Human Rights and international relations
Individual Documents
Description:
"Format: Infographic..."
Source/publisher:
CCCM Cluster, UN High Commissioner for Refugees
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-05
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Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Food Security and nutrition in Burma/Myanmar, Education in Burma/Myanmar - general, Public Health, Human Rights and international relations
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"According to recent monitoring of landmine and explosive remnants of war (ERW) incidents in the first six months of 2024, a total of 692 casualties have been reported nationwide. This figure already represents 66% of the total casualties reported in 2023, which were 1,052.
Delving into the regional breakdown, Shan State recorded the highest number of casualties, accounting for 24% of the total. Sagaing Region and Rakhine State followed with 17% and 12%, respectively. The remaining regions of the country collectively accounted for 47% of the total casualties.
Children constitute 32% of the total casualties arising from landmine and ERW explosions across the country. It is important to note that these figures only reflect civilian casualties..."
Source/publisher:
UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) (Myanmar) via Reliefweb (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-05
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Individual Documents
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"Human Rights Violations took place in States and Regions from July 22 to 31, 2024
Military Junta Troop launched airstrikes and dropped bombs in Sagaing Region, Magway Region, Tanintharyi Region, Mandalay Region, Shan State, and Rakhine State from July 22nd to 31st. The Military Junta Ships attacked with heavy artillery to the villages along the Chindwin River in Monywa Township, Sagaing Region. Prisoners from Insein Prison, Yangon Region, and Kyaiksagaw Prison, Bago Region, got Seasonal Diarrhea Disease and needed medical care. The Military the Minister of Labor gave directions to give fines to the agencies that do not provide the personal details of the coworkers and to send the people to Thailand when they show the papers that give the 25% of their tax fees that must be given to Myanmar.
Around 50 civilians died, and nearly 70 were injured by the Military’s heavy and light artillery attacks within a week. A civilian also died by the landmine of the Military Junta Troop..."
Source/publisher:
Network for Human Rights Documentation-Burma
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-03
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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1.43 MB 1.61 MB 708.46 KB
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Sub-title:
Despite the deteriorating security situation, junta chief Min Aung Hlaing remains committed to holding elections at some point next year.
Description:
"Myanmar’s military junta has once again extended its state of emergency for another six months, as resistance groups continue to make battlefield gains across the country.
According to state media reports, the decision was made at a meeting of the military-controlled National Defense and Security Council (NDSC) on Wednesday, at which coup leader Senior Gen. Min Aung Hlaing held fast to his previously announced plans to hold a multi-party election.
“Holding the election is a government’s vision which never changes. Hence, preparations are ongoing to hold an election,” the Global New Light of Myanmar paraphrased Min Aung Hlaing as saying. The junta leader told the NDSC that the extension was necessary in order to enact “security measures” and “continue the restoration of peace and stability across the nation.” According to other reports, he said that the military administration also needs time to carry out a pre-election census. The new phase of emergency rule is now due to expire at the end of January; Min Aung Hlaing announced in June that polls will be conducted sometime in 2025.
During the meeting, Min Aung Hlaing repeated his prior claims that the February 2021 coup was necessary due to pervasive “voting fraud” at the general election held in November 2020. (No evidence of extensive fraud has ever been adduced.)
Such extensions are supposed to be endorsed by the country’s president, but on July 22, Myanmar state media announced that acting President Myint Swe, who had served in the role since the coup on February 1, 2021 coup, had gone on medical leave, authorizing Min Aung Hlaing to carry out the presidential duties with the NDSC.
The extension of the state of emergency – the sixth since it was imposed following the military takeover – amounted to an admission that the armed forces do not exercise enough control to prepare for the elections that the junta intends as a transition back to a form of civilianized military rule. Indeed, over the past year – and since the most recent extensions of the state of emergency, in August 2023 and February of this year – the junta’s battlefield fortunes have gone from bad to worse.
In late October, the Three Brotherhood Alliance of ethnic armed groups launched Operation 1027, a sweeping offensive in northern Shan State along the country’s border with China.
The first phase of the offensive, which ended with a China-backed ceasefire deal in January, left the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) and Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), two members of the Alliance, in control of large swathes of territory in Shan State, including numerous towns and several important border crossings with China. The most significant of these was the MNDAA’s reconquest of the ethnic Chinese-majority Kokang region, from which the military had expelled it in 2009. At the same time, the Arakan Army, the third member of the Alliance, scored remarkable successes against the Myanmar military in Rakhine State in Myanmar’s west.
After a five-month pause in fighting, the TNLA and MNDAA, backed by allied People’s Defense Forces (PDFs) and other anti-regime groups, opened the second phase of Operation 1027 in Shan State and Mandalay Region in late June. This saw the MNDAA launch attacks on Lashio, the largest city in northern Shan State where the military’s Northeast Regional Command is located, which is reportedly besieged and on the brink of defeat. Meanwhile, the TNLA this week announced the complete seizure of the town of Mongmit in Shan State, the third town that it claims to have captured since the second phase of the offensive began.
Addressing the NDSC yesterday, Min Aung Hlaing said that the MNDAA and TNLA had “violated the temporary ceasefire agreement” and vowed to continue efforts to “forge peace and stability” in northern Shan State and Mandalay Region.
These gains, and the prospect of a full collapse of the military position in northern Shan State, make any discussion of elections increasingly fantastical and detached from reality. While it is hard to gauge claims about which groups have effective control over which areas, it is clear that the junta probably would only be able to administer elections in a minority of the country, predominantly on the dry central plain and in the major cities like Yangon, Mandalay, and Naypyidaw. Whether such partial and illusory exercise would fulfill even the military’s minimal goal of resetting international expectations or disguising its rule in civilian guise, remains very much open to question..."
Source/publisher:
"The Diplomat" (Japan)
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-02
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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"ry base in Kokang region, on March 11, 2015. Stringer/Reuters
CNN
—
The pounding of sustained gunfire and artillery had rattled Khin Swe’s home in northeastern Myanmar for days, with shelling getting ever closer until it was impossible for her to remain.
“If I had stayed, I would have been dead by now because of artillery firing and airstrikes that were falling all over the town,” Khin Swe told CNN, using a pseudonym for security reasons.
“There was nothing we could do to be safe, except to run,” said the 28-year-old online sales rep.
Like many of the residents of Lashio, a major town of about 170,000 people nestled in the mountains of northern Shan state, Khin Swe packed what she could and fled.
Images published by local media in the past few weeks show a mass exodus from the town, with a long line of cars, trucks and bikes laden with belongings snaking through muddy, monsoon-lashed roads.
Since late June, a powerful ethnic rebel army and its allied resistance forces have mounted a renewed offensive to capture Lashio. The strategic garrison town, the largest in Shan state, is the seat of the junta’s regional Northeastern Military Command and the center of its power base in Myanmar’s northeast and areas near the Chinese border, with about 40 battalions under its command.
Myanmar has spiraled into a devastating civil conflict since the junta’s 2021 coup was overwhelmingly spurned by the people, as the military wages a ruthless war against a nationwide armed resistance determined to oust it from power.
On July 25, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), a rebel force of the ethnic Chinese Kokang minority, announced it had “won a decisive victory” against the junta and declared Lashio “fully liberated” following a 23-day operation.
If confirmed, the capture of Lashio would be the biggest victory for the resistance since the coup and mark a turning point in the three-year civil war that has been characterized by increasingly brutal attacks against civilians by junta soldiers and warplanes, and the mass displacement of more than 3 million people.
Junta spokesperson Maj. Gen. Zaw Min Tun has repeatedly denied that the town and the regional command has been captured, calling the claims “propaganda.” The junta said the rebel group has “devastated civilians’ areas [rather] than military strategic holds.”
Video and images posted to social media and on the MDNAA’s accounts in recent days appeared to show their troops in central Lashio, including at the railway station, prison and a broadcast station, and within hundreds of meters of core military infrastructure.
CNN cannot independently verify the claims from either side.
Analysts say the situation remains fluid and while the rebel group is quickly moving through the town, capturing several battalions especially to the south of the city, fighting is ongoing.
“That sort of position in the very middle of Lashio certainly points toward significant gains within the city,” said Nathan Ruser, an analyst at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, who has been mapping positions of the resistance in Lashio.
For Lashio to fall, “it basically eliminates the junta as an effective organized force from a huge part of the country,” Ruser said. “And for it to appear to be happening after only about a month of clashes shows how much the capabilities of the junta have declined in the last year especially.”
Caught in the crossfire
Khin Swe said Lashio’s residents were used to the sounds of fighting nearby but not within the city itself.
“Artillery shelling was fired constantly at night over the town. With our phones in our hands to keep updated with the news, we all sat anxiously. Some nights, I didn’t dare to sleep as shells roared overhead. At some point I fell asleep and was woken up by the sound of the loud artillery again,” she said. “It was the scariest moment I have ever experienced in my life.”
The main forward part of the rebels’ assault had focused on the south and west of Lashio, with the MNDAA and its allies targeting the LIB 507 military base before entering the town and clearing it street by street, analysts and residents told CNN.
Khin Swe, whose home was close to the base, described how shelling started near her part of town but had grown in intensity in other areas as the military’s soldiers exchanged fire with the rebels.
She escaped to Myanmar’s second-biggest city Mandalay, a six-hour drive away in normal conditions. Bus fares leaving the city had skyrocketed, she said, as droves of people tried to flee.
Some of her family members decided to stay in Lashio to protect their homes and businesses. Before phone lines got cut off, Khin Swe said her relatives “saw Kokang troops move into the town and position themselves in empty buildings, while they urged the people to leave.”
“I am sure my home has been wrecked, but we can’t reach out to people who are left in the town because the phone connection is cut off,” she said. “My friend who had stayed in the town until very recently told me that most of the houses have been damaged.”
Being among many people displaced by war in Mandalay, Khin Swe said she and her family “are barely surviving.”
“The displacement shelters are full up with the entire population of Lashio town, some of us are struggling to find a place to live. Besides, we don’t have food to eat either,” she said. “Our family could not take some valuable items other than some money, and now we are living with more than 30 people in a place we rented.”
Other Lashio residents caught in the crossfire have written desperate messages for help on local community and neighborhood Facebook groups.
“There are children and elderly being caught in a high school amid crossfire in Lashio, they have not eaten the whole day, I don’t know how to help,” one social media user posted.
“We are a group of three girls with a 70-year-old grandma, we want to leave the town either for Taunggyi or Mandalay, but we are struggling with how,” another resident posted, leaving her phone number.
One man who spoke to CNN by phone said he fled Lashio at 4 a.m. last Friday as heavy fire raged overhead. “We left the town with a bunch of people by truck. The road on the way was badly damaged,” he said as he traveled to Taunggyi, the Shan state capital some nine hours south of Lashio.
The fighting, which has extended across Shan state and the neighboring Mandalay region has forced thousands of civilians to flee – many of them multiple times – often to towns and villages also facing a barrage of junta airstrikes and shelling.
The deteriorating humanitarian crisis is being exacerbated by a lack of food and aid, with local community networks risking their lives to reach those in need.
Coordination of anti-coup resistance
Rebels have reportedly seized dozens of junta bases and several northern towns since a renewed offensive in late June by the Three Brotherhood Alliance, a trio of ethnic armed groups fighting alongside the People’s Defence Force (PDF), the armed wing of the national unity government in exile.
The gains for the rebel alliance – made up of the MNDAA, the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and the Arakan Army – followed the collapse of a Chinese-brokered ceasefire, according to local media and resistance groups.
Last week, the TNLA said it had captured another strategic town in the Mandalay region – Mogok, the center of Myanmar’s lucrative gem mining industry.
Analysts say resistance forces now control many of the roads to Lashio and other key towns in the northeast, preventing the military from resupplying soldiers in its peripheral outposts.
“They’re unable to push forces up because all the roads are controlled by the opposition, so they have a hard time sending reinforcements,” said Miemie Winn Byrd, a retired US Army Lt. Col. and professor at the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies.
Since October, the military has been weakened by a series of territorial losses, troop defections, desertions and loss of manpower. Endemic corruption and poor command within its ranks mean the junta leadership may not have a clear idea of the situation on the ground across the country, including in Lashio, analysts say.
“Because of the corruption, Naypyidaw does not know how many forces it has… they have had a lot of desertions and defections that are going unreported,” Byrd said. “I’m not sure (junta chief) Min Aung Hlaing knows that that city has fallen into the hands of the opposition. I’m not sure his people are telling him that.”
Last week, the junta reportedly replaced the head of the northeast command. There were also reports in local media that the junta had ordered its staff to leave Lashio as fighting got closer. CNN cannot independently verify these claims.
In a recent address, junta spokesperson Zaw Min Tun appeared to counter claims of a weakened military, which he referred to by its local name, the Tatmadaw.
“As long as Myanmar exists, the Tatmadaw will exist. As long as we exist, Myanmar will live even stronger because we will safeguard your lives and your properties. Therefore, you all must work hand in hand to defend your country,” he said.
The anti-coup resistance in Myanmar was once considered a loose grouping of ill-equipped fighters, but recent successes, including the MNDAA’s push into Lashio, has shown a new level of coordination and capability, according to analysts.
“This phase of Operation 1027 has really shown a new level of interoperability and coordination between the ethnic resistance organizations and the political PDF resistance,” said Ruser, referring to the Three Brotherhood Alliance’s name for its ongoing offensive.
“Given the sort of snowballing gains by the resistance, and especially the Three Brotherhood Alliance over the last six to eight months, they’re now a really equipped force. They have artillery, they have plenty of drones, they have all sorts of capabilities that now allow them to really strike apart at qualified and static positions.”
For Khin Swe, the fighting in Lashio has left people divided.
“Chinese people in the town and young people who are in support of revolution are largely in favor of the Kokang group while the older generation, who don’t want war, blame the Kokang for their territorial invasion [and] are in support of the military,” she said.
Khin Swe said she is “saddened to see the destruction” in her hometown but she supports the “revolutionary groups defeating the junta.”
“I am happy and sad at the same time because I don’t know how we will rebuild our home. But the news of Lashio being captured gives us hope that one day in the near future we can go back home,” she said..."
Source/publisher:
"CNN" (USA)
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-02
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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"Former Karen National Union Vice President Naw Zipporah Sein Passes Away.....NUG Prime Minister Mahn Winn
Khaing Thann Emphasizes Administrative Preparedness Amid
Expanding Territorial Control.....NUG Human Rights Minister
U Aung Myo Min Highlights Junta’s Decline at Philippine Conference......NUG Human Rights Minister U Aung Myo Min Urges Philippine Support for Myanmar
Democracy Movement.....NUG Ministry of Health Urges Participation in
Spring Health Heroes Program.....NUG Ministry of Education
Extends University Admission Deadline.....PDF Forces Capture Military
Council Base in Inn Nat Village.....NUG Ministry of Defense Congratulates
P29999/Special Operations Force on 3rd Anniversary.....NUG Ministry of Women, Youth and Children Affairs Issues Condolence Message
for Naw Zipporah Sein...."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-02
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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pdf
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3.89 MB
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Description:
"Weekly Update of National unity Government ( 31 / 2024 )..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-02
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations, National Unity Government (NUG)
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4.4 MB
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Description:
"Format: Map.....Theme: Protection and Human Rights.....Language:
English..."
Source/publisher:
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (Geneva) via Reliefweb (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-01
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
UNHCR (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees), Burma: Internal displacement/forced migration of several ethnic groups., Human Rights and international relations
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pdf
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974.18 KB
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"Walking back his vow to hold a nationwide election, junta boss Min Aung Hlaing said during the National Defense and Security Council (NDSC) meeting on Wednesday that elections would be held first in areas where it is safe to do so while his regime tries to bring “stability and security” to conflict zones.
The junta boss added that his troops would bring “peace and stability” to Lashio, Nawnghkio, Kyaukme, Hsipaw and Mogoke—areas where his troops have recently suffered humiliating defeats, including the losses of several major bases and towns, to ethnic armies and their allies.
He insisted that after seizing power on Feb. 1, 2021, his regime had planned to hold a nationwide election when the initial two-year state of emergency expired. Hostilities hindered the regime’s plan to return to democracy while forcing an extension of the state of emergency, he said.
During the civil war in the early 1950s, a general election was held over seven months between June 1951 and April 1952 due to armed conflicts.
Nationwide general elections were held in 1990, 2010, 2015 and 2020. But after losing vast swathes of territory in northern Shan State and Rakhine State and with unrest ongoing in many parts of the country, the regime has been left with no option but to hold the election in stages.
At an NDSC meeting in January 2023, Min Aung Hlaing said his regime had complete control over only 198 of 330 townships in the country, and that it needed to improve security in 132 townships.
That was before the Brotherhood Alliance of three ethnic armed organizations launched its large-scale offensive, Operation 1027, which has seen the regime lose dozens of towns in northern Shan State. One of the three alliance members, the Arakan Army, has seized more than half of Rakhine State in western Myanmar.
The junta’s loss of territory is not limited to Shan and Rakhine, however. It has also ceded territory in other ethnic states including Kachin. Recently, it lost two towns in Mandalay Region, home to the second-largest city in Myanmar.
Even as the regime was holding the NDSC meeting on Wednesday to extend the state of emergency for a sixth time, allied anti-regime groups continued their attacks on junta positions in northern Shan State, seizing almost total control of Lashio, where the regime’s Northeastern Command is based.
Nearly 70 towns have fallen into the hands of anti-regime groups since the beginning of Operation 1027 in October last year, which would reduce the 198 townships under junta control claimed by the junta chief to around 130. Furthermore, the junta’s administrative mechanism is not fully functional in some of the areas it claims to control.
Observers doubt the regime has the capacity even to conduct the population census needed to compile voter lists, let alone a nationwide poll.
Min Aung Hlaing earlier said a poll would be held next year after a census scheduled for October. Observers say polls are highly unlikely except in Naypyitaw, Yangon and Mandalay, and in large towns in other regions and states.
At the NDSC meeting on Wednesday, Min Aung Hlaing said his regime would never give up on its objective of holding an election.
After being extended by six more months on Wednesday, emergency rule is now due to expire at the end of January 2025. If Min Aung Hlaing returns power to the NDSC then, it is constitutionally required to organize polls within six months..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-01
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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"July 31 (Reuters) - Myanmar's embattled military government extended a state of emergency on Wednesday for another six months, state media said, as the junta struggles to maintain its grip on power with fighting flaring on multiple fronts and the economy in crisis.
Army-run Myawaddy media said the military-controlled National Defence and Security Council extended emergency rule to give the junta more time to put together population data for voter lists. The junta has said it will hold an election next year.
The military put the country under emergency rule for a year when it took power in a February 2021 coup, deposing the elected civilian government of Aung San Suu Kyi and triggering nationwide street protests that it violently crushed.
The junta has since extended that every six months, as the protest movement morphed into an armed rebellion that has widened and is now posing an existential threat to the generals.
"It is necessary to restore peace and stability because of ongoing terrorist activities," state-run media said of the latest extension, referring to the armed resistance.
Last week, all responsibilities of Myanmar's figurehead president were handed over to junta chief Min Aung Hlaing, after the nominal head of state was placed on medical leave due to a prolonged illness.
Min Aung Hlaing has repeatedly promised to hold a multi-party election, with the general saying in June that polls will be conducted in 2025.
Previous election timelines have been postponed, citing the ongoing violence as the reason. Min Aung Hlaing has insisted the junta does not plan to hold power long.
The military took power after complaining of fraud in a November 2020 general election won overwhelmingly by Suu Kyi's party, which the party denied. Election monitoring groups found no evidence of mass fraud..."
Source/publisher:
"Reuters" (UK)
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-01
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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"The Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) says it has seized complete control of a third town, Mongmit, in northern Shan State following the resumption of Operation 1027 in late June.
The junta’s Infantry Battalion 276, Light Infantry Battalion 348, and a tactical command overseen by the Northern Command fell on Wednesday, TNLA spokesman Lwei Yay Oo told The Irrawaddy.
“We seized total control of Mongmit today,” she told The Irrawaddy on Wednesday. Details of casualties are still unknown, she said.
Mongmit is bordered by Mandalay Region’s Mogoke to the south, Namtu to the east, and the Irrawaddy River to the west.
The northern Shan State town of Namtu was captured by the TNLA during the first phase of Operation 1027 in December.
The TNLA together with People’s Defense Force groups under the command of the civilian National Unity Government (NUG) took complete control of ruby hub Mogoke in northern Mandalay Region last week on Wednesday.
Mongmit is located 46 km north of Mogoke.
The ethnic Kachin Independence Army (KIA) briefly occupied Mongmit in November, but the town was retaken by the regime.
The TNLA and allied groups have also captured Nawnghkio town in northern Shan State. They are now focusing their assault on junta positions in Kyaukme and Hsipaw.
Elsewhere, the KIA has also seized Mabein town, 57 km north of Mongmit.
Much of the Shweli River basin has now fallen into the hands of anti-regime groups.
Meanwhile, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, a TNLA ally, has seized almost complete control of Lashio, the capital of northern Shan State.
PDF groups have also seized Singu town in Mandalay Region and are now conducting an onslaught on junta positions in Madaya and Thabeikkyin just north of Mandalay City..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-01
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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"A convoy of reinforcements the junta sent to the northern Shan State capital Lashio retreated after suffering heavy losses in an early morning ambush by the Myanmar Nationalities Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) and its allies on Tuesday, according to resistance sources and Shan media.
The 30-truck convoy carrying an estimated 400 reinforcements was ambushed near Man Bang town, about 95 kilometers southeast of Lashio.
The reinforcements included young men who were forcibly drafted under the conscription law activated earlier this year, a military analyst close to resistance groups said.
Charred remains of junta troops are visible in a video showing MNDAA fighters inspecting the destroyed vehicles, some of which were still burning. The video has gone viral in Myanmar.
Reports said the convoy was led by Brigadier General Than Tun Aung, a commander of the junta’s Middle East Command based in Kholam town in southern Shan State. The convoy was ambushed while traveling to Lashio on the road between Tangyan and Nampawng towns.
“Eight military vehicles were destroyed or burned and up to 80 regime troops, including the brigadier general suffered injuries. The commander was sent back to Kholam and the other injured soldiers were treated in Tangyan town,” the military analyst told The Irrawaddy on Thursday.
It is now impossible for the junta to retake Lashio because it has to rely on a longer land route to supply and reinforce its troops in and around the city, the analyst said, noting that the MNDAA and its allies were fighting to take control of the city’s airport.
About 50 regime forces were killed in the ambush, according to Shan media reports citing troops on the ground.
The Brotherhood Alliance of three ethnic armies launched Operation 1027 in October last year. The coordinated offensive steamrolled through northern Shan State and was closing in on its goal of liberating the region from the regime’s military when a China-brokered ceasefire halted its progress in January.
Since then, all land routes to Lashio have been controlled by resistance groups. The junta only had access to the city by air.
It lost that access after the MNDAA and its allies captured parts of the airport north of Lashio. They are now fighting for control of Lashio Airport.
Intense clashes continued on Thursday as resistance groups attacked the regime’s remaining bases and positions in Lashio. They are poised to assert complete control over the city after seizing the headquarters of the junta’s North Eastern Command last Thursday.
The MNDAA on Saturday announced the formation of a commission to rebuild and administer the city.
The MNDAA resumed Operation 1027 on July 3 along with its allies by attacking the junta’s outposts and battalion headquarters defending Lashio.
Another member of the Brotherhood Alliance, the Ta’ang National Liberation Army is attacking junta troops west of Lashio in both northern Shan State and northern Mandalay Region. It is fighting alongside other resistance groups, including People’s Defense Force units, under the command of the civilian National Unity Government.
Since the resumption of Operation 1027, ethnic armies and allied resistance groups have captured six towns and cities, including Lashio, and about 100 junta bases – including several battalion headquarters – in northern Shan State and northern Mandalay Region.
In the first phase of Operation 1027, the ethnic alliance and its allies seized 17 towns, 24 junta battalion headquarters and hundreds of the junta’s frontline bases, including command centers..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-01
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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"This Short Update describes events that occurred in Kruh Tuh (Kyonedoe) Township, Dooplaya District, in January and March 2023. On January 21st 2023, the SAC military indiscriminately fired mortar shells into villages in Kruh Tuh Township, Dooplaya District, injuring two villagers. On March 25th 2023, the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) and People Defense Force (PDF) attacked the SAC police office in Kruh Tuh Town, and the SAC police force and SAC Light Infantry Battalion (LIB) #546 indiscriminately fired 120mm mortar shells in Kruh Tuh Township. A 15-year-old boy was killed by the shelling in Z--- village, Kaw Wah Leh village tract, Kruh Tuh Township. Mortar shells that landed into Kruh Tuh Town damaged 39 civilian houses and injured 16 civilians, including two children. On the same day at 8:30 am, the SAC shot and killed Saw A---, who had gone to the town to distribute drinking water to people who were trapped there by the shelling and fighting. On March 26th 2023, the same SAC soldiers indiscriminately fired mortar shells again into Kruh Tuh Town, killing a 67-year-old woman named Daw B---.[1]
January 2023: SAC shelling caused civilian casualties in Kruh Tuh Township
On January 21st 2023, at about 12 am, the State Administration Council (SAC)[2] Infantry Battalion (IB)[3] #97, and Artillery Unit #321, under Military Operations Command (MOC)[4] #12, indiscriminately fired mortar shells into Y--- village, Raw Keh village tract[5], Kruh Tuh Township injuring two villagers. Saw[6] C--- (19 years old) was injured on his leg. U[7] D--- (87 years old) was also injured on his leg. Since U D--- sustained serious injuries by shrapnel from mortar shells, he was sent to Aa--- clinic, Wa Ka village tract, Kruh Tuh Township, for treatment.
March 2023: SAC shelling and killing in Kruh Tuh Township
On March 25th 2023, the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA)[8] and People Defense Force (PDF)[9] attacked the SAC police office in Kruh Tuh Town, Kruh Tuh Township, Dooplaya District. Due to the fighting that broke out [after the office was attacked], civilians in Kruh Tuh Town were trapped in their homes, and were afraid to go out.
At about 7:30 am, SAC Light Infantry Battalion (LIB)[10] #546, under MOC #12, based in Kyone K’Lay military camp, indiscriminately fired 120mm mortar shells into villages [in Kruh Tuh Township], and some mortar shells landed in Z--- village, Kaw Wah Leh village tract, Kruh Tuh Township. From this shelling, a 15-year-old boy, Saw E---, was hit by the shrapnel on his neck and he was killed immediately.
At 8:30 am, a civilian named Saw A--- (23 years old), with ‘the heart of a humanitarian’ [someone willing to help], voluntarily went to [Kruh Tuh] Town and provided drinking water as a donation for civilians who were trapped in their homes in the town. While he was providing drinking water to civilians who were trapped by the fighting, a SAC soldier shot at him, and he was killed immediately.
Due to the attack [on the office of the SAC police], SAC LIB #546, under MOC #12, based in Kyone K’Lay camp, also shelled mortar rounds to Kruh Tuh Town in order to help defend it against KNLA and PDF soldiers. As a result of this shelling, 39 civilian houses were damaged and many civilians in Kruh Tuh Town were injured by the shrapnel of mortar shells.
In Section #2 of Kruh Tuh Town, Kruh Tuh Township, six civilians were injured by shrapnel from mortar shells:
In Section #3 of Kruh Tuh Town, Kruh Tuh Township, one civilian was injured by shrapnel from mortar shells
In Section #4 of Kruh Tuh Town, Kruh Tuh Township, 9 civilians were injured by shrapnel from mortar shells:
On March 26th 2023, at about 10 am, SAC LIB #546, under #12, based in Kyone K’Lay camp, indiscriminately shelled mortar shells 120mm [again] into Kruh Tuh Town, [fatally] injuring Daw B--- (67 years old). As soon as she was injured by shrapnel from mortar shells, she was sent to Kruh Tuh hospital for treatment. However, since Daw B--- was a person living with heart disease, and was [severely] injured, she passed away in the hospital.
[In total,] from March 25th to 26th 2023, 16 villagers were injured and two villagers were killed by SAC shelling in Kruh Tuh Tonwhsip; and one villager was shot dead by the SAC in Kruh Tuh Town.
Further background reading on the human rights situation in Dooplaya District in Southeast Burma can be found in the following KHRG reports:
“Dooplaya District Incident Report: SAC shelling into a village injured two villagers, including a 15-year-old, in Kruh Tuh Township, May 2023”, June 2024.
Photo Set: SAC indiscriminate shelling in Southeast Burma, and its impacts on villagers, January 2023 to February 2024, June 2024.
“Dooplaya District Incident Report: SAC shot and injured a villager in Noh T’Kaw Township, October 2023”, May 2024.
Undeniable: War crimes, crimes against humanity and 30 years of villagers’ testimonies in rural Southeast Burma,December 2022.
Footnotes:
[1] The present document is based on information received in February and April 2023. It was provided by a community member in Dooplaya District who has been trained by KHRG to monitor human rights conditions on the ground. The names of the victims, their photos and the exact locations are censored for security reasons. The parts in square brackets are explanations added by KHRG.
[2] The State Administration Council (SAC) is the executive governing body created in the aftermath of the February 1st 2021 military coup. It was established by Senior General Min Aung Hlaing on February 2nd 2021, and is composed of eight military officers and eight civilians. The chairperson serves as the de facto head of government of Burma/Myanmar and leads the Military Cabinet of Myanmar, the executive branch of the government. Min Aung Hlaing assumed the role of SAC chairperson following the coup.
[3] An Infantry Battalion (IB) comprises 500 soldiers. However, most Infantry Battalions in the Tatmadaw are under-strength with less than 200 soldiers. Yet up to date information regarding the size of battalions is hard to come by, particularly following the signing of the NCA. They are primarily used for garrison duty but are sometimes used in offensive operations.
[4] Military Operations Command (MOC) is comprised of ten battalions for offensive operations. Most MOCs have three Tactical Operations Commands (TOCs) made up of three battalions each.
[5] A village tract is an administrative unit of between five and 20 villages in a local area, often centred on a large village.
[6] ‘Saw’ is a S’gaw Karen male honorific title used before a person’s name.
[7] ‘U’ is a Burmese male honorific title used before a person’s name.
[8] The Karen National Liberation Army is the armed wing of the Karen National Union. The Karen National Union (KNU) is the main Karen political organisation. It was established in 1947 and has been in conflict with the government since 1949. The KNU wields power across large areas of Southeast Myanmar and has been calling for the creation of a democratic federal system since 1976. Although it signed the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement in 2015, relations with the government remain tense.
[9] The People’s Defence Force (PDF) is an armed resistance established independently as local civilian militias operating across the country. Following the February 1st 2021 military coup and the ongoing brutal violence enacted by the junta, the majority of these groups began working with the National Unity Government (NUG), a body claiming to be the legitimate government of Burma/Myanmar, which then formalized the PDF on May 5th 2021 as a precursor to a federal army.
[10] A Light Infantry Battalion (LIB) comprises 500 soldiers. However, most Light Infantry Battalions in the Burma military are under-strength with less than 200 soldiers. Yet up-to-date information regarding the size of battalions is hard to come by, particularly following the signing of the 2015 Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA). LIBs are primarily used for offensive operations, but they are sometimes used for garrison duties.
[11] ‘Daw’ is a Burmese female honorific title used before a person’s name.
[12] ‘Maung’ is a Burmese male honorific title used before a person’s name.
[13] ‘Ma’ is a Burmese female honorific title used before a person’s name.
[14] ‘Ko’ is a Burmese male honorific title used before a person’s name..."
Source/publisher:
"Karen Human Rights Group"
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-31
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"Widespread conflict continued to drive displacement and exacerbate needs across multiple states and regions in Myanmar. Intensified airstrikes, artillery shelling, drone attacks as well as the use of antipersonnel landmines and cluster bombs are impacting forcibly displaced people and host communities. According to the UN, the number of displaced people inside Myanmar is almost 3.2 million as of June 2024 - a milestone for internal displacement within Myanmar. Humanitarian access constraints continued to expose people to various protection risks and restrict the delivery of critical assistance and protection. Coping capacities have been stretched to the limit, with food, emergency shelter and core relief items (CRIs) identified as the most urgent needs. Additionally, some 633,975 Rohingya persons remain stateless, of which some 247,783 are living in displacement camps as well as among the host community since 2012 within Rakhine State and face greater hardship due to systematic discrimination, regular violation of their rights and socio-economic difficulties. UNHCR and partners are adapting and responding to the volatile situation and the urgent needs on the ground..."
Source/publisher:
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (Geneva)
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-31
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Individual Documents
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UNHCR (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees), Human Rights and international relations
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Sub-title:
Coordinating with the junta alone means aid will not reach those most in need, says government in exile.
Description:
"A Thai pledge to donate millions of baht to help alleviate a humanitarian crisis in neighboring Myanmar has met with a mixture of gratitude and skepticism from Myanmar’s pro-democracy government in exile.
The kingdom will give nine million baht (US$250,000) to the humanitarian center of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, known as ASEAN, Thai Foreign Affairs Minister Maris Sangiampongsa told a regional meeting in Laos on the weekend.
But Kyaw Zaw, spokesperson for the president’s office of the National Unity Government, or NUG, said that while they greatly appreciated Thailand’s gesture, coordinating with the junta alone was not enough to ensure the aid would reach those most in need.
“Since most of the desperately in need internal [displaced people] are living in resistance-controlled areas, not the junta,” he told Radio Free Asia on Wednesday. “The coordination with the junta will just give them the photo opportunities and not effectively reach out to the desperately in-need people on the ground.”
ASEAN has been struggling to help fellow member Myanmar resolve a bloody crisis triggered by a 2021 military coup, pressing all sides to accept a plan aimed at ending the violence and initiating talks.
But Myanmar’s military has largely ignored the plan and fighting between junta forces and various allied insurgent groups has intensified this year, with the number of internally displaced rising to more than 3 million civilians, according to the United Nations.
Since forming its humanitarian corridor into eastern Myanmar in March, ASEAN’s Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on disaster management, or AHA Centre, has overseen a Thai shipment of 4,000 aid packages into Kayin state to assist civilians affected by fighting.
The AHA Centre has also distributed nearly US$2 million worth of food and hygiene supplies to communities in Myanmar’s Sagaing and Magway regions, as well as southern Shan state and Mon states, ASEAN said in a statement on Saturday.
The earlier Thai aid was initially sent over the border into a part of Myanmar under the control of junta forces and was then transported deeper into the interior.
Thai officials at the time declined to be drawn into a debate on whose territory the aid ended up in but the NUG believes such donations have failed to target populations that are the most seriously affected by conflict.
Political analyst Panitan Wattanayagorn shared that view.
He told RFA that Thailand’s initiatives regarding Myanmar were not as clear as they were in the past, including the potential use of the humanitarian corridor, because the delivery of aid had become more complicated as the control of territories changed as the course of the war unfolded.
“More and more areas are under control of groups that can deliver the support, like the Karen and others,” Panitain said. “Thailand’s participatory role is changing. It’s adopting a more maybe wait-and-see approach, unlike the previous administration.”
Parts of western Myanmar have seen critical food and healthcare shortages as junta blockades as part of its effort to battle the Arakan Army insurgent force, which has captured at least nine townships in Rakhine state and one in neighboring Chin state..."
Source/publisher:
"Radio Free Asia" (USA)
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-31
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Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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Description:
"This Rapid Market Assessment (RMA) is a suppliment to the MAU Market Price Report in South Sagaing Region. It provides township-level data on market functionality, activity, supply, and logistics. Data were collected through observation and KIIs with retailers during June 21-30, 2024. Reports available at www.themimu.info/market-analysis-unit....
KEY FINDINGS.....
Market operations were stable in June, and threeof-five markets were described as relatively safe;
Retail activity grew in Monywa and Yinmarbin, but activity declined in Shwebo where security was poor;
Supply remained quite poor in some markets, particularly Monywa and Yinmarbin;
Supply of NFIs remained poorer than for foods, and supply of shelter and hygiene NFIs worsened in cases;
Shipping costs rose 7% in Ye-U, althought shipping costs and lead-times were fairly stable elsewhere;
Retail challenges grew considerably in Myaung, while Shwebo retailers reported the most challenges.
Regional Overview
Market Functionality - Security was poor in/around the Myaung and Shwebo markets, but operations were stable. Market operations and security were stable in June, with consistent market hours and no reports of new damage or closures. Observers described three-offive markets monitored as relatively safe.
Market Activity - Market activity was fairly stable, although it grew slightly in Monywa and Yinmarbin. Stable market conditions were accompanied by modest increases in customer and retailer activity in Monywa and Yinmarbin. Retail activity declined slightly in Shwebo where security was poor, but elsewhere it was stable.
Availability of Goods - Supply was mostly unchanged in June, and it remained very poor in Monywa and Yinmarbin. Supply of shelter NFIs worsened in Myaung and Shwebo in June, and supply of essential foods declined in Monywa. In general, supply of foods was better than for NFIs, and shelter and hygiene NFIs were most needed in the region.
Transport & Logistics - Shipping costs rose in twoof-five markets, but lead-times were stable. Shipping costs rose 7% in Ye-U and retailers said they rose in Monywa as well, but they were stable in three other markets. Supply lead-times ranged from two days to ten days, depending on the market, and they were largely unchanged since May. All markets monitored allowed cross-township movement of goods, but transportation remained difficult. Monywa, Mandalay, and Yangon were common sources of supply for markets in the region.
Retailer Challenges - Retail challenges grew in Myaung in June, yet they continued to be most severe in Shwebo. Retailers grew increasingly concerned about safety/security in June, particularly in Myaung, Shwebo, and Yinmarbin. Concerns related to poor cash access also grew in June, and this was a significant challenge for retailers in four-of-five markets monitored. Ye-U retailers reported the fewest difficulties related to retail, and inventory/market damage was not a major concern in any of the markets monitored..."
Source/publisher:
Myanmar Information Management Unit (Myanmar) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-30
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Food Security and nutrition in Burma/Myanmar, Public Health, Human Rights and international relations
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Sub-title:
Fighting in Lashio between the military junta and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army began in June.
Description:
"A Myanmar insurgent army and its allies have freed political prisoners and taken control of a hospital and several police stations in the strategic northern Shan state city of Lashio, where fighting with junta forces has been ongoing for more than a month.
Last week, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, or MNDAA, announced it had captured the junta’s northeastern regional military headquarters in Lashio, although the junta has denied the claim.
Fighting in neighborhoods near the regional headquarters continued over the weekend, several residents who requested anonymity for safety reasons told Radio Free Asia.
The MNDAA announced on Sunday that it had also seized a market, a sub-broadcast station and three junta battalion camps in Lashio, which is located about halfway along the main road linking the city of Mandalay and the Chinese border.
One of the junta camps was located near Lashio prison, where insurgent fighters have opened the gates, several sources said.
Some 200 political prisoners walked free over the weekend, including Tun Tun Hein, a member of the Central Executive Committee for the National League for Democracy party, which was overthrown by the military in a 2021 coup d’etat.
“Local resistance forces are working together to help with the prisoners,” said Maung Maung Swe, the deputy secretary for the shadow National Unity Government’s Ministry of Defense.
“Some have been injured by shrapnel from landmines during the prison break, and we are also providing health care for them,” he said.
A family member of Tun Tun Hein told RFA that there were few details about the prisoners due to telecommunications blackouts.
RFA’s attempts to contact the MNDAA’s spokesperson to ask about the prison were unsuccessful on Monday. Junta spokesperson Major General Zaw Min Tun was also unavailable.
Wa troops in Lashio
On Saturday, the United Wa State Army, or UWSA, entered Lashio and took positions near its liaison office and some of its property.
The UWSA – Myanmar’s largest ethnic army – waited until MNDAA forces controlled most of the city before going into Lashio, according to UWSA liaison officer Nyi Rang.
“We officially informed both sides in advance about our entry,” he said. “Our Wa army will not intervene or side with any armed groups. We also hope for nationwide peace, including in Lashio, as soon as possible.”
The UWSA vowed in November to remain neutral as the Three Brotherhood Alliance began a large-scale operation against junta forces.
The alliance – made up of the MNDAA, the Ta’ang National Liberation Army and the Arakan Army – has made significant gains against junta forces in Shan state and elsewhere in Myanmar since last October, when it launched Operation 1027. It resumed offensive operations in June following a ceasefire.
Zaw Min Tun told local news media that the junta was aware of the UWSA’s presence in Lashio.
Fighting since late June has forced more than 200,000 Lashio residents to flee their homes, according to aid workers. More than 10,000 people remain in the city.
A junta airstrike on Sunday morning killed five people who had taken refuge near a monastery in Lashio, an aid worker told RFA.
Elsewhere in the city, a 25-year-old woman was killed by shrapnel from a landmine that struck the back of her head, the aid worker said..."
Source/publisher:
"Radio Free Asia" (USA)
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-29
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Political prisoners and other violations in Burma - reports, Human Rights and international relations
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"(New York, 29 July 2024) The Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, Alice Wairimu Nderitu, and the Special Adviser on the Responsibility to Protect, Mô Bleeker, express concern about the situation since the military coup in 2021 and are alarmed at the increase of violence and conflict across Myanmar. The situation has been under the close observation of the Office and in March 2021 the Special Adviser Wairimu Nderitu and the then UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Michele Bachelet, issued a joint statement calling for an end to systemic impunity in Myanmar.
Converging reports indicate that serious crimes under international human rights and humanitarian law are being committed, notably the direct targeting of civilians with aerial and artillery bombardments, numerous violations of children’s rights, among them enforced recruitment, maiming and abduction by the Armed Forces. Despite provisional measures ordered by the International Court of Justice in January 2020, Rohingya in Myanmar, including women and children, continue to suffer from targeted killings and indiscriminate violence, including by airstrikes, shelling, burning, landmines, and unexploded ordnance. OCHA reports that the humanitarian crisis “has entered a dangerous new chapter with entrenched conflict posing grave risks to civilians, stirring a worrying resurgence of inter-communal tension and driving record levels of displacement”. As of today, more than 3.2 million people have been internally displaced with young people, boys and girls, reported to be leaving Myanmar, trying to avoid conflict, and enforced military conscription.
“Since October 2023, civilians across the country are paying the brunt of renewed violence between the ethnic armed groups and the Myanmar military. Regardless of religion, ethnicity, origin, gender, political affiliation, the Myanmar military is primarily responsible to address and counter hate speech and prevent incitement to discrimination, hostility, or violence against minorities, as well as to prevent and protect the entire civil population from and against the crimes of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity”, the Special Advisers note.
The Special Advisers reiterate concerns raised by the High Commissioner for Human Rights in his statement to the Human Rights Council on 18 June, which described most serious allegations of targeted violence against the Rohingya, by both the Arakan Army and the Armed forces, including beheadings, burning of villages as people sleep, drone attacks, killings of unarmed people fleeing, evacuation orders with nowhere to go. The situation has seriously deteriorated, and disturbing reports indicate that displaced civilians, many of whom are Rohingya, are being used as human shields. In this context, hate speech is also being used again, since 2017, to stoke ethnic tensions between Rohingya and Arakhan community, with the view to exacerbate interethnic polarization. In addition, reports indicate forced recruitment of the Rohingya into the Armed Forces and the Arakhan Army.
Furthermore, the Special Advisers stress recent reports of escalation of violence in the Shan State and the neighboring Mandalay Region, ending a six-month ceasefire as set by the Haigen agreement, resulting in a deterioration of the security and humanitarian situation also in the north of the country.
Measures to prevent further hate speech and incitement to discrimination, hostility, or violence, as well as violations of human rights, international humanitarian law, and protection of all groups at risk across the country among other against forced internal displacement and forced recruitment, must be put in place. In UNITED NATIONS PRESS RELEASE particular, the provisional measures ordered by the International Court of Justice in 2020 in relation to the members of the Rohingya group on the territory of Myanmar must be upheld.
The restrictions on humanitarian aid threatening civilians in conflict areas may be considered as violation of international humanitarian law. The Special Advisers recall that parties to the armed conflict shall fully respect international law and international humanitarian law and urge them to return to dialogue, deescalate violence, and fully protect civilians.
The Special Advisers also urge for a prompt implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 2669 (2022) on the situation in Myanmar, which demands an immediate end to all forms of violence throughout the country, and restraint and de-escalation of tensions.
They encourage ASEAN to renew urgent and commensurate efforts towards a political solution and a full protection of civilians, taking into account the ongoing serious deterioration of the situation. An inclusive and comprehensive national political dialogue and nationwide reconciliation process is required with the full, effective, and meaningful participation of all ethnic groups, including Rohingya and other minorities, women, young people, and persons with disabilities, as well as civil society and religious leaders. Finally, the Special Advisers urge for the international community to implement joint efforts to reassess the crisis in Myanmar in the light of the significant developments that are unfolding and launch a robust coordinated effort.
The Special Advisers also expressed concern over the ongoing instrumentalization of justice against the political opposition and call the Myanmar Military to respect and reestablish the full independence of justice. The Special Advisers also acknowledge the important efforts taking place before the International Court of Justice (ICJ), as well as the work being carried out by the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar (IIMM) established by the United Nations Human Rights Council. Ensuring the full observance of the principles of Rule of Law today and ensuring accountability for past crimes, to realize a holistic transitional justice process and trial the most serious international crimes committed are indispensable to bring sustainable peace, justice, safety and create the basis for a new peaceful future for all people across Myanmar..."
Source/publisher:
United Nations
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-29
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Individual Documents
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Sub-title:
Beijing will not abandon the regime and sees the military as part of a future political settlement.
Description:
"Chinese frustration with Min Aung Hlaing appears to be heightening, as the junta prepares to issue another six-month extension of its emergency decree on Aug. 1 and ignores Beijing's calls to seek a political solution.
Beijing has sent multiple signals that this is unacceptable and that the military government must prepare to hold elections as an off-ramp to the political crisis.
While some observers saw Beijing’s hand in Min Aung Hlaing’s seizure of power on Feb. 1, 2021, the coup really went against core Chinese interests, leading to political instability, a breakdown in the national cease-fire agreement, and the further stalling of the key projects Myanmar-China Economic Corridor and port in Kyaukphyu.
Beijing failed to endorse the coup, pressured the junta to not dissolve the National League for Democracy, the then ruling and recently re-elected party of Aung San Su Kyi, and backed ASEAN’s Five Point Consensus for ending the conflict. In March 2022, Beijing appointed a special envoy for Myanmar, Deng Xijun.
By mid-2022, however, it seems as though China had come to the conclusion that the opposition National Unity Government and their alliance of ethnic resistance organizations would be unable to prevail. Beijing stepped up their engagements with the junta.
But even with Chinese diplomatic and political support, the generals were unable to consolidate power. Operation 1027, launched by an alliance of ethnic armies in late 2023, led to the junta’s loss of significant amounts of territory along the border with China in Shan state.
The Kachin Independence Army’s subsequent offensive led it to now control all border crossings in that state.
On Jan. 10, Beijing negotiated a ceasefire in northern Shan state. Yet, the junta continued their air and long range artillery attacks, prompting China, in a show of force, to stage live fire military exercises on the border in April.
Pushing for an off ramp
Frustration with the junta’s military and economic incompetence is mounting.
To be clear, Beijing has never trusted Min Aung Hlaing, whom they are said to view as incompetent and an embarrassment.
Chinese leaders have consistently denied him an invitation since the coup, including to the sparsely attended third Belt and Road Initiative Forum in Beijing in October 2023.
Beijing appears more convinced that Min Aung Hlaing is unable to stabilize the country, no matter what, and has been more vocally pushing for elections as an off ramp to the military’s self-made crisis.
There have been a number of high-level delegations in the past few months.
The one that piqued the most interest was that of former president Thein Sein. In a very obvious slight to Min Aung Hlaing, Thein Sein received an audience with Chinese paramount leader Xi Jinping and was described by foreign minister Wang Yi as an “old friend”.
Despite China’s concerns about Thein Sein’s transition to democracy after 2010, they look back on the former army chief and president as a competent leader who protected China’s interests. This presents a stark juxtaposition with Min Aung Hlaing.
While Singapore’s Channel News Asia reported that Wang had conveyed Beijing’s call for Min Aung Hlaing to resign, this was never confirmed.
But China has clearly increased its calls for elections to be held this year, and appears to see Thein Sein as an appropriate transitional figure, accepted by the international community and ASEAN in the past.
Pressing for elections
China invited Soe Win – deputy commander of the State Administrative Council (SAC), as the junta calls itself – to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s Green Development Forum in early July.
He was the highest ranking SAC official invited to China, though in a multilateral, not bi-lateral setting.
While Soe Win’s goal was to secure further military and diplomatic assistance, Beijing saw the meeting as another opportunity to speak directly to the junta leadership and press for a firm date for elections.
In mid-July, China invited a delegation of political parties, led by the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party, or USDP, whose routing in the November 2020 election led to the coup.
But rather than commit to elections, the SAC continues to dither.
On June 25, Min Aung Hlaing announced that the Lunar New Year would become a national holiday – a pathetic attempt to curry favor with Beijing.
The SAC will hold elections only from a position of strength, which is possible only with Chinese military assistance.
According to the UN Special Rapporteur and a forthcoming report from the Special Advisory Council-Myanmar, China continues to sell arms and deploy technicians to Myanmar’s military defense industries. It has also provided software and technical support to monitor telecommunications.
Despite Chinese pressure, Min Aung Hlaing shows absolutely no signs of stepping aside.
On July 20, he assumed the acting presidency, in addition to his role as army chief, Prime Minister, and head of the SAC.
RELATED STORIES
As Myanmar junta falters, rival ethnic armies jostle in Shan state
Myanmar rebels rack up more gains as Operation 1027 enters new phase
Myanmar insurgent allies capture strategic Shan state town from junta
Ethnic army overruns junta command center in Myanmar’s Kokang region
Enter China’s proxy
Despite Chinese admonishment, the junta is about to extend the emergency decree by an additional six months. There are even some reports that under Chinese pressure, Min Aung Hlaing will cede the acting presidency to Thein Sein in August.
Yet, defying China is unlikely to play well for Min Aung Hlaing.
When Phase 2 of Operation 1027 began in June, China put far less pressure on the Three Brotherhood Alliance, the tripartite insurgent force that has led the campaign. Although China negotiated a ceasefire on July 20, it didn’t last a day.
China has held back since then, as the alliance member Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army took over parts of Lashio and the Ta’ang National Liberation Army took Mogoke.
The junta’s air attack on Laukkaing on July 14 is going to antagonize China further.
Rather than the junta, China is increasingly relying on another proxy, the United Wa State Army, to check the Three Brotherhood Alliance’s advances.
In western Myanmar, where China’s bid Belt and Road Initiative projects are, China is clearly dealing with the new reality on the ground.
While the Arakan Army has not taken Kyaukphyu, it has effectively surrounded China’s special economic zone in that Rakhine port city. Any future development there will necessarily entail negotiations with the Arakan Army, the third Brotherhood Alliance member..
If there is one area of ongoing cooperation, it’s assistance in shutting down some of the online scam centers and the return of Chinese nationals.
Indeed, between September 2023 and June 2024, 5,482 Chinese citizens were handed over to Chinese police, according to Chinese state media.
Although many of those were handed over by Myanmar police, an increasing number have been handed over by ethnic armies, who are proving themselves to Beijing to be more competent partners than the junta.
China is clearly fed up with the junta.
They will not abandon the regime, despite its losses, and Beijing sees the military as part of a future political settlement.
China is inherently cautious, and its notion of sovereignty as a pillar of international relations makes it very hard for them to abandon Naypyitaw in favor of an opposition government and loose coalition of ethnic resistance organizations.
But China has always had direct relations with the ethnic armies, especially those along its border, and it will continue to leverage those relations to pressure Naypyitaw.
Beijing has made their preference for a negotiated settlement through elections abundantly clear. The only ones who are missing this message are the generals, who are cocooned in their fortress capital and oblivious to their mounting battlefield losses..."
Source/publisher:
"Radio Free Asia" (USA)
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-28
[field_licence]
Type:
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"BANGKOK —
The United Nations’ special rapporteur on human rights in Myanmar, Tom Andrews, has told VOA he welcomes Thailand’s plans for a task force to help Thai banks vet business with Myanmar’s military regime for possible arms deals.
Thailand announced the task force last week, nearly a month after a report by Andrews exposed the lead role Thailand’s banks have taken in financing arms purchases for the military regime that ousted Myanmar’s elected government in 2021. The civil war that has followed has claimed thousands of civilian lives.
“It’s a real step in the right direction” and a sign “that Thailand is really taking this seriously and efforts are being made to stop these weapons transfers,” he said in a Saturday interview.
His report, Banking on the Death Trade: How Banks and Governments Enable the Military Junta in Myanmar, says international sanctions have helped slash the regime’s purchase of weapons through the global financial system by one-third from the 2022 to 2023 fiscal years, which runs April to March, to some $253 million.
The report says those sanctions have also driven most of the regime’s arms-related banking away from Singapore, which clamped down on its banks’ weapons business with Myanmar last year, to Thailand. While the regime’s weapons financing through Singapore over the past fiscal year tumbled from $260 million to $40 million, it says, those through Thailand doubled to $120 million, the most of any country.
Andrews said he hopes the task force will help Thailand follow Singapore’s lead in slashing its arms-related banking with Myanmar’s military regime, which the U.N. and others have accused of war crimes in its bid to put down a growing armed and civil resistance.
“The action that we saw from Singapore was extremely important. And now the process that Thailand is engaged in … is part of an important momentum that I’m hopeful will cut off the means by which the junta can continue to commit these gross human rights violations,” he said.
“We know that as the junta continues to suffer losses, it is responding by intensifying its attacks on innocent people,” he added. “So, it is very important that any and all efforts to stop this be conducted with a great sense of urgency, and I’m hopeful that this task force will convene and act quickly and urgently to address this crisis.”
‘The human rights agenda’
A spokesman for the Myanmar regime could not be reached for comment. The military has previously denied targeting civilians and claims to be taking proportionate action against “terrorists” to restore peace and order.
In its announcement last week, Thailand said its Anti-Money Laundering Office and the Bank of Thailand, the country’s central bank, would be setting up the task force to help commercial lenders investigate transactions that may be linked to weapons purchases for Myanmar’s regime and avoid the taint of any human rights abuses.
In the wake of Andrews’ report, representatives of the Thai banks it named told a meeting of the national security committee of Thailand's House of Representatives that they lacked the capacity to probe all their transactions with Myanmar for possible weapons deals.
The Thai government has not said when the task force would convene or exactly what types of transactions with Myanmar would be off-limits from now on.
A spokesman for the foreign affairs ministry, which announced the task force, said officials will be holding more talks with Andrews before deciding whether and how to urge the banks to change their behavior.
The government has not come out against facilitating any and all arms deals with Myanmar’s military regime, the spokesman, Nikorndej Balankura, told VOA last week.
“But Thailand attaches great importance to the human rights agenda, and of course we do not support the use of violence. So, if we know for sure that the transactions that took place [are] to purchase weapons, our stance would be definitely not to support that,” he said.
Thailand’s goals of kickstarting a sluggish economy, developing its financial sector and repairing its international reputation since emerging from years of military rule itself will give the new task force a strong incentive to stamp out the country’s role in Myanmar’s arms deals. That’s according to Sean Turnell, an economist and senior fellow at Australia’s Lowy Institute with a focus on Myanmar and Southeast Asia, who spoke with VOA.
Thailand may choose to tread more softly than Singapore and avoid telling its banks to cut the Myanmar junta’s lenders off outright, Turnell said.
“But one could imagine a regulator suggesting quietly to a bank that they regulate that, you know, maybe it’s not such a good idea to be doing business with them,” he added.
Looking for alternatives
Turnell also served as an economic adviser to the civilian government ousted by Myanmar’s military and now advises the National Unity Government, a shadow government vying to kick out the junta. He said Myanmar’s military regime will try to find other countries to help finance its arms purchases should Thailand shut it out, the way it turned to Thailand after Singapore clamped down.
“Definitely there will be other takers; they’ll find their way through the cracks. But every time you have to do that you lose some of your ability to do that sort of financing,” he said.
With each move, he said, the regime will have to turn to less globally connected and reputable banks that will charge higher fees, possibly even bribes and kickbacks, for their services.
“As soon as you start leaving major financial centers and major international banks, it just becomes more and more difficult to get these sorts of transactions going,” Turnell said.
Getting shut out of one country after another could also push Myanmar’s military regime into settling more and more of its arms purchases informally, for instance with cash and barter trades that come with their own costs and limitations, Turnell added.
“I’m not sure how many countries are going to want to barter jet fuel for beans and pulses,” said Jared Bissinger, an economist and visiting fellow in the Myanmar program at Singapore’s Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, in an interview with VOA.
With the exception of only natural gas, dried beans have been Myanmar’s main export in recent years, according to World Integrated Trade Solution, a trade data aggregator developed by the World Bank.
“I’d imagine they will continue seeking out ways to make transactions via banks and intermediaries in a range of countries that are less cooperative with enforcement of sanctions,” Bissinger said.
“But this takes time, effort, and money. So, there is certainly some value in the disruptions and resource denials that sanctions cause. Sanctions are a bit of a game of whack-a-mole,” he said, where a problem is solved in one place only to reemerge someplace else.
"But it still hurts the mole when it gets whacked,” he added..."
Source/publisher:
"Voice of America" (Washington, D.C)
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-28
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Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations, Business and the Military
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"AFM-CN/2024/01/STM
We, the Member States of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the People's Republic of China, gathered on the occasion of the ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference (PMC) Plus One Session with China in Vientiane, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, on 26 July 2024;
DEPLORING the mass civilian casualties caused by landmines and other explosive remnants of war (ERW) in the region, and cognisant of the serious threat that landmines and other ERW pose to the safety of the people as well as to economic and social development;
APPLAUDING the tremendous efforts and achievements made by landmines and other ERW-affected ASEAN Member States on mine action in recent years;
NOTING that many ASEAN Member States are still facing diverse challenges, including in carrying out humanitarian demining efforts along the border areas, in putting an end to landmines and other ERW threats;
HIGHLIGHTING the importance of addressing humanitarian aspects of landmines and other ERW through a coordinated and integrated approach;
ACKNOWLEDGING the importance of the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus) to promote mine action cooperation;
RECOGNISING the role of ASEAN Regional Mine Action Center (ARMAC) in promoting ASEAN’s efforts to address the issue of landmines and other ERW for interested ASEAN Member States and raise awareness of the danger of landmines and other ERW among affected communities;
ALSO RECOGNISING that strengthening mine action cooperation is crucial for sustaining peace, security, stability, prosperity and sustainable development of the region;
APPRECIATING the valuable support that China has provided to some landmines and other ERW-affected ASEAN Member States since 1998 as well as ARMAC, which highlights ASEAN and China's friendship and cooperation, while taking note of China’s vision to build a peaceful, safe and secure, prosperous, beautiful, and amicable home in the region; and
REAFFIRMING the commitment to advance ASEAN-China relations by forging closer cooperation in line with important documents such as the Joint Statement of the Special Summit to Commemorate the 30th Anniversary of ASEAN-China Dialogue Relations: Comprehensive Strategic Partnership for Peace, Security, Prosperity and Sustainable Development and the Plan of Action to Implement the ASEAN-China Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity (2021-2025) and its Annex to Advance the ASEAN-China Comprehensive Strategic Partnership;
WE HEREBY:
Emphasise the importance of humanitarian mine action, enhance people’s awareness of the danger of landmines and other ERW, accelerate the restoration of the residual contaminated land, provide appropriate medical and rehabilitation assistance to the victims, and allow people to return to their homeland in dignity, safety and security;
Integrate humanitarian mine action into the sustainable development agenda of the region, advance regional and cross-border cooperation and resource mobilisation, including exploring various financial instruments for mine action, and enhance the cost-effectiveness of resources;
Optimise existing mechanisms such as the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus Experts’ Working Group on Humanitarian Mine Action, and carry out more practical cooperation in areas such as personnel training, standard setting and joint exercise, to enhance the capacity of ASEAN Member States for mine action;
Support the work of ARMAC including in advancing cooperation on the use of technology in demining to further reduce the risk of human casualties, promoting innovation, enhancing the effectiveness of mine action operations, convening regional high-level and technical working group meetings, encouraging the active participation of multiple stakeholders, and promoting the sharing of experience and achievements;
Strengthen cooperation with United Nations (UN) agencies such as the UN Mine Action Service and the UN Development Programme, actively explore South-South and trilateral cooperation, and call on all parties to step up support to landmines and other ERW-affected ASEAN Member States, including through ARMAC; and
Enhance closer communication and coordination between ASEAN Member States and China at the UN to promote cooperation on mine action that contributes to the maintenance of peace, security, stability, development, and prosperity in the region and the world..."
Source/publisher:
Association of Southeast Asian Nations
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-27
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"1. The National Unity Government welcomes the continued attention of ASEAN Foreign Ministers on the situation in Myanmar. The National Unity Government expresses its position regarding the 57th ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting as follows:-
2. As the legitimate representative of the Myanmar people, the National Unity Government continues to extend its full cooperation to ASEAN. The attempted coup staged by the military on February 1, 2021 was a direct insult to ASEAN's principles of democracy, the rule of law, and good governance, as enshrined in the ASEAN Charter.
3. Over three years have passed since the attempted coup, and the military junta continues to violate and obstruct the implementation of the ASEAN Five-Point Consensus (5PC). During this same period, the NUG and its ethnic partners have secured significant territorial control and have expanded their service provision and administrative governance. It follows that the National Unity Government and its ethnic and civil society partners are the legitimate dialogue partners for ASEAN. This situation calls for a comprehensive review of the 5PC, a renewed approach to engagement, and increased diplomatic pressure to hold the junta accountable for its actions. The continued presence and participation of military junta members and appointees in ASEAN-related meetings solely represents the interests of the junta, not the will or welfare of the people of Myanmar.
4. The junta’s proposed “sham election”, which aims to secure a fig-leaf of legitimacy, will not solve the ongoing crisis in Myanmar. Rather, it would exacerbate the situation and extend regional instability and insecurity. We urge ASEAN to prioritize sustainable solutions to address the root causes rather than short-term fixes, to reject this “sham election” process and to support the people of Myanmar in their pursuit of a genuine and sustainable federal democracy.
5. To address the ongoing conflict, we request ASEAN members to:
(i) Engage directly with the NUG and its ethnic and civil society partners as the legitimate representatives of Myanmar and its people, including through a process to review and operationalise the 5PC.
(ii) Increase pressure on the junta: Impose targeted sanctions on the military leadership and entities supporting them, including restrictions on jet fuel to prevent indiscriminate airstrikes.
(iii) Protect refugees: Urge Myanmar’s neighbouring countries to accept, protect, and assist those fleeing the violence in Myanmar.
(iv) Facilitate cross-border humanitarian aid: Establish mechanisms to deliver essential aid directly to those in need, including through ethnic and civil society channels, and bypassing the junta's obstructions to ensure aid reaches the most vulnerable communities.
(v) Seek international support: Build on point 17 of the 2023 ASEAN Leaders’ Review and Decision on the Implementation of the 5PC by specifying the kind of support that ASEAN seeks from external partners and the international community.
6. We believe ASEAN has a crucial leadership role in resolving the Myanmar crisis. We strongly urge swift and decisive action in consultation with the people of Myanmar to implement effective initiatives that address the root causes of the conflict and alleviate the suffering of the Myanmar people.
7. The NUG and its partners have developed a robust transition plan and implemented a comprehensive strategy toward restoring democracy, peace, and stability in Myanmar. We restate our readiness to work with ASEAN and all stakeholders to find a peaceful and just solution to the crisis. Together, we can restore democracy, peace, and stability to our country.....
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
National Unity Government..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Myanmar - NUG
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-27
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Type:
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Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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"၁။ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရသည် အာဆီယံနိုင်ငံခြားရေးဝန်ကြီးများ၏ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံအခြေအနေ များနှင့် စပ်လျဉ်း၍ ဆက်လက်အလေးပေးအာရုံစိုက်မှုကို ကြိုဆိုပါသည်။ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ အနေဖြင့် (၅၇) ကြိမ်မြောက် အာဆီယံနိုင်ငံခြားရေးဝန်ကြီးများအစည်းအဝေးအပေါ် မိမိတို့အစိုးရ၏ သဘောထားကို အောက်ပါအတိုင်း ဖော်ပြအပ်ပါသည်။
၂။ မြန်မာပြည်သူလူထု၏ တရားဝင်ကိုယ်စားပြုဖြစ်သည့် အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရသည် အာဆီယံနှင့် ဆက်လက်၍ အပြည့်အဝ ပူပေါင်းဆောင်ရွက်လျက်ရှိပါသည်။ ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ် ဖေဖော်ဝါရီလ ၁ ရက်နေ့က အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်၏ အာဏာသိမ်းရန်ကြိုးပမ်းမှုသည် အာဆီယံပဋိညာဉ်တွင် ပြဌာန်း ထားသည့် ဒီမိုကရေစီစနစ်၊ တရားဥပဒေစိုးမိုးရေးနှင့် ကောင်းမွန်သော အုပ်ချုပ်မှုစနစ်ဆိုင်ရာ အာဆီယံ ၏အခြေခံမူများကို တိုက်ရိုက်စော်ကားလိုက်ခြင်း ဖြစ်ပါသည်။
၃။ အာဏာသိမ်းရန် ကြိုးပမ်းခဲ့သည်မှစ၍ သုံးနှစ်ကျော်ကာလအတွင်း၊ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်သည် အာဆီယံဘုံသဘောတူညီချက်(၅)ရပ်အား အကောင်အထည်ဖော်ဆောင်ခြင်းမရှိဘဲ ဆက်လက်ကျူးလွန် ဖောက်ဖျက်လျက်ရှိပါသည်။ ဤကာလအတွင်း အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရနှင့် တိုင်းရင်းသားမိတ်ဖက် များအနေဖြင့် နယ်မြေထိန်းချုပ်မှုများ သိသာထင်ရှားစွာ ရယူနိုင်ခဲ့ပြီး၊ ဝန်ဆောင်မှုနှင့် အုပ်ချုပ်မှုများကို လည်း ပိုမို၍ ပံ့ပိုးပေးလျက်ရှိပါသည်။ ယင်းအချက်က အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရနှင့် ၎င်း၏ တိုင်းရင်း သားနှင့် အရပ်ဘက်အဖွဲ့အစည်း မိတ်ဖက်များသည် အာဆီယံအတွက် တရားဝင်ဆွေးနွေးဖက်များ ဖြစ်ကြောင်း ဖော်ပြလျက်ရှိပါသည်။ ထို့ကြောင့် အာဆီယံဘုံသဘောတူညီချက် (၅)ရပ်ကို ကျယ်ကျယ်ပြန့်ပြန့် ပြန်လည်သုံးသပ်ရန်၊ ပိုမိုအားကောင်းသော ချဉ်းကပ်မှုနည်းလမ်းတစ်ရပ် ရှာဖွေ ဖော်ထုတ်ရန်နှင့် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်အား ၎င်း၏လုပ်ရပ်များအတွက် တာဝန်ခံမှုရှိစေရေး သံတမန်ရေး အရ ဖိအားပေးမှုများ ပိုမိုတိုးမြှင့်လုပ်ဆောင်ရန် တောင်းဆိုအပ်ပါသည်။ အာဆီယံဆက်စပ်အစည်းအဝေး များတွင် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်၏ အဖွဲ့ဝင်များနှင့် ၎င်းကခန့်အပ်ထားသူများကို ဆက်လက်ကိုယ်စားပြု ပါဝင်စေခြင်းသည် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်၏ အကျိုးစီးပွားကိုသာ ထင်ဟပ်ပြီး၊ မြန်မာပြည်သူလူထု၏ စိတ်ဆန္ဒနှင့် ကောင်းကျိုးကို လုံးဝထင်ဟပ်ခြင်း မရှိပါ။
၄။ ထို့အပြင် စစ်အုပ်ချုပ်မှုကို တရားဝင်စေရန်ရည်ရွယ်သည့် စစ်အုပ်စုက ကျင်းပပြုလုပ်မည့် “အတု အယောင်ရွေးကောက်ပွဲ” သည် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၏ လက်ရှိပြဿနာများကို ပြေလည်စေမည် မဟုတ်ဘဲ၊ အခြေ အနေများ ပိုမိုရှုတ်ထွေးစေပြီး၊ ဒေသတွင်း မတည်ငြိမ်မှုနှင့် မလုံခြုံမှုများကိုသာ ပို၍ဖြစ်စေနိုင်ပါသည်။ မြန်မာ့နိုင်ငံရေးပြဿနာများကို ဖြေရှင်းနိုင်ရေးဆောင်ရွက်ရာတွင် ရေတိုဆေးမြီးတို ဖြေရှင်းနည်းထက် ပြဿနာ၏အရင်းအမြစ်ကို ကုစားသည့် ရေရှည်ခံမည့်ဖြေရှင်းနည်းများကို ဦးစားပေး ရှာဖွေရန်၊ ယင်း “အတုအယောင် ရွေးကောက်ပွဲ” လုပ်ငန်းစဉ်ကို လုံးဝငြင်းပယ်ရန်နှင့် စစ်မှန်သော ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီရရှိရေး အတွက် ကြိုးပမ်းတိုက်ပွဲဝင်နေကြသည့် မြန်မာပြည်သူလူထုကို အားပေးထောက်ခံရန် အာဆီယံအား တိုက်တွန်းပါသည်။
၅။ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၏ လက်ရှိဖြစ်ပေါ်နေသော ပဋိပက္ခများကို ကိုင်တွယ်ဖြေရှင်းရန် အာဆီယံ အဖွဲ့ဝင် နိုင်ငံများထံသို့ အောက်ပါတို့အား တောင်းဆိုအပ်ပါသည် -
(က) အာဆီယံဘုံသဘောတူညီချက် (၅)ရပ်အား ပြန်လည်သုံးသပ်ခြင်းနှင့် အကောင်အထည် ဖော်ဆောင်ခြင်း လုပ်ငန်းစဉ်အပါအဝင် ထိတွေ့ဆက်ဆံမှုများတွင် အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေး အစိုးရနှင့် ၎င်း၏ တိုင်းရင်းသားနှင့် အရပ်ဘက်အဖွဲ့အစည်း မိတ်ဖက်များအား မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ နှင့် မြန်မာပြည်သူလူထု၏ တရားဝင်ကိုယ်စားလှယ်များအဖြစ် တိုက်ရိုက်ထိတွေ့ဆက်ဆံ ရန်၊
(ခ) အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်အပေါ် ဖိအားများ တိုးမြှင့်ရန် - အရပ်သားပြည်သူများအား ခွဲခြားထား မှုမရှိသော လေကြောင်းတိုက်ခိုက်မှုများကိုတားဆီးရန်အတွက် ဂျက်လေယာဉ်လောင်စာ ဆီ ကန့်သတ်ချက်များအပါအဝင် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ် ခေါင်းဆောင်ပိုင်းနှင့် ၎င်းတို့နှင့် ဆက်စပ် အဖွဲ့အစည်းများအပေါ် ပစ်မှတ်ထားသော အရေးယူပိတ်ဆို့မှုများ ချမှတ်ရန်၊
(ဂ) ဒုက္ခသည်များကို ကာကွယ်စောင့်ရှောက်ရန်- မြန်မာနိုင်ငံအတွင်း အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်၏ အကြမ်းဖက်မှုများကြောင့် ထွက်ပြေးခိုလှုံလာသူများအား လက်ခံပေးရန်၊ ကာကွယ် စောင့်ရှောက်ပေးရန်နှင့် ကူညီပေးရန်တို့အတွက် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၏ အိမ်နီးချင်းနိုင်ငံများထံသို့ တိုက်တွန်းရန်၊
(ဃ) နယ်စပ်ဖြတ်ကျော် လူသားချင်းစာနာထောက်ထားမှုဆိုင်ရာ အကူအညီများ လွယ်ကူ ချောမွေ့စွာ ပို့ဆောင်ပေးရန်- တိုင်းရင်းသားနှင့် အရပ်ဘက်အဖွဲ့အစည်းများမှတဆင့် ဆောင်ရွက်သည့် နည်းလမ်းများအပါအဝင် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်၏ အတားအဆီးများကို ကျော်လွှားကာ မရှိမဖြစ်လိုအပ်သောအကူအညီများအားလိုအပ်နေသူများထံသို့ တိုက်ရိုက် ပေးပို့နိုင်မည့် ယန္တရားများ ထူထောင်ရန်၊
(င) နိုင်ငံတကာအကူအညီများ တောင်းခံရန်- အာဆီယံအနေဖြင့် ပြင်ပမိတ်ဖက်များနှင့် နိုင်ငံ တကာ အသိုင်းအဝိုင်းထံမှ တောင်းခံမည့် အကူအညီအမျိုးအစားများကို သတ်မှတ်၍ (၂၀၂၃) ခုနှစ် အာဆီယံခေါင်းဆောင်များ၏ ဘုံသဘောတူညီချက်(၅)ရပ်အား အကောင် အထည်ဖော်ဆောင်ခြင်းဆိုင်ရာ သုံးသပ်ချက်နှင့် ဆုံးဖြတ်ချက် အပိုဒ်(၁၇) အား ဆက်လက် အကောင်အထည်ဖော်ဆောင်ရန်၊
၆။ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရအနေဖြင့် အာဆီယံသည် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၏အကျပ်အတည်းကို ဖြေရှင်း ရာ၌ အရေးပါသော ဦးဆောင်မှုအခန်းကဏ္ဍတွင် ရှိနေကြောင်း ယုံကြည်ပါသည်။ ပဋိပက္ခများ၏ မူလ အရင်းခံအကြောင်းများကို ဖြေရှင်းနိုင်ပြီး၊ မြန်မာပြည်သူများ၏ ဆင်းရဲဒုက္ခများကို ဖယ်ရှားပေးနိုင်မည့် ထိရောက်သည့် ဆောင်ရွက်ချက်များကို လျင်မြန်စွာ ပြတ်ပြတ်သားသား လုပ်ဆောင်ရန်ကိုလည်း အလေး အနက် တိုက်တွန်းအပ်ပါသည်။
၇။ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရနှင့် မိတ်ဖက်များအနေဖြင့် ခိုင်မာသော အသွင်ကူးပြောင်းရေး အစီ အစဉ်ကိုရေးဆွဲချမှတ်ကာ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံတွင် ဒီမိုကရေစီ၊ ငြိမ်းချမ်းရေးနှင့် တည်ငြိမ်မှု ပြန်လည် ဖော်ဆောင် နိုင်ရေးအတွက် ပြည့်စုံကျယ်ပြန်သည့် မဟာဗျူဟာကို အကောင်အထည် ဖော်ဆောင်လျက်ရှိပါသည်။ အကျပ်အတည်းအတွက် ငြိမ်းချမ်းပြီး တရားမျှတသော အဖြေကို ရှာဖွေနိုင်ရန် အာဆီယံနှင့် အားလုံးသော သက်ဆိုင်သူများနှင့် လက်တွဲဆောင်ရွက်ရန် အသင့်ရှိပါကြောင်း ထပ်လောင်းဖော်ပြအပ်ပါသည်။ မြန်မာ နိုင်ငံတွင် ဒီမိုကရေစီ၊ ငြိမ်းချမ်းရေးနှင့် တည်ငြိမ်မှုတို့ကို ပြန်လည်ဖော်ဆောင်နိုင်ရေးအတွက် အတူတကွ လုပ်ဆောင်နိုင်ကြမည်ဟု ခိုင်မာစွာ ယုံကြည်ပါသည်။
နိုင်ငံခြားရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာန
အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Myanmar - NUG
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-27
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Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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""It happened so quickly. When I came back home from work, my home was already submerged. The water level was increasing inch by inch. I could bring nothing from my home. My child and I were sick due to the freezing water. Our lives are already difficult due to the armed conflict. I felt desperate. I need help. Not later, but now," Lu Ja, a woman from the flood-affected community, said.
In the wake of flash floods in Kachin state, the people in the community were confronted with loss and displacement. Homes and streets were submerged, and communications & transportation were interrupted.
The floods, caused by heavy rains in northern Kachin, led to the overflowing of the Irrawaddy River, resulting in a flash flood that caused extensive damage to several townships, including Myitkyina and Waing Maw. According to the UN’s Rapid Needs Assessment (RNA), more than 29,000 people in both townships were affected, including 300 pregnant and lactating women. Many people, including women and children, became ill due to exposure to the cold waters, and families were forced to leave their homes with only the clothes on their backs in search of proper shelter, food and health services.
In this emergency situation, UNFPA is working closely with local partners to provide essential assistance and restore the dignity of those affected. Despite the many communications challenges, UNFPA field teams immediately approached its partners to assess and enhance their safety and operational capacity and to plan the emergency response. In Myitkyina, one of the areas most affected by the flash floods, UNFPA, in partnership with the Myanmar Medical Association (MMA) and other partner organisations, provided emergency support to 322 individuals, including women and girls, within 72 hours of the flooding. This rapid response involved setting up mobile clinics in affected areas to provide primary health care, antenatal care, mental health and psychosocial support (MHPSS), as well as distributing Dignity Kits and Clean Delivery Kits for women.
Aye Aye Thein, a pregnant woman whose home was completely submerged, received immediate medical assistance from one of the mobile health teams and was swiftly referred to a hospital for safe delivery. Holding her newborn baby close, she said, "I have no idea what would have happened if the mobile health team hadn't been there. With my pregnancy due for delivery soon, I felt helpless at the evacuation site. However, the response team led by UNFPA came and helped me immediately, referring me to the hospital for delivery. They saved our lives; my life and my baby's life. Despite losing our personal belongings to the flood, the Dignity Kit they provided gave me some of the essentials to care for myself and my child. I am really grateful for the support.”
Shing Ceing, a staff member of the UNFPA implementing partners in Kachin, said, “Every single support and service we provide is needed by the affected community. I still remember one of the women at the IDP camp. She delivered her baby two weeks ahead of the flood. When we met her at the evacuation site, she was helpless with her baby. Her husband had just passed away while he was helping others during the flood. Besides providing medical care and dignity kits, we also gave her mental health and psychosocial support, which was very critical in such a traumatic experience.”
A touching moment took place when a pregnant woman at an evacuation site, where she had sought help, expressed her gratitude. She was wearing a longyi provided in the Dignity Kit and said, "I had nothing dry to wear, but thanks to this kit, I got what I needed for my hygiene and can now return home with the basics to look after myself."
The flood disrupted community support systems and access to essential health and protection services for women and girls, including antenatal care and gender-based violence services. Among the flood-affected population, women and girls in the internally displaced (IDP) camps suffered the most. The situation in these IDP camps is particularly dire; they are not only grappling with the aftermath of the floods but also ongoing conflict. Kham Mo, a mother of three, shared her relief, "The floods took everything. This Dignity Kit helps me feel human again. It has what I need to take care of myself and my daughters."
"I am in my 9th month of pregnancy. When the flood hit our camp, I felt desperate. I was frightened as I crossed the water to reach higher ground. Many people at the camp, including women and children, were sick and needed immediate healthcare. Even in normal times, it's difficult for us to access healthcare near the camp. Now, I'm so happy that the mobile health team delivered health care and provided cash assistance for referral to the hospital for delivery. They give me hope and strength.”
Among the affected population by the flood are humanitarian actors working on the ground. Their homes and offices were also submerged, and their families were displaced. Despite their losses and confusion due to the flood, they helped others and prioritized the needs of their communities. As one staff member from a UNFPA partner organizations said, “Helping others in this time of need gave me strength and purpose.”
Due to the impact of the flood, there is an urgent need for healthcare in affected communities. Common issues include skin infections, fever, diarrhoea, and mental health-related problems. Pregnant women require heightened antenatal care. As a medical doctor from one of the UNFPA’s partner organizations in Kachin put it, while he was grappling with the massive damage to his own home “The flood hit us swiftly when people were not ready. Affected people in the community were waiting for healthcare, including those who needed urgent assistance. Seeing the gratitude in the eyes of the women and girls we help makes all the hardships worth it. We are all in this together, and that keeps me going.”
UNFPA distributed some dignity kits to staff from partner organisations and their families affected by the floods, ensuring that those who were helping others were also cared for.
The critical need to ensure lifesaving support for vulnerable populations, particularly women, girls, and pregnant women, during emergencies cannot be overstated. Providing such support is vital to prevent further health complications and to save the life and the dignity of those affected. The collaboration between UNFPA and partners in Kachin strengthened the effectiveness of the coordinated humanitarian response in delivering timely and efficient assistance to the affected areas.
Since the flooding started, UNFPA and partner organizations, have delivered crucial assistance to women impacted by the flood in Myitkyina and Waing Maw townships. This aid encompasses antenatal care for over 70 pregnant women, referral assistance for over 30 individuals, and primary health care consultations for more than 1,000 individuals from affected communities. Additionally, over 500 Dignity Kits and over 200 Clean Delivery Kits for women and girls have been distributed.
This collaborative response of UNFPA and partners has delivered essential services and restored the dignity and hope of the people affected in Kachin. It served as a powerful example of how coordination at local, community level can make a real difference in times of disaster, providing crucial support to those who need it most..."
Source/publisher:
United Nations Population Fund
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-26
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
UNFPA (United Nations Population Fund), Public Health, Human Rights and international relations
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"An AFP article published ahead of this week’s meeting of Southeast Asian foreign ministers in Laos quotes a diplomat as saying: “The center is still solid under the junta.”
The Southeast Asian envoy who was planning to attend the event went on to warn that Myanmar could “become a failed state.”
This is the main misperception about Myanmar’s revolution that diplomats cling to, whether they are based in Yangon, Bangkok or elsewhere in Southeast or South Asia. It is not just the view of the anonymous Southeast Asian diplomat quoted in the report. It is safe to say it is a diplomatic dogma.
It seems that quite a number of diplomats, mission staff and other international workers in and around Myanmar don’t really live there. Instead, they are ensconced in their own narratives, and they feed these narratives to each other. Through various donors, international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) and consultancy firms, they commission “research” and “analytical reports” that echo their misperceptions and dogmas.
They sound like they live in echo chambers that completely removes them from reality in Myanmar.
None of these diplomats or international staff say much about the total incompetence of Myanmar’s junta. The State Administrative Council, the moniker the junta has given itself, has done nothing well. It has three accomplishments: mismanagement, failure and a more than three-year-long crime spree.
This does not seem to register in the echo chamber, even though the crime spree includes mass murder among its atrocities.
Diplomats and international “experts” do not talk much about the junta’s daily atrocities and other crimes. Civilians are the prime target of Myanmar’s military. In three years, over 3 million people have been driven from their homes. Most of the population has been driven into poverty.
Not a single day passes without the junta bombing a market, a monastery sheltering refugees, a school, hospital or a residential area. The sole purpose is to destroy and terrorize.
However, in the circles where diplomats and international “experts” compare notes, this is hardly mentioned, as if they accept this as completely normal.
Instead, they talk about their worries that Myanmar could become a “failed state” if the revolution succeeds and the people prevail over the junta.
The diplomats and international “experts” do not shy away from long discussions about the weaknesses and incompetence of the National Unity Government, but they avoid talking about the crimes and incompetence of the military regime, as well as the obvious fact that it is crumbling. The junta and its military are still regarded as the credible and inevitable partner of any future “solution” in Myanmar, which may be why it must be seen as “solidly in control of the center” despite all the defeats that it is rapidly accumulating across the country.
Another widely shared talking point in the diplomatic bubble is that ethnic resistance organizations (EROs) will “for sure stop fighting once they secure control over their own territory.” Every single statement or speech from ethnic revolutionary leaders says the opposite. They keep repeating that they are committed to removing the military dictatorship. For three years, EROs have been training, equipping and fighting in tandem with People’s Defense Forces. They are spilling blood together.
Month by month, allied EROs and PDF liberation forces are becoming increasingly capable and strategic in squeezing faltering junta troops from three sides: from the west and southwest, from the north, and from the east and southeast.
Since October 2023, coordinated offensives by liberation forces have been unrelenting. Once advances by resistance forces in one theater of war abate, an advance starts immediately from another direction as resistance forces elsewhere reposition themselves and build up supplies for another offensive.
If one talks with senior ERO leaders, one can hear only their deep historical experience and determination.
Here’s what one told me:
“It is not possible to trust the Myanmar military. They will always break all the promises and deals they make when they are weak. As soon as they become a bit stronger, they come back to attack, occupy, kill, rape, burn and plunder. We have had more than enough experience with them. Now, when the Bamar population is in rebellion against the junta, we see a historic opportunity to liberate the country, and we will not miss that opportunity.”
What he said was not unique.
However, diplomats and international “experts” cocooned in their echo chambers know better. Nothing can persuade them that EROs are not focused only on the narrow self-interest of taking control of territory and establishing their own states, without any care about what happens in Burma proper and without concern about who occupies Naypyidaw.
In the diplomatic bubble, the talk is about “possible future fragmentation.” This is seen as the biggest threat Myanmar faces. It is a bigger threat than the devastation Min Aung Hlaing and his junta have delivered: Three years of destruction. The annihilation of civilians, villages, towns and cities. The unrelenting attacks on the body and soul of a nation are occurring in front of our eyes.
Among diplomats, this is not a matter of concern or conversation.
Inside the bubble, the focus is on the imaginary disintegration of the country in the future, not the destruction Myanmar’s military is inflicting now.
Last but not the least, those in the bubble are behaving as if China’s electoral manipulation plan is inevitable. Many feel they need to jump on the election train so they can be well-placed in the queue to welcome the new “elected” government.
It does not matter that it is very uncertain whether any election will take place at all. It does not matter that, even if an electoral farce is staged, it will only cover one third of the territory and be completely manipulated and falsified. Still, it seems, everybody in the bubble is ready to welcome the “opening” and “opportunity that should not be missed.”
The usual rationalization of those arguing that the junta is “too strong to fall” is that appeasing the Myanmar military is the only solution to stop further fighting, achieve a ceasefire, bring back stability and reduce civilian suffering.
This argument is nothing but shamefully dishonest. It does not recognize that it is not revolutionary forces that are causing civilian suffering. It is primarily the SAC’s intentional targeting of the civilian population and civilian infrastructure that is creating civilian suffering.
Myanmar’s neighbors have done absolutely nothing to reduce the capacity of the junta to target civilians.
They have applied little real pressure on the SAC to stop it from targeting civilians. India and China are still providing the junta with weapons. Thailand is paying the junta money for gas that the junta uses to continue funding its war of terror against the civilian population.
Myanmar’s neighbors and the whole of ASEAN have not even provided meaningful humanitarian aid to millions of internally dispersed persons. They have not provided shelter for civilian victims of war, which would be adequate for the size of the humanitarian catastrophe. Instead, neighbors preferred to create an invisible but effective cordon sanitaire to protect themselves from refugees and other spillover effects.
It is much more correct to conclude that when diplomats in the bubble talk about concern for the civilian population if the war continues, they are in reality concerned about the possibility of the final fall of the military-as-regime.
Myanmar’s neighbors and other ASEAN countries are not able to imagine the Myanmar state without a military-as-regime. They think that without a military-as-regime there will be no central authority, and in their minds that means chaos and state failure (currently they call it “fragmentation” or “Balkanization”).
So they say that the junta is still “solid in the centre” (which it is not) and that the military “cannot fall” (which it can), because that is their wish. They would like to have the junta solid in the center and they do not want the military to fall.
So they create all those disillusioned, out-of-touch narratives and repeat them in their echo chamber.
The consequence is that Myanmar’s neighbors and international “experts” are not ready for the probable fall of the SAC because they fear it. They remain blinded by their denial of reality..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-26
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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"Junta troops retreating from Thandwe Township to Gwa Township in Rakhine State blew up a bridge between the two towns on Wednesday to impede the progress of Arakan Army (AA) troops who were pursuing them, according to residents.
“Half of Chin Kwin Bridge remained on Tuesday, but they destroyed the entire bridge early Wednesday morning,” a resident who arrived at the scene on Wednesday morning told The Irrawaddy.
The bridge is located near Kyeintali town 56 km from Thandwe town, on the only route that civilians can use to flee from Thandwe to Gwa. Part of the Thandwe-Gwa-Yangon Road, the route is used for trade and for patients who need to go to Yangon for healthcare services not available in Rakhine.
A trader who supplies groceries in Thandwe said: “The situation is getting worse. We can’t send supplies without that bridge. I filled a tuk-tuk with food to send to Thandwe, but I can’t send it now.”
One Gwa resident said: “I heard around 80 junta soldiers were deployed at a monastery near a bridge in Sap Thwar Village a few days ago. Junta soldiers have built bamboo fortifications outside checkpoints.”
The regime has set up checkpoints at three important locations in Gwa Township including on Gwa-Yangon Road, residents said.
Three overland routes link Rakhine with other parts of the country. The regime is using a road through the mountains in Gwa Township in the southernmost part of Rakhine to send reinforcements from Ayeyarwady Region to Thandwe Township, which is 128 km from Gwa.
Fighting has been raging in the hotel zone in Mya Pyin Ward and Jeiktaw Village, the junta’s last base in Ngapali Beach.
The two sides clashed in at least four locations in Mya Pyin and Jeiktaw on Wednesday, according to residents.
At least six civilians were killed and several others injured when the regime shelled villages where displaced people were taking shelter this week, residents said.
Fighting has been raging in Ngapali Beach since early June. The AA has seized Thandwe Airport, Light Infantry Battalion 566 and Infantry Battalion 55, and much of the popular beach. It is now focused on attacking the last remaining junta position on the southern tip of the beach. The regime is defending it with air and naval support..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-26
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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Description:
"This Short Update describes events occurring in Daw Hpa Hkoh (Thandaunggyi) Township, Taw Oo (Toungoo) District, in February and March 2024. On February 10th 2024, a skirmish broke out between State Administration Council (SAC) troops and local People’s Defence Force (PDF) and Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) forces near A--- village, Htee Day area, Daw Hpa Hkoh Township. During the skirmish, two cows were killed, and villagers fled to nearby areas. After the skirmish, the SAC troops looted several houses and villager’s properties, including cars and motorbikes, and burned down 64 houses. One villager was arrested when he tried to obtain his car back. The SAC also made threats to burn the entire village if fighting occurred again. On March 21st 2024, two children from A--- village were killed by an unexploded ordnance (UXO). Local villagers believe that this UXO was one of the mortars that the SAC troops fired during the skirmish on February 10th 2024.[1]
Skirmish and house burning in A--- village, Htee Day area
On February 10th 2024, at around 3 pm, a skirmish occurred between State Administration Council (SAC)[2] Infantry Battalion (IB)[3] #49 combined with other [unknown] SAC battalions, against forces of the People’s Defence Force (PDF)[4] [unknown battalions] combined with the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA)[5] Brigade #2, Battalion #4, near A--- village, Htee Day area, Daw Hpa Hkoh (Thandaunggyi) Township, Taw Oo (Toungoo) District. The fighting lasted three hours. These SAC troops [IB #49 and other SAC unknown battalions] are from Naypyidaw Union Territory [an administrative division under direct control of the SAC]. Before the skirmish, the PDF had set up a temporary base near the village, where they stayed for a few days. When the skirmish happened, some soldiers from KNLA Brigade #2 Battalion #4 were also staying at the temporary PDF base. During the fighting, two cows owned by villagers were hit by bullets and killed, and some local villagers fled from A--- village for their safety to nearby farms, plantations, and the mountain. Villagers could not bring anything with them when they fled.
After the fighting ended at around 6 pm, the SAC troops entered the village and burned down 64 houses owned by villagers, causing some villagers to flee to nearby safer areas again. There are more than 100 houses in the village. Before they burned the villagers’ houses, they looted what they wanted from them. They also looted two cars and three motorbikes. One of the cars’ owners is named U[6] B---. The names of the motorbike owners and a second looted car owner are unknown. The SAC demanded that the cars’ owners pay four million kyats [USD 1,905.68][7] for each car if they wanted to get them back. U B--- attempted to redeem his car but was detained by the SAC. [It is unknown to KHRG if U B--- has been released.] Villagers were also threatened by the SAC troops that if any further fighting occurred [between the SAC troops and the PDF/KNLA] the entire village would be burned down.
Most of the villagers have returned to their village at present. Some villagers have not yet returned because they cannot afford to rebuild their houses, so they are staying at their friends or relatives’ houses in other villages. Some villagers whose houses were burned down remained in A--- village and simply built temporary bamboo houses after the burning, with bamboo and trees provided by the KNLA. The Yay Tar Shay Social Service Organisation [from Yay Tar Shay Town in Bago Division, near Daw Hpa Hkoh Township] provided some food support for villagers consisting of one month’s worth of rice and oil. After that, villagers did not receive any other support. No [other] humanitarian organisations provided food assistance or support for rebuilding their houses. Villagers reported they still need assistance to rebuild their homes and restart their lives.
Currently [as of July 2024], there are no PDF temporary bases near A--- village. Instead, the SAC set up a temporary base of their own in its place, which is still active.
UXO explosion in A--- village, Htee Day area
On March 21st 2024, two boys named Wai Yan Lin (5 years old) and Kaung Khet Lwin (8 years old) from A--- village found an unexploded ordnance (UXO) [in A--- village]. [Villagers believe the UXO was a mortar round fired by the SAC during a skirmish between SAC troops and PDF/KNLA forces, likely on February 10th 2024.] Wai Yan Lin and Kaung Khet Lwin started playing with it, and the UXO exploded. The explosion caused extensive injuries to Wai Yan Lin’s head, left arm, left leg, chest and abdomen, killing him instantly. Kaung Khet Lwin was seriously injured; his entire left leg was lacerated, and he sustained injuries to his left arm, hand and chest. Villagers attempted to transport Kaung Khet Lwin to the hospital in Swar Town, in Naypyidaw Union Territory, [located approximately two hours away by motorbike,] but he died right after leaving the village, while being transported to the hospital.
Villagers helped Wai Yan Lin’s and Kaung Khet Lwin’s families with the funeral’s arrangements. No one provided any support to the two children’s family members in the first two weeks after the incident. It is not known whether the families received any other assistance after this date.
Further background reading on the situation on fighting, house burning, looting and UXOs in Southeast Burma/Myanmar can be found in the following KHRG reports:
“Taw Oo District Short Update: Shelling, air strikes and house burning by SAC troops, and use of forced navigators by PDF soldiers in Htaw Ta Htoo Township (November to December 2023)”, April 2024;
“Taw Oo District Short Update: House burning, indiscriminate shelling and air strikes by the SAC in Htaw Ta Htoo Township (September to November 2023)”, March 2024;
“Taw Oo District Situation Update: Fighting, shelling, and house burning in Thandaung Town, and air strikes in Htaw Ta Htoo Township (January to July 2023)”, January 2024;
“Taw Oo District Incident Report: Killings, property destruction, and indiscriminate shelling by the SAC in Daw Hpa Hkoh Township (July 2023)”, November 2023..."
Source/publisher:
"Karen Human Rights Group"
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-26
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Karen Human Rights Group (KHRG) reports, Karen (Kayin) State, Human Rights and international relations
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"The Karen National Union (KNU) and the civilian National Unity Government (NUG) expressed sadness about the death of the group’s former vice-chairwoman Padoh Naw Zipporah Sein, recognizing her as a revolutionary hero.
Naw Zipporah Sein, 69, died of cancer on Wednesday afternoon at her home in the Thai border town of Mae Sariang.
The country’s oldest armed revolutionary group said she dedicated her life to liberating the Karen people and to serving the community. The KNU said, “may her legacy of courage and commitment continue to inspire us all”.
The NUG said the death of Padoh Naw Zipporah Sein was a loss for the whole country, not only for her community.
The NUG said she was the first leader to declare that the 2015 Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) was void after the 2021 coup and pledged support to the civilian government.
Naw Zipporah Sein led the KNU’s Concerned Group which abandoned the NCA and recognized the NUG, sharing its vision for a federal union.
The daughter of KNU commander-in-chief, General Tamla Baw, she served the organization as a school teacher, women’s rights activist, general secretary and vice-chair.
From 1988 to 2008, she was general secretary of the Karen Women’s Association, dealing with refugee issues.
Naw Zipporah Sein was awarded the Women’s Peace Prize by the Women’s Organization Network in 2014.
Messages of condolences spread on social media.
Saw Kapi, a Karen educational rights advocate, said: “Naw Zipporah Sein’s legacy extends beyond her political achievements. She was an inspiration and a role model for countless Karen women and girls who saw her as a symbol of strength and possibility. Her leadership and courage have left an indelible mark on the Karen struggle for self-determination and principled politics.”
He praised her role ahead of the signing of the 2015 NCA as the head of the KNU delegation in negotiating a ceasefire agreement with Thein Sein’s transitional government.
Her ability to navigate the complex and often treacherous negotiations was a testament to her skill, patience and unyielding commitment to the Karen cause, Saw Kapi added..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-25
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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Description:
"The ethnic Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) and allied resistance groups claimed to have seized the junta military’s North Eastern Command headquarters in northern Shan State’s capital Lashio on Thursday morning.
It is the first military regional command headquarters to be seized by anti-regime resistance forces, marking a major milestone in Myanmar’s fight against the regime since it grabbed power in a coup in early 2021.
One of 14 junta military regional commands scattered across the country, the North Eastern Command oversees military operations across northern Shan State, including areas near the Chinese border.
The MNDAA on Thursday announced it had taken control of the command headquarters after 23 days of fighting in what it called a “historic victory.”
Lashio itself has yet to be completely seized, however, as clashes are still going on in parts of the city, sources close to resistance forces on the ground told The Irrawaddy.
Maung Saungkha, the founder of the Bamar People’s Liberation Army, which is fighting alongside the MNDAA, wrote on his Facebook on Thursday that the resistance groups only needed to finish seizing a few remaining junta positions and to capture regime forces trying to flee the city.
The fall of the junta’s North Eastern Command, the regime’s stronghold in northern Shan State, leaves the junta’s garrison town of Pyin Oo Lwin, home to its Defense Services Academy, vulnerable to resistance attack. The academy is Myanmar’s answer to West Point.
Alongside several resistance groups, the MNDAA, a member of the Brotherhood Alliance of ethnic armies that launched the highly successful Operation 1027 offensive in northern Shan State in October last year, resumed its attacks on frontline junta bases and military battalions defending Lashio on July 3.
It took just a little over three weeks for the ethnic alliance and allied resistance forces to seize around five junta battalion headquarters and frontline bases in and around Lashio.
A total of 317 junta soldiers including a lieutenant colonel, two majors and five army captains from regime bases defending Lashio surrendered to the MNDAA on Sunday, the ethnic army said.
The city is almost empty as most residents fled in the early days of the resistance operation, but some people remain trapped there, according to local rescue groups.
Meanwhile, fierce clashes have broken out in Hsipaw, Kyaukme, Nawnghkio and Mongmit townships in northern Shan and Singu, Madaya and Mogoke townships in northern Mandalay Region, where the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA)—another member of the Brotherhood Alliance—are fighting alongside resistance groups including People’s Defense Forces (PDFs) under the command of the civilian National Unity Government (NUG). They resumed fighting on June 25 as part of Phase 2 of Operation 1027.
The TNLA and PDF groups took complete control of Mogoke, Myanmar’s major ruby hub, in northern Mandalay Region on Wednesday after a month of fighting against junta forces.
As part of Operation 1027, Mandalay PDF and allied resistance groups have also taken complete control of Singu Township, 91 km north of Myanmar’s second-biggest city Mandalay, where the headquarters of the junta’s Central Command is based.
Mandalay PDF and allied resistance groups have also managed to seize around 30 junta bases including the junta’s Air Defense Battalion Headquarters in Madaya Township next to Mandalay city. With the PDF attacks threatening Central Command, the regime has tightened security in Mandalay city.
The TNLA and PDF groups have also taken control of Kyaukme and continue to attack regime bases outside the town. Kyaukme is located next to Nawnghkio.
Since the resumption of Operation 1027 on June 25, the ethnic alliance and allied resistance groups have seized around 90 junta bases including around 10 battalion headquarters and the North Eastern Command, and have taken control of five towns in northern Shan and northern Mandalay.
However, towns under the control of the ethnic alliance and PDFs are at risk of being bombarded by the junta as it seeks to avenge its losses. Military-backed pro-junta Telegram channels are eagerly urging the military regime to incinerate all the towns it has lost, by bombing them from the air.
Together with several resistance groups, the Brotherhood Alliance launched Operation 1027 in northern Shan State in October last year, seizing hundreds of junta bases, command centers and 24 military battalion headquarters as well as around 20 towns and vital trade routes with China in its first phase.
The operation was halted on Jan. 10 after the ethnic alliance agreed to a China-brokered ceasefire with the regime, but fighting resumed last month after the ceasefire collapsed..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-25
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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Description:
"July 25 (Reuters) - A rebel army in Myanmar said on Thursday it had seized control of a major regional military headquarters near the border with China, in what could be the biggest recent defeat for a ruling junta that is battling to contain a widening revolt.
The Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) said it had taken the strategic city of Lashio in northern Shan State, about 120 km (75 miles) from the Chinese border, after 23 days of fighting with government troops.
"Our army has won a decisive victory and is now clearing out the remaining enemy troops. The city is now declared completely liberated," it said in a statement shared by its mouthpiece on social media, urging the public to remain calm and comply with its administration of the city.
Reuters could not independently verify the group's claim and a spokesperson for Myanmar's junta did not respond to calls seeking comment.
The MNDAA is among several ethnic minority rebel groups fighting to repel the military from what they consider their territories, in a loose alliance with an armed resistance movement that has waged a nationwide campaign to undermine the junta's rule.
The conflict has morphed into a civil war that represents one of the biggest challenges to Myanmar's well-equipped military in its combined five decades of rule. More than 2.6 million people are displaced, according to the United Nations.
The military, which seized back power in 2021 after a decade of tentative democracy, has been stretched by fighting on multiple fronts across the country of 53 million people, hampering its ability to govern and manage a crippled economy.
The junta has described its opponents as "terrorists" seeking to destabilise the country.
The MNDAA launched its latest offensive after the recent collapse of a ceasefire brokered by China, which has been concerned about fighting at its border and its impact on trade.
China's foreign ministry on Thursday urged all sides to cease hostilities, enter into dialogue and ensure Chinese businesses and nationals were unharmed.
"We will continue to encourage peace and push for talks," spokesperson Mao Ning told a regular briefing.
Online news outlet Myanmar Now quoted the commander of another armed group fighting alongside the MNDAA as confirming the capture of the regional command headquarters at Lashio.
According to an analysis earlier this year by the Special Advisory Council for Myanmar, the junta has no effective control of Myanmar, having lost authority over townships covering 86% of the country and two-thirds of the population..."
Source/publisher:
"Reuters" (UK)
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-25
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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Description:
"Human Rights Violations took place in States and Regions from July 15 to 21, 2024
Military Junta Troop launched airstrikes and dropped bombs in Mandalay Region, Tanintharyi Region, Shan State, Kachin State, and Mon State from July 15th to 21st. The Military Junta Navy attacked heavy artillery on the villages along the Ayeyarwady River in Singu Township, Mandalay Region. Political prisoners from Insein Prison, Yangon Region, were relocated to Thayawaddy Prison and Kyaikzagaw Prison, Bago Region.
Over 40 civilians died, and nearly 20 were injured by the Military’s heavy and light artillery attacks within a week. Over 30 civilians were arrested, and over 10 were killed by the arrest of the Military Junta within a week..."
Source/publisher:
Network for Human Rights Documentation-Burma
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-23
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Format :
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278.49 KB 289.86 KB 65.55 KB
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Description:
"The new course targets practitioners addressing child labour issues as well as children, youth and families in Myanmar who are vulnerable to child labour exploitation.
YANGON, Myanmar (ILO News) - ILO Myanmar today launched a self-paced E-learning programme on rights, responsibilities, and representation for children, youth, and families (3Rs), that aims to equip practitioners and those in vulnerable populations with the tools to enhance social equality and well-being.
Delivered in Myanmar and English language, the 11-module interactive course is now live at https://ecampus.iloyangon.org, the ILO’s digital learning platform. The course is also available in a downloadable offline format to enable full accessibility for those with limited internet capabilities. A certificate will be presented to participants who complete the course.
Developed by ILO Myanmar in collaboration with a team of external experts, the course targets practitioners addressing child labour issues as well as children, youth and families who are vulnerable to child labour exploitation. Packaged in an interactive and visually engaging way, it allows learners to choose and combine modules according to their expertise and interest.
With more children at risk of child labour in Myanmar, the 3Rs emphasizes the urgent need to understand child rights, workers’ rights and gender equality among children, youth and their families in at-risk communities and workplaces.
"Empowering communities through education is key to breaking the cycle of child labour. This E-learning programme provides critical knowledge and resources to those on the front lines, as well as to vulnerable families, to foster a deeper understanding of their rights and responsibilities. By doing so, we aim to build a future where every child is protected from exploitation," said Yutong Liu, ILO Myanmar Liaison Officer/Representative.
The newly launched E-learning programme on rights, responsibilities, and representation for children, youth, and families (3Rs) builds upon the 3-R Trainers’ Kit and also on the foundation established by the E-learning Programme on Child Labour launched in 2022. These were designed to equip civil society partners, social workers, employers and worker’s organizations to effectively assess and address issues of child labour within their communities.
Globally, the incidence of child labour has surged to a staggering 160 million[1] children, with Myanmar reflecting this alarming trend where nearly one in ten children between the ages of 5 and 17 are engaged in child labour[2].
The ILO is the only tripartite United Nations agency devoted to promoting rights at work, encouraging decent employment opportunities, enhancing social protection and strengthening dialogue on work-related issues. Find more information about the ILO’s work in Myanmar.
.......................................
[1] ILO and UNICEF, Child Labour: Global Estimates 2020, Trends and the Road Forward, 2021.
[2] Myanmar Ministry of Labour, Employment and Social Security, Central Statistical Organization, and ILO, Myanmar Labour Force, Child Labour and School to Work Transition Survey 2015, 2015..."
Source/publisher:
International Labour Organization (Geneva)
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-23
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
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Description:
"The MAU tracks market prices in Southeast Myanmar. Data are collected from three vendors per product per market in the last week of each month. The data include prices from Demoso (village), Hpapun (Kamamaung), Hsihseng (main), Kawkareik (main), Loikaw (main), Pekon (main), and Taungoo (Nat Htet). Data are available online at www.themimu.info/market-analysis-unit.
KEY FINDINGS
Essential food prices were fairly stable, with rice pric-es up 4-6% and pulses and cooking oil mostly stable;
Meat/fish prices were stable or rising in June, and they climbed faster than other food categories like vege-tables or essential foods;
NFI price trends varied by market, with more stable prices in Pekon and Demoso and more rising prices in Taungoo;
Soap and detergent prices jump 20-25%, but prices for other hygiene NFIs were relatively stable;
Essential food prices remained 30-50% above 2023, while vegetable prices were 60-100% higher, and NFIs prices were 30-90% higher;
Vegetable prices have risen slower than last year, suggesting large increases may yet be ahead as the mon-soon season progresses..."
Source/publisher:
Myanmar Information Management Unit (Myanmar) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-23
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Food Security and nutrition in Burma/Myanmar, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
738.82 KB
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Description:
"This Rapid Market Assessment (RMA) is a suppliment to the MAU Market Price Report in Rakhine State. It provides township-level data on market functionality, activity, supply, and logistics. Data were collected through observation and KIIs with retailers during June 21-23, 2024. Reports available at www.themimu.info/market-analysis-unit.....
KEY FINDINGS.....
Most markets operated in mornings only, al-though southerly markets were open longer;
Market activity increased in Mrauk-U District as market activity grew with returning IDPs;
Conflict altered market dynamics as market dam-age pushed customers from Ponnagyun to Pauktaw;
Shipping costs climbed, driven by poor monsoon conditions and trade disruptions with Toungoup;
Food and NFI supply was stable, but supply of food and NFIs was very poor in Rathedaung;
Retailers reported more challenges, both season-al and conflict-driven, mostly in Mrauk-U District..."
Source/publisher:
Myanmar Information Management Unit (Myanmar) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-23
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Food Security and nutrition in Burma/Myanmar, Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
12.53 MB
Local URL:
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Description:
"The second anniversary of the execution of hip-hop artist, social justice advocate and lawmaker Ko Phyo Zeya Thaw is on Tuesday (July 23).
His death, along with three others, by hanging at Insein Prison marked the end of a more than 40-year moratorium on executions in Myanmar. The junta cited violations of terrorism laws to justify killing them.
It was merciless and swift.
Ko Phyo Zeya Thaw was arrested on Nov. 18, 2021, sentenced to death by a military court two months later (on Jan. 21 , 2022) and executed on July 23 along with 88 Generation student leader Ko Jimmy and two other democracy advocates: Ko Hla Myo Aung and Ko Aung Thu Zaw.
Within Myanmar, people knew the executions for what they were, retribution and a warning. The junta also desecrated the men by not returning their bodies or ashes to their families.
Before the execution, Ko Phyo Zeya Thaw’s wife, hip hop artist Ma Thazin Nyunt Aung, pleaded with the international community not to stand by and let the regime kill her husband.
She was on the run. After the junta detained Ko Phyo Zeya Thaw, they started hunting for her.
Her husband’s execution hardened her resolve to fight the regime.
Ma Thazin Nyunt Aung now hosts online entertainment programs like “Send Your Letter” and “By-The-Way” with Myanmar actor Aung Myint Myat. The income raised supports resistance fighters. Last year, she gave the rights to her song “Longing for Days of Yangon” to a campaign targeting the regime.
In an interview with The Irrawaddy ahead of the second anniversary of her husband’s execution, Ma Thazin Nyunt Aung recalls the time they were together, what his absence means, and the interplay between politics and art during a revolution.
The interview has been edited for length and clarity.
If there was a last word that Zeya Thaw said before he was arrested, what would it be?
Thazin Nyunt Aung: Every year I tell myself, and sometimes my friends, here comes July. The anniversary of injustice.
When we were together before he was detained, we mostly gazed at each other. Actually, there were last words, but they were about work related to the [political crisis].
That was all.
We didn’t say goodbye … We didn’t say anything personal.
Ko Phyo Zeya Thaw is especially popular with young people. His interest in politics, not just art, led him to become an advocate for social justice. What do you want young people to remember about him?
TZNA: I believe that everyone will have words to remember him by. He said in an interview, “We are behind you and if we have to stay in front, we are also ready.”
I always see people who loved him post this phrase when they share memories of him on social media. They always use that phrase. Another phrase would be, “The big brother who is always with us” or “Our big brother.”
Which one is more memorable for you?
I think of the happier memories we had together. Over time, I developed an attitude that he should be remembered for good things and not bad ones. Rather than being sad about this bad incident [execution], I think of the time we were happy, comfortable … successful moments … and think of our attitude towards each other, the words we said to each other and our decisions. I will always remember these.
I have a lot of memories of him. It’s hard to choose one. The comrades who lived with him or met with him also have memories of him. They always talk to me about them every time I see them. “The brother said this and that at the meeting. At that time, he was angry and scorned us. Big brother has encouraged us.” They share [memories like] those whenever we meet.
You have been deeply involved in the anti-regime movement since the 2021 coup. You are determined. What drives you politics as well as your commitment to art?
I always think about what kind of content I’ll be doing when I compose songs. I rarely focus on love songs or too much longing for love. My songs reflect my life. I was born in Yangon and raised in the same city. In my songs, there are many lyrics that represent the city of Yangon and urban life. I also highlight discrimination [against] women in society.
In this revolution, I always say to this day that “it is too shameful that I am still alive” because, over the past three years, we have lost many lives. People sacrifice a lot and they are not afraid to enter battlefields. Many peaceful protesters have been shot dead. Young people were dragged on the street after being shot. We lost them. I always feel that we are nothing compared to them.
At this moment, my sadness is there … I want to say that my loss is [of] one person, and it is incomparable to the losses of [many] others every day. The terrorist army kills innocent families, rapes daughters in front of family members, arrests young people or severely beats parents when they cannot find their children.
Recently, a family of six was killed by artillery strikes. Every day we hear and see about people being hit by bombs. The more I see, the stronger I become …
Sometimes we may feel depressed, sometimes we may be active and energized …
We must work harder and we must continue.
What message do you have for your followers?
The artist’s job is to create. How can we encourage art without empathy? In taking sides, there are right and wrong sides. Will you be on the right side? Will you be on the wrong side? Will you stand with those who oppress, set fires, kill or bomb innocent civilians?
We have to think about what kind of art and artists we support. Regarding the boycot [of artists who side with the junta], I have consistently urged people to clearly know who they are supporting, because art is powerful and very important in persuading people..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-22
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Individual Documents
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Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations, Political prisoners and other violations in Burma - reports
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"In Myanmar’s Buddhist society, while monks are highly revered as moral authority figures, they have also long been a political force—in British colonial times, during previous military regimes, and continuing with monks’ anti-regime activism today.
To give you a better understanding of the Myanmar Buddhist clergy’s history of defying authoritarian regimes, The Irrawaddy presents our October 2007 cover story, reposted here as part of our new section, “Stories That Shaped Us”. In the section, we will reintroduce you to significant and important stories we have published on Myanmar politics, culture, history, ethnic issues, international relations and more to provide context and help you grasp the nuances and complexities of the issues Myanmar is facing today.
Enjoy the read—we will be back with more!
The Lord Buddha shunned worldly affairs, but in his teachings he stressed the need for good governance and good rulers in the practice of politics.
The Buddha said: “When the ruler of a country is just and good, the ministers become just and good; when the ministers are just and good, the higher officials become just and good; when the higher officials are just and good, the rank and file become just and good; when the rank and file become just and good, the people become just and good.”
If these admonitions are followed by the large community of monks—the Sangha—in predominantly Buddhist Burma, the lingering “love lost” relationship between the country’s military rulers and its monks should be no surprise.
Over the last two decades, Burma’s Sangha community, officially estimated to number around 400,000, has had an uneasy relationship with the ruling generals, who have imprisoned several prominent, politically active monks or pongyis. It is estimated that since the present military regime came to power in 1988, about 300 monks have been defrocked and sentenced to long terms of imprisonment.
Monks, considered “sons of Buddha,” are the biggest institution in Burma after the armed forces, which number more than 400,000 soldiers and police.
In their close contacts with the common people and during their morning alms rounds of local households, the monks witness firsthand the suffering and poverty of ordinary Burmese citizens. They have a very clear picture of the deteriorating situation in Burma.
More importantly, they probably have a better network, connections and influence than politically active students, who are constantly watched, imprisoned or forced into exile.
Who could imagine that these monks, living quietly in monasteries and studying Dhamma, would ever plan to rebel against the repressive regime? Yet history has shown that monks have long played a pivotal role in politics and that they would indeed dare such a bold and dangerous undertaking.
The role of political pongyis is controversial and potentially threatening to the ruling elite, although there has been a continuing debate on whether monks really should involve themselves in politics.
The Early Rebellion
Monks were involved in early outbreaks of resistance against British colonization, joining lay people in taking up arms against the British after seeing King Thibaw sent into exile.
Monks have their resistance martyrs—U Ottama, for instance, who led 3,000 rebels in the Salin area a year after the invasion of Mandalay. The rebel monk, also known as Bo Ottama, was captured and hanged by the British in 1889.
Interestingly, historians noted that monks who took up arms voluntarily defrocked themselves first, following the precept forbidding monks to take lives.
Another martyr, Saya San, who was an ex-monk, led a peasant uprising in Tharrawaddy opposing the tax system imposed by the British. Burma’s colonial masters sent 10,000 troops to quell the rebellion, capturing Saya San and sending him, too, to the gallows.
One of the top Burmese lawyers who defended Saya San at his trial was Dr Ba Maw, who later became head of state in Burma’s Japanese-backed government.
Not all monks advocated armed struggle. Two who preached nonviolent resistance, U Wisara and another monk named U Ottama, spent many years in prison for their opposition to colonialism and their names have joined the list of independence heroes.
U Ottama, a globe-trotting, well-respected monk from Arakan State, was a powerful speaker whose calls for independence were featured in the national newspaper Thuriya. He once famously told the British Governor Sir Reginald Craddock to go home to Britain, in a speech that landed him in prison.
Like U Ottama, U Wisara was imprisoned several times for his public speeches and died in jail in 1929 after 166 days of a hunger strike. His prison sentences included terms of hard labor, and he was also defrocked.
Both monks became an inspiration to activists and students involved in the independence movement.
Scholar Michael Mendelson wrote in his “Sangha and State in Burma,” that all politically active monks tended to be labeled by the colonial authorities as “political agitators in the yellow robes.” Interestingly, a similar term is used by Burma’s current leaders to describe protesting monks.
Historians wrote that the British authorities were surprised to learn the influential role of the Sangha community, and soon after the invasion of 1885 they abolished the position of “Supreme Patriarch,” or Thathana-baing.
In former times, Burmese kings appointed Thathana-baing to govern the Sangha community and made them responsible for doctrinal instruction and discipline of all monks. But the position wasn’t accepted by the entire Sangha. The progressive Shwegin sect was one group that rejected it. Sectarianism created controversy and bitter rivalry among monks.
During the Kon-Baung period in the 18th century, conflicts arose within the Sangha over how the monastic robes were supposed to be worn, and two conflicting sects arose—the so-called Ton Gaing and Yon Gaing.
The Burmese scholar Tin Maung Maung Than records that the Toun-goo and early Kon-Baung dynasties were drawn into the rivalry by their royal patronage of one party or the other. In 1782, King Bodawphaya intervened in the controversy by siding with Ton Gaing.
One experienced colonial political officer, Col Edward Sladen, conversant with the power of the Sangha, advised British authorities to maintain the Thathana-baingsystem in order to head off conflicts in governing the predominately Buddhist country.
The role of Thathana-baing was undoubtedly a complicated one, involving a direct link between the monarchy and the Sangha. The Thathana-baing wielded influence and could even intervene in state affairs. One respected abbot even persuaded King Mindon to abandon corvée labor for his irrigation projects. It’s ironic that the current regime argues that forced labor is a feature of Burmese tradition and a means of making merit.
After independence, however, the influence of Buddhism and the Sangha went into decline, except for a period under the late prime minister U Nu, a devout Buddhist.
U Nu himself was ordained as a monk several times and rarely exploited Buddhism for his own political ends. Under his government, the Sixth Great Buddhist World Council was held in 1954, and he also created the Buddha Sasana Council.
Tin Maung Maung Than noted in his book, “Sangha Reforms and Renewal of Sasana in Myanmar: Historical trends and Contemporary Practice”: “Because of various Gaing and sectarianism U Nu failed to take effective reforms in spite of institutionalization of Buddhism within the state superstructure and notwithstanding the holding of the Sixth Buddhist Synod in 1954.”
U Nu also attempted to legalize Buddhism as the state religion in 1961. The attempt was considered to be a misguided policy, and it anyway failed to materialize as U Nu was ousted by Gen Ne Win one year later.
Ne Win regarded monks as a potential opposition and he developed a different strategy to control them. In the mid-1960s, his regime called a Sangha conference to issue monks with identification cards. Young monks and abbots stayed away from the gathering.
It wasn’t until 1980 that Ne Win succeeded in containing the monks by establishing a “State Sangha Nayaka Committee,” after a carefully orchestrated campaign to discredit the Sangha. Part of the campaign was to discredit a famous monk, Thein Phyu Sayadaw, who was accused of romantic involvement with a woman. He was defrocked.
Before the campaign, intelligence officers and informants of the government infiltrated the temples as monks and gathered information about monks and abbots.
Some well-known abbots, including Mahasi Sayadaw, an internationally respected monk who was invited by U Nu in 1947 to teach Vipassana meditation, were also targeted in the campaign.
Anthropologist Gustaaf Houtmann wrote in his paper “Mental Culture in Burmese Crisis Politics” that the regime had “distributed leaflets accusing Mahasi of talking with the nat spirits, and it was claimed that the Tipitaka Mingun Sayadaw, Burma’s top Buddhist scholar, had been involved in some unsavory incident two years after entering the monkhood.” Both monks were victims of their refusal to cooperate with the regime.
A number of scholars and historians noted, however, that some abbots accused and charged by the government were indeed involved in scandals and had romantic relationship with women or nuns.
The regime’s campaign sometimes took bizarre forms. Rumors were circulated, for instance, suggesting that one Rangoon monk, U Laba, was a cannibal. Several famous abbots were implicated in scandals and were either defrocked or fled to neighboring Thailand. Ne Win successfully launched a “Sangha reform”—also known as “Cleaning Up the Sangha.”
The government managed to get some recognition from elderly Buddhists by forming the Sangha Committee. But Ne Win did not pretend to be a devout Buddhist. He rarely participated in Sangha meetings and held few religious ceremonies during the 26 years of his rule. Unlike current leaders, he was rarely seen with monks.
During the 1988 uprising, however, his government asked the Sangha Committee to help restore order, and senior monks appeared in live television broadcasts appealing to the public for calm.
In August, 1988, days after the massacre in Rangoon, monks expressed sorrow for the loss of life, but—to the surprise of many—they also appealed to the regime to govern in accordance with the 10 duties prescribed for rulers of the people. The appeal failed to calm the public mood, but the message did remind many Burmese of the “10 duties of rulers”—the monks were telling Ne Win to be a good ruler.
On August 30, the Working People’s Daily reported: “1,500 members of the Sangha marched in procession through the Rangoon streets and gathered in front of the Rangoon General Hospital emergency ward, where they recited “Metta Sutta” in memory of rahans (monks), workers and students who fell in the struggle for democracy.” Many young monks were among the demonstrators.
For many Burmese, the struggle for democracy is not yet over and the discord between the Sangha and the ruling generals remains strong.
Unlike Ne Win and U Nu, the generals who came to power in 1988 openly and audaciously schemed to buy off the Sangha community. They have also claimed to be protectors of the Sangha, although their motive is to gain political legitimacy.
Aside from holding numerous merit-making ceremonies, offering hsoon and valuable gifts to monks, the military leaders are launching well-publicized pagoda restoration projects throughout Burma. Nevertheless, confrontations between rebellious monks and the authorities continue.
In Mandalay in 1990, troops fired on the crowds, killing several people, including monks. Angered by the military’s brutality, Mandalay monks began a patta ni kozana kan, refusing to accept alms from members of the armed forces and their families.
The same action has now been taken by monks in several provinces after authorities beat protesting monks in Pakokka, central Burma.
“Patta ni kozana kan” can be called in response to any one of eight offences, including vilifying or making insidious comparisons between monks, inciting dissension among monks or defaming Buddha, the Dhamma or the Sangha.
A “patta ni kozana kan” campaign can be called off if the offended monks receive what they accept as a proper apology from the individuals or authorities involved. This procedure involves a ceremony held by at least four monks inside the Buddhist ordination hall, at which the boycott would be canceled.
Some monks in Burma may believe that the “patta ni kozana kan” of 1990 is still in effect, since they haven’t yet received any proper apology—only a harsh crackdown. At that time, monks refused to attend religious ceremonies held by military officials and family members.
In one incident, the Mandalay Division commander at the time, Maj-Gen Tun Kyi, who later became trade minister, invited senior monks and abbots to attend a religious ceremony but no one showed up. Military leaders realized the seriousness of the boycott and decided to launch a crackdown.
In Mandalay alone, more than 130 monasteries were raided and monks were defrocked and imprisoned. As many as 300 monks nationwide were defrocked and arrested.
Former political prisoners recalled that monks who shared prison quarters with them continued to practice their faith despite being forced to wear prison uniforms and being officially stripped of their membership of the Sangha.
Several monks, including the highly respected Thu Mingala, a Buddhist literature laureate, and at least eight other respected senior abbots, were arrested. Thu Mingala was sentenced to eight years imprisonment.
Apart from being stripped of their robes, imprisoned monks in Mandalay were forced to wear white prison uniforms and were taunted with nicknames instead of being addressed with their true titles, according to former political prisoners.
One year later, in 1991, the then head of the military junta, Snr-Gen Saw Maung, suffered a nervous breakdown and retired for health reasons. Buddhist Burmese still say this was punishment for his maltreatment of the monks.
The 1990 crackdown divided the Sangha community. The late Mingun Sayadaw, who was secretary of the State Sangha Maha Nayaka Committee, was ridiculed by young monks for not supporting the boycott campaign. He was at one time called “senior general Mingun Sayadaw,” and when he visited one temple in Mandalay young monks reportedly saluted him.
Today, while rebellious monks are prepared to go to prison, many senior monks and abbots are allowing themselves to become government tools by accepting gifts and large donations from the generals. By cuddling up to the ruling generals, these elderly abbots can no longer speak for the Sangha community at large, let alone comment on the suffering of the Burmese people. The divisions between abbots and young monks have inevitably widened.
The generals, on the other hand, won’t give up easily. In one spectacular bid to win the hearts and minds of the people, they borrowed a Buddha tooth relic from China and toured the country with it and also held a World Buddhist Summit.
In 1999, military leaders renovated Shwedagon Pagoda, after the Htidaw, the sacred umbrella, had been removed amid reports of minor local earthquakes. Local people said the spirits of Shwedagon had been upset with the removal of the Htidaw. Restoration of the pagoda complex did nothing to help the generals’ image, though.
The generals have also applied “divide and rule” strategies in dealing with the Sangha community and the opposition.
In 1996, the regime accused the National League for Democracy of infiltrating the Sangha with the aim of committing subversive acts against the authorities. The generals obviously did not want to see opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi developing too close a relationship with the monks.
In an attempt to neutralize the political role of Suu Kyi, the government sent a famous, London-based monk, Dr Rewatta Dhamma, to visit the detained opposition leader in 1995. Claiming to be a peace-broker between Suu Kyi and the generals, the monk shuttled between her and top leaders. But his mission failed and he returned to London. Skeptics believe the generals had merely used U Rewatta in a bid to persuade Suu Kyi to relinquish politics.
Ironically, the regime leaders publicly accused Suu Kyi of being a communist and of sacrilege because she had said in a campaign speech that “any human being can become a Buddha in this life.”
Soon after her release from her first term of house arrest in 1995, Suu Kyi immediately traveled to Karen State, followed by infuriated intelligence officers. She went there to make an offering to “Thamanya Sayadaw.”
Traditionally, temples have provided hiding places for activists, and in 1988 monks offered shelter to fugitives from the intelligence authorities.
At one time, the regime even placed restrictions on opposition members, preventing them from ordaining as monks. Like universities and schools, politically active monasteries are under heavy surveillance.
The widely respected abbot Bhaddanta Vinaya, known as Thamanya Sayadaw because he lived on Thamanya Hill, was involved in projects to help villagers in the area, work that was shunned by the generals.
He was revered not only for the mystical powers he was said to possess, but also because of his refusal to kowtow to the regime leaders. He once famously refused to accept the gift of a luxury vehicle from the then powerful intelligence chief Gen Khin Nyunt.
Khin Nyunt could not buy Thamanya.
It may indeed be wrong to assume that Burma’s regime leaders are devout Buddhists. The generals and their families seem to place more trust in astrology and numerology than in Buddhist ritual. They treasure white elephants and lucky charms and are constantly seeking advice from astrologers.
Birds of a feather, such as the generals and their chief astrologers, not only flock together but fall together, too. Ne Win’s family astrologer, Aung Pwint Khaung, was arrested in 2002 when the former dictator and his family were charged with high treason.
Khin Nyunt’s chief astrologer, Bodaw Than Hla, was imprisoned after the former Prime Minister and Military Intelligence chief was toppled in 2004.
Many Burmese may find it hard to believe that their military leaders are actually preserving Buddhism. Even when they are building pagodas and erecting Buddha images, the projects are based on astrological predictions and readings.
Who, for instance, advised Ne Win to ride a wooden horse on his aircraft and to ask the pilot to circle his birthplace nine times? Who advised him to issue banknotes in denominations of 45 and 90 kyat?
Who advised Khin Nyunt to dress up in women’s clothing, complete with the signature flower that Suu Kyi wears, in order to steal power from “the Lady”? Who told Than Shwe to move his capital to central Burma?
It certainly wasn’t a belief in Buddhist tenets. Nor does Buddhism permit the military to beat, defrock, imprison and kill monks.
The decline of Buddhism and the rise of militarism in Burma are a source of concern for the people of Burma. Thus, it is no surprise to hear social critics and political pongyismaintain that the generals who kneel down before images of Buddha are the real threat to Buddhism and Dhamma..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-22
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Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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"Today, the Southern Africa Litigation Centre (SALC), represented by Lawyers for Human Rights (LHR), was granted an order by the Gauteng Division of the High Court (Pretoria) setting aside permits that were granted by the National Conventional Arms Control Committee (NCACC) to facilitate arms transfers to Myanmar. The order by the High Court further declares that the NCACC has an obligation to suspend any contract or export permit of arms to a country that (i) has experienced an unconstitutional change of government and/or (ii) is reasonably suspected, by a special rapporteur, independent expert, or other person working in terms of a United Nations mandate, of having committed any crime against humanity, war crime, or genocide.
SALC and LHR, as well as Justice For Myanmar, an activist organisation that works on arms trades to Myanmar, welcome the High Court's order as it will have immediate consequences not only for any future arms exports from South Africa to Myanmar, but to many other countries too.
SALC’s International Justice Cluster Lead, Dr Atilla Kisla, highlighted that:
“Arms exports to a country that violates human rights and that underwent a military coup are illegal. This order is crucial in creating a more responsible and accountable arms trade regime in South Africa. It shows that human rights and international law are limiting factors for arms exports. The example of Myanmar illustrates that words of condemnation or concern are not sufficient. Fighting for human rights requires action in the form of applying the law and suspending and/or cancelling permits if needed.”
Charné Tracey, attorney at LHR, stated that:
“This case is not just about legal obligations but about moral responsibility and the NCACC's inaction in the face of clear evidence was not just a legal oversight but a moral failure. Today's order has the potential to ensure that South Africa’s policies reflect our values and principles.”
Justice For Myanmar spokesperson Yadanar Maung stated:
“We welcome the High Court’s ruling in this matter as it protects the people of Myanmar by clarifying that such arms transfers are not in compliance with domestic and international law. Such permits should never have been approved in the first place. We hope to see South African arms transfer authorities give full effect to the Court’s decision.”
South Africa has committed itself to a foreign policy guided by human rights and international law. The order by the High Court clarifies that obligations under international law apply to all arms exports. Arms exports to states like Myanmar in times of human rights violations, alleged breaches of the Genocide Convention and a military coup are in breach of domestic and international law. This order directs the NCACC to review, suspend and/or cancel all its permits for exports to states that fall under the categories set out in the order. Ultimately, the order is implementing a foreign policy based on human rights and respect for international law.
Background Information
In 2016 and 2017, Myanmar authorities took measures against its own population that led to serious human rights violations in the country, a refugee crisis of the Rohingya minority, and allegations of genocide against the Rohingya minority. UN special procedures like the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar and the UN Independent Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar have reiterated in their respective reports on the need for investigation and prosecution of military leaders for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. In this context, on 14 November 2019, the International Criminal Court (ICC) authorised an investigation by the ICC Prosecutor into the situation of Myanmar/Bangladesh for alleged crimes against humanity. In a separate case, on 23 January 2020, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) issued provisional measures against Myanmar and directed Myanmar to act in accordance with the Genocide Convention in relation to the members of the Rohingya group in its territory. On 1 February 2021, the Myanmar military overthrew the democratically elected government in an unconstitutional coup. From 2017 to 2021, South Africa exported arms to Myanmar with a total value of R215,735,677 (USD 11,866,216). SALC filed its application in the High Court in October 2022..."
Source/publisher:
Justice For Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-19
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Crimes Against Humanity, Human Rights and international relations
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"This Rapid Market Assessment (RMA) is a suppliment to the MAU Market Price Report in Southeast Myanmar. It provides township-level data on market functionality, activity, supply, and logistics. Data were collected through observation and KIIs with retailers during June 21-26, 2024. Reports available at www.themimu.info/market-analysis-unit.
KEY FINDINGS
• Market security was poor in all four markets, yet operations were stable and closures were rare;
• Retail shifted a bit to Loikaw and Hsihseng towns, but business there was difficult and security poor;
• Shipping goods to towns was costly, although lead-times were slightly better than in villages;
• Supply of food and NFIs was fairly stable despite rising shipping costs;
• Loikaw Town market lacked many essential foods, and only rice was consistently available;
• Town markets faced numerous retail challenges, particularly related to security and cash access.
Regional Overview
Market Functionality - Market operations were stable and most functioned all day, yet most were unsafe. Market hours were generally stable, although Hsihseng retailers extended hours to counterbalance reduced customer activity. There was no reported market damage, but all four markets were considered unsafe and closures occasionally occured. Retail activity in Hsihseng and Loikaw towns grew slightly in June.
Market Activity - Market activity in Hsihseng and Loikaw shifted further from villages to towns in June. Customers returned to Hsihseng and Loikaw town markets for a second month in June, although activity remained low overall. Customer and retailer activity was stable in Demoso and Pekon. Inter-township commerce continued, although it was limited in Hsihseng.
Availability of Goods - Supply was unchanged in June, and it remained poorer for NFIs than for foods. Supply of meat/fish and vegetables was slightly better than other goods, and availability of medicines was poorest. Supply remained poorest in Loikaw, although supply there improved slightly as more retailers operated in/near a new market area established in the town.
Transport & Logistics - Shipping costs continued to rise across markets in June. Shipping lead-times were slightly shorter for town retailers than for village retailers, and lead times grew even longer for retailers in Demoso. Shipping goods across townships lines remained possible in June, although doing so was still very difficult and costly.
Retailer Challenges - Retailers in Loikaw and Hsihseng towns reported many challenges in June. Poor transportation and supply were difficult across the region in June, although retailers in Hsihseng and Loikaw towns reported a broader and deeper suite of challenges. For example, poor safety/security and poor access to cash were more prominent among retailers in these towns than among retailers in the village markets. Market-related damage was not a major challenge reported by retailers in June..."
Source/publisher:
Myanmar Information Management Unit (Myanmar) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-19
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Food Security and nutrition in Burma/Myanmar, Public Health, Human Rights and international relations
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7.55 MB
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"Overview
Violence and displacement continue to ripple across Myanmar. Over 1.6 million people have been displaced since the escalation of fighting in October 2023, forcing some to seek safety in neighbouring countries. The situation in Rakhine State remains deeply concerning, with access restrictions driving up the cost of basic items and exacerbating hardships. In Rakhine State (North), the seizure of food and other goods, along with the destruction of WFP and ICRC warehouses, undermined the delivery of assistance to those in need. In Kachin State, conflict approached within 6 km of the capital, Myitkyina. Similarly, in Lashio, the capital of Shan State (North), fighting displaced thousands of people, mostly to the south. Shan State (South) experienced increased fighting near its border with Kayah State, causing more people to flee to safer areas like Nyangshwe Township. In Pekon Township, Shan State (South), diarrhea outbreaks at a displacement site were reported with cases likely to increase into the monsoon season. The State Administration Council continues to restrict the use of virtual private networks on smartphones, leading to phone inspections and extortion in Yangon, Mandalay, Ayeyarwady, Bago, and Magway regions.
In Thailand, as of 1 July, no refugees remain in the Temporary Safety Areas (TSAs).
Since February 2021, about 66,100 people from Myanmar’s north-west region have sought protec-tion in India, with 7,150 people registering with UNHCR in New Delhi. On 11 June, Manipur’s Chief Minister announced the phased deportation of nearly 40 Myanmar nationals via the Moreh check post. The State government reportedly deported 38 “illegal immigrants” on 2 May, bringing the total to 76 deportations so far. UNHCR continues to raise its concerns to Indian authorities over these developments with respect to the principle of non-refoulement in view of the volatile security situation in Myanmar. On 18 June, India's Permanent Mission in Geneva expressed concerns about Myanmar nationals crossing into India's northeastern states and related transnational crimes. He also reiterated India’s support for ASEAN's efforts and the ASEAN Five-Point Consensus. On 26 June, India's External Affairs Minister met senior Myanmar leaders, stressing the impact of Myanmar's instability on India's borders and India's commitment to engaging all stakeholders. India’s Home Minister assured Mizoram’s Chief Minister that the government would provide humanitarian assistance to Myanmar arrivals in the state. The humanitarian needs of Myanmar arrivals in Mizoram and Manipur are growing as more people continue to seek refuge in the two states. Humanitarian agencies and state governments have appealed for more resources to meet arrivals' needs, which include food, shelter, WASH and health..."
Source/publisher:
UN High Commissioner for Refugees
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-19
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
UNHCR (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees), Food Security and nutrition in Burma/Myanmar, Public Health, Human Rights and international relations
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16.1 MB
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"UN experts demanded more attention from the international community and called for immediate and decisive actions.
The 56th session of the UN Human Rights Council (HRC 56) took place in Geneva, Switzerland from 18 June to 12 July 2024, which had two Interactive Dialogues (IDs) on Myanmar: the ID with the UN High Commissioner on Human Rights on his report (A/HRC/56/23) on the situation of human rights of Rohingya Muslims and other minorities (ID HC) on 18 June; and the ID with the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar on his oral progress report (ID SR) on 4 July 2024. The SR Myanmar has also published two conference room papers prior to the ID: “Courage amid Crisis: Gendered impacts of the coup and the pursuit of gender equality in Myanmar” (HRC/56/CRP.8) and “Banking on the Death Trade: How banks and governments enable the military junta of Myanmar” (HRC/56/CRP.7). A resolution tabled by OIC was adopted on 10 July (A/HRC/RES/56/1) without vote.
ID HC
Opening the ID, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Volker Türk, presented his report saying that Myanmar was “being suffocated by an illegitimate military regime” and that “the disintegration of human rights continues at breakneck speed.” Highlighting terrifying situation faced by the Rohingya and Rakhine communities, worsening humanitarian situation and displacement, and stories of horrific war tactics and extreme measures taken by the military such as indiscriminate attacks, sexual violence, forced conscription and other brutal atrocity crimes, HC stressed “the urgent need for leadership and influence to halt this catastrophe”, for accountability, end of violence as well as the denial of humanitarian aid. Reporting on the efforts of Myanmar civil society and Human Rights Defenders and emerging local governance structures, he stressed on the need for more attention, investment, political will and action from all parties, pointing out the need for “an urgent rethink of how we can respond collectively to this unmitigated crisis”, including the call for ASEAN to go beyond its 5PC and for “all anti-military armed groups to ensure the protection of civilians, defectors and surrendees at all times.”
ID SR
Opening the ID, the SR stressed to the Council on the need for its attention and action saying that “there are opportunities available to your governments right now that would make an enormous difference in how and when this crisis comes to an end.” By presenting his oral progress report as well as two conference room papers, the SR further reported on continued military airstrikes on civilian targets; sexual and gender-based violence against women, girls and LGBT people committed by the military and other groups; extremely dire situation in Rakhine, especially faced by both Rohingya and Rakhine communities; military procurement by the junta through transactions facilitated by foreign backs; among others. Pointing out that “actions taken by the international community to isolate the junta and degrade its capacity to attack the people of Myanmar are working”, the SR called for more and immediate action from the international community. In closing, he stressed to the Council that “the tide is turning in Myanmar, the junta is on its heels, and the opportunity to take decisive action is now.”
CCPR Centre at the HRC 56
The Centre submitted a written statement to the HRC 56 and presented oral statements during the ID HC and ID SR. The Centre also co-sponsored a side event on 4th July organised by Permanent Missions of Liechtenstein, Albania, Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, European Union, Finland, Germany, Luxembourg, Monaco, Montenegro, New Zealand, Slovenia, Switzerland, as well as Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development (FORUM-ASIA), International Commission of Jurists and Human Rights Watch. At this event, focused on ways to combact impunity, both the Special Rapporteur on Myanmar and the Deputy Head of the IIMM joined as speakers. Prior to the HRC 56, the Centre also published a briefing paper on the situation of civil and political rights in Myanmar (January – April 2024) in English, French and Spanish, as well as its findings paper of the HRC 55 discussion on Myanmar. The Centre’s database on what countries are saying about Myanmar at HRC was also updated reflecting on the analysis of discussion up to HRC 55. Following HRC 56, the Centre also updated the list of silent countries on Myanmar at HRC..."
Source/publisher:
Centre for Civil and Political Rights
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-18
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"National Unity Government Pledges Increased Cooperation with Ethnic
Resistance Forces.....NUG Prime Minister Urges Preparedness
for Humanitarian Aid and Military Council Overthrow.....NUG Prime Minister Calls for Transparent Management of Natural Resources.....Ministry of Education Vows Swift Action in Student Murder Case.....NUG Ministry of Defense Announces Operations Involving Multiple Battalions.....Hostage Situation in Sagaing Region: NUG Ministry of Defense Report.....Ministry Provides 205 Million Kyats in Aid Amid War-Driven Floods.....Drone Attack in Sagaing Region Kills Six and Injures Fifteen.....NUG Ministry of Human Rights Welcomes UN Special Rapporteur’s Report.....Burmese Workers Protest in Bangkok, Demand Action from UN and Thai
Government..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-18
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"Weekly Update of National Unity Government ( 29 / 2024 )..."
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National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-18
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"Bangladeshi authorities on Sunday refused entry to around 60 Myanmar junta armed forces personnel who tried to enter Bangladeshi waters on boats.
The junta personnel returned to Myanmar after drifting for several hours on the international boundary in the Naf River, Bangladeshi officials in Teknaf, Cox’s Bazar said. The Bangladeshi Foreign Ministry has yet to comment on the incident.
They drifted for four to five hours as personnel from the Bangladesh Coast Guard and Border Guard Bangladesh prevented the boats from entering Bangladesh.
The officials in Teknaf said they took the step in line with their earlier communications with the junta asking it to take measures to stop the influx of people from Myanmar fleeing fighting between regime forces and the ethnic Arakan Army (AA) in Rakhine State.
The Bangladesh Coast Guard intercepted the trawlers carrying the junta personnel on Sunday in the Teknaf-Myanmar transit ghat near Jaliapara, Teknaf Municipality.
Bangladeshi authorities have stepped up patrols around the Naf River since May to prevent unauthorized entry.
Lieutenant Colonel Md Mohammad Uddin Ahmed, commanding officer of Teknaf-2 Battalion of Border Guard Bangladesh, also declined to comment on the decision to push the Myanmar forces back.
Earlier, however, he said authorities had stepped up patrols along the border considering the worsening situation on the Myanmar side.
Sunday’s incident took place just days after 140 Myanmar Border Guard Force members and soldiers crossed into Bangladesh last week after being defeated by the Arakan Army in northern Rakhine State.
Bangladeshi officials said many of those Myanmar personnel were “pushed back” after a short interrogation.
In June, the Bangladeshi Foreign Ministry said more than 752 junta personnel and their families had been handed over since mid-February, despite the lack of an extradition treaty.
In February, Home Minister Asaduzzaman Khan announced a closed-border policy, which has since been breached numerous times.
Bangladeshi authorities have in the last few weeks also refused entry to Rohingya civilians fleeing violence in Rakhine..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-16
[field_licence]
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Individual Documents
Category:
Arakan (Rakhine) State - reports etc. by date (latest first), Human Rights and international relations, Armed conflict in Burma - attacks on civilians
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"Over three years since the February 2021 coup, the enormous momentum gained by the popular armed resistance is reinforcing the narrative that Myanmar’s military, once recognized as one of Southeast Asia’s strongest armies, can be defeated. The international community, spanning Myanmar’s neighbors to Western powers, now realizes that the fall of the military is no longer impossible, though far from inevitable.
Many observers and analysts remain skeptical that the resistance, with its scattered operations, can deal a final blow to the mighty military, citing the lack of historical precedent. But Myanmar analysts have moved on from their initial assessment – that an uncoordinated resistance armed with makeshift weaponry would be short-lived and only worsen the toll on civilian lives. The emerging consensus is that Myanmar is fragmenting as civil war tears the country apart.
The current discourse consists of a wide variety of views and perspectives, ranging from Myanmar’s political history to economic realities; the current crisis to centuries-old Burmese societal values; and military tactics on both sides to the politics of resistance forces (ethnic armies and People’s Defense Forces) and the Myanmar military.
However, little attention has been paid to the personal aspirations and struggles of the man at the top, the commander-in-chief and coup leader, Min Aung Hlaing.
The man most responsible for current crisis
Studies of Myanmar’s precarious civil-military relations, and military vs democratic doctrines, are worth analyzing to better understand the current crisis. Based on Myanmar’s political nature, no one would argue that one person is more important than the institution he or she represents. Min Aung Hlaing was therefore rowing against the tide when he staged a coup widely understood as a solo decision driven by his personal aspirations and paranoia. Thus, Min Aung Hlaing and his motivations cannot be ignored in whatever scenarios we envision for the country’s future.
For this reason, the question that needs to be raised is not whether foreign governments will have to deal with future statelets in Myanmar, or whether Myanmar people would accept such fragmentation, or even if a negotiated settlement can be reached between ethnic revolutionary organizations (EROs), the junta, and the civilian National Unity Government plus the ousted National League for Democracy.
The pressing question is what actions Min Aung Hlaing would take if any of these scenarios were to materialize. How would the junta chief react to these scenarios, and what would be the best choices for him? And most importantly, how would Myanmar’s people, political leaders, EROs and the wider international community hold him accountable for his heinous crimes to pave the way to a better future for Myanmar?
Coup was the only exit for Min Aung Hlaing
From the coup leader’s perspective, it would have been difficult to imagine that any alternative except a coup could guarantee his position, legacy, wealth, family, and even his life. As dark clouds loomed over Naypyitaw in late 2020, the future looked bleak for the military chief. The people’s leader, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, had won another landslide election victory and was not swayed by Min Aung Hlaing’s relentless petitions to betray her campaign promise and make him president of the country.
The military’s proxy Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) was considering radical reforms after humiliating defeats in the 2015 and 2020 elections – reforms which would effectively limit free access for military top brass. Also, the International Court of Justice was likely to convict Min Aung Hlaing for genocide in Rakhine in 2017.
The coup-leader could not trust that his stone-faced generals, loyal to their old chief Than Shwe, would defend him against the ICJ charges, fearing instead that they might push for his downfall.
Yet while all these facts were apparent, most Myanmar observers failed to see the choices facing Min Aung Hlaing and therefore underestimated the possibility of a coup. The consensus prior to the putsch was that Min Aung Hlaing was doomed, the military had been defeated again, and democracy had prevailed. The possibility of a coup was widely dismissed as too politically and economically costly.
However, just as a drowning man will clutch at a straw, Min Aung Hlaing found the devasting consequences of a coup preferable to being charged at the international court, betrayed by his generals, and living in shame minus a legacy or wealth. The protracted armed conflict that followed was evidently the least of his concerns.
Masking personal interests with military narratives
Despite being unpopular both within and outside the military, Min Aung Hlaing is a seasoned general who understands his institution well. Amid the bitter realization of his own shortcomings, his strategic choice was to flex his power through his institutional mandate, which he earned through obedience to his seniors rather than any military acumen.
Than Shwe, the old chief, appeared to believe that his young and obedient generals, particularly Min Aung Hlaing, would play along with his plans to retire in 2016 and allow a new elected government to take over, with deputy commander-in-chief Soe Win following suit at the 2020 election. These arrangements would have cemented the military’s role in politics, backed by a constitutionally secured 25% seats in Parliament plus control of military-affiliated ministries and economic holdings.
But in that case, why did the other top generals not consider Min Aung Hlaing’s coup as personally motivated? Likely because the generals also prioritized their personal interests over their old boss’s plan. The top generals’ betrayal of institutional interests may appear naïve, but this was a game of personal survival – it was now or never for them.
Consequently, with their limited worldviews and lack of imagination for better alternatives, Min Aung Hlaing and the top generals resorted to their last option: reopening the old playbook of military dictatorship and using violence and terror to enforce submission to their rule.
Although Min Aung Hlaing and his generals have tried to disguise their personal interests behind a mask of military narratives, institutional fears, and objectives, the institution itself seems to be fighting back. Continuing military defeats and resistance gains appear to have sparked shock and awe among soldiers and military supporters. Many have blamed long-term corruption and weak leadership. Few however seem to realize that Min Aung Hlaing and his generals’ pursuit of personal interests at the cost of their institution is the main reason for the failures of junta ground troops.
Weak link in longstanding military dictatorships
Min Aung Hlaing’s unpopularity has spilled over into China, the target of multibillion-dollar online border scams protected by the junta. As Beijing’s frustration with the scams peaked, China cracked down with little concern about embarrassing Min Aung Hlaing’s regime. Worried for his own survival, the junta boss promptly purged his generals to please his powerful neighbor. The move apparently exacerbated mistrust for the coup-maker among his generals. While it may be too early to say that the interest-based alliance among the generals is disintegrating, arrests of old regime loyalists and frequent purges of the junta cabinet betray widening cracks that are further undermining the military institution.
At this point, loyal members of the military face a dark future looming over their institution. Neither of the two scenarios – a resistance victory or Min Aung Hlaing and his self-serving generals maintaining power – offer hope.
The end of Min Aung Hlaing
Since he sparked the crisis, it is reasonable to assume that Min Aung Hlaing will be instrumental in ending it. More than three years after his coup, with tens of thousands of civilians killed or arrested, the junta boss remains mired in a rising tide of bloody crimes.
Any scenario – a negotiated settlement brokered by the international community, or a decisive resistance victory to establish federal democracy – would be intolerable for Min Aung Hlaing.
And anyone considering a possible power-sharing arrangement with the military, as seen from 2010-2021, must address the role of Min Aung Hlaing. Given the long list of atrocities and other crimes he has ordered and the numerous enemies that surround him, he would not be afforded the kind of impunity that his predecessor Than Shwe enjoyed. The people would be reluctant to accept any pardon, even if Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and political elites offered one. A formal pardon and return to ordinary life would be accompanied by widespread fury and threats against his and his family’s life. And for a military general who dragged the country into chaos just to save himself, the threats would be real, not a case of paranoia.
To settle the disputes, it may be practical for all stakeholders to place the blame on Min Aung Hlaing as the sole enemy of Myanmar’s people. Burmese history has a precedent for this: When several independence leaders including Aung San were assassinated in 1947 amid intense political rivalries and ideological debate, U Saw was singled out for blame and duly executed; the country moved on.
In the ongoing crisis, as well as betraying the military’s institutional interests, Min Aung Hlaing has created more enemies than all his predecessors combined managed in their lifetimes. He failed to secure any ceasefires with ethnic armed organizations, as his predecessors had done. He has alienated traditional military loyalists such as USDP supporters and religious fanatics. He has overseen plunging morale among soldiers, thereby losing battles on the ground. He also stands on the verge of being charged with genocide and facilitating the online scam industry. He has wrecked the economy, shrinking the share of the pie for military cronies both old and new. It is difficult to imagine any reasonable person defending him when his time comes.
The fall of Min Aung Hlaing is only a matter of time. However, all stakeholders, including the Myanmar military itself, must ensure that his ousting does not go to waste. All well-meaning peace efforts – for the delivery of humanitarian aid, release of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and political prisoners, cessation of violence, five-point consensus, and engagements with statelets as an entry point to ending the conflict – have proved to be less effective than focusing on the one man solely responsible.
Many would argue that a country like Myanmar needs a strong military. However, do the country and the military need Min Aung Hlaing? Even in a negotiated settlement, would Min Aung Hlaing put his institution’s interests above his own survival?
Could condemning this one man, who has caused insufferable pain to millions of Myanmar people and brought the worst crisis in the country’s history, be a good starting point to unite all stakeholders and people to end the current conflict in Myanmar?..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-16
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"China invited two high-profile figures from Myanmar to visit recently, with former President Thein Sein flying to Beijing on June 27 and General Soe Win, deputy chief of the current junta, following him a week later, visiting Qingdao.
Since Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi received Thein Sein, speculation has been rife and rumors have swirled about the purpose and larger significance of the visits.
The week of Thein Sein’s visit saw a renewal of fighting between ethnic armies and junta forces in northern Shan State after a Chinese-brokered truce collapsed, while in Rakhine State, where China has built a deep seaport and a terminal for its oil-and-gas pipeline project, the Arakan Army continues to gain territory and push the Myanmar military back.
The official reason for Thein Sein’s visit was to attend an event in Beijing commemorating the 70th anniversary of the Declaration of Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence—a set of principles laid out by China in the early days of communist rule governing the country’s foreign relations. It was his first foreign trip since the military seized power over three years ago, plunging the country into turmoil.
Even before Thein Sein arrived back to Naypyitaw the rumors were flying thick and fast, and they have yet to stop. One has it that China seeks to nudge the junta into forming a transitional government including some ministers from the 2011-16 quasi-civilian government led by Thein Sein. According to another, China asked Thein Sein to persuade coup leader Min Aung Hlaing to step down.
Here is my take.
First, China believes Min Aung Hlaing is incompetent and incapable of holding the country together, and has lost patience with him. But Min Aung Hlaing will not leave his post voluntarily and cannot be persuaded to do so.
Second, China is working on Thein Sein, possibly sounding out his opinions and the possibility of his re-entering politics at some point in the future. But is this realistic? Thein Sein is infirm and frail. He would need political backing to fix things in Myanmar. Could he persuade Min Aung Hlaing to step down? No.
Some have floated a scenario in which Thein Sein would guide a transition to civilian rule after an election in 2025—assuming one can be held. One question that arises from this approach is whether—assuming Aung San Suu Kyi is released—Thein Sein would be able to work with her as a “political guiding force” to restore calm to the nation. Or is that sheer fantasy?
Third, analysts say that China doesn’t want to see the junta extend its emergency rule yet another time. And China is not alone in this. Myanmar’s other neighbors also want to see an end to this process of repeated extensions of junta rule.
One thing that must be understood is that Min Aung Hlaing will not leave national politics unless he is forced to do so.
At the meeting between Wang Yi and Thein Sein, China no doubt repeated its commitment to the two countries’ “paukphaw”, or sibling, ties (seemingly its favorite phrase when discussing ties with Myanmar) and expressed a desire to see stability restored in its southern neighbor. For his part, it seems a safe bet that Myanmar’s former president delivered a plea from the regime that China intervene with the ethnic armies to halt the war in the north—underscoring China’s influence and the outsize role it plays in the Myanmar conflict.
Over the last two weeks unverified reports have emerged that China has asked the junta to hold talks with several key players including detained State Counselor Aung San Suu Kyi and powerful ethnic armed leaders.
The regime leader reportedly rejected the proposal, insisting that Suu Kyi is a criminal and thus he can’t talk to her. Regarding the ethnic armed organizations (EAOs), Min Aung Hlaing reportedly said that they have been officially invited to join talks under the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement guidelines.
Upon hearing this reply, not only China but also Myanmar’s neighbors were not pleased.
Soe Win’s surprise trip
China’s invitation to Gen. Soe Win surprised many. While the hardliner second-in-command’s alleged orders to bomb innocent civilians make him responsible for the deaths of many innocent people since the coup, he has no political ambitions.
Min Aung Hlaing (Defense Services Academy Intake 19) and Soe Win (DSA Intake 22) are known to be at loggerheads, but Soe Win does not dare challenge his boss’s leadership.
Some analysts have even speculated that China wants to see Min Aung Hlaing removed. Does it follow that it wants to see Soe Win replace him? For the time being, Min Aung Hlaing isn’t going anywhere. Min Aung Hlaing and Soe Win are both war criminals. Whichever of them leads the nation, they are doomed to failure.
On his first official visit to China since the 2021 coup, Soe Win did not go to Beijing, rather he traveled to Qingdao to attend the Green Development Forum organized by the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).
There, he discussed border stability, security for Chinese investments in Myanmar, elimination of online scam operations, promotion of trade and the proposed election, junta media said.
Soe Win met Shen Yueyue, vice chairwoman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference and president of the SCO’s Good-Neighborliness, Friendship and Cooperation Commission.
Needless to say there was no mention of China’s pending massive arms shipment to the junta during the meeting with Shen.
Wa: Wild card in the war in the north
Only a few days after Soe Win came back from China, the powerful United Wa State Army (UWSA) deployed troops to Tangyan town in northern Shan State—a strong indication of the Wa’s goal of expanding its territory.
Wa spokesman Nyi Rang said the UWSA negotiated with the regime to allow it to deploy troops in Tangyan after residents called for protection from fighting between the junta and the Brotherhood Alliance of three ethnic armies. Negotiated with Myanmar’s regime? This is interesting.
Nyi Rang said: “It is a preventive measure to stop the conflict in northern Shan State from spreading to Tangyan. We maintain our neutrality and reject conflict. We want peace and stability in Tangyan and believe our deployment will be constructive in every aspect.”
So the regime gave the greenlight to the Wa to enter Tangyan?
This move coincided with Soe Win’s visit to China. It is likely that Chinese officials and Soe Win discussed the situation in northern Shan State, including the position of the Wa. Chinese officials have reportedly asked the Myanmar military to elevate the political status of the Wa in order to ease the armed conflict in the north.
Indeed, the Wa, backed by China, are kingmakers in the conflict in the north and suspected of backing (as well as providing arms to) the Brotherhood Alliance, which comprises the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), Arakan Army (AA) and Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA). The alliance is now seriously threatening Lashio, where the regime’s Northeastern Command is based.
Granting a new political status to the Wa could be a way for the regime to ease the ethnic offensive in the north, where its troops continue to suffer losses.
Expansion of territory
In January 2024, a few days after the ceasefire agreement brokered by China was reached between the three northern ethnic armies and the regime, the junta agreed to the Wa’s demand for administrative control of Hopang and Panlong towns in northern Shan State.
The transfer of the two towns to Myanmar’s most powerful ethnic army expands the Wa Self-Administered Region east of the Salween River.
The United Wa State Army (UWSA) and United Wa State Party were established after ethnic Wa soldiers split from the Communist Party of Burma on April 17, 1989 and signed a ceasefire with the then military regime.
What the Wa call “northern Wa State” is officially classified in the 2008 military-drafted constitution as the Wa Self-Administered Region, also known as Special Region 2. This region’s capital is Panghsan, also known as Pangkham, and it is made up of Mongmao, Monglin and Mongpauk districts and Pangkham Special Township, an area covering around 1,500 square kilometers.
Today the UWSA is the most powerful EAO in Myanmar. It has maintained a ceasefire with successive governments, but refused to sign the 2015 Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement.
Wa leaders have also said that Wa State will not secede from the Union, but the UWSA will manage its state independently except for national defense and diplomatic relations.
With the previous military regime’s approval, the UWSA also expanded its territory to include Monghsat District on the border with Thailand in southern Shan State, and around 80,000 to 100,000 ethnic Wa resettled there. Now the district is referred to as “southern Wa State”, also known to the UWSA as Military Region 171, and some 9,000 UWSA fighters are stationed there. Clearly, the Wa want their territory in southern Shan State to be combined with the northern areas and recognized officially as Wa State.
And the winner is …?
Last week, Min Aung Hlaing surprised everyone, declaring Chinese New Year a national holiday amid the renewed fighting near the border with China.
This is the first time in Myanmar’s history that a foreign festival has been officially recognized as a public holiday. Until now, apart from internationally recognized days like New Year’s Day, only national anniversaries, religious holidays such as Christmas and Eid, and some commemorations associated with the major national ethnicities such as traditional Karen New Year’s Day, have been observed.
The junta’s official explanation was that Chinese New Year is a public holiday in Myanmar’s neighbors in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and in many other countries around the world. In truth, there is no ASEAN-wide tradition of observing Chinese New Year. While Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia do officially mark it, Thailand, Cambodia, the Philippines, Laos and Brunei do not, and Vietnam has its own Tet Lunar New Year holiday.
At any rate, the primary reason—as spelled out in a regime statement—for the move is that “Myanmar wants to deepen the Pauk-Phaw relations with China,” according to the regime statement.
It has been reported that China’s outgoing ambassador, Chen Hai, proposed the official recognition of the day to junta boss Min Aung Hlaing during the embassy’s Lunar New Year celebrations in February.
Observers commented that the move reflects a level of dependence on Beijing unprecedented in the 76 years since Myanmar gained independence. The decision is certainly controversial and has caused unease among Myanmar citizens including military personnel.
No wonder Myanmar people often now jokingly refer to their country as the “Chinese Republic of the Union of Myanmar”!
China’s “provinces” or “protectorates” in northern Myanmar will no doubt be celebrating Chinese New Year. For instance, the MNDAA on Sunday officially announced that it would stop fighting for four days (from July 14 to 12 a.m. on July 18), saying in a statement that “at the time of the Third Plenary Session of the Communist Party of China, all combat troops were required to stop active offensive” operations.
Now, with the northern ethnic forces closely connected to China gaining more territory and overtaking military outposts and pushing through to the interior of the country, the regime’s dependence on China will only deepen.
China’s geostrategic and economic interest are enormous in Myanmar, including oil-and-gas pipelines, railroads, deep-water seaports on the Bay of Bengal, border trade and access to the Indian Ocean.
In Myanmar’s quagmire there are many losers, but it’s obvious who the winner is—and it’s unquestionably not the Myanmar people.
Is it too early to wish my countrymen a Happy Chinese New Year?..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-15
[field_licence]
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"Delivered by Ambassador Robert Wood, Alternative Representative for Special Political Affairs, on behalf of the Permanent Missions to the United Nations of Albania, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Norway, Republic of Korea, Switzerland, Türkiye, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, and the European Union and its Member States, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Republic of Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, and Sweden.
We are deeply concerned by the escalation of violence and conflict and credible reports of violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law across Myanmar that are deepening the humanitarian crisis. Recent reports indicate the Myanmar regime has taken deliberate steps in Rakhine State to use internally displaced persons (IDP), many of whom are Rohingya, as human shields amid the conflict. We are particularly concerned by reports indicating the regime has placed landmines around IDP camps and appears to have taken steps to use these camps as military bases. There are also credible reports of forced recruitment of persons, including children, belonging to ethnic minorities by the Myanmar Armed Forces in particular and other parties, which risk further fueling inter-communal tensions and aggravating the humanitarian situation.
These concerning developments follow a range of reports of other violations and abuses, particularly by the Myanmar Armed Forces, including indiscriminate aerial bombardments of civilians and civilian objects, burning of civilian homes, attacks on humanitarian workers and facilities, and restrictions on humanitarian access. These practices are unacceptable.
Since the regime’s violent military coup in February 2021 and attack on the Myanmar population, the number of people in humanitarian need has risen from 1 million to 18.6 million. More than 2.9 million have been newly displaced, including 66,000 people who have sought protection in neighboring countries, adding to the more than 1 million Rohingya refugees who fled before the coup. We highlight the importance of all countries respecting the principle of nonrefoulement. We reiterate our commitment to support safe, voluntary, dignified, and sustainable repatriation when conditions allow. We also reiterate the call for full, rapid, safe, and unhindered humanitarian access to all people in need, including women, children, and members of ethnic and other minority populations.
We urge the Myanmar Armed Forces in particular and all parties concerned in Myanmar to de-escalate violence, respect international humanitarian law and human rights law, and to protect civilians. We recall our demands for the full implementation of UNSC resolution 2669 (2022). We reiterate our full support for ASEAN’s central role and for the appointment of Special Envoy of the Secretary-General Julie Bishop. We reiterate calls to engage in constructive and inclusive dialogue to find a peaceful solution to the situation in Myanmar..."
Source/publisher:
New Zealand Foreign Affairs and Trade via Reliefweb (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-15
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Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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One person died and 10 were injured in the attack on a Shan state town.
Description:
"A rebel army in eastern Myanmar announced a four-day ceasefire shortly after a town under its control was hit by junta airstrikes, residents said.
The Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, or MNDAA, captured Laukkaing, or Laukkai, town in northern Shan state on Sunday, after which the junta hit back, residents said.
A resident who wished to remain anonymous for security reasons told Radio Free Asia that a fighter jet fired at several hotels and residential areas in Laukkaing for 20 minutes, killing a civilian and wounding others.
“What we know is that the person who died was a guest staying at the Full Light International Hotel. More than 10 people were injured,” he said. “At the moment, civilians are not allowed to enter the area because it’s being cleared.”
MNDAA newspaper, The Kokang, identified the victim as a 37-year-old man named Wang. It said several other hotels were damaged in the attack.
Most Laukkaing residents are sheltering in their homes and closing their businesses for fear of more airstrikes, witnesses told RFA.
RFA phoned MNDAA spokesperson Li Kya Win and its head of external relations, Gen. Phone Win Naing, for more details on the fighting but they did not answer calls.
A reporter also attempted to contact Shan state’s junta spokesperson Khun Thein Maung and national junta spokesperson Maj. Gen. Zaw Min Tun for comment, but those calls also went unanswered.
However, a junta account on social messaging app Telegram said Laukkaing was bombed because some MNDAA leaders were living in the town.
The MNDAA is a member of the Three Brotherhood Alliance that launched Operation 1027 last October to seize territory from the junta. It said it had captured seven towns, including Chinshwehaw, Hseni and Kunlong since Operation 1027 began and was implementing its own administration, regional development, education and health sectors.
In January, China brokered a state-wide ceasefire between junta and alliance forces, bringing them together for talks in the Chinese city of Yunnan in May. At the time it said it was concerned fighting would affect border stability and trade between the two countries.
Three Brotherhood Alliance members the Ta’ang National Liberation Army broke the ceasefire in late June, blaming junta airstrikes for the resumption of hostilities. Since then, the alliance has captured dozens of bases across Shan state and Mandalay region.
The MNDAA said the latest ceasefire will run from Monday through Thursday, although residents said both armies have continued to fire weapons near Laukkaing. In a statement Sunday, it said the ceasefire was called as a result of China’s concerns, although it didn’t specify what those concerns were.
Since the resumption of Operation 1027, alliance forces have been trying to seize control of Lashio, the capital of northern Shan state, where fighting has raged for weeks and killed over a dozen civilians.
Political analyst Than Soe Naing said the junta attack on Laukkaing was probably in retaliation for that attack.
“[The MNDAA] took part in Operation 1027, in the second wave of the Spring Revolution. The next thing that happened was that the junta's most important town, Lashio, was targeted and attacked by four military columns,” he said. “I believe the junta bombarded Laukkaing in response to that.”..."
Source/publisher:
"Radio Free Asia" (USA)
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-15
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations, Armed conflict in Burma - attacks on civilians
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"Notes:
AWD cases are reported in two township in Thaketa , Dawbon Township, Yangon. Infection initially start in Insein Township and spread to other Townships. More cases are found in Thaketa Township and now spreading more. In Yangon region, there are 77 hospitalization cases till 17 July 2024. There are also unconfirmed reports of AWD in other states and regions. The general perspective of situation is deteriorating.
Sources for data marked as Other
https://www.mohs.gov.mm/page/19764
Description
The primary affect is the shortage of ORS, preventive items, low health knowledge which directly impact the community. The secondary effects are the overburden of hospitalization, low number of health care personal due to the breakdown of health system and potential loss of life..."
Source/publisher:
International Federation of Red Cross And Red Crescent Societies, Myanmar Red Cross Society via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-15
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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"The extraordinary arc of failure of Myanmar’s military has gone from coup and crack-down to the brink of regime crack-up.
When seizing power in February 2021, the military expected to consolidate power and crush resistance. Instead, the junta’s violence pushed popular opposition to become revolution and civil war. The military’s hold on Myanmar shrinks as it suffers a ‘succession of humiliating defeats’.
The spreading authority of rebel groups mean Myanmar’s government no longer controls most of the country’s international borders. The military dictatorship holds less than 50 percent of the country.
As the centre’s grasp on the country weakens, one possibility is that the centre collapses. The implosion prospect is about more than battlefield defeats but goes to the junta’s internal cohesion and vanishing legitimacy.
The junta head, Min Aung Hlaing, will be keeping a Caesar-like ‘et tu’ eye on his fellow generals. The daggers may not be plunged into his toga, but defeat makes any strongman disposable. This is not the coup Min promised. The shock and awe effects are on the military.
Southeast Asia has shifted from apprehension about what Myanmar’s junta would do to astonishment at its ebbing control.
In her new role as the United Nations special envoy to Myanmar, the former Australian foreign minister Julie Bishop must deal with a loathsome regime that is losing. And a weak government can be as dangerous, in different ways, as a government confident in its power.
The experience of the envoys that have gone before her shows Bishop has little immediate chance to get the military to reduce violence or to get a serious dialogue, as the veteran diplomat Scot Marciel observes:
The Myanmar military, in addition to being xenophobic, misogynistic, dishonest, and brutal, is by nature uncompromising and absolutely committed to maintaining political power. This is true even in the face of significant resistance gains, a worsening economy, and a severe humanitarian crisis. For its part, the broad resistance—and arguably the population at large—is dead-set on removing the military from power and unlikely to accept anything short of that.
Bishop shares with countries of the Association of South East Asian Nations an excruciating dilemma of diplomacy: does Myanmar’s regime still have the capacity to act as a normal government, to negotiate in good faith, to change policy if needed and even offer concessions to strong opponents? A failing government battered by military defeats is so focussed on the struggle it has little capacity for much else. The military’s draft of men between the ages of 23 and 31 is the action of a scrambling government—more grim desperation than resolute determination.
To maintain lines to the junta, Bishop and ASEAN must be relatively polite. For a blunt call on what the region sees unfolding, turn to ASEAN’s ‘in principle’ 11th member, Timor-Leste. Its president, Jose Ramos-Horta, no stranger to popular resistance and military struggle, judges: ‘This is the first time in the history of Myanmar when the military are not winning and will not win. They are losing.’
Ramos-Horta says a junta facing collapse must crawl to the negotiating table:
Efforts have to be intensified to mediate this conflict. Otherwise, it gets out of control. It spirals out of control. And then it will be far more difficult to bring back law and order and a solution. Thus, because the military is very, very weak, on the point of implosion, there is an incentive for them to talk. Someone has to bring all the parties together. No preconditions.
Ramos-Horta’s ‘implosion’ call is more description than prediction. The centre has already lost much. Balkanisation is no longer a possibility; it’s what has happened to Myanmar. The Oxford dictionary of politics describes balkanisation as ‘the division of a state into smaller territorial units. The term tends to imply a policy of “divide and rule”, whereby the strength of a united country is diluted by the creation of internal division.’ Myanmar’s balkanisation sees lots of divide and limited rule.
Even the junta is talking about the country being ‘split into various parts’. Myanmar’s reality today is revolution and balkanisation. The military cannot win; its task is not to lose. The dark forecast is for more years of war. The Crisis Group’s Richard Horsey sees a fragmented Myanmar becoming a confederation of autonomous ethnic zones:
Even in some Burman-majority regions, the idea of de facto self-rule is gaining momentum, and local communities, organizations, and armed resistance groups are starting to put the administrative building blocks in place. All this threatens to leave Myanmar as a collection of statelets, with a rump state at the centre.
Deep into the wars they willed, Myanmar’s junta and Russia’s Vladimir Putin vie for the dreadful honour of committing the worst strategic blunder of this decade. Both were revisionist efforts at resurrection: seeking to remake the Soviet empire or recover the military’s traditional control of Burmese life. Putin’s delusional megalomania and the junta’s delusional desperation were back-to-the future gambles that turned to war. Reaching for the old historical role instead turns into historic blunder.
The bloody prize of the greatest strategic disaster of the decade is the only achievement in sight for Myanmar’s military. Putin’s war does not yet threaten his hold on Russia. Myanmar’s junta has smashed the country as the regime staggers towards its own ruin..."
Source/publisher:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-15
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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"The International Court of Justice (ICJ), on 3rd July 2024, unanimously decided that the Declaration of Intervention submitted by the Republic of Maldives in the ICJ case concerning the "Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (The Gambia v. Myanmar)" is admissible in so far as it concerns the construction of provisions of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (“Genocide Convention”). This Order was made by the ICJ despite the objection submitted by Myanmar in relation to the admissibility of the Maldives’ Declaration of Intervention.
The Gambia instituted proceedings against Myanmar in the ICJ on 11th November 2019, alleging violations of the Genocide Convention through acts committed by Myanmar against the Muslim majority Rohingya population.
The Maldives remains steadfast in its efforts to contribute to the international community’s pursuit of justice for the Muslims of Rohingya and to support the enforcement of the Genocide Convention’s provisions..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Maldives
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-14
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Genocide, Human Rights and international relations
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Description:
"CRISIS IMPACT OVERVIEW:
From 29 June, Myanmar’s monsoon season brought heavy rainfall that caused fluvial flooding in the north of the country. The most extensive flooding has occurred Kachin state, where the Ayeyarwady, Malikha, and N’mai rivers flooded low-lying communities in Bhamo, Hpakant, Mogaung, Myitkyina, and Waingmaw townships. Flooding has also affected communities in Hkamti, Homalin, and Pyaungbin townships in the neighbouring Sagaing region (ECHO 04/07/2024; AHA 03/07/2024 and 04/07/2024; The Irrawaddy 05/07/2024; MIMU/UNDP 07/07/2024).
Between 2 and 11 July, floods submerged an estimated 75% of Hkamti town (The Irrawaddy 11/07/2024).
By 11 July, flooding had also occurred in unspecified townships in Magway region; in Myingyan, Nganzun, Pyinoolwin, and Tada-U townships in Mandalay region; and in Kyaukme, Lashio, Mongmit, and Muse townships in northern Shan state (WFP 01/07/2024; The Irrawaddy 11/07/2024; The Sunday Examiner 10/07/2024). There is limited information on flooding and its humanitarian impacts in Magway, Mandalay, and Shan.
By 11 July, news sources, citing Myanmar’s Department of Disaster Management, reported that at least 31,000 people were evacuated because of floods in Kachin state and Sagaing, Magway and Mandalay regions (Vietnam Plus 11/07/2024; Xinhua 10/07/2024; The Sunday Examiner 10/07/2024). On 4 July, the European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations reported 26,400 affected people, only some of whom had been evacuated (ECHO 04/07/2024).
By 11 July, the floods killed at least one child in Hkamti, Sagaing, and five people in Myitkyina, Kachin (The Irrawaddy 11/07/2024). Another source reported that there were no flood-related deaths and injuries (Vietnam Plus 11/07/2024; The Sunday Examiner 10/07/2024). Significant access challenges because of ongoing flooding, rainfall, and pre-existing conflict may explain these discrepancies in reporting.
There is limited information on humanitarian needs. The rain and flooding have damaged and destroyed homes, roads, and cropland, which has likely increased shelter, NFI, and food security needs among affected communities and disrupted access to WASH infrastructure, health services, and livelihoods..."
Source/publisher:
ACAPS via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-12
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Agriculture in Burma/Myanmar: general and research, Food Security and nutrition in Burma/Myanmar, Public Health, Human Rights and international relations
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pdf
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340.71 KB
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"There is a fundamental difference between Western and Chinese peacemaking efforts in Myanmar. Western governments, NGOs, and think-tanks produce lengthy, well-crafted reports, and some even organize workshops and study trips for what they call “stakeholders.” The Chinese, on the other hand, have an extensive intelligence network throughout Myanmar, and they are a major supplier of military hardware to the Myanmar military, while several resistance forces are equipped with Chinese-made guns obtained through the United Wa State Army (UWSA). In that way, China has leverage over the Myanmar military as well as ethnic armed organizations. And the Chinese are not involved in Myanmar’s internal affairs for entirely altruistic reasons. They want to secure their geostrategic interests in the region, the main one being access to the Indian Ocean.
At the same time, Myanmar has become a playground for well-paid Western peacemakers and analysts who seem to believe that they are in a position to “engage” the military as well as the opposition, armed or otherwise, with the aim of holding talks so that all the parties involved in the conflicts can meet and sort out their differences “peacefully”. The Indians, Myanmar’s second largest neighbors next to the Chinese, have a far more realistic approach to the issues. Like the Chinese, they are also motivated by geostrategic concerns. They realize what the Chinese, their main regional adversaries, are up to in Myanmar and are countering this by following a similar course of action: friendly relations with Naypyitaw – and informal contacts with the opposition. But India has nowhere near the same level of influence – or muscle – inside Myanmar as China, and its efforts have yielded few positive results.
Myanmar’s importance to China as an outlet to the region is not new; it is China’s foreign-policy priorities that have changed since the time of the old chairman, Mao Zedong. In the past, when China wanted to export revolution, Myanmar was the main springboard from which Maoist-style rebellion would spread to Southeast Asia and the region. Today, Beijing wants to export consumer goods and import oil and gas, and, once again, Myanmar serves as its most coveted entranceway to the world beyond China’s southern borders.
China first became involved in Myanmar’s internal conflicts when Naw Seng, a Kachin rebel, crossed into Yunnan with 500 of his men in 1950. They were given shelter in Guizhou province, but not allowed to engage in political activities. A few years later, another group of rebels, this time from the Communist Party of Burma (CPB), trekked into China, and were allowed to settle in Sichuan, where they received political training. But, like Naw Seng’s Kachins, they were told to refrain from Myanmar-related political activities. At that time, the Chinese had good relations with Myanmar, but they also had a major security concern: thousands of Nationalist Chinese, Kuomintang (KMT) soldiers had, after their defeat in the Chinese civil war, set up bases in eastern and northeastern Shan State, from where they launched cross-border raids into Yunnan.
In a tacit agreement with the then U Nu government, a total of 20,000 soldiers from the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) crossed the border between Sipsongpanna in southern Yunnan and Kengtung state in January 1961. In human waves, they swept down across the hills surrounding Möng Yang, Möng Wa and Möng Yawng. The campaign, codenamed the “Mekong River Operation,” broke the back of the KMT in northeastern Myanmar. Beaten Nationalist Chinese forces retreated towards Möng Pa Liao on the Mekong River, where 5,000 Myanmar soldiers launched an attack. The KMT’s base was captured without much resistance – but when the Myanmar troops marched in, they found large quantities of US-made arms and ammunition. When the news hit the newspapers in Yangon, rowdy demonstrations were held outside the US embassy, then on Merchant Street. Neither the Myanmar government nor the Chinese, however, have ever acknowledged that the PLA formed the core of the force that drove the KMT out of the eastern border areas.
Myanmar’s cordial relations with China came to an end when Gen. Ne Win staged a coup to oust the elected U Nu government on March 2, 1962. The Chinese, long wary of the ambitious and unpredictable general, for the first time allowed the CPB exiles to print and publish propaganda material. They were mostly urban intellectuals without military backgrounds, so the Chinese brought them together with Naw Seng’s warriors, and the nucleus of a new CPB army was formed. Teams were sent to the Myanmar border to identify possible infiltration routes, and, inadvertently, Ne Win’s junta provided the Chinese with an opportunity to connect the exiles in China with the remnants of the poorly equipped CPB forces which at that time were holding out in old strongholds like the Pegu Yoma mountains north of Yangon. In July 1963, the junta invited all rebel groups in the country to a “peace parley” in Yangon, and promised them safe passage to and from the meetings regardless of the outcome. Twenty-nine of the exiles in China also flowed in on special planes from Beijing, ostensibly to take part in the talks.
Predictably, the talks broke down in November because the junta offered no more than “rehabilitation” if the rebels, communists and ethnic fighters surrendered. But only two of the “Beijing returnees,” as they were called, went back to China; the rest joined the forces in the Pegu Yoma and assumed de facto leadership of the party at home. They had brought with them radio equipment from China, and a direct link was established between the exiles in Sichuan and the Pegu Yoma. Anti-Chinese riots in Yangon in June and July 1967 provided the Chinese with the pretext they needed to launch their push across the border. That happened on January 1, 1968, and the CPB established a new base area in the northeast. In the beginning, most of the forces consisted of Chinese volunteers and it was only when the Wa Hills were occupied in the early 1970s that the CPB gained a truly indigenous fighting force. Many ethnic resistance armies, eager to benefit from the supply of Chinese weapons, forged alliances with the CPB. But whatever guns they received had to be provided by the CPB; nothing came directly from China.
The CPB collapsed when ethnic Wa soldiers rose in mutiny in 1989 – and China had adopted a new foreign policy. The UWSA, which emerged from the ashes of the CPB, maintains a close relationship with China’s security services and is better armed and equipped with weapons obtained from China than the CPB ever was. And, again, other ethnic resistance armies have also benefited from the supply of Chinese weaponry but, as before, the guns have come from China’s main ally inside Myanmar, now the UWSA. A strong UWSA provides China with a strategic advantage and is also a bargaining chip in negotiations with Naypyitaw.
Significantly, when then President’s Office Minister U Aung Min visited Monywa in November 2012 to meet local people protesting a controversial Chinese-backed copper mining project, he openly admitted: “We are afraid of China … we don’t dare to have a row with [them]. If they feel annoyed with the shutdown of their projects and resume their support to the communists, the economy in border areas would backslide.” By “the communists” he clearly meant the UWSA and its allies, among them the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) in Kokang, another former CPB force. The MNDAA returned to armed struggle in February 2015 after having entered into a ceasefire agreement with the Myanmar military in 1989, and has now assumed a leading role in ongoing battles in northern Shan State. China, predictably, has denied any involvement in that conflict, but the fact remains that most of the MNDAA’s weaponry – and that of its allies, among them the Ta’ang National Liberation Army – have been supplied by the UWSA. At the same time, the Myanmar Army is using its Chinese-supplied weapons to fight the resistance. The UWSA, however, does not send soldiers to take part in the current battles.
China appears to believe that its interests are best served by playing both sides in Myanmar’s internal conflicts. But it is not in China’s interest to see the emergence of a strong, peaceful, democratic and federal Myanmar. As long as Myanmar is weak, China can play official games of being a “friendly neighbor” as well as “peacemaker” and use a carrot-and-stick approach with whatever government is in power: trade coupled with investment on the one hand and indirect support for the ethnic armies on the other. If Myanmar ever became exactly that – strong, peaceful, democratic and federal – China would be the first to lose. The leverage China has today inside Myanmar would be gone. But then China does not want to see the situation get totally out of hand either, because that would mean serious instability in the frontier areas and, most likely, a flood of refugees across the border. Typical examples of China’s unique role in the conflicts occurred in late June and early July, when former President Thein Sein was invited to Beijing. Ironically, Thein Sein’s trip was planned to coincide with the 70th anniversary of “The Declaration of the Five Principles of Co-Existence” which was worked out by China – and India, then friends – in 1954. One of those is non-interference, but no country has interfered more blatantly in Myanmar’s internal affairs than China. Thein Sein met foreign minister Wang Yi and, reportedly, urged China to help bring peace to Myanmar, knowing full well that China is the only outside country that has any clout over the ethnic armies. It was noteworthy that the Chinese invited Thein Sein, a less controversial personality than the hugely unpopular junta-boss, Sn. Gen. Min Aung Hlaing. Had he been invited, it would most probably have caused an anti-Chinese backlash in Myanmar. But then, on July 6, Min Aung Hlaing’s deputy, Gen. Soe Win, went to China, not to Beijing but to Qingdao in Shandong Province to attend “the Green Development Forum” of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and he was met at the airport by a local representative of the Communist Party of China. China had taken a cautious step forward towards establishing full relations with the junta, and then on a less informal party level.
Myanmar’s future depends on what China will do next – and if India will assume a more pro-active role. Squeezed between the two giants of Asia, which are also bitter enemies, Myanmar’s troublesome geographic location has now become a bigger problem than it ever was. Seen in that context, Western peacemakers are irrelevant sideshow artists. Finnish, Swiss, Norwegian and Australian organizations and an obscure outfit called the Joint Peace Fund are once again quietly sniffing around Myanmar’s ethnic armed organizations, hoping to “engage” them and reactivate the idea of talks with the military. But all they can hope to achieve is to persuade various UN agencies to issue statements condemning the atrocities perpetrated by the present junta and call for peace. But the UN is as impotent as the West when it comes to influencing the Myanmar military. Since the 1988 pro-democracy uprising, dozens of rapporteurs and special envoys have come and gone, and the military has always ignored their often critical reports. The UN’s current secretary general, António Guterres, pledged at a news conference on February 5, 2021 – only four days after the coup – that “the United Nations will do everything it can to unite the international community and create conditions for the military coup in Myanmar to be reversed.” But the only actions Guterres has taken since then are a series of statements urging the military to refrain from using violence against civilians. And UN agencies continue to cooperate with military authorities in Naypyitaw while whatever humanitarian aid they have provided has been channeled through junta-controlled entities..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-12
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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"In June, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) was forced to indefinitely suspend our medical humanitarian activities in northern Rakhine state, Myanmar, following the extreme escalation of conflict; MSF’s office in Buthidaung was burnt down. While MSF has been able to maintain a minimum level of activities in some townships in the central part of Rakhine, our teams in those areas also struggle with severe access restrictions, and the consequences of violent conflict. Here are some of the major challenges in healthcare provision we are facing in Rakhine.
''Teleconsultations means a lot to the people since this is the only contact left between the community and MSF.'' CAROLINE DE CRAMER, THE OUTGOING PROJECT MEDICAL ADVISER
Difficulties in accessing patients and delivering healthcare
Since November 2023, when the conflict between the Myanmar military and Arakan Army resumed, MSF teams faced major difficulties in accessing patients. For eight months, MSF did not have authorisation to run any mobile clinics in Rakhine state, including in the displaced people’s camps in Pauktaw, where MSF is often the only healthcare provider. These camps are only accessible by boat, but with the escalation of conflict in Pauktaw, our teams could no longer travel to provide healthcare, nor could patients in need of emergency care reach the hospital in Sittwe.
This presents a major issue for patients with chronic health problems, emergency needs, and women with complicated pregnancies. In June, MSF received travel authorisation to resume our mobile clinic for a month in the mainly Rohingya Aung Mingalar neighbourhood in downtown Sittwe. Our teams are operating here with reduced capacity, including due to severe supply constraints. Our clinics in Pauktaw and other in towns remain inaccessible for the time being.
Travel restrictions are not affecting just MSF, but also other organisations and institutions providing lifesaving assistance and healthcare. MSF is no longer authorised to send any medicines to the camps in Pauktaw. Our community staff have managed to continue the provision of basic health services, but it is difficult to provide patients with basic healthcare, as medical supplies dwindle and medical staff can’t reach them.
''When patients can reach out to a nurse, health promotion officer, or doctor, it is a form of mental health support.'' CAROLINE DE CRAMER, THE OUTGOING PROJECT MEDICAL ADVISER
Emergency referrals blocked
Before the resumption of the conflict in November 2023, when people in the camps or villages supported by MSF needed hospital care, they relied on our teams to provide emergency referrals, including pick up of patients and transportation to hospitals by car or boat. This is no longer possible due to travel restrictions imposed by the authorities, leaving people without the option of receiving specialised medical care.
For people attempting to reach hospital independently, the journey is fraught with difficulty. For patients in Pauktaw, reaching Sittwe by sea is practically impossible, while healthcare services available to them in other towns are limited, equally affected by the conflict, and often require an even longer journey.
People sometimes die on the way to seek healthcare or because they cannot even attempt the journey due to the prohibitive cost and difficulty of travelling. As a result, MSF has seen an alarming trend in maternal and neo-natal deaths. In January, our teams reported the deaths of a mother and her twins, and of two mothers who each lost a baby because they were forced to deliver at home. In June, our teams reported the death of another mother who was unable to receive antenatal care since April. She was scared to leave the displacement camp in Pauktaw due to the road blockages.
''It’s only way for them to feel that they are not forgotten, that we are still present, and that they can count on us.'' CAROLINE DE CRAMER, THE OUTGOING PROJECT MEDICAL ADVISER
Public healthcare facilities no longer function
Since the resumption of the conflict, many health workers have left their jobs in public healthcare facilities, mostly due to safety and security issues. This has forced some facilities to close completely. Those that are still open struggle to function due to shortages of staff, medical supplies and fuel. Electricity networks no longer supply power in Rakhine, so health facilities depend on generators, but fuel to run them is not easily available due to supply routes being disrupted or cut off, impacting their ability to perform medical procedures.
Lack of phone signal makes teleconsultations challenging
To reach patients, MSF medical teams provide consultations by telephone or text message. However, this also poses a challenge, because phone networks are often disrupted, resulting in intermittent and very weak phone coverage across many areas. Patients and community volunteers often need to walk long distances or climb hills to try and get a phone signal.
“Teleconsultations means a lot to the people since this is the only contact left between the community and MSF,” says Caroline de Cramer, the outgoing project medical adviser. “When patients can reach out to a nurse, health promotion officer, or doctor, it is a form of mental health support. It’s only way for them to feel that they are not forgotten, that we are still present, and that they can count on us.”..."
Source/publisher:
Médecins Sans Frontières
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-12
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Public Health, Human Rights and international relations, Arakan (Rakhine) State - reports etc. by date (latest first)
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"The Communist Party of China (CPC) has invited Myanmar’s military proxy Union Solidarity and Development Party, People’s Party, Arakan Front Party (AFP) and Shan and Ethnic Democratic Party (SEDP) to pay a seven-day visit to China.
The invitation by China’s ruling party to the four parties – members of a working group of parties registered under the junta’s election commission – comes after junta chief Min Aung Hlaing again vowed to hold the long-delayed election next year.
The coup leader has repeatedly failed to hold the promised election after ousting the elected government led by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD) and annulling the 2020 election results that secured the NLD a second term. The junta has imprisoned senior NLD members and dissolved the party.
Myanmar people have condemned the election plan as a ruse to legitimize military rule that has brutalized their lives since the 2021 coup. The poll plan has also been dismissed as a sham by much of the international community, including the United States.
However, China – the junta’s major ally and arms supplier – has offered to assist the process.
According to the invitation seen by The Irrawaddy, a 17-member delegation from the four parties will visit China from 20 to 27 July.
The trip aims to strengthen relations between the CPC and Myanmar’s political parties, the invitation stated. The delegation will consist of seven representatives from the military proxy USDP and three each from the People’s Party (PP), AFP and SEDP.
Airfares and expenses will be borne by the Chinese side, the invitation added. The delegation will travel to Yunnan and Qinghai for field studies and talks with Chinese experts on rural development and the Belt & Road Initiative, it said.
People’s Party leader U Ko Ko Gyi confirmed that he would be among three PP representatives in the delegation.
“Our ties with the CPC have existed since the PP’s founding,” he told The Irrawaddy, adding that he would not comment on the trip until after the visit, as he does not know what will be discussed yet.
U Ko Ko Gyi told the pro-junta Eleven Media outlet that his party’s delegation would discuss stability and restoring democracy in Myanmar while explaining to Chinese officials the fear and insecurity people face due to armed conflict.
Former general Thein Sein, whose quasi-civilian government ceded power to Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s party following landmark elections in 2015, left the country for the first time since the coup to visit China last month.
Junta deputy chief Soe Win followed in his footsteps a few days later to explain election preparations to Chinese officials.
Igor Blazevic, a human rights campaigner and Myanmar expert, commented that China is pushing for an election to shore up the junta as a viable, if weak, central government.
The giant neighbor is exerting pressure and offering incentives to military elites to proceed with votes in territories still under junta control, he added.
This raised the likelihood that Myanmar would see a “Chinese election” heavily influenced by Beijing.
“This is nothing but very serious meddling in the internal matters of a neighboring state,” Blazevic said.
The four parties’ participation in Chinese preparations for the junta’s election amounted to high treachery, he added.
The junta last year dissolved 40 political parties including the NLD, whose leaders including Daw Aung San Suu Kyi remain in regime prisons.
Myanmar boasted more than 90 political parties at the 2020 election. So far, the junta’s election body has approved registration applications of 49 parties..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-12
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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"WEEKLY HIGHLIGHTS:
In the South-East, the number of internally displaced people (IDPs) increased from 899,000 last week to 909,400 this week.
In Tanintharyi Region, 10,600 people from Yebyu Township were newly displaced within the same township, with 3,333 people displaced as secondary due to Tatmadaw troop reinforcements in the villages.
In Shan State (South), 1,315 IDPs from Pinlaung Township were displaced to Nyaungshwe Township following increased fighting in the area.
In Kayah State, 61 people from Demoso Township were newly displaced within the same township, while 271 IDPs returned to their places of origin in Demoso Township..."
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UN High Commissioner for Refugees (Geneva) via Reliefweb (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-12
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Burma: Internal displacement/forced migration of several ethnic groups., UNHCR (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees), Human Rights and international relations
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"Secretly recorded videos expose Myanmar junta’s torture of detainees
(BANGKOK, July 11, 2024)—Member States of the International Criminal Court (ICC) should ensure appropriate protection for witnesses from Myanmar who have evidence that would contribute to accountability for ongoing potential war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide, said Fortify Rights today. Fortify Rights obtained ten secretly recorded videos showing Myanmar military junta soldiers severely torturing detainees at an interrogation facility in Mandalay Region, and the defector-whistleblower who filmed the incidents is in need of protection.
The videos expose numerous incidents of severe torture of detainees by Myanmar junta personnel, including fatal beatings as well as electrocutions. In one video, junta personnel use a long implement to severely beat a man who is naked on the floor with his hands bound behind his back. In another video, soldiers allegedly beat two detainees to death.
“These torture videos are the type of evidence needed for justice and accountability, but the key witness who filmed them requires protection to ensure the usefulness of this valuable evidence,” said Chit Seng, Human Rights Associate at Fortify Rights. “Collecting and preserving evidence of atrocities in Myanmar is more crucial now than ever, but without urgent witness protection, significant amounts of evidence will be lost. These videos add to the mounting evidence of the junta’s flagrant violations of international law and should compel the international community to hold the Myanmar junta accountable, including by referring the situation to the ICC.”
To preserve the integrity of the video evidence and future prosecutions and for the security of the witness, Fortify Rights is not at liberty to release the videos at the moment but is preserving them as future evidence in potential war crimes cases.
The witness in question has communicated with the Independent International Mechanism for Myanmar (IIMM), which was created to collect and preserve evidence of international crimes in Myanmar. The IIMM works with U.N. member states to provide protection support for witnesses, including potential deserters, stating in their 2023 annual report, “The Mechanism is in contact with many defectors from the security services, some of whom appear to have valuable ‘insider’ evidence that could advance investigations of crimes within the Mechanism’s mandate.”
In March 2023, Fortify Rights received ten videos from a 35-year-old former private in the Myanmar Air Force who secretly recorded fellow Myanmar military soldiers torturing detainees in an interrogation center in Mandalay Region in October and November 2021. The private defected from the military and fled the country, bringing the videos with him. Fortify Rights interviewed the defector, who served as a security officer at the interrogation facility, and a civilian whom the military detained at the facility and later released. Fortify Rights remains in direct communication with the military whistleblower as well as the former detainee.
The videos, the exact location of the interrogation facility, and the names of five military soldiers—including Army, Air Force, and military intelligence, known as Sa Ya Pa in Burmese language, personnel holding the ranks of major, captain, corporal, and warrant officer—who ordered, committed, and oversaw the torture are on file with Fortify Rights. These men should be investigated and prosecuted for their role in the junta’s widespread and systematic use of torture as an attack against the civilian population or crimes against humanity under international law, said Fortify Rights, which is ready to share the evidence with relevant prosecutorial authorities.
Fortify Rights analyzed the ten videos that range from 20 seconds to four-and-a-half minutes in length and show six different incidents of torture and abuse, including severe and fatal beatings of detainees with heavy whips and other implements, non-fatal electrocutions of detainees, kicking of detainees, threats of sexual violence, and forcing detainees to perform humiliating acts. Altogether, the videos depict the interrogation and torture of approximately 48 detainees, including two women. All the videos were recorded in an outdoor courtyard within the military facility’s compound; in half the videos, the torture took place during the night between approximately 11 p.m. and 2 a.m.
Speaking about the videos he recorded, the 35-year-old military defector told Fortify Rights:
I took ten videos. … [A]ccording to the law, during the interrogation, only intelligence officers are allowed to [interrogate] the detainees. But [at the facility], everyone [all military personnel] was doing the torture, everyone was kicking and hitting [the detainees]. … When you witness these things almost every day, after a while, I didn’t feel good inside. I felt sad, and it was devastating for me to see the military torturing people every single day. At some point, I decided that I wanted to do something. So, I started recording videos to keep as evidence for the victims who were tortured. I want to do what I can for the victims.
One video that runs for one minute and 19 seconds shows two men lying next to each other on the ground. One of the detainees’ hands is bound, and he is lying in the fetal position as three plain-clothed soldiers beat him repeatedly with sticks and a whip. The other detainee is lying face-up and does not appear to move during the entire video, indicating that he may be unconscious or dead. A fellow officer told the defector that the detainees died from the torture in the interrogation facility the day after the video was filmed.
“I have seen people die in front of me,” the defector told Fortify Rights. “As you can see in the video, [two people were beaten to death.] … I took this video secretly from behind the tree. They were interrogated and beaten up repeatedly during interrogation. … They died in the morning.”
In the video, the three soldiers hit the bound man with implements at least 20 times, and the detainee can be heard saying, “Please help me. I am telling the truth.” A man in a black tank top with dark shorts hits the detainee with an approximately three-foot-long stick. “Does it hurt?” another soldier in a white tank top with a thin cane asks. “Yes, it hurts,” the civilian cries.
Following this exchange, in a span of 26 seconds, a soldier in a red t-shirt and longyi [a traditional cloth worn by men] strikes the detained man 11 times with a whip while taunting: “What’s wrong? Huh? I have been waiting for guys like you.” The detainee cries out in pain as the soldier with the thin cane hits the civilian again while shouting: “Are you a man or a woman? Are you a man? Are you a man? Huh?! Are you a man? … If you say you’re a man, don’t make a single sound!”
The video ends with the military officer with the long stick hitting the detainee, who cries out, “It hurts a lot.”
The 35-year-old defector confirmed that the men involved in beating the two detainees “were from the intelligence, special branch police, and security personnel from army and air force.” He said: “I don’t know [their names] because I took this secretly.”
In a three-minute 56-second video filmed at night, a bound, naked man, who is blindfolded with a blue surgical mask and black cloth, is lying face down on the concrete ground while three soldiers interrogate and beat him 65 times with a large wooden stick. The bound man has visible bruises in the middle of his naked back that look purple or black and splotches of discoloration on his left upper thigh and buttock.
One soldier asks the bound civilian if he transferred 500,000 Myanmar Kyat [approximately US$150 to US$200] to a resistance group operating against the Myanmar military in the area. The bound man answers that he only transferred 10,000 Myanmar Kyat [approximately US$3 to US$4]. The soldiers threaten the man’s family for the rest of the video.
“Go and put the gun on his father and call me once you are there,” the interrogator ordered junior soldiers. Speaking to the man being tortured, he adds, “If you don’t tell the truth, your parents will be shot dead. We will set an example of what happens with the families who support [resistance groups].”
The video ends with the detainee repeatedly crying out, “Please, I beg. I apologize. Please don’t do it.”
In two further videos, also filmed at night, show a group of up to eight plain-clothed soldiers surrounding six bound detainees, who are kneeling or lying face down on the ground. The soldiers beat them with a whip and thin canes and electrocute them with what appears to be a hand-held taser. The sound of the detainees being shocked and cries of pain are audible in the video. The soldiers are heard questioning the detainees about payments made to resistance fighters.
Another 15-second video similarly shows interrogators in military uniforms electrocuting detainees. Filmed during the daytime, a uniformed army major and two plain-clothed soldiers are seen encircling two kneeling detainees, who are blindfolded and wearing surgical masks with their hands tied behind their backs. The major proceeds to shock one of the men continuously for eight seconds with a handheld electric taser while interrogating him. The man’s body spasms uncontrollably for the duration of the treatment, and he sobs and begs that he didn’t do anything.
In another one-minute video, two soldiers, one in green camouflage pants and army green singlet and another in plain clothes, interrogate two blindfolded men, whose hands are tied behind their backs, accusing them of being involved with armed resistance fighters. The first detainee is writhing on the ground as one soldier whips the detainee with a black whip while saying: “So now, these hurt you? Huh? How about when my drivers were hurt?” Another soldier interrogating a second kneeling detainee says: “You… decide to blow up this car with a landmine? So, does that give you some satisfaction?” The video ends with the soldier whipping the first detainee while the detainee is squatting on the floor with folded hands, groaning in pain. The video ends with one of the soldiers saying: “So now, you think your life is good?… No, right? It’s not good now.”
Fortify Rights interviewed a 61-year-old civilian who spent 45 days detained in the same interrogation facility where the defector was stationed and at the same time when the defector recorded the videos. He stated:
I was detained on October 10, 2021. … The village administrator and two soldiers ambushed me in [redacted] town and detained me. … They took me back to the village first. I was beaten up once I arrived at the village. … They hit me with the butt of the guns. It was about three hours that they were interrogating me. … [T]hey blindfolded me and tied my hands behind my back. I couldn’t see who was beating me. … They accused me of supporting the [resistance fighters] by donating money.
The 61-year-old man recalled being taken to the military interrogation center afterward in a car, still blindfolded and bound. He said: “I arrived at the interrogation center around 2:30 p.m., but they wouldn’t remove my blindfold until I was settled in the room around 9 p.m.”
The man described how the soldiers confined him and others in a metal shipping container for ten days, saying:
[T]he ten days that they put us in the container box, I felt like I was in hell. There were 15 of us thrown in there. To paint a picture for you, a container box that is usually attached to a truck was just placed on the ground, and there was nothing made up inside to accommodate us. We had to scream out to the guard if we wanted to go outside for bathroom breaks or to breathe. But it depended on the guards, and we all had to be brought out together. The sun’s heat would seep through the metal walls, and it was excruciating inside. We had to stay there day and night. Sometimes, if we wanted to pee, we had to pee into water bottles inside that container.
Sharing what he saw while detained at the interrogation facility, he said:
What I witnessed at the military interrogation center rattled me a lot because I had never ever experienced anything like this before. I saw the soldiers torturing a person they accused of being a [resistance fighter]. What I mean by “torture” was that I saw them asking the person if he was thirsty, and they would force one detainee to pee into another detainee’s mouth.
He went on to describe how he heard other detainees being tortured, saying:
There were small holes in our holding rooms, so we would peep out of them to see what was happening. Most of the interrogation happened at night. One of the worst things I witnessed was the day they brought in youths, who were accused of being [resistance fighters]. The screams were a lot. I could hear the youths denying [the accusations], but [the soldiers] wouldn’t stop hitting them. I saw each person taking turns to hit [the youths] whenever they passed by or when they felt like it. At some point, I saw the soldiers putting tires on the youths’ necks, and if they happened to lean forward, the soldiers put a knife in front of their bodies and had the knife pierce them every time the youths happened to lean forward from having the weight of the tires on their necks.
The former detainee also witnessed how the facility commander at the time, holding the rank of Lieutenant Colonel, threatened to rape a young woman. He said:
[T]he interrogation facility commander came and asked me to follow him. He was drunk at that time. I was taken to a room where a father, a mother, and a young daughter were detained. … He threatened to rape the young girl in front of her family and me. We all had to beg him not to do it, and we also begged the guards around not to do this to the girl and also to the parents.
Describing the commander of the detention center, the 61-year-old torture survivor said:
I don’t know the [commander]’s name. He was about five feet eight inches with tan skin and a round face. I think he was 50 years old. I don’t know his rank, but he referred to himself as the interrogation facility commander, and we had to call him “A Ba” [or “respected elder” in Burmese language], and other [soldiers] only called him “A Ba.”
The military defector also described the commander, saying:
He is really a bad man. … He drinks a lot. Whenever he was drunk, he would bring out all the detainees and do whatever he wanted with them. The video I am about to show is when he put a bottle on top of a detainee’s head, and he was about to shoot the bottle. The part when he fired is not recorded. I didn’t dare to record, but at least I managed to record him threatening and aiming at the bottle on top of the detainee’s head.
In the video, the commander is heard saying to the civilian: “I am just going to shoot the bottle. I won’t shoot your head. Just shooting the bottle.” The civilian in the video looks visibly terrified as he balances the bottle on his head with his left hand and puts his right hand over his heart.
The defector clarified that the commander did not fire his gun during this incident; however, in another video taken during the same incident, the commander is seen kicking a woman in the face after she is unable to answer a question asked by the commander. At one point, he returns to the woman, holds her head, and hits the left side of her head while shouting: “I didn’t want to [kick you]. Do you hear me? I said, ‘Do you hear me?’ I am angry!”
The defector also told Fortify Rights how the commander threatened two women detainees with sexual abuse, saying “…he would use a taser on their genital area. It gave me goosebumps when I heard [this threat].”
Fortify Rights has documented how the Myanmar military is responsible for committing ongoing atrocity crimes, including genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. For example, the joint report “Nowhere is Safe,” published by Fortify Rights and Yale Law School in 2022, documented various acts, including acts of torture, committed by the Myanmar military following the February 2021 coup. The report found that such acts were carried out as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed at a civilian population and amounted to crimes against humanity.
The ten videos obtained by Fortify Rights provide further evidence of torture and crimes against humanity committed by the Myanmar military, which should be investigated, said Fortify Rights.
In March 2024, the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Volker Türk, addressed the U.N. Human Rights Council, expressing deep shock at the continued “systemic use of torture against political detainees in police stations, military interrogation centers, and prisons.”
The Convention against Torture or Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) defines torture as the intentional infliction of “severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental,” for a specific purpose, such as punishment, intimidation, or coercion, “or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind.” Although Myanmar is not a party to CAT, the convention provides authoritative guidance on the act of torture and other forms of ill-treatment under international human rights law. Under CAT, torture is committed “when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity.”
When carried out as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed at a civilian population, torture may constitute a crime against humanity under Article 7(1)(f) of the Rome Statute.
Although the ICC is investigating crimes committed against the ethnic Rohingya community in Myanmar and the state of Myanmar is currently on trial for the Rohingya genocide at the International Court of Justice, there are no criminal investigations by prosecutors into the military junta’s more recent post-coup crimes.
Member states of the ICC should urgently refer the situation in Myanmar to the ICC Prosecutor under Article 14 of the Rome Statute, and the Prosecutor should immediately investigate torture and other ongoing mass atrocity crimes in the country, said Fortify Rights today.
Article 14 of the Rome Statute empowers ICC member states to request the Prosecutor to investigate international crimeswithin the Court’s jurisdiction. While Myanmar is not an ICC member state, the National Unity Government—the body representing Myanmar’s democratically-elected leaders—lodged a 12(3) declaration with the Court’s registrar on July 17, 2021, accepting the jurisdiction of the Court for international crimes committed on Myanmar territory since July 1, 2002 and into the future.
On March 14, 2024, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, Tom Andrews, called on ICC member states to refer the situation in Myanmar to the ICC prosecutor.
At the time of writing, no ICC member state has referred Myanmar to the ICC Prosecutor.
The ICC has a witness protection program for various types of witnesses, including “insider witnesses,” which could include military defectors. However, the ICC’s witness protection can only be activated in relation to an ongoing investigation by the Office of the Prosecutor, and the ICC is not investigating atrocity crimes in Myanmar in relation to the military coup and subsequent attacks on civilians nationwide. For this reason, ICC member states should urgently coordinate to ensure protection for high-value witnesses from Myanmar and should urgently refer the situation in Myanmar to the ICC Prosecutor, said Fortify Rights.
“No one has been prosecuted anywhere in the world for the horrible atrocities unfolding in Myanmar. The Myanmar junta will not get serious about ending its attacks against civilians until the international community ends this lethal inaction,” said Chit Seng. “The junta has shown again and again that it will continue to persecute and abuse those who oppose its dictatorship. The international community and the ICC must act immediately to investigate these violations and create an environment where individuals with evidence on such crimes feel safe to share information and are actually protected.”
Correction: This news release was corrected on July 16, 2024 to include information about the IIMM’s support for witnesses..."
Source/publisher:
"Fortify Rights"
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-11
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International Criminal Court (Myanmar), Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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"Washington, DC — Representative Gregory W. Meeks, Ranking Member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, issued the following statement upon the passage through Committee of the bipartisan ‘‘Rohingya Genocide Accountability and Protection Act’’, or the “Rohingya GAP Act”.
“As the Burmese military continues its violence against ethnic minorities in Burma and the refugee camps in Bangladesh strain to keep up with the influx of refugees, the House Foreign Affairs Committee took action by passing my bipartisan bill, the ‘Rohingya Genocide Accountability and Protection Act’. This legislation lays out a holistic approach to addressing the Rohingya crisis, bolstering U.S. humanitarian assistance and support for refugees and authorizing critical funding for accountability and justice programs so we may start to create a pathway out of genocide and crimes against humanity for the nearly million Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh and the nearly six hundred thousand still located in Burma.”
“The State Department’s determination two years ago that the Burmese military committed genocide and crimes against humanity against the Rohingya was not only a critical recognition of the atrocities they have suffered, but also a call to action. The Rohingya GAP Act is a key step towards protecting and supporting Rohingya and ensuring history does not repeat itself. I look forward to this legislation’s swift passage on the House Floor.”
coordinate Rohingya policy;
Calls for a holistic U.S. strategy to support Rohingya that includes protection efforts; engagement with the Rohingya community and stakeholders to facilitate safe, voluntary, and sustainable repatriation to Burma; developing a comprehensive transitional justice strategy; humanitarian assistance, including basic needs and access to livelihoods; programs to prevent and respond to gender-based violence and trafficking; and support for Rohingya civil society organizations;
Calls on USAID and the Department of State to ensure that Rohingya refugees in camps in Bangladesh receive a ration sufficient to meet the humanitarian minimum standards for food and nutrition;
Authorizes higher education scholarships for Rohingya refugees through 2030;
Establishes a new Conflict Observatory for Burma to monitor and report on the ongoing violence in Burma; and
Authorizes $10 million per year for 5 years for the Department of State to support atrocity crime investigations, documentation, and casework, transitional justice and accountability mechanisms, witness protection measures, and technical support related to Rohingya..."
Source/publisher:
House Foreign Affairs Committee
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-11
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"Highlights
• Protection concerns are on the rise with nearly 3.2 million people internally displaced. Ongoing conflict and seasonal flooding are exacerbating the already severe humanitarian needs.
• During the month of May, UNICEF and partners provided primary health care services to 46,117 women and children, and life-saving child protection services reached 66,483 people.
• Bimonthly maternal and child cash transfers have been made to 9,000 programme participants and 80,075 people received critical WASH supplies.
• Only 12 per cent of the funding against the Humanitarian Action for Children (HAC) Appeal requirement has been received, impacting UNICEF’s capacity to deliver multisectoral humanitarian assistance to children and their families. Timely and sufficient funding is crucial to provide timely assistance, especially during the ongoing monsoon season
Funding Overview and Partnerships
UNICEF Myanmar Country Office has appealed for US$ 208.3 million in 2024 to address the needs of 3.1 million people, including an estimated 2.1 million children. As of 30 June 2024, UNICEF secured US$ 24.8 million (12 per cent of its appealed funding), comprising US$11.6 million received for the current year and US$13.2 million carried forward from the previous year.
This year, UNICEF has received generous funding support from the Government of Japan, the European Commission’s Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations Department (DG ECHO), the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), the Australian Committee for UNICEF, the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF), as well as internal allocations from global humanitarian thematic funding. UNICEF also acknowledges the contributions previously made by Australia’s DFAT, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID)’s Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance (BHA), DG ECHO, the Government of Canada, the Government of Japan, the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), the Government of Norway, the Royal Thai Government, the Czech Committee for UNICEF, the French Committee for UNICEF, and the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), along with the CERF and the Myanmar Country-Based Pooled Fund. Moreover, UNICEF Myanmar received an internal loan from the Emergency Programme Fund to support the humanitarian response.
With these resources, UNICEF and its partners are delivering humanitarian services in nutrition, health, HIV/AIDS, water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH), education, child protection, gender-based violence in emergencies (GBViE), social protection and cash-based programming. UNICEF is also providing humanitarian leadership roles in the WASH Cluster, the Nutrition Cluster, the Child Protection Area of Responsibility (CP AoR), the Mine Action Area of Responsibility (MA AoR) and as co-lead of the Education Cluster and is strengthening protection against sexual exploitation and abuse (PSEA), and social behaviour-change and accountability to affected populations. However, UNICEF’s capacity to deliver these services is severely limited by the funding gap of 88 per cent against the 2024 appeal. Without additional funding, targeted populations, especially children, will not be able to receive urgently needed assistance.
UNICEF continues its efforts to mobilize resources and expresses its sincere appreciation to all private and public sector donors for their contributions to supporting the children of Myanmar.
Situation Overview & Humanitarian Needs
Ongoing conflict continues to lead to further displacement across multiple parts of the country with nearly 3.2 million people internally displaced as of 24 June. This includes 93,500 people internally displaced since the end of May. The onset of monsoon has also led to increased needs with further population movements, and damage to infrastructure and increasing the risk of seasonal diseases.
The fighting in Rakhine state has been intensifying with heavy artillery shelling; 15 townships out of 17 are affected by clashes. In the northern part of the state, fighting has moved from Buthidaung to Maungdaw. In Sittwe, it is estimated that between 15,000 to 20,000 people from at least 35 villages were reportedly forced to move. According to the camp coordination and camp management cluster report, as of 20 June there are more than 300,000 newly displaced people across Rakhine. Humanitarian access is still restricted in most areas, although some agencies gained access to some monasteries to assess the needs of IDPs who are sheltering there.
In the northwest, intense fighting has been continuing with gunfire, artillery shelling and aerial attacks resulting in civilian casualties, with children reportedly killed and injured. Civilian properties and public infrastructure, including temporary learning spaces, have also been destroyed. The number of people displaced since 2021 exceeded 1.5 million2 by the end of June 2024, with an increase of nearly 200,000 IDPs since the beginning of 2024.
In Kachin, conflict between the Myanmar Armed Forces (MAF) and Kachin Independence Army and its allies continues to intensify in several townships. Fighting intensified in Bhamo, Hpakant, Mansi, Momauk, Myitkyina, Puta-O, Sumprabum, Tanai and Waingmaw townships and has displaced thousands of people. By mid-June, about 96,000 people had been newly displaced. Bhamo, Mansi, Momauk and Waingmaw townships are host to the highest numbers of newly displaced people. Some 84,400 people have already been in protracted camps for a decade. Road closures have led to a shortage of essential items, including food and fuel, as well as rocketing prices, particularly in Puta-O.
There was extensive flooding in Myitkyina on 30 June leading to infrastructure damage, and populations being displaced. Some roads are impassable, mobile networks are interrupted, and all flights cancelled as the airport was inaccessible. Most of the internally displaced persons (IDPs) living close to the river were relocated to other areas. An inter-agency needs assessment was planned as at end June. The risks of heavy rain, flood and cyclone are heightened during the monsoon season across the country and these disasters would seriously impact to already vulnerable population amid the escalating of conflict and crisis.
Armed conflicts between the MAF and ethnic armed organizations (EAO) persist, with frequent clashes reported in Pekhon, Pinlaung, Nyaung Shwe, Hsihseng townships in southern Shan and in Nawnghkio, Kyaukme and Hsipaw in northern Shan. By the end of June, there were more than 130,000 IDPs in southern Shan, more than 18,000 people in northern Shan (including more than 2,000 people in Nawnghkio) and more than 132,000 IDPs in Kayah state. Due to the recent conflict in northern Shan and in Pinlaung, the number of internally displaced people is expected to increase. However, in Hsihseng, the number of internally displaced people gradually returning to their places of origin is increasing. In Kayah state as well, some internally displaced people have voluntarily returned to their places of origin; primarily those who had been displaced to southern Shan.
Roads around Lashio in Shan state have been destroyed and tightening security is impacting the transportation of supplies. In addition, the number of landmine incidents is increasing in northern Shan, as well as in the Hsihseng and Pinlaung areas of southern Shan. Increased enforcement of the conscription law and recruitment activities by the MAF and EAOs have been reported. Humanitarian access in northern Shan and Kayah faces significant challenges and access to townships in southern Shan, particularly Hsihseng, Moebye, Phekon and some areas of Pinlaung township, are largely restricted.
According to recent monitoring of incidents involving landmines and explosive remnants of war in the first quarter of 2024, a total of 339 civilian casualties (29 per cent of them children) have been reported4 nationally. This figure represents 32 per cent of the total casualties reported in 2023 (1,052 reported). Shan state had the highest number of casualties (25 per cent of the overall total). Sagaing and Bago followed with 19 per cent and 12 per cent of the total, respectively. The remaining regions, Chin, Kachin, Kayah, Kayin, Magway, Mandalay, Mon, Naypyitaw, Rakhine, Tanintharyi and Yangon, collectively accounted for the remaining 43 per cent of the total casualties..."
Source/publisher:
UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) (Myanmar) via Reliefweb (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-10
[field_licence]
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Individual Documents
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UNICEF (United Nations Children's Fund), Education in Burma/Myanmar - general, Food Security and nutrition in Burma/Myanmar, Public Health, Human Rights and international relations
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"The breakdown of a China-initiated ceasefire in northern Shan State, and the advance of ethnic resistance armies in the same area, have highlighted two crucial issues for the future of Myanmar: the nature and aims of Chinese peacemaking, and what the re-establishment of a federal system akin to that which the country enjoyed prior to the 1962 military coup should look like. China is evidently the only outsider power that is in a position to exercise real influence over some of the ethnic armies as well as the Burmese military. And although most resistance groups, armed or otherwise, say they are in favor of a “free, democratic and federal Myanmar,” none one these has addressed what the status of ethnic minorities within their areas would, or should, be. Would it really bring decades of ethnic strife to an end if the existing seven ethnic minority states – Shan, Kachin, Chin, Karen, Mon, and Karenni (Kayah) – were granted genuine autonomy, the majority Burmans were left to govern the other seven regions, and the union territory around Naypyitaw became common ground for everyone?
The problem is that Chin State is perhaps the only “ethnic state” with only one major “ethnic group”. But, even so, the Chin have no lingua franca; mutually unintelligible dialects are spoken in different parts of the state. In Kachin State, there has always been a huge Shan community , and migration from other parts of Myanmar means that ethnic Kachins have become a minority in their state. And then there is the question of whether the Lisu and Nung-Rawang identify themselves as Kachins? Most Karen, meanwhile, live in Ayeyarwady (Irrawaddy) Region, not in Karen State in the east, which has Shan, Burman and other communities as well. In Mon State, it is hard to say who is what because most urban Mon are Burmanized and the state capital Mawlamyine has an ethnically and religiously very mixed population. Karenni (Kayah) State has large Shan, Padaung, and Pa-O communities. The population of Rakhine State in the west consists of Buddhist Rakhine (Arakanese), Muslim Rohingya and Kaman, and tribal people in the highlands.
And then there is Shan State, the largest and ethnically most diverse state where several non-Shan peoples – among them the Wa, the Palaung, the Kokang Chinese, and the Pa-O – want their own states or, at least, to be self-governing. The main complication can be observed in the north where Shan, Palaung, and Kachin groups have overlapping claims, and their respective armies have throughout the history of the civil war frequently clashed over territory. The Wa already control a de facto self-governing state spanning more than 20,000 square kilometers in the eastern mountains. Their United Wa State Army (UWSA) is allied with the Shan State Army (SSA) of the Shan State Progress Party (SSPP), but has fought battles with the SSA/SSPP’s rival, the Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS), whose army is also called the Shan State Army. In the south, the Pa-O rose in rebellion in the late 1940s, not to fight the central government but against the power of the Shan saohpas, or princes.
The original SSA, which was set up in 1964 and in 1971 formed a political wing called the SSPP, made a point of having other nationalities among its ranks to show that it was fighting for the entire Shan State. There was a Kokang Chinese unit and several Palaung battalions, and it had Kachin and Wa officers. The RCSS, on the other hand, promotes a strongly ethnocentric, Shan-Buddhist identity. Since an above-ground Shan political party, the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy, was formed in 1988, the SSA/SSPP has also become more Shan nationalistic. The near-absurd complexity of the situation in Shan State could be illustrated by the example of late Ta Kalei, an ethnic, Christian Karen who wore Buddha amulets and headed a Pa-O rebel army which was allied with the once powerful Communist Party of Burma.
So, what a future federal Myanmar, and, especially, Shan State, would look like is very much an open question. There are, however, some similarities between Shan State and India’s northeastern state of Assam (which was historically a Shan-ruled kingdom). In the years after India’s independence from Britain in 1947, Assam consisted of all areas east of the Siliguri Neck with the exceptions of the old princely states of Manipur and Tripura. Like the Shan, the Assamese dominated the lowlands and various hill peoples lived in the surrounding highlands. But following years of insurgency, the Naga Hills in the east were separated from Assam and, in 1963, became the state of Nagaland. The Mizo area south of Nagaland also saw a rebellion against the Indian state, and peace efforts resulted in the formation of the union territory of Mizoram in 1972, which in 1987 was proclaimed a state. In 1972, the Khasi, Jaintia and Garo Hills also became a separate state called Meghalaya. Assam then had to move its capital Shillong, which was located in what was to become Meghalaya, to Dispur near Guwahati, the main city in the lowlands. In 1972, the Northeast Frontier Agency, which consisted of the northern areas of Assam bordering China, became the union territory of Arunachal Pradesh, and, in 1987, a state. All that remains of Assam are the lowlands around the Brahmaputra River.
The “Balkanization” of Assam did not come about without discontent among the majority Assamese, but it was the price they had to pay for peace. Would the Shan be willing to accept a similar solution to their internal, ethnic conflicts? With all likelihood, no. But, if there won’t be separate states for the non-Shan peoples of Shan State, what could a solution look like? A “confederation” of smaller, ethnic entities? Autonomous districts within the state? But that has been rejected by the Wa, who already have a self-governing territory that for all intents and purposes is being governed separately from the rest of Shan State. A similar development appears underway in Kokang, where the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army has wrested control over most territory and established its own administration.
And what would happen to Kachin State? Some Shan, supported by the authorities in Naypyitaw, are already arming themselves to fight the Kachin Independence Army. Even if there is peace in that part of the country, the local Shan as well as Burman and Rakhine migrants, and most likely also the Lisu and the Nung-Rawang, would be opposed to attempts to establish a Kachin-dominated state government. Would a future Karen State consist of the present state as well as Karen-dominated areas in Ayeyarwady Region? Should the Rohingya minority in northern Rakhine State have their own state, or could the Mayu Frontier District, which existed for them between 1961 and 1964, be recreated? And how many from the Buddhist Rakhine majority would be willing to accept either solution to the ethnoreligious antagonism in their state?
There are no easy ways of solving Myanmar’s decades-long ethnic conflicts, and it is not only the leadership of the supposedly unified resistance, called the National Unity Government, that has been unable, or unwilling, to provide workable alternatives to the present order. The foreign peacemakers, who descended on Myanmar in droves during the period of relative openness from 2011 to 2021, held seminars and workshops on catchy topics such as “peacemaking,” “dialogue patterns,” “good governance,” and “reconciliation,” which had little or no relevance to the bitter realities on the ground in the conflict areas. Millions of dollars were wasted on fatuous exercises, suggesting inapplicable solutions modelled on entirely different kinds of peace processes elsewhere in the world. In the end, those efforts raised false hopes, caused confusion, and have only served to aggravate already existing problems and conflicts.
In the broader scheme of things, those foreign groups were and still are irrelevant because there is only one outside power that has the leverage that is needed to put pressure on the military as well as major ethnic armies. And that, of course is China. Unlike the Western peaceniks, China has vital geostrategic interests in Myanmar and will do everything in its might to get what it wants, namely, to secure the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor from the southern province of Yunnan to the Indian Ocean. And that corridor consists of already constructed gas- and oil-pipelines, upgraded highways, and plans for high-speed railroads leading to deepwater ports on the Bay of Bengal. China’s interests are also economic as it has become a major investor in Myanmar and its biggest trade partner.
Contrary to the expectations of many, the junta State Administration Council (SAC) in Naypyitaw is not about to fall, but if it did, that would only mean the beginning of a process to find realistic and workable solutions to a host of challenges related to ethnicity and governmental structures. And any post-SAC administration would also have to find ways to deal prudently with its two giant neighbors: China, which wants to control Myanmar, and, not to be overlooked, India, which, without much success so far, wants to keep Chinese influence at a bare minimum. Other outside actors such as the United States, the European Union, Japan, ASEAN, Canada, Australia, Norway, and Switzerland, which at various times have tried to play roles in Myanmar’s internal affairs, lack the means as well as the manipulative skills to be of any decisive importance..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-09
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"Human Rights Violations took place in States and Regions from July 1 to 7, 2024
Military Junta Troop launched airstrikes and dropped bombs in Mandalay Region, Tanintharyi Region, Rakhine State, and Shan State from July 1st to 7th. The Military Junta used the civilians as human shields and searched mines on Monywa-Mandalay Road. The Military’s ward and village Administrators asked for the money under the reason of Military Service Law. The Military’s Minister of Labor said that will stop the workers who go to foreign countries with visiting visas (PV) and working on July 6th.
Almost 30 civilians died, and nearly 20 were injured by the Military’s heavy and light artillery attacks within a week. 3 under-aged children died, and 4 were injured when the Military Junta committed abuses..."
Source/publisher:
Network for Human Rights Documentation-Burma
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-09
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"The Myanmar military has been occupying a Rohingya internally displaced persons (IDP) camp in Sittwe, the capital of western Rakhine State, since 20 June. Soldiers have reportedly placed landmines around the camp in anticipation of an attack by the Arakan Army, an ethnic armed group. Reports indicate that in Rakhine, the Myanmar military is using IDPs as human shields, many of who belong to the stateless Rohingya minority.
Across Rakhine State, there are reports of forced recruitment of people, including children, by the Myanmar military and other armed groups. This risks fuelling inter-communal tension and aggravating the humanitarian situation.
The military occupation comes amidst an increase in violations of international humanitarian and human rights law Rakhine State, including the indiscriminate aerial bombardment of civilians and civilian objects, burning of civilian homes, attacks on humanitarian workers and facilities, and restrictions on humanitarian access..."
Source/publisher:
European Commission's Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-09
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Junta falling back to urban-based porcupine strategy, leaving it vulnerable to rebel attacks on supply chains that aim for regime collapse
Description:
"In major cities around Myanmar’s war-torn borderlands, a pattern is emerging. From Myitkyina and Bhamo in northern Kachin state to Lashio in northeastern Shan, and Sittwe, on the Bay of Bengal in the west, the Myanmar Army is pulling back into urban bastions shielded by air power, artillery and plentiful supplies of ammunition.
Driven by eight months of serial defeat at the hands of ethnic minority insurgent armies, the country’s embattled State Administration Council (SAC) junta is shifting slowly but surely to what can best be described as a porcupine strategy – curling up on itself behind an array of lethally sharp quills.
Whether this war plan offers a viable path for regime survival will likely be decided in the coming months as what began early this year in the ethnic borderlands becomes an increasingly nationwide phenomenon. Indeed, in central Myanmar, the porcupine’s shift towards the national heartland has already begun.
Since June 25 ethnic Palaung insurgents of the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and their ethnic Bamar People’s Defense Force (PDF) allies have begun pressing army forces back toward Mandalay, Myanmar’s ancient royal capital, with offensives in Madaya township immediately north of the city and towards Pyin Oo Lwin, home to the military’s prestigious Defense Services Academy (DSA) that overlooks Mandalay from hills to the east.
The military’s grinding retreat into apparently impregnable urban strongholds is a less conscious strategy than a chaotic response to an aggressive advance of resistance forces that shows no sign of easing. But even if enforced rather than planned, the emerging urban porcupine offers three distinct layers of advantage.
Militarily, it invites the opposition to come down from the hills and jungles of the borderlands and meet the army on the plains and rice paddies around large cities where the army’s overwhelming superiority in artillery, armor and air power will be most lethally effective. Provided it can be concentrated to effect, such firepower stands to decimate ill-equipped and loosely coordinated PDFs.
Politically, the SAC’s grip on urban areas maintains control over the majority of Myanmar’s population and offers the foundations for fresh elections planned for next year – the only viable exit strategy for a military that has been trapped in a catastrophic political cul-de-sac since the coup of February 2021.
Diplomatically, meanwhile, if some form of electoral process – however transparently constrained and flawed – can be staged, the pseudo-civilian administration that emerges may manage to buy the military sufficient time to win at an internationally-brokered negotiating table what it currently risks losing on the battlefield.
Certainly, Myanmar’s key neighbors, China, India and Thailand, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) bloc more generally will waste little time in endorsing the polls and expanding engagement with any administration dressed in civilian longyis rather than military khakis. Once that engagement gathers traction, it seems likely enough that the West will slowly, if grudgingly, fall into line.
The overarching question for the coming year is whether the SAC’s porcupine strategy anchored on the cities of the populous national heartland can sustain a military stand-off for long enough to ensure the military’s ongoing central role in Myanmar’s governance that it sees as its prerogative.
At the beginning of the rainy season of 2024, it would be foolhardy to suggest a clear answer. There is certainly nothing inevitable about the survival of a beleaguered military regime overstretched and exhausted by unprecedented challenges that continue to mount.
Conflict endgames in Vietnam and Cambodia in 1975 and Afghanistan in 1992 and 2021 point to an irrefutable lesson: well-equipped militaries enjoying foreign backing but anchored on the defense of shrinking urban enclaves can be overwhelmed by ubiquitous and relentless resistance forces to the point of disintegration and collapse.
Equally, there is nothing preordained about the success of Myanmar’s federal-democratic resistance. Despite enjoying wide popular support, the “Spring Revolution” continues to lack the most important prerequisites for revolutionary victory: a vanguard political party capable of imposing strategic coherence and direction, charismatic leadership able to inspire and rally, and an external backer willing to provide material and diplomatic support.
Two strategic approaches
Against this fluid backdrop, two key variables will be critical in shaping Myanmar’s chaotic battlespace over the coming year. Unknowns today, both will be on full display by the beginning of 2025.
First, and perhaps the more crucial, is the extent to which opposition forces adopt a direct or indirect approach towards the SAC’s porcupine strategy.
A direct approach would involve PDF forces, either affiliated with the National Unity Government (NUG) or independent of it, attempting to launch attacks on large urban centers and risk being slaughtered in front of the military’s big guns with potentially disastrous implications for resistance morale that since 2021 has weathered three and half years of conflict remarkably well.
The NUG’s Ministry of Defense’s tendency to date has typically been to compensate for what it lacks in material resources and effective command and control with politically rousing calls for “victory within a year.” There is no guarantee that the MoD, where real military experience is in short supply, will not continue to press ahead with calls for stirring but unrealistic objectives.
By contrast, an indirect approach would involve a multi-pronged effort aimed at dividing and exhausting already depleted regime forces. Requiring only minimal coordination, the primary operational focus would not be around urban areas but rather – and especially in the coming months – on the strategic road, rail and riverine lines of communications that connect them.
In short, a war for the roads needs to precede any war for the cities. By triggering internal collapse through blocked supply routes, resistance forces could avoid the need for a war for the cities. It was not by chance that in the examples from Indochina and Afghanistan noted above, all three capitals of Saigon, Phnom Penh and Kabul, and most provincial centers, fell to anti-government forces with little or no fighting.
The topography of central Myanmar offers a remarkably favorable setting for such a strategic approach. Main north-south lines of communication along the Ayeyarwaddy and Sittaung river valleys are hemmed in to the west by mountains of the Arakan Yoma and Chin Hills, to the east by the Karen hills and along the central spine of the country by the Bago Yoma.
What begins with small-unit hit-and-run ambush and harassment escalates into a war of attrition along lines of communication and supply lines critical for the delivery of crucial fuel and munitions. The process sees an incumbent regime being drawn into exhausting and costly operations to hold open and then re-open major arteries while being forced to abandon minor roads and lose smaller towns for lack of troops to defend them.
To a degree, such a strategy has already emerged by default over the past dry season along the major highway connecting SAC-held centers in the southern Tanintharyi panhandle along the Andaman Sea coast and with escalating sabotage of the Yangon-Mawlamyine and Yangon Mandalay railway lines.
But achieving strategic traction in the coming months would undoubtedly require larger mobile resistance units severing roads for days at a stretch; ambushing in strength and at points of their own choosing regime response units; and then disappearing into nearby hills before repeating the process elsewhere.
Such tactics would mirror operations launched in early 1944 by British Chindit columns operating behind the lines of the Japanese Imperial Army in the Indaw region of northern Sagaing, which cut its supply routes to lethal effect.
Other elements of an indirect approach would include mounting pressure on outlying townships in which the regime lacks the manpower to retake once lost, and destabilizing guerrilla attacks inside major cities where the SAC is already facing daunting economic strains and, before long, the challenge posed by large restless populations.
The ethnic variable
The second variable hinges on a decision that the leaderships of key ethnic resistance organizations, most notably Kachin, Karen, Ta’ang and Rakhine, will need to make soon if they have not already done so.
Historic in its ramifications, that decision hinges simply on what approach better serves the long-term interests of any ethnic community in relation to who holds power in the country’s Bamar heartland.
One option would involve increased support for allied PDFs in the shape of munitions, advisors and training that could fuel an indirect strategy and decisively tip the military balance against the SAC, likely ushering in an interim administration centered on the NUG.
The alternative would be based on an assessment that ethnic interests are better served by formalizing with the SAC an autonomy already largely won on the battlefield while accepting the risk of leaving an unreformed if weakened military in the national driving seat.
In mid-late 2024, the reality is almost certainly that either a wait-and-see or a hedging approach on the part of the ethnic armies would be objectively more likely to favor the survival of the SAC porcupine than the success of under-equipped and ill-directed PDFs.
These variables will play out against the backdrop of the military’s Achilles Heel: its manpower shortfall. What has been a persistent problem over the past two decades with infantry battalions typically numbering around 200 men rather than the prescribed 827 is today a crisis with potentially terminal implications.
The frantic scramble to accelerate conscription since the introduction of the People’s Military Service Law last February has given the lie to the Wikipedia mythology of a 350,000-400,000 strong Tatmadaw—figures, which to the extent they were ever true, emerged from calculations based on units at full strength and included the military’s notoriously bloated tail of non-combat branches – administrative, commercial, technical and medical.
Today, almost all credible assessments of the army’s combat-capable strength made by Myanmar and foreign analysts coalesce around a figure somewhere between 70,000 and 90,000 troops.
The shortfall in raw numbers is exacerbated by two factors. The first is structural: a pattern of penny-packet battalion-size deployments across 14 regional military commands driven by the essentially political need to garrison the population of the entire country, not least in ethnic regions, rather than defend against foreign aggression.
The second driver, highlighted by recent dry season campaigns in Rakhine and Kachin states, is operational: a stubborn unwillingness to temporarily surrender territory in the interest of regrouping forces for counteroffensives.
The result, again and again, has seen isolated battalions or larger tactical operations commands (TOCs) fighting until they have either been overrun or surrender while the hemorrhaging of numbers continues apace.
Indeed, the military now faces the risk that current battlefield losses may soon be outpacing the advertised 5,000 man-per-month rate of induction of new conscripts – even assuming draftees with no combat experience have some enthusiasm for the fight.
A resistance strategy targeted squarely over the rest of this year on corridors of communication and supply rather than SAC-held urban porcupines would be well-calculated to act as a further accelerant to the army’s escalating manpower crisis.
Whether such a strategy will be adopted, however, or whether Myanmar’s key ethnic armies, whose role on the national stage is now decisive, will be willing to support it is anything but guaranteed..."
Source/publisher:
"Asia Times" (Hong Kong)
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-09
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"Data reveals shipments of jet fuel still arriving in Myanmar
Investigation shows military air strike killed 12 civilians and injured 26 as historic monastery in Magway, Central Myanmar attacked
“My friends were killed right before my eyes on the street,” eyewitness tells Amnesty
Amnesty International has documented new shipments of aviation fuel to Myanmar despite global calls to deprive the country’s military of the resources it needs to carry out unlawful air strikes.
In January 2024, Amnesty International exposed the Myanmar military’s new evasive tactics for importing aviation fuel throughout 2023, following sanctions imposed on parts of its supply chain.
That pattern continues with at least two, and likely three, additional shipments of aviation fuel having entered the country between January and June this year. As with the previous shipments identified by Amnesty International in January, the fuel was bought and sold multiple times before reaching the last leg of its trip in Viet Nam ahead of shipment to Myanmar.
In two instances, the Chinese owned HUITONG78 oil tanker transported fuel from Viet Nam to Myanmar. Other companies appear to have played a role in the supply chain too, including fuel traders Singapore-based Sahara Energy International Pte. Ltd. and Chinese state-owned entity (SOE) CNOOC Trading (Singapore) Pte. Ltd. A likely third shipment, also by HUITONG78, appears to have come to Myanmar from the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in May 2024.
It is unclear how the fuel was used after it arrived, but the military’s control of the port means there are significant risks it could be used for non-civilian purposes.
“The Myanmar military is relying on the very same Chinese vessel and Vietnamese companies to import its aviation fuel, despite Amnesty International having already exposed that reckless supply chain,” said Agnes Callamard, Secretary General of Amnesty International.
“It is a raw display of both the sheer impunity with which the Myanmar military is operating, and the utter complicity of the states responsible, including Viet Nam, China and Singapore.”
Air strikes on the rise
In June 2024 the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar reported that military air strikes against civilian targets in Myanmar have increased five-fold in the first half of this year.
Amnesty International documented one of these attacks. Witnesses told Amnesty that on the morning of 9 May, the Myanmar military launched an attack on a monastery in Saw Township’s Ah Kyi Pan Pa Lon village in central Myanmar’s Magway Region.
Following two initial air strikes, witnesses said that a fighter jet then circled back around and followed up with heavy gunfire directed at those fleeing the initial explosions.
The monastery, which is believed to be roughly 100 years old, was destroyed.
Amnesty International interviewed four survivors of the attack in Magway and one person who arrived at the scene afterwards to help the victims. Researchers also analysed 34 photos showing the corpses of victims, wounds of survivors, weapons used in the attack and the extent of the damage.
All the visual evidence of the destruction of the monastery is consistent with an air strike that caused a fire and severely burned both the structure and many of the victims. Photos of fragments of the ordnance used show the remnants of a tail kit for an aerial bomb, as well as unexploded 23mm High Explosive Incendiary (HEI) ammunition that is fired from the GSh-23 machine gun mounted as pods on fighter jets such as the Russian YAK-130.
The date on the discarded cartridges from the 23mm HEI rounds indicate the ordnance was manufactured locally in Myanmar in 2024. The wounds of other victims of the attack are consistent with fragments from aircraft bombs or direct gunfire. Satellite imagery also shows that the monastery area has been heavily burned.
‘I heard the people screaming’
Saw Township is located in a contested area of central Myanmar, where parallel administrative structures and armed groups known as People’s Defense Forces (PDF), which sprang up after the coup to resist the military alongside the civilian National Unity Government (NUG), are active.
Witnesses said that while some PDF forces known as People’s Defense Teams, or Pa Ka Pha in Burmese, were present at the monastery, the majority of people were civilians. They also said there had been no fighting in or close to the village before the air strike.
In the early morning of the attack, witnesses said they heard buzzing in the skies, which they described as sounding like a drone. Some hours later, about 50 to 60 locals had gathered on the first floor of the monastery to discuss their concerns about transport issues, including taxation and routes.
In addition, witnesses reported that at least one child and the head monk of the monastery were on the second floor of the site, a place where computer classes were sometimes held.
According to survivors, who asked to be anonymous for fear of being targeted further by the Myanmar military, the first bomb dropped at around 10:45am.
“The bomb fell a bit far behind me, right into the place where my brother, uncle and sister were sitting,” one man said. His relatives were killed instantly.
“I am sure that the fighter jet aimed at killing all of us,” he said.
Following the first bomb, he said the monastery started to collapse and people were trapped under the falling debris.
He managed to escape the site: “Within a few minutes […], I saw the jet come again to the monastery, and this time another bomb was dropped that set the main building on fire,” he said.
Another man said he escaped from the monastery unharmed following the first bomb. He was hiding across the road when the second bomb was dropped. He saw the monastery ablaze. A fighter jet then started to shoot at people running away.
“I heard the people screaming in the monastery. Some people were running on the street amid the continuous gunfire from the fighter jet,” the man said. “The fighter jet flew over the monastery and opened fire on the people running around. I witnessed my friends being killed right before my eyes on the street.”
Those killed in the air strike included a child, while the head of the monastery was among the injured, according to a list of victims given to Amnesty International by a rescue worker.
Even if members of the Pa Ka Pha were present in the monastery at the time of the attack, the pilot should have known there could be civilians as well. Thus, the shooting of civilians attempting to flee and the bombing of a site of religious, cultural and historical value suggest the attack was indiscriminate. It should be investigated as a war crime.
“This recent attack joins a rapidly growing list of violations of international humanitarian law in Myanmar including air strikes, ground raids, arbitrary detentions, torture and numerous other violations targeting civilians,” Callamard said.
How Myanmar continues to access aviation fuel
Amnesty International and others have called on companies and governments to suspend jet fuel shipments to Myanmar or risk complicity in a deadly supply chain. But as these new findings show, many are still not listening.
Vessel tracking and trade data show that the Chinese oil tanker HUITONG78 transported two shipments of aviation fuel to the former Puma Energy terminal (now controlled by the Myanmar based Shoon Energy group and the Myanmar military) in Thilawa, Yangon port, on 14 January and 29 February, respectively. In common with all shipments identified by Amnesty International in 2023, the oil tanker picked up the fuel at the Vietnamese Cai Mep Petroleum storage terminal operated by Hai Linh Co. Ltd., before departing for Myanmar.
Also like the 2023 shipments, the 2024 shipments involved multiple purchases and resales of the same fuel, making it hard to trace the original supplier. In regard to the January 2024 shipment, before its arrival in Viet Nam, the fuel can be traced to the Vopak Singapore Banyan Terminal, a storage facility controlled by Dutch storage and logistics company Royal Vopak. Royal Vopak confirmed the shipment but emphasized that “[o]ur service is the safe storage of our customers’ products while it is in our terminals in the ports” and that they “respect applicable laws, regulations and sanctions”.
The February 2024 shipment can be traced back to the BP Hua Dong terminal in Ningbo port, Hangzhou Bay, China. Amnesty International was unable to identify the company that controls the Chinese terminal.
Before the final transfer and sale of fuel to Myanmar, the January shipment was sold to a Vietnamese company by the Singapore branch of the global fuel trader Sahara Energy. The February shipment was sold by the Singapore trading branch of Chinese SOE China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC Singapore). In both cases, customs data shows that Sahara Energy and CNOOC Singapore should have been aware that the fuel was transported to Viet Nam for transit purposes only. Each of the shipments was worth approximately USD 8 million.
Suspicions raised over third shipment
Evidence also indicates there was likely a third shipment of aviation fuel to Myanmar, in May 2024.
According to vessel tracking data, the HUITONG78 onloaded fuel at the Hamriyah port in Sharjah, UAE, in April, arriving at the Yangon port on or about 12 May. The vessel appears to turn off its AIS radar as it enters Thilawa port, during which satellite imagery shows what appears to be the HUITONG78 moored at the former Puma Energy terminal in Thilawa.
The vessel’s draught data (which indicates a change in overall weight of the ship) suggests that it offloaded fuel at the Thilawa terminal. Although Amnesty International was not able to confirm whether the fuel was in fact aviation fuel, it is quite likely the case given the pattern of shipments conducted by this same vessel.
The HUITONG78 vessel is registered for Protection & Indemnity (P&I) insurance with the West of England P&I Club, although in response to Amnesty International, the Club stated that “if […] this vessel was carrying jet fuel to Myanmar, then there was no cover for those trades”.
According to the P&I Club, the HUITONG78 is owned by an affiliate of the Chinese state-owned defence company China Aerospace Science and Industry Corp (CASIC). According to a media report, CASIC has been involved in transporting US sanctioned Venezuelan oil.
“While Amnesty does not know for certain how the aviation fuel shipped in this way was used once it arrived in Myanmar, the risk is high that the military – which controls the terminal where the fuel was offloaded – uses it to fuel attacks against civilians. It means shipping and fuel companies have no option but to withdraw from that supply chain completely,” Callamard said.
“That includes everyone involved, from vessel owners to insurers to fuel traders. It’s high time that companies put an end to these shipments.”
All companies named in these findings were contacted for comment. The only companies to respond were Royal Vopak and West of England P&I Club..."
Source/publisher:
Amnesty International (UK)
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-08
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"Since October 2023, resistance forces in Myanmar have gained territorial control across different parts of Myanmar. Expanded resistance has been accompanied by increased losses for the Myanmar military. Myanmar’s de facto authorities have routinely punished civilians they view as supporting the opposition, a trend that has worsened since October 2023 as they lose ground to resistance forces across the country.
Escalating armed conflict has led to deepening humanitarian need, high poverty levels, violence against civilians, destruction of civilian infrastructure, and civilian casualties. These recent shifts are challenging the delivery of aid to the most vulnerable.
To address the losses to ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) and mass desertions in the Myanmar military, on February 10, 2024, Myanmar’s de facto authorities reactivated an old law requiring young men and women to enlist in the military. Reports indicate forced conscription into the junta’s ranks, using threats and violence for enlistment. Fear of conscription has driven large numbers of individuals—especially young men—to seek safety in neighboring countries and internally in different parts of the country. Forced recruitment by other parties to the conflict, including EAOs and People’s Defense Forces (PDFs), are also being reported.
Rohingya populations are particularly vulnerable to conscription due to a long history of persecution, limited mobility, and limited access to aid. In Myanmar’s northern Rakhine State, the Rohingya population faces increasingly brutal abuses at the hands of both the military and the Arakan Army (A.A.), a powerful ethnic armed group in Rakhine State. In recent weeks, the A.A. has seized control of several townships in Rakhine, including northern Rakhine, leading to the displacement of thousands of people and increased tensions between Rakhine and Rohingya communities. More than 200,000 people have been displaced in Rakhine since clashes between Myanmar armed forces and AA resumed in November 2023, and the delivery of essential supplies and aid items remains restricted as Myanmar’s junta blocks major roads and waterways.
For Rohingya, conscription is just one element of the continued persecution they face. Both the A.A. and the Myanmar armed forces (MAF) are allegedly forcing Rohingya to join their ranks, generating immense fear of having to fight alongside the armed actors responsible for abuses to their communities.
With their movement restricted in Rakhine State, Rohingya are forced to seek safety in makeshift shelters, including in public buildings like schools. A.A.-MAF clashes are expected to continue resulting in attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure. In addition to violence, populations in Rakhine face telecommunication and internet restrictions that prevent civilians from contacting loved ones amid the conflict, contributing to the isolation that allows for ongoing human rights violations.
The violence and oppression are reminiscent of what Rohingya experienced at the hands of the military back in 2017, which triggered the mass exodus of over 700,000 Rohingya into neighboring Bangladesh. United Nations (U.N.) officials said they have received recent reports of serious human rights abuses. The U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) called for an immediate end to the violence and for all civilians to be protected without any distinction based on identity.
Unfortunately, these events are not confined to Rakhine State—almost all parts of the country are facing human rights violations and continued access restrictions. In a country already experiencing immense humanitarian needs, these conflict dynamics only deepen suffering while the essentials for life, such as food, medical treatment, and shelter, go unmet.
Recommendations
The people of Myanmar are highly resilient and adaptable, but they should not have to face this alone. Despite access and funding challenges, humanitarian organizations continue to use diverse and complementary modalities and localized access strategies to reach people in need, often at great risk. These approaches need additional funding and continued donor flexibility to support adaptive programming to meet the rapidly increasing needs on the ground. Donor governments are responsible for ensuring sufficient funding and appropriate risk-sharing mechanisms for the humanitarian response plan, which is currently funded at only 12%.
The international community must stand in solidarity with the people of Myanmar and take swift action to address the growing humanitarian needs and insecurity. International actors have a significant role to play in helping address and end the rising insecurity, violence, and repression. The U.N. must put in place strong and permanent humanitarian leadership in Myanmar for sustainable humanitarian engagement and outcomes.
U.N. Member States must uphold obligations under international law to facilitate the democratic aspirations of the people of Myanmar and strongly advocate with all parties to the conflict to adhere to international human rights and humanitarian law. The U.N. Security Council (UNSC) should ensure open and regular briefings on the situation in Myanmar and monitor the progress of UNSC Resolution 2669. The Human Rights Council should swiftly condemn all human rights abuses and violations against Rohingya, Rakhine, and other communities by the Myanmar military and other parties to the conflict. Principled engagement with diverse stakeholders at the national and regional levels must be strengthened to ensure a holistic response to the Myanmar crisis..."
Source/publisher:
InterAction
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-08
[field_licence]
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Individual Documents
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Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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"Throughout the first week of July, the Human Rights Foundation of Monland (HURFOM) observed worrying patterns of violence against women and girls in target areas of Mon State, Karen State and the Tanintharyi region.
At the end of June, HURFOM’s latest volume of ‘Voice Up’ also presented evidence of the rise in targeted gendered attacks. Further, a new report released by the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar on the gendered impacts of the coup found, “The threat of sexual and gender-based violence is a dark shadow that follows women, girls, and LGBT people throughout Myanmar.”
Over the last week alone, a woman died, and three others were injured after artillery shelling by the junta’s police station in Pala Town, Pu Law Township, Myeik District, Tanintharyi Region, on June 28th. The shelling occurred without any prior fighting. At 9 AM, the junta’s police station in Pala Town launched two artillery shells. One of the shells hit and exploded near a shop at the three-way intersection in Pala Town.
Daw San Yu, a woman in her 40s who was inside the shop, died due to the explosion. Another two women a man who was near the shop, were also injured. Earlier in June, an artillery shell fired by the military junta’s naval headquarters in Mawrawaddy exploded on a house in Yar Phu village, Yebyu Township, killing four family members, including an infant.
On June 29th, a novice monk was killed, and a woman was injured by artillery fire from Battalion 310 in Thane Zayat Township, Kyaik Hto Township, Mon State. According to locals, a shell fired by Artillery Battalion 310 under junta control struck the Dhamma Duta Monastery, causing casualties.
This incident followed a similar tragedy on June 14th, when a shell fired by Artillery Battalion 310 exploded, killing a 14-year-old girl named Ma Nandar Lin and injuring a one-and-a-half-year-old girl named Shwe Zin Lay. On the same day, four people, including two monks, were injured by artillery fire from junta troops in the village of Kha Kwal.
Furthermore, Artillery Battalion 310 and other military units under junta control frequently launch artillery shells into villages where civilians live. On June 3rd, an artillery mortar landed in Mok Kha Maw village in Thane Zayat, injuring a resident. On June 2, artillery fire destroyed two houses in Wa Duk Kwin village in Thane Zayat.
The ongoing rise of attacks against women, children and young people should be of significant concern to the international community. The lack of justice referral pathways in Burma has made it impossible for justice and accountability. Further, transparent, coordinated, and decisive calls must be organized in collaboration with local organizations to ensure evidence of the junta’s crimes can be tried in international legal systems..."
Source/publisher:
Human Rights Foundation of Monland
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-08
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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"WEEKLY HIGHLIGHTS:
In the South-East, the number of internally displaced people (IDPs) slightly decreased from 901,600 last week to 899,000 this week.
In Mon State, an airstrike affecting Kyaikmaraw Township forced some 2,500 people to flee to Kyaikmaraw Town.
Similar case of displacement within the township due clashes with airstrike took place in Pekon Township, Shan State (South).
The fighting has affected the population of Bokpyin Township , in Tanintharyi Region, where more than 500 people were displaced..."
Source/publisher:
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (Geneva) via Reliefweb (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-07
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
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UNHCR (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees), Burma: Internal displacement/forced migration of several ethnic groups., Human Rights and international relations
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"GENEVA —
A prominent human rights expert is calling on governments to end the billion-dollar arms trade with Myanmar’s military, which is “helping sustain the junta’s brutal campaign of violence against civilians across Myanmar.”
In a report to the U.N. human rights council Thursday, Thomas Andrews, special rapporteur on the human rights situation in Myanmar, accused international finance systems of helping Myanmar procure the weapons that have “enabled attacks on civilians” and have killed, maimed and displaced thousands of people.
Since the military junta toppled the country’s democratically elected government in February 2021, the U.N. human rights office reports at least 5,280 civilians, including 1,022 women and 667 children, “have been killed at the hands of the military.”
Additionally, the agency reports at least 3 million people have been displaced — “the vast majority still without proper shelter,” and more than 20,000 political prisoners remain in detention.
Andrews told the council that in the two years ending March 2024, the Myanmar military has purchased $630 million in weapons, dual-use technologies, manufacturing equipment, and raw materials through the international finance system.
The special rapporteur identified 16 foreign banks that have facilitated transactions related to military procurement by the junta, noting that the junta and its cronies have worked to obscure the specific nature of the transactions “including by setting up military front companies.”
He referenced a report he issued last year, “The Billion Dollar Death Trade,” in which he identified Singapore as the junta’s third largest source of weapons and related materials.
Because of that report, he told the council that “to its credit, the government took immediate action and launched an investigation of my findings. I am very pleased to report that the junta’s purchase of military supplies from Singapore dropped by nearly 90 percent since the publication of that report.”
“Unfortunately, military procurement through Thailand has moved in the opposite direction,” he said, underscoring the junta imported nearly $130 million in weapons and military from Thailand-registered suppliers, “more than double the total from the previous year.”
He observed, however, “It is important to note that as was the case with Singapore last year, I found no evidence that the government of Thailand was involved or even aware of these transactions,” adding that he was hopeful Thailand based entities, including its banks “will no longer be facilitating the transfer of weapons and weapons materials to the military junta.”
Andrews called on financial institutions to stop facilitating transactions with banks that are controlled by the military junta and for governments to sanction those junta-controlled banks, including Myanmar Economic Bank.
The special rapporteur garnered support from member states, including the United States, for his appeal.
“We applaud Singapore for taking action to cut arms supplies to the military and call on others to follow suit,” Michele Taylor, U.S. ambassador to the U.N. Human Rights Council, said during the council’s interactive dialogue.
“We urge the Security Council to use all the tools at its disposal to prevent future atrocities, including by reinforcing this body’s call to cut off the military’s access to jet fuel, and to support efforts to find a peaceful and just resolution to the crisis,” she said.
Andrews said the people of Myanmar need and deserve the support of the council and governments. He emphasized they also need international action, “not only because of the military junta’s relentless attacks on the people of Myanmar, but because there are opportunities available to your governments right now that would make an enormous difference in how and when this crisis comes to an end.”
“The tide is turning in Myanmar, the junta is on its heels, and the opportunity to take decisive action is now,” he said, pointing out that civilian resistance forces are gaining ground.
He said the government’s military bases are falling, tens of thousands of troops “have been lost to casualties, surrender, or defections,” and the economy is being squeezed.
“In response, the junta is doubling down on its brutal attacks on civilian populations,” he said. “Junta leaders appear committed to destroying the country that they cannot control.”
He said the world must not allow that to happen.
“We now have clear evidence that actions taken by the international community to isolate the junta and degrade its capacity to attack the people of Myanmar are working.
“But more must be done and done now to build on this progress including strategic coordination between all governments who support human rights to stop the flow of sophisticated weapons of war that are being used to attack innocent Myanmar civilians,” he said..."
Source/publisher:
"Voice of America" (Washington, D.C)
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-06
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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"Thousands of residents fled the capital of northern Shan on Friday morning after the ethnic armies encircling it continued bombarding the headquarters of the junta’s Northeastern Military Command in Lashio’s center on Thursday, residents of the city said.
They fled after a dozen residents of Lashio were killed by shelling and drone bombs on Thursday.
One resident of the city told The Irrawaddy that shells and bombs had hit residential wards and killed residents. “That is why people are leaving the city [and] many others are sheltering in monasteries,” the resident said.
At least 12 residents, including children, were killed on Wednesday and Thursday when their houses were hit by heavy explosives. More people were injured, and several homes were destroyed.
Another Lashio resident told The Irrawaddy that most evacuees fled residential wards adjacent the headquarters of the regime’s Northeastern Military Command, which is being shelled and bombed by drones. Most of those fleeing the city are traveling to Taunggyi, the capital of southern Shan State, and Mandalay Region.
Fighting intensified near the city this week as the ethnic armies that control most of Lashio Township closed in on it.
The families of the junta officers stationed in Lashio were reportedly evacuated to Naypyitaw by helicopter on Thursday.
Fighting broke out across Lashio Township on Tuesday night when the members of the Brotherhood Alliance – the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and Arkan Army – launched simultaneous attacks on regime bases in the township.
The alliance has reportedly captured several junta bases outside Lashio city, but has yet to officially comment on the status of the battle for Lashio.
The TNLA said that it had captured the junta’s Shwe Tharyar military base in northern Shan State’s Mongmit Township along with its ally, the Mandalay People’s Defense Force (PDF). The PDF is under the civilian National Unity Government. The TNLA said it also attacked a military base at a bridge crossing the Dohktawaddy River (also known as Myitnge River) in northern Shan State’s Hsipaw Township.
Intense clashes between regime forces and the TNLA were reported in nearby Mandalay Region’s Mogoke town, the country’s ruby hub, on Thursday.
Clashes intensified in the northern Shan State’s Nawnghkio Township on Thursday as the TNLA, Mandalay PDF and Danu People’s Liberation Army continued their attempt to capture the headquarters of the junta’s Missile Battalion 606.
The TNLA accused the junta of using chemical weapons to defend the headquarters of the missile battalion. It said resistance troops exposed to the chemicals are suffering from breathlessness, nausea, extreme agitation, fatigue, and low blood oxygen.
The junta has frequently been accused of turning to chemical warfare when its troops face losses on the battlefield.
The Brotherhood Alliance launched Operation 1027 against the regime in northern Shan State in October last year, seizing 24 battalion HQs, hundreds of bases, around 20 towns and trade routes with China before a ceasefire was brokered on January 10 by Beijing.
Before the ceasefire, the alliance had encircled Lashio.
The TNLA resumed the operation on June 25 after repeated junta bombardments of territory it controls.
As of Thursday, the TNLA and allied PDFs had seized about 40 junta bases, including several battalion HQs in three townships in northern Shan State – Kyaukme, Mongmit and Nawnghkio – and three others in upper Mandalay Region – Madaya, Mogoke and Singu. They have also taken control of Kyaukme and Nawnghkio towns as well as large parts of Mogoke town..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-05
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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"Shortly after the Myanmar military staged a coup on February 1, 2021, it began brutalizing, imprisoning and killing individuals at peaceful protests throughout the country.
The ruthless treatment of civilians by the military and police did not go unnoticed, with photos and reports of their actions published widely. The reports deeply affected many soldiers and police, triggering a surge of defections.
Since the coup, a total of 12,341 junta personnel – 3,015 soldiers and 9,326 police – have defected to the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM), according to the People’s Embrace, a group helping defectors.
Military defections peaked in 2021, but the People’s Embrace now expects another surge as soldiers abandon their positions “amidst the escalating war, especially in the Kachin, Karen, and Karenni regions.”
Also spurring defections is February’s enforcement of the conscription law, dictating mandatory military service for men aged 18 to 35 and women aged 18 to 27.
Seven former soldiers shared their reasons for defecting and their experiences afterward in interviews conducted in safe houses and secure locations in Thailand. Their motivations for joining the Myanmar military were also discussed. The interviews were conducted in February, with follow-up sessions when additional information became available.
Aged from 22 to 39, the interviewees had spent between four and 22 years in the military, achieving ranks ranging from private to major.
For safety, all names used in this article are pseudonyms and specific locations are not mentioned.
Refuge from poverty
The defectors said they joined the Myanmar army as teenagers or in their early 20s. All but one was motivated by refuge from unemployment and the education, skills training, and other perceived long-term benefits of military life.
Bo Pyay joined the army aged 17 to escape unemployment.
“There was little prospect of getting a job to earn my living. At that time, the country was somewhat peaceful and the military offered more education and job opportunities.”
Khant Tun had no special interest in the army but needed a career after college.
Zeya Hein entered the military in 2014. “There was a positive perception of the military during that time. The economy was bad and it was difficult to find a job after high school.”
Lin Aung enlisted mostly out of despair. With no family to assist him, he was unable to find employment and needed to support himself.
“I had no other good options to earn a living.”
However, while entering the army was easy, exiting was a different story.
One defector signed an agreement to serve five years but was barred from leaving when he completed his term.
“This happens to the majority of soldiers,” he said.
Lin Aung thought he could join for one or two years to see if he liked it and then leave if not.
“I was not told how difficult it would be to leave,” he said.
A common reason for staying in the military is financial survival. Lin Aung enlisted in 2020 but stayed on even after the 2021 coup.
“Even though I realized how the military was treating the people and ruling the country, I couldn’t see a way to survive on my own,” he explained.
The defectors interviewed had various roles and duties in the army.
Bo Pyay worked on a project to produce cluster bombs during his decade as a soldier.
Thawda Win described his role as support, transporting ammunition to soldiers in the field. Support roles do not always mean being out of harm’s way, and his deliveries exposed him to life-and-death situations. On one occasion, his supply convoy was ambushed by resistance forces, and he narrowly escaped with his life.
Thawda Win now shares his expertise with the People’s Defense Force (PDF), providing guidance on weapons maintenance, storage, transportation, and related subjects, highlighting how defectors are valuable to the resistance.
Turning point
Many soldiers want to defect, but fear for their personal safety and the potential harm it could bring to their families act as significant deterrents.
Others have succumbed to military indoctrination, regulation and control.
They look to the army for benefits in terms of both status and wealth.
Pyae Mg recalled both senior officers and subordinates declaring that Min Aung Hlaing was not tough enough in fighting “insurgents” and advocating hanging for anyone who resisted the military.
“Most of the soldiers in my company felt this way and that’s why I realized that I couldn’t stay in the military.”
Interviewees gave various reasons for defecting, but certain ones were mentioned frequently.
Safety was a major concern when weighing the consequences of defecting. The Washington Post recently reported accounts of punishment meted out to defectors who are caught, including testimony from a defector saying he was tortured. The interviewees said they deliberated over their own safety as well as potential retribution against their families when contemplating defection.
Casual mistreatment of soldiers was a factor, too.
“Everyone in the military should be treated with respect regardless of rank. Due to abusive conditions imposed by the higher ranks on lower ranks, the military is failing,” said an army captain who defected.
A former private said he was often bullied and overloaded with duties.
“I didn’t have enough time to eat or sleep.”
Each said that defecting was an individual decision.
“My grandmother was blinded by the military’s bombs,” said another. “That‘s when I decided to leave the army.”
When asked if the success of resistance operations 1027 and 1111 affected their defection decisions, no specific event or battle was mentioned. However, interviewees conceded that the anticipated outcome of these ongoing operations – the collapse of the entire army – was a factor in their decision.
People’s Embrace continues to assert there is a limited window of opportunity for soldiers to defect, declaring “Stand with the people before it’s too late!” However, none of the interviewees was aware of a time limit for defecting.
One former senior officer had this advice for would-be defectors: “Have a strong determination to defect because the road is not an easy one.”
Another former high-ranking officer said that not enough was being done to attract others to defect, especially since officers often have “valuable and secret” military information. The incentives on offer are not attractive enough for them to consider leaving their posts, he added.
Defector organizations conduct a rigorous process before soldiers are accepted. The vetting process varies and was different for almost everyone interviewed.
A defector’s journey from their base to safety in a resistance-controlled area is not straightforward and can be filled with danger. It can take days to reach a defector organization’s representative, with creativity and cunning required to evade roadblocks, patrols and checkpoints.
Life after defection
Once they reach safety, defectors’ living conditions are typically spartan.
Pyae Mg lives in a small, one-room apartment with three others. Thawda Win and his wife stay in the lobby of a four-story safe house that houses a mix of single men and families. He said defectors are permitted to stay in their safe house for three months but can ask for an extension if they still can’t find alternative accommodation.
Defectors are also expected to find jobs. Some find casual jobs lasting a day or two, but the work is not consistent. People’s Embrace says it does not have the capacity to help defectors find jobs.
By some estimates there are over a million Myanmar migrants and war refugees in Thailand, and defectors are fortunate if they reside within the support network of a Myanmar-centric community.
The defectors interviewed expressed gratitude for financial support from Myanmar’s parallel National Unity Government (NUG). Each defector is currently paid 700 baht per month, or 1,400 baht if accompanied by a spouse. The sum may be small, but it’s vital for survival.
Difficulties faced by both defectors and Myanmar refugees are numerous. Most cannot speak the local language and they all lack official recognition by the Thai government.
One defector summed up what others had said:
“I would like more support from organizations that help defectors. I realize this is not easy, but I would like the NUG to give me documents for a legal stay, a work permit, and not to be harassed by Thai police.”
Most defectors face a precarious existence in Thailand, with little money, no legal protection, and often forced to live under new identities.
Venturing outside their safe house or small community puts them at risk of police harassment. Defectors also fear the Burmese military asking Thai authorities to deport them.
Despite their long and perilous journeys to freedom, all the interviewees expressed gratitude for the defection process.
In a follow-up interview, Lin Aung explained how difficult life was for him now. Basic sustenance is an issue, and day-to-day living is stressful. Jobs are hard to find, and he worries about his dire living conditions and when they will change. Yet he has no misgivings about his decision.
“No matter how hard it is, I don’t regret leaving the Myanmar military.”
The defectors wanted the world to know that they joined what they believed was “the people’s army.”
When they realized that the military was no longer serving civilians but instead harming them, they defected to the people’s side..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-05
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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"Myanmar’s junta violence, atrocities and bombings have claimed 1,076 civilian lives in the first half of this year, according to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP).
In retaliation for battlefield losses, the junta has escalated airstrikes and shelling of non-military targets, such as villages, schools, hospitals, markets, displacement camps and religious sites resulting in mounting civilian deaths.
The AAPP, the activist group which monitors junta arrests and killings, said this year until June 30, Sagaing Region witnessed the highest number of deaths with 313, followed by Rakhine State with 259 fatalities.
Junta shelling caused 318 deaths and airstrikes claimed 308 lives, it said.
The AAPP reported that 348 of those killed were female, 15 members of religious orders were among the dead and 30 were from the education sector.
The regime arrested nearly 27,000 civilians and killed over 5,300 people since the 2021 coup, according to the AAPP.
Myanmar’s anti-regime ambassador to the United Nations, U Kyaw Moe Tun, wrote to UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres about civilian suffering in Myanmar on June 27.
“I would like to reiterate again that the people of Myanmar desperately need immediate and decisive action from the international community,” he wrote.
U Kyaw Moe Tun called on the international community to cut the flow of weapons, jet fuel and money to the junta, which would immediately save lives in Myanmar.
“Decisive timely action from the UN, in particular the UN Security Council, is well overdue…I with a very heavy heart appeal to the international community in particular the Security Council to take concrete action now to save the lives of the people of Myanmar by putting humanity first,” the ambassador said..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-05
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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"On 28 June 2024, Argentine Prosecutor Guillermo Marijuán asked the federal criminal court in Buenos Aires, Argentina to order international arrest warrants against 25 Myanmar government officials for the crime of genocide and crimes against humanity committed against the Rohingya community between 2012 and 2018. This is the first time that arrest warrants are being sought against the Myanmar military for the crime of genocide, the historic persecution and violence suffered by the Rohingya community, which culminated in the horrific “clearance operations” in 2017 and the death of at least 10,000 people and the mass exodus of over 700,000 Rohingya – half of them children.
Requests for arrest warrants include the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, Min Aung Hlaing, the Deputy Commander-in-Chief of Defence Services, Soe Win, and the former commander of the Western Command, Maung Maung Soe.
Legal Action Worldwide (LAW) represents Rohingya survivors who provided testimonies in this case in 2023. This is the first time that any Rohingya survivors from the 2017 “clearance operations” have testified before a court of law.
“I could not believe I could tell a court about my sufferings. I could not believe it until I stepped into the courtroom. I did it for justice, for my grandchildren, for a future where we can return home with dignity… Who would have thought that we, the Rohingya women, would be taking the Myanmar military to the court one day” – said Haseeba, a female witness, name changed to protect identity.
The request from the Prosecutor, under Article 294 of the Argentinian Code of Criminal Procedure to seek statements from the identified perpetrators and issue international arrest warrants is a result of an investigation under the principle of universal jurisdiction, which was initiated following a complaint filed by the Burmese Rohingya Organisation UK (BROUK) in November 2019. It is now for the Court to decide on whether there is sufficient evidence to issue the warrants.
“The request for warrants by the Prosecutor is a critical step in the fight for justice for the Rohingya community. A positive decision of the federal court in Argentina can challenge the impunity enjoyed by the Myanmar military, which has emboldened it to continue to commit atrocity crimes against civilians across the country. Many of the witnesses, who are mainly women who have suffered from severe sexual violence have shown incredible bravery by coming forward and they are an inspiration to us all,” said Antonia Mulvey, Executive Director of LAW.
Sexual violence perpetrated mainly by the Myanmar military was a hallmark of the 2017 “clearance operations” against the Rohingya. The UN International Independent Fact-Finding Mission concluded that the scale and brutality of sexual violence against women and girls was one of the factors that indicated the Myanmar military’s genocidal intent to destroy the Rohingya community.
“I am truly pleased that the Argentinian prosecutor has asked for Myanmar military to provide answers to the court. I strongly believe that if we can catch the high-ranking military or police officials, we can protect my community. Arresting the masterminds behind these atrocities will bring peace to those who are still suffering inside Myanmar.” – said Salma, a female witness, name changed to protect identity.
LAW represents over 400 Rohingya in the ongoing international justice processes including the Gambia v. Myanmar case before the International Court of Justice (ICJ), where Gambia recently filed its Reply to Myanmar’s counter memorial submitted last year.
Whilst the international justice processes in relation to crimes against Rohingya and post-coup atrocities are underway, the ongoing human rights crisis across Myanmar under an illegitimate military regime continues to escalate. No ethnic peoples are left unaffected by the ongoing fighting in Myanmar. For the Rohingya particularly, with the intensification of the armed conflict in Rakhine State in recent months, they face a systematic misinformation campaign directed against them to fuel ethnic tensions, which is reminiscent of the 2012 and 2017 violence. The UN Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights (OHCHR) has called upon all governments to prevent the recurrence of atrocities against Rohingya and for more political will and more action to urgently respond to the unmitigated crisis in Myanmar.
About LAW
LAW is an independent, non-profit organisation of human rights lawyers and jurists working in fragile and conflict-affected areas. LAW provides legal aid to victims and communities that have suffered human rights violations and abuses in Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia.
For questions or further details, please contact LAW’s Communications Manager, Vittoria Groh at [email protected] or Legal and Programme Advisor, Ishita Kumar at [email protected]..."
Source/publisher:
Legal Action Worldwide (Genève)
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-04
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Crimes Against Humanity, Discrimination against the Rohingya
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186.9 KB
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"AMSTERDAM, July 3 (Reuters) - Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Britain and the Maldives are allowed to intervene in Gambia's Myanmar genocide case with the International Court of Justice, the ICJ said in a statement on Wednesday.
The countries had asked to intervene in the case at the ICJ, also known as the World Court, in November 2023.
"The seven States concerned will... be allowed to submit their written observations on the subject-matter of their interventions," the ICJ also said in the statement.
"The Court will determine at a later date whether they should be authorized to make observations in the course of the oral proceedings."
In 2017 Gambia, a predominantly Muslim West African country, filed a case against Myanmar at the ICJ accusing it of committing genocide against the Rohingya, a minority Muslim group in Myanmar.
A United Nations fact-finding mission concluded that a 2017 military campaign by Myanmar that drove 730,000 Rohingya into neighbouring Bangladesh had included "genocidal acts".
Myanmar has denied genocide, rejecting the U.N. findings as "biased and flawed". It says its crackdown was aimed at Rohingya rebels who had carried out attacks.
The World Court rejected Myanmar's objections to the genocide proceedings in July 2022, paving the way for the case to be heard in full but no date has yet been set..."
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"Reuters" (UK)
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-04
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International Court of Justice (ICJ) - Myanmar, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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"56th regular session of the UN Human Rights Council
Item 4: Interactive dialogue on the oral progress report by the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar
Oral statement delivered by Khin Ohmar
On behalf of Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development (FORUM-ASIA)
3 July 2024
Mr. President,
We welcome the Special Rapporteur’s conference room paper on the gendered impact of the coup. The Myanmar military’s systematic and widespread use of sexual and gender-based violence, including rape, as a weapon of war against the Rohingya and other ethnic minorities has been well documented and widely reported by Myanmar’s ethnic women organisations since early 2000s, as well as by the UN Fact-Finding Mission for Myanmar in 2019.
It is international inaction and failure to hold the military accountable for its decades of blatant disregard for international law that has emboldened it to deploy this weapon on a national scale as we are witnessing now following its illegal coup attempt in 2021.
While intensified fighting between Arakan Army and Myanmar military has severely impacted all communities in Rakhine, Arakan Army’s actions against Rohingya in Northern Rakhine State are once again threatening the existence of Rohingya in their ancestral land. This underscores the urgent need to hold accountable all perpetrators of violence against Rohingya.
Myanmar military is rapidly losing while the people’s revolution is advancing. The sacrifices of Myanmar’s people to defeat the junta must not revert the country back to the pre-2021 status quo. But building a new Myanmar with this revolution also requires all revolutionary actors to comply with international humanitarian and human rights law in their resistance against the junta.
This moment presents a critical opportunity that should not and cannot be missed to end repetitive cycles of Myanmar military’s violence and impunity. Myanmar military needs to be held accountable for genocide against the Rohingya as well as its continuing war crimes and crimes against humanity throughout the country. In this regard, we reiterate the Special Rapporteur’s call to refer the situation in Myanmar to the International Criminal Court (ICC) under Article 14 of the Rome Statute.
The international community must also assist to enable Myanmar’s resistance organisations to comply with international law, protect of civilians, and ensure justice and accountability in their efforts to dismantle the Myanmar miliary and to realize their vision to establish federal democracy that guarantees inclusivity, equality and peaceful co-existence.....
Thank you......
(၅၆) ကြိမ်မြောက် ကုလသမဂ္ဂလူ့အခွင့်အရေးကောင်စီ ပုံမှန်အစည်းအဝေး
အကြောင်းအရာ (၄)။ ။ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံလူ့အခွင့်အရေးဆိုင်ရာ အထူးကိုယ်စားလှယ်၏ အစီရင်ခံချက်အပေါ် အပြန်အလှန်ဆွေးနွေးမှု။
Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development (FORUM-ASIA) ကိုယ်စား ဒေါ်ခင်ဥမ္မာ၏ နှုတ်ဖြင့် တင်ပြချက်
၂၀၂၄ ခုနှစ် ဇူလိုင်လ ၃ ရက်နေ့
လေးစားရပါသော ဥက္ကဌကြီး ရှင့်
အာဏာသိမ်းရေး ကြိုးပမ်းမှုနှင့်ဆက်စပ်၍ ကျား-မအခြေပြု သက်ရောက်မှုနှင့်ပတ်သက်သည့် အထူးကိုယ်စားလှယ်၏ အစီရင်ခံစာတင်ပြချက်ကို မိမိတို့မှ ထောက်ခံကြိုဆိုသည်။ မြန်မာစစ်အုပ်စုသည် ရိုဟင်ဂျာများနှင့် အခြားသော လူနည်းစုတိုင်းရင်းသားများအပေါ် မုဒိမ်းကျင့်ခြင်း အပါအဝင် လိင်ပိုင်းဆိုင်ရာနှင့် ကျား-မ အခြေပြု အကြမ်းဖက်မှုများကို စစ်လက်နက်သဖွယ်အသုံးချပြီး စနစ်တကျဖြင့် ကျယ်ကျယ်ပြန့်ပြန့် ကျူးလွန်နေခဲ့သည်ကို မြန်မာနိုင်ငံရှိ တိုင်းရင်းသား အမျိုးသမီးအဖွဲ့အစည်းများက ၂၀၀၀ ခုနှစ် အစောပိုင်းနှစ်များ ကတည်းက ကောင်းမွန်စွာ မှတ်တမ်းတင်ထားကြပြီး ကျယ်ကျယ်ပြန့်ပြန် အစီရင်ဖော်ထုတ်ခဲ့ကြသည့်အပြင် ၂၀၁၉ ခုနှစ်တွင်လည်း ကုလသမဂ္ဂ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံဆိုင်ရာ အချက်အလက်ရှာဖွေရေးမစ်ရှင် (UN Fact-Finding Mission for Myanmar – FFM) က အလားတူ လုပ်ဆောင်ခဲ့ပြီး ဖြစ်သည်။
နိုင်ငံတကာအသိုင်းအဝိုင်းအနေဖြင့် ထိရောက်သော အရေးယူဆောင်ရွက်မှု မရှိခြင်းနှင့် နိုင်ငံတကာဥပဒေကို လျစ်လျူရှုပြီး ဆယ်စုနှစ်ပေါင်းများစွာ ပြောင်ပြောင်တင်းတင်းချိုးဖောက်နေသည့် မြန်မာစစ်တပ်အား တာဝန်ယူမှု တာဝန်ခံမှု ရှိလာစေရေး အရေးယူဆောင်ရွက်ရန် ပျက်ကွက်ခဲ့ခြင်းတို့က ၎င်းကို ပိုမို အတင့်ရဲလာစေပြီး ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ် နောက်ပိုင်းတွင် တစ်နိုင်ငံလုံး အတိုင်းအတာဖြင့် ကျူးလွန်မှုများကို မျက်မြင်ကြုံတွေ့နေရပြီး ဖြစ်သည်။
အာရက္ခတပ်တော် (Arakan Army – AA)နှင့် မြန်မာစစ်တပ်တို့အကြား ပြင်းထန်နေသည့် တိုက်ပွဲများသည် ရခိုင်ပြည်နယ်ရှိ လူမှုအသိုက်အ၀န်း အားလုံးအပေါ် ဆိုးရွားလှသော ဆိုးကျိုးသက်ရောက်မှုများ ရှိနေသည့် တစ်ချိန်တည်းတွင် ရခိုင်ပြည်နယ်မြောက်ပိုင်းရှိ ရိုဟင်ဂျာများအပေါ် ကျူးလွန်နေသည့် အာရက္ခတပ်တော်၏ လုပ်ဆောင်မှုများသည် ဘိုးဘွားပိုင်မြေပေါ်မှ ၎င်းတို့၏ တည်ရှိမှုအပေါ် ထပ်မံ ခြိမ်းခြောက်နေသည်။ ယင်းအခြေအနေသည် ရိုဟင်ဂျာများအပေါ် အကြမ်းဖက်မှု ကျူးလွန်သူအားလုံးမှ တာ၀န်ယူမှု တာဝန်ခံမှု ရှိလာစေရေး အရေးတကြီး လုပ်ဆောင်ရန် လိုအပ်ကြောင်း မီးမောင်းထိုးဖော်ပြနေသည်။
မြန်မာပြည်သူများ၏ တော်လှန်ရေး အသာစီးရလာနေသည့်တစ်ချိန်တည်းတွင် မြန်မာစစ်တပ်မှာမူ တစ်ဟုန်ထိုး ကျဆုံးနေလျက်ရှိသည်။ စစ်အုပ်စုကို အောင်နိုင်ရေး လုပ်ဆောင်နေသည့် ပြည်သူများ၏ စွန့်လွှတ် အနစ်နာခံမှုများသည် တိုင်းပြည်ကို ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ်မတိုင်မီ ပိုနေမြဲ ကျားနေမြဲ အခြေအနေကို ပြန်ရောက်ရေး လုပ်ဆောင်နေခြင်း မဟုတ်ပေ။ သို့ရာတွင် ဤတော်လှန်ရေးဖြင့် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံသစ်ကို တည်ဆောက်ရာတွင် စစ်အုပ်စုကို ဆန့်ကျင်တော်လှန်နေသည့် တော်လှန်ရေးလုပ်ဆောင်နေသူများ အားလုံးအနေဖြင့် နိုင်ငံတကာ လူသားချင်းစာနာထောက်ထားမှုဆိုင်ရာနှင့် လူ့အခွင့်အရေးဆိုင်ရာ ဥပဒေများကို လေးစားလိုက်နာရန် လိုအပ်သည်။
ဤအချိန်ကာလသည် မြန်မာစစ်တပ်၏ အကြမ်းဖက်မှုများနှင့် အပြစ်ဒဏ်ပေး အရေးယူခံရခြင်းမှ ကင်းလွှတ်နေမှု သံသရာကို အဆုံးသတ်ရန် လက်မလွှတ်သင့်သော၊ လက်လွှတ်၍မရသော အရေးကြီးသည့် အခွင့်အရေး ဖြစ်သည်။ ရိုဟင်ဂျာများအပေါ် ကျူးလွန်သော လူမျိုးသုဥ်းသတ်ဖြတ်မှုများ အပါအ၀င်၊ နိုင်ငံတဝှမ်းတွင် ကျူးလွန်နေသော စစ်ရာဇ၀တ်မှုများနှင့် လူသားမျိုးနွယ်အပေါ် ကျူးလွန်သော ရာဇ၀တ်မှုများအတွက် တာဝန်ယူမှု တာ၀န်ခံမှု ရှိလာစေရန် မြန်မာစစ်တပ်အပေါ် အရေးယူဆောင်ရွက်မှုများ လုပ်ဆောင်ရန် လိုအပ်သည်။ ဤကိစ္စနှင့်စပ်လျဉ်း၍ အထူးကိုယ်စားလှယ်၏ တောင်းဆိုချက်ဖြစ်သော ရောမစာချုပ် အပိုဒ် ၁၄ ပါအချက်အရ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံအခြေအနေအား အပြည်ပြည်ဆိုင်ရာ ရာဇဝတ်ခုံရုံး (International Criminal Court – ICC) သို့ လွှဲပြောင်းပေးရန် ဆိုသောအချက်ကို မိမိတို့မှ ထပ်လောင်းတောင်းဆိုလိုက်သည်။
မြန်မာတော်လှန်ရေးအဖွဲ့အစည်းများမှ နိုင်ငံတကာဥပဒေများအားကို လေးစားလိုက်နာမှု ရှိစေရန်၊ အရပ်သားပြည်သူများကို အကာအကွယ်ပေးရန်၊ မြန်မာစစ်တပ်အား ဖြိုချဖျက်သိမ်းရေး ကြိုးပမ်းမှုများမှ တစ်ဆင့် တရားမျှတမှုနှင့် တာဝန်ခံမှု တာ၀န်ယူမှု ရှိလာစေရေးအတွက် သေချာစွာလုပ်ဆောင်ရန်၊ နှင့် အားလုံးပါဝင်မှုရှိပြီး တန်းတူညီမျှမှုနှင့် ငြိမ်းချမ်းစွာ အတူတကွယှဉ်တွဲနေထိုင်ရေးကို အာမခံသည့် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီကို ထူထောင်မည့် ၎င်းတို့၏ မျှော်မှန်းချက်များကို အကောင်အထည်ဖော် ဆောင်ရွက်နိုင်ရန်အတွက် နိုင်ငံတကာအသိုင်းအ၀ိုင်းအနေဖြင့် ပံ့ပိုးကူညီပေးရမည် ဖြစ်သည်။.....
ကျေးဇူးတင်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-04
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"On 4 July 2024, the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) prepared a statement at the 56th session of the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Council for the Interactive Dialogue with the UN Special Rapporteur on human rights in Myanmar. The statement urged Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member states, particularly Thailand, not to lend political legitimacy to the junta and to immediately halt all commercial operations profiting the junta by private and public entities in their jurisdictions. Read the statement below.
UN Human Rights Council – 56th session
Item 4: Interactive Dialogue with the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar
4 July 2024
Mister President,
FIDH and its member organizations ALTSEAN-Burma and Women’s Peace Network thank the Special Rapporteur for his oral update.
The number of political prisoners in Myanmar is growing - we again call for their release amid increasing reports of serious abuses against them. Meanwhile, the junta’s forced recruitment is fueling more human rights violations.
If the junta is not stopped, the number of airstrikes, overwhelmingly targeting civilians, is set to double this year. During January to May alone, the junta launched 592 airstrikes, compared to 663 for the whole of last year.
Atrocities against Rohingya by the junta and the Arakan Army have accelerated in Rakhine State. Rohingya youth are being forced to join the same army that has been committing atrocity crimes against their families. Rohingya people are being pulled, against their will, into both sides of an escalating conflict that has displaced hundreds of thousands, including the people of Buthidaung.
The impunity must stop. We reiterate our call on UN member states to extend their full support to the Special Rapporteur and the International Investigative Mechanism on Myanmar, including by granting them access to their territories for official visits.
We urge the governments of ASEAN, particularly Thailand, not to lend political legitimacy to the junta and to immediately halt all commercial operations profiting the junta by private and public entities in their jurisdictions..."
Source/publisher:
International Federation for Human Rights
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-04
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, UN human rights documents on Myanmar
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Sub-title:
UK statement for Interactive Dialogue on the progress oral report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar.
Description:
"Thank you, Special Rapporteur, for your typically eloquent update.
Four years on from the military coup that thwarted their democratic aspirations, it’s the people of Myanmar who continue to suffer from the deepening humanitarian and human rights crisis: airstrikes, village burnings, increasing use of land mines, forced recruitment. In Rakhine, the scene of recent horrors in Buthidaung and Byain Phyu, intercommunal tensions are being deliberately stoked to divide communities.
All parties to the conflict must prioritise the protection of civilians and allow unimpeded humanitarian access.
The UK has provided more than £150 million in life-saving assistance to the people of Myanmar since the coup. Let me urge others to join us in supporting local civil society organisations, who are the most able to reach conflict-affected communities. And to support the mechanisms for accountability and justice, such as the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar.
Thank you, Special Rapporteur, for shining the spotlight on the military’s use of the international banking system to procure arms and military supplies. We are, as you know, a longstanding supporter of an arms embargo on Myanmar. No state should be transferring weapons or dual-use items to the Myanmar military.
Special Rapporteur, what more can we do to reduce the Myanmar military’s access to arms?..."
Source/publisher:
"GOV.UK"
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-04
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Individual Documents
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Human Rights and international relations
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"This document is a follow-up on the situation in the Pauktaw Internally Displaced People (IDP) camps, where SOLIDARITÉS INTERNATIONAL (SI) is providing comprehensive WASH assistance, in particular to ensure continuous access to water during the water scarcity period. SI started operating in Rakhine State during the emergency phase following Cyclone Giri in 2010. It then responded to the humanitarian crisis resulting from two waves of intercommunal violence in 2012. Since February 2013, SI has been working in Pauktaw IDP camps (ANYC, NC1, NC2, KNP) and village (ANYV), both hosting Rohingyas.
Over the past months, continued blockade of Sittwe-Pauktaw waterways and the lack of Travel Authorization (TA) issued by the authorities still hampered access to the 5 Pauktaw IDP sites. Since November 2023, critical materials required for the water scarcity mitigation could indeed no longer be transported from Sittwe, bringing related activities to a standstill. Most of the planned ponds’ improvements had to be postponed until after the monsoon season. Facing growing concerns related to water scarcity, Camp Management Committees (CMC) and communities agreed to reduce the quantity of water treated and distributed per person, allowing to extend the sufficiency period and thus delaying the water scarcity response itself. In May 2024, thanks to close coordination efforts with the WASH cluster and UNICEF, SI secured alternative solutions for some materials and waterboating was finally underway. As of June 15, 18,512 individuals are benefitting from water in camps, delivered to them as part of SI’s water scarcity response. Further joint efforts will be needed in the coming months, however, to find alternative ways of procuring supplies”..."
Source/publisher:
Solidarités International (Paris) via Reliefweb (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-03
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Burma: Internal displacement/forced migration of several ethnic groups., Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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"THE HAGUE, 3 July 2024. By an Order dated 3 July 2024, the International Court of Justice
decided on the admissibility of the declarations of intervention filed by seven States in the case
concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (The Gambia v. Myanmar).
In its Order, the Court,
“(1) Unanimously,
Decides that the declaration of intervention under Article 63 of the Statute
submitted by the Republic of the Maldives is admissible in so far as it concerns the
construction of provisions of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide;
(2) Unanimously,
Decides that the declaration of intervention under Article 63 of the Statute
submitted jointly by Canada, the Kingdom of Denmark, the French Republic, the
Federal Republic of Germany, the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland is admissible in so far as it concerns the
construction of provisions of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide.”
In accordance with Article 86 of the Rules of Court, the seven States concerned will therefore
be allowed to submit their written observations on the subject-matter of their interventions. The Court
will determine at a later date whether they should be authorized to make observations in the course
of the oral proceedings.
A summary of the Order appears in the document entitled “Summary 2024/7”. This summary
and the full text of the Order are available on the case page on the Court’s website.
___________
History of the proceedings
On 11 November 2019, The Gambia filed in the Registry of the Court an Application
instituting proceedings against Myanmar concerning alleged violations of the Genocide Convention.
In its Application, The Gambia requests, among other things, that the Court adjudge and declare that
Myanmar has breached its obligations under the Convention, that it must cease forthwith any
internationally wrongful act, that it must perform the obligations of reparation in the interest of the
victims of genocidal acts who are members of the Rohingya group, and that it must offer assurances
and guarantees of non-repetition. As a basis for the Court’s jurisdiction, the Applicant invokes
Article IX of the Genocide Convention. The Application was accompanied by a request for the
indication of provisional measures.
On 23 January 2020, the Court made an Order indicating a number of provisional measures,
requiring among other things that Myanmar, in relation to the members of the Rohingya group in its
territory, take all measures within its power to prevent the commission of all acts within the scope of
Article II of the Genocide Convention; take effective measures to prevent the destruction and ensure
the preservation of evidence related to allegations of such acts; and submit a report to the Court on
all measures taken to give effect to the Order within four months, as from the date of the Order, and thereafter every six months, pending a final decision in the case by the Court.
By a further Order dated 23 January 2020, the Court fixed 23 July 2020 and 25 January 2021
as the respective time-limits for the filing of a Memorial by The Gambia and a Counter-Memorial
by Myanmar. By an Order dated 18 May 2020, these time-limits were extended to 23 October 2020
and 23 July 2021, respectively. The Memorial of The Gambia was filed within the time-limit thus
extended.
On 20 January 2021, Myanmar raised preliminary objections to the jurisdiction of the Court
and the admissibility of the Application.
On 22 July 2022, following public hearings, the Court delivered its Judgment, in which it
rejected the preliminary objections raised by Myanmar and found that it had jurisdiction to entertain
the Application filed by The Gambia on the basis of Article IX of the Genocide Convention, and that
the Application was admissible.
By an Order dated 22 July 2022, the Court fixed 24 April 2023 as the new time-limit for the
filing of the Counter-Memorial of Myanmar. By Orders dated 6 April 2023 and 12 May 2023
respectively, the Court extended that time-limit, first to 24 May 2023 and then to 24 August 2023.
The Counter-Memorial was filed within the time-limit thus fixed.
By an Order dated 16 October 2023, the Court authorized the submission of a Reply by
The Gambia and a Rejoinder by Myanmar, and fixed 16 May 2024 and 16 December 2024 as the
respective time-limits for the filing of those written pleadings. The Gambia duly filed its Reply.
On 15 November 2023, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands and the
United Kingdom (jointly) and the Maldives filed declarations of intervention under Article 63 of the
Statute of the Court.
Earlier press releases relating to this case are available on the Court’s website.
___________
Note: The Court’s press releases are prepared by its Registry for information purposes only
and do not constitute official documents.
___________
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) is the principal judicial organ of the United Nations.
It was established by the United Nations Charter in June 1945 and began its activities in April 1946.
The Court is composed of 15 judges elected for a nine-year term by the General Assembly and the
Security Council of the United Nations. The seat of the Court is at the Peace Palace in The Hague
(Netherlands). The Court has a twofold role: first, to settle, in accordance with international law,
legal disputes submitted to it by States; and, second, to give advisory opinions on legal questions
referred to it by duly authorized United Nations organs and agencies of the system..."
Source/publisher:
International Court of Justice
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-03
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Individual Documents
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International Court of Justice (ICJ) - Myanmar, Human Rights and international relations, Genocide
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"KEY DISPLACEMENT FIGURES:
117,800 Estimated refugee outflows to neighbouring countries since 1 Feb. 2021
1,139,500 Refugees and asylum-seekers from Myanmar in neighbouring countries as of 31 Dec. 2023
2,804,700 Estimated total internally displaced persons (IDPs) within Myanmar, displaced since 1 Feb. 2021 Source: UN in Myanmar
3,093,700 Estimated total internally displaced persons (IDPs) within Myanmar as of 27 May 2024 Source: UN in Myanmar
OVERVIEW
Widespread conflict and violence in Myanmar continued to drive displacement and exacerbate needs across multiple states and regions. In May, some 153,400 IDPs were newly displaced, with most living in terrible conditions, lacking adequate shelter, and in need of access to basic services. The humanitarian situation in Rakhine State has been dire, marked by a spike in fighting, underlying inter-communal tensions and heavily restricted access to affected areas. The overall security situation also deteriorated across Chin, Magway, and Sagaing states, Bago Region (East), Tanintharyi Region, Kayah State and Shan State (South), with intense fighting reported. In Kachin State, armed clashes continued, particularly in Waingmaw, Momuak, and Mansi townships. In Kayin State, IDPs returning to their places of origin were exposed to landmine risks. The monsoon season has also compounded the hardships faced by communities, with heavy rain and strong winds causing severe damage, including to IDP shelters, across several townships in Chin, Magway, Sagaing, and Shan states. UNHCR, along with protection partners, is actively engaging with all stakeholders to advocate for the protection of civilians and displaced people, ensuring their access to assistance, and securing their freedom of movement.
In Thailand, as of 1 June, no refugees remain in the Temporary Safety Areas (TSAs). The 77 refugees who had been sheltered in Nong Luang TSA in Umphang District returned to Myanmar on 30 May after spending some two months there. In May, over 180 refugees sought temporary refuge in the Poeng Kloeng TSA in Umphang District due to an escalation in fighting. UNHCR was granted access to the TSA although the refugees returned to Myanmar just before the planned assessment mission could take place, leading to the site's closure. Although UNHCR could not monitor the voluntariness of returns, sources cited various reasons for return. This included the cessation of fighting in their villages, encouragement from village leaders to return, and the desire to prepare their land before the start of the rainy season.
Since February 2021, approximately 64,300 people from Myanmar’s North-West region have sought protection in India, with some 6,800 registered with UNHCR in New Delhi. Intensified fighting in Chin and Sagaing regions in May reportedly led to new arrivals crossing into Mizoram. On 12 May, the Chief Minister of Manipur reported the deportation of around 360 of the 5,800 identified "illegal migrants" from Myanmar in Kamjong District and the biometric data of over 5,100 migrants was reportedly collected for future deportation. Special teams were established to monitor and manage arrivals in five border districts. In late May, Cylone Remal caused significant damage in Mizoram and Manipur, exacerbating the humanitarian needs of Myanmar arrivals in Mizoram and Manipur with food, shelter, WASH and health identified as the most critical needs..."
Source/publisher:
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (Geneva) via Reliefweb (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-03
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Food Security and nutrition in Burma/Myanmar, Public Health, Human Rights and international relations
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"LONDON, Jul 3 2024 (IPS) - Myanmar’s army, at war with pro-democracy forces and ethnic militias, must know it’s nowhere near victory. It recently came close to losing control of Myawaddy, one of the country’s biggest cities, at a key location on the border with Thailand. Many areas are outside its control.
The army surely expected an easier ride when it ousted the elected government in a coup on 1 February 2021. It had ruled Myanmar for decades before democracy returned in 2015. But many democracy supporters took up arms, and in several parts of the country they’ve allied with militia groups from Myanmar’s ethnic minorities, with a long history of resisting military oppression.
Setbacks and violence
Army morale has collapsed. Thousands of soldiers are reported to have surrendered, including complete battalions – some out of moral objections to the junta’s violence and others because they saw defeat as inevitable. There have also been many defections, with defectors reporting they’d been ordered to kill unarmed civilians. Forces fighting the junta’s troops are encouraging defectors to join their ranks.
In response to reversals, in February the junta announced it would introduce compulsory conscription for young people, demanding up to five years of military service. An estimated 60,000 men are expected to be called up in the first round. The announcement prompted many young people to flee the country if they could, and if not, seek refuge in parts of Myanmar free from military control.
There have also been reports of army squads kidnapping people and forcing them to serve. Given minimal training, they’re cannon fodder and human shields. Rohingya people – an officially stateless Muslim minority – are among those reportedly being forcibly enlisted. They’re being pressed into service by the same military that committed genocide against them.
People who manage to cross into Thailand face hostility from Thai authorities and risk being returned against their will. Even after leaving Myanmar, refugees face the danger of transnational repression, as government intelligence agents reportedly operate in neighbouring countries and the authorities are freezing bank accounts, seizing assets and cancelling passports.
Conscription isn’t just about giving the junta more personnel to compensate for its losses – it’s also part of a sustained campaign of terror intended to subdue civilians and suppress activism. Neighbourhoods are being burned to the ground and hundreds have died in the flames. The air force is targeting unarmed towns and villages. The junta enjoys total impunity for these and many other vile acts.
The authorities hold thousands of political prisoners on fabricated charges and subject them to systematic torture. The UN independent fact-finding mission reports that at least 1,703 people have died in custody since the coup, likely an underestimate. Many have been convicted in secret military trials and some sentenced to death.
There’s also a growing humanitarian crisis, with many hospitals destroyed, acute food shortages in Rakhine state, where many Rohingya people live, and an estimated three million displaced. Voluntary groups are doing their best to help communities, but the situation is made much worse by the military obstructing access for aid workers.
International neglect
In March, UN human rights chief Volker Türk described the situation in Myanmar as ‘a never-ending nightmare’. It’s up to the international community to exert the pressure needed to end it.
It’s by no means certain the military will be defeated. Adversity could lead to infighting and the rise of even more vicious leaders. One thing that could make a decisive difference is disruption of the supply chain, particularly the jet fuel that enables lethal airstrikes on civilians. In April, the UN Human Rights Council passed a resolution calling on states to stop supplying the military with jet fuel. States should implement it.
Repressive states such as China, India and Russia have been happy enough to keep supplying the junta with weapons. But democratic states must take the lead and apply more concerted pressure. Some, including Australia, the UK and USA, have imposed new sanctions on junta members this year, but these have been slow in coming and fall short of the approach the Human Rights Council resolution demands.
But the worst response has come from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Ignoring reality and civil society’s proposals, ASEAN has stuck to a plan it developed in April 2021 that simply hasn’t worked. The junta takes advantage of ASEAN’s weakness. It announced compulsory conscription shortly after a visit by ASEAN’s Special Envoy for Myanmar.
ASEAN’s neglect has allowed human rights violations and, increasingly, transnational organised crime to flourish. The junta is involved in crimes such as drug trafficking, illegal gambling and online fraud. It uses the proceeds of these, often carried out with the help of Chinese gangs, to finance its war on its people. As a result, Myanmar now ranks number one on the Global Organized Crime Index. This is a regional problem, affecting people in Myanmar’s neighbouring countries as well.
ASEAN members also have an obligation to accept refugees from Myanmar, including those fleeing conscription. They should commit to protecting them and not forcing them back, particularly when they’re democracy and human rights activists whose lives would be at risk.
Forced conscription must be the tipping point for international action. This must include international justice, since there’s none in Myanmar. The junta has ignored an order from the International Court of Justice to protect Rohingya people and prevent actions that could violate the Genocide Convention, following a case brought by the government of The Gambia alleging genocide against the Rohingya. The UN Security Council should now use its power to refer Myanmar to the International Criminal Court so prosecutions of military leaders can begin.
China and Russia, which have so far refused to back calls for action, should end their block on Security Council action, in the interests of human rights and to prevent growing regional instability..."
Source/publisher:
Inter Press Service
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-03
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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"SITUATION AT A GLANCE
18.6 MILLION People In Need of Humanitarian Assistance in Burma in 2024
UN – June 2024
13.3 MILLION Number of People in Need of Food Assistance in 2024
UN – June 2024
3.1 MILLION Total IDPs within Burma
UNHCR – June 2024
5.3 MILLION People Targeted for Humanitarian Assistance in Burma in 2024
UN – June 2024
3 MILLION People Targeted for Protection Assistance in Burma in 2024
UN – June 2024
Intensifying violence between the MAF and various armed groups since late 2023 drives worsening humanitarian conditions, including increased displacement and deteriorating food security, across Burma.
Humanitarian actors experience heightened operational constraints, limiting assistance for vulnerable populations.
USAID/BHA partner WFP provides emergency assistance to tens of thousands of individuals in Chin and Rakhine states..."
Source/publisher:
US Agency for International Development (Washington, D.C.) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-02
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
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Food Security and nutrition in Burma/Myanmar, Public Health, Human Rights and international relations
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"The UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) on Tuesday called on India to end the arbitrary detention of Rohingya who fled Myanmar to India and refrain from forcible deportation and returns to Myanmar, where they would risk being subjected to serious human rights violations and abuses.
In a statement issued today under its early warning and urgent action procedure, the Committee also said that it was alarmed by reports of widespread racist hate speech and harmful stereotypes against Rohingya, including by politicians and public figures. It urged the State party to firmly condemn such heinous acts and ensure they are investigated and adequately punished, in compliance with its international obligations arising from the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.
The Committee said it was “concerned about reports of arbitrary mass detention of the Rohingya, including children, in inadequate conditions and in some cases without due process or access to legal representation.” It is also alarmed about reports of “several cases of forcible deportation and returns to Myanmar between 2018 and 2022 as well as the ongoing risk of deportation of the remaining Rohingya in India, in violation of the principle of non-refoulement.”
It urged India to end the arbitrary mass detention of the Rohingya, and only apply immigration detention as a measure of last resort - for the shortest possible period - and to provide detained Rohingya with legal safeguards and access to legal counsel. It also called on India to ensure that living conditions in places of detention are adequate and in accordance with international standards. The Committee further called on the State party to “end racial discrimination against Rohingya and to remove restrictions preventing them from enjoying their rights without discrimination, in particular with regard to access to employment, health and education, especially by ensuring the issuance of long term visas and other identity document.”
The Committee called on the State party to continue to collaborate with the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, including by facilitating a country visit to India.
CERD’s early warning and urgent action procedure primarily aims to consider situations that might escalate into conflicts, in order to take appropriate preventive actions to avoid full-scale violations of human rights under the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination..."
Source/publisher:
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (Geneva)
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-02
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, UN Human Rights pages on Myanmar, Human Rights and international relations
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"New York, July 2, 2024—Myanmar authorities should release journalist Htet Aung, and allow members of the press to do their jobs without fear of legal reprisal or imprisonment, the Committee to Protect Journalists said Tuesday.
On June 28, a court in Sittwe, capital of Myanmar’s Rakhine State, sentenced Htet Aung, a reporter with the Development Media Group (DMG) news agency, to five years in prison with hard labor. His sentence was in connection with a report the outlet published on August 25, 2023, under the headline “Calls for justice on sixth anniversary of Muslim genocide in Arakan State,” according to the news agency, a DVB social media post, and DMG editor-in-chief Aung Marm Oo, who communicated with CPJ via text message.
Htet Aung was convicted of abetting terrorism under Section 52(a) of the country’s Anti-Terrorism Law. The journalist’s initial indictment was for defamation under Section 65 of the Telecommunications Law, but the charge was changed to abetting terrorism on December 1.
DMG office security guard Soe Win Aung was handed the same sentence as Htet Aung, according to the news report and Aung Marm Oo. Both were also held on a charge of allegedly stealing a motorcycle, the same sources said.
In a public statement reviewed by CPJ, DMG said it “strongly condemns the regime’s unjust imprisonment” of Htet Aung and Soe Win Aung.
“The 5-year sentencing of Development Media Group reporter Htet Aung on bogus terrorism charges is Myanmar’s latest outrage against the free press and should be immediately reversed,” said Shawn Crispin, CPJ’s senior Southeast Asia representative. “Myanmar’s junta must stop harassing and jailing journalists for merely doing their jobs by reporting the news.”
After his October arrest, Htet Aung was held in pre-trial detention at Sittwe’s No. 1 Police Station, where he was denied visitation, according to the news agency’s report and Aung Marm Oo. Htet Aung was initially arrested while taking photos of soldiers making donations to Buddhist monks during a religious festival in Sittwe.
Hours later, soldiers, police, and special branch officials raided the Development Media Group’s bureau; confiscated cameras, computers, documents, financial records, and cash, and sealed off the building. The agency’s staff went underground to avoid arrest, according to Aung Marm Oo, who has been in hiding since 2019 after being charged under Myanmar’s Unlawful Association Act, which can result in up to five years’ imprisonment and fines.
Development Media Group specializes in news from Rakhine State, where in 2017, an army operation drove more than half a million Muslim Rohingyas to flee to neighboring Bangladesh in what the United Nations called a “textbook example of ethnic cleansing.”
CPJ’s email to the Myanmar Ministry of Information did not receive a response..."
Source/publisher:
Committee to Protect Journalists
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-02
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Freedom of opinion and expression: - the situation in Burma/Myanmar - reports, analyses, recommendations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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"The military coup was a devastating setback for gender equality in Myanmar and has left women, girls, and LGBT people acutely vulnerable to discrimination, violence, and exploitation, according to a new report published today by Tom Andrews, the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar.
“Courage amid Crisis: Gendered impacts of the coup and the pursuit of gender equality in Myanmar” describes the terrible toll that human rights violations by the military junta have had on women, girls, and LGBT people. The report also highlights the role of women at the forefront of the revolutionary movement, to embed equality, justice, and non-discrimination into the foundation of a future democratic state.
The international community must step up support for women, girls, and LGBT people in Myanmar by working with local civil society organisations on delivery of humanitarian aid tailored to the needs of the most vulnerable and funding programmes for survivors of sexual and gender-based violence, the Special Rapporteur said. He urged governments and donors to work with emerging governance structures, ethnic resistance organisations, and civil society to ensure accountability for crimes against women, girls, and LGBT people.
“The threat of sexual and gender-based violence is a dark shadow that follows women, girls, and LGBT people in Myanmar. Cruelty and dehumanisation are the defining features of widespread sexual violence perpetrated by junta forces in conflict zones, at check points and in places of detention,” the expert said.
“The junta has carried out a coordinated campaign to dismantle organisations and networks that support women, girls, and LGBT people. These advocates contend with the constant threat of arrest and imprisonment, leading some to continue their work from exile. Vicious online harassment campaigns target women and LGBT leaders with violent and sexualised threats.”
The report describes threats to the economic, social, and cultural rights of women, girls, and LGBT people, including loss of economic independence, shrinking access to education and health care, and impacts of protracted displacement.
“In cities, villages, and displacement sites across the country, women are shouldering their families’ burdens. They are skipping meals so their children can eat, taking on new duties in the household, and struggling to keep their families safe in violent and chaotic environments. Facing these challenges, many women and girls are turning to negative coping strategies and are vulnerable to gendered protection concerns, including trafficking, sexual exploitation and early marriage,” Andrews said.
The report also highlights the dire situation of Rohingya women and girls, who face intersecting layers of discrimination and grave security risks due to the systematic denial of citizenship and basic human rights, as well as discriminatory beliefs and practices within their own community.
“Facing grave risks and persistent discrimination, women and LGBT leaders refuse to be silenced. They are claiming roles in revolutionary governance structures, tirelessly advocating for meaningful political participation, and bravely developing accountability measures to hold all perpetrators of sexual and gender-based violence to account. Women-led civil society organisations have been the backbone of local humanitarian relief efforts,” he said.
“I am inspired by the courage, resilience, and tenacity of women and LGBT leaders, who are advancing a revolution within the revolution, one that seeks to upend patriarchal hierarchies and guarantee gender equality for future generations. The international community must empower them now with the support they need and deserve,” Andrews said.
Mr. Thomas Andrews (United States of America) is the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar. A former member of the US Congress from Maine, Andrews is a Robina Senior Human Rights Fellow at Yale Law School and an Associate of Harvard University’s Asia Center. He has worked with the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs and parliamentarians, NGOs and political parties in Cambodia, Indonesia, Algeria, Croatia, Serbia, Ukraine and Yemen. He has been a consultant for the National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma and the Euro-Burma Network and has run advocacy NGOs including Win Without War and United to End Genocide.
The Special Rapporteurs are part of what is known as the Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council. Comprising the largest body of independent experts in the UN Human Rights system, Special Procedures is the general name of the Council's independent fact-finding and monitoring mechanisms that address either specific country situations or thematic issues in all parts of the world. Special Procedures experts work on a voluntary basis; they are not UN staff and do not receive a salary for their work. They are independent from any government or organization and serve in their individual capacity..."
Source/publisher:
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-02
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Human Rights and international relations
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"The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination,
Acting under its early warning and urgent action procedure;
Recalling the Committee’s letter adopted under early warning and urgent action procedure on 14
December 2018 during its 97th session, under which the Committee expressed concerns about
allegations that the Rohingya has been the target of hate speech and violence in India, including
calls for deportation to Myanmar and about the conditions of detention camps for migrants. The
Committee expressed concerns about the manifestations of racial discrimination against the
Rohingya in India and that their return to Myanmar in violation of the principle of nonrefoulement would infringe their rights protected under the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (the Convention);
Regrets the lack of response by the State party to its abovementioned letter or information on
measures to ensure sufficient capacity to replace detention camps by reception facilities,
providing adequate shelter, basic services, and humanitarian assistance including effective access
to health care services as well as to comply with the obligation of non-refoulement arising out of
the international norms concerning refugees and human rights;
Reiterates its concerns about the order of the Ministry of Home Affairs, dated 8 August 2017,
which considered Rohingya who fled Myanmar to India (thereafter “Rohingya”) as “illegal
immigrants” and called upon all State Governments to “sensitize all the law enforcement and
intelligence agencies for taking prompt steps in identifying the illegal migrants and initiate the
deportation processes expeditiously and without delay”1
;
Alarmed about reports of racial discrimination and restrictions faced by the Rohingya following
the adoption of the order in August 2017 preventing them from exercising their economic, social
and cultural rights, in particular their rights of access to education, employment and health-care
and reportedly the discontinuation of granting them long term visas;
Deeply concerned about reports on the spread of racist hate speech and the dissemination of
negative stereotypes against Rohingya on the Internet and in social media, reports on the use of racist hate speech by politicians and public figures, and the lack of information on investigations,
prosecutions and convictions of public figures and politicians for hate speech;
Concerned about reports of the prevalence of arbitrary mass detention of the Rohingya, including
children, in inadequate conditions and in some cases without due process or access to legal
representation, following the order of the Ministry of Home Affairs in August 2017;
Alarmed about reports of several cases of forcible deportation and returns of Rohingya to
Myanmar between 2018 and 2022 as well as the ongoing risk of deportation of the remaining
Rohingya in India, in violation of the principle of non-refoulement;
Concerned about reports that human rights defenders, lawyers, members of civil society
organizations, and activists have increasingly become targets of intimidation, harassment and
reprisals as a consequence of their work on the rights of the Rohingya in India;
Taking note that two Rohingya filed a writ petition in 2017 before the Supreme Court of India to
release the detained refugees and halt their deportation from India;
Regrets the delay of the Supreme Court of India in considering the abovementioned petition,
which was submitted six years ago; Also taking note that the Supreme Court of India issued an Interim Order on 8 April 2021 and
decided not to grant an interim measure to prevent the deportation of around 160 Rohingya
detained in Jammu;
2
Takes note of the report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar,
submitted for the 78th session of the UN General Assembly, in which he noted that “six years
after the genocidal attacks by the Myanmar military in Rakhine State, the Rohingya continue to
face violence, persecution and neglect, regardless of their location. The situation in Rakhine State
remains fundamentally unchanged since the violence in 2017, except for the additional misery
wrought by Cyclone Mocha. Approximately 600,000 Rohingya remain under an apartheid
regime, with 140,000 confined to de facto internment camps”;3
Also notes the report Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, submitted
for the 52nd session of the UN Human Rights Council, in which he highlighted reports of
Rohingya in India being subjected to pushback at land borders, forcible deportation to Myanmar
and arbitrary detention;4
Notes that persons who had to flee Myanmar due to the currently prevailing situation of
widespread human rights violations in the context of the conflict are likely to be in need of international refugee protection under Article 1 of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees (1951 Convention), in accordance with the Guidance Note on the International
Protection Needs of People Fleeing Myanmar by the Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR);
5
Recalling the Committee’s general recommendation no. 30 (2004) on discrimination against noncitizens and general recommendation no. 31 (2005) on the prevention of racial discrimination in
the administration and functioning of the criminal justice system;
Calls upon the State party to fully respect its international obligations arising from the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination;
Calls upon India to ensure that legislative guarantees against racial discrimination apply to noncitizens regardless of their immigration status and that laws and policies relating to immigration,
deportation, or other forms of removal of non-citizens do not discriminate—in purpose or
effect—on the basis of race, colour or ethnic or national origin; Further calls upon India to refrain from forcible deportation and returns of the Rohingya to
Myanmar where they would be at risk of being subjected to serious human rights violations and
abuses as well as to provide access to its territory for persons in need of international protection;
Urges the State party to ensure that the Rohingya have access to effective remedies, including
the right to challenge deportation orders, and are allowed effectively to pursue such remedies as
well as to ensure that the system of justice guarantees the victim a court judgement within a
reasonable period, particularly in relation to the petition before the Supreme Court of India;
Calls India to end the arbitrary mass detention of the Rohingya, and ensure that immigration
detention is applied only as a measure of last resort and for the shortest possible period, provide
detained Rohingya with legal safeguards and ensure their access to legal counsel, and ensure that
living conditions in places of detention are adequate and in accordance with international
standards; Urges the State party to end racial discrimination against Rohingya and to remove restrictions
preventing them from enjoying their rights without discrimination, in particular with regard to
access to employment, health and education, especially by ensuring the issuance of long term
visas and other identity documents;
Urges the State party to combat the spread of racist hate speech in the media, on the Internet and
in social media and to firmly condemn any form of hate speech and distance itself from racist
hate speech expressed by politicians and public figures, including members of parliament and
religious leaders, and ensure that such acts are investigated and adequately punished; Also urges India to continue to collaborate with the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the
situation of human rights in Myanmar, including through facilitating a country visit to India from
the Special Rapporteur..."
Source/publisher:
UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-02
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Discrimination against the Rohingya, Rohingya (cultural, political etc.)
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"Myanmar: New report urges robust support for women, girls and LGBT people in post-coup Myanmar
GENEVA (2 July 2024) - The military coup was a devastating setback for gender equality in Myanmar and has left women, girls, and LGBT people acutely vulnerable to discrimination, violence, and exploitation, according to a new report published today by Tom Andrews, the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar.
“Courage amid Crisis: Gendered impacts of the coup and the pursuit of gender equality in Myanmar” describes the terrible toll that human rights violations by the military junta have had on women, girls, and LGBT people. The report also highlights the role of women at the forefront of the revolutionary movement, to embed equality, justice, and non-discrimination into the foundation of a future democratic state.
The international community must step up support for women, girls, and LGBT people in Myanmar by working with local civil society organisations on delivery of humanitarian aid tailored to the needs of the most vulnerable and funding programmes for survivors of sexual and gender-based violence, the Special Rapporteur said. He urged governments and donors to work with emerging governance structures, ethnic resistance organisations, and civil society to ensure accountability for crimes against women, girls, and LGBT people.
“The threat of sexual and gender-based violence is a dark shadow that follows women, girls, and LGBT people in Myanmar. Cruelty and dehumanisation are the defining features of widespread sexual violence perpetrated by junta forces in conflict zones, at check points and in places of detention,” the expert said.
“The junta has carried out a coordinated campaign to dismantle organisations and networks that support women, girls, and LGBT people. These advocates contend with the constant threat of arrest and imprisonment, leading some to continue their work from exile. Vicious online harassment campaigns target women and LGBT leaders with violent and sexualised threats.”
The report describes threats to the economic, social, and cultural rights of women, girls, and LGBT people, including loss of economic independence, shrinking access to education and health care, and impacts of protracted displacement.
“In cities, villages, and displacement sites across the country, women are shouldering their families’ burdens. They are skipping meals so their children can eat, taking on new duties in the household, and struggling to keep their families safe in violent and chaotic environments. Facing these challenges, many women and girls are turning to negative coping strategies and are vulnerable to gendered protection concerns, including trafficking, sexual exploitation and early marriage,” Andrews said.
The report also highlights the dire situation of Rohingya women and girls, who face intersecting layers of discrimination and grave security risks due to the systematic denial of citizenship and basic human rights, as well as discriminatory beliefs and practices within their own community.
“Facing grave risks and persistent discrimination, women and LGBT leaders refuse to be silenced. They are claiming roles in revolutionary governance structures, tirelessly advocating for meaningful political participation, and bravely developing accountability measures to hold all perpetrators of sexual and gender-based violence to account. Women-led civil society organisations have been the backbone of local humanitarian relief efforts,” he said.
“I am inspired by the courage, resilience, and tenacity of women and LGBT leaders, who are advancing a revolution within the revolution, one that seeks to upend patriarchal hierarchies and guarantee gender equality for future generations. The international community must empower them now with the support they need and deserve,” Andrews said.
Mr. Thomas Andrews (United States of America) is the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar. A former member of the US Congress from Maine, Andrews is a Robina Senior Human Rights Fellow at Yale Law School and an Associate of Harvard University’s Asia Center. He has worked with the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs and parliamentarians, NGOs and political parties in Cambodia, Indonesia, Algeria, Croatia, Serbia, Ukraine and Yemen. He has been a consultant for the National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma and the Euro-Burma Network and has run advocacy NGOs including Win Without War and United to End Genocide.
The Special Rapporteurs are part of what is known as the Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council. Comprising the largest body of independent experts in the UN Human Rights system, Special Procedures is the general name of the Council's independent fact-finding and monitoring mechanisms that address either specific country situations or thematic issues in all parts of the world. Special Procedures experts work on a voluntary basis; they are not UN staff and do not receive a salary for their work. They are independent from any government or organization and serve in their individual capacity..."
Source/publisher:
UN Human Rights Council (Geneva) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-01
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Human Rights and international relations
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pdf
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723.21 KB
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"This independent update, covering humanitarian developments up to 28 June, is produced by OCHA Myanmar under its global mandate, in collaboration with the Inter-Cluster Coordination Group and UN agencies. Response figures are based on self-reporting by organizations to clusters. The next humanitarian update will be issued in late July 2024.
HIGHLIGHTS & KEY MESSAGES
Civilian protection concerns are on the rise as conflict continues to expand across the country. Pervasive landmine contamination, explosive hazards, and fighting with heavy weapons and aerial bombardment continues to drive displacement and exacerbate already severe humanitarian needs.
Countrywide, more than 3 million people are estimated to be internally displaced. Many of the newly displaced are living without proper shelters, enduring severe weather in the monsoon season.
Recent attacks and occupation of humanitarian facilities in Rakhine and other areas are elevating risks for both humanitarian personnel and the populations they serve.
In Rakhine, intense fighting has forced thousands of people to flee their homes in recent months. In the state capital, Sittwe, civilian protection concerns are growing, with reports of newly planted mines, forced evictions, and mass arrests around the town area.
Clashes have intensified in Kachin in several townships and are estimated to have reached within six miles of the state capital, Myitkyina. A large number of people are reportedly displaced.
In northern Shan, the temporary ceasefire agreement between the Myanmar Armed Forces (MAF) and the Three Brotherhood Alliance is no longer holding, with the resumption of clashes in several townships during the last week of June.
Six months in, the 2024 Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan (HNRP) remains critically underfunded, with only 12 per cent of required funding received, according to the Financial Tracking Service. More resources are urgently needed to support response efforts and alleviate the suffering of affected people in Myanmar..."
Source/publisher:
UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (New York) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-01
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Education in Burma/Myanmar - general, Food Security and nutrition in Burma/Myanmar, Public Health, Human Rights and international relations
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Format :
pdf
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467.95 KB
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"Through the compelling testimonies of over a dozen female ex-prisoners and ex-detainees and their lawyers, ICJ’s new briefing paper highlights the conditions of women deprived of liberty, and their intense psychological and physical torment in interrogation and detention settings.
The briefing paper, Unseen and Unheard: Violations of the Human Rights of Women Deprived of Liberty in Myanmar, documents how the military authorities have subjected women deprived of liberty to a multitude of egregious human rights violations, including certain acts of gender-based violence amounting to crimes under international law.
“After arbitrarily arresting and detaining women and girls for their legitimate political activism, the Myanmar military forces have subjected them to abject acts of gender-based violence amounting to grave human rights violations and to crimes under international law. These crimes include acts of torture and other ill-treatment inflicted on women deprived of liberty intentionally, to cause them severe pain and suffering, and as a tool for crushing dissent,” said Melissa Upreti, ICJ Regional Director, Asia and the Pacific.
Between the military coup d’état in Myanmar on 1 February 2021 and 20 June 2024, at least 3,987 women were still in detention for political reasons, including 1,528 women who had been convicted on spurious charges, according to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners Burma.
The grave human rights violations to which women deprived of liberty have been subjected include:
Physical beatings and threats of the same, sexual violence and intrusive strip and body searches;
Excessive use of force, and the use of overly punitive disciplinary methods and sanctions, such as prolonged solitary confinement;
Inhumane detention conditions, resulting from severe overcrowding and entailing lack of privacy and inadequate access to sanitary facilities; and
Denial of adequate healthcare, including sexual and reproductive healthcare, such as pre- and post-natal care and menstrual products.
Access to justice and effective remedies for these gross human rights violations against women deprived of liberty is virtually non-existent, despite attempts by lawyers to present cases alleging torture and other ill-treatment in interrogation and detention settings.
In light of its findings, the ICJ concludes by urging the military junta to immediately cease the systematic violations of human rights of women deprived of liberty in the country and calls on the relevant UN agencies, independent human rights experts and UN Member States to strengthen documentation and accountability efforts, especially in relation to the grave human rights violations perpetrated against women in detention who remain largely unseen and unheard..."
Source/publisher:
International Commission of Jurists (Geneva)
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-01
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
International Court of Justice (ICJ) - Myanmar, Public Health, Human Rights and international relations
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pdf
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587.97 KB
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Description:
"WEEKLY HIGHLIGHTS:
In the South-East, the number of internally displaced people (IDPs) increased from 895,800 last week to 901,600 this week.
In Tanintharyi Region, as a result of increased fighting in the area, some 6,200 people from Yebyu were displaced within the same township due to intense fighting and airstrikes.
In the border area of Kayah State and Shan State (South), the intensified clashes have been moving people from Pinlaung Township (Shan State) and Loikaw (Kayah State) towards different directions. Two main highlights in secondary displacement took place in Pekon Township (Shan State), forcing over 7.6 thousand people to flee, and in Loikaw (Kayah State), from there over 1,000 people were displaced to townships in the neighboring Shan State (South).
In Kayin State, some 1,556 IDPs returned to their places of origin in Kawkareik Township..."
Source/publisher:
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (Geneva) via Reliefweb (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-29
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
UNHCR (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees), Human Rights and international relations
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Format :
pdf
Size:
3.8 MB
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Description:
"This Incident Report describes events occurring in Kyeh Htoh (Kyaikto) Township, Doo Tha Htoo (Thaton) District, on October 22nd 2023. On the early morning of October 22nd , State Administration Council (SAC) Light Infantry Battalion (LIB) #2 shelled 81mm mortar rounds into C--- village, Nghet Pyaw Taw village tract. One of the mortar rounds landed in a villager’s house and injured three civilians. The injured villagers were sent to Kyaikto hospital to receive treatment, and one was later transferred to Thaton hospital, due to the severity of his injuries.
Excerpt
Part 3 – Complete Description of the Incident
Describe the Incident(s) in complete detail.
On October 22nd 2023, at around 7 am, the State Administration Council (SAC) Light Infantry Battalion (LIB) #2, from Thaton Town army camp [which is based at Let Pan Pin temporary camp in C--- village] shelled 81mm mortar rounds [in the area], and [one of] the mortar shells landed in C--- village, Nghet Pyaw Taw village tract, Kyeh Htoh (Kyaikto) Township, Doo Tha Htoo District, in Karen National Union (KNU)-controlled area. As the SAC shelled several rounds of mortar, a villager named Saw D--- went under his [stilt] house to hide from the mortars. At that time, one of the mortar shells exploded on the top of his house and injured Saw D---, along with two women who were hiding under the house. In total, three people sustained injuries. The names of the two injured women are Naw E--- and Naw G---.
While Naw E--- was handing out invitations [for a funeral ceremony], she heard the sound of mortar shelling, so she went to hide under Saw D---’s house and was injured along with Saw D---. Similarly, while Naw G--- was waiting for the ‘line car’ [pick-up truck, used as a shared taxi] to go to Kyaikto Town, she heard the sound of mortar shelling and went to hide under Saw D---’s house. Then, she was injured along with Naw E---.
The shrapnel from the shell hit and was embedded inside Saw D---’s right arm and broke his bone. The mortar shrapnel hit Naw E---’s right arm, but she did not sustain severe injuries. Naw G--- was injured on her head, and she sustained life-threatening injuries. These three villagers were sent [by local villagers] to the nearby hospital which is Kyaikto Hospital [run by the SAC]. However, Kyaikto hospital did not admit Saw D--- [as they were not adequately equipped to treat his injuries] and then, he was transferred to Thaton hospital [run by the SAC]. [As of January 2024,] Saw D--- had not fully recovered from the injuries yet.
While Saw D--- was being treated at the hospital, he received a total of 150,000 kyats [71.33 USD] in cash from [two] local humanitarian groups. After this incident, Saw D--- expressed: “It will be better if they [SAC soldiers] don’t conduct shelling like this again. Then, the villagers will live peacefully. Now, we dare not sleep as we don’t know when they will conduct shelling”. He added: “Since I was injured, I have not been able to work, and it causes challenges for my livelihood”..."
Source/publisher:
"Karen Human Rights Group"
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-28
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Format :
pdf pdf pdf
Size:
1.16 MB 402.9 KB 347.95 KB
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"President Joseph R. Biden
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, D.C. 200500
Dear President Biden,
We, the undersigned 228 organizations, including the ethnic and religious minorities of Burma, are deeply concerned by the upswing in aerial attacks carried out by the Burmese junta since the start of the coup. These airstrikes target heavily populated areas, taking the lives of civilians, and completely destroying crucial public infrastructure, including hospitals and schools. We urge you to take and coordinate action immediately and implement harsher sanctions that will effectively hold the military junta accountable for this blatant violation of international law and cut off its fuel and weaponry supply.
Since the start of the coup in 2021 until now, the Burmese junta has carried out at least 1,427 airstrikes across Burma, killing over 434 civilians. Countrywide data on reported airstrikes reveal the junta’s increasing reliance on aerial strikes over time. In 2023, the International Institute for Strategic Studies found that the military conducted, on average, at least 49 airstrikes monthly. This was 25% higher than 2022 when the military conducted at least 39 average monthly aerial attacks. Airstrikes are expected to double this year, unless immediate action is taken. These aerial attacks occur in civilian spaces, even when there are no resistance groups present, nor fighting occurring.
Organizations have been sounding the alarm since 2022, when the military intentionally bombed an outdoor concert in October, killing over 80 civilians. The limited action from the U.S. and the international community has only encouraged more aggressive attacks to continue over the years, resulting in mass destruction and suffering. Around the same time in 2023, the military attacked an IDP camp, killing 28 civilians, including 11 children. This year, in February 2024, the junta went as far as to conduct airstrikes on schools, taking the lives of children and teachers.
We appreciate that after receiving a letter from organizations urging the ban on jet fuel last year, the U.S. has taken some actions in targeting the junta’s access to jet fuel, including sanctions on part of the Asia Sun Group business network that was importing fuel into Burma. However, these sanctions have been limited and more is needed. The U.S. has yet to make extensive use of the regulatory determination it used last August emphasizing that selling aviation fuel to Burma was a sanctionable offense.
Additionally, this year, the UN adopted a resolution for states to refrain from supporting aviation fuel trade and sale. As a responsible member state, the U.S. must only further demonstrate unwavering commitment and strict adherence to this resolution. This involves placing comprehensive aviation fuel sanctions, which only Canada has accomplished at the moment. The U.S. however can demonstrate its own leadership in this matter and fulfill its international obligations by participating in a complete aviation fuel embargo.
To prevent these devastating attacks, it is imperative that the United States further lead coordinated action within the international community to cut off the junta’s ability to purchase aviation fuel and supplies. A recent report from the UN Special Rapporteur showed that the junta’s imports of aviation fuel increased in 2023, including fuel imported through Asia Sun network. More must be done. Targeted sanctions must have harsher penalties and stronger enforcement. Otherwise, these international allies will continue to sell and transport aviation fuel to the junta which will be used to target and kill civilians.
We recognize and thank you for the actions you have taken thus far to support the people of Burma. However, as organizations that have connections, indirect and direct, with those on the ground in Burma, we know that the United States needs to do more. Please regard the junta’s aerial attack as a devastating warning of what is to come for the people of Burma should the military continue to have unchecked access to fuel and other supplies. The United States holds the power and influence to create change – please ensure that this power is not wasted.
We ask for the specific actions below:
Sanction international companies that sell aviation fuel supplies to the military junta. While smaller Burmese entities can be easily replaced, major international entities would face severe repercussions and serious obstacles to their ability to supply the military.
Bar any entity from providing shipping insurance, transport, storage facilities, or other shipping services to companies selling aviation fuel to the military, its allies or affiliated companies. The most effective way of disrupting the flow of aviation fuel is to prevent ships from picking up cargo or accessing ports by withholding insurance and services.
Impose full sanctions on the Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE), as the European Union has already done. Sanctions on MOGE itself, not just on MOGE officials, would cut off one of the junta’s largest revenue streams and have the greatest impact on stopping the junta’s campaign of lethal violence in the country.
Hold the Burmese junta accountable for their clear violations of international law and active war crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity, and mass atrocities..."
Source/publisher:
228 Organizations via Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-28
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations, Sanctions, Business and the Military
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Format :
pdf
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223.5 KB
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"Re: UN Security Council must take immediate intervention to coordinate protection of Rohingya and other ethnic minorities in Myanmar
Your Excellencies,
We, 89 Myanmar, regional, and international civil society organizations, strongly urge the UN Security Council (UNSC) to immediately convene an emergency meeting and coordinate an intervention to halt surging violence and atrocities, and protect Rohingya and other ethnic minorities in Rakhine State and across Myanmar. We call on the UNSC to urgently adopt a binding resolution with targeted economic sanctions, an arms and aviation fuel embargo against the junta, and a referral of the crisis in Myanmar to the International Criminal Court (ICC) or a creation of a criminal tribunal.
In recent months, the Myanmar military junta’s war of terror against Myanmar people and its fighting with the Arakan Army (AA) have resulted in horrendous human rights violations and international crimes in Rakhine State. Across the country civilian populations from Rohingya, Rakhine, Kaman, Chin, Mro, and other ethnic communities are suffering the constant reality of the junta’s war crimes and crimes against humanity, including airstrikes, artillery shelling, and massacres, with no end in sight. As the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights reported to the Human Rights Council on 18 June, “The military has lost control over a considerable amount of territory, so it is resorting to increasingly extreme measures.”
Reports indicate that, on 17 May, Rohingya homes have been targeted, looted, and torched, and four Rohingya civilians were beheaded by AA troops in Buthidaung Township, Rakhine State. Over 200,000 Rohingya civilians in Buthidaung Township—home to Rohingya survivors from 2017 genocide—have been forcbily displaced in consequence of the AA’s arson attacks, abductions, enforced disappearance, and other serious human rights abuses, as well as its intense fighting with the military junta. Amidst reports of blocked roads and extortion by AA soldiers, Rohingya have been displaced in open fields with no access to medicine, clean water, and adequate food. Many have lost direct contact with their families due to telecommunication blackouts imposed by the junta, and some have had their phones taken away by AA soldiers, leaving their families in the dark about their fates.
Atrocities against the Rakhine ethnic group by the Myanmar military junta are also pervasive. On 29 May, the junta brutally tortured and massacred at least 76 men, with knives, gunfire and beatings, and burned most of their bodies to destroy the evidence, during a raid of Byine Phyu Village, Sittwe Township, Rakhine State. Junta soldiers abducted hundreds of villagers, and held women and children captive, denying them food and water and raping them. Over 80 homes and a monastery were burned down. On 4 June, the junta launched a coordinated ground, air, and naval attack on Singaung Village in Thandwe Township, Rakhine State, killing dozens of people. Extreme violence and atrocities are set to continue in Rakhine State as the junta and the AA ordered civilians to evacuate their villages before latest clashes between them.
Since February, the junta has further systematically arrested, abducted, and enlisted by force ethnic youth from Rakhine State and refugee camps in Bangladesh to serve as frontline fighters, human shields, human minesweepers, and porters—including forcing them on frontlines to die. Hundreds of Rakhine youth have been arrested, held incommunicado, and forced to join the Myanmar military. Alongside them, thousands of Rohingya in villages and internment camps in Rakhine State have reportedly been forcibly enlisted or persuaded with offers of potential freedom of movement, money, rice, or national ID cards, to “fight for [their] faith”, or threatened with a humanitarian aid block. On the Bangladesh border, vulnerable Rohingya refugees have been kidnapped from camps and forced into the Myanmar military to fight the AA. Abductions were perpetrated by Rohingya militia groups—the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army, the Rohingya Solidarity Organization, and the Arakan Rohingya Army—groups reportedly partnering with the junta and denounced by Rohingya civil society and activists as unrepresentative of their community. Rohingya youth are being relentlessly forcibly recruited by the Myanmar military, the perpetrators of genocide against them.
In particular, the junta’s instigation of anti-AA protests and coercion of Rohingya recruits to participate in burning down Rakhine homes compound the plight of the Rohingya community. The acute vulnerability of the Rohingya continues to be systematically exploited by the Myanmar military and other armed groups to exacerbate inter-ethnic and religious conflict between the Rakhine and Rohingya communities, two major ethnic minorities in Rakhine State.
In addition, during times of heightened tension, hate speech against the Rohingya—including the use of terms such as “Bengali terrorists” and “Muslim terrorists”—and the portrayal of all Rohingya as collaborators of the junta have been rampant in statements by organizations, media, and individuals. Such sweeping descriptions of an entire ethnic group and their most predominant religion exacerbate ethno-religious conflict, and escalate public hatred against a severely persecuted ethnic minority of Myanmar.
Excellencies, the international community bears responsibility for the continuation of mass atrocities—massacres, torture, airstrikes, artillery shelling, sexual violence and other gross international crimes—against the Rohingya and other ethnic minorities by the military junta, the main perpetrator, in Rakhine State and across Myanmar. After nearly one and a half years since the UNSC’s adoption of Resolution 2669, the junta has continued to massacre civilians. In the first four months of 2024 alone, the junta committed 46 massacres, killing 369 people. Furthermore, despite the UN Human Rights Council’s resolution calling on all states to refrain from the export, sale, or transfer of aviation fuel to Myanmar, UN Member States continue to supply the junta with aviation fuel, enabling them to carry out more airstrikes and other aerial attacks across Myanmar, exacerbating immense human suffering and mass displacement during the grave humanitarian crisis.
To uphold its mandate for international peace and security, the UNSC must convene an emergency meeting and coordinate an immediate intervention to protect civilians and stop the horrific violence against the Rohingya and ethnic minorities in Rakhine State and across Myanmar. Once again, we call on the UNSC to urgently adopt a new resolution under Chapter VII of the UN Charter that imposes targeted economic sanctions and a comprehensive arms embargo against the junta, including a complete ban on all sales, transfers, and diversions of aviation fuel to Myanmar. This resolution must also refer the crisis in Myanmar to the ICC or create a criminal tribunal on Myanmar without delay.
Rohingya, Rakhine, and other ethnic minorities in Rakhine State and across Myanmar will continue to suffer unless and until ongoing crimes are halted by the UNSC’s immediate intervention..."
Source/publisher:
ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-28
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Arakan (Rakhine) State - reports etc. by date (latest first), Discrimination against the Rohingya, Human Rights and international relations, Rohingya (cultural, political etc.)
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Description:
"This Short Update describes events occurring in Hsaw Htee (Shwegyin) Township, Kler Lwee Htoo (Nyaunglebin) District during November and December 2023, including air strikes and shelling conducted by the State Administration Council (SAC). In November 2023, the SAC military conducted an air strike near Z--- village and L--- village, in Klaw Thoh Hkee village tract, and Y--- village, in Htee Hkay Loh village tract. In November and December 2023, SAC soldiers also conducted mortar shelling near villages in Th’Hpih Luh (Gway Kone) village tract and Klaw Thoh Khee village tract. On one occasion, four mortar shells landed in a village causing injuries to a 54-year-old woman, her 7-year-old son, and her 18-year-old daughter. These incidents also caused damages and destruction of villagers’ buildings and plantation fields. In consequence, many villagers fled to the jungle to evade harm.[1]
SAC air strikes in Hsaw Htee Township
On November 17th 2023, at 5 am, fighting occurred between Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA)[2] forces against State Administration Council (SAC)[3] military. A few hours after the fighting, at 9:10 am, two SAC fighter jets conducted air strikes. [First,] a fighter jet dropped two bombs that landed next to Z--- village, Klaw Thoh Hkee village tract[4], Hsaw Htee Township, and dropped three [more] bombs next to Y--- village, Htee Hkay Loh village tract, Hsaw Htee Township. A second fighter jet conducted air strikes firing Oerlikon [machine guns from the aircraft] for four rounds in total. According to a local villager, these are places where SAC assumed that there would be their enemy [armed resistance forces]. Due to fighting and fighter jets conducting air strikes, villagers from Y---, Z---, and L--- villages fled and are hiding in the jungle. There are 49 households, with more than 200 villagers in Z--- village, and 20 households with 91 people in L--- village. The exact households’ number and population of Y--- village is unknown. [These amounts to more than 300 people displaced and hiding in the jungle.]
Indiscriminate shelling by SAC soldiers in Hsaw Htee Township
During the fighting on November 17th 2023, SAC Light Infantry Battalion (LIB)[5] #351, based in Ler Htaw Thoh army camp, led by Aung Bo Bo Battalion Deputy Commander, shelled six 60mm mortar rounds that landed next to L--- village, and the civilians there had to flee to the jungle. Due to the presence of soldiers from both armies [KNLA forces and SAC], villagers residing in this area have not returned to their villages yet. The primary school, run by the Karen Education and Culture Department (KECD)[6], in L--- village closed [due to the fighting]. Most of the villagers are farmers, bamboo cutters, and daily labourers. Due to fighting, villagers face difficulties to secure their livelihood and food. Currently, as it is dry season, villagers are able to take shelter in the jungle beneath the trees while displaced [as of December 2023]. They face health issues and difficulties to recover, especially for babies and elderly women.
On November 24th 2023, around 11:19 pm, SAC LIB #20, based in the army camp in Nyaunglebin Town, shelled approximately eight 120mm mortar rounds into S--- village area, Th’Hpih Luh (Gway Kone) village tract, which is under Karen National Union (KNU)[7] controlled area. Three mortars landed inside S--- village and exploded. Three houses were damaged, as well as [villagers’] belongings in those houses. The owners of the houses are U[8] G--- and Ma[9] E---, U H---, and U V--- and Daw[10] K---. The damaged belongings are a water pump, a motorbike, and furniture.
Ma E---, her son, and her daughter were severely injured due to the mortar explosion. U G--- and Ma E--- have six children, but only one son and one daughter were in the house during the mortar explosions. The mortar shells landed in front of their house, injuring the three. The 18-year-old daughter named Ma O--- was injured on the left side of her stomach, by shrapnel, leaving her in a life-threatening situation. The 7-year-old son named Maung[11] Q--- was injured on the back of his head by shrapnel. 54-year-old Ma E--- was severely injured on her thigh.
Shortly after, an emergency team run by the KNU reached out to help them. Those three injured family members received treatment in an emergency room of a KNU clinic in J--- village, Ain Ba La village tract. After that, Ma O--- was taken to a hospital located at the Thai border by an ethnic organisation and [local] authorities to receive further treatment. The family has been affected also financially after this SAC shelling as they are daily labourers. The family is suffering from trauma and experiencing difficulties due to the injuries caused to the three family members. Currently, Ma E--- and her son Maung Q--- are hospitalised at J--- clinic, and they are receiving treatment [as of November 2023.]
[Since the 2021 coup,] SAC soldiers often deliberately shelled into villages. According to local villagers, SAC soldiers assumed that People’s Defence Force (PDF)[12] and KNLA combined forces were present in the village, and so this is the reason why they indiscriminately shelled into [and near] the villages. Villagers are fearful due to SAC indiscriminately shelling. There are approximately a hundred families in S--- village and half of them were displaced to nearby villages or moved to the city.
On December 4th 2023, SAC Infantry Battalion (IB)[13] #263, based in the army camps in Pein Za Loke Town [located in Bago Region], Hsaw Htee Township, Kler Lwee Htoo District, conducted mortar shelling and four [mortar rounds] landed in M--- village [area], Th’Hpih Luh village tract, Hsaw Htee Township. Then, SAC soldiers from LIB #20, based in [other] army camps in Kler Lwee Htoo District, shelled seven mortar rounds which landed in S--- village, Th’Hpih Luh village tract.
The four mortars that landed in M--- village, damaged Saw[14] R--- and Naw[15] W---’s house and Saw U--- and Naw P---’s house. One of the owners said that mortar shells had landed [inside the village] once before in July [2023]. Fortunately, there were no family members injured. Two [of the four mortar shells] landed in N--- village, on the road in front of the school and damaged the school’s [plastic] water storage tank. [Another mortar] landed next to the house owned by a villager named Saw F---, in a farm, and the mortar shrapnel hit Saw F---’s house wall.
Due to the SAC repeatedly shelling in this area [M--- and S--- villages], most of the villagers do not sleep in their houses. They sleep in other villages, where they have relatives, and some sleep at their farm huts, to avoid being injured. Civilians worry that mortar rounds will land on their houses and might injure them, so they remain full of fear.
Further background reading on the situation on air strikes and indiscriminate shelling in Southeast Burma/Myanmar can be found in the following KHRG reports..."
Source/publisher:
"Karen Human Rights Group"
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-28
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Karen Human Rights Group (KHRG) reports
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"The MAU tracks market prices in southern Sagaing Region. Data are collected from three vendors per product per market at the end of each month. The data include prices from Monywa (main market), Myaung (village), Shwebo (main market), Ye-U (village), and Yinmarbin (village). Data and product specs are available at www.themimu.info/market-analysis-unit.
KEY FINDINGS
May added further increases to April's price hikes, although May's increases were less dramatic;
Cooking oil prices rose 11% in May, and essential food prices crept slightly higher in some markets;
Prices for some vegetables rose 13-25% in May, while a few vegetables pulled back from April's 40% hikes;
Meat and fish prices rose 2-9%, compounding the effects of April's 10-20% price increases;
Prices for hygiene NFIs were relatively stable in May and more so than other product categories this month;
Prices for various other NFIs climbed 3-9%, rising at a pace similar to April, and very few NFI prices fell in May;
Monywa again saw the steepest price hikes—although less severe than last month—and Yinmarbin saw significant price hikes as well.
Product-Level Price Changes
Essential Foods – Essential food prices were stable or rising in May, and cooking oil added 11% on top of April's price hikes. Cooking oil prices rose again in May, adding 11% on top of April's 15% increases. Prices for rice and pulses were overall stable, although they rose 3-12% in Myaung and Shwebo.
Vegetables – Prices for long bean, green chili, and bananas rose 13-25% in May, but other vegetable prices fluctuated. Prices for green chili spiked in May, climbing at least 25% in several markets, while long bean prices rose 13%. By contrast, onion and eggplant prices were down 10% and 20%, respectively. Prices for garlic and watercress fluctuated but were overall stable.
Meat and Fish – Meat and fish prices increased 2-9%, rising somewhat slower than in April when prices climbed 10-20%. Prices for dried fish, shrimp, fresh fish, and fish paste rose 2-4% in May, while chicken prices increased 9%.
Hygiene Products – Prices for hygiene products were relatively stable, although prices jumped in some markets. Detergent prices increased 7% in May, while soap prices fell 5%. Prices for toothpaste and sanitary pads were generally stable. At a township-level, prices for hygiene products rose 7-9% in Monywa while other markets saw a mix of rising and falling prices.
Other NFIs – Prices for most NFIs increased 3-9% in May, rising at a page similar to April. Prices for blankets, plastic tarps, and longyis rose a fairly-modest 1-3%, while prices for charcoal and umbrellas increased 9-12%. Prices for other NFIs like jerry cans, towels, mosquito nets, and cooking pots—some of which saw price hikes last month—were generally stable in May. All markets saw NFI price hikes in May, but increases were most notable in Monywa and Yinmarbin..."
Source/publisher:
Myanmar Information Management Unit
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-28
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Individual Documents
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Food Security and nutrition in Burma/Myanmar, Human Rights and international relations, Business and the Military
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UN Report Shows Foreign Banks Help Military Receive Revenue, Buy Arms
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"The United States, European Union, and other governments should urgently counter illicit activities by foreign banks that are assisting the Myanmar military in evading sanctions imposed after its 2021 coup, Human Rights Watch said today. A United Nations report released on June 26, 2024, reveals that since 2022 the military junta has switched the banks it uses to receive foreign revenue and make payments for weapons and other military needs, after the US, EU, and other governments imposed sanctions on military-controlled entities and banks.
The report, by the UN special rapporteur on Myanmar, Tom Andrews, focuses on the military’s use of banks in third countries to engage in sanctioned transactions. The special rapporteur found that from 2022 to the present, most of the junta’s foreign revenue that previously was sent to foreign accounts at the sanctioned Myanmar Foreign Trade Bank has instead been sent to accounts at the non-sanctioned but also junta-controlled Myanmar Economic Bank. The report also shows that after authorities in Singapore began restricting the military’s use of banks to make arms purchases in 2022-2023, the junta dramatically ramped up the use of its other accounts at banks in Thailand, mostly at Siam Commercial Bank.
“Sanctions on Myanmar’s military have reduced its capacity to receive revenue and purchase arms, but funds are still getting to the junta and vigilant enforcement is essential,” said John Sifton, Asia advocacy director at Human Rights Watch. “Authorities in Thailand, Singapore, and other countries need to put banks on notice that they should not provide services that facilitate further junta atrocities.”
The UN report provides figures showing that the largest source of the junta’s outside income still comes from Thailand: at least US$660 million in payments for natural gas sent to Thailand by pipeline. The payments, made to the military-controlled Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE), come from Thailand’s government-owned energy company PTT. The US and EU have sanctioned MOGE, and banks in numerous other jurisdictions have enforced some US and EU sanctions, including in Singapore and China, since many of these banks operate internationally and have close ties with the US and EU financial systems.
PTT and all Thai banks named in the UN report should stop payments to MOGE and divert future payments to escrow accounts, Human Rights Watch said. Governments should call on Thailand to instruct Thai companies to end transactions involving MOGE.
The UN report shows that sanctions are impeding the junta’s capacity to make military purchases. The military’s use of the international banking system to procure weapons and military supplies declined by 33 percent between March 2022 and March 2023, from $377 million to $253 million. The use of military procurement agents and banks in Singapore, Malaysia, and Russia all declined markedly from 2022 to 2024.
During the same period, however, the use of Thai banks and Thailand-registered military suppliers doubled, from approximately $60 million to almost $130 million. Most of these payments, over $100 million, were handled by Siam Commercial Bank.
For years, the Myanmar military has engaged in war crimes and other atrocities in the context of armed conflict with ethnic armed groups and grave human rights violations against the civilian population. It carried out atrocities and ethnic cleansing of Rohingya Muslims in Rakhine State, including crimes against humanity and acts of genocide in 2017. Since the 2021 coup, the military has been engaged in a broad crackdown on civilians who oppose its rule and committed numerous war crimes in fighting with armed opposition groups. Despite the abuses over many years, however, international efforts in response have been meager, Human Rights Watch said.
Amid economic and infrastructure collapse in Myanmar, the number of people requiring humanitarian assistance has grown to 18.6 million. The UN estimates that 10,000 children under age 5 died in 2023 due to lack of treatment for malnutrition. Over 2.7 million people have been internally displaced or have become refugees. But the junta has ramped up its deadly blocking of humanitarian aid as a form of collective punishment of the population. These blockages sustain the military’s longstanding “four cuts” strategy, designed to maintain control of an area by isolating and terrorizing civilians.
Cutting funds to Myanmar’s military and impeding its capacity to make military purchases is essential to limiting abuses, Human Rights Watch said. The US, EU, and other concerned governments should quickly sanction the Myanmar Economic Bank, which is now handling most junta banking transactions on the international level, as well as the Myanmar Agricultural Development Bank and the Myanmar Investment and Commercial Bank. The US, Canada, and Australia have already sanctioned some of these banks, while the EU and UK have not sanctioned any of them.
All governments should also sanction the networks that provide aviation fuel to the Myanmar military, including insurance and trading companies, owners of storage facilities and transport vessels, and Myanmar-based agents and buyers. Governments should also establish cooperative agreements on sanctions and coordinate their implementation and enforcement.
“All of Myanmar’s state-owned and military-controlled financial institutions and companies should be sanctioned,” Sifton said. “Depriving the junta of revenue and banking services impairs the military’s capacities to brutalize the people of Myanmar.”..."
Source/publisher:
"Human Rights Watch" (USA)
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-28
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Individual Documents
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Human Rights and international relations, Sanctions, The Burmese military's role in the economy
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"This Short Update describes events occurring in Daw Hpah Hkoh (Thadaunggyi) Township, Taw Oo (Toungoo) District in February 2024. On February 21st 2024, a State Administration Council (SAC) helicopter, from Toungoo air base, conducted an air strike on K--- village, Htee Day (Pi Tauk Kon) village tract, Daw Hpah Hkoh (Thadaunggyi) Township. Four villagers were injured, including two children, and an 85-year-old woman was killed. One injured victim was transferred to Naypyidaw city for treatment, where her leg was amputated. The SAC helicopter also conducted an airstrike on M--- village, Htee Day (Pi Tauk Kon) village tract, Daw Hpah Hkoh (Thadaunggyi) Township. In that incident, five villagers were injured and three villagers were killed, including two 8-year-old children. The air strike also damaged houses and plantations and killed livestock. There had been no fighting or armed forces’ movement in or near the village since the first quarter of 2023. Villagers feel devastated, traumatised and aggrieved.
Air strike in K--- village, Htee Day village tract
On February 21st 2024, at 2 pm, an State Administration Council (SAC)2 helicopter from Toungoo air base, located at the SAC Southern Command Headquarters (Ta Pa Ka) in Toungoo Town, dropped bombs on K--- village, section 3, in Htee Day (Pi Tauk Kon) village tract,3 Daw Hpah Hkoh (Thadaunggyi) Township, Taw Oo (Toungoo) District. [Previously,] there had been no fighting or movement of armed forces in or near the village since the first quarter of 2023. Due to the air strike, four K--- villagers were injured by shrapnel, and an 85-year-old woman named Daw4 L---, also from K--- village section 3, died immediately due to injuries to her head, abdomen, and chest. Daw L---’s skull was broken, and her abdomen perforated, expelling her intestines. A 35-year-old woman, named Daw C---, was injured on her leg and required an amputation. The other three injured villagers were Daw T---, a 35-year-old woman; Ma S---, a 12-year-old girl; and a child (unknown name), who is one-and-a-half years old. They are all ethnic Bamar5 and Buddhist. These four injured villagers were transported by car to [a hospital in Yay Tal Shay Town, Bago Division. The hospital in Yay Tal Shay Town lacked resources to treat Daw C---, who required an amputation, so she was transferred to a hospital in] Naypyidaw city, which is [approximately] four hours away. [The injured villagers did not receive any support from any humanitarian organisation to cover treatment costs].
In addition, two houses, belonging to villagers named U 6 O--- and U J---, were hit by the shrapnel. Both villagers are Buddhist and of Bamar ethnicity, ages unknown. Some domestic animals were injured and died as well: a medium-sized cow, one dog, and some chickens died, three cows were injured, and two dogs lost their legs. Crops were destroyed due to the bomb [explosions] and shrapnel. [As explained by local villagers to the KHRG researcher,] the villagers feel devastated, traumatised, and aggrieved after experiencing the air strike..."
Source/publisher:
Karen Human Rights Group
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-28
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Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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One would think that Myanmar’s revolutionary moment would create relationships of solidarity between local NGOS performing essential work and their international donors. But the authors’ research shows that Myanmar organisations feel hampered by the continuation of an approach focused on compliance and mistrust.
Description:
"Apart from causing widespread suffering, economic collapse and conflict, the February 2021 attempted coup in Myanmar has also brought an upheaval amongst international aid agencies engaged in the country. International NGOs, UN agencies and bilateral donors have long been active in Myanmar supporting humanitarian and development programming. But the military’s attempted takeover has meant that international agencies have had to shift their approach.
In the days after the attempted coup, almost all aid agencies ceased their direct cooperation with the new military-controlled State Administrative Council (SAC) regime. But they also had to shift their approach to the way projects are delivered on the ground. With greater instability around the country, there has been significant growth in direct partnerships with Myanmar civil society organisations, who are implementing most humanitarian and advocacy related programs.
Amid the context of Myanmar’s revolution, this shift has brought the relationship between international aid agencies and humanitarian and advocacy groups into focus. International agencies have directed more of their resources to partnerships with local organisations, who are often working in extremely risky situations. We could assume that there might therefore be a strong sense of solidarity between Myanmar civil society leaders and their international supporters as they work together to support vulnerable populations in the country. Local organisations are in critical need of support in their work, and international agencies are providing important funding.
Why, then, are there a growing number of studies revealing strong criticism by those local organisations of their international partners? Why do these organisations say that there is a lack of solidarity, and that they are lacking appropriate support from international agencies in the post-coup context? International aid agencies have long received criticism from Myanmar groups. Yet why is there now, in the context of Myanmar’s revolution, such strident criticism of international aid agencies?
Criticism of the approach of international aid agencies around the world is not new. Many critics of partnerships between international and local aid agencies point toward the problem of a broader neoliberal system that favours the power of external organisations over local ones. Partnerships are also often characterised by overt neoliberal processes of competitive grants and subcontracting, or more subtle hierarchical dynamics based on maximising efficiency.
All of this may be true—but these conventional explanations of the breakdown of aid partnerships are often rather generic, and do little to illuminate the context-specific perspectives of local organisations. We think that there is more at play in understanding frictions in local–international aid partnerships in Myanmar and more attention needs to be given to the interpretations of local actors and how they reveal local expectations and practices of reciprocity.
In research published recently at the Journal of Contemporary Asia we draw on interviews with civil society leaders and aid agency representatives in Myanmar between August and November 2022. Rather than perceiving a relationship of solidarity, we found that in the volatile revolutionary environment in Myanmar, international aid agencies are often perceived by Myanmar agency leaders as self-interested and compliance-focused, while lacking confidence in the capacity of Myanmar aid organisations.
These negative perceptions of international agencies are obviously informed by everyday pragmatic challenges for Myanmar groups. But we think that well-known overlapping notions of sedana (goodwill), parahita (charity), and metta (loving kindness)—which are prominent in everyday language around aid in Myanmar—also inform Myanmar organisation leaders’ expectations of reciprocity in their relationship with international aid agencies.
These values place a moral and ethical overlay on interpretations of aid partnerships beyond the project-based and contractual relationship that characterises the formal realm of aid programs. Myanmar NGO leaders therefore often construct their own local organisations as deserving and committed partners whilst international aid agencies are often constructed as self-preserving and compliance focused.
While concerns about international aid agency engagement with Myanmar organisations are longstanding, the context of revolution and instability has sharpened these critiques considerably. The new existential challenges to organisations and aid workers themselves have raised the stakes in aid partnerships and brought diverging discourses into greater clarity.
Myanmar’s revolutionary context
Before looking specifically at the perceptions of international agencies by Myanmar civil society leaders, it is important to understand Myanmar’s revolutionary context, and how the many new challenges for local organisations have accentuated expectations in their partnerships with international agencies, in a way that is different to pre-coup aid partnerships.
In the years of Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD) government before the coup, civil society groups faced ongoing challenges. The NLD government was considerably more restrictive of their speech and operations than had been initially hoped. But compared to the extreme recent restrictions by the SAC, the NLD era presented a far more stable and congenial environment for international–local agency partnerships.
There are now profound everyday challenges for Myanmar aid organisations, both at a personal and organisational level. “The whole country is in fear,” said one Myanmar civil society leader in a September 2022 interview. “Every day we are threatened and don’t have a free mind anymore. We have to struggle and take risks to rebuild our country and support each other. If not, we will never escape from fear”. Those participants operating in SAC-controlled areas of the country reflected on the daily scrutiny they faced from authorities; for example, through being questioned at checkpoints, having telephones and computers searched, and even having a CCTV camera installed in an organisation’s office.
Another Myanmar organisation leader operating in SAC-controlled areas told us in September 2022 that “I am not sure how we can maintain momentum while the military is continuously suppressing the people and using very violent means every day”. Legal changes by the regime—including to Section 505A of the Penal Code, criminalising making comments that “cause fear” or spread “false news,” including on social media—have made it easier for authorities to target local organisation staff.
Despite all these operational risks and challenges, many Myanmar humanitarian and advocacy organisations continue to work with communities and with actors engaged in the revolution. Some organisation leaders have also become part of the National Unity Government’s administration and policy-making mechanisms, which entails further significant personal risk. Yet leaders often framed their motivation in moral terms and their desire to continue their work despite the personal sacrifices and dangers that they faced. Given the risks that these individuals and organisations are taking, it is understandable that their leaders have expectations that their international supporters will be willing to act in solidarity.
Self-interested and compliance focussed?
Yet due to their decisions since the coup to protect their own programmes and staffing, international agencies are often perceived by Myanmar leaders as self-interested—the antithesis of sedana (goodwill) and metta (loving kindness). They also construct international agencies as being overly focused on compliance—lacking confidence in the parahita (charity) worthiness and capability of local organisations.
In our research there were some positive reflections on the role of international organisations. But these positive interpretations tended to come from participants with short-term or less direct experience of partnerships with international aid agencies. Most participants from Myanmar organisations had longer-term and more intensive interactions with donors, UN agencies, and international NGOs, and they presented far less sanguine interpretations of international support.
Rather than acting in solidarity, one leader reflected in an October 2022 interview that “a disappointing thing is that [international NGOs] are focusing more on their survival”. Another Myanmar humanitarian organisation leader interviewed in the same month said, “They give priority to their survival, survival of their offices, continuing to pay the salary to themselves and to their staff”. The perception of international agencies as lacking sedana was made explicit by another Myanmar organisation leader:
For some internationals…as soon as they heard the news about a small bomb blast or gunshot in the area, their head office did not allow their staff to go to these areas. But…we have to keep working for those communities… So, we are asking, “Though you are saying that you want to provide emergency support, you don’t do it when it is needed” … The sedana is not the same (interview, October 2022)
In a context where local organisation staff and leaders faced everyday risks, some participants also perceived that Myanmar organisations were not treated as deserving support for their work, but rather as sub-contracted partners within externally defined programs. Heavy financial and project reporting requirements in turn implied that Myanmar organisations should not be trusted to deliver projects. “Capacity building” was portrayed by several participants as being more about compliance, and making processes easier for the international partner, than developing the effectiveness of local organisation programs. As a Myanmar humanitarian organisation leader explained in an October 2022 interview:
Our criticism is that the capacity building is just to comply with their project needs. They teach us about financial management so that they don’t have any trouble when the report goes to the donor … More for their compliance, more for their safety and security, and for their risk management … It is the “capacity to comply”.
Fostering relationships of solidarity between international and Myanmar humanitarian organisations requires practical change in terms of easing overly onerous compliance processes. Such suggested policy changes have been outlined in recent research papers. But relations of solidarity also require mindset change amongst international agencies. Local organisation leaders are seeking acknowledgement from international agencies about the sacrifices they are making in their work, and hoping for greater international efforts to support growth and strengthening of their organisations and vision, rather than simply demanding compliance with bureaucratic systems.
In the midst of the fear and extreme challenges since the 2021 coup, many organisation leaders are seeking relationships of solidarity with international organisations. Every day, many Myanmar civil society leaders put themselves and their colleagues at risk by continuing to run humanitarian or advocacy programs.
Yet there are diverging expectations about reciprocity between Myanmar and international agencies. Where many local leaders have expectations of engagement characterised by sedana, parahita and metta, they often perceive international organisations as the antithesis of this—as self-interested and overly focussed on compliance. These differences in expectations are fuelling ongoing frustration..."
Source/publisher:
New Mandala
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-27
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Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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"When National League for Democracy patron U Tin Oo died on June 1, many mourned his passing. He was one of the few military chiefs held in high esteem in Myanmar. His funeral was held on June 5.
Unlike many other Myanmar military generals, who earned medals for gallantry in battle against ethnic revolutionary organizations that were fighting for equality and self-determination, U Tin Oo earned his Thura title for the commitment he demonstrated in driving Kuomintang Chinese nationalist troops out of Myanmar.
Among the politicians of national significance who have died since independent Myanmar’s first coup in 1962 are the country’s first president, Sao Shwe Thaik (died 1962); the third United Nations secretary general, U Thant (1974); the country’s first prime minister, U Nu (1995); former military chief Saw Maung (1997); and the country’s first military dictator, Ne Win (2002).
Sao Shwe Thaik and U Thant died while U Ne Win was in power. U Nu, Ne Win and Saw Maung died while former military dictator Than Shwe was in power. All of them including U Tin Oo should have been honored with a state or military funeral, but they weren’t.
A state or military funeral is meant to pay final tribute to a public figure who has rendered outstanding service to the military or to Myanmar.
U Tin Oo was a respected public figure who deserved to be honored with a state funeral, having rendered meritorious service to protect the country as a military officer, and striven as a politician to initiate a better political system in the country.
Far from honoring him, the regime did not even allow his colleagues, jailed civilian leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and ousted President U Win Myint, to pay their final respects to U Tin Oo. It was like barring children from attending the funeral of their parents, intended to add to the psychological torment the regime has inflicted on Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and U Win Myint.
U Tin Oo’s death notice was published in a junta-controlled newspaper. The notice on Page 31 of the June 2 issue of Myanma Alin newspaper measured 6.5 square centimeters, comprising just 8.7 percent of the page. The death notice for an ordinary citizen next to U Tin Oo’s notice measured 8.8 square centimeters (11.6 percent of the page).
In other words, Min Aung Hlaing showed his disrespect for U Tin Oo by only allocating a small space in the state-owned newspaper he now controls.
This is not strange. Min Aung Hlaing’s predecessors Ne Win and Than Shwe harbored similar grudges against their enemies and rivals.
Public figures who died during Ne Win’s reign
After staging the coup in March 1962, Ne Win became the first military dictator in Myanmar since the country’s independence.
Sao Shwe Thaik, who had served as Myanmar’s first president from independence in 1948 to 1952, was arrested following the coup. He died in prison of unknown causes some eight months after his arrest.
U Thant was the first Asian to serve as the UN secretary general. He was also the third UN secretary general, serving a 10-year term from 1961 to 1972. After he passed away in November 1974, his body was brought back to Myanmar. University students and the public demanded a state funeral for U Thant, but Ne Win refused and imposed a clampdown on student protesters in what later became known as the “U Thant incident”.
Public figures who died during Than Shwe’s reign
U Nu, Saw Maung and Ne Win died while Than Shwe was in power. If he wished, Than Shwe could have arranged at least military funerals for his predecessors Saw Maung and Ne Win. But he didn’t.
Ne Win was the most powerful and feared person in Myanmar for decades. It was probably karma that resulted in him being placed under house arrest before his death by Than Shwe, his handpicked successor.
Ne Win appointed Than Shwe as deputy military chief in 1985 before appointing him military chief in 1992, replacing Saw Maung. Than Shwe owed a debt to Ne Win, who put him on the throne.
Than Shwe never repaid that debt, instead ordering the arrest of Ne Win in 2002 and placing him under house arrest for the remaining months of his life. Ne Win was cremated the same day he died without fanfare at a ceremony attended by a handful of close relatives. Only two days after Ne Win’s death, Than Shwe put his death notice in a small column in the state-owned newspapers.
Dictators’ grudges
Unsurprisingly, dictators arrest those whom they view as threats to their power. But they should not hold grudges against opponents who have died.
Myanmar’s military dictators, being Buddhists, have had many pagodas built for the promotion of Buddhism. But they barely follow the Buddha’s teachings at all.
Successive military leaders from Ne Win to Than Shwe to quasi-civilian government leaders to Min Aung Hlaing have all wanted themselves to be considered promoters of Buddhism, on the same plane as the Myanmar monarchs of centuries past. This desire can be seen in their building of pagodas and religious buildings in a manner that was typical of the old monarchs.
Ne Win had the Maha Wizaya Pagoda built near the famous Shwedagon Pagoda. Than Shwe had Uppatasanti Pagoda, a replica of Shwedagon Pagoda, built in Naypyitaw. Current junta chief Min Aung Hlaing had the colossal Maravijaya Buddha statue built in Naypyitaw. And to surpass his seniors, he made sure the statue was the tallest of its kind in the world.
All of them have striven to show that they can do better than their predecessors, and have demonstrated no desire to honor or appreciate them.
What does the future hold for living military leaders?
Former military dictator Than Shwe, former president and ex-general Thein Sein, former parliament speaker and ex-general Shwe Mann, former prime minister and ex-general Khin Nyunt and current junta chief Min Aung Hlaing are still alive.
They might want to have at least a military funeral after they die. However, considering the previous examples, a military funeral is something they can dream about, but shouldn’t hope for.
But there is still a chance for them. If current junta chief Min Aung Hlaing apologizes and returns power to the people (and if the former generals are willing), the future government may consider organizing appropriate funerals for “remorseful” former military leaders..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-27
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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"The extreme escalation of conflict, indiscriminate violence, and severe restrictions on humanitarian access in northern Rakhine State, Myanmar, have forced Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) to suspend medical humanitarian activities in the townships of Rathedaung, Buthidaung and Maungdaw. MSF ran 14 mobile clinics in northern Rakhine providing essential medical services to all communities, including Rakhine, Rohingya and other minority groups who often had no other access to healthcare.
We are very concerned for the people who have been severely impacted by the conflict. They continue to endure and remain exposed to the deliberate destruction of lives and property, forced recruitment, displacements, and restricted humanitarian access with no options to seek safety due to the ongoing clashes and hostilities. This indefinite suspension of our activities will leave them with zero access to healthcare in the face of huge needs.
A Rohingya person who was forced to flee from the clashes in Buthidaung told us: “It would be an honour if a bomb killed all of us together, so we don’t have to suffer anymore. Dying together is better than this suffering.”
Since November 2023, MSF teams have been unable to run regular healthcare services in the wider areas of both central and northern Rakhine. We have faced severe restrictions on humanitarian access such as difficulties in delivering care to our patients and facilitating referrals to the Township hospitals, inability to move medical and basic supplies, and bear witness to the total decimation of the healthcare system. All communities are without proper primary and secondary healthcare and our teams observed pregnant women and unborn babies losing their lives due to the lack of healthcare. MSF recorded nine maternal deaths or stillbirths between November 2023 and March 2024. On 15 April, the MSF office and pharmacy in Buthidaung were burned down, in this area where both private and public health facilities were already non- functional.
Despite not being able to provide care in the area currently, MSF remains committed to providing much needed humanitarian support to patients and people in northern Rakhine. We will continue to maintain our presence in northern Rakhine that will enable us to immediately resume activities as soon as conditions improve.
We are calling on all parties to the conflict to ensure humanitarian access in Rakhine State and respect the protected status of healthcare facilities and staff. Access to medical care for the most vulnerable communities must be restored immediately to prevent further senseless loss of life and suffering..."
Source/publisher:
Médecins Sans Frontières
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-27
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"
International banks are playing a significant role in the Myanmar military junta’s ability to carry out its systematic and deadly assault on its people, a new United Nations-backed report has found.
Thai banks have now become the main source through which the Myanmar military is buying weapons and military supplies – including parts for helicopter gunships – used to support its three-year civil war that has devastated the country and killed more than 5,000 civilians, the UN special rapporteur on human rights Tom Andrews said in a new report Wednesday.
Since seizing power in a coup in February 2021, the military has been fighting a deepening war against ethnic armed groups and people’s resistance forces across Myanmar. In recent months it has faced significant losses of territory and troops.
As it contends with widespread public opposition and an economic crisis that has sparked soaring levels of poverty, the junta has increased airstrikes and attacks against civilians and civilian infrastructure, displacing more than 3 million people.
The military’s brutal campaign of violence has prompted Western nations to impose wide-ranging sanctions on military leaders, family and cronies, state-owned companies, banks, and jet fuel suppliers.
“The junta, or State Administration Council (SAC), is counting on two primary resources from abroad: weapons and money,” Andrews said in the report.
The report, “Banking on the Death Trade: How Banks and Governments Enable the Military Junta in Myanmar,” found that 16 banks in seven countries have processed transactions linked to the military’s procurement in the past year.
Weapons, dual-use technologies, manufacturing equipment, and raw materials secured by the junta from abroad reached $253 million between April 2023 and March 2024, the report said.
“By relying on financial institutions that are willing to do business with Myanmar state-owned banks under its control, the junta has ready access to the financial services it needs to carry out systematic human rights violations, including aerial attacks on civilians,” Andrews said.
However, the volume of weapons and military supplies purchased by the junta through foreign banks has decreased by a third from 2023, with exports from Singapore dropping dramatically, according to the report.
“The good news is that the junta is increasingly isolated,” Andrews said. “The bad news is that the junta is circumventing sanctions and other measures by exploiting gaps in sanctions regimes, shifting financial institutions, and taking advantage of the failure of Member States to fully coordinate and enforce actions.”
The Thai connection
Singapore-based entities were Myanmar’s third largest source of weapons and military materials. But following a government investigation, the flow of weapons materials to Myanmar from Singapore-registered companies dropped by nearly 90% compared to the previous year.
In 2022, Singapore-based banks facilitated more than 70% of the junta’s purchases passing through the banking system. By 2023, that had dropped to under 20%, the report found.
Looking for other financial institutions, the junta found neighboring Thailand.
Between 2022 and 2023, exports of weapons and related materials from Thai-based entities more than doubled, from $60 million to nearly $130 million last year.
“Many SAC (junta) purchases previously made from Singapore-based entities, including parts for Mi-17 and Mi-35 helicopters used to conduct airstrikes on civilian targets, are now being sourced from Thailand,” the report said.
Siam Commercial Bank is among the Thai banks that have played a “crucial role” in the shift, the report found. In 2022, the bank facilitated just over $5 million in transactions relating to the military, by 2023 that figure ballooned to more than $100 million, according to the report.
CNN has reached out to Siam Commercial Bank for comment on the report but has not received a response.
A spokesperson for Thailand’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs told CNN, “we have seen the report and are looking into it.”
“Many countries have been named and certainly these are countries where the majority of financial transactions in the region would pass through,” the spokesperson said in a statement.
“Our banking and financial institutions follow banking protocols as any major financial hub. So we will have to first establish the facts before considering any further steps.”
Andrews said it was “critical” that “financial institutions take their human rights obligations seriously and not facilitate the junta’s deadly transactions.”
In addition, sanctioning the networks supplying jet fuel to the junta and the military’s “go-to bank” Myanma Economic Bank, “could play a decisive role in helping to turn the tide in Myanmar and saving untold numbers of lives,” he said..."
Source/publisher:
"CNN" (USA)
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-27
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Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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"As the Civil war in Myanmar intensifies, the Arakan Army (AA) has emerged as a formidable force against Myanmar military in Rakhine State. Recent escalation in hostilities between the rebel group and the military in Rakhine has not only disrupted Junta’s hold in the region but also poses serious security threats to Bangladesh. Stray Mortar shelling in Bangladesh’s bordering regions included, last month, AA rebels even kidnapped innocent fishermen from the Naf river that Bangladesh shares with Myanmar. AA’s activities are becoming a growing concern for Bangladesh especially considering that Bangladesh has consistently responded with patience and dignity to the numerous provocations and challenges posed by Myanmar.
On October 27, 2023, the Three Brotherhood Alliance (3BTA), composed of the Arakan Army, Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, and Ta’ang National Liberation Army and numbering some 15,000 fighters, launched Operation 1027, an anti-SAC offensive in Shan State. The coalition had been preparing for this offensive for years, according to local interlocutors, and its forces were equipped with advanced weapons, including drones acquired on foreign markets.
The Arakan Army, founded in 2009, initially aimed at gaining greater autonomy for the Rakhine people. Since the offensive last October, it has actually steered close to its goal and undoubtedly has become one of the strongest pillars challenging the Myanmar junta in the ongoing civil war. The rebel group has taken control of more than half the Rakhine State – nine of its 17 townships. They have seized key territories in the neighbouring Chin state as well. The AA’s tactical prowess and strategic territorial gains have drawn the attention of regional stakeholders, including Bangladesh. The proximity of AA operations to this border has heightened security concerns for Bangladesh, as cross-border skirmishes and the potential for infiltration increase.
The Escalation of Conflict in the borders of Bangladesh
On May 22, Arakan Army launched a large-scale attack on Maungdaw town in northwestern Rakhine State near the border with Bangladesh. If the Arakan Army can seize Maungdaw, only one town in northern Rakhine will remain under the regime’s control: Sittwe, the state’s capital. Capturing Maungdaw will also give the Arakan Army control over the 270-km border with Bangladesh. That possibility does not seem far-fetched as the group has captured more than 10 junta camps in Rakhine State’s Maungdaw in less than two weeks, killing about 200 junta troops.
Direct Security Implications for Bangladesh
The AA’s intensified activities near the border areas in southeastern Bangladesh, particularly in Bandarban and Cox’s Bazar, have experienced stray gunfire, mortar shelling, and airstrikes from Myanmar forces. These incidents have not only caused casualties among Bangladeshi civilians but have also forced thousands to flee their homes, creating a humanitarian crisis.
Just this month, ferry services on the Teknaf-Saint Martin route have been suspended since 6th June due to firing from Myanmar. This had caused a massive food shortage in the region endangering lives of more than 10000 residents. Often shots were fired at trawlers and boats to Saint Martin’s. One of such trawlers was carrying Bangladeshi election officials. Arakan Army members are believed to have fired the shots.
The conflict has also led to an influx of displaced persons, including Myanmar Border Guard Police personnel, into Bangladesh. More than 752 fleeing junta personnel and their families have been repatriated since mid-February after the AA launched offensives near Rakhine’s international border. This sudden influx strains security for Bangladesh-Myanmar border which is already a contested place due to Myanmar people trying to enter the country illegally especially the Rohingya community still living in Myanmar.
Bangladesh’s internal security is already complicated as it is with the existence of over a million Rohingya refugees already residing in camps in Bangladesh. The potential for further displacement due to ongoing violence in Rakhine and Chin states remains high, posing a continuous threat to Bangladesh’s border security and humanitarian stability.
Broader concerns if Arakan army controls Rakhine
Beyond the immediate border incidents, the presence of the AA near Bangladesh raises broader security concerns. The AA’s control over large swathes of territory in Rakhine State, including strategic border areas, increases the risk of arms smuggling, human trafficking, and other illicit activities. Bangladesh geography puts it at the heart of three major Asian drug trade routes: the Golden Wedge, the Golden Triangle and the Golden Crescent. This, unfortunately, makes the country a lucrative transit for the region’s drugs, especially from Myanmar and India, undermining Bangladesh’s internal security.
Moreover, the AA’s conflict with the Myanmar military has the potential to draw in other armed groups and create a broader insurgency landscape. This could lead to a spillover of violence into Bangladesh, exacerbating the security challenges. The presence of armed militants in close proximity to Bangladeshi territory necessitates a robust security response to prevent infiltration and maintain regional stability.
What should be the future?
The AA had previously assured that they will cooperate regarding border stability issues with neighbouring countries. These words seem hollow when they still have not apologized for the deaths Bangladeshi civilians caused by their fighting. The further show of utmost disrespect to Bangladesh’s neutrality by kidnapping Bangladeshi fishermen fishing, firing at Bangladeshi trawlers within the borders of their own country is totally inexcusable.
Bangladesh and the Bay of Bengal are two routes for Arakan or the Rakhine state’s contact with the outside world. Due to the location of Saint Martin’s, most of the north Bay of Bengal is within Bangladesh’s maritime boundary. And so, for the future growth of Rakhine state, creating a friendly relationship with Bangladesh should be priority for the Arakan Army-not provoking the country.
As this situation evolves, Dhaka must remain vigilant and proactive in managing the implications of the AA’s activities to safeguard its national security and humanitarian interests. Diplomatic engagement and cooperation among the parties is essential to ensure the security and stability of Bangladesh..."
Source/publisher:
"Eurasia Review"
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-26
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Arakan (Rakhine) State - reports etc. by date (latest first), Human Rights and international relations, Burmese refugees in Bangladesh
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