Situation Analysis

MYANMAR CRISIS

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Introduction

Purpose

This report provides a comprehensive overview of the current humanitarian situation, focusing on both operational environment factors and sectoral analysis. It aims to support informed decision-making for humanitarian partners and stakeholders.

About GANNET

GANNET is a Generative AI Initiative from Data Friendly Space, offering AI-powered tools built to make knowledge and real-time information accessible to our community in a resource-efficient and ethical way. It provides tools such as the GANNET Virtual Assistant and GANNET SituationHub to help humanitarian actors access, analyze, and utilize critical information for their operations.

GANNET SituationHub

The GANNET SituationHub is a generative AI-powered digital public good designed to identify and analyze humanitarian data from thousands of trusted sources in real time. By transforming complex data into clear insights, it enables faster, more effective response strategies and improved coordination among stakeholders.

GANNET Virtual Assistant

The GANNET Virtual Assistant is a verified chatbot designed for humanitarian quick decision-making. Built on cutting-edge Generative AI and trained with humanitarian expert-reviewed data, it provides real-time information. The GANNET Virtual Assistant facilitates rapid data access and synthesis for crisis response.

Methodology Overview

The Situation Hub's analytical process uses a structured Human-in-the-Loop workflow that combines automated analysis retrieval through GANNET Virtual Assistant, DFS's AI-powered humanitarian assistant, with expert review by the DFS analysis team. GANNET automates the extraction and generation of crisis-related insights based on structured prompts, which are aligned with a tailored analytical framework. These outputs are then reviewed, validated, and refined by analysts to ensure accuracy, contextual relevance, and operational utility. The workflow is organized into four key phases: planning and setup, ongoing operations, quality assurance, and system evolution, ensuring a balance between speed and analytical rigor.

Planning, Setup & Quality Control

In the planning phase, analysts develop a contextualized analytical framework, largely based on the Joint Intersectoral Analysis Framework (JIAF), and convert it into structured prompts for AI-assisted data extraction. These prompts are refined over time to improve output quality. Data sources are vetted for reliability, and translations are reviewed for accuracy. Using a centralized Content Management System (CMS), analysts review and curate AI-generated outputs, validate them against external sources, and make refinements to enhance clarity and relevance. The CMS enables collaborative editing and version tracking, ensuring outputs align with humanitarian needs.

Bias Mitigation

To minimize bias, the team diversifies data sources, cross-verifies information, and continuously evaluates the AI's performance. Analysts are crucial in identifying and correcting inaccuracies, especially in automated categorization. Future improvements aim to enhance source credibility checks and sentiment analysis, further strengthening the reliability of the Situation Hub's outputs.

Crisis Overview

The SituationHub landing pages use a standardized yet customizable template to deliver consistent, comprehensive crisis overviews. These pages integrate static content with dynamic data from sources like ACLED and DTM via open APIs, enabling interactive visuals with real-time updates. Regular reviews and verification with in-country partners ensure accuracy, while manual updates are used for sources not connected to APIs.

Media Monitoring

The media monitoring process has evolved from a manual, list-based approach to an AI-assisted system integrated into the CMS. This allows analysts to efficiently review, filter, and contextualize media narratives, while automation helps track emerging trends.

Overview

The following overview has been generated using the information available up to March 20, 2026. It provides a synthesized summary and key insights into the crisis based on the most recent data accessible at that time.

Summary

Myanmar has been in crisis since February 1, 2021, when the military (Tatmadaw) overthrew the democratically elected government. This coup sparked widespread protests and armed resistance, leading to a severe political, economic, and humanitarian crisis. The military junta, known as the State Administration Council (SAC), has responded with brutal force, resulting in thousands of civilian deaths and widespread human rights abuses.

As of December 2025, approximately 3.6 million people are internally displaced across the country—a dramatic increase from roughly 300,000 pre-2021—with displacement projected to rise toward 4 million in 2026. Intensified clashes continue in Sagaing, Magway, northern Shan, Kayah, and Mandalay, where junta forces have launched renewed ground and air offensives ahead of military-run elections starting December 28, 2025. The Arakan Army now controls all but three of Rakhine State's 17 townships, while resistance forces including the Karen National Liberation Army have consolidated influence across much of central and southeastern Myanmar. The UN's 2026 Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan, released December 10, projects over 16 million people will require humanitarian assistance.

Recovery from the March 2025 earthquake remains slow, with an estimated 3.5 million tonnes of debris and reconstruction hampered by insecurity, shortages of heavy machinery (43%) and labour (40%), and limited access. Many affected communities, particularly in Magway, Sagaing, and Mandalay, continue to live in temporary shelters, while essential services remain disrupted. Approximately 24,200 houses were damaged (24% completely destroyed), and 132 health facilities were damaged—half in Mandalay.

The Rohingya crisis continues to worsen, with the junta's blockade of Rakhine preventing international aid delivery since late 2023, leaving hundreds of thousands of IDPs with severely limited assistance. On December 10, 2025, a military airstrike destroyed Mrauk-U General Hospital, killing at least 33 people and injuring 76-80—one of the deadliest attacks on healthcare in the conflict. Chronic poverty now affects over 80% of the population, the World Bank projects GDP will contract 2.0% in FY2025/26 with inflation remaining above 20%, and market disruptions have deepened food insecurity nationwide. The 2026 HNRP appeals for approximately $890 million but reflects severely constrained funding and narrowed operational space, forcing agencies to prioritize only 2.6 million people with the most severe needs for life-saving support.

Key Insights

1. Myanmar's humanitarian crisis continues to deepen amid persistent conflict, economic collapse, and the lingering impacts of the March 2025 earthquake. An estimated 16 million people—nearly one in three citizens—are projected to require humanitarian assistance in 2026, as conflict-driven displacement, natural disasters, and funding shortages exacerbate vulnerabilities nationwide.

The March 28 earthquake remains a defining event in the humanitarian landscape. Official figures confirm 3,745 deaths and over 5,000 injuries, with the Early Recovery Cluster reporting over 24,200 houses damaged (24% completely destroyed), 4,857 apartments affected, and 132 health facilities damaged. An estimated 3.5 million tonnes of debris blocks roads and markets, with clearance impeded by shortages of heavy machinery (43%) and labour (40%). Nearly three-quarters of the most affected townships continue to face critical shelter and livelihood gaps—64% of communities reported job losses and 30-31% reported damage to crops and workplaces—while disrupted water systems (44% of groundwater sources contaminated) have fueled outbreaks of cholera and dengue.

2. Conflict has escalated dramatically ahead of junta-run elections starting December 28, 2025. The military has intensified air and ground offensives, conducting 2,165 airstrikes between January and November 2025—up from 1,716 in all of 2024. On December 10, a military airstrike destroyed Mrauk-U General Hospital in Rakhine State, killing at least 33 people and injuring 76-80—prompting UN, WHO, and Amnesty International condemnation and calls for investigation as a possible war crime.

Total displacement has reached approximately 3.6 million people as of late 2025, with projections indicating it could rise to 4 million in 2026. The Arakan Army now controls all but three of Rakhine's 17 townships, while resistance forces have captured extensive border areas in the southeast. Attacks on healthcare are widespread: Insecurity Insight recorded 1,815 attacks on health care between February 2021 and November 2025, with WHO verifying 67 attacks in 2025 alone. Access restrictions, including the junta's blockade of Rakhine since late 2023, continue to endanger civilians—particularly Rohingya communities facing persistent protection risks, restricted mobility, and limited access to aid.

3. Humanitarian access remains severely limited by insecurity and deliberate obstruction. The 2026 HNRP appeals for approximately $890 million but reflects severely constrained funding and narrowed operational space, prioritizing only 2.6 million people with the most severe needs at a cost of $521 million. Partners reached some 5 million people in the first nine months of 2025, but access constraints—including roadblocks, landmines, telecommunications blackouts, and the Rakhine blockade affecting 600,000 IDPs—force reliance on low-profile, community-led delivery modalities. WFP warns that hunger has reached "unacceptable" levels, with over 400,000 young children and mothers surviving on nutrient-deprived diets of plain rice or watery porridge.

4. The Food Security Cluster estimates about 8.5 million people face moderate-to-severe food insecurity in 2026, driven by conflict, displacement, rising food and fuel prices, reduced market access and supply-chain disruptions. September 2025 analyses reported "Serious" to "Critical" Global Acute Malnutrition in multiple conflict-affected townships, notably in Northern Rakhine, Kachin, Sagaing, Southern Shan, and Kayah—with nutrition and treatment services suspended or operating at minimal capacity due to access constraints.

Economic conditions continue to deteriorate: the World Bank projects real GDP will contract 2.0% in FY2025/26, with inflation remaining above 20%. Rising poverty and fear of forced conscription have driven male migration, leaving women, girls, and older people as household heads. More than four in ten households identify lack of income as their top challenge, and 83% of internally displaced families can meet half or less of their basic needs. The convergence of conflict, disaster, and economic decline continues to erode coping capacities, pushing Myanmar further toward a protracted humanitarian emergency with no signs of de-escalation.

5. International condemnation has intensified following the December 10 airstrike on Mrauk-U Hospital. The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights called for an investigation, warning the attack could amount to a war crime. WHO's Director-General condemned the strike as among dozens of verified attacks on healthcare in 2025. Amnesty International and the Burma Human Rights Network have urged the UN Security Council to refer Myanmar to the International Criminal Court, impose an arms embargo, and authorize emergency cross-border humanitarian aid.

Peace negotiations remain effectively stalled: resistance leaders and the National Unity Government publicly rejected Chinese-brokered terms for northern Shan State. The junta has cancelled voting in thousands of wards where it cannot secure control, while nationwide "silent strikes" signalled popular rejection of the military's December elections. EU and Australia have declared the vote "not credible" amid junta repression. The junta denies responsibility for civilian casualties, accusing "terrorists" of being targeted, while humanitarian organizations warn the pre-election environment is driving further escalation rather than de-escalation.

Operational Environment

Economy

Current Economic Situation

According to the World Food Programme, a little more than half of Myanmar's population currently live in poverty and WFP projects more than 12 million people will face acute hunger in 2026 [2]. A Myanmar parliamentary delegation told a UN parliamentary hearing on 12–13 February 2026 that more than 16 million people require humanitarian assistance and nearly 4 million remain internally displaced [4][7]. The Bangkok Post reported that EU sanctions targeting the junta have likely exacerbated poverty and hunger while Europe has maintained Myanmar on its Everything But Arms trade schedule, which has benefited the junta [2]. The same coverage noted that the United States halted humanitarian aid after structural changes to USAID and that a January 26 move to end Temporary Protected Status for Myanmar was temporarily blocked by a court order [2]. Economic disruption since the 2021 coup and the effects of sanctions contributed to many civilian firms collapsing, enabling companies linked to ex-military intelligence—such as Delta-X—to re-register, expand into new sectors, and supply equipment to the military procurement system [4].

Conflict Economic Landscape

The junta is reviving resource extraction projects, including efforts to reopen the Mandalay gold mine tied to a sanctioned tycoon, reported in February 2026 [3]. Former military intelligence networks have transitioned into private firms that directly service the armed forces: DeltaX, founded and directed by exMI officers including Thein Swe, reregistered and expanded into "marine machinery equipment and spares," supplied equipment to the Directorate of Defence Procurement, and strengthened its position after the 2021 coup and through outreach to China in 2024–2025 [4]. Military ties to media and commercial ventures indicate blurred lines between private investment and military benefit, with former intelligence figures holding stakes in businesses and media that facilitated political and economic concessions before and after the coup [4][9]. Business engagement and commercial activity have disproportionately benefited the junta rather than vulnerable populations [2][9]. Conflict-driven displacement fuels regional pressures and funding gaps for refugee responses: the 2025 Joint Response Plan for the Rohingya required $934.5 million but was only 49.7% funded as of early December 2025, leaving an approximate $470 million shortfall [6]. Cross-border economic interdependence with Thailand and the growth of illicit economies—meth/fentanyl production and human trafficking—are generating regional spillovers that strain humanitarian resources and hamper livelihoods restoration [2]. Insurgent groups in areas outside junta control tax trade and provide minimal public services, creating quasi-formal local economies and revenue streams that substitute for formal employment [2].

Stability of Currency and Bank System

Bangkok Post reported that EU sanctions aimed at the junta since the 2021 coup have likely exacerbated poverty while Europe kept Myanmar on its Everything But Arms trade schedule, a policy that has benefited the junta [2]. The report also states that the US ended humanitarian aid to Myanmar when President Donald Trump eliminated USAID upon his return to power and that the administration sought on 26 January to end Temporary Protected Status for Myanmar, a move temporarily blocked by a court [2]. These shifts in EU sanctions, continued trade preferences, and changes in US aid and migration policy have altered aid and trade flows in ways that commentators say have exacerbated suffering or benefited the junta, affecting channels for reconstruction and civilian economic support [2].

Employment

Conflict-driven disruptions are undermining livelihoods: UNHCR and Bangladesh's Refugee Relief and Repatriation Commissioner report approximately 1.17 million registered Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh, with 139,378 arrivals between December 2024 and November 2025 [6]. Funding shortfalls for the Rohingya response have reduced services and livelihood support—the 2025 Joint Response Plan required $934.5 million but was 49.7% funded as of early December 2025, and US funding for camp assistance fell to less than half by October 2025 [6]. Rohingya displaced from Maungdaw report loss of land and belongings and remain unable to return safely, threatening property rights and prospects for return-based livelihoods [1]. Illicit and informal economies have expanded: the UN Office on Drugs and Crime reported a 26% increase in poppy cultivation in Chin State to over 2,500 acres in December 2025, and local reports describe forcible detention and recruitment of poppy growers into resistance forces alongside broader conscription pressures that absorb local labour [5][10]. Organized crime and trafficking—notably meth and fentanyl production and labour trafficking to scam centres—are producing alternative income streams and cross-border labour exploitation that distort formal labour markets and increase population vulnerability [2].

Politics

Governance Structures and Rule of Law

A Myanmar parliamentary delegation attended the UN Parliamentary Hearing in New York on 12–13 February 2026 and argued that Myanmar's parliament continues to operate through adaptive mechanisms despite the 2021 coup, warning the junta may seek legitimacy via a "sham election." [16] The military State Administrative Council (SAC) does not control the entire country, and Myanmar is described as torn by civil war with hundreds of armed groups operating across the territory [18]. The Union Election Commission, appointed by the military council, dissolved 40 parties including the National League for Democracy (NLD) on 28 March 2023, and party offices were raided or sealed, undermining representative institutions [19]. According to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP), between the coup and 13 February 2026 the junta arrested 30,463 people with 22,769 still in detention [21]. Prison monitoring groups documented at least 16 inmate deaths (including political prisoners) and over 400 placed in solitary confinement since the coup, with ongoing reports of torture and denial of medical care in junta prisons [21].

International accountability efforts continue through multiple channels. Timor-Leste opened legal proceedings in early February 2026 under the principle of universal jurisdiction against 10 junta members, including Senior Gen. Min Aung Hlaing, following a January complaint by the Chin Human Rights Organization (CHRO); Myanmar expelled Timor-Leste's envoy on 13 February 2026 in response [23][17][29]. The ICJ case brought by The Gambia over the 2017 Rohingya crackdown remains active, but ICJ/ICC mechanisms are viewed as limited to pre-coup crimes, prompting states and rights groups to pursue universal-jurisdiction avenues for post-coup atrocities [17][23]. Human Rights Watch and other observers state the junta has violated the ASEAN five-point consensus and the ASEAN Charter while ASEAN remains divided and largely ineffective at enforcing its obligations [23]. Displaced Rohingya report loss of homes and lack of legal safeguards for return or property restitution in Rakhine State, and the Arakan Army has been accused of seizing belongings and vacant Rohingya properties in Maungdaw, highlighting breakdowns in protections for property and access to justice in conflict areas [28].

Political Freedoms and Recent Laws

The military-led vote in January 2026 has been widely described as a "sham" with many ethnic areas excluded—for example, Kyaukme opened polling in only 14 of 81 village tracts, approximately 6% coverage—and polling stations reporting very low turnout, often deserted [19]. Observers and activists described the election as illegitimate and "Made in China," and revolutionary groups refused to recognize results, warning of intensified conflict [19]. Polling was accompanied by coercion and violence: artillery strikes in Hpakant injured at least five civilians, bridges were blocked to control movement, and authorities used threats such as burning homes or banning students from university to compel participation [19]. Reports indicate forced recruitment and expanding conscription drives—a 17-year-old in Mahaaungmyay Township died in detention after refusing conscription as recruitment resumed across Mandalay [30]. Former military intelligence networks and companies remain embedded in state and commercial structures, and media outlets have historically been used to project junta messaging, indicating sustained state influence over media and civil society space [22][20]. Timor-Leste's legal action and the junta's diplomatic retaliation have highlighted growing regional tension between ASEAN's doctrine of non-interference and emerging accountability efforts under international law [23]. Overall, laws and institutions are being applied selectively to exclude opposition representation, suppress dissent and concentrate power in the military council, while external actors pursue judicial avenues (including universal jurisdiction) to seek accountability for post-coup abuses [19][23].

Influence of Non-State Actors and Political Factions

Former military-intelligence networks have reconstituted as private firms that supply the armed forces, hold media stakes, and perform policy outreach (notably Delta-X and linked bodies such as the Paragon Institute), sustaining informal procurement, propaganda and elite ties to the junta [22][20]. Armed non-state actors—including ethnic armed organisations and resistance groupings (e.g., Arakan Army, TNLA, BNRA, NUG/PDF and allied revolutionary forces)—control territory, collect taxes, provide basic services in enclaves, rejected the junta's election and have stepped up military operations and local governance competition across multiple states, deepening political fragmentation [18][19][26][24]. Civil society actors and Timor-Leste have pursued accountability through universal-jurisdiction mechanisms after the Chin Human Rights Organization delivered a dossier to Dili, an effort that highlighted regional tensions over non-interference versus accountability [17][29][23]. These dynamics have major humanitarian effects: Myanmar parliamentarians at a UN parliamentary hearing reported more than 16 million people need humanitarian assistance and nearly 4 million are internally displaced, while UNHCR and Bangladesh's Refugee Relief and Repatriation Commissioner estimate about 1.17 million registered Rohingya with 139,378 arrivals between December 2024 and November 2025, and the UN World Food Programme projects over 12 million people will face acute hunger in 2026 [16][40][18].

Public Trust in State Institutions

Public confidence in Myanmar's state institutions is very low. The January 2026 elections were widely judged illegitimate by observers and activists; many precincts could not hold polls and turnout was reported as negligible, with polling stations in parts of northern Shan and Kachin often deserted [19]. Violence accompanied the vote: artillery strikes and heavy security around polling areas were reported [19]. Revolutionary forces and civil society groups have refused to recognize the results, signaling deep legitimacy deficits and expectations of intensified conflict [19]. Regional accountability and civil-society actions are active but highlight institutional distrust: observers and activists have labelled the election "Made in China," illustrating that domestic judicial remedies are viewed as unavailable and external legal avenues are being pursued [19][17][29]. ASEAN and regional responses remain divided and limited even as international legal and advocacy pressures increase against the junta [18][17][23].

Role of Marginalized Groups

On 12–13 February 2026, a Myanmar parliamentary delegation (including Daw Mya Myo Aye, Daw Myat Thida Tun and Daw Phyu Phyu Lwin) told a UN parliamentary hearing that more than 16 million people require humanitarian assistance and nearly 4 million are internally displaced, and warned of democratic backsliding and a "sham election" that excludes genuine representation [16]. Ethnic and opposition representation has been eroded since the coup: polling in many ethnic areas was effectively blocked, leaving large populations without voting access [19]. Civil society and ethnic groups are pursuing accountability through external legal avenues: the Chin Human Rights Organization submitted a dossier and Timor-Leste opened legal proceedings under universal jurisdiction, prompting the junta to expel Timor-Leste's chargé d'affaires in mid-February 2026 [31][23][17]. Land and property rights for marginalized communities are under threat: Pa-O authorities ordered 250 households off ancestral land in Southern Shan, and Rohingya in Maungdaw report loss of homes and alleged seizure or reclassification of vacant properties amid ongoing insecurity [41][28]. The Rohingya remain highly marginalized with roughly 1.17 million registered refugees and substantial new arrivals between December 2024 and November 2025, undermining prospects for safe return and political inclusion [40].

Security And Stability

Security Overview

Between February 16–23, 2026, Myanmar experienced intense military offensives across multiple fronts: Hpasawng Township fell to junta forces after months of clashes, the military advanced across the Bago Yoma corridor burning villages and destroying more than 100 homes in Nattalin, pushed towards Tagaung in Mandalay Region, and air and naval strikes killed at least 15 civilians in Kyaukphyu, southern Rakhine [66][61][69][64][47]. Artillery and heavy weapons were actively deployed during the nationwide election period, with artillery strikes in Hpakant injuring at least five civilians and the military blocking access to polling areas [60]. Clashes inflicted operational losses on junta units—more than 20 junta troops, including officers, were killed in Tanintharyi and large weapons caches were seized—while tensions among resistance actors and between resistance groups and the NUG included raids and the BNRA leader turning himself over to the military after fighting with PDF/NUG forces [52][45][59].

Ethnic armed groups remain active and influential on the ground: the TNLA closed Kokang offices in Kutkai, the Arakan Army has been accused of seizing Rohingya properties in Maungdaw amid displacement, and resistance units such as PDF Zoland have detained poppy growers for recruitment even as the Shanni Nationalities Army has restricted movement and pushed military training for students [56][50][57][54]. Illicit economies linked to insecurity are expanding: UNODC reported a near 17% nationwide increase in land used for opium poppy cultivation and a 26% rise in Chin State (now over 2,500 acres), complicating local dynamics and recruitment incentives for armed groups [46][57].

Repression and detention remain pervasive—AAPP reported 30,463 arrests since the 2021 coup with 22,769 people still detained as of February 13, 2026, and Myanmar Prison Witness documented at least 16 inmate deaths and more than 400 placed in solitary confinement in junta prisons since the coup [53]. International accountability efforts provoked diplomatic fallout when Timor-Leste opened legal proceedings over alleged junta war crimes and the junta expelled Timor-Leste's top diplomat on February 13, 2026 [44][48]. Former military intelligence networks have also strengthened junta capacity through private firms such as Delta-X, which supply equipment and logistics that bolster military operations and sustain the conflict economy [70].

Security Forces and Law Enforcement

The junta continues to conduct intensified offensive operations with significant civilian impact, including widespread destruction and casualties. The military has expanded conscription and recruitment drives nationwide, with analysts assessing broader gains from intensified conscription policies [55][65]. Junta-aligned militias have been used to press students into military training and restrict movement in areas such as Mohnyin Township, Kachin State [54].

Prison monitors report systemic abuse in detention: Myanmar Prison Witness documented widespread torture, beatings and denial of medical care in facilities including Insein and Obo prisons [53]. Former military intelligence networks have been preserved through private firms supplying the armed forces, notably Delta-X supplying communications equipment and embedded in defence procurement, indicating continuity in military procurement and logistical capacity [70].

Non-state armed actors and resistance forces are exercising law-enforcement functions in many areas—arresting and recruiting civilians (for example, PDF Zoland's detention and planned training of poppy workers), and conducting poppy-field clearance operations—reflecting a fragmented security environment in which state control is limited and multiple armed groups govern local security [57][43].

Demography

Demographic Overview

Myanmar has a total population of roughly 54 million [75]. Since the 2021 coup, thousands have been killed and tens of thousands detained or displaced, and the State Administrative Council (junta) does not have authority across many precincts of the country [75][71]. Hundreds of armed groups, including at least a dozen ethnic insurgent groups, exercise control over areas outside major cities [71]. A little more than half the population currently live in poverty, and the UN World Food Programme projects more than 12 million people will face acute hunger in 2026 [71]. Registered Rohingya refugees stand at approximately 1.17 million, and between December 2024 and November 2025 around 139,378 Rohingya entered Bangladesh (136,518 during the first eleven months of 2025), driven by intensified clashes in Rakhine State [73]. Rohingya civilians report continued inability to return, loss of homes and belongings, and fears of permanent dispossession amid ongoing conflict in Rakhine State [72].

Socio-Cultural

Socio-Cultural Overview

Myanmar's crisis is deeply shaped by ethnic and communal fault lines: Chin, Kachin, Karen, Shan and Rohingya communities — alongside armed actors such as the Arakan Army and numerous ethnic insurgent groups — remain central actors in local governance, security, and access to services, contributing to a fragmented social fabric and competing claims over territory and property [78][79]. More than 16 million people require humanitarian assistance and nearly 4 million are internally displaced, as highlighted by Myanmar parliamentarians at a UN parliamentary hearing in February 2026 [77]. Approximately 1.17 million registered Rohingya refugees are in Bangladesh, with 139,378 arrivals between December 2024 and November 2025 (136,518 of them during the first eleven months of 2025) [81]. Displacement has eroded community cohesion and property rights: Rohingya families report being unable to return safely to Maungdaw and fear permanent loss of homes and belongings after intensified fighting and reported seizures of vacant Rohingya properties by Arakan Army elements, which local sources say have removed household items and declared ownerless houses eligible for demolition or reclassification [80].

Political processes imposed by the junta have further strained social relations and legitimacy: the postcoup elections were widely described by activists and ethnic representatives as unrepresentative and "Made in China," rejected by revolutionary forces and resulting in threats, home burnings and coercive tactics that intensify mistrust between civilian populations, ethnic groups and the military, undermining prospects for social reconciliation [83]. Efforts at external accountability are reshaping local dynamics and interstate relations: TimorLeste received a dossier from the Chin Human Rights Organization and reportedly opened a prosecutorial inquiry under universal jurisdiction, prompting Myanmar's junta to expel TimorLeste's top representative and order a rapid departure, an episode that has amplified tensions and underscored divisions within ASEAN over noninterference versus protection of rights [85][78]. Voices from affected communities report acute losses and trauma that shape social recovery: Chin community leaders recount villages burned and religious leaders killed, while displaced families express fear of speaking out and deep uncertainty about voluntary, safe returns and restitution of property [78][80].

Gender Dynamics

Human rights reporting indicates sexualized violence has been used as a weapon of war against ethnic minorities, and the Chin Human Rights Organization has filed a complaint alleging gang rape and other abuses by the junta [78][85]. Air and naval strikes in Kyaukphyu killed at least 15 civilians, with infants, women and the elderly among the dead, highlighting civilian—and gendered—harm from bombardment in southern Rakhine State [89]. Women are active in advocacy and political response: female Myanmar parliamentarians participated in the UN Parliamentary Hearing on 12–13 February 2026 urging civilian protection, and the Women's League of Burma continues to mobilize and voice resistance to the junta [77][83].

Impact of Socio-Cultural Drivers on Aid

Myanmar's fragmented governance and parallel authorities are undermining community trust and shaping humanitarian access. Insurgent and ethnic administrations that tax trade and provide minimal public services operate as de facto authorities in many areas, creating alternate power structures that influence where and how aid can be delivered and accepted [79]. Rohingya residents report that Arakan Army elements have entered abandoned homes in Maungdaw, removed household goods and announced vacant properties could be classified as state property, increasing fears of permanent loss of property and obstructing voluntary return and claims to assistance [80]. Funding shortfalls are reducing the humanitarian response and amplifying host community pressures: the 2025 Joint Response Plan required $934.5 million but had secured only $464.4 million (49.7%) as of early December, while US funding fell to less than half of the previous year, contributing to school closures in camps and straining Bangladesh's capacity to host refugees [81]. Local administrative actions are also driving displacement and contesting land rights, including a Pa-O authority order to remove roughly 250 households from ancestral land via reclassification as squatters in Southern Shan [87]. In Chin State, PDF Zoland detained over 200 poppy farmers on 5 February 2026, released some after corporal punishment, and held more than 190 men with plans to recruit eligible detainees, undermining livelihoods and altering local support networks that communities rely on for protection and basic services [88][86]. Community-level accounts of villages burned, clergy killed and survivors hidden reflect deep fear and mistrust of authorities, which limits community engagement with external humanitarian actors and complicates culturally appropriate assistance and returns [78]. Together, parallel authorities, property seizures, forced recruitment and constrained funding are heightening social tensions between host and displaced populations and reducing trust in both state and external humanitarian actors, complicating equitable aid distribution and community acceptance of programs [79][81][80][88].

Environment

Environmental Conditions

Myanmar's geography and natural resources significantly shape the humanitarian crisis. The country shares a long land border with Thailand of over 2,400 kilometres, influencing cross-border movement and regional economic links [92]. In affected areas, farming is practiced on steep ridges, reflecting hilly terrain and upland agricultural reliance [97]. Significant natural resources include rare earth minerals located in Kachin areas, which are reported to be under the control of the Kachin insurgency [92]. The convergence of conflict and resource scarcity has created severe humanitarian needs: the UN World Food Programme projects more than 12 million people will face acute hunger in 2026, while Myanmar parliamentary sources state more than 16 million people currently require humanitarian assistance and nearly 4 million remain internally displaced [92][94].

Environmental Challenges

Opium poppy cultivation has expanded dramatically across Myanmar, particularly in Chin State, driven by conflict and economic desperation. Nationwide land used for opium poppies rose nearly 17 percent year-on-year to a 10-year high, while Chin State saw a 26 percent increase and now exceeds 2,500 acres (1,040 hectares) of poppy fields, according to the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) report [90]. Residents report that poppy cultivation has expanded since 2023 from areas near Tonzang to as far as the Laythar Hill range, driven by quick profits amid ongoing conflict and rising commodity prices [90]. Local armed groups have attempted limited eradication: PDF Zoland cleared over 20 acres in Tedim Township in October 2024, the People's Revolution Alliance Magway reported clearing nearly 30 acres in southern Ngape Township during a two-day operation, and the Karenni Nationalities Defence Force destroyed poppy fields in Demoso on 9 February 2026 [90]. However, communities say such actions are insufficient without livelihood alternatives, and resistance forces state they cannot replace destroyed poppy fields with alternative crops amid active fighting and precarious livelihoods [90]. Beyond illicit cultivation, military operations have caused widespread settlement destruction: armed operations by the Myanmar military reportedly involved burning villages and the destruction of more than 100 homes in Nattalin during advances across the Bago Yoma corridor, contributing to displacement [93].

Land tenure pressures compound displacement risks, including Pa-O authorities ordering 250 households off ancestral land in Southern Shan through reclassification schemes, and Rohingya communities reporting loss of land and homes and continued inability

to return safely, raising risks of permanent loss or abandonment of property [91][95].

Environmental Risks and Mitigation

No specific information on environmental risks such as floods, droughts, natural disasters, or mitigation strategies was provided in the available documentation.

Conflict

Overview of the Ongoing Armed Conflict

Active fighting is widespread across Myanmar, with reported clashes and operations in southern Rakhine (Kyaukphyu), the central Bago Yoma corridor (Nattalin, Paukkhaung), Tanintharyi/Dawei, Mandalay Region (advances toward Tagaung and villages between Thabeikkyin and Tagaung), northern Shan State (Kutkai), and Sagaing's Pale Township [113][111][112][108][101][103]. During 16–23 February 2026 the junta pressed multiple offensives while resistance forces conducted raids and counterattacks: Hpasawng Township fell to the military after months of clashes, resistance forces reported killing junta troops in raids, and more than 20 junta soldiers—including officers—were reported killed in Tanintharyi where large caches of weapons were seized [114][103][112]. The conflict shows frequent use of heavy firepower: air and naval strikes in Kyaukphyu killed at least 15 civilians, and security forces have burned villages and destroyed more than 100 homes in Nattalin, signaling sustained bombardment and scorchedearth tactics [113][111]. Hpasawng's fall threatens key routes to Mawchi mining areas and the military's push into Paukkhaung raised fears of severing resistance supply and movement corridors, while village burnings have driven local displacement and disrupted access along contested routes [114][111]. Ongoing advances toward towns such as Tagaung and continued bombardment constrain humanitarian access and increase risks to civilians in frontline and nearby communities [108][113]. Fighting has produced seized weapons caches and reflects a fragmented armed landscape with hundreds of armed groups and rising tensions among resistance factions—examples include friction between the BNRA and NUG/PDF, and TNLA actions in northern Shan—complicating command-and-control and weapons proliferation across conflict zones [112][98][103][109].

Conflict Stakeholders

The central state actor is the military junta (Tatmadaw/State Administrative Council), which seized power in 2021 and retains control of central institutions while failing to govern large parts of the country [102][98]. The junta staged elections in February 2026 widely described as illegitimate and "Made in China," with activists and observers alleging Chinese pressure to revive Belt and Road projects (including Myitsone) and reporting coercion and violence during voting [100]. The military is pursuing resource and economic initiatives—such as efforts to revive the Mandalay gold mine and attract outside investment—to finance operations and consolidate power [119][100]. Networks of former military intelligence officers reemerged in private firms (e.g., DeltaX) that supplied equipment to the armed forces and acted as informal interlocutors with China, strengthening the junta's logistical and propaganda capacity [116]. Principal nonstate actors include the National Unity Government (NUG) and its People's Defence Forces (PDF), which lead organized resistance operations and have clashed with other resistance groups such as the Burma National Revolutionary Army (BNRA) over territorial control and checkpoints [103][109]. Ethnic armed organisations (notably the Arakan Army, the Ta'ang National Liberation Army/TNLA, and the Shanni Nationalities Army) control territory, extract revenue through taxation and trade, and both contest the junta and have engaged in localized tensions—reports include allegations the Arakan Army seized Rohingya properties in Maungdaw and TNLA actions in northern Shan State [122][101]. Revolutionary and resistance forces have publicly refused to recognise the junta's election and say they are mobilising for intensified offensives, driving continued widespread clashes and instability [100]. External involvement includes Chinese political and economic influence around the election and projects, TimorLeste's earlyFebruary legal proceedings under universal jurisdiction against junta figures and the subsequent expulsion of the TimorLeste envoy on 13 February 2026, and ongoing international legal pressure at forums such as the ICJ—while ASEAN remains divided on engagement versus isolation [100][102][117][99][98]. Humanitarian and governance consequences cited at a UN parliamentary hearing on 12–13 February 2026 include that more than 16 million people require humanitarian assistance and nearly 4 million are internally displaced, underscoring the scale of destabilization driven by these actors and dynamics [110].

Peace Negotiations

Formal peace negotiations are effectively stalled, with no credible nationwide mediation as the junta continues offensive operations while resistance forces and revolutionary groups reject the junta's political processes and elections [111][108][100]. There are no durable, countrywide ceasefires: a ceasefire between the Arakan Army and government forces collapsed in November 2023, driving renewed Rohingya displacement, and the junta's actions have been assessed as breaching regional commitments such as ASEAN's fivepoint consensus [105][102][100]. TimorLeste has moved to pursue accountability via universaljurisdiction legal proceedings and publicly condemned the junta, prompting Myanmar to expel its envoy in midFebruary 2026, while civil society and revolutionary actors continue to mobilise against the junta rather than engage in negotiated settlement talks [102][99][106][100]. Regional dynamics—including allegations of Chinese influence on the junta's election strategy and a divided ASEAN response—are undermining coherent mediation and have been used by the junta to seek external legitimacy instead of negotiating a lasting peace [100][98][102].

Conflict Outlook

Since mid-February 2026 the junta has been steadily recapturing territory, with Hpasawng Township falling after months of clashes, advances across the Bago Yoma corridor accompanied by village burnings, and an ongoing push to recapture villages toward Tagaung between Thabeikkyin and Tagaung [114][111][108]. Resistance forces continue active operations and localized clashes: NUG-led raids have killed junta troops, heavy fighting in Tanintharyi killed more than 20 junta personnel and yielded seized weapons, the head of an independent resistance group reportedly surrendered to the military after clashes, and the TNLA has closed Kokang army offices amid high tensions in northern Shan State [103][112][109][101].

Revolutionary and ethnic armed groups have declared they will not recognise the junta's recent election and are mobilising for stronger offensives, signalling a high likelihood of conflict intensification rather than de-escalation in the near term [100]. External drivers are sharpening tensions: observers allege Chinese pressure behind the junta's election push, and Timor-Leste's move to open a universal-jurisdiction probe into alleged junta war crimes prompted Myanmar to expel its envoy, deepening diplomatic fractures within ASEAN and increasing international legal pressure on the junta [100][99][102]. Given ASEAN divisions, the junta's territorial consolidations, and resistance refusal to accept electoral legitimacy, a negotiated settlement appears unlikely in the short term and prospects for meaningful, inclusive talks remain low [98][100]. Humanitarian consequences are severe and expected to worsen: Myanmar delegates reported more than 16 million people require humanitarian assistance and nearly 4 million are internally displaced, the World Food Programme projects over 12 million will face acute hunger in 2026, and recent air and naval strikes killed at least 15 civilians in Kyaukphyu, all amid continuing Rohingya displacement and cross-border flows to Bangladesh reported by UNHCR and Bangladeshi authorities [110][98][113][105]. These dynamics point to continued large-scale internal displacement, sustained refugee outflows to neighbouring Bangladesh, and worsening protection and funding gaps unless external engagement and humanitarian financing increase imminently [105][110].

Displacement

Displacement Overview

According to UNHCR and Bangladesh's Refugee Relief and Repatriation Commissioner (RRRC), approximately 1.17 million Rohingya refugees are registered in Bangladesh [126]. A renewed influx of 139,378 Rohingya arrived between December 2024 and November 2025, with 136,518 arriving during the first eleven months of 2025, driven by escalating clashes between Myanmar's military junta and the Arakan Army following a ceasefire collapse in November 2023 [126]. Many displaced from Maungdaw have relocated within the township or crossed into Bangladesh [127]. Nearly 4 million people remain internally displaced in Myanmar, according to Myanmar parliamentarians speaking at a UN hearing on 12–13 February 2026 [138]. Military advances across the Bago Yoma corridor have burned villages and destroyed more than 100 homes in Nattalin, contributing to internal displacement [132]. Pa-O authorities ordered about 250 households off ancestral land in Southern Shan [129]. Humanitarian financing shortfalls are constraining response: the 2025 Joint Response Plan required $934.5 million but as of early December only $464.4 million (49.7 percent) had been secured, leaving an approximate $470 million shortfall [126]. US funding had fallen to less than half by October 2025, leading to camp school closures and heightened pressure on Bangladesh [126]. Durable repatriation remains elusive; Myanmar's military pledged to repatriate 180,000 but no tangible progress has followed, even as the interim Bangladesh government and the Myanmar interim administration put forward action plans [126].

Living Conditions of the Displaced Population

More than 16 million people in Myanmar require humanitarian assistance [138]. The UN World Food Programme projects over 12 million people in Myanmar will face acute hunger in 2026 [130]. In Rakhine State, intense fighting in Maungdaw has forced Rohingya families to flee, and displaced residents report that Arakan Army members have entered vacant homes, removed furniture, water tanks and other belongings, barred relatives from retrieving property, and announced vacant Rohingya houses would be classified as state property, deepening fears of permanent loss of homes and blocking voluntary return [127]. Air and naval strikes across southern Rakhine—including attacks that killed at least 15 civilians in Kyaukphyu—have escalated civilian harm and displacement risks [136]. Widespread detention and coercive recruitment add to protection concerns: between the coup and 13 February 2026 the junta arrested 30,463 people with 22,769 still detained, and local reports describe resumed conscription drives and the death in detention of a youth who refused recruitment [140][146]. Constrained access to education and vocational training in the camps is worsening due to funding shortfalls, with numerous schools closing and reductions in education and vocational programmes [126].

Drivers of Displacement

Intense fighting between the Myanmar military and the Arakan Army in Rakhine State—particularly around Maungdaw—has forced Rohingya civilians to flee internally and across the border into Bangladesh [126]. Air and naval bombardment across southern Rakhine, including strikes that killed at least 15 civilians in Kyaukphyu, has escalated civilian harm and likely contributed to displacement pressures [136]. The Myanmar military's offensives—reported advances across the Bago Yoma corridor with village burnings and destruction of over 100 homes in Nattalin, and the fall of Hpasawng Township after months of clashes—have driven population movements and local displacement in multiple regions [132][144]. Political repression and impunity stemming from the post-2021 coup environment, including moves by the junta to expel foreign diplomats after rights complaints and continuing allegations of widespread abuses by security forces, underpin patterns of persecution-driven displacement across ethnic areas [131][133]. Forced recruitment and conscription pressures—illustrated by reports of detained poppy farmers being recruited by Chin resistance forces—and competing recruitment drives across armed groups are displacing communities and disrupting livelihoods [142][128]. Economic drivers include deepening poverty and food insecurity—reporting that a little more than half the population lives in poverty—and expanding illicit-crop economies, with a reported 26% increase in Chin State poppy cultivation, that both reflect and exacerbate livelihood collapse and displacement risks [130][142]. Local land reclassification and eviction orders, such as Pa-O authorities directing 250 households off ancestral land in Southern Shan, are forcing additional community-level displacement through loss of tenure and access to farmland [129].

Integration

Rohingya displaced from Maungdaw report that Arakan Army elements have entered vacant homes, removed household items and announced that properties without their owners present could be demolished or reclassified as state property, deepening barriers to voluntary return and property restitution [127]. Bangladesh authorities and UN interlocutors say durable repatriation depends on Myanmar cooperation, yet no tangible progress has followed despite pledges and action plans [126].

Overall, widespread property insecurity undermines return and social cohesion, and limited institutional progress toward long-term settlement or safe, voluntary repatriation persists [126][127].

Humanitarian Access

Humanitarian Access Overview

Humanitarian access in Myanmar is severely constrained by fragmented state control, active conflict, and political instability. The State Administrative Council (SAC) does not control large parts of the country, and hundreds of armed groups hold territory, limiting safe passage and coordination with central authorities [148]. This territorial fragmentation has created a complex operational landscape where armed actors tax trade and provide alternative services, complicating neutral humanitarian access and supply corridors [148]. Active hostilities continue to disrupt operations: air and naval strikes in southern Rakhine (Kyaukphyu) killed at least 15 civilians on February 20, 2026, and sustained artillery bombardment around Hpakant has caused civilian casualties and further disrupted humanitarian movement [157][158]. The junta's political measures—including dissolution of parties and contested, violence-affected elections—further complicate engagement with authorities and humanitarian coordination across territories [158][148].

Non-state authorities in parts of Rakhine have reportedly occupied vacant Rohingya homes and announced measures treating abandoned properties as state assets, undermining voluntary return and access to property for displaced populations [156]. Cross-border repatriation and donor-agreed roadmaps for Rohingya return have been discussed, but durable, safe and funded repatriation remains elusive, sustaining reliance on cross-border and refugee response mechanisms [153].

Key actors engaged in response include UN agencies (notably the World Food Programme and OCHA/FTS), the wider UN system, local NGOs such as COAST Foundation, and civil-society monitors like the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP), but major funding shortfalls are constraining sustained programming [148][153][164]. Critical humanitarian indicators underscore the operational challenges: 16 million people require humanitarian assistance and nearly 4 million are internally displaced [149]. The World Food Programme projects more than 12 million people will face acute hunger in 2026 [148]. The 2025 Joint Response Plan for the Rohingya required $934.5 million; as of early December 2025 only $464.4 million (49.7%) was secured, leaving an estimated $470 million shortfall, and US funding had fallen to less than half by October 2025, prompting program closures [153]. Between the coup and February 13, 2026, authorities arrested 30,463 people, with 22,769 still in detention, increasing protection and access concerns for civilians and aid workers [164]. Over 100,000 Rohingya arrivals into Bangladesh within a year have increased cross-border humanitarian needs and pressure on host-country services [153].

Barriers to Humanitarian Access

Active hostilities and population targeting have sharply restricted relief delivery across Myanmar. Myanmar military offensives across the Bago Yoma corridor burned villages and destroyed more than 100 homes in Nattalin in mid-February 2026, undermining safe access and supply routes [150]. Hpasawng Township fell to junta forces after months of clashes, eroding access along key local supply and displacement routes [152]. Heavy artillery strikes in northern areas, including Hpakant where at least five civilians were seriously wounded, and the blocking of bridges and major access points have prevented civilian movement and impeded deliveries [158]. Local travel restrictions imposed by armed actors—for example, the Shanni Nationalities Army restricting movement in Mohnyin Township—have limited population movement and humanitarian reach in Kachin State [160].

Displacement, contested property and impeded returns are major obstacles to durable assistance. The Arakan Army has been accused of entering abandoned Rohingya homes in Maungdaw, removing belongings and declaring vacant properties subject to demolition or reclassification, which deters returns and complicates shelter and protection planning [156]. UNHCR and Bangladesh RRRC data indicate roughly 1.17 million registered Rohingya refugees, with some 139,378 arrivals between December 2024 and November 2025 (136,518 of whom arrived during the first eleven months of 2025), reflecting cross-border displacement pressures that strain humanitarian access and coordination [153].

Diplomatic and political impediments have also arisen: Timor-Leste opened legal proceedings over alleged junta war crimes and the junta expelled Timor-Leste's envoy in February 2026, a diplomatic rupture that may hinder regional cooperation on accountability and cross-border humanitarian arrangements [163][155]. These security, physical, political and social barriers vary by region and population group, with ethnic areas and Rohingya-affected locales facing the most severe restrictions on safe access and returns [148][156][150].

Humanitarian Access Gaps

Large parts of northern and ethnic areas are effectively cut off from services. In Kyaukme Township polling stations were opened in just nine urban wards and five village tracts (about 6% of the township), leaving roughly 94% without official presence or access and reflecting wider exclusion from state services and humanitarian reach in northern Shan State [158]. Displaced Rohingya from Maungdaw report they cannot safely return, blocking access to shelter and possessions [156].

Needs and funding gaps are acute across multiple sectors. The country's health-care and education systems have been described as devastated, reducing local capacity to absorb and deliver humanitarian services in conflict-affected areas [148]. Service reductions include school closures after US funding for the Rohingya response fell to less than half by October 2025, contributing to a $470 million funding shortfall that has hampered critical programming [153]. Food-security gaps are particularly severe, underscoring major shortfalls in food assistance and the inability to reach populations with critical unmet needs due to funding constraints, security risks, and operational challenges across the country [148].

Information, Communication and AAP

Information Landscape

Available humanitarian data and public statements on Myanmar needs and response are provided by UN agencies, Bangladesh authorities and Myanmar parliamentary representatives and are reflected in international reporting [170][171]. A Myanmar parliamentary delegate stated at the UN Parliamentary Hearing on 12–13 February 2026 that more than 16 million people require humanitarian assistance and nearly 4 million are internally displaced [170]. UNHCR and Bangladesh's Refugee Relief and Repatriation Commissioner reported approximately 1.17 million registered Rohingya and 139,378 new arrivals between December 2024 and November 2025, including 136,518 in the first eleven months of 2025 [171]. Bangladesh's RRRC attributed the renewed influx to intensified clashes in Rakhine State and said movements resumed after a ceasefire collapsed in November 2023 [171]. OCHA's Financial Tracking Service reported the 2025 Joint Response Plan required $934.5 million and that by early December 2025 only $464.4 million (49.7%) had been secured, leaving an approximate $470 million shortfall [171]. Reporting indicated US funding for Rohingya assistance fell to less than half by October 2025, a decline linked to the closure of numerous camp schools [171]. Data access and sharing channels cited in the documents include UNHCR registration data, OCHA FTS funding tracking and public statements at UN and stakeholder fora, while authors and delegates in the cited reports emphasize a persistent gap between international commitments and on-the-ground implementation [171][170].

Communication Channels

A Myanmar parliamentary delegation, including Daw Mya Myo Aye, used the UN/IPU Parliamentary Hearing at UN Headquarters in New York on 12–13 February 2026 to present humanitarian needs and advocate for democratic legitimacy [170]. Civil society and small states have leveraged legal and diplomatic channels to surface alleged abuses — for example, East Timor presented a warcrimes file that prompted Myanmar to expel its envoy — and have increasingly relied on documentation technologies such as satellite imagery, survivor testimonies and mobilephone footage to document abuses and support legal and advocacy efforts [168].

Barriers to Information

The junta maintains de facto editorial control over major outlets and uses media as a mouthpiece, with the Myanmar Times and other outlets producing commissioned content for military intelligence that functioned to project the regime's narratives internationally [172]. Political repression has removed independent political channels: the Union Election Commission under the military dissolved 40 parties (including the NLD) on 28 March 2023 and party offices were subsequently raided, sealed or bombed, limiting public political information and representation [174]. Security measures around the forced election—blocking bridges and city entrances, heavy security deployments and sustained artillery fire—physically prevented people from reaching polling sites and public spaces for information, with Hpakant reported under blockage since 23 January and civilians wounded by artillery during the voting period [174]. The military employed coercion and intimidation (threats to burn homes, travel restrictions and punishments such as banning university attendance for nonvoters), further suppressing free circulation of information and civic discussion [174]. The junta's expulsion of East Timor's envoy after an alleged warcrimes probe illustrates constraints on external investigative access and diplomatic channels that could surface information about abuses [168].

Misinformation and Rumors

The junta and MI-linked private firms have shaped pro-regime narratives through media influence and covert ties to outlets, notably DeltaX's exMI leadership and disclosed conflicts of interest in media ownership that embedded security-sector messaging in civilian media [165][173]. Investigative reporting shows the Myanmar Times functioned as a de facto mouthpiece for military intelligence, producing content at MI request and amplifying junta narratives internationally (reporting dated 18 February 2026) [172][173]. Civil society activists and analysts characterized the 2026 election as a "Made in China" process and a sham, reporting coordinated coercion — including threats, home burnings and movement restrictions — used to suppress dissent while official messaging claimed calm and legitimacy [174]. Revolutionary groups explicitly rejected the election results and warned that junta propaganda and foreignbacked narratives risked escalating armed conflict, reflecting low public trust in official channels [174]. International and local human rights groups, ethnic organizations (e.g., CHRO) and small states (East Timor) have compiled dossiers and used satellite imagery and survivor testimony to counter junta denials and pursue accountability, representing active documentation and factchecking efforts [168]. At the UN parliamentary hearing on 12–13 February 2026, Myanmar delegates warned that the junta's staged electoral messaging undermines democratic norms while citing humanitarian metrics to contrast rhetoric with ground realities [170]. The combined effect has been eroded trust in mainstream outlets linked to the military and increased reliance among affected communities on civilsociety and resistance channels for information, while digital documentation has made concealment of abuses more difficult for the junta [165][173][168].

Accountability Needs and Transparency

On 12–13 February 2026 Myanmar parliamentary delegates told a UN Parliamentary hearing that more than 16 million people require humanitarian assistance and nearly 4 million remain internally displaced, and warned the junta's effort to stage a sham election undermines civilian protection and democratic legitimacy [170]. On 13 February 2026 TimorLeste initiated universaljurisdiction legal action based on a Chin Human Rights Organization dossier accusing 10 junta officials, including Senior Gen. Min Aung Hlaing, of war crimes and crimes against humanity, and Myanmar ordered TimorLeste's Yangon envoy expelled within seven days [166][168]. Human Rights Watch and other observers have described ASEAN's response as feeble and noted that universal jurisdiction and international courts remain among the few available avenues to pursue accountability for postcoup atrocities [166]. Rohingya displaced from Maungdaw report that the Arakan Army has entered vacant homes, removed household belongings, and announced vacant properties could be classified as state property under its administration, creating barriers to voluntary return and property restitution [169].

Local sources and civil society describe the military's electionperiod coercion — including threats, home burnings, restricted polling access and artillery strikes — and note that polling opened in only about 6% of Kyaukme Township, which local actors say rendered the process unrepresentative and further eroded community trust and participation [174].

Legal and Policy

Legal and Policy Framework

TimorLeste opened legal proceedings in February 2026 under the principle of universal jurisdiction after the Chin Human Rights Organization filed a complaint in January alleging war crimes and crimes against humanity by Myanmar junta officials [178][183][176]. The complaint names 10 junta members, including CommanderinChief Senior Gen. Min Aung Hlaing, accused of killings, rape, indiscriminate attacks and other grave crimes [178]. Timor-Leste, which joined ASEAN in October 2025 and is an ICC member, has signalled willingness to pursue accountability for alleged junta crimes beyond Myanmar's borders using universal-jurisdiction mechanisms [178][176]. Human Rights Watch and other observers note that universal jurisdiction is a key avenue to pursue accountability for postcoup atrocities while ICC and ICJ mechanisms remain limited or focused on precoup periods [178][176]. The Gambia's case at the International Court of Justice concerning the 2017 Rohingya crackdown remains active, and the ICJ issued provisional measures in 2020 in that litigation [176]. Human rights organisations have documented escalating war crimes and crimes against humanity since the 2021 coup, and the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners reported that between the day of the coup and 13 February 2026 some 30,463 people were arrested with 22,769 still in detention [178][182]. The junta has been characterised as violating the ASEAN fivepoint consensus and the binding ASEAN Charter, while ASEAN member responses are described as divided and feeble [178]. Myanmar's military junta ordered East Timor's head of mission to leave the country within seven days on 13 February 2026 in response to the universal jurisdiction proceedings, a move the junta framed as unacceptable diplomatic interference [178][183][176].

Humanitarian Impact of Legislation

The UN World Food Programme projects that more than 12 million people in Myanmar will face acute hunger in 2026, underscoring the scale of humanitarian need amid restricted access and political barriers [179]. Myanmar parliamentary representatives told a UN parliamentary hearing in New York on 12–13 February 2026 that more than 16 million people require humanitarian assistance and nearly 4 million are internally displaced [177]. Repressive legal and security measures are constraining civilian protection and humanitarian space: the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners recorded 30,463 arrests since the 2021 coup with 22,769 still detained as of 13 February 2026, while conscription and juntaaligned efforts to push highschool students into military training have resumed [182][188][193]. The Rohingya situation continues to impede durable solutions: UNHCR and Bangladesh RRRC data estimate about 1.17 million registered Rohingya refugees and some 139,378 arrivals between December 2024 and November 2025 (136,518 in the first eleven months of 2025), while Myanmar's pledge to repatriate 180,000 people has seen no tangible progress [180]. Funding shortfalls further constrain assistance: OCHA's Financial Tracking Service recorded the 2025 Joint Response Plan requirement at $934.5 million, of which $464.4 million (49.7%) had been secured by early December 2025 [180]. Reports also document erosion of property and return rights that will complicate recovery and protection: Arakan Army elements are accused of entering abandoned Rohingya homes and reclassifying vacant properties as state property, and PaO authorities have ordered 250 households off ancestral land in Southern Shan [181][186].

International Agreements Impacting the Crisis

Myanmar's parliamentary delegation participated in the UN Parliamentary Hearing at UN Headquarters on 12–13 February 2026, with Ambassador U Kyaw Moe Tun present, and highlighted a gap between international commitments and realities on the ground [177]. Human Rights Watch and other observers have criticised ASEAN's divided response and noted that regional mechanisms have so far been weak in enforcing the bloc's obligations, including the junta's breach of the 2021 ASEAN fivepoint consensus, while urging support for Timor-Leste's accountability initiative [178][176]. Myanmar's junta expelled Timor-Leste's chargé d'affaires on 13 February 2026 in response to universal jurisdiction proceedings initiated by Timor-Leste judicial authorities following the Chin Human Rights Organization complaint, underscoring tensions between ASEAN's noninterference practice and evolving demands for justice [178][176][183].

Limitations of Current Policies

Myanmar's legal and policy frameworks show multiple, concrete gaps that hinder humanitarian access, protection, and accountability. Sanctions and external policy choices have produced contradictory effects that impede civilian protection and aid delivery, with EU measures and trade exceptions described as simultaneously exacerbating suffering and benefiting the junta [179]. US policy shifts have also reduced bilateral assistance and threatened protections for Myanmar nationals abroad, undermining consistent humanitarian support [179]. The military's postcoup electoral process has been widely labelled illegitimate and exclusionary, with polling open in only small fractions of some townships—such as Kyaukme at about 6%—and documented coercion and threats that undermine representation and the rule of law [184]. ASEAN has remained divided and has not effectively enforced its own fivepoint consensus or regional obligations, weakening regional mechanisms for protection and accountability [178]. Meanwhile, structures of impunity and political interference persist domestically as former military intelligence networks move into private companies and media interests, creating conflicts of interest that impede oversight, transparency, and lawful procurement [192]. Myanmar parliamentary speakers have warned that violations of international law carried out with impunity have eroded confidence in multilateral commitments and prevented global pledges from translating into national protections and effective humanitarian action [177]. OCHA's Financial Tracking Service recorded the 2025 Joint Response Plan requirement for the Rohingya crisis at $934.5 million and that only $464.4 million (49.7%) had been secured by early December 2025, leaving roughly $470 million unmet [180].

Food Security and Livelihoods

Access to Food and Market Functionality

The UN World Food Programme projects that more than 12 million people in Myanmar will face acute hunger in 2026, and a little more than half the population currently live in poverty, undermining household purchasing power and food affordability [198]. Conflict-related restrictions on movement and access have disrupted market access and supply lines, including reports that the military council blocked entrances and exits to Hpakant since 23 January, limiting population movement and market access in that area [199]. Military offensives that have burned villages and destroyed over 100 homes in Nattalin and ongoing clashes that forced mass displacement in Maungdaw have further reduced physical access to markets and household assets needed to procure food [206][197]. Farmers have shifted toward opium poppy cultivation because it offers quicker profits amid rising commodity prices and expanded markedly since 2023, constraining legal crop production and household food-generation options [203]. According to a UNODC report, land under opium poppy cultivation nationwide rose by nearly 17 percent from the previous year, reaching a 10-year high, while resistance forces and local actors have carried out poppy-clearance operations—including a nearly 30-acre clearance in southern Ngape and destruction of fields in Demoso on 9 February—that affect household incomes and local market supply dynamics [200]. Ongoing business engagement and trade arrangements have largely benefited the junta rather than needy populations, limiting the reach of economic channels that could improve food availability for vulnerable households [198].

Coping Mechanisms

Humanitarian funding for the Rohingya response was severely constrained in 2025: the Joint Response Plan required $934.5 million but had secured only $464.4 million (49.7%) by early December 2025 [202]. US funding for food assistance, education and vocational training dropped to less than half by October 2025, contributing to the closure of numerous schools in the camps [202]. Registered Rohingya refugees numbered approximately 1.17 million, with some 139,378 arrivals between December 2024 and November 2025 (136,518 in the first eleven months of 2025) according to UNHCR and Bangladesh authorities [202]. Escalating clashes in Rakhine—particularly around Maungdaw—have driven new displacement and cross-border migration to Bangladesh [202]. Reports of Arakan Army seizure of Rohingya properties and displaced families losing homes and belongings indicate erosion of household assets and barriers to voluntary return [197]. Taken together, these trends show migration to Bangladesh and increased reliance on external food assistance as primary coping strategies, while funding shortfalls and asset losses undermine households' longer-term coping capacity [198][202][197].

Livelihood Disruption

Displaced Rohingya from Maungdaw report that Arakan Army members entered abandoned homes, removed furniture and essential items, have barred families from retrieving belongings, and announced vacant properties could be reclassified as state property, putting return and property rights at risk and causing loss of household assets [197]. Reporting indicates poppy cultivation has expanded since 2023 as a quick income source amid ongoing fighting and rising commodity prices, eradication is expected to take years, resistance forces cannot provide viable alternative livelihoods, and detained poppy growers face recruitment or forced conscription into local resistance forces, all undermining agricultural incomes and income stability in Chin State and surrounding areas [203]. Insurgent groups controlling parts of the country continue to tax trade and provide minimal public services, creating quasi-functioning local economies that limit broader employment opportunities and market access while concentrating economic control in non-state areas [198]. Analysts note that continued business engagement and some external policy measures have mainly benefited the junta rather than vulnerable populations, contributing to worsening economic suffering for those in poverty and further constraining household purchasing power [198].

Impact on Agricultural Activities and Production

Poppy cultivation has expanded in Chin State and nationally since 2023, driven by quick profits amid ongoing conflict and rising commodity prices, with fields reported as far as the Laythar Hill range [200]. The UN Office on Drugs and Crime reported in December 2025 that poppy cultivation in Chin State increased by 26 percent year-on-year, leaving the state with more than 2,500 acres (1,040 hectares) of poppy fields [200]. UNODC also found nationwide opium poppy cultivation rose nearly 17 percent from the previous year, reaching a ten-year high [203]. Armed groups and resistance forces have both cleared and destroyed poppy fields: PDF Zoland cleared over 20 acres in Tedim Township in October 2024, the People's Revolution Alliance Magway cleared nearly 30 acres in Ngape Township during a two-day operation, and on 9 February 2026 the Karenni Nationalities Defence Force destroyed poppy fields in Demoso Township [200][203]. Detained poppy growers have reportedly been recruited or forcibly conscripted by some resistance forces, a practice residents say undermines livelihoods and is unlikely to reduce cultivation without viable income alternatives [200]. Land reclassification and local authority actions are displacing farming households, including an order by Pa-O authorities requiring 250 households to leave ancestral land in Southern Shan after being labelled as squatters [204]. Displaced Rohingya from Maungdaw report loss of homes and belongings and say they are unable to return safely amid ongoing fighting, with local authorities reportedly declaring vacant Rohingya properties state property, deepening uncertainty over return and land rights [197].

Food and Livelihood Needs and Current Response

For the Rohingya response, the 2025 Joint Response Plan required $934.5 million, of which only $464.4 million (49.7%) had been secured by early December 2025, leaving an approximate $470 million shortfall [202]. The United States was the principal donor supporting food assistance, education and vocational training for Rohingya refugees, but US funding had dropped to less than half of the previous year's levels by October 2025, contributing to the closure of numerous schools in the camps [202]. These funding gaps have reduced the reach and effectiveness of assistance for Rohingya refugees, undermining food, education and vocational programmes [202].

The interim government introduced a seven-point action plan to draft a roadmap for safe, dignified and sustainable repatriation, but durable repatriation remained elusive amid continued cross-border violence and diminishing funding [202].

Education

Learning Environment and Facility Conditions

Security threats have severely compromised the learning environment across multiple regions. Artillery strikes in northern towns and the deployment of soldiers inside schools have deterred parents and students from attending classes, with educational facilities being repurposed for military operations or election activities rather than education [208]. In February 2026, the Shanni Nationalities Army, a junta ally, restricted travel in Mohnyin Township, Kachin State, and has pushed high-school students into military training [209].

Access to Education and Barriers

Multiple barriers prevent children from accessing education. In Mohnyin Township, Kachin State, the Shanni Nationalities Army has restricted travel to prevent high-school students from leaving and is reportedly pushing students into military training, constraining their ability to enroll and attend school [209]. Forced conscription and expanded recruitment drives in urban areas such as Mandalay have targeted school-age youth, and a 17-year-old was reported to have died in detention after refusing conscription, indicating coercive pressures that disrupt continued schooling [213]. In Rohingya refugee camps, reduced funding from the United States—previously the principal donor for food assistance, education and vocational training—to less than half by October 2025 contributed to the closure of numerous schools within the camps [210].

Education Needs and Current Response

Significant funding shortfalls and resource gaps have constrained the education response. The 2025 Joint Response Plan, as tracked by OCHA Financial Tracking Service, required $934.5 million but secured only $464.4 million (49.7% of target) by early December 2025, leaving a shortfall of approximately $470 million [210]. This funding gap has contributed to the closure of multiple camp schools serving Rohingya refugees and left critical needs unaddressed, including the provision of safe learning spaces, trained teachers, learning materials, and psychosocial support. Current assistance efforts remain insufficient to meet the scale of need, particularly given ongoing restrictions on student movement and military recruitment pressures in Kachin State that limit students' ability to pursue formal schooling [210][209].

Health

Availability and Access to Healthcare Services

Escalating conflict in Rakhine—including air and naval strikes that killed at least 15 civilians in Kyaukphyu and military advances that have burned villages and destroyed more than 100 homes in Nattalin—is driving displacement and creating major barriers to access for health care [220][225]. Rohingya communities report they remain unable to return safely to villages and fear permanent loss of homes and belongings, undermining prospects to restore local health services and continuity of care [221]. Detention conditions present acute health access gaps: 16 inmates, including political prisoners, died in custody after the coup amid allegations of torture and lack of access to medical care [224]. MPW said it would continue raising public and international awareness of human rights violations in prisons, specifically citing torture and prisoners' lack of medical care [224]. Between the day of the coup and 13 February 2026, the junta arrested 30,463 people, with 22,769 still in detention, according to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP) [224].

Disease Outbreaks

A Myanmar parliamentary delegation reported that more than 16 million people require humanitarian assistance and nearly 4 million are internally displaced, increasing countrywide public-health vulnerabilities [226].

Health System Challenges

The nation's health and education systems have been devastated, depriving Myanmar of critical human capital and undermining service delivery [218]. Between December 2024 and November 2025, some 139,378 Rohingya entered Bangladesh—136,518 of them in the first eleven months of 2025—and the total number of registered Rohingya refugees is approximately 1.17 million, placing further strain on regional health systems and humanitarian health responses [219]. According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Financial Tracking Service, the 2025 Joint Response Plan for the Rohingya crisis required $934.5 million but had secured only $464.4 million (49.7 percent) by early December 2025, and US funding for food, education and vocational training had fallen to less than half of the previous year by October 2025, contributing to service reductions including school closures in camps [219]. Continued violence across the border and diminishing international funding are compounding the Rohingya crisis, leaving Bangladesh with mounting humanitarian, economic and security pressures [219].

Mental Health and Psychosocial Support (MHPSS)

At a UN Parliamentary Hearing on 12–13 February 2026, a Myanmar parliamentary delegation stated that more than 16 million people require humanitarian assistance and nearly 4 million are internally displaced, underscoring widespread MHPSS needs across affected populations [226]. Torture, reported lack of access to medical care in prisons and large numbers of political detainees indicate urgent MHPSS needs among incarcerated people; between the coup and 13 February 2026 the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP) reported 30,463 arrests with 22,769 still in detention [224]. Rohingya residents reported loss of land and homes and said ongoing instability in Rakhine State prevents safe return, contributing to heightened psychosocial stress among displaced Rohingya communities [221]. Reduced funding—alongside halved US support and more than 100,000 new arrivals within a year—has led to service reductions such as school closures in the camps [219].

Health Needs and Current Response

The UN World Food Programme projects more than 12 million people in Myanmar will face acute hunger in 2026, and a little more than half the population currently live in poverty [218]. Registered Rohingya refugees number approximately 1.17 million, and 139,378 Rohingya entered Bangladesh between December 2024 and November 2025—136,518 of them during the first eleven months of 2025—following intensified clashes in Rakhine after a ceasefire collapsed in November 2023 [219]. According to OCHA's Financial Tracking Service, the 2025 Joint Response Plan for the Rohingya required $934.5 million but as of early December only $464.4 million (49.7%) had been secured, leaving an approximate $470 million shortfall, and US funding had dropped to less than half of the previous year by October 2025, contributing to the closure of numerous camp schools [219].

Nutrition

Availability and Access to Nutrition Services

No data available for this section.

Nutrition Needs and Current Response

No data available for this section.

WASH

Availability of Water Sources

No data available for this section.

Access to Sanitation Facilities and Hygiene Practices

No data available for this section.

Waste Management and Vector-Borne Disease Risks

No data available for this section.

Main WASH Needs and Humanitarian Response

No data available for this section.

Shelter and Non-Food Items (NFI)

Damage to Housing and Shelter Needs

More than 100 homes were destroyed in Nattalin during the Myanmar military's advance across the Bago Yoma corridor, raising fears of wider village burning and loss of shelter in the area [231]. In Maungdaw Township, intense fighting forced Rohingya families to flee, leaving many houses vacant for weeks amid reports that Arakan Army members entered abandoned homes, removed household belongings, and announced vacant Rohingya properties could be demolished or reclassified as state property, undermining prospects for return and recovery [228]. Items taken from these homes include furniture, water tanks, and other essential household goods, with residents and relatives prevented from retrieving belongings [228]. Displaced Rohingya from Maungdaw have relocated within the township or crossed into Bangladesh, contributing to a renewed influx that UNHCR and Bangladesh's Refugee Relief and Repatriation Commissioner say brought approximately 139,378 arrivals between December 2024 and November 2025, bringing the total registered Rohingya to about 1.17 million and increasing pressure on shelter needs in camps and settlements [230]. Sources attribute the renewed displacement to escalated clashes between Myanmar's military junta and the Arakan Army in Rakhine State, with intensified insecurity in border areas—particularly Maungdaw—forcing civilians to flee [230]. Land-tenure actions elsewhere include Pa-O authorities ordering some 250 households off ancestral land in Southern Shan through reclassification that labels residents as squatters, creating obstacles to restitution and rebuilding for affected households [232]. Humanitarian funding shortfalls—the 2025 Joint Response Plan for the Rohingya crisis was 49.7% funded as of early December 2025—further constrain shelter assistance for displaced populations and impede reopening of services and community facilities [230].

Living Conditions in Camps or Settlements

The influx of Rohingya refugees into Bangladesh has created severe overcrowding in camps and settlements. Key displacement figures include approximately 1.17 million registered Rohingya refugees, with 139,378 arrivals between December 2024 and November 2025, of whom 136,518 arrived during the first eleven months of 2025 [230]. Humanitarian funding shortfalls have significantly affected services in camps: the 2025 Joint Response Plan required $934.5 million but by early December only $464.4 million (49.7%) had been secured [230]. Reductions in US funding by October 2025 contributed to the closure of numerous schools within the camps [230]. The ongoing uncertainty over property rights for displaced Rohingya—with Arakan Army authorities announcing that vacant properties could be demolished or reclassified as state property—has heightened protection concerns and increased uncertainty over safe return prospects [228]. Escalating clashes between the junta and the Arakan Army, particularly around Maungdaw, continue to drive displacement and constrain safe return, exacerbating insecurity in border areas [230].

NFI and Shelter Needs and Current Response

According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Financial Tracking Service, the 2025 Joint Response Plan for the Rohingya crisis required $934.5 million and as of early December only $464.4 million (49.7 percent) had been secured, leaving a shortfall of approximately $470 million [230]. US funding for Rohingya assistance fell to less than half of the previous year's levels by October 2025 [230]. The funding shortfalls have severely constrained the distribution of essential non-food items and shelter materials to displaced populations.

The crisis has been compounded by the loss of household essentials—including furniture, water tanks, and other critical items—from abandoned Rohingya homes in Maungdaw, creating urgent NFI needs for families who fled with few possessions [228]. Response efforts face logistical challenges in reaching affected populations amid ongoing insecurity and escalated clashes between Myanmar's military junta and the Arakan Army, particularly in Maungdaw and other border areas [230].

Protection

Impact on civilians

Air and naval strikes in Kyaukphyu killed at least 15 civilians, including infants, women and elderly, amid escalated bombardment in southern Rakhine State on Feb 20, 2026 [250]. Heavy artillery and other attacks have struck civilian areas and polling sites, with at least five civilians seriously injured in Hpakant during electionrelated operations [242]. The Myanmar military's advance across the Bago Yoma corridor has included village burnings and the destruction of more than 100 homes in Nattalin, heightening displacement and shelter needs, while Hpasawng Township fell to the military after months of clashes [245][258]. The Arakan Army has been accused of entering abandoned Rohingya houses in Maungdaw to remove belongings and of announcing vacant properties could be demolished or reclassified as state property, preventing displaced families from retrieving possessions and undermining prospects for safe return [236]. PaO authorities ordered 250 households off ancestral land in Southern Shan, indicating localized forced evictions and loss of land rights [237]. Reports of forced recruitment and coercion are widespread: a 17yearold from Mahaaungmyay died in detention after refusing conscription; a junta ally is reportedly pushing highschool students into military training and restricting travel in Mohnyin Township; and PDF Zoland detained around 200 poppy farmers on Feb 5, holding over 190 men and planning to conscript detainees aged 18–35 [235][243][241]. Prisoner abuse and deaths in custody persist: Myanmar Prison Witness documented at least 16 inmate deaths (including political prisoners) along with reports of torture, beatings, solitary confinement and denial of medical care, while the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners reported 30,463 arrests since the coup and 22,769 people still detained as of Feb 13, 2026 [252]. Allegations of killings, rape and other grave crimes have been submitted to TimorLeste prosecutors under universal jurisdiction, prompting Myanmar to expel the TimorLeste chargé d'affaires on Feb 13, 2026 [244][240]. Humanitarian needs and service disruptions are significant: a Myanmar parliamentary delegation reported more than 16 million people require humanitarian assistance and nearly 4 million remain internally displaced, the World Food Programme projects over 12 million people will face acute hunger in 2026, and reduced donor funding contributed to the closure of many Rohingya camp schools by October 2025 [254][253][251].

Factors Driving protection risks

Widespread armed conflict continues across Myanmar, with heavy artillery fire around the January 2026 elections causing civilian casualties and deserted polling stations in northern Shan and Kachin areas [242]. Armed groups and local administrations have compounded protection risks through property seizures and restrictions on return, with Rohingya in Maungdaw reporting that the Arakan Army removed household items from abandoned homes and declared vacant properties state property [236]. Forced conscription and recruitment are expanding: resistance groups detained poppy farmers for military training [255][260]. Illicit economies are growing amid conflict and deprivation—UNODC reported a near17% nationwide rise in land used for opium poppy cultivation and a 26% increase in Chin State—raising risks of exploitation and forced labour [241]. Legal protection and accountability gaps persist: TimorLeste opened universaljurisdiction proceedings accusing 10 junta members, including Senior Gen. Min Aung Hlaing, of war crimes, and Myanmar expelled TimorLeste's envoy in midFebruary 2026 in response [244][248][240]. Crossborder displacement continues: UNHCR and Bangladesh's Refugee Relief and Repatriation Commissioner report roughly 1.17 million registered Rohingya refugees, with 139,378 arrivals between December 2024 and November 2025 tied to renewed clashes in Rakhine [251].

Psychological and mental health impacts

Air and naval strikes in Kyaukphyu that killed at least 15 civilians, including infants, women and elderly, contributed to acute trauma among survivors and families of the deceased [250]. A 17yearold from Mahaaungmyay Township died in detention after refusing conscription, amid reports of resumed and expanding recruitment drives in Mandalay that are generating fear and distress in communities [260]. In northern Chin State, PDF Zoland arrested more than 200 poppy farmers on February 5; nearly two dozen detainees (including two pregnant women) were released after receiving four cane strokes, while over 190 men remain held and detainees aged 18–35 face compulsory military training, actions that have produced physical harm and likely psychological trauma among detainees and their families [255]. Rohingya displaced from Maungdaw report that armed actors have entered vacant homes, removed belongings and barred families from retrieving property, intensifying anxiety, fear of return and a sense of permanent loss among displaced households [236]. Between the 2021 coup and 13 February 2026, the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP) recorded 30,463 people arrested with 22,769 still detained, and reported at least 16 inmates (including political prisoners) died in custody, highlighting widespread detentionrelated trauma and concerns about torture and lack of medical care in custody [252]. Community testimonies from Chin areas describing burned villages and killed clergy underscore collective trauma and displacement across affected populations [248]. Fear has also led families to remain silent about abuses and property loss, indicating social withdrawal and constrained coping among affected communities [236].

Protection Needs and Current Response

More than 16 million people require humanitarian assistance and nearly 4 million remain internally displaced [254]. Key figures include: Since the 2021 coup, 30,463 people have been arrested with 22,769 still in detention as of 13 February 2026 [252]. Sixteen inmates, including political prisoners, have died in custody amid reports of torture and lack of medical care, with civil society continuing awareness efforts [252]. Approximately 1.17 million Rohingya are registered refugees, with 139,378 arrivals recorded between December 2024 and November 2025 (136,518 in the first eleven months of 2025) as clashes in Rakhine/ Maungdaw drive new displacement [251]. The 2025 Joint Response Plan for the Rohingya required $934.5 million but had only $464.4 million (49.7%) secured by early December

2025, contributing to service reductions in camps [251]. Rohingya community members report being unable to return safely to villages in Rakhine State and allege seizures of homes and belongings in Maungdaw amid ongoing instability and an absence of legal safeguards for property rights [236]. Civil society and rights groups are documenting abuses and pursuing legal avenues: the Chin Human Rights Organisation submitted a dossier to Timor-Leste prosecutors under universal jurisdiction, prompting Timor-Leste to open proceedings and Myanmar to expel the Timor-Leste envoy on 13 February 2026 [248][244]. Human Rights Watch and others note a limited regional response and emphasize the need for external accountability mechanisms to address postcoup atrocities [244]. Repatriation pledges by Myanmar (180,000) have not produced tangible returns, and funding shortfalls have led to program closures and weakened prospects for safe, dignified repatriation or durable solutions [251]. Protection monitoring and reporting are being conducted by groups including the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP), CHRO, Human Rights Watch and local actors, who are documenting detentions, deaths in custody, property losses and displacement and advocating for referrals, case management and international attention [252][248][244][236][251].

Child Protection concerns

Mid-February 2026, recruitment drives resumed in Mandalay and a 17-year-old from Mahaaungmyay Township died in detention after refusing conscription, highlighting forced recruitment and lethal risks to children and adolescents [235]. Junta-allied actors and local armed groups have been pushing highschool students into military training and restricting travel in Mohnyin Township, Kachin State, to prevent students from leaving [243]. In early February, PDF Zoland detained more than 200 poppy farmers in Tedim Township and announced detainees aged 18–35 who were not household heads would be required to undergo military training; over 190 men remained held while some detainees, including two pregnant women, were released after corporal punishment [255][241]. Air and naval strikes in Kyaukphyu killed at least 15 civilians, including infants, underscoring escalating risks to children from bombardment and active hostilities [250].

Violence against women and girls

Reports and human rights organizations allege that sexualized violence has been used as a weapon of war against ethnic minorities — including Rohingya, Chin, Kachin and Karen — linked to the 2017 crackdown that drove an estimated 700,000 Rohingya into Bangladesh and to abuses since the 2021 coup, alongside village burnings, forced displacement, detention and other heavyhanded tactics [248].

Vulnerable Groups / Special Needs Groups

Unaccompanied and Separated Children

A junta-aligned force is pushing high-school students into military training and restricting travel in Mohnyin Township, Kachin State, to prevent students from leaving, indicating expanded targeting of school-aged children for recruitment [266]. In mid-February 2026, recruitment drives resumed and expanded in Mandalay, where a 17-year-old from Mahaaungmyay Township died in detention after refusing conscription [263]. Clashes in Maungdaw have forced Rohingya families to flee, leaving vacant homes that residents say have been entered and stripped of belongings and declared state property by local authorities, a development that compounds separation and protection risks for displaced children [270].

Pregnant and Lactating Women

Air and naval strikes in Kyaukphyu, southern Rakhine State, killed at least 15 civilians in February 2026, including infants, women and elderly, illustrating elevated protection risks for women and children in conflict-affected areas [274]. Rohingya residents report they remain unable to return safely to villages in Rakhine State and fear permanent loss of homes and belongings amid ongoing conflict [270]. The World Food Programme projects that more than 12 million people in Myanmar will face acute hunger in 2026 [275].

Adolescents and Youth

Recruitment drives have resumed and expanded in urban areas, including Mandalay, where a 17-year-old reportedly died in detention after refusing conscription [264]. Observers note the junta's broader conscription policy continues to replenish forces even as hundreds of new conscripts have escaped or defected [265]. Schools are being militarized and youth subject to coercion: soldiers were reported waiting inside schools with guns during the election period, and young people faced threats such as being banned from university if they did not vote [280].

People with Disabilities

No specific information was documented for people with disabilities in the reporting period.

Elderly

In February 2026, air and naval strikes in Kyaukphyu killed at least 15 civilians, with reports noting infants, women and elderly among the dead, indicating direct risk to older people from intensified bombardment in southern Rakhine State [274]. Reports also document deaths in custody and a lack of access to medical care for inmates, with 30,463 arrests between the 2021 coup and 13 February 2026 and 22,769 people still detained, underscoring constrained healthcare access for detained populations [281].

Displaced

More than 16 million people require humanitarian assistance and nearly 4 million remain internally displaced, according to a Myanmar parliamentary delegate at the UN Parliamentary Hearing in New York on 12–13 February 2026 [273]. Intense fighting forced many Rohingya to flee within Maungdaw or cross into Bangladesh [270]. Rohingya residents from Maungdaw report that Arakan Army members have entered abandoned homes, removing furniture, water tanks and other belongings and barring relatives from retrieving property, deepening anxiety about return and loss of assets [270]. AA authorities reportedly announced vacant Rohingya houses could be demolished and that properties without original owners present would be classified as state property under their administration, increasing fears of permanent dispossession [270].

Displaced community members cite lack of legal safeguards and clear guarantees for property rights as a key barrier to voluntary, dignified return [270]. According to UNHCR and Bangladesh's Refugee Relief and Repatriation Commissioner, approximately 1.17 million Rohingya were registered in Bangladesh and 139,378 Rohingya arrived between December 2024 and November 2025, with 136,518 arriving during the first eleven months of 2025, with the influx attributed to renewed clashes after a ceasefire collapsed in November 2023 [271]. Myanmar military authorities pledged to repatriate 180,000 forcibly displaced Rohingya, but no tangible progress has been reported on durable returns [271]. Funding shortfalls have undermined services in the camps: OCHA's Financial Tracking Service recorded a $934.5 million 2025 Joint Response Plan target with only $464.4 million (49.7%) secured as of early December, and U.S. funding for food assistance, education and vocational training fell to less than half of the prior year by October 2025, triggering closure of numerous schools in the camps [271]. Beyond Rakhine, Pa-O authorities ordered 250 households off ancestral land in Southern Shan through reclassification schemes labelling residents as squatters, reported 16 February 2026 [276]. Protection risks include threats to displaced households, including reported threats to burn homes to coerce return, and a repressive security environment in which the junta has arrested 30,463 people since the coup with 22,769 still detained as of 13 February 2026, according to AAPP, complicating prospects for safe return and local integration [280][281].

Minorities

Ethnic minorities including the Chin, Kachin and Karen have been documented as enduring village burnings, forced displacement and sexualized violence allegedly used as a weapon of war since the 2021 coup [272]. In February 2026 the Chin Human Rights Organization (CHRO) submitted a dossier to Timor-Leste alleging gang rape, massacre, the killing of religious leaders and a hospital air strike, prompting Timorese prosecutors to open legal proceedings and leading Myanmar's junta to expel Timor-Leste's chargé d'affaires [268][269][279]. The case was brought under the principle of universal jurisdiction and targets ten junta officials, including Senior Gen. Min Aung Hlaing, as a route to accountability for alleged crimes against ethnic minorities [269][268]. Human Rights Watch and other actors have urged support for Timor-Leste's legal action as an external access-to-justice pathway for minority victims of post-coup atrocities [269][278]. CHRO's submission and engagement with Timor-Leste's judiciary illustrate minority civil-society efforts to access international justice mechanisms when domestic remedies are unavailable or blocked by the junta [272][268]. In Rakhine State, Rohingya displaced from Maungdaw report Arakan Army members entering vacant homes, removing furniture and water tanks, declaring ownerless properties for demolition or state appropriation, and barring relatives from retrieving belongings, undermining prospects for safe voluntary return and property rights [270]. Between December 2024 and November 2025 some 139,378 Rohingya arrived in Bangladesh and the total registered Rohingya population stands at about 1.17 million, while the 2025 Joint Response Plan for the Rohingya was only 49.7% funded by early December 2025—funding shortfalls that have led to school closures and constrained basic services in camps [271].

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