Human Rights and international relations
Individual Documents
Description:
"Summary:
Over the past six months, airstrikes by the military junta against civilian targets in Myanmar have increased five-fold as it loses military outposts, territory, and troops to resistance forces. To sustain itself and maintain its attacks, the junta, or State Administration Council (SAC), is counting on two primary resources from abroad: weapons and money.
This conference room paper examines the SAC’s procurement of weapons and related materials and the role that international banks play in this deadly trade.
In the past year, there has been a significant shift in both the amount and source of weapons, dual-use technologies, manufacturing equipment, and raw materials that the SAC has been able to secure from abroad. The volume of weapons and military supplies it purchased using the international finance system decreased by one-third—from $377 million in FY2022 (April 2022 – March 2023) to $253 million in FY2023 (April 2023 – March 2024). Exports from Singapore dropped dramatically, from over $110 million to just over US$10 million. Exports of military supplies from the Russian Federation and China also declined, while Thailand became the SAC’s leading source of military supplies purchased through the international banking system. The transfer of weapons and related materials from companies registered in Thailand doubled from over $60m in FY2022 to over $120m in FY2023.
The SAC continues to engage with a broad international banking network to sustain itself and its weapons supplies. Over the past year, 16 banks located in seven countries processed transactions related to SAC military procurement; 25 banks have provided correspondent banking services to Myanmar’s state-owned banks since the coup.
The Special Rapporteur urges Member States of the United Nations to engage at a significantly higher level of sustained action, including by coordinating sanctions to weaken the SAC’s capacity to continue its attacks on civilians and other systematic human rights violations. He recommends, inter alia, that financial institutions terminate or freeze all financial relationships with Myanmar’s stateowned banks, including Myanma Economic Bank, and undertake enhanced due diligence on all business relationships and transactions related to Myanmar. He urges the Government of Thailand to follow the example of the Government of Singapore, which in 2023 launched an investigation into weapons transfers from Singapore-based entities. A dramatic drop in these transfers followed. The Special Rapporteur is committed to supporting these efforts as he strives to shed light on the crisis in Myanmar and the role that governments, financial institutions, and others can play to help to bring the crisis to an end..."
Source/publisher:
UN Human Rights Council (Geneva) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-26
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
UN human rights documents on Myanmar, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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pdf
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1.89 MB
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"For Immediate Release
Today, the Human Rights Foundation of Monland (HURFOM) releases the second update in the “Voice Up” series, which provides a gendered overview of the human rights situation in target areas of Southeastern Burma, including Mon State, Karen State, and the Tanintharyi region. The report covers violations against women and children who have been impacted by the junta’s ongoing attacks against civilians between March and May 2024. The first update was published at the beginning of March 2024.
Before the attempted coup in Burma on 1 February 2021, HURFOM had published similar content in a bulletin-style format under the title ‘Voice Up.’ All of the cases documented by HURFOM fieldworkers show the strength of women and children in the wake of great adversity.
Our most recent findings indicate a worsening trajectory of complete and utter disregard for civilian life by the Burma Army. A total of at least twenty women were injured, sixteen were killed, and eighteen were arbitrarily arrested and unlawfully detained. Several of those killed were in their homes at the time of indiscriminate firing by the junta. Landmines also continue to pose a devastating risk that robs innocent people of their mobility and freedom of movement. Landmines are hidden, increasing the risk of their detonation.
For example, on the morning of March 11th, a distressing incident occurred in Zahar village, Dawei Township, where Daw Hnin Mu, age 60, tragically stepped on a landmine while tending to her garden. The explosion resulted in the amputation of her right leg. This incident, among others, is further evidence of the deprival of everyday rights and freedoms in Southeastern Burma and across the country.
Nonetheless, women remain steadfast and unwavering in their commitment to see a democratic Burma that includes gender equality. Their voices must be amplified across all political and social spaces to ensure their participation goes beyond tokenism and translates to meaningful change. Women are among the majority of those displaced and have suffered immensely at the hands of a brutal, power-hungry regime which has failed to steal their spirit.
HURFOM urges the international community to act swiftly to respond to women’s challenges and fund their efforts as long-time, reliable providers in their communities. Their roles as leaders have transcended gender norms and dispelled harmful gender stereotypes. Recognition of their bravery must extend to advocacy for protection pathways and transitional justice. Donors must also end long-time funding barriers and support their leadership and organizing with localized approaches.
Women continue to spearhead change, respond quickly to crises, and resist injustice, even during deeply challenging times. The second issue of this report is indicative not only of their struggles but also of their unwavering perseverance and determination..."
Source/publisher:
Human Rights Foundation of Monland
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-26
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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pdf
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897.07 KB
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Description:
"Hundreds of inmates including political prisoners were transferred from Yangon’s notorious Insein Prison to Daik-U and Tharyarwaddy prisons in Bago Region this week, according to the Political Prisoners Network-Myanmar (PPNM).
Five vehicles full of prisoners left Insein for the Bago prisons on Sunday, said Ko Thaik Tun Oo of PPNM.
“We heard male prisoners were sent to Tharyarwaddy Prison and females to Daik-U Prison. I don’t know the exact number, but we heard that each vehicle carried around 50 so there might be 250 [in total],” Ko Thaik Tun Oo told The Irrawaddy.
The transfer came a week after around 250 prisoners including political detainees from Mandalay’s Obo Prison and Mon State’s Kyaikmaraw Township were transported to Tharyarwaddy and Daik-U prisons in Bago, Myingyan Prison in Mandalay and Magwe Prison on June 15, according to PPNM.
Details of the political prisoners transferred to other jails are still unknown. Family members said they were not told about the transfer.
A relative of a prisoner transferred from Insein Prison on Sunday said: “We were not informed about it. Family members know about transfers only when they are reported by organizations helping prisoners. And family members often face obstacles when inquiring where prisoners have been transferred.”
Daik-U and Tharyarwaddy have become notorious as the worst jails for human rights violations against political prisoners and other inmates since the 2021 coup.
Individuals and organizations donating free food and other necessities for prisoners said they have difficulties supplying inmates in notorious prisons.
Ko Thaik Tun Oo said: “Hundreds of political prisoners have been transferred since June 15. This is not a coincidence but an attempt by the regime and its correctional department to disperse political prisoners so that they can’t stage protests in prisons and it becomes easier for guards to handle them.”
Last week, women political prisoners were among 80 female inmates beaten in a brutal assault by guards at Daik-U Prison. Five women prisoners were hospitalized after suffering severe injuries in the beating, which occurred as they were protesting confiscation of personal items during their transfer from Kyaikmaraw Prison.
The Assistance Association for Political Prisoners reported in February that Myanmar jails are overflowing with an all-time high of 20,002 political prisoners – including nearly 4,000 women and at least 300 children..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-26
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Political prisoners and other violations in Burma - reports, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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Description:
"This Rapid Market Assessment (RMA) is a suppliment to the MAU Market Price Report in South Sagaing Region. It provides township-level data on market functionality, activity, supply, and logistics. Data were collected through observation and KIIs with retailers during May 21-30, 2024. Reports available at www.themimu.info/market-analysis-unit.
KEY FINDINGS
Market security was largely unchanged in May, and it remained poor in Shwebo and Monywa Towns;
Market activity was generally stable, although retailers suggested customers were spending less;
Supply of many NFIs improved, including fuel and medicine, although supply of hygiene NFIs worsened;
Supply in Yinmarbin was most improved in May, but supply was still worse here than elsewhere;
Shipping rates rose 10-20% in most areas, and all five markets monitored reported higher rates;
Retail challenges increased most in Monywa, and concerns of weakening demand grew regionwide.
Regional Overview
Market Functionality - Security remained poor in/ around some markets, but operations were stable. Security improved slightly at the Yinmarbin village market, but security conditions were otherwise unchanged in May. All markets monitored remained open, and operating hours were generally stable.
Market Activity - Relatively good security at village markets contributed to stable market activity. Market activity shifted slightly at markets in Shwebo and Monywa Towns, but overall there was little change in customer and retailer volumes in May. The Myaung market—where security remained poor—continued to serve only nearby villages within the township.
Availability of Goods - NFI supply improved in May, particularly in Yinmarbin where supply was worst. Markets in Yinmarbin, Ye-U, and Shwebo saw supply improvements, primarily related to NFIs. Supply of NFIs— including fuel and medicines—generally improved in May, although supply of hygiene items worsened slightly.
Supply of food items was generally stable.
Transport & Logistics - Retailers in all five markets monitored reported rising shipping costs in May. Lead times remained stable in May, but retailers in four-of five markets monitored said shipping costs rose 10% or more. Formal shipping in/around Shwebo resumed in May, and all markets monitored allowed cross-township movement of goods. Sources of supply were generally unchanged in May, with suppliers in Monywa, Mandalay, and Yangon remaining the primary sources of goods.
Retailer Challenges - Monywa retailers reported more challenges in May, and concerns about weak demand grew. Retail challenges grew considerably in Monywa in May, but retailers elsewhere reported overall fewer retail difficulties than last month. Challenges related to transportation and cash lessened somewhat in May, although a growing number of retailers said weak demand was a problem for them. Shwebo Town retailers continued to report the most severe business-related challenges, particularly related to security and transportation..."
Source/publisher:
Myanmar Information Management Unit (Myanmar) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-26
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Food Security and nutrition in Burma/Myanmar, Public Health, Human Rights and international relations
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Format :
pdf
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8.99 MB
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Description:
"GENEVA (26 June 2024) – Foreign banks are facilitating the Myanmar military junta’s access to weapons and related materials that are sustaining its campaign of violence and brutality against the people of Myanmar, according to a new report released today by Tom Andrews, the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar.
Banking on the Death Trade: How Banks and Governments Enable the military Junta in Myanmar identifies 16 banks in seven countries that have processed transactions linked to the junta’s military procurement in the past two years, and an additional 25 that have provided correspondent banking services to Myanmar’s state-owned banks that are controlled by the junta.
“By relying on financial institutions that are willing to do business with Myanmar state-owned banks under its control, the junta has ready access to the financial services it needs to carry out systematic human rights violations, including aerial attacks on civilians,” the Special Rapporteur said.
“International banks that facilitate transactions that include Myanmar state-owned banks are at high risk of enabling military attacks on Myanmar civilians. I urge them to stop doing so. Banks have a fundamental obligation to not facilitate crimes – and this includes war crimes and crimes against humanity,” Andrews said.
“The good news is that the junta is increasingly isolated. The Myanmar military’s annual procurement of weapons and military supplies through the formal banking system declined by a third from the year ending March 2023 to the year that followed – from US$377 million to $253 million.
“The bad news is that the junta is circumventing sanctions and other measures by exploiting gaps in sanctions regimes, shifting financial institutions, and taking advantage of the failure of Member States to fully coordinate and enforce actions.”
The report examines a dramatic shift in the role of two ASEAN countries as sources of weapons and military supplies for the junta. After a report last year by the Special Rapporteur identified Singapore as Myanmar’s third largest source of weapons and related materials, the government of Singapore launched an investigation of the Singapore-based entities involved in the trade. In the year ending March 2024, the flow of weapons materials to Myanmar from Singapore-registered companies dropped by nearly 90 percent compared to the previous year.
Military procurement through Thailand has moved in the opposite direction. In the year ending March 2024, the junta imported nearly US$130 million in weapons and military supplies from Thailand-registered suppliers, more than double the total from the previous year. Thai banks have played a crucial role in this shift. Siam Commercial Bank, for example, facilitated just over US$5 million in transactions related to Myanmar military in the year ending March 2023, but that number skyrocketed to over $100 million in the following year.
“Singapore’s example demonstrates that a government with sufficient political will can make a significant difference toward shutting down the Myanmar death trade. Thailand has an opportunity to follow this powerful example by taking action that will deal a huge blow to the junta’s capacity to sustain its escalating attacks on civilian targets. I urge it to do so,” the expert said.
Over 5,000 civilians have been killed by the junta since the coup, at least 3 million people are displaced, and more than 20,000 political prisoners remain behind bars in Myanmar. Over the last six months, military airstrikes against civilian targets have increased five-fold while the junta continues to lose military outposts, territory, and troops to resistance forces.
“With the junta on its heels, it is critical that financial institutions take their human rights obligations seriously and not facilitate the junta’s deadly transactions. It is also critical that States step up by fully coordinating their actions, including by closing loopholes in sanctions regimes,” the Special Rapporteur said.
“Sanctioning governments should be targeting the networks supplying jet fuel to the junta. It is also critical that they target Myanma Economic Bank, which is not subject to international sanctions and has become the go-to bank for the junta. These actions could play a decisive role in helping to turn the tide in Myanmar and saving untold numbers of lives,” he said.
Mr. Thomas Andrews (United States of America) is the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar. A former member of the US Congress from Maine, Andrews is a Robina Senior Human Rights Fellow at Yale Law School and an Associate of Harvard University’s Asia Center. He has worked with the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs and parliamentarians, NGOs and political parties in Cambodia, Indonesia, Algeria, Croatia, Serbia, Ukraine and Yemen. He has been a consultant for the National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma and the Euro-Burma Network and has run advocacy NGOs including Win Without War and United to End Genocide.
The Special Rapporteurs are part of what is known as the Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council. Comprising the largest body of independent experts in the UN Human Rights system, Special Procedures is the general name of the Council's independent fact-finding and monitoring mechanisms that address either specific country situations or thematic issues in all parts of the world. Special Procedures experts work on a voluntary basis; they are not UN staff and do not receive a salary for their work. They are independent from any government or organization and serve in their individual capacity..."
Source/publisher:
UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-26
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Crimes Against Humanity, Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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Description:
"On this International Day in Support of Victims of Torture, the Karen Human Rights Group (KHRG) calls to action on all stakeholders and individuals to unite in support of the hundreds of thousands of people around the world who are victims of torture. Together, we can raise awareness of the plight of torture victims in Southeast Burma, support their healing journey, and work towards a future free from the horrors of torture and arbitrary detention.
Since the 2021 military coup, human rights violations committed against villagers by armed actors in Southeast Burma have grown in intensity and cruelty. Among these violations, incidents of torture of civilians have increased alarmingly. As highlighted in KHRG’s latest Briefing Paper, Permanent Scars, in 2023 alone, 33 incidents involving at least 37 victims were reported to KHRG, mainly perpetrated by the Burma Army.[1] Physical and mental violence is used by the State Administration Council (SAC) as a weapon of war, in gross violation of the internationally recognised human rights norms. This systematic abuse affects the lives, safety, and livelihoods of villagers, causing them serious injuries and trauma.
Torture is a crime under international law, defined by the United Nations Convention Against Torture (UNCAT) as any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as to obtain information, to punish for an act committed or suspected of having committed, to intimidate, coerce, or for any reason based on discrimination.[2] Protection against torture and inhuman or degrading treatment is an absolute human right that upholds the individual’s right to the protection of his or her dignity and integrity.[3] Torture is a grave breach of Article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions:[4] in Karen State, these acts amount to war crimes and, given their widespread and systematic nature, crimes against humanity as defined by the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.[5]
The SAC military has systematically subjected villagers to arbitrary arrest and detention to extract information or force confessions about the activities of local armed resistance groups, particularly following attacks or clashes.[6] While villagers are often deprived of their liberty without a trial nor supporting evidence, SAC soldiers use physical violence and other forms of ill-treatment as punishment for villagers suspected of being affiliated to, or supporting, local armed resistance groups. [7] Torture of villagers is also committed by the SAC and other affiliated armed groups to intimidate and demonstrate that they have the power to act with impunity, inflicting harm to the civilian population in a serious abuse of power.[8] The SAC also uses arbitrary arrests of villagers to coerce them into acting as human shields or forced porters, accompanying troops as they travel on foot through contested territory. These acts may amount to torture, as villagers are forced to carry heavy loads while at high risk of being drawn into active fighting or landmine-contaminated areas. In addition, villagers forced to act as human shields are verbally and physically abused while detained. In 2023 alone, KHRG documented 13 incidents of human shielding and forced portering, involving at least 97 villagers.[9]
The impact of torture extends beyond the immediate victims. Families and communities suffer deeply as their loved ones endure unimaginable pain, long-term psychological scars, and physical disabilities that affect their ability to be independent. The pervasive fear of arbitrary detention and torture disrupts social cohesion, undermines trust, and fuels constant insecurity. The trauma inflicted by these acts leaves lasting damage, hindering the ability of individuals and communities to rebuild their lives and sustain themselves. Despite these challenges, efforts to heal and rehabilitate victims of torture in Southeast Burma continue. Local civil society and community-based organisations (CSOs/CBOs) play a crucial role in providing psychological support, legal aid, and financial assistance to survivors and their families. Comprehensive support systems are essential to help victims cope with trauma, reclaim their dignity and reintegrate into society.
On this International Day in support of Victims of Torture, KHRG urges international stakeholders, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and regional and foreign governments to:
Recognise the serious crimes committed by the Burma Army leaders, avoid endorsing or legitimising the State Administration Council (SAC), and hold the Burma Army leaders accountable in impartial and independent courts. Support local civil society and community-based organisations (CSOs/CBOs), including ethnic service providers, to expand psychological support programmes for survivors, their families, and local communities to help them cope with their trauma. Listen to and support local and civil society organisations in their efforts to document arbitrary detention and torture in Southeast Burma, advocate for victims’ rights, and provide comprehensive support and protection to witnesses who come forward to testify about arbitrary arrest, detention, and torture. Raise international awareness of the crimes of torture and arbitrary detention in rural Southeast Burma and explore actionable measures to deter and address the occurrence of these crimes, including by expanding the scope of international investigations to include these crimes.
Media contacts:
Saw Nanda Hsue, Advocacy Coordinator at KHRG, [email protected]
Naw Paw Lah, Advocacy Officer at KHRG, [email protected]
Footnotes:
[1] KHRG, Permanent Scars: Torture of villagers under arbitrary detention by State Administration Council in Southeast Burma (January - December 2023), Briefing Paper, April 2024, p.2.
[2] 1984 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Article 1
[3] 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), Article 5.
[4] 1949 Geneva Conventions, Common Article 3(1)(a).
[5] 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Articles 7(f) and 8(2)(c)(i).
[6] KHRG, Permanent Scars, Briefing Paper, April 2024, pp. 4-7.
[7] KHRG, Permanent Scars, Briefing Paper, April 2024, pp. 7-9.
[8] KHRG, Permanent Scars, Briefing Paper, April 2024, pp. 9-10.
[9] KHRG, Permanent Scars, Briefing Paper, April 2024, pp. 10-11..."
Source/publisher:
Karen Human Rights Group
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-26
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Reporting torture: resources
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239.16 KB 212.2 KB 162.86 KB
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Sub-title:
Residents are trapped by fighting and in need of aid.
Description:
"About 10,000 people in Myanmar, most of them members of the mainly Muslim Rohingya minority displaced by fighting, are in urgent need of food and medical aid, residents told Radio Free Asia on Tuesday.
Fighting between junta forces and autonomy-seeking Arakan Army insurgents has intensified in recent weeks in Maungdaw township in western Myanmar’s Rakhine state, compounding hardships for the population after junta troops shut down hospitals, prohibited travel and forcibly conscripted villagers into the army.
The fighting has forced residents from four neighborhoods in the outskirts of Maungdaw town to take shelter in schools for the past two months.
Food and medical resources are now running out as the fighting in the area intensifies, said one resident, who asked to remain anonymous for fear of reprisals.
“We can hear heavy artillery all the time. People have been killed and wounded as a result of shells landing on their houses. There are no hospitals, no doctors, that’s why people are so worried,” he said.
Fighting between insurgent armies and the junta that seized power in a 2021 coup has intensified since late last year in several parts of the country, including Rakhine state, where Arakan Army fighters occupy nine townships and have captured nearly all junta outposts, including those on the Bangladesh border.
While civilians have been suffering throughout the country, the Rohingya people have faced particular hardship with human rights groups saying both sides in the conflict have abused their rights, accusing them of helping their rivals and press-ganging them into their armies.
Rohingya have for decades faced persecution in mostly Buddhist Myanmar with more than 700,000 fleeing to neighboring Bangladesh in 2017 from a military crackdown following Rohingya insurgent attacks on police.
The Maungdaw resident said this time, junta roadblocks imposed as part of their anti-insurgent operations meant fleeing to Bangladesh was not an option and no aid groups were able to provide food and medical care.
Residents reported casualties from the shelling but could not confirm the number or details. Access to the internet and telecommunications has been cut.
Rakhine state’s junta spokesperson Hla Thein did not respond to calls from RFA requesting comment on the situation.
According to the junta-controlled Myanma Alin newspaper, junta officials provided more than 2,000 households in Maungdaw’s affected neighborhoods with a bag of rice each on Saturday.
The World Food Programme said on Tuesday its warehouse in Maungdaw township was burned down on Saturday. The U.N. food agency has not been allowed to travel in Maungdaw township since last month.
The Arakan Army warned residents to evacuate on June 16, saying in a statement its fighters would attack Maungdaw town..."
Source/publisher:
"Radio Free Asia" (USA)
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-26
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Burma: Internal displacement/forced migration of several ethnic groups., Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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Description:
"INTRODUCTION: You’re now listening to “Advocate” by APHR, ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights.
Hello, I’m Karina Tehusijarana, Media Manager of APHR. I’ll be your host for today and currently I’m with APHR Board Member U Shwe Maung. Thank you for joining us today.
Hi. You’re welcome. Thank you.
U Shwe Maung is a Rohingya rights activist and former politician who served as a member of parliament in Myanmar’s House of Representatives from 2011 to 2016. As well as being a board member of APHR, he is also a founding member of the International Panel of Parliamentarians for Freedom of religion or belief or IPP Forb, and serves as president of the Arakan Institute for Peace and Development.
Today, we will be talking about the five point consensus, the current situation in Myanmar, as well as the current situation facing the Rohingya in Myanmar, and the role of Myanmar MP’s, as well as Southeast Asian MP’s.....INTERVIEW: Thank you. Before we get started talking about the situation in Myanmar and the situation of Rohingya. We would like to maybe get to know you a little bit better. So can you tell us about your background and how you first entered politics?
Thank you. By training I am a mechanical engineer and a software engineer. But by situation, I joined politics in 2010 because we had a nationwide demonstration in 1988. Then also I was one of the student leaders. I formed a student union and I tried to maintain peace and stability and peaceful coexistence among the Rohingya and Rakhine community. Rather than the demonstration of the Myanmar military regime. Because my mother was an eyewitness of 1942 violence against Rohingya. And before independence my mother always talked about those stories. Horrible story. So I always remember that.
So in 1988 I saw a lot of instability among the community. So some movements, especially Rakhine community people are leaving from the Buthidaung to situate. Because they were scared of some kind of situation. Probably they recall 1942 conflict or violence against our community.
So what I did is I formed a student union together with my Rakhine friends and Rohingya friends. So we really are, we really achieved it, you see. So actually I am the chairman of the student union. I governed the northern Rakhine state force for like four months. Everything was okay. Especially I focus on peaceful coexistence to avoid similar violence that happened in 1942.
To make a long story short, after the military coup in 1988. So there was an organization called the Rakhine Nationality Protection Committee in Maungdaw. They wrote a memorandum to the military hunter chief. Basically those memorandum was saying that they are just writing anti-Rohingya. Not to grant Rohingya citizenship and to restrict movement travel and to ban access to university. And then also to make travel bans from one township to another. And so many things.
So everything the SLORC, which was the State Law and Order Restoration Council formed in 1980, September 18, implemented and harassed prosecution and violence including forced labor against Rohingya. Everything, according to that memorandum. So I have a copy of that.
So from 1988 to 2010, the situation at Rohingya was horrible. The whole community became poor, helpless because of daily persecution. Whenever we talk about persecution against Rohingya, people always think of the Myanmar military and government. As a matter of fact, it was not true. Of course, Governments and their regimes are primarily responsible. At the same time, almost all local authorities are by Rakhine community, Muslims and Rohingyas are very limited.
My father was the last high ranking police officer in Myanmar police. After that my father retired in 1978. After that there was no recruit of any police officer. Just some ordinary police member. So then people are under a lot of human rights violations. Finally there was a crisis between both people. So people are fleeing their violence. So by that time there was a lot of international pressure in the region.
So probably this is one of the reasons the Myanmar military and its political association approached me and a few Rohingya activists or elders, including me, to join. To join and to participate in the 2010 election. So that we could raise our human rights concern to the government through the parliament officer. So what I thought. So whatever it is their intent by that time, since people are suffering a lot. So I decided to join. Although I didn’t believe them fully because we didn’t have any other option.
So it becomes like a sip of water in the middle of the desert. Especially for the Rohingya people for their daily persecution. Then I agreed to join that military backed party. Then I participated in the election. And then I was elected, especially my fellow Rohingyas who were in Buthidaung constituency, like 80% of voters are Rohingya. So they elected me. Although there was a kind of accusation across Myanmar.
I believe in democracy. I did my best to have a free and fair election.
So I was elected by the people. Then I suffered for my Rohingya people. From 2010 to 2016, January.
Joined the APHR
Thank you for that background. Could you also tell us about how you first joined APHR?
I think I joined APHR in 2013. So APHR Executive Director, Mr. Ismail Wolff came to Myanmar. Then he approached me and explained to me the mandate of APHR. So I was quite interested. Then I decided to join.
Challenges in Myanmar’s Parliament
Thank you. As you mentioned, you were a member of parliament from 2011 to 2016. Could you tell us a little bit about what kind of challenges you faced at the time in Myanmar’s parliament?
From day one of my office, I faced criticism and attacks from members of parliament from the Rakhine community. Especially Dr. Aye Maung, who was chairman of the Rakhine Nationality Development Party, from day one. So he started attacking five Rohingya MPs. So there were five Rohingya MPs, including me. They said we should not be in the parliament. And then if we are in the parliament, the Arakan state will be separated. And there are so many nonsense accusations. And then it will be governed by the Muslim. It could be a muslim state. And then also he joined the 969 movement.
Also he has a lot of followers who are extremists. So on social media and then by interviewing with the various local media and then international media, by print media. So they have started attacking me. And also they try to removed from the seats by complaining to the Union Election Commission. But they failed because there was no law by that time. So how to remove an elected member of parliament from the office? But they kept trying. They keep trying to make a problem. But finally, I was appointed by my party to have a local election in Maungdaw district inter party election.
The Maungdaw district means it includes three townships by that time. Maungdaw, Buthidaung and Rathedaung. So I was like a district election commissioner. So although I was appointed, I did have a very free and fair election in 2012, May, if I remember correctly. It was in my constituency as well as in Maungdaw and Rathedaung. So mostly over there since Rohingyas are the majority.
Although Rohingyas are the majority in some villages, there are Rakhine majority. So from the Rohingya majority village the election winners are Rohingya. From the Rakhine majority villages the Rakhines are the winner.
So by that time I have a lot of information that the Rakhine Nationality Development Party led by Dr. Aye Maung had a meeting in Sittwe. So they are quite upset and uncomfortable. Because according to some reports from my sources who have very close ties, the high ranking officers and party officials of RNDP. They told me that there was some kind of discussion about how to stop that election, and what I have been doing in my region. But finally they took advantage of an incident which happened in Ramree township regarding a drug. So still as of today is although twelve years now nobody know who raped her and who killed her.
But however, the propaganda in the newspaper and then Rakhine politicians and all these Rakhine extremist activists. They are just accusing. They said that Rakhine girl was raped and killed by a Rohingya man. In fact it was not Rohingya. It was a local. So he is not a Rohingya. He’s just a Muslim in that area.
But according to sources, what we received, that the accused, the murderer, he was suicide in prison. Also his wife conducted suicide in prison. And probably therefore nobody knew what was the reality. But by the excuse of that incident, the Rakhine Nationalities Development Party led by Dr. Aye Maung and their followers conducted an anti Rohingya movement. According to the term this is an Anti Bengali movement. So they started to create problems in Sittwe and also Maungdaw in other Rathedaung areas in June 2012.
Then the second episode of the violence was in October 2012. So because of that, you see we have as of today more than 120,000 IDPs are still outskirted in the Sittwe. So that’s how Dr. Aye Maung and his followers conspirated for this violence against the Rohingya. But people mostly understand that, so they want to be noted.
So these things are, although there was a police and soldiers, they were only left with a few police forces, a few military. Whenever they went to a village to do an assault and to set fire on Rohingya homes, only a couple of police force. Most of them are the Rakhine extremist youth with a long sword. So they set fire and then they kill the people.
So according to my interview with a lot of local people in my constituency, Sittwe and Maungdaw, after that violence. So they explained to me that they were mostly killed by those extremists. You see that long sword holder who is Rakhines. So also it means they are vigilantes. They are collaborators with the Myanmar police force.
When we talk about the Myanmar police force, one thing to be noted very importantly. In Rakhine state. So 99% of the police force are Rakhine ethnic people. Only a handful of police forces are of other ethnic from other states. So whether they receive orders from the Yangon or Naypyidaw, they themselves are well determined to conduct these kinds of crimes against humanity, atrocity against the Rohingya people. This was 2012.
Even after that, I received a lot of challenges in the parliament when I submitted proposal, questions. So based on my question, the Home Minister and Immigration Minister need to answer in the parliament that they always blame our Rohingya people. They are always highlighting that these Rohingyas are illegal immigrants from Bangladesh.
So this is why after the 2012 conflict, there was an international convention at the International Convention Center in Naypyidaw in September 2012. So there was a huge gathering together with all ambassadors, head of the UN Missions and most of the prominent international NGOs. But at that meeting, everybody was invited, Rohingya were not invited.
It’s a joke. They were talking about reconciliation and the social harmony between the community. But they invited only the Rakhine community and all government ministers, Vice President, Head of the mission in Myanmar, ambassadors and that’s all.
When I heard about that, I called the Border Affairs Ministry. I said, minister, how is it possible? So the government of Myanmar was doing a conference for reconciliation and social harmony. So how can it be one sided without my community? But finally I said, oh, what a mistake. So I will tell my director general to send 50 invitation cards. Finally I was able to bring 49 more Rohingya, my fellow Rohingyas activists together with me to attend that meeting. Otherwise we’ll never know.
Even in that meeting, the Director General of Immigration was always talking about illegal immigration during the world war, during the colonial period and then blah blah blah. Also, he mentioned that after the colonial period that a million people left, from Myanmar to India. But he mixed up the general colonial system and Rakhine state.
In Rakhine state or Arakan state, we Rohingyas are indigenous people. We never migrate from anywhere. The Arakan state’s official name is Rakhine, but we changed it. He said. Politically it’s Arakan. The Arakan states belong to the Rohingya, Rakhine, and other indigenous people. So we never migrated from anywhere.
But however politically, they always play divided rule policy, and always accuse us blatantly. So for that I also raise my voice over there, which is not true. Even before the 2012 violence, the Home Minister and Immigration Minister even accused our people as if they were illegal immigrants.
This is why finally some extremist people get a chance to create more hate speech against the Rohingya. So when I raised that issue, from that day on, I became a full fledged enemy of the Myanmar quasi civilian government as well as the USDB party. Since then, they have been trying to remove me from the office. But they cannot do that. They are telling me to go under the scrutiny of immigration again if I am a citizen. I said, hey, why? I was already scrutinized by your good office.
In the 2010 election, I was elected officially from the clearance of immigration. Why again I need to go. It is illegal. It’s not including the law. Then I was quite aggressive. And then I stand with my because I am very confrontational because my fathers, my ancestors, everybody were indigenous people of the land. So I didn’t have any concern, any worry. So I kept doing it. But however, when we had another time, the 2015 election, the Election Commission did not allow me to run again from my office.
Even before that, in 2014, November 14, there was a visit by US President Barack Obama. I was invited on behalf of the Rohingya community. On that day in the Myanmar parliament, there was an important proposal. The proposal said there was no Rohingya in Myanmar. And except me, because I was absent on that day as I had a meeting with President Obama, So almost all parliamentarians, 99% of the parliament, voted for that resolution. The resolution was that there were no Rohingya in Myanmar.
But when I went to the office the next day, I was quite shocked. On the same day, November 14, 2014, I was having a meeting with President Obama. But since then I have again become a target of Myanmar, not only the government, but also the Myanmar police department.
But in that situation also there was another problem of Duchiradan fire. The Myanmar foreign minister accused the Rohingya people of setting fire to their own villages. I told that it was not true. Villagers told me that that village was under fire, the fire was set under the supervision of border police in Maungdaw. So when I talk to the media like that and the President thinks in, send an arrest warrant for me to the speaker of the parliament. But I was able to convince the speaker of the parliament not to sign an arrest warrant for the voice of an MP.
So I requested the speaker of the parliament. Sir, if you endorse the arrest warrant, this will be a very ugly history of Myanmar democracy. Because of the voice of an MP on behalf of his constituents. So if an MP is sent to jail and then hanged to the death, that would be a very ugly history. So I know you are a very good speaker. We are trying to build genuine democracy in our country. So I talk. I am an officially elected member of parliament. I have the right to talk on behalf of people, what people told me.
But without doing any proper investigation, how come President Thein Sein sent an arrest warrant blindly for me, which is not fair and which is not legal. Then in front of me, the speaker of parliament called President Thein Sein. He said, Mister president, my representative was accusing you of not conducting any proper investigation. Then you are accusing a member of parliament that he did defame the Myanmar police force. In fact, my father was a police officer. I didn’t have any intention to defame, but to highlight the truth. As foreign minister accused that villager Rohingya themselves set fire, which is a make believe story. I said that was not true. Then finally, President Thein Sein was not able to arrest me.
After that, In September 2015, I came together with the APHR mission to have advocacy with the US Congress State Department. And since then, I interviewed with the Voice of America primary section. So I simply told them that the Myanmar election in 2015 would be unfree and unfair. Because the Myanmar government disenfranchised a million Rohingya people. Because of my death statement to the VoA interview, President tension released another arrest warrant to arrest me upon my return to Myanmar.
So finally, because of that, I remain in the USA. Then I decided to remain in the USA until the situation becomes normal. But as of today, it’s not normal. Even the worst in history. This is why I’m here today in the USA. This is my brief, the story of my parliamentary period from 2010 to 2016.
Five Point Consensus
Thank you very much for sharing your experience. As you mentioned, in 2010-2011, there was a period of an attempt of democratization in Myanmar. And then there was the formation, as you called it, the quasi civilian government, which was nevertheless very flawed, especially in its treatment of Rohingya, as you have shared. But of course, as you know, in February 2011, the Myanmar military junta attempted to stage a coup to take over the government and overthrow the civilian parts of the government. And shortly after, in April 2021, ASEAN signed the Five Point consensus, which was supposed to lead to a peaceful resolution of that conflict. Can you share with us what your view of the current situation in Myanmar is and how you view ASEAN’s role as of now?
After the military coup in 2021, the situation of our country was the worst in the history before. In 2012 and 2017, Myanmar military conducted mass atrocities against humanity only against the Rohingya. By that time, nobody was able to sympathize with us. So as a truth, if I need to tell you, I am one versus 50 million. I am the only person officially in the parliament and the whole Myanmar who was talking about this was a violation of my right.
These atrocities, violent prosecutions were happening against the Rohingya conducted by Myanmar military police and other vigilantes in Sittwe, Mrauk-U, Buthidaung, Maungdaw and the whole Arakan state. But nobody believes us.
But when there was a military coup in February 2021, these same military did the same thing. Even in some areas worse than in the Rohingya, what they did against Rohingya. So I must say there are now 50 million people in Myanmar, except the supporters of the Myanmar military and blah blah. Yes, there’s always the system. But almost all Myanmar population are under the persecution and daily violence of the Myanmar military.
So regarding this Five Point Consensus, when I heard about the Five Point Consensus from the day one, it came to my mind that it could be a total failure. Because I know this Myanmar military junta very well. They are world class liars. They never keep their promise. They are always named seekers.
The reason why the Myanmar junta signed the Five Point Consensus is just to get support from ASEAN. That’s all. So Min Aung Hlaing, he doesn’t have any political willingness to have a Federal Democratic Union of Myanmar.
Although they have been telling all the time through the newspaper and TV, it was a skyful of lies. It’s not true. Their ultimate goal is in their mind, the military must be forever the ruler of Myanmar. This was in their mind. It was painted in their mind. Nobody can remove them. But sometimes politically they said several things. But I never believed them.
So to make a long story short. So this Five Point Consensus is now we can see very clearly it is a total failure. Because the junta doesn’t have political willingness. Even that junta led by Min Aung Hlaing. They become, you say, terrorists. They are terrorizing the whole population. Initially Rohingya, now the whole population of Myanmar. And they will still persecute everywhere. Killing, attacking and war crime. So in my view, these Five Point Consensus is no more meaningful. It’s a total failure. They don’t have any willingness to implement. It will never happen.
What Should ASEAN and the International Community Do?
Given that, your view on the five point consensus. What do you think that ASEAN and maybe the rest of the international community should do instead? About the situation in Myanmar?
Thank you. It’s a very good question.
APHR is the first human rights organization which raised concern for potential genocide of Northern Arakan, for the events of Buthidaung. After that the US government and some European Union and other countries. Even though as of now, as a human organization, Only APHR, not any other human rights organization are raising their voice for the Rohingya, I mean the genuine voice for a lack of potential genocide.
I personally believe that APHR statements, especially our APHR chairperson Mercy comments, hit some kind of level to the US State Department. So I share with them. Also, I submitted a lot of reports to the US State Department. So probably this is a kind of document which could be referred to very concretely and as an evidence. So Thanks again APHR for taking first place to raise concern for the potential genocide against Rohingya.
I was thinking for a long time. What should ASEAN do? I am very familiar with the ASEAN Charter. Which is very inappropriate and illogical. This is the most illogical charter in the world.
So first of all, ASEAN needs to amend their charter. Especially they need to remove the non interference policy. If they don’t interfere, what is the purpose of it? There will always be good interference and bad interference. You should interfere for the betterment of humanity.
If you fail to interfere or intervene in the human rights violation, you are against humanity. There’s no way. So if ASEAN wants to promote human rights. If ASEAN member states want to have a peaceful region, sustainable development in the region and human rights violations, a free region. First of all, they need to amend and remove that non interference policy.
And secondly, especially in this situation in Myanmar. ASEAN should think to set up a peacekeeping mission. Even force is not possible. A peacekeeping mission. Because every block in the world has the right to do that. NATO is a block they have been doing for the security and stability of their region. Also, we have the Quad block.
ASEAN is one of the important blocks on this planet. Also it plays a great role for the peace and stability and security of the region. So ASEAN member states must call a meeting, an emergency meeting. And it is very important to set up a peacekeeping mission to intervene in Myanmar.
Because the Myanmar military junta is no more valid. They lose the majority of their land. Most of the lands are controlled by the revolutionary forces. Especially those led by people defense forces in ERO. Under the guidance of the National Unity Government.
ASEAN members should recognize NUG as a legitimate government of Myanmar. But so far I can see only East Timor is recognizing NUG. No other country. So still they are just dancing with Min Aung Hlaing on international events. It’s a shame for the ASEAN association as well as member states.
So they should have a clear that it is not only Myanmar, but by taking advantage of the situation in Myanmar.
If ASEAN wants to implement or to end persecution and violence against 50 million people, including Rohingya, they must intervene with their power. We have examples of intervention in the case of Cambodia by the Malaysian military. That is for the betterment of humanity. It was okay. Also in East Timor we have some kind of intervention.
So I think that is the only solution now. Otherwise Myanmar military junta leader, he will not listen to anyone on this planet. So that is what ASEAN should do. If ASEAN really wants to help and end violence against Myanmar people and also for the crisis of Rohingya.
Buthidaung
Thank you very much, U Shwe Maung. As you have spoken about, the Rohingya people in Myanmar have faced persecution and violence for years now. I mean like decades. But of course, more recently there has again been an escalation of violence, as you know, against Rohingya in Rakhine state. Last month there were reports of violence in your home township of Buthidaung. And then more recently it has also spread to Maungdaw. Could you maybe tell us a little bit about what’s going on right now there?
Yeah, so let me start with my township. Now. Buthidaung has more than 200,000 of, I will not use the term IDP, they are not Internally Displaced Persons, they are FDP, Forcibly Displaced Persons by the Arakan Army in 2012 and 2017. Myanmar military soldiers, security forces, police forces and some extreme Rakhine youths. They jointly committed this crime against humanity, violences, persecution, atrocity.
But in 2024, although the Arakan Army was outcrying that they are fighting for freedom, fighting against the Myanmar military junta, that is true, I don’t deny. But at the same time, they are also trying to accomplish their unfinished business in terms of the Rohingya, Myanmar military junta and Arakan Army having the same thought.
As I mentioned earlier, the youth, the people, the fighters, vigilantes, who were involved with Myanmar military soldiers in 2012 and 2017. Today they are active forces of the Arakan Army. I have reported several times to Myanmar, but nobody cared.
So being an elected member of parliament from Buthidaung, I reach everywhere. I interview a lot of people. So this is the gentleman. Also, I reminded Arakan Army high ranking officials to be very careful with the recruits in the Northern Rakhine state. Because in northern Rakhine state, majority of Arakan Army forces are the companion and collaborators with Myanmar military police during the genocide and the violence in 2012 and 2017.
But they didn’t listen to me. But this is why this thing is happening. Although they have been raising their voice. That fight was against Myanmar, the southern part of Rakhine state, that’s true, but not for the case of Buthidaung. Maungdaw is also situated because they have two missions. First mission is to occupy the Northern Rakhine state, also to defeat the Myanmar military. Their second mission is to drive out the Rohingya, from the town to the remote area.
So their ultimate policies, they will kill less people. They will create such a situation so that Rohingya will lift themselves with the fear and persecution that the Arakan Army has done. This is their plan. Even a couple of years ago, the elder brother of Arakan Army chief Tun Myat Naing, said through a video, we have a record for them. I watched that video several times. So that is exactly the policy that they implemented in my hometown, Buthidaung township.
On the eve of 17 May 2024. So they started this thing. But when I was talking about a month ago, I had some kind of difficulty because. Because of the Internet outage, telephone lines are not clear. It’s very difficult for us to verify. But today is very clear. A lot of eyewitnesses have now reached the jungle.
Recently I interviewed five eyewitnesses of Buthidaung violence against Rohingya. So they told me very clearly. Now I will start telling you the situation, what the eyewitness told me on the evening of the 17 May. So a lot of people approached some Arakan Army outposts to the south of the Buthidaung, near the Ba Gone Nar bridge.
He said, what shall we do now? He said, you are too late announcing with the loudspeaker. He said to leave the people by 10:00 a.m. on May 18. But now the situation is so bad. A lot of people are now killed. A lot of arson attacks. All the arson attacks, killing drone attacks are committed by the Arakan Army. Nobody else.
Because according to eyewitnesses by that time, with the telephone call as well as eyewitness statement by the 15 May, there were no single Myanmar military soldiers in Buthidaung town. Even you say the airplane attack. Airplane attacks are in Sittwe and Maungdaw, that’s how we know the truth because people never lied to us. Everybody knows that.
But in Buthidaung, there was no single issue of the bombing because they didn’t do that. I don’t know why they didn’t do that. Because if there was a shell. People are very familiar. One of the eyewitnesses told me that they recognize the shell as the Arakan Army shell. Heavy artillery or Myanmar military. Because Myanmar militaries are stationed western part of the city. The Arakan Army stationed the southern part and eastern part of the Buddha town. Even they recognize the sound of gunshot, is the gunshot of the Myanmar military or Arakan Army.
It has been fighting. Fighting was not only in May, it has been happening like two years ago. They are very familiar. So they are very quite sure. All eyewitnesses consistently told me that they are quite sure. Even during the day of 17 May, they started drone attacks on the hospital where a lot of Rohingya forcibly displaced persons. I am not using IDP, they are FDP, forcibly displaced persons caused by the Arakan Army. They are temporarily refuged Buthidaung township hospital and high school.
The Arakan Army launched with heavy weapons from Buthidaung south and east where they were stationed. If there was an attack from the Myanmar military. Because we know our Rohingya people also don’t believe Myanmar military, whenever they attack previously, the shells or weapons come from the eastern side or from the western side. So direction is different.
On 17 May, all the directions of the heavy artillery were from the south and east. It means the place on the east side of Mayu river. And the people called me on that day from the villagers, and also Ka Kyet Bet, which is the border of Ka Kyet Bet village and Buthidaung South. They started. It means they are threatening the people. They are threatening the people.
Before the sunset of 16-17 May, some elders approached the Arakan Army at the bridge. They said, is it possible for us to leave, not to wait until the 18 may. Let us leave by now to a safe place where we should go. He said no. He said not allowed to leave. Even during the night of the 17 May or the 18 may. You all are allowed to leave only at 06:00 a.m. of 18. Maybe by that time they are confused.
My eyewitness number five is a very intelligent man. He has some kind of suspect. The way the Arakan Army soldiers explain to them not to leave the whole night is very risky. If somebody tries to leave the house, they say they will be shot dead. That is very clear. I have a statement from them. So I will share this statement with the US government and EU, the European Union, of course, with APHR, with all stakeholders. Because by that time, we didn’t get a chance to get those eyewitness statements.
And then people are waiting, waiting for the sunrise so that they can leave. But at the same time, the Arakan Army was telling them that they sent the release and noticed it in a timely manner. Because they didn’t leave. They accused that all arson attacks and killings were committed by the Myanmar soldiers. Which is an absolute lie. It’s not true.
Then on the 17 May, starting from 09:00 a.m. according to all my five eyewitnesses, they consistently told me that the Arakan Army entered block by block. If there are four Arakan Army soldiers, a group, some group, they have ten soldiers or ten forces. Five of them have guns. It’s a gun like the AK 47. Other five have a fire stick with the kerosene, with the clothes and at the end of the stick, this kerosene. And then with the fire, they are set on fire.
I asked my witness, did you see if they set fire to your houses? He said, I saw with my own eyes, how can I make fire? This is why I left home. So I asked him, are you sure the person who set the fire was the Arakan Army? He said, Sir, it’s not Myanmar. I asked him, how do you know that? He explained to me that I saw their badge here. Arakan Army badge, also Arakan Army Logo, also speak Rakhine language.
Myanmar soldiers never speak Rakhine. They are not fluent in Rakhine. But the Arakan Army, they never speak in Burmese. Because they are very chauvinist. They mostly speak their Rakhine language. They know them very well. They are 100% sure.
So to make a long story short, all of my five witnesses are very consistent. Starting from that, they do assault attacks and people are leaving. Then they are also shooting who are leaving their home. They are killing also. Whenever people try to take pictures, they shoot them. Because they know when the people took the pictures, it may reach the outside world. They’re trying to destroy evidence which is also a violation of ICJ provisional measures.
And then also my own sister, my own sister in law who is living at my home, they are forced to leave. My house was set on fire. Also my aunt, a lot of my relatives, my friends, almost everyone, they are forced to leave. And then they are told to leave the town immediately. Then they set fire.
Also they confirm there was no single Hindu’s house burned. Although they are doing propaganda. They say even there were no 1,600 Hindu families. I know. I am a member of parliament from my constitution. All of the hindu people live in my ward too. They are very peaceful people. They are very friendly to the Rohingya. Rohingya never provoked them. We never have any problems. They are just trying to get the attention of the media, probably by the government of India. Because recently the government of India and the Arakan Army have had some kind of relationship. Yeah, I read some media.
Probably for that reason. Arakan Army Chief Tun Myat Naing himself shared this nonsense article of the hostage of 1,600 Hindu family and Buddhist families. It was not true. Even there were no 5,000 Rakhine houses. Because I am a member of parliament for the Buthidaung. There were no 5,000 Rakhine in the downtown. There were only a few houses. My eyewitness told me that not more than 500 maximum. But most of them are Rohingyas.
On the night of the 17 May and night of the 18 May they set fire to the whole town. Also they forcibly deported all the people. Southern part of the Buthidaung which is at the mouth of Bay of Bengal. This is their policy. So they could leave. This is why a lot of people have already left for Maungdaw. A lot of people left for Sittwe. According to my source, now more than 1,000 families are in Ramree. It means they are kind of implemented. Implementing unfinished business of mayonnaise as well as unfinished business of the Arakan Army to annihilate Rohingya from the town as well as from the area. And the same thing they are implementing now in Maungdaw.
Same thing they are doing. They are shooting. They are killing. As of now according to my report, more than two dozen innocent Rohingya civilians are killed by their heavy weapon and drone attack. Maung Hna village of Maungdaw. And then in Aye Tar Li Yar village of Maungdaw there were no Myanmar military forces. Only civilian people.
Myanmar military and police are four miles away from Maungdaw Town. The eastern side of Maungdaw Town. There was a border police battalion fighting around that area. There was no reason for the Arakan Army to launch heavy artillery into the Maungdaw town. So you can ask me why they are doing they are doing. They are implementing their plan.
According to a secret report, they have a plan to create Buthidaung and Maungdaw Rohingya-Free City. And then they will bring the Rakhine people from other areas. So Maungdaw and Buthidaung became a Rakhine majority area. So we can conclude that this is a kind of annihilation of Rohingya.
And then also it is another method of genocide. Genocide without killing a lot of people. Genocide not necessarily required to kill everyone. If there was nobody on the land of, soil of Arakan that is genocide according to Genocide Prevention Convention. So they are doing the same thing they have already done in Maungdaw North and Maungdaw South. So they always force all villagers to leave. Even they are not allowed.
There was no fighting between the Myanmar military and Arakan Army. Even those villages are not allowed to return their villages in Maungdaw north and south. Therefore they sought refuge in the Maungdaw town. So when they are attacking Maungdaw town, they are attacking the whole population of Maungdaw township.
So they are not allowed to go back to their villages and home. Even if they are supposed to leave Maungdaw Town, where will they go? Bangladesh government to close their border. I wrote in my tweet, there was nowhere except jumping into the Naf river. If they jump under the Naf river, there was no other thing except you see dying in the river because Bangladesh crossed the border. Even somebody was swimming in the Naf river. Also Myanmar military, of course Myanmar military jet fighters bombed. They bombed some of the Rohingya villagers because the Arakan Army was never stationed in Rakhine villages.
So one thing we learned in Buthidaung and Maungdaw, although Rohingyas are the majority, there’s also some Rakhine and others. Because in 2012-2017, a lot of people left even though the majority said they were Rohingya. But in Maungdaw also some are Rakhine, some villages are in Rakhine.
The Arakan Army never made a launchpad in the Rakhine village. They always make a launchpad for the Rohingya village. This is why Myanmar military bomb is to that area. In this time, all this began. Rohingyas is not target of Myanmar military in this only. But Rohingyas are their main target in 2012 and 2017. That is true, but not at this time. Because at this time they are struggling. They are fighting against the Arakan Army, so they are more focused on the Arakan Army. However, both are against the Rohingya. Nobody has sympathy. No Myanmar military or Arakan Army has sympathy.
If the Rohingya are killed by any attack by the Arakan Army or Myanmar military, they don’t care. So there is the situation in Maungdaw. But also I could foresee a similar situation in Sittwe. As per the statement of the Arakan Army and the recent press conference made by a spokesperson of the Arakan Army, they will do the same thing in Sittwe.
Also in Sittwe, the Rohingya population, Buthidaung and Maungdaw, are creating Forcibly Displaced Person when people need to leave the rural area. But now the problem is I received several calls from my constituency in Buthidaung. They said last week they told me that they have only a little food left only for a couple of days. By now, probably they may have died.
Because for the last three days, I didn’t receive any. Any call. Probably my own sister, probably my own relative, probably my own niece and sister in law. They could have died now because they don’t have food. So the Arakan Army says, we have requested the international community. International community didn’t send the Russian. Therefore they died.
But there is no excuse that because of the Myanmar military and the Arakan Army, the Myanmar military did not force Rohingya out of the town. They fight with the Arakan Army. The Arakan army is responsible for creating this FDP. So if these people are dying from starvation, the Arakan Army is fully responsible. International community must make the Arakan Army responsible, accountable for that. This is the situation.
But in Rangoon, we have a lot of Rohingya. But we have three kind of, actually four different situations. Buthidaung is now the worst. Maungdaw is almost approaching the situation of Buthidaung. After that, Sittwe will become the same thing. I hope it does not happen. But also I request the international community to prevent those kinds of atrocities.
But in Rangoon, who are originally living there and who have already reached there, are still at a safe place. Because the Myanmar military government is not doing anything against the Rohingya living in Yangon and other areas. But, all of their relatives, their own parents, siblings in those townships Sittwe, Buthidaung, and Maungdaw, they’re suffering. So suffering is the same.
What can ASEAN do?
Thank you very much, U Shwe Maung, for giving us that detailed explanation of what is going on in Rakhine state against the Rohingya and between the Arakan Army and also the Myanmar military junta, as you mentioned. Of course, this kind of violence has created many forcibly displaced persons. And a lot of these forcibly displaced rohingya have also been forced to seek refuge in neighboring countries such as Bangladesh. From there, thousands of rohingya have also, due to the desperate conditions that they face, put themselves in the hands of human smugglers. Sometimes to seek a better life in other countries by getting on boats that are very unsafe in countries like trying to reach countries like Malaysia. But then they get stranded and some have been stranded in Indonesian waters, for example. And this has been happening over the years, as you mentioned, 2012, 2017. And also more recently, there have been a few boats that have become stranded. Again, how do you see the situation? And how do you think that ASEAN and ASEAN member states should respond to this refugee crisis?
I must say it is very crucial now for the ASEAN as well as the international community to prevent mass atrocities and violence and persecution against Rohingya. According to pillar three of the Responsibility to Protect. Because the Myanmar military junta is, although it’s a defective government, still it was a government. So the Myanmar military junta is clearly failing to protect the Rohingya. On top of that, the Rohingya were under the persecution and genocide in 2012 and 2017 at this time by the Arakan Army.
So it is very important for the international community, especially the United Nations Security Council, to implement pillar three. The pillar three clearly mentioned if a state failed to protect its own people, it becomes responsible to the international community.
So instead of doing that, if we keep waiting, that will be the ugly history of our period. So at the same time, ASEAN also should cooperate or initiate sending or creating a peacekeeping postal mission. In collaboration with the United Nations General Assembly, United Nations Security Council, in close cooperation with regional stakeholders, including Bangladesh, to create a safe place or a safe zone for the Rohingya. So that Rohingya people could live peacefully, peacefully side by side with other communities on their homeland forever.
Otherwise, we will not be able to. Nobody will be able to end this thing. So there will be a question. But to implement pillar three of R2P. that the United Nations Security Council must approve it. Suppose if it is approved by the UN Security Council, it is very highly likely that either China or Russia will be too. We know that. So even in that situation we should not give up.
And in that situation, I would like to request the international community, especially NATO led by the United States government in cooperation with ASEAN and regional stakeholders and close cooperation with the prime minister of Bangladesh who initiated and proposed the General assembly for a safe zone for Rohingya.
So the US government, especially NATO, is led by the US government. Because NATO is, I understand it is their primary responsibility for the peace and security of 30 countries in the NATO region. But however, this Rohingya issue has become not only a regional issue, but also a global issue. All donor countries, including the EU, are tired of supporting the Rohingya. They are tired of tackling this issue. So this is not only regional for me, this is also global.
So therefore, my last call to end this crisis is regionally and then globally. If the UN Security Council fails or is unable because of a veto from China or Russia, NATO must take initiative under the leadership of the US government and in the cooperation of ASEAN.
Also, I would like to request ASEAN to cooperate with either UN Security Council resolution or the United States government initiative. This is, in my opinion, the only solution. Otherwise Rohingya will face a full fledged genocide. Like Rwanda, like Cambodia. We should not wait for such a situation to happen.
We need to prevent this potential, very highly likely genocide of the Rohingya. So at the same time, I’m not talking about the Rohingya. When the international community will intervene for the Rohingya, at the same time they can implement or as a peacekeeping mission for the 50 million people of Myanmar. Out of 50 million people, their highest risk is now for the Rohingya, because others have only one enemy. Only Myanmar military junta. Myanmar military junta as well as the Arakan Army. So this is why this is the only option or only endeavor I could see to end the Rohingya crisis.
The Role of MPs and Regional Solidarity
Thank you very much, U Shwe Maung. Maybe just for the last question for this podcast. As you know, since the coup in 2021, many Myanmar members of parliament are now in exile. What do you think that Myanmar MP’s in exile can do? To what role can they play to help bring about a resolution to both the Rohingya situation as well as the Myanmar conflict as a whole? And what do you think other MP’s from other Southeast Asian countries can do in solidarity with the Myanmar people?
That is a very good question. Actually, we APHR, are also an association of members of parliament. It’s also a kind of solidarity, although I understand it’s incomplete or not perfect. So we need a perfect one. So it would create a perfect task force incorporating the main major, the parliamentarian from all ASEAN countries, let’s say United Parliamentarian for Ending Human Rights Persecution Task force.
So if we could do that, if APHR could initiate that, it would be good. But I understand it is very challenging. This is one part of the solidarity, because relatively speaking, in every country, members of parliament’s voices are relatively stronger than any other individual or human rights organization. Most of the governments listen to, not only respected members of parliament, but also regional parliamentarians.
So this is why the task force was made by the regional lawmakers from ASEAN member states. So that will help a lot to promote peace and stability and to end violence and persecution in the region. So regarding Myanmar MPs who are in exile, I also, I have great sympathy for that. Because I was an exile MP, I was even worse than their situation. I was forced, by violation of law in 2015, then I have been staying in the US. But after that, our fellow member of parliament became our MP’s in exile. But they are doing a very good job to create a future Federal Democratic Union in cooperation with the National Unity Consultative Council and National Unity Government. They play a great role.
And also at the same time so they have some kind of thing. I have been also advocating for the CRPH and I’m in exile. So in cooperation with NUCC and NUG to create a legislation to recognize the Rohingya ethnic as an official ethnic of Myanmar.
Because we are although indigenous people, 1982 Citizenship Law and a lot of military instruction led to some kinds of acts. You see they have something that makes them Rohingyas like aliens. So although we are indigenous people since there was a lot of criticism and attack, it is very important to make legislation. It’s a small resolution. Only one sentence says “We recognize the Rohingya as a legitimate and indigenous people of Myanmar.” That’s it. Period.
But although I have been calling for more than three years, it still hasn’t happened yet. But the NUG minister as well as the MP in exile gave me a lot of positive thoughts. It could happen in the future when they are in power. But I said, without reaching power it is better to do it now. Because in the future all stakeholders can not deny it.
But recently I learned that I even heard with my own ears during this public assembly hosted by NUCC, some Rakhine community. There are NGO who are supporters of the Arakan Army and United Liberal Arakan. Even they disagree with the amendment of the 1982 Citizenship Law, point to be noted. ULA has been telling their opposing military junta, how come they like the 1982 Citizenship Law.
Whenever the media asked the question about citizenship they said according to law. They are opposing the whole Myanmar military junta which law they are referring to. It’s a joke. They are referring to 1982 Law indirectly. But during the people’s assembly conducted by NUCC, I heard they were like the Arakan National Congress or something. When I checked their profile in the website at Wikipedia, they are a strong supporter of, It’s like a branch of the Arakan Army.
Also the Arakan Army being an Ethnic Revolutionary Organization. They are member of NUCC. So I learned from several sources that in the NUCC because of objections by ULA, NUCC and/ NUG or CRPH is unable to make legislation for the Rohingya.
Even now. Even during the recent interview with the Arakan Army Chief and also at a press conference made by the Arakan Army. When we analyzed that even they are like super powers in Myanmar. This is their strongest ERO among the ERP. Even they don’t care. It looks like they don’t care. They will not care if NUG asks them to or accept Rohingya to make a dialog with Rohingya, etcetera.
So although we appreciate and we feel their Myanmar MP’s exile are like colleagues, also Rohingya are in line with 50 million people. We stand with NUG and 50 million people for a future Federal Democratic Myanmar. But according to my 30 years experience in the region and then my political career, I am quite confident that the ULA and the Arakan Army will not allow that to happen. Because the home of the Rohingya is inside the Arakan, not in the other part of Myanmar. In Yangon it’s like a handful among the people in other areas.
So therefore, although there will be a further democratization union. But in a situation where NUG will be able to govern physically, even at that time, the Rohingya issue will be a big challenge. So therefore, we should not only wait for the restoration of human rights by the fall of the Myanmar military only for the rise of the energy government. But because now the Arakan Army is a very bully to the Rohingya. The more powerful they become, the more they become sort of, you see more and more now they’re bullied. So in that situation the only solution will be a safe zone and the implementation of pillar three of R2P.
Thank you very much, U Shwe Maung. And thank you very much again for taking the time to speak with us for this podcast today..."
Source/publisher:
ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-25
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Arakan (Rakhine) State - reports etc. by date (latest first), Discrimination against the Rohingya, Rohingya (cultural, political etc.), Burmese refugees in Bangladesh, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Local URL:
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Description:
"MESSAGE FROM THE HEAD OF THE MECHANISM
The conflict in Myanmar continues to intensify and spread across the country, resulting in ever-increasing suffering inflicted upon the civilian population. People of various ethnic groups and religions have been injured and killed in their homes, schools and places of worship. Villages have been burned and houses destroyed. Thousands have been arrested and killed or tortured in detention. In the past six months, over three million people were forced to flee their homes.
The Mechanism is closely monitoring attacks on civilians across the country, including in the recent upsurge in fighting between the Myanmar military and the Arakan Army in Rakhine State. We are speaking to victims and witnesses of violent events and analyzing information that we have received to assess if crimes against humanity or war crimes have been committed. From the violence and destruction of property in Buthidaung Township to the alleged torture and killing of more than 70 people in Byaing Phyu village, we are looking at potential crimes committed regardless of the ethnic group or affiliation of the perpetrators or the victims.
Conducting our investigations without access to crime scenes is an enormous challenge. The Myanmar military has ignored numerous requests from the Mechanism for access to the country and specific information. We recently issued a statement on our latest request for information concerning the capture and burning alive of two young men in Magway Region, in the hope that publicizing a request about such a heinous crime might lead to a response.
Without access to Myanmar and with regular internet blackouts that restrict the flow of information from affected areas, the Mechanism relies to a great extent on courageous civil society organizations to provide us with information about crimes and connect us to witnesses. At our second Civil Society Dialogue last month, representatives of organizations shared their challenges securing funding, recruiting staff and dealing with their own trauma amid increased threats to their security. We noted their recommendations on how the Mechanism could better respond to the realities on the ground, and we are currently assessing what modifications we might make to our working methods.
The Mechanism is grateful to everyone who shares evidence and testimonies with us. We use this information to objectively investigate and to build criminal cases against those perpetrators most responsible for serious international crimes. This includes crimes committed by Myanmar security forces and members of armed groups. Just as we are sharing evidence with those working on ongoing cases concerning the Rohingya at the International Criminal Court, the International Court of Justice and in Argentina, I am optimistic that the evidence we collect and analyze of other crimes will one day be used to bring justice for the people of Myanmar..."
Source/publisher:
UN Human Rights Council (Geneva) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-25
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
Language:
Format :
pdf pdf
Size:
1.34 MB 1.45 MB
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Description:
"New Report: The Intensifying Rohingya Genocide
Media Release From Burmese Rohingya Organisation UK
For four and a half years, the United Nations Security Council, with the UK as penholder on Myanmar, has failed to uphold provisional measures ordered by the International Court of Justice on Myanmar to prevent acts of genocide against the Rohingya.
As a result of this failure, in the past six months alone, hundreds if not several thousands more Rohingya have been killed. A new report from the Burmese Rohingya Organisation UK sets out how Rohingya have been targeted as part of the Myanmar military’s intensifying genocidal campaign, against the backdrop of a brutal and increasingly complex war in Rakhine State between the Myanmar military and its proxies, and the Arakan Army.
The Myanmar military has forcibly recruited Rohingya men and youth – including minors – by abducting them from their homes, villages, markets, some during night raids and often at gunpoint. Once conscripted, Rohingya have been subjected to forced labour and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment, then sent to the frontlines in Rakhine State to be used as cannon fodder. The regime’s treatment of forcibly recruited Rohingya may constitute the genocidal act of causing serious bodily or mental harm to the members of the group, says the new report.
All 600,000 Rohingya left in Rakhine State continue to live under wide-ranging repressive laws and policies. This includes 140,000 Rohingya who have been confined to camps since 2012 and are living under a state of indefinite arbitrary detention. According to the report’s analysis, the Myanmar military is perpetrating the genocidal act known as ‘slow death’, which involves deliberately inflicting conditions of life calculated to bring about the physical destruction in whole or in part of the Rohingya group. This includes the deliberate deprivation of resources indispensable for survival – namely adequate food, water, shelter, sanitation and medical care – by the military regime. The severe restrictions on freedom of movement imposed on the Rohingya underpin this act. They also leave Rohingya extremely vulnerable during times of armed conflict.
During the period covered by this report, 13 November 2023 – 23 May 2024, the Myanmar military, its proxies, and the Arakan Army are also alleged to have committed war crimes against Rohingya communities, including murder, torture, cruel treatment, extrajudicial executions, sexual violence, rape, taking hostages, conscripting and using children, pillaging, and deliberately attacking civilians.
“Rohingya remaining in Rakhine State face either a fast death being killed by the Myanmar military or Arakan Army, or a slow death as a result of being systematically deprived of the basic necessities of life,” said Tun Khin, President of the Burmese Rohingya Organisation UK. “We are witnessing another significant increase in violence against the Rohingya and once again the UN Security Council looks on and does nothing.”
This new report provides detailed research and new information on the situation on the ground in Rakhine State, including a timeline of events. It also sounds the alarm about the abrupt escalation of the human rights and humanitarian crisis.
200,000 Rohingya internally displaced in northern Rakhine State are now in dire need of international humanitarian aid to prevent further loss of life. In addition, 110,000 Rohingya – half of them children – are currently trapped in Sittwe township, surrounded by landmines and unable to flee as the conflict edges closer to the city.
The report warns that the international community cannot afford to fail the Rohingya yet again. There must be concerted international public pressure for an open meeting of the UN Security Council to frankly discuss the regime’s repeated breaches of the ICJ’s provisional measures order over the past four-and-a-half years. All relevant organs of the United Nations must make consistent efforts to leverage the ICJ’s provisional measures order within their own mandates, to seek urgent protection for the Rohingya and end the cycle of impunity in Myanmar, including support for the referral of the situation in Myanmar to the International Criminal Court or the creation of an ad hoc international tribunal.
“For the past 12 years, by repeatedly failing to take action to prevent violations of international law against the Rohingya, the UN Security Council has been sending a message to authoritarian regimes worldwide that they can get away with attempting to wipe out minorities they don’t like,” said Tun Khin. “The Rohingya genocide was not inevitable, it was allowed to happen and is still being allowed to happen.”
Background
The International Court of Justice issued its provisional measures order on Myanmar to ‘take all measures within its power’ to protect the Rohingya as part of the ongoing genocide case brought by The Gambia against Myanmar in January 2020. The United Kingdom, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and the Maldives have filed declarations of intervention in support of The Gambia in the case. The case has moved to a second round of written pleadings as part of the merits phase of the case. Oral hearings are unlikely to take place until 2025 at the earliest, after which the Court will issue its judgment following a period of deliberation.
This latest report from the Burmese Rohingya Organisation UK is the ninth in its series detailing both the continual breaches of the order over the past four and a half years, and the ongoing genocide against the Rohingya who remain in Rakhine State..."
Source/publisher:
Burmese Rohingya Organisation UK
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-25
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Arakan (Rakhine) State - reports etc. by date (latest first), Genocide, Discrimination against the Rohingya, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
629.77 KB
more
Description:
"On 12 June 2024, in Kyaikemaraw Prison, a male prisoner was electrocuted when he was forced to put a corrugated iron fence between the male and female prison block, after prison lockup. His fellow political prisoners requested emergency treatment be provided for him. But, the Correction Department under the terrorist State Administration Council (SAC) responded with the forceful transfer of 160 political prisoners, both male and female, to Daik-U Prison.....ယခုလက်ရှိ စစ်ကောင်စီတပ်မှ နိုင်ငံရေးအကျဉ်းသူများအပေါ် ဒိုက်ဦးအကျဉ်းထောင်အတွင်း လူ့အခွင့်အရေးချိုးဖောက်မှု့များကျူးလွန်နေသည့် ဥပဒေမဲ့ လုပ်ရပ်များနှင့် စပ်လျဉ်း၍ နိုင်ငံရေးအကျဉ်းသား၊ သူဟောင်းများနှင့် အဖွဲ့အစည်း (၈)ခုမှ ပူးတွဲသဘောထားကို အောက်ဖော်ပြပါအတိုင်း ထုတ်ပြန်လိုက်သည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Assistance Association for Political Prisoners, Former Political Prisoners, Political Prisoners Network - Myanmar, Women Organization for Political Prisoners, Karenni Political Prisoners Association, Eat My Heart, ထောင်ဝင်စာပို့ကြမယ်, နွေဉီးတမန်နိုင်ကျဉ်း
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-25
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Political prisoners and other violations in Burma - reports, Freedom of opinion and expression: - the situation in Burma/Myanmar - reports, analyses, recommendations, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Format :
pdf pdf
Size:
126.7 KB 112.48 KB
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Sub-title:
Mass civilian casualties are likely as a desperate regime terrorizes the Bamar heartland with fire bombs.
Description:
"Myanmar’s junta expected to consolidate power within a few days of their Feb. 1, 2021 coup d’etat. Nearly three-and-a-half years on, they continue to lose territory. They never had any legitimacy to lose.
The military have always acted as if time was on their side. But that’s no longer the case, and there are signs that the junta is moving with urgency – in ways that will bring even more suffering and indiscriminate killing upon the majority Bamar heartland.
First, the churn of senior officers has intensified as junta chief Senior Gen. Min Aung Hlaing replaces under-performing officers with eager and ambitious sycophants. In the latest reshuffle, some 30 officers were reassigned; five major generals were relieved of their command.
Min Aung Hlaing remains in control and Soe Win, rumored to have been injured by an opposition drone strike, is back. If there is opposition within the ruling State Administrative Council, the formal name for the military junta, to their leadership, it has not made itself manifest.
Second, the economy continues to weaken, hobbled by soaring inflation, a devalued currency, capital flight, and a collapse in foreign investment. Food insecurity is growing, with a benchmark basket of staples having gone up 270% since the coup.
A sharp downturn in government revenue collection also limits the junta’s ability to wage a prolonged conflict. The unlikelihood of a recovery in the near term is forcing the junta to be more aggressive.
Third, given losses on the ground and defections, the military has stepped up their reliance on aerial bombardment and long-range artillery strikes.
Airstrikes terrorize population
Between January and May, the regime launched nearly 2,000 airstrikes, largely against civilian targets. While insufficient to retake or hold territory, airstrikes are meant to crush public support for the opposition.
Given the limited number of aircraft, tempo of operations, and shortage of spare parts, air attacks have exceeded predictions, but this is not sustainable in the long-term.
Fourth, the junta is throwing additional resources into holding the cities.
The military may have lost effective control over half of the country, including 60 towns and small cities, but they still control nearly two-thirds of the population of 55 million.
The military launched an offensive to retake Loikaw, the Kayah state capital which Karenni National Defense Forces had partially taken in early 2024. The military has taken partial control but efforts to reinforce its troops from Hsihseng township in southern Shan state have met with resistance.
Likewise, while the Arakan Army now controls almost the entire north of Rakhine state, the junta has been reinforcing troops in the state capital Sittwe by sea, making the city’s fall unlikely in the near term.
Urban operations remain very costly for the opposition. A recent plot to target Min Aung Hlaing, during the opening of a Japanese-funded bridge, resulted in the arrest of a 13-member cell.
Ceding the borderlands
It's important to also look at what the junta is doing to better position itself for the next phase of the conflict. There are operational and logistical moves underway.
Short on personnel and resources, the military has largely ceded the ethnic dominated regions along the borders for the short term.
The military’s losses in the border regions are enormous. Ethnic resistance organizations and people’s defense forces have captured 218 military camps between January to May 2024. The conquests included 63 in Rakhine, 103 in Kachin, 19 in Shan, 12 in Kayin, eight in Chin, four in Mandalay, three in Mon, two in Tanintharyi, and one each in Kayah, Magee, Bago, and Sagaing.
The Irrawaddy online news site reported that opposition forces have taken 74 battalion headquarters around the country, as well as one of 12 military region headquarters.
The resistance controls most of the border regions and almost all border crossings. The Kachin Independence Army recently captured their state’s final crossing.
The military’s priority is the Bamar heartland, and they have fought with intensified ferocity in Sagaing, Magwe, Mandalay, and other regions to crush ethnic Burmese opposition.
Once that is achieved, the military will no longer worry about vulnerable supply lines across the country’s central dry zone and can then mount counter-offensives in each region, at a time of their choosing; a return to their traditional divide and conquer strategy.
Critical roads and border towns
That leads to the second major junta initiative: The military is determined to regain control over the critical roads to Muse and Myawaddy, the major trading cities on the Chinese and Thai borders, respectively.
The military has been making slow, yet determined progress through the Dawna mountains to retake control over the Asia Highway 1 to Myawaddy on the Thai border. The opposition has put up stiff resistance, but the military has thrown a lot of troops into this.
The junta has recently stepped up air and drone attacks in northern Shan state against the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), despite a Chinese-brokered ceasefire.
The Three Brotherhood Alliance of ethnic armies reportedly sent a delegation to Naypyidaw to protest the ceasefire violations. But, the junta appears to be building up their forces in Lashio, northern Shan’s largest city, for an offensive to reopen Highway 3 to Muse. It has destroyed roads to block TNLA reinforcements.
Facing shortages of foreign exchange, the military has stepped up domestic arms production.
Largely located in the Bamar heartland around Magwe, these defense factories have remained out of reach of the opposition National Unity Government and the ethnic resistance organizations.
In addition to small arms and munitions, these factories also produce 250-lb and 500-lb gravity dropped bombs.
Mass civilian casualties
In a forthcoming report, the Special Advisory Council-Myanmar, an independent expert group, documents China’s assistance in producing new munitions. China North Industries Group (NORINCO), the sprawling state-owned conglomerate, appears to have provided prototypes and manufacturing processes to produce fuel air explosive (FAE) aerial bombs.
Often referred to as thermobaric weapons, the bombs are believed to have been dropped on Pa Za Gyi village in Sagaing, in April 2023, an attack that killed more than 165 people, including children.
The report, which is a follow up to a January 2023 study on the Tatmadaw’s defense production capabilities, finds that China has also dispatched technicians to assist in production.
Given the military’s strategy of terrorizing the population into submission, the junta should be expected to increase their use of these indiscriminate weapons, with the likelihood of mass civilian casualties.
The domestic arms production does not mean there has been no new imported weaponry. Reuters documented the deployment of Chinese drones into the SAC’s ranks. Local production of Chinese-designed drone-specific munitions has already started.
The military will continue to train drone operators and integrate them into their front-line units. This was seen on June 19, when a military drone attacked a TNLA position in northern Shan state, killing four people.
Another prong of the renewed campaign is the junta’s intensification of their conscription program, as well as the call-up of retired officers.
Despite the opposition’s targeted killing of over 80 conscription administrators, the military appears to be on track to meet its monthly target of 5,000. RFA-Burmese has reported that preparation for the conscription of women has begun in the Tanintharyi and Bago regions.
While the majority of the conscripts are hastily trained and poorly motivated, and veterans can be as old as 67, they free up experienced personnel and can be used as human shields and porters.
In war, quantity is its own quality.
The junta’s continuing build up of logistics and personnel point to more assaults in the Bamar heartland and an intensified offensive to retake border trade routes..."
Source/publisher:
"Radio Free Asia" (USA)
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-25
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"Responding to news that the Myanmar military has issued a rare apology and pledged to investigate the killing of a prominent monk, Amnesty International’s Deputy Regional Director for Research, Montse Ferrer, said:
“After killing thousands of people since the 2021 coup, the Myanmar military authorities have issued an unprecedented apology and promised to investigate the tragic shooting of a senior monk. But with the military authorities’ track record on human rights, apologies ring hollow and pledges leave little hope of justice.
“The pattern of this killing can be applied to so many violent attacks in Myanmar. First, the military authorities tried to deflect blame, pinning responsibility for the murder on resistance forces. But when a brave witness and survivor of the shooting shared testimony, military authorities were forced to backtrack.
“Myanmar’s military authorities must launch thorough, impartial, independent, transparent and effective investigations into the thousands of killings they have directed, overseen or tacitly encouraged since the coup took place. This is not an isolated incident but a common feature of life in Myanmar, where people pay the price for the reckless behavior of a military that has no respect for human rights.
“Authorities must bring those suspected of being responsible in this case to justice in fair trials and ensure that the victims are provided with access to justice and effective remedies. Authorities must respect, protect, promote and fulfil the human rights of everyone in the country.”
Background
On 19 June, a senior religious figure in Myanmar’s Buddhist community, Bhaddanta Muninda Bhivamsa, was shot and killed while travelling in a car in Mandalay Region’s Ngazun Township, according to military-controlled media. The 78-year-old was the head abbot of Win Neinmitayon Monastery in Bago Region. He was travelling with another monk who was injured along with the driver.
At first, the military blamed the People’s Defense Forces, armed groups that sprang up in response to the 1 February 2021 coup. But they quickly changed course after the survivor of the shooting, Bhaddanta Gunika Bhivamsa, posted a statement about the event on social media that contradicted the military’s version of events.
The surviving monk said that the shooting occurred around 10:30am as the group was traveling through a checkpoint, and that afterwards, members of the military stationed nearby told him they mistakenly targeted the vehicle, believing it to belong to resistance forces.
“I said to the soldiers, why are you so cruel to us? We are monks. The soldiers then replied because we didn’t know you were monks. They admitted it on the spot,” he said in his video post.
On 22 June, the military then issued a rare statement promising to investigate and expressing regret, saying there had been clashes in the area and when a car tried to pass by while they were conducting a search operation they “shot it to stop.”
A spokesperson pledged to take “necessary action” based on the findings of an investigation. A video has also circulated of Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, who took power in the 2021 coup, apologizing for the incident through an intermediary at the monk’s monastery in Bago Region on 24 June.
Myanmar’s military has killed more than 5,300 people since the 2021 coup, according to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners, a monitoring group..."
Source/publisher:
"Amnesty International" (UK)
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-25
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Amnesty International reports on Burma/Myanmar, Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"Media Release From Burmese Rohingya Organisation UK
For four and a half years, the United Nations Security Council, with the UK as penholder on Myanmar, has failed to uphold provisional measures ordered by the International Court of Justice on Myanmar to prevent acts of genocide against the Rohingya.
As a result of this failure, in the past six months alone, hundreds if not several thousands more Rohingya have been killed. A new report from the Burmese Rohingya Organisation UK sets out how Rohingya have been targeted as part of the Myanmar military’s intensifying genocidal campaign, against the backdrop of a brutal and increasingly complex war in Rakhine State between the Myanmar military and its proxies, and the Arakan Army.
The Myanmar military has forcibly recruited Rohingya men and youth – including minors – by abducting them from their homes, villages, markets, some during night raids and often at gunpoint. Once conscripted, Rohingya have been subjected to forced labour and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment, then sent to the frontlines in Rakhine State to be used as cannon fodder. The regime’s treatment of forcibly recruited Rohingya may constitute the genocidal act of causing serious bodily or mental harm to the members of the group, says the new report.
All 600,000 Rohingya left in Rakhine State continue to live under wide-ranging repressive laws and policies. This includes 140,000 Rohingya who have been confined to camps since 2012 and are living under a state of indefinite arbitrary detention. According to the report’s analysis, the Myanmar military is perpetrating the genocidal act known as ‘slow death’, which involves deliberately inflicting conditions of life calculated to bring about the physical destruction in whole or in part of the Rohingya group. This includes the deliberate deprivation of resources indispensable for survival – namely adequate food, water, shelter, sanitation and medical care – by the military regime. The severe restrictions on freedom of movement imposed on the Rohingya underpin this act. They also leave Rohingya extremely vulnerable during times of armed conflict.
During the period covered by this report, 13 November 2023 – 23 May 2024, the Myanmar military, its proxies, and the Arakan Army are also alleged to have committed war crimes against Rohingya communities, including murder, torture, cruel treatment, extrajudicial executions, sexual violence, rape, taking hostages, conscripting and using children, pillaging, and deliberately attacking civilians.
“Rohingya remaining in Rakhine State face either a fast death being killed by the Myanmar military or Arakan Army, or a slow death as a result of being systematically deprived of the basic necessities of life,” said Tun Khin, President of the Burmese Rohingya Organisation UK. “We are witnessing another significant increase in violence against the Rohingya and once again the UN Security Council looks on and does nothing.”
This new report provides detailed research and new information on the situation on the ground in Rakhine State, including a timeline of events. It also sounds the alarm about the abrupt escalation of the human rights and humanitarian crisis.
200,000 Rohingya internally displaced in northern Rakhine State are now in dire need of international humanitarian aid to prevent further loss of life. In addition, 110,000 Rohingya – half of them children – are currently trapped in Sittwe township, surrounded by landmines and unable to flee as the conflict edges closer to the city.
The report warns that the international community cannot afford to fail the Rohingya yet again. There must be concerted international public pressure for an open meeting of the UN Security Council to frankly discuss the regime’s repeated breaches of the ICJ’s provisional measures order over the past four-and-a-half years. All relevant organs of the United Nations must make consistent efforts to leverage the ICJ’s provisional measures order within their own mandates, to seek urgent protection for the Rohingya and end the cycle of impunity in Myanmar, including support for the referral of the situation in Myanmar to the International Criminal Court or the creation of an ad hoc international tribunal.
“For the past 12 years, by repeatedly failing to take action to prevent violations of international law against the Rohingya, the UN Security Council has been sending a message to authoritarian regimes worldwide that they can get away with attempting to wipe out minorities they don’t like,” said Tun Khin. “The Rohingya genocide was not inevitable, it was allowed to happen and is still being allowed to happen.”
Background
The International Court of Justice issued its provisional measures order on Myanmar to ‘take all measures within its power’ to protect the Rohingya as part of the ongoing genocide case brought by The Gambia against Myanmar in January 2020. The United Kingdom, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and the Maldives have filed declarations of intervention in support of The Gambia in the case. The case has moved to a second round of written pleadings as part of the merits phase of the case. Oral hearings are unlikely to take place until 2025 at the earliest, after which the Court will issue its judgment following a period of deliberation.
This latest report from the Burmese Rohingya Organisation UK is the ninth in its series detailing both the continual breaches of the order over the past four and a half years, and the ongoing genocide against the Rohingya who remain in Rakhine State..."
Source/publisher:
"Burma Campaign UK" (London)
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-25
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Arakan (Rakhine) State - reports etc. by date (latest first), Discrimination against the Rohingya, Rohingya (cultural, political etc.), Human Rights and international relations
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"US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Daniel J. Kritenbrink met with a senior Myanmar regime naval officer in Vietnam last week, according to a source familiar with the meeting.
Kritenbrink was in Hanoi on June 21 and 22 on a visit to promote a strategic partnership between the two countries and their support for “a free and open Indo-Pacific region”, according to the State Department.
During the visit, Kritenbrink met with Commodore Kyaw Lin Zaw, a Myanmar regime naval commander, in Hanoi. The Irrawaddy has learned that another US official and the senior diplomat at the US Embassy in Myanmar, Chargé d’Affaires Susan Stevenson, joined the meeting. But the agenda of the meeting is unknown.
The US State Department would neither deny nor confirm the meeting when asked about it by The Irrawaddy.
A State Department spokesperson said the US continued “to deploy all diplomatic tools” at its disposal to press the Myanmar military regime to change course, adding that the US policy on the country has not changed.
“We continue to make clear to the military regime—including through limited private channels—that it must end its violence against the people of Burma, release those unjustly and arbitrarily detained, allow unhindered humanitarian access, and respect the will of the people for a return to the path of progress and an inclusive, representative democracy,” the spokesperson said.
Since the military coup in Myanmar 2021, the US has ramped up economic and political pressure on the junta while engaging with leaders of Myanmar’s pro-democracy movement, including the parallel National Unity Government (NUG) and other political, ethnic and religious stakeholders.
In June last year, the US leveled sanctions against Myanmar’s Ministry of Defense and two banks—Myanma Foreign Trade Bank (MFTB) and Myanma Investment and Commercial Bank (MICB)—used by the junta to purchase arms and other goods in foreign currencies.
The US has also supported the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)’s five-point peace plan for Myanmar. However, the junta has failed to implement the plan, which calls for an immediate cessation of violence in the country. The junta had killed more than 5,300 people as of Monday.
In May, Kritenbrink underscored the US’ close coordination with ASEAN to support Myanmar’s path to inclusive democracy, in line with ASEAN’s peace plan, during the 36th annual ASEAN-US Dialogue in Washington. The dialogue was joined by Thet Win, chargé d’affaires at the Myanmar Embassy in Washington. Kritenbrink called for the military regime to immediately end the violence, release those unjustly detained, and allow unhindered humanitarian access to all those in need.
NUG Deputy Foreign Minister U Moe Zaw Oo said that despite the US’ engagement with the NUG, it had no information about Kritenbrink’s meeting with the junta official in Hanoi and was not notified about it.
On Saturday, when Kritenbrink was in Hanoi, the State Department’s Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor Robert S. Gilchrist met with NUG Human Rights Minister U Aung Myo Min as well as U Moe Zaw Oo.
During the meeting, the ministers urged the US to take more action against the regime and provide support to the Myanmar people that would be directly effective, the NUG said..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-25
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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"Yangon - The United Nations World Food Programme (WFP) strongly condemns the looting of food supplies and burning of its warehouse in Maungdaw in Myanmar’s northern Rakhine State last Saturday.
WFP is providing emergency food support to conflict-affected populations in Myanmar and has assisted almost one million people so far this year. The seizure of food and other goods and the destruction of humanitarian facilities in Maungdaw undermines these efforts and must be stopped.
WFP calls on all parties to the conflict to uphold their obligations under International Humanitarian Law to ensure that humanitarian facilities and assets are respected and protected, and safe and secure access is provided for the delivery of vital assistance to those in urgent need.
WFP staff have been unable to access the Maungdaw warehouse since late May due to increasing conflict in northern Rakhine. The warehouse was holding 1,175 metric tons of life-saving food and supplies - enough emergency food to sustain 64,000 people for one month. WFP continues to gather details of the circumstances surrounding the incident..."
Source/publisher:
World Food Programme (Rome)
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-25
[field_licence]
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"Many people claim to know what’s happening in northern Rakhine State, but judging by the statements and counter-statements and different figures, no one really knows and most people are seeing the situation through their selective lenses and echo chambers with the truth somewhere in the middle.
On March 26 I wrote an article for the Irrawaddy entitled, “Myanmar’s Junta Plays Both Rakhine and Rohingya for Fools” and in the last paragraph I said,
“Desperately trying to survive in Rakhine State with a large defeat looming, the junta is fomenting ethnic divide as fast as possible. The question is how deep the reconciliation between Rakhine and Rohingya is, to what extent they will see through and reject the junta’s games, and to what extent they will allow themselves to be the junta’s puppets again.”
Judging by social media, the junta has been successful. Extreme, contradictory points of view are dominating and drowning out moderate voices. This was of course the junta’s intention and they have 70 years of experience in psychological warfare. Many of the X posts accuse the Arakan Army (AA) of any crime they can think of, including genocide, while conveniently failing to mention any of the junta’s crimes. One suspects that some of these are actually junta-controlled X accounts. Unfortunately, many members of the Rohingya diaspora and activists have joined this chorus, with the AA responding with racist tweets and anger that escalates the tension.
There is a lack of empathy and understanding on all sides. By empathy I don’t mean sympathy, although it can lead to that. I mean putting oneself in another person’s position and trying to understand how they feel, think and what motivates them; the action of understanding, being aware of, being sensitive to, and vicariously experiencing the feelings, thoughts, and experience of another. One may still strongly disagree, but empathy enables one to better strategize how to respond to others. The prominent emotional condemnation approach drowns out moderate voices and puts people in a corner from which they tend to come out fighting, especially if they are proud and nationalistic.
The junta approach is, “If we can’t have it, we will destroy it physically and socially.” They started by forcing Rohingya to protest against the AA in Buthidaung and Sittwe. This angered many Rakhines, including, it seems, the AA leadership, who ignored the fact that the junta forced them to protest. Then the junta ironically conscripted Rohingya people who they don’t recognize as citizens and in fact tried to eliminate them in 2017. This increased the AA sense of betrayal as they had supplied many Rohingyas with aid and safety in their areas. The inconvenient truth that some Rohingya joined the Myanmar military voluntarily didn’t ease the tensions and AA chief Tun Myat Naing’s tweets demonstrated anger and a lack of empathy.
The Rohingya have suffered from most people in Myanmar; successive military governments, the National League for Democracy (NLD), Rakhines and the apathy of those not actively persecuting them, so many don’t feel it is their revolution. One Rohingya on social media scoffed, “What revolution!” For some Rohingya it is just a matter of choosing what they see will be the best option for them. Some choose the Special Administrative Council because they think it will win and it gives them food, uniforms and guns.
From the AA leadership’s point of view, they had provided the Rohingya with humanitarian aid and protection and were betrayed when some Rohingya joined the junta and fought them. The majority of Rohingya support the revolution and many have joined the AA administration, police and even military voluntarily, but Tun Myat Naing fell into the trap of communal blame and some of the AA troops dished out communal punishment. This of course caused condemnation and accusations, even of genocide, from mainly members of the Rohingya diaspora and activists, which in turn angered the AA leadership even more. The junta inflamed this by making inflammatory statements on social media posing as Rohingya. There seems to have been a lack of empathy by some activists towards the AA leading to an inappropriate heavy-handed approach by the AA. Putting the nationalistic AA in a corner is not going to achieve much except trouble.
In addition, the high levels of international and national attention civil society organizations (CSOs) put solely on the Rohingya have alienated Rakhine CSOs. Even before Buthidaung, hundreds of non-Rohingya were killed in airstrikes and hundreds of thousands left with inadequate shelter as the monsoon started with very few international groups taking note, never mind responding. This happened in 2013 when international aid organizations focused on the Rohingya, causing resentment from Rakhines and harming communal relations. Rakhines didn’t know of the UN rapid needs assessments! All they saw was World Food Program trucks passing their villages going to Rohingya villages.
Maungdaw is in focus at the moment. There are Rohingya, Rakhine, Hindus, Maramagris and Dainets trapped in Maungdaw. The AA warned people to leave from June 14. It seems that those with money have fled irrespective of ethnicity. Some rich Rohingyas have even moved to Yangon. Some Rohingya from villages have already fled to safer places within Maungdaw township. The question is why have some people of various ethnicities stayed in Maungdaw. After talking to Rohingya, Rakhine and Mararagris, it appears people are staying for various reasons, such as lack of information, fear of leaving their homes unprotected, lack of money, fear of junta check points, and fear of being attacked by Rohingya junta fighters or the Arakan Rohingya Solidarity Army which perversely is supporting its old enemy the Myanmar Military. Old people are generally the most reluctant to move. There were Rohingya villages in AA areas they could have fled to. In fact, some Rohingya villages have charged those fleeing to pass them. It is not clear if they also charged Rohingya or just other ethnicities.
Now people are trapped in Maungdaw and I hear AA is trying to rescue them. A Rakhine journalist now in Bangladesh said,
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-24
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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"Human Rights Violations took place in States and Regions from June 15 to 21, 2024
Military Junta Troop launched airstrikes and dropped bombs in Sagaing Region, Kachin State, and Rakhine State from June 15th to 21st. The Military Junta used drones and dropped bombs in Sagaing Region and Mon State. The political prisoners from O-Bo Prison, Mandalay Region, and Kyaikmaraw Prison, Mon State, were relocated. The head of the Prison who works under The Military threatened, arrested, and tortured the female political prisoners, and over 80 people were injured in Daik-U Prison, East Bago Region. The Military arrested the civilians who sold and wore the flowers on the birthday of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi on June 19th.
Almost 20 civilians died, and over 20 were injured by the Military’s heavy and light artillery attacks within a week. The Military Junta arrested over 280 civilians within a week. 3 civilians died in the land mines of the Military Junta Troop..."
Source/publisher:
Network for Human Rights Documentation-Burma
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-23
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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"Thailand is the only ASEAN country, sharing a substantial 2,401-kilometer border with Myanmar, receiving many Myanmar migrants for employment, education, and property investments over time. With a shared Buddhist heritage, both countries have similar festivals, food and languages, helping to build a close friendship socially, culturally and also, economically.
Since the military coup in Myanmar in February 2021, the Thai government has refrained from openly supporting Myanmar’s democracy movement against the junta, while Thai people and civil society groups express solidarity. Moreover, humanitarian assistance for the increasing numbers of Myanmar refugees at the borders remains insufficient and most importantly, irregular refugees and migrants are being forcibly repatriated to Myanmar where violence, torture and mandatory military service law await. Many Myanmar youths are relocating to Thailand to escape conscription and apply for educational visas; yet stricter visa restrictions are being imposed. This raises the question of whether Thailand has become a frenemy to Myanmar people amidst these difficult times.
The Unclear Stance of the Thai government Towards Conflict and Myanmar Politics
The Thai government under the Prayut administration maintained close relations with the Myanmar military after the 2021 coup and continued its business-as-usual cooperation, and so did the recent Sretha government in 2024.
The two militaries have a long-standing relationship in joint border patrols and military cooperation and practices. When the Thai military gained control back in politics after the 2014 coup, this led to a closer and more supportive relationship in bilateral military cooperation after the abandonment of a ‘buffer state’ policy towards Myanmar. Consequently, in 2022 Pornpimol Kanchanalak, being a convicted lobbyist in the U.S was appointed as a special envoy to Myanmar to shape Thai-Myanmar foreign policies together with Don Pramudwinai, Thai foreign minister. So, Thai foreign policies sway more to maintaining good relationships with the military-backed State Administration Council (SAC), given their shared economic interests. Recently, two militaries cooperated in taking a patrol along the Thai-Myanmar border near Mae Sot, which showed significantly good relationships even as conflicts escalate in Myanmar.
Besides strong military ties, Thailand also has significant economic reliance on Myanmar’s resources, particularly natural gas supplies for electricity generation and investments in the Thai company PTT. In early 2024, the two countries decided to enhance their economic cooperation during the visit of U Chan Aye, SAC’s representative to Thailand. Moreover, investments in PTT company for oil and natural gas increased to 89.209 billion baht for 2024-2028, and reportedly, tripled its initial investment of 33.3 billion baht to 93.5 billion baht in 2023 alone because PTT has been ensuring energy security for domestic consumption and reducing foreign currency risk. In 2021, 15% of natural gas consumption was fulfilled by Myanmar’s energy supply; so Thailand has been hesitant to risk this energy source by taking a stance against the junta. Besides PTT, Thai companies have invested over $11 billion in 154 projects in Myanmar, ranking itself as the third largest investor. These companies are likely hoping to benefit from other foreign companies pulling out from Myanmar and to capitalize on economic opportunities and expand their economic presence. Therefore, the Thai government is unlikely to sever ties with the SAC government due to said economic interests.
In over 3 years of civil war after the 2021 military coup, despite the Thai government having several meetings with the SAC and being a supportive friend, the talk between the Karen National Union (KNU) and the Myanmar military facilitated by the Thai government was the first political engagement between the Thai government and revolutionary ethnic resistance organisations from Myanmar. That was also because KNU’s occupation of the Myawaddy border township affects border trade and trade revenues for the Thai government. As a result of the occupation, fighting in Myawaddy led to a big influx of refugees crossing the border into Mae Sot, with daily numbers reaching around 4,000 people, and also disrupted border trade for days—this was a concern for Thailand due to its reliance on stable economic activity. This suggests that the Thai government will never hold talks or meddle as a mediator in Myanmar people’s democratic efforts with revolutionary ethnic resistance groups unless their economic and security interests are threatened.
Nonetheless, border areas play a significant role in encouraging Thailand to become such an active player in conflict resolution as a moderator for peace talks between the SAC and revolutionary forces. This signals the importance of Thailand’s role in Myanmar’s revolutionary efforts to end internal conflicts and can be a way for both revolutionary parties and international communities to leverage Thailand’s interests to support democratic efforts in Myanmar, promoting a positive outcome for all involved parties.
Humanitarian Challenges at Thai-Myanmar Border and Forced Repatriation
After the military coup, it saw a big influx of Myanmar people fleeing violence and persecution from the junta at the border areas. Approximately, 20,000 new refugees are finding sheltering in rural border areas of Thailand, staying in inadequate conditions such as Temporary Safety Areas (TSA). Many of them live in doorless bamboo houses exposed to environmental and health hazards such as malaria, coupled with the lack of food, and the malnourishment in infants and pregnant women. Also, the lack of documentation exposes people to high risks of arrest, detention, and deportation—not to mention, the shortage of job opportunities for refugees and educational prospects for children. Moreover, local Thai authorities and villages do not seem to welcome these refugees because they perceive them as threats to local job opportunities and development.
Thailand, despite not being a signatory to the 1951 UN Convention on the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, has provided humanitarian assistance to refugees in seven temporary shelters and camps across Thai-Myanmar borders. With the country’s Anti-Torture Act not clearly defining the term ‘refugee’, newly arriving refugees encounter several humanitarian challenges, especially detention and deportation, including the lack of access to healthcare services, shelter and food. Asylum Access Thailand reports that the National Screen Mechanism is leaving out new refugees who are in real danger of persecution and violence and fails to protect and accommodate these individuals at the borders.
The humanitarian crisis has now reached a new level of danger, such that there are 754,000 internally displaced persons in states and regions bordering Thailand as of February 2024, with expectations that the number of refugees will increase. Many escaped to nearby Thailand for only one purpose: to flee violence, air strikes, and military attacks. However, many of them are being forced to return to conflict zones despite the high-security risks they face in Myanmar. Thai authorities forced new refugees and IDPs back to Karenni State where airstrikes and severe conflicts are escalating. Therefore, the Thai government must stop immediately forced returns because these refugees may face persecution, torture, violence or any forms of ill treatment by the junta, violating the principle of non-refoulement.
More Restrictions on Visa Applications for Myanmar Citizens
The Thai government has implemented even more visa restrictions for Myanmar citizens. Myanmar migrant workers are now required to go back to their home country to extend their visas after 4-year contracts, even though they used to be able to extend their books at their same workplace domestically. At the same time, the SAC announced that no Myanmar migrant worker will be allowed to work abroad anymore, and eligible youths must serve in the military under the compulsory military service law. This new visa restriction which was probably a SAC request to the Thai government has triggered plenty of risks such as forced military service, high-security risks for eligible youths, detention, and torture upon their return to Myanmar for visa extensions.
Besides work visas, Myanmar youths who are at risk of forced military service and arbitrary arrests are fleeing to Thailand for safety rather than going to civil war for the junta. Many have applied for non-immigrant educational visas through language schools and universities, but their visa applications are being rejected on the ground by the Thai Immigration Bureau. On the other hand, Thai immigration authorities deny visa restrictions to Myanmar applicants—which is the opposite of the reality on the ground, especially in Chiang Mai. Many students are being asked to apply for education visas in Thai embassies outside of Thailand such as Myanmar, Cambodia, and Laos, which most students cannot afford due to the high travel and accommodation costs. Moreover, Myanmar youths and people without any legal documents who irregularly flee to Thailand in search of safety and freedom are reportedly being forced to return to Myanmar by Thai local police and the Royal army at the borders.
These new restrictions clearly disadvantage Myanmar citizens fleeing from the junta’s violence, putting them at high risk of persecution and violence. The Thai government has not only failed to help Myanmar people, but seem to be actively blocking every opportunity for Myanmar refugees to seek safety. These developments point to indications that the Thai government is not supportive of Myanmar people’s revolution for democracy and peace.
Is Thailand a Frenemy to the Myanmar people?
There are 1.5 million Myanmar migrant workers in Thailand, and they comprise 52 percent of migrant workers in Thailand. Myanmar students are the second largest group after Chinese students in Thailand, a number which has increased in the post-coup period. Myanmar people’s natural resources have long supported Thailand’s domestic economy and business companies. All of these contribute towards foreign income, tax revenues, royalties, cheap labour, and further, even boosted domestic Thai economic enterprises. Even so, the Thai government withholds support for the Myanmar revolution and the human rights of Myanmar citizens. As a close neighbour of Myanmar, this is an act of negligence towards Myanmar citizens.
The Thai military and government are still friends with the SAC-led military, given their close historical military relations and deep economic interests. However, it is indeed a frenemy towards Myanmar people and the Spring Revolution even though Thai citizens stand by Myanmar people. For example, in the early months of the coup, Kasit Piroma, the former Thai foreign minister, called for the Thai government’s full support for Myanmar citizens suffering violence from the junta and warned that Thailand must be a friend to Myanmar people —especially during their time of desperate need for protection and assistance. Moreover, Pita Limjaroenrat, a former Prime Minister candidate, clarified his stance on Myanmar revolution that the Thai government must help Myanmar people and revolutionary forces in their democratic revolution, and force the junta to adhere to the ASEAN Five-Point Consensus. Thanathorn Juangroongruangkit, from Thailand’s Future Forward Party, has also articulated a similar position.
The Thai government must immediately end its support to the Myanmar military by all means and take the side of Myanmar people in the revolution—help them to live free from fear and violence, with the understanding that the reliance on the junta and the SAC for economic interests is not a sustainable long-term solution. Otherwise, it will always be a frenemy to Myanmar people in the revolution..."
Source/publisher:
"Tea Circle" (Myanmar)
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-23
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
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Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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"Standing tall beneath the same stars, but the look in their eyes was not as bright as we are. Sleeping in the warm-soft bed while the cries of the innocent pierce the night. I was around 15 when the TV screen showed the puffy eyes of the hijabi US citizen woman desperately asking for justice in that superpower country. At that moment, with my whole life raised by an Islamic family, my teenager’s mind built a level-1 madness towards Islamophobic people.
According to Georgetown University, Islamophobia is an extreme fear of and hostility toward Islam and Muslims which often leads to hate speech, hate crimes, as well as social and political discrimination. With it placed as the second most widely practiced religion in the world after Christianity, Islam, subjectively, remains the most hated religion in the world, at least in the West. The phrase of this term is not as simple as people being hateful towards Muslim people but it occurs to become serious and rumbling the humanity of today’s society. Islamophobia was recognized as a significant issue of concern in a 2011 meeting of the League of Arab States, a key ally, and the United Nations Alliance of Civilizations (Gallup, n.d.).
The Starting Point of Islamophobic
As the 9/11 incident appeared to be so-called the beginning of the islamophobia trend, however, this phobia term and propaganda towards Islam started in the middle-ages era and heavily pointed to the Crusades event that negative notions about Muslims were spread during this time to encourage Islamic wars and win over citizens of Europe as the Christian leader tried to subjugate the Muslim-ruled land in the Middle East region (Kulik, 2024). Major period jumped to the Renaissance era where the expansion of the Ottoman Empire was also the time of the journey of Islamophobia in which many scholars believe that fear is buried in the minds of Europeans within the potential influence of Islamic countries (Kulik, 2024).
The hyperbola badly portrayed of Muslim people in the Ottoman Empire period has been embedded long ago amongst the West scholars and remains still until today. The misconception of those Western intellectuals and the world against Islam is when they view Islam as the bearer of a dominant civilization that seeks to colonize other civilizations, which often depicts Islam in the eyes of the world as a so-called ‘destroyer’ of the world.
The 9/11 incident, which was short for September 11, where it is the most fatal terrorist strike in American history was a suicide incident carried out by 19 terrorists connected to the Islamic extremist organisation al-Qaeda against American targets (Bergen, 2003). The mid-year gift in the quite regular year left a big-hole trauma for Americans where according to the 9/11 Museum, around 2,900 people were killed beyond New York, Washington, D.C., and Pennsylvania triggering enough for them to even build a national museum for this incident in the middle of crowded-hectic New York City. Since then, Islamophobia headlines – which have actually never lighted down – seem to have found the momentum to speak out even louder where the hate over Muslim people pierced the media at that time.
Human Rights Violations Against Muslim People
The mass use of Islamophobia trend was taking it too far to get into the serious stage where they are taking the basic human rights out of Muslim people. Too serious that even myself already gotten used to the human rights violation news against Muslims. Still struggling in the West, in the purported most beautiful country along with its language, France, ironically, served the highest number of islamophobia that even reached to disrupt the human rights of the Muslim people. France’s law restricted Muslim women from using headscarves (hijab) in classrooms in 2004 wherein further years, which in 2010, marked the passing of legislation in France that outlawed face-covering apparel in public, mostly targeting burqa-wearing women (Hajjat & Mohammed, 2023). The bad portrayed and the effort of the past legislation that harms Muslim people, especially women, are coming from France’s highest hierarchy itself, the prime minister, Emanuel Macron, who stated that headscarves or hijab does not align with France values (Al Jazeera, 2021).
Took almost 5,000 miles from France, in China, which took place in northwestern China, Uyghur is the place where many innocent Muslim people were tortured in the practice of ethnic cleansing. China is known for using communism as its form of government. But since 2017, The so-called re-education camp is home to between 800,000 and 2 million Uyghurs and other Muslims, including ethnic Kazakhs and Uzbeks. China has received many curses from the international world for the re-education camp where it conducts to have violated human rights through maltreatment, rape, torture, and in certain cases, a genocide in which most of the victims are women.
Not so far away from China, in the Southeast Asia region, in Myanmar for specific, the Rohingya case has been a serious issue for a long time. The discrimination towards the minority ethnic of the Muslim people has been running since the 1970s forcing them to flee to other states. Though many Rohingya have centuries-old roots in Myanmar, they remain considered illegal immigrants from Bangladesh. In 2017, the military campaign initiated by the Myanmar government resulted in the forced migration of seven hundred thousand Rohingya. The government denies allegations made by rights groups that the government is responsible for genocide against the Rohingya (Albert & Maizland, 2020). The discrimination and the torture towards Rohingya people include the number of killings, enforced displacement, and sexual assault.
International Efforts to Combat Islamophobia
As this crisis is already taking it to a serious stage, the solution must also be serious. According to the 2011 meeting of the League of Arab States, alongside the United Nations Alliance of Civilizations (UNAOC), Islamophobia is considered a significant concern that needs to be tackled. The UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief, Nazila Ghane, in her report, stated the increase of hate towards Islam is the weak policies of diversity in which states are the responsible ones who should bring up the policies that promote diversity and freedom of expression, Ghane added.
In taking this concern into significant step, as many governments already passed legislation for anti-hate-crime by doing public awareness campaigns about Islam, the UN with 60 Member-States of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) as the sponsors formulating the International Day to Combat Islamophobia which take the date on 15 March. This international day demands an international discussion on the growth of a culture of peace and tolerance built on respect for human rights and religious diversity.
Nevertheless, as the international world already puts efforts into reducing the hatred of Islam, after all, we can’t deny that there will always be people who will hate Islam even though there is already a lot of external intervention to combat this ‘phobia’. If we look through the wider glasses, other religions also received hate from the other parties, might be worse, such as anti-semitism (hate towards Jews). At the end of the day, the world cannot be fully at peace, at least for now, with seeing many kinds of hateful to each other..."
Source/publisher:
"Modern Diplomacy"
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-22
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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"Since the military coup in 2021, the regime’s military has faced an unprecedented armed revolt, not only from long-established ethnic revolutionary organizations, but also from newly formed armed resistance groups across the country.
The military has suffered historic losses and humiliating defeats, losing one Military Regional Command (MRC), three Military Operations Commands (MOCs), seven Border Guard Police battalions and 63 of 545 military battalion HQs, as well as more than 2,500 frontline bases including tactical headquarters and frontline headquarters of military divisions.
As a result of these defeats, around 60 towns have fallen into the hands of anti-regime resistance groups across the country.
Based on reports and ground information, The Irrawaddy has compiled a list of the junta military headquarters and divisions that have been occupied by the anti-regime groups.
Northern Shan
During the approximately three-month-long Operation 1027 launched by the Brotherhood Alliance of three powerful armies – the Arakan Army (AA), the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) – and allied resistance groups in northern Shan State, the junta lost hundreds of frontline bases as well as 24 military battalion headquarters including military command centers. As result, it lost control of more than half of northern Shan State, including many towns and vital trade routes with China.
Eradicated junta bases in northern Shan
Thirteen military bases have not yet been defeated.
Rakhine State
As part of Operation 1027, the AA has been conducting a large-scale offensive against junta targets in Rakhine State and Paletwa Township in neighboring Chin State since Nov. 13 last year. The ethnic rebel army has managed to eradicate 36 headquarters of military and police battalions, including military command centers, as well as hundreds of frontline junta bases including tactical strongholds.
After seizing around 11 towns or townships, the ethnic army now controls more than half of Rakhine State. Intense clashes are ongoing in Rakhine, as the AA is attempting to seize towns in the south of the state. Meanwhile, the junta is fortifying Rakhine State’s capital Sittwe, as the AA is poised to attack the capital soon.
Eradicated junta battalion headquarters
Twenty junta bases, including the headquarters of Sittwe Military Region, Military Operations Command 5 and the Western Regional Military Command, have not yet been defeated.
Kachin State
Since the 2021 coup, the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) has been engaged in fighting against the junta. The rebel army has also provided military training to thousands of anti-regime activists, who have gone on to become members of the People’s Defense Forces (PDFs) under the civilian National Unity Government (NUG). Alongside the PDFs, the KIA is attacking the military regime not only in Kachin State, but also in upper Sagaing Region and neighboring Shan State.
The ethnic army has seized several hundred frontline junta bases, as well as a number of towns and eight military battalion headquarters across Kachin State and some areas in northern Shan State. Currently, the KIA is attacking junta bases in Waingmaw Township next to Kachin State’s capital Myitkyina.
Forty military bases including MOC 3 have not yet been defeated.
Karen State
Thousands of clashes between the regime and the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA), the armed wing of the Karen National Union (KNU), have been reported in Karen State. The country’s oldest ethnic army has also trained several thousand anti-regime activists, who have gone on to join the PDF.
Alongside the PDF groups, the KNLA has been fighting the regime in Karen and Mon states and Tanintharyi and Bago regions. The ethnic rebel army has also seized hundreds of junta frontline bases and five military battalion headquarters in Karen State.
Recently, KNLA and PDF forces briefly took control of the vital trade town of Myawaddy near the Thai border, after defeating the military headquarters nearby. Currently, the junta is conducting a major offensive, Operation Aung Zeya—which it has called a “state-level operation”—against the KNLA and PDF in Myawaddy, but junta troops engaged in the operation have been stuck in the Daw Na Mountains for about two months and have suffered heavy losses due to resistance attacks.
During the fighting with the AA in 2019-20, the division was assigned to conduct military operations in Paletwa and Mindat townships in southern Chin State. When the Brotherhood Alliance launched Operation 1027 in northern Shan State and Rakhine State, the headquarters of Military Division 11 relocated to Mrauk-U Township in northern Rakhine State and conducted military operations along the Kaladan River from Chin State’s Paletwa Township to Mrauk-U.
Brigadier General Min Min Tun, the commander of the division, was killed during fighting with the AA in Mrauk-U Township on Jan. 7, 2024. All 10 battalion headquarters under Military Division 11 were defeated during the fighting with the AA, while the division’s deputy commander and all of its military strategists were either killed or captured.
2. Military Division 22
The military division was assigned to conduct military operations against the AA in Buthidaung and Maungdaw townships in northern Rakhine State in 2019-20. Following the 2021 coup, the division was assigned to military operations in the Kawkareik and Kyondoe areas in Karen State, where it was badly defeated by Karen resistance groups and allied PDFs. It no longer leads military operations, but has been involved in Operation Aung Zeya targeting Myawaddy along with military divisions 55 and 44.
3. Military Division 33
The headquarters of the military division is based in jade mining hub Hpakant in Kachin State, and its battalions are deployed to nearby villages. It sent two battalions to conduct military operations in Chin Shwe Haw in northern Shan State during Operation 1027. The entire Light Infantry Battalion 13 was eradicated by the alliance after being airlifted to Chin Shwe Haw in late October 2023.
The division lost its frontline bases around the jade mining hub during offensives by the KIA and allied PDF groups. The remaining bases and troops of Military Division 33 are currently fighting the KIA and PDFs.
4. Military Division 44
The frontline headquarters of the division is located in Myawaddy near the Thai border in Karen State. After it was defeated by Karen resistance and PDF groups during the fighting for the Mount Lat Khat Taung outpost near Myawaddy, the military division’s commander, Brigadier General Win Naung Soe, was replaced with military strategist Colonel Aye Min Naung, who was promoted to brigadier general.
However, Aye Min Naung was killed along with other senior officers during a trip to a military tactical base in Thingyan Nyi Naung near Myawaddy when their chopper was shot down by Karen resistance forces. After his death, Colonel Soe Min Htut, the deputy commander of MOC 13, was appointed as the commander of Military Division 44.
However, due to his incompetent command during the battle for Myawaddy in April 2024, Soe Min Htut was replaced with Colonel Nyi Nyi Thwin, a former instructor at the junta’s Defense Services Academy. The division continues to suffer defeats and has yet to return to full troop strength.
5. Military Division 55
Before the launch of Operation 1027 in northern Shan State, a military tactical unit and four battalions of Military Division 55 were based in Hpasawng Township, Karenni (Kayah) State, while the division’s frontline headquarters were in Mrauk-U Township, Rakhine State. With the launch of Operation 1027, the whole division was assigned to military operations in the Kokang region in northern Shan State.
After suffering defeats, around 850 of the division’s troops, including its commander Brigadier General Zaw Myo Win and 89 other military officers, surrendered to the MNDAA on Jan. 4, 2024. After being handed over to the junta, Brig-Gen Zaw Myo Win was handed a death sentence by a junta military tribunal for surrendering to the ethnic army. The junta then appointed MOC 8 strategist Major Aung Soe Min as the commander of Military Division 55.
Currently, Division 55 is leading the Aung Zeya Operation against the Karen resistance and allied PDF groups in Myawaddy Township alongside the remaining troops of military divisions 22 and 44 as well as two tank battalions, a missile battalion and two artillery battalions. However, the troops conducting the operation have been halted in the Daw Na mountains range and have been suffering heavy defeats for over 50 days.
6. Military Division 66
Following the military coup in February 2021, the division was assigned to military operations in Karenni State. After suffering heavy defeats to Karenni resistance attacks, its operational duty was transferred to MOC 2. However, Division 66 has been assigned as a reserve unit to Loikaw Region Military Command in Karenni State’s capital Loikaw, most of which is under the control of Karenni resistance groups.
7. Military Division 77
The division lost troops during operations in northern Shan State in 2015-16 and Rakhine State in 2019-20. However, it managed to replenish its ranks in 2020. When the junta military staged the coup in 2021, the military division was assigned to security duty in Yangon and Bago.
When anti-regime armed resistance emerged in upper Myanmar, the military division’s headquarters were relocated to northern Sagaing Region and it has conducted military operations against resistance groups there since October 2021. The military division has suffered only light losses. Currently, two tactical units of the miliary division are operating in upper Sagaing Region and another tactical unit is operating in northern Magwe Region near the border with Chin State.
8. Military Division 88
Since the military coup in 2021, the military division has been assigned to the Bhamo area in Kachin State. Its headquarters is in Momauk Township near Bhamo. A military tactical unit and three military battalions of the division are based in Katha Township. The division’s commander Brigadier General Min Htut Oo was killed during a clash with the KIA in the Kone Law area in Momauk Township on March 20. All of its frontline bases except the battalions at Bhamo and Momauk towns were defeated by the KIA, which is currently conducting offensives against the last junta bases in the towns.
9. Military Division 99
The military division has been assigned to the Mongkoe area in northern Shan State since ethnic armies resumed fighting there in 2015-16. Its commander Brigadier General Aung Kyaw Lwin was killed at a strategic hilltop base in Mongkoe during Operation 1027 on Oct. 29, 2023. It also lost strategic frontline bases and military strategists.
The junta appointed Brigadier General Soe Hlaing as commander of the military division on Dec. 10, 2023. Currently, its headquarters, a strategic unit and four military battalions are based in Muse near the Chinese border. Another strategic unit of the military division is assigned to security duty in Mogoke Township in upper Mandalay Region. Another strategic unit comprising three military battalions has been assigned to Kachin State’s Bhamo Township since April 1. The military division has been assigned as an auxiliary force, as it is no longer tasked for operational duty.
10. Military Division 101
In 2017, the division’s headquarters were based in Namhsam Township, northern Shan State, and it conducted military operations in the Palaung Self-Administered Zone in the area. In 2023, a strategic unit of three military battalions under the division was assigned to military operations in Magwe Region. The division’s commander Brigadier General Min Min Tun was arrested by the TNLA during a clash in Namhsam on Dec. 15,2023.
The junta appointed Major Myint Shwe from the Office of the Chief of the Military Staff in Naypyitaw as the new commander of Military Division 101.
The division was assigned to Namshan, Kyaukme and Nawnghkio townships in northern Shan State during Operation 1027.
Currently, it is tasked with security duty for the junta’s garrison town of Pyin Oo Lwin in Mandalay Region and adjacent Nawnghkio, Kyaukme and Hsipaw townships in northern Shan State. A strategic unit under its control is operating in Magwe Region..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-22
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Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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"The MAU tracks market prices in Southeast Myanmar. Data are collected from three vendors per product per market in the last week of each month. The data include prices from Demoso (village), Hpapun (Kamamaung), Hsihseng (main), Kawkareik (main), Loikaw (main), Pekon (main), and Taungoo (Nat Htet). Data are available online at www.themimu.info/market-analysis-unit.
KEY FINDINGS
Rice prices rose 7% in May and pulses were up 6%, although cooking oil prices were fairly stable;
Vegetable prices were unusually stable in May, and eggplant prices pulled back from April's relatively large price increases;
Meat/fish price trends varied by market in May, although prices for fish paste were 6% higher and prices for fish paste were 19% lower;
Prices for hygiene products varied by market May, and they rose sharply in Hpapun;
Food and NFI prices were 20-90% above last year, although prices for hygiene products were just 5-10% above last year;
Near-term prices increases are more likely than not for items like mosquito nets, essential foods, and various hygiene products.
Product-Level Price Changes
Essential Foods – Essential food prices rose in May, and the sharpest increases were in Taungoo. Rice prices rose 7% or more in various markets in May, and prices for pulses were 6% higher. Cooking oil prices were stable except in Taungoo. Essential food prices were sometimes stable but rarely falling.
Vegetables – Vegetable prices were unusually stable in May, and some vegetable prices fell. Prices for onion and eggplant fell 25% and 10%, respectively. Other vegetable prices were generally stable, although there were isolated instances of prices rising or falling.
Meat and Fish – Meat and fish prices varied by market in May. Fish paste prices rose 6% in May, while dried fish prices fell 19%. Prices for shrimp, fresh fish, chicken, and pork rose and fell in different markets but were overall mostly stable. Meat and fish prices were generally stable in Pekon, rising in Taungoo, and falling in Pinlaung.
Hygiene Products – Prices for hygiene products varied considerably by market. Prices for hygiene products climbed sharply in Hpapun where some produces were out of stock. Prices for hygiene products fluctuated in Taungoo while remaining quite stable in three other markets.
Other NFIs – NFI prices also varied considerably by market, with falling prices in Taungoo but a mixed picture elsewhere. Prices for charcoal, umbrellas, and plastic tarps fell a modest 4-12% in May. Prices for cooking pots and jerry cans rose 12% or more across markets. Pekon and Pinlaung saw a second month of stable NFI prices, while Taungoo saw lower prices for a number of NFIs in May..."
Source/publisher:
Myanmar Information Management Unit (Myanmar) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-22
[field_licence]
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Food Security and nutrition in Burma/Myanmar, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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"IN BRIEF:
On its 15th anniversary, the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) faces criticism for its inaction against human rights abuses in member states. The AICHR's outdated terms of reference and avoidance of challenging state sovereignty limit its effectiveness. This is highlighted by its silence during major incidents of human rights abuse, lack of a complaint mechanism, and the individualistic approach taken by representatives, leading to concerns about its future relevance and impact in the region.
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The year 2024 marks the 15th anniversary of the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR). While the endorsement of human rights is vital, the AICHR leaves a lot to be desired. In its 15 years it has done little in word or in deed to prevent human rights abuses and must evolve to effectively tackle these issues in the region.
The AICHR drafted the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration, which was adopted in 2012 at the 21st ASEAN Summit. It is considered by many advocates and scholars to fall short of basic international standards of human rights. It embodies principles of sovereignty and non-interference, but most importantly identifies duties that are as important as rights. It also uses the language of human rights understood in the context of ‘regional particularities’. This language is reminiscent of the discredited ‘Asian values’ debate, a less than stellar beginning for the human rights mechanism.
George Yeo, former Singaporean foreign minister, once remarked that while the AICHR did not have teeth, it ‘at least [has] a tongue, and a tongue will have its uses’. But Yeo’s words have rung hollow. Since the AICHR’s establishment, ASEAN has faced four major incidents of human rights abuses, and in each case did not speak up or issue a single collective statement.
The AICHR did not condemn the 2014 coup in Thailand or call for the restoration of democracy. Thailand’s representative at the time, Dr Seree Nonthasoot, went as far as to say that ‘we all know AICHR has a tacit agreement not to discuss such an issue’.
During and after the 2017–2018 mass expulsion and alleged genocide of the Rohingya from Rakhine State, in which over 1.2 million Rohingya were displaced, the AICHR again did not raise a single question to Naypyidaw. Indonesian and Malaysian AICHR representatives issued statements, but only in their individual capacity.
Upon becoming president of the Philippines in 2016, Rodrigo Duterte announced a ‘War on Drugs’. Subsequent violence, much of which was allegedly perpetrated by state officials, led to the death of over 12,000 people as reported by Human Rights Watch.
When the Myanmar military seized power in the February 2021 coup, the AICHR again did nothing. Instead, former AICHR representatives issued a statement of condemnation and called for return to democratic processes in the country. Since the coup, Myanmar has spiralled ever deeper into conflict and civil war.
This silence raises concerns about the effectiveness of the AICHR as a regional human rights mechanism. The AICHR’s Terms of Reference dictate that it operates according to the region’s method of doing business, the ‘ASEAN Way’. The ASEAN Way centres on principles of state sovereignty, non-interference and consultation and consensus for decision-making. This essentially gives every ASEAN member a veto over all agendas and initiatives — meaning the AICHR is held to the standard of the region’s most troublesome member.
AICHR representatives, while nominally independent, often view themselves as government representatives instead of national representatives. This leads representatives from conservative states especially to view their role as protecting their governments rather than their people.
Another barrier to effective action is that the AICHR lacks a complaints mechanism, breaking the link between people and the member states at a collective level. At an individual level, national representatives receive complaints and forward these onto national bureaucracies. So far, Dr Seree Nonthasoot and Indonesia’s representative Yuyun Wahyuningrum have done so and both received no response to their complaints. These representatives, as well as others, have played active roles — but always as individuals and not as part of an AICHR collective.
AICHR’s Terms of Reference state that the terms ‘shall be reviewed every five years’, but after 15 years no revision has taken place, limiting future prospects. In 2019, ASEAN foreign ministers agreed to convene a high-level panel to study and propose revisions to the AICHR’s mandate. As of June 2024, only Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines have nominated representatives.
It can only be inferred that some ASEAN states are content with how the AICHR performs. The AICHR was never intended to be a powerful body or to challenge state power. It has not interacted with the UN human rights system or national bodies. The AICHR operates alone at the regional ASEAN level, carrying out activities of limited impact while providing a veneer of human rights legitimacy.
It is difficult to see the relevance of the AICHR in its current form or any measurable impact on the people of the region. But it is commendable for ASEAN states to endorse the establishment and maintenance of a human rights mechanism. With the human rights agenda of the West now fading, China’s rise in the region and ASEAN’s democratic backsliding, it is unclear whether the AICHR will ever evolve and become a beacon of hope and protection for people in the region. Only time will tell..."
Source/publisher:
"East Asia Forum" (Australia)
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-22
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
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Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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"21 June 2024: The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) must find creative ways to build on its Five-Point Consensus (5PC), and the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Council must ensure that its upcoming resolution on the rights of Rohingya and other minorities in Myanmar accurately and effectively addresses the grave situation on the ground, says the Special Advisory Council for Myanmar (SAC-M).
SAC-M founding member Marzuki Darusman and members of the SAC-M team visited Geneva this week to meet with ASEAN members, senior diplomats, UN officials and Myanmar civil society in the margins of the UN Human Rights Council session.
The SAC-M visit came as the crisis in Myanmar continues to evolve rapidly and after a recent visit by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights to the region. The High Commissioner on Tuesday expressed in a statement to the UN Human Rights Council that “it is time to go beyond the ASEAN Five-Point Consensus” and that the new generation in Myanmar should “be supported in a ‘visioning process’ for the future of the country”.
The Myanmar military junta is irreversibly weakened by three years of sustained, nationwide resistance and no longer has the control necessary to exercise state power. It is unable to unilaterally determine the course of events in Myanmar.
Grave violations of human rights and international humanitarian law continue to be reported daily across the entire country. The junta’s efforts to ban VPNs are putting those reporting on its violations at even greater risk. The situation in northern Rakhine state is of particular concern, with all communities in the region reporting violence and violations and abuses in recent weeks perpetrated by the military junta, the Arakha Army (AA) and other armed actors. Rohingya are once again at heightened risk of atrocities.
Three years after the ASEAN 5PC was originally agreed to with Min Aung Hlaing, his junta cannot be considered an effective implementing partner. ASEAN should therefore engage creatively with the legitimate representatives of the Myanmar people – the National Unity Government of Myanmar (NUG), Ethnic Resistance Organisations (EROs) and broader civil society – on 5PC implementation if it is to remain relevant.1
The UN Human Rights Council is due to adopt its annual resolution on the rights of Rohingya and other minorities in Myanmar at its current 56th Session. The resolution should directly address the situation in Rakhine, including in Buthidaung and Maungdaw townships, and call on all armed actors, including the junta and the AA to uphold their obligations under international law.
The resolution should also welcome the NUG’s policy position on Rohingya in Rakhine state2, which acknowledges the Rohingya as Myanmar nationals, and the NUG’s filing of a declaration with the International Criminal Court (ICC) under 12(3) of the Rome Statute, which accepted the Court’s jurisdiction across Myanmar dating back to 2002.
ASEAN and the UN Human Rights Council must wake up to and address the new realities in Myanmar if they are to have a meaningful impact on the dire situation or any hope of contributing to a resolution to the crisis.
Footnotes:
1Human Rights Council resolution 55/20 (2024) acknowledges at PP40 ‘the central role’ of ASEAN ‘in facilitating a peaceful solution in the interest of the people of Myanmar and in facilitating constructive and inclusive dialogue among all parties, including the National Unity Government, ethnic organizations and broader civil society, as well as in the provision of humanitarian assistance to all those in need’.
2General Assembly resolution 77/227 (2022) acknowledges the pronouncements of the National Unity Government articulated in the “Policy position on the Rohingya in Rakhine State” released on 3 June 2021..."
Source/publisher:
Special Advisory Council for Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-21
[field_licence]
Type:
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Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations, Discrimination against the Rohingya
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"For those looking to engage with the Myanmar military regime, make no mistake: The men in uniform are blatant liars. I repeat: They don’t deserve your trust at all.
The latest reminder of their cunning nature came with their attempted cover-up of the deadly shooting of a senior Buddhist monk by junta soldiers two days ago, in which they accused an anti-regime People’s Defense Force (PDF) group of the killing.
But their lie was exposed in a video in which a monk who was with the victim at the time of the incident said the regime soldiers chased them down in a truck and fired a volley of shots at the car carrying the monks, leaving the senior monk dead.
The surviving monk’s revelation of course left junta boss Min Aung Hlaing red-faced. He has proclaimed himself the protector and promoter of Buddhism in Myanmar, only for his soldiers to shoot dead a 78-year-old monk who was a retired member of the country’s highest Buddhist authority.
More importantly, the junta’s attempt to shift the blame by accusing a PDF group of a killing it had nothing to do with should be viewed with the utmost seriousness, as it’s a grim reminder of just how fundamentally dishonest the Min Aung Hlaing-led Myanmar military regime really is.
If they are prepared to lie so blatantly about such a killing, what does it say about their other claims, such as their justification for the 2021 coup—that they acted in response to “vote rigging” in the 2020 general election? Should we believe it?
Absolutely not. International observers praised the election as free and fair, and within days of the coup the world witnessed the anger of disenfranchised Myanmar voters nationwide, who flooded the streets shouting “Respect our votes!”
Are we to believe the regime’s repeated statements that it is working with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations to implement the bloc’s five-point peace plan for Myanmar?
Think about the 3 million people who have been internally displaced by the junta’s bombings and arson attacks since the regime agreed to follow the plan in April 2021, not to mention the junta’s killing of more than 5,000 people for their anti-regime activism. If the junta is implementing the peace plan, why are there so many internally displaced people and why are civilians still being killed? One of the plan’s requirements is that the junta act to stop the violence.
Should we believe the junta’s claim that it seeks peace with ethnic armed groups as it wages war in ethnic areas? What about their purported attempts to repatriate Rohingya refugees to Rakhine State, even as they recruit Rohingya to fight the Arakan Army, which enjoys overwhelming support among Rakhine people?
More than three years after he seized power, should we believe Min Aung Hlaing’s frequent justification for the ongoing military rule in Myanmar—that his army has “temporarily” assumed responsibility for the state in line with the constitution?
His recent announcement that he will hold an election next year deserves similar skepticism. You can’t hope for anything positive from a poll organized by an army that stole power from a civilian government based on a false claim of electoral fraud.
Everything Min Aung Hlaing and his regime says must be taken with more than a few grains of salt—everyone in the Myanmar military junta was born to lie. Their cover-up of the shooting of the monk is the latest reminder that the Myanmar regime is totally untrustworthy.
Internationally, now is the time for anyone who is eager to engage in or who has partnered with the regime—from India to China to other neighboring countries or even some others in the West—to ask themselves some difficult questions, starting with “Should I believe them?” It’s a question they should be asking out of their own self-interest.
Just a reminder: Befriending a liar will do you no good in the long term, and only an evildoer listens to wicked lips..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-21
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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"Since its founding in 2022, the Institute of Human Rights and Democratic Governance (IHRDG) – an interdisciplinary faculty under Spring University Myanmar (SUM) – has hosted an annual speaker series aimed at promoting research and awareness about Myanmar. In 2023, the seminar series ran monthly from August to December and featured a diverse speaker line-up from scholars around the world. Although the presentations spoke on a wide variety of issues – ranging from the historical marginalization of the Rohingya to digital oppression tactics of the SAC – what they shared was an emphasis on contemporaneous political trends and real-world policy implications. In this report, I will briefly summarize each event and reflect on some overarching lessons.
The first lecture of the year, titled “Revisiting the Polity: The Making and Remaking of the Rohingya Identity in Myanmar” (3rd August 2023) was presented by Dr. Kazi Fahmida Farzana, Assistant Professor of International Relations at the University of Sharjah (UAE). Demonstrating how the Rohingya ethnic identity has been continuously constructed and reconstructed by consecutive military regimes in Myanmar, Dr. Farzana emphasized that the imposition of a “fixed” identity against various ethnic minorities has been a recurring strategy of successive military regimes since the 1960s. Ideologically, the Myanmar state has effectively subscribed to Buddhist and Burmese nationalism against minority ethnicities to marginalize, exclude, and – in the case of the Rohingya – expel entire ethno-linguistic groups. For example, state policies are often constructed against the backdrop of one unchanging tactic: to (re)define and control ethnic boundaries, as evidenced by the classification of 135 national ethnicities that excluded minority groups like the Rohingya. The exclusion of the Rohingya (amongst others) from this official list is self-contradictory. As Dr. Farzana notes, some Rohingya scholars say the Rohingya ethnicity was excluded on the basis of their Islamic faith, not ethnicity per se. It is worth noting that Rohingya were recognized as part of a British-promised “Muslim National Area” before 1948, promises that never materialized after independence despite the British conscription of Rohingya and other Arakanese Muslims to fight the Burmese.
After Myanmar gained independence from Britain in 1948, the military government excluded Rohingya from the ethnic integration of the new Myanmar by stating Rohingya were not qualified to be an integral part of Myanmar because they supported Britain, defining their military involvement as a betrayal to the Burmese people. The resulting power imbalance is still visible in the post-2021 political dynamics, including in the Rohingya repatriation project from Bangladesh.
The second event of the series – on 7 September 2023 – was a panel discussion on labor politics in post-coup Myanmar, featuring two Myanmar researcher-activists (Khin Thazin Oo and Ko Maung) and chaired by Stephen Campbell, an Assistant Professor of Sociology and Anthropology at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore. Both speakers employed class analysis in their discussion of labor politics and have published extensively on labor rights issues in Myanmar and abroad. Their research shed light on Myanmar’s political dynamics since the 2021 military coup, with a practical focus on labor rights, protest mobilization, and everyday workers’ struggles. Indeed, the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) was started by labor unions in the industrial zones in Yangon after the February 1 coup . By focusing on the experience and agency of people from lower socioeconomic backgrounds, the research challenges elitist accounts that privilege high-profile political and military figures in favor of a “history from below” of present-day Myanmar in the Spring Revolution. This recognizes and spotlights the impact of ordinary people in challenging and transforming post-coup conditions. The purpose of this panel is to employ the concept of labor politics more broadly, expanding it beyond the limited Burmese term that can be translated as “affairs of the state” (နိုင်ငံရေး). However, the presenters emphasized the personal experiences of ordinary people. Such accounts include Myanmar’s domestic migrant workers in Singapore supporting the People’s Defense Force (PDF), the unwaged and largely, unacknowledged, social reproductive labor of women who sustained the Spring Revolution, and the workers’ role in organizing CDM in the industrial zones of Yangon, Mandalay and other major cities since the coup. The labor force has been driving the Spring Revolution and wholeheartedly supporting People’s Defense Forces (PDF) since day one, even though many struggles to support their own family.
The third event, featuring Dr. Shona Loong from the University of Zurich, was titled “A Country with Many Histories: Myanmar’s Diverse Geographies of War and Everyday Life” (5 October 2023). Contrary to dominant strands in conflict studies which demonstrate theories and underlying factors about how armed conflict shapes social processes, Dr. Loong’s long-term ethnographic research in Myanmar demonstrates that the opposite is equally true. Drawing on both pre- and post-coup research, especially in Karen State and the Salween Peace Park, the talk highlighted how the impacts of conflict are geographically diverse, thus challenging dominant (and often Bamar-centric) historical narratives. Another important theme was that of community resilience amidst the violence of military junta. Three years on since the coup began, it continues to negatively affect livelihoods and living conditions, giving rise to increased human rights violations against civilians across Myanmar. However, people continue to fight to put an end to impunity. The session concluded with reflections on the limitations facing Myanmar studies researchers, recognizing the need for a nuanced insight into Myanmar’s complex socio-historical landscape from different community perspectives. The presentation offered new perspectives on approaches for how ethnic armed groups could potentially evolve toward restoring federal democracy in Myanmar.
The fourth event, presented by Professor Ardeth Thawnghmung on 2nd November 2023, was titled “Challenges in Researching Local Governance Structures in Post-Coup Myanmar.” This ongoing research highlights the complexity and heterogeneity of how local government officials – all the way down to the village and ward levels – and their mechanisms for coping with rising post-coup violence. Driven by the nature of localized interpersonal relations, these coping strategies have continued to flexibly evolve in tandem with on-the-ground changes, as many local administrations were partially or completely taken over by pro-democracy armed groups like Rathedaung township of Arakan State, Myanmar. Dr. Thawnghmung’s original research methodologies underscored a need for research in contemporary Myanmar to become more innovative and localized. As a result, new research projects in Myanmar would become ever more subjective (i.e. based on relations of trust) but also more reliant on local researchers, thus shifting the epistemic power balance from the people’s government to the military junta. Similarly, her project’s findings demonstrate that conflicts in Myanmar have become increasingly localized due to the collapse of central authority, which necessitates a re-thinking in strategy by national and international policymakers in how local administrators can play a role in preventing violence – both now and in the future.
The final event of the series, titled “Scrutinizing Digital Repression: Policing Mobile Money in Myanmar,” by Vox, Bradley, and Gar explored the significance of mobile money, banking systems, and digital freedom for daily life in post-pandemic Myanmar. Facing increased regulation and surveillance under a repressive military regime, many people in Myanmar have had their digital rights curtailed. The three speakers presented preliminary results from their ongoing research, examining the role of online financial systems in state surveillance and their contribution to the rise of techno-authoritarianism in Myanmar. The speakers emphasized alternative methods, including decentralized critical infrastructures, as a way to enhance digital security and freedom. The research also revealed the institutionalization of the violation of digital rights and rights to privacy in Myanmar, calling for potential policy improvements once a roadmap to federal democracy is possible. This could mitigate the gap between oppressive legislation and democratic agencies, relieving the suffering of Myanmar civilians for decades.
The 2023 IHRDG Seminar Series on Myanmar Studies yielded valuable lessons for students, scholars, activists, and pro-democracy movements. Firstly, it underscored the persistent use of identity manipulation by successful military regimes to marginalize ethnic groups, as evidenced by the Rohingya Genocide. Furthermore, the focus on labor politics in the post-coup period highlighted the pivotal role of grassroots movement and ordinary people, challenging elitist narratives. Dr. Shona Loong’s insights emphasized the geographical diversity of conflict impacts and the resilience of communities in their heterogeneous and creative responses to ongoing crises. Prof. Thawnghmung’s research showcased the evolving coping strategies of local governance structures in response to post-coup violence, emphasizing the need for innovative, localized research approaches. Finally, the examination of digital repression highlighted the importance of safeguarding digital rights and proposed policy improvements for a future federal democratic union of Myanmar. These lessons reaffirm the significance of a nuanced, grassroots-oriented approach in addressing Myanmar’s complex socio-political landscape.
Note: The 2023 IHRDG Seminar Series was generously funded by the IDRCs Knowledge for Democracy Myanmar (K4DM) initiative. All views expressed in this post and by the various speakers are solely their own and do not necessarily reflect the views of IDRC or Spring University Myanmar..."
Source/publisher:
"Tea Circle" (Myanmar)
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-21
[field_licence]
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Individual Documents
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Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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"As the escalation of conflict in Myanmar continues to increase humanitarian needs, the EU has released an additional €15 million to help people affected in the country, as well as refugees who have fled to neighbouring states. This includes Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh.
This additional allocation will help provide life-saving assistance to people who have had to flee their homes due to conflict, providing them with access to food, shelter, clean water, and emergency healthcare. The additional funds will also go towards helping people protect themselves in the dangerous context, for example by minimising their exposure to the risks of landmines.
The EU has increased its total allocation for the Myanmar crisis each year since the 2021 coup, providing €36 million in 2024 so far.
Background
Following a military coup d'état in Myanmar in February 2021, the number of people in need of humanitarian assistance has risen from 1 million to over 18 million in 2024. After an escalation in fighting at the end of 2023, the number of internally displaced people increased by 50% in six months and has now surpassed 3 million.
Rakhine State is currently facing particularly intensive fighting, with many civilian casualties. Different armed groups are carrying out forced recruitment, with the Rohingya people a particular target.
With monsoon season having arrived, the country is bracing itself for the possibility of a disaster such as cyclonic storm Mocha, which hit the country in May 2023 and caused more than €2 billion in damages.
The EU has been providing humanitarian aid to people in Myanmar since 1994. At the beginning of this year, the EU approved over €19 million to fund humanitarian operations in the country, plus an additional €2 million to address the regional impact of the crisis.
For More Information
EU Humanitarian Aid in Myanmar
Quote(s)
The conflict in Myanmar is having devastating humanitarian consequences for the people of the country. These additional €15 million will bring relief to a population that faces multiple threats, including grave protection risks, a serious food security crisis and little access to critical healthcare. With increasingly disturbing reports of violence against civilians, it is paramount that all parties respect international humanitarian law. The situation is particularly concerning in Rakhine State, where all communities, including the Rohingya, face serious risks at the hands of armed actors. I urge all parties to show restraint and respect their obligations on protecting the civilian population..."
Source/publisher:
European Commission's Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-20
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Food Security and nutrition in Burma/Myanmar, Public Health, Human Rights and international relations
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"Myanmar’s National Unity Government and Karenni State Government should investigate killings and cooperate with international justice mechanisms
(DEMOSO and BANGKOK, June 20, 2024)–The National Unity Government of Myanmar (NUG) and the Interim Executive Council (IEC) of Karenni State should investigate the killings of three women and their three children and hold the perpetrators of the killings accountable, said Burma War Crime Investigation (BWCI) and Fortify Rights today.
A new joint investigation by BWCI–a community-based human rights organization in Myanmar–and Fortify Rights found that the Myanmar military captured seven civilians during a military operation in Shadaw Township, Karenni State on February 5, 2024. Although one man escaped, three women—including a pregnant woman—and their three children were killed during an armed clash between the Myanmar army and ethnic resistance fighters.
The civilians killed were identified as Soe Mae, 50, Law Mae, 45, and Ma Mae Mo, 33, who was pregnant, Nang Khin, 7, Baw Reh, 5, and Li Reh, 3.
“Wartime killings of civilians should be thoroughly investigated and perpetrators held accountable,” said Swe Lin, a researcher from BWCI. “The NUG and the IEC are well-placed to investigate the killings of civilians and work alongside international investigators. Resistance forces fighting against the junta should actively seek to protect civilians and work to support victims and ensure accountability for crimes.”
The killings took place during a battle between the Myanmar military and resistance fighters, including the Karenni Nationalities Defense Force (KNDF) and the Karenni Army (KA) near the village of Daw Ka Tel located northeast of Shadaw town in Shadaw Township.
In June 2024, BWCI and Fortify Rights spoke with members of IEC and NUG and shared the findings of their investigation. A member of the IEC said they are concerned about “any killing of civilians” and would investigate and charge perpetrators from the Myanmar military or Karenni forces who are responsible for crimes.
Between February and June 2024, BWCI and Fortify Rights interviewed 11 people, including a Myanmar military prisoner of war (POW) in the custody of the KNDF, a survivor of the incident who escaped, relatives of victims, two medical doctors, and a soldier from KA. BWCI and Fortify Rights also analyzed and reviewed photographs and videos taken by resistance fighters of the dead bodies on February 6, 2024. BWCI and Fortify Rights’s investigation could not independently verify the perpetrators of the killing.
According to the witnesses, on February 5, 2024, Myanmar junta soldiers from Light Infantry Battalion 249 detained the group of seven civilians who were hiding in a small house on top of a hill. The Myanmar military POW interviewed by BWCI and Fortify Rights also confirmed that soldiers from his unit detained the civilians.
Describing the incident, a 20-year-old Karenni man who escaped after being captured together with the women and children by the Myanmar military soldiers said:
I was working in the forest in the mountains and was resting for one or two days afterward. That was the same time when the [Myanmar military] soldiers came, and I was detained. The military caught me and other women and [children].
He went on to describe what happened after the junta soldiers detained the group:
[The Myanmar soldiers] tied me up with white nylon rope. … I was worried, of course. Capture means death. … [I was] thinking, when would I die? But nothing could be done. When they first arrived and captured me, they kicked me in the head and hit me with their gun. One [soldier] took out a knife and threatened to cut my ear off.
The man explained that the soldiers forced him to walk ahead with a few soldiers, while women and children were behind with other soldiers. When the soldiers began exchanging fire with the resistance troops, he escaped. He said:
There was active shooting. Because of that, they could not capture me again, and I escaped. …When I walked a bit far in front of the military, I ran. [The children and women] were left behind. … I ran, and the rest shouted. [The soldiers] shouted that I escaped and started shooting. … I ran and didn’t look back. I could only hear the screams [of the young girls]. They were shouting, “Please let us go,” and “We want to go back home.” I heard the girls screaming. It could be when they were shot and killed. When I escaped, I went to the farming field. When I got back to the displaced camp, I met with people who released me from the tied ropes.
Although he managed to escape, his niece was among those killed.
A KA resistance fighter who was part of the battle described the scene:
We had the area surrounded, with our forces both down the hill and on top. The [junta] troops were climbing up the middle, split into two units, unaware we were there. We started firing as they climbed towards us. As soon as the fighting started, we heard women screaming and thought the [junta soldiers] had brought their families. But it turned out they were [captured] civilians.
The KA resistance fighter told BWCI and Fortify Rights how he heard screams from the battle ground, saying:
I heard [screams], but we had no idea who [the civilians] were or how they got there. Since we started the fight, we had to finish it. We couldn’t tell if we hit the children, because we were firing from far away. We couldn’t see them clearly as they were with the junta troops. We could only see the junta troops and fired at them.
He continued, saying: “During the fight, kids and moms were screaming things like, ‘Oh, my son,’ or ‘Oh, my daughter,’ frightened. We heard the junta troops ordering them to stop screaming.”
Describing the aftermath of the offensive and seeing the civilians’ dead bodies, the resistance fighter said: “We did [see the bodies] after the troops fled. … I couldn’t bring myself to check on the children I didn’t have the courage to check on the children when asked. When I saw their bodies, I couldn’t stop crying and was too scared to uncover them.”
He continued, saying:
The youngest one, a child, was found a bit away from the group and was still breathing at first. I called a medic, but the child died on the way. I didn’t know where he was shot, but the medic said he was hit in the back. He was the youngest boy [Li Reh], and I couldn’t save him.
Photographs and videos on file with BWCI and Fortify Rights show the six dead bodies, including 45-year-old Law Mae and seven-year-old Ma Nang Khin with gunshot wounds to the head.
Relatives of the women and children described the impact. One woman said, “[The military] took everything. … I don’t know what to say. I lost my sisters. My elder sister, my younger sister, my nieces.”
A 55-year-old Karenni farmer also described how Myanmar military soldiers ransacked his home during the same attack, saying: “[The soldiers] looked inside the hut to see if anyone was inside and stirred things up before heading back downstairs. We could see and hear them as they looted the house.”
When the junta soldiers arrived, the farmer hid in his uncut fields, saying, “Otherwise, we would have been exposed and potentially shot on sight.”
Starting November 11, 2023, KNDF, together with other ethnic resistance organizations, initiated “Operation 1111” to attack the Myanmar military in Karenni State. The KNDF, KA, and People Defense Forces (PDF) has liberated Demoso, Mese and Ywar Thit and Shadaw townships in Karenni State. The battle that liberated Shadaw took place between January 15 and February 12, 2024.
At the time of writing, KNDF continued to detain three junta soldiers captured during the battle in Shadaw Township.
International humanitarian law—known as the laws of war—is applicable in the situation of Karenni State, where armed conflict is taking place between the Myanmar military and armed resistance organizations including KNDF, KA, and other resistance fighters. The Geneva Conventions expressly guarantee the protection of civilians “against all acts of violence.”
On February 1, 2021, the Myanmar military launched a deadly coup d’état, killing untold numbers of civilians and imprisoning tens of thousands of others in a bid to secure nationwide political power. In February 2022, Fortify Rights released a flash report documenting how the Myanmar military massacred civilians, used human shields, and committed other atrocities in Karenni State in acts that amount to war crimes. The junta’s ongoing attack against civilians provides further evidence of crimes against humanity and war crimes.
“The IEC and NUG should work cooperatively with international accountability mechanisms to address ongoing war crimes in Karenni State,” said John Quinley, Director at Fortify Rights. “Both parties to the conflict should uphold the laws of war, including ensuring that the rights of prisoners of war are respected.”..."
Source/publisher:
"Fortify Rights"
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-20
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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"On this World Refugee Day, the Karen Human Rights Group (KHRG) celebrates the strength and courage of people forced to flee Burma to escape conflict and persecution. For internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Karen State, for communities sheltering in refugee camps in Thailand, and for those on the run along the Thai-Burma border, KHRG draws international attention to the needs and hopes of the displaced. Today, KHRG calls on the international community to stand in solidarity with all who have been forced to flee their homes to escape the junta's targeted attacks on civilians. We call on neighbouring countries, as well as global international actors, to take concrete and effective action to protect civilians fleeing such brutality and those who support them.
Despite initial voluntary repatriations and returns had increased after the signing of the 2015 Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA),[1] the 2021 Coup and the violence that followed have reinvigorated the mass displacement of civilians in Karen State and other regions. The State Administration Council (SAC) is responsible for the ongoing violence, persecution and other serious human rights violations, including indiscriminate shelling, air strikes and the burning of entire villages, which have plunged the country into chaos and created a dire humanitarian crisis. Children are the most disproportionately affected by the fighting, facing dangers and disruptions to their education and well-being. Deprived of their childhoods, they are the future of Burma, and ensuring their access to education is crucial to lasting peace.
The SAC continues to deny the critical humanitarian needs of displaced civilians, while actively obstructing and sabotaging the delivery of humanitarian aid to those in desperate need. This is a clear violation of international humanitarian law, which underlines the obligation to prevent and repress forcible displacement of the civilian population by warring parties,[2] and to protect and assist civilians fleeing systematic violence and conflict.[3] Moreover, under international refugee law, the 1951 Refugee Convention sets the standard for protection: although most Southeast Asian countries are not signatories to the Convention, its core principle of non-refoulement, which states that refugees should not be rejected entry to a safe country, nor should be returned to a country where they face a serious threat to their life or freedom,[4] is universally recognised as customary international law.[5]
Displacement has a profound and lasting psychological impact, not only on the survivors but also on the wider community. When attacks against the civilian population are particularly widespread, especially when they are part of or combined with other acts of terror and intimidation, those who perceive themselves or their children to be at risk may live in fear and experience lasting psychological trauma. This trauma can also affect social cohesion within the community, straining relationships and making it difficult to rebuild a sense of normalcy.[6]
On this World Refugee Day, KHRG urges international stakeholders and foreign governments to:
Ensure that neighbouring countries’ authorities do not deny entry to people crossing the border seeking refuge, and encourage them to work with cross-border organisations to develop support and protection services for those seeking refuge. Allow aid to enter Burma through cross-border aid agencies and local civil society organisations (CSOs) already working in the area. Diversify the distribution of funds to include non-state actors, especially local ethnic service providers and CSOs, regardless of their registration status, and involve local actors and communities in decision-making on humanitarian response and crisis resolution. Recognize that the SAC is the root cause of the current human rights and humanitarian crisis and refrain from legitimizing the junta by signing agreements or working with them. Ensure the SAC has no decision-making power over aid distribution and prevent funds from being indirectly channelled through them. Take immediate steps to bring Burma's military leaders to international justice for ordering and/or permitting the targeting of civilians..."
Source/publisher:
Karen Human Rights Group
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-20
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Burmese refugees: discussion groups, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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"Human Rights Violations took place in States and Regions from June 8 to 14, 2024
Military Junta Troop launched airstrikes and dropped bombs in the Sagaing Region, Tanintharyi Region, Chin State, and Rakhine State from June 8th to 14th. The Military Junta Troop arrested a youth for Military Service from Nyaung-U Township, Mandalay Region, and tortured and murdered. The Military Junta did not confirm Cyber Security Law, but Junta troops checked the Mobile Phones at their controlled places and arrested and blackmailed the VPN users. Almost 100 civilians from the Magway Region and Shan State were arrested as human shields.
Over 20 civilians died, and over 30 were injured by the Military’s heavy and light artillery attacks within a week. A civilian died and one was injured by the land mines of the Military Junta Troop..."
Source/publisher:
Network for Human Rights Documentation-Burma
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-19
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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288.44 KB 307.09 KB 129.35 KB
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"The illegal Myanmar military junta has accessed Chinese equipment, technology and support in its efforts to spy on Myanmar internet users and to censor the internet as it speeds up efforts to build a digital dictatorship.
A Justice For Myanmar investigation based on sources including leaked documents and corporate records has exposed the involvement of two Chinese companies in the junta’s digital surveillance and censorship program.
Planning documents show the use of two products from the Chinese company Geedge Networks, which trades as Jizhi (Hainan) Information Technology Company Limited, in the surveillance and censorship system that was activated in Myanmar at the end of May.
Geedge Networks founder and chief scientist is Fang Binxing, the “father” of the Great Firewall of China.
One product, Taingou Secure Gateway (TSG), uses deep pack inspection and claims to be able to decrypt and inspect traffic between the server and client that is encrypted with secure sockets layer (SSL) and transport layer security (TLS) encryption protocols.
TSG also features a firewall that can block applications, including virtual private networks (VPNs), based on their behaviours and attributes.
Cyber Narrator, also from Geedge Networks, is a network intelligence platform designed to monitor and analyse internet traffic and respond to “threats”, including the use of VPNs.
In addition, the Chinese state-owned company China National Electronics Import and Export Corporation (CEIEC), also linked to Fang Binxing, has been involved in a proposed location tracking system for the junta controlled communications ministry.
Both companies business with the junta is brokered by the crony Mascots Group of Companies, led by Dr Win Kyaw and his wife Khin Kay Khaing, who are part of a network of at least 30 companies across Myanmar, Singapore and Thailand, more than half of which were named by the UN Special Rapporteur on Myanmar.
Justice For Myanmar calls on governments to urgently impose sanctions against Geedge Networks, CEIEC and Mascots Group, its directors and related companies.
Governments must block companies and individuals in their territory from providing the illegal junta with arms, equipment, technology, technical support and jet fuel.
Justice For Myanmar spokesperson Yadanar Maung says: “Chinese companies and their Myanmar crony partners are providing the illegal junta with surveillance and censorship technology that will cost lives.
“The junta is a terrorist organisation under Myanmar law and definitions in international law that is waging a campaign of terror against the people with total impunity.
“The junta is killing, torturing and arbitrarily detaining people across Myanmar and this new Chinese technology will further aid and abet the junta’s crimes against humanity as it seeks to track down those who oppose the military’s illegitimate coup attempt.
“Geedge Networks’ censorship system is further violating the Myanmar people’s right to free expression and is part of the junta’s war on independent sources of information.
“Governments must take urgent action against the complicity of foreign and Myanmar companies in the junta’s international crimes, including through targeted sanctions.”..."
Source/publisher:
Justice For Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-19
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Freedom of opinion and expression: - the situation in Burma/Myanmar - reports, analyses, recommendations
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"The MAU tracks market prices in Central and Northern Rakhine State and Chin State. Data are collected from three vendors per product per market in the last week of each month. Data and product specifications are available online through the MPR dashboard at www.themimu.info/market-analysis-unit.
KEY FINDINGS
Rice prices rose 4-8% in May, but in general essential food prices were more stable than other product types;
Vegetables prices rose 15-37%, and recent price in-creases outpaced those at this time last year;
Hygiene NFI prices rose at their fastest rate in months, adding 16-54% on top of five months of past price hikes;
Meat/fish prices rose 6-10% in May, although recent months have seen prices falling more often than rising;
Mosquito net prices spiked in May, although NFI prices were other stable following April's sharp increases;
Hygiene NFI prices were 100-200% above last year, while other NFIs were often double 2023 levels;
Wholesale price and supply should be monitored as retailers suggest local conflict is not their only challenge;
Relentless price hikes for hygiene NFIs may be critical as prices push three-times above last year's levels.
Product-Level Price Changes
Essential Foods – Essential food prices were stable or slightly higher again in May, with rice prices up 4-8%. Rice prices fluctuated in May but trended upward slightly as retailers worried about stable access to supply. Prices for cooking oil also fluctuated but were overall 3% lower. Prices for pulses were flat after rising steadily in March and April.
Vegetables – Vegetables saw a third straight month of rising prices amid continued reports of falling supply. Prices for egg-plant and watercress rose 15-22%, and green chili prices were up 37%. Other vegetable prices fluctuated with little clear trend, although Minbya saw a number of falling prices.
Meat and Fish – Meat and fish prices rose 6-10% in May. Shrimp and fish paste prices rose 6-7% in May, while prices for chicken and dried fish rose 10%. Fresh fish prices varied by market. Retailers said reduced supply of fresh fish increased demand (and therefore prices) for substitutes like dried fish.
Hygiene Products – Hygiene product prices climbed 16-54%, marking the largest increase in six months of higher prices. Prices for sanitary pads and detergent rose 16% and 31%, respectively, while toothpaste rose 54%. Soap prices rose and fell in different markets. Multiple retailers reported rising wholesale prices for hygiene items and overall less supply than normal.
Other NFIs – NFI prices were relatively stable in May, although mosquito net prices jumped 50%. Plastic tarp prices fell in several markets but spiked 40-60% in Mrauk-U and Ponnagyun. Prices for charcoal and longyis fell 2-9%. Prices for cooking pots and mosquito nets rose, while other NFIs were stable. Retailers said Yangon supplies had begun raising mosquito net prices..."
Source/publisher:
Myanmar Information Management Unit (Myanmar) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-19
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Food Security and nutrition in Burma/Myanmar, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Arakan (Rakhine) State - reports etc. by date (latest first), Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
771.16 KB
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Description:
"The Human Rights Council this morning held an interactive dialogue with the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on his report on Myanmar, hearing that Myanmar was being suffocated by an illegitimate military regime, and of stories of horrific war tactics and brutal atrocity crimes.
Volker Türk, High Commissioner for Human Rights, said Myanmar was being suffocated by an illegitimate military regime. It was in agonising pain. This was a crisis, he said, emblematic of a decades-long legacy of military domination, the stifling of dissent, and division.
Right now, these very same dynamics were playing out in terrifying form with the Rohingya and Rakhine communities. There were stories of horrific war tactics, such as beheadings, midnight drone attacks, and the burning of homes as people slept, Mr. Türk recounted. People being shot at as they fled for their lives. The military had lost control over a considerable amount of territory. It was resorting to increasingly extreme measures: forced conscription; indiscriminate bombardment of towns and villages; and brutal atrocity crimes.
Since February 2021, at least 5,280 civilians, including 1,022 women and 667 children, had been killed at the hands of the military, Mr. Türk reported. At least 26,865 individuals had been arrested and 20,592 remained in detention. There were now three million people internally displaced by these conflicts. These and so many more of the cruel consequences of the military’s continued denial of humanitarian access remained invisible and under-reported.
He also reported witnessing a profound sense of hope. There was a new generation of young people from all ethnic communities leading the struggle to create an inclusive vision for the future of Myanmar. The international community was witnessing a people’s revolution against decades of oppression and violence. In some areas outside the military’s control, new local governance structures had emerged, supported by ethnic armed groups and activists alike. They were providing food, shelter, education and healthcare for hundreds of thousands who were otherwise receiving little to no humanitarian support.
Mr. Türk said nobody should be forcibly returned to Myanmar at this time. There needed to be an urgent rethink of how the international community could respond collectively to this unmitigated crisis. It was time to go beyond the Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ Five Point Consensus that had failed to stem the violence or restore democracy. The Association’s efforts needed to be reenergised and backed by a consortium of influential States to develop a new roadmap that could restore the destiny of Myanmar to its people.
This needed to factor in the new realities of local governance emerging on the ground, which could provide building blocks towards a democratic future from the bottom up.
Myanmar’s people needed to have a place at the table. This meant reaching out to the democracy movement and youth, involving them meaningfully in the resolution of this crisis. The new generation in Myanmar – particularly the women’s leadership that had emerged – needed to be supported in a “visioning process” for the future of the country. With more attention, more investment, more political will and more action, this situation could be turned around for a better tomorrow for the people of Myanmar.
In the ensuing debate, many speakers, among other things, said they remained deeply disturbed by the frequent and credible reports of serious violations and abuses of human rights and international law in Myanmar and the deeply deteriorating humanitarian situation. They shared the grave concerns expressed in recent statements from the High Commissioner, the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar, and the Special Rapporteur that detailed targeted attacks against civilians, including Rohingya, which had led people to flee to the Bangladesh border and hampered humanitarian access. Speakers condemned the repressive actions of the Myanmar military; all violence against civilians needed to cease.
States were called on to prevent or halt the flow of arms, military and dual-use materials to the Myanmar military. In the context of decreasing funding for the Joint Response Plan, the international community needed to keep investing in the wellbeing, safety, and dignity of Rohingya, and help realise their right to return to their homeland in Rakhine.
Some speakers said that only by upholding sovereign equality and non-involvement in internal affairs could the problems truly be solved, and human rights upheld. Repatriation was the only way out of the Rohingya crisis. Some speakers expressed concern at the ongoing politicisation of the Human Rights Council’s mandate on Myanmar and the fact that the country concerned did not consent to the process.
Speaking in the interactive debate were Australia on behalf of a group of countries, European Union, Luxembourg on behalf of a group of countries, Pakistan on behalf of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, Denmark on behalf of a group of countries, Kuwait, Ireland, Egypt, Japan, Iran, United Nations Children's Fund, Sierra Leone, Türkiye, Indonesia, Spain, France, Maldives, Switzerland, China, United States, Bangladesh, Saudi Arabia, Russian Federation, Malta, Belarus, Cyprus, Malaysia, Georgia, United Kingdom, Austria, Ghana, Venezuela, Gambia, India, Malawi, Thailand, Viet Nam and Lao People's Democratic Republic.
Also speaking were Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development, CIVICUS - World Alliance for Citizen Participation, Centre pour les Droits Civils et Politiques - Centre CCPR, Association Ma'onah for Human Rights and Immigration, Lawyers' Rights Watch Canada, Human Rights Watch, Association caritative étudiante pour la jeunesse and Legal Action Worldwide.
The webcast of the Human Rights Council meetings can be found here All meeting summaries can be found here. Documents and reports related to the Human Rights Council’s fifty-sixth regular session can be found here.
The Council will reconvene at 3 p.m. this afternoon, 18 June. It will next hold an enhanced interactive dialogue on the report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan, before commencing an interactive dialogue on the oral update of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan.
Report
The Council has before it the report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the situation of human rights of Rohingya Muslims and other minorities in Myanmar A/HRC/56/23
Presentation of Report by the High Commissioner for Human Rights
VOLKER TÜRK, United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, said Myanmar was being suffocated by an illegitimate military regime. It was in agonising pain. The disintegration of human rights continued at breakneck speed. This was a crisis emblematic of a decades-long legacy of military domination, the stifling of dissent, and division.
Right now, these very same dynamics were playing out in terrifying form with the Rohingya and Rakhine communities. There were stories of horrific war tactics, such as beheadings. Midnight drone attacks. The burning of homes as people slept. People being shot at as they fled for their lives. The military had lost control over a considerable amount of territory. It was resorting to increasingly extreme measures: forced conscription; indiscriminate bombardment of towns and villages; and brutal atrocity crimes.
Mr. Türk said he had just returned from a visit to south-east Asia, where he heard from Myanmar civil society on the spiralling regional impacts of the crisis and the urgent need for leadership and influence to halt this catastrophe. The Myanmar military continued to gain access to foreign currency and weapons it needed to sustain its campaign of terror, while international financial support for the people of Myanmar was meagre at best.
He also reported witnessing a profound sense of hope. There was a new generation of young people from all ethnic communities leading the struggle to create an inclusive vision for the future of Myanmar. Mr. Türk said he was moved by their solidarity and shared hopes. Young people had strong expectations of the international community. They sought for the extent of Myanmar’s suffering to be genuinely acknowledged and given the attention it deserved. They hoped that funding would be made available to those on the ground to deliver humanitarian assistance and services directly to communities throughout the country. They had risked their lives and livelihoods to help communities in need and resist the repression by the military. And with them, a future was possible.
The High Commissioner said the international community was witnessing a people’s revolution against decades of oppression and violence. In some areas outside the military’s control, new local governance structures had emerged, supported by ethnic armed groups and activists alike. They were providing food, shelter, education and healthcare for hundreds of thousands who were otherwise receiving little to no humanitarian support. They were delivering critically needed protection services in the complete absence of a functioning public system. The Karenni Interim Executive Council in Kayah State, for example, had created a local governance system, where seven members had been elected by the people to respond to the community’s needs. Mr. Türk called on all anti-military armed groups to ensure the protection of civilians, defectors and persons who surrendered at all times.
The people of Myanmar needed to be spared more despair, more suffering, more fear. Armed conflicts continued to rage brutally across the country, taking an increasingly grim toll on the lives of civilians. The High Commissioner’s Office was investigating several reported attacks against civilians in Rakhine state and Sagaing over recent days with large numbers of civilians allegedly killed in airstrikes, naval artillery barrages and shootings.
Mr. Türk said he was very concerned about the situation in Maungdaw. The Arakan Army this weekend gave all remaining residents – including a large Rohingya population – a warning to evacuate. But Rohingya had no options. There was nowhere to flee. Following a similar pattern in Buthidaung, where Rohingya were ordered to flee, and then the town burned, it seemed that the international community was – yet again -- about to bear witness to displacement, destruction and abuses. The military also reportedly ordered evacuation of ethnic Rakhine villages around Sittwe, where they had been conducting mass arrests in recent days.
In another instance, the village of Byaing Phyu was reportedly emptied of its several hundred residents, as the military tried to identify men of fighting age who sympathised with their armed opponent, the Arakan Army. Men were separated from women. Dozens of men were allegedly tortured, shot and killed. Multiple reports alleged that at least five women were also raped and killed in the incident. Their village was burned. Hundreds of men taken away were now missing.
In a cynical move, the military had pressured and threatened young Rohingya men to join their ranks. Some reports had indicated thousands of Rohingya youth had been conscripted into the very same forces that displaced hundreds of thousands of their community in 2016 and 2017.
In response, the Arakan Army had exhorted Rohingya to fight with them against the military. They had targeted their communities by forcibly displacing residents. On multiple occasions, they had detained or killed men of fighting age who they suspected of taking up arms against them. These tactics had brought back the shocking images and memories from 2017 of systematic terrorisation, persecution and forced displacement of populations. Today, sections of Maungdaw and Buthidaung had been alternately burned. Ethnic Rakhine houses and neighbourhoods were set alight, followed days later by the burning of Rohingya villages. Tens of thousands of civilians from these communities had been forced to flee, among them entire Rohingya communities with no guarantees of finding safe haven. Over one million Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh were still living in limbo in dire conditions, with no prospect for durable solutions.
All this in the face of binding provisional measures ordered by the International Court of Justice for the protection of Rohingya while it examined the case alleging genocide brought before it by Gambia and other Member States. Accountability, including in proceedings currently pending before the International Criminal Court, was absolutely critical. The failures to ensure accountability in Myanmar’s past transition were now allowing history to repeat itself and were haunting the present and the future. The situation in Rakhine state was – tragically – just one example of how this coup, which had resulted in three years of conflict, had brought pain and suffering to an entire country.
The attacks by the military had been, and continued to be, indiscriminate. Since February 2021, at least 5,280 civilians, including 1,022 women and 667 children, had been killed at the hands of the military. At least 26,865 individuals had been arrested and 20,592 remained in detention. There were now three million people internally displaced by these conflicts, the vast majority still without proper shelter, access to food or water, essential medicines or healthcare. These and so many more of the cruel consequences of the military’s continued denial of humanitarian access remained invisible and under-reported.
Mr. Türk said the violence needed to end. The attacks against civilians, the forced conscription and the denial of humanitarian aid needed to end. Mr. Türk urged all parties to prevent the recurrence of the atrocity crimes committed against the Rohingya in 2016 and 2017. He also called on countries in the region to ensure international protection, and provision of adequate shelter, support and long-term access to essential services to people fleeing the violence and persecution. Special provisions needed to be made for human rights defenders, who were particularly exposed and often faced transnational threats and refoulement.
Mr. Türk said nobody should be forcibly returned to Myanmar at this time. There needed to be an urgent rethink of how the international community could respond collectively to this unmitigated crisis. It was time to go beyond the Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ Five Point Consensus that had failed to stem the violence or restore democracy. The Association’s efforts needed to be reenergised and backed by a consortium of influential States to develop a new roadmap that could restore the destiny of Myanmar to its people. This needed to factor in the new realities of local governance emerging on the ground, which could provide building blocks towards a democratic future from the bottom up.
Myanmar’s people needed to have a place at the table. This meant reaching out to the democracy movement and youth, involving them meaningfully in the resolution of this crisis. The new generation in Myanmar – particularly the women’s leadership that had emerged – needed to be supported in a “visioning process” for the future of the country. With more attention, more investment, more political will and more action, this situation could be turned around for a better tomorrow for the people of Myanmar.
Discussion
In the discussion, many speakers, among other things, said they remained deeply disturbed by the frequent and credible reports of serious violations and abuses of human rights and international law in Myanmar and the deeply deteriorating humanitarian situation. They shared the grave concerns expressed in recent statements from the High Commissioner, the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar and the Special Rapporteur that detailed targeted attacks against civilians, including Rohingya, which had led people to flee to the Bangladesh border and hampered humanitarian access. Speakers condemned the repressive actions of the Myanmar military; all violence against civilians must cease.
Conflict continued to escalate across Myanmar, causing suffering across the country, including through military attacks causing civilian fatalities; aerial attacks and shelling of homes, schools, places of worship and hospitals; and mass killings, persecution, torture and sexual and gender-based violence. The forced and prolonged recruitment of conscripts, including forced recruitment of children, exacerbated the civil war and disrupted society at every level, while fuelling identity-based violence. A record 1.3 million people had been displaced, with many of them being children, facing increasing human rights violations.
Many speakers said they were deeply concerned at the resumption of hostilities in Rakhine state and at the recent reports of violence, forced displacement and property destruction against the Rohingya Muslims in Buthidaung township in Rakhine. In Rakhine state, the reported forced recruitment of Rohingya was further dividing communities, and bringing to the surface deep-seated ethnic tensions and mistrust, making it increasingly dangerous for all civilians. Since February, Myanmar security forces had press ganged as many as 5,000 Rohingya men and boys from across Rakhine. Thus, Rohingya who had been denied citizenship and basic freedoms under the military’s system of apartheid were being forced unlawfully to fight on the junta’s behalf. Grave concern was expressed at the forced recruitment and use of Rohingya as a human shield by the warring parties in Rakhine. It was vital to immediately put an end to this illegal conscription and allow Rohingya already conscripted to return home.
Speakers underscored the International Court of Justice’s provisional measures order from 23 January 2020 and the urgent need for compliance with it. Without accountability, there could be no lasting peace. Some speakers welcomed the appointment of the Special Envoy of the United Nations Secretary-General on Myanmar, Julie Bishop. Bangladesh was commended for hosting the Rohingya refugees, as well as Gambia for its efforts to hold the perpetrators accountable at the International Criminal Court of Justice. Some speakers reiterated their willingness to work with Gambia and like-minded countries to bring justice to the Rohingya.
Some speakers said the Myanmar issue was very complex. Only by upholding sovereign equality and non-involvement in internal affairs could the problems truly be solved, and human rights upheld. Repatriation was the only way out of the Rohingya crisis. Some speakers expressed concern at the ongoing politicisation of the Human Rights Council’s mandate on Myanmar and the fact that the country concerned did not consent to the process. Some information from the Myanmar Government had not been included in the report, a speaker said, meaning the report provided a distorted reality of the situation on the ground.
Many speakers urged all conflicting parties to protect the Rohingya Muslims and ensure their safety and security. They called for an immediate end to all violations and abuses against civilians, the provision of full and unhindered humanitarian access, the release of all political prisoners, and an inclusive dialogue with meaningful participation of all stakeholders. All parties, in particular the Myanmar military, needed to allow complete, safe and unhindered humanitarian access to all persons in need and ensure the protection of civilians.
States were called on to prevent or halt the flow of arms, military and dual-use materials to the Myanmar military. In the context of decreasing funding in Joint Response Plan, the international community needed to keep investing in the wellbeing, safety, and dignity of Rohingya, and help realise their right to return to their homeland in Rakhine. The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights needed to closely monitor the situation in Rakhine and play an active role in pursuing a durable solution to the crisis, including through contributing to accountability processes.
Many speakers reiterated their resolute support for the people of Myanmar. Ensuring justice and accountability for all human rights violations and abuses, committed by any actor, was crucial, and in this regard, the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar was vital. Speakers reiterated their support for this important mechanism. Among questions, speakers asked the High Commissioner to provide more information on the unique needs of women and girls who were internally displaced and what could be done to strengthen their protection? How instrumental was the flow of dual-use goods and jet fuel to committing human rights violations and abuses? What else could be done to ensure accountability of perpetrators of grave violations of international human rights and humanitarian law, which, despite all the processes initiated at the international level, was still being committed?
Concluding Remarks by the High Commissioner
VOLKER TÜRK, United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, in concluding remarks, said the response to the crisis was cross-regional. The message to the military in Myanmar was that the world was watching and urgent action needed to be taken. This was an issue that had regional and global implications. The violence had affected a large percentage of Myanmar’s townships. There were over 18 million people in need of urgent humanitarian assistance and 25 million living below the poverty line. There were over a million refugees being hosted in Bangladesh, and hundreds of thousands in other neighbouring countries. This was a crisis that had international implications.
Many women and girls had been killed by the military since the start of the coup. Women had been sentenced to death. Half of the internally displaced population were women and girls. They had limited access to shelter and food. The humanitarian response needed to be stepped up and there needed to be more creativity in how it was delivered. It needed to avoid all military channels. The non-military channels needed to be increased massively. The support of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations needed to be built up and United Nations support needed to be strengthened. Neither the Arakan Army nor the military would protect the Rohingya. All human rights violations needed to be properly documented. The impact of airstrikes on the civilian population was horrendous. Airstrikes had claimed at least 362 civilians since last August.
There were governance structures at the local level providing essential services. There needed to be creative models developed to support these structures. There were capacities at the local level to forge a new Myanmar society. Women’s leadership was essential in this regard.
The International Court of Justice and International Criminal Court processes were essential for ensuring accountability. Mr. Türk congratulated Gambia for pursuing these processes. He also called for support for the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar. The Security Council needed to broaden its mandate on the situation in Myanmar.
More efforts needed to be devoted to ensuring that hate speech and disinformation on the issue was not prevalent on social media. It was possible to reconstruct community cohesion. Mr. Türk said that he had in his most recent visit to the region been able to visit with refugees from all affected groups; this had not been possible in the past. There needed to be a stepping up of international support to respond to this deeply worrying situation in the country.
Produced by the United Nations Information Service in Geneva for use of the information media; not an official record.
English and French versions of our releases are different as they are the product of two separate coverage teams that work independently..."
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UN Human Rights Council (Geneva)
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2024-06-18
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"18 June 2024: SAC-M is seriously concerned over the impact on civilians of armed conflict in Maungdaw township, northern Rakhine state, after the United League of Arakan / Arakha Army (AA) issued an advanced notice and emergency announcement on 16 June 2024 warning of imminent assaults on remaining Myanmar military junta camps in Maungdaw and advising all residents to evacuate Maungdaw immediately.
The majority of civilians in Maungdaw are Rohingya, many of whom are already displaced due to armed conflict and attacks in other parts of northern Rakhine state. In recent weeks, all communities in Rakhine have reportedly suffered human rights violations and violations of international humanitarian law at the hands of the Myanmar military junta, the AA and other armed actors. Rohingya in northern Rakhine again find themselves at heightened risk of being subjected to human rights atrocities.
SAC-M emphasises that all armed actors have obligations under international humanitarian law to ensure the protection of civilians at all times during armed conflict. Issuing evacuation notices does not absolve actors of these obligations. The obligation to protect civilians during armed conflict extends to ensuring unhindered access to humanitarian assistance. The AA leadership has claimed it is committed to the protection of civilians.
Today, the United Nations (UN) High Commissioner for Human Rights presented his most recent report on the situation in Myanmar to the UN Human Rights Council during its 56th session. The High Commissioner expressed his concern about the situation in Maungdaw and emphasised that the Rohingya have nowhere left to flee. Member States of the Council will adopt an annual resolution during the session on the rights of Rohingya and other minorities in Myanmar.
The Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar (IIMM) continues to collect evidence of the most serious violations of international law in Myanmar. This is not limited to violations allegedly committed by the military junta.
SAC-M calls again on the international community to take urgent steps to address impunity in Myanmar and advance accountability, by securing a jurisdiction where the evidence collected by the IIMM can be used in criminal prosecutions. The Security Council or the assembly of state parties to the Rome Statute should refer the situation in Myanmar to the International Criminal Court (ICC). The National Unity Government of Myanmar (NUG) accepted the jurisdiction of the ICC in Myanmar in 2021, but the Court has not acted on this. If the ICC cannot be seized on the situation in Myanmar, then the international community should establish a special international criminal tribunal for Myanmar.
The military junta is by far the primary source of violence and violations of international law in Myanmar, including alleged genocide committed against the Rohingya. Rohingya in Myanmar are at ongoing risk of genocide, according to an interim ruling ordered by the International Court of Justice in 2020. The junta has continued to target Rohingya in Rakhine, including by using Rohingya as human shields and forcibly conscripting Rohingya into the armed conflict.
The AA is reported to have committed serious attacks against Rohingya in Buthidaung township, which neighbours Maungdaw, in May 2024, killing an estimated 1,500 people and displacing 200,000, according to Rohingya activists. The evacuation notice of 16 June and impending attacks in Maungdaw, and rhetoric of senior members of the AA, give cause for concern over a possible intention on the part of the AA to forcibly transfer the Rohingya population from Rakhine state..."
Source/publisher:
Special Advisory Council for Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-18
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Human Rights and international relations, Arakan (Rakhine) State - reports etc. by date (latest first), Discrimination against the Rohingya
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"As we convene here in the Council, yet again discussing Myanmar, we are bearing witness to a country being suffocated by an illegitimate military regime. Myanmar is in agonizing pain. And the disintegration of human rights continues at breakneck speed. This is a crisis emblematic of a decades-long legacy of military domination, the stifling of dissent, and division,” Türk told the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva.
“And right now, these very same dynamics are playing out in terrifying form with the Rohingya and Rakhine communities.We are hearing stories of horrific war tactics, such as beheadings. Midnight drone attacks. The burning of homes as people sleep. People being shot at as they flee for their lives,” he said.
“The military has lost control over a considerable amount of territory. So it is resorting to increasingly extreme measures. Forced conscription. Indiscriminate bombardment of towns and villages. Brutal atrocity crimes,” the High Commissioner said.
“The Myanmar military continues to gain access to foreign currency and weapons it needs to sustain its campaign of terror, while international financial support for the people of Myanmar is meagre at best,” Turk said.
On a recent visit to Southeast Asia, the High Commissioner met with Myanmar civil society to discuss the spiralling regional impacts and the urgent need for leadership and influence to halt the catastrophe in Myanmar.
In Malaysia, he met with representatives of almost all ethnic communities from Myanmar, noting that a few years ago, it would have been unthinkable to meet with Rohingya and other ethnic communities around one table.
“I also witnessed a profound sense of hope. In my discussions with Myanmar civil society, human rights defenders and refugee communities, it was clear to see there is a new generation of young people from all ethnic communities leading the struggle to create an inclusive vision for the future of Myanmar,” he said.
“We are witnessing a people’s revolution against decades of oppression and violence,” Türk said.
In some areas outside the military’s control, new local governance structures have emerged, supported by ethnic armed groups and activists alike. They are providing food, shelter, education and healthcare for hundreds of thousands who are otherwise receiving little to no humanitarian support. And they are delivering critically needed protection services in the complete absence of a functioning public system.
Armed conflicts continue to rage brutally across the country, taking an increasingly grim toll on the lives of civilians, Türk said. The UN Human Rights Office is investigating several reported attacks against civilians in Rakhine State and Sagaing over recent days with large numbers of civilians allegedly killed -- in airstrikes, naval artillery barrages and shootings.
In a cynical move, the military has pressured and threatened young Rohingya men to join their ranks. Some reports have indicated thousands of Rohingya youth have been conscripted into the very same forces that displaced hundreds of thousands of their community in 2016 and 2017.
In response, the Arakan Army has exhorted Rohingya to fight with them against the military. They have targeted their communities by forcibly displacing residents. On multiple occasions, they have detained or killed men of fighting age who they suspected of taking up arms against them.
“These tactics have brought back the shocking images and memories from 2017 of systematic terrorisation, persecution and forced displacement of populations,” the High Commissioner said.
And tens of thousands of civilians from these communities have been forced to flee, among them entire Rohingya communities with no guarantees of finding safe haven. Over one million Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh are still living in limbo in dire conditions, with no prospect for durable solutions.
“The violence must end. The attacks against civilians must end. The forced conscription must end. And the denial of humanitarian aid must end,” Türk said..."
Source/publisher:
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-18
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Human Rights and international relations, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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"In eerie echoes of the brutality of Pol Pot’s Khmer Rouge, the Myanmar military junta is killing and torturing people as it desperately tries to hang on to power in a country inaptly dubbed the “Golden Land”.
Just over the last couple of weeks, the horrific story has been exposed of a brutal and vicious massacre of over 50 people in the village Byai Phyu, which is just outside the Rakhine State capital of Sittwe. This is one of many massacres and killings since the 2021 military coup, displaying the brutality of this “Pol Pot-like regime” that appears to hate its countrymen and women. Myanmar coup leader Min Aung Hlaing appears to encourage this horrific behaviour of his troops.
More than 170 soldiers are believed to have raided the village Byai Phyu as part of operations to tackle the Arakan Army (AA) that has grabbed a number of towns and junta military positions in Rakhine.
Witnesses told the media that everyone in the village, which has just over 1,000 households, were kept out in the open for two days, under the sun, with little or nothing to eat or drink, while dozens of men were tied, blindfolded and some taken away in trucks for further interrogation. Many are yet to return.
According to a BBC report, men who had tattoos showing support for the AA were singled out for especially harsh treatment, locals said. One eyewitness said the soldiers cut out the tattooed skin, poured petrol onto it and set it alight. Men were taken away one by one, brutalized and shot. Several women were gang-raped. Valuables were looted. Another eyewitness recalled an army officer telling the villagers he had come from the fighting in northern Shan State, where the military suffered heavy losses under Operation 1027 late last year, to take his revenge on them.
The National Unity Government (NUG) said in a statement that 51 people aged between 15 and 70 were “violently tortured and killed”. The AA estimates the death toll to be more than 70 people.
The Myanmar junta has denied the accusations, but it is clear that this is yet another massacre perpetrated by soldiers on civilians, displaying a level of brutality on a par with Pol Pot and the Killing Fields of Cambodia.
“Myanmar’s Year Zero” is happening in front of our eyes – unlike the killings in Cambodia from 1975 to 1979 that took place behind a security curtain and media blackout. Independent media reported Myanmar’s Byai Phyu massacre a day after it happened, details beginning to emerge a day or two later. Various organizations including the United Nations have spoken out. But it appears tough to hold the Myanmar junta accountable. The junta has no honour and no soul, using their troops to raise fear amongst the population.
“Vicious cruelty” is how the AA referred to this massacre. While some might argue that comparing Min Aung Hlaing to Pol Pot – responsible for the murder of close to 2 million Cambodians – doesn’t quite fit, anybody hearing the testimony of the survivors of the Byai Phyu massacre will recognize the similarly between the brutality of the Khmer Rouge and the brutality of the Myanmar junta soldiers. They are perpetrating horrific crimes against humanity, a clear breaking of the laws of war..."
Source/publisher:
"Mizzima"
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-16
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Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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The hard-hit middle class is searching for a place to park what’s left of their assets after three years of war.
Description:
"The rumors were everywhere: A politically connected crony, U Thein Wai, better known as Serge Pun, was called in for questioning.
While he was not arrested, the military’s questioning of the CEO of Yoma Bank and eight directors of other subsidiaries under his control is another indicator of just how dire Myanmar’s economic situation is.
The 71-year old Sino-Burmese tycoon sits atop a massive business empire of some 50 different interrelated companies. The most important of these are First Myanmar Investment Company (FMI), Serge Pun and Associates (SPA), and, of course, Yoma Bank.
While largely invested in real estate through Yoma Land, SPA is one of the largest conglomerates in the country, with investments in real estate, construction, banking and financial services, Suzuki automobile assembly, the KFC franchise and healthcare.
Yoma Bank is one of the largest private banks in Myanmar and has been in important overseas conduit, especially after the US government sanctioned two state banks in June 2023.
Yoma Bank has ties to the military, lending to both the military-owned Mytel and Pinnacle Asia, which is owned by Min Aung Hlaing’s daughter, Khin Thiri Thet Mon.
In November 2022, the State Administrative Council, as the junta is formally called, bestowed on him the honorific Thiri Pyanchi, granted for outstanding performance.
Pun’s ties to the military are deep enough that the World Bank’s International Finance Corporation divested their 4.55% equity stake in Yoma Bank in December 2022, selling it to FMI.
This is not to say that Pun has been completely pro-military. Compared to other cronies, he’s been much less so. He’s hedged his bets and incorporated holdings in Singapore and Hong Kong. Arguably he would be a lot wealthier were it not for the coup, but he’s worked within the reality of the coup.
So what prompted the Office of the Chief of Military Security Affairs, the feared military intelligence service, to come calling?
In short, facilitating capital flight.
Real estate roadshow
In late May, a group of five executives of a real estate firm, Minn Thu Co., held an unauthorized roadshow, selling Bangkok condominiums. Minn Thu had allegedly established unauthorized bank accounts in Thailand to facilitate the sales.
Thai real estate is being pitched to Burmese as a safe investment at a time when the kyat has fallen to a record low of over 5,000 kyat per dollar, while soaring inflation eats into the currency’s purchasing power.
Gold has reached record rates: 5.8 million kyat per tical (15.2 grams, .54 oz) – 4.5 times the pre-coup rate of 1.3 million kyat. Over 20 gold dealers have been arrested recently, accused of engaging in speculation.
The beleaguered middle class is desperately searching for a place to park what’s left of their assets after more than three years of conflict.
Four of the five businessmen who staged the roadshow have been arrested, and one other executive is at large.
To serve as a deterrent to others, the junta arrested three people who purchased the condos, having illegally transferred assets overseas.
Yoma Bank is believed to have assisted in financing the purchases by transferring assets to Bangkok in violation of the junta’s currency controls.
Military intelligence officials are also investigating whether Yoma Bank is offering what are de facto mortgages for overseas real estate, as an investment vehicle, in contravention of Myanmar law.
In recent days, the junta has expanded their investigation into over 100,000 private bank transfers.
Capital flight began immediately after the coup. Radio Free Asia reported the purchase of THB2.5 billion (US$69 million) and THB 3.7 billion (US$100 million) in Thai real estate in 2022 and 2023, respectively.
In the first quarter of 2024, Burmese were the second largest group of foreign nationals to invest in Thai real estate, according to the Bangkok Post, having purchased at least 384 units, worth THB2.2 billion ($60 million).
Estimates, though, are far higher, as many properties are believed to have been purchased using Thai nominees.
Focus on funds
And of course, the revelation that junta leader Min Aung Hlaing’s own children have moved their own assets to Thailand was a huge embarrassment for the regime. Aung Pyae Sone owns a condominium worth around $1 million in Bangkok, while Khin Thiri Thet Mon has two accounts at Siam Commercial Bank.
Reports are emerging that Khin Sri Thet Mon purchased a condo in the ultra swank SCOPE Langsuan, which was completed in May 2023, and where a three bedroom unit sells for $4.2 million to over $15 million.
The SAC has deployed uniformed personnel to both public and private banks since mid-2021 to block transfers to the civil disobedience movement, the National Unity Government, and ethnic resistance organizations. But soon after that, they also began monitoring capital flight.
The junta is increasingly cracking down on the informal banking sector, known as hundi, that is used by at least 40 percent of overseas workers.
In early June, the regime froze the accounts of 39 additional hundi dealers, following the crackdown on 20 others in January.
The hundi system keeps desperately needed foreign exchange out of the formal banking system, where people and companies are forced to convert it to kyat at artificially low exchange rates.
Given the state of the economy, capital flight is the rational choice for Burmese with the means..
The World Bank has reported on the dire state of the economy, which has shrunk by nearly 20% since the coup. The poverty rate is now 32%, while 2024 GDP growth estimates have been halved to 1%.
The NUG estimates that the junta has printed 30 trillion kyat (US$11.5 billion) since the coup, a leading – though not the only – cause of inflation, which is now at 30%. The kyat has lost 22% of its value.
Public debt is soaring. Currently at 63% of GDP, compared to 42% under the ousted Aung San Su Kyi government, and it is expected to worsen as revenue collection is collapsing.
A recent report by the Special Advisory Council-Myanmar shows that only one of 51 townships that have border crossings is under stable junta control, with four more under their proxy militias, which has led to a loss of significant amounts of customs duties.
Pinching trade
More importantly, the junta has restricted the volume of trade that can be transacted in local currencies. The World Bank reported that exports fell by 13% and imports by 20% in the first six months of 2024, but that cross border exports, except for gas, fell by 44%, while imports fell by 71%.
In early June, the junta announced further restrictions and controls on importers to stop the outflow of hard currency.
Military losses have forced the Ministry of Oil and Gas Enterprise to abandon two oil fields. Oil and gas production generates some $1.5 billion, half of the regime’s foreign exchange earnings.
Meanwhile, attempts to increase the number of tourists have largely faltered..."
Source/publisher:
"Radio Free Asia" (USA)
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-16
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Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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"Highlights
• More than 3.1 million people have been internally displaced, including 112,000 in the past month. They remain in precarious conditions and in need of life-saving assistance.
• 18,929 children were provided with access to formal and non-formal education including early learning; more than 43,000 people were reached with clean drinking water; and lifesaving child protection services reached more than 34,000 people during the month of April.
• In areas with heightened conflict, the need for access to services continues to increase while the cost of programme delivery is also increasing in a resource constrained environment.
• Underfunding remains a significant constraint with only 11 per cent of against the Humanitarian Action for Children (HAC) Appeal requirement being received. Timely and sufficient funding is crucial in providing immediate assistance for children and their families, especially with the onset of the monsoon season.
Situation in Numbers
6,000,000
children in need of humanitarian assistance
18,600,000
people in need (HAC 2024)
2,830,200
Internally displaced people since 1 February 2021
64,600
People displaced to neighbouring countries since 1 February 2021 (UNHCR, 03 June 2024)
289,000
displacement before February 2021
Funding Overview and Partnerships
UNICEF Myanmar Country Office has appealed for US$ 208.3 million in 2024 to address the needs of 3.1 million people, including an estimated 2.1 million children. As of 31 May 2024, UNICEF’s funding level remains unchanged at US$ 23.1 million (11.1 per cent of its appealed funding), comprising of US$9.9 million received for the current year and US$13.2 million carried forward from the previous year.
In 2024, UNICEF has received generous funding support from the Government of Japan, the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) as well as internal allocations from global humanitarian thematic funding. Additionally, UNICEF also acknowledges the contributions previously made by the Australia’s DFAT, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), USAID’s Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance (BHA), the European Commission’s Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations Department (DG ECHO), the Government of Canada, the Government of Japan, the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), the Government of Norway, the Royal Thai Government, the Czech Committee for UNICEF, the French Committee for UNICEF, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) along with the CERF and the Myanmar Country-Based Pooled Fund (CBPF). Moreover, in 2024, UNICEF Myanmar also received an internal loan from the Emergency Programme Fund (EPF) to support the humanitarian response, following a similar grant received the previous year.
With these resources, UNICEF and its partners are delivering humanitarian services in nutrition, health, HIV/AIDS, water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH), education, child protection, gender-based violence in emergencies (GBViE), social protection and cash-based programming. UNICEF is also providing humanitarian leadership and cluster coordination and is strengthening protection against sexual exploitation and abuse (PSEA), social behaviour-change and accountability to affected populations. However, UNICEF capacity to deliver these services is severely limited by the funding gap of 89 per cent which has remained unchanged over the last two months. Without the funding for these resources, targeted populations, especially children, who need basic social services, will not be able to receive assistance. UNICEF continues its efforts to mobilize resources and expresses its sincere appreciation to all private and public sector donors for their contributions to supporting the children of Myanmar.
Situation Overview & Humanitarian Needs
Armed conflict has been escalating across Myanmar, and more than 3.1 million people are internally displaced in precarious conditions and in need of life-saving assistance. This includes more than 112,000 people displaced since the end of April. The protection situation of children who are suffering grave violations of their rights remains of great concern. Humanitarian assistance is significantly challenged due to access restriction, roadblocks at checkpoints, high commodity prices, transportation costs, banking issues and forced recruitment by different armed groups.
In northern Rakhine, armed conflict between the Arakan Army and the Myanmar Armed Forces (MAF) intensified, particularly in Buthidaung and Maungdaw, and also expanded to southern townships such as Ann and Thandwe and Toungup townships. Clashes have been escalating with artillery shelling, gunfire, airstrikes and bombardment from the sea. This has severely affected both the Rakhine and Rohingya communities, resulting in casualties, multiple displacements, and the destruction of property. More than185,000 people have been displaced across Rakhine since November 2023. Taking into account those displaced earlier in the conflict, the total displacement in Rakhine numbers more than 402,000 people at the end of May. Protection concerns and rights violations have increased. An unverified number of houses in Buthidaung and Maungdaw were set on fire including humanitarian facilities and properties of humanitarian staff were also impacted. Artillery shelling hit a hospital in Buthidaung which was sheltering displaced people, and at least one hospital and one school were bombed in Kyauktaw township.
An estimated 420,000 basic education students will miss formal classes if schools in the conflict-affected townships are not able to open as usual. Routine immunization was stopped in most of the central and northern part of Rakhine for six months. An estimated 1.6 million people could be without access to hospital care in central and northern Rakhine. Restrictions on access and on the movement of supplies, plus the closure of roads and waterways continue to hamper the humanitarian response. There are increased reports of water scarcity across the state including in Pauktaw, Ponnagyun and Myebon. There are shortages of food and essential items, life-saving medicine and therapeutic nutrition commodities and increasing prices, especially in the conflict-affected townships.
The armed conflict in Kachin State has significant developments in May 2024, resulting in substantial changes in the control areas of the ethnic armed organizations/Kachin Independence Army and MAF. This conflict has led to an influx of internally displaced persons (IDPs) across the state, particularly in the townships of Myitkyina, Waingmaw, Bhamo, Tanai, Mansi, Hpakant and Mohnyin during April and May 2024. The state is home to more than 150,000 IDPs (protracted and new) in more than 142 sites and host communities, lacking the means of survival and livelihoods. The humanitarian operations in Bhamo, Tani, Mansi, Shwegu, Mohnyin and Waingmaw townships are facing severe challenges due to fighting and limited access. The numerous checkpoints by different actors along the line from Yangon to Myitkyina impose arbitrary taxes and have significantly impacted supply movements into, and within, the state. In some parts of the state, there is still a need to conduct rapid needs assessments. However, shelter, WASH, food and protection have been identified as the most urgent humanitarian needs. UNICEF, along with its partners, has been working to provide WASH, health and nutrition services, education and child protection services for the newly displaced people. Despite these efforts, there are still significant unmet needs.
In the southeast, the escalation of armed conflict continued throughout the region, particularly in Kawkareik and around Hpa-An districts in Kayin state, and there have been intense armed conflicts in Tanintharyi, Mon and Bago east. As a result, the number of displaced people in this region has increased to around 660,000, the highest increase here since 2021 and highly likely to continue to increase the displacement as the conflict escalates.
In the northwest, armed clashes have continued, resulting in the displacement of more than 1.5 million people. In addition, in early May, strong winds and heavy rains damaged or destroyed about 400 homes, temporary shelters and other structures. The main road from Kalay to Hakha is still blocked, there are unstable phone and internet connections and reportedly increasing the arbitrary arrests of young people for the military service.
The approaching monsoon season with a heightened risk of cyclones and floods further increases the risks faced by the vulnerable population. Already strong winds and heavy rain has impacted multiple locations in recent months damaging infrastructure. If a cyclone with a scale similar to that of last year hits Myanmar this year, its impact would be even more devastating for the populations whose coping capacity continues to be eroded by the escalating conflict and the increasing socio-economic hardships..."
Source/publisher:
UN Children's Fund (New York) via Reliefweb (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-16
[field_licence]
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Individual Documents
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UNICEF (United Nations Children's Fund), Education in Burma/Myanmar - general, Food Security and nutrition in Burma/Myanmar, Public Health, Human Rights and international relations
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"Bangladesh: Low voter turnout and partisan violence mar local body elections
Bangladesh recorded an increase in political violence in May compared to the month prior, coinciding with the first three phases of polling for the upazila parishad (sub-district council) elections; the final phase is scheduled for 5 June.1 The principal opposition party, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), boycotted the elections alongside other parties, calling them “farcical” and questioning the Election Commission’s independence.2 The boycott left electoral competition between rival factions within the ruling Awami League (AL), which has precluded candidates from using the party’s official electoral symbol in an attempt to make the polls more competitive.3 During the first three phases of polling, which had low voter turnout, deadly clashes between supporters of rival candidates led to dozens of injuries and at least four fatalities. While most clashes took place between rival AL or independent candidates, isolated clashes between supporters of the AL and BNP also occurred, even as some BNP leaders contesting in defiance of the party diktat were expelled.4 The BNP’s decision to boycott these elections follows their boycott of the general elections held in January 2024, when the party had led nationwide demonstrations over its concerns regarding the Election Commission’s ability to hold free and fair elections under the incumbent AL government.5
For more, see ACLED’s report on The Violent Politics of Bangladesh’s 2024 Elections.
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India: General elections continue amid partisan violence and claims of voter suppression
India’s 18th general elections continued in May, with polling for four of the scheduled seven phases spread across the month ahead of a final round of voting that was held on 1 June.6 Amid the elections, the states of West Bengal and Uttar Pradesh saw increases in political violence, where the majority of voting was completed in May. In West Bengal, which often has high levels of partisan violence, a significant amount of violence was related to inter-party clashes and the targeting of rival politicians, with the majority of clashes taking place between supporters of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), the incumbent party in the national government, and the Trinamool Congress (TMC), the ruling party at the state level. In Nandigram city, the killing of a female BJP leader on 22 May, days before polling for the sixth phase, prompted violent demonstrations. While the victim’s family blamed the TMC for her death, the TMC claimed that it was the result of a factional feud within the BJP.7
In Uttar Pradesh, allegations of voter suppression, mainly targeting the Muslim community, threatened the election’s integrity. Outside polling centers in Sambhal district, police personnel were accused of assaulting Muslims and stealing their identification cards, preventing them from voting. Opposition politicians alleged that this harassment was designed to benefit the Hindu nationalist BJP’s electoral chances.8
For more on the unrest around the 2024 Indian elections, see ACLED’s Special Election Series on India.
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Myanmar: Civilians subject to military airstrikes and retaliation
Military airstrikes and retaliation targeting civilians continued in the month of May in Mandalay, Magway, and Sagaing regions. On 9 May, the military conducted an airstrike on a monastery compound in Saw township where local businessmen and National Unity Government-affiliated administrators were gathering to discuss trade and checkpoint taxation, killing at least 16 people.9 Two days later, the military used bombs and machine gun fire during three airstrikes on the Ma Gyi Oke village school in Tabayin township, where locals, including anti-military resistance group members, were gathering to access Starlink internet, killing seven people and injuring 23 others.10 Locals believe the military acted with precise intelligence of the gatherings, deliberately targeting them. Dozens of people are reported to have been killed in more than 30 airstrikes that hit Magway and Sagaing regions in May.
Meanwhile, the military carried out multiple retaliatory ground assaults on civilians in Mandalay, Magway, and Sagaing regions. In Myinmu township, the military shot and killed at least 30 men in Let Htoke Taw village monastery after they failed to reveal a local defense force’s camp location on 11 May.11 The military claimed they entered the village in retaliation for a resistance group attack against a military convoy en route from the Wanbao copper mining project a few days prior.12 This also followed a deadly clash in Myingyan township in which several resistance groups coordinated an attack on suspected pro-military Pyu Saw Htee militia members in Son village on 9 May. At least 30 people were reportedly killed in the crossfire.13 Ten more locals, including some children, were then tortured and killed in other retaliatory attacks in Paungbyin and Myingyan townships on 17 May.
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New Caledonia: Proposed electoral reforms trigger deadly rioting
Proposed voting reforms triggered weeks of rioting in New Caledonia that left at least nine people dead, including two gendarmeries. Riots broke out after the French National Assembly approved a proposal on 13 May that would unfreeze the list of eligible voters in New Caledonia for the provincial electoral body and open it to people who have lived in the country for at least 10 years.14 The violence led the French government to declare a state of emergency on 15 May and deploy 3,000 troops from mainland France.15 New Caledonia’s airport also closed, prompting foreign governments to stage military evacuation flights for stranded tourists.16 The proposed electoral reform is opposed by members of the Indigenous Kanak independence movement in New Caledonia, which sees it as an attempt to dilute Kanak voting power and undermine future possibilities of independence.17 This is the largest and deadliest outbreak of rioting in New Caledonia since ACLED coverage began in 2021.
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Papua New Guinea: Deadly communal violence breaks out in Bogia, Madang province
In Madang province, an attempted robbery escalated into deadly communal violence in Bogia district. In mid-May, robbers seized a motorized boat on the Ramu River, reportedly believing its occupants were carrying cash from selling vanilla and cocoa. After finding none, they plunged the passengers into the water and disembarked. The incident led to a series of violent confrontations involving people from Dakit, Guaia, and Kumnug villages, which reportedly saw five people beheaded and one shot dead, and 20 houses torched.18 Security personnel intervened in some of the violence and detained six suspects.19 While responsibility for the initial attacks remains unclear, several gangs, including the Het Wara Gang and Albu Youths Gang, have operated in Mandang, carrying out killings, rapes, and mass displacements.20
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**Thailand: **Violence in the Deep South continued with tactical and symbolic actions
The Deep South remains persistently volatile, with suspected separatists maintaining heightened levels of activity for the second consecutive month following an upswing in activity during Ramadan. On 6 May, a bomb concealed in a gas tank attached to a stolen motorcycle was triggered in Bang Nak, Narathiwat city, injuring nine people, including two public health officers. The attack was claimed by state authorities to have been intended to cause fear and sabotage tourism revenues.21 On 16 May, separatists set fire to car tires and CCTV cameras in eight locations of Rueso District, Narathiwat Province, coinciding with the 29th anniversary of the Patani Islamic Mujahideen Movement (GMIP).22 Founded by the late Jehkumir Kuteh, the GMIP has a history of political violence but has been relatively inactive since 2004. Violence in the Deep South often increases at times of peace discussions between separatists and the state, but it is unclear if the events in May are related to any existing dialogue.23
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Taiwan: Nationwide protests erupt in opposition to KMT-backed legislative reform bill
On 21 May, in one of the largest peaceful protest movements seen in Taiwan in the last decade, over 30,000 people, including representatives from over 40 civic groups, protested at the Legislative Yuan in Taipei.24 The crowds protested against a legislative reform bill, backed by opposition Kuomintang (KMT) and Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) parties, that expands the power of parliament. The bill’s proponents are attempting to push it through the Legislative Yuan without consultation with the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). The bill would allow legislators to unilaterally question, or demand information from, any government official, including newly inaugurated president Lai Ching-te. It also contains a ‘contempt of legislature’ clause that could punish those under investigation for asking questions or behaving in any way deemed to be non-compliant.25 Protesters brandished sunflowers along with their placards and banners — echoing the historic sunflower movement in 2014, which saw hundreds of thousands demonstrating against a trade agreement similarly forced through the legislature by the KMT.26 Protesters returned to the Legislative Yuan on 24 May in a crowd of up to 100,000 people and in lesser numbers in Kaohsiung, Chiayi City, Tainan City, Changhua City, Taichung City, Magong City, and Taitung City.27..."
Source/publisher:
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-14
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
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"During a critical briefing on June 13th, Wiroj expressed concerns that the army's drone capability is falling behind in confronting modern-day threats in Thailand’s western border areas. Highlighting the urgency, he noted that while the army plans to procure an additional fleet of 10 drones for fiscal 2025, this number is insufficient to counteract current security threats.
Wiroj pointed out that both Myanmar’s Tatmadaw troops and various armed ethnic groups operating in the region already employ advanced drone technology. These include attack drones armed with missiles and surveillance drones, posing significant challenges to Thai security forces, who currently rely solely on surveillance drones.
Expressing frustration, Wiroj stated, "The Thai army does not possess any attack drones and faces immense difficulties due to the variety of drones it uses from different countries, such as Israel, Turkey, and China, which complicates tactical coordination during field missions."
Moreover, Wiroj revealed that drug and human traffickers in the border areas are increasingly using drones to locate authorities, further complicating the security situation.
Equally troubling is the lack of anti-drone weapons within the army’s current arsenal. This shortage leaves gaps in the army's capability to neutralize hostile drones, hence increasing their vulnerability.
In addition, Wiroj mentioned funding concerns, noting that the 40 million baht allocated for repairing the army's wheeled personnel carriers in fiscal 2025 is grossly inadequate. These rough-terrain combat vehicles are crucial for maintaining security along the expansive 2,400-kilometre Thai-Myanmar border.
Wiroj's revelations paint a troubling picture of the Thai army’s preparedness and highlight the growing need for technological enhancement and funding to address evolving security challenges in the region..."
Source/publisher:
ASEAN Now
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-14
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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"1. Overview & Key Messages
Key Messages
• Escalating conflict across Myanmar is driving growing humanitarian needs, surging displacement, worsening food insecurity, grave human rights violations and deadly protection threats to civilians.
• The country is now littered with landmines and unexploded ordnance from the daily aerial bombardment that is being inflicted on communities in contested areas.
• Aid workers have proven their resilience in finding ways to overcome the heavy access blockages being imposed on their work. They have shown they are able to deliver, even in the most conflict-affected parts of the country through strong partnerships with local responders.
• Humanitarians reached 3.2 million people in 2023 and already in 2024, almost 950,000 people have received life-saving assistance in all corners of the country and under different areas of control.
• But this is not enough. Partners have capacity to do more but for this they require more resources and expanded humanitarian diplomacy with all parties and with Myanmar’s neighbours to secure facilitated access at-scale.
• The Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan is just 12 per cent funded almost half-way into the year.
• Without an urgent injection of funds aid agencies will soon be forced to make impossible choices about cuts to planned assistance that will risk the lives of millions of people in severe need.
Almost half-way through 2024, Myanmar faces a worsening humanitarian crisis characterized by escalating armed conflict, massive displacement, grave human rights violations and significant protection risks for its civilian population. After finalization of the 2024 Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan (HNRP) and related planning figures, the country entered a dangerous new chapter with fighting erupting across large swathes of the country, well beyond the levels expected for 2024. Systematic rights violations, breaches of International Humanitarian Law, denial of access to life-saving services, indiscriminate use of weapons in populated areas, and protection threats, including forced recruitment, have left the population in fear of their lives, with many fleeing for safety.
Access to vital services including health and education has been crippled by fighting in the most heavily affected parts of the country where these are needed most. The expansion of fighting since October 2023 and the implementation of a long-standing national conscription law have triggered unforeseen levels of displacement both within the country and across borders. This has brought a new regional dimension to the crisis that demands novel approaches to engagement with Myanmar’s neighbours. The total number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) has surpassed 3 million people as of June, which is equal to the original full-year projected total for 2024.
Brave aid workers have proven their ability to navigate this increasingly complex access landscape with changes in territorial control and are reaching people in need, even in the most conflict affected states and regions. Despite the changes in the operating environment and severe underfunding, humanitarian partners used diverse delivery modalities to reach 949,000 people with at least one kind of support once in the first quarter of the year, including almost 500,000 IDPs. However, expanded delivery and more comprehensive coverage of needs for those people we can reach is being undermined by underfunding and denials of sustained access. Urgent humanitarian diplomacy at the political level is required to reduce the human impact of the conflict and facilitate access to affected people. Humanitarian organizations have the capacity to do more in many parts of the country, but further expansion requires both additional funds and concerted political efforts to create a more conducive operating space for scale-up. More than 4.3m people targeted for support in 2024 had still not been reached with any form of assistance at the end of the first quarter and many will inevitably continue to miss out on support during the remainder of the year if the funding landscape does not improve, with devastating and potentially deadly consequences for vulnerable people. If additional funds were received, partners could immediately use the diverse access channels they have developed over the past three years, including working through local partners, to reach more people in desperate need and help communities prepare for and respond to new needs that will inevitably arise during the wet season.
Field colleagues are sounding the alarm about deteriorating humanitarian needs that have increased in both scale and severity as a result of the escalating fighting that is now also touching many urban areas.
This worrying trajectory in needs is currently difficult to quantify due to heavy access constraints, the lack of comprehensive needs assessments in conflict areas, and communications interruptions in many parts of the country, but the reports from frontline responders are unequivocal in their assessment of surging need.
Food insecurity is on the rise with 13.3 million people – almost a quarter of the population - now estimated to be in phase 3 or 4 insecurity. This is raising the spectre of deadly malnutrition if unaddressed. The impacts of food insecurity are geographically widespread with all but two States/Regions seeing a deterioration in conditions since April/May 2023. The cyclone and flooding season is now beginning and the impact of another major disaster similar to last year’s Cyclone Mocha would be catastrophic if repeated in the current conflict, access and funding environment. Renewed inter-communal tension in Rakhine is also worrying and requires concerted advocacy with all parties and communication with communities.
In the absence of comprehensive new data, the Inter-Cluster Coordination Group (ICCG) has focused here on providing an expert narrative analysis of the significant changes in the humanitarian landscape but has not undertaken a full HNRP revision with a new number of people in need (PiN), new targets and new requirements at this time. The ICCG has provided a new estimate of projected displacement through until the end of the year (now 3.6m) and it has been possible for one cluster (Food Security) to update its own sectoral number of people in need based on some newly available analysis, but all other numbers remain unchanged at the inter-sectoral level with at least 18.6 million people in need of humanitarian assistance and 5.3 million targeted for aid. The total financial requirement for this effort is US$ 994 million, aimed at addressing critical needs across multiple sectors. Currently, just 12 per cent of the required funds have been raised, despite the heavy prioritization and boundary setting exercise done at the end of 2023. Even tighter prioritization lies ahead unless additional funding urgently materializes.
While it is understood that some additional funding may be in the pipeline from some key donors, timing is critical, with partners already running low on resources in many areas. Fast-tracking of planned humanitarian funding commitments is now critical to avoid prolonging people’s suffering. Urgent and complementary investment in development activities is also imperative to reverse the unsustainable growth in humanitarian needs..."
Source/publisher:
UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (New York) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-14
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Education in Burma/Myanmar - general, Food Security and nutrition in Burma/Myanmar, Public Health, Human Rights and international relations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)
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Sub-title:
Rebel forces are targeting them for helping the ruling junta
Description:
"More than 80 junta-appointed administrators across Myanmar have been assassinated for aiding or participating in the military conscription of civilians since the draft was announced in February, according to an RFA tally.
In all, 82 village and ward administrators, clerks and others have been killed in the past four months, according to statements from the People’s Defense Force militias, largely made up of ordinary citizens who have taken up arms against the military rulers.
Myanmar’s ruling junta activated the mandatory conscription law, dormant since 2010, as it lost ground — and troops — to ethnic armies and PDF guerilla fighters.
The law allows for men ages 18 to 45 and women ages 18 to 35 to be drafted into the armed forces for two years. Medical doctors and other specialists up to age 45 must serve for three years.
Evading conscription is punishable by three to five years in prison and a fine.
Rebel groups have sought to undermine the draft, and killing those ordered to carry it out has been one way.
“In the past, administrators were well-regarded by the people,” said a relative of an administrator killed in Yangon. “Now, they are becoming widely disliked by the public. Even after his death, his remaining family members face ostracism.”
‘Only one fitting punishment’
In Yangon, administrators in Kungyangon, Insein and North Dagon townships were killed after resistance forces warned them to resign, to stop supporting the junta, and to stop conscripting civilians.
“If they continue these actions without compliance, then there is only one fitting punishment during the revolution,” said an official from the People's Defense Force of Shwebo township in northwestern Myanmar’s Sagaing region.
In the central Mandalay region, two dozen administrators have been killed during the past four months — the highest number of fatalities in a single region or state — followed by Magway region with 18 fatalities.
Nearly 40 administrators have resigned, other officials said.
Residents say that some administrators are extorting amounts equivalent to hundreds of U.S. dollars from civilians who refuse to perform military service.
An administrator in Ayeyarwady region, who wished to remain anonymous for safety reasons, said he is waiting for the junta to approve his resignation.
“I won’t continue because my family's lives are in danger,” he said. “Although I have resigned, the head [of the township’s General Administration Department] will not accept it. As a result, our lives are now filled with chaos and uncertainty.”
The military council has not issued any statements about the administrators’ deaths.
‘Alternative strategies’
A former military officer, who also requested anonymity for safety reasons, said civilian conscription efforts have not slowed down despite the number of administrators who have been killed.
“If one administrator dies, the next assigned administrator will continue the task,” he said. “Killing individuals will not stop the process. If this method fails, the military will pursue alternative strategies.”
The junta’s Central Body for Summoning People’s Military Servants based in Myanmar’s capital of Naypyitaw said it would work with security forces in relevant states and regions to step up protection for administrators.
Political analyst Than Soe Naing said administrators are arbitrarily mistreating civilians under the pretext of the law.
“There is no police department to lodge complaints about these cases, nor a court to file a lawsuit,” he said.
“When the public protests, they are met with gunfire, torture and imprisonment,” he said. “These actions have persisted, leading the public to resist this unjust law in acts of civil disobedience.”..."
Source/publisher:
"Radio Free Asia" (USA)
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-13
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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Description:
"WEEKLY HIGHLIGHTS:
In the South-East, the number of IDPs slightly decreased from 913,300 last week to 912,600 this week. In Mon State, 13 people from Bilin Township were displaced to Bilin Town due to the conflict situation in the area.
In Shan State (South), A total of 178 people from Loikaw Township (Kayah State) and 27 from Hsihseng Township Shan State (South) were displaced to Lawksawk Township, in Shan State (South) due to the fighting. However, 127 IDPs returned to their place of origin in Loikaw Township.
In Tanintharyi Region, 558 people from Thayetchaung were registered as newly displaced within the same township due to the intensified fighting. On the other hand, 1,277 IDPs returned to their place of origin in Yebyu and Thayetchaung Townships on 18 May 2024..."
Source/publisher:
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (Geneva) via Reliefweb (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-13
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
UNHCR (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees), Human Rights and international relations, Burma: Internal displacement/forced migration of several ethnic groups.
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"Human Rights Council
Fifty-sixth session
18 June–12 July 2024
Agenda item 2
Annual report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and reports of the Office of the High Commissioner and the Secretary-General
Summary
Prepared pursuant to Human Rights Council resolution 50/3, this report presents findings based on OHCHR monitoring and verification of the situation of human rights in Myanmar regarding implementation of the recommendations made by the independent international fact-finding mission, including those on accountability, and to track progress on the situation of Rohingya Muslims and other minorities.
I. Introduction and methodology
1. Pursuant to its resolution 50/3, the Human Rights Council requested the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to monitor and follow up on the implementation of the recommendations made by the independent international fact-finding mission, including those on accountability, and to continue to track progress on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, including of Rohingya Muslims (Rohingya) and other minorities, and on the overall situation in the country and to report back during the 56th session.
2. Findings have been verified by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) based on remote monitoring conducted between 1 August 2023 and 31 March 2024. While this report refers to patterns of violations since the military coup in February 2021, it also examines trends and patterns in violations of international human rights law and, where applicable, of international humanitarian law, focusing on the human rights situation of the Rohingya and other minorities.
3. In line with resolution 50/3, the report’s objective is to document violations to ensure that verified information is readily available for use in existing and future accountability processes. It underscores the importance of accountability to address the root cause of the escalating human rights crisis and as a cornerstone of sustainable peace.
4. OHCHR conducted 181 interviews, including with victims and witnesses, eleven consultations with local and international organizations, UN entities and thematic experts, as well as analysis of satellite images and official documents. In the absence of recognized governmental authorities,1 OHCHR submitted requests for information to the Myanmar military (the military), UN entities, other stakeholders including the National Unity Government, relevant ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) exercising effective control in certain areas, civil society organizations, and religious organizations and representatives.
Inputs received were analysed and reflected as appropriate.
5. OHCHR prioritized the full respect of the “do no harm” principle over any other consideration. Factual determinations of incidents and patterns were made where there were reasonable grounds to believe that relevant incidents had occurred as described. Figures of verified deaths likely underestimate realities on the ground as military-imposed internet shutdowns since 1 February 2021 and other restrictions hamper ability to verify fully all casualties.
6. This report builds on findings from previous reports and updates. 2 However, conflict dynamics altered substantially since the end of October, following coordinated operations by Ethnic Armed Organizations and other allied anti-military groups in most ethnic states and central regions. In retaliation, the military scaled up airstrikes and the use of heavy weapons, including against civilians and populated areas. The report examines the human rights impacts, including killings, disappearances, and arrests, of the military’s imposition of mandatory military service which has engendered profound fear amongst the public, especially those within the target age of conscription and their families. As fighting intensified, particularly in areas inhabited by minority communities, the report examines attacks against protected religious objects. Similarly, grave human rights concerns affecting the Rohingya and other communities in Rakhine following the resumption of hostilities in November 2023 are analysed, in further context of the binding provisional measures ordered by the International Court of Justice in 2020.3
7. Amid this dire human rights situation, the report concludes by presenting some positive examples of emerging local forms of administration and governance providing services that protect and promote human rights. Some of these structures, including those in Kayah and Kayin, strive to ensure effective representation and participation of civil society and ensure the representation of women in decision-making. The High Commissioner recommends that these emerging ground-up models be further encouraged and supported, as they may lend themselves to application in other areas of Myanmar as part of possible future solutions..."
Source/publisher:
UN Human Rights Council (Geneva) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-13
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
UN human rights documents on Myanmar, Armed conflict and peace-building in Burma - theoretical, strategic and general, Human Rights and international relations, UN Human Rights pages on Myanmar
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"JAKARTA – ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights (APHR) call on the international community to monitor, and take preventive actions to discourage, the use of judicial instruments to dissolve the Move Forward Party (MFP), which won the most number of seats in the Thai general elections in May 2023 and is currently the largest party in the Thai parliament.
The possible dissolution, which could take place as early as the third week of June, would lead to at least a 10-year ban on the executive members from participating in formal politics. The Election Commission and the Constitutional Court have stated that the MFP’s campaign promise to reform the lèse-majesté law is equivalent to an attempt to overthrow the democratic government with the King as Head of State.
The probable judicial overreach risks encroaching on the prerogative of the legislative branch and blatantly disregards the principle of the separation of powers. “By preventing parliamentarians from deliberating on the law that is not in line with international human rights standards, the court undermines the very idea of democracy as it puts that specific law beyond the reach of any amendments,” APHR Chair and Indonesian Member of Parliament Mercy Chriesty Barends said today.
APHR also calls on international human rights mechanisms and the international community to explore various tools in international law to hold those committing judicial harassment in Thailand accountable.
“Democracy in Thailand is backsliding, not only due to a military coup, but also through dubious interpretations of laws employed to target opposition politicians. If the Move Forward Party is banned, like the Future Forward Party in 2019, millions of people will be disenfranchised, and unrest that could destabilize Thailand is a real possibility,” said APHR Co-Chair and former Malaysian MP Charles Santiago. “This would not only hurt Thailand’s democratic development, but would further harm the economy and damage the reputation and legacy of the current Thai government.”
Prior to this, the MFP was blocked from leading the coalition government by the institutionalized counter-majoritarian mechanism in the Thai military-drafted constitution. Its leader, Pita Limjaroenrat, along with other leading members of parliament have individually been faced with an ongoing campaign of judicial harassment.
Apart from the cases against the MFP and its MPs, the overall human rights trend in Thailand is worrisome. The use of lèse-majesté laws and computer crime accusations to charge and jail those who voice dissenting opinions is on the rise. Surprisingly, these violations are increasing while Thailand is campaigning for its seat at the UN Human Rights Council.
“APHR urges the international community to continue monitoring the deteriorating human rights and democratic situation in Thailand and to take appropriate measures to protect not only parliamentarians at risk but also other political prisoners,” said Barends.
Source/publisher:
ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-13
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Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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"13 June 2024: The United States (US) Government and United Nations (UN) member States must respond to rapidly evolving dynamics on the ground in Myanmar by providing material and political support to the country’s many resistance actors and taking action to protect civilians from escalating junta atrocities, says the Special Advisory Council for Myanmar (SAC-M).
SAC-M founding members Yanghee Lee and Chris Sidoti and members of the SAC-M team this month travelled to Washington, D.C. and New York in the United States to speak to members of the United States Government, UN member States and representatives of the National Unity Government of Myanmar (NUG).
The visit coincided with the third anniversary of UN General Assembly Resolution 75/287 on the situation in Myanmar, adopted on 18 June 2021. Since then, the Myanmar military junta’s sustained attack on the civilian population has created an unprecedented humanitarian and human rights disaster in Myanmar. The crisis is severely undermining the stability and security of the entire region. Despite this, the General Assembly has not addressed the situation since Resolution 75/287.
Conflict dynamics in the country have evolved significantly since nationwide resistance first emerged in response to the Myanmar military’s coup attempt on 1 February 2021. International actors have a responsibility to respond to the new dynamics on the ground and move beyond their current wait-and-see approach to the crisis by taking decisive action to alleviate the suffering of civilians and protect human rights in Myanmar now.
SAC-M calls on the UN General Assembly to adopt a new resolution on Myanmar that recognises the importance of the National Unity Government, ethnic resistance organisations (EROs) and broader civil society in realising the federal democratic will and aspirations of the Myanmar people. The General Assembly must address Myanmar’s humanitarian emergency by calling for the massively scaled-up provision of humanitarian assistance directly to the Myanmar people, including through cross-border channels, by coordinating directly with the NUG, EROs and broader civil society. Furthermore, the General Assembly must call on all States to immediately cease all transfers of arms, munitions, military equipment and dual use items, as well as jet fuel, to the Myanmar military junta.
It has been one and a half years since the UN Security Council attempted meaningful action on Myanmar. The junta has refused to comply with UN Security Council Resolution 2669 on Myanmar since it was adopted in December 2022. The United Kingdom, as the permanent Security Council member that informally leads on Myanmar issues, has been failing in its responsibility to push the Council to address the growing emergency in Myanmar. The Council’s dysfunction on Myanmar reached a new low in April when Myanmar’s permanent representative to the UN, Ambassador Kyaw Moe Tun, was barred from speaking at an open briefing on Myanmar. SAC-M considers this denial of speaking rights to a permanent representative of a concerned country as setting an extremely dangerous precedent.
The Security Council must adopt a new resolution on Myanmar under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter that refers the whole situation in Myanmar to the International Criminal Court. If the Security Council can’t, or won’t, act, the General Assembly must establish a special international criminal tribunal for Myanmar to begin prosecutions of Myanmar military leaders for the most serious international crimes committed in the country.
Finally, SAC-M urges the US Government to return the more than US$1 billion of frozen Myanmar national reserves held by the US Federal Reserve since February 2021, or at least the substantial interest accrued since then, to the legitimate representatives of the Myanmar people: the NUG, EROs, and broader civil society. These funds would provide a lifeline for resistance authorities to address the massive humanitarian needs of the population and strengthen governance capacity and service delivery in areas of the country under their expanding control..."
Source/publisher:
Special Advisory Council for Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-13
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Individual Documents
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Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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"Myanmar’s military regime blocked Facebook and other messaging apps following the 2021 coup in a bid to restrict freedom of expression and communication that it believes threatens its rule.
Myanmar people were using virtual private networks (VPNs), either paid or free versions, to bypass the restrictions.
However, the regime recently banned the use of VPN services in the country, and residents are now reporting difficulties accessing Facebook and other social media platforms.
Ma Wai Phyo Myint, who heads Myanmar’s branch of Access Now, which promotes digital rights around the world, recently talked to The Irrawaddy about how the VPN ban will affect Myanmar people’s access to information and the ability of resistance groups to coordinate their efforts.
People are reporting difficulties using VPNs. What is happening?
The regime blocked access to websites, Facebook, WhatsApp and other messaging platforms in 2021 and 2022. They used blacklisting and whitelisting, handing lists of websites that they wanted blocked to telecom operators and internet service providers.
This time is different. They have bypassed telecom operators and internet service providers and are directly controlling [the internet] from Naypyitaw. We are waiting to see if they will deploy firewalls like China.
People say they can’t use certain VPNs. Which ones?
Local organizations are checking. Some VPNs can still be used. Local organizations say the regime listed VPN servers in late 2023 and early 2024. It has blocked access to widely used VPNs including Psiphon. This includes the paid version [as well as the free version].
The point of using a VPN is to make your browsing history and location untraceable by military and government organizations. Your data are not safe unless you use a secure VPN. So, why haven’t they blocked access to widely available VPNs yet? Perhaps they want to keep monitoring, which is a cause for concern.
People in China can still access banned sites despite the VPN ban? Is there any way to bypass the restrictions in Myanmar?
This is a technical issue and we are still trying to figure out what exactly the regime is doing. Then, we will talk with VPN service providers about how they can help to restore VPN access in Myanmar. Neither local organizations nor VPN service providers can explain the details now.
Why is the junta banning VPNs?
Mainly, it wants to restrict people’s right to information. Since the coup, it has deployed various measures to restrict the information flow. It imposed restrictions to control widespread criticism on websites and [social media pages] of media outlets, sharing of information about the regime, and coordination of anti-regime efforts. It has tightened this grip over time.
At the same time, it has deliberately kept VPNs usable so it can monitor and collect information [about anti-regime activities]. Lately, however, it has lost control. Despite restrictions on the internet, people are still managing to share information via alternative communication channels.
The regime made threats and arrests to instill fear. But people still found ways to communicate. Unable to restrict information flows, the regime decided to resort to an internet shutdown to keep people in the dark.
The VPN ban will also affect the junta, though it may have alternative communication channels. The ban will impact its business operations and spying mechanisms. Though the ban targets the people, the regime will inevitably be affected. So, the fact that it has resorted to this measure means it is failing.
Are there other ways people can use to share information?
We heard that Facebook use has significantly declined due to the VPN problem. The regime can restrict internet access and information flow for the public. The VPN ban is unprecedented and may have severe impacts.
Thanks to technological advances, even China’s government can’t completely ban VPNs. People can switch to other VPNs, and the regime won’t be able to block all the new technologies. There will be impacts, but people will be able to find ways [to evade the VPN ban] over time.
It is very costly to build firewalls. The regime doesn’t have sufficient resources to deploy firewalls in the long run. People should not underestimate what the regime is doing. Yet at the same time, they should not succumb to unwarranted fear. The regime can’t control everything.
Anti-regime forces are trying to use internet service providers that are not controlled by or tied to the regime. They are trying to get satellite phones and satellite internet, which have become accessible both technically and financially. The regime can’t shut down all the channels.
The junta has been promoting a social media app called MySpace. How far can it go?
It has previously created other apps to replace YouTube and Facebook. No social media app, whether it is MySpace or anything else, will be successful unless people accept it. People have boycotted military-linked products. And they know that any such technology made by the military is intended to monitor the people. So, there is little chance that any app created by the regime will succeed.
But we urge the Apple Store and Google Play Store not to offer these applications. We must continue to push international companies not to accept these apps on their platforms.
Is there anything else you want to say?
China had been the only country to ban the use of VPNs, so this situation is quite serious. I urge international bodies and governments to pay serious attention to this and provide tech and resources so people inside Myanmar can use the internet to keep track of the military situation and anti-regime forces can use communication channels that are not controlled by the regime. We notified the international community two years ago that the regime would do this, but there was almost no response or preparations. We continue to push for international assistance in this urgent matter..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-13
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations, Freedom of opinion and expression: - the situation in Burma/Myanmar - reports, analyses, recommendations
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This is the author’s acceptance speech, receiving the the Arthur Svensson Prize to promote trade-union rights today in Oslo.
Description:
"I am deeply honoured to be awarded this prize for the fight of the Myanmar people and trade unions for democracy, justice and freedom. On behalf of the Confederation of Trade Unions Myanmar (CTUM) and its members and people from Myanmar, I thank you sincerely for your support and solidarity in this struggle. We are in a fight not just for our rights and freedoms but for the essence of democracy. This is a long and bitter fight that requires resilience, sacrifice and strong determination.
Since the military coup in February 2021, the military has tried to force us into subordination—with killings, torture, bombing, countless arrests and displacement. Since then, over three million people have been internally displaced. At least 8,000 civilians, including many trade unionists, have died. Seventy per cent of the whole nation have faced armed clashes.
More than 86,000 buildings, including schools and healthcare facilities, have been attacked and destroyed. Around 400,000 government employees who joined the civil-disobedience movement have lost jobs and income. At least 26,799 people have been arrested—among them more than 500 trade unionists.
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For over three years, the military has waged an open war against the people of Myanmar and the world has started to notice. Yet the oppression by successive military regimes has been continuing for decades, as evidenced by the many who had to seek refuge in Norway over many years. We thank the people and the government of Norway, the Norwegian Burma Council and LO Norway, which have supported our organisation (then FTUB) since 1992—for the many years of political and financial support and for allowing the Democratic Voice of Burma to be established in Oslo.
Constant threat
In February 2021, the CTUM condemned the coup and left the National Tripartite Forum. We organised our members and the opposition on all fronts. Members and leaders of the CTUM took to the streets and helped bring hundreds of thousands out in protest. The military issued arrest warrants against all the CTUM central-committee members, including myself. All our passports were declared void and we all have court cases against us for state treason.
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The CTUM headquarters office was ransacked and everything was taken. Our family members are under constant threat—forcing many to leave the country. Many have been tortured to death or forced into hiding.
Our organisation has experience in fighting against the military regime—we did it from 1988. Comparing the progress we have achieved, we can say for a fact that today’s regime is much weaker than the one 20 years ago and the democratic forces are much stronger. The military has lost more than half of the country’s territory because of the co-ordinated attacks by democratic armed forces.
We can win and we will win. However, the international community can and must do more to support our people who risk their lives to free our country.
EU-funded project
The military denies workers all human rights and creates conditions where garment workers have to work for $1.50 per day without any chance to improve their conditions through organising. Under the Made in Myanmar project funded by the European Union, fake unions are sprouting. Made in Myanmar is a shame for the EU and must be stopped immediately! It is nothing but a cover-up for global brands that want to benefit from the cheap labour in Myanmar with the excuse of ‘providing jobs’. What they provide is slave labour!
When workers dare to organise in genuine trade unions, the leaders and their families are threatened with arrest, killing and torture. In many factories, the conditions of garment workers are close to slavery, with more than 16-hour workdays to produce garments for poverty wages—garments that go to European consumers!
It is a convenient lie for multinational fashion brands to argue that they stay in Myanmar to provide jobs for otherwise unemployed workers. In reality, they make use of cheap labour. Under this military regime, any talk of due diligence is nothing but window-dressing. Show me one brand that has prevented and stopped the countless arrests, killings and tortures of trade unionists fighting for decent work in their factories. They cannot stop it, of course, because it is not possible.
Brands claim to do ‘heightened due diligence’—but ‘responsible business conduct’ is simply impossible under a military dictatorship. Global brands that stay in the country, such as the Danish brand Bestseller, implicitly accept the rampant violations of trade-union rights. Brands can even be said to contribute to these violations through the payment of taxes and ‘protection fees’ by factories to the military, which provide funds to the regime. No more excuses: global brands have to exit responsibly from Myanmar!
ILO inquiry
The International Labour Organization formed a Commission of Inquiry to investigate the violation of freedom of association and forced labour in Myanmar. The commission adopted its report in August 2023, confirming that the military authorities violated Myanmar’s obligations under these fundamental conventions and recommending actions to be taken by the ILO governing body, including within the framework of article 33 of the ILO constitution. We need not only the trade unions but also employers and governments at the ILO to back the conclusions of the Commission of Inquiry with firm actions.
We, trade unions, will continue to fight against the brutal military regime by establishing the federal democratic system that we want. As Myanmar trade unions, we are very grateful for the support of the international union movement so we can continue our struggle. We need your continued solidarity and support, politically and financially, to remove the military as quickly as possible.
In October 2023, the United Nations news agency reported the information about the ILO Commission of Inquiry. The recommendations urge the military authorities to cease immediately all forms of violence, torture and other inhuman treatment against trade-union leaders and members; to release, and withdraw all criminal charges against, trade unionists detained in relation to the exercise of their civil liberties and legitimate trade union activities; and to restore fully the protection of basic civil liberties suspended since the coup d’état. The recommendations also urge the military authorities to end the exaction of all forms of forced or compulsory labour by the army and its associated forces, as well as forced recruitment into the army.
Yet, as reported by state broadcasting media, the junta ‘issued the notification of the effectiveness of People’s Military Service Law starting from February 10 2024’. All men aged 18 to 35 and women aged 18 to 27 are required to serve for up to two years under military command, and specialists such as doctors aged up to 45 must serve for three years, state media said on Saturday, according to Reuters.
Describing the move as a further sign of the junta’s ‘weakness and desperation’, the UN special rapporteur, Tom Andrews, called for stronger international action to protect vulnerable populations across the country.
Economic sanctions
If you observe the above happenings, it is clear that the Myanmar junta does not listen to resolutions only. Resolutions enforced through economic sanctions are the only available non-violent action to end the military regime. I stand here representing not only workers and trade unions from Myanmar. I also represent 183 democratic organisations of youth and women, strike committees from across the country, student unions and government employees, such as teachers, doctors and nurses who joined the civil-disobedience movement following our call. Together:
we demand a total arms embargo and comprehensive economic sanctions—with enforcement through legislation provided within the US and UK systems against the three national banks, which mainly collect foreign currency;
we call on multinational companies—including insurance companies and fashion brands—to exit responsibly from Myanmar and for shipping companies to stop delivering to Myanmar weapons or dual-use goods, such as fuels for military vehicles and airplanes;
we call on the EU to withdraw the ‘everything but arms’ trade benefits (EBA). The EU’s EBA programme was designed to offer trade incentives to the poorest countries to promote democracy and full respect for core human and labour rights. The EU withdrew some preferences from Cambodia in 2020, because it does not respect key labour rights—but it maintains the full EBA preferences for Myanmar!
The EU claims it is possible to implement due diligence in a country where industrial zones are under martial law—where freedom of association is banned and all genuine trade-union representatives are under arrest warrant, hunted, tortured or killed. The EU must stop subsidising the military with the EBA trade preferences. It must recognise the government in exile and do everything to support our liberation struggle.
Heartfelt thanks
I would like to express my heartfelt thanks to the international trade unions and supporters who have helped and supported me and shared your love and care with me, to stand strong in fighting the brutal dictatorship in Myanmar. I do not have enough words to show my appreciation for what you have done for our movement and for me personally.
I would also like to thank my trade-union brothers and sisters from Myanmar, especially from the Myanmar Labour Alliance. I am so proud to represent you and I thank you for giving me the chance to represent you even though I am away. Your courage and sacrifices make me feel proud but also pained.
I want to thank the jury for awarding the Arthur Svensson Prize to me and all trade unionists in Myanmar. It means a lot to us. Thank you..."
Source/publisher:
Social Europe
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-12
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Type:
Individual Documents
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Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, International labour standards and mechanisms, Human Rights and international relations
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Resistance plot to assassinate coup leader Min Aung Hlaing at a bridge-opening ceremony raises hard questions about insurgent tactics
Description:
"Myanmar’s dictator Senior General Min Aung Hlaing showcased a major infrastructure project on June 8, opening the Thanlyin Bridge 3 across the Bago River, linking the commercial capital Yangon with the Thilawa Special Economic Zone.
Started in 2019 with a 31 billion yen (US$197 million) loan from the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), the bridge symbolizes economic progress under the State Administration Council (SAC) junta that is largely at odds with widespread armed conflict and economic decline its coup has caused.
Just days later, however, military-controlled media announced that security forces had thwarted a plot to attack the bridge opening ceremony. Several people were arrested with two 107mm rockets and launching gear in a workers’ housing area close to the bridge. Two more were arrested the following day with another rocket.
SAC-aligned media claimed that “(o)n the morning of June 8, 2024, in an old wooden cabin in the shipyard workers’ housing area in Ward 61 of Dagon Myothit (Seikkan) Township… several UG (underground) members were apprehended…(a)ccording to a report from a concerned resident opposed to terrorism.”
The military media, which can never resist displaying a “perp-chart” of mug shots and alleged connections between the conspirators, designated some of them as “rocket shooter”, “shooter assistant”, and “situation monitor.”
It claimed that a man called “Arkar Min (yet to be apprehended) of the Brigade Drone Force PDF (People’s Defense Force) provided instructions on how to use rockets via Instagram in the third week of April 2024.” Another alleged leader, Phyu Hnin Aye, was designated as “Rocket shooting director (at large from Mae Sot).”
The SAC has accused the exiled National Unity Government (NUG) of being behind the alleged plot but stopped short of designating it as an attempt on Min Aung Hlaing’s life. If that was the intention, it raises questions over the ability of the resistance forces to mount an operation that could have decapitated the SAC’s topmost leadership.
Two days after the incident, in a speech published in state media, Min Aung Hlaing “stressed the need to wipe out terrorists in Yangon Region…(he) underscored that as terrorists attempt to commit terror acts, taking a chance in unguarded moments of security forces, individuals have to monitor the movements of terrorists with security awareness and knowledge to ensure peace and stability.”
A rare admission of instability or the fears of a war criminal who just lived through a possible assassination plot? How many other attempts have been made to target who must be the most hated man in Myanmar?
There was an initial optimism among many Myanmar resistance forces that the SAC second in command, Vice Senior General Soe Win, had been killed in a drone strike in mid-April at the military Southeast Command in Mawlamyine.
Not seen for several weeks, speculation swirled that he had been severely injured, that he was in intensive care in Yangon, or that he had been transferred to a hospital in India but he soon resurfaced in apparently fine health.
The anti-SAC resistance has been making increasing use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), such as the largely symbolic drone attack on the military fortress capital of Naypyidaw in early April, which didn’t cause much damage but must have jarred the military leadership to some extent.
But the bridge plot reveals several larger trends in the war against the SAC. On the one hand, it illustrates that urban operations, which have been largely low-level, sporadic and in decline over the past year, are still viable if an urban cell can form, operate, plan and surveil a target, and smuggle into Yangon ordnance to carry out an attack. More dramatic would have been an actual launch of the rockets.
Another interpretation would suggest that the security services’ intelligence capabilities are sufficient to thwart such resistance operations, as they have managed to do in many large urban spaces such as Yangon and Mandalay.
There were numerous predictions that a surge of urban uprisings would follow the successful Operation 1027 in northern Shan state in October, which saw insurgents seize scores of towns and over 200 military positions. But this failed to materialize, partly because of the difficulty in staging urban operations in Myanmar’s proficient and ruthless police state.
The incident also reveals the air of twisted normalcy that hums through Yangon, where the regime’s top leader, Japanese engineers from the Nippon Koei Company and reviled SAC members like the former Karen leader Mahn Nyein Maung open new infrastructure as if the situation is stable.
The regime blithely claimed the bridge “will help utilize the East-West Economic Corridor, which will benefit the Hpa-an/Myawady area, as well as the development of Mon and Kayin states and the improvement of connection with regional countries” – areas the embattled regime has largely lost control over, including that crucial section of the Asia Highway.
But the bridge operation also raises important questions about resistance targeting choices. 107mm rockets have been used in multiple battlefronts in Myanmar, and are notoriously inaccurate and prone to malfunction.
Originally developed by the Chinese military in the 1960s, in a multiple launch system called a Type 63, the rockets can be used in very low-tech mode, often simply propped on a stand or sandbag and ignited using a simple battery in a “fire and forget” fashion. They have a range of several kilometers with a blast radius of 12 meters and were popular with the Mujahideen in Afghanistan in their resistance against the Soviets.
107mm rockets have become a weapon of choice for many Myanmar resistance groups, before and after the coup, used in multiple attacks on built-up areas or airfields. Resistance forces deployed 12 against Mandalay’s Tada U airport in January, with only five actually igniting.
The military airfield at Nam Paung near the Kachin state capital of Myitkyina was targeted in April, but it’s not clear how much damage was inflicted. The rockets are plentiful, easy to use and indicative of the asymmetric nature of Myanmar’s scattered armed conflicts.
But two recent incidents deserve greater scrutiny over the decision-making protocols of anti-military resistance forces. The SAC claims that a large number of 107mm rockets were captured in early February in the city of Bago, and that the “Dark Side Revolution Burma” (DSRB) PDF was planning attacks on tea shops and restaurants where large crowds were gathered to watch the annual Myanmar Academy Awards ceremony on television.
There is no confirmation that the group was actually planning such an attack against civilians. The DSRB is not a widely active organization, so this could potentially be a false flag accusation of the SAC.
Yet in April in Pyin U Lwin, during the annual Thingyan water festival, the Mandalay PDF fired nearly a dozen rockets into the large town, striking a military academy and wounding several cadets, but also hitting a monastery and hospital, killing two Buddhist monks and severely wounding a number of civilians including children.
It wasn’t widely raised at the time but this is potentially a war crime committed by resistance forces. The use of indiscriminate weapons, especially in built-up areas, could also be in breach of international humanitarian law.
The targeting of Min Aung Hlaing with such unguided munitions in a large crowd of civilians could also have constituted a war crime if it had not been thwarted. But the “bridge plot” should also serve as a moment of clarity for the resistance.
Targeting large crowds with indiscriminate weapons is something the SAC does on a daily basis, murdering civilians across the country with airstrikes and artillery. For anti-SAC forces, even those plotting the assassination of senior regime figures, extreme or desperate measures may have a counter-productive effect if innocent civilians become collateral damage..."
Source/publisher:
"Asia Times" (Hong Kong)
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-12
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Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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"On World Day Against Child Labour ILO calls for all children in Myanmar to be protected and allowed to meet their full potential.
YANGON, Myanmar (ILO News) — On World Day Against Child Labour (12 June) the International Labour Organization (ILO) in Myanmar urgently calls all stakeholders to fulfil their commitment and take decisive action to end child labour!
The adoption of the Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, 1999 (No. 182) marked a significant milestone in the fight against child labour. Now, 25 years on, the universal ratification of Convention No. 182 in 2013, is an achievement worth celebrating.
However, the global fight is far from over. An estimated 160 million children worldwide are still engaged in child labour, with 79 million involved in hazardous work, one of the worst forms of child labour.
In Myanmar, according to UN reports, the security situation has deteriorated, with 40 per cent of the population living below the national poverty line and over three million internally displaced persons, one third of whom are children. The promulgation of the 2010 People’s Military Service Law earlier this year has further exacerbated the crisis, leading to an increase of individuals fleeing conscription.
Findings from an ILO study on child labour cases conducted in selected states of Myanmar indicate an increase in child labour levels partly driven, amongst other factors, by parents preferring their children to work as means to avoid conscription. This aligns with an ILO report on Vulnerabilities in Child Labour (2022) highlighting that child labour rates in conflict-affected countries are 77 per cent higher than global averages.
“We remain deeply concerned by the deteriorating situation and escalation of the conflict in Myanmar,” said Yutong Liu, ILO Myanmar Liaison Officer / Representative. “More children are living in poverty, facing movement restrictions, or displacement, making them increasingly vulnerable to child labour. Children should not be victims of conflicts in any form. Instead, they must be protected and allowed to continue to be a beacon of hope for the future of the country. On this World Day Against Child Labour, it is crucial for all stakeholders to honour their commitments to Convention No. 182 and intensify efforts to combat child labour,” Mr Liu added.
The ILO continues to monitor the situation of children in the country and supports partners in tackling child labour through community-based child labour monitoring, awareness raising and skills and livelihood support in the Ayeyarwady and Yangon regions, Shan and Mon states.
World Day Against Child Labour activities in Myanmar
For this World Day Against Child Labour, ILO Myanmar is launching a three-month campaign starting 1 June 2024 that will engage social partners, civil society organizations and development partners in training and awareness-raising activities across Myanmar and on social media platforms..."
Source/publisher:
International Labour Organization (Geneva)
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-12
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Individual Documents
Category:
International Labour Organisation (ILO), Human Rights and international relations, Children, News about the ILO and Burma/Myanmar
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"Amidst the serene but isolating waters of Myanmar's Irrawaddy River, an innovative mobile health service sails to the neediest communities, bringing critical healthcare where traditional facilities are hard to reach. The floating clinics initiated by AFXB Myanmar, with the support of UNFPA, navigate the river to deliver essential health services, focusing on the urgent needs of women and girls affected by the humanitarian crisis in the country.
"For women like us, living in the village, far from the health facilities, each pregnancy is filled with anxiety. In emergencies, we often feel helpless, which adds immense stress and concern for the safety of both ourselves and our babies." — Thiri, an expectant mother from a riverside village in Mandalay.
The ongoing conflict exacerbates the availability of essential health services, disrupting healthcare delivery and heightening risks for women, particularly pregnant women in affected areas. According to the UN inter-agency estimation, the maternal mortality ratio for 2020 stands at 179 deaths per 100,000 live births, significantly influenced by lack of access to reproductive health services, and compounded by poverty. According to Myanmar Demographic Health Survey (2015-2016), the availability of skilled birth attendants is limited, with only three-fifths of births (60%) being attended by skilled providers such as nurses, midwives, and doctors. Traditional birth attendants still assist 29% of births. These figures highlight the significant need for maternal healthcare services, especially in remote and inaccessible areas where women lack access to any medical facilities. These challenges are intensified by current conflict and instability, which obstruct access to necessary health care and amplify the disparities between rural and urban health outcomes.
The floating clinics, RV-Inwa and RV-Mingun, serve as crucial platforms for addressing these gaps and challenges. Staffed by dedicated teams of healthcare professionals, the clinics bring primary health care, maternal health care, including prenatal, postnatal, and emergency obstetric care to those in need in the communities along the river. In addition, family planning services, minor surgeries, and regular health follow-ups for chronic and non-communicable diseases are also provided at the clinics. Between 2021 and 2023, two boats conducted a total of 50 medical missions along the river, providing health services to 38,627 individuals. 894 women received antenatal care as part of these missions.
"Navigating the waters along the Irrawaddy, we deliver more than healthcare and medication; we deliver hope. We provide a commitment to ensuring a safer pregnancy and childbirth for women who would otherwise confront these challenges alone," said Dr. Shwe Paing Oo, Medical Officer of the RV-Inwa.
“It takes a 2 hours’ motorbike drive to get to the nearest health facilities. With my 7 -month pregnancy, it is just not safe to do that in order to receive maternal health care. I’ve been worrying for my baby all the time. Now, thanks to the floating clinic, I am getting proper antenatal care. I feel safe for me and my baby.” Thuzar, an expectant mother from a riverside village in Mandalay
"I'm in my eighth month of pregnancy. Our income barely covers our basic needs, and we can't afford the healthcare and medicines I need. When I got free of charge assistance at the floating clinic, I felt so thankful to the health team. They face many challenges in helping us, especially under these difficult times, but their support really saves our lives when we can hardly pay for healthcare." Nyo Nyo, an expectant mother from one of the riverside villages in Mandalay.
"I vividly recall the occasion on which our team rescued a woman who was suffering from retained placenta during childbirth. We immediately stabilized the situation and facilitated her transfer to the hospital right away, ensuring the well-being of both her and the newborn. I take immense pride in contributing to the committed team aboard the vessel, dedicated to serving the community during these times of crisis." Dr Saw Lwin Tun, Team Leader and Medical Officer, RV Min Gun.
The women and girls in these communities are at risk due to a lack of knowledge about health, including reproductive health and family planning services. The clinics are also essential for educating communities about reproductive health. This knowledge empowers women about their reproductive health and rights and enables them to make informed choices, which is particularly important where misconceptions and traditional practices often put them at higher risk.
"Learning about family planning at the floating clinic has changed everything for us. Now, I make informed decisions that ensure a healthier, more secure future for my family." — Ngu War, a woman from a riverside community.
Additionally, the floating clinics integrated Gender-Based Violence (GBV) and Sexual and Reproductive Health Rights (SRH) services such as awareness raising, parental and education sessions, GVB referrals, etc. Since 2021, nearly 10 thousand youth from villages along the river have received SRHR training and awareness raising sessions provided by the floating clinics.
The presence of the floating clinics is a beacon of hope for the riverside communities. Women, often accompanied by their families, receive health care that is otherwise out of reach, fostering not only healthier communities but also strengthening community ties.
Despite the logistical and security challenges involved in operating under a humanitarian context, the commitment of the floating clinic staff remains unwavering. "The boat operates 10-15 days a month, providing care for over 1000 patients. Throughout the different seasons, we face many challenges on the river while delivering our services, but each challenge we navigate is worth the lives we can save and improve,” said Dr. Saw Lwin Tun, Medical Officer of RV Mingun.
Floating clinics are more than just an innovative healthcare delivery method. They truly are a crucial part of the healthcare ecosystem in Myanmar, particularly in the face of the ongoing crisis. These clinics not only deliver healthcare but also hope and resilience, ensuring that women and girls in the most remote areas have access to the lifesaving services they urgently need.
"Before the floating clinic came to us, every moment of my pregnancy was shadowed by fear, knowing how far we were from the hospital. The day I received health care on the boat near our home, it was as if a weight was lifted—not just from my shoulders but from the entire community. It means we and our babies are protected." — Phyo, a mother from a riverside village in Mandalay..."
Source/publisher:
United Nations Population Fund (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-11
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Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Public Health, UNFPA (United Nations Population Fund), Human Rights and international relations
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"In a country thick with spies and informers, suspicion can be
crippling. History shows that confidence is hard to win back.....We hear a lot these days about the “trust deficit” and “the loss of social capital”. Thanks to a succession of royal commissions, parliamentary inquiries, media investigations and revelations by whistle blowers, many Australians have lost confidence in their most cherished institutions. Faith in politicians, public servants, bankers, churchmen and other traditional authority figures is said to be at an all-time low.
This phenomenon has real world consequences. According to Jerry Useem, writing in The Atlantic, high levels of trust are important for social cohesion, political stability and even economic growth. A downward trust spiral, on the other hand, has the opposite effect. One study has found that, more than 30 years after the Berlin Wall came down, fully half of the income disparity between East and West Germany could be traced to the legacy of informers employed by the Stasi, East Germany’s notorious Ministry for State Security. As Useem wrote, “The legacy of broken trust has proved extraordinarily difficult to shake”.
This statement prompts a comparison between East Germany under the communists and Myanmar under successive military regimes. Both countries had (and, in Myanmar’s case still has) the reputation of being brutal police states. Both regimes relied on hundreds of thousands of informers to spy on their fellow citizens, undermining social cohesion.
It has been estimated that in the 1980s, when the Stasi was at its most powerful, there were 200,000 inoffizielle mitarbeiter, or “unofficial collaborators”. In a population of 16 million, that was one informer for every 50 to 60 people.
The equivalent statistics for Myanmar are more difficult to estimate, but by some calculations the ratio is even higher. Under the Ne Win regime (1962–88), it was widely believed that one in ten Burmese were dalan, or informers. After the 1974 U Thant disturbances in Rangoon, for example, Western diplomats estimated that 20% of the country’s tertiary students were informers. Some of them actively supported the generals, but most were forced to cooperate with the regime.
The junta places a high priority on the identification, location and removal of anyone deemed a threat to the regime, a definition with a very wide meaning.
After the abortive 1988 pro-democracy uprising, the Directorate of Defence Services Intelligence (DDSI) expanded, extending its reach across the entire country. As part of that process, it recruited even more informers. In those pre-digital days (in Myanmar, at least) their contribution to the regime’s mass surveillance of Burmese society was critical. In 1998, one observer wrote that “one in seven (or even one in five) Burmese are informers”.
This claim is valid, but a little misleading. The number and concentration of informers varied between locations, with far fewer located in the rural districts where most Burmese lived. Even so, as another Myanmar watcher suggested in 2001, it was commonly believed that in the urban areas there was one informer for every ten houses. If this was true, then it means that the ratio of informers to other citizens in Myanmar was higher than in East Germany, a country where, in Timothy Garton Ash’s words, the Stasi became “a default global synonym for the secret police terrors of communism”. Under successive military regimes in Myanmar, the DDSI could claim a similar standing.
In one sense, however, the actual numbers do not matter. It is the perception that counts. This was a key feature of both the East German and Burmese surveillance systems. Because no-one knew who was an informer, it was widely assumed that they were everywhere. This had the effect of sowing suspicion and shutting down discussion of politically sensitive subjects.
As a Burmese journalist told the writer Emma Larkin: “It doesn’t make any difference whether they have informers or not. It is enough that we believe their informers are everywhere. After that, we do their work for them.” As Larkin noted, even without the technological means available to other oppressive regimes, in Myanmar “Big Brother really is everywhere”.
This situation only eased slightly under Aung San Suu Kyi’s quasi-civilian government, between 2016 and 2020.
Since the 2021 military coup, the level of surveillance in Myanmar has greatly increased. The country is thick with spies and informers, both paid and unpaid. The junta places a high priority on the identification, location and removal of anyone deemed a threat to the regime, a definition with a very wide meaning. The regime now has greater technical means to monitor the population, but it still relies heavily on human intelligence.
As so often happens in these circumstances, the competition between informers and those secretly working against the regime has turned into a nasty war within a war. The resistance knows that informers pose perhaps the most serious threat to their lives and ability to continue their struggle. Like so many insurgents before them, in many different countries, they have retaliated against informers with a campaign of “targeted killings”.
Many in the resistance appear to subscribe to the views of the legendary Irish guerrilla leader Michael Collins, who said in 1920 that “There is no crime in detecting and destroying, in war-time, the spy and the informer.” Male and female, young and old, service and civilian, no-one has been spared by the opposition’s so-called urban guerrilla units.
Even before the coup, levels of social trust in Myanmar were very low. In 2014, for example, the Asia Foundation conducted a nation-wide survey and asked the question: can most people be trusted? 77% of respondents answered “no”. To a similar question about their close neighbours, 43% still answered in the negative. Trust in government institutions varied but they also fared badly in the survey.
The 2021 coup, and the bitter civil war that has followed, has clearly made this situation much worse. Many communities, normally divided by other things, have been brought together by their shared fear and hatred of the junta. However, in other ways deep divisions have opened up in Myanmar over political allegiances, military tactics and social mores.
To return to the arguments made by Jerry Useem, the lack of trust that has blighted Myanmar for more than half a century will need to be taken into account in any consideration of the country’s future. Myanmar badly needs leaders in whom most people can put their trust. In the past, Aung San Suu Kyi has filled this role, but she will be in prison for the foreseeable future.
Meanwhile, as the civil war grinds on, Myanmar’s social capital diminishes further and the trust spiral continues downwards..."
Source/publisher:
"The Interpreter"
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-11
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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"Exposing the underreported involvement of Burmese Authoritarian left on Rohingya Genocide as an activist who is a descendant of Bengali ethnicity and who also has the distance relatives from Rohingya ethnicity. However, I'm not a ethno-nationalist in any sense. I am only writing this for accountability, responsibility and universal human rights.
Rohingya Genocide was indeed a commonly known incident even for those who don’t really know much about Burma. Before the Rohingya Genocide, Burma was only well known for Aung San Suu Kyi and democracy, even for the activist circles. Later, Rohingya Genocide is something that made Burma famous again, not in the good way.
Everyone well aware that Rohingya Genocide is committed by the Myanmar Military Army and Aung San Suu Kyi defended them at ICJ. There are some interpretations that since ICJ sued the whole nation instead of the Myanmar Military Army as the sole entity, Aung San Suu Kyi had to defend the nation. Regardless, if it’s the case, she could simply say the Myanmar Military Army did it and the state has nothing to do with it. She didn’t do as such. Rohingya Genocide has its root in 2012 Rakhine-Rohingya riots and the 969 grassroot movements which in turn has their roots in far-right islamist Pakistan separationist movement from Burma of 1946 and Arakan massacres by Rohingya in 1942 (during colonial era of divide and rule politics of British colonialism).
The main underreported information of the whole Rohingya Genocide was the passive involvement of Burmese Authoritarian Left. Venerable Wirathu, the xenophobic and racist monk whom Time magazine called “The Face of Buddhist Terror” used to be active among the far-left circles. One of his first books from around 2000s, named “The Criminals of History”. In that book, Venerable Wirathu wrote about how the State Sangha Maha Nayaka Committee was reactionary and tool of the military dictatorship at the expense of the grassroot monk community. After his release of prison at 2012, he was seen preaching anti-military and pro-NLD messages at the local branches of NLD party. In 2012, Venerable Wirathu was invited by the chairman of the Kayan New Land Party, Than Soe Naing, to discuss and deliver knowledges on nationalism, self-determinism, federalism and democracy. Here, it’s important to know that federalism used to a word of kryptonite for the military junta until 2015. The military junta believed in one state solution for Burma. The opposition, including those from the far-left, believed in federalism and self-determinism. So, the military interpreted federalism as an enemy of their one state solution (unitary union). Communist Party of Burma always believed in the one state solution (unitary union). However, since it was too weak around 2010s, it endorses the united front against the military junta. Here, it’s important to know the history and ideological development of the political party that invited Venerable Wirathu to deliver the speech. Since 1979, Kayan New Land Party (KNLP) was a close ally of Communist Party of Burma. It even adopted the Maoist "people's war" strategy upheld by the CPB since 1979. In 1983, under CPB's leadership, KNLP alongside Karenni National People's Liberation Front and Shan State National Liberation Organization formed the central regional command which lasted until CPB was forced underground due to internal mutiny from its Wa and Kokang cadres. The video of Venerable Wirathu delivering speech about nationalism, self-determinism, federalism and democracy at Kayan New Land Party can be seen in the following YouTube link.
YouTube Video - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wFFTzRR2RyQ
Also, All Burma Federation of Student Union, the historical pro-CPB student union, was resurrected by a far-left student union leader called Kyaw Ko Ko in 2007. In 2014, which is after 2012 Rakhine-Rohingya riots, the success of 969 movement led by Venerable Wirathu, All Burma Federation of Student Union invited Venerable Wirathu and fellow monks to host an event that was organized by All Burma Federation of Student Union (ABFSU) to memorated the student union leaders who were killed by the military in 1988. The image from the event is attached as the featured photo of the whole article. It’s still available at the official Facebook page of a branch of All Burma Federation of Student Union whereas it cannot be found the official Facebook page of the All-Burma Federation of Student Union (ABFSU) anymore.
Also, current All Burma Federation of Student Union (ABFSU) which was refounded back in 2007 by Kyaw Ko Ko had some members who became ultra-nationalist right-winger. All Burma Federation of Student Union was refounded with Kyaw Ko Ko as its chairman. Back then, the organising committee contained 12 members. One of the senior members (secretary of student committee) was Ye Min Oo, who later became popular as Wira Ye Min Oo for his close relation with the racist monk Venerable Wirathu.
Some references about him can be seen here:
https://english.dvb.no/charges-against-arakanese-nationalist-baseless-lawyer/
https://democracyforburma.wordpress.com/2012/01/24/all-burma-students-unionabfsu-has-been-reformed/
In 2013, Ye Min Oo was arrested for with the two charges, one of them for anti-Muslim riots. Later, the leaders of 969 movements (mostly monks) launched a nation-wide campaign called "Free Ye Min Oo".
Reference: https://democracyforburma.wordpress.com/2013/04/06/alert-chit-ko-lin-former-pp-ye-myat-hein-former-pp-new-hnin-ye-aka-noe-noeformer-pp-and-ye-min-aung-younger-brother-of-ye-min-oo-were-sued-under-penal-code-353506/
The campaign was led by "U Pammokha", one of the future leader of Patriotic Association of Myanmar (MaBaTha), the far-right ultranationalist monk led pro-military and anti-NLD association.
Again in 2024, there are several reports from international humanist communities about the war crimes committed against Rohingya community by both the Myanmar military junta and the Arakan Army. The Arakan Army and their allied brotherhood are considered the strongest ethnic armed organization and played the imperialistic type of influence on the whole revolution against the military junta. Their operation 1027 was indeed effective against the Myanmar military junta. However, it doesn't give them the license to commit genocide or war crimes.
As of now, given all these reports of international humanist communities about the war crimes committed against Rohingya community by Arakan Army, around 100 non-government civil society organizations published statements and call for an investigation of Arakan Army. Among them, GSC (General Strike Committee) and so other left-wing groups such as Alliance of Students’ Unions Yangon and so on. However, Kyaw Ko Ko, an influential student leader from 2007 generation who also is the founder of “Social Democratic Party”, took the pro-AA position on the on-going Rohingya genocide of Arakan Army. GSC (General Strike Committee), Alliance of Students’ Unions Yangon and several far-left or left-leaned left-wing groups retracted from the statement.
Anti-Junta Mass Movement – AJMM was one of the few groups among the far-left or left-leaned left-wing groups that didn’t retract their statement. The argument given by all of these individuals and these groups for retracting their statement calling for “formal investigation into Arakan Army for genocide or massacre level war crimes committed against Rohingya people” was that they claimed there were no information to back the accusations up. However, a lot of Rohingya refugees and Rohingya activists have been providing audio recordings, video recordings, and photographic documentations of the situations. A Rohingya left-wing activist named Arafat Jamil can been seen confronting Kyaw Ko Ko for his silence on his official Facebook page about the current Rohingya genocide by Arakan Army. Kyaw Ko Ko replied (in briefly translated version) that “Arakan Army despite being ethno-nationalist right-wing group is more left-wing than most of the so-called left-wingers in Burma. I'm dealing with them, so, I know they're more left-wing than you”.
The interaction can be founded under this post: https://www.facebook.com/share/p/Z27QnKGrjwWyNw3R/?mibextid=WC7FNe
In the meantime, United League of Arakan (Arakan Army) publicly stated via “The New Humanitarian” that “from the perspective of the local native indigenous population, ‘Rohingya’ is a political movement to separate a part of Arakan, our fatherland, by destroying the integrity of our ancestral history. We see it as a very unfaithful and dishonest act. However, it does not mean that we will never recognize the term ‘Rohingya’. We want them to admit the historical facts of colonial migration in addition to the removal of politically motivated distorted historical claims harmful to other communities in the region.”
This whole narrative of Arakanese Buddhists being the local native indigenous population and ‘Rohingya people’, the political movement name of “Bengali settlers living in Arakan” was not a new one. The former General of the Myanmar military army and the former president of Myanmar’s quasi-military regime, U Thein Sein, also said the similar thing. He said and I quote “These are no Rohingya among the races in Burma. We only have Bengalis who were brought for farming during British rules”.
A satellite army which is helped and nurtured by Arakan Army called "Bamar People's Liberation Army" which use the classical right-wing ethno-nationalist representation of Bamar ethnicity is in total silence of the whole war crimes committed by Arakan Army. Their founder "Maung Saung Kha" who was a ex-NLD member, who identified himself as a left-wing, despite his active presence on Social Media, refused to offer comments on the war crimes and accused genocide of Arakan Army committed against the Rohingya community. Let alone the genocide, they don't even warn the ULA/AA for their same wavelength racist remarks of "Rohingya" people as post-colonial settlers.
Both the Myanmar military and Arakan Army always conflated Bengali people with Rohingya people. Indeed, they're unique ethnicity with unique language and culture. Among Chittagong Hill Tracts, there are a lot of genocides happening. Myanmar military junta and Arakan Army are committing war crimes against Bengali and Rohingya. On the other hand, the Bangladesh Army is committing war crimes against Chakma people and other Buddhist ethnic minorities for almost a century too. The world has woke up to the sufferings of Rohingya people, yet the Burmese left-wingers are selectively woke only when the Myanmar military junta is the oppressor, not when their ally. Here, I urged everyone to learn more about the sufferings of Rohingya people, Bengali people when it comes to the state of Myanmar and Chakma people when it comes to the state of Bangladesh.
Summing up, it’s not new for Burma to witness the left infightings for interests-based politics and so-called authoritarian far-left movements uniting with far-right movements for political gains. Burma has this curse of authoritarian far-left movements messing up people's lives since independence. Since independence, the CPB have been following Stalin’s Third International lead and tried to establish a one-party rule against the democratic socialism regime of AFPFL led by a popular third camp socialist Kyaw Nyein. Due to the hostility between socialists and communists within AFPFL, General Ne Win conducted a coup in 1962 and founded a NazBol alike ideology called “Burmese Way to Socialism”..."
Source/publisher:
libcom.org
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-10
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Arakan (Rakhine) State - reports etc. by date (latest first), Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Discrimination against the Rohingya, Rohingya (cultural, political etc.), Human Rights and international relations
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"WEEKLY HIGHLIGHTS
In the South-East, the number of IDPs slightly decreased from 913,300 last week to 912,600 this week.
In Mon State, 13 people from Bilin Township were displaced to Bilin Town due to the conflict situation in the area.
In Shan State (South), A total of 178 people from Loikaw Township (Kayah State) and 27 from Hsihseng Township Shan State (South) were displaced to Lawksawk Township, in Shan State (South) due to the fighting. However, 127 IDPs returned to their place of origin in Loikaw Township.
In Tanintharyi Region, 558 people from Thayetchaung were registered as newly displaced within the same township due to the intensified fighting. On the other hand, 1,277 IDPs returned to their place of origin in Yebyu and Thayetchaung Townships on 18 May 2024..."
Source/publisher:
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (Geneva) via Reliefweb (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-07
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
UNHCR (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees), Human Rights and international relations, Burma: Internal displacement/forced migration of several ethnic groups.
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"At least 50 people were killed by Myanmar soldiers in a raid on a village in Rakhine State last week, say local residents and opposition forces.
Warning: You may find some of the details in this piece disturbing
Eyewitnesses told the BBC the village was subjected to two-and-half days of terror as soldiers blindfolded and beat them up, poured burning petrol on their skin and forced some of them to drink their urine.
They were looking for supporters of the Arakan Army (AA), which has become one of the most effective ethnic fighting forces in Myanmar.
Fifty-one people aged between 15 and 70 were "violently tortured and killed", the National Unity Government (NUG), representing the ousted civilian government, said in a statement. The AA estimated the death toll to be more than 70 people.
The ruling military council, or junta, has denied the accusations, which would amount to one of the worst atrocities committed in the three year-old Myanmar civil war.
“They asked the men if the AA was in this village,” one woman told the BBC.
“Whatever answer they gave, whether they said AA was there or it wasn’t, or they didn’t know, the soldiers hit them."
In just six months, the AA has swept through most of Rakhine State, forcing the military to keep retreating. It ended a ceasefire with the army last year and joined ethnic insurgents in other parts of the country in a combined operation aimed at overthrowing the junta which seized power in February 2021.
"I saw with my own eyes my husband being taken away in a military vehicle. My son was separated from both of us, and I don't know where he is. Now I don't know if my son and husband are alive or dead," the woman told the BBC..."
Source/publisher:
"BBC News" (London)
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-06
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Armed conflict in Burma - attacks on civilians, Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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Description:
"This Incident Report describes two events that occurred in Kaw T’Ree (Kawkareik) Township, Dooplaya District, in November and December 2023. On November 4th 2023, State Administration Council (SAC) conducted an air strike into E--- section in Kawkareik Town, Kaw T’Ree Township, and injured an 11-year-old boy, Saw A---, on the leg, while he was near his house. The boy was immediately sent to a hospital in Hpa-an Town by his parents to receive treatment, and later transferred to C--- clinic, Naw Kwaw village tract, Ta Kreh (Paingkyon) Township, Hpa-an District. On December 2nd 2023, at 8 am, the SAC dropped a 500-pound bomb into F--- section in Kawkareik Town, Kaw T’Ree Township. The bomb injured a pregnant villager named Ma B---. Her husband sent her to D--- clinic, in Nabu [T’Nay Cha] Township, Hpa-an District, but she was referred to C--- clinic, Naw Kwaw village tract, as this clinic was better equipped to treat her.[1]
[Excerpt]
Part 1 – Incident Details
Type of Incident
Air strike
Date of Incident(s)
November 4th 2023 and December 2nd 2023
Incident Location
(Village, Township and District)
E--- section and F--- section, in Kawkareik Town, Kaw T’Ree Township, Dooplaya District.
[...]
Part 3 – Complete Description of the Incident
Describe the Incident(s) in complete detail.
On November 4th 2023 [in the morning], fighting broke out between State Administration Council (SAC)[6] soldiers [unknown battalion] against combined forces from People’s Defence Force (PDF)[7] and Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA)[8] in Kawkareik Town, Kaw T’Ree Township, Dooplaya District. At around 10 am, the SAC conducted an air strike [and one bomb landed] inside E--- section, Kawkareik Town. [At the time,] Saw A--- (11 years old), a Grade-3 [primary school] boy, was with his grandmother [in their house in E--- section], and went outside of the house to urinate. While he was urinating, he was hit by shrapnel [from a bomb] on the right calf. His grandmother heard him being wounded by the shrapnel and immediately called his parents, who sent him [by car] to a hospital in Hpa-an Town, Hpa-an District [located one hour away] to receive treatment. When he reached the hospital, he had very low blood pressure [due to blood loss], thus it could not be predicted whether he would live or not. Saw A--- received treatment on time and was saved. [His parents paid for the treatment themselves, and did not receive assistance from any organisations]. By November 30th 2023, his wound was not fully healed, so he received further treatment at C--- clinic, in Naw Kwaw village tract, Ta Kreh (Paingkyon) Township, Hpa-an District. [C--- clinic is under the Karen Department of Health and Welfare (KDHW)[9], so treatment was free of charge.] Regarding the incident, his mother expressed: “In this political situation, it is not convenient to work. Our financial situation is becoming more difficult. It’s really sad to witness my son experience it [the attack].”
On December 2nd 2023, at 8 am, the SAC conducted an air strike into F--- section in Kawkareik Town, Kaw T’Ree Township, Dooplaya District. The shrapnel [from the dropped bomb] injured Ma B---, a woman nine months pregnant, on the left side of her back. At the time, she was gathering things inside her house to flee [as villagers could hear the sound of aircraft approaching them]. Her husband witnessed what happened to his wife, as he was on his motorbike and had just started the engine. He immediately sent his wife to D--- clinic, Meh Pah Leh village tract, Nabu [T’Nay Cha] Township, Hpa-an District. It was hard to perform surgery on a woman who was nine months pregnant, so at 10 am she was referred to C--- clinic, Naw Kwee village tract, [which is better equipped]. Regarding the incident, Ma B--- expressed: “A 500-pound bomb, dropped from the aircraft, injured villagers. And I don’t know how many were killed by it. I don’t want to put the blame on anyone when such things happen. But for certain, I’m very sad and feel bad about the incident.”..."
Source/publisher:
Karen Human Rights Group
Date of entry/update:
2024-05-30
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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"Ethnic armed groups have pushed the military out of most of Myanmar’s borderlands, putting the country on a path toward fracturing into self-governing statelets with the regime hanging on in the centre. Outside actors wishing to help Myanmar’s people should adjust to this new reality.
What’s new? The Myanmar military, which has suffered a series of battlefield defeats to opposition forces, is rapidly losing control of the country’s periphery. Elite circles are blaming Commander-in-Chief Min Aung Hlaing, whose days in charge could be numbered, but the military itself is not on the brink of collapse.
Why does it matter? The Myanmar state is fragmenting as ethnic armed groups consolidate control of their homelands, while in the country’s centre a weak regime clings to power and launches revenge air attacks on territories it has lost. Further fragmentation seems inevitable but does not necessarily presage catastrophic inter-group violence.
What should be done? Myanmar’s neighbours should be more flexible in engaging with bordering non-state authorities. Notwithstanding the inclination to engage with national governments, donors should explore ways to strengthen the service delivery and governance functions of existing and emerging subnational administrations, while remaining mindful of conflict risks, human rights considerations and legal constraints.
I.Overview
The Myanmar military has suffered a series of humiliating defeats, losing territory, bases and towns to ethnic armed groups along the country’s periphery. It no longer has control of most of Myanmar’s borders, and further territorial losses seem inevitable. Nevertheless, the military is not right now on the brink of collapse. Its main battlefield opponents are focused on consolidating their hold on their ethnic homelands, not taking the fight to central Myanmar, and the post-coup resistance forces that do aim to topple the regime do not have the firepower to defeat the military on its home turf. The current trajectory is one in which various ethnic armies will tighten their grip on autonomous statelets in the periphery, while a weak regime brutally clings to power in the centre. While concerning, this atomisation of the state only entrenches a long-existing situation and may not trigger a slide into chaotic violence. It will, however, require outside actors that wish to support Myanmar’s people to grapple with the challenge of engaging with the country as a collection of separate subnational units rather than a unified state.
The military’s recent failures have been dramatic. After losing large swathes of territory in northern Shan State, near the Chinese border, to an alliance of ethnic armed groups following a joint offensive launched on 27 October 2023, it has since been routed by the Arakan Army in much of northern and central Rakhine State, losing control of all the Bangladesh border and part of the Indian Ocean seaboard. Since March 2024, it has also faced pressure from the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) in the far north, getting pushed back from strategic hilltops and losing a key trading town on the Chinese border. Its hold on lucrative jade, gold and amber mining areas is also in question. In April, the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) temporarily defeated regime forces at Myawaddy, a commercial hub on the Thai border, although the military subsequently retook the town with the help of a rival Karen faction.
Apart from military and economic consequences, these losses are having a huge political impact in the capital Naypyitaw. Many in pro-military elite circles see Commander-in-Chief Min Aung Hlaing, the coup leader, as primarily responsible for the failures. Senior serving and retired officers are openly criticising him, while prominent monks and nationalist bloggers are publicly calling upon him to hand over his military command to someone more capable. With no institutional mechanism for removing him, however, it is hard to predict if or when other officers might move against the top general. Neither is the military likely to disintegrate after the battlefield defeats: its most powerful opponents – ethnic armed groups – have little interest in taking the fight to its strongholds in the central plains and main cities. The regime is likely to remain ensconced in Naypyitaw for now, taking vengeance from the air and prompting chaotic violence for some time to come.
Armed groups in [Myanmar’s] periphery are rapidly consolidating control of ethnic homelands and expanding their governance and administrative systems.
By contrast, armed groups in the periphery are rapidly consolidating control of ethnic homelands and expanding their governance and administrative systems. Many of these groups are intent on building autonomous, quasi-independent statelets that they can protect from incursions. For most of them, this objective has always seemed like a distant dream, but it now appears within reach. Already well under way, the fragmentation of the state is likely to be an impediment to, rather than a stepping stone toward, the federal union that many in the country aspire to.
Yet fragmentation in Myanmar is not necessarily a prelude to the kind of catastrophic inter-group violence seen in some other countries riven by civil strife. The post-independence state has always been fractured, with many parts of the country under the control of ethnic armed groups, meaning that some of today’s protagonists have almost eight decades of experience with this reality. While the regime has launched punitive air and artillery attacks on areas it has lost – often targeting civilians – fighting among anti-regime groups has, thus far, been limited. It is quite possible that functioning ethnic minority statelets will be able to coexist amid the convulsions of a failing regime at the centre.
Negotiating this landscape, however, will be a challenge for Myanmar’s neighbours as well as international donors and multilateral institutions. The international system is predicated on bilateral and multilateral relationships among nation-states and has difficulty engaging effectively with subnational entities. Yet with the regime having rapidly lost control of most of the country’s borders, the neighbours must grapple with how to respond. By all appearances, they understand that good policy requires them to step up engagement with armed group administrations, but they worry about the precedent they may be setting, given that several are contending with their own insurgent or separatist groups and may struggle with other constraints as well.
Western and multilateral donors also need to explore far more flexible aid responses that are not predicated on the fiction of a central government authority. An adjusted approach along these lines would be a departure from the traditional model for governance and state-building support and would have to be developed mindful of conflict risks, human rights considerations and legal constraints. Still, there is no way for outside actors to steer around the reality that much of Myanmar is likely to be fragmented for the foreseeable future. Rather than focusing on efforts to build strong central state structures and institutions which, even if federal in intent, are unlikely to gain traction, the greatest potential for positive impact lies in working with the grain to help strengthen existing and emerging subnational administrations..."
Source/publisher:
International Crisis Group (Belgium)
Date of entry/update:
2024-05-30
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Individual Documents
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Armed conflict and peace-building in Burma - theoretical, strategic and general, Human Rights and international relations
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"EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This report covers the period January to December 2023 and outlines TBC’s progress based on the organisation’s Strategic Directions for 2023-5. Multi-sectoral responses by TBC and local partners reinforced the resilience of 400,000 displaced and confl ict-aff ected individuals during 2023. This included over 88,000 people in nine refugee camps inside Thailand, more than 20,000 especially vulnerable individuals dispersed along the Thailand-Myanmar border and at least 300,000 villagers in southeastern Myanmar.
In Thailand, TBC met the immediate humanitarian needs of the 88,953 refugees who remained in refugee camps as of the end of 2023, through the provision of food under our Food Card System and shelter material support. Support for maternal, infant and young child feeding (MIYCF) nutrition activities continued and the results of TBC’s 2022 Nutrition Survey were fi nalised. Technical support to Camp Committees and the provision of capacity building trainings continued throughout the year. Outside of camp, humanitarian support was provided to new refugee arrivals as part of our emergency response plan. While confl ict in Myanmar meant the return of refugees to Myanmar is not feasible, the re-opening of third country resettlement to the US for eligible refugees in camp may mean a gradual outfl ow of refugees from camps.
In Myanmar, TBC and partners mitigated the vulnerability of more than 300,000 internally displaced persons. The humanitarian imperative was prioritised by improving access to food, shelter, health care and education in emergencies. Resilience and recovery have been reinforced by supporting communitydriven agricultural extension, natural resource management and nutrition promotion. To promote protection and safer futures, awareness of human rights and international humanitarian law was raised and social protection mechanisms mobilised. Local governance was strengthened by investing in land administration systems, public administration capacities, inter-agency coordination and community feedback mechanisms..."
Source/publisher:
The Border Consortium (Thailand) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2024-05-29
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
TBC, TBBC, : Annual reports and 6-monthly Programme Reports, Food Security and nutrition in Burma/Myanmar, Public Health, Human Rights and international relations
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"This Situation Update describes events occurring in Tha Htoo Township, Doo Tha Htoo (Thaton) District, during December 2023 and January 2024. This report covers many human rights violations committed by the State Administration Council (SAC) against villagers, including regular indiscriminate shelling, travel restrictions, and the prohibition of bridge construction. During the reporting period, the SAC troops shelled at least 278 rounds of mortar into or near civilian areas. The report also describes the impacts of the shelling on civilians’ livelihoods, access to education and healthcare, as well as the killing and injury of villagers: due to this SAC shelling, at least one villager was injured and two villagers died, including a 26-year-old pregnant woman. SAC shelling also caused heightened security risks, the displacement of more than 1,000 villagers, the destruction of at least 15 civilian houses, one school, and two monasteries, and the death of livestock.[1]
General Situation Overview:
This situation update presents the impacts of regular indiscriminate shelling conducted by the State Administration Council (SAC)[2] in Tha Htoo (Thaton) Township, Doo Tha Htoo District, in the period from December 2023 to January 2024. The shelling caused death and injuries of civilians, destruction of civilians’ properties and livestock, insecurity, displacement, and impacts on livelihoods, education and health services.
During the reporting period, the SAC increasingly conducted indiscriminate shelling in Tha Htoo Township and more mortar shells landed in village communities than in the previous months. Sometimes the SAC shelled mortar rounds into villages after being attacked by local armed resistance groups, but many times villagers did not know the reason why they were being shelled. Villagers heard the sound of mortar rounds explosions every day. Some mortars landed in their villages, some landed near the villages, and some landed in their farms or plantations. According to a local village leader, Saw[3] H--- from I--- village, Kaw Ler village tract[4], Tha Htoo Township: “They [SAC] regularly shelled mortar [rounds], every two or three days; they shelled about 20 [rounds of] mortar per time. Sometimes, they shelled about ten or sometimes more than ten [rounds of] mortar per shelling. […] The total amount of SAC mortar shells that landed in our area [I--- village] might be about a thousand rounds already. […] They did this as if their enemy [armed resistance forces] were in the community. They might keep their shelling target there [in I--- village]. It is hard to assume [the SAC’s strategy]. […] In the current situation, people do not do anything to [attack] them, but they [SAC soldiers] shell more mortar rounds into I--- village regularly.”
The SAC troops that conducted regular shelling in Tha Htoo Township are Light Infantry Battalion (LIB)[5] #206, who are based in an area between Du Yin Seik and P’Leh Hkaw villages; LIB #118, under Light Infantry Division (LID)[6] #44, whose camps are in Thaton Town; Infantry Battalion (IB)[7] #24, whose camp is based on a hill close to I--- village, Kaw Ler village tract; Military Training Unit #9, based in Ah Lan Ta Ya army camp on top of Ah Lan Ta Ya hill; LIB #9, based in Wa Pa army camp; Artillery Unit #314, based in Kya T’Raw (Zi Won) army base in Shwe Yaung Pya village tract; IB #8, based at Myay Taung army camp in Bilin Town; and Artillery Unit #402, who are based in an area between Nya T’Weh village, T’Noh village tract, and Noh Hpa Htaw village, Noh Ta Hsuh village tract. The SAC mainly used 120mm artillery for the shelling. Saw H---, the village head of I--- village, explained: “They use huge artillery weapons which have wheels. […] Most of the mortar [rounds] that landed in my village [I---] are 120mm.”
Although many human rights violations were committed by the SAC in Tha Htoo Township, KHRG researchers could document only some of the incidents due to the high security risks and travel restrictions preventing comprehensive documentation of all incidents. The incidents below were documented by KHRG researchers, who collected information and photos from witnesses and victims of the human rights violations across the District and sometimes witnessed the incidents themselves.
Situation and incidents in Tha Htoo Township
a. SAC shelling killed a pregnant woman and caused property destruction
On December 19th 2023, from around 7 pm to 9:30 pm, SAC LIB #206 and Artillery Unit #402 shelled approximately 23 rounds of 120mm mortar into I--- village, Kaw Ler village tract, Tha Htoo Township. Three rounds of mortar landed inside the village and about ten rounds of mortar landed outside of the village. The mortar explosions in the village killed a 26-year-old woman named Naw[8] K---, who was pregnant at the time. It also destroyed one monastery building and two houses owned by Saw L--- and Saw M---. During the incident, Naw K---, her 3-year-old daughter, and her husband were hiding in a bunker beside their house which they built as a safe place for them. One of the village leaders, Saw H---, testified: “The mortar landed in the middle of their house when they [wife, husband, and daughter] were hiding in the bunker beside the house. The mortar landed close to the bunker [and shrapnel injured her]. Her house was built with bricks, but all the brick [walls] were destroyed by the mortar explosion.”
Naw K--- died from major injuries and significant blood loss caused by the shrapnel of the mortar shell that hit her house. There was a lack of transport available and first aid provisions in the community were limited, preventing a quick response to the incident. Naw K--- was injured at about 7 pm and could not access support or medical treatment until 11 pm. She had to wait for many hours during the ongoing shelling which prevented other villagers from coming to help her until after the shelling stopped, which was around 9:30 pm. Villagers felt safe to help only after the shelling stopped, and there were no healthcare workers in the village to provide first aid for her. Therefore, villagers went to her house after the shelling and took her to a community clinic in L--- village by motorcycle and tractor.
L--- clinic is run by the Karen Department of Health and Welfare (KDHW)[9], under Karen National Union (KNU)[10] administration. The villagers travelled in fear of being shot by the SAC soldiers in the area, especially during nighttime curfew, and the road was difficult to travel on at night, so they arrived at L--- clinic at about 11 pm. The journey took around 1 hour. On arrival, health workers could not save Naw K---’s life because she had lost too much blood from the extreme injuries sustained. After two hours of treatment in the clinic, she passed away. Her three-year-old daughter and her husband were left without access to justice or compensation from the perpetrator. The village leader, Saw H---, explained: “Since we did not have any health worker in the village, we brought her directly to [L--- clinic]. We face challenges because there are no health workers or medical supplies available in our village. Right after this incident, we did not feel secure to go and help her immediately. We could help her only after about two hours, when the shelling stopped. We do not know whether it was her fate [for her life to end] or maybe her gallbladder exploded[11] caused by the extreme fear.”
As a result of the ongoing shelling in villages, villagers have been living with trauma and fear. In addition, about 40 houses in I--- village were damaged by the attacks and some were destroyed. Saw H--- reported that “some women have been suffering from heart attacks [post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD)] because they could not stand to hear mortar explosion. Not only women, but also many children have heart attacks [PTSD], and they would run, scream, cry and even become unconscious when hearing mortar explosions. […] Villagers whose houses were destroyed [by shelling] face very hard situations to rise up [to rebuild their houses and livelihoods]. They probably may not be able to [re]build houses if their children do not migrate to Thailand [for job opportunities].”
b. Travel restrictions and prohibition of infrastructure construction
Villagers in Kaw Ler village tract, Tha Htoo Township, reported to KHRG that they have been facing travel restrictions due to the ongoing armed conflict and curfews set up by the SAC in their area. Due to ongoing shelling, villagers do not feel secure going to their farms or plantations to work for their family livelihoods. The SAC has set up a curfew from 6 pm to 6 am, meaning that villagers could not leave their village during nighttime for hunting or to take care of their livestock.
Moreover, the SAC has prohibited I--- villagers from building a bamboo bridge between I--- and Ff--- village to make their entry to the village easier. I--- village is [almost completely] surrounded by rivers so villagers use boats to leave [some parts of] the village. The villagers face difficulties in accessing healthcare, travelling for their livelihood, and other family needs because of the difficulties crossing the rivers. Therefore, villagers decided to build a temporary bamboo bridge and started the construction process in early December 2023. During the bridge construction, SAC Artillery Unit #402 [from nearby Noh Hpa Htaw army camp] shelled six mortar rounds around the bridge area so villagers who were building the bridge had to flee for their lives and stopped building the bridge. Saw H---, one of the village leaders, explained: “They [some SAC soldiers] could see us from Du Oh Seik army camp [located on a hill]. […] We just need it [the bridge] for easier transportation. […] We just built the bridge with bamboo. We had to flee because they [SAC] shelled mortar rounds. Then, we received information from young villagers who went to apply for the [Myanmar] Identification Card at the ‘Immigration and Population Office’ and they were told by the head of the office that they [SAC] would not allow villagers to build the bridge. […] They [SAC] said they might be attacked [by local armed group] when there is a bridge. […] In my opinion, there is no relation between the bridge and them [SAC]. […] It would be good if we had a bridge to make transportation easier for us, especially transportation for healthcare purposes [to travel to clinics and buy medicine from other villages].”
c. Displacement due to indiscriminate shelling
Despite the SAC conducting regular shelling [in the area], most of the local villagers initially chose not to leave their houses because they had to protect their family properties and livelihoods, and did not want to displace themselves so they could access their livelihood means, houses, and health and education services in the villages. Mostly, villagers would flee from their villages only when rounds of mortar were landing in their villages and causing direct risk to their lives.
After the shelling on December 19th 2023 that killed a villager, Naw K---, and caused significant destruction in I--- village, over a thousand villagers from Shwe Yaung Pya and Kaw Ler village tracts had to flee from their villages in fear. Displaced villagers are from I---, O---, P---, Q---, R--- villages [and J--- village]. They have been displaced to different places; some villagers fled to the forest, others fled to their relatives’ houses in other villages, and others to towns and/or to their relatives’ houses in Thailand. Saw H---, the I--- village leader, reported to KHRG that, “There is no villager [remaining] in I--- village -villagers have been displaced because they [SAC] regularly shelled mortars into villages. […] Some villagers fled to other villages, or to Thaton Town, and some of them fled to Gg--- [a border city in Thailand] -to their relatives’ living there.” However, some elder villagers decided not to run anymore, and they just stay in the village to take care of their properties.
d. Education challenges
Some schools in Tha Htoo Township are under SAC administration and some are run by the Karen Education and Culture Department (KECD)[12], under the KNU. Due to SAC’s regular shelling in the communities, children and teachers have been facing high-security risks to go to schools. Therefore, the schools had to close temporarily when shelling was being conducted in their area. Villagers will re-open schools when the situation improves.
For instance, the school in I--- village, which is under SAC administration, has been closed since December 19th 2023 due to the SAC shelling in this village. Some mortar rounds landed inside the school compound and damaged the school buildings. Students and teachers have been displaced to different areas so they could not study in the places they sought safety in. One of the village leaders, Saw H---, testified: “We have a government [SAC]-run school. The school must close now because they [teachers and students] do not feel secure to teach and study anymore. The two school buildings were also damaged; shrapnel broke the glass of the school windows. […] Students have fled to different places, and they cannot go to school anymore. No villager feels safe to stay in the village so how can students go to school?”.
e. Healthcare and humanitarian assistance
The internally-displaced villagers from Kaw Ler village tract, Tha Htoo Township, could not bring enough food, warm clothes, first aid supplies and other essential items when they were forced to flee. Therefore, they are in need of emergency support, such as drinking water, clothes, food and healthcare supplies. Villagers who fled to their relatives’ houses in other villages were receiving support from their relatives and friends, and villagers who fled to the forest, like in L--- cave, could access some support from religious groups and local organisations. Saw H---, the village leader also displaced from I--- village, explained: “One senior monk from L--- village came to us and donated drinking water. We face extreme cold in this cave, and it impacts [our health] because we usually do not live in cold areas like this. […] Some villagers are sick, so we ask Kawthoolei [KDHW] health workers to come and help us [to provide medical treatment]. […] We had to pay for some medicines because they could not cover all medical expenses for us. […] Running noses and coughs are common illnesses [symptoms]. […] Some villagers experienced diarrhoea during the first couple of days we fled here; it might be because they moved to an uncomfortable place and did not have proper food like they usually have. […] We also received food, rice and vegetables from other villagers, like Hh--- and Jj--- villagers [who did not flee].”
f. Livelihood challenges
Villagers in Kaw Ler village tract ordinarily plant rice paddy during winter and summer, but they could not work on the fields or farms and take care of their livestock to secure their family livelihoods due to the ongoing SAC shelling in the area. Some villagers had to sell their livestock at a lower price than the usual local rate and some lost their livestock, houses and other properties during the shelling and were left without access to any compensation or support. Therefore, villagers are worried about their family livelihoods and their future. Saw H--- explained the concerns to KHRG: “Some villages are hiding in fear with their children and they have to move to a safer place when they hear the sound of mortar explosion. They could not go far away from their children [when trying to secure their livelihoods, as they are responsible for them]. This is the most challenging for us [to secure livelihoods]. […] We do not feel secure to plant paddy on our farms anymore. Farming is the only job we have [for our livelihood]. […] We plant paddy in the dry season. […] People like us have to flee and cannot work on our farms so we face extreme livelihood problems. Currently, we are okay because we received food donations, but it will be worse when there is no humanitarian assistance for us [any longer]. […] We do not feel safe to work on our farms and have sold our livestock like cows and buffalos for a lower price […]. For example, one cow costs about 500,000 kyat [238 USD][13], but villagers have to sell it for only 200,000 or 300,000 kyat [95 or 143 USD] […] because they assumed they could lose their livestock [from the shelling] without receiving anything in return.” Saw H---, from I--- village, continued: “When we could stay in our homes, at least we could work to secure our family’s daily food. We do not feel safe staying in our home here, in rural communities [anymore]. We will stay home when we feel safe. […] I want to go home and stay in our house. The situation might be better if there is no shelling.”
Other Incidents in Tha Htoo Township:
a. December 1st 2023: Shelling in Daw Ya village tract
On December 1st 2023 at 4 am, SAC IB #8, based at Myay Taung army camp in Bilin Town, shelled two rounds of mortar which landed beside Kyeh Chay Hka village, K’Dee Poo village tract, Tha Htoo Township. It did not cause any damage or casualties.
On the same day at 10:10 am, the SAC soldiers encountered a local [resistance] armed group [unknown if Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA)[14] or People’s Defence Force (PDF)[15]] in Q--- village, Daw Ya village tract, Tha Htoo Township, and fighting broke out. The SAC, including soldiers from Artillery Unit #314 and IB #8, responded by shelling 108 rounds of mortar into different areas in Tha Htoo Township. Five of the mortar rounds landed beside T’Raw Meh village, eight mortar rounds landed in Bilin Kyon Th’Waw Mu Nu village, and 40 mortar rounds landed in A’Leh Kyon area, between Q--- village, Daw Ya village tract, and Bilin Kyon village, K’Dee Poo village tract. Five mortar rounds landed in an area between Kyeh Chay Hka and Bilin Kyon villages, K’Dee Poo village tract. Additionally, 15 mortar rounds landed in an area between Q--- and Keh Moh villages and 35 mortars landed in, and beside, Q--- village. The mortar explosions in Q--- village destroyed three villagers’ houses and injured five cattle. The owners of the houses destroyed by the mortar explosion are U[16] V---, Daw[17] W--- and Daw X---. The five injured cattle later died and were owned by Daw Y---.
b. December 2nd 2023: SAC shelling into several village tracts
On December 2nd 2023, at 4 am, SAC LIB #206 shelled two rounds of mortar that landed beside F--- village, Noh Ta Shu village tract, Tha Htoo Township. The mortar explosion killed five cattle and injured three cattle, owned by a local villager named Tee[18] Z--- (60 years old).
On the same day, at 4 pm, SAC Artillery Unit #402 shelled two rounds of mortar in Ma Kaw Koe area, near I--- village, Kaw Ler village tract, Tha Htoo Township. It did not cause property damage or casualties.
Later, at 5:30 pm, Artillery Unit #402 shelled another four rounds of mortar in Kaw Ler village tract. Two of the mortar rounds landed in an area close to Waw Poo cave and another two landed in L--- and Thee Ko villages. Also at this time, SAC IB #206 shelled another two rounds of mortar in Ma Kaw Koe area, near I--- village. It caused no casualty or [major] damage.
At 7:48 pm that day, SAC IB #8 based in Myay Taung army camp shelled four rounds of mortar in Tha Htoo Township. Two of the mortar rounds landed beside Th’Khaw Meh Th’Waw Poe village and one of them landed in an area between K’Dee Poo and Ko Mya villages, K’Dee Poo village tract. [Although not all mortar rounds may be found, the total number of mortar rounds that are shelled can be determined by the number of times the sound of the fired mortar is heard, as reported to KHRG.] SAC Artillery Unit #314 also shelled seven mortar rounds; three of them landed in an area between Kyeh Kay La and Bilin Kyon villages, one landed in Htee Hpoe Kler river near Kya T’Raw village, Shwe Yaung Pya village tract, and three landed in Klee Kloe Ka area. They did not cause casualties or damage.
c. December 4th 2023: Shelling into Daw Ya and Shwe Yaung Pya village tract
On December 4th 2023, between 8:18 am and 11 am, SAC Artillery Unit #314 and Infantry Battalion (IB) #8, based in Myay Taung army camp, shelled 31 mortar rounds into Daw Ya and Shwe Yaung Pya village tracts, Tha Htoo Township. Four of the mortar rounds landed beside Teh Too Ko village (on the eastern side), six rounds landed in Ah Leh Kyon village, and 15 rounds landed in Q--- village, all in Daw Ya village tract. The 15 mortar rounds that landed in Q--- village injured one villager, named Saw N--- (70 years old) on his right arm, and destroyed four houses owned by Ma[19] S--- (55 years old), Daw T--- (58 years old), Daw U--- (70 years old) and U G--- (58 years old). Five of the mortar rounds landed in Taw Tu Kloe (Daung Min Taung) stream area, Shwe Yaung Pya village tract, and damaged a monastery’s water tank.
d. December 5th 2023: Further shelling by the SAC
On December 5th 2023, between 6:45 and 7:20 pm, SAC Artillery Unit #314 shelled four mortar rounds into a farm beside Shwe Yaung Pya village, Shwe Yaung Pya village tract, Tha Htoo Township. It caused no [major] damage or casualties.
[On that day,] SAC LIB #9 also shelled five mortar rounds; one landed beside Ma Aye Chah village, and one landed in an area between Ma Aye Cha and Ka Ma So villages, Htee Nya Paw village tract, Tha Htoo Township. These also did not cause any casualties or damage to property. [The location where the other three rounds landed is unknown.]
[Additionally,] SAC Artillery Unit #402 also shelled two rounds of mortar into a farm near Kaw Ler village, Kaw Ler village tract, causing no [major] damage or casualties.
e. December 6th 2023: Shelling of 26 mortar rounds
On December 6th 2023, from 7:30 to 10 pm, SAC Artillery Unit #402, IB #24 and LIB #206 shelled 26 rounds of mortar [from their respective army bases] in Tha Htoo Township. Two mortar rounds landed beside Kaw Sa Taik factory and two rounds landed in an area between Noh Ta Shu village and T’Rweh Klo stream, Tha Htoo Township. Four rounds landed on a farm beside L--- village, two rounds landed beside Wa Poo Lay cave, four rounds landed beside Kaw Ler Nee village, six rounds landed in an area between Ma Kaw Ko and I--- villages, four rounds landed in an area between Htaw Pra and I--- villages, and two rounds landed in an area between Noh Hpa Htaw and Noh Ta Shu villages. They did not cause damage or injuries to civilians.
f. December 7th 2023: SAC shelling more than 40 mortar rounds
On December 7th 2023, between 12:20 pm and 9:10 pm, SAC Artillery Unit #314 shelled 23 rounds of mortar. Four rounds landed in the cemetery in P--- village, four rounds landed beside O--- village, six rounds landed in Htee Hpoe Naw Boe area, on O--- hill, two rounds landed on T’Hkaw Wah Loo hill, four rounds landed in Law Taw Tu stream, and three rounds landed beside Pa Aww Ko village. During the shelling, one P--- villager, named Saw Ea--- (46 years old), was injured on his head, neck and leg. He died as a result of these major injuries. Shrapnel from the mortar explosion injured three cattle in O--- village, Shwe Yaung Pya village tract. One cow was owned by Naw D--- (36 years old), one cow was owned by Naw B--- (57 years old), and one cow was owned by Naw C--- (47 years old).
On the same day, from 4:37 to 9:20 pm, SAC LIB #9 shelled more than 17 mortar rounds in Tha Htoo Township. Two rounds landed in Chaung Maing Kon village without causing damage or injury, one round landed beside O--- village and another one landed in O--- village. The mortar explosion in O--- village damaged or/and destroyed six houses, including those owned by Naw Aa--- (59 years old), Naw Bb--- (45 years old), Naw Cc--- (60 years old), Saw Dd--- (57 years old) and Saw Ee--- (68 years old). Six mortar rounds landed beside K’Law Kher village, two rounds landed in an area between M’Ya Kon and K’Law Kher villages, and three rounds landed beside M’Ya Kon village; none causing injury or damage. Four rounds landed beside Htee Nya Paw village, without causing damage or injury.
At 5 pm, LIB #206 also shelled two rounds of mortar in an area between Htaw Pra village and Kaw Sa Taik factory, Noh Ta Shu village tract, without causing damage or injury.
g. December 10th 2023: Further SAC shelling
On December 10th 2023, from 6:50 to 7:30 pm, SAC Artillery Unit #314 shelled four rounds of mortar that landed beside Lah Aww Kher village cemetery, Shwe Yuang Pya village tract, Tha Htoo Township, causing no damage or injury.
On the same day, LIB #9 also shelled four mortar rounds which landed beside Htee Nya Paw village, Htee Nya Paw village tract, without causing damage or casualties.
Further background reading on the human rights situation in Doo Tha Htoo District can be found in the following KHRG reports:..."
Source/publisher:
Karen Human Rights Group
Date of entry/update:
2024-05-29
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Education in Burma/Myanmar - general, Public Health, Human Rights and international relations, Karen Human Rights Group (KHRG) reports
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"OVERVIEW
Internal displacement in Myanmar has reached a record high. Over three million people have been forced to flee their homes in just six months – a sharp increase of 50 per cent. Chin, Magway and Sagaing regions in North-West Myanmar host the highest number of those displaced at nearly 1.5 million people. Frequent airstrikes, armed clashes, civilian property destruction and arrests continue to exact a heavy toll, resulting in civilian casualties, injuries, and further forced displacement. The security landscape in Rakhine State has deteriorated drastically amid ongoing armed conflict. Humanitarian access for all UN agencies and INGOs has been mostly restricted since early November 2023 when fighting resumed. Armed clashes in Kayin State have also severely impacted civilians, causing a surge in new displacement within Myanmar and across the border into Thailand. The security situation in southern Kachin State, including urban areas, has also worsened significantly, leading displaced families living in protracted camps to relocate to safer locations in rural areas. UNHCR and partners are exploring ways to adapt to the volatile situation and provide critical assistance where possible despite access constraints.
In Thailand, fighting near the 2nd Thai-Myanmar Friendship Bridge in Mae Sot District and around Myawaddy Town in Myanmar’s Kayin State, resulted in some 3,000 refugees crossing into Thailand in two waves. Between 2 and 5 April, the Royal Thai Government (RTG) reported that close to 80 refugees were received in Nong Luang Temporary Safety Area (TSA) in Umphang District in Tak Province and remained there as of 1 May. Between 19 and 22 April, the RTG reported that close to 3,000 Myanmar refugees crossed into Mae Sot and were sheltered in TSAs. However, by 23 April, authorities reported that this group had returned to Myanmar. At the request of the RTG, UNHCR and humanitarian partners provided food and core-relief items (CRIs) to provincial authorities. UNHCR did not have access to the TSAs, and as such, protection assessments were not possible. UNHCR and partners are advocating with authorities for protection actors to gain access to the TSAs.
Since February 2021, approximately 60,400 individuals from Myanmar’s North-West region have sought protection in India. Out of this population, 6,213 individuals are in New Delhi and have registered with UNHCR. As the monsoon season approaches, the humanitarian needs of Myanmar arrivals in Mizoram and Manipur are escalating, requiring more assistance such as mosquito nets and health facilities/services. Although humanitarian agencies and state governments are mobilizing the necessary support, there is a pressing need for additional resources to sufficiently address the needs of the Myanmar arrivals..."
Source/publisher:
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (Geneva) via Reliefweb (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2024-05-28
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
UNHCR (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees), Food Security and nutrition in Burma/Myanmar, Education and training of migrants and refugees from Burma, Public Health, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
12.76 MB
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Description:
"The Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar has made numerous requests to the Myanmar military for information related to the many serious crimes that we are investigating. These include crimes allegedly committed by the Myanmar security forces and by armed groups. To date, the military has not responded to any of these requests. Today the Mechanism has sent a new request and is issuing this statement in the hope that it will lead to a response.
Today’s request asks for information about the capture and killing of two young men in Myauk Khin Yan village in the Magway Region. In a video widely circulated on the internet, armed men tied the two men and hung them from a tree, then built a fire beneath and killed the men by burning them alive.
Video footage showing the brutal treatment of these young men circulated on social media in early February 2024. The two victims, identified in media coverage as Phoe Tay and Tha Htaung, were in their early twenties and allegedly members of anti-junta group the Yaw Defence Force.
The Mechanism is conducting an impartial and independent determination of the facts surrounding this incident, including the identity and affiliation of the perpetrators. As part of this investigation, the Mechanism has asked the Myanmar military to share with it any information about the units in the area and their commanders, the circumstances of the victims’ detention and treatment, and the persons seen committing the torture and killings.
I urge the Myanmar military to fully cooperate with the Mechanism, as called for in numerous resolutions by the United Nations Human Rights Council and the General Assembly, by giving us access to the country and sharing requested information. The evidence collected by the Mechanism is used to objectively investigate and to build criminal cases against those perpetrators responsible for the most serious international crimes. The goal is to break the cycle of impunity, including for persons so brazen as to commit such sadistic and inhumane crimes, and to bring justice for the people of Myanmar.
The Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar (IIMM or Mechanism) was created by the United Nations Human Rights Council in 2018 to collect and analyse evidence of the most serious international crimes and other violations of international law committed in Myanmar since 2011. It aims to facilitate justice and accountability by preserving and organizing this evidence and preparing case files that can be used by authorities to prosecute individuals in national, regional and international courts..."
Source/publisher:
Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2024-05-27
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
138.67 KB
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Description:
"The MAU tracks market prices in southern Sagaing Region. Data are collected from three vendors per product per market at the end of each month. The data include prices from Monywa (main market), Myaung (village), Shwebo (main market), Ye-U (village), and Yinmarbin (village). Data and product specs are available at www.themimu.info/market-analysis-unit.
KEY FINDINGS
April saw numerous and deep price hikes in Sagaing—the most since monitoring began in September 2023;
Cooking oil prices rose 15%, but essential foods were less affected by rising prices than other product groups;
Prices for some vegetables rose at least 40% in April, indicating a break with winter's more stable prices;
Meat and fish prices rose 10-20% in April, and falling prices were extremely rare;
Hygiene NFI prices rose faster than other NFIs in April as detergent, soap, and toothpaste rose 6-22%;
NFI prices rose slower than other goods at 2-10%, but nearly all NFIs monitored saw prices rising;
Price hikes were broadest in Monywa and Shwebo where half of all products monitored rose 10% and 12%, respectively.
Product-Level Price Changes
Essential Foods – Cooking oil prices rose 15% in April, while price trends for rice and pulses varied by market. Cooking oil prices rose again, adding another 15% to February's increas-es. Prices for rice and pulses varied by market, with prices up in Monywa, Shwebo and Yinmarbin but down in Myaung and Ye-U.
Vegetables – Vegetable prices rose sharply in April, most of all for eggplant, long bean, and green chili. Prices for eggplant, long bean, and green chili rose at least 40% in most markets in April. Garlic prices were up 8%, while onion prices fluctuated. Shwebo alone reported falling vegetable prices in April.
Meat and Fish – Meat and fish prices increased 10-20% in April, and there very few falling prices. Prices for dried fish and chicken increased 10%, while shrimp and fish paste rose 18% and 20%, respectively. Prices for fresh fish rose and fell in differ-ent markets. All markets saw higher meat/fish prices in April, but Ye-U saw the steepest increases at 18-25%.
Hygiene Products – Prices for hygiene products rose 6-22% in April, outpacing price increases for other NFIs. Soap and detergent prices rose 17% and 22%, respectively, in April. Tooth-paste prices rose across markets in April as well, but only 6%. Sanitary pad prices were mostly stable. The steepest price hikes for hygiene NFI were in Monywa where prices climbed 29-36%.
Other NFIs – NFI prices increased 2-10% regionwide, although there were some differences at the township-level. Prices for cooking pots, plastic tarps, blankets, and jerry cans rose 2-4% in April, while prices for towels, mosquito nets, and umbrellas rose a slightly-larger 5-8%. Shwebo saw sharper price increases and more stockouts, while Myaung and Ye-U saw smaller increases and even a few price cuts of 3-10%..."
Source/publisher:
Myanmar Information Management Unit (Myanmar) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2024-05-24
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
686.93 KB
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Description:
"This independent update, covering humanitarian developments up to 22 May, is produced by OCHA Myanmar under its global mandate, in collaboration with the Inter-Cluster Coordination Group and UN agencies. Response figures are based on self-reporting by organizations to clusters. The next humanitarian update will be issued mid-June 2024.
HIGHLIGHTS & KEY MESSAGES
• The humanitarian crisis in Myanmar has entered a dangerous new chapter with entrenched conflict posing grave risks to civilians, stirring a worrying resurgence of inter-communal tension and driving record levels of displacement.
• The humanitarian situation in Rakhine is particularly alarming with fighting intensifying and intercommunal tensions simmering. Access restrictions remain severe despite soaring needs. With the peak of the dry season, water scarcity and cases of Acute Watery Diarrhoea (AWD) have been widely reported while an estimated 1.6 million people are now estimated to be without access to hospital care in central and northern Rakhine.
• In Kayin, an intense battle for control of the key border trading town of Myawaddy resulted in both internal displacement and fluid cross-border population movement. An estimated 4,000 people from Myawaddy Town and surrounding areas remain displaced along the Myanmar-Thai border.
• As the volatile monsoon season approaches, strong winds and heavy rain have already hit several townships in Chin, Magway, Sagaing, and northern Shan in recent months, causing damage and destruction to civilian properties and other structures.
• Despite these challenges, humanitarian partners continue to deliver assistance to the people in need, reaching almost 1 million people during the first quarter of 2024 despite gross underfunding.
• The 2024 Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan (HNRP) remains alarmingly under-resourced, with only 10 per cent of required funding received, according to the Financial Tracking Service (FTS). This is despite the deepening needs, the surge in new displacement, and soaring inflation that have further stretched the grossly insufficient resources across clusters..."
Source/publisher:
UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (New York) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2024-05-24
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Education in Burma/Myanmar - general, Food Security and nutrition in Burma/Myanmar, Public Health, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
838.81 KB
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Description:
"The International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) today condemned the escalation of atrocities against the inhabitants of Buthidaung Township in Rakhine State. The ICJ called on all parties to the ongoing armed conflict in Rakhine State to respect international humanitarian law and cease unlawful operations in the conduct of hostilities.
On 17 May 2024, widespread arson attacks were reported in Buthidaung Township, which has a predominantly Rohingya population. Satellite imagery reveals that large parts of the town have been destroyed by fire. The fires caused the extensive destruction of homes and reportedly forced tens of thousands of civilians, mainly Rohingya, to flee their homes.
Reports indicate that the already besieged Rohingya population has been particularly affected and remains at enormous risk.
“Allegations of widespread burning and destruction of homes and other direct, indiscriminate or disproportionate attacks on civilians and civilian objects, if substantiated, would violate international humanitarian law and constitute war crimes,” said Melissa Upreti, ICJ Regional Director for Asia and the Pacific. “They require independent, prompt and impartial investigations, with a view to bringing perpetrators to justice.”
All parties to the armed conflict are bound by international humanitarian law.
There are competing accounts of who bears responsibility for these arson attacks in Buthidaung Township. The ICJ has been unable to independently verify the veracity of these competing claims, exacerbated by the ongoing military-imposed internet shutdown and communications blackout across Rakhine State. The arbitrary shutdowns on internet and mobile connections in Rakhine State and across Myanmar prevent even rudimentary monitoring of the situation, helping to conceal responsibilities for atrocity crimes and abet the possible destruction of evidence.
“We are gravely concerned about the suppression of information and real risk of past atrocities being repeated, particularly against the Rohingya who have faced decades of systematic persecution and discrimination, with the conflict looking to intensify further across Rakhine State,” added Upreti.
There have been recent patterns of widespread and systematic human rights violations and abuses being committed against the Rohingya community since the escalation of the conflict in Rakhine State in November 2023. These come only a few years after the findings by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar confirming acts of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes against the Rohingya population.
Credible reports have emerged of young Rohingya men facing forcible recruitment from the military junta, Arakan Army and armed Rohingya groups through coercion, bribery and exploitation. There has also been an alleged spread of disinformation and unlawful hate speech against Rohingya Muslims, with the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights warning of the spread of similar “hateful narratives that fuelled communal violence in 2012 and the horrendous attacks against the Rohingya in 2017”.
The ICJ reiterates that the Tatmadaw’s (Myanmar military) continued disregard for human rights and the rule of law has created a climate of near absolute impunity for the widespread and systematic perpetration of grave human rights violations and abuses both by them and other armed groups and non-state actors, including those amounting to serious crimes under international law.
The ICJ urges all armed actors to prioritize the protection of the lives, safety and needs of civilians, regardless of ethnicity or religion, in Rakhine State as well as across Myanmar. All parties to the conflict must also facilitate humanitarian assistance to those affected by the conflict, with the worsening humanitarian crisis in Rakhine State as a result of those forcibly displaced being unable to access food, safe water and sanitation, housing and healthcare.
The ICJ also calls for an immediate emergency response by responsible UN bodies and Member States before the situation in Rakhine State escalates even further. This must include calls by Member States for immediate restoration of internet and mobile access in Rakhine State to reveal the situation on the ground and a prompt investigation by international accountability and human rights mechanisms into potential crimes under international law that may have been committed in Buthidaung Township and other affected areas..."
Source/publisher:
International Commission of Jurists (Geneva)
Date of entry/update:
2024-05-24
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
International Court of Justice (ICJ) - Myanmar, International Court of Justice (ICJ) - General, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Local URL:
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Description:
"Human Rights Violations took place in States and Regions from May 15 to 21, 2024
Military Junta Troop launched airstrikes and dropped bombs in the Sagaing Region, Chin State, Rakhine State, and Shan State from May 15th to 21st. Over 200 men from Magway Region, Yangon Region, and Shan State were arrested for 2nd batch of Military Service and blackmailed. Military Junta Troop and staff who work for the Military collected money from the cars and passengers and also were getting money for making NRC cards (National Registration Citizenship).
Over 20 civilians died, and over 50 were injured by the Military’s heavy and light artillery attacks within a week. 8 underaged people died and 5 were injured when the Military committed Human rights abuses. A civilian also died by the landmines of the Military Junta..."
Source/publisher:
Network for Human Rights Documentation-Burma
Date of entry/update:
2024-05-23
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Format :
pdf pdf pdf
Size:
211.59 KB 197.85 KB 781.69 KB
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Description:
"Geneva, 23 May 2024 – The Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar is closely monitoring the escalation in fighting in Rakhine State in Myanmar and assessing if crimes against humanity or war crimes have been committed.
We are examining numerous reports of high intensity fighting between the Myanmar military and the Arakan Army, including increased violence and the destruction of property in Buthidaung Township which has reportedly resulted in the displacement of thousands of mainly Rohingya civilians, and is also impacting on Rakhine and Hindu communities.
The Mechanism is also collecting evidence of potential serious international crimes committed in other parts of Myanmar as conflict continues to increase across the country.
The Mechanism is mandated to investigate the most serious international crimes in Myanmar regardless of the affiliation of the perpetrators. This includes crimes committed by the Myanmar security forces, as well as members of armed groups.
Under the laws of war, people who are not taking active part in hostilities may not be targeted, and all parties should take measures to minimize harm to civilians and civilian objects, such as homes, schools and hospitals.
The testimonies of witnesses and survivors of crimes are vital for us to build criminal cases against perpetrators. Equally important are people with knowledge of illegal orders or policies. We encourage anyone who has information about serious crimes committed in Rakhine State, and elsewhere in the country, to contact us through our secure and confidential channels..."
Source/publisher:
Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2024-05-23
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Crimes Against Humanity, Arakan (Rakhine) State - reports etc. by date (latest first)
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
142.56 KB
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Description:
"Highlights
• The number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) has now surpassed 3 million, with children continuing to bear the heaviest burden of the continuing violence and experiencing grave violations of their rights. Sustained humanitarian action to provide a comprehensive package of services remains challenging.
• In Rakhine, water scarcity and increase of acute watery diarrhoea cases are exacerbating pre-existing vulnerabilities. UNICEF is providing safe water through water boating and trucking services to internally displaced persons’ camps and communities. In addition, UNICEF with support of the WASH cluster, is providing water purification chemicals for the treatment of key water sources and systems to reduce the spread of infection.
• While 300,000 children missed routine vaccinations, UNICEF has vaccinated 88,043 children aged under one year against measles and rubella as of February 2024.
• The significant funding gap against the Humanitarian Action for Children (HAC) Appeal persists. Securing timely and sufficient funding for immediate and sustained assistance is crucial to avert the worst outcomes for children and their families, especially with the onset of the monsoon season.
Situation Overview & Humanitarian Needs
The humanitarian situation continued to deteriorate across the country, with intensifying armed clashes leading to further displacement, increased security incidents, human rights violations and protection concerns. An additional 200,000 people were displaced internally over the past month. More than 3 million people are now internally displaced, 1 mainly in the northwest, where more than 1.5 million people have left their homes, followed by the southeast (932,900 people) and Rakhine (356,000).
In the southeast, fighting and airstrikes have escalated in Kawtkareik and Myawaddy since 11 April resulting in civilian injuries and deaths. In Loikaw, Hpasaung, Mawchi, Demoso and Bawlakhe in Kayah state, armed clashes between the Myanmar Armed Forces (MAF), ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) and the people’s defence forces (PDFs) have also been escalating, with airstrikes and artillery shelling resulting in civilian casualties and the increasing risk of injuries from landmines. Internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Kayah need urgent humanitarian support; they are suffering from acute water shortages especially in Hpruso township in these driest periods. In southern Shan, armed conflict involving artillery shelling and airstrikes have escalated in Hsihseng, Nyaungshwe, Pinlaung, Pekon and Moebye with some casualties. EAOs had reportedly increased their efforts for further recruitment, while MAF enforced the conscription law. People displaced from Moebye, Hsihseng and Pinlaung are in dire need of humanitarian support, especially food and shelter.
In the northwest, the situation remains unchanged with continuing armed clashes and restrictions on movement and supplies. At least 5,200 IDPs require humanitarian assistance in Katha, Tigyaing and Indaw townships in northern Sagaing.
In Rakhine, armed clashes are intensifying with aerial bombardment, heavy shelling, and increasing grave protection concerns and exacerbating an already vulnerable situation. The escalation in conflict has seen huge needs emerge in previously stable areas. Armed clashes in the outskirts of Buthidaung ignited a new level of conflict in and around the town and displaced at least 15,000 people. 2 The entire population in Buthidaung are without essential services, including health care. Basic commodities and essential items, including fuel, are scarce and cash is very difficult to obtain. While many vulnerable IDPs in Rakhine are short of water, there has been an increase cases of acute watery diarrhoea (AWD) in Sittwe and Pauktaw, with most of those affected being children aged under 5 years. In addition, more than 165,000 people are newly displaced here since the intensification of conflict in November 2023. The risk of forced recruitment by all parties to the conflict is a major protection concern, particularly for the vulnerable Rohingya people. The closure of roads and waterways, restricted access, limited telecommunications and internet connections, and authorizations are hampering attempts to provide humanitarian assistance.
Data released by UNICEF on 4 April, the International Day of Mine Awareness and Assistance, showed a significant increase in civilian casualties – including many children – due the use of landmines and other explosive ordnance. There were 1,052 verified civilian casualties from landmine and explosive ordnance incidents during 2023 – nearly triple the 390 incidents recorded in 2022. More than 20 per cent of the victims were children..."
Source/publisher:
UN Children's Fund (New York) via Reliefweb (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2024-05-23
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
UNICEF (United Nations Children's Fund), Education in Burma/Myanmar - general, Food Security and nutrition in Burma/Myanmar, Public Health, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
440.24 KB
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Description:
""Ever since I reached three months into my pregnancy, I've been fleeing my village due to frequent armed clashes. The displacement has made it impossible for me to continue farming, leaving me without any income to take care of my health during pregnancy. As a displaced woman, the constant worry of ensuring a safe delivery looms over me," *Hla, a 31-year-old pregnant woman from the Sagaing region, one of Myanmar's most conflict-affected areas, told.
The conflict in Myanmar has led to a significant economic downturn, with countless individuals losing their livelihoods. According to the 2024 Myanmar Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan, 1.4 million women and girls are in need of health assistance across the country in 2024. The ongoing strife has led to a dramatic surge in the number of internally displaced people (IDPs), reaching more than 3 million by the early of May, up from 2.6 million at the beginning of the year. Amidst this conflict, the challenge of accessing basic healthcare has become insurmountable for many, particularly for pregnant women. The fear of childbirth without proper medical care is a grim reality for those living in conflict-intensified areas. "The thought of going into labor without any assistance was terrifying. With the hospitals so far away and the roads unsafe, I didn't know how I would make it," *Hla added.
Recognizing the dire need, UNFPA, with the support of local partners, offers a lifeline through financial assistance for referral support. This involves identifying pregnant women in affected areas, providing them with financial assistance, and facilitating their safe transportation to hospitals. "When I learned about the support, it felt like a heavy burden being lifted off my shoulders. It gave me and my baby strength and ray of hope," *Hla expressed her relief and gratitude. This financial assistance is critical in ensuring that pregnant women can have safe deliveries, even in the midst of such challenging times.
This initiative is part of a broader effort by UNFPA, which in 2023 helped over 2,000 pregnant women affected by conflict through the referral support. In 2024, UNFPA aims to assist 4,800 women and girls with cash referral support for accessing emergency obstetric care, including safe deliveries. This work is crucial for preventing maternal deaths, especially in humanitarian crises.
*Hla's story represents many women in Myanmar who need maternal healthcare. The assistance provided by UNFPA, funded by the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF), is vital for saving lives. Yet, as the conflict worsens, the need for humanitarian access grows, emphasizing the urgency to reach these women.
UNFPA's ongoing efforts in close collaboration with local organizations are a testament to the impact of combined actions in saving lives and ensuring safe childbirths in conflict zones. It's a call to the humanitarian community to stand together to support women and girls, particularly pregnant women in conflict-affected areas, ensuring that every childbirth is safe and that no woman dies while giving life..."
Source/publisher:
United Nations Population Fund (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2024-05-19
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
UNFPA (United Nations Population Fund), Human Rights and international relations, Public Health
Language:
Local URL:
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Description:
"This Incident Report describes events occurring in Noh T’Kaw Township, Dooplaya District. On October 30th 2023, villagers from Waw Loo village tract, Noh T’Kaw Township, were transporting yams with two trucks in order to sell them in Mawlamyine Town. When they reached an army camp checkpoint on Ka Lee Hkee hill, where Border Guard Forces (BGF) Battalion #1023, Cantonment Area #4, and State Administration Council (SAC) Light Infantry Division (LID) #44 are based, SAC soldiers shot at them. A 35-year-old villager, Saw A---, from B--- village, Waw Loo village tract, was injured by the shooting. After this incident, the villagers were afraid to travel on that road, but they had to use it for their livelihood activities.[1]
Excerpt
Part 1 – Incident Details
Type of Incident
[Shooting of civilians] A villager’s arm was injured because SAC soldiers shot him while he was travelling.
Date of Incident(s)
October 30th 2023
Incident Location
(Village, Township and District)
Ka Lee Hkee (Hkoh Kwar) army camp, Waw Loo village tract,[2] Noh T’Kaw Township, Dooplaya District.
[...]
Part 3 – Complete Description of the Incident
Describe the Incident(s) in complete detail.
On October 30th 2023, villagers from B--- village, Waw Loo village tract, Noh T'Kaw Township, Dooplaya District, were transporting elephant foot yams [a vegetable used in local cuisine] with two trucks in order to sell them in Mawlamyine Town. Before they went up to [Ka Lee Hkee (Hkoh Kwar)] hill, [where BGF Battalion #1023, Cantonment #4, and SAC LID #44 army camp is located], they passed a car that was returning on that road and asked whether they could go [pass through Ka Lee Hkee camp] or not. After that, they continued their journey until they reached the [camp’s] checkpoint. One of the villagers, Saw C---, from B--- village, Waw Loo village tract, explained to KHRG: “Actually, we waited for them [SAC and BGF soldiers] to come [to the checkpoint] and collect the gate fee. After a few minutes, no one came and collected the fee. Then, we honked the truck’s horn [as a warning noise], but no one came. I thought maybe the situation was not good [something might happen], so I went to the truck and drove it. When we drove [the first truck] about 20 yards [18 meters] past the gate, they [SAC soldiers] shot at us [with machine guns].”
In this incident, a 35-year-old villager, Saw A---, from B--- village, was injured. While [the first truck had already passed the checkpoint gate, and the second truck was still at the gate,] Saw A--- was about to open the truck’s door, when SAC soldiers at the top of the hill camp shot at him. He was shot on his right arm and fell down in front of the gate. [After the victim was shot,] a villager from D--- village, Noh T'Kaw village tract, Noh T’Kaw Township, took the victim away from the gate by motorcycle [to a nearby Democratic Karen Benevolent Army (DKBA)[7] checkpoint]. After that, a DKBA leader, General Nay Lah, sent the victim to Seik Gyi Town hospital. Saw C--- explained: “He [Saw A---] put his arm on the truck’s door. During the shooting, the [second] truck driver said he had doubts about whether he should go [continue driving] or not. The driver stopped the truck and asked Saw A--- to get out of the truck to put a chock under the [truck] wheel because the road is a slope. Saw A--- was [shot and] injured when he was about to open the truck’s door. As soon as he was injured, [a villager took him to the DKBA checkpoint a few minutes away from Ka Lee Hkee camp and] we asked for help from a [DKBA] soldier. The civilians [nearby] dared not transport him [to the hospital] because they did not know whether he was three fingers [People’s Defence Force (PDF)[8]], DKBA, or Karen National Union (KNU)[9]. Actually, we are civilians. We asked for help from the DKBA, and a soldier contacted his company commander. At that time, the company commanders, Nae Klar and Nay Lah, were coming [to the DKBA checkpoint]. So they [the commanders] took him to the [Seik Gyi] hospital”.
As soon as the victim arrived at the hospital, a health worker came immediately. Due to the fact that the victim was injured by a bullet, he needed an X-ray, but Seik Gyi hospital is unable to provide treatment [due to a lack of capacity]. The victim stayed at Seik Gyi hospital for one night. Saw C--- continued: “We called the ambulance, but the ambulance crew dared not transport the victim. The next day, the company commander [DKBA] scolded the ambulance crew and said ‘you guys dared to transport the soldiers who were injured, but not civilians.’ Later, we rented another car [found someone to drive the victim], and the victim was sent [to Mawlamyine].”
The victim was sent to Mawlamyine Town on October 31st 2023, and sought treatment at Mawlamyine Hospital. He has not yet been discharged from the hospital [as of November 2023]. The victim has two children, and his wife is pregnant. The victim was the breadwinner of his family. Therefore, after he got injured, his family faced problems, and they moved to E---village, Poh Yay village tract, Kaw T’Ree Township, and stayed with his wife’s parents. The victim’s family did not receive any support [from any organisations as of November 2023].
After this incident, the villagers were afraid to travel on that road. Saw C--- added: “If it was possible, I would not use this road for travelling anymore. However, we only have this comfortable [paved] road to travel, so we need to use it. We dare to travel only when many people are travelling.” The villagers do not want to travel on this road, but they have to use it for their livelihood..."
Source/publisher:
Karen Human Rights Group
Date of entry/update:
2024-05-16
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Armed conflict in Burma - attacks on civilians
Language:
Format :
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Size:
942.74 KB 457.39 KB 367.81 KB
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Description:
"Human Rights Violations took place in States and Regions from May 8 to 14, 2024
Military Junta Troop launched airstrikes and dropped bombs in the Sagaing Region, Magway Region, Tanintharyi Region, Rakhine State, Kachin State, Shan State, and Kayin State from May 8th to 14th. 20 civilians died and over 50 were injured by the airstrike and dropping bombs in Saw Township, Magway Region, and Tabayin Township, Sagaing Region. Military Junta committed a massacre which involved shooting and killing over 30 local civilians from Lathtuttaw Village in Myinmu Township, Sagaing Region. Military Junta Troop arrested men from Magway Region, Ayeyarwady Region, and Bago Region for 2nd Batch of Military Service and also arrested 7 youths who denied Military Service and their relatives as hostages.
Over 80 civilians died, and over 120 were injured by the Military’s heavy and light artillery attacks within a week. A civilian also died by the landmines of the Military Junta..."
Source/publisher:
Network for Human Rights Documentation-Burma
Date of entry/update:
2024-05-16
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Format :
pdf pdf pdf
Size:
341.43 KB 327.81 KB 120.52 KB
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Description:
"KEY FINDINGS:
Market operations varied by township based on very different local security conditions;
Kyauktaw and Minbya markets gained new life while Maungdaw and Sittwe markets grew quieter;
Supply of vegetables and fuel worsened in April as part of a trend with little sign of changing soon;
Medicine and hygiene NFIs were most scarce, although NFIs in general were often unavailable;
Mrauk-U and Pauktaw markets functioned best, and supply improved in Mrauk-U again in April;
Maungdaw retailers still faced dire challenges, and shipping costs rose in Maungdaw in Sittwe.
Market Functionality - Market operations continued to vary regionally based on security conditions. Operations resumed in Minbya Town in April, but Maungdaw and Sittwe operated irregularly. Security conditions improved slightly but remained tenuous in some markets.
Market Activity - Some markets continued to regain life, but Sittwe and Maungdaw remained subdued. Activity increasingly returned to Minbya and Kyauktaw Town markets, despite lingering security risks there. Village markets in Pauktaw and Ponnagyun remained swollen due to the loss of nearby town markets. Maungdaw market activity dipped further in April, and Sittwe activity shifted to ward markets. Most markets still served only nearby villages as fuel costs limited customer movement.
Availability of Goods - Supply of fuel and vegetables worsened in April, but supply was otherwise stable. Availability of vegetables worsened as local production declined regionally, and fuel supply worsened after improving slightly in March. Supply was poorest in Maungdaw, Sittwe, and Minbya Towns, with the latter two relying mostly on ward markets which seldom sell NFIs.
Transport & Logistics - Shipping costs rose further in Sittwe and Maungdaw but were stable elsewhere. Shipping costs outside of Sittwe stabilized in April after two months of moderate price relief. Retailers continued sourcing goods from neighboring townships, and several paid high prices to order goods from Yangon via Toungup. Sittwe and Maungdaw markets still remained isolated in the region and faced rising shipping costs.
Retailer Challenges - Retailers in some markets reported fewer challenges in April than in March. Retailers in Kyauktaw and Mrauk-U reported fewer challenges related to supply and cash access as market activity there grew. Yet retailers in Maungdaw continued to face multiple severe hurdles to selling goods. Safety/security and weak demand were common concerns, while worries about poor cash access receded slightly (in part due to greater prominence in April of ward retailers, who mostly sell vegetables and require less working capital)..."
Source/publisher:
Myanmar Information Management Unit (Myanmar) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2024-05-16
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Food Security and nutrition in Burma/Myanmar, Arakan (Rakhine) State - reports etc. by date (latest first), Public Health, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
11.37 MB
Local URL:
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Description:
"WEEKLY HIGHLIGHTS
In the South-East, the number of internally displaced people (IDPs) dropped significantly from 934,000 last week to 912,200 this week.
In Bago (East), due to the intensified fighting in the area, 489 IDPs from Shwegyin were displaced within the same township.
The fighting near the border with Kayin State displaced 4,415 people from Thandaunggyi Township (Kayin) to Taungoo Township (Bago) - Some151 IDPs from Thadaunggyi fled to Taungoo as a secondary displacement. On the other hand, 30,150 IDPs returned to their place of origin in Myawaddy Town (Kayin).
In Tanintharyi Region, 3,814 people from Thayetchaung were displaced within the township due to the intensified fighting that included airstrike. Among them, 238 IDPs fled as a secondary displacement..."
Source/publisher:
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (Geneva) via Reliefweb (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2024-05-16
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, UNHCR (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees)
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
3.72 MB
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Description:
"Dr Kyungmee Kim, Nadine Andersen, Katongo Seyuba, Kheira Tarif, Dr Thor Olav Iversen and Ingvild Brodtkorb
Myanmar is home to one of the highest concentrations of people vulnerable to the impacts of climate change, with 40 per cent of the population residing in low-lying and coastal regions. Following a military takeover in 2021, the establishment of the State Administration Council (SAC) was met with broad popular resistance, retriggering confrontations with ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) and local antijunta militias. Conflict has exacerbated the country’s vulnerability to climate change and environmental degradation.
• Since the 2021 military takeover, escalating violence and climaterelated disasters have undermined Myanmar’s crucial agricultural sector, impacting food security and livelihoods in conflict-affected communities.
•Internally displaced persons (IDPs) and urban migrants residing in informal settlements, including protest-engaged youth, are particularly vulnerable to climate hazards. This affects the flow of remittances to rural communities, which serve as a buffer during poor harvests.
• Myanmar’s military and EAOs have used humanitarian aid and disaster response to bolster their legitimacy and gain the support of civilian populations, leading to unequal climate resilience and disaster recovery in areas affected by climate-related disasters.
• The military takeover accelerated extractive activities conducted by the military and private enterprises, leading to environmental degradation. The intersecting crises of conflict and climate change have created opportunities for elites to exploit vulnerable populations, the landless, ethnic minorities and women.
The United Nations and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have engaged in conflict mitigation in Myanmar since the military takeover, with limited success. The UN has emphasized that the military takeover triggered a humanitarian crisis, undermined human rights and heightened vulnerability to climate change. The UN and ASEAN leaders have highlighted the importance of peacebuilding initiatives and enhanced community resilience to climate change. Addressing the intersection of climate change, peace and security in Myanmar, without legitimizing the SAC, is critical for strengthening community resilience to climate change, preventing resource conflict and improving the cooperative management of shared resources across communities and other identity groups.
RECOMMENDED ACTIONS:
▶ The United Nations and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) should support regional and local mechanisms for monitoring and responding to the effects of climate change, including by investing in Myanmar’s meteorological monitoring capabilities through the UN’s ‘Early Warnings for All’ initiative. Monitoring systems can support locally led disaster preparedness and riskreduction efforts, improved climate adaptation strategies and climate-resilient agricultural practices.
▶ The new UN Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Myanmar should support advancing a climate-sensitive analysis of conflict dynamics, including the impacts of climate change on displacement and migration and the different vulnerabilities of displaced people, ethnic minorities, and men, women and children. Within the UN, stronger reporting on climate-related security risks can improve responses to immediate humanitarian needs, as well as inform programming to reduce climate vulnerabilities and build peace in the longer term.
▶ The UN, ASEAN and governments involved in conflict mitigation should coordinate efforts to ease restrictions on access and remove bureaucratic impediments to the safe passage of humanitarian assistance after climate-related disasters. Engaging with local governance and grassroots networks can support conflict-sensitive recovery and build climate resilience, while reducing the risk that aid efforts are instrumentalized.
▶ UN General Assembly Resolution 76/180 highlights the disproportionate effect of conflict and human rights abuses on minority groups in Myanmar. Organizations working at the intersection of climate, peace and security should look for opportunities to advance minority rights through meaningful participation in, for example, environmental governance, sustainable livelihoods and ecosystem restoration programmes. Environmental conservation, equitable resource management and climate change adaptation can serve as entry points for strengthening resilience and livelihood security..."
Source/publisher:
Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Date of entry/update:
2024-05-15
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Climate Change - Burma/Myanmar: general, Armed conflict and peace-building in Burma - theoretical, strategic and general, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
1.73 MB
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Description:
"The MAU tracks market prices in Southeast Myanmar. Data are collected from three vendors per product per market in the last week of each month. The data include prices from Demoso (village), Hpapun (Kamamaung), Hsihseng (main), Kawkareik (main), Loikaw (main), Pekon (main), and Taungoo (Nat Htet). Data are available online at www.themimu.info/market-analysis-unit.
KEY FINDINGS
Prices rose sharply in Taungoo and Demoso in April, but other markets monitored saw relative price stability;
Vegetable prices rose 10-40% as seasonal supply fell, with eggplant and long bean recording the largest price increases
Meat/fish prices rose in Taungoo in April, but they were largely stable in other markets monitored;
Hygiene product prices rose 10% in some markets, and price increases were particularly large in Demoso;
Many prices remained 40-70% above last year, as April price increases largely tracked with price trends at this time last year;
Route closures will continue to raise transport costs and increase the price of goods in Kayin State, especially as road quality worsens in monsoon season.
Product-Level Price Changes
Essential Foods – Rice prices were a bit lower in April, although other essential food prices rose in some markets. Rice prices fell 10-20% in several markets in April, although prices for pulses and cooking oil were stable. The exception was Hpapun, where rice prices rose 3-5%. Cooking oil prices rose 8-9% in Demoso and Hpapun while holding stable elsewhere.
Vegetables – Vegetable prices rose 14-37% in April as seasonal supply shifted. Prices for eggplant, long bean, watercress, and green chili rose at least 14% across markets, and prices often doubled in Taungoo. By contrast, garlic and onion prices were stable in three of five markets monitored.
Meat and Fish – Meat and fish prices rose in Taungoo while holding stable or falling elsewhere. Prices for dried fish, fish paste, chicken, and pork increased sharply in Taungoo, but they were stable or 6-17% lower elsewhere. Shrimp and fresh fish prices rose 25% in Demoso but they were stable elsewhere.
Hygiene Products – Prices for hygiene products rose sharply in Taungoo and Demoso, but they were mixed elsewhere.
Prices for hygiene products rose 20-33% in Demoso in April, and they rose 10% or more in Taungoo. Prices for hygiene products were stable in Pinlaung in April, and they fluctuated in Pekon and Hpapun.
Other NFIs – NFI prices spiked in Demoso and Taungoo, but they were stable in Pekon and Pinlaung. Most NFI prices monitored climbed 20-50% in Demoso and 32% or more in Taungoo in April. Some NFI prices did fall in these markets, such as charcoal and cooking pots in Taungoo and longyis in Demoso. NFI prices were exceptionally stable in Pekon and Pinlaung in April, except for cooking pot prices which fell 38%..."
Source/publisher:
Myanmar Information Management Unit (Myanmar) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2024-05-14
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Food Security and nutrition in Burma/Myanmar, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
715.74 KB
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Description:
"KEY HIGHLIGHTS
63,925 people received core relief items comprising kitchen sets, blankets and sleeping mats, ensuring their basic needs were met.
27,210 people received shelter support for safe and dignified living conditions while in displacement.
454 people benefited from multi-purpose cash assistance to meet their basic needs.
FORCIBLY DISPLACED AND STATELESS PEOPLE
2,883,400 Internally displaced people (IDP) living in Rakhine, Chin, Kachin,
Shan, Kayin, Kayah and Mon States, and Bago (East), Tanintharyi, Sagaing and Magway Regions (as of 8 April 2024). According to UN sources, an estimated 2.5 million people have been displaced (as of 8 April 2024) due to the resumption and intensification of clashes between the Tatmadaw and ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) and/or People’s Defense Forces (PDF) after 1 February 2021.
632,789 Estimated Rohingya in Rakhine State, of which some 155,511 are living in displacement camps as well as among the host community since 2012..."
Source/publisher:
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (Geneva) via Reliefweb (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2024-05-14
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
UNHCR (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees), Burma: Internal displacement/forced migration of several ethnic groups., Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
473.38 KB
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Description:
"Tuberculosis (TB) is a social disease – and migration, as a social determinant of health, may increase TB-related morbidity and mortality among migrants and the communities in which they live. Across the countries of the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS), migrants face various barriers to accessing TB detection and treatment services. The Global Fund Strategy 2023–2028 highlights the importance of human rights, gender equality and community engagement, and of addressing the social determinants of TB, through a package of comprehensive and quality TB services. Further analysis of available evidence relating to the community, rights and gender (CRG) dimension of migration and TB in the GMS is therefore needed to ensure that TB programmes in the region are more responsive to the needs and rights of affected communities, contributing to the elimination of TB among migrants, as well as the broader population. This report reviews existing CRG literature, with a specific focus on TB among migrants in the GMS, and categorizes available information, remarking on the country-specific situation in terms of migration, TB burden, key and vulnerable populations for TB, the stigma attached to TB, and human rights-related and gender-based barriers to TB services. The report proposes a set of recommendations, to be considered at the regional and country levels, based on the findings of the review..."
Source/publisher:
International Organization for Migration ( Switzerland)
Date of entry/update:
2024-05-13
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
3.12 MB
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Description:
"The Indian authorities’ forced return of 77 Myanmar refugees violates the principle of non-refoulement, and any further plans to forcibly return more Myanmar refugees must be immediately halted, said the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) today.
On 2 May 2024, Manipur’s Chief Minister, Biren Singh, announced on social media that they had “completed the first phase of deportation” of 77 Myanmar refugees, referring to them as “illegal immigrants”, and noted that the State Government is continuing to identify “illegal immigrants” and recording their “biometric data”.
“The forcible return of Myanmar refugees from Manipur violates the principle of non-refoulement under international law as it exposes them to a real risk of serious harm, such as indiscriminate violence against civilians amidst escalating conflict in Myanmar, and the widespread and systematic human rights violations being committed by the Myanmar military,” said Mandira Sharma, ICJ Senior International Legal Adviser.
Reports indicate that over 6,000 Myanmar refugees have sought safety in Manipur as a result of the deteriorating security situation in Myanmar. The Manipur Chief Minister has blamed “illegal immigrants” for stoking ongoing violence and unrest between the Meitei community, the Kuki and other tribal hill communities, and promised to “identify and repatriate them”, despite the lack of substantive evidence of their involvement in the ongoing violence in Manipur.
“The Indian authorities must immediately halt all further forcible returns of Myanmar refugees from Manipur and should instead offer protection and support to those seeking safety from serious harm, in line with the non-refoulement principle and India’s other obligations under international human rights law. The incitement of discrimination, hostility or violence against Myanmar refugees in relation to the ongoing violence must also be stopped and prohibited,” added Sharma.
The forced return of Myanmar refugees will expose them to a real risk of serious harm arising from the escalating conflict between the Myanmar military junta and resistance groups, with reports of indiscriminate attacks against civilians, extrajudicial killings, conflict-related sexual violence, conscription and forced recruitment. This escalation of fighting has included areas in Myanmar along the India-Myanmar border, such as Chin State and Sagaing Region.
Furthermore, the Myanmar military junta has continued perpetrating widespread and systematic human rights violations, many of which amount to crimes under international law, in a climate of near absolute impunity, with rampant arbitrary arrests, detention, torture, summary executions and enforced disappearances for political reasons.
The forced returns of Myanmar refugees breach the principle of non-refoulement, which prohibits the forcible removal of anyone to territories where they may face a real risk of irreparable harm, such as torture or other ill-treatment or other serious human rights violations. The non-refoulement principle is the cornerstone of international protection under international law, including under customary international law and is therefore binding on all States. In addition, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), by which India is bound as a State party, guarantee protection against refoulement.
The ICJ is also concerned about the authorities’ mass collection of biometric information of Myanmar refugees in Manipur, including iris scans and fingerprints. The circumstances in which such collection is taking place are coercive and contrary to the principle of prior informed consent, which should be a prerequisite to collection. The ICJ is also concerned that such sensitive data may be used to carry out arbitrary arrests and detention.
Background
India hosts 86,100 refugees and asylum seekers from Myanmar, including the Rohingya, but lacks a national refugee protection framework. The Myanmar refugees in Manipur are mostly from the Sagaing Region, Chin State and Magway Region. Many are arbitrarily arrested and detained in prisons and detention centres and accused of immigration-related offences under India’s Foreigners’ Act 1946 and the Passport (Entry into India) Rules 1950.
India is not a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol. India is party to the ICCPR and CRC, and has signed but not ratified the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. As a signatory, India should refrain from any conduct contrary to the object and purpose of the Convention, which explicitly prohibits refoulement under article 3.
Article 20(2) of the ICCPR states that “any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law.” There have been claims by the authorities that the violence in Manipur “is being done by people who have come from outside, including militants and drug smugglers”. The ICJ has received credible reports of the circulation of messages and social media posts with similar claims, which appear to incite discrimination, hostility or violence against Myanmar refugees.
In February 2024, the Indian government announced its plan to suspend the free-movement border zone agreement between India and Myanmar, and to fence the India-Myanmar border. The agreement had allowed those living in border zones to enter into their neighbouring nation’s territory without a visa. According to India’s Interior Minister, the suspension was necessary “to ensure the internal security of the country and to maintain the demographic structure” of regions bordering Myanmar, such as Manipur.
India’s controversial Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA), which came into effect in March 2024, excludes refugees from Myanmar and/or those belonging to the Muslim religion, despite its purported aim of providing citizenship to persons persecuted on account of their religion in neighbouring countries. The CAA grants nationality to six religious minorities (Hindus, Sikhs, Buddhists, Jains, Parsis and Christians) who had come to India from Pakistan, Bangladesh and Afghanistan before 2015 and faced religious persecution..."
Source/publisher:
International Commission of Jurists (Geneva)
Date of entry/update:
2024-05-13
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Burmese refugees in India
Language:
Local URL:
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Description:
"Executive Summary
Organized crime is a significant driver of conflict globally. It preys on weak governance, slack law enforcement, and inadequate regulation. It tears at the fabric of societies by empowering and enriching armed actors and fueling violent conflict. In Asia, criminal groups prop up corrupt and dangerous regimes from Myanmar to North Korea, posing a direct threat to regional stability.
Concerned by the impact of organized crime on governance, local conflict, and global security, the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) formed a study group to explore the dimensions and nature of Southeast Asia’s China-origin criminal networks and the scourge of online scamming they are now spreading globally. Since 2021, the power, reach, and influence of these criminal networks have expanded to the point that they now directly threaten human security globally while posing a growing threat to the national security of the United States and many of its allies and partners around the world. Equipped with a series of case studies by experts on the key Southeast Asian countries involved with these networks and on the particular methodology and advanced technology employed in scamming, the study group developed a clearer understanding of the interconnections that facilitate the criminal networks’ operations and endow them with the flexibility to remain one step ahead of law enforcement. The resulting study illustrates how these networks have used their power and influence to develop a web of scam compounds within the region, centered primarily in Myanmar, Cambodia, and Laos, but involving most other countries of the region in the management of their operations and fraudulent proceeds. It analyzes in detail the nature of the online scams, how the criminal groups utilize advanced technology, how they gain control over weak and corrupt governments, how they traffic labor and deploy torture to engage victims in forced criminality, how they launder stolen funds, and how they attempt to whitewash their criminal activity.
Perhaps the most pernicious aspects of this spreading regional—and increasingly global—criminal phenomenon are the extent and character of the networks supporting it. They operate in both licit and illicit business spheres, gaining access to regional government and business elites through apparently legitimate connections and creating lucrative incentives for local elites to associate with and provide material support to their criminal activity, which is often hidden by a veneer of apparent legitimacy, such as casinos, resorts, hotels, and special economic zones (SEZs). The dispersal of these networks into the region is strongly correlated with the areas of weakest governance and the most profound state-embedded criminality. The melding of these groups with corrupt local elites has generated a malign ecosystem that is rapidly evolving into the most powerful criminal network of the modern era.
The only hope of destabilizing and disrupting this complex and entrenched criminal network in Southeast Asia is a dedicated and coordinated international effort..."
Source/publisher:
US Institute of Peace
Date of entry/update:
2024-05-13
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Armed conflict and peace-building in Burma - theoretical, strategic and general, Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
Local URL:
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Description:
"OVERVIEW:
The humanitarian crisis in Myanmar has deteriorated dramatically in the first quarter of 2024, characterized by persistent conflict, widespread insecurity, surging displacement and disrupted basic services. The intensification of fighting, aerial bombardment in urban areas and growing explosive ordnance contamination is having severe consequences for millions of civilians, exacerbating humanitarian needs across the country, including shortages of food and lack of access to critical services such as health and WASH. Amid the escalating conflict, the number of internally displaced people (IDPs) had surged to 2.9 million by 31 March, reflecting a significant increase from 2.6 million at the start of 2024. Changes in territorial control in many parts of the country have made humanitarian operations increasingly complex and conflict dynamics in Rakhine are fueling worrying inter-communal tension.
Despite these daunting challenges, humanitarian partners remained committed to delivering assistance to meet the deepening needs of affected populations, reaching almost 950,000 people during the first quarter. However, a comparison between the first quarters of 2023 and 2024 reveals a concerning trend with the percentage of the targeted population reached decreasing from 27 per cent in 2023 to 18 per cent in 2024.
This 9 per cent decline is likely the product of both severe underfunding and the heavily restricted operating environment. The 2024 Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan (HNRP) remains alarmingly under-resourced, with only 5 per cent of required funding received, according to the Financial Tracking Service (FTS) as of 31 March. This is despite the deepening needs, the surge in new displacement, and soaring inflation that have further stretched the grossly insufficient resources across clusters.
Challenges posed by funding shortages and access constraints were exacerbated by the targeting of aid workers by parties to the conflict. Between January and March, humanitarian organizations reported a total of 359 access incidents across the country, impeding the delivery of vital assistance and services to conflict-affected populations..."
Source/publisher:
UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (New York) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2024-05-10
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Food Security and nutrition in Burma/Myanmar, Public Health, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
886.95 KB
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Description:
"The Arakan Army has greatly expanded the territory it controls in Rakhine State, on Myanmar’s border with Bangladesh, seizing many areas inhabited by Rohingya Muslims. With the regime keen to foment inter-communal strife, Rakhine and Rohingya leaders should act swiftly to calm tensions.
Over the past six months, one of Myanmar’s most powerful armed groups, the Arakan Army, has swept across much of Rakhine State, on the country’s western border, expelling regime troops from cities and military bases. But in Rakhine’s north, the force, composed mainly of fighters from the Rakhine ethnic group, has become embroiled in a complex three-way battle that also involves Rohingya Muslims. Desperate to hold on to power, the military regime has sought to foment inter-communal tensions, rallying some Rohingya to its side through a mix of coercion and inducements. Although the Arakan Army, whose goal is to create an autonomous enclave, says it wants to govern for all communities, some of its recent statements and actions have angered Rohingya people. The conflict has accordingly taken on a dangerous communal overtone. A war pitting the Buddhist Rakhine against the Muslim Rohingya would come at great cost to both sides. At this pivotal juncture, leaders from both communities should take the long view – tamping down incendiary rhetoric, guarding against abuses, rising above historical animus and spurning the regime’s efforts to set them at odds to preserve prospects for a more peaceful future..."
Source/publisher:
International Crisis Group (Belgium)
Date of entry/update:
2024-05-10
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Arakan (Rakhine) State - reports etc. by date (latest first), Discrimination against the Rohingya
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
278.99 KB
more
Description:
"India: General elections underway amid ethnic and militant violence
The 18th Indian general elections started in April, and two out of the scheduled seven phases of polling were completed on 19 and 26 April. The elections will continue until 1 June, with the results set to be declared on 4 June.1 Amid the elections, there was an approximately 34% increase in political violence across the country in April compared to the month prior, including increases in the restive Manipur state and the Jammu and Kashmir Union Territory. Meanwhile, security forces intensified their crackdown on Naxal-Maoist rebels as several states in the ‘Red Corridor,’ the epicenter of the Naxal-Maoist insurgency, went to the polls. At least 29 Naxal-Maoist rebels were reportedly killed during a counter-insurgency operation in Chhattisgarh state on 16 April, marking the deadliest clash between Naxal-Maoist rebels and state forces in three years.
In Manipur, videos showing the mutilated bodies of two Kuki assailants, reportedly killed during a clash between the Meitei and Kuki communities in Kangpokpi district, were widely circulated on social media, further escalating ongoing inter-ethnic tension amid the elections.2 Meanwhile, re-polling was organized in several polling locations amid claims of armed assailants, including those from the Meitei militia Arambai Tenggol, intimidating and attacking voters and opposition supporters, mainly from the Indian National Congress.3
In Jammu and Kashmir, where voting for its five constituencies has been spread over five phases due to security concerns,4 armed clashes between security forces and militants increased in April to eight events, up from four in March. Escalating clashes come against the backdrop of a fresh spate of targeted attacks by militants against nonlocal migrant workers and government officials, resulting in at least two reported fatalities in April. Attacks against migrant workers have been a growing concern in Kashmir since the abrogation of Article 370 in 2019, which ended special protections for locals with regard to jobs and land ownership. Many in Kashmir fear that the government, led by the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party, aims to change the demographics of India’s only Muslim-majority region.5
For more on the unrest around the 2024 Indian elections, see ACLED’s Special Election Series on India.
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Indonesia: Intensified conflict in Papua puts civilians at risk
The conflict between Indonesian security forces and the West Papua National Liberation Army (TPNPB) intensified in April, endangering civilians’ safety in the Highland and Central Papua provinces. In Yokatapa village, Intan Jaya, one child was killed and another seriously injured when they were caught in the crossfire between police and the TPNPB, which was trying to free a detained member of the group. In Highland Papua, the rebels killed the son of a Papuan village head and a non-Papuan local public servant. Both were accused of being spies for the Indonesian authorities.6 ACLED records 11 reported fatalities in April in events involving the TPNPB, compared with six during the previous month. Civilian deaths contributed to at least four of the fatalities. Amid the increase in violence, the Indonesian military forces announced they would return to using the term OPM (‘Free Papua Movement’) to describe the TPNPB, rather than KKB (‘Armed Criminal Group’). The military has changed the way it categorizes the TPNPB several times, with this most recent change emphasizing its view that the TPNPB is an enemy made up of soldiers or combatants. The change alters the group’s status under humanitarian law, leading to less legal oversight of military operations against the TPNPB.7
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Myanmar: Conflict escalates over control of Myawaddy border town
Fighting between the military and resistance forces led by the Karen National Union/Karen National Liberation Army (KNU/KNLA) intensified in April as both sides clashed over the control of Myawaddy town in Kayin State, a major trade hub on the Thailand border. The violence escalated in early March, when resistance forces launched offensives to seize control of key military bases on the town’s outskirts, and continued in April, which is usually quieter due to the Buddhist New Year holiday. Political violence levels in both March and April were three times higher than in February. On 5 April, resistance forces captured the strategically important Thin Gan Nyi Naung base, under the Eastern Military Command, which has maintained a presence in the area since 1968.8 On 11 April, about 200 soldiers from the last military battalion guarding the town retreated and sought refuge near the Thai-Myanmar Friendship Bridge No. 2, which connects Myawaddy to Thailand, resulting in the military losing control of Myawaddy proper.9 Thailand authorities ordered tightened security at the border and instructed the air force to strike Myanmar aircraft if they entered Thailand’s airspace.10 The military then launched Operation Aung Zeya to reassert control of the town, deploying a large convoy of hundreds of soldiers to march east toward Myawaddy. The KNU/KNLA and its allies ultimately withdrew, allowing the military to reoccupy the base and town. Thousands of residents were forced to flee to Thailand amid the escalating clashes and the military’s airstrikes.11
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Pakistan: Separatist violence rises in Balochistan province
Political violence in Pakistan’s Balochistan province increased in April by nearly 50% compared to the month prior, as Baloch separatists continued to target ethnic Punjabis, politicians, suspected government employees, and polling infrastructure. On 12 April, Balochistan Liberation Army militants enforced a blockade on a strategic highway connecting Iran and Pakistan, stopping a bus and reportedly killing nine passengers after identifying them as ethnic Punjabis. Separatist Baloch groups have often targeted ethnic Punjabis, who dominate Pakistan’s military and political establishment, as part of their decades-long separatist movement against the Pakistani government, which they accuse of exploiting Balochistan’s natural resources and oppressing the local population during counter-insurgency operations.12 ACLED data show a recent spike in targeted attacks by Baloch separatists against ethnic Punjabis residing in Balochistan, with more events recorded in the first four months of 2024 than in all of 2023.
There was also significant separatist violence associated with re-polling in two constituencies for the February elections, with militants targeting polling booths and party offices with gunfire and explosives.13 The February elections, held amid a steep increase in separatist violence and organic boycotts by the local population, featured widespread allegations of rigging, with regional Baloch parties leading demonstrations against the results.14 These demonstrations followed a sustained protest movement, mainly led by Baloch women, demanding an end to the enforced disappearances of Baloch youth and accountability for those involved in disappearances and alleged extrajudicial killings.15 Some experts attribute the rise in Baloch separatist violence to dissatisfaction among the local population with the political process following the disputed February elections and the suppression of demonstrations over enforced disappearances.16
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Philippines: Top BIFF commander killed
Fighting persisted between the Karialan faction of the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) and state forces in April, following a resumption in March, with multiple deadly firefights between the groups during the Muslim holy month of Ramadan. On 22 April, the military killed the top commander of the Karialan faction, Mohiden Animbang (also known as Kagui Karialan), and 11 other militants in Datu Saudi-Ampatuan town, Maguindanao del Sur, Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM).17 This offensive took place approximately one year before the first-ever BARMM parliamentary elections, set to be held in May 2025 in fulfillment of the 2014 peace agreement between the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the national government. Military officials expressed hope that their offensive would lead to peace and stability in the area and thanked the MILF for their assistance.18 The BIFF broke away from the MILF in 2010 as they opposed the peace negotiations that later led to the 2014 peace deal.19
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Thailand: Separatist violence surges during Ramadan and Hari Raya Aidilfitri
The Deep South saw an increase in separatist activities during Ramadan and subsequent Hari Raya Aidilfitri celebrations. On 7 April, Malay Muslim Separatists ambushed rangers during an inspection of the construction of a Hari Raya celebration arch, reportedly killing two rangers and injuring 10 others.20 The separatists then set off explosions at two power plants in Pattani and Songkhla, on 25 and 26 April, respectively. The 2024 Ramadan period, which ran from 12 March to 10 April, marked the deadliest Ramadan in three years, with seven reported fatalities. The Ramadan periods in 2022 and 2023 each saw three reported fatalities. The failure of the government to negotiate a ‘Ramadan truce’ with separatists calls into question the new civilian government’s ability to address longstanding conflict in the Deep South and its role in the ongoing peace talks with Barisan Revolusi Nasional, the primary insurgent entity in the Deep South. At the same time, the government extended the enforcement of the Emergency Decree until 19 July, the 76th time it has done so since the decree was enacted in 2005, prolonging military presence in the region.21..."
Source/publisher:
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project
Date of entry/update:
2024-05-09
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"Former Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra’s discreet meetings with Myanmar opposition groups and some ethnic revolutionary organizations (EROs) to discuss possible solutions to the country’s ongoing civil war have not only failed to elicit a response from Myanmar’s military junta, but also left some EROs feeling uncomfortable.
Thaksin and his team met separately with representatives of revolutionary groups including the Karen National Union, the Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP), the Kachin National Organization and the National Unity Government in Chiang Mai in March and April. He also met with representatives from the Restoration Council of Shan State.
The meetings were unpublicized at the time but have been confirmed by Thailand’s new Foreign Minister Maris Sangiampongsa, a longtime associate of Thaksin. Maris said the talks were conducted on a private basis, and were not part of any official Thai foreign policy initiative.
Sources said Thaksin wished to mediate between the EROs and the junta, who have been fighting since Myanmar’s military seized power from an elected government in February 2021. The talks came as the junta struggles to contain a nationwide armed resistance movement that has inflicted a series of humiliating defeats on the regime, especially in the country’s north, west, southeast and south.
Thaksin is the de facto leader of Thailand’s ruling Pheu Thai party, though he holds no official position. The controversial former prime minister was accused of abusing his power and having autocratic tendencies during his tenure, and was convicted of corruption after being deposed by the army in 2006.
“We have to admit that Mr. Thaksin is well-known and has connections. Myanmar [the military junta] believes that he can help,” said the new foreign minister.
Thaksin, who is believed to be close to Myanmar junta boss Min Aung Hlaing, has reportedly requested permission to visit Myanmar. He visited Min Aung Hlaing in 2013 during a trip to the country, and had business interests there under the previous regime.
Since the meetings in March and April, however, the Myanmar junta has been silent on the issue, as well as on Thaksin’s visit request.
A well informed Thai source familiar with the matter said the meetings had backfired on Thaksin.
“Thaksin is now being grilled by the media and opposition. It’s good for him to step back without losing face, as Min Aung Hlaing didn’t respond to his request,” the source said.
On Wednesday, Thailand’s House Committee on State Security and Border Affairs, which is led by a key MP of the opposition Move Forward party, announced it would investigate Thaksin’s talks with anti-junta groups, saying the meetings could cause confusion regarding Thailand’s role in restoring peace in the neighboring country.
Sources also said the Thai army is keeping a close watch on those whom Thaksin has been meeting, including the Myanmar opposition groups and EROs. They said the ethnic armed organizations and EROs based along the Thai-Myanmar border are not sure whether the Royal Thai Army is happy to see Thaksin meeting with such groups, as some of the EROs are militarily active.
One source from an ERO that participated in a meeting said Thaksin brought a formal document, granting himself the authority to act as a mediator, for each group to sign, Thai news website The Nation reported.
“No group has signed the document presented by Thaksin,” the source said, citing concerns over upsetting the Thai government.
Furthermore, the meetings didn’t go as the former prime minister had hoped. During talks with the NUG, Thaksin was only able to meet with mid-level officials from the shadow government despite expressing a desire to meet with its senior leadership.
U Aung San Myint, Secretary 2 of the KNPP, told The Irrawaddy that during his meeting with the group, Thaksin said he wanted to mediate Myanmar’s ongoing issues.
“We didn’t strike any agreement with him. We said now is not the time for dialogue. We discussed how humanitarian assistance could be helpful for people as there is fighting. We didn’t discuss anything else,” he said.
Despite Thaksin’s eagerness to mediate the Myanmar crisis, another Thai source familiar with the situation doubted he would be able to do so, as Thaksin has little fresh information about the Myanmar situation.
The source said that rather than just listening to him, the Myanmar opposition side really needs to feed Thaksin information on the situation in the country.
“If they just go and listen to him, this is not the right approach; tell him what he needs to know and do not mislead him,” the Thai analyst, who has met Thaksin, said last week.
Rangsiman Rome, a key MP of the Move Forward party and the chair of the House Committee on State Security and Border Affairs, asked in what capacity Thaksin hosted the meetings.
“Thaksin has no position in this government and the government did not assign him to create peace in Myanmar,” he said.
“Any talks with Myanmar’s warring groups should only be conducted by legitimate and authorized representatives,” Rangsiman added.
So far, neither Thai Prime Minister Srettha Thavisin nor Foreign Minister Maris have said anything critical about Thaksin’s meetings..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2024-05-09
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"For years, the Myanmar military has relied on back-alley trade with global entities to support its brutally violent campaign of terror against its own population — including business with notorious Chinese truck manufacturer Sinotruk and, through it, German Volkswagen subsidiary Traton SE.....
Executive Summary.....
The Myanmar military junta’s continued campaign of repression and violence against the people of Myanmar is reliant on a fleet of military trucks that transport troops and weapons across the country. There is substantial evidence that the military obtains and assembles these trucks through the support of the Chinese state-owned company Sinotruk, which, in turn, benefits from the investment and collaboration of the German company Traton SE. Sinotruk claims to have never conducted business with the Myanmar military junta or sold trucks to the military. However, recent reporting and publicly available information indicate that Sinotruk’s vehicles are widely used during military operations and that the company has directly engaged with the Myanmar military through sales and manufacturing support. If so, Sinotruk should immediately cease business with the Myanmar military. Not doing so exposes the company to the risk of liability for aiding and abetting the junta’s war crimes and crimes against humanity. Traton should ensure that Sinotruk ends any and all business with the Myanmar military junta or divests from the company in accordance with its international human rights responsibilities..."
Source/publisher:
Center for Advanced Defense Studies
Date of entry/update:
2024-05-09
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"Human Rights Violations took place in States and Regions from May 1 to 7, 2024
Military Junta Troop launched airstrikes and dropped bombs in the Sagaing Region, Magway Region, Tanintharyi Region, Bago Region, Kachin State, and Rakhine State from May 1st to 7th. The Military Junta prohibited and blocked working permission in foreign countries on May 1st. The Military’s Pyusawhtee troop killed and wasted 4 civilians in Bago Region. Men were arrested for the Military Service in the Sagaing Region and Magway Region
7 civilians died and over 50 were arrested by the arresting and killing of Military Junta within a week. A civilian died and 2 were injured by the land mines of the Military Junta Troop..."
Source/publisher:
Network for Human Rights Documentation-Burma
Date of entry/update:
2024-05-09
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"This Rapid Market Assessment (RMA) is a suppliment to the MAU Market Price Report in Southeast Myanmar. It provides township-level data on market functionality, activity, supply, and logistics. Data were collected through observation and KIIs with retailers during April 9-16, 2024. Reports available at www.themimu.info/market-analysis-unit.
KEY FINDINGS
Security in/around markets declined in April, yet most markets monitored continued to operate;
Customer traffic continued to ebb in Hsihseng, but elsewhere market activity was stable;
Supply of food and NFIs grew worse in April, and Loikaw continued to struggle most to access supply;
Supply of shelter and household NFIs worsened, and it was poorer than other product types;
Shipping rates rose further Hsihseng and Loikaw, but they were stable in Pekon and Demoso;
Concerns over security and poor cash access grew, and some retailers worried about their solvency.
Regional Overview
Market Functionality - Markets remained open, but security was poor and closures continued. Retailers continued operating daily, but three of four markets monitored were described as unsafe or very unsafe. Village markets in Loikaw and Pekon experienced closures, and infrastructure damage affected retail in Loikaw.
Market Activity - Conflict continued to reduce market activity, and customer traffic dwindled in Hsihseng. Customer traffic was mostly unchanged in April. Some markets remained quieter than they once were (Loikaw, Hsihseng) while others still benefited from new customer arrivals in recent months (Pekon, Demoso).
Availability of Goods - Supply worsened by mid-April, and shelter and household NFIs grew scarcer.
Supply worsened at least somewhat in three of four markets monitored in April. Both food and NFI items became more scarce, although supply remained better for food items than for NFIs. Loikaw still had far worse access to supply than the other markets monitored.
Transport & Logistics - Shipping costs continued to rise in Loikaw and Hsihseng. Inter-township shipping remained limited in Loikaw and Hsihseng, and this continued to drive up shipping costs; costs were stable in Pekon and Demosos. Sources of supply remained diverse and shifted as events unfolded (e.g., Hopong, Pinlaung, Aungban, Taunggyi, Nyaungshwe).
Retailer Challenges - Poor security and cash access remained retailers' greatest challenges. Challenges related to safety and poor supply grew further in April, and poor cash access remained troubling as some retailers worried about solvency. Retail operations grew more difficult in Loikaw and Pekon in April.
Possible Interventions - Hsihseng retailers felt they could increase supply with support. Fuel subsidies and safe transport corridors remained popular, but interest in infrastructure repair also grew in April amid reports of damage. Despite rising concerns about poor cash access, fewer retailers expressed interest in new loans..."
Source/publisher:
Myanmar Information Management Unit (Myanmar) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2024-05-08
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Category:
Food Security and nutrition in Burma/Myanmar, Public Health, Human Rights and international relations
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Expect an uptick in fighting in the weeks before monsoon rains and the next phase of the war.
Description:
"Myanmar’s dry season is ending soon, with the military junta on the back foot after more than six months of reversals and losses to the opposition. This points to an intensification of attacks from the beleaguered regime.
With official forecasts that monsoon rains will start in the second week of June, the State Administrative Council (SAC), as the junta is formally known, is likely to focus on six priorities before the rains set in, hampering the military’s already weak logistics and troop mobility.
While the military recently retook control over the key Thai border city Myawaddy, they have not retaken much of the territory lost since the Three Brotherhood Alliance’s Operation 1027 began in late October, especially outside of the Bamar heartland.
With the rainy season favoring the more flexible opposition, the junta is likely to focus on six strategic priorities in the coming weeks.
The first priority is to retake control along Asia Highway 1, which connects Myawaddy with Yangon. This road is the economic lifeline to Thailand, with over $1 billion in annual border trade.
The SAC cannot afford a repeat of Muse in northern Shan state, where junta troops still control the border town, but the Ta’ang National Liberation Army controls much of the road to Lashio, the state’s largest town, which allows the rebel group to collect taxes.
And yet, their attacks have not only faltered, but also tied down troops who are needed elsewhere.
Focus on Ann township
The second junta priority is playing out now in western Rakhine state’s Ann township, where the Arakan Army has captured two strategic outposts that protect the city after a two-month long battle.
Ann is the headquarters of the Western Military Command, one of the 12 military regions, so its loss would be hugely embarrassing for the junta.
More importantly, Ann is a critical transportation and logistics hub, the junction for the road north to the Rakhine state capital of Sittwe and to a major Chinese special economic zone and port project in Kyaukphyu. China’s oil and gas pipelines also pass through Ann.
In western Myanmar, the Arakan Army has already captured eight townships comprising most of northern Rakhine state, while reports are emerging that it has just captured Maungdaw, a key border port with Bangladesh, and surrounded Buthidaung.
The Arakan Army has not tried to capture Sittwe or Kyaukphyu for now, seemingly content to try to consolidate control of the roads to both. The capture of Ann would force the junta to supply what they still control in Rakhine by sea or from the south through the town of Toungup.
In sum, without control of Ann, the chances for a significant and sustained military counteroffensive in Rakhine get a lot harder. So the military is surging reinforcements there now and stepping up airstrikes.
The third priority for the junta is to push for a new round of ceasefire talks with the Three Brotherhood Alliance and the Kachin Independence Army. As such, it will increase its lobbying of China, which borders Kachin state.
Beijing seeks border ceasefire
Beijing clearly wants a ceasefire on its border. Both Beijing and Naypyidaw are keen to see border trade return to pre-war levels. The junta now controls only 11 of 17 border posts with China, Thailand, India and Bangladesh – and pinched trade flows have led to shortages and spiking prices.
China has also dispatched some 300 additional technicians to Kyaukphyu as construction there ramps up, so Beijing is urgently trying to broker a ceasefire between the junta and the Arakan Army. Before any such pact is reached, we should expect a lot of fighting and air attacks before then.
Unlike the Three Brotherhood Alliance, the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) is likely to reject a ceasefire, as they seek to take advantage of the military’s distractions.
Indeed, on May 5, after a lull of several weeks, the KIA launched a second wave of attacks, capturing a number of junta camps along the Myitkyina-Laiza highway, as well as an assault on the town of Sumprabum, midway between the provincial capital and Puta-O. The KIA has taken over 12 positions in the past four days.
The fourth priority for the junta in the coming weeks must be the resupply of its deployed forces. One of the leading factors in military defections that have taken place since October has been the military’s failure to resupply remotely deployed forces with food, water, ammunition and medical supplies.
Sustaining operations is getting much harder for the military. They have lost several of the few helicopters in their inventory. This week in eastern Myanmar The Karenni Nationalities Defense Force insurgent group said it shot down a junta military helicopter and killed its pilot in Kayah State.
Convoys under threat
With roads and bridges are increasingly being mined, and military manpower spread thin, convoys are smaller and less well protected, making opposition ambushes more costly. Captured weaponry has allowed opposition forces to target junta riverine convoys more effectively.
If the junta is unable to supply those light infantry battalions in the coming six weeks, the ethnic resistance organizations and People’s Defense Forces will pick them off one by one during the rainy season.
The fifth priority for the military regime will be to continue their assaults in Sagaing and Magwe. The heartland of the majority ethnic Bamars is arguably more important to the junta psychologically than militarily. That they do not have full control of Burmese-majority regions and have to worry about their supply lines in once-secure areas is hard for the generals to countenance.
While the generals don’t have the means to hold territory, the junta is punishing civilians with air and artillery strikes, serving up a harsh reminder of the cost of supporting the opposition.
The sixth junta priority is to ramp up the production of arms and munitions. There is a parallel here with Russia, which also expected a very brief war in Ukraine, and did not have its logistics or defense industries prepared for a multi-year conflict.
Drones on both sides
The SAC is broke and cannot afford the costly import of weapons and ammunition, forcing its own defense industries to go into overdrive.
At the same time, given the shortage of spare parts and regular servicing of their overtaxed air force, which has led to the crash of several aircraft, the military has stepped up the production of armed drones.
The opposition National Unity Government (NUG) and the ethnic armies have used modified hobby and crop dusting drones with incredible efficacy, including an attack that purportedly wounded Soe Win the deputy junta commander.
There is concern among the opposition that the military will be able to replicate the NUG success with cheap drones. Evidence has surfaced that the military is already fielding more lethal drone-specific munitions, rather than relying on mortar shells.
The junta has lost significant amounts of territory since Operation 1027 began – which is notable because it happened during the dry season, when the military should have had all the advantages. The rainy season tends to benefit resistance forces.
Along with the scorching heat, expect blistering, brutal attacks, as the military junta desperately tries to retake lost territory and critical supply lines before the rains set in..."
Source/publisher:
"Radio Free Asia" (USA)
Date of entry/update:
2024-05-08
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Type:
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"The Karen National Union (KNU) is a long-standing ethnic resistance organization with a long history among the country’s ethnic resistance groups. In the beginning of the armed revolution in 1949, the KNU held a number of peace talks with successive Myanmar governments and military regimes. These included; the Anti- Fascist People’s Freedom League (AFPFL) led by U Nu’s government and the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) led by Ne Win to successive military juntas - the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) and the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC). Whenever these dialogues and peace talks were held with the successive military juntas, it resulted in rifts and dissent among the KNU.
# Introduction
A big split within the KNU in 1994 resulted in the emergence of the Democratic Kayin Buddhist Army (DKBA/DKBO). The DKBA collaborated with and were sponsored by the Myanmar military and guided attacks on the KNU, resulting in the fall of the KNU headquarters, Manerplaw, in January, 1995.
From 1995 to 2010, conflict and killings between the Karen National Union and the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army, took place for more than a decade. In 2010, the Myanmar military reorganised the DKBA under their command into the Border Guard Force (BGF). Some of the DKBA forces resisted being reformed into BGF and continued as the DKBA This resulted in conflict with the Myanmar military, and an uneasy alliance with the KNU/KNLA. The DKBA did not re-affiliated with the KNU/KNLA and remains as a stand-alone organization still today.
In 2012, a state-level ceasefire agreement was made between the KNU and a peace delegation led by Minister Aung Min representing the proxy military government led by former general, Thein Sein. The resulting Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement, caused dissent within the KNU, materializing at the 15th KNU Congress, where leaders who were in favor with the National Ceasefire Agreement dominated.
In 2015, the KNU withdrew from the United Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC), and on October 15, a Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) was signed again. By the time the KNU made a state-level ceasefire agreement in 2012, its brigade-and-district levels were also directed to sign it. However, it was found that the KNU Brigade (5) of Mutraw District (Hpa-pun District) and Brigade (2) of Taungoo District were not involved in the ceasefire process.
Since the end of the 15th KNU Congress, a great deal of political rivalries among the KNU leaders appeared – the group that accepted the NCA and the group that did not – but no major rifts had occurred within them.
During the ceasefire period, a “Committee for Karen Armed Groups Unity”, sponsored by the KNU, which was comprised of 4 Karen armed groups – KNU/KNLA, BGF, DKBA, and the KNU/KNLA-PC led by Gen. Htin Maung (2007) – were formed in the interest of a national unity. The BGF leader, Saw Chit Thu, was the vice-chairman of the committee.
In addition, during the signing of the NCA with Thein Sein government in 2015, each of three Karen armed groups – the KNU, DKBA, and KNU/KNLA-PC – signed the agreement together. After the signing, there was no longer armed conflict among them, and they worked together on special national days such as Karen New Year, Karen Martyr’s Day, Karen Revolution Day to name some. This arrangement was neither managed under a single group , nor was it under the leadership of the KNU. The KNU also did not make any attempts for political leadership, instead focused on preventing armed conflict between the groups.
# The SLORC/SPDC’s military strategy or trap
During the period of the military reign under its SLORC/SPDC from 2005, the military juntas stopped using its “eradication” strategy to suppress the Karen armed groups in Karen State. Instead, a “containment” strategy was applied, that trapped the Karen armed groups into being implicated in illicit drugs. As a result, drug production, distribution, and consumption had grown tremendously in Karen State in 10 years.
After the KNU signed the NCA in 2015, the junta’s “containment” strategy made the KNU complicit in transnational crimes. After signing the NCA, the KNU was first offered car permits and largely open to
international aid. The biggest ones were the Shwe Kokko New City project and KK Park Project, which opened the way for KNU leaders to become involved in crimes. Some KNU leaders, who did not accept the NCA, saw the Shwe Kokko New City project as a trap, and avoided being involved .
After the 16th KNU Congress in 2017, leaders, who did not accept the NCA, were removed, while leaders, who accepted the government’s NCA, became more dominant in the KNU. The military regime had successfully expanded its ‘trap strategy’ not only to Shwe Kukko City in KNU Brigade (7) area, but to KK Park in Mehtawthalay in KNU Brigade (6) area. To implicate the KNU in transnational crimes, the military junta gave the KNU powers, as well as land renting, setting up a company, providing security, and making payments in advance for many years.
#Recent Myawaddy fighting, the KNU’s challenges and opportunities
After the military coup attempt in 2021, there was no possibility of the KNU-led peace talks based on the NCA agreement. As the KNU, however, had not officially announced that the NCA agreement was null and void, it must be considered that it continued to hold on.
If the NCA agreement is declared null and void, the KNU might be concern the communication channel with the military regime would be cut off. It should also be noted Pado Mahn Nyein Maung, who is a member of the KNU Central Executive Committee, is also a member of the military appointed State Administration Council (SAC).
At the same time, the KNU became deeply involved in the affairs of the National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC) and the National Unity Government (NUG) who were formed from elected lawmakers in opposition to the coup. It is likely the KNU adopted a two-pronged strategy of cooperating with the NUG, while maintaining contact with the military junta. Similarly, the KNU had been leading revolutionary alliance groups for decades, but after the 15th KNU Congress in 2012, it withdrew from the United Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC), this showed that the KNU lacked serious leadership on the coalition pro-democracy forces. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume the KNU considered that the NUG, (as happened with the NCGUB that was formed in 1990 in response to the military’s failure to recognize the result of the election won by Aung San Suu Kyi’s NLD party), and that it would also fade away, and the military would be able to maintain its grip on power. In terms of strategy the KNU was also likely to control the balance of power between the SAC and the NUG.
#The situation in which fighting broke out in KNU territory after the signing of the NCA agreement
As mentioned above, after the NCA was signed in 2015, there were many disagreements and dissent between KNU leaders who accepted the NCA and those that did not. After the end of the 16th KNU Congress in 2017, a group, that did not accept the NCA, emerged. Named as the ‘KNU Concerned Group’, it gained support among some KNU/KNLA brigades and battalions, as well as being very close to Karen CBOs and CSOs. Following 17th KNU Congress in 2023, the ‘KNU Concerned Group’ faded away. In the past, the ‘KNU Concerned Group’ made political positions and statements in parallel with the KNU Central Committee.
Since the signing of the state-level ceasefire agreement between the KNU and the Thein Sein USDP government in 2012, fighting stopped in many of the KNU brigades, but conflict continued in the KNU 5th Brigade area, especially from October 2020, when large bases of the military regime were attacked.
After the military coup in 2021, the KNU 5th Brigade attacked and captured the military regime’s camp on March 27, and took and occupied three military strongholds within three months. Since 2021, the fighting in the KNU’s 5th Brigade has become more intense, with the military regime using jet fighters to launch airstrikes against the KNU. On the ground, the regime ordered hundreds of BGF forces to reinforce its troops. Once more it was Karen were engaged in fighting and killing each other.
#The start of fighting in the KNU 6th Brigade area
After the military coup in 2021, a great number of Myanmar young activists (Gen-Z) and CDM members arrived in the KNU 6th Brigade area, wanting to fight back against the military junta. They noticed there were various armed groups such as KNU, DKBA, KNU-KNLA-PC, and BGF, but at first, they did not seem to realize how they were different from one another. In particular, they did not seem to know that the BGF was under the direct command of the military junta – they considered Karen State’s Myawaddy, Lay Kay Kaw, Hpalu etc. as liberated areas.
They became more cautious when the junta troops entered and carried out inspections in the area of Lay Kay Kaw. At that time, all three Karen armed groups had signed the NCA, therefore, there was no fighting at all in the area. The CRPH/NUG MPs also arrived in large numbers in the KNU
6th Brigade area. The KNU’s statements proved that people, who had arrived in KNU territory due to the 2021 coup attempt and subsequent violent crackdown and jailing of people protesting the coup and the overturning of the NLD’s massive election win, were accepted based on humanitarian grounds.
The people arriving in the KNU resistance areas became dependent on the KNU for military training and weapons, so they could start fighting back against the military junta. Battalions under the command of the KNU provided military training. However, due to the fact that the KNU had signed the NCA agreement during the Thein Sein government’s control and had no political will to declare it null and void, the KNU seemed to be regulating the conditions for being engaged in fighting.
Nevertheless, there had been fierce fighting in the area of the KNU 5th Brigade since March 2021, and the KNU managed to occupy military junta bases one by one. After the signing of the NCA in 2015, the KNU was able to stop the military offensive the KNU 5th Brigade launched against the military junta. The KNU headquarters, however, could no longer control it after 2021. Additionally, the young men, who arrived in the KNU 6th Brigade area, also showed their tremendous enthusiasm to fight against the military junta.
The NUG’s Minister of Defense (NUG-MOD) joined forces with the KNU and began to discuss how to cooperate with the ethnic armed resistance groups to take military action in the South, North, and Central regions, etc., as well as discussing with the DKBA commanders, who did not accept the transformation of the DKBA into the BGF and fought back against the military junta, which resulted in the start of fighting in Hpalu area near Myawaddy. Similarly, fighting led by the Karen National Defence Organisation (KNDO) also took place in Wale area.
After that, there were armed clashes in Lay Kay Kaw area. The district chairman of the 6th Brigade had repeatedly issued letters of protest against the occurrence of such fighting in the 6th Brigade area, pointing out how much the NCA and the KNU 6th Brigade area along the Asian Highway were important.
This is proof the NCA agreement had not been officially declared null and void even after the military coup attempt in 2021. Within the KNU controlled areas, the 6th Brigade was the one with the largest number of People Defense Forces (PDF), not only having a great number of armed forces, but also getting a lot of supports from the NUG and Myanmar diaspora. As a result, the young PDF fighters in the area of the KNU 6th Brigade had been armed enough in 3 years and were fully motivated to be
engaged in fighting. The PDFs began to win as they joined forces with battle-hardened and experienced KNLA soldiers, demoralizing the military junta troops, who now saw themselves fighting superior soldiers.
#How did the fighting in Myawaddy begin?
Ethnic armed resistance groups – Arakan, Kachin, Chin, Karenni – had been occupying cities in their own regions during their attacks on the military regime’s bases. This posed the question why Karen armed groups had not been able to capture border towns close to their territory raised the question of what is the purpose of the KNU. I believed the combined Karen armed forces would be able to easily occupy, not only Myawaddy, but Hpa-an the Karen State capital, if all four Karen armed forces were united. The current Myawaddy fighting answers the question – “Why does it end in deadlock like this?’
The first reason is the ‘NCA trap’, and the second is the “containment” strategy. The main impact of the containment strategy is that the KNU has been implicated in transnational crimes.
Before the 2023 KNU Congress, 68 Karen civil society organizations sent an open letter to the KNU, calling for the Congress to be held only after identifying and taking action against the leaders involved in the KK Park project. If failed to do so. The leaders of the KNU Central Executive Committee were urged to resign. However, the KNU Congress was held by dividing into three sections. In Section
(3) where the KNU Central Executive Committee and Central Committee leaders were to be elected, the 5th Brigade and the 2nd Brigade boycotted the election.
In brief, the KNU could no longer lead the coalition forces as before, and led to a great deal of crippling dissent within the organization over its political approach. The biggest crisis for the KNU was that they had been caught in the illegality trap of Shwe Kokko and KK Park projects. At the last 17th KNU Congress, the KNU formed an “investigation commission” to identify and take action against KNU leaders involved in the online gambling, money laundering and scam syndicate, but until now, no information has been made public.
I believe KNU leaders should be at least aware that they had been framed by the military to be implicated in crimes. It’s likely that some KNU leaders failed to predict such a large political crisis. It is undisputable the KNU is facing a tremendous crisis today.
The current crisis is not only for the KNU, but also for the BGF, led by its leader, Saw Chit Thu. It is time for both groups to decide which path they are taking. Notably, the BGF has a better control over its organization’s power – everyone follows orders and decisions – good or bad – made by its leader Chit Thu.
Before the start of the recent Myawaddy fighting , Saw Chit Thu, claimed publicly that the BGF no longer wanted to kill Karen people, and changed the name of BGF to the “Karen National Army (KNA)”.
Saw Chit Thu’s words were really aimed at providing only a simple person’s grasp of the political situation, because he, as a subordinate under the military regime, had not only spent two decades of armed conflict fighting Karen. Saw Chit Thu had also been the target of negative criticisms from Karen people at home and abroad.
Before the Myawaddy fighting began, Saw Chit Thu, announced the BGF had transformed into the KNA, and when the battle was about to end, he revealed that there would no longer be a KNA, as he had reverted back to the BGF. It shocked and angered not only Karen people, but also the people of Myanmar. I was not surprised at all. The outcome of the Myawaddy fighting depended on two situations. I speculated that the military junta would have benefited most from these situations. It’s unquestionable that it would have gained 50 or 30 % of benefit from this fighting, But, it is hard to say the junta won the battle, even though benefited .
The current Myawaddy battle was not a main target for the junta, but the illegal operations run out of Shwe Kokko. Reportedly, the military junta had promised China to eradicate the money laundering syndicate operating in KK Park and Shwe Kokko. If they failed to do so, the military occupation achieved by the Northern Alliance could be rapidly extended into the capital, Naypyidaw, with the support of China. The military junta, aware of the consequences if this was to happen, had made a rapid ceasefire agreement with the Northern Alliance,
agreeing to share up to 70 % of the border trade income with the Northern Alliance. Similarly, the regime promised China to crack down on Shwe Kokko and the KK Park money laundering syndicate. If the Shwe Kokko was to be cleaned up, it’s unquestionable that the BGF leader, Saw Chit Thu, would also go.
Facing these consequences, Saw Chit Thu immediately calculated and announced the BGF would transform into the KNA, angering the military regime. The regime approached and negotiated with either the KNU or the BGF during the battle of Myawaddy. Reports the Chinese Ministry of Public Security and the junta officials met and discussed the elimination of online gambling, financial scams, money laundering activities on the border on April 26. It is understood may have China provided financial assistance to the regime to clean up Shwe Kokko and KK Park.
Therefore, we can imagine
· How will the resistance forces continue to work on the situation of the Myawaddy clashes?
· What will happen if the Shwe Kokko is eradicated by the military junta?
· What kind of crises the military junta will face if they fail to clear the Shwe Kokko.
Remark – The contents in this article are the opinion of the columnist..."
Source/publisher:
"Karen News"
Date of entry/update:
2024-05-06
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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Description:
"The UN's Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator ad interim in Myanmar has released a statement marking a 'bleak milestone' in the country, with 3 million people now internally displaced. An intensification in conflict at the end of 2023 has led to displacement rising by 50% in just six months.
2.7 million of those displaced have fled their homes in the wake of the 2021 Myanmar military coup d'état. This means that displacement since the military takeover has increased by 900%. About a third of those displaced are children.
There are 18.6 million people in need in Myanmar -- the fifth largest number globally. However, the UN's Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP), which requires USD 994 million in 2024, is only funded at 5%, severely limiting the response. With cyclone season approaching, additional resources are urgently needed to save lives. ECHO's initial allocation for Myanmar is EUR 19.9 million..."
Source/publisher:
European Commission's Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations
Date of entry/update:
2024-05-06
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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Description:
"Myanmar’s political history is riddled with violent military coups. On February 1, 2021, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing took control of Myanmar and reverted the budding democracy into a violent authoritarian regime. This is the third time that a military took control of the country in post-independence Burmese history, 59 years after the first coup led by General Ne Win and 32 years after the second ordered by SLORC. As much as the country’s history is rife with brutal military regimes, it is also filled with the people’s revolutions to fight against military rule, the most prominent being the 8888 Uprising, the Saffron Revolution, and currently the Spring Revolution.
The Spring Revolution is distinct from the previous revolutions in that it is the most durable anti-military political movement the country has ever seen. While both the 8888 Uprising and the Saffron Revolution lasted only for a few months, the Spring Revolution continues to gain momentum in 2024, more than three years after the most recent coup d’etat took place. Protracted conflict is still ongoing across the country. As of April 26, 2024, 4,946 civilians have been murdered by the regime, and 26,573 were arrested. Despite the violent crackdown, millions have taken to the streets to protest the military takeover. The ongoing Spring Revolution encompasses different actors and initiatives, including but not limited to the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM), frontline protests, the National Unity Government (NUG), and the People’s Defence Force (PDF).
To strengthen cooperation across the different branches of the Spring Revolution, pro-democracy activists are increasingly relying on social media. Especially for women, social media has become a powerful space to express their political opinions and organize against the junta. To respond to the growing online resistance, the military government has implemented draconian measures of digital repression that actively persecute civilians who show support for the opposition online. Online violence against pro-democracy activists often translates into offline violence such as arrests and sexual violence. The Burmese military’s digital repression is highly gendered as women activists experience significantly higher rates of gender-based violence and persecution compared to their male counterparts.
Authoritarian actions and responses to online dissent in Myanmar can be sorted into five categories: internet shutdowns, online censorship, surveillance, targeted persecution of online users, and social media manipulation and disinformation. However, women online activists in Myanmar also face specific forms of gender-based violence in addition to these five categories. Some examples of such gender-based violence include doxxing, abusive messages featuring sexist language, leaking intimate videos and images without consent, sexualized disinformation, threats of sexual violence, rape threats, and death threats. Different forms of sexualized repression have the most traumatic physical and psychological effects as these repression tactics subject women online activists and their families to societal shame. An overwhelming majority of gender-based online violence targeted at pro-democracy women is carried out by men.
Women in Myanmar who express their political opinions on social media are targeted for doxxing at a much higher rate than politically active men online. Doxxing is particularly a gendered digital repression tactic in the context of Myanmar since many women activists who were doxxed by pro-military and male-identifying social media personalities, such as Han Nyein Oo and Ba Nyunt, have been arrested by security forces. The arrest comes with the additional danger of more gendered violence against women since mass rape of women and girls is systematically employed by the Burmese military.
The gendered nature of the Burmese military government’s digital repression is worrisome because online violence against women serves as a significant barrier to their meaningful political participation. According to the 2023 Freedom House Freedom on the Net Report, Myanmar has one of the most digitally repressive regimes in the world, second only to China. Enabled by the political support of Russia and China, and equipped with international surveillance technologies, the Burmese regime is committing crimes against humanity targeted at individuals who speak out against the military rule on social media. Women bear the brunt of this targeted digital repression solely due to their gender.
The case of Myanmar highlights how autocrats are leveraging social media as a political tool to not only react to but also proactively deter women’s online activism. Online repression tactics employed by the Burmese military might be appealing to other authoritarian governments for oppressing feminist dissent in their own countries. This somber potential, if realized, can further set back women’s rights in different authoritarian regimes at a highly alarming rate. Therefore, it is not sufficient for the international community to merely condemn gendered digital repression in Myanmar via statements and press releases. International stakeholders need to collaborate with civil society in Myanmar to provide women with robust training in digital security that will enable them to continue fighting for democracy in safer yet more creative and subversive forms of digital activism..."
Source/publisher:
E-International Relations
Date of entry/update:
2024-05-04
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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pdf
Size:
90.9 KB
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Description:
"Human Rights Violations took place in States and Regions from April 22 to 30, 2024
Military Junta Troop launched airstrikes and dropped bombs in the Sagaing Region, Bago Region, Magway Region, Kachin State, Kayin State, Rakhine State, Chin State, and Mon State from April 22nd to 30th. Military Junta Troop committed to arresting the civilians and blackmailing the 2nd batch of Military Service in the Yangon Region, Mandalay Region, Magway Region, and Ayeyarwady Region. Military Junta arrested and used the local civilians as human shields in Magway Region, Kachin State, and Rakhine State.
Over 20 civilians died, and over 70 were injured by the Military’s heavy and light artillery attacks within a week. 4 underaged children died, and 7 were injured when the Military Junta committed abuses..."
Source/publisher:
Network for Human Rights Documentation-Burma
Date of entry/update:
2024-05-03
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Armed conflict in Burma - attacks on civilians
Language:
Format :
pdf pdf pdf
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275.45 KB 271.73 KB 1.84 MB
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Description:
"MORE THAN 3 MILLION PEOPLE FORCED TO FLEE THEIR HOMES IN MYANMAR.
Myanmar has this week marked a bleak milestone with more than 3 million civilians now displaced nationwide amid intensifying conflict. The figure has jumped sharply, up by 50 per cent in just six months.
Myanmar stands at the precipice in 2024 with a deepening humanitarian crisis that has spiraled since the military takeover in February 2021 and the consequent conflicts in many parts of the country, driving record numbers of people to abandon their homes seeking safety. Of the 3 million people who are currently internally displaced, more than 2.7 million people fled as a result of conflict and insecurity since the takeover. It is estimated that one third of those now displaced are children whose education and futures have been upended by conflict.
Escalating flighting in many parts of the country, intensified since October 2023, has contributed to this rapid growth in displacement. Sadly, civilians not involved in the conflict pay the highest price across the country with many seeing no other option but to flee seeking safety. The 3 million displaced people are struggling to survive amid a widespread humanitarian crisis that has left a total of 18.6 million people in need. This is a million more than the previous year. Those in need include 6 million children.
Chin, Magway and Sagaing in north-western Myanmar continue to host the highest number of those displaced at nearly 1.5 million people, while Kayah, Bago, Kayin, Southern Shan, Mon and Tanintharyi in the south-east account for more than 900,000. Another 356,000 people are displaced in Rakhine. Access to internally displaced people (IDPs) in these parts of the country, as well as other states and regions that are hosting IDPs, is critical.
Already in 2024, humanitarians have reached nearly 950,000 people in need with humanitarian assistance, including almost half a million displaced people. But this is not enough. Gross underfunding is hampering response efforts, with less than 5 per cent of requirements received more than a quarter of the way into the year. With cyclone season fast approaching, additional resources are needed now to protect the most vulnerable and save lives..."
Source/publisher:
UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2024-05-03
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations, Humanitarian assistance - emergencies
Language:
Local URL:
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Sub-title:
Top Prizes for Reporting on Suicide Among Afghan Women, Persecution in Myanmar
Description:
"(Taipei) – Today, marking World Press Freedom Day, Human Rights Press Awards in Asia announced the 2024 winners and runners-up. The seven categories of awards are administered by Human Rights Watch, the Walter Cronkite School of Journalism and Mass Communication at Arizona State University, and the foreign correspondents clubs in both Thailand and Taiwan.
Among the top winners are reporting on the rising number of suicides among Afghan women living under abusive Taliban rule; the persecution of religious minorities in Myanmar; and the Chinese government’s treatment of White Paper protesters who stood up against Covid-19 lockdowns.
“The Human Rights Press Awards recognize journalists who are uncovering some of the most pressing rights issues in Asia,” said Tirana Hassan, executive director at Human Rights Watch. “In an era in which rising authoritarianism generates autocratic leaders and mass disinformation, the role of journalists in exposing the truth is more critical than ever. We are thrilled to honor these courageous reporters.”
The seven categories of awards include the newly created “Newsrooms in Exile” category, as well as commentary, print, photography, video, audio, and multimedia. The winners will be honored at a ceremony in Taipei hosted by the Taiwan Foreign Correspondents’ Club (TFCC) on May 10, 2024.
“We are honored once again to be administering the Human Rights Press Awards,” said Dr. Battinto L. Batts, Jr., dean of the Walter Cronkite School of Journalism and Mass Communication. “As part of our Cronkite Global Initiatives, we are proud to help recognize outstanding human rights journalism throughout Asia and the world.”
“It’s no coincidence that many winning entries are examples of brave journalism from Afghanistan, Hong Kong, and Myanmar, places where reporting has become increasingly difficult and dangerous,” said Thompson Chau, president of the Taiwan Foreign Correspondents’ Club. “The TFCC is honored to host the award ceremony in Taipei. Taiwan is an extraordinary place for a growing number of Asia-focused correspondents to live and work.”
Frontier Myanmar and Zan Times shared the top prize in the inaugural “Newsroom in Exile” category for their reporting on Myanmar and Afghanistan, respectively. Frontier Myanmar’s report uncovered the Myanmar military’s oppression of the Bayingyi, Roman Catholics of Portuguese descent. Zan Times gathered data illustrating the dire reality of the growing numbers of Afghan women and girls choosing death as preferable to living under Taliban repression.
“We're increasingly seeing media under threat in countries across Southeast Asia, which is why the new Human Rights Press Awards category for media in exile is so critically important,” said Phil Robertson, program committee chair at the Foreign Correspondents Club of Thailand (FCCT). “In countries such as Afghanistan and Myanmar, there needs to be greater recognition of journalists who bravely report human rights stories from the homeland they were forced to flee, and the FCCT is proud to be a part of that effort.”
The award for multimedia went to Al Jazeera for its piece, “‘If I die, I die’: Pakistan's death-trap route to Europe,” documenting the dangerous journey young Pakistani men undertake in search of work in Europe and the suffering of their families left behind.
The Initium won the investigative reporting prize in Chinese for its series on the anniversary of the White Paper Protest, featuring the lives and struggles of those who protested China’s “zero-Covid” lockdown policies in the wake of the pandemic.
The Guardian won the investigative reporting prize in English for its work, “Revealed: Amazon linked to trafficking of workers in Saudi Arabia,” which exposed the plight of Nepali migrant workers enduring forced labor and discrimination in Saudi Arabia. The reporting revealed the complicity of major multinational corporations that fail to police their supply chains.
Reporting on the Myanmar military’s airstrikes; abuses by the Bangladeshi elite police unit, the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB); issues facing the LGBT community in Hong Kong; and a global private hospital group embroiled in a “cash for kidneys” racket all won honorable mentions..."
Source/publisher:
"Human Rights Watch" (USA)
Date of entry/update:
2024-05-02
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
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Description:
"(excerpt)
Myanmar
An update from Myanmar: Our team on the ground tells us they are concerned by the spreading of misinformation, disinformation and hate speech, especially in northern Rakhine State.
We fully support community leaders in Rakhine State, especially women, and youth, who are coming together and redoubling efforts to promote social cohesion amid increasing signs of tension and the risk of communal violence re-emerging in the current very volatile context.
Addressing the root causes of systemic discrimination and impunity in Rakhine State will be essential in establishing a sustainable pathway out of the current crisis facing Myanmar. The failure to do so will only fuel Myanmar’s vicious cycle of violence; that’s according to the UN team.
And we have, of course, been consistent in condemning all forms of violence against civilians in Myanmar, and we reiterate our call for the protection of civilians, including aid workers, in accordance with international humanitarian law, for the cessation of hostilities and humanitarian access..."
Source/publisher:
UN Department of Global Communications
Date of entry/update:
2024-05-02
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Arakan (Rakhine) State - reports etc. by date (latest first)
Language:
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pdf
Size:
111.19 KB
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Description:
"MIMU’s HDP (Humanitarian, Development and Peace Focus) Nexus “Who does What Where, When and for Whom” database, or 5W, is a tool tracking the implementation of humanitarian, development and peace focused projects to support coordination, planning and efficient use of resources. MIMU has conducted this exercise regularly in Myanmar since 2008. Information is currently compiled every six months based on reports provided voluntarily by contributing agencies.
The MIMU HDP Nexus 5W shows:
➢ which organizations (WHO),
➢ are carrying out which activities (WHAT),
➢ in which locations (WHERE),
➢ project status – whether planned, ongoing or completed (WHEN)
➢ project beneficiary focus (for WHOM) – whether focused on IDPs, IDPs and host communities, other vulnerable communities or are aimed to create further resilience and development in communities.
MIMU HDP Nexus 5W Products capture information on the presence of organisations and do not indicate the volume of assistance, the number of beneficiaries, or the extent to which needs are met or unmet.
Summary
The MIMU HDP Nexus 5W Comparison report compares results from August 2020 to February 2024, looking particularly at the impact of events in early 2021 on agencies’ reported activities over time.
2021 saw a significant reduction in the number of reporting agencies and activities compared to the previous round in August 2020:
Over 30% reduction in reporting agencies (from 213 agencies in Aug’ 2020 to 159/163 agencies in May/Oct 2021), mainly INGOs and NNGOs.
33% reduction in the number of projects reported countrywide (over 200 less projects) in 2021, with reductions mainly in Shan (over 100), Yangon (over 90) and Rakhine (over 60).
A significant reduction in the number of activities reported as ongoing - 43,428 less activities in May 2021, mainly in Tanintharyi (84% reduction), Shan east (58%), Mon (57%), Shan south (55%) and Kayin (50%), and 35,930 less activities in Oct 2021, mainly in Rakhine (18%), Chin and Shan south (11% in each), Tanintharyi (10%), Kayin (9%), Shan north (8%) and Mon (7%).
Suspension of activities was significant. The highest number of suspended activities were reported in May 2021 (19 times higher than in August 2020).
2023 and 2024 has seen increase in reporting agencies and reported activities compared to 2021:
About 1,000 more village tracts/towns reported ongoing activities in 2023 and 200 more in 2024 (86%-78% of VTs/Towns around the country), mainly in Agriculture, Education, Health and Protection as compared to 2021.
Less activities reported as suspended in 2024 (2% of total reported activities) compared to 2021 (around 10%) and Feb’ 2023 (1%) – this does not indicate however whether activities have ended/completed or resumed.
Overall, despite the higher number of reporting agencies over the past 12 months:
More activities were reported as “completed/ended” – 6,476 more completed/ended activities were found in Feb’ 2024 than Feb’ 2023. This change was particularly noted within Livelihoods activities, where one agency ended a project with a large number of micro credit activities in June 2023.
A lower percentage of total activities were reported at VTs/Towns level as “ongoing” – 8% less ongoing activities reported as active (from 86% in Feb’ 2023 and 78% in Feb’ 2024)
More suspended activities focused on Other Vulnerable Groups and IDP Focus (nearly 4 times increase in each group) in Feb’ 2024 compared to Feb’ 2023..."
Source/publisher:
Myanmar Information Management Unit (Myanmar) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2024-05-02
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
1.18 MB
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Description:
"We, the former Representatives of the ASEAN Commission on the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Women and Children (ACWC), strongly condemn the ongoing human rights catastrophe in Myanmar and urge the UN, ASEAN, and key governments to take urgent and appropriate corresponding measures.
Over the past years, intensified fighting between the military and ethnic armed groups have left thousands of civilians killed, seriously injured, detained, and displaced from their homes and communities. Just recently, an airstrike on a school in Myanmar’s Karenni state killed four children and injured at least 15 others.[1] Another airstrike by the military also killed civilians, including nine children, as they gathered to attend church last January.[2] The attacks on civilians show no signs of stopping.
The international community must turn its eye to what is happening in Myanmar. Attacks against schools, churches, and especially children are a grave violation of children’s rights and international humanitarian law.
As of February 2024, more than 2.7 million people have been internally displaced in Myanmar and are living in unwarranted conditions. More than 18.6 people, including six million children, are in need of humanitarian aid in 2024 more than 18 times the number before the military takeover in 2021.[3] As a result, the number of children living in poverty has doubled from 4.7 million in 2017 to 9.9 million in 2022.
The violence and horrendous attacks on civilians clearly violate the principles in the ASEAN Charter to which Myanmar is a signatory including the adherence to the rule of law, good governance, and respect for and protection of human rights.
We reiterate the call to hold the Myanmar military accountable for the violence in Myanmar, to comply with the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), to facilitate continuous dialogue among all concerned parties, and ultimately save and protect the children at all costs..."
Source/publisher:
Child Rights Coalition Asia
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-30
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Children's rights: reports of violations in Burma against more than one ethnic group, Children, Human Rights and international relations
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Description:
"ASEAN must shift away from its military-centric engagement with Myanmar. In doing so, it must embrace a process and posture that addresses underlying structural inequities.
The 2021 Myanmar coup differs markedly from those in 1988 and 1962, facing strong domestic resistance and international condemnation. The National Unity Government (NUG), seen as legitimate, counters the military’s authority, underscoring the coup’s failure to secure control or legitimacy, rendering it more an “attempted” than a successful takeover. To maintain and enhance peace, security, and stability, and to further strengthen peace-oriented values in the region is one of the purposes of the Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN). Presently, a pivotal concern for ASEAN leadership pertains to discerning strategies to mitigate protracted armed conflict and engender sustainable peace within Myanmar. Concurrently, they must grapple with elucidating the underlying reasons for the ineffective implementation of the 5 Points Consensus (5PC) in resolving the Myanmar issue.
The deficiency in realising the 5PC can be attributed to a myopic focus solely on the immediate conflict spurred by the attempted coup, as orchestrated by Myanmar’s military. This focus has hindered solutions addressing the key requisites for enduring peace in Myanmar. In order to adhere to a coherent course of action, ASEAN leaders are compelled to address three fundamental inquiries: Can the Myanmar military engender genuine peace within the nation? Does the Myanmar military singularly possess the requisite capacity to stabilise and uphold the integrity of Myanmar? What are the underlying catalysts precipitating Myanmar’s protracted conflicts?
Can the Myanmar military engender genuine peace within the nation?
The basic premise that the Myanmar military has the capacity to establish sustainable peace within the nation is questionable. The longstanding pattern of armed conflict in Myanmar, exacerbated by military coups and subsequent insurgencies, underscores the ineffectiveness of military rule in being genuine partners in fostering lasting peace. Since assuming power in 1958, and subsequently in 1962 and 1988, successive military regimes have failed to engage, let alone quell, armed resistance movements, leading to the proliferation of ethnic armed groups and protracted conflict over the past six decades.
Despite sporadic attempts at peacemaking initiatives, such as ceasefires and negotiations, these efforts have largely been superficial and have failed to address the root causes of the conflicts. According to Bertil Litner, a prominent expert on the Myanmar Civil War, these peacemaking endeavours have primarily served to provide armed groups with temporary respite and economic opportunities for military leaders, rather than addressing underlying political grievances.
A few weeks ago, renowned conflict scholar Johan Galtung passed away. Galtung long advocated for approaches that deepen understanding and generate creative, integrative solutions to the most complex of conflicts. For example, Galtung’s conflict triangle theory outlines the limitations of ceasefire agreements in achieving sustainable peace. Merely halting hostilities without addressing structural and cultural conflicts, this theory suggests, can only yield negative peace at best. The point here is that the Myanmar military’s historical approach to peacemaking has not fostered enduring stability and does not include peacebuilding approaches for longer-term transformative change to address the drivers of conflicts.
To attain sustainable peace and justice in Myanmar, ASEAN leaders must listen to and engage with a range of Myanmar’s leaders, and work to adopt a comprehensive approach addressing direct, structural, and cultural aspects of the conflict. By acknowledging and addressing the multifaceted nature of the crisis, ASEAN can support and foster a conducive environment for lasting peace and stability in Myanmar.
Is the Myanmar military one entity with enough strength to stabilise and preserve Myanmar?
The assertion that the Myanmar military is the sole entity possessing sufficient capability to stabilise and safeguard the nation is unfounded. That the people of Myanmar have shown their rejection and resistance to military rule is well documented. Since 1 February 2021, during attempted military seizures of power, the nation witnessed annual widespread participation in silent strikes, underscoring public aversion towards military rule and its political entrenchment. Observable trends, such as dwindling enrolment rates at military academies and reports of coerced conscription among Myanmar’s youth further affirm the peoples’ disapproval of military involvement in governance.
Recent events, notably the coordinated offensive launched in Northern Shan State on 27 October, 2024, have unveiled the true limitations of the Myanmar military’s capabilities and morale. Contrary to prior perceptions of invincibility, these events have exposed vulnerabilities within the military apparatus. Assertions propagated by the Myanmar military regarding its indispensable role in maintaining stability within the nation are now recognised as baseless bravado.
The causes of Myanmar’s armed conflicts started from the era of the Burmese kings.
The genesis of armed conflict in Myanmar can be traced back to several historical antecedents, beginning with the era of the Burmese monarchs. The entrenched autocratic system, characterised by its phenotypical brutality, instigated protracted wars between the Burmese kingdom and various ethnic groups such as the Mon, Shan, and Rakhine. These conflicts have endured across generations, perpetuating a cycle of violence and discord. The colonial period and the upheavals of the Second World War exacerbated pre-existing cultural tensions, further exacerbating interethnic hostilities, and entrenching exclusionary governance systems for inequitable recognition and power sharing.
The journey towards Independence, marred by distrust between the dominant Burman ethnic group and minority ethnic communities, laid the groundwork for post-independence conflict. Today, Myanmar’s armed revolution is rooted in entrenched social conflicts, exacerbated by structural disparities. These encompass issues such as perceptions of federalism, resource allocation, territorial delineation, and the protection of ethnic and minority rights. The protracted armed conflicts spanning over 70 years, coupled with the oppressive, divisive tactics employed by the Myanmar military, perpetuate deep cultural and structural fault lines within the nation.
Achieving sustainable peace in Myanmar necessitates addressing not only ceasefires but also the underlying structural and social conflicts. As this line of analysis suggests, giving primacy for peace leadership to the military is not going to be effectual for lasting peace. Engaging with Myanmar entails a multifaceted approach aimed at resolving chronic social tensions and fostering social cohesion across diverse ethnic and cultural divides.
ASEAN leaders and the international community can look to the notable shifts in the dynamics of the situation in Myanmar led by a range of civil society, elected leaders, and EROs (ethnic revolutionary organisations) to help end the conflict. Contemporary Myanmar society exhibits distinct signs of transformation, such as a diminished reliance on the military apparatus, and a profound aversion to the divisive tactics of Burmanisation employed by the Myanmar military. This heightened awareness among the majority Burman populace, coupled with an increasing recognition of the suffering endured by ethnic minority communities residing in border regions, has catalysed a burgeoning sense of mutual understanding and empathy among Myanmar’s diverse ethnic groups.
Notably, the ongoing Myanmar Spring Revolution underscores a positive trajectory towards social cohesion, characterised by widespread sympathy and solidarity among the populace. Leaders of armed resistance factions, including the National Unity Government, evince a nuanced understanding of Myanmar’s structural conflicts and espouse a steadfast commitment to pursuing peaceful resolutions through dialogue.
Myanmar’s protracted peace process stands firmly rooted, with concerted efforts directed towards addressing underlying structural inequities. At the forefront of the revolution’s objectives lies the imperative to dismantle the entrenched authoritarian grip of the Myanmar military, thereby paving the way for the establishment of a new federal democratic state. In this context, the responsibility falls upon ASEAN leaders and the international community to re-assess its military-centric engagement, where no durable solutions can be found, and engage meaningfully in the transformative processes for peace and justice in Myanmar..."
Source/publisher:
Australian Institute of International Affairs
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-29
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations, ASEAN-Burma relations, Australia-Burma relations
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"About three years ago, Asean leaders gathered in Jakarta for an emergency summit on Myanmar at which the FivePoint Consensus (5PC) – entailing the cessation of violence in the country, constructive dialogue among parties to the conflict.....About three years ago, Asean leaders gathered in Jakarta for an emergency summit on Myanmar at which the FivePoint Consensus (5PC) – entailing the cessation of violence in the country, constructive dialogue among parties to the conflict, the appointment of a special Myanmar envoy and the provision of humanitarian assistance – was agreed upon with the State Administration Council’s (SAC) senior general Min Aung Hlaing. The 5PC has since seen very limited progress. Airstrikes by the Myanmar military and fighting among various armed actors continue, leading to the displacement of more than 2.5 million people since the 2021 coup. Inclusive platforms for political dialogue have not materialized.
While Indonesia created a new precedent of meeting with various stakeholders across Myanmar, the Asean chair’s one-year tenure remains too short for significant breakthroughs. Hitherto, observers have described Asean’s 5PC as “failed”, “toothless”, “not appropriate”, and a “dead pact” and have said Asean centrality is “in tatters”. Nonetheless, there are three useful features of the 5PC. It is deliberately capacious: its points (except naming the AHA Centre) remain broad with room for interpretation. It is not a peace plan and was crafted to avoid binding the actions of any successive chair.
Second, the 5PC is what Asean member states believe gives Asean the standing to be involved in the Myanmar crisis. Many may disagree that any agreement from Min Aung Hlaing is required for Asean engagement, but it is nonetheless significant to Asean, committed to its principle of nonintervention. Without the 5PC, there would be no basis for Asean involvement. Third, the 5PC is a measure aimed at preventing major power rivalries around the Myanmar crisis by establishing a test case for Asean centrality. Consequently, the 5PC carries high stakes for Asean’s credibility in responding to the crisis through regional initiatives. Making progress on the 5PC is crucial.
Successive Asean chairs face at least three main challenges. The first is discerning a mediumterm strategy for Asean’s engagement with Myanmar. The 5PC was designed to address the immediate aftermath of post-coup violence. But the desired “cessation of hostilities” will never come without a minimum acceptable medium-term strategy, accommodating the Myanmar people’s visions for the future. Here, half measures aimed solely at cease-fires will make no progress. Second are the limits of time and operating within the one-year Asean chair timeframe. Sensemaking and trust-building are massive undertakings, as Indonesia discovered through its painstaking efforts.
The chair needs to understand facts, histories, and perspectives on the ground, then analyse the interests of domestic and regional actors, before finally devising its policies for the year. The first two stages might already take up the best part of five months, leaving a mere two to three months to craft its approach on Myanmar for the Asean summit. The third challenge is supplementing efforts at internal convening with external rallying. It must create space to bring together Myanmar stakeholders and simultaneously muster meaningful support from the international community.
Between Myanmar, Asean and regional actors, there remains a wide gap of understanding. Many Myanmar stakeholders do not understand Asean’s processes and limitations, and many Asean member states do not fathom the complex relations and perspectives among the Myanmar groups. Asean must continue to create the space to learn from the various relevant Myanmar stakeholders and seek the support of the major frontline states, namely China and India, for its efforts. It is time to rethink the terms of the chair’s special envoy to enable Asean to deal with the aforementioned challenges. After three years, it is clear that no chair has the capacity to deal with the issue alone.
In fact, it is unfair to leave the responsibility to the chair alone. Indonesia’s proposal of a troika mechanism is a nod towards the need for a sustainable, more permanent mechanism. In this respect, the creation of an Asean office on Myanmar follows sensibly. The office should focus on three main areas of the 5PC mandate – cessation of violence, delivery of humanitarian assistance and facilitation of stakeholder dialogues – to create the spaces and conditions for a nationbuilding process.
A troika-plus mechanism (one that includes key Asean countries that have the competence, leverage and persistence to engage) could see its members share a rotating coordinator role of the office, dividing up labour by issue, stakeholders or time periods. Importantly, the office must continue engagement with all stakeholders in Myanmar, not only with the Myanmar military, as its main modus operandi. Finally, domestic engagement will have to be balanced with efforts on the external front, where the office could coordinate international envoys and rally support for Asean’s approach. A new United Nations special envoy has been appointed, and fresh coordination of envoys is needed.
While the international community has given verbal support to Asean centrality, it must also be rallied to provide support through policy options, technical assistance, resources and political leverage. With a more permanent Asean office on Myanmar, a medium-term 5PC strategy can be built. This helps to avoid short-term, individual actions, such as elections organized by the junta or through the existing Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement, that might derail medium-term objectives. The Asean strategy would ideally turn into a framework that coherently guides and shapes the chair’s efforts for the year and allows each chair to make piecemeal, sustainable progress on the crisis.
This framework should outline how Asean, with the full support of the UN Security Council, can help to achieve three key objectives: (1) a humanitarian cease-fire, (2) a negotiated transition and (3) the establishment of an inclusive federal democracy in Myanmar. These objectives cover short, medium and long-term goals. New procedures for implementation and milestones to measure progress toward the objectives must be developed.
As recently as December 2023, the 17th Asean Defense Ministers’ Meeting acknowledged the “need to develop concrete, practical and measurable indicators in support of the implementation of the FivePoint Consensus”. Thankfully, the 5PC is sufficiently broadly worded to allow flexibility in activities and implementation. The establishment of a permanent office in Myanmar, initiated by the current chair Laos, could be formalized by Malaysia and effected by the Philippines. The time to start is now.
(The writers are, respectively, director of research at the Surin Pitsuwan Foundation, Thailand; head of the Department of International Relations and coordinator for the Myanmar Initiative Program at the Jakartabased Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), and executive director of the Institute for Strategy and Policy, Myanmar.)..."
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The Statesman
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2024-04-29
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Individual Documents
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Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, ASEAN-Burma relations, Human Rights and international relations
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"1. Introduction
Since the 2021 military coup[1], human rights violations are being committed against villagers by armed actors in Southeast Burma[2] with increasing intensity. Among these violations, incidents of torture of civilians have seen an alarming increase: in 2023 alone, 33 incidents involving at least 37 victims were reported to KHRG, mainly perpetrated by the Burma Army.[3] This physical and mental violence is used by the State Administration Council (SAC)[4] as a weapon of war. Villagers in locally-defined Karen State[5] are particularly vulnerable to abuse, when continuously arbitrarily arrested and detained, as the SAC punishes and intimidates them in retaliatory violence, failing to adhere to international legal norms and the rules of war. This systematic abuse is impacting the security, livelihoods and freedom of movement of villagers, and causing severe injuries, fear and trauma.
This briefing paper presents incidents of torture against villagers in Southeast Burma by the SAC and affiliated armed groups in the period between January to December 2023.[6] The paper begins with a brief overview of the context in which torture has been occurring across Southeast Burma since the 2021 coup. It then presents a factual summary of the incidents of torture in 2023, and discusses the trends identified in the reports received by KHRG, including the torture of civilians arbitrarily arrested on accusations of affiliation with armed resistance groups or to extract information about their activities; to intimidate and terrorise the population; and/or when forcing villagers to act as human shields or porters. The impact of torture on the communities is also presented. Finally, a security and legal analysis of the situation of these severe human rights violations is conducted, and policy recommendations are provided for stakeholders.
2. Contextual Overview: torture as a weapon of war in Burma
For decades, villagers have been mistreated by the Burma Army who have sought to impose their political and military will over civilian populations across Burma. Civilians have long been targeted as part of the “four cuts” strategy, which aims to destroy links between insurgents, their families, and local villagers by severing supplies of food, funds, intelligence and recruits to armed resistance groups.[7] Amid the civil war, which has been intensifying in Karen State in the past three years, human rights abuses against civilians abound, including killings, air strikes on civilian areas, indiscriminate shelling, landmine usage, arbitrary arrests, enforced disappearances, widespread displacement, severe livelihood challenges, and barriers to education and healthcare.
The practice of arbitrary detention of civilians by the SAC is widespread in Burma, with approximately 20,240 political prisoners under detention across the country.[8] Under detention, civilians are highly vulnerable to abuse, mistreatment, or dire detention conditions, as the SAC fails to adhere to international law regarding the protection of prisoners and disallow the monitoring of conditions by lawyers or outside observers.[9] In rural Southeast Burma, villagers are frequently arrested and detained by SAC authorities in army camps, police stations, prisons, and checkpoints. In addition, villagers are often detained by soldiers in villages, on their plantations, or even their homes. Amid the ongoing conflict and the continued impunity enjoyed by armed actors, villagers are immensely vulnerable to extrajudicial killing, torture and mistreatment when detained in any of these circumstances and places.
The Burma Army has used torture for many decades, defined as the act of inflicting severe pain or suffering on someone to force them to do something or in punishment. Throughout the years, villagers have reported extreme torture including waterboarding, burning, cutting of body parts, hangings and burying underground, and torture has occurred both in detention facilities, in villages and forests, and sometimes publicly in charades of terror.[10] Some of these extreme methods are evident in the incidents documented in this briefing paper. Accusations of villagers being connected with armed resistance groups have been a common feature of torture in interrogation and punishment by the Burma Army throughout the many years of conflict. Ignoring international norms and regulations for the proper treatment of detainees, SAC soldiers inflict suffering on civilians under their captivity without recourse, to a degree which may amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity under customary international criminal law.
3. Factual summary: patterns of torture against villagers by the SAC and its impacts
This section presents evidence of the torture of villagers in Southeast Burma involving the SAC and SAC-affiliated groups. Since the 2021 coup, KHRG has received reports documenting 52 incidents of torture against villagers by the SAC military across our operational area.[11] In 2023 alone, KHRG received 36 reports detailing 33 of those incidents, and involving 37 victims of torture. Incidents of torture mostly occurred during arbitrary arrests; villagers were tortured as part of interrogation to extract information related to military objectives. Torture was also used against villagers in punishment for their alleged affiliation with opposition groups, either for being relatives, informants, or supporters of those groups, including suspicion of supplying them with food and materials. On other occasions, the SAC military tortured villagers in an abuse of power, to intimidate, terrorise and instil fear. Finally, villagers were also subjected to torture whilst being forced to act as human shields or porters by armed actors. Some instances of armed resistance groups operating in Southeast Burma torturing villagers have also been reported to KHRG, usually against those accused of being spies for the SAC, excluded from this analysis.[12]
a) Torture in interrogation to extract information
During the reporting period, the SAC military frequently arbitrarily arrested or detained villagers to obtain knowledge of local armed resistance groups’ activities. These arrests often occurred in the aftermath of attacks by resistance groups, as SAC soldiers sought to collect information on those involved. Torture was used to extract information or force confessions, and detention conditions were often dire. These interrogations also frequently happened publicly in villages, at checkpoints, on roads, or even in villagers’ houses. Many villagers who were arrested by the SAC were also forcibly disappeared, removed from protective measures or observation of their health or welfare by relatives or lawyers.[13] Villagers are at risk of being detained and subjected to intimidation and torture as they go about their daily lives, as the following incidents attest to.
On February 21st 2023, in search of People’s Defence Force (PDF)[14] members in the aftermath of fighting in the area, SAC soldiers from Light Infantry Battalion (LIB)[15] #603, led by Battalion Commander Hein San Htun, entered T’Hsee Theh Mee Lar Town, Than Tuang Way Thaw area, in Taw T’Htoo Township, Taw Oo District. The SAC soldiers arrested eight villagers who were taken to Than Taung police station, in Than Taung Town, where they were interrogated, beaten and punched. The SAC soldiers burned villagers’ houses and confiscated villagers’ belongings, including clothes and five motorcycles, which they burned altogether.
Later that day, five more villagers, three men and two women, from the same village were arrested by the SAC soldiers and questioned at the police station. All but one of the villagers were released shortly afterwards. As explained by a local person from T’Hsee Theh Mee Lar Town, a young villager was taken to an SAC army camp where he was interrogated and tortured before eventually being released a few days later. Villagers assumed that the SAC had found incriminating evidence related to other youngsters, possibly PDF members, on his phone.[16]
Villagers are arbitrarily arrested, and subsequently mistreated or tortured, in the aftermath of attacks against the SAC when soldiers search the area for those involved or who could have information on the attack. Travelling in the aftermath of attacks is therefore particularly dangerous for villagers. As explained by a victim of torture, that had taken place on January 6th 2023, in Dooplaya District: “They [the SAC] suspected me of being a spy. The fighting was happening when I returned to the village to feed my pigs. They suspected me of being a spy and arrested me. They asked many questions. They tortured me. I told them I was nothing [a civilian]. I told them I was a normal villager”. He added:
“I was afraid but could not do anything. I did not know how to be afraid. I considered myself dead.”
When the SAC interrogated him, he was kicked and stabbed by a knife several times.[17]
On another instance on March 26th 2023, at about 3 pm, Saw[18] A---, an 18-year-old villager, from Aa--- village, Aaw P’Lah village tract[19], Hsaw Htee Township, Kler Lwee Htoo District, was arrested by SAC Light Infantry Battalion (LIB) #20, who are based in Nyaunglebin Town, on suspicion of participating in a recent bomb attack along with six other villagers. Saw A--- was travelling by motorcycle to buy a duck to eat when he was arrested in Ba--- village. Saw A---’s mother, B---, was informed of her son’s arrest by other villagers living in Ba--- village. After hearing of the arrest, B--- and her husband went to find him: on March 27th at LIB #20 army camp and on March 28th, at Baw Bi police station. Saw A---’s parents had to provide the SAC soldiers with food and 20,000 kyat [9.50 USD[20]] for the cost of tea to be permitted to ask for information about their son. The SAC soldiers at Baw Bi police station told the victim’s parents not to worry about their son because he would be released soon after interrogation, if found not guilty. After he was released, Saw A--- explained to his mother about the brutal torture he had to endure: he was beaten in public relentlessly by the soldiers soon after his arrest before being taken to the police station, where he was again tortured during interrogation. Others from Ba--- village, who were also arrested along with Saw A---, reported that several villagers were also subjected to torture by the SAC.[21]
On another instance on September 18th 2023, after fighting and air strikes in T’Ko Teh village tract, Waw Ray Township, Dooplaya District, a 50-year-old villager named U[22] C---, from Ca--- village, K’Leh T’Khon Teh village tract, was arrested by the SAC soldiers when he returned from a displacement site to his village to feed his livestock. After the arrest, the SAC soldiers beat and punched him. Due to the severe injuries caused, he had to undergo medical treatment.[23]
Incidents of arrest and torture are also common at checkpoints. On November 16th 2023, a villager named Ko[24] D---, from Da--- village, Sa Htain village tract, Ler K’Saw Township, Mergui-Tavoy District, was apprehended by SAC soldiers from Infantry Battalion (IB)[25] #559 and #560 at a checkpoint on the road near Ea--- village. Ko D--- had visited Ea--- village to purchase items for himself, and was detained on the road while returning home. The soldiers stopped and searched him and his motorbike, and interrogated him. During the search of his motorcycle, the SAC soldiers discovered 20 tablets of yaba[26] hidden inside the seat. When questioned about these tablets, Ko D--- informed the SAC soldiers that they were for his personal use while working. However, one of the SAC soldiers said: “You are lying. I know you bought these drugs for the PDF”. During the interrogation, the SAC soldiers beat the villager. After, one of the SAC commanders threatened Ko D--- by saying: “You can’t tell anyone about this. If you do and we see this news on social media, we will kill you”. Since this incident, Ko D--- has been afraid to travel, and cannot eat well. Ko D---’s wife informed KHRG that villagers were living with fear and concern about their security.[27]
Many local villagers who have been impacted by the arrest and torture have been left with emotional distress and trauma. The escalation of arrests and torture in Southeast Burma has heightened villagers’ worry about being apprehended which is leading to fear of commuting to work or ensuring their livelihoods.
b) Torture and physical abuse as punishment
Villagers are arbitrarily arrested and detained often with no evidence provided for suspicion of affiliation with, or support to, local armed resistance groups; villagers are simply going about their daily lives. When detained on such accusations, SAC soldiers use intimidation, physical violence and other forms of mistreatment in punishment.
Saw E---, a young villager from Fa--- village, T’Nay village tract, Dwe Lo Township, Mu Traw District, was detained three times in November 2023 by the SAC, and at the end tortured to death. First, he was apprehended and detained at his farm, asked for his name and any military affiliation, and then forced along with some friends to guide SAC soldiers to Wa Wee Lay Road. The second time, he was arrested while travelling on a road with two friends, Maung[28] F--- and G---, and accused of having ties with Karen armed resistance groups after they were found carrying a battery with them, which villagers insisted was for personal use to charge their phones. The SAC soldiers gave these three young villagers 240,000 kyat [114 USD] and instructed them to purchase food for the soldiers in Ga--- village, T’Nay village tract. G--- was kept behind with the soldiers. Shortly afterwards, the soldiers were attacked by Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA)[29] soldiers. Maung F--- and Saw E--- were too afraid to return because of the fighting. The SAC soldiers thought the three young villagers were implicated in the attack, even accusing Maung F--- of being a KNLA officer. As punishment, G---, still detained by the SAC military, was severely tortured. The SAC soldiers burned his face with fire, stabbed a knife at his back, and beat his head. The soldiers told him: “You guys are Kaw Thoo Lei[30] soldiers [KNLA]. You see! When your friends were just released, they [KNLA] tried to attack us. […] If your friends do not come back and [KNLA] attack us [again], I will bury your body in a standing position.” The village head from Fa--- village negotiated with the SAC, who asked for the money they gave Maung F--- and Saw E--- in order to release G---. G--- was released the same day and needed treatment and medicine for his injuries.
On November 24th 2023, at around 3 pm, Saw E--- was arrested one more time by this same SAC troop beside a plantation while he was going to meet his friends. He was detained alongside Saw H---, a villager from Ga--- village, T’Nay village tract, who had been arrested earlier; the two men were tied up together. Soon after he was detained, the SAC sergeant in charge gave soldiers knives and took Saw E--- to be tortured. They beat and kicked him and then cut out his eyes and cut his ears with knives. The soldier told him: “Last time [that Saw E--- was arrested], you took the money and after you left, you attacked us. And now, you come and sneak up on us again.” As they took out his eyes and cut his ears, they told him: “The eyes that snuck up on us and the ears that were eavesdropping.” During the torture of Saw E---, H--- was able to slip away and escape. He informed villagers in T’Nay area about what happened to Saw E--- and Fa--- villagers went to look for him nearby Meh Pray Hkee army camp. The SAC soldiers there told villagers that Saw E--- might had been killed during an attack by the KNLA and gave no more information.[31]
Saw H--- had been arrested on November 22nd 2023 while he was herding his cows in Ga--- area. The SAC asked him questions and also accused him of having connections with the KNLA soldiers. Saw H--- recalled:
“They [SAC soldiers] hit me with a machete and I was bleeding. They slapped me in the face. After that, they went to take a rope and tied me from the back. My hands were swelling, as the blood was not running [through]. It was so tight. I could not stand it anymore, so I asked the SAC sergeant to loosen the rope. I was a bit more comfortable when the rope was loosened.”
He was tied up together with Saw E--- on that night, after two days of arrest. When SAC soldiers questioned and tortured Saw E---, Saw H--- untied the rope by scrubbing it and escaped into the forest. After his escape, he was not able to sleep for several days due to fear. Since then, villagers are afraid of being arrested by the SAC soldiers so they dare not going to their farmlands or hill fields to secure their livelihood.[32]
On another instance, on the morning of July 9th 2023, villagers residing near the eastern part of the Pa Ra Lo river in Ler Doh Township, Kler Lwee Htoo District, went to Kyauk Ta Ga Town to purchase food. SAC soldiers from LIB #264 detained them when they entered the town and apprehended 16 of the villagers, accusing them of transporting rice and other items to the PDF. Among the arrested villagers, three individuals were severely beaten by SAC soldiers, as reported by their family members. Despite being able to provide food for the detainees, the families were denied access to see them. During a subsequent meeting with village leaders on July 14th 2023, the family members expressed their desire to secure the release of the villagers but were too afraid to directly confront the SAC soldiers. In August 2023, these arrested villagers were released and many fled their villages, facing security concerns.[33]
On September 11th 2023 from 5 to 6 am, there was a fighting between PDF troops and SAC, involving over 30 soldiers from the Infantry Battalion (IB) #285 marching to Ja--- village, Pu Law area, Ler Muh Lah Township, Mergui-Tavoy District. After the fighting, the SAC indiscriminately conducted constant shelling into nearby villages and vicinities, up until 12:30 pm. This shelling resulted in the displacement of villagers. While fleeing, a 26-year-old villager named Maung K---from Ja--- village, Pu Law area, Ler Muh Lah Township, was arrested by the SAC. The soldiers tortured Maung K--- to death. They also arrested other villagers and brought them to Pu Law Town’s police station. Some villagers were released after a while.[34]
If a villager is arrested on suspicion of affiliation with an armed resistance group, it is common that their family members and close associates will also be targeted, in punishment. This creates much fear among villagers if a friend or family member is detained, regardless of any truth to the claims. In one incident in which a human rights defender was arrested, falsely accused of being PDF, and forcibly disappeared, his daughter feared being targeted herself: “After they arrested my father, I heard that SAC tried to look for the family members. They showed our pictures to people, and they asked people where we were. They also asked people about how many children my father has. They asked people whether we came back to Rb--- [the family’s hometown] or not. […] I think they wanted to arrest all my father’s family members because they wanted to make sure they could arrest every family member of my father. […] We have security concerns. We have to flee from place to place.”[35]
c) Torture as intimidation or as an abuse of power
Torture of villagers is also committed by the SAC and other affiliated armed groups with no clear military objectives discernible. These incidents can be seen as efforts to demonstrate that SAC soldiers have the power to act without fear of punishment from any legal mechanism. They can act with impunity, terrorise and intimidate villagers, and inflict pain on the civilian population, in a grave abuse of power.
For instance, in April 2023, Saw L---, a 30-year-old resident of Ka--- village in the K’Moh Thway area, Ler Doh Soh Township, Mergui-Tavoy District, was apprehended by SAC LIB #409, stationed at the Nga Pyaw Daw Wa checkpoint in Da Wei Town. Saw L--- was returning home by motorbike from escorting students to school in Da Wei Town. The SAC soldiers stationed at the checkpoint were intoxicated and called out to him, but he could not hear them due to the noise of a car engine and hence did not stop. Then, the SAC soldiers followed him by car and apprehended him in La--- village, located in the Htee Ler Klay area. Following his arrest, the SAC soldiers physically assaulted him using sticks. Saw L--- is an ordinary villager who earns a living by working on his hill field.[36]
In another incident, on August 17th 2023, Saw Ta Dah Win, an officer of the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA)[37] -affiliated with the SAC- tortured three villagers on a road located in Mee Kyain village tract, Hpa-an Township, Doo Tha Htoo District. The villagers were Saw M--- (49 years old), Saw N--- (23 years old) and Saw O--- (40 years old), from Na--- village, Mee Kyain village tract. These villagers work as daily labourers, selling gravel to support their livelihood. When the DKBA officer noticed a gravel pile obstructing the road during his travel to Ma--- place in Hpa-an Township, he confronted the villagers. Despite the villagers’ apologies and willingness to remove the gravel, the DKBA officer violently assaulted them. Saw M--- suffered a split lip from a wooden stick blow, and Saw N--- and Saw O--- were also repeatedly struck. This incident has left local villagers living in fear of similar mistreatment. The perpetrator, Saw Ta Dah Win, serves as an operation commander in a DKBA battalion led by Saw Bo Bee.[38]
SAC soldiers also apprehended villagers whilst they were undertaking their livelihood activities in fields and plantations. For example, on October 7th 2023 at 4:30 pm, SAC soldiers arrested and assaulted Naw[39] P---, from Oa--- village, Ma Htaw village tract, Dwe Lo Township, Mu Traw District. She was arrested by the SAC soldiers at her farmland located in Thwah Hkoh Law area, while she was herding buffaloes. Naw P--- was taking care of her three buffaloes because she thought it was a higher risk for her sons and son-in-law to do the herding work during this time of intensified conflict. When apprehended by SAC soldiers, they asked her random questions trying to obtain information about any armed resistance activities in the area, pointing a gun at her chest. Naw P--- was then taken to see the SAC commander at the SAC base in a forest at Wa May Kyoh place. Naw P--- does not speak Burmese, so it was challenging to communicate with the SAC soldiers, but she managed to convey that she was alone and had simply been herding buffaloes. Despite this explanation, however, she was still mistreated, tied up the entire night in the forest, leaving her wet, cold, and deprived of food. Later, the SAC soldiers offered snacks, which she hesitantly accepted, fearing potential harm. On the next day, at dawn, she was released.[40]
As has been demonstrated, villagers in Southeast Burma often face arrest and torture alongside other human rights violations by the SAC and affiliated armed groups whilst they are travelling, purchasing goods, or working. For villagers who must travel for their livelihoods, or to carry out other daily tasks, avoiding interactions with armed actors is impossible, especially since some events occur unexpectedly and there are many checkpoints on roads. Saw Q---, a 26-year-old villager from Pa--- village, A’Lu village tract, Kyeh Htoh Township, Doo Tha Htoo District, whose father was arrested whilst travelling for his livelihood as a day labourer, expressed his fears:
“Before the coup, we could travel freely. We did not hear about arbitrary arrests. After the coup, we are afraid to go to A’Lu Lay. We are afraid when we are travelling. We are concerned about the fighting that is going to happen. Before the coup, our livelihood activities were fine. Yet, after the coup, our livelihood is restricted”.[41]
d) Torture of villagers forced to act as human shields and porters
The SAC arbitrarily arrests villagers to force them to act as human shields or forced porters, accompanying troops as they travel on foot through contested territory. These acts may indeed be seen as torture in themselves, such as the hard physical labour of being forced to carry heavy loads whilst at risk of being attacked by armed groups whilst travelling. Moreover, villagers being forced to act as human shields are often mistreated and physically abused whilst under detention. They are also forcibly disappeared, isolated and cut off from communication with others. In 2023 alone, KHRG documented 13 incidents of use of human shields and forced portering, involving at least 97 villagers.[42]
In one reported incident, on March 20th 2023, 50 to 70 soldiers from SAC Light Infantry Division (LID)[43] #77 and other combined troops, entered Qa--- village and Ra--- village, Nah Tha Kway village tract, Moo Township, Kler Lwee Htoo District. The soldiers arrested 22 villagers in total, including four children aged between 6 to 17. The SAC released six villagers (including two people with disabilities) and took the rest with them as human shields. These arrested villagers were tied up and were forced to walk in front of the SAC soldiers and threatened that they would be killed if KNLA soldiers were to attack on the way. The next day, two elderly villagers were released but 14 villagers remained detained including the three children. One villager taken as a human shield in this incident, Saw R---, explained:
“After arresting us, they tied up our hands; 7-8 people in a set. They did not tell us where they were going to take us. They were so aggressive communicating with us so we dare not refuse to follow them once they arrested us. The soldiers said: ‘Don’t you dare to escape! If you do so, we will shoot you dead.’ How would we dare to escape when they are that aggressive? We dared not even move”.
The SAC soldiers confined these arrested villagers in a classroom of Ra--- village school, locking the door. For five days, these villagers endured living, eating, sleeping, and using a trash bin as a makeshift toilet in the cramped room. Once a day, the SAC soldiers would open the door, allowing the detainees to clean their hands and legs, and bathe. The SAC soldiers hung their clothes in front of the classroom where the villagers were detained so it would be targeted if attacked by KNLA soldiers. On March 24th 2023, the SAC released all of the villagers by tying them up in the forest.[44]
On July 9th 2023, SAC LIB #559 and #560, led by Commander Min Min Htun and based in the army camp in Ea--- village, Sa Htain village tract, Ler K’Saw Township, Mergui-Tavoy District, travelled to Da--- village. On their way, at around 9 am, they arrested Ko S---, a villager from Da--- village, and forced him to carry their ammunition. Ko S--- explained that he suffered from lower back pain and could not carry the bullets. Then, one of the SAC soldiers named Ko San Naing, told him: “Don’t talk nonsense. You have to carry bullets as we ask you to do so”, and continued to force him to carry their bullets. As they travelled, the SAC soldiers arrested whoever they saw on their way and took them as porters and human shields. Ko S--- reported to KHRG that the SAC arrested ten villagers in total, forcing them to carry their ammunition and walk in front of the soldiers. Among the arrested villagers were a three-year-old child and his mother. When they arrived at a plantation, owned by Ko T--- (a villager from Da--- village), they encountered Kaw Thoo Lei Army (KTLA)[45] soldiers and fighting happened. The KTLA soldiers realised that there were also villagers with the SAC soldiers and so stopped firing guns and retreated. During the fighting, the SAC soldiers told the arrested villagers to crouch down but did not let them put down the ammunition they carried. None of the villagers were injured or hit by bullets during the fighting, nor were any of the soldiers. After the fighting, the SAC told the villagers: “You did a good job”, and released them all, leaving them to walk two hours home. Ko S--- stated: “They [SAC] would not have released us if any of their soldiers had died or had been injured.” Ko S--- and the other arrested villagers still feel afraid and panicked after being released: they worry and fear that they will be arrested again and killed.[46]
Villagers who were released or who managed to escape captivity suffer afterwards from the trauma and face recovery from injuries sustained during the torture. After being taken as human shields by the SAC in March 2023, Qa--- and Ra--- villagers, Nah Tha Kway village tract, Moo Township, expressed they were experiencing significant emotional distress. One of the victims from Ra--- village explained:
“Because of this arrest, we were afraid, and one of the children got sick [with shock]; it seems that this child was very afraid. Some elders also had to take medicine after returning to the village.”
The experience of being forced to act as a human shield is traumatic and this is compounded by the high frequency of these crimes: villagers know they may be targeted again. Some villagers who have been tortured and released need continued treatment due to their injuries. With the intensification of armed conflicts and difficulty working to get income, families are struggling to support the injured victims.
4. Analysis: Legal implications of the torture of villagers by the SAC
Villagers in Southeast Burma are individually targeted, assaulted and tortured by SAC soldiers in order to extract information about armed resistance groups, punished for alleged affiliation with such groups, intimidated and terrorised, or dehumanised when captured as human shields or forced porters. Following attacks by armed resistance groups, villagers have been common targets of retaliatory violence, as the SAC violently seeks to extract information and locate resistance soldiers in and around villages. Civilians face constant insecurity, frequently attacked while in their villages, on their plantations or farms, or on roads when travelling for essential livelihood activities. Any potential contact with SAC soldiers puts villagers at risk of ill-treatment. SAC soldiers fail to respect the basic rights, dignity and integrity of civilians, treating them as enemies and legitimate targets.
Endemic across the whole of Burma and escalating with increasing fervour, the incidents presented in this report are an aspect of the widespread and systematic arbitrary detention of civilians by the SAC, who often entangle the lines between civilians, political enemies and military targets. Under detention, whether held temporarily at checkpoints or confined in prisons, villagers are at grave risk of ill-treatment and torture. Even detention in one’s home can involve beatings, intimidation, and other torturous violence. The scale of the abuse of power by the SAC against civilians demonstrates their confidence in their own impunity.
Torture is defined under international law as any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person to obtain information from them or a third party, to punish for an act committed, or suspected of having committed, to intimidate, coerce, or for any reason based on discrimination.[47] The protection against torture and inhuman or degrading treatment is an absolute human right which upholds the individual’s right to the protection of his or her dignity and integrity, enshrined in Article 5 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).[48] In the incidents detailed in this briefing paper, the SAC tortured villagers to extract information about local armed resistance attacks or activities, and punish villagers accused of being affiliated with or supporting local PDFs. Other incidents also included in this briefing paper as evidence encompass violence and ill-treatment at the hands of the Burma Army.
Under international human rights law, these incidents evidence many violations of the 1948 UDHR,[49] including violations of villagers’ right to life, liberty and security, freedom from torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment, freedom from arbitrary arrest or detention, and freedom of movement.[50] The prohibition is further recalled by other universal and regional conventions.[51]
Even though Burma is not a signatory to the 1984 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment, as one of the most universally recognised human rights, the prohibition of torture has acquired status of customary international law, thus creating an obligation erga omnes, owed to and by all states, to act against those who torture, even if a state has not ratified the relevant treaty.[52] Moreover, under international humanitarian law (IHL), the targeting of civilians violates the fundamental principle of distinction between civilian and military targets in the conduct of hostilities, as enshrined in Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, Articles 27 and 32 of the Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilians, and reaffirmed in Rule 1 of the ICRC Commentary of Customary IHL.[53] Any violation of these rights is qualified as a grave breach, allowing universal jurisdiction to bring the perpetrators to justice.[54] As further stated by Rule 90 of the ICRC Commentary, torture is prohibited in non-international armed conflicts, such as that occurring in Southeast Burma.[55] Moreover, Rule 156 of the ICRC Commentary qualifies torture as conduct that endangers protected persons and violates important values, such as by subjecting persons to humiliating treatment or forcing persons to undertake work that directly helps military operations of the enemy, as constituting war crimes.[56]
Under international criminal law, exemplified by Article 8(2)(c)(i) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,[57] torture as a war crime in a non-international armed conflict needs to meet the requirement of the 1984 Convention Against Torture: i) the instrumental purpose of the criminal act, and ii) the act of torture must be committed by, or with the involvement, of a person in a position of authority (public official, de facto organ of a state, or other non-private capacity).[58] The SAC’s acts of torture against civilians for their alleged participation in or support of armed resistance groups meet the requirements to be qualified as war crimes. Torture may also constitute a crime against humanity under Article 7(1)(f) and, residually, (k) of the Rome Statute, when is committed as part of a widespread and systematic attack on a civilian population.[59] Notably, torture as a crime against humanity does not require an instrumental purpose, as the degree of aggression upon personal dignity and integrity is sufficient to make it a matter of international concern. Some of the incidents which occurred in the context of detention by the SAC may not have involved this purposive intent, but given their frequency and systematic nature, they may nevertheless amount to crimes against humanity.
5. Recommendations
For international stakeholders, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and regional and foreign governments:
Acknowledge the serious crimes committed by the Burma Army leaders and avoid endorsing or legitimising the State Administration Council (SAC). This includes refraining from entering into agreements with them, granting them official recognition, and inviting them to participate in international forums and functions. Support local civil society and community-based organisations (CSO/CBOs) and ethnic service providers that prioritise human rights, and work with them to strengthen support systems for victims. Support local CSOs/CBOs to expand psychological support programmes -in all ethnic regions and languages- for survivors, their families, and the communities to help them cope with trauma, uncertainty and fear. Listen to and support local and civil society organisations in their efforts to document arbitrary detention and torture in Southeast Burma, advocate for victims’ rights, and provide comprehensive support to ensure the safety and protection of witnesses who come forward to testify about arbitrary arrest, detention, and torture. This support should include relocation, psychosocial support, legal aid, and financial assistance. Support efforts to hold the Burma Army leaders accountable for their vast array of crimes in impartial and independent courts, including the International Criminal Court (ICC), International Court of Justice (ICJ), and foreign national courts with universal jurisdiction. Broaden the scope of international investigations to include torture and arbitrary detention faced by civilians residing in Southeast Burma. Raise international awareness of the crimes of torture and arbitrary detention in rural Southeast Burma and explore actionable measures to deter and address the occurrence of these crimes.
Footnotes:
[1] On February 1st 2021, the Burma (Myanmar) military deposed the democratically elected government led by the National League for Democracy (NLD). The military transferred power to Min Aung Hlaing, the Commander-in-Chief of Burma’s Armed Forces. Based on unproven fraud allegations, the Burma military invalidated the landslide victory of the NLD in the November 2020 General Election and stated it would hold new elections at the end of the state of emergency. Elected President Win Myint and State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi were detained, along with ministers, their deputies and members of Parliament.
[2] In 1989, the then-ruling military regime changed the name of the country from Burma to Myanmar without consultation from the people. KHRG prefers the use of Burma because it is more typically used by villagers, and since the name change to Myanmar is reflective of the military regime’s longstanding abuse of power.
[3] The terms Burma military, Burma Army, and SAC are used interchangeably throughout this report to describe Burma’s armed forces. Villagers themselves commonly use Burma Army, Burmese soldiers, or alternatively the name adopted by the Burma military regime at the time -since the 2021 coup, the State Administration Council (SAC).
[4] The State Administration Council (SAC) is the executive governing body created in the aftermath of the February 1st 2021 military coup. It was established by Senior General Min Aung Hlaing on February 2nd 2021, and is composed of eight military officers and eight civilians. The chairperson serves as the de facto head of government of Burma (Myanmar) and leads the Military Cabinet of Burma, the executive branch of the government.
[5] Karen State, defined locally, includes the following areas: Kayin State, Tanintharyi Region and parts of Mon State and Bago Region. Karen State, located in Southeastern Burma, is primarily inhabited by ethnic Karen people. Most of the Karen population resides in the largely rural areas of Southeast Burma, living alongside other ethnic groups, including Bamar, Shan, Mon and Pa’Oh.
[6] The present document is based on information received from February 2023 to February 2024. It was provided by community members in six out of seven districts of Karen State who have been trained by KHRG to monitor human rights conditions on the ground. The names of the victims, their photos and the exact locations are censored for security reasons. The code names do not correspond to the actual names or to coding used by KHRG in previous reports.
[7] KHRG, Undeniable: War crimes, crimes against humanity and 30 years of villagers’ testimonies in rural Southeast Burma, December 2022.
[8] Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP Burma), ‘Political Prisoners Post-Coup’ monitoring as of 15th March 2024, available at: aappb.org/
[9] AAPP (Burma), Political Prisoners Experience in Interrogation, Judiciary, and Incarceration Since Burma’s Illegitimate Military Coup, March 2022, pp. 6-11 available at: aappb.org/?p=20734
[10] KHRG, Undeniable, above, December 2022.
[11] KHRG operates in seven areas in Southeast Burma: Doo Tha Htoo (Thaton), Taw Oo (Toungoo), Kler Lwee Htoo (Nyaunglebin), Mergui-Tavoy, Mu Traw (Hpapun) and Dooplaya and Hpa-an. When KHRG receives information from the field, it organises data according to these seven areas. These are commonly referred to as ‘districts’ and are used by the Karen National Union (KNU), as well as many local Karen organisations, both those affiliated and unaffiliated with the KNU. KHRG’s use of the district designations in reference to our research areas does not imply political affiliation; rather, it is rooted in the fact that many rural communities commonly use these designations. For clarity, the Burmese terms for these districts are provided in brackets but do not correspond with the Burma (Myanmar) government administrative divisions.
[12] For torture incidents committed by the People’s Defence Force (PDF) and Kawthoolei Army (KTLA), for instance, see: KHRG, In the Dark: The crime of enforced disappearance and its impact on the rural communities of Southeast Burma since the 2021 coup, November 2023, pp.32-33.
[13] KHRG, In the Dark, above, November 2023.
[14] The People’s Defence Force (PDF) is an armed resistance established independently as local civilian militias operating across the country. Following the February 1st 2021 military coup and the ongoing brutal violence enacted by the junta, the majority of these groups began working with the National Unity Government (NUG), a body claiming to be the legitimate government of Burma/Myanmar, which then formalised the PDF on May 5th 2021 as a precursor to a federal army.
[15] A Light Infantry Battalion (LIB) comprises 500 soldiers. Most Light Infantry Battalions in the Tatmadaw (or Burma Army) are under-strength with less than 200 soldiers, yet up-to-date information regarding the size of battalions is hard to come by, particularly following the signing of the National Ceasefire Agreement (NCA). LIBs are primarily used for offensive operations, but they are sometimes used for garrison duties.
[16] Unpublished report from Taw Oo District, received in March 2023.
[17] KHRG, In the Dark, above, p. 20
[18] ‘Saw’ is a male honorific title in S’Gaw Karen language used before a person’s name.
[19] A village tract is an administrative unit of between five and 20 villages in a local area, often centred on a large village.
[20] All conversion estimates for the kyat are based on the 18th March 2024 mid-market exchange rate of 1,000 kyat to USD 0.48 (taken from https://wise.com/gb/currency-converter/mmk-to-usd-rate).
[21] Unpublished report from Kler Lwee Htoo District, received in August 2023.
[22] ‘U is a Burmese male honorific title used before a person’s name.
[23] Unpublished report from Dooplaya District, received in September 2023.
[24] ‘Ko’ is a Burmese title meaning older brother. It can be used for relatives as well as non-relatives.
[25] An Infantry Battalion (IB) comprises 500 soldiers. However, most Infantry Battalions in the Tatmadaw are under-strength with less than 200 soldiers. Yet up to date information regarding the size of battalions is hard to come by, particularly following the signing of the NCA. They are primarily used for garrison duty but are sometimes used in offensive operations.
[26] Yaba, which means ‘crazy medicine’ in Thai, is a tablet form of methamphetamine. Introduced to East Asia during World War II to enhance soldiers’ performance, methamphetamine has become increasingly popular in Thailand, Laos, Cambodia Vietnam, and in Burma where it is typically manufactured; see “Yaba, the ‘crazy medicine’ of East Asia” UNODC, May 2008 and KHRG, “Chapter: Drug production, use and the social impacts in Southeast Myanmar since the January 2012 ceasefire,” in Truce or Transition: Trends in human rights abuse and local response in Southeast Myanmar since the 2012 ceasefire, June 2014.
[27] Unpublished report from Mergui-Tavoy District, received in November 2023.
[28] ‘Maung’ is a Burmese male honorific title used before a person’s name.
[29] The Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) is the armed wing of the Karen National Union (KNU).
[30] The term Kawthoolei (or Kaw Thoo Lei) refers to Karen State as demarcated by the Karen National Union (KNU), but the exact meaning and etymology is disputed; see: Jonathan Falla, True Love and Bartholomew: Rebels on the Burmese Border, Cambridge University Press: 1991.
[31] Unpublished report from Mu Traw District, received in January 2024.
[32] Unpublished report from Mu Traw District, received in January 2024.
[33] KHRG, In the Dark, above, p. 29.
[34] Unpublished report from Mergui-Tavoy District, received in September 2023.
[35] Unpublished report from Taw Oo District, received in April 2023.
[36] Unpublished report from Mergui-Tavoy District, received in June 2023
[37] In 1994, the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA) split from the KNLA over religious considerations. In 2010, the majority of DKBA troops transformed into BGFs, but one faction refused and changed its name to Democratic Karen Benevolent Army in 2012. In 2015, the DKBA Splinter Group split from this faction and reclaimed their original name, Democratic Karen Buddhist Army. It is active in Mu Traw (Hpapun) and Hpa-an districts, and it has not signed the NCA.
[38] KHRG, “Doo Tha Htoo District Incident Report: A DKBA operation commander tortured three villagers in Hpa-an Township (August 2023)”, December 2023.
[39] ‘Naw’ is a female honorific title in S’Gaw Karen language used before a person’s name.
[40] Unpublished report from Mu Traw District, received in November 2023.
[41] Unpublished report from Doo Tha Htoo District, received in July 2023.
[42] Since February 2021, KHRG has received at least 22 reports containing evidence of SAC soldiers using human shields, involving more than 564 villagers. See: KHRG, Shadow of Death: Use of civilians as human shields by the State Administration Council (SAC) in Southeast Burma since the coup, July 2023.
[43] A Light Infantry Division (LID) of the Tatmadaw is commanded by a brigadier general, and consists of ten light infantry battalions specially trained in counter-insurgency, jungle warfare, search and destroy operations against ethnic insurgents . They were first incorporated into the Tatmadaw in 1966. LIDs are organised under three Tactical Operations Commands, commanded by a colonel, three battalions each and one reserve, one field artillery battalion, one armoured squadron and other support units. Each division is directly under the command of the Chief of Staff (Army).
[44] KHRG, “Kler Lwee Htoo District Incident Report: Villagers arrested as human shields, and shelling and looting by the SAC in Moo Township, March 2023, October 2023”.
[45] The Kaw Thoo Lei Army (KTLA) was founded on July 17th 2022 by Brigadier-General Nerdah Bo Mya. Nerdah Bo Mya, former Commander-In-Chief of the Karen National Defence Organisation (KNDO), was dismissed by the KNU in 2022. KTLA operates in two districts in Southeast Burma, in KNU-controlled areas, namely Mergui-Tavoy and Dooplaya districts. In Dooplaya District, they operate in alliance with resistance armed groups. KTLA battalions in Mergui-Tavoy District are in conflict with both SAC and KNLA troops.
[46] Unpublished report from Mergui-Tavoy District, received in July 2023.
[47] 1984 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Article 1
[48] 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), Article 5.
[49] 1948 United Nations Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)
[50] 1948 United Nations Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), Article 3, Article 5, Article 9, Article 13.
[51] 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Article 7; and 2012 ASEAN Human Rights Declaration, Art 14
[52] 1984 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment (‘Convention Against Torture’).
[53] The 1949 Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols, Common Article 3: ‘Conflicts not of an international character’; Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. Geneva, 12 August 1949, Article 27 and Article 32; ICRC, Customary IHL Database Rule 1: The Principle of Distinction between Civilians and Combatants,
[54] 1949 Geneva Convention (IV), Article 146 and Article 147
[55] ICRC, Customary IHL Database Rule 90: Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment.
[56] ICRC, Customary IHL Database Rule 156: Definition of War Crimes.
[57] 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Article 7(2)(i).
[58] 1984 Convention Against Torture, Article 1
[59] 1998 Rome Statute, Article 7(1)(f) and (k)..."
Source/publisher:
Karen Human Rights Group
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-29
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Armed conflict in Burma - attacks on civilians, Reporting torture: resources, Human Rights and international relations
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Sub-title:
Increased violence would be costly for all parties
Description:
"Recent battlefield gains by Myanmar's resistance forces indicate that the military regime which seized power in February 2021 is on the defensive.
Earlier this month, the junta lost control of Myawaddy, a trading center along the Thai border. Resistance groups also carried out drone strikes against targets in Naypyidaw, the capital, as well as the Defense Services Academy, near Mandalay.
It is an appropriate time then to assess Western support for Myanmar's resistance.
The conflict has strengthened ethnic armed groups, many of which were formed decades ago and are more ethnonationalist than democratic. How to handle these groups is a key issue for Washington, which is on the verge of implementing aid policies that risk exacerbating lethal divisions rather than promoting democracy.
The U.S. cannot bet on the collapse of the military regime, which continues to control major population centers. Yet it has held back from offering military assistance to the resistance, especially after Washington's unproductive experience in Syria's civil war. But the terms on which Washngton is offering nonlethal aid in Myanmar risk creating the outcome it has been seeking to avoid.
A $1.2 trillion funding package passed by the U.S. Congress last month raised this fiscal year's appropriation for Myanmar by 23% to $167 million. The expanded sum includes $75 million for cross-border aid and $25 million for nonlethal support to ethnic armed organizations and People's Defense Forces fighting the regime.
Washington has been here before. The language used in the appropriation was taken from a previous funding authorization relating to Syria, where nonlethal aid included body armor and intelligence about enemy troop positions. That appropriation led eventually to the covert deployment of lethal equipment.
The immediate impact of the U.S. move will be to irritate Myanmar's neighbors, who will see it as an intensification of American involvement in the conflict.
China has been hedging its bets by supporting both the military regime and several armed groups along the border. India and Thailand have also accepted military rule while allowing weapons and fighters to flow over their borders. None of them wishes to see greater U.S. entanglement.
Implementing the nonlethal aid program will cause headaches for U.S. bureaucrats too. While the U.S. is ideologically driven to support democracies overseas, it is understood now in Washington that Myanmar is more complicated than it appeared when democratic leader Aung San Suu Kyi drove the international narrative.
The most powerful armed groups are organized along ethnic lines, entrenching long-standing differences about how to carve up Myanmar's territory.
Alongside them are People's Defense Force groups, formed by urban youth in response to the regime's brutal crackdown on street protests and strikes. They started with no arms or military training and have been able to wage conventional warfare only with the aid of the ethnic armies.
In the northwestern Sagaing region, where government forces recently have lost ground, every major assault on urban areas has been led by or involved significant participation by the Kachin Independence Army, the Chin National Defense Force or the All Burma Students' Democratic Front, which was formed after a 1988 uprising.
The U.S. has taken note, and in an unprecedented public acknowledgement of engagement with the resistance, State Department Counselor Derek Chollet announced on social media platform X last month that he had met with the leaders of a coalition of armed Karen, Kachin, Karenni and Chin groups and had offered congratulations on their "extraordinary efforts to pursue a federal democracy in Burma."
It is tempting for Washington to anoint the ethnic armed organizations as the new heroes of Myanmar. But the blood and soil nationalism that motivates them bears little resemblance to the Enlightenment values that are the pillars of the American republic.
Even in aiming to counter Chinese influence in Myanmar, such U.S. support is unlikely to make much difference given that Beijing is providing arms to both sides.
The armed ethnic groups vary in their allegiance to democratic norms and the level of internal democracy within their ranks. But the harsh reality is that Myanmar is moving toward ethnic cantonization.
The National Unity Government, a pro-democratic front largely operating from exile, has played a role in diplomacy and coalition building, but within Myanmar has had to rely mostly on the might of ethnic armies. Any peace settlement will have to reflect this balance of forces, which is likely to lead to the creation of ethnically based local administrations.
It is not in the interest of the U.S. or of Myanmar for Washington to increase the level of violence by bolstering armed groups engaged in combat. Nor would the U.S. benefit from trying to goad China deeper into the fighting.
While most of Southeast Asia gains from playing off China against the U.S., the most likely outcome in Myanmar would be more violence and death, creating the conditions for perpetual war. Some argue that splitting the country into many parts offers the best hope of a lasting peace, but recent violence between rival local councils in Chin state shows that division along ethnic lines is likely to lead to fresh complications.
The hard fact is that this is not a conflict susceptible to quick and easy solutions, and any U.S. attempt to determine outcomes is likely to fail. Washington should spend its increased appropriation for Myanmar on humanitarian assistance and strengthening civil society, not supporting more fighting..."
Source/publisher:
Nikkei Asian Review
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-29
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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Sub-title:
Exploring the historical nexus between Cox’s Bazar and the Rohingya
Description:
"While classical literature extensively documents the historical trajectory of Cox's Bazar, contemporary discourse often overlooks its intrinsic association with the Rohingya refugees. It is pertinent to acknowledge that the annals of Cox's Bazar are inherently intertwined with the Rohingya narrative.
The incursion of Burmese forces into Arakan in 1784 precipitated a mass exodus of Rohingya and Rakhine ethnic communities towards the Ramu region (present day Cox’s Bazar), marking the inaugural instance of refugee influx into Cox's Bazar. Subsequently, in response to this humanitarian crisis, the British colonial administration dispatched Captain Hiram Cox to facilitate the settlement of displaced Rohingya and Rakhine ethnic people, in 1798.
The eponymous nomenclature "Cox's Bazar" thus derives from Captain Hiram Cox, symbolizing the historical intervention undertaken to address the exigencies of displaced refugees.
Prior to the year 1784, the geographical region presently identified as Cox's Bazar Sadar -- inclusive of its municipal boundaries -- alongside the Ukhiya and Teknaf sub-districts wherein contemporary refugee settlements are positioned, exhibited a notable absence of substantive human habitation. This area was characterized by sparse population density, with only a limited number of individuals inhabiting the territory corresponding to the current Ramu and Chakaria sub-district.
It is to be noted that the territorial expanse comprising the entirety of the Chittagong Division, encompassing Chittagong, Cox's Bazar, Rangamati, Bandarban, Khagrachhari, Feni, Lakshmipur, Comilla, Noakhali, Brahmanbaria, and Chandpur districts, along with the present-day Rakhine State, was historically under the jurisdiction of Arakan -- an autonomous domain distinct from Myanmar and Bengal.
The settlement and agricultural development of the entire Cox's Bazar district and the present-day Rakhine State of Myanmar were undertaken by the antecedents of the Rohingya populace. The vast tracts of land in these regions were previously uncultivated and sparsely inhabited. Following the Anglo-Burmese war in 1824 and with the implementation of British legislation such as the Waste Land Rules of 1839, 1941, 1863, and 1865, a substantial influx of individuals migrated to these areas with the intention of establishing residence and cultivation.
This phenomenon bears resemblance to the governmental policies of both Pakistan and Bangladesh, wherein efforts were made to settle Bengali populations in the hill tracts of Bangladesh.
It is imperative to acknowledge that the initial arrival of Rohingyas in Cox's Bazar was contemporaneous with the displacement of Rakhine ethnic groups, who were compelled to flee persecution stemming from the Burmese invasion. The vestiges of this historical displacement are discernible in the Burmese market locale within Cox's Bazar city, serving as a poignant testament to the shared heritage and collective tribulations endured by diverse communities in the region.
Prior to the year 1784, the geographical region presently identified as Cox's Bazar Sadar exhibited a notable absence of substantive human habitation
Rohingya ethnogenesis
The Rohingya populace residing in the Arakan region is discerned as a distinctive nation or ethnicity, emanating from the amalgamation of disparate cultures, races, and societal vicissitudes over an extensive historical continuum spanning millennia. The Rohingya ethnic identity is the product of a heterogeneous confluence of migratory movements and cultural amalgamations.
This amalgamation encompasses the historical influx of Arab traders and religious emissaries during the 7th to 9th centuries, Bengali migrants in the 15th century, Indian settlers during the 17th and 19th centuries, in addition to subsequent waves of Bengali, Chittagonian, and individuals from Portuguese, Moorish, Persian, Mughal, and Pathan backgrounds at various junctures in history. The Rohingya are recognized as indigenous owing to their possession of distinctive cultural mores, traditions, and values, which underpin their self-identification as a discrete socio-cultural entity. Despite their minority status within the national context, they persist as a coherent ethnic group within their domicile.
The Rohingya population is deemed indigenous based on their preservation of distinctive cultural traditions, customs, and values, which distinguishes them as a separate entity within their nation, thereby meeting the criteria for indigenous status within contemporary anthropological discourse.
People of Chittagong and Cox’s Bazar
It is of scholarly interest to highlight those elderly inhabitants, specially who are aged 70 years and older, within the regions of Cox’s Bazar and Chittagong, exhibit a tendency to eschew the usage of the term "Rohingya" when referring to Rohingya refugees, preferring instead to employ the appellation "Burmaiya," signifying individuals originating from Burma/Myanmar.
One of the inclinations of this is that the senior citizens of Cox’s Bazar deemed themselves as Rohingya, ie the Rohingya citizen of Bangladesh and the refugees as the Rohingya citizen of Myanmar. It implies that the ethnicity is the same while their citizenships are different. One might argue, but there are some differences when it comes to language and culture. As we all know, language and culture evolve over a period of time. We don’t speak the same as we spoke, eg 20 years ago. Many of the terminologies have been incorporated in our culture due to cultural intermingling.
As someone rooted in rural life of Cox’s Bazar and Chittagong and exposed to various societal strata through familial and professional connections, I've observed striking parallels between the linguistic and cultural norms of marginalized communities in our villages and those of the Rohingya populace. While we've had opportunities for linguistic and cultural development, the Rohingya have faced constraints in this regard.
The linguistic discourse prevalent among marginalized communities and rural agrarians in our villages three decades prior bears remarkable resemblance to the contemporary linguistic vernacular of the Rohingya populace
The linguistic discourse prevalent among marginalized communities and rural agrarians in our villages three decades prior bears remarkable resemblance to the contemporary linguistic vernacular of the Rohingya populace, while the cultural paradigms embraced by the Rohingya community conspicuously parallel to those espoused within our societal milieu of three decades past.
While we've had the opportunity to develop our language and culture over time, through education, exposure to media like Bollywood and Hollywood, and the incorporation of new words and cultures, the Rohingya have not had the same chances. That's the fundamental difference I've noticed.
Historically, all countries in the world have borders with the same ethnic groups living on both sides of the border and Rohingya is no exception. Only difference is some Rohingya are Burmese by nationality, and some are Bangladeshi. The indigenous population of the Naga community residing within the territorial confines of India is recognized as Kachin within the borders of Myanmar, whereas the Indian Mijo ethnic group is designated as Chin within the corresponding geographical domain of Myanmar. Similarly, the autochthonous Shaan populace of Myanmar is denominated as Thai within the boundaries of Thailand.
Those individuals acknowledged as Rakhine within the Rakhine State are identified by the appellations Mogh within the regions of Cox’s Bazar and Chittagong, and alternatively referred to as Marma within the Chittagong Hill Tracts. Although the Durand Line delineates the demarcation between Pakistan and Afghanistan, it fails to segregate the Pashtun ethnicity across both nations, thereby preserving their ethnic identity notwithstanding the divergence in citizenship status. While national borders may be imposed to define the territorial sovereignty of individual states, the intrinsic ethnicity, along with its consequent ethnic affiliations and interrelations, persist beyond such delineations..."
Source/publisher:
Dhaka Tribune
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-28
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Arakan (Rakhine) State - reports etc. by date (latest first), Human Rights and international relations, Discrimination against the Rohingya, Burmese refugees in Bangladesh
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