Business and the Military
Individual Documents
Description:
"Myanmar’s regime has announced the discovery of four new offshore gas fields, including blocks in the Ayeyarwady and Tanintharyi reserves, as it scrambles to secure foreign revenue.
The new fields are estimated to hold a combined 109 trillion cubic feet (TCF) of natural gas, according to the regime’s Ministry of Information (MOI).
While the MOI did not mention the new sites’ names, it stated that the largest is located in the Tanintharyi deep-sea zone and holds an estimated 95 TCF at 90 percent probability. It added that the new Ayeyarwady field contains up to 14 TCF at 100 percent probability.
Last December, BBC News Burmese reported the discovery of an estimated 94.6 TCF in Block M15 of the Tanintharyi gas field, making it potentially one of the largest reserves in the world. The regime’s announcement on Monday almost certainly includes Block M15, which covers an area of over 13,000 square kilometers near Kadan Island off the southern Tanintharyi coast in the Andaman Sea.
The Singapore-based Canadian Foresight Group (CFG) won the bidding for the block and signed a product-sharing contract with regime’s Myanma Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE) on March 30, 2015, during President Thein Sein’s administration,
Citing an internal 2017 CFG report, BBC Burmese noted the project has potential to generate revenue equivalent to 40 percent of Myanmar’s total foreign currency earnings. CFG estimated the block’s gas reserves at nearly $280 billion, based on market prices at the time, according to the report.
The CFG is led by Songning Shen, a Canadian citizen of Chinese descent.
The Irrawaddy contacted the Ministry of Electricity and Energy, as well as the Ayeyarwady and Tanintharyi region administrations, for information about the new gas project, but received no reply.
Last year, MOGE and Thailand’s Gulf Petroleum Myanmar (GPM) signed Myanmar’s first production-sharing contract for offshore natural gas production since the 2021 coup. The contract for the Min Ye Thu project (Block M10) in the Mottama Gulf was inked in Naypyitaw on May 30, 2025 as Myanmar’s seventh major gas venture, joining Yadana, Yetagun, Zawtika, Shwe and two other small projects.
The regime claims that the projects are supporting the national economy through electricity generation, fertilizer production and industrial manufacturing.
However, MOGE—the regime’s single largest source of foreign currency—was sanctioned by the European Union and the United States, in 2022 and 2023 respectively, for funding a Myanmar military committing atrocities against its own people.
GPM is a subsidiary of Thailand’s Northern Gulf Petroleum, which has partnered with prominent regime crony Kyaw Kyaw Hlaing and his SMART Group of Companies. SMART Group was established under a previous military dictatorship to serve the military-controlled petroleum industry.
GPM took over the Yetagun gas project in 2022 following the exit of Malaysia’s state-owned oil giant Petronas. The company expects to begin commercial extraction of natural gas at the Min Ye Thu block by 2028.
Rights watchdog Justice For Myanmar (JFM) revealed that GPM’s parent company, Northern Gulf Petroleum, likely funnels payments to Myanmar’s military regime through its network of shell companies registered in Bermuda, the British Virgin Islands and Singapore.
The coup prompted global energy giants—including France’s Total Energies, Australia’s Woodside, and the U.S. firm Chevron—to withdraw from Myanmar over security and human rights concerns. Both Total Energies and Chevron officially abandoned the country’s largest gas asset, the Yadana project..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2026-06-15
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"KEY FINDINGS
• Food prices were fairly stable in September, although the total NFI basket price increased 3%;
• Prices for hygiene NFIs rose sharply, and stockouts impacted soap and toothpaste in some markets;
• Cooking oil prices drew back from their August peak, and other essential foods were relatively stable;
• Myaung and Monywa saw prices rise 9-12%, while in Yinmarbin overall prices were mostly stable;
• NFI prices were up 74% year-on-year, while food prices were up 26% year-on-year;
• The total basket price was up 3% month-on-month, and it was up 48% year-on-year..."
Source/publisher:
Myanmar Information Management Unit (Myanmar) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2024-10-26
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Food Security and nutrition in Burma/Myanmar, The Burmese military's role in the economy, Business and the Military
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
1.79 MB
more
Description:
"An investigation by Justice For Myanmar and Info Birmanie has uncovered damning evidence of Aviation Industry Corporation of China's (AVIC) continued supply of aircraft and weapons to Myanmar's military junta.
The Myanmar military is using AVIC-supplied aircraft to commit war crimes and crimes against humanity against the people of Myanmar with total impunity.
The report “#Airbusted: How Airbus' close partner AVIC is supplying arms to the Myanmar military and what Airbus should do about it” details how AVIC is supplying fighter jets, combat aircraft, and military transport aircraft to the Myanmar military, which are being used in indiscriminate bombings of civilians.
The report includes new details about the recent purchase of FTC 2000G combat aircraft and various missiles.
AVIC also supports the Myanmar Air Force by continuing to provide maintenance, repair, and overhaul services for Chinese fixed-wing aircraft in use by the junta.
French aerospace giant Airbus is a major investor in AVIC's Hong Kong-listed holding company, AviChina Industry and Technology Co. Ltd., and a strategic partner of AVIC in China.
Despite AVIC's clear role in arming Myanmar's brutal junta, Airbus has not only maintained but increased its investment in and collaboration with AVIC-controlled companies. This continues even as other investors have withdrawn due to AviChina’s links to transfers of military aircraft and weapons to the Myanmar junta.
The investigation highlights a stark contradiction between the public statements and private actions of Airbus's key shareholders – the governments of Spain, Germany, and France.
While these governments have publicly condemned the Myanmar military's crimes and committed to stopping arms flows, they appear to be, at least, silent regarding Airbus's continued collaboration with AVIC behind the scenes.
Justice For Myanmar and Info Birmanie demand that Airbus immediately use its leverage to pressure AVIC to cease all collaboration with the Myanmar junta. If AVIC fails to comply, Airbus must responsibly divest from all AVIC-controlled entities.
The governments of Spain, Germany, and France must align their actions with their public commitments by ensuring Airbus acts to cut its links to war crimes in Myanmar.
The people of Myanmar deserve more than empty words. It's time for concrete action to stop the flow of arms and support to the illegal military junta.
Yadanar Maung, spokesperson for Justice For Myanmar, says:
"Airbus has been turning a blind eye to AVIC's dirty deals with the brutal Myanmar military for too long.
"With ongoing credible documentation and reporting at the UN of the human rights crisis in Myanmar, Airbus must have known that its key business partner AVIC is supplying aircraft, weapons and ongoing technical maintenance services to the junta in Myanmar.
"Airbus and its states shareholders must end the flow of arms from AVIC to the genocidal Myanmar military, or ensure Airbus ends it business with AVIC for good.
"How can we take the condemnations of Spain, Germany, and France seriously, if they have investments that sustain the junta in Myanmar?"
Johanna Chardonnieras, coordinator for Info Birmanie, says:
"Multiple tools have been put in place in France, at European and international levels to guarantee corporate responsibility. Our investigation has established serious doubts about Airbus' ability to comply with these tools in the case of the Myanmar conflict.
"Airbus is not an ordinary company, both because operates in the defence sector and because of the identity of its fixed shareholders: governments. The French, Spanish and German governments have a responsibility and a duty to act when Airbus’ partner and investee is linked in war crimes.
"The French, Spanish and German governments, alongside the European Union, have condemned the atrocities committed in Myanmar. Today they have the opportunity to show their capacity for action, in line with their statements, values and sanctions."..."
Source/publisher:
Justice For Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2024-09-16
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Sanctions, Business and the Military
Language:
Format :
pdf pdf pdf
Size:
169.27 KB 142.62 KB 204.2 KB
Local URL:
2024-09-16-J4M_Airbus'-Chinese-partner-AVIC-complicit-in-Myanmar-military’s-international-crimes-en.pdf- 2024-09-16-J4M_Airbus'-Chinese-partner-AVIC-complicit-in-Myanmar-military’s-international-crimes-bu.pdf
- 2024-09-16-J4M_Airbus'-Chinese-partner-AVIC-complicit-in-Myanmar-military’s-international-crimes-french.pdf
more
Description:
"
Justice For Myanmar welcomes the launch of Malaysian police and anti-corruption commission investigations into the involvement of former deputy minister Datuk Dr Mashitah Ibrahim and her husband, Datuk Abdul Shakor bin Abu Bakar, in a cyber scam hub in Karen State.
At a press conference today, Inspector-General of Police Tan Sri Razarudin Husain confirmed that investigations into the involvement of a former deputy minister and her husband in organised crime activities in Myanmar was ongoing and that statements were taken from the couple in July. He also announced that the police are looking for witnesses.
Mashitah Ibrahim has publicly confirmed that she gave a statement to police on the matter.
A Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission (MACC) investigation has also been launched against Mashitah Ibrahim following a civil society complaint filed this week.
The investigations come after a Justice For Myanmar report in May that revealed the role of prominent Malaysians in Dongmei Park with the Karen Border Guard Force (BGF)/Karen National Army, a militia allied with the Myanmar military. The report named Mashitah Ibrahim, Abdul Shakor and others.
We urge the police to conduct a swift investigation into Mashitah Ibrahim and Abdul Shakor, as well as all other Malaysian nationals involved in cyber scam parks in Myanmar, and to hold them accountable under the law.
We urge MACC to conduct a full and transparent investigation and inform the public about its outcomes.
The Dongmei transnational crime hub, formerly named Saixigang Industrial Park, is run with trafficked labour who have been subjected to forced criminality, torture and extortion. Tight security prevents captives from escaping, with watchtowers and guards in military uniform and rifles stationed at the main gate.
Mashitah Ibrahim responded to reports in a Facebook post today that includes an image of her and Abdul Shakor at the anti-trafficking and migrant smuggling division of the Malaysian police: “It was purely coincidental that my friend invited me to take a photo at his project there … I will not hesitate to take legal action against anyone trying to associate me with this slander aimed at damaging my reputation.” However, much of the evidence linking the couple to Dongmei Park is detailed in past posts on Mashitah Ibrahim’s own Facebook page. In one post she referred to herself as an “iron lady” for the project.
Dongmei Park’s investors
One of the main investors in Dongmei Park is Wan Kuok-koi (also known as Broken Tooth, Yin Gouju), a former leader of the 14K Triad, a major Chinese transnational criminal organisation. Wan Kuok-koi was sanctioned by the USA in 2020.
Dongmei Group has a registered company in Hong Kong, Dongmei Investment Group Company Limited, which is also sanctioned by the USA. The company has two Malaysian directors and shareholders: Abdul Shakor bin Abu Bakar and Yong Mun Hong.
Numerous posts on Mashibah Ibrahim’s Facebook page provide evidence of her and Abdul Shakor’s involvement in Dongmei Park.
As Justice For Myanmar detailed in May, Mashitah Ibrahim and Abdul Shakor travelled to Thailand and Myanmar on January 29, 2020 with some of their associates. One photo shows Mashitah Ibrahim in what appears to be Dongmei Park’s construction site, accompanied by Karen BGF troops.
They returned to Thailand and Myanmar the following month, with Mashitah Ibrahim posting on February 23 from Bangkok Airport that she was traveling with a group of 20 “taikos”, a Cantonese term for big brother or boss. One of the bosses was Wan Kuok-koi.
The next day, Mashitah Ibrahim posted from the foundation-laying ceremony at the project site in Myawaddy township where Abdul Shakor gave a speech.
Photos and video of the foundation-laying ceremony show well-armed Karen BGF soldiers standing across the stage during the proceedings and in the background providing security, further evidence of the militia group’s involvement in the park.
On March 15, 2020, a launch event and “investor appreciation night” for the park was held at the Marriott Hotel in Kuala Lumpur. A charitable donation was made to “youth club activities”, with photos showing a giant CIMB Bank cheque issued by Dongmei Group and Grand Commerce Network, a company owned by Mashitah Ibrahim and Abdul Shakor.
Malaysian citizens are also involved in Yatai New City in Shwe Kokko, a development that profits from cyber scam and illegal online gambling operations in partnership with the Karen BGF/KNA. Two Malaysians serve as directors and shareholders of Myanmar Yatai International Holding Group Company Limited, the developer of Yatai New City.
Justice For Myanmar spokesperson Yadanar Maung says: “We welcome the Malaysian police and MACC investigations into the role of prominent Malaysians in the notorious Dongmei cyber scam park.
“Malaysian authorities should swiftly investigate all Malaysian citizens engaged in transnational crime in Myanmar and ensure full accountability.
“Dongmei Park’s business model is human suffering and the destruction of lives. The project profits from human trafficking and cyber slavery with the involvement of the Karen BGF/KNA, a criminal militia responsible for the commission of war crimes.
“As the next ASEAN chair, Malaysia should show the people of Myanmar and the region that it will not tolerate the involvement of its citizens in human trafficking and cyber slavery.
“Malaysia needs to take a clear stand against business with the military junta and its militias, refuse to lend legitimacy to the junta, and reject its sham election.”..."
Source/publisher:
Justice For Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-29
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Business and the Military
Language:
Format :
pdf pdf
Size:
83.12 KB 157.06 KB
more
Description:
"New investigation exposes companies supporting the Myanmar air force as it commits war crimes and crimes against humanity with impunity
Justice For Myanmar has uncovered a global network of companies that have enabled the Myanmar military to acquire and operate at least ten French-manufactured Avions de Transport Regional (ATR) aircraft from 2013 onwards.
The military has used the aircraft to transport troops and arms used in its commission of international crimes, and for surveillance and reconnaissance.
The investigation reveals that international companies, private military arms brokers and commercial airlines have transferred ATR aircraft to the military, in some cases hiding the end user in an apparent attempt to evade sanctions.
Myanmar and international companies have also assisted the military through the procurement of parts and the provision of maintenance services.
Companies operating out of the European Union (EU) – including ATR and Sabena Technics in France, and Axis Flight Simulation Systems in Austria – enabled the continuing flight operations of the military’s ATR aircraft by ensuring repairs of core components, supplying key parts and spares, and enabling the training of Myanmar air force pilots to fly the ATR aircraft.
This business has taken place despite the EU restrictive measures on Myanmar in place during the period investigated and strengthened in 2018.
Companies in Singapore have enabled the continuing flight operations of ATR aircraft in Myanmar by supplying key parts and spares, including after the military’s coup attempt.
Air KBZ (now Mingalar Aviation), owned by the crony 24 Hour Group, has played a central role, transferring two ATR aircraft to the air force and allowing arms broker International Gateways Group to use its name to procure two more ATRs from Vietnam Airlines before the military’s coup attempt.
Air KBZ has also leased at least two ATR aircraft from the military for commercial use, providing it with a source of revenue.
The military-linked crony conglomerate KT Group has brokered the acquisition of two ATR aircraft for the military, through its British Virgin Islands subsidiary MWG Limited.
Other ATR aircraft have been provided by the crony conglomerate Htoo Group, which has additionally provided maintenance for at least six of the air force’s ATRs.
Justice For Myanmar calls on governments to urgently block the Myanmar air force and its brokers from accessing spare and replacement parts, receiving flight crew and maintenance training, and accessing instructions needed for the continuing airworthiness of its ATR aircraft.
Targeted and coordinated sanctions should be extended to all Myanmar companies supporting the military’s ATR fleet, including 24 Hour Group, KT Group, International Gateways Group and Htoo Group.
Existing measures should be enforced for past and ongoing direct and indirect breaches.
International companies should halt all business with Myanmar arms brokers and civilian airline companies that have supported the Myanmar military.
Justice For Myanmar spokesperson Yadanar Maung says: "It is unacceptable that the Myanmar military has been able to acquire ATR aircraft, spare parts and maintenance services over many years while committing genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity with total impunity.
"The junta is now using these aircraft to transport troops and weapons for its nationwide campaign of terror, supporting indiscriminate attacks on civilians that amount to war crimes.
"ATR and other international companies have failed in their human rights responsibilities by not conducting adequate due diligence to prevent their products from being used by the Myanmar military.
"Governments need to take urgent action to ensure that the Myanmar air force can no longer make use of the at least ten ATR aircraft that it relies on for its brutal attacks against children, schools, clinics and whole communities.
"This must involve cutting the military’s access to spare parts, training and technical support for its ATR aircraft.
"The military's use of French aircraft for the commission of international crimes also shows the clear need for the EU to expand and better enforce its restrictive measures on Myanmar.
"Singapore also needs to do more to cut off the military’s access to dual use goods and technology, and to stop allowing Myanmar military arms brokers from operating in its territory."..."
Source/publisher:
Justice For Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-29
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Language:
Format :
pdf pdf
Size:
87.57 KB 137.55 KB
more
Description:
"The Central Bank of Myanmar printed an additional 3 trillion kyats in a single week last month as the junta desperately attempted to contain an increasingly debilitating liquidity crunch at commercial banks, the civilian National Unity Government (NUG) and executives close to leading bankers said.
The central bank printed the banknotes and distributed them to private banks in the third week of July, NUG Minister for Planning, Finance and Investment U Tin Tun Naing said.
The amount is equivalent to about US$ 1.4 billion at the central bank’s official conversion rate of 2,100 kyats to the dollar and about $490 million at the market exchange rate.
U Tin Tun Naing and other economists warned, however, that the central bank’s attempt to contain a liquidity crisis by dramatically increasing the supply of money will cause the value of the local currency, the kyat, to continue its devastating plunge and further damage an economy already hammered by more than three years of severe economic mismanagement under military rule.
Within weeks of the junta ramping up the money supply, the kyat’s value quickly plummeted. On August 9, it fell to 6,000 to the US dollar, and on August 16 it breached the 7,000 mark.
The kyat was trading as low as 1,300 to the US dollar before the Feb.1, 2021 coup.
Residents of cities and rural areas across Myanmar were also hit by fuel shortages at the same time. As the value of the kyat plunged, prices of imported gasoline and diesel surged.
“These impacts are the result of the junta’s careless printing of banknotes since the coup,” U Tin Tun Naing said.
Two executives who are close to private bankers said the central bank pushed trillions of kyat into the banking sector to prevent it from collapsing.
Bank customers have faced restrictions and other difficulties withdrawing cash from banks since early July.
Trust in private banks fell after the regime announced at the beginning of the month that it was punishing major private banks for exceeding the central bank’s cap on home mortgages. Since then, customers have been lining up to withdraw their life savings.
Banks responded by lowering limits on daily withdrawals to between 1 and 2 million kyats.
In the second week of July, daily withdrawal limits fell to as little to only 500,000 kyats per day. They had been as high as 19 million kyats a day on normal savings accounts before the crunch.
Before printing an additional 3 trillion kyats, the junta held an emergency meeting with the country’s top bankers in Naypyitaw on July 10, where the senior junta officials berated them, and accused them of inflicting inflation on Myanmar and causing the kyat to plunge.
Following the 3 trillion kyat injection into the banking system last month, customers began to be able to withdraw more money from banks in late July and still can this month.
Residents of some wards in Yangon and some businesspeople say that the problem has been solved because they can still withdraw the amount of cash from banks that they usually did before the liquidity crunch.
“We are now able to withdraw the amount we want, but obviously, the quality of the banknotes is getting quite low. We can feel that the banknotes, especially the 5,000 and 10,000 banknotes, are much thinner than ever,” one businessman in Yangon explained.
A KBZ customer in Kyauktada Township who said she withdrew 2 million kyats from the bank in late July and a CB customer in Thingangyun Township who said he withdrew 20 million kyats from CB bank this week both said their banknotes were not only thinner but also smelled strongly of ink. This, they said, was evidence that they were printed recently.
The junta’s affection for printing plenty of cash is not new.
Both the National Unity Government and Australian economist Sean Turnell, who was jailed by the junta, previously revealed that the regime had printed about 30 trillion kyats in the three years since its coup.
The junta’s hyper-aggressive monetary expansion, they said, was a major reason for the kyat’s plunge.
Speaking to The Irrawaddy, Tin Tun Naing said the junta had to do this to raise the cash it needed to fund its war and administration, and that it will persist in expanding the supply of money to ensure its future.
“What we can say for sure now is that the amount of money that the junta has been printing since the coup has now already exceeded 30 trillion kyats. As a consequence, Myanmar’s kyat value will continue falling and we see no chance for the banks to recover,” he said.
In the two years before the coup, the government of the civilian National League for Democracy (NLD) injected a total of 3.656 trillion kyats into the economy to help ameliorate the challenges created by the pandemic.
In 39 months, the junta has printed more than eight times the amount of money that the NLD did in a pandemic-hit two-year period, the NUG said in a June press conference.
Economist Turnell, a former economic advisor to Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, told The Irrawaddy that flooding an economy with cash is a common response to severe financial crises, especially those that involve a collapse in institutional trust.
“This is precisely Myanmar’s situation now,” he said. “Nobody can reasonably trust the country’s banks, nor the regulatory authorities that are meant to keep depositor money safe.”
“This is yet another sign of the desperate economic plight the State Administrative Council [the junta’s governing body] has put Myanmar in. This is ‘war economy’ stuff, but on the losing side of that narrative,” he added..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-22
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Business and the Military, The Burmese military's role in the economy, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Local URL:
more
Sub-title:
Ongoing civil war has impacted local currency, leading to rationing by gas stations
Description:
"Residents in northern Myanmar’s Mandalay city and Taunggyi city in Shan state have been queuing all day and – in some instances – overnight to keep their spot in line for the limited amount of gasoline being sold.
Citizen photos provided to RFA show hundreds of motorists in Taunggyi on Aug. 18, queuing to purchase fuel.
A Taunggyi resident told RFA that when gasoline sells out for the day, they have to line up in front of the stores a day in advance to get the fuel that won’t be sold until the next day.
“As soon as the gas distribution quota for the day runs out, people must queue for the next day’s distribution, leading to a full day’s wait,” the resident said.
“Without queuing, getting fuel is quite difficult. Additionally, with more people moving to Taunggyi from other areas, the number of motorcycles and cars in the city has increased.”
Similarly, in Mandalay, locals say that they have to wait in line overnight because there isn’t enough fuel for cars.
Last week, RFA reported that petrol stations in Myanmar’s largest city, Yangon, were closed because of a severe shortage that has forced gasoline suppliers to ration fuel. It’s the latest evidence of an economy struggling with a multitude of problems since the military overthrew an elected government in 2021.
The root of the shortage appeared to be the plummeting value of the kyat currency, and the junta’s efforts to rein in the inflation that the weak kyat is causing, along with the economic disruption stemming from the conflict that has swept the country since the military takeover.
However, the Myanmar junta’s Fuel Import, Storage and Distribution Supervisory Committee stated through junta media outlets on Aug. 14 that there is no fuel shortage..."
Source/publisher:
"Radio Free Asia" (USA)
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-19
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Business and the Military, The Burmese military's role in the economy, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"The Singapore based company Emerging Towns & Cities (ETC) is continuing to fund the Myanmar army as it commits war crimes and crimes against humanity with total impunity.
ETC’s latest financial disclosure, for the 6 months to June 2024, shows the payment of a land lease premium of S$900,000 for Golden City, a real estate complex in Yangon on land leased from the Myanmar army’s office of the quartermaster general.
Earlier financial reports show the payment of S$1.68 million in 2022 and S$2.99 million in 2023, bringing the total paid to the Myanmar military to S$5.57 since its illegal coup attempt. ETC did not register any payments in 2021.
The office of the quartermaster general is under the office of the commander-in-chief of the army, Soe Win, a war criminal. In its December 2021 sanctions designation, the UK government described the quartermaster general’s office as “play(ing) a crucial role in procuring equipment for the Myanmar Armed Forces, including ammunition, bombs and jet fuel. This directly enables serious human rights violations, and the repression of the civilian population including peaceful protestors and ethnic minorities”.
On the same day, the office of the quartermaster general was also sanctioned by the USA and Canada.
The latest payments to the Myanmar army come as ETC has suspended trading for more than three years and has stated that it was in the process of divesting from Myanmar.
In February 2021, Justice For Myanmar published a report into ETC’s payments to the Myanmar army and the implications for the Singapore Stock Exchange, finding that payments to the army included a US$6.8 million “land use premium” and annual payments of US$2.8 million. The deal is under a build-operate-transfer contract, where the army receives the building as an asset at the end of the maximum 70-year term. Total payments to the army over the full 70 years would amount to US$191.1 million.
In response to Justice For Myanmar’s report, Singapore Stock Exchange Regulation took regulatory actions against ETC on February 26 2021 and the company suspended trading.
To address questions from the SGX regulator, ETC commissioned independent reviews into payments to the Myanmar military and its legal compliance.
In October 2021, Justice For Myanmar and the Australian Centre for International Justice published a legal memo from international law experts Felicity Gerry KC, International Criminal Court counsel, and Daye Gang of the Victorian Bar in Australia, which found that international law and guidance places due diligence obligations on the Singapore Stock Exchange and possible associated liability in international law on the Monetary Authority of Singapore and the Singapore Government for companies doing business with the Myanmar military.
The legal memo found that Singapore has an international legal obligation “to investigate, prevent and cease transactions that amount to wrongful acts”, which are applicable to business transactions with the Myanmar military and its business interests, and that legal remedies would be “easily pursued and enforced” against SGX if the Myanmar military’s financial organs are found to be in breach of international laws and/or compliance regulations, including international human rights and humanitarian law.
In July 2023, ETC announced that they had entered into a sales agreement with the Singapore company, Grand Ally Investments, and recently extended the long-stop date to December 31, 2024.
As ETC and Grand Ally are both registered in Singapore, Singapore remains exposed to Golden City’s business with the Myanmar military, which helps fund its ongoing war crimes and crimes against humanity.
We urge Singapore to impose sanctions on the junta and its business interests and to prevent continued payments to the Myanmar military from ETC and successor investors in Golden City.
If it fails to act, Singapore and its financial entities and private Singaporean financial institutions risk asset freezes as ETC’s money and assets move through US financial institutions.
Governments should impose sanctions on ETC’s Myanmar partner, Jewellery Luck Group of Companies, and their owners and directors, because of their continued business relationship with the office of the quartermaster general. Jewellery Luck Group of Companies owns 30% of Golden Land Real Estate Development. The group also finances the junta through teak purchases from the junta controlled Myanma Timber Enterprise, according to Justice For Myanmar sources.
Under the sale, ETC will discharge itself from a loan facility between Golden Land Real Estate and the international banks ICBC of China, E.SUN of Taiwan, and the Myanmar crony bank, KBZ, which will continue to be exposed to the financing of the Myanmar military through the Golden City project. Banks should end their business with the Myanmar military and its associates or risk their funds or assets being frozen in domestic and transnational money-laundering investigations and prosecutions, especially by the United States.
Justice For Myanmar spokesperson Yadanar Maung says: “It is unacceptable that ETC can continue operating in Singapore while financing a genocidal military that is murdering children, bombing schools and clinics, and displacing millions.
“Through this continued funding to the Myanmar army, ETC is complicit in ongoing war crimes and crimes against humanity.
“It’s time for Singapore to do more to block its companies from providing the murderous junta with funds, arms, technology and jet fuel.
“We urge governments, including Singapore, to impose sanctions on the junta and its businesses. Governments should also sanction Jewellery Luck Group, ETC’s Myanmar partner, for its continued business with the junta."..."
Source/publisher:
Justice For Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-19
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
87.29 KB
more
Description:
"Myanmar junta chief Min Aung Hlaing, who has come under fire from regime supporters for presiding over a series of historic military defeats, has promoted lieutenant generals in his inner circle in an apparent move to retain his shaky seat.
Three members of his regime’s governing body, the State Administration Council—Lieutenant General Aung Lin Dwe, Lieutenant General Nyo Saw and Lieutenant General Ye Win Oo—were promoted to the rank of general, according to sources in Naypyitaw.
The promotions came close on the heels of social media reports last week about a palace coup in Naypyitaw claiming that Lt-Gen Aung Lin Dwe, the SAC secretary, had ousted Min Aung Hlaing.
One defector from the Myanmar military said: “There is no organizational structure as such. He is just building a network of patronage. He has the power, so he is doing as he pleases.”
Aung Lin Dwe and Nyo Saw are reservists, and the Myanmar military previously had no tradition of promoting reservists.
Part of the 25th intake of the Defense Services Academy (DSA), Aung Lin Dwe, who turned 62 in May, was Min Aung Hlaing’s subordinate when the future coup leader served as the DSA Commandant in Pyin Oo Lwin.
Min Aung Hlaing served as Commandant of the Defense Services Technological Academy (DSTA) in Pyin Oo Lwin before being appointed as the head of Western Command, which oversees Rakhine State in western Myanmar, in 2014.
Aung Lwin Dwe became the judge advocate general in 2016 and was a member of the Union-level Ceasefire Monitoring Committee.
Part of the DSA’s 23rd intake, Nyo Saw is a Union minister at the SAC Chairman’s Office. He is also an advisor to Min Aung Hlaing. He is a recipient of the Thray Sithu title for his contribution to the construction of the colossal Mara Vijaya Buddha statue in Naypyitaw commissioned by Min Aung Hlaing.
Nyo Saw has served as commandant of the DSA and DSTA in Naypyitaw and as chief of both Southern Command and Central Command.
He was the quartermaster-general from 2014 to 2020, and currently leads a junta committee to purchase and distribute fuel from Russia.
He also chairs the Myanmar military-owned business conglomerate Myanma Economic Corporation and the military-owned Innwa Bank. Min Aung Hlaing appointed Nyo Saw as his advisor in July last year.
Part of the Officer Training School’s 77th intake, Ye Win Oo is the military intelligence chief responsible for the junta’s torture chambers, which use torture to glean information from dissidents.
He is also the joint secretary of the SAC, and often accompanies Min Aung Hlaing at the junta’s cabinet meetings and during his trips..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-19
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, The Burmese military's role in the economy, Business and the Military
Language:
Local URL:
more
Sub-title:
Those who don’t comply are at risk of losing their jobs and legal status in the kingdom.
Description:
"Hundreds of thousands of Myanmar workers in Thailand have to hand over part of their wages to the junta ruling their country or risk losing their jobs under a new rule introduced by the military aimed at collecting foreign exchange and perpetuating army rule.
Myanmar’s economy has been in crisis since the military overthrew an elected government in early 2021, facing significant economic challenges as conflict, macroeconomic instability and dislocation constrained production. The kyat currency has plunged from about 1,350 to the dollar before the coup to about 4,500 to the dollar now, fueling inflation.
The junta, battling a growing insurgency and widespread opposition to its rule, has responded with various measures including cracking down on gold and rice traders to stop them putting up their prices and on the property sector to prevent people buying flats abroad.
In another effort to boost foreign reserves, the junta announced late last year that Myanmar nationals living and working in Thailand were required to pay Myanmar income tax, and it also began pressuring migrant workers to send their salaries home.
Now it is seeking more. In a directive that came into effect on Aug. 1, the junta said that the estimated 250,000 migrant workers in Thailand under a labor scheme agreed by the two governments must pay a quarter of their salary, or at least 6,000 baht (US$170), through junta-owned banks and agencies, over the three months before they apply to renew paperwork allowing them to stay in Thailand.
Workers must renew the permit after four years in Thailand at offices in the Myanmar towns of either Myawaddy or Kawthaung on the Thai border.
The Myanmar Ministry of Labor said in a notice that workers must show proof of the transfers via approved banks, which will only change their Thai currency into Myanmar kyat at an artificially low rate.
The Myanmar embassy did not respond to a request from Radio Free Asai for comment.
‘Unacceptable’
A labor rights organization based in the Thai town of Samut Sakhon, a hub for migrants working in Thailand’s fishing industry, said it has been inundated with phone calls from angry workers asking about the new order.
“The forced requirement to transfer money is unacceptable to the workers,” said a spokesperson for the Labour Rights Foundation, Aung Kyaw. “If they don’t comply, they will become illegal workers, unable to stay in Thailand.”
Aung Kyaw said his group had written to the Thai government asking it to allow workers to stay even if they have not complied with the junta’s directive. Myanmar’s shadow, pro-democracy National Unity Government recently made a similar request.
Many of the Myanmar workers in Thailand fled a military crackdown on protests that erupted after the 2021 coup, and more recently from the draft following the imposition of a conscription law early this year.
Aung Kyaw said many people could not go home given the fate they could face there, adding that he hoped Thailand could let workers stay on.
“If we negotiate with the Thai government to secure employment in Thailand with a single work permit issued by them, it will greatly ease the situation for the millions of Myanmar migrant workers in Thailand,” he said.
There are an estimated two million Myanmar workers in Thailand, or about 75% of Thailand’s total migrant labor force..."
Source/publisher:
"Radio Free Asia" (USA)
Date of entry/update:
2024-08-08
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
The Military's political role, Business and the Military, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"The deputy commander of the North Eastern Command, Brigadier General Tin Tun Aung, was killed after being severely wounded in a rocket attack on the hilltop base he had retreated to in Lashio, the capital of northern Shan State, resistance sources said.
The brigadier general oversaw the defense of the city with Colonel Thant Htin Soe – Commander-in-Chief of the North Eastern Command – following the coordinated attack on the city by the Myanmar Nationalities Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) and its allies that began on July 3.
Brig-Gen Tin Tun Aung and his troops shifted their defense position to Lashio City Hall on July 23 and 24 before retreating to a hilltop base on July 25.
However, a military informant tipped off resistance fighters that he had moved to a new position and the MNDAA swiftly launched a rocket attack on the hilltop base on July 25, a resistance source told The Irrawaddy.
“Within 30 minutes after telling the revolutionary groups the location of the junta’s deputy commander, the MNDAA attacked the hilltop base with 107mm rockets,” the source explained.
The head of the northern Shan State Police Force, Colonel Hla Min, was killed in the rocket attack and Brig-Gen Tin Tun Taung sustained serious injuries, the source said.
The brigadier general’s death was confirmed by a military informant on Sunday, the source said.
The MNDAA and its allies seized the hilltop base on July 27.
The MNDAA is a member of the Brotherhood Alliance, which launched Operation 1027 on October 27 last year. The coordinated offensive steamrolled through northern Shan State and was closing in on its goal of liberating the region from the regime’s military when a China-brokered ceasefire halted its progress in January. The operation resumed on July 3 with attacks on regime bases in Lashio township.
The MNDAA and its allies are poised to assert complete control over Lashio after seizing the headquarters of the junta’s North Eastern Command on Thursday.
Intense clashes continued on Tuesday as resistance groups fought to take the regime’s remaining military bases in the city.
On Saturday, the MNDAA announced the formation of a commission to rebuild and administer the city.
Since June 25, another Brotherhood Alliance member, the Ta’ang National Liberation Army, has been fighting junta troops west of Lashio, in northern Shan State and northern Mandalay Region, along with other resistance groups including People’s Defense Forces under the command of the civilian National Unity Government.
Since Operation 1027 resumed, ethnic armies and allied resistance groups have captured six towns and cities, including the Lashio, and about 100 junta bases, including several battalion headquarters, in northern Shan State and northern Mandalay Region..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-30
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Business and the Military, Human Rights Defenders
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"Russian ambassador to Myanmar Iskander Azizov met deputy Myanmar junta boss Soe Win on Friday in Naypyitaw to discuss the progress of special economic zones and power projects.
Soe Win urged the ambassador to publish more news reports in the Russian media about the regime’s “achievements”, junta media reported.
The ambassador also met junta foreign minister Than Swe to discuss increased cooperation in trade, commerce, investment, customs, science and technology and culture, according to junta media.
Russia and the junta have become increasingly close since the 2021 coup, with Moscow expanding its cooperation in trade, nuclear energy, education, culture and other sectors.
Direct flights began for the first time in 30 years in September last year.
Russia has been the only country that welcomed Min Aung Hlaing after his coup. The junta boss has visited Russia three times since the coup and met President Vladimir Putin. The two countries have also exchanged honorary titles and medals.
Former president Thein Sein, Soe Win, the foreign, commerce and finance ministers and political parties cooperating with the regime have visited China since late June.
Than Swe visited India this month for the regional BIMSTEC foreign ministers’ retreat.
The Indian ambassador to Myanmar Vinay Kumar has visited several junta ministers including its third-in-command Maung Maung Aye this month. The Indian national security advisor Ajit Doval visited junta boss Min Aung Hlaing in Naypyitaw this month.
Russia is planning to invest in the Dawei deep-sea port in Tanintharyi Region in southern Myanmar. It was also planning to invest in tourism development in Myanmar’s premier beach, Ngapali in Rakhine State. The beach is largely controlled by the Arakan Army which is fighting for complete control of Rakhine State.
China and India have not invited Min Aung Hlaing for an official visit but both are key suppliers of arms to the regime along with Russia. They have also provided diplomatic and financial support for the regime and expressed their support for the election proposed by the regime. Other countries say any general election organized by the regime would neither be free nor fair..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-30
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Business and the Military, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights Defenders
Language:
Local URL:
more
Sub-title:
The price of gas used by many for cooking has more than tripled.
Description:
"The price of gas commonly used in Myanmar for cooking has more than tripled amid massive supply shortages since the February 2021 coup d’etat, with some families being forced to switch to charcoal.
A lack of regular electricity in Myanmar means many homes and restaurants relied on liquid petroleum gas, or LPG, which is imported under a strict licensing regime controlled by the government.
Myanmar’s military junta only issues import permits to select individuals who are close to the military, resulting in a near monopoly in the sector and shortages, gas sellers told Radio Free Asia.
“Gas prices are rising every year due to two main issues: monopolization at the ports, and the increase in dollar prices, along with the restricted allocation of import licenses,” the manager of a gas wholesaler in Yangon told RFA on condition of anonymity.
“If there were no monopolies and import licenses were not limited, prices could drop by up to 40 percent from their current levels.”
RFA inquiries to sellers across Myanmar indicate that while there is no uniform price in the country, the cost of one “viss” container of gas, which is equal to about 1.68 kilograms or 3.5 pounds of natural gas, ranges from 12,000 to 20,000 kyat, or about US$2.6 to $4.4.
That is up significantly in a matter of only months.
“Last year, the price was only 3,700 to 4,000 kyat per viss,” said Ko Daung, a resident of Yangon who told RFA that the price of gas had steadily increased and made his everyday living costs skyrocket.
“In a short period, it jumped to about 8,000 kyat per viss. Now, it is over 10,000 kyat,” he said, adding that shortages had complicated things. “Even if you spend more than 10,000 kyat, you can’t fill up at gas shops anymore. Since I can’t get gas, I’ll just have to use charcoal.”
All legal LPG in Myanmar is imported by sea and distributed from the port in Yangon. Some gas is also smuggled across the border from Thailand, but recent floods in Myanmar’s border states of Mon and Kayin had cut off many of the roads used by smugglers.
RFA sought comment about the price rises from Min Min Oo, the deputy permanent secretary of the Ministry of Energy, but did not receive a response. Major General Zaw Min Tun, a spokesman for the military junta, also could not be reached for comment.
Ko Daung, the Yangon resident, said he hoped authorities would prioritize the issue before prices went up any further.
“It’s becoming unaffordable for us. If we could get gas at a lower price, we could save money for other essential needs in our lives,” he said..."
Source/publisher:
"Radio Free Asia" (USA)
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-29
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"BANGKOK —
The United Nations’ special rapporteur on human rights in Myanmar, Tom Andrews, has told VOA he welcomes Thailand’s plans for a task force to help Thai banks vet business with Myanmar’s military regime for possible arms deals.
Thailand announced the task force last week, nearly a month after a report by Andrews exposed the lead role Thailand’s banks have taken in financing arms purchases for the military regime that ousted Myanmar’s elected government in 2021. The civil war that has followed has claimed thousands of civilian lives.
“It’s a real step in the right direction” and a sign “that Thailand is really taking this seriously and efforts are being made to stop these weapons transfers,” he said in a Saturday interview.
His report, Banking on the Death Trade: How Banks and Governments Enable the Military Junta in Myanmar, says international sanctions have helped slash the regime’s purchase of weapons through the global financial system by one-third from the 2022 to 2023 fiscal years, which runs April to March, to some $253 million.
The report says those sanctions have also driven most of the regime’s arms-related banking away from Singapore, which clamped down on its banks’ weapons business with Myanmar last year, to Thailand. While the regime’s weapons financing through Singapore over the past fiscal year tumbled from $260 million to $40 million, it says, those through Thailand doubled to $120 million, the most of any country.
Andrews said he hopes the task force will help Thailand follow Singapore’s lead in slashing its arms-related banking with Myanmar’s military regime, which the U.N. and others have accused of war crimes in its bid to put down a growing armed and civil resistance.
“The action that we saw from Singapore was extremely important. And now the process that Thailand is engaged in … is part of an important momentum that I’m hopeful will cut off the means by which the junta can continue to commit these gross human rights violations,” he said.
“We know that as the junta continues to suffer losses, it is responding by intensifying its attacks on innocent people,” he added. “So, it is very important that any and all efforts to stop this be conducted with a great sense of urgency, and I’m hopeful that this task force will convene and act quickly and urgently to address this crisis.”
‘The human rights agenda’
A spokesman for the Myanmar regime could not be reached for comment. The military has previously denied targeting civilians and claims to be taking proportionate action against “terrorists” to restore peace and order.
In its announcement last week, Thailand said its Anti-Money Laundering Office and the Bank of Thailand, the country’s central bank, would be setting up the task force to help commercial lenders investigate transactions that may be linked to weapons purchases for Myanmar’s regime and avoid the taint of any human rights abuses.
In the wake of Andrews’ report, representatives of the Thai banks it named told a meeting of the national security committee of Thailand's House of Representatives that they lacked the capacity to probe all their transactions with Myanmar for possible weapons deals.
The Thai government has not said when the task force would convene or exactly what types of transactions with Myanmar would be off-limits from now on.
A spokesman for the foreign affairs ministry, which announced the task force, said officials will be holding more talks with Andrews before deciding whether and how to urge the banks to change their behavior.
The government has not come out against facilitating any and all arms deals with Myanmar’s military regime, the spokesman, Nikorndej Balankura, told VOA last week.
“But Thailand attaches great importance to the human rights agenda, and of course we do not support the use of violence. So, if we know for sure that the transactions that took place [are] to purchase weapons, our stance would be definitely not to support that,” he said.
Thailand’s goals of kickstarting a sluggish economy, developing its financial sector and repairing its international reputation since emerging from years of military rule itself will give the new task force a strong incentive to stamp out the country’s role in Myanmar’s arms deals. That’s according to Sean Turnell, an economist and senior fellow at Australia’s Lowy Institute with a focus on Myanmar and Southeast Asia, who spoke with VOA.
Thailand may choose to tread more softly than Singapore and avoid telling its banks to cut the Myanmar junta’s lenders off outright, Turnell said.
“But one could imagine a regulator suggesting quietly to a bank that they regulate that, you know, maybe it’s not such a good idea to be doing business with them,” he added.
Looking for alternatives
Turnell also served as an economic adviser to the civilian government ousted by Myanmar’s military and now advises the National Unity Government, a shadow government vying to kick out the junta. He said Myanmar’s military regime will try to find other countries to help finance its arms purchases should Thailand shut it out, the way it turned to Thailand after Singapore clamped down.
“Definitely there will be other takers; they’ll find their way through the cracks. But every time you have to do that you lose some of your ability to do that sort of financing,” he said.
With each move, he said, the regime will have to turn to less globally connected and reputable banks that will charge higher fees, possibly even bribes and kickbacks, for their services.
“As soon as you start leaving major financial centers and major international banks, it just becomes more and more difficult to get these sorts of transactions going,” Turnell said.
Getting shut out of one country after another could also push Myanmar’s military regime into settling more and more of its arms purchases informally, for instance with cash and barter trades that come with their own costs and limitations, Turnell added.
“I’m not sure how many countries are going to want to barter jet fuel for beans and pulses,” said Jared Bissinger, an economist and visiting fellow in the Myanmar program at Singapore’s Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, in an interview with VOA.
With the exception of only natural gas, dried beans have been Myanmar’s main export in recent years, according to World Integrated Trade Solution, a trade data aggregator developed by the World Bank.
“I’d imagine they will continue seeking out ways to make transactions via banks and intermediaries in a range of countries that are less cooperative with enforcement of sanctions,” Bissinger said.
“But this takes time, effort, and money. So, there is certainly some value in the disruptions and resource denials that sanctions cause. Sanctions are a bit of a game of whack-a-mole,” he said, where a problem is solved in one place only to reemerge someplace else.
"But it still hurts the mole when it gets whacked,” he added..."
Source/publisher:
"Voice of America" (Washington, D.C)
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-28
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations, Business and the Military
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"TASAKI must responsibly end all business with the sanctioned entity Myanmar Pearl Enterprise.
Mekong Watch and Justice For Myanmar have sent letters dated June 11, 2024 to TASAKI and its potential investors FountainVest Partners and Unison Capital, raising concerns over TASAKI’s continuing partnership with Myanmar Pearl Enterprise (MPE), a US, UK, and Canadian sanctioned state-owned enterprise illegally controlled by the Myanmar military junta. The Myanmar military continues to commit war crimes and crimes against humanity with total impunity, relying on revenue from MPE and other junta-controlled entities. The two organizations urged TASAKI to responsibly end all business with MPE.
The letter inquired whether TASAKI, a luxury jeweler founded in Japan, has performed human rights due diligence since the military’s coup attempt, the results of that due diligence and what measures TASAKI has taken in response. The two organizations further urged TASAKI to publicly disclose its transactions with MPE and other junta-controlled entities since February 1, 2021.
MYANMAR TASAKI Co., Ltd, a subsidiary of TASAKI & Co., Ltd, has been in a business partnership with MPE since 1997 through a production sharing contract under a license granted by the now junta-controlled Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Conservation. MYANMAR TASAKI was the largest producer of pearls at almost eleven billion MMK (over US$8 million at the time) worth of pearls in 2017-2018, the year with the most recently published data available.
According to the TASAKI’s website, it has stores in Australia, China, France, Japan, Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, UK and USA among others.
The military junta benefits from revenues generated through the pearl industry, including through a production sharing agreement under which MPE reportedly receives 20-25% of the pearls harvested, as well as through customs duties, other taxes and the transfer of technology that can support further production.
According to Bloomberg, FountainVest Partners and Unison Capital are jointly intending to purchase TASAKI & Co., Ltd.
Since February 1, 2021 when the Myanmar military attempted a coup, it has been committing war crimes and crimes against humanity with total impunity including deliberate killings, arbitrary arrests, torture, indiscriminate airstrikes, and the destruction of civilian property, displacing more than 3 million people across the country.
Despite grave concerns that the military is committing these crimes relying on revenue from MPE and other junta-controlled entities, TASAKI did not disclose any information by the requested deadline on July 5, 2024.
Yuka Kiguchi, Director of Mekong Watch, said, “Under the OECD Guidelines and the UN Guiding Principles, TASAKI has a responsibility to respect human rights and are therefore required to exercise human rights due diligence to identify and prevent, mitigate and account for adverse human rights impacts. As a global company founded in Japan, TASAKI is failing to take up their responsibility to respect human rights and disclose important information that affects the lives of the people of Myanmar. TASAKI should end their partnership with MPE or risk complicity in the military’s international crimes.”
Yadanar Maung, Justice for Myanmar’s spokesperson, said, “By continuing its partnership with the MPE, TASAKI is providing the Myanmar military with a source of revenue that it uses to procure the weapons and jet fuel it needs to commit war crimes and crimes against humanity. Potential investors should use their leverage to ensure TASAKI responsibly divest from Myanmar, or they risk contributing to the military’s international crimes. We call on TASAKI to stop selling blood pearls and finally end its business with the junta, which is a terrorist organization.”..."
Source/publisher:
Justice For Myanmar, Mekong watch
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-16
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Business and the Military, Sanctions
Language:
Format :
pdf pdf pdf
Size:
257.09 KB 180.64 KB 170.07 KB
Local URL:
- 2024-07-10-J4M_Myanmar-pearl-company-TASAKI-and-investors-risk-complicity-in-Myanmar-military-junta’s-international-crimes-en.pdf
- 2024-07-10-J4M_Myanmar-pearl-company-TASAKI-and-investors-risk-complicity-in-Myanmar-military-junta’s-international-crimes-bu.pdf
- 2024-07-10-J4M_Myanmar-pearl-company-TASAKI-and-investors-risk-complicity-in-Myanmar-military-junta’s-international-crimes-Japanese.pdf
more
Description:
"Since it launched a coup attempt on 1 February 2021, the Myanmar military junta has killed over 5,000 civilians and over 3 million people have been displaced by conflict and junta human rights violations. Volker Türk, the UN High Commissioner, told the Human Rights Council last month that “we are hearing stories of horrific war tactics, such as beheadings. Midnight drone attacks. The burning of homes as people sleep. People being shot at as they flee for their lives.” It comes as the junta increasingly uses air strikes to target civilians.
Since the coup attempt began, the junta has used state-owned enterprises, particularly state-owned banks and revenues from the Myanma Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE), to fund its atrocities, purchase weapons and aviation fuel and access international financial markets.
The EU sanctioned MOGE on 21 February 2022, cutting the junta off from at least USD 500 million without stopping gas exports to China. The U.S. has, however, only partially sanctioned MOGE and PTT Group, the Thai state-owned fossil fuel conglomerate, continues to pay tens of millions in monthly gas revenues to MOGE accounts controlled by the junta.
On 21 June 2023, the U.S. belatedly heeded calls from Myanmar civil society to sanction the state-owned Myanmar Foreign Trade Bank (MFTB) and Myanmar Investment and Commercial Bank (MICB). While these banking sanctions were a welcome step forward, it came with warnings that the junta would switch to Myanma Economic Bank (MEB) and Myanma Agricultural Development Bank (MADB). The EU and U.K. have failed to sanction any of these banks while Canada and Australia have sanctioned only MFTB and MICB.
A report published on 26 June 2024, by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar shed further light on how weapons and military supplies continue to make it into Myanmar, including identifying the financial institutions responsible for facilitating military procurement transactions and confirming the continued outsized importance of gas revenues.
The Special Rapporteur’s report also shows two things. First, international actions can effectively disrupt the military junta’s supply chains – the report identifies a 33% drop in military procurement from the junta’s FY2022 to FY2023 and shows a major decline in the amount of military supplies sold by Singapore-registered companies and facilitated by Singaporean banks.
However, the report also shows how the junta has used gaps in sanctions and moved procurement to countries willing to leave routes open for it to get around these actions. Specifically:
As Singapore banks have cut their ties with the junta, Thai banks have stepped in to fill the gap. In particular the “Siam Commercial Bank facilitated just over US$5 million in transactions related to Myanmar military procurement in FY2022, that figure leaped to over US$100 million in FY2023.”
MEB has become a key conduit for the junta’s access to international financial services which it uses to buy weapons.
Thai companies, using Thai banks, sold USD 80 million of aviation fuel in 2023 that could be used by the junta to increase its attacks on civilians.
Gas revenues flowing PTT Group, through Thai banks to MOGE, via MEB, remain the largest single source of revenue for the junta.
In response to a previous report from the Special Rapporteur and subsequent pressure from the Singapore government, Singapore banks have largely cut ties with the junta. The UN Special Rapporteur sets out how Thai banks have stepped in to fill the gap. While ASEAN continues to rely on its failed 5-Point plan and its so-called policy of non-inference, Thailand is allowing PTT and Thai banks to fund the junta and ensuring that Thai banks and companies grant the junta access to weapons and aviation fuel. While the international community has gone some way to improve sanctions coordination, huge gaps remain.
We call on the international community to follow the recommendations of Special Rapporteur, in particular, to coordinate targeted sanctions on Myanmar’s state-owned banks, gas sector and aviation fuel. The U.S. must immediately sanction MEB and MADB and fully sanction MOGE. The U.N. Security council and individual member states, including the U.K. and EU, should sanction MFTB, MICB, MEB and MADB and follow the EU’s lead on sanctioning MOGE.
We call on ASEAN member states to address Thailand’s apparent policy of allowing PTT Group and Thai banks to back the Myanmar military junta.
We call on the Thai government to support sanctions that cut off the junta’s access to international financial services and gas revenues and follow Singapore’s lead in ensuring that its banks are not helping the junta procure weapons and aviation fuel.
We call on Thai banks to comply with their obligations under the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights cease all transactions that support Myanmar’s military junta.
We call on PTT group to end its contribution to grave human rights abuses and divert gas revenues away from their junta in line with calls from Myanmar civil society, Myanmar’s National Unity Government and Thailand’s Move Forward Party.
We call on investors in PTT Group to follow the lead of the Norwegian Sovereign Wealth Fund and Robeco and divest from PTT Group due to its links to human rights abuses in Myanmar..."
Source/publisher:
240 Myanmar and International Organizations via Burma Campaign UK
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-15
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Business and the Military, Sanctions, The Burmese military's role in the economy
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
322.07 KB
more
Description:
"Galloping inflation over the past few months has pushed Myanmar people toward God. The link between piety and prices? “Oh My God” is the frequent response when the cost of everything from food and fuel to pharmaceuticals rises every four or five days.
A chicken egg that cost 120 kyats before the 2021 coup is now 360 kyats. A duck egg has jumped from 200 kyats to 500 kyats. The same goes for cooking oil, rice, tomatoes, cabbage, white radish, chicken, pork and prawns. There is no food whose price has not shot up.
In Yangon, the long lines of people queuing to buy palm oil recall Ne Win’s era, when necessities including rice were rationed. Customers must show their citizenship ID under a regime diktat to prevent people from queuing twice for extra cooking oil. Mobile shops selling subsidized cooking oil at 6,000 kyats per viss (around 1.6 kilos), half the market price, are crowded and sell out quickly.
Satirical cartoons on social media depicting people snatching cabbages from markets are not entirely an exaggeration.
Cabbage, water spinach and eggs were once common on the dining tables of low-income households. But under Min Aung Hlaing’s rule, even middle-class families sigh heavily at their prices.
Shopping may be an enjoyable pastime elsewhere, but not for Myanmar people. The scramble for household provisions is a daily torment for most housewives.
Low-quality rice has surged from 2,000 kyats per viss (2.13 kilos) before the putsch to more than 5,000 kyats. Higher-quality grain is something only well-off families can afford now. I was left speechless when junta boss Min Aung Hlaing told an 8 pm news broadcast a few days ago that Myanmar was exporting surplus rice.
An aunt of mine complains about the soaring price of sea fish she buys to feed street dogs. Min Aung Hlaing’s coup has increased hardship even for stray animals.
Meanwhile, power outages force me to use canister gas to cook my children’s lunch. Cooking gas prices have also gone up recently, but charcoal prices are not cheap either. I am also muttering “Oh My God!”
But price hikes are not the only problem. Certain goods are also becoming scarce.
I entered a store to buy chicken seasoning powder a couple of days ago but found none on the shelves. The salesgirl who knows me as a regular customer told me in a low voice to wait while she fetched some from the storeroom. When I told my wife about it in surprise, she said chicken seasoning had been unavailable for weeks.
At a City Mart supermarket, I discovered that Ovaltine nutrition drink was being rationed at two packets per customer. When I said I needed three packets for my grandparents, the cashier kindly sold me two packets and the third with a separate receipt. I realized that Ovaltine might be out of stock too.
After months searching for Gillette Foamy shaving cream at popular shopping centers, I finally tracked down two bottles at a pharmacy. Logic told me to grab both, but the needs of my two young kids come first. Diaper prices are also increasing.
The prices of pharmaceuticals have skyrocketed too. Patients risk further damage to their health when they hear the prices of pills they need. “That medicine is out of stock” is a common refrain at pharmacy counters these days. My wife has had to get used to her stomach pain, as Kremil-S antacid is often out of stock.
I can’t help cursing Min Aung Hlaing. However, we urban residents are at least more fortunate than compatriots elsewhere, who are forced to abandon their belongings and businesses as they flee junta air raids and artillery barrages.
Inflation, shortages of consumer goods, serious power outages, and a crime wave of theft, mugging and pickpocketing have become part and parcel of life in towns. Adding to the general deterioration are the unlicensed buses that are back on Yangon’s streets. The rogue vehicles are notorious for driving dangerously as they scramble for passengers.
Women wearing sling bags on their shoulders are no longer safe in Yangon. The mugging epidemic also targets phones, bikes and electric bikes. Public bus drivers frequently warn passengers to “take care of their phones and purses” – a sign that pickpockets are on board.
Rogue bus drivers exhort commuters to pray to God as they speed to overtake public buses and taxis. They also provide a source of extra income for traffic police and soldiers, with “bus bribes” now a familiar sight in Yangon.
Out on the streets, Yangonites are in constant fear that junta soldiers will stop them and check their phones. You can be arrested for using a virtual private network (VPN) or storing photos deemed politically sensitive or offensive to the regime.
Walking in downtown Yangon, the din of diesel generators rattles your ears and the stink from overflowing garbage cans gives you a headache.
Fine restaurants like Japanese eatery Gekko that attracted both local and international customers have shut down since the coup.
The regime claims foreign arrivals have increased, but tourists are a rare sight in Yangon. The flocks of foreigners that you saw at Shwedagon Pagoda, outside Yangon City Hall, in Chinatown, and on buses to and from the airport are a thing of the past.
Both urban and rural areas of Myanmar have been in turmoil since the coup.
No guest likes to visit a troubled home.
Every morning, my wife tells me, “Why don’t you play Paritta [Buddhist chant believed to ward off misfortune or danger] on your computer?”
But I know it will take more than chanting to lift the curse of military rule..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-15
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Business and the Military, Economic History
Language:
Local URL:
more
Sub-title:
Withdrawals have increased as kyat loses value and economy tanks.
Description:
"Amid steep inflation and a freefalling economy, Myanmar banks have begun restricting the amounts of cash that can be withdrawn each day, according to local residents, a bank branch, and a bank officer who told Radio Free Asia it was to prevent a bank run.
“People have experienced more anxiety,” the bank officer said, referring to the country’s economic situation.
“We have restricted the amount of daily withdrawal — as any bank does not have enough cash for massive withdrawal — to prevent the collapse of banks,” he said, speaking on the condition of anonymity for security reasons.
Yangon residents who also asked to remain anonymous for security told RFA that restrictions began at the start of this week.
One resident said that while previously he was able to withdraw unlimited amounts of cash, all banks now limited customers to 1,000,000 kyat (about US$208) to 2,000,000 (US$416) per day.
“Although there is no problem with depositing, there are many difficulties in withdrawal,” he said.
The limits come amid economic hardship for many in Myanmar, where the economy has shrunk 20% since the junta came to power in a 2021 coup and prices of consumer goods in some areas have risen 200%.
The kyat, meanwhile, has lost 28% of its value against the U.S. dollar over the past year, according to the latest World Bank report. The same report noted overall inflation was 30% year on year as of September 2023.
In the hopes of stabilizing the domestic economy, the junta has repeatedly lowered the dollar exchange rate and tried to clamp down on capital flight.
A factory owner in Yangon said his own bank branch, a KBZ located on Pyay road, had even lower limits of 500,000 kyat a day, making it hard for him to make payroll.
"People are facing a hard time now,” he said. “The central bank is likely to be watching deposits and withdrawals.”
RFA contacted a branch of KBZ bank in Yangon, which confirmed they had restricted withdrawals. On Tuesday, they allowed a maximum withdrawal of 3,000,000 kyat, but on Wednesday reduced that by a third.
The bank limits come on the heels of a July 1 announcement by the junta’s Ministry of Information saying it would charge executives and issue fines to seven private banks that issued mortgages exceeding limits imposed by the Central Bank.
The banks include Yoma Bank, Myanmar Citizen Bank, AYA Bank, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Bank, UAB Bank, Myanmar Metro Bank and the Construction, Housing and Infrastructure Development Bank.
The bank officer told RFA he believed the warning of legal action had led citizens to assume that the government no longer trusted private banks, apart from KBZ, which has ties to the junta. That, in turn, had led to higher than usual withdrawals in recent days.
Calls to Aung Kyaw Than, director general of the Currency Management Department of the Central Bank went unanswered.
In June, the Central Bank announced it had taken legal actions against approximately 40 people who were involved in illegal digital currency trades and foreign money transfer businesses..."
Source/publisher:
"Radio Free Asia" (USA)
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-10
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Language:
Local URL:
more
Sub-title:
Junta airstrikes have increased five-fold this year, UN rights official said
Description:
"Shipments of aviation fuel are reaching Myanmar despite calls to deprive its military of the resources needed to carry out unlawful air strikes against insurgents battling to end army rule, international human rights group Amnesty International said on Monday.
The London-based group announced on Jan. 30 its researchers had documented new ways that the junta was skirting sanctions with aviation fuel shipped directly from Vietnam to Myanmar at least seven times in 2023.
The group said the pattern had continued with at least two and probably three shipments of aviation fuel reaching Myanmar between January and June.
“As with the previous shipments identified by Amnesty International in January, the fuel was bought and sold multiple times before reaching the last leg of its trip in Vietnam ahead of shipment to Myanmar,” the group said in a report.
RELATED STORIES
Airstrike targets insurgent meeting in Myanmar, 16 killed
UN rights envoy urges action to stop Myanmar's access to weapons, funds
Junta military preparations point to brutal next phase in Myanmar conflict
Myanmar has been in bloody turmoil since the military ousted an elected government in early 2021, ending a decade of tentative reforms.
Democracy activists have taken up arms and linked up with autonomy-seeking ethnic minority insurgents, and together they have made significant advances against junta forces in several parts of the country this year.
But the insurgents have few effective weapons with which to defend themselves against air attacks.
The U.N. special rapporteur on human rights in Myanmar said last month that military airstrikes against civilian targets had increased five-fold in the first half of this year even though the United States and Britain announced sanctions against companies that import jet fuel to the junta in August last year.
Amnesty International said that in two instances this year a Chinese-owned oil tanker transported jet fuel from Vietnam to Myanmar and fuel traders based in Singapore appeared to have played a role in the supply chain.
“Like the 2023 shipments, the 2024 shipments involved multiple purchases and resales of the same fuel, making it hard to trace the original supplier,” the rights group added.
“The Myanmar military is relying on the very same Chinese vessel and Vietnamese companies to import its aviation fuel, despite Amnesty International having already exposed that reckless supply chain,” said Agnes Callamard, secretary general of Amnesty International.
“It is a raw display of both the sheer impunity with which the Myanmar military is operating, and the utter complicity of the states responsible, including Vietnam, China and Singapore.”
Radio Free Asia was not able to contact Myanmar’s junta spokesman for comment. The junta has said it does not intentionally target civilians..."
Source/publisher:
"Radio Free Asia" (USA)
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-08
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"Data reveals shipments of jet fuel still arriving in Myanmar
Investigation shows military air strike killed 12 civilians and injured 26 as historic monastery in Magway, Central Myanmar attacked
“My friends were killed right before my eyes on the street,” eyewitness tells Amnesty
Amnesty International has documented new shipments of aviation fuel to Myanmar despite global calls to deprive the country’s military of the resources it needs to carry out unlawful air strikes.
In January 2024, Amnesty International exposed the Myanmar military’s new evasive tactics for importing aviation fuel throughout 2023, following sanctions imposed on parts of its supply chain.
That pattern continues with at least two, and likely three, additional shipments of aviation fuel having entered the country between January and June this year. As with the previous shipments identified by Amnesty International in January, the fuel was bought and sold multiple times before reaching the last leg of its trip in Viet Nam ahead of shipment to Myanmar.
In two instances, the Chinese owned HUITONG78 oil tanker transported fuel from Viet Nam to Myanmar. Other companies appear to have played a role in the supply chain too, including fuel traders Singapore-based Sahara Energy International Pte. Ltd. and Chinese state-owned entity (SOE) CNOOC Trading (Singapore) Pte. Ltd. A likely third shipment, also by HUITONG78, appears to have come to Myanmar from the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in May 2024.
It is unclear how the fuel was used after it arrived, but the military’s control of the port means there are significant risks it could be used for non-civilian purposes.
“The Myanmar military is relying on the very same Chinese vessel and Vietnamese companies to import its aviation fuel, despite Amnesty International having already exposed that reckless supply chain,” said Agnes Callamard, Secretary General of Amnesty International.
“It is a raw display of both the sheer impunity with which the Myanmar military is operating, and the utter complicity of the states responsible, including Viet Nam, China and Singapore.”
Air strikes on the rise
In June 2024 the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar reported that military air strikes against civilian targets in Myanmar have increased five-fold in the first half of this year.
Amnesty International documented one of these attacks. Witnesses told Amnesty that on the morning of 9 May, the Myanmar military launched an attack on a monastery in Saw Township’s Ah Kyi Pan Pa Lon village in central Myanmar’s Magway Region.
Following two initial air strikes, witnesses said that a fighter jet then circled back around and followed up with heavy gunfire directed at those fleeing the initial explosions.
The monastery, which is believed to be roughly 100 years old, was destroyed.
Amnesty International interviewed four survivors of the attack in Magway and one person who arrived at the scene afterwards to help the victims. Researchers also analysed 34 photos showing the corpses of victims, wounds of survivors, weapons used in the attack and the extent of the damage.
All the visual evidence of the destruction of the monastery is consistent with an air strike that caused a fire and severely burned both the structure and many of the victims. Photos of fragments of the ordnance used show the remnants of a tail kit for an aerial bomb, as well as unexploded 23mm High Explosive Incendiary (HEI) ammunition that is fired from the GSh-23 machine gun mounted as pods on fighter jets such as the Russian YAK-130.
The date on the discarded cartridges from the 23mm HEI rounds indicate the ordnance was manufactured locally in Myanmar in 2024. The wounds of other victims of the attack are consistent with fragments from aircraft bombs or direct gunfire. Satellite imagery also shows that the monastery area has been heavily burned.
‘I heard the people screaming’
Saw Township is located in a contested area of central Myanmar, where parallel administrative structures and armed groups known as People’s Defense Forces (PDF), which sprang up after the coup to resist the military alongside the civilian National Unity Government (NUG), are active.
Witnesses said that while some PDF forces known as People’s Defense Teams, or Pa Ka Pha in Burmese, were present at the monastery, the majority of people were civilians. They also said there had been no fighting in or close to the village before the air strike.
In the early morning of the attack, witnesses said they heard buzzing in the skies, which they described as sounding like a drone. Some hours later, about 50 to 60 locals had gathered on the first floor of the monastery to discuss their concerns about transport issues, including taxation and routes.
In addition, witnesses reported that at least one child and the head monk of the monastery were on the second floor of the site, a place where computer classes were sometimes held.
According to survivors, who asked to be anonymous for fear of being targeted further by the Myanmar military, the first bomb dropped at around 10:45am.
“The bomb fell a bit far behind me, right into the place where my brother, uncle and sister were sitting,” one man said. His relatives were killed instantly.
“I am sure that the fighter jet aimed at killing all of us,” he said.
Following the first bomb, he said the monastery started to collapse and people were trapped under the falling debris.
He managed to escape the site: “Within a few minutes […], I saw the jet come again to the monastery, and this time another bomb was dropped that set the main building on fire,” he said.
Another man said he escaped from the monastery unharmed following the first bomb. He was hiding across the road when the second bomb was dropped. He saw the monastery ablaze. A fighter jet then started to shoot at people running away.
“I heard the people screaming in the monastery. Some people were running on the street amid the continuous gunfire from the fighter jet,” the man said. “The fighter jet flew over the monastery and opened fire on the people running around. I witnessed my friends being killed right before my eyes on the street.”
Those killed in the air strike included a child, while the head of the monastery was among the injured, according to a list of victims given to Amnesty International by a rescue worker.
Even if members of the Pa Ka Pha were present in the monastery at the time of the attack, the pilot should have known there could be civilians as well. Thus, the shooting of civilians attempting to flee and the bombing of a site of religious, cultural and historical value suggest the attack was indiscriminate. It should be investigated as a war crime.
“This recent attack joins a rapidly growing list of violations of international humanitarian law in Myanmar including air strikes, ground raids, arbitrary detentions, torture and numerous other violations targeting civilians,” Callamard said.
How Myanmar continues to access aviation fuel
Amnesty International and others have called on companies and governments to suspend jet fuel shipments to Myanmar or risk complicity in a deadly supply chain. But as these new findings show, many are still not listening.
Vessel tracking and trade data show that the Chinese oil tanker HUITONG78 transported two shipments of aviation fuel to the former Puma Energy terminal (now controlled by the Myanmar based Shoon Energy group and the Myanmar military) in Thilawa, Yangon port, on 14 January and 29 February, respectively. In common with all shipments identified by Amnesty International in 2023, the oil tanker picked up the fuel at the Vietnamese Cai Mep Petroleum storage terminal operated by Hai Linh Co. Ltd., before departing for Myanmar.
Also like the 2023 shipments, the 2024 shipments involved multiple purchases and resales of the same fuel, making it hard to trace the original supplier. In regard to the January 2024 shipment, before its arrival in Viet Nam, the fuel can be traced to the Vopak Singapore Banyan Terminal, a storage facility controlled by Dutch storage and logistics company Royal Vopak. Royal Vopak confirmed the shipment but emphasized that “[o]ur service is the safe storage of our customers’ products while it is in our terminals in the ports” and that they “respect applicable laws, regulations and sanctions”.
The February 2024 shipment can be traced back to the BP Hua Dong terminal in Ningbo port, Hangzhou Bay, China. Amnesty International was unable to identify the company that controls the Chinese terminal.
Before the final transfer and sale of fuel to Myanmar, the January shipment was sold to a Vietnamese company by the Singapore branch of the global fuel trader Sahara Energy. The February shipment was sold by the Singapore trading branch of Chinese SOE China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC Singapore). In both cases, customs data shows that Sahara Energy and CNOOC Singapore should have been aware that the fuel was transported to Viet Nam for transit purposes only. Each of the shipments was worth approximately USD 8 million.
Suspicions raised over third shipment
Evidence also indicates there was likely a third shipment of aviation fuel to Myanmar, in May 2024.
According to vessel tracking data, the HUITONG78 onloaded fuel at the Hamriyah port in Sharjah, UAE, in April, arriving at the Yangon port on or about 12 May. The vessel appears to turn off its AIS radar as it enters Thilawa port, during which satellite imagery shows what appears to be the HUITONG78 moored at the former Puma Energy terminal in Thilawa.
The vessel’s draught data (which indicates a change in overall weight of the ship) suggests that it offloaded fuel at the Thilawa terminal. Although Amnesty International was not able to confirm whether the fuel was in fact aviation fuel, it is quite likely the case given the pattern of shipments conducted by this same vessel.
The HUITONG78 vessel is registered for Protection & Indemnity (P&I) insurance with the West of England P&I Club, although in response to Amnesty International, the Club stated that “if […] this vessel was carrying jet fuel to Myanmar, then there was no cover for those trades”.
According to the P&I Club, the HUITONG78 is owned by an affiliate of the Chinese state-owned defence company China Aerospace Science and Industry Corp (CASIC). According to a media report, CASIC has been involved in transporting US sanctioned Venezuelan oil.
“While Amnesty does not know for certain how the aviation fuel shipped in this way was used once it arrived in Myanmar, the risk is high that the military – which controls the terminal where the fuel was offloaded – uses it to fuel attacks against civilians. It means shipping and fuel companies have no option but to withdraw from that supply chain completely,” Callamard said.
“That includes everyone involved, from vessel owners to insurers to fuel traders. It’s high time that companies put an end to these shipments.”
All companies named in these findings were contacted for comment. The only companies to respond were Royal Vopak and West of England P&I Club..."
Source/publisher:
Amnesty International (UK)
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-08
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Business and the Military, The Burmese military's role in the economy, Sanctions, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"Sanctions urged for Chinese ship, Vietnamese storage terminal, and other entities and individuals involved in supply of jet fuel to the junta
Justice For Myanmar and The Sentry urge the United States to enforce jet fuel sanctions on Myanmar to effectively curtail the capacity of the Myanmar junta to continue its indiscriminate and deadly airstrikes. We are calling for the US to deploy the strong regulatory tools it has already put in place and to leverage the credible intelligence it is receiving from civil society.
As the junta’s brutal aerial war against the Myanmar population intensifies, Justice For Myanmar and The Sentry urge the US Department of the Treasury to finally use its jet fuel determination to sanction Chinese-flagged ship HUITONG78, Vietnamese petroleum storage terminal operator Hai Linh Co. Ltd., and all other entities and individuals involved in the supply of jet fuel to the junta.
We welcomed the adoption in August 2023 of a series of measures by the US Treasury Department targeted at the jet fuel supply to the Myanmar junta and, notably, the issuance of a determination on the jet fuel sector that “allows for sanctions to be imposed on any foreign individual or entity determined to operate in the jet fuel sector of the Burmese economy.” This determination was accompanied by guidance clarifying that the Treasury Department’s Office on Foreign Assets Control “intends to target activities for or related to military regime end users in Burma.” Yet after almost one year, no new jet fuel sanctions have been imposed.
In January 2024, Amnesty International exposed how jet fuel shipments to Myanmar had increased in volume following the adoption of US sanctions. The report notably named two key parties to transshipments aimed at circumventing sanctions: Chinese-flagged ship HUITONG78 and Vietnamese petroleum storage terminal operator Hai Linh Co. Ltd.
In a new report published today, Amnesty International further details how jet fuel shipments to the Myanmar junta continue—with the ongoing involvement of HUITONG78 and Hai Linh Co. Ltd.
Oliver Windridge, Director of Illicit Finance Policy at The Sentry, said: “The US Treasury Department has put in place the regulatory arsenal to strike at those international actors involved with the supply of jet fuel to the Myanmar junta. Amnesty International has now twice provided credible intelligence on who these actors are and how they continue to send the deadly cargo to Myanmar. Treasury must act and sanction these enablers of the Myanmar junta’s air force to show that it is not bark only but that it will use its teeth. These actions can disrupt the supply chain fueling the junta’s air assets and deter international actors from participating in this murderous supply chain.”
Yadanar Maung, spokesperson for Justice For Myanmar, said: “It has been more than three years since the military’s illegal coup attempt, and the junta continues to wage a campaign of terror against the Myanmar people, committing war crimes and crimes against humanity with total impunity. As the junta continues to lose ground to resistance forces, it is increasingly relying on indiscriminate airstrikes, killing women and children; destroying schools, healthcare facilities and whole communities; and causing mass displacement. This is continuing amid a lack of international action to cut off the junta’s jet fuel supply chain. The US has the power to act to disrupt the junta’s access to jet fuel, and now it needs to take concrete action by sanctioning HUITONG78, Hai Linh Co. Ltd. and all other companies that are enabling the junta’s atrocities.”
For media inquiries or interview requests for The Sentry, please contact: Greg Hittelman, Director of Communications, [email protected]
For media inquiries for Justice For Myanmar, please contact: Yadanar Maung, Spokesperson, [email protected]
About Justice For Myanmar
Justice For Myanmar is a covert group of activists using research, data visualisation, and reporting to expose and dismantle the business networks that fuel brutality, corruption and mass-scale suffering. One report at a time, Justice For Myanmar is going after the military’s sources of funds and arms. As a result of its work and the work of many others across Myanmar and the world, multinational corporations have already divested hundreds of millions of dollars from business with the military, and targeted sanctions are beginning to disrupt the Myanmar military cartel's global network.
About The Sentry
(Short descriptor for press use: “The Sentry, an investigative organization that tracks corruption”)
The Sentry is an investigative and policy organization that seeks to disable multinational predatory networks that benefit from violent conflict, repression, and kleptocracy. Pull back the curtain on wars, mass atrocities, and other human rights abuses, and you’ll find grand corruption and unchecked greed. These tragedies persist because the perpetrators rarely face meaningful consequences. The Sentry aims to alter the warped incentive structures that continually undermine peace and good governance. Our investigations follow the money as it is laundered from war zones to financial centers around the world. We provide evidence and strategies for governments, banks, and law enforcement to hold the perpetrators and enablers of violence and corruption to account. These efforts provide new leverage for human rights, peace, and anti-corruption efforts..."
Source/publisher:
Justice For Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2024-07-08
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"YANGON—Former Myanmar President Thein Sein departed for an official visit to China on Thursday, Beijing’s embassy in Yangon said, in his first foreign trip since the military seized power three years ago.
Former general Thein Sein, 79, ruled Myanmar from 2011 to 2016 as the reformist president of a quasi-civilian government which ceded power to Daw Aung San Suu Kyi following landmark elections.
He later retired to the military-built capital Naypyitaw and has largely stayed out of the public eye since.
On Wednesday Thein Sein met China’s ambassador and discussed “the situation in Myanmar and cooperation between the two countries,” the embassy in Yangon posted on its Facebook page.
Ties between the junta and Beijing—a major ally and arms supplier—frayed last year over the junta’s failure to crack down on online scam compounds in Myanmar’s borderlands.
The compounds were staffed by citizens of China and other countries who were often trafficked and forced to work swindling their compatriots in an industry analysts say is worth billions.
Junta chief Min Aung Hlaing has not visited China since the 2021 coup that plunged the country into turmoil.
The Southeast Asian nation has seen widespread fighting since the military coup ended democratic rule.
Myanmar is a vital piece of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, President Xi Jinping’s flagship US$1-trillion project that includes maritime, rail and road projects in Asia, Africa and Europe.
But progress in Myanmar has been hampered by the conflict since the military coup.
Last year an alliance of ethnic minority armed groups seized swathes of territory in Shan State along the border with China’s Yunnan province..."
Source/publisher:
Agence France-Presse (Paris) via "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-28
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Business and the Military
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"President Joseph R. Biden
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, D.C. 200500
Dear President Biden,
We, the undersigned 228 organizations, including the ethnic and religious minorities of Burma, are deeply concerned by the upswing in aerial attacks carried out by the Burmese junta since the start of the coup. These airstrikes target heavily populated areas, taking the lives of civilians, and completely destroying crucial public infrastructure, including hospitals and schools. We urge you to take and coordinate action immediately and implement harsher sanctions that will effectively hold the military junta accountable for this blatant violation of international law and cut off its fuel and weaponry supply.
Since the start of the coup in 2021 until now, the Burmese junta has carried out at least 1,427 airstrikes across Burma, killing over 434 civilians. Countrywide data on reported airstrikes reveal the junta’s increasing reliance on aerial strikes over time. In 2023, the International Institute for Strategic Studies found that the military conducted, on average, at least 49 airstrikes monthly. This was 25% higher than 2022 when the military conducted at least 39 average monthly aerial attacks. Airstrikes are expected to double this year, unless immediate action is taken. These aerial attacks occur in civilian spaces, even when there are no resistance groups present, nor fighting occurring.
Organizations have been sounding the alarm since 2022, when the military intentionally bombed an outdoor concert in October, killing over 80 civilians. The limited action from the U.S. and the international community has only encouraged more aggressive attacks to continue over the years, resulting in mass destruction and suffering. Around the same time in 2023, the military attacked an IDP camp, killing 28 civilians, including 11 children. This year, in February 2024, the junta went as far as to conduct airstrikes on schools, taking the lives of children and teachers.
We appreciate that after receiving a letter from organizations urging the ban on jet fuel last year, the U.S. has taken some actions in targeting the junta’s access to jet fuel, including sanctions on part of the Asia Sun Group business network that was importing fuel into Burma. However, these sanctions have been limited and more is needed. The U.S. has yet to make extensive use of the regulatory determination it used last August emphasizing that selling aviation fuel to Burma was a sanctionable offense.
Additionally, this year, the UN adopted a resolution for states to refrain from supporting aviation fuel trade and sale. As a responsible member state, the U.S. must only further demonstrate unwavering commitment and strict adherence to this resolution. This involves placing comprehensive aviation fuel sanctions, which only Canada has accomplished at the moment. The U.S. however can demonstrate its own leadership in this matter and fulfill its international obligations by participating in a complete aviation fuel embargo.
To prevent these devastating attacks, it is imperative that the United States further lead coordinated action within the international community to cut off the junta’s ability to purchase aviation fuel and supplies. A recent report from the UN Special Rapporteur showed that the junta’s imports of aviation fuel increased in 2023, including fuel imported through Asia Sun network. More must be done. Targeted sanctions must have harsher penalties and stronger enforcement. Otherwise, these international allies will continue to sell and transport aviation fuel to the junta which will be used to target and kill civilians.
We recognize and thank you for the actions you have taken thus far to support the people of Burma. However, as organizations that have connections, indirect and direct, with those on the ground in Burma, we know that the United States needs to do more. Please regard the junta’s aerial attack as a devastating warning of what is to come for the people of Burma should the military continue to have unchecked access to fuel and other supplies. The United States holds the power and influence to create change – please ensure that this power is not wasted.
We ask for the specific actions below:
Sanction international companies that sell aviation fuel supplies to the military junta. While smaller Burmese entities can be easily replaced, major international entities would face severe repercussions and serious obstacles to their ability to supply the military.
Bar any entity from providing shipping insurance, transport, storage facilities, or other shipping services to companies selling aviation fuel to the military, its allies or affiliated companies. The most effective way of disrupting the flow of aviation fuel is to prevent ships from picking up cargo or accessing ports by withholding insurance and services.
Impose full sanctions on the Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE), as the European Union has already done. Sanctions on MOGE itself, not just on MOGE officials, would cut off one of the junta’s largest revenue streams and have the greatest impact on stopping the junta’s campaign of lethal violence in the country.
Hold the Burmese junta accountable for their clear violations of international law and active war crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity, and mass atrocities..."
Source/publisher:
228 Organizations via Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-28
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations, Sanctions, Business and the Military
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
223.5 KB
more
Description:
"The MAU tracks market prices in southern Sagaing Region. Data are collected from three vendors per product per market at the end of each month. The data include prices from Monywa (main market), Myaung (village), Shwebo (main market), Ye-U (village), and Yinmarbin (village). Data and product specs are available at www.themimu.info/market-analysis-unit.
KEY FINDINGS
May added further increases to April's price hikes, although May's increases were less dramatic;
Cooking oil prices rose 11% in May, and essential food prices crept slightly higher in some markets;
Prices for some vegetables rose 13-25% in May, while a few vegetables pulled back from April's 40% hikes;
Meat and fish prices rose 2-9%, compounding the effects of April's 10-20% price increases;
Prices for hygiene NFIs were relatively stable in May and more so than other product categories this month;
Prices for various other NFIs climbed 3-9%, rising at a pace similar to April, and very few NFI prices fell in May;
Monywa again saw the steepest price hikes—although less severe than last month—and Yinmarbin saw significant price hikes as well.
Product-Level Price Changes
Essential Foods – Essential food prices were stable or rising in May, and cooking oil added 11% on top of April's price hikes. Cooking oil prices rose again in May, adding 11% on top of April's 15% increases. Prices for rice and pulses were overall stable, although they rose 3-12% in Myaung and Shwebo.
Vegetables – Prices for long bean, green chili, and bananas rose 13-25% in May, but other vegetable prices fluctuated. Prices for green chili spiked in May, climbing at least 25% in several markets, while long bean prices rose 13%. By contrast, onion and eggplant prices were down 10% and 20%, respectively. Prices for garlic and watercress fluctuated but were overall stable.
Meat and Fish – Meat and fish prices increased 2-9%, rising somewhat slower than in April when prices climbed 10-20%. Prices for dried fish, shrimp, fresh fish, and fish paste rose 2-4% in May, while chicken prices increased 9%.
Hygiene Products – Prices for hygiene products were relatively stable, although prices jumped in some markets. Detergent prices increased 7% in May, while soap prices fell 5%. Prices for toothpaste and sanitary pads were generally stable. At a township-level, prices for hygiene products rose 7-9% in Monywa while other markets saw a mix of rising and falling prices.
Other NFIs – Prices for most NFIs increased 3-9% in May, rising at a page similar to April. Prices for blankets, plastic tarps, and longyis rose a fairly-modest 1-3%, while prices for charcoal and umbrellas increased 9-12%. Prices for other NFIs like jerry cans, towels, mosquito nets, and cooking pots—some of which saw price hikes last month—were generally stable in May. All markets saw NFI price hikes in May, but increases were most notable in Monywa and Yinmarbin..."
Source/publisher:
Myanmar Information Management Unit
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-28
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Food Security and nutrition in Burma/Myanmar, Human Rights and international relations, Business and the Military
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
672.71 KB
more
Description:
"India, one of the Myanmar junta’s closest allies, has urged the regime to protect its assets in the west of the country as fighting rages there between junta troops and ethnic forces.
India’s External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar said he expressed Delhi’s “deep concern” over the issue on Wednesday during talks with junta foreign minister Than Swe.
“Met with Deputy PM and FM of Myanmar U Than Shwe [sic] as he transited New Delhi today,” Jaishankar said in a Facebook post on Wednesday.
“Discussed our deep concern at the impact of continuing violence and instability in Myanmar on our border.
“Pressed for credible security protection for our ongoing projects in the country,” the post continues.
India is funding the US $484-million Kaladan multimodal transport project in Myanmar’s western states of Rakhine and Chin. The mega-project is a crucial plank of India’s Act East Policy to counter China’s influence in Myanmar through its Belt and Road Initiative.
The Kaladan project will link the seaports of Kolkata and Sittwe in Rakhine State and extend to Paletwa in Chin State via the Kaladan River, then by road to Mizoram in northeast India.
Construction of the project was suspended following the 2021 military coup due to tension between junta troops and the Arakan Army (AA). The project has been shelved completely since the AA seized most of northern Rakhine and southern Chin State in an offensive launched late last year.
The rest of Chin State remains a resistance hotbed, with several Chin ethnic forces combining to fight the regime after the coup.
The AA currently controls Paletwa in Chin State and nine towns in northern Rakhine, where it is now advancing on Thandwe, home to the world famous Ngapali Beach.
Launched 12 years ago to provide an alternate route to India’s landlocked northeast, the Kaladan project had been scheduled for completion in 2023 after long delays. But the war in Rakhine and Chin states has shattered that plan.
Despite proclaiming itself the world’s largest democracy, India has strengthened ties with Myanmar’s regime since the coup, even as other major democracies shun it.
India has been assisting the regime in military, economic and diplomatic affairs along with its other two major allies, China and Russia. Delhi has also offered to help the junta hold a general election that has been widely condemned as a sham designed to cement military rule.
Junta boss Min Aung Hlaing demanded speedy completion of construction during his visit to the Kaladan transport project in March last year, when he also hailed India as a good neighbor and friend. His visit came after Indian Foreign Secretary Vinay Mohan Kwatra called for acceleration of the project during talks with the junta boss in Naypyitaw in November 2022.
Jaishankar said he urged an early return to the path of democratic transition for Myanmar in talks with Than Swe on Wednesday, adding that India was ready to help in any manner..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-27
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Business and the Military, The Burmese military's role in the economy, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"
Thai banks and registered companies are taking on an expanding and leading role securing weapons to Myanmar’s military regime even as it grows increasingly isolated amid a brutal civil war claiming thousands of lives, a United Nations report released Wednesday says.
The report, Banking on the Death Trade: How Banks and Governments Enable the Military Junta in Myanmar, says international sanctions have helped to slash the regime’s purchase of weapons through the global financial system by a third from the 2022 to 2023 fiscal year, which runs April to March, to some $253 million.
“That is a very significant step in the right direction and shows the impact that international action can take,” said the U.N. special rapporteur on human rights in Myanmar, Tom Andrews, the report’s author.
Andrews attributed much of the drop in trade to Singapore, which investigated its own banks and companies in the wake of a report he wrote last year that named the city-state among Myanmar’s main pipelines for arms since the military’s 2021 coup.
The new report says Myanmar’s military purchases through the global financial system from companies registered in Singapore crashed between 2022 and 2023 some 90% as a result, from $110 million to just $10 million last year.
“The bad news is that we’ve seen the opposite happen in Thailand, where there has been a significant increase in both the facilitation of weapons procurement transactions by Thai banks and the export of weapons materials from Thai companies into Myanmar,” Andrews told VOA.
According to his report, Myanmar’s military purchases from companies registered in Thailand over the same period doubled to $120 million, topping all other countries, including China and Russia.
China and Russia saw their companies’ arms trade with Myanmar through the global financial system fall in 2023, to $80 million and $10 million respectively. India’s trade stayed steady at $15 million.
Myanmar’s recent military purchases via Thailand, the report says, included items ranging from chemicals to machine tools and radios to spare parts for fighter jets and helicopters, which the junta is widely accused of using to deadly effect on civilian targets.
Myanmar’s military regime has denied targeting civilians and claims it is taking proportionate action against “terrorists.”
Andrews’ report does not claim that the Thai government was directly involved in the arms trades, or that all the military material and goods were made or assembled in, or exported from, Thailand. It also does not capture any arms trade outside of the global financial system, including any deals that may have been settled with hard cash or by barter.
Previous research by Andrews and others showed most weapons shipments to Myanmar since the coup starting out from China and Russia.
Even so, this week’s report highlights the major role international commercial banks continue to play in arming Myanmar’s military despite the mounting allegations of the junta’s war crimes. It names 16 banks in Thailand and six other countries across Asia handling $630 million worth of military-related purchases for the junta over the past two years.
Despite the impact sanctions have had in stemming that trade, Andrews told VOA countries keen on thwarting Myanmar’s junta can do much more to enforce, coordinate and add to the sanctions, to leave fewer gaps for the junta to exploit.
Countries that have placed sanctions on Myanmar have not all sanctioned the same companies, and some companies vital to the junta’s arms trade still have not been sanctioned at all.
Andrews said the junta has reacted to sanctions on two of its key banks for military trades, for example, by redirecting most of that business through another bank still free of sanctions. The junta has also gotten better at disguising its arms purchases.
“What is critical now is that the response of the international community, specifically with respect to sanctions, be coordinated, be strategic and be focused, and that the international community work together to enforce these sanctions and eliminate these loopholes,” he said.
“The reason that is so important is because, given the fact that the junta is on its heels … their response is to escalate attacks on civilians,” he said.
Citing research by Armed Conflict Location and Event Data, a U.S.-based research group, he said the junta has picked up air strikes fivefold in the past six months alone. The junta has lost significant territory to armed resistance groups across the country over the same period and is now believed to be in control of less than half of Myanmar.
Andrews said the junta’s weapons supplies would also be hit hard if Thailand were to follow Singapore’s lead and crack down on its own companies doing business with Myanmar’s military and known suppliers.
Unlike Singapore, though, Thailand’s government has not explicitly come out against trading arms with Myanmar.
Asked for comment, Thailand’s Foreign Affairs Ministry spokesperson Nikorndej Balankura said the government was looking into the report.
“Our banking and financial institutions follow banking protocols as any major financial hub. So we will have to first establish the facts before considering any further steps,” he said in a statement shared with VOA.
“This is a matter of policy which has to be carefully considered, particularly the impact of sanctions on the wider population,” he said. “Thailand has always taken the position not to support any action that impacts the wider population.”
In a separate statement, a group of past and present lawmakers from across Southeast Asia said it was “alarmed” by Myanmar’s shift from Singapore to Thailand to source weapons and urged all 10 governments of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations to learn from Singapore.
The bloc agreed to a five-point peace plan for Myanmar in April 2021 but has failed to make any headway besides providing some humanitarian aid.
In the statement, Philippines lawmaker Raoul Manuel said the role of Southeast Asian companies in helping to arm the junta only undermines the bloc’s peace efforts.
“ASEAN’s efforts to resolve the conflict in Myanmar cannot be taken seriously if ASEAN member states are helping to arm and fund the murderous Myanmar junta, which has already killed thousands of its own people and continues to indiscriminately attack the civilian population,” he said..."
Source/publisher:
"Voice of America" (Washington, D.C)
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-27
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Business and the Military, Sanctions, The Burmese military's role in the economy
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"The Arakan Army’s capture of Rakhine State’s Thandwe Airport on Sunday puts the ethnic army just steps away from Myanmar’s most valuable beach – seven kilometers of fine white sand stretching between turquoise sea and palm-fringed forest – and puts many of the country’s most brazen cronies in an unenviable position.
Will the tycoons who turned their military ties into riches, including the son of junta boss Ming Aung Hlaing, try to negotiate with a rebel army to save their assets?
Ngapali Beach is where Myanmar’s cronies built their most lavish resorts. Its gateway is Thandwe Airport, just 30 minutes away.
The fall of the airport means the loss of the prized beach, which is also famous for watching the sun set over the Bay of Bengal.
The airport was used by the regime to reinforce troops, and send in weapons and supplies from Ayeyarwady Region and southern Shan State. That’s no longer possible. Without the airport’s runway, Thandwe Township is only accessible by two roads that weave through the Arakan Mountains: Gwa-Ngathaingchaung and Taungup-Padaung. Both roads leave convoys prone to ambush. Moreover, the arrival of the monsoon season makes it treacherous to send more troops and supplies by sea to protect the crony beach.
There are 64 hotels and resorts on Ngapali Beach and most of the grandest ones are owned by tycoons with close ties to the leaders of successive military regimes, from the State Law and Order Restoration Council, which ruled from 1988 to 2011, to the current State Administration Council.
Amazing Ngapali Hotel was built on land leased from the military by Aung Myo Min Din, who has personal ties to junta boss Min Aung Hlaing and his wife Kyu Kyu Hla. Aung Myo Min Din was Kyu Kyu Hla’s pupil when he was a high school student and reportedly has an open invitation to Min Aung Hlaing’s home.
Hoteliers say Aung Myo Min Din also bought Max Hotel from crony Zaw Zaw for Min Aung Hlaing’s son Aung Pyae Sone. Max Hotel, now rebranded as Ananda Hotel, is adjacent to Amazing Ngapali Hotel. Local residents also say Aung Pyae Sone is its owner.
The Pristine Mermaid Ngapali is owned by Nandar Aye, a daughter of the deputy junta chief of the previous junta, Maung Aye. The Htoo Group of Companies, owned by crony and arms broker Tay Za, reportedly built the hotel for her for free.
Tun Naing Shwe, son of former junta chief Than Shwe, owns the Thande Ngapali Hotel.
Arch crony Aung Ko Win owns the Jasmine Ngapali Resort through his Kanbawza (KBZ) Group of Companies, which includes KBZ Bank. The resort’s guests include Min Aung Hlaing. In January of last year, it hosted the 8th High-Level Committee Meeting between the Myanmar and Thai armed forces. Participants included General Chalermphon Srisawasdi, Chief of the Defence Forces of the Royal Thai Armed Forces.
Ngapali’s Aureum Palace is owned by Tay Za’s Htoo Group of Companies Za, while its Jade Marina Hotel is owned by crony Ne Win Tun, the leader of a Pa-O militia with ties to the junta’s military, through his Ruby Dragon Co.
Other, less flamboyant cronies, also bought or built resorts on Ngapali Beach.
This may be why the regime tried so hard to hang on to the seven-kilometer strip of white sand. It even sent reinforcements from the Aung Zeya Column to Thandwe in early June. The column is advancing towards Myawaddy along the Thai border in Karen State with the goal of retaking the vital border town.
The Arakan Army defeated the junta soldiers and police protecting the airport and the beach. Reports say more than 100 junta soldiers and police surrendered. Others fled to the bases of nearby battalions in Thandwe Township. Both Light Infantry Battalion 566 and Infantry Battalion 55 have bases there.
The Arakan Army told both battalions to surrender after it seized Thandwe Airport.
The 5th Military Operations Command in Taungup is the nearest battalion to Thandwe, but Taungup is surrounded by Arkan Army troops. The regime is not in a position to regroup its soldiers in Rakhine to send reinforcements to Thandwe.
If the Arakan Army takes Ngapali Beach, Myanmar’s cronies will face a stark choice: abandon their assets or negotiate with a rebel army to save them..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-25
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, The Burmese military's role in the economy, Business and the Military
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"Toshikazu Tajima
Board Director and CEO
TASAKI & Co., Ltd.
7-3-1, Minatojima Nakamachi, Chuo-ku, Kobe, Hyogo 650-0046, Japan
Re: Inquiry regarding TASAKI’s business partnership with sanctioned entity Myanmar Pearl Enterprise.
We are civil society organizations from Japan and Myanmar that make policy proposals urging Japanese companies to consider the environment, society, and human rights in their overseas business operations.
We are writing to you to express our concern regarding your company’s continued partnership with Myanmar Pearl Enterprise (MPE), a US, UK, and Canadian[i] sanctioned state-owned enterprise under the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Conservation that is illegally controlled by the Myanmar military junta.
Since February 1, 2021 when the Myanmar military attempted a coup, it has been committing war crimes and crimes against humanity with total impunity as it tries to take control of Myanmar. These grave international crimes include deliberate killings, arbitrary arrests, torture, indiscriminate airstrikes, and destruction of civilian property, which have led to the displacement of more than 3 million people across the country.[ii] There are grave concerns that the military is committing these crimes relying on revenue from MPE and other junta-controlled entities.
We are aware that MYANMAR TASAKI Co., Ltd, a subsidiary of TASAKI & Co., Ltd, has been in a business partnership with MPE since 1997 under a production sharing contract under a license granted by the now junta-controlled Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Conservation (MONREC). The military junta benefits from revenues generated through the pearl industry, including through a production sharing agreement under which MPE reportedly receives 20-25% of the pearls harvested.[iii] The junta also benefits from customs duties, other taxes and the transfer of technology that can support further production.
Of the companies that have been granted permission for pearl farming, MYANMAR TASAKI was the largest producer at over ten billion MMK (over US$8 million at the time) worth of pearls in 2017-2018, the year with the most recently published data available.[iv] We understand that your company has sold Myanmar pearls around the world, with TASAKI’s website listing stores in Australia, China, France, Japan, Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, UK and USA among others and that the junta has continued to earn revenue from pearls. According to a Myanmar junta run newspaper, 400 pearl lots were up for sale this year during the 59th Myanmar Gems Emporium, which was attended by the junta leader and commander-in-chief of the Myanmar military, Min Aung Hlaing.[v]
In April 2021, over three years ago, TASAKI’s business partner MPE was sanctioned by the US. In adding MPE on the Specially Designated Nationals list, the US stated that “pearl industries are key economic resources for the Burmese military regime that is violently repressing pro-democracy protests in the country and that is responsible for the ongoing violent and lethal attacks against the people of Burma, including the killing of children.[vi]” The UK also sanctioned MPE and a state-owned timber enterprise to “target the junta’s ability to profit from pearl and timber, 2 high-value natural commodities that generate millions in revenue for the military regime.[vii]”
While TASAKI’s website states that pearls produced by the company’s own pearl farms “are ethically and sustainably sourced”, we are concerned that TASAKI’s continuing partnership with MPE contravenes human rights responsibilities under the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (OECD Guidelines) and the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights.[viii] Under the OECD Guidelines and the UN Guiding Principles, all businesses have a responsibility to respect human rights and are therefore required to exercise human rights due diligence to identify and prevent, mitigate and account for adverse human rights impacts.
We would like to reiterate our concern that by continuing its partnership with MPE, TASAKI is providing the junta with a source of revenue that it can use to procure the very weapons and jet fuel that it needs to continue to commit war crimes and crimes against humanity. We also believe that TASAKI’s continued business with MPE undermines the effects of the sanctions imposed by the US, UK and Canada against MPE, which are intended to block the junta’s access to revenue from the pearl sector. Justice For Myanmar, together with another Japanese organization, Human Rights Now, has previously issued a press release expressing concerns regarding TASAKI’s continuing business with MPE.[ix]
While we understand that an objective of TASAKI’s philosophy on sustainability is “harmonious co-existence with local communities'' inspired by a “spirit of sustainability,[x]” we are further concerned by several Myanmar civil society reports on the situation of the indigenous Moken people of Myanmar, which were submitted to the UN in 2020.[xi]According to these reports,[xii] TASAKI’s pearl farms in Myanmar, which are located in the Tanintharyi Region of southern Myanmar, could lead to further forced displacement of Moken people from their ancestral lands due to loss of water and land access.
In light of these concerns, we would like to know what human rights due diligence has been performed since the military’s coup attempt, the results of that due diligence and what measures TASAKI has taken in response.
We believe that by remaining in business with MPE, TASAKI may be in contravention of human rights responsibilities under the UN Guiding Principles and the OECD Guidelines and risks complicity in the military junta’s international crimes. Therefore, we call on you to responsibly end all business with the military junta controlled MPE and fulfill your responsibilities to respect human rights. In addition, TASAKI should publicly disclose its transactions with MPE and other junta-controlled entities since February 1, 2021.
We would appreciate your timely reply to the contact address listed below by July 5, 2024 to share the requested data and to outline your course of action for addressing the issues raised. Furthermore, your response will be published on our organization's website among other platforms (including the fact of no response at the time of deadline). We look forward to receiving your response.
Sincerely,
Yuka Kiguchi
Executive Director, Mekong Watch
Yadanar Maung
Spokesperson, Justice For Myanmar
Contact address:
Mekong Watch
3F Aoki Bldg., Taito 1-12-11,
Taito-ku, Tokyo 110-0016,
Japan
TEL: +81-3-3832-5034
EMAIL: [email protected]
[i] Office of Foreign Assets Control, “Burma-related Designations; Kingpin Act Designations Removals”, April 21, 2021https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20210421; Government of Canada, “Regulations Amending the Special Economic Measures (Burma) Regulations: SOR/2021-106”, May 14, 2021 https://gazette.gc.ca/rp-pr/p2/2021/2021-05-26/html/sor-dors106-eng.html; Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation, “Consolidated List of Financial Sanctions Targets in the UK”, June 2, 2021https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/65bb618927fccf000d4bd1b3/Myanmar.pdf.
[ii] UN Resident Humanitarian Coordinator a.i. for Myanmar, “Statement by the Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator a.i. for Myanmar”, May 3, 2024 https://myanmar.un.org/en/267754-statement-resident-and-humanitarian-coordinator-ai-myanmar.
[iii] Frontier Myanmar, “Moken Fear a Sea Grab in the Myeik Archipelago”, December 29, 2019 https://www.frontiermyanmar.net/en/moken-fear-a-sea-grab-in-the-myeik-archipelago/.
[iv] Myanmar Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, “Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative Myanmar, EITI Report 2017-2018”, January 2019 https://eiti.org/sites/default/files/attachments/meiti_reconciliation_report_2017-2018_final_signed_31st_march_2020.pdf.
[v] The Global New Light of Myanmar, “400 Pearl, 160 Gem, and 4,550 Jade Lots Up for Sale”, May 2, 2024 https://cdn.myanmarseo.com/file/client-cdn/gnlm/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/4-5-2024.pdf.
[vi] U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Sanctions Key Timber and Pearl Enterprises in Burma”, April 21, 2021 https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0138.
[vii] Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office and The Rt Hon Dominic Raab MP, “Foreign Secretary Announces Further Sanctions on Companies Linked to Myanmar’s Military Regime”, June 21, 2021 https://www.gov.uk/government/news/foreign-secretary-announces-further-sanctions-on-companies-linked-to-myanmars-military-regime.
[viii] Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), “OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises on Responsible Business Conduct”, June 8, 2023 https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/finance-and-investment/oecd-guidelines-for-multinational-enterprises-on-responsible-business-conduct_81f92357-en; United nations Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights : Implementing the United Nations ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ Framework”, January 1, 2012https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/publications/guidingprinciplesbusinesshr_en.pdf.
[ix] Human Rights Now and Justice For Myanmar “Human Rights Now and Justice For Myanmar call on TASAKI to end business with the Myanmar military junta, following US designation of Myanmar Pearl Enterprise for sanctions”, April 21, 2021 https://www.justiceformyanmar.org/press-releases/human-rights-now-and-justice-for-myanmar-call-on-tasaki-to-end-business-with-the-myanmar-military-junta-following-us-designation-of-myanmar-pearl-enterprise-for-sanctions.
[x] TASAKI Website, “Our Sustainability”, accessed June 10, 2024. https://www.tasaki-global.com/corporate/sustainability/about/.
[xi] Burma Human Rights Network, “The Coming Extinction: The Moken People of Burma’s Mergui Archipelago”, December 12, 2020https://www.bhrn.org.uk/en/component/edocman/bhrn-report/the-coming-extinction-the-moken-people-of-burma-s-mergui-archipelago.html; FIDH – International Federation for Human Rights and Myanmar Alliance for Transparency and Accountability, “Universal Periodic Review (UPR) 37thSession Myanmar: Joint Submission by FIDH and MATA”, July 2020, https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/fidh-mata_joint_upr_submission_july_2020.pdf; Coalition of Indigenous Peoples in Burma/Myanmar, “Joint submission to the UN Universal Periodic Review of Myanmar July 2020: 37th Session of the UPR Working Group of the human Rights Council January/February 2021”, https://uprdoc.ohchr.org/uprweb/downloadfile.aspx?filename=8278&file=EnglishTranslation.
[xii] United Nations Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review, “Summary of Stakeholders’ submissions on Myanmar: Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights”, 12 November 2020, https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3893981?ln=en&v=pdf. ..."
Source/publisher:
Justice For Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2024-06-11
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Business and the Military, Sanctions, The Burmese military's role in the economy, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
Format :
pdf pdf
Size:
221.59 KB 291.63 KB
more
Description:
"The Myanmar junta-allied Karen Border Guard Force (BGF), rebranded as the Karen National Army (KNA), has built a transnational network of businesses that enriches the militia’s ruling family and their associates, and causes widespread suffering.
A Justice For Myanmar investigation into the Karen BGF/KNA corporate structure and regional network provides new details into the militia’s involvement in illegal and abusive businesses with companies and individuals from Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, Cambodia, China and Hong Kong.
These include cyber scam parks, illegal casinos and illegal online gambling as the junta and its allied Karen BGF/KNA continue to commit international crimes with total impunity.
Malaysians play a prominent role in the Yatai New City and Dongmei Park projects, which involve a vast range of criminal activities and human rights violations.
Yatai New City is a mega development with illegal casinos, cyber scam and illegal online gambling operations and is a joint venture between the Karen BGF/KNA and Yatai International Holding Group. In 2022, Yatai’s chairperson, She Zhijiang, was arrested in Thailand on an international warrant and is awaiting extradition to China to answer charges of running illegal gambling operations. The two remaining members of Yatai Group in the company’s Myanmar joint venture were Malaysian citizens.
Dongmei Park is a cyber scam park established by former 14K Triad boss Wan Kuok-koi (also known as Broken Tooth) with Malaysian associates that include former deputy minister to the prime minister Dato Dr Mashitah Ibrahim and her husband, Datuk Abdul Shakor bin Abu Bakar, a former diplomat. The couple traveled to Karen State in 2020 with a contingent of prominent Malaysians and Wan Kuok-koi to launch the project. Datuk Abdul Shakor bin Abu Bakar continues to serve as a director and shareholder of Dongmei Group’s US-sanctioned Hong Kong company.
The investigation also exposes new connections between Thai companies and individuals and Karen BGF/KNA businesses, including a trip to Shwe Kokko by representatives of the Thai state-owned EXIM Bank, Bangkok Bank, Kasikorn Bank and Krungthai Bank via an unofficial Karen BGF border crossing to discuss financial support.
The investigation details the central role San Myint (who goes by the pseudonym Saw Chit Thu) and his children play in Karen BGF/KNA companies. By distributing shares between family members, San Myint’s family controls six Karen BGF/KNA business and has a minority stake in two notorious cyber scam parks: Apollo Park and Yulong Bay Park. In both of these businesses, San Myint’s son, Saw Htoo Eh Moo, a Karen BGF/KNA major, is a director and shareholder.
Justice For Myanmar calls for urgent sanctions against the Karen BGF/KNA, its businesses and key individuals, including San Myint and his family.
Justice For Myanmar calls for Malaysia and Thailand in particular, as well as other authorities in the region, to investigate and hold their citizens and residents accountable for their involvement in transnational crimes and human rights violations in Myanmar.
Thailand must block the Karen BGF/KNA and its business associates from operating in its territory.
Justice For Myanmar spokesperson Yadanar Maung says: “The Karen BGF/KNA is responsible for war crimes and transnational crimes, which it commits with total impunity.
“The illegal junta not only protects these criminal activities but also profits from them as it continues to wage a war of terror against the people of Myanmar.
“The Karen BGF/KNA and junta’s international and transnational crimes have continued amid insufficient international action to resolve the crisis in Myanmar and to hold perpetrators accountable.
“Justice For Myanmar calls for urgent sanctions against the Karen BGF/KNA and its businesses.
“Authorities in the region must do far more to investigate the involvement of their citizens, residents and companies in the transnational and international crimes committed in Myanmar.
“In 2025, Malaysia will become chair of ASEAN and needs to step up and stamp out the involvement of its citizens in criminal activities in Myanmar. Malaysia cannot credibly respond to the crisis in Myanmar if its own citizens can do business with war criminals and cause harm to the people of Myanmar and the region with impunity.
“Thailand remains complicit in the commission of international crimes in Myanmar through its business with the illegal junta, and it has failed to take sufficient action against its citizens and companies enabling and profiting from the Karen BGF/KNA.
“Thailand and Malaysia need to change course now to help resolve the Myanmar crisis, rather than allowing their companies and citizens to cause more harm to the people of Myanmar.”..."
Source/publisher:
Justice For Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2024-05-22
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Sanctions, Business and the Military, Karen (Kayin) State
Language:
Format :
pdf pdf
Size:
166.91 KB 219.2 KB
more
Sub-title:
Tokyo Should Suspend Payments, Impose Targeted Sanctions
Description:
"Despite Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida’s pledge last February to “appropriately handle” the flow of government aid to Myanmar’s abusive military, a Japanese Foreign Ministry official told the Diet this week that Japan’s construction giant, Yokogawa Bridge Corp., will make further payments to the military-owned Myanmar Economic Corporation (MEC) for an aid project.
In March 2021, Myanmar Now reported that a steel mill owned by the MEC was supplying steel for Japan’s Bago River Bridge Construction Project and “profiting enormously.” Financial transactions analyzed by Human Rights Watch show that from July 2022 to January 2023, Yokogawa Bridge Corp. transferred around US$2 million to MEC for the project, with United States government approval.
During a House of Councilors session, Foreign Minister Yoko Kamikawa said that the MEC’s participation ended in December and that Yokogawa Bridge Corp.’s “progress payments” to the MEC had finished. However, Hideki Kusakabe of the Foreign Ministry’s International Cooperation Bureau responded to a question by opposition lawmaker Michihiro Ishibashi by saying that Yokogawa Bridge Corp. still had certain payments to make for the project. Kusakabe did not disclose a sum or a timeline.
The MEC generates vast revenue through businesses in sectors including manufacturing, mining, and telecommunications, according to a 2019 report by the United Nations-backed Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar. The US, United Kingdom, European Union, Canada, and Australia have sanctioned the MEC and Myanmar’s other military conglomerate, Myanmar Economic Holdings Limited, for their role in generating significant revenues that help fund military abuses.
Since the February 2021 military coup, Myanmar’s military has been responsible for widespread and systematic human rights abuses, including extrajudicial killings, torture, and indiscriminate attacks on civilians that amount to crimes against humanity and war crimes.
Prior to the coup, Myanmar’s security forces committed crimes against humanity and acts of genocide against the Rohingya in Rakhine State, forcing hundreds of thousands to flee to Bangladesh in 2017. An estimated 600,000 Rohingya remain in Rakhine State, where in recent months they have been caught in fighting between the Myanmar military and the Arakan Army armed group and subjected to forced recruitment by the junta.
Prime Minister Kishida needs to take responsibility for his pledge to “appropriately handle” the issue and should suspend further payments to the MEC, stop all non-humanitarian aid to Myanmar’s junta, and impose targeted sanctions on its military leaders and military-owned conglomerates..."
Source/publisher:
Human Rights Watch (USA)
Date of entry/update:
2024-05-21
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Language:
Local URL:
more
Sub-title:
Battlefield losses mount as the military junta has dragged the country back into poverty.
Description:
"While the Myanmar military regime’s battlefield losses throughout the country are grabbing headlines, the country’s dire economic crisis is further undercutting the junta’s capacity to wage war.
Myanmar’s military has suffered significant battlefield losses throughout the country since an ethnic rebel army alliance launched Operation 1027 nearly six months ago, raising questions whether the military is able to retake lost territories.
Fighting across eight distinct battle scapes, the military is unable to divide and conquer, and even its emphasis on first retaking the heartland of the ethnic majority Bamars, has faltered. In Sagaing, the junta has suffered significant setbacks and only recaptured one town. in southern Myanmar, two Mon resistance organizations agreed to work together as they prepare to go on the attack against the regime.
The junta offensive to recapture Myawaddy, the largest border crossing with Thailand is another case in point. Despite the city’s strategic importance, the military’s counter-offensive has stalled, with their force being reportedly ambushed and harassed.
While manpower issues have led to forced conscription, no less important is whether the regime is able to financially sustain its military operations.
Myanmar is broke, because the junta has broken the economy since its February 2021 coup.
The junta has eviscerated over a decade’s worth of economic growth. Between 2011 and 2019, Myanmar’s economy grew by an average 6% a year, making it one of the fastest growing economies in the region. Its poverty rate fell from 49% in 2005 to 25% in 2017.
While the economy has recovered from its 2021 nadir, when GDP contracted by 18%, it’s still down 12% since the coup. The World Bank’s cautious scenario for 1% growth in 2024 seems beyond reach.
Back into poverty
The military has dragged the country back into poverty through their own incompetence. Today, over 50 percent of the population of 55 million people has fallen back into poverty.
A recent United Nations Development Program report was more dire, citing field interviews that found 49.7% of respondents living on less than 76 U.S. cents a day. That number has doubled since 2017. The UNDP noted that the urban middle class has collapsed by 50% since the coup.
Inflation remains extremely high, at over 18 percent; though it reached 29% in mid-2023, according to the World Bank. Food prices have gone up threefold since the coup, with rice up from 60,000 kyat per kilogram to 180,000.
Firms, according to a World Bank survey, were operating at 56% capacity in 2023, down by 16% from 2022. That has diminished tax receipts.
Indeed, all sources of revenue, except natural gas rents, are down since the coup, according to the regime’s own data. This has been in part due to the economic conditions as well as the NUG’s active campaign of product boycotts, the establishment of alternate lotteries, and a drive to have corporations put their taxes into escrow.
Once cash cows, the two military-owned conglomerates Myanma Economic Holdings Ltd. and Myanma Economic Corporation are hemorrhaging funds. The former has since the coup failed to pay dividends to service members who are forced to invest a portion of their monthly salary.
Foreign investment, other than that from opportunistic Chinese and Thai businesses, is fleeing the country.
The once-thriving digital payments market is under intense military scrutiny, as they seek to control the flow of funds to the opposition.
Border crossings lost
The regime’s shortage of dollars has led to arbitrary currency controls, impacting importers and exporters. The kyat lost 16% of its value in the first quarter of 2024 alone, while the price of gold increased 22%.
The war has hurt the economy in another way. Myanmar-Now reports that the State Administrative Council (SAC), as the junta is formally known, only controls 11 border crossings, which has led to a sharp loss of customs duties.
The Kachin Independence Army has captured the Lweje crossing in Kachin State, leaving only the modest town of Kanpaiktee under junta control.
The Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army holds Chinshwehaw in Shan State, where the Chinese brokered an 80-20 revenue sharing agreement between them and the junta.
Although the SAC still holds Muse, the main border crossing with China, the Three Brotherhood Alliance has surrounded the town and controls the roads to Lashio and has begun collecting taxes.
The junta still controls Tachileik in southern Shan State, as well as a number of smaller crossings in Mon and Tanintharyi States.
In western Myanmar, the Arakan Army’s consolidation of power in northern Rakhine and opposition advances in Chin state mean that the junta has lost control of several of the border crossings to India and Bangladesh.
The loss of the Myawaddy, which has a population of 200,000, is an acute financial blow to the regime. With two bridges into Thailand’s Mae Sot, it was the largest border crossing in the country, accounting for $4.4 billion in trade since the February 2021 coup d’etat, roughly 23% of the country’s total trade.
Reuters noted a sharp decline in trade, especially exports, from April 2023 to March 2024. Bilateral trade fell by over 40 percent to $1.15 billion.
Hyperinflation threat
While junta officials are still manning the border gates, the Karen National Union and local border guards forces are in control of much of the city, and have pledged to “implement our plan to establish our administration one step at a time,” including customs.
The loss of border trade is so deleterious to the regime as their shortage of dollars – exacerbated by the U.S.-imposed sanctions on the Myanma Foreign Trade Bank and the Myanma Investment and Commerce Bank, which handled Myanmar’s dollar transactions – has forced them to prioritize trade in local currencies.
The SAC has desperately stepped up economic cooperation with any willing partners. On April 9, the government met with a Russian-led trading bloc to discuss economic cooperation, including trade, investment, direct payments and the opening of direct flights between Moscow and Yangon. Turning to the Eurasian Economic Commission is a sign of how few choices the regime has.
What is not certain right now is the degree to which the illicit economy from areas controlled by pro-junta border guards forces is ebbing. Seeking to distance himself from Naypyitaw, Col. Saw Chit Thu recently rebranded his border forces as the Karen National Army.
There is intense fighting now outside of Shwe Kokko, one of the major scam centers along the Thai border, though opposition forces have not taken the enclave.
While the MNDAA has largely cooperated with the Chinese and helped return hundreds of Chinese fugitives, many of the scam centers along the Thai border – including KK Park I and II, as well as Family Park, Gate 25, Huanya, Xingua and Dongmei – remain open.
The regime has scapegoated a number of senior-level economic officials, including its seventh-highest official, Lt. Gen. Moe Myint Tun, and his aide. But that’s all they were, scapegoats, no different than the other corrupt and incompetent generals who remain.
Thus far, and defying predictions, the junta has not resorted to turning on the printing press at their banknote facility in Wazi. But as they become more cash strapped, they are likely to do just that.
On top of all the human death and misery the generals have caused in the conduct of a war that has largely targeted civilians, the threat of hyperinflation looms..."
Source/publisher:
"Radio Free Asia" (USA)
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-28
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Business and the Military, Sanctions, Border Trade - general
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"Info Birmanie and Justice For Myanmar urge the French government to swiftly investigate and freeze any assets of Theint Win Htet in France and revoke her visa.
On April 3, 2024, the French lawyers William Bourdon and Lily Ravon, acting as counsel for Justice For Myanmar, reported Theint Win Htet to French authorities requesting that they freeze any of her assets in French territory and consider her removal from France. They also wrote to HEC Paris urging the school to notify French authorities of Theint Win Htet’s sources of funds and to consider revoking her admission.
HEC benefits from its status as a Consular Higher Education Institution (Etablissement d'Enseignement Supérieur Consulaire-EESC), and as such the CCI Paris Ile-de-France is one of its main shareholders. On April 5, 2024, Info Birmanie and Justice For Myanmar wrote to CCI Paris Ile-de-France to raise concerns about Theint Win Htet’s access to the HEC, HEC Investment Club and International Consulting Club, the implicit support that her admission may imply from the many business leaders and their institutions who sit on the board of directors, and risks related to the use of the knowledge and network in the Myanmar context.
Theint Win Htet is a member of the founding family of Shwe Byain Phyu Group of Companies, a Myanmar military linked crony conglomerate and, according to her LinkedIn profile, has been admitted to HEC Paris, an elite French business school.
Shwe Byain Phyu Group is a major crony conglomerate with significant links to the Myanmar military, including a partnership to import petroleum with EU-sanctioned Myanma Economic Holdings Limited (MEHL) and interests in the mining and timber industries, which are now dominated by EU-sanctioned state-owned enterprises that are under junta control.
As a result of the family’s business with the Myanmar military junta and its conglomerates, the USA sanctioned Theint Win Htet, her brother Win Paing Kyaw, her parents Thein Win Zaw and Tin Latt Min, and Shwe Byain Phyu Group of Companies on January 31, 2024. In its sanctions announcement, the USA noted the role of Theint Win Htet, her brother and mother in “various companies that are closely related to the regime.”
In 2022, Shwe Byain Phyu Group took control of Telenor Myanmar, renamed ATOM Myanmar, putting the personal data of millions of users at risk amid the junta’s attempts to ramp up surveillance as part of its campaign of terror against the people of Myanmar.
Since the military’s illegal coup attempt, Theint Win Htet has acted as a shareholder and director of One Telecom Company Limited, a company established during Shwe Byain Phyu’s acquisition of Telenor Myanmar. In 2023, Theint Win Htet did an internship at ATOM Myanmar as a financial analyst.
Theint Win Htet has also held shares in Min Shwe Myine Enterprise Limited, a Myanmar petroleum company that formed a consortium in 2022 to “to find reliable suppliers from Russia to tighten Myanmar Russia partnership.”
Theint Win Htet’s expenses are supported by her family, according to Justice For Myanmar sources.
Info Birmanie and Justice For Myanmar call on the EU to urgently impose sanctions on Shwe Byain Phyu Group and its owners and directors, including Theint Win Htet, and to increase its targeted sanctions to block the junta’s access to funds, arms, equipment and jet fuel, in coordination with its allies.
Justice For Myanmar spokesperson Yadanar Maung says:
“The fact that Theint Win Htet is able to study in France is a further sign of the serious lack of coordination in sanctions imposed after the military’s illegal attempted coup.”
“Theint Win Htet’s presence in France undermines EU sanctions on Shwe Byain Phyu Group’s business partners and undermines US sanctions on Theint Win Htet and her family members.
“France should swiftly investigate and freeze any assets in France belonging to Theint Win Htet or her family members and bar her from France.”
“For more than three years, the people of Myanmar have courageously resisted the military’s failing attempted coup. France should stand on the side of the people and send a clear message that Myanmar cronies are not welcome in its territory.”
Info Birmanie coordinator Johanna Chardonnieras says:
"The integration of a student at HEC under American sanctions for her links with the Myanmar military junta, which is responsible for serious human rights violations, shows the laissez-faire approach to Myanmar.”
"By sharing its knowledge and network with Theint Win Htet, HEC, its management, board of directors and shareholders are showing, at best, a flagrant lack of diligence in the admissions process, and at worst, a disregard for the Myanmar people's struggle for freedom.
"It is from France that Theint Win Htet continues to exercise her ownership in the Shwe Byain Phyu Group - generating revenue for the junta and contributing to the bloody repression of her fellow citizens. It is therefore up to the French government to take appropriate measures, as a corollary of its repeated condemnations of the military junta’s international crimes and exactions, and its repeated expressions of support towards the people of Myanmar.".....Info Birmanie et Justice For Myanmar demandent urgemment au gouvernement français d’enquêter sans délai sur les avoirs de Theint Win Htet en France, de les geler et d’évaluer s’il y a lieu de remettre en question son droit de séjour en France.
Le 3 avril 2024, les avocats français William Bourdon et Lily Ravon, agissant en tant que conseils pour Justice For Myanmar, ont signalé Theint Win Htet aux autorités françaises en leur demandant de geler tous ses avoirs sur le territoire français et d’envisager le retrait de son droit de séjour en France. Ils ont également écrit à HEC Paris pour demander à l’école d’informer les autorités françaises sur les sources de financement de Theint Win Htet et d’envisager de révoquer son admission.
HEC bénéficie du statut d’Etablissement d’Enseignement Supérieur Consulaire (EESC) et, à ce titre, la CCI Paris Ile-de-France est l’un de ses principaux actionnaires. Le 5 avril 2024, Info Birmanie et Justice For Myanmar ont écrit à la CCI Paris Ile-de-France pour faire part de leurs préoccupations concernant la présence de Theint Win Htet à HEC, HEC Investment Club et International Consulting Club, du soutien implicite des nombreux chefs d’entreprise et institutions qui siègent au conseil d’administration que cette admission à HEC pourrait impliquer, et des risques liés à l’utilisation des connaissances et du réseau mis à disposition de Theint Win Htet dans le contexte birman.
Theint Win Htet est membre de la famille fondatrice du Shwe Byain Phyu Group of Companies, un conglomérat en relation avec l’armée birmane. D’après son profil LinkedIn, elle a été admise à HEC Paris, une école de commerce française réputée.
Le groupe Shwe Byain Phyu est un important conglomérat qui entretient des liens étroits avec l’armée birmane, notamment un partenariat pour l’importation de pétrole avec Myanma Economic Holdings Limited (MEHL), une société sanctionnée par l’Union Européenne (UE), et des intérêts dans les secteurs de l’exploitation minière et du bois, qui sont désormais dominés par des entreprises d’État sous le contrôle de la junte, sanctionnées également par l’UE.
En raison des affaires de sa famille avec la junte militaire birmane et de ces consortiums, les États-Unis ont sanctionné le 31 janvier 2024 Theint Win Htet, son frère Win Paing Kyaw, ses parents Thein Win Zaw et Tin Latt Min, ainsi que le Shwe Byain Phyu Group of Companies. Dans l’annonce de ces sanctions, les États-Unis ont noté le rôle de Theint Win Htet, de son frère et de sa mère dans « diverses entreprises étroitement liées au régime ».
En 2022, le groupe Shwe Byain Phyu a pris le contrôle de Telenor Myanmar, rebaptisé ATOM Myanmar, mettant en péril les données personnelles de millions d’utilisateurs, alors que la junte tente de renforcer la surveillance dans le cadre de sa campagne de terreur contre le peuple de Birmanie.
Depuis le coup d’État de l’armée, Theint Win Htet est actionnaire et gérante de One Telecom Company Limited, une société créée lors de l’acquisition de Telenor Myanmar par Shwe Byain Phyu. En 2023, Theint Win Htet a effectué un stage chez ATOM Myanmar en tant qu’analyste financière.
Theint Win Htet a également détenu des parts dans Min Shwe Myine Enterprise Limited, une société pétrolière du Myanmar qui a formé un consortium en 2022 pour « trouver des fournisseurs fiables en Russie afin de renforcer le partenariat Myanmar-Russie ».
Selon les sources de Justice For Myanmar, les dépenses de Theint Win Htet pour financer son mode de vie et ses études en France sont prises en charge par sa famille.
Info Birmanie et Justice For Myanmar appellent l’UE à imposer d’urgence des sanctions au groupe Shwe Byain Phyu et à ses propriétaires et directeurs, dont Theint Win Htet, et à renforcer ses sanctions ciblées pour bloquer l’accès de la junte aux fonds, aux armes, aux équipements et au carburant d’aviation, en coordination avec ses alliés.
Yadanar Maung, porte-parole de Justice For Myanmar, déclare :
« Le fait que Theint Win Htet puisse étudier en France est un nouveau signe du grave manque de coordination des sanctions imposées après la tentative illégale de coup d’État de l’armée. »
« La présence de Theint Win Htet en France compromet les sanctions de l’UE à l’encontre des partenaires commerciaux du groupe Shwe Byain Phyu et les sanctions des États-Unis à l’encontre de Theint Win Htet et des membres de sa famille. »
« La France devrait rapidement enquêter et geler tous les avoirs en France appartenant à Theint Win Htet ou aux membres de sa famille et lui interdire l’accès au territoire français. »
« Depuis plus de trois ans, le peuple du Myanmar résiste courageusement à la tentative de coup d’État manqué de l’armée. La France devrait se ranger du côté du peuple et envoyer un message clair selon lequel les complices de la junte birmane ne sont pas les bienvenus sur son territoire. »
Johanna Chardonnieras, coordinatrice d’Info Birmanie, déclare :
« L’intégration à HEC d’une étudiante sous sanctions américaines pour ses liens avec la junte militaire birmane, responsable de graves violations des droits humains, est symptomatique du laisser-faire en place sur le dossier birman. »
« En partageant ses connaissances et son réseau avec Theint Win Htet, HEC, sa direction, son conseil d’administration et ses actionnaires font preuve, au mieux, d’un manque flagrant de diligence dans la procédure d’admission, au pire, d’un mépris pour la lutte du peuple birman pour la liberté. »
« C’est depuis la France que Theint Win Htet continue d’exercer son actionnariat dans le groupe Shwe Byain Phyu, générant des revenus pour la junte et contribuant à la répression sanglante de ses concitoyens. Il appartient donc au gouvernement français de prendre les mesures qui s’imposent, en corollaire de ses condamnations répétées des crimes et exactions commis par la junte militaire et ses déclarations répétées de soutien au peuple birman....."
Source/publisher:
Justice For Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-26
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Business and the Military, Sanctions
Language:
Format :
pdf pdf pdf
Size:
122.79 KB 219.39 KB 154.32 KB
Local URL:
more
Description:
"The American fossil fuel company Chevron has exited from the controversial Yadana gas project in Myanmar after more than 30 years, during which it financed a brutal military dictatorship, an ongoing military coup attempt that began in 2021, and serious human rights abuses against the Myanmar people.
Kirk Herbertson, Senior Policy Advisor at EarthRights, released the following statement:
“Throughout the coup, Chevron has remained in business with the Myanmar military through its partnership with the Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE), which remains under the control of the illegal junta. Even now, Chevron appears to have exited Myanmar in an irresponsible manner, ensuring that the junta will continue misappropriating tens of millions of dollars in gas revenues each month.
“The chief executive officer of the Thai state-owned fossil fuel company PTT Exploration and Production Company (PTTEP), announced Chevron’s exit in a letter to the Thai stock exchange. Justice for Myanmar, an investigative research group, reported on Facebook that ‘Chevron’s interest in the Yadana gas project has been redistributed to the remaining shareholders: Thailand’s PTTEP and MOGE, a government department within the Ministry of Electricity and Energy and a revenue-collecting office for the Government of Myanmar. MOGE’s accounts were unlawfully seized by the junta during its 2021 attempted coup.’
“Since the coup began, the military’s junta has misappropriated billions of dollars in MOGE revenues that are owed to the legitimate Government of Myanmar. United Nations experts have determined that the junta is not the country’s legitimate government, meaning that it is not allowed to stand in for the government in commercial contracts. Nevertheless, the Yadana project shareholders, including Chevron, decided to treat the military junta as their counterpart and have facilitated payments to the junta throughout the coup.
“Chevron announced its intention to exit the project two years ago. The company’s initial plan was to sell its interest to MTI Energy, prompting civil society organizations to file a complaint with the OECD National Contact Point against the Canadian company. Ultimately, Chevron decided to transfer its ownership to the remaining partners in the joint venture.
“Since the military coup began in February 2021, civil society has repeatedly asked Chevron to stop allowing the junta to misappropriate gas revenues before exiting the project, in line with international human rights standards for responsible disengagement. All evidence suggests, however, that Chevron’s exit arrangements will ensure that revenues continue to reach the junta.
“Chevron has a responsibility to disclose what, if any, safeguards it put in place to prevent the military junta from continuing to misappropriate revenues from the Yadana gas project after its exit. So far, all signs suggest that they did not put any safeguards in place.
“Chevron’s responsibilities do not end even though it has exited from the Yadana partnership. According to international human rights standards, the company still has a responsibility to take steps to remediate human rights harms associated with its investment. Where a company has contributed to adverse impacts, disengagement does not absolve it from its responsibility to provide for or cooperate in remediation of such adverse impacts.
“According to international human rights standards, responsible disengagement involves meaningful consultation with stakeholders, including civil society and the National Unity Government. Responsible disengagement also involves transparency – companies are expected to disclose the details of their human rights due diligence process and their plans for remediation. EarthRights has found no evidence that Chevron conducted any meaningful consultation with stakeholders from Myanmar during the disengagement process or shared details of any human rights due diligence or planned remediation.
“In October 2023, the United States announced partial sanctions on MOGE, prohibiting certain types of transactions with the entity but falling short of cutting it off from the U.S. financial system, as the EU had done with the euro in early 2022. However, the Yadana shareholders – in a decision that required approval from Chevron – agreed to redirect payments to new bank accounts and approved a currency change from U.S. dollars to Thai baht, allowing the continued flow of revenues to MOGE despite these sanctions.
“Now that Chevron has exited, we call on the U.S. Government to immediately place full sanctions on MOGE. The United States has the ability to cut off the military junta’s access to lucrative gas revenues, but has delayed action for years in part due to Chevron’s lobbying and misinformation campaigns.”
“Each month that the United States delays further action, the military junta is able to access significant amounts of revenue that can be used to purchase the weapons, aviation fuel, and other resources it needs to continue committing atrocities against the Myanmar people.
“Chevron has been involved in the Yadana project since the 1990s. Since its earliest days, the project has been mired in controversy, as the pipeline’s construction became linked to serious human rights abuses for which they settled lawsuits brought against them by ethnic Karen villagers from the pipeline area. Almost three decades later, the project is nearing the end of its life and about to wind down, but even now continues to bankroll the military’s violence against the Myanmar people.”..."
Source/publisher:
EarthRights International
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-09
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"On March 4, 2024, the French lawyers William Bourdon and Lily Ravon reported Htoo Htwe Tay Za, also known as Rachel Tayza, to Italian authorities on behalf of Justice For Myanmar, requesting that they investigate her involvement as a shareholder and director of companies that are part of the EU-sanctioned Htoo Group of Companies, and where appropriate, to freeze her assets and to remove her from Italy.
Rachel Tayza has continued to reside in Italy and conduct business for the EU-sanctioned Htoo Group of Companies, a crony conglomerate that is owned by her family.
Htoo Group is a key node in the Myanmar military’s international network of businesses that provides it with funds, arms and equipment, which aids and abets genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. It does this though its network of more than 60 businesses in Myanmar and Singapore in sectors throughout the economy, including extractive industries.
Htoo Group is also sanctioned by the US, UK and Canada.
In its reasons for sanctions, the EU noted, “Htoo Group of Companies has acted as an intermediary for the provision of military equipment which was used against civilian populations protesting against the 1 February coup, all across the country and in particular in areas with ethnic minorities.”
William Bourdon and Lily Ravon also submitted a dossier to Rachel Tayza’s bank, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, which is owned by BNP Paribas, urging that they take action under EU sanctions.
Rachel Tayza has been residing in Milan, where she recently completed her studies at a fashion school, supported by proceeds from Htoo Group of Companies, according to a Justice For Myanmar investigation.
While in Italy, Rachel has continued to hold shares and act as director of at least seven Htoo Group companies, including ones newly formed after the military’s coup attempt, and those in direct business with the Myanmar army.
This includes Ayeyarwaddy Resorts and Lodges Company Limited, which has build-operate-transfer contracts with the Myanmar army’s EU-sanctioned Office of the Quarter Master General. One of their projects is for a commercial project on 22 acres of land in Yangon, which provides the military with approximately USD$1.65 million annually under a 50-year contract, according to Myanmar Investment Commission data released by Distributed Denial of Secrets.
Other companies Rachel holds shares in and serves as a director from Italy are Pegu Wood Company Limited, a subsidiary of Htoo Capital Company Limited, and One Fibre Company Limited, a subsidiary of Htoo Tech Company Limited, both established after the military’s illegal coup attempt.
Rachel was previously a director and shareholder in the now dissolved Myanmar Avia Export Company Limited, a Myanmar military arms broker that supplied Russian military aircraft and spare parts.
Rachel was sanctioned by the USA on January 31, 2023 for her active role in Htoo Group of Companies and for being the adult daughter of the Htoo Group Chairperson, Tay Za. Tay Za is sanctioned by the EU, USA, UK and Canada. Rachel’s brothers, Pye Phyo Tay Za and Htoo Htet Tay Za, are sanctioned by the USA, UK and Canada.
In addition to providing arms, Htoo Group donated funds to the Myanmar military in 2017 in support of their campaign of genocide against the Rohingya, a fact noted in the EU’s sanctions designation against the conglomerate.
Justice For Myanmar urges the EU to impose sanctions on the whole Htoo Group network of companies and individuals, including Rachel Tayza, as well as all other Myanmar junta cronies and arms brokers.
Justice For Myanmar spokesperson Yadanar Maung says: “Weak sanctions enforcement by Italian authorities has allowed Rachel Tayza to do business in Italy that funds an illegal and illegitimate military junta.
“Rachel Tayza and her family have long aided and abetted the Myanmar military’s endless war crimes and crimes against humanity through Htoo Group of Companies and profited from the bloodshed of Myanmar people.
“Rachel Tayza should be held accountable under EU sanctions and Italy needs to ensure that she and no other Myanmar cronies can do their bloodstained business on Italian soil.
“The EU and other governments need to do far more to block the junta’s access to funds and arms through more concerted, strategic and coordinated sanctions that cover whole networks of companies, and through far stronger enforcement.
“For three years, the people of Myanmar have courageously resisted the military’s failing attempted coup.
“Italy and the EU must stand with the people of Myanmar in the struggle to build a new and inclusive Myanmar that respects human rights and guarantees justice and accountability.”..."
Source/publisher:
Justice For Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2024-03-08
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Language:
Format :
pdf pdf
Size:
122.34 KB 133 KB
more
Description:
"This Rapid Market Assessment (RMA) is a suppliment to the MAU Market Price Report in Rakhine State. It provides township-level data on market functionality, activity, supply, and logistics. Data were collected through observation and KIIs with retailers during Feb. 10-13, 2024. Reports available at www.themimu.info/market-analysis-unit.
KEY FINDINGS
Village markets swelled with activity as most town markets remained closed;
Busy markets still lacked many foods and NFIs but all markets had at least some critical goods;
Fuel and medicines were scarce, and cooking oil and hygiene products were often unavailable;
Retailers sourced goods from other townships, but transport costs continued to drive prices up;
Retailers' largest challenge was transportation and its impact on price and supply;
Customers may lack cash to buy available goods, as retailers cited weak demand in busy markets.
Regional Overview
Market Functionality - Village markets remained open even as town markets closed. Town markets in Sittwe and Maungdaw continued operating, and village markets remained open in other townships.
Open markets followed regular hours.
Market Activity - Village market activity increased as they absorbed volume from closed town markets. Town markets shrank and village markets grew as displaced households filled rural areas and retail followed.
Prominant village markets in Ponnagyun and Rathedaung swelled with activity, although this did not always result increased availability of goods.
Availability of Goods - Fuel and medicines were scarce, and many foods and NFIs were unavailable. Markets offered a variety of local winter vegetables, but some other goods were hard to find. Low-quality rice was available in village markets (near mills), but regional imports (e.g., NFIs) were more often unavailable.
Transport & Logistics - Retailers still sourced goods from neighboring townships, although transport costs continued rising. Some retailers still sourced goods from neighboring townships, while others were deterred and made do with dwindling inventories.
Retailer Challenges - Retailers struggled with high transport costs and a resulting drought in supply. Retailers reported weak demand even in village markets with increasing customers, possibly pointing to cashpoor households with little money to spend. Cash access (among retailers) was most challenging for Sittwe retailers but less so among those in villages.
Possible Interventions - Retailers felt they could increase local supply with added support. Retailers expressed a willingness and ability to increase supply under more favorable circumstances. Freedom of movement for traders and fuel subsidies or other support for transportation costs were most likely to spur supply, while low-interest loans were less likely. Village retailers appeared more likely than those in towns increase supply, possibly because village markets have grown..."
Source/publisher:
Myanmar Information Management Unit (Myanmar) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2024-03-06
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
3.74 MB
Local URL:
more
Description:
"The MAU tracks market prices in southern Sagaing Region. Data are collected from three vendors per product per market at the end of each month. The data include prices from Monywa (main market), Myaung (Na Bet), Shwebo (main market), Ye-U (Tin Tein Yan), and Yinmarbin (Yin Paung Taing). Data and product specs are available at www.themimu.info/market-analysis-unit.
KEY FINDINGS
Prices for rice and pulses rose at least 8% in January, although cooking oil prices fell 6% or more;
Vegetable prices fell 9% or more across markets with lower prices for onion, eggplant, and long bean;
Meat and fsh price trends varied by market with Myaung and Ye-U experiencing lower prices;
Prices for hygiene products were largely stable except in Monywa where prices were generally higher;
Most NFI prices increased 3-12% in Monywa, and prices for tarps and other NFIs rose 2-7% across markets;
Monywa saw a second month of broad price hikes, although increases this month were more limited to NFIs;
Yinmarbin saw notable price stability in January after notable price increases for NFIs in December.
Product-Level Price Changes
Essential Foods – Prices for rice and pulses rose at least 8% in January, although cooking oil prices fell 6% or more. Prices for rice and pulses increased in three of fve markets monitored, rising at least 8% and 6%, respectively. By contrast, cooking oil prices declined for a second straight month, falling 6% or more across markets.
Vegetables – Many vegetable prices fell at least 9%, with lower prices in most markets monitored. Long bean, eggplant, and onion fell in three of fve markets, declining at least 3%, 17%, and 23%, respectively. Prices for green chili fuctuated, while garlic prices rose 4-14%. Prices for watercress were stable.
Meat and Fish – Meat and fsh price trends varied by market again in January, with lower prices in Myaung and Ye-U. Meat and fsh prices fell at least 6% in Myaung and at least 13% in YeU. Meat and fsh prices were stable in Shwebo and Yinmarbin, and they fuctuated 12-15% in Monywa.
Hygiene Products – Prices for hygiene products were fairly stable in January, except in Monywa where prices rose. Prices for hygiene products rose 3-6% in Monywa, but elsewhere there were few clear trends. Prices for hygiene products fuctuated up to 33% in a few isolated cases but were otherwise mostly unchanged. Prices for hygiene products were stable in Shwebo.
Other NFIs – NFI prices rose again in Monywa, and they increased moderately in other markets. Prices for plastic tarps, mosquito nets, longyis, and towels, were up 2-7% in most markets in January. Prices increased 3-12% for all NFIs monitored in Monywa, marking a second straight month of signifcant price hikes there. NFI prices were stable in Yinmarbin, where they rose sharply last month..."
Source/publisher:
Myanmar Information Management Unit (Myanmar) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2024-02-24
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Food Security and nutrition in Burma/Myanmar, Human Rights and international relations, Business and the Military
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
569.7 KB
more
Description:
"In the first visit by a Chinese government official to Naypyitaw since last month’s ceasefire between the regime and the Brotherhood Alliance of ethnic armed organizations, Yunnan Province Governor Wang Yubo met junta leader Min Aung Hlaing on Tuesday.
Wang, who is also the Chinese Communist Party’s deputy committee secretary for Yunnan Province, discussed the possibility of restoring border trade and the flow of goods between Myanmar and Yunnan.
The anti-regime offensive known as Operation 1027 has disrupted Myanmar’s vital border trade routes with China. Border trade through Chin Shwe Haw, Muse, Pansai, Monekoe and Jinsanjiao has been halted.
Amid pressure from China, the Brotherhood Alliance held talks with the regime and agreed a ceasefire on Jan. 11.
As part of the truce, the two sides agreed to reopen vital Myanmar-China trade routes over which the joint ethnic armies have taken control. The alliance also agreed not to seize any more regime camps or towns in northern Shan State, while the junta agreed to refrain from conducting air strikes and shelling in the area.
One month and 10 days after the fighting ceased in northern Shan State, the Yunnan governor came to ask Min Aung Hlaing to resume border trade.
The two also discussed direct kyat-yuan payments, which they said would facilitate trade; construction of a railroad to promote bilateral trade; and cooperation in various sectors including agriculture, electricity and energy, according to junta media.
On Sunday, Min Aung Hlaing attended a Chinese New Year celebration in Yangon with Chinese Ambassador to Myanmar Chen Hai.
At the event, Min Aung Hlaing called China a “good neighbor” and a “good friend” that had stood by Myanmar through successive periods. Min Aung Hlaing said he was deeply grateful to China and the Chinese people for taking the “correct position” on the international stage regarding the internal affairs of Myanmar.
Wang also met junta Commerce Minister Htun Ohn and called for cooperation to ensure smooth trade between the two neighbors.
With the exception of Muse, the Brotherhood Alliance has taken control of all border towns in northern Shan State crucial for border trade with China.
Meanwhile, some towns along the Mandalay-Muse highway including Kutkai and Hsenwi are also now controlled by ethnic armed organizations, which levy taxes on cargo trucks in parallel to the junta’s taxation system—a problem that observers say is difficult to resolve..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2024-02-21
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"The MAU tracks market prices in in Southeast Myanmar. Data are collected from three vendors per product per market in the last week of each month. The data include prices from Hpapun (Kamamaung market), Hsihseng (main), Kawkareik (main), Loikaw (Thiri Mingalar), Pekon (main), and Taungoo (Nat Htet). Data are available online at www.themimu.info/market-analysis-unit.
KEY FINDINGS
Essential food prices rising moderately in January, and rice prices were up 5%;
Vegetable prices were stable across markets perhaps due to the arrival of winter supply, although eggplant prices rose sharply;
Meat/fish prices were stable or rising in January with shrimp, fresh fish, and dried fish seeing price increases of 2-10%;
Stable NFI prices stayed 20-80% above last year with blankets, mosquito nets, and hygiene items up the most;
Markets remained closed in Kawkareik and Hsiseng, likely making it more difficult to supply some goods to area villages;
Rice prices should be watched closely as transportation disruptions due to ongoing conflict may further in-crease prices.
Product-Level Price Changes
Essential Foods – Essential food prices continued to rise steadily in January, and rice prices were up at least 5%. Rice prices were up 5-17% in January. Prices for pulses and cooking oil were fairly stable, although they rose 4-7% in some cases. January extended a three-month trend of steadily-rising essential food prices. Retailers in Demoso attributed rising prices to increased checkpoints pushing up transportation costs.
Vegetables – Vegetable prices were stable across markets in January. Eggplant prices rose sharply in Hpapun and Taungoo as retailers reported some reduction in supply, but otherwise there were few product-level price trends. Vegetable prices were sta-ble or rising in Hpapun and Taungoo, and they were fairly stable in Pekon.
Meat and Fish – Meat and fish prices were stable or 2-10% higher in January. Prices for shrimp, fresh fish, and dried fish rose 2-10% in January, while chicken prices rose 7-20% in two markets. Fish paste prices spiked at the village market in Pekon due to supply limits, but prices for fish paste and pork were otherwise stable.
Hygiene Products – Price trends for hygiene products varied by market in January. Prices for hygiene products increased 3% or more in Hpapun, but they fell 11% or more in Taungoo. Prices for hygiene products were stable in Pekon.
Other NFIs – Prices for other NFIs were very stable in January. Notwithstanding several isolated price increases, NFI prices were quite stable. Prices for charcoal and cooking pots were up 6-12% in Hpapun, and prices for blankets fell in Taungoo, but otherwise there was little change in NFI prices in January..."
Source/publisher:
Myanmar Information Management Unit (Myanmar) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2024-02-21
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
1.03 MB
more
Sub-title:
Press ASEAN Members to Adopt Similar Measures
Description:
"Australia was among a host of countries that imposed fresh sanctions on Myanmar on February 1, the third anniversary of the military coup. The government added five businesses to its list of 16 individuals sanctioned since 2021.
Australia has targeted two banks that help fund Myanmar’s junta and its arms purchases, the Myanma Foreign Trade Bank and Myanma Investment and Commercial Bank. The sanctions also target three other entities, Asia Sun Group, Asia Sun Trading Co Ltd, and Cargo Link Petroleum Logistics Co Ltd, for their role in supplying jet fuel to the security forces: the same fuel that the military has used to carry out unlawfully indiscriminate airstrikes against civilians.
Other governments had already taken action to limit the junta’s access to funding and jet fuel for the military. In June 2023, the United States sanctioned the two banks that Australia is now targeting. Canada has imposed comprehensive sanctions on jet fuel, while the European Union, United Kingdom and United States took steps to target Myanmar entities helping to purchase and supply jet fuel.
Until now, Australia has hesitated to impose more sanctions out of concern for its relations with member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). No ASEAN countries have unilaterally sanctioned the junta, and Australia joined with other governments to back the bloc’s ineffectual efforts to get the military to end its abuses.
Although Australia may have been slow to realize that targeted sanctions are crucial and need not compromise relations with ASEAN, they can still be effective.
The US action against Myanmar’s banks prompted Singapore to cut ties between its Singapore-based United Overseas Bank and corresponding banks in Myanmar. In December, the Myanmar central bank announced it would stop setting foreign exchange rates, suggesting the junta’s inability to access outside currencies. The sanctions are having an impact.
When it hosts a special summit with ASEAN members in Melbourne in March, Australia should press bloc members to enforce these sanctions in their own jurisdictions.
Stronger measures are still possible: Australia should consider imposing sanctions against companies and individuals in the extractives industries. The Myanma Oil and Gas Enterprise and other military-owned mining entities still collect the lion’s share of revenue for the junta.
By taking a necessary step to help stop Myanmar military abuses, Australia shouldn’t stop now..."
Source/publisher:
"Human Rights Watch" (USA)
Date of entry/update:
2024-02-05
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"Justice For Myanmar welcomes the latest sanctions on the illegal Myanmar junta and its business associates, three years after the military launched a coup attempt that has failed because of the courageous mass resistance of Myanmar people.
Since the attempted coup, the junta has committed widespread atrocity crimes and grave human rights violations with total impunity, enabled by a network of domestic and international companies.
New sanctions targeted the military’s sources of funds and jet fuel.
Australia’s second round of sanctions since February 1, 2021 designated Myanma Foreign Trade Bank (MFTB) and Myanma Investment and Commercial Bank (MICB), state banks illegally seized by the junta. The banks are key nodes in the military cartel’s economic networks, supporting the junta’s campaign of terror.
Australia also targeted three companies that are part of Shoon group (formerly Asia Sun), which is the junta’s main partner in the import, storage and distribution of jet fuel. The Shoon companies designated were Asia Sun Trading Company Limited, Cargo Link Petroleum Company Limited and Asia Sun Group Company Limited.
The US sanctioned Shwe Byain Phyu Group of Companies, a crony conglomerate founded by Thein Win Zaw, who is the group’s chairperson. Following the military’s coup attempt, Shwe Byain Phyu bought Telenor Myanmar, renamed ATOM Myanmar, providing the junta with enhanced surveillance capabilities and access to personal data. Justice For Myanmar exposed the business interests of Shwe Byain Phyu Group in 2022.
The US also sanctioned Thein Win Zaw, his wife Tin Latt Min, and their adult children, Win Paing Kyaw and Theint Win Htet.
In addition, the US sanctioned Myanma Five Star Line Company Limited, a shipping subsidiary of the US-sanctioned military conglomerate, Myanma Economic Holdings Limited.
The UK sanctioned No. 1 Mining Enterprise (ME1) and No. 2 Mining Enterprise (ME2), state-owned enterprises illegally seized by the junta that play a central role in Myanmar’s mining sector. The two mining enterprises illegally channel funds and resources to the junta through production sharing contracts with local and foreign companies. Last year, JFM exposed Greenway Mining Group, a Chinese company that is using British Overseas Territories for its continued business in Myanmar with ME1.
The UK also sanctioned Light Infantry Division 77 and Light Infantry Division 101, which are directly responsible for perpetrating international crimes.
Justice For Myanmar spokesperson Yadanar Maung says: “New Australian, UK and US sanctions are necessary to block the junta’s access to funds and jet fuel and come after sustained pressure from civil society. However, far more needs to be done to cut the junta’s access to funds, arms, equipment, technology and jet fuel.
“Sanctions continue to be too slow, lack coordination and are not covering whole networks of companies and individuals, leaving too many openings for the junta and its associates to bypass measures.
“The slow pace of Australian sanctions in particular is clearly inadequate. Australia should start imposing regular rounds of sanctions, including against the mining sector, in which Australians continue to have a significant presence.
“UK, US, EU, Canada and Australia should extend sanctions to the whole network of entities and key individuals in the junta’s natural resources ministry, join the EU in fully sanctioning MOGE, and join Canada in banning the export, sale, supply and shipment of aviation fuel to Myanmar.
“The people of Myanmar have struggled against a terrorist junta for three years and successfully blocked it from taking control of Myanmar. The fight continues and should be supported by the international community through targeted sanctions, a global arms embargo and a UN Security Council referral of the situation in Myanmar to the International Criminal Court.
“The Myanmar military cartel must be dismantled.”..."
Source/publisher:
Justice For Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2024-02-02
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Sanctions, Business and the Military, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
Language:
Format :
pdf pdf
Size:
112.69 KB 142.56 KB
more
Description:
"Shipping data suggests attempt to evade sanctions in aviation fuel supply chain
Direct sales of fuel diminish; instead intermediaries appear to aid purchase of fuel to Myanmar
At least seven shipments of aviation fuel to Myanmar in 2023, with direct links to storage unit in Viet Nam
2023 the worst year for air strikes in Myanmar since coup three years ago
New evidence suggests Myanmar’s military is using new tactics to import aviation fuel after sanctions were imposed in response to air strikes that have unlawfully killed and injured civilians, Amnesty International said today ahead of the third anniversary of the 2021 coup.
Shipping, satellite, trade and customs data analysis by Amnesty shows significant changes to how aviation fuel entered Myanmar over the past year, with the military appearing to use new routes and rely on storage units to obfuscate the origin of the fuel.
“After the international community took action on this deadly supply chain, the Myanmar military is ripping a page out of the sanctions evasion playbook to continue importing jet fuel,” said Montse Ferrer, Deputy Regional Director for Research.
“Air strikes have killed or injured hundreds of civilians across Myanmar in 2023, and left many feeling nowhere is safe. The best way to stop the Myanmar military from carrying out lethal air strikes is to stop all jet fuel imports into the country.”
Multiple buyers and storage units that conceal origin
The supply chain of aviation fuel to Myanmar appears to have shifted considerably since sanctions were passed by the UK, the USA, the EU and others last year. Buyers in Myanmar are no longer purchasing fuel directly but apparently relying on multiple purchases and sales of the same fuel to distance themselves from the original supplier of the aviation fuel.
Amnesty’s new research uncovers this apparent ruse.
The findings show that in 2023, as pressure built on companies and states to suspend shipments of jet fuel to Myanmar in the wake of an Amnesty International investigation into the supply chain, there was a lull in imports between January and March.
In April that year, they picked up again, and vessel tracking data, satellite imagery and customs and trade data show that at least six shipments entered the country between April and August in 2023. Then, in August, the US passed its latest round of sanctions on jet fuel, which appears to have led to another lull in imports from September to November, after which Amnesty identified one final jet fuel shipment in December 2023. The seven shipments, adding up to at least 67 kilotonnes of aviation fuel, represent an increase in shipments compared to 2021-2022, year on year.
While in 2021-2022 the majority of aviation fuel entered Myanmar as direct sales of fuel shipments – making it much easier to trace the supplier – in 2023, the fuel appears to have been bought and sold more than once, before arriving to Myanmar.
Further, the vessels identified by Amnesty picked up the aviation fuel at a storage unit in Viet Nam immediately prior to traveling to Myanmar.
“This is significant because storage units make fuel notoriously hard to trace,” explains Ferrer. “A lot can happen at a storage unit – fuel can be blended to mask its origin; sellers can lose track of buyers as fuel changes hands; storage unit owners or managers can claim ignorance once the fuel arrives at rented-out tanks. In addition, the larger a storage unit, the more ships arrive with different types of cargo, making the tracing of goods by external actors virtually impossible.
“This could be a way to evade sanctions. Fuel is no longer sold by the supplier directly to a Myanmar – possibly sanctioned – entity, but through one or more intermediaries, while also ensuring that the vessel’s last stop before arrival in Myanmar is a storage unit which cannot be easily linked to the actual fuel supplier.”
Viet Nam connection
The seven shipments in 2023 loaded aviation fuel at a small storage terminal called Cai Mep Petroleum terminal close to Ho Chi Minh City, Viet Nam, which is operated by local company Hai Linh Co. Ltd. Shipments occurred in April, May, June, July, August and December.
Vessel tracking and customs data has made it possible to identify what likely occurred during these shipments. First, the original supplier sold the jet fuel to a trader. That trader would have then off-sold it, once or multiple times, but in all cases, the second-to-last sale of the jet fuel before transfer to Myanmar was from a trader to a Vietnamese company. This Vietnamese company then received the fuel at a storage terminal in Cai Mep managed by Hai Linh. After storing the fuel for anywhere between a few hours to days, that fuel was sold to Myanmar and transported by vessel.
Amnesty has identified three shipments to Viet Nam that were immediately preceded by deliveries from recognizable locations. In one case, a shipment of jet fuel in August originated (although having been transported by a different vessel) from the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) terminal in Huizhou, the third-largest national oil company in China. According to vessel tracking data and satellite imagery, two other shipments in April and May onloaded the jet fuel at the Pengerang Independent Terminals, a storage terminal in Malaysia partly owned by Vopak, before arriving in Viet Nam and subsequently travelling to Myanmar (also by a different vessel).
Vietnamese customs data has also made it possible to identify the fuel traders that made the second-to-last purchase of jet fuel that transited through Viet Nam. The most prominent of these is BB Energy (Asia) Pte. Ltd., the Singapore branch of privately owned BB Energy, based in Dubai and described as “among the world’s leading independent energy trading companies”, with 30 offices around the world, including one in London. At least three of the seven shipments that transited through Viet Nam before arriving in Myanmar involved BB Energy (Asia).
It is unclear whether the trading companies knew the fuel they were selling to Vietnamese companies would soon thereafter end up in Myanmar, or whether their actions could run afoul of existing sanctions.
These traders sold the fuel to a Vietnamese company, which then appears to have sold the jet fuel to a Myanmar purchaser. Customs data indicates one of these companies to be Hai Linh Ltd., the company that owns and operates the storage terminal at Cai Mep.
Jet fuel offloaded in sanctioned-linked Yangon terminal
All seven aviation fuel shipments were offloaded at the former Puma Energy terminal in Thilawa area port, Yangon, Myanmar.
Following Puma Energy’s departure from Myanmar in December 2022, it sold its assets and transferred the management of the Thilawa terminal to a joint venture between Shoon Energy Thilawa Terminal Co. Ltd. (formerly Asia Sun Aviation) and a state-owned and military controlled entity, MPE. Several Shoon Energy companies – although not the company managing the terminal – have been sanctioned by the UK, the USA, the EU and others for their role in the import and distribution of aviation fuel.
“The fact that these shipments are arriving at the same terminal with direct links to sanctioned companies and individuals and to the Myanmar military raises real questions about sanction effectiveness and compliance for those involved in the supply chain,” Ferrer said.
Six of the seven Vietnamese shipments were transported by the Chinese-flagged oil tanker HUITONG 78 (IMO 9646479); the remaining shipment was done by Liberian-flagged oil tanker YIDA 8 (IMO 9936941). Amnesty was unable to confirm the current owners of these vessels.
Companies’ responsibility and countries’ obligations across entire value chain
As outlined in the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, companies have a responsibility to seek to prevent or mitigate adverse human rights impacts by conducting human rights due diligence. In conducting such due diligence, international standards establish that companies should assess the entire value chain for human rights risks and harm. In fact, companies can become directly linked to the harm – and in certain cases, liable under sanctions regimes – as a result of the irresponsible usage of the products or services they supply or manage. This includes jet fuel suppliers, fuel traders and storage terminal managers such as BB Energy, CNOOC, Hai Linh, Vopak and others.
“We have been told time and time again by companies that they are not responsible for what happens to the products after they sell them; or that they cannot control what happens at the storage terminals they themselves own and operate. However, the reality is that companies *can *know and should know what happens to their entire value chain if they are at all serious about human rights due diligence,” Ferrer said.
Under international law, all states have a duty to protect against human rights abuses by all actors, including companies. This means that states must protect individuals and communities from the harmful activities of corporate actors through effective policies, legislation, regulation and adjudication.
“The role played here by Viet Nam is particularly problematic. The Cai Mep port is essential for this new supply chain to work – and so the Vietnamese government has an obligation to make sure its ports are not being used for activities linked to human rights violations,” Ferrer said.
2023 worst year for air strikes
Myanmar military air strikes continued over the same period, with the UN reporting in September 2023 a significant increase compared to the first year after the coup.
In December 2023, Amnesty International documented, among other potential war crimes, the military’s indiscriminate air and ground attacks on Pauktaw town in Rakhine State, as well as its likely use of banned cluster munitions in northern Shan State.
Amnesty International also documented how, on 9 October, an air strike followed by mortar fire on a camp for internally displaced persons in Mung Lai Hkye village, Kachin State killed at least 28 civilians including children, and injured at least 57 others.
According to media reports, air strikes resulting in civilian deaths also took place in Bago and Sagaing Regions and in Chin, Kayah, Kayin and Mon states.
For example on 27 June, air strikes near a monastery in Nyaung Kone village in Sagaing Region killed a monk and at least nine other civilians.
On 11 April, in the single deadliest aerial attack since the coup, military aircraft bombed a gathering of people who were inaugurating a new local administrative office in the village of Pa Zyi Gyi, also in Sagaing Region. At least 100 civilians were killed, including 35 children, as well as 18 people aligned with armed opposition groups.
The military admitted the attack but claimed that explosives stored at the site where the gathering was taking place were responsible for the scale of the fatalities.
“There’s an epidemic of deadly, unlawful air strikes in Myanmar, but the cure is clear. We have to stop jet fuel imports from ending up in the hands of the Myanmar military,” Ferrer said.
Background
Since the 1 February 2021 coup, air strikes have killed, maimed and displaced civilians across the country, targeting schools, IDP camps and other civilian infrastructure.
In response, Amnesty International published Deadly Cargo: Exposing the Supply Chain that Fuels War Crimes in Myanmarin November 2022, which it published in collaboration with Justice for Myanmar.
The report revealed how aviation fuel reached the country, how it ended up with the Myanmar military and how it reached bases from which air attacks that constituted war crimes were conducted. In March 2023, Amnesty published updated findings on new shipments.
Following evidence linking foreign and domestic companies to the supply of aviation fuel to the Myanmar military, the UK, the USA, Canada, the EU and Switzerland imposed sanctions on companies and individuals in Myanmar and Singapore involved in the procurement and distribution of aviation fuel into Myanmar.
In August, the USA extended the reach of potential sanctions, stating that anyone involved in this industry was at risk.
All companies named in this press release were contacted for comment with the exception of Shoon Energy Thilawa Terminal Co. Ltd, who were contacted by Amnesty International at the time the findings against them were originally published. The only company to respond to Amnesty International for this press release is Royal Vopak who emphasised their respect for human rights and claimed to have no record of a vessel birthing at Pengerang storage terminal on or about the dates we identified. This conflicts with Amnesty’s own evidence..."
Source/publisher:
Amnesty International
Date of entry/update:
2024-01-31
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
1.82 MB
more
Sub-title:
UN Security Council Should Impose Global Arms Embargo, Jet Fuel Sanctions
Description:
"UN Security Council Should Impose Global Arms Embargo, Jet Fuel Sanctions
(Bangkok) – Myanmar’s military junta has increasingly carried out unlawful airstrikes harming civilians in its military operations against a coalition of opposition and ethnic armed groups, Human Rights Watch said today. Governments that provide transfers or assistance of arms or materiel to the junta forces risk being complicit in war crimes.
Three years since the February 1, 2021, coup in Myanmar, the junta’s widespread and systematic abuses against the population – including arbitrary arrests, torture, extrajudicial killings, and indiscriminate attacks on civilians – amount to crimes against humanity and war crimes. In 2023, Human Rights Watch investigations found that the military’s unlawful airstrikes in Sagaing Region and Kachin State were apparent war crimes.
“Concerned governments should be doing more to curb the junta’s capacity to commit appalling laws-of-war violations,” said Elaine Pearson, Asia director at Human Rights Watch. “United Nations member countries should urge the UN Security Council to impose an arms embargo on Myanmar, including sanctions on jet fuel that facilitates unlawful air attacks on civilians.”
The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk said in a statement on January 30 that Myanmar’s deteriorating human rights situation was now in “free fall.”
“The people of Myanmar have been suffering for too long,” Türk said. “Since the end of October last year, their situation has deteriorated even further as a result of the long-established tactics of the military to target them.”
On October 27, 2023, the Three Brotherhood Alliance – an anti-junta coalition of the Arakan Army, Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, and the Ta’ang National Liberation Army – began Operation 1027, an offensive that seized Myanmar military outposts in northern Shan State. The offensive also triggered opposition attacks on Myanmar security forces elsewhere in the country.
The junta responded to the attacks with military operations that have involved serious violations of the laws of war.
Amnesty International determined that junta forces most likely used cluster munitions during attacks on the town of Namkham in Shan State in early December. The use of cluster munitions, large weapons that include dozens of smaller weapons known as submunitions, is inherently indiscriminate and constitutes a war crime.
The renewed fighting within weeks displaced about 600,000 people across Myanmar. Humanitarian agencies and local organizations have struggled to respond to the surge in displacement.
An unknown number of civilians have been killed and injured in recent airstrikes. An aid worker in Muse township near the China border told Human Rights Watch that his friend fled from Namhkam after his wife was killed in a junta airstrike on December 1, an incident reported by the Shan Human Rights Foundation.
“He managed to hide their two children in the bunker when they first heard the sounds of a jet,” the aid worker said. “But his wife was showering as it was morning. … She didn’t make it to the bunker and died right there when the junta dropped the bomb. He was injured too, and luckily the children are safe but now they don’t have a mother.”
A spokeswoman from a local ethnic and women’s rights group, the Ta’ang Women’s Organization, said she fled Namhkam township on December 2 after repeated junta airstrikes in her village. “At first, I hid with my family in a dirt bunker we had dug near our home,” she said. “There were so many explosions … it was hard to tell whether it was all the same attack or many planes dropping bombs. The planes came day and night, and they also circled around us repeatedly even if they weren’t dropping bombs.”
The Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project, which reports data on the Myanmar military’s air and drone strikes, found strikes to have substantially increased since early 2022. This data is compiled from media reports and may significantly undercount the military’s total air and drone strikes.
Canada, the European Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States have imposed and expanded sanctions since the coup, but sanctions on jet fuel have been inconsistent.
Canada is the only country to have imposed comprehensive sanctions on the export, sale, supply or shipment of aviation fuel to Myanmar. In 2023, the EU, UK, and US also introduced some sanctions that targeted private actors supplying fuel, arms and funds to Myanmar. However, five British companies are still providing insurance cover for deliveries of aviation fuel to Myanmar.
Governments in the region have not sent a clear message to Myanmar’s junta concerning ongoing rights violations, Human Rights Watch said. Laos, as the 2024 chair of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), should work with other ASEAN member countries to take a more robust approach that pressures the junta to end its abuses and remove restrictions on humanitarian assistance.
The European Union, whose foreign ministers will meet with ASEAN foreign ministers on February 2, should urge ASEAN members, in particular Thailand and Singapore, to cooperate in enforcing sanctions in their jurisdictions.
The UN Security Council should meaningfully follow up on its December 2022 resolution on Myanmar by imposing an arms embargo, including jet fuel, and refer the country situation to the International Criminal Court. Russia and China, which both abstained from the 2022 resolution, should not block stronger measures by the council.
Russia and China have continued to sell weapons to Myanmar’s junta since the 2021 coup, according to the UN special rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar.
“Myanmar’s people have been suffering for years under a junta that shows them no regard,” Pearson said. “A stronger international response is still needed to press for an end to the military’s abuses.”..."
Source/publisher:
Human Rights Watch (USA)
Date of entry/update:
2024-01-30
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
166.38 KB
more
Description:
"Australian companies, executives and investors are continuing to operate in Myanmar’s junta-dominated mining sector three years after the military launched a brutal and illegal attempted coup.
A new Justice For Myanmar report, Mines Against Humanity, reveals the Australian owned and led companies that are engaged in extraction, exploration and services that provide the junta with revenue, or support the maintenance of a sector that bankrolls junta atrocities.
Companies are wrongly treating the illegal junta as if it were the government of Myanmar. The junta is not the legitimate government of Myanmar and has failed to take effective control of Myanmar’s territory because of the sustained and courageous mass resistance of the Myanmar people.
The junta has responded with a war of terror through indiscriminate air strikes and shelling, the killing of more than 4,400 people, rape, torture, the arbitrary arrest of more than 25,800, the destruction of whole communities and the displacement of more than 2.3 million.
The continued Australian presence in Myanmar’s mining sector is a result of Australia’s failure to impose sanctions on the junta’s sources of funds, and a lack of guidance on Australia’s expectations for responsible business in Myanmar.
This report documents 10 company networks that have remained active in Myanmar following the coup attempt and highlights six company networks that are not currently active in the mining sector but remain registered in Myanmar and require monitoring should they resume operations under the junta. These include:
Valentis, a sprawling network of companies backed by Australian investors set up by brothers closely connected to the military. Among Valentis’s activities, Justice For Myanmar’s investigation uncovered an apparent visit to a MEC coal project since the coup attempt, the provision of services to a Myanmar arms broker and business links to a militia under junta control.
Cornerstone Resources – a company thought to be owned by prominent Australian prospector Mark Creasy, and that has an Australian address, has continued to mine and refine zinc in Shan state following the military’s coup attempt. Justice For Myanmar uncovered transactions with military conglomerate Myanmar Economic Corporation (MEC), which may breach UK sanctions given its previous registration in the British Virgin Islands at the time of the transactions.
The Australian branch of the global consulting firm Knight Piésold is providing environmental services to the China owned Wanbao Mining for copper mines that operate in partnership with military conglomerate Myanma Economic Holdings Limited (MEHL). Services were provided as recently as 2023 and it is uncertain whether Knight Piésold is interpreting their contractual obligations consistently with the due diligence exception in the Australian Autonomous Sanctions Act 2011 to avoid breaching the sanctions against MEHL.
The Australia-based miner PanAust has maintained its large-scale exploration licences in Sagaing, a region ravaged in the junta’s campaign of terror. By paying fees to the junta, it helps fund its atrocities.
Asia Pacific Mining Limited, a company with Australian executives, has been communicating with senior members of the junta to continue and expand its exploration activities under cover of the military’s coup attempt.
Even after the coup attempt and amid local opposition, Australian-led company Access Resources Asia has been pushing ahead with gold exploration in eastern Shan state.
Australian Laboratory Services (ALS), listed on the Australian Stock Exchange, has maintained its business in Myanmar following the military’s coup attempt and has done mineral testing for Access Resources Asia and junta-controlled universities.
Justice For Myanmar calls on Australia to immediately impose sanctions on mining enterprises controlled by the junta; to widen sanctions against the junta’s sources of funds, arms and jet fuel, in coordination with its allies; and to investigate sanctions-busting activity and penalise or prosecute companies and individuals as appropriate.
Justice For Myanmar calls on companies operating in Myanmar to follow the laws, policies and guidance of the legitimate federal bodies, including the National Unity Government (NUG), National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC), applicable state councils, and relevant Ethnic Resistance Organisations, and to fulfil their responsibilities under the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises on Responsible Business Conduct, the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Business Conduct, the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas, and the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights.
Under the NUG’s Three-Pillar Framework Guiding Responsible Investment and Continued Operations, companies should avoid all business with the junta and fulfil contractual obligations to the state by paying funds into an escrow account for the lawful and legitimate government of Myanmar.
Justice For Myanmar spokesperson Yadanar Maung says: “It is unacceptable that three years after the military’s illegal coup attempt, Australia is still failing to take necessary action to block the junta’s sources of funds from mining and other lucrative sectors.
“The Myanmar military operates as a cartel that is stealing the wealth of the people of Myanmar on a massive scale to fund its war of terror and enrich war criminals.
“Yet, there are Australian companies, executives and investors in the mining sector that are continuing business as usual, financing the illegitimate junta and helping to keep a corrupt and destructive mining sector open for business.
“Australia needs to act now to impose sanctions on the junta, its businesses, and cronies, and stop Australians from directly and indirectly providing funds and other forms of support to the junta.
“Australian owned and led businesses in Myanmar should follow the laws, policies and guidance of the legitimate federal bodies, including the NUG, NUCC, applicable state councils, and relevant EROs, and fulfil their international human rights responsibilities.”..."
Source/publisher:
Justice For Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2024-01-30
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Business and the Military, Sanctions, The Burmese military's role in the economy, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Format :
pdf pdf
Size:
135.41 KB 149.98 KB
more
Description:
"The United States announced updates to the first business advisory for Myanmar. The supplemental advisory, jointly issued by the Departments of State, Treasury, Commerce, Labor, and Homeland Security, and the Office of the US Trade Representative, includes the identification of additional sectors and activities of concern, notably mining, timber and jet fuel. Businesses, including financial institutions and individuals, are advised to adopt heightened compliance and due diligence measures to reduce risks of exposure to the junta and its enablers.
Denisse Rudich, Senior Policy Advisor at The Sentry, said: “Following the publication of the supplemental business advisory by the US Government, banks in the US and abroad, particularly in countries such as in Singapore, Thailand, and the UAE should monitor transactions to stop the flow of funds suspected of being linked to the military junta and carry out enhanced due diligence. They should engage with their correspondent banking networks, taking measures to prevent de-risking and ensure that humanitarian aid organizations, civilians, and essential sectors of the economy maintain unhindered access to the international financial system.”
Oliver Windridge, Director of Illicit Finance Policy at The Sentry, said: “We welcome the supplemental advisory on Burma by the US Government. It complements the continued targeted sanctions policy adopted by the US to constrain and contain the Myanmar junta by restricting access to funds that finance its brutal war on the people of Myanmar. Targeted sanctions will not solve the crisis in the country on their own, but as essential financial tools of pressure, they must be wielded by the US and its like-minded partners in a coordinated manner and against networks of enablers to enhance their effectiveness. In addition to sanctions, the advisory identifies high-risk business sectors that companies will want to stay clear of to prevent their potential complicity in the atrocities of the Myanmar junta. It nevertheless encourages legitimate and responsible trade and investment flows that benefit the Myanmar population.”
Yadanar Maung, Justice For Myanmar spokesperson, said: “It is positive that the US is continuing to advise companies in Myanmar to act responsibly and avoid key sectors that provide the junta with funds and resources that it needs to commit atrocities. However, this advice needs to be urgently backed up with more targeted sanctions by the US in coordination with its allies, including Australia, which remains exposed to Myanmar’s mining sector. There still are too many gaps in the sanctions that have been imposed and a large number of businesses and individuals that remain unsanctioned, despite evidence of complicity in the junta’s international crimes.”
The first US business advisory on Myanmar, published in January 2022, was issued “to inform individuals, businesses, financial institutions, and other persons — including investors, consultants, and research service providers — of the heightened risks associated with doing business in Burma, and particularly business activity that could benefit the Burmese military regime.”
For media inquiries or interview requests for The Sentry, please contact: Greg Hittelman, Director of Communications, [email protected]
For media inquiries for Justice For Myanmar, please contact: Yadanar Maung, Spokesperson, [email protected]
About Justice For Myanmar
Justice For Myanmar is a covert group of activists using research, data visualisation, and reporting to expose and dismantle the business networks that fuel brutality, corruption and mass-scale suffering.
About The Sentry
(Short descriptor for press use: “The Sentry, an investigative organization that tracks corruption”)
The Sentry is an investigative and policy organization that seeks to disable multinational predatory networks that benefit from violent conflict, repression, and kleptocracy. Pull back the curtain on wars, mass atrocities, and other human rights abuses, and you’ll find grand corruption and unchecked greed. These tragedies persist because the perpetrators rarely face meaningful consequences. The Sentry aims to alter the warped incentive structures that continually undermine peace and good governance. Our investigations follow the money as it is laundered from war zones to financial centers around the world. We provide evidence and strategies for governments, banks, and law enforcement to hold the perpetrators and enablers of violence and corruption to account. These efforts provide new leverage for human rights, peace, and anti-corruption efforts. For more information: www.TheSentry.org..."
Source/publisher:
Justice For Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2024-01-29
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Language:
Local URL:
more
Title: The Myanmar military’s air superiority is slipping away amid sanctions and opposition attacks
Sub-title:
Like everything else in the nearly three years since the coup, the junta’s air superiority is fading.
Description:
"One of the most important setbacks for Myanmar’s military since an opposition alliance launched Operation 1027 last October has been the loss of three different aircraft: two jet trainers and an Mi-17 heavy-lift helicopter. An Mi-35 attack helicopter was also lost in 2023.
The Myanmar military should have total air superiority.
For the first two years of the conflict, the opposition National Unity Government’s (NUG) best air defense was doxing Air Force pilots – publishing their addresses, as part of an assassination campaign.
Gradually, the NUG’s People’s Defense Force militias began to erode the junta’s air superiority by effectively deploying armed drones.
Significantly, we’re now seeing Ethnic Resistance Organizations (EROs) begin to deploy air defenses, at a time when the junta has become even more dependent on air attacks. That increased tempo of operations requires more maintenance on overworked airframes.
These military junta losses matter for three reasons.
First, while not small by regional standards, the Myanmar Air Force (MAF) certainly does not have excess capacity. At the top end, it has some 31 SU-29s and four recently delivered SU-30s from Russia.
The recently delivered seven JF-17s multi-role fighters, jointly produced by China and Pakistan, are reportedly already grounded due to cracks in their airframes and other maintenance issues.
Airworthiness questions
On paper, Myanmar has approximately 40 other jet fighters, but these are old, Chinese-produced knock-off Russian jets from the 1990s. They are well beyond their service life.
The MAF is thought to have 20 Nanchang Q-5s, the Chinese version of the MiG-19, down from the 36 it imported from 1994-2001. It also has some 21 Chengdu J-7s, a Chinese produced MiG-21. That’s down from some 60 that it had purchased from 1990-1999.
It’s unclear how many of these fighters are still airworthy.
Myanmar’s military has relied on its 18 Russian-built Yak-130 trainers for much of its combat operations. Since the February 2021 coup, Myanmar has taken delivery of some six Guizhou JL-9 jet trainers, referred to as FTC-2000G, which have a spotty performance and safety record.
The MAF also flies an unknown number of Chinese K-8 trainers that can be used for ground support.
Second, we should also assume that given sanctions on the Singapore-based companies that have been the key importers of spare parts, the overall lack of foreign exchange available to the junta, and other supply chain issues, including those caused by Russia’s war in Ukraine, that around 20% of the aircraft are probably not operational.
In December 2023, the sanctioned director of Sky Aviator and two others were caught trying to smuggle 508,925 Singapore dollars (US $382,380) in cash out of that city-state. Sky Aviator, which has an office in Singapore, had a large contract to purchase spare parts for the air force. Another sanctioned firm, Sky Royal Hero Company Limited, has the contract for the maintenance and spare parts for servicing the Russian jet fighters.
For nearly three years, the MAF has been flying at increased tempos without the scheduled maintenance they require.
Airstrikes ramping up
The military’s promised counter offensive has not materialized. Over 4,000 troops have surrendered since Operation 1027 began, and well-documented recruitment issues mean the military does not have a sufficient number of troops to launch ground offensives across the multiple battle zones, which has forced them to rely on long range artillery and air strikes.
An independent research firm documented 336 airstrikes in December 2023, alone, with nearly half against the Three Brotherhood Alliance, the group of ethnic armies behind Operation 1027..
The loss of one of their 12 already over-taxed heavy lift helicopters is another important setback for the military’s counter-offensive. One of their tactical advantages has been air mobility and resupply, especially given their loss of key roads.
Although the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) claims to have shot down the Guizhou JL-9/FTC-2000G on Jan. 17, there is little evidence to support this, Video footage that shows the plane falling from the sky, without smoke or any other sign of hostile fire, indicates likely engine failure.
That leads to the third implication: The MAF is losing aircraft to hostile fire.
While the military claims that it was a technical malfunction that brought down a K-8 trainer, Karenni forces claim to have shot it down.
The KIA claims to have shot down an Mi-17 transport helicopter, killing all six crew members on Jan. 3.
Both helicopters and the trainers, especially when they are being used for ground attacks, are vulnerable to small arms fire.
Eyes on Beijing
But these developments also beg the question: What weapons are being used to down the aircraft?
The only ethnic armed group that is known to have shoulder-launched surface-to-air missiles (known as MANPADs) is the United Wa State Army (UWSA).
Until very recently, the UWSA has sat out the conflict, neither supporting the junta nor joining the NUG. It recently declared its neutrality in the Three Brotherhood Alliance’s Operation 1027, though it did receive two townships from them.
Though the UWSA has quietly sold weapons to other ethnic armies and the NUG, it has, to date, refrained from selling MANPADs.
Has that changed? And if so, why now? It was long believed that they would not sell the weapons for fear of angering China. So did China approve the transfer, or are the groups now willing to incur Beijing’s wrath?
The KIA claims that they shot down the Mi-17 helicopter with a Chinese made FN-6 MANPAD. The transfer of these weapons to the KIA has never been acknowledged, and may indicate a substantial shift in Chinese policy.
Even if the Jan. 17 crash was caused by a mechanical failure, the KIA is smart to claim credit for downing the aircraft – if for no other reason than to sow fear amongst the pilots.
But what is clear, is that at the same time Myanmar’s military has become even more dependent on air strikes, it’s confronted by international sanctions and cash shortages that have hurt the servicing of their planes. At the same time, opposition forces are now fielding a limited number of surface-to-air missiles.
Like everything else in the nearly three years since the coup, the junta’s air superiority is slipping away..."
Source/publisher:
"Radio Free Asia" (USA)
Date of entry/update:
2024-01-20
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Language:
Local URL:
more
Sub-title:
UN Security Council Should Impose Sanctions on Military Junta
Description:
"(Bangkok) – Myanmar’s military junta in 2023 increasingly carried out unlawful airstrikes against villages with ethnic minorities and anti-coup residents, Human Rights Watch said today in its World Report 2024. The security forces committed mass killings, enforced disappearances, torture, rape and other sexual violence, and arbitrary arrests and detention.
“The junta’s increased unlawful airstrikes exemplify the deteriorating human rights situation in Myanmar since the 2021 coup,” said Elaine Pearson, Asia director at Human Rights Watch. “Governments should tighten sanctions on the military, and urge the UN Security Council to impose an arms embargo on Myanmar and refer the situation to the International Criminal Court.”
In the 740-page World Report 2024, its 34th edition, Human Rights Watch reviews human rights practices in more than 100 countries. In her introductory essay, Executive Director Tirana Hassan says that 2023 was a consequential year not only for human rights suppression and wartime atrocities but also for selective government outrage and transactional diplomacy that carried profound costs for the rights of those not in on the deal. But she says there were also signs of hope, showing the possibility of a different path, and calls on governments to consistently uphold their human rights obligations.
In April, Myanmar’s military used a thermobaric weapon – a fuel-air explosive – in Sagaing Region that killed more than 160 civilians. In October, the military attacked a village hosting hundreds of displaced civilians in Kachin State, killing 28 civilians, including 11 children. And since the February 2021 coup, the military has used domestically produced cluster munitions, which are inherently indiscriminate, in populated areas.
The junta blocked desperately needed aid from reaching millions of people in conflict areas, in violation of international humanitarian law. More than two million people have been internally displaced, with many fleeing air and ground attacks multiple times. In October, tens of thousands of people fled clashes between the military and an alliance of ethnic armed groups and anti-junta People’s Defense Forces in northern Shan State.
In May, Cyclone Mocha, one of two strongest tropical cyclones ever recorded in the North Indian Ocean, left a trail of destruction affecting nearly eight million people across Chin, Kachin, and Rakhine States, and Sagaing and Magway Regions. Junta authorities refused to authorize travel and visas for aid workers, release urgent supplies from customs and warehouses, or relax onerous and unnecessary restrictions on lifesaving assistance.
UN Security Council measures against Myanmar authorities have long been stymied by Russia and China, both of which have veto power. Other governments should find ways to expand their own national sanctions to press the junta to change course, Human Rights Watch said. UN member countries should comply with a UN General Assembly 2021 resolution, which urged governments “to prevent the flow of arms into Myanmar.”
Key governments such as the United States expanded sanctions, including on two Myanmar banks used by the junta to purchase weapons and military equipment. In August, the US issued a directive prohibiting financial transactions involving the military-owned Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE). But the European Union, US, Canada, and the United Kingdom should better coordinate and enforce their actions while seeking compliance by Singapore, Thailand and other neighbors of Myanmar.
The International Criminal Court (ICC) currently has an investigation into crimes related to the 2017 ethnic cleansing campaign against the Rohingya, but it is limited in scope. An ICC referral remains critical to address the full range of atrocity crimes in Myanmar. Separately, the UN Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar continued gathering evidence for future prosecutions.
The International Court of Justice is hearing the case on Myanmar’s alleged state responsibility under the Genocide Convention. On November 15, six countries joined the case initiated by Gambia in 2019..."
Source/publisher:
Human Rights Watch (USA)
Date of entry/update:
2024-01-11
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"
Justice For Myanmar welcomes the latest sanctions on the Myanmar military junta and its associates, as it intensifies its war of terror against the people, and calls on governments to urgently step up and better coordinate sanctions.
The latest sanctions come as the junta continues to lose territory and control, almost three years after launching an illegal coup attempt.
On December 11, the EU sanctioned the entities Star Sapphire Group of Companies and Royal Shune Lei Company Limited, which are both suppliers of arms and equipment to the Myanmar military, aiding and abetting its international crimes.
Star Sapphire Group of Companies is a crony conglomerate closely associated with the family of Min Aung Hlaing, whose children’s assets were caught in a Thai drug raid against Star Sapphire Group’s founder, Tun Min Latt. Tun Min Latt is currently in custody in Thailand on drug trafficking and money laundering charges.
Royal Shune Lei Company Limited is an arms broker for the Myanmar military that has been sanctioned for the first time. Justice For Myanmar previously highlighted its links to the sale of arms and dual use goods from Russia and Serbia. The company may have also brokered the sale of arms from North Korea to the Myanmar military in 2022, according to reports.
The EU also sanctioned members of the junta’s State Administration Council, Nyo Saw, Wunna Maung Lwin and Hmu Htan, as well as the commander of the military’s Eastern Command, Hla Moe.
Nyo Saw is a major player in the junta’s cartel, having been chairperson of Myanmar Economic Corporation and a member of the junta’s Foreign Exchange Supervision Committee.
On December 8, the UK sanctioned Colonel Chit Thu, whose legal name is San Myint, and his associates Saw Min Min Oo and She Zhijiang (also written as She Zhi Jiang). San Myint leads the Karen Border Guard Force, a militia under Myanmar military command in Karen State. Min Min Oo is a colonel in the same militia and plays a key role in the militia’s corrupt business dealings, which include illegal casinos and cyber slavery compounds. She Zhijiang, a Chinese fugitive who obtained Cambodian citizenship, is their business associate and led the Yatai project in Shwe Kokko with the Karen Border Guard Force up until his arrest in Thailand in 2022 after an extradition request by Chinese authorities. All three have been sanctioned for the first time.
Also on December 8, Canada for the second time sanctioned the war criminal, Min Aung Hlaing, who is responsible for genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity, and is leading the military’s coup attempt. He was designated under the country’s Magnitsky Law, the Justice for Victims of Corrupt Foreign Officials Act. Canada also sanctioned Min Aung Hlaing on February 18, 2021 under the Special Economic Measures (Burma) Regulations.
Justice For Myanmar spokesperson Yadanar Maung says: “These latest sanctions are welcome as a further step in blocking the Myanmar military junta’s sources of funds and arms, which it needs to continue its war of terror against the people.
“It is also welcome that the UK has sanctioned key individuals in the Karen Border Guard Force network, who, under Myanmar military command, are responsible for grave human rights violations and crimes that include human trafficking, the enslavement of victims in cyber scam compounds, the operation of illegal casinos and money laundering.
“The Myanmar military junta is at the apex of these criminal networks, and the threat they pose to the ASEAN region and beyond cannot be eradicated until the Myanmar military cartel is dismantled and there is federal democracy.
“However, the pace of sanctions has so far been too slow compared to the unprecedented crisis on the ground. Far more needs to be done urgently to cut the junta’s sources of arms and funds. We call on governments to step up and better coordinate for further sanctions and for justice and accountability.”..."
Source/publisher:
Justice For Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2023-12-12
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Language:
Format :
pdf pdf
Size:
113.2 KB 121.71 KB
more
Description:
"Myanmar economic recovery falters as conflict and inflation weigh
Broad-based slowdown anticipated across productive sectors
YANGON, December 12, 2023—Little economic growth is expected in Myanmar in the near term, as rising conflict, trade and logistics disruptions, kyat volatility and high inflation combine to negatively impact businesses and households, the World Bank’s semi-annual Myanmar Economic Monitor said.
Myanmar’s economy is projected to grow by just 1% over the year to March 2024, according to the report, Challenges amid conflict. Conflict has escalated across much of Myanmar since October, leading to the displacement of an estimated half a million people, disrupting key overland trade routes and increasing logistics costs.
Even if conflict does not escalate further, growth is expected to remain subdued over the rest of 2024 and into 2025 given a broad-based slowdown across productive sectors including agriculture, manufacturing, and trade. The size of Myanmar’s economy remains around 10% lower than it was in 2019, leaving it the only economy in East Asia that has not returned to pre-pandemic levels of economic activity.
Consumer prices rose by almost 29% in the 12 months ending in June this year, and the more recent drop in the value of the kyat and escalation in conflict have led to further price rises in the months since. Household incomes continue to be severely strained. In surveys conducted by IFPRI in mid-2023, 40% of households reported earning less than in the previous year, with median real incomes declining by around 10 percent. Measures of food insecurity have also worsened.
“The economic situation has deteriorated, and uncertainty about the future is increasing,” said World Bank Country Director for Myanmar, Cambodia, and the Lao PDR, Mariam Sherman. “High food price inflation has had a particularly severe impact on the poor, who spend a larger portion of their income on food, and who tend to live in areas where prices have risen at a faster pace."
Indicators of business activity have worsened since mid-2023. Firms reported operating at just 56% of their capacity in September, down 16 percentage points from March. Weakness in sales has been a major challenge, particularly for retailers.
A special section of the report explores the scope for Myanmar’s garment industry to continue to drive growth in employment and incomes, as it has done for much of the past decade. However, conflict, high logistics costs, trade and foreign exchange restrictions, and electricity disruptions have raised the cost of doing business and reduced the sector’s international competitiveness.
“With the operating environment deteriorating and uncertainty about the future increasing, Myanmar’s garment firms have been forced to focus on survival rather than investment and growth,” said World Bank Program Leader and Senior Economist for Myanmar, Kim Alan Edwards. “The scarring effect of recent developments is likely to curtail Myanmar’s longer-term development potential, in the garment industry and across the broader economy”..."
Source/publisher:
World Bank
Date of entry/update:
2023-12-12
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Food Security and nutrition in Burma/Myanmar, Armed conflict in Burma - attacks on civilians, Business and the Military
Language:
Format :
pdf pdf
Size:
1.85 MB 112.61 KB
more
Description:
"Greenway Mining Group Limited, a mining company based in Kunming, China and operating through British Overseas Territories, is expanding its business in Myanmar following the military’s illegal coup attempt, providing revenue to the junta as it widens its campaign of terror.
The revelations published by Justice For Myanmar based on the company’s disclosures to the Hong Kong Stock Exchange before its recent delisting, come as the UK lags behind its allies in sanctioning No. 1 Mining Enterprise (ME 1) and No. 1 Mining Enterprise (ME 2), which are under illegal control of the junta.
ME 1 and ME 2 have already been sanctioned by the US, EU and Canada.
The junta’s minister for natural resources and environmental conservation, Colonel Khin Maung Yi, has also been sanctioned by the US, EU and Canada, while he has yet to be designated in the UK.
Greenway Mining Group operates two mines in Shan State, Myanmar. Since the coup attempt, it has been seeking approval from the junta to expand one of its mines and has organised the shipment of minerals to China, in partnership with ME 1.
The company, which is incorporated in the Cayman Islands and also operates in the British Virgin Islands, has earned millions of dollars in revenue during the past decade from its lead and silver mines in Myanmar, according to its financial statements.
Justice For Myanmar calls on UK Foreign Secretary David Cameron to immediately sanction all key junta entities and individuals in the mining sector, including ME 1, ME 2 and Khin Maung Yi.
Justice For Myanmar calls on Greenway to immediately end all business with the junta, in line with its human rights responsibilities under the UN Guiding Principles on business and human rights.
Justice For Myanmar spokesperson Yadanar Maung says: “Greenway Mining is using British Overseas Territories for its business with the illegal Myanmar military junta, supporting ongoing war crimes and crimes against humanity committed with total impunity.
“Greenway’s business with the junta, conducted via the Cayman Islands and British Virgin Islands, has been enabled by the UK’s slow pace of sanctions on the mining sector, which is a key source of funds for the junta.
“As the junta continues to lose ground, it is increasingly relying on indiscriminate air strikes and is desperate for revenue to sustain its war of terror.
“The UK and its allies must urgently coordinate to block all of the junta’s sources of arms and revenue, including from the mining sector, and support the people of Myanmar’s struggle for federal democracy.”..."
Source/publisher:
Justice For Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2023-12-11
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"The illegal Myanmar military junta is set to host the 26th Ministerial Conference of the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) program, on December 15 in Naypyidaw, according to Justice For Myanmar sources.
In a welcome move, the Asian Development Bank, which acts as the GMS Secretariat, has told Justice For Myanmar that it will not attend the Ministerial Conference and will not provide any support. In response to an email, an ADB spokesperson told Justice For Myanmar, “The Asian Development Bank (ADB) will not attend the 26th GMS Ministerial Conference. In addition, ADB will not provide any funding for the event, nor provide logistical or advisory support. ADB also will not finance the costs of any developing member countries’ attendees.”
Justice For Myanmar calls on GMS countries to cancel the conference and ban the junta from the GMS program. The ADB should reconsider its support for the GMS program while it continues to engage with the junta.
The conference is planned to take place as the junta continues to lose control of Myanmar, is rapidly losing territory and is waging a campaign of terror against the people, committing mass killings, carrying out indiscriminate air strikes and shelling, arbitrary arrests, torture and mass displacement that has surged to more than 2.5 million.
The conference host is Kan Zaw, the junta’s minister for investment and foreign economic relations, who is sanctioned by the US and EU. The EU noted that Kan Zaw “takes an active role in supporting the military’s efforts to attract foreign investment, thereby contributing to securing the financial needs of the military regime. Therefore, he is responsible for undermining democracy and the rule of law in Myanmar/Burma as well as for engaging in actions that threaten the peace, security and stability of Myanmar.”
According to Justice For Myanmar sources, Kan Zaw has invited China’s finance minister, Lan Fo’an, Cambodia’s deputy prime minister and minister of foreign affairs and international cooperation, Sok Chenda Sophea, Lao’s planning and investment minister, Khamjane Vongphosy, Vietnam’s planning and investment minister, Nguyen Chi Dung, and Thailand’s deputy finance minister, Julapun Amornvivat to the conference.
The conference is being organised by a steering committee headed by the junta’s deputy minister for investment and foreign economic relations. The committee also includes a member of the military conglomerate Myanmar Economic Corporation (MEC) as the sole private sector representative, according to Justice For Myanmar sources. MEC is sanctioned by the US, UK, EU, Canada and Australia.
The junta-controlled Myanmar Police Force is providing security for the conference, overseen by the deputy police chief who is also a member of the steering committee. The junta’s police force is directly responsible for killings, torture and arbitrary arrest, which amount to crimes against humanity. The junta is preparing to maximise propaganda from the conference, having formed a committee to manage the release of information to control journalists.
The conference is being held at the Grand Amara Hotel, which is part of the junta-linked crony conglomerate International Group of Entrepreneur (IGE) owned by Ne Aung, the brother of the junta’s navy chief. The junta is covering the accommodation of delegates, their flights between Yangon and Naypyidaw and hosting a gala lunch.
The upcoming conference comes after Min Aung Hlaing participated in the 7th GMS Leaders’ Summit hosted by Cambodia in 2021. The ADB told Justice For Myanmar that they had provided Cambodia with advisory support to prepare documentation for the summit, which was held virtually.
The Leaders’ Summit, which is the program’s highest body, was featured prominently in junta propaganda. In a speech at the summit, Min Aung Hlaing defended his illegal coup attempt and falsely stated that the 2020 election was rigged and that the coup attempt was constitutional.
At the 2021 Leader’s Summit, Min Aung Hlaing illegitimately endorsed the GMS Strategic Framework 2030, which aims to promote investment and tourism that would help generate revenue for the junta, which it needs to finance its terror campaign.
In 2022, Laos hosted the 25th GMS Ministerial Conference, in which the junta was also wrongly allowed to participate. In the conference, the junta illegitimately endorsed the GMS Regional Investment Framework for 2023-2025, in which the junta has proposed US$208.3 million in projects in sectors that include energy, information and communications technology, tourism and agriculture, mostly to be funded by unspecified “development partners”.
The GMS program was established in 1992 under Myanmar’s previous dictatorship, and has focussed on promoting trade and the development of economic corridors and infrastructure, including in ethnic areas of Myanmar.
As part of the Myanmar junta’s chairing of the GMS, the junta linked Union of Myanmar Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry (UMFCCI) is leading the GMS Business Council, a grouping of chambers of commerce from GMS countries. The GMS Business Council is currently chaired by Zaw Min Win, a former UMFCCI president and the chair of the Myanmar Industries Alliance, which invests in the mobile operator Mytel with the military conglomerate MEC.
Justice For Myanmar spokesperson Yadanar Maung says: “It is unfathomable that the GMS program and its members are not only inviting the illegal junta to participate but are even appointing it as host of a ministerial conference.
“The junta is a terrorist organisation that is committing war crimes and crimes against humanity with total impunity. The military's coup attempt is failing and the GMS program and its members are making a serious moral and strategic error in legitimising it and attempting to facilitate investment that will help it generate revenue and further fuel atrocities.
“GMS members should immediately cancel the planned conference or, failing that, refuse to attend. The junta must be barred from the GMS program, which should instead recognise and support the National Unity Government, which is the legitimate government of Myanmar.
“We welcome the decision of the ADB to withdraw support for the Ministerial Conference and to refuse to attend. The ADB should now reconsider its institutional support for the GMS program as long as its members continue to legitimise the illegal junta.
“The involvement of UMFCCI and the junta-linked crony Zaw Min Win in the GMS Business Council is alarming and is a further sign that the junta and its cronies are using the program to promote investment that can strengthen the junta and worsen the crisis in Myanmar caused by the military’s illegal coup attempt.”..."
Source/publisher:
Justice For Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2023-12-05
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Business and the Military, The Burmese military's role in the economy
Language:
Format :
pdf pdf
Size:
124.95 KB 137.58 KB
more
Description:
"EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:
Myanmar’s current political and economic environment presents major challenges for local businesses, particularly those in need of lending. Reduced GDP growth, rising inflation, and currency fluctuations have made operating a business more difficult throughout the country. Microenterprises and households that have been traditionally under-served by conventional financial institutions will today face even greater difficulty accessing the resources they need to survive or grow. At the same time, ongoing armed conflict and the lingering economic effects of the COVID-19 pandemic have made it harder for microfinance institutions to serve businesses and households. Throughout Myanmar, these complex and interlinked factors continue to impact borrowers and their businesses in different ways.
This study aimed to better understand the experiences and challenges of borrowers and their businesses or livelihood activity by surveying 2372 Vision Fund Myanmar clients about their borrowing activity, business performance, and outlook. The study included separate analyses of farmers and non-farmers as well as borrowers in areas with varying degrees of conflict-exposure.
Key findings of the study include the following:
One-third of MFI clients had borrowed from multiple sources. Farmers were more likely than non-farmers to have debt from multiple sources. Forty-three percent of farmers took on multiple loans compared to 29% of non-farmers.
Non-farmers were more likely than farmers to take on informal debt. Among MFI clients with multiple loans, 62% percent of non-farmers borrowed from informal lenders compared to just 40% of farmers.
Informal borrowing was more common in high-conflict townships than elsewhere. Among borrowers who took on additional debt, 62% of borrowers in high-conflict townships looked to informal lenders, compared to just 50% of borrowers in other townships.
Borrowers with informal debt were threetimes as likely as others to fall behind on debt payments. Although only 16% of borrowers had informal debt, these borrowers were much more likely to fall behind on payments.
Borrowers in areas with more conflict-exposure were 80% more likely to fall behind on interest payments. Twenty-four percent of borrowers in high-conflict townships had pastdue principle compared to 16% of borrowers elsewhere.
Borrowers in areas with more conflict-exposure were less likely to have savings. Borrowers in high-conflict townships were less likely to use mobile apps to hold savings.
Eighty-percent of businesses said their business was profitable, but profits were slim.
Among businesses that were profitable, 92% said profits were “small” and just 8% said profits were “large.” Non-farmers reported thinner profit margins than farmers.
Many businesses still hoped to expand, and few expected to have to close their business in the near future.Just 2% of borrowers planned to discontinue or reduce the size of their business in the next two years; by contrast, half of all businesses hoped to expand their business.
Borrowers in areas with more conflict-exposure were 40% less likely to expand their business. Just 31% of borrowers in high-conflict townships said they planned to expand their business in the next two years, compared to 51% of borrowers elsewhere.
Three-quarters of borrowers said supply and demand were major challenges for their business. Challenges related to supply and demand were more than twice as common as challenges related to cash, credit, labor recruitment, transportation, or security.
Farmers and non-farmers adapted differently to the challenges they faced. Farmers more often adapted to challenges by reducing input costs, while non-farmers more often adapted by reducing the price of their goods or services.
Challenges related to security and transportation were far more common in areas with more conflict-exposure. In high-conflict townships 39-47% of borrowers with business challenges said this included security and transportation problems, compared to just 10-14% of borrowers elsewhere.
The above findings point to several possible recommendations for lenders, development partners, and humanitarian organizations:
Borrowers in areas with more conflict-exposure likely require additional support and services. More borrowers in areas with high conflict-exposure struggle with debt repayment and business operations. Although these businesses may be harder-to-reach, their needs are often greater. Borrowers in these areas may require more resources to achieve similar outcomes to those elsewhere.
Borrowers in areas with more conflict-exposure require lending and savings solutions tailored to their unique circumstances. Conflict-affected businesses face different challenges and exhibit different business and financial behavior, suggesting the need for uniquely-tailored solutions. A one-size-fits-all approach to lending and/or aid may not have the same impact on borrowers in different areas.
Alternatives to mobile-based financial solutions may be necesary. Fewer businesses in areas with more conflict-exposure used mobile platforms for saving. Although the reasons for this were unclear, it may suggest the need for a variety of savings solutions in order to service businesses and households in different settings.
Non-farmers and borrowers in areas with more conflict-exposure may need more avenues to access formal lending. The prevalence of informal borrowing in high-conflict areas and among non-farmers suggests that barriers to formal lending for these groups may need special attention.
Loans intended specifically for business growth may be effective if well-targeted. While businesses in the most conflict-affected areas may be unlikely to plan for expansion, many other businesses with conflict-exposure may nonetheless seek to grow and therefore benefit from such loans.
In-kind support to farmers in the form of agricultural inputs may help them address the financial challenges they face. Farmers reported adapting to challenges by reducing inputs, which hurts yields in the long-run. Lending to these businesses may be most effective if paired with additional aid which targets such adaptation measures..."
Source/publisher:
Myanmar Information Management Unit (Myanmar) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2023-12-04
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Armed conflict in Burma - Impact on village life, including health and education, Business and the Military
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
5.36 MB
more
Description:
"Myanmar Campaign Network (MCN), Justice For Myanmar (JFM), the Australian Coalition for Democracy in Burma (ACDB), and Global Myanmar Spring Revolution (GMSR) commend the decision by the Australian Government to deny visas to the Myanmar football club Shan United. The decision comes after a strong push from the organisations, which cited grave concerns over the club’s associations with individuals and entities connected to the Myanmar military and human rights violations.
This action prompted Australia to bar Shan United's entry for their Asian Football Confederation (AFC) Cup match against Sydney team the Macarthur Bulls, initially slated for November 30 in Australia, leading to the match's relocation to a venue in Bangkok.
MCN, JFM, ACDB, and GMSR urged Australian ministers to deny visas to Shan United players and officials, raising concerns about the club's owner, Wa Minn Group of Companies, and its sponsor, Kanbawza Group of Companies (KBZ Group).
Myanmar Investment Commission data released by Distributed Denial of Secrets shows Wa Minn Group of Companies and its owner, Kun Naung Myint Wai, hold permits for two property development projects in partnership with the Myanmar military: one with Myanmar Economic Corporation (MEC), a military conglomerate sanctioned by Australia, and one with the Office of the Quartermaster General of the Myanmar Army, which has been sanctioned by the US, UK, EU, and Canada.
KBZ Group is a crony conglomerate that donated a total of US$4.7 million to the Myanmar military and the Union Enterprise for Humanitarian Assistance, Resettlement and Development in Rakhine State (UEHRD) during the Rohingya genocide, according to the UN Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar. The Fact-Finding Mission recommended a criminal investigation against officials of KBZ Group as a result of the donations, stating that they made ‘a substantial and direct contribution to the commission of the crime against humanity of “other inhumane acts”’.
MCN and JFM have pressed for sanctions against these companies and related individuals.
Myanmar Campaign Network Campaign Manager Tasneem Roc, said, “Australia's denial of visas sends a powerful message that those implicated in human rights violations will not be granted a platform or support. Further sanctions action is needed to show support for the pro-democracy movement in Myanmar.”
Justice For Myanmar spokesperson Yadanar Maung said, “Australia’s denial of visas to Shan United is welcome but more needs to be done. Australia should urgently impose more targeted sanctions against the illegal junta’s sources of funds, arms, equipment and jet fuel, and catch up with the sanctions already imposed by its allies.”
Australian Coalition for Democracy in Burma spokesperson Peter Murphy said, “While we welcome Australia’s decision to ban visas for Shan United players and officials, Football Australia and ultimately FIFA bear a crucial responsibility to uphold human rights within international football. States, entities or individuals found guilty of human rights abuses should be banned.”
Global Myanmar Spring Revolution Spokesperson Mon Zin said, “This visa ban marks progress towards justice, but it stirs mixed emotions for us, the youth. We long for a Myanmar free from the junta's oppression, with opportunities for all. We imagined celebrating our soccer stars in Sydney, a moment of pride. However until the world opposes the junta's cruelty, our hopes remain unfulfilled. Let this ban resound as a call for justice, fuelling our unwavering struggle for a liberated Myanmar!”..."
Source/publisher:
Justice For Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2023-12-01
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Language:
Format :
pdf pdf
Size:
134.84 KB 226.78 KB
more
Description:
"H.E. Fumio Kishida, Prime Minister
H.E. Yoko Kamikawa, Minister for Foreign Affairs
H.E. Shunichi Suzuki, Minister of Finance
H.E. Tetsuo Saito, Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism
Statement calling on the Japanese government to stop ODA and publicly-funded projects benefiting the Myanmar military
ayus:Network of Buddhists Volunteers on International Cooperation
Friends of the Earth Japan
Japan International Volunteer Center (JVC)
Network Against Japan Arms Trade (NAJAT)
Mekong Watch
Progressive Voice
More than two years and ten months have passed since the failed coup by the Myanmar military. The military continues to commit serious human rights abuses amounting to war crimes and crimes against humanity. At least 4,192 people including pro-democracy activists and civilians have been confirmed killed by the military as of November 21, 2023. Among those protesting the attempted seizure of power by force by the military, a total of 25,425 people have been arrested. Across Myanmar, 2 million people are estimated to be internally displaced as of November 10, including 1.7 million currently displaced by clashes and insecurity since the coup.
By 2020, the Japanese government provided JPY 356.518 billion in total in grant aid as well as JPY 109.94 billion in total in technical assistance to Myanmar, and promised JPY 1,378.47 billion in loan aid (figure based on loan agreements). After the failed coup, then Foreign Minister Motegi made the following statement regarding these Official Development Assistance (ODA) to Myanmar on May 21, 2021: “If the situation continues in this way, it is possible that we will be compelled to review ODA and that companies may become unable to provide investment even if they want to.” However, since then, despite the worsening human rights crisis in Myanmar, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Foreign Affairs have simply repeated that it would “comprehensively consider what measures may be effective while viewing the situation of the efforts made by Japan and the international community”. No contract has been signed on new ODA, but no official announcement has been made as to whether any review or assessment has been conducted regarding the existing ODA.
A large part of ODA to Myanmar is loan aid (yen loans) for development of a special economic zone and surrounding infrastructure, construction of roads, and repairing railroads. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has stated in the Diet that 34 loan aid projects totaling JPY 739.6 billion based on figures in loan agreements are being implemented currently, making it clear that these projects have continued even after the failed coup.
Besides ODA, the Japanese government provides public funds for private projects in Myanmar. Redevelopment of the Defense Services Museum Project (commonly known as the “Y Complex Project”) involves building and operating a large-scale real estate complex at the army-owned site of the former military museum in Yangon, the largest city in Myanmar. Japan Overseas Infrastructure Investment Corporation for Transport and Urban Development (JOIN), a government-funded infrastructure investment corporation under the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, and Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) which is Japan’s public export credit agency, invests or lends to the Y Complex Project. Tokyo Tatemono, Fujita Corporation (a subsidiary of Daiwa House Industry), and JOIN set up a Joint Special Purpose Company (J-SPC) in Singapore. JBIC along with Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation and Mizuho Bank co-financed a loan to this J-SPC, and the J-SPC in turn is co-investing in Y Complex Company Ltd., a Myanmar corporation set up jointly by the J-SPC and Yangon Technical and Trading Company Limited (YTT), a Myanmar crony company. The land lease agreement is between YTT and "Colonel Aung Min Thein (Officer No. Army 17642), Vice Quarter Master General, Office of the Quarter Master General, Commander-in-Chief (Army).” Land lease payments are to be made to "Defence Account no. MD 010424,” an account likely to be under control of the Office of the Quartermaster General.
The US, UK and Canada imposed sanctions on the Office of the Quartermaster General on December 10, 2021. Further, on June 21, 2023, the US designated Myanmar's Ministry of Defence as a “Specially Designated National” subject to financial sanctions, noting that the Ministry was “responsible for the command and control of the armed forces, which has conducted decades of repressive military rule that was violently resumed following the coup in 2021.”
Following are some of the issues that that the continuation of the provision of public funds and ODA could entail:
First, by continuing ODA which requires bilateral agreements even though one of the parties to those agreements has ceased to exist due to the coup in February 2021, and by providing public funds to the Y Complex Project, a venture that allows funds to flow to the Office of the Quartermaster General, it appears that the Japanese government is giving implicit support to the military junta. We share the concern of Myanmar citizens regarding this point.
Second, ODA projects and projects receiving public funds in fact benefit the Myanmar military. It has been made clear by the UN Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar that in Myanmar, revenues from business operations conducted by companies owned or controlled by the military are a source of funds for the military, supporting their atrocities. The UK government has pointed out that the Office of the Quartermaster General which is involved in the Y Complex Project "plays a crucial role in procuring equipment for the Myanmar Armed Forces, including ammunition, bombs and jet fuel.” It has been revealed that the Myanmar Economic Corporation (MEC), one of the military enterprises that the Fact-Finding Mission recommended to the international community not to "enter into or remain in a business relationship” with, is involved in the construction of Bago Bridge, a yen loan project. It has been pointed out that Yokogawa Bridge Corporation made payments to MEC from July to November 2022. Further, in the Thilawa Special Economic Zone (SEZ) Development Project, the Japanese government along with major trade companies and banks is investing in the Myanmar Japan Thilawa Development Ltd. (MJTD) which operates the industrial area using “Private Sector Investment Finance,” a type of ODA. Myanmar established the Thilawa SEZ Management Committee and holds 10% of MJTD. Soon after the coup, the military detained the chairperson of the Management Committee and appointed a new chairperson. Dividend payments are to be made if MJTD makes a profit, but under these circumstances, the possibility cannot be denied that such dividend payments will benefit the military.
Third, in the type of ODA called “Two-Step Loans” under which ODA funds lent by the Japanese government are held and managed by financial institutions in Myanmar, there is concern that the funds may come to be managed by the military through its control over the financial institutions. Projects in question include the Housing Finance Development Project, Project for the Development of Finance for Small and Medium-sized Enterprises, and the Agriculture and Rural Development Two Step Loan Project.
Fourth, funds provided through yen loans are money lent at interest that Myanmar needs to repay, which will increase the debt owed by the people of Myanmar. Japan had already lent a cumulative total of USD 2761.8 million to Myanmar by 2020,but Myanmar will owe an additional JPY 739.6 billion (USD 4.93 billion as of November 10, 2023). This means that the people of Myanmar who are suffering from serious human rights abuses and atrocities by the Myanmar military will be made to bear the burden of repaying ODA for the next decades that is or may well be a source of funds for the military.
As we expressed in our statement in December 2022, we believe that the Japanese government should respect the National Unity Government (NUG), Ethnic Revolutionary Organizations (EROs) and civil society organizations in Myanmar and effectively support the will of the people of Myanmar. We express deep concern that Japan may be complicit in the atrocity crimes by the military by providing ODA and public funds to the benefit of the military. We strongly demand that the Japanese government suspend all yen loan projects currently being implemented. Regarding the Y Complex Project, we strongly demand that the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism immediately withdraw the investment made by JOIN, and that the Ministry of Finance immediately cancel the loan made by JBIC.
Statement has been endorsed by the following organizations:
1 Action Committee for Democracy Development (Coalition of 14 Grassroots Networks)
2 Active Youths Kalaymyo
3 Africa Japan Forum
4 Ah Nah Podcast - Conversations with Myanmar
5 All Arakan Students' & Youths' Congress – AASYC
6 All Burma Indigenous People Alliance (ABIPA)
7 Alternative People's Linkage in Asia
8 ALTSEAN-Burma
9 ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights
10 Asian Community Center 21
11 Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development (FORUM-ASIA)
12 Asian Health Institute, AHI
13 Assistance Association for Political Prisoners
14 Association of Human Rights Defenders and Promoters
15 Association Suisse-Birmanie (ASB)
16 Associazione per l'Amicizia Italia Birmania "Giuseppe Malpeli"
17 Athan – Freedom of Expression Activist Organization
18 Burma Action Ireland
19 Burma Campaign UK
20 Burma Human Rights Network
21 Burmese Relief Center Japan
22 Burmese Women’s Union
23 CRPH & NUG Supporters Ireland
24 CRPH Funding Ireland
25 CRPH, NUG Support Team Germany-Deutschland
26 Democracy, Peace and Women’s Organization
27 Earth Tree
28 Educational Initiatives Prague
29 Equality Myanmar
30 Federation of Workers’ Union of the Burmese Citizen in Japan (FWUBC)
31 Freedom and Labor Action Group (FLAG)
32 Fukuoka NGO forum on ADB
33 Future Light Center
34 Future Thanlwin
35 General Incorporation Association WORKSPACE ASIA
36 Generation Wave
37 Grass-root People
38 HANDS（Health and Development Service)
39 Human Rights Educators Network
40 Human Rights Foundation of Monland (HURFOM)
41 Human Rights Now
42 Info Birmanie
43 Initiatives for International Dialogue (IID)
44 International Association, Myanmar-Switzerland (IAMS)
45 International Karen Organisation
46 Japan Campaign to Ban Landmines (JCBL)
47 Japan Catholic Council for Justice and Peace
48 Japan Center for a Sustainable Environment and Society (JACSES)
49 Japan Overseas Christian Medical Cooperative Service
50 Japan Tropical Forest Action Network (JATAN)
51 Justice For Myanmar
52 Karen Human Rights Group
53 Karen Peace Support Network
54 Karen Swedish Community (KSC)
55 Karenni Human Rights Group
56 Karenni National Women's Organization
57 Keng Tung Youth
58 Mandalay Regional Youth Association Revolution Core Group
59 Metta Campaign
60 Myanmar Campaign Network
61 Myanmar Diaspora Group Finland
62 Myanmar International Assistance Organization
63 Myanmar News Now
64 Myanmar People Alliance (Shan State)
65 Myanmar Refugee Policy Group
66 Network for Human Rights Documentation - Burma (ND-Burma)
67 Nway Oo Guru Lay Myar
68 Padauk Finland-Myanmar Association
69 Pakokku Youth Development Council
70 Peace Boat
71 Peace Village United
72 Political Prisoners Network
73 Progressive Voice
74 Save and Care Organization for Women at Border Areas
75 Services for the Health in Asian and African Regions
76 Shan MATA
77 Southern Youth Development Organization
78 Ta'ang Legal Aid
79 Ta’ang Women’s Organization
80 Tanintharyi MATA
81 The Ladies
82 U.S. Campaign for Burma
83 Women's Democratic Club, Femin
84 Yokohama NGO Network
and one other organization..."
Source/publisher:
Justice For Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2023-12-01
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Business and the Military, The Burmese military's role in the economy
Language:
Format :
pdf pdf pdf
Size:
99.27 KB 426.78 KB 196.18 KB
Local URL:
- 2023-12-01-Statement-calling-on-the-Japanese-government-to-stop-ODA-and-publicly-funded-projects-benefiting-the-Myanmar-military-en.pdf
- 2023-12-01-Statement-calling-on-the-Japanese-government-to-stop-ODA-and-publicly-funded-projects-benefiting-the-Myanmar-military-bu.pdf
- 2023-12-01-Statement-calling-on-the-Japanese-government-to-stop-ODA-and-publicly-funded-projects-benefiting-the-Myanmar-military-japanese.pdf
more
Description:
"Justice For Myanmar has released a spoof Crazy Rich Asians sequel trailer, ‘Crazy Rich Asians 2: The Blood Behind the Money’, spotlighting the real Tay Za, founder of Htoo Group of Companies, and one of the richest men in Myanmar.
Tay Za’s business empire funnels foreign currency and military equipment to the Myanmar military, supporting the junta’s campaign of terror against the people. The US, UK, Canada and EU have imposed sanctions on Tay Za and his companies, but Singapore continues to act as a haven for his and other military crony business dealings, undermining international efforts to resolve the crisis in Myanmar.
The ‘unofficial’ movie trailer and poster circulating online include actual footage sourced from YouTube of Tay Za and his family celebrating at the lavish wedding of one of his sons. It promises the “True story of Tay Za, one of the richest men in Myanmar, and the dirty deals that pay for his beautiful life”.
Featured in the trailer are Tay Za and some of his family members who have a stake in a blood-stained network of more than 60 businesses in Myanmar and Singapore. Tay Za heads Htoo Group of Companies as chair, with his brother Thi Ha as vice chair and his son Pyae Phyo Tay Za as managing director. His other two children, Htoo Htet Tay Za and Htoo Htwe Tay Za (also known as Rachel Tayza), are directors and shareholders of numerous Htoo subsidiaries and associated companies, while his wife Thida Zaw is involved in Htoo’s business in Singapore.
This ‘Crazy Rich Asians 2: The Blood Behind the Money’ trailer is the latest addition to the campaign calling on the Singapore government to block the junta’s access to funds, arms, equipment and jet fuel. Other spoof actions include ‘Dirty Over 30’, a parody of the Forbes 30 Under 30 list, profiling Tay Za and eight other businesspeople who’ve amassed sizable fortunes funding brutality, mass-murder and war crimes in Myanmar, yet continue to freely do business in Singapore.
The public campaign is mounting pressure on Singapore, which is currently the third-largest supplier of arms and equipment to the Myanmar military, to stop all arms trading to the military from its jurisdiction. In October, 430 civil society organisations sent an open letter to the Singapore government, and more than 29,000 people have signed a petition initiated by the Blood Money Campaign. The #DoMoreSingapore and #NoMoreDirtyDeals online movement is continuing amidst substantial gains being made on the ground against the Myanmar military across the country..."
Source/publisher:
Justice For Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2023-11-30
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Business and the Military
Language:
Format :
pdf pdf
Size:
116.51 KB 109.93 KB
more
Description:
"29 November 2023: The Special Advisory Council for Myanmar (SAC-M) congratulates the Australian Government for its decision to deny entry visas to the players and officials of Shan United football team, owned by Kun Naung Myint Wai – a crony with deep ties to the illegal Myanmar military junta.
Kun Naung Myint Wai is also the chairman of Wa Minn Corporation, which has business links with the Myanmar military’s “ministry of defence.” Kun Naung Myint Wai has alleged connections with Myanmar military-controlled conglomerate, Myanmar Economic Corporation (MEC), which generates vast revenues for the Myanmar military that it uses to fund grave human rights violations against civilians. In February, Australia imposed financial sanctions on MEC.
The decision to bar entry to Shan United football club, which came ahead of its scheduled football match against Sydney-based Macarthur FC in Australia, is a modest but welcome step by the Australian Government to hold accountable those who benefit from their association with Myanmar’s criminal military.
SAC-M urges the Australian Government to build on this positive step by taking more meaningful action to hold the Myanmar military accountable. Australia must now follow like-minded democracies, including the United States, United Kingdom, Canada and the European Union, by imposing further targeted financial sanctions on the Myanmar military, its generals, affiliated entities and cronies..."
Source/publisher:
Special Advisory Council for Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2023-11-29
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Business and the Military, Sanctions, The Burmese military's role in the economy, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
114.67 KB
Local URL:
more
Description:
"REDRESS, Justice For Myanmar and the Australian Centre for International Justice have submitted a dossier of evidence to the Governor of the British Virgin Islands and the UK’s Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation, requesting that they open investigations into the formerly British Virgin Islands-incorporated entity Cornerstone Resources (Myanmar) Limited alleged violations of UK sanctions.
The dossier contains research and evidence from Justice For Myanmar into Cornerstone Resources (Myanmar) Limited’s business, including leaked financial statements that show transactions with the military conglomerate, Myanmar Economic Corporation (MEC).
The transactions, which consist of the sale of zinc to MEC and the purchase of coal from MEC, total 1,971,236,483 Myanmar kyat (more than £770,000 or AU$1.33m) between October 2021 and August 2022, and follow the UK’s sanctioning of MEC on April 1, 2021, under the UK’s Global Human Rights Sanctions Regulations 2020, which are in force in the British Virgin Islands.
The dossier urges that, should penalties be imposed through enforcement action, the funds are re-directed to victims as reparations for the abuses they suffered from the Myanmar military. Such financial compensation could serve to provide interim relief to victims, allowing them to rebuild their lives and gain access to healthcare and other social services.
Cornerstone Resources (Myanmar) Limited’s main business is zinc mining and processing in Myanmar’s Shan State. It began operating in Myanmar in 1999, under the previous military junta, and has a production sharing contract with Mining Enterprise No. 1 (ME 1), a state-owned enterprise that is illegally under junta control.
ME 1 has not been sanctioned by the UK or Australia, despite calls in Australia and the UK for sanctions.
The company’s Myanmar business was owned by its British Virgin Islands’ parent company until it was struck off its Register of Companies in November 2022. Due to restrictions on accessing information on this and Myanmar corporate registries, it has not been possible to confirm the identity of the current directors and shareholders of Cornerstone Resources (Myanmar). The company has had an Australian director, Australian shareholders and used an Australian address for its business.
Rupert Skilbeck, Director of REDRESS, said: "The UK’s enforcement agencies can impose significant financial penalties for violations of UK sanctions, which could be used to provide reparations to victims of the crimes sanctions seek to prevent. Yet, to date, the UK has been extremely slow at enforcing sanctions and any fines imposed have been directed to the Treasury for other uses.
“It is crucial that the UK government rigorously enforces its sanctions, both in the UK and in its overseas territories, to ensure they effectively deter serious human rights violations, and are used to make funds available to victims."
Yadanar Maung, Justice for Myanmar’s spokesperson, said: “Cornerstone Resources’ substantial business with Myanmar Economic Corporation, in apparent breach of UK sanctions, supports a corrupt conglomerate that enriches a murderous military and its war criminal leadership. Cornerstone’s ongoing business in Myanmar have been enabled by Australia’s failure to sanction mining enterprises that are illegally controlled by the junta, and which help finance its ongoing atrocities against the people. Australia needs to stop making excuses and sanction the junta’s sources of funds and arms, including state-owned enterprises.
“The UK should urgently sanction junta-controlled mining enterprises to prevent companies registered in the UK and its overseas territories from financing the junta’s international crimes.”
Melissa Chen, Senior Lawyer, Australian Centre for International Justice, said: "The imposition of sanctions against individuals and entities who support Myanmar’s illegal military junta is only one step towards accountability.
“To have real impact, these sanctions must be effectively enforced in order to cut off the junta’s financing and deter those responsible for the devastating human rights violations and atrocity crimes that continue to be perpetrated in Myanmar.”..."
Source/publisher:
Justice For Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2023-11-20
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
179.59 KB
more
Description:
"Justice For Myanmar welcomes the latest round of targeted sanctions imposed against the illegal Myanmar military junta, its cronies and arms brokers, coordinated between Canada, the UK and USA.
The sanctions, announced on October 31, 2023, were significant in targeting the junta’s sources of funds, arms, equipment, and jet fuel, but more sanctions and better coordination are needed to disrupt the junta’s ability to continue its campaign of terror against the people of Myanmar.
Priorities include full sanctions on Myanma Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE), sanctions on junta-controlled mining enterprises, a ban on the sale of jet fuel to Myanmar, action against banks that the junta uses to channel funds and purchase arms, and coordinated sanctions against whole networks of junta cronies and arms dealers. Details of sanctions targets are on the Justice For Myanmar website.
We remain dismayed at the lack of action by Australia, Japan, New Zealand, Singapore and South Korea to impose sanctions in response to the military’s coup attempt and ongoing war crimes and crimes against humanity, and urge these countries to act now. Many of the latest sanctions targets maintain business links to Singapore. We call on the Singaporean government to do more to block the junta’s access to funds, arms, equipment and jet fuel.
Since the military’s illegal coup attempt, more than 4,100 people have been killed by the junta and over 25,000 arrested. In the face of mass, nationwide resistance to its coup attempt by the people of Myanmar, the junta has intensified indiscriminate aerial attacks, shelling, mass arbitrary arrests, torture, rape, the destruction of whole communities and forced displacement.
International action needs to be ramped up urgently to stop the junta’s atrocities and support the Myanmar people’s struggle for federal democracy.
Sanctions imposed this week that target the junta’s sources of funds, arms, equipment and jet fuel, along with previous designations that remain in force, include:
Myanma Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE): A state-owned enterprise illegally controlled by the junta and targeted by the USA for the first time with a directive against the direct and indirect provision of financial services, which will go into force on December 15. This follows a sustained campaign by Myanmar people, civil society and allies.
The financial services directive is an important step to disrupt the flow of funds to the junta but falls short of full sanctions that would freeze MOGE’s assets and block all trade with the junta-controlled state-owned enterprise.
MOGE was previously sanctioned by the EU.
Mining Enterprise No. 1 (ME1) and Mining Enterprise No. 2 (ME2): State-owned enterprises illegally controlled by the junta and sanctioned by Canada. ME1 and ME2 monopolise the mining sector, receive a share of revenue from private mining companies, and funnel large amounts of revenue to the junta.
ME1 and ME2 were previously sanctioned by the USA and EU.
International Group of Entrepreneur Services Company Limited (IGE): A crony company sanctioned by the UK for its business with the Myanmar military, which is a subsidiary of International Group of Entrepreneur Company Limited. IGE Group is a crony conglomerate led by Ne Aung, the son of former junta minister Aung Thaung and brother of junta navy chief Moe Aung. IGE has deep business links with the military, including through the Lotte Hotel, developed on land leased from the Office of the Quartermaster General of the Myanmar Army, as reported by Justice For Myanmar.
IGE Group has at least three companies that remain registered in Singapore: IGE Pte Ltd, UNOG Pte Ltd and IPL Pte Ltd.
International Group of Entrepreneur Company Limited was previously sanctioned by the EU.
Shwe Byain Phyu Group and Thein Win Zaw: Shwe Byain Phyu Group is a crony conglomerate founded by Thein Win Zaw, who is the group’s chairperson. Both were sanctioned by Canada. Shwe Byain Phyu bought Telenor Myanmar, renamed ATOM Myanmar, providing the junta with enhanced surveillance capabilities and access to personal data. Justice For Myanmar has exposed the business interests of Shwe Byain Phyu Group and Thein Win Zaw.
Shwe Byain Phyu has a company in Singapore, Investcom Pte Ltd, which remains registered.
Shwe Byain Phyu Group and Thein Win Zaw have been sanctioned for the first time.
Star Sapphire Group of Companies, Star Sapphire Trading Company Limited, Tun Min Latt and Win Min Soe: All sanctioned by Canada, the group has multiple businesses that generate funds for the Myanmar military, including a casino, a hotel and mining. Star Sapphire Group of Companies and its subsidiary, Star Sapphire Trading, has been a key supplier of arms and equipment to the Myanmar military from Israel and China in particular. The group is owned by Tun Min Latt and Win Min Soe, who are a married couple and are close associates of junta head Min Aung Hlaing and his children. Tun Min Latt is in custody in Thailand on drug trafficking and money laundering charges. Star Sapphire Group’s business with the Myanmar military and links with Min Aung Hlaing’s family have been exposed by Justice For Myanmar.
Star Sapphire group has a company in Singapore, Star Sapphire Group Pte Ltd, which remains registered.
Star Sapphire Group of Companies and Tun Min Latt were previously sanctioned by the UK and USA. The USA also previously sanctioned Star Sapphire Trading Company Limited and Win Min Soe.
Cargo Link Petroleum Logistics Company Limited and Khin Phyu Win: Cargo Link Petroleum Logistics (formerly Cargo Link Pongrawe Logistics Company Limited), sanctioned by Canada, is part of the Shoon group of companies (formerly Asia Sun). Shoon group is the junta’s main partner in the import, storage and distribution of jet fuel. The group is led by Khin Phyu Win, also sanctioned by Canada. Cargo Link Petroleum Logistics is the junta’s main transporter of jet fuel to military bases and airports across Myanmar. The role of Cargo Link Petroleum Logistics and Khin Phyu Win in supply jet fuel to the Myanmar military has been exposed by Amnesty International and Justice For Myanmar.
Shoon group has three companies that remain registered in Singapore: Shoon Energy Pte Ltd, P.E.I. Energy Pte Ltd and PEIA Pte Ltd.
Cargo Link Petroleum Logistics was previously sanctioned by the US, and its parent company, Cargo Link Company Limited, was previously sanctioned by the UK. Khin Phyu Win was previously sanctioned by the USA and UK.
Canada continues to lead in measures to stop the junta’s access to jet fuel, which it needs to continue to carry out indiscriminate airstrikes. On October 31, Canada expanded its ban on the sale of jet fuel to include a prohibition on shipping insurance for the transport of jet fuel to Myanmar.
Sky Aviator Company Limited, Heli Eagle Company Limited, Sky Royal Hero Limited, Kyaw Min Oo and Myo Min Oo: Major suppliers of aviation equipment to the Myanmar military and all sanctioned by Canada, Sky Aviator is owned by Kyaw Min Oo and the linked company, Heli Eagle, is owned by Myo Min Oo, who is his brother, according to Justice For Myanmar sources. Kyaw Min Oo was also sanctioned by the UK. Since the illegal coup attempt, Sky Aviator has procured equipment from Russia and Ukraine, including YAK-130 support equipment, engines and parts. The Yak-130 is increasingly deployed by the military within populated areas, including in the catastrophic indiscriminate bombing of Pazigyi village, Kantabulu township, Sagaing Region, killing at least 168 people, including children, in the deadliest airstrike since the military’s attempted coup. Sky Aviator’s business with the Myanmar military has been exposed by Justice For Myanmar and the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar.
Heli Eagle and Sky Royal Hero have supplied equipment to the Myanmar military following the coup attempt, according to the UN Special Rapporteur on Myanmar. Sky Aviator and Heli Eagle are both registered suppliers of the Myanmar military’s Directorate of Procurement and share phone numbers and an email address. According to the UN Special Rapporteur, Sky Royal Hero has a trading relationship with Sky Aviator.
Sky Aviator was previously sanctioned by the EU, UK and USA. Kyaw Min Oo was previously sanctioned by the USA and EU. Heli Eagle, Sky Royal Hero and Myo Min Oo have been sanctioned for the first time.
Myanmar New Era Trading Company Limited and Naing Htut Aung: Myanmar New Era Trading is a significant supplier of aircraft parts for the Myanmar military from Russia that was sanctioned by Canada. Import data confirms the company’s procurement for the military of parts for Mi-17 (Mi-8M) helicopters from Russia between 2017 and 2020. The Mi- 17 helicopter is frequently used by the junta in its commission of war crimes, including in the 16 September 2022 attack on Let Yet Kone village when the junta indiscriminately bombed a school and a monastery. Myanmar New Era Trading Company Limited is part of the network of International Gateways Group, a major arms broker led by Naing Htut Aung, who was also sanctioned by Canada. Myanmar New Era Trading and the International Gateways Group network has been exposed by Justice For Myanmar and the UN Special Rapporteur on Myanmar.
There are at least two companies in Naing Htut Aung’s network that remain registered in Singapore: Global Polytech Resources Pte Ltd and Xinshidai Company Pte. Ltd.
Myanmar New Era Trading was previously sanctioned by the UK. Naing Htut Aung was previously sanctioned by the USA and EU.
Miya Win International: A private arms broker and sanctioned by Canada, Miya Win International has procured unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and parts from Austria’s Schiebel Corporation, including after the military’s coup attempt. In addition, Miya Win International has played a key role in the military’s deal with the Austrian company Diamond Aircraft Industries, a Chinese-owned company with a facility in Canada, to set up local assembly and production of DART-450 aerial reconnaissance aircraft in Myanmar. Evidence of Miya Win International’s business with Schiebel Corporation and Diamond Aircraft Industries has been exposed by Justice For Myanmar has been exposed by Justice For Myanmar.
Miya Win International was previously sanctioned by the UK.
Creative Exploration Limited: An arms broker sanctioned by Canada that has imported fuses from India to the Myanmar military, including since the attempted coup, which has been exposed by Justice For Myanmar. Creative Exploration was formerly known as My Space or mySpace. The company has also imported digital forensics technology from the USA.
Creative Exploration Limited has been sanctioned for the first time.
Life and Challenge Company Limited: A supplier of technology, equipment and training to the Myanmar military and its police that was sanctioned by Canada. In 2018, Life and Challenge was awarded a contract to design and deliver a radar capability development program for the Myanmar military. Life and Challenge’s business with the military has been exposed by Justice For Myanmar.
Life and Challenge has a company in Singapore, LANC Pte Ltd, which remains registered.
Life and Challenge has been sanctioned for the first time.
Synpex Shwe Company Limited: An arms broker sanctioned by Canada, the company has procured material from Russia for the Myanmar Air Force following the military’s coup attempt, and is also a supplier of raw materials for the military’s domestic arms manufacturing industry. Synpex Shwe’s involvement in the supply of arms to the Myanmar military has been exposed by Justice For Myanmar and the UN Special Rapporteur on Myanmar.
Synpex Shwe has a company in Singapore, Synergy Tripexin Pte Lte, which remains registered.
Synpex Shwe was previously sanctioned by the UK.
Suntac Group of Companies, Suntac Technologies Company Limited, Suntac International Trading Company Limited and Sit Taing Aung: Suntac Group of Companies was sanctioned by Canada, while Suntac Technologies Company Limited and Suntac International Trading Company Limited were sanctioned by the USA for supplying equipment to the Myanmar military. Suntac Group of Companies is owned by Sit Taing Aung, who was also sanctioned by the UK. Sit Taing Aung is Mexico’s Honorary Consul to Myanmar. Sit Taing Aung and Suntac’s involvement in the procurement of aircraft parts has been exposed by Justice For Myanmar and the UN Special Rapporteur on Myanmar, and Suntac’s involvement in the military’s arms manufacturing industry has been exposed by the Special Advisory Council for Myanmar.
Sit Taing Aung was previously sanctioned by the USA, Canada and EU.
Mottama Holdings Limited and Min Dhama Steel Structures Limited: Mottama Holdings is a crony conglomerate and, together with its subsidiary, Min Dhama Steel Structures, was sanctioned by Canada. The companies supply the Myanmar military’s domestic arms industry with raw materials and machinery, as exposed by the Special Advisory Council for Myanmar and the UN Special Rapporteur on Myanmar. Evidence received by Justice For Myanmar reveals the involvement of Min Dhama Steel Structures in importing steel for the construction of the so-called Honorary Hall of the Residence of the State Administration Council.
Mottama Holdings and Min Dhama Steel Structures have been sanctioned for the first time.
Bhone Min Myat Company Limited and Ever Meter Company Limited: The two companies sanctioned by Canada are used by the military conglomerate Myanma Economic Holdings Limited (MEHL) to evade international sanctions, according to reporting by Myanmar Now. Bhone Min Myat was established after the military’s coup attempt, reportedly as a front for the MEHL subsidiary, Myawaddy Trading, and has been used to import fuel and palm oil. Ever Meter Company Limited, part of Same Sky Group of Companies, is an MEHL partner that it has used as a front for payments, according to the UN Special Rapporteur on Myanmar. Ever Meter has been a long-time supplier of electricity meters for MEHL.
Bhone Min Myat and Ever Meter have been sanctioned for the first time.
Pye Phyo Tay Za and Htoo Htet Tay Za: The two sons of Tay Za were sanctioned by the UK for their involvement in Htoo Group of Companies, which has multiple businesses with the Myanmar military and its conglomerates. Htoo Htet Tay Za was also sanctioned by Canada, which had previously sanctioned Pye Phyo Tay Za. Htoo Group’s business with the Myanmar military and the role of Pye Phyo Tay Za and Htoo Htet Tay Za have been detailed by Justice For Myanmar.
The two brothers were also previously sanctioned by the USA.
Myo Thitsar: A director of the Myanmar military arms broker, Dynasty International Company Limited, who has been sanctioned by the UK. Dynasty International is a major arms broker of the Myanmar military from Belarus in particular. Among other dirty deals, the company has imported spare parts for Mi-17 helicopters. The company is led by Aung Moe Myint, who is the Honorary Consul of Belarus to Myanmar. Dynasty International’s business with the Myanmar military has been exposed by Justice For Myanmar.
Dynasty International has a company in Singapore, Dynasty Excellency Pte Ltd, which remains registered.
Myo Thitsar was previously sanctioned by the USA and Canada..."
Source/publisher:
Justice For Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2023-11-03
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Language:
Local URL:
more
Sub-title:
Stronger Enforcement Needed to Stem Funding of Abusive Military
Description:
"The United States government has imposed a ban on financial transactions involving the Myanmar state-owned oil company, the Myanma Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE), in a long overdue move aimed at stanching the junta’s atrocities.
MOGE’s natural gas projects generate over US$1 billion annually for the Myanmar junta, its single largest source of foreign revenue. Since the February 2021 coup, that flow of funding has underwritten crimes against humanity and war crimes carried out by the junta across the country.
Unlike other junta-controlled entities that the US has sanctioned since the coup, MOGE wasn’t added to the Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) list, which blocks trade, assets, and access to the US banking system. Instead, the US Treasury Department issued a directive prohibiting persons and companies under the jurisdiction of the US from directly or indirectly providing financial services to MOGE, including deposits, transfers, loans, insurance, investments, foreign exchange, and other services. The ban goes into effect on December 15.
“Through the issuance of a financial services directive against MOGE, the United States seeks to disrupt the regime’s access to the US financial system and curtail its ability to perpetrate atrocities,” Secretary of State Antony Blinken said in an October 31 statement.
This sanctions action belatedly follows the European Union’s sanctioning of MOGE in February 2022, which led the Bank of China to advise operators of the Shwe gas field in the Bay of Bengal that it would no longer handle payments in euros to MOGE, reportedly moving the funds to escrow accounts.
Chevron, MOGE’s only US partner, announced in February it was selling its 41.1 percent stake in the country’s Yadana gas project to the Canadian firm MTI Energy.
Lax enforcement of the existing sanctions regime has sustained the junta’s flow of weapons and funds, enabling its escalating brutality against Myanmar’s civilian population. Airstrikes in some regions have increased more than 300 percent in the past year.
The US also announced additional sanctions on five individuals and three entities involved in the junta’s abuses, in coordination with Canada and the United Kingdom, a positive step. Broad coordination and rigorous enforcement of sanctions are crucial for raising economic costs that the junta can’t ignore..."
Source/publisher:
Human Rights Watch (USA)
Date of entry/update:
2023-11-01
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"In a coordinated action yesterday, the United States, UK, and Canada each announced an array of new Myanmar sanctions. The sanctions include restrictions by the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) on transactions with the state-owned Myanma Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE), as well as designations on entities and individuals connected to Myanmar’s military junta.
Oliver Windridge, Director of Illicit Finance Policy at The Sentry, said: “We welcome the adoption by the US Treasury Department of additional sanctions that restrict the Myanmar military's access to funds and equipment it uses to conduct a brutal war against its people. The MOGE Financial Services Directive is especially significant as it will hinder substantial flows of foreign exchange earnings from reaching the military's coffers. Coordinated sanctions on networks of arms dealers that enable the military's war effort are also a positive development. We call on the US to continue its efforts in coordination with like-minded partners to use financial tools of pressure to weaken the military and ensure that the Myanmar people prevail."
Yadanar Maung, Justice For Myanmar spokesperson, said: "The US Financial Services directive against MOGE is a welcome step to disrupt the single biggest source of foreign revenue to the junta. This comes after a sustained campaign from Myanmar people and allies for action against MOGE. The US should continue to target the junta’s sources of funds through full sanctions on MOGE that would freeze its assets and block all trade with it, including from the international oilfield service companies that are supporting the maintenance and expansion of gas fields which finance atrocities. Moreover, it is positive to see increased coordination between Canada, the UK and US targeting the junta, its cronies and arms brokers. As the junta continues to wage a campaign of terror against the people of Myanmar, it is crucial that governments ratchet up sanctions to block the junta’s access to funds, arms, and jet fuel.”
For media inquiries or interview requests for The Sentry, please contact: Greg Hittelman, Director of Communications, [email protected]
For media inquiries for Justice For Myanmar, please contact: Yadanar Maung, Spokesperson, [email protected]
About Justice For Myanmar
Justice For Myanmar is a covert group of activists using research, data visualisation, and reporting to expose and dismantle the business networks that fuel brutality, corruption and mass-scale suffering. One report at a time, Justice For Myanmar is going after the military’s sources of funds and arms. As a result of its work and the work of many others across Myanmar and the world, multinational corporations have already divested hundreds of millions of dollars from business with the military, and targeted sanctions are beginning to disrupt the Myanmar military cartel’s global network.
About The Sentry
(Short descriptor for press use: “The Sentry, an investigative organization that tracks corruption”)
The Sentry is an investigative and policy organization that seeks to disable multinational predatory networks that benefit from violent conflict, repression, and kleptocracy. Pull back the curtain on wars, mass atrocities, and other human rights abuses, and you’ll find grand corruption and unchecked greed. These tragedies persist because the perpetrators rarely face meaningful consequences. The Sentry aims to alter the warped incentive structures that continually undermine peace and good governance. Our investigations follow the money as it is laundered from war zones to financial centers around the world. We provide evidence and strategies for governments, banks, and law enforcement to hold the perpetrators and enablers of violence and corruption to account. These efforts provide new leverage for human rights, peace, and anti-corruption efforts..."
Source/publisher:
Justice For Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2023-11-01
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Business and the Military, Sanctions, The Burmese military's role in the economy, Oil and gas
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
110.9 KB
more
Description:
"News release
October 31, 2023 - Ottawa, Canada - Global Affairs Canada
The Honourable Mélanie Joly, Minister of Foreign Affairs, today announced that Canada, in coordination with the United Kingdom and the United States, is imposing sanctions against 39 individuals and 22 entities under the Special Economic Measures (Burma) Regulations in response to the February 1, 2021, military coup d’état that saw Myanmar’s democratically elected government overthrown by a military regime.
These additional measures come as part of a broader strategy seeking to exert coordinated, sequenced and targeted pressure on the Myanmar military regime while mitigating adverse impacts on civilians. Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States unequivocally condemn the military coup d’état against the democratically elected government of Myanmar and support the aspirations of the Myanmar people to a peaceful, inclusive and democratic future.
Today’s announcement builds on previous sanctions and diplomatic efforts to end the sale and transfer of arms to the military regime. It comes in response to the regime’s ongoing and worsening aerial attacks, including against civilians and civilian infrastructure, as well as mass arson, the razing of villages, arbitrary detentions, executions, torture, mutilations, and mass killings of civilians, all of which have deepened the interlinked humanitarian, political and economic crises in Myanmar. The collective actions taken by Canada and its allies aim to maximize concerted pressure on the regime to reverse course and limit its access to key resources and revenue to fuel its violence. The sanctioned individuals and entities have been identified as performing key functions on behalf of the military regime, supplying weapons, resources and revenue, and those that are responsible for democratic reversals. Canada is also expanding its prohibition on the sale of aviation fuel to include a ban on the provision of shipping insurance for the transportation of aviation fuel to Myanmar.
Canada remains committed to ending impunity and to holding the Myanmar regime accountable for serious violations of international law, including against the Rohingya people.
Canada reiterates its support for the people of Myanmar and their aspirations to an inclusive and democratic society and continues to call for the immediate end of violence, the release of detainees and immediate and unrestricted humanitarian access to the region. Collectively, the international community must continue to employ all diplomatic tools at its disposal to address the worsening situation in Myanmar, as well as its regional implications..."
Source/publisher:
Government of Canada
Date of entry/update:
2023-10-31
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"U.S. Takes Coordinated Action with Canada and the United Kingdom
WASHINGTON – Today, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) published a new directive that prohibits certain financial services by U.S. persons to or for the benefit of Myanma Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE). This sanctions action against MOGE seeks to degrade the regime’s ability to purchase weapons to carry out atrocities against the people of Burma. Additionally, OFAC designated three entities and five individuals connected to Burma’s military regime pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 14014. These actions are occurring in alignment with designations by both the United Kingdom and Canada.
Since the military coup in 2021, Burma’s military regime has repeatedly harmed civilians in air strikes, suppressed pro-democracy movements, destroyed homes and infrastructure, and displaced millions of people, among other appalling acts. The sanctions announced today target companies and individuals, including government officials and military cronies, who perpetuate or facilitate the brutal violence in Burma. The military regime officials and supporters that Treasury is designating today have also been, designated by at least the United Kingdom, Canada, or the European Union. These actions are a part of the ongoing, unified strategy of the United States and our partners to combat the Burma military regime’s atrocities.
“Today’s action, taken in coordination with Canada and the United Kingdom, maintains our collective pressure on Burma’s military and denies the regime access to arms and supplies necessary to commit its violent acts,” said Under Secretary of the Treasury for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence Brian E. Nelson. “Collectively, we remain committed to degrading the regime’s evasion tactics and continuing to hold the regime accountable for its violence.”
FINANCIAL SERVICES DIRECTIVE
Today, OFAC is issuing Directive 1 under E.O. 14014, “Prohibitions Related to Financial Services to or for the Benefit of Myanma Oil and Gas Enterprise” (the “MOGE Financial Services Directive”), which prohibits U.S. persons from the provision, exportation, or re-exportation, directly or indirectly, of financial services to or for the benefit of MOGE or its property or interests in property. These prohibitions will take effect on December 15, 2023.
MOGE is a Burmese state-owned enterprise involved in the extraction, production, and distribution of oil and gas in Burma and administers large offshore oil and gas fields through lucrative joint ventures with foreign entities. MOGE was previously designated by the European Union on February 21, 2022, and remains the largest single source of foreign revenue for Burma’s military regime, providing hundreds of millions of dollars each year. OFAC’s action today builds on previous designation actions against MOGE leadership and seeks to further restrict the regime’s access to U.S. dollars, which it uses to procure weapons and other equipment from abroad. This action will limit the regime’s ability to carry out violent attacks against its own citizens.
For more information about the MOGE Financial Services Directive, click here.
SUPPORTERS OF BURMA’S MILITARY REGIME
Today’s action targets three entities who have assisted the military regime in its continued importation of arms, dual-use goods, and other materials, including from sanctioned entities in Russia and other countries. Since the coup, the total value of imports by the Burmese military is estimated to exceed $1 billion. These imports have facilitated the military regime’s ongoing brutality against on the people of Burma. OFAC’s actions today further align our measures with partners and allies to disrupt the regime’s military supply chain, complicate its ability to maintain and repair its weapons, and reduce the regime’s access to imported arms and materiel.
Sky Royal Hero Company Limited is a Burmese entity which contracted repair work from sanctioned Russian entities and has a known relationship with the Burmese defense procurement company, Sky Aviator Company Limited. Sky Aviator Company Limited was designated by OFAC on November 8, 2022 for operating in the defense sector of the Burmese economy.
Sky Royal Hero Company Limited is being designated pursuant to E.O. 14014 for operating in the defense sector of the Burmese economy.
Suntac Technologies Company Limited and Suntac International Trading Company Limited are both part of Sit Taing Aung’s Suntac Group of Companies. Sit Taing Aung, who has close ties to the Burmese military, uses his companies to supply equipment and material to the army, and was designated by OFAC on March 25, 2022, for operating in the defense sector of the Burmese economy.
Suntac Technologies Company Limited and Suntac International Trading Company Limitedare being designated pursuant to E.O. 14014 for being owned or controlled by, or acting for or purporting to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Sit Taing Aung.
Sky Royal Hero Company Limited, Suntac Technologies Company Limited and Suntac International Trading Company Limited are also concurrently being designated by Canada today.
BURMA REGIME OFFICIALS
Following the February 2021 coup, the Burma military regime appointed new officials and officers throughout the government. In their roles, these individuals and others constitute part of the military regime that seized power and overthrew democratically elected leaders in Burma. Today’s action targets five such military regime appointed officials and officers.
Charlie Than was appointed as the Union Minister of the Ministry of Industry in May 2021. Kan Zaw has been the Union Minister of the Ministry of Investment and Foreign Economic Relations since August 2022. Swe Swe Aung was appointed as the Director General of the Prosecution of Department, Ministry of Legal affairs on March 31, 2022. Zaw Min was appointed as the Director General of the Prison Department, Ministry of Home affairs on February 4, 2021. Under his leadership, detainees in Burma’s prisons have been subject to torture, beating, and other inhumane treatment. All four of these individuals were appointed directly by Min Aung Hlaing’s State Administration Council and have been sanctioned by the European Union.
Charlie Than, Kan Zaw, Swe Swe Aung, and Zaw Min are being designated pursuant to E.O. 14014 for being leaders or officials of the Government of Burma on or after February 2, 2021.
Additionally, Maung Maung Aye has been the Chief of General Staff for the Burmese Army, Navy, and Air Force since February 2021. In this role, he holds the third most senior position in the Burmese military. Maung Maung Aye is being sanctioned by Canada today and has been sanctioned by the European Union.
Maung Maung Aye is being designated pursuant to E.O. 14014 for being a leader or official of the military or security forces of Burma, or successor entity to any of the foregoing.
SANCTIONS IMPLICATIONS
As a result of today’s designations pursuant to E.O. 14014, all property and interests in property of the three entities and five individuals named above that are in the United States, or in the possession or control of U.S. persons, are blocked and must be reported to OFAC. In addition, any entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, 50 percent or more by one or more blocked persons are also blocked.
Separately, on or after December 15, U.S. persons are prohibited from providing, exporting, or reexporting, directly or indirectly, financial services to or for the benefit of MOGE or its property or interests in property.
Unless authorized by a general or specific license issued by OFAC, or otherwise exempt, OFAC’s regulations generally prohibit all transactions by U.S. persons or within (or transiting) the United States that involve any property or interests in property of designated or otherwise blocked persons. The prohibitions include the making of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services by, to, or for the benefit of any blocked person or the receipt of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services from any such person.
The power and integrity of OFAC sanctions derive not only from OFAC’s ability to designate and add persons to the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (SDN) List but also from its willingness to remove persons from the SDN List consistent with the law. The ultimate goal of sanctions is not to punish but to bring about a positive change in behavior..."
Source/publisher:
U.S. Department of the Treasury
Date of entry/update:
2023-10-31
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Language:
Local URL:
more
Sub-title:
The UK, US and Canada have coordinated new sanctions on Myanmar military financiers and arms dealers.
Description:
"UK, US and Canada announce further round of sanctions to maximise pressure on the Myanmar military regime
sanctions target arms dealers responsible for the supply of restricted goods to the security forces, as well as financiers of the military
UK reiterates calls for accountability and a return to democracy and freedom in Myanmar
The UK, US and Canada are today (31 October) announcing further sanctions on arms dealers and financiers of the Myanmar military responsible for the repression of the civilian population in Myanmar. The latest round of UK sanctions are against 5 individuals and one entity involved either in providing financial services to the regime or the supply of restricted goods including aircraft parts.
Today’s sanctions package comes as part of the UK’s concerted efforts with international partners to restrict the sale and transfer of arms and finance in response to ongoing and worsening aerial attacks, including against civilians in Myanmar. In 2022, alone there were over 600 reported airstrikes perpetrated by the Myanmar military.
Since the coup in February 2021, at least 3,857 have been killed by the military, and at least 1.2 million have had to flee their homes due to violence, according to the United Nations Human Rights Office.
The announcement follows a report from UN Special Rapporteur Tom Andrews, which called for further coordinated sanctions to prevent arms dealers bypassing restrictions.
Minister for the Indo-Pacific, Anne-Marie Trevelyan, said:
The UK unequivocally condemns the regime’s brutal campaign against the Myanmar people.
Together with our international partners, we are closing the net on Myanmar arms dealers and the Myanmar military’s financiers with new sanctions that will aim to limit their access to key resources and revenue to prevent further such attacks.
The UK will continue to call for accountability, justice and an end to the violence. We remain steadfast in our support for the Myanmar people and their aspirations for a peaceful and democratic future.
On 1 February 2021, the Myanmar military overthrew the democratically elected government, led by Aung San Suu Kyi, and installed a military regime. Since then, they have used violence and atrocities to maintain power and suppress any opposition voices.
The UK, US and Canada have taken coordinated and targeted action to hold the military regime to account for their brutal suppression of opposition voices. The sanctions designations announced today will maximise concerted pressure on the Myanmar military regime to engage with calls for a return to democracy and aim to limit regime access to key resources while minimising consequences for the civilian population.
Since the coup, the UK has designated 25 individuals and 29 entities under the Myanmar Sanctions Regime and designated the military’s 2 key conglomerates and their 111 subsidiaries under the Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime. The UK continues to lead international efforts to undermine the regime’s credibility and constrain their access to revenue and arms.
Background
Those sanctioned today are:
Myo Thitsar: has been involved in the repression of the civilian population in Myanmar through the supply to Myanmar of restricted goods. Namely, through her role as having been Head of Department, Procurement & Supply of Dynasty International
Htoo Htet Tay Za: has been involved in the repression of the civilian population in Myanmar through the supply to Myanmar of restricted goods and/or restricted technology, and/or of material related to such goods or technology, and through making available funds or economic resources to the Myanmar security forces. Namely, through his role as having been a director of Htoo Group of Companies
Pye Phyo Tay Za: has been involved in the repression of the civilian population in Myanmar through the supply to Myanmar of restricted goods and/or restricted technology, and/or of material related to such goods or technology, and through making available funds or other economic resources to the Myanmar security forces. Namely, through his role in Myanmar Avia Services, Yangon Aircraft Engineering Company Limited and Htoo Group of Companies
Kyaw Min Oo: has been involved in the repression of the civilian population in Myanmar through the supply to Myanmar of restricted goods and/or restricted technology, and/or of material related to such goods or technology. Namely, through his role as director of Sky Aviator Company Limited
Sit Taing Aung: has been involved in the repression of the civilian population in Myanmar through the supply to Myanmar of restricted goods and/or restricted technology, and/or of material related to such goods or technology. Namely, through his role as having been director of Yatanarpon Aviation Services and work with Mottama Holdings
International Group of Entrepreneur Services Company Limited (IGE): has been involved in the repression of the civilian population in Myanmar through making available funds or other economic resources to the Myanmar security forces
Asset freeze
An asset freeze prevents any UK citizen, or any business in the UK, from dealing with any funds or economic resources which are owned, held or controlled by the designated person. It also prevents funds or economic resources being provided to or for the benefit of the designated person. UK financial sanctions apply to all persons within the territory and territorial sea of the UK and to all UK persons, wherever they are in the world.
Travel ban
A travel ban means that the designated person must be refused leave to enter or to remain in the United Kingdom, providing the individual is an excluded person under section 8B of the Immigration Act 1971..."
Source/publisher:
Govt. UK (London)
Date of entry/update:
2023-10-31
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"Dear Government of Singapore,
The signatories of people of Myanmar[1], signed by over 27,700 (included from ground 1,314) individuals and endorsed by (430) local and international organizations from across the world, are writing to the government of Singapore.
The brutal and illegal Myanmar military junta has been relying on Singapore for funds and the supply of arms, equipment, technology, and jet fuel, enabling its ongoing attacks against the people.
Since February 1, 2021, the junta has been waging a campaign of terror with indiscriminate airstrikes and shelling, murder, torture, arbitrary detention, rape and the destruction of homes and food supplies.
The UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar recently revealed[2] that Singapore is the third biggest supplier of arms and equipment[3] to the Myanmar military since its coup attempt, in a trade valued at $254 million from at least 138 Singaporean companies.
Singapore also remains a major business center for the military’s cronies. Some, like Tay Za[4] and Naing Htut Aung[5], enjoy lavish lifestyles in the city state while profiting from the destruction of Myanmar lives.
Despite UK and US sanctions, Shoon Group of Companies are continuing to operate in Singapore, supplying the junta with jet fuel[6] that it needs to wage aerial warfare against the people.
It is clear that from Singapore, businesses are transacting with the Myanmar military and conglomerates, enriching war criminals and supporting their international crimes[7]. But this can and must be stopped.
Singapore has committed to investigate companies supplying arms and dual use goods, and United Overseas Bank (UOB) has recently imposed restrictions[8] on transactions involving Myanmar. Singapore needs to now do more to help stop the junta’s campaign of terror.
We call on Singapore to:
1) Introduce sanctions to stop the direct and indirect transfer of arms, dual-use goods, technology, jet fuel, and related transactions, to the Myanmar military,
2) Utilise money laundering provisions and impose sanctions to ensure the illegal junta cannot access the Singapore financial system, including the USD 4.6 billion of funds that belong to the Government of Myanmar,
3) Expedite and make public ongoing investigations into Singaporean companies that have supplied arms, dual-use goods and technology to the Myanmar military.
#DoMoreSingapore
Respectfully,
Signed by the people of Myanmar, (430 orgs) local and international organizations, including (10) local organizations that have chosen not to disclose their names because the junta continues violence in Myanmar..."
Source/publisher:
430 local and international organizations via Justice For Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2023-10-29
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Business and the Military, The Burmese military's role in the economy, Oil and gas, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Format :
pdf pdf
Size:
280.92 KB 299.32 KB
more
Description:
"The German state prosecutor’s office in Ravensburg has launched a criminal investigation into ND SatCom GmbH for supplying communications equipment to the Myanmar military, including after its illegal coup attempt.
The criminal investigation follows a complaint filed by German Solidarity with Myanmar Democracy e. V. with the attorney Holger Rothbauer, based on evidence and research provided by Justice For Myanmar. The opening of the investigation was first reported by ZDF frontal and Spiegel.
ND SatCom is a German satellite communications corporation based in Immenstaad that, according to its website, “provides all the core competencies necessary for the design, turnkey delivery and logistic support of military satcom systems”. The company is owned by Steffen Görig, a German entrepreneur who acquired it from Airbus in 2014. ND SatCom has subsidiaries in China and Dubai.
Since at least 2016, ND SatCom has provided significant support for the Myanmar Army’s satellite communications system, including 5G satellite communications hardware and software for use in the army’s Meiktila hub, fixed station and manpack systems.
In 2017, as the Myanmar military was committing genocide against the Rohingya, ND SatCom listed a SKYWAN Communications on the Move (COTM) system for Myanmar in the defence section of a webpage titled, “Why ND SatCom was so successful in 2017”. The page has since been taken offline.
ND SatCom equipment has been sent from Vietnam to the Myanmar military as recently as October 2021, following the military’s illegal coup attempt, when satellite modems were shipped to the army’s Directorate of Procurement.
Leaked and open-source evidence shows that equipment was brokered by the private Myanmar company Terabit Wave Company Limited, a subsidiary of the crony A1 Group of Companies, in partnership with the Vietnamese company, OSB Investment and Technology JSC (“OSB”). OSB claims to be a leader in defence communications and has its own research and development program.
Terabit Wave and OSB operate a joint venture in Myanmar, Com & Com Company Limited, which provides military and civilian satellite services, including the maintenance of ND SatCom equipment for the Myanmar Army’s Directorate of Signals.
In 2019, ND SatCom appointed Terabit Wave as its dealer to sell satellite communications equipment in Myanmar, and to negotiate and sign contracts. The authorisation was part of a 2019 contract between Terabit Wave and the Myanmar Army’s Directorate of Procurement that also involved Com & Com, which was leaked to Justice For Myanmar.
ND Satcom equipment has been supplied to the Myanmar military via the Singapore companies Bright Sky Pte. Ltd. and Interspace Engineering Service Pte. Ltd. Bright Sky Group, a subsidiary of A1 Group of Companies, was struck off in 2023, after it was named as an arms broker by Justice For Myanmar. Interspace Engineering Service is owned by Nguyen Hong Son, who is the co-founder, chairperson and chief executive officer of OSB and a director of Com & Com.
Justice For Myanmar calls for sanctions against A1 Group of Companies, OSB Investment and Technology JSC, and their directors and owners for their support to the Myanmar military and complicity in its international crimes.
Vietnam and Singapore, which are both ASEAN members and voted in favour of a UN General Assembly resolution calling on “all Member States to prevent the flow of arms to Myanmar”, should immediately end all transfers of arms, equipment, technology and funds to the junta.
Singapore should investigate Bright Sky Group and Interspace Engineering Service for supplying dual use goods to Myanmar through its territory.
Justice For Myanmar spokesperson Yadanar Maung says: “We welcome the opening of a criminal investigation into ND SatCom by the German public prosecutor’s office in Ravensburg.
“We urge German authorities to take swift action against ND SatCom and to cut off the Myanmar junta’s access to German equipment and technology.
“The Myanmar military is responsible for genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity, committed with total impunity, aided by ND SatCom communications technology.
“Satellite communications is essential for military command and control. In Myanmar, improved satellite communications capabilities from ND SatCom support the military’s indiscriminate killings, torture, rape, the razing of whole villages, the destruction of food and forced mass displacement.
“Prosecution is an important step towards accountability for the transfer of arms and dual use goods to the Myanmar military, and to prevent future arms transfers from Germany and the European Union, but they need to be widened to all companies involved in the illegal supply of arms and dual use goods to the Myanmar military.
“Both Germany and the EU have laws in place to prevent the transfer of arms and dual use goods to the genocidal Myanmar military, but governments have repeatedly failed to enforce them, enabling the military to gain access to equipment and technology that supports ongoing war crimes and crimes against humanity.
“Germany must show that breaches of the law will not be tolerated, and we call on other EU member states whose companies have illegally transferred arms, equipment and technology to investigate and hold them accountable.”..."
Source/publisher:
Justice For Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2023-10-18
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Language:
Format :
pdf pdf
Size:
151.67 KB 159.53 KB
more
Sub-title:
With sanctions on the rise, Myanmar’s military is increasingly under pressure and is turning to its few partners for additional support
Description:
"Myanmar’s military may finally be starting to feel the strain of international sanctions, with foreign banks freezing the accounts of Myanmar’s state-owned banks, limiting the junta’s ability to access critical foreign currency reserves. More than two and a half years on from the 2021 coup, the junta continues to rely on the political, military, and diplomatic support of authoritarian partners in Beijing and Moscow who have remained loyal to the generals despite ongoing international outcry and recent gains by Myanmar’s resistance. However, their patronage may not be sufficient for the generals to hold onto power as momentum on the battlefield shifts and overseas banks restrict the regime’s access to critical funds.
Sanctions Start to Bite
At a press conference in late August, the Myanmar military junta’s deputy finance minister Maung Maung Win blamed recent financial instability on U.S. sanctions, which he said were “hurting our government’s programs such as education, health, and infrastructure building…importers and exporters, any person or organizations using foreign banking services.”
The sanctions, announced by the U.S. in June, targeted Myanma Foreign Trade Bank (MFTB) and Myanma Investment and Commercial Bank (MICB), state-owned entities which essentially “function as foreign currency exchanges” for the military junta, allowing it to import arms and other military equipment. Analysts say that the sanctions are aimed at blocking the junta’s ability to conduct purchases in foreign currencies as well as receive incoming foreign currency transactions.
Two recent developments signal that the sanctions are beginning to have their desired effect of constraining the junta’s ability to generate and use cash. Firstly, Myanmar military-linked cronies are blatantly creating new entities to get around existing sanctions. A recently leaked letter from Myanmar’s energy ministry instructed the Central Bank of Myanmar to open new accounts to handle foreign currencies in place of Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE), which is under European sanctions and whose top leaders are sanctioned by the U.S. Treasury Department. On August 10, Shwe Byain Phyu Oil and Gas Co. Ltd., a subsidiary of Shwe Byain Phyu (SBP) conglomerate and a top supplier of fuel to Myanmar’s military, dissolved, presumably to evade sanctions. Its owner Thein Win Zaw holds shares in a number of companies already impacted by targeted sanctions imposed by the European Union, the United States, and the United Kingdom.
Secondly, foreign banks have begun to cut Myanmar state-owned banks’ access, depriving the junta of much-needed foreign currency reserves. In early August, Singapore’s United Overseas Bank (UOB) notified Myanmar banks that it would limit their access to funds and would only allow transactions between UOB accounts. The following week, a state-owned bank in Bangladesh announced it was freezing MFTB and MICB accounts comprising more than US $1 billion in assets. These moves have triggered further financial instability in Myanmar as the kyat continues to depreciate, with the Central Bank of Myanmar trading it well below the market value. Restricting the generals’ ability to use reserves in foreign bank accounts to acquire weapons will hurt their capacity to wage endless war and could give resistance forces the upper hand.
The Junta’s Strategy
The junta, or State Administration Council (SAC), has failed to restore investor confidence, and has been unable to quell resistance to its rule. It is now spread thin on the battlefield, and anecdotal evidence suggests that the junta is heavily reliant on aging Russian fighter jets to sustain its asymmetric advantage over resistance forces to mask its lack of control over territory on the ground.
Recent moves by Singapore and Bangladesh to cut the junta’s access to reserves may test its ability to outlast the nationwide grassroots uprising which seeks to oust the generals once and for all. Forced onto the defensive, the junta now relies on a limited network of supporters, most notably China, Russia, and India (as well as several authoritarian Southeast Asian states such as Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam), to prevent international consensus from forming which could threaten its hold on power.
This overarching strategy, born of a pragmatic acceptance of isolation, was captured in Deputy Senior General Soe Win’s response to a warning from UN Special Envoy Christine Schraner Burgener the month after the coup: “We have to learn to walk with only a few friends.”
The sit-tat, as Myanmar’s military is known, likes to signal its cool-headed preparedness and project its confidence to weather international condemnation and relative isolation. This strategy helps sustain the pretense in international diplomatic circles that the military will win in the long run and foreign governments will have to re-engage eventually. It simultaneously erodes resistance morale and undercuts the likelihood of further defections.
However, the regime’s confidence is in part based on a bluff which downplays the reality of its vulnerability. Concerted efforts by the international community to deprive the junta of access to financial assets have alarmed the military and underscore the extent to which it depends on a few authoritarian friends to avert regime collapse.
China’s Central Role in the Conflict
Beijing appears to have come around to fully backing Myanmar’s armed forces in the civil war, unable to envision a future scenario without them. China continues to provide the junta with the arms it requires to prolong the war. Despite a non-binding UN Resolution prohibiting the flow of weapons to the Myanmar military, a recent UN report found that Beijing in fact sold US $267 million worth of military equipment to Myanmar’s armed forces in 2022–2023.
China remains the country’s largest trading partner and second largest source of foreign investment after Singapore. Bilateral trade exceeded US $2 billion between April 2022 and January 2023. More than half of China’s investments in Myanmar are in the power sector, while it also has major interests in oil and gas (18 percent of China’s overall investment in Myanmar) as well as the mining sector (17 percent).
Beijing’s political support is also essential to deflect pressure at the United Nations. While China abstained from a UN resolution in December 2022 that expressed “deep concern” with the situation in Myanmar and called for an “immediate end to” violence, Chinese diplomats have stepped up public engagement with the junta since the end of last year.
Beginning with special envoy Deng Xijun’s meeting with Senior General Min Aung Hlaing in Naypyidaw in December 2022, there have been monthly high-level meetings between the two sides. Deng also hosted a delegation of ethnic armed groups in Yunnan in December. Beijing has applied pressure on several armed groups with whom it has influence not to support the National Unity Government (NUG), thus prolonging the junta’s ability to wage war on armed groups in other parts of the country. In May 2023, then Foreign Minister Qin Gang met Min Aung Hlaing in Naypyidaw, becoming the most senior Chinese official to meet the junta leader since the coup. During the visit, the two sides pledged to “further promote comprehensive strategic partnership between the two countries.”
How Russia Helps the Junta to Hedge Against China
As part of its strategy of pragmatic isolation, Min Aung Hlaing’s regime has also relied on Russia as an important partner. In particular, the junta leader looks to Moscow as a trusted friend and important source of leverage to offset overreliance on Beijing. Deepening the Russia-Myanmar partnership is part of Min Aung Hlaing’s hedging policy to avoid falling too much into China’s orbit. The Myanmar military has traditionally feared and distrusted China’s intentions dating back to many of the senior generals’ experience as young combatants fighting against ethnic armed groups with ties to the Communist Party of Burma in the country’s north who had Beijing’s support during the Cold War.
Therefore, Min Aung Hlaing has gone to great personal lengths to cultivate the relationship with Moscow, visiting nine times since becoming commander-in-chief in 2011. He has met Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu roughly half a dozen times, and in September 2022, Min Aung Hlaing met with Putin for the first time at the Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok. During a visit by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov to Naypyidaw in February 2023, the two sides signed an agreement on nuclear energy cooperation involving Russia’s State Atomic Energy Corporation ROSATOM.
Russia has also been a major source of defense technology for Myanmar, providing more arms than China from 2018–2022 (42 percent of total imports compared to 29 percent from China). According to the UN report mentioned above, Russia sold US $406 million worth of military equipment to the Myanmar military in 2022–2023.
Other players: Thailand and India
Unlike Russia and China, whose direct military assistance sustains the junta’s grip on power, Thailand and India play more indirect roles in propping up the SAC. Bangkok’s recent Track 1.5 diplomacy has threatened to overtake Indonesia’s “quiet diplomacy” via ASEAN. In March, Thailand hosted talks with the junta and several autocratic regional partners, including Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam, as well as China, India, Bangladesh, and Japan. The following month, India hosted a second Track 1.5 dialogue that included Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, Vietnam, Bangladesh, and China.
Thailand and India’s rogue initiatives threaten to derail progress under Indonesia’s chairmanship of ASEAN by normalizing SAC participation in international diplomacy. Jakarta has been holding regular closed-door talks with all stakeholders (including representatives of the junta as well as the NUG) in hopes of bringing about inclusive diplomatic negotiations between the military and ousted civilian leaders.
India has also maintained high-level engagement with the Myanmar military since the coup and continues to cooperate in joint counterinsurgency operations along its shared border. Furthermore, the two sides recently heralded the opening of the Kaladan Multimodal Transit Transport Project, a decades-long shipping route to increase commerce between the two neighboring countries. Beyond shared border concerns and interest in eradicating ethnic armed insurgents, Indian policymakers also fear that Myanmar is gravitating deeper into China’s orbit. Therefore, New Delhi has refrained from condemning the military’s brutal crackdown on civilians, instead limiting itself to expressions of concern about the spiraling conflict. Given close security cooperation and senior-level military engagement, India offers the SAC another pole in its hedging strategy vis-à-vis China.
However, there are important developments in Myanmar’s regional environs. Recent elections in Thailand and Cambodia have significant implications for the junta’s foreign relations. While carefully managed elections in both authoritarian countries are unlikely to bring about significant change to either’s foreign policy, the junta will no doubt be anxious to shore up its standing with new leaders in both Bangkok and Phnom Penh lest they adopt a new approach to Myanmar’s conflict.
In Thailand, the recent brokered election of Pheu Thai candidate Srettha Thavisin as Prime Minister could introduce modest change to Thai foreign policy, though the Thai military still retains control through the 2017 constitution. The outcome represented a compromise between the military-dominated senate and a coalition of opposition parties, including Pheu Thai and the Move Forward Party, the latter of which won the majority of the vote but whose candidate for Prime Minister, Pita Limjaroenrat, was prevented from forming a government. Therefore, Srettha’s leadership is unlikely to radically alter Thailand’s generally supportive relations with the Myanmar military junta.
Nevertheless, Bangkok’s delicate balancing act as a U.S. ally and friend of the junta suggest that the SAC will want to retain channels of communication with the new government to avoid becoming a pawn in larger powers’ diplomatic games. The junta relies on lucrative cashflows from Thailand’s gas imports (US $2.4 billion in 2022, roughly 20 percent of Myanmar’s exports), giving Bangkok—and U.S. sanctions—inordinate leverage over the military regime’s economic survival.
Cambodia’s August elections, which paved the way for Hun Sen to transfer political power to his son Hun Manet, also added to the mix of uncertainty within ASEAN. The 45-year-old leader is a relatively unknown entity for the region and external powers. While he was recently invited to meet top leaders in Tokyo, there are few clues as to whether his leadership might bring about real change in Phnom Penh’s foreign policy. As he received his education in the United States at West Point and New York University and holds a PhD in economics from Bristol University in the United Kingdom, there are some hopes that the young Hun may be more progressive than his authoritarian father and even introduce a diplomatic realignment away from Beijing’s orbit.
Looking Ahead
Regardless of how these regional chess pieces move on the board, the junta has made clear it will not be deterred by international condemnation and that its foreign policy remains an afterthought to its core mission: regime survival. Therefore, internal battlefield dynamics are the most likely variables to determine the senior generals’ calculations of whether and when to seek off-ramps. The regime is prepared to weather international isolation. Yet as long as the international community remains divided, the junta’s few close friends ensure it is not totally alone.
Cutting off the junta’s economic lifelines and its ability to access reserves held in overseas banks will be vital to restricting its ability to wage endless war against the people of Myanmar. There are finally indications that the military may be beginning to feel the pinch of targeted sanctions making life more difficult, but there is still a long way to go in terms of bringing the junta down or forcing it to negotiate with the resistance. For now, the NUG and People’s Defense Forces are settling into a protracted, years-long conflict to wipe out the military once and for all. If that eventuality materializes, the junta’s external patrons—namely China, Russia, and India—might come to regret their no-strings-attached support for the ruthless dictatorship..."
Source/publisher:
Stimson Center
Date of entry/update:
2023-10-11
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"A Myanmar regime military court has handed life imprisonment terms to the junta’s former trade chief, ex-Lieutenant General Moe Myint Tun, and his assistant, ex-Brigadier General Yan Naung Soe, for corruption, according to junta media. The life imprisonment terms are equivalent to 20 years behind bars.
The two were also removed from their military positions.
The court martial verdicts follow the regime’s investigations into the activities of the duo, other high-ranking officials and hundreds of businesspeople last month.
Moe Myint Tun, who has also been purged from the junta’s top administrative body, the State Administration Council, abused his position for personal benefit in violation of economic policies, and committed high treason by going against the roadmap and objectives of the regime, junta media said Tuesday, adding that he took bribes from companies and illegally held foreign currencies. He was the chairman of the Myanmar Investment Commission, the Foreign Exchange Supervisory Committee, and the Central Committee for Ensuring Smooth Flow of Trade and Goods.
The regime announcement said he was found guilty of failing to take action against persons who raised the price of palm oil rather than selling it at the reference price set by the government. The Central Bank of Myanmar sold US dollars in order to import palm oil to be sold at the reference price, it said.
“Moreover he … [took] bribes from companies, applying his rank and authority, illegally keeping foreign exchange currencies in hand, and participating in civilian businesses by breaking directives related to military discipline,” the statement reads.
Prior to the investigation, The Irrawaddy reported that Moe Myint Tun had squirreled away millions of US dollars in bribes from businessmen over the past two years. Some of the businessmen told The Irrawaddy they had to pay him at least US$20,000 or the equivalent in gold and gifts—Louis XIII cognac, with a list price of more than $4,000 for a 750ml bottle, was highly preferred—just to meet him.
Yan Naung Soe, joint secretary of the Central Committee for Ensuring Smooth Flow of Trade and Goods, personally benefited from violating the economic policies of the state and committed betrayal of the state and treason together with Moe Myint Tun, the regime said.
“He also exchanged foreign currency for Myanmar kyats for businesspersons by applying his rank and authority, accepted foreign currency and Myanmar kyats from businesspersons, created connections between businesspersons with ex-Lt-Gen Moe Myint Tun, illegally kept foreign currencies in hand, and participated in civilian businesses in violation of directives related to the military discipline,” the regime said.
The corruption scandal involving Moe Myint Tun and Yan Naung Soe embarrassed regime chief Min Aung Hlaing. He issued a warning late last month that senior military officers and ministers caught abusing their power for personal benefit would face heavy penalties in addition to dismissal.
However, despite Min Aung Hlaing’s highly publicized anti-graft campaign against his subordinates, it is common knowledge that he leads the regime in terms of corruption and that his son Aung Pyae Sone and daughter Khin Thiri Thet Mon have abused their father’s power to amass great wealth..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2023-10-11
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Business and the Military, The Burmese military's role in the economy, Corruption, Military History
Language:
Local URL:
more
Title: Bloodstained Gateways: escalating SAC abuses in northern Burma pave the way for BRI expansion
Description:
"A new report by the Kachin Women’s Association Thailand (KWAT) links escalating abuses by SAC troops in Kachin and northern Shan State to the regime’s attempts to secure transport routes for expansion of China’s Belt and Road Initiative.
The report documents a sharp increase since mid-2022 in the number of casualties of aerial bombardment, up to nearly 200, and in the number of villagers forced to be human shields, up to 221, compared to the previous fifteen months.
Other widespread SAC abuses documented by KWAT include thirty incidents of shelling into populated areas, inflicting 61 civilian casualties, and arbitrary arrest of 441 people, including Kachin religious leader Dr. Hka Lam Samson. Dozens of those arrested have disappeared.
Mapping shows most SAC abuses clustered along the main transport routes in northern Burma, vital gateways for development of BRI infrastructure. KWAT analyzes this as a deliberate strategy of collective punishment to secure control of key transport arteries.
“With conventional warfare failing against resistance forces, the regime is increasingly resorting to attacks against civilians,” said KWAT spokesperson Ja Ing
KWAT exposes that the devastating airstrike on the concert in Hpakant last October, which inflicted over 170 casualties, was direct retaliation for heavy SAC losses suffered a day earlier during a failed attempt to seize KIA positions on Lung Ja mountain – the highest vantage point in southeast Kachin State, overlooking key transport corridors to China.
The attacks and abuses have fueled fresh displacement of nearly 14,000 villagers during the past fifteen months, even as the regime has been pushing ahead with plans to close down existing camps in northern Burma housing over 107,000 IDPs.
KWAT is calling urgently for increased diplomatic and economic pressure on the SAC regime to stop their attacks on civilians throughout Burma, and for donor countries to step up aid to existing and newly displaced IDPs, prioritizing cross-border channels.
KWAT also calls on China to halt its planned acceleration of BRI projects in Burma.
“China is taking a huge risk by pushing ahead with BRI projects in partnership with the military regime,” said Ja Ing “There are no guarantees of security, and China will find itself complicit in the mounting atrocities associated with the planned projects.”.....ကချင်အမျိုးသမီးများအစည်းအရုံး-ထိုင်းနိုင်ငံ (KWAT) ၏ ဤအစီရင်ခံစာသစ်တွင် ကချင်ပြည်နယ်နှင့် ရှမ်းပြည်နယ် မြောက်ပိုင်းရှိ စစ်ကောင်စီတပ်ဖွဲ့ဝင်များ၏ အခွင့်အရေးချိုးဖောက်မှုများ ပြင်းထန်လာမှု အခြေအနေ များသည် တရုတ်နိုင်ငံ BRI-ပိုးလမ်းမ စီမံကိန်း တိုးချဲ့ရေးအတွက် သယ်ယူပို့ဆောင်ရေးလမ်းကြောင်းများကို လုံခြုံရေး ပေးရန် စစ်ကောင်စီ၏ ကြိုးပမ်းမှုနှင့် ဆက်စပ်ပုံကို ချိတ်ဆက်ဖော်ပြထားသည်။
လွန်ခဲ့သည့် ၁၅ လနှင့် နှိုင်းယှဉ်လျှင် ၂၀၂၂ ခုနှစ် နှစ်လည်ပိုင်းမှစ၍ လေကြောင်းတိုက်ခိုက်မှုကြောင့် ထိခိုက်သူ ၂၀၀ နီးပါးနှင့် လူသားဒိုင်းအဖြစ် အတင်းအဓမ္မ ခိုင်းစေခံရသူ ရွာသူရွာသားဦးရေမှာ ၂၂၁ ဦးထိ သိသိသာသာ တိုးမြင့်လာကြောင်းကို အစီရင်ခံစာမှ မှတ်တမ်းတင်ထားသည်။
KWAT မှ မှတ်တမ်းတင်ထားသော စစ်ကောင်စီမှ ကျယ်ကျယ်ပြန့်ပြန့် ကျူးလွန်နေသော အခြားချိုးဖောက်မှုများ ထဲတွင် အရပ်သား ၆၁ ကို ထိခိုက်သေဆုံးစေခဲ့သော လူနေထူထပ်သော ဒေသများသို့ လက်နက်ကြီးပစ်ခတ်မှု အကြိမ် ၃၀ နှင့် ကချင်ဘာသာရေးအကြီးအကဲ ဒေါက်တာ ခလမ်ဆမ်ဆွန် အပါအဝင် လူပေါင်း ၄၄၁ ဦးအား မတရားဖမ်းဆီးခြင်းတို့လည်း ပါဝင်သည်။ ဖမ်းဆီးခံရသူများထဲမှာ ဒါဇင်ပေါင်းများစွာသည် ယနေ့ချိန်ထိ ပျောက်ဆုံး နေဆဲဖြစ်သည်။
မြေပုံများအရ စစ်ကောင်စီကျူးလွန်သော ချိုးဖောက်မှု အများစုသည် BRI-ပိုးလမ်းမ စီမံကိန်းအောက်ရှိ အခြေခံအဆောက်အအုံများ၏ အရေးကြီးသော တံခါးပေါက်များဖြစ်သော မြန်မာနိုင်ငံမြောက်ပိုင်းရှိ အဓိက သယ်ယူပို့ဆောင်ရေးလမ်းကြောင်းများတစ်လျှောက်တွင် ဖြစ်ပွားသည်ကို ပြသနေသည်။ ၎င်းအခြေအနေသည် အဓိက သယ်ယူပို့ဆောင်ရေးသွေးကြောများထိန်းချုပ်မှုကို ကာကွယ်ရန် စုပေါင်းပြစ်ဒဏ်ပေးခြင်းကို ဗျူဟာတစ်ခုအနေဖြင့် စစ်ကောင်စီမှ ရည်ရွယ်ချက်ရှိရှိ လုပ်ဆောင်နေခြင်းဖြစ်သည်ဟု KWAT မှ လေ့လာသုံးသပ်သည်။
“ခုခံတော်လှန်ရေးတပ်တွေကို သမားရိုးကျ စစ်ဆင်ရေးရှုံးနိမ့်လာတော့ စစ်တပ်က အရပ်သားတွေကို ပစ်မှတ်ထားတိုက်ခိုက်တဲ့ နည်းလမ်းကို ပိုပြီးသုံးလာကြတယ်ဟု KWAT ၏ ပြောရေးဆိုခွင့်ရှိသူ” ဂျာအိန်က ပြောသည်။
ပြီးခဲ့သည့် အောက်တိုဘာလအတွင်းက ဖားကန့်မြို့ ဖျော်ဖြေပွဲတွင် ဖြစ်ပွားခဲ့သော လူပေါင်း ၁၇၀ ကျော် ထိခိုက်ခဲ့သည့် ပြင်းထန်သည့် လေကြောင်းတိုက်ခိုက်မှုသည် ထိုတိုက်ခိုက်မှုမတိုင်မီ တစ်ရက်အကြိုတွင် ဖြစ်ပွားခဲ့သော စစ်ကောင်စီ၏ ကချင်ပြည်နယ်အရှေ့တောင်ဘက် တရုတ်နိုင်ငံသို့ အဓိက ကုန်သွယ်ရေး လမ်းစင်္ကြန်များကို အပေါ်စီးမှမြင်ရသည့် အမြင့်ဆုံးနေရာဖြစ်သော လုံဂျာတောင်ပေါ်ရှိ KIA စခန်းများကို သိမ်းယူ ရန်ကြိုးပမ်းမှုတွင် အကြီးအကျယ် အထိနာခဲ့မှုအတွက် တိုက်ရိုက်လက်တုံ့ပြန်မှုဖြစ်သည်ဟု KWAT မှ ဖော်ထုတ် ထားသည်။
စစ်ကောင်စီသည် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ မြောက်ပိုင်းရှိ IDP ၁၀၇,၀၀၀ ကျော်နေထိုင်သော ရှိရင်းစွဲ စစ်ဘေးရှောင် စခန်းများကို ပိတ်သိမ်းရန် အစီအစဉ်များ ဆက်လက် တွန်းအားပေးလုပ်ဆောင်နေသော်လည်း လွန်ခဲ့သော ၁၅ လ အတွင်း တိုက်ခိုက်မှုများနှင့် အခွင့်အရေးချိုးဖောက်မှုများကြောင့် နောက်ထပ် ရွာသူရွာသားပေါင်း ၁၄,၀၀၀ နီးပါးကို နေရပ်စွှန့်ခွာ ထွက်ပြေးစေခဲ့သည်။
KWAT အနေဖြင့် စစ်ကောင်စီ၏ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံတဝှမ်းရှိ အရပ်သားများအပေါ် ပစ်မှတ်ထားသော ပြင်းထန်သည့် တိုက်ခိုက်မှုများကို ရပ်တန့်ရန် ၎င်းတို့အပေါ် သံတမန်ရေးနှင့် စီးပွားရေးဆိုင်ရာ ဖိအားများ တိုးမြှင့်ပေးရန်နှင့် အလှူရှင် နိုင်ငံအနေများဖြင့် နယ်စပ်ဖြတ်ကျော်လမ်းကြောင်းများကို ဦးစားပေးကာ ရှိရင်းစွဲနှင့် နောက်ထပ် တိုးပွားလာသော IDP များအတွက် အကူအညီများ တိုးမြှင့်ပေးရန် အရေးပေါ် တောင်းဆိုလိုက်သည်။
တရုတ်နိုင်ငံ အနေဖြင့် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံရှိ ၎င်းတို့၏ BRI-ပိုးလမ်းမ စီမံကိန်းတိုးမြှင့်လုပ်ဆောင်မည့် အစီအစဉ်များကို လည်း ရပ်တန့်ရန် KWAT မှ တောင်းဆိုထားသည်။
“တရုတ်နိုင်ငံဟာ စစ်တပ်နဲ့ ပူးပေါင်းပြီး BRI-ပိုးလမ်းမ စီမံကိန်းတွေကို ရှေ့တိုးလုပ်ဆောင်ခြင်းအားဖြင့် ကြီးမားတဲ့ အန္တရာယ်တွေကို ယူနေတယ်”ဟု ဂျာအိန် ကပြောသည်။ “စီမံကိန်းတွေအတွက် ဘာလုံခြုံရေးအာမခံချက်မှလည်း မရှိဘူး။ ပြီးတော့ စီစဉ်ထားတဲ့ စီမံကိန်းတွေနဲ့ ဆက်နွယ်နေတဲ့ တိုးမြင့်လာတဲ့ ရက်စက်ကြမ်းကြုတ်မှုတွေထဲမှာပဲ တရုတ်နိုင်ငံကပါ ကြံရာပါ ဖြစ်လာလိမ့်မယ်”..."
Source/publisher:
Kachin Women’s Association Thailand
Date of entry/update:
2023-10-09
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
“One Belt, One Road” initiative, Burma's economic relations with China, Business and the Military, Other Special Economic Zones
Language:
Format :
pdf pdf pdf pdf
Size:
123.79 KB 100.59 KB 29.2 MB 3.22 MB
more
Sub-title:
In new book, Australian economist Sean Turnell talks about his prison experience.
Description:
"Australian economist Sean Turnell was an economic policy advisor to Myanmar’s State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi in 2021 when the country’s military ousted the democratically elected government in a coup and installed the State Administration Council or SAC, led by Sen. Gen. Min Aung Hlaing.
Five days later he was arrested on charges of espionage and he spent the next 650 days – or about one year and nine months – in detention, mostly in horrible conditions in Yangon’s Insein Prison.
In his soon-to-be released book ‘An Unlikely Prisoner: How an eternal optimist found hope in Myanmar's most notorious jail,’ Turnell tells the story of his time behind bars.
He told RFA Burmese that although it is a story of great sadness, it is also one of courage for other prisoners jailed by the junta, especially Aung San Suu Kyi, who he calls ‘Daw Suu,’ a term of respect for women. The interview has been edited for length and clarity.
RFA: What was your motivation for writing this book?
Turnell: Well, it was something that I always intended to do. In fact, I wrote most of the book in my head during the time I was in prison.
On many days, of course, I didn't really have much to do, so part of my pacing up and down the cells, I'd be trying to think of things to think about. And part of it was writing this book.
So probably about one third of it was written inside my head before I even got out. As soon as I got back, it was a relatively easy process of then converting all the thoughts up here [in my head] onto paper.
RFA: Can you discuss how much of the book deals with your time in prison, and before and after the coup?
Turnell: About two thirds of the book is all about the experience post-coup. So I detailed my experiences on the day of the coup itself and then my subsequent arrest five days later, and then the next 650 days in Yangon’s Insein Prison, and then up in Napyitaw and then back to Insein and the court and meeting Daw Suu in the court and all of that.
So that's the bulk of the book. But I have a section there on … background … Why was I there? And how was I involved at all in the NLD government? The basic background to the reforms, things like that, how those reforms increasingly ran up against the military and the difficulties, things like that.
But most of it is a memoir about post-coup, but I've got a section there about Myanmar before the coup and some of the reforms that we were trying to do.
RFA: Is there any subject that you avoid in the book? Was there at any time that you had to pledge to the junta not to write about as a condition of your release? Was there anything like that in your release agreement?
Turnell: Oh, no. I made no pledge at all. None at all. I wondered whether they would ask me to do something like that. But they never, ever did. I never signed anything. In fact, I was very, very careful about that. On the very last day, as I was being released, we were wondering about exactly that. So, yeah. So I made no pledges, no promises to them whatsoever and wouldn't have done so. I hasten to add, I would not have signed anything if it was put in front of me.
But since coming out, you know, I exercised my right as an Australian citizen, of course, back in Australia, which has complete freedom of speech. I was very vocal in talking about my situation and all that.
I don't think – I mean, obviously I'm subjective in this issue – but I don't think I've been at all unfair or unreasonable in my comments about the regime or the conditions under which they held me and the nature of the trial and all the rest of it.
I think any sort of objective account on any of those things would be identical to mine, would be my view. But obviously Myanmar now under the SAC regime is not a place where freedom of speech is welcome. So I’m to some extent not surprised that they've had a negative reaction to it. But it certainly didn't involve any pledge or anything like that.
RFA: What are some of the most powerful memories from your time in prison that you talk about in this book?
Turnell: Many memorable times. I think some really bad stuff. I think, hearing about the death of my friend Khin Maung Shwe or Yacob, as he was always to me, a wonderful man who protected me, was just a dear friend. I met him in the first six months when I was in Insein Prison, where again, he sort of held me and looked after me. I then went up to Naypyitaw Prison for a whole year as the trial went on, and I never found out about him at all until I was sent back to Insein after the trial. And I heard that he'd been murdered in the prison and that that was a real low moment. But certainly, you know, as I say, it's one that is very much in my head.
Other than that, you know, I remember all the horrible stuff, the terrible cell, the terrible food, the awfulness of prison transfers. And I noticed reading some of the reporting on Myanmar, the internal media, that people like your organization have taken up the issue of transporting prisoners. And just to add my voice to that, it really is terrible. Some of the worst moments I experienced were being transported between the prison and the court and between different prisons, et. cetera. So I certainly remember all that.
But I remember again, some of the good things, the incredible conversations that I had with some wonderful Burmese colleagues and so on. I remember the compassion that they showed me. I remember, you know, some funny issues. And yes, It’s a real mixed bag and a mixture of horror, but a mixture of really good things that not only gladdened my heart whenever I think about Myanmar and its people, but even about human nature.
One of the things that struck me is that while some people behave badly under pressure, a great many more people and certainly many Myanmar people behave superbly under pressure. And I was the beneficiary of that.
RFA: Is there any person or individual that you would like to dedicate this book to?
Turnell: I'm dedicating it to my wife, who just championed me from the get go. You know, she knew what was happening on the first day, she was there the last day. And she just ran a massive campaign from here in Sydney. And she reached out to everyone to not only all the political leadership here in Australia, but even to people like Hun Sen in Cambodia. She wrote letters to Min Aung Hlaing’s wife. She tried to rope in the U.S. president. She got the king of England, Charles III, involved. She got everyone involved. It was the most incredible thing.
So it was a no-brainer as to who I dedicate it to. But beyond her were my father, Peter, my sister Lisa, my nephews, my daughter, all of them were just, you know, just superb and then, you know, to the Myanmar people as well as other development friends and people from Australian foreign affairs and so on. But my Myanmar friends were very much in my thoughts beyond my sort of immediate family.
In terms of the structure of the book, I begin with the sort of drama of the arrest, the early interrogation, a terrible two months I experienced in something that I just called “the box,” which was just a room that I was locked into for two months in complete isolation. And the worst treatment that I had was at that period.
Then I have another chapter on being released into Insein Prison and spent a lot of time just talking about that, the conditions, describing it, because it's a most extraordinary place, particularly, I think, for people outside Myanmar. It would be very hard, I think, to visualize just just what inside is like. And a lot there obviously, again, about some great Myanmar friends.
Then, a big section once we go up to Naypyitaw, the awful conditions there in the Naypyitaw detention center was in many ways even worse than Insein.
Then the trial, the absurdity of the trial and the absurdity of the charges against me and against my friends.
Notes about Daw Suu, of course, who it was a great honor to work alongside before the coup. It was a great honor just to see how fantastic she was in the court in the prison. She remains as far as I know, but certainly to my experience, which was only a year ago, undaunted, full of courage, compassion, again, just raw intelligence, the way that it just shows out, the very courteous way that she treated the people who were persecuting her. She was just an inspiration. And so I spend a lot of time talking about that, just how she kept the spirits of myself up, and everyone else up. I never saw her waver or weaken anyway. So, you know, I certainly deal with that.
And then, the absurdity of the trial, the darkest moments immediately after that, transporting back to Insein is then the final thing where I was put amongst the death row prisoners, which was terribly depressing and inspiring as well, because again, even those people in a desperate, desperate situation, they were also incredibly generous and great friends to me. So that's sort of the second last section. And then I have finally the day in which I was told I was going home and the drama of going home and the incredible feeling and lift of going home.
And then finally, just some of the events that I detail a little bit, how the regime became upset when I had the temerity just to say that I wasn't treated that well by them and a little bit on that as well. But overall, it's an uplifting story in many ways, even though along the way, unfortunately, I have to tell the terribly sad story for so many people in Myanmar.
RFA: What kind of impact do you expect to make with this book?
Turnell: Above all, I would like the world to pay attention to what's going on in Myanmar. As we who are interested in Myanmar know, the situation is desperate, and it doesn't give it enough attention. The world's eyes, very rightly, are on Ukraine, but Myanmar deserves attention as well. It's a terrible situation. The people need help. They deserve help. And so if the book can do anything at all, it would be to help draw attention to that.
RFA: Do you have any messages for Aung San Suu Kyi and your other friends in Myanmar?
Turnell: My message to both Daw Suu and my specific friends in Myanmar, but also people just generally is a big thank you. I love the place and still do.
I was asked and I spoke to the media about this when I got released. A leading immigration official told me just as I was getting on the plane, he said, “Sean, please don't hate Myanmar.”
And it was an odd moment because he just spent minutes beforehand giving me a lecture about how I would never be allowed back, et cetera. But then he sort of changed his whole demeanor and again just said, “Please don't hate Myanmar.”
And I said back to him, “I could never hate Myanmar.”
And again, for all the reasons that I've described here about just the love and compassion, the courage … that I witnessed all around me. So, yes, I have a very soft spot for Myanmar. I desperately hope to get back there one day, but that's not going to happen until we get dramatic political change.
That, of course, is a very minor thing compared to the overall story of what the people in Myanmar are going through. Just to get that message and a big thank you across to them and to say to them that even though Myanmar is not getting the attention it deserves, and that's part of the book, but nonetheless, there are millions of people around the world who do follow events in Myanmar and who do care about what's happening.
RFA: What about the regime? Do you have anything to say to Min Aung Hlaing and other regime leaders?
Well, I would say to them to put their country first. To put the people of Myanmar first. Stop being so defensive, selfish. I mean, I could go on and I won't bother doing that, but I mean that very clearly. These are people who don't have the country's interests at heart.
Perhaps some of them might have second thoughts. I like to think that probably not at the very top, but that there must be people, smart people, and for whatever reason, might be caught up in that regime who might just think, “This is terrible, we've got to stop this. This is enough.”
I'm hopeful that that's the case. It's obviously very hard to know, but you just can't help but feel there must be people who look at the economy, look at the dreadful state of the country and just think, “We can't do this. We've got to stop.”
And so to those people, I would encourage them to do so..."
Source/publisher:
"Radio Free Asia" (USA)
Date of entry/update:
2023-09-18
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Business and the Military, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"Dissolving Myanmar Gems and Jewellery Entrepreneurs Association
Reference:(1) National Unity Government, Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Conservation. Announcement 7/2021, dated 23/08/2021
(2) National Unity Government, Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Conservation. Announcement 2/2021, dated 29/06/2021
(3) Unity Government, Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Conservation. Announcement 1/2021, dated 27/04/2021
(4) Government of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, Ministry of Planning, Finance and Industry. Announcement 4/2021, dated 22/03/2021
1.In light of the imperative duty of business organisations to prioritise the public interest, and in consideration of their established affiliations and actions in support of the terrorist military council, which thereby aim to lend said council legitimacy and derive revenue and profits to their benefit, and further noting their consistent failure to comply with the warnings issued by the National Unity Government in above announcements; it is hereby decreed that the Myanmar Gems and Jewellery Entrepreneurs Association, along with its subsidiary entities, be and is hereby dissolved.
2. Effective from the date of promulgation of this order, the withdrawal or expenditure of any assets and funds associated with the aforementioned association and its subsidiary entities is strictly prohibited.
3. This order shall not infringe upon the proprietary rights of individual entrepreneurs, nor shall it impede their business activities, provided such undertakings remain detached from any affiliations or connections to the terrorist military council.
4.Any individual entrepreneur or employee found to continue their involvement in activities related to the now-dissolved entities, or who offers cooperation, disperses assets and funds, or acts under the guise of said entities, will be construed as acting in support of the terrorist military council, and so be liable to prosecution under existing laws and regulations, as stipulated in Cabinet Meeting No. 14/2013 of the National Unity Government and the approval of the Office of the President..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Conservation - NUG
Date of entry/update:
2023-09-17
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Language:
Format :
pdf pdf
Size:
27.57 KB 266.27 KB
more
Description:
"Dissolving Myanmar Gems and Jewellery Entrepreneurs Association Notification (2/2023)..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Conservation - NUG
Date of entry/update:
2023-09-17
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
304.95 KB
more
Title: ‘It’s a Catastrophe’: Ex-Junta Prisoner, NLD Aide Sean Turnell on Myanmar’s Post-Coup Economy
Description:
"Australian economist Sean Turnell served as a policy adviser to Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy government during its first term. He was detained by the military shortly after the February 2021 coup and later imprisoned on charges—widely dismissed as trumped up—of violating state secrets and immigration laws. After nearly two years behind bars he was released in November 2022 as part of a general amnesty and has continued to speak out against the military junta from his home country, prompting the regime to revoke its pardon. In the following interview with The Irrawaddy’s Justin Higginbottom, Turnell discusses in detail the economic fallout of the military’s disastrous ‘mismanagement’ of the economy—and whether or not that is in fact the correct term to describe its actions—the post-COVID economic recovery plans the NLD was preparing to implement in its stolen second term, as well as the regime’s access to foreign reserves and what actions foreign governments can take to limit it. He also discusses his forthcoming book describing his experiences as a political prisoner in Myanmar.
THE IRRAWADDY: Can you talk about the general economic situation in Myanmar? What’s going on since the coup? What’s the general situation? Where do they find themselves right now?
TURNELL: I mean it’s just awful.… “Catastrophe” is the word that I generally like to employ. And I don’t think that’s even hyperbole. No matter what you look at, it’s negative essentially. I mean if you begin with growth, economic growth in Myanmar took a bit of a knock with COVID, so we’d been expecting for 2020 a growth rate of about 7 percent, and similar for 2021, but then COVID arrived and growth went down to about 1.8 percent for [2020], and no one was clear about 2021. And it went [to] negative 18 percent [-18 percent] in 2021 [and has] recovered a bit since, but.. If you’d said, OK, where can you reasonably apply the trend line? So in other words you get the knock from COVID but then good policy sort of gets you back on track—which is exactly what’s happened all around the world and all around the region—so it’s not an unreasonable expectation [that] we’d have been back to those sort of growth levels – 6, 7, 8 percent—hopefully, because there actually had been a very aggressive reform program to come into place with that second term of the government; you know, many of the things that weren’t done in the first term were geared up and ready to go in the second term.
So, anyway, just to say that growth rates of 6, 7 percent—we’d have been disappointed if we weren’t hitting those. But irrespective of that, even on the worst assumption of where we’d be at, the economy is now 30 percent below any sort of modest trend; the economy’s about 30 percent down. It’s about 20-odd percent down anyway, but by trend it’s nearly a third. Which is just catastrophic for a country like Myanmar, that is poor to begin with, one of the poorest countries in the world, and people are now one-third poorer than where they should have been. There’s no fat in the system; people are desperately poor now, and they can’t take a knock of one third of their income.
But anyway that’s just growth numbers. No matter what the metric is: the budget deficit is now dramatically blown out. Taxation revenue has now shrunk dramatically along with it. The bond sales are not really proceeding as they could be. The banks are not really in a position to take up the bonds on offer; so all of that means the government is just printing money hand over fist. As a consequence of that we’ve got monetary instability, whether it be measured in terms of high inflation rates, particularly relative to peers in Southeast Asia. [And] a collapsing exchange rate, so the exchange rate is less than half of what it was before the coup. The trade situation’s dire: There’s a bit of holding up in terms of gas revenues, because hydrocarbon prices were quite high, but other than that even other energy prices and income are down; agriculture is down. There’s been a bit of a recovery from the really deep lows immediately after the coup in terms of textiles, but overall the trade situation is terrible. Debt levels have more than doubled. Unemployment, to the extent that it’s measured properly, a lot of the measures are not really there anyway, but we do know that there’s been a wholesale shift from the formal economy to the informal economy—and you don’t get a growing, transforming economy out of one that is based in informality. Informality is really just a coping mechanism and that is where most people are.
On top of that, just the opportunities lost. Back in 2020, young educated Myanmar people had real prospects and had choices about where to get employment, and now people are scattered to the winds outside the country, within the country. People with expensive degrees that they thought would yield them a good income in a growing economy are now on the front lines or in prison. It’s just a catastrophe. I get depressed over so many things in Myanmar; obviously the loss of life and the violence above all, but if you look at the economy, compared to the hopes that people reasonably had for it, it just makes you want to cry.
THE IRRAWADDY: So how much can we chalk this economic ruin up to mismanagement by the junta, or is a lot of it caused by sanctions, or just the general conflict, just the country being in a state of war right now?
TURNELL: I’m probably a little bit biased in this obviously, but to me it comes from… In fact [it’s an] interesting word “economic mismanagement”. I wonder if that is the expression? It’s an expression I’ve used, I hasten to add… The more I think about it, it isn’t really economic mismanagement because in terms of policy—and that’s where a lot of the damage is being done—there is the damage of course being done by violence and so on as well, of course, perpetrated by the regime and instigated by them—but I’m just wondering about that term “mismanagement”, because in some ways what they’re doing is gearing the economy to a war economy and neglecting or abusing everything else, so to some extent it’s management for a purpose. It’s just that that purpose is greatly destructive. But in some ways, if you think about it, what they’ve essentially done is created a war economy, [so] the management that has yielded terrible economic outcomes is in once sense quite deliberate in terms of transferring resources into the military state.
But anyway, it’s only “mismanagement” from an economist’s perspective, and what you’d think would be the objective of any sort of sovereign government. I think we’d have to locate it there, but I think it’s mainly because if we just go to the counterexamples around the world—you don’t have to go to the developed world or rich or even fast-growing economies. You just go to the region and you see the bounce-back [from COVID], and Myanmar is such an extraordinary outlier in terms of economies that just haven’t bounced back, so I think the blame for it is really there. COVID had damaged things but there were some very comprehensive plans to deal with that. Nothing too radical—it was more just the [same] playbook of just about anywhere else, about protecting incomes. And all of that was dismantled after the coup and of course the response to COVID itself was greatly mismanaged and the rest, and repression of medical workers, etc., so even though clearly there were external events, if we look at comparable countries around Myanmar you’d really have to slate most of the economic damage home to the regime and, again, it’s mismanagement, is the word we use for it.
THE IRRAWADDY: We had a story recently that reported that the regime-controlled Central Bank of Myanmar had about US$6.8 billion in foreign reserves as of March 2023. More than half of that’s in Singaporean banks. Do you know how much of that is actually accessible to the regime? If the international community wanted to block access to those reserves what might they want to do?
TURNELL: It’s an interesting one. In terms of “accessible”, it’s hard not to get technical here, because reserves by definition are financial assets that are either issued by other countries like US dollars, euros, Singapore dollars, Australian dollars or whatever, or commodities of some form—valuable commodities such as gold—so in a sense they’re accessible to the point that they still have value. By which I mean, if you have US dollars in a US bank account, those dollars only have value if you can access them at the US bank. So in some ways the question of accessibility is really the critical issue when we think of a country having assets because if they’re not accessible those assets in a sense don’t exist. That’s the first thing to say. That is nothing unusual in a way… It’s not like the regime could access them and bring them home. It could if it was gold. You could just store it at the central bank. But the only way for foreign currency-denominated assets to have value is to have them in foreign currency accounts and usually it’s the case that they’re going to be in foreign banks, so the question of accessibility is caught up with the value of those reserves. It’s a big thing to constrain access to foreign assets of governments. This is why you’ll notice that even with the suspension of access to funds at the [US] Federal Reserve, that that [suspension] is what we’re talking about, rather than the transfer of those assets to anywhere else. This gets into areas of untouchablity or…. a lack of precedent, I would say, for that. So measures to transfer those reserves to anyone else become quite problematic.
Which doesn’t mean you still can’t do things. For instance, the NUG [Myanmar’s shadow, civilian National Unity Government] could come up with some quite creative measures to use the value of reserves in ways that they could … essentially financially engineer other financial assets out of reserves that are not accessible to the regime. I know that’s getting complex because we’re getting into the area of financial engineering and the extent to which [denying the regime] access to reserves—does that create value for anyone else, like an alternative government such as the NUG? And there I think you get into some interesting gray areas. But denial of access is one thing and transferring those assets somewhere else is a different thing, so it’s hard to imagine other countries doing that, apart from the US. The US would be the only one to move in that sort of direction and obviously they have to a certain extent in terms of blocking the regime’s access to the funds at the Federal Reserve, but the others, it’s hard to imagine blocking that.
THE IRRAWADDY: So it’s not realistic to think that Singapore might just one day say, “All those assets you have with us – those aren’t accessible. You can’t take those out.”?
TURNELL: It would be a big leap. Where I was going before with this whole issue of access, this is where this becomes important as well, you would probably have degrees of freedom of movement. So for instance, it’s hard to imagine a country actually blocking another country accessing its reserves. On the other hand, if a country decided that it was going to transfer all of its reserves, it’s hard to imagine that being an easy process either. And in the case of Myanmar, a process that wouldn’t involve extraordinary complications. So the degree to which those reserves are fully accessible to the regime would have to be questionable I think.
THE IRRAWADDY: You’re writing a book about your experience in prison, I believe? Did you want to say anything about that?
TURNELL: Sure. We’ll probably go on a big publicity thing in a few weeks. It’s finished. Just a few technical things with the publisher, which is Penguin. It starts with my arrest back on Feb. 6, 2021. I’ve got a couple of chapters that deal with what we were trying to do in Myanmar, just a broad outline of the reform process, things like that. But for the most part it’s all about the prison experience—arrest, Insein [Prison in Yangon], up to Naypyitaw, the trial, the incredible support I got from my fellow political prisoners and then from the Burmese people more broadly. It doesn’t hold back from detailing the horrors all around me but it’s still a little bit of a “love letter” to the Burmese people, because even though there were these terrible people who were keeping me in the prison, it was the case that 99 percent of the people I dealt with even in the prisons and so on were incredibly compassionate, and incredibly courageous in demonstrating that compassion. I’m very, very blunt in saying how awful the prison was and saying how absurd the trial was and what a terrible injustice was meted out not just to me but more importantly to my Burmese colleagues and people who weren’t even connected with my case, but whose cases I got to know about. I met people who were being tortured and so on, and ill-treated. They even ill-treated me—you know, one would have surely thought that I would have told the story once I got out and of course I did so, which caused the SAC regime [the State Administration Council, as the junta calls itself] to get extremely upset anew. So I think they’re going to get upset again in a few weeks when the book’s out.
(Turnell concluded the interview by offering to add to his earlier reply to the question regarding the junta’s access to foreign reserves.)
If you hold US dollars in a bank, obviously they’re not physical, all they are is on the balance sheet of a bank, and they’re just a promise from the bank to pay US dollars. So you open an account, let’s say it’s 1 billion US dollars, and that account is really just a liability of that bank to pay you. So you give them a billion dollars and they then open up a liability, which is just a deposit account, which says that they will repay that billion at some point in time. But it’s only an asset that sits on the balance sheet of that bank. I guess what I was trying to get at is that access to reserves depends on that relationship between you and the financial institution. Again, it’s so different to gold, etc. It’s not a physical commodity that can just be moved about. It depends on the decision [of the bank] and so if a bank grants access then those assets have value. If that access is in any way compromised, those assets no longer have value, and I think that was the nuance I was trying to get at with respect to even places like Singapore—that the extent to which there’s any doubt of you being able to access quickly and in full your reserves puts a shadow over those reserves, even if there’s no sanctions and so on.
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2023-09-11
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Business and the Military, The Burmese military's role in the economy
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"As world leaders gather for the G20 summit in New Delhi this weekend, Burma Campaign UK is calling on G20 members to put pressure on Prime Minister Modi over India arming, financing, and providing diplomatic support for the Myanmar/Burmese military.
A report earlier this year by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the situation in Myanmar revealed that India-based entities have supplied $51 million worth of arms and related materials to the military since February 2021.
Indian companies have entered into business relationships with the military or are working for the Burmese military, helping to finance the military and providing it with technology enabling it to arrest human rights and democracy activists.
Diplomatically, India has been working regionally to undermine ASEAN’s five-point consensus and assist the military in gaining the international legitimacy it craves, while also attempting to protect the military at a global level, including at the UN Security Council, negotiating to weaken a resolution on Burma and then refusing to vote in favour of it.
The Burmese military were already facing charges of genocide and crimes against humanity even before their attempted coup began in 2021, and India continued to arm them despite this. Since the coup, United Nations investigators have said the military is committing an increasing number of human rights violations which could be classified as war crimes and crimes against humanity. Numerous Burmese civil society organisations have documented daily atrocities by the Burmese military.
More than 2 million people have been forced to flee their homes, thousands killed and almost 25,000 arrested. Airstrikes and long-range artillery are used to target schools, hospitals, homes and religious buildings.
India has been mistreating refugees from Burma, refusing to give them legal sanctuary and arresting, beating and detaining refugees, and threatening them with deportation.
“We have seen a succession of world leaders visiting India and failing to challenge Modi on his support for the Burmese military,” said Anna Roberts, Executive Director of Burma Campaign UK. “The G20 is an opportunity for world leaders to come together and collectively pressure Modi to stop arming the Burmese military. Modi must not be allowed to use the summit to promote himself while at the same time arming a military which bombs schools and hospitals.”..."
Source/publisher:
"Burma Campaign UK" (London)
Date of entry/update:
2023-09-04
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Business and the Military, The Burmese military's role in the economy
Language:
Local URL:
more
Sub-title:
Junta leaders are blaming saboteurs and speculators for inflation and devaluation caused by their mismanagement.
Description:
"Amid the news of escalating violence, it’s easy to lose sight of two events in August 2023 that exposed the Myanmar military regime’s vulnerability.
First, in a video message to the Moscow International Security Conference, coup leader Min Aung Hlaing complained about the weaponization of the dollar.
Second, the August appointment of Lt Gen Nyo Saw to two special commissions on trade and foreign exchange that report directly to junta chief Min Aung Hlaing. Saw is a close confidant, but as the chairman of military-owned conglomerate Myanma Economic Corporation (MEC) and a director of military’s other holding company, Myanma Economic Holdings Ltd (MEHL), he’s also the military’s most experienced economic and business expert.
It’s hard to overstate just how bad Myanmar’s economy is. Although the World Bank predicts GDP to grow at 2 to 3% this year, the economy has contracted by 12% since January 2021. A decade’s worth of economic growth was eviscerated.
Nearly 60% of the population is now living beneath the poverty line, and the World Bank is warning about food insecurity across the country. Between war, climate change, and currency controls that limited the amount of the imports of fertilizer and pesticides, agricultural production is down.
Although 2022-23 saw $1.6 billion in pledged foreign investment – almost all of which was from China or boomerang Myanmar investment via Singapore and Hong Kong – far less was actually realized. Other foreign investors are pulling out, citing poor market conditions, pressure from activists, and reputational costs. This has diminished the corporate tax base.
With the exception of gas and oil sales to Thailand and China, exports have been hard hit. According to the military government’s Ministry of Commerce, in the first eight months of 2022, total exports reached $6.57 billion, giving the country a $172 million trade surplus.
In the same period in 2023, total exports dropped by 9.8% to $5.93 billion, with a $500 million trade deficit. But if one disaggregates border trade, it’s even worse.
Currency control confusion
Exports to overseas markets fell by 21%. And it will worsen as key manufacturers, such as clothing makers H&M, Primark, and Inditex,- have left. Some retailers are now shunning Myanmar gemstones.
Trade has been hard hit by a series of hastily implemented currency controls that change regularly, upsetting businesses. Some of the more recent currency controls have forced any individual or business with more than $10,000, without a permit, to purchase the kyat currency at the official exchange rate of 2,100 to the U.S. dollar.
The black market rate for the greenback is 3,900 kyat , a 300% decline in the value of the currency since the Feb. 1, 2021 coup.
Myanmar’s banks are increasingly isolated. U.S. sanctions on Myanma Foreign Trade Bank and Myanma Investment and Commercial Bank, which were responsible for the clearing of most U.S. dollar transactions, have forced costly workarounds, such as establishing new shell companies and bank accounts.
Singapore’s United Overseas Bank Limited (UOB) announced that they would close the accounts of Myanmar, and had already stopped providing banking services for Myanmar Airways International. Other Singapore banks are expected to follow suit, following signaling from the Monetary Authority of Singapore and the additional reporting requirements due to the Financial Action Task Force blacklist. A Bangladesh bank froze the accounts of the two sanctioned banks.
Government revenue is flat or declining. While officially a secret, projections built into the annual Union Taxation Law paint a grim picture. The Internal Revenue Department has warned that revenue from lotteries, income tax, corporate taxes, natural resource rents, and customs duties have all stayed flat or contracted since the coup; only rents from oil and gas exports have gone up. Tax authorities are now specifically hitting medical professionals with preemptive taxes.
According to data compiled by the opposition National Unity Government (NUG), the Central Bank of Myanmar has compelled banks, state-owned enterprises and insurance companies to buy an estimated 26.5 trillion kyat in bonds, $3.1 billion at the black market rate, since the coup. With an inability to repay, and an NUG pledge that the bonds will not be honored, these are additional liabilities for banks that are already saddled with non-performing loans.
The regime is broke and may have turned on the printing presses. The NUG estimates that the military government has printed up to 20 trillion kyat, roughly $5.1 billion at black market rates, since the coup, partially explaining the high inflation.
Sanctions take a bite
In July 2023, the junta issued a K20,000 note, the highest denomination, creating an inflationary spike and a further decline in the currency’s value. It’s supposed to be a limited issue currency, but with 14% inflation, a higher denominated note may be required.
While international sanctions have not resulted in a massive seizure of funds, they’ve not been insignificant either. The U.S.immediately froze $1.1 billion of Central Bank of Myanmar assets following the coup. The European Union froze $503 million when it sanctioned the Ministry of Oil and Gas Enterprise. More importantly, the sanctions have made everything harder for the junta.
The NUG has identified 13 other banks around the world that are holding some $5.5 billion in Central Bank of Myanmar assets, 67% of which are in nine banks in Singapore. Should the NUG ever convince the Singapore government to freeze those assets, it would deliver the coup de grâce.
This degree of economic mismanagement is a crime in itself, right up there with the military’s daily war crimes. The economy is the regime’s Achilles heel and they don’t have the competence to fix it. Their penchant for control has brought banking to a standstill.
An August meeting of the central bank and other top ministries tapped an intelligence agency to lead an investigation into the high rates of inflation and depreciating kyat. Meanwhile, the regime has revoked the licenses of 30 foreign exchange traders.
This says so much about the junta’s way of thinking. They are oblivious to the fact that it’s their mismanagement that has caused both depreciation and inflation, yet the benighted and paranoid military is convinced that it’s the work of saboteurs and speculators.
All the while, the generals are doing everything they can to enrich themselves and move assets overseas, before it all comes crumbling down..."
Source/publisher:
"Radio Free Asia" (USA)
Date of entry/update:
2023-09-02
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Business and the Military, The Burmese military's role in the economy
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"Justice For Myanmar spoofs Forbes 30 Under 30 to profile tycoons funnelling funds, arms and related equipment from Singapore to illegitimate junta
Justice For Myanmar today launched a new effort to draw attention to tycoons supporting the illegal Myanmar military junta. The inaugural Dirty Over 30 list features nine tycoons who continue to funnel funds, arms and related equipment to the junta through the “business-friendly” haven of Singapore, which is currently the third-largest supplier of arms and equipment to the Myanmar military. Future editions will feature tycoons in other regions who are enabling and profiting from the crisis in Myanmar.
The campaign is launching ahead of the 2023 ASEAN Summit in Indonesia to pressure Singapore and other ASEAN member countries to more effectively block the movement of funds and arms to the Myanmar junta.
Meet nine paragons of dirty business
The Dirty Over 30 Singapore edition includes nine businesspeople who’ve amassed sizable fortunes funding brutality, mass-murder and war crimes in Myanmar and who continue to do business in Singapore. They include:
Tay Za, Founder and Chairperson, Htoo Group of Companies
Naing Htut Aung, Founder and Managing Director, International Gateways Group of Companies
Aung Hlaing Oo, Founder and Managing Director, Myanmar Chemical & Machinery Group
Aung Moe Myint, Founder and Director, Dynasty Group of Companies
Tun Min Latt, Founder and Managing Director, Star Sapphire Group of Companies
Khin Phyu Win, Founder and Director, Asia Sun Group of Companies
Jonathan Myo Kyaw Thaung, CEO, KT Group
Thein Win Zaw, Founder and Chairperson, Shwe Byain Phyu Group of Companies
George Yin Soon, Investor
The Dirty Over 30 list parodies the Forbes 30 Under 30 list. Portraits of the Dirty Over 30 “dishonourees” were created using real photos and sophisticated AI facial composites. The profiles include factual details about their lives and dirty business dealings. Notably, in what has been called the “30 Under 30 pipeline to prison,” the pattern of unethical and illegal behaviour amongst “honourees” of the Forbes 30 Under 30 list suggests that the profiteers on the Dirty Over 30 list may not be outliers in the business world.
Putting pressure on the Singaporean government
The Singaporean government has already committed publicly to stopping the movement of arms to Myanmar, but so far their efforts have fallen short. A recent report from the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation in Myanmar identifies 138 unique suppliers in Singapore doing $247 million worth of trade with the Myanmar military. The report concludes that if the Singaporean government successfully stopped all arms trading to the Myanmar military from its jurisdiction, it would “significantly disrupt” the junta’s ability to commit war crimes.
Since the coup attempt in 2021, the Myanmar military has killed at least 4,023 people, including children, committed widespread torture and has arbitrarily arrested over 24,000 people. Many have been killed through indiscriminate airstrikes that require a continued supply of aircraft parts, jet fuel and raw materials that the military needs to manufacture bombs and bullets. It has jailed and tortured countless others.
With the Dirty Over 30 project, Justice For Myanmar calls on Singapore to:
Introduce sanctions to stop the direct and indirect transfer of arms, dual-use goods and technology to the Myanmar military.
Block the junta’s access to Singapore’s financial system through targeted sanctions, including on junta banks.
Expedite and make public ongoing investigations into Singaporean companies that have supplied arms, dual-use goods and technology to the Myanmar military.
Push for more sanctions from other ASEAN countries on the Myanmar military and entities that transact business with it..."
Source/publisher:
Justice For Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2023-09-01
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Business and the Military, The Burmese military's role in the economy, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Format :
pdf pdf
Size:
120.53 KB 144.68 KB
more
Description:
"Justice For Myanmar and The Sentry welcome the recent adoption of sanctions by the United States on two Myanmar state-owned banks, the issuance of a determination on the jet fuel sector, and sanctions targeting a supplier of jet fuel to the Myanmar military. These measures are designed to further weaken the Myanmar junta's ability to access the weapons that it uses in the brutal war it is waging against the country’s population, including through indiscriminate airstrikes.
As global leaders are about to meet in Myanmar’s region, first for meetings with ASEAN in Indonesia from September 2-7 and then for the G20 summit in India from September 9-10, The Sentry and Justice For Myanmar reiterate their call for the US and likeminded partners to take the gloves off and adopt much stronger sanctions on the Myanmar junta and its enablers. The US’s show of resolve would be significantly strengthened by joining the European Union in sanctioning the Myanma Oil & Gas Enterprise (MOGE), the junta’s single largest source of foreign currency earnings.
The US and its partners have already improved coordination to more effectively target military-owned businesses, state-owned enterprises, and networks of individuals and corporate entities that enable the junta’s access to international trade and finance. However, this coordination is far from comprehensive, creating loopholes for the junta and its networks of enablers.
For instance, while the US has sanctioned the Star Sapphire Group of Companies’ co-owners, Tun Min Latt and his wife Win Min Soe, for their firms’ involvement with the import of military equipment, the United Kingdom has not sanctioned Win Min Soe to date, and other US partners including the EU, Canada, and Australia have yet to adopt sanctions on the Star Sapphire companies and their co-owners. At the time of his arrest by the Thai police in Bangkok in September 2022 on charges of drug trafficking and money laundering, Tun Min Latt held assets in the names of the two adult children of Min Aung Hlaing, the head of the Myanmar junta, according to Justice For Myanmar and Reuters. These assets included the property deed for a luxury condominium and bankbooks for Thai bank accounts.
The US should urge the newly elected leader of its longtime ally Thailand to effectively enforce sanctions targeting the junta’s sources of funds, equipment, and jet fuel, and to more broadly ramp up the fight against illicit financial flows, as the crisis in Myanmar and other regional trends lead to the rise of transnational crime in the Mekong region. Enhanced collaboration between regulatory authorities, law enforcement agencies, and banks—the latter acting as gatekeepers to the international financial system—is essential in that regard.
Singaporean banks have reportedly strengthened their compliance and risk management measures toward Myanmar since the coup. It was stated during parliamentary questions in July 2023 that, “as Myanmar is on the blacklist of the Financial Action Task Force [FATF], financial institutions in Singapore have also been applying enhanced due diligence for Myanmar-linked customers and transactions that present higher risks.” A media report in August 2023 revealed that United Overseas Bank (UOB), a key offshore bank for “Myanmar’s generals, big corporations and wealthy individuals,” would be restricting transactions and correspondent banking relationships, partly to avoid falling foul of mounting US sanctions on the country. Justice For Myanmar and The Sentry welcome these positive steps, and the US should continue to support Singapore, which currently chairs the FATF, in its efforts to prevent illicit financial flows, including as related to Myanmar. Other Singaporean banks, while avoiding de-risking that could potentially impact on humanitarian aid as well as on trade and business activities that do not benefit the junta, should follow UOB in restricting transactions and correspondent banking relationships, and Singapore authorities should adopt further restrictive measures to prevent the junta’s access to funds and equipment.
Finally, the US needs to encourage its partners in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue to step up their responses to the crisis in Myanmar. Quad member Australia has only targeted a small number of entities and individuals in February 2023; in coordination with the US and other partners, it should do more to catch up. The US should encourage Japan, which chairs the G7 in 2023, to coordinate with ASEAN to ensure that no junta representatives are invited to the December 2023 summit in Tokyo that celebrates the 50-year anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between Japan and the regional organization. As for India, the US must call for the sale of military equipment to the Myanmar junta to be fully suspended, as research by Justice For Myanmar has found that several Indian firms, including ones controlled by New Delhi, have supplied the junta after the coup. The Quad can and must do more to tackle the crisis in Myanmar.
Yadanar Maung, spokesperson, stated for Justice For Myanmar: “The international community is failing the people of Myanmar. Statements of concern and condemnation have had no impact on the illegitimate junta and the daily atrocities it is committing against the people of Myanmar. Instead, governments and international organizations need to take concrete steps to block the junta’s access to the resources it needs to continue its campaign of terror and ensure that there is international accountability for the military’s genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.”
Oliver Windridge, Director of Illicit Finance Policy at The Sentry, said: “The recent adoption of sanctions by the United States on two Myanmar state-owned banks, the issuance of a determination on the jet fuel sector, and sanctions targeting a supplier of jet fuel supplier to the Myanmar military are positive steps forward, but more must be done. As global leaders meet in Myanmar’s region for meetings with ASEAN and then for the G20 summit, The Sentry and Justice For Myanmar reiterate their call for the US and likeminded partner to take the gloves off and adopt much stronger sanctions targeted at the Myanmar junta and its enablers.”
For media inquiries or interview requests for The Sentry, please contact: Greg Hittelman, Director of Communications, [email protected]
For media inquiries for Justice For Myanmar, please contact: Yadanar Maung, Spokesperson, [email protected]
About Justice For Myanmar
Justice For Myanmar is a covert group of activists using research, data visualisation, and reporting to expose and dismantle the business networks that fuel brutality, corruption and mass-scale suffering. One report at a time, Justice For Myanmar is going after the military’s sources of funds and arms. As a result of its work and the work of many others across Myanmar and the world, multinational corporations have already divested hundreds of millions of dollars from business with the military, and targeted sanctions are beginning to disrupt the Myanmar military cartel's global network.
About The Sentry
(Short descriptor for press use: “The Sentry, an investigative organization that tracks corruption”)
The Sentry is an investigative and policy organization that seeks to disable multinational predatory networks that benefit from violent conflict, repression, and kleptocracy. Pull back the curtain on wars, mass atrocities, and "other human rights abuses, and you’ll find grand corruption and unchecked greed. These tragedies persist because the perpetrators rarely face meaningful consequences. The Sentry aims to alter the warped incentive structures that continually undermine peace and good governance. Our investigations follow the money as it is laundered from war zones to financial centers around the world. We provide evidence and strategies for governments, banks, and law enforcement to hold the perpetrators and enablers of violence and corruption to account. These efforts provide new leverage for human rights, peace, and anti-corruption efforts..."
Source/publisher:
Justice For Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2023-09-01
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Business and the Military, Sanctions, The Burmese military's role in the economy, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"Myanmar’s civilian National Unity Government (NUG) aims to bankrupt the junta through tougher sanctions and diplomatic pressure, foreign minister Daw Zin Mar Aung told the media on Tuesday.
“We aim to increase our efforts to lobby the international community to impose more economic sanctions and more diplomatic pressure upon the military council, which is oppressing the people and committing violence,” said Daw Zin Mar Aung.
She said the NUG will engage with any country that supports efforts to end military rule in Myanmar.
The US expanded its sanctions on August 23 to aviation fuel, adding two Burmese business owners and three companies that supply jet fuel to the regime to its Specially Designated Nationals List.
The US was the first country to impose sanctions after the February 1, 2021, coup with measures taken against Myanmar’s top 10 generals by February 11.
The UK and Canada also imposed sanctions on the generals by February 18.
Further sanctions against the regime’s leaders, advisers, the children of junta leader Min Aung Hlaing and military-owned conglomerates followed from the US, UK and European Union in March and April.
In May 2021, the US issued further sanctions on more junta members and its ruling body.
The EU sanctioned junta cabinet ministers and the attorney general in June 2021 and in July the US sanctioned more junta members, their relatives and Chinese firms.
In September 2021 the UK sanctioned Tay Za, a notorious junta crony, and his businesses for providing financial support and arms to the military.
To mark a year since the coup, the US, UK and Canada sanctioned three junta appointees while Washington also targeted four businessmen who were supporting the regime and two organizations providing arms and equipment.
The EU sanctioned more companies, including the junta-controlled Myanma Oil and Gas Enterprise.
In June 2022 the UK sanctioned three firms from Russia and three from Myanmar for supplying aircraft parts to the junta. The UK expanded these measures a month later to other junta-linked companies.
In October the US placed arms dealers in Myanmar on its sanctions blacklist and in November the US and EU extended sanctions, targeting the Sky Aviator aviation company and its owner and 19 other individuals, including a minister and the chief justice.
To mark two years since the coup, the EU imposed further sanctions on junta members, its arms brokers and jet fuel suppliers.
In June this year, the US sanctioned the junta’s defense ministry and the regime-run Myanma Foreign Trade Bank and Myanma Investment and Commercial Bank, which handle the junta’s foreign currency exchanges. Last month the EU sanctioned six more junta members.
The NUG’s foreign ministry thanked the countries imposing sanctions upon junta assets, individuals and allied businesses.
Daw Zin Mar Aung said the NUG is also working with regional neighbors, although only East Timor has officially recognized the civilian government.
“No neighboring countries have officially recognized us yet but they are communicating with us. We need to maintain these relations through engagement, proceeding silently,” she said.
Daw Zin Mar Aung praised Indonesia, the current Association of Southeast Asian Nations chair, for its active role in Myanmar’s crisis. She called for the progress to be continued next year when Laos is chair.
“The military council has not respected ASEAN’s five-point consensus and it does not listen to anyone or anybody,” she said. “We urge ASEAN to keep up its progress and maintain institutional relations with the NUG as well.”..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2023-08-30
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Business and the Military, Sanctions, The Burmese military's role in the economy, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"Justice For Myanmar welcomes the US determination authorising sanctions against any company or individual that operates in the jet fuel sector of the Myanmar economy, including through “activities related to the importation, exportation, reexportation, sale, supply, or transport, directly or indirectly, of jet fuel”. This follows the US determination ordering sanctions against companies and individuals operating in the defence sector of the Myanmar economy under Executive Order 14014 on February 10, 2021.
The new determination is an important step to dismantle the junta’s access to jet fuel, and sends a clear message that companies involved in all stages of the junta’s jet fuel supply chain can face US sanctions.
This comes after a campaign from Myanmar and international civil society calling for countries to block the junta’s access to jet fuel, and is a response to the junta’s reliance on air strikes to wage its campaign of terror against the people.
We urge the US to follow up its determination with sanctions against companies enabling the junta’s access to jet fuel, including those in the shipping and insurance industries.
We further welcome sanctions against Khin Phyu Win, Zaw Min Tun, and three Singapore companies: Shoon Energy Pte Ltd and two of its subsidiaries: PEIA Pte Ltd (formerly Puma Energy Irrawaddy Aviation) and P.E.I Energy Pte Ltd (formerly Puma Energy Irrawaddy).
Shoon group of companies, formerly Asia Sun, is a key local partner of the Myanmar military junta and is involved in importing, storing, selling and delivering jet fuel to the military.
Asia Sun’s role in the Myanmar military’s jet fuel supply chain was detailed in the Amnesty International report, Deadly Cargo, with research contributed by Justice For Myanmar.
We note that the Big Four accounting firm Ernst & Young LLP is currently the listed auditor of two of the newly sanctioned Singapore businesses: PEIA Pte Ltd and P.E.I Energy Pte Ltd. We call on Ernst & Young to immediately cut ties with these businesses and any other companies involved in the supply of jet fuel to Myanmar.
The sanctioning of more companies in Singapore highlights the failure of the Singapore government to block the use of its territory to support the Myanmar military junta. This week, 200 civil society organisations including Justice For Myanmar sent an open letter to Dr Vivian Balakrishnan, Singapore’s Foreign Minister, urging him to introduce sanctions to prevent the direct and indirect transfer of arms, dual-use goods and technology to the Myanmar military, and to block the junta’s access to Singapore’s financial system through targeted sanctions, which it has imposed on Russia following its invasion of Ukraine.
Singapore should listen to the voices of Myanmar civil society and the recent recommendations of the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar by taking concrete action to help end the crisis in Myanmar.
We reiterate our call for coordinated sanctions on the junta controlled Myanma Petrochemical Enterprise (MPE) and the complete Shoon network. MPE controls the jet fuel supply chain, operates the Mann Refinery which produces jet fuel, and jointly owns National Energy Puma Aviation Services (NEPAS) with Shoon. NEPAS imports, stores and distributes jet fuel. Shoon Energy Thilawa Terminal Company Limited (formerly Puma Energy Asia Sun) operates a major fuel terminal and storage tanks. MPE, NEPAS and Shoon Energy Thilawa Terminal have not yet been sanctioned in any jurisdiction.
The illegal junta relies on its air force to wage a war of terror against the people of Myanmar. In the first two months of 2023 alone, Chin Human Rights Organization documented one airstrike per day in Chin State townships under martial law. A recent New York Times investigation details how the junta’s use of airstrikes against the people of Myanmar is worsening. The junta’s ability to carry out its indiscriminate airstrikes depends on its access to jet fuel.
By supporting the supply of jet fuel to the Myanmar military, businesses are complicit in the junta’s airstrikes, which amount to atrocity crimes, and all those responsible should be held accountable under international law.
Justice For Myanmar spokesperson Yadanar Maung says: “We welcome the latest significant steps the US has taken in issuing a sanctions determination against the jet fuel sector and in sanctioning key companies and individuals that supply jet fuel to the Myanmar military, and are complicit in its indiscriminate airstrikes.
“We urge the US to swiftly follow the determination by sanctioning international businesses in the junta’s jet fuel supply chain to help stop its ongoing airstrikes against the people of Myanmar.
“We urge the US, UK, EU, Canada and Australia to coordinate sanctions against companies and individuals in the junta’s jet fuel supply chain, along with arms brokers and entities that provide the junta with sources of revenue, including Myanma Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE).
“It is concerning that Shoon group has continued to operate in Singapore, along with many other companiessupporting the junta’s international crimes.
“Recent US and UK sanctions against Singapore companies should be a wake-up call to the Singaporen government to act in accordance with its international responsibilities and stop allowing Singaporean companies to provide the junta with access to arms, equipment, technology, jet fuel and funds.
“We note Singapore Foreign Minister Dr Vivian Balakrishnan's recent statement committing to a prohibition on the transfer of arms and dual use goods to Myanmar, but comprehensive action needs to be seen.”..."
Source/publisher:
Justice For Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2023-08-24
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Language:
Format :
pdf pdf
Size:
124.32 KB 135.57 KB
more
Sub-title:
Sanctions this year cover 10 people and 15 entities, all tied to the forces that seized power from the elected government of civilian leader Aung San Suu Kyi in February 2021.
Description:
"WASHINGTON (CN) — The Biden administration expanded its sanctions Wednesday on Myanmar's military junta to include foreign companies or people helping the regime acquire jet fuel used in airstrikes on its own people.
Among those newly designated by the State and Treasury departments are two people and three entities accused of supplying the military.
“The United States will continue to seek to deprive the military regime of the resources that enable its oppression of the people of Burma,” State Department spokesperson Matthew Miller said in a statement, adhering to a U.S. policy by which the country is still called by the name that it shed over 30 years ago after the ruling junta brutally suppressed a pro-democracy uprising.
War crimes from on the ground in Myanmar are recounted in the statement, which highlights in particular fighter jet and helicopter attacks that killed up to 90 civilians in April and June.
“The United States remains committed to supporting the people of Burma in their pursuit of freedom and democracy,” Brian Nelson, under secretary of Treasury for terrorism and financial intelligence, said in the press release.
Myanmar's military, called the Tatmadaw, has been in power since 1962. Though the country started a transition to democracy in 2011, military leaders tightened their grip in response to recent elections that brought overwhelming victories for the opposition party, National League for Democracy.
The influence of NLD leader Aung San Suu Kyi brought improved relations with Washington. The Obama administration lifted longstanding sanctions in 2016, but Myanmar's worsening treatment of Rohingya Muslims led the Trump administration to reimpose sanctions a year later.
After the NLD made more gains in the November 2020 elections, the military disputed the results. It seized control of the government in February 2021, arresting Suu Kyi, President U Win Myint and chief regional political leaders.
The coup kicked off a civil war, with opposition leaders who weren’t arrested forming a National Unity Government in exile and launching an armed resistance against the Tatmadaw.
Myanmar's military has claimed it will hold elections again in 2023, but the State Department is skeptical that any vote under the existing political landscape would hold legitimacy. The regime has also not set a firm date, originally floating August, but now saying it could be sometime in November.
The Biden administration appears to be ramping up sanctions, with 10 people and 15 entities designated so far this year, compared with 16 people and nine entities in all of 2022.
In the civil war that has broken out in response to Myanmar's 2021 coup, an estimated 6,000 civilians have been killed, with tens of thousands detained and more than 1.5 million displaced. Meanwhile, widespread food and fuel shortages have occurred as part of an economic collapse.
The White House has responded with sanctions on 85 people and 55 business entities tied to the military regime..."
Source/publisher:
"Courthouse News Service" (California)
Date of entry/update:
2023-08-23
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Language:
Local URL:
more
Sub-title:
The sanctions are in response to the military regime’s “violent airstrikes” against civilians.
Description:
"The U.S. Treasury Department has expanded sanctions aimed at Myanmar’s military junta so that any “foreign individual or entity” linked to procuring jet fuel for the military government can be targeted.
More than 3,900 civilians have been killed by the regime since it seized power in February 2021, the Treasury Department said, with the junta increasingly reliant on “violent airstrikes” against civilians, including “women and schoolchildren,” to maintain its hold on power.
A press release from the Treasury Department singled out two recent air strikes on civilians in the Sagaing region – one in April and one in June – as the impetus for the expansion of the sanctions.
The announcement Wednesday was accompanied by the designation of two Burmese individuals – Khin Phyu Win and Zaw Min Tun – and a company – Shoon Energy Pte. Ltd – that the Treasury Department said were involved in procuring jet fuel for use by Myanmar’s military.
The sanctions mean that American citizens and firms, including banks, cannot have any business relationship with those sanctioned.
“By expanding the use of our sanctions authority to target an additional sector critical to the military regime, we are able to further deprive the regime of the resources that enable it to oppress its citizens,” Brian Nelson, under secretary of the Treasury for terrorism and financial intelligence, was quoted as saying in Wednesday’s statement.
U.S. State Department spokesman Matthew Miller said in a statement that the sanctions were intended to put pressure on the junta.
"The United States will continue to seek to deprive the military regime of the resources that enable its oppression of the people of Burma," he said.
Sagaing has been a hotbed of clashes between the military junta and the People’s Defense Forces since the February 2021 coup. Almost 800,000 residents of the region have been forced to flee due to the conflict since the junta seized power, the United Nations says..."
Source/publisher:
"Radio Free Asia" (USA)
Date of entry/update:
2023-08-23
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"To: H.E. Dr Vivian Balakrishnan, Minister of Foreign Affairs Singapore
Open letter regarding Singapore’s response to business linked to Myanmar junta
Your Excellency,
We, the undersigned organizations, urge you to take meaningful and concrete action to block the Myanmar military junta’s access to arms, dual-use goods, technology and funds, which are used in its ongoing campaign of terror against the people.
We specifically ask you:
to expedite and make public investigations into Singapore-based companies involved in and enabling the transfer of arms and dual-use goods and technology transferred, transited, shipped or brokered through Singapore to the Myanmar military;
introduce sanctions to prevent the direct and indirect transfer of arms, dual-use goods and technology to the Myanmar military;
block the Myanmar junta’s access to Singapore’s financial system through targeted sanctions.
Since its attempted coup on 1 February 2021, the Myanmar military has killed more than 3,800 people, detained more than 23,000 and displaced more than 1.6 million. The Myanmar military has scorched at least 70,000 homes and razed villages to the ground. They have weaponized and blocked humanitarian aid, depriving the people of food, water and basic needs. They have even attacked schools and hospitals. Compared to last year, there is a 33 percent increase in indiscriminate airstrikes in the first half of 2023, according to the UN. The Myanmar military can continue to commit these atrocities because countries including Singapore continue to allow—or fail to prevent—the transfer of arms, dual-use goods and technology to the military junta and continued access to their banking systems.
In our view, the best way to hinder the Myanmar junta from continued access to funds, arms, dual-use goods and technology is through an autonomous sanctions regime on Myanmar by Singapore that goes beyond a principled oral expression of commitment in response to investigations by the UN and human rights organizations.
As Your Excellency is aware, in 2023, several reports have raised concerns over the fact that Singapore is a major jurisdiction for the transfer of various items—in particular dual-use goods and technology—intended for use by the Myanmar armed forces. A May 2023 report by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar identified at least 138 Singapore-based firms that had acted as intermediaries for the Myanmar military, and highlighted how these firms had shipped arms and related goods worth $254 million USD to Myanmar between February 2021 and December 2022. This follows a report by the activist group Justice For Myanmar which named 38 Singapore companies and their directors and shareholders that have brokered arms and equipment to the Myanmar military and a report by the Special Advisory Council for Myanmar (SAC-M), that highlighted how Singapore continues to function as a strategic transit point for potentially significant volumes of items—including certain raw materials—that feed the Myanmar military’s weapons production industry.
We understand that since the release of these reports, investigations into the conduct of the companies have been initiated by your Government. We welcome these investigations and ask you to expedite them and make public the results.
The May 2023 report by the UN Special Rapporteur also noted that arms dealers move hundreds of millions of dollars through Singaporean banks to supply the Myanmar military. Many Myanmar companies—including companies directly associated with the junta—have offices in Singapore. It is routine practice for companies with direct ties to the Myanmar military to place funds in Singaporean banks. Despite some Western sanctions imposed, most of these companies continue to operate freely, providing a conduit of weapons, munitions and spare parts as well as dual-use items and technology to the junta and through the banking system. We note, in particular, the serious allegations that substantial foreign reserves of Myanmar are suspected to be held in Singapore, providing a financial lifeline for the junta.
The long-standing and well-documented reliance by military-linked companies on the Singaporean banking sector gives Singapore more influence on Myanmar than most other ASEAN member states. It is our view that the degree of cooperation from Singaporean banks will have a major impact on the effectiveness of sanctions on the Myanmar junta.
A legal memorandum from international barristers Felicity Gerry KC and Daye Gang, published by Justice For Myanmar, also concluded that Singapore has an international legal obligation “to investigate, prevent and cease transactions that amount to wrongful acts”, which are applicable to business transactions with the Myanmar military and its business interests. While we appreciate the circular reportedly issued by the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) calling for enhanced due diligence measures to detect and mitigate the risks associated with higher-risk customers and transactions related to Myanmar, and the June 2023 statement by MAS noting that financial institutions should continue to be alert to the heightened risks arising from the situation in Myanmar, much more needs to be done. This includes targeted sanctions against military businesses and an autonomous sanction regime that will stop Singapore-registered companies directly and indirectly procuring arms and dual-use goods and technology for the Myanmar military.
On 14 February 2023, during a parliamentary hearing addressing the report by SAC-M, your Excellency confirmed Singapore’s commitment to not authorize the transfer of dual-use items which have been assessed to have potential military application to Myanmar where there is a serious risk that they may be used to inflict violence against unarmed civilians, and that the government of Singapore would not hesitate to take action against those who contravene relevant laws, including Singapore’s Strategic Goods (Control) Act. This commitment is significant as Singapore is the third largest source of arms and dual-use goods for the Myanmar military after Russia and China. However, it is concerning that half a year later, your Excellency’s expressed commitment has only been communicated orally, and we have not yet seen a policy commitment that includes consequences for non-compliance.
During the parliamentary hearing, you noted that specifically on military sales, there had been no transfers of arms to Myanmar in recent years. While this is welcome, the problem, as we see it, is not a question of transfers of conventional arms to Myanmar, but the numerous times that dual-use goods and technology that originates from or transits Singapore—whether transferred directly or indirectly to the junta—has ended up in the hands of the Myanmar military.
Your Excellency, we therefore ask Singapore to adopt and implement export restrictions on Myanmar. This would follow the recent precedent of restrictive measures applied by your government to Russia, pursuant to which applications to export military items, controlled electronics, controlled computers, and certain telecommunications and encryption items to Myanmar would be rejected. In addition, financial measures targeted at designated military-controlled banks, entities and activities should be put in place to restrict the military’s ability to finance its acts of terror against the people. Recent sanctions imposed by the US on Myanmar’s main portals of foreign currency payments, the state-owned Myanma Foreign Trade Bank (MFTB) and Myanma Investment and Commercial Bank (MICB) should set the example in this regard. A failure by Singapore to act would sustain the current crisis whereby MFTB and MICB facilitate foreign-currency exchange within Myanmar and enable transactions between the military junta and foreign markets to buy arms, dual-use goods, technology and jet fuel, and to undermine the effectiveness of the US sanctions on these entities.
While Singapore continues to call for immediate cessation of violence under ASEAN, Singapore-based businesses and the financial system’s involvement in the transfer of weapons and dual-use goods to the Myanmar military directly undermines ASEAN’s credibility. We the undersigned CSOs strongly urge Your Excellency to set a precedent for the region by taking robust and tangible actions to stop Singapore businesses and financial institutions from enabling and being complicit in the Myanmar junta’s ongoing atrocities. As ASEAN is conducting a review of implementation of the failed Five-Point Consensus, these meaningful steps of Singapore will assist ASEAN in reforming the current ineffective approach and replacing the Consensus with concrete actions to address the crisis effectively.
Sincerely,
A total of 200 organizations, including 4 groups that can't be named because of security reasons, have signed this letter.
1 8888 Generation (New Zealand)
2 ၈၈ငြိမ်ချမ်းရေးနှင့်ပွင့်လင်းလူ့အဖွဲ့အစည်းထားဝယ်ခရိုင်
3 Ah Nah Podcast - conversations with Myanmar
4 All Burma Democratic Face in New Zealand
5 Anti-Junta Mass Movement - AJMM
6 Associations of United Nationalities in Japan
7 Auckland Kachin Community NZ
8 Auckland Zomi Community
9 Aung San Suu Kyi Park Norway
10 Basic Education Students & Youths Association (BESYA)
11 Boycott Military's Pocket
12 Burma Campaign UK
13 Burmese Community Group (Manawatu, NZ)
14 Burmese Rohingya Welfare Organisation New Zealand
15 Burmese American Community Institute 9BACI)
16 Burmese Canadian Network
17 Campaign for a New Myanmar
18 CDM Support Team Mandalay (CSTM)
19 Chin Community of Auckland
20 Chin Community in Norway
21 Citizen of Burma Award - New Zealand
22 Citizens of Burma Award(Buffalo Chapter)
23 COBA UAE
24 CRPH and NUG Supporters Ireland
25 CRPH Funding Ireland
26 CRPH Support Group, Norway
27 CRPH Support Group, Norway and members organizations endorses
28 Democratic Party for a New Society, Norway
29 Democratic Youth Council ( ဒီမိုကရက်တစ်လူငယ်ကောင်စီ )
30 Doh Atu - Ensemble pour le Myanmar
31 Dream Hope Goals Media Group
32 Dunedin Myanmar Community New Zealand
33 Enemy Air Route Channel
34 Federal Myanmar Benevolence Group (NZ)
35 Federal School
36 Federation of Workers’ Union of the Burmese Citizen in Japan ( FWUBC )
37 Free Rohingya Coalition
38 General Strike Committee of Nationalities (GSCN)
39 General Strike Coordination Body - GSCB
40 Global Myanmar Spring Revolution ( GMSR )
41 Hero Behind Bars
42 HTY Scout Channel
43 Human Right Defenders and Promoters(Palaw)
44 Information & Scout News (Hlaing)
45 Insein Scout Channel
46 Integria, z.s.
47 International Association, Myanmar-Switzerland (IAMS)
48 International Campaign for the Rohingya
49 Japan Myanmar Help Network - JMHN (comprising of over 40 youth groups in Japan)
50 Justice For Myanmar
51 K'cho Ethnic Association
52 Kachin Association Norway
53 Kachin State Civilian Movement- KSCM
54 Kamayut Scout Channel
55 Kanbauk Defense Force (KBDF)
56 Karenni Society New Zealand
57 Karenni Association - Norway
58 Karenni Wellington Community
59 Kyauktada Strike Committee
60 Kyimyindaing Scout Channel
61 La Communauté Birmane de France
62 LA2M
63 Lanmadaw,Latha & Pabedan Scout Channel
64 League for Democracy in Burma( Japan )
65 Legal Aid for Human Rights (Southern Shan State)
66 LGBTIQ (လိင်စိတ်ခံယူမှုကွဲပြားသူများ) သပိတ်စစ်ကြောင်း
67 Mayangone News
68 MIIT ကျောင်းသားကျောင်းသူများ သပိတ်စစ်ကြောင်း
69 Minority Affairs Institute (MAI Myanmar)
70 Muslim Youth Network
71 Myanmar Community Christchurch New Zealand
72 Myanmar Gonye (New Zealand)
73 Myanmar Action Group Denmark
74 Myanmar Catholic Community In Norway
75 Myanmar community in Italy
76 Myanmar Community in Norway
77 Myanmar Democratic Force in Denmark
78 Myanmar Engineers - New Zealand
79 Myanmar Global Support Foundation ( MGSF )
80 Myanmar Hindu Community - Norway
81 Myanmar Muslim Revolution Force
82 Myanmar Students' Union in New Zealand
83 Nelson Myanmar Community New Zealand
84 New Zealand Doctors for NUG
85 New Zealand Zo Community Inc.
86 New Zealand Karen Association
87 NLD Organization Committee (International) Norway
88 No Business With Genocide
89 NOK Information & Scout Echo
90 North Dagon & East Dagon News
91 Norway Falam Community
92 Norway Matu Community
93 Norway Rvwang Community
94 Overseas Mon Association. New Zealand
95 PDF Support ( Vancouver - Canada )
96 Peace for Burma ( Vancouver ) Canada
97 Progressive Muslim Youth Association-PMYA
98 Progressive Voice
99 Rangoon Scout Network
100 Rohingya Community in Norway
101 Rvwang Community Association New Zealand
102 Save Myanmar Fundraising Group (New Zealand)
103 Save Myanmar Israel
104 Shan Community (New Zealand)
105 Sitt Nyein Pann Foundation
106 South Dagon Scouting Infos (SDG)
107 Southern Dragon Myanmar
108 Support group for Democracy in Myanmar ( the Netherland )
109 Tamwe Nway Oo Channel
110 Tenasserim Students Unions Network - TSUN
111 Thaketa & Dawbon Scout Channel
112 Tourism Committee
113 U.S. Campaign for Burma
114 Unitarian Universalist Service Committee
115 United States Chin Coalition (USCC)
116 Universities Kachin Literature and Culture Association- Yangon (Yangon JLH)
117 Volunteers in Myanmar
118 We support NUG-NB
119 Wellington Chin Community ( New Zealand )
120 Wellington Myanmar community
121 Yangon Revolution Force - YRF (Soft Strike Community)
122 Youth for Democratization of Myanmar (UDM)
123 Youth Scout For Democracy (YSD)
124 YWTC(yangon)
125 Z Fighter News
126 Zomi Christian Fellowship of Norway
127 Zomi Community Norway
128 ကျန်းမာရေးမိသားစု - မန္တလေး (Medical Family – Mandalay)
129 ကွန်ပျူတာတက္ကသိုလ်(မန္တလေး)ကျောင်းသားများသမဂ္ဂ
130 ချမ်းမြသာစည်မြို့နယ် လူထုသပိတ်စစ်ကြောင်း
131 စိန်ပန်း သပိတ်စစ်ကြောင်း
132 ဆေးတက္ကသိုလ်(မန္တလေး)ကျောင်းသားများသမဂ္ဂ
133 ဆေးဘက်ဆိုင်ရာနည်းပညာတက္ကသိုလ်(မန္တလေး)ကျောင်းသားများ သမဂ္ဂ
134 ဆေးဝါးတက္ကသိုလ်(မန္တလေး)ကျောင်းသားများသမဂ္ဂ
135 တမ္ပဝတီ လူထုသပိတ်စစ်ကြောင်း
136 တိုက်ကွမ်ဒို အားကစားအသင်း
137 တိုင်းရင်းဆေးတက္ကသိုလ်(မန္တလေး)ကျောင်းသားများသမဂ္ဂ
138 တိုင်းရင်းသားလူငယ်များ အထွေထွေသပိတ်ကော်မတီ
139 တောင်သာလူထုလှုပ်ရှားမှုကော်မတီ
140 ဒေါင်းစစ်သည်
141 နည်းပညာတက္ကသိုလ်(မန္တလေး)ကျောင်းသားများသမဂ္ဂ
142 နည်းပညာတက္ကသိုလ်(ရတနာပုံဆိုင်ဘာစီးတီး)ကျောင်းသားများ သမဂ္ဂ
143 နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေးဘာသာပေါင်းစုံကွန်ရက်
144 နားထောင်ရင်းလှူပေးပါ။
145 ပညာရေးမိသားစု (စစ်အာဏာရှင်ဆန့်ကျင်ရေး ပညာရေးစစ်ကြောင်းများ ချိတ်ဆက်ညှိနှိုင်းရေးကော်မတီ)
146 ပြည်ကြီးတံခွန်သပိတ်
147 ပုဂ္ဂလိက မူကြိုဆရာ၊ ဆရာမများအဖွဲ့
148 ဘာသာပေါင်းစုံ သပိတ်စစ်ကြောင်း
149 ဘုရားကြီး ငြိမ်းချမ်းရေးသပိတ်စစ်ကြောင်း
150 မကွေးလူထုတိုက်ပွဲကော်မတီ / Magway People's Revolution Committee
151 မန္တလာတက္ကသိုလ် ကျောင်းသားကျောင်းသူများသပိတ်စစ်ကြောင်း
152 မန္တလာတက္ကသိုလ်ကျောင်းသားများသမဂ္ဂ
153 မန္တလေး ကဗျာဆရာများသမဂ္ဂ (Mandalay Poets’ Union)
154 မန္တလေး ကုန်စည်ဒိုင်သပိတ်စစ်ကြောင်း
155 မန္တလေး၊ တက္ကသိုလ် ဒီဂရီ၊ ကောလိပ် ဆရာ၊ ဆရာမများ၊ ဝန်ထမ်းများ သပိတ်စစ်ကြောင်း
156 မန္တလေးကွန်ပျူတာတက္ကသိုလ်ကျောင်းသားများသမဂ္ဂ
157 မန္တလေးတက္ကသိုလ် ကျောင်းသား ကျောင်းသူဟောင်းများ သပိတ်စစ်ကြောင်း
158 မန္တလေးတိုင်းဒေသကြီးလွှတ်တော် ကိုယ်စားပြုကော်မတီ (Committee Representing Mandalay Region Hluttaw)
159 မန္တလေးနည်းပညာတက္ကသိုလ်ကျောင်းသားများသမဂ္ဂ
160 မန္တလေးနိုင်ငံခြားဘာသာတက္ကသိုလ်ကျောင်းသားများသမဂ္ဂ
161 မန္တလေးပုဂ္ဂလိကတက္ကသိုလ် ကျောင်းသားများသမဂ္ဂ (MPUSU)
162 မန္တလေးမြို့အခြေစိုက် လူထုသပိတ်စစ်ကြောင်း
163 မန္တလေးမဟာမိတ် သပိတ်တပ်ပေါင်းစုစစ်ကြောင်း
164 မန္တလေးလူငယ် သပိတ်စစ်ကြောင်း
165 မန္တလေးသပိတ်အင်အားစု
166 မန္တလေးအင်ဂျင်နီယာ တပ်ပေါင်းစု
167 မန္တလေးအင်ဂျင်နီယာများအဖွဲ့ (Mandalay Engineer Group)
168 မန္တလေးအရပ်ဖက်အဖွဲ့အစည်းများ
169 မြင်းခြံလူထုလှုပ်ရှားမှုကော်မတီ
170 မြတောင် သပိတ်စစ်ကြောင်း
171 မြန်မာနိုင်ငံဘဏ်အလုပ်သမားသမဂ္ဂများအဖွဲ့ချုပ် (Bank Trade Unions Federation of Myanmar – BTUFM)
172 မြန်မာ့မီးရထား တိုင်းအမှတ် (၃) CDM ဝန်ထမ်းများ သပိတ်စစ်ကြောင်း
173 မြန်မာသတင်းအချက်အလက်နည်းပညာတက္ကသိုလ်(မန္တလေး) ကျောင်းသားများသမဂ္ဂ
174 မွတ်စ်လင်မ်လူငယ်များအဖွဲ့
175 မဟာအောင်မြေမြို့နယ် စုပေါင်းလူထုသပိတ်စစ်ကြောင်း
176 မေမြို့ ပင်မအထွေထွေသပိတ်အင်အားစု
177 ရတနာပုံတက္ကသိုလ်ကျောင်းသားများသမဂ္ဂ (ရ.တ.က.သ)
178 ရန်ကုန်အခြေစိုက်တက္ကသိုလ်ကျောင်းသားသမဂ္ဂများ (တကသများ-ရန်ကုန်) | Alliance of Students’ Unions Yangon (ASU-Yangon)
179 ရေဘဝဲ (ပြည်သူ့အကျိုးပြု လူငယ်အဖွဲ့အစည်း)
180 လူငယ်ကဗျာဆရာများသမဂ္ဂ
181 သံဃသမဂ္ဂ (မန္တလေး)
182 သပြေညို သတင်းလွှာ
183 သမဝါယမတက္ကသိုလ် ကျောင်းသူ၊ ကျောင်းသားများ သပိတ်စစ်ကြောင်း
184 သရက်ချောင်းမြို့နယ် ပြည်သူကာကွယ်ရေးပြောက်ကျားတပ်ဖွဲ့
185 သွားဘက်ဆိုင်ရာဆေးတက္ကသိုလ်(မန္တလေး)ကျောင်းသားများ သမဂ္ဂ
186 သားဖွားသင်တန်းကျောင်း(မန္တလေး)ကျောင်းသားများသမဂ္ဂ
187 သူနာပြုတက္ကသိုလ်(မန္တလေး)ကျောင်းသားများသမဂ္ဂ
188 သူနာပြုသင်တန်းကျောင်း(မန္တလေး)ကျောင်းသားများသမဂ္ဂ
189 အ.ထ.က (၇) ကျောင်းသူ၊ ကျောင်းသားဟောင်းများ သပိတ်စစ်ကြောင်း
190 အ.လ.က (၁၂) ထခွဲ၊ အခြေခံပညာကျောင်းသားများသမဂ္ဂ (အ.က.သ)
191 အဖမ်းဆီးခံပြည်သူများ ကိုယ်စားပြုသပိတ်စစ်ကြောင်း
192 အမျိုးသားဒီမိုကရေစီအဖွဲ့ချုပ် (မန္တလေးတိုင်း)
193 အမျိုးသားယဉ်ကျေးမှုနှင့် အနုပညာတက္ကသိုလ်(မန္တလေး)ကျောင်းသားများသမဂ္ဂ
194 အလုပ်သမားသမဂ္ဂများအဖွဲ့ချုပ်
195 အောင်ပင်လယ် ပင်မသပိတ်စစ်ကြောင်း
196 အောင်မြေသာစံ ပညာရေးကျောင်းပေါင်းစုံ သပိတ်စစ်ကြောင်း..."
Source/publisher:
200 civil society organizations via Justice For Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2023-08-22
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Language:
Format :
pdf pdf
Size:
110.82 KB 136.55 KB
more
Sub-title:
Experts say the move will do little to control illegal currency trading.
Description:
"Myanmar’s junta is threatening legal action against anyone found to be in possession of foreign currency without authorization in what observers said was a bid to kneecap black market exchangers after the kyat has tumbled to one-third of its value against the U.S. dollar since the coup.
On Aug. 18, US$1 spiked to 3,900 kyats, the highest in history and up 300% from 1,300 in January 2021, a month before the military seized power.
The Central Bank responded Monday with an announcement in pro-junta media that those in possession of foreign currencies without permission will face charges under the Foreign Currency Management Law.
The threat will do little to rein in the illegal currency exchange market, said an authorized foreign currency exchange business owner, who declined to be named citing security concerns.
"Based on this announcement, it looks like they are going to [try to] enforce their set exchange rate of 2,920 or even 2,100 in any way possible,” he told RFA Burmese. “But no one is going to sell their foreign currencies ... If they have bought at a price of 3,000, they will never sell at 2,000, as they have invested millions of kyats."
Under the Foreign Exchange Management Law, domestic residents are allowed to keep a maximum of US$10,000 or its equivalent in foreign currency for as long as six months from the date of receipt. After six months, the holder must sell the currencies to authorized exchangers or deposit it in a bank.
The law also states that exchanging and selling foreign currency without a business license is punishable by up to three years in prison, a fine, and the confiscation of related assets.
A domestic banking expert, who also spoke on condition of anonymity, said the only way the junta can control the rising dollar in Myanmar is to “regularly meet the demand for U.S. dollars and adjust the exchange rate according to external market conditions.”
“The U.S. dollar exchange rate is going to rise as its demand is much higher than its supply,” he said. “There is no way to stop it. You can't stop it by issuing orders, nor by threats of arrest.”
He noted that authorities have recently been buying U.S. dollars from people’s foreign currency accounts at the Central Bank’s exchange rate.
On Saturday, junta Chairman of the Central Bank Than Than Swe told a meeting between Central Bank officials and local business owners in the capital Naypyidaw that “action will be taken” against illegal money exchangers and “those who write on the internet to inflate the value of the U.S. dollar.”
U.S. dollar ‘only safe asset’
An economist monitoring gold and currency markets in Yangon told RFA that the Central Bank is using a “scare tactic” to control the value of the kyat, and warned that even if it works, it would only result in a “short-term solution.”
“The real problem is the financial crisis,” he said, referring to junta mismanagement that has sent the economy into a nosedive. “Those who have money buy US dollars, which they consider [one of the only] safe assets … It’s impossible to try to change the situation by issuing orders.”
Attempts by RFA to contact the Central Bank's Foreign Exchange Management Department by telephone rang unanswered on Monday.
The junta’s store of U.S. dollars has been hit by U.S. Treasury Department sanctions, as well as a decision by Bangladesh's Sonali Bank last week to freeze the accounts of two junta-controlled banks with more than US$1.1 million after the U.S. Embassy in Dhaka sent a letter to the government requesting that Bangladesh comply with such sanctions
The U.S. Treasury said the two banks – Myanma Foreign Trade Bank and Myanma Investment and Commercial Bank – “facilitate much of the foreign currency exchange within Burma and enable transactions between the military regime and foreign markets, including for the purchase and import of arms and related material.”
Junta Chairman Senior Gen. Min Aung Hlaing accused “some countries” of “using the dollar as a weapon” during remarks he made on Aug. 15 at the 11th International Security Conference in Russia.
The junta’s Central Bank revoked 43 foreign currency exchange licenses this year on the pretext that they did not comply with the Foreign Exchange Management Law..."
Source/publisher:
"Radio Free Asia" (USA)
Date of entry/update:
2023-08-21
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Business and the Military, The Burmese military's role in the economy, Burma's economic relations with the region
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"On June 21, 2023, the United States designated two of Burma’s military regime-controlled banks, Myanma Foreign Trade Bank (MFTB) and Myanma Investment and Commercial Bank (MICB). MFTB and MICB have been instrumental in facilitating the regime’s use of foreign currency to procure arms and jet fuel abroad and to access international markets using offshore accounts.
Through these offshore accounts, MFTB and MICB have facilitated the regime’s profiteering from Burma’s extractive industries, including oil and gas, teak, gemstones, and other natural resources. The designations of MFTB and MICB impose a significant impact on the regime’s ability to fund the violence it inflicts on the people of Burma.
At the time of the designation of these two banks, the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control issued General License 5 (GL 5) to allow entities engaging in transactions with MFTB and MICB to wind these down in an orderly fashion. Following the expiration of GL 5 on August 5 at 12:01 a.m. (EST), the United States will continue to carefully monitor compliance and scrutinize transactions with an MFTB or MICB nexus to counter evasion or other behavior that contravenes the intent of these designations and U.S. policy. We will pursue enforcement actions as appropriate.
The United States will not waver in its support for the people of Burma as they seek peace, justice, and an inclusive, democratic future for their country. We will continue to engage with our partners and allies in the broader international community to constrain the regime’s ability to exploit the international financial system..."
Source/publisher:
U.S. Department of State
Date of entry/update:
2023-08-04
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Business and the Military, Sanctions, The Burmese military's role in the economy
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"Myanmar’s military, which seized power in a coup in February 2021, has made repeated promises about a return to civilian rule and limited democracy — so far unkept. The former leader, 78-year-old Nobel laureate Aung San Suu Kyi, could spend the rest of her life in jail, despite a partial pardon in August. The military, known as the Tatmadaw, has used increasingly brutal tactics to subdue its enemies, including the first executions in three decades. By its own admission, nearly half the country is facing instability due to armed conflict. Prospects for economic growth are “severely weakened,” according to the World Bank. The US and its allies this year imposed new sanctions aimed at military officials and “affiliated cronies.” But the junta retains control of vast interests, including lucrative natural gas exports, and has found backers outside the West.
1. What’s happened with Aung San Suu Kyi?
Get a curated selection of 10 of our best stories in your inbox every weekend.
She and Win Myint, who served as president in the last civilian government, were found guilty soon after the coup of inciting dissent against the military and flouting Covid restrictions while campaigning for the November 2020 elections. Since then she’s been convicted in a series of trials on charges including corruptions and violating the colonial-era Official Secrets Act, and sentenced to a total of 33 years in prison. Her legal defense team described all the allegations against her as groundless and politically motivated. On Aug. 1, the junta pardoned both on some charges, including breaking pandemic-era rules, illegal possession of walkie-talkies and incitement. But they remained in prison.
2. Why was there a coup?
Aung San Suu Kyi’s pro-democracy party, the National League for Democracy (NLD) won 83% of the parliamentary seats at stake in the 2020 vote — an even better performance than its 2015 landslide. The election commission and international observers called the election fair. But the military alleged that there had been voter fraud. On the day of the coup, the military said it was necessary to act before the new parliament session began later that week. More broadly, the military operates almost as a state within a state in Myanmar, and its allies still control vast swaths of the economy. The scale of Suu Kyi’s victory may have prompted fears among the generals of new efforts to chip away at their privileges, especially after the exceptionally poor electoral performance of a military-backed party.
3. Are new elections planned?
Yes, but the NLD said in March it would boycott. The military government then dissolved the party after it failed to register in time under a new law. Back in 2021, the military set an August 2023 deadline for elections and said army chief Min Aung Hlaing would head a caretaker government in the meantime. That deadline was extended on July 31 for another six months, until Jan. 31, 2024, as fighting intensified with ethnic armed groups and supporters of Suu Kyi. The planned election has been dismissed as a “sham” by the United Nations and the US.
4. What is the fighting in Myanmar about?
Violence flared after the coup as Aung San Suu Kyi’s supporters demanded her release and the restoration of the elected government. Junta forces have killed 3,857 people as of July 31 and detained many more, according to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (Burma), a human rights group. According to the UN’s Human Rights Council, ill-treatment and torture have resulted in deaths in detention. Some Aung San Suu Kyi supporters have formed what they call the National Unity Government, with armed units known as the People’s Defence Force. They’ve allied with ethnic insurgent groups that have long battled the military over the right to manage their territories and resources. In extending the state of emergency, the junta leader said 40% of townships are facing instability, an admission of the intensity of the conflict. International experts have said the military has effective control over far less territory than it claims to.
5. What’s the fallout been?
The UN Security Council passed a resolution in December demanding an end to violence in Myanmar and the release of political prisoners. Its passage was a milestone, but China, Russia and India abstained, limiting the impact. The US, the UK, Canada and Australia reimposed economic sanctions in 2021, just five years after many had been lifted, although it’s unclear how much impact they will have. The US has since extended its sanctions, including in January. But China, Myanmar’s most important trading partner, has rejected calls at the UN for an arms embargo and has affirmed support for the regime. Japan and India worry that tough measures against the junta only risk increasing China’s influence there. The junta has drawn closer to Russia despite the war in Ukraine — Min Aung Hlaing has praised Russian President Vladimir Putin “as a leader of the world.” Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong of Singapore, Myanmar’s biggest foreign investor, has said sanctions would only hurt Myanmar’s people. The World Bank this year said Myanmar’s potential for inclusive growth has been “severely weakened” and “there is little appetite to invest.”
6. What’s the history?
After World War II, Burma, as it was then known, emerged from British colonial rule and plunged directly into civil conflict. Ethnic minorities make up a third of the population of 55 million and occupy half the land, including areas where valuable resources such as jade, gold and teak are found. A deal providing them with greater autonomy fell apart after Aung San Suu Kyi’s father, Aung San, who was slated to become the country’s first leader, was gunned down in 1947. A coup led by army chief Ne Win in 1962 started a half-century of military rule, during which the country descended into desperate poverty. Troops viciously suppressed pro-democracy protests in 1988. Two years later the army annulled an election that Aung San Suu Kyi’s party had won by a landslide. Under house arrest for much of the next 20 years, she was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1991.
7. How did she get into government?
The junta began a transition to civilian rule with a new constitution in 2008 that reserved 25% of parliamentary seats for the military — enough to block any amendments to it. Still, Aung San Suu Kyi’s party took part in by-elections in 2012 after the government at the time agreed to the release of political prisoners, the freedom to assemble and an opening to foreign investors. Her party then swept to victory in the first full elections in 2015, defeating the ruling party by a margin of nearly 10-to-1. The constitution bars Aung San Suu Kyi from serving as president because her children are UK citizens. Thus, in 2016 she became state counselor, a newly created role akin to prime minister, as well as foreign minister.
8. How did she do?
Her administration liberalized banking, insurance and education and curbed inflation. But about a third of the population was living in poverty and businesses remained mired in red tape. The military continued to control the defense, home affairs and border affairs ministries. Its forces have been accused by UN investigators of practicing “ethnic cleansing” and “crimes against humanity” with “genocidal intent” in driving more than 700,000 Rohingya people over the border to Bangladesh since 2017. (Among Myanmar’s Buddhist majority, prejudice against the Rohingya — Muslims castigated as illegal immigrants and stripped of citizenship — remains fierce and widespread.) Amid the opprobrium, foreign direct investment fell to $2.3 billion in 2019 from $4.7 billion in 2017. The military turned on Aung San Suu Kyi even though she defended them in 2019 at the International Court of Justice against the genocide allegations — increasing her popularity at home at the expense of her international reputation.
Source/publisher:
"Bloomberg News" (New York) via "The Washington Post"
Date of entry/update:
2023-08-01
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"The German state prosecutor in Augsburg has launched a criminal investigation into MAN Energy Solutions, which supplied key components to the UMS Moattama warship, allegedly in violation of Germany’s Foreign Trade Law and European Union Dual Use Regulations. This follows a criminal complaint filed by Greenpeace Germany with the attorney Holger Rothbauer, using evidence and research provided by Justice For Myanmar. The opening of the investigation was first reported by Süddeutsche Zeitung.
The UMS Moattama is a landing platform dock/amphibious assault ship, boosting the Myanmar Navy’s capabilities to move troops, tanks, armoured personnel carriers and other arms and equipment to support its ongoing campaign of terror against the people.
Since the military’s illegal coup attempt, the UMS Moattama has reportedly been used to transport troops, rocket systems and heavy artillery to Rakhine State, where the military continues to commit atrocities. The Moattama is also used in the junta’s Sea Shield military exercises.
The UMS Moattama was built in South Korea and transferred to the Myanmar military in 2019, in the aftermath of its genocide against the Rohingya which involved the Myanmar Navy.
MAN Energy Solutions SE, a subsidiary of Volkswagen Group, supplied the ship’s main engine, power consumers, propellor and propellor control system, control and propellor equipment, and also gave training to Myanmar Navy personnel in South Korea, apparently involving its subsidiary in Denmark.
MAN Energy Solutions is just one of a number of German companies that supplied equipment and technology for the UMS Moattama. Other German companies include:
Raytheon Anschütz GmbH, which has recently restructured, supplied radar equipment, a gyro compass system, and the autopilot and steering control system,
Reintjes GmbH supplied the gearbox with parts from other German companies including Kracht GmbH,
Alfons Haar Maschinenbau GmbH & Co KG supplied the helicopter refuelling system,
Cassens & Plath GmbH supplied the magnetic compass system,
RHOTHETA Elektronik GmbH supplied the direction finder,
GEA Westfalia Separator Group GmbH provided separators with parts from other German companies including Boll & Kirch Filterbau GmbH,
DSB Deutsche Schlauchboot GmbH of Survitec Group provided rescue boats.
Justice For Myanmar calls on German authorities to also open criminal investigations into the remaining companies that supplied equipment and technology to the Myanmar Navy warship.
The action taken by German authorities was based on evidence from the Myanmar Navy Chief Petty Officer Myat Min Thu, a whistle-blower who is part of the Civil Disobedience Movement and who was a recipient of training by MAN in South Korea and served on the ship until 2021.
In 2021, South Korean police launched a police investigation into the illegal transfer of the Moattama to the Myanmar military, targeting Daesun Shipbuilding & Engineering, which built the ship; Posco International, which brokered the transfer; and Korea’s Ministry of Defence. The investigation remains ongoing.
In November 2020, Justice For Myanmar, Korean Civil Society in Solidarity with Rohingya and Korean Transnational Corporation Watch filed complaints with the OECD National Contact Point in Korea and the National Human Rights Commission of Korea against Daesun Shipbuilding & Engineering, Posco International and other businesses supporting the Myanmar military.
The complaint led to scrutiny of the warship export and the police investigation. The police investigation was later supported through the cooperation of Myat Min Thu.
Justice For Myanmar spokesperson Yadanar Maung says: “We welcome the action taken by the German public prosecutor in Augsburg in response to the criminal complaint by Greenpeace Germany.
“The Myanmar Navy is responsible for genocide against the Rohingya and continues to enforce the junta’s policy of apartheid, arbitrarily detaining Rohingya men, women and children who attempt to flee. The military and all those complicit in its international crimes are yet to be held accountable.
“The UMS Moattama, equipped with German technology, supports the Myanmar military’s capabilities to move troops and arms across coastal areas as it wages a campaign of terror against the people.
“Prosecution is an important step towards accountability for the transfer of arms and dual use goods to the Myanmar military, and to prevent future arms transfers from Germany and the European Union, but they need to be widened to all companies involved in the Moattama project.
“Both Germany and the EU have laws in place to prevent the transfer of arms and dual use goods to the genocidal Myanmar military, but governments have repeatedly failed to enforce them, enabling the military to gain access to equipment and technology that supports ongoing war crimes and crimes against humanity.
“Germany must show that breaches of the law will not be tolerated, and we call on other EU member states whose companies have illegally transferred arms, equipment and technology to investigate and hold them accountable.
“We urge Danish authorities to swiftly investigate and take action against MAN’s Danish subsidiary for its role in the Myanmar Navy’s UMS Moattama project.”..."
Source/publisher:
Justice For Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2023-07-31
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Business and the Military, The Burmese military's role in the economy, Freedom of Movement, violations of in Burma/Myanmar
Language:
Format :
pdf pdf
Size:
174.8 KB 133.05 KB
more
Sub-title:
Growing political instability in Myanmar and financial issues have stymied the progress of the Trilateral Highway project
Description:
"On the sidelines of the recently concluded 12th Mekong Ganga Cooperation (MGC) meeting in Bangkok on 16 July, Indian External Affairs Minister Dr. S. Jaishankar met with his Myanmar counterpart U Than Swe to discuss regional connectivity initiatives, with particular emphasis on expediting the India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway (IMT-TH) project. He emphasised the importance of peace and stability in border areas, expressed concerns about trafficking, reiterated India’s support for Myanmar’s democratic transition, proposed people-centric initiatives to address pressing challenges, and aimed to closely coordinate its policy with ASEAN regarding Myanmar.
The IMT-TH presents a significant opportunity for enhanced connectivity and regional integration. It aims to connect India’s Northeast region with Thailand via Myanmar, facilitating trade and commerce, health, education, and tourism between the three nations while providing a more efficient and cost-effective transportation route. India has proposed extending the road network to include Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam, further expanding its reach and potential impact. Bangladesh is also interested in joining the initiative for enhancing trade links and tourism.
It aims to connect India’s Northeast region with Thailand via Myanmar, facilitating trade and commerce, health, education, and tourism between the three nations while providing a more efficient and cost-effective transportation route.
Since its conception in 2002, the Trilateral Highway project has faced various delays and challenges, including political instability in Myanmar and financial issues. Nonetheless, recent years have seen progress, with several stretches of the highway being completed or nearing completion. The project aims to establish an essential strategic route, but earlier targets for its operationalisation have been delayed. Initially, the government sought to make the highway operational by 2015 and then extended the timeline till 2019. Now, the new deadline is set for 2027. It is, thus, crucial to closely assess the current situation on the ground to gauge the progress of this delayed project.
The IMT-TH project follows a proposed plan that starts from Bangkok and passes through cities like Sukhothai and Mae Sot in Thailand, and Yangon, Mandalay, Kalewa, and Tamu in Myanmar before reaching India. In India, it is likely to pass through Moreh, Kohima, Guwahati, Srirampur, Siliguri, and Kolkata, spanning over 2,800 km. The longest stretch of the highway will be in India, while the most minor road section will be in Thailand.
Thailand’s Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, Vijavat Isarabhakdi, stated in a recent interview that most of the project’s work in Thailand is over. The Indian counterpart also mentioned that around 70 percent of the work is complete. Upon being approached, Aung Naing Oo, Myanmar’s Trade Minister, revealed that most of the highway was constructed, spanning 1,512 km. The contractors will complete the remaining sections within three years.
The longest stretch of the highway will be in India, while the most minor road section will be in Thailand.
Persisting bottlenecks
The IMT-TH project encompasses a vital road network in Myanmar, which, despite having witnessed notable development in recent times, still needs progress at numerous stretches. Several sections of the original IMT-TH alignments have been completed or upgraded, including the crucial bypass road connecting Myawaddy and Kawkareik in Thailand and the second friendship bridge linking Myawaddy and Mae Sot. Additionally, ongoing efforts involve the improvement and repair of roads between Kalewa (India) and Monywa (Myanmar), the construction of a new Bago bridge supported by Japan, and the development of an arterial road connecting Bago and Kyaikto in Myanmar, facilitated by the Asian Development Bank (ADB). However, urgent attention is required to replace 69 bridges along the Tamu-Kyigone-Kalewa road. Work on this stretch has been delayed since 2015 due to the termination of the contractor’s agreement. Recently, reports suggest that work on the first bridge between Moreh (in Manipur) and Tamu (in Myanmar) is expected to restart soon. However, a proper timeline is needed.
Construction is underway on the difficult Yar Gyi road section, a significant part of the Trilateral Highway. This particular stretch is characterised by steep gradients and sharp curves, posing considerable challenges to the construction process. Currently, only about 25 percent of the road is complete. The Trade Minister of Myanmar has indicated that converting a 121.8-km portion of the road, specifically between Kalewa and Yar Gyi, into a four-lane motorway will require more time than anticipated. Consequently, the construction team may need to extend or postpone the initial deadline for completion.
The Trade Minister of Myanmar has indicated that converting a 121.8-km portion of the road, specifically between Kalewa and Yar Gyi, into a four-lane motorway will require more time than anticipated.
Additionally, significant security issues persist in Myanmar. The Chin State and Sagaing Region, where the majority of the work is ongoing, are engulfed in conflict between the Junta and the ethnic armed groups. If the conditions do not subside, the resumption of work by contractors seems improbable.
Another aspect that needs immediate attention is formulating and implementing the IMT Trilateral Motor Vehicle Agreement (IMT-TMVA). While the Indian government conducted the IMT-TH Friendship Car Rally in 2016 to sensitise stakeholders to the potential benefits of a motor vehicles agreement (MVA) between the three countries, not much has occurred. There are several reasons for this; one of the biggest challenges to implementing the IMT-TMVA is the need for more infrastructure, particularly in Myanmar. The country has limited road networks and poor connectivity, which makes it difficult for vehicles to move smoothly between India, Myanmar, and Thailand. Bureaucratic hurdles continue to remain a significant bottleneck, where obtaining permits and clearances remains challenging due to differences in the rules and procedures of vehicle movement in each nation making the situation time-consuming and cumbersome. This will be particularly challenging for small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), which may need more resources to navigate complex regulatory frameworks.
Additionally, the security situation in Myanmar is also a significant concern for the implementation of the IMT-TMVA. The country has faced political instability and conflict in recent years, which has affected road transport safety. There have been reports of attacks on vehicles and disruption of transport routes, which can be a significant risk for businesses and travellers. This has led to concerns about the safety of drivers and passengers, which may impact the viability of any agreement.
Adequate financing and resource allocation will play a vital role in overcoming these challenges and realising the full potential of this transformative regional initiative.
Key factors for consideration
Addressing infrastructure limitations, bureaucratic hurdles, and security concerns will ensure smooth cross-border transportation and maximise the benefits of the Trilateral Highway and the IMT-TMVA. Adequate financing and resource allocation will play a vital role in overcoming these challenges and realising the full potential of this transformative regional initiative.
India’s commitment to supporting Myanmar’s democratic transition process and its emphasis on peace and stability are integral to the region’s progress and prosperity. Strengthening policy coordination with ASEAN regarding Myanmar will contribute to a more holistic approach to regional issues and ensure a stable environment for connectivity projects to thrive.
Overall, the successful completion of the India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway hopes to not only bolster economic growth but also pave the way for more robust regional integration, cultural exchange, and cooperation among the participating nations, ultimately contributing to peace, stability, and prosperity in the Mekong-Ganga region..."
Source/publisher:
Observer Research Foundation
Date of entry/update:
2023-07-28
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Business and the Military, Political History
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"John Lewis Partnership, a highly regarded department store chain selling a wide range of products, has informed Burma Campaign UK that it will stop sourcing gems from Burma.
Burma Campaign UK had written to John Lewis and around 40 other retailers asking them to ensure that if they sell gems from Burma, they make sure the gems they sell have not helped fund the Burmese military.
In an email received on 25th July 2023, John Lewis stated: “We remain extremely concerned to learn of developments around the conflicts that have taken place, and that continues to take place in recent years in Burma/Myanmar…Our suppliers source a very small proportion of gems from Burma/Myanmar but we are in the process of urgently seeking alternative sources of supply.”
The decision by John Lewis follows TJC, one of the biggest TV shopping channels and online jewellery retailers in the UK, telling Burma Campaign UK it was withdrawing Burmese gems from sale.
Following the attempted military coup, which began in February 2021, the Burmese military now dominates Burma’s gems industry, which is potentially worth $2bn per year. Through its own private companies, control of the state-owned enterprises and government ministries, control of trade routes into areas not under its control, legal and illegal trade, and the business interests of military family members, the Burmese military extracts revenue from the gems industry in numerous ways.
Burma Campaign UK is not calling for a blanket ban on Burmese gems. We are calling on companies to make sure the gems they sell haven’t been sourced in a way that provides money to the military and helps pay for weapons and the human rights violations committed by the Burmese military.
“John Lewis have done the right thing by deciding to stop sourcing from Burma,” said Mark Farmaner, Director of Burma Campaign UK. “Retailers must ensure that the gems they sell haven’t helped pay for the bombs and the bullets the Burmese military are using against the people of Burma.”..."
Source/publisher:
"Burma Campaign UK" (London)
Date of entry/update:
2023-07-26
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Gems - mining and trade, Business and the Military, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"Mr. HAYASHI Nobumitsu, Governor of Japan Bank for International Cooperation
Mr. TAKESADA Tatsuhiko, President & CEO of Japan Overseas Infrastructure Investment Corporation for Transport and Urban Development
CC:
Mr. SUZUKI Shunichi, Minister of Finance
Mr. SAITO Tetsuo, Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism
Sent by:
Justice For Myanmar
Mekong Watch
FoE Japan
Human Rights Now
Human Rights Watch
Japan International Volunteer Center
On June 21, 2023, the US government announced that it was imposing financial sanctions on the Myanmar junta's Ministry of Defence as a “Specially Designated National,” noting that the Ministry was “responsible for the command and control of the armed forces, which has conducted decades of repressive military rule that was violently resumed following the coup in 2021.”[1] With this designation, the connection between the Redevelopment of the Defense Services Museum Project (commonly known as the “Y Complex Project”), one of the projects being implemented using Japanese public funds, and the ongoing abuses by the Myanmar military junta, has been made even more obvious.
Y Complex involves building and operating a large-scale real estate complex at the site of the former military museum in Yangon, the largest city in Myanmar. The project receives public and private funds from Japan through Japan Overseas Infrastructure Investment Corporation for Transport and Urban Development (JOIN), a government-funded infrastructure investment corporation under the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, and Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) which is Japan’s public export credit agency. JOIN and JBIC invests or lends to the Y Complex project in which the Myanmar military-controlled Ministry of Defence participates,[2] and they have continued their involvement even after the attempted coup by the Myanmar military on February 1, 2021.
Tokyo Tatemono, Fujita Corporation (a subsidiary of Daiwa House Industry), and JOIN set up a Joint Special Purpose Company (J-SPC) in Singapore. JBIC along with Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation and Mizuho Bank co-financed a loan to this J-SPC, and the J-SPC in turn is co-investing in Y Complex Company Ltd., a Myanmar corporation set up jointly by the J-SPC and Yangon Technical and Trading Company Limited (YTT), a Myanmar military crony-owned company.
The land lease agreement is between YTT and "Colonel Aung Min Thein (Officer No. Army 17642), Vice Quarter Master General, Office of the Quarter Master General, Commander-in-Chief (Army).” Land lease payments are to be made to "Defence Account no. MD 010424,” an account likely to be under control of the Office of the Quartermaster General[3]. On December 10, 2021, the US, UK and Canada imposed sanctions on the Office of the Quartermaster General.[4] The UK government has pointed out that the Office of the Quartermaster General "plays a crucial role in procuring equipment for the Myanmar Armed Forces, including ammunition, bombs and jet fuel.”[5]More recently, the EU imposed sanctions on Kyaw Swar Lin, the Quartermaster General, on July 20, 2023, noting that he is a “person whose policies and activities undermine democracy and the rule of law in Myanmar/Burma, and who provides support for actions that threaten the peace, security and stability of Myanmar/Burma.”[6]
We understand that making land lease payments in the Y Complex project is equivalent to providing funds to the Myanmar military through the Office of the Quartermaster General, and have alluded to this problem since before the attempted coup.[7]
So far, JOIN and JBIC have explained that because the Office of the Quartermaster General is within the Ministry of Defence and therefore a part of the government of Myanmar, land lease payments would not benefit the Myanmar military (see below).
Response by Tatsuhiko Takesada, President & CEO of JOIN at the meeting of the Committee on Financial Affairs of the House of Representatives, April 20, 2021: "Regarding the contract for the project site, J-SPC is not directly involved, but under the contract, the local Myanmar company signed a land lease agreement with the Ministry of Defence which is a part of the government to obtain land use rights, and the said local [Myanmar] company subleases the land to the local project company. We have confirmed the current situation, but regarding the land lease payments, we understand that they were appropriately managed within the government."[8]
Statement by JBIC official in charge of the Y Complex Project at the "Ministry of Finance - NGO Regular Dialogue," March 5, 2021: “JBIC recognizes that in this project the rent is paid to the Office of the Quartermaster General in the Ministry of Defence. We understand that the rent payments are included as revenue in the general budget of the Myanmar government…. In Myanmar, based on a law called the Budget Law, so-called general accounts budget is publicly disclosed, and the Ministry of Defence is included as part of that."[9]
These statements show that both JOIN and JBIC recognized that the rent payments should not be benefiting the military and that they were attempting to maintain an appearance that the rent payments were not going to the military by publicly presenting their view that the ultimate destination of the rent payments was the Ministry of Defence and not the military. The recent imposition of sanctions by the US on the Ministry of Defence, has made these excuses even more untenable.[10]
Regardless of whether the ultimate destination of the land lease payments for the Y Complex Project is the Office of the Quartermaster General or the linked Ministry of Defence, these payments enable the Myanmar military to continue to commit atrocity crimes across the country. According to the UN, there are currently 1.9 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Myanmar. [11] The Japanese government and Japanese companies should fulfill their responsibilities under the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights and the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises by immediately stopping their involvement in the Y Complex Project. To do so, the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism should withdraw the investment made by JOIN, and the Ministry of Finance should cancel the loan made by JBIC to stop the injection of public funds into the project and publicly announce that they have made the decision to do so..."
Source/publisher:
Justice For Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2023-07-25
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Business and the Military, Sanctions, The Burmese military's role in the economy
Language:
Format :
pdf pdf pdf
Size:
177.17 KB 174.92 KB 203.32 KB
more
Description:
"WASHINGTON —
The U.S. is supporting a report by the special rapporteur of human rights in Myanmar, despite China's objection to findings that Beijing has been exporting arms to Myanmar's military which has used them to forcibly suppress resistance groups since its 2021 coup.
"The United States strongly supports the mandate of the Special Rapporteur and his work illuminating the human rights situation in Myanmar," a State Department spokesperson told VOA's Korean Service on Friday.
The remarks came in response to China's opposition to a United Nations report by Tom Andrews, the special rapporteur on human rights in Myanmar, that was issued in May. In the report, Andrews said Myanmar's military imported weapons and related material worth at least $1 billion from China and Russia since the military junta's deadly coup in 2021.
The report came up during the regular daily press briefing by China's Foreign Ministry on July 18 when Sky TV asked about China's investment in Myanmar and arms sales to the junta.
Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Mao Ning said, in part, "The Special Rapporteur actually overstepped his mandate."
She continued, "The report contained smears against normal arms trade between sovereign countries and misrepresentation of facts. China firmly opposes it. We have asked the Special Rapporteur to stay objective and fair and strictly follow his mandate and stop serving any political agenda."
The U.N. report, titled "The Billion Dollar Death Trade: The International Arms Networks that Enable Human Rights Violations in Myanmar," says that out of some $1 billion, the Myanmar military imported more than $267 million worth of weapons and materials from entities in China, including state-owned entities.
The report states, "Numerous private and state-owned companies registered in China, including Hong Kong, continued to supply the Myanmar military with an extensive array of arms, equipment, and raw material between October 2021 and December 2022."
The report said the shipments of arms included jets, attack aircrafts and upgrades to tanks and fighter jets, as well as raw materials, such as aluminum, cooper, steel, rubber and lubricants essential for manufacturing weapons.
China seeks 'friendly country,' says expert
David Maxwell, vice president of the Center for Asia Pacific Strategy, said China has been exporting arms to the Myanmar military because it wants "a friendly country on its southern border" to "access the Bay of Bengal to the Indian Ocean to the East of India."
He said that Beijing has "no concern for the human rights of the people in Burma" as it "seeks to export its authoritarian political system around the world in order to dominate the region."
To achieve this goal, Maxwell said China also seeks to "coopt or coerce international organizations, create economic conditions favorable to China alone, and displace democratic institutions."
Bruce Bechtol, a former intelligence officer at the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency who is now a professor at Angelo State University in Texas, said Myanmar is going to be viewed as "a pariah to the international community" and its "only real friend is going to be China."
He added that China might consider that to be an "advantage" because Beijing wants to prevent a democratic country emerging at its border.
'Indiscriminate use of artillery'
Myanmar's military has been using deadly weapons to suppress oppositions groups that have resisted its rule since the overthrow of the democratically elected government led by de facto leader Aung San Suu Kyi in a violent coup in 2021.
Human Rights Watch pointed out in its 2023 World Report that the Myanmar military makes "indiscriminate use of artillery and airstrikes," which has killed and injured civilians and destroyed civilian properties.
The U.N. report by Andrews said that since the coup, the military killed at least 3,500 civilians, detained as much as 22,000 political prisoners, and forcibly displaced more than 1.5 million people.
On Friday, two villagers said the Myanmar military killed 14 people in the village of Sone Chaung in the Sagaing region during a raid to search for the leaders of a resistance group known as the People's Defense Force, according to The Guardian citing AFP.
In June, the U.S. Treasury imposed sanctions on Myanmar's Defense Ministry and two state-run banks used by the military to purchase weapons.
Myanmar Foreign Trade Bank and Myanma Investment and Commercial Bank allowed state-owned Myanma Oil and Gas Enterprise to access international markets to generate revenues used to import weapons and material, according to the Treasury..."
Source/publisher:
"Voice of America" (Washington, D.C)
Date of entry/update:
2023-07-24
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Political role of the Tatmadaw, Business and the Military
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"Justice For Myanmar welcomes the latest round of EU sanctions targeting Mining Enterprise 2 (ME 2), the Quartermaster General, State Administration Council (SAC) members and junta ministers.
ME 2 sits under the junta’s Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Conservation (MONREC) and is one of five state-owned enterprises within the ministry that are illegally controlled by the junta through its February 1, 2021 coup attempt. ME 2 provide a crucial source of funds to the junta, helping to finance its ongoing campaign of terror against the people.
ME 2 is responsible for the mining of tin, tantalum-niobium, titanium, vanadium, bismuth, molybdenum, rare earth elements, radioactive minerals, rubidium, lithium, hafnium, indium, gold, tungsten and heavy metal, according to data from the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative. It generates revenue for the junta through profit sharing arrangements with military conglomerates and Myanmar and foreign companies.
The EU has now sanctioned all but one of the junta-controlled state-owned enterprises under MONREC, having already sanctioned ME 1, Myanma Gems Enterprise and Myanma Timber Enterprise.
A lack of coordination means ME 1 and ME 2 are not yet sanctioned by the UK, Canada or Australia, while Myanmar Pearl Enterprise is sanctioned by the UK, Canada and the USA but not the EU.
Justice For Myanmar calls on the EU, US, UK, Canada, Australia and their allies to coordinate and sanction all state-owned enterprises under MONREC, as well as Myanma Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE), which provides the biggest source of foreign revenue to the junta, and the junta-controlled Myanma Foreign Trade Bank and Myanma Investment and Commercial Bank, which the junta uses to receive foreign funds and purchase arms.
The EU has also sanctioned three junta ministers, two members of the junta’s State Administration Council and the Myanmar Army’s Quartermaster General, Kyaw Swar Lin.
The Quartermaster General of the Myanmar army plays a key role in the military’s corrupt business activities, overseeing Myanmar Economic Corporation, the army’s real estate developments and the purchase of arms, equipment and technology.
The Quartermaster General’s Office has direct and indirect business with a number of international corporations and agencies. For the Y Complex development, the Quartermaster General is in business with the Japanese corporations Daiwa House Industries and Tokyo Tatemono, and the publicly funded Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) and Japan Overseas Infrastructure Investment Corporation for Transport and Urban Development (JOIN). For the LOTTE Hotel development, the Quartermaster General is in business with the South Korean corporations POSCO International and LOTTE Hotels & Resorts.
Justice For Myanmar calls on all companies and public financial institutions to urgently and responsibly cut ties with the Office of the Quartermaster General.
Justice For Myanmar spokesperson Yadanar Maung says: “JFM welcomes the latest round of EU sanctions targeting ME 2, the Quartermaster General and other junta members.
“ME 2 and the Quartermaster General play key roles in the Myanmar military cartel, channelling funds to the junta that finance its widening campaign of terror, helping to pay for the bombs, bullets and jet fuel that the junta uses to murder Myanmar people daily.
“The pace of US, UK, EU, Canadian and Australian sanctions are too slow and lack coordination. These governments and their allies need to do far more to cut the junta’s access to funds, arms, equipment and technology.
“We urge the EU to urgently follow the US in sanctioning Myanma Foreign Trade Bank and Myanma Investment and Commercial Bank.
“We call on Australia, Canada, the UK and USA to follow the EU in sanctioning MOGE, and for governments to sanction all MONREC state-owned enterprises.”..."
Source/publisher:
Justice For Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2023-07-21
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Business and the Military
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"Justice For Myanmar welcomes the latest round of EU sanctions targeting Mining Enterprise 2 (ME 2), the Quartermaster General, State Administration Council (SAC) members and junta ministers.
ME 2 sits under the junta’s Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Conservation (MONREC) and is one of five state-owned enterprises within the ministry that are illegally controlled by the junta through its February 1, 2021 coup attempt. ME 2 provide a crucial source of funds to the junta, helping to finance its ongoing campaign of terror against the people.
ME 2 is responsible for the mining of tin, tantalum-niobium, titanium, vanadium, bismuth, molybdenum, rare earth elements, radioactive minerals, rubidium, lithium, hafnium, indium, gold, tungsten and heavy metal, according to data from the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative. It generates revenue for the junta through profit sharing arrangements with military conglomerates and Myanmar and foreign companies.
The EU has now sanctioned all but one of the junta-controlled state-owned enterprises under MONREC, having already sanctioned ME 1, Myanma Gems Enterprise and Myanma Timber Enterprise.
A lack of coordination means ME 1 and ME 2 are not yet sanctioned by the UK, Canada or Australia, while Myanmar Pearl Enterprise is sanctioned by the UK, Canada and the USA but not the EU.
Justice For Myanmar calls on the EU, US, UK, Canada, Australia and their allies to coordinate and sanction all state-owned enterprises under MONREC, as well as Myanma Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE), which provides the biggest source of foreign revenue to the junta, and the junta-controlled Myanma Foreign Trade Bank and Myanma Investment and Commercial Bank, which the junta uses to receive foreign funds and purchase arms.
The EU has also sanctioned three junta ministers, two members of the junta’s State Administration Council and the Myanmar Army’s Quartermaster General, Kyaw Swar Lin.
The Quartermaster General of the Myanmar army plays a key role in the military’s corrupt business activities, overseeing Myanmar Economic Corporation, the army’s real estate developments and the purchase of arms, equipment and technology.
The Quartermaster General’s Office has direct and indirect business with a number of international corporations and agencies. For the Y Complex development, the Quartermaster General is in business with the Japanese corporations Daiwa House Industries and Tokyo Tatemono, and the publicly funded Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) and Japan Overseas Infrastructure Investment Corporation for Transport and Urban Development (JOIN). For the LOTTE Hotel development, the Quartermaster General is in business with the South Korean corporations POSCO International and LOTTE Hotels & Resorts.
Justice For Myanmar calls on all companies and public financial institutions to urgently and responsibly cut ties with the Office of the Quartermaster General.
Justice For Myanmar spokesperson Yadanar Maung says: “JFM welcomes the latest round of EU sanctions targeting ME 2, the Quartermaster General and other junta members.
“ME 2 and the Quartermaster General play key roles in the Myanmar military cartel, channelling funds to the junta that finance its widening campaign of terror, helping to pay for the bombs, bullets and jet fuel that the junta uses to murder Myanmar people daily.
“The pace of US, UK, EU, Canadian and Australian sanctions are too slow and lack coordination. These governments and their allies need to do far more to cut the junta’s access to funds, arms, equipment and technology.
“We urge the EU to urgently follow the US in sanctioning Myanma Foreign Trade Bank and Myanma Investment and Commercial Bank.
“We call on Australia, Canada, the UK and USA to follow the EU in sanctioning MOGE, and for governments to sanction all MONREC state-owned enterprises.”..."
Source/publisher:
Justice For Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2023-07-21
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Business and the Military
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"Burma Campaign UK today welcomed new EU sanctions on No2 Mining Enterprise and 6 individuals announced yesterday, but criticised the incredibly slow pace of the introduction of new sanctions.
The EU has the right policy of sanctioning on an ongoing basis sources of revenue and arms and individuals linked to human rights violations, but EU member states are not prioritising the implementation of their own policy.
“At this pace, it will be decades before the EU gets round to sanctioning those committing human rights violations and most sources of revenue and arms to the military,” said Anna Roberts, Executive Director of Burma Campaign UK. “Why has it taken two and a half years to sanction such an obvious source of revenue like a mining enterprise which receives revenue from rare earths?”
There is no ‘silver bullet’ sanction which will by itself have a major impact on reducing revenue to the Burmese military. It is, therefore, essential that the EU, UK USA, Canada and others maximise the breadth of targeted sanctions to chip away at sources of revenue and arms. It is the cumulative impact of such sanctions which will maximise their effectiveness.
“If you set out to try to minimise the impact of sanctions, this is the way you would do it, uncoordinated sanctions implemented at an incredibly slow speed with gaps of months in between, giving the military time to try to find workarounds before the next random sanction,” said Anna Roberts. “Since the USA organised a sanctions coordination meeting there has been less coordination and the UK is missing in action.”..."
Source/publisher:
"Burma Campaign UK" (London)
Date of entry/update:
2023-07-21
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"Today, the Council imposed a seventh round of restrictive measures in view of the situation in Myanmar/Burma against six individuals and one entity in response to the continuing escalation of violence, grave human rights violations and threats to the peace, security and stability in Myanmar/Burma.
The listings include three Union Ministers for immigration and population, labour and health and sports, two members of the State Administration Council (SAC), the Quartermaster General, as well as No. 2 Mining Enterprise (ME 2), a state-owned enterprise that is controlled by and generates revenue for the Myanmar Armed Forces (Tatmadaw).
Restrictive measures currently apply to a total of 99 individuals and 19 entities. Those designated are subject to an asset freeze and a travel ban, which prevents them from entering or transiting through EU territory. In addition, EU persons and entities are prohibited to make funds available to those listed.
Other EU restrictive measure remain in place: the embargo on arms and equipment and export restrictions on equipment for monitoring communications which might be used for internal repression, the export ban on dual-use goods for use by the military and border guard police, and the prohibition of military training and cooperation with the Tatmadaw.
The restrictive measures come in addition to the withholding of EU financial assistance directly going to the government and the freezing of all EU assistance that may be seen as legitimising the junta.
The EU remains deeply concerned by the continuing escalation of violence and the evolution towards a protracted conflict with regional implications. The Union condemns the continuing grave human rights violations including torture, sexual and gender-based violence, the persecution of civil society, human rights defenders and journalists, indiscriminate attacks on the civilian population, including a deadly airstrike killing at least 171 persons on 10 April 2023, by the Myanmar armed forces. The dissolution of 40 political parties on 28 March 2023 was another demonstration of the blatant disrespect by the military regime for democracy and the rights and wishes of the Myanmar population.
All hostilities must stop immediately. The military authorities must fully respect international humanitarian law and put an end to the indiscriminate use of force.
The relevant legal acts have been published in the Official Journal of the European Union.
Background
In February 2021, the Council adopted conclusions condemning in the strongest terms the military coup carried out in Myanmar/Burma.
On 31 January 2023, the High Representative issued a declaration on behalf of the EU on the 2nd anniversary of the military take-over stating that, in the absence of any swift progress on the situation in Myanmar, the EU stood ready to adopt further restrictive measures against those directly responsible for and those abetting the undermining of democracy and the serious human rights violations in the country.
The Council has imposed restrictive measures against those responsible for the military coup staged in Myanmar/Burma on 1 February 2021, and the subsequent military and police repression against peaceful demonstrators on 22 March, 19 April and 21 June 2021, 21 February and 8 November 2022, and 20 February 2023..."
Source/publisher:
Council of the European Union
Date of entry/update:
2023-07-20
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Business and the Military, Sanctions, The Burmese military's role in the economy, European Union-Burma relations -- official links and documents
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"British aid to Burma has been cut by 51% this financial year, and by 70% since the financial year 2020-2021, according to newly published Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office accounts.
This comes during a time when Burma is suffering its worst human rights and humanitarian crisis ever, after the attempted military coup on 1 February 2021.
“Foreign Secretary James Cleverly is cutting aid to Burma at a time when more people than ever are in desperate need of assistance,” said Anna Roberts, Executive Director at Burma Campaign UK. “Aid to Burma should be increased, not cut, and more aid needs to go to local civil society so British aid reaches people in areas not under Burmese military control.”
British aid to Burma has been cut from £61.9 million last year, to £30.1 million in this financial year. Previous government records show that the aid to Burma in 2020 was just over £103 million. This means that aid has been cut by 70% from 2020 to 2023-2024.
These cuts in aid to Burma come after the government’s 82% cuts in aid to Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh, who fled genocide in Burma.
The British government has previously tried to disguise the overall cuts in aid to Burma by highlighting statistics for humanitarian aid, rather than overall aid to Burma. Funding for any development aid programmes discontinued after the attempted coup began should have been reallocated towards the dramatic increase in humanitarian needs but was not. Even before the coup Burma Campaign UK had been campaigning for a higher proportion of UK aid to be spent on the humanitarian emergencies in the country. In 2018 DFID was spending three times as much on economic development and governance as on humanitarian aid.
The humanitarian crisis in Burma has been created as the Burmese military desperately tries to consolidate an attempted coup in February 2021. It has met unprecedented resistance and is losing control of parts of the country. In response, it has launched indiscriminate attacks using airstrikes and long-range artillery.
The British government has so far failed to sanction supplies of aviation fuel to Burma, despite five British companies, UK P&I, Steamship Mutual, Britannia P&I, North Standard and Shipowners’ Club, being involved in the supply chain of aviation fuel deliveries. Without aviation fuel, the jets can’t fly and if they can’t fly, they can’t bomb.
The British government had previously led the implementation of sanctions on sources of revenue and arms but there have been no new sanctions in almost four months and major sources of revenue, such as gas, state-owned banks and rare earth minerals have yet to be sanctioned. The slow plodding pace of sanctions has meant the military has been able to generate revenue to fund arms purchases. The EU has sanctioned Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise and the US has sanctioned state-owned banks.
It is not just the cuts in aid to Burma which are alarming, but also the way in which aid is given. Most of the people forced to flee attacks by the Burmese military are in areas not under the control of the military and where UN and other agencies don’t operate. For most, the only way to reach them is through local civil society organisations, but the British government and other donors provide relatively little aid to them, and apply so many conditions and so much bureaucracy and red tape that local organisations can’t access funds.
“James Cleverly is moving too slowly to cut off sources of revenue and weapons to the Burmese military and is now cutting aid to the people attacked by those weapons,” said Anna Roberts. “Arguing that the British government has also cut life-saving aid to other countries is not a defence justifying these cuts, it’s a disgrace.”..."
Source/publisher:
"Burma Campaign UK" (London)
Date of entry/update:
2023-07-19
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Business and the Military, Sanctions, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"Monsieur Le Président de la République
Emmanuel Macron
Palais de l’Elysée
55 Rue du Faubourg Saint-Honoré
75008 Paris
July 10, 2023
Subject: Seeking French support to stop Indian arms sales to Myanmar junta
Dear President Macron,
We are writing this open letter to you from Justice For Myanmar, a covert group of activists using research, data visualisation, and reporting to expose and dismantle the business networks that fuel the Myanmar military’s international crimes, brutality and corruption.
We request that you raise concerns regarding the sale of arms, dual use goods and technology from India to the Myanmar junta with Prime Minister Modi during his upcoming visit to France. We also request that you require India to ban further exports of arms, dual use goods and technology to the junta as a condition on the export of French arms and technology to India.
After Russia and China, India is the third biggest supplier of arms to the Myanmar military. The flow of arms and dual use goods and technology from India to Myanmar has continued following the military’s illegal coup attempt of February 1, 2021, notably including from Indian state-owned companies.
Since the military’s coup attempt, India’s majority state-owned Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL), a joint venture partner of Thalès, transferred multiple items to the Myanmar military, including:
A coastal surveillance system;
A remote-controlled weapon station;
Slip rings that can be used in any electromechanical system that requires rotation while transmitting power or signals, such as for shipborne radar turntables, rotating turrets on military armoured vehicles, airborne radar turntables or guidance systems;
Mounting base plates (true north) with the harmonised system (HS) code 8529.90, confirming that the item is a part for use with radio transmission or radar equipment;
A sonar transducer and associated main equipment (specified to be wet end) for likely use in a junta submarine;
A directing gear system that would support transducer arrays of hull mounted ship sonar systems, such as those developed by India’s Defence Research and Development Organisation;
An underwater telephony system, coupled with three sets of unspecified technical documents and test equipment;
An expendable bathy thermograph, which can be launched from a ship or submarine to measure the temperature as it falls through the water;
MHS-355 and 20W HF SSB manpack radios.
In the same period, items supplied by other Indian companies to the Myanmar military include:
3,000 fuzes supplied by Sandeep Metalcraft, a private arms manufacturer;
Spare parts and an alarm monitoring and control system supplied by Larsen & Toubro;
122mm gun barrels supplied by Yantra India Limited, a state-owned arms manufacturer;
Motors, timing belts and laboratory items from Jainkoch Corporation.
The Myanmar military junta is a terrorist organisation under Myanmar law and as defined in international law. Since the attempted coup, the junta has killed more than 3,700 people and arrested over 23,700 more. It has conducted deliberate armed attacks on people across Myanmar including children and launches regular indiscriminate airstrikes and shelling as part of a campaign of terror. These actions constitute war crimes and crimes against humanity under international law, for which the military has yet to be held accountable. While the military junta is directly responsible for these attacks, they have been enabled by the continued supply of arms, equipment and technology from international suppliers such as India, and the insufficient level of action taken by the international community to prevent this support from continuing.
We note that in November 2022, H.E. Mr Sébastien Lecornu, Minister for the Armed Forces of France, paid his first official visit to India to hold the Indo-French Annual Defence Dialogue and to strengthen Indo-French strategic ties. The Armed Forces Minister’s visit to India reaffirms France’s engagement in the Indo-Pacific and India’s centrality in the French strategy for the region and came in a year that has seen an acceleration of the French and Indian armed forces’ endeavours towards greater interoperability through joint air, navy, and army exercises. Minister Lecornu also held wide-ranging talks with his counterpart, Rajnath Singh, covering industrial and technological partnerships in line with the Make in India policy, under which the Indian government has brought in reforms to encourage design, development and manufacture of defence equipment in India. Without adequate safeguards in place, France may find itself indirectly supporting the Indian government’s exports of arms and dual use goods and technology to Myanmar as a result of its defence cooperation with India, including through links to India’s domestic production of arms.
India, like France, is a member of the Wassenaar Arrangement. Under this arrangement, India is expected to apply export controls on transfers of arms and dual-use goods and technologies. India also has obligations under international humanitarian and human rights law to not transfer weapons when there is an expectation that these weapons could be used in violation of the Geneva Conventions, or to aid and abet atrocity crimes. The fact that that Indian companies have continued to supply weapons, dual use goods and technology after the attempted coup in Myanmar shows a serious disregard by the Indian government for its obligations under international human rights and humanitarian law, and its commitments under the Wassenaar Arrangement.
In a May 2023 report on the junta’s procurement of arms and equipment, the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar found that India’s supply of materials used in surveillance technology and artillery, as well as likely for missiles, contravenes its obligations under international law. He noted,
“India has the requisite knowledge that the Myanmar military is committing probable war crimes given the substantial international reporting on this subject. India should therefore be aware that the arms it provides to the Myanmar military – though relatively limited – are likely to be used in the commission of international crimes.”
Our request for France to take action on Indian arms sales to Myanmar is consistent with the recommendations of the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar in his reports on arms, and UN General Assembly resolution A/75/L.85, which “calls upon all member States to prevent the flow of arms into Myanmar.”
We further note that in your joint statement regarding the official visit of Prime Minister Modi, it is stated, “France and India have a shared vision on peace and security, especially in Europe and the Indo-Pacific and uphold the objectives and the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, which are also the basis of our cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region”. The UN Charter states that the first purpose of the United Nations is “to maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace”.
Your action in support of the human rights and democratic aspirations of the people of Myanmar is in line with this commitment, as well as the French values of liberty, equality and fraternity.
We look forward to your response..."
Source/publisher:
Justice For Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2023-07-10
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Business and the Military, The Burmese military's role in the economy, Arms (Military Expenditure, Arms Transfers, Arms Production Etc), Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
113.69 KB
more
Description:
"More than two years after the attempted military coup in Myanmar, and two years after financial institutions’ investments in Myanmar’s military cartel were first exposed in a Justice For Myanmar and BankTrack briefing, five major French banks and a pension fund continue to invest in twenty-two companies linked to the Myanmar military junta, a report published today by Info Birmanie, BankTrack and Justice for Myanmar found. The junta is accused of committing war crimes and crimes against humanity.
The report, which is endorsed by ALTSEAN-Burma, FIDH and Reporters without Borders, reveals that these investments by Crédit Agricole, La Banque Postale, the BPCE group, BNP Paribas, Société Générale and the Fonds de Réserve pour les Retraites (FRR) amount to over US$6 billion, 75% of which is in the fossil fuel sector. Investments were also made in companies that sell arms to the junta and in companies operating in the telecommunications sector that enables the junta’s surveillance. With US$4 billion, Crédit Agricole accounts for most of the investments.
The companies in which these six financial institutions are shareholders have been divided into two categories: those with a direct and long-standing relationship with the Myanmar military or with companies controlled by the Myanmar military before the coup (category 1), and those with a direct business relationship with state-owned companies under military control following the coup of February 1, 2021 (category 2).
The report highlights the connection of these investments to fueling widespread and systematic human rights violations in Myanmar, including the imprisonment of 70 journalists and other severe restrictions on press freedom.
It reveals that Crédit Agricole is investing in India’s state-owned company Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL) that has been implicated in the sale of military equipment to the Myanmar junta since the 2021 coup attempt. BEL is also a leading partner of the Thalès Group.
The findings are published while France is preparing to welcome Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi as a guest of honour at the July 14th Bastille Day parade in Paris, as part of the celebrations marking the 25th anniversary of the France-India partnership.
French investments and the partnership between India and France in the field of defence should be rigorously scrutinised in the light of these findings, to prevent French institutions from helping to finance the flow of arms and technology to the junta.
Crédit Agricole also invests in Sinotruk Hong Kong Ltd, a company scrutinised in a recent report from Tom Andrews, UN Special Rapporteur on Myanmar, for transferring equipment to the Military junta since the coup attempt.
Crédit Agricole, Groupe BPCE, BNP Paribas, Banque Postale and Fonds de Réserve pour les retraites also hold shares in the Japanese company KDDI and its partner Sumitomo Corporation. These companies in the telecommunications sector continue to do business with the military junta through their joint operations with Myanma Posts and Telecommunications (MPT), supporting the junta’s surveillance capabilities.
The report calls on the five banks and the pension fund to comply with their obligations under France’s 2017 Duty of Care Law and international standards on business and human rights. The report authors urge the financial institutions to divest immediately and responsibly from companies listed in category 1 and to sell their shares in category 2 companies if they do not cease their support for the junta. France must ensure that the Pension Reserve Fund does not invest in companies linked to the Myanmar military.
The data published in the report highlights the need for France to give the Duty of Care Law its full practical scope with regard to companies in the financial sector and the importance of the negotiations underway at European level to adopt a directive on corporate due diligence. Several countries, including France, have been reported to lobby for a restricted scope of application for the text under negotiation, excluding the financial sector. Continued vigilance and scrutiny of the ongoing negotiations is needed until the final text includes the financial sector.
Info Birmanie's coordinator highlights that "it is urgent to see Crédit Agricole divest from Indian arms manufacturer Bharat Electronics Limited, which Norges Bank Investment Management, a Norwegian sovereign wealth fund, in particular, divested from because of its arms sales to the Myanmar junta."
Yadanar Maung, Justice For Myanmar spokesperson says: “It is unacceptable that French banks and a pension fund continue to invest in companies with known ties to the Myanmar military junta that is committing atrocity crimes against the people of Myanmar with impunity. These banks must act now to ensure they are in no way supporting the junta. As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, we urge France to take a firm stance against the flow of arms to the junta, including from India, and push for a global arms embargo.”
Henrieke Butijn, Climate campaigner & researcher at BankTrack adds : “It is outrageous that these banks have still not taken adequate action to assess and cut ties with companies linked to the Myanmar junta, even after their investments were exposed two years ago. That is two years in which the junta has been able to use the revenues from fossil fuels and the products from companies like Bharat Electronics to terrorise the population. By failing to act on their investments, these five French financiers are not only in breach of the OECD Guidelines and UNGPs, they are also betraying the people of Myanmar."..."
Source/publisher:
Justice For Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2023-07-06
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Business and the Military, The Burmese military's role in the economy, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
Language:
Format :
pdf pdf pdf
Size:
219.59 KB 330.75 KB 232.83 KB
Local URL:
- 2023-07-06-J4M_New-report-names-five-French-banks-and-a-pension-fund-supporting-Myanmar-military-junta-en.pdf
- 2023-07-06-J4M_New-report-names-five-French-banks-and-a-pension-fund-supporting-Myanmar-military-junta-bu.pdf
- 2023-07-06-J4M_New-report-names-five-French-banks-and-a-pension-fund-supporting-Myanmar-military-junta-fr.pdf
more
Description:
"Justice For Myanmar welcomes the latest round of US sanctions targeting Myanma Foreign Trade Bank (MFTB), Myanma Investment and Commercial Bank (MICB) and the junta’s Ministry of Defence.
MFTB and MICB are state-owned banks that the Myanmar military illegally seized through its coup attempt.
The banks are key nodes in the military cartel’s economic networks, supporting the junta’s campaign of terror.
The junta’s Ministry of Defence plays a financial role for the Myanmar military as a whole and its procurement of arms and related materiel that are needed for the junta’s ongoing commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity.
While these sanctions are positive, Justice For Myanmar urges the US and its allies to urgently impose sanctions on Myanma Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE), which is responsible for the junta’s largest source of foreign revenue, and to coordinate sanctions that target whole networks of crony companies and arms brokers, so as to systematically cut the junta’s access to funds and arms.
Justice For Myanmar spokesperson Yadanar Maung says: “We welcome the latest round of US sanctions targeting junta-controlled banks that help sustain the junta’s campaign of terror.
“However, for sanctions to be effective, far more needs to be done to systematically target the junta’s financial and arms procurement networks by the US and its allies.
“Justice For Myanmar calls for urgent sanctions against Myanma Oil and Gas Enterprise, which continues to bankroll the junta’s ongoing war crimes and crimes against humanity, as well as the junta’s network of cronies and arms brokers.
“These sanctions are a result of the courageous resistance of the people of Myanmar to the military’s failing coup attempt, and the efforts of activists around the world supporting the Myanmar people’s struggle for democracy.
“The international community needs to hear to the voices of Myanmar and take decisive action to further cut the junta’s access to funds and arms. The cartel must be dismantled.”..."
Source/publisher:
Justice For Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2023-06-21
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Language:
Format :
pdf pdf
Size:
123.24 KB 111.8 KB
more
Description:
"Justice For Myanmar calls on India’s Quad partners and other allies to use their leverage to pressure India to stop the supply of arms and dual use goods and technology to the Myanmar military junta.
A Justice For Myanmar investigation of Indian export records has revealed over US$5 million in new exports to the Myanmar military and its arms brokers from Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL) in the six months from November 2022 to April 2023.
The shipments consisted of military end-use goods, technology and technical documents to be used by the Myanmar military.
Items included metallic sonar domes, transducers and gaskets for the domes to be used on frigates, warships or submarines; directing gear systems; various items for radio transmission or radar equipment; and manpack radios for battlefield communications.
BEL, which maintains a branch office in Myanmar, transferred the equipment knowing that the Myanmar military is the end user, and that it is committing ongoing war crimes and crimes against humanity with total impunity.
Through its campaign of terror against the people, the Myanmar military junta has so far murdered over 3,600, arbitrarily arrested 23,300 more, committed indiscriminate airstrikes and shelling, torture, sexual violence and displaced at least 1.5 million.
The shipments may aid and abet the junta’s international crimes and are a continuation of India’s flagrant disregard for its obligations under international human rights and humanitarian law and its commitments under the Wassenaar Arrangement.
India and the Myanmar military have long-standing ties. In his speech on 25 December 2022, war criminal and junta head Min Aung Hlaing stated a need for large warships with high combat capabilities and the training of navy officers to operate them, noting that naval officers had been sent to other countries, including India, to enhance their individual capabilities.
The USA and France, which are honouring Prime Minister Narendra Modi in state visits this year, have a particular responsibility to address India’s support for the junta, and to push for India to impose an arms embargo on Myanmar.
BEL’s exports to Myanmar during the six-month period were spread across seven shipments, with three being sent to the Myanmar military directly, three sent to the arms brokers Mega Hill General Trading, and one sent to Alliance Engineering Services.
Alliance Engineering Services is connected to the family of the junta’s former air force chief Maung Maung Kyaw.
Mega Hill General Trading is a private Myanmar military contractor that has a history of procuring technology and providing services to the army’s Directorate of Procurement, including a remote-controlled weapon station supplied by BEL in 2021 and exposed by Justice For Myanmar.
Justice For Myanmar also exposed BEL’s supply of a coastal surveillance system to the Myanmar military before and after its illegal coup attempt.
Justice For Myanmar calls for urgent targeted sanctions against Mega Hill General Trading, Alliance Engineering Services, their associated business, directors and shareholders.
BEL is 51.14% owned by the Indian government and is publicly listed. Other shareholders include Nippon Life India Asset Management, Goldman Sachs, Vanguard, BlackRock, Fidelity, Canada Pension Plan, California Public Employees' Retirement System, California State Teachers Retirement System, Caisse de Depot et Placement du Quebec and the Swedish pension funds, AP-fonden (AP1), Andra AP-fonden (AP2) and Sjunde AP-fonden (AP7).
BEL’s institutional shareholders should divest from the company because of its continued supply of dual use goods and technology to the Myanmar military, in line with their international human rights responsibilities.
Justice For Myanmar spokesperson Yadanar Maung says: “The Indian government and its state-owned arms companies are continuing business as usual in Myanmar, equipping and profiting from the junta as it commits acts of terror against the people.
“These new and significant exports to Myanmar from Bharat Electronics Limited make India further complicit in the junta’s ongoing war crimes and crimes against humanity.
“By selling arms and equipment to the junta, India is choosing to ignore the voices of the Myanmar people, the legitimate National Unity Government, civil society, UN resolutions and its responsibilities under international law.
“It is crucial that India’s Quad partners and other allies step up and start using their leverage to stop India’s abhorrent support for the junta.
“The Biden administration is this week honouring Prime Minister Narendra Modi with a state visit to the White House.
“We urge President Biden and his government to push Prime Minister Modi to immediately stop all shipments of arms and dual use goods and technology to the Myanmar junta.
“The US should impose conditions on military aid to India to help end Indian support for the junta.
“President Macron should raise India’s complicity in the junta’s international crimes when Modi makes a state visit to Paris in July, and push India to impose an arms embargo on Myanmar.”..."
Source/publisher:
Justice For Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2023-06-21
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Business and the Military, Sanctions, The Burmese military's role in the economy, Arms (Military Expenditure, Arms Transfers, Arms Production Etc)
Language:
Format :
pdf pdf
Size:
148.05 KB 133.63 KB
more
Description:
"Sweden must act on recent Indian arms sales to the Myanmar military and investigate how components of Swedish arms are once again being exported from India to Myanmar, despite the EU arms embargo.
Justice For Myanmar calls on the Swedish government and its arms control authority, the Inspectorate of Strategic Products (ISP), to take necessary measures to ensure that Swedish arms do not end up in the hands of the illegal Myanmar military junta that is committing atrocities throughout the country with total impunity.
On 29 March 2023, Sweden’s Minister for Foreign Affairs Tobias Billström responded to an inquiry by Member of Parliament, Håkan Svenneling, on measures taken by the Swedish government to prevent the re-export of weapons produced under Swedish licence in India.
The inquiry follows an investigation by Justice For Myanmar that found that some of the arms and associated components sold from India to the Myanmar military have been Swedish designed, including fuses for Carl Gustaf recoilless rifles, developed and produced by Saab Group.
As an EU member state, it is prohibited for Sweden to transfer arms and dual use items and technologies to the Myanmar military.
In responding to MP Håkan Svenneling’s question, Billström confirmed that Swedish Carl Gustaf recoilless rifles have been manufactured in India under licence since the 1970s. He also confirmed that Sweden has transferred Carl Gustaf recoilless rifles to India and that some of these transferred arms have been diverted from India to Myanmar.
In 2012, this diversion was subject to an official investigation by the ISP.
According to Billström, the ISP concluded that India was respecting its commitments to not re-export weapons manufactured under Swedish licence and that the Indian government had taken sufficient measures to reduce the risk of diversion.
However, since the 2012 investigation concluded, Indian firm Sandeep Metalcraft Private Limited has supplied the Myanmar military with time mechanical fuse 447 designed for 84 mm Carl Gustaf recoilless rifles, despite the Myanmar military’s genocide against the Rohingya and ongoing international crimes. One shipment of fuse 447 was sent to Myanmar in 2019 and a second shipment likely of fuse 447 was shipped after the Myanmar military’s attempted coup, directly supporting its campaign of terror. Sandeep Metalcraft still advertises Carl Gustaf fuses on its website.
The information exposed by Justice For Myanmar therefore suggests that key components for ammunition for Carl Gustaf recoilless rifles once again have been diverted from India to Myanmar. This casts doubt on the Indian government’s willingness to comply with end-user commitments and take appropriate measures to reduce the risk of diversion.
Billström’s response did not address the questions raised about the recent transfer of fuses for Carl Gustaf rifles from India to Myanmar.
In response to Justice For Myanmar’s earlier investigation, Saab declined to respond to questions on whether the transferred fuses would require a Saab licence to be produced, and whether Saab’s licence production agreements with Indian companies prohibit or restrict onward exports from India to other countries. It is unclear whether Sandeep Metalcraft is in a position to manufacture the fuses in India without licensable parts and assistance from the Saab Group.
India has continued to export military hardware, including 122 mm barrels for howitzers, to the Myanmar military as late as October 2022. The manufacturer of these barrels is Yantra India Limited, a state-owned public sector undertaking associated with the Indian Ministry of Defence.
Yantra India Limited’s ordnance factory in Ambajhari currently produces 84 mm mark-III FFV 551 Carl Gustaf ammunition. The FFV551 is the primary high-explosive anti-tank (HEAT) round and is a rocket-assisted projectile.
Billström, in his response, also noted a new system, in place as of March 1, 2022, that implies supervisory controls in foreign countries that have received transfers of light weapons made in Sweden, such as Carl Gustaf recoilless rifles and ammunition for this category of weapon.
This system may include post-transfer verification visits in recipient countries to reduce risks of diversion, including the risk of re-export to other countries without prior and explicit permission from Sweden.
The new system also implies that countries that have not acted in accordance with commitments to not re-export Swedish light arms without prior consent from Sweden should not be considered eligible as recipients of new transfers of arms made in Sweden or of transfers foreseen as part of prior deals made with Sweden, as long as the commitments continue to be contravened or where a recipient country refuses to accept a post-transfer verification visit.
It is not clear whether ISP has undertaken, or intends to undertake, an official investigation into the transfer by Sandeep Metalcraft fuses for Carl Gustaf rifles to Myanmar. ISP should urgently investigate if any of the Sandeep Metalcraft shipments to Myanmar contain Swedish technology and make public any past or future investigation carried out to this end.
Justice For Myanmar supports the proposal made by members of Parliament Håkan Svenneling et al of April 28, 2023, asking the Swedish government to adopt a strategy to prevent the re-export of Swedish arms to Myanmar.
Justice For Myanmar notes with concern that in September 2022, Saab announced its decision to set up a production facility in India for its Carl-Gustaf M4 shoulder-fired weapon system. For this venture, Saab FFV India is being established as a new company to make the rocket launchers for the Indian military, as well as parts of other weapons platforms for foreign states.
This move is particularly alarming in light of India’s increasing military co-operation with the Myanmar military after its campaign of genocide against the Rohingya in 2017. In July 2019, India and Myanmar signed a Memorandum of Understanding to increase defence co-operation and has continued to support the Myanmar military after its coup attempt.
According to data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), India was the third largest supplier of weapons to Myanmar for the years 2017-2021, accounting for 17% of Myanmar’s arms imports after China (36%) and Russia (27%).
Justice For Myanmar spokesperson Yadanar Maung says: “We are deeply concerned about Sweden’s apparent ties to the supply of weapons to the Myanmar military, which is intensifying its indiscriminate attacks against the people.
“The ISP must fully investigate how components of Swedish light arms and their ammunition are still being exported from India to Myanmar, including from Sandeep Metalcraft, and ensure that Sweden abides by the EU arms embargo, which prohibits Sweden from transferring arms and dual use goods to the Myanmar military.
“The Swedish government needs to take urgent action to prevent further diversion, including a suspension of export and production agreements with Indian arms manufacturers in light of India’s blatant disregard for he norms of conduct contained in the Wassenaar Arrangement and in international humanitarian law, as seen in the continued business Indian arms manufacturers have with the illegal Myanmar military junta.
“We demand that the ISP evaluation leading to a decision to grant Saab the right to establish an M4 manufacturing plant in India be made public in light of India’s well-known track record of exporting conventional arms, ammunition, parts and components to Myanmar, including from Swedish designed weapons.”..."
Source/publisher:
Justice For Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2023-06-20
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Business and the Military, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Arms (Military Expenditure, Arms Transfers, Arms Production Etc)
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
144.15 KB
more
Description:
"In 2022, China’s former foreign minister Wang Yi visited Myanmar, but he did not meet with the regime’s leader Senior General Min Aung Hlaing. On May 2 2023, the general warmly welcomed Wang’s successor Qin Gang. The minister expressed China’s support for the regime regardless of the situation and promised deeper economic cooperation. He further promised to support Myanmar’s efforts ‘to maintain stability’.
In March 2021, China condemned the violence against civilians, halted investments and engaged with the exiled National League for Democracy (NLD)’s members. This support changed dramatically in 2023 as China began a new diplomatic approach. On 4 April 2023, the secretary of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) Yunnan Provincial Committee Wang Ning arrived in Naypyidaw.
Later that month, an envoy from the CCP came and met former junta leader Than Shwe — now 90 years old — who had nurtured closer relations with China than Min Aung Hlaing. The envoy also met former president Thein Sein. These meetings were intended to ask the former leaders to advise Min Aung Hlaing, who is known to be anti-Chinese, to forge closer ties.
China’s strategy intertwines economic, political and military dimensions. Since the military coup, China has invested US$113 million in Myanmar.
The China–Myanmar Economic Corridor provides an important economic link between the two countries. The plan for a high-speed railway between Yunnan and Rakhine — which was shelved in 2014 — is now back on the table, as is a windmill project in Rakhine, a hydroelectric power station in Kachin state and a gas power plant.
For Myanmar, supplies of food, fertiliser and stable electricity are urgent, and China is addressing this through infrastructure. Since February 2023, the 770 kilometre-long Chinese-operated oil pipeline from Rakhine to Yunnan has been used to transport Russian oil to China. The pipeline begins at the deep-sea port in Kyaukphyu on Ramree Island and is very important to China’s Belt and Road Initiative.
On the political and military front, China worries about the border regions, where fighting between Myanmar’s military and ethnic armed organisations (EAOs) often land both bombs and refugees on the Chinese side. Qin visited the United Wa State Army, Kachin Independent Army, Arakan Army and other China-friendly northeast EAOs before he saw Min Aung Hlaing. Qin has urged Yunnan to strengthen its border defence.
China worries that the People’s Defense Force (PDF) will attack its investments in Myanmar. PDF attacked one of the stations on the pipeline in February 2022. In May 2023 a series of anti-Chinese protests arose — reflecting mounting resentment towards Chinese investments for neglecting the locals and the environment. The resistance has called for a boycott of Chinese products.
There has also been speculation that China is helping to construct a base on the 11 km-long Great Coco Island, which is located 300 kilometres away from Myanmar in the Bay of Bengal. The island has a radar station and an airfield.
Another sign of China’s offensive strategy in the region was a visit by Chinese diplomats to Bangladesh to accelerate the repatriation of Rohingya refugees, despite poor conditions in the Rakhine settlement camps.
The strategy in Myanmar is also part of China’s attempts to counter US influence in the region. The United States’ 2021 Burma Act will provide support to the National Unity Government and the resistance. This may have convinced China to support Min Aung Hlaing.
Chinese envoys have not been allowed to meet Aung San Suu Kyi and China is not happy with the NLD ban. Despite these concerns, a strategic triad alliance between China, Russia and Myanmar is emerging. Perhaps this is a convenient relationship for the three partners, but it is viewed cynically by Myanmar’s civilians.
Demonstrations have intensified and the pipeline has been attacked three times since Qin’s visit. The parallel National Unity Government has declared Chinese investments illegal. For Min Aung Hlaing, the alliance is a question of survival. He badly needs economic, political and military support and so has chosen to ignore resentment against increased Chinese influence.
Meanwhile, China’s Ambassador to Myanmar Chen Hai met with Myanmar’s Home Affairs Minister and urged him to crack down on the internet fraud and gambling hub Shwe Kokko run by Chinese criminals on the border with Thailand. The Ambassador urged Myanmar to rescue the people trafficked and trapped by Shwe Kokko. But their headquarters are guarded by the Border Guard Forces of the military, which have stakes in the business. China clearly wants Min Aung Hlaing to get control over matters affecting Chinese interests before it sends an invitation for an official visit to Beijing.
The military uses its Russian fighter aircraft and helicopters to bomb civilians, while troops have been burning villages and murdering civilians. The resistance is without a firm coherent command, needs more international help and depends on EAOs opposing the regime. But the resistance will not give up until there is substantial change.
Any mediation seems impossible and the generals are used to cope with international sanctions. China’s support of Min Aung Hlaing is bad for the resistance and the humanitarian crisis. If China’s support for Myanmar continues to be guided by a desire to serve its own interests, prospects for changing the situation will remain dim..."
Source/publisher:
"East Asia Forum" (Australia)
Date of entry/update:
2023-06-17
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Business and the Military, Burma's economic relations with China, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"A Justice For Myanmar investigation has uncovered new details of Austria’s Diamond Aircraft Industries’ project with the Myanmar military to locally assemble and produce DART-450 aircraft, in an apparent breach of the EU arms embargo.
The DART-450 are training and reconnaissance planes that would provide the military with support to train Myanmar Air Force pilots, who are essential to the junta’s large-scale indiscriminate airstrikes, part of its campaign of terror against the people. The aircraft would also provide the military with aerial surveillance capabilities.
Through a transfer of technology deal, Diamond Aircraft Industries supplied the Myanmar military with composites and parts, as well as technical assistance in Myanmar and the training of military personnel in Austria to assemble aircraft and manufacture key parts.
Diamond Aircraft Industries is an Austrian based aircraft manufacturer owned by the Chinese corporation, Wanfeng Aviation Industry via a UK holding company. Wanfeng Aviation Industry’s ultimate owner is the Shenzhen-listed Zhejiang Wanfeng Auto Wheel Company Limited.
Diamond Aircraft Industries’ support for the Myanmar military took place after its campaign of genocide against the Rohingya and while it was committing war crimes and crimes against humanity in other ethnic areas with total impunity. The project was running between 2017 and 2020, when it was temporarily disrupted as a result of the Covid-19 pandemic.
Under the EU’s arms embargo on Myanmar, in force during the project period, it is illegal to provide arms, dual use goods, and equipment used for internal repression to Myanmar, in addition to restrictions on military training and military cooperation.
Justice for Myanmar has obtained confidential records that confirm that the project would result in the Myanmar air force obtaining DART aircraft that would be locally assembled, with the military producing key composite components and parts in Myanmar over six apparent phases.
In the first phase of the DART-450 project in Myanmar, six DART-450 aircrafts were to be manufactured in Austria and shipped, bulk-packed and by airfreight, to Myanmar for final assembly from 2019. The assembly of one aircraft has been completed in Myanmar with the on-site support of Diamond Aircraft technicians from Austria and Germany.
Justice For Myanmar has identified companies from multiple countries implicated in the project that may also be in breach of sanctions. The companies whose key technical components have been used for the DART-450 project in Myanmar and are based in countries with arms embargoes on Myanmar include Garmin (Switzerland), SIRS Navigation (UK), Electronics International (USA) and Safran (France). Composite materials have been supplied to Myanmar by Engineered Cramer Composites (ECC) (Germany).
According to information obtained for Justice For Myanmar, negotiations between Diamond Aircraft Industries and Swedish company DST Control AB to equip the DART-450 aircrafts with OTUS-U250 sensors have also been initiated.
Justice For Myanmar identified companies whose computer numerical control machines have been used to manufacture and assemble the DART-450 aircrafts at the Shante air base in Myanmar, including Schuko (Germany), Styrotec (Germany) and Felder (Austria).
The Diamond Aircraft Industries deal with the Myanmar military was brokered by Miya Win International, a Myanmar company that has been sanctioned by the UK and has been involved in the procurement of other military end-use equipment from Austria for the Myanmar military, including unmanned aerial vehicles from Schiebel Corporation and a flight simulator from Axis Simulation.
Justice For Myanmar has submitted evidence of the Diamond Aircraft Industries business with the Myanmar military to the European Union’s sanctions whistleblower tool and calls for a swift investigation into Diamond and associated companies.
Justice For Myanmar spokesperson Yadanar Maung says: “Diamond Aircraft Industries’ deep engagement with the Myanmar military is a shocking failure of the Austrian government to enforce the EU arms embargo on Myanmar.
“While the Myanmar military was carrying out indiscriminate airstrikes and committing genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity with total impunity, Diamond Aircraft Industries was equipping and training Myanmar military personnel to locally assemble aircrafts that would clearly be used to repress the Myanmar people.
“This is not a standalone case but part of a pattern of Austria’s failures to stop its companies from supplying the Myanmar military with equipment and technology, including after the military’s illegal coup attempt on February 1, 2021
“Austria needs to urgently investigate all those that have violated EU restrictive measures on Myanmar, hold them accountable, and take concrete steps to prevent the further complicity of Austrian companies and citizens in the Myanmar military’s international crimes.
“The UK, Germany, France, Switzerland, Sweden and the USA should also investigate companies in their jurisdictions that are implicated in the Myanmar military’s DART-450 project and take action against all breaches of sanctions.
“The EU and its allies should sanction Miya Win International and its owners to help prevent further European transfers of arms and equipment to the murderous junta.”..."
Source/publisher:
Justice For Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2023-06-12
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Business and the Military, The Burmese military's role in the economy, Arms (Military Expenditure, Arms Transfers, Arms Production Etc), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
150.1 KB
more