Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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"Human Rights Violations took place in States and Regions from Aug 15 to 21, 2023
Military Junta Troop launched airstrikes and dropped bombs in Sagaing Region, Bago Region, Kayin State, and Kachin State from August 15th to 21st. Military Junta troops attacked with heavy artillery which seemed to contain chemical poison, to Thasi Village, Kale Township, Sagaing Region, and 20 civilians were poisoned and took medical care. They also arrested over 30 civilians from Sagaing Region and Magway Region as human shields. Military Junta arrested and killed 8 civilians from Pinlebu Township and Khin-U Township.
Civilians were forced to leave their places by the Military Junta troop’s matching, for 5 times within a week. 2 children died and 1 was injured by the Military’s Human Rights Violations. 5 underage youth were arrested within a week. Military land mines killed a civilian and injured 2 people..."
Source/publisher:
Network for Human Rights Documentation-Burma
Date of entry/update:
2023-08-22
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Individual Documents
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Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights Defenders
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"Abandon hope. This is the message the junta is sending to the population of Myanmar.
World leaders will gather in Jakarta in early September for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and East Asia Summits. Participants will include several G7 leaders and U.S. Vice-President Kamala Harris, while U.S. President Joe Biden will be in the region attending the G20 with several ASEAN and G7 leaders. A key agenda item for the ASEAN meetings will be Myanmar, where a military junta in power after a 2021 coup has engaged in a mass crackdown on opposition movements and ethnic armed groups.
The junta has committed arbitrary detentions, summary executions, torture, and unlawful military attacks, much of the brutality amounting to crimes against humanity and war crimes. A recent so-called partial pardon for ousted leader Aung San Suu Kyi was essentially a scam — six years were shaved off the 78-year-old’s 33-year prison sentence, deflecting attention from another extension of the “state of emergency” the junta has invoked to try to justify their crackdown.
Diplomatic efforts on Myanmar since its 2021 coup have floundered. ASEAN and its allies, as well as the U.N. Security Council, have failed to compel the junta to curb their abuses, just as they failed to hold the Myanmar military accountable for crimes against humanity and acts of genocide against Rohingya Muslims in 2016-2017, atrocities that are ongoing.
Despite ASEAN’s inability to unify on Myanmar, diplomats within and outside the bloc continue to refer to ASEAN’s defunct five-point consensus from April 2021 — which Myanmar’s junta repudiated days after agreeing to it — as a pretext for their own inaction.
Myanmar’s generals have been counting on everyone giving up. And while the people of Myanmar have not, most outside governments have obliged. Myanmar’s human rights crisis, however, is not insolvable, and it’s too horrendous to be ignored.
Granted, it’s hard to be hopeful. The Myanmar military has engaged in relentless, violent campaigns against the country’s people for more than six decades. Some of the military’s most egregious crimes, including the violence against the Rohingya, occurred during the period of democratic reforms that began in 2010. The Myanmar military’s indifference about its international reputation and its willingness to commit massive human rights abuses seems unlimited.
The U.N. Security Council, which last December passed a resolution noting the council’s “full support for ASEAN’s central role in facilitating a peaceful solution” in Myanmar, needs to chart a bolder course. The United Kingdom, which traditionally leads council debates on Myanmar, should distribute ideas for a new, stronger resolution on Myanmar, including the possibility of an arms embargo and international sanctions. China abstained and did not veto last December’s resolution, indicating that more pressure at the council is possible. Some ASEAN members have called for U.N. support in resolving the crisis, and there is little hope ASEAN will ever accomplish anything if the Security Council doesn’t settle on a new approach soon.
Furthermore, ASEAN dialogue partners attending the summits — in particular, Security Council members United States, U.K., France, Japan, and upcoming 2024 addition South Korea — need to signal their intentions for stronger action at the U.N. rather than continuing to imply that ASEAN can solve the crisis in Myanmar on its own.
They should urge reluctant ASEAN members to cooperate in enforcing existing U.S., EU, and U.K. sanctions in Southeast Asian jurisdictions, and press them to suspend Myanmar from ASEAN entirely unless the junta begins moving toward reform.
In particular, ASEAN partners should pressure Thailand, which purchases hundreds of millions of dollars in natural gas from Myanmar, and Singapore, where the military has bank accounts for its foreign revenues. Thailand and Singapore should be warning companies and banks in their jurisdictions not to evade U.S. and EU sanctions or risk financial penalties.
Some observers claim that international pressure and sanctions are impotent in the face of the Myanmar military’s imperviousness. The truth is that the outside governments have never really unified to pressure the junta and impose punitive sanctions on Myanmar’s generals. Sanctions imposed by the US, European Union, and a small number of likeminded governments since the coup do target the military leadership and its business interests. Yet as with the previous sanctions put in place before Myanmar’s fleeting period of reform, measures have been imposed too slowly, not been enforced robustly, and failed to target the junta’s largest sources of foreign income.
Enormous revenues still flow to the junta in dollars, euros, and other currencies from joint ventures, mostly extractive, involving companies across the world — not just China, but also countries that have condemned the junta, including Japan, South Korea, Singapore, and Malaysia. Transactions from natural gas revenues, the junta’s single largest source of foreign currency, have only recently been targeted by the United States, and have not yet been effectively blocked. Restrictions on the military’s purchases of aviation fuel need to be strengthened and more tightly enforced.
More effective efforts to block extractive revenues, paid in dollars and euros, would significantly reduce the junta’s foreign-currency income. These efforts would also likely reduce transactions to the junta in other currencies: most international banks need to comply with U.S. and EU rules so they can conduct U.S. dollar and euro transactions for other clients.
Myanmar’s military has not faced serious economic pain. Should anyone then wonder why it has so blatantly defied calls by neighbors, world powers, and the United Nations? Does it make any sense to expect a divided ASEAN to compel them to change?
It’s not too late to adopt effective measures to compel Myanmar’s military to change its conduct. It’s simply a matter of political will. The people of Myanmar haven’t given up. Neither should the rest of the world..."
Source/publisher:
Just Security (New York) via Human Rights Watch (USA)
Date of entry/update:
2023-08-22
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Type:
Individual Documents
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Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, The Military's political role, Human Rights and international relations
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Kim Aris says in an interview with RFA that the junta hasn’t responded to his requests to contact his mother.
Description:
"Radio Free Asia’s Soe San Aung spoke with Kim Aris, the son of former State Counselor Aung San Suu Kyi, last week.
Suu Kyi served as Myanmar’s de facto leader following national elections in 2015, which her National League of Democracy won by a landslide. The party also won the 2020 national elections, but the military seized power from the democratically elected government on Feb. 1, 2021.
The army immediately arrested civilian leaders, including Suu Kyi, who were in Naypyidaw for the convening of the newly elected lower house of parliament. She was held at Naypyidaw Prison until last month, when a source told RFA that she was relocated to “a more comfortable state-owned residence.”
Aris is living in the United Kingdom and has been unable to contact his mother since the military coup.
RFA: You’ve been involved in supporting the Burmese community in London and you’ve been finding funds to support back home. First, tell me what you’ve been doing to support the spring revolution, the nationwide wave of popular resistance to the Myanmar military following the 2021 coup.
Kim Aris: But I never really wish to be a public figure. I kind of already stand by and see what others do and what is needed. And as my mother’s son, I have a unique position whereby I can speak out to the world. Outside of the Burmese community, people aren’t very aware of what’s happening. So I’m doing what I can to raise funds and awareness for the cause.
RFA: As we know, your mother, Aung San Suu Kyi, was once given the chance to leave Burma, but chose to stay with the Burmese people over her family. How would you describe your mother?
Kim Aris: It always saddens and angers me that my mother has sometimes been portrayed as cold hearted because she was unable to be by my father’s side while he was dying. I was nursing him at that time, and I can say that he did not wish for her to return to England.
We wanted to be by her side in Burma. Unfortunately, the military couldn’t find it in their heart to allow him his dying wish. And from my point of view, I’ve never felt like she left me. I was with her when she was first put under house arrest in Burma. And it never felt like she abandoned me in any way.
Also in Burma, everybody’s now lost their parents to the military. It’s not as though I’ve actually lost my mother. People in Burma are going through far worse than what I have been through. It’s lucky for me that my mother left me here in England, where it’s safe. I feel privileged. Compared to what’s happening to the people in Burma, I have a very easy life.
RFA: Now your mother, Aung San Suu Kyi, is under house arrest again. Have you had any contact with her?
Kim Aris: As far as I’m aware, she’s not actually under house arrest. She’s in prison somewhere. The military has said that she’s been moved into house arrest, but there’s been no evidence that that’s actually the case.
I have had no contact with her. And the military hasn’t responded to any requests I have made for contact or to inform me of her whereabouts. In the past, I have had some contact when she was under house arrest in Yangon, but now I don’t know what condition she’s being kept under or where she is.
RFA: We are aware that you went to the Burmese embassy to give a birthday gift to your mother, but they didn’t let you in and they didn’t even say anything to you. How many times have you sent a request to the junta to get in contact with her?
Kim Aris: There’s actually very little point to corresponding with these people because I haven’t received any response ever. So I’ve tried various other avenues, such as through the British Foreign Office and via the International Red Cross, but they’ve had the same result, which is no response.
RFA: I’m sorry to hear that. But in the last amnesty, they commuted some of your mother’s sentence. What was your reaction?
Kim Aris: It’s a military gesture. The military has used these tactics in the past to try and appease the international community whilst they still continue to perpetrate all sorts of atrocities against their own people every day. And even with the reduced sentence, my mother would still be over 100 when she’s released.
RFA: So you’ve been back to Burma, like when your mother was released in 2010. What was your perception about the country?
Kim Aris: Well, obviously the situation there was incredibly sad, especially since the country was going through a period of development. There was a great deal to look forward to. Now, all of that has been taken away. The country has gone backwards since the coup. So it seems like it is worse now than it was back in 1988.
RFA: Yeah, it’s like the country is in chaos right now. You know, young people are fighting back for their freedom. What's your point of view about today’s crisis?
Kim Aris: Well, from what I can gather, the situation is not sustainable for anybody. The military aren’t as strong as people think they may be. They have lots of high tech weaponry, but they do not have the manpower that the people have. And I hope that this war cannot go on for too much longer. No more bloodshed.
But obviously, that’s not going to happen any time soon. Hopefully things will play out before two years’ time. The military will collapse, but we’ll see.
RFA: What if you had a chance to talk directly with Senior Gen. Min Aung Hlaing, the chairman of the junta’s governing body?
Kim Aris: I would ask him to stop waging this war against his own people. The resolve and fortitude of the Burmese people is absolute. They will never accept the military rule, and the youth of Burma will never accept having their freedom taken away. Now, for the first time in a long time, all the different ethnicities are starting to work together, and that shows that the army will never win this war.
RFA: What hope do you have for Burma?
Kim Aris: I hope that Burma will achieve the freedom that it’s been looking for so many years now. And that people can start to rebuild their lives. In the future, hopefully people will be united and be able to work together in a more inclusive manner.
RFA: Burmese people asking for international help. As Aung San Suu Kyi’s son, what is your message to the international community?
Kim Aris: I would ask the international community not to stand by and let the military junta brazenly commit crimes against humanity. I would ask them to increase humanitarian assistance and support organizations that are actually able to get aid to the areas which are in need. Also, to impose more targeted and effective sanctions against the junta. Also to recognize a meaningful dialogue with the shadow National Unity Government.
As stated in a recent UN report, war crimes committed by Burma’s military, including the vengeance bombings, is becoming increasingly frequent. 1.7 million civilians have been displaced, over 15,000 arrested and 6,000 killed. The military are conducting a war on their own people, regardless of race, ethnicity or religion. 17.6 million civilians are now in urgent need of lifesaving aid, protection and support.
Recent floods triggered by heavy monsoon rains have added to this crisis, with a further 50,000 people displaced. A regime that uses airstrikes against civilian villages, then returns to kill mothers and children while they are collecting the dead for burial. It’s a situation that needs to be addressed by the international community, who seem to be happy to stand aside and let this happen.
RFA: We have learned that your mother doesn’t want you to get involved in politics. Is that true? Did she ever say anything to you?
Kim Aris: Yeah, she’s never wanted me to be involved in politics. I’ve never wanted to be involved in politics. As I said, I would much rather not be any sort of a public figure. But since the military are not allowing me any access to my mother at all, I feel like I need to do something to try my best to help the situation in Burma.
After all, my mother cannot tell me what she thinks. So I have to think what she would want me to be doing. And I know she would want me to be helping where I can.
RFA: Do you hold out hope that she would be set free again?
Kim Aris: Absolutely. I cannot see the situation in Burma continuing as it is. I hope she will be free – along with all the other political prisoners in the country – and can find peace again.
RFA: What is your message to the people who are fighting for democracy in Burma, especially young people?
Kim Aris: I would say never give up. And this fight is one that cannot be lost. The military will never win. And the rest of the world is thinking about what is happening today, even though it doesn’t seem like it. Sometimes people around the world are trying to help.
RFA: By the way, I have seen the pictures with your mother and Taichito (Aung San Suu Kyi’s dog). We know you left Taichito with your mother in Burma. What is his situation now?
Kim Aris: I believe he is in Yangon. I’m not sure where exactly. He’s getting old. His eyesight isn’t as good as it was, and I’m sure he'll be missing May May (Burmese word for Mommy)..."
Source/publisher:
"Radio Free Asia" (USA)
Date of entry/update:
2023-08-20
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Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights Defenders
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"London, 18 August 2023: Myanmar’s junta has filed a complaint with the British police to expel the pro-democracy Ambassador, Kyaw Zwar Minn, from the official ambassadorial residence in London and take possession of the property. The complaint accuses Ambassador Minn of trespassing and before it can go to trial it must be approved by the UK Attorney General.
The Ambassador was locked out of the embassy by pro-military representatives shortly after the coup in 2021, but he has remained in his residence, ‘Myanmar House’.
Ambassador Minn said he was “adamant” that he would not leave the property. “I will resist all attempts to expel me and I will remain the custodian of the property on behalf of the people of Myanmar House until the threat from this kleptocratic criminal gang passes and I am able to hand the house over to an incoming democratic ambassador.”
Chris Gunness, Director of the Myanmar Accountability Project, which has been involved in this case, said “according to the English land registry, the Union of Myanmar owns the house and as the junta does not represent the Union of Myanmar, this move has no legal validity.”
Gunness condemned “in the strongest terms” what he described as “an attempted property heist”. He said it was “inconceivable that the British authorities, who have condemned the coup and imposed economic sanctions on the generals, would permit this move by an illegal junta that has imprisoned the country’s democratically-elected government and which carries out massacres, indiscriminate air strikes and mass arson attacks on a daily basis.”
Gunness urged Myanmar’s democratic National Unity Government “to establish a representative office in Myanmar House and to continue with the important task of representing the people of Myanmar in all major diplomatic hubs. Failure to do this risks handing the junta a major diplomatic prize.”
Myanmar’s military regime has been accused at the International Court of Justice of committing genocide against the Rohingya people and is being investigated by the International Criminal Court. The Myanmar Accountability Project, MAP, has initiated criminal complaints against members of the junta in Turkey and Indonesia and will file a criminal complaint in the Philippines later this year.
The latest report by the UN’s Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar, says there are credible reports that the junta has committed war crimes and crimes against humanity..."
Source/publisher:
Myanmar Accountability Project
Date of entry/update:
2023-08-19
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations, Human Rights Defenders
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"On August 19, 2023, Member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and Foreign Minister Wang Yi held talks in Beijing with Thai Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Don Pramudwinai who came to China for a working visit.
Wang Yi said that China and Thailand are as close as one family. The friendship with China is the consensus of the ruling and opposition parties of Thailand and the shared wish of people from the two countries, and the development of bilateral relations is not affected by changes in the international landscape or the domestic situation in Thailand. He believes that Thailand will maintain its stability and sustained development. The Chinese side is ready to work with the Thai side to jointly implement the important outcomes achieved in President Xi Jinping's visit to Thailand last November, make concerted efforts to advance the building of a China-Thailand community with a shared future, and join hands to address all challenges.
Wang Yi said that China stands ready to work with Thailand to deepen cooperation in various fields and strive for more visualized results of the China-Laos-Thailand Connectivity Development Corridor Outlook. The two sides need to speed up the construction of the China-Thailand railway and the China-Laos-Thailand railway connection lines, and jointly crack down on telecom fraud and other transnational criminal activities. China is ready to continue to firmly support the building of the ASEAN Community, support the upholding of the ASEAN centrality, and support the joint efforts to build an economic growth center, to constantly inject new impetus into regional economic integration. Through deepening the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation, the two sides can create a pioneer zone for the Global Development Initiative, a pilot zone for the Global Security Initiative, and a demonstration zone where the Global Civilization Initiative is best implemented, and build an even closer Lancang-Mekong community with a shared future. China stands ready to work with ASEAN countries to speed up the advancement of consultations on the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea, strive for the early formation of effective and substantive regional rules, and build the South China Sea into a sea of peace, friendship and cooperation. Wang Yi said that all countries should guard against forces outside the region provoking camp-based confrontation and instigating the Cold War mentality, which will undermine the hard-won peaceful and stable situation.
Don Pramudwinai said that Thailand-China relations are strong, delivering enormous well-being for the people of the two countries. Under the current situation of rising international and regional uncertainties, Thailand is ready to further strengthen dialogue and exchanges with China, deepen mutually beneficial cooperation in various fields, promote the China-Laos-Thailand railway connection, and work for common development. Thailand applauds the fact that China is the first to express the readiness to sign the Protocol to the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone. Thailand supports the alignment of the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific and the Belt and Road Initiative, supports deepening the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation, and supports building the South China Sea into a sea of peace, cooperation and stability. Thailand opposes the zero-sum game mentality and camp-based confrontation, welcomes the Global Development Initiative, the Global Security Initiative, and the Global Civilization Initiative proposed by President Xi Jinping, and believes that China's initiatives set examples for the whole world.
The two sides had an in-depth exchange of views on the Myanmar issue, agreeing to make efforts to advance the process of a political solution to the Myanmar issue and supporting the resolution of the Myanmar issue in the ASEAN way.
Both sides also had an exchange of views on international and regional issues of mutual interest and concern..."
Source/publisher:
Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Date of entry/update:
2023-08-19
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations, Burma/Myanmar's Foreign relations, general
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Sub-title:
UN bigwig Martin Griffiths didn’t bow before Myanmar’s coup-maker but he picked an impolitic moment to call for more donor funding
Description:
"The United Nations Under-Secretary for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator Martin Griffiths made a visit this week to Myanmar’s military capital Naypyidaw, and went mano-a-mano with dictator Min Aung Hlaing, recently self-appointed prime minister and head of the State Administration Council (SAC) junta.
Griffiths, also the head of the Office Coordinating Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), is probably the highest-ranking UN official to visit Myanmar since the February 2021 coup.
The UN and international aid agencies have been facing severe restrictions on responding not just to spreading armed conflict throughout Myanmar, which has displaced nearly two million civilians, but also following Cyclone Mocha devastated large parts of Rakhine state and Magwe and Sagaing Regions in mid-May. The military continues to obstruct recovery efforts and reconstruction.
State-run media ran this headline the day after Griffiths and Min Aung Hlaing met and shook hands in Naypyidaw; “Global community should seek accurate information on Myanmar’s situation.”
From the military’s side, the topics for discussion ranged from “spreading misinformation on various situations of Myanmar in the international community, the need for the international community to know actual conditions in Myanmar, lesser aid of international organizations including the United Nations for Myanmar in the period when the Covid-19 broke out and storm (Cyclone) Mocha hit, and further cooperation in humanitarian aid.”
This could be summarized as Min Aung Hlaing blaming the UN and the international community for the violence and dysfunction fueled by his failing military rule. We shouldn’t mistake Griffiths’ visit as a genuine gesture of cooperation from the SAC after years of foreign aid obstruction across the country.
For Min Aung Hlaing it was a “kneel before me” moment, even if the OCHA head isn’t “a take the knee” kind of guy. A seasoned diplomat, founder of the Center for Humanitarian Dialogue (HD Center) and advisor to Middle East peace envoys, Griffiths is a practiced interlocutor with despots. Maybe that’s the problem: he’s simply going through the motions.
It was therefore glumly predictable Griffiths would release a tepid statement. “Successive crises in Myanmar have left one-third of the population in need of humanitarian aid. They expect more and better from their leaders and from the international community” is pointing out not just the obvious but the clear implication that the UN has been failing.
Then, quite brazenly, Griffiths claimed the UN could do better with more access and more funding, reminding a miserly world that the UN humanitarian response plan was only 22% funded.
It’s clear that UN communications messaging is comfortable with stark contradictions, but fund-raising after shaking hands with a war criminal and visiting disaster-racked Rakhine state? Indecorous, if not dehumanizing.
And if the UN has been unable to credibly claim they were capable of doing more with increased funding, then why give them more cash? A hangdog foreigner with hat in hand pleading for mercy and more money doesn’t move a war criminal.
The standard UN reproach after visits like this is wait-and-see the results: even small changes on the ground are evidence of progress and perhaps Griffiths’ was able to penetrate Min Aung Hlaing’s hard shell.
Unlikely. There has been intense criticism of the UN and the international community for their lack of progress in moving the SAC. Griffiths’ visit should be proof that Myanmar hasn’t completely disappeared from the UN’s conscience, and regardless of the view on “success”, he made the effort and is trying. But this is short-term memory loss logic.
Griffiths and the SAC have been at odds before. Responding to the Christmas Eve massacre at Hpruso in Kayah state, where SAC forces murdered 35 civilians and set fire to their vehicles, Griffiths released a statement two days later that stated:
“I condemn this grievous incident and all attacks against civilians throughout the country. I call upon the authorities to immediately commence a thorough and transparent investigation…(and) call upon the Myanmar Armed Forces and all armed groups in Myanmar to take all measures to protect civilians from harm.”
The SAC’s unconvincing response claimed: “Then, about 10 terrorists who were waiting on the hills of the village attacked with (assorted weapons)…KNPP (Karenni National Progressive Party and PDF (People’s Defense Forces) terrorists, including newcomers for explosive training, were arrested dead…the seven vehicles carrying petrol, diesel and foodstuffs collected from the villages by force for the terrorist groups were burnt.”
This has been the SAC’s response to UN accusations of war crimes since the 2021 coup: deny everything and wait for the UN to move on. It’s rumored it was Griffiths who defenestrated former UN special envoy Noeleen Heyzer. If there was valid criticism of Heyzer’s lack of progress, and a lot of criticism was misplaced, the SAC now sits squarely in Griffith’s inbox.
Former special envoy on Myanmar Noeleen Heyzer visiting a Rohingya refugee camp in Bangladesh in August 2022. Image: Twitter / Screengrab
Three further points from Griffiths’ visit are evident. First, the obstruction of aid after Cyclone Mocha provides ample evidence of the SAC’s insincerity in helping people in need.
A recent report from the independent Center for Arakan Studies comparing responses to Cyclone Mocha and the devastating 2008 Cyclone Nargis indicated very similar military obstructing tactics to both disasters, and crucially in the weeks after the May storm, severe restrictions on Rakhine civil society aid workers – something Griffiths failed to mention in his statement.
The UN and aid organizations have also not been able to ensure unfettered access in conflict areas in Myanmar’s northwest, let alone in Rakhine and eastern borderlands, and the majority of aid delivered is in firmly SAC-controlled territory.
Second, Griffiths’ visit illustrates how utterly ineffective the UN Country Team has been, especially since Mocha. The Resident Coordinator and Humanitarian Coordinator (ad interim) Ramanathan Balakrishnan has displayed all the qualities of senior UN management in an authoritarian setting in order to achieve maximum ineffectiveness. Griffiths wouldn’t have had to visit if the country team had been able to do its job. It’s not a performance that compels donors to reach for their checkbooks.
And third, Griffiths’ approach brings high-level international humanitarian mediation into further disrepute. A recent essay in Foreign Affairs by Natasha Hall and Emma Beals, entitled “Humanitarian Blackmail”, outlines the recent failures of UN engagement with authoritarian states, including Myanmar.
They argue that “humanitarian negotiation are no substitute for conflict resolution.” Using the case of the captured Cyclone Mocha response, the essay states: “As conditions on the ground worsen, the junta has done nothing to alleviate the suffering of the people they govern, likely waiting for high-level visits from senior officials from the UN…such negotiations legitimize their role as the primary international interlocutor and decision-maker regarding aid.”
It goes on to castigate international aid actors for failing to “reach communities outside junta control…in places where the government consistently impedes, manipulates, or diverts aid, it may be more effective for humanitarians to work outside the UN and in ways that do not require official consent.”
Although there are significant programs already out of the SAC’s control, including cross-border assistance and expanding “resistance humanitarianism”, which has been a feature of aid work in eastern Myanmar conflict zones for decades, the issue is one of scale and increased funding in areas outside of UN operating zones: not easy to do when foreign donors have funneled so much post-coup aid through the UN Office of Project Services (UNOPS), which has had no qualms with cooperating with the SAC.
It is not clear if, as part of the official protocol, Griffiths was taken on a tour of the recently opened Maravijaya Buddha statue in Naypyidaw, the tallest sitting marble Buddha in the world, with Min Aung Hlaing as its prominent patron.
Any courtesy visit would be potentially more scandalous that shaking Min Aung Hlaing’s hand. In recent days, there has been criticism over prohibitively expensive visiting and photography fees for the general public.
The entrance fee for foreigners is US$10. Perhaps Griffiths could have started the fundraising right then and there?..."
Source/publisher:
"Asia Times" (Hong Kong)
Date of entry/update:
2023-08-18
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Human Rights and international relations
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"The UN’s relief agency, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, began one of its recent Myanmar Humanitarian Updates by criticizing the Myanmar military. “Additional bureaucratic hurdles such as denial of TAs [travel authorizations], insistence on TAs for national staff and refusal of passage through military checkpoints forced aid organizations to reschedule or delay their planned activities in several states including Rakhine, Kayah, Kachin and northern Shan,” the OCHA said in its Update No. 31 issued on July 15.
Then, perhaps in an effort to appear neutral, it stated that, “Compounding these challenges, Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) and People’s Defense Forces (PDFs) have repeatedly obstructed humanitarian movements, detaining private transporters and confiscating relief goods in northern Shan, Chin, Kayah and Sagaing.”
The UN needs to clarify and give evidence of where and when aid was obstructed and in what circumstances, and why it is still transporting aid without coordination with the civilian National Unity Government (NUG) and ethnic resistance organizations (EROs). Coordinating with armed actors on the ground is common sense.
Local actors don’t know what that the trucks are carrying or whom the goods are intended for. In addition, the UN works only with the State Administration Council (SAC)—the junta’s governing body—which it relies on for travel authorization. The SAC is directing aid according to its own strategic interests and thus weaponizing aid. Naturally, resistance organizations are not going to support this.
The World Food Program and UN High Commissioner for Refugees, and in fact the UN Country Team, have simply been asked to communicate information about convoys to the NUG, and have been warned of the dangers of not doing so. The NUG does not want a complex bureaucratic system of travel permission as the junta imposes, they just want to be informed when a convoy is going to travel through areas the resistance controls, which is in everyone’s interest. This is in fact standard UN procedure, but is not being followed in the case of Myanmar.
It is very unfair to accuse the NUG, PDFs and EROs of obstructing aid when the opposite is the reality. The systematic refusal of the UN to work with the NUG and EROs on aid delivery is one of the main obstacles preventing aid from reaching 1.9 million people. Local “humanitarian resistance” strictures are actually those who are providing aid to internally displaced persons (IDPs) who have fled the junta’s strategy of directly targeting civilians.
The NUG has instructed PDFs not to attack aid convoys, but how do they know whether a convoy is transporting UN aid or junta troops and/or supplies? The junta has reportedly used UN flags on their supply vehicles.
The NUG has asked for convoy details to be shared, reiterated its willingness to coordinate with the UN and other international actors, and requested them again to coordinate the delivery of aid. The consequences of not doing so rest on the UN and not humanitarian resistance actors.
Paul Greening is an ex-UN senior staff member with over 20 years’ experience in six Asian countries working for six UN agencies and four INGOs. He worked in Sittwe, Rakhine State for the International Organization for Migration from 2017 to 2020 and since then has been involved in advocacy against the illegal attempted coup and supporting those who have suffered from it..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2023-08-18
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Local URL:
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Description:
""Importantly, those involved in conflict need to know how to cultivate and foster peace for our future."
Jesua Lynn
The military coup in Myanmar has heavily affected young people, who represent more than 30 per cent of the population. The military regime has brutally killed more than 3,000 innocent civilians and made more than 20,000 arrests, and young people have been leading the resistance since day one.
Young people have been active in protests and have employed different disobedience tactics, including social media campaigns, fundraising with gamification and click-to-donate. The oppressive rules limiting the rights and freedom of young people have even led many of them to take up arms to fight for their rights, as well as to defend their families and reclaim democracy.
But many groups of young people also spread the awareness of social cohesion, cultural diversity and conflict resolution, to help equip their peers as a foundation for future nation and state-building.
One youth-led platform in particular is still committed to peacebuilding and nation-building in the future. It is the School of Federalism and Peace Studies, Spring University Myanmar, founded and led by the younger generations of Myanmar. This pioneer academic platform offers three main activities: short courses, diploma courses and debate classes, with the theme of federalism and peace studies.
This platform for young individuals aims to educate and equip their peers, younger generations and the wider public with the necessary knowledge to comprehend the ongoing conflicts in Myanmar from both practical and academic perspectives.
"We train the young people to understand the transitional justice and genocide studies to apply in their relevant works and put efforts to avoid such ugly crimes against humanity in the future"
Teaching peace
The curriculum includes courses such as ‘Peace, Conflict, and Society’ and ‘Human Rights and Peacebuilding’, designed to foster an interdisciplinary understanding of present conflict patterns, violence, and human rights violations within society. Additionally, modules on genocide studies, humanitarian intervention, and the role of media in peacebuilding are incorporated to train young people to analyse current conflicts and encourage their involvement in conflict prevention, management, and action against the crimes committed against humanity in Myanmar.
The module on ‘Social Cohesion and Transitional Justice’ seeks to raise awareness among young individuals about the importance of transitional justice. It encourages them to exert more effort in promoting justice at the community and national levels.
A School representative said, “Young people are actively involved in revolutionary movements for the restoration of democracy and claiming the peaceful federal state. On the other hand, our younger generations need to access the understanding of important ingredients of future peacebuilding. That is what we are doing. We train the young people to understand the transitional justice and genocide studies to apply in their relevant works and put efforts to avoid such ugly crimes against humanity in the future.”
After the military coup, there has been significantly increased hate speech and polarisation within the society due to the different political beliefs and affiliations. There also has been spread of misinformation and ethno-religious divides, which have been used by the military to divide the public. To contribute to combating this, the School’s training equips young people to recognising and undermining these manipulated narratives of hate within the community.
The School offers a training programme focusing on dialogue and debate to enhance critical thinking and foster an authentic community dialogue culture. It is worth noting that the international community has consistently emphasised the importance of dialogue, but the military regime has often manipulated these dialogue arrangements, resulting in negative responses from the younger generations and the people. Therefore, it is crucial to educate the younger generations on the true essence and purpose of authentic dialogue and its potential applications.
Looking to the future
Given the political situation in Myanmar, the areas beyond any government control have been expanding, leaving the local people to decide how to deal with the conflicts in their areas in their own ways. Dialogue can serve as a viable pathway for progress in these circumstances.
To achieve the desired peaceful, democratic, and federal nation, internal cohesion is critical. Dialogue can enhance social cohesion within the community to have a common goal and objective for future nation and state-building. To prepare the younger generations for involvement in nation and state-building, they need to be equipped with essential skills such as critical thinking, research, presentation, and debate.
This school platform can be considered a pioneering space where young people can learn the skills and competencies to actively participate in conflict resolution, monitoring, social cohesion, and future nation and state-building. While much attention is often directed towards resistance and revolution, this group of young people focuses on the future of Myanmar, dedicating their efforts to peacebuilding and preparing their peers for the challenges ahead.
Currently, this school platform is under-resourced and ask for the cooperation and any assistance for the sustainability. These kinds of works should have more access to resources and support.
“Those in the conflict need to understand peace and how to build peace. If they do not know how to make or build peace, there will always be problem-solving through violence, even in the future,” said a representative from the School.
Jesua Lynn is an independent research and training consultant. He has been working in the field of peacebuilding, social cohesion, and youth activism of Myanmar for more than five years. He also writes the articles and stories in Asia Democracy Chronicles, as a regular contributor from Myanmar..."
Source/publisher:
Peace Direct
Date of entry/update:
2023-08-17
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Education in Burma/Myanmar - general, Armed conflict and peace-building in Burma - theoretical, strategic and general, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
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Sub-title:
Myanmar’s military junta is committing indiscriminate atrocities. We shouldn’t look away.
Description:
"My father passed away a few months ago in Australia, dreaming about returning one day to his homeland of Myanmar. Of course, going home was impossible. His health was poor and Myanmar isn’t safe, with a junta unleashing ever-worsening violence, unwilling to relinquish control since the generals staged a coup in 2021. But Dad’s thoughts were always of home. Even in his weakest moments, he would ask me about the ongoing resistance to military rule.
Dad had seen Myanmar in the same circumstances before. That the country faces global opprobrium once again is not a surprise to many of its people. They have been subject to cycles of violence and dictatorship for many decades.
I was born in the shadow of military oppression in the 1980s. Myanmar was in economic turmoil. Since a coup in 1962, the military had run the country according to the “Burmese Way to Socialism,” a warped ideological construct that loosely followed Communist principles.
It was a pretext for the generals to take everything. The military seized properties and stole land from farmers; they monopolized the economy; they demonetized the currency, making what little cash people had useless. When the population resisted, the military imprisoned—or killed—them.
In 1985, when I was 3 years old, my parents decided to leave the country after Dad received a fellowship as a doctor with the United Nations in Samoa, more than 6,000 miles from Yangon, Myanmar’s major city. They had never left Myanmar before and expected their time away to be temporary.
I had an idyllic upbringing in Samoa. I ran to school barefoot and swam in shallow coral reefs the colors of rainbows. But Dad’s fellowship stipend was small, and while I benefited from an education that I wouldn’t have received in Yangon, I recall his worried look every time he couldn’t pack our lunch boxes full. By 1988, he was desperately homesick and hoped to go back to Myanmar by the end of the year.
But it was not to be. That year, a people’s movement rose up in Myanmar. A series of student-led protests became a nationwide strike, with the population demanding an end to military rule, international isolation, and poverty. And on August 8, 1988—just over 35 years ago—the military opened fire on thousands of peaceful demonstrators. Among the dead were monks, doctors, lawyers, human rights advocates, writers, university students, and even schoolkids—some of them from my older sister’s school.
We didn’t have a telephone at home, so Dad would sometimes sleep in his office, waiting to hear from his brothers and friends, who were all protesting. Sometimes I would catch him crying when he thought I was playing. Soon, I realized we weren’t going back.
The international response to the killings—known in Myanmar as the “8888” uprising—was muted, fueling a culture of impunity within the military. In 1988, there were no smartphones to live stream military abuses over social media. Images leaked eventually, but the people of Myanmar were still essentially on their own as the military rounded up and detained thousands of activists, who were severely beaten or tortured. Many died in custody and others were reported “disappeared,” feared dead. Everyone knew someone with a friend or family member who had been killed.
Myanmar rarely made the international news for many years after that, except for the endless house arrest of the political icon Aung San Suu Kyi. We distantly heard about her arrest and the dismantling of the party she chaired, the National League for Democracy.
In 2010, the military began to ease restrictions, releasing Aung San Suu Kyi from house arrest, and even welcoming foreigners into the country. In 2012, censorship on print media ended; Myanmar would have a somewhat free press for the first time in decades. Soon after, the military announced they would allow the first truly competitive general elections in 2015, the first in almost three decades.
I had been living abroad in Europe and Australia, but this was an opportunity for me to go back. I had become a journalist and I hoped to train local reporters and contribute to a society held back by consecutive generations of crooked generals. Dad had returned a few years before me to set up a clinic of his own. He understood my motives—I wanted to find my place in the country where I had been born.
When the NLD won a landslide in the election on November 8, 2015, I was among the people running onto the streets of Yangon in jubilation. A young rickshaw driver grabbed me by the shoulders, grinning with tears streaming down his face. “It happened, sister!” he yelled as he shook me in joy. “I thought it would only happen in our wildest dreams.”
That dream, so hard fought for, has become a nightmare.
During the NLD government’s rule, the military ramped up abuses and in 2017, unleashed a campaign of ethnic cleansing against the minority ethnic Rohingya that amounted to crimes against humanity and acts of genocide. Aung San Suu Kyi distressingly backed the military to the hilt, but even that show of loyalty, which did huge damage to her international reputation, was not enough for the generals.
On February 1, 2021, the military staged a coup, rejecting the results of the November 2020 elections, which the ruling NLD had overwhelmingly won. Although both international and domestic election observers deemed the elections credible, the military—without providing compelling evidence—claimed fraud and corruption. Once again, Myanmar’s population took to the streets in peaceful protest only for the military to suppress them with deadly violence.
Dad and I watched from afar, feeling a familiar sense of loss and helplessness. The Covid-19 pandemic had forced us to leave Myanmar in 2020 and join the rest of our family in Australia. Again, we thought we would be away for a few months, but once the killings started, we knew that we couldn’t return.
As a researcher with Human Rights Watch, I have been documenting the junta’s many atrocities since the coup: mass killings, arbitrary arrests and detention, torture, sexual violence, and attacks on civilians in conflict areas that amount to crimes against humanity and war crimes.
The United Nations human rights chief says the military has killed more than 3,700 people since the coup, while another 23,740 are arbitrarily detained although the numbers for both are likely much higher. According to the UN, the military has burned at least 70,000 homes across the country to destroy pockets of resistance, with 1.5 million people forcibly displaced.
But I have also been watching Myanmar’s youth, who have refused to back down. They have shown a tenacity and strength unimagined before the coup, determined to return to a path of democracy and civilian rule. They have organized and have sought to resist the military in any way they can. Some have joined armed groups as they face an onslaught of military air and ground attacks.
Young people equipped with smartphones want us to know what is happening. When the military began cracking down, I could document human rights violations because of the images they captured. From Australia, I watched footage of the military and police opening fire on and arresting human rights defenders and resistance leaders. Even now, two-and-a-half years since the coup, Myanmar’s youth take risks to send photos and videos of atrocities so the country’s suffering is not forgotten.
The military’s recent “partial pardon” of Aung San Suu Kyi may be an attempt to deflect international concern. But the international community should not be deceived. The military’s deadly abuses are continuing.
Governments around the world need to do more than watch. Targeted sanctions to pressure junta leaders and businesses with ties to the military have helped. Those efforts need to be better coordinated among countries and expanded to limit the military’s access to the aviation fuel it needs for air strikes, and to the revenue from Myanmar’s billion-dollar oil and gas industry it uses to buy weapons.
We can’t use ignorance as a reason not to act..."
Source/publisher:
"The National" via "Human Rights Watch" (USA)
Date of entry/update:
2023-08-16
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
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Description:
"Documented incidents
25 July 2023: In Myawaddy town, township and district, Kayin state, the house of a doctor was sealed and confiscated by the junta authorities. By the time of this attack, the doctor was not at his home after he went into hiding after being charged with the Counter-Terrorism Law. Source:
Eleven Media Group
27 July 2023: In Wi Yaw village and village tract, Thaton township and district, Mon state, a sub-rural health centre, along with two monasteries, 13 civilian houses, and two vehicles were damaged due to the artillery shelling by the Myanmar military. Sources: Khit Thit Media and Irrawaddy Burmese
As reported on 01 August 2023: In Kyet Su Kyin village and village tract, Yesagyo township, Pakokku district, Magway region, a doctor left the station hospital due to having frequently been questioned by the junta security forces, about whether he had provided health care to the local resistance forces. He was not affiliated with the Civil Disobedience Movement. Source: Radio Free Asia
02 August 2023: In Hpakant town and township, Mohnyin district, Kachin state, a 42-year-old medical doctor was arrested by the junta security sources from his private general practitioner clinic. He was accused of having employed a doctor affiliated with the CDM at his clinic, having promoted the CDM, and having provided health care to injured protestors in 2021. He was charged with Section 505 (A). He was not affiliated with CDM. Sources: Democratic Voice of Burma,
Chindwin News Agency, Kachin News Group and Kachin News Group II
04 August 2023: In Dawei town, township, and district, Tanintharyi region, four civilians (two females and two males) were abducted by the junta security sources at the military hospital while they were seeking health care at the facility. The two men were detained at the local battalion of the Myanmar military, and the two women were at the local police station. Source: Delta News Agency
06 August 2023: In Mahaaungmyay town and township, Mandalay city, district, and region, the junta security forces and militia took away the materials from a private clinic which had been sealed and confiscated in April 2022. Source: Mandalay Free Press..."
Source/publisher:
Insecurity Insight (Geneva) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2023-08-15
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Public Health, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
440.36 KB
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Description:
"Human Rights Violations took place in States and Regions from Aug 8 to 14, 2023
Military Junta Troops launched airstrikes and dropped bombs in Sagaing Region and Bago Region from August 8th to 14th. Military Junta troops arrested almost 50 civilians and used them as human shields in Tanintharyi Region. Juna’s troops arrested 2 civilians and burnt and killed them in Kale Township on August 12th. They also destroyed the part of the Seikphyu Road which connects Pathein- Monywa Road.
Pyusawhtee militias that work under the Military Junta are threatening the civilians in various ways and collecting money in Sagaing Region and Tanintharyi Region. 8 civilians were killed by the Military Junta troop within a week. A child died and 2 were injured by the Human Right Violations of the Military Junta..."
Source/publisher:
Network for Human Rights Documentation-Burma
Date of entry/update:
2023-08-15
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Political History
Language:
Format :
pdf pdf pdf
Size:
283.98 KB 149.84 KB 270.71 KB
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Description:
"Despite being on the backfoot as the country’s civil war intensifies, the military regime is showing no interest in a democratic transition that may be the country’s only hope. India must explore various options for a peaceful resolution to the crisis and provide humanitarian assistance to displaced people.
Myanmar’s military regime has once again chosen to extend the state of emergency imposed two and a half years ago, marking the fourth extension since seizing power from the elected government in 2021. This latest decision prolongs the state of emergency for another six months, further delaying the promised elections that were supposed to occur under the military’s rule this month.
The ostensible justification for the extension is the need for additional time to prepare for elections. The move, however, is not surprising since the military that effectively controls the National Defence and Security Council (NDSC) is facing considerable challenges in organising the polls owing to widespread opposition to their rule.
Junta’s Grip Slipping
Inside Myanmar, the situation has grown increasingly precarious, with multiple insurgencies and conflicts involving various ethnic armed groups becoming more prominent. The Rohingya crisis in Rakhine State remains unresolved, and clashes between the military and ethnic rebels have intensified in different regions, necessitating the imposition of martial law in almost 50 townships across Yangon, Mandalay, Sagaing, and Magwe regions, as well as Chin and Kayah states.
The military’s continued use of force against these groups has exacerbated the situation, leading to a spiralling cycle of violence and displacement. According to various estimates, security forces have been responsible for the deaths of 3,868 people and the arrests of 24,137 individuals, with 19,687 still detained or sentenced. As of March 2023, the number of internally displaced people has reached 1,704,000, further intensifying the humanitarian crisis.
The military’s continued use of force against these groups has exacerbated the situation, leading to a spiralling cycle of violence and displacement.
In the face of mounting challenges, the junta’s grip on power appears to be slipping. Armed resistance groups have grown more assertive, resorting to guerrilla warfare tactics and strategic offensives even with financial constraints. The ongoing internal war severely threatens the nation, aggravating chaos and suffering.
Democracy Not On Agenda
Moreover, economic hardships, soaring inflation, and humanitarian crises have added to the people’s discontent and disillusionment with the military rule. Despite having a significant advantage in resources and weaponry, the army has struggled to quell resistance and maintain control.
The military regime’s persistent postponement of the democratic transition reflects a lack of genuine commitment to democratic governance. It has shown little inclination to relinquish control and allow for a truly representative and inclusive political process, leading to growing scepticism among the domestic population, its immediate neighbours, and the international community about the junta’s intentions.
The recent reduction of Aung San Suu Kyi’s prison term from a 33-year combined sentence to merely six years along with her relocation to a state-managed residence, is unlikely to alter these perceptions.
How India Can Help
For India, this situation poses a number of challenges. Myanmar’s ongoing crisis is significantly impacting India’s northeastern border regions. Over 54,100 Myanmar nationals have sought refuge in the Indian states of Arunachal Pradesh, Mizoram, Manipur, and Nagaland, straining resources and posing security challenges for India. The influx of displaced people and potential for cross-border insurgent activities demand India’s careful and proactive approach, especially as China remains keen to exploit the extant situation to its advantage.
As a democratic nation with deep historical and political ties to Myanmar, India has followed a constructive approach while dealing with its Southeast Asian neighbour keeping its own strategic interests in mind. However, India must not hesitate to convey a firm message to the junta, expressing its concerns about escalating instability in Myanmar and exerting pressure on the military government to take more decisive actions toward achieving a peaceful resolution to the crisis.
As a democratic nation with deep historical and political ties to Myanmar, India has followed a constructive approach while dealing with its Southeast Asian neighbour keeping its own strategic interests in mind.
India’s approach should prioritise humanitarian assistance and support for displaced people as well as showcasing its commitment to regional stability. Providing aid and service to those affected by the crisis will alleviate suffering and demonstrate India’s solidarity with the people of Myanmar.
Role At Talks Table
Moreover, India should use its influence to open channels of dialogue with and between the junta and the opposition, including armed ethnic groups. The shifting of Aung San Suu Kyi to house arrest opens up new possibilities and could prove valuable to all parties involved in any such dialogue. Despite the waning influence she holds over the growing and increasingly militant resistance movement, Aung San Suu Kyi remains a prominent symbol in the nation.
In addition to its bilateral efforts, New Delhi should collaborate closely with the ASEAN nations to assess whether their proposed peace plan requires reformulation or revisions. Working in coordination with regional partners can enhance the effectiveness of initiatives to bring stability and peace to Myanmar. India’s active involvement in regional forums will strengthen collective efforts to address the crisis and find viable solutions.
With the ground situation in Myanmar evolving rapidly, India’s efforts hold immense significance in fostering regional peace and cooperation as well as preserving Indian interests in a country which is critical for India’s own internal security in the northeast..."
Source/publisher:
Observer Research Foundation
Date of entry/update:
2023-08-09
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Political History
Language:
Local URL:
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Sub-title:
One observer says it’s the ‘military’s attempt to dominate and control all departments.’
Description:
"A recent reshuffling of top military personnel by the leader of Myanmar’s junta is part of an effort to gain control of the entire governing apparatus and remain in power for years to come, analysts and observers said.
Among the top generals reassigned on Aug. 3 were the heads of the defense and home affairs ministries – the first changes since Senior Gen. Min Aung Hlaing seized power from the elected civilian-led government in a February 2021 coup. The two ministries are responsible for tackling armed anti-junta resistance fighters across the country.
Former Transport and Communications Minister Gen. Tin Aung San was appointed as defense minister, making him a member of the National Defense and Security Council, and former Defense Minister Gen. Mya Tun Oo was made transport and communications minister. Both will continue serving as deputy prime ministers.
Lt. Gen. Yar Pyae, the former Union Government Office 1 minister, replaced Lt. Gen. Soe Htut as head of the Home Affairs Ministry. Yar Pyae held on to his position on the State Administration Council – the junta’s governing body – and his roles of national security adviser to Min Aung Hlaing and leader of the junta’s peace negotiation team.
The move came days after Min Aung Hlaing extended emergency rule in Myanmar for another six months on July 31, thereby delaying the date by which elections must be held according to the country’s constitution. The junta previously pledged to hold elections in August.
It also occurred as Myanmar, already hit hard by economic sanctions, faces intense international criticism over the military’s attacks on civilian communities and execution of detained combatants in areas that are hotbeds of resistance to the regime.
An annual report released publicly on Tuesday by the U.N.'s Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar cited strong evidence that the military and its affiliate militias have committed “increasingly frequent and brazen war crimes.”
New assignments at lower levels
A leader of the nonviolent anti-junta civil disobedience movement, or CDM, said Min Aung Hlaing reassigned generals he trusts to important ministries to prepare for what he may face during the next state of emergency period.
“The Defense Ministry is just like a correspondence office under the commander-in-chief,” the person said. “That’s why he transferred Gen. Mya Tun Oo, who is one of his major players, to the Ministry of Transport and Communications, which he will heavily use in the future to tackle the issues of airplanes and cyber communication.”
Min Aung Hlaing appointed capable Yar Pyae as home affairs minister in place of Soe Htut, who is in poor health, to strengthen the operations of the State Administration Council over the next six months, he added.
The CDM leader, who served in the military for 21 years and held the rank of a captain, moved to the civilian administration where he worked for nearly a decade until he was promoted to a director position. Following the 2021 coup, he left his job and joined other professionals who walked off the job to peacefully protest against the regime.
Reassignments have also taken place among lower-ranking military officers.
From January to the end of June, the junta transferred 40 lieutenant colonels, majors and captains to civil ministries to work as chief executive officers, or deputy and assistant directors, according to the junta’s weekly national reports.
Among them were one lieutenant colonel, nine majors and 30 captains sent to work at the Myanmar Economic Bank, Election Commission, Union Civil Service Board, ministries of construction, industry and commerce, sports and youth affairs, hotels and tourism, and the Yangon and Naypyidaw City Development Committees.
The largest number of military officers were transferred to the Myanmar Economic Bank with five majors as managers and 16 captains as assistant managers.
The transfers indicate that the junta is trying to control the operation of civil departments as well, said former Captain Kaung Thu Win, a member of the CDM.
“The junta aims to replace its people in senior positions in the civil departments such as directors to be able to control the head of the departments so that they will follow its instructions more faithfully,” he told RFA. “It transferred junior officers to the civil departments so that they can provide the military with the necessary information inside each department.”
RFA could not reach junta spokesman Major Gen. Zaw Min Tun for comment on the personnel changes.
‘It’s called militarization’
Thein Tun Oo, executive director of the pro-military Thayninga Institute of Strategic Studies, said the new appointments would strengthen the military administration.
“The bureaucratic mechanism makes the administration of a country run smoothly and easily,” he said. “In order for that mechanism including national security projects to operate, it is important for all the people involved to be able to work effectively. That’s why we need really capable people who can focus on their tasks.”
More reliable replacements were made because many of the current government departments have experienced security breaches, he added.
The appointment of military officers to both top and middle-level civilian positions is the junta’s attempt to dominate the entire government apparatus, political and military analyst Than Soe Naing said.
“It’s called militarization,” he said. “It is a military’s attempt to dominate and control all departments.”
Given the country’s current situation with anti-junta People’s Defense Forces, led by the shadow National Unity Government, and ethnic armed groups fighting junta forces, it is important for the military regime to have reliable people to back it, Than Soe Naing said.
“They only work with their service members who they can trust, so that they feel safer,” he said..."
Source/publisher:
"Radio Free Asia" (USA)
Date of entry/update:
2023-08-09
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Anti-coup protesters, The Military's political role
Language:
Local URL:
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Description:
"Once a joyful and beautiful place where children played and families enjoyed normal days, surrounded by lush nature, traditional homes, livestock and farms, many areas of Kachin State in Myanmar have now become silent and empty spaces scarred by armed conflict. The people in Kachin had not anticipated they would be forced to leave their homes and seek shelter in internally displaced camps. Yet over 100,000 people have been displaced for more than ten years in the state.
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in Kachin is dedicated to helping communities who have faced trauma, lost their livelihoods and lived in cramped temporary shelters as they fled violence. We work to address their urgent needs, improve their living conditions and relieve their suffering.
In late 2022, the ICRC constructed 63 homes for families who relocated to Hka Garan Yang village in Sumprabum township and the Sadung Na Sar resettlement site in Waingmaw township. Our goal was that the families move to a new location where they can live safely and sustainably.
We started our work by helping the families register their land ownership and then built adequately spacious homes equipped with bathrooms and private toilets. We also installed solar power systems in every home for cost-effective and sustainable electricity supply and set up a small-scale gravity water system to provide them with clean water.
"There's a saying that reflects our experience – 'It's always darkest before dawn'. We faced many harsh challenges before relocating here. But now we have a durable home with a kitchen, solar lighting, fresh water supply and a toilet. Things are better now." - Mrs. Lahpai Ja Ring, whose family moved into a new home as part of the ICRC's resettlement project.
She adds that since they have a safe space to live, they can better utilize their potential and pursue their dreams.
Even though they have relocated to a new environment, the families have quickly adapted and settled in. Our teams have also provided them with support to improve their livelihood activities such as rearing livestock and farming.
"We have seen how happy and satisfied the families are since they have moved into their new space. We also helped them transition out of their previous status as internally displaced people and reintegrate into a more normal life," said Guillaume Binet, an ICRC staff member in Kachin State. Binet adds, "we also plan to build a primary school at the Sadung Na Sar resettlement site."
As conflict continues and the challenges multiply, our teams remain committed to helping communities across Kachin State overcome the difficulties.
Every family deserves to have a home to call their own.
In two townships of Myanmar’s northernmost state, we help 63 families to take their first steps towards rebuilding their lives..."
Source/publisher:
International Committee of the Red Cross (Geneva) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2023-08-09
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Burma: Internal displacement/forced migration of several ethnic groups., Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
Local URL:
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Description:
"Insight Email No. 19
This Insight Email is published on August 9, 2023, as a translation of the original Burmese language version that ISP-Myanmar sent out to the ISP Gabyin members on August 4, 2023.
This week’s ISP Insight Email No. 20 focuses on the State Administration Council’s (SAC) extension of its own term in office creating a complex Catch-22 situation with the SAC’s aspiration for fresh elections. Prison terms for President Win Myint and Aung San Suu Kyi were partially pardoned, yet the extent of the goodwill derived from this move remains minimal. This ISP Insight Email also discusses the development of the ‘ASEAN Minus’ strategy in dealing with the Myanmar junta. The bulletin also discusses the possible emerging trend of new military offensives expected after the extension of the junta’s term and also briefly introduces Andrew Ong’s new book on Wa, ‘Stalemate: Autonomy and Insurgency on the China-Myanmar Border.’
∎ Key takeaways
1.Prolonged SAC’s rule
The SAC held a National Defence and Security Council (NDSC) meeting on July 31 during which it extended its term in government by an additional six months citing the ‘unusual circumstances of the country’ as justification. The SAC‘s rationale behind this extension of the state of the emergency period was grounded in Section 42(b) and 425 of the constitution. Both sections pertain to the formal submission to extend the state of emergency, where Section 42(b) stipulates ‘reasons why (the Commander-in-Chief) has not yet been able to accomplish the duties assigned to him’ and where Section 425 stipulates the reasons why the ‘Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Services submits the extension.’ However ordinarily both the sections permit only two extensions of the prescribed duration of the state of emergency for a term of six months for each extension. The SAC has now extended its terms in government under the state of emergency for four times.
The SAC selectively targeted the ‘conditional clause’ of ‘unusual circumstances of the country’ and has creatively interpreted it to suit its extension needs. The SAC also claims that the constitutional court has endorsed this interpretation.
Even as the SAC extends its authority, it continues to uphold the promise of an eventual election. The SAC chairman in 2021 stated that the election process would be ready by August 2023. But this timeline has clearly not been met. In the present context, the chairman of the SAC has outlined two prerequisites for holding elections. The first condition involves conducting the election process outside conflict zones, while the second is that everyone in the nation has access to participate in the nationwide election. Both situations demand a ‘peaceful and stable situation with full law’ and ‘correct voters lists.’ Achieving correct voter lists though hinges on the successful completion of the national census, yet this process has again been delayed by incidents of physical violence and intimidation. The combination of the post-coup legitimacy crisis, a lack of widespread popular support, and the stated goal to hold fresh elections is seemingly a Catch-22 situation for the SAC. The SAC has also stated that the election will be held without delay, meanwhile it has also said ‘the election must not be rushed and should be prepared systematically.’ The SAC has still failed to state the exact date for fresh elections. Given this situation, the people of Myanmar can only realistically expect further extensions of SAC State of Emergency rule under the pretense of ‘unusual circumstances of the country.’
2.Pardoned without freedom
Speculation had been circulating that after the consecration of the Maravijaya Buddha stupa, the SAC might provide amnesty to political prisoners, even extending to the possibility of Aung San Suu Kyi’s full release or move to house arrest. There was also speculation on the formation of an interim government in order to conduct an election. This speculation intensified particularly in light of the unexpected meeting between Thailand’s Foreign Minister Don Pramudwinai and Aung San Suu Kyi.
On August 1, the SAC granted partial clemency to President Win Myint and Aung San Suu Kyi. This gesture though only led to the reduction of their prison terms, falling short of ensuring their full release. For Aung San Suu Kyi, the SAC reduced her prison sentence by six years, leaving 27 years still remaining as she was originally sentenced to 33 years imprisonment. For Win Myint, the SAC reduced his 12-year sentence by four years. In contrast to the previous junta’s approach, the SAC’s leniency appears limited. In this recent amnesty, the SAC granted freedom to 7,749 prisoners, although only a handful political prisoners were included in this group.
The recent developments surrounding Aung San Suu Kyi have sparked a wave of anticipation within Myanmar’s political landscape. Her significance remains undeniable, as she continues to command people’s trust. In a previous analysis on ISP OnPoint No. 16, ISP-Myanmar discussed a forecast scenario of greater freedoms being extended to Aung San Suu Kyi. These included the prospect of Aung San Suu Kyi engaging in more interactions with international delegates, a potential return to house arrest, or even her regaining freedom in the near future. The exact trajectory remains uncertain, but there is still a sense of hope. From August 7 to 11, the Union Supreme Court is set to hear appeals, a notable event that includes six appeals submitted by Aung San Suu Kyi. This legal proceeding holds significant interest and could yet have far-reaching implications.
3.The ‘ASEAN Minus’ approach
The Five-Point Consensus was agreed upon among ASEAN countries in April 2021 in order to resolve the Myanmar conflict, but has so far encountered difficulties in implementation. Notably, U.N. special envoy to Myanmar, Mrs. Noeleen Heyzer recently finished her 18-month term, stepping down without achieving any discernible success. Acknowledging that ASEAN’s leadership and centrality are pivotal in shaping the region, Western nations have largely left resolution of the Myanmar crisis in ASEAN hands. Initial hopes were pinned on the potential of ‘ASEAN Plus’ efforts, leveraging the collaboration of regional entities including special envoys from China, Japan, and the United Nations. However, this approach has faced practical limitations and has not fully materialized. In response, certain ASEAN nations and China have leaned towards a strategy of ‘neighborhood diplomacy’ aimed at managing Myanmar’s challenges within the regional context. This new trend of ‘Asean Minus’ is thus clearly developing (See ISP Insight Email No. 17).
On July 26, 2023, as reported in AP, in a meeting with the Philippines President Ferdinand Marcos Jr., Malaysia Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim suggested that ‘Southeast Asian countries should be given some latitude to engage informally with Myanmar on an individual basis to help resolve a deepening crisis there.’ He added ‘neighboring countries should be given “some flexibility, room and space” to engage with Myanmar on an informal basis.’ This approach concretely shows the position of ‘ASEAN Minus’ gaining traction, despite the fact that the regional group’s formal policy is still for ASEAN unity and that any Southeast Asian nation’s diplomatic efforts should support the centrality of ASEAN unity, be conducted in line with the Five-Point Consensus, and in coordination with the Chair of ASEAN. The momentum behind this ‘ASEAN Minus’ trend has been particularly noticeable following the independent visit of Thailand’s Foreign Minister Don Pramudwinai to Myanmar.
While the ‘ASEAN Plus’ approach has the potential to harness the collective strength of the regional bloc, the concept of ‘ASEAN Minus’ could yield divergent outcomes. Under an ‘ASEAN Minus’ approach, individual countries could be motivated by their own interests and thus could potentially exhibit less cooperative power to pressure Myanmar towards reform. ‘ASEAN Minus’ could also result in a ‘negative peace’, merely a situation absent of fighting, but lacking any substantive peace, justice, or resolution of the Myanmar conflict (See ISP Insight Email No. 16).
∎ Trends to be watched
Risk of intensifying military operations along with the extension of SAC’s term
The military junta extended its rule for another six months on July 31, 2023. One of the reasons for the extension of its rule was ostensibly in order to hold a general election. Along this pretense, SAC chairman Min Aung Hlaing stated that it is necessary to accelerate peace and stability measures, and that rule of law processes must be completed in some areas of regions and states where terror attacks still occur. When the SAC put forward its justification for the previous extension on February 1, 2023, a similar sentiment was given and at least 40 townships subsequently had martial law imposed upon them. Following the July 31 extension, it can be assumed that more townships could now have stricter rules imposed upon them.
As a result of the extension of SAC rule, ISP-Myanmar would also expect an increase in military offensives against opposition forces, orchestrated in different areas. International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) published a conflict updated in its Myanmar Conflict Map as ‘Junta tactics shift in Myanmar’s war-torn Dry Zone’ on July 5, 2023 where it argued that faced with the rise of newly formed armed organizations that the junta’s tactics have now shifted. The New York Times reiterated this point on July 31, 2023, in a special feature article ‘The Country That Bombs Its Own People’ working from IISS data.
Analyses conducted by both the New York Times and IISS reveal a discernible trend in the tactics employed by the junta since the onset of 2023. The junta’s actions have exhibited an increasing selectivity in target identification, accompanied by an escalated level of violence during their raids and assaults. These attacks are mainly conducted by the Myanmar military and its proxy Pyu Saw Htee forces. From December 2022 to July 2023, IISS observed a decline in building burnings, however this decline has been inversely accompanied by a noticeable rise in atrocities targeting PDF armed forces. According to IISS, on 13 July SAC Chairman Min Aung Hlaing announced a plan to intensify efforts to quell armed resistance. The New York Times also reported that ‘altogether, 2023 has had a monthly average of 30 airstrikes, the highest for any year of the conflict so far, based on data from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED).
Based on data compiled by ISP-Myanmar in accordance with ISP-Myanmar’s system for documenting information in armed conflicts, a comprehensive overview of events in the conflict can be discerned. Specifically, the 40 townships under martial law in the period from February to June 2023 demonstrated a declining trend in armed clashes and the torching of houses and buildings. Notably though the number of air strikes has been rising significantly. It is worth noting though that the incidence of house burnings again increased after late June. As the SAC has now extended its rule for another six months, there could be more intense fighting and military operations.
∎ What ISP is reading?
Ong, Andrew. (2023). Stalemate: Autonomy and Insurgency on the China-Myanmar Border.
Cornell University Press. 276 pages.
A book recently released on the Wa ethnicity and the United Wa State Army has attracted praise from many famous contemporary authors on Myanmar including Bertil Lintner. There are still few writings on Wa, as few researchers are working on the subject. The area of Wa State is situated on the China-Myanmar border and is semi-independently ruled through its own leadership with a force of 20,000 to 30,000 well-equipped soldiers. The Wa forces have agreed ceasefires with successive Myanmar governments for more than three decades, using this long-standing truce to pursue the economic and social development of the area. However in the past, many Wa ethnic leaders have been accused of engaging in the illicit drug trade.
The author Andrew Ong’s approach to this study has some unique characteristics. Wa State is a difficult region to access for researchers and writers, but as Ong was a World Food Program (WFP) aid worker, he had a long working history in the Wa area and his anthropological approach is subsequently rather different from other authors and journalists. He studied the aspirations of ordinary Wa people, Wa leaders, and their political culture and external relations. He navigates the complexities of border politics, intersecting geopolitics and geo-economics, culminating in his book titled ‘Stalemate: Autonomy and Insurgency on the China-Myanmar Border.’
In the realm of contemporary books on Wa ethnic group and its political landscape, we can find two books, namely, Magnus Fiskesjö (2021)’s ‘Stories From an Ancient Land: Perspective on Wa History and Culture’ and Bertil Lintner (2021)’s ‘The Wa of Myanmar and China’s Quest for Global Dominance’. Additionally there are some short papers produced by the USIP and a few other institutions.
“This book deliberately disappoints readers searching for details about the narcotics trade or weapons and even details about political factionalism or the who’s who of business conglomerates that investigative journalism tries to uncover,” Ong forewarns, as his approach is mixed with anthropological analysis. He presents readers with the perspective of the highlanders, showcasing how residents of the Wa State perceive the world. He also highlights the Wa’s distinctive governance concepts, which diverge from international norms. He also challenges readers to reconsider their understanding of order and stability.
Given that the Wa ethnic force holds a prominent role as a leader of the Northern Alliance (FPNCC) and serves as a significant stakeholder in Myanmar’s peace process, Ong’s book offers valuable insights into understanding both the Wa people and their leadership.
Source/publisher:
Institute for Strategy and Policy – Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2023-08-09
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"Military Junta Troops arrested almost 60 civilians and used them as human shields from Tanintharyi Region and Sagaing Region from August 1st to 7th. Military Junta Troops launched airstrikes and dropped bombs in Pale Township, Sagaing Region on August 7th. Military Junta’s ships attacked with heavy and light artillery some villages which are located next to the Ayeyarwady River bank, between Katha Township, Sagaing Region, and Shweku Township, Kachin State. Military troops started targeting the youths and checked the civilians by going on the YBS buses in Yangon Region.
The head of the prison that works under the Military Junta, beat, and tortured the political prisoners from Thayarwaddy Prison and Dike-U Prison, Bago Region, and held them in solitary confinement. A child died and a person was injured by the Military’s heavy and light artillery attacks within a week. Local Civilians from Sagaing Region, Magway Region, and Mandalay Region left their places and fled from the Military Junta raiding..."
Source/publisher:
Network for Human Rights Documentation-Burma
Date of entry/update:
2023-08-08
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"In a general amnesty announced on military television last week, Myanmar’s military junta removed six years from the jail term of Aung San Suu Kyi, the 78-year-old leader of the government removed by a coup in February 2021. This came a week after the junta moved her into house arrest following a year in solitary confinement.
But it still leaves Aung San Suu Kyi facing a 27-year jail term on bogus charges.
The junta also lopped four years off former president Win Myint’s sentence, and reportedly released more than 7,000 other prisoners.
But we shouldn’t be persuaded that the junta has changed its stripes. It regularly uses mass amnesties in attempts to cultivate goodwill, either at home or abroad. But any major figures released in these amnesties shouldn’t have been locked up in the first place.
The day before the amnesty, the junta extended its state of emergency for a fourth time, further delaying elections, due to relentless opposition to its February 2021 coup.
The coup sparked ongoing and widespread violence, and shredded the military’s last claims to social esteem. This has left Myanmar impoverished, largely friendless, and without any clear plan for a positive future.
Determined resistance
The army’s top decision-makers, currently bunkered in the capital, Naypyidaw, struggle to maintain control of enough territory to seriously contemplate even a heavily stage-managed nationwide poll.
Under these volatile conditions, people have been voting with their feet by fleeing abroad or taking up arms in a revolutionary mobilisation.
The junta’s leader, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, reportedly told the National Defence and Security Council that elections couldn’t be conducted due to continued fighting in several regions.
The reality for the generals in their fortified compounds is that any poll could further embarrass them – they cannot even reliably rig the national vote.
Read more: As Myanmar suffers, the military junta is desperate, isolated and running out of options
Many areas are off-limits to government forces, perhaps as much as half the country – which is Southeast Asia’s second-largest by land area. While aerial bombardments by regime aircraft might set back the resistance, the strategy is hardly a way to win hearts or minds. Inch by inch, the diminution of central government control raises questions about the country’s future.
There’s increasing concern across the Southeast Asian region. An intractable civil conflict presents significant challenges for neighbours Thailand, China, India and Bangladesh.
Diplomatic efforts to maintain Myanmar’s territorial integrity jostle with the discomfort felt almost everywhere about doing business with a blood-splattered regime.
The regime tries to play the politics of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to its advantage. But even there, sometimes in the company of other autocrats, Myanmar now faces the ignominy of an “empty seat” at the political level. And almost nobody wants to shake hands with regime representatives.
An unnecessary crisis
It’s a precipitous erosion of what was, until the coup, a relatively positive story for most Myanmar people.
Before the coup, the most problematic issue was the military’s abuses of the Rohingya, a Muslim ethnic minority living in westernmost Myanmar.
Other issues – such as longstanding ethnic grievances and yawning economic inequality – were, at the very least, subject to open debate in the media and sometimes in the country’s 16 regional and national legislatures.
That political and social infrastructure, and the emerging civil society it helped sustain, has now crumbled. It’s been replaced by violence, mistrust, terror and martial chauvinism.
Read more: Military violence in Myanmar is worsening amid fierce resistance and international ambivalence
Myanmar’s young talent now banned from universities, bravely disobedient in the faces of tanks and bullets, face dismal options: the mountains, the jungle, the border. Some lie low. Others still seek to fan the revolutionary spark. Many are now in jail, others dead.
The military, of course, blames its opponents for the devastation its coup unleashed. That sad fact hides a tremendous political and cultural miscalculation.
It’s unclear whether Myanmar can recover from the army’s self-inflicted wounds. Some speculate the whole system will collapse, making it impossible for powerbrokers to keep up the increasingly flimsy charade of state power. It has all the ingredients of a failed state.
No way out
The decision to abandon the proposed elections, followed by last week’s amnesty, is hardly a surprise. But it does reveal the fragility of the military system and the paranoia of the men in charge.
It’s also further evidence that nobody can trust the junta. Not only has it broken the faith of the Myanmar people, it constantly tests the patience of foreign governments, even those that offer some sympathy for its self-sabotage.
With Aung San Suu Kyi and other senior members of the democratically elected government still locked up, the reality facing the generals is they will never beat her at any election. They are still betting that eventually the world – and, most importantly, their near neighbours – will lose interest and allow some type of partial rehabilitation. Maintaining links with China and Russia is a key strategy.
Still, there’s no obvious path to fuller inclusion in ASEAN while the generals unleash such violence against their own people.
The extension of the state of emergency and postponement of hypothetical elections will further invigorate resistance forces hoping to steadily weaken the army’s grip on power.
A pointless reduction in the jail sentences for Myanmar’s democratically elected leaders is unlikely to quell the fires of opposition now burning across the country..."
Source/publisher:
"The Conversation" (Melbourne)
Date of entry/update:
2023-08-08
[field_licence]
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"Executive Summary
To read the full report, download the PDF.
Since the February 2021 coup, the Myanmar military has violently suppressed political opposition and used disproportionate violence against civilians. As the Myanmar military struggles to exert control over areas of resistance, persistent fires have been on the rise - likely as part of both the Myanmar military’s offensive against PDF groups, and their attempts to subjugate the civilian populations.
This report by Myanmar Witness seeks to provide insight into this modus operandi of the Myanmar military by assessing data and specific case studies. This paper reviews what are alleged to be intentionally set fires in Myanmar, which has been a consistent feature of the conflict.
Figure: Map showing all fire data collected and analysed by Myanmar Witness as of 31 January 2023.
The use of fire has increased, resulting in the destruction of thousands of homes. As part of enduring monitoring of fire, Myanmar Witness observed a sharp increase in the number of fires being reported around Myanmar at the end of 2022 - with the largest change being an astounding 454% year-on-year increase in December. In every month observed between September 2022 and January 2023, Myanmar Witness collected more fire incidents than in the corresponding months in the previous year.
Myanmar Witness has sought to understand this increase through investigation and analysis of fires in the months of September 2022 to December 2022. To understand this phenomena, Myanmar Witness has analysed large patterns of fires, turning these into case studies that demonstrate the potential systematic nature in which villages are being affected by fire. Myanmar Witness has found that these fires appear to happen in ‘clusters’, with repeated incidents in the same villages over time, as well as multiple simultaneous incidents in multiple villages in the same area. This is a pattern also observed in the wider fire dataset and in operations between September 2021 and January 2022, which can be read about in more detail in Myanmar Witness’ report, Civilian Harm.
Myanmar Witness has collected 347 reports of fires during the period of September 2022 to January 2023. The team have then selected five case studies that are representative of trends observed across the wider set. In some of the selected case studies, fires seem to correlate with People Defence Force (PDF) activity and it is therefore a realistic possibility that they can be explained as retaliation for said activity by Myanmar’s Military. The case studies also demonstrate the way in which fire is used as a weapon, repeatedly destroying civilian infrastructure and objects indispensable to survival.
Myanmar Witness identified a large cluster of fires across Sagaing at the end of November until mid-December 2022. These fires are linked to reports of Myanmar military soldiers and Pyu Saw Htee militia moving from village to village during this period, leaving a wake of charred destruction, and allegedly using human shields. Whilst the time and location of fires matches on the ground reports, Myanmar Witness has been unable to find conclusive imagery showing the presence of the Myanmar military and thus is unable to verify who is responsible.
In addition to the widespread burning of villages, Myanmar Witness has identified claims and evidence of the destruction of food supplies including rice storage facilities, a sesame warehouse, livestock, and rice supplies. Myanmar Witness has been able to geolocate and verify several instances of food infrastructure being destroyed.
Fires in January 2023 in 3 villages across Ye-U Township, Sagaing, resulted in the destruction of more than 100 houses, a historic Christian church and a number of other buildings. Some of these villages had suffered fires in the previous month, all allegedly perpetrated by the Myanmar military. Myanmar Witness has verified the locations and occurrence of fires at these sites, but is yet to find conclusive evidence of Myanmar military presence.
Whilst there is a lack of conclusive evidence of the Myanmar military targeting civilians with fire, Myanmar Witness deems it highly likely that the fires identified in the below case studies were started by the Myanmar military. Myanmar Witness has identified and analysed considerable amounts of eyewitness testimony reported by local news media or by social media users which claimed the military or pro-military militias were responsible. The sequential and seemingly systematic use of fire in multiple villages, all in close proximity, and seemingly tied to PDF and resistance activity, adds weight to this conclusion. Additionally, Myanmar Witness has analysed footage showing military intent to burn villages in nearby areas, and has identified clear patterns of the use of fire by military units. It should also be noted that fires are markedly more common in areas subject to martial law and that have been subjected to SAC airstrikes in recent months.
Since the Coup, Myanmar Witness has identified, investigated and verified footage relating to hundreds of fires in and around villages in Myanmar. As part of this data collection and monitoring, Myanmar Witness has produced several reports detailing some instances of these fires and the patterns they followed. These include: Civilian Harm: The impact of military operations in North-West Myanmar, Fire as a weapon in Sagaing and Burning Myanmar. Myanmar Witness also lays out these instances in the open-source Myanmar Witness Fire Map, making the data accessible for a wider audience to review..."
Source/publisher:
Myanmar Witness
Date of entry/update:
2023-08-08
[field_licence]
Type:
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Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations, Political History
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"Myanmar’s junta finds itself in a conundrum. Two-and-a-half years after its coup, armed resistance to its rule has not diminished and is stronger than ever. What to do about this, from the junta’s perspective, is unclear. Its advantage in military hardware has not been decisive, its atrocity campaigns have not pacified, its diplomatic maneuverings have yielded little benefit, its ranks keep shrinking, and its financial viability gets thinner and thinner. Much of the foreign commentary about Myanmar focuses on the democratic resistance, with a good deal aimed at its weaknesses. But a big question is generally left unanswered: What is the military’s strategy to escape the hole it has dug for itself? On August 1, junta chief Min Aung Hlaing declared another state of emergency and mumbled about a future census and an election, this time in 2025. Why anybody would believe these pronouncements is baffling; they have been said over and over. Considering that, it’s worth assessing what the junta’s military status is and whether it has a viable strategy to regain the initiative, particularly on the battlefield.
It is worth stating some of the stark military realities facing the junta this year. Repeated large-scale offensives in Karenni State have been thwarted. Resistance has expanded across larger parts of Bago, Tanintharyi and Magwe regions while resistance everywhere is deeper, more experienced, better armed, increasingly coordinated, and unwavering in its intent to destroy the junta. No ethnic armed organizations have signed new ceasefires with the junta and none of the NUG’s partners has disowned it. The junta’s meetings with the remnants of the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement don’t even carry ceremonial benefit anymore. The Arakan Army doesn’t need to fight to secure more and more control over Rakhine. All it must do is strengthen its administration and legal systems, support cyclone relief, train new cadres of soldiers within the state, and let the junta kill itself elsewhere. So desperate is the junta, it sends scarce reserves from Rakhine to bolster weakening units elsewhere.
RelatedPosts
The Myanmar Regime’s Hollow Gestures
Myanmar Junta Escalates War Crimes as Resistance Gains Ground in July
What’s Next for Myanmar as State of Emergency Comes to an End?
Presently, the junta cannot use highways to send supplies to large parts of the northern half of the country so it must resort to archaic flotillas easily targeted on the open spaces of rivers. It hasn’t sent significant convoys to Chin in over a year, and has stopped trying, so bad were its casualties. It has effectively lost its main arms supplier, Russia, and has not been able to bring any significant new weapons systems to the battlefield. Its new proxy militias, the Pyu Saw Hti, have never grown into significant combat forces while its old proxies, the Border Guard Forces (BGFs), only engage in hostilities to protect their commercial interests on their home turf. The junta’s troops are not massacred, but day after day they bleed casualties across the country through the steady onslaught of ambushes, roadside bombs, and drone attacks.
Worryingly for the junta, it cannot recruit new troops on any meaningful scale while its officer cadet schools scrape the barrel, desperate for admissions. It cannot maintain steady operations at key border crossings in Muse and Myawaddy, while reaching India with commercial traffic is impossible. There are increasing attacks on major highways – generals are hit with roadside bombs just outside of Naypyitaw while resistance checkpoints are increasingly the norm in Bago, Mon and Karen states. Bridges are now systematically blown up by the resistance, such as across eastern Bago and northern Mon. The coordination and strategy demonstrated in these systematic sabotage campaigns by the Karen National Union and its PDF partners will only spread.
And yes, internal cohesion is ever more problematic for the junta. It has doubts over its senior commanders, repeatedly arresting those from the northern and northwestern commands as well as the southern one in Tanintharyi. Lower-ranking field commanders have been repeatedly arrested in Karenni and Karen states for refusing orders to partake in offensive operations because they are pointless deathtraps. Overall, the junta’s units are more demoralized. Being surrounded by a population that wants you dead eventually takes a toll. Arguably the biggest military threats to the junta are consistent attrition and the subsequent erosion of the chain of command. Defections and desertions are not nearly as likely or devastating to a military as the loss of chain of command. The junta has too many small, disparate units. They won’t desert or defect en masse because that carries too many risks; they’ll just stop responding to orders and hunker down; wait for the storm to blow over until they can safely surrender. From a junta grunt’s perspective, they are now too dispersed as fighting forces, too atomized, and face too much resistance. No armored troop transport, limited and unreliable air support, little to non-existent medivac, no new weapons systems of note, limited to no communications with family, no rotations out, few if any reinforcements coming in… where does it all end for them?
Min Aung Hlaing can neither claim nor offer greater stability: no normalization, no change in public support. He knows it. Extending the state of emergency is all the junta can do, which merely reinforces the overall veracity of the preceding descriptions. The challenge for the junta is what to do about it. It never countenanced the possibility of wide-scale, sustained rebellion across massive swaths of the Bamar heartland, much less that resistance in these places would have consistent support and direct collaboration from major ethnic armed groups, enabling mass armed revolt across most of the country. Myanmar’s sprawling geography and its own decreasing manpower are crippling challenges for the junta.
Predictably, the junta’s forces will persist in what they do best, killing unarmed civilians and provoking massive population displacement through atrocity campaigns. The junta’s military strategy, if one wants to call it that, is to brutalize the population with endless atrocities hoping to break its defiance. At a much lower pace, it will conduct operations against armed resistance groups. Why this strategy would change the overall situation now is dubious given the junta’s challenges, but it will persist because that is all it knows. One shouldn’t downplay the humanitarian costs of atrocities and they do affect the armed resistance’s operations, but they are not decisive at a strategic level. Large parts of the country – think Karenni and Sagaing – have experienced systematic arson attacks and significant population displacement, but the resistance in all of them is stable if not increasing. The humanitarian crisis afflicting the Myanmar people is horrendous but their determination to win through stoic perseverance is unwavering so far.
The coordination and cohesion of resistance forces is constantly questioned and maligned by analysts domestic and foreign, but considering the back-story of decades of mistrust and indoctrination, the core block of the resistance – the National Unity Government and the consultative councils, plus the KIA, KNU, CNF and KNPP – is remarkably stable if at times frustratingly opaque. Local PDFs may bicker but that doesn’t detract from their overall achievement – building their capacities to consistently degrade the junta’s combat units. When they emerge, junta forces numbering up to several hundred men are routinely engaged in mortal combat by PDFs. This stands in contrast to a year or two ago when the junta could burn villages by the dozen with 20 men and face little to no pushback. In the remarkably honest calculation of the junta, far too much of the country requires an active military presence, i.e., what a state of emergency recognizes as necessary. In late March of this year, Min Aung Hlaing admitted in a woeful speech that the junta cannot control 130 townships. One should assume this means the junta cannot effectively control a great deal more. If the junta’s units go outside their bases, they must fight. If the junta doesn’t actively defend an area, it will be lost. The junta may “control” towns, but more and more this just means the army barracks, police station, and GAD office, which it increasingly uses to shell villages so that its battered units don’t have to emerge even to burn villages.
Considering this, what can be expected by the junta is greater emphasis on the theater of international diplomacy to obscure a worsening military position within the country. The supposed meeting by the Thai foreign minister with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, junta clemency for some of her convictions, and her movement to house arrest instead of a prison has the diplomatic and media corps abuzz. With Laos soon assuming the ASEAN chair, it can be expected that there will be more diplomatic engagement with the junta, which will attempt to use Aung San Suu Kyi as a prop to foster the false sense that it is moderating its approach. This theater of the absurd will garner endless commentary because it can be seen and written about. But it won’t change the substance of the matter, which is on the ground: a population of tens of millions that all viscerally want rid of this military. The revolution didn’t start because one party, much less one person, dictated it so. It started across the country when thousands of communities chose to take up arms. That is the reality of this time compared with 1962 and 1988, and it is inescapable. Myanmar’s war will be won or lost on the ground.
Regardless, even in the realm of diplomacy, the junta still faces massive challenges. “Support” from regional neighbors is not significant despite the hype. Nobody is going to prop up the junta with hefty amounts of armaments, help it break sanctions at a large scale, or invest in it in any way that will fundamentally change the strategic trajectory of the conflict, which it is losing. International engagement with the junta is largely transactional and the junta has less and less to offer. Allowing junta officials to join ASEAN meetings is morally pathetic but changes nothing. All that Track 1.5 talks produce is to make their participants feel better about themselves. The junta increasingly demonstrates it has little to offer its neighbors. It cannot control BGF crime hubs. It cannot prevent refugee outflows, instead causing ever more of them. The drugs trade is growing exponentially. Its economic management is woeful to even junta supporters. The latest sanctions by the US mean the junta cannot operate effectively with foreign business partners, meaning investment and even ongoing engagement is massively encumbered and never more unattractive. ASEAN has had no breakthroughs. Nobody can even remember what the 5 points of the ASEAN Consensus even were.
What the junta does next is unclear other than to manipulate the diplomatic stage and commit more atrocities. What the resistance does is much clearer – more of what it has been doing. The best thing going for the resistance is the public, which even after 2.5 years of war, still sees the junta as nothing but a loathsome ‘foreign’ occupying force. Public opinion is not shifting in the junta’s favor; too much innocent blood has been spilled. The biggest need is to send more and more humanitarian aid to displaced populations and bolster battered communities’ resilience. Maintaining public morale and support for the revolution and deepening cohesion of the core block of resistance are the other driving imperatives for the pro-democracy movement. Expanding the chain-of-command, bolstering local social services, and growing local administration are clear priorities already unfolding. Methodical relationships with the Myanmar diaspora are critical for financing. Engagement with unofficially supportive ethnic armed groups is important for bleeding the junta further.
It is easy to find faults in the resistance, to nitpick it in a thousand ways and claim these flaws lead only to defeat. Myanmar’s revolution is what it is: a sprawling bottom-up revolt initially driven by the imperatives of local self-defense that grew into a national uprising based on shared aspirations for a better future built upon federal democracy. Yes, more coordination, more messaging, more clarity about its politics, more inclusion, more and better of everything would be wonderful. But the flaws don’t detract from the bigger picture. Look around the world and there is no clearer example of a mass movement fighting for a just cause. Moreover, despite whatever its critics proclaim, the raw fact remains that Myanmar’s pro-democracy resistance is not being defeated militarily and shows no sign of wavering despite all the horrors the junta has thrown at Myanmar’s people.
The junta is losing. If things continue as they are, it will lose. The junta’s incessant brutality has lit a fire it does not know how to extinguish. That will not change. It created this raging inferno of resistance through the arrogance of staging another coup and the mass atrocities it committed afterwards. More atrocities will not shift the war in its favor. The democratic resistance is viable and ascendant because it is, and will remain, a popular national uprising of a people determined to rid themselves of juntas once and for all. If present trends continue, and it stands to reason they will, Myanmar’s current junta will not be defeated in a grand battle for Naypyitaw. By the end Naypyitaw will not even matter. The junta will simply bleed out in different parts of the country until it effectively collapses as a force and a new government is stood up. The post-conflict peace may be messy in places, at least to parts of the international community, but it will not be Syria. There is simply too much social goodwill and solidarity among the Myanmar people, the starting and end point of this revolution..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2023-08-08
[field_licence]
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Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, The Military's political role, Political History
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"Geneva, 8 August 2023 – There is strong evidence that the Myanmar military and its affiliate militias are committing increasingly frequent and brazen war crimes, according to information collected and analysed by the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar (Mechanism) and outlined in its Annual Report released today.
These war crimes include indiscriminate or disproportionate attacks on civilians from aerial bombing, such as the military airstrike in Sagaing in April 2023 that reportedly killed more than 155 people. There has also been an increase in the mass executions of civilians and detained combatants, and the large-scale and intentional burning of civilian homes and buildings, resulting in the destruction of entire villages in some cases.
“Every loss of life in Myanmar is tragic, but the devastation caused to whole communities through aerial bombardments and village burnings is particularly shocking,” said Nicholas Koumjian, Head of the Mechanism. “Our evidence points to a dramatic increase in war crimes and crimes against humanity in the country, with widespread and systematic attacks against civilians, and we are building case files that can be used by courts to hold individual perpetrators responsible.”
The Myanmar military has justified aerial bombings, including on schools and monasteries, as attacks against military targets. However, the Mechanism’s evidence indicates that the military should have known, or did know, that large numbers of civilians were present in or around alleged military targets at the time of some of these attacks.
The Mechanism’s report explains that under international law, military commanders have a duty to prevent and punish war crimes committed by those under their command and failing to take reasonable measures to prevent and punish these crimes may make the commanders criminally responsible. The Mechanism notes that “repeatedly ignoring such crimes may indicate that the higher authorities intended the commission of these crimes.”
In its investigations into the most serious international crimes committed in Myanmar, the Mechanism has collected information from more than 700 sources, including more than 200 eyewitness accounts, and additional evidence such as photographs, videos, audio material, documents, maps, geospatial imagery, social media posts and forensic evidence.
The Mechanism continues to actively investigate the violence that led to the large-scale displacement of the Rohingya from Myanmar in 2016 and 2017. In particular, the report stresses the prevalence of sexual and gender-based crimes committed against the Rohingya at this time.
“Sexual and gender-based crimes are amongst the most heinous crimes that we are investigating,” said Koumjian. “These were so pervasive during the Rohingya clearance operations that most witnesses we have interviewed have relevant evidence about this.”
The Mechanism is sharing evidence, information, and analytical reports with those working on ongoing cases concerning the Rohingya at the International Criminal Court, the International Court of Justice and in Argentina.
The Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar (IIMM or Mechanism) was created by the United Nations Human Rights Council in 2018 to collect and analyse evidence of the most serious international crimes and other violations of international law committed in Myanmar since 2011. It aims to facilitate justice and accountability by preserving and organizing this evidence and preparing case files for use in future prosecutions of those responsible in national, regional and international courts..."
Source/publisher:
Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2023-08-08
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
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Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations, UN human rights documents on Myanmar
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Indonesia aspires to be a great regional power and its attempt to play peacemaker in the Myanmar crisis is an early test of how it might fare, says this international relations lecturer.
Description:
"BANDUNG, Indonesia: With regional power comes regional responsibilities - as Indonesia is finding out. The world’s fourth most populous nation aspires to be a “great regional power” by 2030, playing a stabilising role in Southeast Asia.
It is getting an early taste of what that entails. As the current chair of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Indonesia has been called upon by international bodies, including the United Nations, to show leadership in resolving one of the region’s bloodiest conflict: Myanmar’s civil war.
And progress has been slow. As a scholar of international relations and Indonesian foreign policy, I see the nation’s handling of the Myanmar crisis as an early test of how Indonesia could fare as the region’s great power.
THE LIMITS OF “QUIET DIPLOMACY”
The civil war between the military and the anti-military groups in Myanmar has claimed thousands of lives. It followed a 2021 coup that returned the country to military rule, with the junta embarking on a brutal crackdown of the opposition. Since then, the ruling generals have encountered fierce resistance from armed groups.
In April 2021, a few months into the conflict, ASEAN leaders meeting in Indonesia’s capital Jakarta agreed to a Five-Point Consensus on Myanmar, calling for an immediate ceasefire, constructive dialogue between all parties, a special envoy to help mediate the conflict, humanitarian assistance from ASEAN and a delegation visit to Myanmar to facilitate the peace process.
More than two years on, the first point of the Five-Point Consensus has still not been implemented, and chances of a ceasefire look remote under the current level of fighting.
In May, Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi, responding to criticism over perceived inaction over the crisis, said Indonesia was relying on “quiet diplomacy”. Such a policy forms part of Indonesia’s attempts to balance the nonintervention principal of ASEAN - by which meddling in the domestic affairs of neighbouring states is unacceptable - with the need to address the internal crisis in Myanmar.
But efforts to influence the behaviour of another state through discreet negotiations or actions have clearly not yet succeeded. It doesn’t bode well for Indonesia’s desire to be a stabilising factor in the region.
In theory, Indonesia should be well placed to assume regional leadership. It is a member of the Group of Twenty (G20) gathering of richest nations and is poised to have the world’s fourth-largest economy within two decades. Its military is ranked the most powerful in the region. Added to this economic and military might is a willingness to assume the role of regional leader.
Yet Indonesia’s calls for a ceasefire in Myanmar have fallen on deaf ears, in part because the warring parties know Indonesia is unwilling to punish Myanmar for failing to end the fighting. Any such punitive action would be deemed unacceptable under the ASEAN nonintervention principle..."
Source/publisher:
"Channel News Asia" (Singapore)
Date of entry/update:
2023-08-07
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Human Rights and international relations
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"India: Violence in West Bengal spikes during local elections
Political violence in India's West Bengal state escalated substantially during local elections in July, more than doubling compared to the month prior. The increase contributes to 2023 levels of political violence in the state -- already well exceeding the total violence recorded for all of 2022. The increase began in anticipation of the panchayat (village-level government) elections held on 8 July, with violence driven by deadly inter-party clashes. In the weeks leading up to the elections, several candidates were physically prevented by the ruling Trinamool Congress (TMC) from filing nominations, forcing them to file at remote locations.1 Clashes were also reported between TMC and former TMC members who contested the elections as independent politicians. The dominant TMC won decisively, though repolling was held in several locations due to the violence that continued after the election results were announced. The degree to which governance in West Bengal is devolved gives substantial power to the panchayat, which in turn fuels local political contention that lends itself to high levels of violence during panchayat elections in the state.2
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Japan and South Korea: Planned Fukushima water release leads to increased demonstrations
Demonstrations opposing the planned release of treated water from the crippled Fukushima nuclear power plant into the Pacific Ocean increased in Japan and South Korea in July. The treated water was used to cool the damaged reactors after an earthquake and tsunami destroyed the plant in March 2011. The Japanese government is expected to go ahead with the release plan starting in August, arguing that the slow release of the treated water is safe and is needed to allow for the plant's decommissioning.3 Despite a report by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) backing the release plan,4 demonstrators oppose the release, arguing that the treated water is still radioactive and harmful to both humans and the marine environment. There are particular concerns about the potential impact on the fishing industry in the region.5 The issue has led to demonstrations in Japan, as well as in South Korea where a recent survey found 80% of South Koreans oppose the discharge plan.6 Around 90 demonstrations against the release plan were recorded in Japan and South Korea in July, with the overwhelming majority of these events recorded in South Korea. The issue has been taken up by the opposition Democratic Party in South Korea, which organized a mass protest on 1 July to call on the South Korean government to oppose the plan.7 Other countries in the region, including China and some Pacific Island nations, have also condemned the plan, arguing that a consensus needs to be reached among countries in the region regarding the water.8
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Myanmar: Clashes in Kachin state increase
Fighting increased in Myanmar's Kachin state in July, with more than four and a half times the number of battles reported in July compared to June. The increase was driven by clashes between the military and the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) and came after at least 1,000 military junta troops were moved into the region in early July.9 Heavy fighting began on 3 July as the military attempted to seize the village of Nam Sang Yang in Waingmaw township, located near Laiza, the headquarters of the KIA.10 Thousands of locals were forced to flee.11 The fighting continued throughout the month as the KIA defended the area by ambushing military reinforcements arriving from three different directions: Bhamo, Myitkyina, and Waingmaw townships.12 By the end of July, the military had resorted to airstrikes during clashes around Nam Sang Yang.13 Nam Sang Yang is situated on the strategically-important Myitkyina-Bhamo road, which the military aims to gain control over.14 Prior to the coup, fighting had previously flared in the area after the ceasefire between the military and the KIA ended in 2011.
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Myanmar: Ongoing violence against political prisoners
Political prisoners in Myanmar faced ongoing violence at the hands of the military junta in prisons across the country in July. In Bago region, the military removed 37 political prisoners from Daik-U Prison (also known as Kyaiksakaw Prison) on 27 June under the pretext of transferring some to Insein Prison and some to Thayarwaddy Prison.15 All 37 political prisoners subsequently went missing. According to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners, at least eight of the 37 missing political prisoners were killed.16 Prison authorities sent letters to the families of the deceased victims in early July stating that the prisoners were shot dead during an attempted escape after a prison transfer van overturned in a road accident. However, the families believe the military used the prison transfer as an excuse to execute them.17 Human rights groups have highlighted the danger for prisoners during such prison transfers.18 The deaths come as anti-coup protests in July marked the one-year anniversary of the executions of four political prisoners, including a former National League for Democracy lawmaker and a well-known pro-democracy activist. Since the coup, the military junta has subjected prisoners, detainees, and prisoners of war to beatings or other forms of severe torture that often results in death. ACLED records over 400 events of violence against individuals in the junta's custody since the coup. However, due to underreporting on the issue, this number is likely far less than the true scale of the violence.
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Thailand: Demonstrations triggered after prime minister vote
Despite the Move Forward Party (MFP) winning the 14 May general election, parliament blocked the MFP party leader, Pita Limjaroenrat, from becoming prime minister in July. On 13 July, Pita -- who was nominated by a coalition composed of MFP, the Pheu Thai Party, and other smaller political parties -- failed to secure the majority vote in parliament, before another parliamentary vote blocked any further nomination on 19 July. Simultaneously, Pita was suspended from his position as an MP due to a case involving his shareholding in a media company.19 The votes, along with Pita's suspension from parliament, were condemned by pro-democracy protesters. They called for the resignation of senators, including the 250 senators appointed by the military, accusing them of hindering the democratic process.20 Tensions persist as protestors decry the military's efforts to undermine the democratic mandate granted to the MFP and its coalition partners. Protesters continue to call for senators to resign, coalition unity, and adherence to promised policy proposals, including the MFP's pledge to reform the lèse-majesté law. More than 30 anti-government demonstrations were reported in July. The next vote for prime minister has been postponed until August, with the Constitutional Court reviewing the rejection of Pita's renomination.21..."
Source/publisher:
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project
Date of entry/update:
2023-08-04
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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"On June 21, 2023, the United States designated two of Burma’s military regime-controlled banks, Myanma Foreign Trade Bank (MFTB) and Myanma Investment and Commercial Bank (MICB). MFTB and MICB have been instrumental in facilitating the regime’s use of foreign currency to procure arms and jet fuel abroad and to access international markets using offshore accounts.
Through these offshore accounts, MFTB and MICB have facilitated the regime’s profiteering from Burma’s extractive industries, including oil and gas, teak, gemstones, and other natural resources. The designations of MFTB and MICB impose a significant impact on the regime’s ability to fund the violence it inflicts on the people of Burma.
At the time of the designation of these two banks, the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control issued General License 5 (GL 5) to allow entities engaging in transactions with MFTB and MICB to wind these down in an orderly fashion. Following the expiration of GL 5 on August 5 at 12:01 a.m. (EST), the United States will continue to carefully monitor compliance and scrutinize transactions with an MFTB or MICB nexus to counter evasion or other behavior that contravenes the intent of these designations and U.S. policy. We will pursue enforcement actions as appropriate.
The United States will not waver in its support for the people of Burma as they seek peace, justice, and an inclusive, democratic future for their country. We will continue to engage with our partners and allies in the broader international community to constrain the regime’s ability to exploit the international financial system..."
Source/publisher:
U.S. Department of State
Date of entry/update:
2023-08-04
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Business and the Military, Sanctions, The Burmese military's role in the economy
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Dr Yanghee Lee, the former United Nations (UN) Special Rapporteur on Myanmar, told CNA’s Asia Tonight on Tuesday (Aug 1) the move signals that the military-controlled government, led by junta chief Min Aung Hlaing, is “really out of ideas and really at the end of the rope” in managing the country.
Description:
"Reducing the jail term of Myanmar's former leader Aung San Suu Kyi is part of the military junta’s attempt to seek international recognition as the country's legitimate government, said Dr Yanghee Lee, the former United Nations Special Rapporteur on Myanmar.
The move signals that the military-controlled government led by junta chief Min Aung Hlaing is “really out of ideas and really at the end of the rope”, she told CNA’s Asia Tonight on Tuesday (Aug 1).
Reducing the jail term of Myanmar's former leader Aung San Suu Kyi is part of the military junta’s attempt to seek international recognition as the country's legitimate government, said Dr Yanghee Lee, the former United Nations Special Rapporteur on Myanmar.
The move signals that the military-controlled government led by junta chief Min Aung Hlaing is “really out of ideas and really at the end of the rope”, she told CNA’s Asia Tonight on Tuesday (Aug 1).
“Reducing the sentence of a 78-year-old lady who had been locked up on bogus charges should not be seen as an act of contrition or a conciliatory gesture by the brutal generals,” said Dr Lee, who took on the UN role from 2014 to 2020.
Her comments came hours after Ms Aung San Suu Kyi was pardoned on five of the 19 offences for which she was convicted and jailed a total of 33 years, reducing her jail term by six years.
Former president Win Myint, who was also arrested at the same time as Ms Aung San Suu Kyi after the 2021 coup, was also pardoned on some of the charges for which he was convicted.
The military junta has struggled for control in Myanmar, as conflict continues to break out across the country and its economy grapples with rising inflation.
On Monday, the military-controlled government had extended the country’s state of emergency by another six months, delaying elections that were promised.
SEEKING INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION
Dr Lee said the pardon was “just another one of the schizophrenic behaviours of Min Aung Hlaing”, as the military resorted to its decades-old playbook.
“They think that reducing sentences for Aung San Suu Kyi and the president U Win Myint will first of all get some of the support of the people, and more importantly, get them international recognition,” she said.
“It’s like a coating, a veneer, so that the international community can recognise them as a legitimate government of Myanmar.”
She noted that the military junta does not have control over the country, with over 50 per cent of the country under the control of the local ethnic groups.
Junta chief Min Aung Hlaing had acknowledged that much of the nation is not under full military control, with fighting continuing in Sagaing, Magway, Bago and Tanintharyi regions, as well as Karen, Kayah and Chin states.
The military junta will be aiming to be recognised as the country’s legitimate government, especially with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Summit and the UN General Assembly session coming up later this year.
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY RESPONSE
“I think it's time that the international community really wakes up and sees that what he (Min Aung Hlaing) is doing has been a decades-old trick, and will not get him far enough because he will never have the support of the people,” said Dr Lee.
Dr Lee added that she has been surprised by the international community’s response to the Myanmar crisis as compared to the war in Ukraine.
She said the international community has been generous with aid for Ukraine, as it is seen as a “country-to-country invasion … and it's in the backyard of the European continent”.
“But when it comes to Myanmar, it's the same thing. Min Aung Hlaing and the military have invaded its own people. It's not just a coup,” said Dr Lee.
“There has been an average of 30 airstrikes per month recently. 85 per cent of the casualties are civilian, and millions of people have been displaced.”
She noted that the junta is employing the same tactics it had used against the Rohingya in 2016 and 2017 when driving them away, which is to burn their villages, schools and places of worship.
DOES IT MATTER TO THE MYANMAR PEOPLE?
Dr Lee said that Ms Aung San Suu Kyi’s pardon will not affect the Myanmar people’s fight against the junta.
“I think the people of Myanmar have moved on. Aung San Suu Kyi is still very much respected. However, the fight now is the people's fight (and) the young generation’s,” she said.
“The people have now been united. They are built on solid consolidation and solidarity across ethnic lines and across generation lines. The Bamar people cannot fight this war by themselves without the ethnic communities, and the ethnic communities are now joining hands with the Bamar and the young generation.”
The Bamar is Myanmar's largest ethnic group, accounting for 68 per cent of the country's population.
Dr Lee said that the young generation are fighting for a dream that has existed since their parents’ time, which is for a “free democratic federal Myanmar”.
“Aung San Suu Kyi’s pardon may not and definitely will not affect the young people's minds, because they are fighting for their lives, to defend their family and their country and their hope and their aspirations,” she said..."
Source/publisher:
"Channel NewsAsia" (Singapore)
Date of entry/update:
2023-08-02
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
About Aung San Suu Kyi, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Political prisoners and other violations in Burma - reports, Freedom of opinion and expression: - the situation in Burma/Myanmar - reports, analyses, recommendations, Human Rights Defenders
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"Rumor: Myanmar State Counselor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and President Win Myint have been released from prison by the junta.
Fact: Suu Kyi and Win Myint remain behind bars along with their cabinet members and thousands of other political prisoners. Myanmar’s descent into chaos and turmoil continues.
The recent partial pardon of Suu Kyi, which saw her total sentence reduced from 33 years to 27 years, is appalling but laughable. Suu Kyi’s former economic adviser Sean Turnell, who was also jailed in Myanmar before his release last year, said it was meaningless. Indeed, they are cowards!
On Monday, amid rumors and speculation about the forming of a transitional government and the release of several politicians including Suu Kyi, the regime held a meeting of the National Defense and Security Council (NDSC) and extended the state of emergency. This is the fourth time the regime has done so, violating the charter. But it was joined by all NDSC members, including Vice President Henry Van Thio, who has served continuously as second vice-president under the National League for Democracy government and now the junta. It is just a divide and conquer scheme: Henry Van Thio is also under house arrest.
The state of emergency was initially declared in February 2021, when the military ousted the democratically elected government of Suu Kyi.
However, the country’s 2008 constitution drafted under the guidance of the military states that an emergency can be declared for an initial period of one year and can “normally” be extended for a maximum of two half-year terms at the discretion of the military-dominated NDSC.
The extension means the regime will continue to rule illegally and unleash its terror campaign in Myanmar, where an unprecedented armed rebellion has been taking place since the coup.
At the meeting, the junta chief called for increased military operations in Sagaing Region as well as Chin and Kayah states, saying “terrorist” attacks are the worst there. Last week, hundreds of military trucks entered Kayah State, where resistance forces have taken control of the territory. More slaughter and air raids are expected there.
Min Aung Hlaing has admitted that the regime has no control over 130 townships, with martial law imposed in nearly 50 townships in Yangon, Mandalay, Sagaing and Magwe regions, as well as Chin and Kayah states.
The regime has responded to the growing resistance movement with indiscriminate air strikes, raids and arbitrary killings across the country.
As of last week, the junta had killed more than 3,850 people, including those engaged in anti-regime activities and civilians killed in indiscriminate attacks, according to independent watchdogs.
World’s tallest Buddha … and most downtrodden people
Around the same time that the regime made the announcement that it would reduce Suu Kyi and Win Myint’s sentences, its murderer-in-chief Senior General Min Aung Hlaing offered up another carefully orchestrated news item to confuse the world and the media, holding a lavish ceremony in Naypyitaw to officially bless and open to the public the Maravijaya Buddha image, reportedly the world’s tallest.
The gesture is absurd in light of the regime’s record. Since the coup, the Myanmar junta has caused the displacement of over 1.5 million people, scorched at least 70,000 homes, and killed more than 3,747 civilians. Dozens of detained activists and politicians have been executed, some hanged, as there is no rule of law in Myanmar.
According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, the regime has committed “sexual violence, mass killings, extra-judicial executions, beheadings, dismemberments and mutilations” and created an appalling humanitarian crisis, plunging millions into dire poverty.
Millions of people in Myanmar need humanitarian assistance due to the economic crisis sparked by the coup, which has only brought more poverty and distress to the population. But in July, addressing the Human Rights Council in Geneva, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Turk said the military was engaged in a “systematic denial” of humanitarian relief to the millions of civilians in need of help.
There is a terrible irony in the regime leaders’ building the tallest Buddha image to show that they are the defenders of the faith in Buddhist-majority Myanmar; the country’s people feel they are the smallest, most defenseless and least protected people in this part of the world.
Neighbors making friends with junta
The question now is who can act as a broker between the regime and the opposition and apply any pressure?
Other than China and Russia, the regime has few friends.
In July, Thai Foreign Minister Don Pramudwinai met with Suu Kyi during a secret visit to Naypyitaw, becoming the first international dignitary to be granted permission by the regime to meet her. However, the meeting has caused controversy, as it took place shortly before the start of an Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) foreign ministerial meeting.
He described his encounter with Myanmar’s former State Counselor as “a good meeting”, going on to say that, in regards to the current situation in Myanmar, “She encouraged dialogue.” There has been no direct communication from Suu Kyi. The regime’s spokesman said the two met freely for more than one hour. Critics pointed out that Don has no right to speak for Suu Kyi, and no one can verify his claim that she has called for dialogue.
The opposition remains fragmented but still wants to bring down the regime, despite having limited resources.
Anyone seeking to appease the regime, or harboring the delusion that they can be successful in taming the wolf, will be surprised to see this meaningless and ludicrous gesture from the criminals in Naypyitaw.
Last week, Chinese special envoy Deng Xijun arrived in Naypyitaw and met with regime leader Min Aung Hlaing. China is said to be increasingly concerned with the growing instability in Myanmar and was reportedly unhappy with the previous extension of the state of emergency in February.
Whenever Beijing sends high-level delegations to Myanmar it is believed that they consistently and repeatedly raise the issue of Suu Kyi and her well-being.
Some China-Myanmar watchers have even speculated that China wants to see Min Aung Hlaing removed. If it is true, this largely echoes the opinion of the majority of Myanmar citizens. Who would want to endorse, defend and prop up a murderous regime leader and his cabinet in this region?
Nevertheless, China also wants to expand its business activities and resume its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects in Myanmar. This conflict of interest means Beijing cannot be viewed as an honest broker.
Time to act
It is time for China, the US, the EU, certain Scandinavian countries previously involved in Myanmar’s political transition process, and Myanmar’s neighbors to do more the resolve the country’s deepening crisis. Ironically, the Southeast Asian nation’s location between rivals China and India has so far rendered it more of an international blind spot than a strategic hot spot such as Taiwan or Ukraine.
But it is time to wake up: Myanmar’s growing instability is in danger of spreading to its neighbors China, India and Thailand—and beyond, throughout the region. The surge in refugees, insurgency, arms smuggling, organized crime, trafficking, money laundering, online scams, illegal drug production and illicit trade since the coup is in danger of contaminating the whole region. No one in the region can escape Myanmar’s crisis. It will only get worse if we fail to stop it.
All players should demand the immediate release of Suu Kyi and other detained leaders of the ousted government, as well as elected MPs and all other political prisoners. They should never have been put in prison in the first place.
Western governments should continue to impose targeted sanctions and arms embargoes on military enterprises, junta leaders’ families and associated crony businessmen.
Across ASEAN, elected MPs, prominent politicians, institutions, and civil society groups should keep up the pressure on their governments to do more on the Myanmar crisis, and continue to pressure companies that are assisting the regime.
If ASEAN and the international community want to see a restoration of stability and peace in Myanmar, it is time to increase—not reduce—the pressure on the regime and support the democratic opposition..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2023-08-02
[field_licence]
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Individual Documents
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Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations, Political History
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Description:
" August 2, 2023
On the Full Moon of Waso, the junta made 7 announcements in regards to the release of sentenced prisoners and prisoners facing trial.
The announcements in question covered:
(1) President U Win Myint
(2) State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi
(3) 22 political prisoners from Ethnic Resistance Organizations
(4) 72 members of Ethnic Resistance Organizations who were facing trials had their cases dismissed
(5) 7,749 prisoners
(6) 125 foreign prisoners were released
(7) Several prisoners on death row had sentences commuted to life imprisonment
Two of the five charges against President U Win Myint, and five of the 19 charges against Daw Aung San Suu Kyi were removed.
U Win Myint’s prison sentence was commuted by 2 years for the two removed charges, he still has to serve 10 years in prison. In a similar vein, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s prison sentence was only commuted by 6 years for the five removed charges, she still has to serve 27 years in prison.
22 people who were imprisoned for their relations with 4 Ethnic Resistance Organizations (EROs), MNDAA, TNLA, SSPP/SSA, and AA, were released.
Only a handful of political prisoners were released out of 7,749 prisoners across the country. As of 10 a.m. at the time of writing this report, AAPP has confirmed over (120) prisoners but further verification of prisoners is ongoing.
The junta continues to deny its criminal detention of (24,130) innocent civilians since the coup.
The political prisoners released were unjustly arrested and should never have been detained in the first place.
The military refuses to be transparent about the identities of the political prisoners to impede independent verification of accurate numbers released, and whether political prisoners are included among them.
Political prisoners released will have had less than 6-months of their sentences remaining.
AAPP Secretary U Tate Naing, said Releasing people after forcibly arresting them arbitrarily in the first place does not signal a relaxation in repression. The military uses these announcements to deceive international opinion on a regular basis. The military wants the outside world to think they are compromising. But the Burma military is not interested in dialogue, that much is clear from its 2021 coup and its decades of atrocities against ethnic people seeking autonomy.
AAPP Joint-Secretary U Bo Kyi said that The junta is using political prisoners for its hostage diplomacy, these releases are not acts of good will. On the same day of this so-called amnesty, the military junta continued its violent oppression of an entire country. In this past month, junta soldiers and supporters continued to terrorize the population, as evident in their detainment and killing of (144) and (101) people respectively. [AAPP data July 1, 2023 – July 31, 2023]..."
Source/publisher:
Assistance Association for Political Prisoners
Date of entry/update:
2023-08-02
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Political prisoners and other violations in Burma - reports, Human Rights Defenders, Freedom of Movement, violations of in Burma/Myanmar, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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Sub-title:
Sky News understands the clemency will not fully pardon ousted civilian leader Aung San Suu Kyi - and that five charges against her have been dropped, while 14 remain.
Description:
"Myanmar's junta says it has pardoned ousted civilian leader Aung San Suu Kyi for some of the offences she denies - more than two years after she was detained as part of a military coup.
Sky News understands the clemency will not fully pardon her and that five charges have been dropped, while 14 remain.
The Nobel laureate, who last week moved from prison to house arrest in the capital, Naypyitaw, has been in detention since the military seized power in a coup in early 2021.
According to local media, Ms Suu Kyi was taken to a government building last Monday. She had spent a year in solitary confinement.
However, speaking on Tuesday morning, her youngest son Kim Aris told Sky News: "It's important to take any news with a healthy level of scepticism.
"Few days ago it was rumoured she was moved to home arrest. Sources suggest to me that she's still in prison."
He added: "Also, given that all the charges against my mother are without any substance, any reduction in her sentence is completely meaningless.
Ms Suu Kyi is appealing against the convictions for various offences ranging from incitement and election fraud to corruption.
The 78-year-old denies all of the charges.
Myanmar Radio and Television reported the pardons on Tuesday but an informed source said she would remain in detention.
"She won't be free from house arrest," said the source, who declined to be identified due to the sensitivity of the issue, according to Reuters news agency.
Read more from Stuart Ramsay for Sky News: Getting inside Myanmar was a risk worth taking
Former President Win Myint also had his sentence reduced as part of the clemency granted to more than 7,000 prisoners, which reportedly saw prison terms reduced in a religious ceremony.
The head of Myanmar's military council, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, granted the clemency order to reduce the sentences in five cases against Ms Suu Kyi in which she was convicted for violating coronavirus restrictions, illegally importing and possessing walkie-talkies and sedition, according to a report on state MRTV.
The clemency was announced a day after Myanmar's military extended the state of emergency it imposed when it seized power from Ms Suu Kyi's elected government, forcing a further delay in elections it promised when it took over.
Ms Suu Kyi, the daughter of Myanmar's independence hero, was first put under house arrest in 1989 after huge protests against decades of military rule.
In 1991, she won the Nobel Peace Prize for campaigning for democracy but was only fully released from house arrest in 2010.
She won the 2015 election, held as part of tentative military reforms that were brought to a halt by the 2021 coup..."
Source/publisher:
"Sky News" (London)
Date of entry/update:
2023-08-01
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
About Aung San Suu Kyi, Political prisoners and other violations in Burma - reports, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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Sub-title:
The leaders of the deposed democratic government shouldn’t be in jail at all.
Description:
"Myanmar’s generals have long demonstrated an extraordinary capacity to remember everything, and to learn nothing. Sometimes this serves them well. Much of the world, when it thinks of Myanmar at all, neither remembers nor learns.
So on Tuesday we see an announcement by Myanmar’s ruling junta that it is to reduce the prison sentences of some key officials of the democratic government it overthrew in February 2021. Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, State Counsellor of the government elected in a landslide in November 2020, had six years shaved off her 33-year sentence. Myanmar’s deposed President, U Win Myint, saw his sentence reduced by four years. Reductions in the sentences of other political prisoners are also likely in the offing.
The sentence reductions come one day after the military junta extended the state of emergency under which it claims to rule, by a further six months. This was the fourth such extension, and in breach of its own constitution that limits such extensions to two.
The junta is weakened by its inability to surmount the opposition to its rule, and even the extreme brutality it has resorted to has done little to consolidate control.
Cynics, the ignorant, the gullible, and various vested interests in military rule in Myanmar will loudly exclaim this news as a positive development signifying real change. It is not. Neither Daw Suu, President Win Myint, nor any of the other political prisoners being ill-treated in Myanmar’s awful jails should be there at all. The charges they were convicted on are absurd, the judicial processes under which they were reached a travesty.
This is all out of an old playbook in Myanmar. The junta is weakened by its inability to surmount the opposition to its rule, and even the extreme brutality it has resorted to has done little to consolidate control. Beyond Russia and (sometimes) China, the junta is without friends. Running out of foreign exchange, of troops to sacrifice, and of ideas beyond base instincts, the junta is attempting an old public relations game and hoping an exhausted and distracted world might fall for it.
The past two-and-a-half-years of military rule in Myanmar has brought about unprecedented destruction, the death of thousands and the displacement of three million. Neighbouring countries once more host desperate refugees from Myanmar. Myanmar’s economy is in a state of collapse, with most people (in rural areas especially) reduced to little more than subsistence. The country has become a base for criminality – partly via the dramatic reinvigoration of the country as a producer of narcotics, partly via new cyber-crime hubs that constitute surely the one and only area of innovation in the country.
Myanmar’s problems will not be solved by reducing the prison sentences on people who should never have been sentenced in the first place. Real change is possible in Myanmar, but it will not come from applauding meaningless gestures, as attractive as they might be as “click-bait”. As with such online temptations broadly, best not to hit the like button until there is truly something to be happy about..."
Source/publisher:
"The Interpreter"
Date of entry/update:
2023-08-01
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
About Aung San Suu Kyi, Political prisoners and other violations in Burma - reports, Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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Sub-title:
The instability in Myanmar has created a conducive environment for human trafficking at the India-Myanmar border with IT workers being made victims to it
Description:
"The political upheaval in Myanmar following the military coup in February 2021 has created a complex and precarious situation for human trafficking between India and Myanmar. India shares a 1,642-km porous border with Myanmar. The instability, unrest, and power struggles within Myanmar have given rise to criminal syndicates that exploit vulnerable individuals and profit from illicit activities. As stated by V Muraleedharan, the Minister of State for External Affairs, more than 400 Indian men in fraudulent IT jobs are stuck in Myanmar.
This issue was also highlighted by the recent tweet by Indian External Affairs Minister, Dr. S Jaishankar, after a meeting with his Myanmar counterpart H.E. U Than Swe during the Mekong Ganga Cooperation (MGC) gathering in Bangkok on 16 July. Concerns about human and drug trafficking were emphasised, calling for stronger collaboration among relevant parties to ensure the prompt return of trafficked victims.
The instability, unrest, and power struggles within Myanmar have given rise to criminal syndicates that exploit vulnerable individuals and profit from illicit activities.
To understand this concern, there is a need to examine the deteriorating human trafficking conditions along the India-Myanmar border post-coup and the challenges faced by authorities in combating this growing menace.
Employment scam
One of the most significant trends observed in post-coup human trafficking is the promise of fake IT occupations in Thailand, with salaries that seem too good to be true. According to reports, the syndicates’ modus operandi involves enticing IT-skilled youths with the promise of lucrative data entry careers in Thailand, with monthly salaries ranging from US$5,000 to US$8,000. These attractive job opportunities are advertised on social media platforms and through recruiting agents based in Dubai and India.
The “recruits” (mostly belonging to the Indian state of Tamil Nadu) are then transported to Thailand using the visa-on-arrival facility. Upon arrival, they are taken to Mae Sot in Tak Province. Under the cover of night, they are made to cross the Moei River to illegally enter Myawaddy. Once in this remote bordering state, they are coerced into working as scammers within the facilities set up by the syndicates.
One of the most significant trends observed in post-coup human trafficking is the promise of fake IT occupations in Thailand, with salaries that seem too good to be true.
Fortunately, a significant number of those held captive have managed to maintain communication, and authorities are in contact with them. The harrowing tales of the rescued victims about not being provided proper food, sleep, or sanitary conditions have been quite disturbing. They were overworked and severely punished for not meeting appropriate targets.
Challenges faced by Indian authorities
The Indian government, particularly the Ministry of External Affairs, is confronted with multifaceted challenges in addressing human trafficking issues. The Myawaddy region, where the trafficking issue is the worst, is located within Myanmar’s Kayin province which shares a border with Thailand. In this remote area, armed militia groups hold greater control, limiting the influence of Myanmar’s military government. As a result, New Delhi encounters numerous intricate challenges in its efforts to rescue the stranded Indians.
The lack of cooperation from the Myanmar authorities due to the ongoing political crisis hampers effective collaboration in tackling this issue. Additionally, the vast and difficult terrain along the border poses challenges in patrolling and securing the area adequately.
Despite the daunting challenges, Indian authorities, along with the Indian missions in Bangkok and Yangon, have been actively working to rescue the victims and repatriate them to India. The collaboration between different agencies and law enforcement bodies has resulted in the successful rescue of 292 individuals who have been brought back to India through repatriation efforts. However, many still remain trapped.
The Myawaddy region, where the trafficking issue is the worst, is located within Myanmar’s Kayin province which shares a border with Thailand.
Bureaucratic and administrative delays also remain a major concern. The process usually involves the rescued victims crossing into Thailand. Upon reaching Thailand, the Thai armed forces detain them due to their illegal entry since the captives lack proper travel documentation to enter Myanmar, and their return to Thailand is also not legally recognised. As a result, Indian diplomats are faced with the challenging task of persuading the relevant authorities to recognise those rescued from Myanmar as victims of a human smuggling racket. This process involves extensive time and documentation efforts.
Points of deliberation
Enhancing collaboration between border control agencies and establishing direct communication channels between India and Myanmar can serve as a potent strategy to combat trafficking in persons and foster cross-border and regional cooperation. This was the very reason for the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) that was signed between India and Myanmar in 2019 for enhancing bilateral cooperation on the prevention, rescue, recovery, and repatriation of persons who have been trafficked. However, the toppling of the civilian government made it difficult to understand whether the military government will honour the MoU and the clauses set within it that includes ensuring speedy investigation and prosecution of traffickers and organised crime syndicates in either country, and also setting up Working Groups/ Task Forces to make efforts to prevent human trafficking.
The solidification of legal frameworks to tackle trafficking also needs to be ensured. While both nations have enacted laws that criminalise trafficking and protect victims and have also ratified international conventions related to human trafficking, the current political instability hinders proper and prompt measures to ensure the safety and protection of trafficked victims. In this regard, improved coordination between India and Myanmar’s law enforcement agencies is essential to effectively combat trafficking. Joint operations and intelligence sharing can help intercept traffickers and rescue victims.
While both nations have enacted laws that criminalise trafficking and protect victims and have also ratified international conventions related to human trafficking, the current political instability hinders proper and prompt measures to ensure the safety and protection of trafficked victims.
Additionally, raising awareness about the risks of trafficking and educating potential victims about the signs of exploitation are crucial steps in combating this issue. A delay in the publication of the advisory on fake IT jobs was noted and, thus, such negligence in the future needs to be addressed. Dissemination of reliable information is critical to restrict the spread of trafficking networks from preying on individuals. Alongside rescue efforts, it is equally important to provide rehabilitation and support to the victims to help them reintegrate into society and rebuild their lives after such traumatic experiences. Proper psychological evaluation and treatment will be essential in this regard.
Addressing this complex issue requires concerted efforts from both India and Myanmar, along with international cooperation, to ensure the safety and well-being of the victims and to combat this grave violation of human rights..."
Source/publisher:
Observer Research Foundation
Date of entry/update:
2023-08-01
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Trafficking: global, regional and national reports, Trafficking: Burma-specific material, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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Description:
"(CNN )— Myanmar’s ruling military junta has pardoned Aung San Suu Kyi on five charges for which she was previously convicted, reducing the lengthy sentences handed down to the deposed, democratically elected leader after generals seized control of the Southeast Asian nation.
The pardon was announced by Aung Lin Dwe, the secretary of the regime’s governing body, and further details were confirmed by a source with direct knowledge of the case.
The five charges pardoned include offenses against defamation, natural disaster laws, export and import laws and the country’s telecommunication law, the source told CNN.
Myanmar’s military spokesperson Zaw Min Tun said Suu Kyi’s jail sentence would be reduced by six years, he said speaking to the media on camera on Tuesday.
It’s unclear how many years Suu Kyi now faces in prison.
The source CNN earlier spoke to with direct knowledge of the case said her sentence had been reduced by 9 years on Tuesday, and that there were prior reductions already made to the amount of time she would have to serve.
Nonetheless Suu Kyi still faces the prospect of decades without liberty, an outcome that has permeated her long political career trying to bring democracy to Myanmar.
As of the end of 2022, the 78-year-old faced a total of 33 years in jail, including three years of hard labor, for multiple convictions including electoral fraud and receiving bribes.
Suu Kyi led Myanmar for five years before being forced from power and detained after her party was re-elected in a landslide election against military-backed opposition.
Army general Min Aung Hlaing seized power at that time in February 2021, ending Myanmar’s brief experiment with democracy, imprisoning multiple opposition figures and plunging the impoverished Southeast Asian nation into a raging civil conflict that continues to this day.
Battles between the military and resistance groups unfold daily across the country. Airstrikes and ground attacks on what the military calls “terrorist” targets occur regularly and have killed thousands of civilians, often including children, according to monitoring groups.
Whole villages have been burned down by junta soldiers and schools, clinics and hospitals destroyed as a result of the attacks, according to local monitoring groups.
Suu Kyi, who spent decades under house arrest during a previous military junta and has been a symbol of opposition to decades of military rule, has denied all of the charges levied against her – and rights groups and international observers say her convictions are politically motivated.
As of Tuesday, Suu Kyi still faces sentences for 14 other offenses of which she was convicted, the source said.
The announcement comes as Myanmar’s Supreme Court is set to hear appeals by Suu Kyi against multiple convictions over the next two weeks. The source told CNN those appeals will still go ahead.
The United Nations Security Council last year called on the junta to release all political prisoners, including Suu Kyi and former President Win Myint..."
Source/publisher:
"CNN" (USA)
Date of entry/update:
2023-08-01
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Political prisoners and other violations in Burma - reports, About Aung San Suu Kyi, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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Description:
"France takes note of the announcement regarding the partial pardon granted to State Counselor Aung San Suu Kyi and President Win Myint. France renews its call for the release of all of the individuals being arbitrarily detained, in keeping with UN Security Council Resolution 2669.
The ongoing detention of nearly 20,000 political prisoners does not allow the will of the Myanmar people to be sincerely, freely expressed, nor does it allow for a good-faith political process that includes all of the stakeholders, in line with ASEAN’s Five-Point Consensus, for which France once again offers its support. This process must include the National Unity Government; the historic leaders of the National League for Democracy, including State Counselor Aung San Suu Kyi; and the ethnic organizations..."
Source/publisher:
French Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Date of entry/update:
2023-08-01
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Political prisoners and other violations in Burma - reports, Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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Description:
"The United States is deeply concerned by the Burma military regime’s extension of the state of emergency, which comes as the regime plunges the country deeper into violence and instability. Since overthrowing a democratically elected government two and a half years ago, the military regime has carried out hundreds of airstrikes, burned down tens of thousands of homes, and displaced more than 1.6 million people. The regime’s widespread brutality and disregard for the democratic aspirations of the people of Burma continue to prolong the crisis. The United States will continue to work with our partners and allies to apply political and economic tools to hold the regime accountable. We continue to call for it to end its violence and atrocities, release those unjustly detained, allow unhindered humanitarian access, seek justice for survivors, and engage with all stakeholders to pursue a peaceful, just, and democratic future for Burma..."
Source/publisher:
U.S. Department of State
Date of entry/update:
2023-07-31
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations, Political History
Language:
Local URL:
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Sub-title:
Military-controlled government seemingly needs more time to organise new vote as it tackles protests and armed resistance
Description:
"Myanmar’s military-controlled government has extended the state of emergency it imposed when the army seized power from an elected government in 2021, forcing a further delay in elections it promised when it took over.
MRTV television said the National Defense and Security Council met on Monday in the capital, Naypyidaw, and extended the state of emergency for another six months starting on Tuesday because time is needed to prepare for the elections. The NDSC is nominally a constitutional government body, but in practice is controlled by the military.
The announcement amounted to an admission that the army does not exercise enough control to stage the polls and has failed to subdue widespread opposition to military rule, which includes increasingly challenging armed resistance as well as nonviolent protests and civil disobedience, despite the army having a huge advantage in manpower and weapons.
The state of emergency was declared when troops arrested Aung San Suu Kyi and top officials from her government and members of her National League for Democracy party on 1 February 2021. The takeover reversed years of progress toward democracy after five decades of military rule in Myanmar.
The military said it seized power because of fraud in the last general election held in November 2020, in which Suu Kyi’s party won a landslide victory while the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development party did poorly. Independent election observers said they did not find any major irregularities.
The army takeover was met with widespread peaceful protests that security forces suppressed with lethal force, triggering armed resistance that UN experts have described as a civil war.
As of Monday, 3,857 people have been killed by the security forces since the takeover, according to a tally kept by the independent Assistance Association for Political Prisoners.
The army-enacted 2008 constitution allows the military to rule the country under a state of emergency for one year, with two possible six-month extensions if preparations are not yet completed for new polls, meaning that the time limit expired on 31 January this year.
However, the NDSC allowed the military government to extend emergency rule for another six months in February, saying the country remained in an abnormal situation. The announcement on Monday is the fourth extension.
The state of emergency allows the military to assume all government functions, giving the head of the ruling military council, Senior Gen Min Aung Hlaing, legislative, judicial and executive powers.
Nay Phone Latt, a spokesperson for the National Unity Government, an underground group that calls itself the country’s legitimate government and serves as an opposition umbrella group, said the extension of emergency rule was expected because the military government hasn’t been able to annihilate the pro-democracy forces.
“The junta extended the state of emergency because the generals have a lust for power and don’t want to lose it. As for the revolutionary groups, we will continue to try to speed up our current revolutionary activities,” Nay Phone Latt said in a message on Monday.
Monday’s report did not specify when the polls might be held, saying only that they would occur after the goals of the state of emergency are accomplished..."
Source/publisher:
"The Guardian" (UK)
Date of entry/update:
2023-07-31
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations, The Military's political role, Political History
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Description:
"JAKARTA – Parliamentarians from Southeast Asia expressed their grave concern today that ASEAN countries are still scheduled to hold counter-terrorism military exercises with the Myanmar junta in August and September. They called on ASEAN to exclude the illegal junta from all joint military exercises held by the regional bloc.
“It would be utterly absurd for ASEAN countries to join the Myanmar junta in military exercises when the junta has consistently shown a lack of political will or interest in abiding by the Five-Point Consensus, notably ‘the immediate cessation of violence’,” ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights (APHR) Chair and member of the Indonesian House of Representatives Mercy Barends said today.
“It is especially galling that these exercises are purportedly for counter-terrorism purposes as the junta has branded the democratically-elected National Unity Government and the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, as well as the People’s Defense Forces and various other pro-democracy entities, as terrorists,” said Barends.
According to statements from the Russian Ministry of Defense as well as documents from ASEAN’s website, the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM+) Experts Working Group on Counter Terrorism is planning to hold a tabletop exercise in Myanmar in August as well as a field exercise in Russia in September. Myanmar and Russia have chaired this working group since 2021, following their appointment in 2020.
“These exercises would only serve to increase the junta’s capacity to continue its campaign of murder and terror against the people of Myanmar. ASEAN must be unified in their condemnation of the escalating human rights situation and take action which makes clear that the Myanmar junta’s atrocities are unacceptable. One way to do this is by canceling these exercises and excluding the junta from all future joint military exercises and defense meetings,” said Barends.
“If ASEAN as a bloc refuses to do this, then we call on ASEAN and ADMM+ countries to follow the example of the United States, Australia and New Zealand and boycott the training.”..."
Source/publisher:
ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights
Date of entry/update:
2023-07-28
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations, ASEAN-Burma relations
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Sub-title:
Growing political instability in Myanmar and financial issues have stymied the progress of the Trilateral Highway project
Description:
"On the sidelines of the recently concluded 12th Mekong Ganga Cooperation (MGC) meeting in Bangkok on 16 July, Indian External Affairs Minister Dr. S. Jaishankar met with his Myanmar counterpart U Than Swe to discuss regional connectivity initiatives, with particular emphasis on expediting the India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway (IMT-TH) project. He emphasised the importance of peace and stability in border areas, expressed concerns about trafficking, reiterated India’s support for Myanmar’s democratic transition, proposed people-centric initiatives to address pressing challenges, and aimed to closely coordinate its policy with ASEAN regarding Myanmar.
The IMT-TH presents a significant opportunity for enhanced connectivity and regional integration. It aims to connect India’s Northeast region with Thailand via Myanmar, facilitating trade and commerce, health, education, and tourism between the three nations while providing a more efficient and cost-effective transportation route. India has proposed extending the road network to include Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam, further expanding its reach and potential impact. Bangladesh is also interested in joining the initiative for enhancing trade links and tourism.
It aims to connect India’s Northeast region with Thailand via Myanmar, facilitating trade and commerce, health, education, and tourism between the three nations while providing a more efficient and cost-effective transportation route.
Since its conception in 2002, the Trilateral Highway project has faced various delays and challenges, including political instability in Myanmar and financial issues. Nonetheless, recent years have seen progress, with several stretches of the highway being completed or nearing completion. The project aims to establish an essential strategic route, but earlier targets for its operationalisation have been delayed. Initially, the government sought to make the highway operational by 2015 and then extended the timeline till 2019. Now, the new deadline is set for 2027. It is, thus, crucial to closely assess the current situation on the ground to gauge the progress of this delayed project.
The IMT-TH project follows a proposed plan that starts from Bangkok and passes through cities like Sukhothai and Mae Sot in Thailand, and Yangon, Mandalay, Kalewa, and Tamu in Myanmar before reaching India. In India, it is likely to pass through Moreh, Kohima, Guwahati, Srirampur, Siliguri, and Kolkata, spanning over 2,800 km. The longest stretch of the highway will be in India, while the most minor road section will be in Thailand.
Thailand’s Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, Vijavat Isarabhakdi, stated in a recent interview that most of the project’s work in Thailand is over. The Indian counterpart also mentioned that around 70 percent of the work is complete. Upon being approached, Aung Naing Oo, Myanmar’s Trade Minister, revealed that most of the highway was constructed, spanning 1,512 km. The contractors will complete the remaining sections within three years.
The longest stretch of the highway will be in India, while the most minor road section will be in Thailand.
Persisting bottlenecks
The IMT-TH project encompasses a vital road network in Myanmar, which, despite having witnessed notable development in recent times, still needs progress at numerous stretches. Several sections of the original IMT-TH alignments have been completed or upgraded, including the crucial bypass road connecting Myawaddy and Kawkareik in Thailand and the second friendship bridge linking Myawaddy and Mae Sot. Additionally, ongoing efforts involve the improvement and repair of roads between Kalewa (India) and Monywa (Myanmar), the construction of a new Bago bridge supported by Japan, and the development of an arterial road connecting Bago and Kyaikto in Myanmar, facilitated by the Asian Development Bank (ADB). However, urgent attention is required to replace 69 bridges along the Tamu-Kyigone-Kalewa road. Work on this stretch has been delayed since 2015 due to the termination of the contractor’s agreement. Recently, reports suggest that work on the first bridge between Moreh (in Manipur) and Tamu (in Myanmar) is expected to restart soon. However, a proper timeline is needed.
Construction is underway on the difficult Yar Gyi road section, a significant part of the Trilateral Highway. This particular stretch is characterised by steep gradients and sharp curves, posing considerable challenges to the construction process. Currently, only about 25 percent of the road is complete. The Trade Minister of Myanmar has indicated that converting a 121.8-km portion of the road, specifically between Kalewa and Yar Gyi, into a four-lane motorway will require more time than anticipated. Consequently, the construction team may need to extend or postpone the initial deadline for completion.
The Trade Minister of Myanmar has indicated that converting a 121.8-km portion of the road, specifically between Kalewa and Yar Gyi, into a four-lane motorway will require more time than anticipated.
Additionally, significant security issues persist in Myanmar. The Chin State and Sagaing Region, where the majority of the work is ongoing, are engulfed in conflict between the Junta and the ethnic armed groups. If the conditions do not subside, the resumption of work by contractors seems improbable.
Another aspect that needs immediate attention is formulating and implementing the IMT Trilateral Motor Vehicle Agreement (IMT-TMVA). While the Indian government conducted the IMT-TH Friendship Car Rally in 2016 to sensitise stakeholders to the potential benefits of a motor vehicles agreement (MVA) between the three countries, not much has occurred. There are several reasons for this; one of the biggest challenges to implementing the IMT-TMVA is the need for more infrastructure, particularly in Myanmar. The country has limited road networks and poor connectivity, which makes it difficult for vehicles to move smoothly between India, Myanmar, and Thailand. Bureaucratic hurdles continue to remain a significant bottleneck, where obtaining permits and clearances remains challenging due to differences in the rules and procedures of vehicle movement in each nation making the situation time-consuming and cumbersome. This will be particularly challenging for small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), which may need more resources to navigate complex regulatory frameworks.
Additionally, the security situation in Myanmar is also a significant concern for the implementation of the IMT-TMVA. The country has faced political instability and conflict in recent years, which has affected road transport safety. There have been reports of attacks on vehicles and disruption of transport routes, which can be a significant risk for businesses and travellers. This has led to concerns about the safety of drivers and passengers, which may impact the viability of any agreement.
Adequate financing and resource allocation will play a vital role in overcoming these challenges and realising the full potential of this transformative regional initiative.
Key factors for consideration
Addressing infrastructure limitations, bureaucratic hurdles, and security concerns will ensure smooth cross-border transportation and maximise the benefits of the Trilateral Highway and the IMT-TMVA. Adequate financing and resource allocation will play a vital role in overcoming these challenges and realising the full potential of this transformative regional initiative.
India’s commitment to supporting Myanmar’s democratic transition process and its emphasis on peace and stability are integral to the region’s progress and prosperity. Strengthening policy coordination with ASEAN regarding Myanmar will contribute to a more holistic approach to regional issues and ensure a stable environment for connectivity projects to thrive.
Overall, the successful completion of the India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway hopes to not only bolster economic growth but also pave the way for more robust regional integration, cultural exchange, and cooperation among the participating nations, ultimately contributing to peace, stability, and prosperity in the Mekong-Ganga region..."
Source/publisher:
Observer Research Foundation
Date of entry/update:
2023-07-28
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The 78-year-old leader is now reportedly being detained at a government building in Naypyidaw.
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"Myanmar’s military government has transferred deposed leader Aung San Suu Kyi from prison to a government building in the capital Naypyidaw, an official from her party has confirmed, three days ahead of the expected extension of the current state of emergency.
The AFP news agency cited an anonymous official from Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD) party that the 78-year-old Nobel laureate was “moved to a high-level venue compound on Monday night.”
The NLD official confirmed earlier reports from Burmese-language media that Aung San Suu Kyi, whose government was removed by the military in February 2021, has been transferred to housing used by government officials. Rumors to this effect have swirled since the junta allowed Thai Foreign Minister Don Pramudwinai to meet Aung San Suu Kyi on July 9. The party official also confirmed to AFP that Aung San Suu Kyi had met Ti Khun Myat, the former speaker of parliament, and was likely to meet Deng Xijun, China’s special envoy for Asian Affairs, who it reported is visiting the country this week.
The transfer comes ahead of the expected extension of the country’s state of emergency on Monday. Initially imposed for a period of one year following the coup, the state of emergency has since been extended twice – Monday’s extension would be the third – a testament to the level of resistance that it has since faced.
Aung San Suu Kyi has been under tight control since the morning of the coup, which took place as she and other NLD lawmakers were preparing to be sworn into office at the parliament in Naypyidaw. After initially keeping her under house arrest at her residence in the capital, the junta put the 78-year-old ousted leader in solitary confinement in Naypyidaw Prison in June of last year. During that time, she has been sentenced to 33 years in prison on a number of outlandish criminal charges, including corruption, possession of illegal walkie-talkies, and the violation of COVID-19 restrictions.
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What this all means is hard to say. Nikkei Asia reported that there is “speculation the military could make further announcements regarding Suu Kyi next week, coinciding with the consecration of a new marble statue of Buddha in Naypyitaw on Tuesday.” The Buddha in question is the $7.6 million Maravijaya statue, purported to be the tallest marble sitting Buddha in the world, which is due to be inaugurated in the capital on August 2.
It is hard to imagine that the transfer of Aung San Suu Kyi into slightly a less austere form of detention marks a sign of the junta’s genuine desire for reconciliation with forces that it has described as “terrorists” and pledged to eliminate by force. Like the military’s account of Aung San Suu Kyi’s meeting with Don Pramudwinai earlier this month, in which it claimed that she disavowed the anti-junta resistance and the National Unity Government (of which she is the titular head), this is probably best seen as an attempt to leverage Aung San Suu Kyi’s potent symbolic status in order to win over public sentiment and to ease mounting international pressure.
For years, the military has been well aware of Aung San Suu Kyi’s totemic image at home and abroad, and sought to manipulate it to its own advantage. Indeed, the NLD leader’s willingness to endorse the military-led process of reform in the early 2010s was among the primary factors for Western governments going along and ultimately removing the economic sanctions and investment bans that they had erected since the 1990s.
Angshuman Choudhury of India’s Centre for Policy Research today described the move as “literally a leaf out of the junta’s old, deadbeat playbook – designed to placate international audiences, quieten the resistance at home & sow divisions within the revolution.”
Whether this gambit will have quite the same effect remains to be seen. In the West, Aung San Suu Kyi’s glow was tarnished considerably by her apparent collusion in the military’s vicious assaults against the Rohingya populations of western Myanmar. At home, too, the resistance to military rule, while still drawing inspiration from Aung San Suu Kyi, is no longer quite so reliant on her person and has in many ways moved above the old paradigm of political resistance with which she is inseparable.
All this is to say that the shift of Myanmar’s most prominent political prisoner out of solitary confinement may represent a tactical shift on the part of the country’s military, but not a fundamental shift in its desired end goal..."
Source/publisher:
"The Diplomat" (Japan)
Date of entry/update:
2023-07-28
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Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, About Aung San Suu Kyi, Political prisoners and other violations in Burma - reports, Human Rights Defenders
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"Myanmar moves from military coup to a civil war that is now a revolution. The junta’s bungled effort to turn the clock back by seizing power in February 2021 has been a bloody fiasco.
The regime ‘controls’ less than half of Myanmar: it’s ‘too unpopular to control the countryside, yet too powerful to yield the cities’. And much of that ‘control’ is contested.
Unable to impose its will, the junta is mired in failure—in its operations, its understanding and its standing.
Calling it a ‘junta’ may be too kind, suggesting military competence and political dominance. Perhaps ‘mafia regime’ is closer.
Myanmar’s wicked tragedy has completed the military’s journey from revered institution to reviled enemy. The extent of the regime’s failure on so many fronts is one of the few firm facts amid the fog of Myanmar’s war.
While it still has the strongest military force (equipment, firepower and control of the air), the junta is fighting ‘on an unprecedented number of fronts’. The International Institute for Strategic Studies reports that the conflict rages in seven theatres which can be grouped into three categories:
borderland resistance strongholds (southeast Myanmar, Kachin State and northwest Myanmar)
central contested areas (the Dry Zone and lower Myanmar)
non-aligned areas (Shan and Rakhine states).
The conflict has blown away the old coup script (roll tanks, imprison politicians, enjoy power). Instead, the coup grasped government but not the country, sparking a war that proclaims revolutionary change.
The shift ‘from coup to revolution’ was the title and theme of the annual Myanmar Update, a two-day conference at the Australian National University: ‘The military’s violent crackdown on what was initially a peaceful popular uprising provoked a near-countrywide revolutionary movement, which has brought together an array of different political, ethnic, and religious groups fighting for the shared goal of ending military rule.’
Chairing the politics session, an eminence of Australia’s study of Myanmar, Andrew Selth, quoted one of literature’s greatest opening lines: ‘It was the best of times, it was the worst of times, it was the age of wisdom, it was the age of foolishness, it was the epoch of belief, it was the epoch of incredulity, it was the season of Light, it was the season of Darkness, it was the spring of hope, it was the winter of despair …’
As Selth noted, Charles Dickens’s writing about the French revolution describes much about Myanmar’s revolution.
My version of the big questions that confront Myanmar involves opposed scenarios: Will the revolt overthrow the military regime and remake the nation? Or will Myanmar fly apart, fragmenting along the fault lines of all those conflicts?
The government-in-exile, the National Unity Government (NUG), offers a vision of federation, not fragmentation. The NUG’s foreign minister, Daw Zin Mar Aung, told the conference that the military can no longer win with its old divide-and-rule tactics: ‘This is no longer about the coup. It’s not about the military.’ She said the military was losing to the NUG’s vision of federalism, to move closer to the people and ‘undo the wrongs of the past’.
The NUG’s representative to Australia, Tun Aug Shwe, told the conference that protests against the military in previous decades had aimed for dialogue and negotiation, release of political prisoners and parliamentary elections. Today, the revolution has two demands: ‘Eliminate the military leadership from Myanmar soil forever. Second, build the genuine federal democracy in Myanmar. Very focused. So previous revolution focused on the process level. But today people focus on the outcome, the end result.’
Myanmar’s military is smaller than commonly thought, according to an analysis by Ye Myo Hein, a global fellow at the Wilson Center. Dismissing estimates of a military headcount of 300,000 to 400,000, his alternative estimate of 150,000 personnel is ‘based on extensive interviews with military deserters and defectors, analysis of internal military directives and meeting notes, historical records of troop movements and sizes, and casualty counts from primary conflict data and military hospital records’.
Ye Myo Hein concludes that of those 150,000 personnel, ‘roughly 70,000 are combat soldiers. At least 21,000 service members have been lost through casualties, desertion and defection since the coup. At this troop level, the Sit-Tat [military] is barely able to sustain itself as a fighting force, much less a government.’
Ye Mo Hein told the conference that the military can’t crush the resistance so it’s preparing for an ‘enduring and protracted war’ by seeking to tighten control over urban areas and strategic routes, launch frequent forays into resistance areas, and ‘divide and conquer’. He says that if neither side can achieve a ‘decisive victory’, Myanmar could shatter into a series of warring states: ‘If the regime remains in power, the conflict will drag and Myanmar could face a political black hole, potentially leading to balkanisation. While no signs of balkanisation are visible yet, the possibility cannot be ruled out if the conflict persists and political agreement remains elusive.’
The military has ceded ground and legitimacy. The regime has proved it can’t win. What’s yet to be established is if it can lose.
Myanmar’s revolution has changed much. But it faces the opposed futures that Dickens identified in another era: ‘[W]e had everything before us, we had nothing before us, we were all going direct to Heaven, we were all going direct the other way.’..."
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Australian Strategic Policy Institute
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2023-07-28
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"First came a bloody massacre. Then came digital snitches, arrests and prison — for those who mourned the deaths.
On the morning of April 11, in a rural village in central Myanmar, a crowd gathered to celebrate the opening of a new administration building, built by the armed resistance to the military junta ruling the country. Suddenly, a military jet dropped two 500-pound bombs, one of them directly onto the villagers. When rescuers came to help the wounded, a combat helicopter sprayed the area with gunfire. In the evening, a military jet fighter conducted another airstrike. More than 175 civilians were killed, including more than 40 children, in the massacre at Pazi Gyi, the bloodiest day in the war between the military junta that seized power more than two years ago and the resistance.
Word of the massacre spread rapidly on social media. On the same day, a young man, Willi Phyo, who lived in Mandalay and was a supporter of the resistance, changed his Facebook photo to black in sympathy for the victims. His protest was noticed by a channel on the social media platform Telegram. The channel is run by Han Nyein Oo, a pro-military social media figure, who acts as a spotter of dissent. It posted photos of Mr. Phyo, and pointed out to the authorities how to find him: “He lives on the ground floor of an apartment in front of elementary school, No. 17, 14th Street, 86th Street,” the Telegram channel reported.
The Telegram channel also called out a television actress, Myat Thu Thu, who announced on Facebook that she would no longer live stream, out of grief for the villagers. Similarly, it called out a pop singer, May La Thanzin, who goes by “May Melody” and had posted a message of sorrow on a black background after the bombing.
The next day, Ko Phyo was arrested. Then the actress and the pop singer were arrested. The pattern was repeated and again, all over the country, according to Radio Free Asia, which has compiled cases and provided details to The Post. The Telegram channel was a snitch line, tattling to the military junta about people who speak their minds online.
The crackdown in Myanmar, or Burma, shows once again how authoritarian regimes are turning the digital revolution to their own ends. Once there was hope the internet would become a global force for freedom and openness. In some ways, it has. But it also has shown a dark underside as a tool of dictatorship.
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The Burmese generals seized power on Feb. 1, 2021, from a democratic government led by Nobel Peace Prize winner Aung San Suu Kyi, whose party had won a resounding victory in parliamentary elections the previous November. After months of peaceful protests, democratic forces coalesced into armed resistance. The ragtag resistance has been fighting an intense war with the military ever since, shoulder to shoulder with ethnic militias also fighting the army. The junta has responded with unremitting force to put down protest and resistance, attacking civilians from the air, burning down villages and killing thousands of innocent people. Some 24,005 people have been arrested for opposition to the junta, and 19,618 are still detained. The military has turned Myanmar back into a dictatorship, cutting short a brief and incomplete flowering of democracy.
In a previous editorial in this series, we detailed how young people around the world were imprisoned by authoritarian regimes for merely posting freely on social media. This editorial adds a grim case study from Myanmar, where a digital war is being fought on top of a shooting war.
The young pop singer, Ms. Thanzin, on July 7 posted a new profile picture, a real photo, her first post since April, to the relief of her fans.
“Missing you,” she wrote to her 7.5 million followers.
Telegram is widely used around the world to avoid snooping by authoritarian regimes. The founder, Pavel Durov, a reclusive Russian entrepreneur, had first created Vkontakte, a hugely popular Russian social media platform that looked like Facebook. It was subsequently taken over by oligarchs close to the Kremlin when Mr. Durov resisted taking down pages of opposition leader Alexei Navalny. Mr. Durov and his brother Nikolai then created Telegram in 2013 to be a secure, ad-free messaging app, and its popularity soared. Mr. Durov fled Russia in 2014. He now lives in Dubai.
In 2018, the Russian authorities demanded that Mr. Durov turn over encryption keys to Telegram, seeking information about Ukrainian users. He refused. Russia’s internet censor, Roskomnadzor, launched a two-year effort to block the platform online, but failed. Mr. Durov’s defiance enhanced the platform’s reputation as a haven against dictatorship. Telegram now has more than 800 million active users and is second in popularity only to WhatsApp in online messenger apps.
Mr. Durov wrote in a blog post in 2021, “Telegram is the first app to stand up to and, if necessary, pick a fight with a government.” He added in April, “Telegram’s mission is to preserve privacy and freedom of speech around the world.” The company says Telegram “played a prominent role in pro-democracy movements around the world, including in Iran, Russia, Belarus, Myanmar and Hong Kong.”
Telegram says communications between users are completely private, but channels — such as the one in Myanmar — are public. In these channels, Telegram says it will take down content that is deemed illegal, such as pornography or advocacy of violence and terrorism. However, it will not remove material that reflects free speech. Telegram declares on its website: “For example, if criticizing the government is illegal in some country, Telegram won’t be a part of such politically motivated censorship. This goes against our founders’ principles. While we do block terrorist (e.g. ISIS-related) bots and channels, we will not block anybody who peacefully expresses alternative opinions.” Mr. Durov posted about Telegram’s mission on his channel, “In the past, countries like China, Iran and Russia have banned Telegram due to our principled stance on the matter of human rights. Such events, while unfortunate, are still preferable to the betrayal of our users and the beliefs we were founded on.”
In Myanmar, though, the snitch channel is using Telegram to suppress free speech — by alerting the authorities to criticism. We asked Telegram whether this is consistent with Mr. Durov’s lofty principles. They replied that Telegram would remove “doxing” content when notified by users.
Telegram is a magnet for users — Mr. Durov says more than 2.5 million users sign up every day — because it combines private messaging to individuals and groups, including a popular “secret chats” function, with public channels that can reach huge numbers of users all at once. It is also fast. This makes it appealing not only to those fighting for democracy but also to authoritarian regimes and their allies. Russian officials, including Russian President Vladimir Putin’s spokesman, Dmitry Peskov, use Telegram, the app they once tried to shut down. When the Russian invasion of Ukraine began, Telegram became the main channel for pro-Kremlin military bloggers to support the war. When the mercenary chieftain Yevgeniy Prigozhin began to complain in public about shortcomings of the Russian military, he broadcast his tirades in audio messages posted to Telegram and heard by millions. He also broadcast about his short-lived mutiny in June on the platform.
Dictators constantly fear they will be overthrown. The digital age has brought them plenty of tools to cling to power. They can use online means to propagandize, to flood the zone of information, and they can pressure or change ownership of platforms to control the message. Dictators can also use force to coerce and block objectionable platforms or sites, or to erect barriers, such as China’s Great Firewall. They have the power to muster cyberwarriors to infiltrate the devices of their opponents, spy on them and to attack or destroy them. They can erect elaborate surveillance mechanisms to track people’s movements at the grocery store — or at a protest. They can reach beyond their own borders.
But one of the most valuable tools an autocrat can have is the ability to zoom down to a granular level to locate individuals at odds with the regime.
That is what the Myanmar Telegram channel is doing — picking out opponents one by one.
Facebook has some 20 million users in Myanmar, a country of 53.8 million people. For many, Facebook is the whole internet, a source of news and information as well as social posting. The material gathered by Radio Free Asia shows that many of those who spoke out against the government did so on Facebook accounts. It is an enduring risk in dictatorships; those who are brave enough to speak out on social media also expose themselves — they put a target on their own back.
The Telegram snitch line in Myanmar today has 54,500 subscribers. Informers are instructed where to send their report, and to “please make sure the address is accurate.”
In war-torn Myanmar, details about arrests are sparse. But according to Radio Free Asia, in most high-profile cases, the charge leveled is based on Section 505-A of the penal code, alleging state defamation, sedition, incitement of public unrest and aiding “terrorism” by supporting pro-democracy groups, which were outlawed by the military junta as “terrorist organizations.” Some of the high-profile arrests are made public by the regime to instill fear in the population.
After the massacre at Pazi Gyi, on April 19 a Burmese woman, Nilar Win, wrote in a Facebook post that she felt sorry for the victims of the massacre. The Han Nyein Oo Telegram channel soon posted screenshots of her lament — and asked the police for her arrest.
She was arrested that day.
The next day, Moe Htet, who owns a photography studio in Yangon, shared pictures of the airstrike victims online. She also changed her Facebook profile to black in mourning. The Han Hyein Oo Telegram channel urged the police to arrest her, providing screenshots of her post and providing her address.
She was arrested.
Also in Yangon, Cho Wint Mar Zaw spoke out in a Facebook post, expressing sympathy to families of the survivors of the massacre. The Telegram channel spotted her — and put her photo on the channel and asked authorities to detain her. She was arrested the next day, April 23.
In May, the hunt snared a popular hip-hop singer, Byu Har, the son of a prominent musician, Naing Myanmar, who is best known for his pro-democracy anthem “Kabar Ma Kyay Bu,” written during a 1988 uprising against military rule. Based on the melody of “Dust in the Wind,” by American rock band Kansas, it was widely sung at anti-coup protests in recent years. According to Radio Free Asia, on May 23, Byu Har posted a video on Facebook, complaining about electricity shortages. Yangon has been stricken by power outages, lasting about five hours in the morning, and five hours in the afternoon or evening.
“I want to tell the minister of electricity who is wearing that elegant uniform, and the employees under the ministry of electricity that you guys are all stupid fools,” the artist said in the video. Under the government of the deposed Aung San Suu Kyi, he added, “not only did we have enough electricity without any power outage, her government even lowered the rate of electricity bills.” He also lashed out at the junta leader, Gen. Min Aung Hlaing.
“The guy who is governing the country is also a stupid incompetent fool himself,” he said. “You guys have no … skill at all. Even if a fool like me were to govern this country, I promise that we would have enough electricity with no power outages. … I am cursing at you because I don’t have the electricity. Got it? If you want to arrest me, just come.”
The day after the video was posted, the Telegram channel urged the police to arrest the singer, calling him a “low class dog.”
He was arrested the same day.
Even mentioning the birthday of Aung San Suu Kyi is reason for being called out — and arrested. She is sentenced to 33 years after a trial on specious charges of corruption.
On June 19, Kaung Khant Lwin, who lives in Yangon and works in a drugstore, posted a message on Facebook to celebrate Aung San Suu Kyi’s 78th birthday. He called her “our leader” and tucked a flower behind one ear, joining a “flower strike” that day to show solidarity with the jailed democracy icon. Flowers tucked into a bun have long been her signature look; on the protest day, many shops sold all their flowers. On Facebook, he included quotes from her famous 1990 “Freedom from Fear” speech, and he wrote his own testament:
“Not being scared is not bravery.
Doing the right thing despite being scared is bravery.
I am also scared (as a human). But keeping in my mind that
I have to do the right thing and then face it.”
He was singled out the same day by the Telegram channel. It referred to him as a dog, and pointed to the address of the drugstore.
About 130 people who participated in the “flower strike” were arrested that day, including Mr. Khant Lwin, and the Telegram channel cheered his detention. “A dog who supported the thieves by celebrating ‘The Dog Strike’ is now seized within an hour and had no time to run. [The police] were fast and reliable, we respect and salute.”
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Just before the birthday and protest, actress Poe Kyar Phyu Khin posted a video entitled “Daw Aung San Suu Kyi (Our True Leader)” to TikTok. She was arrested at her home in Yangon on the night of Aung San Suu Kyi’s birthday.
Radio Free Asia reported that Telegram — Mr. Durov’s dream of defending free speech — has become a “form of military intelligence,” in the words of Yangon-based protest leader Nang Lin. “It may look like ordinary citizens are reporting people who oppose the military, but that’s not true,” he said. “It’s the work of their informers. It’s one of the junta’s intelligence mechanisms. In other words, it’s just one of many attempts designed to instill fear in the people.”
In open societies, there are methods to counter the double-edged sword of social media. Disinformation and misinformation can be rebutted by rapidly leveraging openness and free expression. It is hard enough when the enemies of free expression use the right to free expression to spread their own misbegotten dictatorial message.
But in Myanmar, once a nascent democracy now ruled by a ruthless military junta, the options are doubly hard. A lively independent digital news media is struggling and deserves support. Although Facebook has been criticized for allowing hate speech to be posted against the Muslim Rohingya minority in Myanmar, its continued presence also empowers people who want to resist the generals. The internet can be a force for democracy.
The Telegram snitch channel is doing the junta’s work, and Telegram is complicit. Mr. Durov, a multibillionaire, has said that he stands for free expression and backs Telegram users against the state “no matter what.” It’s time for him to step up and defend these principles..."
Source/publisher:
"The Washington Post"
Date of entry/update:
2023-07-28
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"With the junta’s six-month state of emergency expiring on Monday, Myanmar people and observers have one question on their minds: what’s next?
One possibility is that the regime will again violate the Constitution to extend the emergency for another six months from July 31. The junta has so far extended it three times, most recently in February. The Constitution permits only two six-month extensions.
An alternative option would be for the junta to form an interim government with retired generals to maintain its rule under the guise of a civilian administration.
Speculation about Myanmar’s post-July 31 political landscape is being fueled by the junta’s recent political moves, as it struggles to quell a two-year-old nationwide popular armed resistance.
On July 9, the regime allowed Thai Foreign Minister Don Pramudwinai to meet the imprisoned Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, making him the first foreign visitor to gain access to her since the coup in February 2021.
Two weeks on, it reportedly transferred the civilian leader from prison to house arrest this week. She then reportedly met with Ti Khun Myat, the Lower House Speaker under her National League for Democracy (NLD) government prior to the 2021 putsch. She is also likely to meet Deng Xijuan, China’s special envoy for Asian Affairs, who is visiting the country.
The regime’s spokesperson told Voice of America Burmese on Friday that he had no idea about these developments – from Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s house arrest to the meetings.
This coming Tuesday, the junta is likely to announce an amnesty for political prisoners to mark the consecration of its new giant sitting Buddha statue. Some sources said the amnesty announcement would incorporate Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s house arrest along with the transfer of other NLD government leaders like President U Win Myint and Mandalay Chief Minister Dr Zaw Myint Maung from prison to home confinement.
Yet for all these developments and more in the pipeline, analysts expect no meaningful changes in Myanmar after July 31.
They point out that the transfer of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi from prison to house arrest is another tactic used by the junta to ease international pressure against its rule. The previous military regime that ran Myanmar from 1988 until early 2011 also allowed visiting foreign envoys to see her whenever it faced mounting international pressure.
Some observers say the extension of emergency rule remains a strong possibility, given junta boss Min Aung Hlaing recently hinted to his Cabinet that “much remains to be done to restore stability and rule of law across the union.”
However, analysts do not dismiss the possibility of an interim government being formed with ex-generals. But they said the chances were thin given Min Aung Hlaing’s well-documented craving for absolute power, which could be thwarted by an interim administration.
Formation of an interim government would occur only if the regime boss recognizes he cannot control the current deteriorating situation in the country.
And if that happens, Myanmar would still be under a military-guided transition for years to come. In other words, military rule would be here to stay..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2023-07-28
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"By Madeleine MacLean
On June 21, 2023, the US Holocaust Memorial Museum’s Simon-Skjodt Center for the Prevention of Genocide brought together Burmese civil society leaders to discuss the mass atrocities being committed against civilian populations by the Burmese military and what the United States can do to mitigate these threats and prevent future atrocities.
Speakers included Myra Dahgaypaw, Senior Partnership Officer for International Justice and Accountability for the Unitarian Universalist Service Committee; Wai Wai Nu, Founder and Executive Director of the Women’s Peace Network; Gum San Nsang, President of the Kachin Alliance; and Rosalinn Zahau, Advocacy Team Member for the Chin Human Rights Organization. Tom Andrews, UN Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar, gave opening remarks.
The following is a summary of the key points made by the speakers.
Overview of Current Atrocities Facing Civilians in Burma
The Burmese military is responsible for mass atrocities across Burma, including killings, arbitrary detention, the burning of villages, and the restricting of humanitarian aid and essential services. Different regions and minority groups have experienced unique harm.
Kachin State had suffered mass atrocities at the hands of the military for a decade before the coup, including frequent burning of homes, airstrikes, and bombings. According to the Kachin Alliance, over 150,000 people have been displaced in the past ten years. The military is also responsible for the mass exploitation of natural resources and large-scale land grabs. The coup has exacerbated these dynamics and has increased the levels of violence against civilians.
The human rights situation in southeastern Burma has also deteriorated drastically. Civilians live in a state of fear of being targeted by military attacks or arrested arbitrarily. About 4,000 civilians have been arrested and detained in the southern region alone, while about 1,000 civilians have been injured and over 300 have been killed. There are approximately 500,000 internally displaced people in Karen State alone. The military has blocked humanitarian assistance from reaching internally displaced people under the suspicion that the provisions are being taken to the resistance.
Civilians in Chin State also suffered human rights abuses by the military prior to the coup that have only intensified since the military’s takeover. The military engaged in state-sponsored discrimination against religious minorities, including requiring non-Buddhists to apply for permission to practice their religion and taking children into the custody of state-run schools where they were forced to convert to Buddhism. According to Rosalinn Zahau, over 40,000 people were displaced even before the coup. After the coup, the civilians of Chin State were among the first to take up arms in resistance, and the military responded by sending large numbers of reinforcements. Fighting between the military and the resistance movement has intensified since then, and most of the state is currently under the control of resistance forces. Due to its lack of success on the ground, the military has resorted to airstrikes, from which civilians in Chin State do not have the capacity to protect themselves. Zahau reported that over 25 percent of the population has been displaced into neighboring countries, including India.
The military also continues its history of violence and discrimination against the Rohingya people in Burma’s Rakhine State. Since the coup it has continued its policy of targeting Rohingya, including restricting their movement both within the state and across the country, issuing discriminatory “National Verification Cards,” engaging in abusive family check-in measures, and detaining Rohingya arbitrarily. The military is also systematically restricting Rohingyas’ access to food, water, and basic services. They have escalated the harm against civilians by denying humanitarian assistance to Rakhine State following Cyclone Mocha, which killed a disproportionate number of internally displaced Rohingya. Ms. Nu warned that the situation of the Rohingya people in Burma has not improved since the genocidal attacks six years ago, and she fears we will see future genocidal violence if the international community does not take action.
Next Steps
The speakers recommended a range of measures that the US can implement to support the protection of civilians experiencing mass atrocities:
The US should accelerate the implementation of the Burma Act to provide comprehensive assistance to survivors of atrocities, and it should ensure that this assistance reaches Rohingya genocide victims and survivors.
The US should provide assistance aimed at strengthening the capacity of communities in Burma to protect themselves.
The US should convene a coalition of nations to increase the strategic coordination of actions to support human rights in Burma and stop the flow of money and resources to the junta. These nations should also enforce current sanctions against the military.
UN member states should increase their contributions to the Myanmar Humanitarian Response Plan and the Rohingya Joint Response Plan, which Special Rapporteur Tom Andrews noted are currently only 14 percent and 22 percent funded, respectively.
The US should provide an early warning system for airstrikes, as well as more communication and jamming devices.
Challenges and Recommendations
Many humanitarian organizations have had to leave Burma for neighboring countries in order to continue their operations, and as a result they may not have official registrations or access to bank accounts at the moment. This has created difficulty for the organizations to comply with USAID’s standard procedures. Ms. Zahau recommended that USAID employ an intermediate agency to handle these administrative steps, as it has done in the past.
The panelists also emphasized the need for more comprehensive and coordinated sanctions. This includes sanctioning Burmese oil and gas, which is one of the military’s biggest sources of revenue, and sanctioning companies that provide military supplies like jet fuel. The panelists recommended that the US implement individual sanctions against not just the top military officials but lower level officials as well. Local communities have not seen regional commanders be held accountable, and sanctions against them would help provide a sense of justice.
The US should also take on a greater leadership role in advancing justice through the international legal system. While the US has provided funding to the UN’s Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar, it should also provide and enhance support to the local organizations who are documenting the military’s atrocities. The US government can take action to hold military officials accountable by setting up an international criminal tribunal or building international support for referring Burma to the International Criminal Court, as well as helping develop a comprehensive justice process for addressing crimes by lower ranking officials.
The US can also provide more diplomatic, political, and financial support to the current legal cases against the Burmese military, such as assisting with investigations and offering witness protection..."
Source/publisher:
US Holocaust Memorial Museum
Date of entry/update:
2023-07-27
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Rohingya (cultural, political etc.), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
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Description:
"Key Event Details
Location of Incident: Three villages in Palaw Township (ပုလောမြို့နယ်), Tanintharyi Region (တနင်္သာရီ တိုင်းဒေသကြီး).
To (တို) village [12.865942, 98.660944]
Tan Shin (တန်းရှင်း) village [12.873319, 98.668229]
Thin Gan Taw (သင်္ကန်းတော) village [12.877906, 98.671760]
Date/Time of incident:
30 December 2022
Alleged Perpetrator(s) and/or Involvement:
Myanmar Military
Conclusions by Myanmar Witness
Myanmar Witness documented 32 fire incidents in the Tanintharyi region during 2022.
On 30 December 2022, the villages of To village, Tan Shin village and Thin Gan Taw village in Palaw township experienced fires and over 60 houses were reportedly set alight by the Myanmar military.
Myanmar Witness verified the fires by geolocating and chronolocating user-generated content (UGC) showing the damage.
Myanmar Witness has verified that at least 48 houses were set on fire in the villages of To, Tan Shin and Thin Gan Taw.
Information gathered by Myanmar Witness suggests that Myanmar military are likely to be responsible for the fires.
Summary
Myanmar Witness’ ongoing fire monitoring recorded at least 32 cases of fires in Tanintharyi region (တနင်္သာရီ တိုင်းဒေသကြီး) during 2022. This report focuses on fires that happened on 30 December 2022, during which more than 60 houses were set on fire in three villages of Palaw township (ပုလောမြို့နယ်) in Tanintharyi region. Myanmar Witness verified that the fires occurred in To (တို), Tan Shin (တန်းရှင်း), and Thin Gan Taw (သင်္ကန်းတော) villages. Myanmar Witness concluded that the most likely perpetrator is the Myanmar military.
Background and Context
The military seized power and detained the officially elected government on 1 February 2021. Since then, the Myanmar military has repeatedly committed human rights violations such as arbitrary arrests and torture, setting entire villages alight, and mass killings across the country. In this report, Myanmar Witness investigates the three incidents that reportedly damaged or destroyed more than 60 houses in three villages during the last week of December 2022.
Prior to this event, Myanmar Witness’ monitoring reveals that at least 29 other fire incidents occurred in Tanintharyi during 2022. As previous reporting indicates, civilian homes are overwhelmingly impacted during these events. Homes were destroyed during at least three separate fire incidents in the first three months of 2022, 20 incidents in April, May, June and July, two incidents in September and October, and four incidents in November.
According to Dawei Watch, approximately 48, 7, and 14 houses were destroyed by the fire in To, Tan Shin, and Thin Gan Taw villages respectively in the last week of December. Through an in-depth investigation, Myanmar Witness has confirmed that at least 47 houses were damaged or destroyed by the fires.
Methodology & limitations
To read the methodology and limitations, download the PDF.
Fires in Tanintharyi township during 2022
Burnt homes in Palaw Township
Verifying the fires using geolocation
Myanmar Witness identified 46 houses in To village, and one house in Tan Shin village, that were damaged or destroyed by the fires.
Drone footage captured the period when To village was engulfed in flames and smoke (Figure 3; top). Myanmar Witness fellows were able to geolocate the footage to the village using satellite imagery (figure 3; bottom).
During this analysis, Myanmar Witness scrutinised satellite imagery of the area over time. The house circled in white (figure 3) was not built in November 2021 (as it was not visible in the imagery from that period). This new house, along with the house circled in orange, which were both used during the geolocation, were completely destroyed by the fire.
Myanmar Witness was also able to verify the extent of the damage on the ground using a video recording taken by two men driving a motorcycle through the destroyed village (source redacted due to privacy concerns). The footage was compared with satellite images to identify which houses were destroyed (figure 4). The route taken by the video recorders is shown with the red line, with the starting point of the video on the far right. The houses shown in yellow were damaged or destroyed by the fire, and Myanmar Witness was able to identify 40 damaged or destroyed houses. It is possible that more houses were destroyed, however these were not captured by the video footage.
Between November 2021 (when the latest imagery of To village on Google Earth was taken) and December 2022, new houses had been constructed in the village. For example, this investigation revealed two destroyed homes which were not visible in earlier satellite imagery. The location of these two houses is outlined in orange (figure 4). Additionally, figures 5 and 6 show the geolocations of five damaged houses to To village.
Perpetrators
Myanmar Witness has previously and extensively reported on the use of fire by the military against villages with known anti-State Administration Council (SAC) links. In this case, when the drone captured footage of the three villages engulfed in smoke, a military convoy (outlined by the red box in figure 13) was visible near to the fires.
Myanmar Witness can confirm that the vehicles in the convoy are commonly used by the Myanmar military and has identified this type of vehicles within other military activity (figure 14). For example, the three vehicles shown in red in figure 14, left, are the same as those shown in figure 14, top right. The seven vehicles shown in white in figure 14, left, are identical to those seen in figure 14, bottom right.
Although there is no footage showing military personnel setting the fires alight, Myanmar Witness concluded that the presence of Myanmar military convoy in the vicinity of the fires increases the likelihood that they were the perpetrators.
Conclusion
In this investigation, the Myanmar Witness fellows investigated fires which led to the destruction of civilian homes in Palaw township, Tanintharyi region, on 30 December 2022. The location and time of the fires was verified using geolocation techniques (a location-based verification method) and chronolocation (a location-based time calculation method).
According to reports, about 69 houses were burnt down. Myanmar Witness concluded that at least 47 houses were damaged or destroyed by the fires. Given the presence of a military convoy in the vicinity of the fires, Myanmar Witness deems that it was likely that the Myanmar military was responsible for the fires. This is in line with other documented military activity..."
Source/publisher:
Myanmar Witness
Date of entry/update:
2023-07-26
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations, Armed conflict in Burma - attacks on civilians
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Format :
pdf
Size:
2.3 MB
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Description:
"John Lewis Partnership, a highly regarded department store chain selling a wide range of products, has informed Burma Campaign UK that it will stop sourcing gems from Burma.
Burma Campaign UK had written to John Lewis and around 40 other retailers asking them to ensure that if they sell gems from Burma, they make sure the gems they sell have not helped fund the Burmese military.
In an email received on 25th July 2023, John Lewis stated: “We remain extremely concerned to learn of developments around the conflicts that have taken place, and that continues to take place in recent years in Burma/Myanmar…Our suppliers source a very small proportion of gems from Burma/Myanmar but we are in the process of urgently seeking alternative sources of supply.”
The decision by John Lewis follows TJC, one of the biggest TV shopping channels and online jewellery retailers in the UK, telling Burma Campaign UK it was withdrawing Burmese gems from sale.
Following the attempted military coup, which began in February 2021, the Burmese military now dominates Burma’s gems industry, which is potentially worth $2bn per year. Through its own private companies, control of the state-owned enterprises and government ministries, control of trade routes into areas not under its control, legal and illegal trade, and the business interests of military family members, the Burmese military extracts revenue from the gems industry in numerous ways.
Burma Campaign UK is not calling for a blanket ban on Burmese gems. We are calling on companies to make sure the gems they sell haven’t been sourced in a way that provides money to the military and helps pay for weapons and the human rights violations committed by the Burmese military.
“John Lewis have done the right thing by deciding to stop sourcing from Burma,” said Mark Farmaner, Director of Burma Campaign UK. “Retailers must ensure that the gems they sell haven’t helped pay for the bombs and the bullets the Burmese military are using against the people of Burma.”..."
Source/publisher:
"Burma Campaign UK" (London)
Date of entry/update:
2023-07-26
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Gems - mining and trade, Business and the Military, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
Local URL:
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Description:
"July 26 (Reuters) - Myanmar's military government may move ousted leader Aung San Suu Kyi from prison to house arrest in the capital, Naypyitaw, two media outlets reported on Wednesday.
The 78-year-old Nobel laureate has been in detention since her arrest in early 2021 when the military overthrew her elected government in a coup and unleashed a bloody crackdown on opponents that has seen thousands jailed or killed.
The Associated Press cited an unidentified security official as saying the move was an act of clemency to prisoners as part of a religious ceremony due next week.
The BBC Burmese-language service cited a "source close to the prison" as saying she may have already been moved to a house usually used by government officials.
Reuters could not independently verify the reports or Suu Kyi's whereabouts.
A spokesman for Myanmar's ruling military was not immediately available for comment. Suu Kyi's lawyers and a spokesperson for the shadow National Unity Government, which opposes military rule, could not confirm the reports.
"News of improvements in conditions is welcome, but does not change her status as a prisoner of conscience," said NUG spokesperson Kyaw Zaw.
Suu Kyi is appealing sentences adding up to 33 years in detention after being convicted of offences ranging from incitement and election fraud to corruption, charges she denies.
Many Western governments have condemned the junta's treatment of Suu Kyi and others, calling for their release.
This month, Thai Foreign Minister Don Pramudwinai said he had recently met Suu Kyi, the first foreign official to be granted access to her since she was detained more than two years ago.
The meeting came as Southeast Asian's regional grouping ASEAN struggled to agree on an approach on how to end the crisis in fellow member Myanmar.
The daughter of Myanmar's independence hero was first put under house arrest in 1989 after huge protests against decades of military rule. In 1991, she won the Nobel Peace Prize for campaigning for democracy but was only fully released from house arrest in 2010.
She swept a 2015 election, held as part of tentative military reforms that were brought to a halt by the 2021 coup..."
Source/publisher:
"Reuters" (UK)
Date of entry/update:
2023-07-26
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, About Aung San Suu Kyi, Political History
Language:
Local URL:
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Sub-title:
Troops have been raiding villages almost daily since last Friday
Description:
"A junta raid on Tuesday forced nearly 5,000 residents from 10 villages in Sagaing region to flee, locals told RFA.
They said a junta column raided a village in Salingyi township this morning, prompting locals from other villages in the area to abandon their homes.
“In the past people normally returned to their villages if the junta column left and went away,” said a villager who didn’t want to be named for security reasons.
“But now it’s raining and hot, so the roads are bad and it's hard for people [to move around].”
The local said the junta had been carrying out systematic raids on villages almost every day since July 21.
Residents said they are also scared to return home because they fear junta gunboats will come up the river firing heavy artillery.
RFA reached out to the junta’s Sagaing region spokesman, Saw Naing, for comment but he did not answer calls on Tuesday.
Nearly 800,000 Sagaing region residents have been forced to flee their homes due to the conflict since the junta staged a February 2021 coup, according to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA)..."
Source/publisher:
"Radio Free Asia" (USA)
Date of entry/update:
2023-07-25
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Burma: Internal displacement/forced migration of several ethnic groups., Armed conflict in Burma - attacks on civilians
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Local URL:
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Description:
"Mr. HAYASHI Nobumitsu, Governor of Japan Bank for International Cooperation
Mr. TAKESADA Tatsuhiko, President & CEO of Japan Overseas Infrastructure Investment Corporation for Transport and Urban Development
CC:
Mr. SUZUKI Shunichi, Minister of Finance
Mr. SAITO Tetsuo, Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism
Sent by:
Justice For Myanmar
Mekong Watch
FoE Japan
Human Rights Now
Human Rights Watch
Japan International Volunteer Center
On June 21, 2023, the US government announced that it was imposing financial sanctions on the Myanmar junta's Ministry of Defence as a “Specially Designated National,” noting that the Ministry was “responsible for the command and control of the armed forces, which has conducted decades of repressive military rule that was violently resumed following the coup in 2021.”[1] With this designation, the connection between the Redevelopment of the Defense Services Museum Project (commonly known as the “Y Complex Project”), one of the projects being implemented using Japanese public funds, and the ongoing abuses by the Myanmar military junta, has been made even more obvious.
Y Complex involves building and operating a large-scale real estate complex at the site of the former military museum in Yangon, the largest city in Myanmar. The project receives public and private funds from Japan through Japan Overseas Infrastructure Investment Corporation for Transport and Urban Development (JOIN), a government-funded infrastructure investment corporation under the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, and Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) which is Japan’s public export credit agency. JOIN and JBIC invests or lends to the Y Complex project in which the Myanmar military-controlled Ministry of Defence participates,[2] and they have continued their involvement even after the attempted coup by the Myanmar military on February 1, 2021.
Tokyo Tatemono, Fujita Corporation (a subsidiary of Daiwa House Industry), and JOIN set up a Joint Special Purpose Company (J-SPC) in Singapore. JBIC along with Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation and Mizuho Bank co-financed a loan to this J-SPC, and the J-SPC in turn is co-investing in Y Complex Company Ltd., a Myanmar corporation set up jointly by the J-SPC and Yangon Technical and Trading Company Limited (YTT), a Myanmar military crony-owned company.
The land lease agreement is between YTT and "Colonel Aung Min Thein (Officer No. Army 17642), Vice Quarter Master General, Office of the Quarter Master General, Commander-in-Chief (Army).” Land lease payments are to be made to "Defence Account no. MD 010424,” an account likely to be under control of the Office of the Quartermaster General[3]. On December 10, 2021, the US, UK and Canada imposed sanctions on the Office of the Quartermaster General.[4] The UK government has pointed out that the Office of the Quartermaster General "plays a crucial role in procuring equipment for the Myanmar Armed Forces, including ammunition, bombs and jet fuel.”[5]More recently, the EU imposed sanctions on Kyaw Swar Lin, the Quartermaster General, on July 20, 2023, noting that he is a “person whose policies and activities undermine democracy and the rule of law in Myanmar/Burma, and who provides support for actions that threaten the peace, security and stability of Myanmar/Burma.”[6]
We understand that making land lease payments in the Y Complex project is equivalent to providing funds to the Myanmar military through the Office of the Quartermaster General, and have alluded to this problem since before the attempted coup.[7]
So far, JOIN and JBIC have explained that because the Office of the Quartermaster General is within the Ministry of Defence and therefore a part of the government of Myanmar, land lease payments would not benefit the Myanmar military (see below).
Response by Tatsuhiko Takesada, President & CEO of JOIN at the meeting of the Committee on Financial Affairs of the House of Representatives, April 20, 2021: "Regarding the contract for the project site, J-SPC is not directly involved, but under the contract, the local Myanmar company signed a land lease agreement with the Ministry of Defence which is a part of the government to obtain land use rights, and the said local [Myanmar] company subleases the land to the local project company. We have confirmed the current situation, but regarding the land lease payments, we understand that they were appropriately managed within the government."[8]
Statement by JBIC official in charge of the Y Complex Project at the "Ministry of Finance - NGO Regular Dialogue," March 5, 2021: “JBIC recognizes that in this project the rent is paid to the Office of the Quartermaster General in the Ministry of Defence. We understand that the rent payments are included as revenue in the general budget of the Myanmar government…. In Myanmar, based on a law called the Budget Law, so-called general accounts budget is publicly disclosed, and the Ministry of Defence is included as part of that."[9]
These statements show that both JOIN and JBIC recognized that the rent payments should not be benefiting the military and that they were attempting to maintain an appearance that the rent payments were not going to the military by publicly presenting their view that the ultimate destination of the rent payments was the Ministry of Defence and not the military. The recent imposition of sanctions by the US on the Ministry of Defence, has made these excuses even more untenable.[10]
Regardless of whether the ultimate destination of the land lease payments for the Y Complex Project is the Office of the Quartermaster General or the linked Ministry of Defence, these payments enable the Myanmar military to continue to commit atrocity crimes across the country. According to the UN, there are currently 1.9 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Myanmar. [11] The Japanese government and Japanese companies should fulfill their responsibilities under the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights and the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises by immediately stopping their involvement in the Y Complex Project. To do so, the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism should withdraw the investment made by JOIN, and the Ministry of Finance should cancel the loan made by JBIC to stop the injection of public funds into the project and publicly announce that they have made the decision to do so..."
Source/publisher:
Justice For Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2023-07-25
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Business and the Military, Sanctions, The Burmese military's role in the economy
Language:
Format :
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Size:
177.17 KB 174.92 KB 203.32 KB
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Sub-title:
A federal system that is genuinely inclusive, sustainable, and democratic must include a prominent role for women from the country’s ethnic minority communities.
Description:
"The decades-long struggle for a democratic Myanmar has been marked by many false dawns and untimely collapses, with the challenge of holding together a multiethnic and multicultural union often proving too much of a hurdle.
The civil war has only worsened since the illegal coup in February 2021, and while the military junta’s rule is doomed to fail, it is clear that Myanmar must start working toward its democratic future now to ensure that peace, when it comes, is meaningful and lasting. Doing this will require reflection on why previous attempts have been unsuccessful. It is more apparent than ever that Myanmar’s pro-democracy movement must adopt bottom-up approaches moving forward – and this must start with ensuring the equal participation of women.
In Myanmar, women have long faced discrimination due to laws, religious rules, and conservative social traditions. The onset of the civil war in 1948 brought concerns about women’s safety on the battlefield. However, following the military coup in February 2021, the role of women has undergone a transformative shift compared to previous decades. Women have taken prominent positions in the resistance to bring an end to the brutal military dictatorship, and are leading the humanitarian relief and emergency support efforts in conflict-affected areas.
Over the decades, the women of Myanmar have been repeatedly told by men that establishing a democratic union must come before their calls to ensure gender equality. The Spring Revolution is no exception. Tragically, numerous women have lost their lives in battles against the Myanmar military. Additionally, many women in Myanmar find themselves single-handedly shouldering the responsibility of leading their families following the demise of male family members in the conflict.
Despite the many obstacles placed before women throughout Myanmar’s history, they have prevailed by continuing to be advocates for peace, justice, and equality in their communities. Women continue to emerge as survivors of political and military conflict while stakeholders refuse to recognize their resilience and capabilities.
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This must change.
The Myanmar military junta is undoubtedly the shared enemy of the people and the main obstacle to achieving long-term, sustainable peace and democracy. However, removing the junta from power is not the be-all-end-all of the struggle for a democratic Myanmar. As history has shown, the election of the National League for Democracy, led by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, was not enough to ensure respect for human rights, democracy, and federalism. The roadmap to a sustainable federal Myanmar requires dismantling patriarchal attitudes and beliefs that have held back women and ethnic people from having an equal say in government and public policy. The future of Myanmar must be rooted in equality; men and women in Myanmar should work together to pursue gender-forward policies which champion all groups and identities.
As we strive for democracy, it is crucial to consistently implement measures safeguarding women’s lives, security, and rights. We must devise strategies that support the courage and leadership abilities demonstrated by women who have emerged during the ongoing resistance against the military junta’s brutal oppression.
Women human rights defenders have been working toward this vision for decades, but its success also requires the willpower and commitment of men. While the resistance is ongoing, all members of the pro-democracy movement must begin unlearning harmful practices, many of which stem from Burmanization. Further, the promotion of harmful stereotypes which suggest women are indecisive and incapable of holding leadership positions must be abandoned.
In the meantime, Myanmar’s human rights situation is volatile and rife with widespread and systematic violations of fundamental freedoms and civil liberties. The current conditions deprive civilians, including the most vulnerable, of their dignity and basic rights. An urgent and coordinated response is needed to end military impunity and promote democratic norms and values in the country. This can be achieved by establishing local governance systems in each state and region through a bottom-up, grassroots approach.
A strong example of this approach and its adaptation is the Karenni State Consultative Council (KSCC), which recently established its interim executive committee, becoming the first state to form its governing body. The KSCC cooperates with local organizations to solve political problems and provide services. KSCC established an interim executive council (IEC) for the people of Karenni State, including women’s leadership and participation. The formation of the IEC is a clear example of how this equality-focused approach can work in this context.
For federalism to be successful, what is happening in Karenni State must be replicated in the country’s other ethnic states, with their autonomy recognized by the National Unity Government. Local government administrations must have clearly defined policies, meaning there needs to be equal engagement of all stakeholders, including women. Doing so will ensure that the local governance structures established meet the needs of the people, including reliable and safe access to health care, education, legal services, and accountability mechanisms. Women across Myanmar are committed to these outcomes and have decades of experience working with armed actors, political bodies, and rights groups to provide security and protection for their communities.
Therefore, to ensure long-lasting peace and security in Myanmar, it is imperative to recognize the resilience of women in the revolution and to protect their rights. Women must be supported in their various roles, including providing security and humanitarian relief for their communities. Further, their leadership and engagement are necessary for decision-making in local governance structures and through international diplomatic channels.
The development of federalism and democracy in Myanmar will no doubt require the participation of the National Unity Government and the National Unity Consultative Council. But without the participation of other stakeholders, including women, youth, strike committees, and ethnic communities, there is no way that a democratic, federal Myanmar can be sustainable. The international community, including ASEAN, must recognize this and support and promote the participation of women in establishing local governance structures in Myanmar to ensure meaningful and lasting peace in the country..."
Source/publisher:
"The Diplomat" (Japan)
Date of entry/update:
2023-07-24
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations, Armed conflict in Burma - attacks on civilians
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Description:
"JAKARTA – The farcical elections held in Cambodia must not be legitimized by the international community, Southeast Asian parliamentarians said in a press conference today, decrying the Hun Sen regime’s relentless attacks against human rights defenders and opposition parties prior to election day.
“This year alone, Hun Sen and his regime have publicly threatened opposition supporters with legal action and physical violence, shuttered one of the country’s last independent media outlets, sentenced an opposition leader to 27 years imprisonment on ridiculous charges, and banned the sole viable opposition party,” said ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Right Co-Chairperson and former Malaysian member of parliament Charles Santiago.
“Given all these blatant efforts to undermine free and fair polls, what happened yesterday in Cambodia can only be called ‘elections’ in the loosest sense of the word,” said Santiago. “In effect, it was yet another coronation for Hun Sen and his cronies.”
The Cambodian general elections were held on Sunday, 23 July, with three parties participating in the vote. However, the country’s largest opposition party, the Candlelight Party, was barred from participating in the election on dubious administrative grounds in May. Human Rights Watch reported that numerous Candlelight Party members and supporters have been arbitrarily arrested and harassed in the run-up to the elections. After the polls closed, Hun Sen said that voter turnout reached 84 percent and state-affiliated media has claimed that the ruling Cambodian People’s Party is on course to win 120 out of 125 seats in the National Assembly.
“These types of so-called ‘elections’ have increasingly become the tools of authoritarian leaders to consolidate their power, undermining elections as one of the core pillars of democracy,” said APHR Board Member and former member of the Indonesian House of Representatives Eva Kusuma Sundari. “The international community must not fall into the trap of legitimizing this pantomime.”
In its pre-election assessment mission report, Asian Network for Free Elections (ANFREL) noted that the clear bias of the National Election Commission (NEC) combined with a deteriorating political situation has compromised “the integrity and credibility of the electoral process.” Its initial findings from monitoring election day were no different.
“There is a serious question on the genuineness and electoral competitiveness of yesterday’s elections with the whole process from pre-elections to election day respecting any of internationally accepted election standards,” said ANFREL Executive Director Chandanie Watawala.
The International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) also raised its grave concerns about the judicial harassment of opposition supporters and activists.
“Whether the general election was free and fair has to be seen within the human rights and rule of law crisis in Cambodia. This crisis is being further entrenched by the intensified assaults against the rights to freedom of expression, peaceful assembly, association and political participation. In the lead-up to the elections, there were mass convictions of opposition party leaders on spurious charges, weaponization of laws that are non-compliant with human rights law and standards against human rights defenders, and acts of violence and incitement of violence against perceived political opponents with impunity,” said ICJ Associate International Legal Adviser Daron Tan.
“At every step of the way, PM Hun Sen has violated the rights of civil society activists, independent media, political opposition figures while ensuring the full weight of the Cambodian state backs his party,” said Human Rights Watch Asia Deputy Director Phil Robertson. “This entire election was a charade designed solely to give Hun Sen and the CPP a justification to say that they are democratic when in reality they are presiding over a deepening dictatorship.”
“We call on parliamentarians of democratic countries across the world to use their legislative mandate in parliament to unequivocally denounce the 2023 electoral exercise in Cambodia as undemocratic,” said Sundari. “We must pressure the Cambodian government to end all forms of political persecution and immediately and unconditionally release political prisoners. There must also be an independent investigation into human rights violations and electoral irregularities, with the aim of ensuring accountability.”..."
Source/publisher:
ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights
Date of entry/update:
2023-07-24
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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"WASHINGTON —
The U.S. is supporting a report by the special rapporteur of human rights in Myanmar, despite China's objection to findings that Beijing has been exporting arms to Myanmar's military which has used them to forcibly suppress resistance groups since its 2021 coup.
"The United States strongly supports the mandate of the Special Rapporteur and his work illuminating the human rights situation in Myanmar," a State Department spokesperson told VOA's Korean Service on Friday.
The remarks came in response to China's opposition to a United Nations report by Tom Andrews, the special rapporteur on human rights in Myanmar, that was issued in May. In the report, Andrews said Myanmar's military imported weapons and related material worth at least $1 billion from China and Russia since the military junta's deadly coup in 2021.
The report came up during the regular daily press briefing by China's Foreign Ministry on July 18 when Sky TV asked about China's investment in Myanmar and arms sales to the junta.
Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Mao Ning said, in part, "The Special Rapporteur actually overstepped his mandate."
She continued, "The report contained smears against normal arms trade between sovereign countries and misrepresentation of facts. China firmly opposes it. We have asked the Special Rapporteur to stay objective and fair and strictly follow his mandate and stop serving any political agenda."
The U.N. report, titled "The Billion Dollar Death Trade: The International Arms Networks that Enable Human Rights Violations in Myanmar," says that out of some $1 billion, the Myanmar military imported more than $267 million worth of weapons and materials from entities in China, including state-owned entities.
The report states, "Numerous private and state-owned companies registered in China, including Hong Kong, continued to supply the Myanmar military with an extensive array of arms, equipment, and raw material between October 2021 and December 2022."
The report said the shipments of arms included jets, attack aircrafts and upgrades to tanks and fighter jets, as well as raw materials, such as aluminum, cooper, steel, rubber and lubricants essential for manufacturing weapons.
China seeks 'friendly country,' says expert
David Maxwell, vice president of the Center for Asia Pacific Strategy, said China has been exporting arms to the Myanmar military because it wants "a friendly country on its southern border" to "access the Bay of Bengal to the Indian Ocean to the East of India."
He said that Beijing has "no concern for the human rights of the people in Burma" as it "seeks to export its authoritarian political system around the world in order to dominate the region."
To achieve this goal, Maxwell said China also seeks to "coopt or coerce international organizations, create economic conditions favorable to China alone, and displace democratic institutions."
Bruce Bechtol, a former intelligence officer at the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency who is now a professor at Angelo State University in Texas, said Myanmar is going to be viewed as "a pariah to the international community" and its "only real friend is going to be China."
He added that China might consider that to be an "advantage" because Beijing wants to prevent a democratic country emerging at its border.
'Indiscriminate use of artillery'
Myanmar's military has been using deadly weapons to suppress oppositions groups that have resisted its rule since the overthrow of the democratically elected government led by de facto leader Aung San Suu Kyi in a violent coup in 2021.
Human Rights Watch pointed out in its 2023 World Report that the Myanmar military makes "indiscriminate use of artillery and airstrikes," which has killed and injured civilians and destroyed civilian properties.
The U.N. report by Andrews said that since the coup, the military killed at least 3,500 civilians, detained as much as 22,000 political prisoners, and forcibly displaced more than 1.5 million people.
On Friday, two villagers said the Myanmar military killed 14 people in the village of Sone Chaung in the Sagaing region during a raid to search for the leaders of a resistance group known as the People's Defense Force, according to The Guardian citing AFP.
In June, the U.S. Treasury imposed sanctions on Myanmar's Defense Ministry and two state-run banks used by the military to purchase weapons.
Myanmar Foreign Trade Bank and Myanma Investment and Commercial Bank allowed state-owned Myanma Oil and Gas Enterprise to access international markets to generate revenues used to import weapons and material, according to the Treasury..."
Source/publisher:
"Voice of America" (Washington, D.C)
Date of entry/update:
2023-07-24
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"The National Unity Government of Myanmar (NUG) strongly condemns, in the strongest terms, the horrific Yinmabin massacre in Sagaing, Myanmar. The world must unite against the horrors unfolding in Sagaing, Myanmar. In the early hours of July 21st, 2023, around 2 am, evil forces, acting under the orders of the genocidal military junta's generals, carried out a heinous and tragic massacre in the village of Sone Chaung, in Yinmabin township. Under the cover of darkness, these malevolent forces infiltrated the village, armed with heavy battlefield weapons, and unleashed terror upon innocent villagers. Three individuals were arrested and brutally beheaded, while more villagers fell victim to their merciless brutality. As of now, the confirmed death toll stands at 14 lives lost due to this despicable act perpetrated by the genocidal military junta forces.
Every passing day, we find it increasingly unbearable to hear about the brutal massacres, crimes against humanity, heinous human rights violations, and unthinkable genocide committed by the genocidal military junta with absolute impunity against the entire population of Myanmar.
Over the last 27 months alone, the genocidal military junta in Myanmar has callously killed more than 4000 innocent civilians, including several hundreds of children, and unjustly arrested nearly 24,000 civilians, including the democratically elected President of Myanmar, U Win Myint, and Myanmar's State Counsellor, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. Moreover, 800 plus children have been among those arrested, and some 100 children were held as hostages to target their parents. Tragically, more than 800 children have lost their lives, and over 70,000 homes, including schools, hospitals, and places of worship, have been destroyed. The junta's actions of terrorism have forced nearly 2 million people into homelessness as refugees, and an astonishing 18 million people in Myanmar are in dire need of lifesaving aid, while 48 million people have been pushed below the poverty line. Additionally, several millions of children in Myanmar are on the edge of becoming lost generations, which will significantly affect generations to come.
Moreover, the genocidal military junta has implemented their evil "four cuts" policies against the entire population of Myanmar, effectively using hunger, disease, starvation, death, and destruction as weapons of oppression. Despite the high cost that the people of Myanmar are paying, despite these crimes against humanity, the freedom, and federal democracy-loving people of Myanmar refuse to surrender or give up. They are fighting for freedom and federal democracy, which can only be implemented once the genocidal military junta is defeated and removed from Myanmar politics. The people of Myanmar have made it clear and loud that they no longer desire any form of brutal and genocidal dictatorship imposed by the military; what they yearn for is a truly inclusive federal democracy, for which they are sacrificing their lives every day in the face of these terrors of the genocidal junta.
Regrettably, this Yinmabin Massacre atrocity marks just one of 144 similar massacres committed by the murderous junta over the last 27 months. The genocidal military junta skillfully hides behind a veil of secrecy, evading international scrutiny. It is imperative that the international community and Myanmar's neighbors should no longer keep silent about these heinous crimes happening next door within the global community of humanity. It is no longer just about international borders; it's about humanity collectively and internationally. We must take decisive action now!
Reports from the United Nations reveal that the genocidal junta in Myanmar has engaged in a deadly trade of weapons, amounting to a staggering 1 billion US dollars, with five countries over the past 27 months alone. These weapons fuel their reign of terror and enable them to commit unspeakable crimes against humanity with complete disregard for human life. The international community must act decisively! We call for concrete measures to cut off the flow of money, weapons, and legitimacy to the genocidal military junta in Myanmar. The sooner the international community and Myanmar's neighbors respect and rally with the democratic will of the people of Myanmar by officially recognizing NUG and supporting the pro-democracy movement, the earlier we can end this reign of terror and establish federal democracy for peace and prosperity in Myanmar, the region, and indeed make this world a better place for ALL.
Accountability is paramount! The NUG is resolute in holding all perpetrators accountable for their crimes against humanity and heinous human rights violations. We will pursue justice through international and national mechanisms, such as the International Criminal Court (ICC), International Court of Justice (ICJ), and universal jurisdiction laws. Domestically, we will seek justice through all available means. The genocidal military junta must face the consequences of their acts of crime against humanity.
It is critical that the ASEAN leadership reviews and evaluates ASEAN Special Envoy roles and the ASEAN five points consensus on Myanmar. It is urgent that ASEAN coordinates an international coalition on the Myanmar crisis with like-minded countries and ASEAN partners. Additionally, it is crucial for ASEAN to implement its five points on Myanmar (2021) together with UN Security Council Resolution No. 2669 (2022) on Myanmar, comprising 10 points, and USA NDAA Burma Acts (2023), comprising 8 strategic points. These 23 points from ASEAN, the USA, and the UN Security Council on Myanmar must be implemented on the ground without further delays.
Despite the heinous crimes committed by the genocidal military junta in Myanmar, the brave people of Myanmar remain unwaveringly committed to fighting for freedom, human rights, and federal democracy. Their resolute determination will undoubtedly lead to victory! Justice, Freedom, and Federal Democracy will ultimately prevail in Myanmar, making the region and the world a better place for ALL.
Let us stand in unwavering solidarity with the loved ones, families, and villagers of Sone Chaung village, Yinmabin township during this heart-wrenching time, deliberately created by the genocidal junta and supported by their partners in crimes. Our thoughts and prayers are with the victims and their families. We, the National Unity Government of Myanmar, pledge to tirelessly work until justice is served, and peace and democracy are fully restored in our beloved nation and the region. As we stand together, united in purpose, we are confident that light will overcome darkness, and the dreams of a free, just, and federal democratic Myanmar will soon become a reality..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of International Cooperation Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2023-07-23
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"Sunday marks the first anniversary of the deaths of veteran 88 Generation pro-democracy activist Ko Jimmy (Kyaw Min Yu) and former National League for Democracy lawmaker and hip-hop star Ko Phyo Zeya Thaw, who were hanged by the regime in Yangon’s Insein Prison on this day last year.
Two anti-coup protesters, Ko Hla Myo Aung and Ko Aung Thura Zaw, met the same fate. The deaths of the four marked the first executions of political prisoners since 1989 and shocked Myanmar people and the international community; many governments had appealed for their death sentences to be commuted.
Ko Jimmy and Ko Phyo Zeya Thaw, who were charged under the Counterterrorism Law, were allowed to meet their families on July 22, 2022 for the first time since their arrest. However, the meetings were conducted via Zoom, not in person.
Their family members did not know it would be their last meeting with the pro-democracy activists, or that the two would be hanged the next morning.
Their families only found out about the deaths on July 25 when the junta announced through its state-run newspapers that the executions had been carried out. Family members rushed to Insein Prison, but were not allowed to see the bodies, nor were they told when their husbands and sons were hanged.
On July 27, pro-junta thugs including members of the military’s proxy Union Solidarity and Development Party and the ultranationalist Association for Protection of Race and Religion (known by its Burmese acronym Ma Ba Tha) stoned the houses of Ko Jimmy and Ko Phyo Zeya Thaw. Rallies in support of the executions were held in Yangon and Mandalay in the following days, with junta soldiers and police providing security for protesters.
Prior to the executions, Captain Ohn Kyaw Myint, who plotted to assassinate the generals of the Myanmar Socialist Programme Party, and ethnic Chin student leader Salai Tin Maung Oo were the best-known cases of political dissidents being hanged in Myanmar.
Ko Jimmy was 53 and Ko Phyo Zeya Thaw was 41 when the two made the ultimate sacrifice for the democracy struggle in Myanmar.
According to the Assistance Association for Political prisoners, as of June 2023 more than 150 people including politicians, students and women had been sentenced to death since the putsch..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2023-07-23
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Human Rights Defenders, Political prisoners and other violations in Burma - reports, Human Rights and international relations
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"Myanmar junta troops killed 11 civilians and three resistance fighters in Yinmabin Township, Sagaing Region, on Friday, according to residents.
Troops stationed in Yinmabin town raided Sone Chaung village before dawn on Saturday and beheaded three Bo Tun Tauk People’s Defense Force members, who were guarding the village.
They then killed 11 male villagers, the group said.
“First, we found the bodies of the three fighters in the village center. The other bodies were spread around. Some had been tortured,” said a villager.
Other villagers were taken away and their condition is unknown. The Irrawaddy could not independently verify the reports.
The three resistance fighters were named Ko Pyae Phyo Tun, Ko Sai Thu San and Ko Nay Min Tun.
The civilians killed were U Myo Myint Oo, U Kyaw Oo, U Yan Naing Soe, U Swe Gyi, U Aung Win Swe, U Naing Min, U Tote Kyi, U Lwin Moe Tun, U Htay Zaw, U Phoe Aung and U Aung Zaw Win, according to the resistance group.
Pro-junta Telegram channels released the same names but said they were all resistance fighters.
A funeral was held yesterday and the 14 bodies were cremated together.
Dr Sasa, the National Unity Government’s minister for international cooperation, posted on Facebook that the Yinmabin atrocity was one of around 80 massacres committed by the junta since the 2021 coup.
“The genocidal military junta hides behind secrecy, evading international scrutiny. But we cannot remain silent observers; we must take decisive action now,” he said.
Dr Sasa, known by only one name, called on the international community to cut the flow of money, weapons and legitimacy to the junta.
“Let us stand in solidarity with the loved ones, families and villagers of Yinmabin during this heart-wrenching time, deliberately created by the genocidal junta and supported by their partners in crime,” he said.
In March at least four civilians in Kone village, Yinmabin Township, were killed by junta troops after they torched the village..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2023-07-22
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Freedom of Movement, violations of in Burma/Myanmar, Human Rights Defenders, Human Rights and international relations
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Fighting increases in border states while junta continues to delay elections
Description:
"Fighting between the Myanmar army and anti-junta rebels has flared up in recent days, with local people in one village saying on Saturday that 14 people were killed in a single raid.
Deadly violence has engulfed Myanmar since the military deposed Aung San Suu Kyi’s civilian government in February 2021 and unleashed a bloody crackdown on dissent that has left thousands dead.
The junta has been battling anti-coup “people’s defence force” (PDF) militias and long-established ethnic rebel armies that control large areas of territory near the country’s borders.
A senior military source, speaking on condition of anonymity, told AFP that fighting had been going on in recent days in the states of Kachin, Karen and Kayah, as well as Sagaing and Magway regions.
Two people from Sone Chaung village in Sagaing – a hotbed of opposition to junta rule – told AFP the army had killed 14 people in a raid in the early hours of Friday morning.
The villagers, who both spoke on condition of anonymity, said the army came looking for PDF leaders.
One said that six of the dead were PDF fighters, but the rest were civilians, and the bodies were found scattered over a wide area, apparently shot or cut down as they tried to flee.
“Fighting and raids of PDF places in Sagaing and Magway regions are ongoing these days,” another military source said without giving further details.
Access to the areas affected is extremely difficult for journalists, making it hard to independently verify local accounts.
Earlier this month, the US secretary of state, Antony Blinken, told south-east Asian ministers that Washington and regional states must pressure the junta to put an end to violence and return to democracy.
But diplomatic and economic pressure on the generals has so far had no effect.
The junta, which justified its coup by alleging fraud in elections won by Aung San Suu Kyi’s party, has promised to hold fresh polls.
But it has delayed them once, and earlier this month hinted it would extend the state of emergency and postpone polls again..."
Source/publisher:
"The Guardian" (UK)
Date of entry/update:
2023-07-22
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
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Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Human Rights and international relations, Human Rights Defenders, Freedom of Movement, violations of in Burma/Myanmar
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"Police have been unable to perform their primary duty of law enforcement since the coup as they have been busy helping the Myanmar military impose a crackdown on dissidents. The resulting lawlessness has allowed criminal gangs and allied human traffickers to thrive in areas controlled by ethnic armed organizations on the Myanmar-China border.
Human traffickers have expanded their network to major cities like Yangon and Mandalay, key border towns including Lashio and Tachilek, and even Sagaing and Magwe regions in central Myanmar, which is experiencing fierce fighting between junta and resistance forces. Here, they lure young people with the promise of high-paying jobs, before trafficking them to Wa State, an autonomous enclave in northeastern Myanmar controlled by the United Wa State Army (UWSA).
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At least 350 people were trafficked in Wa State from February 2021 to May 2023, according to data compiled by the UWSA, Thai authorities, news agencies in northern Shan State, and The Irrawaddy.
Among those trafficked were young people from Yangon, Mandalay, Lashio, Kyaukme, Hsipaw, Sagaing and Magwe as well citizens from fellow ASEAN countries including the Philippines, Vietnam, Thailand, Laos and Indonesia, and from Russia. This figure only represents those who have been rescued or sought help. The actual number of trafficked Wa State, officially the Wa Self-Administered Division, is located in northern Shan State on the border with China.
The UWSA is headquartered in Panghsan, and the self-administered division is made up of Mongmao, Monglin and Mongpauk districts and Panghsan and Namtit special townships – areas which the UWSA refers to as northern Wa State, covering around 1,500 square kilometers.
Northern Wa State to the east of the Salween River is under the de facto control of the UWSA. Central government administration is limited to areas west of the Salween River.
Northern Wa State comprises 24 townships. Panghsan, Monglin and Mongpauk are the busiest, hosting casinos, brothels, and hotels that sell narcotics including methamphetamine, ecstasy, ketamine and Happy Water.
The USWA, which has a long history of trading narcotics and arms, claimed in 2005 that it had abandoned opium-poppy cultivation to focus on rubber, tea and orange trees, as well as mining rare earth elements and other minerals.
However, the armed ethnic organization remains on the drugs and arms trafficking watchlists of neighboring Thailand and the US.
But one key USWA-controlled business that the Wa army has avoided talking about is the hotel industry linked with casinos, gambling dens, brothels, and phone and internet scams.
This sector is referred to as the “entertainment business” in Wa State. Investors in the UWSA’s entertainment business are mostly Chinese nationals. Brothels with Chinese names are controlled by criminal gangs and are hubs for human trafficking, slavery and forced prostitution.
Brothels and online-scam businesses owned by Chinese nationals are guarded by armed men, according to a restaurant manager, an entertainment-business investor and other Wa State locals.
Most operate undercover as massage parlors.
The armed guards make sure trafficked victims don’t flee and do what they are told. These so-called businesses more accurately resemble organized crime groups.
Female sex workers at brothels in Panghsan or Mongpauk earn 200 yuan (around 84,000 kyats at the current exchange rate) for 45 minutes, and between 1,000 and 2,500 yuan for the night, according to local agencies that help find recruits for brothels and online scammers.
In some brothels, sex workers are reportedly forced to pay 50 percent of their earnings to their boss. But some are even less fortunate, sold by traffickers to Chinese businessmen for 15,000 to 20,000 yuan to become sex slaves.
A virgin can earn a trafficker between 5,000 and 8,000 yuan per day. Hence, human traffickers target young girls as young as 14.
“They [sex workers] should not be older than 25. Fifteen-year-olds are also okay. They are better since we can contract them for a long time. Virgins get better prices,” a brothel manager in Wa State told The Irrawaddy.
Two of the registered 350 human trafficking victims were girls aged between 14 and 16.
Women younger than 25 are preferred for prostitution, according to job adverts posted by brothels in Panghsan and Mongpauk.
Applicants have to send three photos and a video of themselves to the brothels. Chinese bosses use middlemen in Shan State border towns, who provide transportation costs for successful applicants or send vehicles to pick them up, according to individuals engaged in the business.
The prostitution industry in Wa State is not limited to sex with customers. Sex workers are also used as escorts for Chinese gamblers and nationals working in casinos, in internet scams and brothels, to perform in porn videos and via livestreams. Sex workers are also forced to use narcotics and stimulants so they can work for hours without sleep, according to accounts by victims, some of whom have filed complaints at Mongpauk police station.
Meanwhile, men and women trafficked for phone and internet scams are confined in apartments and forced to work up to 19 hours per day, according to victims. Some were first sold into the scams but later forced into prostitution.
Varying degrees of punishment are imposed on those who refuse to take orders.
First-degree punishments include being confined to a room, gang-beaten, tased, and denied food and water, according to an ethnic Palaung woman who suffered torture before being released in 2022 after her family paid ransom money. Second and third-degree punishments include hanging from a tree or beam, searing the skin with hot objects, confinement in a doghouse, being stripped naked and beaten, imprisonment in a pitch-black room for several days, and chest-deep immersion in a water tank.
An ethnic armed organization official posted to Panghsan for six years said: “This system is practiced on all [victims] regardless of their race or nationality. Whether they are Bamar or Chinese or Wa or Kachin or Palaung, they will be punished if they fail to pay back debts or lose at gambling and can’t repay the money. Men and women come to work here and if they want to go back before their contracts expire, or if they refuse to do the work as ordered, they are also beaten. Or they can be ransomed.”
UWSA involvement in criminal activities
The UWSA is known as the most powerful ethnic armed organization in Myanmar and envied by fellow EAOs for its de facto control over Wa State. But its other face is a vast business enterprise with ties to criminal gangs.
Despite a constant flow of men and young women being trafficked into slavery, the entertainment industry in Wa State continues as usual. Its businesses are officially licensed and taxed by the UWSA-run government, which profits handsomely from the revenues. Meanwhile, UWSA chiefs benefit directly and indirectly from lucrative joint ventures with Chinese investors in the entertainment industry, according to sources in the industry.
As in Wa State, human trafficking is rampant in neighboring China-Myanmar border towns controlled by the Kokang Border Guard Force and National Democratic Alliance Army. These casino towns are also notorious for prostitution and criminal gangs engaged in drug and arms trafficking. These businesses provide a large source of income for various EAOs and are thus unlikely to collapse anytime soon.
International pressure rising
The US State Department’s 2022 Trafficking in Persons Report for Myanmar states that “efforts to combat trafficking declined dramatically after the coup as the military regime shifted its focus away from other justice sector priorities and toward persecution of the pro-democracy opposition.”
Myanmar was ranked on the bottom rung or Tier 3, for countries whose governments do not fully comply with the minimum standards and are not making significant efforts to do so.
Minimum standards include laying out legislation that prohibits and punishes human trafficking as a crime; punishing these crimes in a way that is consistent and appropriate for the gravity of the evil involved in trafficking a person; punishment that appropriately deters future acts; and making “serious and sustained efforts” to eliminate all forms of trafficking by enforcement and prosecution, victim protection, trafficking prevention and more.
Authorities and civil society organizations in Thailand, Indonesia, Vietnam, and the Philippines also report having to conduct tough negotiations with Myanmar authorities to rescue their trafficked citizens from Myanmar.
Thai authorities said last month that around 140 Thai citizens had been trafficked into Shan State, and only 63 had been rescued. They waited two to three months after asking Myanmar authorities before the Thai victims were eventually rescued.
Chinese ambassador to Myanmar Chen Hai held talks with deputy junta chief Soe Win in March and May in Naypyitaw, seeking cooperation to combat cross-border crimes and phone and internet scams. China’s top diplomat, Qin Gang, raised the same issue when he visited the China-Myanmar border and Naypyitaw to meet junta chief Min Aung Hlaing in the first week of May.
Videos warning about Myanmar traffickers luring victims with promises of high-paying jobs have flooded Chinese social media. The videos highlight the plight of victims who are confined and tortured, and how they can also end up as victims of the organ trade.
Following international pressure, the UWSA has taken steps to enforce the law against traffickers. In February, it issued an order barring judicial and law enforcement personnel from visiting casinos and entertainment venues except as part of their duties, and also barred them from drinking alcohol except on weekends.
It also said it had handed over 100 victims of human trafficking to junta police on March 23 as part of regime efforts to rescue victims.
The UWSA issued another order on June 6 warning of harsh action against entertainment venues caught selling narcotics including so-called party drugs such as ketamine, ecstasy and Happy Water.
But the measures have seemingly failed to dent the operations of organized crime groups in Wa State. They continue to operate freely while human traffickers are still luring job seekers via social media.
UWSA second generation
The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) measures human security according to seven criteria: economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community, and political. A situation in which individuals cannot live with dignity or make a living also constitutes a lack of human security.
According to the UNDP’s indicators, the operations of crime groups and traffickers in Wa State are a threat to both personal and community security. That threat on the Myanmar-China border is being monitored not just by Myanmar’s neighbors, but also the US and international human rights agencies.
The Irrawaddy was unable to obtain comment from UWSA spokesman Nyi Rang about reported sex and cyber slavery and crime groups in Wa State.
First-generation UWSA leaders such as Bao Youxiang and Wei Hsueh-kang have a murky past as drug traffickers. They earned their names as drug lords rather than as leaders of an ethnic armed organization fighting for freedom. The US even offered a reward of $ 200,000 for the arrest of UWSA vice chair Wei Hsueh-kang.
But with the changing times, the UWSA has become increasingly involved in the politics of ethnic minorities in Myanmar. It now seeks official status of statehood for Wa State.
The UWSA has also allied with other ethnic armies and supplied them with arms and financial assistance in a bid to enhance its image and expand its political influence. Through its allies, it has also provided help to resistance groups that emerged in the Spring Revolution against junta rule.
The UWSA reshuffled its leadership in August last year, which saw Bao Ai Kham, son of long-time UWSA commander-in-chief Bao Youxiang, promoted to deputy general secretary of the United Wa State Party, the political wing of the UWSA. He is tipped to succeed his father as the next leader of Wa State.
Zhao Ai Nap Lai, a son of Zhao Nyi-Lai, one of the founders of the UWSA, became the head of the politburo. Bao Youxiang’s nephew Bao Ai Chan was also promoted to deputy commander-in-chief of the UWSA.
However, the second generation of UWSA leaders is likely to fall under the same shadow as the first generation if they fail to control criminal activity that threatens the social fabric of Wa State.
Margaret Aung (a pseudonym) is a researcher at the Yangon-based Institute for Strategy and Policy-Myanmar..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2023-07-22
[field_licence]
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Individual Documents
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"The National Unity Government of Myanmar (NUG) welcomes the European Union's (EU) seventh round of sanctions against the genocidal military junta in Myanmar known as the State Administrative Council (SAC). All the current EU sanctions, which apply to a total of 99 individuals and 19 entities, send strong messages to the terrorist military junta in Myanmar, but unfortunately, they are not enough. The strategic, greater, and concrete actions of the international community are absolutely required to end the crimes against humanity and to restore peace and democracy in Myanmar and the region. It is imperative that the sanctions list expands to thousands, targeting not only high ranks but also local and regional commanders of the military junta, Tatmadaw, and their cronies and supporters who are responsible for executing crimes against humanity and heinous human rights violations on the ground against the innocent civilians of Myanmar.
Therefore, we call on all nations of the free world to show solidarity with the people of Myanmar by joining hands and taking decisive actions for the cause of freedom, democracy, peace, justice, stability and security in the region. This can be achieved by cutting off the genocidal military junta's access to finance, weapons, and legitimacy through international channels and supporting Myanmar to establish federal democratic governances. By targeting the junta's resources and strengths, we can effectively cripple their ability to continue their reign of terror and perpetrate crimes against humanity against the entire population of Myanmar.
The Council of the European Union stated that:
Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 29 thereof, having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,
(1) On 22 April 2013, the Council adopted Decision 2013/184/CFSP (1).
(2) On 31 January 2023, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy issued a declaration on behalf of the Union, strongly condemning the overthrow of Myanmar's democratically elected government by the Myanmar armed forces in blatant violation of the will of the people, as expressed in the general election of 8 November 2020. This illegitimate act reversed the country's democratic transition and led to disastrous humanitarian, social, security, economic, and human rights consequences.
(3) The Union remains deeply concerned by the continuing escalation of violence and the evolution towards a protracted conflict with regional implications. The Union condemns the continuing grave human rights violations by the Myanmar armed forces, including torture, sexual and gender-based violence, the persecution of civil society actors, human rights defenders, and journalists, and attacks on the civilian population, including ethnic and religious minorities.
(4) In the absence of swift progress in the situation in Myanmar/Burma, the Union has expressed several times its readiness to adopt further restrictive measures against those responsible for undermining democracy and the rule of law and for the serious human rights violations taking place in that country.
(5) In view of the continuing grave situation in Myanmar/Burma, six persons and one entity should be added to the list of natural and legal persons, entities, and bodies subject to restrictive measures in the Annex to Decision 2013/184/CFSP.
EU HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
Article 1: The Annex to Decision 2013/184/CFSP is amended as set out in the Annex to this Decision.
Article 2: This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.
Council Decision 2013/184/CFSP of 22 April 2013 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Myanmar/Burma (OJ L 111, 23.4.2013, p. 75).
The following entries are added to the list headed ‘A. Natural persons referred to in Articles 5(1) and 6(1)’:
Aung Kyaw Min Nationality: Myanmar/Burma; Date of birth: circa 1958; Place of birth: Myanmar/Burma; Gender: male; Function: Member of State Administration Council
Aung Kyaw Min has been a member of the State Administration Council (SAC) since 1 February 2023. He is also the former Chief-Minister of Rakhine State. SAC is led by Commander in Chief Min Aung Hlaing, who took over the legislative, executive, and judicial powers of the State as of 1 February 2021, preventing the democratically elected government from fulfilling its mandate. As a member of the SAC, Aung Kyaw Min has been directly involved in and responsible for decision-making concerning state functions and is, therefore, responsible for undermining democracy and the rule of law in Myanmar/Burma. Additionally, the SAC has adopted decisions restricting the rights of freedom of expression, including access to information, and peaceful assembly. The military forces and authorities operating under the control of the SAC have committed serious human rights violations since 1 February 2021, killing civilian and unarmed protestors, and have restricted freedom of assembly and expression. As a member of the SAC, Aung Kyaw Min is directly responsible for those repressive decisions and for serious human rights violations.
Kyaw Swar Lin a.k.a Kyaw Swar Linn, Nationality: Myanmar/Burma; Place of birth: Myanmar/Burma; Gender: male; Function: Quartermaster General of the Myanmar armed forces. Lieutenant General Kyaw Swar Lin was appointed as Quartermaster General in May 2020. It is the sixth-highest position in the military of Myanmar/Burma. The Office of the Quartermaster General is a department under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Defense and is involved in arms and military equipment procurement for the Myanmar Armed Forces. In addition, Kyaw Swar Lin runs the Myanmar Economic Corporation (MEC), which is one of the two major conglomerates and holding companies operated by the military, generating revenue for the Myanmar armed forces (Tatmadaw). As Quartermaster General, he forms part of the military regime that has seized power in a military coup and overthrown the legitimately elected leaders of Myanmar/Burma. Kyaw Swar Lin is, therefore, a natural person whose policies and activities undermine democracy and the rule of law in Myanmar/Burma and who provides support for actions that threaten the peace, security, and stability of Myanmar/Burma.
Myint Kyaing a.k.a. U Myint Kyaing Nationality: Myanmar/Burma; Date of birth: 17.4.1957 Place of birth: Myanmar/Burma; Gender: male; Function: Union Minister of Immigration and Population.Myint Kyaing has been the Union Minister for Immigration and Population since 19 August 2021. Before that, he was Union Minister of Labour following the coup of 1 February 2021. He is a member of the State Administration Council (SAC), led by Commander-in-Chief Min Aung Hlaing, which took over the legislative, executive, and judicial powers of the State in a military coup on 1 February 2021. As a government Minister, he forms part of the military regime that has seized power in a military coup and overthrown the legitimately elected leaders of Myanmar/Burma. In his capacity as Union Minister, he carries out duties in support of the military regime's repressive immigration and population policy, such as restrictions for citizens to travel within the country, as well as the policy of the regime towards the minority of the Rohingya in violation of human rights. As Minister for Immigration and Population, he also participates in preparations for the elections announced by the military to legitimize the illegal coup of February 2021. Myint Kyaing is, therefore, responsible for undermining democracy and the rule of law in Myanmar/Burma and for providing support for actions that threaten the peace, security, and stability of Myanmar/Burma.
Porel Aung Thein Nationality: Myanmar/Burma; Date of birth: 1960s-1970s (approx. 50 years old) Place of birth: Myanmar/Burma; Gender: male; Function: Member of State Administration Council. Porel Aung Thein has been a member of the State Administration Council (SAC) since 1 February 2023. He is also a member of a military-proxy party, the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP). SAC is led by Commander in Chief Min Aung Hlaing and took over the legislative, executive, and judicial powers of the State as of 1 February 2021, preventing the democratically elected government from fulfilling its mandate. As a member of the SAC, Porel Aung Thein has been directly involved in and responsible for decision-making concerning state functions and is, therefore, responsible for undermining democracy and the rule of law in Myanmar/Burma. Additionally, the SAC adopted decisions restricting the rights of freedom of expression, including access to information, and peaceful assembly. The military forces and authorities operating under the control of the SAC have committed serious human rights violations since 1 February 2021, killing civilian and unarmed protestors, and restricted freedom of assembly and expression. As a member of the SAC, Porel Aung Thein is directly responsible for those repressive decisions and for serious human rights violations.
Pwint San Nationality: Myanmar/Burma; Date of birth: 13.7.1961 Place of birth: Myanmar/Burma; Gender: male; Function: Union Minister of Labour.
Pwint San has been Union Minister of Labour since 19 August 2022. He was appointed by the State Administration Council (SAC), led by Commander in Chief Min Aung Hlaing, which took over the legislative, executive, and judicial powers of the State as of 2 February 2021. His position as the Union Minister for Labour was confirmed again on 1 February 2023. He was previously appointed as Union Minister of Commerce from the period of 3 February 2021 to 19 August 2022. As a government Minister, he forms part of the military regime that has seized power in a military coup and overthrown the legitimately elected leaders of Myanmar/Burma. Under his authority, workers' rights, especially the rights of workers affiliated with the opposition movement, are being systematically violated. As Minister of Commerce, Pwint San facilitated the importation of goods necessary to sustain the regime's power (e.g., fuel oil importation). Furthermore, through his national activities and international contacts, he contributes to further stabilizing the illegitimate power of the military regime. At the same time, the ministry under his authority aggravates supply disruptions within the country by imposing import controls and restricting the transfer of remittances. Pwint San is, therefore, a natural person whose actions, policies, and activities undermine democracy and the rule of law in Myanmar/Burma and who is engaged in actions that threaten the peace, security, and stability of Myanmar/Burma.
Thet Khaing Win Nationality: Myanmar/Burma Date of birth: 13.7.1961 Place of birth: Myanmar/Burma; Gender: male; Function: Union Minister of Health.
Dr. Thet Khaing Win has been the Minister for Health and Sport since 1 February 2021. He was appointed by the State Administration Council (SAC), led by Commander in Chief Min Aung Hlaing, which took over the legislative, executive, and judicial powers of the State as of 2 February 2021. His position as the Union Minister for Health was confirmed on 1 February 2023. Before the coup, he was the permanent secretary of the Ministry of Health and Sport. As a government Minister, he forms part of the military regime that has seized power in a military coup and overthrown the legitimately elected leaders of Myanmar/Burma. Under his authority, hundreds of doctors have been fired for political reasons and had their licenses revoked. He also rebuffed UN-OCHA's requests for expanded aid access amid the pandemic. Under his authority, private hospitals were urged not to hire doctors who refused to work in public hospitals under the military regime. Dr. Thet Khaing Win is, therefore, a natural person whose actions, policies, and activities undermine democracy and the rule of law in Myanmar/Burma and who is engaged in actions that threaten the peace, security, and stability of Myanmar/Burma.
The following entry is added to the list headed 'B. Legal persons, entities, and bodies referred to in Article 6(1)':
No. 2 Mining Enterprise (ME 2) Address: Ywargout Quarter, Pyinmana Township, Nay Pyi Taw, Myanmar/Burma; Type of entity: State-Owned Enterprise (SOE) Place of registration: Myanmar/Burma; Principal place of business: Myanmar/Burma; No. 2 Mining Enterprise (ME 2) is a state-owned enterprise (SOE) under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Conservation (MONREC) that also acts as the regulator for the sector of non-ferrous metals production and marketing. As such, the SOE is endowed with the power to grant permits and collect part of the tax on profits made by private companies that are either in so-called 'production-sharing contracts' or in joint ventures with ME. The Minister of Natural Resources and Environmental Conservation, U Khin Maung Yi, has been appointed by the State Administration Council (SAC), which took over the legislative, executive, and judicial powers of the State as of 2 February 2021. Since the military coup, the military regime has acquired control over and benefits from SOEs, including No. 2 Mining Enterprise. No. 2 Mining Enterprise is thus controlled by and generates revenue for the Myanmar armed forces (Tatmadaw), thereby contributing to its capabilities to carry out activities that undermine democracy and the rule of law. Moreover, No. 2 Mining Enterprise has taken part in and overseen various projects linked to violence by the Myanmar armed forces against civilian populations and the violation of their most basic rights, including through land confiscation and forced relocation.
We strongly commend the EU's commitment to justice, human rights, and federal democracy, and highly appreciate their efforts. However, it is crucial for the international community and the free and democratic world to step up efforts for stronger, tougher, more coordinated, and targeted actions. The situation in Myanmar is dire, with the genocidal military junta perpetrating unspeakable crimes against humanity, violating the will of the people, and suppressing all forms of dissent.
The brave people of Myanmar and Ukraine have been fighting and sacrificing their lives for the cause of freedom, justice, and democracy. It is imperative that the international community as a whole stands in solidarity with the people of Myanmar and Ukraine, who have been giving their lives for the cause of freedom from evil and striving for peace and prosperity to create a better world for all and future generations..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of International Cooperation Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2023-07-21
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National Unity Government (NUG), Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Genocide, Human Rights and international relations
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"JAKARTA – The Myanmar military must be held accountable for their continued mockery of the rule of the law, ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights (APHR) said today, marking one year since four political prisoners committed to the success of the pro-democracy movement in Myanmar were executed at the order of junta leader Min Aung Hlaing. Former lawmaker Phyo Zeya Thaw and three other activists – Kyaw Min Yu, known as “Ko Jimmy,” Hla Myo Aung and Aung Thura Zaw – were all sentenced to death in closed-door military courts during sham trials backed by junta-appointed judges.
“The executions of the four activists was a gross miscarriage of justice and a grave loss for the pro-democracy movement in Myanmar. The fact that the military continues to sentence scores of people to death is evidence of their disregard for upholding any qualified measure of the law. ASEAN should take this for what it is – evidence of a brutal military regime with no intention of abiding by human rights principles, including the right to a free and fair trial. One year on, there has yet to be any justice for the victims’ families and the thousands of political prisoners detained,” APHR Chair and member of the Indonesian House of Representatives Mercy Barends said today.
The junta intended the executions to send a strong message to the pro-democracy movement but their cruelty has only propelled activists to amplify their calls to the international community to go beyond condemning the brutal military regime and respond with tangible actions that hold the junta to account, including an immediate referral by the United Nations Security Council to the International Criminal Court.
The situation in Myanmar remains volatile as the junta continues to torture, kill, arrest and detain people who resist their dictatorship. As indicated in the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar and other rights-based reports, crimes against humanity continue to be systematically perpetrated in the country by the junta.
“We stand in solidarity with the Myanmar people and pro-democracy movement and their courageous stand against the illegal military junta. We echo their calls and urge the international community, including ASEAN, to take concrete measures to hold the junta accountable for their terrible crimes, including by supporting the legal cases in the International Criminal Court and the International Court of Justice as well as ongoing efforts to assert universal jurisdiction,” said Barends..."
Source/publisher:
ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights
Date of entry/update:
2023-07-21
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations, Human Rights Defenders, Freedom of Movement, violations of in Burma/Myanmar
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"၁။ မြန်မာပြည်သူများအပေါ်၌ ဆိုးရွားသော အကြမ်းဖက်မှုများနှင့် လူ့အခွင့်အရေး ချိုးဖောက်မှုများ ကျူးလွန်လုပ်ဆောင်လျက်ရှိသည့်အပြင် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၏ ဒီမိုကရေစီဖွံ့ဖြိုး တိုးတက်မှုများကို ဖျက်ဆီးခဲ့ပြီး တိုင်းပြည်အတွင်း တည်ငြိမ်အေးချမ်းရေးကို ထိပါးခြိမ်းခြောက် နေသည့် နိုင်ငံတော်စီမံအုပ်ချုပ်ရေးကောင်စီအမည်ခံ အာဏာသိမ်းစစ်တပ်၏ တရားမဝင် အဖွဲ့အစည်းမှ အဖွဲ့ဝင် (၂) ဦး၊ ယင်းတရားမဝင်အဖွဲ့အစည်း၏လက်အောက်ခံ လူဝင်မှုကြီးကြပ် ရေးနှင့် ပြည်သူ့အင်အားဝန်ကြီးဌာန၊ အလုပ်သမားဝန်ကြီးဌာန၊ ကျန်းမာရေးနှင့် အားကစား ဝန်ကြီးဌာနတို့မှ ပြည်ထောင်စုဝန်ကြီးများ၊ စစ်ထောက်ချုပ်နှင့် အာဏာသိမ်းစစ်ကောင်စီ၏ ထိန်းချုပ်မှုအောက်ရှိ အမှတ်(၂) သတ္တုတွင်းလုပ်ငန်းတို့အပေါ် ဥရောပသမဂ္ဂက ဒဏ်ခတ်အရေးယူ ပိတ်ဆို့မှုများ ချမှတ်ခဲ့ခြင်းအပေါ် ပြည်ထောင်စုလွှတ်တော်ကိုယ်စားပြုကော်မတီအနေဖြင့် ကျေးဇူးတင်စွာဖြင့် ကြိုဆိုပါသည်။
၂။ ယခုကဲ့သို့ ဥရောပသမဂ္ဂ၏ (၇) ကြိမ်မြောက်သည့်တိုင် ချမှတ်ခဲ့သည့် ဒဏ်ခတ်အရေးယူ ပိတ်ဆို့မှုများသည် တရားမဝင်အာဏာသိမ်းစစ်တပ်၏ တိုးမြှင့်လုပ်ဆောင်လျက်ရှိသည့် အကြမ်းဖက် မှုနှင့် ရာဇဝတ်မှုများကို တားဆီးနိုင်ရေးအတွက် များစွာ ထိရောက်မှုရှိပါသည်။ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၌ ဒီမိုကရေစီပြန်လည်ရရှိရေးနှင့် နိုင်ငံတဝှမ်းလုံး၌ ရေရှည်တည်တံ့သော ငြိမ်းချမ်းရေးနှင့် ဖွံ့ဖြိုးရေး တို့တည်ရှိသော ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီ နိုင်ငံတော်သစ် တည်ဆောက်နိုင်ရေး ကြိုးပမ်းနေကြသည့် မြန်မာပြည်သူတို့အတွက် များစွာခွန်အားဖြစ်စေခြင်းကြောင့် ထပ်တိုးပံ့ပိုးကူညီမှုများကိုလည်း ကျွန်ုပ်တို့ မျှော်လင့်ပါသည်။
၃။ ဒေသတွင်းနှင့် နိုင်ငံတကာက ပြင်းထန်သော ဖိအားပေးမှုများ လုပ်ဆောင်နေစေကာမူ တရားမဝင်အာဏာသိမ်းယူထားသည့် စစ်ကောင်စီသည် နိုင်ငံတော်အား ဥပဒေမဲ့ ဆက်လက် ထိန်းချုပ်ထားနိုင်ရန် အကြမ်းဖက်မှုများ လုပ်ဆောင်နေခြင်း၊ လူ့အခွင့်အရေး ချိုးဖောက်မှုများကို စနစ်တကျတိုးမြှင့်လုပ်ဆောင်နေခြင်းတို့ကြောင့် ကုလသမဂ္ဂအပါအဝင် ကမ္ဘာ့နိုင်ငံများ၊ အဖွဲ့အစည်း များက ညီညွတ်သော တုံ့ပြန်အရေးယူမှုများကို ချမှတ်လုပ်ဆောင်ပေးရန်မှာ အရေးတကြီး လိုအပ်လျက်ရှိကြောင်း မြန်မာပြည်သူများကိုယ်စား ထပ်လောင်းအသိပေးလိုပါသည်။
၄။ လက်ရှိဖြစ်ပေါ်နေသည့် အကြမ်းဖက်မှုများ အမြန်ဆုံး အဆုံးသတ်နိုင်ရေးနှင့် မြန်မာ ပြည်သူများမျှော်လင့်ကြိုးပမ်းနေသည့် ငြိမ်းချမ်းသာယာသော ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီ နိုင်ငံတော်သစ် တည်ဆောက်သွားနိုင်ရေးအတွက် အရေးအကြီးဆုံးအရာမှာ တရားမဝင်သည့် စစ်အုပ်ချုပ်ရေးကို အမြန်ဆုံး အဆုံးသတ်နိုင်ရေးပင်ဖြစ်ပြီး ဒီမိုကရေစီအင်အားစုများအား ထိရောက်ပြီး လက်တွေ့ ကျသည့် ပံ့ပိုးကူညီပေးမှုများဖြင့်သာ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၏ ကာလရှည်ပြည်တွင်းစစ်နှင့် နိုင်ငံရေး မတည်ငြိမ်မှုအား အဆုံးသတ်နိုင်မည်ဖြစ်သည်ကို နိုင်ငံတကာအသိုက်အဝန်းအနေဖြင့် ကောင်းစွာ နားလည်သဘောပေါက်လိမ့်မည်ဟု မိမိတို့ အခိုင်အမာယုံကြည်ပါသည်။
၅။ မိမိတို့ ပြည်ထောင်စုလွှတ်တော်ကိုယ်စားပြုကော်မတီသည် လက်ရှိပဋိပက္ခအား အမြန်ဆုံး အဆုံးသတ်ပြီး မြန်မာပြည်သူများအတွက် ငြိမ်းချမ်းသောအနာဂတ်ကို ဖန်တီးပေးနိုင် ရေးအတွက် ဒီမိုကရေစီအင်အားစုများနှင့် ခိုင်မာသော ပူးပေါင်းဆောင်ရွက်မှုများဖြင့် ဆက်လက် လျှောက်လှမ်းသွားမည်ဖြစ်ကြောင်းကို ထပ်မံအသိပေးလိုပါသည်။ ယခု (၇) ကြိမ်မြောက် ဒဏ်ခတ် အရေးယူပိတ်ဆို့မှုများအပါအဝင် မြန်မာပြည်သူများနှင့်အတူ ရပ်တည်ပြီး မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၌ ဒီမိုကရေစီ ပြန်လည်ရရှိရေး၊ တရားမျှတမှုဖော်ဆောင်နိုင်ရေးနှင့် အားလုံးပါဝင်သော အနာဂတ် ဖက်ဒရယ် ဒီမိုကရေစီနိုင်ငံတော်သစ် တည်ဆောက်နိုင်ရေးအတွက် စဉ်ဆက်မပြတ်သော ပံ့ပိုးကူညီမှုများ အတွက် ဥရောပသမဂ္ဂနှင့် အဖွဲ့ဝင်နိုင်ငံများကို အထူးကျေးဇူးတင်ရှိပါသည်။
ပြည်ထောင်စုလွှတ်တော်ကိုယ်စားပြုကော်မတီ..."
Source/publisher:
Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw
Date of entry/update:
2023-07-21
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Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH), Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Political History
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"You’re the military dictator in Myanmar. You can have offers of friendship or condemnation; diplomatic relations or an appointment at the International Court of Justice; fighter jets or sanctions. Which are you going to choose?
It’s not a difficult decision for Commander-in-Chief Min Aung Hlaing, head of the Tatmadaw – Myanmar’s military. He led the February 2021 coup, which deposed the democratically elected government of Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy. Since then, a nationwide armed insurgency by several ethnic groups has grown in intensity. The military leadership has reacted with increasing ferocity, including launching repeated airstrikes on villages and continuing the persecution of the Rohingya Muslims.
China offers friendship, ambassadors and fighter jets, which is why it will win the tug of war for the minds, if not the hearts, of the junta based in Myanmar’s capital, Naypyidaw. There are about one million people of Chinese origin in Myanmar, many of whom are among the economic elite and have close ties with the military government. The Americans can’t even dream of such access.
In June, Washington imposed its latest round of sanctions on Myanmar, targeting the defence ministry and two state-owned banks that it said were facilitating the junta’s weapons purchases (in this case, from Russia). The USA calls for an end to human rights abuses, a negotiated settlement of the conflict and, eventually, a democratic federal government. It holds out the carrots of diplomatic assistance in achieving these goals and investment after a return to democracy.
The Americans would like to have Myanmar onside as part of its ‘pivot’ to the Indo-Pacific and to block Chinese influence. At times, the junta (in previous iterations) has shown an interest in economic partnerships with Western investors. However, it’s a tough neighbourhood with a lot going on, and there’s only so much ‘bandwidth’ in any country’s foreign ministry. Washington views Myanmar as a secondary regional issue and is reluctant to drop its insistence on a return to democracy. Conversely, Naypyidaw’s dictatorship won’t cede power and so believes it can’t rely on the democratic countries to dig it out of its economic crisis. Last year, the economy shrank by 18 per cent and the country is now suffering soaring inflation.
Reluctantly, therefore, the junta looks to Beijing, which, in return, makes offers that Naypyidaw is in no position to refuse. July should see the completion of a survey assessing the environmental impact of a US$1.3 billion project to build a deep-water seaport and economic zone in the coastal city of Kyaukphu. Despite evidence that it will destroy natural habitats, fish stocks and livelihoods, the project will likely be approved. Once built (over 20 years), it will link Kyaukphu via road and rail across central Myanmar, up through mountainous Shan State and into the landlocked Chinese province of Yunnan 1,600 kilometres away. This link will give China direct access to the Indian Ocean, which will reduce both its shipping costs and its current reliance on the narrow and congested Strait of Malacca, through which most of its energy supplies pass and which it knows could be easily blockaded.
Shan State, which borders Yunnan, has always been the gateway for Chinese influence in Myanmar. Its Kokang region, which used to be part of China, is hard up against the border and mostly populated by ethnic Han Chinese, of whom there are about 150,000. One of the numerous ethnic groups fighting the Tatmadaw is the MNDAA, which is based in Kokang. Interestingly, the group has been receiving Chinese-made weapons via Yunnan, which suggests that Beijing might be keeping a foot in both camps to secure its long-term interests in creating the Myanmar corridor to the Indian Ocean. Following its facilitation of the Saudi/Iranian rapprochement and offers to mediate between Russia and Ukraine, it also means President Xi can position himself as a potential peacemaker in Myanmar.
Watching this with some alarm is India. It, too, won’t condemn the junta and has maintained diplomatic relations in a bid to prevent China from gaining too much influence. However, economically, it can’t match China’s firepower. Its GDP is around US$3.75 trillion, whereas China can boast above US$17 trillion. Myanmar? US$65 billion. Another easy choice for the Tatmadaw.
An easy choice for China as well. It adds Myanmar to the short but growing list of countries it can count on for diplomatic support, it blocks the Americans, gets access to the Indian Ocean and further builds out its now global Belt and Road project..."
Source/publisher:
Geopolitical
Date of entry/update:
2023-07-20
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Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations, China-Burma-US relations
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From Myanmar’s crisis to China’s activities in the South China Sea to relations with Russia, the Southeast Asia bloc is at the center of many key global challenges.
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"Foreign ministers from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) gathered last week in Jakarta, with a range of critical challenges to address. Chief among those issues was the crisis in member state Myanmar, which the bloc is divided on how to approach. China’s aggressive activities in the South China Sea were also a key topic at the summit, with Beijing and ASEAN pledging to reach an agreement on a long-stalled non-binding code of conduct.
ASEAN’s regional centrality means that the bloc is often thrust into broader geopolitical issues. At the ASEAN Regional Forum that took place alongside the foreign minister’s meeting, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken and China’s top diplomat, Wang Yi, continued discussions on thawing U.S.-China ties. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov also attended the regional forum. ASEAN countries have largely condemned the invasion of Ukraine but have focused on their own interests in engagement with Moscow.
USIP’s Jason Tower, Brian Harding and Alex Stephenson discuss how ASEAN countries are approaching Myanmar’s crisis and relations with Russia, where negotiations with China on the South China Sea stand, and the meeting between the top U.S. and Chinese diplomats at the regional forum.
1. Differences over Myanmar persist.
Tower: ASEAN’s deliberations on Myanmar’s crisis demonstrated that divisions over how to address the military’s ongoing war against the Myanmar people are impacting the Southeast Asian grouping much more than ASEAN can influence the situation in Myanmar. As the current ASEAN chair, Indonesia has followed a low-key approach, attempting to build cautious dialogue with the country’s diverse resistance actors, including the National Unity Government (NUG) and several ethnic armed organizations. While this should be seen as a welcome step, China’s growing assertiveness and high-level engagements with the military regime since December 2022 have prompted Myanmar’s neighbors to introduce their own platform for engagement with the military regime, undercutting Indonesia as chair.
Dubbed the “track 1.5” on Myanmar, this platform began convening in March of 2023 in Thailand, bringing together representatives of the military junta with all of Myanmar’s neighbors and most other mainland Southeast Asian countries. In the four months leading up to the ASEAN summit, this platform convened three times, mounting a campaign to overrule ASEAN’s decision made back in 2021 to suspend Myanmar’s participation in high-level ASEAN meetings at the ministerial level and above. While ASEAN ultimately rejected this move — keeping the junta out of the foreign minister’s meeting — China sent a strong signal of its preferences by inviting the junta’s minister of science and technology, Myo Thein Kyaw, to join a ministerial level China-ASEAN meeting on technology transfer overlapping with the ASEAN meeting on July 12.
Further overshadowing Indonesia’s efforts as chair, Thailand’s outgoing foreign minister, Don Parmudwinal, revealed at the ASEAN summit that he had made a secret visit to Myanmar, where Min Aung Hlaing granted him access to the country’s imprisoned State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi. This came as a considerable surprise given that repeated requests by the United Nations special envoy, subsequent ASEAN chairs, the United States, China and countless other governments and envoys had been rejected. Additionally, there was no effort made to coordinate the meeting with the ASEAN chair or with other stakeholders. The move was interpreted by the NUG as a form of “hostage diplomacy,” with the Myanmar army leveraging its close relationship with the outgoing government of Thailand to manipulate both international and domestic perceptions of Aung San Suu Kyi’s views about the situation in country. As NUG Foreign Minister Zin Mar Aung pointed out, the way in which the meeting took place amounted to “nothing more than … cornering her to answer questions in the interests of her captor.”
Many ASEAN states have voiced some level of agreement with the NUG in this regard. The joint communique from the foreign minister’s meeting indicated that “a number of ASEAN member states” viewed Thailand’s move as positive, implying that others do not share this view. Meanwhile, Singapore released its own statement demanding that the ASEAN chair be granted access to Aung San Suu Kyi, and pointing out that violence has only continued to escalate. China on the other hand seems not to share these concerns. On July 14, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs released a read out of Chinese foreign policy chief Wang Yi’s meeting with the Thai foreign minister on the sidelines of the ASEAN summit, commending Thailand for its “positive contributions to addressing the Myanmar issue.”
2. ASEAN countries have a tricky balancing act to play with Russia.
Harding: ASEAN’s centrality in regional security architecture, with this year’s ASEAN chair hosting a series of major meetings, meant that Indonesia found itself at the center of geopolitics for the week, hosting Blinken, Wang and Lavrov, among others. ASEAN countries, which find themselves divided on many major geopolitical issues, have a range of views on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. While no parties welcomed the invasion of Ukraine, they have mostly sought to avoid the topic and instead have advocated for their practical interests such as the export of grain and related food prices.
Indonesia, in its own unilateral capacity, has been the most active ASEAN member on the issue, with President Joko Widodo casting Indonesia as a potential “bridge for peace.” Jokowi visited Kyiv and Moscow ahead of Indonesia’s hosting of the 2020 G20 Summit and Defense Minister (and presidential candidate) Prabowo Subianto unveiled his own peace plan at the Shangri-La Dialogue, demonstrating Indonesia’s interest in playing a leadership role on the issue. This interest aligns with Indonesia’s longstanding “independent and active” foreign policy that is rooted in nonalignment and places Indonesia with a front-row seat in global affairs. Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi notably took the opportunity to convene a trilateral meeting with Wang and Lavrov, visibly putting Indonesia at the center of the table and perhaps idealistically trying to shape how these two powers engage each other and the world.
3. A code of conduct for South China Sea remains elusive.
Harding: ASEAN and China have been negotiating a non-binding code of conduct for the South China Sea since 2002 and negotiations have been in a deep freeze since 2020. Last week, on the sidelines of the ASEAN Regional Forum, ASEAN and China announced an agreement to accelerate negotiations with the creation of new “guidelines.” While the announcement puts a good face on the issue, which was important to ASEAN chair Indonesia to mark the 20th anniversary of China joining ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, negotiations remain intractable.
At issue is China’s ongoing, unlawful harassment of activities being conducted by Southeast Asian claimants in disputed waters ranging from fishing to energy exploration, and the freedom to conduct military activities. While ASEAN and China have agreed to another “reading” of a single draft, there are deep divisions about the contents, starting with basic issues of international law.
Regional political dynamics also suggest that substantive progress is highly unlikely to accelerate. The most notable recent change in ASEAN-China relations relates to the foreign policy disposition of the Philippines since the inauguration of President Ferdinand Marcos, Jr. in July 2022. Whereas his predecessor, Rodrigo Duterte, discarded the Philippines’ victory in the Arbitral Tribunal under the U.N. Convention of the Law of the Sea at the Hague that declared China’s claims in the South China Sea unlawful in a gambit to warm relations with Beijing, Marcos has instead relentlessly shined light on China’s swarming of vessels within the Philippines’ Exclusive Economic Zone and aggressive confrontations by China’s Coast Guard. With the Philippines again at the vanguard of ASEAN’s pushback against China’s activities in the South China Sea, an ASEAN-China agreement seems as unlikely as ever.
4. The high-level thaw in U.S.-China relations continues.
Stephenson: On the sidelines of the summit, Blinken met with Wang for the second time in less than a month. At a glance, the talks didn’t yield any breakthroughs. But assessing the meeting in isolation doesn’t do it justice. Regular and direct communication between a range of high-level officials will be necessary if any improvement is to be made in U.S.-China relations. To this end, Washington and Beijing have been building steady momentum, a trend which Blinken and Wang continued in Jakarta.
Blinken’s visit to China in June set the stage for Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen and Special Presidential Envoy for Climate Change John Kerry to make similar trips only weeks later. Last week, Chinese Ambassador Xie Feng met with top American defense officials at the Pentagon, an important step towards the resumption of military talks, which have been frozen last August. This modest return to communication could help lower the risk of conflict at a volatile time in the relationship. Moreover, it will tee up a meeting between Biden and Xi later this year, which could expand opportunities for a greater “thaw” by providing the relationship with much needed direction.
Ultimately, the Blinken and Wang meeting was a small yet significant step forward on the long road to détente. But building peace often requires workable minimums, not impossible maximums. Even in the absence of a flashy breakthrough, Washington's and Beijing’s agreement to keep talking is a promising sign..."
Source/publisher:
United States Institute of Peace
Date of entry/update:
2023-07-20
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"Ties between China and the Myanmar junta are getting warmer, and diplomats and observers following the issue recently received a message that suggests the relations between Beijing and Naypyitaw could reach a new milestone soon with a visit to China by regime boss Min Aung Hlaing in September.
Every China-Myanmar relations watcher knows that—if the news is true—it would be really mind-blowing for the junta leader, who has mostly been ostracized by Western democracies for his 2021 coup, and has even been banned from ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) capitals and excluded from their summits. Since then, Russia and China have turned out to be his allies, and Moscow has invited him for several official visits, but Beijing hasn’t. Following the coup, Min Aung Hlaing desperately tried to visit China to seek Beijing’s blessings for his regime. But his attempts were turned down by Chinese officials. What’s significant about the September trip—the message says—is he would be there at Beijing’s official invitation! But can China handle this hot potato?
The Irrawaddy has not been able to independently verify the message that emerged in June, one month after Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang’s visit to Naypyitaw. Qin is so far the most senior Chinese official to see Min Aung Hlaing in more than two years since the takeover.
Following Qin’s visit, regime spokesperson Major General Zaw Min Tun briefly visited China. Neither side made any announcement.
Early this month, Min Aung Hlaing disappeared from public for a few days after a July 2 meeting in Yangon with officials from the Union of Myanmar Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry and associates to discuss national economic promotion.
Asian intelligence sources and others in Naypyitaw said he flew to Guangzhou, southern China. The reason behind the visit was unknown.
Obviously, Min Aung Hlaing is desperate to visit China to be received by high-ranking officials, and there is evidence to suggest that he will do whatever it takes to get invited.
In May, Major General Yang Yang, acting director-general of the Intelligence Bureau of the Joint Staff Department of China’s Central Military Commission, met the junta’s No. 2 official, Soe Win, for talks on “cooperation between the two armies.”
During the meeting, Soe Win reportedly proposed a resumption of the controversial Myitsone Dam project in Kachin State. In September 2011, then President Thein Sein suspended work on the Chinese-funded Myitsone Dam in response to a mounting public outcry over the project, which critics say threatens the source of the Irrawaddy River. The Chinese were upset with the decision. The surprise suspension was also interpreted as a cue to Western governments, including the US, to ease sanctions.
In any case, if Soe Win raised this controversial proposal with visiting Chinese officials, analysts believe it indicates Min Aung Hlaing is desperate for further endorsement from Beijing, including an official visit. It will be a quid pro quo.
But will Beijing buy it?
For China, welcoming Min Aung Hlaing officially will be seen as an endorsement and the lending of full legitimacy to the brutal and totally condemned regime in Myanmar.
China should think twice before inviting Min Aung Hlaing.
Deep anti-China feeling
Following the February 2021 coup, the Chinese Embassy in Myanmar faced daily demonstrations in which thousands of protesters demanded that their neighbor stop supporting the military.
Despite widespread international condemnation of the coup, China called it merely a “major cabinet reshuffle” and said the takeover was an internal affair, provoking huge protests.
At the time there were calls for a boycott of Chinese products and threats to China-backed projects and pipelines. There were also attacks on Chinese-owned factories in Yangon. Then there were attacks on China’s pipelines in Mandalay Region.
At the time, Chen Hai, Chinese ambassador to Myanmar, came out to say that the current situation in the country was “absolutely not what China wants to see,” adding that China hoped all parties in Myanmar “could handle the current problem through dialogue and consultation properly and lead the country back on track as soon as possible.”
Despite such anti-China sentiment among Myanmar people, Beijing hasn’t been totally alienated from the regime over the past two-and-a-half years.
In 2023, China stepped up its most high-profile engagement with the Myanmar regime since the 2021 coup by sending Qin. Prior to his visit, there came the Chinese special envoy, Peng Xiubin, who is the director of the International Liaison Department of the Communist Party of China, as well as visits by senior officials of Yunnan Province.
However, there have been no regime ministers separately invited by their Chinese counterparts to Beijing for direct engagements since the coup. Engagement between the two militaries has also been at a low level since the takeover, even though China is a major ally and arms supplier to Myanmar.
Once Min Aung Hlaing sets foot in Beijing on an official visit, it will only fuel anti-Chinese feeling in Myanmar. There will be consequences. Myanmar opposition forces may attack Chinese projects in Myanmar and protests will likely take place in and outside of the country.
Last time, after Foreign Minister Qin’s visit, anti-China protests broke out across Myanmar. Activists, student union members and general strike committees across the country launched an online campaign, sharing the message, “Hey China: stop killing Myanmar’s people by supporting fascist criminals,” in Chinese and English..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2023-07-20
[field_licence]
Type:
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Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Human Rights and international relations, China-Burma relations
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"Your Honors,
We, the ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights, are writing to express our grave concerns about the state of human rights and democracy in Cambodia. Despite hollow attempts to prove the contrary, Cambodia is continuing on its descent into authoritarianism, which is of great concern not only to the people of Cambodia and the region, but also to the international community.
The situation related to human rights and democracy has drastically deteriorated in Cambodia in recent years, notably since Prime Minister Hun Sen used the country’s courts to dissolve the opposition Cambodia National Rescue Party (CNRP) in 2017. This occurred shortly after the CNRP demonstrated itself to be a real threat for Hun Sen’s Cambodian People’s Party in successive nationwide elections.
This year alone, Hun Sen has openly threatened opposition supporters with legal and physical violence, while his regime has shut down one of the country’s last remaining independent media outlets Voice of Democracy (VOD), threatened to shoot a former opposition leader with a rocket launcher for any attempt to step on Cambodian soil, and sentenced former CNRP leader Kem Sokha to 27 years of house arrest on trumped-up treason charges. This is on top of the forced defection of political prisoners, through means such as depriving those them of desperately needed medical care as well as the prior years of mass trials for both opposition party members and activists, invoking actions taken by the Khmer Rouge to silence, shut down, and even kill anyone acting as a dissident.
Earlier this month, the Cambodian National Election Commission (NEC) rejected the registration of the main opposition Candlelight Party for the upcoming July elections on administrative grounds, stating that not having their initial notarized registration document from 1998 prohibited them from running. In addition to this not being a requirement in last years’ commune elections, the document in question disappeared in 2017 when authorities raided CNRP headquarters, thus preventing it from being provided. This manufactured bureaucratic obstacle, designed to block the Candlelight Party from competing in the elections by any means possible, was then affirmed on May 25th by Cambodia’s Constitutional Council, essentially making this an unopposed election for the CPP. The amendment to the Election Law has further clamped down the freeness and fairness of the upcoming elections by prohibiting those who will abstain from voting in next month’s general elections from running as candidates in future polls. Furthermore, the new election amendment will impose criminal liability on citizens who disrupt and boycott the election.
The government of Hun Sen appears determined to drive the final nail into the coffin of Cambodia’s democracy, which is guaranteed by the Paris Peace Agreements of 1991. Any elections held under the present circumstances cannot possibly be free and fair, nor should any government created from such elections be recognized as legitimate by the international community.
While we appreciate the attention to the anti-democratic actions of the Cambodian government and the decision to not send official observers, the authoritarian nature of Hun Sen is not impacted by words or morality, only action.
We therefore urge you to take stronger actions to deny legitimacy to the July elections as it is becoming increasingly clear that Hun Sen is intent on using the elections as just another tool to consolidate his power. We implore you to take action as parliamentarians to use your legislative mandate in parliament to unequivocally denounce the 2023 electoral exercise in Cambodia as undemocratic. Through legislative action, we implore you to strongly call out the Cambodian government to end all forms political persecution and immediately and unconditionally release of political prisoners, advocate for the reinstatement of a politically diverse and inclusive environment, and call on an independent investigation into human rights violations and electoral irregularities, with the aim of ensuring accountability.
By taking legislative action, through a bill or resolution, condemning the human rights abuses of Hun Sen’s regime, you would join the global community in standing up for democracy and human rights, sending a clear message to the Cambodian government that its actions are unacceptable and will not be tolerated.
Cambodia, as a member of the United Nations and a signatory to various international agreements and treaties, has an obligation to uphold democratic values and ensure free and fair elections. Unless the international community takes strong actions for the 2023 election, nothing will prevent Hun Sen from further solidifying his decades-long dictatorship.
Your honors, as you yourselves have come to power in democratically-held elections with strong human rights protections, we are sure that you recognize and understand the importance of human rights and democracy to the prosperity and well-being of a nation. We have confidence in your commitment to these principles and hope that you will demonstrate that commitment by coming to the aid of the people of Cambodia..."
Source/publisher:
ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights
Date of entry/update:
2023-07-20
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Degrees of culpability must be carefully weighed to stop justice turning into vindictiveness, while those claiming authority need to come clean about their own past deeds.
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"More than two years into Myanmar’s post-coup conflict, the question of justice looms large. Certainly, it cannot be expected from the military regime, the main perpetrator of the almost daily atrocities across Myanmar and the instigator of the crisis itself. Instead, hope lies with the resistance. However, the questions of what crimes to punish and who to hold accountable need to be carefully considered if justice is not to turn into vindictiveness.
The military’s crimes are so outrageous that they demand accountability, but the resistance may be casting its net too widely in the search for culprits. In January the National Unity Consultative Council, the body coordinating resistance policy, issued a policy paper advocating that civil servants who went on strike to join the Civil Disobedience Movement should be rewarded when the revolution succeeds. More controversially, the paper states that government workers who have stayed in their jobs should be punished.
Civil servants in the CDM have made enormous sacrifices and are rightly regarded as heroes, so it is fair to honour them. But nobody should be punished for not being a hero. The policy seemingly ignores that many people are in an impossible situation; family commitments and economic hardship often leave them with little alternative to keeping their jobs and following regime orders. Tarring these people as villains could drive them into the arms of the junta, if only to seek protection, and will make reconciliation harder after the conflict.
It is also necessary to acknowledge that some members of the resistance are committing crimes, too. These certainly pale in comparison to those of the Tatmadaw and most of them would not have happened if the military had not thrown the country into chaos. But this doesn’t make them any less responsible for their actions.
The most notorious of these crimes is probably the gruesome killings of seven young people in Sagaing Region by a local armed group affiliated with the National Unity Government, the parallel administration set up by lawmakers ousted in the coup. There are conflicting accounts of the incident, but all agree that members of the armed group based in Chaung-U Township apprehended the victims in August last year when they were scavenging in a village recently raided by the military, allegedly raping some females in the group before the massacre.
The fighters were detained shortly after by the NUG-backed township administration body but released after one month. The NUG itself appears to have only heard about the case months later, in January this year, and it did not release a statement about it until May after some media reported on it. In the statement it called the killings unlawful and said it was “working to reveal the truth and to take legal actions”. But it is unclear what action, if any, has been taken against the perpetrators.
The slowness and inadequacy of this response is troubling because it undermines the NUG’s claim to offer a more humane alternative to military rule. Despite publishing a military code of conduct that states that “captives shall not be tortured and murdered”, the parallel government seemingly fails to enforce this code even when the most egregious breaches occur.
However, this may be less due to unwillingness than a straightforward lack of control over the troops it nominally commands. Although a highly mitigating factor, it is difficult for the NUG to admit to because it contradicts its claims of “effective control” over large swathes of Myanmar, which is key to its strategy of being recognised as the country’s legitimate government.
But while it lacks the military’s hard power, the NUG has the clear moral high ground among the Myanmar public and much of the international community. Its words carry huge weight and are keenly listened to by millions. It must therefore choose them carefully.
The Chaung-U killings were the actions of a rogue resistance group, but they took place amid a conflict where the military, and to some extent the resistance, have blurred the lines between combatants and civilians. The junta’s raising of local militias has muddied the situation, but many of the civil servants, military veterans and political party members assassinated by resistance groups would be considered civilians under international humanitarian law. Resistance groups often claim their victims have directly contributed to the arrest, torture and killing of their members, but there is little due process to establish the facts.
Although the NUG’s military code of conduct forbids attacks on civilians without qualification, its leaders have given tacit approval for these assassinations or simply dodged the issue. Asked about this by The Diplomat, Acting President Duwa Lashi La offered a vague excuse, saying most of the victims “are like spies of the military” who are “destroying our policy”.
The lack of clear red lines gives resistance groups licence to settle scores on the vaguest of pretexts and is particularly dangerous in such a decentralised movement. Some might argue that, while brutal, targeting the regime’s local minions will expedite its demise. But although the assassination campaign has led to some mass resignations of local officials, the practice also fuels a cycle of retributive violence that would be difficult to stop even after regime change. Frontier interviews with members of military families and veterans indicate that the assassinations have in fact tethered some people more closely to the military.
But for the NUG to exert more moral authority, it also needs to look inwards. Several of its members are from the National League for Democracy, whose time in government coincided with the military’s brutal “clearance operations” against the Rohingya in Rakhine State, in 2016 and 2017. While the constitution denied it any control over the armed forces, the NLD participated in the cover-up of the atrocities in Rakhine through an international campaign of denials.
In what appeared as a momentous break from these policies, the NUG announced in June 2021 that it would restore citizenship to the Rohingya, welcome back the refugees in Bangladesh and seek justice for them. Meanwhile, some members of the parallel government, which recently appointed a deputy minister from the minority group, have declared a change of heart. However, they have stopped short of acknowledging their complicity in what happened in Rakhine.
“In 2017, few of our people raised their voices against the military’s genocide of the Rohingya people. Past military regimes’ narratives about the Rohingya were deeply entrenched in society. The junta still rejects the very name Rohingya, but we have learned,” wrote the NUG Minister of Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management Dr Win Myat Aye.
From Win Myat Aye, these words are a deflection. As minister of social development, relief and resettlement in the NLD government, he accused the Rohingya of torching their own houses, despite overwhelming evidence that the military had done so, and oversaw the expropriation of the lands of those who fled to Bangladesh.
In addition, it is disingenuous to claim that the military deceived the NLD and wider public about the Rohingya. Successive military regimes have indeed tried to scapegoat the Muslim minority, but the results of the 2015 and 2020 elections and the reaction to the 2021 coup show Myanmar society is hardly in thrall to military propaganda. If people believed the military’s lies about the Rohingya, it was because they were more than ready to do so.
In any case, being hoodwinked by propaganda is not a valid excuse for complicity in crimes against humanity. If it were, those currently collaborating with the military regime could make the same argument.
Although a standout example, the events in Rakhine are one chapter in a more than seven-decade history of conflict across Myanmar, and justice is key to any attempt to break the cycle of violence. Overthrowing the military alone will not achieve this aim.
There are no easy formulas, but for real justice to be made, no victims can be forgotten and careful distinctions must be made between degrees of culpability. Direct involvement in atrocities should be punished, but political affiliation by itself should not be. And perhaps above all, a full reckoning over past crimes is required to build a new Myanmar..."
Source/publisher:
"Frontier Myanmar"
Date of entry/update:
2023-07-20
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Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Human Rights and international relations
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"မြန်မာနိုင်ငံတွင် ဒီကနေ့ကျရောက်သော (၇၆) ကြိမ်မြောက် အာဇာနည်နေ့အထိမ်းအမှတ်ကို ကျင်းပနေကြပါသည်။ မြန်မာပြည်သူများ၏ လွတ်လပ်ရေး၊ ကိုယ့်ကံကြမ္မာကိုယ့်ဖန်တီးရေးနှင့် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီအတွက် ရုန်းကန်ခဲ့သည့် (၇၆) နှစ်ကြာကိုလည်း ကိုယ်စားပြုနေသည်။ အာဇာနည်နေ့တွင် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံနှင့် ဒေသတွင်းတစ်ခုလုံးအတွက် လွတ်လပ်ရေး၊ ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီနှင့် တရားမျှတရေးတို့ရရှိရန်အတွက် မိမိတို့အသက်ကို စွန့်လွှတ်အနစ်နာခံခဲ့သော သူရဲကောင်းများအားလုံးကို အလေးပြု ဂုဏ်ပြုအပ်ပါသည်။
လွန်ခဲ့သော (၇၆) နှစ် ဇူလိုင်လ ၁၉ ရက်နေ့၊ ၁၉၄၇ ခုနှစ်၊ နံနက် (၁၀) နာရီ (၃၇) မိနစ်တွင် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၏ အမျိုးသားသူရဲကောင်းနှင့် လွတ်လပ်ရေးခေါင်းဆောင် ဗိုလ်ချုပ်အောင်ဆန်းနှင့်တကွ လွတ်လပ်ရေးခေါင်းဆောင်များ ရက်စက်ကြမ်းကြုတ်စွာ လုပ်ကြံသတ်ဖြတ်ခံခဲ့ရခြင်းက မြန်မာ့သမိုင်းကို ပြောင်းလဲစေခဲ့သည်။ ရလဒ်အနေဖြင့် မြန်မာပြည်သူများသည် သမိုင်းတလျှောက် ကြောက်စရာကောင်းတဲ့ အမှောင်နေ့ကို ခံစားခဲ့ကြရသည်။ လွတ်လပ်ရေးခေါင်းဆောင်များသာ ရက်ရက်စက်စက် လုပ်ကြံသတ်ဖြတ်ခြင်းမခံခဲ့ရလျှင် ယနေ့ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံသည် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီ၊ တန်းတူညီမျှရေးကတိကဝတ်နှင့် မူဝါဒများကို အပြည့်အဝအကောင်အထည်ဖော်ဆောင်ပြီး ကမ္ဘာ့အလယ်တွင် တိုးတက်ကောင်းမွန်နေလောက်ပြီဖြစ်သည်။
ဤကဲ့သို့ အမှောင်ကျသော နေ့ရက်များမတိုင်မီက မြန်မာနိုင်ငံသည် အာရှတွင် အလားအလာအရှိဆုံး နိုင်ငံတစ်နိုင်ငံဖြစ်ခဲ့ပြီး အာရှတိုက်၏ဆန်အိုးကြီးဟု လူသိများလောက်အောင် ဒေသတွင်း၌ ချမ်းသာကြွယ်ဝမှုရှိသောနိုင်ငံများအနက် တစ်ခုဖြစ်နေခဲ့သည်။ သို့သော် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံတွင် လွတ်လပ်ရေးမတိုင်ခင်ကတည်းက အမြစ်တွယ်နေသည့် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အာဏာရှင်စိတ်ဓာတ်ရှိသူများ၏ လုပ်ရပ်ကြောင့် တိုးတက်မှုများအားလုံး အနှောင့်အယှက်ဖြစ်ခဲ့ရသည်။ လုပ်ကြံသတ်ဖြတ်မှုဖြင့် လွတ်လပ်ရေးခေါင်းဆောင်များကို ဆုံးရှုံးသွားရုံသာမက ပင်လုံမြို့တွင် လက်မှတ်ရေးထိုးခဲ့သည့် ပင်လုံစာချုပ်ပါ လွတ်လပ်ရေးသဘောတူညီချက်များနှင့် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီ သဘောတူညီချက်များလည်း ပြိုပျက်သွားခဲ့ရသည်။
(၇၆) နှစ်ကြာပြီးနောက် တူညီသော အကြမ်းဖက်အုပ်စု၏ အရင်းအမြစ်ဖြစ်သည့် စစ်တပ်က အခြေခံလူ့အခွင့်အရေးများကို လျစ်လျူရှုပြီး မြန်မာပြည်သူလူထုအပေါ် လူမျိုးတုံးသတ်ဖြတ်တိုက်ခိုက်ခြင်း၊ ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီစံတန်ဖိုးများနှင့် မူဝါဒများကို လျစ်လျူရှုခြင်းဖြင့် နည်းအမျိုးမျိုးသုံး၍ ဖိနှိပ်အကြမ်းဖက်နေကြဆဲဖြစ်သည်။ ခေတ်အဆက်ဆက် ငြိမ်းချမ်းရေး၊ လွတ်လပ်ရေးနှင့် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီအတွက်ရပ်တည်ခဲ့ကြသော်လည်း အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စုသည် မိမိတို့ပြည်သူလူထုအပေါ် ပြန်လည်စစ်ကြေညာဆဲဖြစ်သည်။
၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ်၊ ဖေဖော်ဝါရီလ ၁ ရက်နေ့တွင် မတရားအာဏာသိမ်းရန်ကြိုးပမ်းခဲ့သော အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စုသည် လွတ်လပ်ပြီး တရားမျှတသည့် ၂၀၂၀ ဒီမိုကရေစီရွေးကောက်ပွဲရလဒ်ကို ဖျက်ဆီးပြီး မြန်မာပြည်သူလူထုထံမှ ဒီမိုကရေစီကို လုယူခဲ့သည်။ ငြိမ်းချမ်းစွာ ဆန္ဒဖော်ထုတ်ကြသည့် ပြည်သူလူထုများကိုလည်း စစ်မြေပြင်သုံးလက်နက်များဖြင့် အကြမ်းဖက်တိုက်ခိုက်ခဲ့ကြသည်။
(၇၆) နှစ်အတွင်း ငြိမ်းချမ်းရေးနှင့် လွတ်လပ်ရေးကို ငြင်းပယ်ခံရခြင်း၊ စစ်အာဏာရှင်များ၏ လူမျိုးတုံးသတ်ဖြတ်ခံရခြင်းကို အဆုံးသတ်ရန်နှင့် အားလုံးပါဝင်သော ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံတော်သစ်ကို တည်ထောင်ရန်အတွက် မြန်မာတစ်နိုင်ငံလုံးက စစ်အာဏာရှင်ကို တော်လှန်လာခဲ့ကြသည်မှာ (၂၇) လ တိုင်ခဲ့ပြီဖြစ်ပါသည်။ ပြီးခဲ့သော (၂၇) လအတွင်းတွင် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်သည် ကလေးပေါင်း ၈၀၀ အပါအဝင် အပြစ်မဲ့ပြည်သူ ၄,၀၀၀ နီးပါးကို သတ်ဖြတ်ခြင်း၊ နိုင်ငံတော်အတိုင်ပင်ခံပုဂ္ဂိုလ် ဒေါ်အောင်ဆန်းစုကြည်၊ သမ္မတကြီး ဦးဝင်းမြင့် စသည့် ခေါင်းဆောင်များသာမက ကလေး ၄၀၀ အပါအဝင် အပြစ်မဲ့ပြည်သူပေါင်း ၂၃,၀၀၀ ကျော်ကို မတရားဖမ်းဆီး အကျဉ်းချခြင်းများ ကျူးလွန်သည့်အပြင် လူနေအိမ်များ၊ စာသင်ကျောင်းများ၊ ဆေးရုံများနှင့် ဘာသာရေးအဆောက်အဦး ၇၀,၀၀၀ ကျော်ကိုလည်း မီးရှို့ဖျက်ဆီးခဲ့ကြသည်။ လွန်ခဲ့သော (၂၇) လအတွင်းတွင် မြန်မာပြည်သူ (၁၈) သန်းနီးပါး အသက်ကယ်ဆယ်ရေးအကူအညီများလိုအပ်ခြင်း၊ ပြည်သူ (၂) သန်းနီးပါး အိုးမဲ့အိမ်မဲ့ဖြစ်သွားရခြင်းနှင့် ပြည်သူ (၄၈) သန်းတို့ အလွန်အမင်း ဆင်းရဲသည့် ဒဏ်ကိုခံစားနေကြရသည်။ လွန်ခဲ့သော (၂၇) လသည် နာကျင်ခြင်းဝေဒနာ၊ ဆင်းရဲဒုက္ခအမျိုးမျိုး၊ သေဆုံးခြင်းနှင့် ပျက်စီးခြင်းများဖြင့် ပြည့်နှက်သောအချိန်ကာလဖြစ်သည်။ တချိန်ထဲမှာပင် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီက “ဖြတ် ၄ ဖြတ်” နည်းကို အသုံးပြုပြီး မြန်မာပြည်သူလူထုတရပ်လုံးအပေါ် ငတ်မွတ်ခေါင်းပါးခြင်းနှင့် ရောဂါများကို လက်နက်သဖွယ်အသုံးပြု အကြမ်းဖက်လျက်ရှိသည်။
မဖော်ပြနိုင်သော ရက်စက်ကြမ်းကြုတ်မှုများ၊ လူသားမျိုးနွယ်အပေါ် ကျူးလွန်သည့် ရာဇဝတ်မှုများ၊ စစ်ရာဇဝတ်မှုများနှင့် ရင်ဆိုင်နေရသော်လည်း လွတ်လပ်မှုနှင့် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီကို မြတ်နိုးသော မြန်မာပြည်သူများရဲ့မျှော်လင့်ချက်ကို အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အာဏာရှင်များ၏ စစ်လက်နက်များနှင့် တိုက်လေယာဉ်များက မဖျက်ဆီးနိုင်ပါ။ ဤအကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အာဏာရှင်များသည် မိမိတို့ပြည်သူလူထုကို ပြန်လည်တိုက်ခိုက်သတ်ဖြတ်သည့်အကြောင်းကို ရိုဟင်ဂျာလူမျိုးများကို လူမျိုးတုံးသတ်ဖြတ်ခဲ့ခြင်းဖြင့် သက်သေပြခဲ့ပြီးဖြစ်သည်။ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီက “ဖြတ် ၄ ဖြတ်” ပေါ်လစီမှ တဆင့် အသက်ဆယ်ရေးအကူအညီများ လိုအပ်လျက်ရှိသော မြန်မာပြည်သူ (၁၈) သန်းအတွက် အကူအညီများကို ငြင်းပယ်ခြင်း၊ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံရှိ ကလေးသန်းပေါင်းများစွာ၏ ပညာရေးအခွင့်အလမ်းများကို တားဆီးပိတ်ပင်ခြင်းများကြောင့် နောင်လာမည် မျိုးဆက်သစ်များအတွက် ဆိုးကျိုးများစွာရှိသည်သာမက မြန်မာပြည်သူတရပ်လုံးအပေါ် လူမျိုးတုံးအကြမ်းဖက်ခြင်းကို ကျူးလွန်ခြင်းလည်းဖြစ်သည်။
ငြိမ်းချမ်းရေး၊ လွတ်လပ်မှုနှင့် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီတို့၏ရန်သူ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အာဏာရှင်သည် မြန်မာပြည်သူ (၅၄) သန်းကို ဒုက္ခဆင်းရဲများနဲ့ သေကျေပျက်စီးစေရန် အလုပ်များနေစဉ် အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ (NUG)၊ မြန်မာပြည်သူတရပ်လုံး၊ ဒီမိုကရေစီရေးအတွက် တိုက်ပွဲဝင်နေသော ရဲဘော်ရဲဘက်များနှင့် ဒီမိုကရေစီအရေးလှုပ်ရှားသူများသည် လွတ်လပ်ရေးနှင့် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီ စံတန်ဖိုးများနှင့် မူဝါဒများအတွက် ဆိုးရွားသော အခြေအနေများအကြား ဆက်လက်တိုက်ပွဲဝင်နေကြသည်။
လွန်ခဲ့သော (၇၆) နှစ်အတွက် နောက်ဆုံးတော်လှန်ရေးဖြစ်သည့် တစ်နိုင်ငံလုံးပါဝင်သည့် နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေးသည် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ်ကို အမြစ်ပြတ်ချေမှုန်းသည်သာမက ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံတော်သစ်ပန်းတိုင်ကို အပြည့်အဝ မရောက်မချင်း ကြိုးစားအားထုတ်ရန်အတွက် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီလမ်းပြမြေပုံဖြစ်သည့် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီပဋိညာဉ် (FDC) ကို ရေးဆွဲပြီးနောက် အသွင်ကူးပြောင်းရေး ဖွဲ့စည်းပုံအခြေခံဥပဒေ (Transitional Constitution) ကို ဆက်လက်ရေးသားလျက်ရှိသည်။ မြန်မာတစ်နိုင်ငံလုံးရှိ စစ်ကောင်စီကိုတော်လှန်နေကြသည့် မြန်မာပြည်သူများသည် အားလုံးပါဝင်သည့် လွတ်လပ်သော ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီနိုင်ငံတော်သစ်ကို ရေးဆွဲကြသည်သာမက ပြည်သူ့ကာကွယ်ရေးတပ်ဖွဲ့များ (PDFs)၊ ဒေသကာကွယ်ရေးတပ်ဖွဲ့များနှင့် တိုင်းရင်းသား တော်လှန်ရေး အဖွဲ့အစည်းများ (EROs)များမှတဆင့် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံထက်ဝက်ကျော်ကို စိုးမိုးထားပြီးဖြစ်သည်။
မြန်မာနိုင်ငံတွင် စစ်တပ်၏ လူမျိုးတုံးသတ်ဖြတ်ခြင်း အမှောင်ထုအဆုံးသတ်ပြီး လွတ်လပ်ခြင်းရောင်ခြည်အတွက် အာဇာနည်သူရဲကောင်းများက အသက်ပေးဆပ်နေကြခြင်းဖြစ်သည်။ အပြည်ပြည်ဆိုင်ရာ သက်ဆိုင်ရာအဖွဲ့အစည်းများက အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီအပေါ် ထိရောက်သော အရေးယူဒဏ်ခတ်ခြင်းများပြုလုပ်ရန် တွန့်ဆုတ်နေပါက ဤကြောက်မက်ဖွယ်အမှောင်ထုကြီး အဓွန့်ရှည်ပြီး သန်းပေါင်းများစွာသော အပြစ်မဲ့ပြည်သူများ ဒုက္ခခံစားကြရပါလိမ့်မည်။ မြန်မာပြည်သူလူထုက ဤအရာကို မခံရပ်နိုင်တော့ပါ။ အပြည်ပြည်ဆိုင်ရာအသိုင်းအဝိုင်းများအနေဖြင့် မြန်မာပြည်သူများ၏ ဒီမိုကရေစီဆန္ဒနှင့် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီရည်မှန်းချက်များကိုလေးစားပြီး အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ (NUG)ကို မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၏ တရားဝင် ဒီမိုကရေစီကိုယ်စားလှယ်အဖြစ် အသိအမှတ်ပြုပေးပါ။ ထို့အပြင် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီသာမက သူတို့ကိုထောက်ခံသည့် တစ်ဦးချင်းဖြစ်စေ၊ အဖွဲ့လိုက်ဖြစ်စေ၊ ကုမ္ပဏီများ၊ နိုင်ငံများဖြစ်စေ အားလုံးကိုပါ ဆန့်ကျင်သည့် ထိရောက်သော ပစ်မှတ်ထား အရေးယူ ဒဏ်ခတ်ပိတ်ဆို့မှုများ ချက်ချင်းပြုလုပ်ပေးပါ။ ဤပိတ်ဆို့မှုများကို လူမှုစီးပွားရေးအရသာမက နိုင်ငံရေးနှင့် သံတမန်ရေးအရလည်း အကောင်အထည်ဖော်သင့်သည်။
မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၏ အာဇာနည်သူရဲကောင်းများသည် မြန်မာတစ်နိုင်ငံလုံး စစ်အာဏာရှင်ကို တော်လှန်သည့်အရေးတော်ပုံနှင့် အားလုံးပါဝင်သော ဖက်ဒရယ် ဒီမိုကရေစီအနာဂတ်အတွက် ခွန်အားပေးနေသည်။ ဒီကနေ့ အာဇာနည်နေ့တွင် လွတ်လပ်ရေးနှင့် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီအတွက် မိမိတို့အသက်များကို ပဓာနမထားပဲ ဖိနှိပ်ခြင်းများနှင့် မတရားခြင်းများအကြား စွန့်လွှတ်ပေးဆပ်ခဲ့ကြသည့် မတုန်လှုပ်သော သတ္တိနှင့် ခိုင်မာသော ဆုံးဖြတ်ချက်များအတွက် နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေး သူရဲကောင်းများအားလုံးကို ဦးညွှတ်အလေးပြုအပ်ပါသည်။ အာဇာနည်သူရဲကောင်းများက လွတ်လပ်မှု၊ လူ့အခွင့်အရေးနှင့် တရားမျှတမှုတို့၏ ကြီးမားသောတန်ဖိုးများကို သတိရစေသကဲ့သို့ သူတို့၏သတ္တိနှင့် စွန့်လွှတ်အနစ်နာခံမှုများကို ပြည်သူများ၏နှလုံးသားတွင် ထာဝစဉ်အောက်မေ့ ဂုဏ်ပြုနေမည်ဖြစ်သည်။
မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၏ အာဇာနည်နေ့တွင် ယူကရိန်းနိုင်ငံဟာလည်း မြန်မာပြည်သူများ၏အတွေးထဲတွင် ရှိနေပါသည်။ ယူကရိန်းနိုင်ငံအတွက်သာမက တစ်ကမ္ဘာလုံး၏ လွတ်လပ်သော မနက်ဖြန်များအတွက် ၎င်းတို့၏နေ့ရက်များကို စွန့်လွှတ်ပေးဆပ်ခဲ့ကြသည့် ယူကရိန်းသူရဲကောင်းများကိုလည်း အောက်မေ့ ဂုဏ်ပြု အလေးပြုအပ်ပါသည်။ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံနှင့် ယူကရိန်းနိုင်ငံတို့မှ ရဲရင့်သောသူရဲကောင်းများသည် ဖိနှိပ်မှုမှ လွတ်မြောက်စေရန်နှင့် မိမိတို့လူမျိုးများကို လွတ်လပ်သောကမ္ဘာကြီးဆီသို့ ရောက်ရှိစေရန် အသက်များကို စတေးခဲ့ကြသည်။ မစဉ်းစားနိုင်လောက်သော နာကျင်မှုနှင့် ဆုံးရှုံးမှုများကို ခါးစည်းခံစားရသည့် အာဇာနည်သူရဲကောင်းများ၏ ကျန်ရစ်သူမိသားစုဝင်များနှင့် ထပ်တူထပ်မျှရပ်တည်လျက်ရှိပါသည်။ အာဇာနည်သူရဲကောင်းများ တိုက်ပွဲဝင်ခဲ့ကြသည့် လွတ်လပ်မှုနှင့် ဒီမိုကရေစီတို့အတွက် မယိမ်းယိုင်သော ကတိကဝတ်သည် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၊ ယူကရိန်းနှင့် ကမ္ဘာတစ်ဝန်းလုံးတို့၏ ခွန်အားနှင့် စိတ်ဓာတ်ကို သက်သေထူလျက်ရှိသည်။
လွတ်လပ်မှု၊ ငြိမ်းချမ်းရေးနှင့် ချမ်းသာကြွယ်ဝတဲ့ ဒီမိုကရေစီကမ္ဘာကြီးအတွက် တိုက်ပွဲဝင်နေကြသော ရဲရင့်သော မြန်မာပြည်သူများနှင့် ယူကရိန်းပြည်သူများကို ထောက်ပံ့ပေးဖို့ ပြည်တွင်း၊ ဒေသန္တရနဲ့ အပြည်ပြည်ဆိုင်ရာ သက်ဆိုင်ရာအဖွဲ့အစည်းများကို ထပ်မံတိုက်တွန်းလိုပါသည်။ အားလုံးအတွက် ပိုမိုတောက်ပသော မနက်ဖြန်နေ့ရက်များရောက်ရှိလာစေရန် တော်လှန်နေကြသည့် မြန်မာပြည်သူများအားလုံးကို အာဇာနည်သူရဲကောင်းများက အစဉ်အမြဲစောင့်ရှောက်ပါစေကြောင်း တောင်းဆုပြုအပ်ပါသည်။ လွတ်လပ်မှု၊ တရားမျှတမှု၊ တန်းတူညီမျှမှုနဲ့ စည်းလုံးညီညွတ်မှုတို့အပေါ် တည်ဆောက်ထားသည့် ပိုမိုကောင်းမွန်သည့် ကမ္ဘာကြီးကို တက်တက်ကြွကြွ ပါဝင်ဖော်ဆောင်ခြင်းအားဖြင့် သူတို့၏ ပေးဆပ်မှုများကို ဂုဏ်ပြုရန် တိုက်တွန်းအပ်ပါသည်။ နောက်လာမည့် (၇၇) ကြိမ်မြောက် အာဇာနည်နေ့ကို စစ်အာဏာရှင်လက်အောက်မှ လွတ်မြောက်ပြီး ငြိမ်ချမ်းမှု၊ လွတ်လပ်မှုများနဲ့ အာဇာနည်နေ့ကို ပြည်သူများ အောက်မေ့ဂုဏ်ပြုနိုင်ရန် မျှော်လင့်ပါသည်။
အရေးတော်ပုံအောင်ရမည်!
မြန်မာနိုင်ငံကို ဘုရားသခင်ကောင်းချီးပေးပါစေ!
လေးစားစွာဖြင့်
ဒေါက်တာဆာဆာ
ပြည်ထောင်စုဝန်ကြီး
အပြည်ပြည်ဆိုင်ရာပူးပေါင်းဆောင်ရွက်ရေး ဝန်ကြီးဌာန
အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of International Cooperation Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2023-07-20
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Individual Documents
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National Unity Government (NUG), Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Political History
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Kim Aris has spoken to Sky News as a civil war rages in the country two years after his mother was removed as leader in a military coup.
Description:
"International governments should impose "tougher sanctions" on Myanmar and restrict its military from accessing aviation fuel, the son of the country's ousted leader has said.
Kim Aris' mother Aung San Suu Kyi was the head of Myanmar's government before she was arrested during a military coup in the country in 2021.
He has spoken to Sky News after chief correspondent Stuart Ramsay and his team went undercover deep in the jungle in Myanmar to report on the civil war which has been raging in the country since the coup.
They spent a month in Myanmar with resistance fighters, medics and volunteers who are fighting a war the military regime claims isn't happening.
Asked why international governments are not speaking about the war in Myanmar as much as people in the country would hope, Mr Aris said: "Unfortunately, I think it's kind of an indication of the disinterest of people in what's going on on the other side of the world... Until people themselves start to get involved, the governments aren't likely to do anything."
He added that governments have "condemned what's happening" but now need to take more meaningful steps.
Asked what measures those might be, Mr Aris said: "Tougher sanctions would help, and making sure the military are restricted or completely cut off from aviation fuel and those kinds of things.
"This would help immensely.
"And just being able to get aid to the people who need it. At the moment, the military are cutting off all aid to everybody."
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Mr Aris's call to restrict Myanmar's access to aviation fuel comes as the military is using fighter jets to bomb targets during the civil war.
He cited a report from the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights which says China and Russia are the main suppliers of advanced weapons to Myanmar's military.
'No concrete news of Suu Kyi's whereabouts'
Mr Aris grew up in the UK with his mother in the early years of his life and remained in Britain when she returned to Myanmar as a political figure who promoted democracy and human rights.
He told Sky News the last time he spoke to his mother was before her government was overthrown more than two years ago.
Mr Aris continued: "Yes. I haven't really received any concrete news about her whereabouts and I haven't had any communication with her since before the coup.
"So despite my requests for official channels, I haven't received any response.
"It is hard, but I'm kind of used to it, having lived with this most of my life."
Myanmar's military rulers repeatedly imprisoned Suu Kyi under house arrest between 1989 and 2010 as they viewed her as someone undermining the peace and stability of the country.
However, following her release from house arrest for the final time she became state counsellor, the title for the de facto leader equivalent to a prime minister, in 2016.
Suu Kyi and other democratically elected leaders led a democratic experiment in the country before it was crushed by the military coup in 2021.
Their government was overthrown and she was arrested alongside others..."
Source/publisher:
"Sky News" (London)
Date of entry/update:
2023-07-19
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations, About Aung San Suu Kyi, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
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"British aid to Burma has been cut by 51% this financial year, and by 70% since the financial year 2020-2021, according to newly published Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office accounts.
This comes during a time when Burma is suffering its worst human rights and humanitarian crisis ever, after the attempted military coup on 1 February 2021.
“Foreign Secretary James Cleverly is cutting aid to Burma at a time when more people than ever are in desperate need of assistance,” said Anna Roberts, Executive Director at Burma Campaign UK. “Aid to Burma should be increased, not cut, and more aid needs to go to local civil society so British aid reaches people in areas not under Burmese military control.”
British aid to Burma has been cut from £61.9 million last year, to £30.1 million in this financial year. Previous government records show that the aid to Burma in 2020 was just over £103 million. This means that aid has been cut by 70% from 2020 to 2023-2024.
These cuts in aid to Burma come after the government’s 82% cuts in aid to Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh, who fled genocide in Burma.
The British government has previously tried to disguise the overall cuts in aid to Burma by highlighting statistics for humanitarian aid, rather than overall aid to Burma. Funding for any development aid programmes discontinued after the attempted coup began should have been reallocated towards the dramatic increase in humanitarian needs but was not. Even before the coup Burma Campaign UK had been campaigning for a higher proportion of UK aid to be spent on the humanitarian emergencies in the country. In 2018 DFID was spending three times as much on economic development and governance as on humanitarian aid.
The humanitarian crisis in Burma has been created as the Burmese military desperately tries to consolidate an attempted coup in February 2021. It has met unprecedented resistance and is losing control of parts of the country. In response, it has launched indiscriminate attacks using airstrikes and long-range artillery.
The British government has so far failed to sanction supplies of aviation fuel to Burma, despite five British companies, UK P&I, Steamship Mutual, Britannia P&I, North Standard and Shipowners’ Club, being involved in the supply chain of aviation fuel deliveries. Without aviation fuel, the jets can’t fly and if they can’t fly, they can’t bomb.
The British government had previously led the implementation of sanctions on sources of revenue and arms but there have been no new sanctions in almost four months and major sources of revenue, such as gas, state-owned banks and rare earth minerals have yet to be sanctioned. The slow plodding pace of sanctions has meant the military has been able to generate revenue to fund arms purchases. The EU has sanctioned Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise and the US has sanctioned state-owned banks.
It is not just the cuts in aid to Burma which are alarming, but also the way in which aid is given. Most of the people forced to flee attacks by the Burmese military are in areas not under the control of the military and where UN and other agencies don’t operate. For most, the only way to reach them is through local civil society organisations, but the British government and other donors provide relatively little aid to them, and apply so many conditions and so much bureaucracy and red tape that local organisations can’t access funds.
“James Cleverly is moving too slowly to cut off sources of revenue and weapons to the Burmese military and is now cutting aid to the people attacked by those weapons,” said Anna Roberts. “Arguing that the British government has also cut life-saving aid to other countries is not a defence justifying these cuts, it’s a disgrace.”..."
Source/publisher:
"Burma Campaign UK" (London)
Date of entry/update:
2023-07-19
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Business and the Military, Sanctions, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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"Today, Myanmar commemorates the 76th Anniversary of our Martyrs Day, the Day when Myanmar’s Independence agreement, known as Panglong Agreements, was taken away by brutally assassinating our National heroes, Myanmar’s great leaders of Independence from Britain. Today also marks 76 years of the brave people's unwavering struggle for freedom, self-determination, and federal democracy. We honour and pay tribute to the brave souls who sacrificed their lives in 1947 and during this ongoing Myanmar’s Nationwide Revolution to end genocidal military junta and establish inclusive federal democracy based on principles of self-determination, equality, human rights, and justice in Myanmar, the region, and the world. As we commemorate our great Martyrs who have come before us, we also salute and appreciate our great living Martyrs and Heroes who are holding the frontline of our freedom and federal democratic aspirations and democratic will of the brave people of Myanmar by risking their lives every day in the face of crimes against humanity, brutality, and cruelty of the genocidal military junta.
76 years ago, on July 19, 1947, Myanmar’s National Hero and Independence Leader, General Aung San, the father of Myanmar’s State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, along with Independence leaders, were brutally assassinated, changing Myanmar's history forever. As a result, the brave people of Myanmar have suffered from this terrible black day in our history. If our independence leaders were not assassinated in such a brutal way, Myanmar's promises and principles of federal democracy and equality would have been fully implemented, and Myanmar could have thrived under federal democracy, standing tall along with free and federal democratic Nations for the region and the world.
Before this black day happened, Myanmar was already the most promising country in Asia and one of the most prosperous nations in the region, known as the food basket of Asia. However, acts of terrorism by a terrorist group, rooted right from Myanmar's pre-independent era, disrupted this progress. The assassination not only robbed us of our independence leaders but also shattered our freedom and federal democratic agreements and the Burma Independent's terms and conditions agreement signed in Panglong, known as the Panglong Agreement in our history.
After 76 years, these same terrorism roots caused the emergence of the genocidal military institution known as the Tatmadaw, which oppressed its own people and denied basic human rights to the people of Myanmar through the destruction of federal democracy values and principles and genocidal attacks against its own people. Despite successive generations standing up for peace, freedom, and federal democracy, the brutal genocidal military declared wars against its own people.
On February 1st, 2021, the same genocidal military mindset attempted to take away our freedom and democracy by destroying the results of the 2020 Myanmar election, which was nationally and internationally recognized as free, fair, and democratic. The people of Myanmar's peaceful protests were crushed with battlefield weapons.
27 months have passed since Myanmar's Nationwide Revolution began to end the 76 years of denial of peace, freedom, and the genocidal military dictatorships and to establish an inclusive federal democratic Union of Myanmar. In the last 27 months alone, the genocidal military has killed more than 4,000 civilians, including 800 children, unjustly arrested more than 23,000 civilians, including 400 children, Myanmar President U Win Myint and State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, and destroyed more than 70,000 homes, including schools, hospitals, and places of worship. During these 27 months, more than 18 million people of Myanmar have been pushed into a great need for life-saving aid, nearly 2 million people displaced to homelessness, and 48 million people pushed into extreme poverty. These 27 months have been filled with pain, suffering, deaths, and destruction. At the same time, the genocidal military junta has used starvation, hunger, and disease as weapons through their evil "four cuts" policies against the entire population of Myanmar.
Despite facing unspeakable atrocities, crimes against humanity, and war crimes, the freedom and federal democracy-loving people of Myanmar's hope cannot be taken away or destroyed by the genocidal military's battlefield weapons or their fighter jets, which have committed genocide against their own people, as exemplified in the genocidal attacks against the Rohingya by the same genocidal military. The denial of life-saving aid to 18 million people under their evil "four cut" policies and the denial of basic education to dozens of millions of Myanmar's children, who are on the edge of lost generations, which will have effects for generations to come, are slow genocide against the entire population of Myanmar.
While the genocidal military junta, the enemy of peace, freedom, and federal democracy, has been busy bringing death, destruction, and suffering to the 54 million people of Myanmar, the people of Myanmar, democratically represented by the National Unity Government of Myanmar (NUG), together with heroes, comrades, and pro-democratic freedom fighters, have been defending the values and principles of freedom and federal democracy in the face of this terrible terror and nightmare.
This Nationwide Revolution, the last revolution for the past 76 years, will not only end the genocidal military dictatorship once and for all but will also clearly lay out Myanmar’s inclusive federal democratic roadmaps in our Federal Democratic Charter (FDC), which is now in the process of developing a transitional Constitution (TC) before we reach our destination of a fully-fledged federal democratic new Myanmar! The people of Myanmar Nationwide Revolution have not only written the destination of Myanmar’s future in freedom and an inclusive federal democratic union for all Myanmar but also control more than half of Myanmar’s territory through our heroes and freedom fighters from People’s Defence Forces (PDFs), Local Defences Forces (LDFs), and Ethnic Revolutionary Organizations (EROs).
Our great martyrs have stated with their lives that enough is enough to the genocidal forces of darkness and have given their lives for the light of freedom. If the International Community hesitates to take decisive actions against these evil forces, the genocidal military, these reigns of terror will be prolonged, and millions more innocent people will suffer. Our people cannot bear this any longer. The International Community, as a responsible global Community, must support the Nationwide Revolutions for freedom and federal democracy, respect the democratic will of the people of Myanmar by officially recognising the National Unity Government of Myanmar (NUG), and reject the genocidal military junta by cutting off international finance, weapons, and legitimacy going into the brutal hands of the genocidal military junta and imposing strong, coordinated, and targeted sanctions against them and their supporters, be they countries, businesses, or individuals.
Our martyrs continue to inspire us every day in this Nationwide Revolution against the genocidal military forces of evil and remain a guiding light in our collective journey towards an inclusive federal democratic future. On this Martyrs Day, we also remember our fallen heroes of the Spring Revolution, who, with their unwavering determination and bravery, stood up against injustice and oppression, sacrificing their lives for the cause of federal democracy and freedom. Their courage and sacrifice will forever be remembered and appreciated in our hearts as the sacrifices of our martyrs remind us of the immense value of freedom, human rights, and justice.
Myanmar's Martyrs Day, Ukraine is also very much in our thoughts and prayers. We also remember, appreciate, and salute all the fallen heroes and martyrs of Ukraine who have given their today for the freedom of tomorrow, not only for Ukraine but for the whole world. The brave people of Myanmar and Ukraine have dedicated their God-given lives to the cause of liberation from oppression and to send their people to freedom and a free world. We stand in solidarity with the families and loved ones of the martyrs who have endured unimaginable pain and loss. Their unwavering commitment to freedom and democracy, for which their loved ones fought, is a testament to the strength and spirit of the people of Myanmar, Ukraine, and the whole world.
We urge once again all stakeholders, domestic, regional, and international, to support the people of Myanmar and Ukraine in their aspirations for freedom, peace, and a prosperous democratic world. May the spirit of our martyrs continue to guide and inspire us as we strive for a brighter tomorrow to make this world a better place for all. Let us seize this moment to honour their sacrifice by actively engaging in the pursuit of a free and just world built on the principles and values of liberty, justice, equality, and solidarity. Together, let us forge a path forward towards the new world where the hopes for which our martyrs gave their lives are fully realised. May their sacrifice never be forgotten, and may their legacy inspire us to make this world a better place for all, one that our martyrs would be proud of, and where the world will fully enjoy peace and prosperity. May we celebrate the 77th Martyr Day without genocidal military junta’s brutality but with the joy of freedom, peace, and liberation of our people from the reign of terror and tyranny.
Myanmar Nationwide Revolution will Prevail!
May God Bless Myanmar!
Sincerely,
Dr. Sasa
Union Minister
Ministry of International Cooperation
The National Unity Government
Republic of the Union of Myanmar..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of International Cooperation Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2023-07-19
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Political History
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"၁။ “မမများနဲ့ပွဲကမယ်” ဘဏ္ဍာငွေ ရှာဖွေရေးအစီအစဥ်တွင် ပါဝင်ခဲ့ကြသည့် ပြည်သူများ၊ Fundraiser များ ၊ အနုပညာရှင်များ၊ အတတ်ပညာရှင်များအပါအဝင် “မမများနဲ့ပွဲကမယ်” အဖွဲ့သားအားလုံးကို ကျေးဇူးအထူး တင် ရှိပါကြောင်း အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၊ ကာကွယ်ရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာနအနေဖြင့် ဂုဏ်ပြုမှတ်တမ်းတင်အပ် ပါသည်။
၂။ “မမများနဲ့ပွဲကမယ်” ကရင်နီ၊ စစ်ကိုင်း၊ ချင်း မကွေး၊ အလယ်ပိုင်းဒေသ ဘဏ္ဍာငွေရှာဖွေရေး အစီအစဥ် (၄) ကြိမ်မှ စုစုပေါင်း ဘဏ္ဍာငွေ အမေရိကန်ဒေါ်လာ ၁.၉၈ သန်း လက်ခံရရှိခဲ့ပါသည်။
၃။ ယင်းလက်ခံရရှိခဲ့သော ဘဏ္ဍာငွေများအနက်မှ အမေရိကန်ဒေါ်လာ ၁.၅၅ သန်းကို ကာကွယ်ရေး ဝန်ကြီးဌာန ကွပ်ကဲမှု လက်အောက်ရှိ တပ်ရင်း၊ တပ်ဖွဲ့များအတွက် လည်းကောင်း၊ အမေရိကန်ဒေါ်လာ ၀.၂၅ သန်းကို KNDF အတွက် လည်းကောင်း၊ အမေရိကန်ဒေါ်လာ ၀.၁၄ သန်းကို CJDC အတွက် လည်းကောင်း၊ အမေရိကန်ဒေါ်လာ ၀.၀၄ သန်းကို အခြားသောတော်လှန်ရေးအင်အားစုများအတွက် လည်းကောင်း လျာထား သုံးစွဲလျက်ရှိပါသည်။
၄။ ကာကွယ်ရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာနအနေဖြင့် ပြည်သူလူထုမှ တော်လှန်ရေးအတွက် ထည့်သွင်းလှူဒါန်းထားသည့် ဘဏ္ဍာငွေကြေးများကို တာဝန်ခံမှု၊ တာဝန်ယူမှုအပြည့်ဖြင့် အဖိတ်အစင်မရှိ စနစ်တကျ စီစစ်သုံးစွဲလျက်ရှိပြီး အလေအလွင့်မရှိစေရေး ထိန်းကျောင်းဆောင်ရွက်နေပါသည်။
၅။ “မမများနဲ့ပွဲကမယ်” အစီအစဥ်မှ ရရှိခဲ့သော ရန်ပုံငွေဖြင့် ဝယ်ယူတပ်ဆင်ထားသည့် လက်နက်ကြီးများ ၏ မြေပြင်တိုက်ပွဲဝင်မှုများကို သင့်လျော်သည့်အချိန်တွင် ထုတ်ပြန်သွားမည်ဖြစ်ပါကြောင်း အသိပေးထုတ်ပြန် အပ်ပါသည်။
၆။ ပြည်သူ့တော်လှန်ရေးကြီး အမြန်ဆုံးအောင်မြင်ရေးအတွက်လည်း ပြည်သူလူထု တစ်ရပ်လုံး အနေဖြင့် “မမများနဲ့ပွဲကမယ်” အစီအစဉ်အပါအဝင် အခြားသော တော်လှန်ရေးဆိုင်ရာ ရန်ပုံငွေ ရှာဖွေရေး အစီအစဉ်များ ကိုလည်း အင်တိုက်အားတိုက် ဆက်လက် ပါဝင်ပေးကြပါရန်လည်း မေတ္တာရပ်ခံ တိုက်တွန်းအပ်ပါသည်။
ကာကွယ်ရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာန
အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2023-07-19
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights Defenders
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"၁။ ၁၉၄၇ ခုနှစ်၊ ဇူလိုင်လ ၁၉ ရက်နေ့သည် မြန်မာ့သမိုင်းတွင် တိုင်းပြည်အတွက် ကြီးမား သော ဆုံးရှုံးမှုအဖြစ် ကြုံတွေ့ခဲ့ရသည့် မမေ့နိုင်စရာ ကြေကွဲဖွယ်နေ့ တစ်နေ့ဖြစ်ပါသည်။ မသမာ လူတစ်စုတို့၏ လုပ်ကြံမှုကြောင့် ဗိုလ်ချုပ်အောင်ဆန်းနှင့်တကွ နိုင်ငံ့ခေါင်းဆောင်ကြီးများ ကျဆုံး ခဲ့ကြရသည်မှာ ယနေ့တွင် (၇၆) နှစ် ပြည့်မြောက်ခဲ့ပြီ ဖြစ်ပါသည်။ ကမ္ဘာတည်သရွေ့ မေ့ဖျောက် ၍ မရနိုင်သည့် နေ့တစ်နေ့လည်းဖြစ်ပါသည်။
၂။ ၁၉၄၇ ခုနှစ်၊ ဇူလိုင်လ ၁၉ ရက် (စနေနေ့)၊ နံနက် ၁၀ နာရီ ၃၇ မိနစ်တွင် အတွင်းဝန်များ ရုံး၌ တိုင်းပြည်ကျွန်ဘဝက လွတ်မြောက်ရေးနှင့် စစ်ပြီးခေတ် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံပြန်လည်ထူထောင်ရေး အတွက် အစည်းအဝေးပြုလုပ်နေသော အမျိုးသားခေါင်းဆောင်ကြီး ဗိုလ်ချုပ်အောင်ဆန်း ဦးဆောင်သော ဖဆပလ ကြားဖြတ်အစိုးရ ဝန်ကြီးများကို မျိုးချစ်ခေါင်းဆောင် နန်းရင်းဝန်ဟောင်း ဂဠုန်ဦးစောနှင့် အပေါင်းအပါတို့က ရက်ရက်စက်စက် လုပ်ကြံသတ်ဖြတ်ခဲ့ကြပြီး မြန်မာပြည်၏ အနာဂတ်ကို ဖျက်ဆီးခဲ့ကြပါသည်။ အာဇာနည်ခေါင်းဆောင်ကြီးများ လုပ်ကြံခံရသောကြောင့် မိမိတို့တိုင်းပြည်အတွက် ထိခိုက်နစ်နာ ဆုံးရှုံးမှုများ အလွန်များပြားသည်ကို ယနေ့နိုင်ငံရေး အခြေ အနေများအား သုံးသပ်ကြည့်ပါက သိနိုင်မည်ဖြစ်ပါသည်။ တစ်စုတစ်ဖွဲ့ကောင်းစားရေးအတွက် တိုင်းပြည်ကို အသုံးချကာ ကိုယ်ကျိုးအတွက် လုပ်ဆောင်ခဲ့ကြသောကြောင့် မိမိတို့တိုင်းပြည်သည် ယနေ့အချိန်အထိ နလန်မထူနိုင်ဘဲ အာဇာနည်သူရဲကောင်းများစွာလည်း ဆုံးရှုံးခဲ့ကြရပါသည်။
၃။ ယနေ့နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေးတွင်လည်း ဂဠုန်ဦးစောနှင့် အပေါင်းအပါများကဲ့သို့ အကြမ်းဖက် စိတ်ဓာတ်များဖြင့် အာဏာရှင်ပီသစွာ ပြုမှုလုပ်ဆောင်လျက်ရှိသည့် တရားမဝင် စစ်အုပ်စုသည်လည်း ပြည်သူလူထုထံမှ ဆင်းသက်လာသည့် နိုင်ငံတော်အာဏာကို လက်နက်အားကိုးဖြင့် အဓမ္မ သိမ်းယူ ခဲ့ပြီး ၎င်းတို့ကိုယ်ကျိုးစီးပွားအတွက် တိုင်းပြည်နှင့်လူမျိုးတို့၏ အသက်၊ အိုးအိမ်နှင့်စည်းစိမ်များစွာ ကို ချနင်းဖျက်ဆီးလျက် ရှိပါသည်။ လူမဆန်သော စစ်အာဏာရှင်တို့၏ အကြမ်းဖက် ဖိနှိပ်ချုပ်ချယ် မှုများကို တိုင်းရင်းသားပြည်သူလူထုအားလုံးက ခေါင်းငုံ့မခံဘဲ တိုင်းပြည်နှင့်လူမျိုးအတွက် အသက် ကိုပင် ပဓာနမထားဘဲ အာဇာနည်ခေါင်းဆောင်(၉)ဦး စိတ်ဓာတ်အပြည့်ဖြင့် အာဏာရှင်စနစ် အပြီးသတ်ချုပ်ငြိမ်းရေးအတွက် တိုင်းရင်းသားပြည်သူများအားလုံး တွဲလက်ညီညီ တိုက်ပွဲဝင်လျက် ရှိပါသည်။ ဇူလိုင် ၁၉ တွင် ကျဆုံးခဲ့သော ဗိုလ်ချုပ်အောင်ဆန်းနှင့်တကွ အာဇာနည်ခေါင်းဆောင် ကြီးများ၊ နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေးတွင် ကျဆုံးခဲ့သောအာဇာနည်သူရဲကောင်းများနှင့် ခေတ်အဆက်ဆက် ဒီမိုကရေစီအရေး၊ မိမိတိုင်းပြည်နှင့် လူမျိုးလွတ်လပ်ရေးအတွက် တိုက်ပွဲဝင်ရင်း ကျဆုံးခဲ့ကြသော အာဇာနည်သူရဲကောင်းအပေါင်းတို့အား ဤသဝဏ်လွှာမှတစ်ဆင့် ဂုဏ်ပြု ဦးညွှတ်လိုက်ပါသည်။
၄။ ဗိုလ်ချုပ်အောင်ဆန်းအပါအဝင် အာဇာနည်ခေါင်းဆောင်ကြီးများ၏ မပြီးပြတ်ခဲ့သော အာဏာရှင်စနစ် ပျက်သုဉ်းရေးလုပ်ငန်းစဉ်များကို မိမိတို့ တိုင်းရင်းသားပြည်သူများ၊ တော်လှန်ရေး အင်အားစုများအားလုံးက တော်လှန်ရေးအသိ၊ တော်လှန်ရေးသတိဖြင့် စည်းလုံးညီညွတ်စွာ ဆက်လက် အကောင်အထည်ဖော်ဆောင်ရွက်ကြစေလိုကြောင်း အလေးအနက် တိုက်တွန်းနှိုးဆော် လိုပါသည်။ တိုင်းပြည်အတွက် အသက်ပေးလှူခဲ့ကြသည့် ဗိုလ်ချုပ်အောင်ဆန်းနှင့်တကွ အာဇာနည် အပေါင်းတို့၏ ကျေးဇူးကိုသိ၍ အမှန်တကယ် လေးစားမြတ်နိုးတန်ဖိုးထားကြသည်ဆိုလျှင် အာဇာနည်ကြီးများ၏ အသက်၊ သွေး၊ ချွေးတို့ဖြင့် ရယူပေးခဲ့သည့် လွတ်လပ်ရေးကို ရေရှည်တည်တံ့ အောင် မိမိတို့နိုင်ငံသားအားလုံးက ဦးလည်မသုန် ထိန်းသိမ်းကာကွယ် စောင့်ရှောက်သွားကြရမည် ဖြစ်ပါသည်။
၅။ အတိတ်သမိုင်းဖြစ်ရပ်များကို သင်ခန်းစာယူပြီး တိုင်းရင်းသားပြည်သူများနှင့် တော်လှန်ရေး အင်အားစုများအားလုံးအနေဖြင့် အပြန်အလှန်နားလည်မှု၊ ယုံကြည်မှုနှင့် လေးစားမှုတို့ကို အခြေ တည်လျက် အာဇာနည်ကြီးများ ချမှတ်ခဲ့သည့် နိုင်ငံရေးလမ်းစဉ်များကို ကျင့်သုံးကာ မိမိတို့အားလုံး မျှော်လင့်တောင့်တနေသည့် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီနိုင်ငံသစ်ဆီသို့ အမှန်တရားမှပေါက်ဖွားလာသော ခွန်အားများဖြင့် ရှေ့ဆက်ချီတက်ကြပါစို့လို့ တိုက်တွန်းရင်း ဤသဝဏ်လွှာအား ပေးပို့အပ်ပါသည်။
ပြည်ထောင်စုလွှတ်တော်ကိုယ်စားပြုကော်မတီ..."
Source/publisher:
Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw
Date of entry/update:
2023-07-19
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH), Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Political History
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
596.58 KB
more
Description:
"Lead researcher: June Nilian Sang
Contributors: Victor Biak Lian, Dan Seng Lawn, Adam Burke, Tabea Campbell Pauli, Nathan Shea, Rebecca Crisp
Design: Deddeaw Laosinchai
Executive Summary
The violent crackdowns that followed the Myanmar military’s coup d’état in February 2021 led many civilians in Chin State, a region in the west which borders India and Bangladesh, to take up weapons and defend themselves. Suffering high numbers of arbitrary attacks on civilians, Chin State has seen hundreds of deaths and tens of thousands of individuals displaced in the past two years. Conflict continues as local groups resist the Myanmar military in the absence of any political solution or decisive military victory. Airstrikes and arson attacks by Myanmar forces have led to the destruction of thousands of civilian homes, religious and community buildings, and crops and livestock. The United Nations estimates that up to 54,000 people have been displaced within Chin State since 1 February 2021, and over 50,000 people have fled across the Indian border.
Civilians in Chin State, both in military-controlled areas and territory ‘liberated’ by ethnic armed or resistance groups, lack proper access to food, education, health, and livelihoods services, further increasing the number of fatalities. Women, children, elderly people, and people with disabilities are particularly vulnerable. Political and geographic challenges have stymied a coordinated humanitarian response. Displacement of civilians is likely to continue in the medium term, including across the Indian border into Mizoram and Manipur. Direct access for international humanitarian actors has been severely limited. Local authorities and communities on the Indian side of the border, which share historical and kinship ties with Chin people, have played a significant role in providing support on the ground. Nevertheless, long-term solutions for aid, livelihoods, and future security of Chin populations are absent, leaving many uncertain around their strategies for survival.
This report provides an update on the situation facing many communities along the Myanmar/India border. The data and insights, collected in December 2022, reveal the evolving landscape of armed and political actors and the shifting balance of power within Chin State. It also spotlights the situation faced by thousands of Chin civilians displaced by violence, seeking refuge along the India-Myanmar border. Its key findings, underpinned by detailed contextual analysis, provide evidence for humanitarians and development policymakers seeking to improve support to conflict-affected populations..."
Source/publisher:
The Asia Foundation
Date of entry/update:
2023-07-18
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
2.24 MB
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Sub-title:
အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၊ ကြားကာလဗဟိုဘဏ်သည် အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၏ (၁/ ၆/ ၂၀၂၃) ရက်စွဲပါ၊ ဥပဒေကဲ့သို့အာဏာတည်သည့် အမိန့်အမှတ် (၁/၂၀၂၃)၊ အပိုဒ် (၃)၊ အပိုဒ်ခွဲ(ဂ) ပါ အပ်နှင်း ထားသည့် အာဏာကို ကျင့်သုံး၍အောက်ပါ စည်းမျဉ်းကို ထုတ်ပြန်လိုက်သည် -
Description:
"အခန်း (၁)
အမည်နှင့် အဓိပ္ပါယ်ဖော်ပြချက်
၁။ ဤစည်းမျဉ်းကို နွေဦးဖွံ့ဖြိုးရေးဘဏ် တည်ထောင်သည့်စည်းမျဉ်းဟု ခေါ်တွင်စေရမည်။
၂။ ဤစည်းမျဉ်းတွင်ပါရှိသော စကားရပ်များသည် အောက်ပါအတိုင်း အဓိပ္ပါယ်သက်ရောက် စေရမည် -
(က) နွေဦးဖွံ့ဖြိုးရေးဘဏ်ဆိုသည်မှာ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၏ (၁- ၆- ၂၀၂၃) ရက်စွဲဖြင့် ထုတ်ပြန်သည့် ဥပဒေကဲ့သို့အာဏာတည်သောအမိန့်အမှတ် (၁/၂၀၂၃) ဖြင့် ဖွဲ့စည်း တည်ထောင် ထားသော ကြားကာလဗဟိုဘဏ်က အဆိုပါအမိန့် အပိုဒ် ၃၊ အပိုဒ်ခွဲ (ခ) အရ အပ်နှင်းထားသည့် လုပ်ပိုင်ခွင့်ကို ကျင့်သုံး၍ ဖွံ့ဖြိုးရေးဘဏ်လုပ်ငန်း အပါအဝင် ဤ စည်းမျဉ်းအရ ခွင့်ပြုထားသည့် လုပ်ငန်းတရပ်ရပ်အား ဆောင်ရွက်ရန်အတွက် ဖွဲ့စည်း တည်ထောင်မည့် ဘဏ်ကိုဆိုသည်။
( ခ ) လုပ်ငန်းလုပ်ကိုင်ခွင့်လိုင်စင်ဆိုသည်မှာ နွေဦးဖွံ့ဖြိုးရေးဘဏ် ဖွဲ့စည်းတည်ထောင်၍ ဘဏ် လုပ်ငန်း လုပ်ကိုင်ဆောင်ရွက်ရန် ကြားကာလဗဟိုဘဏ်က ထုတ်ပေး သောလိုင်စင်ကို ဆိုသည်။
( ဂ ) ဗဟိုဘဏ်ဆိုသည်မှာ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၏ (၁/ ၆/ ၂၀၂၃) ရက်စွဲပါ ဥပဒေကဲ့သို့ အာဏာတည်သည့်အမိန့် (၁/ ၂၀၂၃) အရ တည်ထောင်သည့် ကြားကာလဗဟိုဘဏ် ကို ဆိုသည်။
အခန်း (၂)
ရည်ရွယ်ချက်
၃။ နွေဦးဖွံ့ဖြိုးရေးဘဏ်အားအောက်ပါ ရည်ရွယ်ချက်များဖြင့် တည်ထောင်ဆောင်ရွက်သွားမည် -
(က) နိုင်ငံတကာငွေရေးကြေးရေးအဖွဲ့အစည်းများမှ ချမှတ်ထားသော နိုင်ငံတကာ စံသတ်မှတ် ချက်များနှင့် အကောင်းဆုံးလုပ်ထုံးလုပ်နည်းများအား လိုက်နာ၍ ဘဏ်တွင် အပ်ငွေအပ်နှံသူ နှင့်အများပြည်သူတို့၏ အကျိုးစီးပွားကို အထူးအလေးအနက်ထား ရှေ့တန်းတင်၍ အကောင်းဆုံး ဘဏ်ဝန်ဆောင်မှုများ ကို ဖော်ဆောင်သွားရန်၊
(ခ) အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီ၏ ဗဟိုဘဏ်မှ ထိန်းချုပ်ထားသော ဘဏ်များသို့ စီးဆင်းနေသည့် နိုင်ငံခြားငွေ အပါအဝင် ငွေကြေးများအား ထိန်းချုပ်၍ နွေဦးဖွံ့ဖြိုးရေးဘဏ်သို့ စီးဝင် စေခြင်းဖြင့် စစ်ကောင်စီထိန်းချုပ်ထားသော ငွေကြေးစနစ်အား ဟန့်တားနိုင်ရန်၊
(ဂ) အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၊ စီမံကိန်း၊ ဘဏ္ဍာရေးနှင့်ရင်းနှီးမြှုပ်နှံမှု ဝန်ကြီးဌာနက ဆောင်ရွက်နေသော ဘဏ္ဍာရန်ပုံငွေရှာဖွေခြင်း၊ အခွန်ကောက်ခံခြင်း၊ နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေးအား ဘဏ္ဍာရန်ပုံငွေထောက်ပံ့ခြင်းလုပ်ငန်းတို့အား အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၏ ကိုယ်စားလှယ် ဘဏ်အဖြစ် ဆောင်ရွက်၍ ပံ့ပိုးကူညီ ဆောင်ရွက်သွားရန်၊
(ဃ) နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေးအလွန်ကာလတွင် တိုင်းပြည်ဖွံ့ဖြိုးရေးလုပ်ငန်းများအား ဖွံ့ဖြိုးရေးဘဏ် တခု၏ အင်္ဂါရပ်နှင့်အညီ သက်ဆိုင်ရာကာလအလိုက် ဖွဲ့စည်းအုပ်ချုပ်ပုံ အခြေခံဥပဒေပါ လမ်းစဉ် နှင့်အညီ ဆောင်ရွက်သွားရန်။
အခန်း(၃)
ဖွဲ့စည်းတည်ထောင်ခြင်းနှင့်ပိုင်ဆိုင်မှု
၄။ နွေဦးဖွံ့ဖြိုးရေးဘဏ်ကို အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၏ (၁/ ၆/ ၂၀၂၃) ရက်စွဲပါ ဥပဒေကဲ့သို့ အာဏာ တည်သောအမိန့်အမှတ် (၁/ ၂၀၂၃) နှင့် နိုင်ငံတခုခု (offshore)၏ ဥပဒေအရ တရားဝင်အဖွဲ့အစည်းအဖြစ် ဖွဲ့စည်း တည်ထောင်ရမည်။
၅။ နွေဦးဖွံ့ဖြိုးရေးဘဏ်ကို ကိုယ်ပိုင်အမည်ဖြင့် စဉ်ဆက်မပြတ် ဆက်ခံဆောင်ရွက်ပိုင်ခွင့်၊ တရားစွဲ ဆိုနိုင်ခွင့်၊ တရားစွဲဆိုခံနိုင်ခွင့်ရှိသော တရားဝင်အဖွဲ့အစည်းအဖြစ် တည်ထောင်ရမည်။
၆။ နွေဦးဖွံ့ဖြိုးရေးဘဏ်၏ ရုံးချုပ်နှင့် ဘဏ်ခွဲများကို ကနဦးအဆင့်တွင် ကြားကာလ ဗဟိုဘဏ်၏ ခွင့်ပြုချက်ဖြင့် offshore entity တခု၏ပိုင်ဆိုင်မှု (ownership) အောက်တွင် ဆောင်ရွက်သွားရမည်။
၇။ နွေဦးဖွံ့ဖြိုးရေးဘဏ်ကို နိုင်ငံတခုခု (offshore) တွင် ဥပဒေနှင့်အညီ ဖွဲ့စည်း တည်ထောင်ထားသော အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရကိုယ်စားပြု ကုမ္ပဏီက အနည်းဆုံး ၅၁ % အစုရှယ်ယာပိုင်ဆိုင်ရမည်ဖြစ်ပြီးနှင့် Initial Coin Offering (ICO) သို့မဟုတ် Initial Public Offering (IPO) ဖြင့် ထုတ်ဝေထားသည့် အစုရှယ်ယာ ဝယ်ယူသူများ (public minority shareholder) က အများဆုံး ၄၉% ပိုင်ဆိုင်ခွင့်ရှိသည်။
အခန်း (၄)
လုပ်ငန်းလိုင်စင် လျှောက်ထားခြင်း
၈။ နွေဦးဖွံ့ဖြိုးရေးဘဏ်အနေဖြင့် ကြားကာလဗဟိုဘဏ်သို့ လုပ်ငန်းလိုင်စင် လျှောက်ထားရာတွင် အောက်ပါစာရွက်စာတမ်းများ အနည်းဆုံး ပူးတွဲတင်ပြရမည် -
(က) ဘဏ်အမည် နှင့် ဥပဒေအမည်၊
( ခ ) ဘဏ်ဆောင်ရွက်မည့်ပုံစံ (ကူးသန်းရောင်းဝယ်ရေးဘဏ်၊ ဖွံ့ဖြိုးရေးဘဏ်၊ နိုင်ငံခြားဘဏ်၊ ဘဏ်ခွဲ ၊ နိုင်ငံခြားဘဏ်၊ လက်အောက်ခံဘဏ်၊ အစရှိသည်။)
( ဂ ) ဘဏ်တွင်ပါဝင်မည့် ဘဏ်ဒါရိုက်တာအဖွဲ့ဝင် ဒါရိုက်တာများ၏ အမည်နှင့် နောက်ကြောင်း ရာဇဝင်၊ ကိုယ်ရေးရာဇဝင်၊
(ဃ) ဘဏ်လုပ်ငန်း နှင့် စီးပွားရေးလုပ်ငန်းဆိုင်ရာ အစီအစဉ်၊
( င ) အစုရှယ်ယာ ၁၀% နှင့် အထက်ပိုင်ဆိုင်သော အဓိက အစုရှယ်ယာပိုင်ရှင်များ၏ အမည်စာရင်း နှင့် ကိုယ်ရေးရာဇဝင်၊
( စ ) ကြားကာလဗဟိုဘဏ်က သတ်မှတ်သည့်ပုံစံတွင် ပြည့်စုံစွာ ဖြည့်စွက်၍ ဒါရိုက်တာအဖွဲ့ဝင် ( ၂) ဦးမှ လက်မှတ်ရေးထိုးထားသည့် လျှောက်လွှာ၊
( ဆ ) ဘဏ်၏ပိုင်ဆိုင်မှု နှင့် ဖွဲ့စည်းတည်ထောင်မှုဆိုင်ရာ အထောက်အထားစာရွက် စာတမ်းများ၊
( ဇ ) အဆိုပြုဖွဲ့စည်းပုံဇယား နှင့်
( ဈ ) ကြားကာလဗဟိုဘဏ်က သတ်မှတ်သည့် အနည်းဆုံးမတည်ငွေရင်း (required capital) အား ထည့်ဝင်မည့်အစီအစဉ်၊
၉။ ကြားကာလဗဟိုဘဏ်သည် လုပ်ငန်းလုပ်ကိုင်ခွင့်လိုင်စင်လျှောက်ထားခြင်းကို လက်ခံရရှိ ပြီးနောက် လုပ်ထုံးလုပ်နည်းနှင့်အညီ စိစစ်၍ လုပ်ငန်းလုပ်ကိုင်ခွင့်လိုင်စင်ထုတ်ပေးမည်။
၁၀။ နွေဦးဖွံ့ဖြိုးရေးဘဏ်သည် ၎င်း၏လုပ်ငန်းတိုးချဲ့ခြင်း၊ လုပ်ငန်းလိုင်စင်လျှောက်ထားစဉ်က တင်ပြ ခဲ့သည့် ဘဏ်လုပ်ငန်းနှင့် စီးပွားရေးလုပ်ငန်းဆိုင်ရာ အစီအစဉ်ပါ လုပ်ငန်းတရပ်ရပ် အားရပ်စဲခြင်း၊ လုပ်ငန်း ပုံစံတရပ်ရပ် အသွင်ပြောင်းခြင်းတို့ ဆောင်ရွက်တိုင်း ကြားကာလ ဗဟိုဘဏ်သို့ အသိပေးရမည်။
အခန်း (၅)
မတည်ငွေရင်းနှင့်အမြတ်ခွဲဝေခြင်း
၁၁။ (က) နွေဦးဖွံ့ဖြိုးရေးဘဏ်တည်ထောင်ရာတွင် အနည်းဆုံးထည့်ဝင်ရမည့် မတည် ငွေရင်းသည် US$- ၅၀၀,၀၀၀ (အမေရိကန်ဒေါ်လာ ငါးသိန်း)ဖြစ်သည်။ ဘဏ်၏ အစုရှယ်ယာတစ်ခုလျှင် (US$ ၀.၀၀၀၁) ဖြင့် သာမန်အစုရှယ်ယာပေါင်း တစ်ရာဘီလီယံ (၁၀၀,၀၀၀,၀၀၀,၀၀၀) သတ်မှတ်သည်။
( ခ ) နွေဦးဖွံ့ဖြိုးရေးဘဏ်၏ ခွင့်ပြုမတည်ငွေရင်းကို ဘဏ်အတွက် ဥပဒေအရ ဖွဲ့စည်းတည်ထောင် ထားသည့် ကုမ္ပဏီ၏ အစုရှယ်ယာ အစည်းအဝေးတွင် ဆုံးဖြတ်ချက်အရ သတ်မှတ်၍ ကြားကာလ ဗဟိုဘဏ်သို့ အသိပေး တင်ပြထားရမည်။ အဆိုပါ ခွင့်ပြုမတည်ငွေရင်းကို နွေဦးဖွံ့ဖြိုးရေးဘဏ်၏ နှစ်ပတ်လည် အထွေထွေညီလာခံ ( Annual General Meeting–AGM) ၏ အတည်ပြုဆုံးဖြတ်ချက်ဖြင့် တိုးမြှင့်နိုင်ပြီး ယင်းသို့ တိုးမြှင့်သည့်အခါတိုင်း ကြားကာလဗဟိုဘဏ် သို့ အသိပေး တင်ပြထားရမည်။
၁၂။ နွေဦးဖွံ့ဖြိုးရေးဘဏ်သည် ကြားကာလဗဟိုဘဏ်၏ ခွင့်ပြုချက်ဖြင့် လုပ်ငန်းစတင်သည့် ပထမနှစ်မှ အပ နှစ်စဉ်အမြတ်ငွေမှ ဒါရိုက်တာအဖွဲ့က သတ်မှတ်သော ရာခိုင်နှုန်းတစ်ရပ်ကို အစုရှယ်ယာရှင်များသို့ အစုပေါ်အမြတ် ခွဲဝေပေးရမည်။
အခန်း (၆)
ရန်ပုံငွေများ တည်ထောင်ခြင်း
၁၃။ နွေဦးဖွံ့ဖြိုးရေးဘဏ်သည် အထွေထွေသီးသန့်ရန်ပုံငွေကို တည်ထောင်ရမည်။ ထိုသို့ တည်ထောင်ရာတွင် ကြားကာလဗဟိုဘဏ်၏ သတ်မှတ်ချက်နှင့်အညီ အသားတင်အမြတ်ငွေ ၏ ရာခိုင်နှုန်း တရပ်ကို အထွေထွေ သီးသန့်ရန်ပုံငွေစာရင်းတွင် ထည့်သွင်းခြင်းဖြင့် ဆောင်ရွက် ရမည်။
၁၄။ နွေဦးဖွံ့ဖြိုးရေးဘဏ်သည် အထူးသီးသန့်ရန်ပုံငွေကိုလည်း ရလမ်းမရှိသောချေးငွေများနှင့် ရရန် မသေချာသော ချေးငွေများအတွက် တည်ထောင်ရမည်။ ထိုသို့ဆောင်ရွက်ရာတွင် နှစ်စဉ် အမြတ်ငွေမှ ဒါရိုက်တာအဖွဲ့က သတ်မှတ်သော ရာခိုင်နှုန်းတရပ်ကို ယင်းအထူးသီးသန့် ရန်ပုံငွေ စာရင်းသို့ ထည့်သွင်း ရမည်။
၁၅။ ဖွံ့ဖြိုးမှုရန်ပုံငွေကိုလည်း နှစ်စဉ်အမြတ်ငွေမှ ဒါရိုက်တာအဖွဲ့က သတ်မှတ်သော ရာခိုင်နှုန်း တရပ် ထည့်သွင်းပေးခြင်းဖြင့်လည်းကောင်း၊ ကြားကာလလိုအပ်သော ရန်ပုံငွေနှင့်ဖွံ့ဖြိုးတိုး တက်ရေးလုပ်ငန်းများ အတွက် ပြည်တွင်းနှင့်ပြည်ပမှ လှူဒါန်းငွေများ သို့မဟုတ် ထောက်ပံ့ကူညီ ငွေများဖြင့်လည်းကောင်း တည်ထောင်ရမည်။
၁၆။ ဖွံ့ဖြိုးမှုရန်ပုံငွေမှငွေများကို ကာလရှည်ရင်းနှီးမြှုပ်နှံမှုအတွက် ငွေချေးသက်သေခံ လက်မှတ်များ ဝယ်ယူ ရင်းနှီးမြှုပ်နှံခြင်းကဲ့သို့သော ကိစ္စရပ်များကို ဒါရိုက်တာအဖွဲ့၏ ဆုံးဖြတ်ချက်ဖြင့် ဆောင်ရွက်နိုင်သည်။
အခန်း (၇)
အစုရှယ်ယာများ လွှဲပြောင်းရောင်းချခြင်း
၁၇။ နွေဦးဖွံ့ဖြိုးရေးဘဏ်၏ ကနဦးမတည်ငွေရင်းထည့်ဝင်သော အစုရှယ်ယာပိုင်ရှင်များ အပါအဝင် ဘဏ်၏ အစုရှယ်ယာပိုင်ရှင်များသည် ၎င်းတို့၏ အစုရှယ်ယာများအား လူပုဂ္ဂိုလ်နှင့် တရားဝင်ဖွဲ့စည်းတည်ထောင် ထားသော ပြည်တွင်း၊ ပြည်ပငွေရေးကြေးရေးအဖွဲ့အစည်းများသို့ လွှဲပြောင်းရောင်းချနိုင်သည်။ ဘဏ်၏ အစုရှယ်ယာစုစုပေါင်း၏ ၁၀% နှင့်အထက်ပမာဏရှိသည့် အစုရှယ်ယာလွှဲပြောင်းရောင်းချခြင်းများအတွက် ကြားကာလဗဟိုဘဏ်၏ ကြိုတင် ခွင့်ပြုချက်ဖြင့် ဆောင်ရွက်ရမည်။
အခန်း (၈)
လုပ်ကိုင်ခွင့်ရှိသောလုပ်ငန်းများ
၁၈။ နွေဦးဖွံ့ဖြိုးရေးဘဏ်သည် အောက်ပါတို့ကိုဆောင်ရွက်နိုင်သည်-
(က) ကြားကာလတွင်- အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၏ ဘဏ်အဖြစ်ဆောင်ရွက်ခြင်း၊
( ခ ) ဘဏ်တွင်စာရင်းဖွင့်လှစ်ထားသူများအား ၁ လ ၊ ၃ လ ၊ ၆ လ ၊ ၉ လ ၊ ၁ နှစ် သက်တမ်းရှိသည့် ပုံသေအပ်ငွေစာရင်းများကို မြန်မာကျပ်ဖြင့် အပ်ငွေစာရင်း နှင့် သတ်မှတ်ထားသော နိုင်ငံခြားငွေ
ဖြင့် အပ်ငွေစာရင်း တို့ ဖွင့်လှစ်ပေးခြင်း၊
(ဂ) အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ(NUG)၊ စီမံကိန်း၊ ဘဏ္ဍာရေးနှင့် ရင်းနှီးမြှုပ်နှံမှုဝန်ကြီးဌာန (MOPFI) တို့အား Offshore Entity မှတဆင့် နှစ်ချင်းဆပ် သို့မဟုတ် နှစ်လတ်ချေးငွေများ ထုတ်ချေးခြင်း၊
(ဃ) ဒါရိုက်တာအဖွဲ့၏ ခွင့်ပြုချက်ဖြင့် အခြားချေးငွေများထုတ်ချေးခြင်း၊
( င ) အပ်ငွေလက်ခံခြင်း၊ အပ်ငွေပြန်လည် ထုတ်ပေးခြင်းတို့ကို ဆောင်ရွက်ရန်ဒါရိုက်တာ အဖွဲ့၏ ခွင့်ပြုချက်ဖြင့် ကိုယ်စားလှယ် (Relationship Managers) များ ရွေးချယ်ခန့်အပ်ခြင်း၊
(စ) NUG pay wallet နှင့် ချိတ်ဆက်၍ လုပ်ငန်းများဆောင်ရွက်ခြင်း ၊
(ဆ) Crypto related လုပ်ငန်းများဆောင်ရွက်ခြင်း၊
(ဇ) Crypto wallet မှစုဆောင်းရရှိသော Crypto currency (USDT) ဖြင့် Fiat Loan များ ထုတ်ချေးခြင်း၊
(ဈ) အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ ၊ စီမံကိန်း၊ ဘဏ္ဍာရေးနှင့် ရင်းနှီးမြှုပ်နှံမှုဝန်ကြီးဌာန နှင့် အခြား သော တော်လှန်ရေးအထောက်အကူပြု အဖွဲ့အစည်းများ က ဘဏ္ဍာရန်ပုံငွေရှာဖွေရာတွင် ထုတ်ဝေသည့် Product များ အတွက် ငွေပေးချေ ပေးခြင်း၊ NFT (Non-Fungible Token) ထုတ်ပေးခြင်း၊ ကိုယ်စားလှယ်လုပ်ငန်းများ ဆောင်ရွက်ပေးခြင်း၊
(ည) အပိုဒ်ခွဲ(ဈ) ပါ Product များအား ငွေတိုက်စာချုပ်နှင့် အစုရှယ်ယာအဖြစ် ပြောင်းလဲခြင်းကို ဆောင်ရွက်ပေးခြင်း၊ Product များကို ပြင်ပစျေးကွက်မှတဆင့် ရောင်း/ဝယ်/လဲလှယ် နိုင်အောင် ဆောင်ရွက်ပေးခြင်း
(ဋ) နွေဦးထီ နှင့် အလားတူ Product များ အတွက် ကိုယ်စားလှယ် ဆောင်ရွက်ခြင်း၊
(ဎ) ကမ္ဘာ့ရွှေစျေးအတိုင်း သတ်မှတ်တွက်ချက်ထားသည့်နှုန်းဖြင့် Gold Certificate များ ထုတ်ပေး ခြင်း၊ ရွှေသက်သေခံလက်မှတ်များစုဆောင်းခြင်း၊ ရောင်းဝယ်ခြင်းများအတွက် ကိုယ်စားလှယ် ဆောင်ရွက်ခြင်း၊
အခန်း (၉)
ကော်ပိုရိတ်အုပ်ချုပ်မှုနှင့်ဘဏ်အားစီမံခန့်ခွဲခြင်း
၁၉။ (က) နွေဦးဖွံ့ဖြိုးရေးဘဏ်ကို ဒါရိုက်တာအဖွဲ့ဖြင့် စီမံခန့်ခွဲရမည်။
( ခ ) ဒါရိုက်တာအဖွဲ့ကို အဖွဲ့ဝင် အနည်းဆုံး (၃)ဦးဖြင့် ဖွဲ့စည်းရမည်။ အဖွဲ့တွင် အောက်ပါ ဒါရိုက်တာအဖွဲ့ဝင်များ ပါဝင်ရမည်-
(၁) စီမံကိန်း၊ ဘဏ္ဍာရေးနှင့် ရင်းနှီးမြှုပ်နှံမှု ဝန်ကြီးဌာန၊ အမျိုးသား ညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ မှ တာဝန်ရှိသူ (၂)ဦး
(၂) စီမံကိန်း၊ဘဏ္ဍာရေးနှင့်ရင်းနှီးမြှုပ်နှံမှုဝန်ကြီးက ခန့်အပ်သည့် စီးပွားရေး ဆိုင်ရာမူဝါဒ ကျွမ်းကျင်သူအနည်းဆုံး (၁)ဦး၊
(၃) ကြားကာလဗဟိုဘဏ်ဥက္ကဋ္ဌ သို့မဟုတ် စီမံကိန်း၊ဘဏ္ဍာရေးနှင့် ရင်းနှီးမြှုပ်နှံမှု ဝန်ကြီးက ခန့်အပ်သည့် ဘဏ်ပိုင်ဆိုင်မှုအဖွဲ့ဝင် သို့မဟုတ် ဘဏ်လုပ်ငန်း ကျွမ်းကျင်သူ၊
(၄) သီးခြားလွပ်လပ်သည့် ဒါရိုက်တာ အဖွဲ့ဝင် အနည်းဆုံး (၁) ဦး၊
၂၀။ (က) ကြားကာလတွင် ဘဏ်၏ဥက္ကဋ္ဌအဖြစ် အမျိုးသား ညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၊ စီမံကိန်း၊ ဘဏ္ဍာရေး နှင့် ရင်းနှီးမြှုပ်နှံမှုဝန်ကြီးဌာန တာဝန်ရှိသူ တဦးက ဆောင်ရွက်ရမည်။
(ခ) အသွင်ကူးပြောင်းရေးကာလတွင် ဘဏ်၏ဥက္ကဌအဖြစ် သင့်လျော်သောပုဂ္ဂိုလ်အား အစားထိုး
ခန့်အပ်တာဝန်ပေးနိုင်သည်။
( ဂ ) ဥက္ကဋ္ဌအပါအဝင် အဖွဲ့ဝင်အားလုံး၏ သက်တမ်းသည် တစ်နှစ်ဖြစ်သည်။ သက်တမ်းတိုးခြင်း (သို့မဟုတ်) ပြောင်းလဲခန့်အပ် တာဝန်ပေးခြင်းများကို နှစ်စဉ် ပြုလုပ်သော Annual General Meeting တွင် ဆုံးဖြတ်သွားမည်။
၂၁။ အောက်ပါပုဂ္ဂိုလ်တို့ကို နွေဦးဖွံ့ဖြိုးရေးဘဏ်၏ အဓိကအစုရှယ်ယာရှင်အဖြစ် လည်းကောင်း၊ ဘဏ်၏ ဒါရိုက်တာအဖွဲ့နှင့် စီမံအုပ်ချုပ်မှုအဖွဲ့ဝင်များအဖြစ်လည်းကောင်း ဆောင်ရွက်ခွင့်မပြုရ-
(က) ပြည်သူ့ကြွေးမြီ စီမံခန့်ခွဲမှုဥပဒေကို တတိယအကြိမ် ပြင်ဆင်သည့်ဥပဒေ (၂၀၂၁ခုနှစ်၊ ပြည်ထောင်စု လွှတ်တော် ဥပဒေအမှတ် ၄) ပုဒ်မ ၂၊ ပုဒ်မခွဲ (ဗ) အရ “ကန့်သတ်ထားသော အဖွဲ့အစည်းများ”၊
( ခ ) ဘဏ်လုပ်ငန်းနှင့် အဖွဲ့အစည်းဆိုင်ရာ ဥပဒေများနှင့် ဆန့်ကျင်လျက် တရားမဝင် ဆောင်ရွက်ချက်များတွင် ပါဝင်ပတ်သက်ဖူးကြောင်း အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရက သတ်မှတ်ခြင်းခံရသူ၊
( ဂ ) ဘဏ်နှင့်ငွေရေးကြေးရေးဆိုင်ရာ အဖွဲ့အစည်းများ၏လုပ်ငန်းများလုပ်ကိုင် နိုင်စွမ်း မရှိသူ၊
(ဃ) ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ်၊ ဖေဖော်ဝါရီလ (၁) ရက်နေ့မှစ၍ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီအား အဓိက ထောက်တိုင် အဖြစ် ပံ့ပိုးဆောင်ရွက်ခဲ့သူများ
(ဃ) လူမွဲစာရင်းခံယူထားသူများ
၂၂။ ဒါရိုက်တာအဖွဲ့၏ အောက်တွင် အောက်ပါကော်မတီများနှင့် ကော်မတီအဖွဲ့ဝင်များကို ဒါရိုက်တာ အဖွဲ့၏ အစည်းအဝေးဆုံးဖြတ်သဘောတူညီမှုဖြင့် ဖွဲ့စည်းတည်ထောင်ရမည် -
(က) Asset Management Committee
( ခ ) Audit & Risk Committee
( ဂ ) Remuneration Management Committee
၂၃။ ဒါရိုက်တာအဖွဲ့သည် အထက်အပိုဒ် ၂၂ ပါ ကော်မတီများ၏ လုပ်ငန်းတာဝန်အသီးသီး ကို သတ်မှတ် ပေးရမည်။
အခန်း (၁၀)
စာရင်းများပြုစုခြင်းနှင့် ထိန်းသိမ်းခြင်း
၂၄။ နွေဦးဖွံ့ဖြိုးရေးဘဏ်သည် -
(က) ဝင်ငွေနှင့်အသုံးစရိတ်၊ ရရန်ပိုင်ခွင့်နှင့် ပေးရန်တာဝန်များနှင့် အခြားသော ငွေရေးကြေးရေး စာရင်းများကို နိုင်ငံတကာစာရင်းကိုင်စံများနှင့်အညီ ပြုစု၍ ကြားကာလဗဟိုဘဏ်သို့ အစီရင်ခံစာများကို သတ်မှတ်သည့်အချိန်ကာလ အလိုက် တင်ပြရမည်။
( ခ ) စာရင်းမှတ်တမ်းများအား Customer နှင့်လုပ်ငန်းဆက်သွယ်မှု ရပ်ဆိုင်းသည့်နေ့မှ အနည်းဆုံး ငါးနှစ်ထိန်းသိမ်းထားရမည်ဖြစ်ပြီး ငါးနှစ်ထက်ကျော်လွန်ပြီး နောက်ယင်းမှတ်တမ်းများကို ပယ်ဖျက်လိုပါက ကြားကာလဗဟိုဘဏ်(သို့မဟုတ်) ယင်းအားဆက်ခံသော ဗဟိုဘဏ်၏ ကြိုတင် ခွင့်ပြုချက်ရယူရမည်။
အခန်း (၁၁)
စာရင်းစစ်ဆေးခြင်းနှင့်အစီရင်ခံခြင်း
၂၅။ နွေဦးဖွံ့ဖြိုးရေးဘဏ်သည် နိုင်ငံတကာအသိအမှတ်ပြု စာရင်းစစ်အဖွဲ့အားငှားရမ်း၍ ပြင်ပစာရင်းစစ် ခန့်ထားနိုင်သည်။
၂၆။ ဘဏ္ဍာရေးနှစ်အတွက် စာရင်းစစ်၏ စစ်ဆေးတွေ့ရှိချက်အစီရင်ခံစာနှင့် လက်ကျန် ရှင်းတမ်းတို့ကို အများပြည်သူသိရှိစေရန် ထုတ်ပြန်ကြေညာရမည်။
၂၇။ ကြားကာလဗဟိုဘဏ်၏ စာရင်းစစ်ဆေးရေးမှူးများ သို့မဟုတ် ကြားကာလဗဟိုဘဏ်က ခန့်အပ်သော စာရင်းစစ်များသည် နွေဦးဖွံ့ဖြိုးရေးဘဏ်အားစစ်ဆေးနိုင်သည်။ ယင်းသို့ စစ်ဆေးသည့်အခါ အစစ်ဆေးခံဘဏ်၏ -
(က) စာရင်းများ၊ သက်ဆိုင်ရာစာရွက်စာတမ်းများ၊ စာအုပ်များနှင့် အခြားစာရွက် စာတမ်းများကို စစ်ဆေးနိုင်သည်၊
( ခ ) ဖွဲ့စည်းပုံ၊ လုပ်ငန်းဆောင်ရွက်မှုများနှင့် စပ်လျဉ်းသည့်သတင်းအချက်အလက်များကို သက်ဆိုင်ရာ ကြီးကြပ်သူများ၊ စီမံခန့်ခွဲသူများ၊ ကိုယ်စားလှယ်များနှင့် ဝန်ထမ်းများကို မေးမြန်းနိုင်သည်။
အခန်း (၁၂)
ဆက်နွှယ်နေသူများအား ချေးငွေထုတ်ချေးခြင်းဆိုင်ရာ ကန့်သတ်ချက်များ
၂၈။ ဘာဆဲလ် စံသတ်မှတ်ချက်အပါအဝင် နိုင်ငံတကာဘဏ်လုပ်ငန်းဆိုင်ရာ အကောင်းဆုံး လုပ်ထုံး လုပ်နည်းများအရ နွေဦးဖွံ့ဖြိုးရေးဘဏ်သည် ၎င်း၏ အဓိကအစုရှယ်ယာရှင်များ၊ ဒါရိုက်တာ အဖွဲ့ဝင်များ သို့မဟုတ် ဝန်ထမ်းများနှင့် ၎င်းတို့နှင့်ဆက်နွှယ်နေသူများအား ချေးငွေ ထုတ်ချေးပေးခြင်း မပြုရ။
အခန်း (၁၃)
အခြားတာဝန်ဝတ္တရားများ
၂၉။ ဤစည်းမျဉ်းအရ နွေဦးဖွံ့ဖြိုးရေးဘဏ်က လိုက်နာရမည့် အခြားတာဝန်ဝတ္တရားများမှာ အောက်ပါ အတိုင်းဖြစ်သည် -
(က) ဘဏ်သည် ၎င်း၏အပ်ငွေနှင့် ချေးငွေအပေါ် အတိုးနှုန်းများနှင့်ဝန်ဆောင်ခ အမျိုးမျိုးကို ကြားကာလဗဟိုဘဏ်သို့ (၆)လတစ်ခါ အသိပေးတင်ပြရမည်။
(ခ) နွေဦးဖွံ့ဖြိုးရေးဘဏ်အနေဖြင့် ကြားကာလဗဟိုဘဏ်က စည်းမျဉ်းများထုတ် ပြန်၍ သတ်မှတ်သည့်အတိုင်း မတည်ငွေရင်း လုံလောက်မှုအချိုး၊ သီးသန့်ငွေ လိုအပ်ချက်၊ ငွေကြေး လွယ်ကူမှုအချိုးအပါအဝင် ငွေရေးကြေးရေးဆိုင်ရာ အချိုးများနှင့် စည်းမျဉ်းများ၊ ငွေကြေး ခဝါချမှုနှင့် အကြမ်းဖက်မှုကိုငွေကြေးထောက် ပံ့မှုဆိုင်ရာ လိုက်နာဆောင်ရွက်ရမည့် အချက်များ တို့ကိုလိုက်နာရမည်ဖြစ်သည့် အပြင် ကြားကာလဗဟိုဘဏ်က သတ်မှတ် တောင်းခံသည့်အတိုင်း စာရင်းဇယား များပေးပို့တင်ပြရမည်။
(ဂ) နွေဦးဖွံ့ဖြိုးရေဘဏ်အနေဖြင့် ငွေကြေးခဝါချမှုနှင့် အကြမ်းဖက်ငွေကြေးထောက်ပံ့မှု တိုက်ဖျက်ရေးတွင် နိုင်ငံတကာအဖွဲ့အစည်းများဖြစ်သည့် Financial Action Task Force (FATF) ၊ Asia Pacific Group on Money Laundering ( APG) တို့ကဲ့သို့သော အဖွဲ့ အစည်းများ၏ အကြံပြုချက်များ၊ စံသတ်မှတ်ချက်များ၊ best practices များအား လိုက်နာ အကောင်အထည်ဖော်ဆောင်ရွက်သွားရမည်။
( ဃ) ဘဏ်၏ဒါရိုက်တာအဖွဲ့ဝင်များ၊ စီမံခန့်ခွဲမှုအဖွဲ့ဝင်များနှင့် ဝန်ထမ်းများသည် နိုင်ငံတကာ နှင့် ဒေသတွင်းဘဏ်များလိုက်နာသည့် လျှို့ဝှက်ချက်များထိန်းသိမ်းရန် တာဝန်ကိုဖြစ်စေ၊ လျှို့ဝှက်ထားရန် တာဝန်အား ခြွင်းချက်ပြုခြင်းကိုဖြစ်စေ လိုက်နာရမည်။
(ပုံ) တင်ထွန်းနိုင်
ဥက္ကဋ္ဌ
ကြားကာလဗဟိုဘဏ်
အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2023-07-18
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Banking
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
1.28 MB
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Description:
"Despite the unerringly military nature of state control in Myanmar for decades, the junta has on several occasions — and especially in times of crisis — used ancient traditions and rituals of Buddhist kingship to legitimise its control, even endowing military officers with special religio-ritual characteristics. Niklas Foxeus tracks this phenomenon in its various contexts.
In post-Independence Burma, starting from 4 January 1948, the model of Buddhist kingship to promote and defend Buddhism has repeatedly been employed as a source of political legitimacy, especially in times of uncertainty, contestation and instability. Although the circumstances have changed from one period to another, the ideology of Buddhist kingship has been a common denominator of political leaders of most governments: during the U Nu period (1948–62, with some hiatuses); the late Ne Win period (1962–88); the military dictatorship of SLORC–SPDC (1988–2011); and after the military coup of 1 February 2021, led by General Min Aung Hlaing.
The model draws on the karmic path of Buddhism: improving karma through merit-making by giving alms and other donations to the sangha (monastic community); building or renovating pagodas, monasteries and the like, thereby enabling a rebirth in the heavenly world of the gods (nat-pyi) or as a wealthy human being in the next life (while those who commit misdeeds can be reborn in hell (nga-ye)), and so forth.
In a more traditional understanding of society as mainly determined by karma from previous lives, everyone deserves his or her social position. The kings or — in a modern context, political leaders — have, similarly, earned the highest position in society due to their superior accumulation of karmic merit acquired in previous lives. Hpoun (‘power’ or ‘glory’) is obtained as a result of having a large store of karmic merit. As noted by Min Zin, hpoun is taken for granted and naturalised at most levels of Burmese society, from the family to the government; further, there are also certain signs of superior hpoun such as the ability to collect huge amounts of donations to host merit-making ceremonies on a grand scale; giving lavishly to monks; building imposing pagodas and monasteries, etc. Such acts will not only generate more favourable karmic merit but will also serve as a source of social prestige.
A politically significant sign of such karmic power is being able to seize political power and maintaining it, or the appearance of white elephants as its embodiment (see below). This hpoun is therefore (as Min Zin points out) self-legitimating by its mere fact (certain signs or possession of power). What is needed is a public that will recognise its significance. As we will see, that may have changed in the contemporary period. Having committed misdeeds (especially military leaders), acts of merit-making are also performed to create a balance between the accumulation of merit and demerit. Many of the features above can be traced back to the so-called Asokan model of the Buddhist Indian King Asoka (r. 273–32 BC).
There are thus three dimensions involved in, for instance, public performances by Buddhist leaders:
display of karmic power (hpoun);
generating karmic merit through Buddhist merit-making;
social prestige.
The performative spectacles of the military leaders have covered these three dimensions, with an emphasis on the first: to persuade the people of their possession of superior store of karmic merits from previous lives providing them with hpoun and a cosmic sanction to rule as a kind of Buddhist kings defending and promoting Burmese Buddhism and nation.
*
Shortly after independence, Burma was plunged into civil war with Karen and Communist insurgencies. At the same time, there were rumours, prophecies and expectations — from around the 1940s — that a righteous king would arrive who would protect and promote Buddhism. Moreover, there were also expectations that a Buddhist ‘world emperor’ (Burmese sekyā-watay-min; Pali cakkavattin) would appear, both figures, at times, seemingly fused in the popular imagination. The future king would inaugurate a prosperous era for Burma and Burmese Buddhism that would make it last for its prophesied remainder of about 2,500 years during the second half of the sasana era.
In this unstable and tumultuous period, U Nu became prime minister and came to embody the expectations of a righteous Buddhist king who would promote Buddhism after a long hiatus of British colonial rule. Some regarded U Nu as a bodhisatta (a Buddha-to-be), like the Burmese kings, while others believed that he was the prophesised Buddhist world emperor. U Nu, however, combined this Buddhist imaginary with an essentially secular socialist ideology. Like a king in the Asokan model, he convened the so-called Sixth Buddhist Synod in 1954–56. He built pagodas, monasteries and even temples for the spirit-cults of the 37 Lords. As his Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League (AFPFL) party won three elections (1952, 1956, and 1960), it was clear that his persistent appeal to traditional Buddhist sensibilities resonated with most of the Buddhist population. In the 1960 elections, he even promised to make Buddhism the state religion.
In contrast to earlier periods, the military leaders of the SLORC–SPDC government, which seized power in a coup in 1988 following a popular uprising, portrayed themselves as inheritors of the Burmese Buddhist warrior kings that had united the country, of whom there were grand statues in the new capital Naypyidaw, the ‘Abode of Kings’ (in 2005): King Anawrahta (1044–77), King Bayinnaung (1551–81), and King Alaungpaya (1752–60).
To appease popular opinion, the military junta promised to hold multi-party elections in May 1990. The National League for Democracy (NLD) and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi won a landslide victory, but the military government refused to hand power to them. Later the same year, in August, monks organised a monastic boycott of the military. As it had annulled the Constitution of 1974, the military junta had no formal source of political legitimacy; it was essentially a military council ruling by decree. Without popular consent to rule, they began to focus more on Buddhist sources of legitimacy. They employed Buddhism as a kind of populist political legitimation strategy, and performed a ritual theatre in a performative manner to persuade the public about the notion that they are the rightful rulers of Burma/Myanmar, not merely defending the country and preventing its disintegration but also — like the historical Burmese kings — foremost in promoting and defending the Buddha’s dispensation (sasana), as well as Burman Buddhist cultural traditions and customs. In 1994, as noted by Juliane Schober, the military government borrowed a tooth relic from China and led a procession in royal style (with other rituals) in order to unify the divided public in their common interest of Buddhist merit-making. It was a performative spectacle in the emulation of pre-colonial royal Buddhist ceremonies that portrayed the generals as righteous rulers (dhammaraja) over the Buddhist realm.
At this time, the military government repeatedly declared (in state-controlled media) that it had found white elephants. In traditional Buddhism, white elephants are seen as a cosmic confirmation of the hpoun of the ruler that confirms his political legitimacy and promises an era of abundant prosperity. It is one of the seven jewels of a Buddhist world emperor and thought to be able to bring rain and prosperity. There were also other cosmic signs that were meant to confer legitimacy on them. What people could not see on the ground in the economically mismanaged country at the time, they were thus assumed to see in such cosmological signs promising a prosperous future. Reportedly, it was General Than Shwe who first used white elephants as a source of political legitimacy since the monarchical period; nine white elephants were found during his rule. In one elephant stall, there is an inscription attributed to General Than Shwe saying: ‘White elephants are only found during the reign of a glorious king. It is an omen that augurs the country’s prosperity.’
*
On 1 February 2021, General Min Aung Hlaing carried out a miliary coup in which the army seized power from the NLD, which had won a landslide victory in the general elections of November 2020. Although the military junta (titled the State Administration Council (SAC)) led by General Min Aung Hlaing claimed to seize power in accordance with the Constitution of 2008, it was, according to analysts, unconstitutional and illegal.
Once again, Burma/Myanmar had a government ruling without popular consent. As during the former military junta rule, military leaders turned to Buddhism for political legitimacy. During the demonstrations that broke out following the coup throughout major parts of the country, initially led by a popular movement called the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM), General Min Aung Hlaing seemed to focus on Buddhist matters, namely finishing what he claimed to be the largest seated Buddha statue in the world, a project he began before the coup. In the months following the coup, while the streets were filled by demonstrators and clashes occurred between them and the police and the military, Min Aung Hlaing held several ceremonies and organised events to which monks were invited where they discussed the project devoted to his seated Buddha statue. Like his predecessors, Min Aung Hlaing made lavish donations to the monks and the Sangha; he performed — like military rulers of SLORC-SPDC — various magical rituals (yadaya-khye) intended to ward off dangers and mishaps predicted by astrologers and to help to maintain his power; and a white elephant was found that would confirm his hpoun.
According to Ingrid Jordt, some/many Burmese people during the SLORC–SPDC period (1988–2011) were persuaded by some of the Buddhist cosmological implications of the performances and events during military governments confirming their hpoun and right to rule. However, the younger Generation Z seems to be more secular, or have at least adopted more secular attitudes demanding religion be separated from politics, including monks supporting their own cause. Moreover, they have mocked and ridiculed the generals and military rule by using humour, thereby rejecting their pretentions of legitimate claims to power.
After the coup, the monk Sitagu Hsayadaw, formerly held in great respect by the people, became a kind of chief monastic advisor to Min Aung Hlaing, thereby providing him with legitimacy. As a result, his reputation has been tarnished and he has come to be despised by people belonging to the Opposition. He is criticised and ridiculed on social media. This public criticism of a famous monk is a significant change in comparison to earlier times.
An important difference between U Nu and the military dictatorships is that he won elections and enjoyed popular support among the people. He did not portray himself as a warrior king but mainly as a pious Buddhist layman who sought to implement Buddhist principles in society as a kind of panacea for social, political, and economic problems — like disseminating loving-kindness to all living beings; avoiding killing living beings by the prohibition of using pesticides by farmers; and trying to refrain from using violence against insurgents.
By contrast, the military seized power, and most people were/are opposed to their rule. In the absence of popular consent, they turned to Buddhism as a kind of populist political legitimation strategy and performed a ritual theatre in a performative manner to persuade the public about the notion that they are the rightful rulers of Burma/Myanmar. Their sincerity has — among Western observers and some Burmese people — therefore often been doubted, that is, that they are using religion instrumentally in a cynical manner. However, it is likely that they are more convinced than anyone else of the efficacy of their own rituals and the significance of various perceived signs of their greatness. Military leaders have turned to astrologers and cult leaders for various forms of divination and power-strengthening rituals (yadaya-khye). Min Aung Hlaing even claimed that his white elephant is superior to those of the generals of the former military junta; and maintained that his ruby — a symbol of royalty — is larger and of better quality than theirs, etc. The seated Buddha statue he is currently sponsoring will, he has claimed, be the largest one in the world. In this way, he seems to say that he is even more fit to be a righteous Buddhist ruler than the previous generals, because the cosmic signs are more persuasive.
Yet, Min Aung Hlaing seems to enjoy less respect among the public than his predecessors. The public mockery of him reached unforeseen levels in the months following the coup in February 2021. Demonstrators carried portraits of him hanging from the gallows; photographs of him were strewn on the streets so that not only would the demonstrators trample on them but also soldiers and police, a very disrespectful act; slippers were seemingly sold with his portrait underneath them; and even toilet paper with his portrait was sold. On cartoons, he has been sometimes depicted as a short man wearing women’s high-heeled shoes that would make him taller.
All these actions were a kind of popular mocking counter-discourse to any claim he could make to legitimate political power. Generation Z may be less likely to be persuaded by the public performances of Buddhist kingship and related cosmic sanctions than previous generations, probably a sign of the social and ideological transformations the country has undergone, especially in urban areas during the 10-year (2011–2021) experiment in democracy.
*
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2023-07-17
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"Key Event Details
Location of Incident: 13 villages in Shwegu township (ရွှေကူ မြို့နယ်), Kachin state (ကချင် ပြည်နယ်)
Man Wein (မံဝိန်း) village [24.137754, 96.738591]
Si Thar (စီသာ) village [24.128808, 96.745465]
Man Nar (မံနား) village [24.126390, 96.745613]
Tone Kauk (တုံးကောက်) village [24.136419, 96.753562]
Si Thaung (စီသောင်) village [24.107611,96.746033]
Man Hkar (မံခါး) village [24.117149, 96.737877]
Si Maw (စီမော်) village [24.136141, 96.719658]
Hing Kawng (ဟိန်ကောင်) village [24.131099, 96.724823]
Si Mu Gyi (စီမူကြီး) village [24.153250, 96.739304
Si Mu Lay (စီမူလေး) village [24.149589, 96.732140]
Nam Lang (နန့်လန်) village [24.157110, 96.719063]
Nawng Let Gyi (နောင်လက်ကြီး) village [24.162870, 96.723030]
Moe Kint (မိုးကင့်) village [24.131803, 96.711720]
Date/Time of Incident:
24 March 2023 - 11 April 2023
Alleged Perpetrator(s) and/or Involvement:
Light Infantry Division (LID) 88
Infantry Battalion (IB) 10, IB 77 under LID 88
Myanmar Air Force (MAF)
Kachin Independence Army (KIA)
Shwegu People’s Defense Force (PDF)
Summary of Investigation:
Shwegu township is an area of known resistance and site of clashes between the local Kachin Independence Army (KIA), Shwegu People’s Defense Force (PDF), and the military.
Multiple incidents were reported by social media users and local media in Shwegu between the end of March and mid-April including airstrikes, destruction of a medical facility, and ground battles.
Myanmar Witness has fully verified damage and destruction to structures in five villages through the geolocation of user-generated content (UGC).
Myanmar Witness partially verified fires in several other villages in Shwegu township between 24 March 2023 and 11 April 2023.
Myanmar Witness also investigated claims that these attacks have resulted in the death and displacement of civilians in the township but have been unable to verify these occurrences.
Executive Summary
On 24 March 2023, it was alleged that Myanmar military forces clashed with KIA and PDF joint forces in Shwegu township, Kachin state. As a result of these clashes, which continued from 25 March 2023 to 11 April 2023, multiple villages - 13 were identified by Myanmar Witness - suffered air and ground attacks from the Myanmar military resulting in fires and the destruction of housing. Some villages experienced multiple fires within this time period.
Myanmar Witness verified, through geolocation and chronolocation of UGC and FIRMS data, fires in 13 villages in Shwegu township between 24 March and 11 April 2023. Media sources reported that 12 villages were affected during the clashes, but Myanmar Witness has also identified fires in Moe Kint village. This could indicate that 13 villages were affected.
Additionally, Myanmar Witness geolocated an alleged airstrike in Si Thar village; a site that the Shwegu PDF claimed the military had attacked. Myanmar Witness has geolocated additional footage which purports to show a medical facility having suffered damage akin to an airstrike attack in Si Thar village, suggesting that civilian infrastructure has been affected by the clashes in Shwegu. Myanmar Witness has identified content that indicates the presence of Myanmar military troops during and/or before the fires in Shwegu and around the affected area. Their presence was determined by cross-referencing location information from pro-Security Administration Council (SAC) media channels and social media claims related to SAC personnel presence and operations in the area.
Background and Context
Shwegu has experienced clashes between the military, the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), and local PDF since the military coup in February 2021. By June 2021, Myanmar Peace Monitor reported that roughly 6,000 civilians had fled from 42 locations in Mansi and Shwegu townships, Kachin state, due to clashes in the area. The Shwegu region borders three notably important conflict areas in Myanmar: Sagaing (part of the ‘dry zone’), Kachin, and Shan (Figure 1).
Prior to the coup, Kachin was an area of prolonged internal conflict. Ethnic armed organisations have long sought autonomy over the state and control over its natural resources. Since the coup, the KIA has been one of the ethnic armed organisations actively supporting the development of armed resistance in the dry zone, such as Sagaing and Magway. In these areas, fighting between the PDF and the military is ongoing, with repeated claims that the military is targeting communities in areas of suspected PDF activity. Attacks impacting civilians have become more commonly reported and investigated by Myanmar Witness. For example, Myanmar Witness investigated an airstrike on a concert which reportedly killed over 80 people.
Multiple media organisations have reported on the destruction in Shwegu between 24 March 2023 and 11 April 2023. Civilian houses in Nam Lang village were allegedly destroyed due to clashes between local defence forces and the military on 24 March 2023. On 25 March, BBC Burma reported that airstrikes had taken place in the villages of Nam Lang, Man Wein and Si Thaung. On 30 March 2023, Khit Thit Media reported that the SAC cut the internet and phone connections in Shwegu township. The military has historically used internet shutdowns to quell opposition, notably since taking power in February 2021 and — as Myanmar Witness has previously reported on — during the following months of anti-military protest. However, platforms such as Netblocks, OONI and IODA, which often report on communications blackouts, provide no indication that there was an internet shutdown, preventing Myanmar Witness from verifying these claims. Nevertheless, there is relatively little UGC associated with the fires in Shwegu, supporting the notion that some form of restriction on communication systems was in place.
Since 30 March 2023 — when it is alleged that the military cut the internet connection — several villages were reportedly attacked by the military using airstrikes and arson, including: Man Wein, Si Thar, Tone Kauk, Si Thaung, Man Hkar, Si Maw, Nam Lang, and Nawng Let Gyi. The media generally report clashes in 12 villages in Shwegu, which resulted in fires. Myanmar Witness has partially verified fires in a further six villages using low-resolution satellite imagery analysis and FIRMS: Man Nar, Hing Kawng, Si Mu Gyi, Si Mu Lay, and Moe Kint.
Myanmar Witness was able to verify:
At least 13 villages suffered fire damage between 24 March and 11 April 2023.
The destruction of the villages was verified through the use of Sentinel satellite imagery.
The possible dates of fires were identified through FIRMS, which indicated that some villages may have been attacked multiple times.
Four villages were badly affected by fire. The damage and destruction, as shown by UGC, was geolocated to: Si Thaung, Man Wein, Si Thar, and Nawng Let Gyi villages. Some structural damage was also verified in Man Nar village allegedly due to airstrikes.
A building in Si Thar, allegedly a medical facility, was badly damaged during the timeframe investigated.
The investigation walkthrough
Myanmar Witness identified a cluster of fires in Shwegu township using the Myanmar Witness fire database, which were then verified using FIRMS and Sentinel. Following this, Myanmar Witness conducted an investigation to identify related UGC and reports via social media channels and official media sources, which led to further verification of the impact of the fires and destruction in five of the villages.
Myanmar Witness cannot verify the exact number of houses destroyed due to the limited UGC and information. Multiple media sources claimed that the military were the single perpetrator responsible for the fires, setting them intentionally throughout the clashes with the KIA and PDF in the area. Myanmar Witness has been unable to verify these claims. Despite this, Myanmar Witness confirmed that fire incidents in Shwegu township were consistent with the locations where clashes between the military, KIA, and PDF were reported.
The following section will provide information related to fires in the 13 villages. Fire incidents in five villages were classified as ‘fully verified’ as Myanmar Witness was able to identify and geolocate UGC associated with the fires and the destruction they caused (as per Myanmar Witness’ methodology). Incidents in the remaining villages were ‘partially verified’ using FIRMS and Sentinel data. Despite the verification of fire incidents and the resultant destruction, in all cases there is no evidence to conclusively say that the military was responsible.
Lastly, the impact of the fires and clashes in the township was investigated, including the displacement and deaths of individuals.
Myanmar Witness analysed satellite imagery from these locations and confirmed that the 13 villages had suffered from fire damage. Satellite imagery from 20 April 2023 (nine days after the clashes reportedly ended) demonstrates destruction in each village, some of which is considerable.
Despite there being no related UGC of Si Maw, Hing Kawng, and Man Nar from 10 April 2023 to allow for the further verification of fires through geolocation, Myanmar Witness identified parts of these villages which appear to have active fires at the time when Sentinel satellite imagery was taken. This can be seen using Sentinel’s false colour filter on 10 April 2023 (Figure 7).
Fires in five villages further verified using UGC
Si Thaung
Si Thaung village reportedly experienced fires more than once within the investigative timeframe. For example, the media reported the first fire on 25 March, however FIRMS didn't detect fire signatures that day. On the same day, a Shwegu Facebook page and the BBC posted images allegedly showing the aftermath of military attacks in Si Thaung, Si Mu Lay, and Man Wein. Myanmar Witness geolocated the images (Figure 8) to Si Thaung at 24.105928, 96.748044.
Although there were claims of airstrikes in the area, the images posted by the Shwegu Facebook page are inconclusive. While some show destruction that is consistent with airstrike damage — houses have been completely destroyed with parts of the roofing and fencing broken — other images appear to show burnt flooring and material that could indicate fires where the houses were destroyed (Figure 9). Despite images of destruction to buildings, Myanmar Witness cannot fully verify the claims of an airstrike due to the lack of geolocatable features or verifiable evidence in these images, particularly of aircraft or munitions in the area.
FIRMS detected heat signatures on 9 April; this is consistent with the destruction Myanmar Witness identified using Sentinel satellite imagery on 20 April. Sentinel imagery from 20 April 2023 shows ground changes, suggesting potential fire damage to Si Thaung. This indicates that the village could have been the site of clashes more than once between 24 March 2023 and 11 April 2023.
Man Wein
On 30 March 2023, Mandalay Free Press reported on an airstrike in Man Wein and claimed that almost the entire village was burned down after the airstrike. The military allegedly set fire to the village by hand.
FIRMS registered a fire at around 0844 on 30 March 2023 in Man Wein. Myanmar Witness geolocated PDF drone footage that reveals that almost the whole of Man Wein was damaged by fire. Myanmar Witness geolocated this drone footage to around 24.137754, 96.738591. Using Google Earth’s measurement tool, Myanmar Witness estimates that a 60 m squared area of Man Wein was destroyed, as shown in the drone footage. This coincides with the Sentinel satellite imagery burn mark visible the day after the event on 31 March 2023 (Figure 10).
Si Thar and Man Nar
On 5 April 2023, the anti-military group Red Peacock media reported that Si Thar was hit by an airstrike, resulting in the destruction of the village’s hospital and fire damage to the adjoining village of Man Nar (Figure 11). FIRMS data shows multiple heat signatures in Si Thar and Man Nar villages on 5 Apr 2023, consistent with media claims that the military attacked these villages on these days. Both villages also appear to have suffered significant burn damage, evident through changes to ground coverage as identified using Sentinel imagery (dated 20 April 2023).
Shwegu PDF posted footage on 6 April 2023, purporting to show the aftermath of the airstrike on the medical facility which Myanmar Witness geolocated to 24.128808, 96.745465 (Figure 12). Myanmar Witness also geolocated images of destruction to Man Nar village. Limited UGC showing the aircraft or munitions has made it difficult for Myanmar Witness to confirm the airstrike. Despite this, the damage to structures in Si Thar and Man Nar appears to be consistent with an air attack: buildings suffered structural damage (especially to roofing). Additionally, images posted online by Shwegu PDF indicate that there was fire damage and active fires.
Nawng Let Gyi
On 11 April 2023, Mizzima reported that the military set fire to Nam Lang and Nawng Let Gyi (for the second time). FIRMS also detected high heat signatures around Nam Lang on 11 April 2023. Myanmar Witness analysed Sentinel imagery (taken on 20 April 2023) and confirmed that both villages suffered significant ground changes which are consistent with burn damage.
Myanmar Witness also identified and verified UGC from Nawng Let Gyi village, confirming the extent of the destruction (uploaded by a private account and the source has been redacted due to privacy concerns).
Displacement and Victims
Clashes causing displacement
On 23 March 2023, The 74 Media reported that thousands of residents from the western side of Shwegu were seen fleeing Shwegu township at around 0800 local time, as the military was reportedly using heavy weapons in the area. Similarly, on 17 April 2023, Kachin News Group reported that around 10,000 people had fled Shwegu, with more than half of them living in surrounding jungles, where emergency medical aid and food were needed. Individuals supporting IDPs from Shwegu told the Kachin News Group that IDPs feared returning to villages in southeast Shwegu due to concerns about the military’s return.
At the time of reporting, Myanmar Witness has not identified verifiable footage of IDP movement from the township. It’s likely that internet shutdowns and ongoing conflict could have hampered the documentation and reporting of these events. As such, these claims have not, as of yet, been verified.
Deceased individuals
PCT reported at least 17 known KIA/PDF soldiers were killed by the military during the clashes. On 19 April 2023, RFA also reported on casualties of the clashes, including that the bodies of ten individuals were found after the military convoy left Shwegu. The victims’ names and ages were shared online. The casualties reportedly aged between 22-60 years old. RFA also noted that these individuals had sustained injuries to their throats and gunshot wounds. MRTV uploaded images of three deceased individuals allegedly killed during the clashes; two of which were wearing military fatigues. The MRTV post alleged that these individuals were KIA/PDF personnel killed during clashes in the area. Myanmar Witness could not identify images of all of the deceased individuals.
Graffiti
Mandalay Free Press released Images online allegedly showing messages left on structures within Shwegu (although the specific village or location remains unknown). These messages contain profanities directed against the KIA and PDF (Figure 17). Myanmar Witness has reported on similar graffiti in other sites of conflict and have largely been considered an intimidation tactic.
Munitions
During the course of the investigation, Myanmar Witness analysed a video posted by local residents on Facebook on 12 April 2023, in which they claim that munitions from a military aircraft had been found in Si Thaung.
Myanmar Witness cannot identify with certainty the type and model of the filmed ordnance nor the system that delivered it. At the same time, Myanmar Witness has identified some noteworthy details – reported below – which allow for an overall assessment that the ordnance filmed in the video was highly likely delivered by an aircraft.
In the video, seven pieces of ordnance are visible. The seven pieces of ordnance appear to be identical apart from one, which has an additional tail kit with fins section still partly attached (Figure 19). Myanmar Witness believes that it is highly likely that the other six pieces of ordnance belong to the same model as the seventh but lack the additional tail kit, which may have been lost during flight or impact.
The presence of add-on tail kits strongly suggests these rounds were re-purposed to be employed by aircraft. At the same time, the lack of suspension lugs on all of the bombs’ bodies indicates that these rounds could not have been attached to any aircraft pylons. The possibility that these rounds were fired by a rocket pod must be excluded, given the absence of a rocket motor and the fixed tail fins. For these reasons Myanmar Witness strongly believes that these seven rounds may in fact be sub-munitions, released mid-air by a larger, cargo-type bomb.
An additional element which corroborates this thesis is the strong resemblance between the only surviving tail kit found in Shwegu township with other add-on tail kits allegedly found in the Kokang region of Shan State – following SAC airstrikes – and posted on Facebook on 28 December 2022 (shown below). On that occasion the add-on kits were found together with a large container-type bomb.
Conclusion
Myanmar Witness investigated a cluster of 13 fires in Shwegu township between 24 March 2023 and 11 April 2023. These fires coincided with claims online that the military was active in the area. All 13 fires were confirmed using FIRMS and sentinel satellite imagery, and five of the fires were further verified following the geolocation of UGC of the fire damage. As a result, Myanmar Witness is confident that multiple fires occurred in villages in Shwegu around the time clashes were taking place in the area.
Myanmar Witness has also identified several allegations of airstrikes and claims related to munitions found in these attacks. It is claimed online that LID 88 and the Myanmar Air Force were responsible, causing destruction to medical facilities and close to places of worship. While this could not be verified, the munitions found were consistent with those used in other Myanmar Air Force attacks.
This investigation has highlighted the destruction of civilian infrastructure and identified claims related to the mass displacement of individuals from the township as well as human casualties. Myanmar Witness will continue to monitor claims related to the human toll of fires.
Abbreviations
Ethnic Armed Organization/Ethnic Resistance Organisation - EAO/ERO
Fire Information for Resource Management System - FIRMS
Kachin Independence Army - KIA
People’s Defense Forces - PDF
Local Defense Forces - LDF
Myanmar Air Force - MAF
State Administration Council - SAC
User Generated Content - UGC..."
Source/publisher:
Myanmar Witness
Date of entry/update:
2023-07-17
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Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Armed conflict in Burma - attacks on civilians, Human Rights and international relations, Political History
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"Less than a decade ago, Wan Kuok Koi, better known as “Broken Tooth”, was incarcerated in a purpose-built top-security detention facility on Coloane, one of the two islands that once formed part of the old Portuguese possession of Macau off the coast of southern China. He was arrested in May 1998 after a bomb exploded in a minivan belonging to Antonio Marques Baptista, nicknamed “Rambo”, the new crime-busting head of the then Portuguese territory’s police force. No evidence of his involvement in that attack was ever revealed in court. Instead, he was brought to justice on old charges related to intimidation of employees at the Lisboa Casino in Macau, loan-sharking and suspicion of being a member of “an illegal organization”.
In plain language, that meant a triad, the secret societies that are the Chinese equivalent of the Mafia. After a lengthy and complicated trial—where one witness after another was struck by sudden bouts of amnesia and could not remember anything—he was nonetheless sentenced to 15 years in prison and had all his assets confiscated in November 1999, a month before Macau reverted to Chinese rule and became, like Hong Kong, a “Special Administrative Region” (SAR) of the People’s Republic of China.
Among the many outlandish ventures Wan was accused of running, and made public by jurists during the trial, was a weapons business in Cambodia, where he allegedly sought to trade in rockets, missiles, tanks, armored vehicles and other kinds of military equipment in the then civil war-wracked country. Few envisioned that he would ever re-emerge as what he had always claimed to be—just “a prominent businessman”. But that is exactly what happened when he was granted early release in December 2012. Wan had by then spent 13 years and 10 months behind bars.
Leveraging old connections, Wan nestled himself back into the casino business in Macau and, after a few years, launched a cryptocurrency called Dragon Coin. He also established three entities operating out of Cambodia: The Hongmen History and Culture Association; the Dongmei Group, which is officially headquartered in Hong Kong; and the Palau China Hung-Mun Cultural Association, supposedly based in the Pacific Ocean nation Palau.
The designations said it all. Hongmen, or Hung Mun in Wan’s native Cantonese dialect, is the name of the original underworld triads formed in the 18th century. According to a Dec. 9, 2020 statement by the US Treasury Department, the Hongmen History and Culture Association in particular soon spread its influence across Southeast Asia, first in Cambodia—and then in Myanmar. Wan’s Dongmei Group is a major investor in the casino enclaves near Myawaddy that were established after a faction of the Karen National Union and its Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) broke away, entered into ceasefire agreements with the Myanmar military, and became a Border Guard Force (BGF).
The first such enclave was Shwe Kokko, which was built on the ruins of a former KNLA military base known as Kawmoorah, or Wangkha, which was overrun by the Myanmar military in 1995. The BGF that gained official control over the enclave is led by Saw Chit Thu, a former KNLA officer whose army protects all activities at Shwe Kokko. Officially called Yatai New City and locally known as “Chinatown”, the project was launched in April 2017 and when completed is supposed to include luxury housing, hotels, shopping malls, trade centers, factories, golf courses, casinos, and perhaps even an airport. Shwe Kokko was soon followed by two other, similar self-governing “special economic zones” near Myawaddy, the so-called Huanya International City and the Saixigang Industrial Zone. Wan’s Dongmei Group and its network of shady affiliates are major investors in those projects. Wan is also known to be involved in projects in Mong Pawk southeast of the Panghsang (Pangkham) headquarters of the United Wa State Army on the border between Myanmar and China.
According to a July 2020 report by the United States Institute of Peace, “The Dongmei Company itself appears to have incorporated as a business in Hong Kong on March 3, 2020, but is operating out of Kuala Lumpur. Wan promotes the project through the official public WeChat of the Hongmen Association, as well as in partnership with a Guangdong-based representative of the Huaguan Holding Company.”
It is evident that Wan has powerful connections and is protected by high-level officials in China. According to a researcher who is following developments in Myanmar’s frontier areas, “Wan Kuok Koi clearly has tremendous influence across China, Hong Kong and Macau, close relations with the local government in Guangdong province, and very deep ties with the [Chinese Communist] Party’s united front organizations and Overseas Chinese Associations. In my view, the Party sees him as useful in doing a lot of its political work—both in Hong Kong and Macau, and in Southeast Asia more broadly.”
But how has it been possible for a former convicted felon and alleged leader of an organized crime group to become an influential and seemingly untouchable business tycoon? While criminals may live outside the law, they have never been outside society. In China especially, there has always been a symbiosis between law and crime. The links between officialdom and secret societies became obvious to the outside world in the run-up to Hong Kong’s return to the “motherland”, which eventually happened in 1997. On April 8, 1993, Tao Siju, chief of China’s Public Security Bureau, gave an informal press conference to a group of local reporters in the then still British territory. After making it clear that the “counter-revolutionaries” who had demonstrated for democracy in Beijing’s Tiananmen Square in 1989 would not have their long prison sentences reduced, he began talking about the triads: “As for organizations like the triads in Hong Kong, as long as they are patriotic, as long as they are concerned with Hong Kong’s prosperity and stability, we should unite with them.” Tao also invited “the patriotic triads” to come to China to set up businesses there.
The statement sent shockwaves through Hong Kong’s then professional police force and there was an uproar in the still independent media. But the people of Hong Kong should not have been surprised. Deng Xiaoping, the father of China’s economic reforms, had over the years hinted at the existence of connections between China’s security services and some Hong Kong triads. In a speech in the Great Hall of the People in October 1984, Deng had pointed out that not all triads are bad. Some of them were “good” and “patriotic”, he said.
Before Hong Kong was handed over to Beijing, and people could demonstrate their support for pro-democracy groups inside China, certain “patriotic triads” were Beijing’s eyes and ears in the territory. They infiltrated trade unions and even the media and reported their findings back to the authorities inside China. In July 2019, by which time Hong Kong had been a supposedly self-governing SAR for more than two decades and local people were demanding democratic reforms, masked men equipped with wooden sticks and metal rods stormed into a train station in Hong Kong, assaulting people returning home from a pro-democracy protest. In other incidents, thugs were seen beating up pro-democracy demonstrators and removing tents and barriers they had set up. Needless to say, no action was taken against the perpetrators.
Wan may have spent more than a decade in a Macau prison, but he nevertheless fits the profile of a “true Chinese patriot” and, therefore, has proven useful to China’s security services. According to the World Hongmen History and Culture Association’s public profile, it is a patriotic organization supportive of China’s worldwide infrastructure project, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and advocates the transfer of Taiwan to control by the authorities in Beijing. The association has also criticized what it calls “separatists” in Hong Kong, meaning the territory’s pro-democracy movement, and condemned US “interference” in Chinese politics.
Like many other Chinese organized crime figures, Wan has humble roots. Born in the slums of Macau in 1955, he joined at an early age one of the many violent youth gangs in the territory and reportedly still bears scars from his street-fighting days. He was shot and wounded twice and severely injured when
he was attacked by a rival gang armed with meat cleavers. He lost several teeth in another fight, which earned him the nickname “Broken Tooth Koi”. He later rose through the ranks of the street gangs and became a full-fledged member of the 14K triad and eventually became the boss of its Macau chapter. As such, he commanded a band of several hundred young ma jai, or “horse boys”, which ran various street protection and extortion rackets that sometimes led to gunslinging turf wars with rival gangs.
And he even clashed, briefly and verbally, with the media. In early 1997, an unsigned letter was sent to several newspapers in the area saying: “Warning: From this day on it is forbidden to mention Broken Tooth Koi in the press, otherwise bullets will have no eyes and knives and bullets will have no feelings.” Outlandishly dressed in a striped suit, boldly designed shoes, flashy silk shirts and with a couple of mobile phones attached to his belt, he could be seen dining with his men at the most exclusive restaurants in Macau. He seemed untouchable until his arrest in 1998, and now appears to have established, or perhaps even re-established, a working relationship with Chinese authorities.
Today a rich and free man, Wan has had his broken teeth fixed and can smile confidently at his new transnational business empire. Interests in Myanmar’s frontier areas form an important part of his intricate network of overseas enterprises—but international public and private investigators tracking his activities are not convinced of what he claims to be benevolent pursuits of happiness. In Cambodia, Wan claims to be involved only in the establishment of schools where people can learn more about “Chinese culture”. The US Treasury believes otherwise and claimed in that statement issued on Dec. 9, 2020 that he is “a leader of the 14K triad” which engages in “drug trafficking, illegal gambling, racketeering” as well as “bribery, corruption and graft.”
The Treasury Department went on to accuse him of “corruption, including misappropriation of state assets, the expropriation of private assets for personal gains, and corruption related to government contracts or the extraction of natural resources.” The Irrawaddy was not able to contact Wan for this article, but the Treasury Department has announced that it has blocked any holdings he may have in the US and banned all transactions between him and US nationals under the Global Magnitsky Act. Named after Russian tax lawyer Sergei Magnitsky, who died in a prison in Moscow in 2009, the act was originally signed into law by then US President Barack Obama in 2012. Amended in 2016, it authorizes the US government to sanction foreign government officials worldwide who are human rights offenders, freeze their assets, and ban them from entering the US. At the same time, the Treasury Department blacklisted and imposed sanctions on Wan’s three main enterprises: the World Hongmen History and Culture Association, the Palau China Hung-Mun Cultural Association and the Dongmei Group.
Shwe Kokko soon became a hub for all kinds of illegal activities and Wan’s networks are engaged in lucrative pursuits in the Huanya International City and the Saixigang Industrial Zone as well. Casinos are perfect vehicles for money laundering, and cross-border smuggling is rampant. Hundreds of people from India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and as far away as Kenya have been lured by promises of well-paid jobs “in the IT industry” in Thailand—only to find themselves working in online scam operations run by Chinese syndicates across the border in Myanmar. Many Thai women, hoping to get jobs as waitresses in various establishments, were tricked into sex work in the area’s casinos.
The exact nature of Wan’s connections with local authorities on the Thai side of the border may be a matter of conjecture and has never been investigated thoroughly. But it is obvious to anyone visiting the area around Mae Sot that construction material, equipment for the casinos, food and other supplies are coming from the Thai side. All new cross-border establishments north and south of Myawaddy also rely on electricity from Thailand. On June 5, Thailand ceased providing Shwe Kokko with power, but that only led to a brisk trade in generators in Mae Sot.
All these developments should serve as a warning to Western peacemakers who have repeatedly lauded various ceasefire agreements between some ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) and the Myanmar military, the most extensive being the so-called “Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement” concluded in 2015. A ceasefire agreement with only promises of business opportunities—which so far has been all that the Myanmar military has promised the EAOs—and no political settlement can only lead to one thing: the border rebels become border bandits. It is, as we have seen across the border at Mae Sot, a recipe for disaster. And BGF commander Saw Chit Thu is not the only example of a rebel commander-turned-resourceful private entrepreneur after entering into a non-political ceasefire agreement with the Myanmar military. He has not managed to secure any political concessions for the Karen or brought prosperity to his community, but, in November 2022, the junta awarded him the title of Thiri Pyanchi, one of the country’s highest honors.
A similar development can be seen in Kachin State, where a former Communist Party of Burma unit in the eastern part of the state made peace with the Myanmar military as far back as 1989. First known as the New Democratic Army-Kachin, it quickly became engaged in opium and heroin trafficking, illegal logging with massive sales of timber to China, and even the production of guns, which have been sold on the black market. Other, smaller former EAOs have also become involved in—to say the least—unsavory business activities. So-called BGFs under the ultimate command of the Myanmar military exist not only among the Kachin and the Karen but also in the Pa-O area south of the Shan State capital of Taunggyi and in the Kokang area of northeastern Shan State.
China’s role in this imbroglio appears ambivalent. When Myanmar still had democratically elected members of parliament, the scams and rackets in Shwe Kokko were raised by civilian politicians and questions were asked during public hearings in Naypyitaw. In June 2020, a tribunal was even set up to investigate the Yatai New City in Shwe Kokko and developments there were halted—at least temporarily. After the 2021 coup, investors in Yatai New City were allowed to resume their construction activities, expanding the area and their range of criminal enterprises.
In 2020, the Chinese Embassy in Yangon expressed its “support” for the then government’s efforts to investigate Yatai New City, saying in a statement that China was “strengthening law enforcement and security with Myanmar” to crack down on “cross-border illegal and criminal activities such as illegal gambling and telecommunications fraud.” But it was far from clear that Beijing had any intention of pursuing the well-connected Wan on any of the various accusations made by the US Treasury Department.
Some of Wan’s old associates are back in prison in Macau, serving time in the Coloane facility for money laundering and racketeering. Wan may also have to stay clear of his old Macau stomping ground, where he is too well-known and anything he did would be embarrassing for the local SAR authorities. But Cambodia and Myanmar are not a problem, and his interests there coincide with those of China. According to the USIP report, Chinese state-owned companies such as the China Railway 20th Bureau, which has investments in construction projects outside China, and MCC International, another company involved in infrastructure projects, are working closely together with the Yatai New City project. Guojing Consulting, an affiliate of official think-tank the Center for International Economic Exchanges, has signed a partnership agreement with Yatai New City. All those endeavors are part and parcel of the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor and Beijing’s BRI.
Wan and enterprises run by him and his associates represent the new face of Chinese investment in Myanmar—and the criminalization of the country under the current junta. Not only have construction activities at Shwe Kokko, or the Yatai New City, resumed, but the Huanya International City and the Saixigang Industrial Zone have also seen a revival, with criminal networks running new areas and an even wider range of enterprises. The impact of those developments, and the possibility of more potentially disastrous “ceasefire agreements” between some EAOs and the military, could, in the long term, turn Myanmar into a failed state where only China would be able to pick up the spoils. And with the outside world preoccupied with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, there seems to be little hope of Myanmar regaining some of the international attention it once had..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2023-07-17
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Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, China-Burma relations, Burma's economic relations with China
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"Worldwide refugee crises have taken center stage in the news in recent years. According to the UNHCR report, there are currently 110 million refugees worldwide, compared to 100 million in 2022.
The report also said that the number of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) worldwide remained stable at 40 million for two decades until 2011, but this number has almost tripled due to the Syrian crisis in 2011 and various events in recent years. The re-establishment of Taliban rule in Afghanistan in 2021, the war in Ukraine in 2022, and finally the civil war in Sudan on April 15 this year have exacerbated the refugee crisis.
A refugee is a person or persons who have sought refuge from their own country to a neighboring or foreign country due to social or political discrimination and who fear loss of life or persecution upon returning to their country. They are called refugees in international law. Internationally, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) takes care of refugees in coordination with the concerned country or countries.
This year, on the occasion of the World Refugee Day (June 20), UNHCR head (High Commissioner) Filippo Grandi said the number of refugees around the world is increasing at an alarming rate. He expressed concern and said that violence among people is increasing. He lamented that we live in a polarized world where international tensions dismiss all humanitarian issues. There is a growing laxity among countries in following the principles of the 1951 Refugee Convention, even among many signatories to that convention.’
Currently, the number of displaced Myanmar nationals (Rohingya) residing in Cox’s Bazar and Noakhali in Bangladesh is said to be 9 lakh, but with the addition of 30,000 new births every year, this number will exceed 12 lakh in 2022. However, Bangladesh does not recognize these Rohingya as refugees and calls them Forcefully Displaced Myanmar Nationals (FDMN). Even though the Rohingya crisis that has been going on since 2017 has been going on for almost 6 years, it can be said without hesitation that there is no visible progress in resolving it, i.e., repatriation to Myanmar. At different times, the representatives of different countries and international organizations during their visits to Bangladesh have traditionally only heard the message of hope.
During a visit to Cox’s Bazar on March 30, Senior Vice President for US Development Daniel Runde said that the US is serious about solving the Rohingya problem. He said that the United States is working with the international community for a sustainable solution to the Rohingya problem. Meanwhile, in mid-April, an impromptu meeting on the Chinese-mediated repatriation of the Rohingya was held in Kunming, where officials from the foreign ministries of Bangladesh, Myanmar, and China participated.
A 27-member team, including 20 Rohingyas, visited Maungdaw in Myanmar’s Rakhine state on May 5 to boost the Rohingyas’ confidence and interest in repatriation. They visited various villages and transit centers in Maungdaw city and spoke to the Rohingyas there. From their reactions, it can be understood that all those hoping for repatriation are optimistic.
Meanwhile, as time goes on, there is increasing uncertainty about the continuation of humanitarian aid for the Rohingya. The reason for this is the prolongation of the Rohingya’s stay and the creation of new humanitarian crises around the world. Humanitarian services for the Rohingya are challenged to continue at the same level while providing funding for the humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan, the war in Ukraine, the floods in Pakistan, the earthquake in Turkey, the civil war in Sudan, the food crisis in Africa, etc.
The 2022 report of the United Nations Office in Dhaka, published on April 4, feared a financial crisis in 2023 with Rohingya aid. On June 1, the United Nations cut the per capita allocation for the Rohingya to $8 for the second time in a year, from $12 earlier this year. The UN said it had to take this step as funding sources for the Rohingya continued to dwindle. As of June 1, only 24 percent had been pledged against the UN’s $876 million aid appeal for 2023. On the other hand, it is not possible for Bangladesh to bear the pressure of more than 12 lakh Rohingya indefinitely.
Although the government has sheltered these Rohingyas for humanitarian reasons, there is practically no regional or international initiative to repatriate them. Although the government has been vocal about the Rohingya issue in bilateral discussions and various national and international forums, world leaders are not seen as active in solving the problem; rather, the matter is still limited to assurances. During the Prime Minister’s visit to Geneva last week, when UNHCR chief Filippo Grandi met him, the Prime Minister called for creating a favorable environment for the return of the Rohingyas to the country.
Grundy reiterated UNHCR’s support for Bangladesh on repatriation but acknowledged its limitations. Meanwhile, the joint working group (JWG) of Bangladesh and Myanmar on the issue of Rohingya repatriation was held in June 2022, after three years.
Most of the world’s refugee camps are long-term destinations for refugees, and their inhabitants are travelers on an uncertain path. Refugees in Bangladesh (Rohingya) have been living inhumane lives in confined spaces for a minimum of 6 years and a maximum of 30 years. Syrian refugees have been in Turkey and other countries for more than a decade. The Afghan refugee crisis in Pakistan and Iran has been ongoing since the 1990s.
During the post-Afghan war (2001–2002) that began after the 9-11 (2001) attacks by the United States, Afghan refugees took shelter in Pakistan, where 36 million refugees were already stayed since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the 1990s. Half of these refugees scattered across the world are children (under 18), who face an uncertain future without formal education.
According to international law, no refugee may be forced to return to their home country, where they are at risk of further persecution. In parallel, as a populous country, it is not possible for Bangladesh to shelter refugees or displaced Rohingyas staying in the country for a long period of time in accordance with international standards. Apart from this, due to the delay in their repatriation, various social disturbances are occurring frequently. Incidents of violence and conflict are frequent inside and outside the camps, which is alarming. In addition, Rohingyas often spread outside the camps, even to different parts of the country, and get involved in illegal activities.
We must not only sympathize with the plight of refugees. The forces that are creating this situation must be held accountable. Public opinion should be created in favor of refugees in the domestic and international arenas. The sooner the repatriation of Rohingyas is possible, the better for Rohingyas and their host countries. Sustainable repatriation through bilateral and international diplomatic efforts is the only solution to this crisis. So, the role of rich countries cannot be ignored; big countrie must work earnestly to solve the refugee problem..."
Source/publisher:
Eurasia Review
Date of entry/update:
2023-07-16
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Burmese refugees in Bangladesh, Internal displacement/forced migration of Rohingyas, Rohingya (cultural, political etc.)
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Sub-title:
The Thailand caretaker government’s decision to engage with the military junta in Myanmar has threatened ASEAN unity
Description:
"The outgoing caretaker government of Thailand hailed the Thailand-led informal meetings to engage Myanmar—joined by representatives of a few members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and neighbouring countries, namely Laos, Cambodia, India, China, Brunei, and Vietnam, as well as Myanmar—on 19 June as successful, amidst growing criticisms from several quarters. Only Thailand, Laos, and Myanmar had sent their Foreign Ministers for this meeting. The invitation sent from Thailand read, “ASEAN should fully reengage with Myanmar at the leaders’ level.” The Thai Foreign Ministry statement read, “informal dialogue would not amount to a formal ASEAN meeting, the ministry said, but would help support ASEAN’s efforts to end the violence in Myanmar.” The talks held in Pattaya were boycotted by significant regional countries such as Indonesia (the current ASEAN chair), Singapore, and Malaysia, leading to seeming divisions within the bloc.
Indonesia cited the lack of consensus among ASEAN members to engage with the regime leaders, while Singapore deemed it premature to engage with the junta at the summit level. The meeting received condemnation from Myanmar’s parallel civilian government, the National Unity Government, and over 300 civil society organisations and regional lawmakers. They viewed it as a clear violation of ASEAN’s consensus agreement to exclude junta representatives from high-level meetings.
The meeting received condemnation from Myanmar’s parallel civilian government, the National Unity Government, and over 300 civil society organisations and regional lawmakers.
Thailand’s decision to take the lead in organising these meetings signifies the caretaker government’s intent not to rely solely on the incoming government (that may change the current military policy towards Myanmar and align it with countries that support democracy) and ASEAN to address Myanmar-related issues. Thailand’s deputy prime minister and foreign minister, Don Pramudwinai, justified this choice by emphasising the belief that efforts to tackle the crisis within Myanmar should be smooth, given they share one of the longest borders of around 2,416 km. The organisation of these talks aims to prioritise Thailand’s best interests, particularly considering the direct impact of the issue on the borders, trade, refugee conditions, and overall business activities.
Thailand’s bilateral approach towards Myanmar diverges from the position adopted by ASEAN. In November 2021, Thailand’s deputy prime minister and foreign minister publicly announced his visit to Myanmar, where he met with Min Aung Hlaing, the coup’s leader. On 22 December 2022, Thailand took the initiative to arrange a meeting with representatives from mainland Southeast Asian countries, including Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, and Myanmar. Another meeting involving stakeholders from Thailand and Myanmar occurred in April 2023. Notably, both of these later meetings included the participation of ministers from Myanmar’s military government, the State Administration Council (SAC). These engagements contradict the ASEAN Five Point Consensus (5PC), which ASEAN member states agreed upon in April 2021. These actions by Thailand reflect its interests, concerns, and historical approach to its mainland neighbours to sort its bilateral position.
Thailand’s rationale for engaging with Myanmar
Thailand considers itself the most impacted ASEAN member state regarding the situation in Myanmar. According to reports, Thailand hosts more than 20,000 displaced people and illegal migrants from Myanmar. Similar to other Southeast Asian nations, Thailand has not signed the 1951 Refugee Convention or its 1967 Protocol, which means it does not have provisions to recognise or protect refugees according to international standards legally.
Furthermore, Thailand heavily depends on importing oil and primarily gas from the Yadana field located in the Andaman Sea off the coast of Myanmar. Following the 2021 coup, Thailand’s state-owned oil and gas company, PTT Exploration and Production, actively acquired the investments Chevron and Total divested from Myanmar.
The caretaker government of Thailand’s decision to host the foreign minister of the Myanmarese ruling junta for an ‘informal regional peace talk’ not only drew criticism but is said to again bring to the fore the internal divisions within the ASEAN bloc.
Thailand’s reliance on Myanmar extends to the labour sector, with a significant dependence on both formal and informal workers from Myanmar in various industries, including agriculture and fisheries, construction and manufacturing, and the service sector. In 2021, Thailand stood as Myanmar’s largest trading partner, and Thai businesses have a substantial presence in Myanmar, particularly in the food and beverage and pharmaceutical sectors.
However, since the 2021 coup in Myanmar, border trade between Myanmar and Thailand has significantly declined due to the junta’s restrictions to prevent weapons from reaching resistance forces. According to Myanmar’s Ministry of Commerce, under the military generals, border trade has decreased from over US$4 billion in the 2019-2020 financial year to US$3.6 billion in the 2022-2023 financial year. Ongoing border conflicts frequently delay trade, while high taxes burden traders.
For nearly two years, Myanmar’s military generals have been barred from senior-level meetings of the ASEAN for not living up to the agreement to start talks with the ousted civilian government led by now-jailed Nobel laureate Aung San Suu Kyi. Therefore, the caretaker government of Thailand’s decision to host the foreign minister of the Myanmarese ruling junta for an ‘informal regional peace talk’ not only drew criticism but is said to again bring to the fore the internal divisions within the ASEAN bloc. Critics have pointed out “it risks legitimising Myanmar’s military government and is inappropriate because it is outside the official ASEAN peace initiative, known as the five-point consensus.” But the question is, does it really present ASEAN as a fractured and divided organisation in this scenario? Even though most countries like Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore did not agree to participate in this gathering, the reason cited for not doing so was the same. All these countries wanted to stick to the decision taken at the ASEAN meetings of not engaging with the top leaders of the junta until the conditions laid down by the ASEAN are met, like the junta open to engaging with the civilian opposition government, scaling down the ongoing violence, among others.
Problems with the 5PC
The lack of progress of the five-point consensus (5PC) signed in an emergency meeting held in Jakarta in April 2021, two months after the coup, has led many to say that there is a need for the ASEAN to now look beyond the 5PC, but does that give Thailand (a fellow ASEAN member country) the pass for hosting these informal meetings and inviting the top officials like the Foreign Minister of the junta regime? This brings into question the unity and credibility of the ASEAN. Thitinan Pongsudhirak, professor of political science at Chulalongkorn University, has pointed out, “By riding roughshod over Indonesia’s leadership, Thailand is also undermining the ways that ASEAN works and the role of its chair.” Regardless of the fact (stated in the previous section) that Thailand appears to be the most affected country by the ongoing crises in Myanmar, given that Thailand itself is on the cusp of undergoing a change in government, with the new government (if it comes to power) having stated that they will be committed to the ASEAN’s 5PC, this move to engage with the military junta in Myanmar seems like a desperate attempt by the caretaker government to try and earn one last feather in its cap. Scholars like Zachary Abuza at the National War College in Washington, D.C., have stated, “Thailand’s caretaker government seems determined to continue advancing the political and economic interests of the Thai military and royalist elites.”
Countries like Indonesia and Singapore will hardly ever endorse such meetings because ASEAN forms the main nucleus of their foreign policy outlooks.
This year’s ASEAN chair, Indonesia, already has a lot on its plate, like the ASEAN community-building project, tensions in the South China Sea, the impacts of the Russia-Ukraine war, the growing United States-China rivalry, promoting the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific, and the planned accession of Timor Leste as ASEAN’s 11th member this year. But according to statements from the Indonesia Foreign Ministry, it is still “undertaking efforts with the office of the ASEAN special envoy to Myanmar to achieve an inclusive dialogue with all parties in the conflict.” While it cannot be denied that the ASEAN mechanisms like the 5PC and the various summits and meetings about the Myanmar crisis have not come out with any substantive progress, it also does not seem plausible for individual member countries to organise such informal meetings by completely side-tracking the ASEAN platform.
Countries like Indonesia and Singapore will hardly ever endorse such meetings because ASEAN forms the main nucleus of their foreign policy outlooks. If not all ASEAN countries are on board with such arrangements, that again raises a finger on the whole notion of unity within the ASEAN. At a time when ASEAN centrality is being championed in the debates centring on the evolving dynamics of the Indo-Pacific, and there are constant efforts by countries like Indonesia and Singapore to ensure that the ASEAN remains relevant amidst the mushrooming of the many mini-laterals and plurilaterals in the region, these ‘informal secretive meetings’ will only feed into the ongoing narrative of the ‘fading of the ASEAN unity’.
Critics of the ASEAN 5PC have said that alternate plans and drastic measures should be taken, like suspending Myanmar’s membership in the ASEAN or letting the United Nations deal with this issue. These measures seem overly severe, but if the ASEAN wants to implement any of these, the decision needs to be taken following the ASEAN way and the platform of the ASEAN itself to ensure the credibility of the ‘ASEAN centrality’ principle..."
Source/publisher:
Observer Research Foundation
Date of entry/update:
2023-07-15
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Human Rights and international relations, ASEAN-Burma relations
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"Human Rights Violations Committed by Military Junta from January to June, 2023.
Military Junta troops Committed 1222 times of Human Right Violations in 15 Regions and States within 6 months from January to June 2023. According to Social Media and News Media, they committed 30 types of Human Right Violations. Among those Human Right Violations, the Military Junta attacked with heavy artillery 292 times to the Civilians and their places the most. As a second, the Military troops burnt and destroyed the civilians’ houses and properties 281 times. Third, they arrested the Anti- Military activists who protested in various ways 259 times. The Military Junta Troop is targeting and attacking Civilians entire country and also destroying the Civilians’ houses and buildings by launching airstrikes 128 times. As the worst Human Right Violations, the Military committed massacres by launching airstrikes and dropping bombs on over 100 civilians including children, and all died at Bazigyi Village in Kanbalu Township, Sagaing Region on April 11th in 2023. Military Junta committed rape and kill over 8 women and a total of 12 women died within 6 months. 2 civilians from Yangon Region and 6 from Mandalay Region, a total of 8 were arrested and killed by the Thwaythout Force that works under Military Junta. They committed arresting the civilians, burning the people, raping the women, and using the locals as human shields along their matching area. Civilians fled to the safety of the Military 180 times within 6 months. The Military Junta troop has been still committing Human Right Violations in various ways since the coup on 1st February 2021..."
Source/publisher:
Network for Human Rights Documentation-Burma
Date of entry/update:
2023-07-14
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Human Rights and international relations
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"The National Unity Government of Myanmar, led by opponents of the ruling junta, has criticized a recent meeting between Thailand's top diplomat and Aung San Suu Kyi, saying that it may complicate ASEAN's efforts to resolve the crisis in Myanmar.
Thailand's foreign minister, Don Pramudwinai, has revealed that he met with the ousted Myanmar leader on July 9, and that she expressed her willingness to discuss with him further the issues in her war-torn country.
Zin Mar Aung, the foreign minister of the NUG, expressed her disapproval, saying the Thai minister's actions were an attempt to parallel ASEAN's role in resolving the crisis. She said the Thai official's move calls into question the existing arrangement in which Western powers and the U.N. Security Council have pushed for ASEAN to play a central role in resolving the conflict, which has escalated since a military coup in February 2021.
Five-point proposal
Indonesia’s foreign minister, whose country is the current chair of ASEAN, stated at an annual meeting of ASEAN foreign ministers this week in Jakarta that ASEAN would continue to prioritize its five-point peace proposal. The proposal, developed in 2021, calls for a cessation of violence and brokered dialogue between the parties. The junta has faced widespread criticism for failing to implement its terms.
Thailand's foreign minister is the only international official who has been granted access to Suu Kyi since the coup. He assured ASEAN officials at the meeting in Jakarta that Suu Kyi was in good health.
In a statement released Friday, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken called on Myanmar’s military regime to “implement ASEAN’S five-point consensus” and to “support a return to democratic governance.”
For more perspectives and insights, VOA conducted an interview with the NUG's Zin Mar Aung, via Zoom, on Thursday. This interview has been edited for length and clarity.
VOA: Did Thailand's foreign minister discuss his secret trip to Myanmar with the NUG? According to multiple media outlets, he briefed his ASEAN colleagues about his meeting with Aung San Suu Kyi on Sunday in Myanmar during the bloc's foreign ministers' meeting in Jakarta. Has the NUG approached him directly about these matters?
Zin Mar Aung, NUG foreign minister: No. We didn’t receive any direct communication from the Thai foreign minister regarding his meeting with Aung San Suu Kyi. The NUG has attempted to contact both the foreign minister and the Thai special envoy on Myanmar, but have received absolutely no response. We have often attempted diplomatic communication with Thailand's foreign minister on issues such as Myanmar's refugee crisis and the arrest and detention of migrant workers. The Thai foreign ministry has yet to respond to the NUG officially on any of these issues but continues to communicate with the junta regularly.
VOA: According to Japan’s Kyodo News, Aung San Suu Kyi told the minister that she supports "dialogue without any preconditions" to address her country's ongoing issues. What is NUG's opinion on this?
Zin Mar Aung: The first thing I'd want to point out is that the Thai foreign minister's comments about conveying Aung San Suu Kyi's views are inherently one-sided. She is a political prisoner with no freedom to communicate with the outside world. There were only two people at the meeting, so we have to take only his word for what was said. That is why we are skeptical that the Thai foreign minister or the junta would accurately convey messages from her that don’t fit their agenda.
VOA: How does this meeting affect the NUG?
Zin Mar Aung: The main issue is, due to the Thai foreign minister's visit, both ASEAN and the international community have become more confused when dealing with the Myanmar issue. Thailand stated that because it is Myanmar's ASEAN neighbor, it bears greater responsibility for the Myanmar issue. However, they actually try to go around the five-point consensus, rather than helping to implement it. Thailand's parallel track, outside of official channels, violates the ASEAN common agreement. Western countries and Myanmar's neighbors, such as India and China, have pushed for ASEAN centrality in resolving Myanmar's problems. NUG also have criticisms of the ASEAN, and we feel that ASEAN alone is no longer enough; however, the Thai foreign minister’s actions only serve to weaken it further.
VOA: Secretary of State Anthony Blinken, while attending the ASEAN foreign ministers' meeting, stated that he would focus on attempting to end the crisis in Myanmar. However, there is also focus on the South China Sea dispute between China and ASEAN countries. So, do you think the U.S. is effectively putting pressure on ASEAN on the Myanmar issue?
Zin Mar Aung: I must respond that it is ineffective. In the case of Myanmar, there is an ASEAN centrality policy that states that only ASEAN should take the lead in addressing the issue. It arose because powerful countries do not want to conflict with one another on the Myanmar issue. They went to ASEAN to avoid their conflicts. The Myanmar issue is simply one of several for world powers and ASEAN members. There are also regional issues, such as the South China Sea problem. There are also Indo-Pacific concerns to consider. For the U.S., Myanmar is simply a small component of their overall strategy; similarly, exerting pressure on ASEAN is only a small element of their overall strategy. As a result, the United States cannot exert significant pressure on ASEAN..."
Source/publisher:
"Voice of America" (Washington, D.C)
Date of entry/update:
2023-07-14
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Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Human Rights and international relations
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"1. The National Unity Government of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar considers the disclosures made by the Thai Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Don Pramudwinai, to the ASEAN Foreign Minister’s Meeting and to the press, of an engagement with the State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi on his recent trip to Myanmar contravene ASEAN’s authority, the ASEAN Five Point Consensus, and the role of the ASEAN Special Envoy.
2. In particular, the Thai Foreign Minister’s unilateral report of the alleged views and position of Aung San Suu Kyi are unacceptable and illegitimate, in view of her inability to not only receive factual and complete information, but to also speak freely and openly under her current arbitrary detention and solitary confinement.
3. We will continue to welcome all good faith efforts of the international community, including our neighbors, to promote a lasting and durable peace, justice and freedom, and the flourishing of a federal democracy in Myanmar, but we must stress that these outcomes will never be achieved by enabling, engaging, and cooperating with the illegitimate military coup council.
4. The ultimate goal of Myanmar’s Spring Revolution is the permanent removal and ending of all dictatorships that have become entrenched, persistent, and have oppressed Myanmar over the past 70 years, and to establish a federal democratic system free from the influence and remnants of dictators.
5. In order to successfully achieve this goal, various revolutionary forces and organizations with diverse representation have united and are working together hand-in-hand with the principles of collective leadership, collective responsibility, and enduring commitment based on equality.
6. As such, the National Unity Government, with a firm hold on the vision and values of a federal future, pledges to continue in our efforts to achieve these revolutionary goals established in line with the aspirations of the people, unwavering and unshakeable until victory..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2023-07-14
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
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National Unity Government (NUG), Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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"၁။ ထိုင်းနိုင်ငံ ဒုတိယဝန်ကြီးချုပ်နှင့် နိုင်ငံခြားရေးဝန်ကြီးအဖြစ် တာဝန်ယူထားသော Don Pramudwinai၏ လတ်တလော မြန်မာနိုင်ငံခရီးစဉ်တွင် နိုင်ငံတော်၏ အတိုင် ပင်ခံပုဂ္ဂိုလ် ဒေါ်အောင်ဆန်းစုကြည်နှင့် တွေ့ဆုံခွင့်ရရှိခဲ့သည်ဟု အာဆီယံ နိုင်ငံ ခြားရေးဝန်ကြီးများ အစည်းအဝေးနှင့် သတင်းမီဒီယာများအား ထုတ်ဖော်ပြောဆိုမှု များသည် အာဆီယံ၏ မြန်မာ့အရေး အခြေခံဘုံသဘောတူညီချက်ငါးရပ်နှင့် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံဆိုင်ရာ အာဆီယံအထူးကိုယ်စားလှယ်၏ အခန်းကဏ္ဍတို့ကို ကျော်လွန်စွက်ဖက် ရာရောက်သည်ဟု ရှုမြင်လက်ခံသည်။
၂။ အထူးသဖြင့် မတရားဖမ်းဆီး၍ အကျဉ်းထောင်ထဲတွင် တစ်ဦးတည်းသီးသန့် ချုပ်နှောင်ခံထားရသောကြောင့် သတင်းအချက်အလက် မှန်ကန်ပြည့်စုံစွာ လက်ခံရရှိနိုင် ခြင်း မရှိသည့်အပြင် လွတ်လပ်စွာ ထုတ်ဖော်ပြောဆိုနိုင်ခွင့်လည်း ဆုံးရှုံးလျက်ရှိသည့် ဒေါ်အောင်ဆန်းစုကြည်၏ အမြင်သဘောထားများဟု ထိုင်းနိုင်ငံခြားရေးဝန်ကြီးက တဖက်သတ်ကိုယ်စားပြု ထင်ဟပ်ပြောဆိုမှုများသည် ယုံကြည်လက်ခံနိုင်ဖွယ်ရာ မရှိသော၊ တရားဝင်မှုအလျဉ်းမရှိသော ပြောဆိုမှုများသာဖြစ်သည်။
၃။ မိမိတို့အနေဖြင့် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံတွင် ရေရှည်တည်တံ့ခိုင်မြဲသော ငြိမ်းချမ်းမှု၊ တရားမျှတမှု၊ လွတ်လပ်မှုနှင့် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီ အနှစ်သာရများ ထွန်းကားစည်ပင်လာစေရန် အိမ်နီးချင်းနိုင်ငံများအပါအဝင် နိုင်ငံတကာအသိုင်းအဝိုင်း၏ စိတ်စေတနာကောင်းဖြင့် ကြိုးပမ်းဆောင်ရွက်မှုမှန်သမျှကို ကြိုဆိုသော်လည်း တရားမဝင်အာဏာသိမ်း စစ်ကောင်စီအား အရာသွင်း ထိတွေ့ဆက်ဆံ၍ ပူးပေါင်းဆောင်ရွက်ခြင်းနည်းလမ်းဖြင့် အဆိုပါရလဒ်ကောင်းများ မည်သည့်အခါမျှ ရရှိလာလိမ့်မည် မဟုတ်ကြောင်း အလေး အနက်အသိပေးလိုသည်။
၄။ မြန်မာ့နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေး၏ အန္တိမရည်မှန်းချက်ပန်းတိုင်သည် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံတွင် နှစ်ပေါင်း(၇၀)ကျော်တိုင် အမြစ်တွယ်၊ ရှင်သန်၊ ဖိစီးနှိပ်စက်လျက်ရှိသော အာဏာရှင် စနစ်မှန်သမျှအား အပြီးတိုင်ဖယ်ရှားချုပ်ငြိမ်းစေပြီး အာဏာရှင်စနစ်၏ အငွေ့အသက်၊ အကြွင်းအကျန် အလျဉ်းကင်းစင်သည့် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီစနစ်သစ်ဖြင့် အစားထိုး ပြောင်းလဲရန်ဖြစ်သည်။
၅။ ထိုရည်မှန်းချက်ပန်းတိုင်သို့ အောင်မြင်စွာရောက်ရှိနိုင်ရေးအတွက် ကိုယ်စားပြုမှု စုံလင်ကွဲပြားသော တော်လှန်ရေးအင်အားစုများ၊ အဖွဲ့အစည်းများအကြား တန်းတူ ရည်တူဖြစ်မှု အခြေခံ၍ စုပေါင်းခေါင်းဆောင်မှု၊ စုပေါင်းတာဝန်ယူမှု၊ ခိုင်မာသော ကတိက ဝတ်ပြုမှုများဖြင့် တညီတညွတ်တည်း လက်တွဲပူးပေါင်း ကြိုးပမ်းဆောင်ရွက်လျက်ရှိ သည်။
၆။ သို့ဖြစ်ပါ၍ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရအနေဖြင့် ပြည်သူလူထု၏ လိုလားတောင့်တ ချက်နှင့်အညီ ချမှတ်ထားသည့် တော်လှန်ရေးပန်းတိုင်၊ အနာဂါတ်ဖက်ဒရယ်မျှော်ရည် ချက်နှင့် စံနှုန်းများကို ခိုင်ခိုင်မာမာ စွဲကိုင်ရပ်တည်၍ အောင်ပွဲရသည်အထိ မမှိတ်မသုန်၊ မယိမ်းမယိုင် ဆက်လက် အားထုတ်ကြိုးပမ်းသွားမည်ဖြစ်ကြောင်း ကတိပြု အသိပေး အပ်ပါသည်။
အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2023-07-14
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Thailand-Burma relations
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"We have heard the powerful message and heartbreaking updates from the UN Special Rapporteur and the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. We urge you to take a few moments to listen to this crucial update and join us in taking decisive actions. Unless immediate actions are taken, the children of Myanmar are at risk of becoming a lost generation. Since the attempted bloody coup on February 1, 2021, the genocidal military junta has mercilessly taken the lives of over 800 innocent children, unjustly imprisoned more than 380 children as political prisoners, held 51 children hostage to pressure their parents, displaced over 660,000 children, left more than 5.8 million children in need of lifesaving aid, and deprived dozens of millions of children of their right to education. These unspeakable crises demand not mere resolutions, but concrete actions from the international community in the following areas:
MONEY - We once again call on the international community, the free and democratic world, to take immediate action in cutting off the flow of international financing to the genocidal military junta, which fuels their fighter jets and arms their bomb factories. Please join the United States in sanctioning Myanmar's financial institutions, which serve as the main channels for cash flow to the junta's banks. Please join the European Union in sanctioning MOGE, one of the junta's primary sources of income, and join other nations in implementing an arms embargo and sanctioning all major financial contributors to the junta.
WEAPONS - We once again call on the international community, the free and democratic world, to take immediate action in disrupting the flow of international arms into the hands of the genocidal military junta. The more weapons they possess, the more innocent lives are lost. It is vitally crucial to disable the genocidal military junta's weapon factories and dismantle their lethal bomb factories.
LEGITIMACY - We once again call on the international community, the free and democratic world, to deny the military junta's illegitimate claim to power, as they are responsible for the murder of their own people. It is crucial to cut off all diplomatic engagements with the military junta's leadership. They, the murderers of Myanmar's people, should not represent the people of Myanmar at any level. These criminals must be held accountable for their crimes against humanity and serve their prison sentences.
Furthermore, the people of Myanmar urgently require assistance in the following areas to restore democracy, peace, and stability not only in our nation but for the entire region:
SANCTIONS - We once again call on the international community, the free and democratic world, to take immediate action by imposing coordinated, stronger, and targeted sanctions against the military junta.
RECOGNITION - We once again call on the international community, the free and democratic world, to officially recognize the National Unity Government (NUG) as the sole legitimate democratic representative of Myanmar.
SUPPORT - We once again call on the international community, the free and democratic world, to support the brave people of Myanmar in their courageous struggle against the genocidal military dictatorship. Stand with us in our pursuit of freedom and federal democratization, which is the only path to peace, prosperity, and stability not only for Myanmar but for the entire region.
For the past 27 months, the people of Myanmar have endured crimes against humanity committed by the genocidal military junta. They face these atrocities not because of their actions, but because of their unwavering belief in freedom, federal democracy, and their refusal to accept injustice, tyranny, and brutal military dictatorship.
Together, let us take a stand against these grave violations and work towards a future where the people of Myanmar can live in peace, dignity, and freedom. Our collective actions can make a difference and bring hope to the 54 million people of Myanmar who deserve a brighter and more just future..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of International Cooperation Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2023-07-13
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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"ကုလသမဂ္ဂအထူးကိုယ်စားလှယ်နှင့် ကုလသမဂ္ဂ လူ့အခွင့်အရေးဆိုင်ရာ မဟာမင်းကြီးရုံးက တင်ပြခဲ့သည့် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံရှိ စိတ်ကြေကွဲစရာအခြေအနေများနှင့် အားကောင်းသော သတင်းစကားများကို ကြားသိခွင့်ရခဲ့သည်။ဤအရေးပါသော နောက်ဆုံးဖြစ်ပေါ်လျက်ရှိသော အခြေအနေများကို အချိန်ပေးနားထောင်ပြီး ပြတ်သားသော အရေးယူမှုများပြုလုပ်နိုင်ရန် ပူးပေါင်းပေးပါ။ အရေးယူမှုများကို ချက်ချင်းမလုပ်ဆောင်ပါက မြန်မာနိုင်ငံရှိကလေးများသည် အနာဂတ်ပျက်သုဉ်းတော့မည်ဖြစ်သည်။ ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ်၊ ဖေဖော်ဝါရီလ ၁ ရက်နေ့မှစပြီး စစ်အာဏာရှင်ရဲ့ သွေးချောင်းစီးသော အာဏာသိမ်းရန်ကြိုးပမ်းခဲ့ကတည်းက အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စုသည် အပြစ်မဲ့ ကလေးသူငယ် ၈၀၀ ကျော်ကို သတ်ဖြတ်ခဲ့ခြင်း၊ ကလေးပေါင်း ၃၈၀ ကျော်ကို နိုင်ငံရေးအကျဉ်းသားများအဖြစ် မတရားဖမ်းဆီးချုပ်နှောင်ထားခြင်း၊ မိဘများကို ဖိအားပေးဖို့ရန်အတွက် သူတို့၏ကလေး ၅၁ ယောက်ကို ဓားစာခံများအဖြစ် ဖမ်းဆီးထားခြင်း၊ ကလေးပေါင်း ၆၆၀,၀၀၀ ကျော် အိုးမဲ့အိမ်မဲ့ ဖြစ်သွားရခြင်း၊ ၅.၈ သန်းကျော်သော် ကလေးများ အသက်ကယ်အကူအညီများလိုအပ်ခြင်းနှင့် ကလေး သန်းပေါင်းများစွာ ပညာသင်ယူဖို့ အခွင့်အရေး ဆုံးရှုံးခဲ့ရသည်။ မဖော်ပြနိုင်လောက်အောင် ဆိုးရွားသည့် အကျပ်အတည်းများအတွက် ညင်သာသောဖြေရှင်းနည်းလမ်းများမဟုတ်ပဲ အပြည်ပြည်ဆိုင်ရာ သက်ဆိုင်ရာအဖွဲ့အစည်းများမှ အောက်ပါကဏ္ဍများတွင် ပြင်းထန်ခိုင်လုံသော အရေးယူမှုများလုပ်ဆောင်ရန် အရေးကြီးပါသည်။
ဘဏ္ဍာရေး/ ငွေကြေး - လူမျိုးတုံးသတ်ဖြတ်နေသော အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စုအပေါ် အပြည်ပြည်ဆိုင်ရာ ဘဏ္ဍာငွေစီးဆင်းမှုများကို ဖြတ်တောက်ပေးပါ။ ၎င်းဘဏ္ဍာငွေများက စစ်တပ်၏ တိုက်လေယာဉ်များအတွက် လောင်စာဆီများနှင့် ဗုံးစက်ရုံကို အထောက်အကူပစ္စည်းများ ထောက်ပံ့ပေးခြင်းဖြစ်သည်။ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စုအတွက် ငွေကြေးလဲလှယ်ပေးသော မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၏ ဘဏ္ဍာရေးအဖွဲ့အစည်းများအပေါ် အမေရိကန်နိုင်ငံမှ အရေးယူဒဏ်ခတ်ပိတ်ဆို့သကဲ့သို့ အခြားသော အပြည်ပြည်ဆိုင်ရာနိုင်ငံများကလည်း ပူးပေါင်းပါဝင်ပေးပါ။ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စု၏ အဓိက ဝင်ငွေအရင်းအမြစ်များထဲမှ တစ်ခုဖြစ်သော MOGE ကို အရေးယူဒဏ်ခတ်ပိတ်ဆို့ရာတွင် ဥရောပသမဂ္ဂနှင့်အတူ ပူးပေါင်းပါဝင်ပေးပါ။ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီကို အဓိက ဘဏ္ဍာရေးထောက်ပံ့ပေးသူများနှင့် လက်နက်များစီးဆင်းမှုကို ဖြတ်တောက်သည့် အခြားနိုင်ငံများနှင့်အတူ ပူးပေါင်းပေးပါ။
လက်နက်များ - လူမျိုးတုံးသတ်ဖြတ်သော စစ်တပ်လက်ထဲသို့ အပြည်ပြည်ဆိုင်ရာမှ လက်နက်စီးဆင်းမှုကို ဖြတ်တောက်ပေးပါ။ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီပိုင်ဆိုင်ထားသည့် လက်နက်ပိုများလာသည်နှင့်အမျှ အပြစ်မဲ့သူများ အသက်ဆုံးရှုံးမှု ပိုမိုများပြားမည်ဖြစ်သည်။ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်၏ လက်နက်ထုတ် စက်ရုံများကို ပိတ်ပင်ပေးပြီး ဗုံးစက်ရုံများကိုလည်း ဖြိုဖျက်ပေးပါ။
တရားဝင်မှု - မိမိတို့ပြည်သူများကို အကြမ်းဖက်သတ်ဖြတ်သည့် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စု၏ တရားဝင်မှုရယူရန် ကြိုးပမ်းခြင်းကို လျစ်လျူရှုပေးပါ။ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ခေါင်းဆောင်များနှင့် သံတမန်ရေးရာ ချိတ်ဆက် ဆက်ဆံမှုအားလုံးကို ဖြတ်တောက်ပေးပါ။ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ခေါင်းဆောင်များက မြန်မာပြည်သူများကို မည်သည့်အဆင့်တွင်မှ ကိုယ်စားပြုရန် မထိုက်တန်ပါ။ ဤလူမျိုးတုံးသတ်ဖြတ်သည့် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စုသည် ၎င်းတို့ကျူးလွန်သော လူသားမျိုးနွယ်အပေါ်ဆန့်ကျင်သည့် ရာဇဝတ်မှုများအတွက် အပြည့်အဝ တာဝန်ယူ၊ တာဝန်ခံရမည်ဖြစ်ပြီး ထောင်ဒဏ်များ ကျခံရမည်ဖြစ်သည်။
ထို့ပြင် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံပြည်သူများသည် နိုင်ငံအတွင်းသာမက ဒေသတစ်ခုလုံးတွင် ဒီမိုကရေစီ၊ ငြိမ်းချမ်းရေးနှင့် တည်ငြိမ်အေးချမ်းရေးကိုပြန်လည်ထူထောင်နိုင်ရန်အတွက် အောက်ပါအကူအညီများ အရေးတကြီး လိုအပ်လျက်ရှိသည်။
အရေးယူဒဏ်ခတ်ပိတ်ဆို့ခြင်း - အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စုအပေါ် ပြင်းထန်သော ပစ်မှတ်ထားအရေးယူ ဒဏ်ခတ်ပိတ်ဆို့မှုများ နိုင်ငံတကာမှညှိနှိုင်းပြုလုပ်ပေးပါ။
အသိအမှတ်ပြုခြင်း - မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၏ တရားဝင်အစိုးရ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ(NUG)ကို အသိအမှတ်ပြုပေးပါ။
ထောက်ပံ့ခြင်း - လူမျိုးတုံးသတ်ဖြတ်သည့် စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ်ကို ရဲရင့်စွာ တော်လှန်တိုက်ခိုက်နေကြသည့် မြန်မာပြည်သူများကို ထောက်ပံ့ပေးပါ။ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံနှင့် ဒေသတွင်းတစ်ခုလုံးအတွက် လွတ်လပ်ရေး၊ ငြိမ်းချမ်းရေး၊ သာယာဝပြောရေးနှင့် တည်ငြိမ်အေးချမ်းရေးတို့ဆီဦးတည်သော တစ်ခုတည်းသောလမ်းကြောင်းဖြစ်သည့် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီရရှိရေးတိုက်ပွဲတွင် မြန်မာပြည်သူများနှင့်အတူ ရပ်တည်ပေးပါ။
လွန်ခဲ့သော ၂၇ လအတွင်းတွင် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စုက ကျူးလွန်သော လူသားမျိုးနွယ်ကို ဆန့်ကျင်သည့်ရာဇဝတ်မှုကို မြန်မာနိုင်ငံသားများက ခါးစီးခံစားခဲ့ကြရသည်။ ဤကဲ့သို့ရာဇဝတ်မှုများကို ခံစားခဲ့ကြရခြင်းသည် ပြည်သူများ၏ လုပ်ရပ်ကြောင့်မဟုတ်ပဲ လွတ်လပ်မှု၊ ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီအပေါ် ယုံကြည်ခြင်းနှင့် တရားမဝင်စစ်အာဏာရှင်များနှင့် ၎င်းတို့၏ အကြမ်းဖက်မှုများကို လက်ခံရန်ငြင်းဆန်ခြင်းကြောင့်ဖြစ်သည်။
ရာဇဝတ်မှုများကို မြေမြှပ်ပြီး မြန်မာပြည်သူများ ငြိမ်းချမ်းစွာ၊ သိက္ခာရှိစွာနှင့် လွတ်လပ်စွာ နေထိုင်နိုင်မည့် အနာဂတ်အတွက် အတူတကွ ခိုင်မာစွာရပ်တည်ရန် တိုက်တွန်းလိုပါသည်။ အားလုံးအတူတကွ ပေါင်းစည်းလုပ်ဆောင်ခြင်းဖြင့် တရားမျှတပြီး ပိုမိုတောက်ပသောအနာဂတ်နှင့် ထိုက်တန်သောမြန်မာပြည်သူ ၅၄ သန်းအတွက် မျှော်လင့်ခြင်းနှင့် ပြောင်းလဲခြင်းများယူဆောင်ပေးကြရန် တိုက်တွန်းလိုပါသည်။
လေးစားစွာဖြင့်
ဒေါက်တာဆာဆာ
ပြည်ထောင်စုဝန်ကြီး
အပြည်ပြည်ဆိုင်ရာပူးပေါင်းဆောင်ရွက်ရေး ဝန်ကြီးဌာန
အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of International Cooperation Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2023-07-13
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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Format :
pdf
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Description:
"The Singapore Exchange-listed company Emerging Towns & Cities Singapore (ETC) has announced an agreement to sell its controlling stake in the Golden City real estate development, built on land leased from the Office of the Commander-in-Chief (Army), Office of the Quartermaster General.
The deal involves the sale of the ETC Singapore subsidiary DAS, which owns 70% of the Singapore company Uni Global Power. Uni Global Power own 70% of the Myanmar company Golden Land Real Estate Development, which is the developer of the Golden City project.
The buyer is Grand Ally Pte Ltd, a private Singapore company set up in February 2023 and owned by key members of ETC who manage the Golden City project.
Grand Ally is controlled by Li Bo, a Chinese citizen who is the Vice President of Sales and Marketing for ETC, and the company’s regional sales and marketing director for Myanmar. The other shareholder/directors are Lai Xuejun and Zhang Xiaoping, who are also Chinese citizens.
ETC sold its stake in Golden City for S$4 million, which involved a loss of S$80.2 million, according to the company’s announcement.
The fact that ETC’s sale involves related parties creates risks that the company may still maintain links to the Myanmar military through its personnel and shareholders.
Justice For Myanmar asked ETC if Li Bo, Lai Xuejun and Zhang Xiaoping will continue to have a role and hold shares in ETC after completion of the sale but did not receive a response.
As Grand Ally is registered in Singapore, Singapore will continue to be exposed to Golden City’s business with the Myanmar military, which is committing ongoing war crimes and crimes against humanity with total impunity.
Through its campaign of terror against the people, the Myanmar military junta has so far murdered over 3,700, arbitrarily arrested more than 23,700, committed indiscriminate airstrikes and shelling, torture, sexual violence and displaced at least 1.5 million since the coup attempt in 2021.
Justice For Myanmar urges Singapore Exchange Regulation to scrutinise ETC’s divestment to ensure that SGX has no further direct or indirect exposure to business with the Myanmar military.
We urge Singapore to deregister Grand Ally Pte Ltd and to impose sanctions on the junta and its business interests.
Singapore banks should ensure that they do not hold accounts for Grand Ally or support the Golden City project in any way.
Governments should impose sanctions on Grand Ally Investments, its Myanmar partner, Jewellery Luck Group of Companies, and their owners and directors. Jewellery Luck Group of Companies owns 30% of Golden Land Real Estate Development through its subsidiary, Nature Link Company Limited.
Under the sale, ETC will discharge itself from a loan facility between Golden Land Real Estate and the international banks ICBC, E.SUN, and the Myanmar crony bank, Kanbawza, which will continue to be exposed to the financing of the Myanmar military through the Golden City project. All banks should end their business with the Myanmar military and its associates.
ETC’s road to divestment
The sale comes after a February 25, 2021, Justice For Myanmar report into ETC’s payments to the Myanmar army and the implications for Singapore Exchange, which found that payments to the army included a US$6.8 million “land use premium” and annual payments of US$2.8 million. The deal is under a build-operate-transfer contract, where the army receives the building as an asset at the end of the maximum 70-year term. Total payments to the army over the full 70 years would amount to US$191.1 million.
In response to Justice For Myanmar’s report, Singapore Exchange Regulation took regulatory actions against ETC on February 26 2021 and the company suspended trading.
To address questions from the SGX regulator, ETC commissioned independent reviews into payments to the Myanmar military and its legal compliance.
The independent review of transactions, carried out by Nexia TS for the period from October 2016 to February 2021, identified two payments to the Office of the Quartermaster General in 2018 and one in 2020, totalling US$5.035 million. According to the summary of findings, payments to the army were communicated “verbally and there were no formal written invoices”.
The review also found that annual payments to the army were made in MMK using a below market exchange rate of 830 MMK to the USD agreed to with the quartermaster general’s office, although the reviewers noted that there is “no formal written agreement or notification”. ETC had kept the balance as an accrued land lease premium.
In October 2021, Justice For Myanmar and the Australian Centre for International Justice published a legal memo from international law experts Felicity Gerry KC, International Criminal Court counsel, and Daye Gang of the Victorian Bar in Australia, which found that international law and guidance places due diligence obligations on the Singapore Exchange and possible liability on the Monetary Authority of Singapore and the Singapore Government for companies doing business with the Myanmar military.
The legal memo found that Singapore has an international legal obligation “to investigate, prevent and cease transactions that amount to wrongful acts”, which are applicable to business transactions with the Myanmar military and its business interests, and that legal remedies would be “easily pursued and enforced” against SGX if the Myanmar military’s financial organs are found to be in breach of international laws and/or compliance regulations including international human rights and humanitarian law.
In December 2022, ETC released an executive summary of its legal compliance review, after a follow-on engagement was commissioned to respond to the October 2021 legal memo following questions from Singapore Exchange Regulation.
The review, conducted by Kelvin Chia Partnership, outlined steps for ETC to avoid being caught by unilateral sanctions, such as by avoiding company personnel who are US, UK or EU citizens; to pay the Myanmar military in kyat; to avoid business in the US, UK or EU; and to use third-party contractors in Golden City for the installation of any machinery from the US, UK or EU.
ETC’s latest annual report shows a “partial payment” of 2.33 billion kyat (S$1.68 million) to the Myanmar army in 2022, which deepened ETC’s complicity in the Myanmar military’s atrocity crimes.
Justice For Myanmar spokesperson Yadanar Maung says: “ETC is a longstanding business partner of the Myanmar military that is complicit in the junta’s genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity.
“ETC’s divestment was necessary but raises further questions that we urge Singapore authorities to address, including whether SGX will remain exposed to the Golden City project, and the fact that a private Singapore company will continue to bankroll the murderous junta.
“We are heartened that Singapore Exchange Regulation has taken swift action against ETC over its business with the Myanmar military, and to issue sanctions guidance that strengthens the impact of Myanmar sanctions for SGX-listed companies.
“It is a positive sign that Singapore authorities are investigating companies for possible links to the supply of arms and equipment to the Myanmar military, but Singapore needs to do far more to respond to the crisis in Myanmar and to prevent the Singapore companies from providing funds to the junta, including through imposing sanctions as it has done on Russia.
“Governments must now sanction Grand Ally and its owners, who, together with Jewellery Luck Group of Companies, have chosen to continue to pursue business with the Myanmar army and finance its atrocities.”..."
Source/publisher:
Justice For Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2023-07-11
[field_licence]
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"On 11 July 2023, H.E. Ms. Busadee Santipitaks, Deputy Permanent Secretary for Foreign Affairs, was the representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to witness the humanitarian aid delivery ceremony to assist the Myanmar people affected by Cyclone Mocha where a representative of the Siam Cement Public Company Limited (SCG) delivered relief items through H.E. U Chit Swe, Ambassador of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar to Thailand, at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Thailand.
Thailand is scheduled to deliver additional humanitarian aid from the SCG, consisting of corrugated zinc sheets, roof nails, common nails and solar cell lamps as requested by the Myanmar side to support the reconstruction and rehabilitation efforts for the people affected by Cyclone Mocha on 12 July 2023. The delivery will be transported by land from Bangkok to Yangon, with the support from the Embassy of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar and the Thai-Myanmar Association for Friendship.
This is the 3rd delivery of humanitarian assistance from Thailand to Myanmar following the 1st delivery by air on 23 May 2023 and the 2nd delivery by land on 1 June 2023..."
Source/publisher:
Government of Thailand
Date of entry/update:
2023-07-11
[field_licence]
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Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Cyclones - regional, Natural Disasters - General
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"Monsieur Le Président de la République
Emmanuel Macron
Palais de l’Elysée
55 Rue du Faubourg Saint-Honoré
75008 Paris
July 10, 2023
Subject: Seeking French support to stop Indian arms sales to Myanmar junta
Dear President Macron,
We are writing this open letter to you from Justice For Myanmar, a covert group of activists using research, data visualisation, and reporting to expose and dismantle the business networks that fuel the Myanmar military’s international crimes, brutality and corruption.
We request that you raise concerns regarding the sale of arms, dual use goods and technology from India to the Myanmar junta with Prime Minister Modi during his upcoming visit to France. We also request that you require India to ban further exports of arms, dual use goods and technology to the junta as a condition on the export of French arms and technology to India.
After Russia and China, India is the third biggest supplier of arms to the Myanmar military. The flow of arms and dual use goods and technology from India to Myanmar has continued following the military’s illegal coup attempt of February 1, 2021, notably including from Indian state-owned companies.
Since the military’s coup attempt, India’s majority state-owned Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL), a joint venture partner of Thalès, transferred multiple items to the Myanmar military, including:
A coastal surveillance system;
A remote-controlled weapon station;
Slip rings that can be used in any electromechanical system that requires rotation while transmitting power or signals, such as for shipborne radar turntables, rotating turrets on military armoured vehicles, airborne radar turntables or guidance systems;
Mounting base plates (true north) with the harmonised system (HS) code 8529.90, confirming that the item is a part for use with radio transmission or radar equipment;
A sonar transducer and associated main equipment (specified to be wet end) for likely use in a junta submarine;
A directing gear system that would support transducer arrays of hull mounted ship sonar systems, such as those developed by India’s Defence Research and Development Organisation;
An underwater telephony system, coupled with three sets of unspecified technical documents and test equipment;
An expendable bathy thermograph, which can be launched from a ship or submarine to measure the temperature as it falls through the water;
MHS-355 and 20W HF SSB manpack radios.
In the same period, items supplied by other Indian companies to the Myanmar military include:
3,000 fuzes supplied by Sandeep Metalcraft, a private arms manufacturer;
Spare parts and an alarm monitoring and control system supplied by Larsen & Toubro;
122mm gun barrels supplied by Yantra India Limited, a state-owned arms manufacturer;
Motors, timing belts and laboratory items from Jainkoch Corporation.
The Myanmar military junta is a terrorist organisation under Myanmar law and as defined in international law. Since the attempted coup, the junta has killed more than 3,700 people and arrested over 23,700 more. It has conducted deliberate armed attacks on people across Myanmar including children and launches regular indiscriminate airstrikes and shelling as part of a campaign of terror. These actions constitute war crimes and crimes against humanity under international law, for which the military has yet to be held accountable. While the military junta is directly responsible for these attacks, they have been enabled by the continued supply of arms, equipment and technology from international suppliers such as India, and the insufficient level of action taken by the international community to prevent this support from continuing.
We note that in November 2022, H.E. Mr Sébastien Lecornu, Minister for the Armed Forces of France, paid his first official visit to India to hold the Indo-French Annual Defence Dialogue and to strengthen Indo-French strategic ties. The Armed Forces Minister’s visit to India reaffirms France’s engagement in the Indo-Pacific and India’s centrality in the French strategy for the region and came in a year that has seen an acceleration of the French and Indian armed forces’ endeavours towards greater interoperability through joint air, navy, and army exercises. Minister Lecornu also held wide-ranging talks with his counterpart, Rajnath Singh, covering industrial and technological partnerships in line with the Make in India policy, under which the Indian government has brought in reforms to encourage design, development and manufacture of defence equipment in India. Without adequate safeguards in place, France may find itself indirectly supporting the Indian government’s exports of arms and dual use goods and technology to Myanmar as a result of its defence cooperation with India, including through links to India’s domestic production of arms.
India, like France, is a member of the Wassenaar Arrangement. Under this arrangement, India is expected to apply export controls on transfers of arms and dual-use goods and technologies. India also has obligations under international humanitarian and human rights law to not transfer weapons when there is an expectation that these weapons could be used in violation of the Geneva Conventions, or to aid and abet atrocity crimes. The fact that that Indian companies have continued to supply weapons, dual use goods and technology after the attempted coup in Myanmar shows a serious disregard by the Indian government for its obligations under international human rights and humanitarian law, and its commitments under the Wassenaar Arrangement.
In a May 2023 report on the junta’s procurement of arms and equipment, the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar found that India’s supply of materials used in surveillance technology and artillery, as well as likely for missiles, contravenes its obligations under international law. He noted,
“India has the requisite knowledge that the Myanmar military is committing probable war crimes given the substantial international reporting on this subject. India should therefore be aware that the arms it provides to the Myanmar military – though relatively limited – are likely to be used in the commission of international crimes.”
Our request for France to take action on Indian arms sales to Myanmar is consistent with the recommendations of the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar in his reports on arms, and UN General Assembly resolution A/75/L.85, which “calls upon all member States to prevent the flow of arms into Myanmar.”
We further note that in your joint statement regarding the official visit of Prime Minister Modi, it is stated, “France and India have a shared vision on peace and security, especially in Europe and the Indo-Pacific and uphold the objectives and the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, which are also the basis of our cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region”. The UN Charter states that the first purpose of the United Nations is “to maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace”.
Your action in support of the human rights and democratic aspirations of the people of Myanmar is in line with this commitment, as well as the French values of liberty, equality and fraternity.
We look forward to your response..."
Source/publisher:
Justice For Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2023-07-10
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Business and the Military, The Burmese military's role in the economy, Arms (Military Expenditure, Arms Transfers, Arms Production Etc), Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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"The delegation led by H.E. Daw Zin Mar Aung, Foreign Minister of the National Unity Government
of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar paid an official visit to Timor-Leste (East Timor) at the
official invitation of the President of Timor-Leste from 1st to 5th July 2023. The purpose of the
visit was to enhance relationships with countries in the region, build stronger and closer ties with
neighboring countries and promote the role of Myanmar in regional organizations. During the
official visit, the delegation led by Union Minister engaged in meetings with relevant officials
including the President, the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of the Democratic Republic of
Timor-Leste.
The Delegation led by Union Minister attended the inauguration ceremony of the new government
of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste which was held on 1st July 2023. During the ceremony,
Union Minister and the delegation had the opportunity to meet with Timor-Leste’s government
leaders, regional leaders and other relevant officials. In his speech, the President of Timor-Leste
acknowledged and conveyed his greetings to Foreign Minister H.E. Daw Zin Mar Aung and U Linn
Thant, the Representative to the Czech Republic of the National Unity Government.
On 3rd July, Union Minister and the delegation had a cordial meeting and engaged in a discussion
with H.E. Mr Jose Ramos Horta at his office for an hour. During the meeting, Union Minister
presented the President of Timor-Leste with a portrait of State Counsellor H.E. Daw Aung San Suu
Kyi as a token of remembrance. Following this, Union Minister and the delegation met with H.E.
Ms Maria Fernanda Lay, the President of the National Parliament of Timor-Leste at her office.
During the official visit to Timor-Leste, Union Minister and the delegation had a meeting with
Foreign Minister H.E. Mr. Bendito dos Santos Freitas at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and
Cooperation of Timor-Leste and held discussions with other relevant officials on 4th July. Union
Minister and the delegation also met with H.E. Mr. Kay Rala Xanana Gusmao, Prime Minister of
Timor-Leste at the Prime Minister’s Office in the morning of 5th July.
As Timor-Leste is a country that emerged from the people’s revolution and its national leaders are
also representatives of the people, during the meeting with Union Minister, they warmly welcomed
the delegation, wholeheartedly supported the Myanmar people’s revolution and shared their own
experiences.
On 5th July, Union Minister and the delegation were bid farewell by the relevant officials of the
Democratic Republic of Timor-Lester. The official visit of the delegation led by the Union Minister
concluded successfully, encompassing discussions on political agreements, including bilateral
cooperation. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the National Unity Government has consistently
prioritized fostering cordial relations with neighboring countries and regional countries since its
establishment. The Ministry remains committed to further strengthening relationships and
promoting cooperation as its foremost objective..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Myanmar - NUG
Date of entry/update:
2023-07-10
[field_licence]
Type:
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Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Human Rights and international relations
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"On June 27, under the pretense of transferring them, the military removed political prisoners from Daik-U (Kyaiksakaw) Prison. 37 political prisoners have since gone missing. However, when concerned families of the political prisoners inquired at Daik-U Prison, the prison authorities repeatedly denied the whereabouts of these prisoners.
On July 7, 2023, the Staff Officer of Daik-U Prison, Kyaw Zeya (A-3702) sent a signed letter to the family of Khant Linn Naing (aka Ko Khant, aka Let Wel), Prison Registration No. PaKha/22/00436, the son of Than Soe Naing, to inform them of his death.
On July 8, Kyaw Zeya sent another signed letter to the family of Pyae Phyo Hein (aka Ko Pyae), Prison Registration No. DaU/22/00176, the son of Kyaw Oo, to inform them of his death.
The letters stated that while transferring prisoners from Daik-U Prison to Insein Prison, a transport vehicle suffered an accident. Seizing the opportunity, the two of them (Khant Linn Naing and Pyae Phyo Hein) were alleged to have attempted escape. As a result, they were killed by the security forces who fired “warning shots” at them in an attempt to recapture.
Despite the letters being dated as “June 29”, they arrived to the 2 families on only July 7 and July 8 respectively. However, in envelope provided to the wife of Pyae Phyo Hein, the letter inside the envelope was in fact addressed to Khin Moe Moe, the wife of the still missing Aung Myo Thu. According to this, there are clear grounds to believe the life of Aung Myo Thu is in danger.
Prison transfers are but one of the excuses used, and according to events in recent months there are consistent reports of people being removed from prisons, being interrogated, and killed.
On July 2, the family of political prisoner Sein Win was informed about his passing in Myingyan Prison that same day from gastrointestinal tract bleeding. However, prisoners inside the prison revealed that Sein Win had been removed from prison and interrogated. His family members also stated that bruises were found on his body from the time of his death.
On June 7, Pyu Saw Htee militiamen went to the house of political prisoner Kaung Zarni Hein’s (aka La Pyae) mother and sister, and murdered them. Thereafter, on July 6, the junta forces killed political prisoners Kaung Zarni Hein and Kyaw Thura, according to reports from within the junta’s community.
It is clear, these brazen murders of political prisoners in prisons violates not only domestic laws, but also international laws. Such killings mirror the unlawful and sadistic murders of the Jewish community by the fascist Nazi Germany during the World War II. Moreover, political prisoners removed from Daik-U Prison remain missing without a trace. It is currently unknown whether they are dead or alive. These actions overstep the procedures of prison, along with committing the heinous crime of unjust torture and illegal killings. This is also a blatant violation of the ASEAN Human Rights Convention.
In Burma, the rule of law has been rendered void since the military junta coup by the supporting pillars of junta rule: the judges; soldiers; police; prison staff, who have intentionally perpetrated wrongful arrests, unlawful sentencings, illegal killings, torture and persecution of political prisoners in prisons, at the command of the junta.
We, the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners, strongly condemn such unlawful killings and torture, we will do our best to ensure justice for all political prisoners who have been wrongfully imprisoned.
All perpetrating parties must be held accountable for these acts.
In addition to the above-mentioned crimes, the human rights violations, unlawful killings, and arbitrary torture that Burma experiences day after day are violations of international human rights law. These violations cannot be dealt with within the country’s judiciary at this time. Therefore, we strongly urge the international community to make a collective effort to take action through international judicial mechanisms.
Since the unjust seizure of state power by the terrorist junta led by Min Aung Hlaing on February 1, 2021, there have been at least a total 3,757 people killed. 150 of them lost their lives in prison due to poor healthcare and ill-treatment, or tortured to death during interrogation. The numbers shown here were based on the data AAPP collected, the real number of fatalities could be higher..."
Source/publisher:
Assistance Association for Political Prisoners
Date of entry/update:
2023-07-10
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Human Rights and international relations
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"The Myanmar crisis and implementation of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ peace plan for the country’s post-coup conflict is set to dominate the ASEAN foreign ministers’ retreat on Wednesday (July 12).
One notable absentee will be junta foreign minister Than Swe, who has not been invited despite Myanmar’s membership in the regional bloc.
The junta leadership has been excluded from ASEAN meetings since late 2021 after they failed to honor the peace plan, known as the five-point consensus.
ASEAN ministers joining the meeting are expected to express their frustration and concern over the conflict, with many showing signs of ‘Myanmar fatigue.’ But Myanmar’s neighbor Thailand will likely maintain its policy of appeasing the junta.
Thai foreign minister Don Pramudwinai flew into Naypyitaw on Sunday to meet with the regime’s senior leadership. Details of the meeting are unknown. Don plans to attend this week’s foreign ministers’ retreat in Jakarta, where he will be able to update other ASEAN members on his talks in Myanmar.
Patience is wearing thin with a peace process that has failed to gain traction, and ASEAN is under pressure to find a solution for Myanmar. Stubborn generals have been unable to control vast swaths of the country despite waging a brutal military campaign against both armed and peaceful opposition to their rule.
The majority of Myanmar citizens continue to oppose the regime following the military takeover in February 2021.
Current ASEAN chair Indonesia is taking a hardline stance against Myanmar’s military rulers for failing to implement the five-point consensus, especially the points related to ending violence, humanitarian assistance and jump-starting political dialogue.
ASEAN leaders reached the consensus for Myanmar during an emergency summit in April 2021, two months after the military staged a coup against the democratically elected National League for Democracy government. But the Southeast Asian bloc has since been heavily criticized for its inaction in pressing ahead with the five-point plan.
As chair, Jakarta has also held several meetings with Myanmar stakeholders including the country’s shadow National Unity Government (NUG), its People’s Defense Force (PDF) armed wing and allied ethnic armed organizations (EAOs).
“We have conducted 110 engagements, in the form of in-person meetings, virtual meetings, and phone calls, including my own face-to-face meetings with both the NUG and SAC [junta] foreign ministers on several occasions,” Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi said.
But observers say the peace process has made little if any progress, citing the junta’s ongoing atrocities including deadly airstrikes against civilians.
At the same time, ASEAN has been under pressure from its dialogue partners, especially the US, which wants to see the cessation of all violence against the Myanmar people. Washington has also imposed sanctions on junta leaders and two state-owned banks that the regime uses for international transactions, including for buying arms. The purpose is to cripple the military regime’s ability to wage war against civilians and the resistance.
US Secretary of State Antony Blinken will meet with his ASEAN colleagues at the Post Ministerial Conference on Friday (July 14). He will then join the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the East Asia Summit (EAS), due on the same day, to discuss regional and international issues.
Thailand’s concern with Myanmar crisis
Thailand’s outgoing military-backed government stepped into the limelight on Myanmar again on Sunday when acting foreign minister Don Pramudwinai paid a secret visit to Naypyitaw prior to the retreat.
In June, Thailand hosted highly criticized informal talks with Myanmar, Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, the Philippines, India and China to reengage with Myanmar’s military leaders. Outgoing Thai Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha argued that direct talks were necessary to protect his country, as the crisis has a direct impact on Thailand which shares a 2,416-kilometer border with Myanmar.
The meeting was, however, shunned by ASEAN chair Indonesia as well as Singapore and Malaysia, driving a rift between the regional bloc’s member states.
Of ASEAN’s 10 members, Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam are not democracies while Thailand’s outgoing government first came to power in the same way as the current Myanmar junta, via a military coup.
There is deep frustration among ASEAN members as the conflict in Myanmar drags on into its third year with no end in sight. The regime has rejected a peaceful settlement in favor of brutal suppression of opposition forces.
Jakarta is frustrated but has so far maintained a fairly balanced policy of engaging with stakeholders on both sides in Myanmar. However, this could change when Laos takes over the chair next year.
There is concern among ASEAN democracies that Laos may lift the ban on Myanmar junta leaders and allow them to rejoin regional meetings. This move would likely cause an even deeper split in ASEAN.
So far, ASEAN has come up with no effective ‘carrots’ or ‘sticks’ for Myanmar.
In May, Indonesian President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo somberly acknowledged to fellow Southeast Asian leaders that no progress had been made to end the civil strife gripping Myanmar and renewed his call for an end to violence. He spoke after yet another deadly regime airstrike on the civilian population.
Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim also voiced his frustrations, noting that about 200,000 people had fled to Malaysia to escape the tumult in Myanmar. Anwar called into question ASEAN’s rigid principle of non-intervention in its members’ internal affairs.
“Yes, there is non-interference, but we will have to then have a new vision that could give us some flexibility in order to navigate and maneuver the way forward,” he said.
So far, Myanmar’s military regime has successfully managed to hold two groups hostage – the people of Myanmar and ASEAN..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2023-07-10
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Human Rights Defenders, Human Rights and international relations
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"Human Rights Violations took place in States and Regions from July 1 to 7, 2023
Military Junta troops arrested over 100 civilians from Sagaing Region from July 1st to 7th. Over 8 civilians died by the Military’s arresting and killing within a week and a civilian was burnt and killed in Khin-U Township, Sagaing Region. 7 civilians died and 6 were injured by Military junta troops in Sagaing Region on July 6th. A child also died and 2 were injured by the Military’s heavy and light attacks.
Military Junta troops also arrested over 30 civilians within a week in Bago Region, Yangon Region and Tanintharyi Region. When youths from Yangon and Mandalay apply for a job offer that opportunity at Facebook, however the military arrests and recruits instead of getting the job..."
Source/publisher:
Network for Human Rights Documentation-Burma
Date of entry/update:
2023-07-09
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights Defenders
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Sub-title:
ITEM 4 - Oral update of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar
Description:
"The Republic of the Union of Myanmar, as represented by the National Unity Government, welcomes the oral update of the Special Rapporteur on Myanmar, Mr. Tom Andrews, as well as the Special Rapporteur's recent statements and conference room paper.
In cataloguing the illegal military junta's atrocities, including its murder and maiming of children, the Special Rapporteur urged that the junta "be disabused of any notion that time is on its side, that it need only wait out a fickle and distracted world." It must be stripped of weapons, cash and legitimacy.
Myanmar joins the Special Rapporteur in welcoming positive steps by States. These include Singapore's investigation of suppliers implicated in the transfer of weapons-related materials to the junta; the European Union's leadership in sanctioning Myanma Oil and Gas Enterprise; the United States targeting of junta-controlled banks; and Indonesia's continuing efforts as
ASEAN Chair.
Yet, as Mr. Andrew says, "more can and must be done". There must be a coordinated strategy of positive actions that are "proactive and targeted like a laser beam on undermining the junta's capacity to continue its attacks against the people of Myanmar." Myanmar, as represented by the National Unity Government, welcomes the Special Rapporteur's frank address of the dire, unconscionable and unacceptable situation of the Rohingya who, in the Special Rapporteur's words, "are being forced to make an impossible choice" between hunger and malnutrition in camps, junta atrocities in Rakhine, or the peril of unseaworthy vessels.
Myanmar recognises the Rohingya as an integral part of our nation and as Myanmar nationals.
We remain committed to addressing the root causes of the Rohingya crisis, to securing justice for the Rohingya, and to creating conditions conducive to their voluntary, safe, dignified and sustainable return to their homes. Tragically, as High Commissioner Turk today told the Council, these conditions for return "are still non-existent"
Myanmar strongly supports the Special Rapporteur's urging of UN Member States to increase their contributions to the Humanitarian Crisis Joint Response Plan for the Rohingya in Bangladesh. We also echo Mr. Andrews' call on States to "shine the light of public attention" on Myanmar and to cultivate and sustain the international action that the Myanmar people
"need and deserve".
In closing, Myanmar expresses its deep gratitude to Mr. Andrews for his tireless commitment
to his mandate and to the people of Myanmar.....၅၃ ကြိမ်မြောက်ကုလသမဂ္ဂ လူ့အခွင့်အရေးကောင်စီညီလာခံသို့ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံဆိုင်ရာ လူ့အခွင့်အရေးအထူးအကြံပေးပုဂ္ဂိုလ် မဟာမင်းကြီး Mr.Tom Andrews ကနှုတ်ဖြင့်တင်သွင်းသည့် အစီရင်ခံစာ
အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရအနေဖြင့် Mr. Tom Andrews ၏ နှုတ်ထွက်စကားဖြင့် တင်ပြမှုနှင့် ယင်းတင်ပြခဲ့သည့် နောက်ဆုံးထုတ်ပြန်ချက်များကို ကြိုဆိုလက်ခံပါသည်။
အဆိုပါတင်ပြမှုများထဲတွင် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်အား လက်နက်နှင့်ငွေသားထောက်ပံ့မှု၊ ယင်း အကြမ်းဖက်လူသတ်ကောင်တို့အား တရားဝင်အဖြစ် သတ်မှတ်ရန်ကြိုးပမ်းနေမှုများကို ဖယ်ရှားရမည်ဖြစ်ကြောင်းနှင့် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်အား လက်နက်နှင့် ဆက်စပ်ပစ္စည်းများလွှဲပြောင်းမှုတွင် ပါဝင်ခဲ့သည့် လူပုဂ္ဂိုလ်များအား စင်ကာပူနိုင်ငံတွင်စုံစမ်း စစ်ဆေးလျက်ရှိကြောင်းဖော်ပြပါရှိခဲ့သည်။
မြန်မာနိုင်ငံအတွက်အပြုသဘောဆောင်သည့် ခြေလှမ်းများကိုဖော်ဆောင်ရန်အတွက် မိမိအနေနှင့်လည်း အထူးကိုယ်စားလှယ်အဖြစ် ဆက်လက် ပူးပေါင်းဆောင်ရွက်သွားမည်ဖြစ်ကြောင်းဖော်ပြပါရှိခဲ့သည်။
ဥရောပသဂ္ဂ၏ ဦးဆောင်မှုဖြင့် အကြမ်းဖက်မင်းအောင်လှိုင်ဦးဆောင်သည့် စစ်အုပ်စုထံ ရေနံနှင့် သဘာဝဓာတ်ငွေ့မှ တဆင့် ငွေစီးဆင်းမှု များအား တားမြစ်ပိတ်ပင်မှုများပြုလုပ်နေပြီး အမေရိကန်အစိုးရအနေဖြင့် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စုထိန်းချုပ်ထားသည့် bank များအပေါ် ပစ်မှတ်ထား ပိတ်ဆို့ရန်ကြိုးပမ်းနေပြီး ဒေသတွင်းအနေဖြင့် ASEAN ဥက္ကဌ နေရာကိုရရှိပြီး ပိုမိုကောင်းမွန်သော အရွေ့ဖြစ်စေရန် အင်ဒိုနီးရှားနိုင်ငံက ကြိုးပမ်းနေကြောင်းဖော်ပြပါရှိသည်။
ရိုဟင်ဂျာများကိုလည်း မြန်မာနိုင်ငံသားများအဖြစ် အသိအမှတ်ပြုပါကြောင်းနှင့် ရိုဟင်ဂျာအကျပ်အတည်း၏ မူလဇစ်မြစ်အကြောင်းတရားများကိုဖြေရှင်းရန်၊ရိုဟင်ဂျာများအတွက် တရားမျှတမှု ရရှိစေနိုင်ရန်နှင့် ၎င်းတို့ဆန္ဒအလျောက် ဘေးကင်းလုံခြုံ၍ ဂုဏ်သိက္ခာရှိစွာ နေရပ်ပြန်နိုင်ရေး အတွက် အထောက်အကူဖြစ်စေမည့် အခြေအနေများဖန်တီး ပေးနိုင်စေရန်အတွက် ကတိပြုပါကြောင်းလည်းဖော်ပြပါရှိခဲ့သည်။
မဟာမင်းကြီးအနေဖြင့် နှုတ်ဖြင့်တင်ပြခဲ့သည့်ပြောကြားချက်များကိုဖော်ပြပါ စာစောင်တွင် မူရင်း English ဘာသာဖြင့်လေ့လာနိုင်ပါကြောင်း ပြည်သူသို့တင်ပြအပ်ပါသည်။ ..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Human Rights
Date of entry/update:
2023-07-07
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Rohingya (cultural, political etc.), Human Rights and international relations
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Sub-title:
ITEM 4 - Interactive dialogue the High Commissioner for Human Rights on the human rights situation in Myanmar
Description:
"The Republic of the Union of Myanmar, as represented by the National Unity Government, welcomes the interactive dialogue on Myanmar with the High Commissioner for Human Rights as well as OHCHR's corresponding report on the situation of human rights in Myanmar.
"Finally, Myanmar fully supports the High Commissioner's call on the Security Council to refer the situation in Myanmar to the International Criminal Court, and his call on the international community to cease and prevent the supply of arms, cash and aviation fuel to the junta as well as other means enabling it to wage war on the people.
With the United Kingdom this month holding the presidency, the Security Council should formally place Myanmar on its agenda as a threat to international peace and security and adopt a follow-up resolution to 2669 (2022) that urgently addresses the junta's compliance failures with Chapter VII measures. In the High Commissioner's words, the Security Council must
"exert maximum pressure to end this crisis".”.....53 ကြိမ်မြောက် ကုလသမဂ္ဂ လူ့အခွင့်အရေးကောင်စီသို့မြန်မာနိုင်ငံတွင်အမှန်တကယ် ကြုံတွေ့ရင်ဆိုင်နေရသည့် လူ့အခွင့်အရေးချိုးဖောက်ခံရမှုများဆိုင်ရာ အစီရင်ခံစာကို တင်သွင်းပေးခဲ့သည့်အတွက်
မြန်မာနိုင်ငံဆိုင်ရာ လူ့အခွင့်အရေးအထူးအကြံပေးပုဂ္ဂိုလ် မဟာမင်းကြီး အား မိမိတို့ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရအနေနှင့် ကြိုဆို ထောက်ခံပါကြောင်းဦးစွာဖော်ပြလိုပါသည်။
High Commissioner တင်သွင်းခဲ့သည့်အစီရင်ခံစာတွင် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်အနေဖြင့် လူထုအပေါ် လိင်ပိုင်းဆိုင်ရာအကြမ်းဖက်မှု၊အစုလိုက်အပြုံလိုက်သတ်ဖြတ်မှု၊တရားလက်လွတ်ကွပ်မျက်မှု၊ခေါင်းဖြတ်သတ်ဖြတ်မှု စသည့် ရာဇဝတ်မှုမျိုးစုံကို ကျူးလွန်နေမှုများ ထင်ရှားကြောင်း ထည့်သွင်းဖော်ပြခဲ့သည်။
ထို့အပြင် မဟာမင်းကြီး၏ နောက်ဆုံးအစီရင်ခံစာတွင်မူအကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်က ကာလရှည်ကြာအသုံးပြုနေသည့် ဖြတ်လေးဖြတ်ဗျုဟာကို ဆက်လက်လုပ်ဆောင်နေပြီး နိုင်ငံတကာက ကူညီပေးမည့် လူသားချင်းစာနာမှုဆိုင်ရာဝင်ရောက်ကူညီခွင့်တွေကို မတရားသော အာဏာအသုံးပြု၍ ပိတ်ပင်တားဆီးထားကြောင်းကိုလည်း မီးမောင်းထိုးဖော်ပြထားသည်။ အစီရင်ခံစာထဲတွင် ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ်နောက်ပိုင်း အာဏာသိမ်းရန်ကြိုးပမ်းမှုဖြစ်စဉ်နောက်ပိုင်းမှာ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံဟာ ဆင်းရဲမွဲတေမှု ၂ဆ တိုးလာခြင်းအပါအဝင်ငွေကြေးဖောင်းဖွမှုတဟုန်ထိုးတိုးလာခြင်း၊ စားနပ်ရိက္ခာမလုံလောက်မှု၊ မလုံခြုံမှုနှင့် ကျန်းမာရေးစောင့်ရှောက်မှုဝန်ထမ်းများနှင့် ကျန်းမာရေး စောင့်ရှောက်မှုပေးသည့် နေရာများကို ပစ်မှတ်ထားတိုက်ခိုက်မှု စတဲ့ တိုင်းပြည်ဆုတ်ယုတ်စေမှု၊ရာဇဝတ်မှုကျုးလွန်မှုများကို ကျုးလွန်နေကြပြီး တိုင်းပြည်တိုးတက်မှုကို ဆယ်စုနှစ် ၁ခုစာလောက်နီးပါး ဆုတ်ယုတ်သွားအောင် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်ကကျုးလွန်နေကြကြောင်း စသည့်အချက်အလက်များ ထည့်သွင်းဖော်ပြခဲ့သည်။
မဟာမင်းကြီးတင်သွင်းခဲ့သည့် အစီရင်ခံစာအပြည့်အစုံကို အောက်ဖော်ပြပါ စာစောင်တွင် မူရင်း English ဘာသာဖြင့် လေ့လာနိုင်ပြီးတောင်းဆိုခဲ့သည့် အချက်များကိုလည်း ဖတ်ရှုနိုင်ပါကြောင်း ပြည်သူသို့ တင်ပြအစီရင်ခံအပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Human Rights
Date of entry/update:
2023-07-07
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
54.27 KB
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Description:
"ယနေ့ ဇူလိုင်လ (၇) ရက်နေ့သည် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံတွင် စစ်အာဏာရှင်တို့၏ မတရားအနိုင်ကျင့်မှုကို ရဲရင့်ပြတ်သားစွာ ဆန့်ကျင်ခဲ့သည့် ကျောင်းသားလူငယ်ထု၏ သွေး ရန်ကုန်တက္ကသိုလ်မြေပေါ်တွင်ကျခဲ့ရသည့် ဆဲဗင်းဂျူလိုင် (၇. ၇. ၁၉၆၂) ကျောင်းသား အရေးတော်ပုံကြီး (၆၁) နှစ် ပြည့်မြောက်သည့် နေ့ဖြစ်သည်။
၁၉၆၂ မတ်လ (၂) ရက်နေ့တွင် အာဏာရှင်နေဝင်းဦးဆောင်သော တော်လှန်ရေးကောင်စီသည် လူထု၏တရားဝင်ရွေးကောက်ခံအစိုးရကို လက်နက်အားကိုးဖြင့်ဖြုတ်ချပြီး အကြမ်းဖက်အာဏာသိမ်းယူကာ ရှိရင်းစွဲ တက္ကသိုလ်အက်ဥပဒေကို ရက်ပိုင်းအတွင်းပင်ဖျက်သိမ်း၍ တက္ကသိုလ်ကျောင်းသားများအား ဖိနှိပ်ချုပ်ချယ်သည့် လုပ်ရပ်များကို စတင်ခဲ့သည်။ စစ်အာဏာရှင်တို့က ၎င်းတို့ အာဏာတည်မြဲရေးအတွက် ပြဌာန်းလိုက်သည့် တက္ကသိုလ်အက်ဥပဒေကို ဗမာနိုင်ငံလုံးဆိုင်ရာကျောင်းသားသမဂ္ဂများအဖွဲ့ချုပ်၊ ကျောင်းသားသမဂ္ဂများအပါအဝင် ကျောင်းသားထုကြီးတရပ်လုံးကလက်မခံပဲ ရဲရဲရင့်ရင့်ပြတ်ပြတ်သားသား အုံကြွဆန့်ကျင်ခဲ့ကြသည်။
ထို့နောက် စစ်အာဏာရှင်၏ လက်ပါးစေတပ်များက သမိုင်းဝင်ပညာတတ်နိုင်ငံရေးခေါင်းဆောင်များ သန္ဓေတည် မွေးဖွားသည့် အမိရန်ကုန်တက္ကသိုလ်မြေတွင် ကျောင်းသားထုကြီးကို သွေးစွန်းစေခဲ့ပြီး ကျောင်းသားသမဂ္ဂ အဆောက်အဦကိုလည်း ယုတ်မာရက်စက်စွာ ဗုံးခွဲဖြိုချဖျက်ဆီးခဲ့ကြပေသည်။ ခေတ်သမိုင်းအဆက်ဆက်ကို ပြန်ကြည့်ပါက ကျောင်းသားလူငယ်များ၏ လွတ်လပ်မှု ၊ ညီမျှမှု၊ တရားမျှတမှု နှင့် အမှန်တရားကို မြတ်နိုးကာ ထိပါးလာပါက တုံ့ဆိုင်းခြင်းမရှိဘဲ ဖြူစင်ရဲရင့်စွာ တုံ့ပြန်တော်လှန်တတ်သည့် သူရဲကောင်းစိတ်သည် စစ်အာဏာရှင် များ၏ လက်နက်အားကိုး၍ ယုတ်မာရက်စက်စွာ ဖိနှိပ်အနိုင်ကျင့်လိုသည့် ယုတ်ညံ့သောစိတ် နှင့် အမြဲဆန့်ကျင်ဘက်ဖြစ်ကာ ကွဲလွဲခဲ့ပြီး စစ်အာဏာရှင်တို့သည် ကျောင်းသားလူငယ်ထုအပေါ် အညှိုးအတေးကြီးစွာ ဖြင့် ဖိနှိပ်ခဲ့သည်မှာ ထင်ရှားခဲ့သည်။ သို့သော် "အဆောက်အဦ ကိုသာဖြိုဖျက်လို့ရမယ် .. အမောင်တို့ရင်ထဲက သမဂ္ဂစိတ်ဓာတ်ကို ဖြိုဖျက်လို့မရဘူး" ဆိုသည့် သခင်ကိုယ်တော်မှိုင်း၏ စကားနှင့်အညီ စစ်အာဏာရှင်နှင့် ၄င်း၏လက်ပါးစေတပ်များက သမဂ္ဂစိတ်ဓါတ်အား ဖြိုဖျက်နိုင်စွမ်း မရှိခဲ့ကြသည်ကို ယခုနွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေးတွင် ရှေ့တန်းမှ ရွပ်ရွပ်ချွံချွံ တော်လှန်တိုက်ပွဲဝင်နေကြသော လူငယ်ထုက သက်သေပြလျက်ရှိပေသည်။ လွတ်လပ်မှု၊ ညီမျှမှု၊ တရားမျှတမှု နှင့် အမှန်တရားအတွက် အသက်နှင့်ဘဝကို ပဓာနမထားဘဲ ခေတ်အဆက်ဆက် ယုံကြည်ရဲရင့်စွာဖြင့် စနစ်ဆိုးများကို တော်လှန် တိုက်ပွဲဝင်ခဲ့ကြသော ကျောင်းသားသမဂ္ဂများအပါအဝင် ကျောင်းသား၊လူငယ်၊တော်လှန်ရေး ရဲဘော်အပေါင်းအား အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရက လေးစားစွာဖြင့် ဦးညွတ်ဂုဏ်ပြုအပ်ပါသည်။
သမိုင်းခေတ်များအတွင်း အသိဉာဏ်ကင်းမဲ့ပြီး လက်နက်အားကိုးသော စစ်အာဏာရှင်များက တိုင်းပြည်၏အနာဂတ် ကျောင်းသားလူငယ်များအား အကြောင်းမဲ့ သတ်ဖြတ်ညှင်းပမ်းမှုများအတိုင်း ယခု ၂၁ရာစုတွင်လည်း အာဏာရှင် မင်းအောင်လှိုင်ဦးဆောင်သော အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်က ရဟန်းရှင်လူကျောင်းသား ပြည်သူတစ်ရပ်လုံး အပေါ်တွင် ရက်စက်စွာ ညှင်းဆဲသတ်ဖြတ်နေမှုများ ဆက်လက်ကျူးလွန်နေမြဲပင်ဖြစ်သည်။ ခေတ်အဆက်ဆက် ကျူးလွန်သူ စစ်အာဏာရှင်များသည် အပြစ်ပေးအရေးယူခံရခြင်းမှ ကင်းလွတ်ခဲ့ကြခြင်းကြောင့် ယခုလို ယုတ်မာစွာ ဆက်လက် လုပ်ဆောင်နေကြသည်မှာလည်း ထင်ရှားပေသည်။
ထို့ကြောင့် မြန်မာ့သမိုင်းကို အရုပ်ဆိုးအကျည်းတန် စေသည့် လက်နက်ဖြင့် အနိုင်ကျင့်သတ်ဖြတ်မှုကို အားပေးသည့် စစ်အာဏာသိမ်းမှုများကို ယခုနွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေးတွင် အပြီးသတ်အမြစ်ဖြတ်ကာ နောင်အနာဂတ်တွင် မည်သည့်အာဏာရှင်မှ ထပ်မံပေါ်ပေါက် လာမှုမရှိစေရေး နှင့် လူသားမျိုးနွယ်အပေါ် စစ်ရာဇဝတ်မှုကျူးလွန်ခဲ့ကြသော စစ်အာဏာရှင်များ အပြစ်ပေးအရေးယူခံရမှု သေချာစေရေးတို့ကို ရည်မှန်းချက်ထားပြီး ခေတ်အဆက်ဆက် တော်လှန်ရဲရင့်ခဲ့သည် ကျောင်းသားထု၏ သမဂ္ဂစိတ်ဓါတ်၊ ပြည်သူလူထုတစ်ရပ်လုံး၏ စိတ်ပိုင်းဖြတ်မှုများ၊ တိုင်းသားလူမျိုးပေါင်းစုံမှ တော်လှန်ရေး ခေါင်းဆောင်များအားလုံး၏ အတွေ့အကြုံတို့နှင့်ပေါင်းစပ်ကာ ယခု နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေးတွင် အစွမ်းကုန်ဆက်လက်ကြိုးပမ်းဆောင်ရွက်သွားပါမည်ဟု မမေ့အပ်သော ဆဲဗင်းဂျူလိုင် အရေးတော်ပုံကို ဦးညွတ်ရင်း သန္နိဋ္ဌာန်ပြုအပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2023-07-07
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Individual Documents
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National Unity Government (NUG), Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Student Groups
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"More than two years after the attempted military coup in Myanmar, and two years after financial institutions’ investments in Myanmar’s military cartel were first exposed in a Justice For Myanmar and BankTrack briefing, five major French banks and a pension fund continue to invest in twenty-two companies linked to the Myanmar military junta, a report published today by Info Birmanie, BankTrack and Justice for Myanmar found. The junta is accused of committing war crimes and crimes against humanity.
The report, which is endorsed by ALTSEAN-Burma, FIDH and Reporters without Borders, reveals that these investments by Crédit Agricole, La Banque Postale, the BPCE group, BNP Paribas, Société Générale and the Fonds de Réserve pour les Retraites (FRR) amount to over US$6 billion, 75% of which is in the fossil fuel sector. Investments were also made in companies that sell arms to the junta and in companies operating in the telecommunications sector that enables the junta’s surveillance. With US$4 billion, Crédit Agricole accounts for most of the investments.
The companies in which these six financial institutions are shareholders have been divided into two categories: those with a direct and long-standing relationship with the Myanmar military or with companies controlled by the Myanmar military before the coup (category 1), and those with a direct business relationship with state-owned companies under military control following the coup of February 1, 2021 (category 2).
The report highlights the connection of these investments to fueling widespread and systematic human rights violations in Myanmar, including the imprisonment of 70 journalists and other severe restrictions on press freedom.
It reveals that Crédit Agricole is investing in India’s state-owned company Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL) that has been implicated in the sale of military equipment to the Myanmar junta since the 2021 coup attempt. BEL is also a leading partner of the Thalès Group.
The findings are published while France is preparing to welcome Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi as a guest of honour at the July 14th Bastille Day parade in Paris, as part of the celebrations marking the 25th anniversary of the France-India partnership.
French investments and the partnership between India and France in the field of defence should be rigorously scrutinised in the light of these findings, to prevent French institutions from helping to finance the flow of arms and technology to the junta.
Crédit Agricole also invests in Sinotruk Hong Kong Ltd, a company scrutinised in a recent report from Tom Andrews, UN Special Rapporteur on Myanmar, for transferring equipment to the Military junta since the coup attempt.
Crédit Agricole, Groupe BPCE, BNP Paribas, Banque Postale and Fonds de Réserve pour les retraites also hold shares in the Japanese company KDDI and its partner Sumitomo Corporation. These companies in the telecommunications sector continue to do business with the military junta through their joint operations with Myanma Posts and Telecommunications (MPT), supporting the junta’s surveillance capabilities.
The report calls on the five banks and the pension fund to comply with their obligations under France’s 2017 Duty of Care Law and international standards on business and human rights. The report authors urge the financial institutions to divest immediately and responsibly from companies listed in category 1 and to sell their shares in category 2 companies if they do not cease their support for the junta. France must ensure that the Pension Reserve Fund does not invest in companies linked to the Myanmar military.
The data published in the report highlights the need for France to give the Duty of Care Law its full practical scope with regard to companies in the financial sector and the importance of the negotiations underway at European level to adopt a directive on corporate due diligence. Several countries, including France, have been reported to lobby for a restricted scope of application for the text under negotiation, excluding the financial sector. Continued vigilance and scrutiny of the ongoing negotiations is needed until the final text includes the financial sector.
Info Birmanie's coordinator highlights that "it is urgent to see Crédit Agricole divest from Indian arms manufacturer Bharat Electronics Limited, which Norges Bank Investment Management, a Norwegian sovereign wealth fund, in particular, divested from because of its arms sales to the Myanmar junta."
Yadanar Maung, Justice For Myanmar spokesperson says: “It is unacceptable that French banks and a pension fund continue to invest in companies with known ties to the Myanmar military junta that is committing atrocity crimes against the people of Myanmar with impunity. These banks must act now to ensure they are in no way supporting the junta. As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, we urge France to take a firm stance against the flow of arms to the junta, including from India, and push for a global arms embargo.”
Henrieke Butijn, Climate campaigner & researcher at BankTrack adds : “It is outrageous that these banks have still not taken adequate action to assess and cut ties with companies linked to the Myanmar junta, even after their investments were exposed two years ago. That is two years in which the junta has been able to use the revenues from fossil fuels and the products from companies like Bharat Electronics to terrorise the population. By failing to act on their investments, these five French financiers are not only in breach of the OECD Guidelines and UNGPs, they are also betraying the people of Myanmar."..."
Source/publisher:
Justice For Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2023-07-06
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Business and the Military, The Burmese military's role in the economy, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
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"North Kalay Police Station at Kalay in Myanmar’s Sagaing Region was among the first police stations to be established by the anti-junta resistance forces and recognized by the National Unity Government (NUG) after the February 2021 military coup in Myanmar. Pa Ka Pha, the local defense force in the region, began work on setting up a police station following a decision by the NUG early in October 2021 to set up a People’s Police under the Civil Disobedience Movement. The police station that existed at north Kalay near Letpanchaung, which functioned under the government before the coup, had been abandoned by police personnel after Kalay erupted in massive protests against the junta.
With the arrival of Han Thar Oo in early December 2021, the efforts of the Pa Ka Pha gathered momentum. Han Thar Oo, who hails from north Kalay, was a one-star police officer at Yangon when he decided to join the resistance movement after the coup. He is among the 2,937-odd police officers attached to the NUG — all of whom had joined the CDM after the coup. Resistance groups appointed him as head of the police in North Kalay and tasked him with establishing a system to check crime in the region.
In May of last year, police forces and stations under the NUG received a boost after the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (Union Parliament), the legislative body of the NUG, enacted the People’s Police Force Law to regulate law enforcement in areas controlled by resistance forces.
On January 24, I visited the North Kalay Police Station near Letpanchaung. Similar to other stations, it is rudimentarily equipped and has a lock-up for criminals. But it is also different in that it is prepared for an attack from the regime forces. There are trenches around the police station and landmines have been manufactured for planting where necessary. Locations have been identified for police personnel to take positions as a defensive measure against junta attacks.
Here are excerpts from an interview with North Kalay Police Station chief Han Thar Oo.
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Tell us about yourself.
I was born in Kalay. I joined the police service in 2013 as a one-star officer. I received training in Shan State at the Police Training Center for six months. I was posted there for two years and then transferred to Yangon, where I served for around a year. Our duty was mainly to patrol some parts of the city. This was stopped after the coup on February 1, 2021.
Subsequently, we were tasked with apprehending anti-coup protesters. We were instructed to shoot at them. I shot some protesters with rubber bullets. Then I realized that as a policeman my duty is to protect the people and not to shoot them. On March 5, I escaped from Yangon. Two of my friends from the police helped me escape. They took me to the taxi stand. I reached Mandalay and then Sagaing Region.
How many have left the police service like you?
Around 20,000 probably all over the country, but not everybody has registered with the CDM. This is almost double the number of army personnel who have left their jobs after the coup.
How did you get associated with this police station?
After arriving from Yangon, I was in hiding for almost two months at different locations in Sagaing Region. I realized I could not rest content with the CDM but wanted to engage against the military regime at a deeper level. At Chang-U in Sagaing Region, another policeman and I provided training to a batch of wannabe rebels, who were equipped with their own guns. But after the training ended, some members of this group were apprehended by the army. We then shifted the camp to another location very high on a hill. Then the group broke up.
Around May-June 2021, the Kalay PDF was formed. Meanwhile, some people who were trained by the Chin National Army at Camp Victoria in Chin State also returned to Sagaing Division. Then as the PDFs took shape and began to operate, I realized that a police service would be of huge importance if we were to set up our own government. I returned to Kalay. There was a high demand for the police in this region mainly because of drug trafficking and addiction. PDF and resistance leaders and a Member of Parliament from Kalay had also requested me to begin the police service.
On December 6, 2021, the Kalay Police Service was formed. It was a big challenge given the scant resources at our disposal. There is a constant danger of attacks from regime troops.
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Prior to the coup, police here were not following the law. People had lost faith in the police because it was lax against criminals. Police were active mainly against the functionaries and sympathizers of the resistance movement. Many stations were attacked and burned in this region. There was lawlessness. The police service had collapsed. This police station was already abandoned before we occupied it. Some personnel had also joined the CDM.
How has the police service been organized in North Kalay?
Before the coup, there were five police stations in Kalay, including the one in North Kalay. We moved here on March 3, 2022. The military has no presence here. I began with a team of 10 people, including myself; all of us had joined the CDM. Thirty-five more people were engaged with the station after training. Currently, our strength is 45 personnel. We remain in touch with the chief of the police service of the country, who is based at a secret location in Sagaing Region.
We have established two lock-ups – one in this police station and another in the jungle, where 17 and 21 people respectively are locked up. The NUG has recognized this police station. You can see the letter pasted on the wall of the station.
What is the area and population covered by this police station?
This station is responsible for the northern region of Kalay. There is a separate police station for the southern region. We cover about 50 villages, comprising around 50,000 people.
What are the challenging crimes that you deal with in Kalay?
The most challenging for us is checking drug trafficking. Drug trafficking has increased after the coup and the junta is involved in this illicit activity. A section of the military is compelled to get engaged because they do not receive regular salaries. The military’s objective is also to destroy the young generation through drugs. Consignments come mostly from Shan State. I have not heard of any place near Kalay where either Heroin No 4 or synthetic drugs are produced.
After the coup, 2,000 acres of poppy were planted at Tonzang in Chin State by farmers owing to poverty and lack of livelihood alternatives. There were some other places in and around Tedim where this phenomenon is discernible. Traffickers and consumers are from all income groups and include men and women.
Small packets are packed in soap boxes and then ferried across huge distances. Before the coup, the NLD government had made optimum efforts to curb the menace. Three sophisticated X-ray scanners were installed at three highways believed to be the main arteries of the drug trade to detect the consignments. On one occasion, drug barons attacked one of the X-ray scanners because it impeded the illicit trade. After the coup, the efforts have become lax. The scanners’ primary objective now is to detect weapons and not drugs.
Assassinations and killings have also emerged as a big challenge for us. Many dalans (informers of the military) have been killed on mere suspicion, on false information and without evidence. There were five cases of killings last year. In total, there were 96 cases of crime in the first year. This includes all types of cases. Drug trafficking accounted for most of the cases, followed by killings, theft, and rape.
Almost every week there are seizures of drug consignments in India’s northeastern states. Are there cartels that have been specifically pushing drugs to India?
The export of drugs to India has certainly increased after the coup, which is very apparent from the quantity that has been confiscated in the last two years. It is the junta that is actively involved in drug trafficking, and there are people to ferry the consignments through numerous routes in the country. There is a wrong notion among some people that PDFs and refugees in India are involved in drug trafficking.
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What happens to the criminals after they are arrested?
After they are arrested, a chargesheet is submitted to the court based on the investigation of the offense. Then, the accused is produced before the court. Currently, there are five courts with four judges. The verdict is binding on the police. The laws that are followed are mostly those that were in place under the earlier system before the coup, and some have been amended to suit the local conditions and situation.
How do you meet the expenses of the police station?
All personnel in the police station are volunteers. We do not take salaries. Expenses are met through local contributions and from the Pa Ka Pha.
How can the police administration be made more efficient? Are any plans being implemented?
We need more unity, support, a stable situation and effective expansion of our operations to more areas. Now we cannot go to the Pyu Hsaw Htee (allies of the military) villages, even if a serious offense or crime is committed there. If the junta decides to launch operations in this locality, then we would have to pack up and relocate to safer places. And in all probability, the station would be burned, and we will have to start all over again. Of course, we need more funds and manpower. Now very often we have to spend money from our pockets.
What kind of assistance have you received from the NUG?
Our police station is under the NUG’s Ministry of Home Affairs. Under the NUG, police services have been formed in only four districts so far, including Tamu and Wetlet. Kalay is among the first police stations recognized by the NUG. Guidelines and laws have been formulated by NUG. Police stations also function as per the norms laid down by the NUG. It is a process that has to grow and evolve.
There are so many guns everywhere with civilians in Myanmar. Imagine a situation when the military regime is toppled and democracy is restored in the country. Will so many weapons not trigger a serious law and order situation in the future?
In my personal opinion, it will be a very big challenge. But now, all the resistance groups have the same goals and are not much of a problem at the moment.
Could you deliver a message to the world from us?
I will, certainly.
This is an appeal to the world and especially to democratic nations. Myanmar is suffering. We appeal to the world not to forget us. Please assist us in our struggle against the atrocious junta. This must end once and for all..."
Source/publisher:
"The Diplomat" (Japan)
Date of entry/update:
2023-07-06
[field_licence]
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Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Anti-coup protesters, Human Rights Defenders
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"၁။ ယနေ့သည် ကရင်အမျိုးသားတရပ်လုံး လေးစားတန်ဖိုးထား ဂုဏ်ယူရသည့် (၇၄) နှစ်မြောက် ကရင်အမျိုးသားလွတ်မြောက်ရေး(ကော်သူးလေ) တပ်မတော်နေ့ဖြစ်သည်။ ကရင်အမျိုးသားလွတ်မြောက်ရေး(ကော်သူးလေ) တပ်မတော်နေ့ကို ဂုဏ်ယူဝမ်းမြောက်စွာ ကြိုဆိုပါကြောင်းနှင့် ကရင်အမျိုးသားပြည်သူ တရပ်လုံး ဘေးကင်းရန်ကွာရှိကြပါစေဟု ဆုမွန်ကောင်း တောင်းအပ်ပါသည်။။
၂။ ၁၉၄၉ ခုနှစ်၊ ဇန်နဝါရီလ (၃၁) ရက်နေ့မှ စတင်ခဲ့သော ကရင်အမျိုးသား လက်နက်ကိုင် တော်လှန်ရေးသည် အဖိနှိပ်ခံပြည်သူလူထုနှင့်တကွ ရပ်တည်ပြီး အာဏာရှင်စနစ်ကို တွန်းလှန် ဖြိုဖျက်လာခဲ့သည်မှာ ယနေ့တိုင်ပင် ဖြစ်သည်။
၃။ ၁၉၅၆ ခုနှစ် ဇူလိုင်လ (၅) ရက်နေ့တွင် ကရင့်အမျိုးသားလက်နက်ကိုင်တော်လှန်ရေး လမ်းစဉ်နှင့်ကိုက်ညီသော ကရင်အမျိုးသားလွတ်မြောက်ရေးတပ်မတော် (Karen National Liberation Army) ကို အတည်ပြု ပြင်ဆင်ဖွဲ့စည်းခဲ့ပြီး ထိုနေ့ကို အစွဲပြု၍ ကရင်အမျိုးသားလွတ်မြောက်ရေး(ကော်သူးလေ) တပ်မတော်နေ့အဖြစ် သတ်မှတ်ဂုဏ်ပြု ကျင်းပခဲ့သည်။
၄။ ကရင့်အမျိုးသားတော်လှန်ရေးခရီးကြမ်းအတွင်း အသက်၊ အိုးအိမ်၊ စည်းစိမ် စွန့်လွှတ် ပေးလှူခဲ့ကြသော ကရင်အမျိုးသားအာဇာနည်ခေါင်းဆောင်ကြီးများ၊ သူရဲကောင်းများနှင့်တကွ ပြည်သူများအားလုံးကို အလေးအနက် အောက်မေ့ဦးညွှတ်အပ်ပါသည်။
၅။ ကရင်အမျိုးသားလွတ်မြောက်ရေး(ကော်သူးလေ) တပ်မတော်သည် အဖိနှိပ်ခံ တော်လှန်ပြည်သူများနှင့် ရပ်တည်လျက် အာဏာသိမ်းအကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်အား နိုင်ငံရေး၊ စစ်ရေး အဘက်ဘက်မှ ပြင်းပြင်းထန်ထန် ခုခံတွန်းလှန်နေသည့်အပြင် ပြည်သူ့ခုခံတွန်းလှန်စစ် အောင်မြင်စေရန် နည်းနာပေါင်းစုံဖြင့် ပါဝင်ပံ့ပိုးကူညီလျက်ရှိသည်။
၆။ ယနေ့အချိန် အုပ်ချုပ်ရေး၊ စစ်ရေး၊ သံတမန်ရေး၊ စီးပွားရေး၊ စိတ်ဓာတ်ရေးရာ စသည့် မျက်နှာစာ အများအပြားတွင် ကြီးမားသော ထိခိုက် ဆုံးရှုံးမှုများနှင့် အကြပ်တွေ့လျက်ရှိသည့် အကြမ်းဖက် စစ်တပ်အား အမြစ်ပြတ်သည်အထိ ခုခံတွန်းလှန်ပြီး ပြည်သူလူထုတရပ်လုံး၏ မျှော်မှန်းချက် ဖြစ်သည့် ကိုယ်ပိုင်ပြဌာန်းခွင့်၊ တန်းတူရေးနှင့် တရားမျှတမှု အပြည့်အဝ အာမခံသော ဖက်ဒရယ် ဒီမိုကရေစီပြည်ထောင်စုကို အတူတကွ လက်တွဲညီစွာဖြင့် ကြိုးပမ်း တည်ဆောက်နိုင်လိမ့်မည်ဟု လေးနက်စွာ ယုံကြည်ပါသည်။ ကရင်အမျိုးသားလွတ်မြောက်ရေး (ကော်သူးလေ)တပ်မတော်သည် ကရင်အမျိုးသား တရပ်လုံး၏ အကျိုးစီးပွားကို မြင့်တင်ပေး နိုင်သော၊ ပြည်သူလူထု၏ အသက်၊ အိုးအိမ်၊ စည်းစိမ်ကို ကာကွယ်စောင့်ရှောက်နိုင်သော တပ်မတော်ကောင်း တရပ်အဖြစ် ဆက်လက်ရပ်တည် နိုင်ပါစေကြောင်း ဆုမွန်ကောင်း တောင်းလျက် ယနေ့ကျရောက်သော (၇၄) နှစ်မြောက် ကရင်အမျိုးသားလွတ်မြောက်ရေး (ကော်သူးလေ) တပ်မတော်နေ့သို့ ဤသဝဏ်လွှာကို ဂုဏ်ယူစွာဖြင့် ပေးပို့အပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2023-07-05
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Karen National Union (KNU), Karen history
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"Human Rights Violations took place in States and Regions from June 22 to 30, 2023
Military Junta troops launched an airstrike and dropped bombs in Chin State, Kayah State, Kachin State, and Sagaing Region from June 22nd to 30th. Over 9 civilians were injured and 11 died by the airstrike and civilian buildings were burnt within a week. Over 35 civilians were arrested as human shields in Salingyi Township and Khin-U Township, Sagaing Region. 6 children were also injured by the Military’s heavy and light artillery attacks.
Military Junta troops raped and killed 2 women in Sagaing Region and also arrested and killed 18 civilians including 13 PDF Fighters. The Pyusawhtee troop which is under the Military Junta, also threatened the civilians from Kanbalu Township that they will occupy the houses and farms if the local civilians do not attend the Pyusawhtee military training..."
Source/publisher:
Network for Human Rights Documentation-Burma
Date of entry/update:
2023-07-04
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Human Rights Defenders, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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Sub-title:
RFA interviews anti-junta fighter who faced torture before the daring escape.
Description:
"In a daring escape from a prison in Myanmar last month, 10 inmates wrestled guns away from guards, got into a gunfight and sped away on stolen motorcycles, one of the former prisoners told Radio Free Asia.
Junta authorities acknowledged the jailbreak at Taungoo Prison, in the Bago region in central Myanmar, saying police were searching for the escapees.
But the de facto leader of the inmates, Baydar, who goes by one name, gave RFA Burmese a first-hand account of what happened, saying it all unfolded as the prisoners – some of whom were facing a death sentence – were being taken from their cells to a small courtroom within the prison walls go on trial.
Secret trials inside prisons have become a common practice in Myanmar, where the military took control of the country in a February 2021 coup d’etat, overthrowing the civilian government.
Baydar, a 30-year-old government telecommunications worker who had become a rebel fighter against the junta, had been captured in March and held in the prison since then, enduring frequent torture at the hands of guards seeking to extract information from him.
To protest the military takeover, he had quit his job, traveled to Kayah state in eastern Myanmar and joined the anti-junta People’s Defense Force – made up of civilians who have taken up arms against the military – where he underwent combat training.
“We realized that we could not protest peacefully because the soldiers are inhuman,” he told RFA. “From then on, we decided to take up arms to launch a revolution.”
Baydar started fighting the Burmese army and even formed an anti-junta militia called the Underground Revolution Knights Force.
Captured and tortured
In March, he was arrested, along with seven other PDF fighters, imprisoned and tortured.
“I was interrogated for five days in Yedashe police station,” he said, referring to a town in the Bago region. “If they weren’t satisfied with the answers, they beat me. I said ‘no’ because I didn’t do it, or they asked rubbish questions, but they beat me until I made an admission.”
“You had to admit every charge whether you committed it or not because you were afraid of being beaten,” he said.
In prison, Baydar constantly thought of ways to escape.
Six of the people he was arrested with were also at the prison, and together they secretly brainstormed about ways to get out.
Deposed President Win Myint, who was arrested in the coup, was also being held at Taungoo. Baydar and his inmate friends tried to come up with a way of bringing him out.
But one rough plan they devised had to be abandoned when word got around the prison they were planning a jailbreak.
“There was no one who could provide cover for us in the city,” Baydar said, referring to Taungoo. “We trusted no one to ask for help to give us cover.”
One-time shot
On May 18, Baydar and about 20 other prisoners were taken to a small building that acts as a courthouse.
Normally, there is a heavy amount of security when trials are held, but on that day there were only two prison guards at the gate and seven other policemen nearby, he said.
Baydar and others noticed that one police officer had a revolver, and a rifle was laying upon a bench.
Several of the prisoners discreetly started talking among themselves.
“We would get such an opportunity only once,” he said “We could not get it again.”
Suddenly, one prisoner grabbed the officer’s revolver, and another inmate pinned down a second officer so they could get the rifle.
“And then we wrestled with those guards,” he said.
Gunfire erupted as police officers started firing at the prisoners, who fired back, wounding some of the officers. Baydar collected more guns from them.
“The sergeant tried to get back his gun, so I had to shoot him in the chest,” he said.
Since the small courtroom was already outside the prison wall, the ten prisoners were able to escape much more easily. Quickly locating some motorcycles nearby, they pleaded with the owners to let them ride away – and sped away from the prison.
“We didn’t have time to explain to them about our organizations, so they might think we were rude,” he said. “And we were holding weapons.
“But without using harsh words, we apologized by supplicating with palms togethers to promise that we would return the motorcycles at an appropriate time,” he said.
They drove into the nearby jungle, where they have since re-joined PDF units.
After the escape, there were reports that one prisoner was interrogated and tortured. Families and other sources close to the prisons have said that political inmates are now being treated more harshly.
“When I was arrested, the military council made us feel intimidated. From there, I stood firmly on my belief and tried to make the impossible possible,” Baydar said.
“What I would like to say is that our revolution won’t take that long if the people participate in big numbers.”..."
Source/publisher:
"Radio Free Asia" (USA)
Date of entry/update:
2023-07-04
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights Defenders, Political History
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Description:
"As Myanmar’s junta continues to lose ground to resistance forces, former army captain Lin Htet Aung, who joined the nationwide civil disobedience movement in March 2021, is helping others to defect.
He recently talked to The Irrawaddy about the revolution, how the junta’s tactics might change and the effect of the regime’s scorched earth attacks.
Why is the junta conducting so many airstrikes and shelling attacks on resistance and civilian targets?
The ground troops cannot meet the regime’s goals. Without shelling and airstrikes, the troops achieve nothing.
There is a slogan, “The military will fight with heavy explosives”.
They think they can win with explosives and they are prepared to use them plentifully whenever they are attacked.
Can the junta use any more extreme tactics?
The next step might be to use chemical weapons. The junta expected to have toppled the resistance by now. It is now also using politics and religion to break public support and stop supplies from reaching the resistance.
It is suffering badly militarily, which is why we see more shelling.
Junta forces burn people’s homes while arbitrarily arresting and killing civilians. These acts are among their high efforts.
Chemical weapons and cluster bombs are the next steps.
Does the junta have chemical weapons and cluster bombs?
The junta will not admit it but we have learned that its factories are producing those weapons.
Personnel who have defected from those factories said the military is designing and producing cluster bombs with 120mm explosives.
We hear the junta has produced chemical bombs but we have no documents.
Defectors from the factories say the regime has been collecting these weapons for several years.
How is the junta trying to reduce public support for the revolution?
The junta’s airstrike on Pazi Gyi village was a message that anyone who supported the revolution would be killed.
Troops burn villages based on accusations they are sheltering resistance fighters.
In Magwe Region, the regime banned oil drilling to stop supplies to the resistance.
This is nothing new. We used to use these tactics in conflict areas.
They follow stages: block off the whole conflict area, conduct violence to divide the revolutionary organizations from the people and, if that fails, kill civilians to increase fear. This is a familiar strategy.
Is it easy to conduct airstrikes?
In the past, the military used its air force sparingly. Helicopters were sometimes used in clashes with the Arakan Army in Rakhine State.
Now fighter jets and helicopters are used in every situation. Helicopters are deployed at many bases and fighter jets are always on standby.
The junta uses its aircraft for almost every incident, no matter how small because the routes for reinforcements are controlled by revolutionary forces. In the past, the use of helicopters was restricted due to the costs.
Does the junta consider any code of conduct to avoid harming civilians?
The regime does not follow any code of conduct. There are also rules about taking up positions near civilian areas but the regime ignores them.
They use civilians as human shields during operations.
There is no distinction between civilians and military targets. Anyone who opposes military rule is an enemy.
Does the regime worry about violating the Geneva Conventions?
There are war crimes and crimes against humanity committed but to the junta there is no such thing. It only respects its own rules. From the bottom to junta boss Min Aung Hlaing, they all have the same attitude.
Could the revolution succeed if the regime lost its airpower?
The resistance groups are much stronger now in tactics and capabilities. They have really improved while junta troops have weakened.
The regime is losing ground, despite using 120mm rounds or heavy machine guns that cause great damage.
Helicopters and fighter jets have become the main strike force.
Everything would change if we could stop the airstrikes.
But the revolutionary forces need weapons to match the junta troops. With their current weapons, revolutionary groups can still not counter and protect themselves from junta offensives..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2023-07-04
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Human Rights Defenders, Freedom of Movement, violations of in Burma/Myanmar, Spring Revolution
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"The horrendous account of a businessman who says he escaped from “cyber slavery” in Myanmar made headlines in the Chinese mainland last week.
The man, using the pseudonym Li Wei, told the Metropolitan Channel of Henan TV in April that he was lured by a client to the Southeast Asian nation late last year when he tried to chase a payment he was owed.
His story is becoming a familiar one. Like many other victims, the man says he was trafficked by a criminal syndicate and forced to engage in so-called pig butchering scams.
More Chinese victims plucked from cross-border cyberscams in Myanmar
This common form of cyber fraud sees scammers, many of them trafficked, seeking to win the trust of victims by developing romantic or business connections – “fattening the pigs” before they are “butchered” by swindling money from them.
Li told the broadcaster that some of the cyber slaves had even been put in what their captors called a water prison. He said they were locked in rooms filled with water up to their mouths, with sharp nails on the floor that made it hard to stand.
Such accounts have been appearing more frequently in Chinese state media recently as the government seeks to warn the public about these scams.
In what the media called “a very big case”, a court in Chengdu, Sichuan province convicted 34 people late last month over their involvement in a scam ring based in Myanmar.
But the case only involved fraudulent proceeds of several million yuan – meaning the syndicate was just one of the many small operators in the crime hubs that have sprung up along the Moei River in Myanmar.
Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang in May called on the Myanmar government to work harder to stop the scams, but it is unclear whether this type of pressure is having any effect.
One of the most infamous of the scam hubs is Shwe Kokko in the restive Kayin state. Originally a casino city co-developed by Yatai International Holdings – owned by Chinese-born businessman She Zhijiang – and the Kayin State Border Guard Force (BGF), it became a centre for online scams during the Covid-19 pandemic.
Shwe Kokko is also the headquarters for the BGF, which is made up of former insurgency troops from Kayin who were integrated into Myanmar’s military, the Tatmadaw, during a ceasefire in 2010.
In 2020, the Myanmar government – then a power-sharing arrangement between the civilian government and the military – launched an investigation and halted the controversial project, called Yatai New City.
But local NGOs and media pointed out that the military coup that came the following year reversed the project’s fortunes, as the military government needed the BGF to fight rival armed groups.
The Tatmadaw has neither the capacity nor the incentive to stop the BGF from restarting this project and turning it into a hub for cybercrime.
The BGF is a loose group of former ethnic militias. Two small battalions reportedly defected from the military government recently, further undermining the Tatmadaw’s incentives to upset the remaining BGF forces on its side.
She has been a long-time fugitive from China and was arrested in Thailand last year for running a cross-border gambling business. He is waiting to be extradited to China, and according to Myanmar media reports the BGF has filled the void left by She.
Chinese, Malaysians among 2,700 victims rescued in Philippines cyber scam raid
30 Jun 2023
These schemes are a concern across the region, with Association of Southeast Asian Nations members vowing to work together to combat them.
There have been reports of rescues, crackdowns and trials in recent months – it is progress, but they are just the tip of the iceberg.
Getting to the root of the problem will be difficult and complicated, but there is an opportunity now for cooperation between Beijing and Asean members, since they face a common enemy.
Stopping these criminal syndicates and their protectors can only be done with regional cooperation, and with strong political will..."
Source/publisher:
"South China Morning Post"
Date of entry/update:
2023-07-04
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Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, The Military's political role, Political History
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"The world’s largest marble Buddha, now under construction in Myanmar’s military capital of Naypyidaw, will reportedly be able to withstand 193 kilometer-per-hour winds and earthquakes measuring as high as 8.8 on the Richter scale.
The gargantuan 25-meter Buddha, weighing over 5,000 tons and etched from over 20,000 tons of marble, is nearly complete after three-plus years of building, according to state media reports.
And State Administration Council (SAC) junta leader Senior General Min Aung Hlaing is clearly excited judging by reports of his June 29 visit to the construction site.
The project has employed over 150 laborers, including from the Myanmar Engineering Society and Military Engineering Corps, and will be built entirely “without foreign experts,” Min Aung Hlaing proudly proclaimed during his site visit.
The image, carved in the Maravijaya style, is a very common Buddha pose “with 32 great characteristics and 80 small characteristics of the Lord Buddha”, according to state media reports.
In a report covering the first section of the image’s installation in October 2021, just as multiple conflicts were raging in Myanmar following the February coup that year that installed the SAC, the purpose of the statue was touted as peaceful.
“(T)he Buddha image is being built with the aim of showing the flourishing of the Theravada Buddhism in Myanmar to the world, ensuring the peace and tranquility of the country, contributing to development of the region through the visits of local and foreign travelers and improving the State development.”
Min Aung Hlaing had taken a close interest in the gigantic statue’s construction even before his disastrous and bloody coup. He has reportedly visited frequently at important stages of the statue’s assembly.
In May, for instance, he witnessed the “Unnalon Holy Hair installation.” At the auspicious time and date of 2:43 am on February 13, the fourth section of the image was conveyed and installed. The military ruler has seemingly staked his karmic fortunes on the statue’s successful completion.
Gigantic Buddha statues are not new to Myanmar or Theravada Buddhist countries across Southeast Asia.
Some of the biggest Buddhas in Myanmar are at the Maha Bodhi Tahtaung in Monywa, home to a 116-meter standing Buddha reportedly opened in 2008, the third tallest Buddha statue in the world, and a 90-meter-long reclining Buddha replete with 31 floors inside.
(The tallest Buddha statue in the world is the Statue of Unity in India, towering at 182 meters.)
There are also gigantic reclining Buddhas in the Mon State capitol of Mawlamyaing, in Bago city and the famous Chaukhtatgyi in Bahan township in Yangon – all of which underscore Myanmar’s long tradition of religious construction and support of the Buddhist clergy, or sangha.
The Maravijaya Buddha will overshadow the previous largest marble Buddha, the Lawka Chantha Abhaya Labha Muni, or Kyauk Taw Gyi Pagoda, on the outskirts of Yangon, carved in 2013 to 11.3 meters from 700 tons of marble winnowed down to 400 tons upon completion. The statue was so heavy it required specially-built barges and railways to transport.
While gigantic religious statues in Myanmar are commonplace, so too is the pursuit of celestial absolution for mass crimes by military rulers. Min Aung Hlaing is merely the latest dictator to support religious construction projects in karmic hope that building giant Buddhas will give them positive reincarnation rather than rebirth in the “hungry ghost realm” where they belong to be endlessly tormented by their many victims.
There are growing reports of SAC leaders engaging in not just the building of gigantic religious structures but also flourishes of yedaya, or Myanmar black magic, also common practiced by generations of superstitious generals.
In the mid-1990s, the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), the current junta regime’s obvious inspiration, toured a Buddha Tooth Relic borrowed from China around Myanmar. That abusive regime built lavish temples, reportedly with forced prison labor, to display the artifact in a bid to boost their spiritual fortunes and appease the Buddhist priesthood.
The sangha and military haven’t always seen eye to eye. There have been sometimes supportive, almost symbiotic, relations, especially with conservative or ultranationalist monks in the official Buddhist synod, the State Sangha Maha Nayaka Committee.
At other times, including in 1990 and 2007, the two power centers have been antagonistically opposed as activist monks staged public marches to agitate against declining living standards and the then-military regimes’ disastrous socio-economic policies.
The relationship between the military-controlled central state and Buddhist clergy was also tested during General Thein Sein’s 2011-16 administration by the rise of the Buddhist monk-led Patriotic Association of Myanmar, or Ma Ba Tha, which contributed to a rise in anti-Muslim persecution and at times open violence.
The most notorious pro-military monk is Sitagu Hsayadaw, who was widely revered in the country until his support for the Ma Ba Tha caused certain unease. But as Myanmar Now’s editor Swe Win wrote early in 2023, Sitagu expressed support for the coup soon after it was staged and continues to sidle up to Min Aung Hlaing, to the opprobrium of many in Myanmar.
In recent weeks, the influential Ottama Thara from the Thabarwa Monastery in Thanlyin township, close to the commercial capital of Yangon, reportedly urged senior National League for Democracy (NLD) officials to compel Aung San Suu Kyi to retire from politics and seek to promote peace in the country.
Many monks formerly connected to Ma Ba Tha are now reported to support SAC-raised death squads such as the Thwe Thouq (blood drinkers) and brutal militias such as the Phyu Saw Thee in the deeply religious but horrifically violent conflict areas of Sagaing and Magwe.
State media routinely claims many monks have been targeted for assassination by the anti-coup resistance despite their supposed innocence but likely due to their perceived support for the SAC. At the same time, many monks are known to be involved in the clandestine support for resistance activities while also conducting their traditional roles in health, education and humanitarianism.
The lavish funeral arrangements for the former chairperson of the State Sangha Maha Nayaka Committee, Bhamo Hsayadaw, who died at age 94 on May 25, were another indication of the regime’s karmic compulsions, even if the respected monk dissolved the Ma Ba Tha in 2017 and reportedly called on the military not to stage a coup in January 2021.
Min Aung Hlaing, Vice Senior General Soe Win and other senior SAC officials were pallbearers at the June 6 funeral in another apparent attempt to stockpile good deeds to outweigh their widespread war crimes.
As if to deepen the macabre aspects of these religious performances, the silicon sculpture of Bhamo Hsayadaw will have state-of-the-art artificial teeth to represent his unique smile, the work of famed sculptor Aung Kyaw Tun.
But as Myanmar endures a grinding multi-sided war, extreme military violence, natural disasters and a devastated economy, Min Aung Hlaing’s gigantic Buddha statue in Naypyidaw will not be smiling down kindly upon him or his junta.
Indeed, in March, the Maravijaya image seemingly cried as stripes appeared around the marble statue’s eyes, stains that prompted officials to unceremoniously cover its face. It was hardly a propitious sign for a superstitious dictator seeking spiritual absolution for his many well-documented karmic crimes..."
Source/publisher:
"Asia Times" (Hong Kong)
Date of entry/update:
2023-07-03
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Political History
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Sub-title:
Flash mobs, longyi campaign, and voices from the protest frontlines
Description:
"The pro-democracy movement in Myanmar continues to challenge the junta which grabbed power in a coup in February 2021. The opposition government, ethnic armed groups, urban activists, and exiled media are all demanding the end of the military dictatorship, restoring civilian leadership, and reviving the nation’s transition to democratic rule.
Massive rallies opposed the junta and a civil disobedience movement emerged against the military dictatorship immediately after the coup. The junta responded by violently suppressing protest actions, revoking the licenses of independent media outlets, and designating the opposition government as a terrorist group. A systematic crackdown on dissent targeted youth activists, opposition leaders, journalists, and ordinary citizens suspected of supporting the pro-democracy movement.
Despite the mass arrests and violence, opposition against the junta continues to garner public support as seen in the coordinated “silent strike” across the country. Activists either joined the armed resistance in rural communities or sustained the opposition in urban centers.
READ MORE: Myanmar's Spring Revolution
Through the help of a solidarity network, Global Voices interviewed the Yangon Revolution Force (YRF) and the Artists Collective about the status and prospect of the urban struggle against the junta.
After the violent dispersal of rallies, activists organized flash mobs to evade security forces while spreading the message of the resistance. Oakkar, a spokesperson of YRF, explained how flash mobs are organized.
Our flash mobs initially included 30–40 people, but when crackdowns became lethal, we downsized to groups of 10–20. Eventually, most of us were apprehended, and we had to operate in even smaller units.
The Artists Collective, a group of rebel artists, affirmed the value of flash mobs in the overall resistance.
Soft strikes and flash mobs are highly effective. We must always show the fascists that they're not in control. We believe these campaigns are gaining significance over time.
Images and videos of flash mobs often go viral reflecting the online support of Myanmar internet users. Oakkar shared how activists are maximizing multiple platforms to reach more people:
When the junta began brutally cracking down on peaceful protests and restricting internet access, we started organizing flash mobs. We didn't expect our campaigns to go viral or receive applause; we simply acted as necessary and relayed information to the media. The public's support has given us the strength to continue. We've also leveraged platforms like Telegram and Instagram. It's risky for people to engage with our Facebook posts due to potential repercussions, but we continue innovating ways to demonstrate that the junta cannot govern.
Another innovative protest is the Longyi campaign which involves the posting of protest messages in Myanmar’s traditional attire.
The Longyi campaign is a source of pride for us. Longyi is our traditional attire, a wrap-around skirt worn by both men and women. We wrote revolutionary messages on the fabric that would become visible when adjusting the Longyi in the crowd. The campaign received significant praise and global support, marking a proud moment for us.
Another risky form of protest is talking to strangers in the streets about the anti-junta campaign.
Another risky campaign involved our members approaching random people on the street to discuss the junta's upcoming sham election. This task was dangerous; if the people we approached were spies or junta supporters, we risked imprisonment. But we managed to execute it successfully.
Oakkar narrated the difficulties they face in waging guerilla tactics in urban centers:
It's extremely risky for our comrades to operate in Yangon. Increased patrolling, more spies, and advanced surveillance make it difficult and resource-intensive to operate in the city. Despite the ruined economy, locals are willing to rent safe houses to our members for a higher price. Operations cost is high due to the necessity of employing several scouts for safety.
The Artists Collective underscored the role of collaboration among different members of the pro-democracy movement:
As long as our comrades, who are in riskier situations, are willing to revolt, we're ready to help in any way to ensure the success of this spring revolution. For instance, during Daw Aung San Suu Kyi's birthday, we stayed up all night on a video call to guide our comrades in Yangon on how to draw the banner.
Oakkar highlighted the sacrifices of those who decided to join the anti-junta resistance:
Our members have had to make tremendous sacrifices. Our security is a constant worry, day and night. Many of us are unable to sleep peacefully, as the threat of midnight raids looms large. One of the most heart-wrenching realities is being cut off from our families. Additionally, unlike most young adults in their 20s, we don't have the luxury of enjoying regular pastimes and leisure activities. Our commitment to this cause, however, makes these sacrifices bearable.
He also shared an appeal to the international community:
We understand that everyone has their own responsibilities and tasks. However, we would greatly appreciate it if they could provide donations to support war victims fleeing to the borders, assist immigrants, or offer free online education to students supporting the Civil Disobedience Movement
The Artists Collective cited the contribution of artists in the pro-democracy movement:
As artists, we knew we could contribute by creating artworks to support the revolution. The fact that people are printing our artwork or using the digital versions online brings us immense satisfaction. We support the revolution through our art. Working together, we create banners, convey important messages, and assist with designs. Seeing our art pieces printed, displayed in marches, and online during flash events fills us with pride.
The group is confident that the revolution against the junta will lead to success:
We've seen a significant number of women and people of diverse sexual orientations and identities in deadly combat. This unique situation has brought people of different ages together to fight against the regime that has systematically oppressed our nation for 70 years. We believe the world will witness the establishment of a new federal democratic order in our country..."
Source/publisher:
"Global Voices"
Date of entry/update:
2023-07-03
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Human Rights Defenders, Freedom of Movement, violations of in Burma/Myanmar, Spring Revolution, Anti-coup protesters
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Sub-title:
Observers say such sales abet junta war crimes and suppliers should be held accountable.
Description:
"Companies in India are supplying weapons to Myanmar’s junta while Prime Minister Narendra Modi expresses concern about the political crisis in Myanmar on the international stage, observers said Monday, highlighting the two-faced nature of the strategy.
Indian arms manufacturer Bharat Electronics Limited, or BEL, transferred military equipment worth more than US$5.1 million to Myanmar’s army or known Myanmar arms brokers Alliance Engineering Consultancy and Mega Hill General Trading over a period of six months from November 2022 to April 2023, the rights group Justice for Myanmar reported in June.
The military equipment included metallic sonar domes; transducers and gaskets for the domes to be used on frigates, warships or submarines; directing gear systems; technical documents; various items for radio transmission or radar equipment; and manpack radios for battlefield communication.
Justice for Myanmar called the shipments “part of a pattern of Indian support for the Myanmar military and its domestic arms industry” and called on India’s allies to use their leverage to “pressure India to stop the supply of arms and dual use goods and technology” to the regime, including during Modi’s state visits to the U.S. and France this year.
The weapons sales come even as Modi and U.S. President Joe Biden issued a joint statement following their meeting at the White House on June 22 expressing concern about the worsening rights situation in Myanmar and calling for the release of the country’s political prisoners.
Than Soe Naing, a political analyst, pointed out the hypocrisy of India selling weapons to the junta with one hand while saying it is concerned with the situation in Myanmar on the other.
He noted that India has stayed neutral amid the ongoing conflict in Myanmar and neglected or even arrested refugees who have fled fighting across its border.
“But on the international arena, when making a statement as a democratic country, it uses the terms ‘democracy and human rights,’” he told RFA. “It doesn’t make any sense. It is a government that is indirectly supporting the crimes committed by the Myanmar military by willfully ignoring them.”
Justice for Myanmar’s report came on the heels of one released in May by U.N. Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar Tom Andrews, who said the junta had imported at least US$1 billion in arms and raw materials to manufacture weapons between the Feb. 1, 2021, military coup d’etat and December 2022.
Rights groups say the junta is using such weapons against the people of Myanmar, including to attack the armed resistance and civilians who oppose its rule.
While Russia, China and Singapore were the major sources by far, the U.N. report found that Indian entities, including state-owned entities, had transferred US$51 million in arms and related materials to the junta over the same period. That followed Russia’s US$406 million, China’s US$267 million, and Singapore’s US$254 million.
Selling weapons for war crimes
Ko Mike, a spokesman for the Blood Money Campaign, a collective of Myanmar activists campaigning to stop revenues reaching the junta, said that Indian companies selling weapons to Myanmar are abetting war crimes.
“They are supporting killings by a terrorist group [the junta] that is committing the worst crimes in the world,” he said. “Sometime in the future, it will be necessary to do something internationally about accountability [for such entities].”
Ye Tun, a political analyst, said that Modi appears to believe the junta is responsible for maintaining stability in Myanmar.
“So if you [maintain stability] by using weapons, India will sell weapons to Myanmar’s military [to support such alleged efforts].”
Prior to the sales detailed in Justice for Myanmar’s latest report, the group noted that Indian state-owned arms producer Yantra India Limited shipped multiple 122mm howitzer barrels to the junta in October 2022 in an apparent breach of international law.
The Indian government has so far ignored calls by civil society organizations and the people of Myanmar, including the shadow National Unity Government, or NUG, and failed to comply with U.N. resolutions and its responsibilities under international law, said Justice For Myanmar spokesperson Yadana Maung.
Radio Free Asia attempted to contact the Indian Embassy in Myanmar by email for comment but received no response. Calls to junta Deputy Information Minister Major Gen. Zaw Min Tun, seeking comment on the claims, went unanswered Monday.
Regional stability at risk
Thein Tun Oo, the executive director of the Thayninga Institute for Strategic Studies, which is made up of former military officers, called it “normal” for India to assist its neighbor.
“India can stand on its own two feet and cooperate with anyone it wants to,” he said. “India has taken Myanmar as a partner ... [because] Myanmar is the best country for India to cooperate with on the security of the Indian Ocean. So, it is normal for India to cooperate with Myanmar.”
But NUG spokesman Kyaw Zaw said that as the world’s largest democracy, India is expected to embrace democratic values and not prop up regimes that oppress their own people.
“We hope that India will try to understand the will of the people of Myanmar and help them to fulfill that will,” he said.
If India instead continues to support the junta, he said, there will be no resolution to the conflict in Myanmar and the stability of the region will be at risk..."
Source/publisher:
"Radio Free Asia" (USA)
Date of entry/update:
2023-07-03
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Arms (Military Expenditure, Arms Transfers, Arms Production Etc), Political History
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