Human Rights and international relations
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Description:
"This report summarizes the situation as of 25 August 2024.
Situation Overview
Yangon
According to the ministerial authorities for health,
As of 18 August 2024, a total of 2 957 hospitalized cases of acute watery diarrhea (AWD) including 160 cases with severe dehydration were reported in Yangon Region, since 24 June 2024.
Since week 31 (starting on 28 July 2024) more than 400 hospitalized AWD cases have been reported every week, with a total of 515 hospitalized AWD cases reported in the week 33 (12 – 18 August 2024). No new cases with severe dehydration were reported after 4 August 2024.
As per information from open sources, it has been reported that cases are on the rise again in some townships.
Rakhine
According to the early warning and response systems (EWARS) supported by the Health Cluster in Myanmar, an increase of AWD cases has been observed in Sittwe in Rakhine State. A notable surge of cases, including those with severe dehydration, has been observed since late July. Cholera infection is confirmed in some of those AWD cases.
During the most recent epidemiological week (week 34, from18 to 24 August), a total of 364 new AWD cases were reported, including 22 AWD cases with severe dehydration. This represents an increase compared to the 197 AWD cases reported in the previous week (week 33, from 11 to 17 August). The AWD cases were reported from both camps and residential areas in Sittwe.
Out of 22 AWD cases with severe dehydration, four were among children under the age of five, and 18 cases were children aged 5 years and older..."
Source/publisher:
World Health Organization (Geneva) via Reliefweb (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2024-09-06
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"Primary country: Myanmar.....Source: UN High Commissioner for Refugees.....Format: Map.....Theme: Protection and Human Rights.....Language:
English..."
Source/publisher:
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (Geneva) via Reliefweb (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2024-09-05
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Individual Documents
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UNHCR (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees), Human Rights and international relations
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"WEEKLY HIGHLIGHTS:
In the South-East, the number of internally displaced people (IDPs) increased from 932,400 last week to 933,100 this week.
As a result of increased fighting in Shan State (North), 481 people from Lashio Township have been displaced to Kyethi Township.
In addition, 200 people from Tanintharyi Township have been newly displaced within the same township..."
Source/publisher:
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (Geneva) via Reliefweb (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2024-09-05
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UNHCR (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees), Human Rights and international relations
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"The United Nations Security Council should mobilize to prevent further atrocities in Myanmar. The Council’s inaction over the last few months starkly contrasts with the clear warnings from senior UN officials who are urgently ringing alarm bells. As the Council is grappling with calls for reform, the current silence on Myanmar only deepens the sense that the Council can’t rise to the moment when it matters.
The UN special rapporteur on human rights in Myanmar warned in July that “the situation carries echoes of the lead-up to genocidal violence in 2016 and 2017.” In a rare joint statement, the UN special advisers on genocide prevention and the responsibility to protect urged the international community to undertake “joint efforts to reassess the crisis in Myanmar in the light of the significant developments that are unfolding and launch a robust coordinated effort.”
In the last few weeks, both the UN children’s agency, Unicef, and the UN’s acting resident coordinator in Myanmar have condemned attacks on civilians in Rakhine State.
The Council’s last open meeting on Myanmar was held in April. Britain is the “penholder” on Myanmar, which means it takes the lead on all statements or resolutions in the Council and bears unique responsibility to galvanize the members. The Council has allowed paralysis at the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) level around Myanmar to influence its approach, leading to paralysis at the international level too. The Council has also failed to follow up on its December 2022 resolution on Myanmar, the body’s first since the country’s independence in 1948.
In contrast, both the UN Human Rights Council and the UN General Assembly have adopted a series of stronger but nonbinding resolutions on Myanmar, including calls for an embargo on arms and jet fuel to the military junta. The crisis presents a key test for the UK’s new Labour government, which has claimed the mantle of “progressive realism” and defense of international law.
Progressive realism may promote engaging with regional blocs, but allowing regional paralysis to mute the Security Council amid atrocities certainly is neither progressive nor pragmatic.
Since the breakdown of an unofficial ceasefire between the Myanmar military and the ethnic Rakhine Arakan Army last November, Human Rights Watch has been warning that the ethnic Rohingya population, which was already marginalized, faced even greater risks. The Rohingya have been subjected for years to movement restrictions, mass detention, denial of medical care persecution and apartheid.
The recent violence has included the killing of nearly 200 Rohingya civilians on the banks of the Naf River. They were attempting to escape hostilities after monthlong Arakan Army attacks on Rohingya villages and neighborhoods. Satellite imagery and thermal anomaly data analyzed by Human Rights Watch reveal that more than 40 villages and hamlets in Buthidaung township were partly or completely destroyed by fire from April 24 to May 21.
The Myanmar military has been stoking tensions between the Rakhine Buddhist and Rohingya Muslim communities for years, most recently through the unlawful recruitment of Rohingya men and boys, triggering heightened hate speech and misinformation.
These divisive tactics were previously used during the ethnic cleansing against the Rohingya in 2012. The community’s vulnerability was then deepened by the military junta’s 2017 scorched-earth campaign, rampant sexual violence and genocidal acts, which left villages burned to ash as several hundred thousand people fled to Bangladesh.
More than 327,000 Rohingya have been newly displaced across Rakhine State since fighting resumed in late 2023, bringing the overall number of displaced people to well over a half a million. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs estimates that 400,000 people are experiencing “food gaps” in Rakhine State with cross-border supplies limited because of the conflict.
Members of the military junta, the Arakan Army and other armed groups could also face scrutiny by the prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) for alleged crimes amid the current conflict committed in Bangladesh, such as forced recruitment and deportation of Rohingya.
The court is investigating the situation, but its jurisdiction is limited to crimes committed, at least in part, in Bangladesh, an ICC member country, or on the territory of any other member of the court. The Security Council should expand the court’s jurisdiction by referring the situation in Myanmar, which is not an ICC member country, to the court.
Recent events also underscore the blatant disregard of the provisional measures ordered by International Court of Justice in the ongoing case brought by Gambia against Myanmar. The provisional measures are binding, and the Council should play a role in enforcing them. In a June report, the UN high commissioner for human rights found that “actions taken by all parties that endanger the Rohingya appear inconsistent with the provisional measures ordered by the International Court of Justice.”
Article 94(2) of the UN Charter makes clear that parties to disputes may take recourse to the Security Council if their opponent fails to “perform obligations incumbent upon it under a judgment rendered by the Court.”
The Council’s great-power deadlock means that it has been far too quiet on Myanmar for years. But if it chooses to let recent events pass without even a meeting or public show of concern, that neglect will stain the legacy of every ambassador sitting on the Council, particularly the UK, which is supposed to “lead” on Myanmar..."
Source/publisher:
Human Rights Watch (USA)
Date of entry/update:
2024-09-05
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Individual Documents
Category:
UN Security Council, UN Human Rights pages on Myanmar, Human Rights and international relations
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"BANGKOK, Thailand (4 September 2024) – The Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development (FORUM-ASIA) condemns the Myanmar military junta’s plan to expand the age limit of its forced conscription policy.
We are calling on the international community to express solidarity with the people of Myanmar.
The junta’s plan to extend the age limit of forced conscription represents its desperate attempt to tighten its grip on power amid its losing streak against the growing pro-democracy resistance movement.
On 25 August 2024, junta leader Senior General Min Aung Hlaing announced plans to introduce a new “security system with public participation,” which required men aged 35 to 60 to serve as guards, with the possibility of being sent to the frontlines of fighting forces.
On 16 August 2024, the junta established the Central Supervisory Committee for People’s Security and Anti-Terrorism to organise a military training. The committee is also tasked to form branch offices at regional, district, and township levels to oversee “people’s security and anti-terrorism” groups.
The junta’s plan follows its forced conscription policy implemented on 10 February 2024. The policy activates the 2010 People’s Military Service Law, mandating men aged 18 to 35 and women aged 18 to 27 to serve two years in the military, with professionals such as doctors and engineers potentially serving up to five years. Those evading service or assisting others to do so face up to five years in prison. The junta planned to conscript 5,000 individuals monthly starting in April 2024.
Civilians used for forced labor and human shields
FORUM-ASIA has condemned the junta’s forced conscription policy. The military has a documented history of using civilians as human shields as well as forcing them into hard labor.
Since the attempted coup in 2021, the military junta continues to impose forced labor and recruitment amidst armed conflict, the International Labour Organization’s Commission of Inquiry found in October 2023.
The military junta is also forcibly abducting and arresting citizens, using them as human shields, according to local news and human rights groups.
Rather than be forced to fight for a war they did not choose, the forced conscription has pushed Myanmar’s youth to flee their homes to join the resistance movement..
United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres expressed concern over the reported forced detention and recruitment of Myanmar youth. UN Special Rapporteur on the situation in Myanmar, Tom Andrews, also noted how the junta has been intensifying its assault on civilians–utilizing powerful weapons–following its troop losses and recruitment challenges.
Call to action
FORUM-ASIA calls on the Myanmar military junta to immediately halt its forced conscription policy, abductions, forced labor, and use of civilians as human shields.
“FORUM-ASIA urges the international community, including the UN and ASEAN to thoroughly investigate the Myanmar military junta’s long list of human rights violations. The junta should be held accountable for all its crimes through sanctions and other punitive measures,” said Mary Aileen Diez-Bacalso, Executive Director of FORUM-ASIA.
“The international community must urgently isolate the junta and support the people of Myanmar in their struggle for justice and freedom,” Bacalso added...'
Source/publisher:
FORUM-ASIA
Date of entry/update:
2024-09-04
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Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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Title: Evolution of the Myanmar Revolution (Part 3): The Factors That Sparked the Current Revolution
Description:
"One spring morning in 2021, the sky fell: The military was staging another coup. That’s what every citizen felt, as they knew nothing would be the same in their lives or for their nation.
Twenty years earlier, on Sept. 11, 2001, when Islamic terrorists launched their deadly attacks on New York’s World Trade Center in what would become known as the 9/11 attacks, we all witnessed shocking live video of a jetliner flying into the North Tower, followed soon after by another flying into the South Tower. As the towers exploded in fireballs, with smoke pouring from within, followed by their horrifying collapse, it definitely seemed to all as if the sky was falling—especially for the onlookers in lower Manhattan.
On Feb. 1, 2021, when the military seized power in Myanmar, the sky—the whole sky—fell for the Myanmar people. The coup staged by military leader Min Aung Hlaing has inflicted huge damage on the country and devastated the entire population of 55 million.
Since Day One, nothing has been the same for Myanmar’s society, politics and economy. It changed everything—crushing the existing social order, shattering the economy, destroying the livelihoods of the people and forcing the country into a revolution. For the Myanmar people, the coup was “The Attack”, worse than any terrorist attack and different from the coups the country experienced in 1962 and 1988.
A day of hope turns into doomsday
Feb. 1, 2021 began as a day of promise for the country and its people; on that day their newly elected or reelected lawmakers were due to assemble in Parliament and a second five-year term was due to begin for the civilian government first formed in 2016—54 years after the first coup in 1962. Though the civilian government had in its first term faced both expected and unexpected political turbulence as it struggled to negotiate a system designed and manipulation by the military—the military-drafted constitution, the military’s quota of 25 percent of seats in Parliament, military-appointed ministerial positions in the government, the obstructions of a military-backed party, and the conservative military leaders themselves—the coming term, many believed, would further the country’s political transition toward democracy, autonomy for ethnic states and economic growth.
By the time the sun rose, however, the coup had crushed the expectations, held by the entire population, that their country was heading in the right direction thanks to the result of the votes they cast less than three months earlier. The coup leader, Min Aung Hlaing, tried to justify his takeover by claiming that the election was fraudulent—a claim rejected by the majority of Myanmar people as well as independent international electoral observers. The putsch was not the first; multiple generations have been affected by the military’s repeated deceptions—first in 1962, a second time in 1988 and again this time in 2021. Their anger at the military was tripled.
The latest takeover sparked an uprising, stirring what had been a stable Myanmar to get angry again. According to dictionary definitions, “angry” means: “having the feeling people get when something unfair, painful or bad happens,” or: “having a strong feeling against someone who has behaved badly, making you want to shout at them or hurt them.” Both definitions literally capture the feeling of the Myanmar people when the military staged the coup. That’s one of the elements that has brought Myanmar to revolution this time.
But the Spring Revolution ignited by the coup did not begin as a real revolution. At first, it was a nationwide uprising like the one in 1988. One definition of “revolution” is: “a change in the way a country is governed, usually to a different political system and often using violence or war.” That’s what happened a few months after the coup. Like every revolution throughout world history, Myanmar’s revolution had multiple causes.
Immediate elements for a revolution
A coup is a way to kill democracy, but Min Aung Hlaing’s coup killed much more than that.
It also killed every potential political process and all platforms that might lead to democracy and federalism.
What his coup killed:
the 2020 election results (a landslide victory for the NLD).
the elected civilian government and Parliament.
the democratic transition started in 2011 by the coup maker’s ex-boss, General-turned-President Thein Sein.
the national reconciliation process involving an elected government, other key stakeholders (including ethnic organizations) and the military, as well as public support for the process as an alternative to
the ceasefire or peace process, which prompted many EAOs to join the new armed resistance after the coup.
the opinion held by the public, including politicians, ethnic leaders and civil society groups (except military sympathizers), that the military leadership at that time was a key stakeholder in the democratization process.
With those political platforms destroyed, the people were deeply aware that this coup would end the “best and freest” period they had known, that it was different from the two dictatorships, both of which lasted for decades, that preceded it; that this coup would destroy everything: their lives, businesses, education, opportunities, hopes and dreams, now and in the future—in other words, forever.
All generations, from grandparents to their grandchildren, felt sad, hopeless and angry. These emotions feed into political discontent as an essential element for revolution.
A new level of butchery
In the beginning, the uprising was peaceful, organized, and even colorful and creative as demonstrators, mostly members of Generation Z, staged protests in various ways, including street performances. Their demands were simple—truth and democratic values, as expressed in their slogans: “Down with the military dictatorship!”, “Respect our votes!” “Free our leaders.” In addition to these demands, huge graffiti appeared on city walls, expressing their anger: “Fuck the coup!”
But the Myanmar military has never changed when it comes to its oppressive attitude and conservative mentality, which have been institutionalized over many decades since the first coup. If anything, it has only gotten worse. The way the regime troops responded to the peaceful demonstrations was much worse than any other crackdown, even in their brutal history.
They indulged in a new level of butchery this time. Soon after the coup in 2021, the junta troops started killing young peaceful protesters execution-style, aiming for their heads and hearts. Victims of the junta this time were from all generations. One of the youngest victims was 5-year-old Khin Myo Chit, who was killed in her home in Mandalay. Another was 19-year-old Kyal Sin, who was shot in the head while protesting on a street in Mandalay. My former fellow political prisoner Ko Soe Moe Hlaing (aka Mae Gyi)—by this time in his early 50s, he had taken part in the ’88 uprising, joined the ABSDF student army, and was jailed in the 1990s for 13 years—was tortured to death within two days of his arrest at home in Yangon in May 2021.
Within a few months, Min Aung Hlaing had turned Myanmar into a “killing field”. The streets were bloody; funerals were being held in every city; houses were deserted; prisons were packed; the nation was crying.
The mood of the people was as if murderers were at their door; all their dreams had been torn apart; nothing good was left and evil prevailed; the dark age had returned as they saw their country fall again into the abyss of military dictatorship, realizing their worst fears. This left the majority of Myanmar people feeling so desperate they’d rather fight back than submit to military rule. The hard lessons from their bitter experiences in the past strengthened their feelings.
Bitter lessons of the past fuel revolution
The hard lessons the Myanmar people learned under the previous coups and from earlier resistance movements also served as foundations for a revolutionary period. These feelings, determination and lessons were accumulated over 60 years of consecutive military dictatorships.
As discussed in Part 2 of this series, the Myanmar people learned from the ’88 Uprising and the following years under the then junta:
Popular uprisings don’t work because the generals will simply oppress them. (Yes, once again.)
Elections and even landslide victories don’t work because the generals will reject them. (They did it again!)
Nonviolent methods don’t work because the generals respond with violence. (They are ferociously violent this time.)
Pressure from the international community doesn’t work because the generals don’t play by its standards. (Exactly the same.)
Having learned those hard lessons, they are more politically aware that this military, with the same mentality of the generals, will repeat what it did in the past and will even choose a worse path, as they are doing now.
Given all these hard lessons from the past and present, combined with the specific elements of the present, the new level of butchery and their feelings of sadness, anger and fear, they had only one option left—a revolution.
The final battle—do or die!
Driven by this impetus, they started to fight the junta with their bare hands. Their revolution was a reaction against the junta’s injustice and cruelty. They started to wage their “war” with makeshift “weapons” like slingshots, catapults, air guns made from blue plastic pipes, slings and bamboo arrows. Many of them were killed, but they refused to cower. In short, the whole terrible situation drove young people in different regions and states to take up arms for “the final battle”, as they put it, which means “do or die”— a different level of fighting from the 1988 Uprising.
Not only young Bamar people from Yangon, Mandalay, Sagaing, Magwe, Tanintharyi and other regions but also ethnic youths from Chin, Karenni, Kachin, Karen and other states decided to fight back with whatever they had—even with rudimentary hunting rifles. They flocked to ethnic armed group-controlled areas to undergo military training. While some of them returned to their towns to join underground movements, most remained in the jungle to form their own anti-regime armed resistance forces across the country.
Meanwhile, the formation of the National Unity Government (NUG) by elected NLD lawmakers and their ethnic allies—not only as an umbrella organization for the anti-regime movement but also as a parallel government to challenge the junta’s legitimacy at home and abroad—has given people more faith in the revolution as they see the NUG as their legitimate government. The NUG has worked with some anti-regime EAOs and their collaboration has seen a mushrooming of People’s Defense Force groups (PDFs) across the country.
This was a different level of resistance, and marked the beginning of a revolution against the military dictatorship, after the young resistance fighters (some of them were first-time voters) saw their votes and democratic rights discarded. This revolution initiated by a diverse new generation of young Bamar and ethnic fighters was also different from the autonomy-based struggle started by some EAOs many decades ago. That’s why we’ve been seeing members of PDFs fighting alongside experienced EAOs like the Kachin Independence Army, the Ta’ang National Liberation Army, the Karen National Union, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army and others in various military offensives. They’ll do whatever it takes to end the military dictatorship, as rooting out the system is their common goal.
This is the first revolution in Myanmar’s modern history.
Unprecedented coordination
Unlike the 1988 coup, many established ethnic armed organizations have taken a political stand in solidarity with the anti-coup movement. They have supported, trained and equipped newly arrived young fighters and have fought the junta troops with them. Such coordination had never before been seen in the history of armed struggle in Myanmar, bringing together young and old generations, old and new fighters and newly-formed PDFs and established EAOs, though of course there have been disagreements and arguments.
An important factor this time is that many EAOs have the same feeling as young fighters and the people about this latest coup. The military has always bullied and betrayed the people but this time they went too far. For many of the EAOs who sympathize with the anti-military regime movement, the latest takeover was a testament to the fact that the military couldn’t be trusted, especially in the peace process they participated in with the military for many years. The result was that following the coup they openly stated that they would no longer participate in the regime’s peace process.
The collaboration between PDFs and EAOs put the Myanmar people’s hopes of toppling the regime in high gear and saw them join hands to support the revolution by establishing crowdfunding among their compatriots at home and abroad, generating millions of dollars. It’s the Myanmar people’s support that has kept the revolution moving forward for more than three years now while the world merely offers lip service, and not a dime in material assistance.
While the people’s financial support for the revolution plays an important role, new technology like mobile phones and the internet have become another powerful force in the Spring Revolution. Unlike in 1988, information technology in 2021 enabled the people to record the regime’s atrocities on their phones, allowing the world to see how brutal the junta is. Furthermore, the internet also makes crowdfunding easier as well-wishers can contribute to the revolution with a few taps on their phones. On the front lines, the PDFs have successfully turned commercial drones into objects of fear for the regime troops, capable of carrying bombs.
The junta’s terror tactics intensify the revolutionary spirit
The junta and its military have resorted to the worst forms of brutality. They have attacked not only resistance fighters but the civilian population for supporting them. They have used all methods and weapons—from Su-30 fighter jets to MI-17 and MI-35 military helicopters, to helicopter gunships and all forms of artillery. Junta fighter jets have bombed village schools while students are learning; its troops have torched houses, churches and monasteries in villages and towns; they have kidnapped, tortured and beheaded innocent villagers. They use these tactics to terrify the public.
Over the past three years, according to the UN and observer groups, junta fighter jets have carried out 5,800 airstrikes. Its troops have killed around 5,600 people, including more than 1,000 women and 705 children, mostly in artillery barrages, airstrikes and shootings. And more than 27,200 people have been arrested. An estimated 3 million people have been forced from their homes since the coup.
But the junta’s terror tactics haven’t been able to weaken the revolution. Instead, they have only intensified the revolutionary spirit. Since last October, the resistance fighters, both PDFs and EAOs, have launched unprecedented military offensives like Operation 1027, seizing many military bases, outposts and towns in different states and regions. And because of their operations, thousands of soldiers have already surrendered.
In the beginning, scholars and observers believed that this resistance initiated by young resistance fighters would be crushed by the brutal tactics of the military. This view reflects their failure to grasp the revolutionary spirit of the Myanmar people this time, or to understand how and why this revolution has evolved step by step based on previous coups and resistance movements and the bitter lessons learned over the past 60 years, or to understand the key elements in this revolution.
No more deals with the criminal generals
After this latest coup, the military has become the enemy of the people again. This time, it is seen as a genuine enemy, one with whom there can be no compromise, under any conditions. In the past, most political forces from political parties to the prominent ’88 generation student group to ethnic armed organizations agreed to compromise and open negotiations with the military. It was a kind of national political tendency before the 2021 coup. They all tried to achieve national reconciliation with the military. Because not only different political leaders and ethnic leaders but also the general public thought reconciliation would be the best way to avoid confrontation and more bloodshed, despite the military’s long-term human rights violations and its greed for power. It was probably based on a traditional view that the Myanmar military was too powerful to collapse. Another thought was the military leaders might change positively, like military generals in other countries. That was the policy adopted by the National League for Democracy when it tried to work with a semi-civilian government led by ex-General Thein Sein in the 2010s.
But that didn’t work either. During that “democratic transition” period (2011-2020), the Myanmar people learned other lessons from the ex-generals’ quasi-civilian government:
“Democratic transition” doesn’t work.
National reconciliation doesn’t work.
Ceasefire or peace processes don’t work.
So, the “national reconciliation” era is over and the “peace process” has failed. Likewise, the junta’s election proposal has been rejected by the public. It will not turn back as long as this military exists. This is because the military leaders have repeatedly destroyed the public’s trust and hopes, and have rebuffed every opportunity they have been offered to join other stakeholders and the public in sincerely rebuilding a democratic nation based on federalism. All tolerance for them is gone.
In the place of national reconciliation, only justice will be available for the criminal generals and their collaborators. Only justice will heal the wounded Myanmar people; only justice will bring about a future from which war has been banished. That’s all the Myanmar people want this time. No more Ne Win. No more Than Shwe. No more Min Aung Hlaing. No more junta. No more quasi-civilian governments, either.
For many Myanmar people, they are fighting this revolution with all that they have left—their flesh, blood and their remaining belongings. So, this is the final battle, one they can’t lose, one on which they have bet their lives—it is do or die.
Understanding this evolution of the Myanmar revolution, everyone, including our neighboring countries and the rest of the international community, should understand that old, military-centered solutions that led nowhere over the past many decades—like elections planned by the junta and negotiations with the criminal generals—are nothing but empty and insincere diplomatic gestures.
Those who support the generals—China, Russia, India and others—only insult the Myanmar people who have been fighting this revolution with their own blood, flesh and funding.
This is the Myanmar revolution (စစ်အာဏာရှင်တော်လှန်ရေး), whose goal is to uproot the military dictatorship, including the military institution’s political culture—its unethical, brutal, lie-ridden, corrupt culture—forever, in a final battle. Once it is won, the vicious circle of Myanmar’s modern history will end, and a new chapter can begin. This time, having suffered this decades-long cycle created by the military, all Myanmar people deserve a successful revolution that will allow them to live in the free world..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2024-09-03
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Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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"In the first six months of 2024, the situation in Myanmar remains deeply alarming.
The surge in intensified armed clashes in both rural and urban areas has led to further deterioration of the humanitarian crisis, resulting in a lack of access to life-saving health-care services, widespread destruction of infrastructure, impediments to the affected population's ability to relocate to safer areas and significant economic burdens. Increased security risks and restrictions on access to reach affected communities has also created steeper challenges for humanitarian responders.
Nevertheless, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) continued to explore different approaches to ensure that the essential needs of those worst-affected by conflict are adequately met, all the while safeguarding the security of our staff members.
Despite the challenges and constraints, ICRC teams remain committed to reaching and supporting the most vulnerable communities, particularly in Shan, Kachin, Rakhine, central Myanmar and conflict-affected areas in Chin, Kayah and Kayin States.
The ICRC urges all parties to the conflict to ensure the protection of civilians in accordance with internationally recognized laws and standards, as well as the safety of humanitarian actors, in order to facilitate the unimpeded and effective delivery of humanitarian aid to affected communities..."
Source/publisher:
International Committee of the Red Cross (Geneva)
Date of entry/update:
2024-09-03
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Education in Burma/Myanmar - general, Public Health, Human Rights and international relations
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"The Chinese government has found itself on the receiving end of a torrent of condemnation from Myanmar people over a threat it reportedly made against the ethnic Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) for fighting the regime.
The warning issued by the Ruili Town Security Committee on Thursday told the TNLA to “immediately stop fighting and cooperate with China in maintaining peace and stability in northern Shan State and along the China-Myanmar border or face more deterrent and disciplinary actions.”
Despite arguments over the authenticity of the warning, the TNLA confirmed that it had received the warning in the form of a letter.
When asked by AFP about the letter during a press conference in Beijing, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson replied, “China is closely following the situation in Myanmar and the developments of the conflict in northern Myanmar, and has been working to promote peace talks and ceasefire.
“China will continue to play a constructive role for Myanmar’s peace and reconciliation process and promote the de-escalation in northern Myanmar.”
Since the Chinese Embassy in Myanmar shared the ministry’s reply on its Facebook on Saturday, thousands of netizens in Myanmar have responded to the post, slamming Beijing for interfering in Myanmar’s domestic affairs while expressing their support for the TNLA.
Netizens said they understand China’s concerns over border stability and its interests in Myanmar, but added that China should not put pressure on Myanmar’s popular revolt against the regime.
The post had attracted 6.3k comments as of noon Monday, most of them criticizing China for its threat against the TNLA.
Octopus, an anti-regime group waging guerrilla warfare in Yangon, commented under the post: “We are revolutionaries. We listen to the voices of our people. The comments you see are the testimony to the voices of our people. If you listen to the voices of the people, people’s government, and ethnic forces, and stand by the side of the truth, you will gain huge benefits as a good neighbor.”
Other netizens called on China to support revolutionary forces including the civilian National Unity Government instead of the “fascist” military if it really wants to see peace and stability in Myanmar.
Some said the warning was evidence of Beijing’s meddling in Myanmar’s internal affairs despite its repeated claims that it does not do so. Many warned that in the future China would be collectively punished by the Myanmar people—such as through increased anti-China sentiment—if it turns a blind eye to their will.
The National Unity Consultative Council, the NUG’s advisory body, issued a statement on Saturday condemning China’s “impertinent threat and insult against the army of the ethnic Ta’ang people and the popular revolt”.
Prominent former 88-Generation student leader U Min Ko Naing told anti-regime media PVTV: “Those who made threats must recognize the reality. The revolutionary people are prepared to face anything. They will not surrender to the bullying of any big power. They will not allow any threat to destroy a revolution that has cost many lives and limbs, while the destination is not far.”
China issued the warning as the TNLA, one of the three members of the Brotherhood Alliance of ethnic armies, is in the midst of installing its own administrations in townships it has seized from the regime in northern Shan State during the alliance’s anti-regime offensive, known as Operation 1027.
The warning was issued after China ended a three-day live-fire drill on the Chinese border on Thursday, and followed Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s visit to Naypyitaw in mid-August.
When he held informal talks with counterparts from Myanmar, Thailand and Laos in Chiang Mai following his Naypyitaw visit, Wang insisted that three basic principles must be adhered to regarding the Myanmar “issue.” The principles he cited are: that Myanmar should not be subject to civil strife, should not be detached from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, and should not be infiltrated or interfered with by external forces..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2024-09-02
[field_licence]
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Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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"A provincial agency of China’s Yunnan province bordering Shan State has warned the ethnic Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) to immediately stop fighting the Myanmar regime in northern Shan or face “more deterrent and disciplinary measures”. The Ruili City Security Commission made the warning in a statement issued Thursday. Ruili is a major trading hub on the border with Myanmar, across from Muse in Shan State.
It urged the TNLA to cooperate with China in “maintaining peace and stability” in northern Shan State and along the China-Myanmar border, and to ensure the safety of the border and the people who live in the area, as well as of Chinese projects and Chinese nationals in Myanmar.
“End all military activities harmful to Chinese border stability and to the lives and properties of Chinese citizens. Otherwise, China will take more deterrent and disciplinary measures. And you [the TNLA] will be entirely responsible for the consequences,” the Chinese-language statement reads.
The commission urged the TNLA to swiftly return to dialogue with the regime, saying it was the right path to settle differences.
It said China is willing to continue to play a “constructive” role and help to restore peace in northern Myanmar, and will help the TNLA assert its rightful claims.
“We are watching where you [the TNLA] are heading,” the commissioned warned.
TNLA spokeswoman Lway Yay Oo told The Irrawaddy on Friday that the group had read the statement and that its Central Committee was still discussing how to respond.
“The Chinese government has been putting pressure on us in various ways since before we resumed Operation 1027 [in June]. It is pressuring us by blocking trade routes and trade flows to us,” the spokeswoman said.
Another TNLA source said the Chinese government is also urging other ethnic armed groups in northern and eastern Shan to block trade routes to prevent the flow of foods, medicine and fuel to the TNLA.
At a press conference on Friday, when asked about the Chinese warning to the TNLA to stop fighting, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lin Jian said China “will continue to play a constructive role for Myanmar’s peace and reconciliation process and promote the deescalation in northern Myanmar”, the ministry said.
The Chinese embassy in Yangon was not available for comment on Friday.
The TNLA is a member of the Brotherhood Alliance, which launched Operation 1027 in northern Shan State last year, seizing hundreds of junta bases and command centers, and 24 junta military battalion headquarters as well as around 20 towns and vital trade routes with China.
The operation was halted in northern Shan State on Jan. 10 after Beijing brokered a ceasefire between the ethnic alliance and the regime. However, the TNLA and another member of the ethnic alliance, the Myanmar Nationalities Democratic Alliance Army, resumed their operation in northern Shan State on June 25 after the regime’s military repeatedly bombed the TNLA’s territory, breaching the China-brokered ceasefire.
Since the resumption of the operation, the ethnic armies and allied resistance groups have seized the capital of northern Shan State, Lashio, along with the Myanmar military’s Northeastern Command, which was based in the city, as well as Kyaukme, Nawnghkio and Mongmit towns.
As part of the operation, along with the TNLA, several resistance groups including People’s Defense Forces under the civilian National Unity Government have seized Mogoke, Singu, Tagaung and Thabeikkyin townships in neighboring Mandalay Region..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-31
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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Description:
"Primary country: Myanmar.....Source: UN High Commissioner for Refugees.....Format: Map.....Theme: Protection and Human Rights.....Language: English..."
Source/publisher:
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (Geneva) via Reliefweb (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-30
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, UNHCR (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees), Burma: Internal displacement/forced migration of several ethnic groups.
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"(Excerpt)
This Incident Report describes an event occurred in Kaw T’Ree (Kawkareik) Township, Dooplaya District. On March 20th 2024, an air strike was conducted by the State Administration Council (SAC) onto G--- village, Noh Poe village tract, Kaw T’Ree Township, killing one villager and injuring two. Saw A--- was travelling with his infant when an aircraft flew over them in G--- village. After hearing the sound of aircraft a second time, he got his child to safety with his wife in a bunker, but he was fatally hit by the air strike. Saw A--- was sent to a local clinic, located in B--- village, P’Lu village tract, by local authorities, but passed away en route. Saw A--- was survived by his wife and three children. The air strike also injured two women and destroyed five houses, one elementary school and one middle school.[1]
Part 3 – Complete Description of the Incident
Describe the Incident(s) in complete detail.
On March 20th 2024, in the evening, an air strike was conducted on G--- village, Noh Poe village tract, Kaw T’Ree Township. When Saw A--- had finished showering, it was around 5 pm. Saw A---’s four-month-old son was unwell, so Saw A--- rode his bike to take his child to a [local] medical nurse who lived in the same village [around 200 meters away from his home]. His wife, Naw F---, had given birth four months prior so she did not accompany her husband. When Saw A--- reached half-way [to the nurse’s house], he heard the sound of an aircraft flying across the sky, so he stopped his bike, hid in a covered place and watched the aircraft pass over him [, as witnessed by a local villager named Naw E---].
After, he met with the medic nurse and did the checkup for his son, Saw A--- visited Naw E--- [a villager from G--- village,] at her house [around 40 meters from the local nurse’s house]. As Saw A--- was eating betel nut [at Naw E---’s house], he heard the sound of an aircraft once again, around 15 minutes after the first aircraft. This time, the aircraft sounded like it was dipping down. In fear, he rushed to bring his son to safety with his wife.
As soon as he reached his wife, Naw F---, she went inside the [underground] bunker. While they [mother and three children] were in the bunker, Saw A--- was [outside] searching to see where the aircraft was. He saw the SAC fighter jet drop a bomb, so he tried to flee to a covered place, but he could not reach safety. The bomb landed beside him and his body was propelled by the force of the explosion. He was found lying next to a house, injured all over. Saw A--- was taken to a KNLA-run clinic in B--- village [also known as B--- clinic], P’Lu village tract, Kaw T’Ree Township, by the Cobra Column[7] security in Dooplaya District, but he died on the way. His wife became a widow with three children. [At the time of the incident,] his eldest child was 9 years old, middle child was 5 years old, and the youngest was 4 months old.
The bomb also injured two women, including Naw E--- [who Saw A--- had visited], as reported by Saw A---’s brother named Saw C---. Naw E--- was minorly injured on her face. The other elderly woman [unknown name] was injured severely on her stomach. The injured villagers were sent to B--- clinic with Saw A---.
The air strike also destroyed five villagers’ houses, an elementary school located inside an animist temple’s area, and one middle school located near a football ground in G--- village..."
Source/publisher:
"Karen Human Rights Group"
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-30
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Karen Human Rights Group (KHRG) reports, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations, Armed conflict in Burma - attacks on civilians
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Sub-title:
The government-in-exile says the vote would be a sham and has vowed to accelerate its offensive.
Description:
"Myanmar’s military junta, which seized power in a 2021 coup d’etat from a civilian government, has declared it intends to hold a general election in November 2025.
But armed rebel groups and members of the shadow National Unity Government, or NUG – made up of former civilian leaders – are opposed to the vote, which they say would be a sham, allowing the military to legitimize its control over the country.
Ever since the coup, the country has been wracked by a civil war, with ethnic armies and rebel groups gaining the upper hand over the past year, pushing the military back on its heels.
On Tuesday, the NUG said it would try to speed up its offensive against the military to gain even more territory – where they would boycott elections – and double international outreach efforts.
Why does the junta want to hold elections?
Facing a series of battlefield defeats and troop surrenders, military leaders are searching for an exit strategy to a civil war that will drag on and that increasingly appears they will not win. Holding elections may be a bid by the junta to create a sense of normalcy and political stability in the country – in part to placate its northern neighbor China, one of its few international backers.
The military leaders probably are hoping to legitimize their control of Myanmar’s government by manipulating the electoral process to ensure that their preferred candidates win, experts say. Doing so would allow them to retain power under the guise of a democratic system.
The junta is also hoping that plans to hold an election will ease international pressure and sanctions, and even give the regime international recognition by showing a commitment to the democratic process – regardless of whether the polls are manipulated.
Meanwhile, on the ground, the junta’s recent enactment of a military draft to shore up troop shortages and formation of a committee to arm communities at the village level appear to be aimed in part at providing security for the would-be polls.
Why are Myanmar’s armed opposition groups so opposed to such an election?
Junta opponents say a history of election fraud under military rule – and the junta’s crackdown on any form of dissent – means it is highly unlikely any such election will be free and fair. It would be illegitimate and aimed at securing power for the junta, rather than ushering in a democratic transition, they say.
These doubts are bolstered by the junta’s exclusionary electoral process that would deny many groups a stake in the country’s future.
Instead, the rebel groups say they will ratchet up their attacks on junta positions to increase their territory and block elections in areas under their control.
Furthermore, the armed opposition says the junta is using the election as a distraction from the ongoing civil war and its human rights abuses. Many groups say they will focus on resisting the junta militarily while advocating for democratic reforms without a ballot.
"The military council has planned to hold a fake election as their last resort next year,” NUG Prime Minister Mahn Win Khaing Than said Tuesday. “Some countries will support the elections, encouraging the junta to continue the plan by all possible means. With thorough consideration, we need to speed up our offensives and political measures.”
Is the junta even able to stage elections?
Junta chief Senior Gen. Min Aung Hlaing has made promises to hold the ballot ever since the coup in early 2021, with little progress made.
Junta forces have lost significant territory this year to various rebel groups, and its Union Election Commission said this week that a vote would need to be conducted “first in places where the situation is fine and stable,” followed by “areas that are moderately stable.”
The junta extended a state of emergency for another six months on July 31, the sixth extension since the 2021 coup. The constitution mandates that elections must be held within six months after a state of emergency is lifted. The junta is also planning to organize a census this October to prepare for the polls, but observers say that may be difficult..."
Source/publisher:
"Radio Free Asia" (USA)
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-30
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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They face military conscription in Myanmar and are banned from Thailand for two years.
Description:
"Thailand has detained and deported more than 144,000 Myanmar citizens over the past three months, its labor ministry said, in a crackdown aimed at weeding out “job seekers” who use the turmoil in their country as an excuse to seek opportunities in Thailand, a Thai police chief said.
Myanmar nationals were the largest group detained in the campaign to round up illegal workers launched in June that involved inspections of nearly 15,000 businesses, economic zones and areas where job-seekers congregate, the Ministry of Labor said on the weekend.
Workers from Myanmar play a vital role in the Thai economy with about two million of them legally employed in areas such as agriculture, fishing and the service sector, but labor activists say many more arrive illegally hoping to find work.
Another factor behind the arrival of many more young Myanmar citizens in Thailand this year is a junta conscription law that came into effect in April, three years after the military seized power in a coup, as it struggles to fend off advances by insurgents battling to end military rule.
Assistant Thai police chief Lt. Gen. Itthipol Achariyapradit told Radio Free Asia that Thailand had to act against people who entered illegally, some of whom, he believed, were “opportunistic job seekers” citing conflict at home as an excuse to come to Thailand.
“For those without passports or crossing illegally, we have no choice but to detain them. We can sort refugees or political migrants out from job seekers,” Ittipol said.
“But if the situation remains unsafe we have to delay the process.”
He did not say if he thought being conscripted into the Myanmar army was an unsafe situation.
Despite Thailand’s need for migrant workers, it has been tightening up procedures for them, closing offices where migrants can get vital paperwork processed and granting the junta, through its embassy, greater authority over the fate of its migrant population in Thailand.
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‘More reliable’
People being deported in the crackdown will be banned from re-entering Thailand for two years under the ministry’s rules and they also face the risk of being conscripted upon their arrival home, said Moe Gyo, chairperson of the Thai social aid organization Joint Action Committee for Burmese Affairs.
“Deported people are being recruited under the military’s conscription law and they’re worried,” he said.
Myanmar military authorities forcibly recruited dozens of people deported after serving time in jail in the southern Thai province of Ranong, relatives told RFA this month.
“We can’t say a similar incident won’t happen again. People returning from abroad were extorted and coerced in the conscription process,” Moe Gyo said.
One Thai employer was dismayed by the crackdown.
“It affects us a lot because if they have to go back and can’t return how can we find replacements,” said a hotel owner in the border province of Kanchanaburi who has hired undocumented people from Myanmar for years.
“We hire them not because they’re cheap labor – we pay them the same as Thais – but because they’re more reliable than Thai workers.”
Thailand’s Ministry of Labor did not respond to requests for comment from RFA.
While Thailand documents more than two million Myanmar workers in the kingdom legally, some labor groups estimate as many as seven million people from Myanmar are in Thailand.
The ministry said that in addition to 144,261 Myanmar nationals detained in the crackdown, there were 29,448 Cambodians, 12,258 from Laos, 117 from Vietnam and 6,196 from other countries..."
Source/publisher:
"Radio Free Asia" (USA)
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-30
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Labour issues in Burma, General labour standards, Human Rights and international relations
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Description:
"Editor’s Note: If you or someone you know is struggling with suicidal thoughts or mental health matters, please call the 988 Suicide & Crisis Lifeline by dialing 988 to connect with a trained counselor, or visit the 988 Lifeline website.
Hong Kong/New Delhi
CNN
—
Delivery driver Maung Maung’s wife and young daughter hadn’t eaten in three days, he recalled, when he walked into an internet cafe in his hometown of Mandalay, Myanmar, in late 2022.
He had recently been detained and tortured by the country’s military junta for weeks, he said, on suspicion of transporting goods for opposition forces, during which time his wife had been forced to take out loans to support the family.
When he was finally released, he had lost his job and the family found themselves penniless and ridden with debt. Desperate, Maung Maung went on Facebook and offered to sell his kidney.
“In that moment, I felt life was so harsh. There is no other way I could survive other than to rob or kill people for money,” he said. “My wife was the same, she didn’t want to stay in this world anymore. But only for the sake of our daughter we stayed.”
Months later in July 2023, Maung Maung, who asked to use a pseudonym for safety reasons, traveled to India for the transplant surgery. A wealthy Chinese-Burmese businessman had bought his kidney for 10 million Burmese kyat ($3,079), nearly twice the annual average urban household income in Myanmar, according to 2019 data from UN affiliated Myanmar Information Management Unit.
Maung Maung is not the only one.
A year-long CNN investigation has revealed desperate people in Myanmar, also known as Burma, hawking their organs to wealthy people on Facebook. With the help of agents, they travel to India, for instance, for transplants — defying laws in both countries, where selling organs is illegal.
CNN found posts offering to sell organs on at least three Burmese-language Facebook groups and spoke to two dozen people involved in the organ trade — including sellers, buyers and agents — to piece together the inner workings of an illicit industry fueled by desperation in a country ravaged by civil war.
When asked for comment, Meta, Facebook’s owner, said one online group had been removed, but the company declined to give further details or comment further. Facebook’s own rules do not allow content that lets users buy, sell or trade human body parts and breaches can be reported for review.
Coup sends poverty soaring
Three years since Myanmar’s military took power in a coup, nearly half of the country’s 54 million people live below the poverty line. That figure has doubled since 2017, researchers with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has found.
As various armed groups fought against junta control, violence spread across the country. Foreign investment dropped, unemployment skyrocketed and the cost of basic goods increased at a rate most people couldn’t keep up with. While sellers are poor and buyers relatively rich, both sides are in the illegal organ market because they find themselves in dire straits.
“To sell a part of your body is a difficult decision for everyone. Nobody wants to do it,” April, 26, who asked to go by a pseudonym, said shortly after advertising her kidney on Facebook in February. “The only reason I am doing this is because I have no choice.”
April said she abandoned her dreams of becoming a nurse and moved to Myanmar’s commercial capital Yangon when she was 18 to work in a garment factory and help support her family. But her monthly salary of $100 was not enough to keep up with rising costs exacerbated by the political crisis and medical bills that kept piling up as her aunt suffered from cancer.
“I am trying my best to survive amid such a challenging situation. There were days I cried. There were days I didn’t have anything to eat when my friends could not help me,” she told CNN.
One night, unable to sleep, she was up late scrolling Facebook when she came upon a group where people were offering to sell their kidneys. Most of these groups were made for patients suffering from kidney disease to share home remedies and recommend doctors. But in recent years, posts offering to sell organs have become increasingly common, a CNN analysis has found.
A person can still live a healthy life with one kidney, which makes this trade possible, but it’s a major surgery that can have lasting consequences. The biggest risk is not having a backup in case anything happens to the remaining kidney, according to the National Kidney Foundation.
April quickly wrote up her own post: “I want to donate my kidney. My blood type is O. I need money for my aunt who has cancer and needs an operation. I’m 26 years old and I don’t drink. DM me.”
An illegal but accessible industry
In the online organ trade, buyers and sellers often work with agents, middlemen who match donors with recipients, to forge the necessary documents and arrange surgery.
Because the sale of organs is illegal in India and donations are permitted only among relatives, with a few rare exceptions, agents often forge household records, family trees and other documents with the help of lawyers and notaries. Myanmar’s embassy in New Delhi has to review the paperwork in order to pass the case to the state or hospital authorization committee.
The authorization committee is the final line of defense. It’s designed to catch anyone trying to cheat the system. Documents, family photos and bank statements are checked, and interviews conducted to expose strangers posing as family members or anyone trafficking organs.
CNN has reached out to Myanmar’s embassy in New Delhi and the Indian Ministry of Health and Family Welfare for comment, but did not get a response.
Thiri Khine, who asked to use a pseudonym so she could speak safely, became a widow when her husband died eight years ago. Six years later, ravaged by kidney disease, she posed for new wedding photos. This time, the groom smiling next to her was the man whose kidney she was buying for 12 million kyat ($3,695).
Thiri Khine tried to get a transplant by getting on the official transplant waitlist, but said the process would’ve taken years, at which point she may have already died from her illness.
Between 1995 and 2022, there were only 308 successful kidney transplants in Myanmar, according to ruling junta chief Min Aung Hlaing’s office.
Since the coronavirus pandemic and the coup, transplants can only be performed at military hospitals, with a few exceptions, according to one current and one former doctor in Yangon who asked to remain anonymous out of fear for their safety.
The war has also created a shortage of doctors.
In the early days of the military takeover, doctors were often at the forefront of the resistance movement, treating injured protesters and staging strikes. For this, they paid a high price, with many medical professionals arrested or forced to flee the country, leaving Myanmar’s already fragile healthcare system on the brink of collapse.
‘Family photos’, a trip to India
In the weeks leading up to the surgery, Thiri Khine and her pretend husband practiced for the authorization committee interview, finding answers to questions such as how they met, each other’s favorite foods and their license plate number.
“It’s an interrogation to confirm whether we are a real couple or not. But the thing is they know that we are lying,” Thiri Khine says. “The law by definition is strict, and so are the hospital’s rules. However they make it possible for us to get the treatment by ignoring the red flags and forged documents.”
All of the ten donors and recipients CNN spoke to, except for one, confirmed that in each of their cases, documents were falsified to prove a family relationship. They pretended to be spouses, in-laws, nieces and nephews. Maung Maung was supposed to be his recipient’s son-in-law.
Scared and far from home, Maung Maung went through a number of medical tests and interviews in the days before his transplant surgery. He had never left Myanmar before, but now he found himself posing for photos in front of New Delhi’s famous Lotus Temple next to the family of the man who would soon have his kidney.
“I am suffering deep down when I look at my family. They have nothing. Meanwhile, I am also stressed about what lies ahead,” he told CNN before his surgery.
“If I die, I hope this money could help my wife and daughter for their food and survival, even if it would not last their whole lifetime.”
Myanmar’s military has a long and well-documented track record of rights abuses, and the civil war has unleashed new levels of violence on both civilians and rebel forces alike.
In response to Maung Maung’s arrest and torture allegations, which set off the chain of events that led him to sell his kidney, Myanmar’s military told CNN: “Members of Myanmar’s military are well organized, meaning they cannot unlawfully arrest or torture anyone.”
‘Saving a life’
In 2022, just under 10,000 kidney transplants involving live donors were carried out across India, according to the National Organ and Tissue Transplant Organization. CNN could not confirm the number of transplant surgeries involving Burmese patients or the number of surgeries in which an organ may have been sold.
One Yangon-based agent, who asked to remain anonymous due to the illicit nature of his work, said both the Burmese embassy in India as well as the authorization committees are aware that the document presented are forged.
“It is an act of saving a life. It is not a bad thing,” he says, having received a kidney transplant himself in a similar way last year.
Dr Sunil Shroff, a transplant surgeon and founder of the Multi Organ Harvesting Aid Network, a non-profit which promotes organ donation in India, said the issue of organ donation is complex.
“It is not an easy job for the (authorization) committee either. Then again, they’re not policing it. They’re looking at each case individually with some sympathy because there is a recipient suffering who needs an organ,” he said.
This is complicated by the fact that documents produced in another country are extremely difficult to authenticate.
“Once the embassy signs, what happens is that the local authorization committee thinks the responsibility was on the embassy. They might be coming with an unrelated donor we don’t know,” Dr Shroff said.
A ward filled with Burmese patients
A few days after the transplant surgery in August 2023, Maung Maung sat on the edge of his hospital bed and lifted his shirt to reveal a fresh scar on his left side.
“It seems it is healing from inside, but it still hurts on the outside,” he said, touching the purple mark.
As he walked through the hospital, he pointed out other Burmese patients in the recovery ward, each with the same four-inch scar on their abdomen.
“When you go to the toilet, you see Myanmar people and when you go somewhere nearby you see Myanmar people again,” he said.
For those trapped in a never-ending cycle of poverty, selling a body part often appears as a quick way to escape. It’s been a last resort taken by people in many other countries from Afghanistan to Nepal, but it’s one that comes with serious and sometimes fatal health consequences.
“The quality of life after selling the kidney is not good because once the money runs out, they’re back to square one. And then there’s a scar to see. They look at it, so they’re depressed,” Dr Shroff says.
Maung Maung predicts that with only one kidney left “the most I can live is 15 to 20 years and then I will be gone.”
Yet, he doesn’t regret his decision.
“If I had not done this at this moment, my life would be in chaos. No job, no food. My wife, my kid didn’t have anything to eat. All three of us could have been dead or gone crazy.” he says.
He has since returned home to Mandalay but hasn’t recovered enough to work. He spends most of his days at home, in pain, as the money he got for selling his kidney slowly runs out.
As for April, the last time CNN was able to reachher was a few months ago. She had found a 49-year-old man from Yangon who was willing to buy her kidney for 12 million kyat ($3,700).
Documents were forged, family photos showing April as the man’s eldest daughter taken — the only thing left was the surgery.
As the transplant neared, April worried she might die on the operating table, but felt it was too late to back out.
April’s family still did not know about her plan to sell her kidney.
For mental health support outside of the US, a worldwide directory of resources and international hotlines is provided by the International Association for Suicide Prevention. You can also turn to Befrienders Worldwide..."
Source/publisher:
"CNN" (USA)
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-30
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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Sub-title:
With the Arakan Army making gains in Rakhine state, junta officials arm civilians.
Description:
"Insurgents in Myanmar’s Rakhine state are closing in on an important junta naval base, a spokesman for the group said on Thursday, as military authorities in neighboring regions rounded up people into civil defense teams in preparation for rebel advances.
The Arkan Army ethnic minority force has made stunning gains in Myanmar's westernmost state, capturing townships, military bases and an airport at Thandwe town, since going on the offensive late last year.
Now AA fighters are attacking the last remaining junta positions protecting its Maung Shwe Lay naval base in Thandwe, AA spokesman Khaing Thu Kha told Radio Free Asia.
He said eight naval vessels were supporting junta ground troops and the fighting was fierce.
Junta spokesmen have not commented on the latest fighting.
Myanmar’s military has been battling insurgencies since soon after independence from Britain in 1948 but the pressure its forces are under this year is unprecedented.
Pro-democracy activists, outraged by the ouster of an elected government in 2021 and a bloody crackdown on protests that followed, have taken up arms, linking up in many parts of the country with ethnic minority rebels fighting long wars for self-determination.
Junta forces have lost ground in Rakhine and Chin states in the west, Kachin state in the north, Shan state in the northeast and eastern areas along the border with Thailand.
In addition, central heartland areas that have been peaceful for decades have been rocked by clashes as anti-junta People’s Defense Forces go on the attack.
Junta officials told administrators on Aug. 16 it would begin setting up militias, or public security committees, to arm people to defend their communities, according to information leaked on social media.
Residents in the Ayeyarwady region, near a conflict zone in southern Rakhine state, said on Thursday that authorities there had begun recruiting people into the militias, drawing names through a lottery system in five townships.
“They’re recruiting us for their militia,” said one resident of a township that borders Rakhine state.
“Local administrators are recruiting people between the ages of 35 and 65 under the pretext of serving public security in the neighborhoods and villages,” said the resident, who declined to be identified.
“They even tried to recruit some disabled people and when they refused, they had to pay a fine.”
RFA tried to telephone Ayeyarwady region’s junta spokesperson, Khin Maung Kyi, for information but he did not answer.
Political parties in the area have also been told to help fill the ranks, said one party member.
“Political parties have been called up for recruitment in some towns,” said the party worker who declined to be identified. “The junta asked us to contribute 50 people.”
Recruits would be asked to carry weapons and do some short military training, he said..."
Source/publisher:
"Radio Free Asia" (USA)
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-29
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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Description:
"Myanmar junta artillery and airstrikes have killed at least 21 civilians in Hsipaw Township, northern Shan State, this month, according to the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA).
On Tuesday morning, a Y-12 transport plane reportedly dropped at least 50 bombs on Hsipaw town and a fighter jet bombed the town later that day.
A Shan civil society group member said: “The junta cannot reinforce Hsipaw and bombs the town instead. It is inhumane. Civilians are the victims.”
Two men were killed in Tuesday’s airstrikes, two other residents were injured and two schools were damaged, according to the TNLA.
The TNLA, a member of Brotherhood Alliance along with the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) and Arakan Army, said junta artillery and airstrikes had killed at least 21 civilians and injured 59 others, including 10 children, this month.
The Shan Human Rights Foundation (SHRF) on Tuesday reported that junta bombardment of Hsipaw had killed at least 19 civilians from July 19 to August 25, damaging over 100 buildings, including near Chinese oil and gas pipelines.
On August 10, junta shelling killed five civilians and injured four. A man was killed in Na Loi village and a woman was killed in Kyaung Suu village. Both villages are beside the key pipelines.
Since June 25, the TNLA and its allies have seized Nawnghkio, Mongmit and Kyaukse towns in northern Shan State and Mogoke Township in Mandalay Region. The MNDAA and its allies have captured Lashio, the capital of northern Shan.
TNLA-led forces are attempting to seize full control of Hsipaw Township, where Infantry Battalion 23 and Light Infantry battalions 503 and 504 are based.
Hsipaw is a junta hub on the Dokthawaddy River and on the main road from Mandalay to the Chinese border. Junta troops are trapped in their bases in the town surrounded by the TNLA, according to sources..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-28
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Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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Sub-title:
Shadow government expects junta to try to re-capture lost ground before 2025 election
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"Myanmar junta officials have begun collecting the personal information of workers in industrial zones in preparation for a census and a general election next year, an industry management official said on Wednesday.
The military has promised to hold elections since shortly after it ousted an elected government in early 2021, triggering a civil war in which its troops are under growing pressure from pro-democracy fighters and ethnic minority guerrillas.
The collection of data at industrial zones in the city of Yangon has raised fears the information could also be used by officials enforcing a hugely unpopular conscription law.
“It’s so worrying to give out our information at a time like this,” said one worker in Yangon’s Hlaingtharya township who declined to be identified for safety reasons.
“They don’t care if you’re a woman or man, or your age, to recruit you for the military,” said the worker.
He said he had given information in 2023 for a smart identification card and workers were now being told they risked losing their jobs if they didn’t give personal data.
“If we don’t want to, they said we can quit,” he said.
Radio Free Asia tried to call Kyaw Kyaw Lwin, director general of the junta’s Workshop and Labor Law Inspection Department, to ask about the data collection but he did not respond.
The generals who ousted a government led by Aung San Suu Kyi in 2021 aims to hold a staggered elections by November 2025, with voting likely to be impossible in large areas controlled by insurgents. A census is planned for this October.
Those fighting to end military rule including a shadow National Unity Government, or NUG, say an election will be a sham with Suu Kyi, by far Myanmar’s most popular politician, locked up along with hundreds of politicians and activists.
‘Increase attacks’
The NUG prime minister, Mahn Win Khaing Than, told a meeting on Tuesday, the junta was likely to launch new offensives before the election and pro-democracy forces had to go on the attack.
“The junta will do whatever they can,” he told a meeting of his cabinet.“We need to also increase our own attacks as much as possible while preparing politically.”
The data collection follows a recent junta announcement it was forming neighborhood and village-level supervision groups for “public security” and “anti-terrorist operations” to crack down on insurgent forces.
China, India and Thailand have offered to help with the election, hoping it can help end the war in their resource-rich neighbor.
An official with a junta industrial zone management committee said workers’ personal information must be submitted by Friday.
“It’s necessary to count the workers and send the lists to our committee, the council told us it was necessary for the census,” said the official at the management committee in Hlaingtharya, Yangon’s biggest industrial zone.
Some 80,000 workers from more than 700 factories in six industrial zones of Hlaingtharya have given their information, a labor activist estimated..."
Source/publisher:
"Radio Free Asia" (USA)
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-28
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Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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"Buddhists and Hindus believe in the power of the White Elephant to subdue enemies.
Myanmar’s military junta, facing powerful armed insurgencies in the North Eastern part of the country, has decided to use Buddhist symbolism to defeat the enemy.
According the Myanmar daily Irrawaddy, the junta is preparing to launch a major offensive code-named “Operation Sin Phyu Shin” or “Operation Lord of the White Elephant” – to retake the areas of northern Shan State captured by the “Brotherhood Alliance” and its allies late last year.
The Irrawaddy reported that the junta had set up a committee to lead the operation and placed Vice-Senior General Soe Win in control of it. Three recently promoted Generals have been assigned to command the troops.
The operation’s name refers to Burmese King Hsinbyushin (1763-76) of the Konbaung dynasty who is revered among the generals for waging wars against Qing China and Siam. Hsinbyushin was the third king of the Alaungpaya, or Konbaung dynasty in Myanmar. He had pursued a policy of expansion at the expense of practically all his neighbors, especially Siam (Thailand).
The Myanmar military’s fresh move to step up attacks follows a second string of humiliating defeats in the northern Shan State in July. The first series of defeats began in late October 2023 and ended when China intervened to broker a ceasefire in January 2024.
The Brotherhood Alliance comprises three ethnic armies – the Arakan Army, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army and the Ta’ang Nationalities Liberation Army (TNLA). These armies overran dozens of towns in northern Shan State during its first phase. The alliance also punctured the government military’s reputation as a competent fighting force when many of its troops and senior officers raised the white flag in the face of determined and coordinated attacks by the Brotherhood Alliance, the Irrawaddy said.
The operation resumed in late June this year after the China-brokered ceasefire collapsed. Since then, the Brotherhood Alliance has seized northern Shan’s Kyaukme, Nawnghkio and Lashio towns, and the Northeastern Military Command, as well as Madaya and Mogoke towns in the Mandalay Region..
India, the White Elephant does not have the pejorative connotation that it has in the English language where it means an expensive and non-productive project or property. But it is a good omen, a sign of wisdom, good governance and power.
In Hindu mythology, Indra, the king of the gods, is depicted as seated on a White Elephant. Buddhists believe that the mother of Gautama Siddhartha, the Buddha, dreamt that a White Elephant had entered her womb, signifying that she was to give birth to a person of great wisdom and power.
The kings of Myanmar took the title “Master of the White Elephant” and had a large number of White Elephants which they captured by waging wars against the Thais. When the British took over Myanmar (then known as Burma), they discouraged the use of White Elephants as these represented the Burmese monarchy which they had abolished in 1885.
A later military dictator of Myanmar,Than Shwe, (1992- 2011) revived the use of the White Elephant as a symbol of power. Than Shwe, it was said, desperately wanted one of the power symbols to signify his own “kingly rule.” He needed divine help especially to build Naypyidaw, Myanmar’s new capital.
In 2008, Than Shwe’s created a White Elephant Capture and Training Group charged with directing a nationwide effort to increase the stock of White Elephants.
The question as to whether White Elephants are really white arises. In fact, they appear to have little in common with the silk-draped White Elephants in paintings of royal processions in the mythical past. At best, they could be gray.
It is said that a White Elephant’s skin “has to turn red, not black, when sprayed with water, the tail and trunk should be straight and long, and the eyes must have yellow irises enclosed by red rings.”
According to literature on the subject, some of the more mystical authorities even insist that a White Elephant must not snore but should emit the gentle sounds of Burmese and Thai classical musical instruments!
However, in Thailand, the most important traits of the White Elephant are the shape of the tail hair, the mottling on the inside of the mouth, the blotches on the head of the penis and even the sound of snoring, according to one source. Notice that the one trait that seems not to matter at all is the color of the elephant.
To set the record straight, the Thai term for the “White Elephant” is actually “Auspicious Elephant.” There is no allusion to color!
From 1549 to 1769, the kings of Thailand, Cambodia and Burma fought a series of wars over White Elephants. In fact, White Elephant-related plunder of rival partly helped build Myanmar’s national symbol, the golden stupa of the Shwedagon pagoda in Yangon (Rangoon).
White Elephants are believed to appear during the reign of the righteous leaders and their presence in a country or kingdom as signifying “a new renaissance”.
It is believed that in Myanmar’s history, White Elephants emerged during the time of kings who ruled discharging ten kingly duties. The White Elephant is a good omen when the state is endeavoring to build a peaceful, modern and developed nation.
Is Myanmar ruled justly?
The obvious answer to the question whether Myanmar is ruled justly is a resounding “no”. The military launched a coup against an elected government in February 2021 and cracked down on protests. War against rebellious Christian tribes in the North made that part of the country unlivable.
Vowing to resist the military junta, former lawmakers and activists formed a shadow government and mobilized fighting forces across the country. The military has responded with a brutal crackdown on opposition forces and protesters.
“The coup has also brought economic turmoil, wiping out modest gains in poverty reduction made over the past decade. The economy shrank by nearly 20 percent in 2021. Additionally, the health-care system has collapsed amid the COVID-19 pandemic. Millions of people are facing hunger, and tens of thousands have fled to other parts of Myanmar or across the borders. Because of the coup, Myanmar has become a failing state,” says Joshua Kurlantzick of America’s Council on Foreign Relations (CFR).
The junta detained and charged de facto civilian leader Aung San Suu Kyi with corruption and other crimes. It placed members of her party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), and other parties, as well as many activists, under house arrest.
Massive protests erupted nationwide in the weeks after the coup. Eventually, ousted NLD lawmakers, protest leaders, and activists from several minority groups established a parallel government known as the National Unity Government (NUG). The NUG declared war on the junta and formed an armed division known as the People’s Defense Force.
The military’s brutal crackdown on dissent and widespread abuses in the conflict have drawn condemnation from the United Nations, foreign governments, and rights organizations. The military shot live ammunition at civilian protesters and into people’s homes. By late 2021, the military was destroying entire villages believed to support the opposition, massacring both civilians and opposition fighters.
At least 1,500 people have been killed by the military, which is likely an undercount, according to Thailand-based nonprofit Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (Burma). The junta has arrested more than eight thousand people, including journalists, medical workers, and NLD politicians.
More than one million people fled abroad as refugees before the 2021 coup. Hundreds of thousands more remain displaced internally. Many of these refugees in recent years have been Muslim Rohingya.
In 2019, The Gambia filed the first international lawsuit against Myanmar at the International Court of Justice, accusing the country of violating the UN Genocide Convention. But both Suu Kyi’s government and the military have denied that ethnic cleansing is taking place, and Suu Kyi defended the military at a tribunal in The Hague..."
Source/publisher:
"Eurasia Review"
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-28
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"The Arakan Army, an ethnic Rakhine group, is carving out a proto-state on the Myanmar-Bangladesh border. Fighting with regime forces has taken a heavy toll on civilians, including Rohingya. The Arakan Army, communal leaders and outside powers all have roles to play in fostering stability.
What’s new? The Arakan Army has seized most of central and northern Rakhine State, on Myanmar’s border with Bangladesh, and seems on the verge of expelling the military. Scrambling for a riposte, the junta has conscripted Rohingya Muslims. The Arakan Army’s response is widely reported to include serious abuses against Rohingya civilians.
Why does it matter? Rakhine State faces huge humanitarian challenges as the Arakan Army assumes administration of an emerging proto-state. Fighting has displaced hundreds of thousands. A blockade diverts essential goods from civilians. External actors accustomed to working with national governments must determine how to address humanitarian and security issues with a non-state counterpart.
What should be done? The Arakan Army should avoid incendiary rhetoric, protect civilians, support credible investigations of reported abuses and initiate dialogue with Rohingya leaders. Mindful of risks and legal constraints, Bangladesh should increase engagement with the Arakan Army to stabilise borderlands, and donors should explore ways to expand humanitarian operations throughout Rakhine State.
Executive Summary
After restarting its fight for Rakhine State in late 2023, the Arakan Army is in the process of carving out a proto-state of over a million people on the Myanmar-Bangladesh border. Although the Myanmar military has countered with indiscriminate attacks and a blockade that is causing huge economic distress, the armed group, which draws support mainly from the state’s Rakhine Buddhist majority, has pushed on, reaching into northern townships where it is alleged to have attacked Muslim Rohingya civilians. Desperate to retain these areas and control of the border, the military has conscripted and collaborated with Rohingya and orchestrated the destruction of Rakhine homes. When the dust settles, the Arakan Army will likely emerge as Rakhine State’s de facto governing authority, and outside actors will have to decide how and whether to engage with it. To foster stability, the Arakan Army should mend relations with the Rohingya, support an independent investigation of alleged abuses, and reach out to Dhaka and donors, which should find ways to work with the group on shared humanitarian and security objectives.
In just a few months, the Arakan Army has created the largest area in Myanmar under the control of a non-state armed group – in terms of both size and population – and is now on the verge of securing almost all of Rakhine. The cost of its success has been high, not least for civilians in the state. Hundreds of thousands from both the Rakhine and Rohingya communities have been displaced. The regime carries out deadly airstrikes on a daily basis, and both it and the Arakan Army are credibly alleged to be committing serious abuses against civilians. In late May, in one of the worst atrocities since the 2021 coup, regime forces were accused of massacring scores of Rakhine civilians in a village on the outskirts of the state capital, Sittwe. More recently, the Arakan Army is widely reported to have been responsible for the deaths of as many as 200 Rohingya civilians while assaulting Maungdaw town in the northern part of the state.
While the Arakan Army is likely to complete its rout of the military, it is less clear whether its political wing, the United League of Arakan, has the resources and capability to govern the territory and people who come under its rule, much less bring stability to the region. Strong support among the majority Rakhine will buy the group time to address difficult living conditions – including the lack of electricity and internet, the loss of essential services and an economy destroyed by conflict – but it is uncertain how long the public’s resilience will last.
The Arakan Army faces serious challenges in realising its vision for an autonomous state. Rakhine boasts few easily exploited natural resources and has poor trade and transport connections with neighbouring Bangladesh and nearby India, which have been less amenable to engaging with Myanmar’s ethnic armed groups than China or Thailand. As a result, the state is heavily reliant on regime-controlled central Myanmar for essential goods and almost entirely dependent on Naypyitaw for electricity, communications and banking services. At the same time, both China and India are seeking influence in Rakhine for geostrategic reasons, while Bangladesh wants to see the speedy return of up to 1 million Rohingya refugees. Navigating this complex environment will be no small task for the armed group.
The Arakan Army is also struggling to manage difficult ethnic relations within Rakhine, a state that since 1942 has been wracked by recurrent outbreaks of communal violence between the majority Rakhine, who are mainly Buddhist, and the Muslim Rohingya, who are a minority at the state level but dominate northern Rakhine. Since February, the military regime in Naypyitaw has fanned the flames, including by pressing Rohingya into service fighting the Arakan Army and cooperating with Rohingya armed groups that it had previously labelled terrorists. These groups have also forcibly recruited young men and boys from Rohingya refugee camps across the border in Bangladesh, either for their own ranks or to hand over to the military as conscripts.
While many Rohingya have been forced to enlist, some have also volunteered and been implicated in attacks on Rakhine civilians and mass arson campaigns, infuriating the Arakan Army, and prompting incendiary remarks from the group’s leaders, which have further fuelled worsening intercommunal tensions. As fighting has intensified in two mainly Rohingya townships in northern Rakhine State, Maungdaw and Buthidaung, Arakan Army forces have been accused of serious human rights abuses against the Rohingya, including the attack on 5 August, for which the group denies responsibility.
Rakhine State remains at a perilous juncture, requiring leaders of both the Rakhine and Rohingya communities to rise above their historical animosity and defuse tensions. They should avoid toxic rhetoric, establish a dialogue aimed at preventing further violence and spurn the regime’s efforts to pit them against each other. The Arakan Army, for its part, needs to ensure that its forces protect civilians and respect their human rights. It should also incorporate more Rohingya into its administration and commit to supporting an independent investigation into allegations of abuses against civilians, which should begin as soon as practicable.
For all the challenges it is facing domestically, Bangladesh also has a key role in Rakhine State, as do other outside actors. The emergence on its border of a de facto statelet that aspires to permanent autonomy will require the new interim government in Dhaka to expand the scope of its engagement with the Arakan Army, whatever its views of those ambitions. While strengthening ties with the group, Bangladeshi envoys should emphasise the importance of treating the Rohingya humanely and with dignity. To stabilise the borderlands, and address drivers of irregular migration, Dhaka should also allow for more humanitarian aid to the area and trade across the frontier. Finally, Dhaka should improve security in the refugee camps, reduce the influence of armed groups there and allow a genuine Rohingya civil society movement to emerge. Other foreign governments should explore how they can work with the Arakan Army and neighbouring states to improve humanitarian access and expand assistance for all ethnic communities affected by conflict in central and northern Rakhine State.
For neighbouring states and other outside actors, the emerging situation in Rakhine State creates quandaries – not least the question of how to work with a de facto authority like the Arakan Army amid an international system that for legal and practical reasons privileges relationships with nation-states. Despite these dilemmas, as Crisis Group has noted elsewhere, neighbours and donors will likely find that the greatest potential for positive humanitarian and security impact lies in working with Rakhine State’s de facto administrators toward mutual goals – mindful of human rights, conflict and legal risks and constraints that may present themselves.
The Arakan Army now faces a stiff test. Having made major battlefield gains over the Myanmar military, it needs to show it can bring stability to a neglected corner of the country and govern in the interests of all the people living there..."
Source/publisher:
International Crisis Group (Belgium)
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-27
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Armed conflict and peace-building in Burma - theoretical, strategic and general, Human Rights and international relations, Arakan (Rakhine) State - reports etc. by date (latest first)
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"Myanmar was ready to explode—just like the historic student union building that General Ne Win dynamited after his coup in 1962. Asia’s former “rice bowl” was now empty and classified by the UN as a least developed country, the parliamentary democracy long gone, no pride left. By 1988, these were the terrible legacies of his coup and his iron-fisted rule over the previous 26 years.
When it exploded, it shook Ne Win’s entire system. It was the 1988 people’s uprising. He could do nothing but step down in shame. History was having its revenge. But even before he stepped down, he threatened the protestors in a state-run broadcast: “The military never fires into the air. It just shoots straight to hit.” We would expect nothing less from the mouth of a dictator—and he was regarded as exactly that: the first dictator of Myanmar.
Though his coup, or the “Mother Coup”, in 1962, faced little resistance, history didn’t repeat for the coups to follow.
The ’88 Uprising and the 2021 Spring Revolution drew similar levels of nationwide popular participation, but they differed in other ways. Here’s one overlooked but crucial point of difference between the two coups: In 1988, the military staged its takeover one month and 10 days after the pro-democracy uprising erupted across the country in an attempt to topple the Socialist authoritarian regime led by Ne Win. In 2021, the military staged a coup when the country was stable and the people were in a good mood, full of positive expectations to welcome a newly elected civilian government.
To make it very clear: in 1988, a nationwide uprising sparked a coup; but in 2021, a coup sparked a nationwide uprising. The sequence of events was reversed.
In March 1988, a riot in which university student Phone Maw was shot to death by security forces led to a student demonstration. Later it escalated into a democracy movement as the public’s discontent with political repression and economic hardships was already at boiling point after 26 years of the regime’s oppressive rule and mismanagement. When student-led demonstrations evolved into a nationwide uprising on Aug. 8, known as the Four Eights Uprising or the ’88 Uprising, Ne Win and his immediate successors tried to convince the public that they would change their one-party system to a multi-party system.
But the people continued their uprising to get rid of what was just a military dictatorship in disguise. The daily protests continued in full swing across the country for more than one month until Sept. 18, when the generals staged a bloody coup. (Here, it is important to understand that the junta actually assumed power from Ne Win’s Socialist regime rather than grabbing it by force. The coup took place with Ne Win’s consent but its goal was to stop the people power movement by force and prevent outcomes which might be even worse from the regime’s perspective.)
The coup was led by Ne Win loyalists and younger generals—General Saw Maung and his deputy officers Than Shwe and Khin Nyunt. Of course, the coup halted the uprising, with regime troops killing several thousand protesters and arresting thousands more across the country. Such a brutal and massive crackdown outraged the people. Public sentiment against the regime and in support of radical change was still strong; it maintained its momentum and there were all kinds of intentions and ideas on how to continue the anti-regime movement in different ways to achieve the main goal—democracy. But the junta’s new political course led to a new political landscape.
New landscape
Right after the coup, the junta announced that it would hold a free and fair election under a multi-party system—a U-turn from the one-party system of its predecessor Socialist regime.
Immediately, many political figures and forces rushed to form parties. Both old politicians and new faces became leaders of those parties. U Nu—the first prime minister of the country—Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, old communists, ex-generals, ethnic figures and even young student activists who were part of the ’88 uprising formed political parties. After 26 years under just one party—the Burma Socialist Programme Party led by dictator Ne Win—about 200 parties were registered. Contesting elections became the main political priority. Let’s call those engaged in this task “the urban politics” camp, which was close to what we called it back then.
Globally, it should be noted that when Myanmar reintroduced a multi-party system in September 1988, right after the coup, the Soviet Union had yet to collapse and its reformist leader Mikhail Gorbachev had yet to introduce his policies of glasnost (openness) and perestroika (restructuring) to reform the USSR’s one-party system. Even before the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the end of the Cold War on the world stage, the ’88 uprising in Myanmar managed to bring down the Socialist regime and force the new military junta to transform the country’s political system from a one-party to a multi-party system. It also appeared set to switch to a market economy after 26 years of isolation. Under the circumstances, that was a significant change brought to the country by the ’88 uprising.
As new political parties mushroomed, two other spheres of anti-junta activity emerged—one was the armed struggle (or “AS”, a term student activists then used widely). Another was an underground movement launched by student unions. Both of these were led by students. After the coup and nationwide crackdown, students who wanted to take the AS route left for border areas where ethnic armed organizations have been based for decades fighting for autonomy. There, thousands of students formed the All Burma Students’ Democratic Front (ABSDF) as a student army.
Those in the student unions continued their anti-regime activities (broadly speaking, this was a pro-democracy movement) in urban areas, organizing underground activities such as guerilla-style street protests, publishing and distributing political journals and statements to keep the public informed and politically aware. The latter—to which I belonged—was part of the “urban politics” camp. So, the whole “urban politics” camp was based on non-violent methods employed by political parties and underground student unions. But we regarded all three ways—political parties, underground student unions and AS—as supporting one another to keep pressuring the junta. (Note: That’s not what happened in 2021. The “fresh election” option was rejected by the public, and the political parties that chose to reregister after the 2021 coup were regarded as collaborators of the junta who rejected the recent election result.)
A dominant trend emerges
Among the three alternatives, however, the most popular was to contest the junta’s elections. Newly formed political parties were actively preparing to take on the junta-backed party, the National Unity Party, which was transformed from Ne Win’s Socialist party, and hoping to form a civilian government after the elections. The country’s many ethnic parties were also a main force in this “urban politics”, planning to contest the elections both in main cities and their ethnic states. They were not related to the ethnic armed organizations based along the borders.
The new political landscape had advantages: the political parties could open offices across the country, they could officially organize party activities, and they could conduct campaigns in which thousands of people could take part. Mainly, they could publicly challenge the ruling junta. And people could support the parties they liked. The political space was significantly widened, though the junta continued to arrest and intimidate party members as well as student activists and dissidents, sentencing them to lengthy terms of imprisonment. This anti-regime movement through non-violent methods within the framework of the political parties became quite active and dynamic. It became the main political trend after the coup and the majority of the people supported it.
On May 27, 1990, the junta held the election as promised. Millions of citizens cast votes, almost three decades after the people’s democratic rights were denied. The result shocked the ruling generals—a landslide victory for the National League for Democracy (NLD), the party they had endlessly denounced and oppressed the most. The junta refused to hand over power to the victorious NLD. Later, the junta arrested many elected members of parliament and jailed them. Some elected members were forced to flee the country.
This led to the formation of the National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma (NCGUB) in late 1990, in Manerplaw, Karen State (home to the headquarters of the KNU). Comprising elected MPs from the NLD and other parties, the NCGUB was formed with the aim of implementing the results of the 1990 election. But it never gained sufficient traction to threaten the junta’s de facto rule.
However, the election result became a legitimate political tool with which the international community could pressure the junta.
Why the ‘AS’ didn’t work
The armed struggle along the borders started by the newly formed student army (made up mostly of Bamar students from cities like Yangon and Mandalay, the central regions and other cities and towns) was fought for two years at that time but never achieved anything significant either. (In stark contrast to what we have seen in the current post-2021 armed revolt.)
There were several reasons for that. One was that established ethnic armed organizations were not ready to fully support the student army. (A totally different scenario from the cooperation we’ve seen between some EAOs and newly formed resistance forces since the 2021 coup.) Among the reasons was that the young students from the cities couldn’t really adapt to the tough jungle life. Soon after arriving, several thousand students went back to their homes when the junta offered them an amnesty.
Another big factor undermining the students’ armed struggle was a ceasefire agreement initiated by the junta. After the coup, the junta’s powerful Secretary-1 and spy chief General Khin Nyunt convinced many ethnic armed organizations to sign ceasefire agreements in the late 1980s and 1990s. More than a dozen ethnic armed groups, including major groups like the Kachin Independence Army, the United Wa State Army, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, the New Mon State Party and others signed the junta’s ceasefire agreements, though the process was obviously a sham. Many people, including ethnic communities, regarded the EAOs as the junta’s “allies” or “ceasefire partners” at the time, deviating from the pro-democracy political course embarked upon after the ’88 uprising.
Looking at it through a political prism, it’s easy to understand that the “ceasefire” was the junta’s card to divide the resistance forces. For the junta, at that time, there were two main political enemy camps: the political parties “inside” the system and the dozens of ethnic armed organizations along the borders. Of these two, the political party camp was the top priority for the generals as it was supported by the majority of people. The generals knew that if they could neutralize ethnic armed organizations with “ceasefire agreements” and offers of business concessions, they wouldn’t need to fight them, so they could use their energy and capacity to annihilate the “urban politics” camp—both the political parties and the underground student unions.
Many leaders of the NLD and ethnic parties were arrested. But as the elections approached in May 1990, the crackdown became more targeted: Many key leaders of political parties, including Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and ethnic figures, were arrested even before the vote.
Most of the student activists were also thrown behind bars with lengthy imprisonment terms. To take my own case as an example, I was arrested at a protest in 1991 along with over 100 other students. We were each sentenced to a minimum of 10 years’ imprisonment. A series of student protests occurred in the 1990s and the junta responded with a blanket crackdown on them. I would say there were almost no dissidents who were not arrested at least once after the 1988 coup. All of us who were active dissidents under a political party flag or a student union flag were arrested and tortured because the junta aimed to “kill” our political awareness and fighting spirit, so that it could not be passed to a new generation. That was the junta’s political strategy at the time—to annihilate “urban politics” rather than the neutralized ethnic armed organizations along the borders. Their strategy worked.
To analyze the whole situation after the 1988 coup, the nonviolent “urban politics” camp, the armed struggle launched by the new student army and the established ethnic armed organizations were not on the same page or synchronized at all. That’s how the AS lost its way at that time.
Hard lessons
The “urban politics” camp was crippled by the junta’s systematic, yearslong crackdown. But by securing political legitimacy for the anti-regime movement, the election result was the most significant and long-lasting achievement of the 1988 uprising. It was used for political leverage and a tool by the international community led by the UN and the West to pressure the junta to hand over power or enter negotiations with the election winner and ethnic organizations. And it took exactly 20 years for the ruling generals to formally “override” the people’s 1990 choice with its rigged election held in 2010.
If I had to give a name to the popular resistance against the coup in 1988 and the following decades, I would call it “the nonviolent resistance period” as it overwhelmed other political trends and methods. So, the resistance against the regime throughout the whole period before and after the 1988 coup didn’t reach the level of a revolution (တော်လှန်ရေး), in which all necessary methods are applied, especially armed struggle.
But all of the military’s brutality and cheating—the coup in 1988, the killing of innocent protesters and political persecutions, and the blatant refusal to hand over power to the party for which the people voted—were engraved in the hearts of the Myanmar people once more. It was the second time the entire population had been deceived.
The generals have displayed this political treachery again and again since 1962. It has become institutionalized as “the military institution’s political culture.” This unethical and brutal military culture sufficiently angered and outraged the Myanmar people that their motivation changed from anti-regime sentiment to anti-military sentiment. This has never waned—it has only grown and grown.
Here, we should understand what the Myanmar people learned—through their own experience and suffering—from the ’88 Uprising and the couple of decades that followed it under another round of military dictatorship:
Popular uprisings don’t work because the generals will simply oppress them.
Elections and even landslide victories don’t work because the generals will reject them.
Nonviolent methods don’t work because the generals respond with violence.
Pressure from the international community doesn’t work because the generals don’t play by its standards.
The biggest lesson of all, based on the above lessons: The generals individually and the military institutionally use their power and cunning ways to destroy the people’s aspirations to, at a minimum, simply live and die in a free and democratic society.
But these seemingly discouraging lessons couldn’t kill the people’s hopes or stop them struggling to achieve them. That’s the nature of the Myanmar people. In the next installment in this series, we’ll see how these lessons have been applied to their unfinished struggle.
Read the first part of this series: Evolution of the Myanmar Revolution (Part 1): Why the ‘Mother Coup’ Faced Little Resistance..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-27
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
The Military's political role, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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"This month marks seven years since the 2017 “clearance operation” when Myanmar’s military forces, the Tatmadaw, unleashed waves of violence against Rohingya ethnic minorities in Rakhine State, Myanmar.
The conflict triggered the expulsion of over 700,000 Rohingya into neighboring Bangladesh, marking the largest and fastest influx into the country. The U.S. government later determined that these attacks constituted genocide and crimes against humanity.
Rohingya in Myanmar
Rohingya who stayed in Myanmar following the genocidal attacks continue to face violence at the hands of the Tatmadaw. Conditions are dire, marked by severe deprivations of rights, discrimination, and exposure to armed conflict. In Rakhine State, where the majority of Rohingya reside, they face severe restrictions on their movement, limited access to essential services, and deep-seated prejudice based on their ethnicity and religion.
Many Rohingya live in impoverished conditions, often in makeshift shelters that have inadequate sanitation and are unable to withstand extreme weather events. Rohingya have limited access to healthcare, and even to seek medical treatment, they must obtain permission to leave their communities. Rohingya are also denied access to education, employment, and livelihood opportunities, which exacerbates their hardship and prevents them from moving out of poverty. Intensifying armed conflict in Rakhine State has further eroded their security.
While the Myanmar military and the Arakan Army (AA)—a powerful ethnic armed group seeking sovereignty for Rakhine State—fight to maintain or secure control of territory, Rohingya and other civilians are caught between these warring parties with devastating consequences. Indiscriminate attacks against civilians, arson and looting of civilian property, killings, and forced recruitment by both sides of the conflict continue to occur.
In early August of 2024, the AA launched attacks on Rohingya civilians in Rakhine State, which are part of a larger trend of intensifying conflict that does not distinguish between civilians and combatants. The U.N. Children’s Fund has called on all parties to uphold their obligations under international law to protect civilians, especially children and families.
Rohingya in Bangladesh
Rohingya living in Bangladesh also face significant protection and humanitarian concerns. Since 2017, Rohingya refugees have been living in sprawling, overcrowded camps where necessities are scarce. Small temporary shelters, often made from bamboo and plastic tarps, leave residents vulnerable to extreme weather conditions, such as heavy monsoon rains, landslides, and intense heat. These shelters are also susceptible to fire and arson. Fencing around the camps with limited exits make it difficult for people to evacuate during emergencies.
While primary education has improved, educational opportunities for Rohingya youth and young adults needs to be ensured. This education gap not only hinders immediate development for youth but also undermines prospects and livelihoods, perpetuating a cycle of poverty and marginalization.
Adults also face barriers to earning livelihoods as current policies prohibit Rohingya from working, forcing them to depend on humanitarian aid that is often unreliable. Due to ongoing cuts in support from international donors, the U.N. World Food Programme significantly reduced food assistance to Rohingya in Cox’s Bazar. While partially restored, the assistance remains inadequate.
The reality for Rohingya plays out in the larger context of political unrest in Bangladesh. Several tumultuous weeks marked by violent protests and numerous deaths have led to the ousting of Bangladesh’s Prime Minister and economic turmoil. Amidst the crisis, Rohingya refugees face heightened vulnerabilities and protection concerns. It remains to be seen how the interim government will address Rohingya refugees who have been referred to as a burden on the economy in previous political debates.
Moving Forward
As we commemorate this somber date, it is important to reflect on the current realities facing the Rohingya in Myanmar and Bangladesh and consider what needs to change so they can move forward.
The international community and donor governments should:
At a minimum, fully fund the Rohingya Joint Response Plan and the Myanmar Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan.
Funding for food vouchers should be prioritized.
Support local non-governmental organizations and groups on the front lines of delivering humanitarian assistance, especially those operating in Rakhine State, Myanmar.
Work with the government of Bangladesh to allow livelihood opportunities for Rohingya.
The government of Bangladesh should:
Allow Rohingya to pursue livelihoods and entrepreneurial opportunities within camps.
Work with local partners to ensure educational opportunities for Rohingya youth and young adults.
The U.S. government should:
Work with the U.N. to mitigate protection concerns for Rohingya refugees given the changing circumstances on the ground in Bangladesh.
Expedite processing times for Rohingya refugees in Cox’s Bazar and immediately resume departures for Rohingya in Bangladesh.
The U.S. Congress should pass the Rohingya Genocide, Accountability, and Protection (GAP) Act (H.R.8936) to provide protection, support, and humanitarian assistance to Rohingya refugees and internally displaced persons..."
Source/publisher:
InterAction
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-27
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Arakan (Rakhine) State - reports etc. by date (latest first), Crimes Against Humanity, Genocide, Rohingya (cultural, political etc.)
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Description:
"Human Rights Violations took place in States and Regions from Aug 15 to 21, 2024
Military Junta Troop launched airstrikes and dropped bombs in Sagaing Region, Magway Region, Mandalay Region, Tanintharyi Region, Rakhine State, and Shan State from August 15th to 21st. The Military Junta arrested the civilians for military service in the Bago Region, Magway Region, and Mandalay Region. The political prisoners from Daik-U Prison and Thayawaddy Prison from Bago Region were tortured.
Over 20 civilians died, and about 40 were injured by the Military’s heavy and light artillery attacks. Over 200 civilians were arrested by the Military Junta within a week..."
Source/publisher:
Network for Human Rights Documentation-Burma
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-26
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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Format :
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The junta’s opponents say an election organized during military rule would be a sham and solve no problems.
Description:
"Myanmar’s junta has committed to holding a general election late next year, with voting to be staggered because of security concerns, said politicians who met the military’s election committee on the weekend.
Junta chief Senior Gen. Min Aung Hlaing has made promises to hold an election ever since early 2021 when he overthrew a government led by then State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi.
Suu Kyi’s party won a late 2020 election in a landslide but the military complained of election fraud, staged a coup, locked up Suu Kyi and many others and declared a state of emergency.
The junta’s Union Election Commission, or UEC, met political party representatives in the capital, Naypyidaw, on Saturday and urged them to prepare for the polls, said Tin Swe, vice chairman of the Democratic Party, one the parties at the meeting.
“They said they are prepared and that the election is a goal of the State Administration Council,” he told Radio Free Asia, referring to the junta by its official name.
“It must hold the election and has committed to holding it,” he said.
While the UEC had not officially announced the date of the election Tin Swe said he believed, given the discussions the parties held with the election organizer, that it would be held in November.
Military-run media also reported on the meeting and the preparations for the election, without reporting a date.
Radio Free Asia attempted to contact UEC member Khin Maung Oo for details about the plan for the election but he did not return calls by the time of publication.
The junta’s opponents have dismissed the junta’s plans for an election as meaningless.
Suu Kyi, Myanmar’s most popular politician, remains in detention along with many of her party members and supporters. Her National League for Democracy (NLD) party, which swept elections in 2016 and again in 2020, has been disbanded along with many other parties.
“I believe that the international community and the public will strongly oppose the sham election,” said Sithu Maung, spokesperson for a group of NLD politicians elected in the 2020 vote.
“This election is a way of trying to bring about military rule with supposed civilian approval,” Sithu Maung, who lives outside Myanmar, told RFA.
Elections organized by the military would resolve nothing, he said.
“We’ve said all along it’s not practical to solve Myanmar’s problems through elections. What Myanmar needs is not an election, it’s to change the system,” he said.
'Voting in stages'
Parties seen as representing the military and led by retired officers fared poorly in the 2016 and 2020 elections, even in constituencies where many military personnel and their families live.
The junta remains very unpopular, most Myanmar people say, and its forces have lost significant territory this year to various rebel groups fighting to end what they condemn as illegitimate army rule.
The election organizer told the parties on the weekend that voting would have to be staggered because of the security situation, said Myo Set Thway, general secretary of the People’s Pioneer Party.
“The UEC chairman said that it’s impossible to complete the election in one day in terms of security and other conditions. He said that the election will be held in stages,” he said.
“For security, we will do it first in places where the situation is fine and stable,” Myo Set Thway said, citing the UEC. “After that, elections will be held in areas that are moderately stable.”
The junta extended a state of emergency for another six months on July 31, the sixth extension since the 2021 coup. The constitution mandates that elections must be held within six months after a state of emergency is lifted.
The junta is also planning to organize a census this October to prepare for the polls.
Neighbors, including China and India, will be hoping that an election can help to bring stability to resource-rich Myanmar. Thailand, China and India have discussed providing support for the census and the vote.
In January 2023, the UEC introduced an election law stipulating that parties wanting to participate in a general election must have at least 100,000 members and funds of at least 100 million kyats (US$50,000). Parties were required to re-register within 60 days, which many of them, in disarray with members in detention or exile, failed to do so and were disqualified.
Of the 49 parties that have been approved, only nine plan to campaign nationally. The other 40 will compete on a regional or state level.
Scores of parties with suspected ties to rebel groups, including any political or ideological links, have been barred from any election..."
Source/publisher:
"Radio Free Asia" (USA)
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-26
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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Local URL:
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Description:
"Background and Introduction
UN Women, grounded in the vision of equality enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, works for the elimination of discrimination against women and girls, the empowerment of women and the achievement of equality between women and men as partners and beneficiaries of development, human rights, humanitarian action and peace and security. Placing women’s rights at the centre of all its efforts, UN Women leads and coordinates gender mainstreaming across the United Nations system to ensure that commitments on gender equality and gender mainstreaming translate into action throughout the world. In 2022, UN Women officially became a member of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee, affirming a stronger commitment to incorporate a gender lens in humanitarian action.
In Myanmar, UN Women and the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) co-led the Gender in Humanitarian Action working group (GiHA WG), which evolved from the need to respond to the increasing demand for technical support for gender mainstreaming humanitarian action. Its membership includes UN agencies, international and local nongovernmental organisations (NGOs), women-led and women-focused civil society organizations (CSOs), and other organizations that are working in humanitarian response with gender mandates or implementing gender-related activities. The primary goal of the GiHA WG is to promote the integration of gender considerations into humanitarian actions across operations and analysis, including sectors, clusters and cross-cutting themes.
The international humanitarian organization, CARE, developed the Rapid Gender Analysis (RGA) Toolkit to help humanitarian actors understand the different needs, capacities and coping strategies of women, men, boys and girls in crisis situations. RGAs have been conducted in more than 30 countries and can be adapted to focus on protection, urban areas or remote data collection settings.
In Myanmar, however, collecting data via traditional methods (interviews, surveys and group discussions) is highly complex, sometimes not possible and puts people (both data collectors and affected populations) at risk. Observational data collection can help mitigate these risks and does not rely on people’s ability or willingness to provide information. Instead, it relies on what the data collector can see and observe in the community. With this in mind, in 2023, CARE and the GiHA WG together adapted the RGA to the Myanmar context, creating the Observational Gender Review (OGR).
An OGR informs humanitarian responses by developing nuanced data and information on the impacts of a crisis on different groups. It helps to identify gender dynamics, assess gendered impacts, and support gender-responsive programming without directly questioning members of the affected community.
Conducting either an RGA or OGR allows humanitarian actors to collect important information about gender roles and responsibilities, capacities and vulnerabilities after a shock, as well as potential protection risks among women and girls. RGAs are conducted rapidly and in circumstances where resources are scarce. RGAs, and therefore OGRs, build on existing primary and secondary information in addition to collecting new primary data. Finally, both RGAs and OGRs aim to inform programming by providing operational recommendations to meet the different needs of women, men, girls and boys..."
Source/publisher:
Asia Pacific Gender in Humanitarian Action Working Group, CARE International, UN Women, United Nations Population Fund via Reliefweb (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-26
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Food Security and nutrition in Burma/Myanmar, Public Health, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
4.12 MB
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Description:
"GENEVA – On the seventh anniversary of attacks by the military junta, that forced more than 700,000 Rohingya to flee to neighbouring Bangladesh, the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, Tom Andrews, has called for an emergency convening of UN Member States to halt a new round of atrocities underway in Rakhine State. He issued the following statement:
“The best way for the world to commemorate the seventh anniversary of the onset of genocidal attacks against the Rohingya in Myanmar is by acting to halt the new round of atrocities under way in Rakhine State.
Despite warning signs in 2017, untold numbers of Rohingya men, women and children were massacred in Rakhine State and more than 700,000 were forced to literally run for their lives over the Bangladesh border.
Now, seven years later, history is repeating itself. In Rakhine State, Rohingya civilians are being systematically attacked, displaced and killed. Just like seven years ago, glaring warning signs are being ignored by the international community, as the lives of hundreds of thousands of Rohingya hang in the balance.
Myanmar’s military junta has carried out a deliberate campaign to inflame tensions between Rohingya and Rakhine communities in Rakhine State, fueling resentment and prejudice to toxically high levels.
The junta has forcibly conscripted young Rohingya men into the very army that was responsible for the 2017 genocidal attacks. It forced Rohingya to participate in staged “protests” against the Arakan Army, pictures of which circulated online and heightened tensions with the Rakhine population. Some Rohingya militant groups have cynically aligned with the junta and participated in attacks on Rakhine villages.
Rohingya villages are reportedly being burned to the ground by Arakan Army forces that continue their military campaign to expel junta forces from Rakhine State. Both Arakan Army and junta forces have been imperiling innocent Rohingya by setting up bases inside Rohingya villages, exposing them to the hell-fire of artillery and drone attacks from both sides.
The death toll continues to mount in northern Rakhine State, with tens of thousands of Rohingya displaced, cut off from humanitarian aid and forced to fend for themselves to find food, water and shelter. Growing numbers, including young children, are starving or perishing from diseases and lack of access to medical care.
Now, just as in 2017, thousands of Rohingya, with nowhere else to turn, are seeking safety and shelter in Bangladesh. Despite being shot at, shelled and attacked with drones, the number of desperate families attempting to cross the border continues to grow. Scores have perished as overcrowded boats sink to the bottom of the Naf River that separates Myanmar and Bangladesh.
The way to end this cycle of horror and violence – a cycle that is repeating itself even as governments take note of the seventh anniversary of the Rohingya genocide – is to put an end to the conditions that enabled that genocide. These include lethal doses of international ignorance and indifference and the impunity that it fostered.
World leaders have issued statements every year on the anniversary of the beginning of the 2017 genocidal attacks, condemning the violence and expressing sympathy for its victims. These statements, no matter how well intentioned, are grossly inadequate.
Given the horror that is unfolding, once again, for the Rohingya in Myanmar, I implore world leaders to replace words of commemoration with action.
It is time for an emergency convening of UN Member States to address this crisis.
The UN Security Council should immediately convene and act to address this unfolding disaster before more innocent lives are lost. If the Security Council will not act, then I call for an emergency convening of UN Member States and non-state actors that are ready to act on behalf of those who are under seige. Such a convening can begin to address the crisis by:
Shining the spotlight of world attention on a crisis that remains in the shadows – attention that can cultivate and sustain the political will for action;
Launching an emergency action plan that includes the strong, practical measures necessary to address the cause of the crisis and its consequences while building strong, sustained support for the implementation of the plan from Member States;
Mobilising robust emergency humanitarian aid and the access necessary to reach those in need; and
Supporting mechanisms to hold those responsible for grave human rights violations, including war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide, to account.
Finally, I urge the Government of Bangladesh to once again demonstrate its generosity and commitment to humanitarian action by opening its borders to Rohingya fleeing for their lives. And, I call on Member States to provide Bangladesh with the support needed to meet this profound responsibility.
The worst way to mark the anniversary of the 2017 Rohingya genocide is with empty words and hollow declarations. The Rohingya need and deserve much more. There is no time to lose.”
Mr.Thomas Andrews (United States of America) is the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar. A former member of the US Congress from Maine, Andrews is a Robina Senior Human Rights Fellow at Yale Law School and an Associate of Harvard University’s Asia Center. He has worked with the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs and parliamentarians, NGOs and political parties in Cambodia, Indonesia, Algeria, Croatia, Serbia, Ukraine and Yemen. He has been a consultant for the National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma and the Euro-Burma Network and has run advocacy NGOs including Win Without War and United to End Genocide.
The Special Rapporteurs are part of what is known as the Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council. Comprising the largest body of independent experts in the UN Human Rights system, Special Procedures is the general name of the Council's independent fact-finding and monitoring mechanisms that address either specific country situations or thematic issues in all parts of the world. Special Procedures experts work on a voluntary basis; they are not UN staff and do not receive a salary for their work. They are independent from any government or organization and serve in their individual capacity..."
Source/publisher:
UN Human Rights Council (Geneva)
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-26
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Arakan (Rakhine) State - reports etc. by date (latest first), Crimes Against Humanity, Genocide, Human Rights and international relations
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Description:
"On 26 August 2024, Mrs. Eksiri Pintaruchi, Permanent Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Thailand, presented Thailand’s financial contribution of 9,000,000 Baht or about 280,000 US dollars to Mr. Lee Yam Ming, Executive Director of the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management (AHA Centre), at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Also present at the ceremony were H.E. Mr. Alounkeo Kittikhoun, Special Envoy of the ASEAN Chair on Myanmar, as well as Ambassadors and representatives from ASEAN member states' missions in Bangkok.
This financial contribution builds on Thailand's previous efforts to assist the affected population in Myanmar, including through various international organisations and the pilot project of cross-border humanitarian initiative between the Thai and Myanmar Red Cross Societies in March 2024. It would increase the amount of critical humanitarian assistance that the AHA Centre would deliver to affected population in the hard-to-reach areas in Myanmar without discrimination.
The donation reaffirms Thailand’s strong support for the Lao PDR, as the current ASEAN Chair, to advance the implementation of the ASEAN’s Five-Point Consensus.
On this occasion, H.E. Mr. Alounkeo Kittikhoun, Special Envoy of the ASEAN Chair on Myanmar, and Mr. Lee Yam Ming, Executive Director of the AHA Centre expressed their appreciation for Thailand’s constructive role and contribution, as well as steadfast commitment to expanding humanitarian assistance to reach more people in need in Myanmar..."
Source/publisher:
Government of Thailand
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-26
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
The discussion on humanitarian assistance to Burma, Thailand-Burma relations, Human Rights and international relations
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Description:
"In an effort to raise awareness and advocate for justice and accountability for the serious crimes that their community has suffered in Myanmar, Rohingya survivors living in the camps in Cox’s Bazar have tirelessly worked, together with LAW, during the past seven years to raise their voice and support others to do the same. They travelled to Argentina to give their testimonies at the investigative hearings for an important universal jurisdiction case in the Argentine federal criminal court, attended hearings before the International Court of Justice as part of The Gambia delegation that brought the case against Myanmar for violation of Genocide Convention, shared their experiences for those to appear in research reports to build evidence for the ongoing legal proceedings, learned different ways to express their life stories through visual means, such as art, for these stories to travel further, reach a wider public. They have conducted information sessions with their communities living in the camps to counter misconceptions about international justice, and served as a peer support group for survivors of torture and sexual and gender-based violence within the community providing them a trusted pathway to contribute to the ongoing accountability avenues.
On the 25th of August 2024, as we mark seven years since the deadly “clearance operations” committed by the Myanmar military against the Rohingya community in 2017, we witness the specter of ethnic cleansing against Myanmar’s stateless Rohingya minority being on the rise yet again. Accountability for past and ongoing crimes is therefore essential and we share with you a brief summary reflecting the past one-year results of the tireless work to advance accountability, and updates on the legal developments in relation to accountability for the Rohingya crisis.
1. Rohingya women at the forefront of the fight for justice
In December 2023, “Shanti Mohila”, a Rohingya women-led entity based in the Rohingya refugee camps in Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, was honoured with the title of Raphael Lemkin Champion of Prevention by the UN Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide for their exceptional efforts in advocating for justice for the Rohingya community. Their work embodies the spirit of the Genocide Convention, demonstrating the crucial role of grassroots efforts in preventing atrocities and preserving human dignity. The majority of LAW’s network of volunteers – the Survivor Advocates – are members of Shanti Mohila. They work closely with LAW as grassroots champions, conducting information sessions, sharing resources, and raising awareness and countering misconceptions about international justice, supporting survivors, contributing to legal research, and participating in global advocacy efforts.Read more about Shanti Mohila’s work here.
In February 2024, **Survivor Advocates/Shanti Mohila members participated in a series of art facilitation sessions conducted by LAW, in collaboration with Artolution Inc.**These sessions were an opportunity for survivors to find different ways to express stories from their life in exile in Bangladesh, memories from the time in Myanmar, and hopes for returning to their homeland in Rakhine state, Myanmar, everything through art.
2. Legal Developments related to accountability and justice for the Rohingya crisis
International Court of Justice (ICJ) In March 2024, LAW commenced an evidence collection exercise for the preparation of detailed witness statements for The Gambia’s Reply to Myanmar’s counter-memorial. Between March and May 2024, LAW conducted interviews with clients from multiple villages and gathered over 300 pages of witness testimonies that contributed to The Gambia’s Reply.On 23 May 2024, The Gambia submitted its Reply to the ICJ. Myanmar is expected to file its rejoinder by 16 December 2024. Oral hearings in the case are anticipated to commence later in 2025.
Universal Jurisdiction case in Argentina On 28 June 2024, Argentine Prosecutor Guillermo Marijuán asked the federal criminal court in Buenos Aires, Argentina to order international arrest warrants against 25 Myanmar government officials for the crime of genocide and crimes against humanity committed against the Rohingya community between 2012 and 2018. The Prosecutor’s request for warrants is based on an investigation under the principle of universal jurisdiction initiated in Argentina through a criminal complaint in 2019. This is the first time that arrest warrants are being sought against the Myanmar military for the crime of genocide, the historic persecution and violence suffered by the Rohingya community. The court is yet to respond to this request.Read more about this development here.
3. Publications and resources
In December 2023, LAW published a research report on the enduring impact of the systematic SGBV committed against Rohingya in Myanmar during the 2017 “clearance operations”, particularly in terms of its consequences for not only survivors’ mental health but also their reproductive capacity and its impact on the community as a whole.The research concludes that the long-term health and social impacts of the sexual violence committed against the Rohingya constituted two acts of genocide: causing serious bodily or mental harm and imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group. Therefore, LAW finds reasonable grounds to believe that the Myanmar military’s 2017 actions against the Rohingya can be legally characterized as genocide under Article 2 of the Genocide Convention. LAW aims to bring the perpetrators to justice in international courts and ensure ongoing care and support for survivors and witnesses of this violence.Read the full report here. Read the summary in Burmese here.See the video summary (EN) here or click on the picture above. For the Burmese language video click here.
In May 2024, the article “What kind of court is this?: Perceptions of International Justice Among Rohingya Refugees”, authored by Prof. Payam Akhavan, Prof. Rebecca Hamilton, and Antonia Mulvey (LAW’s Executive Director) was published in the Human Rights Quarterly (Vol. 46, No. 2).Based on the findings of a community-participatory research conducted by LAW and a team of Rohingya researchers in Cox’s Bazar, the article seeks to understand what “justice” means for Rohingya people, contextualizing it within their cultural framings of justice and their current reality of displacement in a protracted crisis. Amidst the ongoing crisis in the camps linked to the conflict in the Rakhine state, the article strives to advocate for justice actors to ensure meaningful participation of the Rohingya in the international justice mechanisms and that their perceptions inform the accountability discourse and more broadly, reflects on how grassroots perspectives can and should shape the global justice discourse.For further details and to access the article, visit HRQ’s website here (open access).
In July 2024, LAW published an animated five video series explaining the ongoing international justice and accountability mechanisms concerning the Rohingya, and also how other communities who faced mass atrocities sought justice. These videos provide simplified information on the ongoing cases before different international courts, the expected outcomes, and how the Rohingya can participate in these processes.Watch the videos in English here: Youtube Playlist (also available in Rohingya and Burmese on LAW’s YouTube channel)
Rohingya communities now face the most significant threat of wide-scale violence since 2017
The resumption of conflict in Rakhine State between the Myanmar military and the Arakan Army since November 2023 has resulted in a disproportionate impact on the Rohingya civilians. The Rohingya Survivor Advocates, Shanti Mohila, and LAW are deeply concerned over the direct or indiscriminate attacks on civilians and civilian objects in Rakhine State in the face of binding provisional measures ordered by the International Court of Justice for the protection of Rohingya. In its most recent statement, the OHCHR has expressed deep alarm over hundreds of civilians being reportedly killed while trying to flee the fighting, and particularly, members of the Rohingya community finding themselves trapped between the military and its allies and the Arakan Army, with no path to safety.
Read LAW’s statement at the 56th regular session of the Human Rights Council here; See LAW’s Legal and Programme Advisor, Ishita Kumar in an interview with Al Jazeera here on the ongoing developments. LAW will continue to monitor the situation of the Rohingya closely to pursue accountability for both past and ongoing atrocity crimes on behalf of the survivors with the goal to challenging the cycle of impunity in Myanmar..."
Source/publisher:
Legal Action Worldwide (Genève)
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-25
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Arakan (Rakhine) State - reports etc. by date (latest first), Human Rights and international relations, Crimes Against Humanity, Genocide
Language:
Local URL:
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Description:
"Khin Mar Cho worries for her 4-year-old son as she struggles to scrape together enough food to feed him in a makeshift displacement camp at a crowded monastery in western Myanmar.
Soldiers had stormed their village of Byine Phyu, Rakhine state, and forced her and other family members out of their homes. They detained all the men and shot her brother and other neighbors, she said.
Survivors like Khin Mar Cho fled to the monastery just outside the regional capital Sittwe. There, a lone monk is struggling to feed about 300 people who have sought refuge inside the camp as a three-year civil war intensifies around them, waged by Myanmar’s military junta against an armed resistance.
“There are days that we have no food, even though we are hungry,” Khin Mar Cho said. “I cannot feed my kid anything more than meals donated by people because I don’t have a job or income, and all the male family members have been taken away.”
Disturbing accounts from multiple aid workers suggest hunger is being used as a weapon of war in Rakhine state.
The junta is preventing aid from reaching desperate people by imposing checkpoints, blocking roads and waterways, and refusing to issue access permits to humanitarian groups, multiple senior United Nations officials, and local and international aid workers in Rakhine told CNN on condition of anonymity because most weren’t authorized to speak.
Rakhine has become a focal point of the conflict, where a powerful ethnic minority armed rebel group, the Arakan Army (AA) — which is accused of human rights abuses — has seized control of at least 10 of the state’s townships since a year-long ceasefire with the military collapsed in November.
The aid officials said the junta is trying to “starve” civilians in AA-held territory, using tactics that have repeatedly been described as war crimes and crimes against humanity by UN officials and rights groups.
“They are using food as a weapon,” a senior aid official told CNN. “That much is clear.”
Related
Hundreds of fleeing Rohingya reportedly killed in Rakhine as fears mount of ethnic cleansing mount
In a statement to CNN, Myint Kyaw, Deputy Permanent Secretary for Myanmar’s Ministry of Information, alleged rebel groups — not the junta — are restricting “people’s access” to territories they control.
“The Myanmar government is committed to the equality of all citizens,” the statement said. “Every citizen has the right to travel freely without any restrictions.”
Risk of starvation
Aid workers say they don’t know the full extent of the suffering due to telecoms and internet blocks coupled with restrictions on access to affected areas.
But they say the crisis is acute.
The situation unfolding across the country is desperate, but in Rakhine — which is almost entirely dependent on food aid — the UN says that fewer than a quarter of the 873,000 people who need food assistance have received it.
“There is a very real possibility that the most vulnerable… may die if they do not receive support,” a UN report warned in June. It is now August, and the situation has deteriorated.
Displaced residents in Rakhine told CNN they are growing increasingly desperate as they and their families struggle to cope with escalating violence and dwindling supplies of food and medicine.
Prices for basic staples, like rice, fuel and cooking oil, have skyrocketed partly due to shortages created by the junta’s control of supply routes north from Myanmar’s largest city, Yangon, aid officials said. Requests to transport goods, including food, into the region are being refused, they added.
Meanwhile, food production in the state has plummeted, with farmers predicting a 50% drop in this year’s rice harvest, independent Myanmar news outlet The Irrawaddy reported.
Mohammed, a 43-year-old father of three, has lived in a displacement camp with his family in Sittwe since 2012, when anti-Muslim violence forced tens of thousands of people from their homes.
The latest fighting has not yet reached Sittwe, which the junta still controls. But since the collapse of the ceasefire deal between the AA and the military in November opened a major new front in Myanmar’s civil war, the camp has been all but cut off and conditions have drastically deteriorated, he said.
Mohammed’s children attend a small, makeshift school within the camp, but he says it’s difficult to nurture their dreams when he can only feed them half a bowl of rice.
“My children would cry and ask, ‘Are we not eating tonight?’ In those moments, feeling desperate, I would go to a neighbor and ask for some food to feed our children,” Mohammed told Partners Relief and Development, an aid NGO.
Yet his neighbors are hungry too, and they have little to spare.
Access denied
Shayna Bauchner, a researcher at Human Rights Watch, told CNN the junta is obstructing aid deliveries in Rakhine by blocking roads and waterways, seizing relief cargoes and confiscating medical supplies.
“As the conflict has spread around Rakhine, we’ve also seen the destruction of roadways and bridges,” she said. “The result is, basically, no one has access to these places.”
Aid groups, including UN agencies, must get “travel authorizations” from the state government, which reports to the ruling military council, before they can access territory that the junta considers “travel-restricted areas,” according to aid officials.
In February, the junta stopped issuing nearly all travel authorizations to contested or rebel-controlled territory in the state, most of which are in northern Rakhine, according to seven aid officials with direct knowledge of the matter, all of whom requested anonymity.
Without the travel authorizations, it’s impossible to pass through the junta’s road and waterway blockades, they said.
“All we need at the moment is aid and support to survive this.”
North Rakhine State villager
One senior aid official said, “it is difficult to negotiate because the SAC does not want assistance to go to non-SAC controlled areas,” referring to the State Administration Council, the official name of the junta government.
In May, some aid agencies received travel authorizations for Sittwe when the junta allowed them to begin transporting supplies from Yangon. Two cargo vessels carrying rice and basic medicine arrived in Sittwe two months later, but some items such as solar lights, hygiene and newborn kits remained held up, OCHA reported in August.
Teams still can’t access the surrounding townships or areas further afield.
“No official travel authorization has been granted to humanitarian partners to implement activities outside of Sittwe township since November 2023,” a senior aid official told CNN.
Seeking to broker an end to the blockade, senior UN officials held informal talks with SAC officials last month in the country’s capital, two sources told CNN.
The UN aid officials made clear in their meetings, which have not been previously reported, that the status quo is unacceptable, the sources said. Separately, the two officials said the issue was raised with the UN Security Council, the European Union and China, among others.
The junta told humanitarian groups that it cut their access to AA territory because aid workers cannot safely travel through areas the military does not control, sources told CNN.
But “that’s a lame excuse,” said a senior aid official. “We don’t need the junta to cover for our security.”
Local aid workers caught trying to deliver food and supplies in junta-controlled territory without a permit have also been arrested, those on the ground told CNN.
Aid workers and officials say the junta’s blockade is part of a wider war strategy long used by the military, designed to chip away at the rebel group’s popular support by cutting off food, water and medical care to the civilian population.
“They are using food as a weapon. That much is clear.”
Senior aid official
Bauchner, the Human Rights Watch researcher, said the blockades are “deliberate, and they are intended to harm the population in what is an apparent war crime.”
Myint Kyaw of the junta’s information ministry, said humanitarian groups are “being allowed to go to safe areas” after completing a verification process and alleged — without evidence — that rebel groups are blocking aid deliveries.
In the statement, the junta linked instability in the region to armed groups allegedly engaging in online gambling, planting and selling illegal drugs, human trafficking, online scams and illegal weapons deliveries to “terrorist groups” in rebel-controlled areas.
But one local aid official who works in northern Rakhine said the junta is “punishing civilians collectively” by blocking most food and medicine imports. Even the limited food that is available in the state is prohibitively expensive to most, largely thanks to blockade-induced inflation, he said.
“People are surviving on the bare minimum … like rice and salt,” said Ejaz, who asked to be identified by a pseudonym for his safety.
“I’ve seen it with my own eyes.”
War and hunger
Many of the displaced in Rakhine are members of the stateless Rohingya minority, who have been persecuted for decades in a country that denies them citizenship.
Jamila, 26, a former resident of the predominantly Rohingya town of Buthidaung, close to the Bangladesh border, said the community recently suffered food shortages for at least six months due to the fighting.
“No one came to give us food. The junta blocks all roads. They block all aid trucks,” said Jamila, who goes by one name and spoke to CNN from a refugee camp in Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, where her family recently fled.
Many shops were looted by fighters and soldiers, she said, and those still open could only get supplies by smuggling them at high prices across the border from Bangladesh.
Food supplies were also strained as droves of displaced people from surrounding villages fled to Buthidaung to escape fighting and landmines.
“Everyone was helping everyone,” she said. “I lived life with risk and hunger.”
With little food and no medicine, Jamila said her children suffered from diarrhea and vomiting. “I am suffering from allergies. My whole body is full of itching. But there is no medicine, no treatment,” she said.
In late May, the Arakan Army said it seized Buthidaung. Activists and relatives of residents accused AA soldiers of extrajudicial killings, torching and looting Rohingya neighborhoods, and forcing thousands of people to flee.
Jamila said fighters stormed her village, drenching her home in petrol and setting it on fire while she and her family were still inside.
As the flames consumed their home, they scrambled to grab what belongings they could salvage — but only those on the ground floor had time to flee. Her parents-in-law, asleep in their beds upstairs, did not make it out.
They had no time to mourn. As they ran to escape their village, the howl of gunfire rang out, and a bullet pierced her younger brother. He did not survive.
“We didn’t try to save him,” Jamila said. “We were hearing the screams of people, the cries of children.”
She walked for six days to reach Bangladesh, saying “we lived by eating banana leaves and drinking pond water.”
CNN could not verify Jamila’s account but it matches other reports from the incident.
In a statement, the AA denied it torched Buthidaung, saying it “adheres to its principle of fighting under the military code of conduct and never targets non-military objects.”
Earlier this month, the AA was accused of killing Rohingya people in drone strikes and artillery fire as villagers fled the nearby town of Maungdaw. It denied involvement and blamed the deaths on the Myanmar military and allied Rohingya armed groups.
CNN reached out for comment to the AA and the Humanitarian and Development Coordination Office (HDCO) of the United League of Arakan (ULA), the AA’s political wing.
In a statement to CNN, the HDCO said there are about 590,000 people displaced in Rakhine state, according to their data, but civil society organizations are only reaching 20-30% of conflict-affected people.
“Emergency responses are extremely slow. The ULA government, including HDCO, is making every effort to provide food, shelter, water, and healthcare with the limited resources available,” it said.
‘We are invisible’
When the junta blocks official aid deliveries, regional and local humanitarian groups use covert tactics to operate without approval from the military, risking their lives to deliver aid to those in need, according to officials at four local aid groups, all of whom declined to publicize their tactics because it could jeopardize their operations.
But it’s far from enough.
At least 18.6 million people — about one third of Myanmar’s population — need humanitarian assistance this year, but aid workers have only been able to reach 2.1 million, according to an OCHA report published last week. Even in territories that the junta does not blockade, intensifying war, record-low funding and international apathy are also limiting aid workers’ access.
Aid workers have also become targets in the junta’s war.
A World Food Programme (WFP) warehouse in Maungdaw was looted and burned in June, depriving that community of urgently needed food aid. But WFP’s local partners were already struggling to reach their warehouses in Rakhine because “artillery shells are falling everywhere,” according to a source with direct knowledge of the matter.
Junta-imposed restrictions on communications are also limiting aid workers’ ability to operate, they say. Signal, a popular encrypted messaging app, has become inaccessible to users in Myanmar unless they use a VPN (virtual private network), four Yangon residents told CNN. Junta police are also conducting random phone checks throughout the city, one resident added.
Meanwhile, the UN’s humanitarian response program in Myanmar is among the most underfunded in the world. UN agencies and their local partners estimate that about $1 billion is needed to fund aid efforts in the country through 2024, but they have only raised about 20% of that amount.
“In the best-case scenario, based on my discussions with the donors, we may raise 30-35%, though not beyond that, by the end of the year,” Sajjad Mohammad Sajid, the OCHA Head of Office in Myanmar, told CNN. “This is the second year in a row that Myanmar is facing a significant decrease in funds despite rising food insecurity.”
Without an immediate injection of cash and a lifting of the blockade, aid officials say they will be forced to choose who does — and does not — receive humanitarian aid, leaving millions of desperate civilians without urgently needed assistance.
“Underfunding will result in livelihoods falling beyond the point of repair,” the OCHA report warned.
A senior UN aid official in Myanmar blamed the funding shortfall in part on international apathy. There are relatively few global advocacy groups and international news outlets consistently reporting on the country, and unlike Gaza and Ukraine, human rights abuses in Myanmar have gained little international attention, he said.
“We have become invisible,” the official said. “Donors will find it difficult to fund missions that are invisible.”
The monastery in Sittwe, where Khin Mar Cho and her family now reside, relies on food donated from the local community.
Another villager from Byine Phyu, who declined to be named for safety reasons, told CNN that on good days they are given two basic meals of rice and vegetables, but her two children, aged 11 and 7, often go to bed hungry.
“The soldiers took all the money we had,” she said. “All we need at the moment is aid and support to survive this.”
Though his small monastery is overwhelmed with displaced people, the monk said he tries to collect more donations from the community, hoping to feed those in the compound more than small helpings of rice.
But they receive meager food donations. Adding to the dire situation, his makeshift camp is overfilled, many families are forced to sleep outside without a covering in the height of the rainy season, so sickness and diarrhea is rife, the monk said.
“There are no NGOs or medics helping them,” he said.
“The only help we get is from the fire service for their funerals.”
This story has been updated with additional information..."
Source/publisher:
"CNN" (USA)
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-25
[field_licence]
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Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations, The discussion on humanitarian assistance to Burma
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"NEW YORK/KATHMANDU/BANGKOK, 25 August 2024 – Seven years after hundreds of thousands of Rohingya people fled violence and persecution in Myanmar, conflict continues to intensify in Rakhine State, on the western coast of Myanmar, with a surge in casualties and displacement in Maungdaw Township and reports of increasing numbers of people seeking shelter and protection in Bangladesh.
UNICEF has received alarming reports that civilians, particularly children and families, are being targeted or caught in the crossfire, resulting in deaths and severe injuries. Humanitarian access in Rakhine has become extremely challenging. Critical services, including access to safe water and healthcare are jeopardised, exacerbated by electricity, telecommunications and internet blackouts since January. This is impacting both civilian activities and humanitarian operations.
“Seven years after a deadly wave of violence forced thousands of families from their homes in search of safety, new reports of violence are painful reminders of the continuing threats to children in Myanmar,” said UNICEF Executive Director Catherine Russell. “In Rakhine and across the country, children and families continue to pay the price for conflict, with their lives, livelihoods, and futures. Parties to the conflict must uphold their obligations to protect children.”
On 5 August 2024, artillery shelling and drone attacks reportedly killed about 180 people, including a significant number of women and children, near the bank of the Naf River, which marks the border between southeastern Bangladesh and northwestern Myanmar, as they attempted to escape hostilities. On the same day, an estimated 20,000 people were reportedly displaced from three downtown Maungdaw wards.
In separate incidents on 6 and 19 August, boats carrying dozens of people - including women and children – sank in the Naf River, with children among the casualties, the latest in a series of capsizing incidents involving children.
Since 13 November 2023, the escalating conflict has displaced an estimated 327,000 people in Rakhine State and Paletwa Township in Chin. This brings the total current estimated internal displacement in Rakhine State to well over half a million people.
Across Myanmar, the humanitarian crisis that escalated in February 2021 continues to rapidly deteriorate, with children bearing the heaviest burden of unabating violence, including grave violations, mass displacement, and the near collapse of health and education service provision systems. Escalating attacks and clashes have displaced an estimated 3.3 million people, nearly 40 per cent of whom are children. In 2024, a record 18.6 million people - nearly one-third of the country's population – including 6 million children, require humanitarian assistance.
The Rohingya population who fled attacks and violence in 2017, joined refugees already in Bangladesh from previous waves of displacement. Together, they total almost one million displaced people. Seven years later, about half a million Rohingya refugee children are growing up in the world’s largest refugee camp, with many of them born there as refugees. The refugee community relies entirely on humanitarian assistance and lives in temporary shelters in highly congested camp settings. Working with the Interim Government of Bangladesh and partners, UNICEF provides water and sanitation, establishes diarrhoeal treatment centres, enables access to health and nutrition services for children and pregnant women, as well as to quality education; and supports children affected by violence, abuse and neglect with protection and response services.
“Bangladesh’s continued support to the refugee population – especially children - is both commendable and critical,” said Russell. “Over the past 12 months, we have been increasingly concerned about the security situation in the camps and reports of child rights violations. We stand ready to support the new Interim Government of Bangladesh to ensure that these children are protected and have access to critical services.”
In Myanmar, UNICEF calls on all parties to the conflict to uphold their obligations under international humanitarian law and international human rights law to protect civilians, particularly children, and ensure their safety and well-being. UNICEF also calls for safe and unimpeded access to deliver humanitarian aid by all humanitarian actors..."
Source/publisher:
UN Children's Fund (New York) via Reliefweb (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-24
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
UNICEF (United Nations Children's Fund), Arakan (Rakhine) State - reports etc. by date (latest first), Human Rights and international relations, Internal displacement/forced migration of Rohingyas
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US State Department envoy Beth Van Schaack describes challenges providing aid and justice to the minority group.
Description:
"The U.S. and other countries are in need of “creative solutions” to assist tens of thousands of Muslim Rohingyas displaced by conflict in western Myanmar’s Rakhine state, where the ruling junta has restricted access to aid providers, according to a State Department envoy who monitors international crime.
In the meantime, U.S. Ambassador-at-Large for Global Criminal Justice Beth Van Schaack told RFA Burmese, Washington is working with authorities in neighboring Bangladesh to support the nearly 1 million Rohingyas sheltering across the border at camps in Cox’s Bazar and helping to document persecution of the group for potential referral to international criminal courts.
“Providing humanitarian assistance inside Myanmar is much more of a challenge,” said Van Schaack. “We don't necessarily have access to cross border points where that assistance can come in, so it's just much more difficult to do that work. But I want to acknowledge how dire the situation is, and we need to look for creative solutions.”
Van Schaack spoke to RFA as Rohingyas marked the seventh anniversary of a 2017 military crackdown on Rohingya militants in Rakhine state that triggered an exodus of some 740,000 people to Bangladesh.
Since then, the number of displaced Rohingyas in camps across the border has swelled to nearly 1 million, by United Nations estimates, with more attempting to cross daily. The group has found itself caught in the crossfire between the junta, which seized power in a 2021 coup d’etat and the ethnic Arakan Army, or AA, which is fighting for self-determination in Rakhine state.
Both sides have been accused of killing Rohingya, with the AA fighters blamed for attacking people accused of supporting junta forces.
On Aug. 5, dozens of Rohingya people were killed by fire from heavy weapons as they waited for boats to cross to Bangladesh, survivors told Radio Free Asia. Some survivors said the AA was responsible though the insurgents denied that.
Civilian minorities ‘ultimate sufferers’ in conflict
Van Schaack categorized the need for assistance for the Rohingya community within Myanmar as “enormous,” but said that with junta restrictions to access and the chaotic nature of the civil war, delivering it is impossible.
“There are a number of different groups that are ascendant, and they're having conversations amongst themselves about what a future, inclusive, democratic Myanmar looks like,” she said. “But because that's the case, we can't. There's only so much we can do with respect to the territory.”
The Ambassador-at-Large said that with a new government in place in Bangladesh, after student-led protests earlier this month turned deadly and touched off a mass movement that forced Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina to resign, the hope is that the U.S. can provide greater humanitarian assistance to the Rohingya in Cox’s Bazar, with the goal of allowing them to return home to Myanmar.
“But they cannot do so until it is safe, until they are returning home voluntarily and until there is a sustainable plan for them to restart their lives in their ancestral homelands,” she said.
Amid the fighting in Rakhine state, it’s difficult to determine the extent of the crimes against Rohingyas, Van Schaak said.
“We do know that atrocities are being committed and that because the violence has risen, it's inevitably the civilian population – civilian communities of multiple ethnic groups – that are the ultimate sufferers of this situation,” she said.
“So we have called upon the parties to commit to more comprehensive efforts at a ceasefire,” she said. “But this government is unwilling to relinquish power at this point, and so we see these continual acts of violence and atrocities.”
‘Pages and pages of documentation’
Van Schaak said that in addition to providing humanitarian assistance to Rohingyas in Cox’s Bazar and other areas where they have sought refuge, the U.S. government is also helping to bring justice to their community, by conducting investigations and operating as a clearinghouse of evidence for courts around the world to bring cases.
In August 2022, the U.S. State Department determined that members of the Burmese military committed genocide and crimes against humanity against the Rohingya during the crackdown in 2017, but information gathering is still underway to classify the latest crimes against the ethnic minority.
She acknowledged that even with clear evidence to proceed to trial, some courts, like the International Criminal Court in The Hague, can do little more than issue an arrest warrant without the perpetrator in custody. So while senior members of the junta remain within Myanmar, it will be difficult for those cases to proceed.
“But those prosecutors and investigators are ready – they have dossiers on responsible individuals, they have pages and pages of documentation ... [not only] with respect to the genocide against the Rohingya, but also crimes committed since the since the coup in 2021,” she said.
While the conflict in Myanmar continues, Van Schaak urged ethnic armies such as the AA to “distinguish themselves from the Tatmadaw,” using the official name for the country’s military, which “throughout its history has been characterized by violence, war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide.”
“The ethnic armed groups, if they want to build legitimacy in the eyes of the international community, if they want to be a part of the solution, they need to strictly adhere to the laws of war,” she said.
“Treat civilian communities with respect and dignity, treat individuals in their custody humanely – even members of the Tatmadaw – and ultimately, work towards a democratic future for Myanmar.”..."
Source/publisher:
"Radio Free Asia" (USA)
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-23
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Arakan (Rakhine) State - reports etc. by date (latest first), Discrimination against the Rohingya, Rohingya (cultural, political etc.), Human Rights and international relations
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Description:
"Primary country: Myanmar.....Source: UN High Commissioner for Refugees.....Format: Map.....Theme: Protection and Human Rights.....Language:
English..."
Source/publisher:
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (Geneva) via Reliefweb (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-23
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
UNHCR (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees), Human Rights and international relations, Burma: Internal displacement/forced migration of several ethnic groups.
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978.92 KB
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"GENEVA – UN Human Rights Chief Volker Türk today expressed grave alarm and raised profound concerns about the sharply deteriorating situation across Myanmar, particularly in Rakhine State where hundreds of civilians have reportedly been killed while trying to flee the fighting.
Over the past four months, tens of thousands of people, many of whom are Rohingya, have fled a major offensive by the Arakan Army to take control of Buthidaung and Maungdaw towns from the military. In one of the deadliest attacks along the Naf River bordering Bangladesh on 5 August, dozens were reportedly killed, including by armed drones. It remains unclear which party to the conflict was responsible.
“Thousands of Rohingya have been forced to flee on foot, with the Arakan Army herding them repeatedly into locations that offer scant safe haven,” Türk said. “As the border crossings to Bangladesh remain closed, members of the Rohingya community are finding themselves trapped between the military and its allies and the Arakan Army, with no path to safety.”
Despite repeated warnings and calls for action, the ongoing violence underscores the prevailing sense of impunity and the persistent challenges in ensuring protection of civilians in accordance with international law, the High Commissioner said.
“This month marks seven years since the military operations which drove 700,000 across the border into Bangladesh. Despite the world saying “never again” we are once more witnessing killings, destruction and displacement in Rakhine. Parties to the armed conflict are issuing statements denying responsibility for attacks against the Rohingya and others, acting as though they are powerless to protect them. This stretches the bounds of credulity,” said Türk.
According to information documented by the UN Human Rights Office, both the military and the Arakan Army, which now controls most of the townships in Rakhine, have committed serious human rights violations and abuses against the Rohingya, including extrajudicial killings, some involving beheadings, abductions, forced recruitment, indiscriminate bombardments of towns and villages using drones and artillery, and arson attacks. Such attacks stand in sharp contrast to obligations of all parties under international humanitarian law and to the provisional measures ordered by the International Court of Justice to protect the Rohingya against risk of further harm.
Credible sources have described increasing numbers of Rohingya, nearly half of whom are children, seeking assistance for conflict-related injuries. There have also been reports of people dying of diarrhoea, due to lack of access to clean water and grossly inadequate living conditions. Food warehouses holding vitally important supplies for civilians have been attacked, ransacked and burnt. Buthidaung and Maungdaw hospitals have been closed due to the violence, further aggravating an already disastrous humanitarian crisis compounded by an extensive telecommunications shutdown.
“Both the military and the Arakan Army bear direct responsibility for the human tragedy that is unfolding in Rakhine,” said Turk. “Both parties must immediately cease attacks against civilians, protect those fleeing the conflict, and ensure their unimpeded access to life-saving humanitarian assistance.”
“These atrocities demand an unequivocal response - those responsible must be held accountable, and justice must be pursued relentlessly,” said Türk. “Recurrence of the crimes and horrors of the past must be prevented as a moral duty and a legal necessity. It is the responsibility of the international community, with ASEAN at the forefront, to take all necessary measures to protect the Rohingya and other civilian victims of this cruel conflict.”..."
Source/publisher:
UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (Geneva)
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-23
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Arakan (Rakhine) State - reports etc. by date (latest first), Discrimination against the Rohingya, Rohingya (cultural, political etc.)
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"The Asia Justice Coalition is a network of organizations whose purpose is to promote justice and accountability for gross violations of international human rights law and serious violations of international humanitarian law in Asia, and to contribute to the fulfillment of the rights of victims and their families.
As we are coming to the fourth year of the military coup in Myanmar and the seventh anniversary of the 2017 exodus of more than 730,000 Rohingya forced to flee from Rakhine State to Bangladesh during the Myanmar military’s so-called ‘clearance operations’, the atrocities committed against the Rohingya continue unabated. According to the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar (IIMM), the past year has witnessed horrific levels of brutality and inhumanity across Myanmar, including crimes committed with an intent to punish and induce terror in the civilian population. The escalation of conflict in Rakhine State since November 2023, compounded by the international community’s inaction, is eerily reminiscent of the 2017 atrocity crimes committed against the Rohingya by the Myanmar military.
Situation in Myanmar
The Myanmar military has committed widespread and systematic human rights violations, including crimes against humanity and war crimes, across the country. Since the 2021 coup in Myanmar, more than 5,534 civilians have been killed by the Myanmar military, and over 27,226 people have been arbitrarily arrested and detained. According to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OHCHA), more than 3 million people have been internally displaced, and 18.6 million people are in urgent need of humanitarian aid. In continuation of its persistent patterns, the military junta routinely conducts raids, torches civilian properties, including schools and hospitals, and burns down homes. In defiance of international humanitarian law, the military has been conducting airstrikes, using anti-personnel landmines, and intentionally targeting and killing civilians, and causing the destruction of civilian property. According to the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED), in the first half of 2024, military airstrikes increased by 112% compared to the whole of 2023. On 10 February 2024, the military began enforcing the 2010 People’s Military Service Law, enabling the conscription of Burmese citizens, men ages 18 to 35 and women ages 18 to 27, as well as older professionals such as doctors and engineers, for up to two years and as long as five years in a State of Emergency.
The resumption of conflict in Rakhine State between the Myanmar military and the Arakan Army since November 2023 has resulted in a further and swifter deterioration of the situation. Intensified attacks between the two parties have disproportionately affected over 600,000 Rohingya living under de facto indefinite detention and apartheid-like conditions in Rakhine State. Despite denying the Rohingya citizenship in Myanmar, the military is forcefully recruiting the Rohingya to fight the Arakan Army with the use and threat of force, abductions, and kidnappings, and on the pretext of securing freedom of movement and the grant of citizenship. In furtherance of the military’s attempts to cause intercommunal strife, the Rohingya were also forced to protest against the Arakan Army with threats of repeat of 2017 military operations, the imposition of heavy fines, and the razing of villages. Similarly, the Arakan Army is forcibly recruiting and deploying the Rohingya against the military junta, effectively using them as human shields.
The Arakan Army has gained control of and strategically positioned itself around the majority of Rohingya villages in Rakhine State and has systematically conducted offensives against the Rohingya. The attacks include raiding and forcing the evacuation of Rohingya townships, such as Maungdaw and Buthidaung, killing and torturing civilians, shelling and conducting drone attacks, torching houses across the village, and other direct, indiscriminate or disproportionate attacks on civilians and civilian objects. The Rohingya continue to live with increasing restrictions on movement, arbitrary arrests and detention, access to education, healthcare, employment, food, water, sanitation, and the imposition of taxes, by both the military junta and the Arakan Army. The deliberate restriction on humanitarian aid to Rakhine State, the seizure of food and other goods, the attack, torching, and destruction of World Food Programme warehouses have resulted in a situation of famine and exacerbated the hardships of the Rohingya. Rohingya women and the LGBTQIA+ population in Rakhine State are at heightened risk of discrimination, exploitation, and sexual and gender-based violence by the Arakan Army as well as the military junta.
Situation in Bangladesh
The situation of the Rohingya in the refugee camps in Cox’s Bazaar and Bhasan Char has worsened over the years. Over 1 million refugees continue to live with restrictions on movement, lack of access to adequate food, water, durable housing, education, livelihood, and health care. The dire situation within the camps has heightened the risks of human trafficking, forced marriages, and child labour and forced thousands of Rohingya to escape life in the camps by paying huge amounts to undertake precarious boat journeys on the sea.
The widespread operation of insurgent and armed groups, including the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army, Rohingya Solidarity Organisation, and others, has contributed to increased violence and insecurity in the refugee camps. Armed groups have killed, abducted, detained and tortured with impunity in the camps. Moreover, Rohingya refugees, especially boys and men, have been reportedly enticed, manipulated, and abducted from camps in Bangladesh to join organised armed groups or transferred to Myanmar to forcibly join the military junta. Bangladeshi officials, including the police, have failed to actively monitor, maintain peace and security, and provide protection to the Rohingya. The rising incidents of sexual abuse and exploitation of women, girls, and LGBTQIA+ persons within the camps, without any real redress, further reflect the absence of accountability. The renewed fighting between the military and the Arakan Army forced at least 4000 Rohingya in Rakhine to flee to the Bangladesh border, only to be beaten and pushed back by Bangladeshi officials in flagrant violation of international law.
International Accountability Efforts
The ongoing case at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Gambia v. Myanmar pertains to Myanmar’s state responsibility under the Genocide Convention. Despite the provisional measures ordered by the ICJ for Myanmar to take all measures to prevent the commission of genocidal acts and to ensure that the military and security forces do not commit genocidal acts, the Myanmar military continues to commit atrocities against the Rohingya. On 3 July, the ICJ found that the interventions filed by seven states (the Maldives, the Netherlands, Canada, Denmark, the UK, France, and Germany) are admissible ‘in so far as they concern the construction of provisions of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide’. Consequently, all seven states are authorised to submit their written observations in accordance with Article 86 of the Rules of Court.
Since 2019, the International Criminal Court (ICC) has been investigating but has not yet made any significant progress concerning the arrest warrants in the situation. The ongoing ICC investigation is aimed at seeking individual criminal responsibility for crimes against humanity, such as deportation, persecution, and other inhuman acts, committed against the Rohingya population, at least in part on the territory of Bangladesh. However, in a welcome move, the Federal prosecutor in Argentina has sought international arrest warrants against 25 Myanmar officials, including Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, Min Aung Hlaing, for the crime of genocide and crimes against humanity committed against the Rohingya community between 2012 and 2018. The case before the Federal Court in Buenos Aires is based on the principle of universal jurisdiction, initiated by the Burmese Rohingya Organisation UK (BROUK) in November 2019.
In July, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) issued a joint communiqué reaffirming its support for the Five-Point Consensus, despite the brazen disregard of the agreement by the Myanmar military and consistently undermining regional stability. The non-compliance of the military junta with United Nations Security Council Resolution 2669 (2022) and the failure of ASEAN to hold the military accountable show the limitations of the Five-Point Consensus framework and the incapacity of the regional bloc. The deferral of responsibility to ASEAN by the international community has emboldened the Myanmar military and resulted in accountability gaps. As per the recent report of UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar Tom Andrews, many banks based in ASEAN are facilitating the Myanmar military junta’s access to weapons and related materials, and thus contributing to and exacerbating the conflict.
The Asia Justice Coalition is deeply concerned and condemns the indifference of the international community to the worsening situation of the Rohingya and other civilians in Rakhine State. It calls upon:
All parties to the conflict to immediately end the ongoing attacks and military operations across the country, including by ceasing all violations of international law against Rohingya and other minorities.
The military junta to facilitate safe, rapid, and unimpeded humanitarian access.
The new interim government of Bangladesh to provide increased protection and security to the Rohingya and investigate and prosecute security officials responsible for rights violations against the Rohingya.
The Bangladesh interim government to end restrictions in the refugee camps and provide Rohingya freedom of movement and access to education, livelihood, and health services.
ASEAN to overhaul the Five-Point Consensus and set a concrete and timebound action plan, block Myanmar from all its meetings, and impose financial sanctions, and an arms embargo against Myanmar.
The UN Security Council to hold a public session on the situation in Myanmar, impose targeted economic sanctions on the military and affiliates, and a binding global arms embargo, including on transfers of jet fuel and dual-use technology, and refer the situation to the ICC.
The UN member states and regional bodies to impose targeted sanctions, stop the supply and transfer of arms to the Myanmar military, and ensure effective implementation and prosecution of sanction breaches under their respective domestic laws.
UN member states to fully cooperate with and provide access to theIndependent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar (IIMM) to undertake its mandated activities, including facilitating secure access to victims and witnesses.
Neighbouring countries, including India, Thailand, Indonesia, and Bangladesh, to devise a comprehensive regional response to the refugee crisis, provide protection, support, and humanitarian aid to all refugees fleeing Myanmar, observing the principle of non-refoulement, and authorize and fund emergency cross-border aid to civilians, including internally displaced people in Myanmar.
All countries to use all avenues and diplomatic channels at their disposal in pursuit of justice and accountability for the people of Myanmar, including civil and criminal legal actions based on the principle of universal and extraterritorial jurisdiction..."
Source/publisher:
Amnesty International, Burmese Rohingya Organisation UK, Centre for Policy Alternatives, Fortify Rights, Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, Human Rights Watch, International Commission of Jurists, Legal Action Worldwide
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-22
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"The Central Bank of Myanmar printed an additional 3 trillion kyats in a single week last month as the junta desperately attempted to contain an increasingly debilitating liquidity crunch at commercial banks, the civilian National Unity Government (NUG) and executives close to leading bankers said.
The central bank printed the banknotes and distributed them to private banks in the third week of July, NUG Minister for Planning, Finance and Investment U Tin Tun Naing said.
The amount is equivalent to about US$ 1.4 billion at the central bank’s official conversion rate of 2,100 kyats to the dollar and about $490 million at the market exchange rate.
U Tin Tun Naing and other economists warned, however, that the central bank’s attempt to contain a liquidity crisis by dramatically increasing the supply of money will cause the value of the local currency, the kyat, to continue its devastating plunge and further damage an economy already hammered by more than three years of severe economic mismanagement under military rule.
Within weeks of the junta ramping up the money supply, the kyat’s value quickly plummeted. On August 9, it fell to 6,000 to the US dollar, and on August 16 it breached the 7,000 mark.
The kyat was trading as low as 1,300 to the US dollar before the Feb.1, 2021 coup.
Residents of cities and rural areas across Myanmar were also hit by fuel shortages at the same time. As the value of the kyat plunged, prices of imported gasoline and diesel surged.
“These impacts are the result of the junta’s careless printing of banknotes since the coup,” U Tin Tun Naing said.
Two executives who are close to private bankers said the central bank pushed trillions of kyat into the banking sector to prevent it from collapsing.
Bank customers have faced restrictions and other difficulties withdrawing cash from banks since early July.
Trust in private banks fell after the regime announced at the beginning of the month that it was punishing major private banks for exceeding the central bank’s cap on home mortgages. Since then, customers have been lining up to withdraw their life savings.
Banks responded by lowering limits on daily withdrawals to between 1 and 2 million kyats.
In the second week of July, daily withdrawal limits fell to as little to only 500,000 kyats per day. They had been as high as 19 million kyats a day on normal savings accounts before the crunch.
Before printing an additional 3 trillion kyats, the junta held an emergency meeting with the country’s top bankers in Naypyitaw on July 10, where the senior junta officials berated them, and accused them of inflicting inflation on Myanmar and causing the kyat to plunge.
Following the 3 trillion kyat injection into the banking system last month, customers began to be able to withdraw more money from banks in late July and still can this month.
Residents of some wards in Yangon and some businesspeople say that the problem has been solved because they can still withdraw the amount of cash from banks that they usually did before the liquidity crunch.
“We are now able to withdraw the amount we want, but obviously, the quality of the banknotes is getting quite low. We can feel that the banknotes, especially the 5,000 and 10,000 banknotes, are much thinner than ever,” one businessman in Yangon explained.
A KBZ customer in Kyauktada Township who said she withdrew 2 million kyats from the bank in late July and a CB customer in Thingangyun Township who said he withdrew 20 million kyats from CB bank this week both said their banknotes were not only thinner but also smelled strongly of ink. This, they said, was evidence that they were printed recently.
The junta’s affection for printing plenty of cash is not new.
Both the National Unity Government and Australian economist Sean Turnell, who was jailed by the junta, previously revealed that the regime had printed about 30 trillion kyats in the three years since its coup.
The junta’s hyper-aggressive monetary expansion, they said, was a major reason for the kyat’s plunge.
Speaking to The Irrawaddy, Tin Tun Naing said the junta had to do this to raise the cash it needed to fund its war and administration, and that it will persist in expanding the supply of money to ensure its future.
“What we can say for sure now is that the amount of money that the junta has been printing since the coup has now already exceeded 30 trillion kyats. As a consequence, Myanmar’s kyat value will continue falling and we see no chance for the banks to recover,” he said.
In the two years before the coup, the government of the civilian National League for Democracy (NLD) injected a total of 3.656 trillion kyats into the economy to help ameliorate the challenges created by the pandemic.
In 39 months, the junta has printed more than eight times the amount of money that the NLD did in a pandemic-hit two-year period, the NUG said in a June press conference.
Economist Turnell, a former economic advisor to Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, told The Irrawaddy that flooding an economy with cash is a common response to severe financial crises, especially those that involve a collapse in institutional trust.
“This is precisely Myanmar’s situation now,” he said. “Nobody can reasonably trust the country’s banks, nor the regulatory authorities that are meant to keep depositor money safe.”
“This is yet another sign of the desperate economic plight the State Administrative Council [the junta’s governing body] has put Myanmar in. This is ‘war economy’ stuff, but on the losing side of that narrative,” he added..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-22
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Business and the Military, The Burmese military's role in the economy, Human Rights and international relations
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"Statement by Nicholas Koumjian, Head of the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar
Geneva, 22 August 2024 – This week marks seven years since a wave of violent atrocities by the Myanmar security forces drove hundreds of thousands of Rohingya women, men and children to flee their homes in Rakhine State, Myanmar. Rohingya lost their loved ones and property, and many were subjected to horrific sexual violence. The majority sought refuge in neighbouring Bangladesh where they remain, still awaiting the day when it will be safe to return to their homes in Myanmar.
No one has yet been held accountable for these horrific crimes. This has emboldened perpetrators in Myanmar to continue their brutal actions without fear of the consequences. When crimes go unpunished, this can fuel more violence. This cycle of impunity must be broken.
This year, armed conflicts have increased across Myanmar, including in Rakhine State, as opposition to military rule grows. This has left Rohingya particularly vulnerable, with horrific reports of killings, torture, rape and the burning of villages. Earlier this month, a drone attack on Rohingya fleeing the violence reportedly killed a high number of civilians. The Mechanism has opened new investigations into these crimes and is collecting evidence of all alleged perpetrators regardless of their affiliation. However, this cycle of atrocities is likely to continue until perpetrators of earlier crimes face justice.
International justice is often slow, and this can be very frustrating for victims who rightly hope for justice that can bring an end to their suffering. At the Mechanism, we understand their frustration and are making our best efforts to produce results.
We have collected and analysed a very large quantity of evidence, including videos, photographs, social media posts and geospatial imagery. We have interviewed hundreds of survivors, eyewitnesses, and people with insider knowledge about the orders given to commit crimes.
We have accelerated the amount of evidence and analysis we are sharing with the authorities involved in the cases concerning the Rohingya at the International Criminal Court, the International Court of Justice and in Argentina. To date we have shared 80 packages containing more than one million items of supporting information and analysis. This includes reports on the movements of military units during the clearance operations and various analyses on the armed groups present in the area when the atrocities against the Rohingya were committed. We are also collecting and analysing evidence of the loss and expropriation of Rohingya property before, during and after the clearance operations.
We are identifying the individuals who are most responsible for the crimes committed against the Rohingya, including those who ordered the crimes, those who failed to punish crimes committed by those under their command and those that actively promoted the hate campaign which fueled these crimes. We are working towards the day that this evidence will be presented in a court of law, and the perpetrators will have to answer for their actions.
The Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar (IIMM or Mechanism) was created by the United Nations Human Rights Council in 2018 to collect and analyse evidence of the most serious international crimes and other violations of international law committed in Myanmar since 2011. It aims to facilitate justice and accountability by preserving and organizing this evidence and preparing case files that can be used by authorities to prosecute individuals in national, regional and international courts..."
Source/publisher:
UN Human Rights Council (Geneva) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-22
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UN human rights documents on Myanmar, Arakan (Rakhine) State - reports etc. by date (latest first), Human Rights and international relations
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"Atrocity Alert is a weekly publication by the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect highlighting situations where populations are at risk of, or are enduring, mass atrocity crimes.
ROHINGYA POPULATION ONCE AGAIN ENDURING ATROCITIES IN MYANMAR
This Sunday, 25 August, marks seven years since security forces in Myanmar (Burma) initiated so-called “clearance operations” against the Rohingya population, a distinct Muslim ethnic minority, in Rakhine State. The operations were characterized by brutal violence and grave human rights violations on a mass scale in what a UN Human Rights Council-mandated Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar concluded to be genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. The violence forced over 720,000 Rohingya to flee to Bangladesh where they endure dire conditions in some of the largest refugee camps in the world.
Seven years on, survivors and victims of the Rohingya genocide remaining in Myanmar are facing the threat of atrocity crimes as Rakhine State is besieged by armed conflict again. The Rohingya are increasingly caught in the middle of escalating fighting between the military and Arakan Army (AA), an ethnic Rakhine armed group, which has surged in Rakhine State since November 2023 when an informal ceasefire broke down. In recent months the AA has advanced across Rakhine State, taking control of many predominantly Rohingya areas from the military junta. In response, the military has carried out relentless indiscriminate aerial attacks and blocked Rohingya attempting to escape.
Last month, the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, Tom Andrews, warned that the situation “carries echoes of the lead-up to genocidal violence in 2016 and 2017,” while highlighting how the junta has deliberately stoked tensions between the Rakhine and Rohingya communities in Rakhine State. The Rohingya have also been disproportionately targeted in the junta’s forced conscription campaign. Reports have also emerged of atrocities committed by the AA against Rohingya civilians, including mass arrests, forced displacement, looting and the blocking of humanitarian aid. According to the Women’s Peace Network, at least 200 Rohingya – mostly women and children – were killed in drone attacks launched by the AA near the Naf River during the first week of August. Around 20,000 Rohingya were forcibly displaced from downtown Maungdaw prior to this and attempting to escape other attacks by the AA in the area.
Impunity for past atrocity crimes in Myanmar has enabled the ongoing commission of atrocities, while the renewed fighting in Rakhine State compounds existing vulnerabilities and risks for the Rohingya. The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect’s Executive Director, Savita Pawnday, said, “For decades, the Rohingya have been systematically persecuted, with little-to-no redress for their generational suffering. On this somber commemoration, the international community must commit to action, including by pursuing justice for both past and ongoing atrocities in Myanmar and cutting off access to the jet fuel, weapons and funds the junta needs to continue to commit atrocities.”..."
Source/publisher:
Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-21
[field_licence]
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Individual Documents
Category:
Arakan (Rakhine) State - reports etc. by date (latest first), Discrimination against the Rohingya, Crimes Against Humanity, Human Rights and international relations
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"The MAU tracks market prices in Central and Northern Rakhine State and Chin State. Data are collected from three vendors per product per market in the last week of each month.1 Data and product specifications are available online through the MPR dashboard at www.themimu.info/market-analysis-unit.
KEY FINDINGS
Cooking oil prices rose 12% further in July as transportation costs pushed essential food prices higher;
Some vegetables prices rose 30%, although other vegetable prices also fell by as much as 30%;
The price of fish products rose 10-16% in July as fishermen reported increasing operating costs;
Toothpaste and detergent prices rose 10-20%, climbing at a pace similar to June;
Charcoal prices rose 27% as electricity cuts continued to boost demand and in turn strain supply;
Hygiene NFI prices remained 300% above 2023, and other NFIs—while stable in July—were still 100% higher;
Shipping costs are likely to push prices up in August, as fuel prices climb and transportation links fray;
Myebon households may face particular stress, after two consecutive months of very steep price hikes.
Product-Level Price Changes
Essential Foods – Rising transportation costs lifted essential food prices in July. Prices for higher-quality rice rose 6% in July, although lower-quality rice prices were fairly stable. Cooking oil prices rose at least 12% in most markets monitored, while prices for pulse held steady for a second straight month. Meybon saw the steepest price hikes for essential foods in July.
Vegetables – Shifts in supply increased prices for some vegetables while lowering prices for others. Prices for green chili and garlic rose 30-33% in July, while prices for onion and long bean fell 18-30% on reports of increased supply. Eggplant and watercress prices were fairly stable in July. Kyauktaw saw the steepest vegetable price increases in July.
Meat and Fish – Fish prices rose in July and fishermen said their operating costs were rising. Prices for fish paste and dried fish rose 10-16% in July, although prices for fresh fish and chicken were stable. Shrimp prices fell 8% in July partly due to increased monsoon season supply.
Hygiene Products – Prices for hygiene products rose another 10-20% in July amid rising transportation costs. Toothpaste and detergent prices rose another 19-20% in July, and soap prices rose 10%. Prices for sanitary pads were stable in July. Prices for hygiene products increased most dramatically in Myebon.
Other NFIs – Electricity cuts boosted charcoal prices in July, but other NFIs were relatively stable. Charcoal prices rose 27% in July and longyi prices rose 5-12%, but most other NFI prices were relatively stable. Minbya and Rathedaung saw a mix of rising and falling NFI prices, while in other markets prices were stable or rising. NFI prices rose steeply in Meybon..."
Source/publisher:
Myanmar Information Management Unit (Myanmar) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-21
[field_licence]
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Individual Documents
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Food Security and nutrition in Burma/Myanmar, Arakan (Rakhine) State - reports etc. by date (latest first), Human Rights and international relations
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"Increasing deadly attacks against Rohingya people in Myanmar’s Rakhine State bear a terrifying resemblance to the atrocities of August 2017, Amnesty International said ahead of the seventh anniversary of the crisis.
“As the seven-year anniversary of the Rohingya crisis nears, the horrific situation in Rakhine State looks disturbingly familiar. Rohingya men, women and children are being killed, towns are emptying out, and vestiges of Rohingya history and identity are being eroded. Many are once again seeking shelter in refugee camps across the border in Bangladesh, where economic, security and livelihood conditions have deteriorated,” Amnesty International’s Myanmar Researcher Joe Freeman said.
“After being subjected to a brutal and systematic campaign of violence in August 2017 following decades of state-backed persecution, Rohingya civilians are now caught in the middle of intensifying conflict in Rakhine State between the Arakan Army (AA) and the Myanmar military, which has forcefully conscripted Rohingya to fight on its side.”
The military has responded to battlefield losses with devastating aerial attacks that have killed Rohingya as well as ethnic Rakhine civilians. They have targeted civilian areas, destroying homes, marketplaces and other civilian infrastructure.
“The Myanmar military must immediately end their renewed campaign of violence and refrain from unlawful attacks on civilians, who are bearing the brunt of the conflict not only in Rakhine State but across the country, with millions displaced,” Freeman said.
As they advance through Rakhine State and capture more territory, the Arakan Army has also faced mounting allegations of atrocities.
“In addition, the international community must apply more pressure on the Arakan Army to abide by international humanitarian law. All allegations of war crimes perpetrated by the Myanmar military or by any armed groups in the country should be effectively investigated,” Freeman said.
Arakan Army advances on the northern Rakhine town of Buthidaung reportedly resulted in large-scale arson on 17 May of this year, displacing thousands of Rohingya residents. And on 5 August, an attack that survivors blamed on the Arakan Army killed an unknown number of Rohingya civilians fleeing the town of Maungdaw near the border with Bangladesh. The Arakan Army has denied attacking Rohingya.
“The rapidly escalating conflict in Myanmar is all the more reason for the United Nations Security Council to finally refer the situation in the country to the International Criminal Court. There can be no progress without accountability. The future of Myanmar hinges on protecting, promoting and upholding the human rights of all people in the country,” Freeman said.
“This includes scrapping discriminatory laws or policies that are used to cement the apartheid system against hundreds of thousands of Rohingya men, women and children in Rakhine and restoring their rights to health, education and freedom of movement.”
Meanwhile, Bangladesh continues to host nearly one million Rohingya refugees in camps in poor conditions for the seventh consecutive year. Last year, at least 12,000 refugees in the camps were rendered homeless due to devastating fires and the impact of cyclone Mocha. Acute funding shortfalls led to food insecurity in the camps, as well as shortcomings in healthcare and education.
“Bangladesh’s new interim government should prioritize the protection of Rohingya refugees’ human rights and their safety in camps, uphold the principle of non-refoulment, and adopt a rights-respecting policy towards the Rohingya,” Freeman said.
Background
On 25 August 2017 Myanmar security forces launched a widespread and systematic assault on Rohingya villages after an armed group calling itself the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army carried out deadly attacks on police posts. Arakan is another name used for Rakhine State.
The military response included extrajudicial killings, destruction of properties and sexual assault. As a result of the military’s so-called “clearance operations”, more than 740,000 Rohingya women, men and children fled northern Rakhine State to neighbouring Bangladesh. Taking into account previous waves of violence against them, an estimated one million Rohingya refugees now live in Bangladesh.
Amnesty International has said the 2017 attacks against the Rohingya amounted to crimes against humanity, recommending that at least a dozen senior officials be investigated for their roles in the violence, including Senior General Min Aung Hlaing.
The International Criminal Court (ICC) is investigating alleged crimes committed in 2016 and 2017 against the Rohingya population, but only those committed partly in the territory of Bangladesh or other states, because Myanmar has not ratified the ICC’s Statute. Amnesty International has called for the United Nations Security Council to refer the full situation in Myanmar to the ICC, so that an investigation of all crimes committed in Myanmar can be conducted.
Min Aung Hlaing has never been held accountable and on 1 February 2021, the military seized power in a coup, with Min Aung Hlaing chairing the newly created State Administration Council (SAC). SAC-backed soldiers, police and militias have killed more than 5,000 civilians in Myanmar since the 2021 coup.
Amnesty International has documented torture, arbitrary detention and unlawful air strikes by the Myanmar military following the coup. In November 2022, the organization called for the suspension of aviation fuel imports, which the Myanmar military uses to bomb civilians. While many companies have withdrawn from the supply chain after being made aware of the risks, shipments have continued..."
Source/publisher:
"Amnesty International" (UK)
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-21
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Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Arakan (Rakhine) State - reports etc. by date (latest first), Discrimination against the Rohingya, Human Rights and international relations, Armed conflict in Burma - attacks on civilians, Rohingya (cultural, political etc.)
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Investors also cite rising inflation, banking difficulties, a lack of raw materials and worker shortages.
Description:
"Foreign investment in Myanmar has dropped precipitously in the three and a half years since the military seized power from a democratically elected government, according to officials and observers, as companies weigh the risks of operating in a nation engulfed in civil war.
Myanmar’s economy has been in freefall since the Feb. 1, 2021, coup, contracting by nearly 20%, according to the World Bank. Its 2024 gross domestic product growth estimates have been halved to 1%, in large part due to widespread conflict and junta mismanagement.
Investors have fled, citing political instability, rising inflation, difficulties with bank transactions, challenges in obtaining raw materials, and insufficient manpower as reasons for scaling back their presence or leaving Myanmar altogether.
According to official statements from Myanmar’s Directorate of Investments and Company Administration, foreign investment reached a mere US$150 million in the first seven months of 2024. Comparatively, some US$2.9 billion in investment flowed into Myanmar during the three years between 2021 and 2024.
These numbers represent a drop in the bucket when measured against US$3.8 billion in foreign investment in 2020 alone, when the country was governed by former State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi’s civilian National League for Democracy party.
Singapore’s Sembcorp became one of the latest firms to reduce its footprint in Myanmar on Aug. 12, when it announced the temporary closure of its gas-fired power plant in the Mandalay region city of Myingyan, citing safety concerns.
Similarly, on May 28, South Korea’s CJ Feed Myanmar announced the suspension of its production and sales of animal feed at its plant in the largest city Yangon due to the economic crisis.
Dueling exchange rates
One Myanmar businessman told RFA Burmese that the junta’s control of the exchange rate for the kyat has made it difficult for foreign companies to operate.
"The exchange rate of the dollar is unstable due to inflation,” said the businessman who, like others interviewed for this report, requested anonymity for security reasons. “The Central Bank’s control of the dollar, with a fixed rate of 2,100 kyats, poses significant challenges for foreign companies."
The junta is increasingly cracking down on black market money changers as they keep desperately needed foreign exchange out of the formal banking system, where people and companies are forced to convert it to kyats at artificially low exchange rates.
In Myanmar’s informal banking sector, known as hundi, one U.S. dollar is worth more than 6,000 kyats.
Worsening conflict
However, the main obstacle to foreign investment is the worsening conflict, according to Aung Thu Nyein, a member of the Institute for Strategy and Policy – Myanmar think tank.
"The current environment in Myanmar is not conducive to smooth business operations,” he said. “The primary concern is that investing in Myanmar under the present circumstances entails significant political risk.”
Meanwhile, the junta’s investment policies are unclear, “making it uncertain with whom one should engage."
Just last month, Thailand-based newspaper The Thaiger reported that Thai companies with investments worth US$7 billion had withdrawn from Myanmar due to the persistent tensions between the junta and the armed opposition.
And Japan’s Nikkei Asia reported last week that numerous businesses in Myanmar have relocated to Thailand due to the conflict.
Junta lacks ‘business mindset’
A senior official from the junta’s Ministry of Investment and Foreign Economic Relations, who also declined to be identified, told RFA that “new investment is unlikely.”
“Foreign investment is almost non-existent under the present circumstances,” he said. “Existing businesses may be transferred, with the likelihood of such transfers depending on the evolving situation.”
The official noted that it was increasingly difficult for companies to justify investing in Myanmar when they could do so elsewhere in the region, where the political situation was more stable.
An economic analyst told RFA that the junta lacks a “business-oriented mindset.”
"If the economy were managed by a government with a strong understanding of business practices, the country’s economic situation would likely improve,” he said.
Following the coup in 2021, a majority of Western companies withdrew from Myanmar.
According to a report released by ISP-Myanmar at the end of 2022, out of 52 countries with companies that had regularly done business in Myanmar, 39 had ceased their investments.
The primary foreign investors in Myanmar now are companies based in Singapore, China, and Thailand. Among the 12 foreign investment sectors, energy, natural gas, and oil manufacturing attract the most investment..."
Source/publisher:
"Radio Free Asia" (USA)
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-21
[field_licence]
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Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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"WHO South-East Asia Region:
The Immunization and Vaccine Development (IVD) unit of the Department of Communicable Diseases of the World Health Organization (WHO), Regional Office for South-East Asia (SEARO), has been producing the Expanded Programme on Immunization (EPI) factsheets for all Member States of the South-East Asia (SEA) Region and the Region annually. The primary data sources of the EPI factsheet are the WHO-UNICEF Joint Reporting Form (JRF) and the SEA Region annual EPI reporting form (AERF), in which each country officially reports EPI and vaccine preventable diseases related core information annually. The EPI factsheets 2024 are based on 2023 data reported to WHO SEARO by Member States..."
Source/publisher:
World Health Organization (Geneva) via Reliefweb (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-21
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"From their base in ungoverned stretches of Southeast Asia, international criminal networks are prowling the Internet, seeking to defraud victims around the world with sophisticated and psychologically devastating scams. Gangsters operating out of Myanmar, Cambodia and Laos, relying on forced labor, have spread their tentacles through Asia, Africa and Latin America and increasingly within the United States, stripping gullible prey of at least $64 billion annually. Clearly, to eradicate such a global menace will require a coordinated international response. Even so, the United States is not internally powerless to confront this striking example of how conflict and corrupt governance in distant parts of the world can directly threaten Americans’ security and well-being.
The scale and scope of this mass scamming has essentially snuck up on law enforcement and policy makers given its pathbreaking geographic and organizational parameters. Effective action to counter the scammers will require a whole-of-government effort by the U.S. coordinating the work of government agencies, civil society and concerned international counterparts, beginning with Southeast Asia.
One such effort to address scamming in the U.S. is already underway, organized by civil society and government on an ad hoc basis to begin charting a comprehensive plan of attack. Known as Operation Shamrock, it is a first-of-its-kind public-private partnership whose goal is sharing information across diverse and multi-disciplinary stakeholders affected by the organized crime crisis emanating from Southeast Asia. Within the Shamrock alliance, working groups focus on specific strategies and tactics that include raising public awareness of the scams; educating bankers to look for red flags that indicate criminal activity; and boosting law enforcement capacity to assist victims and trace lost funds, thereby gaining better intelligence on precisely how the criminal groups operate. Acting as a non-governmental arm and laboratory for innovative responses to the problem, Operation Shamrock could be a valuable partner for a larger government program.
How the Scam Operations in Southeast Asia Developed
The epicenter of this scamming activity is located in the borderlands of Myanmar, Cambodia and Laos, where weak governance, vast swathes of largely unregulated territory, widespread corruption and armed conflict have provided virtually free license for the criminal networks to gain a solid foothold over the past decade.
A USIP study published this year found that what began as enclaves hosting illegal gambling has expanded in recent years into sophisticated scamming operations. The tightly guarded enclaves operated by the criminal networks house hundreds of thousands of forced-labor victims from around the world, enticed by false ads for well paid, high-tech jobs and trafficked into the armed enclaves by another set of criminal networks adept at moving people across borders under false pretenses.
While the transnational criminal networks originate predominantly from China, until recently Beijing did very little to disrupt these criminal groups overseas.
While the transnational criminal networks originate predominantly from China, until recently Beijing did very little to disrupt these criminal groups overseas. In many cases Chinese enterprises, government and party institutions played a role in deepening the gangs’ influence across Southeast Asia to further their own goals.
When the scam centers along the Chinese border began to proliferate during the pandemic, with the Chinese public as their major target, however, Chinese police cracked down on the syndicates targeting mainland China. The crime groups responded by globalizing their illicit activities, seeking victims on other continents including North America. While Africa, Central Asia, South Asia and Latin America have all been hit hard by the human trafficking employed to staff the scam centers, the United States is proving to be a particularly rich target for this malign activity.
The Toll on American Victims
The scams are unprecedented in their use of psychological manipulation, technology, social media and advanced financial technologies. Dubbed “pig-butchering” for the technique of figuratively fattening and ultimately slaughtering the victim, the scams aim to strip targets of all their assets — a process that of course inflicts deep emotional harm. New victims emerge every day in the U.S. reporting losses of hundreds of thousands or even millions of dollars.
Pig butchering works by luring potential marks into online investment or romantic relationships — or both —through common social media and internet sites. Scam actors will target victims by text message or social media and then engage in a psychological campaign to isolate the victim and develop a trust between victim and scammer. The process is similar to brainwashing.
Preying on the bond that develops, they induce Americans to deposit money into “cryptocurrency investment accounts” after showing them false data purportedly reflecting their return on investment. Then, believing that they have it all — a new love and an amazing way to make money — the victims are pushed into liquidating retirement accounts, college savings or other forms of assets. Some have even been manipulated into taking high interest loans to allegedly pay “taxes” on their fictitious reported gains. One such victim, an employee of a local U.S. bank, was even convinced to criminally divert bank funds into a scam investment scheme, causing millions of dollars in losses. Ultimately, victims are hit with a double punch: Their entire nest egg is gone and they have been betrayed by someone they may have loved and definitely trusted.
Some reported case studies illustrate particular manipulative techniques. An adult son received a call from his elderly mother in Florida asking him to help her pay the mortgage on her condo. “You don’t have a mortgage,” he told her. “I do now,” she said, explaining how her new love had helped her get a high-interest equity line against the home so that she could put it into a crypto investment. The son told the authors he then used his retirement funds to pay off that mortgage for his mother, two generations were struck by this crime.
Other manipulative techniques have even resulted in violent crimes in the United States — illustrating how these networks could undermine much broader forms of instability. In Ohio, AP recently reported a case involving a scam victim who shot and killed an Uber driver after a manipulative criminal convinced him that the driver was somehow involved in the scam. Meanwhile, a newer plague of custom scams in the United States and Europe also illustrate how the pig-butchering scamsters may impersonate law enforcement by acquiring knowledge of the family situations and legal and or political vulnerabilities of victims.
Reports to the FBI’s victim hotline (known as IC3) from 2023 alone show losses of $4.5 billion to online investment schemes and $650 million to romance scams, though we know this is only the tip of the iceberg, because victim shame leads to vast underreporting of the crime. Victims are embarrassed, isolated and frequently too humiliated to seek help. In the most extreme cases, people have been known to end their lives. Such losses are commonly thought to affect the elder population, but IC3 reports show people of all ages — indeed anyone with a cell phone — is vulnerable to these scams.
Countering the Threat
As the USIP study concludes, only a comprehensive, well-coordinated international effort, beginning with Southeast Asia, has any chance of containing this global menace. It cannot be effectively addressed on a county-by-country basis, because the criminal networks behind it are infinitely adept at outpacing law enforcement efforts and advancing new technological applications that reach beyond current capabilities.
Only a comprehensive, well-coordinated international effort, beginning with Southeast Asia, has any chance of containing this global menace.
However, with the United States increasingly rising to the top as a prime victim of this type of scamming, it also behooves U.S. institutions — law enforcement, cybersecurity agencies, civil society organizations and media — to organize a coordinated program to prevent and disrupt its impact on innocent U.S. citizens.
This is the goal of Operation Shamrock, which could serve as a model platform for a much wider U.S.-government led effort.
Operation Shamrock has assembled many of the stakeholders necessary for alerting the public to the threat of this criminal activity and mobilizing grassroots responses toward crafting remedial measures to disrupt the scams. Stakeholders engaged in the operation include social media, financial sector and banking industry representatives, cryptocurrency exchanges, law enforcement at all levels including international, NGOs and victim services providers. Operating mainly in the United States, but with international ties, Shamrock is a good example of the kind of multidisciplinary approach that must be replicated and expanded to check criminal scamming.
Building public awareness must be at the center of any strategy to combat scams. This crime won’t stop until we reach full American awareness of the threat. It warrants a massive campaign to educate the public about the dangers of engaging by text with people we don’t know. And it requires new efforts by the private sector to ensure that Americans using various social media platforms can do so safely. It also requires much greater partnership between banks, law enforcement and social media companies to prevent psychological manipulation from emptying bank accounts. Finally, it requires strong government leadership in building a whole-of-government approach that can advance robust international collaboration to disrupt these networks overseas. It’s time to cultivate a new normal of caution as a primary response to online communication..."
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United States Institute of Peace
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2024-08-21
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"This epidemiological bulletin aims to provide the situation of key infectious diseases in the WHO South-East Asia Region to inform risk assessments and responses. The bulletin uses information from publicly available sources and will be published every two weeks. For feedback or suggestions, please write to [email protected].
Key events and updates
Upsurge of mpox as a public health emergency of international concern
Key messages
WHO Director-General has determined that the upsurge of mpox in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and a growing number of countries in Africa constitutes a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC), concurring with the advice offered by the International Health Regulations (IHR)(2005) Emergency Committee.
The detection and rapid spread of a new strain of mpox (Clade 1b) in eastern DRC, its detection in neighboring countries that had not previously reported mpox, and the potential for further spread within Africa and beyond are the major concerns. Situation overview (as of 17 August 2024)
Growing outbreaks in the DRC: Since the beginning of this year, the DRC has been experiencing a severe outbreak of mpox, with more than 15 600 reported suspected (clinically compatible) cases and 537 related deaths.
This represents a 160% increase from the same period last year in DRC.
The increased case reporting is driven by two concomitant outbreaks, including (1) outbreaks in historically endemic parts of the DRC, affecting primarily children, and (2) a rapidly expanding outbreak of a new strain of MPXV clade I (clade Ib) which appears to be spreading predominantly through sexual networks, expanding geographically in DRC’s eastern provinces, and affecting neighboring countries.
New countries affected in Africa: Four countries neighboring the DRC reported their first mpox cases in the past one month: Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda. In total, 12 countries in Africa have reported mpox this year, with 9 countries with active outbreaks.
New virus strain behind recent cases: The current outbreak in the Eastern DRC is triggered by a new variant of the Clade I, called clade Ib.
Clade I (Clade Ia) has been historically circulated in DFC, while Clade II was responsible for the global outbreak that began in 2022.
Clade I is known to cause more severe disease than clade II. It is unknown if the two clade I variants, clade Ia and Ib, differ in disease severity.
Clade Ib is spreading among people, driven by sexual contact but also involving other type of contact.
Clade Ib has now been detected in countries in East and Central Africa (i.e. DRC, Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda) and Sweden.
There are many scientific uncertainties and evidence gaps (e.g., modes of disease transmission, transmission dynamics, risk factors, and disease severity associated with the different mpox virus clades).
Continued spread of mpox globally: mpox remains a global public health concern, with cases and outbreaks still being reported worldwide. In June 2024, 26 countries reported over 930 cases and 4 deaths globally. Please see regular mpox section where mpox situation in WHO South-East Asia Region is summarized.
The first case of the mpox Clade Ib outside Africa: On August 15, the Public Health Agency of Sweden reported the first case of the mpox Clade Ib outside Africa.
The infected individual has travel history to Central Africa, where a mpox outbreak is ongoing..."
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World Health Organization (Geneva) via Reliefweb (New York)
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2024-08-21
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"BEIJING, Aug. 20 (Xinhua) -- Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi met with Julie Bishop, special envoy of the secretary-general of the United Nations (UN) for Myanmar, in Beijing on Tuesday.
Wang, also a member of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China Central Committee, said that on the Myanmar issue, China is committed to respecting its sovereignty, independence, national unity and territorial integrity, is committed to non-interference in its internal affairs, and is committed to the "Myanmar-owned, Myanmar-led" peace process. China supports ASEAN's role as the main channel, he added.
Noting the special envoy of the UN secretary-general on Myanmar plays a unique role, Wang said China stands ready to provide support and assistance to Bishop in performing her duties and play a constructive role in achieving political reconciliation and lasting peace and stability in Myanmar.
Bishop said she is willing to maintain close communication and strengthen cooperation with China and ASEAN to reach a consensus on the proper handling of the Myanmar issue. ■
Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, also a member of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China Central Committee, meets with Julie Bishop, special envoy of the secretary-general of the United Nations (UN) for Myanmar, in Beijing, capital of China, Aug. 20, 2024. (Xinhua/Yan Yan)..."
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"Xinhua News Agency" (Beijing)
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2024-08-20
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"Primary country: Myanmar.....Source: World Health Organization.....Format: News and Press Release.....Theme: Health.....Disaster type: Epidemic.....Language
English..."
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World Health Organization (Geneva) via Reliefweb (New York)
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2024-08-20
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Battlefield failures and scapegoating have prompted a growing dissatisfaction with Min Aung Hlaing’s leadership.
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"Rumors of a putsch swirled around Myanmar last week ahead of Chinese Prime Minister Wang Yi’s visit to Naypyidaw where he obliquely rebuked junta chief Senior Gen.l Min Aung Hlaing. Given the scale of recent military losses there were reasons for both.
The opposition’s military gains have fundamentally transformed the battlescape and it is hard to see how the military can recover.
Since the ethnic army offensive known as Operation 1027 began in late 2023, opposition forces have captured over 2,000 military positions. The Arakan Army controls almost the entire northern half of Rakhine, and is rapidly pushing south, meeting little resistance.
The Kachin Independence Army controls every border crossing to China, and it is now on the outskirts of Myitkyina and Bhamo. The Ta’ang National Liberation Army and the Myanmar National Defense Alliance Army control much of northern Shan state.
One conflict monitoring group estimates that there have been 6,000 army casualties since Operation 1027 began. Hastily recruited and poorly trained conscripts are now at the front lines.
The military mustered 5,000 troops for the defense of Lashio and, even with air support, were outmanned and overpowered. When Lashio fell, nearly 5,000 troops and their families surrendered.
The shadow National Unity Government, or NUG, Defense Minister Ye Mon, recently asserted that 75 of 252, or 30%, of the country’s towns and cities are completely liberated, while 74 are being contested. Only one-third of the cities and towns are under full military control, though they are the largest population centers.
Since Operation 1027 began, the military has been unable to recapture almost any territory, and where it has, it’s been through sheer scorched earth tactics, intended to depopulate communities.
Unappreciated role of PDFs
While so much attention has been focused on the gains of the ethnic resistance organizations, or EROs, not enough attention has been paid to the NUG’s People’s Defense Forces, also known as PDFs.
When the PDFs were first established in 2021, they were largely written off as nothing more than canon fodder. Filled with urban youths who fled the junta, they had few arms.
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Groups like the Karen National Liberation Army and the Ta’ang National Liberation Army provided training and a limited supply of arms and ammunition. By 2022 and 2023, the NUG was able to supply the PDFs with a steady stream of funding, which allowed them to begin to purchase weapons on the black market.
But most of the weapons they obtained were captured on the battlefield. Each successive victory gave them the arms and munitions that laid the foundation for future victories.
The PDFs have been disciplined and highly motivated, committed to the political goals of a federal democracy.
Taking advantage of their tech savvy youth, they have also been technically proficient and innovative, quickly utilizing commercial drones, long before any ERO or the military did.
PDFs have played an under-appreciated role in all of the Operation 1027 battles. They fought alongside the Karen Nationalities Defence Force in Kayah state, the Ta’ang National Liberation Army, and Kachin Independence Army.
The NUG was smart enough to put many of their units under the operational command of the various EROs, which had more battlefield experience.
But the PDFs have demonstrated exceptional battlefield experience in the past two years. In some regions, they are doing the lion’s share of the fighting.
Operation Shan-Man
The Mandalay PDF has built on the success of the Ta’ang National Liberation Army in northern Shan state.
It moved out of the hills to the east of the Irrawaddy River, capturing the town of Singu, a mere 50 km (30 miles) north of Mandalay.
This allowed them to block the movement of troops and supplies up Route 311 to the southern Kachin city of Bhamo, evidence of close tactical coordination between the NUG and the EROs.
The Mandalay PDF continues to stage attacks along that road. Last week they captured Takaung, which is the symbolic center of the Burmese empire, and Thabeikkyin township, situated between Singu and Takaung. In addition, they have taken nine army camps.Control of these towns not only gives them control of the highway, but also, should they be able to acquire heavier weaponry, control of the movement of troops and supplies along the Irrawaddy River.
PDFs have increased sporadic, though not sustained, attacks on the outskirts of Mandalay, the country’s second largest city.
Roughly 100 km (60 miles) to the city’s southwest, PDFs have been engaged in fighting across Myingyan township. Four separate PDFs converged on Taungtha township.
Other PDFs moved on the town of Natogyi. The government quickly responded, deploying 200 reinforcements to retake the town, where there is a pumping and off-take station for China’s parallel oil and gas pipeline from Kyaukphyu in Rakhine state to Kunming, across the border in Yunnan province. PDFs had briefly held the guard stations at the facility.
The escalation of fighting in the region prompted the Singapore-listed Sembcorp to indefinitely suspend operations at its US$300 million, 225-megawatt gas-fired power plant, which was opened in 2019. For a country already suffering acute power shortages, this is another blow for the faltering junta.
From four cuts to depopulation
While the NUG and their PDFs are quick to capitalize on their victories, releasing videos of townspeople warmly welcoming opposition forces, there are costs entailed with liberation.
When Operation 1027 began, the Kachin Independence Army and PDFs took over Kawlin township, in the heart of Sagaing region’s dry zone. This prompted a brutal counterattack. For nearly two weeks the town was shelled and bombed.
PDF-initiated attacks have also intensified in recent weeks in southern Sagaing, prompting fierce reprisals, mass arson attacks, and artillery strikes. Likewise, the military has lashed out in Shan state, indiscriminately bombing civilians in towns captured by the armed opposition.
A desperate regime seems to be adapting its already brutal counter-insurgency doctrine known as the “Four Cuts,” which is designed to terrorize the population into submission, to a Russian style campaign of depopulating territories.
Signs of strain
Min Aung Hlaing met with China’s Wang Yi, on Aug. 15, dispelling claims that he had been ousted by his peers.
But given the battlefield failures and his penchant for scapegoating, one certainly understands why there is growing dissatisfaction and unease.Min Aung Hlaing has been rotating generals at breakneck speed. Of the 14 regional military commands, seven have been assigned new commanders in 2024 alone. The Northeast Command has had three commanders in the past two months alone.
Only one of the 14 regional military commanders has been in place since January 2022. The remainder were replaced between April and August 2023. Of the six Bureau of Special Operation commanders that oversee the regional military commands, four have been replaced since April 2023. This month Lt. General Ni Lin Aung was assigned to oversee the four regional military commands in Shan state.
There are reports that the State Administrative Council, as the junta is formally known, has assigned its second ranking official, General Soe Win, to personally lead counter-offensive operations.
The junta has detained several commanders and their deputies from the Triangle Region, Northeast, and Central Region commands.
The costs of failure are high as the regime searches for people to blame. But more failure is likely, as the flailing junta is confronted by a surging opposition, and the financial and logistical realities that make any counter-offensive impossible..."
Source/publisher:
"Radio Free Asia" (USA)
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-20
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The captured base is a key to the defense of a military headquarters.
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"One of Myanmar’s most powerful insurgent armies has taken full control of a strategically important township in Kachin state on the border with China, its information officer told Radio Free Asia.
The Kachin Independence Army, or KIA, together with People’s Defense Forces loyal to the shadow National Unity Government, defeated junta forces to capture their last remaining battalion base in Momauk township in northern Myanmar on Monday, Col. Naw Bu said.
“We were able to completely seize Infantry Battalion 437,” he said. “The military council launched airstrikes but now we can say we have taken control of the whole of Momauk township.”
There were casualties on both sides, Naw Bu said, but he declined to give details.
RFA telephoned the junta’s Kachin state spokesman and social affairs minister Moe Min Thei to ask about Momauk but he did not answer.
The KIA, fighting for self-determination against the forces of the junta that toppled a democratically elected government in 2021, launched an initial attack on Momauk on May 7, then began their final push, along with their allies, on July 24.
Momauk is about 130 kilometers (81 miles) south of the Kachin state capital of Myitkyina, and only about 14 kilometers (9 miles) east of the town of Bhamo where the junta’s Operations and Command Headquarters 21 is based, Naw Bu said.
Junta forces had withdrawn towards Bhamo, which is on the east bank of the Irrawaddy River, he said.
The KIA and its allies have captured more than 20 junta camps in the township since late July and about 200 junta camps in the whole of Kachin state since the beginning of the year, he said.
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Junta airstrikes, artillery attacks and arson led to the destruction of more than 100 homes in Momauk and more than 3,000 people had fled, many to the safety of areas under KIA control, residents said.
One displaced resident sheltering near the Chinese border said he was afraid of more fighting.
“The town is being cleared up but I haven’t gone back,” said the man, who wished to remain anonymous for safety reasons.
“I would like to check my home if I could but I’m still worried that there will be more fighting,” he said, referring to Bhamo and Mansi towns where junta forces are based.
“There are so many difficulties when we flee and shelter with relatives”.
The KIA is one of several insurgent forces to make significant gains against junta forces since late last year.
An alliance of three rebel factions has pushed junta forces out of major towns in Shan state, to the southeast of Kachin state, while the military has lost ground to ethnic minority insurgents in Rakhine state in the west, and in Kayah and Kayin states in the east, as well as in parts of the deep south.
The junta has responded with airstrikes including on the KIA headquarters at Lai Zar on Aug. 15. That attack unsettled neighboring China, which fired warning shots at junta jets, according to the KIA.
The United Nations says about 3 million people have been forced from their homes by the fighting in Myanmar, many since clashes surged at the beginning of the year..."
Source/publisher:
"Radio Free Asia" (USA)
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-20
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"19 August 2024: The Arakan Army (AA) must ensure the protection of civilians in northern Rakhine state and uphold its obligations under international humanitarian law, says the Special Advisory Council for Myanmar (SAC-M).
An attack on Rohingya men, women and children on 5 August 2024 may have resulted in the deaths of up to 200 people, according to credible reports. The victims were attempting to escape violent conflict between the AA and Myanmar military in Maungdaw, northern Rakhine state, and cross the Naf River into Bangladesh.
Survivors and witnesses report bombs being dropped from drones, artillery fire, and soldiers shooting people with small arms. The AA has been accused of being responsible. The recent events follow the reported large-scale, coordinated killing, arson and shelling attacks on Rohingya in Buthidaung on 17 May, which AA troops are also alleged to have committed.
The humanitarian situation in northern Rakhine state, in particular for Rohingya communities, is dire. Rohingya in northern Rakhine are at risk of genocide, according to a 2020 ruling issued by the International Court of Justice, and the region is subject to an internet shutdown and tight movement restrictions imposed by the Myanmar military.
SAC-M has not yet been able to determine who is responsible for the recent atrocities against the Rohingya and other civilians in northern Rakhine state. However, it is satisfied that the AA and its political wing the United League of Arakan (ULA) are now the primary military and governance authorities in the region, having almost entirely defeated and displaced the Myanmar military.
As such, SAC-M calls on the ULA/AA, as the de facto authority in northern Rakhine state and a party to the conflict, to act immediately to protect all civilians at all times as its principal obligation under international law. In particular, the ULA/AA must:
Work with the Government of Bangladesh to establish a humanitarian corridor from Bangladesh and facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance to all communities in Rakhine state.
Assure, ensure and facilitate safe passage for Rohingya and other civilians to take shelter in designated areas of protection.
Request, enable and cooperate fully with an independent international investigative team to enter Rakhine state to investigate the treatment of Rohingya and other civilians in Rakhine state.
Invite independent international monitors to be stationed in Rakhine state to monitor and report on the protection of civilians and the observance of other obligations under international law.
The ULA/AA has said that it is committed to upholding the human rights of all ethnic and religious communities living in Rakhine. Now it must prove it.
SAC-M calls on the United Nations and its agencies and other States to uphold their own obligations and expedite efforts to prevent further grave violations of international law in Myanmar and hold perpetrators of those violations to account.
This Sunday 25 August marks seven years since the start of the massive 2017 atrocities during which thousands of Rohingya men, women, boys and girls were killed in the ensuing mass murder, rape and gang rape, torture, burning and arson carried out by the Myanmar military. Three quarters of a million Rohingya were forced to flee to neighbouring Bangladesh.
Seven years on, victims are still waiting for justice and accountability. And now new atrocities are being added to the old ones. The total impunity for perpetrators of grave violations of international law in Myanmar ensures the conditions for continuing atrocities against civilians, as this most recent massacre attests. The international community must do more to deliver justice and finally bring impunity in Myanmar to end.
ဩဂုတ်လ ၁၉ ရက်၊ ၂၀၂၄ ခုနှစ်။ ။ ရက္ခိုင့်တပ်တော် (AA) သည် ရခိုင်ပြည်နယ်မြောက်ပိုင်းရှိ အရပ်သားများအား အကာအကွယ်ပေးရေးနှင့် နိုင်ငံတကာ လူသားချင်းစာနာထောက်ထားမှုဆိုင်ရာ ဥပဒေအောက်တွင် ၎င်း၏ တာဝန်ဝတ္တရားများကို လိုက်နာထိန်းသိမ်းဆောင်ရွက်ရမည်ဖြစ်ကြောင်း မြန်မာနိုင်ငံဆိုင်ရာ အထူးအကြံပေးကောင်စီ (SAC-M) မှ ပြောကြားလိုက်သည်။
ခိုင်လုံသော အစီရင်ခံမှုများအရ ၂၀၂၄ ခုနှစ်၊ သြဂုတ်လ ၅ ရက်တွင် ရိုဟင်ဂျာအမျိုးသား၊ အမျိုးသမီးနှင့် ကလေးငယ်များအပေါ် တိုက်ခိုက်မှုတစ်ခုကြောင့် လူပေါင်း ၂၀၀ အထိ သေဆုံးခဲ့သည်ဟု သိရှိရသည်။ ဒုက္ခသည်များသည် AA နှင့် မြန်မာစစ်တပ်တို့ကြား ဖြစ်ပွားသည့် ပြင်းထန်သော တိုက်ပွဲများကြောင့် ရခိုင်ပြည်နယ်မြောက်ပိုင်း၊ မောင်တောမြို့နယ်မှ နတ်မြစ်ကို ကျော်ဖြတ်ကာ ဘင်္ဂလားဒေ့ရှ်နိုင်ငံဘက်သို့ ထွက်ပြေးရန် ကြိုးပမ်းနေခဲ့ကြသည်။
ဒရုန်းများမှ ကြဲချသော ဗုံးများ၊ အမြောက်ပစ်ခတ်မှုများနှင့် စစ်သားများက လူများကို လက်နက်ငယ်များဖြင့် ပစ်ခတ်ခဲ့ကြောင်း အသက်ရှင်ကျန်ရစ်သူများနှင့် မျက်မြင်သက်သေများက သတင်းပေးပို့ကြသည်။ ရက္ခိုင့်တပ်တော် (AA) အနေနှင့် တာဝန်ရှိသည်ဟု စွပ်စွဲခံထားရသည်။ ယခုလတ်တလော ဖြစ်ရပ်များသည် ဘူးသီးတောင်တွင် မေလ ၁၇ ရက်က ဖြစ်ပွားခဲ့သော ပမာဏကြီးမားလှသည့် အကွက်ကျကျစီမံသတ်ဖြတ်မှု၊ မီးရှို့မှုနှင့် ပစ်ခတ်မှုတို့တွင် AA တပ်ဖွဲ့ဝင်များလည်း ပါဝင်သည်ဟူသော စွပ်စွဲမှုများ၏ နောက်ဆက်တွဲဖြစ်သည်။
ရခိုင်ပြည်နယ်မြောက်ပိုင်းရှိ လူသားချင်းစာနာထောက်ထားမှု အခြေအနေ၊ အထူးသဖြင့် ရိုဟင်ဂျာအသိုင်းအ၀ိုင်း၏ အခြေအနေသည်အဆောတလျင်ပင်ဖြစ်သည်။ ၂၀၂၀ ခုနှစ်၊ နိုင်ငံတကာတရားရုံး (ICJ) မှ ချမှတ်သော စီရင်ချက်တရပ်အရ၊ ရခိုင်ပြည်နယ်မြောက်ပိုင်းရှိ ရိုဟင်ဂျာများသည် လူမျိုးသုဥ်းသတ်ဖြတ်မှုအန္တရာယ်နှင့် ဆက်လက်ရရင်ဆိုင်နေရပြီး ဒေသတွင်း အင်တာနက်ပိတ်ဆို့ခြင်းနှင့် သွားလာလှုပ်ရှားမှုအား တင်းကျပ်စွာ ကန့်သတ်ခြင်းများ မြန်မာစစ်တပ်မှ လုပ်ဆောင်ထားသည်။
SAC-M သည် ရခိုင်ပြည်နယ်မြောက်ပိုင်းရှိ ရိုဟင်ဂျာများနှင့် အခြားအရပ်သားများအပေါ် လတ်တလော ကျူးလွန်ထားသည့် ရက်စက်ကြမ်းကြုတ်မှုများအတွက် မည်သူ့တွင် တာဝန်ရှိသည်ကို မဆုံးဖြတ်နိုင်သေးပေ။ မည်သို့ပင်ဆိုစေကာမူ AA နှင့် ၎င်း၏ နိုင်ငံရေးပါတီဖြစ်သည့် ရက္ခိုင့်အမျိုးသားအဖွဲ့ချုပ် (ULA) တို့သည် ယခုအခါတွင် မြန်မာစစ်တပ်ကို လုံးလုံးနီးပါး ချေမှုန်းကာ ဖယ်ရှားပြီး ဒေသတွင်း အခရာကျသည့် စစ်တပ်နှင့် အုပ်ချုပ်မှု အာဏာပိုင်များ ဖြစ်လာမှုသည် ကျေနပ်အားရဖွယ်ရာဖြစ်သည်။
ထို့ပါသောကြောင့် SAC-M အနေဖြင့် ULA/AA အား ရခိုင်ပြည်နယ် မြောက်ပိုင်းတွင် လက်တွေ့အားဖြင့် အုပ်ချုပ်လျက်ရှိသော အာဏာပိုင်နှင့် ပဋိပက္ခတွင် ပါ၀င်နေသော အဖွဲ့တစ်ဖွဲ့အနေနှင့် တောင်းဆိုလိုသည်မှာ နိုင်ငံတကာဥပဒေအောက်ရှိ ၎င်း၏ အဓိကတာဝန်ဝတ္တရားများအရ အရပ်သားအားလုံးကို အချိန်တိုင်း အကာအကွယ်ပေးရန်အတွက် ချက်ချင်းဆောင်ရွက်သွားရန်ဖြစ်သည်။ အထူးသဖြင့် ULA/AA သည်-
ဘင်္ဂလားဒေ့ရှ်နိုင်ငံမှတဆင့် လူသားချင်းစာနာထောက်ထားမှုစင်္ကြံတစ်ခု တည်ဆောက်ရန်နှင့် ရခိုင်ပြည်နယ်ရှိ လူမှုအသိုက်အဝန်းအားလုံးသို့ လူသားချင်းစာနာထောက်ထားမှုအကူအညီများ ပေးပို့ရာတွင် ဖြစ်မြောက်စေရေးအတွက် ဘင်္ဂလားဒေ့ရှ်အစိုးရနှင့် လက်တွဲဆောင်ရွက်ပါရန်။
သတ်မှတ်ထားသော အကာအကွယ်ပေးသည့်နယ်မြေများတွင် ရိုဟင်ဂျာများနှင့် အခြားအရပ်သားများအတွက် လုံခြုံစွာ ဖြတ်သန်းသွားလာခြင်းအား ခိုင်မာသေချာစေပြီး ဖြစ်မြောက်စေရန် ကူညီဆောင်ရွက်ပေးပါရန်။
ရခိုင်ပြည်နယ်အတွင်း ရိုဟင်ဂျာများနှင့် အခြားအရပ်သားများအပေါ် ပြုမူဆက်ဆံမှုများအား စုံစမ်းစစ်ဆေးရန် လွတ်လပ်သော နိုင်ငံတကာ စုံစမ်းစစ်ဆေးရေးအဖွဲ့တစ်ခုအား တောင်းဆိုရန်၊ ၎င်းအဖွဲ့အား အထောက်အကူပေးရန်နှင့် အပြည့်အဝ ပူးပေါင်းဆောင်ရွက်ပါရန်။
အရပ်သားများအား အကာအကွယ်ပေးရေးနှင့် နိုင်ငံတကာဥပဒေအောက်တွင်ရှိ အခြားသော တာဝန်ဝတ္တရားများနှင့်စပ်လျဥ်း၍ လိုက်နာစောင့်ကြပ်ကြည့်ရှုရန်နှင့် အစီရင်ခံရန်အလို့ငှာ ရခိုင်ပြည်နယ်တွင် နေရာချထားပေးရေးအတွက် လွတ်လပ်သော နိုင်ငံတကာစောင့်ကြည့်လေ့လာသူများအား ဖိတ်ကြားပါစေရန်။
ULA/AA မှ ရခိုင်ပြည်နယ်အတွင်း နေထိုင်ကြသော လူမျိုးရေး၊ ဘာသာရေး အသိုင်းအဝိုင်းအားလုံး၏ လူ့အခွင့်အရေးအား မြှင့်တင်ပေးရန်အတွက် ၎င်းအနေနှင့် ကတိကဝတ်ပြုထားပြီးဖြစ်ကြောင်းပြောကြားထားပြီးဖြစ်သည်။ ယခုတွင်မူ ယင်းအား သက်သေပြရမည်ဖြစ်သည်။
SAC-M က ကုလသမဂ္ဂနှင့် ၎င်း၏အေဂျင်စီများနှင့် အခြားအဖွဲ့၀င်နိုင်ငံများအား ၎င်းတို့၏ တာဝန်ဝတ္တရားများကို လိုက်နာရန်နှင့် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံတွင် နိုင်ငံတကာဥပဒေအား ထပ်မံ၍ ဆိုးရွားစွာ ချိုးဖောက်မှုများကို တားဆီးရန်အတွက် အားထုတ်မှုများအား မြန်ဆန်စွာ အလုပ်တွင်စေရေးနှင့် အဆိုပါချိုးဖောက်မှုများကို ကျူးလွန်သူများအား တာဝန်ယူ/ခံမှုရှိစေရေး ကြိုးပမ်းဆောင်ရွက်သွားရန် SAC-M မှ တောင်းဆိုသည်။
ယခု ဩဂုတ်လ ၂၅ ရက်၊ တနင်္ဂနွေနေ့သည် မြန်မာစစ်တပ်မှ ကျူးလွန်ခဲ့သည့် အစုလိုက်အပြုံလိုက်သတ်ဖြတ်မှု၊ မုဒိမ်းပြုကျင့်ခံရမှုနှင့် အုပ်စုဖွဲ့ မုဒိမ်းမှု၊ ညှဉ်းပန်းနှိပ်စက်မှု၊ မီးလောင်မှုနှင့် ရှို့မီးများမှတဆင့် ရိုဟင်ဂျာ အမျိုးသား၊ အမျိုးသမီး၊ ယောက်ျားလေးနှင့် မိန်းကလေး ထောင်ပေါင်းများစွာ သေဆုံးခဲ့ရသည့်အချိန်ကာလ အစပြုသည့် ကြီးမားသော ၂၀၁၇ ခုနှစ် ရက်စက်ကြမ်းကြုတ်မှု စတင်သော ခုနှစ်နှစ်ပြည့် အထိမ်းအမှတ်ဖြစ်သည်။ ရိုဟင်ဂျာ တစ်သန်း၏ လေးပုံသုံးပုံသည် အိမ်နီးချင်း ဘင်္ဂလားဒေ့ရှ် နိုင်ငံသို့ ထွက်ပြေးတိမ်းရှောင်ရန် အတင်းအကြပ်စေခိုင်းခံခဲ့ရသည်။
ခုနစ်နှစ်လွန်လေပြီးသကာလ ကျူးလွန်ခံရသူများသည် တရားမျှတမှုနှင့် တာဝန်ခံ/ယူမှုအား စောင့်မျှော်နေဆဲဖြစ်သည်။ ယခုတွင်မူရက်စက်မှုအသစ်များက အဟောင်းနှင့်ပေါင်း ထပ်လောင်းပေါ်ပေါက်နေလေတော့သည်။ ယခုနောက်ဆုံး အစုလိုက်အပြုံလိုက် သတ်ဖြတ်မှုသည် ခိုင်မာသော အထောက်အထား အဖြစ် သက်သေထူနေသည့်အလျောက် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံတွင် နိုင်ငံတကာဥပဒေကို ပြင်းထန်လေးနက်စွာ ချိုးဖောက်မှုများ၏ ကျူးလွန်သူများ အပြစ်ပေးအရေးယူခံရခြင်းမှ ကင်းလွတ်ခွင့် ရရှိနေမှုသည် အရပ်သားများအပေါ် ဆက်လက် ရက်စက်ကြမ်းကြုတ်မှုပေါက်ထွန်းစေသည့် အခြေအနေများအား သေချာစေလေသည်။ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံတွင်း တရားမျှတမှုအား ဆောင်ကြဥ်းရန်နှင့် ရာဇဝတ်မှုကျူးလွန်သူများ အပြစ်ပေးအရေးယူခံရခြင်းမှ ကင်းလွတ်ခွင့် ရရှိနေမှုအား နောက်ဆုံးအနေနှင့် အဆုံးသတ်ရန်နိုင်ငံတကာအသိုင်းအဝိုင်းက မဖြစ်မနေ ပိုမို လုပ်ဆောင်ရမည်ဖြစ်သည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Special Advisory Council for Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-19
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Arakan (Rakhine) State - reports etc. by date (latest first), Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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"Friedgard Lottermoser passed away at the age of 82 on Aug. 8th, 2024 in Germany, from an aggressive cancer of unknown origin. Dedicating herself to a life that fused Western and Eastern spiritual traditions, Friedgard’s journey was marked by profound personal transformation and significant contributions to the global dissemination of Vipassana meditation. Under the guidance of Sayagyi U Ba Khin, one of Burma’s most revered meditation masters, she became a testament to the power of mindfulness.
Friedgard was born in Germany on April 13, 1942, and grew up during a time of immense upheaval and reconstruction. Her early life was shaped by the challenges of living in a society just emerging from years of brutal dictatorship and the ravages of World War II. Despite the hardships, those formative years instilled in Friedgard a resilience and adaptability that characterized her life.
At some point after the war, her mother remarried. Her stepfather secured a position with Fritz Werner, a German company involved in establishing armament factories in Burma, and in 1959, when Friedgard was just 17, her family relocated there. It was a move that would forever alter the trajectory of her life. It was the beginning of Friedgard’s deep connection with the culture and its people, and a country that became her spiritual home.
The family’s initial years in Burma were spent in Rangoon (now Yangon), where they lived in an exotic but somewhat isolated Chinese-style palace situated on a peninsula in Inya Lake. Surrounded by the lush, colorful, overgrown wilderness, her new home sparked in Friedgard a deep sense of curiosity and wonder about the country, and pointed her in the direction of its rich cultural and spiritual traditions.
Fascinated by the Burmese way of life, Friedgard began learning the language and gradually immersed herself in Burmese society, quite a rare thing for a foreigner in those days, and eventually taking the Burmese name Daw Onmar Khin. Her budding interest in Buddhism led her to the International Meditation Center (IMC) in Rangoon, where she met Sayagyi U Ba Khin, a pioneering teacher of Vipassana meditation and a good friend of her stepfather, who had organized his previous visit to Germany. This turned out to be a pivotal moment in Friedgard’s life. Under the guidance of this great meditation master, Friedgard immersed herself in the practice, becoming a committed disciple at U Ba Khin’s IMC for over a decade. She was strongly attracted to the simple yet profound way that Sayagyi presented the teachings.
Friedgard also spent considerable time with both Webu Sayadaw and Maha Gandayone Sayadaw during her time in Burma. Webu Sayadaw, a reputed Arahat, was known for his emphasis on the continuous practice of mindfulness, a teaching that profoundly influenced Friedgard’s own meditation journey. And she was granted rare permission to attend the Maha Gandayone Monastery in Amarapura to study Buddhist philosophy under the guidance of Maha Gandayone Sayadaw, who was renowned for his strict adherence to monastic discipline and deep commitment to monastic education.
While continuing her committed engagement with her spiritual practice, Friedgard also pursued academic studies as one of the few foreign students at the University of Rangoon, and then the University of Mandalay, where she got a Master’s degree in Pali; her 1969 thesis was titled, The Doctrine of Relationship. Yet her academic pursuits were not just about getting a degree; they also provided her with a deeper understanding of the cultural and historical context in which she was living. This knowledge enriched her spiritual practice, allowing her to connect more deeply with the teachings of the Buddha and the Vipassana tradition. Her ability to integrate into Burmese culture, combined with her commitment to Vipassana meditation, set her apart, and the intersection of her academic and spiritual pursuits laid the groundwork for her future contributions to the global mindfulness movement.
But her time at the university coincided with significant upheaval in Burma. The military coup of 1962 led by General Ne Win marked the beginning of decades of military rule in Burma. In this period of great political instability, many foreigners were forced to leave the country … but even as her family packed up to return to Germany, she adamantly insisted that she would stay behind to continue her meditation practice and studies. Fortunately, she had a rare kind of scholarship that allowed her to do so.
Nearly a decade later, in 1971, Friedgard left Burma on her own terms to return to Germany to complete a PhD, also in Pali. During the early 1970s, Friedgard supported the emerging globalization of the meditation lineage of Sayagyi U Ba Khin, helping it gain a foothold in Europe. She facilitated meditation courses for Robert Hover, Ruth Denison, and John Coleman, while also corresponding with S.N. Goenka and others.
In her later years, Friedgard’s commitment to Buddhism deepened, leading her to ordain as a Sāmaṇerī, taking the Pāḷi name of Akiñcanā. This ordination marked a significant step in her spiritual journey, reflecting her lifelong dedication to the Dhamma. In her view, the disappearance of the bhikkhuni order in Burma and elsewhere was not only a loss for women, but a significant historical oversight as well. She believed that there is a strong potential for the revival of the bhikkhuni order, and she actively advocated for this, understanding it as a necessary step for gender equality within the Buddhist community. Friedgard’s perspective on this was based not in contemporary thinking or recent social movements, but rather, was grounded in her historical understanding of the practical and egalitarian spirit of early Buddhism. She contrasted this with later developments that became increasingly patriarchal and restrictive. Friedgard argued that early Buddhism, as practiced by the Buddha, did not impose gender-based limitations on spiritual practice and leadership, suggesting that a return to those principles could lead to greater gender equality within contemporary Buddhist communities.
Friedgard expressed deep sorrow and frustration over the 2021 coup in Myanmar. She felt a profound sense of loss and disillusionment about the violence and suffering caused by the military’s actions, and lamented the senseless brutality inflicted on civilians and the deep scars they have left. Yet her reflections on the coup were grounded in her Buddhist outlook. She saw the military’s acts as not just political tragedies, but as deep spiritual failings, which, in her view, would lead to severe karmic consequences for those responsible.
Despite her deep resonance with the sufferings of the Burmese people, she was at the same time hopeful that the fall of the military would pave the way for the restoration of peace, justice, and dignity. She hoped for a future where the Burmese people are able to overcome the divisions and traumas inflicted by the military regime, working together to create a compassionate and harmonious society. She was also a fervent advocate of the current revolution, insisting that now was the time for Burmese to do everything in their power to finally achieve their freedom from decades of oppression and tyranny.
An accomplished scholar and author, Friedgard contributed to the books “Code of Conduct for Buddhist Nuns” and “A Critical Pali Dictionary”, and her unpublished thesis was titled “Quoted Verse Passages in the Works of Buddhaghosa”.
If a Hollywood screenwriter were to fashion a script based on the real life biography of Friedgard Lottermoser, it would likely be rejected as too fanciful. Her life was truly unique, intersecting so many diverse elements: the modern origins and early global spread of Vipassana meditation; the ongoing battle for freedom to win over tyranny and oppression; and the recognition of women’s rights in all sectors. Her story is a testament to the extraordinary impact one determined individual can have on the world, defying the boundaries of history, culture, gender and spirituality..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-19
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations, Buddhism in Burma - general
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"18.6 million people:
Across Myanmar, 18.6 million people are struggling to meet their basic needs—including access to medical care. The humanitarian situation in Myanmar is rapidly deteriorating, and yet the international community is crippled by inaction, their attention elsewhere.
As a humanitarian, I have witnessed crises in Africa and the Middle East, driven by conflicts and large-scale displacements. However, my recent visit to Myanmar has given me an eye-opening insight into its fast-unfolding humanitarian crisis. Due to the escalating civil war, large swaths of the country are in chaos today, a third of the population in desperate need of urgent humanitarian aid. Three million have been forcibly displaced in search of safety from the violence. As one citizen has put it to Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), “Thousands tried to evacuate but many were killed or wounded. The violence is still ongoing.” Early this August, our teams in Bangladesh received escalating numbers of wounded Rohingya people, 40% of them women and children, who were again forced to flee Myanmar because of the violence.
MSF has been working in Myanmar for over 30 years providing medical humanitarian assistance from basic healthcare to HIV treatment to mental care. Following the 2021 military takeover, our teams on the ground have witnessed the intensifying conflicts impacting public health after thousands of medical professionals left their jobs. Widespread insecurity and violence, and administrative barriers have hampered the delivery of supplies and humanitarian access, further limiting the availability of healthcare in the country.
In Myanmar’s largest city of Yangon, MSF supports what has now become the country’s only functioning tuberculosis (TB) hospital, where almost 50% of the country’s patients with drug-resistant TB receive care. However, restrictions on humanitarian aid set by the authorities have had a serious impact on the hospital’s capacity to operate as before. Some hospital wards have been closed and equipment has not been replaced. MSF is also concerned about the TB / HIV patients in northern Shan and Kachin who have been handed over to the national TB program as any interruption of their treatment may result in resistance and/or deterioration of their conditions.
In Yangon, I met MSF volunteers from the ethnic Rohingya community who had traveled on foot for days, to escape the escalating violence in Buthidaung, Rakhine State. Civilians are caught in the middle of the conflict, hit by stray bullets and targeted/indiscriminate attacks, with their houses and belongings destroyed by widespread fires. Many of them have had to repeatedly flee while men feared forced recruitment from all sides of the warring parties. As of 10 August 2024, MSF teams in Bangladesh treated 50 war-wounded Rohingya, of whom 18 children, arriving from Myanmar. The spike in number of violence-related injuries, including mortar shell injuries and gunshot wounds, indicates the worsening humanitarian crisis in Rakhine.
The escalation of violence in Rakhine, Kachin, and Shan States since late 2023 has severely affected MSF’s medical activities. Our office and pharmacy in Buthidaung, Rakhine, was burnt down in April — along with the life-saving drugs inside. The breakdown of a year-long ceasefire brokered in November 2022 has led to drastic reduction in MSF’s monthly outpatient consultations in Rakhine, plummeting from 6,684 in September 2023 to just 81 in March 2024. We have also been alerted by increasing maternal and neonatal deaths since 2023, signifying multiple healthcare barriers.
As with many other humanitarian organisations, it has just been impossible for MSF to provide essential healthcare to the people in areas controlled by ethnic armed groups due to movement restrictions set by the authorities.
MSF used to run 25 mobile clinics in Rakhine, but these activities have been largely suspended for 8 months because of the conflict. When I visited Sittwe, MSF teams had just received travel authorisation to at least one area, having been able to reach some patients. Hundreds, including pregnant women from both the Rohingya and Rakhine communities, came to our clinics seeking essential healthcare. The resumption of this activity addresses only a small fraction of the enormous medical needs. Yet unmet are the greater medical and humanitarian needs in other parts of Rakhine and the country.
MSF observes neutrality and impartiality in the name of universal medical ethics and the right to humanitarian assistance. We aim for full and unhindered access in the provision of much needed medical care. But how do we hold fast to our principles while reaching those who need our help the most in Myanmar?
The humanitarian situation in Myanmar is more serious than ever. Persistent diplomatic efforts by Japan, Australia, China, India, as well as Thailand and other ASEAN countries are indispensable to enable humanitarian organisations regain access to those in need. Furthermore, all parties involved in the conflict must protect civilians and medical facilities. The suffering of the people of Myanmar, where over 18 million are unable to meet even their basic needs including access to medical care, should not be neglected.
This blog was written as part of a partnership between the Development Policy Centre with Médecins Sans Frontières / Doctors Without Borders (MSF) Australia. MSF provides medical assistance to people affected by conflict, epidemics, disasters, or exclusion from healthcare. Their actions are guided by medical ethics and the principles of impartiality, independence and neutrality. MSF Australia does not receive public institutional funding..."
Source/publisher:
Australian National University
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-19
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
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"OVERVIEW
The humanitarian crisis in Myanmar worsened significantly in the second quarter of 2024 due to escalating armed conflict, small-scale natural hazards, and overall economic and political instability. Millions of people faced severe vulnerabilities, often exacerbated by displacement, acute food insecurity, and restricted access to essential services. Between April and June 2024, intensified clashes in Kachin, northern Shan and Rakhine led to new waves of displacement. By the end of the second quarter, a total of 3.2 million people were displaced from their homes, marking an increase of more than 320,000 compared to the first quarter of this year. Many of the newly displaced people were forced to seek refuge in temporary shelters and informal camps. Access to education, health, and other essential services remained severely restricted in conflict-affected and remote areas, with ongoing school closures and overwhelmed health facilities of particular concern. Protection concerns continued to grow across the country, with increasing reports of landmine and explosive ordnance incidents, premature returns, confiscation of civilian assets, and the threat of forced recruitment.
Humanitarian operations faced formidable challenges. A total of 323 access incidents were reported by various organizations between April and June, including but not limited to military operations and armed activities, administrative restrictions and violence and threats against humanitarian personnel, assets and facilities. Transportation infrastructure in poor condition, damaged or destroyed further complicated access to affected communities.
Despite these obstacles, the humanitarian community remained steadfast in its efforts to ensure support reached affected people. Through innovative approaches and enhanced coordination, aid delivery persisted, reaching more than 2.1 million people in the first half year of 2024, or roughly 40 per cent of those targeted for humanitarian assistance in the 2024 Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan (HNRP). This marks a significant increase from the first quarter, when only 18 per cent was reached, effectively doubling the impact within just one quarter. However, this reach falls short of..."
Source/publisher:
UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (New York) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-19
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Education in Burma/Myanmar - general, Food Security and nutrition in Burma/Myanmar, Public Health, Human Rights and international relations
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Format :
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Size:
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"World Humanitarian Day is an occasion for us all to honor the courageous aid workers who are delivering humanitarian assistance to millions of people in need throughout Myanmar. Amid an expanding crisis, they are stepping up each day to get help where it is needed most.
Across Myanmar, people are facing the painful consequences of widespread conflict and devastating disaster. An estimated 18.6 million people urgently require humanitarian assistance, including 6 million children. The spiraling crisis has pushed many people into survival mode. With remarkable dedication, aid workers do their utmost to get people in need food, shelter, protection and other lifesaving assistance. In the first half of 2024, the humanitarian community reached 2.1 million people with support. This assistance was delivered despite significant funding challenges, with the 2024 Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan only 21 per cent funded.
Local and national humanitarian organizations are at the forefront of this response, showing tireless determination to help those in need. Alongside aid workers, host communities across Myanmar are providing crucial support to people in need. They are often the first responders in this crisis and a lifeline to affected people.
This year’s World Humanitarian Day calls on people around the world to #ActForHumanity. It aims to shine a light on the consequences of violations of International Humanitarian Law and confront the normalization of attacks on aid workers and civilians suffering from the impact of the conflict. In Myanmar, civilians and aid workers face risks each day as the conflict escalates. It is imperative that all parties to the conflict uphold their obligations under International Humanitarian Law to protect civilians and aid workers, ensuring sustained and unhindered humanitarian access to those in need.
Today, and every day, all who are working to help the most vulnerable people in Myanmar are deeply appreciated. Amid immense challenges, your unwavering support is a source of hope that together we can alleviate suffering and protect lives..."
Source/publisher:
UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-19
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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"The protracted conflict in Myanmar, known for its ongoing repression of opposition groups and ethnic minorities by the military junta, has resulted in significant regional instability. The recent meeting between former Myanmar military leader Than Shwe and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi underscores China’s increasing influence in the region. While China presents itself as a mediator, there are concerns about its true intentions and whether its actions are genuinely aimed at restoring peace or driven by self-interest.
Given these circumstances, it is crucial to critically examine Indonesia’s role and potential under President-Elect Prabowo to assume a bridging role in the diplomatic landscape of Southeast Asia. The political turmoil in Myanmar has persisted since the military coup in February 2021, which deposed the democratically elected government of Aung San Suu Kyi. The junta’s rule has been characterised by severe crackdowns on dissent, widespread human rights abuses, and the displacement of hundreds of thousands of individuals. Ethnic minority groups, particularly the Rohingya population, have faced considerable persecution, while the country’s economy has suffered due to mismanagement by the military.
The ongoing violence and instability in Myanmar have not only exacerbated the domestic crisis but also had far-reaching implications for regional security and international relations. In response to this situation, Myanmar has increasingly relied on China for support. The recent meeting between Than Shwe and Wang Yi highlights Myanmar’s dependence on Chinese assistance in sustaining the junta’s hold on power. Than Shwe’s request for help from China in restoring stability provides insight into the deepening relationship between the two nations. However, China’s involvement in Myanmar is primarily driven by strategic interests rather than altruistic motives.
China’s involvement in Myanmar is multifaceted. On the one hand, Beijing has offered diplomatic and military assistance to the junta, shielding it from international condemnation and sanctions. This support has been crucial in enabling the regime to survive despite widespread international isolation. On the other hand, China has also engaged with ethnic insurgent groups in Myanmar, helping to broker ceasefires and serving as a mediator in conflicts.
Through this dual approach, China seeks to maintain its influence in Myanmar while safeguarding its strategic interests, which include access to Myanmar’s natural resources and the preservation of its geopolitical position. China’s role as a mediator in Myanmar has been met with scepticism regarding its true intentions. Rather than genuinely addressing the conflict, China’s actions seem to prioritize the protection of its interests. This is evident through its involvement in brokering ceasefires with ethnic insurgent groups, which can be seen as a strategy to ensure stability in border areas crucial for Chinese infrastructure projects. Additionally, China’s support for the junta serves to maintain a government that aligns closely with Beijing’s interests, particularly in countering Western influence in the region.
The response of global and regional powers to the Myanmar situation has varied. The United States has taken a firm stance against the junta, implementing sanctions on military leaders and entities involved in the coup. The Biden administration consistently denounces the military’s actions and calls for the reinstatement of democratic governance. Similarly, the European Union has imposed sanctions on the junta and assists in humanitarian efforts in Myanmar. The EU also advocates for international pressure on the military regime to cease its violence against civilians and engage in dialogue with opposition forces.
ASEAN’s response to the crisis is multifaceted. The regional organization remains divided in its approach, with some member states advocating for engagement with the junta while others push for its isolation. Although the Five-Point Consensus of ASEAN, which calls for an end to violence and the initiation of dialogue, has yet to be fully implemented, the bloc’s inability to effectively address the crisis underscores the limitations of its consensus-based decision-making process.
Nevertheless, ASEAN continues to play a vital role in regional diplomacy, and its efforts to mediate the conflict remain ongoing. Indonesia, a prominent member of ASEAN, consistently calls for a peaceful resolution to the conflict in Myanmar. The country has consistently called for dialogue and the restoration of democratic governance in Myanmar. Indonesia’s diplomatic efforts are guided by its historical commitment to non-alignment and its influential role as a leader in Southeast Asia.
The election of President-Elect Prabowo has the potential to further enhance Indonesia’s involvement in regional diplomacy. Prabowo’s administration could leverage Indonesia’s influence within ASEAN to promote a more coordinated and effective response to the crisis in Myanmar.
The role of China in resolving the conflict in Myanmar is a topic of great significance that warrants academic analysis. The assessment of whether China acts as a facilitator for peace or is primarily motivated by self-interest is crucial. While China’s involvement is integral to any potential resolution, it is imperative to evaluate its actions in light of broader regional and international efforts aimed at restoring peace and stability. The efficacy of China as a mediator may be compromised if its primary objective is to safeguard and expand its influence and strategic interests.
In contrast, Indonesia holds considerable potential as a bridge builder, which assumes particular significance with the advent of President Prabowo. Unlike China, Indonesia lacks comparable strategic interests in Myanmar, thus positioning itself as a more neutral and credible mediator. Indonesia’s non-aligned stance, combined with its adeptness in regional diplomacy, makes it well-suited to play a constructive role in mediating the conflict. Prabowo’s administration should prioritize Myanmar in its foreign policy agenda and work in close collaboration with ASEAN and other international partners to advocate for a peaceful resolution.
In conclusion, the situation in Myanmar remains highly unstable, with no immediate prospects for conflict resolution. While China’s involvement is indispensable, concerns arise due to its self-interest-driven motives, which cast doubt on its effectiveness as a mediator. The international community, including the United States, European Union, and ASEAN, must persist in exerting pressure on the junta to engage in dialogue and restore democratic governance.
Simultaneously, Indonesia possesses the potential to assume a pivotal role in resolving the crisis. Under the leadership of President-Elect Prabowo, Indonesia should utilize its diplomatic influence to advocate for a peaceful resolution, establishing itself as a prominent mediator in Southeast Asia. By doing so, Indonesia can make a significant contribution to regional stability and facilitate the path towards a more peaceful and prosperous Myanmar.
opinions expressed in this article are the author’s own.
References
Albert, Eleanor. “Myanmar’s Troubled History: Coups, Military Rule, and the Struggle for Democracy.” Council on Foreign Relations, 28 February 2022.
ASEAN Secretariat. “ASEAN’s Five-Point Consensus on Myanmar: Progress and Challenges.” ASEAN.org, 10 August 2024.
Li, Nan. “China’s Strategic Interests in Myanmar: Diplomacy, Security, and Economic Ties.” Journal of Contemporary China, vol. 31, no. 134, 2022, pp. 345-362.
Maizland, Lindsay. “The Myanmar Coup and its Regional Implications.” Council on Foreign Relations, 5 March 2023.
Myanmar Institute for Peace and Security. “Myanmar’s Political Crisis: An Overview of the Current Situation.” MIPS Reports, July 2024.
O’Toole, Megan. “Myanmar’s Future under Military Rule.” Al Jazeera, 23 July 2023.
Zaw, Htet Htet. “Ethnic Conflicts and Ceasefires in Myanmar: China’s Influence.” The Diplomat, 30 June 2023.
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Source/publisher:
"Eurasia Review"
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-17
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"The recent four-day visit of Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi to Southeast Asia has underscored the implementation of China’s good neighbour’s diplomacy.
Wang Yi firstly visited Myanmar and remarked that China supports its government’s plan to hold fresh elections and return the country to a “democratic transition” – a gesture showing China’s respect to Myanmar’s peaceful political transition and objection to any foreign intervention. After the removal of Aung San Suu Kyi government, the Myanmar military regime has encountered a legitimacy problem, especially in light of the fierce fighting with ethnic minority armed forces in the northern regions. Some of the ethnic armed forces are composed of Hans Chinese who are also supportive of China. Although China mediated in the conflicts between the Myanmar military regime and some ethnic armed forces, the ceasefire has recently been broken in June as some rebels captured a military command post in Lashio in the Shan state, where the violent conflicts between the military and the Hans-dominated Kokang forces (who according to some rumours received weapons from mysteriously unknown external forces) have undermined the border security as some Chinese in mainland China were wounded innocently by shells fired from Myanmar.
The military junta in Myanmar has failed to control the whole country as online gambling, telecom fraud syndicates and human smuggling persisted. Recently the military has smashed the telecommunication fraud syndicates amid unsubstantiated rumours that a minority of rotten elements in the military supported a few kingpins of telecom fraud syndicates, which deceived a lot of mainland Chinese in China.
After the diplomatic lobbying and efforts from China, the Myanmar government dismantled the telecom syndicates and extradited thousands of the Chinese organizers, participants and victims of these criminal syndicates back to China – a triumph of the joint Sino-Myanmar combat against cross-border crime.
On August 16, Wang Yi met the former chair of Myanmar’s State Peace and Development Council, U Than Swe, who said China is Myanmar’s brother and friendly neighbour, and who hoped that China would continue to help Myanmar prevent external interference and maintain domestic stability.
Wang Yi said that the Sino-Myanmar brotherly friendship is important to China’s neighbourhood diplomacy, and that China upholds the five principles of peaceful coexistence with Myanmar on a shared future. He added that China is keen to deepen the Belt and Road cooperation with Myanmar, develop the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor, ensure the smooth operation of the Sino-Myanmar oil and gas pipeline project, combat cross-border crime, and to collaborate in agricultural development and people-to-people exchange.
U Than Swe emphasized Myanmar’s support of the one-China principle, backed up China’s Belt and Road Initiative and welcomed the idea of having a shared future for mankind, and he pledged to work with China to safeguard border security through the joint combat against cross-border crime.
After the diplomatic lobbying and efforts from China, the Myanmar government dismantled the telecom syndicates and extradited thousands of the Chinese organizers, participants and victims of these criminal syndicates back to China – a triumph of the joint Sino-Myanmar combat against cross-border crime.
Wang Yi’s visit to Myanmar followed not only the trip of Chinese special envoy Deng Xijun’s trip to meet Myanmar’s junta chief Min Aung Hlaing last year, but also the arrival of new Chinese ambassador Ma Jia in Myanmar. China has reportedly supplied weapons to the military junta which encounters Western sanctions, but it is in Beijing’s interest to maintain border security for the sake of enhancing and deepening all kinds of cooperation. As such, Wang Yi’s visit was timely and necessary.
Wang Yi also went to Thailand where he met Laos deputy prime minister and foreign minister Saleumxay Kommasith in Chiang Mai. The Sino-Laos trade has risen with the full capacity of the Sino-Laotian railway. Wang Yi remarked that China supports Laos to be a rotating chair of ASEAN, that Beijing is keen to see Laos enhancing its regional and international influence, and that China is eager to accelerate infrastructure development along the Sino-Laos railway, to deepen high-level and people-to-people exchange and to fight cross-border crime.
Saleumxay expressed his appreciation to China for promoting peace talks in Myanmar’s northern regions as border peace and regional stability are the common interests of Laos and China.
During the 9th Lancang-Mekong Cooperation (LMC) Foreign Ministers Meeting, Wang Yi conducted informal discussion with not only Saleumxay but also Myanmar foreign minister U Than Swe and Thailand foreign affairs permanent secretary Eksiri Pintaruchi. They came to a consensus that all sides would combat cross-border crimes, including online gambling, telecom fraud and human smuggling, which have affected the personal safety and properties of ordinary people. China’s Global Security Initiative, according to Wang Yi, secured the warm responses from Myanmar, Laos and Thailand. Since 2023, about 50,000 people who were involved in cross-border crimes have been arrested by the joint efforts of these countries.
The LMC was formed in 2016 with the participation of China, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam to strengthen connectivity, production capacity, socio-economic development, poverty alleviation, and water resources and agricultural management in the region.
Wang Yi also said that the borders of China, Myanmar, Thailand and Laos have to be guarded while criminal intelligence will have to be shared together through a ministerial-level law enforcement and security meeting in the Lancang-Mekong region. Technology, equipment and judicial cooperation will have to be utilized and strengthened to combat cross-border crime.
Wang Yi’s visit was politically significant.
First and foremost, China’s good neighbourhood diplomacy can be seen so as to counter the misperception of the so-called “China threat” as propagated by those foreigners hawkish and hostile to China without a deeper understanding of the turbulence of Chinese history.
Wang Yi’s visit to Southeast Asia has revealed the implementation of China’s good neighbourhood diplomacy under which the joint combat against cross-border crime has become a precondition for closer socio-economic and sustainable development, infrastructure expansion, mutual investment, expanded tourism, and more intensive people-to-people as well as cultural and educational exchange
Second, the Lancang-Mekong region is geopolitically and economically strategic for the implementation of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, Global Security Initiative, Global Civilization Initiative and the common destiny for mankind. Combining regional security issues with infrastructure development, socio-economic and sustainable development, China is keen to create a peaceful and mutually economically prosperous environment in Southeast Asia through the realization of its good neighbourhood diplomacy.
Take the example of Sino-Thailand relations. China is Thailand’s biggest trading partner while Thailand provides a huge market for China’s Electric Vehicles. Chinese tourists amount to 3.5 million in 2023 and the number is expected to increase with the introduction of a mutual visa waiver scheme. Although Thailand has traditionally been an ally of the US, China has been adopting a good neighbourhood diplomacy to woo the support of Thailand for the sake of balancing the US influence.
Third, China accurately targets at the joint combat against cross-border crime so that other issues will be tackled more smoothly and systematically, including detailed visit and visa arrangements, mutual investment, the personal and property safety of Chinese investors, and the minimization of mainland Chinese victims of cross-border online gambling, cross-border casinos, human smuggling, drugs trafficking and telecom fraud.
Fourth, Wang Yi’ visit came at a time when China criticized the Philippines for continuous provocation in the South China Sea, like a military NC-212 aircraft entering the airspace over China’s Huangyan Island. Objectively speaking, the Philippines leadership has shifted to a more militarily hawkish position toward the territorial disputes with China since 2022. It remains to be seen how the Ferdinand Marcos Jr leadership can rein in its own hawkish elements so that economic pragmatism and peace can and will continue to prevail over ultranationalist fervour in a new Cold War era during which ideological politics are threatening world peace. Wang Yi’s peaceful moves and good neighbourhood diplomacy to Southeast Asian states perhaps made a gesture, indirectly or unintentionally, to the Philippines leadership that China remains a peace-loving country.
In conclusion, Wang Yi’s visit to Southeast Asia has revealed the implementation of China’s good neighbourhood diplomacy under which the joint combat against cross-border crime has become a precondition for closer socio-economic and sustainable development, infrastructure expansion, mutual investment, expanded tourism, and more intensive people-to-people as well as cultural and educational exchange. From a broader perspective, China’s Belt and Road Initiative, Global Security Initiative and the common shared future for mankind can and will hopefully make a breakthrough in Southeast Asia. The deeper meaning and significance of Wang Yi’s visit to Southeast Asia and the related good neighbourhood diplomacy have to be properly and objectively understood..."
Source/publisher:
Macau Business
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-17
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"WASHINGTON—The United States on Friday promised to keep supporting Myanmar’s democratic opposition, after China endorsed the junta’s transition plans.
Two senior US officials met virtually with the shadow National Unity Government, which consists mostly of lawmakers ousted in the 2021 coup, as well as key ethnic rebel groups, including the Karen National Union.
The US officials “commended the groups on their collaborative efforts to work on establishing a path toward an inclusive federal, democratic Burma,” the State Department said, using Myanmar’s former name.
The US officials “reiterated that the United States will continue to expand direct support and assistance to pro-democracy actors” including to “develop concrete steps towards a full transition to civilian governance that respects the will of the people of Burma,” it said.
The US officials in the meeting were Tom Sullivan, who is a senior advisor to Secretary of State Antony Blinken, and Michael Schiffer, the top official for Asia at the US Agency for International Development.
Myanmar’s coup upended a 10-year democratic transition process that had been backed by the United States.
Beijing is a major ally and arms supplier to the junta, whose chief, Min Aung Hlaing, met earlier this week with China’s visiting foreign minister, Wang Yi.
Wang voiced support for promises by the junta for a transition that includes an election.
The junta has repeatedly delayed its timetable for a general election..."
Source/publisher:
"Agence France-Presse" (Paris) via "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-17
[field_licence]
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"BEIJING —
China urged neighboring countries to help war-torn Myanmar advance its peace and reconciliation process as its foreign minister met counterparts from Laos, Myanmar and Thailand on Friday.
Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi called the situation in Myanmar "worrying," and he suggested neighboring countries should promote cooperation with Myanmar to help it create economic and social conditions that prevent conflict.
Earlier, Wang told a news conference in Thailand that China supports a democratic transition in Myanmar and backs a regional plan to find a way out of the ongoing crisis in the Southeast Asian country.
Wang said neighboring countries "sitting in the same boat, and drinking water from the same river" have a better understanding of Myanmar's situation than others.
Myanmar has been in turmoil since February 2021 when the military ousted an elected civilian government in a coup, abruptly ending the impoverished country's tentative steps toward becoming a full-fledged democracy.
"No one wants Myanmar to restore stability and development more than its neighbors," Wang said..."
Source/publisher:
"Reuters" (UK) via "Voice of America" (Washington, D.C)
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-16
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"BANGKOK, Aug. 15 (Xinhua) -- Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi met with Lao Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Saleumxay Kommasith in Chiang Mai, Thailand on Thursday on strengthening bilateral relations and cooperation on regional issues, and the situation in Myanmar.
Wang, also a member of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China Central Committee, said China and Laos treat each other with sincerity and have always been supporting and helping each other.
Under the strategic guidance of the top leaders of the two parties and countries, the building of the China-Laos community with a shared future has accelerated, bilateral trade has been increasing, the China-Laos railway capacity has been constantly achieving new heights, personnel exchanges have significantly intensified, and the two sides have seen closer coordination in international and regional affairs, said Wang.
China firmly supports Laos in exploring a development path suited to its national conditions, staunchly supports Laos to hold the 12th Congress of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party to consolidate the party's leadership and the direction of socialism, and firmly supports Laos' ASEAN chairmanship to further enhance its international and regional influence, he said.
China is willing to further deepen mutually beneficial cooperation with Laos across various fields, leverage the comprehensive benefits of the China-Laos railway, jointly resolve bottlenecks and accelerate integrated development along the route so as to serve the respective development and revitalization of the two countries.
Saleumxay, for his part, said the rapid development of cooperation between Laos and China has played a crucial role in the socio-economic development of Laos. Laos is willing to jointly implement the important consensus reached by the leaders of the two countries, enhance high-level exchanges, deepen cooperation in areas such as connectivity and mineral resources, jointly fight transnational crime, and promote further achievements in the building of the Laos-China community with a shared future for the benefit of the people of both nations.
The two foreign ministers also exchanged views on the situation in Myanmar. Wang pointed out that Myanmar is an important member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). China supports ASEAN to enhance communication and contact with Myanmar, explore the docking of ASEAN's five-point consensus and Myanmar's new five-point roadmap, and help Myanmar maintain domestic stability, achieve political reconciliation, and resume its process of democratic transition, which is beneficial for ASEAN's unity and the peace and stability of the region.
Saleumxay spoke highly of China's constructive role in promoting peace talks in northern Myanmar and its political reconciliation, adding that Laos is willing to strengthen coordination and cooperation with China to support Myanmar's stability and development.
The two ministers agreed to ensure the success of the ninth Lancang-Mekong Cooperation Foreign Ministers' Meeting in Chiang Mai, strengthen the awareness of a community with a shared future, enhance practical cooperation in all fields, and advance the building of a community with a shared future for the Lancang-Mekong countries in an effort to make greater contribution to regional prosperity and stability..."
Source/publisher:
"Xinhua News Agency" (Beijing)
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-16
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"London —
China has increased high-level diplomatic engagement with Myanmar’s military government over the past week as rebel groups continue to make gains in the northern part of the country, where Beijing has huge economic and geostrategic interests.
Some analysts say recent trips by top Chinese officials, including Foreign Minister Wang Yi and China’s special envoy to Myanmar, Deng Xijun, reflect Beijing’s attempt to stabilize the situation in Myanmar.
“The Chinese are trying to use these high-level visits to entice the Myanmar military to come back to the negotiation table,” said Jason Tower, the U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP) country director for Myanmar.
However, he thinks the Chinese government is struggling to facilitate new rounds of cease-fire talks between the military government and rebel groups, which have been gaining control over key facilities along the China-Myanmar border in recent months.
“It’s not clear how the Chinese would be able to facilitate a sustainable agreement between the rebel groups and the military government [since] both sides seem to be fundamentally at odds with each other,” Tower told VOA in a phone interview.
Following his meeting with the Myanmar junta chief Min Aung Hlaing on Wednesday, Wang said Beijing “opposes chaos and conflicts in Myanmar” and hopes the country will increase efforts to stabilize the situation along the China-Myanmar border.
“Wang Yi expressed his hope that Myanmar will earnestly safeguard the safety of Chinese personnel and projects in Myanmar, maintain peace and stability along the China-Myanmar border, step up joint efforts to crack down on cross-border crimes, and create a safe environment for bilateral exchanges and cooperation,” the Chinese government said in its official readout.
For its part, Myanmar’s military government said China supports its “endeavors in implementing the five-point roadmap for ensuring peace and stability of the state and development and making preparations to hold a free and fair multiparty democratic general election.”
While Myanmar’s state-run Global New Light of Myanmar newspaper claimed that Beijing vowed to support a promised election, which the military government has said will be held in 2025, the Chinese readout didn’t include such details.
Some analysts say this difference reflects how Myanmar’s military government and the Chinese government view the supposed “election plan.”
“For the Myanmar military and its leader Min Aung Hlaing in particular, the elections are existential, but China probably remains very skeptical about the likelihood of an election being held since the military government controls less than half of Myanmar’s territory at the moment,” Hunter Marston, an adjunct research fellow at La Trobe University in Australia, told VOA by phone.
An alliance formed by several armed resistance groups called the Three Brotherhood Alliance gained control in recent months over key facilities and infrastructure in the northern part of the country, including a regional military base in the northern Shan State and the strategic city of Lashio, which sits on a highway between China and the major city of Mandalay.
USIP’s Tower said as the Myanmar military loses more of its monopoly over the ability to provide security to Chinese state-run enterprises’ projects in northern Myanmar, Beijing may increase cooperation with rebel groups to safeguard its economic interests in the region.
“As more and more of these projects fall under the control of different resistance actors, we may see China work with these groups to try to facilitate its business operation in Myanmar,” he told VOA.
While Beijing may increase cooperation with rebel groups, Marston said, China will continue to manage its relationship with Myanmar by engaging all political players in the country.
“China is continuing its long-term strategy of hedging its bets, which means that it will engage with a number of stakeholders and try to retain influence over as many factions in Myanmar as possible,” he told VOA.
In addition to meeting leaders of Myanmar’s military government, Wang also met with the former chairman of Myanmar’s State Peace and Development Council, Than Shwe, who urged Beijing to help Myanmar “prevent external interference and maintain domestic stability.”
While some analysts say Myanmar’s military government has been stalling the cease-fire negotiations as many competing political forces refuse to negotiate with them, they think China will not support the complete ousting of the military from Burmese politics.
“Since Myanmar became independent in 1948, there has not been a single day when the Burmese military was not a part of the center of the Burmese politics,” Yun Sun, China Program director at the Stimson Center in Washington, told VOA by phone.
She said Beijing will likely support a peace process based on negotiation and reconciliation.
“The peace process has to be based on some sort of concessions made by both sides,” said Sun.
But since there is no sign that the fighting between rebel groups and Myanmar’s military will stop any time soon, Marston said Beijing can only try to urge different resistance groups to respect its interests while gradually cultivating an environment for potential cease-fire negotiations.
“Beijing will continue to incrementally work around the margins by pushing cease-fire negotiations in northern Myanmar while trying to ensure that all players are on China’s side,” he told VOA..."
Source/publisher:
"Voice of America" (Washington, D.C)
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-16
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"Overview:
Yangon:
• According to the ministerial authorities for health, a total of 2,261 hospitalized cases of acute watery diarrhea (AWD) and 161 hospitalized cases of AWD cases with severe dehydration were reported from 44 townships of Yangon region as of 8 Aug 2024. Among them, 15 cases have died, but cause of deaths is unknown. Cholera infection is confirmed in some of those AWD cases.
• Until 23 July 2024, ministerial authorities for health had publicly shared the daily number of new AWD cases with or without severe hydration (Figure 1).
• Most affected townships were Thaketa, Hlaingtharyar, Botahtaung, Dawbon, and Thingangyun...."
Source/publisher:
World Health Organization (Geneva) via Reliefweb (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-16
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"This independent update, covering humanitarian developments up to 15 August, is produced by OCHA Myanmar under its global mandate, in collaboration with the Inter-Cluster Coordination Group and UN agencies. Response figures are based on self-reporting by organizations to clusters. The next humanitarian update will be issued in September 2024.
HIGHLIGHTS & KEY MESSAGES
• Persisting conflict is widespread across the country with a deteriorating situation in northern Shan, Mandalay Region and Rakhine State, driving new displacement.
• Since the end of June, torrential monsoon rains and overflow of various rivers have submerged several states and regions, exacerbating already severe humanitarian needs and affecting an estimated 393,000 people.
• Countrywide, an estimated 3 million people are internally displaced, with many of the newly displaced living without proper shelter amid the monsoon season.
• Conflict continues to intensify in Rakhine State, with a surge in casualties and displacement in Maungdaw Township and reports of increasing people crossing into Bangladesh.
• In northern Shan, a resurgence of fighting since late June, including the reported capture of Lashio, has displaced an estimated 33,000 people from four townships, with civilian casualties and the destruction of numerous homes and structures.
• In Mandalay Region, an escalation of conflict has forced thousands of people to flee their homes from townships north of Mandalay City.
• Humanitarians are working to deliver assistance amid formidable challenges, with increasing violence, restrictions imposed by parties to the conflict, disruptions in telecommunications and internet services, and severe underfunding.
• During the first half of 2024, 2.1 million people were reached with some type of humanitarian assistance across the country out of 5.3 million people targeted, including 1.2 million internally displaced persons (IDPs).
• Eight months into the year, the 2024 Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan (HNRP) remains critically underfunded, with only 21.1 per cent of required funding received, according to the Financial Tracking Service. More resources are urgently needed to enable humanitarian partners to respond at-scale to expanding needs...."
Source/publisher:
UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (New York) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-16
[field_licence]
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"WEEKLY HIGHLIGHTS:
In the South-East, the number of internally displaced people (IDPs) increased from 923,700 last week to 925,700 this week. The intensity of the conflict in Shan State (North) keeps on pressuring Shan State (South) to host more displaced people – over 900 people left Lashio Township towards Kyethi Township. In parallel, clashes in the southernmost part of the state, bordering Kayah State, also forced almost 1,500 IDPs to a second displacement withing Pinlaung Township. In Mon State, the indicrimintate shelling resulted in over 1,000 newly displaced in Kyaikto Township, apart from over 500 IDPs in second displacement in both Kyaikto and Shwegyin Townships..."
Source/publisher:
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (Geneva) via Reliefweb (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-16
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
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UNHCR (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees), Human Rights and international relations, Burma: Internal displacement/forced migration of several ethnic groups.
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"Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi warned Myanmar junta boss Min Aung Hlaing on Wednesday that Beijing would not accept comments intended to harm bilateral ties or “smear” China, according to a statement released by the Chinese Embassy in Myanmar after the two met in Naypyitaw.
“China opposes any remarks that attempt to sow discord in China-Myanmar relations or smear and vilify China,” Wang said at the meeting, according to the embassy. The meeting followed a recent televised address by Min Aung Hlaing in which he lamented foreign intervention in the fighting in northern Shan State near the Chinese border, without naming a particular country.
Wang visited Myanmar on Wednesday before traveling to Thailand to co-chair the ninth Lancang-Mekong Cooperation Foreign Ministers’ Meeting.
China’s top diplomat did not bother to meet the junta boss when he attended the 7th edition of the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Bagan, Mandalay Region in 2022.
Beijing apparently thought it should deliver an in-person warning to the junta boss after Min Aung Hlaing repeatedly implied that China is behind the anti-regime military operations in northern Shan State.
In November last year, after the Brotherhood Alliance of three ethnic armies launched a major offensive against the regime in northern Shan State, Min Aung Hlaing alleged anti-regime groups were using China-made drones to bomb junta positions there, and said foreign technicians were assisting the groups.
Following that outburst, junta-backed nationalists staged anti-Beijing protests in downtown Yangon and outside the Chinese Embassy in the city.
After the Myanmar military’s Northeastern Command fell to ethnic and resistance forces earlier this month during the second phase of the offensive, the junta boss claimed in the televised speech that certain foreign countries were funding the anti-regime armed groups, though he did not name China specifically.
He claimed ordnance factories built in territory controlled by ethnic armed organizations on the China-Myanmar border were selling weapons to anti-regime groups, and alleged that weapons seized from People’s Defense Force resistance groups had been traced to those factories.
Certain foreign countries were supplying anti-regime groups with food, pharmaceuticals, arms, technology and administrative aid to prolong conflicts in Myanmar, Min Aung Hlaing said in the speech.
Military sympathizers then organized rallies against the Brotherhood Alliance. The protesters saluted Myanmar’s flag, raised banners reading “Victory in the just war”, and sang the national anthem and patriotic songs as they attempted to portray the war in northern Myanmar as a foreign invasion.
Pro-junta Telegram channels have also alleged that Chinese mercenaries are involved in the fighting.
Chinese special envoy to Myanmar Deng Xijun met with Min Aung Hlaing in Naypyitaw on the heels of those protests.
During the meeting with Min Aung Hlaing on Wednesday, Wang said “China firmly supports Myanmar in maintaining its independence, sovereignty, national unity, and territorial integrity,” according to the Chinese Embassy.
It said Wang also expressed China’s support for what he characterized as the junta’s efforts to restore peace and stability in Myanmar and restore the democratic transition process.
In their coverage of the meeting, junta-controlled media claimed Wang stressed China’s opposition to attacks by ethnic armed organizations in northern Shan State. However, both Xinhua and the Chinese Embassy quoted Wang as saying simply that “China opposes chaos or conflict in Myanmar.”
The junta-controlled media also failed to report Wang’s statement that “China opposes external forces interfering in Myanmar’s internal affairs, and opposes any remarks that attempt to sow discord in China-Myanmar relations or smear and vilify China.”
They also ignored a warning delivered by Wang to the regime to ensure the effective operation of the China-Myanmar oil and gas pipeline project, as well as the safety of the project and its employees.
A photo of the meeting published by junta media drew mockery online, with critics pointing out that the regime boss essentially treated the Chinese foreign minister as his equal—despite recently assuming the title of acting president of Myanmar—by sitting side-by-side with Wang before the Palin (throne), the symbol of Myanmar’s sovereignty..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-15
[field_licence]
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"Source: UN High Commissioner for Refugees.....Format: Map.....Theme: Protection and Human Rights..."
Source/publisher:
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (Geneva) via Reliefweb (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-15
[field_licence]
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Individual Documents
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UNHCR (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees), Human Rights and international relations, Burma: Internal displacement/forced migration of several ethnic groups.
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"Introduction:
Myanmar, a nation rich in natural resources and biodiversity, continues to confront unprecedented challenges due to ongoing political turmoil since 1962, intensified by the recent chaos beginning in 2021, which has thrown the country and its citizens into deep uncertainty. On the other hand, Myanmar is one of the world’s most disaster-prone countries, susceptible to multiple hazards such as floods, droughts, strong winds, cyclones, tsunamis, earthquakes, landslides, fires, and industrial/technological incidents. Additional localised disasters have occurred in recent years, including lightning strikes and riverbank erosion. The country’s geographical location makes it particularly vulnerable to these multiple hazards, with existing poverty and inadequate infrastructure further amplifying its susceptibility to natural calamities.
Amidst the political crisis, promoting sustainability literacy has become essential for safeguarding the environment and empowering citizens. Myanmar’s numerous natural disasters will likely persist regardless of the political situation. This is further evidenced by the recent, June 2024 flood in Myanmar, which began in areas controlled by ethnic armed groups and has since spread to regions under Myanmar military control.
The Current Landscape
Since the political instability in February 2021, the State Administration Council (SAC) seized power, implementing numerous new laws and governance guidelines. Consequently, the SAC imposed censorship on major social media platforms such as Facebook, X (formerly Twitter), Instagram, and WhatsApp, citing political turbulence as the reason. This was a significant setback for Myanmar netizens, as Facebook had been the most popular and versatile platform, widely used for personal communication, online marketing, SMEs, and major business advertising. Despite the censorship, many tech-savvy youths and adults continue to access these social media platforms using virtual private networks (VPNs). However, the number of users has significantly decreased, particularly among those who are not as comfortable with technology. In addition, the instability in the banking sector, fuelled by widespread rumours, led to a banking crisis where most users withdrew their savings in cash in concern of bankruptcy.
Due to the overall political unrest, many international funding agencies and nongovernmental organizations have withdrawn most of their development projects in Myanmar, while some, including the UN agencies, have scaled down their activities to focus solely on humanitarian aid. The political turmoil also triggered a mass exodus of youths from major cities to areas controlled by ethnic armed groups, where they began armed resistance against the SAC government. Concurrently, many Burmese academics and professionals fled to neighbouring countries and various locations worldwide for their survival. This dramatic shift created a significant knowledge gap between the youths remaining in Myanmar and the Burmese professionals who have established themselves at intermediate and senior levels in their respective fields. Furthermore, the ongoing civil war between ethnic armed groups and the SAC has fragmented the country into multiple zones with different administrations, severely restricting freedom of movement across regions.
Edu4SD Project
In response, the Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre (SRIc) is dedicated to enhancing the sustainability literacy of the youth, targeting this demographic as a primary group for fostering long-term change. SRIc leverages the power of information technology, social media, and various other platforms to effectively disseminate knowledge and promote sustainable practices, despite some youths facing challenges in accessing the internet. By organising initiatives and creating a platform that connects Burmese young professionals worldwide with the underprivileged youth in Myanmar under the Edu4SD project. As part of its initiative to target the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), especially under the scope of Sustainability Literacy, SRIc is offering invaluable knowledge and guidance to individuals dealing with daily uncertainties. By doing so, SRIc empowers them to navigate and tackle the complex challenges they encounter, fostering their sustainability literacy, resilience and sustainable development in their communities.
Edu4SD Approach
With the voluntary support and collaboration of Burmese and non-Burmese professionals worldwide, SRIc is organising monthly webinars with the “Sabai Webinar Series”, covering a diverse range of sustainability topics. These topics include such as waste management, youth and women-led sustainable development, sustainability finance, and sustainability diplomacy. Additionally, SRIc manages the weekly publication of the Guest Opinion Corner at SRIc – The Sabai Times by accepting articles from both professional and young sustainability enthusiasts. This platform invites contributors to write opinion pieces related to sustainable development themes, addressing any of the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). These initiatives enable Burmese professionals across the globe to share their visions, experiences, and expertise with underprivileged Burmese youth in both their native language and English.
Due to internet censorship concerns, these webinars are initially hosted on the Microsoft Teams platform and recorded. The recordings are then uploaded to the SRIc YouTube channel and Zenodo, a general-purpose open repository developed under the European OpenAIRE Consortium, a Horizon 2020 project, and operated by the European Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN), for reference. To further expand accessibility and reach, audio recordings are also made available as podcasts on the SRIc website, Apple Podcasts for iOS users, and Spotify for Android users. Meanwhile, opinion articles are published on the SRIc website and the Medium platform. This multi-platform approach ensures that our content is widely accessible and impactful.
In addition, to maximise awareness and engagement, we extensively share announcements about these webinars and published articles, along with infographics and videos highlighting key points from the sessions, across a variety of social media channels. These include Facebook, LinkedIn, YouTube, Instagram, Telegram, and TikTok, ensuring that the information reaches a broad and diverse audience. By leveraging these platforms, we aim to engage users who prefer different types of media and social networks, thereby enhancing the overall visibility and impact of our sustainability initiatives. Notably, YouTube, Telegram, and TikTok are not subject to censorship, providing us with uncensored channels to disseminate our content effectively.
Edu4SD Progress
Since the launch of the Edu4SD project in January 2023, SRIc has successfully organised 14 monthly webinars and published 8 infographics and 5 educational videos. These achievements were made possible through the collaboration of 26 professionals from various fields of sustainability. Among the speakers, 50% were based outside of Myanmar, with 23% hailing from Asian countries, 23% from European countries, 4% from the United States, and the remaining 50% from Myanmar. In terms of gender diversity, 58% of the speakers were female, and 42% were male.
In the Guest Opinion Corner at SRIc – The Sabai Times, we have broadened our scope to include voices traditionally marginalised in Burmese-led initiatives, such as Rohingya refugees. These contributions have provided unique perspectives and enriched our discourse on sustainability. By actively seeking and accepting articles from ethnic writers, we aim to create an inclusive platform that amplifies diverse voices and fosters dialogue on critical issues. This initiative not only empowers the ethnic communities to share their insights and experiences but also challenges existing narratives and encourages broader engagement with the complexities of sustainable development in the region. Through this effort, we are committed to promoting inclusivity and diversity in our discussions and ensuring that the voices of those often overlooked are heard and valued.
Over 10 months (Nov 2023 to July 2023), the Sabai Webinar Series successfully drew nearly 450 attendees (direct beneficiaries) from across Myanmar’s 14 states and regions and from Burmese communities living abroad. Each webinar averaged an impressive 31 registrations, reflecting strong and consistent interest. Among the regions, Yangon, Myanmar’s largest city, led with the highest number of participants, with attendance numbers tripling those of Mandalay, the country’s second capital, ranked as having the second highest participation. Interestingly, attendees from outside Myanmar ranked third in participation, underscoring the webinar series’ broad reach and impact across borders. Given Myanmar’s current challenges, such as limited electricity and internet access, the recorded sessions available on the SRIc YouTube channel have been particularly valuable, amassing more than 3000 views (indirect beneficiaries). Despite the difficult circumstances, this highlights the significant interest and engagement in the sustainability-focused discussions facilitated by the webinar series.
The demographic breakdown of the attendees is noteworthy highlighting strong female participation at 58, while 41% were male, reflecting a diverse audience. The age distribution of the attendees further underscores the inclusive nature of the series, with 44% of participants falling within the 26-35 age group, 35% within the 18-25 range, 17% in the 36-45 bracket, and 5% being 46 years or older. This diverse mix of participants from various age groups and gender identities demonstrates the broad appeal and relevance of the Sabai Webinar Series in addressing critical sustainability issues.
Conclusion
In Myanmar, virtual engagement is the only solution capable of reaching all parts of the country during these challenging times. However, there are significant limitations regarding internet access and electricity availability, particularly during summer. This is evidenced by data from the Sabai webinar series, which showed a slight decline in registrations in February, March, and April when electricity was severely limited in Myanmar. Additionally, attendance numbers were significantly low in Kayah and Chin states, where intense conflict persists between the Myanmar military and ethnic armed groups. Interestingly, the number of female attendees was considerably higher than that of males, surpassing the gender ratio typical in Myanmar. This discrepancy may be due to the ongoing conflict, with men either being forcibly recruited or voluntarily participating on both sides. Despite the challenges posed by political instability, SRIc remains committed to fostering sustainability literacy and empowering Myanmar’s citizens to create positive change. Notably, more than 75% of attendees were younger than 35, indicating the impact of the Edu4SD project, which primarily aims to enhance sustainability literacy among the younger generation aligned with the SRIc’s motto “Advocating Sustainability, Shaping Our Future”..."
Source/publisher:
"Eurasia Review"
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-15
[field_licence]
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Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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"Highlights
In the first half of 2024, widespread conflict continued to drive displacement, further exacerbating humanitarian needs in multiple states and regions in Myanmar.
Seasonal flooding and increased cases of acute watery diarrhea (AWD) have worsened pre-existing vulnerabilities, particularly for children and women.
Against this backdrop, nearly 230,000 people were provided with life-saving WASH supplies and services. Among them, 163,210 people (including displaced and conflict affected people) received clean drinking water.
The funding gap of 88 per cent against the Humanitarian Action for Children (HAC) Appeal impacts UNICEF’s capacity to deliver life-saving assistance to millions of children and their families. In the current volatile context, with deepening needs and surging displacement, flexible, predictable, sufficient and timely funding is even more critical.
Situation Overview & Humanitarian Needs
The humanitarian situation in Myanmar is dire and continues to deteriorate as fighting escalates across the country.
More than 3.2 million people have been displaced, including about 600,000 displaced within first half of 2024 (compared to the 345,000 displaced in the first half of 2023). One third of the population – 18.6 million people – including six million children, are in need of humanitarian assistance.
Escalating attacks and clashes have displaced more than 1.2 million people in Sagaing Region, more than 775,000 people in the south-east, and more than 300,000 people in Rakhine state.
About 40 per cent of all displaced people are children. Food insecurity is on the rise, with 13.3 million people, almost a quarter of the population, estimated to be facing high acute food insecurity (phase 3 or above) with 2.7 million in phase 4.4 More than one million children under the age of five have missed basic immunization in recent years and are at greater risk of catching vaccine preventable diseases, while 5.6 million people require urgent access to WASH services.
Children are bearing the heaviest burden of unabating violence, grave violations, mass displacement and the near collapse of critical health and education systems. It is reported that forced recruitment, the enforcement of conscription law, and telecommunication blockages in some conflict and disaster-affected areas impacted the availability and capacity of humanitarian partners. Access restrictions and funding shortages are major barriers to the delivery of life-saving assistance to millions of conflict-affected children and their families..."
Source/publisher:
UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) (Myanmar) via Reliefweb (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-15
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
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UNICEF (United Nations Children's Fund), Education in Burma/Myanmar - general, Food Security and nutrition in Burma/Myanmar, Human Rights and international relations
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"Source: Myanmar Peace Monitor.....Format: Infographic.....Theme: Protection and Human Rights..."
Source/publisher:
Myanmar Peace Monitor via Reliefweb (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-14
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
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"Yangon, Myanmar —
Myanmar's military on Wednesday said rumors top generals had detained the embattled junta chief in a new coup were "propaganda" spread by "traitors" ahead of a visit by China's foreign minister.
Junta chief Min Aung Hlaing has faced public criticism from military supporters in recent weeks as government troops lose territory to ethnic minority armed groups and other opponents battling to overturn its 2021 coup.
On Tuesday several social media posts claimed that top generals had detained Min Aung Hlaing in the capital Naypyidaw in a bid to change the junta's top leadership.
The claims were "propaganda... with the aim of disrupting the country's peace and stability," the junta said in a statement, accusing those sharing the news of being "traitors."
"The head of state and authorities are fulfilling their national responsibility together," it said.
Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi is due to arrive in Myanmar on Wednesday for talks with Min Aung Hlaing.
The visit is "aimed at deepening bilateral mutually beneficial cooperation in various fields," an unnamed Chinese foreign ministry spokesman said on Tuesday.
China is a major ally and arms supplier to the junta but analysts say it also maintains ties with ethnic armed groups that hold territory near its border.
In recent weeks an alliance of ethnic armed groups has seized territory from the junta in northern Shan state, which borders China's Yunnan province.
Territory captured includes the military's northeastern command in the Shan state town of Lashio, home to about 150,000 people.
The capture of the regional command, the first by opponents of the junta since the military's 2021 coup, sparked rare public criticism of the top generals by its supporters.
Min Aung Hlaing later said the alliance was receiving weapons, including drones and short-range missiles, from "foreign" sources that he did not identify.
The last top Chinese official to visit the isolated junta was former foreign minister Qin Gang, who held talks with Min Aung Hlaing in May last year.
According to a senior Myanmar military official Wang Yi will not meet Myanmar democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi, who has been detained by the military since it seized power..."
Source/publisher:
"Voice of America" (Washington, D.C)
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-14
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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"The resistance’s capture of the northern city of Lashio on August 3 marks a watershed moment in Myanmar’s conflict. After a month of fierce fighting, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army and allied resistance forces captured this crucial stronghold in northern Shan State, dealing a severe blow to the beleaguered junta. This represents more than just the loss of a major city. It is the first time that a military regional command has been captured by resistance forces.
Even more, the prestigious Northeastern Regional Military Command (NERMC) is widely regarded as the strongest among the military’s 14 regional commands. The loss is another major setback that has provoked frustration within the military’s inner circles and among its key internal supporters.
Although the fall of Lashio and capture of the NERMC is historic, it is also the continuation of a sustained trend of resistance gains.
Despite possessing superior aerial power and weaponry, Myanmar’s military, known as the Sit-Tat, has deteriorated into just another of the many armed groups operating in the country, rather than a dominant national army. As the resistance continues its assault on junta forces across the country, it has only deepened its steadfast resolve to remove the Myanmar military from power and achieve a new political paradigm no longer dominated by the military.
Failed Cease-fire
In late 2023, resistance forces launched a coordinated assault on the junta, dubbed Operation 1027, which was centered on northern Shan State but replicated in conflict theaters across the country. When fighting in northern Shan State was interrupted in January 2024 by a China-brokered cease-fire, many analysts and diplomats concluded that the conflict in Myanmar had reached a stalemate. Some expected that the regime would concede its losses in ethnic areas and consolidate control in central Myanmar. They predicted that this would motivate ethnic-armed organizations (EAOs) to withdraw from the broader fight and focus on consolidating their gains in newly won areas.
Myanmar’s military has deteriorated into just another of the many armed groups operating in the country, rather than a dominant national army.
This view assumes that the warring parties would be content with a power-sharing arrangement – EAOs maintaining their respective territories while the Myanmar military controls the center. Some analysts even suggested that the regime could “win” by holding urban areas and outlasting the fractious resistance. These assumptions tend to misunderstand the objectives of the conflict’s key actors and the dominant trend of the war.
Despite repeated claims that the junta would soon realize its losses and withdraw to the center, it has not. And it will not. The Myanmar military is committed to its self-appointed role as the nation's guardian, driven by a deep-seated delusion of its own indispensability. This ideological commitment is reinforced by the practical need to hold territory for resource extraction (particularly as foreign exchange dwindles), to tax border trade and to manage the complex logistics of a multi-front war.
Furthermore, the Sit-Tat overestimates its own fighting capability, underestimates the capacity of its adversary and expects the international community to shift power in its direction through cease-fires and political dialogue. For these reasons, among others, it will not concede territorial losses and is unlikely to accept a position as anything other than the dominant player in Myanmar.
As illustrated by statements from the leaders of resistance forces — such as the Karenni, Kokang, Three Brotherhood Alliance (3BHA), Kachin and Ta’ang — many ethnic minority stakeholders understand that the Myanmar military is a threat to their communities as long as it is in a position of power. Even where it is incapable of capturing and occupying resistance-held territory, the military deploys heavy artillery and air power to terrorize the public. This is playing out in Laukkai today, but can also be seen in other parts of the country like Minbya in Rakhine State, Camp Victoria in Chin State, and Laiza in Kachin State. These leaders also recognize this as an historic opportunity to eliminate or greatly weaken this threat. Some EAOs only recently joined the fight as this opportunity became clear to them.
Primarily for these two reasons, resistance groups continue to pursue their goal of removing the Myanmar military from power. There is little that internationals can do, at this point, to derail resistance groups who see this as an historic chance to eliminate Myanmar’s primary agent of instability and suffering.
Shan-Man(dalay) Operation
Whereas phase 1 of Operation 1027 focused primarily on northern Shan State, during phase 2, the anti-junta resistance forces have set their sights on Mandalay — marking a new phase of the war and challenging the junta head on in Myanmar’s second largest city. Before launching the second wave of Operation 1027, leaders from the 3BHA and the National Unity Government (NUG) convened in a secret location in northern Shan State to coordinate the attack. Contrary to some reports claiming the NUG was not involved in 1027, the coordination around phase 2 mirrors the dynamics of phase 1, in which the NUG and 3BHA worked closely together to prepare for a new wave of conflict.
The anti-junta resistance forces have set their sights on Mandalay, marking a new phase of the war and challenging the junta head on in Myanmar’s second largest city.
On June 24, the T’ang National Liberation Army, joined by the Mandalay People’s Defense Forces and other people’s defense groups, launched offensives in Kyaukme. This was followed by a Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) attack on Lashio on July 5. Within days, resistance groups launched offensives on Nawnghkio and Mongmit in northern Shan State and Madaya, Singu, Mogoke, and Tabeikkyin in the Mandalay region. This new wave of operations was dubbed “Operation 1027 Phase 2” and “Shan-Man Operation,” referencing its targets in northern Shan State and Mandalay.
The resumption of hostilities in northern Shan State and new fighting in Mandalay further stretched the beleaguered military, which was losing ground in Rakhine and Kachin states, and facing sustained pressure in Karenni, Karen, Chin, Tanintharyi, Sagaing, Bago and Magway. Resistance forces fought with greater intensity than phase 1 and made more rapid advances. This is partly a result of the resistance’s greater military coordination and weaponry, but also because of the low morale of Sit-Tat forces, many of whom surrendered without contest. Over the course of a month, the resistance forces have succeeded in controlling six townships, including Lashio, home to the military’s NERMC.
The Most Intense Urban Fighting
The battle of Lashio featured the most intense urban fighting in Myanmar's civil war, with both sides engaging in conventional warfare on a scale not previously seen. The military, recognizing the strategic and symbolic importance of this regional command, fortified Lashio with extensive defenses and deployed heavy weaponry to prevent its fall.
Approximately 5,000 Sit-Tat soldiers were mobilized to defend Lashio, including troops from the NERMC, LID 99 and Military Operations Command 1, 14 and 16, along with artillery, tank, and armored vehicle battalions, and numerous support units. Additionally, the military reinforced its position with newly acquired advanced Chinese-built drones, which some believed could tilt the battle in favor of the Sit-Tat.
While the Sit-Tat utilized the cease-fire to prepare for an escalation of conflict, the MNDAA-led resistance forces also mobilized. They assembled about 6,000 troops for the battle for Lashio, drawn from its own forces, NUG-aligned people’s defense forces and other local defense forces. Beginning July 5, the resistance forces launched attacks on Lashio from five positions around the city. They gradually broke through the military's defensive lines and advanced toward the NERMC headquarters.
As the battle intensified, the involvement of other armed actors, such as the United Wa State Army (UWSA) and its ally, the Shan State Army-North (SSA-N), complicated the situation. While the regime struggled to contain the resistance’s advance, it sent delegates to the UWSA headquarters in Pang Seng, hoping the UWSA would intervene to halt the MNDAA’s offensive.
On July 12, the UWSA deployed 2,000 troops to Tangyan Township, east of Lashio, while the SSA-N sent forces to Mongyai, approximately 40 miles from Lashio. Both groups announced that the troops movements were to prevent the conflict from spilling over into their areas. The regime did not impede these movements, possibly hoping intra-EAO competition over territorial control might undermine the assault on Lashio.
To head off attempts by other EAOs to involve themselves in the late stages of capturing Lashio, the MNDAA announced on July 25 that the city had been liberated from military control. They claimed to have established administration of the city even though fierce fighting continued.
Facing the impending loss of a crucial regional command, the regime made several attempts to persuade the UWSA leadership to intervene and disrupt the MNDAA-led offensives. On July 27, some UWSA troops entered Lashio, fueling speculation that the UWSA would support the junta’s aims. However, the UWSA announced that they entered Lashio to protect their liaison office and assist the relocation of some residents — not to engage in combat.
Twice during the battle, the MNDAA announced unilateral cease-fires, aiming to alleviate pressure from China. Despite these cease-fire declarations, intense fighting continued on the ground as MNDAA forces pressed forward to gain full control of Lashio. This highlights a broader trend in which resistance groups superficially respond to Chinese pressure without allowing it to divert them from their strategic goals.
Contrary to predictions of an inter-EAO conflict that would undermine the offensive, MNDAA-led forces advanced and successfully captured both Lashio and the NERMC on August 3.
Around 2,000 junta troops and approximately 500 resistance fighters were killed in the battle for Lashio. Additionally, 4,783 individuals, including 2,000 soldiers and their family members, surrendered (author’s estimates). Numerous high-ranking military officials, including one major general and two brigadier generals, were captured by the resistance. The regime’s miscalculation with the UWSA also cost it dearly. Instead of fragmenting the resistance, the UWSA deployed 2,000 troops across the Salween River into Tangyan and took control of the town without firing a shot.
Moving Beyond the Old Paradigm
The battle of Lashio has had far-reaching effects on the trajectory of Myanmar's conflict. It has further demoralized the military and bolstered the morale and confidence of the resistance forces, which are now preparing to advance into central Myanmar.
Resistance control of northern Shan State and the surrounding areas also provides a valuable base of operations for resistance forces planning to escalate their offensives into Mandalay and Sagaing. Stabilized by this base, the resistance is preparing attacks on Madaya and Pyinoolwin, which will open direct paths to Mandalay.
Establishing a base in weapons-rich northern Shan State also helped achieve the objective of opening a weapons supply route to forces in Sagaing, Magwe, Chin and Rakhine. Since taking control of northern Shan State, resistance forces have initiated attacks on Thabeikkyin, a strategic junction linking northern Shan State, Sagaing and Mandalay, and are seeking to establish a corridor between resistance-controlled areas on the east bank of the Ayeyarwady River and Shwebo valley in Sagaing on the west bank. Linking northern Shan State and central Myanmar would be a boon to the over 50,000 resistance troops there who have struggled to expel junta forces from the open plains of Sagaing and Magwe partly because of their rudimentary weaponry.
Currently, the resistance forces appear to be planning a multi-pronged advance on Mandalay from Pyinoolwin, Madaya and Sagaing. To encircle Mandalay, operations in Myingyan and Ngatogyi to the west have intensified significantly. The resistance's push toward Mandalay is likely to be its most challenging and costly undertaking to date. The regime is expected to mount its strongest defenses, viewing the battle for Mandalay as existential. If the resistance manages to secure control over Mandalay, it would signify a dramatic new conflict landscape.
Looking Forward
Although some argued before the fall of Lashio that the military is beginning to “regroup”, the Sit-Tat is, in fact, at its weakest point in modern history and showing no signs of regrouping. In addition to its historic losses in northern Shan State, the Myanmar military faces resistance offensives in Mandalay, Rakhine, Chin, Karen, Bago, Sagaing, Magway, Tanintharyi, Karenni and Kachin.
Within four months of offensives in Kachin State, the Kachin Independence Army has captured over 200 military positions, including several strategically significant bases and nine towns. In Karen State, the junta deployed its largest operation to date, named Aung Zeya, with 3,000 troops aimed to retake Myawaddy in Karen State. The offensive faced stiff resistance defenses in the Dawna hills and has been forced to retreat — never coming close to retaking Myawaddy. Meanwhile, the Arakan Army has achieved near-total control of northern Rakhine State and is steadily advancing toward full control of the entire region.
Plagued by low morale, poor fighting capabilities, inept leadership, public hatred and internal discontent, there are few scenarios in which the military could recover. Over the past three years, the military has deteriorated from a national army, capable of controlling the country through fear and force, into just one of many armed groups in Myanmar.
The resistance movement recognizes this as an historic opportunity to remove the military from power and achieve a new political order.
Although the conflict landscape in Myanmar is complex, two things are clear: (1) the conflict has consistently moved in a single direction that favors the resistance, and the Myanmar military lacks the capacity to alter its course; and (2) the resistance movement recognizes this as an historic opportunity to remove the military from power and achieve a new political order that is not dominated by the military, and it is unlikely to be diverted from that objective.
Ultimately, it may not matter much if the international community understands these facts — the war will be decided by those inside Myanmar — but international efforts that prolong the life of the military, by providing direct assistance, encouraging power-sharing negotiation, or otherwise, only increase civilian suffering. It would help if the international community would support the people’s will to remove the genocidal dictatorship from power..."
Source/publisher:
United States Institute of Peace
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-14
[field_licence]
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Individual Documents
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Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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"Unlike the Chinese, who have close dealings with the State Administration Council (SAC) while maintaining a certain distance from the generals so as not to further antagonize public opinion in Myanmar, the Russians have without hesitation thrown in their entire lot with the coupmakers in Naypyitaw. China has yet to invite the SAC leader, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, but he has visited Moscow on several occasions and met Russian dictator Vladimir Putin in Vladivostok in September 2022. Russia has sold helicopter gunships, jet fighters, armored vehicles, artillery and other military equipment to Myanmar, and thousands of Myanmar cadets have undergone training in Russia, while Russian military dignitaries in full uniform have attended March 27 Armed Forces celebrations in Naypyitaw.
More controversially, Russian military technicians are helping the Myanmar Air Force maintain its Russian-supplied aircraft, and, according to on-the-ground eyewitnesses, some are even assisting the Myanmar army in its drone warfare in Rakhine State, which may be the case in other warzones as well.
On the day before the Feb. 1, 2021 coup, a group of Russians and Myanmar colleagues were having a party in Yangon, where the vodka flowed freely. They were reportedly celebrating the opening of a military high-tech multimedia complex in which some of Min Aung Hlaing’s children had financial interests. It goes without saying that they also toasted the coup that was going to be launched the following day.
There is every reason for Beijing to play its cards carefully; it has vital, long-term geostrategic interests in Myanmar, the only neighboring country that provides China with direct access to the Indian Ocean. The Russians, on the other hand, have other concerns. Their friendship with Myanmar’s military should be understood first and foremost in the context of Putin’s vision of “making Russia great again.” Having lost its superpower status after the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union and the chaotic Boris Yeltsin years that ensued—and seen its once strong influence in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia and close relationship with India diminish—the Kremlin leadership has found a new friend in Myanmar, whose generals have become its most trusted and faithful allies in Asia. As The Irrawaddy reported on June 26, 2021: “Min Aung Hlaing lauded Russia as Myanmar’s ‘friend forever’…[while] our neighboring China and India are our close friends.”
Key arms supplier
Wary of becoming too dependent on Myanmar’s powerful northern neighbor for military supplies, Naypyitaw has turned increasingly to Russia, which since the 2021 coup has displaced China as the country’s largest provider of defense-related material. According to a Nov. 21, 2023 research paper titled “Myanmar-Russia Relations Since the Coup: An Even Tighter Embrace” and written by Ian Storey for the Yusof Ishak Institute in Singapore, Russia provided Myanmar’s military with US$276 million worth of supplies between 2021 and 2022, compared to armaments valued at $156 million from China. A UN report states that Russian entities during the same period transferred US$406 million in defense supplies to Myanmar, with China at second place at US$267 million.
Significantly, the Myanmar military remains one of very few outside entities which has all along supported the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and is the only member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations to do so. On Feb. 27, 2022, Myanmar Alin, the Burmese-language version of the Global New Light of Myanmar, published a two-page commentary titled “Lessons from Ukraine for those who haven’t learned from history” by a writer using the pseudonym “Myint Myat”. The article referred to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky as a “puppet of the West”, while Putin was praised as a “visionary leader” who had had the “foresight to quietly build up his country’s military and economic strength.”
But there is an economic dimension to the partnership as well. Apart from Myanmar’s becoming a lucrative market for the Russian war industry, Russia has also shown interest in oil and gas exploration as well as mining in Myanmar. Playing “religious diplomacy,” one of the first Russian companies that became involved in Myanmar was one from Kalmykia, a Buddhist, autonomous republic in the European part of the Russian Federation. Russian website Kommersant carried an article on March 20, 2007 reporting that Kalmykia’s Kalmneftegaz “wins Myanmar’s Crude, Gas Tender on Religious Fellowship.” In another development, The New Light of Myanmar (before it became “The Global New Light”) reported on Feb. 16, 2008 that Myanmar’s Geological Survey and Mineral Exploration Department and a Russian company, Victorious Glory International, had signed a deal for exploration for “gold and associated minerals” in an area along the Uru River between Hpakant in Kachin State and Homalin in Sagaing Region. The newspaper gave no further details, but the Homalin area in the upper Chindwin River basin is known for its deposits of gold, while Hpakant is world-famous for its jade.
It is uncertain what became of those ventures and, given the fierce fighting that has broken out in precisely those regions since Min Aung Hlaing’s ill-fated 2021 coup, it is likely that they have been put on hold. Instead, it is Russia that has provided Myanmar with energy supplies. According to Storey: “Between March and June 2023, Russian oil exports to Myanmar jumped from almost nothing to 836 million barrels of oil.” A portion of that oil, the report states, “is likely to have been jet fuel for use by MAF (Myanmar Air Force) aircraft to conduct air strikes.” However, the research paper states, “not all Russian oil shipped to Myanmar is for domestic consumption. According to Energy Intelligence, from February 2023 Russia began delivering an estimated 70,000 barrels of oil per day to China using a Chinese-funded oil pipeline from the port of Kyaukphyu in Myanmar to Kunming in Yunnan Province.”
In August this year, Khin Yi, the chairman of the military’s own political outfit, the Union Solidarity and Development Party, said in an interview with the Russian news agency Sputnik: “The main support we would like is for Russia to work together with us in the fight against terrorism. To do this, we must first realize that what is happening [in Myanmar] must be perceived not as internal political squabbles, but as terrorism. If you recognize this as terrorism, then your departments and agencies that are engaged in the fight against terrorism can join us and together achieve our goals.” In effect, he asked for Russian intervention in Myanmar’s civil wars, which would violate even the Myanmar army-drafted 2008 constitution. Its Section 42 (b) stipulates that no foreign troops can be deployed in Myanmar. But, in a sense, that is already happening with Russian technicians working together with the Myanmar military in the maintenance of Russian-supplied jet fighters and helicopter gunships as well as in drone warfare. And in November 2023, the first Myanmar-Russia Maritime Security Exercise (MARUMEX) was held in the seas west of Myeik, Tanintharyi Region, involving ships and aircraft from both countries and focusing on the “prevention of air, water surface and underwater dangers and maritime security measures”, according to Myanmar’s military-controlled state media.
In the less lethal field, Russian Ambassador to Myanmar Iskander Azizov met the number two in the SAC, Vice Senior General Soe Win, in July to discuss the progress of Myanmar’s special economic zones and power projects. Russia is, reportedly, interested in investing in the deep-sea port at Tanintharyi’s Dawei in the southeast and, somewhat ironically given the volatile domestic situation in Myanmar, tourism in, among other areas, the beaches in Rakhine State.
Nuclear partnership
Russia and Myanmar have also agreed to cooperate in the field of nuclear power. In October 2023, Rosatom Director General Alexei Likhachev and the junta’s Science and Technology Minister Myo Thein Kyaw signed a memorandum of understanding which, according to Russian sources, “determines that the development of nuclear infrastructure will be carried out in accordance with the IAEA approaches and recommendations as well as Rosatom’s best practices.” (Rosatom is a Russian state corporation specializing in nuclear energy, while the IAEA, the International Atomic Energy Agency, is a global intergovernmental nuclear energy watchdog.) The memorandum also provides for training of Myanmar scientists and “human resources development and enhancement of safety culture in the organizations participating in the nuclear energy development program.” And then, in June this year, Moscow approved what Nuclear Engineering International, a monthly magazine published in the United Kingdom, called “a draft agreement on the basic principles of cooperation in the construction of a low-power nuclear power plant in Myanmar.” That seems to be the latest development in the long saga of nuclear cooperation between Russia and Myanmar, and it remains to be seen if it will ever materialize.
The Kremlin seems to believe that absolute military rule is there to stay in Naypyitaw and that Myanmar is not, as many independent analysts fear, on the verge of becoming a failed state. Russians have been spotted at several military bases and institutions in Myanmar, including Pyin Oo Lwin, the home of the Defense Services Academy and the Defense Services Technological Academy. But they may have been evacuated recently along with Myanmar personnel because of the fighting that is raging to the north and east of Pyin Oo Lwin. According to unconfirmed reports, however, seemingly optimistic Russian entities are still interested in mineral exploration in Myanmar’s more remote regions. Exactly what they are doing is not clear, but what can be said with certainty is that the SAC’s minister for natural resources and environmental conservation, Khin Maung Yi, received a Russian delegation headed by Anatoly Bulochnikov, senior vice-president of the Russia-Myanmar Association of Friendship and Cooperation, in Naypyitaw on June 28 last year. According to local media reports, they discussed development of the mineral sector and Russian technological assistance to Myanmar in mineral exploration. Furthermore, on Oct. 8 last year, a delegation from Fund RC Investments of Russia’s Roscongress Foundation also visited Naypyitaw, where they met SAC Energy Minister Ko Ko Lwin. The Russian guests reportedly pledged to provide technical assistance and investment for extracting natural gas trapped in coal deposits in Myanmar.
Even if military rule survives in one form or another, it seems shortsighted of the Russians to engage in such a close relationship with the junta—and for Myanmar generals to depend on Russia for business deals and military purchases. It is impossible under present circumstances to engage in any large-scale mineral exploration in Myanmar, and, even if Myanmar’s generals want to buy more military hardware from Russia, Moscow’s domestic needs for the war effort in Ukraine have made it harder for it to export weapons to any country, let alone a cash-strapped entity like the junta in Naypyitaw. But as long as the vodka flows, the friendship between the warmongers in Moscow and Naypyitaw seems solid. And there is precious little the outside world can do about it..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-14
[field_licence]
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Individual Documents
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Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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"BEIJING —
China's top diplomat Wang Yi will visit Myanmar and Thailand from Aug. 14 to 17, Beijing's foreign ministry said Tuesday.
"Wang Yi will visit Myanmar and travel to Thailand to co-chair the ninth Lancang-Mekong Cooperation Foreign Ministers' Meeting," foreign ministry spokesman Lin Jian said.
Wang will also attend an "informal discussion" between counterparts from Laos, Myanmar and Thailand, Lin said.
Last week, China's special envoy for Asian affairs met Myanmar's junta chief in the capital Naypyidaw for talks on "peace and stability" along their shared border, Myanmar state media said, days after ethnic rebels seized a regional military command.
Myanmar's northern Shan state has seen repeated clashes since late June after ethnic rebel groups renewed an offensive against the military along a vital trade highway to China.
Junta chief Min Aung Hlaing discussed "internal peace processes in Myanmar, peace and stability measures in the border region" with China's Deng Xijun, according to the Global New Light of Myanmar.
The senior general "explained the implementation of objectives and a five-point roadmap in order to ensure peace, stability," the state-run newspaper said.
China is a major ally and arms supplier to the junta, but analysts say it also maintains ties with armed ethnic groups in Myanmar that hold territory near its border.
An unnamed spokesman from China's foreign ministry on Tuesday said Wang's visit to Myanmar was "aimed at deepening bilateral mutually beneficial cooperation in various fields."
China supports "Myanmar's effort to uphold stability, grow the economy and improve people's livelihood," the spokesman added..."
Source/publisher:
"Agence France-Presse" (Paris) via "Voice of America" (Washington, D.C)
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-13
[field_licence]
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Individual Documents
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Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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"Geneva, 13 August 2024 – There is substantial evidence that brutal war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by the Myanmar military have escalated at an alarming rate across the country, according to information collected and analysed by the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar (Mechanism) and detailed in its Annual Report released today.
The Report focuses on the period 1 July 2023 to 30 June 2024 – a time when armed conflicts increased across Myanmar as the challenges to military rule intensified.
During this time, the Mechanism collected significant evidence of more intensive and violent war crimes, such as aerial attacks on schools, religious buildings and hospitals where there was no apparent military target, and physical mutilations against people detained during the armed conflicts, including beheadings and public displays of disfigured and sexually mutilated bodies.
“We have collected substantial evidence showing horrific levels of brutality and inhumanity across Myanmar. Many crimes have been committed with an intent to punish and induce terror in the civilian population,” said Nicholas Koumjian, Head of the Mechanism.
The Mechanism is also investigating the unlawful imprisonment, including arbitrary detention and manifestly unfair trials, of perceived opponents of the military junta. Thousands of people have been arrested and many tortured or killed in detention. There is abundant evidence of systematic torture, including severe physical and mental abuse such as beatings, electric shocks, strangulations and sleep deprivation. There is also evidence of gang rape, the burning of sexual body parts and other violent sexual and gender-based crimes committed in detention. The victims include people of all genders and ages, including children.
“No one has been held accountable for any crimes, which emboldens perpetrators and deepens the culture of impunity in the country. We are trying to break this cycle. I believe the Mechanism has made considerable progress in building criminal cases against those most responsible for these crimes,” said Koumjian.
The findings in the Report are based on information and evidence collected from more than 900 sources, including more than 400 eyewitness testimonies, and additional evidence such as photographs, videos, audio material, documents, maps, geospatial imagery, social media posts and forensic evidence.
While the vast majority of information collected by the Mechanism concerns crimes committed by the Myanmar security forces, there is also credible evidence of crimes committed by armed groups which are fighting against the military. This includes summary executions of civilians suspected of being military informers or collaborators.
While the Mechanism is working hard to investigate the high volume of crimes committed since the military takeover in February 2021, it also maintains its commitment to the investigation of earlier crimes committed against the Rohingya during the Myanmar military’s 2016 and 2017 clearance operations. In particular, the Mechanism has analysed the movements of military units, the resettlement practices and policies intended to attract the migration of non-Rohingya people to Rakhine State, and the quantities and qualities of weapons possessed by the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army at the time of the clearance operations.
The Mechanism has shared these analyses, along with a vast volume of evidence, with authorities working on ongoing cases concerning the Rohingya at the International Criminal Court, the International Court of Justice and in Argentina. The Mechanism is proactively sharing evidence that may be relevant to the proceedings and is also responding to targeted requests from these authorities for specific information and analysis.
The Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar (IIMM or Mechanism) was created by the United Nations Human Rights Council in 2018 to collect and analyse evidence of the most serious international crimes and other violations of international law committed in Myanmar since 2011. It aims to facilitate justice and accountability by preserving and organizing this evidence and preparing case files that can be used by authorities to prosecute individuals in national, regional and international courts..."
Source/publisher:
UN Human Rights Council (Geneva)
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-13
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, The UN and Burma - news and commentary, UN Human Rights pages on Myanmar
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251.1 KB 522.87 KB 525.81 KB 334.87 KB 446.85 KB 241.29 KB
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"Sources: CCCM Cluster, UN High Commissioner for Refugees.....Format:
Infographic..."
Source/publisher:
CCCM Cluster, UN High Commissioner for Refugees via Reliefweb (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-11
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Agriculture in Burma/Myanmar: general and research, Education in Burma/Myanmar - general, Food Security and nutrition in Burma/Myanmar, Human Rights and international relations
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pdf
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"Human Rights Violations took place in States and Regions from Aug 1 to 7, 2024
Military Junta Troop launched airstrikes and dropped bombs in Mandalay Region, Shan State, Chin State, and Rakhine State from August 1st to 7th. The Military Junta is making lists and arresting youths for batch 4th of Military Service in the Yangon and Ayeyarwady regions. The Military Junta arrested over 100 local civilians in Sagaing Region and Rakhine State.
Over 30 civilians died, and over 40 were injured by the Military’s heavy and light artillery attacks. 3 underaged children were injured when the Military Junta committed abuses..."
Source/publisher:
Network for Human Rights Documentation-Burma
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-11
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
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"What happened, where and when? The monsoon rains in Myanmar have led to severe flooding in multiple rivers and waterways throughout the country. The Myanmar Red Cross Society (MRCS) has been responding since the start of the floods in the northern part of the country on 30 June 2024. Due to the ongoing flooding in all of the main rivers and several smaller waterways and tributaries throughout the country, the MRCS’s capacities have been overwhelmed and now require additional support.
On 30 June 2024, heavy rainfall began affecting northern Myanmar, particularly Kachin State, leading to floods and river overflows, notably in the Ayeyarwady River. This resulted in population displacement and damage, impacting an estimated 45 wards and 29 villages in Kachin State.
On 1 July 2024, the MRCS national Emergency Operations Centre (EOC) received limited information from the MRCS Kachin branch. That day’s report (9:30 AM) indicated that the Ayeyarwady River water level in Myitkyina had risen above the danger level by more than four feet (about 122 cm) and continued to rise at about three inches (7.6 cm) per hour. The water level reached 1.3 metres (4.2 feet) above the danger mark within 12 hours. Low-lying areas in Myitkyina were flooded, and displaced families from the Lekon neighbourhood, who had relocated due to violence and conflict, faced compounded challenges.
On 7 July 2024, the Department of Meteorology and Hydrology (DMH) reported significant rises in the water levels in additional locations in the country. This included ongoing increases of water levels in the Ayeyarwady and Chindwin Rivers and the Nant Yin Chaung and Nant Kaung Chaung Rivers at critical levels. Residents of several townships in Kachin, Mandalay, and Sagaing regions were advised to take extra precautions.
By 11 July 2024, floods affected several townships in the Magway region, Mandalay region, and townships in northern Shan State. The Department of Disaster Management (DDM) of the Ministry of Social Welfare reported that at least 31,000 people were evacuated due to floods in Kachin State and the Sagaing, Magway, and Mandalay regions. The floods led to the death of at least one child in Hkamti, Sagaing, and five people in Myitkyina, Kachin. However, another source reported no flood-related deaths and injuries. Discrepancies in reporting may be due to significant access challenges caused by ongoing flooding, rainfall, and pre-existing violence and conflict.
On 25 July 2024, the DMH issued flood advisories for several regions in lower Myanmar in response to rising water levels moving downstream. The affected areas include Kayin state, Mon state, Bago state, and Ayeyarwady region.
As of late July 2024, Sagaing and Magway regions are experiencing severe flooding due to the overflow of the Chindwin and Ayeyarwady Rivers. Heavy rainfall in central Myanmar has exacerbated the situation, causing widespread damage to agricultural lands and displacing residents. As of 1 August, river levels were still on the rise, posing a significant threat to communities living along the banks of multiple waterways in central and lower Myanmar.
The water levels in major rivers such as the Ayeyarwady, Sittoung, Thanlwin, Bilin, Shwegyin, Ngawun, and Bago have surpassed danger thresholds and causing extensive flooding across multiple regions in lower Myanmar.
On 29 July 2024, surges of the Hlaing and Bawlae Rivers in the Yangon region caused significant flooding in Taikkyi and Kungyangon townships, which are located in the far north and south, respectively of the region. Approximately 3,000 residents from 640 households in three village tracts in Taikkyi township have been affected. In Kungyangon township, over 9,000 people from 29 villages have been evacuated to the Sasana Hitakayi Monastery, according to reports from MITV.
Due to ongoing monsoon rains, widespread flooding continues to be reported at different locations along the main rivers, affecting the Ayeyarwady delta, Rakhine, Mon, Tanintharyi coastal areas, and regions including Yangon and Bago. This situation is exacerbated by Typhoon Gaemi, which struck Taiwan with wind speeds of 127 mph on 25 July. The residual clouds from the typhoon moved towards Myanmar, Thailand, and China, potentially generating further flooding and heavy rainfall in these regions..."
Source/publisher:
International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-10
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"During the second quarter of 2024, the Health Cluster reached 198,168 individuals who received essential health services, representing 7.27 percent of the HNRP target. A total of 216 998 patients have received primary health care services.
Additionally, 42 patients have received trauma care services and 14 181 maternal and child health care services have been provided. In terms of financial assistance, 5 585 patients have been given cash assistance. Furthermore, 3 522 individuals have received basic psychosocial support, and 75 712 people have participated in awareness-raising sessions. Lastly, 4 439 units of medicine have been donated as part of medical support efforts.
Having recent intensified armed conflicts and deteriorating security conditions, our partners in Northern Shan State have made the difficult decision to relocate their personnel to more secure areas and suspend their activities temporarily. Some partners are still trying to operate minimally with the resources they have in certain areas. In response to the increasing incidence of acute watery diarrhea, health partners have provided their health assistance to the Rakhine and Chin states, limitedly to the operational capacity and to access challenges in these locations. Due to constraints in local procurement, transportation challenges, and limited funding, there are considerable gaps in the availability of medicine and medical supplies in most of the areas in the country.
In May 2024, the Myanmar Health Cluster hosted a workshop dedicated to monsoon preparedness, where discussions centered around infectious and environmental risks, as well as risk communication and community engagement during disaster emergencies. Key health knowledge can be found at https://themimu.info/emergencies/health-cluster . The purpose of the workshop is to enhance the Myanmar Health Cluster Capacity for the monsoon season focusing on communicable diseases and risk communication and community engagement.
Following this, in June 2024, the Health Cluster held a workshop on Accountability to Affected Populations, aimed at ensuring accountability and protection for those in need of humanitarian health assistance through an inclusive and participatory method..."
Source/publisher:
Health Cluster and World Health Organization via Reliefweb (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-09
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"KEY HIGHLIGHTS
231,580 people received Core Relief Items comprising kitchen sets, blankets and sleeping mats, ensuring their basic needs were met.
34,800 people received shelter support for safe and dignified living conditions while in displacement.
16,190 people benefited from multi-purpose cash assistance to meet their basic needs.
FORCIBLY DISPLACED AND STATELESS PEOPLE
3,187,200 Internally displaced people (IDP) living in Rakhine, Chin, Kachin, Shan, Kayin, Kayah and Mon States, and Bago (East), Tanintharyi, Sagaing and Magway Regions (as of 24 June 2024). According to UN sources, an estimated 2.8 million people have been displaced (as of 24 June 2024) due to the resumption and intensification of clashes between the Tatmadaw and ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) and/or People’s Defense Forces (PDF) after 1 February 2021.
632,789 Estimated Rohingya in Rakhine State, of which some 155,511 are living in displacement camps as well as among the host community since 2012..."
Source/publisher:
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (Geneva)
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-09
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
UNHCR (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees), Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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603.04 KB
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"washington —
Myanmar's ruling generals are facing unprecedented challenges as armed resistance groups gain more control in the north and the economy stalls. Experts say the rapidly shifting situation is giving China more leverage over the nation’s ruling military junta.
Earlier this week, Myanmar's junta confirmed its loss of control of a regional military base in the northern Shan State – a key area for China's Belt and Road Initiative and border trade.
That setback was the latest in the northern part of the country where the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) says the Three Brotherhood Alliance, an ethnic group coalition, has been making steady advances since late last year.
Between October and December 2023, USIP says, rebels gained control of more than 7,700 square miles, an area including crucial border crossings and trade routes between China and Myanmar.
By June, the Three Brotherhood Alliance expanded its control to central Myanmar, including Lashio, Kyauk Mae and areas near Mandalay, the country's second-largest city.
Professor Zachary Abuza of the National War College in Washington told VOA Burmese that the opposition forces' capture of the strategic city of Lashio has "symbolic meaning."
"It is on the highway between Mandalay and the Chinese border of Ruili. It's a critically important town. It's also the headquarters of the Northeastern Command," Abuza said.
On Thursday, China dispatched its special envoy to Myanmar, Deng Xijun, and he met with Myanmar's military leader, senior general Min Aung Hlaing.
According to the junta's official statement, their discussions focused on election preparations and maintaining stability at the border and the rest of the country. It did not, however, mention China's sponsored peace talks with the Three Brotherhood Alliance, initially scheduled for the end of July but reportedly boycotted by the regime. China has been pushing for the next round of talks to occur soon.
The junta's struggles have led to an increasing reliance on China for support, experts say.
In April 2024, Min Aung Hlaing offered to restart the long-delayed Myitsone Dam project in Kachin State to appeal to Chinese interests.
The China-backed Myitsone Dam was put on hold in 2011 following protests over its possible environmental and social impact. The loss of the project was a big setback for Beijing; 90% of the electricity the project was expected to generate was supposed to go to China.
"Min Aung Hlaing's recent messaging around the Myitsone Dam is quite instructive. He's trying to use economic concessions to compel the Chinese side to give additional support to the Myanmar military strategically," said Jason Tower of USIP, who has closely watched China-Myanmar relations.
China has also shown growing interest in engaging with former military elites including Thein Sein and Than Shwe, signaling Beijing's possible concerns about Min Aung Hlaing's leadership.
Former President Thein Sein visited Beijing in July, and the Chinese ambassador to Myanmar visited former military chief Than Shwe in April.
In a recent USIP analysis, Tower argued that "by inviting Thein Sein, Beijing sent a strong message that it hopes Myanmar will return to a pathway of reform like the military started on in 2008."
Abuza agreed, and said he believes China is looking for elections in Myanmar as an "off-ramp."
"I think the Chinese are looking for a way that Min Aung Hlaing and [Deputy Commander-in-Chief of Defense] Soe Win are retired. A group of more pragmatic generals looks for elections with the opposition as a transitional process to end this civil war," Abuza said. "I think the Chinese believe that the devil you know is better than the one you don't."..."
Source/publisher:
"Voice of America" (Washington, D.C)
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-08
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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""The Rohingya crisis in Maungdaw Township in Arakan State is a heartbreaking story of survival amidst constant conflict and violence. The systematic targeting by the Arakan Army and military junta threatens the very existence of the Rohingya. The international community must not stay silent. Immediate action is necessary to protect the Rohingya and ensure their survival."
Khair Ullah, Rohingya Refugee Advocate, Human Rights Defender and Researcher, Asia Pacific Refugee Rights Network (APRRN) member
The Rohingya people of Arakan State are caught in the violent conflict between the Arakan Army and the Myanmar military. Forced into a deadly power struggle, they face recruitment into fighting, displacement, hunger, and senseless violence. They continue to have their basic human rights violated on a daily basis. This crisis demands immediate and urgent global attention and action to prevent the extermination of the Rohingya people.
The conflict has reached a breaking point. Civilian lives are being lost daily, with Rohingya families struggling to find food and shelter amidst the violence. In June, 70 Rohingya were reportedly killed, and hundreds injured; in July, 29 were reportedly killed and 64 injured, and on 5 and 6 August, over 200 Rohingya were reportedly killed near the Bangladesh-Myanmar border. Young Rohingya are being forced into combat, deepening the violence and tearing the Rohingya community apart. The military and the Arakan Army use the youths as shields on the frontlines, exacerbating the already desperate situation.
The Rohingya are a protected ethnic minority group. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 2020 mandated Myanmar to protect and safeguard the Rohingya from genocidal attacks and preserve the evidence. The ICJ has ruled that Myanmar must take all the measures to protect Rohingya from further harm. Hence, all the parties involved in the armed conflict in Myanmar or Arakan must refrain from causing further destruction to the community. In this distressing situation, women and children are suffering in innumerable ways, directly violating all the safeguards available in International Human Rights Law. They are the most vulnerable groups in need of urgent support and humanitarian aid.
The consequences of turning a blind eye to the conflict
The world's neglect has worsened the Rohingya's suffering, leaving them isolated and vulnerable. With no internet access in their areas, communication is nearly impossible, deepening the isolation. The Rohingya people are facing the dual burdens of violence from the Arakan Army and neglect from the international community. While international intervention and advocacy could bring much-needed aid and protection, it also faces political backlash and challenges in effectively coordinating efforts in a conflict zone.
The Arakan Army's arbitrary arrests, disappearances, and killings within Rohingya communities create a cycle of fear and despair. The systematic targeting of Rohingya people by the Arakan Army and military junta is a genocidal campaign that threatens their very existence.
Ali Johar, Co-lead, Global Movement Against Statelessness and APRRN member continues: “Under the shadow of what’s happening in Bangladesh, hundreds of Rohingyas have been slaughtered in Arakan during the first week of August. On 6 August alone, locals on the Bangladesh side of the Naf River discovered at least 13 dead bodies of Rohingya women and children who were killed while trying to run for safety. But we continue to witness hesitant international attention. If the international community is already tired of the news of Rohingyas getting slaughtered every day, imagine how hopeless and unseen the Rohingya themselves may feel about this ongoing Genocide.
Sabber Kyaw Min, founder & Director, of Rohingya Human Rights Initiative (ROHRIngya) and APRRN member added:
“It’s heartbreaking to see, yet again, vulnerable Rohingya people being forcefully displaced from Maungdaw and struggling to cross into Bangladesh. The Military Junta and the Rakhine militants’ Arakan Army took advantage of the unfolding situation in Bangladesh to drive out the remaining Rohingya population in Maungdaw, Rakhine State, Myanmar. Hundreds have reportedly been killed.”
Direct experiences from people on the ground
APRRN members spoke to three Rohingya who fled Maungdaw Township in the last two weeks and are now in Bangladesh:
Solim, a 23-year-old from Arakan State, shared his plight: "There are constant clashes between the Arakan Army and the military, and I have no scope to run or hide from the regular fighting in the state."
Mohammed, a 31-year-old, expressed his despair: "We are on the brink of death as we haven't had anything to eat for several days, and the fear of violence is always in our minds. Both the military and the Arakan Army haven't halted fighting in most Rohingya villages."
Alam, a 42-year-old from Arakan State, highlighted his eyewitness account: "I saw that many people have gathered in the coastal area near the border between Bangladesh and Myanmar to escape the clash between the Arakan Army and military juntas. The Arakan Army intentionally fired drones at the Rohingya, and I saw more than 200 dead bodies on the beach, but luckily, I'm safe."
Recommendations by Asia Pacific Refugee Rights Network (APRRN)
APRRN calls for immediate global attention and comprehensive and sustainable action, and have the following recommendations:
The international community must urge the Myanmar government and the Arakan Army to cease fighting and protect all civilians, especially the Rohingya. Those responsible for human rights abuses must be held accountable;
Neighbouring states should allow international agencies, national groups, and camp volunteers to form rescue teams to facilitate aid to Rohingya trapped in Arakan State;
The international community should coordinate rescue teams to the borders [Bangladesh and Thailand] to protect and assist fleeing Rohingya;
APRRN also calls on Bangladesh to open the border and allow for the safe passage of civilians from Northern Rakhine who are seeking protection from the armed conflict;
Restoring internet access and communication channels is essential to aid coordination and support for the Rohingya community;
Sufficient funds should be allocated for critical resources, including food, shelter, and medical care;
Comprehensive support services to address the trauma and psychological needs of the Rohingya should be established.
For further information, please reach out to Hafsar Tameesuddin ([email protected]), and Klaus Dik Nielsen ([email protected]) Co-Secretaries General, Asia Pacific Refugee Rights Network (APRRN).
The Asia Pacific Refugee Rights Network (APRRN) is a network of over 280 civil society organisations and individuals from 30 countries. We are committed to protecting and promoting the rights of refugees and other vulnerable groups on the move in the Asia Pacific..."
Source/publisher:
"Asia Pacific Refugee Rights Network"
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-08
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Discrimination against the Rohingya, Rohingya (cultural, political etc.), Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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"More than five years have passed since the atrocities committed against the Rohingyas in the Rakhine State of Myanmar in August 2017 forced nearly a million of them to take refuge in Bangladesh. With the prolongation of the Rohingya crisis, newer challenges are emerging for Bangladesh. The Rohingyas living in the camps in Bangladesh are willing to return to their homeland. The International Court of Justice’s verdict on July 22, 2022, rejecting all four Preliminary Objections of Myanmar, has paved the way to ensure accountability, an essential mechanism for finding a solution to the Rohingya crisis. At the same time, there have been public statements from government officials in Bangladesh, China, and Myanmar that repatriation will start soon. However, critics, both within the country and outside, point out that such repatriation should not compromise the principle of nonrefoulment. In this context, in the last few years, several pathways to the repatriation of the Rohingya have been envisaged and brought to the attention of policymakers and other national and international stakeholders. Eight potential pathways can easily be identified.
1 The Bilateral Approach
Bangladesh engaged with Myanmar bilaterally from the beginning of the crisis. One could list at least eight meetings when the Memorandum of Arrangement (MoA) on the Return of Displaced Persons from Rakhine State was signed, on November 23, 2017. The last bilateral meeting took place virtually on June 14, 2022. But nothing concrete has materialized so far, although there have been developments between the two countries, with China’s participation – to which I will return below. However, from the beginning, there were specific weaknesses in the bilateral approach. Three could be flagged. One is the signing of an “Arrangement” between Bangladesh and Myanmar, in place of an “Understanding” or “Agreement.” One cannot help but point out that in signing a “Memorandum,” the weakest type is an “Arrangement.” This is because neither “Understanding” nor “Arrangement” has any legally binding force; they only indicate the “willingness” of the parties. Only an “Agreement” is legally binding on the parties. Moreover, there have been few examples of signing an “Arrangement” between two countries globally.
The MoA signed in Nay Pyi Taw stipulated that the return “will commence at the earliest and shall be completed in a time-bound manner agreed [to] by both parties.i It is easy to see that not only did the Rohingya did not return, but also, no period of time was mentioned in the “Arrangement.” The parties only agreed to the “process of return.” Such, “process of return shall commence within two months of the signing of this Arrangement.”ii However, there is a vagueness in how this “process” is to be completed. The signed document only mentions that the “process” shall be “completed within a reasonable time from the date the first batch of returnees is received.” This flexibility allowed Myanmar to flout and delay the process and the period. Second, a Joint Working Group will be established “within three weeks of signing this arrangement.”iii This has occurred – but, so far, without progress on repatriating the Rohingyas residing in Bangladesh. Third, “a specific instrument on the physical arrangement for the repatriation of returnees will be drawn up upon agreement in a speedy manner following the conclusion of this Arrangement.”iv No such “agreement” has been reached in the last five years, or since the signing of the “Arrangement” in 2017, which only shows the limitation of the wording “speedy manner”!
In the bilateral meeting, however, one crucial issue seems to have been ignored. This relates to Myanmar committing “genocide” or “crimes against humanity.” On the contrary, the foreign minister of Bangladesh handed over three ambulances for their use in Rakhine State as a gift from Bangladesh to Myanmar on the day of the signing the MoA. A gesture of this kind does not show that Bangladesh was dealing with a “genocidal regime” or a regime that has committed violent atrocities against its residents, the evidence for which was abundant from the day the Rohingyas were driven out in August 2017. Moreover, the body language of the Bangladesh delegation remained subdued, although Bangladesh could have engaged with Myanmar on a high moral ground, particularly given the fact that the latter had committed mass atrocities against the Rohingyas.
What were the reasons for this? Three factors seem to have played out. The first was Foreign Minister Mahmud Ali’s earlier experience dealing with Myanmar on the Rohingya exodus. Mahmud Ali negotiated the Burmese Refugees Repatriation Agreement in 1992, when he was the country’s additional foreign secretary. This probably gave him the confidence that this time, too, he could pull it off and have the Rohingyas return to Arakan without delay, without realizing that this time the context was markedly different. Not only was there evidence that the Myanmar military had committed mass atrocities, even genocide, but also that Myanmar had entered the global world with key Asian countries – including China, India, and Japan – on its side, with the Western countries having withdrawn sanctions after Aung San Suu Kyi’s release and her assuming governmental power. Second, Bangladesh could have been advised by “friendly countries” to have the MoA signed, with Bangladesh believing that such countries would be able to impress upon or pressure Myanmar for a quick repatriation of the Rohingyas. And third, Bangladesh also wanted a quick solution as part of its civilizational quest of not having conflicts with its neighbors and focusing more on its robust developmental trajectory. This point may sound odd, but it should not be minimized, particularly considering the fact that Bangladesh never saw Myanmar as an “enemy.” Instead, Bangladesh, despite hosting over 1.1 million Rohingya refugees, a population larger than Bhutan’s, continues to have regular trading and other relations with Myanmar. However, whatever the merit of this approach, nothing productive has resulted from Bangladesh engaging with Myanmar bilaterally on the Rohingya issue.
2 The Multilateral Approach
The involvement of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) on the Rohingya issue has been critical, with its role mentioned as early as November 2017 in the Memorandum of Arrangement: “UNHCR and other mandated U.N. agencies as well as interested international partners would be invited to take part, as appropriate, in various stages of return and resettlement, and to assist returnees in carrying on life and livelihood as members of Myanmar society.”v It took another six months, until May 2018, for Myanmar to sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and UNHCR, which categorically stated that “after the necessary verification, those who have left Myanmar are to return voluntarily and safely to their households and original places of residence or a safe and secure place nearest to it of their choice.vi However, there has not been much headway in the repatriation of the Rohingya. On the contrary, the multilateral approach, particularly as undertaken by UNHCR and other mandated U.N. agencies, has focused more on Bangladesh than Myanmar. Flagging one area – education, for instance – would suffice to provide credence to the contention.
The U.N. agencies have impressed upon Bangladesh that it needs to provide education to the Rohingya refugees, but what kind of education is meant? According to the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, “refugee children need to be included in the national education systems of their host countries.”vii This would suggest that the Rohingya refugees get an education in a “formal curriculum” and in the local language. Understandably, the Rohingyas must be able to communicate with the host community’s members. But given the context that the Rohingyas are not only “refugees” but are also “stateless,” not knowing Burmese and English would add to their plight, as it would further marginalize them from the majority Burman population and jeopardize their future when they return to Myanmar.
However, a balance could be struck on the issue of language. This could be done by pursuing a twofold policy. First, it would entail implementing 100% literacy – indeed, not only for the 73 percent illiterate Rohingya refugees but also for the 60.7% illiterate members of the host community in the Cox’s Bazar district.viii Second, it would mean rendering knowledge of English to Rohingya refugees and children of the host community. At the regional level, knowing English would help the members of both communities communicate and gain employment both within and beyond borders. The protection area, or safety net, needs to be broadened to include the Rohingya refugees and the vulnerable local population residing in the vicinity.
Employment opportunities of this precise kind should also be explored, in fact, of the type that would make the Rohingyas equally, if not more, helpful once they are repatriated to Myanmar. Becoming skilled in as many languages as possible would only add to the opportunities of the job seeker. Indeed, only at their peril could Bangladesh and the international community ignore the education of the refugees and the host community members. But then, when Bangladesh decided to relocate 100,000 Rohingya refugees out of the total 1.1 million to Bhasan Char Island in the Bay of Bengal, 60 kilometers from the mainland, mainly to provide skills development training for agricultural work,ix the international community, including nongovernmental humanitarian agencies, objected to the relocation on the ground that the island is not safe for habitation.
Only in May 2021, after over a year of procrastinating and when some 13,000 Rohingyas had already been moved to the island at Bangladesh’s expense, did the U.N. agencies agree to support the relocated Rohingyas. Still, only 30,000 Rohingyas have been relocated out of the proposed 100,000.x Funds for relocation were flagged repeatedly, more so because the funding for the Rohingyas has been gradually declining since the COVID-19 pandemic hit the economy of donor countries in 2020, followed by the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war since February 2022. One estimate shows that in 2019, Bangladesh and the U.N. agencies raised $636.7 million out of the $920.5 million required for the refugee program. But in 2022, the donors delivered only half the budget of $881 million.xi In the meantime, the entire gaze of the international humanitarian agencies, despite the May 2018 MoU cited above, shifted from Myanmar to Bangladesh, which must have made Myanmar even less interested in pursuing the repatriation of the Rohingyas and resettling them. Yet the multilateral approach, including the involvement of the U.N. and other agencies, remains critical for resolving the plight of the stateless Rohingyas.
3 The Tripartite Pathway
Bangladesh, Myanmar, and China agreed to form a “tripartite joint working mechanism” for Rohingya repatriation in New York on September 24, 2019. Subsequently, several trilateral meetings were held. The most recent meeting took place in Kunming in April 2023, amid news that a pilot project on repatriation would commence before the rainy season. But before assessing the pros and cons of the tripartite meeting in Kunming, it is worth pointing out China’s interests in resolving the Rohingya crisis. Three reasons could be flagged.
The first reason is Chinese investments and the quest for stability. China has been Bangladesh’s largest source of foreign direct investment since 2022. In fiscal year (FY) 2021-22, China invested approximately $940 million in Bangladesh.xii Moreover, China remains Bangladesh’s most influential trading partner. The bilateral trade between the two countries showed robust growth of 58% in FY 2022.xiii However, China’s investment in Myanmar has been more significant than Bangladesh’s. One estimate shows China invested over $25 billion from 1988 to June 2019.xiv Even since the military coup in February 2021, China’s investment in Myanmar has remained as steady as ever. Economic investments in both countries also compel China to seek stability, lest the investments become too risky and costly.
Second, China wants to offset Western influences in Myanmar. This has made China remain at Myanmar’s side, despite Myanmar’s serious human rights violations over the years – including in the postcoup period since February 2021, which saw more than 3,000 civilians killed, nearly 17,000 detained, and more than 1.5 million displaced.xv This has become all the more important since the United States’ declaration of the Burma Act 2023, which allows the Biden administration to interpret the act more liberally, mainly when providing military aid to ethnic armed organizations.xvi The act also gives the Biden administration the discretionary authority to make significant changes.xvii This has undoubtedly compelled China to put pressure on Myanmar for an early resolution of the Rohingya crisis, including initiating a process for their repatriation to the Arakan, lest the region become ripe for conflicts, with the United States getting involved near the Chinese border.
Third, any breakthrough in the tripartite pathway, particularly in making the Rohingyas return to their ancestral lands in the Arakan and making them legal residents of Myanmar, would boost Chinese status in the region and the world. Besides Rohingya refugees returning to Myanmar, the Chinese three-phase plan of November 2017 sought a long-term solution based on poverty alleviation.xviii
However, the tripartite approach has yet to make much headway. In 2018 and 2019, the trilateral initiative failed to repatriate a single Rohingya from Bangladesh. This time, the three countries met in Kunming in April 2023 and planned to initiate a pilot project to repatriate over 1,000 Rohingya refugees. The initiative saw a 20-member Rohingya delegation visiting Arakan on May 5, 2023, to see the two model villages erected for the pilot project.xix Although it is too early to say whether the pilot project will materialize before the onslaught of the rainy season, as envisaged, the complexity cannot be underestimated. One is the mixed reaction among the members of the Rohingya delegation after the visit.xx The extent to which the Rohingyas are eager to compromise on their four-point demands – seeking national identification and citizenship rights, return of their original land or properties, rights to livelihood and movement, and security assurance – remains a core issue.xxi
Moreover, the UNHCR, although aware of the visit, is not involved in the tripartite initiative, which could dampen the enthusiasm among the Rohingyas for the pilot project. But given the international isolation of Myanmar, coupled with the factor of civil unrest at home and various judicial processes being undertaken against Myanmar on the issue of genocide, it is not difficult to see that Myanmar would want to initiate the repatriation in order to make a difference in its dismal position, both at home and abroad. At the same time, Rohingya repatriation, even in a pilot form, would provide an electoral dividend to the ruling party in Bangladesh, with the national election scheduled in two or three months. Initiating a pilot project on the Rohingya repatriation in the remaining months of 2023, possibly discreetly, cannot be ruled out.
However, this project is currently on hold, for three reasons. First, there are disputes between Bangladesh and Myanmar on the list provided by Bangladesh and the identity of the Rohingyas. These disputes have arisen more from the Rohingyas’ demand to resettle their original land, which the Myanmar military is not eager to do. Moreover, the Myanmar military has transformed some Rohingya lands beyond recognition. Second, the MoU reached between Myanmar and the UNDP and UNHCR in May 2018 has lapsed and needs renewal, which has yet to be done. Bangladesh and the international agencies require firm guarantees from the Myanmar military that the repatriated Rohingyas would feel safe and can engage in livelihood-related activities without fear and discrimination, something to which the Myanmar military has yet to commit and provide in writing. Finally, since only a few months are left before the Myanmar military would like to go slowly and wait for the outcome.
4 Accountability
The issue of accountability has seen significant developments in the last five years. The two provisional rulings at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) were the most promising ones, particularly for pursuing the crime of genocide committed by the Myanmar military against the Rohingyas and providing legal recognition of the Rohingya identity. This was achieved unanimously with the consent of judges from Myanmar, China, India, Russia, and many more countries. Let me elaborate on this.
The ICJ hearing on the Rohingya genocide was held in The Hague on December 10-12, 2019. This is a unique case. An African country, The Gambia, brought charges against an Asian country, Myanmar, for committing genocide against the Rohingyas in the Arakan. This is something that no one expected. Indeed, if it surprised the world, it surprised Myanmar the most. In less than two months after the hearing on January 23, 2020, the ICJ granted the provisional measures requested by The Gambia.xxii Two things from the provisional measures stand out clearly.
First, the order of the ICJ was unanimous. This Myanmar had never expected. In all probability, Myanmar was looking for a split decision at the ICJ, which would have allowed it to rally at home that not all members had agreed to the provisional measures and, therefore, the order could be ignored. Fortunately for the Rohingyas and those supporting their cause, this did not happen. Second, the ICJ identified the group at the center of the case as “Rohingyas.” This statement by the ICJ is worth noting:
The Court’s references in this Order to the “Rohingya” should be understood as references to the group that self-identifies as the Rohingya group and that claims a longstanding connection to Rakhine State, which forms part of the Union of Myanmar.xxiii
Indeed, this was a significant victory for the Rohingyas, with implications far beyond the provisional measures. In many ways, it was a direct slap on the face of Myanmar for keeping a taboo on the word “Rohingya.” There is no denying the fact that the recognition of the “Rohingya identity” remains critical. If anything, it is the most significant stumbling block and, conversely, a way to resolve the crisis.
The disruptive policy of Myanmar, which has gradually disenfranchised and dehumanized the Rohingyas, comes from an “unspoken racial feeling” of the military and civilian elite of the country. This, unfortunately, found a “legal” expression in the 2008 National Constitution of Myanmar. As Thant Myint-U points out:
The Constitution … included an arcane formula tied to race. Any taing-yintha (or multinational races) “whose population constitutes at least 0.1% of the national populace” (around 50,000 people in 2010) was entitled to representation in local legislative assemblies and ministerial portfolios in local administrations. If a taing-yintha constituted more than half of two contiguous townships, it was entitled to an “autonomous zone.” So, in addition to ethnically-based states for the Shan, Kachin, and five others, there would now be “self-administered zones” for the Nagas, Danus, and a few smaller ethnic groups.
I’ve heard many Burmese warn that giving Muslims in northern Arakan taing-yintha status, as “Rohingya,” would lead automatically to their being entitled to a zone of their own. “A part of Burma would fall under Sharia law,” a university lecturer whispered. To consider the Muslims of northern Arakan as one of the “National Races” fused anxieties around both race and religion. The ethnonym “Rohingya” was particularly toxic for this reason, as it means literally “of Arakan” and therefore implied that those to whom it referred were indigenous. On the other hand, if they were called “Bengalis,” they could be seen … as immigrants and not natives deserving special protection and special rights (Myint-U, 2020:108-109).xxiv
Good sense prevailed during the hearing at the ICJ, where Suu Kyi and her team refrained from using the words “Bengalis” or “illegal migrants” for the Rohingyas. Given the proliferation of research on the Rohingyas in recent times, Myanmar is well aware that labeling the Rohingyas as “Bengalis” or “illegal migrants” would take them nowhere. Instead, this would make them closer to being accused of committing genocide against the Rohingyas. Myanmar also knows that the International Criminal Court has opened an investigation into crimes committed against the Rohingyas in Arakan. Also, there is a lawsuit pending in the Argentinian Supreme Court on the issue of the Myanmar military committing genocide against the Rohingya population. Furthermore, now that the United States has officially declared that the Myanmar military has committed genocide against the Rohingya, the issue of accountability will get an additional boost and pressure the Myanmar military to resolve the issue.
5 Reimposing Sanctions
Economic pressure in the form of sanctions on Myanmar is required. Although sanctions often economically harm the disempowered more than the empowered, the West has utilized sanctions, not always from the standpoint of economic merit but also on moral grounds, which certainly brings pressure on the sanctioned regime to reform and rectify within. The United States withdrew sanctions from Myanmar in 2016, followed by other countries. This is where the Myanmar military cleverly used Aung San Suu Kyi. Her acceptance by the military created space for sanctions to be withdrawn and allowed Myanmar to begin globalization. Many would argue that the Myanmar military created a semblance of democracy and allowed Suu Kyi to come to power precisely because sanctions made it difficult for the military to govern the population and cleverly assessed that the West would fall for the bait and withdraw the sanctions if space were provided to Suu Kyi, even if it was on the military’s terms. However, now, with Suu Kyi’s internment, the time has come to reimpose sanctions, which will make a difference not only to the lives of the Rohingyas but also to the Myanmar people who have been suffering since February of last year.
Sanction politics has come back since the start of Russia’s war with Ukraine. However, it must be quickly pointed out that the international community, particularly the Western countries, did not shy away from imposing sanctions on Iran, North Korea, and even China on various items. There is no reason, therefore, not to reimpose sanctions on Myanmar because of its perceived noneffectiveness. Anything less at this stage will only empower the Myanmar military. In December 2016, U.S. President Barack Obama lifted sanctions against Myanmar, saying “it had made strides in improving human rights.”xxv But a year later, under President Donald Trump, new sanctions were imposed on Myanmar military commanders in 2018 and 2019, as evidence of atrocities by the military came to light.xxvi
Western countries have thus far imposed sanctions only on military personnel and companies in Myanmar. The United States has placed visa and financial sanctions on 9 Myanmar military officers, including Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, and on two military units for their involvement in attacks on Rohingya and Burmese civilians.xxvii The European Union also sanctioned 22 Myanmar military officials and some gas companies,xxviii which has hardly impacted the Myanmar military. Sanctions on a larger scale to put pressure on the military are still absent. Moreover, the current sanctions were imposed in response to Myanmar’s recent military coup and are unrelated to the Rohingya issue.
A beginning on reimposing sanctions could be made by exposing and shaming the companies that have invested in Myanmar, by telling them that since they are profiting from a country that is killing its people and has forcibly displaced 1.1 million of its population and is now under investigation for committing genocide and crimes against humanity, these companies will also be held responsible for their “complicity in crime” if they continue to profit from their investments. It is worth pointing out that foreign direct investment (FDI) flows into Myanmar increased by $259.6 million in the quarter ending in September 2022, compared with an increase of $392.5 million in the previous quarter.xxix Moreover, Myanmar approved $1.45 billion in FDI during the first seven months of 2022-23, mainly from Singapore, a conduit for foreign money into Myanmar and China.xxx In this context, investigative information would be required because the Myanmar military has stopped disclosing the projects it has approved since the coup.
But the sad aspect here is that Myanmar is still eligible for trade benefits from the United States under the General System of Preferences. Even the Burma Act makes an exception for U.S. imports from Myanmar.xxxi This sends the wrong signals to Myanmar and U.S. allies that maintain trade preference programs with Myanmar. At the same time, international financial institutions provide significant development funding to Myanmar. For instance, the World Bank announced $460 million in credits to upgrade electricity power generation and improve health services.xxxii There ought to be sanctions on such projects until the discriminatory laws, policies, and practices are addressed. The international community, particularly the Western countries that campaign for a rule-based international order, must use its collective influence to ensure that sanctions are reimposed, so that the Myanmar military will feel pressure to resolve the Rohingya crisis.
6 A Policy of Decoupling
“Decoupling” refers to a policy, widely practiced by various countries, that means to separate a particular activity from others. The former policy is pursued while contradicting the latter policy, in order to attain critical objectives. This is mainly because countries have varied interests and priorities, which are not always all equally important but are carried out to meet urgent national goals. This creates space for separating one policy from the other without jeopardizing the country’s relationships and core national interests. Some countries, for instance, have strategic and economic interests in Myanmar, and thus policy changes cannot be brought about instantly. This is understandable, but such countries also have the power to impress upon Myanmar the need to change its policy in a different area by taking action related to that area. In situations like this, what is required from such countries is to decouple the Rohingya issue from their strategic and financial interests.
This is where Japan made a difference when it cosponsored a resolution in the United Nations in November 2021 favoring the Rohingya community.xxxiii Although this was done in the context of changes in Myanmar in February 2021, which saw the removal of Suu Kyi and the military takeover of the government, with the U.N. Myanmar seat held by the forces favorable to the former, it is still a good sign that a longtime strategic partner of Myanmar decided to put pressure on the latter by decoupling the Rohingya issue from its strategic interests. Japan formerly used to abstain from such resolutions, but by cosponsoring the resolution, Japan for the first time decoupled the Rohingya issue from its strategic interests in Myanmar. And since Japan cosponsored the resolution, it is bound to put pressure on Myanmar.
Even by recognizing the “Rohingya identity,” pressure is being put on Myanmar to change its decision of not recognizing the Rohingya community as one of the ethnic groups of Myanmar. Myanmar so far recognizes 135 ethnic groups clustered in eight “national races.”xxxiv It may be pointed out that several countries, including Myanmar, refer to the Rohingyas as “Arakanese Muslims” without realizing that there are also Rohingya Hindus,xxxv and even Rohingya Christians.xxxvi More importantly, one should use the word “Rohingya” mainly because the ICJ, to which all U.N. members are legally bound, has recognized the community as Rohingya. Therefore, there is no reason why “Rohingya” should not be used while discussing the latter’s plight vis-à-vis Myanmar. That itself would contribute to decoupling and putting pressure on Myanmar. Similarly, inviting a Rohingya delegation to India or Japan, for instance, would decouple the Rohingya issue from these countries’ core strategic or economic interests and make Myanmar realize that the Rohingya issue will not go away. Instead, the more quickly it is resolved, the more stable and comprehensive these countries’ relationships will be.
But unfortunately, one also sees other kinds of decoupling, which only go on to empower the Myanmar military, to the detriment of the Rohingyas’ lives and of the dissenting forces supportive of the National Unity Government in exile. This relates mainly to the sale and manufacturing of weapons. The following report is noteworthy:
Companies in the United States, Europe and Asia have been helping Myanmar’s military manufacture weapons used in human rights abuses, according to three former United Nations experts. Companies from 13 countries – including France, Germany, China, India, Russia, Singapore and the United States – have been providing supplies that are “critical” to the production of weapons in Myanmar. … It found that high precision machines manufactured by companies based in Austria, Germany, Japan, Taiwan and the U.S. are currently being used by the Myanmar military at its weapons factories. … Software to operate these machines is being provided by companies based in France, Israel and Germany. … Singapore, meanwhile, functions as a strategic transit point for potentially significant volumes of items, including certain raw materials, that feed the Myanmar military’s weapons production, and Taiwan is believed to serve as an important route for the military’s purchase of the high precision machines. … The military also regularly sends these machines from KaPaSa factories to Taiwan, where they are serviced by technicians associated with the European manufacturers of the machines, after which they are shipped back to Myanmar.xxxvii
The countries mentioned in the report often emphasize a rule-based international order and the need for democratic principles and human rights to thrive in Myanmar. But at the same time, they have no qualms in decoupling such principles, selling weapons to Myanmar, and profiting from this. The time has come to expose and shame such deals while impressing on their practitioners the need to decouple their arms sales and pressure Myanmar to resolve the Rohingya crisis.
7 Economic Incentives
The idea of offering economic incentives may sound odd, particularly with the backdrop of Myanmar committing genocide against the Rohingyas. But let us take a dispassionate or “realist” look at this approach. It is already known that the Myanmar military is either directly or indirectly involved in the drug trade, particularly for Yaba, a synthetic drug composed of a methamphetamine substance. Historically, Myanmar has always been a significant producer of opium, which has contributed to the country’s gross domestic product. UNODC recently provided data on the opium cultivation in Myanmar, which has seen a declining trend.xxxviii However, the decline in opium cultivation has resulted in a situation where drug lords, albeit with the connivance of the Myanmar military, have shifted their illicit narcotics production from natural to synthetic drugs.
The bulk of the production takes place in Myanmar’s Shan state. Looking at the output, one can easily see its enormity. One recent report revealed that the authorities in Laos, Thailand, and Myanmar seized 90 million methamphetamine tablets and 4.4 tons of crystal methamphetamine in January 2022 alone,xxxix which gives us a sense of the size of the trade. More than 70% of seizures of Yaba occurred in the Cox’s Bazar district,xl mainly because of its geographical location, as it shares a critical border with Myanmar. Not surprisingly, there are indications that the Myanmar military profits from Yaba production and its distribution worldwide, including in Bangladesh.
The seizure of Yaba went up sharply after the Rohingya exodus in 2017 and peaked in 2020. The Rohingyas, however, are not consumers of Yaba; one hardly finds a severe addict among the Rohingyas. However, the Rohingyas became involved in the narcotics trade because of the opportunity to earn quick money, which caused a steep rise in drug-related incidents in Bangladesh, particularly in the Cox’s Bazar area.xli But since 2021, mainly due to the efforts of the Bangladesh Border Guards and other security agencies, there has been a steady decline in the seizure of Yaba.xlii This gives the impression that the flow of Yaba is on the decline. But this is very deceptive, because there has been a steep rise in the seizure of crystal meth ice, which is nothing but concentrated Yaba and is more profitable when drug dealers successfully transport it. It is worth pointing out that Myanmar has long been a leading producer and trafficker of illicit drugs, with drug exports generating $1-2 billion annually.xliii The trafficking and selling of illegally mined jade and gemstones also bring benefits of up to $31 billion annually.xliv During the 1990s, the Myanmar military increased its cooperation with several insurgent groups in the region. In exchange for a cease-fire, the government placed the insurgent groups’ territory beyond the reach of Burmese law. This agreement allowed insurgents and the military junta to create partnerships to increase trade in illegal goods, including drugs, gems, and timber.
The Myanmar military has no qualms about getting involved in the lucrative illicit drug trade. From wildlife and human trafficking to smuggling illegal drugs, jade, and gemstones, Myanmar’s informal economy is expansive and is often facilitated by its military. In fact, over the years, the Myanmar military has transformed itself into a “military-business complex” (MBC), which thrives on the illicit narco-trade, instability, and conflicts. Not surprisingly, as an MBC, the Myanmar military would need economic incentives that are more significant than the illegal drug trade to see benefits from the repatriation of the Rohingyas.
This could come in two ways. The first one is by initiating a mini–Marshall Plan with international support. Many have forgotten that the Marshall Plan made a difference in post–World War II Europe.xlv Europe’s number of refugees after World War II was in the millions. But the Marshall Plan helped reorganize and develop Europe in many ways. The time has come to think of a mini–Marshall Plan in the Arakan, which would be attractive to the Myanmar military, and thus would enable it to shun the illicit drug trade and repatriate the Rohingya refugees residing in Bangladesh and elsewhere.
The second way is an offshoot of the first one. A concerted effort is required to establish special economic zones, employing many marginalized people in the bordering states, including Rohingyas. Public-private partnerships between Bangladesh and Myanmar in the Arakan could also benefit the Rohingyas. Such economic engagements are bound to make the Rohingyas’ repatriation more saleable to Myanmar. The international community must work together to create space for legal business to flourish and make the MBC more formal and legal. A mini–Marshall Plan tied to the Rohingyas in the Arakan is otherwise required to interest Myanmar in resolving the Rohingya crisis.
8 Militancy
There is still a mystery regarding the events that exacerbated the Rohingyas’ exodus to Bangladesh in August 2017. Four dates in 2017 are critical. On August 23, the Advisory Commission on the Rakhine State (i.e., the Kofi Annan Commission) submitted its final report to the Myanmar national authorities. On August 24, the media, both at home and abroad, published the report in detail. On August 25, the so-called Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) attacked the Myanmar military forces. The very next day, August 26, the Myanmar military resorted to what came to be referred to as “a textbook case of ethnic cleansing,”xlvi which in the next three months saw more than 750,000 Rohingyas, mostly women and children, flee Myanmar to take refuge in Bangladesh. The mystery lies in the militancy of ARSA: why would it resort to violence and attack the Myanmar military forces when the Annan Commission’s report remains favorable to the cause of the Rohingyas, including the need to provide them with citizenship in Myanmar? As the report stated:
The Commission … notes the need to revisit the [1982 citizenship] law itself and calls on the government to set in motion a process to review the law. Such a review should consider – amongst other issues – aligning the law with international standards, re-examining the current linkage between citizenship and ethnicity, and considering provisions to allow for the possibility of acquiring citizenship by naturalisation, particularly for those who are stateless. The Commission calls for the rights of non-citizens who live in Myanmar to be regulated, and for the clarification of residency rights.xlvii
Does this mean that the Myanmar military created a pretext in the name of ARSA? Or could it be that the Myanmar military, as part of its counterinsurgency strategy, floated an “armed group” called ARSA? Whatever the case, it confirms the intricate relationship between militancy and the Rohingya crisis – one feeds into the other, which is even more the case for the stateless Rohingya refugees. Historically, youth have been the first to rebel against oppressive conditions. Most Rohingyas residing in Bangladesh refugee camps are between 15 and 24 years of age, and they constitute approximately 22.41% (199,431 youth) of the Rohingya population in Cox’s Bazar (899,704).xlviii Naturally, the nonresolution of the Rohingya issue would make youth restless; some of them would not shy away from joining the militant forces and taking up arms against the Myanmar military in order to forcibly impress upon them the need to recognize the Rohingya identity and enable the displaced Rohingyas to return to their native land in the Arakan.
Moreover, suppose the Myanmar military does not settle the Rohingya repatriation issue, even under international pressure? In that case, it will create space for armed militant groups among the Rohingyas and the disaffected youth of Myanmar to rise up against the Myanmar military. Insurgent groups favorable to the Rohingyas’ cause can create alliances with other insurgent groups in the region. The Myanmar government’s inaction on the Rohingya repatriation issue could give it more public support in the future. Fringe militant groups have also emerged among the Rohingyas on both sides of the border. They can become more organized in the future and join the insurgency in Myanmar to ensure Rohingya repatriation.
There is an additional, more sinister, problem. The Bangladeshis who wholeheartedly welcomed the Rohingyas in the early days of the exodus could aid them with arms and ammunitions, given their historical record of empathizing with victims, apart from their constitutional obligation to support “oppressed peoples throughout the world” (Article 25, para. C, of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh). There have been historical instances of militancy paving the way for refugee repatriation. The most remarkable example is the 1971 Liberation War of Bangladesh, when 10 million Bengali refugees went to India to flee the genocide committed by the Pakistan military. The armed struggle of the Mukti Bahini of Bangladesh, which was supported by India and other external actors, set the path for the country’s independence and the refugees’ subsequent repatriation. The militant approach might be the least desirable but probable one, if the international community fails to reason with the Myanmar military regarding restrictions on repatriating the Rohingyas. However, the militant pathway is bound to destabilize the region, which would only see international and regional actors getting involved in either supporting or quelling the militancy, from the standpoint of their respective national and strategic interests. And therein lies the fear!
In Lieu of a Conclusion
All these eight potential pathways are significant. Collectively, they are like an octopus, and one should be cognizant of all the paths to see how one can resolve the Rohingya crisis. If someone thinks the Rohingya issue will disappear because of other pressing global problems, they are only looking at one or two pathways. Each pathway has its momentum, and once it unrolls, despite limitations and difficulties, there is no way it can be stopped unless and until the crisis, which has given birth to the pathways, is resolved. No ideas and practices that are grounded in reality can be erased. They can sometimes become challenging, but when found relevant to people for determining the course of the crisis, they return and make their presence all the more urgent. Interventions on the part of Bangladesh and the international community, again at three interrelated levels, can make the eight pathways effective.
At the first, national level, Bangladesh’s policymakers need to spend more time resolving the Rohingya crisis. The Government of Bangladesh (GoB) could fall back on one of its success stories, the resolution of maritime boundaries with India and Myanmar, where the GoB had a dedicated expert with the rank of additional secretary and later secretary working full time on the issue. The additional secretary worked in consultation with the foreign minister and foreign secretary, but having a dedicated expert made a difference to this case. Likewise, it is high time to appoint a dedicated expert on the Rohingya issue, with the rank of additional secretary or secretary, who will have a dedicated team with members from all relevant sectors to work on the various options and provide workable suggestions to the government. At the same time, the GoB should activate its foreign missions and members of civil society, including the media, to highlight the plight of the Rohingya refugees nationally, regionally, and internationally. Second, the stakeholders should give more effort to regional initiatives, including engaging countries that are friendly to Myanmar. Tripartite meetings on the Rohingya crisis involving Myanmar, Bangladesh, and a supportive third country, both at Track 1 and 2 levels, should be initiated to put pressure on Myanmar and let the other countries know of the crisis’s urgency. Third and finally, a more significant effort ought to be started at the international level, including supporting the Rohingya diaspora community in forming a Rohingya civil entity, which would then take the responsibility to flag its cause internationally, including at the United Nations, European Union, and other international bodies. The proposed Rohingya civil entity also needs to work on the kind of economic, educational, and even health policies it plans to pursue once the Rohingyas return to their motherland, with the full dignity of the person.
Looking back at the eight pathways, one can easily see that some are more promising. Still, it is too early to say which one or two will have a lasting impact on the outcome of the Rohingya crisis. At this stage, impatience will not help. The Rohingya crisis is a human issue; therefore, one should have faith in humans if one is looking for a resolution to the plight of the Rohingyas in Myanmar.
Endnotes
1 Taw, N.P. (2017, November 23). Arrangement on Return of Displaced Persons from Rakhine State Between the Government of the People’s Republic of
Bangladesh and the Government of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar.
2 Taw, N.P. (2017, November 23). Arrangement on Return of Displaced Persons from Rakhine State Between the Government of the People’s Republic of
Bangladesh and the Government of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar.
3 Taw, N.P. (2017, November 23). Arrangement on Return of Displaced Persons from Rakhine State Between the Government of the People’s Republic of
Bangladesh and the Government of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar.
4 Taw, N.P. (2017, November 23). Arrangement on Return of Displaced Persons from Rakhine State Between the Government of the People’s Republic of
Bangladesh and the Government of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar.
5 Taw, N.P. (2017, November 23). Arrangement on Return of Displaced Persons from Rakhine State Between the Government of the People’s Republic of
Bangladesh and the Government of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar.
6 Ministry of Labour, Immigration and Population of the Government of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar (GoM), United Nations Development
Programme, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. (2018, May 30). Memorandum of Understanding Between the Ministry
of Labour, Immigration and Population of the Government of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar (GoM) and the United Nations Development
Programme and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.
7 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). (2017). Turn the Tide: Refugee Education in Crisis. UNHCR.
8 The literacy rate of the Cox’s Bazar district stood at 39.3% in 2011. See Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, Government of Bangladesh. (2013). District
Statistics 2011: Cox’s Bazar.
9 UNB. (2023, March 2). Dhaka wants foreign funds to relocate 70,000 Rohingyas to Bhasan Char. Dhaka Tribune. https://www.dhakatribune.com/
bangladesh/305975/dhaka-wants-foreign-funds-to-relocate-70-000.
10 UNB. (2023, March 2). Dhaka wants foreign funds to relocate 70,000 Rohingyas to Bhasan Char. Dhaka Tribune. https://www.dhakatribune.com/
bangladesh/305975/dhaka-wants-foreign-funds-to-relocate-70-000.
11 Korobi, S.A. (2023, March 19). Declining Funds, food for Rohingyas. New Age, https://www.newagebd.net/article/197176/declining-funds-food-forrohingyas#:~:text=The%20World%20Food%20Programme%20reports,from%20acute%20malnutrition%20and%20anaemia.
12 The Financial Express. (2022, December 18). China now largest FDI source in BD. https://fairbd.net/chinese-investment-in-bangladesh-explained/#.
13 The Financial Express. (2022, December 18). China now largest FDI source in BD. https://fairbd.net/chinese-investment-in-bangladesh-explained/#.
14 Oinam, A. (2023, April 8). China’s Investments in the Post-Coup Myanmar: An Assessment. CLAWS – Centre for Land Warfare Studies, New Delhi.
15 Blinken, A. J. (2023, January 31). Marking Two Years Since the Military Coup in Burma. U.S. Department of State. https://www.state.gov/marking-twoyears-since-the-military-coup-in-burma/.
16 Martin, M. (2023, February 6). What the BURMA Act Does and Doesn’t Mean for U.S. Policy in Myanmar. CSIS. https://www.csis.org/analysis/whatburma-act-does-and-doesnt-mean-us-policy-myanmar.
17 Martin, M. (2023, February 6). What the BURMA Act Does and Doesn’t Mean for U.S. Policy in Myanmar. CSIS. https://www.csis.org/analysis/whatburma-act-does-and-doesnt-mean-us-policy-myanmar.
18 Reuters, Naypyitaw. (2017, November 20). China draws 3-stage path to resolve Rohingya crisis. The Daily Star. https://www.thedailystar.net/rohingyacrisis/china-draws-3-stage-path-ceasefire-myanmar-rakhine-bangladesh-asem-wang-yi-naypyitaw-1493917.
19 Al Jazeera. (2023, May 5). Rohingya delegation visits Myanmar amid latest repatriation plans. Al Jazeera. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/5/5/
rohingya-delegation-visits-myanmar-amid-latest-repatriation-plans#:~:text=A%20Rohingya%20refugee%20delegation%20has,persecuted%20
minority%20to%20their%20homeland.
20 NewAge Bangladesh. (2023, May 25). Repatriation Scheme: Myanmar team visits Rohingya again. NewAge Bangladesh. https://www.newagebd.net/
article/202533/myanmar-team-visits-rohingyas-again.
21 NewAge Bangladesh. (2023, May 25). Repatriation Scheme: Myanmar team visits Rohingya again. NewAge Bangladesh. https://www.newagebd.net/
article/202533/myanmar-team-visits-rohingyas-again.
22 International Court of Justice. (2020). Reports of Judgments, Advisory Opinions and Orders Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide (The Gambia v. Myanmar) Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures, Order of 23 January 2020.
23 International Court of Justice. (2020). Reports of Judgments, Advisory Opinions and Orders Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide (The Gambia v. Myanmar) Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures, Order of 23 January 2020.
24 Myint-U, T. (2020). The Hidden History of Burma: Race, Capitalism, and the Crisis of Democracy in the 21st Century. W.W. Norton.
25 Albert, E., & Maizland, L. (2020, January 23). The Rohingya Crisis. Council on Foreign Relations.
26 Albert, E., & Maizland, L. (2020, January 23). The Rohingya Crisis. Council on Foreign Relations.
27 U.S. Department of State. (2023, March 24). Burma Sanctions; BBC News. (2021, February 11). Myanmar coup: U.S. announces sanctions on leaders. BBC
News. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-56015749,
28 AP News. (2022, February 21), EU sanctions 22 Myanmar officials, gas company, over abuses. AP News. https://apnews.com/article/business-europeelections-myanmar-aung-san-suu-kyi-4613d6b2545ea9411dddfa3b58f8bf49.
29 CEIC Data. (1976-2022). Myanmar Foreign Direct Investment: 1976-2022. https://www.ceicdata.com/en/indicator/myanmar/foreign-direct-investment
30 Chau, T. & Oo, D. (2023, February 2). ‘Riding a Rollercoaster’ in Myanmar’s post-coup economy. Al Jazeera. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/2/2/
riding-a-rollercoaster-in-myanmars-post-coup-economy#:~:text=Deepening%20conflict%2C%20sudden%20changes%20to,in%20the%20country%20
increasingly%20challenging.
31 Martin, M. (2023, February 6). What the BURMA Act Does and Doesn’t Mean for U.S. Policy in Myanmar. CSIS. https://www.csis.org/analysis/whatburma-act-does-and-doesnt-mean-us-policy-myanmar.
32 The Irrawaddy. (2020, June 1). World Bank Approves $460 Million Funding for Power Generation, Health Services in Myanmar. The Irrawaddy. https://
www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/world-bank-approves-460-million-funding-power-generation-health-services-myanmar.html.
33 UNB, Dhaka. (2021, November 18). UN adopts resolution on Rohingyas’ human rights in Myanmar. Daily Star. https://www.thedailystar.net/news/asia/
south-asia/news/un-adopts-resolution-human-rights-rohingya-muslims-myanmar-2232986.
34 Archives. Myanmar People and Races. https://web.archive.org/web/20100609072939/http://myanmartravelinformation.com/mti-myanmar-people/
index.htm
35 Mithun, M. B., & Arefin, A. (2020, November 26). Minorities among Minorities: The Case of Hindu Rohingya Refugees in Bangladesh. International
Journal on Minority and Group Rights, 28(1), 187-200. https://doi.org/10.1163/15718115-bja10020.
36 International Christian Concern. (2021, April 2). Myanmar’s Persecuted Rohingya Christians – Minority of Minorities. Persecution.org. https://www.
persecution.org/2021/04/02/myanmars-persecuted-rohingya-christians-minority-minorities/.
37 Al Jazeera. (2023, January 16). Firms in Europe, U.S. helping Myanmar manufacture arms, report says. Al Jazeera. https://www.aljazeera.
com/news/2023/1/16/firms-in-europe-us-helping-myanmar-manufacture-arms-report#:~:text=Companies%20from%2013%20countries%20
%E2%80%93%20including,a%20report%20released%20on%20Monday.
38 UNODC Regional Office for Southeast Asia and the Pacific. (2021, February 11). UNODC report: opium production drops again in Myanmar as the
synthetic drug market expands,. UNODC Regional Office for Southeast Asia and the Pacific, United Nations. https://www.unodc.org/roseap/en/2021/02/
myanmar-opium-survey-report-launch/story.html.
39 Strangio, S. (2022, February 2). Illicit Drug Production Has Surged Since Myanmar’s Coup. The Diplomat. https://thediplomat.com/2022/02/illicit-drugproduction-has-surged-since-myanmars-coup/..
40 Department of Narcotics Control, Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh. (2020). Annual Drug Report Bangladesh 2020.
41 Ahmed, I., & Biswas, N. R. (2022). Rohingyas in Myanmar and Bangladesh: The Violence-Protection Dialectic and the Narratives of Certain Unsafety /
Uncertain Safety. Centre for Genocide Studies, University of Dhaka and Institute for Risk and Disaster Reduction, University College London.
42 Ahmed, I. (2022, September). Myanmar, Narco-terrorism, Rohingya, and the World. Diplomats World.
43 Marrero, L. (2018, June 15). Feeding the Beast: The Role of Myanmar’s Illicit Economies in Continued State Instability. International Affairs Review.
44 Levin, D. (2015, October 22). Myanmar’s Jade Trade Is a $31 Billion ‘Heist,’ Report says. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/23/world/
asia/myanmars-jade-trade-is-a-dollar31-billion-heist-report-says.html.
45 Agnew, J., & Entrikin, J. N. (Eds.). (2004). The Marshall Plan Today Model and Metaphor (1st ed.). Routledge.
46 UN News. (2017, September 11). UN human rights chief points to ‘textbook example of ethnic cleansing’ in Myanmar. United Nations. https://news.un.org/
en/story/2017/09/564622-un-human-rights-chief-points-textbook-example-ethnic-cleansing-myanmar#:~:text=%E2%80%9CThe%20situation%20
seems%20a%20textbook,access%20to%20human%20rights%20investigators.
47 Advisory Commission on Rakhine State. (2017, August 23). Overview of key points and recommendations. Towards a Peaceful, Fair and Prosperous
Future for the People of Rakhine: Final Report of the Advisory Commission on Rakhine State.
48 UNFPA. (2021, August 19). Transformative education for adolescent youth in the Rohingya camps, one micro-garden at a time. Reliefweb. https://reliefweb.
int/report/bangladesh/transformative-education-adolescent-youth-rohingya-camps-one-micro-garden-time#:~:text=In%202021%2C%203%2C600%20
adolescent%20youth,activity%20should%20not%20be%20underestimated.
This essay originally appeared in the anthology “The Accountability, Politics, and Humanitarian Toll of the Rohingya Genocide” To download the full anthology, click here.
Dr. Imtiaz Ahmed is a professor of International Relations at the University of Dhaka. He is also a visiting Pprofessor at Taylor’s University, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. He has authored, co-authored, and edited 55 books and 20 monographs and published more than 125 research papers and scholarly articles in leading journals and edited volumes. Ahmed heads several national and international projects on mass violence, violent extremism, and the Rohingya crisis. His recent publications are the following books: “Rohingyas in Myanmar and Bangladesh: The Violence-Protection Dialectic and the Narratives of Certain Unsafety/Uncertain Safety,” co-authored with Niloy Ranjan Biswas (Dhaka: 2022); “Imagining Post-Covid Education Futures,” edited (Dhaka: 2023); and “Celebrating 100 Years of the University of Dhaka: Reflections from Alumni – National and International, in 7 Volumes,” edited (Dhaka: 2023). .."
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New Lines Institute
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2024-08-07
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Limits of Chinese power to influence actors and events in Myanmar’s raging civil war have become starkly apparent
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"In the closing weeks of 2023, the sweeping advances of an alliance of ethnic forces across Myanmar’s northeastern Shan state were often described as a watershed in a slow-grinding war, a telling sign that a military regime long held to be too big to fail could after all be defeated and ultimately overwhelmed.
Eight months on, following the late June collapse of a shaky Chinese-brokered ceasefire, a return to full-scale war and the military’s signal loss of the north Shan city of Lashio mean the issue looming over Myanmar is now of an entirely different order.
It turns simply on whether, beyond the watershed, the second phase of the 1027 campaign initiated by the Brotherhood alliance on October 27 last year has triggered a landslide of accelerating and potentially terminal reverses for the State Administration Council (SAC) coup regime; or whether, propped up by another Chinese-sponsored ceasefire, the military, or Tatmadaw, can stabilize an increasingly desperate situation.
In three fundamental respects, the latest hostilities in northern Myanmar have wrought a sea change in the conflict. Importantly, all three underscore the rapidity with which events are assuming a momentum of their own beyond the control of any of the main actors, domestic or external, but with striking geopolitical implications that will impact them all.
The decisive shift of hostilities into the national heartland spearheaded by ethnic Bamar People’s Defense Forces (PDFs), militarily capable and largely loyal to the opposition’s National Unity Government (NUG), has been the first and perhaps biggest game-changer.
Launched on June 25, 1027 Phase Two was planned and executed across three organizationally and logistically distinct fronts.
One, best described as the “highway front”, required seizing control of the towns of Nawnghkio, Kyaukme and Hsipaw strung out along the national highway between the regional capital of Lashio and Mandalay in central Myanmar.
That task has fallen mainly to the ethnic Palaung Ta’ang National Liberation Front (TNLA), a force of around 11,000 troops based in the tea-growing hill country in the northwest of the state.
Focused on Lashio itself, operations on the second front were undertaken by the TNLA’s Brotherhood ally, the Kokang Chinese Myanmar Nationalities Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA).
A city with a pre-1027 population of some 200,000 and an army garrison estimated in late June at around 6,000 troops, Lashio constitutes the strategic lynchpin of northern Shan state and, until it finally fell on August 3, was the headquarters of the Tatmadaw’s Northeast Regional military command (RMC).
From late June through July, fighting on both Shan fronts was bitter as Brotherhood forces, hammered by unrelenting airstrikes, assaulted and overran a score of well-defended battalion bases screening all four urban centers.
By the beginning of August, the two Brotherhood allies had basically secured their key objectives, albeit at a high human cost. Neither side has even hinted at its losses, but given the scope and intensity of the fighting, it is probably safe to assume a toll of at least 5,000 killed and wounded on both sides.
The critical new element of 1027 Phase Two, however, has been a third western front driving into the national heartland along the Ayeyarwady Valley. Fighting in this zone spread from the ruby-mining center of Mogok south to the outskirts of the country’s second-largest city, Mandalay, with Bamar PDFs spearheading the advance.
The most notable has been the Mandalay PDF (MDY-PDF), a well-organized and well-equipped force of at least 3,000 troops based in the hills along the Shan state-Mandalay Region border to the north of the garrison town of Pyin Oo Lwin.
While the force has declared its allegiance to the NUG and received some funding from the shadow government, it has grown since late 2022 as the result of training and material support provided by the TNLA and operates under TNLA command and control.
As in Shan state, opposition advances were fiercely contested: joint TNLA and PDF forces did not finally secure Mogok until July 24. Further south, the strategically vital town of Singu where a bridge across the Ayeyarwady links northern Mandalay Region to Shwebo city in Sagaing Region, fell to PDF forces on July 20.
By that time PDFs were attacking army-held villages 20 kilometers from the northern suburbs of Mandalay which, with its population of 1.6 million, is the headquarters of the Central RMC.
The shift of large-scale hostilities into the Bamar heartland is critically significant. It offers logistical and organizational connectivity between the MDY-PDF and opposition forces in two other key zones: to the north, the riverine towns of Tigyaing and Katha that fall within the greater sphere of influence of the Kachin Independence Army (KIA); and to the west, the resistance hotbed of central Sagaing around Shwebo city, potentially threatening the highway between Shwebo and Mandalay.
If in the coming weeks the TNLA/MDY-PDF combine advances from newly captured Nawnghkio along the highway to threaten the garrison town of Pyin Oo Lwin, the noose around Myanmar’s ancient royal capital would tighten inexorably from both the north and east.
Limits of Chinese influence
While highlighting the role of well-organized PDFs with strategic punch, 10.27 Phase Two has also laid bare the stark limits of Chinese influence in stemming the coming landslide.
Following the collapse of the Hai Geng ceasefire, an agreement reached in Kunming in January this year, repeated efforts to broker another cessation of hostilities in the midst of fierce battles proved predictably unsuccessful.
All three Brothers – including the alliance’s third partner, the Arakan Army (AA) – benefit to a greater or lesser degree from cross-border connectivity with China and have been at pains to stress that they will safeguard Chinese economic and infrastructure interests.
At the same time, all three are evidently intent on prioritizing war objectives that go well beyond securing autonomy for their own regions to include supporting at various levels Bamar efforts to bring down the edifice of military dictatorship.
For its part, China is undoubtedly deeply frustrated with Senior General Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, a capricious and incompetent dictator whose 2021 coup effectively torpedoed Beijing’s long-term economic and geostrategic objectives in Myanmar.
At the same time, China has no interest in facilitating the collapse of the SAC regime, which it fears would mean either a descent into fragmentation and chaos or an interim administration in Naypyidaw centered on a NUG that Beijing views as a stalking horse for Western meddling in its backyard.
As a result, Beijing appears caught between the Scylla of the Brotherhood and aggressive PDFs it cannot rein in and the Charybdis of its support for a regime in Naypyidaw led by generals whose floundering defeats and potential collapse have set at risk years of economic and political investment in Myanmar.
Thrown into sudden relief by the fall of Lashio, the upshot will not be a foreign policy debacle on the scale of Cambodia 1978, when Beijing’s errant Khmer Rouge proteges were abruptly swept from power by a Vietnamese army forcing thousands of Chinese advisors to flee for their lives.
But the dilemma policymakers in Beijing are wrestling with today is already a far cry from the caricature of China-in-Myanmar projected by its many Western critics: as a deeply prescient chess master skillfully moving pawns and knights in pursuit of grand geostrategic ambitions stretching decades into the future.
All of that, however, has gone to underscore the importance of one trusty knight that China does have on the board and can probably count on: the United Wa State Army (UWSA), one of the world’s largest drug-trafficking militias.
The sudden intervention of the China-leaning, 30,000-strong force which had earlier stood aside from the post-coup chaos sweeping the rest of the country has undoubtedly been the third major game-changer triggered by 1027 Phase Two.
Having grown strong, rich and influential behind the shield of a 35-year-long ceasefire with the Tatmadaw, the once-despised Wa tribals have emerged from their mountain redoubts east of the Salween River and along the Thai border to reshape the political and military balance across south-central Shan state.
On July 27, even as fighting in Lasho still raged, a contingent of around 500 Wa troops advanced into the city as a neutral force enjoying good relations with both belligerents ostensibly to protect a liaison office and other real estate interests.
Not lost on independent observers, however, was that the UWSA had effectively taken advantage of the conflict to establish a significant and easily reinforceable military presence in the regional capital of north Shan well beyond their traditional bailiwicks.
For those paying attention, pointers to the wider scope of Wa ambitions had come 16 days earlier in central Shan State when on July 11 UWSA forces abruptly crossed the Salween River and occupied the Tatmadaw garrison town of Tangyan on the west bank without a shot fired.
It remains unclear whether the move was brokered by China two days earlier when Myanmar Army commander Vice Senior General Soe Win was attending a Shanghai Cooperation Organization meeting in the Chinese city of Qingdao — and likely pleading with his hosts to rein in the Brotherhood and pass on more ammunition.
But the occupation of Tangyan was clearly agreed in advance with the Tatmadaw garrison and effectively shielded the army from losing the town to advancing MNDAA and TNLA forces.
It was also coordinated with a close Wa protege, the ethnic Shan State Progress Party (SSPP) which since the coup has benefitted from new infusions of UWSA-supplied weaponry, vehicles and drones to expand its presence west of the Salween. Shortly after the Wa moved into Tangyan, SSPP troops advanced into Mong Yai town 65 kilometers to the west that controls the road to Lashio.
The Wa power-play has served to throw into sharp relief two new realities with major geopolitical implications. The first is that the UWSA-SSPP alliance is now well-placed to dominate south-central Shan state.
The expansion will come at the cost of the only other significant ethnic faction in the region: the SSPP’s longtime rival for leadership of the state’s ethnic Shan majority, the Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS).
Led by Yord Serk, an aging warlord-cum-businessman, and already weakened by a string of military reverses, the RCSS faces the imminent prospect of being pushed back to its bases on the Thai border.
Its retreat would leave the Wa-SSPP combine dominant across the entirety of central and southern Shan state sharing a loose border with the northern Brotherhood Alliance forces of the MNDAA and TNLA.
The second emerging reality is closely related to the first: the Tangyan gambit served to lay bare the striking weakness of the Myanmar military, an incapacity with potentially far-reaching repercussions.
As the Tatmadaw faces escalating pressure in the national heartland in the coming months, the Tangyan precedent is all too likely to encourage further Wa takeovers of larger army bases in eastern Shan state, including potentially the Triangle RMC in Keng Tung and Tachilek city, a short drive south on the Thai border.
Any such scenario implies the realization of a long-cherished Wa dream: the merger of the UWSA’s autonomous zone along the China border with its Military Region 171 enclave on the Thai border.
The territorial tie-up would mean the emergence of a newly unified “Wa State” with close political, military and economic links to China and sympathetic to China’s infrastructure ambitions in Shan state and beyond.
What for the Wa leadership is a dream on the cusp of reality, however, may prove a nightmare for Thai military planners already struggling to stem a tsunami of illicit narcotics flowing south across a porous border from industrial-scale production centers in Wa-ruled territory..."
Source/publisher:
"Asia Times" (Hong Kong)
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-07
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Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations, The Military's political role
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"Local aid workers and organisations must not only be accountable to the communities they serve but also meet the compliance requirements of international funding agencies.
Compliance frameworks are of course important to ensure the accountability and effectiveness of internationally funded programs. However, local humanitarian actors often find these frameworks to be top-down, overly rigid, and unsuited to volatile and politically complex crises. This persists despite the commitments made in the Grand Bargain to localise aid systems and simplify requirements such as those related to reporting.
Our evidence from Myanmar demonstrates that, while perhaps established with good intentions, international agencies’ compliance frameworks and related requirements can have unintended negative consequences for local actors and communities.
Since the military junta’s coup in early 2021, civilian populations in Myanmar have faced an escalating humanitarian emergency. In a country of approximately 56 million people, more than three million have been forced to flee their homes. This crisis is a direct result of the Myanmar military’s targeting of civilian populations and aid workers. In this context, local aid workers and systems are essential to ensuring vital aid for civilian populations, serving as a “lifeline for the population,” as one aid worker said.
Yet our interviews with leading members of Myanmar’s local humanitarian networks revealed a pattern of negative repercussions from the compliance requirements imposed on internationally funded aid programs, including increased security risks and the obstruction of vital aid flows.
In Myanmar, the junta’s widespread use of extreme violence has led local organisations to develop very low-profile approaches which enable them to navigate military restrictions and reach communities in need of humanitarian aid. However, the compliance frameworks of international aid agencies commonly require local organisations to collect detailed information from “beneficiaries”, including sensitive information, revealing a dangerous lack of situational awareness. These systems can lead to critical delays in the delivery of humanitarian aid, undermining rapid and adaptive approaches.
International compliance requirements can also increase the already grave risks faced by actors on the ground. For example, the common requirement to obtain multiple quotes before procuring aid supplies can draw increased attention to aid workers and suppliers. A local Civil Society Organisation (CSO) member pointedly said:
[The Myanmar military] asked the local sellers to report to them when there is buying of temporary shelters … as they do not want [them] to reach [internally displaced people] and defence forces … But if we ask for three quotations using organisational formats in our small town, they will know us right away, putting us at risk.
Other requirements like the need to supply copies of drivers’ licences to show how supplies are transported, or the location of displacement camps, similarly jeopardise the low-profile approaches that local aid workers have developed.
During our interviews, aid workers described having to hide sensitive documents, often storing them at staff houses or concealing them on their bodies to cross through checkpoints.
There were exceptions, with some international agencies having increased the flexibility of their systems since the coup — for example, allowing for soft copies of documentation or reducing the need for multiple quotes for procurement. But these changes often took the form of short-term “emergency exceptions”, leaving local actors concerned about a return to “business as usual”.
For local humanitarian actors, there is a perception that this business-as-usual approach is linked to self-interest. As one local organisation leader said:
The most important thing that many INGOs and UN agencies should consider right now is the community, what they need and how they can support … Instead, they are just considering themselves, their survival, staff salaries, organisational survival, and self-preservation.
Amid Myanmar’s complex emergency, leaders of local organisations were not advocating for the abandonment of compliance systems; they acknowledged the crucial role they play. Instead, they argued for “a balance between what local partners can do in this context and how to ensure … minimum accountability requirements,” as said by one CSO member. They felt that this balance was currently lacking.
Not only can inappropriate compliance systems cause harm for local aid workers and organisations, they can also perpetuate unequal aid partnerships and create the perception of a lack of trust by international actors in their local “partners”. The knowledge and expertise of local aid organisations are often sidelined when compliance systems impose externally determined ways of working that are ill-suited to Myanmar’s volatile situation. This speaks to a disconnect between international approaches and the commitments made in frameworks like the Grand Bargain and the Charter for Change.
Many local organisations have developed contextually appropriate internal policies and systems to ensure accountability and compliance. However, international agencies too often deem these policies and approaches inadequate. This can force local agencies into prioritising what one CSO leader called the “capacity to comply” with internationally determined standards and criteria, rather than focusing on the “capacity to grow” their organisation and human resources based on local context and needs.
As highlighted by analysts like Hugo Slim, genuine localisation should enhance the agency of local populations in crisis situations to develop and lead their own humanitarian systems and approaches. Yet a “compliance-first” culture impedes the agency of local actors, reinforcing power inequalities in aid relationships.
It is vital that international agencies adopt a “do no harm” approach in relation to all compliance systems, ensuring that local partner and beneficiary security is always prioritised above other concerns, including financial risk management. They should also work with local organisations to develop systems that achieve a fair balance between their requirements and what is realistic in a context like Myanmar.
In developing and implementing compliance systems, they should “walk the walk” and not just “talk the talk” of shifting power to the local actors who are leading humanitarian responses on the ground.
The authors would like to acknowledge the contribution of Tamas Wells to this blog.
Disclosure
This research was conducted by the authors for the Myanmar Research Network at the University of Melbourne. The research was part-funded by a European NGO that prefers not to be identified..."
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