or to perpetuate a framework that ignores their continued suffering. If ASEAN is to remain relevant, it must move towards a genuinely people-centered approach hinged on accountability to effectively address the Myanmar crisis.
ASEAN must choose—stand with the people of Myanmar—or risk complicity in the Myanmar military’s ongoing atrocity crimes.
We call on the Philippines, as ASEAN Chair, to adopt a principled, rights-based, inclusive, and accountable approach to the Myanmar crisis in support of a federal democratic future. We stand ready to support such efforts..."
Source/publisher:
201 Civil Society Organizations
Date of entry/update:
2026-04-24
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"Overview:
The following overview has been generated using the information available up to April 21, 2026. It provides a synthesized summary and key insights into the crisis based on the most recent data accessible at that time.....
Summary:
Myanmar has been in crisis since February 1, 2021, when the military (Tatmadaw) overthrew the democratically elected government. This coup sparked widespread protests and armed resistance, leading to a severe political, economic, and humanitarian crisis. The military junta, known as the State Administration Council (SAC), has responded with brutal force, resulting in thousands of civilian deaths and widespread human rights abuses.
As of December 2025, approximately 3.6 million people are internally displaced across the country—a dramatic increase from roughly 300,000 pre-2021—with displacement projected to rise toward 4 million in 2026. Intensified clashes continue in Sagaing, Magway, northern Shan, Kayah, and Mandalay, where junta forces have launched renewed ground and air offensives ahead of military-run elections starting December 28, 2025. The Arakan Army now controls all but three of Rakhine State's 17 townships, while resistance forces including the Karen National Liberation Army have consolidated influence across much of central and southeastern Myanmar. The UN's 2026 Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan, released December 10, projects over 16 million people will require humanitarian assistance.
Recovery from the March 2025 earthquake remains slow, with an estimated 3.5 million tonnes of debris and reconstruction hampered by insecurity, shortages of heavy machinery (43%) and labour (40%), and limited access. Many affected communities, particularly in Magway, Sagaing, and Mandalay, continue to live in temporary shelters, while essential services remain disrupted. Approximately 24,200 houses were damaged (24% completely destroyed), and 132 health facilities were damaged—half in Mandalay.
The Rohingya crisis continues to worsen, with the junta's blockade of Rakhine preventing international aid delivery since late 2023, leaving hundreds of thousands of IDPs with severely limited assistance. On December 10, 2025, a military airstrike destroyed Mrauk-U General Hospital, killing at least 33 people and injuring 76-80—one of the deadliest attacks on healthcare in the conflict. Chronic poverty now affects over 80% of the population, the World Bank projects GDP will contract 2.0% in FY2025/26 with inflation remaining above 20%, and market disruptions have deepened food insecurity nationwide. The 2026 HNRP appeals for approximately $890 million but reflects severely constrained funding and narrowed operational space, forcing agencies to prioritize only 2.6 million people with the most severe needs for life-saving support....
Key Insights:
1. Myanmar's humanitarian crisis continues to deepen amid persistent conflict, economic collapse, and the lingering impacts of the March 2025 earthquake. An estimated 16 million people—nearly one in three citizens—are projected to require humanitarian assistance in 2026, as conflict-driven displacement, natural disasters, and funding shortages exacerbate vulnerabilities nationwide.
The March 28 earthquake remains a defining event in the humanitarian landscape. Official figures confirm 3,745 deaths and over 5,000 injuries, with the Early Recovery Cluster reporting over 24,200 houses damaged (24% completely destroyed), 4,857 apartments affected, and 132 health facilities damaged. An estimated 3.5 million tonnes of debris blocks roads and markets, with clearance impeded by shortages of heavy machinery (43%) and labour (40%). Nearly three-quarters of the most affected townships continue to face critical shelter and livelihood gaps—64% of communities reported job losses and 30-31% reported damage to crops and workplaces—while disrupted water systems (44% of groundwater sources contaminated) have fueled outbreaks of cholera and dengue.
2. Conflict has escalated dramatically ahead of junta-run elections starting December 28, 2025. The military has intensified air and ground offensives, conducting 2,165 airstrikes between January and November 2025—up from 1,716 in all of 2024. On December 10, a military airstrike destroyed Mrauk-U General Hospital in Rakhine State, killing at least 33 people and injuring 76-80—prompting UN, WHO, and Amnesty International condemnation and calls for investigation as a possible war crime.
Total displacement has reached approximately 3.6 million people as of late 2025, with projections indicating it could rise to 4 million in 2026. The Arakan Army now controls all but three of Rakhine's 17 townships, while resistance forces have captured extensive border areas in the southeast. Attacks on healthcare are widespread: Insecurity Insight recorded 1,815 attacks on health care between February 2021 and November 2025, with WHO verifying 67 attacks in 2025 alone. Access restrictions, including the junta's blockade of Rakhine since late 2023, continue to endanger civilians—particularly Rohingya communities facing persistent protection risks, restricted mobility, and limited access to aid.
3. Humanitarian access remains severely limited by insecurity and deliberate obstruction. The 2026 HNRP appeals for approximately $890 million but reflects severely constrained funding and narrowed operational space, prioritizing only 2.6 million people with the most severe needs at a cost of $521 million. Partners reached some 5 million people in the first nine months of 2025, but access constraints—including roadblocks, landmines, telecommunications blackouts, and the Rakhine blockade affecting 600,000 IDPs—force reliance on low-profile, community-led delivery modalities. WFP warns that hunger has reached "unacceptable" levels, with over 400,000 young children and mothers surviving on nutrient-deprived diets of plain rice or watery porridge.
4. The Food Security Cluster estimates about 8.5 million people face moderate-to-severe food insecurity in 2026, driven by conflict, displacement, rising food and fuel prices, reduced market access and supply-chain disruptions. September 2025 analyses reported "Serious" to "Critical" Global Acute Malnutrition in multiple conflict-affected townships, notably in Northern Rakhine, Kachin, Sagaing, Southern Shan, and Kayah—with nutrition and treatment services suspended or operating at minimal capacity due to access constraints. Economic conditions continue to deteriorate: the World Bank projects real GDP will contract 2.0% in FY2025/26, with inflation remaining above 20%. Rising poverty and fear of forced conscription have driven male migration, leaving women, girls, and older people as household heads. More than four in ten households identify lack of income as their top challenge, and 83% of internally displaced families can meet half or less of their basic needs. The convergence of conflict, disaster, and economic decline continues to erode coping capacities, pushing Myanmar further toward a protracted humanitarian emergency with no signs of de-escalation.
5. International condemnation has intensified following the December 10 airstrike on Mrauk-U Hospital. The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights called for an investigation, warning the attack could amount to a war crime. WHO's Director-General condemned the strike as among dozens of verified attacks on healthcare in 2025. Amnesty International and the Burma Human Rights Network have urged the UN Security Council to refer Myanmar to the International Criminal Court, impose an arms embargo, and authorize emergency cross-border humanitarian aid.
Peace negotiations remain effectively stalled: resistance leaders and the National Unity Government publicly rejected Chinese-brokered terms for northern Shan State. The junta has cancelled voting in thousands of wards where it cannot secure control, while nationwide "silent strikes" signalled popular rejection of the military's December elections. EU and Australia have declared the vote "not credible" amid junta repression. The junta denies responsibility for civilian casualties, accusing "terrorists" of being targeted, while humanitarian organizations warn the pre-election environment is driving further escalation rather than de-escalation..."
Source/publisher:
Data Friendly Space via Reliefweb (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2026-04-21
[field_licence]
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Individual Documents
Category:
Education in Burma/Myanmar - general, Food Security and nutrition in Burma/Myanmar, Public Health, Human Rights and international relations
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"To: Honorable Chair and Members of the Southeast Asia National Human Rights Institution Forum (SEANF)
Honorable Chairperson Dato’ Seri Mohd Hishamudin Yunus
Human Rights Commission of Malaysia (SUHAKAM)
Honorable Chairperson Ms. Anis Hidayah
National Human Rights Commission (Komnas HAM), Indonesia
Honorable Provedor Mr. Virgilio da Silva Guterres
Provedor de Direitos Humanos e Justiça (PDHJ) , Timor-Leste
Honorable Chairperson Atty. Richard Paat Palpal-latoc
Commission on Human Rights of the Philippines (CHRP)
Honorable Chairperson Ms. Pornprapai Ganjanarintr
National Human Rights Commission of Thailand (NHRCT)
21 April 2026
[Open Letter] SEANF must remove membership of junta-controlled Myanmar National Human Rights Commission
We, the CSO Working Group on Independent National Human Rights Institution (Burma/Myanmar) (Working Group), the Asian NGO Network on National Human Rights Institutions (ANNI), and the Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development (FORUM-ASIA) respectfully urge the Southeast Asia National Human Rights Institution Forum (SEANF) to take decisive steps toward the formal removal of the Myanmar National Human Rights Commission (MNHRC) from its membership.
As SEANF convenes its first Technical Working Group Meeting under the leadership of the Human Rights Commission of Malaysia (SUHAKAM) from 20–22 April 2026, we encourage meaningful progress, including necessary amendments to the Rules of Procedure, to enable the removal of the junta-controlled MNHRC.
This action is essential to uphold SEANF’s integrity, credibility, and commitment to accountability.
MNHRC’s alignment with the military junta
Since the attempted coup in 2021, the Myanmar military junta has perpetrated widespread and systematic human rights violations against civilians. In this context, the MNHRC has failed to act independently and has instead reinforced the junta’s narratives, thereby undermining its mandate and legitimacy.
For over five years, the MNHRC has remained silent in the face of grave violations. It also openly defended the junta against criticisms.
The MNHRC’s 15 January 2026 statement criticizing SUHAKAM—following SUHAKAM’s concerns over the junta-led sham election held between 28 December 2025 and 25 January 2026—further illustrates its unwillingness to engage constructively and its continued failure to maintain independence as required under the Paris Principles, the minimum international standards expected of national human rights institutions.
Such conduct reflects a fundamental lack of independence, credibility, and meaningful engagement with regional human rights mechanisms.
Recent escalations further underscore the severity of the crisis. Reports of continued airstrikes targeting civilian areas, including attacks in Sagaing Region and Karen and Kachin States, have resulted in significant civilian casualties and destruction of homes, hospitals, schools, and places of worship. These incidents reflect a pattern of increasing atrocity crimes by the Myanmar military and reinforce the urgent need for accountability, contradicting the junta’s narratives portraying a transition to civilian governance.
Myanmar’s illegitimate junta Chief, now self-appointed president, Min Aung Hlaing, also remains subject to international accountability efforts, including proceedings before courts in Argentina and the International Criminal Court, as well as universal jurisdiction cases initiated in Timor-Leste and Indonesia.
On 10 April 2026, Min Aung Hlaing re-appointed the Commissioners of the MNHRC shortly after assuming the self-appointed presidency. The lack of independence of the MNHRC is again evident, as the Commissioners are selected by the military, reflecting continued military control over the entity and falling short of the independence and pluralism required by the Paris Principles.
This sustained non-compliance has resulted in the MNHRC’s expulsion from the Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions (GANHRI) in March 2025 and the Asia Pacific Forum of National Human Rights Institutions (APF) in May 2025.
To preserve its standing as a credible regional human rights body, SEANF must follow suit without further delay.
Safeguarding SEANF’s credibility
Continued inclusion of a dis-accredited institution risks undermining the SEANF’s collective integrity. The removal of the MNHRC, alongside full disengagement from the junta-controlled body, is essential to promoting accountability.
We recognize the ongoing efforts of SEANF members—including its Chair, SUHAKAM—in demonstrating solidarity with the people of Myanmar. We also acknowledge current initiatives to amend the Rules of Procedure to clarify membership and procedural standards, with a view to strengthening accountability and safeguarding the integrity of SEANF.
ANNI and the Working Group extend our support to these efforts and to members actively advancing accountability, while respectfully encouraging timely and concrete progress.
GANHRI’s decision sends a clear message that non-compliance with the Paris Principles cannot be tolerated. We respectfully call on SEANF to act with similar resolve. Doing so would reinforce regional commitment to human rights standards and principled institutional leadership. The removal of the MNHRC also presents an opportunity for SEANF to strengthen its institutional coherence and renew its collective efforts to advance human rights, justice, and accountability across Southeast Asia.
We further encourage SEANF to publicly announce the removal of the MNHRC’s membership and to promptly update all relevant official platforms. In parallel, all forms of engagement with the MNHRC should cease without delay. Transparency in this process will be critical to maintaining public trust.
We look forward to confirmation of the MNHRC’s formal removal from SEANF and remain ready to engage constructively in support of independent and accountable national human rights institutions in the region.
Sincerely,
CSO Working Group on Independent National Human Rights Institution (Burma/Myanmar)
Asian NGO Network on National Human Rights Institutions (ANNI)
Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development (FORUM-ASIA)
For more information, please contact:
The CSO Working Group on Independent National Human Rights Institution (Burma/Myanmar); [email protected]
ANNI Secretariat, FORUM-ASIA; [email protected]
About the Asian NGO Network on National Human Rights Institutions (ANNI)
The Asian NGO Network on National Human Rights Institutions (ANNI) was established in December 2006. It is a network of Asian non-governmental organisations and human rights defenders working on issues related to National Human Rights Institutions (NHRIs). ANNI currently has 33 member organisations from 21 countries or territories. ANNI members work on strengthening the work and functioning of Asian NHRIs to better promote and protect human rights as well as to advocate for the improved compliance of Asian NHRIs with international standards, including the Paris Principles and General Observations of the Sub-Committee on Accreditation (SCA) of the Global Alliance of NHRIs (GANHRI). The Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development (FORUM-ASIA) has served as the Secretariat of ANNI since its establishment in 2006.
More information at: https://forum-asia.org/anni/
About the CSO Working Group on Independent National Human Rights Institution (Burma/Myanmar)
The CSO Working Group on Independent National Human Rights Institution (Burma/Myanmar) advocates for the establishment of a new NHRI—tentatively named the Union Human Rights Commission—to replace the illegitimate MNHRC which has aligned itself with the illegal military junta. The Working Group was previously known as the ‘CSO Working Group on MNHRC Reform.’ Currently, it consists of 21 Myanmar civil society organizations. From its founding in 2019 until the attempted coup in February 2021, the Working Group consistently advocated for an effective MNHRC that demonstrates a commitment to the international standards set forth in the Paris Principles..."
Source/publisher:
Asian NGO Network on National Human Rights Institutions, CSO Working Group on Independent National Human Rights Institution (Burma/Myanmar)
Date of entry/update:
2026-04-21
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Human Rights Defenders, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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pdf
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"We are among the tens of thousands of Karen refugees–spanning at least three generations–who fled Burma (Myanmar) military atrocities in Kawthoolei and spent years in refugee camps across Thailand.
With respect, we are writing to express our grave concerns with regard to your upcoming trip to Nay Pyi Taw to meet with the self-appointed president whose hands are soaked in the blood of thousands of people, including children, women, youth, doctors, nurses, artists, and the elderly. We trust that you care about the stability, peace, and prosperity of people from both countries. However, we are deeply concerned that your visit will be manipulated by the junta as a sign of endorsement of their illegitimate power and their sham elections.
Although many of us have been able to resettle in safe places, it is abhorrent and incomprehensible to witness the continuing atrocities that are being inflicted upon the people of Kawthoolei and all other areas bordering Thailand, causing immense instability, disruption, and fear for communities from both sides of the country.
Especially in the last five years since the Burmese military junta staged a coup, the people of Burma are living through hell–enduring excessive use of force, indiscriminate aerial attacks targeting civilian facilities, arbitrary arrests, forced conscription, torture, economic and financial repression every single day.
Since April 2021, when leaders of ASEAN reached a five-point consensus to help resolve the Burma crisis, the very first point–the immediate cessation of violence–is still nowhere close to making any progress. The Burmese military junta is blatantly violating the commitment it made in front of all the ASEAN leaders by repeatedly launching air strikes over civilian facilities, such as schools, hospitals, and religious structures.
We note with profound distress that on the day before your trip to Nay Pyi Taw, the junta’s fighter jets dropped nine bombs on Oo Mi Hta hospital on the bank of the Salween River, across Mae Hong Son Province of Thailand. This attack followed devastating aerial attacks on Day Bu Noh and Kheh Pa Hta the week prior. We see these heinous acts as a total disregard for the goodwill of His Excellency, the Kingdom of Thailand, and the ASEAN 5PC.
As long as the Burmese military is in power in its current shape and form, none of us, including Thailand, will see any semblance of stability, prosperity, and normalcy that we all desire. Being the closest neighbor within ASEAN, Thailand knows how reckless the junta can be due to several cases of its own mortar shells falling on Thai soil and causing severe injuries to civilians and damage to civilian homes.
In light of all the above, we respectfully and urgently call upon Your Excellency to carefully reconsider your proposed visit to Nay Pyi Taw and possibly cancel the trip. Should the visit proceed, we strongly urge you to leverage Thailand’s crucial role and leadership within ASEAN to apply maximum pressure on the Burmese military junta to honor its commitments under the ASEAN 5PC–beginning with an immediate and unconditional cessation of all violence against civilians.
Thailand has endured nearly eight decades of instability–economic destruction, environmental damage, public health crisis, drug trafficking, scam centers operations, and other cross-border crimes. All of which track back to a single common source–the Burmese military. This is not only a crisis for people of Burma, but one that Thailand has shouldered alongside us for generations
It is time to break this vicious cycle–for the sake of our people, our shared region, and the generations yet to come.
We wish to draw your attention to an unfolding reality. Along our shared borders, the people of Burma are building local administrations, providing services, upholding justice, and working toward lasting stability, while the Burmese military continues to bomb and kill civilians in order to undermine our efforts, relocate scam centers, and continue mining projects that pollute Thailand. Far from aspirational, the Karen administration in Kawthoolei and the Karenni administration in Karenni State are actively functioning realities on the ground. Thailand will find far greater security, stability, and partnership working alongside these administrations than it will ever find in engagement with a military junta that has brought nothing but suffering to both our people.
We respectfully and sincerely urge you to consider this path forward.
In closing, we wish to express our enduring gratitude to the people and the government of Thailand for your remarkable kindness and generosity shown to the Karen people and the border people of Burma through decades of hardship..."
Source/publisher:
Karen Community Organizations Worldwide
Date of entry/update:
2026-04-20
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
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Format :
pdf
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2.32 MB
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Description:
"Politicians and political activists in Myanmar fear that the new quasi-civilian government of Min Aung Hlaing is stepping up its surveillance activities and conducting an intensified harassment campaign against them. At least one senior member of the National League for Democracy (NLD) was detained and questioned over the weekend, before being released without charge.
This sweeping crackdown seems to have been triggered by the recent release of political prisoners, including ousted President U Win Myint, a senior NLD member. Although the NLD is officially banned, it remains the main opposition party, and its members are still actively engaged in campaigning for the release of all political prisoners, including the party’s leader, detained democracy icon Daw Aung San Suu Kyi.
The NLD overwhelmingly won the national elections held in 2020 but was ousted from power by a military coup five years ago.
The Irrawaddy has learned that party spokesman and Central Executive Committee (CEC) member Dr. Myo Nyunt was summoned for questioning by the Ministry of Home Affairs on April 18, held overnight and released the following day. The Irrawaddy attempted to contact Dr. Myo Nyunt on Monday for confirmation, but he could not be reached.
According to an academic based in Yangon who declined to be identified, Dr. Myo Nyunt was detained because he gave interviews to the local media regarding the release of President U Win Myint.
He also led a delegation of other CEC members—as well as former President U Htin Kyaw and his family—to meet and pay respects to U Win Myint and his family, according to party sources.
U Win Myint’s residence is currently under strict surveillance, as are the homes of other CEC members. Anyone who plans to visit U Win Myint must undergo thorough checks in advance, including ID verification. Newly acquired PSMS (Passenger Screening and Security Management System) technology is also being used.
Clearly the new regime is anxious about the growth of real democracy and the possibility of public protests now that senior members of the opposition have been released, according to a former Asian diplomat who continues to follow developments there closely. “They are increasingly nervous about the impact any relaxation of restrictions may have,” said a Yangon-based businessman, on condition of anonymity.
The country’s military leaders are paranoid about the popularity and support Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and her party continue to enjoy throughout the country. They are particularly worried about potential public reaction if she is released—and the support she would attract, according to Myanmar political observers. Thousands took to the streets on the previous occasions she was released from house arrest.
According to analysts and academics who closely follow Myanmar’s political situation, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi would not accept any deal with the military—including being released—without first consulting other senior members of her party. The fact that several top senior party members got together at President U Win Myint’s home suggests something maybe in the wind, they say.
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2026-04-20
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Political prisoners and other violations in Burma - reports, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Local URL:
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Description:
"MANILA 19 April 2026 – The Philippines welcomes the full pardon and release of former President U Win Myint, held in custody since early 2021, as well as the amnesty of 4,514 prisoners, including foreign nationals, to mark Myanmar’s traditional New Year (Thingyan). This significant development is a constructive step toward fostering a more conducive environment in Myanmar for building confidence and inclusive dialogue among all stakeholders.
The Philippines reiterates the paramount importance of the release of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and all other remaining political prisoners, particularly the elderly and infirm. Such actions are vital to advancing meaningful national dialogue and supporting the full implementation of the Five-Point Consensus in Myanmar.
As Myanmar marks the New Year (Thingyan), the Philippines expresses the hope that this development will be accompanied by further gestures of goodwill and constructive engagement toward a peaceful and inclusive national dialogue under a Myanmar-owned and Myanmar-led political process. END..."
Source/publisher:
Department of Foreign Affairs Philippines
Date of entry/update:
2026-04-19
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
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pdf
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562.42 KB
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"South & South East Asia (SSEA) Route | Situation overview:
The humanitarian crisis in Myanmar remains one of the world’s most complex and protracted, marked by repeated waves of displacement and limited prospects for durable solutions. Escalating conflict and human rights violations have forced millions to flee within Myanmar and across borders. As of March 2026, 3.7 million people are internally displaced, and 1.6 million are refugees and asylum-seekers. The crisis has been worsened by disasters and extreme weather in recent years, including Cyclone Mocha (May 2023), Typhoon Yagi (September 2024), and a 7.7 magnitude earthquake (March 2025). With no sign of improvement, prospects for safe and voluntary returns, especially for 1.3 million Rohingya remain bleak.
As humanitarian resources in host countries grow increasingly strained, thousands of Myanmar refugees are undertaking dangerous journeys in search of protection, safety, family reunification, and livelihoods.
UNHCR is adopting a Route-Based Approach to improve early access to protection and solutions for refugees and asylum-seekers - ultimately reducing the need for risky onward movement. UNHCR continues to urge States across the region to strengthen coordination to save lives at sea, fully deploy rescue capacities, and ensure safe, timely disembarkation—upholding the principles of humanity, solidarity, and shared responsibility..."
Source/publisher:
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (Geneva) via Reliefweb (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2026-04-17
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
UNHCR (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees), Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
11.97 MB
more
Description:
"Overview
The following overview has been generated using the information available up to April 13, 2026. It provides a synthesized summary and key insights into the crisis based on the most recent data accessible at that time.
Summary
Myanmar has been in crisis since February 1, 2021, when the military (Tatmadaw) overthrew the democratically elected government. This coup sparked widespread protests and armed resistance, leading to a severe political, economic, and humanitarian crisis. The military junta, known as the State Administration Council (SAC), has responded with brutal force, resulting in thousands of civilian deaths and widespread human rights abuses.
As of December 2025, approximately 3.6 million people are internally displaced across the country—a dramatic increase from roughly 300,000 pre-2021—with displacement projected to rise toward 4 million in 2026. Intensified clashes continue in Sagaing, Magway, northern Shan, Kayah, and Mandalay, where junta forces have launched renewed ground and air offensives ahead of military-run elections starting December 28, 2025. The Arakan Army now controls all but three of Rakhine State's 17 townships, while resistance forces including the Karen National Liberation Army have consolidated influence across much of central and southeastern Myanmar. The UN's 2026 Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan, released December 10, projects over 16 million people will require humanitarian assistance.
Recovery from the March 2025 earthquake remains slow, with an estimated 3.5 million tonnes of debris and reconstruction hampered by insecurity, shortages of heavy machinery (43%) and labour (40%), and limited access. Many affected communities, particularly in Magway, Sagaing, and Mandalay, continue to live in temporary shelters, while essential services remain disrupted. Approximately 24,200 houses were damaged (24% completely destroyed), and 132 health facilities were damaged—half in Mandalay.
The Rohingya crisis continues to worsen, with the junta's blockade of Rakhine preventing international aid delivery since late 2023, leaving hundreds of thousands of IDPs with severely limited assistance. On December 10, 2025, a military airstrike destroyed Mrauk-U General Hospital, killing at least 33 people and injuring 76-80—one of the deadliest attacks on healthcare in the conflict. Chronic poverty now affects over 80% of the population, the World Bank projects GDP will contract 2.0% in FY2025/26 with inflation remaining above 20%, and market disruptions have deepened food insecurity nationwide. The 2026 HNRP appeals for approximately $890 million but reflects severely constrained funding and narrowed operational space, forcing agencies to prioritize only 2.6 million people with the most severe needs for life-saving support.
Key Insights
1. Myanmar's humanitarian crisis continues to deepen amid persistent conflict, economic collapse, and the lingering impacts of the March 2025 earthquake. An estimated 16 million people—nearly one in three citizens—are projected to require humanitarian assistance in 2026, as conflict-driven displacement, natural disasters, and funding shortages exacerbate vulnerabilities nationwide. The March 28 earthquake remains a defining event in the humanitarian landscape. Official figures confirm 3,745 deaths and over 5,000 injuries, with the Early Recovery Cluster reporting over 24,200 houses damaged (24% completely destroyed), 4,857 apartments affected, and 132 health facilities damaged. An estimated 3.5 million tonnes of debris blocks roads and markets, with clearance impeded by shortages of heavy machinery (43%) and labour (40%). Nearly three-quarters of the most affected townships continue to face critical shelter and livelihood gaps—64% of communities reported job losses and 30-31% reported damage to crops and workplaces—while disrupted water systems (44% of groundwater sources contaminated) have fueled outbreaks of cholera and dengue.
2. Conflict has escalated dramatically ahead of junta-run elections starting December 28, 2025. The military has intensified air and ground offensives, conducting 2,165 airstrikes between January and November 2025—up from 1,716 in all of 2024. On December 10, a military airstrike destroyed Mrauk-U General Hospital in Rakhine State, killing at least 33 people and injuring 76-80—prompting UN, WHO, and Amnesty International condemnation and calls for investigation as a possible war crime. Total displacement has reached approximately 3.6 million people as of late 2025, with projections indicating it could rise to 4 million in 2026. The Arakan Army now controls all but three of Rakhine's 17 townships, while resistance forces have captured extensive border areas in the southeast. Attacks on healthcare are widespread: Insecurity Insight recorded 1,815 attacks on health care between February 2021 and November 2025, with WHO verifying 67 attacks in 2025 alone. Access restrictions, including the junta's blockade of Rakhine since late 2023, continue to endanger civilians—particularly Rohingya communities facing persistent protection risks, restricted mobility, and limited access to aid.
3. Humanitarian access remains severely limited by insecurity and deliberate obstruction. The 2026 HNRP appeals for approximately $890 million but reflects severely constrained funding and narrowed operational space, prioritizing only 2.6 million people with the most severe needs at a cost of $521 million. Partners reached some 5 million people in the first nine months of 2025, but access constraints—including roadblocks, landmines, telecommunications blackouts, and the Rakhine blockade affecting 600,000 IDPs—force reliance on low-profile, community-led delivery modalities. WFP warns that hunger has reached "unacceptable" levels, with over 400,000 young children and mothers surviving on nutrient-deprived diets of plain rice or watery porridge.
4. The Food Security Cluster estimates about 8.5 million people face moderate-to-severe food insecurity in 2026, driven by conflict, displacement, rising food and fuel prices, reduced market access and supply-chain disruptions. September 2025 analyses reported "Serious" to "Critical" Global Acute Malnutrition in multiple conflict-affected townships, notably in Northern Rakhine, Kachin, Sagaing, Southern Shan, and Kayah—with nutrition and treatment services suspended or operating at minimal capacity due to access constraints.
Economic conditions continue to deteriorate: the World Bank projects real GDP will contract 2.0% in FY2025/26, with inflation remaining above 20%. Rising poverty and fear of forced conscription have driven male migration, leaving women, girls, and older people as household heads. More than four in ten households identify lack of income as their top challenge, and 83% of internally displaced families can meet half or less of their basic needs. The convergence of conflict, disaster, and economic decline continues to erode coping capacities, pushing Myanmar further toward a protracted humanitarian emergency with no signs of de-escalation.
5. International condemnation has intensified following the December 10 airstrike on Mrauk-U Hospital. The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights called for an investigation, warning the attack could amount to a war crime. WHO's Director-General condemned the strike as among dozens of verified attacks on healthcare in 2025. Amnesty International and the Burma Human Rights Network have urged the UN Security Council to refer Myanmar to the International Criminal Court, impose an arms embargo, and authorize emergency cross-border humanitarian aid.
Peace negotiations remain effectively stalled: resistance leaders and the National Unity Government publicly rejected Chinese-brokered terms for northern Shan State. The junta has cancelled voting in thousands of wards where it cannot secure control, while nationwide "silent strikes" signalled popular rejection of the military's December elections. EU and Australia have declared the vote "not credible" amid junta repression. The junta denies responsibility for civilian casualties, accusing "terrorists" of being targeted, while humanitarian organizations warn the pre-election environment is driving further escalation rather than de-escalation..."
Source/publisher:
Data Friendly Space via Reliefweb (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2026-04-13
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Education in Burma/Myanmar - general, Food Security and nutrition in Burma/Myanmar, Public Health, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
2.84 MB
more
Description:
"Overview
The following overview has been generated using the information available up to April 7, 2026. It provides a synthesized summary and key insights into the crisis based on the most recent data accessible at that time.
Summary
Myanmar has been in crisis since February 1, 2021, when the military (Tatmadaw) overthrew the democratically elected government. This coup sparked widespread protests and armed resistance, leading to a severe political, economic, and humanitarian crisis. The military junta, known as the State Administration Council (SAC), has responded with brutal force, resulting in thousands of civilian deaths and widespread human rights abuses.
As of December 2025, approximately 3.6 million people are internally displaced across the country—a dramatic increase from roughly 300,000 pre-2021—with displacement projected to rise toward 4 million in 2026. Intensified clashes continue in Sagaing, Magway, northern Shan, Kayah, and Mandalay, where junta forces have launched renewed ground and air offensives ahead of military-run elections starting December 28, 2025. The Arakan Army now controls all but three of Rakhine State's 17 townships, while resistance forces including the Karen National Liberation Army have consolidated influence across much of central and southeastern Myanmar. The UN's 2026 Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan, released December 10, projects over 16 million people will require humanitarian assistance.
Recovery from the March 2025 earthquake remains slow, with an estimated 3.5 million tonnes of debris and reconstruction hampered by insecurity, shortages of heavy machinery (43%) and labour (40%), and limited access. Many affected communities, particularly in Magway, Sagaing, and Mandalay, continue to live in temporary shelters, while essential services remain disrupted. Approximately 24,200 houses were damaged (24% completely destroyed), and 132 health facilities were damaged—half in Mandalay.
The Rohingya crisis continues to worsen, with the junta's blockade of Rakhine preventing international aid delivery since late 2023, leaving hundreds of thousands of IDPs with severely limited assistance. On December 10, 2025, a military airstrike destroyed Mrauk-U General Hospital, killing at least 33 people and injuring 76-80—one of the deadliest attacks on healthcare in the conflict. Chronic poverty now affects over 80% of the population, the World Bank projects GDP will contract 2.0% in FY2025/26 with inflation remaining above 20%, and market disruptions have deepened food insecurity nationwide. The 2026 HNRP appeals for approximately $890 million but reflects severely constrained funding and narrowed operational space, forcing agencies to prioritize only 2.6 million people with the most severe needs for life-saving support..."
Source/publisher:
Data Friendly Space via Reliefweb (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2026-04-07
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Education in Burma/Myanmar - general, Food Security and nutrition in Burma/Myanmar, Public Health, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
2.9 MB
Local URL:
more
Description:
"Highlights:
One year on from the devastating earthquake that hit Sagaing on 28 March 2025, an estimated 285,000 people are left without adequate access to health care, as many health partners have ceased operations in earthquake-affected areas because of funding shortages.
The highest number of conflict events recorded between 1 January 2025 and 31 March 2026 are from earthquake-affected areas in Sagaing (3,200 conflict events) and Mandalay (1,800) as per data published by the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED).
Between 28 March 2025 and 31 March 2026, a total of 232 attacks on health care were reported by Insecurity Insight, as compared to 73 verified attacks on health care recorded by WHO’s Surveillance System for Attacks on Health Care (SSA). So far in 2026, 22 verified attacks have been recorded with 19 fatalities.
Partners are reporting a dramatic surge in preventable skin infections in overcrowded temporary settlements in Ayeyarwaddy, Bago, Kayah, Kayin, Magway, Rakhine, and Tanintharyi: highlighting serious shortages in accessible treatment. Most cases are fungal infections and scabies, often complicated by secondary bacterial infections.
Shortages in essential supplies for treatment of Acute Watery Diarrhoea (AWD) are reported from Rakhine IDP camps and Magway, Sagaing, Mandalay, Chin, and Rakhine.
Jointly with WASH and Nutrition Clusters, the Health Cluster is supporting the annual updating of the AWD Readiness Action Plans at sub-national level, using the AWD Risk Index to prioritize townships for trainings and prepositioning of supplies.
Fuel shortages and higher fuel prices as a result of the Middle East Crisis are severely impacting patient referrals for life-saving emergency treatment, potentially leading to increase in preventable disability and mortality..."
Source/publisher:
Health Cluster, World Health Organization via Reliefweb (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2026-04-01
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
1.14 MB
more
Description:
"Summary
Myanmar has been in crisis since February 1, 2021, when the military (Tatmadaw) overthrew the democratically elected government. This coup sparked widespread protests and armed resistance, leading to a severe political, economic, and humanitarian crisis. The military junta, known as the State Administration Council (SAC), has responded with brutal force, resulting in thousands of civilian deaths and widespread human rights abuses.
As of December 2025, approximately 3.6 million people are internally displaced across the country—a dramatic increase from roughly 300,000 pre-2021—with displacement projected to rise toward 4 million in 2026. Intensified clashes continue in Sagaing, Magway, northern Shan, Kayah, and Mandalay, where junta forces have launched renewed ground and air offensives ahead of military-run elections starting December 28, 2025. The Arakan Army now controls all but three of Rakhine State's 17 townships, while resistance forces including the Karen National Liberation Army have consolidated influence across much of central and southeastern Myanmar. The UN's 2026 Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan, released December 10, projects over 16 million people will require humanitarian assistance.
Recovery from the March 2025 earthquake remains slow, with an estimated 3.5 million tonnes of debris and reconstruction hampered by insecurity, shortages of heavy machinery (43%) and labour (40%), and limited access. Many affected communities, particularly in Magway, Sagaing, and Mandalay, continue to live in temporary shelters, while essential services remain disrupted. Approximately 24,200 houses were damaged (24% completely destroyed), and 132 health facilities were damaged—half in Mandalay.
The Rohingya crisis continues to worsen, with the junta's blockade of Rakhine preventing international aid delivery since late 2023, leaving hundreds of thousands of IDPs with severely limited assistance. On December 10, 2025, a military airstrike destroyed Mrauk-U General Hospital, killing at least 33 people and injuring 76-80—one of the deadliest attacks on healthcare in the conflict. Chronic poverty now affects over 80% of the population, the World Bank projects GDP will contract 2.0% in FY2025/26 with inflation remaining above 20%, and market disruptions have deepened food insecurity nationwide. The 2026 HNRP appeals for approximately $890 million but reflects severely constrained funding and narrowed operational space, forcing agencies to prioritize only 2.6 million people with the most severe needs for life-saving support.
Key Insights
1. Myanmar's humanitarian crisis continues to deepen amid persistent conflict, economic collapse, and the lingering impacts of the March 2025 earthquake. An estimated 16 million people—nearly one in three citizens—are projected to require humanitarian assistance in 2026, as conflict-driven displacement, natural disasters, and funding shortages exacerbate vulnerabilities nationwide.
The March 28 earthquake remains a defining event in the humanitarian landscape. Official figures confirm 3,745 deaths and over 5,000 injuries, with the Early Recovery Cluster reporting over 24,200 houses damaged (24% completely destroyed), 4,857 apartments affected, and 132 health facilities damaged. An estimated 3.5 million tonnes of debris blocks roads and markets, with clearance impeded by shortages of heavy machinery (43%) and labour (40%). Nearly three-quarters of the most affected townships continue to face critical shelter and livelihood gaps—64% of communities reported job losses and 30-31% reported damage to crops and workplaces—while disrupted water systems (44% of groundwater sources contaminated) have fueled outbreaks of cholera and dengue.
2. Conflict has escalated dramatically ahead of junta-run elections starting December 28, 2025. The military has intensified air and ground offensives, conducting 2,165 airstrikes between January and November 2025—up from 1,716 in all of 2024. On December 10, a military airstrike destroyed Mrauk-U General Hospital in Rakhine State, killing at least 33 people and injuring 76-80—prompting UN, WHO, and Amnesty International condemnation and calls for investigation as a possible war crime.
Total displacement has reached approximately 3.6 million people as of late 2025, with projections indicating it could rise to 4 million in 2026. The Arakan Army now controls all but three of Rakhine's 17 townships, while resistance forces have captured extensive border areas in the southeast. Attacks on healthcare are widespread: Insecurity Insight recorded 1,815 attacks on health care between February 2021 and November 2025, with WHO verifying 67 attacks in 2025 alone. Access restrictions, including the junta's blockade of Rakhine since late 2023, continue to endanger civilians—particularly Rohingya communities facing persistent protection risks, restricted mobility, and limited access to aid.
3. Humanitarian access remains severely limited by insecurity and deliberate obstruction. The 2026 HNRP appeals for approximately $890 million but reflects severely constrained funding and narrowed operational space, prioritizing only 2.6 million people with the most severe needs at a cost of $521 million. Partners reached some 5 million people in the first nine months of 2025, but access constraints—including roadblocks, landmines, telecommunications blackouts, and the Rakhine blockade affecting 600,000 IDPs—force reliance on low-profile, community-led delivery modalities. WFP warns that hunger has reached "unacceptable" levels, with over 400,000 young children and mothers surviving on nutrient-deprived diets of plain rice or watery porridge.
4. The Food Security Cluster estimates about 8.5 million people face moderate-to-severe food insecurity in 2026, driven by conflict, displacement, rising food and fuel prices, reduced market access and supply-chain disruptions. September 2025 analyses reported "Serious" to "Critical" Global Acute Malnutrition in multiple conflict-affected townships, notably in Northern Rakhine, Kachin, Sagaing, Southern Shan, and Kayah—with nutrition and treatment services suspended or operating at minimal capacity due to access constraints..."
Source/publisher:
Data Friendly Space via Reliefweb (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2026-03-24
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Education in Burma/Myanmar - general, Food Security and nutrition in Burma/Myanmar, Public Health, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Format :
pdf (35 pages)
Size:
2.2 MB
more
Description:
"Summary:
Myanmar has been in crisis since February 1, 2021, when the military (Tatmadaw) overthrew the democratically elected government. This coup sparked widespread protests and armed resistance, leading to a severe political, economic, and humanitarian crisis. The military junta, known as the State Administration Council (SAC), has responded with brutal force, resulting in thousands of civilian deaths and widespread human rights abuses.
As of December 2025, approximately 3.6 million people are internally displaced across the country—a dramatic increase from roughly 300,000 pre-2021—with displacement projected to rise toward 4 million in 2026. Intensified clashes continue in Sagaing, Magway, northern Shan, Kayah, and Mandalay, where junta forces have launched renewed ground and air offensives ahead of military-run elections starting December 28, 2025. The Arakan Army now controls all but three of Rakhine State's 17 townships, while resistance forces including the Karen National Liberation Army have consolidated influence across much of central and southeastern Myanmar. The UN's 2026 Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan, released December 10, projects over 16 million people will require humanitarian assistance.
Recovery from the March 2025 earthquake remains slow, with an estimated 3.5 million tonnes of debris and reconstruction hampered by insecurity, shortages of heavy machinery (43%) and labour (40%), and limited access. Many affected communities, particularly in Magway, Sagaing, and Mandalay, continue to live in temporary shelters, while essential services remain disrupted. Approximately 24,200 houses were damaged (24% completely destroyed), and 132 health facilities were damaged—half in Mandalay.
The Rohingya crisis continues to worsen, with the junta's blockade of Rakhine preventing international aid delivery since late 2023, leaving hundreds of thousands of IDPs with severely limited assistance. On December 10, 2025, a military airstrike destroyed Mrauk-U General Hospital, killing at least 33 people and injuring 76-80—one of the deadliest attacks on healthcare in the conflict. Chronic poverty now affects over 80% of the population, the World Bank projects GDP will contract 2.0% in FY2025/26 with inflation remaining above 20%, and market disruptions have deepened food insecurity nationwide. The 2026 HNRP appeals for approximately $890 million but reflects severely constrained funding and narrowed operational space, forcing agencies to prioritize only 2.6 million people with the most severe needs for life-saving support.
Key Insights
1. Myanmar's humanitarian crisis continues to deepen amid persistent conflict, economic collapse, and the lingering impacts of the March 2025 earthquake. An estimated 16 million people—nearly one in three citizens—are projected to require humanitarian assistance in 2026, as conflict-driven displacement, natural disasters, and funding shortages exacerbate vulnerabilities nationwide.
The March 28 earthquake remains a defining event in the humanitarian landscape. Official figures confirm 3,745 deaths and over 5,000 injuries, with the Early Recovery Cluster reporting over 24,200 houses damaged (24% completely destroyed), 4,857 apartments affected, and 132 health facilities damaged. An estimated 3.5 million tonnes of debris blocks roads and markets, with clearance impeded by shortages of heavy machinery (43%) and labour (40%). Nearly three-quarters of the most affected townships continue to face critical shelter and livelihood gaps—64% of communities reported job losses and 30-31% reported damage to crops and workplaces—while disrupted water systems (44% of groundwater sources contaminated) have fueled outbreaks of cholera and dengue.
2. Conflict has escalated dramatically ahead of junta-run elections starting December 28, 2025. The military has intensified air and ground offensives, conducting 2,165 airstrikes between January and November 2025—up from 1,716 in all of 2024. On December 10, a military airstrike destroyed Mrauk-U General Hospital in Rakhine State, killing at least 33 people and injuring 76-80—prompting UN, WHO, and Amnesty International condemnation and calls for investigation as a possible war crime.
Total displacement has reached approximately 3.6 million people as of late 2025, with projections indicating it could rise to 4 million in 2026. The Arakan Army now controls all but three of Rakhine's 17 townships, while resistance forces have captured extensive border areas in the southeast. Attacks on healthcare are widespread: Insecurity Insight recorded 1,815 attacks on health care between February 2021 and November 2025, with WHO verifying 67 attacks in 2025 alone. Access restrictions, including the junta's blockade of Rakhine since late 2023, continue to endanger civilians—particularly Rohingya communities facing persistent protection risks, restricted mobility, and limited access to aid.
3. Humanitarian access remains severely limited by insecurity and deliberate obstruction. The 2026 HNRP appeals for approximately $890 million but reflects severely constrained funding and narrowed operational space, prioritizing only 2.6 million people with the most severe needs at a cost of $521 million. Partners reached some 5 million people in the first nine months of 2025, but access constraints—including roadblocks, landmines, telecommunications blackouts, and the Rakhine blockade affecting 600,000 IDPs—force reliance on low-profile, community-led delivery modalities. WFP warns that hunger has reached "unacceptable" levels, with over 400,000 young children and mothers surviving on nutrient-deprived diets of plain rice or watery porridge.
4. The Food Security Cluster estimates about 8.5 million people face moderate-to-severe food insecurity in 2026, driven by conflict, displacement, rising food and fuel prices, reduced market access and supply-chain disruptions. September 2025 analyses reported "Serious" to "Critical" Global Acute Malnutrition in multiple conflict-affected townships, notably in Northern Rakhine, Kachin, Sagaing, Southern Shan, and Kayah—with nutrition and treatment services suspended or operating at minimal capacity due to access constraints..."
Source/publisher:
Data Friendly Space via Reliefweb (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2026-03-24
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Education in Burma/Myanmar - general, Food Security and nutrition in Burma/Myanmar, Public Health, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
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2.34 MB
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Description:
"Summary
Myanmar has been in crisis since February 1, 2021, when the military (Tatmadaw) overthrew the democratically elected government. This coup sparked widespread protests and armed resistance, leading to a severe political, economic, and humanitarian crisis. The military junta, known as the State Administration Council (SAC), has responded with brutal force, resulting in thousands of civilian deaths and widespread human rights abuses.
As of December 2025, approximately 3.6 million people are internally displaced across the country—a dramatic increase from roughly 300,000 pre-2021—with displacement projected to rise toward 4 million in 2026. Intensified clashes continue in Sagaing, Magway, northern Shan, Kayah, and Mandalay, where junta forces have launched renewed ground and air offensives ahead of military-run elections starting December 28, 2025. The Arakan Army now controls all but three of Rakhine State's 17 townships, while resistance forces including the Karen National Liberation Army have consolidated influence across much of central and southeastern Myanmar. The UN's 2026 Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan, released December 10, projects over 16 million people will require humanitarian assistance.
Recovery from the March 2025 earthquake remains slow, with an estimated 3.5 million tonnes of debris and reconstruction hampered by insecurity, shortages of heavy machinery (43%) and labour (40%), and limited access. Many affected communities, particularly in Magway, Sagaing, and Mandalay, continue to live in temporary shelters, while essential services remain disrupted. Approximately 24,200 houses were damaged (24% completely destroyed), and 132 health facilities were damaged—half in Mandalay.
The Rohingya crisis continues to worsen, with the junta's blockade of Rakhine preventing international aid delivery since late 2023, leaving hundreds of thousands of IDPs with severely limited assistance. On December 10, 2025, a military airstrike destroyed Mrauk-U General Hospital, killing at least 33 people and injuring 76-80—one of the deadliest attacks on healthcare in the conflict. Chronic poverty now affects over 80% of the population, the World Bank projects GDP will contract 2.0% in FY2025/26 with inflation remaining above 20%, and market disruptions have deepened food insecurity nationwide. The 2026 HNRP appeals for approximately $890 million but reflects severely constrained funding and narrowed operational space, forcing agencies to prioritize only 2.6 million people with the most severe needs for life-saving support.
Key Insights
1. Myanmar's humanitarian crisis continues to deepen amid persistent conflict, economic collapse, and the lingering impacts of the March 2025 earthquake. An estimated 16 million people—nearly one in three citizens—are projected to require humanitarian assistance in 2026, as conflict-driven displacement, natural disasters, and funding shortages exacerbate vulnerabilities nationwide.
The March 28 earthquake remains a defining event in the humanitarian landscape. Official figures confirm 3,745 deaths and over 5,000 injuries, with the Early Recovery Cluster reporting over 24,200 houses damaged (24% completely destroyed), 4,857 apartments affected, and 132 health facilities damaged. An estimated 3.5 million tonnes of debris blocks roads and markets, with clearance impeded by shortages of heavy machinery (43%) and labour (40%). Nearly three-quarters of the most affected townships continue to face critical shelter and livelihood gaps—64% of communities reported job losses and 30-31% reported damage to crops and workplaces—while disrupted water systems (44% of groundwater sources contaminated) have fueled outbreaks of cholera and dengue.
2. Conflict has escalated dramatically ahead of junta-run elections starting December 28, 2025. The military has intensified air and ground offensives, conducting 2,165 airstrikes between January and November 2025—up from 1,716 in all of 2024. On December 10, a military airstrike destroyed Mrauk-U General Hospital in Rakhine State, killing at least 33 people and injuring 76-80—prompting UN, WHO, and Amnesty International condemnation and calls for investigation as a possible war crime. Total displacement has reached approximately 3.6 million people as of late 2025, with projections indicating it could rise to 4 million in 2026. The Arakan Army now controls all but three of Rakhine's 17 townships, while resistance forces have captured extensive border areas in the southeast. Attacks on healthcare are widespread: Insecurity Insight recorded 1,815 attacks on health care between February 2021 and November 2025, with WHO verifying 67 attacks in 2025 alone. Access restrictions, including the junta's blockade of Rakhine since late 2023, continue to endanger civilians—particularly Rohingya communities facing persistent protection risks, restricted mobility, and limited access to aid.
3. Humanitarian access remains severely limited by insecurity and deliberate obstruction. The 2026 HNRP appeals for approximately $890 million but reflects severely constrained funding and narrowed operational space, prioritizing only 2.6 million people with the most severe needs at a cost of $521 million. Partners reached some 5 million people in the first nine months of 2025, but access constraints—including roadblocks, landmines, telecommunications blackouts, and the Rakhine blockade affecting 600,000 IDPs—force reliance on low-profile, community-led delivery modalities. WFP warns that hunger has reached "unacceptable" levels, with over 400,000 young children and mothers surviving on nutrient-deprived diets of plain rice or watery porridge.
4. The Food Security Cluster estimates about 8.5 million people face moderate-to-severe food insecurity in 2026, driven by conflict, displacement, rising food and fuel prices, reduced market access and supply-chain disruptions. September 2025 analyses reported "Serious" to "Critical" Global Acute Malnutrition in multiple conflict-affected townships, notably in Northern Rakhine, Kachin, Sagaing, Southern Shan, and Kayah—with nutrition and treatment services suspended or operating at minimal capacity due to access constraints..."
Source/publisher:
Data Friendly Space via Reliefweb (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2026-03-24
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Education in Burma/Myanmar - general, Food Security and nutrition in Burma/Myanmar, Public Health, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Format :
pdf (63 pages)
Size:
3.2 MB
more
Description:
"Summary:
Myanmar has been in crisis since February 1, 2021, when the military (Tatmadaw) overthrew the democratically elected government. This coup sparked widespread protests and armed resistance, leading to a severe political, economic, and humanitarian crisis. The military junta, known as the State Administration Council (SAC), has responded with brutal force, resulting in thousands of civilian deaths and widespread human rights abuses.
As of December 2025, approximately 3.6 million people are internally displaced across the country—a dramatic increase from roughly 300,000 pre-2021—with displacement projected to rise toward 4 million in 2026. Intensified clashes continue in Sagaing, Magway, northern Shan, Kayah, and Mandalay, where junta forces have launched renewed ground and air offensives ahead of military-run elections starting December 28, 2025. The Arakan Army now controls all but three of Rakhine State's 17 townships, while resistance forces including the Karen National Liberation Army have consolidated influence across much of central and southeastern Myanmar. The UN's 2026 Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan, released December 10, projects over 16 million people will require humanitarian assistance.
Recovery from the March 2025 earthquake remains slow, with an estimated 3.5 million tonnes of debris and reconstruction hampered by insecurity, shortages of heavy machinery (43%) and labour (40%), and limited access. Many affected communities, particularly in Magway, Sagaing, and Mandalay, continue to live in temporary shelters, while essential services remain disrupted. Approximately 24,200 houses were damaged (24% completely destroyed), and 132 health facilities were damaged—half in Mandalay.
The Rohingya crisis continues to worsen, with the junta's blockade of Rakhine preventing international aid delivery since late 2023, leaving hundreds of thousands of IDPs with severely limited assistance. On December 10, 2025, a military airstrike destroyed Mrauk-U General Hospital, killing at least 33 people and injuring 76-80—one of the deadliest attacks on healthcare in the conflict. Chronic poverty now affects over 80% of the population, the World Bank projects GDP will contract 2.0% in FY2025/26 with inflation remaining above 20%, and market disruptions have deepened food insecurity nationwide. The 2026 HNRP appeals for approximately $890 million but reflects severely constrained funding and narrowed operational space, forcing agencies to prioritize only 2.6 million people with the most severe needs for life-saving support..."
Source/publisher:
Data Friendly Space via Reliefweb (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2026-03-23
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Education in Burma/Myanmar - general, Food Security and nutrition in Burma/Myanmar, Public Health, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Format :
pdf (3၀ pages)
Size:
1.99 MB
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Description:
"Summary
Myanmar has been in crisis since February 1, 2021, when the military (Tatmadaw) overthrew the democratically elected government. This coup sparked widespread protests and armed resistance, leading to a severe political, economic, and humanitarian crisis. The military junta, known as the State Administration Council (SAC), has responded with brutal force, resulting in thousands of civilian deaths and widespread human rights abuses.
As of December 2025, approximately 3.6 million people are internally displaced across the country—a dramatic increase from roughly 300,000 pre-2021—with displacement projected to rise toward 4 million in 2026. Intensified clashes continue in Sagaing, Magway, northern Shan, Kayah, and Mandalay, where junta forces have launched renewed ground and air offensives ahead of military-run elections starting December 28, 2025. The Arakan Army now controls all but three of Rakhine State's 17 townships, while resistance forces including the Karen National Liberation Army have consolidated influence across much of central and southeastern Myanmar. The UN's 2026 Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan, released December 10, projects over 16 million people will require humanitarian assistance.
Recovery from the March 2025 earthquake remains slow, with an estimated 3.5 million tonnes of debris and reconstruction hampered by insecurity, shortages of heavy machinery (43%) and labour (40%), and limited access. Many affected communities, particularly in Magway, Sagaing, and Mandalay, continue to live in temporary shelters, while essential services remain disrupted. Approximately 24,200 houses were damaged (24% completely destroyed), and 132 health facilities were damaged—half in Mandalay.
The Rohingya crisis continues to worsen, with the junta's blockade of Rakhine preventing international aid delivery since late 2023, leaving hundreds of thousands of IDPs with severely limited assistance. On December 10, 2025, a military airstrike destroyed Mrauk-U General Hospital, killing at least 33 people and injuring 76-80—one of the deadliest attacks on healthcare in the conflict. Chronic poverty now affects over 80% of the population, the World Bank projects GDP will contract 2.0% in FY2025/26 with inflation remaining above 20%, and market disruptions have deepened food insecurity nationwide. The 2026 HNRP appeals for approximately $890 million but reflects severely constrained funding and narrowed operational space, forcing agencies to prioritize only 2.6 million people with the most severe needs for life-saving support..."
Source/publisher:
Data Friendly Space via Reliefweb (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2026-03-23
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Education in Burma/Myanmar - general, Food Security and nutrition in Burma/Myanmar, Public Health, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Format :
pdf (35 pages)
Size:
2.24 MB
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Description:
"Summary / Description:
This evidence brief highlights the critical role of women-led organisations and women’s rights organisations in sustaining humanitarian access across Myanmar’s complex crisis environment. Developed through the Myanmar Gender in Humanitarian Action Working Group, the brief draws on focus group discussions with 18 women-led and women’s rights organisations delivering humanitarian assistance across the country.
The analysis provides field-based insights into the access constraints these organisations face, the adaptive strategies they use to reach communities, and persistent gaps between global localisation commitments and the realities experienced by local actors.
About the Myanmar Gender in Humanitarian Action Working Group
The Myanmar Gender in Humanitarian Action (GiHA) Working Group promotes gender-responsive humanitarian action in Myanmar. It brings together women-led organisations, NGOs, UN agencies and other partners and is co-led by UN Women and UNFPA..."
Source/publisher:
Asia Pacific Gender in Humanitarian Action Working Group, UN Women via Reliefweb (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2026-03-19
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
UN Women, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
664.99 KB
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Description:
"MYANMAR:
Ongoing conflict is continuing to impact communities in Myanmar with airstrikes and military operations across several regions resulting in civilian casualties, displacement, and damage to key civilian infrastructure. In eastern Bago Region, large-scale military operations since early March reportedly resulted in the death of more than 30 civilians and displaced thousands of people from villages in Nyaunglebin Township. In northwestern Myanmar, aerial attacks in Mandalay, Sagaing, and Magway between 3 and 5 March reportedly killed at least 11 civilians, including a drone strike on a monastery sheltering displaced people in Myingyan Township and paramotor attacks in Pale Township. In southeastern Myanmar, aerial attacks across southeastern Myanmar between 9 and 11 March reportedly killed at least 19 civilians, including children, and injured an estimated 30 people in Bago, Kayin, Kayah and Tanintharyi, while homes and religious buildings were damaged..."
Source/publisher:
UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (New York) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2026-03-19
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Agriculture in Burma/Myanmar: general and research, Food Security and nutrition in Burma/Myanmar, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
2.97 MB
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Description:
"Summary / Description
This Gender Analysis Snapshot highlights key gender findings and priority actions emerging from a Rapid Gender Analysis conducted by a local member organisation of the Myanmar Gender in Humanitarian Action (GiHA) Working Group. The analysis draws on participatory research with more than 300 respondents across several townships in Central Rakhine State, including focus group discussions, key informant interviews and community mapping exercises.
The snapshot provides insights into gender roles, vulnerabilities and protection risks affecting women, men, girls, boys and LGBTIQ+ persons in conflict-affected communities. It highlights how restrictive gender norms, movement constraints and deteriorating economic conditions are shaping access to resources, livelihoods and decision-making.
Designed as a practical reference for humanitarian actors, the snapshot translates locally generated evidence into key gender insights and priority actions to support more inclusive and gender-responsive humanitarian programming in Myanmar.
About the Myanmar Gender in Humanitarian Action Working Group
The Myanmar Gender in Humanitarian Action (GiHA) Working Group promotes gender-responsive humanitarian action in Myanmar. It brings together women-led organisations, NGOs, UN agencies and other partners and is co-led by UN Women and UNFPA..."
Source/publisher:
Asia Pacific Gender in Humanitarian Action Working Group, UN Women via Reliefweb (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2026-03-19
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
UN Women, Human Rights and international relations, Arakan (Rakhine) State - reports etc. by date (latest first)
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
269.6 KB
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Description:
Themes:
Protection and Human Rights,Shelter and Non-Food Items..."
Source/publisher:
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (Geneva)
Date of entry/update:
2026-03-19
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
UNHCR (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees), Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
1.45 MB
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Description:
"Throughout February, the delivery of essential humanitarian services intended for
approximately 90,000 crisis-affected people was constrained by 91 access-related
incidents reported across 12 states and regions in Myanmar. The total number of
incidents increased by seven per cent compared to the 2025 average, with the
largest number of access constraints reported from Rakhine at 31 per cent,
followed by Chin at 26 per cent, and Kachin and Mandalay at eight per cent each.
Ongoing armed hostilities continued to be the most prevalent factor of access
constraints, resulting in delays to planned humanitarian activities in nine states
and regions, including Chin, Rakhine, Kachin, Tanintharyi and Kayah, which
collectively accounted for 83 per cent of all reported incidents. In Sagaing, on three
different occasions, some local organizations had to relocate their volunteers to
safer locations temporarily following heavy clashes between the Myanmar Armed
Forces (MAF) and non-state armed groups (NSAGs), forcing them to postpone
their activities for more than seven days. In Magway, a number of medical kits
stored by a humanitarian organisation were destroyed during armed clashes.
Unexpected roadblocks by armed actors in several townships in Rakhine, Magway
and Tanintharyi disrupted scheduled aid deliveries for up to five days. Airstrikes
and heavy-weapon attacks accounted for 28 per cent of the total constraints,
further heightening risks for aid workers in Chin, Kachin and Rakhine, resulting in
delays or temporary suspension of activities, including the provision of essential
protection, health and WASH services.
Administrative and bureaucratic impediments accounted for 10 per cent of the
total reported incidents and affected humanitarian activities in six states and
regions, with Rakhine and Northern and Southern Shan particularly impacted. In
four different incidents reported from Rakhine, Magway and Kayin, humanitarian
organisations had to postpone planned deliveries, including the distribution of
food and WASH materials, due to delays in obtaining Travel Authorization from the
state administration. Humanitarian organisations continued to face increased
scrutiny and prolonged delays at checkpoints manned by parties to the conflict in
Kachin, Rakhine, and Northern and Southern Shan, significantly delaying relief
operations. In Kachin, due to local-level restrictions on gathering large numbers of
people in certain locations, an international organization had to wait for more than
two weeks to resume activities. While access to IDP camps in Sittwe Township
remains restricted for partners due to the lack of renewed MoUs, there was a
welcome development as a number of UN agencies received approval to access
the camps. The joint TA facilitated by OCHA has also been approved.
Violence and threats against humanitarian personnel continued, with two such
incidents reported in Kachin and Rakhine. In one incident, staff from an
international organization returning from a field mission was compelled by a
non-state armed actor to give a lift to a person. In six different incidents,
humanitarian organisations were forced to suspend their activities for more than
two weeks due to ongoing recruitment campaigns, mainly in Mandalay and Bago
regions. In one such incident, a local aid worker in Bago was recruited by the MAF
and remained in their custody as of the end of February..."
Source/publisher:
UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (New York) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2026-03-18
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
612.32 KB
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Description:
"Human Rights Council
Sixty-first session
23 February–2 April 2026
Agenda item 4
Human rights situations that require the Council's attention.....
Summary:
Five years after launching a military coup against a democratically elected government, the Myanmar military junta continues to relentlessly attack civilians and obstruct humanitarian aid, driving Myanmar into a spiraling humanitarian crisis. Thousands of political prisoners remain behind bars. The situation of the Rohingya people has become more perilous than ever.
The military junta’s efforts to assert its authority across Myanmar and wrestle its people into submission are failing. It has lost control of vast swathes of territory and is more reviled than ever. Violence and chaos have reverberated across Myanmar’s borders, with armed conflict, cyberscam operations, drug trafficking and refugee flows impacting its neighbors’ sovereignty and citizens.
In a sign that international pressure is impacting the junta, coup leader Senior General Min Aung Hlaing orchestrated a sham election in an apparent attempt to hide military oppression behind the trappings of a nominally civilian government. The spectacle fooled no one, least of all the people of Myanmar, who continue to demand respect for human rights and the establishment of a federal, democratic system of government free from military control.
The international community’s response to the situation in Myanmar has shown promise, impeding the junta’s ability to secure the weapons and financing that it needs to sustain itself and its military assaults on civilians. Alarmingly, however, the resolve of many governments to support the people of Myanmar appears to be waning. Sanctions regimes- which have played an important role in isolating the junta and weakening its capacity to attack civilians - have not been kept up to date. Global cuts to foreign aid are devastating humanitarian programs for refugees and vulnerable populations. The Security Council continues to be unwilling to act, and there is a lack of political will to ensure accountability for grave human rights violations.
In this, his final report to the Human Rights Council, the Special Rapporteur urges governments that value human rights to double down on effective measures that have been taken to support the people of Myanmar and deny the junta the three things that it needs to sustain itself: money, weapons and legitimacy. Just as most governments refused to recognize a sham election as legitimate, he urges that they similarly refuse to recognize the government that will emerge as legitimate. Finally, he reiterates his call for concerted, coordinated action by the international community including reversing funding cuts that undermine humanitarian aid and human rights..."
Source/publisher:
UN Human Rights Council (Geneva)
Date of entry/update:
2026-03-16
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Statements and reports by the Special Rapporteur on Myanmar and the High Commissioner for Human Rights to regular sessions of the Human Rights Council, UN Human Rights pages on Myanmar, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Format :
pdf (17 pages)
Size:
453.49 KB
Local URL:
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Description:
"Insecurity Insight identified at least 1873 incidents of violence against or obstruction of health care in Myanmar since the military coup on 01 February 2021 and 31 January 2026. Health facilities were reportedly damaged or destroyed 472 times and used for non-medical purposes 228 times. At least 170 health workers were killed and 909 arrested. 70% of these incidents were attributed to the Myanmar Armed Forces (MAF).
At least 909 health workers were reportedly arrested or detained in 368 incidents across 17 regions and states during the reporting period. In the first year of the military coup, health workers were mostly arrested on allegations of Civil Disobedience Movement-affiliation, because of the care they provided to injured local defense forces (LDF) or their leadership roles as caregivers in communities, including rural communities and clandestine networks opposed to the military government. Over time, the reasons for arrests shifted from security forces’ arresting health workers treating injured protesters to arresting them for allegedly assisting or being affiliated with LDFs or for political activism on social media.
Documented incidents
18 February-03 March 2026
The publicly reported incidents below are not a complete nor a representative list of all incidents that affected the provision of health care between 18 February-03 March 2026. The incidents below have not been verified through ground investigations. There is a delay in reporting incidents due to our open source verification protocol.
18 February 2026: In Ywar Kone Gyi village, Yae Shin village tract, Kyunhla township, Kanbalu district, Sagaing region, a station hospital, a public high school, and at least seven houses were damaged by bombs dropped from a Myanmar military fighter jet. Sources: Democratic Voice of Burma, Khit Thit Media, and Red Peacock
18 February 2026: Near Pe Gyi Khin village, Ma Gyi Kone village tract, Natogyi township, Myingyan district, Mandalay region, a 100-bedded underground hospital was destroyed in a targeted explosion by the Myanmar military who had planted explosives in the facility. The facility was built with the support of the government in exile and started functioning in late 2024. Sources: Mandalay Free Press, Mizzima, and Surbung Time
19 February 2026: In Tha Yet Cho village and village tract, Ramree township, Kyaukpyu district, Rakhine state, a station hospital, a market, and a police station were damaged by bombs dropped from two Myanmar military fighter jets. At least two adults were killed. Sources: Arakan Bay News and Western News
20 February 2026: In Kone Yoe village and village tract, Taze township, Ye-U district, Sagaing region, a sub-rural health centre was damaged by three bombs dropped by three Myanmar military gyrocopters. The clinic was not functioning at the time of the attack. Sources: Khit Thit Media, Mandalay Free Press, and Taze News
22 February 2026: In Hnit Kayin village and village tract, Ye township, Ye district, Tanintharyi region, a medical LNGO leader was arrested by the Myanmar military and sent to a local command centre in Ye town for interrogation. He was accused of having connections with the PDF. Sources: Independent Mon News Agency and Myanmar Pressphoto Agency
As reported on 25 February 2026: Along the highway connecting Khin-U town and Shwebo town, Shwebo district, Sagaing region, private pharmacies, houses, and rice mills were torched by the Myanmar military. Source: Myanmar Pressphoto Agency
As reported on 25 February 2026: In Mogoke town and township, Thabeikkyin district, Mandalay region, a township hospital and public schools were used as temporary offices for the Immigration Department. Source: Mandalay Free Press
As reported on 27 February 2026: In Banmat village (New), Mawkmai township, Langkho district, Shan state (South), a local clinic, houses, and the administrative offices of the Pa-O National Liberation Army; and the houses in three neighbouring villages were torched by an allied group of the Myanmar military and Pa-O National Army. Sources: Maun and Mekong News..."
Source/publisher:
Insecurity Insight (Geneva) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2026-03-12
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
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Format :
pdf
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Sub-title:
Five years after the coup, Myanmar’s instability is bleeding across borders. Canberra’s policy hasn’t kept up.
Description:
"In Burmese kitchens there is a saying that adding ginger to a curry can sometimes disguise the smell of ingredients that have already gone bad. It’s an apt truism as Myanmar enters a new phase of its crisis. Following elections organised under military supervision, the country’s authorities are now preparing to convene a new parliament and form a government. Institutional arrangements can create the impression of stability, but they do not necessarily resolve the deeper political crisis.
The intention of the generals is clear: to offer the appearance of constitutional order after years of conflict and international condemnation. Even if the electoral process lacks credibility in the eyes of many observers, the creation of a parliamentary structure allows the regime to argue that Myanmar is moving toward political normalisation.
For regional diplomacy, this raises a difficult question: how should governments respond when an unresolved civil conflict is repackaged as political order?
Five years after the 2021 coup, Myanmar’s crisis has evolved into one of Southeast Asia’s most complex challenges. At a time when global attention is increasingly drawn to other geopolitical crises, including escalating conflict in the Middle East, Myanmar risks slipping further from the centre of international policy debates. Yet the consequences of its instability continue to unfold across Southeast Asia.
Armed conflict continues across large parts of the country. Millions remain displaced. The breakdown of governance has allowed criminal networks and humanitarian pressures to spill across borders.
Australia’s response has been principled and compassionate, centred on humanitarian assistance and support for civil society. Yet as Myanmar’s political situation shifts toward attempted normalisation, a broader policy question emerges:
Is Australia’s Myanmar policy prepared for the next phase of the crisis?
Myanmar’s prolonged instability therefore represents not only a humanitarian concern but also a strategic challenge, intersecting with regional security, migration pressures and transnational crime networks.
Australia’s official framework is articulated in the Australia–Myanmar Development Partnership Plan 2024–2029, released by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.
The strategy makes several clear commitments.
First, Australia condemns the military takeover and calls for a return to democracy. It also emphasises the need for humanitarian access and the protection of civilians.
Second, Australia deliberately avoids direct engagement with the military regime. Development assistance is delivered through the United Nations, international organisations and local civil society partners rather than state institutions.
Third, the policy frames Myanmar as a “protracted and multifaceted crisis”, signalling that instability is likely to persist for the foreseeable future.
This approach reflects a careful balance: supporting the people of Myanmar while avoiding actions that could legitimise the military authorities. It is a sensible policy foundation. However, the strategy is also largely humanitarian in orientation, focusing on relief, resilience and development assistance. What it does not yet fully address is the regional spillover of Myanmar’s collapse.
Myanmar’s internal conflict is increasingly producing consequences beyond its borders.
Millions of people have been displaced internally since the coup, while hundreds of thousands have sought refuge in neighbouring countries such as Thailand, India, Bangladesh and Malaysia.
At the same time, the breakdown of governance across large parts of the country has allowed criminal networks to expand. Scam centres, trafficking routes and cross-border organised crime have proliferated in territories where state authority has weakened.
For Southeast Asian governments, these developments are becoming as consequential as the political crisis itself.
Regional actors are therefore beginning to view Myanmar not only through the lens of democracy and human rights, but also through the lens of security and stability. In Southeast Asia, humanitarian crises and security challenges rarely remain neatly separated for long.
This shift in perspective matters for policymakers in Canberra.
Australia has consistently supported ASEAN’s efforts to address the crisis, particularly through the Five-Point Consensus agreed in April 2021. However, ASEAN’s institutional structure limits its ability to respond decisively.
The organisation operates on a consensus principle, meaning that all member states must agree before collective action can be taken. This often leads to cautious diplomatic language and incremental steps rather than strong enforcement measures.
Furthermore, ASEAN’s rotating chairmanship creates inconsistency in leadership. As one regional observer once joked, it is difficult to run a marathon when the baton changes hands every twelve months. Each year brings different priorities and diplomatic approaches.
The result is a regional mechanism that is valuable for dialogue but ill-suited to resolving a complex civil conflict.
For external partners such as Australia, this means ASEAN engagement must be complemented by additional regional initiatives rather than relied upon exclusively.
Australia is not the only country grappling with how to respond to Myanmar’s crisis, and different governments have adopted markedly different strategies.
Japan, for example, has maintained a policy of continued engagement with Myanmar’s institutions, arguing that sustained dialogue and development assistance may help preserve long-term channels of influence. Western governments such as the United States and members of the European Union have taken a more sanctions-focused approach, targeting military-linked individuals and businesses.
Australia’s policy sits somewhere between these two models. Canberra has imposed targeted sanctions and avoided direct engagement with the military authorities, while continuing to fund humanitarian assistance and civil society programs.
This middle-ground approach reflects Australia’s desire to balance democratic principles with regional diplomatic realities. However, it also highlights the need to ensure that humanitarian engagement is accompanied by a broader regional framework that addresses the regional consequences of Myanmar’s prolonged instability.
Another notable feature of Australia’s Myanmar policy is the emphasis placed on stakeholder consultation.
In developing the Australia–Myanmar Development Partnership Plan, DFAT reports that it engaged a wide range of stakeholders including United Nations agencies, international NGOs, civil society organisations and members of the Myanmar diaspora.
These consultations are an important step toward ensuring development programs reflect the realities faced by Myanmar communities.
However, the consultation process itself is largely opaque.
Due to security concerns, the identities of local implementing partners and many consultation participants are not publicly disclosed. While this approach may be necessary to protect individuals operating in conflict environments, it also creates a significant challenge: it becomes difficult to assess how inclusive or representative these consultations truly are.
Myanmar’s political landscape is extraordinarily diverse. It includes ethnic political organisations, resistance groups, civil society networks, women’s organisations, youth movements, humanitarian actors and a global diaspora with varying perspectives on the country’s future.
When consultation processes occur largely behind closed doors, an inevitable question arises: whose voices are being heard and whose may be missing?
For policymakers in Canberra, this presents a delicate balancing act. Protecting partners from retaliation by the military regime is essential. Yet at the same time, transparency and inclusivity remain critical to building trust among the wider Myanmar community.
Without broader visibility into consultation processes, diaspora communities and emerging civic actors may feel disconnected from policy discussions that directly affect the future of their country.
Strengthening mechanisms for inclusive and transparent engagement (while still protecting the safety of participants) could therefore become an important next step in Australia’s Myanmar policy.
Such engagement would not only improve policy design but also reinforce Australia’s long-standing reputation as a partner committed to democratic values and accountable governance.
Myanmar’s diaspora communities have become one of the quiet engines sustaining humanitarian response since the coup – a community with untapped potential.
Across Australia, North America, Europe and Southeast Asia, diaspora communities have become an important source of humanitarian assistance, advocacy and political engagement since the 2021 coup. Many individuals have mobilised resources, organised international awareness campaigns and supported communities affected by conflict inside Myanmar.
Yet diaspora participation in formal policy processes often remains limited and fragmented.
While consultation with diaspora representatives did occur during the development of Australia’s Myanmar Development Partnership Plan, the structure and breadth of this engagement remain difficult to assess publicly.
This matters because diaspora communities can play a unique role in bridging international policy discussions with the complex realities inside Myanmar.
Diaspora professionals frequently possess deep cultural understanding, linguistic ability and social networks that allow them to interpret developments on the ground in ways that external observers may find difficult. Many also maintain close connections with civil society organisations, humanitarian actors and emerging political networks within the country.
At the same time, diaspora communities often reflect the diversity (and divisions) of Myanmar’s political landscape. Different groups may prioritise different strategies for political change, humanitarian response or international engagement.
For policymakers, this complexity can make diaspora engagement appear challenging.
However, excluding or underutilising diaspora expertise carries its own risks. When diaspora voices feel disconnected from formal policy processes, frustration can grow and opportunities for constructive collaboration may be lost.
As Myanmar’s crisis continues to evolve, there is an opportunity for Australia to explore more structured mechanisms for diaspora engagement. This could include advisory forums, policy dialogues or thematic working groups that allow diaspora experts to contribute perspectives on humanitarian access, governance reform and regional stability.
Such initiatives would not replace the voices of communities inside Myanmar. Rather, they could complement them by ensuring that Australia’s policy framework draws on the widest possible range of informed perspectives.
In a protracted crisis where reliable information and trusted networks are often difficult to access, diaspora communities represent an underutilised asset.
Australia’s policy currently recognises that Myanmar’s crisis will be long-term. The Development Partnership Plan explicitly notes that development and humanitarian programs must operate within a humanitarian–development nexus due to the protracted nature of the conflict.
Yet if Myanmar’s instability continues for years rather than months, its consequences for Southeast Asia will grow more severe. Irregular migration will increase. Criminal networks will expand. Border regions will face mounting humanitarian pressure. ASEAN’s internal divisions over Myanmar will also persist.
In this environment, a policy framework centred primarily on humanitarian assistance is necessary but insufficient. Humanitarian assistance saves lives. But on its own, it cannot stabilise a region.
Australia is well positioned to support a broader regional response.
Rather than attempting to resolve Myanmar’s internal political conflict directly, Canberra could focus on mitigating the wider regional consequences of prolonged instability.
Several practical initiatives could form the basis of such a strategy.
First, Australia could expand support for cross-border humanitarian assistance, particularly through partnerships with organisations operating along Myanmar’s borders.
Second, Canberra could work with regional governments to strengthen temporary protection arrangements for displaced Myanmar nationals in Southeast Asia.
Third, Australia could utilise regional mechanisms such as the Bali Process to improve coordination on migration governance and trafficking prevention.
Fourth, Australia could support local governance and service delivery in border communities hosting displaced populations.
None of these initiatives would undermine ASEAN’s central role in regional diplomacy. Instead, they would complement ASEAN’s efforts by addressing practical challenges that affect neighbouring states directly.
Myanmar’s political future will ultimately be determined by its own people. External actors cannot impose a resolution to the country’s internal conflict.
But the regional consequences of that conflict are already unfolding.
Myanmar may appear distant from Australia’s immediate interests. Geography, however, has a way of shrinking quickly when instability begins to spill across borders. Instability in Southeast Asia has direct implications for regional security, migration patterns and economic cooperation. Supporting regional responses to Myanmar’s humanitarian and governance challenges is therefore consistent with Australia’s broader strategic objectives.
Moreover, such an approach allows Australia to demonstrate constructive leadership while respecting ASEAN’s preference for regional solutions.
By complementing humanitarian assistance with a broader regional stability strategy, Australia can help mitigate the spillover effects of Myanmar’s crisis while strengthening resilience across Southeast Asia. In this part of the world, instability rarely stays politely within national borders.
Policy rarely solves conflicts overnight. But it can shape the environment in which solutions eventually become possible..."
Source/publisher:
"The Interpreter"
Date of entry/update:
2026-03-12
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Australia-Burma relations, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Local URL:
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Description:
"Conflict continues to fuel suffering and drive humanitarian needs in Myanmar. Hostilities have been marked by airstrikes and violations of International Humanitarian Law, triggering widespread displacement and civilian harm. The humanitarian situation continues to worsen with each passing year due to ongoing conflict, recurrent disasters, and steady economic decline.
Humanitarian partners continue to deliver life‑saving assistance to millions of people, despite access challenges, shrinking funding, and insecurity. In 2025, partners reached 6.3 million people at least once, noting that the depth and frequency of the support provided has in many cases been insufficient. The earthquake response alone reached 1.7 million people, taking advantage of temporary access arrangements that allowed rapid aid delivery in the hardest-hit areas.
Underfunding is pushing people into impossible choices and is hindering access to humanitarian aid. Families are skipping meals, taking dangerous journeys and exposing themselves to serious risks simply to survive. Significant underfunding, inflation, access restrictions, and service disruptions have left many essential needs unmet.
In 2026, humanitarians are focusing efforts on 2.6 million people in Myanmar with the very most severe needs, among the 87 million people being hyper-prioritized globally for life-saving aid. In total, the 2026 Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan (HNRP) calls on donors for US$890 million to reach 4.9 million people in Myanmar with critical life-saving assistance and protection services..."
Source/publisher:
UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (New York) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2026-03-09
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Human Rights and international relations
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"Summary of Crisis and Key Findings:
Myanmar’s humanitarian crisis has continued to deepen due to intensifying conflict, recurrent natural disasters, and steady economic collapse.3 In the first half of 2025, Myanmar ranked second globally for conflict intensity, with more than half of the population exposed to conflict. The security situation for civilians is deteriorating, protection risks are severe, and the resilience of communities is stretched to breaking point.
In spite of the high level of needs, the Myanmar 2026 Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan (HNRP) target has been set at 4.9 million people, a 27% decrease from 6.7 million in 2025. The reduction in target is proportional across most clusters and largely a reflection of diminished response capacities foreseen for 2026.
Access to basic health services is particularly dire in Rakhine, Kayah and Sagaing, where nearly half the population faces serious difficulties, while between 25% and 40% of residents in Kachin, Tanintharyi, Kayin, Northern Shan and Chin need humanitarian health assistance. Disease outbreaks are on the rise due to unsafe drinking water, inadequate sanitation and the interruption of routine health programmes.
A nationwide cholera outbreak occurred between June 2024 and April 2025, malaria has resurgeddue to supply shortages and dengue fever continues to affect children under 15.7 Alarmingly, 1.5 million children under five have missed basic vaccinations since 2018, increasing the risk of vaccine-prevetable diseases, such as measles and diphtheria and the possible re-emergence of polio.
In March 2025, a devastating earthquake struck central Myanmar. The disaster impacted key agricultural regions, destroying crops, irrigation systems, and grain stores—threatening food security for 2 million newly affected people. The earthquake damaged or destroyed tens of thousands of houses, dozens of roads and bridges, and nearly 70 health facilities, severely disrupting access to essential services..."
Source/publisher:
World Health Organization (Geneva)
Date of entry/update:
2026-03-09
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
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pdf (29 pages)
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1.2 MB
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"With the outbreak of war between Iran and the United States and Israel on 28 February, Pakistan finds itself at the brink of an escalating regional conflict. Its recently signed mutual defense pact with Saudi Arabia raises the prospect that Iranian strikes in the Gulf could directly draw Pakistan into the fray. Meanwhile, Islamabad has urged Tehran to moderate its attacks on Saudi territory.
Closer to home, the conflict has brought with it a series of threats to Pakistan’s internal security. Most acutely, it has raised concerns of worsening militancy in the restive Balochistan province, which borders Iran and is the site of a decades-long separatist insurgency. More widely, it could heighten sectarian tensions between the country’s minority Shiite and majority Sunni populations.
Balochistan lies at the intersection of Pakistan, Iran, and Afghanistan, with separatist Baloch groups active across these borders, though mainly in Pakistan and Iran. The region is difficult to govern at the best of times: Its vast terrain and weak infrastructure compound security challenges. In this context, any instability within Iran could create openings for militant movement and arms smuggling across the border into Pakistan, further destabilizing an already worsening security environment. Should the US-Israeli coalition pursue a peripheral destabilization strategy involving the Baloch Sunni militant groups, Pakistan would also be wary of Iranian retaliation in Balochistan. Tehran has long accused Islamabad of failing to adequately crack down on some of these groups, and in January 2024, it carried out airstrikes targeting suspected Jaish al-Adl hideouts across the border in Pakistan.
At the end of January, the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) launched phase two of Operation Herof, carrying out attacks and suicide bombings across the province and seizing control of Nushki city. This was one of its most audacious offensives to date. Security forces dealt with the fallout in February, launching retaliatory operations between 1 and 4 February, which reportedly killed over 70 militants. Despite this onslaught, BLA militants maintained their hold on Nushki city for five days. The increasing sophistication of BLA attacks — moving beyond their usual hit-and-run modus operandi — underscores their growing capabilities.
Away from the border with Iran, the killing of Iranian leader Ali Khamenei triggered deadly demonstrations across Pakistan on 1 March, with dozens of people reportedly killed in clashes with security personnel. Most fatalities occurred in the Shia-majority Gilgit-Baltistan region and in Karachi city, where US Marines opened fire after pro-Iran protesters breached the American consulate. These protests are unlikely to die down soon. Pakistan is also home to one of the largest Shiite populations outside of Iran, and its well-organized religious and political groups have a history of mobilizing in response to global events affecting the Islamic world. Reports of US troops forcibly intervening in Pakistan will only inflame tensions.
It is a volatile environment, and although support for Iran likely crosses sectarian divides, any perception of a crackdown on Shiite protesters could deepen existing fissures. This is a dangerous mix in a country where sectarian tensions have often spilled over into violence, with armed groups present on both sides. Large gatherings of Shiite protesters also present a clear target for Sunni militant groups, such as the Islamic State, which recently carried out a suicide bombing on a Shiite mosque in Islamabad and has actively stoked sectarian tensions. While Baloch separatism may remain concentrated in the peripheries, sectarian strife would impact the entire country.
See more of ACLED’s coverage on Pakistan and the live Iran crisis hub for daily updates on the conflict unfolding in Iran and the wider region..."
Source/publisher:
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data via Reliefweb (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2026-03-06
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Peace processes, ceasefires and ceasefire talks (websites, documents, reports and studies), Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
3.71 MB
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Description:
"Yangon – International Women’s Day comes at a time of profound challenge in Myanmar. Women’s rights are not privileges to be held only in times of peace – they are universal, inalienable and must be upheld at all times. Protecting and resourcing the rights of Myanmar’s women and girls is an immediate responsibility.
Across Myanmar, as conflict intensifies, displacement rises and essential systems collapse, women have increasingly been thrust into roles of leadership and responsibility for ensuring the survival of families and communities. Women are demonstrating extraordinary resilience—yet resilience alone does not replace their right to protection, justice, and meaningful participation.
When health services fail, women become caregivers without support. When schools close or families cannot afford fees, girls are most often denied education while mothers shoulder the additional childcare. When food becomes scarce, women reduce their own portions so others can eat. When men are killed, injured, detained, forcibly recruited or unable to return home, women assume responsibility for keeping children safe, holding households together and securing income while rebuilding from disruption.
Violence is also increasingly reaching women and girls directly – in their homes, in displacement sites, and during daily tasks such as gathering food, water or fuel, where insecurity and explosive hazards add further risk. Women who are already marginalised – including by ethnicity, disability, age or other identity – experience these pressures in compounded ways. Displaced women separated from extended family and community support face heightened barriers to childcare, livelihoods, and safety. This is courage and resilience. But this is not justice.
The cumulative burden of conflict, displacement, economic insecurity and violence is both physical and psychological. Women and girls often carry invisible wounds of trauma, grief and chronic stress, frequently without access to mental health and psychosocial support.
Year after year, the support systems that women and girls rely on are shrinking. The impacts are not abstract: fewer shelters for survivors of violence, fewer skilled birth attendants, more untreated health conditions, rising trafficking and exploitation, and fewer opportunities for girls to stay in school. Families are forced into impossible choices, and very often women and girls pay the price. Women from Myanmar’s diverse ethnic communities, including those facing long-standing discrimination, experience these harms in distinct and often intensified ways.
Despite these escalating pressures women across Myanmar are leading through this crisis. Despite shrinking civic space, increasing pressures, surveillance and severe financial constraints, women-led and community-based organizations are delivering protection, food, referrals and care where access is constrained. Despite extraordinary barriers, women continue to advocate for their rights and priorities and those of their communities, often within the few political spaces available to them. This perseverance is extraordinary, but endurance is not justice.
Protection from gender-based violence must be recognised and delivered as life-saving assistance, including sustained funding for sexual and reproductive health services, maternal health care, survivor-centred services and safe spaces for women and girls. Women-led and community-based organisations cannot be expected to hold communities together while operating with shrinking resources and under increasing risk. Leadership and decision-making on peace, security and Myanmar’s future cannot remain the sole domain of men and armed actors.
To address both immediate needs and the structural inequalities driving this crisis humanitarian and recovery efforts must adopt gender-responsive and transformative approaches that recognise unpaid care, economic and educational inequality, and barriers to women’s leadership and meaningful participation. Access constraints must not render women invisible in data or decision-making. Women’s and girls’ leadership and inclusion must be deliberate and central to any pathway toward peace and stability – not symbolic inclusion, but a precondition for lasting solutions.
Rights cannot wait. Justice cannot be deferred. Action cannot be delayed. On this International Women’s Day, the courage and leadership of Myanmar’s women and girls must be matched with protection, accountability, meaningful inclusion and the sustained support required to uphold their rights..."
Source/publisher:
United Nations Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2026-03-06
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Articles, reports and sites relating to women of Burma, Women's rights, Women and Politics in Burma/Myanmar, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Local URL:
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Description:
"Families displaced by conflict are often pushed to make impossible choices, with many skipping meals, taking dangerous journeys and exposing themselves to serious risks simply to survive.
To keep their families afloat, women are often the ones forced to make difficult choices that prioritize the needs and well-being of their families over their own.
Mothers like Ma Khin and Daw Ei are often the first to make personal sacrifices, cutting back on much-needed essential items for women’s health and well-being so their families can get by.
With support from the Myanmar Humanitarian Fund (MHF), a local partner distributed carefully curated packages containing sanitary products, hygiene supplies and other items such as flashlights, to displaced women and girls in conflict-affected communities in Kayah and Shan.
“The dignity kit has made things so much easier for me and my daughter. Every item is useful in our daily life,” said Ma Khin, a 43-year-old single mother displaced in Kayah State.
“The hand-crank flashlight is truly a blessing for me and my baby girl at night,” said Daw Ei, a 35-year-old mother of two displaced in northern Shan. “It has made us feel so much safer.”
These tailored packages of support empower mothers to protect their safety and dignity during the incredibly difficult experience of being displaced from their homes and communities.
For resource-constrained families, the MHF-funded support allows households to direct limited income toward food, school fees and other essentials without forcing women and girls to sacrifice their health, safety and dignity.
These kits provide more than just material support. “They show women that their needs are recognized and that they are not alone,”said a local staff member of the MHF partner.
The MHF continues to prioritize the distinct vulnerabilities of women and girls affected by the compounding crisis in Myanmar, ensuring they are not left behind..."
Source/publisher:
UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (New York) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2026-03-05
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Local URL:
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Description:
"Theme: Protection and Human Rights..."
Source/publisher:
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (Geneva) via Reliefweb (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2026-03-05
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
UNHCR (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees), Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
1.45 MB
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Description:
"Executive Summary:
Myanmar faces a protracted humanitarian emergency characterized by widespread displacement, ongoing armed conflict, severe economic deterioration, and compounding natural disasters. The crisis demands sustained international attention and coordinated humanitarian response across multiple sectors. The Myanmar crisis requires sustained engagement across diplomatic, humanitarian, and development channels. Immediate priorities include scaling humanitarian assistance, protecting civilian infrastructure, and maintaining pressure for political resolution while preparing for long-term recovery and resilience-building efforts.
This analysis, produced through GANNET SituationHub's AI-powered platform with human-in-the-loop verification, synthesizes data from thousands of humanitarian sources to provide actionable insights for decision-makers, field teams, and donors responding to the Myanmar crisis. The platform's real-time monitoring capabilities enable rapid identification of emerging needs and coordination gaps critical for effective humanitarian response..."
Source/publisher:
Data Friendly Space via Reliefweb (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2026-03-03
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Education in Burma/Myanmar - general, Food Security and nutrition in Burma/Myanmar, Public Health, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
2.17 MB
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Description:
"Highlights:
- Annual update for 2025 on the Human Rights Situation in Myanmar shows that civilian deaths due to airstrikes rose to the highest levels verified since 2021. 2025 was also the deadliest year for children since 2021 with the impact of violence on girls particularly increasing. Almost 25% of the population faced high levels of acute food insecurity with risk of further deterioration.
- Record number of deadly attacks on health care verified by WHO’s Surveillance System for Attacks on Health Care (SSA): 70 attacks were recorded during 2025 as compared to 31 in 2024. Attacks are becoming more deadly, with 148 fatalities reported in 2025, as compared to 51 in 2024.
- Access to humanitarian aid is increasingly blocked, mainly due to a dramatic rise in armed activities, as per 2025 data from OCHA. Chin, Rakhine and Sagaing are most affected. Intensified conflict is impeding health service delivery, as patients and health workers are unable to visit health facilities.
- Severe arsenic contamination in river water in Kayah, with recent laboratory findings showing arsenic levels 4–9 times above standards in the Salween River and as high as 55 times above safe levels in Mo Lo Creek. Local authorities are prohibiting any consumption of water or fish from contaminated areas.
- Ongoing increase in preventable skin infections throughout the country, particularly in temporary settlements where overcrowding, inadequate hygiene, and lack of access to water are allowing sin infections to spread.
- Severe shortages of medical supplies, including for treatment of skin infections.
- Lack of funding and impossibility to register will force many health partners to discontinue services in the coming months..."
Source/publisher:
Health Cluster and World Health Organization via Reliefweb (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2026-02-27
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
496.07 KB
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Description:
"The humanitarian crisis in Myanmar remains one of the world’s
most complex and protracted, marked by repeated waves of
displacement and limited prospects for durable solutions.
Escalating conflict and human rights violations have forced
millions to flee within Myanmar and across borders. As of January
2026, 3.7 million people are internally displaced, and 1.6 million
are refugees and asylum-seekers. The crisis has been worsened
by disasters and extreme weather in recent years, including
Cyclone Mocha (May 2023), Typhoon Yagi (September 2024), and
a 7.7 magnitude earthquake (March 2025). With no sign of
improvement, prospects for safe and voluntary returns, especially
for 1.3 million Rohingya remain bleak.
As humanitarian resources in host countries grow increasingly
strained, thousands of Myanmar refugees are undertaking
dangerous journeys in search of protection, safety, family
reunification, and livelihoods.
UNHCR is adopting a Route-Based Approach to improve early
access to protection and solutions for refugees and
asylum-seekers - ultimately reducing the need for risky onward
movement. UNHCR continues to urge States across the region to
strengthen coordination to save lives at sea, fully deploy rescue
capacities, and ensure safe, timely disembarkation—upholding
the principles of humanity, solidarity, and shared responsibility.....How have the movements evolved over time?.....From January 2022 to January 2026, an estimated 366,900 people
fled Myanmar by land and sea—93% by land and 7% by sea or river.
Land and maritime movements peaked in 2024, with a notable
increase in the second half of the year. The movements trend
continued in the first half of 2025.
The first half3 of 2025 recorded 53% higher land movements than
the same period in 2024. Many reported facing detention or other
protection risks along the land routes. Due to limited access and the
often clandestine nature of these movements, the actual numbers
are likely higher. Maritime movements surged by 153% in the first half
of 2025. However, in the last six months of 2025, trends aligned
more closely with those observed in 2022–23, with around 35% as
many maritime movements recorded compared to the same period
in 2024. The total movements in 2025 fell by 56% when compared
with 2024, with a 42% reduction in land movements and a 66%, in
maritime movements. Inspite of the decreasing trends in the latter
half of 2025, the significant number of movements highlight the
urgent need for a coordinated and comprehensive respons.....maritime movements.....In 2026 so far, there were an estimated 1,100 people attempting the
journey on 11 boats. Women and children accounted for some 30% of
the overall movement. Most of the movements (92%) took place
between Myanmar and Bangladesh.
At least eight tragic boat incidents were recorded in 2025, resulting in
some 892 people reported dead or missing.....In 2026, some estimated 300 people have undertaken desperate
land journeys. The figures may include stateless Rohingya refugees
attempting to cross into Bangladesh by land but intercepted by Myanmar authorities.
From January 2022 to January 2026, 79% of Myanmar refugees
arriving by land were women and children.....The worsening situation in Myanmar—particularly the escalating
conflict in Rakhine State—along with insecurity and hardship in
countries of asylum, continues to push Rohingya and other
refugees from Myanmar to seek safety, protection, and dignity
elsewhere in the region.
While many express a willingness to return home, they stress this
can only happen when conditions allow for a voluntary, safe,
dignified, and sustainable return that addresses the root causes of
displacement. In the meantime, most refugees from Myanmar
hope to contribute to their host communities but face limited
access to education, work, and skills training. Combined with legal
uncertainty and economic hardship, this leaves many vulnerable to
exploitation and compels some to take irregular and dangerous
journeys in search of better opportunities.
In the absence of a comprehensive refugee protection framework
in many first countries of asylum, refugees from Myanmar remain in
limbo. UNHCR continues to advocate for access to asylum and
protection-sensitive entry systems at borders. Refugees must be
allowed to access territory and be protected against refoulement,
in line with international human rights and refugee law—including
the principle of non-refoulement- which applies regardless of What are the protection issues along the SSEA Route? Refugees from Myanmar travelling on the South and South East
Asia Route face significant protection risks before, during and after
arriving at their destination. This includes incidents of online and
offline hate speech, disinformation and misinformation. The impact
of this on access to territory and to asylum, physical protection,
self-reliance, and social cohesion, is felt by refugee communities
from Myanmar in the sub region.
Human trafficking networks frequently operate across borders and
are connected to broader transnational criminal syndicates.
Threats to physical integrity include abuse, torture and death and
are often perpetrated by traffickers or smugglers. Refugees and
migrants from Myanmar are often denied the use of telephones or
other means of communication by smugglers and traffickers and
may be separated from their family during the journey. Unaware of
the risks, many undertake a people smuggling journey that later
becomes a trafficking situation. Trafficking for the purpose of child
marriage and forced labour continues to be of particular concern
with reports emerging from several countries in the sub-region.
Smugglers often take money without providing the promised
service or demand a higher fee than initially agreed, threatening to
stop the journey or harm refugees from Myanmar or their family
members unless they pay more money.
Refugees from Myanmar are frequently held in prolonged or
indefinite detention, with limited access to due process. Nearly
3,400 are currently known to be held in detention outside
Myanmar. While in detention, refugee women, girls, men and boys
are at risk of gender- based violence.Unseaworthy vessels led to shipwrecks and death or distress
situations. Cases of malnutrition, skin and communicable diseases
contracted during the journey have been reported by refugees
and migrants moving on the SSEA Route..."
Source/publisher:
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (Geneva) via Reliefweb (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2026-02-27
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
UNHCR (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees), Human Rights and international relations
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pdf
Size:
11.97 MB
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Description:
"Insecurity Insight identified at least 1869 incidents of violence against or obstruction of health care in Myanmar since the military coup on 01 February 2021 and 20 January 2026. 70% of these incidents were attributed to the Myanmar Armed Forces (MAF). Health facilities were reportedly damaged or destroyed 471 times and used for non-medical purposes 227 times. At least 170 health workers were killed and 909 arrested.
Incidents involving drones armed with explosive weapons affected health care 74 times between February 2021 and December 2025. Reported incidents shifted between conflict parties over time and across regions/states, from mainly local defense forces in the Sagaing region in the early years following the coup to the MAF, primarily in the Bago and Sagaing regions and Kayin State from 2024 onward.
These incidents underscore how armed drones have become an escalating threat in conflict settings. Adapting to this risk means rethinking security measures for health facilities. This practical guide by Insecurity Insight provides measures to help health care providers mitigate these risks and is available in Burmese and English. From early warning systems to protective strategies for staff, infrastructure, and mobile teams, this guide is essential for anyone working to safeguard medical services in Myanmar. For broader insights, consult the Security Risk Management for Health Care Services (SR4H) Handbook. Individual resources:
Outside When a Drone is Spotted: Burmese; English
Inside a Building During a Drone Attack: Burmese; English
Response During a Drone Attack: Burmese; English
Please get in touch for data enquiries. View the incidents on our interactive map. Numbers may change if or when further information is made available.
Documented incidents
04-17 February 2026
The publicly reported incidents below are not a complete nor a representative list of all incidents that affected the provision of health care between 04-17 February 2026. The incidents below have not been verified through ground investigations. There is a delay in reporting incidents due to our open source verification protocol.
06 February 2026: In Mogoke town and township, Thabeikkyin district, Mandalay region, a township hospital occupied by the Myanmar military was attacked with a handmade electroshock rocket by the PDF. Source: Khit Thit Media
As reported on 09 February 2026: In Banmauk town, Banmauk township, Katha district, Sagaing region, bunkers built by KIA and the PDF were found at a township hospital, schools, religious buildings, government buildings, hotels, and civilian houses by the Myanmar military after the town had been reseized. The town was under the control of KIA and PDF for five months. Source: Ministry of Information Myanmar
09 February 2026: In Myaing Gyi Ngu village and village tract, Hlaingbwe township, Hpa-An District, the staff house building of a station hospital was damaged and a child was injured by artillery shelling by an unidentified perpetrator. After the attack, the health workers and patients left the hospital and relocated. Sources: Karen Information Centre and Independent Mon News Agency
10 February 2026: In Tlangkhua village and village tract, Htantlang township, Hakha district, Chin state, a local clinic and a housing construction site were damaged by bombs dropped by a Myanmar military fighter jet. At least six people were killed and seven were injured at the construction site. Sources: Chin Human Rights Organization and Khit Thit Media
17 February 2026: In Nyaung Pin Gyi Su village, Yone Su village tract, Khin-U township, Shwebo district, Sagaing region, a public high school used as a makeshift hospital and at homes were damaged by three bombs dropped by a Myanmar military fighter jet. The school was closed, and patients and health workers evacuated just before the airstrike. In the neighbouring area, three people, including one patient, were killed and at least six were injured. Sources: Khit Thit Media, Maun, Myaelatt Athan, and People’s Spring
Past briefs: 21 January-03 February; 07-20 January; 24 December 2025-06 January; 10-23 December; 26 November-09 December; 12-25 November; 29 October-11 November; 15-28 October; 01-14 October; All
SHCC Factsheets: Burmese: 2024; 2023. English: 2024; 2023: 2022; 2021; 2020
Help support the protection of health care by sharing this resource. Please copy and paste this link: https://bit.ly/04-17Feb2026MMRHealth..."
Source/publisher:
Insecurity Insight (Geneva) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2026-02-26
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"INSTITUTIONAL UPDATE:
.....PROGRESS IN 2025.....
In 2025, the Mechanism made important headway in collecting and analysing evidence of serious international crimes in Myanmar and in identifying those responsible. During the year it added more than 117,000 items of information and over 30 witness statements to its evidence repository. While most investigations point to crimes committed by the Myanmar military, the Mechanism is also examining a growing number of allegations involving opposition armed groups.
The Mechanism advanced its investigations into airstrikes, including analysis of the structures and operation of the Myanmar Air Force. It also made progress in investigating arbitrary arrests and crimes committed in detention, including the identification of perpetrators responsible for sexual violence and other forms of torture.
Crimes in Rakhine State became a major focus of investigations, including air attacks on civilians, hospitals and schools, as well as the obstruction of humanitarian aid. The Mechanism is investigating crimes committed by all perpetrators against Rohingya, Rakhine and other civilian populations.
Investigations into earlier crimes against the Rohingya continued, with teams interviewing witnesses in Bangladesh and other locations. The Mechanism also published a report analysing the Myanmar military’s confiscation of Rohingya land and property – one of nine Mechanism reports relied upon during the public hearings in The Gambia v. Myanmar case.
The Mechanism expanded the number of authorities with whom it shares evidence and analysis, responding to requests for information from parties to proceedings before the International Court of Justice, the International Criminal Court, the Federal Prosecutor’s Office No. 9 in Argentina, and authorities in the United Kingdom and other jurisdictions. This includes requests related to crimes committed after the 2021 military coup.
While it made significant progress in the past year, the Mechanism’s funding is now under severe strain which will inevitably impact its investigations. In the coming months, it will be forced to reduce 20 percent of staff positions funded through the United Nations regular budget, as well as several specialized roles previously supported by Member State donors..."
Source/publisher:
UN Human Rights Council (Geneva) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2026-02-24
[field_licence]
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Individual Documents
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pdf pdf
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1.69 MB 1.88 MB
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Description:
"Highlights
Children and families in Myanmar faced an escalating humanitarian crisis in 2025, as conflict, repeated displacement, public health emergencies, and natural disasters—including a major earthquake—left millions of children without access to safe shelter, education, healthcare, and protection services. In 2025, 21.9 million people, including 6.9 million children, were in need of humanitarian assistance.
A 7.7‑magnitude earthquake on 28 March hit central Myanmar, where over half of all vulnerable displaced population reside, destroying water, sanitation, health, and education infrastructure and pushing an additional two million people into acute humanitarian need.
Despite the challenging environment, and amid funding constraints, UNICEF and its partners reached 4 million people, including 3.2 million children, in 2025. Nearly 2.5 million children received vitamin A supplementation, over 1.2 million people were reached with safe water, 747,375 children accessed learning, and 23,025 children with disabilities were supported with specialized services.
UNICEF secured only 25 per cent of its US$ 346.8M appeal, leaving a 75 per cent funding gap that significantly limited scale‑up of its critical humanitarian and earthquake‑response service.
Situation Overview & Humanitarian Needs
In 2025, Myanmar remained the world’s most fragmented conflict and second-highest globally in conflict intensity,1 leading to a deepening humanitarian crisis for children and families. By the end of December, over 3.6 million people2 were internally displaced,3 an increase of more than 150,000 newly displaced individuals compared to 2024. Most newly displaced populations are from Sagaing, Kayin, Tanintharyi, and Ayeyarwaddy regions, often fleeing multiple times, only to end up in informal shelters with limited access to food, healthcare, and clean water.
Children’s rights to education and safety were severely affected. Ongoing conflict, school destruction, teacher shortages, and severe access restrictions limited service delivery, while areas hit by both conflict and the 2025 earthquake faced critical shortages of safe learning spaces, learning materials, and mental health and psychosocial support (MHPSS).
Protection risks intensified as families under extreme stress resorted to harmful coping strategies, including child labour, unsafe migration, family separation, and early marriage. Landmine and explosive ordnance contamination remained a major threat, with children making up over a quarter of casualties in the first half of 2025.
Displacement continued to rise particularly across Kachin, the northwest and northern and southern Shan, where airstrikes, shifting frontlines, prolonged banking and telecommunications disruption, widespread landmine contamination, and service disruptions heightened risks of exploitation and psychological distress. In Rakhine state, intensified conflict and movement restrictions left an estimated 500,000 displaced people - including a 235,862 stateless population6 – at risk of harassment and abuse.
The humanitarian crisis severely worsened in March 2025 when a 7.7 magnitude earthquake struck central Myanmar, followed by 262 aftershocks ranging from 5.5 to 3.0 magnitude,8 damaging more than 10,000 water systems impacting over 92,457 people’s access to safe water, damaging 10,471 household latrines in the 401 locations assessed in 29 townships, and depriving 45,812 people of access to safe sanitation facilities.9 Seasonal disasters compounded the situation: flash floods from late May to July affected 195,000 people across multiple states and regions.
Disease outbreaks, hunger and inadequate WASH conditions intensified the risks to child survival. Health risks heightened in overcrowded displacement settings. In 2025, as per WHO, a total of 2,378 acute watery diarrhoea (AWD) cases were reported10 across nine states and regions, with the majority occurring in Yangon, Kayin, Chin, and Rakhine. Specific outbreaks were reported in Kayin state, bordering Thailand, in January and Chin state in December.11 Myanmar remained classified as a hunger hotspot of “very high concern” in the latest global food security update,12 and 410,000 children under five, along with pregnant and breastfeeding women, were projected to be suffering from acute malnutrition between June 2025 and May 2026.13 Joint mapping conducted by Health, Nutrition and WASH clusters identified 76 townships at very high risk of AWD outbreaks, primarily located in conflict- and disaster-affected areas.
Humanitarian access remained critically constrained, with over one-third of townships extremely difficult to access (Level 3)14 due to active hostilities, administrative restrictions, and insecurity. Conflict hotspots like Rakhine, Sagaing, and Magway accounted for 69 per cent of incidents.15 Furthermore, 58 per cent of the 6.7 million people targeted for assistance reside in high-restriction areas, where airstrikes, landmines, and telecommunications blackouts frequently force the suspension of life-saving operations..."
Source/publisher:
UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) (Myanmar) via Reliefweb (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2026-02-18
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
UNICEF (United Nations Children's Fund), Education in Burma/Myanmar - general, Food Security and nutrition in Burma/Myanmar, Public Health, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Format :
pdf
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1.05 MB
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Description:
"Insecurity Insight identified at least 1853 incidents of violence against or obstruction of health care in Myanmar since the military coup on 01 February 2021 and 23 December 2025. Health facilities were reportedly damaged or destroyed 460 times, 163 health workers were killed and 906 arrested. These attacks on health care severely undermined the provision of medical services, forcing facilities to close or scale back operations and endangering patients’ lives. Violence, aerial and drone strikes, and restrictions on medical supplies disrupted care delivery, causing long-term damage to health systems and the wellbeing of affected populations. 70% of these 1853 incidents were attributed to the Myanmar Armed Forces (MAF).
During 2025, incidents increased in Yangon region compared to previous years, following an initial spike observed in the early post-coup period. Health workers, particularly those linked to the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) or expressing political criticism, were arrested, including for social media activity. Private and NGO health facilities were repeatedly impacted through temporary shutdowns, sealing orders, and looting, often on accusations of CDM affiliation, support to PDFs, or regulatory violations. February 2025 marked a peak in forced closures of private health facilities, while incidents of vandalism, medicines seizures, and damage to ambulances highlighted growing insecurity. By late 2025, these incidents intensified further constricting space for health care provision in Yangon region..."
Source/publisher:
Insecurity Insight (Geneva) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2026-02-03
[field_licence]
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Individual Documents
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731.1 KB
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"Comment: Saturday February 1 was the grim fourth anniversary of the military coup in Myanmar. The date seems to have gone unnoticed back here in New Zealand. Even before war in Ukraine and then Gaza, Myanmar got little attention. Yet it is the most destructive conflict in our region.
The figures are shocking; nearly a third of the population of 60 million is likely to need humanitarian aid this year. At least 3.5 million are internally displaced; they are escaping indiscriminate bombing and shooting by the army. Around 1.3 million people have fled the country and are living in refugee camps.
As opposition to the army grows, its control on the ground has shrunk dramatically. Most border zones are in the hands of local warlords or ethnic resistance groups, and conflict is spilling over into neighbouring states: China, Thailand, India and Bangladesh. Many of these groups have been fighting against the central government for many years. Unfortunately, their differences have often been exploited and there is no clarity among those opposing the junta about the way ahead.
Increasing pressure on the junta has resulted in even more untargeted attacks on civilians. Forced conscription has been reinstated and has led to raids in areas under military control. The conscripts are given very little training and used as cannon fodder. Jails are full of people swept up in raids and conditions are appalling. The annual amnesty mainly sees the release of common prisoners, and a few foreigners who have become an embarrassment for the regime. There are around 20,000 jailed for dissent of one kind or another.
Myanmar hit the news recently over the kidnapping of a high-profile Chinese actor who was spirited over the Thai border and forced to work in a scam factory in the Myanmar town of Myawaddy.
His return to Thailand came quickly, but those working in these scam centres are not always so lucky. While the Chinese and Thai governments are believed to have put pressure on the junta to close down the centres, it is doubtful whether the junta has the ability, or even the political will to do so. Thailand has just cut off electricity, internet and fuel supplies to five locations across the border that host cyber-scam centres. However, these cuts are most likely to hurt innocent locals who already do not receive electricity for more than a few hours a day.
All of this is very tough on the small Myanmar community in New Zealand, most of whom came here as refugees. They are desperately worried about family members back in Myanmar, find it increasingly difficult to get funds to them, and are in despair over the New Zealand Government’s unwillingness to make any concession to the gravity of the situation. There is a pathway to bring their family members to New Zealand, called the Refugee Family Support Categories, but very few are arriving here under the scheme, which has a large backlog. Immigration Minister Casey Costello has acknowledged that scheme needs an overhaul, but it may come too late for some families.
To put a human face on the situation, I support the Ling* family from Myanmar who came here as refugees in 2010 via Malaysia. The parents and six children are now New Zealand citizens, have bought themselves a house, and are all either working or studying. However, the Lings still have a daughter, son-in-law and three young grandchildren back in Myanmar, who are living in real danger. They have been waiting since 2017 to be reunited under the Refugee Family Support Categories.
Not only is there a genuine risk of a tragedy in this case, but the delay is self-defeating. The sooner the Ling family members in Myanmar are brought here, the sooner the children will be in NZ schools and adapting to a new life. The Lings have room in their home, and the close-knit community would provide support, including for airfares if necessary.
The New Zealand Red Cross and the Centre for Asia-Pacific Studies published a study in January called ‘Reuniting Families: a Path Forward for Aotearoa New Zealand’. This puts forward a number of suggestions for improving the Refugee Family Support Categories which would transform the lives of families like the Lings..."
Source/publisher:
NewsRoom
Date of entry/update:
2025-02-10
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Local URL:
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Sub-title:
Crimes against humanity, a deepening hunger crisis and more than 2,600 rebel groups: Myanmar’s civil war is both brutal and bewildering. Here's a closer look.
Description:
"Summary
The military coup in Myanmar on Feb. 1, 2021, has sparked an ongoing civil war between the military junta and over 2,600 rebel groups.
While civilian casualties have risen to over 6,000 and the country is threatened by famine, neighboring states like China are mostly pursuing their own interests in the region.
Elections announced for 2025 could lead to further escalations of violence, and an overthrow of the junta could create a dangerous power vacuum.
Perhaps the most surreal video of a coup ever recorded dates back to Feb. 1, 2021 – the day Myanmar’s military seized power. A young influencer filmed herself performing aerobic exercises at a street intersection in the capital Naypyidaw. In the background, armored military vehicles can be seen rolling toward parliament; the young woman said later that she had thought nothing of it. The video went viral, bringing global attention to Myanmar’s latest military takeover – even among those with little interest in Southeast Asian politics.
Four years ago, the military overthrew the elected government of Nobel Peace Prize laureate Aung San Suu Kyi, who had pledged to usher in a new democratic era in 2015. The coup was followed by mass protests, and just a few weeks later, the country spiraled into civil war – a conflict that has continued ever since.
The situation: Since the 2021 coup, Myanmar has been mired in a bloody civil war, with the military junta, rebels and ethnic militias locked in a battle for control.
Geopolitical dynamics: China, India and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) are pursuing their own strategic interests while steering clear of direct intervention – leaving Myanmar a geopolitical tinderbox.
Looking ahead: The election scheduled for 2025 could trigger further violence, while the junta’s collapse risks creating a chaotic power vacuum.
The situation in Myanmar is constantly shifting and remains largely overlooked in the West. The military junta is bombing civilian areas, while rebel forces have pushed their military opponents out of vast swathes of territory. More than 6,000 civilians have been killed, and over three million have been displaced. What is happening in Myanmar right now? And what lies ahead?.....The historical backdrop:
Understanding Myanmar’s civil war requires a look at its modern history. The country is one of Southeast Asia’s most ethnically diverse, home to roughly 135 distinct groups. Since gaining independence from the British in 1948, there have been repeated armed clashes between the various groups. This is partly due to promises made to various ethnic groups for a degree of autonomy when Myanmar gained independence. However, the state’s founders established a centralized system instead. Historian Thant Myint-U once described Myanmar as an «unfinished nation» where identity struggles have fueled war, poverty and isolation.
From the start, the country’s ruling elite has relied on military power to hold the fragile state together. After independence, their priority was strengthening the armed forces, leading to a stark imbalance between military dominance and weak civilian institutions, as political scientist Aurel Croissant has noted. In 1962, just two years after the initial establishment of a democratically elected government, the generals staged a coup and seized power.
For decades, Myanmar’s military rulers controlled the country – sometimes overtly, sometimes from behind the scenes. In 1988, they executed those who took to the streets to protest for greater freedom. Beyond securing their political grip, the generals also took control of key industries and cemented their influence through structural reforms. In 2008, they altered the constitution to ensure that 25% of parliamentary seats were filled by the military, effectively giving the generals a right of veto. In 2015, the National League for Democracy, led by Aung San Suu Kyi, won the elections. Cautious reforms followed, until the military seized power once again five years later, citing unproven allegations of electoral fraud.....The rebels:Tracking Myanmar’s myriad rebel groups is no easy task. According to the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED), an initiative that collects data on various conflicts around the globe, more than 2,600 groups have emerged since the 2021 coup. Many were founded by local politicians, student activists and protesters who fled into the jungle to wage guerrilla warfare against the army. Ethnic armed organizations had been active in the country before 2021, already engaged in fighting the state and seeking autonomy within their territories. The most important of these are located in the regions of Rakhine, Kachin and in the north of Shan, but also in Kayin in the south of the country.
These ethnic armed organizations have inflicted painful losses on the military in recent months. They now not only control larger areas, but also crucial border crossings – to China in the north and to Bangladesh in the west. Today, the military controls a smaller area of Myanmar than at any time since the 1960s.
These ethnic groups have years of experience in financing their guerrilla warfare, whether through drug trafficking (methamphetamines have replaced heroin as Myanmar's top export) or the overexploitation of natural resources. Their cooperation with newly formed rebel groups has created communities of purpose, with the different groups benefiting from each other. These new groups supply the ethnic armies with an ongoing influx of fighters, and they are consistently attacking military bases together. In turn, the new rebel groups receive training from the ethnic armies and benefit from their combat experience.
This cooperation is fragile, however, and there have been repeated battles between the various insurgents. The groups’ individual war aims diverge as well. Many of the new rebel groups have united under the National Unity Government (NUG), a Myanmar shadow government that has made it its goal to overthrow the junta. The ethnic armed organizations, however, are primarily concerned with controlling their own territories. This is evident from the only tentative advances into the junta-controlled interior of Myanmar, in which the ethnic armies have little interest – partly because they would be vulnerable to the military's airstrikes.....The civilian population:The U.N. estimates the civilian death toll in Myanmar at over 6,000. According to the U.N., 2,000 people alone were executed while in military custody. At least 365 people were shot in the head; 215 were burned alive. International observers are racing to document widespread atrocities – including torture, beheadings, rapes and other crimes against humanity.
«Increasingly frequent and indiscriminate air strikes, artillery and drone attacks have killed civilians, driven survivors from their homes, and destroyed hospitals, schools and places of worship,» writes Nicholas Koumjian, head of the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar, the U.N.'s investigative office for the region. «While most of the evidence the Mechanism has collected concerns crimes committed by the Myanmar military, we are also investigating disturbing reports of atrocities committed by other armed groups, including rape, killings and torture,» he continues.
As if all this were not enough, the country is also on the verge of a famine. The local economy, including agriculture, has collapsed. Next summer 15 million people in Myanmar could be threatened by hunger, warn analysts from IPC, a platform for mapping global hunger.....The neighbors: China plays an important yet undecided role in Myanmar. «China is supporting the junta, even though without enthusiasm, and continues to sell weapons to it. But it also supports to some extent some of the powerful ethnic groups operating along its borders,» says David Mathieson, a longtime Myanmar expert. In 2024, Beijing brokered a ceasefire, but it unraveled within five months. In January, the junta announced a new ceasefire between the military and one of the ethnic armed organizations, with China acting as mediator once again.
In November, junta leader Min Aung Hlaing traveled to China – not for a state visit, but for a regional summit, a move that could signal Beijing’s view of him as a key figure in efforts to manage the crisis. China has no interest in a civil war on its border, and certainly not one with broader geopolitical consequences.
Yet the ethnic armies along the Chinese border hold significant leverage over their neighbor. They control infrastructure and mines built by China that are located in China's sphere of influence. According to Mathieson, China keeps reminding the leaders of these ethnic armies that they should not seek support from the West. China wants to maintain control over conflict mediation along its border and for now, Western peace initiatives are ineffective, he says.
China recognizes that it has influence over Myanmar, says Mathieson, «but it doesn’t want the burden of having to solve a civil war.» It just wants to influence the trajectory of such a war so that it can prioritize its investments and strategic interests.
Meanwhile, the regional powers – the states forming the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) – have struggled for years to find a unified strategy for Myanmar. The only clear consensus appears to be maintaining their economically focused, cooperative union without letting the Myanmar issue cause division. Malaysia has held ASEAN’s annually rotating chairmanship since the start of the year. At an early meeting, the Malaysian foreign minister issued a call for peace, stating somewhat helplessly: «Malaysia wants to know what Myanmar has in mind.»
India, which also shares a border with Myanmar, continues to sell weapons to the junta, despite well-documented human rights violations.....The road ahead: Myanmar’s military junta has announced an election for 2025, but critics argue it is little more than a bid to legitimize its rule. Only parties that have been vetted by the junta are allowed to take part in the election. In addition, only half the country is likely to vote – voter lists could only be drawn up in 145 out of 330 municipalities. But the election is nonetheless set to move forward. Observers warn that violence could escalate in the coming months as the vote approaches. Rebel groups might attack voters and politicians, while the military could seek quick territorial gains to generate success stories ahead of the election.
Beyond domestic control, the junta is also seeking international validation, says Mathieson, particularly from China, the ASEAN states and India. How Western governments will respond remains unclear, in his view. They could view the election as an opportunity to reestablish contact with the junta, which has so far refused any diplomatic mediation. Mathieson calls this a «folly,» pointing to the West’s lack of a clear plan for Myanmar.
The junta is unlikely to collapse anytime soon. It appears to be strong enough to hold off the rebels, at least within its strongholds in the country's interior. Internal divisions are also unlikely to bring it down – outwardly, the junta shows few signs of fracturing, and little is known about its internal dynamics. A prolonged civil war in the heart of Asia appears the more probable outcome.
And even if the junta were to fall, then what? The ethnic armed organizations would likely maintain control over their own territories, Mathieson says, «but violent anarchy would probably break out in Myanmar's interior."..."
Source/publisher:
Genocide Watch
Date of entry/update:
2025-02-07
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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Local URL:
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Description:
"Introduction
This report provides a locally informed interim assessment of humanitarian access in Karen State (Kayin State per UN terminology), examining key constraints through insights from international actors and local community-based organisations (CBOs).
Global humanitarian efforts often rely on state authorities, sidelining local actors in conflict zones. In Myanmar, official aid is through the State Administrative Council (SAC) controlled NDMO, which has limited access and reliability for delivering aid to non-SAC-controlled areas, such as Karen State. SAC’s bureaucratic barriers and movement restrictions further obstruct aid, while traditional iNGOs and UN agencies have significantly less impact and reliable access in these resistance controlled areas.
By contrast, CBOs, local NGOs, Border Based Organisations (BBOs) and IDP humanitarian services under de facto authorities have proven to be the most effective existing channel for delivering aid—despite often operating outside the traditional humanitarian system. Through community networks, these actors consistently adapt to security risks and logistical challenges, ensuring aid reaches populations deemed inaccessible by conventional means.
This report finds that the most effective means of supporting conflict-affected communities is through local NGO and CBO stakeholders working with de facto authorities, who enable access and provide critical aid where traditional mechanisms fail.
This report provides an interim analysis of humanitarian access constraints and explores alternative pathways for aid delivery. The full report, covering all constraints listed on page 13, with additional risk related information for practitioners, will be released in late March 2025..."
Source/publisher:
Humanitarian Assistance And Disaster Relief Institute
Date of entry/update:
2025-02-04
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Education in Burma/Myanmar - general, Public Health, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
14.52 MB
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Description:
"Insecurity Insight identified 1563 incidents of violence against or obstruction of health care in Myanmar since the military coup on 01 February 2021 and 05 December 2024. In these incidents, health facilities were damaged 347 times and taken over for non-medical purposes on at least 198 occasions. In addition, 135 health workers were killed and 835 arrested.
Over two-thirds of incidents were attributed to the Myanmar junta forces. Ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) including the Arakan Army, the Chinland Defense Force, the Chin National Army, the Kachin Independence Army, the Karen National Liberation Army, the Karenni Nationalities Defence Force, and Pyi-thu-sit, Pyu-saw-htee, Shanni Nationalities Army, Swan-arr-shin militias and Ta'ang National Liberation Army were named in some incidents, but less often than the Myanmar junta forces.
Explore our interactive map to see where incidents happened.
1 Access the data on HDX. The dataset no longer includes event descriptions due to HDX policy. Data is updated every Monday. Follow us for the latest updates. Numbers may change if or when further information is made available..."
Source/publisher:
Insecurity Insight (Geneva) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2025-02-03
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
1.6 MB
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Description:
"New York, 3 February 2025: Four years since the military seized power from the democratically elected Government in Myanmar and plunged the country into chaos, the United Nations Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict, Ms. Pramila Patten, strongly condemns the continued use of rape and other forms of sexual violence as a tactic of war and political repression and strategy to punish and terrorize communities across Myanmar.
Since the military seized power, civilians of diverse ethnicities, religions and gender identities, including women and children, have been killed, arbitrarily detained, tortured and subjected to sexual violence and other abuses. There are persistent and alarming reports about the continued use by the Myanmar security forces and their affiliates of sexual violence, including rape and gang rape, predominantly against women and children, but also men and LGBTQI persons, during ground operations, village raids, at check points and in detention settings. In July 2024, the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar reported that it had collected evidence of sexual and gender-based crimes, including rape and gang rape, in relation to ongoing armed conflict and in detention. The escalating conflict has compounded longstanding patterns of sexual violence, with some disturbing reports of sexual violence perpetrated by Ethnic Armed Organizations and People’s Defence Forces also emerging.
Escalating conflict, poverty, food insecurity and mandatory conscription have resulted in increased reports of sexual violence, including trafficking for the purpose of sexual violence and/or exploitation of women and children. The continued hostilities in Rakhine State have been accompanied by reports of Rohingya women and children being raped and trafficked as they fled to neighboring countries.
Special Representative Patten urgently calls on the Myanmar military and all armed groups to immediately cease all acts of sexual violence, in accordance with their obligations under international humanitarian and human rights law. “It is imperative that the perpetrators of these heinous crimes take effective measures to prevent sexual violence crimes and that perpetrators face justice,” said Special Representative Patten. “Breaking the cycle of impunity is urgent to shift the stigma of sexual violence from the survivors to the perpetrators.” Special Representative Patten recalled that since 2017, the Myanmar Armed Forces has been listed in the annex of the annual reports of the Secretary-General on conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV) as a party credibly suspected of committing rape and other forms of sexual violence.
Survivors of CRSV in Myanmar continue to experience enduring physical, psychological, reproductive and socio-economic impacts and face severe limitations to access service provision and care, particularly in conflict-affected areas. “It is crucial that all survivors receive adequate medical care and mental health, psychosocial, livelihood and socio-economic support, which is essential to rebuild their lives,” said Special Representative Patten. “Survivors’ dignity, safety and healing are paramount. I call for sustained international and regional support to meet the unique needs of survivors.”
Special Representative Patten commends the courage and resilience of Myanmar’s women’s rights and local organizations who, at great personal risk, continue to be on the frontlines supporting survivors and affected communities, tackling stigma around sexual violence and dismantling gender discrimination in Myanmar. Special Representative Patten echoes the calls of the Secretary-General to all parties to the conflict to exercise maximum restraint, uphold human rights and international humanitarian law and prevent further incitement of violence, including sexual violence..."
Source/publisher:
UN Office of the SRSG on Sexual Violence in Conflict
Date of entry/update:
2025-02-03
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Human Rights Reporting (global, regional and Myanmar)
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
192.31 KB
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Description:
"Today marks the fourth anniversary of the military coup in Myanmar, The Border Consortium (TBC) stands in solidarity with civil society, humanitarian workers, and activists who continue to work tirelessly for a peaceful, just, and inclusive future for the people of Myanmar.
Since the coup in February 2021, the illegitimate military regime has inflicted immense suffering on the people of Myanmar and widespread crimes against humanity. Over 6,100 civilians have been killed and more than 28,000 individuals have been arbitrarily arrested. Indiscriminate aerial attacks have destroyed schools, hospitals, and places of worship, tearing apart communities and depriving civilians of basic safety and dignity.
TBC reaffirms our commitment to supporting displaced communities on both sides of the Thai-Myanmar border. We embody resistance humanitarianism, not only addressing the immediate needs of those displaced but also by challenging the root causes of this crisis, the illegitimate military regime.
For refugees in Thailand, many of whom have spent more than four decades in displacement, we continue to advocate for durable solutions that uphold their rights to security, protection, and development. In Myanmar, together with our partners, we will continue to provide emergency humanitarian aid and focus on the pursuit of human security and long-term stability for these communities.
Today, we call upon the international community to renew its commitment to Myanmar. Funding for Myanmar is at an all-time low, and there exists real risks that due to funding pressures displaced communities may not receive the assistance they need. The needs of Myanmar’s displaced communities cannot be forgotten.
TBC stands united with the people of Myanmar in their struggle for freedom, justice, and peace. Together, we will build a better future for all..."
Source/publisher:
The Border Consortium (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2025-02-01
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Articles on the TB[B]C
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
567.02 KB
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Description:
"Four years since the 1 February 2021 coup in Myanmar, the political impasse that has generated increased conflict across the country is no closer to being resolved. While the armed groups opposing the military have achieved some battlefield successes, tensions among the resistance that predate the coup continue to impact their ability to unify politically or militarily. Amid the evolving dynamics of the post-coup conflict environment, violence targeting civilians continues to grow each year. In the four years since the coup, around 90% of Myanmar’s population has been exposed to political violence, as defined by ACLED’s Conflict Exposure metrics, as millions live in active conflict. Civilians also lack access to electricity, communications, healthcare, and education and are vulnerable to crime and human and drug trafficking.
This fact sheet dives into the data on who is behind the violence, and how civilians are being targeted..."
Source/publisher:
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project
Date of entry/update:
2025-01-31
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Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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"Today marks four years since the Myanmar military regime overthrew the democratically elected government in Myanmar, creating one of the largest crises in the Indo-Pacific. Since the coup, the people of Myanmar remain subject to military rule that has deprived many of their rights, democratic aspirations and, for thousands, their liberty and their lives.
We condemn in the strongest terms the Myanmar military regime’s escalating violence harming civilians, including human rights violations, sexual and gender-based violence, and systematic persecution and discrimination against all religious and ethnic minorities. The military’s airstrikes are killing civilians, destroying schools, markets, places of worship and medical facilities; with almost a 25-fold increase since 2021 this represents an average of three airstrikes per day. The rise in airstrikes in areas with no active conflict has marked a clear escalation by the military.
We call on the Myanmar military regime to immediately de-escalate violence, ensure unhindered and safe humanitarian access across the country, and we urge all parties to prioritize the protection of civilians and fully adhere to International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law.
As of 2025, humanitarian needs have increased twenty-fold since the coup. Over one-third of the population,19.9 million people, are now in need of humanitarian assistance to meet their basic needs. An estimated 15.2 million people are in need of food assistance and cases of preventable diseases are on the rise.
Increasing needs and ongoing conflict have displaced up to 3.5 million people internally - an increase of nearly one million in the last year. Many more people are forced to flee across Myanmar’s borders. Rising transnational crime, including narcotics production and trafficking, scam centres and human trafficking, harm the people of Myanmar and affect neighbouring countries, risking instability in the broader region.
The current trajectory is not sustainable for Myanmar or the region. Now is the time for the Myanmar military regime to immediately change course. We strongly urge the Myanmar military regime to cease violence, including harming civilians and civilian infrastructure, release all political prisoners, and engage in genuine and inclusive dialogue with all stakeholders. These are essential first steps towards any peaceful, democratic transition, reflecting the will of Myanmar’s people.
We reiterate our support for the central role of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Five Point Consensus, including the ASEAN Chair’s Special Envoy, in addressing the Myanmar and resultant refugee crisis. We strongly welcome collaboration between the ASEAN and United Nations (UN) Special Envoys. We call on the international community to continue to support the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 2669 (2022). We underline the need for accountability for all atrocities committed in Myanmar, human rights must be safeguarded, violations and abuses must be prevented.
We will continue to stand in solidarity with the people of Myanmar and support their vision for an inclusive, peaceful and prosperous future..."
Source/publisher:
European Union, Government of Australia, Government of Canada, Government of New Zealand, Government of Norway, Government of Switzerland, Government of the Republic of Korea, Government of the United Kingdom, US Department of State
Date of entry/update:
2025-01-31
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Type:
Individual Documents
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Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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"The international community must take urgent action to ensure accountability for atrocities in Myanmar, 46 organizations said today ahead of the four-year anniversary of the 1 February 2021 military coup.
This year represents a turning point for accountability in Myanmar. While the military remains in control, they are losing ground in many areas. Amid rapidly evolving patterns of hostilities and changing political dynamics, renewed efforts must push for justice and ensure a future built on a lasting culture of respect for human rights.
Since the 2021 coup, Myanmar’s military junta has killed more than 6,000 people, arbitrarily detained more than 20,000, and renewed judicial executions. More than 3.5 million people are internally displaced. Human rights groups have documented the military’s torture and other ill-treatment of detainees, indiscriminate attacks, and the denial of humanitarian aid, which may amount to crimes against humanity and war crimes.
Myanmar’s military junta has carried out widespread and systematic attacks against the civilian population nationwide, bombing schools, hospitals, and religious buildings with total impunity. Armed groups fighting the military have also committed human rights violations. While some have pledged to hold perpetrators accountable, it remains to be seen whether these efforts are genuine and can meet international standards.
Last year, 2024, also marked the worst year of violence against the Rohingya community since 2017, with men, women, and children dying in bombings while being trapped in the middle of the armed conflict between the Myanmar military and the armed group the Arakan Army in Rakhine State.
At the same time, Myanmar’s military has lost an unprecedented amount of territory across the country to a loose coalition of ethnic armed groups, which have captured two regional commands, high-ranking military officers, dozens of towns, and border crossings. These groups have also been implicated in human rights abuses.
In areas controlled by ethnic armed groups or overseen by the National Unity Government—formed by democratically elected lawmakers and officials ousted in the 2021 coup—local structures of governance and civil society are emerging. These include schools, hospitals, administrative offices, prisons, police stations, and courts.
Our undersigned organizations call on all parties to the armed conflict in Myanmar to comply with international humanitarian law and engage with international justice mechanisms, including the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar. All countries, including regional actors in ASEAN and neighbouring states, must increase pressure on the junta by blocking arms shipments, suspending aviation fuel shipments and supporting international justice mechanisms, including by prosecuting or extraditing any suspected perpetrators. ASEAN must move beyond its failed Five-Point Consensus and take decisive action to hold the junta accountable. We also urge the international community to commit to a coordinated, long-term international justice strategy.
Globally, some highly anticipated international justice efforts are moving forward. In November 2024, the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) Office of the Prosecutor requested an arrest warrant for Myanmar’s Senior General Min Aung Hlaing for the crimes against humanity of deportation and persecution of the Rohingya committed in Myanmar and in part in Bangladesh between August and December 2017. Requests targeting other senior military officials are expected.
If these requests are granted, authorities in ICC member states must urgently comply with an arrest warrant for a suspect present within their jurisdiction and hand the person over to the ICC to face their accusers in a fair trial for alleged crimes under international law. The international community must deny safe haven to those accused of serious crimes by ensuring their immediate arrest and transfer to the ICC. The world must not allow perpetrators to evade international justice.
While the present arrest warrant request is a welcome step, it remains limited in scope, location, and time and does not cover any alleged crimes after the 2021 coup. The ICC Prosecutor should demonstrate further progress in his investigation, including considering crimes under international law committed after 2017 and in the four years since the coup. The UN Security Council and Member States of the ICC must refer the full situation in all of Myanmar to the ICC to ensure justice for all victims.
Governments, donors, and international agencies should support and pursue a wide variety of accountability efforts, including universal jurisdiction,and the potential creation of ‘hybrid’ or similar tailored justice mechanisms. The international community must also impose a global arms embargo, suspend jet fuel exports, and engage with all relevant national stakeholders, including civil society and those most affected by crimes.
The UN Human Rights Council resolution from April 2024 stressed the need for “close and timely cooperation” between the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar, a body established by the UN Human Rights Council to collect and preserve evidence of atrocity crimes in Myanmar for future prosecutions, and “any future investigations or proceedings by national, regional or international courts or tribunals, including by the International Criminal Court or the International Court of Justice.”
It also requested the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights to maintain a focus on accountability regarding international human rights law, international humanitarian law, and the rule of law and submit a future report on ways to “fulfil the aspirations of the people of Myanmar for human rights protection, accountability, democracy, and a civilian government.”
Myanmar will be discussed at the upcoming UN Human Rights Council session from 24 February to 4 April 2025. UN member states must use this opportunity to take a bold and innovative approach on Myanmar and adopt a resolution aimed at breaking the cycle of impunity for atrocity crimes. The international community must also amplify the voices of survivors, activists and the people of Myanmar who continue to resist oppression at great personal risk.
Myanmar’s human rights crisis did not begin with the coup. Decades of oppression have led to this moment. Ending impunity requires bold and adapted solutions and long-term political and financial commitment. The world must act now..."
Source/publisher:
Amnesty International, Fortify Rights, Karen Human Rights Group, Refugees International
Date of entry/update:
2025-01-31
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Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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"GENEVA – Myanmar’s military ramped up violence against civilians last year to unprecedented levels, inflicting the heaviest civilian death toll since they launched their coup four years ago, the UN Human Rights Office reported on Friday.
An analysis of the conflict throughout 2024 found that as the military’s grip on power eroded, it launched wave after wave of retaliatory airstrikes and artillery shelling on civilians and civilian populated areas, forced thousands of young people into military service, conducted arbitrary arrests and prosecutions, caused mass displacement, and denied access to humanitarians, even in the face of natural disasters.
According to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP), at least 6,231 civilians have been killed by the military, including 1,144 women and 709 children, over the past four years. In 2024, at least 1,824 people were killed, including 531 women and 248 children, sharply up from the previous peak of 1,639 verified deaths in 2023.
“After four years, it is deeply distressing to find that the situation on the ground for civilians is only getting worse by the day,” said UN Human Rights Chief Volker Türk. “Even as the military’s power wanes, their atrocities and violence have expanded in scope and intensity,” he said, adding that the retaliatory nature of the attacks were designed to control, intimidate, and punish the population.
“This military-created human rights crisis has caused untold suffering through indiscriminate attacks against civilians, denial of humanitarian aid, and systematic violations of human rights.
“Without an immediate end to this brutality and accountability for the perpetrators, civilian casualties will continue to rise and the overall situation for civilians will inevitably continue to deteriorate.”
The analysis details acts of extreme brutality, including beheadings, burnings, mutilations, executions, torture and the use of human shields – all of which were carried out against civilians with absolute impunity. In many townships, soldiers attacked villages in the absence of active fighting, likely in retaliation for anti-military armed group advances in other areas.
Deliberate targeting of civilian infrastructure, schools, places of worship, healthcare facilities, IDP camps and public gatherings led to mass civilian casualties and displacement, and the interruption of essential services such as education and healthcare. Civilians also bore the brunt of communication shutdowns and extensive surveillance, hampering lifesaving and rescue operations.
Although not comparable to military violence in scale and scope, violence by anti-military armed groups in 2024 also caused protection concerns for civilians. The UN Human Rights Office received allegations of torture, extrajudicial killings, sexual violence, forced recruitment and other abuses committed by anti-military armed groups in areas under their control.
Türk said he was alarmed by the dramatic deterioration of the situation and grave protection risks in Rakhine State for all communities, including the Rohingya population.
“The Rohingya find themselves trapped between the warring Arakan Army and the military, with nowhere to turn for protection. They suffered throughout the year as their villages were burnt, and their youth were pressed into military service. Humanitarian assistance was cut off while they were forced repeatedly into displacement, fleeing in an effort to find any means of safety,” the High Commissioner said. He added that tens of thousands had sought refuge in Bangladesh and nearly 8,000 people since 2024 had attempted perilous sea travels to seek safety.
“As the Arakan Army have all but consolidated their control of Rakhine State, they must respect international human rights law and international humanitarian law, and protect all individuals within areas of their control,” said Türk.
Across Myanmar, nearly 20 million civilians are in need of humanitarian assistance. UN figures show that over 3.5 million people have been displaced, a third of whom are children, although data from civil society organizations suggest that the overall number may be more than double that.
A key driver of displacement in the past year was conscription and forced recruitment by the military of thousands of young people, including members of the Rohingya community, creating widespread fear. Tens of thousands of youths have gone into hiding or fled abroad, robbing the workforce of many aged between 18 and 35 and further aggravating the economic crisis.
Türk called on States with influence, particularly those in the region, to double down on bringing an end to the violence, to press for full and unhindered humanitarian assistance, to demand the release of all those detained on political grounds, to engage meaningfully with actors promoting democracy and human rights, and to ensure international protection for those fleeing the violence and persecution.
The High Commissioner added that ending impunity for the crimes committed also rests on the international community. He stressed that any sustainable political solution must be anchored in justice and accountability, to ensure that the people of Myanmar will never have to face the horrors they have endured for four years..."
Source/publisher:
UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (Geneva)
Date of entry/update:
2025-01-31
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Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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"OVERVIEW
Throughout 2024, Myanmar experienced intense and widespread conflict, pushing the number of people internally displaced beyond the 3.5 million mark and exacerbating an already dire humanitarian situation. In December, significant developments occurred, with ethnic armed organizations seizing strategic townships – many in border areas, such as in Rakhine, Kachin, and Shan State (North). The situation remained particularly volatile in the SouthEast, which became the second region after the North-West to surpass the milestone of leaving over 1 million people displaced. The conflict continued to be shaped by frequent airstrikes, indiscriminate shelling, landmines, improvised explosive devices, and clashes in urban areas. These methods of warfare have inflicted severe harm on children, women, and elderly people caught in the crossfire. Despite continued calls for a cessation of hostilities, the situation showed little improvement. In this complex environment, UNHCR and its partners continued to focus on lifesaving interventions, delivering critical humanitarian assistance while exploring ways to adapt and optimize aid for affected populations.
According to the Royal Thai Government, over 52,000 refugees have crossed into Thailand seeking protection since February 2021 and have subsequently returned from the temporary safety areas.
Since February 2021, approximately 71,200 people from Myanmar’s North-West region have sought protection in India, with 9,302 of them registered with UNHCR in Delhi. India has reportedly intensified efforts to fence its 1,643 km border with Myanmar, aiming to complete the project within the next decade. This initiative faced strong opposition from communities, particularly due to the termination of the Free Movement Regime (FMR). In place of the FMR, the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) introduced a new border pass system to regulate cross-border movement for residents living within 10 km of the Myanmar-Manipur border. The system, based on proof of identity and residence, permits Myanmar nationals and Manipur residents to cross the border for specific purposes, such as visiting relatives, tourism, business, or medical needs. The MHA also reinstated the Protected Area Regime in Manipur, Nagaland, and Mizoram, requiring foreign nationals, including those from Myanmar, to obtain Protected Area Permits before entry. Citing heightened security concerns in border areas, the MHA has also mandated all foreign visitors to register with the Foreigners Registration Officer within 24 hours of arrival. However, the Mizoram Government has urged the MHA to review this decision because of its implications on tourism, cross-border movements, and trade, particularly for new arrivals from Myanmar. Addressing the pressing requirements for food, shelter, health and winterization supplies in Manipur and Mizoram remain essential. The limited resources available to humanitarian organizations and local author-ities continues to place significant pressure on the relevant actors and host communities to provide critical lifesaving support..."
Source/publisher:
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (Geneva) via Reliefweb (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2025-01-30
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
UNHCR (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees), Agriculture in Burma/Myanmar: general and research, Education in Burma/Myanmar - general, Food Security and nutrition in Burma/Myanmar, Human Rights and international relations
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"SG/SM/22541
The following statement was issued today by the Spokesman for UN Secretary-General António Guterres:
Four years since the military seized power and arbitrarily detained members of the democratically elected Government on 1 February 2021, the situation in Myanmar continues to deteriorate, with devastating consequences for civilians.
The Secretary-General condemns all forms of violence and calls on all parties to the conflict to exercise maximum restraint, uphold human rights and international humanitarian law, and prevent further incitement of violence and intercommunal tensions. He reiterates his concern regarding the military’s stated intention to hold elections amid intensifying conflict, including aerial bombardment and widespread human rights violations and without conditions that permit the people of Myanmar to freely and peacefully exercise their political rights, including safety and security.
Over 19.9 million people in Myanmar — more than one third of its population — need humanitarian assistance, compared to 1 million before the military took over four years ago. Unimpeded access must be assured to enable the UN and its partners to continue to deliver humanitarian assistance and essential services.
The Secretary-General renews his calls for greater cooperation among all stakeholders to bring an end to the hostilities and help the people of Myanmar forge a path towards an inclusive democratic transition and return to civilian rule. The Secretary-General also appeals to countries in the region to grant access to safety and protection for those fleeing conflict and persecution and for the international community to provide greater support to countries, including Bangladesh, hosting refugees from Myanmar.
The Secretary-General’s Special Envoy, Julie Bishop, remains actively engaged with all stakeholders, in close cooperation with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), in the search of a Myanmar-led resolution to the crisis.
A viable future for Myanmar must ensure safety, accountability and opportunity for all its communities, including the Rohingya, and address the root causes of conflict, discrimination and disenfranchisement in all its forms. The Secretary-General reaffirms the unwavering support of the United Nations to the people of Myanmar in these efforts..."
Source/publisher:
UN Secretary-General
Date of entry/update:
2025-01-30
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Armed conflict and peace-building in Burma - theoretical, strategic and general
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"Four years ago, Myanmar’s elected government was overthrown by the military. Since then, according to substantial evidence collected and analysed by the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar, serious international crimes have been committed across the country.
Protests against the military regime were suppressed with often lethal violence. Thousands of perceived opponents have been unlawfully imprisoned, where many have suffered torture, sexual violence and other abuses. Increasingly frequent and indiscriminate air strikes, artillery and drone attacks have killed civilians, driven survivors from their homes, and destroyed hospitals, schools and places of worship.
While most of the evidence the Mechanism has collected concerns crimes committed by the Myanmar military, we are also investigating disturbing reports of atrocities committed by other armed groups, including rape, killings and torture. The Mechanism is collecting evidence of serious international crimes committed throughout Myanmar, regardless of the ethnicity, religion, or politics of the perpetrators or victims.
The Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) has requested an arrest warrant for Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, Commander-in-Chief of the Myanmar Defence Services, for crimes committed against the Rohingya during the clearance operations in 2016 and 2017. However, there are currently no judicial proceedings for any serious international crimes committed since the military takeover. We believe that impunity for crimes emboldens perpetrators to commit more violence, and ending this impunity is necessary for Myanmar to build a peaceful future for all its people.
The Mechanism stands ready to assist authorities who are willing and able to investigate and prosecute these cases. Until the perpetrators are brought to justice, violence will continue to spiral, and the suffering of Myanmar’s people will only increase..."
Source/publisher:
UN Human Rights Council (Geneva)
Date of entry/update:
2025-01-30
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Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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"GENEVA – The fourth anniversary of the military coup in Myanmar is a time to mourn the loss of thousands of innocent lives at the hands of a brutal military regime while celebrating the heroism of those who continue to stand up for human rights in a country under siege, a UN expert said today.
“It is also a time for the international community to provide the people of Myanmar a genuine partnership to help end this nightmare,” said Tom Andrews, Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in Myanmar.
Andrews said four years of military oppression, violence and incompetence have cast Myanmar into an abyss.
“Junta forces have slaughtered thousands of civilians, bombed and burned villages, and displaced millions of people. More than 20,000 political prisoners remain behind bars. The economy and public services have collapsed. Famine and starvation loom over large parts of the population,” the Special Rapporteur said.
“The junta’s plans, including holding sham elections this year in a backdrop of escalating armed conflict and human rights violations, are a path to ruin,” Andrews said.
He said it was not possible to hold a legitimate election while arresting, detaining, torturing and executing leaders of the opposition and when it is illegal for journalists or citizens to criticise the junta.
“Governments should dismiss these plans for what they are – a fraud,” Andrews said.
He lauded pro-democracy activists, journalists, doctors, human rights defenders and citizens from all walks of life who have risked their lives to fight for Myanmar’s future.
“The resilience and courage of Myanmar’s people continue to amaze and inspire others around the world. I am heartened by the courageous efforts of those documenting the junta’s crimes, caring for those injured by the attacks, providing food and shelter to those displaced, and teaching children whose education was upended by the coup. These heroic efforts are compelling indicators that Myanmar’s best days lie ahead,” the expert said.
Andrews said action by member states including targeted sanctions and a crackdown on the arms trade by Singapore have contributed to a one-third drop in the volume of weapons and military supplies the junta has been able to purchase through the formal banking system since the year ending March 2023.
“When governments muster the political will, they help save lives and support freedom in Myanmar,” the Special Rapporteur said, calling for stronger action from the international community. “The failure of the Security Council to take action requires that UN Member States who support human rights coordinate strong, sustained actions that can deny the junta the means to continue its brutality against the people of Myanmar.”
He urged governments to back efforts to hold perpetrators of grave human rights violations accountable, including in the International Criminal Court (ICC), and by supporting the democratic movement and civil society as they build the foundation for a strong justice system and transitional justice processes.
“Impunity has enabled a decades-long cycle of violence and oppression in Myanmar. Ultimately, this sad chapter of Myanmar’s history must end with junta leaders being prosecuted for their crimes,” Andrews said..."
Source/publisher:
UN Human Rights Council (Geneva)
Date of entry/update:
2025-01-30
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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"The number of IDPs in the South-East increased from 1,022,800 last week to 1,035,200 this week due to ongoing conflict and instability across multiple regions.
In Kayin State, 175 people from Shwe Hpar La Kya village, Hpapun Township, were displaced to Hpa-An Township, and 2,300 people from Ka Taking Ti village, Sin Swe village, Hpapun Township, were displaced to Kamarmaung Town due to the intensified fighting including artillery shelling and airstrike. 48 people from Pyar Sa Khan village, Thandaunggyi Township were displaced to Thandaunggyi Town due to armed conflict.
In Tanintharyi Region, 9,905 people from Pa Ra Dat, Le Shaung villages, Yebyu township were newly displaced within the same township and 1,885 IDPs from Pa Ra Dat village, Yebyu township were displaced as a secondary displacement within the township..."
Source/publisher:
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (Geneva)
Date of entry/update:
2025-01-27
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Burma: Internal displacement/forced migration of several ethnic groups.
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Format :
pdf
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3.85 MB
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"In the South-East, slightly decreased from 1,019,400 last week to 1,016,900 this week.
In Kayin State, the intensified fighting displaced 1,203 people within Kyainseikgyi Township, 95 within Thandaunggyi Township, and also forced 99 to flee from villages to Hpapun town.
In Mon State, 2,068 people had to flee within Billin Township due to indiscriminate shelling and airstrikes.
In Tanintharyi Region, 1,387 people who were displaced in December in Dawai returned to their place of origin this month. Similarly, 3,270 IDPs 3270 IDPs returned to their place of origin to Auk Kyauk Wut village and Pa Nyit village in Launlong Township.
Another trend of return could be observed in Kayah State, where almost 2,800 displaced people who were in Shan State (South) returned to Laikaw town.
In Bago Region (East), troop reinforcement by the Tatmadaw and airstrikes forced 74 people to flee within Yedashe Township..."
Source/publisher:
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (Geneva) via Reliefweb (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2025-01-18
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
UNHCR (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees), Human Rights and international relations
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Format :
pdf
Size:
3.86 MB
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"Echoes of Anger: Social Media Responses to Increasing Violence in Myanmar
This brief provides an analysis of sentiments expressed in 2,106 public comments in response to 13 Facebook posts published by news sources on social media in Myanmar between June and October 2024. It offers a unique insight into public reactions, the emotional responses to events of those posting the comments, and perspectives on key humanitarian issues.
The 13 Facebook posts covered events involving:
humanitarian blockades and resource restrictions
the targeting of international and local NGOs [AP1] and health care workers; and
looting by armed actors.
The comments included opinions relevant to an acceptance-based security risk management strategy in the form of opinions related to aid workers or aid groups (6 comments) and blockades (237 comments). Overall, the social media space in Myanmar was highly polarised in the period that was studied, with most comments containing strong opinions rather than references to neutral facts.
Criticism of military actions against aid workers or aid groups was common:
The analysis highlights that most criticisms of military actions against NGOs and aid workers were rooted in strong personal anger. Explicit references to international humanitarian law or related legal frameworks were rare, but were present in some posts.
Criticism of aid workers or aid groups was not commonly voiced in response to these 13 posts, but social media users were not convinced that aid agencies remained neutral, and several posts alleged that they were involved in smuggling of some kind.
Military blockades elicited mainly negative comments and included nuances such as criticism of their humanitarian impact on health care and aid, frustration over the economic consequences of blockades like disrupted trade and shortages of supplies, and general condemnation of the military’s tactics.
Comments also included insights on other key concerns:
Protection and accountability concerns: Several comments highlighted the need to safeguard humanitarian operations and uphold human rights, reflecting public expectations of accountability in conflict-affected areas.
Criticism of the media: Some comments criticised perceived media bias or misinformation, which may affect public trust and influence the narrative around aid efforts.
Hate speech and ethnic hostility: Evidence of hate speech and ethnic hostility in comments underscores the need for aid agencies to incorporate protection obligations.
Sentiment towards China: A strong negative attitude towards China was evident, often linked to its perceived role in the conflict. Understanding these sentiments is critical for security risk management processes and navigating local dynamics to ensure effective aid delivery.
Help support the protection of health care by sharing this resource. Please copy and paste this link: bit.ly/25Dec-07Jan2025MMRHealth
Past incident briefs: 11-24 December; 27 November-10 December; 13-26 November; 30 October-12 November; All
SHCC Factsheets: Burmese: 2023. English: 2023: 2022; 2021; 2020
Please get in touch if you are interested in curated datasets, have made a public statement that you would like us to include in our Bi Monthly News Brief, to report an incident or if you have additional information on an incident we have reported on. Join our Myanmar mailing list for regular updates..."
Source/publisher:
Insecurity Insight (Geneva) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2025-01-17
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Public Health, Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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Format :
pdf
Size:
1.26 MB
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Description:
"The ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights (APHR) unequivocally condemns the recent airstrike by Myanmar’s military on Kyauk Ni Maw village in Rakhine State on 9 January 2025; and the continuing bombing of other cities like Kyauktaw and Ponnagyun.
As of 9 January 2025, this devastating attack, which claimed the lives of at least 41 civilians, including women and children, and left more than 52 others injured, demonstrates the junta’s escalating violence and blatant disregard for human life. Due to the cutoff of internet and mobile phone services, communication and the provision of medical assistance have become even more difficult, with uncertainty about when the next attack might occur. This has significantly increased the likelihood of further deaths. Over 500 homes were destroyed in the aftermath, leaving a community in ruins and intensifying Myanmar’s growing humanitarian crisis.
The airstrike, targeting an area under the control of the Arakan Army, follows an alarming pattern of military operations deliberately aimed at civilians in ethnic minority regions. The Myanmar junta’s indiscriminate use of violence against ethnic groups and pro-democracy movements further underscores its contempt for international humanitarian law and universally recognised human rights norms.
“This atrocity is yet another stark reminder of the Myanmar military’s systematic brutality and its targeted assaults on civilians, especially in ethnic minority areas,” said Mercy Chriesty Barends, APHR Co-Chairperson and member of Indonesia’s House of Representatives.
“Enough is enough! ASEAN and the international community can no longer turn a blind eye to these crimes. Decisive action must be taken to hold the junta accountable and end the relentless suffering of Myanmar’s people, “ she added.
The massacre in Kyauk Ni Maw is part of a broader trajectory of violence that has persisted since the junta’s unlawful coup in February 2021. These crimes include widespread airstrikes, arbitrary detentions, and systematic attacks on ethnic and religious minorities. Millions have been displaced, impoverished, and left at risk of starvation, compounding an already dire humanitarian situation.
APHR expresses profound concern over ASEAN’s continuing failure to address the crisis effectively. Despite a series of statements and initiatives, the regional bloc has yet to implement meaningful measures to hold the junta accountable for its egregious actions.
Wong Chen, APHR Board Member and member of the Malaysian Parliament urged bold measures: “ASEAN must suspend Myanmar’s participation in all meetings, isolate the military diplomatically, and devise a comprehensive strategy to dismantle the junta’s machinery of terror. Silence is complicity, and ASEAN’s credibility as a regional organisation is at stake.”
With the upcoming ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting (AMM) Retreat in Langkawi on 18–19 January 2025, APHR emphasises the urgent need to prioritise the atrocities in Myanmar on the agenda. Rangsiman Rome, APHR Board Member and member of Thailand’s Parliament stressed, “These atrocities must not be treated as business as usual. ASEAN has a responsibility to act decisively and demonstrate that it values justice and human dignity.”
ASEAN’s unique position as a neighbouring bloc with direct influence on Myanmar demands leadership in addressing these atrocities. Arlene D. Brosas, APHR Board Member and member of the Philippines House of Representatives, pointedly stated, “The resilience of Myanmar’s people in the face of unimaginable cruelty is remarkable. But resilience should not be mistaken for an absence of suffering. The world owes it to them to act decisively and deliver justice.”
APHR calls on the United Nations and the broader international community to escalate targeted sanctions against the junta’s leadership and their revenue streams, including the natural gas sector. Humanitarian assistance must be significantly expanded, particularly for ethnic minority regions such as Rakhine, to ensure immediate relief for those in need.
APHR reaffirms its unwavering solidarity with the people of Myanmar. The organisation calls for urgent, coordinated action to end these atrocities, hold perpetrators accountable for crimes against humanity, and restore democracy and civilian rule in Myanmar. ###..."
Source/publisher:
ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights
Date of entry/update:
2025-01-11
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Arakan (Rakhine) State - reports etc. by date (latest first), Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
Local URL:
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Description:
"In the afternoon of Wednesday 8th January, air strikes carried out by Myanmar’s military junta struck the village of Kyauk Ni Maw, in Ramree Township in the country’s Rakhine (also known as Arakan) state, killing at least 41 civilians and injuring 52 more.
The targeted village is predominantly Muslim and under the control of the Arakan Army (AA), an armed group in Western Rakhine. The attack caused widespread damage and devastation to the area, igniting fires which destroyed over 500 homes. According to locals, there were numerous women, children and elderly residents among the victims.
It was also reported that the situation in Kyauk Ni Maw cannot be independently confirmed, as access to the internet and mobile phone services in the area has been largely cut off.
U Khaing Thukha, a spokesperson for the AA has denounced the attacks, claiming it as a war crime. He stated that “Assaulting unarmed civilians in an area free from conflict is explicitly a war crime.”
The AA is one of countless armed groups engaged in combat with the Myanmar military junta across the country. The AA is currently battling the junta for control of Rakhine, where it has already captured swathes of territory within the last year.
Rakhine state has experienced the highest numbers of civilian casualties in the country since the military ousted Aung San Suu Kyi‘s civilian government in a military coup in February 2021, which ignited a national armed uprising and the development of countless armed factions.
Since 1 February 2021, AOAV has recorded an 857% increase in civilian casualties in Myanmar, from 353 to 3,379, 28% (1,930) of which were recorded in Rakhine. Between 2021 and 2024, the military junta has intensified its air strikes across the country, for example, the number of airstrikes increased by 2,563%, from 8 to 213 between 2021 to 2024. The number of civilian casualties as a result has increased by 3,145%, from 62 to 2,012 between the same time period.
Overall 2024 was the most harmful year since AOAV records began in 2010, overtaking 2023, which had previously been Myanmar’s most violent year. In 2024, AOAV recorded 451 incidents of explosive violence in Myanmar, resulting in 3,776 casualties, 89% (3,379) of which were civilians (1,494 killed and 1,885 injured). The military junta accounted for 88% of civilian casualties in 2024, whereas non-state actors accounted for 9% of civilian casualties.
So far in the first nine days of January 2025, AOAV has recorded 4 incidents of explosive violence, resulting in 83 casualties, 80% (66) of which were civilians (44 killed and 22 injured), this figure is mainly comprised of casualties from the attack on Kyauk Ni Maw village. The numbers of civilian casualties in Myanmar are expected to continue rising as the year goes on, with the conflict showing no sign of de-escalation and civilian casualties increasing year on year.
AOAV’s casualty figures represent the lowest of estimations in terms of the number of people killed and injured by explosive weapon use. In an effort to quantify the explicit harm caused by specific explosive weapons, AOAV solely records incident-specific casualty figures, as reported in English-language media.
AOAV condemns the use of violence against civilians and the use of explosive weapons in populated areas. All actors should stop using explosive weapons with wide-area effects where there is likely to be a high concentration of civilians..."
Source/publisher:
Action on Armed Violence (London) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2025-01-10
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Arakan (Rakhine) State - reports etc. by date (latest first), Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
Local URL:
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Description:
"Escalating conflict and civilian casualties in Rakhine State
The humanitarian community is deeply alarmed by the recent reports of civilian casualties in Rakhine State. On 8 January 2025 an aerial attack in Kyauk Nima Village in Ramree Township reportedly killed over 40 civilians, including children and women, and injured more than 20 people. It is reported that around 500 homes were allegedly destroyed, with children, women, and elderly people among the casualties. Fighting in Rakhine has recently escalated, with civilians paying the highest price of the conflict. Civilians face extreme risks, acute food insecurity and a near total collapse of critical public services. The humanitarian community reiterates our call on all parties to the conflict to uphold their obligations under international humanitarian law, to ensure the protection of civilians and civilian property, humanitarian workers and supplies, and to guarantee unimpeded humanitarian access to deliver aid to the most vulnerable..."
Source/publisher:
UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2025-01-10
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
The discussion on humanitarian assistance to Burma, Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
489.51 KB
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Description:
"ABOUT THIS REPORT
This report describes the recent changes in the INFORM Severity Index scores of humanitarian crises in Myanmar from January 2021 to July 2024. The selected period covers the military coup in February 2021, which has significantly affected the humanitarian situation in the country. July 2024 was selected as the endpoint of the period to set a closed time frame and relate changes in the INFORM Severity Index scores to specific events. The report explores INFORM Severity Index data to delineate the trends in scores over this period, with a focus on the changes deemed most significant. Additional contextual analysis was conducted to investigate and explain the drivers of the trends observed.
The INFORM Severity Index
The INFORM Severity Index is a composite index that measures the severity of humanitarian crises against a common scale at the global level. The goal is to support prioritisation in humanitarian funding and response. The index allows users to compare the severity of different humanitarian crises across the world. It is based on three dimensions: impact of the crisis, conditions of people affected, and complexity of the crisis, which are further divided into categories, then into components, and then into core indicators. The Joint Research Centre of the European Commission collaborates with INFORM stakeholders to develop and maintain the index’s methodology. ACAPS is responsible for data collection, adhering closely to the established methodology. In this report, ACAPS uses the full description of the INFORM Severity Index concept and methodology document to explain trends.1
Note on the contribution of core indicators to INFORM Severity Index scores
While some core indicators can contribute to INFORM Severity Index scores, they might not generate a change in the score in a given month because of various factors. These factors include gradual changes in the core indicators, the core indicators having less weight as per the design of the INFORM Severity Index formula, and certain conditions assigned to the INFORM Severity Index formula. For example, displacements (which affects two core indicators in the index) related to the country-level crisis in Myanmar have been on an increasing trend, but given the design of the INFORM Severity Index formula and the gradual change in displacements, the increase in displacements itself has not triggered any month-to-month change in the INFORM Severity Index score of the country-level crisis..."
Source/publisher:
ACAPS via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2025-01-09
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
2.75 MB
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Description:
"Description of the crisis:
Since 1 February 2021, Myanmar has been experiencing a political crisis, which has led to widespread civil unrest and a humanitarian emergency that affects people in numerous regions in the country. The escalation of violence and security incidents since February 2021 has generated a significant rise in the number of internally displaced people (IDP) in the country. Recent and more historic humanitarian needs of IDPs continue to be the requirements for access to food, healthcare services, housing items and appropriate clothing in certain areas to mitigate the diverse climate conditions as people move between regions.
Despite the still mounting humanitarian needs, the ability to provide principled humanitarian assistance has been severely impeded due to multiple factors such as movement restrictions (including the need for authorizations and roadblocks), security concerns, limitations on electricity and internet access, as well as banking challenges. In February 2023, the State Administration Council (SAC) issued a six-month extension of the then two-year state of emergency with martial law established in 47 townships in Myanmar.
Armed conflicts and clashes remain present, and are escalating, in states and regions across the country. This has led to more than 1.4 million internally displaced people (IDP) since February 2021, out of the total 1.85 million IDPs (UNHCR, Myanmar Operational Data Portal, 26 June 2023). Many of these people remain in informal settlements across the country. In April 2023, OCHA estimated that 60,000 civilian properties, including houses, places of faith (churches and monasteries), and schools have been burnt or destroyed.
The economic situation remains fragile due to transportation challenges (roadblocks and insecure transit in some locations), increased demands as populations move between geographic areas, currency devaluation and rampant inflation. The prices of the basic food basket and household items, fuel, and transportation have increased. At the end of 2022, almost half the population in the country was estimated to be living in poverty due to the pre-existing impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic and the political crisis leading to loss of livelihood and employment3 . The UN Humanitarian Response Plan, published in January 2023, estimated 17.6 million people (a third of the population) to be in need of humanitarian assistance..."
Source/publisher:
International Federation of Red Cross And Red Crescent Societies (Geneva) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2025-01-08
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Food Security and nutrition in Burma/Myanmar, Public Health, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
1.59 MB
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Description:
"OVERVIEW
Since the military takeover in February 2021, the political and security landscape in Myanmar has plunged millions into a deepening humanitarian crisis. This month marks one year since the escalation of conflict that has spread across multiple regions of the country. Civilians continue to face serious protection risks, including conscription, human rights violations and insufficient resources to meet basic needs. Ongoing territorial conflicts have disrupted key access roads, restricting freedom of movement, impeding supply routes and driving up commodity prices, further exacerbating humanitarian needs.
Over a month after torrential monsoon rains and Typhoon Yagi struck Myanmar, impacting some 70 townships across 11 states and regions, an estimated 1.1 million people continue to deal with the aftermath. The catastrophic floods that followed have caused widespread damage, destroying houses and critical infrastructures – water sources, schools, roads and community facilities – and flooded crops and washed away livestock. The states and regions most affected include Nay Pyi Taw, Bago, Kayah, Kayin, Magway, Mandalay, Mon, and eastern and southern Shan states. This disaster has added another layer of complexity and vulnerability to an already precarious situation marked by conflict.
Access remains challenging in some areas with roads and bridges in need of urgent repairs to facilitate the delivery of urgent, life-saving assistance. Many families are without shelter and access to basic services, having lost basic household items such as kitchen utensils, bedding, water storage, facilities, and other daily essentials. UNHCR is actively responding to the most urgent needs, working alongside partners and other UN Agencies, particularly in the north-west and south-east of the country.
According to the Royal Thai Government, over 52,000 refugees crossed into Thailand seeking protection since February 2021. Most have since returned to Myanmar and no new arrivals have been reported since June 2024.
Since February 2021, close to 70,000 people from Myanmar’s North-West region have sought protection in India. Out of this population, 8,241 are registered with UNHCR. The Indian Army Chief recently reaffirmed India's commitment to sheltering displaced people from Myanmar and providing essential aid. This statement follows recent clashes in the Ukhrul district, which resulted in six casualties, underscoring the challenges border communities and newly arrived Myanmar refugees face. Reports suggest an increase in new arrivals from Myanmar to border villages in Manipur's Tengnoupal and Chandel districts. Humanitarian agencies reported improvement in the security situation in Manipur's border districts although strict curfews remain in effect in some locations. While essential services remained operational, heavy rainfall significantly disrupted economic activities, leaving both host communities and displaced people without livelihoods. Newly arrived populations face acute shortages of food, medical care and essential commodities. Recogizing the impact on communities in the region, local authorities have called for additional government resources for the response..."
Source/publisher:
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (Geneva) via Reliefweb (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2024-11-22
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Agriculture in Burma/Myanmar: general and research, Education in Burma/Myanmar - general, Food Security and nutrition in Burma/Myanmar, Public Health, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
9.08 MB
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Description:
"Insecurity Insight identified 1501 incidents of violence against or obstruction of health care in Myanmar since the military coup on 01 February 2021 and 01 October 2024. At least 126 health workers were killed in 99 incidents. Some health workers were shot and killed while they travelled to provide medical care to remote areas or at home, others were killed in Myanmar military airstrikes. Eight health workers were tortured and killed.
The Myanmar armed forces were most commonly identified as the perpetrators. Health worker killings were documented in 13 of Myanmar’s 21 administrative divisions with high numbers recorded in Mandalay region, followed by Sagaing region.
The data with details on location, reported conflict party, weapon used and brief description is available here for download. Explore this interactive map to see where incidents happened. Data is updated on HDX every Monday. Registered HDX user? Follow us for the latest dataset updates. Numbers may change if or when further information is made available. Please get in touch if you’re interested in curated datasets.
Past incident briefs: 18 September-01 October; 04-17 September; 21 August-03 September; 07-20 August; All
SHCC Factsheets: Burmese: 2023. English: 2023: 2022; 2021; 2020
Please get in touch if you are interested in curated datasets, have made a public statement that you would like us to include in our Bi Monthly News Brief, to report an incident or if you have additional information on an incident we have reported on. Join our Myanmar mailing list for regular updates. Help support the protection of health care by sharing this resource. Please copy and paste this link: bit.ly/02-15Oct2024MMRHealth
Documented incidents
02 October 2024: In Maung Htaung village and village tract, Budalin township, Monywa district, Sagaing region, a rural health centre, a school, and a monastery were damaged and a civilian injured by bombs and gunfire from two Myanmar military fighter jets. These civilian infrastructure were targeted because local resistance forces used them as temporary shelters during an armed clash between the local resistance forces and the Myanmar military at a nearby village on 30 September. Sources: Democratic Voice of Burma, Khit Thit Media and Mandalay Free Press
03 October 2024: In Kyauk Maw village, Thit Seint Kone village tract, Mongmit township and district, Shan state, a sub-rural health centre was damaged and a health worker injured by bombs dropped by a Myanmar military fighter jet. Although it was a public health facility, it was operated by volunteer health workers and was functioning at the time of the attack. Source: The 74 Media
06 October 2024: In Khin-U town and township, Shwebo district, Sagaing region, a township hospital occupied by the Myanmar military was attacked with small firearms and armed drones by the local resistance forces, damaging the roofs, ceilings, windows, and walls of hospital buildings and staff houses. There were no casualties. The hospital was functioning at the time of the attack. Sources: Khit Thit Media and NP News
08 October 2024: In Pan Ni Lar village and village tract, Ponnagyun township, Sittwe district, Rakhine state, a makeshift hospital based at a school was damaged by bombs dropped by a Myanmar military fighter jet. There were no casualties. The hospital was functioning at the time of the attack. After the town had been taken over by the Arakan Army, the township hospital was temporarily relocated to the school. Source: Development Media Group
12 October 2024: At a PDF checkpoint near Thone Gwa village and village tract, Kyaikto township and district, Mon state, a female nurse and her husband (a lieutenant of the Myanmar military) were arrested by the PDF. Sources: Khit Thit Media and Mandalay News
12 October 2024: In Myit Chay town, Pakokku township and district, Magway region, a private clinic was raided by the Myanmar military. The doors and windows were destroyed and all the rooms were inspected. The doctor was in the operation theatre at the time of the raid and he was not harmed. The mobile phones and money of the patients were confiscated. The medicines were confiscated, alleging the clinic had provided treatment to PDF. Sources: Facebook and Khit Thit Media
14 October 2024: In Ei Naing village and village tract, Lashio township and district, Shan state , a rural health centre, a church, and at least 20 civilian houses were damaged by bombs dropped by a Myanmar military fighter jet. Three were killed and three injured. Sources: Irrawaddy and Shan News
Insecurity Insight. 2024. 02-15 October 2024, Attacks on Health Care in Myanmar. Switzerland: Insecurity Insight. bit.ly/02-15Oct2024MMRHealth..."
Source/publisher:
Insecurity Insight (Geneva) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2024-10-25
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Public Health, Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
1.1 MB
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Description:
"Context:
Between the coup on the 1st of February 2021 and the end of June 2024, the State Administration Council (SAC) has killed over 5,350 civilians, detained and imprisoned over 26,500 human rights defenders. There are now over 3 million internally displaced persons (IDP) nationwide, with over 1.1 million IDPs in southeastern Myanmar.
The Myanmar Armed Forces (MAF), following widespread territorial losses on the ground, have continued to launch prolonged indiscriminate air strikes and heavy artillery fire throughout the country, with a devastating impact on the civil population. Hospitals, schools and places of worship have been destroyed by the MAF, in in clear violation of international humanitarian law. Human security continues to deteriorate around the country, but particularly in disputed terrorises due to heavy fighting, and the continued threat of airstrikes.
Refugee flows into Thailand from Myanmar have continued throughout the first half of 2024. This displacement has been exacerbated by the SAC’s announcement in February that they would introduce mandatory conscription into the armed forces. Displacement into Thailand has primarily been into refugee camps, remote communities in rural Thailand and increasingly urban areas.
Thailand launched a humanitarian initiative early in the year, aiming to provide aid to conflict affected communities in Myanmar, in part to reduce further displacement into Thailand. This effort was widely criticised by civil society and the NUG for its engagement with the SAC. There was one shipment of aid that took place in March. The potential for future versions of the Humanitarian Initiative which would instead engage civil society based cross-border aid modalities instead of the SAC seemed likely. However, momentum slowed following a cabinet reshuffle in April which led to the resignation of Foreign Minister Parnpree Bahiddha-nukara, who had spearheaded the initiative..."
Source/publisher:
The Border Consortium (Thailand) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2024-10-25
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Food Security and nutrition in Burma/Myanmar, Human Rights and international relations, TBC, TBBC, : Annual reports and 6-monthly Programme Reports
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
867.22 KB
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Description:
"MESSAGE FROM THE HEAD OF THE MECHANISM
Last month, floods caused by Typhoon Yagi ripped through Myanmar leading to widespread death, damage and displacement. This natural disaster has compounded the devastation caused by multiple armed conflicts, and by war crimes and crimes against humanity that are being committed with impunity across the country. As detailed in the Mechanism’s recent Annual Report and in my statement to the Human Rights Council in September, these crimes have become increasingly brutal.
Unfortunately, on an almost daily basis the Mechanism receives reports of new atrocities including aerial attacks on civilian targets, unlawful imprisonment, torture in detention centres, violent sexual and gender-based crimes, the burning of villages, beheadings and the public display of sexually mutilated bodies. Many of these crimes appear to be committed to punish and induce terror in the civilian population.
Most of the information we have collected concerns crimes committed by the Myanmar security forces. However, we are increasingly collecting credible evidence that armed groups fighting against the military are also perpetrating crimes, such as the execution of civilians suspected of being military informers or collaborators. We are investigating all perpetrators of serious international crimes, no matter their political affiliation, beliefs or ethnicity.
We recently opened new investigations in Rakhine State where fighting between the Arakan Army and the military has escalated, and there are allegations of crimes by multiple armed groups involved in the conflict. We have received shocking reports of killings, torture and rapes, and we are collecting and verifying information received and seeking to identify those persons responsible for these crimes. Civilians from all ethnicities in Rakhine have suffered, but the Rohingya population are particularly vulnerable. They have been directly targeted and tens of thousands have had to flee their homes.
The echoes of the 2016 and 2017 clearance operations against the Rohingya are impossible to ignore. In August, I released a statement commemorating seven years since the violent attacks that forced hundreds of thousands of Rohingya to flee Myanmar. I reflected that the current situation in Rakhine and elsewhere in the country is the result of decades of impunity. When crimes go unpunished, perpetrators are emboldened to commit more crimes. The Mechanism was created to fight against this impunity. In this regard, we have accelerated the volume of information and analysis we are sharing with the authorities conducting proceedings concerning crimes against the Rohingya at the International Criminal Court, the International Court of Justice and in Argentina.
Our fight against impunity would be impossible without courageous individuals and organizations who share information with us in the most challenging of circumstances. Internet blackouts, blocked technologies and increased surveillance deepen the security risks people take to engage with us. We are doing all we can to make their interactions with us as safe as possible, and to ensure that the risks they take are not in vain. I am optimistic that the information people share with us now will one day bring the perpetrators of these horrific crimes to justice..."
Source/publisher:
UN Human Rights Council (Geneva) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2024-10-25
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
UN human rights documents on Myanmar, UN Human Rights pages on Myanmar, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Format :
pdf pdf
Size:
2.29 MB 2.38 MB
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Description:
"Executive summary:
Since the military takeover on 1 February 2021, the security situation in Myanmar has deteriorated, poverty levels have risen – to 40 per cent of the population living below the national poverty line – and the number of displaced persons has increased sharply. The economy has contracted with international investors pulling out, and job losses and underemployment have increased significantly. Democratic space has come under pressure with the military authorities cracking down on civil protest, trade union leaders and political opponents. Human rights violations, particularly of civil rights, have been documented and investigated in detail by a Commission of Inquiry (COI) established by the Governing Body of the International Labour Organization (ILO).
This study was undertaken to analyse and better understand how these developments have impacted child labour in Myanmar, and to provide inputs and advice on viable strategies to address child labour in the current circumstances. It includes a situational assessment, covering trends and developments in child labour in ethnically controlled areas in four states – Mon, Kayin, Kayah (Karenni) and Shan States. It also includes case studies of children engaged in child labour which illustrate key themes and developments in the incidence, nature and causes of child labour in Myanmar. The study was carried out in 2023–24, with field work conducted virtually in early 2024 due to the challenging security situation in the country. The study’s key conclusions of the study are based on the results of the field work, supplemented by the results of other recent studies and research. It is safe to assume that the conclusions have some applicability outside the study areas, even though statistically valid estimations of child labour are beyond the scope of this study.
Key conclusions
This study finds that the military takeover has impacted child labour in the four study areas – and most likely in all of Myanmar – in a number of ways. The top line conclusions are that:
The risk of child labour appears to have increased since the military takeover. As a result of the deteriorating security and economic situation, more children are on the move, live in poverty, and face restrictions to their movements (such as checkpoints and documentation requirements that are difficult to meet). All of these factors increase the risk of child labour.
These “outside” factors are significant drivers of child labour in Myanmar (and other conflict areas), and are underpinned by perceptions and cultural norms about who is a “good child” that pre-date the military takeover. They are also underpinned by perceptions and experiences of security and insecurity that are very significant in shaping preferences, for example, for work rather than education when schools are not regarded as safe.
There has been a noticeable shift in attitudes towards child labour in Myanmar, primarily driven by a desire to avoid conscription. With the renewed enforcement of the People’s Military Service Law of 20102 by the military authorities, and conscription by some ethnic armed groups, many families now regard child labour as a means of keeping their children safe from recruitment into armed conflict. This change in perceptions appears to have contributed to an increase in child labour.
The renewed enforcement of the conscription law has also prompted many able-bodied adults to flee, leaving children behind to take up the economic responsibilities in their households.
The nature of child labour in Myanmar appears to be evolving. While children are still primarily engaged in agriculture, there seems to be greater vulnerability to the worst forms of child labour. These include forced recruitment into armed conflict, as well as recruitment into criminal activities. Early marriages also appear to be increasing. The recruitment of children into the gambling and scamming industry appears to be of particular concern in border areas (Shan and Kayin States), where children able to speak Chinese. Children are often lured into gambling and scamming by recruiters who target children in camps for internally displaced persons (IDPs).
It is difficult to determine whether the children recruited into gambling and scamming are usually boys or girls. However, other forms of child labour appear to follow traditional gendered patterns. Girls are more likely to be recruited for domestic work or forced into early marriages, while boys are at higher risk of (potentially forced) recruitment into armed conflict.
Protecting children against child labour and other rights violations is increasingly difficult due to the security situation and the military authorities’ policies and actions towards civil society organizations.
There is an urgent need to adjust both technical strategies and operational arrangements to prevent child labour, protect working children, and ensure that children have alternatives to child labour, particularly its worst forms..."
Source/publisher:
International Labour Organization (Geneva) via Reliefweb (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2024-10-25
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
International Labour Organisation (ILO), Labour issues in Burma, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
4.51 MB (72 pages) - Original version
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Description:
"(Bangkok) – On the evening of October 23, 2022, the Myanmar military carried out an airstrike on a music concert in Hpakant, Kachin State, organized by the opposition Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) to commemorate the ethnic organization’s 62nd anniversary. Local media reported that at least 60 people were killed and 100 injured, and that the Myanmar military blocked access to medical care for those harmed. The concert was held at a base also used for military training by the KIO’s armed wing, the Kachin Independence Army (KIA).
The following quote can be attributed to Elaine Pearson, Asia director at Human Rights Watch:
The Myanmar military’s airstrike on hundreds of concertgoers in Kachin State is an apparent violation of the laws of war, which prohibit attacks causing indiscriminate or disproportionate civilian harm. Myanmar military operations in ethnic minority areas have long been characterized by a near total disregard for civilian lives and property and a failure to abide by international law. The military’s entrenched impunity underlines the need for an international investigation of those responsible for this attack and the many others committed by security forces since the February 2021 military coup.
For over a year and a half, the junta has carried out grave abuses against the millions of people who oppose military rule, amounting to crimes against humanity and war crimes. How high does the death count need to reach before governments around the world impose consequences that will impact the junta’s behavior?
This horrific attack should trigger renewed efforts by concerned states to enforce tougher sanctions on the junta, including cutting off its access to foreign currency revenues as well as arms and aviation fuel. The United Nations Security Council should urgently pass a resolution imposing a global arms embargo on the junta and referring the situation to the International Criminal Court. Southeast Asian leaders meeting this week and at the ASEAN Summit in November should signal their support for such efforts to bring justice to the victims of the junta’s abuses across the country..."
Source/publisher:
Human Rights Watch (USA)
Date of entry/update:
2024-10-24
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, The Military's political role, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Local URL:
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Description:
"Media Release from Burmese Rohingya Organisation UK......
For Immediate Release 17 October 2024:
The Burmese Rohingya Organisation UK (BROUK) condemns the continued targeting and abuse of Rohingya communities in Rakhine State by the Arakan Army (AA). These latest incidents, including violent raids on October 4 and the imposition of strict curfews, come just weeks after BROUK’s urgent call for international intervention in response to escalating atrocities. The international community cannot continue to ignore this relentless violence against Rohingya civilians.
In August, BROUK raised concerns (https://www.brouk.org.uk/urgent-international-action-needed-to-address-escalating-humanitarian-crisis-in-rakhine-state/) over the brutal August 5 attack, where up to 200 Rohingya civilians fleeing violence were killed as they attempted to cross the Naf River into Bangladesh. This massacre followed another heinous assault on May 17, when AA forces nearly decimated the town of Buthidaung. Together, these incidents underscore the Arakan Army’s persistent and unchecked campaign of terror against the Rohingya.
"If the UN and governments are engaging with the Arakan Army leadership on their treatment of Rohingya, then that engagement is failing," said Tun Khin, President of BROUK. “The Arakan Army is using its power to terrorise and displace the Rohingya, and without immediate action, these atrocities will continue unabated. The Arakan Army leadership must be told that the atrocities must stop, or they will face consequences, including sanctions.”
On October 4, AA forces conducted early-morning raids on the Rohingya villages of Ah Twin Nget They and Hpon Nyo Leik in southern Buthidaung Township. Villagers reported that AA members threatened and assaulted residents, with one witness stating, “They came into our village in the morning and inspected each house, and threatened the villagers in different ways. They even beat some villagers with guns and sticks.” In Hpon Nyo Leik, the AA demanded the removal of fences surrounding Rohingya homes under intimidation. “The Arakan Army frequently intimidating us and demanding us to remove the fences that are surrounded our homes. We have no other options but to comply with their orders. If we don't remove the fences, we will have to face unimaginable consequences,” another villager said.
The AA claimed the raids were in response to alleged Rohingya armed groups hiding in these villages, though residents deny this. “There are neither members nor supporters of Rohingya armed groups in these villages. We haven't seen the movements of any armed groups except the movements of Arakan Army in these areas. This seems to be part of a plan to continue their brutal actions against Rohingya IDP camp, who sought refuge here after fleeing from their own villages,” a local resident reported.
These raids followed the imposition of a strict curfew across northern Maungdaw Township on October 2, restricting movement from 7 PM to 6 AM in villages such as Kyauk Hle Kha, Thayet Oak, Oo Shay Kya, and Minglalar Gyi. Villagers were ordered to patrol during curfew hours, facing severe consequences if they did not comply. The AA reportedly abducted six Rohingya from Kyauk Hle Kha and Minglalar Gyi villages while they were returning home after curfew. Additionally, on October 2, two young Rohingya boys disappeared while searching for cattle, with villagers suspecting they may have been detained by AA forces stationed nearby.
BROUK condemns these acts as part of a larger strategy by the AA to instill fear and assert control over Rohingya communities. “These raids and the enforced curfews are clear violations of basic human rights and an alarming escalation in a protracted pattern of violence and persecution,” said Tun Khin. “Rohingya only want to live in peace and harmony with the diverse peoples of Rakhine State and Burma. If the Arakan Army leadership won’t voluntarily accept the ethnic and religious diversity of Rakhine State, they must be pressured to do so. The alternative is to once again stand back and do nothing as the Rohingya face violations of international law.”
The international community must recognise the deliberate and systematic nature of these abuses. The Arakan Army’s actions reveal a blatant disregard for the safety and rights of Rohingya villagers, perpetuating a climate of fear and further entrenching the crisis in Rakhine State.
“Those condemning Rohingya for calling out human rights violations by the Arakan Army are victim blaming and effectively helping to enable those human rights violations. The Arakan Army is solely responsible for its own actions, and nothing justifies those actions,” said Tun Khin, President of BROUK..."
Source/publisher:
Burmese Rohingya Organisation UK
Date of entry/update:
2024-10-17
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"It was an honor and a privilege to visit Australia in my capacity as the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar. I am sincerely grateful to the Government of Australia for inviting me here and for the opportunity to meet with key Australian government leaders, including Her Excellency Foreign Minister Penny Wong, the Australian Human Rights Ambassador, and senior officials from the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the Department of Home Affairs and the Australian Federal Police.
I also appreciated the opportunity to meet with Members of Parliament from both major political parties and the Australian Human Rights Commission. And, I would like to express my thanks to the civil society groups, UN officials, academics, researchers, students, policy analysts, faith-based organisations and others who took the time to meet with me and share their valuable perspective and expertise on the human rights crisis in Myanmar.
I had the honor of meeting with the National Unity Government’s representative to Australia. I appreciate the National Unity Government’s warm welcome and tireless work on behalf of the people of Myanmar. I encourage the Australian government to continue to engage with the National Unity Government and recognize it as the legitimate representative of the people of Myanmar.
During my visit I also had the privilege of meeting with members of Myanmar diaspora communities, including recently resettled refugees, who shared stories about their journeys and their experience here in Australia. All were deeply grateful that they had been given the opportunity to continue their lives in safety and security.
I came to Australia because the human rights situation in Myanmar has gone from bad to worse to horrific; because the international response to this crisis is clearly not working; and because a course correction is imperative to avoid an even greater disaster.
I’m worried that the deepening crisis in Myanmar has become invisible to much of the world. You can’t solve a problem that you cannot see.
Australia has demonstrated timely and effective leadership in addressing historic challenges in the Asia-Pacific region. Its strategic location, its role as a strong democracy in the region, and its position as an important dialogue and security partner to ASEAN make it uniquely suited to help forge a more effective international response.
Doing so is not only the right thing to do, it is in Australia’s national interest. The military coup has allowed high levels of criminality to flourish in Myanmar. Online scam centres, for example, are operating round the clock in Myanmar, claiming victims in Australia, throughout the region and beyond. They include those who are caught in human trafficking webs after applying for what they thought were legitimate employment opportunities and also those who lose millions to online scammers. Myanmar is the world’s largest producer of opium and a major supplier of methamphetamine into Australia. The escalating violence and worsening humanitarian crisis are forcing more and more Myanmar victims to seek refuge well beyond its borders.
The crisis in Myanmar
Three and a half years ago, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing initiated an illegal coup after a military-backed political party was soundly defeated in a democratic election. It was a grave miscalculation that severely underestimated the resolve of the Myanmar people to prevent a return to military rule.
Min Aung Hlaing and the junta responded to the deep and widespread opposition of the people of Myanmar with barbarism and oppression. Massive anti-junta demonstrations were met with brute force. Soldiers gunned down protestors in the streets. Arbitrary detention, torture and systematic attacks on villages became hallmarks of the junta’s oppression. Many young people responded by taking up weapons. People’s Defense Forces were formed, and often aligned with and were trained by ethnic armed organisations.
Things have not gone well for junta military forces, which have been losing ground in Myanmar both literally and figuratively. Losses have included military bases and tens of thousands of troops. The junta now controls less than half of Myanmar and has been forced to establish a forced conscription program to fill the widening shortfall in troop numbers. Not surprisingly, the junta has responded by ratcheting up attacks on villages. There has been a five-fold increase in aerial attacks on civilian targets over the last year. The junta appears determined to destroy population centers that it cannot control.
The numbers associated with the junta’s human rights violations are staggering. Since the coup was launched:
Over 3.1 million people have been displaced;
More than 5,600 civilians have been killed by junta forces;
18.6 million Myanmar people are in urgent need of humanitarian assistance;
Over 20,000 political prisoners are behind bars;
13.3 million people are facing emergency levels of food insecurity.
The imperative for international action
The people of Myanmar have been fighting back with enormous courage and tenacity. The future of Myanmar is in their hands but they need the support of the international community and they need it now.
How? By working to deny the junta the three things that it needs to sustain itself: money, weapons and legitimacy. And, by providing critical support to address a humanitarian catastrophe that is unfolding at this very moment.
To its credit, Australia has been a major source of humanitarian aid for the besieged people of Myanmar, providing more than $860 million since 2017 for those in both Myanmar and Bangladesh, including for Rohingya in the camps and their host communities.
Australia has established targeted economic sanctions and a weapons ban and has ongoing engagement with the National Unity Government that has an office here in Canberra.
But, more needs to be done. Australia is in a crucial position to provide leadership for a stronger international response to the crisis in Myanmar.
There is a significant and growing need for life-saving humanitarian aid, but the shifting dynamic within Myanmar requires changes to ensure that aid gets to those with the greatest needs. The junta continues to obstruct the distribution of humanitarian aid within and outside of the shrinking area that it controls, leaving larger and larger numbers dependent on community organizations and civil society networks to get aid through, particularly in conflict areas.
This requires providing aid directly to these groups, including through cross-border channels, and flexibility in administrative reporting requirements. Holding administrative forms and receipts when stopped at a military junta check point could be lethal.
I urge Australia to increase funding to those in non-junta-controlled areas who are in the process of building and enhancing new institutions and infrastructure that will be essential for a future federal democratic Myanmar. In my conversations with diaspora community members, I learned a great deal about these promising initiatives. They need and deserve stronger international support.
Many thousands of Rohingya have been forced from their homes as intense fighting between junta forces and the Arakan Army engulfs Rakhine State. Most are without adequate food, shelter or medicine. Tens of thousands have made their way over the border in the last few months. It is highly likely that in the coming months thousands of desperate people could decide to put their fate into the hands of smugglers and head out to sea.
This deepening crisis requires a significant increase in humanitarian aid for those who are in dire need in Rakhine State and those who have crossed into Bangladesh. But generating the requisite level of support to address this rapidly escalating disaster is going to require the attention and engagement of a distracted world.
To gather this attention and engagement, I believe that there should be an emergency convening of nations and stakeholders to address this growing disaster before it gets even worse. I also believe that
Australia is in a critical position to provide the leadership necessary to make this happen. Australia has a direct stake in what happens in Myanmar, Bangladesh and the region and has been providing generous support. Australia is now the third largest donor to the UN’s Joint Response Plan for the Rohingya in Bangladesh, and a significant donor to support the people of Myanmar. But, it cannot do it alone. As a major source of humanitarian aid and an influential member of the international community, Australia is in a position to leverage stronger levels of support from nations who remain on the sidelines. This is a crisis that requires emergency action now. A high profile emergency convening that focuses regional and world attention on this unfolding disaster would be a crucial step forward that Australia can help make a reality.
Australia has joined other nations willing to impose targeted economic sanctions on the junta and those that aid and abet it, including on networks that are supplying jet fuel to the junta. But, the junta has been increasingly effective in avoiding these sanctions, including through the creation of shell companies. While the imposition of sanctions on the junta-controlled Myanma Foreign Trade Bank and Myanma Investment and Commercial Bank have been effective, for example, transactions have simply been shifted to the junta controlled Myanma Economic Bank, which is not sanctioned. To be truly effective, sanctions need to more comprehensive, strategic and coordinated, and must be rigorously enforced. Australia can play an important role in making this happen.
The junta is seeking to be able to claim legitimacy by preparing to hold sham elections. A national census is under way that the junta is claiming will support the development of voter lists, but that, according to my sources, is primarily a vehicle to collect information and intelligence on the opposition and the population at large.
A junta organized election is as outrageous as it is absurd. You cannot have a free and fair election when opposition leaders have been arrested, imprisoned, tortured and executed. You cannot have a free and fair election when it is a crime for journalists to report the truth or for anyone to criticize the junta. It is also dangerous, as it will likely lead to even more violence.
The international community must not fall into the trap of legitimizing or in any way supporting or encouraging these elections. I urge Australia to not only denounce this so-called “election” for what it is, a fraud, but to proactively reach out to nations in the region and world to encourage them to also deny this absurd attempt by the junta to seek legitimacy.
Australia has offered resettlement to some who have fled Myanmar. I encourage the scaling up of this program and the prioritization of the reunification of families.
The success of this program was evident as I met with members of Bamar, Chin, Karen, Kachin, Karenni, Mon, Rakhine and Rohingya ethnic groups, among others. Some have lived in Australia since the 1988 uprising. Others have been resettled since the coup. They came from all walks of life – doctors, educators, lawyers, successful businesspersons, students, exiled members of parliament – all contributing to the communities in which they now live and building skills they will take back home to Myanmar when it becomes possible to do so. This program is truly a win-win.
But the stories that I heard from those who made it out of extreme danger in Myanmar were harrowing. A man from Mon State showed me photos of his village after it came under attack from the sky. A woman told me the heartbreaking story of learning, just the day before, that her brother had been shot and killed as he prepared to cross the Naf River into Bangladesh. Two other members of her family drowned.
Everyone from Myanmar with whom I met denounced the coup and expressed their outrage and despair about what is going on in their country. But, it is clear from what I observed that they are doing more than expressing their views, they are taking action including through grassroots fundraising initiatives that have enabled them to send significant amounts of money back home to support their families and communities.
Australia and Indonesia, co-chairs of the Bali Process, created an emergency response ‘Consultation Mechanism’ following the 2015 Rohingya boat crisis in the Andaman Sea. Given the escalating humanitarian crisis in Rakhine State and Bangladesh, and the tens of thousands who have crossed the border into Bangladesh over the last few weeks, it is likely that significant numbers of Rohingya families could soon be placing their fate into the hands of smugglers and heading out to sea. It is therefore important that a robust maritime emergency response plan, with protocols for rescue at sea, the disembarkation of boats, and the humane treatment of those aboard, be immediately established along with the requisite resources for its deployment.
Australia has long been a supporter of accountability for crimes committed in Myanmar, including through its support for accountability mechanisms at the United Nations. I encourage Australia to consider additional means of supporting accountability, including intervening in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) case against Myanmar concerning genocide against the Rohingya. This would be consistent with Australia’s intervention in the ICJ case against Russia in relation to Ukraine and support the robust pursuit of justice.
The Attorney General of Australia has noted that he would “carefully consider any proposals to help bring to justice military figures in Myanmar guilty of war crimes.” In light of Australia’s legal framework enabling universal jurisdiction, I encourage Australia to consider pursuing universal jurisdiction cases for violations of international crimes in Myanmar in Australian courts. I urge Australia to also consider referring the situation in Myanmar to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court under Article 14 of the Rome Statute.
It has been an honor and privilege to visit Australia. It is clearer than ever to me that Australia is well positioned to help deny the military junta of Myanmar the means to hold 54 million people hostage while serving as a catalyst for coordinated, strategic action and increased humanitarian support for those in desperate need.
I would like to once again thank the government of Australia for its warm welcome and engagement and extend my gratitude to all of those who I met with on my mission here. I very much look forward to working with them toward the realization of a free, democratic and human rights respecting Myanmar..."
Source/publisher:
UN Human Rights Council (Geneva) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2024-10-15
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Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, UN human rights documents on Myanmar, Human Rights and international relations
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"Myanmar’s military authorities must immediately account for the whereabouts and wellbeing of two pro-democracy activists arrested in Yangon on Wednesday, Amnesty International said today.
Paing Phyo Min and Shein Wai Aung were arrested on 9 October and sent to an interrogation centre, Amnesty International understands. Paing Phyo Min’s family has not been able to reach him, while Shein Wai Aung and his father, mother and sister have also been uncontactable.
As many as six additional people are also believed to have been arrested in raids.
“The Myanmar military must urgently account for the whereabouts and wellbeing of Paing Phyo Min and of Shein Wai Aung and his family. Unless they can be charged with an internationally recognized crime, they must be immediately and unconditionally released,” Amnesty International’s Myanmar Researcher Joe Freeman said.
“As leaders from The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) meet in Laos and discuss a way out of the crisis brought on by the 2021 coup, the Myanmar military continues to arbitrarily detain people and carry out repression across the country.”
Paing Phyo Min is known for his involvement with a group of young people performing Thangyat, a popular Myanmar traditional art form which fuses poetry, comedy and music to comment on social issues.
In 2019, Paing Phyo Min and other members of an activist group called the Peacock Generation were arrested after performing Thangyat dressed as soldiers. For this, he was sentenced to six years in prison.
In 2020, Amnesty International called for Paing Phyo Min’s release as part of its annual Write 4 Rights campaign, with many people writing letters to him to bolster his spirits. He was released in 2021 as part of a mass prisoner amnesty.
After the military coup, he and others took part in peaceful protests in Yangon, despite enormous risks following violent crackdowns.
Shein Wai Aung, a former student at Dagon University in Yangon, has been active in peaceful protests and in supporting political prisoners in Myanmar.
“Protesting in Myanmar today is not the same as it was before the coup. Anyone involved in any kind of dissent against the military faces long jail terms, torture and other ill-treatment, and even death in custody,” Joe Freeman said.
“In Myanmar’s prison system, there is little hope of fair treatment, no transparency, and extremely substandard conditions. Interrogation centers, where these two activists have likely been sent, are also notorious locations of abuse where torture has been used to extract information before charges are formally brought.”
Myanmar’s military has killed more than 5,000 civilians since seizing power in the coup on 1 February 2021. The United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights said in its latest report last month that at least 1,853 of those people have died in custody.
In the 2022 report ‘15 Days Felt Like 15 Years’, Amnesty International documented torture and other ill-treatment against people arbitrarily detained by the military and police after the coup..."
Source/publisher:
Amnesty International (UK)
Date of entry/update:
2024-10-10
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Political prisoners and other violations in Burma - reports, Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Freedom of opinion and expression: - the situation in Burma/Myanmar - reports, analyses, recommendations
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""The water rushed into my house. In just a few minutes, everything I owned was gone—my home, my small farm, livestock, and everything I belonged to. I can’t even imagine how we will recover from this," says Nang, a pregnant woman, her voice trembling with grief. Displaced by the floods that have swept through her village in Shan State, Nang, like so many other women, now faces an uncertain future in a crowded shelter.
Her story is one of thousands emerging from Myanmar as the country battles one of its worst flood disasters in recent history. Torrential monsoon rains, exacerbated by Typhoon Yagi, have unleashed widespread devastation across Myanmar, affecting 1 million people across 70 townships. The floods, which began in early September, have submerged homes, destroyed farmlands, and forced entire communities to flee to temporary shelters.
As the floodwaters continue to rise, the most vulnerable—women and children—are suffering the greatest impacts. Many, like Nang, have lost their homes and livelihoods. The flood has affected nearly half of Myanmar’s 14 states and regions, including Kayin, Mandalay, Rakhine, and Shan.
Throughout the country, the scale of the disaster is overwhelming. Entire communities have been engulfed by floodwaters, destroying crops, livestock, and homes. Although humanitarian efforts are underway, they are encountering significant challenges. Damaged infrastructure, blocked roads, and ongoing conflict in certain states and regions have made it difficult to access many of those in need. The hardest-hit regions, including Mandalay, eastern Bago, Kayin, Mon, and southern Shan, are in urgent need of emergency aid as communities struggle with the loss of their homes and livelihoods.
As the rainfall persists and river levels increase, the risk of more flooding remains high, and the difficulties of providing aid to affected areas are growing. The country is facing dual crises of conflict and flooding, leaving many women with nowhere to turn. According to the report by UNOCHA as of 27th September 2024, 600,000 women were affected by the flood nationwide, with 270,000 of them being of reproductive age and 13,000 pregnant.
Thida, who is eight months pregnant, is living in a crowded shelter after her home was destroyed by the flood. She described the overwhelming fear that grips her daily. "I was already worried about my pregnancy because of the conflict," she says. "Now, with the flood, it feels like everything is against us." Road blockages and damaged infrastructure have made it nearly impossible for her to access healthcare, leaving her uncertain about her baby’s safety.
UNFPA partners' mobile clinics play a crucial role in this challenging environment. These clinics offer vital sexual and reproductive health (SRH) services, including maternal health care and family planning (contraceptive) services to the affected population. Despite the logistical challenges posed by the floodwaters, these mobile units are reaching women in remote areas and shelters, providing life-saving care. For many women, these clinics are their only access to healthcare, as local health facilities have been affected by floods or are still inaccessible.
Moe Moe, an eight-month-pregnant woman from Kayin State, shared how the mobile clinic made a crucial difference for her. “I experienced flooding three times in the recent months of 2024. I was so worried for my baby in this difficult situation. I hadn’t been able to see a doctor since the flooding started. When the mobile clinic came to the place near where we live, I was so happy. They checked my baby’s health and gave me the vitamins and a clean delivery kit. I finally feel like I can breathe again, knowing I have the support and care I need for me and my baby,” she said with relief.
UNFPA’s clean delivery kits have provided critical support for pregnant women like Moe Moe, who are unable to get to a health facility during a crisis or emergency situation, preventing deadly infections and ensuring safe deliveries. "I was terrified that I wouldn't have access to a safe delivery. The mobile clinic brought me a clean delivery kit, and it gave me hope that, even in this situation, I can give birth safely," she says. The kits contain sterile supplies for childbirth, including a plastic sheet, a sterile towel, sterile gloves, an apron, soap, a sterile blade, an umbilical cord tie, and an information sheet for safe delivery.
In addition, Dignity kits containing essential hygiene products like sanitary pads, soap, and undergarments are another crucial intervention for humanitarian-affected women and girls. For Thandar, a 30-year-old woman, these kits have made an enormous difference. “Unlike men, women could not stay at the displacement shelter without proper clothing and protection. Having these hygiene products helps us feel a little more in control and confident,” she says. Yet, despite the relief these UNFPA’s dignity kits provide, the overwhelming need for safe, gender-segregated sanitation facilities in the shelters remains unmet.
Many women, displaced by the floods and living in temporary shelters, are also struggling to access contraceptives. Nway Nway, a mother of three children, expressed her concerns. “After the repeated floodings in Kayin during this rainy season, I couldn’t get my contraceptives, and I’m not ready to have another child. I went to the mobile clinic, and they were able to provide me with what I needed. Without that, I don’t know what I would have done,” she explained.
The mobile clinics are providing not just maternal health services but also essential contraceptive services to women who would otherwise be left vulnerable to unplanned pregnancies or unwanted pregnancies in already dire conditions. With healthcare centres damaged and transportation routes cut off, these services are critical for women to regain control over their reproductive health.
In the displacement camps and temporary shelters, women are facing more than just the loss of their homes and livelihoods. Many have become targets of violence, as the displacement caused by the floods has made them even more vulnerable. The lack of privacy, overcrowded living conditions, and insufficient security in the camps have led to an increase in Gender-Based Violence (GBV).
GBV prevention and response have become increasingly challenging in the ongoing conflict, where access to affected areas is restricted, and GBV support services are limited. A local GBV organization supported by UNFPA shared the challenges they face: “In the midst of floodings, we are trying every option and using every available resource to continue supporting displaced women affected by GBV at their home or temporary displacement shelter. The political situation makes it even more difficult, but we know we need to help and protect each other in these challenging times with the limited support available.”
At the heart of the response are community volunteers like Htar, whose dedication has been instrumental in supporting affected women and girls during the floods. Volunteers have been working tirelessly alongside UNFPA and other partners to distribute relief items such as dignity kits and raise awareness about available health services. They also serve as crucial links between the affected communities and healthcare service providers, ensuring that women in the most remote areas are reached.
Htar, a local youth volunteer from Kayin State, spoke passionately about the urgency of their work: “In a disaster like this, we know that time is everything. The sooner we reach the affected people, the better chance they have of staying healthy and safe. With the support of UNFPA, we’ve been able to distribute dignity kits and clean delivery kits in the affected areas within 72 hours. Some team members are providing relief support in affected areas, while others are trying to connect with local donors and service providers for immediate support, and some are collecting data on the affected to identify urgent locations in need. We know that our work is risky, and the conditions are tough, but seeing the smiles on people’s faces makes all the hardship and exhaustion fade away.”
As the floodwaters begin to recede, the challenges remain immense. Women and girls continue to bear the brunt of the crisis, facing heightened risks of GBV, poor access to reproductive healthcare, and disruption of their livelihoods and incomes. UNFPA’s support through partners on the ground, including mobile clinics, dignity kits, clean delivery kits, and family planning services, is critical to ensuring their health, safety, and dignity. However, the need for more funding and resources is urgent. According to UNOCHA, only 28% of the 2024 Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan has been funded, leaving large gaps in the response. This funding shortfall is even more acute in services aimed at GBV prevention and response, with only about 12% of the required funds received, which is less than half of that for the overall HNRP. This drastic underfunding severely limits the ability to provide adequate support to women and girls who are at an increased risk of gender-based violence in the chaotic conditions of displacement camps.
For women like Nang, Moe Moe, and Nway Nway, the flood has completely disrupted their lives in ways they never anticipated. However, with the ongoing support of community members, youth volunteers, local service providers, and humanitarian partners, there is hope that they can start to rebuild not only their homes but also their futures.
The story of Myanmar's flood crisis is full of challenges, but it also reflects resilience and hope. With continued support, the women of Myanmar can transition from merely surviving to thriving, guiding their communities toward a stronger, more resilient future..."
Source/publisher:
United Nations Population Fund (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2024-10-04
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
UNFPA (United Nations Population Fund), Public Health, Human Rights and international relations
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"This update was developed by the Myanmar Gender in Humanitarian Action Working Group (GiHA WG) and is based on available reports from humanitarian partners, including women-led organizations operating in flood-affected townships. It provides an overview of the gendered impacts of the flooding in Myanmar and the differentiated needs of women, men, girls, and boys.
Overview
Since 9 September 2024, severe flooding and mudslides triggered by torrential monsoon rains and remnants of Typhoon Yagi have devastated 70 townships across 11 states and regions in Myanmar.
An estimated 1 million people have been impacted, with more than 360 fatalities and 100 people reported missing,¹ although data is still being verified. The flooding has affected already marginalized groups, including internally displaced persons, pregnant and breastfeeding women, children, and the elderly, for whom the disaster has exacerbated existing vulnerabilities. Early assessments suggest women and girls account for approximately 60% of people affected.
The most severely affected areas include the capital Nay Pyi Taw; the regions of Mandalay, Magway, Bago, Sagaing and Tanintharyi; and the states of southern and eastern Shan, Mon, Kayah, Kayin, and Rakhine. As floodwaters recede, communities, including those in camps for internally displaced persons and relocation sites are beginning cleanup efforts.
The floods have submerged thousands of crops, farmlands, and livestock, significantly impacting the livelihoods of affected communities. Critical infrastructure has been damaged or destroyed, including roads, bridges, communication networks, schools, public service facilities, religious sites, and farmlands. More than 65,000 homes, 1,500 schools, 200 roads and bridges, and more than 80 telecom towers have been destroyed or damaged. The impacts of the disaster are exacerbating Myanmar’s existing humanitarian crisis, already strained by ongoing conflict, political instability, and widespread food insecurity..."
Source/publisher:
Asia Pacific Gender in Humanitarian Action Working Group, UN Women, United Nations Population Fund
Date of entry/update:
2024-10-02
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Agriculture in Burma/Myanmar: general and research, Education in Burma/Myanmar - general, Food Security and nutrition in Burma/Myanmar, Public Health, Human Rights and international relations
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"1. Introduction
The current human rights and security situation in Southeast Burma (Myanmar) has been in crisis since the 2021 military coup due to an escalation of armed conflict and increasing human rights violations committed by the State Administration Council (SAC). The SAC has targeted and attacked anyone who opposes the regime, including peaceful protestors, pro-democracy activists, members of the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM), local rights organisations, and civil society. Since the 2021 coup, Human Rights Defenders (HRDs) and their family members have been arbitrarily arrested and detained, tortured, forcibly disappeared, and killed, with total impunity. Whilst the gravity of threats and lack of protection has forced HRDs in Southeast Burma to adapt their activism and protection strategies, their work remains active and essential, and in increased need of protection and recognition.
This briefing paper analyses the threats and challenges that HRDs have faced in locally-defined Karen State since the 2021 coup (until June 2024). The first section gives an overview of the history of violence and oppression against HRDs. The second section provides evidence of attacks and violence faced by HRDs and their families, including anyone perceived to be defending human rights: namely torture and killings; arbitrary arrest and detention; restrictions on freedom of movement; surveillance and digital threats; risks related to the armed conflict; and threats faced by women human rights defenders. It also shows how those threats have changed since the 2021 coup; the impacts of such threats; and how HRDs have adapted. The third section presents a security and legal analysis of the situation. The paper concludes with a set of policy recommendations provided for regional and international stakeholders..."
Source/publisher:
Karen Human Rights Group
Date of entry/update:
2024-09-30
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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pdf
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2.97 MB
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"DESCRIPTION OF THE EVENT:
Starting 8 September 2024, strong winds and heavy rainfall from Typhoon Yagi triggered severe flooding and landslides across Myanmar. The floods and landslides impacted about 60 townships in nine states and regions, with an estimated 631,000 people affected, and resulting in nearly 200 deaths reported by the time the IFRC Emergency Appeal was launched on 18 September 2024. Estimates of damage have subsequently increased and current reporting indicates nearly 1 million people affected and more than 400 deaths.1
The severe weather lasted until 12 September, ultimately impacting nine states and regions, including Southern and Eastern Shan State, Kayah, Mandalay, Naypyidaw, Magway, Kayin, Bago and Mon.
On 14 September, state run media reported that the State Administration Council made a request for assistance from other countries to cope with the impact of floods that and to date more than 320,000 people have been relocated to temporary camps, many of which are potentially overcrowded and lack sufficient access to water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) following the destruction and severe damage to homes and belongings.
Severity of humanitarian conditions
1. Impact on accessibility, availability, quality, use and awareness of goods and services.
The floods and subsequent landslides have caused extensive damage across Myanmar, severely impacting infrastructure, homes and essential services. Over 141,000 buildings, including houses, office buildings, and schools, and approximately 1,171 road networks and bridges, have been damaged, making it extremely difficult to conduct needs analyses, deliver goods and provide much- needed aid.2
Local markets, homes and health facilities have been destroyed, significantly reducing the availability of food, water and medical supplies. The agricultural sector has been particularly hard- hit, with over 176,000 animals reportedly lost and more than 838,000 acres of rice paddy and other crops submerged and damaged3. The timing of the floods, coinciding with the end of the rice planting season, has heightened food insecurity, especially for communities that rely heavily on agriculture for their livelihoods. The flooding has also made access to health facilities and schools nearly impossible for many people.
The destruction of over 110 telecommunication towers and 5,700 electricity poles has disrupted communication and power supply as well, complicating efforts to identify needs, coordinate the distribution of essential goods and disseminate information.
Access to clean water has been severely restricted too, as household water and sanitation systems and community water sources are expected to be damaged or contaminated by floodwaters. This raises the risk of waterborne diseases. And this risk will become more complex as affected populations return to their homes in severely affected areas.
2. Impact on physical and mental well-being
The floods have had significant adverse effects on both the physical and mental well-being of the affected people.
As mentioned in Point 1 above, disruptions to water systems are limiting access to clean drinking water and increase the risks of waterborne diseases. The risk of disease outbreaks is high due to poor water and sanitation. This adds mental stress to an already difficult situation. Many people are living in overcrowded camps and other locations that lack appropriate sanitation infrastructure. They have limited access to clean water and proper hygiene facilities, which increases the risk of illness.
The widespread damage to roads and infrastructure has hindered the transportation of patients, making access to emergency healthcare increasingly challenging. The disruption of supply chains has also restricted the availability of essential medicines, escalating the risk of preventable health complications and fatalities.
Across the country, especially in conflict-affected areas, the floods have exacerbated particularly dangerous risks, as the movement of unexploded ordnance in flooding and shifts in land mass expose communities to accidental detonation.
The psychological impact of the disaster is thus profound. Thousands of people have been displaced from their homes, with numerous individuals reported missing, contributing to heightened stress and trauma. The long-term mental health and psychosocial well-being of the affected population are clearly at risk as survivors cope with the loss of loved ones, homes and livelihoods. Support is essential in this context.
3. Risks & Vulnerabilities
Myanmar is still reeling from previous severe humanitarian challenges too. Over 3.4 million people are currently displaced due to ongoing violence, conflict, political instability and natural disasters.4 The situation is dire, with more than 18 million people, or approximately one-third of the population, in urgent need of humanitarian assistance. 5 Many communities already had limited access to essential goods, clean water, healthcare and sanitation facilities. Rising poverty levels are also further complicating the crisis, and Myanmar is already among the countries with the highest vulnerability to climate change impacts.
The recent floods have compounded these existing challenges, worsening the already critical conditions for millions of people. With widespread damage to homes, infrastructure, and livelihoods, the flood has disrupted access to basic services and exacerbated food insecurity.
Myanmar's economy remains fragile as well, with nearly half of the population estimated to be living in poverty at the end of 2023.6 This combination of economic instability and frequent climate-related disasters has left many families struggling to meet their basic needs. The flooding’s impact on agricultural production and employment opportunities will likely only deepen poverty levels and further weaken people’s economic resilience..."
Source/publisher:
International Federation of Red Cross And Red Crescent Societies (Geneva) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2024-09-29
[field_licence]
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"KEY FINDINGS
• NFI prices rose much faster than foods in August, with the NFI basket climbing 30% since july;
• Hygiene NFI prices jumped sharply in August, up 40% while other NFIs rose 30%;
• Essential food prices rose 8% month-on-month while vegetable prices were unusually stable;
• Plastic tarps, soap, and sanitary pads rose sharply, while shrimp and fresh fish prices climbed as well;
• Yinmarbin saw the steepest increases with prices rising 24% month-on-month in August;
• The total basket monitored rose 17% in August, driving prices 43% higher year-on-year..."
Source/publisher:
Myanmar Information Management Unit (Myanmar) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2024-09-28
[field_licence]
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Individual Documents
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pdf
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1.76 MB
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"Situation Overview & Humanitarian Needs
Bago, Kayah, Kayin, Magway, Mandalay, Mon, Nay Pyi Taw, Rakhine, Sagaing, eastern and southern Shan, and Tanintharyi regions/states. The most affected areas are Mandalay Region, southern Shan, eastern Bago, Kayin, Mon, and Nay Pyi Taw. As per state-run media, more than 400 fatalities have been reported as of 25 September.2 The flooding and landslides have caused significant damage to homes, household assets, and critical infrastructure, including health facilities, schools, water sources, major highways, bridges, and WASH (Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene) infrastructure. Livelihoods have been destroyed, forcing many families to evacuate. Communication challenges persist due to flooded roads and downed electric lines. While floodwaters have receded in some areas, ongoing rain and riverine conditions continue to threaten some areas with recurrent flooding and potential river overflows.
Around 480,000 people are affected in Mandalay and Magway regions including Nay Pyi Taw. In Rakhine, more than 40,000 people from villages including IDPs locations in Mrauk U, and Myinbya and Tounangoup townships are affected. In Bago east, more than 180,000 people are affected while in eastern and southern Shan, flooding and landslides have affected over 100,000 people. In Mon and Kayin states, affected figures are over 200,000.3 Across all affected areas, critical needs include access to safe drinking water, hygiene items, medicine, food, shelter, and humanitarian cash assistance.
Acute watery diarrhoea, dengue fever, malaria, cholera and measles are already a threat to children in Myanmar. The ongoing flooding is likely to worsen the spread of waterborne diseases and increasing the need to provide urgent health, nutrition and WASH services. Despite ongoing rapid response efforts, delivering essential WASH assistance—such as clean water, sanitation, hygiene supplies, menstrual hygiene management, and shelter— remains a significant challenge. Numerous schools were forced to close or are being used as shelters, affecting the access to education for thousands of children. Child Protection concerns are critical in the aftermath of the floods, with risks such as family separation, psychological distress, exposure to explosive ordnance, and physical dangers, including drowning. Initial assessments indicate that more than 270,000 children and over 180,000 parents and caregivers are in urgent need of child protection services..."
Source/publisher:
UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) (Myanmar) via Reliefweb (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2024-09-28
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
UNICEF (United Nations Children's Fund), Education in Burma/Myanmar - general, Public Health, Human Rights and international relations
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Description:
"This independent report, covering humanitarian developments up to 26 September, is produced by OCHA Myanmar under its global mandate, in collaboration with the Inter-Cluster Coordination Group and UN agencies. Response figures are based on self-reporting by organizations to clusters. The situation is fluid, and estimated figures are subject to change.
Highlights
• As of 26 September, an estimated 1 million people across 70 out of the 330 townships in Myanmar are reportedly affected by the flooding from heavy monsoon rains and remnants of Typhoon Yagi. This widespread flooding has caused significant damage in the Northwest, Southeast, and Rakhine State.
• More than 360 people have reportedly drowned, with at least 100 more missing due to the severe flooding.
• The floods have caused widespread devastation, submerging thousands of crops, farmlands, and livestock, leading to substantial losses in the livelihoods of affected communities.
• Eighteen days since the onset of the flooding on 9 September, the humanitarian response is rapidly moving forward. Emergency assistance, including food, drinking water, shelter, and WASH support, has been delivered to some of the affected populations, with more aid efforts underway.
• Significant gaps however remain, and growing needs continue to strain the limited available resources, highlighting the urgency for sustained relief efforts, including early recovery and livelihoods assistance. Aid agencies still require more supplies, additional funds and expanded access to distribute assistance on a larger scale.
• The Myanmar Humanitarian Fund (MHF) continues to capitalize on the various flexible response measures, including the activation of contingency budgets, to quickly support to partners best placed to deliver lifesaving aid in communities hardest hit by the recent floods.
• Donors have committed more than US$3 million additional contributions to the MHF. This will complement the recently announced Central Emergency Response Fund allocation of up to $4 million.
• Additional funding and unrestricted access to affected areas are crucial for humanitarian organisations to respond effectively to the needs of flood impacted communities and the those have been displaced across the country due to the conflict.
Situation Overview
Eighteen days since the severe flash flooding and landslides hit many parts of Myanmar, the humanitarian response is rapidly moving forward. Humanitarian agencies, however, still urgently require additional supplies, funding, and expanded access to distribute assistance on a larger scale. Needs remain high among the flood-affected populations, many of whom had been displaced by the conflict and have had to also deal with the consequences of recurring floods. Even after surviving the disaster, the affected people remain at risk of waterborne diseases and now face the challenge of rebuilding their livelihoods, which have been lost by the floods. The destruction of homes, assets, farmlands, and income-generating activities has left many without the means to recover, further intensifying the need for both immediate humanitarian and early recovery assistance. Essential support is critical to help the affected populations rebuild their livelihoods and address the pressing challenges of recovery, loss of income, and health risks. Without timely assistance in agricultural inputs, shelter, food, and health services, recovery will be slow, and vulnerable communities will continue to face prolonged hardships. Coordinated efforts are necessary to ensure that aid reaches those most in need during this critical phase.
With the extent of the impact still unfolding, latest reports on the ground show a significant rise in the number of people affected by flooding. As of 26 September, flooding caused by torrential monsoon rains, including remnants from Typhoon Yagi, has impacted an estimated 1 million people across 70 of the country’s 330 townships in Bago, Kayah, Kayin, Magway, Mandalay, Mon, Nay Pyi Taw, Rakhine, Sagaing, eastern and southern Shan, and Tanintharyi regions/states. This means that well over half of the country’s 14 states and regions and Nay Pyi Taw have been affected. The hardest hit areas include Mandalay, eastern Bago, Kayin, Mon, southern Shan and to a lesser extent Nay Pyi Taw. Communities and volunteers are working on cleanup efforts where floodwaters have receded, but persistent rains and riverine conditions in the country continue to threaten some areas with recurrent flooding and potential river overflows.
• In the Northwest, floodwaters have largely receded, allowing communities to begin cleaning up and preparing to return home. Most affected people are from rural areas, primarily reliant on farming for their livelihoods. The floods have destroyed farms and submerged agricultural tools and materials. Farmers face challenges in resuming their livelihood activities without support for agricultural inputs. Potential health risks are rising due to limited access to clean water, and immediate emergency needs include drinking water, food, basic medicine, household kits, clothes, and shelter. More than 200 people are reportedly missing or drowned in Mandalay Region, mostly in Yamethin Township.
• In the Southeast, although the flooding has receded in many areas, flood warnings remain for areas near rivers in Bago and Taungoo townships, eastern Bago. Some areas in Kayah and southern Shan faced recurrent flooding at the time of reporting. Severe damage has occurred to livestock, farmland, and properties, including paddy barns. Nearly 48,500 acres of crops were reportedly submerged in southern and eastern Shan, an estimated 5,000 acres were damaged in Kayah State, and more than 2,600 livestock were lost across eastern Bago, Kayin, and Mon. More than 160 people allegedly drowned, and more than 100 missing, with actual figures potentially higher due to reporting and telecommunication challenges.
• In Rakhine State, more than 42,000 people in Minbya, Mrauk-U and Toungup townships are estimated to be affected by flooding. Floodwaters are beginning to recede across these areas, but due to access and telecommunication challenges, detailed information about the extent of the damage remains difficult to obtain..."
Source/publisher:
UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (New York) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2024-09-27
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Agriculture in Burma/Myanmar: general and research, Education in Burma/Myanmar - general, Food Security and nutrition in Burma/Myanmar, Public Health, Human Rights and international relations
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Format :
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298.71 KB
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"In Myanmar, the Shelter/NFI/CCCM Cluster was activated in January 2013. By March 2013, the Shelter/NFI/CCCM Cluster became operational in Kachin and Shan (North) States. Currently 3 Camp Management Agencies undertake substantial work for the Shelter/NFI/CCCM Cluster: data collection, coordination, monitoring of services, community mobilization and capacity building across camps that house over 107,600 IDPs. The objective of the Shelter/NFI/CCCM Cluster remains to ensure all of the priority camps, camps that contain the majority of IDPs, have a dedicated Camp Management Agency, delivering coordinated assistance in line with the rights and needs of the displaced and where possible preparing them for life after displacement..."
Source/publisher:
CCCM Cluster, Shelter Cluster, UN High Commissioner for Refugees via Reliefweb (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2024-09-25
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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pdf
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442.97 KB
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Description:
"CRISIS IMPACT OVERVIEW
On 8 September, Typhoon Yagi caused severe flooding and landslides in Myanmar, affecting more than 69 townships in nine central, eastern, and southeastern states and regions, namely Bago, Kayah, Kayin, Magway, Mandalay, Mon, Nay Pyi Taw, and southern and eastern Shan (UNICEF 18/09/2024; IFRC 18/09/2024).
Flooding has affected nearly 890,000 people, resulting in approximately 384 fatalities and 89 missing by 22 September (IFRC 18/09/2024; UNICEF 22/09/2024; AA 22/09/2024). As the situation continues to evolve and affected areas remain difficult to access as a result of damaged roads and widespread telecommunications and electricity disruptions, the number of those affected and dead are expected to rise (UNICEF 18/09/2024; IFRC 18/09/2024).
Until 9 June, prior to the flooding, there were already 18.6 million people (around one-third of the total population), including nearly six million children, in need of humanitarian assistance across Myanmar, including over 7.19 million in flood-affected areas (OCHA 09/06/2024; OCHA accessed 20/09/2024; IFRC 18/09/2024)..."
Source/publisher:
ACAPS via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2024-09-24
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Agriculture in Burma/Myanmar: general and research, Education in Burma/Myanmar - general, Public Health, Human Rights and international relations
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pdf
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1.32 MB
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"Delivered by:
United Nations Deputy High Commissioner for Human Rights Nada Al-Nashif
At
57th session of the Human Rights Council
Mr. Vice-President,
Your Excellencies,
Distinguished delegates,
The crisis in Myanmar continues to sink into an abyss of human suffering. Entrenched in armed conflicts spreading the length and breadth of the country, the military continues to lose ground, exacting an ever-higher price as it goes along the way. Airstrikes and artillery – the military’s weapons of choice -- have killed scores of civilians in villages and Internally Displaced Persons’ (IDP) camps, violating international human rights and humanitarian law.
While not comparable in scale and scope to the military, some ethnic armed groups have also harmed civilians, at times apparently deliberately. Recently, the Office issued another warning about the possible reoccurrence of atrocities against Rohingya caught between the ‘Arakan Army’ – which is forcing them to flee their homes -- and the military, leaving them nowhere safe to run. In Rakhine, the situation continues to deteriorate, with intensified clashes killing more civilians, with desperately needed food and medical assistance almost entirely blocked.
Credible sources have verified a minimum of 5,600 civilians, including 1,160 women and 624 children, killed by the military since February 2021. Compounding the violence, the number of people forced to flee due to natural disasters continues to escalate daily.
Earlier this month, flooding from Typhoon Yagi resulted in an estimated over 800,000 displaced with over 300 reported deaths. Yet the military has reportedly failed to issue warnings or to help non-military families evacuate affected areas.
United Nations figures indicate that over 18.6 million people are in humanitarian need; over 3 million have been displaced due to violence across the country and over 15 million are food insecure.
These numbers tell only a partial story. As the economy plummets, essential commodities, to the extent that they remain available, are becoming unaffordable for many. More than half the population now lives in poverty with the country’s GDP dropping 12 percent annually on average since the coup in 2021.
Meanwhile, the Myanmar Humanitarian Response Plan is only 12 percent funded. For many, essential services have long since ceased to function. Shortages of food and medicine, along with a rise in cases of malaria, dengue fever, and cholera, combined with a lack of access to vaccinations, were reported in several areas.
Yet rather than addressing the needs of the people and mitigating the crisis, the military have doubled down on repression and restrictions on humanitarian operations, especially in conflict-affected areas.
After attempting to forcibly conscript civilians between 18 and 35, the military has announced its intention to arm civilians in local militias to defend territories which the military itself cannot. This risks of course leading to wider militarization and greater violence across the country.
Throughout the crisis, the people of Myanmar have consistently expressed their desire for democracy, the rule of law, and accountability, in the face of a military desperately trying to hold on to power by any means necessary.
The report before you highlights the military’s use of the criminal justice process, law enforcement and the penal apparatus to deter and punish any form of opposition. Applicable laws have been repeatedly and unilaterally modified in attempts to justify detaining an ever-growing number of actual or perceived opponents.
Credible sources have verified 26,933 individuals arrested, including 5,556 women and 547 children, indefinitely incarcerated. Between April 2023 and June 2024, over 9,000 individuals were verified as having been detained with 1,648 convicted by military-controlled courts that do not ensure minimum respect of basic judicial guarantees.
It is deeply disturbing that a full third of all those verified as having been killed since this crisis began, died in military custody. In the reporting period alone, over 1,853 people have been killed while in the military’s custody – whether in places of detention or during military operations in the field, including 759 people.
We remain very concerned by the possible use of the death penalty, with 167 people sentenced to death since the military coup.
Torture and ill-treatment, including multiple reports of sexual violence in detention – against women and LBGTI persons -- remain rampant in interrogation centers, prisons, and other detention sites. Interviewees describe being subjected to some of the most depraved treatment, including electrocution, asphyxiation, having insects and animals set upon them, and sexual torture. Perpetrators have been emboldened by long-standing impunity.
Appalling conditions in detention further contributed to multiple violations of human rights suffered by detainees. Interviewees released from 12 military-run prisons across nine states and regions described generally squalid facilities with cells being badly-lit, poorly ventilated, and overcrowded – often at double their original capacity.
In addition, continued exposure to violence and associated fear, have had a devastating impact on the mental health and well-being of victims and communities across Myanmar. The lack of adequate resources to provide mental health support has been further exacerbated by mental health professionals fleeing the country.
Mr. Vice-President,
This situation is not new. This crisis has been in a steady downward spiral for over three and half years now. Every indicator across the country is tipping downwards. Despite this, there has been little focused international attention to stem this tide of horror.
When the High Commissioner last addressed this Council, he spoke clearly of the need for a new approach to end this crisis. There is an urgent need for political will and leadership at regional and international levels to demand, and achieve, a solution in the best interests of the people of Myanmar. It is imperative that Member States, notably those with influence, work together to bolster and support ASEAN members to resolve this crisis and bring an end to the violence in Myanmar.
Our Office has proposed concrete ways to address key aspects of this self-perpetuating crisis.
The flow of arms, other military material and aviation fuel that is powering the military’s campaign of violence against the civilian population must stop.
The political process must be renewed, engaging equally with the National Unity Government, ethnic armed groups and the democracy movement to define future solutions for the country.
People in Myanmar need to have their voices and agency in this crisis fully recognized. Engagement with the youth, women and civil society must be reinvigorated and broadened to ensure they have a voice at the table.
Creative ways should be used to get humanitarian aid to the people, including through cross-border operations. This means supporting civil society and community-based organizations that have been at the forefront of efforts to deliver services where public institutions have failed to do so.
The initiatives of civil society exemplify how people-led movements are able to take steps to effectively mitigate, within limited resources, many aspects of the current suffering. Such efforts will be crucial to Myanmar’s future and to ensuring there is capacity to deliver once this crisis ends.
Myanmar’s democratic prospects rest squarely on these organizations and networks, which have stepped up since February 2021 to support those in need, despite severe security concerns and challenges.
Increased political and financial support to local organizations, is critical to ensuring civil society’s full involvement in decision-making processes concerning their country’s future.
In the midst of so much suffering, it is imperative that steps are taken to protect Rohingya civilians, in line with the provisional measures ordered by the International Court of Justice in January 2020. The time to hold military leaders accountable is now. In this, the International Criminal Court, the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar and a variety of national jurisdictions are all playing key roles.
Member States with influence should take meaningful steps to ensure the military complies with its obligations under international law, including the release of all arbitrarily detained prisoners, in order to return the country to the stable and democratic path its people so deserve..."
Source/publisher:
UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2024-09-24
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, UN Human Rights pages on Myanmar
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"Jakarta, 23 September 2024—The ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights (APHR) strongly condemns the executions of two Myanmar pro-democracy activists by the State Administration Council (SAC) today and expresses its deepest condolences to the families and friends for the loss of their beloved ones.
Kaung Htet and his wife Chan Myae Thu were executed at 04:00 AM Myanmar time on 23 September 2024 for alleged involvement in Yangon’s Insein Prison bombing on October 19, 2022.
“Break the silence now,“ said Mercy Chriesty Barends, APHR Chairperson and member of Indonesia’s House of Representatives. “ASEAN foreign ministers must speak up against the SAC execution policy.”
The junta military arrested the couple and sentenced them to death for their alleged involvement without due process and fair trial. Chan Myae Thu is the first woman who was executed since the military coup in February 2021, according to the Women’s Peace Network.
“We are gravely concerned that the death penalty is being used to silence persons with dissenting views in Myanmar,” said Arlene D. Brosas, APHR Board Member and the Philippines Member of Parliament.
APHR has received a report from a reliable source that the SAC will execute five other pro-democracy activists on 24 September 2024. They are Zaryaw Phyo (32), San Min Aung (24), Kyaw Win Soe (33), Kaung Pyae Sone Oo (27) and Myat Phyo Pwint (unknown).
The five activists were sentenced to death on 18 May 2023 in a closed-door civilian hearing at Yangon’s Insein Prison for their alleged participation in a shooting on a train in 2021. APHR was informed that they were brutally tortured and experienced sexual violence without any access to reliable legal support.
“This must stop,” said Charles Santiago, APHR co-chairperson and former Malaysian parliament member. He further said, “ASEAN foreign ministers must denounce such an unjust act. They must be united to push the SAC to terminate their execution and release them from prison.”
The Myanmar junta military will execute over 120 detainees in the coming weeks, who are mostly activists and human rights defenders. Fifteen of them are women human rights defenders.
APHR urges the international community to hold the SAC accountable for the arbitrary arrest and detention of over 27,000 people, as well as its commission of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide, as a fundamental step toward ending impunity in Myanmar..."
Source/publisher:
ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights
Date of entry/update:
2024-09-23
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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"Geneva, 23 September 2024 – The Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar is closely monitoring reports of planned executions of persons sentenced to death in non-public trials.
According to information received by the Mechanism, executions may be imminent for several individuals who were sentenced to death during closed-door hearings in Yangon’s Insein Prison in 2023.
Imposing a death sentence, or even a period of detention, on the basis of proceedings that do not satisfy the basic requirements of a fair trial may constitute one or more crimes against humanity or war crimes.
One of the most fundamental attributes of a fair trial is that it be held in public unless there are compelling national security reasons. When proceedings are not public, this casts doubt on whether other fair trial guarantees have been respected, such as the requirement that the tribunal was impartial and independent. Imposing a prison or death sentence in such circumstances could constitute crimes against humanity or war crimes.
The Mechanism is monitoring and collecting information on the cases against these individuals and others that involve the imposition of the death penalty in circumstances that might violate fundamental fair trial guarantees.
The Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar (IIMM or Mechanism) was created by the United Nations Human Rights Council in 2018 to collect and analyse evidence of the most serious international crimes and other violations of international law committed in Myanmar since 2011. It aims to facilitate justice and accountability by preserving and organizing this evidence and preparing case files that can be used by authorities to prosecute individuals in national, regional and international courts..."
Source/publisher:
UN Human Rights Council (Geneva) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2024-09-23
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
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84.57 KB
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Description:
"Situation Overview & Humanitarian Needs:
Across Myanmar, nearly 890,000 people, including an estimated 270,000 children are affected by the ongoing flooding in nine states and regions, including Nay Pyi Taw. The most affected areas are Mandalay Region, southern Shan, eastern Bago, Kayin State, and Nay Pyi Taw. As per OCHA, more than 300 fatalities and nearly 100 injuries have been reported.
The floods and landslides have caused widespread damage and destruction of homes, household assets, destroyed livelihoods and critical infrastructure including health facilities, schools, water sources, and major highways and bridges. In some parts of Mandalay region which was among the worst affected, water levels in many flooded villages have receded while challenges remain for the affected population to return home. Communication challenges persist due to flooded roads and downed electric lines.
In eastern and southern Shan, flooding and landslides have affected 26 townships; in Bago region, more than 100,000 people have been severely affected across six townships while in Mon and Kayin states, around 100,00 are affected by floods and landslides.3 In Rakhine, more than 40,000 people from villages including IDPs locations in Mrauk U, and Myinbya and Tounangoup townships are affected..."
Source/publisher:
UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) (Myanmar) via Reliefweb (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2024-09-22
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
UNICEF (United Nations Children's Fund), Education in Burma/Myanmar - general, Public Health, Human Rights and international relations
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pdf
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168.98 KB
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"Human Rights Violations took place in States and Regions from Sep 8 to 14, 2024
Military Junta Troop launched airstrikes and dropped bombs in the Magway Region, Shan State, Kachin State, and Rakhine State from September 8th to 14th. Military Junta arrested the civilians as human shields from Mindon Township, Magway Region, and Salingyi Township, Sagaing Region. Military Junta also committed a massacre by killing over 30 civilians in Hpakant Township, Kachin State. The Military Junta arrested the civilians from Ayeyarwady Region and Bago Region for the Military Service.
Over 30 civilians died, and over 10 were injured by the Military’s heavy and light artillery attacks within a week. Over 50 civilians were arrested by the Military Junta within a week..."
Source/publisher:
Network for Human Rights Documentation-Burma
Date of entry/update:
2024-09-20
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
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Size:
1.33 MB 1.58 MB 102.79 KB
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Description:
"(1.2) Background
(DMH-Issued at 14:15 hrs M.S.T. on 16-9-2024)
Due to the intensity of the typhoon "Ragi" occurred in the South China Sea, heavy rainfall and strong winds are expected in Naypyidaw and 11 other states and regions from September 8 to September 12, lasting for about 5 days.
16-9-2024: : According to the observations at (12:30) hrs MST today, the Deep Depression over the West Bengal(India) and adjoining Bangladesh almost stationary still persists. Monsoon is moderate to strong over the Andaman Sea and Bay of Bengal .
Flood condition of Dokehtawaddy River
According to the (17:30)hrs M.S.T observation today, the water level of Dokehtawaddy River at Myinge has exceeded by more than 3 feet (92 cm) above its danger level 28.54 feet (870 cm). may fall from the present water level by about 1 foot during the next 1 day and may remain above its danger level.
Flood conditions of Sittoung River
According to the (17:30)hrs M.S.T observation today, the water level of Sittoung River at Toungoo has exceeded by about 6 feet (180 cm) above its danger level 19.69*feet (600 cm)..."
Source/publisher:
Myanmar Red Cross Society via Reliefweb (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2024-09-19
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Food Security and nutrition in Burma/Myanmar, Public Health, Human Rights and international relations
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Format :
pdf
Size:
752.16 KB
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Description:
"Highlights:
• Starting from 8 September 2024, strong winds and heavy rainfall triggered by Typhoon Yagi affected 9 states/ regions in Myanmar.
• Floods and landslides caused significant damage to agricultural lands, road networks, telecommunications and electricity across all 9 state and regions.
• Thousands of houses damaged or destroyed, including MRCS branch office at Tachileik (Eastern Shan).
• An Emergency Appeal is being launched by IFRC to assist at least 25,000 affected people..."
Source/publisher:
International Federation of Red Cross And Red Crescent Societies, Myanmar Red Cross Society via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2024-09-19
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Food Security and nutrition in Burma/Myanmar, Public Health, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
1.01 MB
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Description:
"In the wake of political and economic instability, migration within Myanmar is becoming an increasingly common strategy for survival. This report offers a comprehensive analysis of the migration patterns emerging across different states and regions, focusing on the sectors of employment both at the points of origin and destination. By examining the well-being, particularly the mental health, of migrants, it aims to inform community-level interventions and targeted policy responses.
The data shows a significant demographic shift, with a majority of internal migrants being young adults moving to urban areas in search of better job prospects. However, many face unemployment and mental health challenges, particularly those migrating for safety rather than economic reasons. Additionally, the report highlights the growing gender disparities in the labor market, with women facing lower wages and higher discrimination post-migration.
The study also draws critical comparisons between internal migrants and those who moved to Thailand, revealing significant disparities in income and well-being. It warns of the risk of further out-migration if employment opportunities within Myanmar do not improve, potentially leading to labor shortages that could hinder the country’s economic recovery. With nearly 25% of the population already living abroad, addressing these migration trends is essential to retaining a productive workforce within the country.
Explore the full report for a detailed look at migration in Myanmar, including the key challenges and potential interventions to support this vulnerable population..."
Source/publisher:
UN Development Programme (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2024-09-18
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"An American currently fighting for the revolution in Myanmar discusses the avoidance of ethnic and political schisms, the decentralisation of guerilla combat, the confusions generated by counter-insurrection, and the complex geopolitical dynamics at play
~ Azad, intrerviewed by Ill Will ~
Ill Will: How did a civil protest movement using the tactics and strategies of the black bloc and rock throwing evolve to become a domestic insurgency? How does this process compare to the 1988 civil war which, at first glance, seemed to proceed along similar lines?
Azad: Before responding to the questions of the comrades, I would like to first address certain realities about the revolution in Myanmar that I believe are important for the full understanding of the situation. The current revolution, spurred from a nationwide rebuke of the sudden assumption of power by the military, has proceeded along many separate and contradictory lines. I think it is important to frame these developments in the language of diversity and flowering, rather than of fracturing or inconsistency.
Myanmar is a state formed within colonial boundaries. As a result, it is the common nation of a dozen-plus ethnicities in addition to the Burmese people. The progression from independence to ‘Burmese Socialism’ has long been complicated, and democratic rule here has always stood on shaky ground.
As I write this, the state is now confronted by over a hundred different armed groups. Some of them are as small as a township, while others rival the junta’s army in capability. I have spent 7 months in Chin State with two militias; the PDF Zoland and the Chin National Defense Force (CNDF). These two groups are members of the Chin Brotherhood alliance, itself one of two military blocs within Chin state. In this short 7 months, I have only just begun to understand the local dynamics and conditions of the revolution, to say nothing of regional and national differences. As such, I hope any inaccuracies can be forgiven, and that any insight I can give will be considered a fragment of a more complete analysis of the situation in Myanmar.
Following the Juntas usurpation of power, protests from all sections of society began immediately: not only in the Burmese heartland, but in the urban centers of the ethnic regions as well. In Instagram and Facebook story collections of those who resisted, you can find a progression of the protests reminiscent of a slideshow: at first, reactions of disbelief and outrage at the coup; then, of horror at the use of violence and massacres to repress dissent, followed finally by calls for armed resistance. While initially peaceful, favoring mass marches and general strikes, the dissident movement underwent rapid evolution when faced with bullets and massacres in the streets. Realizing they were confronting an enemy that recognized only violence, armed resistance began in the first month with homemade air-cannons, slingshots, and traditional muzzle-loading hunting rifles. It soon became clear that there were only two choices: between revolution, or surrender to dictatorship. At this point, thousands flocked to the countryside, either joining existing “Ethnic Armed Organizations” (EAOs) that had already been resisting the central Burmese government for decades, or forming their own new resistance organizations.
As resistance swelled in the streets, the now-deposed elected government worked to retain its legitimacy. Only days after the coup, legislators from the National League for Democracy (NLD) — the political party that secured majority control of both houses of the legislature, with help from politicians from other ousted parties, — formed the CRPH, or “Committee representing [the legislature].” The CRPH refused to recognize the authority of the military coup. One month later, the National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC) was formed, a coalition that gathered elements from the nationwide protest movement, the opposition government, and — significantly — eight ethnic armed organizations. The NUCC went on to form the National Unity Government (NUG), widely recognized as the legitimate de jure government of Myanmar.
To return to your question, I think it is a mistake to see this as “1988 but different.” The current moment is the result of a historical current that cannot be explained without the 1988 uprising. The NLD, for example, had its roots in this uprising. Since its inception as a state, there has always been a “pro-democracy” element of Burmese politics and ethnic armed organizations vying for independence or autonomy. However, never have these two elements joined forces like we are seeing today. The 1988 uprising was catalyzed in urban centers and failed to evolve into a national resistance, while today almost all liberated territory is held by the EAOs. Symbolized in the inclusion of EAO representatives in the NUCC and later NUG, the alliance between ethnic fighters seeking autonomy and pro-democracy Burmese society marks a major point of departure from previous cycles of struggle.
It seems like the tables have turned in favor of the revolution? To what do you attribute this? What would winning look like militarily and politically?
For the first time in the revolutionary history of Myanmar, the military is indeed on the backfoot. The Tatmadaw (the armed forces of Myanmar) was historically organized exclusively for the purposes of counter-insurgency, modeled after the brutal colonial repression strategy of the British empire. Through the clever use of ceasefires and autonomy agreements, it has pursued a divide and conquer strategy, isolating EAOs one at a time and destroying them with concentrated force. Before the outbreak of the “Spring revolution” against the dictatorship, the government of Myanmar was party to the NCA or “National Ceasefire Agreement” alongside signatories from ten EAOs.
Now, the situation has changed. Following the overwhelming popular opposition to the Junta and the collaboration of the NUG with the EAOs, almost every organization either withdrew from the ceasefire agreement or was otherwise attacked by the Tatmadaw (in violation of the ceasefire). Instead of having the freedom to amass forces in one section of the country, with no complaints from a largely apathetic Burmese public, the Tatmadaw was now forced to fight everywhere at once against an enemy with virtually unlimited popular support. While clashes began almost immediately following the coup, the junta suffered its first major defeat as a result of Operation 1027, which took its name from the coordinated strike on October 27 2023 by the Three Brotherhood Alliance, an alliance of three major EAOs. In just the first month of the offensive, over 220 junta positions were overrun, triggering a shockwave across the country. This was the first signal that the military regime was too overstretched to defend itself, and gave many around the country the confidence needed to begin their own offensives. As operation 1027 continues, so too do the many regional campaigns that it inspired. Since then, as you have seen, the junta has suffered defeat after defeat.
It seems that the trend will continue. Militarily, each EAO is nearing the liberation of their home states, and as PDF militias under the ostensible command of the NUG fight alongside them, slowly the Tatmadaw is losing its footing in the ethnic regions, all the while facing a guerrilla campaign around the outskirts of cities in the Bamar regions. Plain and simple, the military is losing. The ethnic areas will soon be liberated, the only remaining question being how much of that momentum will carry over into Bamar-majority regions. Many EAOs have stated plainly that in addition to their demands for autonomy, they will continue fighting until the unconditional defeat of the military dictatorship.
At a political level the goal is a bit less defined. Whoever you ask will tell you that we are all fighting for a “Federal Democracy.” What that means in practice has yet to be clearly defined and universally agreed upon, but this is understandable given the nature of the conflict and doesn’t necessarily detract from its validity as a goal.
Have you had support from other countries or international forces? Have the fighters drawn upon connections with insurgents elsewhere?
So far, support from foreign governments has been mostly marginal: recognition of the NUG as the legitimate representative of Myanmar, as well as economic sanctions against those affiliated with the junta. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has been largely non-committal, and the efforts of neighboring nations to mediate the conflict have been mostly ignored. India and China have been incredibly calculating in their relationship to the regime and rebels, overtly continuing their support of the regime while turning a blind eye to the activities of resistance groups conducting business in their own countries. This is especially true when we consider the rate at which the junta has been suffering defeats — it seems many are waiting to see how the conflict will develop before fully committing to a position.
In December 2022, the United States Congress passed the “BURMA Act,” which recognizes the NUG as the legitimate representative of Myanmar and authorizes the use of funds to support “democratic elements.” So far, this is all going through humanitarian avenues. While it isn’t guns and ammo, armed groups who are now ousting the junta from their towns are having to foot the bill for the services provided. NGOs such as USAID are able to cover a portion of that cost, which understandably reduces administrative burden significantly.
I have yet to see serious indications of meaningful connections or examples drawn from other insurgent groups. In the span of a few years, entire armies have been made out of students, teachers, workers, and the former professional class, so the focus has been on the rapid emergency armament of a people and less on the strategic analysis of methods. Many ethnicities in Myanmar have a significant diaspora in the West, and especially in the United States, where participation in the military is more common. As a result, I have seen multiple ethnic Chin from the US with a military background give trainings, and anecdotally I’m told this has happened in other regions as well.
I am aware of various communist and Maoist groups such as the Burmese Communist Party, but am not knowledgeable enough about them to comment as to their inspirations.
What lessons can be taken from the sequence of insurgency, then civil war with guerilla features? How portable is the model that has been adopted? What limits are there to translating the situation to elsewhere?
I don’t think there actually is a model that has been adopted, but rather a progression of developments that are still very much unfolding. The lessons from these are nevertheless tangible. One of the most striking is that unorganized popular resistance can only be so effective in the face of bullets. As we saw in Syria in 2011, unrest can provide the inertia necessary to begin revolution, but it cannot become the revolution in and of itself. In the case of Rojava, it was the People’s Democratic Union (PYD), dormant but organized since 2003, which was able to put the spear into the heart of the Syrian occupation, and subsequently to defend the revolution from attacks by Al-Nusra and ISIS, as well as the fascist Turkish state. Here in Burma, it was the ethnic organizations that have been resisting in the mountains for decades which were able to fight with renewed spirit and support of the people, alongside a shadow government which still holds serious claims to legitimacy.
Still, there is something to be said for the newer groups formed after the coup. These organizations and armies — hewn from nothing but the moral fiber of refusal to live under dictatorship — catalyzed around pre-existing organizational structures that later solidified during the post-coup civil disobedience movement, mostly along regional or ethnic lines.
This is not to say that the role of “the people” isn’t critical, or to imply that the revolution is made by armed vanguards alone. Rather, as revolutionaries of all nations, we should understand the critical role that organization plays. When the moment of intensity and inertia arrives, a prepared revolutionary organization must seize it. If there is no such organization at the time, one must be formed. If one is not formed, the revolution will die.
What is the culture of the fighters? What ties like with locals or other above ground elements of the struggle? Are the guerillas in the jungle isolated, or is there a lot of exchange with civilian elements?
Every ethnic organization has a political and an armed wing. Perhaps in previous times these were of a much more traditional clandestine and “guerilla” nature, but given the current inability of the central government to maintain its grasp on remote areas, these have increasingly become above-ground organizations in and of themselves. The legitimacy gained from affiliation or official relationship with the NUG helps in this regard. While the NUG has a ministry of defense that is doing its best to rally support and raise funds to support the PDFs and various EAOs with whom it has partnered, the fact that it is an exiled government means that local militias are largely responsible for funding their own operations.
This is done through a very organic relationship with the civil population, combined with a well-organized support element in the diaspora. Although the specific numbers vary group by group, roughly 50% of operational funds come from local donations and taxes, and the other 50% from the diaspora. While taxes are levied primarily on commerce vehicles passing through resistance checkpoints, the overwhelming majority of income of these groups is generated via donations from supporters. This is in part due to the nature from which these groups arose. As mentioned earlier, the civil disobedience movement following the coup commanded huge amounts of social power and organizational capital. Professionals and government workers from villages and entire cities walked off the job to join the resistance. It would be imprecise to say that the relationship with the people is “good”; more accurate would be to say that the various defense forces are themselves the people, and likewise that the people see themselves represented in the guerilla.
As to the culture of the fighters, truth be told there is still much to be desired. Imagine you have given a liberal a gun and now they are fighting fascism. They are ready to fight, but there is still a lack of a deep revolutionary perspective in many of the rank and file, and much adherence to the trappings of civil life. In a way, this is to be expected — after all, this is the story of a people in arms, who had their hopes for a peaceful transition to democratic rule snatched from them after the military coup. They had never dreamed of holding a rifle and yet, forced by circumstance and the dignity of the human spirit, they have become revolutionaries. This lack of depth should be understood but criticized; above all, it must be taken into account as a necessary feature of any successful mobilization of a people towards radical ends.
It cannot be said that every group is revolutionary. Indeed, many opportunists, especially in the border regions, have taken advantage of the chaos and formed “militias” which are little more than crime organizations in order to participate in lucrative smuggling, drug trade, or scamming markets. Groups of this nature are, as a rule, either functionally neutral to the conflict, or are tacitly supporting the junta in exchange for taking up space that the rebels cannot operate in. It should be said that these groups make up a very tiny minority, instead representing the unsavory element on the edges of any revolution.
What is the relationship between the various armed groups? Is there a coordinated command? Does this relation reflect any political distinctions, and if so, of what sort?
In Burma there are over a hundred armed groups. If we were to consider only the most significant, this number can be reduced to about a dozen, falling into one of two blocs — EAO or PDF/Bamar militia. Between these there is a complicated web of relationships, some much more collaborative than others. At scale, most groups fundamentally agree on a set of basic principles: first, that the military regime is the common enemy; second, that the fight should continue until the total defeat of the regime; third, among EAOs, that their shared goals of autonomy are working towards more or less the same end; and finally, among all groups, that the establishment of a federal system which removes the historic power of the military from government, and grants autonomous regions an equal footing in a new union, is the ultimate goal.
With this in mind, there is no “national alliance” with a coordinated strategy and logistical pipeline. This is not to say that higher-level cooperation doesn’t exist. Between EAOs especially, there is a high degree of material cooperation in the form of soldiers, training, weapons, and ammo. Sometimes entire units pack up and move across the country to take part in a strategic flashpoint which would help another group, and ultimately the progression of the revolution as a whole. In its own way, this collaboration between groups across religious and ethnic lines is itself a shining example of internationalist solidarity.
The NUG, while officially being the vehicle through which the resistance is coordinated and facilitated, is in practice a power among powers. While the NUG does not officially control as much liberated land as the EAOs by volume, the fact that they retain international legitimacy and the support of the Burmese public is enough to make them a serious unifying element. This balance of power is likely to make itself felt in any federal formation that may occur after the defeat of the dictatorship.
Not to give the skeptics ammunition for their arguments, but of course the sheer number of different groups has given rise to conflict inside and between ethnic groups. This has yet to truly explode into something tragic, but it already has made the fight against the junta more difficult in areas plagued by factionalism. However, these tensions exist mostly along regional or tribal lines, and on the national scale do not pose a threat to the unity of the largest groups who are cooperating to bring down the dictatorship. In general, the political language of every group emphasizes and reinforces the solidarity and friendship between peoples.
We’d like to understand the struggle more historically: what kind of theory or thinkers, past and present, have contributed to the present strategy? Are people reading books or websites?
Among the new wave of groups formed after the 2021 coup — those with which I have the most experience — I cannot say that I have identified any particular tendency. While I have seen individuals in leadership positions reading and studying, this is not in pursuit of a particular line of study rather than a general search for information and solutions, including options that we might not consider to be revolutionary. Social democracy has a particularly strong pull, as the country’s problematic history with “socialism” — in practice, the most absurd dictatorships — has left many sour to the concept. At the same time, the glaring contradictions of dictatorship also causes unease when “capitalism” is mentioned. While there are groups that include a socialist union in their platform, this is not the common tendency of the resistance as a whole. “Federalism” is the only word we can go off of, which includes as varied sources of study as the US and European federal systems and the revolution in Rojava.
The level of political development among the rank and file is low. Especially in the EAOs, many are motivated first of all by feelings of national pride, and only secondarily by an ideological opposition to fascism and dictatorship (though this is not uncommon in even more developed revolutionary movements). Anecdotally, my experience with Bamar comrades has been slightly different: since many come from a student background, it is not uncommon for them to engage in an individual search for more radical methods. Still, I have not noticed any preference towards any particular revolutionary tendency.
Does the current struggle employ the Maoist concepts of a protracted people’s war and urban encirclement?
Many legacy EAOs subscribed in whole or in part to a Maoist theory of guerilla war. However, although the present revolution developed along lines that Mao had identified, it did not emerge through any actual study and application of this theory. The strongholds of the EAOs in remote and mountainous regions provided the perfect springboard that the newly insurgent population needed to rapidly train, organize, and develop. While some groups may still subscribe to Maoist political and military theory, I do not have enough experience with these groups to comment about them.
What is the relationship of the revolution to the Rohingya and other disenfranchised ethnic groups from before the coup?
While there is no monolithic “revolution,” in general all parties have condemned the genocide committed by the military against the Rohingya and called for greater co-operation between ethnic groups. Given the ongoing nature of a tragedy like this one, it is a touchy subject with many elements. Exacerbating existing religious and ethnic tensions, various Islamist Rohingya organizations have allied with the military which just committed genocide against them, and are fighting against the Arakha Army, one of the largest rebel organizations. Now, Junta disinformation mills are capitalizing on the international recognition of the Rohingya genocide, trying to paint the AA as continuing this persecution. Despite evidence being shaky at best, this narrative has even been picked up by mainstream media outlets, causing confusion as to the reality of the situation.
Each region is fighting its own micro-war, with limited strategic coordination between them. Sometimes it can seem like a battle in a neighboring state might as well be happening in another country. The news that you see is the same news everyone else here is reading, so you will learn about complicated events such as hotly contested battles or tragic massacres of civilians at the same time I do. Nobody in the country wants to see the mistreatment of the Rohingya continue, and as a group they are caught in the crossfire without adequate representation. The fact that several Rohingya groups, with foreign support from private individuals in countries like Turkey, are fighting for the Junta only further complicates the situation and adds salt to an already tense relationship.
As for the relationship of the revolution with “other ethnic groups,” I think its safe to say that the revolution is itself comprised of these ethnic groups and that relations are in general friendly.
What are the politics of the insurgency? Western media describe the rebels as “pro-democracy.” From our vantage point, capitalist democracy is not revolutionary. What do the people there want, and how do they speak of it?
I have encountered this sentiment in the majority of comrades with whom I have spoken at any depth about Myanmar. It is true, there exists no mainstream element of the revolution in Myanmar upon which we can project our hopes and aspirations for revolution against the liberal systems we are faced with in the West. Perhaps even out of the mainstream, you would be hard pressed to zoom in on any particular group and highlight them as the example of a revolutionary alternative. That doesn’t change the validity of the struggle the people here are waging against the dictatorship.
I think the question of what a transition to a democratic system would look like was up in the air even before the coup. In any case, the party spearheading the push for democracy, the NLD (itself born in the aftermath of the 1988 uprisings) commands the absolute popular support of the people of Myanmar, across all ethnic and religious lines. The intent was to bloodlessly remove the stranglehold of the military from the government. When the military seized power to stop these proposed changes, the only option left on the table was revolution. It can then be understood why there is not necessarily a universally accepted revolutionary platform, especially when many EAOs had already been resisting the government for decades under a variety of motives.
I cannot speak for the people of Burma, but with their near-unanimous support of the NLD (78% of seats in the lower house, 82% in the upper house), there was a clear base for the uprising against the dictatorship. In such a case, while the future may not be as clear as we’d like it to be, I cannot envision the struggle of an entire people against dictatorship and towards a democratic system described in any way except as revolution. Whether observers will support such a perspective depends largely on their moral facilities. The people certainly perceive themselves as revolutionaries.
Take the example of Palestine. In the current struggle against Israeli occupation, the actual politics of most of the organizations waging the resistance are unquestionably bad. Yet this doesn’t change the fact that their struggle against settler colonialism grants them a certain moral authority and legitimacy. This is what explains the tension many experience in supporting Islamic fascists against occupation, or receiving US support while defending oneself against Turkish imperialism in Rojava. A similar contradiction is at issue here, just as it was in Hong Kong five years ago, where we find would-be neoliberals fighting tooth and nail against dictatorship. In my view — and perhaps this is controversial, who knows — those doing so are deserving of our revolutionary solidarity.
We’re reminded of a text that comrades in France wrote in 2016, where their message to the liberals in the Nuit debout movement was something like, “okay so, how about instead of drafting constitutions now, what if we focus on achieving the insurrection first, then sort this out later?”
Exactly.1
What is at stake geopolitically? How could we map the struggle in Myanmar to what is happening to places like Palestine, Ukraine, Haiti, Rojava, or Sudan? Has there been a circulation of ideas or practices between these places? How might a victory there resonate elsewhere?
China, Russia, and the US are all certainly keeping a very close eye on the developments in Burma. Most tangibly, Russia and the military regime have a two-way transfer of arms and munitions, and Russia forms a very serious component of Tatmadaw military capability in the form of training and equipment repair services. As China tries to improve its naval power, having Myanmar as a close ally allows it an important access point to the sea, avoiding strategic chokepoints. Conversely, the US is looking for any opportunity to create a friendly power on China’s doorstep.
Russia is the only power that will suffer from the defeat of the Junta. Ammunition manufactured in Myanmar is used on the frontlines in Ukraine. China is much more calculating, refusing to take steps necessary to cement the control of the Junta but without yet throwing its weight behind any resistance groups. It keeps its ties to the SAC warm, but turns a blind eye to cross-border resistance activity and mediates ceasefires to protect Chinese interests in areas under insurgent control.
The resistance, the diaspora, and the exiled government have strong roots in the West and especially in the US. However, the official position of the NUG has not been anti-China, and a controversial January 2024 statement pledged to safeguard Chinese interests, including recognizing Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan. While the NUG doesn’t represent every revolutionary group, this balancing act nevertheless gives context to the situation the rebels find themselves in.
Messages of support and solidarity are common both from armed resistance groups as well as civil protestors, especially in politically organized sections of the diaspora. The common throughlines run through Palestine, Rojava, Ukraine, Hong Kong, Taiwan, recently Bangladesh, and elsewhere in the similar vein. As is common in revolutionary movements with a strong diaspora component, there is lots of collaboration and intermingling in the diaspora, but I don’t have the impression that in-country there has been any serious exchange of lessons or practices yet.
A victory in Myanmar would be a victory for resisting peoples everywhere. It sends a simple yet powerful message: a rebellious people with a unified will can overthrow the systems that oppress them. In the first days of the uprising, the common analysis was that the Tatmadaw was so strong as to be militarily undefeatable; yet the people took up arms regardless, if for nothing else than a life lived with dignity. When they did rise up, they found that the giant was not as invulnerable as everyone assumed, and the façade began to crumble rapidly. Victory in Myanmar would be a victory for hope itself, for the idea that victory is possible but not inevitable, depending only on our commitment to struggle and the degree to which we are willing to organize and sacrifice for freedom..."
Source/publisher:
Freedom News (London)
Date of entry/update:
2024-09-18
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Type:
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Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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"Human Rights Council
Fifty-Seventh session
9 September–9 October 2024
Agenda items 2 and 4
Annual Report of the United Nations High Commissioner
for Human Rights and reports of the Office of the
High Commissioner and the Secretary-General
Human rights situations that require the Council’s attention
Summary
Prepared pursuant to Human Rights Council resolution 52/31, this report presents findings based on OHCHR monitoring and verification of the overall situation of human rights in Myanmar regarding alleged violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, as well as the rule of law, since 1 April 2023. It concludes by examining the impact of the crisis on the mental health of the population and good practices in provision of mental health services by civil society and community-based organizations. The report concludes with recommendations to the military, armed groups and international community, including to ensure accountability..."
Source/publisher:
UN Human Rights Council (Geneva) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2024-09-17
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Resolutions and Decisions on Myanmar at regular sessions of the Human Rights Council, Human Rights and international relations
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"UNICEF Statement
UNICEF is deeply concerned for the safety and well-being of thousands of children and families affected by the severe flooding across Myanmar. Heavy rainfalls marking the peak of the monsoon season, exacerbated by Typhoon Yagi, have caused widespread devastation, particularly in Bago, Kayah, Kayin, Magway, Mandalay, Mon, Naypyitaw, Rakhine and Shan areas.
The floods have resulted in casualties, displaced families, damaged homes, and have destroyed livelihoods and critical infrastructure, including health facilities, schools, and major highways and bridges.
As of today, over 130 deaths and about 320,000 displacements have been reported, though the situation is still evolving. Verifying numbers remains challenging, as many affected areas are still hard to reach due to damaged roads and widespread disruptions to telecommunications and electricity.
As is too often the case in natural disasters, children are among the worst affected. Their safety, well-being, and access to basic services are at grave risk. Affected areas include camps for displaced people, including children, who were already struggling with limited services due to ongoing conflict.
UNICEF teams are on the ground, working closely with stakeholders to assess the situation and mobilize immediate relief. The provision of clean water, sanitation, and healthcare is critical to averting water-borne disease outbreaks, while ensuring psycho-social support and protection services for children during this challenging time.
Ongoing conflict in Myanmar has displaced more than 3.3 million people, nearly 40 per cent of whom are children bearing the heaviest brunt..."
Source/publisher:
UN Children's Fund (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2024-09-16
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Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
UNICEF (United Nations Children's Fund), Education in Burma/Myanmar - general, Public Health, Human Rights and international relations
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"OVERVIEW
In Myanmar, humanitarian needs are rising as escalating conflict continues to drive displacement and exacerbate existing vulnerabilities. Since fighting escalated in October 2023, an estimated 1.8 million people have been displaced by widespread violence. In the North-East, fighting remained intense, particularly in Kachin State (South) which saw frequent airstrikes, ground troop movements, and artillery fire. In the NorthWest, increased air attacks in Mindat and Kanpetlet townships in southern Chin State displaced about 90% of Mindat’s residents to lowland areas in Magway Region. In Rakhine State (Central), nearly 50 people were killed by airstrikes, artillery shelling and landmine explosions while arbitrary arrests, detentions, and extortion were reported in Rakhine State (North). In early August, an estimated 20,000 people moved from Maungdaw downtown to the coastal area due to clashes. In addition, at least 60 to 100 people were killed in the coastal area as a result of artillery and drone attacks. In the South-East, severe flooding in parts of Kayin and Shan State (South) affected both IDP and host communities, leaving around 200 IDPs in villages along the Shan/ Kayah border in dire need of assistance. UNHCR has responded by distributing hygiene kits and tarpaulins to those affected by conflict and flooding in these areas.
According to the Royal Thai Government, over 52,000 refugees have crossed into Thailand seeking protection from fighting since the military takeover in Myanmar in February 2021, with all reportedly returning to Myanmar. No new arrivals from Myanmar were officially reported during the period.
Since February 2021, approximately 68,600 individuals from Myanmar’s North-West region have sought protection in India. Out of this population, 7,718 people registered with UNHCR in New Delhi. On 3 August, the Chief Minister of Manipur stated that 10,000 “illegal immigrants”, primarily from Myanmar, had been identified over the past five years. About 85 have reportedly been deported, and 143 remain in detention centres. The largest group, nearly 6,200 people, was reported in Kamjong District along the India-Myanmar border. To address reports of “illegal immigration” in Manipur, state authorities formed a 12-member ‘House Committee’ and increased checks, patrols, and monitoring of unofficial entry routes and border areas. On 7 August, restrictions were enforced near India's borders with Bangladesh and Myanmar in Mizoram's Lawngtlai District due to unrest in Bangladesh. On 19 August, Champhai District imposed a two-month restriction amid an investigation into alleged nut smuggling, which will likely impact cross-border movement from Myanmar. Since late July, residents in western Myanmar have reported severe food, fuel and medicine shortages following the closure of some India-Myanmar border crossings. Heavy monsoons continue to cause flooding, landslides, infrastructure damage, and outbreaks of malaria, typhoid, and diarrhoea in areas where Myanmar arrivals reside. Food, health, basic medicines, and water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) remain urgent needs among Myanmar arrivals in Mizoram and Manipur. Humanitarian agencies and state governments require more resources to ensure the provision of life-saving assistance for Myanmar arrivals..."
Source/publisher:
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (Geneva) via Reliefweb (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2024-09-16
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
UNHCR (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees), Food Security and nutrition in Burma/Myanmar, Public Health, Human Rights and international relations
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9.34 MB
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"Statement attributable to June Kunugi, UNICEF Regional Director for East Asia and the Pacific
BANGKOK, 12 September 2024 - “UNICEF is deeply alarmed by reports that at least ten children have been killed in airstrikes in Myanmar in less than a week.
“According to reports, five airstrikes in Shan State, Chin State and Magway Region in 5-6 September killed 24 civilians, including at least 10 children. The airstrikes also injured at least eight children and destroyed a community-based learning centre.
“As Myanmar’s conflict rages on, children and their families are bearing the brunt of these attacks. Children are being killed in the very places where they should feel safe, including their places of learning and in their communities. Every child killed or injured causes intense grief for their families.
“As attacks intensify, we fear this pattern will only continue. In 2024 alone, at least 600 children have been killed or injured in Myanmar.
“UNICEF reminds all parties that the killing and maiming of children and attacks on schools are grave violations. Children and civilians must be protected at all times.”..."
Source/publisher:
UN Children's Fund (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2024-09-13
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
UNICEF (United Nations Children's Fund), Education in Burma/Myanmar - general, Human Rights and international relations
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Description:
"Primary country: Myanmar.....Sources: CCCM Cluster, Shelter Cluster, UN High Commissioner for Refugees.....Format: Infographic.....Themes:
Camp Coordination and Camp Management, Shelter and Non-Food Items.....Language: English..."
Source/publisher:
CCCM Cluster, Shelter Cluster, UN High Commissioner for Refugees via Reliefweb (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2024-09-13
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
UNHCR (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees), Human Rights and international relations
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pdf
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404.46 KB
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Description:
"This report summarizes the situation as of 9 September 2024.
Situation Overview
Yangon
According to the ministerial authorities for health:
As of 25 August 2024, a total of 3 421 hospitalized cases of acute watery diarrhea (AWD) including 160 cases with severe dehydration were reported in Yangon Region, since 24 June 2024.
Since week 31 (starting on 28 July 2024) more than 400 hospitalized AWD cases have been reported every week, with a total of 464 hospitalized AWD cases reported in the week 34 (19 – 25 August 2024). No new cases with severe dehydration were reported after 4 August 2024.
Overall situation in Yangon
According to the ministerial authorities, 154 severe cases and 15 deaths were reported among 3 421 cases between 24 June and 8 August (causes of 15 deaths were uncertain and may not be linked to severe AWD/cholera), while there were no reports of severe case and death after 8 August.
Clinicians at hospitals also suggested that patients are no longer presenting with severe dehydration and/or shock in the recent weeks, while severe cases were more common in early period of the outbreak.
At the same time, information from open sources suggested an increase of cases is again observed in some townships, including some cases with severe outcomes.
As such it is important for all the stakeholders to continue making efforts to interrupt transmission and reduce morbidity and mortality.
Rakhine
According to the ministerial authorities for health, from 4 to 25 August 2024, a total of 235 hospitalized AWD cases including 63 cases with severe dehydration were reported in Sittwe, Rakhine.
According to the early warning and response systems (EWARS) supported by the Health Cluster in Myanmar:
In the epidemiological week 36 (1 – 7 September 2024), a total of 47 AWD cases were recorded, including 20 cases with severe dehydration. This is 87% decrease compared the week 35 (25 – 31 August 2024). Prior to this decline, approximately 300 or more AWD cases had been reported for five consecutive weeks (week 31 to week 35, or 28 July – 3 August 2024).
However, the number of the AWD cases with severe dehydration remains stable, raging between 20 to 30 cases in the past three weeks (week 34 to 36).
Out of 48 AWD cases with severe dehydration in the weeks 35 and 36 (25 August - 7 September), six cases (12.5%) were children under the age of five, and 42 cases were aged 5 years and older.
There was no decrease in the overall number of medical consultations. The reason for the sudden decline in AWD cases in the week 36 is uncertain..."
Source/publisher:
World Health Organization (Geneva)
Date of entry/update:
2024-09-11
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
348.65 KB
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Description:
"Statement at the 57th Regular Session of the Human Rights Council
Mister President,
Excellencies,
It is an honour to present to this Council the sixth Annual Report of the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar.
Over the past year, the Mechanism has seen evidence of increasingly frequent and brutal war crimes and crimes against humanity, committed by many different parties to the ongoing conflicts. In many instances, civilians are not just collateral damage but rather the target of attacks, which appear intended to create terror.
Aerial attacks by the Myanmar military intensified across the country. Planes bombed a wedding party and monasteries in Sagaing region; a displaced persons’ camp in Kachin State; and schools in Kayah, Kayin and Chin States. Just last week, airstrikes near a night market in Northern Shan State reportedly killed about a dozen people, including a pregnant woman and two children.
The Mechanism has collected many reports and testimonies regarding crimes against the thousands now in detention, including torture and sexual assault. Victims and witnesses have recounted beatings, electric shocks, strangulations and torture by pulling out fingernails with pliers. There is evidence that minors and other victims of all genders have been subjected to gang rape, burns on sexual body parts and other violent sexual and gender-based crimes.
The intensity of warfare across Myanmar has escalated, including in Rakhine State where fighting between the military and the Arakan Army has impacted thousands of civilians. The Mechanism is actively investigating horrific reports of killings, torture, rape and the burning of villages. All ethnicities in Rakhine State have suffered, but the Rohingya population that remains there is in a particularly precarious situation, caught between the Myanmar military and the Arakan Army. They have been directly targeted and thousands forcibly displaced from their homes.
I was particularly shocked by one video that circulated last month showing the aftermath of a drone attack on Rohingya that were attempting to flee Myanmar. Dozens of bodies, mainly women and children, were scattered beside luggage on a riverbank. The victims were clearly civilians. I cannot imagine anyone believing there was a military purpose to this attack. We will follow the evidence wherever it leads and make every effort to see those responsible for this attack, regardless of their ethnicity or politics, are held to account.
Mr. President,
What is happening today in Rakhine State and across the country is the result of decades of impunity. When crimes go unpunished, this only fuels more criminal behaviour.
To fight against this impunity, we have accelerated the sharing of our evidence and analysis with the authorities conducting proceedings concerning crimes against the Rohingya at the International Criminal Court, the International Court of Justice and in Argentina. To date we have shared over 80 packages containing more than one million evidence items.
While we have made significant progress, we face a number of challenges. We do not have access to crime scenes or witnesses inside Myanmar. Securely receiving information from inside the country is difficult. Many individuals who cooperate with us do so at great personal risk.
To compensate, we have looked to innovate and use the most modern technologies. We have a specialised team to authenticate and verify the large volumes of digital information we have collected, including photographs, videos, audio material, geospatial imagery and social media posts. This evidence is then cross-checked against the information received from more than 900 sources, including over 400 accounts collected from victims and other witnesses. We have automated some of our processes to make the collection, analysis and sharing of information more efficient and secure.
I am very grateful to the many courageous and committed persons and civil society organisations who risk their lives and liberty to share information with us. Our work would not be possible without them. We put their safety paramount and are using the most advanced technology to ensure that their interactions with us have the highest level of confidentiality and security.
Mr President,
The members of this Council and concerned States have for years called for an end to the violence and horrific crimes in Myanmar. But seven years after the clearance operations that led to our creation, and three and a half years after the military coup, the violence has only increased. The people of Myanmar are suffering, and nearby States are also strained under the burden of people fleeing across their borders. Clearly, words are not enough. All States, but especially those in the region, must support our efforts to collect evidence of the very worst violence being committed in Myanmar and help us to end this downward cycle of impunity.
Thank you..."
Source/publisher:
UN Human Rights Council (Geneva)
Date of entry/update:
2024-09-09
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights Council: Special Session on Myanmar, Statements and reports by Myanmar, Human Rights and international relations
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Format :
pdf
Size:
251.32 KB
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