Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Websites/Multiple Documents
Description:
Talks, interviews, conversations etc.
Source/publisher:
Youtube
Date of entry/update:
2018-02-11
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"Daily independent news program, hosted by Amy Goodman and Juan Gonzalez, airing on over 800 stations."...Topics in the News...
Amy Goodman and Juan Gonzalez
Source/publisher:
Democracy Now!
Date of entry/update:
2016-01-17
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Language:
English
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"...Here are some of the things I try to fight: environmental destruction, undemocratic power, corruption, deception of the public, injustice, inequality and the misallocation of resources, waste, denial, the libertarianism which grants freedom to the powerful at the expense of the powerless, undisclosed interests, complacency..."
George Monbiot
Source/publisher:
George Monbiot
Date of entry/update:
2017-09-27
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Websites/Multiple Documents
Category:
Climate Change - networks, campaigns, guides, resources, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
English
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Description:
Advancing the politics of small deeds....
"In this beautifully animated clip from Dirt! The Movie, Wangari Maathai tells an inspiring tale of doing the best you can under seemingly interminable odds. Join us at www.DirtTheMovie.org"
Wangari Maathai
Source/publisher:
www.DirtTheMovie.org
Date of entry/update:
2016-01-22
Grouping:
Websites/Multiple Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Climate Change policy - global ( statements, studies, conferences etc.), Economy and social justice (global)
Language:
English
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"About 11,100,000 results, February 2018, of a Google search for Noam Chomsky
Source/publisher:
Google
Date of entry/update:
2015-10-20
Grouping:
Websites/Multiple Documents
Language:
English
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"Avram Noam Chomsky (/ˈnoʊm ˈtʃɒmski/; born December 7, 1928) is an American linguist, philosopher, cognitive scientist, logician, political commentator, social justice activist, and anarcho-syndicalist advocate. Sometimes described as the "father of modern linguistics", Chomsky is also a major figure in analytic philosophy. He has spent most of his career at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), where he is currently Professor Emeritus, and has authored over 100 books. He has been described as a prominent cultural figure, and was voted the "world?s top public intellectual" in a 2005 poll..."
Source/publisher:
Wikipedia
Date of entry/update:
2015-10-20
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Websites/Multiple Documents
Language:
English
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Description:
Wide-ranging collection of videos
Noam Chomsky
Source/publisher:
Youtube
Date of entry/update:
2016-02-29
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Websites/Multiple Documents
Language:
English
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Description:
"Noam Chomsky was born on December 7, 1928, in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. He has written and lectured widely on linguistics, philosophy, intellectual history, contemporary issues, and particularly international affairs and U.S. foreign policy. Chomsky has been a writer for Z projects since their earliest inception, and a tireless supporter of our operations."
Source/publisher:
Z Communications
Date of entry/update:
2015-10-20
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Language:
English
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347 videos, November 2016; 111,000, February 2018 - of Noam Chomsky - interviews, debates, lectures etc. on politics, education, philosophy, activism.... from 2 minutes to more than 2 hours -
Source/publisher:
Youtube
Date of entry/update:
2016-11-13
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Websites/Multiple Documents
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English
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"Tom Engelhardt launched Tomdispatch in November 2001 as an e-mail publication offering commentary and collected articles from the world press. In December 2002, it gained its name, became a project of The Nation Institute, and went online as "a regular antidote to the mainstream media." The site now features Tom Engelhardt?s regular commentaries and the original work of authors ranging from Rebecca Solnit, Bill McKibben, and Mike Davis to Chalmers Johnson, Michael Klare, Adam Hochschild, Robert Lipsyte, and Elizabeth de la Vega. Nick Turse, who also writes for the site, is associate editor and research director.
Tomdispatch is intended to introduce readers to voices and perspectives from elsewhere (even when the elsewhere is here). Its mission is to connect some of the global dots regularly left unconnected by the mainstream media and to offer a clearer sense of how this imperial globe of ours actually works..."
Source/publisher:
tomdispatch.com
Date of entry/update:
2018-02-11
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"Myanmar is in the midst of a momentous political and economic transition, the outcome of
which will have ramifications not only for the country itself but also for the rest of Southeast
Asia and much of continental Asia. This volume has provided an in-depth survey and analysis
of the many cultural, political and economic shifts currently underway and the key challenges
that the country faces. It is now therefore worth considering what a successful transition in
Myanmar might look like.
There can be little doubt that for most people in Myanmar, and for the country’s many
supporters elsewhere in the world, a successful transition will result in a prosperous and peaceful
democracy: many of its people took to the streets demanding democracy in 1988 and electoral
support for the National League for Democracy (NLD) was overwhelming in both 1990 and
2015 (Ardeth Thawnghmung 2016). However, as with all political concepts, the form and function of democratic rule is heavily contested. In Myanmar, the military’s roadmap to ‘disciplineflourishing democracy’, put into practice with the 2008 constitution, reserves a quarter of
legislative seats for serving military personnel, mandates direct military appointments to the
executive and allocates the Tatmadaw a key role in many aspects of national governance. Such
enduring military dominance does not satisfy most definitions of democracy. Nevertheless, with
the gradual loosening of constraints on political debate and the NLD government coming
to power in 2016, Myanmar is becoming more democratic than at any point in the past half
century. Whether the transition can continue in this democratic direction is still unclear.
A fundamental component of any transition to a democratic society is adherence to international norms relating to democracy and a broad portfolio of human rights in the political, civil,
economic, social and cultural realms. The political reform process underway in Myanmar therefore has major implications for the country’s economic and cultural future. Genuine respect for
democratic norms and human rights should lead to a more equitable and ecologically sustainable
model of economic development. It should also support the recognition and respect of social and
cultural diversity, whether based on ethnicity, sexual orientation, ability or gender. Democracy,
human rights, sustainability and equitable economic development are often treated as separate
issues, but this is usually the result of applying unduly narrow definitions. More comprehensive
visions of sustainable and just states provide useful insights on the interdependence of these issues
(Eckersley 2004). In 2015, Myanmar finally signed the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), which sets out a range of state obligations in these areas.
A democratic, just and sustainable future for Myanmar therefore relies on the notion of
inclusion. An inclusive polity, economy and society do not discriminate on the basis of religion,
ethnicity, gender or sexual orientation. With ongoing civil conflict in Myanmar’s north, east
and west, and the religious tensions between Buddhists and Muslims in much of the country,
this may seem like a utopian vision, but it remains a precursor for any truly liberal or social
democratic state.
Political and economic inclusion is generated by adherence to human rights norms but it is
also necessary for any successful strategy of sustainable development. Inequality in Myanmar is
significant and there is a growing global recognition, even in institutions such as the IMF, that
inequality and neoliberal economic models can stifle the full potential of economic development
(Dabla-Norris et al. 2015; Ostry et al. 2016; Wilkinson and Pickett 2009). Myanmar’s natural
resources and agricultural development provide avenues for addressing poverty throughout the
country but only if such development is achieved through ecologically sustainable strategies that
respect the rights of ethnic minority and local communities in decision-making. Policies that
promote free, high-quality education for all, particularly in ethnic languages, not only improve
understanding and tolerance of difference but also provide the human capital for future economic development ( Jolliffe and Mears 2016; Lall and South 2013).
Political inclusion is possibly the most significant issue facing Myanmar, with questions of
ethnicity a key contributor to historical and contemporary conflicts. Ethnicity feeds directly
into Myanmar’s unresolved citizenship crisis (Holliday 2014). As Walton (2013) has shown,
many in the ethnic Bamar (Burman) community are oblivious of the systematic marginalisation
of other ethnic cultures, languages and religions. This unacknowledged privilege is not, however,
unique to the Bamar community, as some ‘accepted’ national ethnic minorities also receive
unacknowledged privilege and reinforce the marginalisation of other minority communities.
The key document in this area is the 1982 Citizenship Law, which set out the country’s 135
officially designated ethnic groups, the ‘national races’. The law was passed during military rule
under Ne Win, which was opposed by the NLD and many ethnic groups for its authoritarian
and chauvinist practices. While arguing that laws made under Ne Win were unjust and illegitimate, in the new political climate many ethnic minority activists have been happy to cite and
promote this law to justify the exclusion of other minorities, notably the Muslim Rohingya in
Rakhine State, although this is part of a broader scapegoating of Muslims throughout Myanmar
(Cheesman 2017; van Klinken and Su Mon Thazin Aung 2017). There is no easy political
solution to the issue of inclusion in Myanmar but a useful first step could be the technical separation of ethnicity from eligibility for citizenship (see Farrelly 2016).
An intermediate point for the transition currently underway in Myanmar might, therefore,
see the law redrafted to remove ethnicity as a primary determinant of citizenship. There are of
course significant political impediments to implementing such a change but, just as the concept
of federalism is, for the first time, being openly debated in Myanmar, the emergence of a new
definition of citizenship, founded on liberal values rather than arbitrary and often ethnologically
dubious categorisations, should not be entirely ruled out. Such a shift would take courage on
the part of Myanmar’s democrats to make the necessary adjustments in what is currently a rigid
set of social expectations about ethnic belonging.
In government, the NLD has made efforts to promote what they consider neutral language
on sensitive ethnic issues, particularly the Rohingya. Their terminological revisions have caused
consternation among ‘nationalist’ Buddhists, and have also been opposed by some Rohingya
themselves. There were reports that Muslims in Rakhine State townships refused to accept new
government-issued national verification cards, or ‘green cards’, as part of a citizenship verification
pilot programme because their race and religion were omitted ( The Myanmar Times, 16 June 2016). These Muslims wanted their ethnicity listed on the card both to emphasise their identity and
because they thought its absence could reduce their chances of eventually gaining citizenship.
There is, in such cases, a lack of trust between ethnic minorities and the government due to
deep-seated historical animosities. While the NLD government generates much more goodwill
than its predecessors, there are obvious challenges when it comes to contentious ethnic and
religious fault lines. The removal of ethnicity and religion from government identification cards
is, however, a worthwhile ambition for a pluralist democracy. The official diminution of ethnic
classification may be possible if supposedly discrete groups accept that they are all, fundamentally, the same.
An attempt to reduce communal tensions came with the government announcement in
mid-2016 that it would use the religiously determined, but ethnically neutral, terminology of
‘Buddhist community in Rakhine State’ and ‘Muslim community in Rakhine State’ in stateowned publications ( The Irrawaddy, 21 June 2016). The previous USDP government commonly
referred to the Rohingya as ‘Bengalis’, a pejorative and ethnologically suspect term. Under the
NLD government these tentative steps towards more ethnically neutral governance were shaped
by the need to balance the competing demands of local nationalists and external critics. In
championing such difficult changes, the NLD were encouraged by their landslide triumph at
the 2015 election in the face of large-scale ‘nationalist’ Buddhist protests, including exhortations
by prominent monks not to vote for the leading democratic politicians. Even with that popular
mandate, the NLD’s efforts have foundered amongst the Buddhist majority of Rakhine State
who continued to insist on identifying their Muslim neighbours as ‘Bengali’.
The NLD attempted to placate international criticism on the treatment of the Rohingya by
the appointment of an international advisory commission in August 2016, led by former UN
Secretary General Kofi Annan (Reuters, 24 August 2016), and by October the situation in
northern Rakhine State was relatively stable, despite the ongoing incarceration of over 100,000
Rohingya in internally displaced peoples (IDP) camps. On 9 October 2016, however, coordinated armed attacks on three border posts near Maungdaw township in northern Rakhine State
killed nine Myanmar police officers and eight assailants ( The Myanmar Times, 10 October 2016).
As a result, the region again became heavily militarised with widespread allegations of Tatmadaw
abuse of the Muslim community and an exodus of 70,000 Rohingya to Bangladesh (OHCHR
2016; 2017).
On 24 August 2017 the commission delivered their final report, which included comprehensive and productive recommendations on pathways to peace in Rakhine State. The NLD
government quickly committed to implement the recommendations ‘to the fullest extent, and within the shortest timeframe possible’. In the early hours of the next morning, militants
attacked 30 police posts and an army barracks in northern Rakhine State, resulting in a brutal
military operation which the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights labelled ‘a textbook
example of ethnic cleansing’. At the time of writing over 400,000 Rohingya had fled across the
border to Bangladesh in the three weeks following the attacks. The outlook for the Rohingya
and peace in Rakhine State is now even more bleak (Simpson 2017a).
Broader concerns by ethnic minorities over the NLD as primarily a Bamar party were reinforced around the one year anniversary of the NLD government over a bridge-naming dispute
in Chaungzon, Mon State. The government insisted on naming the bridge after the Bamar
General Aung San, Aung San Suu Kyi’s father, while the Mon ethnic community were in
favour of a more locally sensitive name. By-elections for parliament were held on 1 April 2017
to replace government appointees, including for the seat surrounding the bridge, and to fill
several seats left vacant due to civil conflict in Shan State during the 2015 elections. The dispute
resulted in a 17 per cent collapse in the NLD vote in Chaungzon and they lost the seat.Similarly, in Shan State the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD) won all six previously empty seats with a negligible NLD vote registered in several electorates. The tactical
voting in ethnic areas that delivered the NLD its landslide in 2015 is unlikely to be repeated
(Simpson 2017b).
Ethnic concerns fed into broader dissatisfaction with the performance of the NLD and Aung
San Suu Kyi in their first year in office. Little progress was made on the peace process, despite
Aung San Suu Kyi expending considerable political capital in this area. Furthermore, there
were relatively few detailed plans for development with Aung San Suu Kyi continuing to promote a ‘socially conservative ideology of radical self-sufficiency and laissez-faire relations
between the state and society’ (Mary Callahan, Nikkei Asian Review, 29 March 2017), arguing
citizens should muster ‘courage’ and ‘self-confidence’ rather than rely on government action or
support; an exhortation unlikely to be received with equanimity in ethnic areas facing off
against the state’s military. The NLD was undoubtedly left a shambolic economic legacy by the
previous USDP government and the military operates independently, but the government
came to power with unprecedented goodwill and it is striking how this has metamorphosed
into an aloof sense of entitlement within the NLD.
One sector with which the NLD needs to engage further is civil society. Since the opening
of political space in Myanmar it has been apparent that civil society is not always civil, with
chauvinist ‘nationalist’ movements becoming more prominent. Nonetheless, civil society is an
essential component of any thriving democratic system and it has a pivotal role to play in
engaging community and government stakeholders. Civil society provides an outlet for
pursuing cultural goals, as well as political ones, and provides mechanisms for minorities or
groups unable, or unwilling, to enter the formal political process. There are concerns that the
NLD government does not consider civil society an active partner in the transition, since it
lacks the electoral legitimacy of the NLD. It would be a missed opportunity, and do little for
democratic development, if local activists were merely expected to follow the lead set by
elected politicians (Simpson and Smits 2018).
After decades of military rule, a free media in Myanmar will also be crucial for the development of a vibrant, inclusive and democratic society but here again the NLD’s record is mixed.
The rapid expansion of newspapers and news outlets in the country under the USDP government was welcome and there have been some moves by the NLD to continue relaxing restrictions on the media. For politicians and government officials, however, there is still a need to
embrace the scrutiny offered by journalists, even when it proves uncomfortable. The media, including its rambunctious online elements, should be considered an essential component of
democracy rather than an impediment to smooth national development. Unfortunately, journalists and political activists continued to be arrested and jailed under residual legislation, such
as section 66(d) of the 2013 Telecommunications Act, during the NLD’s first year in office
(Simpson 2017b). The ongoing difficulties and restrictions in reporting on civil conflicts, particularly in Rakhine State, demonstrate that there remain clear limits on press freedom in the
country (Brooten and Verbruggen 2017).
Free and fair elections are a key component of successful democracies and the 2015 election
was, given Myanmar’s recent history, undoubtedly a success by almost any measure. However,
Myanmar’s first-past-the-post electoral system, while delivering the NLD a useful majority, is
actually not the best system for pursuing inclusive democracy. A system of proportional representation, with preferential voting, would result in more representative and inclusive legislatures
(Dryzek and Dunleavy 2009). If Myanmar’s parliaments are seen as accurately reflecting the will
of all communities, ethnic groups are more likely to pursue their interests through democratic
means rather than armed struggle. A related factor in the potential success of Myanmar’s transition is the continuing centrality
of Myanmar’s military in the country’s political and economic life. While the NLD government
gains most of the media attention for its activities, it still only governs with the acquiescence of
the Tatmadaw. The military may have receded from the frontline of government but it remains
a powerful force that, under its own 2008 constitution, is an autonomous institution, free from
civilian control or oversight. The military clearly runs its own operations in the restive ethnic
regions. The assassination in January 2017 of Ko Ni, a key legal adviser to the NLD, at Yangon
International Airport reinforced the views of some that military subterfuge was consciously
undermining the government. That he was the NLD expert on understanding and challenging
the military-authored constitution, as well as being one of the few prominent Muslims in
political life, cast further doubt on hopes that Myanmar had entered a new more liberal and
democratic era.
While the constitution ensures that the military plays a dominant role in Myanmar’s politics,
its role in Myanmar’s economy is much less formalised, but no less significant (Ford et al. 2016;
Jones 2014). To consolidate democratic rule the NLD must also democratise economic
development; if the poor see continuing inequality and little material gain from democratic rule
they may be inclined to accept more authoritarian options in future if they come attached with
promises of economic relief. During the first year in office Aung San Suu Kyi focused almost
exclusively on the peace process at the expense of economic development; in reality, the two
goals are interdependent.
Finally, the transition inside Myanmar will inevitably be shaped by events in the wider world
as the country continues to embrace international society. External actors are increasingly present in Myanmar as major foreign powers, corporations and INGOs look for opportunities in
what is an emerging site for regional competition. Aung San Suu Kyi rightly insists that the
Myanmar government, not international actors, will decide on the country’s policies both big
and small. Nevertheless, no country is immune to the pressures of globalisation, and Myanmar
will certainly need to account for many transborder considerations.
To build a modern democratic state, political leaders in Myanmar will need to effectively
manage a daunting set of interrelated challenges. As well as establishing robust foundations for
democracy inside the country, they will be forced to balance external influences seeking leverage at a time of national vulnerability. It helps that the elected NLD government claimed a
strong popular mandate to improve the economy and increase political participation but inadequate state resourcing is likely to remain a persistent constraint. As Myanmar continues its
transition towards a more inclusive government and society it remains far too early to claim that the nascent process has been a success.
Source/publisher:
Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Myanmar via Academia
Date of entry/update:
2026-05-23
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
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Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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"After decades of mismanagement and direct military rule, Myanmar’s contested transition to a
more democratic government has rapidly shifted the outlook in this significant Southeast Asian
nation. Since 2011, the removal of Western sanctions and new foreign investments have resulted
in high rates of economic growth and an expanding middle class, albeit from a very low base. In a
result unthinkable a few years earlier, former political prisoner and Nobel laureate Aung San Suu
Kyi and her party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), formed a national government
in early 2016. However, despite significant political and economic reforms since the liberalisation
process commenced, the transition to civilian rule remains constrained by the military’s 2008
Constitution, which guarantees that it operates unfettered by civilian oversight. As a result,
although some ethnic conflicts have abated, others continue to fester and new conflicts have
erupted. With a daunting task ahead the NLD government has made some progress in removing
the vestiges of repressive military-era laws but many remain untouched and some of the practices
of the new government provide unwelcome reminders of the country’s authoritarian history.
This timely Handbook describes the political, economic, and cultural dimensions of this
crucial period of transition in Myanmar. It presents explanations for contradictory trends,
including those that defy some of the early narratives about the comprehensive transformation
of Myanmar. The Handbook also considers the impact of major environmental, strategic, and
demographic trends which help underscore that Myanmar’s development will be an ongoing
task. In addition to introductory and concluding chapters by the editors, the body of the Handbook is divided into seven core sections:• Fundamentals
• Spaces
• Cultures
• Living
• Governance
• International
• Challenges
Written by an international team of scholars, with a mix of world-leading established academics
and talented emerging researchers, the Handbook provides a rigorous scholarly overview of Myanmar’s politics, economics, and society. As Myanmar opens to Western businesses and
government agencies, this is an invaluable reference book that will provide a foundation for
further research and offer the first port of call for scholars, students, and policy makers working
on Myanmar and Asia.
Adam Simpson is Director of the Centre for Peace and Security at the Hawke Research
Institute and Senior Lecturer in International Studies at the University of South Australia. He
is also Adjunct Research Fellow at the Centre for Governance and Public Policy at Griffith
University, Australia.
Nicholas Farrelly is an Associate Dean of the College of Asia and the Pacific at the Australian
National University and Director of the ANU Myanmar Research Centre.
Ian Holliday is Vice-President and Pro-Vice-Chancellor (Teaching and Learning) at the
University of Hong Kong..."
Source/publisher:
Routledge Handbook via Academia
Date of entry/update:
2026-05-19
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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Format :
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"“Message of Congratulations on President U Win Myint’s Return to His Family”
Date: April 22, 2026
U Win Myint, the President of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, who was unlawfully arrested and detained by the terrorist military on February 1, 2021, while serving in his capacity as President, has reunited with his family on April 17, 2026, after more than five years.
On this occasion, the Steering Council for the Emergence of a Federal Democratic Union (SCEF) expresses its great joy and congratulations together with his family and with all the people of Myanmar.
We sincerely wish that President U Win Myint will have good health and that he will be able to continue to safely carry out responsibilities for the benefit of the country and its people.
We will continue to make every possible effort, together with all the people of Myanmar, to ensure the swift and unconditional release of all political prisoners, including State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, who remains unjustly detained.
Steering Council for the Emergence of a Federal Democratic Union (SCEF)..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2026-04-23
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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Format :
pdf
Size:
216.52 KB
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"“နိုင်ငံတော်သမ္မတဦးဝင်းမြင့် မိသားစုထံပြန်လည်ရောက်ရှိခြင်းအတွက် ဝမ်းမြောက်ကြောင်း သဝဏ်လွှာ”
ရက်စွဲ။ ။ ၂၀၂၆ ခုနှစ် ဧပြီလ ၂၂ ရက်
၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ် ဖေဖော်ဝါရီလ (၁) ရက်နေ့တွင် ပြည်ထောင်စုသမ္မတမြန်မာနိုင်ငံတော်၏ နိုင်ငံတော်သမ္မတအဖြစ် တာဝန်ထမ်းဆောင်လျက်ရှိနေချိန် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်၏ မတရားဖမ်းဆီးအကျဉ်းချခြင်းကို ခံခဲ့ရသည့် နိုင်ငံတော်သမ္မတဦးဝင်းမြင့်သည် (၅) နှစ်ကျော်အကြာ ၂၀၂၆ ခုနှစ် ဧပြီလ ၁၇ ရက်နေ့တွင် မိသားစုထံ ပြန်လည်ရောက်ရှိခဲ့သည့်အတွက် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီပြည်ထောင်စု ပေါ်ထွန်းရေး ဦးဆောင်ကောင်စီ - SCEF အနေဖြင့် မိသားစုနှင့်ထပ်တူ၊ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံသူနိုင်ငံသားများအားလုံးနှင့် ထပ်တူ ဝမ်းမြောက်ဝမ်းသာဖြစ်ရပါသည်။
နိုင်ငံတော်သမ္မတဦးဝင်းမြင့်အနေဖြင့် ကိုယ်၏ ကျန်းမာခြင်း၊ စိတ်၏ ခိုင်မာခြင်းတို့ကို ပိုင်ဆိုင်ကာ နိုင်ငံ့အကျိုး၊ နိုင်ငံသူနိုင်ငံသားတို့၏ အကျိုးကို ဘေးအန္တရာယ်ကင်းစွာဖြင့် ဆက်လက်သယ်ပိုးထမ်းရွက်နိုင်ပါစေကြောင်း ဆန္ဒပြုဆုမွန်ကောင်းတောင်းအပ်ပါသည်။
ကျွန်ုပ်တို့အနေဖြင့် မတရားဖမ်းဆီးခံထားရသည့် နိုင်ငံတော်၏အတိုင်ပင်ခံပုဂ္ဂိုလ်ဒေါ်အောင်ဆန်းစုကြည်နှင့်တကွ နိုင်ငံရေးအကျဉ်းသားများအားလုံး ခြွင်းချက်မရှိ အမြန်ဆုံးလွတ်မြောက်နိုင်ရေးအတွက် တိုင်းရင်းသား ပြည်သူလူထုအားလုံးနှင့် အတူ အစွမ်းကုန် ဆက်လက် ကြိုးပမ်းဆောင်ရွက်သွားမည်ဖြစ်ပါသည်။
ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီပြည်ထောင်စုပေါ်ထွန်းရေးဦးဆောင်ကောင်စီ
Steering Council for the Emergence of a Federal Democratic Union (SCEF)..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2026-04-22
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"To: Honorable Chair and Members of the Southeast Asia National Human Rights Institution Forum (SEANF)
Honorable Chairperson Dato’ Seri Mohd Hishamudin Yunus
Human Rights Commission of Malaysia (SUHAKAM)
Honorable Chairperson Ms. Anis Hidayah
National Human Rights Commission (Komnas HAM), Indonesia
Honorable Provedor Mr. Virgilio da Silva Guterres
Provedor de Direitos Humanos e Justiça (PDHJ) , Timor-Leste
Honorable Chairperson Atty. Richard Paat Palpal-latoc
Commission on Human Rights of the Philippines (CHRP)
Honorable Chairperson Ms. Pornprapai Ganjanarintr
National Human Rights Commission of Thailand (NHRCT)
21 April 2026
[Open Letter] SEANF must remove membership of junta-controlled Myanmar National Human Rights Commission
We, the CSO Working Group on Independent National Human Rights Institution (Burma/Myanmar) (Working Group), the Asian NGO Network on National Human Rights Institutions (ANNI), and the Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development (FORUM-ASIA) respectfully urge the Southeast Asia National Human Rights Institution Forum (SEANF) to take decisive steps toward the formal removal of the Myanmar National Human Rights Commission (MNHRC) from its membership.
As SEANF convenes its first Technical Working Group Meeting under the leadership of the Human Rights Commission of Malaysia (SUHAKAM) from 20–22 April 2026, we encourage meaningful progress, including necessary amendments to the Rules of Procedure, to enable the removal of the junta-controlled MNHRC.
This action is essential to uphold SEANF’s integrity, credibility, and commitment to accountability.
MNHRC’s alignment with the military junta
Since the attempted coup in 2021, the Myanmar military junta has perpetrated widespread and systematic human rights violations against civilians. In this context, the MNHRC has failed to act independently and has instead reinforced the junta’s narratives, thereby undermining its mandate and legitimacy.
For over five years, the MNHRC has remained silent in the face of grave violations. It also openly defended the junta against criticisms.
The MNHRC’s 15 January 2026 statement criticizing SUHAKAM—following SUHAKAM’s concerns over the junta-led sham election held between 28 December 2025 and 25 January 2026—further illustrates its unwillingness to engage constructively and its continued failure to maintain independence as required under the Paris Principles, the minimum international standards expected of national human rights institutions.
Such conduct reflects a fundamental lack of independence, credibility, and meaningful engagement with regional human rights mechanisms.
Recent escalations further underscore the severity of the crisis. Reports of continued airstrikes targeting civilian areas, including attacks in Sagaing Region and Karen and Kachin States, have resulted in significant civilian casualties and destruction of homes, hospitals, schools, and places of worship. These incidents reflect a pattern of increasing atrocity crimes by the Myanmar military and reinforce the urgent need for accountability, contradicting the junta’s narratives portraying a transition to civilian governance.
Myanmar’s illegitimate junta Chief, now self-appointed president, Min Aung Hlaing, also remains subject to international accountability efforts, including proceedings before courts in Argentina and the International Criminal Court, as well as universal jurisdiction cases initiated in Timor-Leste and Indonesia.
On 10 April 2026, Min Aung Hlaing re-appointed the Commissioners of the MNHRC shortly after assuming the self-appointed presidency. The lack of independence of the MNHRC is again evident, as the Commissioners are selected by the military, reflecting continued military control over the entity and falling short of the independence and pluralism required by the Paris Principles.
This sustained non-compliance has resulted in the MNHRC’s expulsion from the Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions (GANHRI) in March 2025 and the Asia Pacific Forum of National Human Rights Institutions (APF) in May 2025.
To preserve its standing as a credible regional human rights body, SEANF must follow suit without further delay.
Safeguarding SEANF’s credibility
Continued inclusion of a dis-accredited institution risks undermining the SEANF’s collective integrity. The removal of the MNHRC, alongside full disengagement from the junta-controlled body, is essential to promoting accountability.
We recognize the ongoing efforts of SEANF members—including its Chair, SUHAKAM—in demonstrating solidarity with the people of Myanmar. We also acknowledge current initiatives to amend the Rules of Procedure to clarify membership and procedural standards, with a view to strengthening accountability and safeguarding the integrity of SEANF.
ANNI and the Working Group extend our support to these efforts and to members actively advancing accountability, while respectfully encouraging timely and concrete progress.
GANHRI’s decision sends a clear message that non-compliance with the Paris Principles cannot be tolerated. We respectfully call on SEANF to act with similar resolve. Doing so would reinforce regional commitment to human rights standards and principled institutional leadership. The removal of the MNHRC also presents an opportunity for SEANF to strengthen its institutional coherence and renew its collective efforts to advance human rights, justice, and accountability across Southeast Asia.
We further encourage SEANF to publicly announce the removal of the MNHRC’s membership and to promptly update all relevant official platforms. In parallel, all forms of engagement with the MNHRC should cease without delay. Transparency in this process will be critical to maintaining public trust.
We look forward to confirmation of the MNHRC’s formal removal from SEANF and remain ready to engage constructively in support of independent and accountable national human rights institutions in the region.
Sincerely,
CSO Working Group on Independent National Human Rights Institution (Burma/Myanmar)
Asian NGO Network on National Human Rights Institutions (ANNI)
Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development (FORUM-ASIA)
For more information, please contact:
The CSO Working Group on Independent National Human Rights Institution (Burma/Myanmar); [email protected]
ANNI Secretariat, FORUM-ASIA; [email protected]
About the Asian NGO Network on National Human Rights Institutions (ANNI)
The Asian NGO Network on National Human Rights Institutions (ANNI) was established in December 2006. It is a network of Asian non-governmental organisations and human rights defenders working on issues related to National Human Rights Institutions (NHRIs). ANNI currently has 33 member organisations from 21 countries or territories. ANNI members work on strengthening the work and functioning of Asian NHRIs to better promote and protect human rights as well as to advocate for the improved compliance of Asian NHRIs with international standards, including the Paris Principles and General Observations of the Sub-Committee on Accreditation (SCA) of the Global Alliance of NHRIs (GANHRI). The Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development (FORUM-ASIA) has served as the Secretariat of ANNI since its establishment in 2006.
More information at: https://forum-asia.org/anni/
About the CSO Working Group on Independent National Human Rights Institution (Burma/Myanmar)
The CSO Working Group on Independent National Human Rights Institution (Burma/Myanmar) advocates for the establishment of a new NHRI—tentatively named the Union Human Rights Commission—to replace the illegitimate MNHRC which has aligned itself with the illegal military junta. The Working Group was previously known as the ‘CSO Working Group on MNHRC Reform.’ Currently, it consists of 21 Myanmar civil society organizations. From its founding in 2019 until the attempted coup in February 2021, the Working Group consistently advocated for an effective MNHRC that demonstrates a commitment to the international standards set forth in the Paris Principles..."
Source/publisher:
Asian NGO Network on National Human Rights Institutions, CSO Working Group on Independent National Human Rights Institution (Burma/Myanmar)
Date of entry/update:
2026-04-21
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"Kim Aris, the youngest son of Myanmar’s jailed civilian leader Aung San Suu Kyi, has issued an urgent plea to the regime in Naypyidaw to provide “proof of life” for his 80-year-old mother on Monday. Aris has had no direct communication with Aung San Suu Kyi since the military seized power in a military coup on Feb. 1, 2021 and detained her.
“I just want some proof that she’s alive more than anything else,” Aris told DVB in an interview on April 20. “The world at large often thinks that she’s still under house arrest, whereas all this time she’s spent in jail.”
This appeal from Aris comes three days after Aung San Suu Kyi loyalist, President Win Myint, was transferred from prison to house arrest in Naypyidaw. But rumors regarding Aung San Suu Kyi’s transfer out of prison have failed to materialize.
A Myanmar New Year amnesty announced by Min Aung Hlaing on April 17 granted parole to a reported 4,514 people, including at least 292 political prisoners, according to the Political Prisoners Network Myanmar (PPNM).
Fears about Aung San Suu Kyi’s health
Aris has not spoken to his mother Aung San Suu Kyi since before the 2021 coup. In the last five years, he has received only a single letter, which arrived nearly three years ago in response to a care package he sent to her at Naypidaw Prison.
The last independent verification of her condition in prison came five years ago from Sean Turnell, an Australian economist and former advisor to the National League for Democracy (NLD) party, who was imprisoned alongside her before being released in 2022.
Aung San Suu Kyi’s NLD administration governed Myanmar from 2016 up until it was ousted by Min Aung Hlaing’s military in the 2021 coup. Aris expressed deep concern over his mother’s deteriorating health, specifically her ongoing heart condition.
“Heart conditions need proper machinery to be diagnosed correctly, and I know that she won’t be getting that. I know that prison doctors in Burma will not be providing that,” Aris told DVB.
He directly challenged Min Aung Hlaing, who was inaugurated Myanmar’s president by a pro-military parliament elected in highly controversial polls which ended on Jan. 25, to allow independent verification of her status.
Aris suggested Myanmar grant access to Aung San Suu Kyi to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) or foreign diplomats based in Yangon. “If she is still alive and healthy, then let me talk to her,” Aris told DVB.
A bargaining chip for the regime?
Despite the reduction of her 27-year sentence by one-sixth on April 17, Aris dismissed this as meaningless. “She’ll still be over a hundred if she sees this sentence through,” he noted.
If the military does eventually move her to house arrest, Aris suspects she will not be permitted to return to their family home on University Avenue in Yangon.
Instead, he believes the regime will keep her close to their seat of power in Naypyidaw—not only to prevent her from speaking publicly but potentially to use her as a bargaining chip in the ongoing civil war started by resistance forces against the military.
“They’re quite vulnerable in Naypyidaw,” Aris observed. “It’s quite close to the frontline, so it might be good for them to have her nearby. I think [Min Aung Hlaing] has his own agenda where she’s concerned.”
A call to the international community
Aris also criticized the international community for its waning focus on his mother’s plight. Unlike Aung San Suu Kyi’s previous 15 years of house arrest under former military regimes, where global leaders consistently advocated for her release, international pressure has largely stalled in recent years.
He warned that some foreign governments may attempt to use Myanmar’s recent “sham” 2025-26 elections as an excuse to normalize relations with the regime.
“They need to understand that they’re doing business with a bunch of crooks, and they can’t expect good results,” Aris told DVB.
Despite the dire situation facing his mother and over 22,000 other political prisoners held since the 2021 coup, Aris expressed a faint hope that Min Aung Hlaing’s elevation to the presidency might make him feel secure enough to ease restrictions.
“I think there’s very little reason for him to fear anything by moving her to house arrest,” Aris told DVB, urging a return to negotiations. “The bloodshed that’s still going on in Burma can’t continue forever.”..."
Source/publisher:
Democratic Voice of Burma
Date of entry/update:
2026-04-20
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About Aung San Suu Kyi, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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"Politicians and political activists in Myanmar fear that the new quasi-civilian government of Min Aung Hlaing is stepping up its surveillance activities and conducting an intensified harassment campaign against them. At least one senior member of the National League for Democracy (NLD) was detained and questioned over the weekend, before being released without charge.
This sweeping crackdown seems to have been triggered by the recent release of political prisoners, including ousted President U Win Myint, a senior NLD member. Although the NLD is officially banned, it remains the main opposition party, and its members are still actively engaged in campaigning for the release of all political prisoners, including the party’s leader, detained democracy icon Daw Aung San Suu Kyi.
The NLD overwhelmingly won the national elections held in 2020 but was ousted from power by a military coup five years ago.
The Irrawaddy has learned that party spokesman and Central Executive Committee (CEC) member Dr. Myo Nyunt was summoned for questioning by the Ministry of Home Affairs on April 18, held overnight and released the following day. The Irrawaddy attempted to contact Dr. Myo Nyunt on Monday for confirmation, but he could not be reached.
According to an academic based in Yangon who declined to be identified, Dr. Myo Nyunt was detained because he gave interviews to the local media regarding the release of President U Win Myint.
He also led a delegation of other CEC members—as well as former President U Htin Kyaw and his family—to meet and pay respects to U Win Myint and his family, according to party sources.
U Win Myint’s residence is currently under strict surveillance, as are the homes of other CEC members. Anyone who plans to visit U Win Myint must undergo thorough checks in advance, including ID verification. Newly acquired PSMS (Passenger Screening and Security Management System) technology is also being used.
Clearly the new regime is anxious about the growth of real democracy and the possibility of public protests now that senior members of the opposition have been released, according to a former Asian diplomat who continues to follow developments there closely. “They are increasingly nervous about the impact any relaxation of restrictions may have,” said a Yangon-based businessman, on condition of anonymity.
The country’s military leaders are paranoid about the popularity and support Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and her party continue to enjoy throughout the country. They are particularly worried about potential public reaction if she is released—and the support she would attract, according to Myanmar political observers. Thousands took to the streets on the previous occasions she was released from house arrest.
According to analysts and academics who closely follow Myanmar’s political situation, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi would not accept any deal with the military—including being released—without first consulting other senior members of her party. The fact that several top senior party members got together at President U Win Myint’s home suggests something maybe in the wind, they say.
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2026-04-20
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"၁။ နိုင်ငံတော်သမ္မတ ဦးဝင်းမြင့်သည် ပြည်သူလူထုမှ ဒီမိုကရေစီ နည်းလမ်းကျ အပ်နှင်းထားသော နိုင်ငံတော် သမ္မတ တာဝန် ထမ်းဆောင်နေစဉ် အကြမ်းဖက် စစ်အုပ်စုမှ ၎င်းတို့ကိုယ်တိုင် ရေးဆွဲ ထားသည့် ၂၀၀၈ ဖွဲ့စည်းပုံ အခြေခံဥပဒေကို ချိုးဖောက်ကာ နိုင်ငံတော်ပုန်ကန်မှု ကျူးလွန် ပြီး မတရား ဖမ်းဆီး ချုပ်နှောင်မှုကို ခံခဲ့ရခြင်းဖြစ်သည်။
၂။ ယနေ့ ၂၀၂၆ ခုနှစ်၊ ဧပြီလ ၁၇ ရက်၊ မြန်မာနှစ်ဆန်း တစ်ရက်နေ့တွင် နိုင်ငံတော် သမ္မတ ဦးဝင်းမြင့် အနေဖြင့် ကျန်းမာစွာဖြင့် မိသားစုနှင့် ပြန်လည်ဆုံဆည်းရသည်ကို အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအတိုင်ပင်ခံကောင်စီ (NUCC) က ပြည်သူလူထုနှင့် ထပ်တူများစွာ ဝမ်းမြောက်ရပါသည်။
၃။ နိုင်ငံတော် သမ္မတ ဦးဝင်းမြင့်အား မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၏ သမ္မတဖြစ်သည်ဟု အမျိုးသား ညီညွတ်ရေး အတိုင်ပင်ခံ ကောင်စီက တရားဝင် ဆက်လက်အသိအမှတ်ပြု ထားဆဲ ဖြစ်သည်။။
၄။ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေး အတိုင်ပင်ခံကောင်စီ အနေဖြင့် လူထုခေါင်းဆောင် ဒေါ်အောင်ဆန်းစုကြည် နှင့်တကွ ကျန်ရှိနေသော နိုင်ငံရေး အကျဉ်းသားများ အားလုံး လွတ်မြောက်ရေး အတွက် ဆက်လက် ကြိုးပမ်းသွားမည်ဖြစ်သည်။
၅။ ထို့အပြင် အမျိုးသား ညီညွတ်ရေး အတိုင်ပင်ခံ ကောင်စီသည် စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ် အပါအဝင် အာဏာရှင် စနစ်မှန်သမျှ ပပျောက်ရေးနှင့် ဖက်ဒရယ် ဒီမိုကရေစီ ပြည်ထောင်စု တည်ဆောက်ရေး တို့အတွက် ပြည်သူတရပ်လုံး၊ တော်လှန်ရေး အင်အားစု အားလုံးနှင့် အတူလက်တွဲ၍ နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေး အောင်ပွဲရသည်အထိ ဆက်လက်တိုက်ပွဲဝင်သွားမည် ဖြစ်သည်။..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Consultative Council
Date of entry/update:
2026-04-17
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National Unity Consultative Council
Date of entry/update:
2026-04-16
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"In order to advance our ongoing revolution and achieve victory at the earliest possible time; to advance the current revolutionary phase by adopting the Federal Transitional Arrangements and successfully establish a transitional government; and to effectively implement the processes of building a Federal Democratic Union— we have formally established the Steering Council for the Emergence of a Federal Democratic Union (SCEF) on the following three pillars:
1. The pillar representing States/Federal Units/EROs
2. The pillar representing the people
3. The pillar representing women — to coordinate, lead, guide, and implement military, political, federal, and institutional matters.
We hereby solemnly announce this formation to all the people.
Our vision and strategic objectives are to completely dismantle all forms of dictatorship, including the military dictatorship, and to collectively initiate a new political landscape that can effectively and practically realize our political aspirations and positions.
Furthermore, we are committed to protecting and promoting the diverse identities of all ethnic nationalities residing within members states and units of the Union, and to firmly building a new Federal Democratic Union composed of states that fully guarantee equality among nationalities and the right to self-determination.
To ensure the swift achievement of these objectives, we will lead and coordinate the military and political activities of all revolutionary forces with legitimacy, unity, and accountable leadership.
To realize these goals, we have firmly adopted the following six political objectives:
(1) To overturn the usurpation of state power by the military, and to terminate the involvement of the armed forces in politics
(2) To ensure that all armed forces operate solely under the command of a civilian government elected through democratic processes
(3) To abrogate the constitution of 2008 in its entirety, and to quash all attempts to reinstate its provisions
(4) To draft and promulgate a new constitution that embodies federalism and democratic values, garnering the consensus of all relevant parties
(5) To establish a new federal democratic union in accordance with the proposed federal democratic constitution
(6) To institute a system of transitional justice to achieve justice and accountability for victims of injustices, including gender-based violence, during the conflict period.
In carrying out its functions, the SCEF upholds the principle that sovereignty belongs to the people residing within the States/Federal Units, and adopts the principle of shared sovereignty between the Union and the States/Federal Units.
In political decision-making, we will practice collective leadership, ensuring that the voices of Ethnic Revolutionary Organizations (EROs), democratic resistance forces, women’s groups, and representatives of the people are meaningfully included.
Member organizations of the Council will act based on mutual respect and recognition of diversity, and will adopt and implement the principle of “one policy, one strategy.” Through coordinated efforts across military, political, and administrative sectors, we will work in unity with the people and allied forces to achieve our shared goals while promoting broader representation.
We hereby make this announcement..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2026-03-30
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National Unity Government (NUG), Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
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"ကျွန်ုပ်တို့ဆင်နွှဲလျက်ရှိသော တော်လှန်ရေးကို အရှိန်အဟုန်မြှင့်တင်၍ အမြန်ဆုံးအောင်ပွဲ ရယူ နိုင်ရန်၊ လက်ရှိတော်လှန်ရေးကို တဆင့်တက်၍ အသွင်ကူးပြောင်းမှုကာလ အစီအမံများ ကို အတည်ပြုပြီး အသွင်ကူးပြောင်းရေး အစိုးရတရပ်အောင်မြင်စွာဖွဲ့စည်းနိုင်ရန်၊ ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီ ပြည်ထောင်စု တည်ဆောက်ရေးလုပ်ငန်းစဉ်များကို လက်တွေ့အကောင်အထည်ဖော်နိုင်စေရန် တို့အတွက် စစ်ရေး၊ နိုင်ငံရေး၊ ဖက်ဒရယ်ရေးနှင့် အင်စတီကျူးရှင်းဆိုင်ရာ ကိစ္စရပ်များကို ညှိနှိုင်းဦးဆောင်လမ်းညွှန်အကောင်အထည်ဖော်ဆောင်နိုင်ရန် "ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီပြည်ထောင်စုပေါ်ထွန်းရေး ဦးဆောင် ကောင်စီ (Steering Council for the Emergence of a Federal Democratic Union - SCEF)" ကို အောက်ပါ
၁။ ပြည်နယ်/ဖက်ဒရယ်ယူနစ်/EROs ကိုယ်စားပြုမဏ္ဍိုင်
၂။ ပြည်သူ့ကိုယ်စားပြုမဏ္ဍိုင် နှင့်
၃။ အမျိုးသမီးကိုယ်စားပြု/ ကိုယ်စားလှယ်များ မဏ္ဍိုင်တို့ကို အခြေခံပြီး တရားဝင်ဖွဲ့စည်း လိုက်ပြီဖြစ်ကြောင်း ပြည်သူလူထုတရပ်လုံးကို လေးနက်တည်ကြည်စွာ အသိပေးကြေညာအပ် ပါသည်။
ကျွန်ုပ်တို့၏မျှော်မှန်းချက်နှင့် မဟာဗျူဟာရည်မှန်းချက်မှာ စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ် အပါအဝင် မည်သည့် အာဏာရှင်စနစ်ကိုမဆို မဖြစ်မနေ အမြစ်ပြတ်ဖယ်ရှားပစ်ရန်ဖြစ်ပြီး ကျွန်ုပ်တို့၏ နိုင်ငံရေး ရည်မှန်းချက်များ၊ ရပ်တည်ချက်များကို လက်တွေ့ကျကျ၊ ထိရောက်အောင်မြင်စွာ အကောင် အထည်ဖော်ဆောင်နိုင်မည့် နိုင်ငံရေးအခင်းအကျင်းအသစ်တခုကို စုစည်းညီညွတ်စွာ စတင် လိုက်ခြင်းဖြစ်ပါသည်။ ထို့အပြင် ပြည်ထောင်စုအတွင်း မှီတင်းနေထိုင်ကြသော စုံလင် ကွဲပြားသည့် လူမျိုးများ၏ ကိုယ်ပိုင်လက္ခဏာများကို ကာကွယ်မြှင့်တင်ပေးပြီး၊ အမျိုးသားတန်းတူရေးနှင့် ကိုယ်ပိုင်ပြဋ္ဌာန်းခွင့် အပြည့်အဝရှိသည့် ပြည်နယ်များဖြင့် စုဖွဲ့ထားသော ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီ ပြည်ထောင်စုသစ်ကို ခိုင်မာကောင်းမွန်စွာ တည်ဆောက်သွားရန် ဖြစ်ပါသည်။
ဤရည်မှန်းချက်များ အမြန်ဆုံး အောင်မြင်နိုင်စေရန် တော်လှန်ရေးအဖွဲ့အစည်းအသီးသီး၏ စစ်ရေးနှင့် နိုင်ငံရေးလှုပ်ရှားမှုများကို တရားဝင်မှု၊ ညီညွတ်မှုနှင့် တာဝန်ယူ၊တာဝန်ခံမှုရှိသော ခေါင်းဆောင်မှုတို့ဖြင့် ဦးဆောင်ညှိနှိုင်း အကောင်အထည်ဖော်ဆောင်ရွက်သွားမည် ဖြစ်ပါသည်။
ကျွန်ုပ်တို့သည် အဆိုပါ ရည်မှန်းချက်များ အောင်မြင်စွာ အကောင်အထည် ဖော်နိုင်ရန်အတွက် အောက်ပါ နိုင်ငံရေးဦးတည်ချက် (၆) ရပ်ကို ခိုင်မာစွာ ချမှတ်ထားပါသည်။
(၁) စစ်အာဏာသိမ်းထားမှုကို ဖယ်ရှားပြီး မြန်မာစစ်တပ်၏ နိုင်ငံရေး၌ ပါဝင်နေခြင်းအား အပြီးတိုင် အဆုံးသတ်ရန်
(၂) လက်နက်ကိုင်တပ်ဖွဲ့များအားလုံးကို ဒီမိုကရေစီနည်းကျ ရွေးကောက်တင်မြှောက်ထား သည့် အရပ်သားအစိုးရ၏ စီမံအုပ်ချုပ်မှုအောက်၌ အပြည့်အဝထားရှိရန်
(၃) ၂၀၀၈ ဖွဲ့စည်းပုံအခြေခံဥပဒေကို အပြီးတိုင် ဖျက်သိမ်းရန်နှင့် ယင်းကို ပြန်လည်အသက်သွင်းရန် ကြိုးပမ်းမှုမှန်သမျှကို တိုက်ဖျက်ရန်
(၄) သက်ဆိုင်သူများအားလုံး လက်ခံနိုင်သော ဖက်ဒရယ်နှင့် ဒီမိုကရေစီစနစ်ကို အခြေခံသည့် ဖွဲ့စည်းပုံအခြေခံဥပဒေသစ် ရေးဆွဲပြဋ္ဌာန်းရန်
(၅) ထွက်ပေါ်လာမည့် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီ ဖွဲ့စည်းပုံအခြေခံဥပဒေနှင့်အညီ ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီ ပြည်ထောင်စုအသစ်အား တည်ဆောက်ရန်
(၆) ပဋိပက္ခအတွင်း မတရားကျူးလွန်ခံရသူများအတွက် တရားမျှတမှုရရှိရေးနှင့် အသွင်ကူးပြောင်း ရေးကာလ တရားမျှတမှု ရရှိရေး လုပ်ငန်းစဉ်များကို ဖော်ဆောင်ရန်
"ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီပြည်ထောင်စုပေါ်ထွန်းရေး ဦးဆောင်ကောင်စီ” အနေဖြင့် လုပ်ငန်းစဉ်များ ဆောင်ရွက်ရာတွင် အချုပ်အခြာအာဏာကို ပြည်နယ်/ဖက်ဒရယ်ယူနစ်များအတွင်း နေထိုင်ကြသော ပြည်သူလူထုက ပိုင်ဆိုင်ကြပြီး ဖက်ဒရယ်နှင့် ပြည်နယ်/ဖက်ဒရယ်ယူနစ် များအကြား "မျှဝေသုံးစွဲသော အချုပ်အခြာအာဏာ (Shared Sovereignty)" မူကို ကိုင်စွဲမည် ဖြစ်ပါသည် ။ နိုင်ငံရေး ဆုံးဖြတ်ချက်များ ချမှတ်ရာတွင် တိုင်းရင်းသားလက်နက်ကိုင်တော်လှန်ရေး အဖွဲ့အစည်းများ (EROs)၊ ဒီမိုကရေစီတော်လှန်ရေးအင်အားစုများ၊ အမျိုးသမီးအစုအဖွဲ့များနှင့် ပြည်သူ့ကိုယ်စားလှယ် များ၏ သဘောထားအမြင်များထင်ဟပ်ပါဝင်သည့် "စုပေါင်းခေါင်းဆောင်မှု (Collective Leadership)" ဖြင့် ဖော်ဆောင်သွားမည် ဖြစ်ပါသည် ။
ကောင်စီဝင်အဖွဲ့အစည်းများအနေဖြင့် မတူကွဲပြားမှုများအပေါ် အပြန်အလှန် လေးစားမှု၊ အပြန်အလှန် အသိအမှတ်ပြုမှုတို့ကိုအခြေခံ၍ “မူဝါဒတရပ်တည်း၊ မဟာဗျူဟာတရပ်တည်း - one policy, one strategy” မူဝါဒကို ချမှတ်ကျင့်သုံး၍ စစ်ရေး၊ နိုင်ငံရေး နှင့် အုပ်ချုပ်ရေး ကဏ္ဍများကို ဟန်ချက်ညီပူးတွဲဖော်ဆောင်ပြီး ပိုမိုကျယ်ပြန်သည့် နိုင်ငံရေးကိုယ်စားပြုမှုဖြစ်အောင် မဟာမိတ် အင်အားစုများ နှင့်ဆက်လက်ပူးပေါင်းညှိနှိုင်း၍ ကျွန်ုပ်တို့၏ ရည်မှန်ချက်ပန်းတိုင်ရောက်အောင် လက်တွဲဆောင်ရွက်သွားမည်ဖြစ်ကြောင်း ကြေညာအပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2026-03-30
[field_licence]
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Individual Documents
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National Unity Government (NUG), Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
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"U Aung Lin Dwe, a former general and longtime loyalist of coup leader Min Aung Hlaing, will oversee the selection of the next president and cabinet over the next two weeks after taking office as speaker of the post‑coup Upper House.
The presidential election is due to take place later this month amid widespread rumors within the regime that Min Aung Hlaing intends to secure the role after stepping down as commander‑in‑chief. If he stands, the vote elevating him to the post will be chaired by one of his closest confidants—a clear indication of the trust he places in U Aung Lin Dwe.
That trust has been on display throughout the junta’s five years in power. As secretary of the State Administration Council (SAC), U Aung Lin Dwe signed more than 350 decrees on Min Aung Hlaing’s behalf to ensure the regime’s administrative machinery functioned smoothly.
While the junta chief personally signed key political orders—including the formation of the SAC and its successor, the State Security and Peace Commission—U Aung Lin Dwe handled most other executive directives. These ranged from appointing and dismissing ministers and deputy ministers to installing Central Bank chiefs, declaring martial law, reassigning military officers, and token reduction of jail sentences for democracy leaders U Win Myint and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi .
His central role in the regime’s day‑to‑day governance reflects the depth of Min Aung Hlaing’s reliance on him. U Aung Lin Dwe—then a lieutenant general—was appointed SAC secretary as soon as the junta was formed in 2021. He remained in that post even as other top brass were purged, before being promoted to full general and serving in the restructured State Security and Peace Commission and the Office of the National Defense and Security Council.
Under the 2008 Constitution, the Upper House speaker presides over the presidential election as chair of the Union Parliament. Political observers say this constitutional point is a key reason U Aung Lin Dwe was elevated to speaker, as Min Aung Hlaing is widely expected to assume presidency in the incoming government. Analyst Ko Htin Kyaw Aye noted that U Aung Lin Dwe’s immediate priority is the presidential election.
“He will serve to ensure the process goes smoothly,” he said.
Speculation regarding the junta chief’s intentions intensified after U Khin Yi—previously viewed as a potential presidential contender due to his role as chairman of the military’s proxy Union Solidarity and Development Party—was instead appointed speaker of the Lower House. Meanwhile, Min Aung Hlaing held what observers described as a farewell party among his generals, further reinforcing expectations that he will assume the presidency after stepping down as commander-in-chief—a position he has held for 15 years.
U Aung Lin Dwe, 64, won an Upper House seat on the USDP ticket in Mandalay Region in the junta’s December-January election. During campaigning, he highlighted his experience as commandant of the Defense Services Technological Academy and the Defense Services Academy, as well as his six years as Judge Advocate General. His administrative and legal background is exactly what Min Aung Hlaing needs to ensure his bid for presidency proceeds smoothly in parliament.
U Aung Lin Dwe will serve as speaker of the bicameral parliament for the first half of its five-year term, before the Lower House speaker takes over for the remainder.
His close ties with Min Aung Hlaing predate the coup by decades. The two men have been linked since their days at the Defense Services Academy, where U Aung Lin Dwe served under Min Aung Hlaing when the latter was still a commandant. When Min Aung Hlaing became military chief in 2011, he oversaw his confidant’s steady rise through the ranks — from Western Command chief in 2014 to Judge Advocate General in 2016, and later to SAC secretary after the coup. Military sources say his promotions resulted less from professional merit than unwavering loyalty to Min Aung Hlaing.
His family reaped benefits from his rise. Following his promotion to SAC secretary, three businesses owned by his wife and children—Mingalar Aung Myay Co, Aung Myint Moh Lin Co, and Shwe Yi Phyo Pyae Co.—expanded rapidly, becoming key players in construction and manufacturing. At the same time, his younger sister, Dr. Su Su Dwe, was promoted from medical superintendent of Mandalay General Hospital to director‑general of the Traditional Medicine Department.
Analysts note that as leader of the rubberstamp parliament, U Aung Lin Dwe is unlikely to prioritize the public interest. Instead, they expect him to continue advancing the interests of Min Aung Hlaing and his own family, just as he did throughout the junta’s five years in power..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2026-03-20
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
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Sub-title:
Five years after the coup, Myanmar’s instability is bleeding across borders. Canberra’s policy hasn’t kept up.
Description:
"In Burmese kitchens there is a saying that adding ginger to a curry can sometimes disguise the smell of ingredients that have already gone bad. It’s an apt truism as Myanmar enters a new phase of its crisis. Following elections organised under military supervision, the country’s authorities are now preparing to convene a new parliament and form a government. Institutional arrangements can create the impression of stability, but they do not necessarily resolve the deeper political crisis.
The intention of the generals is clear: to offer the appearance of constitutional order after years of conflict and international condemnation. Even if the electoral process lacks credibility in the eyes of many observers, the creation of a parliamentary structure allows the regime to argue that Myanmar is moving toward political normalisation.
For regional diplomacy, this raises a difficult question: how should governments respond when an unresolved civil conflict is repackaged as political order?
Five years after the 2021 coup, Myanmar’s crisis has evolved into one of Southeast Asia’s most complex challenges. At a time when global attention is increasingly drawn to other geopolitical crises, including escalating conflict in the Middle East, Myanmar risks slipping further from the centre of international policy debates. Yet the consequences of its instability continue to unfold across Southeast Asia.
Armed conflict continues across large parts of the country. Millions remain displaced. The breakdown of governance has allowed criminal networks and humanitarian pressures to spill across borders.
Australia’s response has been principled and compassionate, centred on humanitarian assistance and support for civil society. Yet as Myanmar’s political situation shifts toward attempted normalisation, a broader policy question emerges:
Is Australia’s Myanmar policy prepared for the next phase of the crisis?
Myanmar’s prolonged instability therefore represents not only a humanitarian concern but also a strategic challenge, intersecting with regional security, migration pressures and transnational crime networks.
Australia’s official framework is articulated in the Australia–Myanmar Development Partnership Plan 2024–2029, released by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.
The strategy makes several clear commitments.
First, Australia condemns the military takeover and calls for a return to democracy. It also emphasises the need for humanitarian access and the protection of civilians.
Second, Australia deliberately avoids direct engagement with the military regime. Development assistance is delivered through the United Nations, international organisations and local civil society partners rather than state institutions.
Third, the policy frames Myanmar as a “protracted and multifaceted crisis”, signalling that instability is likely to persist for the foreseeable future.
This approach reflects a careful balance: supporting the people of Myanmar while avoiding actions that could legitimise the military authorities. It is a sensible policy foundation. However, the strategy is also largely humanitarian in orientation, focusing on relief, resilience and development assistance. What it does not yet fully address is the regional spillover of Myanmar’s collapse.
Myanmar’s internal conflict is increasingly producing consequences beyond its borders.
Millions of people have been displaced internally since the coup, while hundreds of thousands have sought refuge in neighbouring countries such as Thailand, India, Bangladesh and Malaysia.
At the same time, the breakdown of governance across large parts of the country has allowed criminal networks to expand. Scam centres, trafficking routes and cross-border organised crime have proliferated in territories where state authority has weakened.
For Southeast Asian governments, these developments are becoming as consequential as the political crisis itself.
Regional actors are therefore beginning to view Myanmar not only through the lens of democracy and human rights, but also through the lens of security and stability. In Southeast Asia, humanitarian crises and security challenges rarely remain neatly separated for long.
This shift in perspective matters for policymakers in Canberra.
Australia has consistently supported ASEAN’s efforts to address the crisis, particularly through the Five-Point Consensus agreed in April 2021. However, ASEAN’s institutional structure limits its ability to respond decisively.
The organisation operates on a consensus principle, meaning that all member states must agree before collective action can be taken. This often leads to cautious diplomatic language and incremental steps rather than strong enforcement measures.
Furthermore, ASEAN’s rotating chairmanship creates inconsistency in leadership. As one regional observer once joked, it is difficult to run a marathon when the baton changes hands every twelve months. Each year brings different priorities and diplomatic approaches.
The result is a regional mechanism that is valuable for dialogue but ill-suited to resolving a complex civil conflict.
For external partners such as Australia, this means ASEAN engagement must be complemented by additional regional initiatives rather than relied upon exclusively.
Australia is not the only country grappling with how to respond to Myanmar’s crisis, and different governments have adopted markedly different strategies.
Japan, for example, has maintained a policy of continued engagement with Myanmar’s institutions, arguing that sustained dialogue and development assistance may help preserve long-term channels of influence. Western governments such as the United States and members of the European Union have taken a more sanctions-focused approach, targeting military-linked individuals and businesses.
Australia’s policy sits somewhere between these two models. Canberra has imposed targeted sanctions and avoided direct engagement with the military authorities, while continuing to fund humanitarian assistance and civil society programs.
This middle-ground approach reflects Australia’s desire to balance democratic principles with regional diplomatic realities. However, it also highlights the need to ensure that humanitarian engagement is accompanied by a broader regional framework that addresses the regional consequences of Myanmar’s prolonged instability.
Another notable feature of Australia’s Myanmar policy is the emphasis placed on stakeholder consultation.
In developing the Australia–Myanmar Development Partnership Plan, DFAT reports that it engaged a wide range of stakeholders including United Nations agencies, international NGOs, civil society organisations and members of the Myanmar diaspora.
These consultations are an important step toward ensuring development programs reflect the realities faced by Myanmar communities.
However, the consultation process itself is largely opaque.
Due to security concerns, the identities of local implementing partners and many consultation participants are not publicly disclosed. While this approach may be necessary to protect individuals operating in conflict environments, it also creates a significant challenge: it becomes difficult to assess how inclusive or representative these consultations truly are.
Myanmar’s political landscape is extraordinarily diverse. It includes ethnic political organisations, resistance groups, civil society networks, women’s organisations, youth movements, humanitarian actors and a global diaspora with varying perspectives on the country’s future.
When consultation processes occur largely behind closed doors, an inevitable question arises: whose voices are being heard and whose may be missing?
For policymakers in Canberra, this presents a delicate balancing act. Protecting partners from retaliation by the military regime is essential. Yet at the same time, transparency and inclusivity remain critical to building trust among the wider Myanmar community.
Without broader visibility into consultation processes, diaspora communities and emerging civic actors may feel disconnected from policy discussions that directly affect the future of their country.
Strengthening mechanisms for inclusive and transparent engagement (while still protecting the safety of participants) could therefore become an important next step in Australia’s Myanmar policy.
Such engagement would not only improve policy design but also reinforce Australia’s long-standing reputation as a partner committed to democratic values and accountable governance.
Myanmar’s diaspora communities have become one of the quiet engines sustaining humanitarian response since the coup – a community with untapped potential.
Across Australia, North America, Europe and Southeast Asia, diaspora communities have become an important source of humanitarian assistance, advocacy and political engagement since the 2021 coup. Many individuals have mobilised resources, organised international awareness campaigns and supported communities affected by conflict inside Myanmar.
Yet diaspora participation in formal policy processes often remains limited and fragmented.
While consultation with diaspora representatives did occur during the development of Australia’s Myanmar Development Partnership Plan, the structure and breadth of this engagement remain difficult to assess publicly.
This matters because diaspora communities can play a unique role in bridging international policy discussions with the complex realities inside Myanmar.
Diaspora professionals frequently possess deep cultural understanding, linguistic ability and social networks that allow them to interpret developments on the ground in ways that external observers may find difficult. Many also maintain close connections with civil society organisations, humanitarian actors and emerging political networks within the country.
At the same time, diaspora communities often reflect the diversity (and divisions) of Myanmar’s political landscape. Different groups may prioritise different strategies for political change, humanitarian response or international engagement.
For policymakers, this complexity can make diaspora engagement appear challenging.
However, excluding or underutilising diaspora expertise carries its own risks. When diaspora voices feel disconnected from formal policy processes, frustration can grow and opportunities for constructive collaboration may be lost.
As Myanmar’s crisis continues to evolve, there is an opportunity for Australia to explore more structured mechanisms for diaspora engagement. This could include advisory forums, policy dialogues or thematic working groups that allow diaspora experts to contribute perspectives on humanitarian access, governance reform and regional stability.
Such initiatives would not replace the voices of communities inside Myanmar. Rather, they could complement them by ensuring that Australia’s policy framework draws on the widest possible range of informed perspectives.
In a protracted crisis where reliable information and trusted networks are often difficult to access, diaspora communities represent an underutilised asset.
Australia’s policy currently recognises that Myanmar’s crisis will be long-term. The Development Partnership Plan explicitly notes that development and humanitarian programs must operate within a humanitarian–development nexus due to the protracted nature of the conflict.
Yet if Myanmar’s instability continues for years rather than months, its consequences for Southeast Asia will grow more severe. Irregular migration will increase. Criminal networks will expand. Border regions will face mounting humanitarian pressure. ASEAN’s internal divisions over Myanmar will also persist.
In this environment, a policy framework centred primarily on humanitarian assistance is necessary but insufficient. Humanitarian assistance saves lives. But on its own, it cannot stabilise a region.
Australia is well positioned to support a broader regional response.
Rather than attempting to resolve Myanmar’s internal political conflict directly, Canberra could focus on mitigating the wider regional consequences of prolonged instability.
Several practical initiatives could form the basis of such a strategy.
First, Australia could expand support for cross-border humanitarian assistance, particularly through partnerships with organisations operating along Myanmar’s borders.
Second, Canberra could work with regional governments to strengthen temporary protection arrangements for displaced Myanmar nationals in Southeast Asia.
Third, Australia could utilise regional mechanisms such as the Bali Process to improve coordination on migration governance and trafficking prevention.
Fourth, Australia could support local governance and service delivery in border communities hosting displaced populations.
None of these initiatives would undermine ASEAN’s central role in regional diplomacy. Instead, they would complement ASEAN’s efforts by addressing practical challenges that affect neighbouring states directly.
Myanmar’s political future will ultimately be determined by its own people. External actors cannot impose a resolution to the country’s internal conflict.
But the regional consequences of that conflict are already unfolding.
Myanmar may appear distant from Australia’s immediate interests. Geography, however, has a way of shrinking quickly when instability begins to spill across borders. Instability in Southeast Asia has direct implications for regional security, migration patterns and economic cooperation. Supporting regional responses to Myanmar’s humanitarian and governance challenges is therefore consistent with Australia’s broader strategic objectives.
Moreover, such an approach allows Australia to demonstrate constructive leadership while respecting ASEAN’s preference for regional solutions.
By complementing humanitarian assistance with a broader regional stability strategy, Australia can help mitigate the spillover effects of Myanmar’s crisis while strengthening resilience across Southeast Asia. In this part of the world, instability rarely stays politely within national borders.
Policy rarely solves conflicts overnight. But it can shape the environment in which solutions eventually become possible..."
Source/publisher:
"The Interpreter"
Date of entry/update:
2026-03-12
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Australia-Burma relations, Human Rights and international relations
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Description:
"Abstract:
Myanmar’s rallying cry do ayei (‘our cause’) encodes a structural duality that this article
takes as its organising problem: ayei means both ‘cause’ and ‘inscription.’ Since 1988, the
cause has been claimed repeatedly; the inscription has not followed. No binding compact
co-signed across ethnic lines has emerged from three decades of resistance. The military
understood this gap before the resistance did, capturing do ayei as constitutional obligation
within two years of the 1988 uprising.
This article asks why Burmese resists horizontal political inscription and what building it
would require. Drawing on linguistic analysis of pronouns, verbs, and documentary genres;
a border workshop in which resistance participants attempted to compose horizontal
compact sentences in Burmese; bilingual scoring of twelve constitutional texts spanning
1878 to 2026; and comparative analysis of mid-conflict declarations from the Atlantic
Charter to the Federal Democracy Charter, it identifies six reinforcing impediments, each
expressing a single structural condition in which Burmese political culture defaults to the
individual as the unit of revolutionary agency: sacral confinement of the political domain, a
grammatical default to hierarchy, soteriological orientation inward, the absence of any
sacralizing mechanism for horizontal obligation, systematic co-option of resistance
vocabulary, and a documentary asymmetry that confines compact-making expertise to the
ethnic periphery. Every document in the corpus scores higher in horizontal commitment in
English than in Burmese; the gap measures a structural condition, not a translation
problem.
The article concludes that the drafter’s task is assembly, not recovery: no single Burmese
political term survives stress-testing as genuinely horizontal, but compromised
components can be combined so that the cracks do not align. The ethnic nationality
organizations who have maintained continuous compact-making traditions since 1947
hold the engineering knowledge the Bamar centre lacks. The Burmese case exposes a
precondition Derrida’s (1986) paradox of self-constitution left unexamined: that the
language of a founding declaration can carry a horizontal collective pronoun. When it
cannot, the declaration constitutes not citizens but subjects, and the founding paradox
shifts from political (who authorized the signer?) to material (what did the declaration actually bring into being?). The compact must accomplish what grammar, soteriology, and
revolutionary tradition have not: the constitution of a collective political subject..."
Source/publisher:
Royal Anthropological Institute
Date of entry/update:
2026-03-10
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, The Military's political role
Language:
Format :
pdf (84 pages)
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828.84 KB
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"With the outbreak of war between Iran and the United States and Israel on 28 February, Pakistan finds itself at the brink of an escalating regional conflict. Its recently signed mutual defense pact with Saudi Arabia raises the prospect that Iranian strikes in the Gulf could directly draw Pakistan into the fray. Meanwhile, Islamabad has urged Tehran to moderate its attacks on Saudi territory.
Closer to home, the conflict has brought with it a series of threats to Pakistan’s internal security. Most acutely, it has raised concerns of worsening militancy in the restive Balochistan province, which borders Iran and is the site of a decades-long separatist insurgency. More widely, it could heighten sectarian tensions between the country’s minority Shiite and majority Sunni populations.
Balochistan lies at the intersection of Pakistan, Iran, and Afghanistan, with separatist Baloch groups active across these borders, though mainly in Pakistan and Iran. The region is difficult to govern at the best of times: Its vast terrain and weak infrastructure compound security challenges. In this context, any instability within Iran could create openings for militant movement and arms smuggling across the border into Pakistan, further destabilizing an already worsening security environment. Should the US-Israeli coalition pursue a peripheral destabilization strategy involving the Baloch Sunni militant groups, Pakistan would also be wary of Iranian retaliation in Balochistan. Tehran has long accused Islamabad of failing to adequately crack down on some of these groups, and in January 2024, it carried out airstrikes targeting suspected Jaish al-Adl hideouts across the border in Pakistan.
At the end of January, the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) launched phase two of Operation Herof, carrying out attacks and suicide bombings across the province and seizing control of Nushki city. This was one of its most audacious offensives to date. Security forces dealt with the fallout in February, launching retaliatory operations between 1 and 4 February, which reportedly killed over 70 militants. Despite this onslaught, BLA militants maintained their hold on Nushki city for five days. The increasing sophistication of BLA attacks — moving beyond their usual hit-and-run modus operandi — underscores their growing capabilities.
Away from the border with Iran, the killing of Iranian leader Ali Khamenei triggered deadly demonstrations across Pakistan on 1 March, with dozens of people reportedly killed in clashes with security personnel. Most fatalities occurred in the Shia-majority Gilgit-Baltistan region and in Karachi city, where US Marines opened fire after pro-Iran protesters breached the American consulate. These protests are unlikely to die down soon. Pakistan is also home to one of the largest Shiite populations outside of Iran, and its well-organized religious and political groups have a history of mobilizing in response to global events affecting the Islamic world. Reports of US troops forcibly intervening in Pakistan will only inflame tensions.
It is a volatile environment, and although support for Iran likely crosses sectarian divides, any perception of a crackdown on Shiite protesters could deepen existing fissures. This is a dangerous mix in a country where sectarian tensions have often spilled over into violence, with armed groups present on both sides. Large gatherings of Shiite protesters also present a clear target for Sunni militant groups, such as the Islamic State, which recently carried out a suicide bombing on a Shiite mosque in Islamabad and has actively stoked sectarian tensions. While Baloch separatism may remain concentrated in the peripheries, sectarian strife would impact the entire country.
See more of ACLED’s coverage on Pakistan and the live Iran crisis hub for daily updates on the conflict unfolding in Iran and the wider region..."
Source/publisher:
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data via Reliefweb (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2026-03-06
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Peace processes, ceasefires and ceasefire talks (websites, documents, reports and studies), Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
3.71 MB
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Description:
"Myanmar junta chief Min Aung Hlaing is fond of bestowing titles on loyalists and receiving honors from allies—but he also has a habit of awarding prestigious titles on himself.
As well as the six decorations he received before the coup—including honors from Thailand and Malaysia—the senior general has amassed at least 12 titles. That makes him the most heavily decorated military dictator in Myanmar’s modern history.
The most recent vanity honor came on February 5, when Yangon University handed him an Honorary Doctorate in Public Administration. Education Minister Chaw Chaw Sein said the degree was awarded in recognition of his “successful” management of challenges during the country’s transitional period, including the recent election.
“Awarding him a title for ‘managing’ the country is absurd. People in Myanmar and around the world know Min Aung Hlaing as the man who led the country to ruin—economically, socially, politically, and in every other way,” said Daw Hnin Hnin Mway, general secretary of the Democratic Party for a New Society (DPNS), which boycotted the election.
Chaw Chaw Sein presented the award to her boss in person, months after being promoted as education minister by Min Aung Hlaing last July. The “successful election” she mentioned was in reality a staggered vote held in three phases, as large parts of the country remained beyond junta control. Staged five years after the military ousted the elected National League for Democracy and jailed its leaders including Aung San Suu Kyi, the poll recorded the lowest turnout of the four elections held since 2010.
A year after leading the coup, Min Aung Hlaing awarded himself two high-ranking national titles: the Thadoe Thiri Thudhamma, for “exceptional service to the nation,” and the Thadoe Maha Thray Sithu, awarded for “outstanding efforts to realize the Union.”
His “service to the nation” was to deprive Myanmar of years of democratic and economic progress after decades of isolation under military rule. His supposed “efforts to realize the Union,” meanwhile, take the form of military attacks on ethnic civilians—non-military targets—that continue to this day.
The junta chief has also bestowed honorary titles upon his wife, close cronies, loyal ethnic leaders, and even deceased artists. In doing so, he ignored Article 205 of the Constitution, the which stipulates that authority to confer national titles belongs solely to the country’s president. Myint Swe held the position of acting president at the time, but Min Aung Hlaing signed off on these awards—including his own—in his capacity as the chairman of the State Administration Council (junta chief).....
Awards from Russia.....Russia’s military academy awarded Min Aung Hlaing an Honorary Professorship in 2021 as reward for strengthening ties with Moscow following the coup.
In 2023, he was bestowed an honorary doctorate for his “humanitarian work”, along with other titles. His major humanitarian legacy is the 3.6 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) currently fleeing conflict across the country.....Honors from Thailand and Malaysia.....Min Aung Hlaing received three titles from Thailand and Malaysia before staging the coup in 2021. However, international human rights groups urged Malaysia to revoke his honors in 2018 following the Rohingya genocide. Min Aung Hlaing now faces international arrest warrants for overseeing the ethnic cleansing in Rakhine State.
At home, the nationalist Young Men’s Buddhist Association (YMBA) also awarded him three titles in 2019 and 2020.
As his collection of medals and honors continues to grow—a reflection of self-aggrandizement and quest for legitimacy—Min Aung Hlaing has overseen five years of economic collapse, with record price surges for basic commodities, gold and the US dollar. Meanwhile, the rule of law has deteriorated so severely that many are questioning whether it exists at all..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2026-02-19
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
Language:
Local URL:
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Sub-title:
International organisations are often instruments for consolidating state power rather than agents of transformation, and ASEAN is no exception.
Description:
"Myanmar remains the scene of an unending crisis. More than 6000 civilians killed, 20,000 political prisoners, and more than 3 million internally displaced persons represent the human cost of a war waged by the military junta against its own people in the four years since the February 2021 coup d'état. But the regional effects are also being felt as a consequence of ASEAN’s inertia, an organisation paralysed by structural constraints and a diplomatic culture that prioritises stability over justice, where the principle of non-interference has become a shield for autocrats.
The principle of non-interference, a cornerstone of ASEAN, was conceived in a historical context where member states feared external interventions more than their own internal fragilities. In a modern era of economic interdependence and transnational crises, this doctrine no longer guarantees stability; instead, it has become an excuse for inaction. International organisations are often instruments for consolidating state power rather than agents of transformation, and ASEAN is no exception. Its governance model protects regimes in power, even when they blatantly violate human rights, as in the case of Myanmar.
The Five-Point Consensus, adopted in 2021, serves as proof of this failure. Designed as a compromise between the diverse interests of member states, the plan was doomed from the outset due to its non-binding nature. On paper, it seemed reasonable: a ceasefire, dialogue, and humanitarian aid access. However, the military junta ignored every aspect of it, continuing to repress dissent with even greater ferocity.
The Myanmar junta used the plan as a smokescreen to buy time, escalating its repression without facing any significant diplomatic consequences. The result is that ASEAN has remained a powerless spectator.
The Myanmar junta is not a reliable negotiating partner but an actor that undermines the security of the entire region.
Malaysia, under the leadership of Anwar Ibrahim, this year holds the rotating ASEAN chair and faces the complex challenge of transforming an organisation trapped in its own inertia. Malaysia has historically taken more critical stances against authoritarian regimes, yet its room for manoeuvre is constrained by three fundamental obstacles.
First, there is internal opposition within ASEAN. Countries such as Thailand and Cambodia, which maintain pragmatic relations with Myanmar’s junta, are likely to obstruct any initiative that challenges the principle of non-interference.
Second, there is the risk of a diplomatic fracture within ASEAN itself. Recognising the National Unity Government (NUG) as Myanmar’s legitimate representative would mean directly confronting the junta, but this could divide ASEAN and render what passes for mediation efforts futile.
The third challenge pertains to the ethnic minority issue. The Myanmar crisis is not only a struggle between democracy and dictatorship but also a war between the central government and ethnic militias. Ignoring this dimension means perpetuating the state-centric perspective that has repeatedly failed over past decades.
What is needed is a new paradigm for ASEAN. To overcome its impasse, ASEAN must acknowledge that regional stability can no longer be guaranteed by the unconditional protection of existing governments. The Myanmar junta is not a reliable negotiating partner but an actor that undermines the security of the entire region.
The first step should be the introduction of conditionality mechanisms: participation in ASEAN forums must be contingent on adherence to minimum governance standards. At the same time, there needs to be a rethinking of the concept of legitimacy. The NUG and civil society organisations must be recognised as key interlocutors. The systematic exclusion of non-state actors is not only an injustice but also a strategic mistake, as without their involvement, any resolution attempt is bound to fail.
ASEAN stands at a crossroads, four years after the coup, Myanmar has become a symbol of the failure of regional institutions. The crisis in Myanmar poses an existential challenge for ASEAN. If the organisation continues to prioritise regime stability over the security of its people, its credibility will be irreparably damaged.
Anwar has the chance to initiate structural change, but time is running out. Each day of inaction means more violence, more repression, and more instability. If ASEAN aspires to be a relevant political actor, it must prove it now. The cost of inertia has become unsustainable, not only for Myanmar but for the entire future of regional integration. This is not merely a crisis within Myanmar; it is a crisis that calls into question ASEAN’s very role. Can this organisation continue to ignore the tragedies unfolding within its borders without losing credibility? If ASEAN wants to be more than just a club of governments, it must evolve, take a stand, and demonstrate its ability to manage crises..."
Source/publisher:
"The Interpreter"
Date of entry/update:
2025-02-10
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights Reporting (global, regional and Myanmar), Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
Local URL:
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Description:
"Comment: Saturday February 1 was the grim fourth anniversary of the military coup in Myanmar. The date seems to have gone unnoticed back here in New Zealand. Even before war in Ukraine and then Gaza, Myanmar got little attention. Yet it is the most destructive conflict in our region.
The figures are shocking; nearly a third of the population of 60 million is likely to need humanitarian aid this year. At least 3.5 million are internally displaced; they are escaping indiscriminate bombing and shooting by the army. Around 1.3 million people have fled the country and are living in refugee camps.
As opposition to the army grows, its control on the ground has shrunk dramatically. Most border zones are in the hands of local warlords or ethnic resistance groups, and conflict is spilling over into neighbouring states: China, Thailand, India and Bangladesh. Many of these groups have been fighting against the central government for many years. Unfortunately, their differences have often been exploited and there is no clarity among those opposing the junta about the way ahead.
Increasing pressure on the junta has resulted in even more untargeted attacks on civilians. Forced conscription has been reinstated and has led to raids in areas under military control. The conscripts are given very little training and used as cannon fodder. Jails are full of people swept up in raids and conditions are appalling. The annual amnesty mainly sees the release of common prisoners, and a few foreigners who have become an embarrassment for the regime. There are around 20,000 jailed for dissent of one kind or another.
Myanmar hit the news recently over the kidnapping of a high-profile Chinese actor who was spirited over the Thai border and forced to work in a scam factory in the Myanmar town of Myawaddy.
His return to Thailand came quickly, but those working in these scam centres are not always so lucky. While the Chinese and Thai governments are believed to have put pressure on the junta to close down the centres, it is doubtful whether the junta has the ability, or even the political will to do so. Thailand has just cut off electricity, internet and fuel supplies to five locations across the border that host cyber-scam centres. However, these cuts are most likely to hurt innocent locals who already do not receive electricity for more than a few hours a day.
All of this is very tough on the small Myanmar community in New Zealand, most of whom came here as refugees. They are desperately worried about family members back in Myanmar, find it increasingly difficult to get funds to them, and are in despair over the New Zealand Government’s unwillingness to make any concession to the gravity of the situation. There is a pathway to bring their family members to New Zealand, called the Refugee Family Support Categories, but very few are arriving here under the scheme, which has a large backlog. Immigration Minister Casey Costello has acknowledged that scheme needs an overhaul, but it may come too late for some families.
To put a human face on the situation, I support the Ling* family from Myanmar who came here as refugees in 2010 via Malaysia. The parents and six children are now New Zealand citizens, have bought themselves a house, and are all either working or studying. However, the Lings still have a daughter, son-in-law and three young grandchildren back in Myanmar, who are living in real danger. They have been waiting since 2017 to be reunited under the Refugee Family Support Categories.
Not only is there a genuine risk of a tragedy in this case, but the delay is self-defeating. The sooner the Ling family members in Myanmar are brought here, the sooner the children will be in NZ schools and adapting to a new life. The Lings have room in their home, and the close-knit community would provide support, including for airfares if necessary.
The New Zealand Red Cross and the Centre for Asia-Pacific Studies published a study in January called ‘Reuniting Families: a Path Forward for Aotearoa New Zealand’. This puts forward a number of suggestions for improving the Refugee Family Support Categories which would transform the lives of families like the Lings..."
Source/publisher:
NewsRoom
Date of entry/update:
2025-02-10
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Local URL:
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Sub-title:
Crimes against humanity, a deepening hunger crisis and more than 2,600 rebel groups: Myanmar’s civil war is both brutal and bewildering. Here's a closer look.
Description:
"Summary
The military coup in Myanmar on Feb. 1, 2021, has sparked an ongoing civil war between the military junta and over 2,600 rebel groups.
While civilian casualties have risen to over 6,000 and the country is threatened by famine, neighboring states like China are mostly pursuing their own interests in the region.
Elections announced for 2025 could lead to further escalations of violence, and an overthrow of the junta could create a dangerous power vacuum.
Perhaps the most surreal video of a coup ever recorded dates back to Feb. 1, 2021 – the day Myanmar’s military seized power. A young influencer filmed herself performing aerobic exercises at a street intersection in the capital Naypyidaw. In the background, armored military vehicles can be seen rolling toward parliament; the young woman said later that she had thought nothing of it. The video went viral, bringing global attention to Myanmar’s latest military takeover – even among those with little interest in Southeast Asian politics.
Four years ago, the military overthrew the elected government of Nobel Peace Prize laureate Aung San Suu Kyi, who had pledged to usher in a new democratic era in 2015. The coup was followed by mass protests, and just a few weeks later, the country spiraled into civil war – a conflict that has continued ever since.
The situation: Since the 2021 coup, Myanmar has been mired in a bloody civil war, with the military junta, rebels and ethnic militias locked in a battle for control.
Geopolitical dynamics: China, India and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) are pursuing their own strategic interests while steering clear of direct intervention – leaving Myanmar a geopolitical tinderbox.
Looking ahead: The election scheduled for 2025 could trigger further violence, while the junta’s collapse risks creating a chaotic power vacuum.
The situation in Myanmar is constantly shifting and remains largely overlooked in the West. The military junta is bombing civilian areas, while rebel forces have pushed their military opponents out of vast swathes of territory. More than 6,000 civilians have been killed, and over three million have been displaced. What is happening in Myanmar right now? And what lies ahead?.....The historical backdrop:
Understanding Myanmar’s civil war requires a look at its modern history. The country is one of Southeast Asia’s most ethnically diverse, home to roughly 135 distinct groups. Since gaining independence from the British in 1948, there have been repeated armed clashes between the various groups. This is partly due to promises made to various ethnic groups for a degree of autonomy when Myanmar gained independence. However, the state’s founders established a centralized system instead. Historian Thant Myint-U once described Myanmar as an «unfinished nation» where identity struggles have fueled war, poverty and isolation.
From the start, the country’s ruling elite has relied on military power to hold the fragile state together. After independence, their priority was strengthening the armed forces, leading to a stark imbalance between military dominance and weak civilian institutions, as political scientist Aurel Croissant has noted. In 1962, just two years after the initial establishment of a democratically elected government, the generals staged a coup and seized power.
For decades, Myanmar’s military rulers controlled the country – sometimes overtly, sometimes from behind the scenes. In 1988, they executed those who took to the streets to protest for greater freedom. Beyond securing their political grip, the generals also took control of key industries and cemented their influence through structural reforms. In 2008, they altered the constitution to ensure that 25% of parliamentary seats were filled by the military, effectively giving the generals a right of veto. In 2015, the National League for Democracy, led by Aung San Suu Kyi, won the elections. Cautious reforms followed, until the military seized power once again five years later, citing unproven allegations of electoral fraud.....The rebels:Tracking Myanmar’s myriad rebel groups is no easy task. According to the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED), an initiative that collects data on various conflicts around the globe, more than 2,600 groups have emerged since the 2021 coup. Many were founded by local politicians, student activists and protesters who fled into the jungle to wage guerrilla warfare against the army. Ethnic armed organizations had been active in the country before 2021, already engaged in fighting the state and seeking autonomy within their territories. The most important of these are located in the regions of Rakhine, Kachin and in the north of Shan, but also in Kayin in the south of the country.
These ethnic armed organizations have inflicted painful losses on the military in recent months. They now not only control larger areas, but also crucial border crossings – to China in the north and to Bangladesh in the west. Today, the military controls a smaller area of Myanmar than at any time since the 1960s.
These ethnic groups have years of experience in financing their guerrilla warfare, whether through drug trafficking (methamphetamines have replaced heroin as Myanmar's top export) or the overexploitation of natural resources. Their cooperation with newly formed rebel groups has created communities of purpose, with the different groups benefiting from each other. These new groups supply the ethnic armies with an ongoing influx of fighters, and they are consistently attacking military bases together. In turn, the new rebel groups receive training from the ethnic armies and benefit from their combat experience.
This cooperation is fragile, however, and there have been repeated battles between the various insurgents. The groups’ individual war aims diverge as well. Many of the new rebel groups have united under the National Unity Government (NUG), a Myanmar shadow government that has made it its goal to overthrow the junta. The ethnic armed organizations, however, are primarily concerned with controlling their own territories. This is evident from the only tentative advances into the junta-controlled interior of Myanmar, in which the ethnic armies have little interest – partly because they would be vulnerable to the military's airstrikes.....The civilian population:The U.N. estimates the civilian death toll in Myanmar at over 6,000. According to the U.N., 2,000 people alone were executed while in military custody. At least 365 people were shot in the head; 215 were burned alive. International observers are racing to document widespread atrocities – including torture, beheadings, rapes and other crimes against humanity.
«Increasingly frequent and indiscriminate air strikes, artillery and drone attacks have killed civilians, driven survivors from their homes, and destroyed hospitals, schools and places of worship,» writes Nicholas Koumjian, head of the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar, the U.N.'s investigative office for the region. «While most of the evidence the Mechanism has collected concerns crimes committed by the Myanmar military, we are also investigating disturbing reports of atrocities committed by other armed groups, including rape, killings and torture,» he continues.
As if all this were not enough, the country is also on the verge of a famine. The local economy, including agriculture, has collapsed. Next summer 15 million people in Myanmar could be threatened by hunger, warn analysts from IPC, a platform for mapping global hunger.....The neighbors: China plays an important yet undecided role in Myanmar. «China is supporting the junta, even though without enthusiasm, and continues to sell weapons to it. But it also supports to some extent some of the powerful ethnic groups operating along its borders,» says David Mathieson, a longtime Myanmar expert. In 2024, Beijing brokered a ceasefire, but it unraveled within five months. In January, the junta announced a new ceasefire between the military and one of the ethnic armed organizations, with China acting as mediator once again.
In November, junta leader Min Aung Hlaing traveled to China – not for a state visit, but for a regional summit, a move that could signal Beijing’s view of him as a key figure in efforts to manage the crisis. China has no interest in a civil war on its border, and certainly not one with broader geopolitical consequences.
Yet the ethnic armies along the Chinese border hold significant leverage over their neighbor. They control infrastructure and mines built by China that are located in China's sphere of influence. According to Mathieson, China keeps reminding the leaders of these ethnic armies that they should not seek support from the West. China wants to maintain control over conflict mediation along its border and for now, Western peace initiatives are ineffective, he says.
China recognizes that it has influence over Myanmar, says Mathieson, «but it doesn’t want the burden of having to solve a civil war.» It just wants to influence the trajectory of such a war so that it can prioritize its investments and strategic interests.
Meanwhile, the regional powers – the states forming the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) – have struggled for years to find a unified strategy for Myanmar. The only clear consensus appears to be maintaining their economically focused, cooperative union without letting the Myanmar issue cause division. Malaysia has held ASEAN’s annually rotating chairmanship since the start of the year. At an early meeting, the Malaysian foreign minister issued a call for peace, stating somewhat helplessly: «Malaysia wants to know what Myanmar has in mind.»
India, which also shares a border with Myanmar, continues to sell weapons to the junta, despite well-documented human rights violations.....The road ahead: Myanmar’s military junta has announced an election for 2025, but critics argue it is little more than a bid to legitimize its rule. Only parties that have been vetted by the junta are allowed to take part in the election. In addition, only half the country is likely to vote – voter lists could only be drawn up in 145 out of 330 municipalities. But the election is nonetheless set to move forward. Observers warn that violence could escalate in the coming months as the vote approaches. Rebel groups might attack voters and politicians, while the military could seek quick territorial gains to generate success stories ahead of the election.
Beyond domestic control, the junta is also seeking international validation, says Mathieson, particularly from China, the ASEAN states and India. How Western governments will respond remains unclear, in his view. They could view the election as an opportunity to reestablish contact with the junta, which has so far refused any diplomatic mediation. Mathieson calls this a «folly,» pointing to the West’s lack of a clear plan for Myanmar.
The junta is unlikely to collapse anytime soon. It appears to be strong enough to hold off the rebels, at least within its strongholds in the country's interior. Internal divisions are also unlikely to bring it down – outwardly, the junta shows few signs of fracturing, and little is known about its internal dynamics. A prolonged civil war in the heart of Asia appears the more probable outcome.
And even if the junta were to fall, then what? The ethnic armed organizations would likely maintain control over their own territories, Mathieson says, «but violent anarchy would probably break out in Myanmar's interior."..."
Source/publisher:
Genocide Watch
Date of entry/update:
2025-02-07
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"Four years since the 1 February 2021 coup in Myanmar, the political impasse that has generated increased conflict across the country is no closer to being resolved. While the armed groups opposing the military have achieved some battlefield successes, tensions among the resistance that predate the coup continue to impact their ability to unify politically or militarily. Amid the evolving dynamics of the post-coup conflict environment, violence targeting civilians continues to grow each year. In the four years since the coup, around 90% of Myanmar’s population has been exposed to political violence, as defined by ACLED’s Conflict Exposure metrics, as millions live in active conflict. Civilians also lack access to electricity, communications, healthcare, and education and are vulnerable to crime and human and drug trafficking.
This fact sheet dives into the data on who is behind the violence, and how civilians are being targeted..."
Source/publisher:
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project
Date of entry/update:
2025-01-31
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"Today marks four years since the Myanmar military regime overthrew the democratically elected government in Myanmar, creating one of the largest crises in the Indo-Pacific. Since the coup, the people of Myanmar remain subject to military rule that has deprived many of their rights, democratic aspirations and, for thousands, their liberty and their lives.
We condemn in the strongest terms the Myanmar military regime’s escalating violence harming civilians, including human rights violations, sexual and gender-based violence, and systematic persecution and discrimination against all religious and ethnic minorities. The military’s airstrikes are killing civilians, destroying schools, markets, places of worship and medical facilities; with almost a 25-fold increase since 2021 this represents an average of three airstrikes per day. The rise in airstrikes in areas with no active conflict has marked a clear escalation by the military.
We call on the Myanmar military regime to immediately de-escalate violence, ensure unhindered and safe humanitarian access across the country, and we urge all parties to prioritize the protection of civilians and fully adhere to International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law.
As of 2025, humanitarian needs have increased twenty-fold since the coup. Over one-third of the population,19.9 million people, are now in need of humanitarian assistance to meet their basic needs. An estimated 15.2 million people are in need of food assistance and cases of preventable diseases are on the rise.
Increasing needs and ongoing conflict have displaced up to 3.5 million people internally - an increase of nearly one million in the last year. Many more people are forced to flee across Myanmar’s borders. Rising transnational crime, including narcotics production and trafficking, scam centres and human trafficking, harm the people of Myanmar and affect neighbouring countries, risking instability in the broader region.
The current trajectory is not sustainable for Myanmar or the region. Now is the time for the Myanmar military regime to immediately change course. We strongly urge the Myanmar military regime to cease violence, including harming civilians and civilian infrastructure, release all political prisoners, and engage in genuine and inclusive dialogue with all stakeholders. These are essential first steps towards any peaceful, democratic transition, reflecting the will of Myanmar’s people.
We reiterate our support for the central role of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Five Point Consensus, including the ASEAN Chair’s Special Envoy, in addressing the Myanmar and resultant refugee crisis. We strongly welcome collaboration between the ASEAN and United Nations (UN) Special Envoys. We call on the international community to continue to support the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 2669 (2022). We underline the need for accountability for all atrocities committed in Myanmar, human rights must be safeguarded, violations and abuses must be prevented.
We will continue to stand in solidarity with the people of Myanmar and support their vision for an inclusive, peaceful and prosperous future..."
Source/publisher:
European Union, Government of Australia, Government of Canada, Government of New Zealand, Government of Norway, Government of Switzerland, Government of the Republic of Korea, Government of the United Kingdom, US Department of State
Date of entry/update:
2025-01-31
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"The international community must take urgent action to ensure accountability for atrocities in Myanmar, 46 organizations said today ahead of the four-year anniversary of the 1 February 2021 military coup.
This year represents a turning point for accountability in Myanmar. While the military remains in control, they are losing ground in many areas. Amid rapidly evolving patterns of hostilities and changing political dynamics, renewed efforts must push for justice and ensure a future built on a lasting culture of respect for human rights.
Since the 2021 coup, Myanmar’s military junta has killed more than 6,000 people, arbitrarily detained more than 20,000, and renewed judicial executions. More than 3.5 million people are internally displaced. Human rights groups have documented the military’s torture and other ill-treatment of detainees, indiscriminate attacks, and the denial of humanitarian aid, which may amount to crimes against humanity and war crimes.
Myanmar’s military junta has carried out widespread and systematic attacks against the civilian population nationwide, bombing schools, hospitals, and religious buildings with total impunity. Armed groups fighting the military have also committed human rights violations. While some have pledged to hold perpetrators accountable, it remains to be seen whether these efforts are genuine and can meet international standards.
Last year, 2024, also marked the worst year of violence against the Rohingya community since 2017, with men, women, and children dying in bombings while being trapped in the middle of the armed conflict between the Myanmar military and the armed group the Arakan Army in Rakhine State.
At the same time, Myanmar’s military has lost an unprecedented amount of territory across the country to a loose coalition of ethnic armed groups, which have captured two regional commands, high-ranking military officers, dozens of towns, and border crossings. These groups have also been implicated in human rights abuses.
In areas controlled by ethnic armed groups or overseen by the National Unity Government—formed by democratically elected lawmakers and officials ousted in the 2021 coup—local structures of governance and civil society are emerging. These include schools, hospitals, administrative offices, prisons, police stations, and courts.
Our undersigned organizations call on all parties to the armed conflict in Myanmar to comply with international humanitarian law and engage with international justice mechanisms, including the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar. All countries, including regional actors in ASEAN and neighbouring states, must increase pressure on the junta by blocking arms shipments, suspending aviation fuel shipments and supporting international justice mechanisms, including by prosecuting or extraditing any suspected perpetrators. ASEAN must move beyond its failed Five-Point Consensus and take decisive action to hold the junta accountable. We also urge the international community to commit to a coordinated, long-term international justice strategy.
Globally, some highly anticipated international justice efforts are moving forward. In November 2024, the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) Office of the Prosecutor requested an arrest warrant for Myanmar’s Senior General Min Aung Hlaing for the crimes against humanity of deportation and persecution of the Rohingya committed in Myanmar and in part in Bangladesh between August and December 2017. Requests targeting other senior military officials are expected.
If these requests are granted, authorities in ICC member states must urgently comply with an arrest warrant for a suspect present within their jurisdiction and hand the person over to the ICC to face their accusers in a fair trial for alleged crimes under international law. The international community must deny safe haven to those accused of serious crimes by ensuring their immediate arrest and transfer to the ICC. The world must not allow perpetrators to evade international justice.
While the present arrest warrant request is a welcome step, it remains limited in scope, location, and time and does not cover any alleged crimes after the 2021 coup. The ICC Prosecutor should demonstrate further progress in his investigation, including considering crimes under international law committed after 2017 and in the four years since the coup. The UN Security Council and Member States of the ICC must refer the full situation in all of Myanmar to the ICC to ensure justice for all victims.
Governments, donors, and international agencies should support and pursue a wide variety of accountability efforts, including universal jurisdiction,and the potential creation of ‘hybrid’ or similar tailored justice mechanisms. The international community must also impose a global arms embargo, suspend jet fuel exports, and engage with all relevant national stakeholders, including civil society and those most affected by crimes.
The UN Human Rights Council resolution from April 2024 stressed the need for “close and timely cooperation” between the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar, a body established by the UN Human Rights Council to collect and preserve evidence of atrocity crimes in Myanmar for future prosecutions, and “any future investigations or proceedings by national, regional or international courts or tribunals, including by the International Criminal Court or the International Court of Justice.”
It also requested the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights to maintain a focus on accountability regarding international human rights law, international humanitarian law, and the rule of law and submit a future report on ways to “fulfil the aspirations of the people of Myanmar for human rights protection, accountability, democracy, and a civilian government.”
Myanmar will be discussed at the upcoming UN Human Rights Council session from 24 February to 4 April 2025. UN member states must use this opportunity to take a bold and innovative approach on Myanmar and adopt a resolution aimed at breaking the cycle of impunity for atrocity crimes. The international community must also amplify the voices of survivors, activists and the people of Myanmar who continue to resist oppression at great personal risk.
Myanmar’s human rights crisis did not begin with the coup. Decades of oppression have led to this moment. Ending impunity requires bold and adapted solutions and long-term political and financial commitment. The world must act now..."
Source/publisher:
Amnesty International, Fortify Rights, Karen Human Rights Group, Refugees International
Date of entry/update:
2025-01-31
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"GENEVA – Myanmar’s military ramped up violence against civilians last year to unprecedented levels, inflicting the heaviest civilian death toll since they launched their coup four years ago, the UN Human Rights Office reported on Friday.
An analysis of the conflict throughout 2024 found that as the military’s grip on power eroded, it launched wave after wave of retaliatory airstrikes and artillery shelling on civilians and civilian populated areas, forced thousands of young people into military service, conducted arbitrary arrests and prosecutions, caused mass displacement, and denied access to humanitarians, even in the face of natural disasters.
According to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP), at least 6,231 civilians have been killed by the military, including 1,144 women and 709 children, over the past four years. In 2024, at least 1,824 people were killed, including 531 women and 248 children, sharply up from the previous peak of 1,639 verified deaths in 2023.
“After four years, it is deeply distressing to find that the situation on the ground for civilians is only getting worse by the day,” said UN Human Rights Chief Volker Türk. “Even as the military’s power wanes, their atrocities and violence have expanded in scope and intensity,” he said, adding that the retaliatory nature of the attacks were designed to control, intimidate, and punish the population.
“This military-created human rights crisis has caused untold suffering through indiscriminate attacks against civilians, denial of humanitarian aid, and systematic violations of human rights.
“Without an immediate end to this brutality and accountability for the perpetrators, civilian casualties will continue to rise and the overall situation for civilians will inevitably continue to deteriorate.”
The analysis details acts of extreme brutality, including beheadings, burnings, mutilations, executions, torture and the use of human shields – all of which were carried out against civilians with absolute impunity. In many townships, soldiers attacked villages in the absence of active fighting, likely in retaliation for anti-military armed group advances in other areas.
Deliberate targeting of civilian infrastructure, schools, places of worship, healthcare facilities, IDP camps and public gatherings led to mass civilian casualties and displacement, and the interruption of essential services such as education and healthcare. Civilians also bore the brunt of communication shutdowns and extensive surveillance, hampering lifesaving and rescue operations.
Although not comparable to military violence in scale and scope, violence by anti-military armed groups in 2024 also caused protection concerns for civilians. The UN Human Rights Office received allegations of torture, extrajudicial killings, sexual violence, forced recruitment and other abuses committed by anti-military armed groups in areas under their control.
Türk said he was alarmed by the dramatic deterioration of the situation and grave protection risks in Rakhine State for all communities, including the Rohingya population.
“The Rohingya find themselves trapped between the warring Arakan Army and the military, with nowhere to turn for protection. They suffered throughout the year as their villages were burnt, and their youth were pressed into military service. Humanitarian assistance was cut off while they were forced repeatedly into displacement, fleeing in an effort to find any means of safety,” the High Commissioner said. He added that tens of thousands had sought refuge in Bangladesh and nearly 8,000 people since 2024 had attempted perilous sea travels to seek safety.
“As the Arakan Army have all but consolidated their control of Rakhine State, they must respect international human rights law and international humanitarian law, and protect all individuals within areas of their control,” said Türk.
Across Myanmar, nearly 20 million civilians are in need of humanitarian assistance. UN figures show that over 3.5 million people have been displaced, a third of whom are children, although data from civil society organizations suggest that the overall number may be more than double that.
A key driver of displacement in the past year was conscription and forced recruitment by the military of thousands of young people, including members of the Rohingya community, creating widespread fear. Tens of thousands of youths have gone into hiding or fled abroad, robbing the workforce of many aged between 18 and 35 and further aggravating the economic crisis.
Türk called on States with influence, particularly those in the region, to double down on bringing an end to the violence, to press for full and unhindered humanitarian assistance, to demand the release of all those detained on political grounds, to engage meaningfully with actors promoting democracy and human rights, and to ensure international protection for those fleeing the violence and persecution.
The High Commissioner added that ending impunity for the crimes committed also rests on the international community. He stressed that any sustainable political solution must be anchored in justice and accountability, to ensure that the people of Myanmar will never have to face the horrors they have endured for four years..."
Source/publisher:
UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (Geneva)
Date of entry/update:
2025-01-31
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"Four years ago, Myanmar’s elected government was overthrown by the military. Since then, according to substantial evidence collected and analysed by the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar, serious international crimes have been committed across the country.
Protests against the military regime were suppressed with often lethal violence. Thousands of perceived opponents have been unlawfully imprisoned, where many have suffered torture, sexual violence and other abuses. Increasingly frequent and indiscriminate air strikes, artillery and drone attacks have killed civilians, driven survivors from their homes, and destroyed hospitals, schools and places of worship.
While most of the evidence the Mechanism has collected concerns crimes committed by the Myanmar military, we are also investigating disturbing reports of atrocities committed by other armed groups, including rape, killings and torture. The Mechanism is collecting evidence of serious international crimes committed throughout Myanmar, regardless of the ethnicity, religion, or politics of the perpetrators or victims.
The Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) has requested an arrest warrant for Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, Commander-in-Chief of the Myanmar Defence Services, for crimes committed against the Rohingya during the clearance operations in 2016 and 2017. However, there are currently no judicial proceedings for any serious international crimes committed since the military takeover. We believe that impunity for crimes emboldens perpetrators to commit more violence, and ending this impunity is necessary for Myanmar to build a peaceful future for all its people.
The Mechanism stands ready to assist authorities who are willing and able to investigate and prosecute these cases. Until the perpetrators are brought to justice, violence will continue to spiral, and the suffering of Myanmar’s people will only increase..."
Source/publisher:
UN Human Rights Council (Geneva)
Date of entry/update:
2025-01-30
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"GENEVA – The fourth anniversary of the military coup in Myanmar is a time to mourn the loss of thousands of innocent lives at the hands of a brutal military regime while celebrating the heroism of those who continue to stand up for human rights in a country under siege, a UN expert said today.
“It is also a time for the international community to provide the people of Myanmar a genuine partnership to help end this nightmare,” said Tom Andrews, Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in Myanmar.
Andrews said four years of military oppression, violence and incompetence have cast Myanmar into an abyss.
“Junta forces have slaughtered thousands of civilians, bombed and burned villages, and displaced millions of people. More than 20,000 political prisoners remain behind bars. The economy and public services have collapsed. Famine and starvation loom over large parts of the population,” the Special Rapporteur said.
“The junta’s plans, including holding sham elections this year in a backdrop of escalating armed conflict and human rights violations, are a path to ruin,” Andrews said.
He said it was not possible to hold a legitimate election while arresting, detaining, torturing and executing leaders of the opposition and when it is illegal for journalists or citizens to criticise the junta.
“Governments should dismiss these plans for what they are – a fraud,” Andrews said.
He lauded pro-democracy activists, journalists, doctors, human rights defenders and citizens from all walks of life who have risked their lives to fight for Myanmar’s future.
“The resilience and courage of Myanmar’s people continue to amaze and inspire others around the world. I am heartened by the courageous efforts of those documenting the junta’s crimes, caring for those injured by the attacks, providing food and shelter to those displaced, and teaching children whose education was upended by the coup. These heroic efforts are compelling indicators that Myanmar’s best days lie ahead,” the expert said.
Andrews said action by member states including targeted sanctions and a crackdown on the arms trade by Singapore have contributed to a one-third drop in the volume of weapons and military supplies the junta has been able to purchase through the formal banking system since the year ending March 2023.
“When governments muster the political will, they help save lives and support freedom in Myanmar,” the Special Rapporteur said, calling for stronger action from the international community. “The failure of the Security Council to take action requires that UN Member States who support human rights coordinate strong, sustained actions that can deny the junta the means to continue its brutality against the people of Myanmar.”
He urged governments to back efforts to hold perpetrators of grave human rights violations accountable, including in the International Criminal Court (ICC), and by supporting the democratic movement and civil society as they build the foundation for a strong justice system and transitional justice processes.
“Impunity has enabled a decades-long cycle of violence and oppression in Myanmar. Ultimately, this sad chapter of Myanmar’s history must end with junta leaders being prosecuted for their crimes,” Andrews said..."
Source/publisher:
UN Human Rights Council (Geneva)
Date of entry/update:
2025-01-30
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The junta still holds a third of Myanmar, and two-thirds of the population, but misrule has left the regime broke.
Description:
"Myanmar’s military approaches the fourth anniversary of the coup d’etat that put them in power in terminal decline.
The economy continues to atrophy, with even more pronounced energy shortages, less foreign exchange, and an even larger share of the budget allocated to the military.
The battlefield losses are staggering, as the opposition has withstood Chinese pressure to stop their offensives, and continues to hand the over-stretched military defeat after defeat. Opposition forces now control two of the 14 military regional commands.
According to the National Unity Government (NUG) Ministry of Defense, the opposition is in full control of 95 of 330 townships, while the State Administrative Council (SAC), as the junta calls itself, had full control over 107 townships.
By the junta’s own admission, they are only able to conduct a census and safely organize elections in 161 of Myanmar’s 330 townships.
Losses on all battlefronts
Having taken 15 of 17 townships in Rakhine state, the Arakan Army is now in almost total control of the key western state. They’ve surrounded the Rakhine capital of Sittwe and come up to the border of Kyaukphyu where China’s special economic zone and port are located.
Although the capture of Buthidaung and Ann were neither quick nor easy, the AA was able to sustain sieges of over a month at each, and in the case of the former, tunneled beneath the last military outpost in a stunning display of grit.
Having captured the southern city of Gwa, the Arakan Army has now crossed into Ayeyarwaddy, taking the fight into the Bamar ethnic majority heartland.
In the north, the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) has shrugged off extensive Chinese pressure, and taken the strategic junction town of Mansi, which will make the overland resupply of the besieged city of Bhamo from Mandalay very hard for the junta.
Fighting is ongoing in Bhamo, Kachin’s second largest city. The KIA is now in control of well over half of Kachin, including most of the resource rich regions.
Although they are known for fractiousness, Chin opposition forces are now in almost full control of that state that borders India and Bangladesh, holding five of nine townships, roughly 85% of the territory.
In Shan state, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) and the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) temporarily succumbed to Chinese pressure to stop their offensive in November, but they’ve neither surrendered Lashio nor ceded territory, despite airstrikes.
Citing a new military offensive in Naungcho township, the TNLA, which controls nine townships, announced an end to the ceasefire on Jan. 9.
In eastern Myanmar, Karenni resistance have continued to battle, despite concerted military regime efforts and airstrikes, and their acknowledged ammunition shortages. The Karenni National Defense Force and allied People’s Defense Forces (PDFs) militias claim to control 80% of Kayah state.
Further south, the Karen National Liberation Army and allied people’s defense forces (PDFs) are slowly taking pro-junta border guard posts along the frontier with Thailand.
In Tanintharyi, local PDFs have increased their coordination and are pushing west from the Thai border towards the Andaman Sea coast, diminishing the scope of the military-controlled patchwork of terrain in Myanmar’s southernmost state.
Some of the most intense fighting of late has been in the Bamar heartland, including Sagaing, Magway, and Mandalay.
The military has stepped up their bombings, artillery strikes, and arson, intentionally targeting civilians for their support of the opposition forces. A number of PDFs have expanded their operations into the dry zone.
Mounting troubles
The Myanmar military regime faces severe headwinds as the fourth anniversary of the Feb. 1, 2021 coup approaches.
Prisoners of war from multiple fronts have recounted that the military’s ability to resupply and reinforce troops in the field has all but broken down.
They have a limited number of heavy lift helicopters, including three new Mi-17s that entered service in December. But even those are vulnerable: Some six Mi-17s and two other helicopters have been lost since the coup.
In some cases, the military has tried to parachute in supplies, but those often fall into the hands of the opposition forces.
Nothing demoralizes troops more than the feeling that the headquarters has abandoned them.
The military has always treated Myanmar as a country under occupation, with thousands of remote outposts scattered throughout the country. The NUG claims that opposition forces have captured 741 of these through 2024, and they continue to fall.
The military is increasingly short of manpower. Over a thousand POWs have been taken in recent months, more have surrendered and others have deserted.
The military has now taken in nine tranches of conscripts, amounting to roughly 45,000 troops, and is increasingly dragooning men. But they are deployed almost immediately and are untrained and poorly motivated, in sharp contrast with ethnic resistance organizations (EROs) and PDFs.
That loss of manpower includes senior officers. The NUG claims that in 2024, 53 senior officers, ranked colonel to major general, were killed, captured or injured.
The military is so broke that they recently announced that they would no longer pay death benefits to conscripts. At the same time, the military is often labeling their dead as “MIA”, rather than “KIA”, to avoid paying benefits.
While the junta fumbles, the degree of tactical battlefield coordination between the legacy ethnic armies and the new PDFs is unprecedented.
Every major offensive outside of Rakhine, entails cooperation between them, and even there, the AA was assisted by Chin PDFs who blocked the military’s resupply from Magway.
The increased PDF operations have been made possible by increased assistance from EROs. The AA and Chin PDFs are pushing in from the west and assisting local PDFs in the Bamar heartland.
The AA’s foray into Ayeyarwaddy was done in concert with local PDFs. The United Wa State Army appears to be defying China by arming and equipping the Mandalay PDF and others that are operating in Mandalay, Magway, and Sagaing.
In its favor, the military has finally caught up to the opposition and effectively employed unmanned aerial systems down to the tactical level.
These include drones that can drop munitions, kamikaze drones, and those for intelligence gathering or for more accurate targeting of artillery.
This has proven costly for the opposition and impeded some of their offensives. Nonetheless, their deployment of drones has been too little too late, and will not fundamentally alter the battlefield dynamics.
The military continues to use air power. Indeed, they put their fifth and sixth SU-30 imported from Russia and three more FTC-2000Gs imported from China into service in December.
It’s the economy
But air power is primarily used as a punitive weapon against unarmed civilian targets, not in support of ground forces.
For example, the Jan. 9 bombing in Rakhine’s Yanbye township that killed 52, wounded over 40 and destroyed 500 homes, had no military utility.
Finally, the state of the economy is even more precarious given the loss of almost all border crossings..."
Source/publisher:
"Radio Free Asia" (USA)
Date of entry/update:
2025-01-18
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"Echoes of Anger: Social Media Responses to Increasing Violence in Myanmar
This brief provides an analysis of sentiments expressed in 2,106 public comments in response to 13 Facebook posts published by news sources on social media in Myanmar between June and October 2024. It offers a unique insight into public reactions, the emotional responses to events of those posting the comments, and perspectives on key humanitarian issues.
The 13 Facebook posts covered events involving:
humanitarian blockades and resource restrictions
the targeting of international and local NGOs [AP1] and health care workers; and
looting by armed actors.
The comments included opinions relevant to an acceptance-based security risk management strategy in the form of opinions related to aid workers or aid groups (6 comments) and blockades (237 comments). Overall, the social media space in Myanmar was highly polarised in the period that was studied, with most comments containing strong opinions rather than references to neutral facts.
Criticism of military actions against aid workers or aid groups was common:
The analysis highlights that most criticisms of military actions against NGOs and aid workers were rooted in strong personal anger. Explicit references to international humanitarian law or related legal frameworks were rare, but were present in some posts.
Criticism of aid workers or aid groups was not commonly voiced in response to these 13 posts, but social media users were not convinced that aid agencies remained neutral, and several posts alleged that they were involved in smuggling of some kind.
Military blockades elicited mainly negative comments and included nuances such as criticism of their humanitarian impact on health care and aid, frustration over the economic consequences of blockades like disrupted trade and shortages of supplies, and general condemnation of the military’s tactics.
Comments also included insights on other key concerns:
Protection and accountability concerns: Several comments highlighted the need to safeguard humanitarian operations and uphold human rights, reflecting public expectations of accountability in conflict-affected areas.
Criticism of the media: Some comments criticised perceived media bias or misinformation, which may affect public trust and influence the narrative around aid efforts.
Hate speech and ethnic hostility: Evidence of hate speech and ethnic hostility in comments underscores the need for aid agencies to incorporate protection obligations.
Sentiment towards China: A strong negative attitude towards China was evident, often linked to its perceived role in the conflict. Understanding these sentiments is critical for security risk management processes and navigating local dynamics to ensure effective aid delivery.
Help support the protection of health care by sharing this resource. Please copy and paste this link: bit.ly/25Dec-07Jan2025MMRHealth
Past incident briefs: 11-24 December; 27 November-10 December; 13-26 November; 30 October-12 November; All
SHCC Factsheets: Burmese: 2023. English: 2023: 2022; 2021; 2020
Please get in touch if you are interested in curated datasets, have made a public statement that you would like us to include in our Bi Monthly News Brief, to report an incident or if you have additional information on an incident we have reported on. Join our Myanmar mailing list for regular updates..."
Source/publisher:
Insecurity Insight (Geneva) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2025-01-17
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Public Health, Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
1.26 MB
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Description:
"Myanmar’s junta has invited anti-regime organizations to peace talks since December to discuss a possible general election. Meanwhile, revolutionary groups hope to make military gains during 2025.
The Karenni Nationalities Defence Force (KNDF) is a coalition of armed groups in Karenni State formed after the 2021 coup as part of the broader resistance movement against the regime.
What changes do you expect in 2025?
The regime has been talking about holding elections and calling for ceasefires with revolutionary groups. However, behind this, the generals aim to maintain power and reestablish centralized authority. This is unacceptable to Myanmar’s people, including us. Clashes will continue in 2025 as a solid political foundation is laid down with public support.
What political and administrative systems could guarantee freedom?
It’s difficult to speak for the entire country at the moment. Our primary struggle is to overthrow the dictatorship. Everyone believes it will eventually fall. However, I don’t know what the future will look like for the whole country.
But in Karenni State, I guarantee freedom for everyone. We can choose the path we want and the system our people want by electing a government democratically, separating the three branches of power [the executive, legislative branch and judiciary] and ensuring everyone can move, trade and speak freely. We aim to establish a political platform that allows people to do business freely without government interference.
We have been building this system [in Karenni State], despite the regime’s oppression. We have assumed the responsibilities of a government by providing education and healthcare and protecting the people. This is how we fight for our freedom.
I invite other parts of the country to do the same. Let’s see which area can best deliver freedom and equality. I believe that competing in this way will lead to freedom for the entire country. All leaders, especially those who are pro-democratic, share this view.
How close are you to achieving freedom from the military dictatorship?
We are getting close to achieving nationwide freedom. This largely depends on the unity of our people and leaders. We have exercised different military strategies and approaches. Some areas may achieve liberation faster but it’s not true freedom until the whole country is liberated. Nationwide freedom is crucial.
As long as the regime remains in Naypyitaw, it can regroup its forces to fight in Rakhine, bomb Kokang or attack Karenni anytime.
To achieve true freedom, the country must stand united. The public must continue to assist by providing information and participating in anti-junta campaigns. It is difficult to set a specific timeline for completely dismantling the junta.
As long as our people remain united and our efforts unwavering, we will see progress. In 2025 we are close to achieving our goals.
If we are united militarily and politically, the regime will not be able to hold elections or fight back. The country will be free and liberated if we can continue to pressure the regime by consolidating our gains.
What are your military preparations for 2025?
There have been junta offensives but they have failed to regain 20 percent of the lost territory. They are desperately trying to control the main roads.
We have defeated the junta’s counteroffensives. Depending on our weapons, ammunition and troop numbers, this year we will make strategic decisions about where to attack. We will aim to achieve the best military outcomes in 2025. We also need to install an administrative mechanism and promote socio-economic stability in a balanced way.
Recently, the military has ramped up attacks on civilians, including displacement camps. It has also cut off internet access to disrupt our socio-economic life. We need to respond with resilience.
There are ongoing battles in Kachin, Mandalay and Karen. We have to keep pressuring the regime by working collaboratively. This is how we will achieve victory in 2025.
What is your view on regime calls for elections and peace talks?
I am very skeptical about the possibility of the regime holding elections. Political parties participating said they fear that armed groups will disrupt voting and they will carry weapons in response.
If politicians are holding weapons, the election cannot be free or fair. The parties standing for election will be aligned with the regime, fitting into the general’s political mold. It would be an ugly election.
The regime is calling for peace talks with armed groups but their actions contradict their words. They continue to bomb civilians each day. We are not naive revolutionaries who will lay down our arms and trust the regime’s “sincere” invitations. We have clear reasons and evidence not to trust their invitations.
We also face international pressure. This will not lead to peace talks or negotiations. The best course of action for the generals is to relinquish power and seek asylum in another country..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2025-01-17
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
Language:
Local URL:
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Description:
"The ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights (APHR) unequivocally condemns the recent airstrike by Myanmar’s military on Kyauk Ni Maw village in Rakhine State on 9 January 2025; and the continuing bombing of other cities like Kyauktaw and Ponnagyun.
As of 9 January 2025, this devastating attack, which claimed the lives of at least 41 civilians, including women and children, and left more than 52 others injured, demonstrates the junta’s escalating violence and blatant disregard for human life. Due to the cutoff of internet and mobile phone services, communication and the provision of medical assistance have become even more difficult, with uncertainty about when the next attack might occur. This has significantly increased the likelihood of further deaths. Over 500 homes were destroyed in the aftermath, leaving a community in ruins and intensifying Myanmar’s growing humanitarian crisis.
The airstrike, targeting an area under the control of the Arakan Army, follows an alarming pattern of military operations deliberately aimed at civilians in ethnic minority regions. The Myanmar junta’s indiscriminate use of violence against ethnic groups and pro-democracy movements further underscores its contempt for international humanitarian law and universally recognised human rights norms.
“This atrocity is yet another stark reminder of the Myanmar military’s systematic brutality and its targeted assaults on civilians, especially in ethnic minority areas,” said Mercy Chriesty Barends, APHR Co-Chairperson and member of Indonesia’s House of Representatives.
“Enough is enough! ASEAN and the international community can no longer turn a blind eye to these crimes. Decisive action must be taken to hold the junta accountable and end the relentless suffering of Myanmar’s people, “ she added.
The massacre in Kyauk Ni Maw is part of a broader trajectory of violence that has persisted since the junta’s unlawful coup in February 2021. These crimes include widespread airstrikes, arbitrary detentions, and systematic attacks on ethnic and religious minorities. Millions have been displaced, impoverished, and left at risk of starvation, compounding an already dire humanitarian situation.
APHR expresses profound concern over ASEAN’s continuing failure to address the crisis effectively. Despite a series of statements and initiatives, the regional bloc has yet to implement meaningful measures to hold the junta accountable for its egregious actions.
Wong Chen, APHR Board Member and member of the Malaysian Parliament urged bold measures: “ASEAN must suspend Myanmar’s participation in all meetings, isolate the military diplomatically, and devise a comprehensive strategy to dismantle the junta’s machinery of terror. Silence is complicity, and ASEAN’s credibility as a regional organisation is at stake.”
With the upcoming ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting (AMM) Retreat in Langkawi on 18–19 January 2025, APHR emphasises the urgent need to prioritise the atrocities in Myanmar on the agenda. Rangsiman Rome, APHR Board Member and member of Thailand’s Parliament stressed, “These atrocities must not be treated as business as usual. ASEAN has a responsibility to act decisively and demonstrate that it values justice and human dignity.”
ASEAN’s unique position as a neighbouring bloc with direct influence on Myanmar demands leadership in addressing these atrocities. Arlene D. Brosas, APHR Board Member and member of the Philippines House of Representatives, pointedly stated, “The resilience of Myanmar’s people in the face of unimaginable cruelty is remarkable. But resilience should not be mistaken for an absence of suffering. The world owes it to them to act decisively and deliver justice.”
APHR calls on the United Nations and the broader international community to escalate targeted sanctions against the junta’s leadership and their revenue streams, including the natural gas sector. Humanitarian assistance must be significantly expanded, particularly for ethnic minority regions such as Rakhine, to ensure immediate relief for those in need.
APHR reaffirms its unwavering solidarity with the people of Myanmar. The organisation calls for urgent, coordinated action to end these atrocities, hold perpetrators accountable for crimes against humanity, and restore democracy and civilian rule in Myanmar. ###..."
Source/publisher:
ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights
Date of entry/update:
2025-01-11
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Arakan (Rakhine) State - reports etc. by date (latest first), Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
Local URL:
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Description:
"In the afternoon of Wednesday 8th January, air strikes carried out by Myanmar’s military junta struck the village of Kyauk Ni Maw, in Ramree Township in the country’s Rakhine (also known as Arakan) state, killing at least 41 civilians and injuring 52 more.
The targeted village is predominantly Muslim and under the control of the Arakan Army (AA), an armed group in Western Rakhine. The attack caused widespread damage and devastation to the area, igniting fires which destroyed over 500 homes. According to locals, there were numerous women, children and elderly residents among the victims.
It was also reported that the situation in Kyauk Ni Maw cannot be independently confirmed, as access to the internet and mobile phone services in the area has been largely cut off.
U Khaing Thukha, a spokesperson for the AA has denounced the attacks, claiming it as a war crime. He stated that “Assaulting unarmed civilians in an area free from conflict is explicitly a war crime.”
The AA is one of countless armed groups engaged in combat with the Myanmar military junta across the country. The AA is currently battling the junta for control of Rakhine, where it has already captured swathes of territory within the last year.
Rakhine state has experienced the highest numbers of civilian casualties in the country since the military ousted Aung San Suu Kyi‘s civilian government in a military coup in February 2021, which ignited a national armed uprising and the development of countless armed factions.
Since 1 February 2021, AOAV has recorded an 857% increase in civilian casualties in Myanmar, from 353 to 3,379, 28% (1,930) of which were recorded in Rakhine. Between 2021 and 2024, the military junta has intensified its air strikes across the country, for example, the number of airstrikes increased by 2,563%, from 8 to 213 between 2021 to 2024. The number of civilian casualties as a result has increased by 3,145%, from 62 to 2,012 between the same time period.
Overall 2024 was the most harmful year since AOAV records began in 2010, overtaking 2023, which had previously been Myanmar’s most violent year. In 2024, AOAV recorded 451 incidents of explosive violence in Myanmar, resulting in 3,776 casualties, 89% (3,379) of which were civilians (1,494 killed and 1,885 injured). The military junta accounted for 88% of civilian casualties in 2024, whereas non-state actors accounted for 9% of civilian casualties.
So far in the first nine days of January 2025, AOAV has recorded 4 incidents of explosive violence, resulting in 83 casualties, 80% (66) of which were civilians (44 killed and 22 injured), this figure is mainly comprised of casualties from the attack on Kyauk Ni Maw village. The numbers of civilian casualties in Myanmar are expected to continue rising as the year goes on, with the conflict showing no sign of de-escalation and civilian casualties increasing year on year.
AOAV’s casualty figures represent the lowest of estimations in terms of the number of people killed and injured by explosive weapon use. In an effort to quantify the explicit harm caused by specific explosive weapons, AOAV solely records incident-specific casualty figures, as reported in English-language media.
AOAV condemns the use of violence against civilians and the use of explosive weapons in populated areas. All actors should stop using explosive weapons with wide-area effects where there is likely to be a high concentration of civilians..."
Source/publisher:
Action on Armed Violence (London) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2025-01-10
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Arakan (Rakhine) State - reports etc. by date (latest first), Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
Local URL:
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Description:
"Escalating conflict and civilian casualties in Rakhine State
The humanitarian community is deeply alarmed by the recent reports of civilian casualties in Rakhine State. On 8 January 2025 an aerial attack in Kyauk Nima Village in Ramree Township reportedly killed over 40 civilians, including children and women, and injured more than 20 people. It is reported that around 500 homes were allegedly destroyed, with children, women, and elderly people among the casualties. Fighting in Rakhine has recently escalated, with civilians paying the highest price of the conflict. Civilians face extreme risks, acute food insecurity and a near total collapse of critical public services. The humanitarian community reiterates our call on all parties to the conflict to uphold their obligations under international humanitarian law, to ensure the protection of civilians and civilian property, humanitarian workers and supplies, and to guarantee unimpeded humanitarian access to deliver aid to the most vulnerable..."
Source/publisher:
UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2025-01-10
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
The discussion on humanitarian assistance to Burma, Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
489.51 KB
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Description:
"ABOUT THIS REPORT
This report describes the recent changes in the INFORM Severity Index scores of humanitarian crises in Myanmar from January 2021 to July 2024. The selected period covers the military coup in February 2021, which has significantly affected the humanitarian situation in the country. July 2024 was selected as the endpoint of the period to set a closed time frame and relate changes in the INFORM Severity Index scores to specific events. The report explores INFORM Severity Index data to delineate the trends in scores over this period, with a focus on the changes deemed most significant. Additional contextual analysis was conducted to investigate and explain the drivers of the trends observed.
The INFORM Severity Index
The INFORM Severity Index is a composite index that measures the severity of humanitarian crises against a common scale at the global level. The goal is to support prioritisation in humanitarian funding and response. The index allows users to compare the severity of different humanitarian crises across the world. It is based on three dimensions: impact of the crisis, conditions of people affected, and complexity of the crisis, which are further divided into categories, then into components, and then into core indicators. The Joint Research Centre of the European Commission collaborates with INFORM stakeholders to develop and maintain the index’s methodology. ACAPS is responsible for data collection, adhering closely to the established methodology. In this report, ACAPS uses the full description of the INFORM Severity Index concept and methodology document to explain trends.1
Note on the contribution of core indicators to INFORM Severity Index scores
While some core indicators can contribute to INFORM Severity Index scores, they might not generate a change in the score in a given month because of various factors. These factors include gradual changes in the core indicators, the core indicators having less weight as per the design of the INFORM Severity Index formula, and certain conditions assigned to the INFORM Severity Index formula. For example, displacements (which affects two core indicators in the index) related to the country-level crisis in Myanmar have been on an increasing trend, but given the design of the INFORM Severity Index formula and the gradual change in displacements, the increase in displacements itself has not triggered any month-to-month change in the INFORM Severity Index score of the country-level crisis..."
Source/publisher:
ACAPS via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2025-01-09
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
2.75 MB
more
Description:
"Insecurity Insight identified 1501 incidents of violence against or obstruction of health care in Myanmar since the military coup on 01 February 2021 and 01 October 2024. At least 126 health workers were killed in 99 incidents. Some health workers were shot and killed while they travelled to provide medical care to remote areas or at home, others were killed in Myanmar military airstrikes. Eight health workers were tortured and killed.
The Myanmar armed forces were most commonly identified as the perpetrators. Health worker killings were documented in 13 of Myanmar’s 21 administrative divisions with high numbers recorded in Mandalay region, followed by Sagaing region.
The data with details on location, reported conflict party, weapon used and brief description is available here for download. Explore this interactive map to see where incidents happened. Data is updated on HDX every Monday. Registered HDX user? Follow us for the latest dataset updates. Numbers may change if or when further information is made available. Please get in touch if you’re interested in curated datasets.
Past incident briefs: 18 September-01 October; 04-17 September; 21 August-03 September; 07-20 August; All
SHCC Factsheets: Burmese: 2023. English: 2023: 2022; 2021; 2020
Please get in touch if you are interested in curated datasets, have made a public statement that you would like us to include in our Bi Monthly News Brief, to report an incident or if you have additional information on an incident we have reported on. Join our Myanmar mailing list for regular updates. Help support the protection of health care by sharing this resource. Please copy and paste this link: bit.ly/02-15Oct2024MMRHealth
Documented incidents
02 October 2024: In Maung Htaung village and village tract, Budalin township, Monywa district, Sagaing region, a rural health centre, a school, and a monastery were damaged and a civilian injured by bombs and gunfire from two Myanmar military fighter jets. These civilian infrastructure were targeted because local resistance forces used them as temporary shelters during an armed clash between the local resistance forces and the Myanmar military at a nearby village on 30 September. Sources: Democratic Voice of Burma, Khit Thit Media and Mandalay Free Press
03 October 2024: In Kyauk Maw village, Thit Seint Kone village tract, Mongmit township and district, Shan state, a sub-rural health centre was damaged and a health worker injured by bombs dropped by a Myanmar military fighter jet. Although it was a public health facility, it was operated by volunteer health workers and was functioning at the time of the attack. Source: The 74 Media
06 October 2024: In Khin-U town and township, Shwebo district, Sagaing region, a township hospital occupied by the Myanmar military was attacked with small firearms and armed drones by the local resistance forces, damaging the roofs, ceilings, windows, and walls of hospital buildings and staff houses. There were no casualties. The hospital was functioning at the time of the attack. Sources: Khit Thit Media and NP News
08 October 2024: In Pan Ni Lar village and village tract, Ponnagyun township, Sittwe district, Rakhine state, a makeshift hospital based at a school was damaged by bombs dropped by a Myanmar military fighter jet. There were no casualties. The hospital was functioning at the time of the attack. After the town had been taken over by the Arakan Army, the township hospital was temporarily relocated to the school. Source: Development Media Group
12 October 2024: At a PDF checkpoint near Thone Gwa village and village tract, Kyaikto township and district, Mon state, a female nurse and her husband (a lieutenant of the Myanmar military) were arrested by the PDF. Sources: Khit Thit Media and Mandalay News
12 October 2024: In Myit Chay town, Pakokku township and district, Magway region, a private clinic was raided by the Myanmar military. The doors and windows were destroyed and all the rooms were inspected. The doctor was in the operation theatre at the time of the raid and he was not harmed. The mobile phones and money of the patients were confiscated. The medicines were confiscated, alleging the clinic had provided treatment to PDF. Sources: Facebook and Khit Thit Media
14 October 2024: In Ei Naing village and village tract, Lashio township and district, Shan state , a rural health centre, a church, and at least 20 civilian houses were damaged by bombs dropped by a Myanmar military fighter jet. Three were killed and three injured. Sources: Irrawaddy and Shan News
Insecurity Insight. 2024. 02-15 October 2024, Attacks on Health Care in Myanmar. Switzerland: Insecurity Insight. bit.ly/02-15Oct2024MMRHealth..."
Source/publisher:
Insecurity Insight (Geneva) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2024-10-25
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Public Health, Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
1.1 MB
more
Description:
"(Bangkok) – On the evening of October 23, 2022, the Myanmar military carried out an airstrike on a music concert in Hpakant, Kachin State, organized by the opposition Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) to commemorate the ethnic organization’s 62nd anniversary. Local media reported that at least 60 people were killed and 100 injured, and that the Myanmar military blocked access to medical care for those harmed. The concert was held at a base also used for military training by the KIO’s armed wing, the Kachin Independence Army (KIA).
The following quote can be attributed to Elaine Pearson, Asia director at Human Rights Watch:
The Myanmar military’s airstrike on hundreds of concertgoers in Kachin State is an apparent violation of the laws of war, which prohibit attacks causing indiscriminate or disproportionate civilian harm. Myanmar military operations in ethnic minority areas have long been characterized by a near total disregard for civilian lives and property and a failure to abide by international law. The military’s entrenched impunity underlines the need for an international investigation of those responsible for this attack and the many others committed by security forces since the February 2021 military coup.
For over a year and a half, the junta has carried out grave abuses against the millions of people who oppose military rule, amounting to crimes against humanity and war crimes. How high does the death count need to reach before governments around the world impose consequences that will impact the junta’s behavior?
This horrific attack should trigger renewed efforts by concerned states to enforce tougher sanctions on the junta, including cutting off its access to foreign currency revenues as well as arms and aviation fuel. The United Nations Security Council should urgently pass a resolution imposing a global arms embargo on the junta and referring the situation to the International Criminal Court. Southeast Asian leaders meeting this week and at the ASEAN Summit in November should signal their support for such efforts to bring justice to the victims of the junta’s abuses across the country..."
Source/publisher:
Human Rights Watch (USA)
Date of entry/update:
2024-10-24
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, The Military's political role, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Local URL:
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Description:
"Myanmar’s military authorities must immediately account for the whereabouts and wellbeing of two pro-democracy activists arrested in Yangon on Wednesday, Amnesty International said today.
Paing Phyo Min and Shein Wai Aung were arrested on 9 October and sent to an interrogation centre, Amnesty International understands. Paing Phyo Min’s family has not been able to reach him, while Shein Wai Aung and his father, mother and sister have also been uncontactable.
As many as six additional people are also believed to have been arrested in raids.
“The Myanmar military must urgently account for the whereabouts and wellbeing of Paing Phyo Min and of Shein Wai Aung and his family. Unless they can be charged with an internationally recognized crime, they must be immediately and unconditionally released,” Amnesty International’s Myanmar Researcher Joe Freeman said.
“As leaders from The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) meet in Laos and discuss a way out of the crisis brought on by the 2021 coup, the Myanmar military continues to arbitrarily detain people and carry out repression across the country.”
Paing Phyo Min is known for his involvement with a group of young people performing Thangyat, a popular Myanmar traditional art form which fuses poetry, comedy and music to comment on social issues.
In 2019, Paing Phyo Min and other members of an activist group called the Peacock Generation were arrested after performing Thangyat dressed as soldiers. For this, he was sentenced to six years in prison.
In 2020, Amnesty International called for Paing Phyo Min’s release as part of its annual Write 4 Rights campaign, with many people writing letters to him to bolster his spirits. He was released in 2021 as part of a mass prisoner amnesty.
After the military coup, he and others took part in peaceful protests in Yangon, despite enormous risks following violent crackdowns.
Shein Wai Aung, a former student at Dagon University in Yangon, has been active in peaceful protests and in supporting political prisoners in Myanmar.
“Protesting in Myanmar today is not the same as it was before the coup. Anyone involved in any kind of dissent against the military faces long jail terms, torture and other ill-treatment, and even death in custody,” Joe Freeman said.
“In Myanmar’s prison system, there is little hope of fair treatment, no transparency, and extremely substandard conditions. Interrogation centers, where these two activists have likely been sent, are also notorious locations of abuse where torture has been used to extract information before charges are formally brought.”
Myanmar’s military has killed more than 5,000 civilians since seizing power in the coup on 1 February 2021. The United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights said in its latest report last month that at least 1,853 of those people have died in custody.
In the 2022 report ‘15 Days Felt Like 15 Years’, Amnesty International documented torture and other ill-treatment against people arbitrarily detained by the military and police after the coup..."
Source/publisher:
Amnesty International (UK)
Date of entry/update:
2024-10-10
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Political prisoners and other violations in Burma - reports, Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Freedom of opinion and expression: - the situation in Burma/Myanmar - reports, analyses, recommendations
Language:
Local URL:
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Description:
"UN Member States should support a resolution to promptly begin formal negotiations of a Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Humanity, with the aim of strengthening the international justice framework and vastly reducing safe havens from investigation and prosecution for perpetrators, said Amnesty International today.
The organization’s call comes as the UN General Assembly (UNGA) Sixth Committee meets to debate the agenda item “Crimes against humanity”. The Sixth Committee session is scheduled to last until 22 November.
“The next six weeks present a unique opportunity for the international community to finally make progress on the negotiation and adoption of a convention on crimes against humanity. Such a treaty would open new pathways – desperately needed in today’s world – for ensuring justice, truth and reparation for victims and survivors of some of the most heinous of crimes,” said Agnès Callamard, Amnesty International’s Secretary General.
Unlike other crimes under international law, such as genocide and war crimes, there is presently no specific, standalone convention for crimes against humanity. While the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) does outlaw crimes against humanity under international law, a Convention on Crimes Against Humanity, which would be applied by states, would reinforce and strengthen the overall international justice framework, including that of the ICC.
“The Crimes Against Humanity Convention could be a milestone treaty in more ways than one. It would impose obligations on states not only to criminalize and punish crimes against humanity, but also to prevent them, and to cooperate with other states, including through mutual legal assistance,” said Agnès Callamard.
The next six weeks present a unique opportunity for the international community to finally make progress on the negotiation and adoption of a convention on crimes against humanity.
Agnès Callamard, Amnesty International’s Secretary General
“The new convention would bring much-needed improvement of international standards on gender justice, including by recognizing gender-based crimes that have received far too little international attention, such as gender apartheid, forced marriage and forced abortion. It is well past time for an international law that’s fit to address the age-old war being waged on women, girls and LGBTI people in many corners of our planet.”
“A convention on crimes against humanity would make it much harder for perpetrators to escape justice. For instance, the present draft includes provisions for universal jurisdiction for all crimes covered. It would obligate states to either prosecute or extradite any suspects within their reach – regardless of where the crime was committed or the nationality of the suspect or the victim – and enable domestic courts to take up cases, including those that the International Criminal Court is unable or unwilling to pursue.”
Crimes against humanity are a worldwide phenomenon. In the past 10 years alone, Amnesty International has found evidence of such crimes in at least 18 countries all over the planet.
“No region on earth is free from these atrocities that deeply shock the conscience of humanity. Recent and ongoing situations in countries such as Afghanistan, China, Ethiopia, Iran, Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Myanmar, Nicaragua, the Philippines, Syria, Ukraine and Venezuela serve as constant reminders of the urgent need to reinforce the international justice system,” said Agnès Callamard..."
Source/publisher:
Amnesty International (UK)
Date of entry/update:
2024-10-09
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Crimes Against Humanity
Language:
Local URL:
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Description:
"1. Introduction
The current human rights and security situation in Southeast Burma (Myanmar) has been in crisis since the 2021 military coup due to an escalation of armed conflict and increasing human rights violations committed by the State Administration Council (SAC). The SAC has targeted and attacked anyone who opposes the regime, including peaceful protestors, pro-democracy activists, members of the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM), local rights organisations, and civil society. Since the 2021 coup, Human Rights Defenders (HRDs) and their family members have been arbitrarily arrested and detained, tortured, forcibly disappeared, and killed, with total impunity. Whilst the gravity of threats and lack of protection has forced HRDs in Southeast Burma to adapt their activism and protection strategies, their work remains active and essential, and in increased need of protection and recognition.
This briefing paper analyses the threats and challenges that HRDs have faced in locally-defined Karen State since the 2021 coup (until June 2024). The first section gives an overview of the history of violence and oppression against HRDs. The second section provides evidence of attacks and violence faced by HRDs and their families, including anyone perceived to be defending human rights: namely torture and killings; arbitrary arrest and detention; restrictions on freedom of movement; surveillance and digital threats; risks related to the armed conflict; and threats faced by women human rights defenders. It also shows how those threats have changed since the 2021 coup; the impacts of such threats; and how HRDs have adapted. The third section presents a security and legal analysis of the situation. The paper concludes with a set of policy recommendations provided for regional and international stakeholders..."
Source/publisher:
Karen Human Rights Group
Date of entry/update:
2024-09-30
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
2.97 MB
more
Description:
"In Myanmar, the Shelter/NFI/CCCM Cluster was activated in January 2013. By March 2013, the Shelter/NFI/CCCM Cluster became operational in Kachin and Shan (North) States. Currently 3 Camp Management Agencies undertake substantial work for the Shelter/NFI/CCCM Cluster: data collection, coordination, monitoring of services, community mobilization and capacity building across camps that house over 107,600 IDPs. The objective of the Shelter/NFI/CCCM Cluster remains to ensure all of the priority camps, camps that contain the majority of IDPs, have a dedicated Camp Management Agency, delivering coordinated assistance in line with the rights and needs of the displaced and where possible preparing them for life after displacement..."
Source/publisher:
CCCM Cluster, Shelter Cluster, UN High Commissioner for Refugees via Reliefweb (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2024-09-25
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Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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"Since early 2024, fighting in northern Rakhine state has led to the worst attacks on the Rohingya population since 2017, when Myanmar’s military drove more than 750,000 across the border into Bangladesh. The new attacks are a stark reminder of the Rohingyas’ vulnerability. The world has known about their plight for decades, and in 2024, only 636,000 Rohingya — or 23 percent of the 2.8 million Rohingya around the world — still live in their homeland, Myanmar.
Since early 2024, fighting in northern Rakhine state has led to the worst attacks on the Rohingya population since 2017, when Myanmar’s military drove more than 750,000 across the border into Bangladesh. The new attacks are a stark reminder of the Rohingyas’ vulnerability. The world has known about their plight for decades, and in 2024, only 636,000 Rohingya — or 23 percent of the 2.8 million Rohingya around the world — still live in their homeland, Myanmar.
These figures are from a new report by Doctors Without Borders (Médecins Sans Frontières, or MSF) on the global Rohingya community. Behind the Wire offers an alarming illustration of the devastating impact of prolonged discrimination and persecution on the entire group. This persecution intensified in the 1980s when Myanmar’s military regime deliberately rendered the Rohingya stateless. Since then, their statelessness has been passed down from one generation to the next. The majority of Rohingya children are now born outside Myanmar and have never known their homeland. By the end of this decade, only one in five will be born in Myanmar.
The four countries where most exiled Rohingya now live are Bangladesh, with 1.1 million; Pakistan, with 400,000; Saudi Arabia, with 340,000; and Malaysia, with 210,000.
MSF estimates that only one percent of the total Rohingya population has managed to obtain a passport, citizenship or resettlement in a country where they have no fear of arrest and abuse. Most others are contained or marginalized by harmful policies that deny them basic human rights and self-determination, both in Myanmar and elsewhere. Fifty-seven percent live in barbed-wire-fenced camps in Bangladesh and Myanmar, or in closed villages in Myanmar where apartheid-like conditions are the norm.
While most international attention focuses on the Rohingya in Myanmar and Bangladesh, the overall situation of the 2.8 million Rohingya has been deteriorating, says MSF, negatively impacting the community’s ability to cope with the consequences of exclusion from citizenship and a place in the world. There is no credible international dialogue underway that addresses the Rohingya as a people scattered around the world. International attention tends to focus on immediate humanitarian and conflict-related crises and, as MSF points out, broader perspectives are largely ignored.
Of course, the current crises in Arakan and Bangladesh do deserve full attention, but they should be considered part of the search for comprehensive solutions for the entire group.
The Current Crisis in Arakan
Military forces of the State Administration Council (SAC) — Myanmar’s illegitimate regime — are gradually retreating from Rakhine (or Arakan as it is increasingly called). With most of Arakan under control of the Arakan Army (AA), the key question is how to achieve the kind of stability needed to ensure that all Arakan’speoplecan live in peace and harmony and lead safe and productive lives. Shifting from military control to civilian governance is always a tall order, but in the case of Arakan, trust between its two main communities, the Rakhine and the Rohingya, has suffered serious setbacks since the start of the AA’s current campaign in November 2023, making this transition even more difficult.
Although the SAC is losing the war in Arakan, it has won an important battle. It has successfully employed its tried-and-tested divide-and-rule strategy, not only deepening the divide between the Arakan and Rohingya communities, but also creating a split that has brought some Rohingya armed groups to the SAC’s side. Both the AA and SAC have increased their recruitment of Rohingya fighters. In both cases, reports indicate that many have been forcibly recruited, particularly by Rohingya militias aligned with the SAC.
Although the SAC is losing the war in Arakan, it has won an important battle.
These militias — Arakan Rohingya Army (ARA), Rohingya Solidarity Organization (RSO) and Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) — have long been unpopular with most Rohingya. Earlier this year, as the war in northern Arakan escalated, it became abundantly clear that the militias worked closely with the SAC to forcibly recruit young Rohingya from the camps in Bangladesh and traffic them into the hands of the military regime. Some sources say that as many as 2,000 crossed the border into Myanmar. It is highly unlikely that this could have been done without the knowledge of senior officials in Bangladesh.
Tragically, Rohingya have been forced to fight on both sides of the conflict. This complicated and brutal warfare has contributed significantly to the thick fog of war in northern Arakan. Many individuals have provided information and evidence to help piece together a complex conflict puzzle, sometimes at great personal risk. Their efforts must be acknowledged. However, as of mid-September, none of the conflict parties (SAC, AA, RSO, ARA and ARSA) has released information about the number of fatalities or wounded.
At the same time, civilian casualties are said to be high, which would be consistent with reports from other parts of Myanmar, showing shocking disregard for the laws of war and humanitarian law. The willful destruction of entire villages and towns, critical infrastructure and the targeting of schools, clinics and houses of worship demonstrate a total lack of respect for human life.
Serious allegations have been lodged against all parties, but verification has been problematic mostly due to the lack of independent access to conflict areas. A truth deficit remains, and an independent assessment mission will be necessary to obtain a more complete picture of what happened since early 2024, particularly in Maungdaw and Buthidaung townships.
To establish a credible record, the cooperation of all conflict parties will be needed. Moreover, an independent mission should examine the impact of violent conflict on all ethnic communities in Arakan. While the Rohingya are the largest population group in northern Arakan, there are many others, such as the Rakhine, Hindus, Maramagyi, Mro, Thet and Kaman. Amid the flood of information coming out of northern Arakan, details about the impact of conflict on some of these groups have been scant.
With most of Arakan now under AA’s military control, its civilian branch, the United League of Arakan (ULA), may soon have an opportunity to share proposals to operationalize what the group calls “The Way of Rakhita,” its, until now, fairly vague vision for a future Arakan. In an interview with The Diplomat in early September, AA commander Twan Mrat Naing said, “We are always in favor of repatriation [of Rohingya Muslims] in principle, and there should be voluntary, dignified and safe repatriation under conducive conditions.” That is a welcome statement, but it remains to be seen what specific proposals the ULA will present. Will they envisage an inclusive Arakan, one where all ethnic communities can find a place they can call home, based on equality and respect? One thing is clear: without dismantling the apartheid system — put in place by successive regimes — genuine progress will remain out of reach.
It is important to acknowledge that for decades, the Rohingya have borne the brunt of violence and oppression in Arakan. However, the justifiable fears and grievances of all other communities must also be recognized and addressed. Without dialogue and understanding among all groups, progress will be limited.
Equally, it must be clear that there are no quick fixes. Arakan has multiple crises: a security crisis, an economic and development crisis, and a human rights crisis. Much of the state’s critical infrastructure has been destroyed, while outward flight has depleted essential human resources in critical sectors, including agriculture. Food security is no longer guaranteed, the toll on all ethnic communities is significant and the destruction of entire villages and livelihoods has led to incalculable economic damage. The United Nations reports that 533,000 people in Arakan are now displaced, while many others have fled.
Given the enormous destruction of human and economic capital, a long-term recovery plan will be needed—one that addresses not only the economy but also the restoration of inter-communal relations, including a transitional justice plan. Discussions about transitional justice are always difficult, particularly when suffering continues. Reconciliation cannot succeed unless all are prepared to listen to others’ fears and grievances. Postponing dialogue risks making matters worse.
In the case of the Rohingya, the all-important issue of citizenship will be high on the agenda, and in addition, freedom of movement will also be critically important. The lack of freedom of movement infringes on many other rights, including access to livelihoods, education, health care and religious worship. In other words, addressing lack of freedom of movement paves the way for the enjoyment of many other rights.
The Current Crisis in Bangladesh
For Rohingya in refugee camps in Bangladesh, 2024 has been an exceedingly difficult year. With the violence and insecurity in camps increasing and enforced abductions leaving behind terrified families of hundreds of young men, trauma is widespread, and hope has dimmed.
Given the major destruction and displacement in Arakan, the immediate returns of Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh will not be possible. However, Bangladesh, Arakan’s leadership and the Rohingya should start discussions about how returns might ultimately take place. Fostering hope is critical, as is ensuring that Rohingya repatriation becomes part of Arakan’s longer-term recovery plan. In this context, the recent statement by Bangladesh’s head of government, Mohammed Yunus, is encouraging. He pledged continued support for the Rohingya and their “eventual repatriation to their homeland, Myanmar, with safety, dignity and full rights.”
To improve the situation in the camps near Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh and its international partners should consider enabling greater freedom of movement, improving access to livelihoods, allowing the use of sturdier building materials and providing education to all Rohingya children and young people in the camps. There could hardly be a greater gift from Bangladesh to Arakan than the education of young Rohingya.
Additionally, there is one immediate recommendation for Bangladesh. It would be an act of great humanity and neighborliness to facilitate the establishment of a humanitarian corridor into Maungdaw district. Reducing the severe shortages of humanitarian supplies in Arakan would not only directly aid all communities but also significantly contribute to stabilizing the current situation.
Looking Ahead
Even though bilateral relations are important for addressing issues between immediate neighbors like Bangladesh and Myanmar, the insistence on a state-centric approach — one that dictates that faraway Naypyidaw should be the entry point for all contacts between states — has increasingly lost relevance.
The AA’s de facto territorial control demands greater pragmatism in the conduct of interstate relations. Myanmar’s western neighbors should begin to accept this reality and reach out to Arakan’s leadership, particularly to the United League of Arakan (ULA), the civilian arm of the Arakan Army. The SAC regime in Myanmar’s capital, Naypyidaw, is not only far from Arakan but has also lost control over much of Myanmar. Pragmatism is particularly urgent to ensure immediate humanitarian access and assistance.
At the same time, important questions about atrocities committed in Arakan remain, particularly in Buthidaung and Maungdaw. ULA/AA’s willingness to cooperate with an independent investigation might help to overcome the understandable reluctance of key players.
Another major issue is the future of the Rohingya as a people. As the new MSF report shows, the situation of most Rohingya around the world is deeply troubling. Limiting responses to mostly short-term humanitarian issues while ignoring the longer-term plight of a community of 2.8 million has been a failure of the international community. A new initiative is needed — one that addresses the Rohingya community as a whole, focusing on improving their immediate needs as well as their future. Obviously, highly sensitive issues will have to be addressed. One of these, mentioned by MSF, could be the acceptance that not all Rohingya will return to Arakan, particularly descendants of older generations who left 20 to 40 years ago and have never seen their homeland. But such questions can only be addressed as part of a comprehensive effort to do justice to the Rohingya people and their plight.
A new comprehensive effort could be based on the Global Compact on Refugees, which represents the political will and ambition of the international community for strengthened cooperation and solidarity with refugees and affected home countries. It is based on four principles: (i) enhancing refugee self-reliance, (ii) easing pressure on host countries, (iii) supporting conditions in countries of origin and (iv) expanding access to refugees’ countries of origin..."
Source/publisher:
United States Institute of Peace
Date of entry/update:
2024-09-25
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Arakan (Rakhine) State - reports etc. by date (latest first), Discrimination against the Rohingya, Burmese refugees in Bangladesh
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"Delivered by:
United Nations Deputy High Commissioner for Human Rights Nada Al-Nashif
At
57th session of the Human Rights Council
Mr. Vice-President,
Your Excellencies,
Distinguished delegates,
The crisis in Myanmar continues to sink into an abyss of human suffering. Entrenched in armed conflicts spreading the length and breadth of the country, the military continues to lose ground, exacting an ever-higher price as it goes along the way. Airstrikes and artillery – the military’s weapons of choice -- have killed scores of civilians in villages and Internally Displaced Persons’ (IDP) camps, violating international human rights and humanitarian law.
While not comparable in scale and scope to the military, some ethnic armed groups have also harmed civilians, at times apparently deliberately. Recently, the Office issued another warning about the possible reoccurrence of atrocities against Rohingya caught between the ‘Arakan Army’ – which is forcing them to flee their homes -- and the military, leaving them nowhere safe to run. In Rakhine, the situation continues to deteriorate, with intensified clashes killing more civilians, with desperately needed food and medical assistance almost entirely blocked.
Credible sources have verified a minimum of 5,600 civilians, including 1,160 women and 624 children, killed by the military since February 2021. Compounding the violence, the number of people forced to flee due to natural disasters continues to escalate daily.
Earlier this month, flooding from Typhoon Yagi resulted in an estimated over 800,000 displaced with over 300 reported deaths. Yet the military has reportedly failed to issue warnings or to help non-military families evacuate affected areas.
United Nations figures indicate that over 18.6 million people are in humanitarian need; over 3 million have been displaced due to violence across the country and over 15 million are food insecure.
These numbers tell only a partial story. As the economy plummets, essential commodities, to the extent that they remain available, are becoming unaffordable for many. More than half the population now lives in poverty with the country’s GDP dropping 12 percent annually on average since the coup in 2021.
Meanwhile, the Myanmar Humanitarian Response Plan is only 12 percent funded. For many, essential services have long since ceased to function. Shortages of food and medicine, along with a rise in cases of malaria, dengue fever, and cholera, combined with a lack of access to vaccinations, were reported in several areas.
Yet rather than addressing the needs of the people and mitigating the crisis, the military have doubled down on repression and restrictions on humanitarian operations, especially in conflict-affected areas.
After attempting to forcibly conscript civilians between 18 and 35, the military has announced its intention to arm civilians in local militias to defend territories which the military itself cannot. This risks of course leading to wider militarization and greater violence across the country.
Throughout the crisis, the people of Myanmar have consistently expressed their desire for democracy, the rule of law, and accountability, in the face of a military desperately trying to hold on to power by any means necessary.
The report before you highlights the military’s use of the criminal justice process, law enforcement and the penal apparatus to deter and punish any form of opposition. Applicable laws have been repeatedly and unilaterally modified in attempts to justify detaining an ever-growing number of actual or perceived opponents.
Credible sources have verified 26,933 individuals arrested, including 5,556 women and 547 children, indefinitely incarcerated. Between April 2023 and June 2024, over 9,000 individuals were verified as having been detained with 1,648 convicted by military-controlled courts that do not ensure minimum respect of basic judicial guarantees.
It is deeply disturbing that a full third of all those verified as having been killed since this crisis began, died in military custody. In the reporting period alone, over 1,853 people have been killed while in the military’s custody – whether in places of detention or during military operations in the field, including 759 people.
We remain very concerned by the possible use of the death penalty, with 167 people sentenced to death since the military coup.
Torture and ill-treatment, including multiple reports of sexual violence in detention – against women and LBGTI persons -- remain rampant in interrogation centers, prisons, and other detention sites. Interviewees describe being subjected to some of the most depraved treatment, including electrocution, asphyxiation, having insects and animals set upon them, and sexual torture. Perpetrators have been emboldened by long-standing impunity.
Appalling conditions in detention further contributed to multiple violations of human rights suffered by detainees. Interviewees released from 12 military-run prisons across nine states and regions described generally squalid facilities with cells being badly-lit, poorly ventilated, and overcrowded – often at double their original capacity.
In addition, continued exposure to violence and associated fear, have had a devastating impact on the mental health and well-being of victims and communities across Myanmar. The lack of adequate resources to provide mental health support has been further exacerbated by mental health professionals fleeing the country.
Mr. Vice-President,
This situation is not new. This crisis has been in a steady downward spiral for over three and half years now. Every indicator across the country is tipping downwards. Despite this, there has been little focused international attention to stem this tide of horror.
When the High Commissioner last addressed this Council, he spoke clearly of the need for a new approach to end this crisis. There is an urgent need for political will and leadership at regional and international levels to demand, and achieve, a solution in the best interests of the people of Myanmar. It is imperative that Member States, notably those with influence, work together to bolster and support ASEAN members to resolve this crisis and bring an end to the violence in Myanmar.
Our Office has proposed concrete ways to address key aspects of this self-perpetuating crisis.
The flow of arms, other military material and aviation fuel that is powering the military’s campaign of violence against the civilian population must stop.
The political process must be renewed, engaging equally with the National Unity Government, ethnic armed groups and the democracy movement to define future solutions for the country.
People in Myanmar need to have their voices and agency in this crisis fully recognized. Engagement with the youth, women and civil society must be reinvigorated and broadened to ensure they have a voice at the table.
Creative ways should be used to get humanitarian aid to the people, including through cross-border operations. This means supporting civil society and community-based organizations that have been at the forefront of efforts to deliver services where public institutions have failed to do so.
The initiatives of civil society exemplify how people-led movements are able to take steps to effectively mitigate, within limited resources, many aspects of the current suffering. Such efforts will be crucial to Myanmar’s future and to ensuring there is capacity to deliver once this crisis ends.
Myanmar’s democratic prospects rest squarely on these organizations and networks, which have stepped up since February 2021 to support those in need, despite severe security concerns and challenges.
Increased political and financial support to local organizations, is critical to ensuring civil society’s full involvement in decision-making processes concerning their country’s future.
In the midst of so much suffering, it is imperative that steps are taken to protect Rohingya civilians, in line with the provisional measures ordered by the International Court of Justice in January 2020. The time to hold military leaders accountable is now. In this, the International Criminal Court, the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar and a variety of national jurisdictions are all playing key roles.
Member States with influence should take meaningful steps to ensure the military complies with its obligations under international law, including the release of all arbitrarily detained prisoners, in order to return the country to the stable and democratic path its people so deserve..."
Source/publisher:
UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2024-09-24
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Individual Documents
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Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, UN Human Rights pages on Myanmar
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"Jakarta, 23 September 2024—The ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights (APHR) strongly condemns the executions of two Myanmar pro-democracy activists by the State Administration Council (SAC) today and expresses its deepest condolences to the families and friends for the loss of their beloved ones.
Kaung Htet and his wife Chan Myae Thu were executed at 04:00 AM Myanmar time on 23 September 2024 for alleged involvement in Yangon’s Insein Prison bombing on October 19, 2022.
“Break the silence now,“ said Mercy Chriesty Barends, APHR Chairperson and member of Indonesia’s House of Representatives. “ASEAN foreign ministers must speak up against the SAC execution policy.”
The junta military arrested the couple and sentenced them to death for their alleged involvement without due process and fair trial. Chan Myae Thu is the first woman who was executed since the military coup in February 2021, according to the Women’s Peace Network.
“We are gravely concerned that the death penalty is being used to silence persons with dissenting views in Myanmar,” said Arlene D. Brosas, APHR Board Member and the Philippines Member of Parliament.
APHR has received a report from a reliable source that the SAC will execute five other pro-democracy activists on 24 September 2024. They are Zaryaw Phyo (32), San Min Aung (24), Kyaw Win Soe (33), Kaung Pyae Sone Oo (27) and Myat Phyo Pwint (unknown).
The five activists were sentenced to death on 18 May 2023 in a closed-door civilian hearing at Yangon’s Insein Prison for their alleged participation in a shooting on a train in 2021. APHR was informed that they were brutally tortured and experienced sexual violence without any access to reliable legal support.
“This must stop,” said Charles Santiago, APHR co-chairperson and former Malaysian parliament member. He further said, “ASEAN foreign ministers must denounce such an unjust act. They must be united to push the SAC to terminate their execution and release them from prison.”
The Myanmar junta military will execute over 120 detainees in the coming weeks, who are mostly activists and human rights defenders. Fifteen of them are women human rights defenders.
APHR urges the international community to hold the SAC accountable for the arbitrary arrest and detention of over 27,000 people, as well as its commission of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide, as a fundamental step toward ending impunity in Myanmar..."
Source/publisher:
ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights
Date of entry/update:
2024-09-23
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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"Geneva, 23 September 2024 – The Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar is closely monitoring reports of planned executions of persons sentenced to death in non-public trials.
According to information received by the Mechanism, executions may be imminent for several individuals who were sentenced to death during closed-door hearings in Yangon’s Insein Prison in 2023.
Imposing a death sentence, or even a period of detention, on the basis of proceedings that do not satisfy the basic requirements of a fair trial may constitute one or more crimes against humanity or war crimes.
One of the most fundamental attributes of a fair trial is that it be held in public unless there are compelling national security reasons. When proceedings are not public, this casts doubt on whether other fair trial guarantees have been respected, such as the requirement that the tribunal was impartial and independent. Imposing a prison or death sentence in such circumstances could constitute crimes against humanity or war crimes.
The Mechanism is monitoring and collecting information on the cases against these individuals and others that involve the imposition of the death penalty in circumstances that might violate fundamental fair trial guarantees.
The Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar (IIMM or Mechanism) was created by the United Nations Human Rights Council in 2018 to collect and analyse evidence of the most serious international crimes and other violations of international law committed in Myanmar since 2011. It aims to facilitate justice and accountability by preserving and organizing this evidence and preparing case files that can be used by authorities to prosecute individuals in national, regional and international courts..."
Source/publisher:
UN Human Rights Council (Geneva) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2024-09-23
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
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"Human Rights Violations took place in States and Regions from Sep 8 to 14, 2024
Military Junta Troop launched airstrikes and dropped bombs in the Magway Region, Shan State, Kachin State, and Rakhine State from September 8th to 14th. Military Junta arrested the civilians as human shields from Mindon Township, Magway Region, and Salingyi Township, Sagaing Region. Military Junta also committed a massacre by killing over 30 civilians in Hpakant Township, Kachin State. The Military Junta arrested the civilians from Ayeyarwady Region and Bago Region for the Military Service.
Over 30 civilians died, and over 10 were injured by the Military’s heavy and light artillery attacks within a week. Over 50 civilians were arrested by the Military Junta within a week..."
Source/publisher:
Network for Human Rights Documentation-Burma
Date of entry/update:
2024-09-20
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
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"An American currently fighting for the revolution in Myanmar discusses the avoidance of ethnic and political schisms, the decentralisation of guerilla combat, the confusions generated by counter-insurrection, and the complex geopolitical dynamics at play
~ Azad, intrerviewed by Ill Will ~
Ill Will: How did a civil protest movement using the tactics and strategies of the black bloc and rock throwing evolve to become a domestic insurgency? How does this process compare to the 1988 civil war which, at first glance, seemed to proceed along similar lines?
Azad: Before responding to the questions of the comrades, I would like to first address certain realities about the revolution in Myanmar that I believe are important for the full understanding of the situation. The current revolution, spurred from a nationwide rebuke of the sudden assumption of power by the military, has proceeded along many separate and contradictory lines. I think it is important to frame these developments in the language of diversity and flowering, rather than of fracturing or inconsistency.
Myanmar is a state formed within colonial boundaries. As a result, it is the common nation of a dozen-plus ethnicities in addition to the Burmese people. The progression from independence to ‘Burmese Socialism’ has long been complicated, and democratic rule here has always stood on shaky ground.
As I write this, the state is now confronted by over a hundred different armed groups. Some of them are as small as a township, while others rival the junta’s army in capability. I have spent 7 months in Chin State with two militias; the PDF Zoland and the Chin National Defense Force (CNDF). These two groups are members of the Chin Brotherhood alliance, itself one of two military blocs within Chin state. In this short 7 months, I have only just begun to understand the local dynamics and conditions of the revolution, to say nothing of regional and national differences. As such, I hope any inaccuracies can be forgiven, and that any insight I can give will be considered a fragment of a more complete analysis of the situation in Myanmar.
Following the Juntas usurpation of power, protests from all sections of society began immediately: not only in the Burmese heartland, but in the urban centers of the ethnic regions as well. In Instagram and Facebook story collections of those who resisted, you can find a progression of the protests reminiscent of a slideshow: at first, reactions of disbelief and outrage at the coup; then, of horror at the use of violence and massacres to repress dissent, followed finally by calls for armed resistance. While initially peaceful, favoring mass marches and general strikes, the dissident movement underwent rapid evolution when faced with bullets and massacres in the streets. Realizing they were confronting an enemy that recognized only violence, armed resistance began in the first month with homemade air-cannons, slingshots, and traditional muzzle-loading hunting rifles. It soon became clear that there were only two choices: between revolution, or surrender to dictatorship. At this point, thousands flocked to the countryside, either joining existing “Ethnic Armed Organizations” (EAOs) that had already been resisting the central Burmese government for decades, or forming their own new resistance organizations.
As resistance swelled in the streets, the now-deposed elected government worked to retain its legitimacy. Only days after the coup, legislators from the National League for Democracy (NLD) — the political party that secured majority control of both houses of the legislature, with help from politicians from other ousted parties, — formed the CRPH, or “Committee representing [the legislature].” The CRPH refused to recognize the authority of the military coup. One month later, the National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC) was formed, a coalition that gathered elements from the nationwide protest movement, the opposition government, and — significantly — eight ethnic armed organizations. The NUCC went on to form the National Unity Government (NUG), widely recognized as the legitimate de jure government of Myanmar.
To return to your question, I think it is a mistake to see this as “1988 but different.” The current moment is the result of a historical current that cannot be explained without the 1988 uprising. The NLD, for example, had its roots in this uprising. Since its inception as a state, there has always been a “pro-democracy” element of Burmese politics and ethnic armed organizations vying for independence or autonomy. However, never have these two elements joined forces like we are seeing today. The 1988 uprising was catalyzed in urban centers and failed to evolve into a national resistance, while today almost all liberated territory is held by the EAOs. Symbolized in the inclusion of EAO representatives in the NUCC and later NUG, the alliance between ethnic fighters seeking autonomy and pro-democracy Burmese society marks a major point of departure from previous cycles of struggle.
It seems like the tables have turned in favor of the revolution? To what do you attribute this? What would winning look like militarily and politically?
For the first time in the revolutionary history of Myanmar, the military is indeed on the backfoot. The Tatmadaw (the armed forces of Myanmar) was historically organized exclusively for the purposes of counter-insurgency, modeled after the brutal colonial repression strategy of the British empire. Through the clever use of ceasefires and autonomy agreements, it has pursued a divide and conquer strategy, isolating EAOs one at a time and destroying them with concentrated force. Before the outbreak of the “Spring revolution” against the dictatorship, the government of Myanmar was party to the NCA or “National Ceasefire Agreement” alongside signatories from ten EAOs.
Now, the situation has changed. Following the overwhelming popular opposition to the Junta and the collaboration of the NUG with the EAOs, almost every organization either withdrew from the ceasefire agreement or was otherwise attacked by the Tatmadaw (in violation of the ceasefire). Instead of having the freedom to amass forces in one section of the country, with no complaints from a largely apathetic Burmese public, the Tatmadaw was now forced to fight everywhere at once against an enemy with virtually unlimited popular support. While clashes began almost immediately following the coup, the junta suffered its first major defeat as a result of Operation 1027, which took its name from the coordinated strike on October 27 2023 by the Three Brotherhood Alliance, an alliance of three major EAOs. In just the first month of the offensive, over 220 junta positions were overrun, triggering a shockwave across the country. This was the first signal that the military regime was too overstretched to defend itself, and gave many around the country the confidence needed to begin their own offensives. As operation 1027 continues, so too do the many regional campaigns that it inspired. Since then, as you have seen, the junta has suffered defeat after defeat.
It seems that the trend will continue. Militarily, each EAO is nearing the liberation of their home states, and as PDF militias under the ostensible command of the NUG fight alongside them, slowly the Tatmadaw is losing its footing in the ethnic regions, all the while facing a guerrilla campaign around the outskirts of cities in the Bamar regions. Plain and simple, the military is losing. The ethnic areas will soon be liberated, the only remaining question being how much of that momentum will carry over into Bamar-majority regions. Many EAOs have stated plainly that in addition to their demands for autonomy, they will continue fighting until the unconditional defeat of the military dictatorship.
At a political level the goal is a bit less defined. Whoever you ask will tell you that we are all fighting for a “Federal Democracy.” What that means in practice has yet to be clearly defined and universally agreed upon, but this is understandable given the nature of the conflict and doesn’t necessarily detract from its validity as a goal.
Have you had support from other countries or international forces? Have the fighters drawn upon connections with insurgents elsewhere?
So far, support from foreign governments has been mostly marginal: recognition of the NUG as the legitimate representative of Myanmar, as well as economic sanctions against those affiliated with the junta. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has been largely non-committal, and the efforts of neighboring nations to mediate the conflict have been mostly ignored. India and China have been incredibly calculating in their relationship to the regime and rebels, overtly continuing their support of the regime while turning a blind eye to the activities of resistance groups conducting business in their own countries. This is especially true when we consider the rate at which the junta has been suffering defeats — it seems many are waiting to see how the conflict will develop before fully committing to a position.
In December 2022, the United States Congress passed the “BURMA Act,” which recognizes the NUG as the legitimate representative of Myanmar and authorizes the use of funds to support “democratic elements.” So far, this is all going through humanitarian avenues. While it isn’t guns and ammo, armed groups who are now ousting the junta from their towns are having to foot the bill for the services provided. NGOs such as USAID are able to cover a portion of that cost, which understandably reduces administrative burden significantly.
I have yet to see serious indications of meaningful connections or examples drawn from other insurgent groups. In the span of a few years, entire armies have been made out of students, teachers, workers, and the former professional class, so the focus has been on the rapid emergency armament of a people and less on the strategic analysis of methods. Many ethnicities in Myanmar have a significant diaspora in the West, and especially in the United States, where participation in the military is more common. As a result, I have seen multiple ethnic Chin from the US with a military background give trainings, and anecdotally I’m told this has happened in other regions as well.
I am aware of various communist and Maoist groups such as the Burmese Communist Party, but am not knowledgeable enough about them to comment as to their inspirations.
What lessons can be taken from the sequence of insurgency, then civil war with guerilla features? How portable is the model that has been adopted? What limits are there to translating the situation to elsewhere?
I don’t think there actually is a model that has been adopted, but rather a progression of developments that are still very much unfolding. The lessons from these are nevertheless tangible. One of the most striking is that unorganized popular resistance can only be so effective in the face of bullets. As we saw in Syria in 2011, unrest can provide the inertia necessary to begin revolution, but it cannot become the revolution in and of itself. In the case of Rojava, it was the People’s Democratic Union (PYD), dormant but organized since 2003, which was able to put the spear into the heart of the Syrian occupation, and subsequently to defend the revolution from attacks by Al-Nusra and ISIS, as well as the fascist Turkish state. Here in Burma, it was the ethnic organizations that have been resisting in the mountains for decades which were able to fight with renewed spirit and support of the people, alongside a shadow government which still holds serious claims to legitimacy.
Still, there is something to be said for the newer groups formed after the coup. These organizations and armies — hewn from nothing but the moral fiber of refusal to live under dictatorship — catalyzed around pre-existing organizational structures that later solidified during the post-coup civil disobedience movement, mostly along regional or ethnic lines.
This is not to say that the role of “the people” isn’t critical, or to imply that the revolution is made by armed vanguards alone. Rather, as revolutionaries of all nations, we should understand the critical role that organization plays. When the moment of intensity and inertia arrives, a prepared revolutionary organization must seize it. If there is no such organization at the time, one must be formed. If one is not formed, the revolution will die.
What is the culture of the fighters? What ties like with locals or other above ground elements of the struggle? Are the guerillas in the jungle isolated, or is there a lot of exchange with civilian elements?
Every ethnic organization has a political and an armed wing. Perhaps in previous times these were of a much more traditional clandestine and “guerilla” nature, but given the current inability of the central government to maintain its grasp on remote areas, these have increasingly become above-ground organizations in and of themselves. The legitimacy gained from affiliation or official relationship with the NUG helps in this regard. While the NUG has a ministry of defense that is doing its best to rally support and raise funds to support the PDFs and various EAOs with whom it has partnered, the fact that it is an exiled government means that local militias are largely responsible for funding their own operations.
This is done through a very organic relationship with the civil population, combined with a well-organized support element in the diaspora. Although the specific numbers vary group by group, roughly 50% of operational funds come from local donations and taxes, and the other 50% from the diaspora. While taxes are levied primarily on commerce vehicles passing through resistance checkpoints, the overwhelming majority of income of these groups is generated via donations from supporters. This is in part due to the nature from which these groups arose. As mentioned earlier, the civil disobedience movement following the coup commanded huge amounts of social power and organizational capital. Professionals and government workers from villages and entire cities walked off the job to join the resistance. It would be imprecise to say that the relationship with the people is “good”; more accurate would be to say that the various defense forces are themselves the people, and likewise that the people see themselves represented in the guerilla.
As to the culture of the fighters, truth be told there is still much to be desired. Imagine you have given a liberal a gun and now they are fighting fascism. They are ready to fight, but there is still a lack of a deep revolutionary perspective in many of the rank and file, and much adherence to the trappings of civil life. In a way, this is to be expected — after all, this is the story of a people in arms, who had their hopes for a peaceful transition to democratic rule snatched from them after the military coup. They had never dreamed of holding a rifle and yet, forced by circumstance and the dignity of the human spirit, they have become revolutionaries. This lack of depth should be understood but criticized; above all, it must be taken into account as a necessary feature of any successful mobilization of a people towards radical ends.
It cannot be said that every group is revolutionary. Indeed, many opportunists, especially in the border regions, have taken advantage of the chaos and formed “militias” which are little more than crime organizations in order to participate in lucrative smuggling, drug trade, or scamming markets. Groups of this nature are, as a rule, either functionally neutral to the conflict, or are tacitly supporting the junta in exchange for taking up space that the rebels cannot operate in. It should be said that these groups make up a very tiny minority, instead representing the unsavory element on the edges of any revolution.
What is the relationship between the various armed groups? Is there a coordinated command? Does this relation reflect any political distinctions, and if so, of what sort?
In Burma there are over a hundred armed groups. If we were to consider only the most significant, this number can be reduced to about a dozen, falling into one of two blocs — EAO or PDF/Bamar militia. Between these there is a complicated web of relationships, some much more collaborative than others. At scale, most groups fundamentally agree on a set of basic principles: first, that the military regime is the common enemy; second, that the fight should continue until the total defeat of the regime; third, among EAOs, that their shared goals of autonomy are working towards more or less the same end; and finally, among all groups, that the establishment of a federal system which removes the historic power of the military from government, and grants autonomous regions an equal footing in a new union, is the ultimate goal.
With this in mind, there is no “national alliance” with a coordinated strategy and logistical pipeline. This is not to say that higher-level cooperation doesn’t exist. Between EAOs especially, there is a high degree of material cooperation in the form of soldiers, training, weapons, and ammo. Sometimes entire units pack up and move across the country to take part in a strategic flashpoint which would help another group, and ultimately the progression of the revolution as a whole. In its own way, this collaboration between groups across religious and ethnic lines is itself a shining example of internationalist solidarity.
The NUG, while officially being the vehicle through which the resistance is coordinated and facilitated, is in practice a power among powers. While the NUG does not officially control as much liberated land as the EAOs by volume, the fact that they retain international legitimacy and the support of the Burmese public is enough to make them a serious unifying element. This balance of power is likely to make itself felt in any federal formation that may occur after the defeat of the dictatorship.
Not to give the skeptics ammunition for their arguments, but of course the sheer number of different groups has given rise to conflict inside and between ethnic groups. This has yet to truly explode into something tragic, but it already has made the fight against the junta more difficult in areas plagued by factionalism. However, these tensions exist mostly along regional or tribal lines, and on the national scale do not pose a threat to the unity of the largest groups who are cooperating to bring down the dictatorship. In general, the political language of every group emphasizes and reinforces the solidarity and friendship between peoples.
We’d like to understand the struggle more historically: what kind of theory or thinkers, past and present, have contributed to the present strategy? Are people reading books or websites?
Among the new wave of groups formed after the 2021 coup — those with which I have the most experience — I cannot say that I have identified any particular tendency. While I have seen individuals in leadership positions reading and studying, this is not in pursuit of a particular line of study rather than a general search for information and solutions, including options that we might not consider to be revolutionary. Social democracy has a particularly strong pull, as the country’s problematic history with “socialism” — in practice, the most absurd dictatorships — has left many sour to the concept. At the same time, the glaring contradictions of dictatorship also causes unease when “capitalism” is mentioned. While there are groups that include a socialist union in their platform, this is not the common tendency of the resistance as a whole. “Federalism” is the only word we can go off of, which includes as varied sources of study as the US and European federal systems and the revolution in Rojava.
The level of political development among the rank and file is low. Especially in the EAOs, many are motivated first of all by feelings of national pride, and only secondarily by an ideological opposition to fascism and dictatorship (though this is not uncommon in even more developed revolutionary movements). Anecdotally, my experience with Bamar comrades has been slightly different: since many come from a student background, it is not uncommon for them to engage in an individual search for more radical methods. Still, I have not noticed any preference towards any particular revolutionary tendency.
Does the current struggle employ the Maoist concepts of a protracted people’s war and urban encirclement?
Many legacy EAOs subscribed in whole or in part to a Maoist theory of guerilla war. However, although the present revolution developed along lines that Mao had identified, it did not emerge through any actual study and application of this theory. The strongholds of the EAOs in remote and mountainous regions provided the perfect springboard that the newly insurgent population needed to rapidly train, organize, and develop. While some groups may still subscribe to Maoist political and military theory, I do not have enough experience with these groups to comment about them.
What is the relationship of the revolution to the Rohingya and other disenfranchised ethnic groups from before the coup?
While there is no monolithic “revolution,” in general all parties have condemned the genocide committed by the military against the Rohingya and called for greater co-operation between ethnic groups. Given the ongoing nature of a tragedy like this one, it is a touchy subject with many elements. Exacerbating existing religious and ethnic tensions, various Islamist Rohingya organizations have allied with the military which just committed genocide against them, and are fighting against the Arakha Army, one of the largest rebel organizations. Now, Junta disinformation mills are capitalizing on the international recognition of the Rohingya genocide, trying to paint the AA as continuing this persecution. Despite evidence being shaky at best, this narrative has even been picked up by mainstream media outlets, causing confusion as to the reality of the situation.
Each region is fighting its own micro-war, with limited strategic coordination between them. Sometimes it can seem like a battle in a neighboring state might as well be happening in another country. The news that you see is the same news everyone else here is reading, so you will learn about complicated events such as hotly contested battles or tragic massacres of civilians at the same time I do. Nobody in the country wants to see the mistreatment of the Rohingya continue, and as a group they are caught in the crossfire without adequate representation. The fact that several Rohingya groups, with foreign support from private individuals in countries like Turkey, are fighting for the Junta only further complicates the situation and adds salt to an already tense relationship.
As for the relationship of the revolution with “other ethnic groups,” I think its safe to say that the revolution is itself comprised of these ethnic groups and that relations are in general friendly.
What are the politics of the insurgency? Western media describe the rebels as “pro-democracy.” From our vantage point, capitalist democracy is not revolutionary. What do the people there want, and how do they speak of it?
I have encountered this sentiment in the majority of comrades with whom I have spoken at any depth about Myanmar. It is true, there exists no mainstream element of the revolution in Myanmar upon which we can project our hopes and aspirations for revolution against the liberal systems we are faced with in the West. Perhaps even out of the mainstream, you would be hard pressed to zoom in on any particular group and highlight them as the example of a revolutionary alternative. That doesn’t change the validity of the struggle the people here are waging against the dictatorship.
I think the question of what a transition to a democratic system would look like was up in the air even before the coup. In any case, the party spearheading the push for democracy, the NLD (itself born in the aftermath of the 1988 uprisings) commands the absolute popular support of the people of Myanmar, across all ethnic and religious lines. The intent was to bloodlessly remove the stranglehold of the military from the government. When the military seized power to stop these proposed changes, the only option left on the table was revolution. It can then be understood why there is not necessarily a universally accepted revolutionary platform, especially when many EAOs had already been resisting the government for decades under a variety of motives.
I cannot speak for the people of Burma, but with their near-unanimous support of the NLD (78% of seats in the lower house, 82% in the upper house), there was a clear base for the uprising against the dictatorship. In such a case, while the future may not be as clear as we’d like it to be, I cannot envision the struggle of an entire people against dictatorship and towards a democratic system described in any way except as revolution. Whether observers will support such a perspective depends largely on their moral facilities. The people certainly perceive themselves as revolutionaries.
Take the example of Palestine. In the current struggle against Israeli occupation, the actual politics of most of the organizations waging the resistance are unquestionably bad. Yet this doesn’t change the fact that their struggle against settler colonialism grants them a certain moral authority and legitimacy. This is what explains the tension many experience in supporting Islamic fascists against occupation, or receiving US support while defending oneself against Turkish imperialism in Rojava. A similar contradiction is at issue here, just as it was in Hong Kong five years ago, where we find would-be neoliberals fighting tooth and nail against dictatorship. In my view — and perhaps this is controversial, who knows — those doing so are deserving of our revolutionary solidarity.
We’re reminded of a text that comrades in France wrote in 2016, where their message to the liberals in the Nuit debout movement was something like, “okay so, how about instead of drafting constitutions now, what if we focus on achieving the insurrection first, then sort this out later?”
Exactly.1
What is at stake geopolitically? How could we map the struggle in Myanmar to what is happening to places like Palestine, Ukraine, Haiti, Rojava, or Sudan? Has there been a circulation of ideas or practices between these places? How might a victory there resonate elsewhere?
China, Russia, and the US are all certainly keeping a very close eye on the developments in Burma. Most tangibly, Russia and the military regime have a two-way transfer of arms and munitions, and Russia forms a very serious component of Tatmadaw military capability in the form of training and equipment repair services. As China tries to improve its naval power, having Myanmar as a close ally allows it an important access point to the sea, avoiding strategic chokepoints. Conversely, the US is looking for any opportunity to create a friendly power on China’s doorstep.
Russia is the only power that will suffer from the defeat of the Junta. Ammunition manufactured in Myanmar is used on the frontlines in Ukraine. China is much more calculating, refusing to take steps necessary to cement the control of the Junta but without yet throwing its weight behind any resistance groups. It keeps its ties to the SAC warm, but turns a blind eye to cross-border resistance activity and mediates ceasefires to protect Chinese interests in areas under insurgent control.
The resistance, the diaspora, and the exiled government have strong roots in the West and especially in the US. However, the official position of the NUG has not been anti-China, and a controversial January 2024 statement pledged to safeguard Chinese interests, including recognizing Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan. While the NUG doesn’t represent every revolutionary group, this balancing act nevertheless gives context to the situation the rebels find themselves in.
Messages of support and solidarity are common both from armed resistance groups as well as civil protestors, especially in politically organized sections of the diaspora. The common throughlines run through Palestine, Rojava, Ukraine, Hong Kong, Taiwan, recently Bangladesh, and elsewhere in the similar vein. As is common in revolutionary movements with a strong diaspora component, there is lots of collaboration and intermingling in the diaspora, but I don’t have the impression that in-country there has been any serious exchange of lessons or practices yet.
A victory in Myanmar would be a victory for resisting peoples everywhere. It sends a simple yet powerful message: a rebellious people with a unified will can overthrow the systems that oppress them. In the first days of the uprising, the common analysis was that the Tatmadaw was so strong as to be militarily undefeatable; yet the people took up arms regardless, if for nothing else than a life lived with dignity. When they did rise up, they found that the giant was not as invulnerable as everyone assumed, and the façade began to crumble rapidly. Victory in Myanmar would be a victory for hope itself, for the idea that victory is possible but not inevitable, depending only on our commitment to struggle and the degree to which we are willing to organize and sacrifice for freedom..."
Source/publisher:
Freedom News (London)
Date of entry/update:
2024-09-18
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"GENEVA, Switzerland—The UN on Tuesday provided accounts of horrifying torture and an overall worsening rights situation in Myanmar, amid intensifying hostilities and the absence of rule of law.
“Myanmar is plumbing the depths of the human rights abyss,” said James Rodehaver, head of the United Nations rights office’s Myanmar team.
Speaking to reporters in Geneva, he said the office’s latest report on the situation in the war-torn country had found “massive regressions in human rights that have been provoked by a vacuum of rule of law”.
“Myanmar military has created the crisis by instrumentalizing the legal system, criminalizing nearly all forms of dissent against its attempts to rule the country,” he said.
Myanmar has been in turmoil since the military ousted Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s government and seized power in 2021.
The junta is struggling to crush resistance to its rule by long-established ethnic rebel groups and newer pro-democracy forces.
Since the coup, at least 5,350 civilians have been killed and more than 3.3 million displaced, while nearly 27,4000 people have been arrested, Tuesday’s report said.
“Credible sources indicate that at least 1,853 people have died in custody, including 88 children and 125 women,” rights office spokeswoman Liz Throssell told reporters.
Rodehaver said that since the rights office’s last report on Myanmar was published 15 months ago, the mass arrests had continued and the rights situation had continued to deteriorate.
He voiced particular concern over the “horrific conditions” in detention facilities, where torture and ill-treatment were “pervasive”.
“Detainees interviewed by our office describe methods such as being suspended from the ceiling without food or water, being forced to kneel or crawl on hard or sharp objects, the introduction of animals such as snakes or insects or other wild animals in order to provoke fear and terror in individuals,” he said.
Others, he said, described beatings with iron poles, bamboo sticks, batons, rifle butts, leather strips, electric wires and motorcycle chains.
There were also accounts of “asphyxiation, mock executions, electrocution and burning with tasers, lighters, cigarettes and boiling water”.
“There are truly some of the most depraved behavior utilized as methods of torture in these detention centers,” Rodehaver said, also decrying “extremely disturbing reports … of sexual violence both against male and female detainees”.
The UN rights office stressed the urgent need for those behind the vast array of abuses to be brought to justice.
“The lack of any form of accountability for perpetrators is an enabler for the repetition of violations, abuses and crimes,” Throssell warned.
UN rights chief Volker Turk was once again calling on the UN Security Council to refer the situation in Myanmar to the International Criminal Court, she said..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2024-09-18
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"An investigation by Justice For Myanmar and Info Birmanie has uncovered damning evidence of Aviation Industry Corporation of China's (AVIC) continued supply of aircraft and weapons to Myanmar's military junta.
The Myanmar military is using AVIC-supplied aircraft to commit war crimes and crimes against humanity against the people of Myanmar with total impunity.
The report “#Airbusted: How Airbus' close partner AVIC is supplying arms to the Myanmar military and what Airbus should do about it” details how AVIC is supplying fighter jets, combat aircraft, and military transport aircraft to the Myanmar military, which are being used in indiscriminate bombings of civilians.
The report includes new details about the recent purchase of FTC 2000G combat aircraft and various missiles.
AVIC also supports the Myanmar Air Force by continuing to provide maintenance, repair, and overhaul services for Chinese fixed-wing aircraft in use by the junta.
French aerospace giant Airbus is a major investor in AVIC's Hong Kong-listed holding company, AviChina Industry and Technology Co. Ltd., and a strategic partner of AVIC in China.
Despite AVIC's clear role in arming Myanmar's brutal junta, Airbus has not only maintained but increased its investment in and collaboration with AVIC-controlled companies. This continues even as other investors have withdrawn due to AviChina’s links to transfers of military aircraft and weapons to the Myanmar junta.
The investigation highlights a stark contradiction between the public statements and private actions of Airbus's key shareholders – the governments of Spain, Germany, and France.
While these governments have publicly condemned the Myanmar military's crimes and committed to stopping arms flows, they appear to be, at least, silent regarding Airbus's continued collaboration with AVIC behind the scenes.
Justice For Myanmar and Info Birmanie demand that Airbus immediately use its leverage to pressure AVIC to cease all collaboration with the Myanmar junta. If AVIC fails to comply, Airbus must responsibly divest from all AVIC-controlled entities.
The governments of Spain, Germany, and France must align their actions with their public commitments by ensuring Airbus acts to cut its links to war crimes in Myanmar.
The people of Myanmar deserve more than empty words. It's time for concrete action to stop the flow of arms and support to the illegal military junta.
Yadanar Maung, spokesperson for Justice For Myanmar, says:
"Airbus has been turning a blind eye to AVIC's dirty deals with the brutal Myanmar military for too long.
"With ongoing credible documentation and reporting at the UN of the human rights crisis in Myanmar, Airbus must have known that its key business partner AVIC is supplying aircraft, weapons and ongoing technical maintenance services to the junta in Myanmar.
"Airbus and its states shareholders must end the flow of arms from AVIC to the genocidal Myanmar military, or ensure Airbus ends it business with AVIC for good.
"How can we take the condemnations of Spain, Germany, and France seriously, if they have investments that sustain the junta in Myanmar?"
Johanna Chardonnieras, coordinator for Info Birmanie, says:
"Multiple tools have been put in place in France, at European and international levels to guarantee corporate responsibility. Our investigation has established serious doubts about Airbus' ability to comply with these tools in the case of the Myanmar conflict.
"Airbus is not an ordinary company, both because operates in the defence sector and because of the identity of its fixed shareholders: governments. The French, Spanish and German governments have a responsibility and a duty to act when Airbus’ partner and investee is linked in war crimes.
"The French, Spanish and German governments, alongside the European Union, have condemned the atrocities committed in Myanmar. Today they have the opportunity to show their capacity for action, in line with their statements, values and sanctions."..."
Source/publisher:
Justice For Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2024-09-16
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"BANGKOK, Thailand (4 September 2024) – The Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development (FORUM-ASIA) condemns the Myanmar military junta’s plan to expand the age limit of its forced conscription policy.
We are calling on the international community to express solidarity with the people of Myanmar.
The junta’s plan to extend the age limit of forced conscription represents its desperate attempt to tighten its grip on power amid its losing streak against the growing pro-democracy resistance movement.
On 25 August 2024, junta leader Senior General Min Aung Hlaing announced plans to introduce a new “security system with public participation,” which required men aged 35 to 60 to serve as guards, with the possibility of being sent to the frontlines of fighting forces.
On 16 August 2024, the junta established the Central Supervisory Committee for People’s Security and Anti-Terrorism to organise a military training. The committee is also tasked to form branch offices at regional, district, and township levels to oversee “people’s security and anti-terrorism” groups.
The junta’s plan follows its forced conscription policy implemented on 10 February 2024. The policy activates the 2010 People’s Military Service Law, mandating men aged 18 to 35 and women aged 18 to 27 to serve two years in the military, with professionals such as doctors and engineers potentially serving up to five years. Those evading service or assisting others to do so face up to five years in prison. The junta planned to conscript 5,000 individuals monthly starting in April 2024.
Civilians used for forced labor and human shields
FORUM-ASIA has condemned the junta’s forced conscription policy. The military has a documented history of using civilians as human shields as well as forcing them into hard labor.
Since the attempted coup in 2021, the military junta continues to impose forced labor and recruitment amidst armed conflict, the International Labour Organization’s Commission of Inquiry found in October 2023.
The military junta is also forcibly abducting and arresting citizens, using them as human shields, according to local news and human rights groups.
Rather than be forced to fight for a war they did not choose, the forced conscription has pushed Myanmar’s youth to flee their homes to join the resistance movement..
United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres expressed concern over the reported forced detention and recruitment of Myanmar youth. UN Special Rapporteur on the situation in Myanmar, Tom Andrews, also noted how the junta has been intensifying its assault on civilians–utilizing powerful weapons–following its troop losses and recruitment challenges.
Call to action
FORUM-ASIA calls on the Myanmar military junta to immediately halt its forced conscription policy, abductions, forced labor, and use of civilians as human shields.
“FORUM-ASIA urges the international community, including the UN and ASEAN to thoroughly investigate the Myanmar military junta’s long list of human rights violations. The junta should be held accountable for all its crimes through sanctions and other punitive measures,” said Mary Aileen Diez-Bacalso, Executive Director of FORUM-ASIA.
“The international community must urgently isolate the junta and support the people of Myanmar in their struggle for justice and freedom,” Bacalso added...'
Source/publisher:
FORUM-ASIA
Date of entry/update:
2024-09-04
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Title: Evolution of the Myanmar Revolution (Part 3): The Factors That Sparked the Current Revolution
Description:
"One spring morning in 2021, the sky fell: The military was staging another coup. That’s what every citizen felt, as they knew nothing would be the same in their lives or for their nation.
Twenty years earlier, on Sept. 11, 2001, when Islamic terrorists launched their deadly attacks on New York’s World Trade Center in what would become known as the 9/11 attacks, we all witnessed shocking live video of a jetliner flying into the North Tower, followed soon after by another flying into the South Tower. As the towers exploded in fireballs, with smoke pouring from within, followed by their horrifying collapse, it definitely seemed to all as if the sky was falling—especially for the onlookers in lower Manhattan.
On Feb. 1, 2021, when the military seized power in Myanmar, the sky—the whole sky—fell for the Myanmar people. The coup staged by military leader Min Aung Hlaing has inflicted huge damage on the country and devastated the entire population of 55 million.
Since Day One, nothing has been the same for Myanmar’s society, politics and economy. It changed everything—crushing the existing social order, shattering the economy, destroying the livelihoods of the people and forcing the country into a revolution. For the Myanmar people, the coup was “The Attack”, worse than any terrorist attack and different from the coups the country experienced in 1962 and 1988.
A day of hope turns into doomsday
Feb. 1, 2021 began as a day of promise for the country and its people; on that day their newly elected or reelected lawmakers were due to assemble in Parliament and a second five-year term was due to begin for the civilian government first formed in 2016—54 years after the first coup in 1962. Though the civilian government had in its first term faced both expected and unexpected political turbulence as it struggled to negotiate a system designed and manipulation by the military—the military-drafted constitution, the military’s quota of 25 percent of seats in Parliament, military-appointed ministerial positions in the government, the obstructions of a military-backed party, and the conservative military leaders themselves—the coming term, many believed, would further the country’s political transition toward democracy, autonomy for ethnic states and economic growth.
By the time the sun rose, however, the coup had crushed the expectations, held by the entire population, that their country was heading in the right direction thanks to the result of the votes they cast less than three months earlier. The coup leader, Min Aung Hlaing, tried to justify his takeover by claiming that the election was fraudulent—a claim rejected by the majority of Myanmar people as well as independent international electoral observers. The putsch was not the first; multiple generations have been affected by the military’s repeated deceptions—first in 1962, a second time in 1988 and again this time in 2021. Their anger at the military was tripled.
The latest takeover sparked an uprising, stirring what had been a stable Myanmar to get angry again. According to dictionary definitions, “angry” means: “having the feeling people get when something unfair, painful or bad happens,” or: “having a strong feeling against someone who has behaved badly, making you want to shout at them or hurt them.” Both definitions literally capture the feeling of the Myanmar people when the military staged the coup. That’s one of the elements that has brought Myanmar to revolution this time.
But the Spring Revolution ignited by the coup did not begin as a real revolution. At first, it was a nationwide uprising like the one in 1988. One definition of “revolution” is: “a change in the way a country is governed, usually to a different political system and often using violence or war.” That’s what happened a few months after the coup. Like every revolution throughout world history, Myanmar’s revolution had multiple causes.
Immediate elements for a revolution
A coup is a way to kill democracy, but Min Aung Hlaing’s coup killed much more than that.
It also killed every potential political process and all platforms that might lead to democracy and federalism.
What his coup killed:
the 2020 election results (a landslide victory for the NLD).
the elected civilian government and Parliament.
the democratic transition started in 2011 by the coup maker’s ex-boss, General-turned-President Thein Sein.
the national reconciliation process involving an elected government, other key stakeholders (including ethnic organizations) and the military, as well as public support for the process as an alternative to
the ceasefire or peace process, which prompted many EAOs to join the new armed resistance after the coup.
the opinion held by the public, including politicians, ethnic leaders and civil society groups (except military sympathizers), that the military leadership at that time was a key stakeholder in the democratization process.
With those political platforms destroyed, the people were deeply aware that this coup would end the “best and freest” period they had known, that it was different from the two dictatorships, both of which lasted for decades, that preceded it; that this coup would destroy everything: their lives, businesses, education, opportunities, hopes and dreams, now and in the future—in other words, forever.
All generations, from grandparents to their grandchildren, felt sad, hopeless and angry. These emotions feed into political discontent as an essential element for revolution.
A new level of butchery
In the beginning, the uprising was peaceful, organized, and even colorful and creative as demonstrators, mostly members of Generation Z, staged protests in various ways, including street performances. Their demands were simple—truth and democratic values, as expressed in their slogans: “Down with the military dictatorship!”, “Respect our votes!” “Free our leaders.” In addition to these demands, huge graffiti appeared on city walls, expressing their anger: “Fuck the coup!”
But the Myanmar military has never changed when it comes to its oppressive attitude and conservative mentality, which have been institutionalized over many decades since the first coup. If anything, it has only gotten worse. The way the regime troops responded to the peaceful demonstrations was much worse than any other crackdown, even in their brutal history.
They indulged in a new level of butchery this time. Soon after the coup in 2021, the junta troops started killing young peaceful protesters execution-style, aiming for their heads and hearts. Victims of the junta this time were from all generations. One of the youngest victims was 5-year-old Khin Myo Chit, who was killed in her home in Mandalay. Another was 19-year-old Kyal Sin, who was shot in the head while protesting on a street in Mandalay. My former fellow political prisoner Ko Soe Moe Hlaing (aka Mae Gyi)—by this time in his early 50s, he had taken part in the ’88 uprising, joined the ABSDF student army, and was jailed in the 1990s for 13 years—was tortured to death within two days of his arrest at home in Yangon in May 2021.
Within a few months, Min Aung Hlaing had turned Myanmar into a “killing field”. The streets were bloody; funerals were being held in every city; houses were deserted; prisons were packed; the nation was crying.
The mood of the people was as if murderers were at their door; all their dreams had been torn apart; nothing good was left and evil prevailed; the dark age had returned as they saw their country fall again into the abyss of military dictatorship, realizing their worst fears. This left the majority of Myanmar people feeling so desperate they’d rather fight back than submit to military rule. The hard lessons from their bitter experiences in the past strengthened their feelings.
Bitter lessons of the past fuel revolution
The hard lessons the Myanmar people learned under the previous coups and from earlier resistance movements also served as foundations for a revolutionary period. These feelings, determination and lessons were accumulated over 60 years of consecutive military dictatorships.
As discussed in Part 2 of this series, the Myanmar people learned from the ’88 Uprising and the following years under the then junta:
Popular uprisings don’t work because the generals will simply oppress them. (Yes, once again.)
Elections and even landslide victories don’t work because the generals will reject them. (They did it again!)
Nonviolent methods don’t work because the generals respond with violence. (They are ferociously violent this time.)
Pressure from the international community doesn’t work because the generals don’t play by its standards. (Exactly the same.)
Having learned those hard lessons, they are more politically aware that this military, with the same mentality of the generals, will repeat what it did in the past and will even choose a worse path, as they are doing now.
Given all these hard lessons from the past and present, combined with the specific elements of the present, the new level of butchery and their feelings of sadness, anger and fear, they had only one option left—a revolution.
The final battle—do or die!
Driven by this impetus, they started to fight the junta with their bare hands. Their revolution was a reaction against the junta’s injustice and cruelty. They started to wage their “war” with makeshift “weapons” like slingshots, catapults, air guns made from blue plastic pipes, slings and bamboo arrows. Many of them were killed, but they refused to cower. In short, the whole terrible situation drove young people in different regions and states to take up arms for “the final battle”, as they put it, which means “do or die”— a different level of fighting from the 1988 Uprising.
Not only young Bamar people from Yangon, Mandalay, Sagaing, Magwe, Tanintharyi and other regions but also ethnic youths from Chin, Karenni, Kachin, Karen and other states decided to fight back with whatever they had—even with rudimentary hunting rifles. They flocked to ethnic armed group-controlled areas to undergo military training. While some of them returned to their towns to join underground movements, most remained in the jungle to form their own anti-regime armed resistance forces across the country.
Meanwhile, the formation of the National Unity Government (NUG) by elected NLD lawmakers and their ethnic allies—not only as an umbrella organization for the anti-regime movement but also as a parallel government to challenge the junta’s legitimacy at home and abroad—has given people more faith in the revolution as they see the NUG as their legitimate government. The NUG has worked with some anti-regime EAOs and their collaboration has seen a mushrooming of People’s Defense Force groups (PDFs) across the country.
This was a different level of resistance, and marked the beginning of a revolution against the military dictatorship, after the young resistance fighters (some of them were first-time voters) saw their votes and democratic rights discarded. This revolution initiated by a diverse new generation of young Bamar and ethnic fighters was also different from the autonomy-based struggle started by some EAOs many decades ago. That’s why we’ve been seeing members of PDFs fighting alongside experienced EAOs like the Kachin Independence Army, the Ta’ang National Liberation Army, the Karen National Union, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army and others in various military offensives. They’ll do whatever it takes to end the military dictatorship, as rooting out the system is their common goal.
This is the first revolution in Myanmar’s modern history.
Unprecedented coordination
Unlike the 1988 coup, many established ethnic armed organizations have taken a political stand in solidarity with the anti-coup movement. They have supported, trained and equipped newly arrived young fighters and have fought the junta troops with them. Such coordination had never before been seen in the history of armed struggle in Myanmar, bringing together young and old generations, old and new fighters and newly-formed PDFs and established EAOs, though of course there have been disagreements and arguments.
An important factor this time is that many EAOs have the same feeling as young fighters and the people about this latest coup. The military has always bullied and betrayed the people but this time they went too far. For many of the EAOs who sympathize with the anti-military regime movement, the latest takeover was a testament to the fact that the military couldn’t be trusted, especially in the peace process they participated in with the military for many years. The result was that following the coup they openly stated that they would no longer participate in the regime’s peace process.
The collaboration between PDFs and EAOs put the Myanmar people’s hopes of toppling the regime in high gear and saw them join hands to support the revolution by establishing crowdfunding among their compatriots at home and abroad, generating millions of dollars. It’s the Myanmar people’s support that has kept the revolution moving forward for more than three years now while the world merely offers lip service, and not a dime in material assistance.
While the people’s financial support for the revolution plays an important role, new technology like mobile phones and the internet have become another powerful force in the Spring Revolution. Unlike in 1988, information technology in 2021 enabled the people to record the regime’s atrocities on their phones, allowing the world to see how brutal the junta is. Furthermore, the internet also makes crowdfunding easier as well-wishers can contribute to the revolution with a few taps on their phones. On the front lines, the PDFs have successfully turned commercial drones into objects of fear for the regime troops, capable of carrying bombs.
The junta’s terror tactics intensify the revolutionary spirit
The junta and its military have resorted to the worst forms of brutality. They have attacked not only resistance fighters but the civilian population for supporting them. They have used all methods and weapons—from Su-30 fighter jets to MI-17 and MI-35 military helicopters, to helicopter gunships and all forms of artillery. Junta fighter jets have bombed village schools while students are learning; its troops have torched houses, churches and monasteries in villages and towns; they have kidnapped, tortured and beheaded innocent villagers. They use these tactics to terrify the public.
Over the past three years, according to the UN and observer groups, junta fighter jets have carried out 5,800 airstrikes. Its troops have killed around 5,600 people, including more than 1,000 women and 705 children, mostly in artillery barrages, airstrikes and shootings. And more than 27,200 people have been arrested. An estimated 3 million people have been forced from their homes since the coup.
But the junta’s terror tactics haven’t been able to weaken the revolution. Instead, they have only intensified the revolutionary spirit. Since last October, the resistance fighters, both PDFs and EAOs, have launched unprecedented military offensives like Operation 1027, seizing many military bases, outposts and towns in different states and regions. And because of their operations, thousands of soldiers have already surrendered.
In the beginning, scholars and observers believed that this resistance initiated by young resistance fighters would be crushed by the brutal tactics of the military. This view reflects their failure to grasp the revolutionary spirit of the Myanmar people this time, or to understand how and why this revolution has evolved step by step based on previous coups and resistance movements and the bitter lessons learned over the past 60 years, or to understand the key elements in this revolution.
No more deals with the criminal generals
After this latest coup, the military has become the enemy of the people again. This time, it is seen as a genuine enemy, one with whom there can be no compromise, under any conditions. In the past, most political forces from political parties to the prominent ’88 generation student group to ethnic armed organizations agreed to compromise and open negotiations with the military. It was a kind of national political tendency before the 2021 coup. They all tried to achieve national reconciliation with the military. Because not only different political leaders and ethnic leaders but also the general public thought reconciliation would be the best way to avoid confrontation and more bloodshed, despite the military’s long-term human rights violations and its greed for power. It was probably based on a traditional view that the Myanmar military was too powerful to collapse. Another thought was the military leaders might change positively, like military generals in other countries. That was the policy adopted by the National League for Democracy when it tried to work with a semi-civilian government led by ex-General Thein Sein in the 2010s.
But that didn’t work either. During that “democratic transition” period (2011-2020), the Myanmar people learned other lessons from the ex-generals’ quasi-civilian government:
“Democratic transition” doesn’t work.
National reconciliation doesn’t work.
Ceasefire or peace processes don’t work.
So, the “national reconciliation” era is over and the “peace process” has failed. Likewise, the junta’s election proposal has been rejected by the public. It will not turn back as long as this military exists. This is because the military leaders have repeatedly destroyed the public’s trust and hopes, and have rebuffed every opportunity they have been offered to join other stakeholders and the public in sincerely rebuilding a democratic nation based on federalism. All tolerance for them is gone.
In the place of national reconciliation, only justice will be available for the criminal generals and their collaborators. Only justice will heal the wounded Myanmar people; only justice will bring about a future from which war has been banished. That’s all the Myanmar people want this time. No more Ne Win. No more Than Shwe. No more Min Aung Hlaing. No more junta. No more quasi-civilian governments, either.
For many Myanmar people, they are fighting this revolution with all that they have left—their flesh, blood and their remaining belongings. So, this is the final battle, one they can’t lose, one on which they have bet their lives—it is do or die.
Understanding this evolution of the Myanmar revolution, everyone, including our neighboring countries and the rest of the international community, should understand that old, military-centered solutions that led nowhere over the past many decades—like elections planned by the junta and negotiations with the criminal generals—are nothing but empty and insincere diplomatic gestures.
Those who support the generals—China, Russia, India and others—only insult the Myanmar people who have been fighting this revolution with their own blood, flesh and funding.
This is the Myanmar revolution (စစ်အာဏာရှင်တော်လှန်ရေး), whose goal is to uproot the military dictatorship, including the military institution’s political culture—its unethical, brutal, lie-ridden, corrupt culture—forever, in a final battle. Once it is won, the vicious circle of Myanmar’s modern history will end, and a new chapter can begin. This time, having suffered this decades-long cycle created by the military, all Myanmar people deserve a successful revolution that will allow them to live in the free world..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2024-09-03
[field_licence]
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Individual Documents
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Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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"The Chinese government has found itself on the receiving end of a torrent of condemnation from Myanmar people over a threat it reportedly made against the ethnic Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) for fighting the regime.
The warning issued by the Ruili Town Security Committee on Thursday told the TNLA to “immediately stop fighting and cooperate with China in maintaining peace and stability in northern Shan State and along the China-Myanmar border or face more deterrent and disciplinary actions.”
Despite arguments over the authenticity of the warning, the TNLA confirmed that it had received the warning in the form of a letter.
When asked by AFP about the letter during a press conference in Beijing, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson replied, “China is closely following the situation in Myanmar and the developments of the conflict in northern Myanmar, and has been working to promote peace talks and ceasefire.
“China will continue to play a constructive role for Myanmar’s peace and reconciliation process and promote the de-escalation in northern Myanmar.”
Since the Chinese Embassy in Myanmar shared the ministry’s reply on its Facebook on Saturday, thousands of netizens in Myanmar have responded to the post, slamming Beijing for interfering in Myanmar’s domestic affairs while expressing their support for the TNLA.
Netizens said they understand China’s concerns over border stability and its interests in Myanmar, but added that China should not put pressure on Myanmar’s popular revolt against the regime.
The post had attracted 6.3k comments as of noon Monday, most of them criticizing China for its threat against the TNLA.
Octopus, an anti-regime group waging guerrilla warfare in Yangon, commented under the post: “We are revolutionaries. We listen to the voices of our people. The comments you see are the testimony to the voices of our people. If you listen to the voices of the people, people’s government, and ethnic forces, and stand by the side of the truth, you will gain huge benefits as a good neighbor.”
Other netizens called on China to support revolutionary forces including the civilian National Unity Government instead of the “fascist” military if it really wants to see peace and stability in Myanmar.
Some said the warning was evidence of Beijing’s meddling in Myanmar’s internal affairs despite its repeated claims that it does not do so. Many warned that in the future China would be collectively punished by the Myanmar people—such as through increased anti-China sentiment—if it turns a blind eye to their will.
The National Unity Consultative Council, the NUG’s advisory body, issued a statement on Saturday condemning China’s “impertinent threat and insult against the army of the ethnic Ta’ang people and the popular revolt”.
Prominent former 88-Generation student leader U Min Ko Naing told anti-regime media PVTV: “Those who made threats must recognize the reality. The revolutionary people are prepared to face anything. They will not surrender to the bullying of any big power. They will not allow any threat to destroy a revolution that has cost many lives and limbs, while the destination is not far.”
China issued the warning as the TNLA, one of the three members of the Brotherhood Alliance of ethnic armies, is in the midst of installing its own administrations in townships it has seized from the regime in northern Shan State during the alliance’s anti-regime offensive, known as Operation 1027.
The warning was issued after China ended a three-day live-fire drill on the Chinese border on Thursday, and followed Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s visit to Naypyitaw in mid-August.
When he held informal talks with counterparts from Myanmar, Thailand and Laos in Chiang Mai following his Naypyitaw visit, Wang insisted that three basic principles must be adhered to regarding the Myanmar “issue.” The principles he cited are: that Myanmar should not be subject to civil strife, should not be detached from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, and should not be infiltrated or interfered with by external forces..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2024-09-02
[field_licence]
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Individual Documents
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Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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"A provincial agency of China’s Yunnan province bordering Shan State has warned the ethnic Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) to immediately stop fighting the Myanmar regime in northern Shan or face “more deterrent and disciplinary measures”. The Ruili City Security Commission made the warning in a statement issued Thursday. Ruili is a major trading hub on the border with Myanmar, across from Muse in Shan State.
It urged the TNLA to cooperate with China in “maintaining peace and stability” in northern Shan State and along the China-Myanmar border, and to ensure the safety of the border and the people who live in the area, as well as of Chinese projects and Chinese nationals in Myanmar.
“End all military activities harmful to Chinese border stability and to the lives and properties of Chinese citizens. Otherwise, China will take more deterrent and disciplinary measures. And you [the TNLA] will be entirely responsible for the consequences,” the Chinese-language statement reads.
The commission urged the TNLA to swiftly return to dialogue with the regime, saying it was the right path to settle differences.
It said China is willing to continue to play a “constructive” role and help to restore peace in northern Myanmar, and will help the TNLA assert its rightful claims.
“We are watching where you [the TNLA] are heading,” the commissioned warned.
TNLA spokeswoman Lway Yay Oo told The Irrawaddy on Friday that the group had read the statement and that its Central Committee was still discussing how to respond.
“The Chinese government has been putting pressure on us in various ways since before we resumed Operation 1027 [in June]. It is pressuring us by blocking trade routes and trade flows to us,” the spokeswoman said.
Another TNLA source said the Chinese government is also urging other ethnic armed groups in northern and eastern Shan to block trade routes to prevent the flow of foods, medicine and fuel to the TNLA.
At a press conference on Friday, when asked about the Chinese warning to the TNLA to stop fighting, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lin Jian said China “will continue to play a constructive role for Myanmar’s peace and reconciliation process and promote the deescalation in northern Myanmar”, the ministry said.
The Chinese embassy in Yangon was not available for comment on Friday.
The TNLA is a member of the Brotherhood Alliance, which launched Operation 1027 in northern Shan State last year, seizing hundreds of junta bases and command centers, and 24 junta military battalion headquarters as well as around 20 towns and vital trade routes with China.
The operation was halted in northern Shan State on Jan. 10 after Beijing brokered a ceasefire between the ethnic alliance and the regime. However, the TNLA and another member of the ethnic alliance, the Myanmar Nationalities Democratic Alliance Army, resumed their operation in northern Shan State on June 25 after the regime’s military repeatedly bombed the TNLA’s territory, breaching the China-brokered ceasefire.
Since the resumption of the operation, the ethnic armies and allied resistance groups have seized the capital of northern Shan State, Lashio, along with the Myanmar military’s Northeastern Command, which was based in the city, as well as Kyaukme, Nawnghkio and Mongmit towns.
As part of the operation, along with the TNLA, several resistance groups including People’s Defense Forces under the civilian National Unity Government have seized Mogoke, Singu, Tagaung and Thabeikkyin townships in neighboring Mandalay Region..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-31
[field_licence]
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Individual Documents
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Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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"The Arakan Army (AA) says its troops have penetrated Maung Shwe Lay Naval Base, the junta’s last remaining stronghold in Thandwe Township, Rakhine State.
“Fighting is raging around Maung Shwe Lay and Kwin Wyne naval bases,” AA spokesman Khaing Thukha told The Irrawaddy.
He said the two bases, located near the world-famous Ngapali Beach, are key naval strongholds in the western coastal province.
AA troops launched the onslaught on Maung Shwe Lay Naval Base in Thabyugyaing after seizing Thandwe town and the adjacent Ngapali Beach last month.
“AA troops have entered parts of the naval base and seized most of it. Junta soldiers around the base have fled their posts and the AA is clearing the area,” a source close to the ethnic army said.
Fighting is also raging in Kyeintali town, around 60 kilometers down the coast from Thandwe.
The junta responded to attacks on Maung Shwe Lay by reinforcing its fleet of four to five patrol boats with naval vessels from Pathein in Ayeyarwady Region. The base now houses around eight Navy boats, according to residents.
The regime has been using the boats to ship reinforcements and artillery supplies, the AA information department reported on Monday.
Junta forces are also conducting aerial attacks on villages surrounding the base as clashes intensify, inflicting civilian casualties, the AA said.
Since launching its Rakhine offensive in November, the AA has seized Pauktaw, Kyauktaw, Ponnagyun, Mrauk-U, Minbya, Myebon, Rathedaung, Buthidaung, Ramree townships, plus Paletwa Township in neighboring Chin State. It has also captured most of Maungdaw Township on the border with Bangladesh..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-30
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Arakan (Rakhine) State - reports etc. by date (latest first), Rakhine (Arakanese) - cultural, political, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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Sub-title:
Security officials told the insurgent group they would 'teach them a lesson' if they didn’t comply.
Description:
"Chinese authorities warned an ethnic minority insurgent group on Myanmar’s northeastern border to stop fighting the Myanmar military or be “responsible for the consequences,” according to a spokesperson for the group.
China has extensive economic interests in neighboring Myanmar, including oil and gas pipelines and mines, and it has been increasingly concerned about the impact of a surge of fighting this year between various insurgent forces and the military
A spokesman for the insurgent group, the Ta’ang National Liberation Army, or TNLA, told Radio Free Asia that the security committee in the Chinese border town of Ruili told the TNLA in a letter to stop fighting.
“Fighting must stop immediately in order to maintain stability and peace on the China-Myanmar border and protect the lives of Chinese citizens,” the Chinese security committee said in the letter, copies of which were posted online.
If the TNLA did not comply, China would “teach them a lesson,” and the group would be “responsible for the consequences,” the security committee said.
Radio Free Asia was not able to contact the security committee in Ruili and the Chinese Embassy in Yangon did not respond to a request for comment by the time of publication. However, during a regular press briefing in Beijing on Friday, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lin Jian told reporters that China is "highly concerned about ... the conflict in northern Myanmar" and "will continue to ... promote the easing and cooling of the situation" in the region.
A spokesperson for the TNLA, Lway Yay Oo, confirmed that the letter was from Chinese authorities but declined further comment except to say the group’s top leaders were meeting to discuss it.
China is known to maintain contacts with Myanmar rebel groups operating along its border, some of which have promised to protect Chinese business interests.
China-brokered two short-lived ceasefires between a three-party insurgent alliance, which includes the TNLA, and the junta this year but the truces collapsed and the insurgents stepped up pressure on the military, capturing numerous outposts, several major towns and a regional military headquarters. RFA was unable to independently confirm whether the warning was also sent to the other armies that make up the alliance -- the Arakan Army and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army.
China also maintains close ties with the junta that seized power in a 2021 coup, and is keen to limit the influence in Myanmar of Western countries and Myanmar’s other big neighbor, India.
RELATED STORIES:
Myanmar’s old army leader calls on China to help restore stability
China’s frustration with the Myanmar junta’s incompetence mounts
As Myanmar junta falters, rival ethnic armies jostle in Shan state
Exercises
China is hoping an election the junta has promised to hold next year can help restore peace and stability, analysts say, while at the same time it is pressing anti-junta forces to agree to peace.
Media reported this week that China had closed the border between Ruili and the Myanmar town of Muse, cutting off trade including fuel supplies apparently to pressure the TNLA to silence its guns.
In a show of force, China’s People’s Liberation Army began military exercises, including live-fire drills, in the Ruili area on Tuesday. China’s defense ministry said the drills would strengthen border security and stability.
In mid-August, China fired warning shots into Kachin state to the north apparently in a bid to warn off junta aircraft bombing an insurgent base on the border.
Myanmar political and military analyst Than Soe Naing said there was little China could do to stop the war apart from making threats and imposing border restrictions on the insurgent groups and their leaders.
“These restrictions can’t actually limit the battles that are being fought from Nawnghkio township in Shan state to Pyinoolwin township in Mandalay,” Than Soe Naing said, referring to a broad swathe of central-northeast Myanmar where rebel forces have been making advances..."
Source/publisher:
"Radio Free Asia" (USA)
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-30
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Various groups
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"(Excerpt)
This Incident Report describes an event occurred in Kaw T’Ree (Kawkareik) Township, Dooplaya District. On March 20th 2024, an air strike was conducted by the State Administration Council (SAC) onto G--- village, Noh Poe village tract, Kaw T’Ree Township, killing one villager and injuring two. Saw A--- was travelling with his infant when an aircraft flew over them in G--- village. After hearing the sound of aircraft a second time, he got his child to safety with his wife in a bunker, but he was fatally hit by the air strike. Saw A--- was sent to a local clinic, located in B--- village, P’Lu village tract, by local authorities, but passed away en route. Saw A--- was survived by his wife and three children. The air strike also injured two women and destroyed five houses, one elementary school and one middle school.[1]
Part 3 – Complete Description of the Incident
Describe the Incident(s) in complete detail.
On March 20th 2024, in the evening, an air strike was conducted on G--- village, Noh Poe village tract, Kaw T’Ree Township. When Saw A--- had finished showering, it was around 5 pm. Saw A---’s four-month-old son was unwell, so Saw A--- rode his bike to take his child to a [local] medical nurse who lived in the same village [around 200 meters away from his home]. His wife, Naw F---, had given birth four months prior so she did not accompany her husband. When Saw A--- reached half-way [to the nurse’s house], he heard the sound of an aircraft flying across the sky, so he stopped his bike, hid in a covered place and watched the aircraft pass over him [, as witnessed by a local villager named Naw E---].
After, he met with the medic nurse and did the checkup for his son, Saw A--- visited Naw E--- [a villager from G--- village,] at her house [around 40 meters from the local nurse’s house]. As Saw A--- was eating betel nut [at Naw E---’s house], he heard the sound of an aircraft once again, around 15 minutes after the first aircraft. This time, the aircraft sounded like it was dipping down. In fear, he rushed to bring his son to safety with his wife.
As soon as he reached his wife, Naw F---, she went inside the [underground] bunker. While they [mother and three children] were in the bunker, Saw A--- was [outside] searching to see where the aircraft was. He saw the SAC fighter jet drop a bomb, so he tried to flee to a covered place, but he could not reach safety. The bomb landed beside him and his body was propelled by the force of the explosion. He was found lying next to a house, injured all over. Saw A--- was taken to a KNLA-run clinic in B--- village [also known as B--- clinic], P’Lu village tract, Kaw T’Ree Township, by the Cobra Column[7] security in Dooplaya District, but he died on the way. His wife became a widow with three children. [At the time of the incident,] his eldest child was 9 years old, middle child was 5 years old, and the youngest was 4 months old.
The bomb also injured two women, including Naw E--- [who Saw A--- had visited], as reported by Saw A---’s brother named Saw C---. Naw E--- was minorly injured on her face. The other elderly woman [unknown name] was injured severely on her stomach. The injured villagers were sent to B--- clinic with Saw A---.
The air strike also destroyed five villagers’ houses, an elementary school located inside an animist temple’s area, and one middle school located near a football ground in G--- village..."
Source/publisher:
"Karen Human Rights Group"
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-30
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Karen Human Rights Group (KHRG) reports, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations, Armed conflict in Burma - attacks on civilians
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Sub-title:
The government-in-exile says the vote would be a sham and has vowed to accelerate its offensive.
Description:
"Myanmar’s military junta, which seized power in a 2021 coup d’etat from a civilian government, has declared it intends to hold a general election in November 2025.
But armed rebel groups and members of the shadow National Unity Government, or NUG – made up of former civilian leaders – are opposed to the vote, which they say would be a sham, allowing the military to legitimize its control over the country.
Ever since the coup, the country has been wracked by a civil war, with ethnic armies and rebel groups gaining the upper hand over the past year, pushing the military back on its heels.
On Tuesday, the NUG said it would try to speed up its offensive against the military to gain even more territory – where they would boycott elections – and double international outreach efforts.
Why does the junta want to hold elections?
Facing a series of battlefield defeats and troop surrenders, military leaders are searching for an exit strategy to a civil war that will drag on and that increasingly appears they will not win. Holding elections may be a bid by the junta to create a sense of normalcy and political stability in the country – in part to placate its northern neighbor China, one of its few international backers.
The military leaders probably are hoping to legitimize their control of Myanmar’s government by manipulating the electoral process to ensure that their preferred candidates win, experts say. Doing so would allow them to retain power under the guise of a democratic system.
The junta is also hoping that plans to hold an election will ease international pressure and sanctions, and even give the regime international recognition by showing a commitment to the democratic process – regardless of whether the polls are manipulated.
Meanwhile, on the ground, the junta’s recent enactment of a military draft to shore up troop shortages and formation of a committee to arm communities at the village level appear to be aimed in part at providing security for the would-be polls.
Why are Myanmar’s armed opposition groups so opposed to such an election?
Junta opponents say a history of election fraud under military rule – and the junta’s crackdown on any form of dissent – means it is highly unlikely any such election will be free and fair. It would be illegitimate and aimed at securing power for the junta, rather than ushering in a democratic transition, they say.
These doubts are bolstered by the junta’s exclusionary electoral process that would deny many groups a stake in the country’s future.
Instead, the rebel groups say they will ratchet up their attacks on junta positions to increase their territory and block elections in areas under their control.
Furthermore, the armed opposition says the junta is using the election as a distraction from the ongoing civil war and its human rights abuses. Many groups say they will focus on resisting the junta militarily while advocating for democratic reforms without a ballot.
"The military council has planned to hold a fake election as their last resort next year,” NUG Prime Minister Mahn Win Khaing Than said Tuesday. “Some countries will support the elections, encouraging the junta to continue the plan by all possible means. With thorough consideration, we need to speed up our offensives and political measures.”
Is the junta even able to stage elections?
Junta chief Senior Gen. Min Aung Hlaing has made promises to hold the ballot ever since the coup in early 2021, with little progress made.
Junta forces have lost significant territory this year to various rebel groups, and its Union Election Commission said this week that a vote would need to be conducted “first in places where the situation is fine and stable,” followed by “areas that are moderately stable.”
The junta extended a state of emergency for another six months on July 31, the sixth extension since the 2021 coup. The constitution mandates that elections must be held within six months after a state of emergency is lifted. The junta is also planning to organize a census this October to prepare for the polls, but observers say that may be difficult..."
Source/publisher:
"Radio Free Asia" (USA)
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-30
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"Editor’s Note: If you or someone you know is struggling with suicidal thoughts or mental health matters, please call the 988 Suicide & Crisis Lifeline by dialing 988 to connect with a trained counselor, or visit the 988 Lifeline website.
Hong Kong/New Delhi
CNN
—
Delivery driver Maung Maung’s wife and young daughter hadn’t eaten in three days, he recalled, when he walked into an internet cafe in his hometown of Mandalay, Myanmar, in late 2022.
He had recently been detained and tortured by the country’s military junta for weeks, he said, on suspicion of transporting goods for opposition forces, during which time his wife had been forced to take out loans to support the family.
When he was finally released, he had lost his job and the family found themselves penniless and ridden with debt. Desperate, Maung Maung went on Facebook and offered to sell his kidney.
“In that moment, I felt life was so harsh. There is no other way I could survive other than to rob or kill people for money,” he said. “My wife was the same, she didn’t want to stay in this world anymore. But only for the sake of our daughter we stayed.”
Months later in July 2023, Maung Maung, who asked to use a pseudonym for safety reasons, traveled to India for the transplant surgery. A wealthy Chinese-Burmese businessman had bought his kidney for 10 million Burmese kyat ($3,079), nearly twice the annual average urban household income in Myanmar, according to 2019 data from UN affiliated Myanmar Information Management Unit.
Maung Maung is not the only one.
A year-long CNN investigation has revealed desperate people in Myanmar, also known as Burma, hawking their organs to wealthy people on Facebook. With the help of agents, they travel to India, for instance, for transplants — defying laws in both countries, where selling organs is illegal.
CNN found posts offering to sell organs on at least three Burmese-language Facebook groups and spoke to two dozen people involved in the organ trade — including sellers, buyers and agents — to piece together the inner workings of an illicit industry fueled by desperation in a country ravaged by civil war.
When asked for comment, Meta, Facebook’s owner, said one online group had been removed, but the company declined to give further details or comment further. Facebook’s own rules do not allow content that lets users buy, sell or trade human body parts and breaches can be reported for review.
Coup sends poverty soaring
Three years since Myanmar’s military took power in a coup, nearly half of the country’s 54 million people live below the poverty line. That figure has doubled since 2017, researchers with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has found.
As various armed groups fought against junta control, violence spread across the country. Foreign investment dropped, unemployment skyrocketed and the cost of basic goods increased at a rate most people couldn’t keep up with. While sellers are poor and buyers relatively rich, both sides are in the illegal organ market because they find themselves in dire straits.
“To sell a part of your body is a difficult decision for everyone. Nobody wants to do it,” April, 26, who asked to go by a pseudonym, said shortly after advertising her kidney on Facebook in February. “The only reason I am doing this is because I have no choice.”
April said she abandoned her dreams of becoming a nurse and moved to Myanmar’s commercial capital Yangon when she was 18 to work in a garment factory and help support her family. But her monthly salary of $100 was not enough to keep up with rising costs exacerbated by the political crisis and medical bills that kept piling up as her aunt suffered from cancer.
“I am trying my best to survive amid such a challenging situation. There were days I cried. There were days I didn’t have anything to eat when my friends could not help me,” she told CNN.
One night, unable to sleep, she was up late scrolling Facebook when she came upon a group where people were offering to sell their kidneys. Most of these groups were made for patients suffering from kidney disease to share home remedies and recommend doctors. But in recent years, posts offering to sell organs have become increasingly common, a CNN analysis has found.
A person can still live a healthy life with one kidney, which makes this trade possible, but it’s a major surgery that can have lasting consequences. The biggest risk is not having a backup in case anything happens to the remaining kidney, according to the National Kidney Foundation.
April quickly wrote up her own post: “I want to donate my kidney. My blood type is O. I need money for my aunt who has cancer and needs an operation. I’m 26 years old and I don’t drink. DM me.”
An illegal but accessible industry
In the online organ trade, buyers and sellers often work with agents, middlemen who match donors with recipients, to forge the necessary documents and arrange surgery.
Because the sale of organs is illegal in India and donations are permitted only among relatives, with a few rare exceptions, agents often forge household records, family trees and other documents with the help of lawyers and notaries. Myanmar’s embassy in New Delhi has to review the paperwork in order to pass the case to the state or hospital authorization committee.
The authorization committee is the final line of defense. It’s designed to catch anyone trying to cheat the system. Documents, family photos and bank statements are checked, and interviews conducted to expose strangers posing as family members or anyone trafficking organs.
CNN has reached out to Myanmar’s embassy in New Delhi and the Indian Ministry of Health and Family Welfare for comment, but did not get a response.
Thiri Khine, who asked to use a pseudonym so she could speak safely, became a widow when her husband died eight years ago. Six years later, ravaged by kidney disease, she posed for new wedding photos. This time, the groom smiling next to her was the man whose kidney she was buying for 12 million kyat ($3,695).
Thiri Khine tried to get a transplant by getting on the official transplant waitlist, but said the process would’ve taken years, at which point she may have already died from her illness.
Between 1995 and 2022, there were only 308 successful kidney transplants in Myanmar, according to ruling junta chief Min Aung Hlaing’s office.
Since the coronavirus pandemic and the coup, transplants can only be performed at military hospitals, with a few exceptions, according to one current and one former doctor in Yangon who asked to remain anonymous out of fear for their safety.
The war has also created a shortage of doctors.
In the early days of the military takeover, doctors were often at the forefront of the resistance movement, treating injured protesters and staging strikes. For this, they paid a high price, with many medical professionals arrested or forced to flee the country, leaving Myanmar’s already fragile healthcare system on the brink of collapse.
‘Family photos’, a trip to India
In the weeks leading up to the surgery, Thiri Khine and her pretend husband practiced for the authorization committee interview, finding answers to questions such as how they met, each other’s favorite foods and their license plate number.
“It’s an interrogation to confirm whether we are a real couple or not. But the thing is they know that we are lying,” Thiri Khine says. “The law by definition is strict, and so are the hospital’s rules. However they make it possible for us to get the treatment by ignoring the red flags and forged documents.”
All of the ten donors and recipients CNN spoke to, except for one, confirmed that in each of their cases, documents were falsified to prove a family relationship. They pretended to be spouses, in-laws, nieces and nephews. Maung Maung was supposed to be his recipient’s son-in-law.
Scared and far from home, Maung Maung went through a number of medical tests and interviews in the days before his transplant surgery. He had never left Myanmar before, but now he found himself posing for photos in front of New Delhi’s famous Lotus Temple next to the family of the man who would soon have his kidney.
“I am suffering deep down when I look at my family. They have nothing. Meanwhile, I am also stressed about what lies ahead,” he told CNN before his surgery.
“If I die, I hope this money could help my wife and daughter for their food and survival, even if it would not last their whole lifetime.”
Myanmar’s military has a long and well-documented track record of rights abuses, and the civil war has unleashed new levels of violence on both civilians and rebel forces alike.
In response to Maung Maung’s arrest and torture allegations, which set off the chain of events that led him to sell his kidney, Myanmar’s military told CNN: “Members of Myanmar’s military are well organized, meaning they cannot unlawfully arrest or torture anyone.”
‘Saving a life’
In 2022, just under 10,000 kidney transplants involving live donors were carried out across India, according to the National Organ and Tissue Transplant Organization. CNN could not confirm the number of transplant surgeries involving Burmese patients or the number of surgeries in which an organ may have been sold.
One Yangon-based agent, who asked to remain anonymous due to the illicit nature of his work, said both the Burmese embassy in India as well as the authorization committees are aware that the document presented are forged.
“It is an act of saving a life. It is not a bad thing,” he says, having received a kidney transplant himself in a similar way last year.
Dr Sunil Shroff, a transplant surgeon and founder of the Multi Organ Harvesting Aid Network, a non-profit which promotes organ donation in India, said the issue of organ donation is complex.
“It is not an easy job for the (authorization) committee either. Then again, they’re not policing it. They’re looking at each case individually with some sympathy because there is a recipient suffering who needs an organ,” he said.
This is complicated by the fact that documents produced in another country are extremely difficult to authenticate.
“Once the embassy signs, what happens is that the local authorization committee thinks the responsibility was on the embassy. They might be coming with an unrelated donor we don’t know,” Dr Shroff said.
A ward filled with Burmese patients
A few days after the transplant surgery in August 2023, Maung Maung sat on the edge of his hospital bed and lifted his shirt to reveal a fresh scar on his left side.
“It seems it is healing from inside, but it still hurts on the outside,” he said, touching the purple mark.
As he walked through the hospital, he pointed out other Burmese patients in the recovery ward, each with the same four-inch scar on their abdomen.
“When you go to the toilet, you see Myanmar people and when you go somewhere nearby you see Myanmar people again,” he said.
For those trapped in a never-ending cycle of poverty, selling a body part often appears as a quick way to escape. It’s been a last resort taken by people in many other countries from Afghanistan to Nepal, but it’s one that comes with serious and sometimes fatal health consequences.
“The quality of life after selling the kidney is not good because once the money runs out, they’re back to square one. And then there’s a scar to see. They look at it, so they’re depressed,” Dr Shroff says.
Maung Maung predicts that with only one kidney left “the most I can live is 15 to 20 years and then I will be gone.”
Yet, he doesn’t regret his decision.
“If I had not done this at this moment, my life would be in chaos. No job, no food. My wife, my kid didn’t have anything to eat. All three of us could have been dead or gone crazy.” he says.
He has since returned home to Mandalay but hasn’t recovered enough to work. He spends most of his days at home, in pain, as the money he got for selling his kidney slowly runs out.
As for April, the last time CNN was able to reachher was a few months ago. She had found a 49-year-old man from Yangon who was willing to buy her kidney for 12 million kyat ($3,700).
Documents were forged, family photos showing April as the man’s eldest daughter taken — the only thing left was the surgery.
As the transplant neared, April worried she might die on the operating table, but felt it was too late to back out.
April’s family still did not know about her plan to sell her kidney.
For mental health support outside of the US, a worldwide directory of resources and international hotlines is provided by the International Association for Suicide Prevention. You can also turn to Befrienders Worldwide..."
Source/publisher:
"CNN" (USA)
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-30
[field_licence]
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Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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Justice For Myanmar welcomes the launch of Malaysian police and anti-corruption commission investigations into the involvement of former deputy minister Datuk Dr Mashitah Ibrahim and her husband, Datuk Abdul Shakor bin Abu Bakar, in a cyber scam hub in Karen State.
At a press conference today, Inspector-General of Police Tan Sri Razarudin Husain confirmed that investigations into the involvement of a former deputy minister and her husband in organised crime activities in Myanmar was ongoing and that statements were taken from the couple in July. He also announced that the police are looking for witnesses.
Mashitah Ibrahim has publicly confirmed that she gave a statement to police on the matter.
A Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission (MACC) investigation has also been launched against Mashitah Ibrahim following a civil society complaint filed this week.
The investigations come after a Justice For Myanmar report in May that revealed the role of prominent Malaysians in Dongmei Park with the Karen Border Guard Force (BGF)/Karen National Army, a militia allied with the Myanmar military. The report named Mashitah Ibrahim, Abdul Shakor and others.
We urge the police to conduct a swift investigation into Mashitah Ibrahim and Abdul Shakor, as well as all other Malaysian nationals involved in cyber scam parks in Myanmar, and to hold them accountable under the law.
We urge MACC to conduct a full and transparent investigation and inform the public about its outcomes.
The Dongmei transnational crime hub, formerly named Saixigang Industrial Park, is run with trafficked labour who have been subjected to forced criminality, torture and extortion. Tight security prevents captives from escaping, with watchtowers and guards in military uniform and rifles stationed at the main gate.
Mashitah Ibrahim responded to reports in a Facebook post today that includes an image of her and Abdul Shakor at the anti-trafficking and migrant smuggling division of the Malaysian police: “It was purely coincidental that my friend invited me to take a photo at his project there … I will not hesitate to take legal action against anyone trying to associate me with this slander aimed at damaging my reputation.” However, much of the evidence linking the couple to Dongmei Park is detailed in past posts on Mashitah Ibrahim’s own Facebook page. In one post she referred to herself as an “iron lady” for the project.
Dongmei Park’s investors
One of the main investors in Dongmei Park is Wan Kuok-koi (also known as Broken Tooth, Yin Gouju), a former leader of the 14K Triad, a major Chinese transnational criminal organisation. Wan Kuok-koi was sanctioned by the USA in 2020.
Dongmei Group has a registered company in Hong Kong, Dongmei Investment Group Company Limited, which is also sanctioned by the USA. The company has two Malaysian directors and shareholders: Abdul Shakor bin Abu Bakar and Yong Mun Hong.
Numerous posts on Mashibah Ibrahim’s Facebook page provide evidence of her and Abdul Shakor’s involvement in Dongmei Park.
As Justice For Myanmar detailed in May, Mashitah Ibrahim and Abdul Shakor travelled to Thailand and Myanmar on January 29, 2020 with some of their associates. One photo shows Mashitah Ibrahim in what appears to be Dongmei Park’s construction site, accompanied by Karen BGF troops.
They returned to Thailand and Myanmar the following month, with Mashitah Ibrahim posting on February 23 from Bangkok Airport that she was traveling with a group of 20 “taikos”, a Cantonese term for big brother or boss. One of the bosses was Wan Kuok-koi.
The next day, Mashitah Ibrahim posted from the foundation-laying ceremony at the project site in Myawaddy township where Abdul Shakor gave a speech.
Photos and video of the foundation-laying ceremony show well-armed Karen BGF soldiers standing across the stage during the proceedings and in the background providing security, further evidence of the militia group’s involvement in the park.
On March 15, 2020, a launch event and “investor appreciation night” for the park was held at the Marriott Hotel in Kuala Lumpur. A charitable donation was made to “youth club activities”, with photos showing a giant CIMB Bank cheque issued by Dongmei Group and Grand Commerce Network, a company owned by Mashitah Ibrahim and Abdul Shakor.
Malaysian citizens are also involved in Yatai New City in Shwe Kokko, a development that profits from cyber scam and illegal online gambling operations in partnership with the Karen BGF/KNA. Two Malaysians serve as directors and shareholders of Myanmar Yatai International Holding Group Company Limited, the developer of Yatai New City.
Justice For Myanmar spokesperson Yadanar Maung says: “We welcome the Malaysian police and MACC investigations into the role of prominent Malaysians in the notorious Dongmei cyber scam park.
“Malaysian authorities should swiftly investigate all Malaysian citizens engaged in transnational crime in Myanmar and ensure full accountability.
“Dongmei Park’s business model is human suffering and the destruction of lives. The project profits from human trafficking and cyber slavery with the involvement of the Karen BGF/KNA, a criminal militia responsible for the commission of war crimes.
“As the next ASEAN chair, Malaysia should show the people of Myanmar and the region that it will not tolerate the involvement of its citizens in human trafficking and cyber slavery.
“Malaysia needs to take a clear stand against business with the military junta and its militias, refuse to lend legitimacy to the junta, and reject its sham election.”..."
Source/publisher:
Justice For Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-29
[field_licence]
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Individual Documents
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Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Business and the Military
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With the Arakan Army making gains in Rakhine state, junta officials arm civilians.
Description:
"Insurgents in Myanmar’s Rakhine state are closing in on an important junta naval base, a spokesman for the group said on Thursday, as military authorities in neighboring regions rounded up people into civil defense teams in preparation for rebel advances.
The Arkan Army ethnic minority force has made stunning gains in Myanmar's westernmost state, capturing townships, military bases and an airport at Thandwe town, since going on the offensive late last year.
Now AA fighters are attacking the last remaining junta positions protecting its Maung Shwe Lay naval base in Thandwe, AA spokesman Khaing Thu Kha told Radio Free Asia.
He said eight naval vessels were supporting junta ground troops and the fighting was fierce.
Junta spokesmen have not commented on the latest fighting.
Myanmar’s military has been battling insurgencies since soon after independence from Britain in 1948 but the pressure its forces are under this year is unprecedented.
Pro-democracy activists, outraged by the ouster of an elected government in 2021 and a bloody crackdown on protests that followed, have taken up arms, linking up in many parts of the country with ethnic minority rebels fighting long wars for self-determination.
Junta forces have lost ground in Rakhine and Chin states in the west, Kachin state in the north, Shan state in the northeast and eastern areas along the border with Thailand.
In addition, central heartland areas that have been peaceful for decades have been rocked by clashes as anti-junta People’s Defense Forces go on the attack.
Junta officials told administrators on Aug. 16 it would begin setting up militias, or public security committees, to arm people to defend their communities, according to information leaked on social media.
Residents in the Ayeyarwady region, near a conflict zone in southern Rakhine state, said on Thursday that authorities there had begun recruiting people into the militias, drawing names through a lottery system in five townships.
“They’re recruiting us for their militia,” said one resident of a township that borders Rakhine state.
“Local administrators are recruiting people between the ages of 35 and 65 under the pretext of serving public security in the neighborhoods and villages,” said the resident, who declined to be identified.
“They even tried to recruit some disabled people and when they refused, they had to pay a fine.”
RFA tried to telephone Ayeyarwady region’s junta spokesperson, Khin Maung Kyi, for information but he did not answer.
Political parties in the area have also been told to help fill the ranks, said one party member.
“Political parties have been called up for recruitment in some towns,” said the party worker who declined to be identified. “The junta asked us to contribute 50 people.”
Recruits would be asked to carry weapons and do some short military training, he said..."
Source/publisher:
"Radio Free Asia" (USA)
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-29
[field_licence]
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Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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"The Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and allied resistance forces reportedly seized two artillery battalion headquarters in Taung Hkam Village, Nawnghkio Township, northern Shan State on Wednesday and Thursday after weeks of fighting, according to sources close to the frontline forces.
Citing both frontline resistance fighters and informants in the junta’s military, former Captain Zin Yaw, a participant in the Civil Disobedience Movement, confirmed that the headquarters of Artillery Battalions 206 and 406 are now in the hands of the TNLA.
“This time, the TNLA is fighting in Taung Hkam with [the help of] many allied forces, so they were able to break through the junta’s defenses and seize these two bases,” Zin Yaw said.
However, he added that the TNLA and its allies are still fighting in Taung Hkam as they try to seize two remaining regime units there—Artillery Operations Command 902 and Artillery Battalion 354.
A source close to TNLA fighters and officers on the front line also confirmed the TNLA has seized Artillery Battalions 206 and 406.
Additionally, a local media outlet founded by Ta’ang youths reported the capture of Artillery Battalion 206’s headquarters by the TNLA on Wednesday evening.
However, the TNLA has yet to make any official announcement on the seizure of the bases, and its spokesperson Lway Yay Oo did not answer The Irrawaddy’s phone calls.
On Wednesday evening, the TNLA announced in a statement that it and its allies had launched attacks on Artillery Operations Command 902 and Artillery Battalions 406 and 206.
The TNLA said junta fighter jets and a Y-12 transport plane dropped at least 100 bombs on Taung Hkam and nearby areas.
Taung Hkam is currently crowded with forces from both sides. Junta military units that retreated from Lashio in recent months are stranded in the village, while reinforcements sent from the Myanmar military’s Eastern Command in Taunggyi city, the capital of Shan State, are also there.
Taung Hkam is a large village on the road between Nawnghkio and Lawksawk (Yatsauk) townships in southern Shan State. Lawksawk is located about 160 km south of Nawnghkio. Taung Hkam is home to the four artillery bases, including a command, but has no infantry or light infantry bases.
The junta’s military goal in in Taung Hkam is a defensive one: to prevent the TNLA and its allies from entering southern Shan State, Capt. Zin Yaw said..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-29
[field_licence]
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Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Various groups
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"Chinese special envoy to Myanmar Deng Xijun held talks with the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) in China’s Tengchong, Yunnan Province, on Wednesday. The meeting with KIA vice-chairman General Gam Shawng followed China’s closure of northern Shan State border crossings in areas controlled by the United Wa State Army (UWSA) and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA).
Sources told The Irrawaddy that Beijing has warned the UWSA about the flow of weapons through its territory to the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA).
China reportedly plans to hold separate talks with the TNLA and its Northern Alliance partners – the KIA, MNDAA, and Arakan Army.
The KIA, which is battling the regime in Kachin State and Sagaing Region, has seized Lwelgel on the Chinese border and Sadone town on the trade route between Kachin’s capital Myitkyina and the border trade town of Kanpiketi, which remains under junta control.
The MNDAA, TNLA and AA also belong to the Brotherhood Alliance, a separate military coalition that launched Operation 1027 in northern Shan State last October, seizing hundreds of junta bases and command centers, 24 battalion headquarters and around 20 towns and vital trade routes with China.
The operation was halted in northern Shan State on Jan. 10 after Beijing brokered a ceasefire between the ethnic alliance and the regime. The AA however continues to fight in Rakhine State where China has major interests including the Kyaukphyu Special Economic Zone and deep-sea port that will give it direct access to the Indian Ocean.
Since Operation 1027 resumed in late June, the regime has lost the capital of northern Shan State, Lashio, along with the Northeastern Command it hosted, as well as Kyaukme, Nawnghkio and Mongmit towns. It has also lost Mogoke, Singu, Thabeikkyin and Tagung towns in neighboring Mandalay Region. Fighting has now spilled into southern Shan State.
Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi met with junta chief Min Aung Hlaing in Naypyitaw on Aug. 14. Following Wang’s visit, China closed border crossings with territory controlled by the MNDAA and the Namtit crossing in UWSA-controlled territory. It also restricted the flow of goods at other border crossings.
Responding to an inquiry by The Irrawaddy, KIA spokesman Colonel Naw Bu said he had no knowledge of the meeting between Gen. Gam Shawng and the Chinese special envoy.
China has expressed concern over its investments in Myanmar, including oil and gas pipelines running from coastal Rakhine State through central Myanmar and Shan State to Yunnan Province, the Tagaung nickel mine in Mandalay Region, the Letpadaung copper mine in Sagaing Region, and other projects within the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor.
China specialist Dr. Hla Kyaw Zaw stated, “I heard China had warned it would close border crossings if the fighting didn’t stop. China will continue to negotiate with all sides, using various approaches to pressure the Northern Alliance and the regime into peace talks. The Brotherhood Alliance may already recognize the potential consequences and have contingency plans in place.”
China is pushing to resume Myanmar border trade worth billions of dollars annually which has ground to a halt since Operation 1027.
KIA spokesman Naw Bu said trade through Kachin State’s Lwelgel border hub is now limited to goods bartering.
“We don’t have a checkpoint in Kanpiketi and the road is open. I don’t know the exact amount of trade, but I’ve heard it’s limited to only a few cargo trucks,” he said.
An analyst who asked for anonymity said China is pressuring ethnic armies to join peace talks by restricting the flow of food, medicines and fuel to territory they control, but might find it more difficult to persuade the regime.
“China recognizes the regime’s military is collapsing and wants to pressure both sides into peace talks. But the regime may not be willing to acknowledge its loss of the entire northern Shan State. The regime is reluctant to grant control of Lashio, Nawnghkio and Kyaukme to the MNDAA and the TNLA and it will try to reclaim those towns.”
During their meeting in Naypyitaw, Wang told Min Aung Hlaing that China opposes chaos and armed conflict in Myanmar and called on the junta boss to secure the China-Myanmar oil and gas pipelines and ensure peace and stability along the border.
On Tuesday, the Chinese military launched live-fire drills with ground and air force units along the border with Myanmar..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-28
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Armed conflict and peace-building in Burma - theoretical, strategic and general
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"Clashes between the Myanmar junta’s military and the Arakan Army (AA) have been reported in multiple locations around Gwa Township, the strategic southernmost township in Rakhine State, since Sunday, according to residents.
The AA, a member of the Brotherhood Alliance of three ethnic armies, has advanced to a location approximately 32 km to the north of Gwa town after seizing Kyeintali town in Thandwe District on Aug. 14, and fighting has broken out in at least at four areas in the township.
Gwa town abuts the Arakan Mountains, known locally as the Rakhine Yoma, and the northernmost rural areas of Ngathaingchaung town in Ayeyarwady Region’s Yegi Township. Gwa is also home to the headquarters of the junta’s Light Infantry Battalions 562 and 563.
As they prepare to defend themselves against expected AA attacks, junta troops inside these bases are shelling the north of the town, the residents said.
“As the clashes are getting closer to the town, the residents are growing more concerned. But the junta’s military has now blocked all the routes to Ayeyarwady Region,” a Gwa resident said.
Hundreds of people managed to flee Gwa in recent weeks, but as the junta’s military has now blocked the escape routes, thousands of residents are now trapped in the town and live in fear that clashes in the township will escalate.
Taungup, Thandwe and Gwa are coastal townships in the southernmost part of Rakhine State, and are near Ayeyarwady Region’s northernmost Myanaung District and Bago Region’s westernmost townships.
The AA has not yet been able to take control of Taungup Township, although it captured Ma-ei town in the township in May. The AA took control of Thandwe Township in late July.
According to a local media report, junta forces in Taungup began deploying artillery and troops at Taungup University on Aug. 23 in preparation for an AA attack.
Since the Brotherhood Alliance launched Operation 1027 last October, the AA has seized at least 15 towns in Rakhine State and one in southernmost Chin State. Rakhine State has 17 townships and only the capital Sittwe along with Munaung, Ann and Gwa townships remain firmly under the control of the junta’s military. The 13 other townships have been partially or entirely seized by the AA.
The International Crisis Group said on Tuesday that the AA has made rapid advances across Rakhine since November last year and is set to create the single largest area controlled by an ethnic armed group since the coup in February 2021.
“The AA will do its best to take control of strategic Gwa Township as soon as possible before the junta’s military can send in reinforcements through Ayeyarwady Region,” said an analyst who is monitoring the conflict in Rakhine.
For its part, the junta is determined to maintain control of the township, as it needs it as a base from which to reinforce and supply townships farther north.
The AA said in a statement on Aug. 26 that heavy clashes are ongoing in Kyeintali Town in Thandwe Township, as the junta’s navy has deployed eight vessels in the town’s waterways.
“Intense clashes are breaking out between our Arakan Army and the fascist junta military’s Maung Shwe Lay Naval Base near Kyauk Par Sat Village, Kyeintali town,” the AA said.
It said the naval vessels were sending reinforcements, arms and ammunition to nearby areas via waterways, while continuously shelling villages in the area..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-28
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Arakan (Rakhine) State - reports etc. by date (latest first), Armed conflict in Burma - attacks on civilians, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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"Myanmar junta artillery and airstrikes have killed at least 21 civilians in Hsipaw Township, northern Shan State, this month, according to the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA).
On Tuesday morning, a Y-12 transport plane reportedly dropped at least 50 bombs on Hsipaw town and a fighter jet bombed the town later that day.
A Shan civil society group member said: “The junta cannot reinforce Hsipaw and bombs the town instead. It is inhumane. Civilians are the victims.”
Two men were killed in Tuesday’s airstrikes, two other residents were injured and two schools were damaged, according to the TNLA.
The TNLA, a member of Brotherhood Alliance along with the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) and Arakan Army, said junta artillery and airstrikes had killed at least 21 civilians and injured 59 others, including 10 children, this month.
The Shan Human Rights Foundation (SHRF) on Tuesday reported that junta bombardment of Hsipaw had killed at least 19 civilians from July 19 to August 25, damaging over 100 buildings, including near Chinese oil and gas pipelines.
On August 10, junta shelling killed five civilians and injured four. A man was killed in Na Loi village and a woman was killed in Kyaung Suu village. Both villages are beside the key pipelines.
Since June 25, the TNLA and its allies have seized Nawnghkio, Mongmit and Kyaukse towns in northern Shan State and Mogoke Township in Mandalay Region. The MNDAA and its allies have captured Lashio, the capital of northern Shan.
TNLA-led forces are attempting to seize full control of Hsipaw Township, where Infantry Battalion 23 and Light Infantry battalions 503 and 504 are based.
Hsipaw is a junta hub on the Dokthawaddy River and on the main road from Mandalay to the Chinese border. Junta troops are trapped in their bases in the town surrounded by the TNLA, according to sources..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-28
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Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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Sub-title:
Shadow government expects junta to try to re-capture lost ground before 2025 election
Description:
"Myanmar junta officials have begun collecting the personal information of workers in industrial zones in preparation for a census and a general election next year, an industry management official said on Wednesday.
The military has promised to hold elections since shortly after it ousted an elected government in early 2021, triggering a civil war in which its troops are under growing pressure from pro-democracy fighters and ethnic minority guerrillas.
The collection of data at industrial zones in the city of Yangon has raised fears the information could also be used by officials enforcing a hugely unpopular conscription law.
“It’s so worrying to give out our information at a time like this,” said one worker in Yangon’s Hlaingtharya township who declined to be identified for safety reasons.
“They don’t care if you’re a woman or man, or your age, to recruit you for the military,” said the worker.
He said he had given information in 2023 for a smart identification card and workers were now being told they risked losing their jobs if they didn’t give personal data.
“If we don’t want to, they said we can quit,” he said.
Radio Free Asia tried to call Kyaw Kyaw Lwin, director general of the junta’s Workshop and Labor Law Inspection Department, to ask about the data collection but he did not respond.
The generals who ousted a government led by Aung San Suu Kyi in 2021 aims to hold a staggered elections by November 2025, with voting likely to be impossible in large areas controlled by insurgents. A census is planned for this October.
Those fighting to end military rule including a shadow National Unity Government, or NUG, say an election will be a sham with Suu Kyi, by far Myanmar’s most popular politician, locked up along with hundreds of politicians and activists.
‘Increase attacks’
The NUG prime minister, Mahn Win Khaing Than, told a meeting on Tuesday, the junta was likely to launch new offensives before the election and pro-democracy forces had to go on the attack.
“The junta will do whatever they can,” he told a meeting of his cabinet.“We need to also increase our own attacks as much as possible while preparing politically.”
The data collection follows a recent junta announcement it was forming neighborhood and village-level supervision groups for “public security” and “anti-terrorist operations” to crack down on insurgent forces.
China, India and Thailand have offered to help with the election, hoping it can help end the war in their resource-rich neighbor.
An official with a junta industrial zone management committee said workers’ personal information must be submitted by Friday.
“It’s necessary to count the workers and send the lists to our committee, the council told us it was necessary for the census,” said the official at the management committee in Hlaingtharya, Yangon’s biggest industrial zone.
Some 80,000 workers from more than 700 factories in six industrial zones of Hlaingtharya have given their information, a labor activist estimated..."
Source/publisher:
"Radio Free Asia" (USA)
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-28
[field_licence]
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"Buddhists and Hindus believe in the power of the White Elephant to subdue enemies.
Myanmar’s military junta, facing powerful armed insurgencies in the North Eastern part of the country, has decided to use Buddhist symbolism to defeat the enemy.
According the Myanmar daily Irrawaddy, the junta is preparing to launch a major offensive code-named “Operation Sin Phyu Shin” or “Operation Lord of the White Elephant” – to retake the areas of northern Shan State captured by the “Brotherhood Alliance” and its allies late last year.
The Irrawaddy reported that the junta had set up a committee to lead the operation and placed Vice-Senior General Soe Win in control of it. Three recently promoted Generals have been assigned to command the troops.
The operation’s name refers to Burmese King Hsinbyushin (1763-76) of the Konbaung dynasty who is revered among the generals for waging wars against Qing China and Siam. Hsinbyushin was the third king of the Alaungpaya, or Konbaung dynasty in Myanmar. He had pursued a policy of expansion at the expense of practically all his neighbors, especially Siam (Thailand).
The Myanmar military’s fresh move to step up attacks follows a second string of humiliating defeats in the northern Shan State in July. The first series of defeats began in late October 2023 and ended when China intervened to broker a ceasefire in January 2024.
The Brotherhood Alliance comprises three ethnic armies – the Arakan Army, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army and the Ta’ang Nationalities Liberation Army (TNLA). These armies overran dozens of towns in northern Shan State during its first phase. The alliance also punctured the government military’s reputation as a competent fighting force when many of its troops and senior officers raised the white flag in the face of determined and coordinated attacks by the Brotherhood Alliance, the Irrawaddy said.
The operation resumed in late June this year after the China-brokered ceasefire collapsed. Since then, the Brotherhood Alliance has seized northern Shan’s Kyaukme, Nawnghkio and Lashio towns, and the Northeastern Military Command, as well as Madaya and Mogoke towns in the Mandalay Region..
India, the White Elephant does not have the pejorative connotation that it has in the English language where it means an expensive and non-productive project or property. But it is a good omen, a sign of wisdom, good governance and power.
In Hindu mythology, Indra, the king of the gods, is depicted as seated on a White Elephant. Buddhists believe that the mother of Gautama Siddhartha, the Buddha, dreamt that a White Elephant had entered her womb, signifying that she was to give birth to a person of great wisdom and power.
The kings of Myanmar took the title “Master of the White Elephant” and had a large number of White Elephants which they captured by waging wars against the Thais. When the British took over Myanmar (then known as Burma), they discouraged the use of White Elephants as these represented the Burmese monarchy which they had abolished in 1885.
A later military dictator of Myanmar,Than Shwe, (1992- 2011) revived the use of the White Elephant as a symbol of power. Than Shwe, it was said, desperately wanted one of the power symbols to signify his own “kingly rule.” He needed divine help especially to build Naypyidaw, Myanmar’s new capital.
In 2008, Than Shwe’s created a White Elephant Capture and Training Group charged with directing a nationwide effort to increase the stock of White Elephants.
The question as to whether White Elephants are really white arises. In fact, they appear to have little in common with the silk-draped White Elephants in paintings of royal processions in the mythical past. At best, they could be gray.
It is said that a White Elephant’s skin “has to turn red, not black, when sprayed with water, the tail and trunk should be straight and long, and the eyes must have yellow irises enclosed by red rings.”
According to literature on the subject, some of the more mystical authorities even insist that a White Elephant must not snore but should emit the gentle sounds of Burmese and Thai classical musical instruments!
However, in Thailand, the most important traits of the White Elephant are the shape of the tail hair, the mottling on the inside of the mouth, the blotches on the head of the penis and even the sound of snoring, according to one source. Notice that the one trait that seems not to matter at all is the color of the elephant.
To set the record straight, the Thai term for the “White Elephant” is actually “Auspicious Elephant.” There is no allusion to color!
From 1549 to 1769, the kings of Thailand, Cambodia and Burma fought a series of wars over White Elephants. In fact, White Elephant-related plunder of rival partly helped build Myanmar’s national symbol, the golden stupa of the Shwedagon pagoda in Yangon (Rangoon).
White Elephants are believed to appear during the reign of the righteous leaders and their presence in a country or kingdom as signifying “a new renaissance”.
It is believed that in Myanmar’s history, White Elephants emerged during the time of kings who ruled discharging ten kingly duties. The White Elephant is a good omen when the state is endeavoring to build a peaceful, modern and developed nation.
Is Myanmar ruled justly?
The obvious answer to the question whether Myanmar is ruled justly is a resounding “no”. The military launched a coup against an elected government in February 2021 and cracked down on protests. War against rebellious Christian tribes in the North made that part of the country unlivable.
Vowing to resist the military junta, former lawmakers and activists formed a shadow government and mobilized fighting forces across the country. The military has responded with a brutal crackdown on opposition forces and protesters.
“The coup has also brought economic turmoil, wiping out modest gains in poverty reduction made over the past decade. The economy shrank by nearly 20 percent in 2021. Additionally, the health-care system has collapsed amid the COVID-19 pandemic. Millions of people are facing hunger, and tens of thousands have fled to other parts of Myanmar or across the borders. Because of the coup, Myanmar has become a failing state,” says Joshua Kurlantzick of America’s Council on Foreign Relations (CFR).
The junta detained and charged de facto civilian leader Aung San Suu Kyi with corruption and other crimes. It placed members of her party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), and other parties, as well as many activists, under house arrest.
Massive protests erupted nationwide in the weeks after the coup. Eventually, ousted NLD lawmakers, protest leaders, and activists from several minority groups established a parallel government known as the National Unity Government (NUG). The NUG declared war on the junta and formed an armed division known as the People’s Defense Force.
The military’s brutal crackdown on dissent and widespread abuses in the conflict have drawn condemnation from the United Nations, foreign governments, and rights organizations. The military shot live ammunition at civilian protesters and into people’s homes. By late 2021, the military was destroying entire villages believed to support the opposition, massacring both civilians and opposition fighters.
At least 1,500 people have been killed by the military, which is likely an undercount, according to Thailand-based nonprofit Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (Burma). The junta has arrested more than eight thousand people, including journalists, medical workers, and NLD politicians.
More than one million people fled abroad as refugees before the 2021 coup. Hundreds of thousands more remain displaced internally. Many of these refugees in recent years have been Muslim Rohingya.
In 2019, The Gambia filed the first international lawsuit against Myanmar at the International Court of Justice, accusing the country of violating the UN Genocide Convention. But both Suu Kyi’s government and the military have denied that ethnic cleansing is taking place, and Suu Kyi defended the military at a tribunal in The Hague..."
Source/publisher:
"Eurasia Review"
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-28
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Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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"Myanmar was ready to explode—just like the historic student union building that General Ne Win dynamited after his coup in 1962. Asia’s former “rice bowl” was now empty and classified by the UN as a least developed country, the parliamentary democracy long gone, no pride left. By 1988, these were the terrible legacies of his coup and his iron-fisted rule over the previous 26 years.
When it exploded, it shook Ne Win’s entire system. It was the 1988 people’s uprising. He could do nothing but step down in shame. History was having its revenge. But even before he stepped down, he threatened the protestors in a state-run broadcast: “The military never fires into the air. It just shoots straight to hit.” We would expect nothing less from the mouth of a dictator—and he was regarded as exactly that: the first dictator of Myanmar.
Though his coup, or the “Mother Coup”, in 1962, faced little resistance, history didn’t repeat for the coups to follow.
The ’88 Uprising and the 2021 Spring Revolution drew similar levels of nationwide popular participation, but they differed in other ways. Here’s one overlooked but crucial point of difference between the two coups: In 1988, the military staged its takeover one month and 10 days after the pro-democracy uprising erupted across the country in an attempt to topple the Socialist authoritarian regime led by Ne Win. In 2021, the military staged a coup when the country was stable and the people were in a good mood, full of positive expectations to welcome a newly elected civilian government.
To make it very clear: in 1988, a nationwide uprising sparked a coup; but in 2021, a coup sparked a nationwide uprising. The sequence of events was reversed.
In March 1988, a riot in which university student Phone Maw was shot to death by security forces led to a student demonstration. Later it escalated into a democracy movement as the public’s discontent with political repression and economic hardships was already at boiling point after 26 years of the regime’s oppressive rule and mismanagement. When student-led demonstrations evolved into a nationwide uprising on Aug. 8, known as the Four Eights Uprising or the ’88 Uprising, Ne Win and his immediate successors tried to convince the public that they would change their one-party system to a multi-party system.
But the people continued their uprising to get rid of what was just a military dictatorship in disguise. The daily protests continued in full swing across the country for more than one month until Sept. 18, when the generals staged a bloody coup. (Here, it is important to understand that the junta actually assumed power from Ne Win’s Socialist regime rather than grabbing it by force. The coup took place with Ne Win’s consent but its goal was to stop the people power movement by force and prevent outcomes which might be even worse from the regime’s perspective.)
The coup was led by Ne Win loyalists and younger generals—General Saw Maung and his deputy officers Than Shwe and Khin Nyunt. Of course, the coup halted the uprising, with regime troops killing several thousand protesters and arresting thousands more across the country. Such a brutal and massive crackdown outraged the people. Public sentiment against the regime and in support of radical change was still strong; it maintained its momentum and there were all kinds of intentions and ideas on how to continue the anti-regime movement in different ways to achieve the main goal—democracy. But the junta’s new political course led to a new political landscape.
New landscape
Right after the coup, the junta announced that it would hold a free and fair election under a multi-party system—a U-turn from the one-party system of its predecessor Socialist regime.
Immediately, many political figures and forces rushed to form parties. Both old politicians and new faces became leaders of those parties. U Nu—the first prime minister of the country—Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, old communists, ex-generals, ethnic figures and even young student activists who were part of the ’88 uprising formed political parties. After 26 years under just one party—the Burma Socialist Programme Party led by dictator Ne Win—about 200 parties were registered. Contesting elections became the main political priority. Let’s call those engaged in this task “the urban politics” camp, which was close to what we called it back then.
Globally, it should be noted that when Myanmar reintroduced a multi-party system in September 1988, right after the coup, the Soviet Union had yet to collapse and its reformist leader Mikhail Gorbachev had yet to introduce his policies of glasnost (openness) and perestroika (restructuring) to reform the USSR’s one-party system. Even before the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the end of the Cold War on the world stage, the ’88 uprising in Myanmar managed to bring down the Socialist regime and force the new military junta to transform the country’s political system from a one-party to a multi-party system. It also appeared set to switch to a market economy after 26 years of isolation. Under the circumstances, that was a significant change brought to the country by the ’88 uprising.
As new political parties mushroomed, two other spheres of anti-junta activity emerged—one was the armed struggle (or “AS”, a term student activists then used widely). Another was an underground movement launched by student unions. Both of these were led by students. After the coup and nationwide crackdown, students who wanted to take the AS route left for border areas where ethnic armed organizations have been based for decades fighting for autonomy. There, thousands of students formed the All Burma Students’ Democratic Front (ABSDF) as a student army.
Those in the student unions continued their anti-regime activities (broadly speaking, this was a pro-democracy movement) in urban areas, organizing underground activities such as guerilla-style street protests, publishing and distributing political journals and statements to keep the public informed and politically aware. The latter—to which I belonged—was part of the “urban politics” camp. So, the whole “urban politics” camp was based on non-violent methods employed by political parties and underground student unions. But we regarded all three ways—political parties, underground student unions and AS—as supporting one another to keep pressuring the junta. (Note: That’s not what happened in 2021. The “fresh election” option was rejected by the public, and the political parties that chose to reregister after the 2021 coup were regarded as collaborators of the junta who rejected the recent election result.)
A dominant trend emerges
Among the three alternatives, however, the most popular was to contest the junta’s elections. Newly formed political parties were actively preparing to take on the junta-backed party, the National Unity Party, which was transformed from Ne Win’s Socialist party, and hoping to form a civilian government after the elections. The country’s many ethnic parties were also a main force in this “urban politics”, planning to contest the elections both in main cities and their ethnic states. They were not related to the ethnic armed organizations based along the borders.
The new political landscape had advantages: the political parties could open offices across the country, they could officially organize party activities, and they could conduct campaigns in which thousands of people could take part. Mainly, they could publicly challenge the ruling junta. And people could support the parties they liked. The political space was significantly widened, though the junta continued to arrest and intimidate party members as well as student activists and dissidents, sentencing them to lengthy terms of imprisonment. This anti-regime movement through non-violent methods within the framework of the political parties became quite active and dynamic. It became the main political trend after the coup and the majority of the people supported it.
On May 27, 1990, the junta held the election as promised. Millions of citizens cast votes, almost three decades after the people’s democratic rights were denied. The result shocked the ruling generals—a landslide victory for the National League for Democracy (NLD), the party they had endlessly denounced and oppressed the most. The junta refused to hand over power to the victorious NLD. Later, the junta arrested many elected members of parliament and jailed them. Some elected members were forced to flee the country.
This led to the formation of the National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma (NCGUB) in late 1990, in Manerplaw, Karen State (home to the headquarters of the KNU). Comprising elected MPs from the NLD and other parties, the NCGUB was formed with the aim of implementing the results of the 1990 election. But it never gained sufficient traction to threaten the junta’s de facto rule.
However, the election result became a legitimate political tool with which the international community could pressure the junta.
Why the ‘AS’ didn’t work
The armed struggle along the borders started by the newly formed student army (made up mostly of Bamar students from cities like Yangon and Mandalay, the central regions and other cities and towns) was fought for two years at that time but never achieved anything significant either. (In stark contrast to what we have seen in the current post-2021 armed revolt.)
There were several reasons for that. One was that established ethnic armed organizations were not ready to fully support the student army. (A totally different scenario from the cooperation we’ve seen between some EAOs and newly formed resistance forces since the 2021 coup.) Among the reasons was that the young students from the cities couldn’t really adapt to the tough jungle life. Soon after arriving, several thousand students went back to their homes when the junta offered them an amnesty.
Another big factor undermining the students’ armed struggle was a ceasefire agreement initiated by the junta. After the coup, the junta’s powerful Secretary-1 and spy chief General Khin Nyunt convinced many ethnic armed organizations to sign ceasefire agreements in the late 1980s and 1990s. More than a dozen ethnic armed groups, including major groups like the Kachin Independence Army, the United Wa State Army, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, the New Mon State Party and others signed the junta’s ceasefire agreements, though the process was obviously a sham. Many people, including ethnic communities, regarded the EAOs as the junta’s “allies” or “ceasefire partners” at the time, deviating from the pro-democracy political course embarked upon after the ’88 uprising.
Looking at it through a political prism, it’s easy to understand that the “ceasefire” was the junta’s card to divide the resistance forces. For the junta, at that time, there were two main political enemy camps: the political parties “inside” the system and the dozens of ethnic armed organizations along the borders. Of these two, the political party camp was the top priority for the generals as it was supported by the majority of people. The generals knew that if they could neutralize ethnic armed organizations with “ceasefire agreements” and offers of business concessions, they wouldn’t need to fight them, so they could use their energy and capacity to annihilate the “urban politics” camp—both the political parties and the underground student unions.
Many leaders of the NLD and ethnic parties were arrested. But as the elections approached in May 1990, the crackdown became more targeted: Many key leaders of political parties, including Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and ethnic figures, were arrested even before the vote.
Most of the student activists were also thrown behind bars with lengthy imprisonment terms. To take my own case as an example, I was arrested at a protest in 1991 along with over 100 other students. We were each sentenced to a minimum of 10 years’ imprisonment. A series of student protests occurred in the 1990s and the junta responded with a blanket crackdown on them. I would say there were almost no dissidents who were not arrested at least once after the 1988 coup. All of us who were active dissidents under a political party flag or a student union flag were arrested and tortured because the junta aimed to “kill” our political awareness and fighting spirit, so that it could not be passed to a new generation. That was the junta’s political strategy at the time—to annihilate “urban politics” rather than the neutralized ethnic armed organizations along the borders. Their strategy worked.
To analyze the whole situation after the 1988 coup, the nonviolent “urban politics” camp, the armed struggle launched by the new student army and the established ethnic armed organizations were not on the same page or synchronized at all. That’s how the AS lost its way at that time.
Hard lessons
The “urban politics” camp was crippled by the junta’s systematic, yearslong crackdown. But by securing political legitimacy for the anti-regime movement, the election result was the most significant and long-lasting achievement of the 1988 uprising. It was used for political leverage and a tool by the international community led by the UN and the West to pressure the junta to hand over power or enter negotiations with the election winner and ethnic organizations. And it took exactly 20 years for the ruling generals to formally “override” the people’s 1990 choice with its rigged election held in 2010.
If I had to give a name to the popular resistance against the coup in 1988 and the following decades, I would call it “the nonviolent resistance period” as it overwhelmed other political trends and methods. So, the resistance against the regime throughout the whole period before and after the 1988 coup didn’t reach the level of a revolution (တော်လှန်ရေး), in which all necessary methods are applied, especially armed struggle.
But all of the military’s brutality and cheating—the coup in 1988, the killing of innocent protesters and political persecutions, and the blatant refusal to hand over power to the party for which the people voted—were engraved in the hearts of the Myanmar people once more. It was the second time the entire population had been deceived.
The generals have displayed this political treachery again and again since 1962. It has become institutionalized as “the military institution’s political culture.” This unethical and brutal military culture sufficiently angered and outraged the Myanmar people that their motivation changed from anti-regime sentiment to anti-military sentiment. This has never waned—it has only grown and grown.
Here, we should understand what the Myanmar people learned—through their own experience and suffering—from the ’88 Uprising and the couple of decades that followed it under another round of military dictatorship:
Popular uprisings don’t work because the generals will simply oppress them.
Elections and even landslide victories don’t work because the generals will reject them.
Nonviolent methods don’t work because the generals respond with violence.
Pressure from the international community doesn’t work because the generals don’t play by its standards.
The biggest lesson of all, based on the above lessons: The generals individually and the military institutionally use their power and cunning ways to destroy the people’s aspirations to, at a minimum, simply live and die in a free and democratic society.
But these seemingly discouraging lessons couldn’t kill the people’s hopes or stop them struggling to achieve them. That’s the nature of the Myanmar people. In the next installment in this series, we’ll see how these lessons have been applied to their unfinished struggle.
Read the first part of this series: Evolution of the Myanmar Revolution (Part 1): Why the ‘Mother Coup’ Faced Little Resistance..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-27
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The Military's political role, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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"WASHINGTON —
Journalists in Myanmar are calling for greater protections for media following the killing last week of two reporters, and the heavy sentences handed down to other media professionals since the military seized power.
A journalist with the Democratic Voice of Burma, or DVB, and a freelancer were both killed on Aug. 21 when the military raided the home of the freelance reporter in the town of Kyaikhto, in Mon state.
The killings come amid a crackdown on independent journalism, according to media watchdogs. Since the February 2021 coup, media have had licenses revoked, journalists have been forced into exile and dozens have been detained.
Aung Kyaw of DVB told VOA more than 30 military members entered the home of freelancer Htet Myat Thu and fatally shot both him and DVB reporter Win Htut Oo, along with two resistance fighters.
VOA was unable to determine if the journalists, the fighters, or both were the targets. Local authorities did not respond to VOA’s request for comment on the raid.
"When Htet Myat Thu's mother heard the gunshots and ran back to the house, she saw DVB reporter Win Htut Oo falling down with a gunshot wound,” said Aung Kyaw. “Htet Myat and Win Htut Oo were childhood friends.”
The journalists both reported on the resistance movement. For safety reasons they interviewed opposition members in private spaces, including their home.
Win Htut Oo had previously been arrested by the junta under Section 505 — amended legislation that penalizes spreading anything deemed to be false information or fear about the military. The 26-year-old had more recently been living at the home of his friend, Htet Myat, 28.
The junta cremated the bodies of both journalists instead of returning them to their families.
Media watchdog the Committee to Protect Journalists condemned the killings as “an atrocity against the free press [that] must not go unpunished.”
Nay Aung, the editor-in-chief of The Nation Voice, told VOA that Win Htut Oo worked for the local media outlet.
"He was a reporter who sent us daily news about the resistance activities, not just the battle news, but also the economic news in the region,” said Nay Aung.
Two days before the raid, Win Htut Oo had reported on a police officer arrested by the military over suspected connections to the local People’s Defense Forces, or PDF fighters, and about a female lawyer who was also accused of supporting the local pro-democracy militia.
“I think it must have been the reason behind the raid, which happened the day after the news were published,” Nay Aung said.
"Not only our reporters risk [their] lives to file reports but also all the journalists in Myanmar are risking their lives, reporting news that is happening in the country and the suffering of the people,” he added.
Nay Aung said that more needs to be done to ensure journalist safety in Myanmar and that reporters understand the security risks.
“In addition, we need to prepare more to create safe conditions for journalists to live and travel in the country."
Media watchdog Reporters Without Borders, known as RSF, condemned the killings.
In a statement, it said that the junta is “demonstrating ruthless violence against the journalists still courageously reporting in the country despite the prolonged conflict.”
“We again renew our call on the international community to step up pressure on the regime to cease its campaign of terror against reporters,” said RSF Asia-Pacific head, Cédric Alviani.
Myanmar’s journalists have also been renewing calls for the international community to pressure the military council on press freedom.
The editor in chief of the Dawei Watch news agency, Kyaw San Min, told VOA that two of its reporters were unjustly arrested and sentenced to lengthy prison terms.
Reporters Myo Myint Oo and Aung San Oo were arrested on Dec. 11, 2023, and questioned for four days. In separate military hearings, Myo Myint Oo was sentenced to life in prison in February and Aung San Oo was sentenced to 20 years in May.
"They were sentenced to long prison terms without knowing what section or article they were charged under. Looking back on this whole process, there is no transparency at all,” said Kyaw San Min. “There is no justice for journalists. There is no right to defend nor explain."
With the military leaders saying they will hold elections at some point in 2025, some analysts believe more media may face attacks or arrests.
Myanmar is already one of the top jailers of journalists globally, with at least 43 detained there for their work, according to data by the Committee to Protect Journalists.
Toe Zaw Latt, of the Independent Press Council of Myanmar, said that journalists are being oppressed unfairly.
"We also need to protect journalists more from this end,” he said, adding that Myanmar’s media are discussing steps with groups including RSF..."
Source/publisher:
"Voice of America" (Washington, D.C)
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-27
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Type:
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A group of conservationists and villagers fought to preserve Myanmar’s southern Pat-Chan River and its mangrove forests – until a military coup forced their efforts to halt
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"TANINTHARYI, MYANMAR — Efforts to conserve rivers and mangroves in southern Myanmar came to a standstill when activists fled the country in fear of their safety. The responsibility now falls on those who remain, although they face intense surveillance from the military.
Ko Shwe Phan was once known as the “Pat-Chan Hero,” a title given to him by Myanmar news outlet Tanintharyi Weekly Journal in 2019 in recognition of his efforts to protect the Pat-Chan River.
The Pat-Chan, also known as Pakchan, is a 130-kilometer boundary river shared by Myanmar’s southern Tanintharyi region and Thailand’s Ranong province.
It hosts a large area of mangrove forests that provide habitats for marine animals, making it the primary “rice pot” for about 5,000 people living along the river at Myanmar border.
Ko Shwe Phan, originally from Myanmar’s southernmost Kawthaung town where the river meets the Andaman Sea, formed the Pat-Chan River Conservation Group in 2016 in collaboration with local people – who were aware of the river’s value to their lives.
They were able to stop local companies that planned to clear the mangrove forests for profit-making enterprises while working with more than 250 villagers to request a “community forest” status for about 920 hectares of mangrove areas on various parts of the river.
This status would allow local communities to obtain legal rights to guard the forest and earn sustainable livelihoods from it. The Forest Department under the previous elected government answered their call.
Many forests were still in the process of receiving this status when the military staged a coup in February 2021, suspending conservation work across the country as environmental activists fled in fear for their safety.
Ko Shwe Phan was forced to take refuge in a neighboring country, far from the river he cherished.
“We were able to protect the Pat-Chan River by demonstrating that we would survive only if the river and mangrove forests existed,” he recalled. “What I can do in the current situation is worry about the Pat-Chan River from afar.”
Similarly, other members of his group had to maintain a low profile within Myanmar or leave their homes due to various reasons, including harassment, the economic downturn, and the military government’s reactivation of the national conscription law.
One of the conservationists remaining in the country showed an image of a community forest certificate on his mobile phone and lamented, “Who can we show this certificate to now?”
With the weakened presence of the conservation group, the river and mangrove forests were left without guardians – which opened the door for unregulated and unsustainable businesses to flourish.
Mangrove forest seizure
Less than one year after the coup and up until now, members of the Pat-Chan River Conservation Group, who had already scattered into refuge, received reports of widespread mangrove forest clearance in many areas.
At the mouth of the river, where Kawthaung town is located, local people witnessed workers from a local company cutting down trees in the mangrove forest of Nga-Eain-Su village and fencing off the area. They were told the forest was going to be turned into a crab farm.
Conservation network members in Chaung-Wa and Aye-Chan-Tha villages, situated in the middle part of the Pat-Chan River, also reported the clearing of mangrove forests for commercial prawn and crab farms.
“They cut the forests without letting us know,” said a villager who asked to remain anonymous due to safety concerns.
Buildings were erected in the cleared areas, and an embankment was constructed along the riverbank, leaving no space for the mangrove forests to grow back. Palm oil and rubber companies have also seized land along the river’s banks and in community areas.
Conservation group members who have remained in their villages reported seeing the military patrolling the river in speedboats.
Landmines were planted on the paths that villagers previously used to access the mangrove forests, by both the military and its opposition armed revolutionary groups fighting for control of the area.
Kawthaung town is now under the control of the military, with little presence of armed groups. This situation allows military members and their bureaucrats to dictate the usage of the river and mangrove forests.
“Some local businesspeople are granted protection due to their close ties with the military network. We dare not run conservation activities at the mouth of the river, let alone try to stop them,” said a local conservationist who remains in the area.
The contrast is striking on the eastern side of the river, which is under Thailand’s administration. Without war and unrest, conservation efforts for mangrove forests are thriving, along with local eco-tourism businesses.
Facing Kawthaung town, Thailand’s 14,230-hectare Ranong Mangrove Forest remains protected and is now part of the Thai government’s nominated Andaman Sea Nature Reserves for UNESCO World Heritage Site status.
Conservation before the coup
Due to the booming seafood and aquaculture industry, areas near the mouth of the Pat-Chan River had long been eyed for facilities like dockyards, fuel depots, cold-storage factories, fish-processing factories and warehouses.
Since 2014, many businessmen arrived with plans for large-scale developments that would involve clearing the mangrove forests, but these efforts were thwarted by a strong local conservation movement.
The Pat-Chan River Conservation Group, with support from local villagers, ran several initiatives in the pre-coup years.
These included campaigning for river conservation, educating local communities on the value of the river, planting mangrove trees and implementing a waste management project to ensure clean water.
The group also sought support from Forest Department officials, civil society organizations, the media and experts, who were invited to provide know-how on conservation work.
The key message of their campaign was clear: “If you care about the river and mangrove forests, you will always have your rice pots.”
This message proved true as many villagers found their livelihoods improved, despite having limited access to roads and electricity.
They could catch more marine animals such as fish, crabs, prawns and oysters when the river was healthy. Many even ran small-scale oyster and fish farms near the riverbank.
“I could send three of my children to school because of this,” said Ko Bike-Hla, who earned a living by selling mud crabs and horseshoe crabs caught on the banks of the Pat-Chan River.
The growth of the conservation movement was also driven by local communities’ experiences with the loss of mangrove forests when they had previously cut down trees for charcoal production. As a consequence, many riverbanks collapsed and some marine species disappeared.
“Some crab species only inhabit the mangrove forests. They are still found in the mangrove forests on Thailand’s side, but they never came back to our side [at Myanmar’s border],” said a Pat-Chan villager.
Although Pat-Chan hero Ko Shwe Phan cannot return home just yet, he believes the river’s protection now largely depends on the local people who remain.
“We made an arrangement for local people [to lead conservation work] so they can protect the river if we are no longer there. Anyone who takes care of the Pat-Chan River can be a hero,” he said.
While it won’t be easy for them to drive the conservation movement at the moment, there will be those who are ready to step up once the unrest has subsided.
This story was produced in collaboration with Dawei Watch, a news outlet covering Tanintharyi region in southern Myanmar. Read Burmese version..."
Source/publisher:
Mekong Eye
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-26
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Mangrove swamps of Burma/Myanmar - general studies and articles, Natural Disasters - General, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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"Human Rights Violations took place in States and Regions from Aug 15 to 21, 2024
Military Junta Troop launched airstrikes and dropped bombs in Sagaing Region, Magway Region, Mandalay Region, Tanintharyi Region, Rakhine State, and Shan State from August 15th to 21st. The Military Junta arrested the civilians for military service in the Bago Region, Magway Region, and Mandalay Region. The political prisoners from Daik-U Prison and Thayawaddy Prison from Bago Region were tortured.
Over 20 civilians died, and about 40 were injured by the Military’s heavy and light artillery attacks. Over 200 civilians were arrested by the Military Junta within a week..."
Source/publisher:
Network for Human Rights Documentation-Burma
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-26
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The junta’s opponents say an election organized during military rule would be a sham and solve no problems.
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"Myanmar’s junta has committed to holding a general election late next year, with voting to be staggered because of security concerns, said politicians who met the military’s election committee on the weekend.
Junta chief Senior Gen. Min Aung Hlaing has made promises to hold an election ever since early 2021 when he overthrew a government led by then State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi.
Suu Kyi’s party won a late 2020 election in a landslide but the military complained of election fraud, staged a coup, locked up Suu Kyi and many others and declared a state of emergency.
The junta’s Union Election Commission, or UEC, met political party representatives in the capital, Naypyidaw, on Saturday and urged them to prepare for the polls, said Tin Swe, vice chairman of the Democratic Party, one the parties at the meeting.
“They said they are prepared and that the election is a goal of the State Administration Council,” he told Radio Free Asia, referring to the junta by its official name.
“It must hold the election and has committed to holding it,” he said.
While the UEC had not officially announced the date of the election Tin Swe said he believed, given the discussions the parties held with the election organizer, that it would be held in November.
Military-run media also reported on the meeting and the preparations for the election, without reporting a date.
Radio Free Asia attempted to contact UEC member Khin Maung Oo for details about the plan for the election but he did not return calls by the time of publication.
The junta’s opponents have dismissed the junta’s plans for an election as meaningless.
Suu Kyi, Myanmar’s most popular politician, remains in detention along with many of her party members and supporters. Her National League for Democracy (NLD) party, which swept elections in 2016 and again in 2020, has been disbanded along with many other parties.
“I believe that the international community and the public will strongly oppose the sham election,” said Sithu Maung, spokesperson for a group of NLD politicians elected in the 2020 vote.
“This election is a way of trying to bring about military rule with supposed civilian approval,” Sithu Maung, who lives outside Myanmar, told RFA.
Elections organized by the military would resolve nothing, he said.
“We’ve said all along it’s not practical to solve Myanmar’s problems through elections. What Myanmar needs is not an election, it’s to change the system,” he said.
'Voting in stages'
Parties seen as representing the military and led by retired officers fared poorly in the 2016 and 2020 elections, even in constituencies where many military personnel and their families live.
The junta remains very unpopular, most Myanmar people say, and its forces have lost significant territory this year to various rebel groups fighting to end what they condemn as illegitimate army rule.
The election organizer told the parties on the weekend that voting would have to be staggered because of the security situation, said Myo Set Thway, general secretary of the People’s Pioneer Party.
“The UEC chairman said that it’s impossible to complete the election in one day in terms of security and other conditions. He said that the election will be held in stages,” he said.
“For security, we will do it first in places where the situation is fine and stable,” Myo Set Thway said, citing the UEC. “After that, elections will be held in areas that are moderately stable.”
The junta extended a state of emergency for another six months on July 31, the sixth extension since the 2021 coup. The constitution mandates that elections must be held within six months after a state of emergency is lifted.
The junta is also planning to organize a census this October to prepare for the polls.
Neighbors, including China and India, will be hoping that an election can help to bring stability to resource-rich Myanmar. Thailand, China and India have discussed providing support for the census and the vote.
In January 2023, the UEC introduced an election law stipulating that parties wanting to participate in a general election must have at least 100,000 members and funds of at least 100 million kyats (US$50,000). Parties were required to re-register within 60 days, which many of them, in disarray with members in detention or exile, failed to do so and were disqualified.
Of the 49 parties that have been approved, only nine plan to campaign nationally. The other 40 will compete on a regional or state level.
Scores of parties with suspected ties to rebel groups, including any political or ideological links, have been barred from any election..."
Source/publisher:
"Radio Free Asia" (USA)
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-26
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"Khin Mar Cho worries for her 4-year-old son as she struggles to scrape together enough food to feed him in a makeshift displacement camp at a crowded monastery in western Myanmar.
Soldiers had stormed their village of Byine Phyu, Rakhine state, and forced her and other family members out of their homes. They detained all the men and shot her brother and other neighbors, she said.
Survivors like Khin Mar Cho fled to the monastery just outside the regional capital Sittwe. There, a lone monk is struggling to feed about 300 people who have sought refuge inside the camp as a three-year civil war intensifies around them, waged by Myanmar’s military junta against an armed resistance.
“There are days that we have no food, even though we are hungry,” Khin Mar Cho said. “I cannot feed my kid anything more than meals donated by people because I don’t have a job or income, and all the male family members have been taken away.”
Disturbing accounts from multiple aid workers suggest hunger is being used as a weapon of war in Rakhine state.
The junta is preventing aid from reaching desperate people by imposing checkpoints, blocking roads and waterways, and refusing to issue access permits to humanitarian groups, multiple senior United Nations officials, and local and international aid workers in Rakhine told CNN on condition of anonymity because most weren’t authorized to speak.
Rakhine has become a focal point of the conflict, where a powerful ethnic minority armed rebel group, the Arakan Army (AA) — which is accused of human rights abuses — has seized control of at least 10 of the state’s townships since a year-long ceasefire with the military collapsed in November.
The aid officials said the junta is trying to “starve” civilians in AA-held territory, using tactics that have repeatedly been described as war crimes and crimes against humanity by UN officials and rights groups.
“They are using food as a weapon,” a senior aid official told CNN. “That much is clear.”
Related
Hundreds of fleeing Rohingya reportedly killed in Rakhine as fears mount of ethnic cleansing mount
In a statement to CNN, Myint Kyaw, Deputy Permanent Secretary for Myanmar’s Ministry of Information, alleged rebel groups — not the junta — are restricting “people’s access” to territories they control.
“The Myanmar government is committed to the equality of all citizens,” the statement said. “Every citizen has the right to travel freely without any restrictions.”
Risk of starvation
Aid workers say they don’t know the full extent of the suffering due to telecoms and internet blocks coupled with restrictions on access to affected areas.
But they say the crisis is acute.
The situation unfolding across the country is desperate, but in Rakhine — which is almost entirely dependent on food aid — the UN says that fewer than a quarter of the 873,000 people who need food assistance have received it.
“There is a very real possibility that the most vulnerable… may die if they do not receive support,” a UN report warned in June. It is now August, and the situation has deteriorated.
Displaced residents in Rakhine told CNN they are growing increasingly desperate as they and their families struggle to cope with escalating violence and dwindling supplies of food and medicine.
Prices for basic staples, like rice, fuel and cooking oil, have skyrocketed partly due to shortages created by the junta’s control of supply routes north from Myanmar’s largest city, Yangon, aid officials said. Requests to transport goods, including food, into the region are being refused, they added.
Meanwhile, food production in the state has plummeted, with farmers predicting a 50% drop in this year’s rice harvest, independent Myanmar news outlet The Irrawaddy reported.
Mohammed, a 43-year-old father of three, has lived in a displacement camp with his family in Sittwe since 2012, when anti-Muslim violence forced tens of thousands of people from their homes.
The latest fighting has not yet reached Sittwe, which the junta still controls. But since the collapse of the ceasefire deal between the AA and the military in November opened a major new front in Myanmar’s civil war, the camp has been all but cut off and conditions have drastically deteriorated, he said.
Mohammed’s children attend a small, makeshift school within the camp, but he says it’s difficult to nurture their dreams when he can only feed them half a bowl of rice.
“My children would cry and ask, ‘Are we not eating tonight?’ In those moments, feeling desperate, I would go to a neighbor and ask for some food to feed our children,” Mohammed told Partners Relief and Development, an aid NGO.
Yet his neighbors are hungry too, and they have little to spare.
Access denied
Shayna Bauchner, a researcher at Human Rights Watch, told CNN the junta is obstructing aid deliveries in Rakhine by blocking roads and waterways, seizing relief cargoes and confiscating medical supplies.
“As the conflict has spread around Rakhine, we’ve also seen the destruction of roadways and bridges,” she said. “The result is, basically, no one has access to these places.”
Aid groups, including UN agencies, must get “travel authorizations” from the state government, which reports to the ruling military council, before they can access territory that the junta considers “travel-restricted areas,” according to aid officials.
In February, the junta stopped issuing nearly all travel authorizations to contested or rebel-controlled territory in the state, most of which are in northern Rakhine, according to seven aid officials with direct knowledge of the matter, all of whom requested anonymity.
Without the travel authorizations, it’s impossible to pass through the junta’s road and waterway blockades, they said.
“All we need at the moment is aid and support to survive this.”
North Rakhine State villager
One senior aid official said, “it is difficult to negotiate because the SAC does not want assistance to go to non-SAC controlled areas,” referring to the State Administration Council, the official name of the junta government.
In May, some aid agencies received travel authorizations for Sittwe when the junta allowed them to begin transporting supplies from Yangon. Two cargo vessels carrying rice and basic medicine arrived in Sittwe two months later, but some items such as solar lights, hygiene and newborn kits remained held up, OCHA reported in August.
Teams still can’t access the surrounding townships or areas further afield.
“No official travel authorization has been granted to humanitarian partners to implement activities outside of Sittwe township since November 2023,” a senior aid official told CNN.
Seeking to broker an end to the blockade, senior UN officials held informal talks with SAC officials last month in the country’s capital, two sources told CNN.
The UN aid officials made clear in their meetings, which have not been previously reported, that the status quo is unacceptable, the sources said. Separately, the two officials said the issue was raised with the UN Security Council, the European Union and China, among others.
The junta told humanitarian groups that it cut their access to AA territory because aid workers cannot safely travel through areas the military does not control, sources told CNN.
But “that’s a lame excuse,” said a senior aid official. “We don’t need the junta to cover for our security.”
Local aid workers caught trying to deliver food and supplies in junta-controlled territory without a permit have also been arrested, those on the ground told CNN.
Aid workers and officials say the junta’s blockade is part of a wider war strategy long used by the military, designed to chip away at the rebel group’s popular support by cutting off food, water and medical care to the civilian population.
“They are using food as a weapon. That much is clear.”
Senior aid official
Bauchner, the Human Rights Watch researcher, said the blockades are “deliberate, and they are intended to harm the population in what is an apparent war crime.”
Myint Kyaw of the junta’s information ministry, said humanitarian groups are “being allowed to go to safe areas” after completing a verification process and alleged — without evidence — that rebel groups are blocking aid deliveries.
In the statement, the junta linked instability in the region to armed groups allegedly engaging in online gambling, planting and selling illegal drugs, human trafficking, online scams and illegal weapons deliveries to “terrorist groups” in rebel-controlled areas.
But one local aid official who works in northern Rakhine said the junta is “punishing civilians collectively” by blocking most food and medicine imports. Even the limited food that is available in the state is prohibitively expensive to most, largely thanks to blockade-induced inflation, he said.
“People are surviving on the bare minimum … like rice and salt,” said Ejaz, who asked to be identified by a pseudonym for his safety.
“I’ve seen it with my own eyes.”
War and hunger
Many of the displaced in Rakhine are members of the stateless Rohingya minority, who have been persecuted for decades in a country that denies them citizenship.
Jamila, 26, a former resident of the predominantly Rohingya town of Buthidaung, close to the Bangladesh border, said the community recently suffered food shortages for at least six months due to the fighting.
“No one came to give us food. The junta blocks all roads. They block all aid trucks,” said Jamila, who goes by one name and spoke to CNN from a refugee camp in Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, where her family recently fled.
Many shops were looted by fighters and soldiers, she said, and those still open could only get supplies by smuggling them at high prices across the border from Bangladesh.
Food supplies were also strained as droves of displaced people from surrounding villages fled to Buthidaung to escape fighting and landmines.
“Everyone was helping everyone,” she said. “I lived life with risk and hunger.”
With little food and no medicine, Jamila said her children suffered from diarrhea and vomiting. “I am suffering from allergies. My whole body is full of itching. But there is no medicine, no treatment,” she said.
In late May, the Arakan Army said it seized Buthidaung. Activists and relatives of residents accused AA soldiers of extrajudicial killings, torching and looting Rohingya neighborhoods, and forcing thousands of people to flee.
Jamila said fighters stormed her village, drenching her home in petrol and setting it on fire while she and her family were still inside.
As the flames consumed their home, they scrambled to grab what belongings they could salvage — but only those on the ground floor had time to flee. Her parents-in-law, asleep in their beds upstairs, did not make it out.
They had no time to mourn. As they ran to escape their village, the howl of gunfire rang out, and a bullet pierced her younger brother. He did not survive.
“We didn’t try to save him,” Jamila said. “We were hearing the screams of people, the cries of children.”
She walked for six days to reach Bangladesh, saying “we lived by eating banana leaves and drinking pond water.”
CNN could not verify Jamila’s account but it matches other reports from the incident.
In a statement, the AA denied it torched Buthidaung, saying it “adheres to its principle of fighting under the military code of conduct and never targets non-military objects.”
Earlier this month, the AA was accused of killing Rohingya people in drone strikes and artillery fire as villagers fled the nearby town of Maungdaw. It denied involvement and blamed the deaths on the Myanmar military and allied Rohingya armed groups.
CNN reached out for comment to the AA and the Humanitarian and Development Coordination Office (HDCO) of the United League of Arakan (ULA), the AA’s political wing.
In a statement to CNN, the HDCO said there are about 590,000 people displaced in Rakhine state, according to their data, but civil society organizations are only reaching 20-30% of conflict-affected people.
“Emergency responses are extremely slow. The ULA government, including HDCO, is making every effort to provide food, shelter, water, and healthcare with the limited resources available,” it said.
‘We are invisible’
When the junta blocks official aid deliveries, regional and local humanitarian groups use covert tactics to operate without approval from the military, risking their lives to deliver aid to those in need, according to officials at four local aid groups, all of whom declined to publicize their tactics because it could jeopardize their operations.
But it’s far from enough.
At least 18.6 million people — about one third of Myanmar’s population — need humanitarian assistance this year, but aid workers have only been able to reach 2.1 million, according to an OCHA report published last week. Even in territories that the junta does not blockade, intensifying war, record-low funding and international apathy are also limiting aid workers’ access.
Aid workers have also become targets in the junta’s war.
A World Food Programme (WFP) warehouse in Maungdaw was looted and burned in June, depriving that community of urgently needed food aid. But WFP’s local partners were already struggling to reach their warehouses in Rakhine because “artillery shells are falling everywhere,” according to a source with direct knowledge of the matter.
Junta-imposed restrictions on communications are also limiting aid workers’ ability to operate, they say. Signal, a popular encrypted messaging app, has become inaccessible to users in Myanmar unless they use a VPN (virtual private network), four Yangon residents told CNN. Junta police are also conducting random phone checks throughout the city, one resident added.
Meanwhile, the UN’s humanitarian response program in Myanmar is among the most underfunded in the world. UN agencies and their local partners estimate that about $1 billion is needed to fund aid efforts in the country through 2024, but they have only raised about 20% of that amount.
“In the best-case scenario, based on my discussions with the donors, we may raise 30-35%, though not beyond that, by the end of the year,” Sajjad Mohammad Sajid, the OCHA Head of Office in Myanmar, told CNN. “This is the second year in a row that Myanmar is facing a significant decrease in funds despite rising food insecurity.”
Without an immediate injection of cash and a lifting of the blockade, aid officials say they will be forced to choose who does — and does not — receive humanitarian aid, leaving millions of desperate civilians without urgently needed assistance.
“Underfunding will result in livelihoods falling beyond the point of repair,” the OCHA report warned.
A senior UN aid official in Myanmar blamed the funding shortfall in part on international apathy. There are relatively few global advocacy groups and international news outlets consistently reporting on the country, and unlike Gaza and Ukraine, human rights abuses in Myanmar have gained little international attention, he said.
“We have become invisible,” the official said. “Donors will find it difficult to fund missions that are invisible.”
The monastery in Sittwe, where Khin Mar Cho and her family now reside, relies on food donated from the local community.
Another villager from Byine Phyu, who declined to be named for safety reasons, told CNN that on good days they are given two basic meals of rice and vegetables, but her two children, aged 11 and 7, often go to bed hungry.
“The soldiers took all the money we had,” she said. “All we need at the moment is aid and support to survive this.”
Though his small monastery is overwhelmed with displaced people, the monk said he tries to collect more donations from the community, hoping to feed those in the compound more than small helpings of rice.
But they receive meager food donations. Adding to the dire situation, his makeshift camp is overfilled, many families are forced to sleep outside without a covering in the height of the rainy season, so sickness and diarrhea is rife, the monk said.
“There are no NGOs or medics helping them,” he said.
“The only help we get is from the fire service for their funerals.”
This story has been updated with additional information..."
Source/publisher:
"CNN" (USA)
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-25
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Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations, The discussion on humanitarian assistance to Burma
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"Pioneering Myanmar documentary filmmaker Pe Maung Same died on Monday, three days after being transferring from Yangon’s notorious Insein Prison to a hospital, according to close friends.
He was 51 years old.
Pe Maung Same was arrested at a Myanmar military regime checkpoint in Karenni State’s capital, Loikaw, in late May 2022. Junta officials prosecuted him for allegedly contacting local People’s Defense Force groups and sending his video records to the National Unity Government and local media outlets.
He was convicted and sentenced to three years in prison.
He contracted tuberculosis in Loikaw Prison. His condition worsened in April this year, and he had not been able to walk since then.
“He said his lower body was like a stone and sensed nothing,” one of his friends said.
Later, it was found that he had developed spinal tuberculosis. Due to the severity of his condition, he was transferred to Insein Prison in Yangon on July 13 to receive medical treatment in the prison hospital, but he never recovered.
“While he was in Loikaw Prison, four of his ribs were broken during interrogation. He also said he was denied proper food and medical treatment in both prisons,” the friend said.
After over two years in prison, Pe Maung Same was released from Insein Prison on Aug. 16 due to his health condition and transferred to Yangon’s Sakura Hospital.
He died in the hospital on Monday, three days after his release.
“After he underwent a screening test of his stomach on Sunday, his heart stopped. He was [revived and] sent to the ICU but the next day he died of cardiac arrest. He died because of being sent into prison and not receiving proper food or treatment. He would not have died had he not been arrested,” the friend added.
He was cremated at the Yayway Cemetery in Yangon on Wednesday.
Pe Maung Same was a son of prominent Burmese satirical cartoonist Pe Thein, who was widely respected for both his artistic gifts and his political convictions.
Pe Maung Same was among a group of young Myanmar documentary filmmakers who emerged in the early 2000s. He made many documentaries while at Yangon Film School and won many international awards.
His prominent documentaries include “Don’t Think It’s Funny”, about his father; and “Nargis—When Time Stopped Breathing”, the first-ever feature-length documentary made by a Myanmar filmmaker, which captured the aftermath of Cyclone Nargis, which killed nearly 140,000 people in the Irrawaddy Delta in 2008. The film was internationally screened and won four awards.
Another of his documentaries, “The River Our Ayeyarwady”, won plaudits among both local and international audiences.
He was widely admired by his peers in the new generation of Myanmar documentary filmmakers for his willingness to share his documentary filmmaking experiences and teach about filmmaking.
“Pe Maung Same is a pioneer filmmaker in the modern film industry of Myanmar. Everybody loves him,” his friend said..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-21
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Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Freedom of opinion and expression: - the situation in Burma/Myanmar - reports, analyses, recommendations, Freedom of Opinion and Expression - tools for change in Burma/Myanmar
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"Increasing deadly attacks against Rohingya people in Myanmar’s Rakhine State bear a terrifying resemblance to the atrocities of August 2017, Amnesty International said ahead of the seventh anniversary of the crisis.
“As the seven-year anniversary of the Rohingya crisis nears, the horrific situation in Rakhine State looks disturbingly familiar. Rohingya men, women and children are being killed, towns are emptying out, and vestiges of Rohingya history and identity are being eroded. Many are once again seeking shelter in refugee camps across the border in Bangladesh, where economic, security and livelihood conditions have deteriorated,” Amnesty International’s Myanmar Researcher Joe Freeman said.
“After being subjected to a brutal and systematic campaign of violence in August 2017 following decades of state-backed persecution, Rohingya civilians are now caught in the middle of intensifying conflict in Rakhine State between the Arakan Army (AA) and the Myanmar military, which has forcefully conscripted Rohingya to fight on its side.”
The military has responded to battlefield losses with devastating aerial attacks that have killed Rohingya as well as ethnic Rakhine civilians. They have targeted civilian areas, destroying homes, marketplaces and other civilian infrastructure.
“The Myanmar military must immediately end their renewed campaign of violence and refrain from unlawful attacks on civilians, who are bearing the brunt of the conflict not only in Rakhine State but across the country, with millions displaced,” Freeman said.
As they advance through Rakhine State and capture more territory, the Arakan Army has also faced mounting allegations of atrocities.
“In addition, the international community must apply more pressure on the Arakan Army to abide by international humanitarian law. All allegations of war crimes perpetrated by the Myanmar military or by any armed groups in the country should be effectively investigated,” Freeman said.
Arakan Army advances on the northern Rakhine town of Buthidaung reportedly resulted in large-scale arson on 17 May of this year, displacing thousands of Rohingya residents. And on 5 August, an attack that survivors blamed on the Arakan Army killed an unknown number of Rohingya civilians fleeing the town of Maungdaw near the border with Bangladesh. The Arakan Army has denied attacking Rohingya.
“The rapidly escalating conflict in Myanmar is all the more reason for the United Nations Security Council to finally refer the situation in the country to the International Criminal Court. There can be no progress without accountability. The future of Myanmar hinges on protecting, promoting and upholding the human rights of all people in the country,” Freeman said.
“This includes scrapping discriminatory laws or policies that are used to cement the apartheid system against hundreds of thousands of Rohingya men, women and children in Rakhine and restoring their rights to health, education and freedom of movement.”
Meanwhile, Bangladesh continues to host nearly one million Rohingya refugees in camps in poor conditions for the seventh consecutive year. Last year, at least 12,000 refugees in the camps were rendered homeless due to devastating fires and the impact of cyclone Mocha. Acute funding shortfalls led to food insecurity in the camps, as well as shortcomings in healthcare and education.
“Bangladesh’s new interim government should prioritize the protection of Rohingya refugees’ human rights and their safety in camps, uphold the principle of non-refoulment, and adopt a rights-respecting policy towards the Rohingya,” Freeman said.
Background
On 25 August 2017 Myanmar security forces launched a widespread and systematic assault on Rohingya villages after an armed group calling itself the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army carried out deadly attacks on police posts. Arakan is another name used for Rakhine State.
The military response included extrajudicial killings, destruction of properties and sexual assault. As a result of the military’s so-called “clearance operations”, more than 740,000 Rohingya women, men and children fled northern Rakhine State to neighbouring Bangladesh. Taking into account previous waves of violence against them, an estimated one million Rohingya refugees now live in Bangladesh.
Amnesty International has said the 2017 attacks against the Rohingya amounted to crimes against humanity, recommending that at least a dozen senior officials be investigated for their roles in the violence, including Senior General Min Aung Hlaing.
The International Criminal Court (ICC) is investigating alleged crimes committed in 2016 and 2017 against the Rohingya population, but only those committed partly in the territory of Bangladesh or other states, because Myanmar has not ratified the ICC’s Statute. Amnesty International has called for the United Nations Security Council to refer the full situation in Myanmar to the ICC, so that an investigation of all crimes committed in Myanmar can be conducted.
Min Aung Hlaing has never been held accountable and on 1 February 2021, the military seized power in a coup, with Min Aung Hlaing chairing the newly created State Administration Council (SAC). SAC-backed soldiers, police and militias have killed more than 5,000 civilians in Myanmar since the 2021 coup.
Amnesty International has documented torture, arbitrary detention and unlawful air strikes by the Myanmar military following the coup. In November 2022, the organization called for the suspension of aviation fuel imports, which the Myanmar military uses to bomb civilians. While many companies have withdrawn from the supply chain after being made aware of the risks, shipments have continued..."
Source/publisher:
"Amnesty International" (UK)
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-21
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Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Arakan (Rakhine) State - reports etc. by date (latest first), Discrimination against the Rohingya, Human Rights and international relations, Armed conflict in Burma - attacks on civilians, Rohingya (cultural, political etc.)
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Investors also cite rising inflation, banking difficulties, a lack of raw materials and worker shortages.
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"Foreign investment in Myanmar has dropped precipitously in the three and a half years since the military seized power from a democratically elected government, according to officials and observers, as companies weigh the risks of operating in a nation engulfed in civil war.
Myanmar’s economy has been in freefall since the Feb. 1, 2021, coup, contracting by nearly 20%, according to the World Bank. Its 2024 gross domestic product growth estimates have been halved to 1%, in large part due to widespread conflict and junta mismanagement.
Investors have fled, citing political instability, rising inflation, difficulties with bank transactions, challenges in obtaining raw materials, and insufficient manpower as reasons for scaling back their presence or leaving Myanmar altogether.
According to official statements from Myanmar’s Directorate of Investments and Company Administration, foreign investment reached a mere US$150 million in the first seven months of 2024. Comparatively, some US$2.9 billion in investment flowed into Myanmar during the three years between 2021 and 2024.
These numbers represent a drop in the bucket when measured against US$3.8 billion in foreign investment in 2020 alone, when the country was governed by former State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi’s civilian National League for Democracy party.
Singapore’s Sembcorp became one of the latest firms to reduce its footprint in Myanmar on Aug. 12, when it announced the temporary closure of its gas-fired power plant in the Mandalay region city of Myingyan, citing safety concerns.
Similarly, on May 28, South Korea’s CJ Feed Myanmar announced the suspension of its production and sales of animal feed at its plant in the largest city Yangon due to the economic crisis.
Dueling exchange rates
One Myanmar businessman told RFA Burmese that the junta’s control of the exchange rate for the kyat has made it difficult for foreign companies to operate.
"The exchange rate of the dollar is unstable due to inflation,” said the businessman who, like others interviewed for this report, requested anonymity for security reasons. “The Central Bank’s control of the dollar, with a fixed rate of 2,100 kyats, poses significant challenges for foreign companies."
The junta is increasingly cracking down on black market money changers as they keep desperately needed foreign exchange out of the formal banking system, where people and companies are forced to convert it to kyats at artificially low exchange rates.
In Myanmar’s informal banking sector, known as hundi, one U.S. dollar is worth more than 6,000 kyats.
Worsening conflict
However, the main obstacle to foreign investment is the worsening conflict, according to Aung Thu Nyein, a member of the Institute for Strategy and Policy – Myanmar think tank.
"The current environment in Myanmar is not conducive to smooth business operations,” he said. “The primary concern is that investing in Myanmar under the present circumstances entails significant political risk.”
Meanwhile, the junta’s investment policies are unclear, “making it uncertain with whom one should engage."
Just last month, Thailand-based newspaper The Thaiger reported that Thai companies with investments worth US$7 billion had withdrawn from Myanmar due to the persistent tensions between the junta and the armed opposition.
And Japan’s Nikkei Asia reported last week that numerous businesses in Myanmar have relocated to Thailand due to the conflict.
Junta lacks ‘business mindset’
A senior official from the junta’s Ministry of Investment and Foreign Economic Relations, who also declined to be identified, told RFA that “new investment is unlikely.”
“Foreign investment is almost non-existent under the present circumstances,” he said. “Existing businesses may be transferred, with the likelihood of such transfers depending on the evolving situation.”
The official noted that it was increasingly difficult for companies to justify investing in Myanmar when they could do so elsewhere in the region, where the political situation was more stable.
An economic analyst told RFA that the junta lacks a “business-oriented mindset.”
"If the economy were managed by a government with a strong understanding of business practices, the country’s economic situation would likely improve,” he said.
Following the coup in 2021, a majority of Western companies withdrew from Myanmar.
According to a report released by ISP-Myanmar at the end of 2022, out of 52 countries with companies that had regularly done business in Myanmar, 39 had ceased their investments.
The primary foreign investors in Myanmar now are companies based in Singapore, China, and Thailand. Among the 12 foreign investment sectors, energy, natural gas, and oil manufacturing attract the most investment..."
Source/publisher:
"Radio Free Asia" (USA)
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-21
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"From their base in ungoverned stretches of Southeast Asia, international criminal networks are prowling the Internet, seeking to defraud victims around the world with sophisticated and psychologically devastating scams. Gangsters operating out of Myanmar, Cambodia and Laos, relying on forced labor, have spread their tentacles through Asia, Africa and Latin America and increasingly within the United States, stripping gullible prey of at least $64 billion annually. Clearly, to eradicate such a global menace will require a coordinated international response. Even so, the United States is not internally powerless to confront this striking example of how conflict and corrupt governance in distant parts of the world can directly threaten Americans’ security and well-being.
The scale and scope of this mass scamming has essentially snuck up on law enforcement and policy makers given its pathbreaking geographic and organizational parameters. Effective action to counter the scammers will require a whole-of-government effort by the U.S. coordinating the work of government agencies, civil society and concerned international counterparts, beginning with Southeast Asia.
One such effort to address scamming in the U.S. is already underway, organized by civil society and government on an ad hoc basis to begin charting a comprehensive plan of attack. Known as Operation Shamrock, it is a first-of-its-kind public-private partnership whose goal is sharing information across diverse and multi-disciplinary stakeholders affected by the organized crime crisis emanating from Southeast Asia. Within the Shamrock alliance, working groups focus on specific strategies and tactics that include raising public awareness of the scams; educating bankers to look for red flags that indicate criminal activity; and boosting law enforcement capacity to assist victims and trace lost funds, thereby gaining better intelligence on precisely how the criminal groups operate. Acting as a non-governmental arm and laboratory for innovative responses to the problem, Operation Shamrock could be a valuable partner for a larger government program.
How the Scam Operations in Southeast Asia Developed
The epicenter of this scamming activity is located in the borderlands of Myanmar, Cambodia and Laos, where weak governance, vast swathes of largely unregulated territory, widespread corruption and armed conflict have provided virtually free license for the criminal networks to gain a solid foothold over the past decade.
A USIP study published this year found that what began as enclaves hosting illegal gambling has expanded in recent years into sophisticated scamming operations. The tightly guarded enclaves operated by the criminal networks house hundreds of thousands of forced-labor victims from around the world, enticed by false ads for well paid, high-tech jobs and trafficked into the armed enclaves by another set of criminal networks adept at moving people across borders under false pretenses.
While the transnational criminal networks originate predominantly from China, until recently Beijing did very little to disrupt these criminal groups overseas.
While the transnational criminal networks originate predominantly from China, until recently Beijing did very little to disrupt these criminal groups overseas. In many cases Chinese enterprises, government and party institutions played a role in deepening the gangs’ influence across Southeast Asia to further their own goals.
When the scam centers along the Chinese border began to proliferate during the pandemic, with the Chinese public as their major target, however, Chinese police cracked down on the syndicates targeting mainland China. The crime groups responded by globalizing their illicit activities, seeking victims on other continents including North America. While Africa, Central Asia, South Asia and Latin America have all been hit hard by the human trafficking employed to staff the scam centers, the United States is proving to be a particularly rich target for this malign activity.
The Toll on American Victims
The scams are unprecedented in their use of psychological manipulation, technology, social media and advanced financial technologies. Dubbed “pig-butchering” for the technique of figuratively fattening and ultimately slaughtering the victim, the scams aim to strip targets of all their assets — a process that of course inflicts deep emotional harm. New victims emerge every day in the U.S. reporting losses of hundreds of thousands or even millions of dollars.
Pig butchering works by luring potential marks into online investment or romantic relationships — or both —through common social media and internet sites. Scam actors will target victims by text message or social media and then engage in a psychological campaign to isolate the victim and develop a trust between victim and scammer. The process is similar to brainwashing.
Preying on the bond that develops, they induce Americans to deposit money into “cryptocurrency investment accounts” after showing them false data purportedly reflecting their return on investment. Then, believing that they have it all — a new love and an amazing way to make money — the victims are pushed into liquidating retirement accounts, college savings or other forms of assets. Some have even been manipulated into taking high interest loans to allegedly pay “taxes” on their fictitious reported gains. One such victim, an employee of a local U.S. bank, was even convinced to criminally divert bank funds into a scam investment scheme, causing millions of dollars in losses. Ultimately, victims are hit with a double punch: Their entire nest egg is gone and they have been betrayed by someone they may have loved and definitely trusted.
Some reported case studies illustrate particular manipulative techniques. An adult son received a call from his elderly mother in Florida asking him to help her pay the mortgage on her condo. “You don’t have a mortgage,” he told her. “I do now,” she said, explaining how her new love had helped her get a high-interest equity line against the home so that she could put it into a crypto investment. The son told the authors he then used his retirement funds to pay off that mortgage for his mother, two generations were struck by this crime.
Other manipulative techniques have even resulted in violent crimes in the United States — illustrating how these networks could undermine much broader forms of instability. In Ohio, AP recently reported a case involving a scam victim who shot and killed an Uber driver after a manipulative criminal convinced him that the driver was somehow involved in the scam. Meanwhile, a newer plague of custom scams in the United States and Europe also illustrate how the pig-butchering scamsters may impersonate law enforcement by acquiring knowledge of the family situations and legal and or political vulnerabilities of victims.
Reports to the FBI’s victim hotline (known as IC3) from 2023 alone show losses of $4.5 billion to online investment schemes and $650 million to romance scams, though we know this is only the tip of the iceberg, because victim shame leads to vast underreporting of the crime. Victims are embarrassed, isolated and frequently too humiliated to seek help. In the most extreme cases, people have been known to end their lives. Such losses are commonly thought to affect the elder population, but IC3 reports show people of all ages — indeed anyone with a cell phone — is vulnerable to these scams.
Countering the Threat
As the USIP study concludes, only a comprehensive, well-coordinated international effort, beginning with Southeast Asia, has any chance of containing this global menace. It cannot be effectively addressed on a county-by-country basis, because the criminal networks behind it are infinitely adept at outpacing law enforcement efforts and advancing new technological applications that reach beyond current capabilities.
Only a comprehensive, well-coordinated international effort, beginning with Southeast Asia, has any chance of containing this global menace.
However, with the United States increasingly rising to the top as a prime victim of this type of scamming, it also behooves U.S. institutions — law enforcement, cybersecurity agencies, civil society organizations and media — to organize a coordinated program to prevent and disrupt its impact on innocent U.S. citizens.
This is the goal of Operation Shamrock, which could serve as a model platform for a much wider U.S.-government led effort.
Operation Shamrock has assembled many of the stakeholders necessary for alerting the public to the threat of this criminal activity and mobilizing grassroots responses toward crafting remedial measures to disrupt the scams. Stakeholders engaged in the operation include social media, financial sector and banking industry representatives, cryptocurrency exchanges, law enforcement at all levels including international, NGOs and victim services providers. Operating mainly in the United States, but with international ties, Shamrock is a good example of the kind of multidisciplinary approach that must be replicated and expanded to check criminal scamming.
Building public awareness must be at the center of any strategy to combat scams. This crime won’t stop until we reach full American awareness of the threat. It warrants a massive campaign to educate the public about the dangers of engaging by text with people we don’t know. And it requires new efforts by the private sector to ensure that Americans using various social media platforms can do so safely. It also requires much greater partnership between banks, law enforcement and social media companies to prevent psychological manipulation from emptying bank accounts. Finally, it requires strong government leadership in building a whole-of-government approach that can advance robust international collaboration to disrupt these networks overseas. It’s time to cultivate a new normal of caution as a primary response to online communication..."
Source/publisher:
United States Institute of Peace
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-21
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"BEIJING, Aug. 20 (Xinhua) -- Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi met with Julie Bishop, special envoy of the secretary-general of the United Nations (UN) for Myanmar, in Beijing on Tuesday.
Wang, also a member of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China Central Committee, said that on the Myanmar issue, China is committed to respecting its sovereignty, independence, national unity and territorial integrity, is committed to non-interference in its internal affairs, and is committed to the "Myanmar-owned, Myanmar-led" peace process. China supports ASEAN's role as the main channel, he added.
Noting the special envoy of the UN secretary-general on Myanmar plays a unique role, Wang said China stands ready to provide support and assistance to Bishop in performing her duties and play a constructive role in achieving political reconciliation and lasting peace and stability in Myanmar.
Bishop said she is willing to maintain close communication and strengthen cooperation with China and ASEAN to reach a consensus on the proper handling of the Myanmar issue. ■
Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, also a member of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China Central Committee, meets with Julie Bishop, special envoy of the secretary-general of the United Nations (UN) for Myanmar, in Beijing, capital of China, Aug. 20, 2024. (Xinhua/Yan Yan)..."
Source/publisher:
"Xinhua News Agency" (Beijing)
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-20
[field_licence]
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Battlefield failures and scapegoating have prompted a growing dissatisfaction with Min Aung Hlaing’s leadership.
Description:
"Rumors of a putsch swirled around Myanmar last week ahead of Chinese Prime Minister Wang Yi’s visit to Naypyidaw where he obliquely rebuked junta chief Senior Gen.l Min Aung Hlaing. Given the scale of recent military losses there were reasons for both.
The opposition’s military gains have fundamentally transformed the battlescape and it is hard to see how the military can recover.
Since the ethnic army offensive known as Operation 1027 began in late 2023, opposition forces have captured over 2,000 military positions. The Arakan Army controls almost the entire northern half of Rakhine, and is rapidly pushing south, meeting little resistance.
The Kachin Independence Army controls every border crossing to China, and it is now on the outskirts of Myitkyina and Bhamo. The Ta’ang National Liberation Army and the Myanmar National Defense Alliance Army control much of northern Shan state.
One conflict monitoring group estimates that there have been 6,000 army casualties since Operation 1027 began. Hastily recruited and poorly trained conscripts are now at the front lines.
The military mustered 5,000 troops for the defense of Lashio and, even with air support, were outmanned and overpowered. When Lashio fell, nearly 5,000 troops and their families surrendered.
The shadow National Unity Government, or NUG, Defense Minister Ye Mon, recently asserted that 75 of 252, or 30%, of the country’s towns and cities are completely liberated, while 74 are being contested. Only one-third of the cities and towns are under full military control, though they are the largest population centers.
Since Operation 1027 began, the military has been unable to recapture almost any territory, and where it has, it’s been through sheer scorched earth tactics, intended to depopulate communities.
Unappreciated role of PDFs
While so much attention has been focused on the gains of the ethnic resistance organizations, or EROs, not enough attention has been paid to the NUG’s People’s Defense Forces, also known as PDFs.
When the PDFs were first established in 2021, they were largely written off as nothing more than canon fodder. Filled with urban youths who fled the junta, they had few arms.
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Groups like the Karen National Liberation Army and the Ta’ang National Liberation Army provided training and a limited supply of arms and ammunition. By 2022 and 2023, the NUG was able to supply the PDFs with a steady stream of funding, which allowed them to begin to purchase weapons on the black market.
But most of the weapons they obtained were captured on the battlefield. Each successive victory gave them the arms and munitions that laid the foundation for future victories.
The PDFs have been disciplined and highly motivated, committed to the political goals of a federal democracy.
Taking advantage of their tech savvy youth, they have also been technically proficient and innovative, quickly utilizing commercial drones, long before any ERO or the military did.
PDFs have played an under-appreciated role in all of the Operation 1027 battles. They fought alongside the Karen Nationalities Defence Force in Kayah state, the Ta’ang National Liberation Army, and Kachin Independence Army.
The NUG was smart enough to put many of their units under the operational command of the various EROs, which had more battlefield experience.
But the PDFs have demonstrated exceptional battlefield experience in the past two years. In some regions, they are doing the lion’s share of the fighting.
Operation Shan-Man
The Mandalay PDF has built on the success of the Ta’ang National Liberation Army in northern Shan state.
It moved out of the hills to the east of the Irrawaddy River, capturing the town of Singu, a mere 50 km (30 miles) north of Mandalay.
This allowed them to block the movement of troops and supplies up Route 311 to the southern Kachin city of Bhamo, evidence of close tactical coordination between the NUG and the EROs.
The Mandalay PDF continues to stage attacks along that road. Last week they captured Takaung, which is the symbolic center of the Burmese empire, and Thabeikkyin township, situated between Singu and Takaung. In addition, they have taken nine army camps.Control of these towns not only gives them control of the highway, but also, should they be able to acquire heavier weaponry, control of the movement of troops and supplies along the Irrawaddy River.
PDFs have increased sporadic, though not sustained, attacks on the outskirts of Mandalay, the country’s second largest city.
Roughly 100 km (60 miles) to the city’s southwest, PDFs have been engaged in fighting across Myingyan township. Four separate PDFs converged on Taungtha township.
Other PDFs moved on the town of Natogyi. The government quickly responded, deploying 200 reinforcements to retake the town, where there is a pumping and off-take station for China’s parallel oil and gas pipeline from Kyaukphyu in Rakhine state to Kunming, across the border in Yunnan province. PDFs had briefly held the guard stations at the facility.
The escalation of fighting in the region prompted the Singapore-listed Sembcorp to indefinitely suspend operations at its US$300 million, 225-megawatt gas-fired power plant, which was opened in 2019. For a country already suffering acute power shortages, this is another blow for the faltering junta.
From four cuts to depopulation
While the NUG and their PDFs are quick to capitalize on their victories, releasing videos of townspeople warmly welcoming opposition forces, there are costs entailed with liberation.
When Operation 1027 began, the Kachin Independence Army and PDFs took over Kawlin township, in the heart of Sagaing region’s dry zone. This prompted a brutal counterattack. For nearly two weeks the town was shelled and bombed.
PDF-initiated attacks have also intensified in recent weeks in southern Sagaing, prompting fierce reprisals, mass arson attacks, and artillery strikes. Likewise, the military has lashed out in Shan state, indiscriminately bombing civilians in towns captured by the armed opposition.
A desperate regime seems to be adapting its already brutal counter-insurgency doctrine known as the “Four Cuts,” which is designed to terrorize the population into submission, to a Russian style campaign of depopulating territories.
Signs of strain
Min Aung Hlaing met with China’s Wang Yi, on Aug. 15, dispelling claims that he had been ousted by his peers.
But given the battlefield failures and his penchant for scapegoating, one certainly understands why there is growing dissatisfaction and unease.Min Aung Hlaing has been rotating generals at breakneck speed. Of the 14 regional military commands, seven have been assigned new commanders in 2024 alone. The Northeast Command has had three commanders in the past two months alone.
Only one of the 14 regional military commanders has been in place since January 2022. The remainder were replaced between April and August 2023. Of the six Bureau of Special Operation commanders that oversee the regional military commands, four have been replaced since April 2023. This month Lt. General Ni Lin Aung was assigned to oversee the four regional military commands in Shan state.
There are reports that the State Administrative Council, as the junta is formally known, has assigned its second ranking official, General Soe Win, to personally lead counter-offensive operations.
The junta has detained several commanders and their deputies from the Triangle Region, Northeast, and Central Region commands.
The costs of failure are high as the regime searches for people to blame. But more failure is likely, as the flailing junta is confronted by a surging opposition, and the financial and logistical realities that make any counter-offensive impossible..."
Source/publisher:
"Radio Free Asia" (USA)
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-20
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The captured base is a key to the defense of a military headquarters.
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"One of Myanmar’s most powerful insurgent armies has taken full control of a strategically important township in Kachin state on the border with China, its information officer told Radio Free Asia.
The Kachin Independence Army, or KIA, together with People’s Defense Forces loyal to the shadow National Unity Government, defeated junta forces to capture their last remaining battalion base in Momauk township in northern Myanmar on Monday, Col. Naw Bu said.
“We were able to completely seize Infantry Battalion 437,” he said. “The military council launched airstrikes but now we can say we have taken control of the whole of Momauk township.”
There were casualties on both sides, Naw Bu said, but he declined to give details.
RFA telephoned the junta’s Kachin state spokesman and social affairs minister Moe Min Thei to ask about Momauk but he did not answer.
The KIA, fighting for self-determination against the forces of the junta that toppled a democratically elected government in 2021, launched an initial attack on Momauk on May 7, then began their final push, along with their allies, on July 24.
Momauk is about 130 kilometers (81 miles) south of the Kachin state capital of Myitkyina, and only about 14 kilometers (9 miles) east of the town of Bhamo where the junta’s Operations and Command Headquarters 21 is based, Naw Bu said.
Junta forces had withdrawn towards Bhamo, which is on the east bank of the Irrawaddy River, he said.
The KIA and its allies have captured more than 20 junta camps in the township since late July and about 200 junta camps in the whole of Kachin state since the beginning of the year, he said.
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Junta airstrikes, artillery attacks and arson led to the destruction of more than 100 homes in Momauk and more than 3,000 people had fled, many to the safety of areas under KIA control, residents said.
One displaced resident sheltering near the Chinese border said he was afraid of more fighting.
“The town is being cleared up but I haven’t gone back,” said the man, who wished to remain anonymous for safety reasons.
“I would like to check my home if I could but I’m still worried that there will be more fighting,” he said, referring to Bhamo and Mansi towns where junta forces are based.
“There are so many difficulties when we flee and shelter with relatives”.
The KIA is one of several insurgent forces to make significant gains against junta forces since late last year.
An alliance of three rebel factions has pushed junta forces out of major towns in Shan state, to the southeast of Kachin state, while the military has lost ground to ethnic minority insurgents in Rakhine state in the west, and in Kayah and Kayin states in the east, as well as in parts of the deep south.
The junta has responded with airstrikes including on the KIA headquarters at Lai Zar on Aug. 15. That attack unsettled neighboring China, which fired warning shots at junta jets, according to the KIA.
The United Nations says about 3 million people have been forced from their homes by the fighting in Myanmar, many since clashes surged at the beginning of the year..."
Source/publisher:
"Radio Free Asia" (USA)
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-20
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"19 August 2024: The Arakan Army (AA) must ensure the protection of civilians in northern Rakhine state and uphold its obligations under international humanitarian law, says the Special Advisory Council for Myanmar (SAC-M).
An attack on Rohingya men, women and children on 5 August 2024 may have resulted in the deaths of up to 200 people, according to credible reports. The victims were attempting to escape violent conflict between the AA and Myanmar military in Maungdaw, northern Rakhine state, and cross the Naf River into Bangladesh.
Survivors and witnesses report bombs being dropped from drones, artillery fire, and soldiers shooting people with small arms. The AA has been accused of being responsible. The recent events follow the reported large-scale, coordinated killing, arson and shelling attacks on Rohingya in Buthidaung on 17 May, which AA troops are also alleged to have committed.
The humanitarian situation in northern Rakhine state, in particular for Rohingya communities, is dire. Rohingya in northern Rakhine are at risk of genocide, according to a 2020 ruling issued by the International Court of Justice, and the region is subject to an internet shutdown and tight movement restrictions imposed by the Myanmar military.
SAC-M has not yet been able to determine who is responsible for the recent atrocities against the Rohingya and other civilians in northern Rakhine state. However, it is satisfied that the AA and its political wing the United League of Arakan (ULA) are now the primary military and governance authorities in the region, having almost entirely defeated and displaced the Myanmar military.
As such, SAC-M calls on the ULA/AA, as the de facto authority in northern Rakhine state and a party to the conflict, to act immediately to protect all civilians at all times as its principal obligation under international law. In particular, the ULA/AA must:
Work with the Government of Bangladesh to establish a humanitarian corridor from Bangladesh and facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance to all communities in Rakhine state.
Assure, ensure and facilitate safe passage for Rohingya and other civilians to take shelter in designated areas of protection.
Request, enable and cooperate fully with an independent international investigative team to enter Rakhine state to investigate the treatment of Rohingya and other civilians in Rakhine state.
Invite independent international monitors to be stationed in Rakhine state to monitor and report on the protection of civilians and the observance of other obligations under international law.
The ULA/AA has said that it is committed to upholding the human rights of all ethnic and religious communities living in Rakhine. Now it must prove it.
SAC-M calls on the United Nations and its agencies and other States to uphold their own obligations and expedite efforts to prevent further grave violations of international law in Myanmar and hold perpetrators of those violations to account.
This Sunday 25 August marks seven years since the start of the massive 2017 atrocities during which thousands of Rohingya men, women, boys and girls were killed in the ensuing mass murder, rape and gang rape, torture, burning and arson carried out by the Myanmar military. Three quarters of a million Rohingya were forced to flee to neighbouring Bangladesh.
Seven years on, victims are still waiting for justice and accountability. And now new atrocities are being added to the old ones. The total impunity for perpetrators of grave violations of international law in Myanmar ensures the conditions for continuing atrocities against civilians, as this most recent massacre attests. The international community must do more to deliver justice and finally bring impunity in Myanmar to end.
ဩဂုတ်လ ၁၉ ရက်၊ ၂၀၂၄ ခုနှစ်။ ။ ရက္ခိုင့်တပ်တော် (AA) သည် ရခိုင်ပြည်နယ်မြောက်ပိုင်းရှိ အရပ်သားများအား အကာအကွယ်ပေးရေးနှင့် နိုင်ငံတကာ လူသားချင်းစာနာထောက်ထားမှုဆိုင်ရာ ဥပဒေအောက်တွင် ၎င်း၏ တာဝန်ဝတ္တရားများကို လိုက်နာထိန်းသိမ်းဆောင်ရွက်ရမည်ဖြစ်ကြောင်း မြန်မာနိုင်ငံဆိုင်ရာ အထူးအကြံပေးကောင်စီ (SAC-M) မှ ပြောကြားလိုက်သည်။
ခိုင်လုံသော အစီရင်ခံမှုများအရ ၂၀၂၄ ခုနှစ်၊ သြဂုတ်လ ၅ ရက်တွင် ရိုဟင်ဂျာအမျိုးသား၊ အမျိုးသမီးနှင့် ကလေးငယ်များအပေါ် တိုက်ခိုက်မှုတစ်ခုကြောင့် လူပေါင်း ၂၀၀ အထိ သေဆုံးခဲ့သည်ဟု သိရှိရသည်။ ဒုက္ခသည်များသည် AA နှင့် မြန်မာစစ်တပ်တို့ကြား ဖြစ်ပွားသည့် ပြင်းထန်သော တိုက်ပွဲများကြောင့် ရခိုင်ပြည်နယ်မြောက်ပိုင်း၊ မောင်တောမြို့နယ်မှ နတ်မြစ်ကို ကျော်ဖြတ်ကာ ဘင်္ဂလားဒေ့ရှ်နိုင်ငံဘက်သို့ ထွက်ပြေးရန် ကြိုးပမ်းနေခဲ့ကြသည်။
ဒရုန်းများမှ ကြဲချသော ဗုံးများ၊ အမြောက်ပစ်ခတ်မှုများနှင့် စစ်သားများက လူများကို လက်နက်ငယ်များဖြင့် ပစ်ခတ်ခဲ့ကြောင်း အသက်ရှင်ကျန်ရစ်သူများနှင့် မျက်မြင်သက်သေများက သတင်းပေးပို့ကြသည်။ ရက္ခိုင့်တပ်တော် (AA) အနေနှင့် တာဝန်ရှိသည်ဟု စွပ်စွဲခံထားရသည်။ ယခုလတ်တလော ဖြစ်ရပ်များသည် ဘူးသီးတောင်တွင် မေလ ၁၇ ရက်က ဖြစ်ပွားခဲ့သော ပမာဏကြီးမားလှသည့် အကွက်ကျကျစီမံသတ်ဖြတ်မှု၊ မီးရှို့မှုနှင့် ပစ်ခတ်မှုတို့တွင် AA တပ်ဖွဲ့ဝင်များလည်း ပါဝင်သည်ဟူသော စွပ်စွဲမှုများ၏ နောက်ဆက်တွဲဖြစ်သည်။
ရခိုင်ပြည်နယ်မြောက်ပိုင်းရှိ လူသားချင်းစာနာထောက်ထားမှု အခြေအနေ၊ အထူးသဖြင့် ရိုဟင်ဂျာအသိုင်းအ၀ိုင်း၏ အခြေအနေသည်အဆောတလျင်ပင်ဖြစ်သည်။ ၂၀၂၀ ခုနှစ်၊ နိုင်ငံတကာတရားရုံး (ICJ) မှ ချမှတ်သော စီရင်ချက်တရပ်အရ၊ ရခိုင်ပြည်နယ်မြောက်ပိုင်းရှိ ရိုဟင်ဂျာများသည် လူမျိုးသုဥ်းသတ်ဖြတ်မှုအန္တရာယ်နှင့် ဆက်လက်ရရင်ဆိုင်နေရပြီး ဒေသတွင်း အင်တာနက်ပိတ်ဆို့ခြင်းနှင့် သွားလာလှုပ်ရှားမှုအား တင်းကျပ်စွာ ကန့်သတ်ခြင်းများ မြန်မာစစ်တပ်မှ လုပ်ဆောင်ထားသည်။
SAC-M သည် ရခိုင်ပြည်နယ်မြောက်ပိုင်းရှိ ရိုဟင်ဂျာများနှင့် အခြားအရပ်သားများအပေါ် လတ်တလော ကျူးလွန်ထားသည့် ရက်စက်ကြမ်းကြုတ်မှုများအတွက် မည်သူ့တွင် တာဝန်ရှိသည်ကို မဆုံးဖြတ်နိုင်သေးပေ။ မည်သို့ပင်ဆိုစေကာမူ AA နှင့် ၎င်း၏ နိုင်ငံရေးပါတီဖြစ်သည့် ရက္ခိုင့်အမျိုးသားအဖွဲ့ချုပ် (ULA) တို့သည် ယခုအခါတွင် မြန်မာစစ်တပ်ကို လုံးလုံးနီးပါး ချေမှုန်းကာ ဖယ်ရှားပြီး ဒေသတွင်း အခရာကျသည့် စစ်တပ်နှင့် အုပ်ချုပ်မှု အာဏာပိုင်များ ဖြစ်လာမှုသည် ကျေနပ်အားရဖွယ်ရာဖြစ်သည်။
ထို့ပါသောကြောင့် SAC-M အနေဖြင့် ULA/AA အား ရခိုင်ပြည်နယ် မြောက်ပိုင်းတွင် လက်တွေ့အားဖြင့် အုပ်ချုပ်လျက်ရှိသော အာဏာပိုင်နှင့် ပဋိပက္ခတွင် ပါ၀င်နေသော အဖွဲ့တစ်ဖွဲ့အနေနှင့် တောင်းဆိုလိုသည်မှာ နိုင်ငံတကာဥပဒေအောက်ရှိ ၎င်း၏ အဓိကတာဝန်ဝတ္တရားများအရ အရပ်သားအားလုံးကို အချိန်တိုင်း အကာအကွယ်ပေးရန်အတွက် ချက်ချင်းဆောင်ရွက်သွားရန်ဖြစ်သည်။ အထူးသဖြင့် ULA/AA သည်-
ဘင်္ဂလားဒေ့ရှ်နိုင်ငံမှတဆင့် လူသားချင်းစာနာထောက်ထားမှုစင်္ကြံတစ်ခု တည်ဆောက်ရန်နှင့် ရခိုင်ပြည်နယ်ရှိ လူမှုအသိုက်အဝန်းအားလုံးသို့ လူသားချင်းစာနာထောက်ထားမှုအကူအညီများ ပေးပို့ရာတွင် ဖြစ်မြောက်စေရေးအတွက် ဘင်္ဂလားဒေ့ရှ်အစိုးရနှင့် လက်တွဲဆောင်ရွက်ပါရန်။
သတ်မှတ်ထားသော အကာအကွယ်ပေးသည့်နယ်မြေများတွင် ရိုဟင်ဂျာများနှင့် အခြားအရပ်သားများအတွက် လုံခြုံစွာ ဖြတ်သန်းသွားလာခြင်းအား ခိုင်မာသေချာစေပြီး ဖြစ်မြောက်စေရန် ကူညီဆောင်ရွက်ပေးပါရန်။
ရခိုင်ပြည်နယ်အတွင်း ရိုဟင်ဂျာများနှင့် အခြားအရပ်သားများအပေါ် ပြုမူဆက်ဆံမှုများအား စုံစမ်းစစ်ဆေးရန် လွတ်လပ်သော နိုင်ငံတကာ စုံစမ်းစစ်ဆေးရေးအဖွဲ့တစ်ခုအား တောင်းဆိုရန်၊ ၎င်းအဖွဲ့အား အထောက်အကူပေးရန်နှင့် အပြည့်အဝ ပူးပေါင်းဆောင်ရွက်ပါရန်။
အရပ်သားများအား အကာအကွယ်ပေးရေးနှင့် နိုင်ငံတကာဥပဒေအောက်တွင်ရှိ အခြားသော တာဝန်ဝတ္တရားများနှင့်စပ်လျဥ်း၍ လိုက်နာစောင့်ကြပ်ကြည့်ရှုရန်နှင့် အစီရင်ခံရန်အလို့ငှာ ရခိုင်ပြည်နယ်တွင် နေရာချထားပေးရေးအတွက် လွတ်လပ်သော နိုင်ငံတကာစောင့်ကြည့်လေ့လာသူများအား ဖိတ်ကြားပါစေရန်။
ULA/AA မှ ရခိုင်ပြည်နယ်အတွင်း နေထိုင်ကြသော လူမျိုးရေး၊ ဘာသာရေး အသိုင်းအဝိုင်းအားလုံး၏ လူ့အခွင့်အရေးအား မြှင့်တင်ပေးရန်အတွက် ၎င်းအနေနှင့် ကတိကဝတ်ပြုထားပြီးဖြစ်ကြောင်းပြောကြားထားပြီးဖြစ်သည်။ ယခုတွင်မူ ယင်းအား သက်သေပြရမည်ဖြစ်သည်။
SAC-M က ကုလသမဂ္ဂနှင့် ၎င်း၏အေဂျင်စီများနှင့် အခြားအဖွဲ့၀င်နိုင်ငံများအား ၎င်းတို့၏ တာဝန်ဝတ္တရားများကို လိုက်နာရန်နှင့် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံတွင် နိုင်ငံတကာဥပဒေအား ထပ်မံ၍ ဆိုးရွားစွာ ချိုးဖောက်မှုများကို တားဆီးရန်အတွက် အားထုတ်မှုများအား မြန်ဆန်စွာ အလုပ်တွင်စေရေးနှင့် အဆိုပါချိုးဖောက်မှုများကို ကျူးလွန်သူများအား တာဝန်ယူ/ခံမှုရှိစေရေး ကြိုးပမ်းဆောင်ရွက်သွားရန် SAC-M မှ တောင်းဆိုသည်။
ယခု ဩဂုတ်လ ၂၅ ရက်၊ တနင်္ဂနွေနေ့သည် မြန်မာစစ်တပ်မှ ကျူးလွန်ခဲ့သည့် အစုလိုက်အပြုံလိုက်သတ်ဖြတ်မှု၊ မုဒိမ်းပြုကျင့်ခံရမှုနှင့် အုပ်စုဖွဲ့ မုဒိမ်းမှု၊ ညှဉ်းပန်းနှိပ်စက်မှု၊ မီးလောင်မှုနှင့် ရှို့မီးများမှတဆင့် ရိုဟင်ဂျာ အမျိုးသား၊ အမျိုးသမီး၊ ယောက်ျားလေးနှင့် မိန်းကလေး ထောင်ပေါင်းများစွာ သေဆုံးခဲ့ရသည့်အချိန်ကာလ အစပြုသည့် ကြီးမားသော ၂၀၁၇ ခုနှစ် ရက်စက်ကြမ်းကြုတ်မှု စတင်သော ခုနှစ်နှစ်ပြည့် အထိမ်းအမှတ်ဖြစ်သည်။ ရိုဟင်ဂျာ တစ်သန်း၏ လေးပုံသုံးပုံသည် အိမ်နီးချင်း ဘင်္ဂလားဒေ့ရှ် နိုင်ငံသို့ ထွက်ပြေးတိမ်းရှောင်ရန် အတင်းအကြပ်စေခိုင်းခံခဲ့ရသည်။
ခုနစ်နှစ်လွန်လေပြီးသကာလ ကျူးလွန်ခံရသူများသည် တရားမျှတမှုနှင့် တာဝန်ခံ/ယူမှုအား စောင့်မျှော်နေဆဲဖြစ်သည်။ ယခုတွင်မူရက်စက်မှုအသစ်များက အဟောင်းနှင့်ပေါင်း ထပ်လောင်းပေါ်ပေါက်နေလေတော့သည်။ ယခုနောက်ဆုံး အစုလိုက်အပြုံလိုက် သတ်ဖြတ်မှုသည် ခိုင်မာသော အထောက်အထား အဖြစ် သက်သေထူနေသည့်အလျောက် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံတွင် နိုင်ငံတကာဥပဒေကို ပြင်းထန်လေးနက်စွာ ချိုးဖောက်မှုများ၏ ကျူးလွန်သူများ အပြစ်ပေးအရေးယူခံရခြင်းမှ ကင်းလွတ်ခွင့် ရရှိနေမှုသည် အရပ်သားများအပေါ် ဆက်လက် ရက်စက်ကြမ်းကြုတ်မှုပေါက်ထွန်းစေသည့် အခြေအနေများအား သေချာစေလေသည်။ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံတွင်း တရားမျှတမှုအား ဆောင်ကြဥ်းရန်နှင့် ရာဇဝတ်မှုကျူးလွန်သူများ အပြစ်ပေးအရေးယူခံရခြင်းမှ ကင်းလွတ်ခွင့် ရရှိနေမှုအား နောက်ဆုံးအနေနှင့် အဆုံးသတ်ရန်နိုင်ငံတကာအသိုင်းအဝိုင်းက မဖြစ်မနေ ပိုမို လုပ်ဆောင်ရမည်ဖြစ်သည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Special Advisory Council for Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-19
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Individual Documents
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Arakan (Rakhine) State - reports etc. by date (latest first), Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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"Friedgard Lottermoser passed away at the age of 82 on Aug. 8th, 2024 in Germany, from an aggressive cancer of unknown origin. Dedicating herself to a life that fused Western and Eastern spiritual traditions, Friedgard’s journey was marked by profound personal transformation and significant contributions to the global dissemination of Vipassana meditation. Under the guidance of Sayagyi U Ba Khin, one of Burma’s most revered meditation masters, she became a testament to the power of mindfulness.
Friedgard was born in Germany on April 13, 1942, and grew up during a time of immense upheaval and reconstruction. Her early life was shaped by the challenges of living in a society just emerging from years of brutal dictatorship and the ravages of World War II. Despite the hardships, those formative years instilled in Friedgard a resilience and adaptability that characterized her life.
At some point after the war, her mother remarried. Her stepfather secured a position with Fritz Werner, a German company involved in establishing armament factories in Burma, and in 1959, when Friedgard was just 17, her family relocated there. It was a move that would forever alter the trajectory of her life. It was the beginning of Friedgard’s deep connection with the culture and its people, and a country that became her spiritual home.
The family’s initial years in Burma were spent in Rangoon (now Yangon), where they lived in an exotic but somewhat isolated Chinese-style palace situated on a peninsula in Inya Lake. Surrounded by the lush, colorful, overgrown wilderness, her new home sparked in Friedgard a deep sense of curiosity and wonder about the country, and pointed her in the direction of its rich cultural and spiritual traditions.
Fascinated by the Burmese way of life, Friedgard began learning the language and gradually immersed herself in Burmese society, quite a rare thing for a foreigner in those days, and eventually taking the Burmese name Daw Onmar Khin. Her budding interest in Buddhism led her to the International Meditation Center (IMC) in Rangoon, where she met Sayagyi U Ba Khin, a pioneering teacher of Vipassana meditation and a good friend of her stepfather, who had organized his previous visit to Germany. This turned out to be a pivotal moment in Friedgard’s life. Under the guidance of this great meditation master, Friedgard immersed herself in the practice, becoming a committed disciple at U Ba Khin’s IMC for over a decade. She was strongly attracted to the simple yet profound way that Sayagyi presented the teachings.
Friedgard also spent considerable time with both Webu Sayadaw and Maha Gandayone Sayadaw during her time in Burma. Webu Sayadaw, a reputed Arahat, was known for his emphasis on the continuous practice of mindfulness, a teaching that profoundly influenced Friedgard’s own meditation journey. And she was granted rare permission to attend the Maha Gandayone Monastery in Amarapura to study Buddhist philosophy under the guidance of Maha Gandayone Sayadaw, who was renowned for his strict adherence to monastic discipline and deep commitment to monastic education.
While continuing her committed engagement with her spiritual practice, Friedgard also pursued academic studies as one of the few foreign students at the University of Rangoon, and then the University of Mandalay, where she got a Master’s degree in Pali; her 1969 thesis was titled, The Doctrine of Relationship. Yet her academic pursuits were not just about getting a degree; they also provided her with a deeper understanding of the cultural and historical context in which she was living. This knowledge enriched her spiritual practice, allowing her to connect more deeply with the teachings of the Buddha and the Vipassana tradition. Her ability to integrate into Burmese culture, combined with her commitment to Vipassana meditation, set her apart, and the intersection of her academic and spiritual pursuits laid the groundwork for her future contributions to the global mindfulness movement.
But her time at the university coincided with significant upheaval in Burma. The military coup of 1962 led by General Ne Win marked the beginning of decades of military rule in Burma. In this period of great political instability, many foreigners were forced to leave the country … but even as her family packed up to return to Germany, she adamantly insisted that she would stay behind to continue her meditation practice and studies. Fortunately, she had a rare kind of scholarship that allowed her to do so.
Nearly a decade later, in 1971, Friedgard left Burma on her own terms to return to Germany to complete a PhD, also in Pali. During the early 1970s, Friedgard supported the emerging globalization of the meditation lineage of Sayagyi U Ba Khin, helping it gain a foothold in Europe. She facilitated meditation courses for Robert Hover, Ruth Denison, and John Coleman, while also corresponding with S.N. Goenka and others.
In her later years, Friedgard’s commitment to Buddhism deepened, leading her to ordain as a Sāmaṇerī, taking the Pāḷi name of Akiñcanā. This ordination marked a significant step in her spiritual journey, reflecting her lifelong dedication to the Dhamma. In her view, the disappearance of the bhikkhuni order in Burma and elsewhere was not only a loss for women, but a significant historical oversight as well. She believed that there is a strong potential for the revival of the bhikkhuni order, and she actively advocated for this, understanding it as a necessary step for gender equality within the Buddhist community. Friedgard’s perspective on this was based not in contemporary thinking or recent social movements, but rather, was grounded in her historical understanding of the practical and egalitarian spirit of early Buddhism. She contrasted this with later developments that became increasingly patriarchal and restrictive. Friedgard argued that early Buddhism, as practiced by the Buddha, did not impose gender-based limitations on spiritual practice and leadership, suggesting that a return to those principles could lead to greater gender equality within contemporary Buddhist communities.
Friedgard expressed deep sorrow and frustration over the 2021 coup in Myanmar. She felt a profound sense of loss and disillusionment about the violence and suffering caused by the military’s actions, and lamented the senseless brutality inflicted on civilians and the deep scars they have left. Yet her reflections on the coup were grounded in her Buddhist outlook. She saw the military’s acts as not just political tragedies, but as deep spiritual failings, which, in her view, would lead to severe karmic consequences for those responsible.
Despite her deep resonance with the sufferings of the Burmese people, she was at the same time hopeful that the fall of the military would pave the way for the restoration of peace, justice, and dignity. She hoped for a future where the Burmese people are able to overcome the divisions and traumas inflicted by the military regime, working together to create a compassionate and harmonious society. She was also a fervent advocate of the current revolution, insisting that now was the time for Burmese to do everything in their power to finally achieve their freedom from decades of oppression and tyranny.
An accomplished scholar and author, Friedgard contributed to the books “Code of Conduct for Buddhist Nuns” and “A Critical Pali Dictionary”, and her unpublished thesis was titled “Quoted Verse Passages in the Works of Buddhaghosa”.
If a Hollywood screenwriter were to fashion a script based on the real life biography of Friedgard Lottermoser, it would likely be rejected as too fanciful. Her life was truly unique, intersecting so many diverse elements: the modern origins and early global spread of Vipassana meditation; the ongoing battle for freedom to win over tyranny and oppression; and the recognition of women’s rights in all sectors. Her story is a testament to the extraordinary impact one determined individual can have on the world, defying the boundaries of history, culture, gender and spirituality..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-19
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations, Buddhism in Burma - general
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Ongoing civil war has impacted local currency, leading to rationing by gas stations
Description:
"Residents in northern Myanmar’s Mandalay city and Taunggyi city in Shan state have been queuing all day and – in some instances – overnight to keep their spot in line for the limited amount of gasoline being sold.
Citizen photos provided to RFA show hundreds of motorists in Taunggyi on Aug. 18, queuing to purchase fuel.
A Taunggyi resident told RFA that when gasoline sells out for the day, they have to line up in front of the stores a day in advance to get the fuel that won’t be sold until the next day.
“As soon as the gas distribution quota for the day runs out, people must queue for the next day’s distribution, leading to a full day’s wait,” the resident said.
“Without queuing, getting fuel is quite difficult. Additionally, with more people moving to Taunggyi from other areas, the number of motorcycles and cars in the city has increased.”
Similarly, in Mandalay, locals say that they have to wait in line overnight because there isn’t enough fuel for cars.
Last week, RFA reported that petrol stations in Myanmar’s largest city, Yangon, were closed because of a severe shortage that has forced gasoline suppliers to ration fuel. It’s the latest evidence of an economy struggling with a multitude of problems since the military overthrew an elected government in 2021.
The root of the shortage appeared to be the plummeting value of the kyat currency, and the junta’s efforts to rein in the inflation that the weak kyat is causing, along with the economic disruption stemming from the conflict that has swept the country since the military takeover.
However, the Myanmar junta’s Fuel Import, Storage and Distribution Supervisory Committee stated through junta media outlets on Aug. 14 that there is no fuel shortage..."
Source/publisher:
"Radio Free Asia" (USA)
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-19
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Business and the Military, The Burmese military's role in the economy, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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Description:
"World Humanitarian Day is an occasion for us all to honor the courageous aid workers who are delivering humanitarian assistance to millions of people in need throughout Myanmar. Amid an expanding crisis, they are stepping up each day to get help where it is needed most.
Across Myanmar, people are facing the painful consequences of widespread conflict and devastating disaster. An estimated 18.6 million people urgently require humanitarian assistance, including 6 million children. The spiraling crisis has pushed many people into survival mode. With remarkable dedication, aid workers do their utmost to get people in need food, shelter, protection and other lifesaving assistance. In the first half of 2024, the humanitarian community reached 2.1 million people with support. This assistance was delivered despite significant funding challenges, with the 2024 Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan only 21 per cent funded.
Local and national humanitarian organizations are at the forefront of this response, showing tireless determination to help those in need. Alongside aid workers, host communities across Myanmar are providing crucial support to people in need. They are often the first responders in this crisis and a lifeline to affected people.
This year’s World Humanitarian Day calls on people around the world to #ActForHumanity. It aims to shine a light on the consequences of violations of International Humanitarian Law and confront the normalization of attacks on aid workers and civilians suffering from the impact of the conflict. In Myanmar, civilians and aid workers face risks each day as the conflict escalates. It is imperative that all parties to the conflict uphold their obligations under International Humanitarian Law to protect civilians and aid workers, ensuring sustained and unhindered humanitarian access to those in need.
Today, and every day, all who are working to help the most vulnerable people in Myanmar are deeply appreciated. Amid immense challenges, your unwavering support is a source of hope that together we can alleviate suffering and protect lives..."
Source/publisher:
UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-19
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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"The protracted conflict in Myanmar, known for its ongoing repression of opposition groups and ethnic minorities by the military junta, has resulted in significant regional instability. The recent meeting between former Myanmar military leader Than Shwe and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi underscores China’s increasing influence in the region. While China presents itself as a mediator, there are concerns about its true intentions and whether its actions are genuinely aimed at restoring peace or driven by self-interest.
Given these circumstances, it is crucial to critically examine Indonesia’s role and potential under President-Elect Prabowo to assume a bridging role in the diplomatic landscape of Southeast Asia. The political turmoil in Myanmar has persisted since the military coup in February 2021, which deposed the democratically elected government of Aung San Suu Kyi. The junta’s rule has been characterised by severe crackdowns on dissent, widespread human rights abuses, and the displacement of hundreds of thousands of individuals. Ethnic minority groups, particularly the Rohingya population, have faced considerable persecution, while the country’s economy has suffered due to mismanagement by the military.
The ongoing violence and instability in Myanmar have not only exacerbated the domestic crisis but also had far-reaching implications for regional security and international relations. In response to this situation, Myanmar has increasingly relied on China for support. The recent meeting between Than Shwe and Wang Yi highlights Myanmar’s dependence on Chinese assistance in sustaining the junta’s hold on power. Than Shwe’s request for help from China in restoring stability provides insight into the deepening relationship between the two nations. However, China’s involvement in Myanmar is primarily driven by strategic interests rather than altruistic motives.
China’s involvement in Myanmar is multifaceted. On the one hand, Beijing has offered diplomatic and military assistance to the junta, shielding it from international condemnation and sanctions. This support has been crucial in enabling the regime to survive despite widespread international isolation. On the other hand, China has also engaged with ethnic insurgent groups in Myanmar, helping to broker ceasefires and serving as a mediator in conflicts.
Through this dual approach, China seeks to maintain its influence in Myanmar while safeguarding its strategic interests, which include access to Myanmar’s natural resources and the preservation of its geopolitical position. China’s role as a mediator in Myanmar has been met with scepticism regarding its true intentions. Rather than genuinely addressing the conflict, China’s actions seem to prioritize the protection of its interests. This is evident through its involvement in brokering ceasefires with ethnic insurgent groups, which can be seen as a strategy to ensure stability in border areas crucial for Chinese infrastructure projects. Additionally, China’s support for the junta serves to maintain a government that aligns closely with Beijing’s interests, particularly in countering Western influence in the region.
The response of global and regional powers to the Myanmar situation has varied. The United States has taken a firm stance against the junta, implementing sanctions on military leaders and entities involved in the coup. The Biden administration consistently denounces the military’s actions and calls for the reinstatement of democratic governance. Similarly, the European Union has imposed sanctions on the junta and assists in humanitarian efforts in Myanmar. The EU also advocates for international pressure on the military regime to cease its violence against civilians and engage in dialogue with opposition forces.
ASEAN’s response to the crisis is multifaceted. The regional organization remains divided in its approach, with some member states advocating for engagement with the junta while others push for its isolation. Although the Five-Point Consensus of ASEAN, which calls for an end to violence and the initiation of dialogue, has yet to be fully implemented, the bloc’s inability to effectively address the crisis underscores the limitations of its consensus-based decision-making process.
Nevertheless, ASEAN continues to play a vital role in regional diplomacy, and its efforts to mediate the conflict remain ongoing. Indonesia, a prominent member of ASEAN, consistently calls for a peaceful resolution to the conflict in Myanmar. The country has consistently called for dialogue and the restoration of democratic governance in Myanmar. Indonesia’s diplomatic efforts are guided by its historical commitment to non-alignment and its influential role as a leader in Southeast Asia.
The election of President-Elect Prabowo has the potential to further enhance Indonesia’s involvement in regional diplomacy. Prabowo’s administration could leverage Indonesia’s influence within ASEAN to promote a more coordinated and effective response to the crisis in Myanmar.
The role of China in resolving the conflict in Myanmar is a topic of great significance that warrants academic analysis. The assessment of whether China acts as a facilitator for peace or is primarily motivated by self-interest is crucial. While China’s involvement is integral to any potential resolution, it is imperative to evaluate its actions in light of broader regional and international efforts aimed at restoring peace and stability. The efficacy of China as a mediator may be compromised if its primary objective is to safeguard and expand its influence and strategic interests.
In contrast, Indonesia holds considerable potential as a bridge builder, which assumes particular significance with the advent of President Prabowo. Unlike China, Indonesia lacks comparable strategic interests in Myanmar, thus positioning itself as a more neutral and credible mediator. Indonesia’s non-aligned stance, combined with its adeptness in regional diplomacy, makes it well-suited to play a constructive role in mediating the conflict. Prabowo’s administration should prioritize Myanmar in its foreign policy agenda and work in close collaboration with ASEAN and other international partners to advocate for a peaceful resolution.
In conclusion, the situation in Myanmar remains highly unstable, with no immediate prospects for conflict resolution. While China’s involvement is indispensable, concerns arise due to its self-interest-driven motives, which cast doubt on its effectiveness as a mediator. The international community, including the United States, European Union, and ASEAN, must persist in exerting pressure on the junta to engage in dialogue and restore democratic governance.
Simultaneously, Indonesia possesses the potential to assume a pivotal role in resolving the crisis. Under the leadership of President-Elect Prabowo, Indonesia should utilize its diplomatic influence to advocate for a peaceful resolution, establishing itself as a prominent mediator in Southeast Asia. By doing so, Indonesia can make a significant contribution to regional stability and facilitate the path towards a more peaceful and prosperous Myanmar.
opinions expressed in this article are the author’s own.
References
Albert, Eleanor. “Myanmar’s Troubled History: Coups, Military Rule, and the Struggle for Democracy.” Council on Foreign Relations, 28 February 2022.
ASEAN Secretariat. “ASEAN’s Five-Point Consensus on Myanmar: Progress and Challenges.” ASEAN.org, 10 August 2024.
Li, Nan. “China’s Strategic Interests in Myanmar: Diplomacy, Security, and Economic Ties.” Journal of Contemporary China, vol. 31, no. 134, 2022, pp. 345-362.
Maizland, Lindsay. “The Myanmar Coup and its Regional Implications.” Council on Foreign Relations, 5 March 2023.
Myanmar Institute for Peace and Security. “Myanmar’s Political Crisis: An Overview of the Current Situation.” MIPS Reports, July 2024.
O’Toole, Megan. “Myanmar’s Future under Military Rule.” Al Jazeera, 23 July 2023.
Zaw, Htet Htet. “Ethnic Conflicts and Ceasefires in Myanmar: China’s Influence.” The Diplomat, 30 June 2023.
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Source/publisher:
"Eurasia Review"
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-17
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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"The recent four-day visit of Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi to Southeast Asia has underscored the implementation of China’s good neighbour’s diplomacy.
Wang Yi firstly visited Myanmar and remarked that China supports its government’s plan to hold fresh elections and return the country to a “democratic transition” – a gesture showing China’s respect to Myanmar’s peaceful political transition and objection to any foreign intervention. After the removal of Aung San Suu Kyi government, the Myanmar military regime has encountered a legitimacy problem, especially in light of the fierce fighting with ethnic minority armed forces in the northern regions. Some of the ethnic armed forces are composed of Hans Chinese who are also supportive of China. Although China mediated in the conflicts between the Myanmar military regime and some ethnic armed forces, the ceasefire has recently been broken in June as some rebels captured a military command post in Lashio in the Shan state, where the violent conflicts between the military and the Hans-dominated Kokang forces (who according to some rumours received weapons from mysteriously unknown external forces) have undermined the border security as some Chinese in mainland China were wounded innocently by shells fired from Myanmar.
The military junta in Myanmar has failed to control the whole country as online gambling, telecom fraud syndicates and human smuggling persisted. Recently the military has smashed the telecommunication fraud syndicates amid unsubstantiated rumours that a minority of rotten elements in the military supported a few kingpins of telecom fraud syndicates, which deceived a lot of mainland Chinese in China.
After the diplomatic lobbying and efforts from China, the Myanmar government dismantled the telecom syndicates and extradited thousands of the Chinese organizers, participants and victims of these criminal syndicates back to China – a triumph of the joint Sino-Myanmar combat against cross-border crime.
On August 16, Wang Yi met the former chair of Myanmar’s State Peace and Development Council, U Than Swe, who said China is Myanmar’s brother and friendly neighbour, and who hoped that China would continue to help Myanmar prevent external interference and maintain domestic stability.
Wang Yi said that the Sino-Myanmar brotherly friendship is important to China’s neighbourhood diplomacy, and that China upholds the five principles of peaceful coexistence with Myanmar on a shared future. He added that China is keen to deepen the Belt and Road cooperation with Myanmar, develop the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor, ensure the smooth operation of the Sino-Myanmar oil and gas pipeline project, combat cross-border crime, and to collaborate in agricultural development and people-to-people exchange.
U Than Swe emphasized Myanmar’s support of the one-China principle, backed up China’s Belt and Road Initiative and welcomed the idea of having a shared future for mankind, and he pledged to work with China to safeguard border security through the joint combat against cross-border crime.
After the diplomatic lobbying and efforts from China, the Myanmar government dismantled the telecom syndicates and extradited thousands of the Chinese organizers, participants and victims of these criminal syndicates back to China – a triumph of the joint Sino-Myanmar combat against cross-border crime.
Wang Yi’s visit to Myanmar followed not only the trip of Chinese special envoy Deng Xijun’s trip to meet Myanmar’s junta chief Min Aung Hlaing last year, but also the arrival of new Chinese ambassador Ma Jia in Myanmar. China has reportedly supplied weapons to the military junta which encounters Western sanctions, but it is in Beijing’s interest to maintain border security for the sake of enhancing and deepening all kinds of cooperation. As such, Wang Yi’s visit was timely and necessary.
Wang Yi also went to Thailand where he met Laos deputy prime minister and foreign minister Saleumxay Kommasith in Chiang Mai. The Sino-Laos trade has risen with the full capacity of the Sino-Laotian railway. Wang Yi remarked that China supports Laos to be a rotating chair of ASEAN, that Beijing is keen to see Laos enhancing its regional and international influence, and that China is eager to accelerate infrastructure development along the Sino-Laos railway, to deepen high-level and people-to-people exchange and to fight cross-border crime.
Saleumxay expressed his appreciation to China for promoting peace talks in Myanmar’s northern regions as border peace and regional stability are the common interests of Laos and China.
During the 9th Lancang-Mekong Cooperation (LMC) Foreign Ministers Meeting, Wang Yi conducted informal discussion with not only Saleumxay but also Myanmar foreign minister U Than Swe and Thailand foreign affairs permanent secretary Eksiri Pintaruchi. They came to a consensus that all sides would combat cross-border crimes, including online gambling, telecom fraud and human smuggling, which have affected the personal safety and properties of ordinary people. China’s Global Security Initiative, according to Wang Yi, secured the warm responses from Myanmar, Laos and Thailand. Since 2023, about 50,000 people who were involved in cross-border crimes have been arrested by the joint efforts of these countries.
The LMC was formed in 2016 with the participation of China, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam to strengthen connectivity, production capacity, socio-economic development, poverty alleviation, and water resources and agricultural management in the region.
Wang Yi also said that the borders of China, Myanmar, Thailand and Laos have to be guarded while criminal intelligence will have to be shared together through a ministerial-level law enforcement and security meeting in the Lancang-Mekong region. Technology, equipment and judicial cooperation will have to be utilized and strengthened to combat cross-border crime.
Wang Yi’s visit was politically significant.
First and foremost, China’s good neighbourhood diplomacy can be seen so as to counter the misperception of the so-called “China threat” as propagated by those foreigners hawkish and hostile to China without a deeper understanding of the turbulence of Chinese history.
Wang Yi’s visit to Southeast Asia has revealed the implementation of China’s good neighbourhood diplomacy under which the joint combat against cross-border crime has become a precondition for closer socio-economic and sustainable development, infrastructure expansion, mutual investment, expanded tourism, and more intensive people-to-people as well as cultural and educational exchange
Second, the Lancang-Mekong region is geopolitically and economically strategic for the implementation of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, Global Security Initiative, Global Civilization Initiative and the common destiny for mankind. Combining regional security issues with infrastructure development, socio-economic and sustainable development, China is keen to create a peaceful and mutually economically prosperous environment in Southeast Asia through the realization of its good neighbourhood diplomacy.
Take the example of Sino-Thailand relations. China is Thailand’s biggest trading partner while Thailand provides a huge market for China’s Electric Vehicles. Chinese tourists amount to 3.5 million in 2023 and the number is expected to increase with the introduction of a mutual visa waiver scheme. Although Thailand has traditionally been an ally of the US, China has been adopting a good neighbourhood diplomacy to woo the support of Thailand for the sake of balancing the US influence.
Third, China accurately targets at the joint combat against cross-border crime so that other issues will be tackled more smoothly and systematically, including detailed visit and visa arrangements, mutual investment, the personal and property safety of Chinese investors, and the minimization of mainland Chinese victims of cross-border online gambling, cross-border casinos, human smuggling, drugs trafficking and telecom fraud.
Fourth, Wang Yi’ visit came at a time when China criticized the Philippines for continuous provocation in the South China Sea, like a military NC-212 aircraft entering the airspace over China’s Huangyan Island. Objectively speaking, the Philippines leadership has shifted to a more militarily hawkish position toward the territorial disputes with China since 2022. It remains to be seen how the Ferdinand Marcos Jr leadership can rein in its own hawkish elements so that economic pragmatism and peace can and will continue to prevail over ultranationalist fervour in a new Cold War era during which ideological politics are threatening world peace. Wang Yi’s peaceful moves and good neighbourhood diplomacy to Southeast Asian states perhaps made a gesture, indirectly or unintentionally, to the Philippines leadership that China remains a peace-loving country.
In conclusion, Wang Yi’s visit to Southeast Asia has revealed the implementation of China’s good neighbourhood diplomacy under which the joint combat against cross-border crime has become a precondition for closer socio-economic and sustainable development, infrastructure expansion, mutual investment, expanded tourism, and more intensive people-to-people as well as cultural and educational exchange. From a broader perspective, China’s Belt and Road Initiative, Global Security Initiative and the common shared future for mankind can and will hopefully make a breakthrough in Southeast Asia. The deeper meaning and significance of Wang Yi’s visit to Southeast Asia and the related good neighbourhood diplomacy have to be properly and objectively understood..."
Source/publisher:
Macau Business
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-17
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Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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"WASHINGTON—The United States on Friday promised to keep supporting Myanmar’s democratic opposition, after China endorsed the junta’s transition plans.
Two senior US officials met virtually with the shadow National Unity Government, which consists mostly of lawmakers ousted in the 2021 coup, as well as key ethnic rebel groups, including the Karen National Union.
The US officials “commended the groups on their collaborative efforts to work on establishing a path toward an inclusive federal, democratic Burma,” the State Department said, using Myanmar’s former name.
The US officials “reiterated that the United States will continue to expand direct support and assistance to pro-democracy actors” including to “develop concrete steps towards a full transition to civilian governance that respects the will of the people of Burma,” it said.
The US officials in the meeting were Tom Sullivan, who is a senior advisor to Secretary of State Antony Blinken, and Michael Schiffer, the top official for Asia at the US Agency for International Development.
Myanmar’s coup upended a 10-year democratic transition process that had been backed by the United States.
Beijing is a major ally and arms supplier to the junta, whose chief, Min Aung Hlaing, met earlier this week with China’s visiting foreign minister, Wang Yi.
Wang voiced support for promises by the junta for a transition that includes an election.
The junta has repeatedly delayed its timetable for a general election..."
Source/publisher:
"Agence France-Presse" (Paris) via "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-17
[field_licence]
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Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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"BEIJING —
China urged neighboring countries to help war-torn Myanmar advance its peace and reconciliation process as its foreign minister met counterparts from Laos, Myanmar and Thailand on Friday.
Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi called the situation in Myanmar "worrying," and he suggested neighboring countries should promote cooperation with Myanmar to help it create economic and social conditions that prevent conflict.
Earlier, Wang told a news conference in Thailand that China supports a democratic transition in Myanmar and backs a regional plan to find a way out of the ongoing crisis in the Southeast Asian country.
Wang said neighboring countries "sitting in the same boat, and drinking water from the same river" have a better understanding of Myanmar's situation than others.
Myanmar has been in turmoil since February 2021 when the military ousted an elected civilian government in a coup, abruptly ending the impoverished country's tentative steps toward becoming a full-fledged democracy.
"No one wants Myanmar to restore stability and development more than its neighbors," Wang said..."
Source/publisher:
"Reuters" (UK) via "Voice of America" (Washington, D.C)
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-16
[field_licence]
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Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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"BANGKOK, Aug. 15 (Xinhua) -- Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi met with Lao Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Saleumxay Kommasith in Chiang Mai, Thailand on Thursday on strengthening bilateral relations and cooperation on regional issues, and the situation in Myanmar.
Wang, also a member of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China Central Committee, said China and Laos treat each other with sincerity and have always been supporting and helping each other.
Under the strategic guidance of the top leaders of the two parties and countries, the building of the China-Laos community with a shared future has accelerated, bilateral trade has been increasing, the China-Laos railway capacity has been constantly achieving new heights, personnel exchanges have significantly intensified, and the two sides have seen closer coordination in international and regional affairs, said Wang.
China firmly supports Laos in exploring a development path suited to its national conditions, staunchly supports Laos to hold the 12th Congress of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party to consolidate the party's leadership and the direction of socialism, and firmly supports Laos' ASEAN chairmanship to further enhance its international and regional influence, he said.
China is willing to further deepen mutually beneficial cooperation with Laos across various fields, leverage the comprehensive benefits of the China-Laos railway, jointly resolve bottlenecks and accelerate integrated development along the route so as to serve the respective development and revitalization of the two countries.
Saleumxay, for his part, said the rapid development of cooperation between Laos and China has played a crucial role in the socio-economic development of Laos. Laos is willing to jointly implement the important consensus reached by the leaders of the two countries, enhance high-level exchanges, deepen cooperation in areas such as connectivity and mineral resources, jointly fight transnational crime, and promote further achievements in the building of the Laos-China community with a shared future for the benefit of the people of both nations.
The two foreign ministers also exchanged views on the situation in Myanmar. Wang pointed out that Myanmar is an important member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). China supports ASEAN to enhance communication and contact with Myanmar, explore the docking of ASEAN's five-point consensus and Myanmar's new five-point roadmap, and help Myanmar maintain domestic stability, achieve political reconciliation, and resume its process of democratic transition, which is beneficial for ASEAN's unity and the peace and stability of the region.
Saleumxay spoke highly of China's constructive role in promoting peace talks in northern Myanmar and its political reconciliation, adding that Laos is willing to strengthen coordination and cooperation with China to support Myanmar's stability and development.
The two ministers agreed to ensure the success of the ninth Lancang-Mekong Cooperation Foreign Ministers' Meeting in Chiang Mai, strengthen the awareness of a community with a shared future, enhance practical cooperation in all fields, and advance the building of a community with a shared future for the Lancang-Mekong countries in an effort to make greater contribution to regional prosperity and stability..."
Source/publisher:
"Xinhua News Agency" (Beijing)
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-16
[field_licence]
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Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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"London —
China has increased high-level diplomatic engagement with Myanmar’s military government over the past week as rebel groups continue to make gains in the northern part of the country, where Beijing has huge economic and geostrategic interests.
Some analysts say recent trips by top Chinese officials, including Foreign Minister Wang Yi and China’s special envoy to Myanmar, Deng Xijun, reflect Beijing’s attempt to stabilize the situation in Myanmar.
“The Chinese are trying to use these high-level visits to entice the Myanmar military to come back to the negotiation table,” said Jason Tower, the U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP) country director for Myanmar.
However, he thinks the Chinese government is struggling to facilitate new rounds of cease-fire talks between the military government and rebel groups, which have been gaining control over key facilities along the China-Myanmar border in recent months.
“It’s not clear how the Chinese would be able to facilitate a sustainable agreement between the rebel groups and the military government [since] both sides seem to be fundamentally at odds with each other,” Tower told VOA in a phone interview.
Following his meeting with the Myanmar junta chief Min Aung Hlaing on Wednesday, Wang said Beijing “opposes chaos and conflicts in Myanmar” and hopes the country will increase efforts to stabilize the situation along the China-Myanmar border.
“Wang Yi expressed his hope that Myanmar will earnestly safeguard the safety of Chinese personnel and projects in Myanmar, maintain peace and stability along the China-Myanmar border, step up joint efforts to crack down on cross-border crimes, and create a safe environment for bilateral exchanges and cooperation,” the Chinese government said in its official readout.
For its part, Myanmar’s military government said China supports its “endeavors in implementing the five-point roadmap for ensuring peace and stability of the state and development and making preparations to hold a free and fair multiparty democratic general election.”
While Myanmar’s state-run Global New Light of Myanmar newspaper claimed that Beijing vowed to support a promised election, which the military government has said will be held in 2025, the Chinese readout didn’t include such details.
Some analysts say this difference reflects how Myanmar’s military government and the Chinese government view the supposed “election plan.”
“For the Myanmar military and its leader Min Aung Hlaing in particular, the elections are existential, but China probably remains very skeptical about the likelihood of an election being held since the military government controls less than half of Myanmar’s territory at the moment,” Hunter Marston, an adjunct research fellow at La Trobe University in Australia, told VOA by phone.
An alliance formed by several armed resistance groups called the Three Brotherhood Alliance gained control in recent months over key facilities and infrastructure in the northern part of the country, including a regional military base in the northern Shan State and the strategic city of Lashio, which sits on a highway between China and the major city of Mandalay.
USIP’s Tower said as the Myanmar military loses more of its monopoly over the ability to provide security to Chinese state-run enterprises’ projects in northern Myanmar, Beijing may increase cooperation with rebel groups to safeguard its economic interests in the region.
“As more and more of these projects fall under the control of different resistance actors, we may see China work with these groups to try to facilitate its business operation in Myanmar,” he told VOA.
While Beijing may increase cooperation with rebel groups, Marston said, China will continue to manage its relationship with Myanmar by engaging all political players in the country.
“China is continuing its long-term strategy of hedging its bets, which means that it will engage with a number of stakeholders and try to retain influence over as many factions in Myanmar as possible,” he told VOA.
In addition to meeting leaders of Myanmar’s military government, Wang also met with the former chairman of Myanmar’s State Peace and Development Council, Than Shwe, who urged Beijing to help Myanmar “prevent external interference and maintain domestic stability.”
While some analysts say Myanmar’s military government has been stalling the cease-fire negotiations as many competing political forces refuse to negotiate with them, they think China will not support the complete ousting of the military from Burmese politics.
“Since Myanmar became independent in 1948, there has not been a single day when the Burmese military was not a part of the center of the Burmese politics,” Yun Sun, China Program director at the Stimson Center in Washington, told VOA by phone.
She said Beijing will likely support a peace process based on negotiation and reconciliation.
“The peace process has to be based on some sort of concessions made by both sides,” said Sun.
But since there is no sign that the fighting between rebel groups and Myanmar’s military will stop any time soon, Marston said Beijing can only try to urge different resistance groups to respect its interests while gradually cultivating an environment for potential cease-fire negotiations.
“Beijing will continue to incrementally work around the margins by pushing cease-fire negotiations in northern Myanmar while trying to ensure that all players are on China’s side,” he told VOA..."
Source/publisher:
"Voice of America" (Washington, D.C)
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-16
[field_licence]
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Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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"Executive Summary
Myanmar is experiencing a deepening economic crisis with devastating consequences for its population. Accurate assessments of poverty and vulnerability indices are increasingly needed to evaluate the current crisis. Given the data challenges, it has become essential to investigate proxy indicators that provide a greater understanding of the unfolding situation on the ground in Myanmar. One such proxy indicator that has been applied in other countries, including fragile states like Afghanistan and Yemen, is the analysis of Nighttime Light (NTL). NTL satellite imagery measures the intensity of artificial light emissions, primarily from human settlements and economic activities. With traditional data sources potentially compromised or unavailable, nighttime light analysis offers an alternative means to monitor changes in the country's development landscape.
This report leverages NTL satellite imagery to shed light on Myanmar’s development challenges. Key findings of the report include:
Localized analysis and perspectives: NTL data offers a strong evidence-base for conducting localized analysis and provides insights into the dynamics and disparities across different administrative levels in Myanmar.
Economic Activity: There is a strong relation between NTL intensity and economic activity.
From 2013 to 2021, Myanmar experienced a steady increase in NTL, indicative of economic growth and development. The post-2021 decline in NTL intensity (with over 70% of the townships facing a decline) corroborates the severe economic downturn.
Urban & Rural Development: NTL data revealed significant urban & rural development trends prior to 2021, with notable growth especially in rural areas. Post-2021, the decline in both urban & rural NTL suggests a regression in overall development.
Electricity Access and Consumption: There is a stark discrepancy between the latest 2021 electricity access rate of 72.5% and the projected rate based on UNDP’s NTL data of 48%, showing a difference of 24.5 percentage points. It is argued that Myanmar’s access to affordable and reliable electricity has decreased drastically, as illustrated by the country’s frequent power outages, reduced usage to save costs, and disconnections from the grid due to an inability to pay.
Socio-economic Inequality and Human Well-being: NTL intensity variations between regions underscore existing socio-economic inequalities. Regions with higher NTL growth pre-2021 saw improved economic conditions and development, while post-2021, the decline in NTL exacerbated existing inequalities, particularly in conflict-affected and vulnerable areas. A positive correlation was also found between NTL changes and changes of the
Household Human Development Index (H-HDI) — a multidimensional indicator combining education, health, and assets — proving NTL can serve as a proxy indicator for H-HDI, and consequently, for human well-being.
Conflict and Social Distress: Nearly 90% of the townships with a high vulnerability to conflict experience a drop in NTL, compared to a national average of 70%. This observation underscores that townships with a high vulnerability to conflict are disproportionally affected by electricity outages and declined economic activity.
The report highlights the value of NTL as a proxy indicator for assessing the impact of political turmoil, economic decline, and social distress in Myanmar. The human cost to the already vulnerable communities is high. Though a response requires a holistic approach, specific actions regarding electricity access and use can be taken into consideration: enhancing household level coping and adaptation strategies, application of alternative energy sources, and strengthening of local energy governance.
It is imperative to continue leveraging innovative data sources for accurate monitoring and targeted interventions. Comprehensive recovery and resilience strategies, informed by high-frequency data, will be essential in fostering localized sustainable development and resilience amidst Myanmar's ongoing adversity..."
Source/publisher:
UN Development Programme (New York) via Reliefweb (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-16
[field_licence]
Type:
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Category:
UNDP - Burma/Myanmar, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
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"Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi warned Myanmar junta boss Min Aung Hlaing on Wednesday that Beijing would not accept comments intended to harm bilateral ties or “smear” China, according to a statement released by the Chinese Embassy in Myanmar after the two met in Naypyitaw.
“China opposes any remarks that attempt to sow discord in China-Myanmar relations or smear and vilify China,” Wang said at the meeting, according to the embassy. The meeting followed a recent televised address by Min Aung Hlaing in which he lamented foreign intervention in the fighting in northern Shan State near the Chinese border, without naming a particular country.
Wang visited Myanmar on Wednesday before traveling to Thailand to co-chair the ninth Lancang-Mekong Cooperation Foreign Ministers’ Meeting.
China’s top diplomat did not bother to meet the junta boss when he attended the 7th edition of the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Bagan, Mandalay Region in 2022.
Beijing apparently thought it should deliver an in-person warning to the junta boss after Min Aung Hlaing repeatedly implied that China is behind the anti-regime military operations in northern Shan State.
In November last year, after the Brotherhood Alliance of three ethnic armies launched a major offensive against the regime in northern Shan State, Min Aung Hlaing alleged anti-regime groups were using China-made drones to bomb junta positions there, and said foreign technicians were assisting the groups.
Following that outburst, junta-backed nationalists staged anti-Beijing protests in downtown Yangon and outside the Chinese Embassy in the city.
After the Myanmar military’s Northeastern Command fell to ethnic and resistance forces earlier this month during the second phase of the offensive, the junta boss claimed in the televised speech that certain foreign countries were funding the anti-regime armed groups, though he did not name China specifically.
He claimed ordnance factories built in territory controlled by ethnic armed organizations on the China-Myanmar border were selling weapons to anti-regime groups, and alleged that weapons seized from People’s Defense Force resistance groups had been traced to those factories.
Certain foreign countries were supplying anti-regime groups with food, pharmaceuticals, arms, technology and administrative aid to prolong conflicts in Myanmar, Min Aung Hlaing said in the speech.
Military sympathizers then organized rallies against the Brotherhood Alliance. The protesters saluted Myanmar’s flag, raised banners reading “Victory in the just war”, and sang the national anthem and patriotic songs as they attempted to portray the war in northern Myanmar as a foreign invasion.
Pro-junta Telegram channels have also alleged that Chinese mercenaries are involved in the fighting.
Chinese special envoy to Myanmar Deng Xijun met with Min Aung Hlaing in Naypyitaw on the heels of those protests.
During the meeting with Min Aung Hlaing on Wednesday, Wang said “China firmly supports Myanmar in maintaining its independence, sovereignty, national unity, and territorial integrity,” according to the Chinese Embassy.
It said Wang also expressed China’s support for what he characterized as the junta’s efforts to restore peace and stability in Myanmar and restore the democratic transition process.
In their coverage of the meeting, junta-controlled media claimed Wang stressed China’s opposition to attacks by ethnic armed organizations in northern Shan State. However, both Xinhua and the Chinese Embassy quoted Wang as saying simply that “China opposes chaos or conflict in Myanmar.”
The junta-controlled media also failed to report Wang’s statement that “China opposes external forces interfering in Myanmar’s internal affairs, and opposes any remarks that attempt to sow discord in China-Myanmar relations or smear and vilify China.”
They also ignored a warning delivered by Wang to the regime to ensure the effective operation of the China-Myanmar oil and gas pipeline project, as well as the safety of the project and its employees.
A photo of the meeting published by junta media drew mockery online, with critics pointing out that the regime boss essentially treated the Chinese foreign minister as his equal—despite recently assuming the title of acting president of Myanmar—by sitting side-by-side with Wang before the Palin (throne), the symbol of Myanmar’s sovereignty..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-15
[field_licence]
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Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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"Introduction:
Myanmar, a nation rich in natural resources and biodiversity, continues to confront unprecedented challenges due to ongoing political turmoil since 1962, intensified by the recent chaos beginning in 2021, which has thrown the country and its citizens into deep uncertainty. On the other hand, Myanmar is one of the world’s most disaster-prone countries, susceptible to multiple hazards such as floods, droughts, strong winds, cyclones, tsunamis, earthquakes, landslides, fires, and industrial/technological incidents. Additional localised disasters have occurred in recent years, including lightning strikes and riverbank erosion. The country’s geographical location makes it particularly vulnerable to these multiple hazards, with existing poverty and inadequate infrastructure further amplifying its susceptibility to natural calamities.
Amidst the political crisis, promoting sustainability literacy has become essential for safeguarding the environment and empowering citizens. Myanmar’s numerous natural disasters will likely persist regardless of the political situation. This is further evidenced by the recent, June 2024 flood in Myanmar, which began in areas controlled by ethnic armed groups and has since spread to regions under Myanmar military control.
The Current Landscape
Since the political instability in February 2021, the State Administration Council (SAC) seized power, implementing numerous new laws and governance guidelines. Consequently, the SAC imposed censorship on major social media platforms such as Facebook, X (formerly Twitter), Instagram, and WhatsApp, citing political turbulence as the reason. This was a significant setback for Myanmar netizens, as Facebook had been the most popular and versatile platform, widely used for personal communication, online marketing, SMEs, and major business advertising. Despite the censorship, many tech-savvy youths and adults continue to access these social media platforms using virtual private networks (VPNs). However, the number of users has significantly decreased, particularly among those who are not as comfortable with technology. In addition, the instability in the banking sector, fuelled by widespread rumours, led to a banking crisis where most users withdrew their savings in cash in concern of bankruptcy.
Due to the overall political unrest, many international funding agencies and nongovernmental organizations have withdrawn most of their development projects in Myanmar, while some, including the UN agencies, have scaled down their activities to focus solely on humanitarian aid. The political turmoil also triggered a mass exodus of youths from major cities to areas controlled by ethnic armed groups, where they began armed resistance against the SAC government. Concurrently, many Burmese academics and professionals fled to neighbouring countries and various locations worldwide for their survival. This dramatic shift created a significant knowledge gap between the youths remaining in Myanmar and the Burmese professionals who have established themselves at intermediate and senior levels in their respective fields. Furthermore, the ongoing civil war between ethnic armed groups and the SAC has fragmented the country into multiple zones with different administrations, severely restricting freedom of movement across regions.
Edu4SD Project
In response, the Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre (SRIc) is dedicated to enhancing the sustainability literacy of the youth, targeting this demographic as a primary group for fostering long-term change. SRIc leverages the power of information technology, social media, and various other platforms to effectively disseminate knowledge and promote sustainable practices, despite some youths facing challenges in accessing the internet. By organising initiatives and creating a platform that connects Burmese young professionals worldwide with the underprivileged youth in Myanmar under the Edu4SD project. As part of its initiative to target the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), especially under the scope of Sustainability Literacy, SRIc is offering invaluable knowledge and guidance to individuals dealing with daily uncertainties. By doing so, SRIc empowers them to navigate and tackle the complex challenges they encounter, fostering their sustainability literacy, resilience and sustainable development in their communities.
Edu4SD Approach
With the voluntary support and collaboration of Burmese and non-Burmese professionals worldwide, SRIc is organising monthly webinars with the “Sabai Webinar Series”, covering a diverse range of sustainability topics. These topics include such as waste management, youth and women-led sustainable development, sustainability finance, and sustainability diplomacy. Additionally, SRIc manages the weekly publication of the Guest Opinion Corner at SRIc – The Sabai Times by accepting articles from both professional and young sustainability enthusiasts. This platform invites contributors to write opinion pieces related to sustainable development themes, addressing any of the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). These initiatives enable Burmese professionals across the globe to share their visions, experiences, and expertise with underprivileged Burmese youth in both their native language and English.
Due to internet censorship concerns, these webinars are initially hosted on the Microsoft Teams platform and recorded. The recordings are then uploaded to the SRIc YouTube channel and Zenodo, a general-purpose open repository developed under the European OpenAIRE Consortium, a Horizon 2020 project, and operated by the European Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN), for reference. To further expand accessibility and reach, audio recordings are also made available as podcasts on the SRIc website, Apple Podcasts for iOS users, and Spotify for Android users. Meanwhile, opinion articles are published on the SRIc website and the Medium platform. This multi-platform approach ensures that our content is widely accessible and impactful.
In addition, to maximise awareness and engagement, we extensively share announcements about these webinars and published articles, along with infographics and videos highlighting key points from the sessions, across a variety of social media channels. These include Facebook, LinkedIn, YouTube, Instagram, Telegram, and TikTok, ensuring that the information reaches a broad and diverse audience. By leveraging these platforms, we aim to engage users who prefer different types of media and social networks, thereby enhancing the overall visibility and impact of our sustainability initiatives. Notably, YouTube, Telegram, and TikTok are not subject to censorship, providing us with uncensored channels to disseminate our content effectively.
Edu4SD Progress
Since the launch of the Edu4SD project in January 2023, SRIc has successfully organised 14 monthly webinars and published 8 infographics and 5 educational videos. These achievements were made possible through the collaboration of 26 professionals from various fields of sustainability. Among the speakers, 50% were based outside of Myanmar, with 23% hailing from Asian countries, 23% from European countries, 4% from the United States, and the remaining 50% from Myanmar. In terms of gender diversity, 58% of the speakers were female, and 42% were male.
In the Guest Opinion Corner at SRIc – The Sabai Times, we have broadened our scope to include voices traditionally marginalised in Burmese-led initiatives, such as Rohingya refugees. These contributions have provided unique perspectives and enriched our discourse on sustainability. By actively seeking and accepting articles from ethnic writers, we aim to create an inclusive platform that amplifies diverse voices and fosters dialogue on critical issues. This initiative not only empowers the ethnic communities to share their insights and experiences but also challenges existing narratives and encourages broader engagement with the complexities of sustainable development in the region. Through this effort, we are committed to promoting inclusivity and diversity in our discussions and ensuring that the voices of those often overlooked are heard and valued.
Over 10 months (Nov 2023 to July 2023), the Sabai Webinar Series successfully drew nearly 450 attendees (direct beneficiaries) from across Myanmar’s 14 states and regions and from Burmese communities living abroad. Each webinar averaged an impressive 31 registrations, reflecting strong and consistent interest. Among the regions, Yangon, Myanmar’s largest city, led with the highest number of participants, with attendance numbers tripling those of Mandalay, the country’s second capital, ranked as having the second highest participation. Interestingly, attendees from outside Myanmar ranked third in participation, underscoring the webinar series’ broad reach and impact across borders. Given Myanmar’s current challenges, such as limited electricity and internet access, the recorded sessions available on the SRIc YouTube channel have been particularly valuable, amassing more than 3000 views (indirect beneficiaries). Despite the difficult circumstances, this highlights the significant interest and engagement in the sustainability-focused discussions facilitated by the webinar series.
The demographic breakdown of the attendees is noteworthy highlighting strong female participation at 58, while 41% were male, reflecting a diverse audience. The age distribution of the attendees further underscores the inclusive nature of the series, with 44% of participants falling within the 26-35 age group, 35% within the 18-25 range, 17% in the 36-45 bracket, and 5% being 46 years or older. This diverse mix of participants from various age groups and gender identities demonstrates the broad appeal and relevance of the Sabai Webinar Series in addressing critical sustainability issues.
Conclusion
In Myanmar, virtual engagement is the only solution capable of reaching all parts of the country during these challenging times. However, there are significant limitations regarding internet access and electricity availability, particularly during summer. This is evidenced by data from the Sabai webinar series, which showed a slight decline in registrations in February, March, and April when electricity was severely limited in Myanmar. Additionally, attendance numbers were significantly low in Kayah and Chin states, where intense conflict persists between the Myanmar military and ethnic armed groups. Interestingly, the number of female attendees was considerably higher than that of males, surpassing the gender ratio typical in Myanmar. This discrepancy may be due to the ongoing conflict, with men either being forcibly recruited or voluntarily participating on both sides. Despite the challenges posed by political instability, SRIc remains committed to fostering sustainability literacy and empowering Myanmar’s citizens to create positive change. Notably, more than 75% of attendees were younger than 35, indicating the impact of the Edu4SD project, which primarily aims to enhance sustainability literacy among the younger generation aligned with the SRIc’s motto “Advocating Sustainability, Shaping Our Future”..."
Source/publisher:
"Eurasia Review"
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-15
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"Source: Myanmar Peace Monitor.....Format: Infographic.....Theme: Protection and Human Rights..."
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Myanmar Peace Monitor via Reliefweb (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-14
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"Yangon, Myanmar —
Myanmar's military on Wednesday said rumors top generals had detained the embattled junta chief in a new coup were "propaganda" spread by "traitors" ahead of a visit by China's foreign minister.
Junta chief Min Aung Hlaing has faced public criticism from military supporters in recent weeks as government troops lose territory to ethnic minority armed groups and other opponents battling to overturn its 2021 coup.
On Tuesday several social media posts claimed that top generals had detained Min Aung Hlaing in the capital Naypyidaw in a bid to change the junta's top leadership.
The claims were "propaganda... with the aim of disrupting the country's peace and stability," the junta said in a statement, accusing those sharing the news of being "traitors."
"The head of state and authorities are fulfilling their national responsibility together," it said.
Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi is due to arrive in Myanmar on Wednesday for talks with Min Aung Hlaing.
The visit is "aimed at deepening bilateral mutually beneficial cooperation in various fields," an unnamed Chinese foreign ministry spokesman said on Tuesday.
China is a major ally and arms supplier to the junta but analysts say it also maintains ties with ethnic armed groups that hold territory near its border.
In recent weeks an alliance of ethnic armed groups has seized territory from the junta in northern Shan state, which borders China's Yunnan province.
Territory captured includes the military's northeastern command in the Shan state town of Lashio, home to about 150,000 people.
The capture of the regional command, the first by opponents of the junta since the military's 2021 coup, sparked rare public criticism of the top generals by its supporters.
Min Aung Hlaing later said the alliance was receiving weapons, including drones and short-range missiles, from "foreign" sources that he did not identify.
The last top Chinese official to visit the isolated junta was former foreign minister Qin Gang, who held talks with Min Aung Hlaing in May last year.
According to a senior Myanmar military official Wang Yi will not meet Myanmar democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi, who has been detained by the military since it seized power..."
Source/publisher:
"Voice of America" (Washington, D.C)
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-14
[field_licence]
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Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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"The resistance’s capture of the northern city of Lashio on August 3 marks a watershed moment in Myanmar’s conflict. After a month of fierce fighting, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army and allied resistance forces captured this crucial stronghold in northern Shan State, dealing a severe blow to the beleaguered junta. This represents more than just the loss of a major city. It is the first time that a military regional command has been captured by resistance forces.
Even more, the prestigious Northeastern Regional Military Command (NERMC) is widely regarded as the strongest among the military’s 14 regional commands. The loss is another major setback that has provoked frustration within the military’s inner circles and among its key internal supporters.
Although the fall of Lashio and capture of the NERMC is historic, it is also the continuation of a sustained trend of resistance gains.
Despite possessing superior aerial power and weaponry, Myanmar’s military, known as the Sit-Tat, has deteriorated into just another of the many armed groups operating in the country, rather than a dominant national army. As the resistance continues its assault on junta forces across the country, it has only deepened its steadfast resolve to remove the Myanmar military from power and achieve a new political paradigm no longer dominated by the military.
Failed Cease-fire
In late 2023, resistance forces launched a coordinated assault on the junta, dubbed Operation 1027, which was centered on northern Shan State but replicated in conflict theaters across the country. When fighting in northern Shan State was interrupted in January 2024 by a China-brokered cease-fire, many analysts and diplomats concluded that the conflict in Myanmar had reached a stalemate. Some expected that the regime would concede its losses in ethnic areas and consolidate control in central Myanmar. They predicted that this would motivate ethnic-armed organizations (EAOs) to withdraw from the broader fight and focus on consolidating their gains in newly won areas.
Myanmar’s military has deteriorated into just another of the many armed groups operating in the country, rather than a dominant national army.
This view assumes that the warring parties would be content with a power-sharing arrangement – EAOs maintaining their respective territories while the Myanmar military controls the center. Some analysts even suggested that the regime could “win” by holding urban areas and outlasting the fractious resistance. These assumptions tend to misunderstand the objectives of the conflict’s key actors and the dominant trend of the war.
Despite repeated claims that the junta would soon realize its losses and withdraw to the center, it has not. And it will not. The Myanmar military is committed to its self-appointed role as the nation's guardian, driven by a deep-seated delusion of its own indispensability. This ideological commitment is reinforced by the practical need to hold territory for resource extraction (particularly as foreign exchange dwindles), to tax border trade and to manage the complex logistics of a multi-front war.
Furthermore, the Sit-Tat overestimates its own fighting capability, underestimates the capacity of its adversary and expects the international community to shift power in its direction through cease-fires and political dialogue. For these reasons, among others, it will not concede territorial losses and is unlikely to accept a position as anything other than the dominant player in Myanmar.
As illustrated by statements from the leaders of resistance forces — such as the Karenni, Kokang, Three Brotherhood Alliance (3BHA), Kachin and Ta’ang — many ethnic minority stakeholders understand that the Myanmar military is a threat to their communities as long as it is in a position of power. Even where it is incapable of capturing and occupying resistance-held territory, the military deploys heavy artillery and air power to terrorize the public. This is playing out in Laukkai today, but can also be seen in other parts of the country like Minbya in Rakhine State, Camp Victoria in Chin State, and Laiza in Kachin State. These leaders also recognize this as an historic opportunity to eliminate or greatly weaken this threat. Some EAOs only recently joined the fight as this opportunity became clear to them.
Primarily for these two reasons, resistance groups continue to pursue their goal of removing the Myanmar military from power. There is little that internationals can do, at this point, to derail resistance groups who see this as an historic chance to eliminate Myanmar’s primary agent of instability and suffering.
Shan-Man(dalay) Operation
Whereas phase 1 of Operation 1027 focused primarily on northern Shan State, during phase 2, the anti-junta resistance forces have set their sights on Mandalay — marking a new phase of the war and challenging the junta head on in Myanmar’s second largest city. Before launching the second wave of Operation 1027, leaders from the 3BHA and the National Unity Government (NUG) convened in a secret location in northern Shan State to coordinate the attack. Contrary to some reports claiming the NUG was not involved in 1027, the coordination around phase 2 mirrors the dynamics of phase 1, in which the NUG and 3BHA worked closely together to prepare for a new wave of conflict.
The anti-junta resistance forces have set their sights on Mandalay, marking a new phase of the war and challenging the junta head on in Myanmar’s second largest city.
On June 24, the T’ang National Liberation Army, joined by the Mandalay People’s Defense Forces and other people’s defense groups, launched offensives in Kyaukme. This was followed by a Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) attack on Lashio on July 5. Within days, resistance groups launched offensives on Nawnghkio and Mongmit in northern Shan State and Madaya, Singu, Mogoke, and Tabeikkyin in the Mandalay region. This new wave of operations was dubbed “Operation 1027 Phase 2” and “Shan-Man Operation,” referencing its targets in northern Shan State and Mandalay.
The resumption of hostilities in northern Shan State and new fighting in Mandalay further stretched the beleaguered military, which was losing ground in Rakhine and Kachin states, and facing sustained pressure in Karenni, Karen, Chin, Tanintharyi, Sagaing, Bago and Magway. Resistance forces fought with greater intensity than phase 1 and made more rapid advances. This is partly a result of the resistance’s greater military coordination and weaponry, but also because of the low morale of Sit-Tat forces, many of whom surrendered without contest. Over the course of a month, the resistance forces have succeeded in controlling six townships, including Lashio, home to the military’s NERMC.
The Most Intense Urban Fighting
The battle of Lashio featured the most intense urban fighting in Myanmar's civil war, with both sides engaging in conventional warfare on a scale not previously seen. The military, recognizing the strategic and symbolic importance of this regional command, fortified Lashio with extensive defenses and deployed heavy weaponry to prevent its fall.
Approximately 5,000 Sit-Tat soldiers were mobilized to defend Lashio, including troops from the NERMC, LID 99 and Military Operations Command 1, 14 and 16, along with artillery, tank, and armored vehicle battalions, and numerous support units. Additionally, the military reinforced its position with newly acquired advanced Chinese-built drones, which some believed could tilt the battle in favor of the Sit-Tat.
While the Sit-Tat utilized the cease-fire to prepare for an escalation of conflict, the MNDAA-led resistance forces also mobilized. They assembled about 6,000 troops for the battle for Lashio, drawn from its own forces, NUG-aligned people’s defense forces and other local defense forces. Beginning July 5, the resistance forces launched attacks on Lashio from five positions around the city. They gradually broke through the military's defensive lines and advanced toward the NERMC headquarters.
As the battle intensified, the involvement of other armed actors, such as the United Wa State Army (UWSA) and its ally, the Shan State Army-North (SSA-N), complicated the situation. While the regime struggled to contain the resistance’s advance, it sent delegates to the UWSA headquarters in Pang Seng, hoping the UWSA would intervene to halt the MNDAA’s offensive.
On July 12, the UWSA deployed 2,000 troops to Tangyan Township, east of Lashio, while the SSA-N sent forces to Mongyai, approximately 40 miles from Lashio. Both groups announced that the troops movements were to prevent the conflict from spilling over into their areas. The regime did not impede these movements, possibly hoping intra-EAO competition over territorial control might undermine the assault on Lashio.
To head off attempts by other EAOs to involve themselves in the late stages of capturing Lashio, the MNDAA announced on July 25 that the city had been liberated from military control. They claimed to have established administration of the city even though fierce fighting continued.
Facing the impending loss of a crucial regional command, the regime made several attempts to persuade the UWSA leadership to intervene and disrupt the MNDAA-led offensives. On July 27, some UWSA troops entered Lashio, fueling speculation that the UWSA would support the junta’s aims. However, the UWSA announced that they entered Lashio to protect their liaison office and assist the relocation of some residents — not to engage in combat.
Twice during the battle, the MNDAA announced unilateral cease-fires, aiming to alleviate pressure from China. Despite these cease-fire declarations, intense fighting continued on the ground as MNDAA forces pressed forward to gain full control of Lashio. This highlights a broader trend in which resistance groups superficially respond to Chinese pressure without allowing it to divert them from their strategic goals.
Contrary to predictions of an inter-EAO conflict that would undermine the offensive, MNDAA-led forces advanced and successfully captured both Lashio and the NERMC on August 3.
Around 2,000 junta troops and approximately 500 resistance fighters were killed in the battle for Lashio. Additionally, 4,783 individuals, including 2,000 soldiers and their family members, surrendered (author’s estimates). Numerous high-ranking military officials, including one major general and two brigadier generals, were captured by the resistance. The regime’s miscalculation with the UWSA also cost it dearly. Instead of fragmenting the resistance, the UWSA deployed 2,000 troops across the Salween River into Tangyan and took control of the town without firing a shot.
Moving Beyond the Old Paradigm
The battle of Lashio has had far-reaching effects on the trajectory of Myanmar's conflict. It has further demoralized the military and bolstered the morale and confidence of the resistance forces, which are now preparing to advance into central Myanmar.
Resistance control of northern Shan State and the surrounding areas also provides a valuable base of operations for resistance forces planning to escalate their offensives into Mandalay and Sagaing. Stabilized by this base, the resistance is preparing attacks on Madaya and Pyinoolwin, which will open direct paths to Mandalay.
Establishing a base in weapons-rich northern Shan State also helped achieve the objective of opening a weapons supply route to forces in Sagaing, Magwe, Chin and Rakhine. Since taking control of northern Shan State, resistance forces have initiated attacks on Thabeikkyin, a strategic junction linking northern Shan State, Sagaing and Mandalay, and are seeking to establish a corridor between resistance-controlled areas on the east bank of the Ayeyarwady River and Shwebo valley in Sagaing on the west bank. Linking northern Shan State and central Myanmar would be a boon to the over 50,000 resistance troops there who have struggled to expel junta forces from the open plains of Sagaing and Magwe partly because of their rudimentary weaponry.
Currently, the resistance forces appear to be planning a multi-pronged advance on Mandalay from Pyinoolwin, Madaya and Sagaing. To encircle Mandalay, operations in Myingyan and Ngatogyi to the west have intensified significantly. The resistance's push toward Mandalay is likely to be its most challenging and costly undertaking to date. The regime is expected to mount its strongest defenses, viewing the battle for Mandalay as existential. If the resistance manages to secure control over Mandalay, it would signify a dramatic new conflict landscape.
Looking Forward
Although some argued before the fall of Lashio that the military is beginning to “regroup”, the Sit-Tat is, in fact, at its weakest point in modern history and showing no signs of regrouping. In addition to its historic losses in northern Shan State, the Myanmar military faces resistance offensives in Mandalay, Rakhine, Chin, Karen, Bago, Sagaing, Magway, Tanintharyi, Karenni and Kachin.
Within four months of offensives in Kachin State, the Kachin Independence Army has captured over 200 military positions, including several strategically significant bases and nine towns. In Karen State, the junta deployed its largest operation to date, named Aung Zeya, with 3,000 troops aimed to retake Myawaddy in Karen State. The offensive faced stiff resistance defenses in the Dawna hills and has been forced to retreat — never coming close to retaking Myawaddy. Meanwhile, the Arakan Army has achieved near-total control of northern Rakhine State and is steadily advancing toward full control of the entire region.
Plagued by low morale, poor fighting capabilities, inept leadership, public hatred and internal discontent, there are few scenarios in which the military could recover. Over the past three years, the military has deteriorated from a national army, capable of controlling the country through fear and force, into just one of many armed groups in Myanmar.
The resistance movement recognizes this as an historic opportunity to remove the military from power and achieve a new political order.
Although the conflict landscape in Myanmar is complex, two things are clear: (1) the conflict has consistently moved in a single direction that favors the resistance, and the Myanmar military lacks the capacity to alter its course; and (2) the resistance movement recognizes this as an historic opportunity to remove the military from power and achieve a new political order that is not dominated by the military, and it is unlikely to be diverted from that objective.
Ultimately, it may not matter much if the international community understands these facts — the war will be decided by those inside Myanmar — but international efforts that prolong the life of the military, by providing direct assistance, encouraging power-sharing negotiation, or otherwise, only increase civilian suffering. It would help if the international community would support the people’s will to remove the genocidal dictatorship from power..."
Source/publisher:
United States Institute of Peace
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-14
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"Source: Myanmar Peace Monitor.....Format: Infographic..."
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Myanmar Peace Monitor via Reliefweb (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-14
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Armed conflict and peace-building in Burma - theoretical, strategic and general, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
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"Unlike the Chinese, who have close dealings with the State Administration Council (SAC) while maintaining a certain distance from the generals so as not to further antagonize public opinion in Myanmar, the Russians have without hesitation thrown in their entire lot with the coupmakers in Naypyitaw. China has yet to invite the SAC leader, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, but he has visited Moscow on several occasions and met Russian dictator Vladimir Putin in Vladivostok in September 2022. Russia has sold helicopter gunships, jet fighters, armored vehicles, artillery and other military equipment to Myanmar, and thousands of Myanmar cadets have undergone training in Russia, while Russian military dignitaries in full uniform have attended March 27 Armed Forces celebrations in Naypyitaw.
More controversially, Russian military technicians are helping the Myanmar Air Force maintain its Russian-supplied aircraft, and, according to on-the-ground eyewitnesses, some are even assisting the Myanmar army in its drone warfare in Rakhine State, which may be the case in other warzones as well.
On the day before the Feb. 1, 2021 coup, a group of Russians and Myanmar colleagues were having a party in Yangon, where the vodka flowed freely. They were reportedly celebrating the opening of a military high-tech multimedia complex in which some of Min Aung Hlaing’s children had financial interests. It goes without saying that they also toasted the coup that was going to be launched the following day.
There is every reason for Beijing to play its cards carefully; it has vital, long-term geostrategic interests in Myanmar, the only neighboring country that provides China with direct access to the Indian Ocean. The Russians, on the other hand, have other concerns. Their friendship with Myanmar’s military should be understood first and foremost in the context of Putin’s vision of “making Russia great again.” Having lost its superpower status after the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union and the chaotic Boris Yeltsin years that ensued—and seen its once strong influence in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia and close relationship with India diminish—the Kremlin leadership has found a new friend in Myanmar, whose generals have become its most trusted and faithful allies in Asia. As The Irrawaddy reported on June 26, 2021: “Min Aung Hlaing lauded Russia as Myanmar’s ‘friend forever’…[while] our neighboring China and India are our close friends.”
Key arms supplier
Wary of becoming too dependent on Myanmar’s powerful northern neighbor for military supplies, Naypyitaw has turned increasingly to Russia, which since the 2021 coup has displaced China as the country’s largest provider of defense-related material. According to a Nov. 21, 2023 research paper titled “Myanmar-Russia Relations Since the Coup: An Even Tighter Embrace” and written by Ian Storey for the Yusof Ishak Institute in Singapore, Russia provided Myanmar’s military with US$276 million worth of supplies between 2021 and 2022, compared to armaments valued at $156 million from China. A UN report states that Russian entities during the same period transferred US$406 million in defense supplies to Myanmar, with China at second place at US$267 million.
Significantly, the Myanmar military remains one of very few outside entities which has all along supported the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and is the only member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations to do so. On Feb. 27, 2022, Myanmar Alin, the Burmese-language version of the Global New Light of Myanmar, published a two-page commentary titled “Lessons from Ukraine for those who haven’t learned from history” by a writer using the pseudonym “Myint Myat”. The article referred to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky as a “puppet of the West”, while Putin was praised as a “visionary leader” who had had the “foresight to quietly build up his country’s military and economic strength.”
But there is an economic dimension to the partnership as well. Apart from Myanmar’s becoming a lucrative market for the Russian war industry, Russia has also shown interest in oil and gas exploration as well as mining in Myanmar. Playing “religious diplomacy,” one of the first Russian companies that became involved in Myanmar was one from Kalmykia, a Buddhist, autonomous republic in the European part of the Russian Federation. Russian website Kommersant carried an article on March 20, 2007 reporting that Kalmykia’s Kalmneftegaz “wins Myanmar’s Crude, Gas Tender on Religious Fellowship.” In another development, The New Light of Myanmar (before it became “The Global New Light”) reported on Feb. 16, 2008 that Myanmar’s Geological Survey and Mineral Exploration Department and a Russian company, Victorious Glory International, had signed a deal for exploration for “gold and associated minerals” in an area along the Uru River between Hpakant in Kachin State and Homalin in Sagaing Region. The newspaper gave no further details, but the Homalin area in the upper Chindwin River basin is known for its deposits of gold, while Hpakant is world-famous for its jade.
It is uncertain what became of those ventures and, given the fierce fighting that has broken out in precisely those regions since Min Aung Hlaing’s ill-fated 2021 coup, it is likely that they have been put on hold. Instead, it is Russia that has provided Myanmar with energy supplies. According to Storey: “Between March and June 2023, Russian oil exports to Myanmar jumped from almost nothing to 836 million barrels of oil.” A portion of that oil, the report states, “is likely to have been jet fuel for use by MAF (Myanmar Air Force) aircraft to conduct air strikes.” However, the research paper states, “not all Russian oil shipped to Myanmar is for domestic consumption. According to Energy Intelligence, from February 2023 Russia began delivering an estimated 70,000 barrels of oil per day to China using a Chinese-funded oil pipeline from the port of Kyaukphyu in Myanmar to Kunming in Yunnan Province.”
In August this year, Khin Yi, the chairman of the military’s own political outfit, the Union Solidarity and Development Party, said in an interview with the Russian news agency Sputnik: “The main support we would like is for Russia to work together with us in the fight against terrorism. To do this, we must first realize that what is happening [in Myanmar] must be perceived not as internal political squabbles, but as terrorism. If you recognize this as terrorism, then your departments and agencies that are engaged in the fight against terrorism can join us and together achieve our goals.” In effect, he asked for Russian intervention in Myanmar’s civil wars, which would violate even the Myanmar army-drafted 2008 constitution. Its Section 42 (b) stipulates that no foreign troops can be deployed in Myanmar. But, in a sense, that is already happening with Russian technicians working together with the Myanmar military in the maintenance of Russian-supplied jet fighters and helicopter gunships as well as in drone warfare. And in November 2023, the first Myanmar-Russia Maritime Security Exercise (MARUMEX) was held in the seas west of Myeik, Tanintharyi Region, involving ships and aircraft from both countries and focusing on the “prevention of air, water surface and underwater dangers and maritime security measures”, according to Myanmar’s military-controlled state media.
In the less lethal field, Russian Ambassador to Myanmar Iskander Azizov met the number two in the SAC, Vice Senior General Soe Win, in July to discuss the progress of Myanmar’s special economic zones and power projects. Russia is, reportedly, interested in investing in the deep-sea port at Tanintharyi’s Dawei in the southeast and, somewhat ironically given the volatile domestic situation in Myanmar, tourism in, among other areas, the beaches in Rakhine State.
Nuclear partnership
Russia and Myanmar have also agreed to cooperate in the field of nuclear power. In October 2023, Rosatom Director General Alexei Likhachev and the junta’s Science and Technology Minister Myo Thein Kyaw signed a memorandum of understanding which, according to Russian sources, “determines that the development of nuclear infrastructure will be carried out in accordance with the IAEA approaches and recommendations as well as Rosatom’s best practices.” (Rosatom is a Russian state corporation specializing in nuclear energy, while the IAEA, the International Atomic Energy Agency, is a global intergovernmental nuclear energy watchdog.) The memorandum also provides for training of Myanmar scientists and “human resources development and enhancement of safety culture in the organizations participating in the nuclear energy development program.” And then, in June this year, Moscow approved what Nuclear Engineering International, a monthly magazine published in the United Kingdom, called “a draft agreement on the basic principles of cooperation in the construction of a low-power nuclear power plant in Myanmar.” That seems to be the latest development in the long saga of nuclear cooperation between Russia and Myanmar, and it remains to be seen if it will ever materialize.
The Kremlin seems to believe that absolute military rule is there to stay in Naypyitaw and that Myanmar is not, as many independent analysts fear, on the verge of becoming a failed state. Russians have been spotted at several military bases and institutions in Myanmar, including Pyin Oo Lwin, the home of the Defense Services Academy and the Defense Services Technological Academy. But they may have been evacuated recently along with Myanmar personnel because of the fighting that is raging to the north and east of Pyin Oo Lwin. According to unconfirmed reports, however, seemingly optimistic Russian entities are still interested in mineral exploration in Myanmar’s more remote regions. Exactly what they are doing is not clear, but what can be said with certainty is that the SAC’s minister for natural resources and environmental conservation, Khin Maung Yi, received a Russian delegation headed by Anatoly Bulochnikov, senior vice-president of the Russia-Myanmar Association of Friendship and Cooperation, in Naypyitaw on June 28 last year. According to local media reports, they discussed development of the mineral sector and Russian technological assistance to Myanmar in mineral exploration. Furthermore, on Oct. 8 last year, a delegation from Fund RC Investments of Russia’s Roscongress Foundation also visited Naypyitaw, where they met SAC Energy Minister Ko Ko Lwin. The Russian guests reportedly pledged to provide technical assistance and investment for extracting natural gas trapped in coal deposits in Myanmar.
Even if military rule survives in one form or another, it seems shortsighted of the Russians to engage in such a close relationship with the junta—and for Myanmar generals to depend on Russia for business deals and military purchases. It is impossible under present circumstances to engage in any large-scale mineral exploration in Myanmar, and, even if Myanmar’s generals want to buy more military hardware from Russia, Moscow’s domestic needs for the war effort in Ukraine have made it harder for it to export weapons to any country, let alone a cash-strapped entity like the junta in Naypyitaw. But as long as the vodka flows, the friendship between the warmongers in Moscow and Naypyitaw seems solid. And there is precious little the outside world can do about it..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-14
[field_licence]
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"BEIJING —
China's top diplomat Wang Yi will visit Myanmar and Thailand from Aug. 14 to 17, Beijing's foreign ministry said Tuesday.
"Wang Yi will visit Myanmar and travel to Thailand to co-chair the ninth Lancang-Mekong Cooperation Foreign Ministers' Meeting," foreign ministry spokesman Lin Jian said.
Wang will also attend an "informal discussion" between counterparts from Laos, Myanmar and Thailand, Lin said.
Last week, China's special envoy for Asian affairs met Myanmar's junta chief in the capital Naypyidaw for talks on "peace and stability" along their shared border, Myanmar state media said, days after ethnic rebels seized a regional military command.
Myanmar's northern Shan state has seen repeated clashes since late June after ethnic rebel groups renewed an offensive against the military along a vital trade highway to China.
Junta chief Min Aung Hlaing discussed "internal peace processes in Myanmar, peace and stability measures in the border region" with China's Deng Xijun, according to the Global New Light of Myanmar.
The senior general "explained the implementation of objectives and a five-point roadmap in order to ensure peace, stability," the state-run newspaper said.
China is a major ally and arms supplier to the junta, but analysts say it also maintains ties with armed ethnic groups in Myanmar that hold territory near its border.
An unnamed spokesman from China's foreign ministry on Tuesday said Wang's visit to Myanmar was "aimed at deepening bilateral mutually beneficial cooperation in various fields."
China supports "Myanmar's effort to uphold stability, grow the economy and improve people's livelihood," the spokesman added..."
Source/publisher:
"Agence France-Presse" (Paris) via "Voice of America" (Washington, D.C)
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-13
[field_licence]
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"Human Rights Violations took place in States and Regions from Aug 1 to 7, 2024
Military Junta Troop launched airstrikes and dropped bombs in Mandalay Region, Shan State, Chin State, and Rakhine State from August 1st to 7th. The Military Junta is making lists and arresting youths for batch 4th of Military Service in the Yangon and Ayeyarwady regions. The Military Junta arrested over 100 local civilians in Sagaing Region and Rakhine State.
Over 30 civilians died, and over 40 were injured by the Military’s heavy and light artillery attacks. 3 underaged children were injured when the Military Junta committed abuses..."
Source/publisher:
Network for Human Rights Documentation-Burma
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-11
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
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"In the past week MSF staff in Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, have treated a number of war wounded Rohingya people who crossed the border from Myanmar in search of safety.
Mortar shell injuries and gun shot wounds indicate the worsening humanitarian situation for the Rohingya in Rakhine state.
Civilians caught up in the ongoing conflict in Rakhine state must be protected.
Dhaka, Bangladesh – Escalating numbers of Rohingya people with violence-related injuries have crossed the border into Bangladesh over the past week, indicating the worsening humanitarian crisis in Myanmar’s Rakhine state. Civilians caught up in the conflict must be protected.
In the four days leading up to 7 August, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) teams in Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, treated 39 people for violence-related injuries. More than 40 per cent were women and children. Many had mortar shell injuries and gunshot wounds. Numbers peaked on 6 August when our teams treated 21 wounded people. MSF staff at the clinic say this is the first time in a year that they have seen serious injuries on this scale.
“Considering the rise in the number of wounded Rohingya patients crossing from Myanmar in recent days, and the nature of the injuries our teams are treating, we are becoming increasingly concerned about the impact of the conflict on Rohingya people,” says Orla Murphy, MSF’s country representative in Bangladesh. “It is clear that safe space for civilians in Myanmar is shrinking more each day, with people caught up in the ongoing fighting and forced to make perilous journeys to Bangladesh to seek safety.”
It is clear that safe space for civilians in Myanmar is shrinking more each day.
Patients have described the desperate situation in Rakhine state to MSF staff. Some reported seeing people bombed while trying to find boats to cross the river into Bangladesh and escape the violence. Others described seeing hundreds of dead bodies on the riverbanks. Many patients spoke of being separated from their families en route to safer areas and of loved ones being killed in the violence. Many people said they were fearful that family members remaining in Myanmar would not survive.
Conflict has been escalating in Rakhine state since October 2023, causing immense suffering to Rohingya communities and crippling the healthcare system.
“Our patients tell us that they faced extreme difficulties in accessing medical facilities in Myanmar due to the highly volatile situation there,” says Murphy.
The conflict has also impacted our ability to run medical activities safely. In June, MSF was forced to suspend our services in northern Rakhine state because of the violence, depriving people of vital medical care and further deepening the humanitarian crisis.
We call for the immediate protection of civilians caught up in the conflict.
“People must not come under indiscriminate attack and should be allowed to leave for safer areas, while all those in need of vital medical care should have unhindered and sustained access to medical facilities,” says Murphy..."
Source/publisher:
Médecins Sans Frontières
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-09
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Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Discrimination against the Rohingya, Arakan (Rakhine) State - reports etc. by date (latest first)
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"KEY HIGHLIGHTS
231,580 people received Core Relief Items comprising kitchen sets, blankets and sleeping mats, ensuring their basic needs were met.
34,800 people received shelter support for safe and dignified living conditions while in displacement.
16,190 people benefited from multi-purpose cash assistance to meet their basic needs.
FORCIBLY DISPLACED AND STATELESS PEOPLE
3,187,200 Internally displaced people (IDP) living in Rakhine, Chin, Kachin, Shan, Kayin, Kayah and Mon States, and Bago (East), Tanintharyi, Sagaing and Magway Regions (as of 24 June 2024). According to UN sources, an estimated 2.8 million people have been displaced (as of 24 June 2024) due to the resumption and intensification of clashes between the Tatmadaw and ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) and/or People’s Defense Forces (PDF) after 1 February 2021.
632,789 Estimated Rohingya in Rakhine State, of which some 155,511 are living in displacement camps as well as among the host community since 2012..."
Source/publisher:
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (Geneva)
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-09
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"washington —
Myanmar's ruling generals are facing unprecedented challenges as armed resistance groups gain more control in the north and the economy stalls. Experts say the rapidly shifting situation is giving China more leverage over the nation’s ruling military junta.
Earlier this week, Myanmar's junta confirmed its loss of control of a regional military base in the northern Shan State – a key area for China's Belt and Road Initiative and border trade.
That setback was the latest in the northern part of the country where the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) says the Three Brotherhood Alliance, an ethnic group coalition, has been making steady advances since late last year.
Between October and December 2023, USIP says, rebels gained control of more than 7,700 square miles, an area including crucial border crossings and trade routes between China and Myanmar.
By June, the Three Brotherhood Alliance expanded its control to central Myanmar, including Lashio, Kyauk Mae and areas near Mandalay, the country's second-largest city.
Professor Zachary Abuza of the National War College in Washington told VOA Burmese that the opposition forces' capture of the strategic city of Lashio has "symbolic meaning."
"It is on the highway between Mandalay and the Chinese border of Ruili. It's a critically important town. It's also the headquarters of the Northeastern Command," Abuza said.
On Thursday, China dispatched its special envoy to Myanmar, Deng Xijun, and he met with Myanmar's military leader, senior general Min Aung Hlaing.
According to the junta's official statement, their discussions focused on election preparations and maintaining stability at the border and the rest of the country. It did not, however, mention China's sponsored peace talks with the Three Brotherhood Alliance, initially scheduled for the end of July but reportedly boycotted by the regime. China has been pushing for the next round of talks to occur soon.
The junta's struggles have led to an increasing reliance on China for support, experts say.
In April 2024, Min Aung Hlaing offered to restart the long-delayed Myitsone Dam project in Kachin State to appeal to Chinese interests.
The China-backed Myitsone Dam was put on hold in 2011 following protests over its possible environmental and social impact. The loss of the project was a big setback for Beijing; 90% of the electricity the project was expected to generate was supposed to go to China.
"Min Aung Hlaing's recent messaging around the Myitsone Dam is quite instructive. He's trying to use economic concessions to compel the Chinese side to give additional support to the Myanmar military strategically," said Jason Tower of USIP, who has closely watched China-Myanmar relations.
China has also shown growing interest in engaging with former military elites including Thein Sein and Than Shwe, signaling Beijing's possible concerns about Min Aung Hlaing's leadership.
Former President Thein Sein visited Beijing in July, and the Chinese ambassador to Myanmar visited former military chief Than Shwe in April.
In a recent USIP analysis, Tower argued that "by inviting Thein Sein, Beijing sent a strong message that it hopes Myanmar will return to a pathway of reform like the military started on in 2008."
Abuza agreed, and said he believes China is looking for elections in Myanmar as an "off-ramp."
"I think the Chinese are looking for a way that Min Aung Hlaing and [Deputy Commander-in-Chief of Defense] Soe Win are retired. A group of more pragmatic generals looks for elections with the opposition as a transitional process to end this civil war," Abuza said. "I think the Chinese believe that the devil you know is better than the one you don't."..."
Source/publisher:
"Voice of America" (Washington, D.C)
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-08
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""The Rohingya crisis in Maungdaw Township in Arakan State is a heartbreaking story of survival amidst constant conflict and violence. The systematic targeting by the Arakan Army and military junta threatens the very existence of the Rohingya. The international community must not stay silent. Immediate action is necessary to protect the Rohingya and ensure their survival."
Khair Ullah, Rohingya Refugee Advocate, Human Rights Defender and Researcher, Asia Pacific Refugee Rights Network (APRRN) member
The Rohingya people of Arakan State are caught in the violent conflict between the Arakan Army and the Myanmar military. Forced into a deadly power struggle, they face recruitment into fighting, displacement, hunger, and senseless violence. They continue to have their basic human rights violated on a daily basis. This crisis demands immediate and urgent global attention and action to prevent the extermination of the Rohingya people.
The conflict has reached a breaking point. Civilian lives are being lost daily, with Rohingya families struggling to find food and shelter amidst the violence. In June, 70 Rohingya were reportedly killed, and hundreds injured; in July, 29 were reportedly killed and 64 injured, and on 5 and 6 August, over 200 Rohingya were reportedly killed near the Bangladesh-Myanmar border. Young Rohingya are being forced into combat, deepening the violence and tearing the Rohingya community apart. The military and the Arakan Army use the youths as shields on the frontlines, exacerbating the already desperate situation.
The Rohingya are a protected ethnic minority group. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 2020 mandated Myanmar to protect and safeguard the Rohingya from genocidal attacks and preserve the evidence. The ICJ has ruled that Myanmar must take all the measures to protect Rohingya from further harm. Hence, all the parties involved in the armed conflict in Myanmar or Arakan must refrain from causing further destruction to the community. In this distressing situation, women and children are suffering in innumerable ways, directly violating all the safeguards available in International Human Rights Law. They are the most vulnerable groups in need of urgent support and humanitarian aid.
The consequences of turning a blind eye to the conflict
The world's neglect has worsened the Rohingya's suffering, leaving them isolated and vulnerable. With no internet access in their areas, communication is nearly impossible, deepening the isolation. The Rohingya people are facing the dual burdens of violence from the Arakan Army and neglect from the international community. While international intervention and advocacy could bring much-needed aid and protection, it also faces political backlash and challenges in effectively coordinating efforts in a conflict zone.
The Arakan Army's arbitrary arrests, disappearances, and killings within Rohingya communities create a cycle of fear and despair. The systematic targeting of Rohingya people by the Arakan Army and military junta is a genocidal campaign that threatens their very existence.
Ali Johar, Co-lead, Global Movement Against Statelessness and APRRN member continues: “Under the shadow of what’s happening in Bangladesh, hundreds of Rohingyas have been slaughtered in Arakan during the first week of August. On 6 August alone, locals on the Bangladesh side of the Naf River discovered at least 13 dead bodies of Rohingya women and children who were killed while trying to run for safety. But we continue to witness hesitant international attention. If the international community is already tired of the news of Rohingyas getting slaughtered every day, imagine how hopeless and unseen the Rohingya themselves may feel about this ongoing Genocide.
Sabber Kyaw Min, founder & Director, of Rohingya Human Rights Initiative (ROHRIngya) and APRRN member added:
“It’s heartbreaking to see, yet again, vulnerable Rohingya people being forcefully displaced from Maungdaw and struggling to cross into Bangladesh. The Military Junta and the Rakhine militants’ Arakan Army took advantage of the unfolding situation in Bangladesh to drive out the remaining Rohingya population in Maungdaw, Rakhine State, Myanmar. Hundreds have reportedly been killed.”
Direct experiences from people on the ground
APRRN members spoke to three Rohingya who fled Maungdaw Township in the last two weeks and are now in Bangladesh:
Solim, a 23-year-old from Arakan State, shared his plight: "There are constant clashes between the Arakan Army and the military, and I have no scope to run or hide from the regular fighting in the state."
Mohammed, a 31-year-old, expressed his despair: "We are on the brink of death as we haven't had anything to eat for several days, and the fear of violence is always in our minds. Both the military and the Arakan Army haven't halted fighting in most Rohingya villages."
Alam, a 42-year-old from Arakan State, highlighted his eyewitness account: "I saw that many people have gathered in the coastal area near the border between Bangladesh and Myanmar to escape the clash between the Arakan Army and military juntas. The Arakan Army intentionally fired drones at the Rohingya, and I saw more than 200 dead bodies on the beach, but luckily, I'm safe."
Recommendations by Asia Pacific Refugee Rights Network (APRRN)
APRRN calls for immediate global attention and comprehensive and sustainable action, and have the following recommendations:
The international community must urge the Myanmar government and the Arakan Army to cease fighting and protect all civilians, especially the Rohingya. Those responsible for human rights abuses must be held accountable;
Neighbouring states should allow international agencies, national groups, and camp volunteers to form rescue teams to facilitate aid to Rohingya trapped in Arakan State;
The international community should coordinate rescue teams to the borders [Bangladesh and Thailand] to protect and assist fleeing Rohingya;
APRRN also calls on Bangladesh to open the border and allow for the safe passage of civilians from Northern Rakhine who are seeking protection from the armed conflict;
Restoring internet access and communication channels is essential to aid coordination and support for the Rohingya community;
Sufficient funds should be allocated for critical resources, including food, shelter, and medical care;
Comprehensive support services to address the trauma and psychological needs of the Rohingya should be established.
For further information, please reach out to Hafsar Tameesuddin ([email protected]), and Klaus Dik Nielsen ([email protected]) Co-Secretaries General, Asia Pacific Refugee Rights Network (APRRN).
The Asia Pacific Refugee Rights Network (APRRN) is a network of over 280 civil society organisations and individuals from 30 countries. We are committed to protecting and promoting the rights of refugees and other vulnerable groups on the move in the Asia Pacific..."
Source/publisher:
"Asia Pacific Refugee Rights Network"
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-08
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Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Discrimination against the Rohingya, Rohingya (cultural, political etc.), Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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