Human Rights and international relations
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Source/publisher:
Myanmar Information Management Unit (Myanmar) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
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2023-10-07
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"EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:
This report covers the period January to December 2022 and outlines TBC’s progress based on the organisation’s Strategic Directions for Thailand and Myanmar 2020-22. TBC’s assistance reached over 460,000 men, women and children during 2022.- This included approximately 100,000 in Thailand (80,000 in refugee camps and 20,000 new arrivals outside of camps) and at least 360,000 internally displaced persons in southeastern Myanmar.
In Thailand, following a substantial update of the vaccine rollout in most camps, TBC has cautiously resumed in-person camp activities. TBC continued to address the immediate humanitarian needs of those in refugee camps and provided emergency response to recent refugee arrivals outside of camps. Support for Maternal, Infant, Young Child Feeding (MIYCF) nutrition activities persisted, and TBC conducted both the Biennial Nutrition Survey and the Annual Population Survey. Throughout the year, technical support to Camp Committees and the provision of capacity-building trainings were maintained. As both the return and resettlement programmes remain on indefi nite hold, ensuring dignifi ed futures for refugees continues to be a matter of key importance.
In Myanmar, TBC’s local partners were able to mitigate the impact of violence and displacement for 360,000 people at an average value of USD 20 per benefi ciary. Emergency relief in the form of cash transfers, food aid, non-food items and/or medical treatment was coordinated for 260,000 civilians. Stabilisation and recovery eff orts were supported to assist another 100,000 civilians through agricultural extension, nutrition promotion, social protection, and health care initiatives..."
Source/publisher:
The Border Consortium (Thailand) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2023-10-05
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Individual Documents
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Food Security and nutrition in Burma/Myanmar, Public Health, Human Rights and international relations
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"Context:
The State Administration Council (SAC) announced a six-month extension to the State of Emergency (for the third time) on 1st February 2023 which implicitly acknowledges that they do not have sufficient control of the nation to administer the Generals’ proposed sham elections. Martial law was also expanded in 37 additional townships where armed resistance is strengthening across Sagaing, Magwe, Bago and Tanintharyi Regions as well as Kayah,
Karen, Mon and Chin States. Since the February 2021 coup, the SAC has killed over 3,800 civilians, detained, and imprisoned over 24,000 human rights defenders and displaced at least 1.5 million people.
Economic conditions stabilised slightly during the first half of 2023 compared to deep contraction in 2021 and volatility in 2022. However, electricity outages became even more pronounced and logistical constraints associated with conflict continue to raise costs and investment remains negligible. The shift away from a rules- and market-based system continues to enable privileged access to import licences, foreign exchange, and state contracts for SAC affiliated businesses. Inequalities in welfare have been exacerbated with 48% of farming households reporting acute food security concerns and conditions are particularly severe in conflict-affected areas.
Tropical Cyclone Mocha wreaked a path of destruction through Rakhine State and Sagaing Region in May, which displaced or otherwise affected over a million people. However, restrictions imposed by the SAC on the delivery of life-saving aid highlighted an even greater challenge. Given humanitarian access to communities affected by a natural disaster was obstructed, the prospects appear dim that negotiations with the junta will lead to a meaningful response to the complex emergency elsewhere.
As the Myanmar Armed Forces (MAF’s) operational control of rural areas reduces, its capacity to sustain light artillery units in contested areas has decreased. However, MAF airstrikes were launched in 40 townships across Myanmar during the first quarter of 2023, which reflects the widespread and systematic scale of indiscriminate military attacks in violation of humanitarian law. Such violations of international humanitarian law have been widespread and gained prominence since June 2023 as over 9,000 civilians have fled from air strikes in Me Se and Shadaw Townships into Thailand.
At the end of June 2023, UNHCR estimated there were 472,600 internally displaced persons in southeastern Myanmar, which represents an increase of 133,600 people since the end of 2022.3 These are generally considered conservative figures with civil society estimates approximately double the UN’s assessment.
UNOCHA reports that USD 292 million was raised for UN Myanmar’s Humanitarian Response Plan in 2022. A total of 4.4 million people were assisted through these formal mechanisms but 60% of beneficiaries were in Yangon or Rakhine State and only 748,000 were internally displaced persons (IDPs). Overall, informal border-based mechanisms are estimated to have reached double that number of IDPs with only 10% of the HRP funding in 2022. The lack of proportionality in funds allocated for border-based agencies remains the primary obstacle to reinforcing the resilience of the most vulnerable communities suffering from the SAC’s commission of atrocities in ethnic administered areas.
More than 20,000 people crossed into Thailand during this period. New arrivals, in accordance with Thai Policy, were disallowed official access to the existing nine refugee camps, with many instead kept in tightly controlled “temporary safety areas” (TSA). Numerous concerns have been raised regarding the adequacy of these TSAs as suitable living spaces for individuals. The restricted access to these areas has posed significant challenges in ensuring adequate protection and the provision of humanitarian aid. Many of the newly arrived individuals have been pressured into returning, fully aware that they will not be granted long-term refuge in Thailand.
Thailand held a general election on May 14th. The Move Forward Party received the majority share of the vote at 38%, yet ended up excluded from the eventual ruling coalition, led by Pheu Thai, which received 29% of the vote. After a long series of political negotiations, Pheu Thai’s candidate for PM, Srettha Thavisin was elected Prime Minister on 22nd August. 87,114 refugees remain in nine camps in Thailand, representing a 7.5% increase for the sixmonth period. In these camps the COVID-19 vaccination programme continued and by the end of June 57% of refugees over 18 years of age had received at least one dose, with 50% of refugees being fully vaccinated. By end June there were 7,434 cumulative cases of COVID19 among encamped refugees, with 43 deaths from Coronavirus-related illness..."
Source/publisher:
The Border Consortium (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2023-10-05
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Individual Documents
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Food Security and nutrition in Burma/Myanmar, Public Health, Human Rights and international relations
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"Western countries and international NGOs like to portray themselves as promoters and protectors of human rights, democracy, justice, fairness and equality. Their humanitarian and development aid often comes with conditions for recipients: take a human rights-based approach, be gender sensitive, socially inclusive, etc.
However, the treatment of employees by embassies and some INGOs is indicative of their hypocrisy.
This analysis is based on interviews with several employees of western embassies and INGOs in Yangon.
The people of Myanmar are suffering real hardship driven by ever rising food prices, plummeting value of the kyat, lack of opportunities, and worsening political and security turmoil. Everyone is feeling the pain one way or another, with no telling when it will end.
But as the saying goes, “the best thing about the worst time in your life, is that you get to see the true colors of everyone.”
Seeing the true nature of a person or organization is a valuable insight because it can act as a guide for future relations.
Not practicing what you preach
Western countries and INGOs have provided or supported training in human rights, democracy, women rights, gender equality, and labor rights in developing countries for decades. However, the rights training is often limited to teaching citizens how to challenge authority in their own countries. Rights-promoting countries and organizations often refuse to tolerate any challenge to their own influence or authority.
When local staff at some western embassies in Myanmar recently complained that their salaries have not been raised to match soaring inflation, bosses told them they could find work elsewhere, according to sources at two embassies.
Elsewhere, the Geneva-based Lutheran World Federation (LWF Myanmar) fired 80 staff from its Sittwe branch on September 4 after they demanded their euro salaries be paid at the real market rate rather than the overvalued kyat rate set by the junta-controlled central bank.
Those fired included pregnant women, married women and staff whose job contracts ranged from one to three years. The report on the sackings was among the outlet’s top five most-read articles that week.
LWF Myanmar later told the fired staff, except the protest leaders, that they could return to work – an invitation many were forced to accept amid the soaring cost of living and limited job opportunities.
Ironically, LWF Myanmar does not seem to practice what it preaches.
The organization’s website cites “Dignity, Human Rights, and Justice; Compassion and Commitment; and Humanitarian Principles” as its “Core Values”. It also aims to promote human rights of vulnerable communities in Myanmar by empowering communities to effectively claim land rights, right to legal identity, rights of women and the right to education.
However, the move to fire its entire Sittwe staff prompts us to ask just how committed LWF Myanmar is to its own stated core values.
The Sittwe workers went on strike after being paid at the official exchange rate of 2,100 kyat per euro instead of the real rate of nearly 4,000.
“We have been asking for the market exchange rate for nearly two years. They [LWF Myanmar] did nothing, so our entire Sittwe staff stopped coming to the office from August 14,” said one of the sacked staffers.
“They did not negotiate anything with us. On September 4, they unfairly fired the entire Sittwe office staff by email.”
LWF’s reported refusal to negotiate – and then summary sacking of the workers after they withdrew their labor in protest – is surely at odds with the labor rights it loudly espouses.
Soaring inflation
“Personally, I feel bad about asking for a raise,” said an INGO staffer. “But I had to do so to keep my family afloat as the kyat’s value plunges.”
Surging commodity prices have soared even higher since the central bank introduced the 20,000-kyat note at the end of July.
The Yangon price of 1 pyi (1.9 kg) of low-grade Aemahta rice – the staple for millions in Myanmar – rose 38 percent between July 19 and August 21, according to a survey by the state-run Myanmar Alinn newspaper. It continued to rise by another 10 percent from August 21 to September 11. Similar rises were recorded in Mandalay (14 percent and 20 percent) and Myitkyina (14 percent and 23 percent).
The Yangon price of onions over the same period rose 15 percent, then skyrocketed 54 percent. Meanwhile, the onion price rose 9 percent and 64 percent in Mandalay and 7 percent and 54 percent in Myitkyina.
Purchasing power collapsing as kyat plunges
The market exchange rate on June 19, before the announcement of the 20,000-kyat banknote, was 2,970 kyat per dollar (the official rate is 2,100). On July 25, after the announcement, the kyat plunged to 3,300 per dollar. It was 3,690/dollar on Aug. 31, then 3,500 on Sept. 13, and is now around 3,400.
On Aug. 22 the junta announced that exporters must sell 50 percent of their foreign-currency earnings to the central bank at the official rate 2,100 kyats per dollar. Plus, any of the remaining 50 percent not recycled through export-import connections had to be sold to the central bank at a rate of 2,900 kyats/dollar. Importers of key goods like medicine and fuel could then buy greenbacks from the central bank at the rate of 2,922 kyats/dollar.
However, importers complain they are unable to buy dollars from banks at the stated rate and must pay the market rate. As a result, prices of many imported goods have soared by more than 100 percent, with increased costs transferred to consumers.
Hence, in terms of purchasing power, Myanmar has become a happy hunting ground for diplomats and leaders of INGOs who get paid either in euros or dollars. In contrast, Myanmar citizens are finding their income can no longer keep up with ever-rising living costs.
Since the new banknote’s introduction, fuel prices have soared at an unprecedented rate, worsening living conditions as transport costs surge for millions of citizens.
In Yangon, the retail price of diesel has increased by 21 percent, according to the Myanmar Alinn survey from July 21 to Sept. 12. Meanwhile, the price of premium diesel rose by 20 percent, Octaine 92 by 9 percent, and Octane 95 by 8.7 percent. Similar rises were seen across the country.
The price of goods is also being driven up by the ongoing civil war. All major roads are now dotted with checkpoints controlled either by junta troops or resistance forces who collect toll fees that add to transport costs.
Labor rights and salary disputes
Labor rights empower workers to protest and insist on being paid in a universally recognized currency. For example, the International Labor Organization (ILO)’s Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work includes the “right to collective bargaining”. Even jurisdictions that have not ratified the Conventions in question are obliged to ensure workers can exercise their basic rights.
In the case of LWF Myanmar in Sittwe, local staff merely exercised their “right to collective bargaining” when they refused to work after their repeated requests were ignored.
Moreover, it is also legal to demand salaries be paid in US dollars. The Payment Wages Law (2016) stipulates that employers can pay their staff either in local currency or foreign currencies that are recognized by the Central Bank of Myanmar.
Some western embassies in compliance
Some embassies in Myanmar do pay local staff in US dollars exchanged into kyats at the market rate. Others pay half in dollars and half in the local currency. Staff at these embassies have expressed gratitude toward their employers, as well as sympathy for colleagues who do not enjoy similar treatment.
Since the coup, UN agencies have considered Myanmar a high-risk security environment and paid staff including drivers a monthly $400 “danger-payment”. The payment is reportedly reviewed every month.
Budget in euros or dollars, spend in local currency
Salary is a fixed cost for embassies and international agencies and is usually budgeted in advance in either dollars or euros.
However, local exchange rate volatility coupled with cuts in international aid since the coup are taking a heavy toll on local staff.
Several European embassies have told their local staff that development aid to Myanmar has been cut because of the war in Ukraine and changes in government policy, according to interviews with several staff members. The staff are told that economic hardship is a global phenomenon and Myanmar is not the only country in crisis. The implied message is that local staff should not complain or make demands.
In real terms, local staff are not demanding salary increases but only to be paid either in dollars, or at the market exchange rate, or in line with inflation, according to INGOs and embassy staff interviewed.
Who is benefiting from exchange-rate gains?
There are currently at least three exchange rates in Myanmar – two official rates set by the junta (2,100 and 2900 kyats per dollar) and the market rate of around 3,400 per dollar.
Of the international organizations contractually obliged to pay local staff in dollars, some calculate kyat salaries at the official exchange rate while others offer the market rate.
At the organizations and embassies that do not pay locals in dollars or the market-rate equivalent, it is unclear who benefits from gains made on the exchange rate. It would be interesting to know if those gains are returned to the donor government, heads of missions, or senior leaders of the organizations.
No protections for Myanmar workers
A local staffer at a western embassy in Yangon queried whether his colleagues in neighboring countries such as Singapore, Thailand and Malaysia get the same treatment. He wondered whether western missions were exploiting Myanmar employees because they lack legal protections.
Another embassy staffer said, “They [donors] look down on local staff because we do not have a good government. The exploitation might not occur if we had an elected government to protect us, rather than a military regime.”
Embassies take the attitude that local staff have few if any alternatives but to continue working for survival, so refuse to address their grievances, according to an embassy employee.
The bleak outlook extends to workers across the whole economy amid the erosion of labor rights since the 2021 military takeover.
In an interview with BBC Burmese last year, Yangon factory worker Hay Man spoke for many when said she was active in the labor rights movement before the military coup but is now more careful for fear of being laid off.
She said that since the coup, workers have been routinely fired without reason, denied leave and holidays, had work contracts violated, and refused overtime pay. Meanwhile, workers seeking solutions to disputes are often denied meetings with government labor officials, leaving them no choice but to continue working despite the rights violations.
The junta’s governing body, which calls itself the State Administration Council (SAC), has ignored the plight of its workforce and even jailed labor rights activists. In other words, the regime wants all the benefits from workers without any of the protections. In the latest example of exploitation, the junta imposed a tax of up to 10 percent on the salaries of Myanmar citizens working abroad, effective from Oct. 1. Observers noted that the cash-strapped regime is now double-taxing Burmese expatriates to extract foreign currency from them.
Three core labor reforms needed
The irrationality, self-interest, and economic mismanagement of successive junta leaders have earned Myanmar the status of “least developed country”, with its resources and citizens exploited to the hilt.
Regarding labor rights, there are three obvious tasks to ensure legal protections for workers.
First, Myanmar has no core law covering labor rights, which are instead covered by 12 separate laws that are sectoral in nature. As a result, employers, both foreign and local, often exploit their workers due to a lack of comprehensive legal protections.
Second, currently only civil servants or government employees are covered by the pension scheme. The rest of the population must rely on themselves or their children in their old age. There is no law that requires private-sector employers to provide pensions. The starting point here should be to amend Myanmar’s Social Security Law (2012) that exempts “international organizations, embassies or consulates of foreign governments; non-profit companies, associations or organizations” from having to provide social security to their employees.”
Third, enforce compliance with existing labor laws, and change authorities’ attitude toward labor rights activists who demand a fair share in return for workers’ contribution to the economy..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2023-10-05
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Individual Documents
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Labour issues in Burma, International labour standards and mechanisms, Human Rights and international relations
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"The Commission of Inquiry urges the Myanmar military authorities to immediately cease all forms of violence, torture and other inhumane treatment against trade unionists, and to end all forms of forced or compulsory labour.
GENEVA (ILO News) - The International Labour Organization’s Commission of Inquiry for Myanmar, has concluded that the actions taken by the military authorities since February 2021 have resulted in far-reaching restrictions on the exercise of basic civil liberties and trade union rights, as well as in the incapacity of trade unionists to engage in trade union activities.
Such actions violate Myanmar's obligations under the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No.87) .
The Commission also found that Myanmar did not comply with its obligations under the Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No.29) , since the military continues to exact different types of forced labour in the context of armed conflict. It also said there is a lack of adequate enforcement of the prohibition of forced or compulsory labour.
Its report urged the Myanmar military authorities to take “immediate action, so as to stop egregious violations of the two Conventions and prevent further abuses.”
The Commission was established by the ILO Governing Body in March 2022, following the takeover by the Myanmar military authorities in February 2021 and the military’s suppression of pro-democracy protests.
It was tasked with assessing reports of violence against trade union leaders, severe and repeated violations of basic civil liberties and a resurgence of forced labour.
The three independent experts who conducted the inquiry gathered written submissions from various entities and had direct contacts with persons affected by the complex political, human rights, humanitarian and economic crisis, as well as those having expert knowledge of the issues raised. While the Commission had no access to the country, it was able to obtain extensive information on the situation through these witnesses.
In accordance with Article 28 of the ILO Constitution, the report of the Commission of Inquiry sets out its findings, conclusions and recommendations with respect to the above matters.
The recommendations urge the military authorities to immediately cease all forms of violence, torture and other inhumane treatment against trade union leaders and members; to release and withdraw all criminal charges against trade unionists detained in relation to the exercise of their civil liberties and legitimate trade union activities; and to fully restore the protection of basic civil liberties suspended since the coup d’état. The recommendations also urge the military authorities to end the exaction of all forms of forced or compulsory labour by the army and its associated forces, as well as forced recruitment into the army.
The report sets out further recommendations to be implemented once the country returns to a situation of governance through democratic institutions and processes. It calls on all relevant parties to strive to achieve a peaceful transition to fully democratic rule.
The report of the Commission of Inquiry has been sent to the Permanent Mission of Myanmar in Geneva. Myanmar has three months to announce whether or not it accepts the recommendations; and if not, whether it proposes to refer the matter to the International Court of Justice.
This is the 14th Commission of Inquiry established in more than 100 years of ILO history to investigate allegations of serious non-observance of ratified international labour standards. Such Commissions represent the highest level of ILO supervisory mechanisms..."
Source/publisher:
International Labour Organization
Date of entry/update:
2023-10-05
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Individual Documents
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"Europe’s largest LGBTQ+ right charity Stonewall has been joined by 245 other organisations across the human rights, refugee, LGBTQ+ and women’s sectors in a powerful display of solidarity, following comments by the Home Secretary, Suella Braverman, last week.
The coalition, including organisations such as Amnesty, Oxfam, End Violence Against Women Coalition, Refugee Council and Women For Refugee Women, has written to UK Prime Minister, Rishi Sunak, to reaffirm the UK’s commitment to protect LGBTQ+ people and women around the world.
Many of the signatories work daily with LGBTQ+ and women refugees, and ‘bear witness to their scars from being persecuted’.
The letter rejects Ms Braverman’s claim that LGBTQ+ and women refuges are misusing their identities to make false claims, and speaks of regret that the Home Secretary’s selective use of stats ‘have nothing to do with genuine concern or respect for international law, refugees or their protection.’
Read the full letter here.
Robbie de Santos, Director of External Affairs at Stonewall, said: “We all deserve a government with the compassion and will to protect the most vulnerable in society. Not only is the incumbent UK Government failing LGBTQ+ people domestically, with inaction on rising hate crime, but they are also failing the international community by indicated their disdain for international law – in the process bringing great shame on party and country.”
Steve Valdez-Symonds, Refugee and Migrant Rights Director at Amnesty International UK, said: “The Home Secretary’s verbal attack on the rights of LGBTQ+ and women refugees is deplorable. Not only did she once again stir utterly false prejudices against people seeking asylum, she also targeted refugees who often continue to face grave insecurity, hostility and violence – even long after escaping persecution and conflict. Ministers must stop their constant scapegoating and put their energy into repairing the utter wreckage they have made of the asylum system.”
Alphonsine Kabagado, Director, Women For Refugee Women, said: “We strongly condemn Suella Braverman’s speech last week – which was dangerous, inflammatory and racist. Not only did her claims stoke hatred and fear, they were untrue. To be granted asylum in the UK, you must prove a well-founded fear of persecution. Her suggestion that people lie about their identities to make false claims for protection, or that it is possible to be granted asylum based on discrimination alone, is unfounded. We know from our work supporting refugee and asylum-seeking women, including LGBTQ+ women, that many face persecution including torture, gender-based violence, sexual violence, trafficking and rape.
Braverman’s speech was also hypocritical. The Government has repeatedly stated its commitment to tackling violence against women and supporting survivors of such violence, as well as to supporting LGBTQ+ people. Yet when it comes to women or LGBTQ+ people seeking asylum in the UK, it seems these commitments do not apply. Instead of whipping up hatred, fear, and division against women and LGBTQ+ people seeking safety, the Government should treat them with compassion and kindness. How we treat people is who we are; the Government’s hostility does not represent us.”
Enver Solomon, CEO of the Refugee Council, said: “Turning our backs on LGBTQ+ people and suggesting they are undeserving of a fair hearing in the asylum system is immoral.
Of the small number of people who come to the UK claiming asylum based on their sexual orientation, the majority are recognised as having a well-founded fear of persecution and are given refugee protection. We know from our work how traumatised they often are – what they need is support to restart their lives in safety, rather than hostility and disbelief.
The Refugee Convention’s fundamental purpose is to offer protection to those who need it, based on shared global values of humanity and fairness. Abandoning these values does not reflect who we are as a country.”
Leila Zadeh, CEO, Rainbow Migration, said: “Across the world there are LGBTQI+ people experiencing violence and persecution simply because of their sexual orientation or gender identity. Around 70 countries still criminalise same-sex relations, and in some places the picture is getting worse.
Many LGBTQI+ people that we support every day tell us how they faced life-threatening situations back home. For example, Olu, a lesbian from Nigeria had to run for her life when her husband found out she was a lesbian and nearly killed her, or Adams was violently attacked in the street on several occasions by members of his community in Ghana because he was bisexual.
We all want to live somewhere where we can be safe and live fulfilling lives and most of us welcome people who are fleeing for their lives. We ask that the PM gets in line with public sentiment and commits to the protection of the rights of LGBTQ+ people seeking safety in the UK.”..."
Source/publisher:
"Burma Campaign UK" (London)
Date of entry/update:
2023-10-04
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Type:
Individual Documents
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Human Rights and international relations, Articles, reports and sites relating to women of Burma, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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"OVERVIEW
In Myanmar, the situation has continued to deteriorate since February 2021. Over 1.9 million people remain displaced with 47 Townships in the North-West and the South-East still under martial law. Armed clashes, airstrikes, indiscriminate shelling, arson and destruction of civilian property and infrastructure are driving displacement and placing civilians at risk. In the South-East, some 80,000 people have been displaced by heavy monsoon rains and subsequent flooding, according to the latest estimates. Locations across the region have experienced temporary road disruptions due to rising water levels, hampering opportunities to deliver assistance. In Rakhine State, the unofficial ceasefire is fragile with reported increases in restrictions on the freedom of movement in specific townships as well as growing number of security checkpoints.
Humanitarian access remains unpredictable, leaving displaced people – including cyclone-affected communities – with extremely limited access to basic needs and life-saving assistance.
In Thailand, according to the Royal Thai Government, 9,418 refugees were sheltered in five Temporary Safety Areas (TSAs) across three districts (4,695 in Mae Sariang District, 832 in Khun Yuam District and 3,891 in Mueang District) in Mae Hong Son Province by end-August. Humanitarian access to the TSAs is still limited with UNHCR only being granted access twice to undertake protection assessments. However, in some instances, UNHCR and partners were able to directly distribute Core Relief Items (CRIs) to refugee committees in the TSAs or via the District Office.
In India, 150 new arrivals fled from Myanmar’s North-West region to India in August 2023, according to estimates by community-based organizations (CBOs). The total number of arrivals from Myanmar to India follow-ing the events of 1 February 2021 is currently estimated at 54,960. As of 28 August, 5,466 individuals have approached UNHCR in New Delhi for registration since February 2021. Over 450 individuals reportedly returned to Myanmar from Manipur and Mizoram in August and fewer arrivals from Myanmar are expected due to the dynamic situation in Manipur. Food for new arrivals and host communities remains a major gap and the capacity of CBOs and the host community to address this is over-stretched. In remote locations where access to health-care is limited, CBOs are providing mobile healthcare facilities..."
Source/publisher:
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (Geneva) via Reliefweb (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2023-10-04
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Education in Burma/Myanmar - general, Food Security and nutrition in Burma/Myanmar, Public Health, Human Rights and international relations
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"Executive Summary:
Since the military coup in Myanmar on 1 February 2021, the operational challenges around the delivery of humanitarian assistance have evolved significantly in response to new areas of conflict and displacement, access and security constraints, and the limitations of the formal financial sector. At the same time, rising conflict and displacement, surging poverty levels, and a destruction of livelihoods has led to over 14.4 million people in need according to the UN’s 2022 Humanitarian Needs Overview.1 While prior to the coup humanitarian actors in Myanmar had focused on longer-term structural and market assistance, the year since has seen a staggering rise in the need for basic needs and emergency assistance, including cash and voucher-based assistance.
These concurrent shifts have forced humanitarian actors, both local and national, to expand the modalities they use to meet their operational cash needs – including paying salaries, vendors, partners, and last-mile distributions to beneficiaries. While formal (for example, mobile money providers, microfinance institutions, and bank to bank services) and informal cash transfer modalities (those who move or provide cash, regionally or domestically, without regulation and formal approval from the Myanmar authorities) have been operational for decades in Myanmar – and were widely used as part of the cross-border response and initial post-Nargis response, use of the formal financial system has been dominant for the last decade due to operational ease, reduced risks, and built-in compliance and documentation.
Following the coup, the Myanmar government instituted draconian measures to limit both humanitarian agencies and individuals from accessing bank-held funds. This, coupled with the increasing security and political reasons for not engaging or being able to access formal financial institutions (including banks, mobile money providers, and payroll services), has meant reduced reliance on formal financial systems, although increased flexibility by these institutions in the past few months has meant they continue to be used by primarily international organisations to meet some of their operational cash needs. It is unknown, but likely, there will be increased scrutiny on these transactions in the near future – and there are still large concerns around data protection.
New modalities – including formal financial service providers and informal cash transfer modalities – are used to meet operational cash needs in a variety of ways, including: moving cash between offices; providing/ sourcing physical cash to agencies they can use for payments; agents to source cash liquidity for bank- held funds; or payments to third-parties, including vendors, partners, and beneficiaries. This paper aims to provide an overview of the different options for sourcing and transferring operational cash – including how they work, challenges, and risks.
Given the plurality of options, and the decentralised nature of the informal financial sector, it is critical there are established best-practices that provide humanitarian actors with flexibility, while ensuring that basic compliance and risk management practices are followed. In order to remain relevant and fit for the future in the protracted crisis environment, donors need to have clear risk-appetites and clarity of purpose around continued humanitarian activities. The priority should be ensuring that aid continues to flow in line with the humanitarian imperative, and that donors’ risk-threshold reflects both the need for accountability and flexibility. Policies should focus on mitigating the misuse of funding by ensuring the principles of compliance are followed, and there is clear documentation of the money flow.
This paper draws from the experience of the UN, INGOs and local actors, in Myanmar and other comparable contexts, to develop an operational guide – from identification to the final receipt of funds – to guide humanitarian actors through the process. The aim is to establish clear minimum standards which can be used across the humanitarian sector, and which can be adapted by both operational partners and donors. The guidance included in this document ensures that humanitarian actors are operating within accepted compliance regulations, in line with precedent previously established in the Myanmar context as well as other fluid operating environments. Given the plurality of contexts and localised challenges, and the humanitarian imperative to reach the most vulnerable, flexibility and alternative documentation may be needed – but compliance requirements, including audit trail and vetting, will still be met.
Key Recommendations
Donors should have a clear risk threshold that reflects the protracted nature of the conflict and the need to ensure flow of aid in an accountable manner. Donors should support humanitarian organisations to use a wide variety of modalities to meet their operational needs, recognising the benefits, challenges and risks of each modality and why they should be used in different contexts. Using a toolbox of approaches is the only way to ensure that assistance continues to flow to the most vulnerable, in line with the humanitarian imperative, while reducing the risk of harm to humanitarian workers and beneficiaries.
Donors and NGOs should understand the risks of using both formal and informal modalities. The continued use of formal financial systems, where operational and liquid, has many benefits from a compliance and fraud perspective – although determining legality raises questions around legitimacy and ability to regulate in a given However, given the ongoing conflict and scrutiny on humanitarian actors, the oversight of the formal financial system by the Central Bank of Myanmar and the SAC raises significant concerns around regulation, oversight, restriction of aid flows limiting certain partners or geographic areas, data security, and physical security in some areas, which can justify the use of informal modalities.
Donors and NGOs should ensure accountability, and that there is clear documentation of the money This can be done with both formal and informal cash transfer modalities, as long as organisations’ existing policies and procedures are followed, and the principles of compliance are met with alternative documentation when a derogation from these policies is needed.
Donors should support organisations to strengthen their internal controls and procedures if needed, particularly for local organisations..."
Source/publisher:
Center for Operational Analysis and Research
Date of entry/update:
2023-10-03
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
The discussion on humanitarian assistance to Burma, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
1.84 MB
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Description:
"The evaluation assessed WFP’s work in the country from September 2017 to December 2022 to meet accountability requirements and identify learning. It aimed to inform the design of a new interim country strategic plan (ICSP) for Myanmar and WFP’s emergency response practice globally. While the focus of the evaluation was on the corporate emergency response to a series of crises affecting Myanmar, it also covered WFP’s work under the entire country strategic plan (CSP) for 2018–2023, with a special emphasis on the period from 2020 onwards.
The evaluation concluded that:
WFP achieved a major scale-up in response to consecutive crises in Myanmar, using its growing role as a humanitarian agency prudently and effectively, in coordination with United Nations partners. It carefully managed risks and balanced tensions between humanitarian principles but risks to cooperating partners require more attention. While assistance was effectively targeted in areas with access, humanitarian needs in conflict-affected areas are likely to be underestimated, which could lead to significant coverage gaps . Several shocks in Myanmar have diverted WFP from its original CSP goal of providing support for medium-term, government-led development. In the post-military takeover context, WFP lacked a strategic approach for resilience building at community and systems levels..."
Source/publisher:
World Food Programme (Rome) via reliefweb (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2023-10-03
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
WFP (World Food Programme), Food Security and nutrition in Burma/Myanmar, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Format :
pdf pdf
Size:
2.74 MB 3.2 MB
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Description:
"3 October 2023: The United Nations (UN) is failing Myanmar, says the Special Advisory Council for Myanmar (SAC-M). UN member States and their inter-governmental forums are failing to act, the UN Country Team (UNCT) is pursuing the same failed approach of appeasing the military despite growing risks and ever-fewer results, and UN Secretary-General António Guterres has neglected his responsibilities to the Myanmar people as head of the UN Secretariat, a new report by SAC-M has found.
The report, How the UN Is Failing Myanmar, looks at the response from the UN’s component parts – the UN intergovernmental forums, the UN Secretariat and the UN Entities, represented in Myanmar by the UNCT – to the crisis in Myanmar caused by the coup that was launched by the military junta on 1 February 2021. For two and a half years, the junta has waged a campaign of atrocities against the civilian population in Myanmar that has left 2 million people internally displaced and up to 20 million people in need of humanitarian assistance. The UN system is failing to respond in a manner that reflects the gravity of the crisis and the objections of Myanmar civil society to the actions of UN officials are being ignored.
“The junta is the root cause of civil war, poverty, inequalities, and injustices in our country,” said Nai Aue Mon, Program Director, Human Rights Foundation of Monland (HURFOM), a non-profit human rights and pro-democracy organisation in Myanmar. “We have urged UN agencies, regional and international actors to cut ties with the junta, to deliver humanitarian assistance directly to local humanitarian actors; and commit to meaningful engagement and collaboration with Myanmar’s legitimate stakeholders, including civil society organizations and local service providers.”
“They must listen to our voices and stand in solidarity with us by supporting our calls,” Nai Aue Mon added.
The report is written from the perspective of SAC-M’s members as former UN mandate holders on Myanmar, who, during their mandates, called for an inquiry into the involvement of the UN in Myanmar since 2011. The resulting inquiry published its findings in a 2019 report commonly referred to as “the Rosenthal Report”. It found ”systemic and structural failures” within and across the UN system that rendered the UN impotent in the face of massive human rights violations committed by the Myanmar military, including the atrocities committed against the Rohingya in 2016 and 2017. Measures taken by the Secretary-General to implement the Rosenthal Report’s recommendations have been insufficient. The UN’s failures in Myanmar are being repeated.
“During the previous democracy uprising in 1988, the UN tried to use engagement with the military junta and it was a failure. We ended up with military rule for the next 30 years,” said Linn Yaung, a former university teacher in Yangon and current member of Myanmar’s Civil Disobedience Movement. “Now there’s an even more brutal junta led by Min Aung Hlaing. The UN’s strategy did not work then, so why do they think it will work this time?”
SAC-M’s report identifies key ways in which the UN system is failing Myanmar in the current crisis and makes recommendations for change. The UN Security Council must enforce the junta’s compliance with Resolution 2669, including by imposing a comprehensive arms embargo and targeted financial sanctions on the junta, and refer the situation in Myanmar to the International Criminal Court.
The UNCT must redefine its relationship with the junta and should coordinate directly with the National Unity Government, Ethnic Resistance Organisations and resistance authorities for humanitarian access. It should also support – but not co-opt – civil society networks engaged in the existing cross-border humanitarian response. This is the only effective way to reach all of those in Myanmar in need.
Finally, the Secretary-General must fulfil his responsibility as the head of the UN Secretariat to lead the development of a unifying, comprehensive and coherent UN strategy on Myanmar with clear lines of responsibility to monitor and evaluate implementation and ensure accountability for UN actions.
“The humanitarian provision from UN is not being effective and have not reached the people on the ground,” said Musel, a local humanitarian actor with Kyay Latt Myay, a local humanitarian group working in Karenni state of Myanmar. “In Karenni state, people who have been displaced due to the military attacks have not received any support from international humanitarian organizations, particularly from the UN agencies. There are some UN agencies in Karenni state, but they are only active in urban areas. They can only support where the junta allows them to reach… Therefore, I would like to urge the donors to support through cross-border.”
Musel added: “To deliver humanitarian assistance effectively to the ground, the UN agencies must work together with local humanitarian service providers.”
On the day that the military coup was launched, the Secretary-General issued a statement reaffirming “the unwavering support of the United Nations to the people of Myanmar in their pursuit of democracy, peace, human rights, and the rule of law”. That commitment has not been met. The people of Myanmar rightfully expect the UN’s support in their nation-defining struggle to free themselves once and for all from military dictatorship. The UN must end its cycle of failure in Myanmar. The UN must stand on the side of the Myanmar people..."
Source/publisher:
Special Advisory Council for Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2023-10-03
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, UN human rights documents on Myanmar, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
1.27 MB
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Description:
"HIGHLIGHTS & KEY MESSAGES
Ongoing conflict and monsoon floods continue to cause new displacement, civilian casualties, and destruction of civilian properties, further worsening the already dire humanitarian situation in Myanmar.
Nearly two million people are now internally displaced in precarious conditions and require lifesaving assistance.
The threat to civilians from explosive ordnance is spreading with new data showing that for the first time, landmine casualties have now been recorded in every state and region, except Nay Pyi Taw.
Local and international humanitarian partners continue to scale up and adapt in response to the deepening needs, reaching at least 1.8 million people during the first half of 2023.
Access and administrative restrictions are causing prolonged delays or postponements of scheduled relief efforts, further compounding the suffering of affected and displaced communities.
To date, the combined US$887 million Humanitarian Response Plan and Cyclone Mocha Flash Appeals remain critically underfunded, with only 28 per cent of the required funding received.
Provision of additional financial support and easing of access restrictions are imperative for the humanitarian community to address urgent needs.
SITUATION OVERVIEW
Nine months into 2023, humanitarian needs and protection risks have intensified throughout the country, driven by persistent conflict that has led to unprecedented levels of displacement, extensive property damage, and the expanding presence of landmines, particularly in the Northwest and Southeast. The United Nations Development Programme’s Myanmar Information Management Unit (MIMU), in collaboration with the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), has produced its annual map for 2023 of townships with suspected contamination by anti-personnel landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW). Since 2021, for the first time, contamination by anti-personnel landmines has been reported in all states and regions except Nay Pyi Taw.
Now, the latest data reveals that casualties due to landmines have occurred in every state and region of Myanmar, except Nay Pyi Taw and Yangon.
Nearly two million people remain internally displaced across the country – many of them multiple times. They face increase risks from explosive ordnance while they are on the move or staying in unfamiliar areas. In addition, more than 63,000 people remain displaced across borders into neighbouring countries since the 2021 military takeover.
Humanitarian partners are increasingly concerned about the SAC’s gradual implementation of the national IDP camp closure policy with many people being pushed to return to their places of origin or other locations even where this is against their wishes and is premature given the current security conditions. During the reporting period, approximately 100 out of 500 displaced families living in sites slated for camp closure in Kyauktaw township in Rakhine in 2023, had to return to their places of origin. The remaining IDPs face pressure to return by the end of the rainy season.
Displaced families who were moved from the Kyauk Ta Lone IDP camp in Kyaukpyu township to a nearby relocation site, have been facing persistent flooding issues. In total, more than 50,000 IDPs nationwide are estimated to be at risk of premature return in 2023, particularly in Rakhine, Chin and Shan. They face potential protection concerns, lack of livelihood opportunities, absence of social services, and inadequate shelter in villages affected by conflict. Many IDPs are expressing fears about safety in their home villages in conflict areas where there is often ongoing fighting and significant explosive ordnance contamination. Sustained access to those who have been prematurely returned, reclassified or relocated by the State Administration Council under this policy remains crucial so that conditions and needs can be monitored, and assistance is not interrupted. Humanitarians continue to stress that any return, relocation, or reclassification of IDPs from displacement camps and sites must be safe, voluntary, informed and dignified, taking into account the wishes of affected people and the prospects for sustainable solutions that allow them to resume their normal lives.
Severe monsoon weather conditions also persist, triggering floods in multiple areas, mostly in the Northwest and Southeast, resulting in the destruction of civilian infrastructure, displacement and new humanitarian needs. Thousands of people sought refuge in evacuation centres or safer areas on higher ground in August, with most of them returning to their homes in September. Nevertheless, many remain in need of support as they have lost their homes and belongings due to flooding. Local and international partners have extended immediate assistance wherever access is possible.
Suffering is being exacerbated by significant access constraints, despite sporadic openings in some areas in recent months. Administrative and physical access limitations have intensified in the Southeast and Kachin, curtailing people's ability to access critical services and impeding the distribution of aid to affected communities. In the face of these formidable challenges, at least 1.8 million people received humanitarian assistance in the first half of the year2.
However, the 2023 Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) and Cyclone Mocha Flash Appeal remain severely underfunded, with only a fraction (27 per cent) of the total requirement secured. This shortfall jeopardizes comprehensive assistance delivery and negatively impacts vulnerable communities. Urgent and substantial funding is essential to alleviate suffering and enhance the resilience of the affected communities amid this multifaceted crisis..."
Source/publisher:
UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (New York) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2023-10-02
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Education in Burma/Myanmar - general, Food Security and nutrition in Burma/Myanmar, Public Health, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
828.02 KB
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Source/publisher:
Myanmar Information Management Unit (Myanmar) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2023-09-29
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
1.61 MB
Local URL:
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Description:
"At least 268 attacks on Myanmar's health care system have been documented by Insecurity Insight between 01 January-04 September 2023. In these incidents, 27 health workers have been killed and health facilities have been damaged 82 times. Most incidents have been attributed to the Myanmar military. Explosive weapons including air and drone strikes, IEDs, and mortar shells have been used in over 60 incidents. These attacks undermine health care providers’ ability to effectively meet patient needs, maintain safe staffing levels and impact the population’s access to health care. Explore this interactive map to see where incidents happened. Access the data on HDX..."
Source/publisher:
Insecurity Insight (Geneva) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2023-09-26
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
519.58 KB
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Description:
"Advance unedited version Distr.: General, 19 September 2023
Original: English
Human Rights Council
Fifty-fourth session
11 September --6 October 2023
Agenda items 2 and 4
Annual report of the United Nations High Commissioner
for Human Rights and reports of the Office of the
High Commissioner and the Secretary-General
Human rights situations that require the Council's attention
Summary
Prepared pursuant to A/HRC/RES/50/3, this report identifies trends and patterns of human rights violations that occurred in Myanmar between 1 April 2022 and 31 July 2023. This report documents incidents affecting the civilian population with particular focus on military airstrikes, ground operations, and arson, and also covers acts of violence by anti-military armed groups. It further addresses human rights concerns of the Rohingya community. Recommendations are made to the military, the National Unity Government, and the international community.
Introduction and methodology
In resolution A/HRC/RES/49/23, the Human Rights Council requested the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to monitor and assess the overall situation of human rights in Myanmar, with a particular focus on accountability regarding alleged violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, and to make recommendations on additional steps necessary to address the current crisis. It also requested presentation of a comprehensive report at its 54th session.
This report presents findings from monitoring and verification activities conducted remotely by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) between 1 April 2022 and 31 July 2023. It examines trends and patterns in violations of international human rights law and, where applicable, of international humanitarian law, and examines where some of these violations may amount to crimes under international law. Paramount among these violations are killing of civilians, forced displacement, denial of humanitarian assistance, and extreme and systematic discrimination against the Rohingya by the Myanmar military.
This report is based on 161 interviews conducted during the reporting period with primary and secondary sources, including victims and witnesses, regular consultations and collaboration with local and international organizations, United Nations entities, thematic experts, and other actors. Analysis of other primary sources, such as satellite images and official documents, and systematic monitoring of media and social media, contributed to the findings of this report. OHCHR submitted questionnaires to military authorities, the National Unity Government, and key ethnic armed organizations. Given the serious protection concerns of individuals reporting on violations occurring in Myanmar, this report prioritized full respect of the “do no harm” principle over any other consideration. Factual determinations of incidents and patterns were made where there were reasonable grounds to believe that relevant incidents had occurred. Figures of deaths likely represent an underestimation of realities on the ground. For purposes of this report, a mass killing is considered an alleged incident in which at least 10 civilians or persons hors de combat were killed.
This report gives particular focus to key human rights and protection concerns deriving from the systematic use of indiscriminate attacks and attacks directed against the civilian population including, airstrikes, mass killings, and burning of villages. It also demonstrates that the intensity and brutality of military actions against the civilian population have increased over time, with complete impunity. Military actions have also resulted in interconnected humanitarian, political, and economic crises. imposing an unbearable toll on the people in Myanmar. Additionally, the report presents findings on the human rights situation of the Rohingya community, reiterating the lack of progress on the root causes of systemic discrimination, including on accountability, safety, citizenship, and fundamental freedoms.
A seemingly endless spiral of military violence has engulfed all aspects of life in Myanmar. Since the coup, OHCHR has consistently investigated and reported the evolution of Myanmar’s human rights crisis and the military’s absolute disregard for international law and protection of civilians. Analysing the use of violence by the military against individuals opposing their power and the civilian population at large, clear patterns emerged demonstrating a continuous escalation in terms of number, type, intensity, and brutality of attacks. Shortly after the coup, the military unilaterally amended and instrumentalized the legal framework to stifle free expression, justify arbitrary deprivation of liberty, and deny thousands of activists, journalists, and human rights defenders due process and fair trial rights. Their tactics quickly evolved into systematic targeted killings and mass arrests, with torture and ill-treatment causing numerous deaths in custody.
Increasingly, the military resorted to brutal campaigns against any perceived opponent. They increasingly rely on air and artillery strikes on villages and other populated areas, burning of villages, executions and killings, torture, arbitrary detentions, enforced disappearances, forced displacement, denial of humanitarian access, and persecution. Depending on the circumstances, some of these acts may constitute crimes against humanity and/or war crimes.
Amid a surge in the military’s reliance on fighter jets and helicopter gunships, violence has continued to escalate, as epitomized in April 2023 through multiple airstrikes on Pa Zi Gyi village, Sagaing, resulting in the largest mass casualty incident recorded since February 2021. The military’s increasing use of air power and munitions exhibited the military’s growing reliance on heavy weapons and materiel that can only be purchased from foreign sources. To do so, they rely on access to foreign currency to purchase such military hardware, support services, and aviation fuel. Thus far, targeted measures have shown some limited success in degrading the military’s offensive capacity, suggesting that more comprehensive, concrete, and meaningful international sanctions of this sort are urgently needed to curtail the military’s capacity for continuing its campaign of violence and repression.
Concerns arise also with regard to violations and abuses by anti-military armed groups and elements. While not comparable to the military’s violence in scale, proportion, or scope, such abuses exacerbate protection concerns of the civilian population. This situation requires decisive actions by the National Unity Government and relevant armed groups to ensure accountability and prevent impunity for human rights abuses by respective forces under their control..."
Source/publisher:
UN Human Rights Council (Geneva) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2023-09-26
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
UN human rights documents on Myanmar, Human Rights and international relations, Armed conflict and peace-building in Burma - theoretical, strategic and general
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
492.58 KB
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Description:
"Human Rights Violations took place in States and Regions from Sep 15 to 21, 2023
Military Junta Troop launched airstrikes and dropped bombs in Sagaing and Mandalay Region from September 15th to 21st. Over 130 civilians including women from Mandalay, Sagaing, Tanintharyi Region and Kachin State were arrested and used as human shields. Military Junta burnt and killed a civilian from Shweku Township, Kachin State. The families of political prisoners were extorted by prison authorities in Pathein Prison, Ayeyarwady Region.
18 Civilians died and over 29 were injured by the heavy and light artillery attacks of the Military Junta. They arrested around 50 civilians and killed 36 within a week. An underage child died and other 3 were injured by the Military junta committed violations..."
Source/publisher:
Network for Human Rights Documentation-Burma
Date of entry/update:
2023-09-22
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
Format :
pdf pdf pdf
Size:
367.54 KB 347.35 KB 129.99 KB
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Description:
"In revolutions, citizens push to overthrow the power of unpopular and unjust leaders. Yet in these contexts, it is often the case that other established power relations in society are also challenged. Revolutions and crises can ‘lift the lid’ on other unequal relationships and injustices.
In the case of Myanmar’s current revolution, the exiled National Unity Government, along with numerous armed groups and resistance movements around the country, are resisting the deeply unpopular and abusive Myanmar military. Amidst this revolution, however, there are other relationships that are being renegotiated, for example between different ethnic groups and, as millennials increasingly take on new leadership roles in the movement, between different generations.
Meanwhile, relationships and power dynamics within the aid architecture are also being challenged, as local and national Myanmar organisations question the longstanding dominance of international actors in humanitarian decision-making and resourcing.
Along with the revolution, there is currently a devastating humanitarian crisis in Myanmar. The UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs estimates that more than 17 million people, or almost one-third of the country, will need humanitarian assistance in 2023. As international NGOs and UN agencies are heavily restricted in their access to key areas of need, humanitarian programs are almost entirely reliant on local and national organisations. Yet despite their central role in aid program delivery, Myanmar humanitarian organisations remain on the periphery of humanitarian decision-making and resourcing.
In late 2022 and early 2023, we did interviews with 25 leaders of these Myanmar organisations (along with ten interviews with international aid agency representatives in Myanmar), exploring the dynamics of aid localisation.
One of our key findings is that there is a ‘conflict paradox’ for these local organisations – where local humanitarian actors can be both disempowered and empowered through international aid partnerships in settings of conflict. In conflict situations characterised by restricted international access, local actors can have greater control over aid resources and decision-making; yet such contexts can also result in the further disempowerment of local actors, when they are reduced to subcontractors delivering aid programs that remain controlled by international agencies.
In Myanmar, on one hand, local organisations are facing severe restrictions from the military regime – who confiscate and block aid, attempt to control financial transactions, and frequently threaten the security of staff and communities. At the same time, these Myanmar humanitarian organisations also report being hampered in their work by the bureaucracy and risk aversion of their international aid agency ‘partners’.
At times, international agency compliance rules – such as gaining three quotations for services, or keeping recipient lists – place local organisations and communities at risk from the regime. For example, one local aid provider told us how, in Sagaing division in Myanmar, the military regime recently destroyed all of the medicine at a local pharmacy and forced its closure, after local authorities saw the store listed on a voucher which had been kept for financial auditing of an aid project.
While some international agencies have increased their flexibility, Myanmar agency leaders reported that many international partners had shown little awareness or willingness to change systems to be more appropriate. More broadly, local leaders said that the relationship between international and local organisations was often a disempowering one in the humanitarian system. One Myanmar leader said that the “donors’ approach … examining [local groups] and saying ‘you don’t have this and you don’t have that’ … it undermines and disempowers the locals from the initial contact.”
On the other hand, local organisations have also, in some ways, been empowered in their work within the context of Myanmar’s conflict. They are able to operate more autonomously than international agencies as they have the ability to navigate the instability and dangers of the context. One Myanmar humanitarian organisation leader said, “Since COVID in 2020, and followed by the [military] coup [in February 2021], we know that, and we have proven that, local CSOs [civil society organisations] and agencies are the only actors on the ground.”
Along with greater access, local organisations have often developed stronger relationships of trust with other local organisations and communities. In the context of instability and revolution, such trust is crucial and is seen by many to go beyond the context or duration of an aid project. A leader from one organisation said, “trust-building does not happen overnight … If we want to support, help, and work together with [communities], we need to go beyond the project.”
Due to their access and relationships of trust with local communities, Myanmar humanitarian organisations, rather than international ones, are at the centre of current humanitarian responses. Yet regime and donor agency restrictions also hamper these responses.
This conflict paradox, where Myanmar humanitarian organisations are both empowered and disempowered, has led local leaders to attempt to reposition their agencies within the aid architecture. Rather than being subcontracted through a chain of funding – going from bilateral donor to UN agency or pooled fund to international NGO to local NGO – many large Myanmar organisations are now seeking to establish more direct funding relationships with donors. This aim is in line with the commitments made by the largest aid agency donors through the Grand Bargain in 2016.
Myanmar organisation leaders argue that they play a more effective aid intermediary role than international agencies. Access, local knowledge and trust allow them to support other local organisations and communities with more efficiency and context sensitivity.
Yet more than simply having greater effectiveness, Myanmar organisations are pushing for more decision-making power within the aid architecture as a matter of political rights and self-determination. They argue persuasively that decisions made about humanitarian action should be made by the people who are affected by them.
Revolution is not only a time of struggle towards regime change, but also a time when old inequalities of other kinds can be more clearly seen and challenged. This includes the old hierarchies in the aid sector. International aid agencies, including DFAT, need to adapt quickly and find sensible ways to address the inequalities in the aid system and more directly support the growth of Myanmar’s humanitarian organisations..."
Source/publisher:
Australian National University
Date of entry/update:
2023-09-20
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
The discussion on humanitarian assistance to Burma, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
718.29 KB
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Description:
"In Rakhine State, 51,590 individuals have been displaced across 10 townships due to the ongoing AA-Tatmadaw conflict. Additionally, 4,472 individuals have been displaced in Paletwa township in Chin State, bringing the total number of displaced persons to 56,062. As of August 2023, a further 4,174 individuals newly displaced remain in Mrauk-U, Kyautaw, Sittwe, Myebon, Minbya, Rathedaung, Buthidaung, and Ponnagyun townships.
In collaboration with partners and other UN agencies, UNHCR is responding to the humanitarian needs and continues to provide assistance to affected communities. Since January 2023, UNHCR provided core relief items, emergency shelter support, dignity kits and cloth masks to some 44,917 individuals in Mrauk-U, Kyauktaw,
Ponnagyun, Myebon, Sittwe, Pauktaw, Paletwa, Buthidaung and Rathedaung townships..."
Source/publisher:
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (Geneva) via Reliefweb (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2023-09-20
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Arakan (Rakhine) State - reports etc. by date (latest first), UNHCR (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees), Public Health, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
7.34 MB
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Description:
"MYANMAR:
Severe weather conditions continue to trigger floods in multiple areas, compounding the already precarious living conditions of people affected by ongoing armed clashes which continue across the country. In Sagaing, approximately 1,000 people from 6 wards in Kale town were relocated to safer locations on 8 September due to flooding. In the Southeast, although some of the 80,000 people affected by the August floods have now returned to their homes, a significant number remain displaced and in urgent need of assistance. Access constraints have increased, notably in the Southeast and Kachin, further restricting people’s access to vital services and hindering the delivery of assistance to affected communities.
Despite these challenges, more than 1.8 million out of 5 million people targeted in 2023 have been reached with humanitarian assistance in the first half of the year..."
Source/publisher:
UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (New York) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2023-09-19
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Flooding in Burma/Myanmar, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
2.29 MB
more
Sub-title:
The junta’s opponents are contesting roads, rivers and railways throughout the country, but the regime retains sufficient control over supply lines to sustain its offensives.
Description:
"Opposition forces across the country launched multiple attacks on regime convoys and flotillas carrying supplies and reinforcements, as well as against infrastructure like bridges and railways. To secure its lines of communication, the regime deployed more firepower and sent advance units to raid and depopulate nearby communities. This month’s update looks at recent dynamics in the Dry Zone, Bago East, and Kayah, where fighting along vital transport routes continues to escalate.
Regime makes progress over Dry Zone resistance, although some units grow stronger
Widespread armed violence persisted across the Dry Zone, with regime units continuing their efforts to locate and destroy independent Local Defence Forces (LDFs).?
In July, the IISS described an ongoing shift in tactics away from the pervasive use of arson by regime forces. Instead, soldiers are increasingly employing more select forms of violence, drawing on improved intelligence to help them identify and kill resistance fighters and their supporters. Reports of raids, killings, and torture by regime forces continue even as the pace of village arson declines.
The number of successful raids against LDFs coupled with information from multiple sources suggest that the regime may be making progress in reducing the number of localised armed actors operating across the Dry Zone. Most LDFs continue to depend primarily on homemade weapons, restricting their ability to effectively defend against raids, which accelerated after the regime dedicated additional resources to this theatre of operations early this year. Single attacks by regime units commonly result in the destruction of entire resistance cells.
Although independent and poorly equipped LDFs appear to be facing mounting difficulties, some individual People’s Defence Forces (PDFs) operating in coordination with the National Unity Government (NUG) or ethnic armed organisations (EAOs) appear increasingly coordinated and well-equipped. Over the last two months, photo and video evidence uploaded to social media has shown the growing prevalence of what appear to be factory-manufactured rifles, rather than homemade weapons, in the hands of uniformed PDF units operating in the Dry Zone. If these trends continue into 2024, the conflict in central Myanmar may evolve from a grassroots rebellion into a protracted insurgency waged by a smaller number of armed outfits. The geographical extent of fighting between combatants could become more limited even as some individual battles intensify.
The Dry Zone has also witnessed intensified conflict along its rivers, which both sides rely on for transport and supply. In late July, a regime flotilla of six supply ships and three gunboats departed from Mandalay, traveling up the Irrawaddy River on its way to Kachin State. On 31 July, a similarly-sized flotilla embarked from Monywa, moving north along the Chindwin River. In both instances, the regime sent advance columns to secure the riverbank as the flotilla moved upriver by conducting village raids, leading to mass displacement as well as the death and injury of numerous civilians. Multiple resistance outfits equipped with makeshift rockets and small arms made unsuccessful attempts to halt the regime’s waterborne convoys by launching ambushes from dug-in positions along the riverbank. Violence along the Irrawaddy and Chindwin rivers is likely to accelerate, leading to more civilian casualties and displacement.....Resistance contests regime supply lines in Bago East
The last three months saw a marked acceleration of fighting in Bago East, where allied units from the Karen National Union (KNU) and PDFs are exerting increased pressure on one of the country’s most important corridors. Resistances forces may now aim to break out onto the western side of the Sittaung River in order to threaten three important routes linking Yangon to Naypyidaw and Mandalay: the railway, the old highway, and the new highway further to the west. In the last three months, resistance forces have carried out multiple ambushes near to the railway and old highway. The regime’s hold on the new highway, however, remains relatively secure for now.
Some of the more notable fighting has occurred outside the towns of Kyauktaga and Nyaunglebin, where the river nears the old road and railway. Yet resistance forces will need to overcome several significant obstacles if they are to expand operations further west beyond the Sittaung River. The Karen Hills, which are dominated by the KNU, are an important supply base and launching pad for attacks along the eastern side of the valley. To threaten the new highway in the west, coalition forces will need to establish a firmer foothold in the Bago Mountains or risk overstretching their supply lines. Resistance activities in the Bago Mountains appear limited for the time being.
Despite a growing number of ambushes and acts of sabotage, the regime’s strengths in air and artillery will likely prevent resistance forces from consolidating control over any exposed segment of the transport corridor. Since the coup, a similar contest over the Asia Highway 1 in Kayin and Mon states has involved numerous resistance disruptions to commerce and logistics, sometimes for weeks at a time. However, the regime has consistently proven itself able to repel major offensives, repair damaged segments of the road, and resume the flow of troops and traffic. Moreover, attacks on infrastructure are costly for resistance forces and their civilian supporters who also rely on the same roads and bridges used by the regime. A limited contest along transport routes in Bago is likely to continue, especially in the southeastern portion of the Sittaung Valley.
Kayah State resistance maintains operational tempo despite regime onslaught
An ongoing battle that began in March this year continued unabated in Kayah State, where the regime and a coalition of Karenni resistance outfits are vying for control over key lines of communication. In late May, regime forces adopted a blockade strategy by seizing control of the main junctions and roads along the border between Kayah and Shan states. On 13 June, however, a sizeable faction of soldiers from the regime-aligned Karenni border guard forces defected before launching attacks alongside resistance units in the state’s southeast. The mutiny forced the regime to dispatch additional units southward in an ongoing attempt to regain control of Mese town and its surrounding positions.
Karenni fighters have attempted to halt the regime’s reinforcements with frequent ambushes, especially along the road between Demoso and Hpruso, the state’s second- and third-largest towns. In August, regime units seized several key villages along the route in an effort to secure safe passage for a convoy, reportedly comprising between 80 and 120 trucks. Karenni units responded with surprise attacks behind the enemy’s frontlines in early September, inflicting losses on the regime. In a recent interview, Karenni Nationalities Defence Force (KNDF) chair Khun Bedu admitted that his forces could not stop the regime’s advances due to heavy air and artillery strikes. Though they struggle to consolidate their gains, Karenni fighters remain able to manoeuvre throughout the theatre and continually contest the state’s key sites, preventing the regime from establishing a secure frontline outside urban areas. Both sides have suffered significant casualties in the last two months.
The Karenni resistance is possibly the most formidable of any movement to have emerged after the 2021 coup. Their success is drawn from a number of factors, including effective coordination among various outfits, a good degree of shared political vision, and strong leadership from field commanders. The Karenni coalition is also well-equipped, making it possible for its motivated fighters to maintain a high tempo of attacks against the regime. The ongoing battle involves some of the fiercest combat of the last two decades and is likely to continue indefinitely, with both sides stubbornly committed to the fight despite the mounting costs in lives and materiel. The conflict is driving a major humanitarian crisis, with as much as 75% of the state’s population displaced..."
Source/publisher:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Date of entry/update:
2023-09-19
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Armed conflict in Burma - attacks on civilians, Burma: Internal displacement/forced migration of several ethnic groups., Human Rights and international relations
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Description:
"Findings from an online survey suggest establishing direct cooperation with Ethnic Armed Organisations can potentially foster trust towards the National Unity Government, and contribute to a more inclusive and stable political future of Myanmar.
AUTHORS
Jiwon KimPhD Candidate, Stanford University
Since the 2021 military coup, politics in Myanmar has been increasingly tumultuous. The disorder has been especially pronounced in the ethnic minority areas where multiple political authorities were already fighting for control over the population. On top of the conflict between the Myanmar military and ethnic armed organisations (EAOs) fighting for self-determination, the rise of the pro-democracy movement led by the National Unity Government (NUG) has added another dimension to conflict in the country.
Against this backdrop, it is interesting to see where the ethnic minority communities will stand amidst this political upheaval. While some have joined the pro-democracy resistance, others have remained more neutral. It is crucial whether ethnic minority people would support and trust the new national political actor (NUG) as they assess whether it will truly represent their interests, or be another project led by the largest ethnic minority, Bamar?
One key factor that differentiates the ethnic minority areas of Myanmar from the rest of the country is the presence of over twenty different EAOs. They not only ensure security but also provide social services like education, healthcare, and dispute resolution. This raises the question of whether exposure to EAO governance influences one’s perception of other political actors, particularly among ethnic minorities.
To investigate this, an online survey targeting ethnic minority areas of Myanmar was run and Facebook advertisements were leveraged to recruit respondents. By providing translations into Burmese and six minority languages, the survey was able to collect 1,113 respondents from 35 different ethnic groups. They were asked whether they thought the NUG would care for the interests of their ethnic group, and how much they have experienced or heard of various governance activities by the EAO they have the most exposure to.....A high level of trust in NUG among ethnic minority communities.....Results of the survey show that in general, trust for the NUG is high among ethnic minority communities. 69% of all the respondents said they trusted the NUG and 79% said the NUG would be effective in providing social services to their ethnic group’s area.
People were also mostly confident that the NUG would prioritise the interests of their ethnic group or ethnic minorities in general. Around 70% believed the NUG would advocate for their ethnic group’s interests, while 49% said the NUG would ensure representation of their ethnic group’s people in positions of power. Additionally, 51% felt they would prioritise the interests of Bamar and ethnic minority people equally.....Positive and negative EAO governance experiences influence trust in ethnic minority areas.....There is a moderate level of exposure to governance provided by ethnic armed organisations (EAOs) in ethnic minority areas. About 33-38% of respondents said they had either directly experienced or know someone who had experienced their EAO providing education and medical care, solving community problems, and dealing with crimes and drugs. When considering those who had only heard about these activities, the rate was as high as 71-79%.
Exposure to negative governance activities including taxation, forcible recruitment, engaging in business with the Myanmar military (Tatmadaw), and violence against civilians was much lower in general. Although among respondents, 30% had directly or indirectly experienced taxation, direct or indirect exposure to other activities ranged from 8-15%.
A significant correlation was found between exposure to EAO governance and trust in the EAOs. Greater exposure to positive governance activities resulted in higher trust for the EAOs, while those with more negative exposure had lower trust for the EAOs. These relationships remained true even after accounting for respondents’ strength of ethnic identity, exposure to violence by Myanmar military, and ethno-political beliefs.....Notes: The distribution of responses varies based on the level of exposure, with the majority of respondents reporting the lowest exposure levels (0 and 1). The majority of respondents reported exposure to governance related to education, medical services, and community issue resolution.
Reliance on EAOs for social services may challenge the widespread popularity of the NUG in Myanmar
The survey shows that EAO governance affects trust not only for the EAOs themselves, but also for the NUG. More exposure to positive EAO governance is associated with slightly lower trust in the NUG, as long as the EAO is not perceived as explicitly supportive of the NUG. When respondents believed that their EAO as neutral towards the NUG, then an increase in average exposure score from 0 (never heard) to 3 (experienced firsthand) moves their average perception of the NUG from 5 (somewhat positive) to 4 (neither positive nor negative). This is true even after accounting for factors such as respondent’s exposure to NUG governance, belief in democracy, strength of ethnic identity, and other demographic variables.
This is a significant result considering the near universal popularity of the NUG in Myanmar. It indicates that those accustomed to receiving social services and governance from EAOs are less likely to trust that the NUG would prioritise their ethnic group’s interest if it assumes control of the country.
Figure 2: Positive EAO governance, EAO stance on NUG, and NUG perceptions.....Notes: This figure illustrates the relationship between positive EAO governance and perceptions of the NUG among respondents, showing that increased exposure to positive EAO governance is associated with lower perceptions of the NUG. This relationship is most pronounced when the EAO's stance somewhat opposes the NUG. Conversely, when the EAO's stance somewhat supports the NUG, greater exposure to positive EAO governance leads to slightly higher perceptions of the NUG.
Implications for Myanmar politics
The study’s findings suggest that EAOs are important political actors with significant influence and enjoy a high level of trust among the ethnic minority population. Recognised as major providers of governance and social service providers as well as protectors of ethnic minority interests over many decades, they should be actively included in political dialogues and decision-making processes.
The study also suggests that the NUG would benefit from direct cooperation with the EAOs in order to build trust among ethnic minority populations. Once an EAO is in direct collaboration with the NUG, governance provision by the EAO does not negatively undermine trust in the NUG. Building a cooperative relationship with EAOs would enable the NUG to more easily gain the trust of the ethnic minority communities..."
Source/publisher:
International Growth Centre
Date of entry/update:
2023-09-19
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Human Rights and international relations
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"The ASEAN summit is important for Southeast Asia because it engages with other states in the region. Over the years, the ASEAN summit decisions have fostered economic growth and development in the region, which has a combined population of over 650 million and a GDP of over $3 trillion. With that, the 2023 ASEAN Summit was held in Jakarta, Indonesia, on September 5-7, 2023, under the theme “ASEAN Matters: Epicentrum of Growth”. At this summit, ASEAN countries expanded their economic opportunities and partnerships.
However, the 2023 ASEAN summit was quite different from the previous one. During the 2023 summit, ASEAN countries showed concern about the civil strife and human rights violations in Myanmar. This was also the first time that ASEAN countries have combined to put diplomatic pressure on Myanmar’s junta. Indonesia has been the most active and vocal ASEAN member in addressing the Myanmar crisis. It proposed and hosted the ASEAN Leaders’ Meeting in April 2021, where the Five-Point Consensus was adopted. Indonesia urged the junta to stop the violence, release political prisoners, and engage in dialogue with all parties. It has also expressed support for a global arms embargo on Myanmar.
Malaysia has also been outspoken in criticizing the junta and calling for a peaceful resolution. It has also advocated for the protection of Rohingya refugees, who have fled from Myanmar to Malaysia and other countries. Singapore has taken a more pragmatic and balanced approach to the Myanmar crisis. Singapore has maintained its economic ties with Myanmar but has also suspended some military cooperation and imposed targeted sanctions on some junta officials. The Philippines has suspended defense engagements with Myanmar but has not imposed any sanctions or cut off trade relations.
Thailand has been more sympathetic and accommodating to the junta due to its close ties and shared interests with Myanmar. It has refrained from condemning the coup or calling it a coup and instead emphasized the need for stability and non-interference. It has also hosted an informal meeting with some ASEAN members and the junta’s foreign minister, which was seen as undermining ASEAN’s unity and credibility. Cambodia has also been supportive of the junta, citing its respect for Myanmar’s sovereignty. It has opposed any foreign intervention or pressure on Myanmar and called for dialogue within the framework of ASEAN. Laos has been relatively silent and passive in the Myanmar crisis, following its policy of neutrality.
Vietnam has taken a cautious and moderate position on the Myanmar crisis, balancing its interests and principles. It has also supported ASEAN’s role in finding a peaceful solution but has not interfered in Myanmar’s internal affairs.
The ASEAN 2023 summit was an important event for Myanmar, as it was the first time that the bloc discussed the situation in the country since the military coup in February 2021. However, the summit did not result in any significant breakthroughs or pressure on the junta to stop the violence and restore democracy. ASEAN operates on the principle of consensus, which means that all 10 member states have to agree on any decision or action.
ASEAN also adheres to the principle of non-interference, which means that it respects the sovereignty and internal affairs of each member state. This limits ASEAN’s ability to intervene in Myanmar’s crisis, as it does not want to be seen as meddling or imposing its will on Myanmar. ASEAN has no enforcement mechanism or sanctions power to compel Myanmar to comply with its demands or recommendations. The only leverage that ASEAN has is its moral authority and diplomatic influence, which are not enough to sway the junta, which has shown little regard for international opinion or pressure. ASEAN faces competition from other actors, such as China, India, Japan, and the United States, who have their interests and agendas in Myanmar. These actors may undermine ASEAN’s efforts by pursuing bilateral engagements with the junta or offering incentives or alternatives that are more appealing to Myanmar.
Currently, the trade value of Myanmar’s trade with the ASEAN countries has exceeded $10.3 billion in the nine months until December of the 2022–2023 fiscal year, according to the country’s Ministry of Commerce. Major ASEAN countries are Myanmar’s major trading partners, including Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Vietnam. The main export items are agricultural and fishery products and minerals. Myanmar’s trade with Indonesia recorded an estimated value of over $936.5 million, with Vietnam at over $609.47 million, the Philippines at over $122.74 million, Cambodia at over $25.7 million, trade with Laos at over $1.3 million, and Brunei at over $0.31 million. Therefore, it is unlikely that ASEAN can pressure Myanmar to stop the civil war with the junta government unless there is a significant change in the economic dynamics within Myanmar or among ASEAN members. ASEAN’s role may be more effective in facilitating dialogue and humanitarian assistance than imposing solutions or sanctions.
The inaction of ASEAN 2023 towards Myanmar has further complicated the situation for Rohingyas. The Rohingyas have endured decades of persecution and displacement at the hands of the military and are in a dire situation in Myanmar. The Rohingya have faced several waves of violence and ethnic cleansing by the Myanmar army and local mobs, especially since 2017, which have killed thousands and forced hundreds of thousands to flee to neighboring Bangladesh. The Rohingya who remain in Myanmar are confined to camps or villages, where they face severe restrictions on their movement, livelihoods, health care, and education. The Rohingya have received little support or protection from the international community, which has failed to hold the Myanmar authorities accountable for their crimes against humanity and genocide.
The 2021 military coup has further worsened the situation, as the junta has cracked down on all forms of dissent and opposition across the country. Therefore, the Rohingya people are in a desperate and hopeless situation, with no prospects of returning to their homes or obtaining justice. They are trapped in a cycle of violence, displacement, and deprivation, with no end in sight.
However, Myanmar has rejected the ASEAN 2023 summit statement condemning violence as one-sided. The junta claimed that the statement was not objective and biased, and it seized power in a coup in February 2021. Myanmar also complained that it was not represented at the ASEAN summit. Myanmar accused ASEAN nations of interfering in its internal affairs and ignoring its views and voices. Myanmar has further withdrawn from its scheduled chairmanship of ASEAN in 2026, which is a blow to its international legitimacy. Therefore, it is unlikely that ASEAN can address the issue of Rohingya repatriation to Myanmar effectively unless there is a significant change in the political dynamics within Myanmar or among ASEAN members. However, this also depends on the willingness and cooperation of the junta and other stakeholders in Myanmar.
In conclusion, ASEAN has no enforcement mechanism or sanctions power to compel Myanmar to comply with its demands or recommendations. The only leverage that ASEAN has is its moral authority and diplomatic influence, which are not enough to sway the junta, which has shown little regard for international opinion or pressure..."
Source/publisher:
"Eurasia Review"
Date of entry/update:
2023-09-18
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, ASEAN-Burma relations, Human Rights and international relations
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Sub-title:
In new book, Australian economist Sean Turnell talks about his prison experience.
Description:
"Australian economist Sean Turnell was an economic policy advisor to Myanmar’s State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi in 2021 when the country’s military ousted the democratically elected government in a coup and installed the State Administration Council or SAC, led by Sen. Gen. Min Aung Hlaing.
Five days later he was arrested on charges of espionage and he spent the next 650 days – or about one year and nine months – in detention, mostly in horrible conditions in Yangon’s Insein Prison.
In his soon-to-be released book ‘An Unlikely Prisoner: How an eternal optimist found hope in Myanmar's most notorious jail,’ Turnell tells the story of his time behind bars.
He told RFA Burmese that although it is a story of great sadness, it is also one of courage for other prisoners jailed by the junta, especially Aung San Suu Kyi, who he calls ‘Daw Suu,’ a term of respect for women. The interview has been edited for length and clarity.
RFA: What was your motivation for writing this book?
Turnell: Well, it was something that I always intended to do. In fact, I wrote most of the book in my head during the time I was in prison.
On many days, of course, I didn't really have much to do, so part of my pacing up and down the cells, I'd be trying to think of things to think about. And part of it was writing this book.
So probably about one third of it was written inside my head before I even got out. As soon as I got back, it was a relatively easy process of then converting all the thoughts up here [in my head] onto paper.
RFA: Can you discuss how much of the book deals with your time in prison, and before and after the coup?
Turnell: About two thirds of the book is all about the experience post-coup. So I detailed my experiences on the day of the coup itself and then my subsequent arrest five days later, and then the next 650 days in Yangon’s Insein Prison, and then up in Napyitaw and then back to Insein and the court and meeting Daw Suu in the court and all of that.
So that's the bulk of the book. But I have a section there on … background … Why was I there? And how was I involved at all in the NLD government? The basic background to the reforms, things like that, how those reforms increasingly ran up against the military and the difficulties, things like that.
But most of it is a memoir about post-coup, but I've got a section there about Myanmar before the coup and some of the reforms that we were trying to do.
RFA: Is there any subject that you avoid in the book? Was there at any time that you had to pledge to the junta not to write about as a condition of your release? Was there anything like that in your release agreement?
Turnell: Oh, no. I made no pledge at all. None at all. I wondered whether they would ask me to do something like that. But they never, ever did. I never signed anything. In fact, I was very, very careful about that. On the very last day, as I was being released, we were wondering about exactly that. So, yeah. So I made no pledges, no promises to them whatsoever and wouldn't have done so. I hasten to add, I would not have signed anything if it was put in front of me.
But since coming out, you know, I exercised my right as an Australian citizen, of course, back in Australia, which has complete freedom of speech. I was very vocal in talking about my situation and all that.
I don't think – I mean, obviously I'm subjective in this issue – but I don't think I've been at all unfair or unreasonable in my comments about the regime or the conditions under which they held me and the nature of the trial and all the rest of it.
I think any sort of objective account on any of those things would be identical to mine, would be my view. But obviously Myanmar now under the SAC regime is not a place where freedom of speech is welcome. So I’m to some extent not surprised that they've had a negative reaction to it. But it certainly didn't involve any pledge or anything like that.
RFA: What are some of the most powerful memories from your time in prison that you talk about in this book?
Turnell: Many memorable times. I think some really bad stuff. I think, hearing about the death of my friend Khin Maung Shwe or Yacob, as he was always to me, a wonderful man who protected me, was just a dear friend. I met him in the first six months when I was in Insein Prison, where again, he sort of held me and looked after me. I then went up to Naypyitaw Prison for a whole year as the trial went on, and I never found out about him at all until I was sent back to Insein after the trial. And I heard that he'd been murdered in the prison and that that was a real low moment. But certainly, you know, as I say, it's one that is very much in my head.
Other than that, you know, I remember all the horrible stuff, the terrible cell, the terrible food, the awfulness of prison transfers. And I noticed reading some of the reporting on Myanmar, the internal media, that people like your organization have taken up the issue of transporting prisoners. And just to add my voice to that, it really is terrible. Some of the worst moments I experienced were being transported between the prison and the court and between different prisons, et. cetera. So I certainly remember all that.
But I remember again, some of the good things, the incredible conversations that I had with some wonderful Burmese colleagues and so on. I remember the compassion that they showed me. I remember, you know, some funny issues. And yes, It’s a real mixed bag and a mixture of horror, but a mixture of really good things that not only gladdened my heart whenever I think about Myanmar and its people, but even about human nature.
One of the things that struck me is that while some people behave badly under pressure, a great many more people and certainly many Myanmar people behave superbly under pressure. And I was the beneficiary of that.
RFA: Is there any person or individual that you would like to dedicate this book to?
Turnell: I'm dedicating it to my wife, who just championed me from the get go. You know, she knew what was happening on the first day, she was there the last day. And she just ran a massive campaign from here in Sydney. And she reached out to everyone to not only all the political leadership here in Australia, but even to people like Hun Sen in Cambodia. She wrote letters to Min Aung Hlaing’s wife. She tried to rope in the U.S. president. She got the king of England, Charles III, involved. She got everyone involved. It was the most incredible thing.
So it was a no-brainer as to who I dedicate it to. But beyond her were my father, Peter, my sister Lisa, my nephews, my daughter, all of them were just, you know, just superb and then, you know, to the Myanmar people as well as other development friends and people from Australian foreign affairs and so on. But my Myanmar friends were very much in my thoughts beyond my sort of immediate family.
In terms of the structure of the book, I begin with the sort of drama of the arrest, the early interrogation, a terrible two months I experienced in something that I just called “the box,” which was just a room that I was locked into for two months in complete isolation. And the worst treatment that I had was at that period.
Then I have another chapter on being released into Insein Prison and spent a lot of time just talking about that, the conditions, describing it, because it's a most extraordinary place, particularly, I think, for people outside Myanmar. It would be very hard, I think, to visualize just just what inside is like. And a lot there obviously, again, about some great Myanmar friends.
Then, a big section once we go up to Naypyitaw, the awful conditions there in the Naypyitaw detention center was in many ways even worse than Insein.
Then the trial, the absurdity of the trial and the absurdity of the charges against me and against my friends.
Notes about Daw Suu, of course, who it was a great honor to work alongside before the coup. It was a great honor just to see how fantastic she was in the court in the prison. She remains as far as I know, but certainly to my experience, which was only a year ago, undaunted, full of courage, compassion, again, just raw intelligence, the way that it just shows out, the very courteous way that she treated the people who were persecuting her. She was just an inspiration. And so I spend a lot of time talking about that, just how she kept the spirits of myself up, and everyone else up. I never saw her waver or weaken anyway. So, you know, I certainly deal with that.
And then, the absurdity of the trial, the darkest moments immediately after that, transporting back to Insein is then the final thing where I was put amongst the death row prisoners, which was terribly depressing and inspiring as well, because again, even those people in a desperate, desperate situation, they were also incredibly generous and great friends to me. So that's sort of the second last section. And then I have finally the day in which I was told I was going home and the drama of going home and the incredible feeling and lift of going home.
And then finally, just some of the events that I detail a little bit, how the regime became upset when I had the temerity just to say that I wasn't treated that well by them and a little bit on that as well. But overall, it's an uplifting story in many ways, even though along the way, unfortunately, I have to tell the terribly sad story for so many people in Myanmar.
RFA: What kind of impact do you expect to make with this book?
Turnell: Above all, I would like the world to pay attention to what's going on in Myanmar. As we who are interested in Myanmar know, the situation is desperate, and it doesn't give it enough attention. The world's eyes, very rightly, are on Ukraine, but Myanmar deserves attention as well. It's a terrible situation. The people need help. They deserve help. And so if the book can do anything at all, it would be to help draw attention to that.
RFA: Do you have any messages for Aung San Suu Kyi and your other friends in Myanmar?
Turnell: My message to both Daw Suu and my specific friends in Myanmar, but also people just generally is a big thank you. I love the place and still do.
I was asked and I spoke to the media about this when I got released. A leading immigration official told me just as I was getting on the plane, he said, “Sean, please don't hate Myanmar.”
And it was an odd moment because he just spent minutes beforehand giving me a lecture about how I would never be allowed back, et cetera. But then he sort of changed his whole demeanor and again just said, “Please don't hate Myanmar.”
And I said back to him, “I could never hate Myanmar.”
And again, for all the reasons that I've described here about just the love and compassion, the courage … that I witnessed all around me. So, yes, I have a very soft spot for Myanmar. I desperately hope to get back there one day, but that's not going to happen until we get dramatic political change.
That, of course, is a very minor thing compared to the overall story of what the people in Myanmar are going through. Just to get that message and a big thank you across to them and to say to them that even though Myanmar is not getting the attention it deserves, and that's part of the book, but nonetheless, there are millions of people around the world who do follow events in Myanmar and who do care about what's happening.
RFA: What about the regime? Do you have anything to say to Min Aung Hlaing and other regime leaders?
Well, I would say to them to put their country first. To put the people of Myanmar first. Stop being so defensive, selfish. I mean, I could go on and I won't bother doing that, but I mean that very clearly. These are people who don't have the country's interests at heart.
Perhaps some of them might have second thoughts. I like to think that probably not at the very top, but that there must be people, smart people, and for whatever reason, might be caught up in that regime who might just think, “This is terrible, we've got to stop this. This is enough.”
I'm hopeful that that's the case. It's obviously very hard to know, but you just can't help but feel there must be people who look at the economy, look at the dreadful state of the country and just think, “We can't do this. We've got to stop.”
And so to those people, I would encourage them to do so..."
Source/publisher:
"Radio Free Asia" (USA)
Date of entry/update:
2023-09-18
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Business and the Military, Human Rights and international relations
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Description:
"The Republic of the Union of Myanmar, as represented by the National Unity Government, issues this brief statement on its human rights commitments.
In March 2022, the National Unity Government circulated a report to Geneva delegations that provided Myanmar’s replies and voluntary commitments following its third cycle UPR examination. We stand by these commitments, which included formally abolishing the death penalty, ratifying all international human rights treaties and their optional protocols, cooperating with the International Court of Justice in The Gambia v. Myanmar case, and increasing women’s political representation and decision-making at all levels.
The National Unity Government continues to extend its full cooperation to the Human Rights Council and its mandates. We support and actively engage with the Special Rapporteur on Myanmar and we have issued a standing invitation to Special Procedures mandate-holders. We remain committed to implementing relevant recommendations of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar.
The National Unity Government regularly submits information to OHCHR to inform its crucial investigations and reports on Myanmar’s dire human rights situation. We will work with the Office to set up a country presence in Myanmar.
The National Unity Government is committed to delivering justice to survivors of historic and continuing military atrocities. We pledge our cooperation with international, regional and national accountability mechanisms, particularly countries exercising universal jurisdiction. This builds on our article 12(3) declaration to the International Criminal Court in 2021, which accepted the Court’s jurisdiction in Myanmar going back to 1 July 2002.
We also continue to partner with the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar, submitting information and identifying witnesses to provide testimony in safe and secure ways. We strongly support the IIMM’s efforts to hold the military accountable for its atrocity campaigns against the Rohingya, and we are ready to explore the IIMM’s access to Myanmar to facilitate on the ground investigations into the military junta’s widespread crimes.
The National Unity Government, acting on its ‘Policy Position on the Rohingya’, is committed to creating the conditions needed to bring the Rohingya and other displaced communities home in voluntary, safe, dignified and sustainable ways. A Rohingya leader now serves as Deputy Minister of Human Rights to ensure that Rohingya perspectives inform and support the development of government policies and programs.
Furthermore, we are working with the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw on legislative change to ensure the equal treatment and protection of all communities, including ethnic and religious minorities. This will see the replacement of the Citizenship Law of 1982 with a new law that bases citizenship on birth in Myanmar or birth anywhere as a child of Myanmar citizens, the abolition of the National Verification Card process, and the repeal of the Race and Religion Protection Laws of 2015. We will also introduce laws prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity.
Myanmar’s Federal Democracy Charter promises an inclusive nation founded on peace, justice, equality, human rights and the protection of minorities. We urge the international community to support us in delivering it to our people..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2023-09-18
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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"၁။ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရက ကိုယ်စားပြုသည့် ပြည်ထောင်စုသမ္မတမြန်မာနိုင်ငံ တော်၏ လူ့အခွင့်အရေးဆိုင်ရာ ရပ်တည်ချက်နှင့်ပတ်သက်၍ ထုတ်ပြန်ကြေညာအပ်ပါသည်။
၂။ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရသည် ၂၀၂၂ ခုနှစ်၊ မတ်လတွင် တတိယအကြိမ် နိုင်ငံ အားလုံးအလှည့်ကျ အစီရင်ခံသုံးသပ်ခြင်း (Universal Periodic Review) အတွက် အစီရင်ခံ စာကိုထုတ်ပြန်ခဲ့ပြီး မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၏ တုံ့ပြန်ချက်များနှင့် ရပ်တည်ချက်များကို ဂျီနီဗာမြို့ရှိ ကိုယ်စားလှယ်များအား အသိပေးအကြောင်းကြားခဲ့ပြီးဖြစ်ပါသည်။ သေဒဏ်ကို တရားဝင် ဖျက်သိမ်းမှု၊ အပြည်ပြည်ဆိုင်ရာ လူ့အခွင့်အရေးသဘောတူစာချုပ်များနှင့် နောက်ဆက်တွဲစာ ချုပ်များကို အတည်ပြုလက်မှတ်ထိုးမှုနှင့် ဂမ်ဘီယာ-မြန်မာ အမှုကိစ္စရပ်တွင် အပြည်ပြည် ဆိုင်ရာတရားစီရင်ရေးရုံးနှင့် ပူးပေါင်းဆောင်ရွက်မှု၊ အဆင့်အားလုံးတွင် အမျိုးသမီးများ၏ နိုင်ငံရေးဆိုင်ရာ ကိုယ်စားပြုခြင်းနှင့် ဆုံးဖြတ်ချက်ချခြင်းတို့ တိုးမြင့်လာစေမှုများပါဝင်သော ဤဆုံးဖြတ်ချက်များအတိုင်း ကျွန်ုပ်တို့ရပ်တည်ပါသည်။
၃။ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရသည် လူ့အခွင့်အရေးကောင်စီနှင့် ၎င်း၏လုပ်ပိုင်ခွင့် အာဏာအပ်နှင်းထားမှုများနှင့် အပြည့်အဝ ပူးပေါင်းဆောင်ရွက်မှုကို ဆက်လက်တိုးမြှင့် ဆောင်ရွက်နေပါသည်။ ကျွန်ုပ်တို့သည် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံဆိုင်ရာ လူ့အခွင့်အရေး စုံစမ်းစစ်ဆေးရေး အရာရှိ ခန့်အပ်ထားမှုကို အားပေးထောက်ခံပြီး ၎င်းနှင့်လည်း တက်တက်ကြွကြွ ပူးပေါင်း လုပ်ဆောင် လျက်ရှိသည်။ အထူးလုပ်ထုံးလုပ်နည်း လုပ်ပိုင်ခွင့်အာဏာ အပ်နှင်းခံထားရသော သူများအား မြန်မာနိုင်ငံသို့လာရောက်ရန် ဖိတ်ခေါ်မှုကို ထုတ်ပြန်ထားပြီးဖြစ်သည်။ မြန်မာ နိုင်ငံဆိုင်ရာ သီးခြားလွတ်လပ်သော အချက်အလက်စုံစမ်းစစ်ဆေးရေးယန္တရားက ထုတ်ပြန် ထားသည့် အကြံပြုချက်များကိုလည်း အကောင်အထည်ဖော်ရန် ကတိကဝတ်ပြုထားလျက် ရှိသည်။
၄။ ထို့အပြင်အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရသည် ကုလသမဂ္ဂလူ့အခွင့်အရေးဆိုင်ရာ မဟာ မင်းကြီးရုံး (OHCHR)ထံသို့ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၏ ချွတ်ခြုံကျနေသော လူ့အခွင့်အရေးအခြေအနေနှင့် ပတ်သက်၍ အရေးပါလှသည့် စုံစမ်းမှုများနှင့် အစီရင်ခံစာများကို ပုံမှန်တင်သွင်းလျက်ရှိပါ သည်။ မဟာမင်းကြီးရုံးအနေနှင့် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံအတွင်း လက်လှမ်းမှီနိုင်ရေးအတွက် ကျွန်ုပ်တို့ လက်တွဲလုပ်ဆောင်သွားမည်ဖြစ်သည်။
၅။ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရသည် ဆက်လက်ဖြစ်ပွားနေသော စစ်တပ်၏ သမိုင်းဝင် ရက်စက်ကြမ်းကြုတ်မှုများကြားမှ အသက်ရှင်လွတ်မြောက်သူများကို တရားမျှတမှုဖော် ဆောင်ပေးရန် ဆုံးဖြတ်ထားပါသည်။ ကျွန်ုပ်တို့သည် အပြည်ပြည်ဆိုင်ရာ၊ ဒေသဆိုင်ရာနှင့် နိုင်ငံဆိုင်ရာ တာဝန်ခံမှု ယန္တရားများ (အထူးသဖြင့် ကမ္ဘာလုံးဆိုင်ရာ တရားစီရင်ပိုင်ခွင့်ကို ကျင့်သုံးသော နိုင်ငံများ)နှင့် ပူးပေါင်းဆောင်ရွက်သွားရန် ကတိပြုထားပါသည်။ ၂၀၀၂ ခုနှစ်၊ ဇူလိုင်လ ၁ ရက်နေ့ ရက်စွဲဖြင့် အပြည်ပြည်ဆိုင်ရာ ရာဇဝတ်မှုတရားရုံး (International Criminal Court)သို့ ပေးပို့ခဲ့သော အပိုဒ်ခွဲ ၁၂(၃) ကြေညာချက်တွင် ထိုရာဇဝတ်မှုဆိုင်ရာ တရားရုံးအနေဖြင့် ၂၀၀၂ခုနှစ်၊ ဇူလိုင်လ ၁ ရက်နေ့မှစ၍ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံအတွင်းကျူးလွန်ခဲ့သော ရာဇဝတ်မှုများအပေါ် တရားစီရင်ပိုင်ခွင့်ကို လက်ခံကြောင်းး အကြောင်းကြားပြီးဖြစ်သည်။
၆။ ကျွန်ုပ်တို့သည် လုံခြုံစိတ်ချရသော နည်းလမ်းများဖြင့် သက်သေခံချက်ကို ပေးစွမ်းနိုင် ရန်အတွက် အချက်အလက်များကိုတင်သွင်းပြီး သက်သေများကို သတ်မှတ်ကာ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ အတွက် သီးခြားလွတ်လပ်သော စုံစမ်းစစ်ဆေးရေးယန္တရားအဖွဲ့ (IIMM)နှင့် လက်တွဲလုပ် ဆောင်လျက်ရှိပါသည်။ ရိုဟင်ဂျာပြည်သူများအပေါ် ရက်စက်ကြမ်းကြုတ်စွာ ကျူးလွန်နေမှု များအတွက် စစ်တပ်ကို တာဝန်ခံမှုရှိစေရန်အတွက် ယန္တရား၏ အားထုတ်ဆောင်ရွက်နေမှု များကို ကျွန်ုပ်တို့ အပြည့်အဝထောက်ခံပါသည်။ နိုင်ငံအနှံ့အပြားတွင် စစ်တပ်က ကျူးလွန် လျက်ရှိသည့် ရာဇဝတ်မှုများကို မြေပြင်ကျကျ စုံစမ်းစစ်ဆေးမှုပြုရန် ယန္တရား၏ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ အတွင်း လက်လှမ်းမီနိုင်မှုအတွက် နည်းလမ်းရှာဖွေဖော်ဆောင်ရန် ကျွန်ုပ်တို့အသင့်ရှိပါသည်။
၇။ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရသည် ချမှတ်ထားသော “ရိုဟင်ဂျာအပေါ် မူဝါဒရပ်တည် ချက်” အတိုင်း လုပ်ဆောင်ရင်း ရိုဟင်ဂျာနှင့် အခြားအိုးအိမ်စွန့်ခွာသူများကို မိမိသဘော အလျောက် လုံခြုံပြီးဂုဏ်သိက္ခာရှိသည့် ရေရှည်နည်းလမ်းများဖြင့် နေရပ်ပြန်လာနိုင်ရေး လိုအပ် သောအခြေအနေများကို ဖန်တီးရန် ဆုံးဖြတ်ထားပါသည်။ အစိုးရမူဝါဒများနှင့် အစီ အစဉ်များ ဖွံ့ဖြိုးတိုးတက်လာအောင် လုပ်ဆောင်ရာတွင် ရိုဟင်ဂျာပြည်သူများ၏ အမြင် သဘောထားများ ထင်ဟပ်နိုင်ရန်အတွက် အသိပေးအားပေးခြင်းများ လုပ်ဆောင်နိုင်ရန် ရိုဟင်ဂျာ ခေါင်းဆောင်တစ်ဦးသည် လူ့အခွင့်အရေးဆိုင်ရာဝန်ကြီးဌာန၏ ဒုတိယဝန်ကြီး အဖြစ် တာဝန်ထမ်းဆောင်လျက်ရှိပါသည်။
၈။ ထို့အပြင် ကျွန်ုပ်တို့သည် တိုင်းရင်းသားနှင့် ဘာသာရေးလူနည်းစုများ အပါအဝင် လူ့ အသိုက်အဝန်းအားလုံးကို တန်းတူညီမျှဆက်ဆံရန်နှင့် ကာကွယ်ပေးနိုင်ရန်အတွက် ပြည် ထောင်စုလွှတ်တော်ကိုယ်စားပြုကော်မတီနှင့် လက်တွဲပြီး ဥပဒေပြုပြင်ပြောင်းလဲမှုများနှင့် ပတ်သက်၍ လုပ်ဆောင်နေပါသည်။ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံသားမိဘနှစ်ပါးက မြန်မာနိုင်ငံအတွင်း မွေး ဖွားသည့် (သို့မဟုတ်) မည်သည့်နေရာတွင်မဆို မွေးဖွားလာသည့် ကလေးသူငယ်များကို နိုင်ငံ သားဖြစ်စေခြင်း၊ နိုင်ငံသားအဖြစ်အတည်ပြုမှုကဒ်လုပ်ငန်းစဉ်ကို ဖျက်သိမ်းခြင်းနှင့် ၂၀၁၅ ခုနှစ်မျိုးစောင့်ဥပဒေ ရုပ်သိမ်းခြင်းတို့ကို အခြေခံသော ဥပဒေအသစ်ဖြင့် ၁၉၈၂ခုနှစ် နိုင်ငံသား ဥပဒေကို အစားထိုးပါမည်။ လိင်ပိုင်းဆိုင်ရာ တိမ်းညွတ်မှုနှင့် လိင်သတ်မှတ်ချက် တို့အပေါ် အခြေခံပြီး ခွဲခြားဆက်ဆံမှုအားတားမြစ်သော ဥပဒေများကိုလည်း ဖော်ဆောင်သွားမည်ဖြစ် သည်။
၉။ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၏ ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီ ပဋိညာဉ်စာတမ်းသည် ငြိမ်းချမ်းရေး၊ တရားမျှတ မှု၊ တန်းတူညီမျှမှု၊ လူ့အခွင့်အရေးနှင့် လူနည်းစုများကို အကာအကွယ်ပေးမှုအပေါ် အခြေခံထားသော ဘက်ပေါင်းစုံပါဝင်သည့် နိုင်ငံတစ်ရပ်ဖြစ်လာစေရန် ကတိပြုထားပါသည်။ ထိုအကြောင်းအရာများကို ပြည်သူများအပေါ် ပေးစွမ်းနိုင်ရေးအတွက် ပံ့ပိုးပေးကြရန် နိုင်ငံ တကာအသိုင်းအဝိုင်းကို တိုက်တွန်းအပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2023-09-18
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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Format :
pdf
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Sub-title:
The Asean-India Summit of 2023, themed "ASEAN Matters: Epicentrum of Growth," provided Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi with a platform to articulate his vision for strengthening India-Asean cooperation.
Description:
"While addressing various dimensions of this partnership, including digital transformation, trade, and economic engagement, Prime Minister Modi made it unequivocally clear that his paramount focus was on ensuring peace, security, and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region. Furthermore, he underscored the critical importance of addressing a pressing concern – maintaining peace and security along India's border with Myanmar. This commentary delves into how India can contribute to ensuring peace and security along its Myanmar border, thereby fostering stability in the broader Indo-Pacific region.
Asean as a Central Pillar—India's "Act East Policy" has been central to its foreign policy approach in recent years, with Asean emerging as a pivotal partner in this endeavour. The Act East Policy aims to strengthen India's economic, strategic, and cultural ties with nations in the Asia-Pacific region, recognizing the significance of the Indo-Pacific as a dynamic and vital area for India's growth and influence.
Prime Minister Modi's emphasis on peace and security in the Indo-Pacific region during the Asean-India Summit of 2023 underscores the region's growing strategic importance. The Indo-Pacific is not merely a hub of economic growth but also a theater of evolving geopolitical dynamics, marked by competing interests, territorial disputes, and emerging security challenges. In this context, ensuring peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific is of paramount importance to India, with far-reaching implications for its economic interests, strategic objectives, and overall security. India's contribution to regional stability hinges on several key factors.
When considering diplomacy and strategic partnerships, it is suggested to play an active role in promoting peace and security in the Indo-Pacific, India must employ diplomatic means to forge stronger partnerships with Asean countries and other regional actors. Diplomatic engagement is the bedrock of conflict resolution, confidence-building, and creating an environment conducive to peaceful coexistence.
India's diplomatic engagement with Asean nations can serve as a cornerstone for regional stability. By fostering close ties and open lines of communication, India can facilitate dialogues, mediate disputes, and build trust among regional players. As a non-aligned nation with a history of diplomatic finesse, India is well-positioned to act as an impartial intermediary, promoting peaceful resolutions to conflicts in the Indo-Pacific.
In tandem with diplomacy, collaborative security measures are essential for deterring and addressing common security threats in the Indo-Pacific. This includes joint military exercises, intelligence sharing, and the strengthening of defense ties with Asean nations. Building a robust security architecture within the region is critical to addressing emerging challenges effectively.
Engaging in joint military exercises and security drills with Asean countries can foster interoperability among armed forces and enhance the collective capacity to respond to security contingencies. Additionally, sharing intelligence and coordinating efforts can help identify and mitigate emerging threats promptly.
Territorial disputes, particularly in the South China Sea, are significant drivers of instability in the Indo-Pacific. India can play a pivotal role in facilitating dialogue and conflict resolution mechanisms in the region. Given its non-aligned stance, India can serve as an honest broker, advocating for peaceful solutions to these disputes.
India's involvement in regional forums and multilateral organizations like the Asean Regional Forum (ARF) and the East Asia Summit (EAS) provides platforms for constructive dialogue and problem-solving. By actively participating in these forums, India can contribute to shaping a regional environment conducive to conflict resolution and cooperation.
While addressing border security or regional concerns, Prime Minister Modi also highlighted the critical need to ensure peace and security along India's border with Myanmar. This issue holds significant importance not only for bilateral relations but also for broader regional stability. India's approach to addressing this concern involves a multifaceted strategy.
Strengthening border infrastructure, surveillance capabilities, and patrolling along the India-Myanmar border is essential to curbing cross-border illegal activities. These activities, including smuggling and the movement of armed groups, pose security risks and hinder regional stability.
Improved border management can also facilitate better cooperation with Myanmar in addressing shared security challenges. By fortifying the border and enhancing security measures, India can deter potential threats and contribute to the stability of the broader Indo-Pacific region.
Engaging in sustained dialogue with the Myanmar government is crucial to addressing concerns and jointly working toward peace along the border. India's approach should encompass various aspects, including addressing issues related to insurgency, border demarcation, and the movement of refugees and displaced persons. By maintaining open channels of communication and diplomatic engagement with Myanmar, India can collaboratively address security challenges, foster trust, and promote regional stability.
Given the presence of insurgent groups along the India-Myanmar border, robust counterterrorism cooperation is essential. India can collaborate closely with Myanmar in intelligence sharing and coordinated efforts to combat these groups. Additionally, involving Asean countries in such counterterrorism efforts is critical, as some of these insurgent groups have transnational reach. By working collectively, India and Asean nations can effectively address this shared security concern, contributing to overall regional stability.
India can provide diplomatic support for Myanmar's internal peace process. A stable and peaceful Myanmar is not only in India's interest but also contributes to regional stability. By offering diplomatic backing, India can play a constructive role in encouraging Myanmar's efforts toward reconciliation and conflict resolution.
In a nutshell, Prime Minister Narendra Modi's emphasis on ensuring peace and security in the Indo-Pacific region, as highlighted during the Asean-India Summit of 2023, underscores the critical importance of India's role in fostering stability in this dynamic and strategically significant area. India's "Act East Policy" has rightly recognized the Asean nations as central pillars in this endeavour, reflecting the region's pivotal role in India's economic growth, strategic interests, and overall security. To contribute effectively to regional stability, India must employ a multifaceted approach that combines diplomacy, collaborative security measures, and proactive engagement with its neighbours, particularly Myanmar. However, diplomacy remains the cornerstone of conflict resolution and trust-building, and India's history of diplomatic finesse positions it as an impartial intermediary in regional disputes. Collaborative security efforts, such as joint military exercises and intelligence sharing with Asean nations, are essential for addressing common security threats in the Indo-Pacific. Additionally, India can play a pivotal role in facilitating dialogue and conflict resolution mechanisms in territorial disputes, like those in the South China Sea, promoting peaceful solutions.
Furthermore, India's commitment to ensuring peace and security along its border with Myanmar is not just a bilateral concern but also has far-reaching implications for regional stability. Strengthening border infrastructure, sustained dialogue, and counterterrorism cooperation are vital components of India's approach to addressing this concern. By pursuing these strategies and actively engaging with Myanmar, India can contribute to a more secure and stable Indo-Pacific region, aligning with the theme of the Asean-India Summit: "ASEAN Matters: Epicentrum of Growth."..."
Source/publisher:
"The National" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2023-09-17
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, ASEAN-Burma relations, Human Rights and international relations
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Description:
"The Story So Far
There are more than 1 million Rohingya refugees living in the Asia and Pacific region. Most live in Bangladesh, home to the world’s largest and most densely populated refugee settlement. Amidst the pressures of competing global crises and dwindling humanitarian resources,
Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand, have continued to generously host Rohingya refugees. In the absence of a regional response mechanism, Malaysia hosts over 150,000 asylum-seekers and refugees — the vast majority of whom are Rohingya, and Indonesia has stepped in to disembark 10 boatloads of 1,137 Rohingya refugees since December 2021. New initiatives to create third country solutions for Rohingya hosted in the region are being developed. Opportunities to support Rohingya refugees in achieving greater self-reliance and resilience and prepare them for sustainable reintegration when they return home, are being implemented with an incremental expansion of education, portable skills development and livelihoods activities.
A Paradigm Shift is Needed
These initiatives must be scaled up. With limited opportunities to develop self-reliance and lacking prospects for sustainable solutions, Rohingya refugees are risking their lives in search of solutions. In 2022, the region witnessed a 360 per cent increase in maritime movements compared to the previous year. A paradigm shift is however needed, in collaboration with Rohingya communities, to transform the Rohingya response into comprehensive and coordinated action towards achieving sustainable solutions and resilience.
The Multi-Stakeholder Pledge
While the first Global Refugee Forum in 2019 resulted in over 1,400 pledges, only 7 per cent targeted Asia Pacific. Pledges were not only financial. They also included technical support and policy commitments.
The second Global Refugee Forum will be held in Geneva, in December 2023. It is a unique opportunity to put a spotlight on the situation of Rohingya refugees, the imperative to work towards solutions, and sustain the support offered by host countries in the region. At the forum, stakeholders can demonstrate their commitment in support of a multiactor pledge that expands solutions and enhances collective resilience, including through climate action, and as such contributing to peaceful coexistence.
Key elements of this pledge will also contribute to the protection of Rohingya refugees along the SouthEast Asia onward movement route. Recognizing each context within the region has its own specificities, the pledge does not envisage a one-size-fits-all approach.
By combining collective strengths and expertise, this multi-stakeholder pledge has the potential to be truly transformational. Beyond the region, offers of resettlement and complementary pathways are an integral element of an expanding package of solutions, notably for the most vulnerable refugees and for those with no prospect of future return to Myanmar. An increasing number of States in and beyond the region are willing to offer resettlement or complementary pathways through access to higher education opportunities, labour mobility, family reunification and private or community sponsorship; the latter also includes Rohingya diaspora.
A sample of commitments:
• Implementation of 300 quick impact projects in Rakhine State to support the creation of conditions conducive for return.
• 25,000 Rohingya submitted for resettlement consideration each year and 15 pilots initiated to expand complementary pathways.
• Civil registration and legal identity documentation provided in support of solutions.
• Predictable and sustained funding for the humanitarian response.
• Ensuring access to quality education for all Rohingya students in Rakhine and countries of asylum.
• Building refugee resilience so that one refugee in every household is engaged in selfreliance activities, notably skills development, community work and livelihood opportunities.
• Strengthening partnerships with Rohingya-led organizations (RLOs).
• Improving climate resilience through naturebased solutions and eco-disaster risk reduction..."
Source/publisher:
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (Geneva) via Reliefweb (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2023-09-15
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
UNHCR (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees), Discrimination against the Rohingya, Rohingya (cultural, political etc.), Burmese refugees in Bangladesh, Human Rights and international relations
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Description:
"Human Rights Violations took place in States and Regions from Sep 8 to 14, 2023
Military Junta Troop launched airstrikes and dropped bombs in Shan State, Sagaing Region, and Bago Region from September 8th to 14th. The local civilians were arrested and used as human shields in Mandalay Region and Kachin State. A woman from Mogaung was arrested, tortured, and killed under interrogation by the Junta in Kachin State. Military Junta’s navy attacked with heavy and light artillery the villages along the river in Thabeikkyin Township, Mandalay Region including Salingyi Township and Kani Township from Sagaing Region.
About 13 civilians died and over 19 were injured by the Military Junta Soldiers’ light and heavy artillery attacks. Over 70 civilians were arrested within a week. 3 underaged children died by the Military Junta Soldiers’ Human Right Abuses and Violations..."
Source/publisher:
Network for Human Rights Documentation-Burma
Date of entry/update:
2023-09-15
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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Format :
pdf pdf pdf
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4.91 MB 5.11 MB 122.81 KB
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Description:
"WEEKLY HIGHLIGHTS:
In the South-East, the number of IDPs increased from 518,700 from last week to 523,900 this week.
In Bago (East) Region, ongoing fighting forced 5,400 IDPs from Phyu to be displaced within their communities. Among them, 1,600 IDPs were displaced to Kyauktaga Township and 3,800 IDPs were displaced within Phyu Township.
In Kayin State, 25 IDPs from Hpapun Township were displaced within the same township in light of the intensified fighting in their area.
In Mon State, the ongoing conflict led to the displacement of over 200 IDPs for the second time in Kyaikto Township. However, during the reporting period, som 200 IDPs returned to their place of origin in Billin Township.
Across the border, about 8,400 people from Myanmar remain displaced in Mae Hong Son Province, Thailand..."
Source/publisher:
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (Geneva) via Reliefweb (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2023-09-15
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
UNHCR (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees), Human Rights and international relations, Burma: Internal displacement/forced migration of several ethnic groups.
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921.25 KB
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Sub-title:
Civil society groups call on Canadian and UK government bodies to help ensure that MTI Energy does not uphold Chevron’s legacy of bankrolling atrocity crimes.
Description:
"September 14, 2023, Today, EarthRights International and a Myanmar civil society organization submitted a complaint to the National Contact Points of Canada and the United Kingdom asserting that Canadian company MTI is engaging in acts of corruption and contributing to human rights atrocities in Myanmar in breach of guidelines established by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).
The OECD Guidelines are a leading global standard used by multinational corporations worldwide to inform their human rights, anti-corruption, and environmental practices. Many governments belonging to the OECD, including Canada and the U.K., have established National Contact Points that accept complaints about breaches of the Guidelines.
The U.K. and Canada have also repeatedly raised concerns about the Myanmar military’s use of stolen natural resource revenues to fund the military’s atrocities. MTI Energy is going into business with the junta through the Myanma Oil and Gas Enterprise, whose offices were seized by the military early in the coup.
While MTI Energy is registered in Canada, its purchase is being made through a subsidiary registered in Bermuda. Bermuda is a British Overseas Territory and implements U.K. sanctions. MTI Energy is set to take over from Chevron and become the largest shareholder in Myanmar’s Yadana gas project, which earns the junta tens of millions of dollars monthly. The company appears likely to use its substantial management powers to ensure that it and the junta can sell off Myanmar’s state assets, funding the junta’s atrocities. This leaves MTI Energy in breach of the OECD Guidelines.
“MTI Energy has not consulted with communities or civil society in Myanmar that are directly affected by their investment,” said John Doe, a representative of the civil society group, which wishes to remain anonymous for security reasons. “If they had, we’d have told them their pipeline cuts through communities torn apart by civil war, and they will be funding one side of it. The junta is not our government and is using gas revenues to rain bombs from jet planes on our communities.”
MTI Energy can only enter Myanmar’s gas sector by signing contracts with the Government of Myanmar. The United Nations General Assembly has refused to recognize the junta as the government, and Myanmar’s Ambassador to the U.N. instead answers to Myanmar’s National Unity Government.
“In January, Robert Rae, Canada’s Ambassador to the U.N., gave opening remarks during the launch of a U.N. report on why the junta is not the legitimate Government of Myanmar. MTI Energy is planning to treat the military junta as if it were the recognized government so it can profit from Myanmar’s methane gas exports,” said EarthRights Director of Strategy and Campaigns, Keith Slack.
The complaint to the OECD National Contact Points calls on MTI Energy to comply with the OECD Guidelines, including by ensuring that it can use its leverage, either alone or in cooperation with other investors, to divert gas revenues away from the junta. If it cannot, it will contribute to the junta’s atrocity crimes.
“Canada’s National Contact Point (NCP) sits in the office of Global Affairs Canada. As GAC considers whether to finally follow the EU’s lead and impose sanctions on Myanmar gas revenues, we’d hope that the NCP staff might wander down the hall and highlight that MTI Energy is entering a corrupt joint venture with Myanmar’s brutal military junta that will fund airstrikes on school and hospitals,” added Keith Slack.
Just this month, the junta targeted a school and a church in Karen state, killing four students and a teacher. “MTI Energy has completely ignored its responsibilities under the OECD Guidelines by entering into business that contributes to the junta’s atrocities. MTI has so far refused to communicate with Myanmar civil society, and I hope the OECD National Contact Points will provide an avenue for us to resolve our serious concerns about MTI’s investment. MTI’s irresponsible entry into Myanmar is enabled by the failure of the UK and Canadian governments to sanction Myanma Oil and Gas Enterprise. I urge them to now take action and block gas funds to the junta,” concluded John Doe..."
Source/publisher:
Earth Rights International
Date of entry/update:
2023-09-14
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Oil and gas, Human Rights and international relations
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Source/publisher:
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (Geneva) via Reliefweb (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2023-09-14
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
UNHCR (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees), Human Rights and international relations, Burma: Internal displacement/forced migration of several ethnic groups.
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Format :
pdf
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946.13 KB
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Description:
"အကြမ်းဖက်မှုတိုက်ဖျက်ရေးဥပဒေနှင့်အညီ စစ်ကောင်စီလက်အောက်ခံ ဗဟိုဘဏ်၏ ဝန်ထမ်းများအား အကြမ်းဖက်သမားများအဖြစ်သတ်မှတ်ကြေညာခြင်း
အကြမ်းဖက်မှုတိုက်ဖျက်ရေးဗဟိုအဖွဲ့သည် အကြမ်းဖက်မှုတိုက်ဖျက်ရေး ဥပဒေပုဒ်မ ၆။ ပုဒ်မခွဲ (င)နှင့် ပုဒ်မ ၇၂။ ပုဒ်မခွဲ(ခ)ပါ လုပ်ပိုင်ခွင့်ကို ကျင့်သုံး၍ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေး အစိုးရ၏ သဘောတူညီချက်ဖြင့် ဤအမိန့်ကြော်ငြာစာကို ထုတ်ပြန်လိုက်သည်။
၁။ အကြမ်းဖက်မှုတိုက်ဖျက်ရေးဥပဒေအရ အကြမ်းဖက်အုပ်စုအဖြစ် ကြေညာထားခြင်း ခံရသည့် တရားမဝင် အာဏာသိမ်းစစ်ကောင်စီသည် ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ်၊ ဖေဖော်ဝါရီလမှစတင်၍ ယနေ့အထိ ဒီမိုကရေစီအရေးလှုပ်ရှားသူနှင့် အရပ်သားပြည်သူများအား မတရားဖမ်းဆီးခြင်း ၊ ညှင်းပမ်းနှိပ်စက်ခြင်း၊ ထောင်သွင်းအကျဉ်းချခြင်း၊ လိင်ပိုင်းဆိုင်ရာအကြမ်းဖက်ခြင်း၊ သတ်ဖြတ်ခြင်း၊ လူမျိုးတုန်းသတ်ဖြတ်ခြင်း၊ ပြည်သူ့ဘဏ္ဍာငွေဖြင့် ဝယ်ယူထားသော လက်နက်ငယ်များ၊ လက်နက်ကြီးများ၊ စစ်မြေပြင်သုံးတိုက်လေယာဉ်များအား အသုံးပြု၍ စာသင်ကျောင်းများ၊ ကျေးရွာများ၊ ကလေးသူငယ်များ၊ အရပ်သားလူစုလူဝေးများအား ဗုံးကြဲ တိုက်ခိုက်ခြင်း ၊ လက်နက်ကြီးများနှင့် တိုက်ခိုက်ခြင်း အစရှိသည့် အကြမ်းဖက်လုပ်ရပ် များနှင့် လူသားမျိုးနွယ်တစ်ခုလုံးကို ထိခိုက်စေသည့် စစ်ရာဇဝတ်မှုမြောက်သည့် ပြစ်မှုများကို အကြိမ်ကြိမ် ကျူးလွန်ခဲ့ပြီး ဆက်လက်၍လည်း ကျူးလွန်လျက်ရှိသည်။
၂။ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ ၊ လူ့အခွင့်အရေးဆိုင်ရာဝန်ကြီးဌာန နှင့် Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (Burma) – AAPP တို့၏ စာရင်းဇယားများအရ ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ် ၊ ဖေဖော်ဝါရီလ (၁) ရက်နေ့မှ ၂၀၂၃ ခုနှစ် ၊ စက်တင်ဘာလ (၈) ရက်နေ့အထိ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီနှင့် ၎င်း၏အမိန့်နာခံသူများ၏ လက်ချက်ဖြင့် ဒီမိုကရေစီအရေး လှုပ်ရှားသူနှင့် အရပ်သားပြည်သူ (၄,၀၅၆) ဦး အသက်ဆုံးရှုံးခဲ့ပြီး (၂၄,၇၄၀) ဦး အဖမ်းဆီး ခံခဲ့ရကာ ယင်းတို့အနက် (၁၉၄၄၇) ဦးမှာ ထောင်သွင်း အကျဉ်းချခံရဆဲဖြစ်ပြီး (၇,၂၉၉) ဦးမှာ မတရား ပြစ်ဒဏ်ချမှတ်ခံထားရပါသည်။ ကျေးရွာ (၂၀၂၉) ရွာ၊ ရပ်ကွက် (၇၃) ခု၊ အိမ်ခြေပေါင်း (၇၅၉၂၀) ခု၊ ဆေးရုံ ဆေးခန်းများ၊ စာသင်ကျောင်းများ၊ ဘာသာရေးအဆောက်အဦးများ အပါအဝင်အဆောက် အဦးပေါင်း (၁၃၅) ခု တို့မှာ စစ်ကောင်စီ မှ မီးရှို့ဖျက်ဆီးခြင်းခံထားရပြီး မီးရှို့သတ်ဖြတ်ခံရသူဦးရေ (၃၃၄) ဦးထိရှိလာသည့်အပြင် ( ၁.၉ သန်းကျော် ) ဦးမှာ စစ်ဘေး ရှောင်ဘဝဖြင့် နေရပ်၊ အိုးအိမ်စွန့်ခွာ ထွက်ပြေးနေရပါသည်။
၃။ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီအနေဖြင့် အထက်အပိုဒ် (၁) နှင့် (၂) ပါ အကြမ်းဖက်လုပ်ရပ် များကို ကျူးလွန်နိုင်ရေးအတွက် ဘဏ္ဍာငွေအထောက်အပံ့၊ ငွေကြေးစီးဆင်းမှု ၊ နိုင်ငံခြား တိုင်းပြည်များမှ လေယာဉ်ဆီအပါအဝင် လူအများအပြားသေကြေပျက်စီးနိုင်သည့် လက်နက်များဝယ်ယူခြင်း အစရှိသည်တို့တွင် စစ်ကောင်စီလက်အောက်ခံ ဗဟိုဘဏ်၏ ဝန်ထမ်းများသည် အဓိကကြံရာပါများအဖြစ် ပါဝင်လျက်ရှိသည်။ စစ်ကောင်စီလက်အောက်ခံ ဗဟိုဘဏ်၏ ဥက္ကဌဆိုသူမှစ၍ အောက်အဆင့်ဆင့် ဝန်ထမ်းကြီး၊ အလတ်၊ အငယ်များသည် အောက်ပါလုပ်ငန်းများကို ကျင့်ဝတ်နှင့် ဆောင်ရွက်ရမည့်တာဝန် ဝတ္တရားများနှင့်သွေဖည်ပြီး မလျော်ဩဇာသုံး၍ ကျူးလွန်နေသောကြောင့် ပြည်သူလူထုအပေါ် ကြီးမားပြင်းထန်သော ဆိုးကျိုးများ ဖြစ်ပေါ်စေခဲ့ပါသည်။
(က) ဗဟိုဘဏ်တစ်ခုအနေဖြင့် နိုင်ငံ၏အခြေအနေနှင့် ကိုက်ညီပြီး ပြည်တွင်း ဈေးနှုန်းတည်ငြိမ်ရေးကိုရရှိစေမည့်ငွေကြေးမူဝါဒကိုချမှတ်၍ အကောင်အထည်ဖော်မှု မရှိခြင်း၊ ယင်းအစား ပြည်တွင်းသုံးငွေကြေး (မြန်မာကျပ်) အား အမြောက်အများ ရိုက်ထုတ်ခဲ့ပြီး အကြမ်းဖက်အုပ်စုအတွက် အဓိကငွေကြေးထောက်တိုင်များအဖြစ် ဆောင်ရွက်ခဲ့ခြင်း၊ ယင်း၏ အကျိုးဆက်အဖြစ် အဆမတန် ငွေကြေးဖောင်းပွမှုကြောင့် ပြည်သူများ ကုန်ဈေးနှုန်းကြီးမြင့်သည့်ဒဏ်ကို ခံစားကြရခြင်း၊
(ခ) မိမိကိုင်တွယ်ကျင့်သုံးရမည့် ဥပဒေများအား
ဥပက္ခာပြု၍ နိုင်ငံခြားငွေကြေး ဈေးကွက်ကို အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီအလိုကျ ချယ်လှယ်၊ ဆောင်ရွက်ခွင့်ပြုသဖြင့် နိုင်ငံခြားငွေလဲလှယ်နှုန်း မတည်မငြိမ်ဖြစ်ပြီး မြန်မာကျပ်ငွေတန်ဘိုး အဆမတန် ကျဆင်းခြင်း၊ နောက်ဆက်တွဲအနေဖြင့် အခြေခံလူသုံးကုန်၊ ဆေးဝါး အပါအဝင် လူသုံးကုန်ပစ္စည်းများ ရှားပါးပြတ်လပ်လာခြင်း၊
(ဂ) ဗဟိုဘဏ်တစ်ခုအနေဖြင့် ပြည်သူ့ကိုယ်စား စီမံခန့်ခွဲရမည့် နိုင်ငံ၏ နိုင်ငံခြားသုံးသီးသန့်ငွေများအား အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီအတွက် နိုင်ငံခြား တိုင်းပြည်များမှ လေယာဉ်ဆီအပါအဝင် လူအများအပြား သေကြေပျက်စီးနိုင်သည့် လက်နက်များ ဝယ်ယူရာတွင်အသုံးပြုခြင်း၊ ပြည်သူပိုင်ငွေကို တလွဲ အသုံးပြုခြင်း။
၄။ အထက်ပါ လုပ်ရပ်များကို ကျူးလွန်ခြင်းသည် အကြမ်းဖက်မှုတိုက်ဖျက်ရေးဥပဒေ ပုဒ်မ ၃။ ပုဒ်မခွဲ(ပ) ပါ အကြမ်းဖက်သမား ဆိုသည်မှာ အကြမ်းဖက်မှုတစ်ခုခုကို တိုက်ရိုက် ဖြစ်စေ၊ သွယ်ဝိုက်၍ဖြစ်စေ ဥပဒေနှင့်မညီဘဲ တစ်နည်းနည်းဖြင့်ကျူးလွန်သူ သို့မဟုတ် ကျူးလွန်ရန်အားထုတ်သူကိုသော်လည်းကောင်း၊ အကြမ်းဖက်မှုတွင် ကြံရာပါအဖြစ်ပါဝင်သူ သို့မဟုတ် အကြမ်းဖက်မှုကျူးလွန်ရန် အခြားသူများအားညွှန်ကြားသူ သို့မဟုတ် စည်းရုံး သိမ်းသွင်းသူကိုသော်လည်း ကောင်း၊ အကြမ်းဖက်မှု ကျူးလွန်နိုင်ရန် ရည်ရွယ်ချက်ဖြင့် ပါဝင် ထောက်ပံ့သူကိုသော်လည်းကောင်း ဆိုသည်ဟူသော အဓိပ္ပာယ်ဖွင့်ဆိုချက်နှင့် ကိုက်ညီလျက် ရှိကြောင်း တွေ့ရှိရသည်။
၅။ သို့ပါ၍ အောက်ဖော်ပြပါ လူပုဂ္ဂိုလ်များအား အကြမ်းဖက်သမားများအဖြစ် သတ်မှတ်ကြေညာလိုက်သည်။
၆။ ဤအမိန့်ကြော်ငြာစာဖြင့် အကြမ်းဖက်သမားများအဖြစ် သတ်မှတ်ကြေညာခြင်း ခံရသူများအား အကြမ်းဖက်မှုတိုက်ဖျက်ရေးဥပဒေ၊ အခန်း(၁၄) ပါ ပြဌာန်းချက်များနှင့်အညီ အရေးယူဆောင်ရွက်သွားမည်ဖြစ်သည်။..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2023-09-14
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National Unity Government (NUG), Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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"Asean has been much criticised over its failure to effectively respond to the crisis in Myanmar that was triggered by the military junta seizing power in the February 2021 coup. Thus, the deliberations of its leaders in Jakarta last week, and the subsequent release and implications of its “review and decision” statement, are under scrutiny.
Many, especially the long-suffering people of Myanmar and humanitarian organisations on the ground, would not see this as a sign of tangible resolution, and they would be right. Yet the decisions reached indicate greater cohesion among different member states on how to move forward and, more importantly, in not yielding to the demands of the junta. The following from the nine decisions bear particular importance.
First, the group was more direct in its condemnation of the post-coup violence which has driven the country down a path of civil conflict and humanitarian tragedy, and the failure of all parties to de-escalate the violence. The Tatmadaw’s indiscriminate use of force was particularly singled out for criticism, which only selected Asean member states had previously done.
Second, Asean agreed to the formation of an informal troika made up of the incumbent, immediate past and incoming chairs to coordinate a more comprehensive management of Myanmar. This means that Asean’s next chair Laos, one of its smallest and least developed states, can count on the support of Indonesia and Malaysia on Myanmar-related matters, lessening the strain on other chair-related duties. This approach also draws lessons from Asean’s efforts to engage different stakeholders in Cambodia before its eventual admission to the regional grouping in the late 1990s.
Third and most importantly, Asean’s leaders upheld their decision to disallow the junta’s participation at the Asean Summit and Foreign Ministers meeting and did not entertain the junta’s preference to “voluntarily defer” its role as Asean chair in 2026.
The leaders decided instead that the Philippines will take on the role after Malaysia, and the rotation continue alphabetically until a different decision is made. This effectively blocks Myanmar from assuming its chairmanship for at least another decade and the international recognition that comes with it. The opportunity for non-political participation remains should Myanmar wish to take it.
It is also notable, given the division among Asean member states over how to proceed on the situation in Myanmar and its current rulers, that the decisions above were endorsed by all Asean leaders, including by those countries that were either friendly or indifferent to the junta. Such is the loss of goodwill among Asean member states that the belligerence of the generals in Naypyidaw has achieved.
That said, progress in this Asean summit is frankly measured by the lack of deterioration, rather than stagnation. Looking ahead, there are long-term considerations that Asean must keep in mind.
The organisation must remain resolute in not being held hostage by the junta’s schemes or threats, and the indifference of some member states. The voices of members like Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore and the Philippines are important here, especially in adding heft to the organisation when lethargy sets in.
Asean must also be consistent in its messaging and action that it is the junta – rather than Myanmar or its people – that is being targeted. It would be self-defeating for Asean to further lose the trust of the people of Myanmar.
Closely related to that, Asean must find alternative pathways to engage multiple stakeholders in Myanmar to prepare the ground for a political solution. A crucial aspect in this is for Asean to engage all major stakeholders in Myanmar, including the Tatmadaw and National Unity Government.
The lessons of Cambodia are again relevant here, where different member states and organisations can engage different stakeholders on various tracks. Such efforts, however, must be sanctioned by the troika and Asean as a whole.
There must also be targeted and concentrated efforts to get dialogue partners, especially those who have influence with Naypyidaw like India, China, Japan and South Korea, involved in influencing the different stakeholders in Myanmar.
Given Asean’s structural limitations, it can only effectively play a role if all parties in Myanmar are prepared to allow it. Many, including this author, argued in the weeks following the coup that things were liable to get worse, and Asean must be prepared for the long haul.
The Five-Point Consensus is just a starting point, and an imperfect one at that. The decisions reached in Jakarta, while commendable, are far from the endgame or even the midpoint.
While it cannot fully act to improve the situation, Asean must not fail to act to prevent further deterioration within the spheres that it does have a say in.
Thomas Daniel is a Senior Fellow with the Institute of Strategic & International Studies (ISIS) Malaysia..."
Source/publisher:
"South China Morning Post"
Date of entry/update:
2023-09-13
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Human Rights and international relations
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"Documented incidents
23 August 2023: In Aungmyaythazan town, Mandalay city and region, an Optometrist, his wife, and son were arrested by junta security forces and authorities from their home, and their optometry clinic and house sealed/confiscated. They were charged with anti-terrorism laws. Sources:
Chindwin News Agency, Delta News Agency, Eleven Media Group and Radio Free Asia
As reported on 23 August 2023: In Yangon city, district and region, a military doctor was given a death sentence by the Military Court of Myanmar. He was arrested in May 2023 for sharing political posts on his social media and charged with the Defence Act Section 32. Sources: Ayeyarwaddy Times, Democratic Voice of Burma and Myaelatt Athan
24 August 2023: In Ther Thaw Mu – Ther Thaw Kwar village, Kyaukkyi township, Nyaunglebin district, Bago region, a clinic was damaged by bombs dropped from the Myanmar military jet fighters. Sources: Karen Information Centre and Mizzima As reported on 24 August 2023: INGO funding to four private clinics providing free-of-charge cleft-lip/ cleft-palate repair surgery was confiscated by the junta. Source: Khit Thit Media
24 August 2023: In Dauk Yat village and village tract, Bilin township, Kyaikto district, Mon state, a non-functioning hospital occupied by the Myanmar military was attacked by the KNLA and local resistance forces, killing and injuring Myanmar military soldiers. Sources: Burma Human Rights Network, Delta News Agency and Karen Information Centre
28 August 2023: In Kanpetlet township, Mindat district, Chin state, 60 health workers were blacklisted by the local government bodies since they were not affiliated with CDM. Sources:
Khonumthung Burmese, Mizzima and Myanmar Pressphoto Agency
29 August 2023: In Zee Taw village and village tract, Shwebo township and district, Sagaing region, a health centre occupied by the local resistance forces was raided by the Myanmar military who seized improvised firearm and explosive devices, local resistance force uniforms, medicines, and vehicles. Sources: Myaelatt Athan and Telegram
29 August 2023: In Zee Taw village and village tract, Shwebo township and district, Sagaing region, an improvised explosive device was detonated at a health centre by the local resistance forces when the Myanmar military entered the facility. Source: Myaelatt Athan
As reported on 29 August 2023: In Tachileik town, township, and district, Shan state, a doctor was arrested by the junta police force while on her way to Thailand. She was affiliated with the CDM and reportedly did not have official documents for international travel. Source: Telegram..."
Source/publisher:
Insecurity Insight (Geneva) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
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2023-09-13
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Anti-Personnel Landmines - Specialist organisations and commentary, Human Rights and international relations
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"Key Event Details
Date, time and location of Incidents:
Airstrikes — 22 June 2023: Li Khu Pa Yar village (လီခူပရား), Hpruso Township (ဖရူဆို), Kayah state (ကယား/ကရင်နီ ပြည်နယ်), [19.288804, 96.968735].
K-8 plane crash — 30 June 2023: Ywar Thit sub-township (ရွာသစ်), Bawlakhe (ဘော်လခဲ), Kayah state (ကယား/ကရင်နီ ပြည်နယ်), [19.135286,97.520772].
Airstrikes — 9 July 2023: Hpasawng township (ဖားဆောင်းမြို့), Kayah state (ကယား/ကရင်နီ ပြည်နယ်), [18.833424, 97.323086].
Airstrikes — 12 July 2023: Daw Noe Ku Internally Displaced Persons Camp (IDP) (ဒေါနိုကူး စစ်ရှောင်စခန်း) Shadaw township (ရှားတောမြို့), Kayah state (ကယား/ကရင်နီ ပြည်နယ်), [19.32696180, 97.8187087].
Airstrikes — 12 July 2023: Hpasawng township (ဖားဆောင်းမြို့), Kayah state (ကယား/ကရင်နီ ပြည်နယ်), [18.833068, 97.324233].
Airstrikes — 12 July 2023: Kyauk Su village (ကျောက်စု), Mese township (မယ်စဲ့မြို့), Kayah state (ကယား/ကရင်နီ ပြည်နယ်), [18.769276, 97.389804].
Clashes and airstrikes — 18 July 2023: Yar Do village (ယာဒို), Thantaunggyi township (သံတောင်ကြီး), Kayin State (ကရင် ပြည်နယ်), [19.358822, 96.802461].
Airstrikes — 26 July 2023: Kyauk Su village middle school, Mese township (မယ်စဲ့မြို့), Kayah state (ကယား/ကရင်နီ ပြည်နယ်), [18.769715, 97.3873880].
Alleged Perpetrator(s) and/or Involvement:
Myanmar Air Force (MAF)
Myanmar military
State Administrative Council (SAC)
People's Defence Forces (PDF)
Summary
After the February 2021 coup d'état, Kayah state has been the site of clashes between the Myanmar military and People's Defence Forces (PDF). The Myanmar military has struggled to exert and maintain control on the ground, and has taken to using airstrikes on areas of resistance. This has resulted in damage to not only PDF camps, but also IDP camps and residential areas. During July 2023, multiple Myanmar Air Force (MAF) airstrikes were reported in Kayah state. Myanmar Witness has investigated these events and geolocated user-generated content (UGC) purporting to show the different incidents.
According to claims made in local media reports, the Myanmar military has conducted air and ground offensives to regain control of Mase town (မယ်စဲ့) in Kayah state (ကယား/ကရင်နီ) on the Thai-Myanmar border, as well as offensives in Hpasawng township, which sits on the banks of the Salwin River (သံလွင်မြစ်). Resistance groups reported daily battles, which have led to more than 3,500 people fleeing the area and crossing the border into Thailand, where Thailand's Mae Hong Son Inspection Department has been sheltering them.
Myanmar Witness has identified UGC associated with a number of claimed airstrikes in Kayah state in late June and July 2023. On 22 June, the MAF reportedly carried out three airstrikes on Li Khu Pa Yar village, Hpruso Township, damaging four homes and a school and leaving a middle-aged man with significant injuries. On 30 June, a MAF K-8 light attack aircraft reportedly crashed in Ywar Thit sub-township, Bawlakhe. Accounts vary over whether the plane crashed due to bad weather or whether Karenni/Kayah PDF shot down the plane. However, this places a MAF plane which has the capacity to carry out airstrikes in the vicinity during the timeframe when airstrikes were reported.
On 9 July, it was reported that the MAF carried out airstrikes in Hpasawng township (video no longer available online, however it was previously archived by Myanmar Witness). Myanmar Witness captured a still image from a video of the airstrike and used peakvisor to verify the location. Further airstrikes were reported in Kyauk Pe Nyo village, Hpasawng township, on 12 July. Myanmar Witness geolocated footage showing buildings that were allegedly damaged in the strikes. This was done by stitching together a panorama from video footage uploaded to social media and cross-referencing it with satellite imagery.
Two other airstrikes were also reported on the same day. At around 0102 local time on 12 July 2023, it is reported that the MAF bombed an Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) camp on the Kayah/Karenni-Thai border, killing a 10-year-old child and seriously injuring others. The airstrike also allegedly damaged houses which were sheltering IDPs who had already fled conflict elsewhere in the country. Myanmar Witness geolocated UGC showing the camp before and after the alleged airstrike.
Additionally, an 11-year-old child and an IDP were reportedly killed in an airstrike in Kyauk Su village, Mese township, also on 12 July 2023. Although Myanmar Witness could not independently confirm the number of deaths, it was possible to geolocate the site of the airstrike using UGC. According to a Facebook user, a middle school in the same village, Kyauk Su, was also bombed on 26 July 2023 (source redacted due to privacy concerns). Although Myanmar Witness could not confirm the exact date, the location was verified.
Finally, following a ground battle on 18 July 2023 near Yar Do village, Thantaunggyi township, the MAF allegedly carried out an airstrike. Myanmar Witness have analysed a video purporting to show the event and was able to verify the location of the airstrike.
While efforts have been taken to collect as much information as possible on airstrikes in Kayah state over this time period, a number of other airstrikes reportedly took place in the region during this timeframe which Myanamr Witness were unable to verify or partially verify.
Myanmar Witness has been able to verify:
Myanmar Witness geolocated imagery posted on Facebook showing extensive destruction to structures in Li Khu Pa Yar village (လီခူပရား), Hpruso township (ဖရူဆို), Kayah state (ကယား/ကရင်နီ ပြည်နယ်)
Myanmar Witness geolocated drone footage which purports to show the aftermath of a K-8 plane crash Ywar Thit sub-township (ရွာသစ်), Bawlakhe (ဘော်လခဲ), Kayah state (ကယား/ကရင်နီ ပြည်နယ်)
Myanmar Witness geolocated footage showing buildings that were allegedly damaged in the strikes in Hpasawng township (ဖားဆောင်းမြို့).
Myanmar Witness geolocated UGC showing the Daw Noe Ku IDP Camp (ဒေါနို့ကူးစစ်ရှောင်စခန်း) before and after the alleged airstrike and verified damage to structures there which is consistent with airstrike damage.
Myanmar Witness geolocated UGC showing damage consistent with airstrikes in Kyauk Su village (ကျောက်စု) Mese township (မယ်စဲ့မြို့), Kayah state (ကယား/ကရင်နီ ပြည်နယ်)
Myanmar Witness geolocated video footage showing airstrikes in Yar Do village, Thantaunggyi township (သံတောင်ကြီး), Kayin State (ကရင် ပြည်နယ်).
Clashes prior to the airstrikes
It is reported that three SAC camps and the Mese police station in Mese township (မယ်စဲ့မြို့), Kayah state (ကယား/ကရင်နီ), were attacked simultaneously by local PDF on 13 June 2023, between 0500 and 1000 local time. According to the Karenni Military Central Information Organisation (KMIC), the three camps included Taung Hla (တောင်လှ) camp near Taung Hla village (တောင်လှရွာ), Meltangwe camp (မယ်လနွယ်) and the Myanmar-Thailand border post Number 14 on the east bank of the Salwin River (သံလွင်မြစ်) in Mese Township. At present, Myanmar Witness has not geolocated the camps.
Approximately 40 automatic rifles were recovered from the three SAC camps, according to a KMIC spokesperson responsible for publishing the Karenni Army's (KA) military news. Additionally, the township police chief was reportedly killed at the Mese police station during the clashes.
Clashes reportedly continued until the 25 June, when according to multiple sources, the entire SAC Light Infantry Battalion (LIB) 430 — made up of approximately 100 personnel, including Lieutenant Colonel Zana Aung and Deputy Battalion Commander Kyaw Thu Soe — surrendered to the Karenni joint forces from Mese Byuha Gone Military Camp no. 13. However, the surrender was contested by SAC sources.
The area has been the site of previous conflict; other Light Infantry Divisions (LIDs) and LIBs have operated in Kayah state. For example, following the coup, the LID 66 and its 10 subordinate battalions reportedly moved to west Bago (ပဲခူး), Thegon Township (သဲကုန််းမြို့), Kayah state. In September 2021, intense fighting between Karenni resistance forces and LID 66 reportedly led to heavy casualties. The struggle for control of Kayah state has continued since then, with the SAC increasing the use of air attacks in recent months. Loikaw, Demoso, Hpasawng, Mese, and Bawlakhe townships have come under fire and IDPs on the Kayah state/Thailand border have also been put at risk from airstrikes.
Timeline of events
The investigation walkthrough
Airstrikes in Hpruso Township
On 22 June 2023, at 0030, the MAF reportedly carried out three airstrikes on Li Khu Pa Yar village (လီခူပရား), Hpruso Township. Four homes and a school were allegedly damaged by the airstrikes, and a middle-aged man suffered significant injuries to his chest. The village houses a population of roughly 200 people, within 40 houses and has poor transportation links. According to the Hpruso PDF, there was no fighting going on in the immediate area when the MAF bombed the village and its surroundings.
Myanmar Witness geolocated imagery posted on Karenni’s Voice’s facebook page, which shows extensive destruction to structures in the village [19.288804, 96.968735].
K-8 light attack aircraft crash
On 30 June 2023, a MAF K-8 light attack aircraft reportedly crashed in Ywar Thit sub-township, Bawlakhe (tail number 3935). According to Myanmar Now, pro-SAC media channels claimed that the K-8 crashed because of bad weather and that the two pilots were still missing. However, Karenni/Kayah PDF claimed they shot down the plane. For example, the former SAC Border Guard Forces, Ka-La-La-Ta (ကရင်နီပြည်လူမျိုး ပေါင်းစုံပြည် သူ့ လွတ် မြောက် ရေးတပ်ဦး - ကလလတ) — a group which recently defected and joined the Karenni/Kayah resistance forces — claimed that they had fired weapons at the aircraft while it was flying at low altitude.
The news of a K-8 crashing went viral on social media and on 5 July 2023, Ka-La-La-Ta facebook page posted drone footage purporting to show the crash site. According to the Khit Thit, Ka-La-La-Ta and local PDF repeatedly tried to take pictures using drones of the plane wreckage, located in the forest in the eastern part of Ywar Thit village; however, it was difficult to get a clear view and the site was heavily guarded by the SAC. As a result, drone footage was only possible from a distance (see figure 3 below). While markings on the ground suggest a crash could have taken place here, there is no visible sign of debris from the plane. Reports suggest that SAC personnel, who arrived quickly at the scene, cleared away all debris of the plane.
The two pilots — Captain Thaw Zin and Captain Aung Phyo Kyaw — were posthumously awarded the rank of captain by SAC leader, Min Aung Hlaing, according to an official press release from the Department of War of Ka-La-La-Ta on 23 July. Khit Thit Media reported that the pilots were given awards of “Hero’s Degree” and “Hero Record Seal” as per SAC Order No. 125/2023. This corroborates claims that a K-8 light attack aircraft was active in the area and crashed.
Airstrikes in Hpasawng township
On 9 July, at 1740 local time, a MAF fighter jet reportedly bombed Kyauk Pe Nyo Village in Hpasawng Township, destroying a monastery. Two people were allegedly hurt during the attack. Myanmar Witness was unable to independently verify the casualties; however, the location of the attack was verified using a still image from a video of the airstrike posted on social media and peakvisor.
It is reported that the MAF also carried out airstrikes in Hpasawng township on 12 July 2023. Myanmar Witness identified video footage purporting to show the aftermath of the airstrike and associated damage. This was stitched together to form a panorama of the scene, which was then geolocated and cross-referenced with satellite imagery. The video shows significant damage to buildings and religious sites in the area.
Airstrike on IDP camp
At around 0102 local time on 12 July, it is reported that the Myanmar Air Force bombed an IDP camp on the Karenni-Thai border, killing a 10-year-old child, seriously injuring others and damaging houses. Myanmar Witness has been unable to independently verify the casualties. The camp was housing a population of more than 5,000 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) who had already fled conflict elsewhere in the country. These individuals are in need of shelter and food assistance.
Images of the airstrike’s aftermath published by the media and local civil society organisations’ pages were identified and geolocated by Myanmar Witness, as well as UGC showing the site before and after the airstrike allegedly took place. Through this process, Myanmar Witness has identified that the events took place at the Daw Noe Ku IDP Camp, in Shadaw township, Kayah state and confirmed the camps location at [19.32696180, 97.8187087].
According to UGC, a middle school in the same village, Kyauk Su, was also bombed on 26 July 2023 (source redacted due to privacy concerns). Although Myanmar Witness could not confirm the exact date, the location was verified.
Clashes and airstrike in Thantaunggyi township
A fierce battle was reported on the morning of 18 July 2023 near Yar Do village, Thantaunggyi township. Soon after 0900, the MAF allegedly carried out an airstrike on the village. The airstrike was captured in a video posted on Facebook by the Kantarawaddy Times, and can be seen at 0.08 seconds. Myanmar Witness was able to verify the location of the airstrike.
Additional unverified airstrikes
While efforts have been taken to collect as much information as possible on airstrikes in Kayah state over this time period, a number of other airstrikes reportedly took place in the region during this timeframe which Myanamr Witness were unable to verify or partially verify. For example, on 1 June 2023, the Kayan Thit (ကယန်းသစ်) Security Gate in the western part of Mobye Township (မိုးဗြဲ) was reportedly hit by an airstrike. Additionally, on 14 June around 2125 local time, it is claimed that the Myanmar military fired at least 15 rounds of heavy weapons into the Mobye military camp. The following day, at 0200 local time, an airstrike was reported. Myanmar Witness will continue to look for more information on these events, and others in the area, in order to verify their occurrence.
Future monitoring
Kayah state has been the site of conflict since the February 2021 coup. Like other regions in Myanmar, the conflict is escalating and the use of airstrikes has become commonplace. Both Karenni resistance fighters and civilians have been caught up in the attacks.
Myanmar Witness continues to monitor, document and investigate human rights violations, as well as SAC activity, in Kayah state. The impact of attacks on locations used by civilians, including IDP camps, must also be monitored.
Abbreviations
Border Guard Forces - BGF
Internally Displaced Peoples - IDPs
Myanmar Air Force - MAF
People’s Defence Force - PDF
Security Administrative Council - SAC
User-generated Content - UGC
Light Infantry Division - LID..."
Source/publisher:
Myanmar Witness
Date of entry/update:
2023-09-12
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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"The Karen Women’s Organisation condemns the Burmese military continued airstrikes and indiscriminate shelling targeting civilians which has been ongoing this month. These attacks have killed and wounded at least 30 civilians mostly women and children. The recent aggressive airstrikes and mortar shelling have been particularly intensive in Kler Lwee Htu, Mutraw district.
As just one example, on September 7th, 2023 at 18:03 pm the Burmese military carried out an airstrike in Htee Gaw Hta village, Na Koh Kee village tract, Dweh Lo township, Mutraw district around the school compound areas and killing a teacher with 3 students and wounding one teacher with 5 students. In Kler Lwee Htu district on Sunday, September 3rd, the Burmese military airstrike on civilians resulted in the death of a 12-year-old boy, leaving a 16-year-old girl injured, and causing the destruction of numerous houses and other public buildings..."
Source/publisher:
Karen Women's Organisation
Date of entry/update:
2023-09-12
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Women and Politics in Burma/Myanmar, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Burmese women's organisations, Articles, reports and sites relating to women of Burma, Human Rights and international relations
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Source/publisher:
CCCM Cluster, Shelter Cluster, UN High Commissioner for Refugees via Reliefweb (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2023-09-12
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Food Security and nutrition in Burma/Myanmar, UNHCR (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees), Human Rights and international relations
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"Deputy High Commissioner Expresses Concern about Proposed Anti-Terrorism Bill and Law to Regulate Media Broadcasting in Sri Lanka
The Human Rights Council this morning held an interactive dialogue on the report of the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar, and started an interactive dialogue on the written update of the High Commissioner for Human Rights on the situation of human rights in Sri Lanka. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Cameroon also addressed the Council.
Nicholas Koumjian, Head of the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar, said last year he reported to this Council an increase in serious international crimes committed in Myanmar. Tragically, the frequency and intensity of war crimes and crimes against humanity had only increased in recent months, with more brazen aerial bombings and indiscriminate shelling, resulting in the deaths of innocent civilians, including children; increased executions of captured combatants and civilians; and intentional burnings of homes and villages.
The Mechanism was currently sharing information and evidence with three ongoing proceedings focused on crimes committed against the Rohingya at the International Court of Justice, the International Criminal Court, and in Argentina. It was finalising three analytical reports to share with these authorities concerning the military chain of command in Rakhine state; the failure of Myanmar authorities to investigate or punish sexual and gender-based crimes; and the organised spread of hate speech content on Facebook by the Myanmar military during the 2017 clearance operations. Mr. Koumjian said the people of Myanmar were suffering deeply from the effects of these ongoing horrific crimes. The Mechanism was committed to pursuing justice for them and focusing all its efforts to ensure that the perpetrators would one day be held to account.
In the discussion, some speakers said they fully supported the work of the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar. They thanked the Mechanism for its work, which was being conducted in difficult and dangerous conditions. The report revealed that the situation in Myanmar continued to be tragic. The population suffered from ongoing fighting resulting in numerous human rights violations. Many speakers fully condemned all human rights violations and abuses in Myanmar and called for an immediate end to brutal attacks on civilians, including the Rohingya. Some speakers expressed concern about the continued politicised mandates against Myanmar, including the Mechanism. Only good will and the cooperation of the country would lead to tangible results on the ground. Some speakers called for the international community to refrain from putting pressure on the Government and for human rights defenders to undertake an unbiased approach and expand the space for cooperation.
The Council then started an interactive dialogue on the written update of the High Commissioner for Human Rights on the situation of human rights in Sri Lanka.
Nada Al-Nashif, United Nations Deputy High Commissioner for Human Rights, presenting the written update of the High Commissioner on the situation of human rights in Sri Lanka, said one year after the remarkable protest movement demanding deep political and democratic reforms, the transformation that was hoped for to address long-standing challenges had still not materialised. The international community, including international financial institutions, should keep on supporting Sri Lanka in its recovery, by providing the fiscal space needed while pressing for genuine progress in governance, transparency and accountability.
Ms. Al-Nashif said the report provided an analysis of concerns with some forthcoming legislation, in particular the proposed Anti-Terrorism Bill replacing the Prevention of Terrorism Act and a new law to regulate media broadcasting, and urged a moratorium on the use of the Act in the meantime, and for the review of long-standing cases under the Act to be expedited. Fourteen years since the war ended, tens of thousands of victims and their families continued to suffer in agony and grief as they waited for truth, justice and remedy. The report recommended that the Government accelerate investigations and prosecutions in emblematic cases of human rights violations, in compliance with international human rights standards.
Sri Lanka, speaking as a country concerned, reiterated that the Government had consistently rejected resolutions 46/1 and 51/1 that led to the setting up of the so-called ‘Accountability Project’. The Government also rejected the written update, its conclusions and recommendations. Sri Lanka had repeatedly pointed out that this was an unproductive and unhelpful drain on the resources of the Council and its members. For these reasons, Sri Lanka would not cooperate with it. However, Sri Lanka would continue to engage constructively with other mechanisms of the Council that had been productive and beneficial, such as the Universal Periodic Review process. Sri Lanka remained firmly committed to pursuing tangible progress on human rights through domestic institutions and had made significant progress.
In the discussion, some speakers said as the recovery continued, economic reform measures must uphold the economic, social and cultural rights of the people of Sri Lanka. The Government must promptly hold legally prescribed elections, which were now overdue, and safeguard the fundamental rights of peaceful assembly, expression and association. Sri Lanka had made important recent commitments on land issues and devolution of political authority. Some speakers encouraged Sri Lanka to turn these commitments into meaningful action and deliver long-awaited results. Sri Lanka still had a long way to go to fulfil commitments to justice, accountability, and reconciliation. Some speakers deplored the politicisation of human rights, and their use as a pretext to interfere in the national and sovereign affairs of certain countries.
Speaking in the discussion on Myanmar were Finland on behalf of the Nordic-Baltic countries, European Union, Pakistan (on behalf of Organization of Islamic Cooperation, Liechtenstein, Egypt, Luxembourg, Costa Rica, Belgium, Netherlands, France, United States, Japan, Switzerland, Türkiye, Malta, United Nations Children's Fund, China, Malawi, Canada, Malaysia, Indonesia, Romania, Russian Federation, South Africa, Bangladesh, Australia, United Kingdom, Venezuela, Mauritania, Gambia, Iran, Bulgaria and Belarus.
Also speaking were CIVICUS - World Alliance for Citizen Participation, Centre pour les Droits Civils et Politiques - Centre CCPR, Southeast Asia Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity and Expression Caucus (ASC), Inc., International-Lawyers.Org, Christian Solidarity Worldwide, iuventum e.V., International Bar Association, Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development, International Commission of Jurists, and Lawyers' Rights Watch Canada.
Speaking in the discussion on Sri Lanka were New Zealand, European Union, United Kingdom, Oman, Liechtenstein, Egypt, Luxembourg, Germany, France, United States, Japan, Israel, Switzerland, Türkiye, Canada and Cuba.
The webcast of the Human Rights Council meetings can be found here. All meeting summaries can be found here. Documents and reports related to the Human Rights Council’s fifty-fourth regular session can be found here.
The Council will reconvene at 3 p.m. this afternoon to continue the interactive dialogue on the written update of the High Commissioner for Human Rights on the situation of human rights in Sri Lanka, followed by an interactive dialogue on the oral update of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan..."
Source/publisher:
UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
Date of entry/update:
2023-09-11
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Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Crimes Against Humanity, Human Rights and international relations
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"In the nearly three years that have passed since Myanmar’s coup d’état, the global media has shifted its attention to other crises, from the sudden withdrawal of Western forces from Afghanistan to Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine. But despite a lull in headlines, the turmoil that resulted from the coup remains life-altering for the generation of young activists who have been displaced by the shattering of democratic ideals.
Myanmar’s military — the Tatmadaw — staged a coup d’état on February 1, 2021, detaining top government officials, including Aung San Suu Kyi and President Win Myint. The military claimed that the election results were fraudulent, but independent observers have dismissed these claims. The coup has sparked widespread protests and civil disobedience, with many people calling for the release of the detained leaders and the restoration of democracy. According to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners, a human rights organization dedicated to justice in Myanmar, more than 4,000 people have so far been killed by Myanmar’s military junta since the coup, and upwards of 24,000 have been arrested, charged or sentenced.
For JURIST, coverage of the Myanmar coup is personal. Despite the risks, Myanmar law student correspondents – most of them women – covered the coup for JURIST from its beginning and have kept reporting in its aftermath. In a bid to keep the crisis in the public dialogue, we have conducted a series of interviews with some of the law students and young lawyers whose lives have been affected by Myanmar’s tumult, ranging from law students who fled abroad to save their futures and continue their studies to those who put down their textbooks and went into the jungle to take up arms against the junta as part of the pro-democracy resistance. Their accounts reflect the full range of emotional responses, from despair to anger to hope.
The interviews, which will be published in a series of articles, explore the challenges and opportunities facing young people in Myanmar as they navigate a country in political turmoil. This is the first interview in a seven-part series. Please note that our interviewees’ names have been kept private to protect their security unless otherwise noted.
Would you briefly introduce yourself? What was your life like before the coup?
I am a third-year law student. I am a Myanmar woman in her early 20s. Before the coup, my life was pretty normal; I went to school regularly, joined many club activities, skipped classes sometimes for a little bit of fun, participated in moot court competitions, spent many hours in the library, and thought life would be just a straight-line till after graduation. Before the coup, Myanmar was not a completely democratic country, but it was a country that was able to offer endless possibilities for a young university student like me. At the time, I thought I could easily come up with a 5-year plan or a 10-year plan.
How are you doing now, two and a half years after the coup?
I am surviving. Surviving is sometimes the only way to live in Myanmar. Our daily life is filled with unpredictable political events. It’s hard enough to try to figure out how I’ll keep meals on the table for the next month, let alone making long term plans. Just as grocery prices continue to change overnight, my path toward legal education has been caught up in the storm. If things had gone as planned, I would be preparing to graduate this year and I would probably be planning for my Master’s study abroad.
Being a law student who learned about concepts like the rule of law, justice, and human rights at school, I’m able to recognize the many unlawful and unethical acts the military junta carries out in plain sight; I can even identify specific actions as violations of specific norms of human rights and international law.
In the beginning, I couldn’t see this as anything more than a curse; my heart just ached to witness it. But I have since come to look for opportunities in the darkness; I do everything I can to share news of our plight with the world. I have seen many traumatic things. I’ll never get used to seeing such horrible things. But at some point, I realized that I have a duty amid these historic events. I am no longer just a law student; I have taken on the role of a citizen journalist, and by virtue of my background, I have a legal perspective to share.
As a law student, do you think the international community is showing enough support for the people of Myanmar? What more could they do to help?
Many key actors of the international community have shown support for Myanmar. In my opinion, I think everyone has the capacity to do more than this. Failing to help Myanmar would not be recorded as just a minor event in a third-world country. This would be remembered as a failure of humanity. The whole international community will share this burden and will bear the consequences. Later on, a military coup could become just a mere trend and a genocide case could become just a temporary entertainment on the news. To prevent this collective failure of humanity, the international community needs to come up with more “actions.” Your voices of comfort and official statements have helped, but I respectfully remind you that this coup has been going on for more than two years and has resulted in over 3,000 deaths.
In addition to sanctions, attempts to bring the military juntas to the International Court of Justice, and recognition for the National Unity Government, I would like to make a request. I hope that Myanmar updates are frequently highlighted in the global mainstream media. I hope that Myanmar news is accessible to the international audience in any possible way so that the whole international community stays “curious” about Myanmar, about a random law student from Myanmar, about the Myanmar people who grit every day to prove that truth and justice shall always win. The silence and ignorance of the international audience would strengthen the military juntas. If we think about this in common sense, would abusers think they need to stop committing a crime when nobody is watching them or taking action against them? I would like to tell the international community that Myanmar desperately needs their constant attention. The misery of Myanmar should not be buried among the world’s media trends. This is life-and-death news.
What are your thoughts on the Civil Disobedience Movement as a law student when the military junta is pressuring all university students to go back to classes?
The Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) is one of the most powerful counteracts against the military juntas. I made the decision to join the CDM since the beginning of the coup, and I have seen how far this movement has brought us in this revolution. Not only is this a clear message to the juntas that they cannot rule without our cooperation, but it is also a demonstration of individuals’ understanding of how democracy is all about ruling ourselves, not being ruled by a group of juntas.
My stance is that I will never go back to the classrooms run by the professors under military rule. I take the ethical value “Legal profession is a noble profession,” which we learned in our freshman year, very seriously. Even when I went to law classes before the coup, I sought real educational experience through mock trials, moot courts, and internships when I felt that the class lectures at a local university in Myanmar could not offer “a quality education” that met my own standards. I was a law student who tried to be creative with all the resources available. So, for me, a quality education is more than a degree.
However, I also understand the other view that thinks we should all go back to school for a college degree. No matter how talented a person is, an official certificate or diploma is needed in the local work environment. People with language barriers and financial difficulties cannot seek opportunities outside of Myanmar. For various reasons, I have seen my own classmates and close friends go back to school despite their promises at the beginning of the coup. On the other hand, many CDM students would view them as traitors and even discuss setting social punishment after winning this revolution.
Now that the revolution is more than two years old, I see a slight change in the dynamics that individuals have their own limits on the extent of their active participation in politics. Many of the university students who decide to go back to school now, not since the beginning, may not have harmful thoughts against the whole revolution. They will surely have their own situations. They might have made a decision to join the CDM at the very beginning, but we cannot ignore the fact that the military juntas cause difficulties in basic human needs over time. Surrounded by waves of challenges for themselves and for their families, they might not be able to seek the common good but to look after themselves first. As we all know, this is a natural human tendency.
I hope that the university students who go back to school do not cause any significant harm to this revolution, even if they cannot be of great help anymore for the time being. However, I do not think that social punishment for deciding what they think is best for them would be a fair solution. This will forever divide all the legal scholars and professionals in our generation. I hope that they can act upon their own beliefs and together contribute to Myanmar’s legal and political affairs in the future. As long as they are not acting out of fear, I sincerely hope that they act upon their own convictions.
What do you think about the leadership of the National Unity Government as a parallel government of Myanmar?
I think the NUG is making progress over the years. As a citizen who has vested her trust in the government she approves, I understand that the NUG focuses on earning strong recognition through diplomacy on the international horizon and leading the People’s Defense Force in the defensive war against the military juntas. Putting myself in the shoes of political leaders in the NUG, I can sympathize that this is not an easy job overall. Nonetheless, they must listen to the voices of people who call the NUG their government and keep trying everything with endless effort. As a citizen, we do our job which is to keep the NUG in check.
There is something I would specifically like to point out as a law student. Recently, I attended a panel discussion titled “Ending Impunity Through Transitional Justice” held on June 15, 2023. U Thein Oo, the head of the Ministry of Justice, said that the ministry is working on collecting evidence and getting ready to take action after winning the revolution. In response to that, other panelists also discussed how we should come up with mechanisms to take action even before we announce a clear win in this revolution. I agree with the latter view and my main concern here is that the country will be in need of legal scholars and professionals who can execute the goals we are setting right now.
As a law student, I want to demand that the NUG comes up with more actions on:
How law students can continue their legal education either within or outside the country.
How they will open doors for Myanmar students who pursue a legal education in different places and wish to contribute in Myanmar in the near future.
On planting seeds in much younger generations who seek to become legal professionals.
In the era of federal democracy, this revolution shall bring more human resources in the legal field, the merrier.
How do you anticipate the Spring Revolution will end?
I strongly believe we will win. It may take time, but we will win. This is more than intuition. Looking back at what Myanmar has gone through over the decades; we have always been meant to win this revolution.
Do you have any parting words for law students and lawyers across the international community?
If I could get the opportunity to exchange thoughts with law students from different parts of the world, I would like to ask them what kind of legal professional they want to become after graduating from law school.
A very common thought is that many law schools teach us how to read and apply the existing laws. In a simple sense, we obey the laws. However, Myanmar’s experience should serve as a lesson that law students must also learn to challenge the existing laws when it is necessary. Merely knowing the law is not enough anymore. We need to see the intentions behind the formation of each law.
Just in case a law becomes unjust or we have someone sitting above the law, we should be well-prepared with the techniques and stamina to resist unjust laws. I would like to tell fellow law students that it is now our duty to formulate constructive doubts about the existing legal systems, but be hopeful about the better changes we can bring.
I believe that law students should be agents of change. We should use our knowledge of the law to challenge injustice and make the world a better place. We should not be afraid to stand up for what we believe in, even if it means challenging the status quo.
I am hopeful that the next generation of law students will be up to the task. I believe that they have the power to make a real difference in the world..."
Source/publisher:
JURIST
Date of entry/update:
2023-09-11
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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Description:
"THE Irrawaddy online reported on August 31 the Myanmar junta’s warning to residents of Nay Pyi Taw, the centre of the military regime, that ‘resistance forces may attack Nay Pyi Taw at any time.’ The day before, a team of junta officials led by Nay Pyi Taw council member Colonel Min Naung held motivational interaction with villagers in the capital’s Pyinmana Township, calling for ‘solidarity between the government, military and people against the danger of the regime’s enemies at the gate.
Before the regime could appreciate the potential danger from resistance forces, fighters from the People’s Defence Force had sneaked into the capital to attack the target of opportunities on hit-and-run tactics. The People’s Defence Force claims to have killed in April a local administrator, a police officer and two soldiers and seriously injuring a lieutenant colonel at a bar near a military base in Nay Pyi Taw.
In March, two People’s Defence Force fighters were arrested before launching an attack on the Armed Forces Day Parade. In June, the force seized a military outpost near the capital and killed 14 soldiers in three days of operation. The People’s Defence Force claims to have killed in December 2021 a dozen junta troops in landmine blast at Pyinmana Township near the capital.
In recent months, the media have reported combined operations by the People’s Defence Force and the ethnic armed organisation against the regime forces. Of the 14 states and regions, intense fights have been reported in 13 states and regions. The Arakan Army in Rakhine State has been on informal but long ceasefire with the military regime since the coup on February 1, 2021.
Among the 13 regions and states, Sagaing has been the stronghold of resistance forces from the beginning of the coup. The regime forces sustained the worst losses here. People suffered the worst atrocities at the hands of the regime forces. Fights intensified in Shan, Kachin, Kayah, Chin and Mon states. The People’s Defence Force and ethnic armed organisations are reportedly gaining grounds in all states and regions, forcing the regime forces to take defensive tactics since July 2023.
Air power has been the regime’s crucial weapon to slow down the advances of resistance forces. Indian Defence Research Wing online reported on September 1 that Myanmar Air Force has grounded all its 11 JF-17 Thunder fighter jets because of technical reasons. This has been a blow to the regime’s air power. The grounding of the whole squadron of fighters have significantly disrupted Nay Pyi Taw’s plan for targeted airstrikes against PDF and EAO positions. The United States in August imposed sanctions on three companies which supply jet fuel for Myanmar’s air force. The sanctions will further constrain the regime’s air power.
The military junta has lost control over almost all of the Sagaing region and many townships in Magwe and Mandalay regions because of relentless daily attacks, land-mine ambushes, drone strikes, shelling, and hit-and-run attacks from resistance groups and ethnic armed organisations. An analyst has said, ‘the junta is no longer able to defeat resistance forces there, so its troops can only raid and torch villages.’
The regime’s aggravated cause of concern over the centre has been the fight that has broken out in Bago region barely 100 kilometres south of the capital. The war in the Bago region has created grave insecurity for the regime because the People’s Defence force and Myanmar’s oldest ethnic revolutionary group, the Karen National Union, combinedly increased attacks against the positions that the regime holds. Security analyst in Myanmar say that the junta was struggling to defeat the resistance because it has to focus on multiple front lines across the country. Human resource shortage and defection from rank and files are making regimes struggle tougher.
‘Bago Region has been regarded as an epicentre of revolutionary movements in Myanmar since the country achieved independence in 1948.’ The KNU has long been active in the eastern part of the Bago region. Now, the western part is also contested. The Central Bago region on the west of the Sittaung River basin, is strategically important both to the regime and resistance forces. The road through the region connects Nay Pyi Taw and Yangon and the Tanintharyi region in the south. PDF forces along with KNU is trying to gain a foothold in the area because it would give them control over vital gateways to Yangon and Nay Pyi Taw. The fight is continuing since July 2023. Control of the vital roadways could also isolate the south-eastern areas of the country, including Karen (Kayin) and Mon states and Tanintharyi Region..."
Source/publisher:
New Age
Date of entry/update:
2023-09-11
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Local URL:
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Description:
"Mister President,
Excellencies,
It is an honour to appear before you to present the fifth Annual Report of the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar. Last year I reported to this Council an increase in serious international crimes committed in the country. Tragically, the frequency and intensity of war crimes and crimes against humanity has only increased in recent months.
In the past year we have seen more brazen aerial bombings and indiscriminate shelling, resulting in the deaths of innocent civilians including children. We have also seen increased executions of captured combatants and civilians and intentional burnings of homes and villages. There has also been a rise in the number of arrests without due process and we have collected credible evidence that some detainees have been subjected to torture, sexual violence, and other severe mistreatments.
The ongoing violence has forced our Mechanism to expand its inquiries to many parts of the country, but we retain our commitment and focus on collecting and analysing evidence of the campaign against the Rohingya population during the 2016 and 2017 clearance operations. We have collected compelling evidence of the widespread burning of Rohingya villages and the assaults and killings of civilians. I have been particularly horrified by the numerous accounts of sexual crimes that we have collected.
Mr. President,
The quantity of evidence and information we have been able to collect in the past year from individuals and organizations is unprecedented and frankly, unanticipated. With this increased workload and our limited resources, we have had to strategically focus our investigations on the gravest crimes where the impact on victims has been the most severe.
We continue to face the challenge of not having access to Myanmar. Our repeated requests for information and access have been ignored by the military authorities. We also face challenges in conducting investigative activities in other countries where witnesses and information providers are located.
To compensate, we have embraced innovative technology to propel our investigations. Our Open-Source team uses cutting edge technology to analyse and verify large quantities of material, such as videos, photographs and other information posted on social media. We are also using geospatial imagery to determine damage to villages before and after attacks. This type of evidence is then cross-checked against the information received from at least 700 sources, including more than 200 eyewitness accounts.
We have also begun a dedicated inquiry into financial information related to entities and individuals that have contributed to, or benefitted from, the serious international crimes committed in Myanmar. We are looking at weapon supply chains, and the dispossession of land, homes, and businesses, particularly during the clearance operations in Rakhine State.
Mr. President,
We understand this Council did not create our Mechanism to simply place evidence in storage. Rather, we intend to use the evidence to facilitate justice and accountability in courts and tribunals willing and able to prosecute these cases. We are currently sharing information and evidence with three ongoing proceedings focused on crimes committed against the Rohingya at the International Court of Justice, the International Criminal Court and in Argentina. We are now finalising three analytical reports to share with these authorities concerning: the military chain of command in Rakhine State; the failure of Myanmar authorities to investigate or punish sexual and gender-based crimes; and the organized spread of hate speech content on Facebook by the Myanmar military during the 2017 clearance operations.
I am particularly grateful to the brave survivors of these crimes who have shared their testimonies. None of our work would be possible without the courage and commitment of the many individuals and organizations that provide us with information. We are using the most advanced technologies to ensure that their interactions with us have the highest level of security and confidentiality.
I am also very grateful for the support of this Council and call on all Member States committed to ending the violence in Myanmar to support our work and give us the access we need to witnesses and information on their territories.
Mr. President,
The Myanmar people are suffering deeply from the effects of these ongoing horrific crimes. I would like them to know that the Mechanism is committed to pursuing justice for them and focusing all our efforts to ensure that the perpetrators will one day be held to account..."
Source/publisher:
Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2023-09-11
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations, UN human rights documents on Myanmar
Language:
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Sub-title:
Statement for the Interactive Dialogue on the Independent Investigative Mechanism on Myanmar. As delivered by the UK Human Rights Ambassador, Rita French.
Description:
"Thank you, Mr President.
The UK is grateful for the Mechanism’s continued work to facilitate justice and accountability in Myanmar. Its latest report brings to light the scale of the Myanmar military’s brutal tactics. The reporting of the military’s brutal actions against the people of Myanmar, including indiscriminate targeting and killing of civilians through airstrikes and the large-scale burning of homes, is truly alarming.
Accountability is the only way to end the culture of impunity in Myanmar.
And the UK is committed to supporting this goal - providing £500,000 to the IIMM (Independent Investigative Mechanism on Myanmar), establishing the Myanmar Witness programme, and leading efforts to secure the first ever UN Security Council Resolution on the situation in Myanmar, urging all parties to respect human rights and end violence.
To successfully collect evidence and continue to meet its mandate, the Mechanism relies on the cooperation of all UN and international partners. Without the cooperation of all UN entities, the Mechanism would not be able to undertake vital activities to hold the Myanmar military to account.
High Commissioner, Mr President,
What more can Member States do to facilitate the Mechanism’s collection of evidence and witness statements?
Thank you..."
Source/publisher:
GOV.UK
Date of entry/update:
2023-09-11
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations, UN human rights documents on Myanmar
Language:
Local URL:
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Description:
"Human Rights Violations took place in States and Regions from Sep 1 to 7, 2023
Military Junta Troop arrested over 70 local civilians and used them as human shields in Sagaing Region and Mandalay Region from September 1st and 7th. 11 women who were holding Sagaing NRC number from South Okkalapa Township were arrested and beaten by the Military Junta on September 3rd. A woman from the Sagaing Region and a man from the Ayeyarwady region died due to beating and torture during the interrogationby the Military’s . Thayarwaddy Prison and Dike-U Prison, restriction of the sending of food and necessity needs of prisoners.
The Department of Electricity distributed the warning letters that the meter boxes will be taken when the civilians do not pay the bill in Yangon Region and Mandalay Region. 14 civilians died and 13 were injured by the Military Junta heavy and light artillery attacks within a week. They raided the villages, attacked and burnt the houses, as a sequence the civilians left their places 8 times..."
Source/publisher:
Network for Human Rights Documentation-Burma
Date of entry/update:
2023-09-08
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
Format :
pdf pdf pdf
Size:
5.02 MB 103.65 KB 5.21 MB
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Description:
"Justice For Myanmar calls on other ASEAN members to follow Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines in refusing to attend the upcoming ASEAN Air Chiefs’ Conference (AACC), heeding the outcry from Myanmar and international civil society.
We call on ASEAN members to bar the illegal junta from all ASEAN defence activities, and failing that, to refuse to attend activities in which the junta participates.
The Myanmar junta’s air force head, Htun Aung, is the chair of AACC, and is currently commanding an indiscriminate campaign of aerial terror, slaughtering men, women and children, and destroying homes, schools, places of worship and whole villages.
According to reporting by AFP, the Thai air force chief is the only confirmed attendee of the 2023 AACC, while the air forces of Singapore, Brunei and Vietnam did not respond to questions.
Cambodia’s air force chief refused to comment to AFP on whether he will attend the meeting, which will be held in Naypyidaw from September 12-15.
Justice For Myanmar condemns ASEAN’s continued and direct support for the Myanmar air force, army and navy as it commits genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes with total impunity.
In August, Singapore was the only ASEAN member state that refused to attend a counter terrorism tabletop military exercise in Naypyidaw, chaired by the military junta with the Russian regime.
From September 25-30, the junta is scheduled to co-chair an ASEAN counter terrorism field training exercise in Russia, which ASEAN leaders must cancel, or refuse to attend if it goes ahead.
Myanmar and international civil society organisations have repeatedly denounced ASEAN’s defence cooperation with the illegal military junta, called for the junta’s exclusion from ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM) activities, and urged countries to boycott defence activities that include the junta.
In an oral update to the UN Human Rights Council in July 2023, the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar slammed ASEAN’s appointment of Htun Aung as AACC chair, stating that “those responsible for these atrocities should not be serving in leadership positions in ASEAN. They should be serving sentences for their crimes.”
Justice For Myanmar spokesperson Yadanar Maung says: “The refusal of Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines to attend the AACC sends a clear and strong message to the military junta that it is losing support.
“It is untenable for a criminal junta that is committing atrocities with total impunity to chair a regional conference.
“Other ASEAN air force chiefs should follow the example of Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines and refuse to attend the AACC with the illegal junta.
“ASEAN must take a firm stand against the illegal junta and its aerial campaign of terror, led by the current AACC chair Htun Aung, who is a war criminal.
“ASEAN must stop providing legitimacy and support to the Myanmar military, which totally disregards and directly undermines its own commitments to resolve the crisis in Myanmar.
“We call on ASEAN members to bar the junta from defence meetings and activities, and refuse to attend when the junta participates.”..."
Source/publisher:
Justice For Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2023-09-08
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
ASEAN-Burma relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Format :
pdf pdf
Size:
114.75 KB 116.62 KB
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Description:
"This regular update, covering humanitarian developments up to 25 August, is produced by OCHA Myanmar in collaboration with the Inter-Cluster Coordination Group and UN agencies. Response figures are based on self-reporting by organizations to clusters. The next humanitarian update will be issued in September 2023.
HIGHLIGHTS & KEY MESSAGES
Ongoing conflict and natural disasters have resulted in new displacement, civilian casualties, and destruction of civilian properties, intensifying the already fragile humanitarian situation in Myanmar.
More than 1.9 million people are now internally displaced in precarious conditions and requiring lifesaving assistance.
Heavy monsoon rainfall has triggered flooding in Rakhine and in the Southeast where more than 80,000 people have been affected since early August.
Transportation and distribution plans for the cyclone response in Rakhine have been approved and some relief items have been distributed. However, the overall humanitarian needs of cyclone-affected communities remain high and more assistance is still needed.
Humanitarian access restrictions have increased, notably in the Southeast and Kachin, further hindering timely and efficient aid delivery to affected and displaced communities.
Easing of access restrictions and provision of financial support are imperative for the humanitarian community to address urgent needs.
Eight months into 2023, the combined US$887 million Humanitarian Response Plan and Cyclone Mocha Flash Appeals remain critically underfunded, with only 25 per cent of the required funding received.
The Emergency Relief Coordinator, Martin Griffiths, visited Myanmar from 14 to 17 August to raise awareness of the situation in Myanmar and advocate for both expanded space for humanitarian operations and the removal of bureaucratic obstacles.
KEY FIGURES
1.9M total people currently internally displaced across Myanmar
1.6M people currently displaced by clashes and insecurity since February 2021
306K people who remain internally displaced due to conflict prior to February 2021, mainly in Rakhine, Kachin, Chin, and Shan
75K civilian properties estimated burnt or destroyed since February 2021
SITUATION OVERVIEW
Natural disasters have continued to impact Myanmar adding another challenge on top of active conflict, leading to an increase in displacement and additional hardship for affected people. Simultaneously, bureaucratic, and physical barriers continue to hinder humanitarian partners' access to those in need, often posing safety and security risks for frontline aid workers. In Rakhine, regular humanitarian programming continues but the specific humanitarian cyclone response remains limited in scope. In August, the de facto authorities approved the transportation and distribution plans for cyclone-related assistance to Rakhine that UN agencies and INGOs re-submitted in early July for a second time. Initial distributions of existing relief items in Sittwe to cyclone-affected communities have been approved and food has been distributed to 12 villages during the reporting period with more expected to follow.
As part of ongoing advocacy at all levels for greater humanitarian access in conflict-affected areas, the Emergency Relief Coordinator, Mr. Martin Griffiths, visited Myanmar from 14 to 17 August and met with various stakeholders in Nay Pyi Taw. During his mission, he also visited Rakhine and met with Rakhine and Rohingya communities affected by both conflict and disaster, emphasizing the importance of placing people at the center of humanitarian action and urging the removal of all access restrictions for humanitarian partners.
Despite the ongoing operational challenges and financial limitations, Myanmar's humanitarian community remains steadfast in its commitment to stay and deliver aid based on need. The 2023 Mid-Year HRP Dashboard (Jan-Jun 2023) highlights that more than 1.8 million people have been reached with humanitarian assistance in the first half of the year. However, the 2023 Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) and Cyclone Mocha Flash Appeal remain severely underfunded at only 25 percent of the total requirement, undermining the provision of comprehensive assistance and adversely impacting vulnerable communities. Urgent and more generous funding is pivotal to alleviate suffering and enhance resilience of the people in the face of this multidimensional crisis..."
Source/publisher:
UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (New York) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2023-09-08
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Education in Burma/Myanmar - general, Food Security and nutrition in Burma/Myanmar, Public Health, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
579.77 KB
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Description:
"Salesians adapt to provide medication and support where needed
(MissionNewswire) People in Salesian communities and people who are internally displaced in Myanmar* received medication and other health support thanks to donor funding from Salesian Missions, the U.S. development arm of the Salesians of Don Bosco.
While initially wanting to set up a clinic, Salesians had to shift how they provided health services in a country that has been experiencing political turmoil since a military coup in February 2021.
Doctors were unable to come to a Salesian clinic and the need was far reaching outside of Salesian communities. As a result, Salesians used donor funding to send medicines to people most in need. If medicine couldn't reach them, Salesians sent funding so that items could be purchased locally to address the overwhelming need.
Father Khun Myat Victor, provincial economer in Myanmar, said, "I would like to express my heartfelt gratitude for the financial support donors have provided for the poor people who are staying in our communities and in refugee camps in different parts of our country. With their generous support, we provided health support for 500 people."
The military takeover of the democratically elected National League For Democracy Government has unleashed an unprecedented political, socioeconomic, and humanitarian crisis on top of the continuing impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, sending the country into a dangerous spiral of conflict and poverty, according to the United Nations. There has been significant displacement, human suffering, asset depletion, rising food insecurity and reversal of many of the development gains made in recent years. Nearly 50% of the population is estimated to be living in poverty.
Salesian missionaries are responding to the needs of children, youth and their families who are in crisis. Not only do programs address desperate poverty, but they also serve people whose lives have recently been impacted by natural disasters and a refugee emergency..."
Source/publisher:
Salesian Missions
Date of entry/update:
2023-09-05
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Language:
Local URL:
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Source/publisher:
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (Geneva) via Reliefweb (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2023-09-04
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
UNHCR (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees), Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
924.05 KB
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Description:
"With Myanmar’s military fighting on other fronts, the Ta’ang National Liberation Army is firming up its foothold in the country’s north. Clashes with other ethnic armed groups are possible. The Ta’ang group should focus on improving governance in its areas, in conjunction with civil society.
What’s new? The Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) has used Myanmar’s post-2021 coup crisis to expand its territory in northern Shan State, recruit fighters and strengthen its parallel administration. Although it has quietly supported anti-coup resistance forces, it has clashed with the military only rarely and has met with regime representatives.
Why does it matter? The TNLA’s expansion has created tensions with other ethnic armed groups and non-Ta’ang communities in northern Shan State. The group’s ambiguous political positioning since the coup reflects the complex environment in which ethnic armed groups operate. It also helps explain why building a countrywide anti-regime alliance has proven so difficult.
What should be done? The TNLA, which seeks greater autonomy, should focus on caring for the people under its control through improved self-administration rather than expanding its territory further. It should also reform its recruitment practices. Foreign donors should increase funding for local civil society organisations delivering services in Shan State.
I. Overview
Since the February 2021 coup in Myanmar, the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) – one of the country’s most powerful ethnic armed groups – has strengthened its control of a swathe of territory in northern Shan State. In conjunction with Ta’ang civil society organisations, it is working to maintain the rule of law, deliver health and education services, and improve the local economy. Unlike some of Myanmar’s other ethnic armed groups, it has mostly avoided confronting the military since the coup. Instead, it has provided only covert support to anti-junta forces and engaged indirectly with new opposition political institutions. The group’s ambiguous post-coup positioning reflects its long-term ambition to achieve autonomy. As it assumes the role of a quasi-state, the TNLA should focus on supporting the population in its areas and avoiding military adventurism that might provoke conflict with other ethnic armed groups or the military; it should also cease coerced and underage recruitment for its armed forces. Outside actors should support the provision of services in Shan State, working through local civil society.
Since its inception in 2009, the TNLA has slowly acquired more strength and territory. It garnered popular supportamong the Ta’ang by pushing a strict anti-drug use policy and bringing together disparate communities under a common ethnic identity. Other ethnic armed groups in Myanmar – including the Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO) and, more recently, the United Wa State Army (UWSA), which is the largest such group and controls an autonomous region in Shan State – provided the training and weapons the TNLA needed to build up its armed forces. Over the past decade, it gradually expanded its geographical footprint. For much of that time, it regularly clashed with the Myanmar military and its allied militias, as well as the Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS), a rival ethnic armed group.
The 2021 coup has further strengthened the TNLA’s hand. Busy fighting on other fronts, the Myanmar military has largely withdrawn from the northern Shan State battlefield, enabling the group and its allies to gain territory and expel the RCSS from the area. The TNLA, which counts an estimated 10,000 to 15,000 personnel, can now project power into nearby towns. The military’s withdrawal has also enabled the TNLA to assert authority in places it controls and govern in a way that advances its goal of building a robust, autonomous Ta’ang nation. Working in partnership with Ta’ang civil society organisations, it has followed the lead of larger armed groups and created an incipient “Ta’ang State”, complete with courts, schools and health facilities. This quasi-state is very much a work in progress, but since the coup the group and its civil society partners, many of which are women-led, have moved well down the road toward creating a de facto autonomous governing body.
To focus on consolidating control, the TNLA has staked out a middle ground in Myanmar’s post-coup conflict. It now tries to steer clear of clashes with the military. Although the Ta’ang group has been an important source of training and weapons for new forces resisting the junta, it has avoided publicising this support. It has also kept informal its engagement with the National Unity Government (NUG) – a parallel administration set up by lawmakers ousted by the coup – instead allowing Ta’ang civil society groups and politicians to lead the way in building these relationships. The TNLA has also maintained contact with the junta. Along with two other ethnic armed groups, it recently had a rare meeting with regime negotiators tasked with striking ceasefire deals.
It did so under pressure from Beijing. China has longstanding ties to Myanmar, with which it shares a 2,160km border, and since the late 1980s has invested heavily in its neighbour, in part through its Belt and Road Initiative. In order to protect its economic interests, China is particularly keen to keep the southern border it shares with Shan State stable.
The TNLA’s positioning helps explain why building an anti-military coalition in Myanmar has proven so difficult. Most ethnic armed groups are hostile to the military regime, but they also see little prospect of it collapsing, making them reluctant to cement alliances with the NUG or armed resistance. Chinese pressures further push these groups away from overt confrontation. At the same time, the TNLA and other ethnic armed groups are influenced by their communities, civil society organisations, and the broader domestic and even international public. They thus have to balance various demands when determining the best pathway to achieving their objectives – in the TNLA’s case, a de facto autonomous Ta’ang State.
The group’s expansion in recent years also reflects a broader fragmentation within Myanmar’s national borders that has accelerated since the 2021 coup. With the central administration unable to operate normally, non-state armed groups such as the TNLA or civil society organisations working in the areas they control are the purveyors of public services to millions of people. Together, the TNLA and Ta’ang civil society organisations run schools, provide health care, collect taxes and administer justice systems.
The TNLA’s rise is not without risk to it or the people under its control. Further expansion could provoke conflict with either other ethnic armed groups or the military. Even absent TNLA growth, the military may at some point seek to recapture some of the lost territory. Non-Ta’ang people in Shan State feel threatened by the TNLA’s gathering might, fanning inter-communal tensions. The high costs associated with maintaining a large armed force and system of governance also mean that the TNLA runs the risk of overreach. The need to raise revenue already appears to be pushing it into competition with other ethnic armed groups and pro-military militias, which could lead to sharpening hostilities.
Given the reality of state fragmentation in Myanmar, the people of northern Shan State will be best served through a combined effort by the TNLA, civil society and donors to manage conflict risk, improve governance and deliver services. The TNLA should refrain from further expansion, which would risk renewed conflict, and take greater care to avoid provoking other ethnic minorities living in its territory. It should reform its recruitment policies, including by ending conscription – often enforced through violence or threats thereof – and cracking down on recruitment of child soldiers. Meanwhile, donors should expand support for civil society organisations in northern Shan State, including not only Ta’ang groups but also those run by other ethnic minorities. Strengthening civil society would not only allow these groups to provide more services to civilians, but it would also afford them a degree of moderating influence over the leadership of armed groups, particularly when it comes to maintaining peaceful inter-ethnic relations in this corner of war-torn Myanmar..."
Source/publisher:
International Crisis Group (Belgium)
Date of entry/update:
2023-09-04
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Education in Burma/Myanmar - general, Armed conflict and peace-building in Burma - theoretical, strategic and general, Human Rights and international relations
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3.34 MB 499.8 KB
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"Human Rights Violations took place in States and Regions from Aug 22 to 31, 2023
Military Junta Troop launched airstrikes and dropped bombs in Sagaing Region, Bago Region, Kachin State, and Kayah State from August 22nd to 31st. Military Junta arrested over 30 civilians including 2 children and used them as human shields in Kachin State. They also arrested, tortured, and killed over 20 civilians from the Sagaing Region, Bago Region, Kachin State, and Shan State. A woman from Wetlet Township was raped and killed by the Military’s Junta on August 26th.
The Head of the Prison who works under the Military Junta sued 33 political prisoners from Pathein Prison again with 2 more Penal codes. At least an underage child died and 4 were injured by the Military’s light and heavy attacks within a week. Civilians were forced to leave their places at least 6 times within a week by the Military Junta troops marching in the regions..."
Source/publisher:
Network for Human Rights Documentation-Burma
Date of entry/update:
2023-09-01
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Armed conflict in Burma - attacks on civilians
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177.59 KB 144.68 KB 297.43 KB
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"Justice For Myanmar spoofs Forbes 30 Under 30 to profile tycoons funnelling funds, arms and related equipment from Singapore to illegitimate junta
Justice For Myanmar today launched a new effort to draw attention to tycoons supporting the illegal Myanmar military junta. The inaugural Dirty Over 30 list features nine tycoons who continue to funnel funds, arms and related equipment to the junta through the “business-friendly” haven of Singapore, which is currently the third-largest supplier of arms and equipment to the Myanmar military. Future editions will feature tycoons in other regions who are enabling and profiting from the crisis in Myanmar.
The campaign is launching ahead of the 2023 ASEAN Summit in Indonesia to pressure Singapore and other ASEAN member countries to more effectively block the movement of funds and arms to the Myanmar junta.
Meet nine paragons of dirty business
The Dirty Over 30 Singapore edition includes nine businesspeople who’ve amassed sizable fortunes funding brutality, mass-murder and war crimes in Myanmar and who continue to do business in Singapore. They include:
Tay Za, Founder and Chairperson, Htoo Group of Companies
Naing Htut Aung, Founder and Managing Director, International Gateways Group of Companies
Aung Hlaing Oo, Founder and Managing Director, Myanmar Chemical & Machinery Group
Aung Moe Myint, Founder and Director, Dynasty Group of Companies
Tun Min Latt, Founder and Managing Director, Star Sapphire Group of Companies
Khin Phyu Win, Founder and Director, Asia Sun Group of Companies
Jonathan Myo Kyaw Thaung, CEO, KT Group
Thein Win Zaw, Founder and Chairperson, Shwe Byain Phyu Group of Companies
George Yin Soon, Investor
The Dirty Over 30 list parodies the Forbes 30 Under 30 list. Portraits of the Dirty Over 30 “dishonourees” were created using real photos and sophisticated AI facial composites. The profiles include factual details about their lives and dirty business dealings. Notably, in what has been called the “30 Under 30 pipeline to prison,” the pattern of unethical and illegal behaviour amongst “honourees” of the Forbes 30 Under 30 list suggests that the profiteers on the Dirty Over 30 list may not be outliers in the business world.
Putting pressure on the Singaporean government
The Singaporean government has already committed publicly to stopping the movement of arms to Myanmar, but so far their efforts have fallen short. A recent report from the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation in Myanmar identifies 138 unique suppliers in Singapore doing $247 million worth of trade with the Myanmar military. The report concludes that if the Singaporean government successfully stopped all arms trading to the Myanmar military from its jurisdiction, it would “significantly disrupt” the junta’s ability to commit war crimes.
Since the coup attempt in 2021, the Myanmar military has killed at least 4,023 people, including children, committed widespread torture and has arbitrarily arrested over 24,000 people. Many have been killed through indiscriminate airstrikes that require a continued supply of aircraft parts, jet fuel and raw materials that the military needs to manufacture bombs and bullets. It has jailed and tortured countless others.
With the Dirty Over 30 project, Justice For Myanmar calls on Singapore to:
Introduce sanctions to stop the direct and indirect transfer of arms, dual-use goods and technology to the Myanmar military.
Block the junta’s access to Singapore’s financial system through targeted sanctions, including on junta banks.
Expedite and make public ongoing investigations into Singaporean companies that have supplied arms, dual-use goods and technology to the Myanmar military.
Push for more sanctions from other ASEAN countries on the Myanmar military and entities that transact business with it..."
Source/publisher:
Justice For Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2023-09-01
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Business and the Military, The Burmese military's role in the economy, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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Format :
pdf pdf
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120.53 KB 144.68 KB
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Source/publisher:
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (Geneva) via Reliefweb (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2023-09-01
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
UNHCR (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees), Human Rights and international relations
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"(Geneva, August 31 2023) – The Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC) condemns new use of cluster munitions by the Myanmar government’s armed forces and calls for an immediate end to use of this prohibited weapon. A new report by the CMC’s monitoring wing shows how Myanmar’s armed forces have used an apparently domestically produced cluster bomb in attacks in several parts of the country since 2021, including as recently as early June 2023.
“Myanmar’s production and use of cluster bombs is gravely concerning as these indiscriminate weapons primarily kill and injure civilians. There can be no justification for using them,” said Dr. Yeshua Moser-Puangsuwan, Cluster Munition Monitor researcher. “All governments should condemn this use of an internationally-banned weapon.”
Cluster munitions are delivered by artillery, rockets, missiles, and aircraft. They open in mid-air and disperse dozens or hundreds of submunitions, also called bomblets, over a wide area. Many submunitions fail to explode on initial impact, leaving duds that can indiscriminately wound and kill, like landmines, for years until they are cleared and destroyed. A total of 123 countries have prohibited the weapon under the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions, but not Myanmar.
Cluster Munition Monitor has reviewed photographs showing the remnants of cluster bombs used in attacks by the Myanmar Air Force in Chin, Kayah, Kayin, and Shan states over the past 13 months. The most recent known cluster bomb attack by the Myanmar Air Force damaged a school in Kedong village tract in Kawkareik township, Kayin/Karen state on 6 June 2023. Another attack in Mindat township, Chin state in April 2023 also involved cluster bomb use. Remnants of this same type of cluster bomb were previously found in the same township after a July 2022 air attack that wounded 13 civilians, according to Amnesty International.
These attacks are part of an internal conflict that has intensified in recent months in both northwest and southeast Myanmar, resulting in civilian casualties, widespread destruction of homes and other civilian objects, and displacing people. The conflict has also been characterized by extensive new use of antipersonnel landmines by all parties.
The cluster bombs used by the Air Force look similar to other products made by Myanmar’s state-owned weapons production facility “KaPaSa” or Defence Products Industries of Myanmar, but there are no markings on the bomb remnants that show where they were manufactured or assembled.
The weapon consists of a 120mm mortar projectile with a plastic arming vane that is attached to an impact fuze that detonates each submunition on contact. Each cluster bomb has space for 12 mortar projectiles or submunitions on an internal frame. This weapon appears to meet the definition of a cluster munition under the Convention on Cluster Munitions, which prohibits a “conventional munition that is designed to disperse or release explosive submunitions each weighing less than 20 kilograms each.”
Myanmar is not known to have produced or used cluster munitions previously, although a rudimentary cluster munition adaptor was documented a decade ago. (See Cluster Munition Monitor 2013).
The Cluster Munition Monitor hs asked Myanmar's Ministry of Defence to confirm or deny its production and use of cluster bombs. No response was received as of time of publication.
At the United Nations General Assembly in November 2019, Myanmar said that it could not join the convention until a nationwide peace agreement is in place. In 2009, a Myanmar government official told a regional meeting that its forces “do not use cluster munitions.”
For further information see Cluster Munition Monitor briefing note [link].
Ends.
Note: The military regime changed the name of the country from Burma to Myanmar in 1989, but many ethnic groups in Myanmar’s border areas and a number of countries still prefer to use the name Burma.
About ICBL-CMC
The International Campaign to Ban Landmines-Cluster Munition Coalition (ICBL-CMC) works for a world free of landmines, cluster munitions, and other explosive remnants of war, where all lives are protected. A world where contaminated land is cleared and returned to local populations for productive use and where the needs of affected communities and survivors are met and their human rights guaranteed.
About the Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor (The Monitor) The Monitor is the civil society initiative providing research and monitoring for the International Campaign to Ban Landmines and the Cluster Munition Coalition (ICBL-CMC).
Cluster Munition Monitor 14th annual edition to be released on 5 September 2023 will provide a global overview of recent efforts to implement and join the ban on cluster munitions, ensure clearance of cluster munition remnants, provide risk education, and assist victims of these indiscriminate weapons.
About the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions
The convention comprehensively prohibits cluster munitions, requires destruction of stockpiles, clearance of contaminated areas, and the provision of risk reduction education and assistance for victims of the weapons. As of July 2023, 123 countries have joined the convention..."
Source/publisher:
Cluster Munition Coalition, International Campaign to Ban Landmines
Date of entry/update:
2023-08-31
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Reports and maps covering anti-personnel landmines and Burma/Myanmar, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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567.93 KB 470.19 KB
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"RE: ASEAN members and their dialogue partners are urged to end Burma/Myanmar military’s access to jet fuel and weapons ahead of ASEAN summit
Your excellencies,
We, the undersigned 149 organizations, are writing to urge prompt, coordinated actions of governments of ASEAN and ASEAN dialogue partners to bring an end to the ongoing atrocities perpetrated daily by the Burmese military.
It has been more than two years since the illegal military coup deposed Burma’s democratically-elected leaders. In that time, ASEAN and its partner governments, including the EU, US, Japan, South Korea and Australia, have failed to take sufficient actions to hold the military to account, implement the “Five Point Consensus,” and end the violence.
From September 5-7, your government will participate in the ASEAN Summit in Jakarta. We urge you to work with all government representatives present at the Summit to deliver the following:
1. A joint call from ASEAN and ASEAN dialogue partners calling for the United Nations Security Council to demonstrate their support of ASEAN, the Five-Point Consensus, and the people of Burma by keeping the situation in Burma on the agenda and introducing resolution that calls for regular meetings and an arms embargo, including a ban on aviation fuel.
2. A joint release from ASEAN governments announcing: a commitment to preventing the junta from procuring aviation fuel. This includes:
Classifying aviation fuel as a “dual-use technology” under applicable local laws;
Banning the shipment or transshipment of aviation fuel through ports in ASEAN member states;
Banning companies located in ASEAN member-states from selling or transporting aviation fuel to any entity in Myanmar; and
Banning the provision of financial services, such as maritime shipping insurance, to companies or vessels transporting aviation fuel to Burma.
3. A joint commitment from ASEAN members to further restrict the military junta’s access to funding and the international banking system. U.S. sanctions on the Myanmar Foreign Trade Bank have given ASEAN members legal cover to prevent their banks from transmitting money to the junta. ASEAN members should work with their domestic monetary authorities to ensure that domiciled banks are not making or processing payments to the junta and its affiliated entities.
The junta is using aerial attacks to target civilian-populated areas, including IDPs hiding places, and initiate conflict with local ethnic groups. In the first four months of 2023, there were 442 airstrikes. This nearly eclipses the total number of airstrikes conducted in all of 2022, which was 449.
On July 27, two schools in Karenni State were damaged due to airstrikes, with many villagers emphasizing the intentionality behind the attacks: “When they [the military] can’t establish the educational and administrative systems they want, they resort to attacking schools, hindering Karenni children from learning.” Children from Karen state have been forced to seek refuge in the seven refugee camps that line the Thai-Burma border after military attacks increased the number of school-aged refugees from 16,000 to 21,000 in just one year.
In Kachin state, military planes drop bombs in villages, killing civilians. Civilians in Shan state were killed after the military bombed villages believed to be hiding local soldiers, an accusation later disproved. In late July, over 3,000 civilians were forcibly displaced from central Burma’s Sagaing region over the span of five days of military fighting.
As the civilian death toll rises and the number of refugees and internally displaced peoples increases, it is impossible to deny that access to jet fuel is critical to support the military’s campaign of violence.
Yet governments have failed to act and companies continue to facilitate the military’s access to jet fuel. In November 2022, Amnesty International’s report, Deadly Cargo, linked jet fuel access to increasing human rights abuses; but only months later, Global Witness and Amnesty International revealed the names of several companies, including, but not limited to, Thai, Indian, and Japanese, that were still engaging in the shipment of jet fuel to the Burmese junta in March 2023. The engagement of these companies makes them complicit in the human rights abuses committed by the Burmese junta via aerial attacks throughout the country.
The United States and United Kingdom have both placed sanctions on Burmese and Singaporean entities accused of facilitating the trade in aviation fuel, while the U.S. has issued a regulatory determination threatening further sanctions against companies involved in the sale of aviation fuel into Burma. We strongly encourage ASEAN member-states to support these sanctions and work with international partners to end the trade of aviation fuel in Burma.
ASEAN, the UN, and other governments have failed the people of Burma for far too long. The country is in desperate need of support beyond arbitrary condemnations. We urge you to stand on the right side of history and act with urgency to hold the military accountable for its crimes and bring Burma the peace and justice the people of Burma deserve.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Ah Nah Podcast – Conversations with Myanmar, Ireland
ALTSEAN-Burma, Thailand
American Baptist Churches, KS, USA
American Baptist Churches, OH, USA
Arizona Kachin Community, AZ, USA
Australian Karen Organisation Inc
Bangladesh Rohingya Student Union (BRSU)
Better Burma, CA, USA
Burma Action Ireland
Burma Advocacy Group, USA
Burma Campaign UK
Burma Canadian Association of Ontario
Burma Task Force, IL, USA
Burmese American Community Institute, IN, USA
Burmese Women’s Union (BWU), Thailand
California Kachin Community, CA, USA
Calvary Burmese Church, Washington, DC
Campaign for a New Myanmar, Washington, DC, USA
Chin Association of Maryland, Inc. MD, USA
Chin Baptist Association, MD, USA
Community Rebuilding Centre, Bangladesh
Coordination Team for Emergency Relief (Karenni), Burma
Crane Center for Prevention of Mass Atrocities, CA, USA
CRPH Funding Ireland
Dallas Kachin Community, TX, USA
DEEKU-Karenni Community of Amarillo, TX, USA
Det Norsk Baptistsamfunn, Norway
DFW Kachin Baptist Church, TX
EarthRights International, Washington, DC, USA
European Karen Network, Norway
Florida Kachin Community, FL, USA
Free Burma Campaign South Africa
Georgia Kachin Community, GA, USA
Give A Helping Hand, Norway
Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, NY, USA
Houston Kachin Community, TX, USA
Human Rights Foundation of Monland, Burma
Humanity Institute, Burma
Institute for Asian Democracy, Washington, DC. USA
International Campaign for the Rohingya, Washington, DC, USA
International Karen Organization, PA, USA
Iowa Kachin Community, IA, USA
Jewish World Watch, CA, USA
Justice For All, Washington, DC. USA
K’Nyaw Baptist Church, MN
Kachin American Community (Portland – Vancouver)
Kachin Baptist Churches, MD, USA
Kachin Community of Indiana, IN, USA
Kachin Community of USA
Kachin Contextual Analysis Team, Burma
Kachin refugee committee, Malaysia
Kachin Women’s Association Thailand
Kansas Karenni community, KS, USA
Karen American Association of Wisconsin, WI, USA
Karen Association of Huron, SD, USA
Karen Baptist Church, CO
Karen Community of Canada
Karen Community in Norway
Karen Community of Akron, OH, USA
Karen Community of Georgia, GA, USA
Karen Community of Greensboro, NC, USA
Karen Community of Iowa, IA, USA
Karen Community of Kansas City, KS & MO, USA
Karen Community of Minnesota, MN, USA
Karen Human Rights Group, Burma
Karen Organization of Illinois, IL, USA
Karen Peace Support Network, Thailand
Karen Women’s Organization (KWO), Thailand
Karen Youth Education Pathways, Washington, DC, USA
Karen Youth Network, Burma
Karenni Community of Arizona, AZ, USA
Karenni Community of Arkensas, AK, USA
Karenni Community of Austin, TX, USA
Karenni Community of Bowling Green, KY, USA
Karenni Community of Buffalo, NY, USA
Karenni Community of Chicago, IL, USA
Karenni Community of Colorado, CO, USA
Karenni Community of Dallas, TX, USA
Karenni Community of Des Moines, IA, USA
Karenni Community of Florida, FL, USA
Karenni Community of Fort Worth, TX, USA
Karenni Community of Georgia, GA, USA
Karenni Community of Houston, TX, USA
Karenni Community of Idaho, ID, USA
Karenni Community of Indianapolis, IN, USA
Karenni Community of Massachusetts, MA, USA
Karenni Community of Michigan, MI, USA
Karenni community of Minnesota, MN, USA
Karenni Community of Missouri, MO, USA
Karenni Community of North Carolina, NC, USA
Karenni Community of Portland, OR, USA
Karenni Community of Rockford, IL, USA
Karenni Community of San Antonio, TX, USA
Karenni Community of Sioux Falls, SD, USA
Karenni Community of Utah, UT, USA
Karenni Community of Utica, NY, USA
Karenni Community of Washington, WA, USA
Karenni Community of Wisconsin, WI, USA
Karenni Human Rights Group, Burma
Karenni National Women’s Organization (KNWO), Thailand
Karenni Society of Omaha, NE, USA
Karenni-American Association, USA, USA
Kayan Women’s Organization (KyWO), Burma
Kentucky Kachin Community, KY, USA
Kuki Women’s Human Rights Organization (KWHRO), Burma
L’chaim! Jews Against the Death Penalty
Lahu Women’s Organization (LWO)
Louisiana Kachin Community, LA, USA
Maryland Kachin Community, MD, USA
Michigan Kachin Community, MI, USA
Milwaukee Myanmar Christian Church, WI, USA
Mingalarama Wiharra Monastery, MD, USA
Minnesota Kachin Community, MN, USA
Myanmar Campaign Network, Australia
Myanmar Christian Church of Metro Chicago, IL, USA
Never Again Coalition, OR, USA
New York Kachin Community, NY, USA
No Business With Genocide, Washington, DC, USA
North Carolina Kachin Community, NA, USA
NUG and CRPH Supporters Ireland
Omaha Kachin Community, NE, USA
Overseas Burmese Christian Fellowship, MA
Pa-O Women’s Union (PWU), Burma
Peace and Justice Committee, KY, USA
Pennsylvania Kachin Community, PA, USA
Reconstructionist Rabbinical Association
Rohingya Action Ireland
Rohingya Students Network, Bangladesh
Shan Women’s Action Network (SWAN), Thailand
South Carolina Kachin Community, SC, USA
Ta’ang Women’s Organization (TWO), Burma
Tavoy Women’s Union (TWU)
Temple Beth Tikvah, Roswell, GA
Temple Habonim, Barrington, RI
Tennessee Kachin Community, TN, USA
U.S. Campaign for Burma, Washington, DC, USA
Unitarian Universalist Association, NY, USA
Unitarian Universalist Service Committee, MA, USA
Unitarian Universalist Women’s Federation, WI, USA
United States Chin Coalition, IN, USA
UU College of Social Justice, MA, USA
UU Mass Action, MA, USA
UU Society of Oneonta NY, USA
Virginia Kachin Community, VA, USA
Washington Kachin Community, WA, USA
West Virginia Kachin Community, WV, USA
Women for Justice (WJ), Burma
Women’s League of Burma, Thailand
Women’s Peace Network, Washington, DC. USA..."
Source/publisher:
Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, Kachin Women's Association Thailand, Karen Human Rights Group, Shan Women's Action Network
Date of entry/update:
2023-08-31
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Education in Burma/Myanmar - general, Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
Local URL:
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"ASEAN is planning to hold a conference of air force chiefs in Naypyidaw from September 12-15, chaired by the commander-in-chief of the illegal Myanmar junta’s air force, according to a Justice For Myanmar source.
Justice For Myanmar demands ASEAN cancel the conference and strongly condemns the bloc’s continued and direct support for the Myanmar junta’s air force, army and navy as it wages a campaign of terror against the people, committing ongoing war crimes and crimes against humanity with total impunity.
The ASEAN Air Chiefs Conference (AACC) is currently chaired by the junta’s air force head, General Htun Aung, a war criminal who has commanded indiscriminate air strikes across Myanmar since his appointment in January 2022.
Evidence of Htun Aung’s direct commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity is extensive.
Data from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) shows that there were 930 airstrikes between January 10, 2022 and July 31, 2023, under Htun Aung’s command, killing close to 1,000 people.
Through an indiscriminate campaign of aerial terror, Htun Aung has commanded the slaughter of men, women and children, and destroyed homes, schools, places of worship and whole communities.
Htun Aung was in command for the aerial massacre on April 11, 2023 against a civilian gathering in Pazigyi village, Sagaing Region, murdering at least 168 people, including 40 children.
And in command for the aerial massacre on October 24, 2022 against those gathered for a concert in Hpakant, Kachin State, killing more than 80.
And in command for the aerial massacre on September 16, 2022 against a school in Let Yet Kone village, Sagaing Region, killing at least 12 people.
The ASEAN Chair issued a statement strongly condemning the junta's Pazigyi massacre. Yet it is now honouring one of the main perpetrators.
Htun Aung is currently sanctioned by the US, UK, EU and Canada.
ASEAN’s decision to appoint Htun Aung as the chair of AACC on November 4, 2022, and to allow him to convene a meeting of ASEAN air force commanders, is further evidence of the bloc knowingly supporting the junta’s international crimes.
ASEAN’s planned air force chiefs’ conference is part of its extensive program of defence and security cooperation in which the illegitimate junta plays a leading role. The junta currently heads ASEAN air force, navy, military counter terrorism and police cooperation.
In August, ASEAN held a counter terrorism military training exercise in Naypyidaw, and is now planning to hold a counter terrorism field training exercise in Russia from September 25-30, both co-chaired by the military junta.
In May, ASEAN appointed the junta’s navy head to chair the ASEAN Navy Chiefs Meeting, and the junta is set to host a conference of ASEAN navy chiefs in 2024.
In March 2022, Myanmar junta police brigadier general Zaw Lin Tun was appointed executive director of the police cooperation body, ASEANPOL.
Myanmar and international civil society organisations have repeatedly denounced ASEAN’s defence cooperation with the illegal military junta, called for the junta’s exclusion from ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM) activities, and urged countries to boycott ADMM activities that include the junta.
In an oral update to the UN Human Rights Council in July 2023, the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar slammed ASEAN’s appointment of Htun Aung as AACC chair, stating that “those responsible for these atrocities should not be serving in leadership positions in ASEAN. They should be serving sentences for their crimes.”
Justice For Myanmar spokesperson Yadanar Maung says: “By proceeding with this air force conference and other military and police engagement with the junta, ASEAN and its member states are showing a callous disregard for the lives of Myanmar people and actively undermining its own commitments to resolve the crisis in Myanmar through the Five Point Consensus.
“ASEAN has tried to excuse military engagement with the junta by claiming it is technical and not political. This is insulting to the people of Myanmar who are victims of the junta’s daily attacks. It is an untenable position that in no way can excuse ASEAN’s support for the terrorist junta and complicity in its international crimes.
“There is no denying that ASEAN is legitimising and emboldening war criminals through its defence and security cooperation, endangering the lives of Myanmar people and worsening the crisis.
"Indonesia as the Chair of the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting must immediately cancel the air chief’s meeting, the counter terrorism field training exercise and ban the junta from all activities.
“ASEAN members should boycott the air chiefs’ meeting if it goes ahead and refuse to attend all other ADMM activities that include the illegal junta.”..."
Source/publisher:
Justice For Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2023-08-31
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
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Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations, ASEAN-Burma relations
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"US President Joe Biden’s decision to skip Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)-related summits in the Indonesian capital Jakarta on Sept. 5-7 in favor of the G-20 leaders’ meeting in India just two days later has been greeted with howls of disappointment and criticism around Southeast Asian capitals and elsewhere that are concerned about America’s role in the region.
Biden’s unwillingness to show up is said to undermine “ASEAN centrality”, the notion that the bloc should be the main convening platform for promoting regional peace and security.
It would of course be ideal to have the American president take part in the ASEAN-US summit and the East Asia Summit—the latter a preeminent strategic dialogue which also includes Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, Russia, and South Korea, apart from ASEAN member states.
But ASEAN centrality can no longer be taken for granted or simply assumed to hold. It increasingly has to be earned. First and foremost among ASEAN’s critical shortcomings is its inability to address the Myanmar coup that occurred in February 2021, and the raging and violent civil war that has ensued ever since.
It is common knowledge that ASEAN has been divided on both the United States-China competition and conflict, and the Russian aggression against Ukraine. Brunei, Laos and Cambodia appear to be in China’s orbit, whereas the rest more or less lean towards the US, especially the Philippines and Vietnam.
Myanmar is an outcast, while Thailand has been more inclined towards Beijing than it needs to be since the military coup in 2014. On the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Laos and Vietnam have abstained from key United Nations resolutions to condemn the aggression, with Thailand joining the abstainers on one of the resolutions. Singapore is at the opposite end, putting its money where its mouth is by imposing sanctions on Russia.
Notwithstanding these and other issues that have split ASEAN, such as human rights and China-Taiwan tensions, the most critical ASEAN divisiveness centers on Myanmar, because the war-torn country is a member state. If ASEAN cannot get its house in order with sufficient unity and common purpose, then it should not and cannot claim a central regional role to promote peace and security.
Indonesia’s chairmanship this year has fallen short in effecting dialogue and a way forward in Myanmar. The Indonesian government did try, however, and should not be blamed for the lack of concrete results, because Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, the head of the junta known as the State Administration Council, has been devious and intransigent.
He has taken ASEAN for a ride by agreeing to the Five-Point Consensus (5PC), which he personally signed on to after it was brokered by Brunei in April 2021. The 5PC calls for the cessation of violence, inclusive dialogue, humanitarian assistance, an ASEAN envoy, and a delegation visit to promote compromise and a way out.
Yet the 5PC has floundered. Gen. Min Aung Hlaing’s apparent strategy is to exhaust and outlast other players in the mix. He has been instrumentally assisted by Thailand’s outgoing Foreign Minister Don Pramudwinai and his envoy for Myanmar, Pornpimol Kanchanalak. The pair have organised and facilitated “Track 1.5” policy-related meetings and even ministerial gatherings to lend legitimacy to the SAC.
Upholding the 5PC as the way to deal with Myanmar, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore have steadfastly refused to join the Thailand-hosted meetings. The Philippines falls in the same category, except Manila sent a mid-level diplomat to take part in one of the meetings.
Under Thailand’s newly elected government, headed by Prime Minister Srettha Thavisin, who has already stated his intention of restoring his country’s international standing, the ASEAN mix on Myanmar will likely be different. If the Philippines can stay the 5PC course, with Thailand’s recalibrated foreign policy posture and projection, including its approach towards the Myanmar junta, there will be a fundamental flip, whereby firm 5PC backers will be the five original founding members of ASEAN.
The alignment of the original ASEAN-5 can bring a lot of diplomatic heft to the table. This is the way to reboot and recover ASEAN momentum. In turn, the ASEAN-5 from August 1967 can pressure the SAC to implement the 5PC, which Gen. Min Aung Hlaing duplicitously agreed to. The ASEAN-5 should also engage the National Unity Government (NUG), especially if Myanmar’s civilian-led parallel administration can be revamped for greater effectiveness. Indonesia and Malaysia have already interacted with the NUG.
These two staunch ASEAN member states, along with Singapore, have maintained what’s left of ASEAN’s credibility and relevance by sticking to the 5PC and not recognizing the SAC and Gen. Min Aung Hlaing as Myanmar’s legitimate government. If the Philippines and Thailand, both with democratically elected governments, can follow suit, ASEAN centrality will be given a big boost. Other ASEAN member states can come in as they see fit. But they should not be allowed to hold ASEAN hostage on the Myanmar impasse because the 5PC was signed by representatives from each of the 10 member states.
A newly configured regional grouping led by the ASEAN-5 will have the leverage and latitude to bring Gen. Min Aung Hlaing to heel because his military regime is losing in the country’s civil war. Reliable reports and datapoints suggest the ubiquitous People’s Defence Force units and ethnic armies are winning more territory and keeping Myanmar troops pinned down, and the latter are reluctant to fight without armour or air support. With a coup that has failed to consolidate and impose control over his territory and population, Gen. Min Aung Hlaing is vulnerable.
Getting its act together on Myanmar would enable ASEAN to be taken more seriously. Dissatisfaction with ASEAN centrality has manifested in other forms of “minilateral” cooperation among outside powers, including the Quad among Australia, India, Japan and the US, and Aukus, a security pact of Australia, the United Kingdom and the US. If ASEAN wants to be back at the front and center in the region, it will need to regroup around the original core five states. The old ASEAN way of consensus and non-interference would need to be tweaked and nuanced correspondingly..."
Source/publisher:
"The Bangkok Post" via "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2023-08-31
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Human Rights and international relations, ASEAN-Burma relations
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"In the South-East, the number of IDPs increased from 513,000 last week to 515,600 this week.
In Mon State, about 2,400 IDPs were verified in Thaton Township. Among them, 450 were displaced within the township while 1,900 IDPs originated from Bilin Township. In Bago Region (East), intensified fighting displaced 30 people from Thandaunggyi Township in Kayin State to Taungoo Township. In Kayin State, 150 people from two villages in Thandaunggyi Township were displaced within the township due to intensified fighting. Across the border, about 9,400 people from Myanmar remain displaced in Mae Hong Son Province, Thailand..."
Source/publisher:
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (Geneva) via Reliefweb (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2023-08-31
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
UNHCR (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees), Burma: Internal displacement/forced migration of several ethnic groups., Human Rights and international relations
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"OVERVIEW
The humanitarian crisis in Myanmar deteriorated significantly throughout the first half of 2023. Escalating clashes and attacks have had dire consequences for millions of civilians who are enduring widespread insecurity and aerial bombardment, mass displacement, and limited access to critical services, including health. In May, the situation was further exacerbated by extremely severe cyclone Mocha, the worst natural disaster in Myanmar in over a decade. The cyclone devastated communities across Rakhine, the Northwest and Kachin with thousands of homes, productive assets, vast swathes of farmland, and critical infrastructure such as hospitals and schools destroyed or severely damaged. Cyclone Mocha rolled back some limited gains of recent years especially around agriculture and livelihoods, and added an additional 500,000 people to the humanitarian target for 2023 (now 5 million people). The first half of 2023 also saw surging inflation nationwide that further disrupted livelihood activities and depleted coping capacity, leaving more people than ever needing humanitarian assistance.
Between January and June 2023 alone, the number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) climbed to nearly 1.9 million (as of end of June) up from just over 1.5 million in late December 2022, increasing needs and further stretching already lean humanitarian resources. The spike in displacement aligns with a surge in conflict during the first half of the year, with the Northwest and Southeast being most affected. Humanitarian operations and personnel were also targeted or heavily affected by conflict, bureaucratic impediments and restrictions. Between January and June, humanitarian organizations reported about 630 access incidents across the country (60 per cent of which occurred in Q2), impeding the delivery of vital assistance and services to affected people particularly in Rakhine, the Northwest and Southeast regions.
Despite multiple challenges in the operating context and severe underfunding, humanitarian partners have continued to rapidly scale up in response to the deepening needs, reaching at least 1.8 million people during the first half of 2023. This represents 36 per cent of the 5 million people targeted for assistance through the combined 2023 HRP and Cyclone Mocha Flash Appeal. However, this assistance is not as deep, sustained, or multi-sectoral as planned due to access blockages and this is a major impediment to addressing needs. The Food Security Cluster accounts for the highest proportion of the reported mid-year result (about 1.2 million) followed by the Protection (more than 929,000) and WASH Clusters (around 637,000). These figures are based on self-reporting by partners and the number of operational partners, particularly local organizations who are reporting, has now jumped to 208 (up from 156 in Q1). Despite this improvement, some response efforts are still likely to be missed in these calculations.
The coverage of the response reflects the prioritization of the most vulnerable groups, particularly IDPs and ‘non-displaced stateless people’, with partners collectively reaching 42 per cent of the targets for these population groups. The reach for the ‘other crisis-affected people’ and ‘returned, resettled, and locally integrated IDPs’ is much lower at 33 per cent and 10 per cent respectively. Despite the multiple constraints and impediments, partners have prioritized and marginally scaled up responses across some of the areas of highest needs in Rakhine, the Southeast (Kayah, Kayin), and the Northwest (Chin, Magway, Sagaing), and northern Shan during the first half of the year.
The 2023 HRP remains drastically underfunded, with only 20 per cent of the requirements received by the end of June, according to FTS (22 per cent funded as of August). This dire funding situation is despite the deepening needs, the surge in displacement, cyclone Mocha impacts, and soaring inflation that have further stretched the grossly insufficient resources across clusters. Heading into the second half of the year, partners will be forced to further reduce coverage and packages of assistance if immediate and sufficient funding is not received, leaving large numbers of vulnerable households without the critical services and support they need to survive..."
Source/publisher:
UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (New York) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2023-08-31
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Education in Burma/Myanmar - general, Public Health, Food Security and nutrition in Burma/Myanmar, Human Rights and international relations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)
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"Seventy-eighth session
Item 73 (c) of the provisional agenda*
Promotion and protection of human rights: human rights
situations and reports of special rapporteurs and representatives
Summary
The present report is submitted pursuant to General Assembly resolution 77/227 and covers the period from 15 August 2022 to 14 August 2023. In addition to the human rights situation of Rohingya Muslims and other minorities, the report focuses on the continued deterioration of the political, humanitarian and security situation in Myanmar following the military takeover in February 2021, including further restrictions of human rights and the worsening of socioeconomic conditions. There is an urgent need for safe, full and unhindered humanitarian access to vulnerable communities in line with international principles. That urgency has been compounded by the devastation caused by Cyclone Mocha in May 2023. The report highlights the continued brutal repression by the military. Thousands have been killed since February 2021, including children, with reports of increased sexual and gender-based violence committed by the military while civic space continues to shrink. The multifaceted crisis in Myanmar continues to yield serious regional implications, including displacement and the proliferation of illicit activities. Since February 2021, more than 64,000 people have fled and remain outside of Myanmar. More than 1.6 million people have been internally displaced. Rohingya people remained displaced domestically and abroad, including nearly 1 million Rohingya in Bangladesh. While peaceful opposition to the military persisted, armed resistance expanded, adding to an already precarious situation. There has been no meaningful action by the military to address the root causes that led to the forced displacement of the Rohingya population. The United Nations will continue to stand in solidarity with the people of Myanmar and to support their democratic aspirations for an inclusive, peaceful and just society and the protection of all communities, including the Rohingya. As part of this effort, the Organization will seek to further strengthen cooperation with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations towards de-escalating the violence and reaching a sustainable political solution in line with relevant General Assembly resolutions and Security Council resolution 2669 (2022).
I. Introduction
1. The present report is submitted pursuant to General Assembly resolution 77/227, in which the Assembly requested the Secretary-General to continue to provide his good offices and pursue discussions relating to Myanmar, involving all relevant stakeholders, and to offer assistance to Myanmar, and to submit a report to the General Assembly on all relevant issues addressed in the resolution at its seventy-eighth session. The present report covers the period from 15 August 2022 to 14 August 2023.
2. During the reporting period, the political, security, humanitarian and human rights situation in Myanmar deteriorated further, and socioeconomic conditions worsened, affecting regional stability, in particular in terms of increased illicit activities. Armed conflict and violence continued to intensify, displacing communities across Myanmar, with many seeking asylum across borders. The devastation caused by Cyclone Mocha in May 2023 and access constraints compounded multiple vulnerabilities in conflict-affected areas.
3. Myanmar remains extremely vulnerable to natural disasters, including cyclones, flooding, extreme temperatures and droughts, disproportionately affecting the most vulnerable. The collapse of many rule of law and regulatory safeguards since the military takeover has also resulted in the illegal exploitation of natural resources.
4. The Secretary-General and his Special Envoy continued to condemn all forms of violence and reiterated calls for the military to respect the will of the people, to refrain from repression and to act in the greater interest of peace and stability in Myanmar and the region. In a statement ahead of 1 February 2023, which marked two years since the military takeover, the Secretary-General expressed his ongoing solidarity with the people of Myanmar in support of their democratic aspirations for an inclusive, peaceful and just society and the protection of all communities, including the Rohingya. He called for the release of all those arbitrarily detained, including President Win Myint and State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi.
5. The Secretary-General has called for neighbouring countries and other Member States to leverage their influence over the military leadership. The Secretary-General drew global attention to Myanmar as the multifaceted crisis continued to unfold, including through his strong condemnation of large-scale aerial attacks by the military and his expression of deep concern about the ongoing political repression.
6. On 21 December 2022, the Security Council adopted resolution 2669 (2022), in which it demanded an immediate end to all forms of violence throughout the country and urged restraint and de-escalation of tensions, while acknowledging the central role of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), including its five -point consensus on Myanmar. The Council further urged the military to immediately release all arbitrarily detained prisoners, including President Win Myint and State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi, and reiterated its call to uphold democratic institutions and processes and to pursue constructive dialogue and reconciliation in accordance with the will and interests of the people of Myanmar. The Council also requested the Secretary-General, in coordination with the ASEAN Special Envoy, to report orally to the Council by 15 March 2023. The Council convened a private meeting on 13 March 2023 and heard briefings from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Indonesia, in her capacity as the representative of the ASEAN Chair, and from the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General. The Council also met twice in closed consultations to consider the situation in Myanmar during the reporting period.
8. On 15 December 2022, the annual General Assembly adopted by consensus resolution 77/227 on the situation of human rights of Rohingya Muslims and other minorities in Myanmar.
9. The Special Envoy briefed the General Assembly on 25 October 2022 and 16 March 2023, and called for regional unity and international coherence in support of a process led by Myanmar to end the violence and return to the path of democracy. The Special Envoy also emphasized the need for the delivery of humanitarian assistance through all available channels and the protection of civilians.
10. The Special Envoy visited Myanmar from 16 to 18 August 2022 and met with the Commander-in-Chief of the Myanmar armed forces, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, to press for full and unimpeded humanitarian access and stress that progress depended on an end to the violence and visible and significant improvements in the lives of the people of Myanmar. Following the execution of pro-democracy activists in late July 2022, which the Secretary-General strongly condemned, the Special Envoy urged the Senior General to impose a moratorium on executions. She also reiterated the call of the Secretary-General for the release of all political prisoners. The Special Envoy further highlighted the responsibility of Myanmar to create conditions conducive to the voluntary, safe, dignified and sustainable return of refugees. Her visit was preceded by consultations with a range of stakeholders, including the National Unity Government and key ethnic armed organizations.
11. The Special Envoy visited Bangladesh from 22 to 26 August 2022 to engage with refugees in Cox’s Bazar and highlight the need for greater responsibility-sharing, while recognizing the continued generosity of that country. On 21 and 22 February 2023, the Special Envoy visited Saudi Arabia to discuss potential cooperation with the Organization of Islamic Cooperation on educational opportunities for Rohingya refugees. The Special Envoy also visited Indonesia from 4 to 6 April to strengthen cooperation with the ASEAN Chair and the ASEAN Special Envoy on Myanmar. She visited China and India from 1 to 3 May and on 9 and 10 May, respectively, to call for strengthened regional unity to respond to the crisis in Myanmar.
12. The Secretary-General and his Special Envoy repeatedly cautioned against proceeding with any electoral process without a genuine, inclusive political dial ogue and conditions that permitted citizens to freely exercise their political rights without fear or intimidation, as this risked further exacerbating violence and instability.
13. On 11 November 2022, ASEAN leaders attending the fortieth and forty-first ASEAN Summits reaffirmed the need to implement the five-point consensus “in its entirety” and requested ASEAN foreign ministers to develop “an implementation plan that outlines concrete, practical and measurable indicators with a specific timeline”. In his address to ASEAN leaders, the Secretary-General reiterated his support for ASEAN playing a vital role in contributing to multilateral solutions to respond to the political, security, human rights and humanitarian situation in Myanmar.
14. ASEAN leaders met again from 9 to 11 May 2023 and, in a statement by the Chair, reiterated their “unified position” that the ASEAN five-point consensus remained their “main reference” in addressing developments in Myanmar, and supported the Chair’s continued engagement with all stakeholders in Myanmar to find a peaceful and durable solution. In a statement following their meeting of 11 and 12 July 2023, ASEAN foreign ministers “urged all parties involved to take concrete action to immediately halt indiscriminate violence, denounce any escalation, and create a conducive environment for the delivery of humanitarian assistance and inclusive national dialogue”.
15. The United Nations is committed to staying in Myanmar and addressing the multiple vulnerabilities arising from the actions of the military since February 2021. Humanitarian and community resilience needs increased significantly during the reporting period, while the United Nations and other operational partners faced greater constraints and risks in delivering assistance. Despite these factors, the United Nations continued to deliver support to the people of Myanmar and scaled up the response, reaching 4.4 million people in 2022 and a further 1.8 million people in the first six months of 2023. The State Administration Council continued to limit access to affected populations in many parts of the country, including in the wake of Cyclone Mocha, which caused significant damage in many parts of Myanmar. In May, unidentified assailants attacked an ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management convoy under military escort, underscoring the challenges in delivering assistance in a complex security environment. Since February 2021, the military has enacted numerous measures, including an extension of the state of emergency and the introduction of martial law in 47 townships as of the end of February 2023, alongside Internet shutdowns in over 20 townships, eroding civic space and restricting the exercise of human rights, such as the rights to freedom of opinion and expression and freedom of peaceful assembly and association. During the reporting period, the introduction of an organization registration law established new, cumbersome administrative steps to register and re-register civil society organizations and international non-governmental organizations, and imposed severe criminal penalties for non-compliance, including prison sentences.
16. Elections initiated by the State Administration Council appear unlikely to occur this year. The military had pledged elections as part of its five-point road map, but the efforts of the State Administration Council to consolidate control included revisions to the election law that led to the dissolution of some of the most popularly supported political parties, including the ousted National League for Democracy. The extension of the state of emergency, and the sustained offensive against the resistance, including ongoing aerial bombardment in civilian populated areas, continued to drive conflict and violence throughout the country.
17. The State Administration Council continued its engagement with select ethnic armed organizations signatory to the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement, inviting their leaders to what it described as peace talks in Nay Pyi Taw. Key ethnic armed organizations, especially those engaged in active conflict, including several signatories to the Agreement, declined to participate. The State Administration Council has excluded key resistance movements, including the National Unity Government, as well as the National Unity Consultative Council and the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, foreclosing the opportunity for genuine and inclusive dialogue. The State Administration Council continues to designate the National Unity Government, the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, and the People’s Defence Forces as “terrorist organizations”.
18. Ethnic states in border areas, as well as central Myanmar regions, including Sagaing and Magway, remain among the most affected by armed conflict, refl ecting sustained opposition to the Myanmar military. Resistance forces, including selfdeclared People’s Defence Forces in these areas, have increased their collaboration with established ethnic armed organizations, and some of these forces have grown increasingly sophisticated, utilizing new technologies and accessing regional arms markets. Some resistance groups are also carrying out attacks on targets they perceive as pro-military as the State Administration Council continues to support and reportedly increasingly rely on militias that work alongside security forces. Such groups include the Pyu Saw Htee militia, which includes military veterans and supporters active in Sagaing and Magwe, as well as several other militias allegedly responsible for targeted killings, notably of civilians, elsewhere in the country.
19. Despite efforts by the Myanmar armed forces to assert control, popular support for the resistance persisted, which also affected key allies, including the Border Guard Forces. In June, armed personnel from the military-aligned Border Guard Forces in Kayah State broke ranks and fought alongside resistance forces against military targets. The defection, assessed by some as the first substantial defection from the Border Guard Forces since the military takeover, reflected the competing pressures faced by some allies of the Myanmar armed forces.
20. Throughout the reporting period, there continued to be credible reports of aerial bombardments, large-scale burning of villages, killings of civilians, and sexual and gender-based violence by the Myanmar armed forces. There were also reports of resistance groups using violence and committing human rights abuses. The Secretary - General has called on all sides to exercise maximum restraint and to desist from any form of violence and focus on reducing the suffering of the people as a prerequisite for sustainable peace.
21. Reflective of growing social cohesion across ethnic and political party lines, several key ethnic armed organizations, the National Unity Government and civil society organizations articulated several proposals aimed at fostering domestic political coherence and responding to the increasing humanitarian and protection needs of the most vulnerable communities, including by working with the Un ited Nations, ASEAN and neighbouring countries.
22. For example, National Unity Government and National Unity Consultative Council members, including representatives of women’s groups, labour groups and ethnic armed organizations, formed a joint coordination committee on humanitarian assistance to coordinate policy in relation to the delivery of aid to communities affected by human-made and natural disasters. The National Unity Government and several key ethnic armed organizations, including the Chin National Front, the Karen National Union and the Karenni National Progressive Party, conducted a joint humanitarian assessment of the most vulnerable areas of Myanmar and shared it with international actors. This group, together with humanitarian civil society organizations, continued to promote an inclusive humanitarian forum led by Myanmar aimed at addressing vulnerabilities through all channels, including credible, locally led organizations.
23. In Rakhine State, there was some incremental improvement in freedom of movement for the Rohingya owing to improved intercommunal relations in certain areas. However, no discernible efforts were noted on the part of the military to address the structural issues that impede the peace and prosperity of Rakhine State and that disproportionately affect Rohingya communities.
24. Civil and citizenship documentation remained inaccessible for the vast majority of the Rohingya owing to complicated and lengthy procedures, as well as prohibitive costs. Citizenship application remains contingent on possessing the National Verification Card or Identity Card for National Verification, which continue to designate Rohingya as “Bengali”. Rohingya communities continued to face significant challenges in registering the births of their children and updating household lists, which affects their freedom of movement, access to services, school enrolment and civil and other key documentation, including with regard to housing, land and property.
25. Cyclone Mocha caused significant damage in Rakhine State, with Rohingya in internally displaced persons camps among the worst affected. The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs estimated that almost 5.4 million people were in the cyclone’s path in Rakhine and north-west Myanmar. In response, humanitarian partners issued a flash appeal to assist 1.6 million people in the affected areas, including 1.1 million already targeted as part of the Myanmar humanitarian response plan for 2023. The combined humanitarian response plan and flash appeal for 2023 would assist 5 million people and require $887 million. As at 14 August 2023, the combined response plan was only 25 per cent funded.
26. The retraction by the State Administration Council of initial approval for the cyclone-related distribution and transportation plans of the United Nations and the temporary suspension of travel authorizations for humanitarian organizations in Rakhine impeded the humanitarian response and compounded the already dire living conditions of the cyclone-affected population. Despite restrictions, humanitarians reached almost 607,000 people with food assistance in Rakhine, and more than 274,000 people with shelter support, while support was provided in other areas, including health care, nutrition, and short- and long-term recovery and communitybased resilience support. The Resident Coordinator and Humanitarian Coordinator ad interim for Myanmar called on the State Administration Council to urgently reconsider its decision to deny access.
27. The Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Myanmar, Noeleen Heyzer, concluded her assignment on 12 June 2023. The Secretary-General is thankful to Ms. Heyzer for her tireless efforts on behalf of peace and the people of Myanmar..."
Source/publisher:
UN General Assembly
Date of entry/update:
2023-08-31
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Education in Burma/Myanmar - general, Public Health, Armed conflict and peace-building in Burma - theoretical, strategic and general, Human Rights and international relations
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pdf
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298.13 KB
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Description:
"When the Rohingya refugee response began in 2017, many agencies identified the language dynamics as a significant challenge. Translators without Borders’ (TWB) first review of lessons learned uncovered key insights on differences between women’s and men’s comprehension of second languages, the importance of verbal communication in the Rohingya language, and the need to adequately support responders tasked with facilitating multilingual interactions.
This learning review builds on insights from a further five years of evidence generation on language and communication barriers in the response, including TWB/CLEAR Global’s research, reports from other responding organizations, and sectoral coordination documents. It summarizes key findings on language and communication, recommendations of good practices, successes and challenges to implementing these, and remaining knowledge gaps..."
Source/publisher:
CLEAR Global
Date of entry/update:
2023-08-30
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Discrimination against the Rohingya, Rohingya (cultural, political etc.), Human Rights and international relations
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Description:
"Myanmar’s civilian National Unity Government (NUG) aims to bankrupt the junta through tougher sanctions and diplomatic pressure, foreign minister Daw Zin Mar Aung told the media on Tuesday.
“We aim to increase our efforts to lobby the international community to impose more economic sanctions and more diplomatic pressure upon the military council, which is oppressing the people and committing violence,” said Daw Zin Mar Aung.
She said the NUG will engage with any country that supports efforts to end military rule in Myanmar.
The US expanded its sanctions on August 23 to aviation fuel, adding two Burmese business owners and three companies that supply jet fuel to the regime to its Specially Designated Nationals List.
The US was the first country to impose sanctions after the February 1, 2021, coup with measures taken against Myanmar’s top 10 generals by February 11.
The UK and Canada also imposed sanctions on the generals by February 18.
Further sanctions against the regime’s leaders, advisers, the children of junta leader Min Aung Hlaing and military-owned conglomerates followed from the US, UK and European Union in March and April.
In May 2021, the US issued further sanctions on more junta members and its ruling body.
The EU sanctioned junta cabinet ministers and the attorney general in June 2021 and in July the US sanctioned more junta members, their relatives and Chinese firms.
In September 2021 the UK sanctioned Tay Za, a notorious junta crony, and his businesses for providing financial support and arms to the military.
To mark a year since the coup, the US, UK and Canada sanctioned three junta appointees while Washington also targeted four businessmen who were supporting the regime and two organizations providing arms and equipment.
The EU sanctioned more companies, including the junta-controlled Myanma Oil and Gas Enterprise.
In June 2022 the UK sanctioned three firms from Russia and three from Myanmar for supplying aircraft parts to the junta. The UK expanded these measures a month later to other junta-linked companies.
In October the US placed arms dealers in Myanmar on its sanctions blacklist and in November the US and EU extended sanctions, targeting the Sky Aviator aviation company and its owner and 19 other individuals, including a minister and the chief justice.
To mark two years since the coup, the EU imposed further sanctions on junta members, its arms brokers and jet fuel suppliers.
In June this year, the US sanctioned the junta’s defense ministry and the regime-run Myanma Foreign Trade Bank and Myanma Investment and Commercial Bank, which handle the junta’s foreign currency exchanges. Last month the EU sanctioned six more junta members.
The NUG’s foreign ministry thanked the countries imposing sanctions upon junta assets, individuals and allied businesses.
Daw Zin Mar Aung said the NUG is also working with regional neighbors, although only East Timor has officially recognized the civilian government.
“No neighboring countries have officially recognized us yet but they are communicating with us. We need to maintain these relations through engagement, proceeding silently,” she said.
Daw Zin Mar Aung praised Indonesia, the current Association of Southeast Asian Nations chair, for its active role in Myanmar’s crisis. She called for the progress to be continued next year when Laos is chair.
“The military council has not respected ASEAN’s five-point consensus and it does not listen to anyone or anybody,” she said. “We urge ASEAN to keep up its progress and maintain institutional relations with the NUG as well.”..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2023-08-30
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Business and the Military, Sanctions, The Burmese military's role in the economy, Human Rights and international relations
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Sub-title:
Revolutionary forces have seen notable successes in some areas, while struggling to gain traction in others.
Description:
"On May 5, 2021, Myanmar’s parallel government, the National Unity Government (NUG), established its armed wing, the People’s Defense Force (PDF), with the aim of overthrowing the military regime that seized power in a coup on February 1, 2021. Led by members of the ousted National League for Democracy (NLD) government, the NUG has built a strong military partnership with four long-standing ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) known as the K3C: the Kachin Independence Organization (K), the Karen National Union, the Karenni National Progressive Party, and the Chin National Front. The NUG is also collaborating less visibly with other EAOs, mostly those that enjoy close ties to China.
Though the military still controls the country’s major cities and assets after two years of battle, resistance groups have slowly taken control of territory, including border areas and some towns in ethnic states, in addition to the territories that have long been under the control of allied EAOs. As territorial competition has intensified, so have human rights breaches and humanitarian crises. As of July 30, the United Nations estimated that there were now 1.9 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Myanmar, 1.59 million of whom had been displaced since the coup. On the human rights front, a local NGO reported that 3,850 civilians had been killed for opposing the junta; at least 24,100 had been arrested, of whom 158 had been sentenced to death. In addition, approximately 70,324 houses and buildings had been torched by the military as of May 31. In fact, all those numbers mostly represent open sources and Myanmar military abuses, not counting opposition violations, which were of course relatively insignificant. What the current political climate suggests is that the country’s struggle will not end anytime soon.
Throughout the world’s history, different factors have contributed to the success or failure of armed revolutions, and this article reviews the strengths and weaknesses of the current resistance movement in five key areas.
In the aftermath of the coup, the Myanmar military, known as Tatmadaw, offered certain positions to ethnic-based political parties in the newly-formed administration in order to mitigate the political unrest in ethnic states, while anticipating anti-coup protests in the country’s Burman majority regions. The calculation was totally wrong, as the regime’s spokesperson later admitted in a media interview, as the initial protests against the military takeover evolved into a nationwide uprising. The Tatmadaw was brutal in cracking down on peaceful protestors, and yet the public continued to resist it by organizing nationwide silent protests (or uprisings) on specific days, banging pots and pans every night during a specific period, boycotting military businesses, and initiating social punishment against military associates.
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The Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) has rapidly evolved into a resistance platform for civil servants, including security forces, and the NUG claims that the number of state workers who had joined the movement reached 360,000 in mid-2021. The movement drew international attention, even being nominated for the 2022 Nobel Peace Prize. Even when the anti-coup campaign devolved into a full-fledged civil war, the people, especially Burmese expatriate communities, continued to fund both the NUG and their own ethnic-based resistance organizations. The public’s support basically ticks all the boxes for the revolution to prevail.
International Support (4/10)
Just as the people’s support was an obvious strength of Myanmar’s revolution, international assistance and support has been on the weaker side. Following the coup, protestors called widely for external armed intervention to safeguard civilians from the Tatmadaw’s inhumanity, but it was utterly unsuccessful. Under diplomatic and economic pressure, the U.S. has played a leading role in coordinating sanctions, pressuring the Tatmadaw on human rights issues, and encouraging the members of ASEAN to move forward with its Five-Point Consensus peace plan.
However, these efforts have been largely ineffective in preventing the military’s action and the U.S. has even failed to persuade its Quad partners – Australia, India, and Japan – to collaborate on a solution to the crisis. The passing of the Burma Act by the U.S. Congress remains the most significant gesture of international support, yet six months later, there has been no meaningful action or pledge under the Act. Meanwhile, the Tatmadaw has maintained close ties with neighboring countries, except Bangladesh, and imported at least $1 billion in arms since the coup, mostly from Russia ($406 million) and China ($254 million).
A Strong & Charismatic Leader (6/10)
An influential and charismatic leader is essential to uniting the populace, motivating followers, gaining international confidence, and waging psychological warfare on the enemy. The Tatmadaw was of course concerned about the anti-coup movement being led by a prominent leader, so it detained key officials and senior members of the ruling party, including the president, Win Myint, and de facto leader, Aung San Suu Kyi, on the morning of the coup.
Arrest warrants are also issued to NLD associate public figures, including Min Ko Naing, once described by The New York Times as the second most prominent opposition leader behind Aung San Suu Kyi. Though he no longer wields much weight in the aftermath of the Rohingya crisis, he was someone the public looked up to during the peaceful protest phase, but has surprisingly played no key role in the NUG.
The current acting president, Duwa Lashi La, is highly praised for his honesty, social skills, and communication skills. However, with all due respect, his appointment was widely seen as a gesture toward the Kachin Independence Organization, the NUG’s most reliable armed group partner, to which Duwa Lashi La is reportedly close. Is it time for a new leader to emerge among the NUG’s trusted armed partners? A former U.S. Ambassador to Myanmar, Scot Marciel, once said, “a unifying, charismatic figure would certainly help a great deal, as would a highly professional public communications campaign.”
Adaptability and Resilience (8/10)
By its nature, armed revolution can last much longer than anticipated, and can encounter unforeseeable challenges. Therefore, resilience and adaptation to changing circumstances is crucial for survival and eventual success. The PDF- and NUG-affiliated Local Defense Forces (LDFs) were born out of the immense need to protect civilians from the Tatmadaw’s cruelty without receiving any international aid. The presence of well-established EAOs has been crucial in terms of providing technical and moral guidance for the PDF and LDF.
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With technical support and limited materiel from EAOs, these groups have grown in numbers, manufactured military equipment, built strong coordination, built an operational structure, and developed a military code of conduct. They have attracted defectors from the security forces, with or without arms, through financial rewards and promises of protection. They have modified commercial drones and employed them on the battlefield in a variety of ways, including taking security footage, transporting equipment, and dropping improvised explosive devices. Their fierce drive and endurance gives them an edge over their enemies, who fight for money and power alone.
A Strong Chain of Command (6/10)
The coup and its subsequent bloodshed led to the establishment of approximately 309 armed groups as of November 2021, the troop number in each group could range from less than 50 to more than 1,000. After failing to create a much-anticipated Federal Army, uniting the newly formed armed groups with existing EAOs under a coordinated and cooperated chain of command, the NUG created the PDF as a precursor. As of April 2022, the NUG claimed to have consolidated an estimated 50,000–100,000 troops into its armed wing, while more than 30,000 troops are estimated to be operating outside of their chain of command. As security analyst Ye Myo Hein stated in 2022, more than 100 LDFs, or around 25 percent, had joined the NUG.
The obstacle to further mergers is the NUG’s inability to provide substantial aid. A few groups have refused to join for ideological reasons, seeing the NUG as under the NLD’s dominance. When it comes to military affairs, the NUG relies heavily on partner EAOs to set up an effective chain of command and reinforce its authority over PDFs. However, EAOs are also focusing on strengthening their parallel influence over PDFs or LDFs with technical support and arms supplies. Ye Myo Hein argues that “alliance politics in the resistance movement are still fluid and unstable,” though there are some improvements in military cooperation on the ground.
Conclusion
Myanmar’s decade-long democratic transition during the 2010s produced greater political freedom, economic prosperity, and a new educated generation, all of which have contributed to strong resistance against the return of military rule by any possible means. Resilience and determination are what have kept the revolution moving forward, in contrast to the regime soldiers, who frequently surrender or defect when faced with a crisis.
As the revolution approaches its third year, financial hardship has posed a major challenge to the resistance groups’ continued expansion and even their existence. The passage of the Burma Act was widely expected to be a watershed moment in the revolution that would address its financial burden and help the NUG to consolidate more resistance groups under one chain of command. But the implementation of the Act indicates that it is mostly intended to provide moral support to Myanmar’s opposition forces. As things stand, a power vacuum will likely persist with no side able to fill it anytime soon, leading to increased violence and instability and a worsening humanitarian crisis..."
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"The Diplomat" (Japan)
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2023-08-30
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"Myanmar’s situation is becoming more protracted as violence between the military, the People’s Defence Force (PDF), and other ethnic armed groups continues. ASEAN is actively trying for an amicable solution to end the ongoing conflict and restore peace in Myanmar. The forum has voiced its support for a political solution to the crisis.
In the ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Conference on July 12, Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi said that only a political solution could bring lasting peace to Myanmar. As the Junta chief Min Aung Hlaing is not interested in negotiating with the opposition, the five-point peace proposal given by ASEAN to restore peace in Myanmar has not yet been implemented. ASEAN calls on all member states to strongly condemn the on-going violence in Myanmar and also wants Myanmar’s conflicting parties to resume talks to reach a political settlement. Parliamentarians from ASEAN nations asked Thailand to sever ties with Myanmar’s junta-run government. They argued that no ASEAN member state should have friendly relations with Myanmar’s military because the force has turned Myanmar into a center of instability – threatening the entire region.
However, Thailand, a neighbor of Myanmar and a member of ASEAN, arranged a conference with Myanmar in December 2022 to talk about the current conflict there. Foreign Minister of Laos and Cambodia and the Deputy Foreign Minister of Vietnam along with Myanmar Junta representative were present in that meeting. Malaysia, the Philippines, Indonesia and Singapore did not participate there. As ASEAN is divided over diplomatic efforts to resolve the crisis of Myanmar, the alliance has failed to take a united stand. ASEAN is trying to bridge the divisions that have arisen among the member states over the Myanmar issue.
Chief of the Royal Thai Armed Forces, General Chalermpol Srisawat and Myanmar’s Junta Chief Min Aung Hlaing, met on January to further strengthen mutual trust, understanding and friendly relations between the two-armed forces. Myanmar has more than 2,400 kilometers of border with Thailand. Cooperation between the two countries is needed on various issues, including human trafficking, drugs, and weapons. Millions of people displaced by Myanmar’s ongoing violence seek refuge along the Thai-Myanmar border, where they fear deportation because of their lack of legal protection. Besides, Thailand has corporate investment in Myanmar totaling more than $11 billion in 154 projects, which is 12.5% of all foreign investment in Myanmar and ranks Thailand third in terms of investment.
Junta Foreign Minister Than Swe said that Myanmar’s military is focusing its efforts on three of the five ASEAN consensus points. He told that, the regime is working to end the violence in the country, initiate dialogue between all parties and provide humanitarian aid to the people of Myanmar. ASEAN welcomes any strategy, bilateral, trilateral or multilateral, based on ASEAN or non-ASEAN frameworks, to restore peace in Myanmar. At the same time, the National Unity Government (NUG) and other opposition coalitions in Myanmar along with the Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) must unite and demonstrate that they have the strength and capability to lead and protect the nation. Gaining skills in local government structure, good governance and management of federal system and dialogue between NUG and various ethnic groups will play an important role in strengthening their position.
The military coup in Myanmar has led to a wave of civil protests and armed resistance by EAOs and civil defence forces. The junta government responded brutally with hundreds of air strikes, resulting in the destruction of tens of thousands of homes. According to a report issued on July 15 by the United Nations Office for Humanitarian Affairs, 1.9 million people have been displaced in Myanmar, including 1.6 million victims of the 2021 military coup, and more than 1 million people have abandoned their homes. The Rohingyas, who fled the nation and sought asylum in Bangladesh as a result of the Myanmar junta’s cruel persecution, are excluded from this estimate. The military junta has killed 3,800 citizens and imprisoned almost 20,000 since taking power. Military personnel have destroyed around 70,000 structures. Millions of people in the country are enduring food shortages, relocation, and economic devastation as a result of the armed conflict. The country has endured international isolation and sanctions, leading in decreased foreign investment and commerce, which has harmed the economy.
The people of Myanmar have resisted to get rid of this situation. The United Nations Human Rights Council established the Independent Investigation Mechanism for Myanmar (IIMM) to gather evidence of war crimes and crimes against humanity in Myanmar. Their reports revealed the burning of entire villages, the deliberate bombing of civilian homes, and the massacre of civilians and captured combatants. After all these, the arms supply to Myanmar could not be stopped. A UN report notes that the junta government bought $1 billion worth of weapons and equipment after taking power. Many Southeast Asian countries, networks, and organizations are benefitting from the plight of the Myanmar people by supplying the junta with weapons and other equipment.
Myanmar’s junta government reneged on its promise to hold general elections in August this year, suspending the election process and extending the ongoing state of emergency for another six months. Junta Chief Min Aung Hlaing informed a top officials’ conference that the prevalence of terrorism in Myanmar has dropped as a result of ongoing actions by the military against the attacking groups. However, the country’s position has not yet returned to normal. By extending the state of emergency four times since assuming power, it is clear that the military does not have enough control over the people and most areas of the country.
The Election Commission of Myanmar removed the NLD from the list of political parties due to its failure to register with the Election Commission, making it ineligible to participate in the elections. Extending the state of emergency, according to the US, would plunge Myanmar into bloodshed and instability. Former Myanmar leader Aung San Suu Kyi was imprisoned after being ousted in a military coup in 2021. Suu Kyi was sentenced to a total of 33 years in prison at the end of the 19-count trial. In five of these criminal cases, the term of imprisonment was reduced to six years by declaring amnesty. On July 28, Suu Kyi was released from prison and taken to a government building.
In 2017, under Suu Kyi’s rule, the Myanmar military’s crackdown on the Rohingya ethnic group forced nearly 1.1 million Rohingya to seek refuge in neighboring Bangladesh. Her inability to address the armed forces’ ethnic cleansing of Rohingyas in Rakhine State sparked international outrage and criticism. Regardless, her efforts to build a democratic Myanmar are internationally acknowledged. On May 27 and June 4, Suu Kyi and senior military leaders held fruitful talks on the country’s armed conflict, public security and peace building. It is perceived that the current junta government wants to use Suu Kyi’s influence to end the armed struggle.
The international community must continue its support to restore peace and stability in Myanmar. Countries that have been helping Myanmar prolong the present conflict by providing weapons and other aid must withdraw from their positions and help fulfil the election promises made by the junta government. The UN, Western countries and donor agencies believe that a return to peace and democracy in Myanmar will accelerate Rohingya repatriation. As a neighbouring country, Bangladesh hopes for peace, progress and stability in Myanmar. Aside from the Rohingya issue, communication between the two countries can help both countries develop and progress. There is no doubt about ASEAN countries’ contribution to Myanmar’s economy. As a result, ASEAN should maintain its efforts to restore peace and stability in Myanmar. If ASEAN and other regional countries can restore peace in Myanmar, it will be a phenomenal success as well as recognition of the region’s ability to resolve crises locally..."
Source/publisher:
Eurasia Review
Date of entry/update:
2023-08-30
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The case for proactive, multilateral, pro-peace diplomacy.
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"The past two-and-a-half years have seen Myanmar enmeshed in a spiraling political crisis.
Since the 2021 coup that toppled a civilian-led government under the National League for Democracy (NLD), the country has been embroiled in a civil war during which at least 3,800 civilians have been killed by the military, and another 23,000 have been arrested. The military and affiliated forces have cracked down upon dissent, opposition, and civil society organizations that they perceive as a threat to their tenuous grip on power.
The civil war has also triggered an ongoing humanitarian crisis, with a large number of internally and externally displaced persons. Estimates suggest that up to 1.6 million people have been internally displaced since the coup. Up to 9,000 refugees are now seeking shelter in Mae Sariang district in northwestern Thailand, where humanitarian aid is provided.
While most of the pro-democracy resistance have coalesced around the National Unity Government (NUG), there are also select fringe militias and ethnic armed groups that have taken the opportunity to engage in territorial expansion and reenact long-standing rivalries. It is likely that neither the incumbent government nor the fragmented and structurally disadvantaged opposition rebels will prevail anytime soon.
While Myanmar’s military government is rumored to have withdrawn from chairing the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 2026, the actions of the officially non-recognized and illegal regime in Myanmar have widened the existing fissures within the regional bloc. The fundamental question concerns the extent to which principles of democratic legitimacy and minimal norms of decency should be upheld, even at the expense of ASEAN solidarity and consensus.
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An ASEAN that refuses to speak up for the interests of the ordinary citizens of its member states would have its legitimacy and credibility significantly eroded; but an ASEAN that merely vocally repudiates the junta regime without creating a clear off-ramp or showing any ability to exert actual influence over Naypyidaw, would be fundamentally ineffective in pursuing the goals of partial normalization and restoration of a less malign political order in Myanmar. The bloc’s Five-Point Consensus peace plan that was agreed in Jakarta in April 2021 by ASEAN’s member states, including Myanmar’s military junta, remains under-enforced and only partially implemented.
Efforts by current ASEAN chair Indonesia to juggle these interests through “quiet diplomacy” – exerting pressure on the military government through discreet, back-door negotiations as opposed to high-profile, public talks and discourse – have yielded some, albeit limited, successes. While the junta has authorized selective passage to humanitarian assistance and delegations by high-level United Nations officials, the aid is often held up and obstructed by vindictive local military personnel. Deposed leader Aung San Suu Kyi had been granted a partial pardon, but the move was more symbolic than substantive: she still faces 14 cases and 27 years in prison, and remains under house arrest.
Thailand’s Unique Position
The above challenges raise the question: Could Thailand, as the ASEAN member most geographically proximate and historically connected to Myanmar, have a greater role to play? It is clear that Thailand is uniquely positioned in several distinctive ways, which has two clear implications. The first is that Thailand has an obvious stake in bringing about peace in Myanmar, beyond the obvious moral and humanitarian imperatives. The second is that among ASEAN’s member states, Thailand is best-placed to play a critical role as a mediator between the Tatmadaw, the NUG, the Myanmar public, and other opposition forces.
On the latter point, the Thai political establishment plausibly has the most personnel and interpersonal access to past and present senior leaders of the Tatmadaw. The Thai and Myanmar armed forces are close collaborators on regional peacekeeping and anti-drug trafficking operations, with generals on both sides on personally friendly terms. To take one example, in 2012, Senior Gen. Min Aung Hlaing was named the “adopted son” of Prem Tinsulanonda, the former chief of the Royal Thai Army (RTA). In 2014, the post-coup government in Thailand received official endorsement from the Myanmar military. Both governments are known to advocate economic and security cooperation in relation to the infamous Golden Triangle.
With Thailand set to embrace a new, civilian-led government with clear military representation in the coming weeks, the RTA will remain a significant player in the country. The long-standing connections between Thai military elite and the Tatmadaw should be harnessed by the incoming administration in order to pursue substantial concessions regarding Myanmar’s brutally oppressed activists and political prisoners. It is also in the interests of the incoming Pheu Thai-led government to shift Thailand’s Myanmar policy away from unquestioning accommodation, to strategic engagement with clear moral baselines.
Secondly, Thailand and Myanmar are highly economically interconnected. A volatile Myanmar caught in developmental limbo is not in the interest of its eastern neighbor, with which it shares a 2,416-kilometer border – the longest among its five borders.
Thailand is the second-largest trading partner of Myanmar, though bilateral trade has significantly declined in recent years due to a combination of political instability and tightened border controls. Tatmadaw-imposed restrictions concerning equalizing exports and imports, and stipulating that payments must be made via a junta-controlled bank, have damaged business confidence, as well as creating huge bottlenecks at land border crossings. Additionally, Myanmar’s labor market faces substantial vulnerabilities, with war-related disruptions contributing towards a labor productivity drop of 10 percent since 2019, with nearly half of households experiencing food access concerns.
These business-related considerations, coupled with Thailand’s significant dependence upon Myanmar for energy production and imports, highlight the urgent need for Bangkok to act. Stabilizing and reviving supply chains and securing Thai businesses and investors’ interests in the country requires both military and rebel factions to arrive at a sustainable modus vivendi.
Thirdly, Thailand has long played an integral role in shaping the diplomatic outlook and strategy adopted by ASEAN. As one of the founding members of the organization and a key regional player during the Cold War, Thailand had been a primary promulgator of “mediator diplomacy.” In 1961, with the only three members then in the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) locked in a bitter Konfontasi in Malaysia, Thailand sought to provide a neutral foundational space for Southeast Asian nation-states to explore the space for a Southeast Asia-centered and -driven economic grouping, eventually culminating in the establishment of ASEAN in 1967.
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Since then, Thailand played a key role in nudging ASEAN members to weigh non-intervention over calls for changes to the totalitarian Khmer Regime (more indicative of intricate balancing of powers between the USSR and China than perhaps any substantive normative position). It also advocated the establishment of the ASEAN Free Trade Area in the 1990s, and addressed the challenge posed by insurgent groups along the Thai-Malay border and in Southern Philippines. Recent years have seen a reduction in Thailand’s mediation capacity, as its attention has shifted precipitously towards deepening ties with and balancing between Beijing and Washington, and away from intervening non-militarily in regional disputes and disagreements. If Thailand wishes to revive its erstwhile leadership functions within ASEAN, it needs to play a more active role to resolve Myanmar’s crisis.
Why Unilateralism Won’t Work
Thailand’s responsibilities cannot be discharged unilaterally. The two-person meeting in early July between Foreign Minister Don Pramudwinai and Aung San Suu Kyi, three days prior to the official ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting on July 11-12, risked derailing efforts by the regional grouping to broker a viable path forward. Initiated by the outgoing Thai government, the meeting offered the Tatmadaw a substantial PR victory, with minimal substantive gains for most in the opposition movement. The comments that Aung San Suu Kyi purportedly made – that she was in favor of “dialogue without any preconditions” – were unverifiable.
Unilateralism will not work. If the Tatmadaw perceives that it can successfully pick and choose from amongst ASEAN members the prospective interlocutors and negotiating “partners,” it will likely to continually drive a wedge between Thailand and other ASEAN powers, offering selective and tokenistic access to the former in exchange for reduced pressures from the other eight member states. This move would also destabilize Thailand’s soft power and stature in the eyes of the other governments, thereby diluting the attention and scrutiny of key stakeholders in ASEAN towards the abuses of the junta regime in Myanmar.
Fundamentally, the Five-Point Consensus has repeatedly affirmed that all solutions to the Myanmar crisis must be led by and steered in accordance with the foundational principles of ASEAN. The need for consensus be inherently restrictive, but the solution should be to advocate reformulations of this norm, as opposed to bypassing it altogether. In seemingly recognizing the legitimate standing of the Tatmadaw as the representatives of the people of Myanmar, the outgoing Thai administration risks upsetting the delicately forged equilibrium that has drawn upon the heterogeneity of ASEAN as a strength, whilst maintaining a consistent underlying line. The “shuttle diplomacy” of Indonesia, and the “access-based diplomacy” practiced by Thailand, can and should complement one another.
The Case for Proactive, Pro-Peace Diplomacy
The incoming administration in Bangkok should invest in significantly greater humanitarian support infrastructure for incoming refugees, and aid to internally displaced persons and victims of the ongoing civil strife in Myanmar. Incoming civilians should be carefully housed and allocated to minimize the burdens placed upon the regions neighboring Myanmar, such as Mae Sai and Mae Sot districts. Both Chinese and American resources should be mobilized to support this effort, though ASEAN countries should also play a role in devising a shared financial support scheme for humanitarian initiatives to be implemented primarily by Thailand.
The Thai government should keep communication channels open with the junta, while emphasizing that it does not thereby recognize the military regime as legitimate. Other ASEAN member states should also be incorporated into these conversations, or at least be kept abreast of the substantive contents discussed by these talks. Additionally, Bangkok should deepen its unofficial ties with the NUG, as well as more radical ethnic minority militias operating in Myanmar. The overarching aim here is to convince all parties of the possibility and value in partial ceasefires or de-escalation (a complete cessation of violence is unlikely to materialize anytime soon, and we must be realistic.)
Thailand should also prioritize the brokering of closed-room dialogues, with precise stipulations of ceasefire, between all parties of interest, both within Myanmar, with the NUG and other major factions present, and in other locales in ASEAN. Each of these dialogue sessions should be driven by precisely defined and clearly achievable objectives, e.g. the establishment and maintenance of the humanitarian corridor, the status and welfare of political prisoners, and the security of the Myanmar-Thailand border.
Some may argue that the above cedes too much ground to the junta, and that full accountability in the form of an immediate relinquishing of control is the only outcome ASEAN states should accept. As sympathetic as we may be to these views, however, it is imperative that we recognize the practical constraints on what is possible. The Tatmadaw may accept a controlled reduction to its scope of influence, as well as a reduction in the level of violence and the intensity of the conflict. Yet to ask for it to dissolve itself with immediate effect would be fundamentally futile. Thailand should instead lobby for civilian representatives to be granted a clear and meaningful say over the peace-brokering process, as well as guarantees of the freedoms and rights of political prisoners still held in captive or in hiding in Myanmar.
Ultimately, the divisions that have emerged between the ASEAN states are not sustainable, and require urgent redress. Last December, Thailand hosted a meeting with Myanmar’s top diplomat, as well as counterparts from Cambodia and Laos, with Vietnam’s deputy foreign minister present. The meeting was not attended by the other five ASEAN states, who have systemically ruled out liaising openly with the military administration. From ASEAN’s perspective, a clear roadmap to normalization, with clearly defined objectives that collectively pave the way for the restoration of civilian rule in Myanmar, must be offered as the carrot, alongside a stepping-up of the punitive “stick” — beyond sanctions alone. A carrot-and-stick approach, as clichéd as it may seem, is perhaps the best model that can draw upon the disparate levels of interconnectivity and mutual dependence between Myanmar and the other member states of ASEAN..."
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"The Diplomat" (Japan)
Date of entry/update:
2023-08-30
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"Justice For Myanmar condemns ASEAN’s move to organise a military exercise in Russia, co-chaired by the Myanmar military junta.
The exercise will provide the junta with improved military capabilities as it wages a campaign of terror against the people with indiscriminate airstrikes and shelling, murder, rape, torture, arbitrary detention, and the deliberate torching of homes, villages and crops.
The military exercise will take place from September 25-30 in Ussuriysk and Vladivostok, according to a recent update to ASEAN’s defence calendar.
Ussuriysk and Vladivostok are under Russia’s Eastern Military District, which is engaged in Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine. Vladivostok is the headquarters of Russia’s Pacific Fleet and Ussuriysk is the headquarters of the 5th Combined Arms Army.
The military exercise is part of the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus Experts’ Working Group on Counter Terrorism, which the Russian regime and illegal Myanmar junta are leading.
The ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM) platform is chaired by Indonesia’s defence minister, Prabowo Subianto.
Justice For Myanmar and other Myanmar and international civil society organisations have repeatedly called on ASEAN to bar the junta from ADMM, and for member states and dialogue partners to boycott ADMM activities that include the junta.
If it goes ahead, the upcoming field training in Russia will deepen ASEAN’s complicity in the junta’s ongoing commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity against the people of Myanmar.
ASEAN tabletop military exercise fuels junta violence
In August, the junta hosted an ASEAN tabletop military exercise in Naypyidaw, which provided direct military support to junta troops as they slaughter Myanmar people.
In propaganda published after the tabletop exercise, the junta confirmed that ASEAN’s tabletop exercise supports operations against the legitimate National Unity Government of Myanmar (NUG) and People’s Defence Forces (PDF), which it has illegally designated as terrorist groups, stating that “Myanmar, where the attacks of NUG/PDF terrorists occur in recent political development, has gained invaluable experiences from the opportunity to work closely together with international community in the counter terrorism measures.”
In fact, the military junta is itself a terrorist organisation under Myanmar law and as defined in international law.
The tabletop exercise involved the junta’s Special Operations Task Force (SOTF), elite troops trained for urban warfare. Unverified reports suggest SOTF was involved in the junta's bloody and brutal crackdown of peaceful protesters following the military’s illegal coup attempt. The ASEAN tabletop exercise featured a demonstration by SOTF, and the junta reported that the international participants “recognized the physical strength and mental toughness of male and female SOTF members who are well-disciplined and well-trained.”
Justice For Myanmar welcomes the decision of Australia, Japan, New Zealand, Singapore, South Korea and the USA to not attend the tabletop exercise, and condemns ASEAN, and countries that participated, which included all remaining ASEAN members and the dialogue partners China and India. The junta responded that refusal to attend the military exercise “infers the meaning of supporting terrorism and terrorist acts.”
The tabletop exercise was opened by the junta’s Chief of General Staff for the army, navy and air force, General Maung Maung Aye, who is sanctioned by the EU.
The EU noted that in addition to Maung Maung Aye’s direct responsibility for numerous human rights violations, he is involved in the purchase of Russian arms and “helps to strengthen the Myanmar Armed Forces international positioning through meetings with counterparts from other countries”.
Justice For Myanmar spokesperson Yadanar Maung says: “ASEAN’s decision to provide training for junta troops in counter terrorism tactics is abhorrent and untenable.
“ASEAN, its member states and dialogue partners know full well that the junta commits atrocities with total impunity, and that military training emboldens it and aids and abets its international crimes.
“ASEAN is not only failing to resolve the crisis in Myanmar through its Five Point Consensus but is actively undermining its own commitment to the consensus by backing the junta with military support and legitimacy, while also impeding international action.
"Indonesia as the Chair of the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting must immediately cancel the exercise and ban the junta from all activities.
“ASEAN members and dialogue partners should boycott the exercise if it goes ahead and refuse to attend all other ADMM activities that include the illegal junta.
“ASEAN’s military training clearly shows that claims of ‘ASEAN centrality’ is a cover for business as usual with the terrorist junta, at the expense of the lives of Myanmar people.
“The UN Security Council and governments need to urgently step up and take concrete steps to block the junta’s access to funds, arms, equipment and jet fuel, and refer the situation in Myanmar to the International Criminal Court.”..."
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Justice For Myanmar
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2023-08-29
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"This Short Update describes events occurring in T’Nay Hsah Township, Hpa-an District during the period between January to June, 2023. In January 2023, villagers’ cows stepped on landmines three times in Htee Wah Blaw village tract, T’Nay Hsah Township. These landmines are suspected to have been planted by the State Administration Council (SAC). After the incident, the SAC instructed villagers from B--- village and P-- village not to release their cows. If the cows were to step on landmines again, the cows’ owners would have to pay a penalty. In another incident that took place on June 13th 2023, at around 2:00 pm, a 41-year-old man from N---village, Yaw Ku village tract, T’Nay Hsah Township, stepped on a landmine as he was going to a deserted Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA) army camp in the forest to collect some wild plants. He sustained an injury to his right foot and was sent to T--- hospital, Pee T’Hka village tract, Ta Kreh Township, Hpa-an District, for medical treatment.[1]
On February 8th 2023, Saw[2] M---, a 53-year-old village head from B--- village, Htee Wah Blaw village tract[3], T’Nay Hsah Township, Hpa-an District explained how villagers’ cows had stepped on landmines three times in his area, killing some and injuring others. The first time, in January 2023 [unknown date], one of the cows owned by a villager named A--- stepped on a landmine at A’Leh Bo Deh camp [an State Administration Council (SAC)[4] camp] and broke a leg. The second time, in January 2023 [unknown date], one of the cows of a villager named K--- was killed by a landmine near Light Infantry Battalion (LIB)[5] #356 located in Thin Gan Nyi Nuang military camp, Myawaddy Township. The third time, on January 24th 2023, three cows owned by a villager named D--- were injured and two of his cows were killed by a tripwire mine explosion. This tripwire mine was set up by SAC LIB #357 beside Saw E---'s farm. During this time [March to June] it is common for villagers to release their cows [into fields]. The SAC had planted landmines near the villagers’ farms but did not inform the villagers about the landmines, and so the villagers released their cows unaware of the mine contamination. After the landmine explosions, the SAC soldiers asked to whom the cows belonged but no one answered because they knew the owner would be made to pay for the landmines [that exploded]. After these incidents, the SAC informed villagers from B--- village and P--- village that the cows’ owners would have to pay for landmines if their cows stepped on landmines again. The SAC soldiers also restricted some areas [in Htee Wah Blaw village tract] so that villagers could not let their cows pasture there.
On June 13th 2023, at around 2:00 pm, Saw U---, a 41-year-old man from N--- village, Yaw Ku village tract, T’Nay Hsah Township, Hpa-an District, stepped on a landmine as he was going to the forest to collect some wild plants from a place near to a deserted Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA)[6] army camp. His right foot was badly injured in the explosion. With his wounded foot, he travelled back alone from the jungle to a local villager's tent. He was initially taken to the O--- hospital, but they could not provide adequate medical care there. Therefore, he was transferred to T--- hospital, Pee T’Hka village tract, Ta Kreh Township, Hpa-an District, for medical treatment. He has now been discharged from the hospital however he is currently bedridden due to his injury. His inability to work threatens his family's livelihood. The victim was aware of the possibility of landmine contamination in the forest, but in order to support his family and earn some money he went to the forest to collect some wild plants for sale..."
Source/publisher:
Karen Human Rights Group
Date of entry/update:
2023-08-29
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Anti-Personnel Landmines - Specialist organisations and commentary, Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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Description:
"La Hkum Lu Aung remembers a time when her life was peaceful and pleasant. Her family had enjoyed normal days, working hard to raise farm animals and cultivate rice and other crops in Nam Lin Pa village of Mansi Township, Kachin State. That was almost ten years ago, before conflict disrupted their lives and they had to flee from their homes. La Hkum Lu Aung has been living in Maing Khaung KBC camp for internally displaced people since then.
"Life at the camp has been full of difficulties," she says. Among the different challenges that they have been facing, La Hkum Lu Aung says one of the most difficult problems was the lack of access to clean water.
"Everyone at the camp used to collect water from a single hand pump so we could hardly ever collect sufficient water for ourselves. The water was also dirty and had high iron content, making it unsafe for drinking or cooking. It was not adequate even for washing clothes because it used to stain all our clothes," she says.
In Maing Khaung village, a total of 6,200 people suffered from limited access to clean water, one of the most conflict-affected areas in Kachin State. The village also hosts 1,600 displaced people.
Therefore, both displaced people and host communities would get water from hand-dug wells and hand pump boreholes, but it was not good enough for drinking, cooking, and washing clothes.
To improve access to clean water for the people living in remote and conflict-affected areas of Kachin, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has implemented four gravity flow water system projects over the last five years, benefiting 11,000 people.
The gravity flow water systems, designed to efficiently transport water from uphill springs to low-lying areas through pipelines, were set up in Sumpyiyang village (Putao Township), Lawa village (Hpakant Township), and Taunglin and Maing Khaung villages (Mansi Township). The system helps people save time and effort in collecting water from distant water sources and increases their access to clean water. "During our assessment visits, villagers shared their everyday struggle to access clean water in sufficient quantity. They were also eager to work collectively in creating a solution," says ICRC engineer Ko Thein Oo. He shares that the communities came together to carry materials to the site, dig for the pipelines, build grooves when the pipelines were laid and connect pipes to transfer water within the villages.
"The gravity flow water system is a simple and cost-effective method of distributing water in areas where electricity or fuel is not available or affordable," says Ko Thein Oo. The system's effectiveness depends on various factors, including the terrain, the distance between the water source and the point of use, and the demand for water. "In Kachin, the system proved to be effective," he adds.
La Hkum Lu Aung expresses that the system has significantly improved their lives.
Now, we get clean water in abundance. We are no longer always anxious about our health and are even able to organize celebrations or events in the village without worrying about the quantity of water required. We appreciate the ICRC for all the help.
La Hkum Lu Aung
Lazing Bawk Mai, who is also from Maing Khaung village, says they used to struggle often to find someone to repair the hand pump. "I have four kids, which means that I have many clothes to wash. It used to be very difficult when we had to collect water from the hand pump. But since the ICRC set up the new system, I am not worried about this basic need. We have enough water, and it is very clean, so we drink without any hesitation," says Lazing Bawk Mai..."
Source/publisher:
International Committee of the Red Cross (Geneva) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2023-08-29
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Armed conflict in Burma - attacks on civilians, Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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Description:
"Documented incidents
11 August 2023: On the highway connecting Shwegyin town, near Puzun Myaung village, Swea Da Lwe village tract, Nyaunglebin township, Bago region, two ambulances were attacked with small firearms, injuring a male aid worker and damaging the roof and windows of one of the ambulances. The junta authorities accused an ethnic armed group and local resistance forces of the attack. Sources: Myaelat Athan, Popular News Journal and Telegram
12 August 2023: In Kanbalu town, township, and district, Sagaing region, a female midwife and four family members were stabbed and killed at their home by an unidentified armed group. The midwife was not affiliated with the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM). After being warned by the local resistance forces to be affiliated with CDM, she moved to the town. The junta authorities accused the local resistance forces of the attack. Sources: Delta News Agency, Mandalay Free Press and Popular News Journal
12 August 2023: On the highway connecting Falam town and Hakha town in Chin state, an ambulance leaving Falam town for Ramthlo village, Falam township was blocked by the Myanmar military while on its way to rescue seven civilians wounded in an air and ground attack of the village by the Myanmar military. Source: Chin Human Rights Organization
12 August 2023: At the military checkpoint in Dawei town, township, and district, the restrictions of transport of medicine and rice from Dawei town to the villages in the east of this town was reinforced with a warning that the people would be arrested and vehicles would be seized if they were found with medicine and rice cargoes. The restrictions have been in place since late 2021.
Sources: Khit Thit Media and Tanintharyi Times
13 August 2023: In Tha Khut Ta Nei village and village tract, Budalin township, Monywa district,
Sagaing region, a rural health centre, a monastery, market stalls, and civilian houses were torched in a two-day raid on the village by the Myanmar military. Sources: Mandalay Free Press, Myaelatt Athan and Myanmar Now
13 August 2023: In Pauk Kan village and village tract, Wetlet township, Shwebo district, Sagaing region, a rural health centre, a school, and civilian houses were attacked by the Myanmar military air force, injuring four civilians. The impact on the health facility and health workers was reported to be not known at the time of report. At the time of the attack the health facility was functioning with CDM-affiliated health workers. Sources: Kachin News Group, Khit Thit Media and Myaelatt Athan
14 August 2023: In Chanayethazan town and township, Mandalay city, district, and region, a CDM-affiliated obstetrician was arrested from her home by the junta authorities and security forces.
Sources: Facebook, Irrawaddy and Telegram
As reported on 15 August 2023: In Thin Gan Nyi Naung village and village tract, Myawaddy township and district, Kayin state, civilians were denied access to health care at a station hospital due to Border Guard Force and Myanmar military members receiving health care at the hospital and for the security reason of the junta forces. Source: Myanmar Pressphoto Agency
15 August 2023: On the highway connecting Monywa town and Mandalay town, near Myay Ne village and village tract, Monywa township and district, Sagaing region, a doctor, who was a political prisoner, was killed in a landmine attack on a convoy of five military trucks transferring prisoners from Monywa Prison to prisons in Myingyan town and Mandalay town. He was arrested on 24 September 2021 and sentenced to 11-year imprisonment for allegedly providing health care to civilians in areas affected by armed clashes, and for supporting local resistance forces.
Sources: Mandalay Free Press and Radio Free Asia
As reported on 16 August 2023: In Mese town, township, and district, Kayah state, a township hospital was damaged during armed clashes between the Myanmar military and a joint force of ethnic armed groups and local resistance forces that took place between 13 to 15 June 2023. The ceiling and window glasses were damaged and bullet holes on the walls of the hospital buildings.
Artillery fire was used by both sides and airstrikes were conducted by the Myanmar military.
Source: Myanmar Now
18 August 2023: In Nam Poke village and village tract, Mohnyin township and district, Kachin state, a female nurse and six civilians were injured during artillery shelling by the ethnic armed organisation Shan-Ni Army. Source: Mekong News
18 August 2023: In Mahaaungmyay town and township, Mandalay city, district, and region, the Mingalar Private Hospital was ordered to temporarily close for three months starting 25 August 2023. The junta’s order does not mention any reasons; however, the hospital employed two CDM-affiliated doctors arrested in February and August 2022. Sources: Delta News Agency,
Mandalay Free Press and Radio Free Asia
19 August 2023: At the military checkpoint near Za Wea village and village tract, Tanintharyi township, Myeik district, Tanintharyi region, the Myanmar military blocked the transport of medicine, rice, and fuel from Myeik town to Tanintharyi town. Sources: Dawei Watch and Tanintharyi Times
20 August 2023: In Htee Paw So village and village tract, Hpruso township, Demoso district, Kayah state, a rural health centre was damaged during artillery shelling by the Myanmar military. Source: Kantarawaddy Times
21 August 2023: In Mindat town, township, and district, Chin state, a district hospital and three public schools were ordered to temporarily close down. The junta’s order does not mention any reasons; however, there were heightened clashes in the downtown area of Mindat town, and an ambulance owned by the hospital was seized from the hospital by the ethnic armed organisation Chin Defence Force on 20 August. At the time of the attack, the hospital was functioning, but only in a low profile. Before this attack, six health facilities with in-patient service, 40 health facilities with out-patient service, and 180 schools in this township were under the control of the ethnic armed organisation. Sources: Delta News Agency, Irrawaddy, The Mindat Post and Zalen
22 August 2023: In Myawaddy town, township, and district, Kayin state, a fully-functioning district hospital was damaged by a drone armed with explosives to drop two bombs. The roofs of mortuary and public latrines were damaged. The junta authorities accused the ethnic armed group Karen National Union and local resistance forces for the attack. Source: Telegram..."
Source/publisher:
Insecurity Insight (Geneva) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2023-08-28
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Public Health, Armed conflict in Burma - attacks on civilians
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Sub-title:
NUG Statement on the Terrorist Military Junta’s Expulsion of the Charge d'Affaires of the Embassy of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste from Myanmar
Description:
"1. It has been brought to our attention that the illegitimate terrorist military junta that does not
represent the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, has compelled the Charge d'Affaires of
the Embassy of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, who is representing the State of
Timor-Leste and its people in Myanmar and exercising his diplomatic responsibilities, to
permanently leave from Myanmar prior to 1st September 2023.
2. Being an illegal organization that has unlawfully taken control of the country’s power
through the use of force, the junta does not hold any authority to make decisions concerning
the international diplomatic relations of the State. The right to decision making on such
matter rests solely with the people of Myanmar and the legitimate government duly elected
by them. The expulsion of Timorese Charge d'Affaires from Myanmar is a customary,
unlawful and inappropriate act of the illegitimate military junta.
3. We deeply respect and appreciate the position of Timor-Leste that values fundamental
democratic policies and standards, the rule of law and human dignity. This stands as an
exemplary model for others to follow.
4. We respectfully state that the Timor-Leste's steadfast stance as a good friend will always be
deeply remembered and our sincere gratitude will be permanently inscribed in the hearts of
the National Unity Government and the people of Myanmar.
5. We appeal to the various governments of the international community which respect and
value democratic principles, human rights values and standards and embrace
humanitarianism, to stand in solidarity with the people of Myanmar, like Timor-Leste has
done, and provide support to Myanmar for its return to the path of democracy..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Myanmar - NUG
Date of entry/update:
2023-08-28
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations, East Timor-Burma relations
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Sub-title:
အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စုမှ တီမောလက်စတေး သံရုံးယာယီတာဝန်ခံအား မြန်မာနိုင်ငံမှ နှင်ထုတ်ခြင်း နှင့်စပ်လျဉ်း၍ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၏ ထုတ်ပြန်ချက်
Description:
"၁။ ပြည်ထောင်စုသမ္မတမြန်မာနိုင်ငံတော်ကို ကိုယ်စားမပြုသည့် တရားမဝင် အကြမ်းဖက် စစ်အုပ်စုသည် တီမောလက်စတေးနိုင်ငံတော်နှင့် ပြည်သူများအား ကိုယ်စားပြုလျက် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံတွင် သံတမန်ရေးရာ တာဝန်များထမ်းဆောင်နေသည့် သံရုံးယာယီတာဝန်ခံအား ၂၀၂၃ ခုနှစ်၊ စက်တင်ဘာ ၁ ရက်နေ့ မတိုင်မီ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံမှ အပြီးထွက်ခွာသွားရန် ဖိအားပေးခဲ့ကြောင်း သိရှိရပါသည်။
၂။ နိုင်ငံတော်၏ အာဏာကို ဥပဒေဘောင်ပြင်ပမှ လက်နက်အားကိုးဖြင့် အဓမ္မ ရယူထားသော တရားမဝင် အဖွဲ့အစည်းအနေဖြင့် နိုင်ငံတော်၏ နိုင်ငံတကာ သံတမန်ဆက်ဆံရေးကိစ္စရပ်များအပေါ် ဆုံးဖြတ် ဆောင်ရွက်ခွင့် ရှိမည်မဟုတ်ပါကြောင်း သိစေအပ်ပါသည်။ နိုင်ငံတော်၏ နိုင်ငံတကာနှင့် သံတမန်ဆက်ဆံရေး ကိစ္စရပ်များအပေါ် ဆုံးဖြတ်ဆောင်ရွက်နိုင်သော အခွင့်အာဏာသည် မြန်မာ ပြည်သူလူထုနှင့် ၎င်းတို့မှ ရွေးကောက် တင်မြှောက်ထားသည့် တရားဝင်အစိုးရ၌သာ တည်ရှိပါသည်။ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံရှိ တီမောလက်စတေးသံရုံးမှ သံရုံးယာယီတာဝန်ခံအား ယခုကဲ့သို့ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံမှ နှင်ထုတ်ခြင်းမှာ တရားမဝင် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီ၏ ပြုမူနေကျဖြစ်သော မလျော်ကန်သည့် ဥပဒေမဲ့ပြုကျင့်မှုသာ ဖြစ်ပါသည်။
၃။ ဒီမိုကရေစီ အခြေခံမူဝါဒများနှင့် စံနှုန်းများ၊ တရားဥပဒေစိုးမိုးမှုနှင့် လူသားဂုဏ်သိက္ခာ တို့ကို တန်ဖိုးထားသည့် တီမောလက်စတေးနိုင်ငံ၏ ရပ်တည်ချက်အား အထူးလေးစား ကျေးဇူးတင်ရှိ ပါကြောင်းနှင့် ၄င်းရပ်တည်ချက်သည် အများ စံနမူနာထားသင့်သည့် ရပ်တည်ချက်ဖြစ်ကြောင်းလည်း ဖော်ပြအပ်ပါသည်။
၄။ တီမောလက်စတေးနိုင်ငံ၏ မိတ်ဆွေကောင်းအဖြစ် ခိုင်မာမြဲမြံသည့် ရပ်တည်ချက်သည် မိမိတို့ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရနှင့် မြန်မာပြည်သူလူထု၏ နှလုံးသားထဲ၌ နက်ရှိုင်းစွာ အစဉ်အမြဲ အမှတ်ရနေမည်ဖြစ်ပြီး၊ ကျေးဇူးတင်ကဗ္ဗည်း မြဲမြံစွာ မှတ်တမ်းတင်ရေးထိုးထားမည်ဖြစ်ပါကြောင်း လေးစားစွာဖြင့် ဖော်ပြအပ်ပါသည်။
၅။ ဒီမိုကရေစီအခြေခံမူများ၊ လူ့အခွင့်အရေးစံတန်ဘိုးများနှင့် လူသားချင်းစာနာထောက်ထားမှု များကို လေးစားတန်ဖိုးထားသည့် နိုင်ငံတကာအသိုင်းအဝိုင်းမှ အစိုးရအသီးသီးအနေဖြင့်လည်း တီမောလက်စတေးနိုင်ငံကဲ့သို့ မြန်မာပြည်သူလူထုနှင့် အတူရပ်တည်ပေးလျက် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ ဒီမိုကရေစီ လမ်းကြောင်း ပြန်လည်ရောက်ရှိရေးအတွက် ကူညီပံ့ပိုးမှုများ ပြုလုပ်ပေးကြပါရန် မေတ္တာရပ်ခံပါ သည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Myanmar - NUG
Date of entry/update:
2023-08-28
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Format :
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398.04 KB
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Description:
"Statement by Nicholas Koumjian, Head of the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar
Geneva, 25 August 2023 – Today marks six years since hundreds of thousands of Rohingya people were forced to flee their homes in Myanmar for refuge in neighboring Bangladesh. It has been six years since Rohingya men, women and children were subjected to an escalation of violence and atrocities by Myanmar security forces that resulted in the loss of their loved ones and homes. Yet six years later, no one has been held accountable for these crimes.
The United Nations Human Rights Council created our Mechanism to work for justice. We are collecting and analysing evidence of the most serious international crimes committed in Myanmar since 2011, including against the Rohingya. We are collecting testimonies and other evidence about the physical violence inflicted on so many Rohingya people and have also begun a dedicated enquiry into the businesses, farms and other property that was taken away from them. We want to see if there was a financial motivation behind these crimes and determine who profited from the campaign against the Rohingya.
We are also finalizing new analytical reports to share with relevant authorities to support their understanding of grave crimes committed against the Rohingya. These include reports focused on the military chain of command in Rakhine state, the failure of Myanmar authorities to investigate or punish sexual and gender-based crimes, and the organized spread of hate speech content on Facebook by a network of Myanmar military before, during and after the 2017 clearance operations.
We share evidence and analysis, when we have the consent of those that gave us the information, to support the investigations which are underway at the International Criminal Court and in Argentina, and the ongoing proceedings in the case of The Gambia vs. Myanmar at the International Court of Justice.
The mandate of the Mechanism does not stop with investigating those that “pulled the trigger” but includes anyone, no matter how powerful. Our work is dependent on the information we receive from courageous individuals – survivors, witnesses and members of the security forces who may have information about illegal orders or commands. We call on those with relevant information to contact us using secure channels.
We also call on States to provide us with access to witnesses and information in their territories. The pursuit of justice for the Rohingya is a global effort. Only together can we ensure that those responsible will face the consequences, and that those who have suffered the horror of these crimes will see justice served.
*Information on how to communicate securely and confidentially with the Mechanism can be found at *https://iimm.un.org/contact-us/confidential-and-sensitive-communications/
*The Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar (IIMM or Mechanism) was created by the United Nations Human Rights Council in 2018 to collect and analyze evidence of the most serious international crimes and other violations of international law committed in Myanmar since 2011. It aims to facilitate justice and accountability by preserving and organizing this evidence and preparing case files for use in future prosecutions of those responsible in national, regional and international courts. For more information visit https://iimm.un.org/ or contact *[email protected]..."
Source/publisher:
UN Human Rights Council (Geneva) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2023-08-26
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Discrimination against the Rohingya, Rohingya (cultural, political etc.)
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"The United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) Asia and the Pacific Regional Office is committed to making sure that all efforts to address gender-based violence (GBV) are inclusive of and accessible to women and girls with disabilities, ensuring that transformative goals are met and that no one is left behind. To meet this critical need, UNFPA APRO developed tools for UNFPA Country Offices and partners to strengthen GBV and Disability inclusion programming, which include a Tip-sheet on Disability Inclusion in GBV Programming and a GBV and Disability Inclusion Assessment Tool.
The lessons learnt from the implementation of the UNFPA APRO tools informed this documentation on promising practices and innovative approaches to disability inclusion in GBV programming adopted by UNFPA Country Offices and their partners in the Asia-Pacific region. The promising practices and approaches highlight the power of partnerships between UNFPA, GBV service providers and Organizations of Persons with Disabilities not only in addressing the needs of survivors with disabilities, but for knowledge exchange, mentoring and joint advocacy. However, there is still a critical gap in the evidence on effective approaches and interventions to ensure sustainable changes in the knowledge, attitudes and practices of service providers. Gathering more information about this is critical to identifying what disability-inclusive approaches and strategies work, where they work and why..."
Source/publisher:
United Nations Population Fund (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2023-08-25
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"Meta should immediately pay reparations to the Rohingya for the role that Facebook played in the ethnic cleansing of the persecuted minority group, Amnesty International said today, on the sixth anniversary of the Myanmar military’s brutal operation during which they raped Rohingya women and girls, burned down entire villages, and killed thousands.
Facebook’s algorithms and Meta’s ruthless pursuit of profit created an echo chamber that helped foment hatred of the Rohingya people and contributed to the conditions which forced the ethnic group to flee Myanmar en masse.
“Six years have gone by since Meta contributed to the terrible atrocities perpetrated against the Rohingya people. Yet although this stands out as one of the most egregious examples of a social media company’s involvement in a human rights crisis, the Rohingya are still awaiting reparations from Meta,” said Pat de Brún, Head of Big Tech Accountability at Amnesty International.
“Our investigations have made it clear that Facebook’s dangerous algorithms, which are hard-wired to drive “engagement” and corporate profits at all costs, actively fanned the flames of hate and contributed to mass violence as well as the forced displacement of over half the Rohingya population of Myanmar into neighbouring Bangladesh.
“It is high time Meta faced its responsibilities by paying reparations to the Rohingya and by fixing its business model to prevent this from happening again.”
Coincidentally, 25th August also marks an important step in holding Big Tech to account for its human rights impacts as it is when key provisions of the Digital Services Act (DSA) come into force for major online platforms in the European Union. The DSA is a landmark piece of legislation aimed at strengthening rights in the digital age, which could create ripple effects far beyond the EU.
A personal plea to Meta and Mark Zuckerberg
Today, Amnesty International and Al Jazeera publish a searing first-person account by Rohingya refugee Maung Sawyeddollah, who was forced to flee his village in Myanmar when he was just a teenager. He fled through torched villages and fields filled with dead bodies and now lives in the world’s biggest refugee camp, Cox’s Bazar in Bangladesh, with around a million of his people.
As a child, before the hate took root with the help of Facebook, he and his mostly Muslim Rohingya friends played happily with the mostly Buddhist Rakhine children from the neighbouring village — but that all changed when the military moved in.
“I’d like to meet Mark Zuckerberg and his team. Maybe they’d like to come and spend a night or two in the refugee camp?”, Sawyedollah writes. “I’d tell them: ‘Can’t you see your role in our suffering? We asked you, repeatedly, to try and help make things better for us… Yet you ignore our pleas. Tell me, do you feel anything for us? Is it only about the data, is it only about the dollars?”
Background.
Last year, Amnesty International published a report detailing Meta’s role in the atrocities committed against the Rohingya people by the Myanmar military in 2017. It revealed that even Facebook’s internal studies dating back to 2012 indicated that Meta knew its algorithms could result in serious real-world harms. In 2016, Meta’s own research clearly acknowledged that “our recommendation systems grow the problem” of extremism.
Beginning in August 2017, the Myanmar security forces undertook a brutal campaign of ethnic cleansing against Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar’s Rakhine State. They unlawfully killed thousands of Rohingya, including young children; raped and committed other sexual violence against Rohingya women and girls; tortured Rohingya men and boys in detention sites; and burned down hundreds of Rohingya villages. The violence pushed over 700,000 Rohingya — more than half the Rohingya population living in northern Rakhine State at the beginning of the crisis — into neighbouring Bangladesh.
Meta contributed to serious adverse human rights impacts suffered by the Rohingya in the context of the 2017 atrocities in Rakhine State and therefore has a responsibility under international human rights standards to provide an effective remedy to the community. This includes making necessary changes to its business model which can ensure this never happens again. All companies have a responsibility to respect all human rights wherever they operate in the world and throughout their operations. This is a widely recognized standard of expected conduct as set out in international business and human rights standards, including the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UN Guiding Principles) and the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (OECD Guidelines)..."
Source/publisher:
Amnesty International (UK)
Date of entry/update:
2023-08-25
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Individual Documents
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Human Rights and international relations, Discrimination against the Rohingya, Rohingya (cultural, political etc.)
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"Today marks Rohingya Genocide Remembrance Day.
Six years ago, violence and persecution related to the so-called “clearance operation” by the Myanmar military in Rakhine State forced more than 700,000 Rohingya to flee to Bangladesh. During this time, numerous human rights abuses were committed against the Rohingya population. The events of 2017 follow decades of persecution of Rohingya in Myanmar and their continual displacement, and the effects of these actions are still felt today.
The Myanmar military persists in carrying out its genocide and crimes against humanity with impunity. “Until the de facto government is held accountable for its actions, the Rohingya will never be able to return home in safety and dignity,” said USCRI President and CEO Eskinder Negash. “The international community should do all within its power to stop the perpetrators of these horrific crimes.”
While the international community has vowed to never let something like this happen again, the Rohingya continue to face persecution that is met with ever-waning sympathy and growing indifference from abroad. “Action is more than a declaration of empty words,” said Negash. “Silence not only leads to more suffering, but it also enables the junta to commit further atrocities.”
To mark these horrific events, USCRI hosted the webinar, “Examining Continued Protection Concerns for Rohingya Refugees,” during which panelists discussed the security, safety, and protection concerns that Rohingya face today.
Too many Rohingya continue to suffer with decreasing response from our communities. We must do better as a country and as an international community to raise our eyes and see what is happening. Never again and never forget.
USCRI, founded in 1911, is a non-governmental, not-for-profit international organization committed to working on behalf of refugees and immigrants and their transition to a dignified life..."
Source/publisher:
US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants
Date of entry/update:
2023-08-25
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Individual Documents
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Human Rights and international relations, Discrimination against the Rohingya, Rohingya (cultural, political etc.)
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"25 August 2023: Today, we commemorate the victims and survivors of the genocidal ‘clearance operations’ carried out against the Rohingya in Rakhine State by the Myanmar military on 25 August 2017. We also acknowledge the international community’s failure to fulfil its obligation to hold the Myanmar military accountable for the most serious crimes under international law and to protect the Rohingya from further harm, says the Special Advisory Council for Myanmar (SAC-M).
Decades of state oppression against Rohingya in Myanmar came to a head when the Myanmar military launched a campaign of mass atrocities against the Rohingya in northern Rakhine State six years ago today. Thousands of Rohingya men, women, boys and girls were killed in the ensuing mass murder, rape and gang rape, torture, burning and arson carried out by the Myanmar military. Three quarters of a million Rohingya were forced to flee to neighbouring Bangladesh where they joined a quarter of a million Rohingya who had previously fled military persecution.
“Today serves as a sad reminder of the appalling abrogation of responsibility by the international community to hold Myanmar military leaders accountable for the crimes committed against the Rohingya,” said Yanghee Lee of SAC-M. “The consequences of the genocide are still being lived by the Rohingya today. The international community failed to protect the Rohingya then and it is utterly failing to protect the Rohingya now.”
Rohingya communities in Myanmar, Bangladesh and around the world show resilience and courage in their unwavering pursuit of justice and the full restoration of their rights despite the extreme hardship many continue to face. Almost one million Rohingya refugees live in overcrowded and unsafe camps in Cox’s Bazar in Bangladesh where they are denied their basic rights to freedom of movement, employment and education.
Extreme restrictions on the rights of some 600,000 Rohingya who remain in Myanmar, including 140,000 Rohingya who have been confined to squalid camps in Rakhine State for more than a decade, have become more severe since the Myanmar military junta launched an illegal coup in February 2021. A relentless campaign of mass atrocities against Myanmar civilians by junta forces and the subsequent denial of urgently needed humanitarian aid to vulnerable communities, including the Rohingya, by the junta has created both human rights and humanitarian emergencies in Myanmar. As such, the safe, voluntary, dignified and durable return of Rohingya refugees to Myanmar is impossible.
“The Rohingya have made it clear they will only return home when it is safe for them to do so, and when they can be guaranteed their full rights and representation under a new federal democratic system in Myanmar,” said Marzuki Darusman of SAC-M. “Any effort to engineer the return of the Rohingya people under the current adverse circumstances that would also directly implicate the United Nations (UN) is seen through immediately as a deliberate act to grossly mislead the Rohingya and the international community. The Rohingya must be heard and their calls for justice reflected in the actions of the international community.”
“A glaring lack of political will on the part of the international community is now what stands between the continuation of absolute military impunity in Myanmar and justice and accountability for the Rohingya,” added Darusman.
Proceedings are underway at the International Court of Justice, and the International Criminal Court (ICC) against Myanmar military leaders for alleged crimes committed against Rohingya outside Myanmar while in Argentina a criminal case is being heard under universal jurisdiction. Criminal cases have also been filed in Germany and Turkey under universal jurisdiction. These are all important avenues for accountability but such efforts are slow moving and need increased international support.
On this Rohingya Genocide Remembrance Day, SAC-M calls on the international community, including the UN and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, to support these efforts and urgently pursue accountability for grave human rights violations committed by the Myanmar military against the Rohingya and all peoples in Myanmar going back decades. Furthermore, SAC-M calls on the ICC to accept the legitimate National Unity Government of Myanmar’s Article 12(3) declaration granting the Court jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute atrocity crimes committed in Myanmar dating back to 2002.
“The culture of Myanmar military impunity that paved the way for the Rohingya genocide is devastatingly apparent in Myanmar today,” said Chris Sidoti of SAC-M. “The complete failure of the international system to deliver justice for the Rohingya and hold Myanmar military leaders accountable has to end. The UN Security Council must finally take action in accordance with the UN Charter to refer the situation in Myanmar to the ICC and initiate punitive actions against the Myanmar military to cut off its access to funds and weapons.”..."
Source/publisher:
Special Advisory Council for Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2023-08-25
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"The following statement was issued today by the Spokesperson for UN Secretary-General António Guterres:
25 August marks six years since the forced mass displacement of Rohingya people and other communities from Myanmar’s Rakhine State. Rohingya people remain displaced domestically and abroad, including around 1 million Rohingya in Bangladesh.
The vulnerabilities faced by people of Myanmar, including the Rohingya, have been compounded by the ongoing conflict and by the devastation caused by Cyclone Mocha. The United Nations will continue to support efforts to create conditions that would be conducive to the voluntary, safe, dignified and sustainable return of Rohingya refugees to their places of origin in Myanmar.
The Secretary-General calls on all stakeholders to redouble efforts to find comprehensive, inclusive and durable solutions that can adequately address the root causes of systemic discrimination and violence in Myanmar, and to respond to the growing protection crisis and humanitarian needs while strengthening refugee protection efforts in the region for those fleeing persecution and violence.
Bangladesh has demonstrated humanitarian commitments and generosity, which must be acknowledged through shared responsibility. More must be done to support the Joint Response Plan and prevent a broader humanitarian crisis.
The United Nations is committed to working with all stakeholders, including regional actors, to help resolve the crisis and seek accountability and justice for victims towards a sustainable peace in Rakhine State and all of Myanmar..."
Source/publisher:
UN Secretary-General
Date of entry/update:
2023-08-25
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Individual Documents
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UN human rights documents on Myanmar, Human Rights and international relations, Internal displacement/forced migration of Rohingyas, Rohingya (cultural, political etc.)
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"The National Unity Government of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar commemorates with great sadness the sixth anniversary of the egregious atrocities committed against the Rohingya people by the Myanmar military in 2017.
Thousands of Rohingya were killed and disappeared. Rape and sexual violence, including mass gang rape, were used systematically to intimidate, terrorise and punish Rohingya women and girls. Hundreds of villages were razed. Lives were destroyed, and histories were erased. Last year, the United States Government determined that these crimes amounted to genocide.
Today, over one million Rohingya people remain displaced not only from their villages and homes but from the country to which they belong. Many live in crisis and deep poverty as refugees, including in camps in Bangladesh. A growing number of Rohingya denied any foreseeable prospect of a return to their homes and livelihoods in Myanmar have resumed treacherous sea voyages, placing their lives in the hands of traffickers. This shows just how desperate they are.
The National Unity Government recognises the Rohingya people as an integral part of Myanmar and as nationals. We acknowledge with great shame the exclusionary and discriminatory policies, practices, and rhetoric that were long directed against the Rohingya and other religious and ethnic minorities. These words and actions laid the ground for military atrocities, and the impunity that followed them emboldened the military’s leaders to commit countrywide crimes at the helm of an illegal junta.
Acting on our ‘Policy Position on the Rohingya in Rakhine State’, the National Unity Government is committed to creating the conditions needed to bring the Rohingya and other displaced communities home in voluntary, safe, dignified, and sustainable ways.
We are also committed to social change and to the complete overhaul of discriminatory laws in consultation with minority communities and their representatives. A Rohingya leader now serves as Deputy Minister of Human Rights to ensure that Rohingya perspectives support the development of government policies and programs and legislative reform.
Furthermore, the National Unity Government is committed to delivering justice to survivors of historic and continuing military atrocities. Truth-telling and accountability are essential. So too is recognising the true extent and scale of the crimes committed against the Rohingya and other minorities and ending the history of denial. We pledge our full cooperation with national and international accountability mechanisms, including the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court.
Myanmar’s new Federal Democracy Charter promises a nation founded on peace, justice, equality, human rights, and the protection of minorities. We urge Myanmar people of all ethnicities, religions, social groups, and communities to join in making it a reality..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2023-08-25
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Individual Documents
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National Unity Government (NUG), Discrimination against the Rohingya, Rohingya (cultural, political etc.), Human Rights and international relations
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"2023 marks the sixth anniversary of the 2017 exodus of more than 730,000 Rohingya fleeing the Myanmar military’s so-called ‘clearance operations’ from Rakhine State to Bangladesh.
SITUATION IN MYANMAR
The 2021 military coup, after toppling the civilian government and declaring a state of emergency across the country, has disproportionately affected the Rohingya population in Myanmar and heightened their vulnerability. The further extension of martial law and postponement of the general election risks aggravation of the political and humanitarian crisis.
In Rakhine State, approximately 600,000 Rohingya continue to live under de facto indefinite detention with severe restrictions ranging from freedom of movement (harassment, extortion, curfews, etc.) to arbitrary detention and arrests under immigration laws. The limited access to food, water, healthcare, education, employment, and justice has compounded their social exclusion and entrenched systemic discrimination that amounts to an apartheid-like situation.
Cyclone Mocha, which struck the Bangladesh-Myanmar border on 14 May 2023, had a devastating effect on the Rohingya in Rakhine State; hundreds were killed, thousands were injured, and there was a widespread collapse of housing and shelters. The Myanmar military not only provided inadequate warning and evacuation plans, but it also failed in relief and rehabilitation. The military junta deliberately blocked access to humanitarian aid, rejected travel visas and suspended authorisations to aid and medical workers. The intentional blockade and abject indifference by the military exacerbated the food, water, and health crisis, including rising malnutrition and waterborne diseases, and lack of sanitation.
SITUATION IN BANGLADESH
In Bangladesh, which hosts over a million Rohingya refugees, the situation in the camps in Cox’s Bazar and Bhasan Char is dire, with restrictions on movement, lack of access to durable housing, education, livelihood, and health care. Recurring natural disasters, including cyclones and floods and man-made events like fires and arson in the camps, exacerbate the situation. In June 2023, faced with a shortage of funds from the international community, the United Nations World Food Programme slashed food rations from $12 to $8 a month, heightening the risk of malnutrition, drug and human trafficking, forced marriages, and child labour.
There is growing violence in the camps from armed gangs and militants, including the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) in the refugee camps. The increase in killings of community leaders, including Majhis has had a chilling effect and contributed to a climate of extreme insecurity. Bangladesh police have failed to respond to the complaints filed by Rohingya relating to sexual violence, torture, abduction, child recruitment etc., and provide adequate security and protection. In fact, since 2020, the Armed Police Battalion (APBn) tasked to provide security at the camps has been accused of corruption and rights violations and extorted, tortured, and arbitrarily detained the already vulnerable Rohingya.
Thousands of Rohingya, risking their lives and paying exorbitant ransoms, have undertaken perilous journeys by sea to escape the harsh living conditions of the camps. In doing so, hundreds of Rohingya including women and children have lost their lives. Failure of States to respond to boats with refugees in distress increases the risk of starvation and deaths at sea.
THE PILOT REPATRIATION PROJECT
In May 2023, following the tripartite negotiations between the Myanmar junta, Bangladesh, and China, a select group 20 Rohingya were taken to resettlement camps in Rakhine State as a part of a ‘pilot project’. According to the project, around 1000 Rohingya refugees will be placed in ‘transit camps’ for two months before being shifted to one of the two resettlements camps in one of the 15 ‘designated villages’ in Myanmar. These transit camps are detention-like centres with barbed wire perimeters and check posts. The camps will be guarded by the military for reasons of ‘security’. The Project doesn’t grant Myanmar citizenship to the Rohingya under the 1982 Citizenship Law and only accord them with the National Verification Cards (NVCs). The NVCs designate the Rohingya as ‘foreigners’ and restricts their access and movement.
The May 2023 visit was preceded by the visit of Myanmar military officials to Cox’s Bazar in March to undertake the ‘verification process’ for the pilot project. The refugees in the camps were misled, deceived, and coerced by the Bangladesh security officers into interacting with the junta officials. Any repatriation must ensure that the Rohingya are included in the talks and the return of refugees is voluntary, informed, safe, and dignified. However, the present condition in Myanmar is far from conducive to meeting these requirements. If anything, the situation in Rakhine State has worsened since the 2021 military coup. While there is a long-standing demand for a durable solution from Rohingya, including the return to their homeland, the forceful refoulement of refugees to Myanmar under the leadership of the military junta – the orchestrators of the 2017 ‘clearance operations’, would place the lives of the Rohingya at significant risk.
The December 2022 UN Security Council (UNSC) resolution and the High Commissioner on Human Rights and Special Rapporteur’s report – all acknowledge that the current situation in Myanmar is not optimal for the return of the Rohingya refugees and call for the root causes to be resolved. However, the purported pilot project doesn’t accord equal citizenship to Rohingya and the violence by the military junta remains unabated in Myanmar.
INTERNATIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY EFFORTS
The military junta spearheading the repatriation project is nothing but an attempt to garner legitimacy from the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the international community. Following the rejection of the military’s preliminary objection to the court’s jurisdiction, the military failed to submit its counter-memorial at the ICJ in the allotted time and sought an extension. The ongoing legal proceedings at the ICJ pertaining to the Genocide Convention and the International Criminal Court (ICC) concerning crimes against humanity seeking responsibility for the atrocities committed against the Rohingya are essential accountability initiatives albeit slow. The ICC investigation opened in 2019 is yet to result in any significant movement when compared to other investigations in the recent past, including the issuance of an arrest warrant. In contrast, the progress in the universal jurisdiction case in Argentina as well as a new complaint filed against the Myanmar military in Germany for the atrocity crimes committed against the Rohingya, is a welcome development.
The passivity of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has emboldened the Myanmar military. The Indonesian chairmanship of the regional group has not yielded any substantial change. The blatant and continuing breach of the Five-Point Consensus reflects the military’s disregard for regional peace and security. The commission of mass atrocities, increase in transnational crimes,including drug smuggling and trafficking, and blockage of humanitarian assistance, demand strong action by ASEAN rather than quiet diplomacy. The Security Council would be betraying its duty and obligation under the UN Charter if it remains seized of the rising impunity of the military junta in Myanmar but turns a blind eye to the flagrant violation of the adopted resolution and passes the buck to ASEAN.
The Asia Justice Coalition is alarmed at the international indifference to the plight of the Rohingya and expresses its deep concern regarding the proposed ‘pilot project’ aimed at forceful repatriation of the Rohingya. It calls upon:
The Myanmar junta to immediately end the ongoing attacks and military operations across the country, including all violations of international law against Rohingya and other
The military junta to urgently facilitate safe, rapid, and unimpeded humanitarian access across the country, especially to the Rohingya and Cyclone Mocha victims.
The Bangladesh government to provide increased protection and security to the Rohingya and investigate and prosecute security officials responsible for rights violations against the
The Bangladesh government to halt its participation in the tripartite diplomatic efforts to repatriate Rohingya and continue to uphold its commitment to hosting the refugees.
The Bangladesh government to ease restrictions in the refugee camps and provide Rohingya access to education, livelihood, health services.
ASEAN to overhaul the Five-Point Consensus and set a concrete and timebound action plan, block Myanmar from all its meetings, and support UN member states in enforcing sanctions and a global arms embargo.
The UN Security Council to hold a public session on the situation in Myanmar, impose a binding global arms embargo, and along with UN member states impose targeted sanctions, and stop the supply and transfer of arms to the Myanmar military and ensure effective implementation and prosecute sanction breaches.
The UN Security Council to urgently refer the situation in Myanmar to the International Criminal Court for a full investigation.
International community, especially donor governments, to urgently contribute to the UN Joint Response Plan for the Rohingya and meet funding commitments.
UN member states to call for voluntary, informed, safe, and dignified return of the Rohingya and prevent forceful repatriation of the refugees to Myanmar.
The US, UK, EU, and other like-minded states/international organizations to formally intervene in The Gambia Myanmar before the ICJ, and Canada and The Netherlands to take formal steps towards their intention to intervene.
Neighbouring countries, including India, Thailand, Indonesia, Bangladesh, to devise a comprehensive regional response to the refugee crisis, provide protection, support, and humanitarian and legal aid to all refugees fleeing Myanmar, and to authorize emergency cross- border aid to internally displaced people in Myanmar.
All countries to use all avenues and diplomatic channels at their disposal in pursuit of justice and accountability for the people of Myanmar, including civil and criminal legal actions based on the principle of universal jurisdiction..."
Source/publisher:
Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
Date of entry/update:
2023-08-25
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"Official partners of the 2023 Business 20 (B20) Summit, which is the business dialogue forum of the Group of 20 (G20), have supplied arms and equipment to the Myanmar military, including since its illegal February 1, 2021 coup attempt. India is hosting the 2023 B20 and G20 summits.
Justice For Myanmar calls on G20 member states to urge India to end all support for the Myanmar military junta and impose an arms embargo.
B20 Summit partners and participants should end all business with the junta and its conglomerates, in accordance with their international human rights responsibilities.
Among official B20 Summit partners are TATA, Larsen & Toubro and Bharat Forge, which have supplied arms and military equipment to Myanmar, and JFW, which has supported the construction of a military-owned port.
The Myanmar military has been producing trucks in the Magwe Region under an agreement TATA Motors originally signed with the military’s former junta in 2010. TATA Motors Limited is part of TATA Group and is publicly listed in India. The company manufactures civilian and military vehicles.
A 2019 article published by the war criminal Min Aung Hlaing details a visit to the Magwe Tatmadaw Heavy Industries plant and confirmed TATA’s continued involvement in truck manufacturing following the military’s genocide against the Rohingya.
Indian export records also show over US$13 million in TATA Motors’ shipments of vehicles and parts to Myanmar since August 2018, including to the Myanmar Army’s Directorate of Procurement, the military conglomerate Myanmar Economic Corporation (MEC) and TATA Motors’ private partner, Apex Greatest Industrial Company Limited.
Apex Greatest Industrial is an official service provider for TATA vehicles in Myanmar and is a current registered supplier of the Myanmar Army’s Directorate of Procurement.
Larsen & Toubro Ltd is a publicly listed Indian conglomerate that manufactures arms and has supplied the Myanmar military with LWT-XP torpedoes. Days after the military’s coup attempt, Larsen & Toubro sent on-board spares and an alarm monitoring system to the Myanmar military arms broker, Star Sapphire Group of Companies, via its Singapore subsidiary, according to Indian export records.
Bharat Forge Limited is a publicly listed Indian conglomerate that manufactures arms. Its subsidiary, Kalyani Strategic Systems, produces field guns.
A document leaked to Justice For Myanmar shows that a delegation from Bharat Forge and Kalyani met with the Myanmar military in October 2017, during its campaign of genocide against the Rohingya. The meeting was to discuss India’s Garuda 105mm light field gun.
News reports show that the Indian government was again in discussions with the Myanmar military as recently as October 2020 regarding the supply of 105mm field guns, which may involve Bharat Forge.
2019 Indian import and export records show that Kalyani Strategic Systems provided maintenance and spare parts for the Myanmar military’s T90 battle tank.
JSW Steel Limited is a publicly listed subsidiary of JSW Group. According to the company’s 2021-2022 integrated report, the Adani Ports & SEZ container terminal in Myanmar is a JSW Steel showcase project. The newly constructed port, which Adani Ports recently divested from, is a partnership with the military conglomerate MEC. Adani Ports has paid MEC over US$90 million in rent, land use and “land clearance” fees, and MEC will take ownership of the lucrative and strategic port and its assets at the end of the lease, including the materials supplied by JSW.
TATA Motors, Larsen & Toubro and Bharat Forge have all provided arms and equipment that have supported the Myanmar military’s international crimes. JSW has supported an infrastructure project that enriches a military conglomerate, benefiting war criminals and helping to finance the military’s atrocities.
TATA Motors and Larsen & Toubro are both on the Burma Campaign UK’s Dirty List of companies doing business with the Myanmar military.
Indian state and corporate complicity in the Myanmar military’s international crimes extends beyond the actions of B20 Summit partners. As Justice For Myanmar has previously exposed, Indian state-owned companies Bharat Electronics Limited and Yantra India Limited have supplied equipment and technology to the Myanmar military junta following its coup attempt.
Justice For Myanmar spokesperson Yadanar Maung says: “The Indian government’s support for the Myanmar military, with the complicity of some B20 Summit partners, should cast a shadow over the B20 and G20 summits and be a concern for participants and member states.
“By selling arms and equipment to the junta, the Indian government and companies are choosing to ignore the voices of the Myanmar people, UN resolutions and their responsibilities under international law.
“Justice For Myanmar calls for India to immediately impose an arms embargo on the Myanmar military and end its support for the junta.
“India’s allies in the G20 should use their leverage to pressure India to finally stop the flow of arms to the murderous junta.
“B20 partners and participants should cut all ties with the junta and its conglomerates.”..."
Source/publisher:
Justice For Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2023-08-24
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Human Rights and international relations
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"Six years ago this week, Myanmar’s military initiated its latest brutal campaign in a decades-long persecution of the Rohingya Muslim minority in Rakhine State. In what has been alleged to be a genocidal operation against the Rohingya, some 10,000 men, women, boys, girls, and newborns were killed, over 300 villages destroyed and over 700,000 fled to Bangladesh within a short period of time.
In all, over a million Rohingya have fled persecution and systematic discrimination to seek international refugee protection in Bangladesh, and more than 100,000 others are being held in closed displacement camps inside Myanmar. In a sign of their desperation, thousands more continue to attempt dangerous sea crossings from Myanmar and Bangladesh, too often ending in tragedy.
More must be done to hold the military to account for their repeated campaigns of persecution against the Rohingya, and for driving the country into its current human rights and humanitarian crisis. In the face of the impunity enjoyed by the Myanmar military for past and present crimes against the Rohingya as well as other groups, I call on States fully to support the ongoing international accountability efforts.
Having spent many years trying to ease the plight of the Rohingya, my most fervent wish is for them to be able to return to their homes in dignity, in freedom and properly recognised as part of the diversity of Myanmar’s population. Their human rights must be fully respected and their security guaranteed. This is currently not the case given the precarious conditions in Rakhine State. Furthermore, the military has shown no willingness to address systematic discrimination against the Rohingya.
In the face of competing crises, the international community must not forget the Rohingya people or their host community in Bangladesh. Humanitarian appeals for supporting the Rohingya, both in Myanmar and in the camps in Bangladesh, need greater support and funding. At the same time, third countries should expand Rohingya resettlement programmes or provide temporary protection, particularly in the region. And international efforts must be redoubled to reverse course in Myanmar and to ensure accountability and justice..."
Source/publisher:
UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
Date of entry/update:
2023-08-24
[field_licence]
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Individual Documents
Category:
Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, UN Human Rights pages on Myanmar, Human Rights and international relations
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"Statement from Refugees International:
“August 25, 2023, marks six years since the genocide that devastated the Rohingya people of Myanmar. Refugees International stands in solidarity with the survivors and recommits to partnering with them in advocacy to rebuild the Rohingya community both in current countries of refuge and toward a time where it is safe to return to their homeland.
Today, more than 1 million Rohingya refugees continue to live in the largest refugee settlement in the world in Bangladesh, facing aid cuts and ongoing restrictions on their freedom of movement and access to education and livelihood opportunities. They also face rising insecurity at the hands of criminal and extremist groups in the camps. Another 600,000 Rohingya remain at risk inside Myanmar, under the same military leaders responsible for genocide. Tens of thousands of other Rohingya have sought safety and a better life in surrounding countries, including India, Indonesia, and Malaysia, but too often face the risks of arbitrary or indefinite detention or forced return to the genocidal authorities from which they fled.
On this sixth day of remembrance, Refugees International calls upon the United States and other countries of influence to sustain support for humanitarian and accountability efforts for Rohingya. We further urge an increase in resettlement of Rohingya to the United States and other third countries. And we call upon other countries of refuge to increase the education and livelihood opportunities that will enable the Rohingya community to thrive. Finally, we urge global action to pressure Myanmar’s military junta, through such actions as further coordinated sanctions and arms embargoes, to create the conditions conducive for the safe, voluntary, dignified, and sustainable return of Rohingya to their homeland.”
For more information or to schedule an interview, contact Refugees International Vice President for Strategic Outreach Sarah Sheffer at [email protected]..."
Source/publisher:
Refugees International
Date of entry/update:
2023-08-24
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Discrimination against the Rohingya, Rohingya (cultural, political etc.), Burmese refugees in Bangladesh
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"Insight Email No. 21
This Insight Email is published on August 22, 2023, as a translation of the original Burmese language version that ISP-Myanmar sent out to the ISP Gabyin members on August 18, 2023.
For this week’s insight email to Gabyin community members, ISP-Myanmar discusses the suffocating lives under military rule. This sense of stagnation stems from the gradual decline of the Myanmar economy, which is now facing not just distress, but a slow demise. We also examine the expansion of conflict as the ongoing Myanmar crisis becomes more brutal and fought more vociferously. Furthermore, there are indications that the SAC could relinquish its responsibility to take up the alternate ASEAN Chairmanship in 2026. Additionally, this bulletin introduces U Ye Htut’s book, ‘Whither to… the Globe and Hlaingtharya?’ published this year. U Ye Htut is a former spokesperson of both the Myanmar government and the former Minister of Information.
∎ Key takeaways
1. Myanmar to shun ASEAN chairmanship in 2026
According to Thailand’s PBS News, Myanmar will defer its ASEAN alternate chairmanship to 2027 instead of the originally scheduled 2026, citing domestic circumstances and unpreparedness as the reasons. The ASEAN chairmanship rotation is based on alphabetical order. Following Indonesia’s (I) chairmanship, Laos (L) is set to assume the role in 2024, followed by Malaysia (MA) in 2025. Myanmar (MY) was initially slated for 2026, but the Philippines (P) will now take its place. This echoes a previous instance when Myanmar’s former junta postponed their ASEAN chairmanship responsibilities in 2006, allowing other ASEAN members to take up the lead. The ASEAN chairmanship was taken only in 2014 when the President Thein Sein’s government came in power with the 2010 general election.
In practice, transferring the ASEAN leadership to other member nations is a complex process that demands extensive consultations. The host country must proactively allocate a budget for organizing events and related expenses. The ASEAN chair is responsible for hosting a minimum of two ASEAN summits, engaging with partner dignitaries, and orchestrating numerous ASEAN ministerial meetings and sessions for officials of various ranks. If Myanmar is unable to assume leadership, the replacement country must make substantial preparations beforehand. In the meantime, leaders of the Myanmar junta are still excluded from attending ASEAN Summit meetings due to their failure to effectively implement the five-point consensus (5PC) aimed at resolving the nation’s crisis.
2.Intensifying levels of conflict
Even two years on from the military coup, conflict and civil unrest continue to escalate in Myanmar, with the total number of armed clashes reaching a minimum of 10,000 to July 2023. This figure represents a twofold increase compared to clashes that transpired over the entire preceding decade, spanning from 2010 to 2020 (which numbered at least 4,600). The conflict zones are widely dispersed, encompassing a significant geographical range. Following the coup, skirmishes occurred in at least 139 townships in 2021. This number surged to 193 townships in 2022 and further expanded to 211 townships in 2023. It is noteworthy that while in 2021 and 2022 clashes mostly occurred between the State Administration Council (SAC) and Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs), but that the number of clashes between these two groups decreased in 2023.
Clashes between SAC forces and Peoples Defence Forces, and Local Defence Forces (PDFs/LDFs) under various designations have also been steadily increasing. Besides which, the number of collaborative military operations between EAOs and PDFs has increased. These developments underscore the expanding capacity for force deployment of new forces that have entered the military-political theatre. In August this year, armed conflict reached the center of power, the plains areas surrounding the capital Naypyitaw. The presence and activities of PDFs and allied forces have emerged as substantial challenges to the authority of the junta.
On the other hand, there is a growing debate about whether the Myanmar military is grappling with a waning potency and declining in strength. Nevertheless, the SAC still maintains military advantages, significantly including air superiority, advantages in heavy artillery, and more recently with the deployment of multiple-launch rocket systems. The SAC military command structure remains capable of maneuvering across diverse theaters of conflict and engaging adversaries in various offensives, although their effectiveness has been somewhat diminished. Nonetheless, the ruthless tactics and indiscriminate assaults employed by SAC forces have wrought significant havoc, disproportionately affecting urban and rural inhabitants, particularly in the Karenni, Chin, and Sagaing regions. One significant aspect of the resistance movement is the ad hoc and irregular nature of opposition forces’ movements and engagement. This lack of any apparent cohesive or coordinated strategy means that whatever clashes do occur, are unlikely to result in territorial advances or greater control projection. Civilian casualties though continue to grow country-wide, reaching almost 9,000 civilian deaths in two years (to July 2023). Additionally, instances of home looting and destruction of civilian property are on the ascent, accounting for around 80,000 affected structures (See ISP Data Matters No. 48).
Conversely, the proliferation of diverse opposition armed factions has inherently given rise to intricate political dynamics among combatants, leading to challenges like resource distribution and rivalry for authority. The Defense Minister of the National Unity Government (NUG) recently asserted that the armed resistance could achieve success in the early months of the upcoming year. However, it remains premature to provide a comprehensive analysis at this juncture.
3.Myanmar’s suffocating economy
While the military junta is struggling to maintain control, the foreign exchange value of the Myanmar Kyat is depreciating swiftly. On August 16, one Thai Baht fetched over 100 Kyats while the US dollar is trading at 3,850 Kyats in the informal market. The consequences of the rapidly devaluing Kyat has made imported goods more expensive while domestic commodity prices also rise, placing substantial strain on the populace as they struggle to make ends meet.
The State Administration Council (SAC) is resorting to market price control measures through directives and leveraging threats against export-import traders. In June, the SAC’s Central Bank revoked the licenses of three foreign exchange companies and arrested 51 people working in currency exchange. On July 15, the SAC once again terminated licenses for ten additional foreign exchange companies. More recently, on August 15, an additional 13 foreign exchange companies were compelled to cease operations.
The genesis of these financial problems traces back to the State Administration Council’s (SAC) imposition of foreign currency controls. The banks are compelled to convert all customer accounts denominated in foreign currencies into Myanmar Kyats at predetermined rates. Additionally, a mandate requires foreign exporters to convert 65% of their export income into Kyats within a single day, using the official designated rate, while the remaining 35% of companies’ export earnings are allowed to be converted at the market rate. However, there was a partial easing when, on July 30, the Central Bank shifted the ratio to 50-50. Despite this adjustment, the alteration has not significantly alleviated the competitive constraints faced by traders.
On June 21, the U.S. Government imposed a new round of economic sanctions against two major state-owned banks, Myanmar Foreign Trade Bank (MFTB) and Myanmar Investment and Commerce Bank (MICB). This move had an immediate impact, triggering a decline in the value of the Myanmar Kyat. In a separate development, the SAC announced the forthcoming release of a new limited-circulation currency note with a value of 20,000 Kyats. This has heightened concerns about the Kyat’s stability, eroding people’s confidence in retaining the currency.
In addition, on August 9, Singpore’s United Overseas Bank (UOB) announced its decision to sever correspondent bank relationships with Myanmar, which has worsened confidence in Myanmar’s financial system. The UOB decision complicates the military regime’s access to the global financial system. Furthermore, intensifying armed conflict and natural disasters have damaged crops, properties, and industries, leading to declining productivity. Myanmar’s economic landscape remains fraught with difficulties and uncertainties. The economy isn’t merely grappling with distress—it’s teetering on the brink of collapse. The brunt of these economic hardships is felt most acutely by the marginalized, impoverished, and grassroots segments of the population. They are enduring a gale of difficulty while fighting for survival.
∎ Trends to be watched
Are people happy nowadays?
In a recent episode of the ‘GPS’ program, hosted by Fareed Zakaria, a conversation unfolded with Bruce Feiler, the author of the New York Times bestseller ‘The Search: Finding Meaningful Work in a Post-Career World’. The discourse highlighted widespread discontent among workers with their employment, attributed to various factors such as the pandemic and the subsequent shift to remote work arrangements. However, the situation in Myanmar diverges significantly from global trends, as the populace faces a distinct challenge: the scarcity of viable job opportunities.
According to a recent International Labor Organization (ILO) brief on Myanmar, dated August 2023, the rate of employment terminations increased by 23.5 percent following the military takeover on 1 February 2021. The data includes dismissals of workers increasing by 41 percent while workers’ resignations increased by 22 percent. Many of these ousted workers were from the wholesale and retail trade sector, followed by the textiles, apparel, leather, and related manufacturing sector, and the construction sector. It is significant that among the civil disobedience movement (CDM) many activists refused to collaborate with the regime, which was reflected in the labour statistics. The job termination rate in the public sector increased by 392 percent (comparing the ratio prior to and after the military takeover) following the military takeover, mostly from the education sector. Many dismissals were for ‘non-standard’ reasons and are outside of national labor laws. Such violations rose by 690 percent after the military coup. Their struggle is harsh, some found waged jobs again after termination or become self-employed, but the average time for a worker to return to wage employment was 167 days, ILO reported. It is definitely not a happy experience.
Workers in Myanmar are encountering the most difficult situation. The SAC’s Cooperative and Rural Development Ministry website revealed at least 646 small businesses (SMEs) negated their registrations in the first seven months from early this year to July, as they could not continue their businesses. Simultaneously, a combination of human-caused and natural disasters has inflicted additional devastation upon the population. The situation in conflict-ridden areas has escalated to more dire proportions, with over 1.6 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) navigating treacherous terrains in search of safety. These adversities compound existing economic challenges, further compounding societal distress. The confluence of dim economic prospects, the continuous devaluation of the currency, and the State Administration Council’s (SAC) implementation of ad hoc economic policies has created an unfavorable environment for the creation of new job opportunities. The trajectory of employment dynamics and the voluntary or involuntary termination of jobs is a pivotal concern, as it directly influences the well-being of the majority of citizens.
∎ What ISP is reading?
Whither to… the Globe and Hlaingtharya?
Ye Htut, (April 2023). Whither to… the Globe and Hlaingtharya? Yangon: Ye Htut Publication.
A book authored by a former spokesperson of the Myanmar government and Minister of Information has recently been released. Known for his adeptness in Myanmar prose writing, he has garnered a substantial following through his earlier published essays. This latest publication is an anthology of articles and essays drawn from his Facebook page, encompassing a diverse range of subjects: from personal anecdotes and reflections on pivotal events to intricate portrayals of grassroots communities, travel accounts and his freethought. The book comprises 60 essays in 274 pages.
In the preface of his book, he recited Myanmar’s famous author, Mya Than Tint saying, ‘traveling is a type of politics.’ Against the backdrop of heightened security following the military coup in Myanmar, he documented his experiences and observations from routine local shopping excursions to journeys on the Yangon circular train. His essays maintain a message he wants to convey. As he writes in his book’s preface, ‘At the time of almost diminishing freedom, more vigorous conflicts and antagonisms, it is difficult to write about politics, economics, and social lives. Some ideas can be expressed openly, but some subjects can be only touched finely and left the readers to think further.’ The same paragraph is also printed on the back page of the book.
Within the essays, as outlined by the author, a panorama emerges encapsulating “tantrum situations both in the mountains and on the plains.” These narratives underscore the widespread scarcity afflicting numerous individuals, encompassing persistent and often extended periods of electricity blackouts. Individuals are compelled to navigate these challenges by looking for ways to reduce spending, reducing their food costs, and for those people at the grassroots, to ignore the nutritional value of their foods, embark on troublesome long queues in front of banks and ATMs. Soaring prices change the way people use fuel, and people become disgruntled living lives among the three catastrophes of famine, war, and epidemic disease. There are cases of ‘strangers’ pillaging villages and destroying properties. The reader can see the social-justice sensitiveness of the author through the texts as he recurringly points out the growing inequalities. It is observed that if he has to say something, he regularly stands with the view of the grassroots people.
Source/publisher:
ISP-Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2023-08-23
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
2.62 MB
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Description:
"MYANMAR
Ongoing fighting in several states and regions across the country has resulted in additional new displacement and an increase in humanitarian needs, particularly in Kachin, Mandalay, and the Northwest. In Kachin, continued armed clashes and heavy military deployment have forced another 200 families (more than 1,100 people) in Shwegu township into displacement, bringing the total number of newly internally displaced people (IDPs) in this township to nearly 20,000 since early March 2023. In Mandalay, nearly 10,000 people have been displaced since mid-July due to continued fighting in Thabeikkyin township and are especially in urgent need of food and healthcare. In the Northwest, more than 7,150 IDPs in four townships in Sagaing are in urgent need of food, water, shelter, and hygiene kits. In addition, at least ten houses and a church in eastern Bago, Chin, Kayin, Mon, southern Shan, and Tanintharyi were reportedly destroyed during the reporting period.
As of 14 August, the total displaced people in the country stands at more than 1.9 million across the country, with over 1.6 million people having been displaced since 1 February 2021..."
Source/publisher:
UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (New York) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2023-08-23
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
UN human rights documents on Myanmar, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Agriculture in Burma/Myanmar: general and research, Human Rights and international relations
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Format :
pdf
Size:
2.15 MB
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Description:
"Six years after an unprecedented exodus of Rohingya people from Myanmar to Bangladesh, medical needs in the world's largest refugee camp remain pressing and care increasingly inadequate.
In a global context marked by multiple large-scale humanitarian crises, international funding allocated to the humanitarian response for these one million stateless people is under increased pressure year on year. A very worrying situation for these people, who rely almost entirely on humanitarian aid due to their lack of legal status, which prevents them from working legally to sustain themselves or their families.
Despite being one of the largest healthcare providers in the camps, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) has reached capacity in several areas, and we are now obliged to set stricter admission criteria to cope with the overwhelming medical needs of patients coming to our facilities.
We are therefore calling on international donors to significantly scale up their financial contributions to provide adequate support and prevent further irreversible consequences on the physical and mental health of Rohingya people.
Six years after the exodus
In just a few weeks in August 2017, more than 700,000 men, women and children fled the mass violence perpetrated against them by the Myanmar military in Rakhine State in northwestern Myanmar. They found refuge in the hills of Cox's Bazar district in Bangladesh.
The Bangladeshi people organised the reception of their neighbours, as they did on previous occasions. Six years later, what was a temporary solution to offer refuge to people escaping harrowing violence, has become a protracted crisis with no meaningful solution on the horizon.
Although the camps now have better roads, more latrines and drinking water than at the initial peak of the emergency, people still live in overcrowded shelters, and the construction of permanent structures is not allowed. Fires have destroyed hundreds or thousands of shelters, presenting an ongoing, but preventable risk to the safety of people living in the camps.
As the area is prone to natural disasters, shelters made of bamboo and plastic sheeting are often damaged and destroyed by strong winds, torrential rains and landslides. Added to this environment of extreme vulnerability is the impossibility of evacuating the camps to safer areas, as was the case during Cyclone Mocha in May this year. Most of our hospitals had to close for two days, their semi-permanent structures threatening to collapse.
Less and less funds reach the world’s largest refugee camp
For the time being, the return of Rohingya refugees to Myanmar remains a dream: they need guarantees of their rights, including recognition of their citizenship and a return to homes on their land.
Time seems to stand still. Life in the camps feels like a never-ending day. Camps have been surrounded by fences and barbed wire since the outbreak of COVID-19. Rohingya people are not allowed to work or leave the camps. Access to food, water and healthcare for one million stateless people depends on international humanitarian aid.
But aid is increasingly under-funded by international donors. Over the past two years, the commitment of UN member states to the humanitarian funding appeal has been dwindling: from around 70 per cent in 2021 to 60 per cent in 2022, and around 30 per cent so far in 2023. In March, the World Food Programme’s food rations were cut from the equivalent of US$12 per person per month to US$10, and then again to just US$8 in June.
Our teams witness difficulties faced by health centres run by various organisations dependent on this funding for human resources, drug supplies and the ability to ensure patient follow-up. Regular maintenance of water and sanitation infrastructure is also a challenge, making hygiene conditions and access to drinking water problematic in many camps.
Growing medical needs strain services
Unsanitary living conditions complicate the health situation considerably, leading to various health issues. Last year, patients with dengue fever increased tenfold on the previous year, and at the start of 2023, we saw the highest weekly increase in patients with cholera since 2017.
Forty per cent of people living in the camps suffer from scabies, according to the results of a long-awaited survey presented by the camps’ health sector coordination in May. This is well above the World Health Organisation’s recommended threshold of 10 per cent to start a mass drug administration for scabies outbreaks.
This situation has put an increasing strain on MSF’s services over the past two years. Our teams have been treating the consequences of difficult living conditions since the influx six years ago: infectious diseases, respiratory, intestinal and skin infections. But over the years, we have also seen a growing need to treat long-term illnesses linked to a chronic lack of access to healthcare for the Rohingya in Myanmar, such as diabetes, hypertension, or hepatitis C.
The number of patients arriving at the outpatient department of the ‘hospital on the hill’, built by MSF in the middle of the camps in 2017, increased by 50 per cent during 2022. This situation goes hand in hand with several health centres closing in the area in the past year due to a lack of funding and a rampant scabies epidemic.
In this hospital as well as in our mother-and-child hospital in Goyalmara, we saw an unusually high rise of paediatric admissions from January to June 2023 compared to the same period last year. In July, while the annual peak season of medical needs was only just starting, our paediatric hospital admissions were at capacity.
How will patients cope?
MSF is not directly affected by the crisis in funding from international donors, but the capacity of our services to absorb the ever-increasing demand for care is reaching its own limits. The growing number of consultations inevitably puts pressure on our human resources, hospital bed management and drug supplies.
As long as the Rohingya in Bangladesh are contained to camps and trapped in a cycle of dependency on humanitarian aid, it is imperative that international donors significantly scale up their financial contributions to provide adequate support and prevent further irreversible consequences on their physical and mental health..."
Source/publisher:
Médecins Sans Frontières
Date of entry/update:
2023-08-23
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Discrimination against the Rohingya, Human Rights and international relations, Public Health, Rohingya (cultural, political etc.), Burmese refugees in Bangladesh
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Local URL:
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Sub-title:
The changing world order and the growing Chinese aggression in the SCS have compelled the ASEAN countries to increase their military expenditures
Description:
"With global dynamics changing due to big power rivalry, the Indo-Pacific region is challenging the traditional concept of the Asia-Pacific with ASEAN at its core. Several ASEAN-centric bodies provided the regional security architecture. The United States (US) and its Quad partners—India, Japan, and Australia—have decided to challenge China’s aggressive intent in the South China Sea (SCS) and in the larger Indo- Pacific. ASEAN worries that it may have to choose sides.
ASEAN integration with the Chinese economy is intense. Its defence engagement with China is constrained by China’s assertiveness in the SCS and claims over its ‘traditional rights’ as outlined by the nine-dash line. This brings it into conflict with five ASEAN countries, notably Vietnam and the Philippines; the contention with Malaysia, Brunei and Indonesia is more muted.
The Quad, the AUKUS, the threat of a Taiwan conflict, and the Ukraine crisis cause anxiety to ASEAN. ASEAN’s traditional posture of a liberal construct to deal with security challenges is failing. The Chinese have upended the reality in the SCS while providing lip service to ASEAN’s efforts to have a Code of Conduct (CoC) since 2002.
There is enhanced threat perception and defence spending by ASEAN countries. It cannot be termed as an arms race because ASEAN members are generally not competing with each other, nor are they in a position to challenge China or other inimical powers. Yet, military acquisition is increasing as maritime security moves centre stage.
The Chinese have upended the reality in the SCS while providing lip service to ASEAN’s efforts to have a Code of Conduct (CoC) since 2002.
ASEAN countries have a modernisation process underway. This has several aspects to it. Some started a while ago, but the need to bolster defences and replace equipment has had a link to Chinese aggression since 2010. According to the SIPRI Military Expenditure database 2023, ASEAN’s military expenditure increased from US$20.3 billion in 2000 to US$43.2 billion in 2021. From 2002-2007, this was below US$30 billion annually. Since 2015, ASEAN countries spent US$41 billion or more, the highest being US$ 44.3 billion in 2020.
From 2012, Chinese aggression in the SCS grew, cleaving ASEAN and bringing Chinese ships to the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), waters and shoals of five ASEAN countries. Notably, military expenditure increases began in 2013, when expenditures leapt from US $34 billion to US $38 billion and have been growing since. Among ASEAN countries, according to SIPRI, from 2002-2021, Singapore has had the largest defence budget, reaching US$11 billion. The next was Indonesia with US$8.2 billion in 2023 marginally lower than US$ 9.3 billion as seen in 2020. Since 2012, Indonesia increased its defence expenditure from US$ 6.5 billion to US$ 8.3 billion in 2013 and has maintained a steady level.
Thailand is another major importer of weaponry with a budget of US$ 6.6 billion though it had maintained US$7 billion per annum for the previous three years. Malaysia and the Philippines both crossed the threshold of US$3 billion per annum and maintained it for a decade. These are likely to rise.
SIPRI does not have reliable defence expenditure figures for Vietnam but places them around US$ 5.5 billion per annum. Vietnam ceased publishing its defence budget in 2018 when it was estimated at 2.36 percent of its GDP. In December 2022, Vietnam held its first Def Expo; 170 exhibitors from 30 countries participated, which is a sign that Vietnam, facing Chinese hostility consistently, aims to diversify its Russian defence base. JSC Rosoboronexport (Russia), Lockheed Martin (US), Airbus (Europe), BrahMos Aerospace (India) and Mitsubishi Electric (Japan) had participated. Chinese companies, though invited, were absent. Vietnam relied on Russia for 70 percent of its weaponry. Most of its large equipment is Russian. The dependence decreased to below 60 percent in 2021. The US lifted an embargo on weapon transfers to Vietnam in 2016. Since 2017, the US and South Korea became suppliers.
Chinese aggression in the SCS grew, cleaving ASEAN and bringing Chinese ships to the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), waters and shoals of five ASEAN countries.
South Korea has enhanced its exports to ASEAN. Korean Aerospace Industries in February 2023 signed a US$910-million contract for 18 FA-50 fighters to Malaysia; they challenged the offer of India’s Tejas aircraft. While Malaysia is not among the major arms spenders, its engagement with South Korea and Türkiye is growing. According to SIPRI, between 2017 and 2021, South Korea sold over US $2 billion of defence equipment to the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam, Myanmar, and Malaysia.
Threat perceptions and its implications
The perceptions of threats among ASEAN member states and how they should confront them varies. Some are more comfortable in dealing with the US, Australia, and Japan who are Quad members; others are more circumspect. The difference is due to the threat perceptions. Vietnam and the Philippines, for instance, are the biggest victims of Chinese aggression in the SCS. China has occupied islands and challenged control by Vietnam and the Philippines over islets and shoals that were traditionally governed but not defended. The Mischief Reef and Second Thomas Shoal with the Philippines and Johnson Reef with Vietnam have witnessed such aggression. Therefore, the expansion of Vietnamese and the Filipinos armed forces and equipment and capabilities are an important factor.
In cases where military coups have occurred, such as in Thailand and Myanmar, the expansion of the armed forces was faster and more sustained. Some equipment purchased by Myanmar and Thailand cannot be easily linked to direct threats because these countries are not engaged in direct confrontation with China in the SCS. They have no ostensible enemies except within; yet obtaining submarines like Thailand received from China in 2017 and Myanmar obtained from India as a gift looks odd. Myanmar is perhaps responding more to Bangladesh acquiring Chinese submarines. Submarine acquisitions by Singapore, Indonesia, Vietnam, and Malaysia are also noted in ASEAN.
China has occupied islands and challenged control by Vietnam and the Philippines over islets and shoals that were traditionally governed but not defended.
In several ASEAN countries, the ideology behind the defence of the realm has altered. While the control by the military in Thailand and Myanmar gives impetus to defence expenditure there, in Indonesia and the Philippines, the move away from military governments towards democracy goes in the other direction. Instead of large armies, intended for internal control, and dealing with counter-insurgencies, the emphasis shifts to understanding the maritime challenges and acquiring naval and air assets for developing maritime security capabilities.
In democratic societies, budgetary constraints often come in the way of purchasing new equipment. This requires the executive to coordinate with the legislature and the Treasury. This impacts the kind of weapon systems that are being acquired or have become lost opportunities. The ability to coordinate these internally led the Philippines to outrun Indonesia and Vietnam in ordering the BrahMos missiles from India. In Indonesia, the order has not materialised, because internal coordination between the government and Parliament is inconclusive.
It is not entirely clear why Vietnam, despite its interest in the Brahmos and placing orders for weapons from other sources, is hesitant, though it happily accepts a gift of a warship from India.
In the case of Indonesia, they ordered 42 Rafaeles from France. Meanwhile, they obtained 12 second-hand Mirage 2000-5 fighter jets from Qatar for US$792 million. This is the impact of budgetary constraints.
The Philippines during the first Horizon (2013 to 2017) purchased military hardware for internal security. The second horizon (2017 to 2022) focused shifting from internal security to territorial defence. The Philippines allocated US$ 5.6 billion for Horizon 2 and US$ 4 billion for Horizon 3 (2022-2027).
The ability to coordinate these internally led the Philippines to outrun Indonesia and Vietnam in ordering the BrahMos missiles from India.
Thailand, in 2022, ordered armed reconnaissance AH-6 helicopters from the US and Hermes 900 drones from Israel to support maritime operations. Singapore’s 2023 defence budget is US$13.4 billion, witnessing a 10-percent increase over 2022. It will include buying 8 (STOVL)-capable Lockheed Martin F-35B fighter aircraft to replace its F16s. Malaysia, besides the Korean fighters, will acquire three unmanned aerial systems from Turkish Aerospace Industries, and two maritime patrol aircraft from Italian firm Leonardo. In Indonesia, new helicopters, aircraft, naval vessels and surface combatants, military rotorcraft, submarines, underwater and electronic warfare systems, are the key components for expansion,
SIPRI indicates that in 2021, ASEAN countries spent US$43 billion on defence, merely 2 percent of worldwide defence expenditures. Comparatively, the US spent US$ 827 billion (39 percent), Europe US $418 billion (20 percent). China spent US$ 292 billion (13 percent) and Japan and South Korea both spent US$ 46 billion (2.1 percent) each.
The surge started around 2010. Russia was quick to provide equipment particularly Sukhoi aircraft to Malaysia, Indonesia, and Vietnam. Submarines were also popular. The Ukraine crisis and US nudging led ASEAN to avoid Russian equipment. Between 2000 and 2020, Russia was the largest arms supplier to ASEAN with sales of US$11 billion compared to US$8.4 billion from the US. The cost factor, the non-interference by Russia in the internal matters of ASEAN countries, and sometimes the use of barter arrangements by payment in commodities helped Russia. The US sanctions on Russia reportedly led to the cancellation by Indonesia of the Sukhoi 35 fighter deal and reduced the Philippines’ interest in buying 16 military helicopters.
Due to the Ukraine war, Russia is constrained in supplying weaponry. Its diminished capacity leads ASEAN to buy new equipment from American, European, and other Asian countries. The biggest advantage is for South Korea. They provide good technology at competitive cost, with little interest in the domestic politics of ASEAN. Given the new impetus to military modernisation in ASEAN, the market serves a good opportunity for middle powers to expand their imprint especially India..."
Source/publisher:
Observer Research Foundation
Date of entry/update:
2023-08-23
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
ASEAN-Burma relations, Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
Local URL:
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Sub-title:
Byu Har, the son of a prominent musician, also called the junta’s leader an ‘incompetent fool’ in a Facebook video.
Description:
"Myanmar’s junta has sentenced a hip-hop singer to 20 years in prison for a video published on social media in which he complained about electricity shortages and criticized the junta’s leadership.
Prison authorities informed the family of Byu Har that the Insein Prison Court on Wednesday sentenced him to 20 years in prison under section 124 of the Penal Code for incitement to destroy the state, his wife told Radio Free Asia.
Byu Har, the son of prominent musician Naing Myanmar, posted a video on Facebook earlier this year where he called out the “minister of electricity” and called the holder of the office “a fool.” He was arrested on May 23.
The ministry’s proper name is the Ministry of Electric Power and the minister of electric power is Thaung Han.
The country has experienced power shortages, and residents told RFA’s Burmese Service earlier this year that many areas of Yangon – including where Byu Har lived – received power for only five hours in the morning and another five hours in the afternoon and evening.
Some areas of the city, such as the area where retired military officers live, were supplied with full power, though.
“You can’t supply enough electricity to us,” Byu Har said in the video. “You can barely supply us every five hours. Even that is not certain.”
He also criticized the junta’s leader, Sen. Gen. Min Aung Hlaing, calling him “a stupid incompetent fool.”
“I am cursing at you because I don’t have the electricity,” he said in the video. “Got it? If you want to arrest me, just come.”
Before he was arrested, Byu Har lived with his 31-year-old wife, 10-year-old daughter and 8-year-old son in North Dagon township in eastern Yangon..."
Source/publisher:
"Radio Free Asia" (USA)
Date of entry/update:
2023-08-23
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Freedom of opinion and expression: - the situation in Burma/Myanmar - reports, analyses, recommendations, Political prisoners and other violations in Burma - reports, Human Rights and international relations
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"Myanmar's detained pro-democracy leader, Aung San Suu Kyi’s younger son, Kim Aris, has called for international unity against the actions of the Myanmar junta in an interview with VOA from his home in England.
In the interview via Zoom, Aris says, “the scale of junta’s crime against humanity is horrifying.” He also called for the release of his mother, as well as all political prisoners who have been arbitrarily detained.
He describes how his mother, while working to bring democracy to her home country from England, was supported by his father, Michael Aris, who would later die of cancer. Suu Kyi went back to Myanmar to nurse her dying mother in 1988, during the people's uprising against Ne Win’s socialist authoritarian government.
Suu Kyi would go on to lead the democracy movement in Myanmar and be put under house arrest for more than two decades by the military junta. The junta stripped Aris and his older brother, Alexander Aris, of their Myanmar citizenships in 1989, when their mother first was placed under house arrest.
This interview has been edited for clarity and brevity.
VOA: You have frequently been interviewed by different media outlets regarding the current situation in Myanmar where your mother, Aung San Suu Kyi, has been sentenced to nearly 30 years imprisonment by the junta. Why are you now willingly and actively engaging with the media and the public in a way that you haven't before?
Kim Aris: Since the beginning of the coup, I have had no contact with my mother. The military regime has not answered any of my queries as to her whereabouts or told me that I can have any contact with her in any way, shape or form. So, I have no other way of trying to reach her. I tried to do what I can. And I don't believe that anyone seeing the horrific images and sheer scale of the crimes against humanity being perpetrated by the military, against the Burmese people could turn a blind eye. … I cannot stand by and simply hope others will do what is needed to free my mother and support the people in desperate need of humanitarian aid if I do not do something myself.
The recent news that my mother had been transferred into house arrest is, as far as I'm aware, not true. As far as I know, she's still in prison in Napyidaw somewhere. And the military have used these tactics of false propaganda many times before. And I think this is just what's happening again, now that they're saying to be moved back to house arrest, whereas in fact, she's still in prison.
VOA: Your mother has said that she didn't want her kids to be involved in politics. Do you know what her reasons were?
Aris: Well, I'm sure every mother's natural instinct is to protect her children. From the personal risks involved due to the brutality of the military. Obviously, paramount in her mind that she herself has faced assassination attempts, and how her father was assassinated as well. These things come with risks.
VOA: Many of our viewers know that you don't like to talk about your personal life much, but can you share a little about your experience, especially for our younger audience, on how you overcame the difficult situation of being alone while your mother was back in Myanmar working to lead her country?
Aris: It has always saddened and angered me that my mother has sometimes been portrayed as cold-hearted because she was unable to be by my father's side during his final days. I was nursing him at that time and can say that he did not want my mother to return to England. After all the sacrifices she had already made. His wish was to join her in Burma (now Myanmar) and be with her under house arrest. Unfortunately, the military could not find this in their hearts to grant his dying wish. I believe it was a unity between my parents and this gave them the strength to oppose the injustice with which they were faced. Furthermore, I never felt that it was actually hard for me to be without my mother compared to what the Burmese people are going through. Their sacrifices have been far greater than anything that I've had to endure.
VOA: Can you give us an update on your campaign to bring attention to your mother’s imprisonment? What is the main aim of the campaign? What do you see as the biggest challenges going forward?
Aris: My main aim is to call on the international community to stand in solidarity, take meaningful action to achieve the release of my mother and all political prisoners and hold to account the military leaders responsible for violating the rule of law and numerous rights of the Burmese people.
Also, I'm trying to support humanitarian aid fundraising events taking place around the world, and to generate more global awareness of the crisis in Burma and the crimes against humanity being committed by the military every day. Some of the biggest challenges that I'm going to be facing are that some governments and institutions are willing to facilitate the military in their increasingly brazen crimes against humanity, the ability of the United Nations and wider international community to effectively impose more targeted sanctions on individuals, companies and institutions that facilitate the flow of revenue and aid to the junta’s military capabilities.
VOA: In my interview with Myanmar activists from the U.K., they said that they felt encouragement when you, as the son of Aung San Suu Kyi, showed your support for them. Do you have any plan to work with any of Myanmar organizations, such as the National Unity government, which led among opponents to the junta?
Aris: No, I have no plans on working with any of them. I have no wish to be a politician in any way. But I will be standing in solidarity with all of these organizations. I believe that they will win this war, especially through collaboration and new unity amongst all the different groups in their common fight against this military regime. My belief is that Burma will reemerge as a democratic country with greater inclusivity and acceptance..."
Source/publisher:
"Voice of America" (Washington, D.C)
Date of entry/update:
2023-08-23
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations, About Aung San Suu Kyi
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"Civil society statement on the visit of Head of OCHA to Myanmar
While noting efforts by UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Martin Griffiths, to negotiate humanitarian access across Myanmar, including to Rakhine State following deadly Cyclone Mocha, we, the undersigned 514 civil society organizations, are concerned that Mr. Griffiths’ visit lacked substantive achievements and was used as propaganda by the military junta. We urge the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), to officially engage and partner with legitimate stakeholders of Myanmar and civil society service providers to deliver humanitarian assistance.
As Mr. Griffiths’ end-of-visit statement affirmed, “it is critical for us to have the humanitarian space we need for safe, sustained aid deliveries around the country.” Principled humanitarian engagement must see OCHA and other UN humanitarian agencies cut ties with the illegal criminal junta which is weaponizing aid and is the root cause of human suffering in Myanmar. Rather, OCHA must immediately partner with legitimate governance actors that control large parts of the country and deliver aid through local service providers. This includes Ethnic Revolutionary Organizations (EROs), the National Unity Government (NUG), and civil society organizations who have been effectively providing essential services on the ground, including through cross-border channels. Such stakeholders have the access, legitimacy, capacity and, most importantly, trust from the people that the junta simply lacks.
Given that the visit happened three months since Cyclone Mocha devastated communities in Chin and Rakhine States, Sagaing Region and beyond, the junta has proven to have no intention to address the acute needs of affected communities. Rather, OCHA visit has become the military junta’s latest propaganda exercise to attempt to gain international recognition and legitimacy. We are alarmed that OCHA’s statement omits the fact that the cause of the escalating humanitarian crisis is the junta’s violence and atrocities, or that it is the junta’s weaponization of humanitarian assistance that is blocking access to Cyclone Mocha’s victims.
While the junta has restricted humanitarian access and prevented aid from reaching vulnerable communities affected by the natural disaster, it is also the perpetrators of a nationwide man-made humanitarian catastrophe. Its widespread and systematic campaign of arson, military offensives, extrajudicial killings, and aerial attacks on civilians are, according to the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar, strong evidence of “increasingly frequent and brazen war crimes.” In addition to these heinous crimes, severe restrictions of humanitarian aid delivery, including targeting aid workers, are the junta’s collective punishment of a population that is rejecting its ongoing brutal attempt to grab power. In his recent report to the 53rd Session of the Human Rights Council, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Volker Türk, outlines how “As part of its attempts to assert control, the military has imposed a range of legal, financial, and bureaucratic requirements on civil society and humanitarian activity that have severely reduced civic space and delivery of life-saving assistance.”
We further note OCHA’s recognition of the Myanmar military’s unconstitutional body of the “State Administration Council” in its statement which is inconsistent with the language used by the UN Security Council and UN General Assembly in their resolutions. It also legitimizes Min Aung Hlaing’s claim to be head of government by referring to him as the Chairman of the State Administration Council. We express serious concerns that OCHA’s current approach will embolden the junta to further its war of terror across the nation. Such actions risk exacerbating the humanitarian crisis, the very crisis OCHA is mandated to address and alleviate.
Despite the junta attempting to gain diplomatic legitimacy over this type of visit, OCHA must ensure substantial benefits are provided for the millions of people in dire need of humanitarian assistance as a result of the junta’s violence and atrocities. Access for OCHA staff to parts of Rakhine State and nearby areas is one issue at stake, but so is the hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons in central, southeast and northwest Myanmar, where the junta is launching non-stop deliberate attacks on civilians. In these areas, the junta does not have effective control and cannot grant access to affected communities. On the contrary, local governance and civil society actors have been effectively delivering assistance to affected communities, but must be supported by more resources.
OCHA must reflect on its current failed approach and take critical, concrete actions which truly serve Myanmar communities that are in dire need. To fulfill its mandate and principles to do no harm, OCHA must immediately pivot to delivering aid in collaboration or partnership with local humanitarian and civil society groups, ethnic service providers, diaspora communities, local administration forces of the Spring Revolution, members of the Civil Disobedience Movement, EROs, and the NUG who have been effectively providing life-saving services on the ground, including through cross-border channels.
The Myanmar military has a long history of weaponizing humanitarian aid and UN agencies have a long history of being criticized for complicity in military atrocities, all done in the name of access. OCHA can no longer afford to rehash failed models of humanitarianism, and thus tacitly giving credence and status to the illegal military junta. Rather, OCHA must be innovative and supportive of local service providers, as well as engage and collaborate with the legitimate stakeholders of Myanmar. This will ensure the most effective and widespread delivery of humanitarian assistance to affected communities suffering from international crimes committed by a brutal military junta..."
Source/publisher:
514 Myanmar, Regional and International Organizations
Date of entry/update:
2023-08-22
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), UN human rights documents on Myanmar, Human Rights and international relations
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pdf
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266.2 KB
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"Human Rights Violations took place in States and Regions from Aug 15 to 21, 2023
Military Junta Troop launched airstrikes and dropped bombs in Sagaing Region, Bago Region, Kayin State, and Kachin State from August 15th to 21st. Military Junta troops attacked with heavy artillery which seemed to contain chemical poison, to Thasi Village, Kale Township, Sagaing Region, and 20 civilians were poisoned and took medical care. They also arrested over 30 civilians from Sagaing Region and Magway Region as human shields. Military Junta arrested and killed 8 civilians from Pinlebu Township and Khin-U Township.
Civilians were forced to leave their places by the Military Junta troop’s matching, for 5 times within a week. 2 children died and 1 was injured by the Military’s Human Rights Violations. 5 underage youth were arrested within a week. Military land mines killed a civilian and injured 2 people..."
Source/publisher:
Network for Human Rights Documentation-Burma
Date of entry/update:
2023-08-22
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights Defenders
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309.21 KB 146.29 KB 302.28 KB
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"Abandon hope. This is the message the junta is sending to the population of Myanmar.
World leaders will gather in Jakarta in early September for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and East Asia Summits. Participants will include several G7 leaders and U.S. Vice-President Kamala Harris, while U.S. President Joe Biden will be in the region attending the G20 with several ASEAN and G7 leaders. A key agenda item for the ASEAN meetings will be Myanmar, where a military junta in power after a 2021 coup has engaged in a mass crackdown on opposition movements and ethnic armed groups.
The junta has committed arbitrary detentions, summary executions, torture, and unlawful military attacks, much of the brutality amounting to crimes against humanity and war crimes. A recent so-called partial pardon for ousted leader Aung San Suu Kyi was essentially a scam — six years were shaved off the 78-year-old’s 33-year prison sentence, deflecting attention from another extension of the “state of emergency” the junta has invoked to try to justify their crackdown.
Diplomatic efforts on Myanmar since its 2021 coup have floundered. ASEAN and its allies, as well as the U.N. Security Council, have failed to compel the junta to curb their abuses, just as they failed to hold the Myanmar military accountable for crimes against humanity and acts of genocide against Rohingya Muslims in 2016-2017, atrocities that are ongoing.
Despite ASEAN’s inability to unify on Myanmar, diplomats within and outside the bloc continue to refer to ASEAN’s defunct five-point consensus from April 2021 — which Myanmar’s junta repudiated days after agreeing to it — as a pretext for their own inaction.
Myanmar’s generals have been counting on everyone giving up. And while the people of Myanmar have not, most outside governments have obliged. Myanmar’s human rights crisis, however, is not insolvable, and it’s too horrendous to be ignored.
Granted, it’s hard to be hopeful. The Myanmar military has engaged in relentless, violent campaigns against the country’s people for more than six decades. Some of the military’s most egregious crimes, including the violence against the Rohingya, occurred during the period of democratic reforms that began in 2010. The Myanmar military’s indifference about its international reputation and its willingness to commit massive human rights abuses seems unlimited.
The U.N. Security Council, which last December passed a resolution noting the council’s “full support for ASEAN’s central role in facilitating a peaceful solution” in Myanmar, needs to chart a bolder course. The United Kingdom, which traditionally leads council debates on Myanmar, should distribute ideas for a new, stronger resolution on Myanmar, including the possibility of an arms embargo and international sanctions. China abstained and did not veto last December’s resolution, indicating that more pressure at the council is possible. Some ASEAN members have called for U.N. support in resolving the crisis, and there is little hope ASEAN will ever accomplish anything if the Security Council doesn’t settle on a new approach soon.
Furthermore, ASEAN dialogue partners attending the summits — in particular, Security Council members United States, U.K., France, Japan, and upcoming 2024 addition South Korea — need to signal their intentions for stronger action at the U.N. rather than continuing to imply that ASEAN can solve the crisis in Myanmar on its own.
They should urge reluctant ASEAN members to cooperate in enforcing existing U.S., EU, and U.K. sanctions in Southeast Asian jurisdictions, and press them to suspend Myanmar from ASEAN entirely unless the junta begins moving toward reform.
In particular, ASEAN partners should pressure Thailand, which purchases hundreds of millions of dollars in natural gas from Myanmar, and Singapore, where the military has bank accounts for its foreign revenues. Thailand and Singapore should be warning companies and banks in their jurisdictions not to evade U.S. and EU sanctions or risk financial penalties.
Some observers claim that international pressure and sanctions are impotent in the face of the Myanmar military’s imperviousness. The truth is that the outside governments have never really unified to pressure the junta and impose punitive sanctions on Myanmar’s generals. Sanctions imposed by the US, European Union, and a small number of likeminded governments since the coup do target the military leadership and its business interests. Yet as with the previous sanctions put in place before Myanmar’s fleeting period of reform, measures have been imposed too slowly, not been enforced robustly, and failed to target the junta’s largest sources of foreign income.
Enormous revenues still flow to the junta in dollars, euros, and other currencies from joint ventures, mostly extractive, involving companies across the world — not just China, but also countries that have condemned the junta, including Japan, South Korea, Singapore, and Malaysia. Transactions from natural gas revenues, the junta’s single largest source of foreign currency, have only recently been targeted by the United States, and have not yet been effectively blocked. Restrictions on the military’s purchases of aviation fuel need to be strengthened and more tightly enforced.
More effective efforts to block extractive revenues, paid in dollars and euros, would significantly reduce the junta’s foreign-currency income. These efforts would also likely reduce transactions to the junta in other currencies: most international banks need to comply with U.S. and EU rules so they can conduct U.S. dollar and euro transactions for other clients.
Myanmar’s military has not faced serious economic pain. Should anyone then wonder why it has so blatantly defied calls by neighbors, world powers, and the United Nations? Does it make any sense to expect a divided ASEAN to compel them to change?
It’s not too late to adopt effective measures to compel Myanmar’s military to change its conduct. It’s simply a matter of political will. The people of Myanmar haven’t given up. Neither should the rest of the world..."
Source/publisher:
Just Security (New York) via Human Rights Watch (USA)
Date of entry/update:
2023-08-22
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, The Military's political role, Human Rights and international relations
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One film, posted on YouTube last month, emphasized the importance of Buddha’s teachings over images and pagodas.
Description:
"Myanmar junta officials arrested a Swiss filmmaker and 13 cast members, accusing them of defaming Buddhism in informational videos posted on YouTube, according to a statement published by junta-controlled state media.
The Swiss Embassy in Yangon told Radio Free Asia on Monday that it has asked Myanmar authorities to clarify the current status of filmmaker Didier Nusbaumer.
Junta Capt. Than Naing Kyaw and other military security members arrested Nusbaumer and 13 others – including a 12-year-old girl – on Aug. 7, two weeks after a video they produced appeared on YouTube. It was first reported in state media last week.
Nusbaumer, 52, is associated with the Phaung Daw Oo Integrated Monastic Education School in Mandalay, authorities said. He wrote the screenplay while the 12-year-old girl played the main character in the story. The other cast members also came from the school.
They are accused of insulting Buddhist cultural traditions and the morals of Buddhist monks, according to state media. Authorities haven’t specified under which law they would be prosecuted.
Sensitive subject
The film, titled “Don’t Expect Anything,” portrays the message that it is meaningless to worship Buddha images or pagodas, and instead it’s important to follow Buddha’s teachings.
The 12-year-old main character uses harsh words in the film to describe how the monks enjoy the food donated by lay people every day. The film portrays her as a reincarnation of a hermit who practiced Buddhist teaching in a previous life.
The film was posted on YouTube and other social media on July 24.
On Aug. 15, after the 14 people were arrested, the school and charity group wrote to junta officials and the Sangha Maha Nayaka Committee – established by the government in 1980 to oversee the Buddhist clergy – asking for their release.
The school wrote that Nusbaumer is a former Buddhist monk at the Phaung Daw Oo monastery, a true believer in Buddhism and did not intend to offend the religion. About 90 percent of people in Myanmar follow Buddhism.
Junta-controlled newspapers first reported the arrests on Aug. 18.
When contacted by telephone by RFA, a monk at the monastery answered that all the monks have been saddened by the arrests and cannot respond at the moment.
Because of how sensitive religion can be, it’s best to avoid any kind of filming that might mislead people, said Ashin Thabarwa Nadi, the secretary of the Arakan Monks' Association.
“In this country, such a thing could easily cause religious or ethnic riots as a political trick,” he said.
The junta as Buddhism protector
A Mandalay resident who has watched the film said on the condition of anonymity that arresting multiple people for criticizing Buddhism should not happen.
“In the film, he gave the message that we should live according to the teachings of Buddha,” the resident said. “The little girl sending alms to the monastery in the film said some words to the monks, but that is nothing more than just a scene in the movie.
“But the authorities just pinpointed that scene and arrested and detained all of them under the pretext that they have defamed Buddhism,” the resident said. “I think that should not have happened.”
When RFA contacted Aung San Win, director of the junta’s Ministry of Religion and Culture, he said he was unaware of the case.
RFA attempted to contact the junta spokesman Maj. Gen. Zaw Min Tun and the junta’s spokesman for the Mandalay region, Thein Htay, but they could not be reached.
It’s possible that the junta made the arrests to make itself appear to be the protector of the people and religion, said Min Thae, a political author.
“The military leaders have always tried to appear to be protecting Buddhism, trying to imply that it should be in the political arena in Myanmar,” he said. “The junta wants to create a public opinion that it is protecting the national religion, especially among its pro-military people."..."
Source/publisher:
"Radio Free Asia" (USA)
Date of entry/update:
2023-08-21
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Freedom of opinion and expression: - the situation in Burma/Myanmar - reports, analyses, recommendations, Political prisoners and other violations in Burma - reports, Human Rights and international relations
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"Six years ago, in August 2017, the Myanmar military began a deadly operation in Rakhine State targeting the Rohingya group. This “Clearance Operation” caused incredible suffering and destruction including the loss of civilian life, widespread use of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV), and the demolition of Rohingya villages. The UN’s Independent, International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar (IIFFM) conducted in-depth field investigations and found reasonable grounds to believe that during this operation, the Myanmar military committed war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide against the Rohingya, not least of which is the deportation of over 700,000 Rohingya from Rakhine State into neighboring Bangladesh.
To this day, over one million Rohingya survive in one of the world’s largest refugee camps in Cox’s Bazar, waiting for conditions to allow for their safe, voluntary, dignified, and sustainable return to Myanmar in accordance with international law. With the UN’s World Food Programme cutting their food rations, and with the deteriorating security situation inside the camps, many Rohingya find themselves in a dire situation with impunity being but one of many pressing concerns. Through its offices in Cox’s Bazar, Legal Action Worldwide (LAW) provides legal assistance and support to Rohingya survivors in these refugee camps.
Having been deported en masse to Bangladesh, and without a fair legal remedy available within Myanmar, Rohingya survivors are forced to rely on pathways for justice outside of Myanmar. A variety of efforts on the international level have yielded some results, but so far, no court has found any individual or state responsible for crimes against the Rohingya. For example, the Pre-Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Court (ICC) granted the Office of the Prosecutor’s request to open an investigation into crimes against humanity committed, at least in part, on the territory of Bangladesh such as deportation, persecution, and other inhumane acts. LAW has submitted statements of several Rohingya survivors for the consideration of the OTP in their ongoing criminal investigation. Although the OTP’s investigative activities in this situation are ongoing, to date, no arrest warrants have been announced.
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) is also conducting litigation brought by The Gambia against Myanmar alleging breaches of the 1949 Genocide Convention, to which Myanmar is a party, in particular, Myanmar’s failure to prevent and punish those responsible for genocide against the Rohingya. Despite some logistical challenges, in December 2019 LAW supported three Rohingya survivors to travel from Cox’s Bazar to The Hague to attend an oral hearing at the ICJ on provisional measures, where they joined The Gambian delegation in the courtroom. In a unanimous decision on 23 January 2020, the ICJ granted The Gambia’s request for provisional measures, ordering Myanmar to prevent genocidal acts against the Rohingya group, preserve any evidence of these acts, and to report regularly on its implementation of the order. On August 24th, Myanmar military was due to submit its counter-memorial to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the only ongoing case on genocide in the world. LAW is supporting this litigation through providing witness statements and other evidence to The Gambia’s legal team. An upcoming report from LAW, that combines both in-depth psychological interviews with cutting-edge legal analysis, will demonstrate reasonable grounds to believe that the Myanmar military’s use of SGBV during the 2017 Clearance Operation constituted acts of genocide under the Genocide Convention.
The UN’s Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar (IIMM), supports these important international efforts, as well as domestic efforts, through providing evidence in accordance with its mandate to collect, consolidate and analyze evidence of international crimes committed in Myanmar, and to prepare files to facilitate fair and independent criminal proceedings in national, regional, or international courts or tribunals.
In parallel, there are several initiatives in domestic courts seeking to hold members of the Myanmar military accountable for their crimes under principles of universal jurisdiction. These efforts seek to initiate structural investigations that will examine the military apparatus and eventually result in criminal responsibility for individual perpetrators. In Argentina, for example, federal prosecutors into allegations of genocide and crimes against humanity the Myanmar military committed against the Rohingya based on a complaint filed on the basis of universal jurisdiction. In Germany, Fortify Rights submitted a complaint earlier this year under the principles of universal jurisdiction, alleging the Myanmar military has committed crimes against humanity and genocide against the Rohingya, as well as crimes against humanity against civilians after their 2021 coup d’etat. In 2022, another criminal complaint was filed in Turkey under principles of universal jurisdiction alleging the Myanmar military committed crimes against humanity, including the torture of civilians after the *coup. *In Indonesia, LAW also participated in a lawsuit brought in 2022 to change a domestic law to allow for non-citizens to bring human rights claims against foreign perpetrators, with an eye towards achieving justice for Rohingya survivors in a fellow ASEAN state. Unfortunately, the Constitutional Court in Jakarta dismissed this case in April 2023, finding that their human rights law only applied to Indonesian citizens.
LAW has assisted with several of these initiatives in different ways. For example, LAW’s Executive Director has testified in one case. In another case, LAW helped review the draft complaint. In yet another case, LAW provided logistic, financial, and material support to a group of Rohingya witnesses to travel and to testify in a proceeding about their experience being persecuted Myanmar. LAW assisted by obtaining witnesses’ informed consent, preparing them for their testimony, and establishing extensive individualized security and protection plans. Over months-long conversations with ministries from various governments, LAW faced significant challenges in securing travel documentation given Myanmar has effectively revoked their citizenship through decades of legal and political discrimination. This difficulty was not just for the travel documents for the destination country, but for every stop along the flight path. While their live testimony was indeed impactful, and added value to the case in ways that remote testimony simply cannot, future proceedings should consider having at least some Rohingya witnesses testify via a secure audio-visual link, given the incredibly complex political and security challenges LAW and victims faced.
Despite these numerous and important international efforts, there has been no final determination by a court that an individual or state is responsible for the crimes committed against the Rohingya. For the over one million Rohingya refugees around the world, and the 600,000 Rohingya who remain in Myanmar – including over 120,000 in conditions of mass detention – it is more important than ever that justice actors across the world keep the pressure on the Myanmar military in each of these legal fora to ensure an end to impunity for their crimes.
*By Nick Leddy, Head of Litigation, Legal Action Worldwide, former Trial Lawyer for the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, where he worked, inter alia, on the situation in Myanmar/Bangladesh..."
Source/publisher:
Legal Action Worldwide (Genève)
Date of entry/update:
2023-08-21
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Discrimination against the Rohingya, Rohingya (cultural, political etc.), Burmese refugees in Bangladesh
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
177.47 KB
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Sub-title:
No Justice, Freedom Since 2017 Atrocities
Description:
"(Bangkok) – One million Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh face little prospect of safely returning home, six years since the Myanmar military launched a campaign of mass atrocities in Rakhine State on August 25, 2017, Human Rights Watch said today. The United Nations Security Council has failed to hold Myanmar’s generals accountable for crimes against humanity and acts of genocide against the Rohingya.
Over 730,000 Rohingya who fled to Bangladesh in 2017 now live in sprawling, overcrowded camps under growing restrictions by the authorities and spiraling violence by armed groups. About 600,000 Rohingya remain in Myanmar, effectively detained by junta authorities under a system of apartheid.
“Rohingya on both sides of the Myanmar-Bangladesh border are trapped in stateless purgatory, denied their most basic rights, awaiting justice and the chance to go home,” said Shayna Bauchner, Asia researcher at Human Rights Watch. “Instead of addressing these issues head on, UN Security Council inaction and government aid cutbacks are leaving Rohingya in even more desperate straits.”
Rohingya in both Bangladesh and Myanmar describe a pervasive sense of hopelessness that grows each year as restrictions increase and conditions deteriorate on both sides of the border, Human Rights Watch said.
Since the February 1, 2021 military coup in Myanmar, security forces have arrested thousands of Rohingya for “unauthorized travel” and imposed new movement restrictions and aid blockages on Rohingya camps and villages. The junta’s systematic abuses against the Rohingya amount to the crimes against humanity of apartheid, persecution, and deprivation of liberty. More than three months since the deadly Cyclone Mocha struck Rakhine State, the junta continues to block lifesaving humanitarian aid, including urgently needed medical care for communities experiencing dengue and malaria outbreaks.
Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh describe new barriers to education, livelihoods, and movement that are similar to the restrictions they faced in Myanmar. Bangladesh authorities have also moved about 30,000 Rohingya to the isolated silt island Bhasan Char, where they face movement restrictions and food and medicine shortages.
Without recognized legal status in Bangladesh, Rohingya refugees are on a precarious footing under domestic law, making them vulnerable to rights violations. “We have lost six years here,” a Rohingya woman told Human Rights Watch. “I am human. Why have I been treated this way throughout my life? I have millions of these thoughts every day.”
Amid surging violence by armed groups and criminal gangs in the camps, Bangladesh authorities are failing to provide protection, maintain security, or prosecute those responsible. Refugees report facing layers of barriers to police, legal, and medical assistance.
Bangladesh authorities have imposed restrictions on community-led schools since December 2021. “The prolonged refugee situation, lack of access to education and work, and ongoing violence are leaving us hopeless,” a Rohingya community leader said. “We are struggling to see a way out. We want to build better lives but can’t. The lack of education is keeping us from building skills and knowledge. The education gap in our community is growing.”
Camp authorities have recently resumed harassing and evicting Rohingya shop owners, including destroying their stores, a practice that began in December 2021. “First they surround us with fencing, now they’re shutting down our small businesses and stopping us from going outside to work,” one refugee said. “They also stopped local vehicles from operating in the camps, which was the only way that some older people, pregnant women, and people with medical crises could move around. Now we have to walk four to five kilometers just to collect rations.”
The 2023 UN Joint Response Plan for the Rohingya humanitarian crisis has received less than one-third of the US$876 million sought in donor contributions. The funding shortfall has led the World Food Programme (WFP) to cut Rohingya food rations by a third since February, down from $12 to only $8 a month, increasing malnutrition, disease, and desperation among refugees. Rohingya and humanitarian workers report that the ration cuts are already having medical and social consequences.
“With the ration cuts, we don’t have enough food to serve ourselves,” a Rohingya volunteer said. “Think about the little kids in our families or the pregnant women. They’re all affected.”
Donors, including the United States, United Kingdom, European Union, and Australia, should increase funding and pressure to meet the needs of the Rohingya refugee population. They should urge Bangladesh to reverse its restrictions so that refugees have access to the necessary tools for rebuilding their lives. Countries should also increase resettlement opportunities for Rohingya, particularly those who have been targeted by armed groups, who not only fear persecution at home in Myanmar but also threats to their lives in the camps.
The prospect of durable, voluntary returns has grown ever more distant since the military coup in Myanmar, carried out by the same generals who orchestrated the 2017 mass atrocities.
Bangladesh authorities contend that the repatriation of Rohingya is the only solution. The government has initiated steps with the Myanmar junta to return Rohingya to Rakhine State under a pilot project that has been marked by coercion and deception.
The UN and concerned governments should continue to underscore that conditions for the safe, sustainable, and dignified return of Rohingya do not currently exist. Rohingya refugees have consistently said they want to go home, but only when their security, access to land and livelihoods, freedom of movement, and citizenship rights can be ensured. “The toll of displacement has tested our resilience and strength over these six years,” one refugee said. “I dream of being able to go back to my own country Myanmar, to my village and home, with full rights of citizenship and everything else that a person deserves.”
The international response to the 2017 atrocities was fragmented and halting, with the UN Security Council doing little more than issuing a handful of statements. The council should take concrete, meaningful action, including instituting a global arms embargo, referring the country situation to the International Criminal Court (ICC), and imposing targeted sanctions on junta leadership and military-owned companies.
“Moving ahead with repatriating Rohingya now would mean sending refugees back to the control of a ruthless and repressive junta, setting the stage for the next devastating exodus,” Bauchner said. “Building conditions for the voluntary, safe, and dignified return of Rohingya will need a coordinated international response to establish rights-respecting civilian rule in Myanmar and achieve justice for past atrocities.”..."
Source/publisher:
"Human Rights Watch" (USA)
Date of entry/update:
2023-08-20
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Discrimination against the Rohingya, Internal displacement/forced migration of Rohingyas, Burmese refugees in Bangladesh, Human Rights and international relations
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"London, 18 August 2023: Myanmar’s junta has filed a complaint with the British police to expel the pro-democracy Ambassador, Kyaw Zwar Minn, from the official ambassadorial residence in London and take possession of the property. The complaint accuses Ambassador Minn of trespassing and before it can go to trial it must be approved by the UK Attorney General.
The Ambassador was locked out of the embassy by pro-military representatives shortly after the coup in 2021, but he has remained in his residence, ‘Myanmar House’.
Ambassador Minn said he was “adamant” that he would not leave the property. “I will resist all attempts to expel me and I will remain the custodian of the property on behalf of the people of Myanmar House until the threat from this kleptocratic criminal gang passes and I am able to hand the house over to an incoming democratic ambassador.”
Chris Gunness, Director of the Myanmar Accountability Project, which has been involved in this case, said “according to the English land registry, the Union of Myanmar owns the house and as the junta does not represent the Union of Myanmar, this move has no legal validity.”
Gunness condemned “in the strongest terms” what he described as “an attempted property heist”. He said it was “inconceivable that the British authorities, who have condemned the coup and imposed economic sanctions on the generals, would permit this move by an illegal junta that has imprisoned the country’s democratically-elected government and which carries out massacres, indiscriminate air strikes and mass arson attacks on a daily basis.”
Gunness urged Myanmar’s democratic National Unity Government “to establish a representative office in Myanmar House and to continue with the important task of representing the people of Myanmar in all major diplomatic hubs. Failure to do this risks handing the junta a major diplomatic prize.”
Myanmar’s military regime has been accused at the International Court of Justice of committing genocide against the Rohingya people and is being investigated by the International Criminal Court. The Myanmar Accountability Project, MAP, has initiated criminal complaints against members of the junta in Turkey and Indonesia and will file a criminal complaint in the Philippines later this year.
The latest report by the UN’s Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar, says there are credible reports that the junta has committed war crimes and crimes against humanity..."
Source/publisher:
Myanmar Accountability Project
Date of entry/update:
2023-08-19
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations, Human Rights Defenders
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"Yangon - On this World Humanitarian Day, we commemorate the 20th anniversary of the tragic attack on the Canal Hotel in Baghdad that reshaped the course of humanitarian action. Today, as we reflect, we are honored to recognize the dedicated aid workers of Myanmar, who exhibit unwavering commitment in delivering crucial assistance to affected and displaced communities despite the immensely challenging operational environment.
In Myanmar, active conflicts and natural disasters have led to surging displacement and unparalleled hardships. Nearly 18 million people (one-third of the population) urgently require humanitarian aid in 2023. Despite escalating complexities and multiplying challenges, our resilient humanitarians continue to rise above difficulties to deliver life-saving support.
Local and national humanitarian partners have demonstrated unwavering resolve in supporting their fellow citizens, employing innovative approaches to reach conflict-affected and disaster-stricken areas. Their determination remains focused on the singular goal of preserving lives. Throughout the first half of 2023, these partners provided shelter, food, health services, education, protection, and more to 1.8 million men, women, and children affected by conflicts and natural disasters, achieving 36 percent of their target.
However, the journey is far from over. Completing this mission amidst insecurity and continual challenges demands safeguarding the lives of these brave humanitarians and ensuring unhindered access to those in need. Financial support is equally vital to deliver comprehensive assistance to the people of Myanmar who are grappling with the compounding consequences of COVID-19, conflict, economic crisis, and natural disasters.
Nonetheless, almost eight months into 2023, the Humanitarian Response Plan and Cyclone Mocha Flash Appeal are only funded at 25 per cent. This shortfall hinders our ability to provide timely and extensive aid.
On this World Humanitarian Day, we implore all parties to uphold international human rights and humanitarian laws, including ensuring humanitarian access and protecting aid workers. We also call upon the donor community to escalate their financial contributions, thereby reaffirming their commitment to the resilient people of Myanmar who endure this multi-faceted crisis.
In the spirit of humanity, let us stand united and resolute in our determination to protect lives and alleviate suffering no matter what and where..."
Source/publisher:
UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (New York) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2023-08-19
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Human Rights and international relations, Cyclones - regional, Flooding in Burma/Myanmar
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181.39 KB 187.79 KB
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"On August 19, 2023, Member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and Foreign Minister Wang Yi held talks in Beijing with Thai Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Don Pramudwinai who came to China for a working visit.
Wang Yi said that China and Thailand are as close as one family. The friendship with China is the consensus of the ruling and opposition parties of Thailand and the shared wish of people from the two countries, and the development of bilateral relations is not affected by changes in the international landscape or the domestic situation in Thailand. He believes that Thailand will maintain its stability and sustained development. The Chinese side is ready to work with the Thai side to jointly implement the important outcomes achieved in President Xi Jinping's visit to Thailand last November, make concerted efforts to advance the building of a China-Thailand community with a shared future, and join hands to address all challenges.
Wang Yi said that China stands ready to work with Thailand to deepen cooperation in various fields and strive for more visualized results of the China-Laos-Thailand Connectivity Development Corridor Outlook. The two sides need to speed up the construction of the China-Thailand railway and the China-Laos-Thailand railway connection lines, and jointly crack down on telecom fraud and other transnational criminal activities. China is ready to continue to firmly support the building of the ASEAN Community, support the upholding of the ASEAN centrality, and support the joint efforts to build an economic growth center, to constantly inject new impetus into regional economic integration. Through deepening the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation, the two sides can create a pioneer zone for the Global Development Initiative, a pilot zone for the Global Security Initiative, and a demonstration zone where the Global Civilization Initiative is best implemented, and build an even closer Lancang-Mekong community with a shared future. China stands ready to work with ASEAN countries to speed up the advancement of consultations on the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea, strive for the early formation of effective and substantive regional rules, and build the South China Sea into a sea of peace, friendship and cooperation. Wang Yi said that all countries should guard against forces outside the region provoking camp-based confrontation and instigating the Cold War mentality, which will undermine the hard-won peaceful and stable situation.
Don Pramudwinai said that Thailand-China relations are strong, delivering enormous well-being for the people of the two countries. Under the current situation of rising international and regional uncertainties, Thailand is ready to further strengthen dialogue and exchanges with China, deepen mutually beneficial cooperation in various fields, promote the China-Laos-Thailand railway connection, and work for common development. Thailand applauds the fact that China is the first to express the readiness to sign the Protocol to the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone. Thailand supports the alignment of the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific and the Belt and Road Initiative, supports deepening the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation, and supports building the South China Sea into a sea of peace, cooperation and stability. Thailand opposes the zero-sum game mentality and camp-based confrontation, welcomes the Global Development Initiative, the Global Security Initiative, and the Global Civilization Initiative proposed by President Xi Jinping, and believes that China's initiatives set examples for the whole world.
The two sides had an in-depth exchange of views on the Myanmar issue, agreeing to make efforts to advance the process of a political solution to the Myanmar issue and supporting the resolution of the Myanmar issue in the ASEAN way.
Both sides also had an exchange of views on international and regional issues of mutual interest and concern..."
Source/publisher:
Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Date of entry/update:
2023-08-19
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations, Burma/Myanmar's Foreign relations, general
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Sub-title:
UN bigwig Martin Griffiths didn’t bow before Myanmar’s coup-maker but he picked an impolitic moment to call for more donor funding
Description:
"The United Nations Under-Secretary for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator Martin Griffiths made a visit this week to Myanmar’s military capital Naypyidaw, and went mano-a-mano with dictator Min Aung Hlaing, recently self-appointed prime minister and head of the State Administration Council (SAC) junta.
Griffiths, also the head of the Office Coordinating Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), is probably the highest-ranking UN official to visit Myanmar since the February 2021 coup.
The UN and international aid agencies have been facing severe restrictions on responding not just to spreading armed conflict throughout Myanmar, which has displaced nearly two million civilians, but also following Cyclone Mocha devastated large parts of Rakhine state and Magwe and Sagaing Regions in mid-May. The military continues to obstruct recovery efforts and reconstruction.
State-run media ran this headline the day after Griffiths and Min Aung Hlaing met and shook hands in Naypyidaw; “Global community should seek accurate information on Myanmar’s situation.”
From the military’s side, the topics for discussion ranged from “spreading misinformation on various situations of Myanmar in the international community, the need for the international community to know actual conditions in Myanmar, lesser aid of international organizations including the United Nations for Myanmar in the period when the Covid-19 broke out and storm (Cyclone) Mocha hit, and further cooperation in humanitarian aid.”
This could be summarized as Min Aung Hlaing blaming the UN and the international community for the violence and dysfunction fueled by his failing military rule. We shouldn’t mistake Griffiths’ visit as a genuine gesture of cooperation from the SAC after years of foreign aid obstruction across the country.
For Min Aung Hlaing it was a “kneel before me” moment, even if the OCHA head isn’t “a take the knee” kind of guy. A seasoned diplomat, founder of the Center for Humanitarian Dialogue (HD Center) and advisor to Middle East peace envoys, Griffiths is a practiced interlocutor with despots. Maybe that’s the problem: he’s simply going through the motions.
It was therefore glumly predictable Griffiths would release a tepid statement. “Successive crises in Myanmar have left one-third of the population in need of humanitarian aid. They expect more and better from their leaders and from the international community” is pointing out not just the obvious but the clear implication that the UN has been failing.
Then, quite brazenly, Griffiths claimed the UN could do better with more access and more funding, reminding a miserly world that the UN humanitarian response plan was only 22% funded.
It’s clear that UN communications messaging is comfortable with stark contradictions, but fund-raising after shaking hands with a war criminal and visiting disaster-racked Rakhine state? Indecorous, if not dehumanizing.
And if the UN has been unable to credibly claim they were capable of doing more with increased funding, then why give them more cash? A hangdog foreigner with hat in hand pleading for mercy and more money doesn’t move a war criminal.
The standard UN reproach after visits like this is wait-and-see the results: even small changes on the ground are evidence of progress and perhaps Griffiths’ was able to penetrate Min Aung Hlaing’s hard shell.
Unlikely. There has been intense criticism of the UN and the international community for their lack of progress in moving the SAC. Griffiths’ visit should be proof that Myanmar hasn’t completely disappeared from the UN’s conscience, and regardless of the view on “success”, he made the effort and is trying. But this is short-term memory loss logic.
Griffiths and the SAC have been at odds before. Responding to the Christmas Eve massacre at Hpruso in Kayah state, where SAC forces murdered 35 civilians and set fire to their vehicles, Griffiths released a statement two days later that stated:
“I condemn this grievous incident and all attacks against civilians throughout the country. I call upon the authorities to immediately commence a thorough and transparent investigation…(and) call upon the Myanmar Armed Forces and all armed groups in Myanmar to take all measures to protect civilians from harm.”
The SAC’s unconvincing response claimed: “Then, about 10 terrorists who were waiting on the hills of the village attacked with (assorted weapons)…KNPP (Karenni National Progressive Party and PDF (People’s Defense Forces) terrorists, including newcomers for explosive training, were arrested dead…the seven vehicles carrying petrol, diesel and foodstuffs collected from the villages by force for the terrorist groups were burnt.”
This has been the SAC’s response to UN accusations of war crimes since the 2021 coup: deny everything and wait for the UN to move on. It’s rumored it was Griffiths who defenestrated former UN special envoy Noeleen Heyzer. If there was valid criticism of Heyzer’s lack of progress, and a lot of criticism was misplaced, the SAC now sits squarely in Griffith’s inbox.
Former special envoy on Myanmar Noeleen Heyzer visiting a Rohingya refugee camp in Bangladesh in August 2022. Image: Twitter / Screengrab
Three further points from Griffiths’ visit are evident. First, the obstruction of aid after Cyclone Mocha provides ample evidence of the SAC’s insincerity in helping people in need.
A recent report from the independent Center for Arakan Studies comparing responses to Cyclone Mocha and the devastating 2008 Cyclone Nargis indicated very similar military obstructing tactics to both disasters, and crucially in the weeks after the May storm, severe restrictions on Rakhine civil society aid workers – something Griffiths failed to mention in his statement.
The UN and aid organizations have also not been able to ensure unfettered access in conflict areas in Myanmar’s northwest, let alone in Rakhine and eastern borderlands, and the majority of aid delivered is in firmly SAC-controlled territory.
Second, Griffiths’ visit illustrates how utterly ineffective the UN Country Team has been, especially since Mocha. The Resident Coordinator and Humanitarian Coordinator (ad interim) Ramanathan Balakrishnan has displayed all the qualities of senior UN management in an authoritarian setting in order to achieve maximum ineffectiveness. Griffiths wouldn’t have had to visit if the country team had been able to do its job. It’s not a performance that compels donors to reach for their checkbooks.
And third, Griffiths’ approach brings high-level international humanitarian mediation into further disrepute. A recent essay in Foreign Affairs by Natasha Hall and Emma Beals, entitled “Humanitarian Blackmail”, outlines the recent failures of UN engagement with authoritarian states, including Myanmar.
They argue that “humanitarian negotiation are no substitute for conflict resolution.” Using the case of the captured Cyclone Mocha response, the essay states: “As conditions on the ground worsen, the junta has done nothing to alleviate the suffering of the people they govern, likely waiting for high-level visits from senior officials from the UN…such negotiations legitimize their role as the primary international interlocutor and decision-maker regarding aid.”
It goes on to castigate international aid actors for failing to “reach communities outside junta control…in places where the government consistently impedes, manipulates, or diverts aid, it may be more effective for humanitarians to work outside the UN and in ways that do not require official consent.”
Although there are significant programs already out of the SAC’s control, including cross-border assistance and expanding “resistance humanitarianism”, which has been a feature of aid work in eastern Myanmar conflict zones for decades, the issue is one of scale and increased funding in areas outside of UN operating zones: not easy to do when foreign donors have funneled so much post-coup aid through the UN Office of Project Services (UNOPS), which has had no qualms with cooperating with the SAC.
It is not clear if, as part of the official protocol, Griffiths was taken on a tour of the recently opened Maravijaya Buddha statue in Naypyidaw, the tallest sitting marble Buddha in the world, with Min Aung Hlaing as its prominent patron.
Any courtesy visit would be potentially more scandalous that shaking Min Aung Hlaing’s hand. In recent days, there has been criticism over prohibitively expensive visiting and photography fees for the general public.
The entrance fee for foreigners is US$10. Perhaps Griffiths could have started the fundraising right then and there?..."
Source/publisher:
"Asia Times" (Hong Kong)
Date of entry/update:
2023-08-18
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Human Rights and international relations
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Description:
"The UN’s relief agency, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, began one of its recent Myanmar Humanitarian Updates by criticizing the Myanmar military. “Additional bureaucratic hurdles such as denial of TAs [travel authorizations], insistence on TAs for national staff and refusal of passage through military checkpoints forced aid organizations to reschedule or delay their planned activities in several states including Rakhine, Kayah, Kachin and northern Shan,” the OCHA said in its Update No. 31 issued on July 15.
Then, perhaps in an effort to appear neutral, it stated that, “Compounding these challenges, Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) and People’s Defense Forces (PDFs) have repeatedly obstructed humanitarian movements, detaining private transporters and confiscating relief goods in northern Shan, Chin, Kayah and Sagaing.”
The UN needs to clarify and give evidence of where and when aid was obstructed and in what circumstances, and why it is still transporting aid without coordination with the civilian National Unity Government (NUG) and ethnic resistance organizations (EROs). Coordinating with armed actors on the ground is common sense.
Local actors don’t know what that the trucks are carrying or whom the goods are intended for. In addition, the UN works only with the State Administration Council (SAC)—the junta’s governing body—which it relies on for travel authorization. The SAC is directing aid according to its own strategic interests and thus weaponizing aid. Naturally, resistance organizations are not going to support this.
The World Food Program and UN High Commissioner for Refugees, and in fact the UN Country Team, have simply been asked to communicate information about convoys to the NUG, and have been warned of the dangers of not doing so. The NUG does not want a complex bureaucratic system of travel permission as the junta imposes, they just want to be informed when a convoy is going to travel through areas the resistance controls, which is in everyone’s interest. This is in fact standard UN procedure, but is not being followed in the case of Myanmar.
It is very unfair to accuse the NUG, PDFs and EROs of obstructing aid when the opposite is the reality. The systematic refusal of the UN to work with the NUG and EROs on aid delivery is one of the main obstacles preventing aid from reaching 1.9 million people. Local “humanitarian resistance” strictures are actually those who are providing aid to internally displaced persons (IDPs) who have fled the junta’s strategy of directly targeting civilians.
The NUG has instructed PDFs not to attack aid convoys, but how do they know whether a convoy is transporting UN aid or junta troops and/or supplies? The junta has reportedly used UN flags on their supply vehicles.
The NUG has asked for convoy details to be shared, reiterated its willingness to coordinate with the UN and other international actors, and requested them again to coordinate the delivery of aid. The consequences of not doing so rest on the UN and not humanitarian resistance actors.
Paul Greening is an ex-UN senior staff member with over 20 years’ experience in six Asian countries working for six UN agencies and four INGOs. He worked in Sittwe, Rakhine State for the International Organization for Migration from 2017 to 2020 and since then has been involved in advocacy against the illegal attempted coup and supporting those who have suffered from it..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2023-08-18
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Human Rights and international relations
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Description:
"(Myanmar, 17 August 2023) – Under-Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator Martin Griffiths today called for expanded humanitarian access and increased funding to assist the 18 million people in need of aid across Myanmar.
“Successive crises in Myanmar have left one third of the population in need of humanitarian aid,” Griffiths said at the end of a three-day visit to the country. “They expect more and better from their leaders and from the international community.”
Humanitarian needs in Myanmar have surged in recent years, with the number of displaced persons increasing fivefold in less than three years, from 380,000 at the start of 2021 to 1.9 million at present.
During the visit, Griffiths met with families affected by conflict and natural disasters, including with Rakhine and Rohingya communities and with Myanmar authorities.
Griffiths visited Rakhine state, still reeling from the impact of cyclone Mocha three months ago. The cyclone flattened homes, damaged displacement camps, destroyed farmland, and killed livestock, leaving thousands of people vulnerable.
“Families are struggling to cope after the successive blows of the COVID-19 pandemic, conflict and cyclone Mocha. We stand ready to do more both in Rakhine and nationwide, but we urgently need greater access and more funding to do so.”
In the capital Nay Pyi Taw, Griffiths met with the State Administration Council Chairman, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, with whom he discussed what humanitarians need to scale-up direct aid to affected populations in areas affected by conflict and natural disasters.
“My meetings were an opportunity to raise the need for expanded access,” Griffiths said. “I also expressed my concerns about the protection risks facing civilians in conflict areas and the bureaucratic constraints we humanitarians are facing in reaching them. It is critical for us to have the humanitarian space we need for safe, sustained aid deliveries around the country,” Griffiths said.
Despite rising needs, the humanitarian operation in Myanmar is facing a huge resource gap with just 22 per cent of required funds received more than half-way through the year.
“Over the past three days, I spoke with brave aid workers about their efforts to help those in need. However, a severe lack of funding means aid agencies are forced to make tough decisions about cutting assistance at a time when they should be scaling up even further. This needs to change,” Griffiths said..."
Source/publisher:
UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (New York) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2023-08-17
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Agriculture in Burma/Myanmar: general and research, Food Security and nutrition in Burma/Myanmar, Human Rights and international relations
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"WASHINGTON —
In an interview with VOA, the humanitarian minister in Myanmar's anti-junta shadow government has apologized for failing "to bring justice to the Rohingya in northern Rakhine State," where Myanmar's military launched a brutal crackdown in August 2017.
Dr. Win Myat Aye served as social welfare minister in the administration of Myanmar's since-ousted de facto leader Aung San Suu Kyi at the time of the crackdown, which was seen as a massive overreaction to attacks by Rohingya insurgents on government security posts.
The soldiers are accused of widespread atrocities including mass killings, sexual violence, and the burning of villages. Hundreds of thousands of Rohingya fled across the border into Bangladesh where they have spent years living in squalid refugee camps, still fearing to return.
"As the civilian government, we could not administer justice when this occurred," Win said, referring to the 2017 operation to eradicate insurgents from among Rakhine's Muslim-minority Rohingya people. "I feel sorrow when I consider all of this. We apologize for that. It is now evident why we could not administer justice then."
Win's apology marks a reversal from his public position in a 2017 BBC interview, when he defended the crackdown as a necessary response to terrorism and responded "yes" when asked whether it was the Rohingya themselves who burned their villages.
"In the villages where the terrorists can't enter, there is no burning," he said at that time. "When terrorists come in, it burns." (( https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-asia-41343887 ))
In his interview last month with VOA, Win said his administration had been misled by the military leaders behind the operation. "In the past, the military restricted access to accurate information … restricted my ability to communicate openly with Rohingya victims," he said.
Reason for apology
During a July visit to the United States, Win told members of a Burmese community in Maryland that the Myanmar military is conducting the same kind of tactics again today, this time during what it calls "clearance operations" in the northwestern Sagaing Region.
Now, as in 2017, he said, the military is labeling an entire people as enemies based on the actions of a few.
"The Myanmar military attributed attacks on approximately 30 security outposts in northern Rakhine State on August 25, 2017, to [the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army], laying the blame solely on ARSA for these events," Win said.
"However, this incident led to the displacement of an enormous number of people, around 700,000, and the subsequent burning of numerous villages. A similar pattern seems to be unfolding in Sagaing Division," he said. "Local villagers opposing the military coup are being targeted. The military has labeled them as [People's Defense Forces] supporters, mirroring how they accused the Rohingya of collaborating with ARSA.
"The junta has used this flawed logic to justify targeting civilians in Sagaing, by claiming they are all combatants," he said. "This is another example of how, from the military's perspective, the people within the country are seen as enemies."
Win's account
Soon after the 2017 military operations began in northern Rakhine state, Aung San Suu Kyi dispatched Win to the area, where he saw security forces engage in what they called an anti-ARSA operation.
But upon arriving by helicopter, Win was shocked by what he saw. "We couldn't land due to the raging flames rising from the burning fields everywhere we looked," he said.
Asked why a high-level civilian minister was unable to confront the military's actions — characterized by many as genocide — Win pointed to the country's 2008 constitution, in which the long-ruling military ceded power to a civilian-led government but reserved substantial powers for itself.
"This constitution granted considerable influence to entities such as the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Home Affairs, and the Ministry of Border Affairs, significantly impacting Rakhine State, where these incidents occurred," he said.
"The primary movement on the ground was orchestrated by individuals from the General Administration Department of the Ministry of Home Affairs, many of whom are former military members," he said. "When the events transpired, they were under the direct command of the military and overseen by the security forces responsible for the region. Those who carried out these actions are the ones who are responsible for what happened."
Rohingya reaction
Some Rohingya leaders, including Tun Khin, president of the Burmese Rohingya Organization U.K., have asked Win to testify before the International Court of Justice (ICJ), which is investigating allegations of genocide in Rakhine.
In a Zoom interview with VOA, Tun said he views Win's comments as a positive step toward reconciliation.
"I welcome what Dr. Win Myat Aye said. This is a good sign for all of us as we move towards the Spring Revolution and a federal democratic system that includes all ethnic groups in the future," he said. "His apology shows a sign of accountability and responsibility in Myanmar."
Tun himself pursued legal action against Myanmar's military in the Argentinian courts in 2019, alleging crimes against humanity during the 2017 crackdown. His case describes in detail gang rapes, beheadings and the slaughter of Rohingya civilians committed by Myanmar's military, known as the Tatmadaw.
He said Win's National Unity Government (NUG), comprising members of the ousted civilian administration and other elements of the anti-junta resistance, "should work together with the Rohingya community to bring an end to the history of negative propaganda about the Rohingya."
Shwe Maung, a Rohingya lawmaker in the former government who now lives in the United States, told VOA that Win also formally apologized to the Rohingya community during a two-hour meeting in Houston, Texas.
"The minister said he went to Rakhine State around 96 times concerning the Rohingya issue," said Maung via Zoom. "During that period, the ministries of home affairs, defense, and border affairs, controlled by the military, held sway and suppressed information. They had to work with them and, therefore, they were not able to do as much as they should have done."
Maung quoted Win as saying, "I apologize to the Rohingya community."
Maung added that the minister described how the NUG is engaging on this issue with international bodies such as the IJC and the International Criminal Court, both based in The Hague.
"Especially since they are the individuals responsible for making the cases before international courts ... they have a lot of evidence," he said. "At this time, they have to fight the common enemy — the military junta — and they have urged everyone to cooperate."
Changing stance
In 2022, NUG officials issued a declaration to the ICC, accepting the court's jurisdiction with respect to Myanmar, although the country is not itself a member of the court.
The NUG also withdrew preliminary objections to the ICJ's jurisdiction on its genocide case. When the court started its hearing process in 2019, Aung San Suu Kyi traveled to The Hague to defend Myanmar against the genocide allegations.
The NUG recently appointed Rohingya activist and adviser Aung Kyaw Moe as its deputy human rights minister. Maung told VOA that while the community welcomed the appointment of a Rohingya leader as a deputy minister in the NUG interim government, laws must be passed to guarantee the rights of the Rohingya in Myanmar in the future.
"The NUG doesn't consider these issues resolved, and neither do the Rohingya," Maung emphasized. "This is precisely why we have asked the NUG to legislate Rohingya rights to prevent such injustices in the future."..."
Source/publisher:
"Voice of America" (Washington, D.C)
Date of entry/update:
2023-08-17
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Discrimination against the Rohingya, Rohingya (cultural, political etc.)
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Sub-title:
Myanmar’s military junta is committing indiscriminate atrocities. We shouldn’t look away.
Description:
"My father passed away a few months ago in Australia, dreaming about returning one day to his homeland of Myanmar. Of course, going home was impossible. His health was poor and Myanmar isn’t safe, with a junta unleashing ever-worsening violence, unwilling to relinquish control since the generals staged a coup in 2021. But Dad’s thoughts were always of home. Even in his weakest moments, he would ask me about the ongoing resistance to military rule.
Dad had seen Myanmar in the same circumstances before. That the country faces global opprobrium once again is not a surprise to many of its people. They have been subject to cycles of violence and dictatorship for many decades.
I was born in the shadow of military oppression in the 1980s. Myanmar was in economic turmoil. Since a coup in 1962, the military had run the country according to the “Burmese Way to Socialism,” a warped ideological construct that loosely followed Communist principles.
It was a pretext for the generals to take everything. The military seized properties and stole land from farmers; they monopolized the economy; they demonetized the currency, making what little cash people had useless. When the population resisted, the military imprisoned—or killed—them.
In 1985, when I was 3 years old, my parents decided to leave the country after Dad received a fellowship as a doctor with the United Nations in Samoa, more than 6,000 miles from Yangon, Myanmar’s major city. They had never left Myanmar before and expected their time away to be temporary.
I had an idyllic upbringing in Samoa. I ran to school barefoot and swam in shallow coral reefs the colors of rainbows. But Dad’s fellowship stipend was small, and while I benefited from an education that I wouldn’t have received in Yangon, I recall his worried look every time he couldn’t pack our lunch boxes full. By 1988, he was desperately homesick and hoped to go back to Myanmar by the end of the year.
But it was not to be. That year, a people’s movement rose up in Myanmar. A series of student-led protests became a nationwide strike, with the population demanding an end to military rule, international isolation, and poverty. And on August 8, 1988—just over 35 years ago—the military opened fire on thousands of peaceful demonstrators. Among the dead were monks, doctors, lawyers, human rights advocates, writers, university students, and even schoolkids—some of them from my older sister’s school.
We didn’t have a telephone at home, so Dad would sometimes sleep in his office, waiting to hear from his brothers and friends, who were all protesting. Sometimes I would catch him crying when he thought I was playing. Soon, I realized we weren’t going back.
The international response to the killings—known in Myanmar as the “8888” uprising—was muted, fueling a culture of impunity within the military. In 1988, there were no smartphones to live stream military abuses over social media. Images leaked eventually, but the people of Myanmar were still essentially on their own as the military rounded up and detained thousands of activists, who were severely beaten or tortured. Many died in custody and others were reported “disappeared,” feared dead. Everyone knew someone with a friend or family member who had been killed.
Myanmar rarely made the international news for many years after that, except for the endless house arrest of the political icon Aung San Suu Kyi. We distantly heard about her arrest and the dismantling of the party she chaired, the National League for Democracy.
In 2010, the military began to ease restrictions, releasing Aung San Suu Kyi from house arrest, and even welcoming foreigners into the country. In 2012, censorship on print media ended; Myanmar would have a somewhat free press for the first time in decades. Soon after, the military announced they would allow the first truly competitive general elections in 2015, the first in almost three decades.
I had been living abroad in Europe and Australia, but this was an opportunity for me to go back. I had become a journalist and I hoped to train local reporters and contribute to a society held back by consecutive generations of crooked generals. Dad had returned a few years before me to set up a clinic of his own. He understood my motives—I wanted to find my place in the country where I had been born.
When the NLD won a landslide in the election on November 8, 2015, I was among the people running onto the streets of Yangon in jubilation. A young rickshaw driver grabbed me by the shoulders, grinning with tears streaming down his face. “It happened, sister!” he yelled as he shook me in joy. “I thought it would only happen in our wildest dreams.”
That dream, so hard fought for, has become a nightmare.
During the NLD government’s rule, the military ramped up abuses and in 2017, unleashed a campaign of ethnic cleansing against the minority ethnic Rohingya that amounted to crimes against humanity and acts of genocide. Aung San Suu Kyi distressingly backed the military to the hilt, but even that show of loyalty, which did huge damage to her international reputation, was not enough for the generals.
On February 1, 2021, the military staged a coup, rejecting the results of the November 2020 elections, which the ruling NLD had overwhelmingly won. Although both international and domestic election observers deemed the elections credible, the military—without providing compelling evidence—claimed fraud and corruption. Once again, Myanmar’s population took to the streets in peaceful protest only for the military to suppress them with deadly violence.
Dad and I watched from afar, feeling a familiar sense of loss and helplessness. The Covid-19 pandemic had forced us to leave Myanmar in 2020 and join the rest of our family in Australia. Again, we thought we would be away for a few months, but once the killings started, we knew that we couldn’t return.
As a researcher with Human Rights Watch, I have been documenting the junta’s many atrocities since the coup: mass killings, arbitrary arrests and detention, torture, sexual violence, and attacks on civilians in conflict areas that amount to crimes against humanity and war crimes.
The United Nations human rights chief says the military has killed more than 3,700 people since the coup, while another 23,740 are arbitrarily detained although the numbers for both are likely much higher. According to the UN, the military has burned at least 70,000 homes across the country to destroy pockets of resistance, with 1.5 million people forcibly displaced.
But I have also been watching Myanmar’s youth, who have refused to back down. They have shown a tenacity and strength unimagined before the coup, determined to return to a path of democracy and civilian rule. They have organized and have sought to resist the military in any way they can. Some have joined armed groups as they face an onslaught of military air and ground attacks.
Young people equipped with smartphones want us to know what is happening. When the military began cracking down, I could document human rights violations because of the images they captured. From Australia, I watched footage of the military and police opening fire on and arresting human rights defenders and resistance leaders. Even now, two-and-a-half years since the coup, Myanmar’s youth take risks to send photos and videos of atrocities so the country’s suffering is not forgotten.
The military’s recent “partial pardon” of Aung San Suu Kyi may be an attempt to deflect international concern. But the international community should not be deceived. The military’s deadly abuses are continuing.
Governments around the world need to do more than watch. Targeted sanctions to pressure junta leaders and businesses with ties to the military have helped. Those efforts need to be better coordinated among countries and expanded to limit the military’s access to the aviation fuel it needs for air strikes, and to the revenue from Myanmar’s billion-dollar oil and gas industry it uses to buy weapons.
We can’t use ignorance as a reason not to act..."
Source/publisher:
"The National" via "Human Rights Watch" (USA)
Date of entry/update:
2023-08-16
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Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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