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Title: India’s Massive Armaments Sales
Description: "It does not surprise one any longer when news relating to the persecution of minorities surfaces in India. In yet another development, the BJP’s Hindutva-backed regime has been found to be expanding its network of terror beyond India’s borders by colluding with Myanmar’s outlawed junta. The military govt that staged a coup in February 2021 overthrew the civilian government of Noble laureate Aung San Suu Kyi, putting her and her party behind bars. The military junta in charge faces a grave legitimacy crisis from the global community at large with India being an exception. When the 2021 issue was debated in the UN General Assembly, India abstained from voting against it evincing its tacit support for the military setup in Naypyidaw. UN’s recent report titled Billion Dollar Death Trade exposed India’s massive arms shipments to the ports of Myanmar which the military junta is potentially using against its civilian population committing gross atrocities to suppress democratic voices in the country. The volume of arms exports from India increased significantly when an organised genocide began in the country against the Rohingya community in 2017. International bodies such as Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and New Global Report on Arms Expenditure have claimed that half of India’s arms exports between the years 2017-21 have gone to Myanmar. The supplies included surveillance equipment, artillery, and missiles manufactured by Indian state-owned enterprises like Bharat Dynamics Limited. Not only has India become an abettor of crimes against humanity in Myanmar but also a violator of the Wassenaar Arrangement which makes it incumbent on the signatories to increase transparency in their arms exports. The arrangement also prohibits its members from supplying and acquiring ‘dual use items’ meaning those that can be used for civilian as well as military purposes to and from a state that is a cause of concern for the region in which Myanmar is. There is overwhelming evidence available that the junta is involved in heinous war crimes yet the Indian state continues to aid and arm them knowing well to what ends they are being used. The UN’s Special Rapporteur has reported that $51 million worth of arms has been supplied directly to Myanmar’s military and arms dealers by Indian firms. Another state-owned enterprise named Bharat Electronics Limited is reported to have despatched Remote Controlled Weapons Station (RCWS) according to export data. A further six HJT-16 Kiran-1 light attack aircrafts were flown to former Burma with which India shares over a thousand-mile border. The Indian representative claimed that any defence exports made to Myanmar over the period in question were part of the deal signed with the civilian government before the coup for the security interests of both nations. India could have suspended these supplies till democracy was restored in the country, yet it continues to empower the junta through this enormous flow of arms. The impact of this arms influx has been grievous for the civilians who are subjected to mass slaughter and destruction of their homes and villages. For instance, the fuses in the recoilless rifles used by the military to fire on people of the Kayin state where more than 10,000 were forced to flee from their homes were produced by Maharashtra-based Sandeep Metalcraft. Another firm called Yantra India supplied 122 mm gun barrels for Howitzers manufactured by Ka Pa Sa defence industries that were used by the artillery to shell villages. The rapid militarization of the junta is only resulting in instability and civil war in the ASEAN member state. Not only is it wreaking havoc on innocent minorities but also this bellicose group surfeiting on Indian supplies is posing a glaring threat to other countries in the region as well as those part of the Wassenaar Arrangement which prohibits this sort of unchecked outflow of weapons and military technology. If the rogue regime in Myanmar gets hold of strategic weapons it could be a recipe for disaster and a compromise on global security. As a result of the crisis in Myanmar, India has refused to host the Rohingya refugees and those already in their custody are discriminately denied even the basic safeguards listed under International Refugee Law. If the Indian state has any regard for the dignity of human life, it must halt this multi-layered siphoning of military hardware until a stable, popular and legitimate government is established in Myanmar..."
Source/publisher: Daily Times
Date of entry/update: 2023-07-03
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Title: Minister for Foreign Affairs Dr Vivian Balakrishnan's Written Replies to Parliamentary Questions, 3 July 2023
Description: "QUESTION Mr Dennis Tan Lip Fong: To ask the Minister for Foreign Affairs (a) whether the Government has data on the number of Singaporeans who have been placed under exit bans by the foreign countries they are living in; (b) if so, what is the total number of such persons for each of the last five years; (c) what is the breakdown of the countries involved; and (d) what are the top five most common reasons given for the exit bans. REPLY The Government does not have data on the number of Singaporeans who have been placed under exit bans by foreign countries. Foreign authorities do not have an obligation to inform the Government when exit bans are issued to Singaporeans. QUESTIONS Mr Vikram Nair: To ask the Minister for Foreign Affairs (a) whether the Government has investigated the allegations in the report by the UN Special Rapporteur claiming that Singapore-based entities had shipped US$254 million worth of supplies to the Myanmar military; (b) if so, what is the update; and (c) whether any actions are being taken. Mr Dennis Tan Lip Fong: To ask the Minister for Foreign Affairs (a) how many Singapore-based companies have been identified by the United Nations Special Rapporteur in Myanmar in the sale of dual-use items, raw materials and spare parts for military related uses in Myanmar; (b) what actions have been taken against such companies; and (c) what is the number of such companies against which actions have been taken. Mr Dennis Tan Lip Fong: To ask the Prime Minister in view of the report published on 17 May 2023 by the United Nations Special Rapporteur in Myanmar relating to Singapore companies or Singapore-based entities implicated in the sales of dual-use items, raw materials and spare parts for military related uses (a) how many cases involved Singapore-based banks in the financing of the transactions, including trade financing; and (b) what actions have been taken or are being taken against such banks. REPLY 1 Let me first make clear that the Singapore Government has not imposed a general trade embargo on Myanmar. We do not want to add to the suffering of Myanmar’s civilian population. In 2022, Singapore’s total bilateral trade with Myanmar was S$5.8 billion. The allegations in the May 2023 report by UN Special Rapporteur for Myanmar Thomas Andrews pertain to supposedly US$254 million worth of goods over a two-year period. Nonetheless, we take Mr Andrews’ report very seriously, and have requested him to provide specific and verifiable evidence to aid our efforts. An initial list of 47 entities were identified. More recently, another 91 entities were identified too. I seek Members’ understanding that this is an interim update as the investigations are ongoing. 2 First, nine entities are no longer registered with the Accounting and Corporate Regulatory Authority, which means that they can no longer carry on business or operate as legal entities in Singapore. This includes entities that were allegedly involved in the transfer of components and spare parts for fighter aircraft, equipment for the Myanmar Navy, as well as radios, research and equipment for electronic warfare. 3 Second, most of the 47 entities no longer have business facilities with Singapore banks. The banks will review the remaining accounts and take appropriate measures, including enhanced scrutiny to ensure that the transactions processed by these entities are not suspicious. Such measures would curtail their ability to continue with any undesirable business. 4 As Myanmar is on the blacklist of the Financial Action Task Force, financial institutions in Singapore have also been applying enhanced due diligence for Myanmar-linked customers and transactions that present higher risks. 5 Third, we are looking into specific details of the alleged US$254 million worth of “arms and related goods” that were shipped through Singapore-based entities to the Myanmar military. In Mr Andrews’ report, there were no indications that specific armaments were being transferred to the Myanmar military. Instead, under the category of “arms”, what was cited were only spare parts and equipment, without details of what these constituted. The other major categories of items covered in the report included “dual use supplies” which included items such as computers, electrical components, and medical equipment. Another category of items was “manufacturing equipment” which comprised items like welding machines and overhead cranes; and “raw materials” which covered items such as steel beams and aluminium ingots, pipes and valves, and fabric. 6 Members would appreciate from these descriptions that the items do not necessarily constitute “arms” or weaponry in its ordinary meaning. Many of them such as computers and medical equipment are also non-controlled items. It is difficult to isolate specific suspicious transactions from such broad categories. We are therefore seeking more details such as export transaction documents to ascertain how these transactions are connected to the manufacture of weapons in Myanmar, so that our checks and investigations can be more thorough, and effective based on objective evidence. At the same time, let me make clear that it is not the Singapore Government’s policy intention to block legitimate trade with Myanmar. Doing so would further set back the country’s development and exacerbate the suffering of the civilian population of Myanmar. 7 Finally, I would like to re-state categorically that the Singapore Government has not conducted any military sales to the Myanmar military in recent years, including during the period covered in Mr Andrews’ report – that is, between February 2021 and December 2022. Indeed, Mr Andrews himself reaffirmed in his report that “there are no indications the Government of Singapore has approved, or is involved in, the shipment of arms and associated materials to the Myanmar military.” 8 We will continue to work closely and constructively with Mr Andrews to seek specific, verifiable, and where possible court admissible information to advance our investigations. 9 In conclusion, let me reiterate that the Government remains committed to implementing our policy to prevent the transfer of arms and dual-use items which have been assessed to have potential military application to Myanmar, where there is serious risk that they may be used to inflict violence against unarmed civilians. We will not hesitate to take action against any individual or entity which contravenes this..."
Source/publisher: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Singapore
Date of entry/update: 2023-07-03
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Title: Southeast Asian parliamentarians call for women, ethnic people to have greater say in the future of a democratic Myanmar
Description: "CHIANG MAI – The Myanmar pro-democracy movement must listen to the calls of women and ethnic people and their vision for federalism, ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights said today. On 29 June, APHR held a closed-door meeting with women human rights defenders and activists from Myanmar civil society groups in Chiang Mai, Thailand as part of a series of discussions that aim to provide a platform for gendered perspectives on the crisis in the country, including topics such as federalism, patriarchy, and ethnic inclusion. As long as there has been a civil war in Myanmar, there has been a struggle for ethnic autonomy, including the rights to their land, language, health care, education and traditions. For women, in addition to the fight for ethnic equality, has also been for gender equality. In the current context of post-coup Myanmar, new challenges have emerged and a new struggle for equality across all genders and ethnicities. “The commitment and dedication of women to Myanmar’s struggle for democracy is evident across the movement,” said APHR Board Member and former Thai foreign minister Kasit Piromya. “Federalism cannot exist in Myanmar without democracy, and certainly not without the contributions of women.” “The history of Burma is rooted in ongoing conflict. When we look at the creators of conflict, it is very clear it is the Myanmar junta. Women have always been involved in revolutionary acts because we believe in genuine peace,” said Moon Nay Li, Joint General Secretary of the Women’s League of Burma . While pro-democracy bodies, including the National Unity Government, the National Unity Consultative Council and the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, have called for federalism to defeat the junta, women-led organizations and activists are advocating for a future that is gender-equal as well as federal. “Too often, women are told that their pursuits for gender equality are of lesser importance amidst the shared struggle to defeat the junta. These struggles are interconnected as the commitment to end military rule is rooted in ending patriarchal norms and institutions,” said APHR member and member of the Philippine House of Representatives Arlene Brosas. “Women’s rights defenders are critical actors in the pro-democracy movement, and their voices must be amplified to ensure their needs are met and perspectives are heard.” During the meeting, the women human rights defenders and activists were very clear that more reflection needed to be done on how the ‘pro-democracy’ movement is currently progressing. For many, this includes inner work, primarily from the Bamar majority, on how to ‘unlearn’ certain attitudes and beliefs which stem from Burmanization, Buddhism and the patriarchy. Calls were also made to the international community to engage with pro-democracy stakeholders, and not the terrorist regime. “The international community, including ASEAN, must support women human rights defenders and their calls for a more inclusive vision of federalism in Myanmar. Defeating the junta is imperative, but without the participation of women and ethnic people, a democratic Myanmar cannot be sustainable,” said APHR Chair and member of Indonesian House of Representatives Mercy Barends..."
Source/publisher: ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights
Date of entry/update: 2023-07-03
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Title: Spring Diary
Description: "I used to be a university teacher. As a teacher, I was proud of my work as a mentor to students, our young gems for the future. I highly valued my job, and I’d devoted myself to teaching as I had few skills for another profession. As my husband was an employee at a private bank, we had to manage living on a fixed income since we were both salary earners. We’ve brought up our children to be content with life, doing our best to make a happy family, although it was not fully provided. But my dreams were shattered one morning in spring. That day was 1st February 2021. My life, steady until that point, was struck by an immense change. On that day, the military announced a state of emergency and staged an illogical coup. I felt like a motherless child, like someone who had lost her future. It felt like I had travelled back in time. I had no motivation to work, and I felt even more lonely when the internet connections were cut off. Nobody could tell what would happen next or what had happened. People would voice their random ideas, and the department, the school, the town, and the entire country became silent with people deeply immersed in their own thoughts. The movement started in Mandalay. Two days after the military coup, motorbike riders expressed their distress by honking on the streets. The whole street and residential quarters were noisy with honking sounds. Later, a silent strike was staged with a three-finger salute. Posters bearing the images of the three-finger salute spread throughout the country—it was not long before we heard the frustrated voices of people protesting the dictatorship. Educators and staff from universities across the country also took part in protests by holding up posters of three-finger salutes. The once silent university came alive without the orchestrated but simultaneous chanting of slogans. At the same time, universities were closed, but staff continued to rotate teaching work due to the high rates of COVID-19 infections. The presence of teaching staff that day was a clear sign of how much civil servants loathed the dictatorship. Multiple ethnic groups, students, and civil servants participated in various anti-dictatorship activities. People resented the unjust acts committed by the authoritarian government, especially since the time for a newly elected government was just an arms-length away. Despite these challenges, our university’s strike column marched daily. I could not participate in these marches as I had to take care of my daughter’s security, but my inability to join the marches gave me a guilty conscience. I felt like I was being unfaithful to the movement. I tried to counteract my guilty conscience by banging pots and pans harder at 8pm, a symbolic act to drive out the evil dictators. Continuing work as an educator became a big challenge. It took time for me to decide about what to do, since I’ve always been a responsible person who highly valued my work. I discussed it with my colleagues, friends, family, and parents. My supervisor explained the pros and cons of standing bravely for the truth. As they did, the State Counsellor’s quote, “people matter,” echoed in my mind. My husband supported me in resisting the dictatorship within my own capacity. It was with such support that I was able to make a strong decision. From the 8th of February, I decided to join the CDM movement and withhold my labour—proudly contributing to the revolution alongside my colleagues at the university. Three weeks after the coup, the CDMers’ personal security was threatened when the military forces and police entered our university under the pretext of security. On 6th March, a month after we commenced our refusal to work with the slogan “don’t go to the office but struggle for freedom”, I went to my parents’ place with my daughter. My son and his father stayed behind in Yangon because of their respective responsibilities. About 10 days after I reached my parents’ village, a close friend and colleague informed me that she was going back to the office and asked me if I wished to recommence my duties. If so, she would submit my name. Soon after, my supervisor whom I so revered informed me that they would be resuming their duties out of fear for their security and arrest. We discussed with our colleagues how we could support them. We will not surrender, and we will fight till the end. At the end of April 2021, I received news that my nephew, a young university student had been shot dead by military forces the night before. The sad news broke me. On that day, Tedim was completely silent. The soldiers, whose duty was to protect the life and property of the people, were brutally killing innocent people for no reason. I prayed that such incidents would not take place again for anyone—but my prayers were not answered. Many people’s lives were sacrificed. If we did not resist this horrible system, then who would? In May 2021, I was expelled from my post for standing for the truth. It was a profession that I invested my heart and soul in for several decades, and I felt as though my arms and legs had been amputated. Moreover, the income source to support my family was now cut off. Life became very lonely. It was difficult to detach myself from work, but I had no reason to defend it any longer. I believed that Eternal God would prepare the best for me. I was satisfied that I had been able to take refuge with my parents and care for my 80-year-old father. I found strength in the understanding and support from my parents and siblings. Whenever I had a chance, I went to my father’s farm and nurtured the plants, ploughed the ground with an iron hoe, or cut the trees with a knife. I learned how to make use of the same hands I once used only to hold pencils and pens. Perhaps this was a blessing in disguise—I now had a chance to experience my community’s traditions and customs. Many people from my village did not share my ideas. Few civil servants became CDMers. They believed they had to mind their own business regardless of the government. They continued to show up for the civil servants’ recruiting exams held by the military council and were proud of their achievements when appointed. They thought they were doing great, but it was very uncomfortable for me to live in such an environment. My daughter would always encourage me—unhappy from trying to adapt to a new place—with positive motivation like “Mom…don’t be depressed. Our revolution will win.” Compared to my daughter’s moral support, I felt sorry about the lack of understanding in society. However, I was proud of my daughter because she knew what was right and what was wrong. Her sacrifice and willingness to accept a meagre way of living was much greater than mine. My husband’s support also gave me power. He would repeatedly tell my daughter, “Your mother is a revolutionary heroine. We should always be proud of Mom.” Maybe it was the emotional dejection that lowered our immunity. At the end of May 2021, my entire family was infected by COVID-19. We had to pull ourselves together to prevent us from falling to pieces. I was grateful for the fellow nurse CDMer who came to our house and treated us. Her words of consolation at that time of sickness and depression energized us. A year after returning to my native village, the community criticized me in different ways. The most annoying question I got was, “Are you divorced from your husband?” Because I was a CDMer, I did not receive any salary. They would heartlessly tell me that the success of our revolution would not be achieved in any way, and that I should go back to work. Even my close relatives blamed me. On the one hand, the arrest of CDMers increased every day. Though imprecisely, security became a concern. Over time, some schools in the village reopened, but my daughter had no desire to attend the school run by the military council. It was impossible to pursue online education either since the internet remained cut off. Meanwhile, I was able to meet and accompany a Catholic priest who came back to visit the village from Mizoram, India. In this way, I reached Buarpui village in Mizoram state in early April 2022. My daughter came with me and was able to continue her schooling, but she faced various challenges due to the language barrier, an unfamiliar school syllabus in Hindi, Mizo, and Lai languages, and culture shock. I felt guilty. For work, I worked in the kitchen of a hostel as an assistant to the chef. My days were spent peeling potatoes, picking rice grains, and washing dishes. I was exhausted both mentally and physically. I missed Myanmar and the life I enjoyed in the past—but I had to control my homesickness. I reminded myself not to forget that my life was where it was supposed to be, not where I wanted to be. The challenges as a CDMer refugee were hard. I prayed to God all the time, wishing to go back to where I deserved and wished to be. Through a friend, I learned about a call for 5 Research Fellowships from the Institute of Chin Affairs (ICA). I was interested, and I started to prepare for the application without any prior experience and with much difficulty. As I worked, I jotted down my thoughts and sought advice from my experienced friends. I sent my application before the deadline on the 31st of August. When the decision letter came on 15th September, I was happy to know that I was among the short-listed candidates. It reminded me of the same feeling I had when I first applied for my job. I wanted to be selected because I was interested in the field. On 27th September, I was informed that I had been selected as one of the Research Fellows. I was overjoyed. It was evident that God is good. I was pleased and proud of myself for being a Research Fellow of the Myanmar Fellowship Program. Then again, I grew wary when I thought of leaving my daughter behind. Departing from Buarpui, my daughter told me constantly not to worry about her but to take care of myself. From there, I started my second lonely journey to the capital city, Aizawl. In October 2022, myself and four other research fellows met the Deputy Director and the learning facilitator at the ICA office in Aizawl. The Chin Research Centre was formally opened in the compounds of Mizoram University. It is possible that the Spring Revolution created a historical milestone between the ICA and Mizoram University. We had the opportunity to learn from the professors and associate professors of MZU and to write research papers. I’m grateful to the responsible persons of ICA, our group leader who paid attention to every detail, and the learning facilitator, for not only providing knowledge but for supporting the livelihood of someone living with uncertainty in a foreign land. My ambition is to prepare a thesis paper that will enable us to implement a credit transfer, in addition to finding a way to have dialogue and collaborate on how to overcome the challenges of educational opportunities for refugee children. I aim to continue my tasks of the Spring Revolution as a researcher preparing research papers for the interest of the community and our people. Starting from Spring, how far do I have to walk on this journey? It is grueling to predict when this journey will end. I hope it will not take long. Another spring will come along with the sweet, lamenting, cooing sound of cuckoos. I have to nurture the victory plant embedded in my heart to welcome the triumphant spring. There will also be light after darkness. If the opportunity avails in peaceful times after the Spring Revolution prevails, I will create a good educational environment while sharing the knowledge earned through this program with my colleagues and students..."
Source/publisher: "Tea Circle" (Myanmar)
Date of entry/update: 2023-07-03
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Title: Dr. Sasa's Speech on the 2nd Anniversary of the United States Chin Coalition-USCC
Description: ""They can kill my body, but not my belief." These famous words from our dear hero and brother, the late Salai Tin Maung Oo, continue to resonate with me. Indeed, the battle belongs to the LORD, and the victory belongs to the brave people of Myanmar. Justice belongs to the light of love, hope, peace, and freedom. Dear leaders of the United States Chin Coalition (USCC), I extend my deepest gratitude for having me here today. It is a great honor to be with you once again, and I thank USCC for its significant contributions to the fight for freedom and federal democracy in Myanmar. Every day, the remarkable people of Myanmar draw closer to the dawn of freedom and federal democracy, which will liberate them from the oppressions and aggressions of the genocidal military junta and their acts of terrorism. Our people have suffered for far too long under this brutal reign of terror. It has been more than two years since the formation of the United States Chin Coalition, and these two years have been challenging, especially in the pursuit of Federal Democracy. The coalition has faced numerous obstacles and difficulties along the way, but its members have remained resilient and committed to their cause. Despite the hurdles encountered, the coalition has made significant progress in advocating for the principles of democracy and working towards a federal system of governance. The journey has been arduous, but the coalition remains determined to continue their efforts in the fight for a democratic future. The Myanmar Spring Revolution began 27 months ago with the revolutionaries of Chin TUMI. Through the help of God and the sacrifices of our people, the revolution that started from nothing has now developed into the creation of DRONES to defend our freedom and establish federal democracy—an extraordinary future that awaits us all. TUMI is an integral part of the Chin identity, historically protecting the Chin people from attacks by wild animals that could endanger their lives. However, when our fundamental freedom of expression came under attack by the genocidal military junta as consequences of their attempted coup on February 1, 2021, our courageous people once again resorted to using TUMI to defend our Fatherland and the lives of the Chin people known for their bravery and loyalty since the first world war. This is not the first time our people have defended freedom. Even during the First World War in 1914, over 1,000 men from Chinland marched from our Motherland all the way to Europe to fight for freedom alongside their partners in the struggle. Similarly, in the Second World War, our forefathers did everything in their power to contribute to the freedom of the world, fighting alongside their fellow freedom fighters. Our forefathers were called for the mission of Burma’s independent, once again they gave everything they had for the independence of Burma. The independence of Burma became possible through the cooperation and joint fight of our forefathers with our ethnic brothers and sisters under the leadership of our freedom fighter, General Aung San, the father of State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, who has been unjustly arrested along with nearly 24,000 innocent people of Myanmar, including our President U Win Myint, by the genocidal military junta. If the Burma’s Independent agreement known as the Palong agreement, signed by our forefathers together with ethnic leaders and General Aung San, had been fully implemented, Chin State would have thrived under the federal democratic values and principles of self-determination. However, due to the genocidal military dictatorships in Myanmar, a nation once considered one of the richest in Asia has become one of the poorest in the world. In the past, Burma was far ahead of Singapore in several dimensions, but now Myanmar has deteriorated even below the level of North Korea. If the genocidal military generals had been stopped long ago, Myanmar could have thrived like other Federal Democratic Nations such as Germany, UK, USA, or Australia and played its rightful place on the global stage to make this world a better place for all. This last Revolution of Myanmar aims to end the genocidal military dictatorship once and for all and establish a federal democratic union where Chin State will play its part in nation-building, becoming a fully-fledged federal democratic society. This is Myanmar's final revolution, destined to write a new chapter in our nation's history, not only for this generation but also for generations to come. Myanmar will regain its rightful place not only in our beautiful Asia but also in the world. Therefore, the genocidal military junta, the enemies of the people of Myanmar, and the enemies of Myanmar's freedom and federal democracy, have been relentlessly bombing us, killing over 4,000 civilians and destroying more than 67,000 houses, including schools, hospitals, churches, and monasteries. They have displaced nearly 2 million civilians, rendering them homeless, and caused more than 18 million people to suffer from hunger and starvation, in desperate need of life-saving aid. These atrocities have occurred in the past 27 months alone, perpetrated by the genocidal military junta, who commit these acts of terrorism because they despise the light of freedom and federal democracy. Their worship of darkness, tyranny, and oppression has no place in Myanmar's near future. Despite these crimes against humanity committed by the genocidal military junta, the brave people of Myanmar have made it clear that they will never give up or rest until they bring the light of justice, freedom, and federal democracy to dispel the darkness of cruel genocidal attacks against our people. The genocidal military's darkness will be replaced by the light of federal democracy, their violence will be replaced by the light of peace, and the pain and suffering caused by their tyranny will be replaced by the joy of freedom and prosperity that awaits our courageous people. The genocidal military junta cannot perceive the great light that awaits the brave people of Myanmar because they are blinded by their evil reign of terror against our people. They not only kill our people and destroy our homes, churches, schools, and hospitals, but they also weaponize life-saving aid, starvation, hunger, and pain through their evil "four cut policies." They have not only bombed, burned, and destroyed our homes, villages, and towns, such as Thatlang in Chin State, which has been wiped out, but they have also blocked humanitarian aid from reaching Chin State after the devastating Cyclone Mocha hit our state a few months ago. They want our people to surrender to their reign of terror, but they fail to understand the spirit of Salai Tin Maung Oo, which now resides in the hearts of all Chin people and beyond. I would also like to take this opportunity to express our sincerest appreciation for all the advocacy work that you have done, especially regarding the Burma Acts NDAA of the USA. It is crucial that we continue to do everything that we can for the full implementation of the Burma Acts NDAA, ensuring that all its objectives, aimed at helping Myanmar remove the genocidal military junta once and for all and establishing federal democratic governance at the national, state, and local levels, are realized. It is imperative that the implementation strategies of the Burma Acts NDAA are well-coordinated and cooperated with ASEAN's five points on Myanmar and the historic UN Security Council Resolutions on Myanmar. Together, we will do everything we can to enlist the support of the international community in ending the pain and suffering of humanity in Myanmar. This can be achieved through decisive, targeted, coordinated, and stricter sanctions against the genocidal military junta, such as an international arms embargo and the sanctioning of jet fuels and the military junta's financial banks and channels like MOGE. At the same time, it is crucial that the international community promptly recognizes the will of the people of Myanmar without further delay by officially recognizing the National Unity Government of Myanmar (NUG) as the legitimate and true democratic representative of the people of Myanmar. It is time to cease supporting the terrorist military junta known as SAC and start supporting the NUG and all pro-democracy movements. In order to prevent another genocide and hold the genocidal military junta and their partners accountable for their war crimes and crimes against humanity, it is imperative that the NUG rightfully represents Myanmar at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) regarding the Rohingya genocide case. Allowing the genocidal military junta, the perpetrators, to represent Myanmar at any international level is illegal, illegitimate, wrong, misleading, and an insult to the people of Myanmar, who are also victims of the junta's war crimes and crimes against humanity. Through international mechanisms such as the International Criminal Court (ICC) and international law, we must strive to hold the genocidal military junta and their partners in crimes accountable for all the crimes that they have openly and freely committed against the people of Myanmar. We will not rest until justice is delivered to our people. Justice is the future of Myanmar, freedom is the future of Myanmar, and Myanmar's future lies in the hands of 54 million brave people of Myanmar. Countries that have been supporting the crimes against the people of Myanmar must halt their support to the genocidal military junta and instead support the bright future of Myanmar, where stability and prosperity await not only Myanmar but also the region and the world. Myanmar is a new fertile land for the world economy, and its potential will be realized once the genocidal military junta is removed. We are not far from that day of freedom and federal democracy, the day of joy of peace and prosperity. Once again, we call upon the international community to invest in the pro-democracy movement, which will end the genocidal military junta's reign of terror to establish federal democracy and bring about peace and prosperity. Furthermore, we urge all freedom fighters, both inside and outside Myanmar, to maintain unity at the highest level and focus on our common goals rather than our differences. I take this opportunity to salute all the fallen freedom fighters; their sacrifices are about to bring the light, the stars of freedom and federal democratic Chinland, within the true federal democratic Union of the new Myanmar, for ALL the people of Myanmar, regardless of race, religion, culture, gender, language, background, and ethnicity. Thank you! May God bless you! May God bless Myanmar!..."
Source/publisher: Ministry of International Cooperation Myanmar
Date of entry/update: 2023-07-02
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Title: United States Chin Coalition (USCC) ၂ နှစ်ပြည့် နှစ်ပတ်လည်နေ့အတွက် ပြည်ထောင်စုဝန်ကြီး ဒေါက်တာဆာဆာ၏ မိန့်ခွန်း။
Description: "ဆလိုင်းတင်မောင်ဦး၏ ကျော်ကြားတဲ့ ပြောဆိုချက်ဖြစ်တဲ့ "မင်းတို့ ငါ့ခန္ဓာကိုယ်ကိုသာ သတ်လို့ရမယ်၊ ငါ့ယုံကြည်ချက်နဲ့ ရပ်တည်ချက်ကို သတ်လို့မရဘူး" ဆိုတဲ့စကားက ယနေ့အထိ ကျွန်ုပ်တို့အတွက် ခွန်အားစေဖြစ်သည်။ ဤတိုက်ပွဲသည် ထာရဝဘုရား၌သာမူတည်ပြီး အောင်မြင်မှုသည် မြန်မာပြည်သူများ၏ လက်ထဲတွင်ရှိသည်။ တရားမျှတမှုသည်လည်း မေတ္တာ၊ မျှော်လင့်ချက်၊ ငြိမ်းချမ်းရေးနှင့် လွတ်လပ်ရေးအလင်းရောင်အတွက်ဖြစ်သည်။ ကျွန်တော့်ကို ယခုလို မိန့်ခွန်းပြောဖို့ ဖိတ်ကြားသည့်အတွက် ချစ်လှစွာသော United States Chin Coalition (USCC) ခေါင်းဆောင်များအား ကျေးဇူးတင်ပါသည်။ လွတ်လပ်မှုနှင့် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီ တိုက်ပွဲအတွက် ကြီးမားသော အထောက်အပံ့များပေးတဲ့အတွက် USCC ကို ကျေးဇူးတင်ပါသည်။ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီ၏ ဖိနှိပ်အကြမ်းဖက်ခြင်းများမှ လွတ်မြောက်မည့် မြန်မာပြည်သူလူထု၏ နေ့ရက်တိုင်းသည် လွတ်လပ်မှုနှင့် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီနှင့် တဖြည်းဖြည်း နီးကပ်လာပြီဖြစ်သည်။ မြန်မာပြည်သူလူထုများသည် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အာဏာရှင်လက်အောက်တွင် ဒုက္ခခံစားခဲ့ရသည်မှာ နှစ်ပေါင်းအတော်ကြာပြီဖြစ်သည်။ United States Chin Coalition (USCC) ကို ဖွဲ့စည်းခဲ့တဲ့ နှစ်နှစ်အတွင်း အတားအဆီး အခက်အခဲပေါင်းများစွာ ရင်ဆိုင်ခဲ့ရသော်လည်း အဖွဲ့ဝင်များအနေဖြင့် မိမိတို့တိုင်းပြည် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီရရှိရေးအတွက် ကြံ့ကြံ့ခံပြီး ရပ်တည်ပေးကြသည့်အတွက် ကျေးဇူးတင် ဂုဏ်ပြုအပ်ပါသည်။ တော်လှန်ရေးခရီးစဉ်က ခက်ခဲကြမ်းတမ်းသော်လည်း USCC အဖွဲ့သားများသည် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီအနာဂတ်အတွက် ဆက်လက်လုပ်ဆောင်နေကြသည်ကို တွေ့ရပါသည်။ မြန်မာ့နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေးသည် ချင်းတူမီးသေနတ်များဖြင့် လွန်ခဲ့သော (၂၇ )လက စတင်ခဲ့သည်။ ဘုရားသခင်၏အကူအညီနှင့် ပြည်သူလူထု၏ စွန့်လွှတ်အနစ်နာခံမှုများဖြင့် သုံညမှ စတင်ခဲ့သည့် နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေးသည် လွတ်လပ်မှုနှင့် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီထွန်းကားသည့် ထူးခြားကောင်းမွန်သော အနာဂတ်သစ်အတွက် ယခုအခါ ဒရုန်းများဖြင့် တော်လှန်နိုင်သည့်အဆင့်သို့ ရောက်ရှိနေပြီဖြစ်သည်။ တူမီးသည် ချင်းလူမျိုးများအတွက် အရေးပါသောအစိတ်အပိုင်းဖြစ်ပြီး သမိုင်းအရ တောရိုင်းတိရိစ္ဆာန်များ၏ တိုက်ခိုက်မှုရန်မှ အသက်ကိုကာကွယ်ရာတွင် အသုံးပြုကြသည်။ သို့သော်လည်း ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ်၊ ဖေဖော်ဝါရီလ ၁ ရက်နေ့တွင် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီများက မတရားအာဏာသိမ်းပြီး ပြည်သူလူထု၏ အခြေခံလွတ်လပ်မှုနှင့် လူ့အခွင့်အရေးကို တိုက်ခိုက်ခံရသည့်နေ့မှစပြီး ပထမကမ္ဘာစစ်ကတည်းက ရဲရင့်ခြင်းနှင့် သစ္စာရှိခြင်းအတွက် ရပ်တည်ခဲ့ကြသည့် မိမိတို့ချင်းလူမျိုးများ၏ အသက်အိုးအိမ်ကိုကာကွယ်ဖို့ရန်အတွက် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အာဏာရှင်ကို တူမီးဖြင့် ပြန်လည်တော်လှန်ခဲ့ကြသည်။ ဒါဟာ ကျွန်တော်တို့ပြည်သူတွေအတွက် လွတ်လပ်မှုကို ကာကွယ်ဖို့ ပထမဆုံးအကြိမ်မဟုတ်ပေ။ ၁၉၁၄ ခုနှစ် ပထမကမ္ဘာစစ်ကတည်းကပင် ချင်းအမျိုးသား ၁,၀၀၀ ကျော်တို့သည် အမိမြေမှ ဥရောပနိုင်ငံများအထိ ခရီးနှင်ပြီး လွတ်လပ်ရေးအတွက် အတူတကွတိုက်ပွဲဝင်ခဲ့ကြသည်။ အလားတူ ဒုတိယကမ္ဘာစစ်အတွင်းတွင်လည်း ကျွန်တော်တို့ ဘိုးဘေးများသည် အခြားလွတ်လပ်ရေးသူရဲကောင်းများနှင့်အတူ လွတ်လပ်ရေးအတွက် စွမ်းစွမ်းတမံ တိုက်ပွဲဝင်ခဲ့ကြသည်။ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ လွတ်လပ်ရေးအတွက်လည်း ဘိုးဘေးများက အစွမ်းကုန်တိုက်ပွဲဝင်ခဲ့ကြသည်။ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ လွတ်လပ်ရေးရခဲ့ခြင်းသည် တိုင်းရင်းသားညီကိုမောင်နှမဘိုးဘေးများနှင့် လွတ်လပ်ရေးဖခင်လည်းဖြစ်သည့် နိုင်ငံတော်အတိုင်ပင်ခံပုဂ္ဂိုလ် ဒေါ်အောင်ဆန်းစုကြည်၏ဖခင် ဗိုလ်ချုပ်အောင်ဆန်းတို့၏ စည်းလုံးညီညွတ်စွာ တော်လှန်ခဲ့မှုကြောင့်ဖြစ်သည်။ တိုင်းရင်းသားခေါင်းဆောင်များနှင့် ဗိုလ်ချုပ်အောင်ဆန်းတို့ သဘောတူစာချုပ်ချုပ်ဆိုခဲ့သည် ပင်လုံစာချုပ်ပါအချက်များကိုသာ အကောင်အထည်ဖော်ဆောင်နိုင်ခဲ့လျှင် ယနေ့ချင်းပြည်နယ်သည် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီ​၏အနှစ်သာရများ၊ ကိုယ့်ကံကြမ္မာကိုယ့်ဖန်တီးခြင်း စံချိန်စံနှုန်းများနှင့်အတူ ချမ်းသာကြွယ်ဝသော ပြည်နယ်တစ်ခု ဖြစ်နေလောက်ပြီဖြစ်သည်။ သို့သော် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အာဏာရှင်များ၏ မတရားအာဏာသိမ်းခြင်းကြောင့် တစ်ချိန်က အာရှတိုက်တွင် အချမ်းသာဆုံးနိုင်ငံတစ်နိုင်ငံဖြစ်ခဲ့သည့် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံသည် ယနေ့ကမ္ဘာပေါ်တွင် အဆင်းရဲဆုံးနိုင်ငံတစ်ခု ဖြစ်လာခဲ့သည်။ သမိုင်းတွင် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံသည် စင်ကာပူနိုင်ငံထက်ရှေ့ရောက်ခဲ့သော်လည်း လက်ရှိတွင် မြောက်ကိုရီးယားနိုင်ငံထက် နိမ့်သောအဆင့်ရောက်ရှိနေပြီဖြစ်သည်။ အကယ်၍ လွန်ခဲ့သောနှစ်များက အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အာဏာရှင်များကသာ ၎င်းတို့၏ အကြမ်းဖက်လုပ်ရပ်များကို ရပ်တန့်ခဲ့လျှင် ယနေ့ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံသည် ဂျာမနီ၊ ယူကေ၊ ယူအက်စ်အေ သို့မဟုတ် ဩစတြေးလျကဲ့သို့သော အခြား ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရက်တစ်နိုင်ငံများကဲ့သို့ အောင်မြင်နိုင်ခဲ့ပြီး ကမ္ဘာကြီးအတွက် ပိုမိုကောင်းမွန်သော နေရာတစ်ခုဖြစ်စေရန် ကမ္ဘာလုံးဆိုင်ရာစင်မြင့်ပေါ်တွင် ၎င်း၏ မှန်ကန်သောနေရာကို ထမ်းဆောင်နိုင်ခဲ့မည်ဖြစ်သည်။ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၏ နောက်ဆုံးတော်လှန်ရေးဖြစ်သည့် နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေးတွင် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ်ကို အမြစ်ပြတ်ချေမှုန်းပြီး ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီပြည်ထောင်စုတည်ဆောက်ရေးအတွက် ချင်းပြည်သည်လည်း ၎င်း၏အခန်းကဏ္ဍမှ ပါဝင်ဆောင်ရွက်သွားမည်ဖြစ်သည်။ နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေးသည် လက်ရှိမျိုးဆက်များအတွက်သာမကပဲ နောင်လာနောင်သားမျိုးဆက်များအတွက် သမိုင်းသစ်ရေးထိုးမည့် အရေးတော်ပုံလည်းဖြစ်သည်။ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံသည် အာရှတိုက်တွင်သာမက ကမ္ဘာ့အလည်တွင် နေရာမှန်ကို ပြန်လည်ရရှိစေရမည်။ လွန်ခဲ့တဲ့ (၂၇) လကျော်အတွင်း မြန်မာနိုင်ငံရှိ စစ်အာဏာရှင်များက နိုင်ငံတော်အတိုင်ပင်ခံပုဂ္ဂိုလ် ဒေါ်အောင်ဆန်းစုကြည်နှင့် နိုင်ငံတော်သမ္မတဦးဝင်းမြင့်အပါအဝင် အပြစ်မဲ့ အရပ်သား ၂၃,၀၀၀ ကျော်ကို တရားမဝင် ဖမ်းဆီးခဲ့ပါသည်။ ထိုစစ်ဗိုလ်ချုပ်များကပင် အရပ်သား ၄,၀၀၀ ကျော်သေဆုံးမှုနှင့် ဆေးရုံများ၊ ကျောင်းများ၊ ခရစ်ယာန်ဘုရားကျောင်းများနှင့် ဘုန်းကြီး ကျောင်းများအပါအဝင် နေအိမ်ပေါင်း ၆၇,၀၀၀ ကျော် ပျက်စီးဆုံးရှုံးခြင်းအတွက်လည်း တာဝန်ရှိသည်။ စစ်အာဏာရှင်များက အရပ်သားများအပေါ် အကြမ်းဖက်တိုက်ခိုက်မှုများကြောင့် ပြည်သူပေါင်း ၂ သန်းနီးပါး အိုးမဲ့အိမ်မဲ့ဖြစ်သွားခဲ့ရပြီး ပြည်သူပေါင်း ၁၈ သန်းကျော် လူသားချင်းစာနာထောက်ထားမှုဆိုင်ရာ အကျပ်အတည်းသို့ရောက်ရှိရန် တွန်းအားပေးခဲ့သည်။ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံလူဦးရေ၏ထက်ဝက်ကို ဆင်းရဲနွမ်းပါးမှုဘေးသို့ ရောက်ရှိစေခဲ့သည်။ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အာဏာရှင်များကိုးကွယ်သော အကြမ်းဖက်ခြင်း၊ မှောင်မိုက်ခြင်းနှင့် ဖိနှိပ်ချုပ်ခြယ်ခြင်းများသည် အနာဂတ် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံတွင် ပပျောက်ရတော့မည်ဖြစ်သည်။ လူမျိုးတုံးသတ်ဖြတ်မှုကျူးလွန်နေသည့် စစ်အာဏာရှင်များက မြန်မာပြည်သူလူထုအပေါ် လူသားမျိုးနွယ်အပေါ် ဆန့်ကျင်သည့် ရာဇဝတ်မှုများ နေ့စဉ်ကျူးလွန်နေသော်လည်း ရဲစွမ်းသတ္တိရှိသော မြန်မာပြည်သူများသည် တရားမျှတခြင်း၊ လွတ်လပ်ခြင်းနှင့် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီ မရမချင်း အရှုံးမပေး လက်မမြှောက်ပဲ ဆက်လက်တိုက်ပွဲဝင်သွားမည်ဖြစ်သည်။ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အာဏာရှင်များ၏ အမှောင်ထုကို ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီ အလင်းရောင်ဖြင့်အစားထိုးပြီး၊ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီ၏ နိုင်ထက်စီးနင်းမှုကြောင့် ခံစားနေရသည့် နာကျင်ခြင်းနှင့် ဆင်းရဲဒုက္ခများကို လွတ်လပ်ခြင်းနှင့် သာယာဝပြောခြင်းများဖြင့် အစားထိုးသွားမည်ဖြစ်သည်။ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီသည် သူတို့၏ အကြံအစည်ဆိုးများဖြင့် ပိတ်မိနေသဖြင့် မြန်မာပြည်သူများကို စောင့်ကြိုနေသည့် တောက်ပသော အနာဂတ်ကို ဘယ်တော့မှ မြင်ခွင့်ရမည်မဟုတ်ပါ။ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အာဏာရှင်များသည် ပြည်သူများ၏ အသက်အိုးအိမ်များကို ဖျက်ဆီးရုံသာမကပဲ ပြည်သူများ၏ ဆင်းရဲဒုက္ခအမျိုးမျိုး၊ ငတ်မွတ်ခေါင်းပါးခြင်းများကို “ဖြတ်လေးဖြတ် ပေါ်လစီ”အောက်တွင် လက်နက်သဖွယ် အသုံးချနေခြင်းဖြစ်သည်။ အာဏာသိမ်းစစ်ကောင်စီသည် ချင်းပြည်နယ်၊ ထန်တလန်မြို့ အပါအဝင် တိုင်းပြည်အနှံ့ရှိ မြို့ရွာများကို ပြာကျသည်အထိ မီးရှို့ဖျက်ဆီးကြသည့်အပြင် မိုခါမုန်တိုင်း၏ရိုက်ခတ်မှုကြောင့် လိုအပ်နေသည့် လူသားချင်းစာနာထောက်ထားမှု အကူအညီများကိုလည်း တားဆီးပိတ်ပင်နေကြသည်။ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီသည် ပြည်သူများကို ကြောက်ရွံ့စိတ်များမွေးစေလိုသော်လည်း ချင်းပြည်သူများနှင့် မြန်မာတနိုင်ငံလုံးရှိ ပြည်သူများ၏စိတ်ထဲတွင် ဆလိုင်းတင်မောင်ဦးလို ခံယူချက် အခိုင်အမာ ကိန်းဝပ်နေသည်ကို သူတို့အနေနဲ့ နားလည်နိုင်စွမ်းမရှိပေ။ The Burma Acts NDAA of the USA ကိစ္စ အပါအဝင် အခြားအရေးကြီးသော ထောက်ပံ့ကူညီမှုများအတွက် အားလုံးကို ကျေးဇူးတင်ကြောင်း ထပ်လောင်းပြောကြားလိုပါသည်။ Burma Acts of NDAA ပါ အချက်များအားလုံးကို မြန်မာမြေပြင်တွင် အပြည့်အဝ အကောင်အထည်ဖော်ဆောင်ပြီး ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီနိုင်ငံဖြစ်ထွန်းသည်အထိ အစွမ်းကုန် ကူညီပေးကြပါရန် မေတ္တာရပ်ခံလိုပါသည်။ Burma Acts of NDAA ပါ အချက်များသာမက အာဆီယံ၏ ဘုံသဘောတူညီချက် ၅ ချက်နှင့် UN လုံခြုံရေးကောင်စီ၏ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံနှင့်ပတ်သက်သည့် သမိုင်းဝင် ဆုံးဖြတ်ချက်များအားလုံးကို မြန်မာမြေပြင်တွင် အကောင်အထည်ဖော်ဆောင်ရန် အရေးကြီးပါသည်။ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံတွင် တွေ့ကြုံနေရသော ဆင်းရဲဒုက္ခများနှင့် ပဍိပက္ခများအားလုံးကို အဆုံးသတ်နိုင်ရန် အတွက် လိုအပ်သည့် အပြည်ပြည်ဆိုင်ရာ သက်ဆိုင်ရာအဖွဲ့အစည်းများ၏ အကူအညီများရရှိနိုင်ရန် အားလုံးအတူတကွ အစွမ်းကုန်ကြိုးစားလုပ်ဆောင်ရန် တိုက်တွန်းအပ်ပါသည်။ ထိုကဲ့သို့ပြုလုပ်ရာတွင် စစ်ကောင်စီအား လေယာဉ်ဆီများထောက်ပံ့ပေးသော ဘဏ်များ၊ လုပ်ငန်းများ၊ MOGE နှင့် လက်နက်ရောင်းဝယ်မှု ဈေးကွက်များအပေါ် ထိရောက်သော ပစ်မှတ်ထား အရေးယူဒဏ်ခတ်ပိတ်ဆို့မှုများ ပိုမိုပြင်းထန်စွာပြုလုပ်နိုင်ရန် ကြိုးစားလုပ်ဆောင်သွားမည်။ တချိန်တည်းမှာပင် အပြည်ပြည်ဆိုင်ရာမှ သက်ဆိုင်ရာအဖွဲ့အစည်းများအနေဖြင့် မြန်မာပြည်သူများ၏ လိုအင်ဆန္ဒကို လျစ်လျူမရှုပဲ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ (NUG) ကို မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၏ တရားဝင်အစိုးရအဖြစ် အသိအမှတ်ပြု ဆက်ဆံပေးကြဖို့ အလွန်အရေးကြီးပါသည်။ တရားမဝင် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီအား ထောက်ပံ့ခြင်းများအားလုံး ရပ်တန့်ပြီး NUG နှင့်အတူ လွတ်လပ်ရေး လှုပ်ရှားမှုများအားလုံးကို စတင်ထောက်ခံအားပေးရန် အချိန်တန်ပြီဖြစ်သည်။ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံတွင် နောက်ထပ် လူမျိုးတုံးသတ်ဖြတ်မှုများဖြစ်ပွားခြင်းမှ ကာကွယ်ပြီး စစ်ရာဇဝတ်မှုများနှင့် လူသားမျိုးနွယ်အပေါ် ကျူးလွန်သည့်ရာဇဝတ်မှုများအတွက် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီနှင့် အပေါင်းအပါများအား အရေးယူနိုင်ရန် အပြည်ပြည်ဆိုင်ရာတရားရုံး (ICJ) တွင်အမှုရင်ဆိုင်နေရသည့် ရိုဟင်ဂျာလူမျိုးများအပေါ် စစ်အာဏာရှင်များက လူမျိုးတုံးသတ်ဖြတ်ခဲ့ခြင်းကိစ္စအတွက် NUG က မြန်မာနိုင်ငံကိုယ်စားပြုရန် အရေးကြီးပါသည်။ လူမျိုးတုံးသတ်ဖြတ်သည့် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီအား အပြည်ပြည်ဆိုင်ရာရှေ့မှောက်တွင် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံကို ကိုယ်စားပြုရန် အခွင့်အရေးပေးခြင်းသည် ဥပဒေကိုဆန့်ကျင်ခြင်း၊ မမှန်ကန်ခြင်း၊ တရားမဝင်ခြင်း၊ မှားယွင်းသည့်ဆုံးဖြတ်ချက်ဖြစ်သည့်အပြင် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီ၏စစ်ရာဇဝတ်မှုများ၊ လူသားမျိုးနွယ်အပေါ် ဆန့်ကျင်သည့် ရာဇဝတ်မှုများ၏သားကောင်ဖြစ်သည့် မြန်မာပြည်သူလူထုအား စော်ကားရာရောက်သည်။ အပြည်ပြည်ဆိုင်ရာ ယန္တရားများဖြစ်သည့် အပြည်ပြည်ဆိုင်ရာ ရာဇဝတ်မှုခုံရုံး (ICC) နှင့် အပြည်ပြည်ဆိုင်ရာဥပဒေများမှတဆင့် မြန်မာပြည်သူလူထုအပေါ် ရာဇဝတ်မှုများ ပေါ်ပေါ်တင်တင် ပွင့်ပွင့်လင်းလင်း လွတ်လပ်စွာကျူးလွန်နေသည့် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အာဏာရှင်များနှင့် အပေါင်းအပါများအားလုံးကို ၎င်းတို့အပြစ်များအတွက် ပြန်လည်ပေးဆပ်စေရမည်။ မြန်မာပြည်သူများအတွက် တရားမျှတမှုမရမခြင်း ဘယ်တော့မှ အနားယူမည် မဟုတ်ပါ။ တရားမျှတခြင်းသည် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၏အနာဂတ်ဖြစ်ပြီး လွတ်လပ်မှုသည် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၏အနာဂတ်ဖြစ်သည်။ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၏အနာဂတ်သည် မြန်မာပြည်သူ ၅၄ သန်း၏လက်ထဲတွင် တည်ရှိသည်။ မြန်မာပြည်သူများအပေါ် ရာဇဝတ်မှုများကျူးလွန်နိုင်ရန် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီကို ထောက်ပံ့ပေးသော နိုင်ငံများအနေဖြင့် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီအား ထောက်ပံ့မှုများအားလုံး ရပ်တန့်ပြီး ဒေသတွင်းနှင့် ကမ္ဘာတစ်ခုလုံးအတွက် တည်ငြိမ်အေးချမ်းရေးနှင့် ချမ်းသာကြွယ်ဝမှုများတည်ရှိသည့် အနာဂတ် ဖက်ဒရယ်မြန်မာနိုင်ငံအတွက် စတင်ရင်းနှီးမြုပ်နှံကြရန် တိုက်တွန်းအပ်ပါသည်။ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံသည် ကမ္ဘာ့စီးပွားရေးအတွက် မြေသြဇာကောင်းသော မြေကွက်သစ်တစ်ခုဖြစ်ပြီး လူမျိုးတုံးသတ်ဖြတ်သည့် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီကို ဖယ်ရှားလိုက်သည်နှင့်တစ်ပြိုင်နက် ၎င်း၏အလားအလာကို အကောင်အထည်ဖော်နိုင်ပါလိမ့်မည်။ ငြိမ်းချမ်းရေး၊ ကြွယ်ဝချမ်းသာခြင်း၊ လွတ်လပ်မှုနှင့် ဖက်ဒရယ် ဒီမိုကရေစီနေ့ရက်များသည် ကျွန်တော်တို့နှင့် အနီးမဝေးတွင် စောင့်ကြိုနေပါသည်။ အပြည်ပြည်ဆိုင်ရာအဖွဲ့အစည်းများအနေဖြင့် လူမျိုးတုံးသတ်ဖြတ်သည့် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အာရှင်စနစ်ကို ချုပ်ငြိမ်းစေပြီး ငြိမ်းချမ်းရေးနှင့် သာယာဝပြောရေးကိုယူဆောင်လာပေးမည့် အနာဂတ် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီနိုင်ငံတော်အသစ်အတွက် ဒီမိုကရေစီလှုပ်ရှားမှုများကို ထောက်ခံအားပေးရန် ထပ်လောင်းတိုက်တွန်းအပ်ပါသည်။ ထို့အပြင် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံအတွင်းရော ပြင်ပမှာပါ နေထိုင်ကြသည့် လွတ်လပ်ရေးအတွက် တိုက်ပွဲဝင်သူအားလုံးအနေဖြင့် စည်းလုံးမှုကိုဦးထိပ်ထားပြီး ကွဲလွဲမှုများထက် တူညီသည့် ပန်းတိုင်များကို အာရုံစိုက်ဖို့ တိုက်တွန်းအပ်ပါသည်။ နိဂုံးချုပ်အနေဖြင့် မြန်မာပြည်သူအားလုံးအတွက် လူမျိုး၊ ဘာသာ၊ ယဉ်ကျေးမှု၊ ကျား/မလိင်ခွဲခြားမှု၊ ဘာသာစကား၊ တိုင်းရင်းသားလူမျိုးစုနှင့် နောက်ခံအကြောင်းတရား မခွဲခြားပဲ အားလုံးပါဝင်သည့် လွတ်လပ်သော ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီ ချင်းပြည်နယ်နှင့် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံအတွက် တိုက်ပွဲဝင်ခဲ့ကြသည့် ကျဆုံးသွားသော သူရဲကောင်းများအားလုံးကိုလည်း အလေးပြု ဂုဏ်ပြုအပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher: Ministry of International Cooperation Myanmar
Date of entry/update: 2023-07-02
[field_licence]
Type: Individual Documents
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Format : pdf
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Title: China Looms Large Over Thailand's Move to Reengage With Myanmar Junta
Description: "WASHINGTON - A recent attempt by Thailand to reengage with Myanmar's junta appears to be aimed at creating an alignment with China, a close ally of the military regime in Myanmar, analysts said. On June 19, the outgoing Thai government of Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-ocha, a former general who seized power in a 2014 military coup, hosted informal talks for foreign ministers from member nations of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Myanmar's foreign minister, Than Swe, appointed by the military junta that seized power in February 2021, was among those who attended. Top diplomats from some other countries in the 10-member regional bloc, such as Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia, did not. In August 2022, foreign ministers from ASEAN member states had agreed to bar Myanmar's ruling generals from the group's meetings until they made progress on the so-called Five-Point Consensus reached in April 2021 to end the violence that engulfed Myanmar after the coup. Protests, a civil disobedience movement and fighting continue in Myanmar. As China is currently the second-largest aid provider to the Myanmar junta after Russia, Beijing may want the junta to restore order to stabilize the China-Myanmar border and the pipelines running through Myanmar into China, according to Paul Chambers, lecturer and special adviser on international affairs at Naresuan University in Thailand. Thailand, which is close to China diplomatically and geographically, has sought to take a similar stance, said Chambers. "[The] Prayut government would want to include China in any ASEAN negotiations concerning Myanmar," he said. Sek Sophal, a researcher at the Center for Democracy Promotion at Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University in Japan, said Thailand's military-backed government sees China as a key player in the Myanmar issue. The Thai government has continued to engage with Myanmar on a "business as usual" basis and has done "very little" to put pressure on the junta, Sophal said. When asked by VOA about the informal talks hosted by Thailand, the Chinese Embassy in Washington said they were not aware of the matter and referred the question to the Chinese Embassy in Myanmar or Thailand instead and received no reply. The United States called on Myanmar to comply with the Five-Point Consensus. "As the secretary noted, Burma's military regime has repeatedly carried out horrific, and extensive violence against the people of Burma since the February 2021 military coup," a State Department spokesperson said last week in an email to VOA. "We recognize and continue to welcome ASEAN's efforts to address the crisis in Burma. Given the regime's lack of progress on the Five-Point Consensus, we call on ASEAN members to hold Burma accountable for its actions," the spokesperson said. The U.S. Treasury Department last week imposed sanctions on Myanmar's Defense Ministry and two state-owned banks, the Myanmar Foreign Trade Bank and the Myanmar Investment and Commercial Bank. The measure freezes any assets of the sanctioned entities that are in the U.S. or controlled by a U.S. person. It also prohibits all transactions by U.S. persons or entities carried out within or transiting the U.S. that the targeted entities would benefit from. Chambers said that the U.S. could use its sanctions against Myanmar's junta and work with its ASEAN opponents, such as Indonesia, to slow down Bangkok's current cooperation with the junta. "The U.S. is aware that Thailand has, since at least 2013, followed a realist policy of hedging or 'creating balance' between Beijing and Washington," he said. After more than nine years of China-leaning rule under Prayuth, a surprise win by the Move Forward Party in the May 14 elections means Thailand is slated to have a new government installed in July, according to parliamentary procedure. Pita Limjaroenrat, who leads the left-leaning, progressive Move Forward Party, is the front-runner to become Thailand's next premier. He has been vocal about how he would shift Thailand's foreign policy direction, including its stance on Myanmar. "A stable Myanmar is a boon to the entire region, but if Myanmar sneezes, Thailand gets sick as well," Pita told VOA's Thai Service during an interview in April. Educated at Harvard and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Pita is known to have a natural affinity for the U.S. Analysts, however, say the Thai politician has to walk a fine line to engage constructively with China, given its economic clout and growing influence in Thailand's foreign policy. "Thailand might have to continue to bandwagon with China for its economic interests," although Thailand has reset its foreign policy to work with the U.S.-led Western countries, said Sophal. Chambers said a Pita-led Thailand would distance itself from China, work closely with Washington, and cease cooperating with the Myanmar junta..."
Source/publisher: "VOA" (Washington, D.C)
Date of entry/update: 2023-07-01
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Title: Defence Secretary visits Myanmar; Discusses matters relating to India’s security with the country’s senior leadership
Description: "Defence Secretary Shri Giridhar Aramane paid an official visit to Myanmar from June 30, 2023 to July 01, 2023. He called on Chairman, State Administrative Council Senior General Min Aung Hlaing in Nay Pyi Taw. The Defence Secretary also called on Defence Minister of Myanmar Gen (Retd.) Mya Tun Oo and held meetings with Commander-in-Chief, Myanmar Navy Admiral Moe Aung and Chief of Defence Industries Lt Gen Khan Myint Than. The visit provided an opportunity to raise matters relating to India’s security with senior leadership of Myanmar. During the meetings, the two sides discussed issues related to maintenance of tranquillity in the border areas, illegal trans-border movements and transnational crimes such as drug trafficking and smuggling. Both sides reaffirmed their commitment to ensure that their respective territories would not be allowed to be used for any activities inimical to the other. India shares an approximately 1,700-km long border with Myanmar. Any developments in that country have a direct impact on India’s bordering regions. Peace & stability in Myanmar and well-being of its people, therefore, remain of utmost importance to India..."
Source/publisher: Press Information Bureau
Date of entry/update: 2023-07-01
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Title: Myanmar: Military’s obstruction of humanitarian aid could be international crime
Description: "The chief of OHCHROpens in new window’s Myanmar team, James Rodehaver, explained that since their February 2021 coup, the country’s military rulers have been instilling a “climate of fear” to subjugate the civilian population, restricting aid access and using “all means” at their disposal to clamp down on civil society. Brutal tactics He said the military’s tactics had included the use of heavy weaponry on civilian areas and airstrikes, the burning of villages, and the use of landmines to prevent those forced to flee from returning home. “Another thing that they have done regularly has been to burn food stores, crops and seed stores, to destroy medical facilities and to target medical workers.” The military imposed further restrictions on humanitarian assistanceOpens in new window in the aftermath of deadly Cyclone Mocha in May, Mr. Rodehaver said. Over 17.6 million people, or a third of the overall population of Myanmar need aid. OHCHR Spokesperson Ravina Shamdasani briefing in Geneva on the comprehensive human rights update for Myanmar, stressed that intentional obstruction or denial of humanitarian assistance may amount to serious violations of international law. Aid workers treated as opponents “The military has operated as if those providing aid are helping those opposed to their rule, rather than respecting their need for protection and facilitating their access and assistance to the civilian population in a time of crisis”, she said. She cited the military’s “four cuts” strategy outlined in the report “to kill and injure thousands of civilians while destroying goods and infrastructure necessary for survival, including food, shelter, and medical centres”. An estimated 1.5 million people have been internally displaced, and approximately 60,000 civilian structures have reportedly been burnt or destroyed, she said. Between the overthrow of the civilian Government and April 2023, credible sources have verified that at least 3,452 people had died at the hands of the military and its affiliates, and 21,807 individuals had been arrested. Dramatically worse “Notably, our report says the security situation has dramatically worsened for humanitarian workers since the coup. Aid providers are consistently exposed to risks of arrest, harassment or other mistreatment, or even death”, Ms. Shamdasani added. “In the context of armed conflicts, intentional obstruction or denial of humanitarian assistance may further constitute war crimes such as wilful killing, torture and other degrading treatment, starvation, and collective punishment”, she warned. Intentional denial can also constitute crimes against humanity, she continued, such as murder, “extermination, torture and other inhumane acts, or persecution, when committed in the context of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population.”..."
Source/publisher: UN Geneva
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-30
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Title: အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီနှင့် အပေါင်းအပါများက စစ်ကိုင်းတိုင်း၊ ပုလဲမြို့နယ်တွင် ပြည်သူလူထုအား အစုလိုက်အပြုံလိုက် သတ်ဖြတ်ခြင်းအပေါ် ပြင်းပြင်းထန်ထန်ပြစ်တင်ရှုတ်ချခြင်း။
Description: "၂၀၂၃ ခုနှစ်၊ ဇွန်လ ၂၇ ရက်နေ့တွင် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီများမှ တိုက်လေယာဉ်ဖြင့် ဗုံးကြဲတိုက်ခိုက်မှုကြောင့် စစ်ကိုင်းတိုင်း၊ ပုလဲမြို့နယ်တွင် ရဟန်းတစ်ပါးအပါအဝင် အပြစ်မဲ့ပြည်သူ (၁၀) ဦးကျော် အသက်ဆုံးရှုံးခဲ့ရပြီး ပြည်သူအများအပြား ဒဏ်ရာရရှိခဲ့သည့် အကြမ်းဖက်လုပ်ရပ်ကို ပြင်းပြင်းထန်ထန် ပြစ်တင်ရှုတ်ချပါသည်။ ထိုအကြမ်းဖက်တိုက်ခိုက်မှုကြောင့် အပြစ်မဲ့ပြည်သူများအသက်ဆုံးရှုံးသည်သာမက ဘုန်းကြီးကျောင်း၊ စာသင်ကျောင်းများနှင့် အရေးပါသော လူထုအဆောက်အဦးများလည်း ပျက်စီးသွားခဲ့ပါသည်။ ဤကဲ့သို့သော ဖြစ်စဉ်သည် ယခုတစ်ကြိမ်သာ သီးခြားဖြစ်ပွားခြင်းမဟုတ်ဘဲ လွန်ခဲ့သော (၂၇) လ တစ်လျှောက်လုံး လူမျိုးတုံးသတ်ဖြတ်သည့် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီမှ ပြည်သူများအပေါ် အကြိမ်ပေါင်း (၇၀) ကျော် အစုလိုက်၊ အပြုံလိုက် သတ်ဖြတ်ခြင်းများထဲမှ တစ်ခုသာဖြစ်ပါသည်။ မျက်မြင်သက်သေများက ၎င်းတို့ကြုံတွေ့ခဲ့ရသည့် ကြောက်မက်ဖွယ်ဖြစ်ရပ်ကို ကွင်းကွက်ကွင်းကွင်း ထင်ထင်ရှားရှား သက်သေထွက်ဆိုထားပါသည်။ ရုရှားတိုက်လေယာဉ်အမျိုးအစားများ ဖြစ်သည့် YAK-130 ၏ မြေပြင်ပေါ်တွင်ရှိသမျှကို ပစ်ခတ်မှုနှင့်အတူ အင်အားပြင်းဗုံးများဖြင့် ညောင်ကုန်းရွာ၊ ချင်းပြစ်ရွာနှင့် ပိတောက်ကုန်းရွာတို့ကို ပစ်မှတ်ထား တိုက်ခိုက်ခံရပြီး သေကြေပျက်စီးမှု ကြီးကြီးမားမားဖြစ်ပွားစေခဲ့ပါသည်။ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အာဏာရှင်များမှ ဆေးရုံများ၊ စာသင်ကျောင်းများ၊ ဘုန်းကြီးကျောင်းများနှင့် ခရစ်ယာန်ဘုရားကျောင်းများကို တမင်တကာပစ်မှတ်ထား အကြမ်းဖက်သည့်လုပ်ရပ်သည် လူ့အသက်ကို တန်ဖိုးမထားပဲ အပြစ်မဲ့အရပ်သားပြည်သူများကို ရည်ရွယ်ချက်ရှိရှိ တိုက်ခိုက်ဖျက်ဆီး သတ်ဖြတ်နေပြီး လူသားမျိုးနွယ်ကို ဆန့်ကျင်သည့် ရာဇဝတ်မှုများ ၎င်းအကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်မှ ပြောင်ပြောင်တင်းတင်းကျူးလွန်နေသည်ကို ဖော်ပြနေပါသည်။ အသက်လုထွက်ပြေးနေသော ရွာသားများကို ရည်ရွယ်ချက်ရှိရှိ တိုက်ခိုက်ရေး လေယာဉ်များပေါ်မှ ကျည်ဆန်များဖြင့် ပစ်ခတ်ခဲ့ပြီး နောက်ထပ် သေဆုံးမှုများဖြစ်ပွားခဲ့ကြောင်း မျက်မြင်သက်သေများက ထွက်ဆိုထားပါသည်။ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီတပ်သားများ၏ ကိုယ်ထိလက်ရောက် ကျူးလွန်မှုကြောင့် ပြည်သူလူထု၏ အသက်ပေါင်းများစွာဆုံးရှုံးသည်သာမကပဲ ဗုံးကြဲတိုက်ခိုက်ခြင်းနှင့် မီးရှို့ခြင်းများကြောင့် အိုးအိမ်များစွာ ဆုံးရှုံးပျက်စီးနေသည်။ အပြစ်မဲ့ပြည်သူလူထုအပေါ် စစ်ကောင်စီ၏ အကြမ်းဖက်ခြင်းများကြောင့် ပြည်သူများ၏အသက်အိုးအိမ် ပျက်စီးဆုံးရှုံးမှုများသည် အလွန်ဆိုးရွားသဖြင့် အပြည်ပြည်ဆိုင်ရာ၏ အာရုံစိုက်မှုနှင့် ထိရောက်သည့် အရေးယူဆောင်ရွက်မှုများ ချက်ချင်းလိုအပ်နေပါသည်။ မဖော်ပြနိုင်လောက်အောင် နာကျင်မှုနှင့် ဝမ်းနည်းပူဆွေးမှုများခံစားရသည့် ကျန်ရစ်သူမိသားစုဝင်များနှင့်အတူ ထပ်တူထပ်မျှ ဝမ်းနည်းပူဆွေးရပါသည်။ ဒဏ်ရာရရှိသည့် ပြည်သူများလည်း အမြန်ဆုံးပြန်လည်သက်သာ ကျန်းမာလာစေရန် ဆုတောင်းပေးနေပါသည်။ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီအနေဖြင့် အများပြည်သူကို တရားဓမ္မလမ်းပြပေးနေသော ရဟန်းသံဃာတစ်ပါး၏ အသက်ကိုပါ ဆုံးရှုံးစေခဲ့သဖြင့် ထိုလုပ်ရပ်အတွက်လည်း တာဝန်အပြည့်အဝယူရပါလိမ့်မည်။ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီများက ယခုကဲ့သို့ လူသားမျိုးနွယ်ကို ဆန့်ကျင်သည့် ရာဇဝတ်မှုများကို ပြောင်ပြောင်တင်းတင်းပေါ်တင် ဆက်လက်ကျူးလွန်ခြင်းသည် ၎င်းတို့ကျူးလွန်ခဲ့သမျှသော ဆိုးရွားသည့် ရာဇဝတ်မှူများအတွက် အပြည်ပြည်ဆိုင်ရာ အသိုင်းအဝိုင်းက ထိရောက်သည့် အရေးယူဆောင်ရွက်မှုများ မတွေ့ရသောကြောင့်ဖြစ်သည်။ အပြည်ပြည်ဆိုင်ရာ ရာဇဝတ်သားများဖြစ်သည့် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီနှင့် ၎င်းတို့၏အပေါင်းအပါများ၊ မြန်မာပြည်သူအပေါ် ရာဇဝတ်မှုများပိုမိုကျူးလွန်နိုင်ရန် စစ်လက်နက်ပစ္စည်းထောက်ပံ့သူများကို အပြည်ပြည်ဆိုင်ရာတရားဥပဒေများအရ ထိရောက်စွာ အရေးယူရန်လိုအပ်ပါသည်။ ဤလုပ်ရပ်များ ချက်ချင်းရပ်တန့်ရမည်။ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီက မြန်မာပြည်သူလူထုအပေါ် လူသားမျိုးနွယ်ကို ဆန့်ကျင်သည့် ရာဇဝတ်မှုများ ဆက်လက်ကျူးလွန်နိုင်ရန် ထောက်ခံအားပေးသည့် နိုင်ငံများရှိနေသေးသည်မှာ လွန်စွာရက်စက်ပြီး လက်နိုင်ခံစရာအကြောင်းမရှိပေ။ UN၏ နောက်ဆုံးထုတ်ပြန်ကြေညာချက်အရ လွန်ခဲ့သော (၂၇) လအတွင်းတွင် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီသည် အနည်းဆုံး အမေရိကန်ဒေါ်လာ (၁) ဘီလီယံ တန်ဖိုးရှိ စစ်လက်နက်များနှင့် နှစ်မျိုးသုံးလက်နက်ပစ္စည်းများကို အထူးသဖြင့် ရုရှားနိုင်ငံမှ ဝယ်ယူခဲ့ကြောင်းတွေ့ရသည်။ ဆိုလိုရင်းမှာ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံရှိ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီသည် ယူကရိန်းပြည်သူအပေါ် ရုရှားနိုင်ငံကစစ်တိုက်ခြင်းကို ငွေကြေးအားဖြင့် တိုက်ရိုက်ကူညီနေခြင်းဖြစ်သည်။ ဤအာဏာသိမ်း အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ဗိုလ်ချုပ်များသည် ရိုဟင်ဂျာလူမျိုးများကို လူမျိုးသတ်ဖြတ်ခဲ့ခြင်းအတွက် အပြည်ပြည်ဆိုင်ရာတရားရုံး (ICJ) တွင် တရားစွဲဆိုခြင်းခံနေရသည်။ လူမျိုးတုံးသတ်ဖြတ်သည့် စစ်အာဏာရှင်များနှင့် အပေါင်းအပါများသည် သူတို့ကျူးလွန်ခဲ့သမျှသော ရာဇဝတ်မှုများအားလုံးအတွက် အပြည်ပြည်ဆိုင်ရာတရားဥပဒေအောက်တွင် မုချအရေးယူခံရမည်။ လူမျိုးတုံးသတ်ဖြတ်သော အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီက စစ်ကိုင်းတိုင်း ပုလဲမြို့တွင် ကျူးလွန်သည့် အစုလိုက်အပြုံလိုက်သတ်ဖြတ်မှုသည် အာဆီယံ ဘုံသဘောတူညီချက်(၅)ချက်နှင့် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံအပေါ်ချမှတ်သည့် UN လုံခြုံရေးကောင်စီ၏ ဆုံးဖြတ်ချက်များကို တိုက်ရိုက်ချိုးဖြတ်နေခြင်းဖြစ်သည်။ ဤကဲ့သို့သော အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီ၏လုပ်ရပ်ကို အာဆီယံနှင့် ကုလသမဂ္ဂ လုံခြုံရေးကောင်စီက လစ်လျူရှုခြင်းကြောင့် လူသားမျိုးနွယ်အပေါ်ကျူးလွန်သည့် ရာဇဝတ်မှုများကို ပိုမိုတိုးပွားစေသည်။ ယင်းအစား ဗီတိုအာဏာပိုင်အချို့နှင့် UN လုံခြုံရေးကောင်စီ၏ အမြဲတမ်းအဖွဲ့ဝင်အချို့တို့သည် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၏တရားဝင်အစိုးရဖြစ်သည့် NUG ကိုအသိအမှတ်ပြုပြီး အတူတကွလုပ်ဆောင်မည့်အစား မြန်မာပြည်သူလူထုအပေါ် လူမျိုးတုံးသတ်ဖြတ်မှုများ ဆက်လက်ကျူးလွန်နိုင်ရန် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီကိုထောက်ပံ့နေကြပြီး ဤလုပ်ရပ်များသည် ဒေသတွင်း ငြိမ်းချမ်းရေးနှင့် လုံခြုံရေးကိုသာမက ကမ္ဘာ့ငြိမ်းချမ်းရေးနှင့် လုံခြုံရေးကို ခြိမ်းခြောက်သော လူသားမျိုးနွယ်ကို ဆန့်ကျင်သည့် ရာဇဝတ်မှုများ အမြောက်အမြားပါဝင်သည်။ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီအား တိုက်ရိုက်သော်လည်းကောင်း၊ သွယ်ဝှိုက်သော်လည်းကောင်း ထောက်ပံ့ခြင်းများအားလုံး ချက်ချင်းရပ်တန့်ရမည်။ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံသည် လူသားမျိုးနွယ်အပေါ် ဆန့်ကျင်သည့် ရာဇဝတ်မှုအား ပုံမှန်ဖြစ်အောင် မည်သည့်အခါမှ ခွင့်ပြုမှာမဟုတ်ပါ။ ဤကဲ့သို့သော လူ့အခွင့်အရေးချိုးဖောက်မှုများကို ချက်ချင်းရပ်တန့်ရန်အတွက် သက်ဆိုင်ရာအပြည်ပြည်ဆိုင်ရာ အဖွဲ့အစည်းများက လျင်မြန်ပြတ်သားစွာ အရေးယူဆောင်ရွက်ရန် တောင်းဆိုအပ်ပါသည်။ လူမဆန်သော အကြမ်းဖက်မှုများ ဆက်လက်ကျူးလွန်နိုင်ရန် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီအား လေယာဉ်ဆီများ ထောက်ပံ့ပေးသည့်လမ်းကြောင်းများကို ပစ်မှတ်ထား အရေးယူဒဏ်ခတ်ပိတ်ဆို့ရန် တောင်းဆိုအပ်ပါသည်။ စစ်ကိုင်းတိုင်း၊ ပုလဲမြို့နယ်တွင် စစ်ကောင်စီ၏ အစုလိုက်၊ အပြုံလိုက်သတ်ဖြတ်မှုပေါ် ကျူးလွန်သူ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီအား တရားစီရင်ပြီး ပြည်သူများအားလိုအပ်သည့် ထောက်ပံ့မှုများပေးနိုင်ရန် အပြည်ပြည်ဆိုင်ရာ သက်ဆိုင်ရာအဖွဲ့အစည်းများအား တောင်းဆိုအပ်ပါသည်။ မျက်မြင်များ၏ သက်သေထွက်ဆိုချက်များသည် မြန်မာပြည်သူများ၏ အသက်အိုးအိမ်ကို ကာကွယ်စောင့်ရှောက်ရန် နိုင်ငံတကာမှ ကြားဝင်ဆောင်ရွက်မှု အရေးတကြီးလိုအပ်ကြောင်း သတိပေးနေပါသည်။ လူ့အခွင့်အရေးချိုးဖောက်မှုများကို ရေရှည်တည်တံ့သော ဖြေရှင်းမှုများပြုလုပ်နိုင်ရန် အပြည်ပြည်ဆိုင်ရာ အဖွဲ့အစည်းများအနေဖြင့် အရေးယူဆောင်ရွက်သင့်သည်။ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံတွင် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီရရှိပြီး အကြမ်းဖက်မှုများပပျောက်ကာ လူတိုင်း တန်းတူအခွင့်အရေး၊ ဂုဏ်သိက္ခာနှင့် လေးစားမှုရရှိသော အနာဂတ်ဆီသို့သွားနိုင်ရန် လူမျိုးတုံးသတ်ဖြတ်နေသော စစ်ကောင်စီကို အမြစ်ဖြတ်ချေမှုန်းရမည်။ မည်သည့်လူသားမဆို ယခုကဲ့သို့ ဖော်ပြရန်ပင်မစွမ်းသာတဲ့ ကြောက်စရာအတွေ့အကြုံများနှင့် ဆုံးရှုံးမှုများကို ဘယ်တော့မှ မခံစားသင့်ပေ။ အကြမ်းဖက်မှုနှင့် ဖိနှိပ်မှုများ ကင်းရှင်းပြီး ငြိမ်းချမ်းစွာ နေထိုင်နိုင်ရန် ကျွန်ုပ်တို့အားလုံး စုပေါင်းလုပ်ဆောင်ရန် လိုအပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher: Ministry of International Cooperation Myanmar
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-30
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Title: Condemnation of the Massacre in Pale Township, Sagaing Division, Myanmar, by the Brutal Genocidal Military Junta - SAC and Their Partners in Crimes
Description: "We strongly condemn the heinous massacre that occurred in Pale Township, Sagaing Division, Myanmar, on June 27th, orchestrated by the brutal genocidal military junta. This merciless act resulted in the deaths of at least 10 innocent villagers, including a revered monk and a student, and the wanton destruction of monasteries, schools, and other vital community structures. It is crucial to recognize that this is not an isolated incident but rather one among a series of over 70 massacres committed by the brutal genocidal military junta in the past 27 months alone. The witness testimonies vividly recount the horrifying events that unfolded. The indiscriminate firing of Russian fighter jets YAK-130, along with the deployment of large bombs, deliberately targeted innocent villagers and villages such as Nyaung Kone, Chin Pyit, and Pi Tauk Kone villages, causing widespread devastation and claiming the lives of men, women, students, and monks. The deliberate targeting of civilians, homes, hospitals, schools, monasteries, and churches demonstrates a flagrant disregard for human life, openly committing war crimes and crimes against humanity, and a calculated effort to inflict suffering on innocent civilians. According to witnesses, fleeing villagers were subjected to relentless attacks, with bullets fired from the fighter jets, resulting in additional casualties. The destruction caused by the military junta's assault extended beyond the immediate loss of life, with houses being consumed by fires sparked by the bombardment. The scale of violence and destruction inflicted upon the affected communities is deeply distressing and requires immediate international attention and action. We offer our deepest condolences to the families and loved ones of the victims, who are enduring unimaginable pain and grief. Our thoughts and prayers are also with those who have been injured, and we fervently hope for their swift recovery. The loss of innocent lives, including a young student and a monk dedicated to spiritual guidance, is an irreparable tragedy that demands justice and accountability. The brutal genocidal military junta has been openly and freely committing these heinous crimes against humanity because they see no real actions taken against them by ASEAN and the international community for the crimes they have been committing everyday, therefore they perceived no action against them as license to commit more crimes against humanity against the population of Myanmar. This has to stop!. It is totally unacceptable that some countries are still supporting the genocidal military junta to commit more crimes against humanity against the population of Myanmar. According to the recent UN report, the genocidal military have received more than $ 1billion worth weapons and dual use from these countries knowing that this same genocidal military generals in Myanmar are facing the case of genocide against Rohingya population.The genocidal military junta and their partners in crimes must be hold accountable for their mass atrocities under the international laws. This Pale Massacre is another textbook of the brutal genocidal military junta directly violating ASEAN's five points on Myanmar and the UN Security Council Resolution on Myanmar. The inaction from the ASEAN and the UN Security Council have led to more crimes against humanity . Instead of taking decisive actions against genocidal military junta and recognising and fully engaging with the true democratic representative of the people of Myanmar, the National Unity Government of Myanmar (NUG), some veto power holders and permanent members of the UN Security Council and some members of ASEAN countries are directly supporting the genocidal military junta, and their support is massively contributing to these crimes against humanity, which threaten not only peace and security in the region but the world. The people of Myanmar will never allow the normalisation of crimes against humanity. To put an end to these grave human rights abuses, we implore the international community to take swift and decisive action. One effective measure would be to impose sanctions on the jet fuels used by the military junta, which would hinder their ability to carry out such ruthless attacks. We call upon international agencies and organisations to launch a thorough investigation into the Pale Township massacre, ensuring that the perpetrators are brought to justice and that the affected community is provided with adequate support and protection. The witness testimonies stand as a stark reminder of the urgent need for international intervention to safeguard the lives and dignity of the people of Myanmar. The international community must unite to address these ongoing human rights abuses and work towards a sustainable solution. It is imperative to establish a federal democracy in Myanmar and remove the genocidal military junta to prevent further atrocities and uphold the principles of human dignity, justice, and respect for human rights. No human being should ever have to endure such unspeakable terror and loss. Together, we must take collective action to ensure that the people of Myanmar can live in peace, free from the grip of violence and oppression..."
Source/publisher: Ministry of International Cooperation Myanmar
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-29
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Title: The Mirage of the ‘United Front’ in Myanmar
Description: "According to numerous postings on social media, a united front consisting of ethnic resistance armies and Burman resistance groups known as People’s Defense Forces, or PDFs, is waging a successful war against the army of the junta, which seized power in Naypyitaw on Feb. 1, 2021. Some foreign analysts have even claimed that the alliance is made up of 100,000 ethnic fighters and as many as 65,000 men and women are under the command of the PDFs, and that they together control most of the country. If those grossly exaggerated figures and outlandish claims were taken at face value, the days of the so-called State Administration Council (SAC) would be numbered and Myanmar could soon become the democratic, federal union that the resistance is said to be fighting for. It may be correct to say that the SAC-appointed government in Naypyitaw is the most incompetent the country has had since independence in 1948. The civil war has also spread from the ethnic-minority inhabited areas in the frontier areas to the Myanmar heartland, and the SAC has been unable to exercise control over some previously peaceful parts of the country. But the bitter truth is that Myanmar has a long and troubled history of failed attempts to forge pan-ethnic resistance fronts—and the main, divisive issue has always been Burman-ethnic minority relations. And it should be remembered that there are also conflicts between the various ethnic minorities. There is long-standing animosity between the Kachin and the Shan in Kachin State, and Shan, Kachin and Palaung have overlapping claims to territory in northern Shan State. The Wa, now in eastern Shan State, want their own state, which the Shan may not agree to. Rakhine State is torn apart by conflicts between Buddhists and Muslims, and Karen and Mon rebels have been fighting over territory adjacent to the Thai border. Myanmar may not have as many as 135 “national races”, a figure that has more to do with numerology (1+3+5=9, the military’s lucky number) than reality, but the country is nevertheless the home of a multitude of ethnic groups, and successive post-independence governments—as well as forces that for decades have resisted central authority—have all failed to create the shared sense of nationhood and belonging that everyone has been talking about since the Panglong Agreement was signed in 1947. The very first resistance front was set up in 1949, so only a year after independence. It was called the People’s Democratic Front and comprised the Communist Party of Burma (CPB), the Communist Party (Red Flag), the People’s Comrade Party (PCP), the Revolutionary Burma Army (RBA), and the Arakan People’s Liberation Party (APLP). Despite the fact that all of them were leftist and had similar ideologies, it failed to achieve anything noteworthy on the battlefield. The PCP, an offshoot of Aung San’s erstwhile militia, the People’s Volunteer Organization, surrendered in 1958 and so did the APLP, which was set up in 1945 and led by U Sen Da, an Arakanese monk and nationalist leader. What remained of the RBA, pro-communist defectors from the Burma Army, merged with the CPB. In 1956, four ethnic resistance armies, the Karen National Union (KNU), the Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP), the Mon People’s Front and a Pa-O group led by U Hla Pe forged an alliance called the Democratic Nationalities United Front, but it ceased to exist when the Mon and the Pa-O surrendered in 1958. A broader, pro-communist alliance called the National Democratic United Front was set up in 1959 and had six members: the CPB, the Karen National United Party (KNUP; a leftist Karen faction), the KNPP, the Chin National Vanguard Party, the New Mon State Party (NMSP), and a Pa-O faction. It was dissolved in 1975 over disagreements with the CPB, for which class was more important than nationality. Splits occurred within the ethnic groups as well, as some were still more sympathetic to the CPB and others were not. In the early 1960s, some of the ethnic resistance armies tried to unite their respective forces under the banner of the Nationalities Liberation Alliance. It consisted of the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO), the KNPP, the Kawthoolei Revolutionary Council (KRC), and Noom Suk Harn, a Shan group. Largely dysfunctional, it was dissolved when KRC chairman Saw Hunter Thwame surrendered in 1963. Two years later, the KNU, the KNPP, the Kayan New Land Party (KNLP; a Padaung group), the Zomi National Front (ZNF; a Chin group) and the War Council of the Shan State Army (SSA) set up the United Nationalities Front, which was dissolved after only a year of existence. An alliance called the Nationalities United Front was set up in 1967 comprising the KNUP, the KNPP, the KNLP, the NMSP, the ZNF and the Shan State Nationalities Liberation Organization (later known as the Shan State Nationalities People’s Liberation Organization, the SSNPLO, a leftist Pa-O group.) The NMSP left the Nationalities United Front in 1969, considering the alliance too leftist. The front was eventually dissolved in 1973. In that year, the more moderate Revolutionary Nationalities Alliance was formed consisting of four members: the KNU, the KNPP, the KNLP and the Shan State Progress Party (SSPP), the political wing of the SSA. The KNU, now led by the legendary General Bo Mya, was instrumental in bringing several groups together in the base area the Karen rebels controlled on the Thai border. As a result of his efforts, the Revolutionary Nationalities Alliance was succeeded in 1975 by the Federal National Democratic Front, which a year later changed its name to the National Democratic Front (NDF). Over the years, the NDF became the only alliance that had regular meetings, usually at the KNU’s Manerplaw headquarters on the Thai border. It also managed to maintain at least a semblance of unity among the ethnic resistance armies. But it also experienced splits, as well as disputes within its various member organizations, mainly over the question of whether they should or should not cooperate with the CPB. The communists demanded that other groups should made declarations accepting the leadership of the CPB, a predominantly Burman-led organization. That in turn led to splits within ethnic groups such as the SSA/SSPP and even the KNU went through a sometimes bloody power struggle between leftists and rightists. The original members of the NDF were the KNU, the KNPP, the SSPP, the Arakan Liberation Party (ALP), the Lahu National United Party (LNUP), the United Pa-O Liberation Organization (UPNO), and the Palaung State Liberation Organization (PSLO). The UNPO resigned in 1977 and was replaced in 1980 by the Pa-O National Organization (PNO). The NMSP joined in 1982 and the KIO in 1983; the Wa National Organization (WNO) in 1983; the Lahu National Organization (LNO) in 1987 (replacing the LNUP, which had resigned from the front in 1984); the National United Front of Arakan replaced the ALP in 1988; and the Chin National Front (CNF) joined in 1989. The KNLP resigned in 1977 but rejoined in 1991. The PNO, the PSLP and the SSPP were expelled from the NDF in 1991 because they had entered into peace agreements with the government. In the early 1990s, the NMSP, the KNPP, the KNLP and the KIO also made peace with the government while the Wa on the Thai border merged with the much more numerous Wa forces of the former CPB, which had collapsed following a mutiny among the mainly hilltribe rank-and-file of its army in April 1989. In late 1989, the combined force became the United Wa State Party and Army (UWSP/UWSA). Following the collapse of the communist insurrection, a handful of ethnic groups that had been allied with the CPB formed the All Nationalities People’s Democratic Front: the SSNPLO, the KNLP and the Karenni State Nationalities People’s Liberation Force. A smaller Burman group called the Democratic Patriotic Army (DPA), which the CPB had set up after the 1988 pro-democracy uprising, also joined the front. But by 1994, the DPA was gone from the scene and the other groups entered into ceasefire agreements with the government. The ceasefire agreements of the early 1990s led to the demise of the NDF as well, and it was not until 2011 that an attempt was made to form a new alliance of ethnic resistance armies. It became known as the United Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC) and, initially, brought together 11 groups, the most powerful being the KIA, the KNU and the SSA/SSPP, and it even had a unified, armed wing called the Federal Union Army (FUA). But, before long, six of the groups made their own, separate peace agreements with the government. Like all peace agreements before those, they were based on the same principle: the ceasefire groups were allowed to retain their respective armies—and to engage in any kind of business. Fundamental political issues were never on the table, and it was, in effect, nothing more than a divide-and-rule policy from the side of the military. The FUA never became a properly organized armed force, and by 2017 the UNFC had ceased to exist. In 2016, representatives of the KIA, the Arakan Army (AA), the Kokang-based Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) and the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) set up the Northern Alliance, which actually proved to be quite successful on the battlefields of Kachin State and northern Shan State. The AA, whose home base was in Rakhine State in western Myanmar, was included because it had been trained by the KIA and fought alongside the MNDAA in the Kokang region. That front was enlarged in 2017 as seven groups formed an alliance called the Federal Political Negotiation and Consultative Committee (FPNCC): the KIA, the TNLA, the MNDAA, the AA—and the SSA/SSPP, the UWSA and the National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA; based in Mong La in eastern Shan State, the NDAA was one of four local armies that emerged from the CPB after it collapsed in 1989). The FPNCC was set up at the UWSA’s Pangkham (Panghsang) headquarters, and it has appealed to China to help find a solution to Myanmar’s civil wars. Parallel to the FPNCC, the TNLA, the MNDAA and the AA—and, off-and-on, the KIA—fight under the banner of the Brotherhood Alliance, sometimes referred to as the Northern Brotherhood Alliance. But the peace agreements of the 1990s and the so-called “Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement”, which the Myanmar military initiated in 2015, have made it impossible for the ethnic armed organizations to establish any united front that could take part in meaningful peace talks. Massive foreign aid to dubious “peace projects” during the period 2011-2021 has also divided the groups, rather than help them unite behind common political demands. But long before the peace agreements of the early 1990s, which led to the demise of the NDF, and more recent events, splits had also occurred between the ethnic groups and what should have been their Burman allies. In 1969, a number of prominent Burman politicians formed what was called the Parliamentary Democracy Party (PDP), whose aim was to resist General Ne Win’s military dictatorship. Led by former and ousted prime minister U Nu, it included several of the legendary Thirty Comrades who had gone to Japan with Aung San during World War II and later went back to drive out the British. The PDP’s Patriotic Liberation Army (PLA) was led by one of them, Bo Let Ya. They set up bases on the Thai border where they in 1970 signed a pact with the KNU and the NMSP called the National United Front. The SSA was invited to join as well, but declined when U Nu made no firm commitment to federalism. The movement began to dwindle when U Nu left Bangkok for India in 1973, and those who remained became the People’s Patriotic Party (PPP), led by Bo Let Ya. But they soon fell out with the KNU, also over issues related to federalism, and Bo Let Ya was killed by the Karen in 1978. Nearly all remaining members of the PPP surrendered during a general amnesty in 1980. After the 1988 pro-democracy uprising, about a dozen Burman and ethnic groups set up the Democratic Alliance of Burma (DAB), but it became defunct when the KIA began to negotiate a separate peace deal with the government in 1993, which was finalized in 1994. Members of the National League for Democracy, who had been elected in 1990 but prevented from taking up their posts, also fled to the Thai border area, where they formed the National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma (NCGUB) and an expanded front called the National Council of the Union of Burma (NCUB) with KNU leader Bo Mya as the official president. But the Burmans and the ethnic groups never agreed on any political issues and the DAB, the NGCUB and the NCUB soon faded into oblivion. Those who have had the patience to read this far must find the clutter of acronyms of major, middle-sized and small and insignificant groups, shifting alliances, splits and surrenders truly bewildering, and it all seems like an absolute mess only very few outsiders would even want to try to make sense of. But it reflects the complexities of Myanmar’s ethnic resistance and its complex relationships with Burman groups, whether leftist or rightist. Even so, it has not prevented foreign peacemakers from coming up with easy solutions based on suggestions of “dialogs” and talks about “reconciliation”. In this regard, the Swiss and the Norwegians have been especially destructive, dealing only with people they know and pouring vast amounts of money into what they call “the peace process”, which isn’t and never was a genuine effort to solve Myanmar’s decades-long civil wars. Nor do we need those more recent, extravagant accounts of the situation on the battlefield today, but sober assessment of the strength and policies of the various groups, realizing that there is no nationwide entity comprising Burman outfits as well as ethnic armed organizations. Three of the main ethnic armies, the UWSA, the NDAA and the Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS), have substantial investments in commercial enterprises in SAC-controlled areas and are not even involved in any fighting with the Myanmar army. Instead, the RCSS has fought fierce battles with the TNLA and the SSA/SSPP. And the PDFs are local forces that are not under any effective, common command. This is a war that neither side can win. The anti-SAC forces are not well-equipped enough to defeat the much more heavily armed Myanmar army, which, in turn, is stretched out on too many fronts to be able to crush the resistance. Besides, the Myanmar army has tried to do precisely that for more than 70 years, and not succeeded. What has been lacking is a genuine analysis of what has caused the never-ending civil wars, and how the ethnic issue that is at the heart of the problem should be addressed. But that can be done only by the peoples of Myanmar themselves and, if outsiders want to play a role, they should refrain from giving bad advice based on poor insights into the history of Myanmar’s civil wars, failed alliances and misguided peace efforts as well as insufficient understandings of the intricacies of the country’s ethnic politics. Westerners especially must rid themselves of their “White-Messiah Complex” and start listening to people who matter instead of patronizing them. Only then can we, to paraphrase what Winston Churchill said during World War II, see not the end and not even the beginning of the end—but, perhaps, the end of the beginning of a process that could lead to peace..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-29
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Title: Can China help bring peace to Myanmar?
Description: "The ASEAN Summit in Indonesia in May 2023 saw, once again, the problem for Southeast Asian leaders seeking better outcomes to Myanmar’s political and humanitarian crises. Pleas for giving greater attention to the fading Five-Point Consensus from 2021 jostled with growing disdain for the self-destructive tendencies of Myanmar’s military leadership. Part of the deal for respectability in ASEAN is to focus on practical and reasonable steps to achieve agreed outcomes. Myanmar now fails every time. Such failure means Myanmar is a problem for China’s leaders too, who have been watching closely since the 2021 military coup. China’s foreign policy establishment and analysts think deeply about the opportunities and risks of future scenarios across Southeast Asia. It should not be forgotten that former leader Aung San Suu Kyi’s deposed government in Myanmar was in key respects a useful partner for China’s regional ambitions. The coup was probably judged an unhelpful complication. For Chinese strategists, a primary consideration is access to the Indian Ocean. That access made it possible for China to import around US$1.5 billion of natural gas in 2022 from the Rakhine State coast, across central Myanmar, up through Myanmar’s mountainous Shan State and to Yunnan province in China. In a future regional security crisis, where maritime access was in doubt, Myanmar might also allow valuable ‘back door’ access for China to friendly ports on the Bay of Bengal. With such scenarios in mind, the economic relativities of the Myanmar–China relationship are worth considering. According to 2021 World Bank data, Myanmar’s nominal GDP was US$65 billion (US$1200 per capita), while China’s was US$17.73 trillion (US$12,200 per capita). To put Myanmar’s poverty in perspective, if it were a Chinese province, its economy would be the third smallest. It would only best two of China’s remote landlocked regions, Tibet and Qinghai — which are both still at least five times richer per capita. Yunnan — the Chinese province neighbouring Myanmar, and with many geographical and cultural commonalities — has a GDP of around $430 billion a year. This is over six times larger than Myanmar’s, and around nine times more on a per capita basis. With such incredible disparity in wealth, anti-Chinese politics in Myanmar, while usually only a fringe issue, can ignite quickly given local resentment against Myanmar’s commercially successful ethnic Chinese minority. This old story, replayed around Southeast Asia over centuries, is a fact of life for Chinese diplomats seeking to build relationships that offer mutual benefit. With China a significant supplier of weapons and training to Myanmar government forces, and also to some ethnic armies, it is entangled in the country’s politics in ways that are both profitable and problematic. Exactly how much of this involvement is centrally planned in Beijing is an open question. Yunnanese authorities have a habit of seeking local solutions through the often unruly borderlands. Under President Xi Jinping, Chinese diplomacy has yet to get much momentum for its ‘peacemaking’ activities in such a contested environment. More than two years after the coup, China’s Foreign Minister Qin Gang recently met with Myanmar Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, becoming the highest-ranking Chinese official to meet with the coup leader. With more high-level engagement likely soon, the question of how China can encourage positive outcomes for Myanmar requires a focus on its core interests. While Myanmar’s economic growth until the coup was advantageous, the fact that the coup leaders are almost friendless — and despised even in ASEAN — offers different upside. For now, China can harness the Myanmar military’s appetite for attack aircraft, heavy weapons and constant resupply of ammunition and technical equipment to bolster its role as the patron-in-chief. Russia has traditionally taken a similar approach. For Beijing and Moscow, Myanmar is part of a convenient global constellation of countries pushed to the outer edge of the international system. Whatever its short-term strategy, it would help China’s standing in ASEAN, and even in countries like Australia, if it showed a creative instinct to use its wealth and influence to broker better outcomes for the people of Myanmar. The fear is that China will instead continue to manipulate Myanmar’s impoverished and downtrodden status while fuelling, through its lucrative weapons exports, some of the most atrocious violence seen in Southeast Asia for generations. When the dust finally settles in Myanmar, its people will rightly ask who sustained the reviled military regime. Right now, the answer is that Beijing offered ‘friendship’ to the coup-makers, an irony for a Communist Party so committed to regime and institutional stability. Yet with the right attention to China’s role and self-interests, it is still possible to imagine shifting positions, where Chinese institutions eventually work out how to negotiate a more peaceful settlement. At a time when China talks regularly about peace in European, Middle Eastern and African conflict zones, a positive contribution in Myanmar would be welcomed by all..."
Source/publisher: "East Asia Forum" (Australia)
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-28
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Title: Incoming Thai government must enact refugee-friendly policies, Southeast Asian MPs say
Description: "JAKARTA – The incoming Thai government must heed calls from civil society to reform policies on refugees to be more compassionate and in line with international human rights standards, ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights (APHR) said today. “We support calls made by the Karen Peace Support Network and other locally-led civil society groups regarding Thailand’s policies on refugees and asylum seekers,” said APHR Chair and member of Indonesia’s House of Representatives Mercy Barends. “The incoming government must respond to the needs of refugees, uphold their human rights, and guarantee their safety.” According to data from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), there are over 90,000 Myanmar refugees living in nine recognized refugee camps along the Thai-Myanmar border. Refugees, some of whom have been stuck in limbo for years, are strictly confined behind fences and barred from seeking employment in Thailand. According to the Karen Peace Support Network, the current food ration is valued at approximately 300 THB or 10 USD per month. Meanwhile, human rights groups have repeatedly criticized Thai border authorities for sending those seeking refuge back across the border to Myanmar, where they are at risk of indiscriminate airstrikes, arbitrary arrest, torture, and worse. In the most recent high-profile case in April this year, Thai immigration authorities detained three members of a Myanmar opposition group that had crossed into Thailand to seek medical treatment and then handed them over to the Myanmar junta-allied Border Guard Forces (BGF). Witnesses say that BGF troops shot at the men after the handover. According to media reports, at least one of the men was killed, while the fates of the other two remain unclear. “The incoming Thai government must recognize that the junta’s treatment of refugees cannot continue. The new government must grant Myanmar asylum-seekers safe passage through the border and guarantee their access to humanitarian assistance. Refugees living in the camps in Thailand must be given access to educational and economic opportunities that will allow them to thrive outside the camps in various capacities,” said Barends. “Adding to the suffering of those who have already been forced from their homes by a murderous junta is unconscionable; any administration that claims to represent change must start by immediately remedying this untenable situation,” said Barends..."
Source/publisher: ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-28
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Title: Internal discord the greatest threat to Southeast Asian unity
Description: "As great power rivalry casts its long shadow over Southeast Asia, the imperative of regional unity grows more urgent. Yet diversity, divisions and disputes remain consequential features of the region that pose a significant threat to unity. Differences in cultures, languages, religions, historical experiences, political systems and developmental pathways have shaped Southeast Asia as it stands today. Geopolitically, these differences make the challenge of forging unity a particularly onerous task. During the Cold War, diversity manifested in the ideological division of Southeast Asia into communist and non-communist states. This division also assumed a geographical expression in terms of the divide between mainland (mostly communist) and maritime (non-communist) Southeast Asia. Yet the picture that emerges on closer inspection is far more complex. Among the communist mainland states were Chinese and Soviet clients, at a time when the Sino–Soviet split was at its height. While relations among non-communist maritime states were more harmonious, they were still fraught with residual suspicion and mistrust, much of which took the form of sovereignty disputes stemming from decolonisation projects. Since 2022, diversity has also manifested in regional states’ positions on the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Regional powers such as Vietnam (because of longstanding ties with Russia) and Indonesia (because of its foreign policy non-alignment principle) have taken restrained positions, whereas Singapore has openly condemned the invasion and imposed unilateral sanctions. Meanwhile, the military junta that seized power in Myanmar in February 2021 has unsurprisingly been one of Russia’s staunchest supporters. While other Southeast Asian states voted at the United Nations to condemn the invasion, they have avoided taking more robust stances. Then come divisions. One of the most pressing challenges to ASEAN cohesion is the Myanmar crisis. While ASEAN has strained to maintain a semblance of unity in its efforts to pressure the junta leadership in Myanmar, differences between member states on the issue diminished the prospects of the organisation resolving the crisis. In the lead-up to the ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Jakarta in February 2023, Thailand departed from the organisation’s formal exclusion of the junta from regional talks by reaching out to it in different capacities. Thailand hosted an ‘open-ended informal consultation’ with the junta in December 2022 that involved several other mainland Southeast Asian states. In February 2023, Thailand invited Myanmar to the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus meeting on maritime security that it co-chaired with the United States. Thailand’s visibly accommodative posture contrasts to those of several other ASEAN member states who continue to pressure the Myanmar junta to abide by the five-point consensus agreed upon at the 2021 special summit. Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim even reached out to his Thai counterpart on 10 February 2023, urging Bangkok to take a firmer stance against the junta. These divisions prevented ASEAN from issuing a joint statement on the second anniversary of the coup. Persisting fault lines in Southeast Asia have periodically given rise to diplomatic disputes and even low-key conflicts. For instance, in 2013, militants from the Sulu archipelago of the Philippines landed in the East Malaysian state of Sabah to assert the sovereignty of the historic Sulu Sultanate over that territory. The situation served as a reminder that the Philippine claim to the Malaysian territory of Sabah remains unresolved. On the Southeast Asian mainland, differences exist between Mekong riparian states over Laos’ unilateral move to build dams — with Chinese assistance — along sections of the river that pass Laotian territory. In maritime Southeast Asia, the Philippine move to submit their case against China over their South China Sea territorial disputes in 2013 to an international tribunal was described by a senior official from an ASEAN member state as an ‘unfortunate development’ and an ‘inconvenience to ASEAN’. Detractors have often criticised ASEAN for its inability to resolve differences between member states. This criticism betrays a fundamental misunderstanding of ASEAN’s intended role and limitations. Since its creation, ASEAN’s primary purpose has been to create a more conducive environment for cooperation among Southeast Asian states. It also seeks to manage their differences such that these do not hamper broader aspirations to enhance cooperation. Though ASEAN’s success on this score has been patchy, it was never envisaged to be the panacea for all the region’s problems. In that sense, it should be no surprise that member states have never used the mechanism of the High Council in Article 14 of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation. Dispute resolutions involving Southeast Asian states have usually come in the form of third-party mediation and efforts of international institutions such as the International Court of Justice. Southeast Asia has come a long way from the Cold War years when it was described as a ‘region of revolt’. Still, despite the attention on great power rivalry and its consequences for regional security, intramural conflicts persist. Unless Southeast Asian states can get their regional house in order, the challenge of fostering much-needed regional unity in the face of sharpening great power rivalry will grow more acute — as will the consequences of their inability to do so..."
Source/publisher: "East Asia Forum" (Australia)
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-28
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Title: Authoritarianism in the Modern World: Analyzing the Myanmar Crisis and Thailand’s Complicity
Description: "2,146 kilometers of landlocked demarcation is all that cuts through Myanmar and Thailand, two Southeast Asian nations that share a complicated, erstwhile rivalry that has evolved into a mutual bilateralism in the scope of current developments, with the incumbent Prayuth Chan-ocha regime cozying up to the likes of the Tatmadaw, Myanmar’s armed forces. These two countries are nothing alike; they do not share any linguistic overlap nor do they have any cultural heritages together, and they follow drastically different models of governance. In that sense, they are not complementary to each other, but centuries of warfare and geopolitical realities have shaped a new outlook. Once old foes, Thailand and Myanmar have now basked in a much more intimate and deeper bond, owing to the Thai government’s warmth towards the military-installed regime in Myanmar, due to similarities and parallels between the militaries of both nations, long-standing bastions of power and influence in politics, respectively. Since the Tatmadaw ousted the Aung San Suu Kyi-led government, the Prayuth administration has exercised a policy of soft diplomacy and engaged the Tatmadaw through peaceful politicking and appeasement behind the scenes. In this spirit of opportunism, minute realpolitik, and a much more drastic about-face of national fortunes, they have not only grown closer than ever, but this has also placed Thailand at loggerheads with the contradicting ASEAN doctrine of assertive, overt action condoning the Tatmadaw. Despite Thailand’s efforts towards an active role in the Myanmar peace process, the latest episode by Foreign Minister Don Pramuwinai to defuse tensions and bring an amicable end to the crisis only served to exacerbate an already fraught regional situation. To provide meaningful context, the Foreign Minister facilitated a series of talks between Thailand, ASEAN members, and envoys from the Myanmar junta, such as Myanmar’s foreign minister, Than Swe. In the end, several ASEAN members declined the invitation, embarrassing and thwarting Thailand’s efforts. The fact that the meeting was proposed and arranged only drew biting criticism and backlash. Professor Thitinan Pongsudhirak, a senior fellow of the ISIS (Institute of International Studies) at Chulalongkorn University, argues in an op-ed for the Bangkok Post that Don’s actions seem to be born out of desperation and that there is something much larger at play, presumably vested business interests or priorities that exceed national concerns. It is worth noting that this comes at a crucial juncture for Thailand, following the recent election that witnessed an unprecedented victory by the pro-democracy bloc, particularly the Move Forward Party, which has sought to orient Thailand back to the West and adhere to the ASEAN Five-Point agreement. In that sense, one has to wonder if this misadventure by the Prayuth government is part of something much more indicative in the realm of local politics, one that bypasses geopolitical concerns and delves into a more personal, ideological splinter within Thailand, which the recent election has irreparably carved. Herein, I address three critical takeaways that can be extracted from this strategic blunder and its implications within the framework of future foreign policy directives toward the Myanmar crisis. 1. Authoritarianism in Modern Context The Myanmar crisis is only a footnote in the discussion of authoritarianism in the globalized world, where diplomacy and commerce are shaped by affiliation with regional and intergovernmental blocs. It is an eclectic reverie of different nation-states with diverse economic, national objectives, and ideologies. Countries like Sweden and Finland have discussed entering NATO in light of the Russo-Ukrainian War, while entities like the United Kingdom have departed the EU. All of this is integral to contextualizing the spread and revival of authoritarianism and despotic regimes worldwide. Countries such as India, Hungary, and Russia have experienced democratic backsliding and upheaval, while European nations have turned increasingly nationalistic and right-wing, as seen in Italy. The 20th century observed a political realm shaped by allies and blocs against the backdrop of the Cold War. However, this trend seems to be changing as of late, with countries prioritizing national defense and economic recovery in the post-pandemic world. Germany, for instance, has ramped up its defense spending to its highest levels since the Cold War when it was West Germany. Meanwhile, nations like Venezuela, Iran, and Turkey have isolated themselves from the global community due to social unrest and uncertainty. In the 1990s, there were more democratic countries than authoritarian ones, but this trend has been upended. A pattern of despotic and increasingly autocratic regimes has emerged since the post-2007-2008 financial crisis and the coronavirus pandemic. Analyzing the Myanmar crisis and Thailand’s stakeholdership in it helps understand the connection to authoritarianism. To understand Thailand’s stance on the junta, one must examine the motives behind it. The obvious conclusion is that both countries have militarized natures and benefit from closer ties to prop up and aid each other in the event of a potential Chinese invasion of the Taiwan Strait. However, the real dissection of their relationship is much more nuanced. It is simply a relationship of convenience laced with appeasement and ignorance, part of the larger systemic global trend of authoritarian regimes elevating or supporting other like-minded regimes based on common objectives and similar ideologies. Thailand’s current rapprochement towards Myanmar overlooks a crucial and perhaps obscured problematic reality—the Rohingya refugee crisis and the exodus of migrants to Thailand’s borders. Thailand currently shelters 90,000 refugees, mostly those fleeing the sectarian violence in Myanmar. Issues such as statelessness and integration into society remain pervasive. A glaring fact is that Thailand has not signed the UN charter on Refugees and has recently proposed the now-suspended Torture Act. All of this suggests that Thailand is complicit in some manner by not taking an active hand in dealing with cross-border issues, and it ought to be much more compassionate. One can argue that Thailand is effectively damaging its global credibility by continuously supporting a regime that has shown little regard for human rights or respect for democratic institutions. Whatever stake Thailand has in this, it must not be transactional and purely manufactured out of greed. This may explain the Prayuth government’s reticence on the matter. Of course, one must also consider other factors and scandals, such as the recent uproar over a sitting senator’s business ties to the junta. Overall, it would be better to forget that Thailand and Myanmar form part of the Golden Triangle, the notorious hotbed of drug and crime productivity. With these points in mind, the incoming new pro-democratic administration must reboot its foreign policy initiatives, placing the human cost of crises and wars above other priorities. They should find a locus that allows Thailand to assert its regional strength without losing any leverage, and strive to eliminate the vested interests that foster this affair, particularly the links and business dealings with the junta. 2. The Way Forward 14th May 2023 saw a monumental tectonic shift in Thai politics with Move Forward leading the pack and winning the right to form a government first. While their prospects are bleak as of this writing, their policies and the coalition’s MOU on Myanmar must constitute a return to respectability for Thailand as a regional power after years of mismanagement and ineptness. After all, it is a potential for a restart in Thai attitudes toward foreign policy. The Prayuth government’s current flirtations with the Myanmar government are still a thorn in the side of the incoming coalition’s side. I examine for two reasons why the current government’s Myanmar imbroglio is in fact a political machination deliberately designed to be a chink in the armor for the pro-democracy camp. The first is to flaunt Thailand’s political strength in the region, positioning it as an active actor in ASEAN. However, this gambit has failed because the current government has yet to embrace the current political dynamic in which Thailand has little to no sway in the regional community. It is only a passive driver, unable to effect change to the likes of Indonesia. The current government’s credibility has only backfired from the day it assumed office. Authoritarian regimes thrive on legitimacy and Thailand is no different. From showcasing its global entry through last year’s APEC summit and other gaffes, Thailand has only demonstrated that it is a tiny player, a pawn in an ever-evolving dynamic – the tug of war against America and China for influence through subterfuge, soft power, and neocolonialism. With Move Forward’s Western outlook, Prayuth’s government-crafted blunder seems to have been a ploy, to place the new government on a collision course with the SAC to the extent where mobilization and brinkmanship will be possibilities, with catastrophic ends. Therefore, the onus is on the new government to immediately respond to the Myanmar crisis and that will involve engaging with the junta in ways unseen before in the bilateral history of both nations. 3. Refugees and Reassurance The refugee crisis in Myanmar has dominated popular memory through violent and startlingly graphic depictions portrayed in the media, as well as the persecution and genocide of ethnic groups, to the point where the ICC investigated the aforementioned actions taken against the Rohingya. After 2015, almost 900,000 people of Rohingya descent have fled Myanmar, displaced into neighboring countries. What is most grim is the Myanmar state’s denial of such violence and cleansing, almost tantamount to the conditions faced in apartheid or the Rwandan Genocide. This crisis has taken on a life of its own, transcending a national issue to a global concern that has led to a reevaluation of the treatment and eradication of ethnic minorities in other countries, such as the Uighur extermination camps or Darfur. While this crisis is largely isolated to Myanmar and is insulated, Thailand must be vigilant and willing to speak against this perpetuated injustice, this violation of human rights, and the recognition of the Rohingya as a population severely dispersed by the perils of war. It is not the time for compassion, nor is it time to be a passive bystander. For that, it is Thailand’s role as a neighbor and as an Asiatic power to bring awareness about this critical crisis, to call for accountability, and to portray the crisis in a manner that highlights the multifaceted impacts it has consequently wreaked on a minority group and, by extension, a national state that is interspersed with in-fighting and the re-emergence of a human rights, pro-democratic movement within the country that has captured the global imagination. If Thailand claims to be a democratic polity after the results of this election have been entertained, the responsibility should be placed on its shoulders to become more active in championing democratic ideals in the regional sphere, instead of supplicating and kowtowing to authoritarian regimes that have a lack of interest in following the rule of established law. These three points, I hope, have accurately captured the zeitgeist and future implications of Thailand’s Myanmar policy, and the reader finds this encouraging in the greater strata of things, that the new government will readjust current attitudes toward Myanmar to the point where other stakeholders can actively participate in the peace process without appeasing the junta or supplanting it through force. There is no perfect solution, nor is there a worse outcome. There is only an outcome that will be solely determined by the Myanmar people’s sheer will, and we, as a regional partner, must observe every development while distancing ourselves from the SAC..."
Source/publisher: Thai Enquirer
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-27
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Title: National Unity Government Weekly Press Update (25/2023)
Source/publisher: National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-27
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Title: Will the first Myanmar border guard defection have a contagion effect?
Sub-title: It is imperative that the NUG successfully integrate the defecting Karenni forces and accommodate their leadership.
Description: "The slowing of Myanmar military defections to the National Unity Government (NUG) since 2022 challenges the opposition theory of victory based on hollowing out the junta army as an effective fighting force, spread too thinly across too many fronts. The Myanmar military’s most important victory to date may not have been on the battlefield, but in the barracks, having staved off mass defections. Cracks have recently emerged, however, as the Karenni National People’s Liberation Front (KNPLF) announced that its two battalions had defected to the NUG. The border guard forces on the country’s eastern frontier with Thailand had been integrated into the Myanmar military for more than a decade. Though small with only a few hundred men, it is the first Border Guard Force (BGF) to defect en masse. And while it is one of dozens of BGFs, which are in no way a monolithic force, the reasons for their defection may be shared more widely across the multi-ethnic country of 55 million people. The Border Guard Forces Border Guard Forces emerged as the Myanmar military reached ceasefires with various ethnic resistance organizations that had been fighting the central government for decades. This accelerated during the National Ceasefire Agreement process, during which 10 ethnic armies signed a pact with the military in 2015. The military sought to divide the different ethnic armies and buy off individual commanders with promises of local autonomy, control over lucrative cross-border trade and more control over special economic zones. The most notorious example of these zones is the gambling hub of Shwe Kokko in eastern Kayin state. In 1994, a group broke away from the Karen National Union/Liberation Army (KNLA), establishing themselves as the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army. In 2009-2010, they became the Kayin State Border Guard Force, under the leadership of Colonel Saw Chit Thu, and formally integrated into Myanmar's military. Under the agreement, Saw Chit Thu was allowed to develop the area. Enter a Chinese national, with Cambodian citizenship, She Zhijiang, whose Yatai International Holdings pledged to invest $15 billion in Shwe Kokko, starting in 2017. Yatai New City is nothing but a hub of gambling, human and drug trafficking, and on-line scam centers. An ex-BGF colonel, Saw Min Min Oo, is one of directors of Myanmar Yatai, the local partner. Another key player is Chit Lin Myaing Co., ostensibly the corporate holding company of Saw Chit Thu’s Border Guard Force. In December 2020, the military raided Shwe Kokko, but when the government tried to oust Saw Chit Thu in January 2021 some 7,000 border guards threatened to resign in protest, forcing a government rethink. The government quickly reappointed him and Saw Chit Thu became an important military ally following their seizure of power on Feb. 1, 2021. Since then, Shwe Kokko has grown, with rents paid to the State Administrative Council (SAC), as the junta formally calls itself. Thailand arrested She Zhijiang in August 2022 at China’s request and will soon extradite him, but business continues. Under pressure from China, Thai authorities briefly turned off the power to Shwe Kokko and other SEZs in June 2023. Border Guard Forces have done much of the front-line duty against the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA), the cost of doing business with the junta. In April 2023, there was intense fighting near Shwe Kokko, which caused a large refugee exodus into Thailand. Though the junta’s border guards suffered heavy casualties, they were supported by the Myanmar Air Force, which eventually pushed the KNLA back; the KNLA and allied People's Defence Force militias suffered their own heavy losses. Since the coup, casinos and scam centers, funded by Chinese transnational criminal enterprises, have proliferated along the border, under the protection of Naypyidaw-backed BGFs. They are an important financial lifeline for the economically beleaguered junta, whose sources of revenue have dwindled due to their economic mismanagement. The Karenni patchwork Like elsewhere in Myanmar’s border regions, the political tapestries are complex and there are a multiplicity of actors in Kayah state. The Karenni National Progressive Party immediately joined with the NUG following the February 2021 coup and has actively fought against junta forces. They have worked with the Karen Nationalities Defense Force that was established following the coup as an umbrella for local people’s defense forces in Kayah State and southern Shan State. The KNPLF was one of the 2015 National Ceasefire Agreement parties, formally integrated into the military as the Karenni Border Guards Force. Despite being on the junta’s side, the KNPLF has been attacked by the Myanmar military. On 24 December 2021, over 100 members of the 66th Light Infantry Division massacred and incinerated the bodies of some 40 civilians, including two aid workers from Save the Children, in Hpruso. When the KNPLF tried to intervene and secure the release of detained civilians, the military killed four of their members. In early 2023, the KNPLF refused to attend a ceasefire meeting in the capital Naypyitaw. Unlike other BGFs, the KNPLF control no special economic zone. As such their defection is not a financial loss for the junta. With fewer financial incentives than the border guards in Shwe Kokko and other areas, the KNPLF has been less willing to fight on behalf of the junta or be used as cannon fodder. Fighting in the Karenni region has subsided in relative terms, according to the think tanks IISS and ACLED. And there may be a reason for the decline in violence: The various Karenni forces have routed the military in recent engagements. In reply, the military has increased air attacks; some 108 in Kayah state in April, alone. There’s been at least at least two since the defection, with more expected. And yet, it is a loss and one more piece of the border that the junta no longer controls, between the Karen region and Shan State, adjacent to Thailand’s Mae Hong Son and close to Naypyitaw. While numerically small, the KNPLF immediately joined in military operations against the junta, which had tried to seize their headquarters in Mese township. Several military outposts near Mese fell over this past weekend, and there are reports that Light Infantry Battalion 430 surrendered, with up to 100 troops. If so, it would be the largest surrender to date. Finally, on June 12, a group of ethnic armies and opposition militias established the Karenni State Interim Executive Council, the first revolutionary state government established. The KNPLF’s defection helps to maintain political solidarity. Contagion unlikely Every Border Guard Force is their own organization, with their own political and economic motivations to maintain their alliance with the junta. The BGFs who control the special economic zones in Shwe Kokko, KK Park, and Kokang still have a financial incentive to stay loyal to the junta. Many fear the more puritanical ethnic armies, which are vehemently against the gambling and human trafficking that goes on within the economic zones and might not countenance being under the NUG umbrella. And given the fighting that has transpired between some BGFs and ethnic armies, the latter may not be too willing to embrace their formal rivals. Spread thin, the junta needs the border guards now more than ever, which gives them additional leverage over Naypyitaw. A contagion is unlikely, but the first BGF to defect represents a crack. As the junta fails to provide other BGFs with materiel or air support, while milking them for funds and using them as fodder, some groups may take note. To that end, it’s imperative that the NUG handle this well, integrating the defecting Karenni forces and accommodating their leadership. After all, the theory of victory is based on the man-by-man, unit-by-unit hollowing out the junta’s forces..."
Source/publisher: "RFA" (USA)
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-27
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Title: A Criminal Cancer Spreads in Southeast Asia
Sub-title: In post-coup Myanmar, crime syndicates, working with the military, are moving into more complex fraud schemes from a growing number of autonomous enclaves.
Description: "In the fractured authority surrounding crime-group controlled enclaves on the Moei River separating Thailand and Myanmar, this is what a crackdown on armed gangsters looks like: China presses Myanmar’s military junta — a sometimes client of Beijing — to make Thailand cut electric power to a large gambling and fraud hub run by Chinese crime syndicates across the river in Myanmar. The military-supervised Border Guard Force in the area, a partner of the syndicates, responds with threats to shut down cross-border trade. Then, giant generators appear in the enclave, deployed by the border guards and the gangs. The army, without explanation, does nothing. Individual commanders, if not the army itself, are believed to profit from the criminal activity. Business as usual continues. That is roughly how it goes along Myanmar’s lawless border, with variations for geography and the local cast of characters. Late last year, awareness began to rise in the region that Myanmar’s criminal enclaves were metastasizing, and the call do something about it grew louder from the media, civil society and governments. While the zones themselves were not a new phenomenon, a nefarious development amplified international alarm: After Beijing’s anti-COVID measures sent Chinese workers scurrying home from the enclaves, their criminal operators began luring jobseekers from around the world with offers of lucrative high-tech jobs, then trafficking them across borders into cyber slavery to work in financial scams. Despite the growing perception of the enclaves as a global security threat, nothing of consequence has changed. Every angle of attack is blunted by the tangle of interests in these zones — powerful organized criminal groups, local armed actors, fragmented sovereignty, and corruption, with the gambling and fraud city of Shwe Kokko at the heart of it all. Myanmar’s military has neither the will nor the capacity to manage its own Border Guard Forces (BGF), much less curb the reach of transnational crime from enclaves under BGF control. Much of the country, embroiled in full scale revolution against the junta, is beyond the reach of the overstretched army. It will be up to key neighboring countries, in cooperation with international law enforcement, to cut off access to critical cross-border connections and resources. For the United States, which has already been victimized, this crime wave represents a growing non-traditional security threat that requires a robust response. BGF and Its Criminal Syndicates Grow Deeper Roots in Myanmar At least 17 distinct crime zones now provide an estimated 5 million square meters of criminal office space along a 31-mile stretch of the Moei River on the Myanmar border with Thailand alone. Despite strict border controls and lockdowns during the COVID-19 pandemic, these zones expanded dramatically in size following the 2021 military coup. For example, the notorious KK Park Zone — sensationalized on Tik-Tok for harvesting and selling the organs of trafficking victims who refused to work on scams — grew from 26 to over 75 structures between 2021 and May 2023. By early last year, the criminal activity had victimized nationals of more than 46 countries, with the majority trafficked into Myanmar through Thailand. Despite increased awareness of the problems by the media and international law enforcement, the gangs continued expanding their ability to infiltrate online hiring platforms, set up fraudulent recruitment firms and networks, establish links with traffickers, and set up shop in new jurisdictions across Myanmar. By March 2023, growing organized crime activity in Karen State began to generate tremendous pressure for action even on resistance figures. Karen civil society groups raised concerns that the BGF’s illicit pursuits threatened to undermine governance and prospects for democracy and autonomy in Karen State, as suspicion deepened that a growing number of Karen resistance leaders had ties to the BGF schemes. In April, tensions spilled into armed conflict when a coalition of pro-democracy armed forces attacked the BGF criminal empire in Shwe Kokko and other illicit BGF businesses in Myawaddy township. “Shwe Kokko is a hub of drugs and sex-trafficking that funds the military regime with dirty money,” they charged. The junta responded with a joint force of BGF and army troops, intercepting the advancing resistance fighters, crushing a key People’s Defense Force group, and taking dozens of hostages. Thus, the junta proudly demonstrated its determination to keep Shwe Kokko a safe zone for crime. An Online Confidence Scheme — ‘Pig Butchering’ — Goes Global Initially focused on illegal online gambling, the crime zone operators now concentrate on a new form of fraud known as “pig butchering” or in Chinese, “shazupan.” The scheme originated in China around 2018, and as COVID depressed profits from gambling, Chinese-affiliated crime groups ramped it up. Here’s how it works: Scammers lure potential victims into trusting online relationships over a long period. Eventually, the scammer proposes a small investment idea and often transfers to the victim purported returns over what appear to be legitimate online trading platforms. This process, known as “fatting the pig,” continues until the victim feels secure enough to hand over substantial funds. The scammer then “butchers the pig” and disappears with the money. Some syndicates are developing new forms of artificial intelligence to identify potential victims on Western social media sites and WhatsApp, or to enhance the efficiency of the scams. This includes the use of generative AI to create images and video content for fraud schemes, as well ChatGPT to generate scripts and content. The Military and BGFs Provide Protection for Myanmar’s Crime Enclaves The overarching obstacle to staunching the spread of organized crime in Myanmar is the chaos in governance and the lawlessness triggered by the February 2021 military coup. While the elected government tried to stem the influx of Chinese gangsters, the junta reversed those efforts after the coup, and the illegal operations quickly resumed their rapid expansion. At the center of that story is the Karen Border Guard Force, which maintains its headquarters in the very heart of the Shwe Kokko crime city. The rise of the Karen BGF, operating at least nominally under Myanmar Army control, was accelerated by the coup and its ties with the Chinese crime bosses. The Karen BGF emerged in the late 2000’s from an ethnic armed group called the Democratic Karen Benevolent Army. From 2017-2019, it forged alliances with two key Chinese criminals, She Zhijiang, head of Yatai International Holding, and Wan Kuok-Kui (aka Broken Tooth), a triad leader who heads a transnational criminal organization known as the Hongmen World Historical and Cultural Association. The BGF provided land and support for these first two large illegal gambling cities to spring up near the Thai border — Shwe Kokko and Saixigang (now known as Dongmei Zone), respectively. When Thai police arrested She Zhijiang in August 2022, his absence left the BGF in control of a massive criminal empire, vastly increasing its wealth and power. Meanwhile, Wan Kuok-kui, who was sanctioned by the United States in December 2020, relocated to China, where his focus seems to be laundering hundreds of millions of dollars into the Chinese economy. His move apparently gave the BGF even wider control over the enclave’s criminal activity. From the beginning of their emergence in Myanmar, the autonomous crime zones have relied on Karen BGF leaders to offer secure space. By providing security, controlling border trade, and handling relations with rival armed groups and the Myanmar army, the BGF and its leaders are among the greatest beneficiaries of the illicit activity. Profits from the partnership have been plowed into high-tech upgrades of weapons and other military equipment for the BGF, commanded by Col. Chit Thu and his colleague, Major Mote Thon. Indeed, Chit Thu’s forces’ weapons are qualitatively superior to the Myanmar Army’s, making his BGF one of the most lethal units under the military’s “command.” Thailand Sees the Threat, But Makes Little Headway Against It Seeking influence and material support, the BGF and the Chinese crime groups have invested heavily in Thailand. They use the country to traffic people into the criminal zones and to access the internet and electricity essential to their operations. Thailand is also a source and transit route for the BGF’s sophisticated arms and equipment — made easy by BGF control of crossing points for bilateral trade. By mid-2022, Thai authorities were increasingly concerned about what they call “grey Chinese business” and an explosion of trafficking Thai nationals and tens of thousands of foreigners into Myanmar. A string of murders, gunfights and rumors of Chinese kidnapping, assaulting or torturing victims on Thai soil produced a serious public outcry. Consequently, Thailand has begun to clamp down. Yatai crime boss She Zhijiang is on the verge of extradition to China. A Thai working committee was set up to crack down on trafficking, and Thai law enforcement has mobilized to investigate Chinese “grey business.” In June 2023, the Thai police raided the Hongmen office in Thailand, arrested a second notorious criminal associated with Shwe Kokko named Yu Xinqi, and scooped up the owners of several exclusive nightclubs catering to Chinese crime bosses. So far, however, these measures have failed to dent the Thai base for criminal operations in Myanmar. Construction continues around Mae Sot and new players are emerging along the Thai border to the north in Myanmar territory controlled by the United Wa State Army. Meanwhile, the Karen BGF has brazenly flouted Thailand’s enforcement efforts. When Thai police arrested She Zhijiang, a BGF spokesman stated publicly that the arrest would not “harm normal operations” in Shwe Kokko. When Thailand moved to curtail electricity to the border compounds in early June 2023, the BGF threatened to close the largest frontier crossing to bilateral trade. After Thailand squeezed the power supply, the BGF ramped up diesel imports for generators, turning a crackdown into a money-making opportunity. Even China’s Moves to Curb Criminal Groups Has Had Only Mixed Effects As a key target for scam operations, China has significant steps to rein them in to protect its own citizens and its relations with the Southeast Asia neighborhood. Beijing has enhanced anti-money laundering requirements for banks, cut off criminals’ access to Chinese telecoms by policing WeChat, raised public awareness on trafficking and banned travel for many Chinese to Southeast Asia. Unfortunately, none of this has stopped the networks from regional spread. Instead, gangsters have adapted, focusing more on markets outside of China and recalibrating efforts to traffic young Chinese job seekers. Last month, Chinese authorities insisted the junta crush criminal activities directed at Chinese nationals from Myanmar. As yet, Chit Thu and his BGF are still operating with impunity, making it clear that not even a military operation — like the one launched by the pro-democracy forces in April — will dislodge the criminals. Taking the cue, other armed militias are building their own enclaves at an alarming rate. Only a Concerted, Transnational Approach Will Halt the Spread of Myanmar-Based Crime To stem the rise of these criminal networks will require a coordinated international effort. The United States could potentially take a leading role, partnering with others to sanction the BGF and cut off telecommunications services to all criminal militias in Myanmar. This would call for careful coordination with neighboring countries and other international law enforcement. Repatriating the sheer number of globally trafficked victims inside Myanmar will require a major cross-border operation..."
Source/publisher: United States Institute of Peace
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-26
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Title: Dr. Sasa's Message on the 47th Anniversary of the Hanging of Myanmar's Student Leader, Salai Tin Maung Oo, for Anti-Military Dictatorship on June 26, 1976:
Description: "Salai Tin Maung Oo's famous saying was, "They can kill my body but not my beliefs." On this day in 1976, Salai Tin Maung Oo, a 25-year-old student leader, was brutally executed by hanging in Insein Prison. His execution marked one of the darkest chapters in Myanmar's struggle for inclusive federal democracy. Salai Tin Maung Oo's only "crime" was expressing his belief in federal democracy and his opposition to genocidal military dictatorships. He shared famous proverbs and wisdom that resonated with the people of Myanmar who sought freedom and federal democracy. Born on June 11, 1951, in Taungoo, Myanmar, Salai Tin Maung Oo was a beacon of hope for many during a challenging period in Myanmar's history. At the young age of 11, Salai Tin Maung Oo witnessed the coup that took place in 1962, marking the beginning of a tumultuous era in his country. At the age of 21, Salai Tin Maung Oo was unlawfully arrested by genocidal military general Ne Win on December 5, 1972, for advocating federal democratic principles. After enduring brutal conditions, he was released from prison on January 3, 1974. He played a significant role in advocating for the use of "Salai" before Chin male names and "Mai" before Chin female names for the Chin people of Myanmar. During the Burma crisis in 1974, known as U Thant's crisis, Salai Tin Maung Oo emerged as a prominent figure at the age of 23. U Thant, a Burmese diplomat, served as the third Secretary-General of the United Nations from 1961 to 1971. Salai Tin Maung Oo, an ethnic Chin zoological student at the University of Yangon, participated in student movements and labor strikes against military rule. He gained recognition in 1974 when students protested against brutal military dictator Ne Win's refusal to grant a state funeral to former United Nations secretary-general U Thant, who had passed away that year. Tragically, on March 19, 1976, Salai Tin Maung Oo was unjustly rearrested along with his father, U Mya Din, his brother, Salai Hla Swe, and his sister, Mai Po Po, who actively participated in the struggle for freedom and federal democracy by the brutal military dictator Ne Win due to his unwavering struggle for freedom and federal democracy. He was sentenced to death. The brutal dictator offered him a chance to reduce his sentence if he expressed remorse and apologized for opposing military dictatorship. However, Salai Tin Maung Oo famously refused, stating, "I will never bow down before brutal military dictators. You can only kill my body, but you cannot kill my beliefs and hope." Consequently, he was executed by Ne Win on June 26, 1976. Before his execution, Salai Tin Maung Oo uttered his famous last words: "If I do not die quickly as planned by the execution of hanging, then I have defeated you dictators." He bravely prolonged his last breath as a symbol of his final struggle for Myanmar's freedom and federal democracy. His courageous spirit represented the true essence of the brave people of Myanmar. Salai Tin Maung Oo remains the only student known to have been hanged in the history of Myanmar. His opposition to military dictatorship has had a lasting impact on subsequent generations of students. After 47 years, the courageous people of Myanmar continue to fight for their freedom and federal democracy, which brutal military dictators have suppressed by executing pro-democracy leaders. Just 12 months ago, four pro-democracy leaders, activists, and elected officials—Ko Jimmy, Phyo Zeya Thaw, Hla Myo Aung, and Aung Thura Zaw—were brutally executed by the genocidal military junta. Their only "crime" was exercising their fundamental freedoms. Over the past 27 months, the entire population of Myanmar has endured unimaginable suffering. The genocidal military junta has escalated attacks on civilians, killing more than 4,000 and unjustly arresting more than 23,000 civilians, including State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and President U Win Myint, and several hundred children. They have also destroyed more than 67,000 homes, including hospitals, schools, churches, and monasteries. Hundreds of airstrikes and dozens of massacres have been reported, and the Chin State, Salai Tin Maung Oo's ethnic region, has faced displacement and persecution. Tragically, approximately 30% of the Chin State's population has been uprooted by the military's brutal actions. Many Chin people have lost their lives, and entire towns and villages, like Thantlang Town, have been wiped out. Adding to the ongoing crisis, Cyclone Mocha devastated Rakhine State and Chin State last month, leaving an additional 5 million people in desperate need of life-saving assistance. The combination of the COVID-19 pandemic, the military coup, and the cyclone has plunged Myanmar into unspeakable pain, suffering, death, and destruction. The brutal genocidal military junta has worsened the situation by blocking humanitarian aid and using starvation, hunger, pain, and suffering as weapons through their evil "four cuts" policies. Even before the recent cyclone, the humanitarian situation in Myanmar was dire, with approximately 18 million people, including 5 million children, in desperate need of life-saving aid. Additionally, nearly 2 million people were displaced, and 48 million individuals lived at or below the poverty line. Immediate international intervention is crucial to address this crisis. Despite these atrocities and consecutive crises, the spirit of freedom that Salai Tin Maung Oo embodied decades ago still lives within the 54 million people of Myanmar. The brave people of Myanmar have made their unwavering decision clear—they will never give up or bow down before genocidal military dictators. The future they envision is a shining beacon of federal democracy that promotes, protects, and respects the freedom and rights of all people in Myanmar, regardless of their race, religion, culture, language, background, or ethnicity. The question is not if justice will triumph over injustice but when. The brave people of Myanmar will overcome the genocidal military junta once and for all. The military dictatorship will fade away, just as darkness fades before light. Brutal genocidal military dictatorships belong to the past, while freedom and federal democracy represent the future of Myanmar. The brave people of Myanmar are fighting for freedom and federal democracy with all their might and every means available to them. They are willing to sacrifice their lives for freedom and democracy, just as Salai Tin Maung Oo did before them. We are not asking foreign soldiers to intervene in Myanmar, but we are once again calling upon the international community to impose tougher, coordinated, and targeted sanctions on individuals responsible for human rights violations in Myanmar. This includes military officials, associates, and their financial networks, such as MOGE. Additionally, countries and companies directly supporting the brutal genocidal military junta should face consequences. We urge the international community to advocate for the immediate referral of Myanmar's situation to the International Criminal Court (ICC) and to support the representation of Myanmar by the National Unity Government of Myanmar (NUG) at the International Court of Justice (ICJ). We call upon the international community, especially Myanmar's neighboring countries, to support the NUG, NUCC, CRPH, EROs, pro-democracy movements, civil society organizations, human rights defenders, and independent media in Myanmar. They tirelessly work to promote human rights, federal democracy, and accountability. Most urgently, we need the borders to be open for humanitarian corridors, pressuring genocidal military generals to respect human rights, release all political prisoners, and restore federal democratic governance to achieve peace, prosperity, and stability not only in Myanmar but also in the entire region. It is crucial for the international community and Myanmar's neighboring countries to do everything in their power to end the crisis in Myanmar for the good and interest of all regions. By increasing pressure on the foot soldiers of the Tatmadaw to lay down their arms and by rallying around the pro-democracy movement and the people of Myanmar, immediately engage and officially recognize the National Unity Government of Myanmar (NUG). Similar measures and means, as seen in Ukraine, should be employed to help Myanmar achieve its freedom and put an end to this crisis, pain, and suffering that have persisted for far too long in the Asia-Pacific region. Furthermore, we must acknowledge the significance of the NDAA Burma Act of the USA, the UN Security Council Resolution on Myanmar, and the ASEAN five-point consensus on Myanmar. Supporting the implementation of these measures on the ground in Myanmar will play a vital role in addressing the humanitarian crisis, human rights crisis, restoring democracy, and establishing peace, stability, and justice. The 47th Anniversary of the brutal execution of Myanmar student leader Salai Tin Maung Oo, coupled with the deepening situation in Myanmar, demands immediate attention and a robust international response. By taking decisive actions and standing up for human rights, freedom, and federal democracy, we can put an end to the crimes against humanity in Myanmar, advance justice, promote human dignity, and restore democracy in Myanmar. May the dream of Salai Tin Maung Oo come true soon! May God bless Myanmar!..."
Source/publisher: Ministry of International Cooperation Myanmar
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-26
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Title: ၁၉၇၆ ခုနှစ်၊ ဇွန်လ ၂၆ ရက်နေ့တွင် အာဏာရှင်စနစ်ဆန့်ကျင်ခဲ့သူ မြန်မာကျောင်းသားခေါင်းဆောင် ဆလိုင်းတင်မောင်ဦးအား ကြိုးပေးကွက်မျက်သည့်နေ့ (၄၇) ကြိမ်မြောက် နှစ်ပတ်လည်နေ့အတွက် ဒေါက်တာဆာဆာ၏ သတင်းစကား။
Description: "ဆလိုင်းတင်မောင်ဦး၏ ကျော်ကြားသည့် ပြောဆိုချက်မှာ "မင်းတို့ ငါ့ခန္ဓာကိုယ်ကိုသာ သတ်လို့ရမယ်၊ ငါ့ယုံကြည်ချက်နဲ့ ရပ်တည်ချက်ကို သတ်လို့မရဘူး"။ လွန်ခဲ့သော ၁၉၇၆ ခုနှစ်၊ ဇွန်လ ၂၆ ရက်နေ့တွင် စစ်အာဏာရှင်များက အသက် ၂၅ နှစ်အရွယ် ကျောင်းသားခေါင်းဆောင် ဆလိုင်းတင်မောင်ဦးအား အင်းစိန်အကျဉ်းထောင်၌ ရက်ရက်စက်စက် ကြိုးပေးကွပ်မျက်ခဲ့ကြသည်။ သူ့အားကြိုးပေးကွပ်မျက်ခြင်းသည် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၏ ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီအတွက်ရုန်းကန်မှုတွင် အမှောင်ဆုံး အခန်းကဏ္ဍတစ်ခုဖြစ်သည်ဟု မှတ်သားဖော်ပြခဲ့သည်။ ဆလိုင်းတင်မောင်ဦး၏ တစ်ခုတည်းသော"ရာဇဝတ်မှု"သည် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီအတွက် သူ၏ယုံကြည်ချက်ကို ဖော်ပြခြင်းနှင့် လူမျိုးတုံး သတ်ဖြတ်သည့် စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ်ကို ဆန့်ကျင်ခြင်းဖြစ်သည်။ သူသည် လွတ်လပ်မှုနှင့် ဖက်ဒရယ် ဒီမိုကရေစီအတွက်တိုက်ပွဲဝင်ခဲ့သော မြန်မာပြည်သူများအတွက် အထက်ပါ သမိုင်းဝင်စကားကို ရဲရဲဝံ့ဝံ့ဆိုခဲ့သူဖြစ်သည်။ ဆလိုင်းတင်မောင်ဦးကို ၁၉၅၁ ခုနှစ်၊ ဇွန်လ ၁၁ ရက်နေ့တွင် တောင်ငူမြို့၌ မွေးဖွားခဲ့ပြီး သူသည် မြန်မာ့သမိုင်းတွင် ခက်ခဲသောကာလအတွင်း လူများစွာအတွက် မျှော်လင့်ချက် မီးရှူးတန်ဆောင် ဖြစ်ခဲ့သည်။ ၁၉၆၂ ခုနှစ်တွင်ဖြစ်ပွားခဲ့သော မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ စစ်အာဏာရှင်လက်အောက်သို့ကျရောက်သည့် ခေတ်ကာလအစ ပထမအကြိမ်အာဏာသိမ်းမှုကို သူ့အသက် (၁၁) နှစ်အရွယ်တွင် တွေ့မြင်ခဲ့သည်။ ၁၉၇၂ ခုနှစ်၊ ဒီဇင်ဘာလ ၅ ရက်နေ့ ဆလိုင်းတင်မောင်ဦး အသက် (၂၁) နှစ်အရွယ်တွင် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီမူများကို ထောက်ခံအားပေးသည့်အတွက် အာဏာရှင်ဗိုလ်ချုပ်နေဝင်းရဲ့ မတရားဖမ်းဆီးခြင်းကိုခံခဲ့ရသည်။ ရက်စက်ကြမ်းကြုတ်သော အခြေအနေများကို ကြံ့ကြံ့ခံရပ်တည်ပြီးနောက် ၁၉၇၄ ခုနှစ်၊ ဇန်နဝါရီလ ၃ ရက်နေ့တွင် ထောင်မှလွတ်လာခဲ့သည်။ ထို့ပြင် ဆလိုင်းတင်မောင်ဦးသည် ချင်းအမျိုးသားများ၏ အမှတ်အသားဖြစ်သည့် ချင်းအမျိုးသားများ၏နာမည်ရှေ့တွင် “ဆလိုင်း”ဟူ၍ သော်လည်းကောင်း၊ ချင်းအမျိုးသမီးများ၏အမည်ရှေ့တွင် “မိုင်” ဟူ၍လည်းကောင်း ခေါ်‌ဝေါ်သုံးစွဲရန်အတွက် အဆိုပြုခဲ့ပြီး ထိုအဆိုပြုချက်ကို အတည်ပြုနိုင်ခဲ့ကြသည်။ ၁၉၇၄ ခုနှစ် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ အကျပ်အတည်းကာလအတွင်း ဦးသန့်အရေးခင်းတွင် အသက် (၂၃) နှစ်အရွယ် ဆလိုင်းတင်မောင်ဦးသည် အထင်ကရလှုပ်ရှားသူများထဲ ပေါ်ထွက်လာခဲ့သည်။ ရန်ကုန်တက္ကသိုလ်မှ ချင်းကျောင်းသားတစ်ဦးဖြစ်သူ ဆလိုင်းတင်မောင်ဦးသည် ကျောင်းသားလှုပ်ရှားမှုများနှင့် စစ်အုပ်ချုပ်မှုကိုဆန့်ကျင်သည့် အလုပ်သမားသပိတ်မှောက်မှုများတွင်ပါဝင်ခဲ့သည်။ ထိုနှစ်တွင် ကွယ်လွန်ခဲ့သော ကုလသမဂ္ဂ အထွေထွေအတွင်းရေးမှူးချုပ်ဟောင်း၏ဈာပနအခမ်းအနား ကျင်းပခွင့်ပေးရန် ငြင်းဆန်ခဲ့သည့် စစ်အာဏာရှင်နေဝင်းကို ဆန့်ကျင်ဆန္ဒပြခဲ့ခြင်းအတွက် ၁၉၇၄ ခုနှစ်တွင် စတင်ထင်ရှားလာခဲ့သည်။ ဆလိုင်းတင်မောင်ဦးသည် ၁၉၇၆ ခုနှစ်၊ မတ်လ ၂၃ ရက်တွင်ပြုလုပ်မည့် သခင်ကိုယ်တော်မှိုင်း၏ အသက် ၁၀၀ ပြည့် မှိုင်းရာပြည့်အခမ်းအနားဖြစ်မြောက်အောင် ဦးဆောင်ကြိုးပမ်းနေစဉ် ၁၉၇၆ ခုနှစ်၊ မတ်လ ၁၉ ရက်တွင် ကမာရွတ်၊ ပတ္တမြားခြံတွင် ဖမ်းဆီးခြင်းခံခဲ့ရသည်။ ထိုလှုပ်ရှားမှုတွင် ဆလိုင်းတင်မောင်ဦးအပါအ၀င် ဖခင်ဖြစ်သူ ဦးမြဒင်နှင့် အစ်ကိုဖြစ်သူ ဆလိုင်းလှဆွေတို့လည်း အဖမ်းခံရသည်။ သူတို့အဖမ်းခံရပြီး ညီမဖြစ်သူ မိုင်ပိုပို ခေါ် မလှမြိုင်လည်း မှိုင်းရာပြည့်အရေးအခင်းတွင် တက်ကြွစွာပါ၀င်လှုပ်ရှားခဲ့သဖြင့် အဖမ်းခံခဲ့ရသည်။ စစ်အာဏာရှင်များက ဆလိုင်းတင်မောင်ဦးကို ဆိုရှယ်လစ်အစိုးရကိုဆန့်ကျင်ခြင်းသည် မှားယွင်းတဲ့လုပ်ရပ်ဖြစ်ကြောင်း၊ တော်လှန်ရေးလုပ်ငန်းစဉ်ကို စွန့်လွှတ်ကြောင်းနှင့် နောင်တရကြောင်းဖော်ပြပြီး အသနားခံစာရေးလျှင် ပြစ်ဒဏ်လျှော့ပေးမည်ဟုဆိုသော်လည်း “မင်းတို့စစ်ဖိနပ်အောက်မှာ ငါဘယ်တော့မှ ဒူးမထောက်နိုင်ဘူး၊ မင်းတို့ ငါ့ခန္ဓာကိုယ်ကိုသာ သတ်လို့ရမယ်၊ ငါ့ယုံကြည်ချက်နဲ့ ရပ်တည်ချက်ကို သတ်လို့မရဘူး” ဟု ပြန်ပြောခြင်းကြောင့် ၁၉၇၆ ခုနှစ်၊ ဇွန်လ ၂၆ ရက်နေ့တွင် အာဏာရှင်နေဝင်း၏အမိန့်ဖြင့် ကြိုးပေးကွပ်မျက်ခံခဲ့ရသည်။ သူ၏ကွပ်မျက်ခြင်းမတိုင်မီ ဆလိုင်းတင်မောင်ဦးက သူ၏ကျော်ကြားသော နောက်ဆုံးစကားကို ကြိုးပေးသတ်ဖြတ်သောအချိန်တွင် စီစဉ်ထားသည့်အတိုင်း ချက်ချင်းမသေလျှင် အာဏာရှင်များကို ငါအနိုင်ယူခဲ့ပြီဟုပြောပြီး နောက်ဆုံးအချိန်ထိ တောင့်ခံတော်လှန်ခဲ့သည်။ သူသည် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၏ လွတ်လပ်မှုနှင့် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီ အတွက် သူ၏နောက်ဆုံးထွက်သက်အထိ သက်သေပြခဲ့သည်။ သူ၏ရဲစွမ်းသတ္တိက မြန်မာတို့၏ စစ်မှန်သော ရဲစွမ်းသတ္တိကို ကိုယ်စားပြုသည်။ ဆလိုင်းတင်မောင်ဦးသည် မြန်မာ့သမိုင်းတွင် ကြိုးပေးကွပ်မျက်ခံရသည့် တစ်ဦးတည်းသော ကျောင်းသားဖြစ်ခဲ့သည်။ စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ်အပေါ် ဆလိုင်းတင်မောင်ဦး၏ဆန့်ကျင်မှုသည် ကျောင်းသားမျိုးဆက်များအပေါ် ရေရှည်အကျိုးသက်ရောက်မှုရှိခဲ့သည်။ (၄၇)နှစ်ကြာပြီးသည်တိုင် မြန်မာပြည်သူများသည် ဒီမိုကရေစီအရေးလှုပ်ရှားသည့် ခေါင်းဆောင်များကို ကွပ်မျက်သည့် အကြမ်းဖက် စစ်အာဏာရှင်များကို ဆန့်ကျင်ပြီး လွတ်လပ်ရေးနှင့် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီအတွက် ဆက်လက်တိုက်ပွဲဝင်နေကြသည်။ လွန်ခဲ့သော (၁၂)လတွင် ဒီမိုကရေစီအရေးတက်ကြွလှုပ်ရှားသည့် ခေါင်းဆောင်များဖြစ်ကြတဲ့ ကိုဂျင်မီ၊ ကိုဖြိုးဇေယျာသော်တို့နှင့်အတူ စစ်အာဏာသိမ်းမှုကိုဆန့်ကျင်သူ ကိုလှမျိုးအောင်နှင့် ကိုအောင်သူရဇော်တို့အား အကြမ်းဖက် စစ်အာဏာရှင်များက ရက်စက်စွာ ကွပ်မျက်ခဲ့ကြသည်။ သူတို့၏ တစ်ခုတည်းသော "ရာဇဝတ်မှု" သည် အခြေခံလူ့အခွင့်အရေးလွတ်လပ်မှုဖြစ်သည့် သူတို့၏နိုင်ငံရေးခံယူချက်ကို ကျင့်သုံးခြင်းဖြစ်သည်။ လွန်ခဲ့တဲ့ (၂၇)လကျော်အတွင်း မြန်မာနိုင်ငံရှိ စစ်အာဏာရှင်များက အပြစ်မဲ့အရပ်သား ၂၃,၀၀၀ ကျော်ကို တရားမဝင် ဖမ်းဆီးခဲ့ပါသည်။ နိုင်ငံတော်အတိုင်ပင်ခံပုဂ္ဂိုလ် ဒေါ်အောင်ဆန်းစုကြည်နှင့် နိုင်ငံတော်သမ္မတဦးဝင်းမြင့်အပါအဝင် အပြစ်မဲ့အရပ်သား ၂၃,၀၀၀ ကျော်ကို ဖမ်းဆီးထိန်းသိမ်းခဲ့သည်။ ထိုစစ်ဗိုလ်ချုပ်များကပင် အရပ်သား ၄,၀၀၀ ကျော်သေဆုံးမှုနှင့် ဆေးရုံများ၊ ကျောင်းများ၊ ခရစ်ယာန်ဘုရားကျောင်းများနှင့် ဘုန်းကြီးကျောင်းများအပါအဝင် နေအိမ်ပေါင်း ၆၇,၀၀၀ ကျော် ပျက်စီးဆုံးရှုံးခြင်းအတွက်လည်း တာဝန်ရှိသည်။ ဆလိုင်းတင်မောင်ဦး၏ လူမျိုးတို့နေထိုင်ရာ ချင်းပြည်နယ်အပါအဝင် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၏နေရာအနှံ့တွင် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီ၏ လေကြောင်းတိုက်ခိုက်မှုများနှင့် မရေတွက်နိုင်သော အစုလိုက်အပြုံလိုက်သတ်ဖြတ်မှုများကြောင့် ပြည်သူလူထု တစ်ရပ်လုံး နေရပ်စွန့်ခွာပြီး အသက်ဘေးလွတ်ရာသို့ ပြောင်းရွှေ့နေထိုင်ကြရသည်။ လက်ရှိအကျပ်အတည်းအပြင် ရခိုင်ပြည်နယ်နှင့် ချင်းပြည်နယ်တွင် မိုခါမုန်တိုင်း၏ရိုက်ခတ်မှုကြောင့် ပြည်သူ (၅)သန်းခန့် အသက်ကယ်ဆယ်ရေး အကူအညီ လိုအပ်လျက်ရှိသည်။ COVID-19 ကူးစက်ရောဂါ၊ မတရားစစ်အာဏာသိမ်းခြင်းနှင့် မိုခါမုန်တိုင်းတို့ကြောင့် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံသည် နေ့စဉ်နှင့်အမျှ နာကျင်ခြင်း၊ ဆင်းရဲဒုက္ခ၊ ပျက်စီးခြင်းနှင့် သေဆုံးခြင်းများ ရင်ဆိုင်နေရသည်။ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီသည် လူသားချင်း စာနာထောက်ထားမှုအကူအညီများကို ပိတ်ဆို့ခြင်းနှင့် ငတ်မွတ်ခေါင်းပါးခြင်း၊ နာကျင်မှု၊ ဆင်းရဲဒုက္ခများကို “ဖြတ်လေးဖြတ်” ပေါ်လစီတွင် လက်နက်သဖွယ် အသုံးပြုခြင်းကြောင့် အခြေအနေကို ပိုမိုဆိုးရွားစေသည်။ မိုခါဆိုင်ကလုန်းမုန်တိုင်းမတိုင်မီကပင် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံရှိ လူသားချင်းစာနာထောက်ထားမှုအခြေအနေမှာ ဆိုးရွားလာခဲ့ပြီး ကလေး (၅) သန်းအပါအဝင် ပြည်သူပေါင်း (၁၈) သန်းနီးပါးသည် အသက်ကယ်ဆယ်ရေးအထောက်အပံ့ အလွန်လိုအပ်နေသည်။ ဒါ့အပြင် ပြည်သူပေါင်း (၂) သန်းနီးပါး အိုးမဲ့အိမ်မဲ့ဖြစ်နေပြီး၊ (၁၈) သန်းကျော်သည် လူသားချင်းစာနာထောက်ထားမှုဆိုင်ရာ အကျပ်အတည်းနှင့် ရင်ဆိုင်ကြုံတွေ့နေရပြီး (၄၈) သန်းမှာ ဆင်းရဲမွဲတေမှုဒဏ်ခံစားနေကြရသည်။ ဒီအကျပ်အတည်းကို အပြည်ပြည်ဆိုင်ရာမှ ကြားဝင်ဆောင်ရွက်မှုဟာ အလွန်အရေးကြီးပါသည်။ အကြမ်းဖက်မှု အကျပ်အတည်းများဆက်တိုက်ရှိလင့်ကစား လွန်ခဲ့သောဆယ်စုနှစ်များက ဆလိုင်းတင်မောင်ဦး၏ လွတ်လပ်ရေးအတွက် စိတ်ဓာတ်ခံယူချက်သည် မြန်မာပြည်သူ (၅၄) သန်း အတွင်း ၌ ရှင်သန်နေဆဲဖြစ်သည်။ ရဲစွမ်းသတ္တိရှိတဲ့ မြန်မာပြည်သူတွေဟာ လူမျိုးတုံးသတ်ဖြတ်နေသည့် အကြမ်းဖက် စစ်ကောင်စီရှေ့မှောက် လက်လျှော့အရှုံးပေးမှာ မဟုတ်တဲ့အကြောင်း မယိမ်းယိုင်တဲ့ ဆုံးဖြတ်ချက်ကို ရှင်းရှင်းလင်းလင်း သက်သေပြနေကြသည်။ သူတို့ စိတ်ကူးထားသော အနာဂတ်သည် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံရှိ ပြည်သူများအားလုံး၏ လွတ်လပ်မှုနှင့် အခွင့်အရေးများကို မြန်မာနိုင်ငံရှိ လူမျိုး၊ ဘာသာတရား၊ နောက်ခံအပေါ်မူတည်ပြီး ခွဲခြားခြင်းမရှိသော နိုင်ငံသားတိုင်းကို တန်းတူ လေးစား၊ ကာကွယ်မှုပေးသော ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီဖြစ်သည်။ ထိုတရားမျှတမှုအတွက် အောင်မြင်မှုရရှိခဲ့လျှင်ဟု မဟုတ်ဘဲ ဘယ်အချိန်မှာ အောင်မြင်မှာလဲဟုသာ မေးရမည်ဖြစ်သည်။ မြန်မာပြည်သူလူထုသည် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီကို မုချအနိုင်ပိုင်းပြီး လွတ်လပ်မှုနှင့် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီ အနာဂတ်ဆီသို့ ချီတက်လိမ့်မည်။ ဆလိုင်းတင်မောင်ဦးကဲ့သို့ပင် ရဲစွမ်းသတ္တိနှင့်ပြည့်စုံသော မြန်မာပြည်သူလူထုသည် လွတ်လပ်မှုနှင့် ဒီမိုကရေစီအတွက် တိုက်ပွဲဝင်ရာတွင် အပြည်ပြည်ဆိုင်ရာ သက်ဆိုင်ရာအဖွဲ့အစည်းများအနေဖြင့် စစ်ကောင်စီ၏ ပြည်သူလူထုအပေါ် လူ့အခွင့်အရေး ချိုးဖောက်မှုများအတွက် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီနှင့် သူ၏အပေါင်းအပါများအား ပြင်းထန်သော ပစ်မှတ်ထား အရေးယူဒဏ်ခတ်ပိတ်ဆို့မှုများ ပြုလုပ်ရန် တိုက်တွန်းအပ်ပါသည်။ အပြည်ပြည်ဆိုင်ရာ အဖွဲ့အစည်းများအနေဖြင့် International Criminal Court (ICC) ရှိ မြန်မာ့အရေးနှင့်ပတ်သက်သည့် စွဲတင်ချက်ကို International Court of Justice (ICJ) သို့ ချက်ချင်းလွှဲပြောင်းပေးဖို့နှင့် အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ (NUG)၏ ကိုယ်စားပြုမှုကို ထောက်ခံရန် တောင်းဆိုအပ်ပါသည်။ လူ့အခွင့်အရေးနှင့် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီတို့အတွက် အဆက်မပြတ် တိုက်ပွဲဝင်နေကြသော NUG, NUCC၊ CRPH၊ EROs၊ ဒီမိုကရေစီလှုပ်ရှားသူများ၊ အရပ်ဘက်အဖွဲ့အစည်းများ၊ လူ့အခွင့်အရေးလှုပ်ရှားသူများနှင့် လွတ်လပ်သောသတင်းမီဒီယာများကို ထောက်ခံအားပေးရန် အိမ်နီးချင်းနိုင်ငံများနှင့် အပြည်ပြည်ဆိုင်ရာအဖွဲ့အစည်းများအား တောင်းဆိုအပ်ပါသည်။ လူသားချင်းစာနာထောက်ထားသည့် အကူအညီများရရှိနိုင်ရန်အတွက် နယ်စပ်များဖွင့်ပေးရန်နှင့် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံသာမက ဒေသအတွင်း၌ ငြိမ်းချမ်းရေး၊ ကြွယ်ဝချမ်းသာခြင်းနှင့် ငြိမ်သက်နိုင်ရန် လူ့အခွင့်အရေးကို လေးစားပြီး တရားမဝင်ဖမ်းဆီးသူများအားလုံးကို လွှတ်ပေးရန် စစ်ကောင်စီအား ဖိအားပေးဖို့ တောင်းဆိုအပ်ပါသည်။ နိုင်ငံတကာအသိုင်းအဝိုင်းနှင့် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံအိမ်နီးချင်းနိုင်ငံများအနေဖြင့် ဒေသအတွင်းကောင်းကျိုးနှင့် တည်ငြိမ်ရေးအတွက် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံရှိ အကျပ်အတည်းကို အဆုံးသတ်ရန် တတ်နိုင်သမျှ လုပ်ဆောင်ရာတွင် အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရအား အသိအမှတ်ပြုဖို့ အရေးကြီးပါသည်။ ယူကရိန်းနိုင်ငံတွင်တွေ့ရသည့်အတိုင်း အလားတူ ဆောင်ရွက်ချက်များနှင့် နည်းလမ်းများကို မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၏ လွတ်လပ်မှုရရှိရန်အတွက် ကူညီပေးရန်နှင့် အာရှ-ပစိဖိတ်ဒေသတွင် ကြာမြင့်စွာ ဆက်လက်တည်ရှိနေသော ဤအကျပ်အတည်း၊ နာကျင်မှုနှင့် ဆင်းရဲမှုဝေဒနာများကို အဆုံးသတ်ရန် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံကို ကူညီပေးဖို့ရန် တောင်းဆိုအပ်ပါသည်။ ထို့ပြင် အမေရိကန်ပြည်ထောင်စု NDAA Burma Act၊ UN Security Council Resolution on Myanmar နှင့် ASEAN five-point consensus တို့၏ အရေးပါမှုကိုလည်း အသိအမှတ်ပြုရမည်။ ဤဆုံးဖြတ်ချက်များကို မြန်မာ့မြေပြင်တွင် အကောင်အထည်ဖော်ရေးကို ထောက်ပံ့ပေးခြင်းသည် လူသားချင်းစာနာထောက်ထားမှု အကျပ်အတည်း၊ လူ့အခွင့်အရေး အကျပ်အတည်း၊ ဒီမိုကရေစီ ပြန်လည်ထူထောင်ရေး၊ ငြိမ်းချမ်းရေး၊ တည်ငြိမ်ရေးနှင့် တရားမျှတမှုကို တည်ထောင်ရေးတွင် အရေးပါသော အခန်းကဏ္ဍမှ ပါဝင်ပါလိမ့်မည်။ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံသား ကျောင်းသားခေါင်းဆောင် ဆလိုင်းတင်မောင်ဦး ရက်ရက်စက်စက် ကွပ်မျက်ခံခဲ့ရခြင်း (၄၇)ကြိမ်မြောက် နှစ်ပတ်လည်နေ့မှာ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံမှာ ပိုမိုနက်ရှိုင်းလာတဲ့အခြေအနေတွေနဲ့အတူ အပြည်ပြည်ဆိုင်ရာမှ အရေးပေါ်အာရုံစိုက်မှုနဲ့ အားကောင်းတဲ့ တုံ့ပြန်မှုကို တောင်းဆိုပါသည်။ လူ့အခွင့်အရေး၊ လွတ်လပ်မှုနဲ့ ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီအတွက် ရပ်တည်ခြင်းအားဖြင့် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံမှာ စစ်အာဏာရှင်နှင့် ၎င်း​၏စစ်တပ်မှ လူသားမျိုးနွယ်အပေါ် ကျူးလွန်နေသည့် ရာဇဝတ်မှုတွေကို အဆုံး သတ်ပြီး တရားမျှတမှုနှင့် ဂုဏ်သိက္ခာကို ပြန်လည်မြှင့်တင်ပေးခြင်းအားဖြင့် ဒီမိုကရေစီကို မြန်မာနိုင်ငံတွင် ပြန်လည်ထူထောင်နိုင်မည်ဖြစ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher: Ministry of International Cooperation Myanmar
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-26
[field_licence]
Type: Individual Documents
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Title: This Civilian Resistance Needs the West’s Help, Not Its Silence
Description: "Winning the hearts and minds of fellow citizens is a key pillar of any armed resistance. The 95,000 civilians thought to have joined Myanmar’s grassroots insurgency since the 2021 coup have done that, harnessing people’s fury at the military for overthrowing the democratically elected government, imprisoning leader Aung San Suu Kyi and bringing to an end a period of relative freedom. Waging a surprisingly effective and enduring guerrilla war, the People’s Defense Forces have taken on an experienced army that has shown no limits to its brutality. To the surprise of seasoned analysts, this network of opposition groups has inflicted sustained casualties via ambushes, skirmishes, bombings, the sabotage of military-related facilities and businesses and targeted assassinations from the hinterlands to the former capital, Yangon. Many of the armed ethnic groups that have fought insurgencies along Myanmar’s borders for decades have been lending vital assistance to this new resistance, including weapons, resources and training. But without access to heavy weaponry or counter-measures to withstand the military’s deadly airpower, these anti-junta forces and the people they’re fighting for are stuck in a grinding civil war. And they are no closer to achieving the goal of the National Unity Government, under whose umbrella they loosely operate. Made up of representatives of those elected in a landslide in 2020, the NUG, operating in exile with an office in Washington, wants to remove the junta from power and restore democracy to a country that’s been in an almost constant state of conflict since its independence from British rule in 1948. To do that, Myanmar’s citizens need more from the West, and from allies in Asia, including financial, diplomatic, strategic and political assistance. New sanctions announced by the US last week on the Ministry of Defense, as well as two state-owned banks, are a welcome step forward. However, the junta’s most valuable asset — the Myanma Oil and Gas Enterprise — remains untouched, despite the European Union imposing sanctions on the lucrative firm in February 2022. We know that the military has been able to import at least $1 billion in arms, dual-use goods, equipment and materials to manufacture weapons since the coup — a clear failure of the current sanctions regime and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ five-point plan adopted in the wake of the coup that called for an immediate end to violence and dialogue among parties. Using these weapons and equipment, the regime has killed at least 3,500 civilians, detained as many as 22,000 political prisoners and forcibly displaced over 1.5 million people since February 2021. The violence has continued unabated: Airstrikes, land attacks, murder, torture and rape. Villages aligned with opposition groups have been burned to the ground; suspected collaborators have been beheaded. An investigation by the United Nations’ Special Rapporteur, Tom Andrews, revealed that it’s not just private and state-owned entities in China, Russia and India profiting off the misery of Myanmar’s people, but also networks and companies in Singapore and Thailand, two members of Asean supposedly backing the five-point plan. His inquiry identified the transfer of fighter jets, attack helicopters, reconnaissance and attack drones, advanced missile systems, tank upgrades, radio and communication equipment, radar complexes, and components for naval ships. One of the worst air attacks since the coup occurred on April 11, when a Yak-130 fighter jet armed with two 250-kilogram bombs struck a National Unity Government ceremony attended by around 300 people. As Andrews details in his May 17 report to the UN, the attack caused widespread carnage, compounded when two Mi-35 attack helicopters arrived soon afterward to strafe survivors and first responders. At least 160 people died, including nearly 40 children. Russia supplied the fighter jet and the choppers, while the Myanmar military’s Directorate of Defense Industries domestically manufactured the bombs and the machine guns, relying in part on raw materials supplied by private entities from Singapore, China and Thailand, the report said. Separately, it documented that Indian state-owned arms manufacturers have shipped a coastal surveillance system, a remote-controlled weapons system, components from an ammunition and missile manufacturer, and 122-mm howitzer barrels, while private sector entities exported explosive fuses likely for artillery shells. This weaponry, along with a vast array of other military hardware, has been used in countless operations across Myanmar that have caused atrocities amounting to probable war crimes and crimes against humanity, Andrews noted. With lengthy borders along both China and India, Myanmar is strategically important — and its stability matters well beyond Southeast Asia. The junta has been struggling to stabilize an already-backward economy that contracted 18% last year and is facing soaring inflation, a weakening currency and shrinking foreign-currency reserves. The NUG says the regime now controls only half the country, and transnational crime including fraud scams, slavery and drug production is rife. There are still protests, including strikes and non-violent demonstrations, almost daily, from Yangon to smaller cities and towns. Significantly different from past periods of military rule, even the formerly stable ethnic majority Bamar and Buddhist heartland is engaged to an unprecedented degree in resistance. The military is facing a high attrition rate from casualties and desertions, and correspondingly low morale, Richard Horsey, senior Myanmar adviser with the International Crisis Group, told me. But it is difficult for anti-junta groups to take advantage of this weakness, despite their tenacity and effectiveness in some areas. Beijing has already made its move. Foreign Minister Qin Gang met with the head of the military government, General Min Aung Hlaing, last month in the capital, Naypyidaw, with a statement released afterward noting China “supports all parties in Myanmar to properly handle differences and achieve reconciliation under the constitutional and legal framework.” Thailand’s recent plan to re-engage with junta officials — rightly shunned by key Asean partners Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines, Brunei, Vietnam and Cambodia — is counterproductive at best, while the UN Security Council has yet to find a way to hold the junta accountable for its abuses. Now is the time for Washington to better coordinate a more effective sanctions regime and take a more active role to support pro-democracy forces — as it is empowered to do by the Burma Unified through Rigorous Military Accountability Act that President Joe Biden signed into law in December. It authorizes the provision of “non-lethal assistance” to both the ethnic armed organizations and People’s Defense Forces. In Syria and Ukraine, non-lethal assistance has included uniforms, protective armor, armored military vehicles, radar and medical equipment. It begs the question: Why not for Myanmar?..."
Source/publisher: Washington Post
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-25
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Title: ASEAN’s planned military exercises led by Myanmar junta and Russian regime will deepen its complicity in the junta’s international crimes
Description: "Justice For Myanmar calls on the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM) to immediately cancel Myanmar junta and Russia led counter terrorism military exercises to be held in the coming months. The drills are being organised by the ADMM-Plus Experts’ Working Group on Counter Terrorism, co-chaired by the Myanmar military junta and the Russian regime, and will involve a tabletop exercise in Myanmar in August and a field training exercise in Russia in September. The working group held its final planning conference for the exercises in June in Khabarovsk, Russia, attended by all members of ASEAN and dialogue partners China and India. The USA, Australia, Japan, South Korea and New Zealand boycotted the meeting. The exercises will involve military training that coordinates a response to a simulated terrorist attack and will help the Myanmar military build the capabilities of elite troops engaged in a campaign of terror against the people. ASEAN’s practical assistance and support for the training of Myanmar junta troops makes the bloc further complicit in ongoing war crimes and crimes against humanity. Since the military’s illegal coup attempt on February 1, 2021, the junta has murdered more than 3,600 people, arbitrarily arrested more than 23,000, committed indiscriminate airstrikes and shelling, torture, and sexual violence, and displaced at least 1.5 million people. Since 2021, ADMM’s counter terrorism working group has been led by Major General Aung Myo Thant, Deputy Chief of the Myanmar military’s Armed Forces Training, and Major General Grigorii Tiurin of the Operational and Strategic Command of Russia’s Eastern Military District. Their co-chairpersonship ends this year. The working group is also used by the junta for propaganda purposes and to seek regional support for its attacks against the legitimate National Unity Government (NUG), People’s Defence Forces (PDFs) and Ethnic Revolutionary Organisations. For instance, a junta propaganda article on the December 2021 ASEAN counter terrorism meeting, hosted by the junta, reported on Aung Myo Thant’s speech, “highlighting… the terrorist activities of NUG and PDF, electoral fraud which led to the state of emergency declared by Tatmadaw to maintain the State affairs, efforts of Tatmadaw in various ways to peacefully find a solution on vote-rigging, the NLD government’s multiple rejections on the discussion and its intent to form a new government with controversial election results.” ASEAN has not only failed to take action in support of human rights and democracy in Myanmar but is actively aiding the junta’s criminal conduct through direct military support like the planned military exercises. This makes ASEAN complicit in the junta’s atrocity crimes. ASEAN is also impeding effective international action to resolve the crisis in Myanmar by acting as an institutional barrier that supports the junta by providing cover for its members and dialogue partners to enhance military cooperation and avoid taking action to protect the human rights of the Myanmar people and end the military’s impunity. Justice For Myanmar spokesperson Yadanar Maung says: “If the world needs anymore evidence that the Five Point Consensus has failed, ASEAN’s training of junta troops in “counter terrorism” should be the nail in the coffin. “ASEAN’s planned training of junta troops will make the bloc further complicit in the junta’s violent attacks against the Myanmar people. “Rather than helping to resolve the Myanmar crisis, ASEAN’s actions are worsening it and causing real harm. “The fact these military exercises are planned is testament to the shocking failure of Indonesia as ASEAN chair to uphold basic principles of democracy and human rights. “ASEAN must immediately cancel the exercises, ban the junta from all meetings and recognise and support the National Unity Government as the legitimate government of Myanmar. “If, under Indonesia’s leadership, the exercises do go ahead, Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines and the incoming Thai government should boycott the exercises and stand with the people of Myanmar in support of human rights and democracy.”..."
Source/publisher: Justice For Myanmar
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-22
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Title: Human Rights Situation weekly update (June 15 to 21 2023) [EN/MY]
Description: "Human Rights Violations took place in States and Regions from June 15 to 21, 2023 Military Junta troops arrested over 240 local civilians from Thayetchaung Township, Tanintharyi Region, Okpho Township, Bago Region and Sagaing Township, Sagaing Region and used them as human shields from 15th June to 21st June. Military Junta troops launched an airstrike and dropped bombs in Moebye, Shan State and Tamu Township, Saging Region. 3 civilians were burned and killed by Military Junta’s soldiers in Sagaing Region. The Military Junta strictly forbidden the “Flower Strikes” that were held on 19th June. The Military Junta arrested the peaceful protesters who participated in Flower Strike throughout the whole country. The Military Junta also arrested the people who post wishes for Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s birthday on social media. The Military Junta tortured and killed (7) civilians at interrogation..."
Source/publisher: Network for Human Rights Documentation-Burma
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-22
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Title: Durable solutions to the Rohingya crisis in Myanmar
Description: "Panel discussion on durable solutions to the Rohingya crisis and to end human rights violations and abuses against Rohingya Muslims and other minorities in Myanmar 53rd session of the Human Rights Council Statement by Nada Al-Nashif, UN Deputy High Commissioner for Human Rights Mr President, Distinguished Panelists, Excellencies, Rohingya Muslims and other minorities in Myanmar have endured decades of persecution and systematic discrimination. Today, eleven years after the 2012 violence in Rakhine State, and six years after the 2017 military operations that killed thousands and displaced hundreds of thousands of Rohingya, more than one million languish in refugee camps in Bangladesh. An estimated 600,000 remain in Myanmar where they continue to be deprived of their basic rights. Meanwhile other ethnic and religious minorities, who had pinned their hopes on ceasefire agreements and the promise of a federal and democratic future for Myanmar, are now once again the victims of a new cycle of conflict. The military coup of February 2021 and violent repression in many parts of Myanmar have inflicted more suffering on minority communities, including Rohingya Muslims. In addition, last month Cyclone Mocha – the most powerful storm to hit the region in a decade – raged through the country. More than 100 Rohingya died while thousands had their homes shattered and their lives upended, rendering them even more vulnerable. The Myanmar military has the unequivocal obligation to provide full, safe and unimpeded humanitarian access to all persons in need. Instead, the military has put in place a system of physical and administrative restrictions on the conduct of humanitarian operations, including in assessing casualties and needs on the ground. People are reportedly living in forests and improvised shelters without any access to life-saving services, such as medicines and at times, food. Alarmed by the gravity of the worsening situation at the end of last year the Security Council adopted its first resolution on Myanmar in which it underscored the need to create conditions necessary for the voluntary, safe, dignified and sustainable return of Rohingya refugees and internally displaced persons. Sadly, those conditions do not yet exist on the ground. To achieve an inclusive future, the authorities in Myanmar must ensure a fully democratic, representative and accountable political system, repeal all discriminatory legislation, undertake inclusive and constructive dialogue aimed at national reconciliation, and implement measures that ensure the respect and protection of the human rights and dignity of each and every person without discrimination. A fundamental step is the full legal recognition of the right to citizenship of all Rohingya people and issuance to them of appropriate civil documentation, allowing for the full and equal access to basic services, including education and health, economic opportunity, and freedom of movement. Needless to say, any dialogue and deliberation about the future of the Rohingya – including any possibility for their return to Myanmar - must include their full, effective and meaningful participation, in all their diversity. Sustainable returns in line with international standards are impossible unless the human rights, freedoms and security of the Rohingya community are guaranteed. In the meantime, a large number of Rohingya continue to flee to safer countries, often taking immense risks, including dangerous sea crossings. According to UNHCR, more than 3,500 Rohingya attempted deadly sea crossings last year, 2022 – a 360 per cent increase compared to 2021. At least, 348 Rohingya died while making these sea crossings in 2022. I take this opportunity to express our solidarity with and support to Bangladesh for stepping up to provide refuge to more than 1 million Rohingya refugees through this protracted crisis. I also commend countries in the region, such as Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand for allowing safe disembarkation and provision of protection and humanitarian assistance to Rohingya who arrived by boat and I hope that would continue. I also acknowledge the significant pressure placed on these countries, notably Bangladesh, in their humanitarian efforts as well on humanitarian actors, in ensuring delivery of services to the camps in Bangladesh. Since March of this year, due to shortfalls in funding, the World Food Programme has had to sharply reduce food rations in the camps – twice – which has further compounded the refugees’ hardship. The 2023 Joint Response Plan for the Rohingya Humanitarian Crisis in Bangladesh is severely underfunded. I call upon the international community to provide robust and sustained support to Rohingya refugees. We must continue to build their** resilience and self-reliance**, which is fundamental. Ensuring access to education, lifelong learning, skills development and livelihoods in the camps is critical if the refugees are to move away from total dependency on humanitarian assistance, in order to be prepared to rebuild their lives in Myanmar, once they can return in dignity. In the face of the impunity enjoyed by the Myanmar military for past and present violations against the Rohingya, we fully support the ongoing accountability efforts at the international level. The application brought by the Gambia against Myanmar at the International Court of Justice is an important step in this direction, as is the continuing investigation of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court. I hope the Human Rights Council will redouble its support in the direction of accountability initiatives. To conclude, I urge the Council to give careful attention to the views expressed by the panel and to work collectively on a roadmap towards durable solutions – solutions that are anchored in the hopes and the human rights of Rohingya Muslims and other minorities..."
Source/publisher: UN Human Rights Council (Geneva)
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-21
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Title: Camp Closures: Current Status (April 2023)
Description: "Background In October 2022, this analytical unit reported several State Administration Council (SAC) orders to close IDP camps in Rakhine, Chin, and Shan States, with most deadlines given as the end of that month. Responses to the SAC’s closure orders, some of which were detailed in a November 2022 follow-up report, varied widely depending on context. In February, this analytical unit spoke to IDP camp leaders, residents, and other sources near IDPs about the status of several specific camps in Kachin State, who described mounting pressure from General Administration Department (GAD) staff to close IDP camps there. IDPs, camp leaders, and communities living in these four states proposed diverse theories about the SAC’s orders, including that the SAC wanted to cut off the potential flow of aid through IDP camps to the Arakan Army in Rakhine and (southern) Chin States; that the SAC wanted to disperse IDPs in order to undermine both the ability of Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs) to fight in Northern Shan State, and community support for those same EAOs; and that the SAC was moving IDPs as a tactic in negotiations about territorial control with certain EAOs in Southern Shan State. The SAC may also be attempting to reduce the official number of IDPs in order to posture to international observers that the situation in Myanmar is improving under the leadership of Min Aung Hlaing, and that the military is successfully consolidating control. In areas with current or potential camp closures — Rakhine, southern Chin, Northern Shan, Southern Shan, and Kachin States — key concerns reported by IDPs remain the continued tensions between armed actors in IDPs’ areas of origin or locations to which they might feasibly relocate. These tensions have persisted, posing the same challenges to returning or resettlement now as they have in the past, and in many cases perpetuating conditions that caused initial displacement — in some cases, over a decade ago. Over the course of discussions between this analytical unit and camp stakeholders since September 2022, tensions have remained high in Rakhine State, fighting is still ongoing between the SAC and Kachin forces in the Kachin State townships with the most IDPs, the SAC (sometimes alongside the Pa-O National Army) has continued to clash with Karenni forces near Southern Shan State’s border with Karenni State, and a medley of armed actors (including the SAC) have intermittently fought in Northern Shan State, where a diverse array EAOs jostle over areas of control. Other concerns reported by IDPs include unexploded ordnance (UXO) contamination, presence of armed forces near return or relocation sites, lack of arable land and other livelihood opportunities, destroyed homes and land, and a lack of support to rebuild lives. This update is based on a small set of the camps in Rakhine, Chin, Shan, and Kachin States, and findings should not be assumed to be comprehensive or representative. The value of the qualitative approach is in the context-specific knowledge it provides; this snapshot illustrates perceptions of community members from a broad cross section of the local context, and the range of responses taken by displaced communities to the developing situation. For further analysis, detailed response implications, and recommendations for humanitarian responders regarding the SAC’s push to close formal IDP camps across Myanmar, please refer to the first report in this series: Situation Update: Camp Closure Crisis..."
Source/publisher: Center for Operational Analysis and Research
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-20
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Title: The Heyzer Maneuver in Myanmar
Description: "Myanmar has seen the back of the sixth Special Envoy of the Secretary General of the United Nations since 1995. Noeleen Heyzer resigned her position in recent weeks, earlier than planned from her appointment in October 2021 and assuming her role in December of that year. What will be her legacy? Not much. A kind assessment could conclude she gave it the good old college try, but was reasoning with caged beasts. A realpolitik regard would argue she was doomed from the starting line, because those caged beasts cannot be reasoned with. What can we learn from Heyzer’s 20 months in the position? There isn’t much to labor over. The military State Administration Council (SAC) wasn’t interested in any form of international engagement let alone mediation, and absolutely nothing to do with conflict resolution. The efforts of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have been stuck since the signing of the Five-Point Consensus in early 2021, yet remain the lodestar of international efforts regardless of how adrift, capsized or sunk they are. Heyzer didn’t have much to work with. The entire “good offices” position of the envoy is mired in the past, with its mandate in the UN General Assembly, not completely with the Secretary General. There hasn’t been any serious reform of the role in close to 30 years, a point acknowledged by an in-depth study of the good offices mandate released by the International Peace Academy (IPI) over 10 years ago. One of the concluding points of that study from 2012 could have been written today: “There is no doubt that the UN carries a legacy of resentment or disappointment among many sides within Myanmar who have felt, for different reasons, that the good offices in the past did not sufficiently consider their interests. In the international donor community, while some acknowledge the potentially important role the UN can play in Myanmar, few seem to want the world organization to actually take the lead in coordinating international assistance to the country.” The failure of the UN to gain access to Cyclone Mocha-affected communities in Rakhine State, or conflict-affected displaced in Sagaing Region, poses crucially important questions on the efficacy of the UN to remain in Myanmar. With a weak and distracted Secretary General in António Guterres, a dysfunctional Permanent Five members of a divided Security Council (China, Russia, the United States, Britain and France), it’s a wonder Heyzer got any attention let alone the level of support she needed from her first day. Early on, she was roundly criticized for suggesting a form of “power sharing” in a Channel News Asia interview. Whether she misspoke or considered it a serious proposal and was compelled to walk it back following the furor, the damage of an unforced error was already inflicted. Her one trip to call on Min Aung Hlaing in August 2022 was an unmitigated disaster, with the SAC releasing details of their conversation that were not completely congruent with what her post-visit statement said. Following this envoy equivalent of road-kill, she was compelled to broaden her consultations to members of the resistance including the National Unity Government (NUG) and some ethnic armed organizations (EAOs), although this was an uncommon development. From the August visit until her resignation, she was dogged by criticism from all sides, much of it perhaps unfair yet reflecting frustration at ongoing violence and the trap of diplomatic language that compelled her to express “deep concern” at incessant SAC mass atrocities. Heyzer met with Chinese foreign minister Qin Gang on May 1, where he “stressed the need to act prudently and pragmatically to prevent the escalation of the conflict and spillover of the crisis, and expressed his hope that Madame Special Envoy will uphold an objective and fair position and play a role as a bridge.” Trips were also made to India, and all around Southeast Asia. Soon after the announcement of her stepping down, she visited with NUG Foreign Minister Daw Zin Mar Aung: a photo of them hugging was both touching and, one hopes, cardiac arrest-inducing in Naypyitaw. The Global New Light of Myanmar made its position on the UN clear in its June 16 opinion piece from Kyaw Myint Tun-Paris called “The Picture of Irrelevance.” It was vintage vitriol. While it may have been designed to condemn the UN system and international mediation efforts, it must also be seen as a good riddance to Heyzer and a glove slap to any replacement. “What breakthrough do they have to prove in recent memory? Where have they brought lasting peace? Name one! Under their watch record number of people have been forcibly displaced or stateless. So, what have they done? Is the world becoming more peaceful? These people should be given no role in finding solutions for the problems Myanmar is facing. Solutions for Myanmar will come from within and with the help, cooperation and understanding of the neighbours (sic) and friendly countries.” As if to pour salt on the wound, the paper also carried a report on a meeting with acting UN Resident Coordinator Ramanathan Balakrishnan and colleagues with three SAC ministers in Sittwe, still struggling for official access to assist over a month after Cyclone Mocha. What have we learned from the near three decades of special envoys? Precious little. The first, the polished Peruvian diplomat Álvaro de Soto served from 1995 to 1999, which started optimistically with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s release before dissolving into repressive military rule deadlock. He may have visited the country six times during his tenure, but he achieved little of note apart from the “concession” of meeting with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi on every visit. De Soto’s contribution to Myanmar may be slight, but his legacy as a UNSG special envoy is instructive for Myanmar. Resigning from his envoy role in the Middle East peace process, his frustration at being hogtied to conditions that limited engagement with key actors was reflected in his leaked End of Mission memo in May 2007 following his resignation: “the UN should resist the natural temptation of almost every government and intergovernmental institution to throw a committee or a czar, or in this case, an envoy, at a problem…(w)e are not in the lead, and the role we play is subsidiary at best, dangerous at worst.” A similar end of mission memo from Heyzer should be encouraged. Then the reptilian Razali Ismael from Malaysia (2000-2005) served at a relatively optimistic time following the release of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi in 2002, but any optimism was dashed with the mass killing of her supporters at Depayin in May 2003, and then the purge of his erstwhile partner, Military Intelligence chief and Prime Minister General Khin Nyunt in October 2004. He refused to renew his position in early 2006 because he had been not permitted to visit the country in two years. In a creepy two-step criticism of the then regime with pretension over his own performance, Razali said in an interview; “Progress has not been made towards any reconciliation. If there used to be any, that has now snapped with [Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s] continued house arrest… What possibility is there of further progress?… Still, there is no frustration as this was, after all, a noble effort… good at dodging things and stonewalling… We have been dealing with these [Myanmar military] people for a very long time now. We are familiar with their ways.” This wasn’t exactly an advertisement for institutional memory and adaptive engagement. Next came the former Nigerian ambassador to the United Nations, Ibrahim Gambari. The then ruling State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) should have recognized a kindred spirit in Gambari, after all he rebuffed the General Assembly when they condemned the execution of prominent environmental activist Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight other Ogani people in late 1995. Gambari faced a genuine domestic political deadlock in 2006, then the popular protests and the brutal crackdown of September 2007, Cyclone Nargis and the desperate days of the UN seeking access to affected areas and the timely visit of Ban Ki-moon (who visited again in April, with great fanfare and no progress). The Indian diplomat Vijay Nambiar enjoyed greater success, but he operated between 2010 and 2016 when the opening afforded him access, and even some EAOs welcomed his role in the peace process. Nambiar wasn’t completely astute: he asked Senior General Min Aung Hlaing to contribute Sit-Tat troops for UN peacekeeping operations in 2014 (a small number served in Liberia and South Sudan). Christine Schraner Burgener was appointed in April 2018 following the carnage of ethnic cleansing against the Rohingya in Rakhine State, was told by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi to stay out of the peace process and stick to Rakhine, where she could do little. Her post-2021 performance was strident in condemning the SAC, her calls with Vice Senior General Soe Win unresponsive, and her plaintive calls to visit Myanmar rebuffed by the SAC, but also over-stating her importance: “Clearly, I can imagine that he [Min Aung Hlaing] would not like to see me now in Myanmar because the people know me… and they would probably be very encouraged by my presence.” Despite pushing a much stiffer and determined UN response for an envoy, she was also criticized in Myanmar for perceived moral equivalency in condemning violence by all sides (the trap of neutrality in vocalizing opposition to violence, even grossly asymmetric state violence and atrocity). Kyaw Myint Tun-Paris summed up the past envoys in colorful fashion. “There have been appointments of those who were no longer wanted anymore close to the Ivory Tower in New York. Dump them all on Myanmar! There was one who was appointed so that frequent trips can be made to see family and relatives in a nearby country [likely Gambari]. Then, there was a lightweight who had no clues whatsoever about Myanmar [this could be any of them]. One promptly turned up at Davos soon after the appointment… Whether there is a need or not, they visit the country frequently and put out press statements just to show they are working hard and justify their employment. Attempts would be made to visit the country especially when their contract is up for extension.” Like carrion birds, potential replacements are circling. But any future appointment will face not just the same blend of SAC stonewalling or UN dysfunction Heyzer endured, but a witches brew of competitive engagement initiatives from predatory actors from China, India, Thailand and Japan through the Nippon Foundation, along with the frozen efforts of ASEAN, and the rumors of attempts from Switzerland, Norway, Finland and other deluded European states looking to forge a breakthrough. The competing “Track 1.5” efforts of Thailand has annoyed Indonesia, received no support from the rest of ASEAN, and is but the latest data point of dysfunction. Many of these efforts have some bit-part Myanmar players who have highly questionable legitimacy and political cachet. All of this incoherence benefits the SAC, who chortle at foreigners competing for pole position to appease them. For many in the international community have adopted a stance of mee-sa-ta-phet yay-mote-ta phet (holding the flame/torch in one hand and the firehouse in the other): effectively hedging their bets on who is going to “win” the conflict and be the side to ingratiate. There has been a plethora of post-coup shapeshifting amongst foreign actors, who prior to February 2021 sought to engage the Myanmar deep state and its many war criminals, and who—regardless of their affected ardor for the resistance now—will casually betray the revolution when the winds of opportunism shift. If another envoy is going to be offloaded on Myanmar, it will likely be another seasoned diplomat with similar skills sets to Heyzer. The candidates will resemble archetypes of international servants, but to the SAC a bevy of min-laung (pretender kings, or more accurately “imminent kings”) and their cohorts of pontificating min-sayar (king’s teacher, or advisor). There will be no “innovation”, “off-ramping”, “nuance”, or that absolute pearl of statecraft thinking, “fresh approach.” It’s almost certainly going to be some soiled version of what came before. But does it need to be? Is there a possibility of obviously needed reform? Ralph Waldo Emmerson wrote that “foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of small minds, adored by little statesmen”, which could aptly describe the current cohort of Western diplomats and donors working on Myanmar all conjoined by a dearth of clear thinking. There are four potential courses of action: in theory. In all likelihood the UN and P5 countries will shuffle on with an utter disregard for impact, progress or the interests of the people of Myanmar. But what if we entertain the potential for the self-straitjacketed global order to react differently, even with expectations on progress being as low as possible? First, consider a completely different candidate. Heyzer was deemed suitable in late 2021 because she was a consummate UN insider, who had sidled up to the generals before, and being Singaporean could “read their minds” more acutely. Many observers thought then as now, these qualities worked against her. The same calculation holds true. If you find merely a “new Noeleen” then we’ll all be concluding similar bleak assessments of dashed expectations in three years as we are today. Six very different envoys from Africa, Southeast Asia, Switzerland and Latin America have confounded calculations on whether outsiders or Asians are most effective. No one who actually wants the job should be considered, especially if it’s former US ambassador to the UN Bill Richardson or disgraced British politician Boris Johnson, should they put their hands up. A UN lifer obviously has little comparative advantage other than a more acute understanding of the UN’s internal defects, as Heyzer demonstrated (as did previous envoys). Former military officers elicit little respect either, as retired US general Wesley Clark found in 2010 when he co-chaired an Asia Society task force on engaging Myanmar, or most recently the lack of any discernable progress in engaging with the SAC from former Indonesian army general Agus Widjojo. Second, rewire an entirely new approach, with a new mandate directly from the Secretary General and a closer rapport with the SG’s office. The need for reform has been apparent for many years, but even tinkering with structures in the UN is seen as disruptive. If Heyzer’s failure should spur anything, it is the necessity for a genuine reimagining of the role, and what its long-term utility could be for the UN’s assistance to Myanmar. One dimension could be the total restructuring of the UN’s presence in Myanmar, discarding half of the operational agencies and paring down presence and operations to address immediate humanitarian and development needs related to livelihoods, health, education and emergency relief. This would alleviate the funding gap for donors who have already invested in multi-donor funds. The current leadership under Ramanathan Balakrishan needs to be radically reconstituted, and a balance sought between operational realities and high-level mediation efforts. Third, consider a collective effort of a contact group of multiple officials, expanding the team from a bare bones operation (although one I’m certain well remunerates the players regardless of their 1-0 scorecard) to multiple high-level actors. Nothing limply ineffectual like the “Group of Friends of Myanmar” that the UN tried before, following the 2007 demonstrations and crackdown, involving some 14 countries. However, this shouldn’t be a consortium of existing envoys or point people such as the Norwegian envoy, or Igor Driesmans, the European Union envoy, but a group of higher level officials who can interact with multiple actors. These consultations must be broad and inclusive, especially the resistance actors in EAOs, the NUG and emerging political forces such as the Karenni State Interim Executive Council (IEC) and new configurations such as the Sagaing Forum. However, just the convening of such a forum within the constraints of the UN is devilishly difficult with protocol, egos and above all competing state interests. Look at one collection of “Group of Friends” meeting memos from 2009, which echoes the impasse of 2023, and face up to the hard facts that change in Myanmar didn’t come about from outside pressure or support. Or, fourth, do nothing. Just inform the SAC that they’re not worth the trouble. Alleviate the diplomatic corps from having to expend energy on supporting labored interventions that have no chance of even minimal success. Clear the space for ASEAN to continue to fail. Stop investing in false hope in Myanmar; it might do the standing of the UN some good, but likely not. The Heyzer maneuver of early departure should be a call for reform and reengagement, to clear a clogged diplomatic passage. But it won’t be. David Scott Mathieson is an independent analyst working on conflict, humanitarian and human rights on Myanmar..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-20
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Title: Nearly 100 Arrested in Myanmar for Wearing Flowers on Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s Birthday
Description: "Nearly 100 people, most of them women, were arrested in Myanmar for wearing, holding, selling or buying flowers on Monday, the 78th birthday of detained civilian leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. It was another sign of how complete the loss of human rights has been in Myanmar in less than two-and-a-half years since the coup. The regime’s detention of women wearing, holding, buying or selling flowers on Monday followed a call by resistance forces to stage a nationwide flower strike on the birthday of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. She was arrested by the regime on the first day of the coup in February 2021 and is being detained in Naypyitaw prison. She has been sentenced by a military council court to a total of 33 years in prison in 19 cases. Many Myanmar people at home and abroad embraced the call for a flower strike by wearing flowers to show their support for a civilian leader who almost always wore flowers before she was jailed. About 40 women were detained by the regime for wearing flowers in the central market of Sagaing Region’s Kale Town. In Yangon’s Kamayut Township, 15 women who wore or held flowers were arrested by the regime troops, according to the Kamayut Information group. Video footage shows armed regime troops checking pedestrians near a shopping mall in in the township and arresting two women who were holding flowers. Regime troops also arrested three flower vendors and two women wearing flowers in a market in the Township, the Kamayut Information Group said. Elderly, middle aged and young women were arrested, it said. “We heard that three flower vendors were released last night, but the fate of the others is still unknown,” a member of Kamayut Information Group told The Irrawaddy. The regime arrested 13 women staff at Thamardi gold shop in Yangon for wearing roses. A man from Yangon’s Mingaladon Township was arrested on Monday. He was accused of participating in the flower strike. About 20 women from Myit Nge Township in Mandalay Region were arrested on Monday for wearing flowers, according to local residents. Wearing flowers is not a crime, said Ma Zu Zu, a joint secretary of the Burmese Women’s Union. It is an individual right and no one can ban this, she said. “Almost all women wear flowers in Myanmar and it is natural. So, they take part in flower strikes, but the military is afraid of women’s involvement in revolution. Therefore, they repress people with fear,” Ma Zu Zu told The Irrawaddy. The junta’s enthusiasts on Telegram urged it to arrest 20 people, 13 women and seven men, for participating in the flower strike..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-20
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Title: Thai Election Winner Reaffirms Commitment to Peace in Myanmar
Description: "The leader of Move Forward, Pita Limjaroenrat, who won the recent Thai general election, says he is committed to ASEAN-led solutions for Myanmar and distanced himself from the outgoing government’s talks with Myanmar’s junta this week. Thailand’s military government hosted informal talks with Myanmar’s regime on Monday, dividing the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Myanmar’s regime has been excluded from high-level ASEAN meetings since late 2021 after the junta failed to follow the bloc’s five-point peace plan. Thailand invited all 10 ASEAN members to the closed meeting of foreign ministers but the current chair Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore shunned the event. Myanmar’s junta-appointed foreign minister, Than Swe, and representatives from Laos, Cambodia, India, China, Brunei and Vietnam attended Monday’s meeting. Following the meeting, Pita said in a statement that Move Forward is closely monitoring developments in Myanmar and prioritized the issue as a top concern. He referred to divisions caused by the talks within ASEAN and reaffirmed Move Forward’s commitment to the bloc’s five-point peace plan. “As one of the founding members of ASEAN, we attach high importance to unity among ASEAN members and to upholding principles of democracy and human rights as enshrined in the ASEAN Charter,” Pita stated. He said engagement must be inclusive, multi-layered and appropriate to help Myanmar stabilize. Pita said Move Forward’s coalition government plans to create a Myanmar Inter-Agency Task Force controlled by the Prime Minister’s Office which will coordinate efforts and seek solutions to Myanmar’s challenges..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-20
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Title: International Day for the Elimination of Sexual Violence in Conflict
Description: "On June 19, 2008, the 15-member United Nations Security Council passed resolution 1820 and designated the day as the International Day for the Elimination of Sexual Violence in Conflict. This resolution strongly condemns the usage of sexual violence during times of war and conflict, considering it a dangerous tactic and strategy that undermines international peace and stability. Mainly women and LGBTQI people fall victim to conflict-related sexual violence. However, some men and young men are not exempt from that. Sexual violence is the result of power imbalance, gender inequality, and the culture of impunity. The victims of sexual violence are both armed actors as well as many innocent civilians. Sexual violence in conflict is not an unavoidable by-product of wars and conflicts. It can be prevented through specific strategies, such as plans, military orders, Code of Conduct, communications procedures, and operation guidelines. Research demonstrates that conflict related sexual violence (CRSV) does not occur in every war and conflict with the same magnitude and prevalence. By implementing effective guidelines and operations with strong political will, it is possible to decrease and address sexual violence. All warring parties involved in the conflict must uphold the international humanitarian law during armed conflicts. This is also a pressing matter for Myanmar. CRSV should not be perceived as an inevitable part of active armed conflicts. At this time, the National Unity Government and all armed actors must prohibit and prevent it. To effectively support survivors, concerned stakeholders, local NGOs, and CSOs need multisectoral assistance. International development partners must provide timely and adequate resources in the manner that aligned to the local situations. This type of assistance would enable survivors to reclaim their fundamental rights. All survivors have the human right to receive survivor-centered services, live a life free from violence and threats, and access justice. Civic space has been shrinking across the country since February 2021. When CRSV cases happen, those who tirelessly work on them are civil society women's groups. On this day, we would like to take this opportunity to honor these women human rights defenders, frontline workers and first responders, for their important work to help the survivors, despite the danger and risk that could fall on them. It is mandatory for the international justice mechanisms to hold Myanmar’s military, or Sit-Tat accountable for systematic, widespread and pervasive sexual violence and gender-based crimes that they have committed in armed conflicts for decades. Myanmar military and Myanmar Security Forces have been designated in the UN list of parties that have committed widespread and systematic patterns of sexual violence since 2018. It is also necessary to hold perpetrators of all kinds accountable for sexual violence directly or indirectly linked to armed conflicts regardless of their kinship, political party affiliation, ranks in an army, or socioeconomic strata. All perpetrators must be held accountable without partiality to end impunity. We must act urgently to impose immediate and severe punishments for sexual violence crime perpetrators as we continue to build our path towards a Federal Democratic future. Enhancing response mechanisms can be achieved through a survivor-centered approach and seeking guidance from women's and human rights groups. A just and equal future can only be achieved when armed organizations and women's groups collaborate. Sexual violence in conflict is not just a women's issue or a concern solely for survivors; it is a Myanmar’s societal issue. Sexual violence during conflicts shatters mutual trust and represents a misuse and abuse of power. To rebuild trust, a comprehensive societal approach, in accordance with the international definitions and standards, should be adopted..."
Source/publisher: Women Advocacy Coalition Myanmar
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-19
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Title: Is Myanmar the Frontline of a New Cold War?
Sub-title: How America and China Are Reshaping the Burmese Civil War
Description: "ver since the Burmese military seized power in a coup in early 2021, the country has been caught in a deadly tailspin. What began as peaceful mass protest against the junta flared into armed resistance, with much of the country descending into renewed civil war. The conflict has since turned into a protracted insurgency, with newer pro-democracy forces fighting alongside ethnic armed groups that have battled central authorities for decades. Amid growing signs of a strategic stalemate, both the junta and the resistance appear determined to fight on. Neighboring states have tried to mediate, but a negotiated peace is not in sight. For much of the last two years, the Burmese crisis received minimal attention from the United States and China, despite unfolding at a time of intensifying great-power tensions. Washington and its partners have voiced support for Myanmar’s pro-democracy faction, yet geopolitical considerations have limited their willingness to take forceful action against the junta. Although Beijing favors the military dictatorship in some respects, it initially opted to wait and see, too. But this great-power restraint is now breaking down. Misperceiving several developments as indications that the antiregime forces are American proxies, Beijing is moving with increasing determination to shore up the junta. The result is what one might call Cold War–ization: the civil war is attracting outside meddling by great-power rivals, each fearing that inaction would benefit the other side. Stay informed. In-depth analysis delivered weekly. This puts other countries in the region, particularly those in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, in a bind. One of ASEAN’s core tenets has been that it should not be forced to choose between the United States and China. Instead, the group values maintaining good relations with both great powers. But as Myanmar’s civil war takes on aspects of a Cold War proxy conflict—a situation brought on in part by the unwillingness of governments in the region to unite against the junta early on—the country’s neighbors may soon face that exact choice: not just between a junta and a pro-democracy resistance but between China and the United States. For Washington and its allies, meanwhile, the entrenchment of a military junta beholden to China would portend diminished influence and greater instability throughout Southeast Asia. A RENEWED CIVIL WAR The February 2021 coup set Myanmar on a path to conflict and devastation. The putschists enjoyed scarce support among the population, which rallied behind deposed leader Aung San Suu Kyi. Hundreds of thousands took to the streets in peaceful protest. Members of the ousted government banded together with several other political and ethnic groups to proclaim a civilian National Unity Government to restore democracy. The military’s answer was to unleash relentless and often indiscriminate violence on its opponents. By the spring of 2021, Myanmar was careening toward a renewed civil war, with opponents of the military dictatorship taking up arms and vowing to fight back rather than retreat. The resistance found allies among the country’s almost two dozen ethnic armed groups—organizations located along Myanmar’s periphery, some with close economic and political ties to neighboring China, that have fought for increased autonomy or outright independence ever since Myanmar’s founding in 1948. Although facing a ruthless and better-equipped adversary, the pro-democracy and ethnic armed groups quickly gained a foothold in many rural areas, especially along the country’s borders with India, China, and Thailand. As early as mid-2021, the junta’s leader, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, conceded that his forces did not control the entire country. They have since held their ground in the countryside but have struggled to take cities and towns, in part because they are outgunned by the regime’s heavy artillery and at the mercy of its air force. As of late spring 2023, the two parties appear to have reached a strategic stalemate. DOUBLE GAMES The United States’ approach to post-coup Myanmar has consisted of a cautious and pragmatic balancing act between values and interests. Washington opposes the junta, yet it is also wary of alienating its allies and partners in the region, some of whom have maintained engagement with the Burmese military since the coup. High-level U.S. officials have met with Burmese opposition resistance leaders, and the U.S. government has issued targeted sanctions against high-ranking military officials. But the sanctions have left untouched the junta’s most prized asset: Myanma Oil and Gas Enterprise, a military-owned firm that generates some $1.5 billion in annual revenues and offers the regime much-needed access to foreign currency. Washington has also refrained from imposing secondary sanctions on those who do business with the junta, such as Thai energy companies and Singaporean financial firms. This restraint on the part of the United States is likely meant to placate other countries in the region, particularly Thailand, whose government—itself brought to power in a coup in 2014—remains supportive of the Burmese junta and maintains close economic ties to the regime. Important U.S. allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific, such as Australia, India, and Japan, have voiced their “concern” about the Burmese crisis but fear that excessive pressure would open the regime to greater Chinese influence. As a result, they have maintained or, in the case of India, expanded their economic and diplomatic ties to the junta and are unlikely to provide support to the Burmese resistance. Not unlike the United States, China has viewed the chaos in Myanmar with ambivalence. Beijing enjoyed good relations with Aung San Suu Kyi’s government before its overthrow. From the Chinese perspective, the outbreak of a civil war next door—China and Myanmar share a 1,300-mile border—was bad news for regional stability and for China’s multibillion-dollar investments in Myanmar under the Belt and Road Initiative. China was and remains one of the Burmese military’s leading arms suppliers, but it has never quite trusted the military’s leadership, which it views as too unpredictable. Beijing also supports some of Myanmar’s ethnic armed groups, including by acquiescing to an underground cross-border arms trade. For this and other reasons, leaders in Beijing opted to hedge their bets in the aftermath of the coup. Although they never denounced the junta or explicitly called for a return to civilian rule, they opened a backchannel to the National Unity Government and pressured the regime not to dissolve Aung San Suu Kyi’s party, the National League for Democracy. When fighting between the junta and an ethnic armed group led to the accidental shelling of a Chinese border town, Beijing reportedly warned the junta that another such incident would draw “the necessary response.” Chinese leaders also kept the ruling generals at arm’s length. When Wang Yi, then the Chinese foreign minister, visited Myanmar in the summer of 2022, he declined to meet with Min Aung Hlaing, the junta’s leader, a move that was seen at the time as a major diplomatic snub. CHINA GOES ON THE OFFENSIVE The complex array of American and Chinese interests at play in Myanmar allowed the country to mostly avoid the gravity well of U.S.-Chinese competition, at least for a while. The warring parties on the ground may view their fight as part of a global struggle between democracy and autocracy, a fact most evident in the resistance’s vocal support for Ukraine and the junta’s Russian sympathies. But the same has not been true of Washington and Beijing, for whom the civil war has been an exercise in balancing and hedging, not in proxy warfare. In September 2021, the United States and China even collaborated to block the junta from taking over Myanmar’s seat at the United Nations. Things have taken a turn for the worse over the past year, however, as Beijing has abandoned its initial caution and embraced the junta. Driving this shift is China’s perception that the United States has itself changed course and that Washington now fully supports—and is solidifying its influence over—the pro-democracy resistance. Two developments in particular have triggered Beijing: new U.S. legislation on Myanmar and last year’s decision by the National Unity Government to open an office in Washington. In truth, neither step signals a meaningful shift in U.S. policy. The law in question, the 2023 BURMA Act, reiterates Washington’s goal of reversing the coup and calls for the provision of nonlethal military aid (mostly communications equipment) to antiregime forces. Yet the law mandates neither lethal military support nor sanctions on the junta’s oil and gas business, and even the disbursement of nonlethal aid has lagged. U.S. efforts on behalf of Myanmar’s rebels are negligible—practically nonexistent—in comparison with the support the United States is providing to Ukraine, for instance, in its war against Russia. As for the National Unity Government’s new office in the U.S. capital, its goal is to coordinate and amplify the resistance’s advocacy, but whether it succeeds in this task is another question. These caveats notwithstanding, Beijing’s reaction has been to throw its weight more forcefully behind the junta, ending two years of relative disengagement. In May, Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang met with Min Aung Hlaing, declaring that China would help Myanmar “achieve reconciliation under the constitutional and legal framework”—diplomatic code for supporting the military regime. Earlier this year, the junta banned Aung San Suu Kyi’s party, which it would likely not have done without feeling that it had Beijing’s assent. According to insiders, Chinese interlocutors have also urged the pro-democracy resistance not to grow too close with the West. Beijing’s new special envoy to Myanmar, Deng Xijun, has gone on the offensive, too. In recent months, Deng has held a flurry of meetings with junta leaders and representatives of several ethnic armed groups and is reportedly pushing for cease-fires between these parties. That outcome would benefit the regime and hobble the resistance: a truce with Chinese-aligned ethnic armed groups would drive a wedge between them and their pro-democracy allies, whose fighters rely on the ethnic armed groups for training, manpower, and equipment (a large portion of which is of Chinese origin or is built using Chinese-made parts. The regime, on the other hand, would be fighting on fewer fronts at once and could redeploy its soldiers to the most important hot spots. The result would be an emboldened junta, confident of its chances for survival and willing to fight on. GET OFF THE FENCE China’s newfound interest and engagement in Myanmar brings to mind Cold War–era conflicts in Southeast Asia, such as wars in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam. Then as now, rival domestic factions curried favor with and sought support from rivaling superpowers—which were often receptive to these efforts, driven by a fear that the other side would otherwise gain a leg up. Myanmar today is no exception. Competition between China and its rivals—above all, the United States and India—is reshaping domestic politics in many countries in the Indo-Pacific as local actors feel compelled to pick sides. The Maldives and Sri Lanka have for years been caught in a geopolitical push and pull between India and China. The question of Chinese influence, and of embracing or rejecting China’s growing regional ambitions, has become a political lightning rod elsewhere in South Asia, parts of Southeast Asia, and Oceania. But the stakes are particularly high in an armed conflict such as Myanmar’s, where China’s growing involvement risks prolonged suffering and additional great-power tensions. Given the state of U.S.-Chinese relations and the ideological dimension of Myanmar’s civil war, it was perhaps inevitable that the warring parties would become entangled in broader geopolitical rivalries. But substantial culpability lies with regional actors who have long since abdicated responsibility and thereby ceded the playing field to Beijing. ASEAN has performed especially poorly. Owing to the bloc’s focus on consensus building and noninterference, it has proven incapable of exerting any serious pressure on the junta. Its flagship diplomatic initiative in the conflict, an unworkable 2021 agreement known as the Five-Point Consensus, quickly lost steam because it lacked enforcement mechanisms. Meek attempts at backdoor diplomacy by the Indonesian government, which currently chairs ASEAN, have failed to make progress, too. Meanwhile, several autocratic ASEAN member states appear eager to rehabilitate the junta within the organization, including Thailand and Laos, which is set to assume the role of chair for 2024. Instead of endless dithering and talk of engaging “all stakeholders,” ASEAN members and other countries in the region should face the facts. First, the Burmese military is the structural and proximate cause for the violence that has repeatedly engulfed Myanmar for three-quarters of a century. Second, the military is incapable of achieving battlefield victory, as evidenced by its failure to consolidate control over rural areas, defeat the ethnic armed groups, and suppress popular resistance despite its overwhelmingly superior firepower. Its removal from power is the only realistic option for achieving long-term peace in the country. The diplomatic efforts of ASEAN and other states should reflect that reality. ASEAN could learn from the African Union, which in 2019 suspended Sudan for its military’s failure to hand over power to civilians. Washington should try to coordinate its Myanmar policy with Beijing. Finally, ASEAN will risk obsolescence if it sticks to seeking cooperation and striving to accommodate both great powers. This approach is already proving ineffective in the South China Sea in the face of aggressive Chinese territorial expansion. In Myanmar, ASEAN needs to make some hard choices and get off the fence. China’s diplomatic efforts to shore up the junta, if successful, will only drag out the conflict and consolidate a regime beholden to China’s revisionist geopolitical goals. That outcome, in turn, would likely portend greater pressure on other states in the region to align with either Washington or Beijing—an outcome that no one within ASEAN wants. The United States, for its part, should understand that it can no longer dismiss Myanmar as strategically unimportant. Given the country’s location at the meeting point of South Asia and Southeast Asia, a stable Myanmar is essential for stability in the region at large. As a first step, the United States should turn more attention to Myanmar, as it pledged to do in the BURMA Act, and persuade its allies and partners to align their policies. Yet the U.S. government should not view the civil war as a zero-sum competition with China, whose geographic proximity to and major interests in Myanmar make it a necessary part of any settlement. On the contrary, Washington should try to coordinate its Myanmar policy with Beijing, if only to build the necessary guardrails to preclude escalation. U.S. officials should make their case by appealing to the pragmatism of Chinese leaders: The United States and China’s shared interest in regional stability means the junta must go. And since the junta will consider a peaceful negotiated settlement only if it sees no path to military victory, U.S. assistance to the resistance forces under the BURMA Act is not a threat to China but is instead in line with Beijing’s own goals. Moreover, Beijing should be well aware that the junta’s complete lack of popular support makes it a risky long-term partner. For Southeast Asian states, keeping Cold War dynamics from fracturing the region should be a paramount concern, one that takes precedence over increasingly unworkable norms around noninterference and consensus. Recent moves by Thailand to rehabilitate the junta are the exact wrong approach, giving the regime a false sense that it can hold on to power. Instead, ASEAN’s interest in regional stability points to one solution only: removing Myanmar’s main destabilizing agent, the junta, from power..."
Source/publisher: Foreign Affairs
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-19
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Title: Rethinking Independence in a Time of Revolution
Description: "January 4 was the 75th anniversary of Myanmar’s independence. Although the military regime went out of its way to hold lavish celebrations, the response among much of the population — at home and abroad — was significantly more muted. That is not surprising, given widespread popular resistance to the 1 February 2021 military coup and criticism of the regime’s brutal actions since then. The persistence and strength of this revolutionary sentiment compels a closer look at the ways in which Burma’s independence in 1948 was both partial and exclusionary. Today, there is a deep sense among many people that the current revolution needs to be not only political but also social and cultural, challenging the categories and political norms that have harmed marginalised groups and constrained democratic possibilities. Are there ways to use this anniversary to learn from the past without feeling obligated by it, to support the efforts that open up wider possibilities for Myanmar’s future and reject those that would reinforce the political exclusions of its past? We offer four areas where this revolutionary-minded lens compels more thorough re-thinking of key aspects of Myanmar’s political dynamics. First is a reconsideration of the fundamental presumption of ‘Independence’ — the nation-state model; the second is a critical assessment of what Independence in 1948 actually constituted and what perspectives were left out; third is a return to the Left-leaning economic critiques of Independence and the effects of their comparative absence today; and finally, fourth, we look at တိုင်းရင်းသား (taingyintha), one of the key categories of belonging in contemporary Myanmar, to show how its persistence suppresses alternate notions of community and perpetuates élite-driven identity politics. Questioning the Nation-State Norm Immediately following the 1 February coup, the initial public discourse was about a ‘return to democratic government’. But as the revolution gained momentum and needed more broad-based support, its political aspirations had to expand to include more groups. At the same time, its scope also expanded, incorporating not just a more robust sense of federalism but addressing broader systemic inequalities as well as more radical proposals (like the complete abolition of the armed forces). But ground realities present a more sobering and complicated picture: both the United Wa State Army (UWSA) and Arakan Army (AA) are asserting their territorial control and pushing for a level of political autonomy that resembles an independent state. Some major ethnic armed organisations such as the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) and Karen National Union (KNU) are providing space and support for multi-ethnic youth fighting against the military, while smaller ethnic organisations — as well as some leaders within these larger groups — have remained close to the regime, preferring to maintain the status quo through the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement. These dynamics point to a scenario of ‘fragmented sovereignty’ with local ethnic military leaders deciding the fate of a significant percentage of the population who call Myanmar home. Meanwhile, the international community appears unwilling to robustly support the revolutionaries, with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) predictably constrained by its Five-point Consensus. Reflecting on Myanmar’s independence under these circumstances requires a willingness to think outside of the Westphalian nation-state box, and the presumption that international borders are sacrosanct. Even today, as tens of millions of Myanmar people resist the military coup, there are reasonable and persistent differences in their visions of what they are fighting for. Even those who have recently opened up to robust conversations on federalism might balk at fully independent Wa or Arakan States, as fear-mongering framings of ‘Balkanisation’ have been a part of Burmese political discourse since before military rule. It is also the case that a post-Westphalian or post-Myanmar discussion might feel like it dismisses the sacrifices made by so many for Independence, and the investments that many people have in their Myanmar identity. But the persistent distrust between leaders of various groups, and between leaders and the populations they claim to represent, shows that the situation demands a new imagination of what independent Myanmar could look like. Independence for Whom? Instead of imagining Burma’s declaration of independence in 1948 as a simplistic rejection of British colonial rule and the restoration of indigenous rule, we can look back even further, to critically assess the centralising, assimilationist project of previous Burman kings: Bodawpaya violently annexed Arakan in 1784, strengthening a dismissive discourse about Rakhine cultural and religious practice and provoking a lasting hostility of Rakhine people toward Burman rule; looking even earlier, Alaungpaya’s conquest of the Irrawaddy Delta in the 1750s set off an ethnic Burman migration to the area that effectively made Mons and other groups a minority by the 19th century. Burma’s independence addressed none of these historical dynamics of assimilation, appropriation and exclusion. From the perspective of some occupied populations, it merely presented an opportunity for a majority group to take control of a territory that had already been forcefully brought together by successive colonising powers (first, the Konbaung kings, then the British), perpetuating the fiction of it being a coherent political entity. In fact, 1948 is only considered a meaningful or complete moment of independence from a particular set of standpoints. Non-Burman responses ranged from hesitant and conditional acceptance (as laid out in some of the clauses of the Panglong Agreement of 1947) to justified fear that they were simply trading a relatively benevolent colonial master for a more hostile Burman one. There is an important parallel here with the present moment. While labels like the ‘Spring Revolution’ can be a useful shorthand for what has been happening in Myanmar for the last two years, presenting a unified sense of the resistance movements foregrounds an overly-simplistic narrative. Instead of presuming that solidarity automatically emerges through a shared enemy, more effective descriptions of the current struggle see solidarity as something that is achieved gradually and provisionally, through the hard work of groups on the ground, seeking to build alliances across differences of identity, but also of interest. This likely requires a much stronger economic critique. The Need for Economic Revolution At the time of Independence, Left-leaning critics argued that full political liberation from colonial rule was impossible unless it was accompanied by a socialist economic revolution that could resist the neo-colonial domination of a global capitalist system, where influential actors often sought to actively undermine aspiring socialist states. Today, not only are the dynamics of economic dependence amplified in ways that constrain new actors, new states would be heavily dependent on resource extraction and probably driven by the existing economic interests of entrenched élites. In this context, it is likely that newly-created political entities would end up being heavily militarised and autocratic, not necessarily a better solution than the present. The road to independence in the 1940s featured disjunctures between groups that seemingly pitted ethnic interests against class interests. For example, although the saophas (traditional hereditary leaders in the Shan States) represented Shans at Panglong, their positions and influence were being increasingly challenged by other groups, including the youth of the Shan State Freedom League (SSFL). Although a Leftist ally of the Burman-led Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League (AFPFL) that was pushing for independence, the SSFL was denied a role at Panglong. Rather than see this as a clash between ethnic and economic interests, we might instead take a critical view that sees both class and ethnic identities as potentially meaningful for people, but also exploitable by élites with their own interests, a lesson that remains crucially important for alliance-building in today’s movement. Frustratingly, virtually none of the current revolutionary leadership — among Ethnic Revolutionary Organisations (EROs) or the National Unity Government (NUG) — are explicitly talking about the need for an economic revolution to complement a political one. Instead, they are primarily focused either on ethnic rights and federalism or on opposition to the military government. But across the country, at the grassroots, people are much more conscious of the ways in which their oppression emerges from political factors and predatory neo-liberal capitalism. This is consistent with the critique put forward by social movements that were becoming more prominent before the coup, focused on land rights, workers and farmers rights, and opposition to mega-projects and destructive Special Economic Zones (SEZs). Continued economic collapse after the coup has simply reinforced this sentiment, but it is not emphasised sufficiently in public discourse around the revolution partly because it poses a threat to many established actors and their economic interests and partly because élites continue to dominate that discourse. Challenging Élite Discourses Without the coup, it’s possible that Myanmar’s political discourse might have continued in a generally reformist manner, under successive National League for Democracy (NLD) governments. When Daw Aung San Suu Kyi labelled the post-1988 movement ‘Burma’s second struggle for independence’, it had only the modest goal of ending military rule. But the 2021 coup has made a revolutionary approach not just more thinkable and more imperative; it feels almost inevitable. Ten years of a quasi-democratic experiment gave people a sense of the benefits of freedom but the coup radicalised many, turning them away from gradualist, reform-minded alternatives to try to break free from the constraints of established categories and norms in politics and society. Abolition of these categories is a complicated task. To take one example, တိုင်းရင်းသား (taingyintha; lit., ‘natives of the country’) is a term that denotes a kind of belonging and connection to the territory, but it has been used by successive military governments to distinguish officially recognised ethnic groups from those designated as ‘foreign’. In this way, it has provided some protection for those fortunate enough to be included, even as it has excluded others and helped justify widespread complicity in the face of the Rohingya genocide. But the spectre haunting taingyintha is the history of Burmanisation: it offers belonging only on the terms of a dominant Burman and Buddhist national identity and can likely never offer a genuinely inclusive ground for solidarity. Fortunately, potential alternatives have arisen from the struggle itself. In the early days of the revolution, with the spontaneity of an almost leaderless, bottom-up revolt against the coup, it was mostly Gen-Z youth across the country who expressed their unequivocal rejection of the dictatorship. In doing so, they also called for addressing other social hierarchies, starting with gendered hierarchies in the ထဘီ (htamein; sarong-like wraparound garment worn by women) movement and for mass apologies for atrocities done to the Rohingya people. The movement went on to call, for the first time, for solidarity with ethnic Chinese, Muslims, and people of all classes and identities in society. The masses acknowledged this fight and named it ‘လူမျိုးဘာသာမခွဲခြား မြန်မာနိုင်ငံသား’ (lumyo-batha-ma-khwe-cha-myanmar-naigantha; lit., ‘Myanmar citizens without any differentiation based on race or religion’). But as the revolution grows more protracted, the real politics of the struggle on the ground have an impact on the political subjectivities of all the resistance forces. Progressive and transgressive discourses like these get pushed down by a romanticising of the taingyintha ideal, which does not change the terms of belonging but simply rebrands EAOs as Ethnic Revolutionary Organisations (EROs). It is imperative that the ongoing struggles and sacrifices of these communities be recognised, but it is equally imperative to do so without reinforcing the constraining, dominant ideas that have supported previous Burman-led military regimes. * At the 75th anniversary of independence, the way the dominant discourses were re-asserted by élites is telling: the regime is using the old playbook with its narrative to save the country and save Buddhism. The corresponding discourse from some revolutionary actors is also to harden ethnic difference, portraying the NUG-led resistance as simply a Burman vs Burman civil conflict and entrenching claims based on more rigid ethnic identities. In fact, these two discourses are two sides of the same coin, as they are essentialising identity categories following the state-driven logic of taingyintha. Myanmar’s moment of partial independence in 1948 displayed a similar parallel in its dominant discourses and the ones that sought to portray political belonging in ways that captured a more complex range of salient identities and dynamics. Grassroots and youth groups in the current revolution offer an opportunity to reclaim the spirit of independence not only as liberation from oppressive rule but also from norms that have constrained the ability of people in Myanmar to imagine a more just and inclusive political community. * The views expressed here are those of the author and not of the ‘South Asia at LSE’ blog, the LSE South Asia Centre or the London School of Economics and Political Science. Please click here for our Comments Policy. This blogpost may not be reposted by anyone without prior written consent of LSE South Asia Centre; please e-mail [email protected] for permission. Banner image © Saw Wunna, Yangon, 13 May 2021, Unsplash. The ‘Myanmar @ 75’ logo is copyrighted by the LSE South Asia Centre, and may not be used by anyone for any purpose. It shows the national flower of Myanmar, Padauk (Pterocarpus macrocarpus), framed in a design adapted from Burmese ikat textile weaves. The logo has been designed by Oroon Das..."
Source/publisher: London School of Economics and Political Science
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-19
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Title: The sound of gunshots across the Salween met with silence elsewhere
Sub-title: On the Myanmar-Thai border, there are airstrikes, gunshots and explosions that no one in the outside world notices.
Description: "MAE HONG SON, THAILAND – In winter, international tourists flowed into Thailand’s northern towns when the country fully opened its borders after the Covid-19 pandemic. The sleepy town of Mae Sariang in Mae Hong Son province near the Thai-Myanmar border was full of visitors. Hotels and guesthouses were fully booked, highlighting the end of a pandemic that killed more than 30,000 people in the country. However, a one-hour drive from the town is Mae Sam Laep village, where silence and fear chill the air. While the whole country celebrated a return to normal life, residents in this small Thai village – many of whom fled from war-torn Myanmar – are haunted by the decades of civil war happening right on their doorsteps. Mae Sam Laep is next to the Salween River, the last free-flowing river in the Mekong region. Less than half a kilometer of this more than 3,000-km-long river is the border that divides the two countries. The sound of gunshots and explosions has become part of the villagers’ daily lives, along with the occasional sound of military aircraft from the Myanmar side of the river. Facing Myanmar’s Karen state, the villagers in Mae Sam Laep have seen the fighting between Myanmar’s military, known as the Tatmadaw, and the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA), escalate after the military coup in February 2021 – which overthrew the elected civilian government and left the country into turmoil. The KNLA is the armed wing of the Karen National Union (KNU), a political organization that has fought Myanmar’s central government since 1949 and called for a federal state in which ethnic Karen can determine their own political direction. The coup resulted in a rapidly growing resistance to the Tatmadaw by armed groups across the country, and the KNU was no exception. The military’s response was to deploy more forces and launch a series of airstrikes and raids aimed at cracking down on the resistant groups. At least 23 airstrikes were reported in Dooplaya district in southern Karen state from December 2021 to May 2022, according to the Karen Human Rights Group’s report. This resulted in several thousand Karen people fleeing across the Salween River to Mae Sam Laep in Thailand – creating a humanitarian crisis that halted the local economy and the tourism industry. Bunkering down As clashes between the military and armed groups increased, villagers along the Thai border were forced to build safety bunkers to avoid stray bullets from the Myanmar side. Students in Thai schools had to undergo evacuation training to prepare for unexpected fighting nearby. The escalating violence also disrupted the transportation of food and necessities on the Salween River. When I visited Mae Sam Laep early this year, the ports were empty and lifeless despite the lifting of Covid travel restrictions. Only a few boats were seen carrying goods from the Thai to the Myanmar side. Thai authorities had set up areas to temporarily host displaced people from Karen State. The border was officially closed due to security concerns, while visitors were not allowed to get near the border. This ghostly atmosphere contrasted with the pre-coup period when boats would queue up at the ports, waiting for passengers and goods to be carried over to the Myanmar side. Local villagers would organize boat trips for tourists, who came to explore the lush and then peaceful scenery along the Salween. Restaurants were crowded with customers looking to try local food. After the coup, many villagers reported seeing the Myanmar military’s fighter jets flying over their towns. However, this was denied by Thai security officers, who said the jets had not entered Thai air space. “We are mostly afraid of airstrikes,” one villager told me. “Many of us used our mobile phone cameras to capture photos of Myanmar aircraft flying near our houses. But we were asked by [Thai] soldiers to not upload the videos on social media or send them to journalists because it would affect diplomatic relations between Thailand and Myanmar.” With the villagers urged to stay silent, their stories have not been heard by outsiders, making the ongoing war invisible to the outside world. But this silence is louder than any sound. It resonates with the difficulties of villagers whose lives will not be at peace anytime soon. Rebuilding the economy However, living in the shadow of war, some villagers feel they cannot let themselves and their people be forgotten by outsiders. Recently, a group of villagers joined hands with local politicians in an effort to restore eco-tourism, with an attempt to bring in tourists despite the ongoing war on the other side of the border. Led by Phongphiphat Mibenchamat, the head of the Mae Sam Laep Administrative Organization who is known locally by his nickname Chai, the villagers hosted a media boat trip to show the natural beauty of the Salween River and the forest surrounding it. They hope the media will spread the word about their village and its attractions. Tourism can play a crucial role in boosting the local economy in the post-pandemic era as cross-border trade and farming have been disrupted by the war. “Tourist safety is still a challenge. But we must start rebuilding our profile in the industry now,” said Phongphiphat. Meanwhile, both the war and the pandemic have created a political vacuum that halted the development of seven proposed dams on the Salween River. One of those is the Hatgyi Dam, which is only 47 kilometers north of Mae Sam Laep. It was first proposed by the Myanmar government in 1998 and made a leap forward in 2005 when Myanmar and the Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand signed a Memorandum of Understanding to develop the dam. About 90% of the 1,360-megawatts of electricity generated from the dam will likely be imported to Thailand. But progress has been marred by bloody conflicts and the project is unlikely to move on under the current military government. This political vacuum may leave civil society groups protesting against the dam in limbo for a while. But they believe the project will be revived once Myanmar’s political situation stabilizes. Their main concerns are the impact of the dam on the river’s rich biodiversity and people’s livelihoods. Thousands of villagers will be displaced by the dam’s construction. For local people, the dam seems to be a small concern in the face of never-ending war. Seeking new sources of income, like tourism, while ensuring safety and food on their plates, are now their urgent issues. However, the gunshots are still ringing loud in their ears.
Source/publisher: Mekong Eye
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-19
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Title: Thailand’s ‘re-engagement’ of illegal Myanmar junta is a betrayal of the Myanmar people, Southeast Asian MPs say
Description: "JAKARTA – Thailand Deputy Prime Minister Don Pramudwinai’s decision to push through with “informal” meetings with the illegal Myanmar military junta despite widespread criticism and condemnation is a betrayal of the Myanmar people and an affront to ASEAN unity, Southeast Asian lawmakers said today. “The Thai government’s determination to hold these meetings, despite receiving rejections from the ASEAN chair, Indonesia, as well as Singapore and Malaysia, demonstrates its arrogant disregard for the unity of ASEAN, the human rights of the people of Myanmar, and even the will of its own citizens,” ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights (APHR) Co-chair Charles Santiago said today. “The current Thai government was overwhelmingly defeated in the recent general election and no longer has a mandate from the people; initiating such talks in spite of this is a slap in the face of the Thai voters.” According to leaked documents, Pramudwinai sent a letter on 14 June inviting other ASEAN foreign ministers to an “informal discussion” on 18-19 June, with the aim of “fully [re-engaging] with Myanmar at the leaders’ level”. Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi replied to the letter rejecting the invitation on 15 June, while the Malaysian Ministry of Foreign Affairs released a statement to the same effect on 18 June. Singapore Foreign Minister Vivian Balakrishnan said in a press conference during his visit to the United States on 17 June that it was “premature to re-engage with the junta at a summit level or even at a foreign minister level.” The Philippines has yet to release an official statement but reportedly will not attend. Despite this, Pramudiwinai has insisted that the talks will go ahead on 19 June and the Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs has said that high-level representatives from Laos, Myanmar, Cambodia, India, China, Brunei and Vietnam have confirmed their attendance. This meeting follows a previous “track 1.5 meeting” that was held in Thailand in March and was attended by Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam along with China, India, Bangladesh and Japan. “We are dismayed that Thailand and other countries are still willing to engage with the murderous Myanmar junta without any attempt to hold it accountable, despite the military’s continued atrocities that have already resulted in the deaths of thousands of its own people. The ‘Track 1.5’ meetings also weaken ASEAN’s credibility on their ability to resolve the many crises unfolding in Myanmar,” said Santiago. “Indonesia as ASEAN chair, as well as the other ASEAN member states, must not let this meeting go unanswered: there must be an inquiry into Thailand’s blatant disregard and disrespect of the current Chair. While we appreciate their rejection of this ill-conceived meeting, it cannot stop there. ASEAN must work together to hold the military junta accountable, including by reforming the failed Five-Point Consensus which has yet to yield any results since its adoption in April 2021,” said Santiago..."
Source/publisher: ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-19
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Title: China’s support in Myanmar driven by self-interest
Description: "In 2022, China’s former foreign minister Wang Yi visited Myanmar, but he did not meet with the regime’s leader Senior General Min Aung Hlaing. On May 2 2023, the general warmly welcomed Wang’s successor Qin Gang. The minister expressed China’s support for the regime regardless of the situation and promised deeper economic cooperation. He further promised to support Myanmar’s efforts ‘to maintain stability’. In March 2021, China condemned the violence against civilians, halted investments and engaged with the exiled National League for Democracy (NLD)’s members. This support changed dramatically in 2023 as China began a new diplomatic approach. On 4 April 2023, the secretary of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) Yunnan Provincial Committee Wang Ning arrived in Naypyidaw. Later that month, an envoy from the CCP came and met former junta leader Than Shwe — now 90 years old — who had nurtured closer relations with China than Min Aung Hlaing. The envoy also met former president Thein Sein. These meetings were intended to ask the former leaders to advise Min Aung Hlaing, who is known to be anti-Chinese, to forge closer ties. China’s strategy intertwines economic, political and military dimensions. Since the military coup, China has invested US$113 million in Myanmar. The China–Myanmar Economic Corridor provides an important economic link between the two countries. The plan for a high-speed railway between Yunnan and Rakhine — which was shelved in 2014 — is now back on the table, as is a windmill project in Rakhine, a hydroelectric power station in Kachin state and a gas power plant. For Myanmar, supplies of food, fertiliser and stable electricity are urgent, and China is addressing this through infrastructure. Since February 2023, the 770 kilometre-long Chinese-operated oil pipeline from Rakhine to Yunnan has been used to transport Russian oil to China. The pipeline begins at the deep-sea port in Kyaukphyu on Ramree Island and is very important to China’s Belt and Road Initiative. On the political and military front, China worries about the border regions, where fighting between Myanmar’s military and ethnic armed organisations (EAOs) often land both bombs and refugees on the Chinese side. Qin visited the United Wa State Army, Kachin Independent Army, Arakan Army and other China-friendly northeast EAOs before he saw Min Aung Hlaing. Qin has urged Yunnan to strengthen its border defence. China worries that the People’s Defense Force (PDF) will attack its investments in Myanmar. PDF attacked one of the stations on the pipeline in February 2022. In May 2023 a series of anti-Chinese protests arose — reflecting mounting resentment towards Chinese investments for neglecting the locals and the environment. The resistance has called for a boycott of Chinese products. There has also been speculation that China is helping to construct a base on the 11 km-long Great Coco Island, which is located 300 kilometres away from Myanmar in the Bay of Bengal. The island has a radar station and an airfield. Another sign of China’s offensive strategy in the region was a visit by Chinese diplomats to Bangladesh to accelerate the repatriation of Rohingya refugees, despite poor conditions in the Rakhine settlement camps. The strategy in Myanmar is also part of China’s attempts to counter US influence in the region. The United States’ 2021 Burma Act will provide support to the National Unity Government and the resistance. This may have convinced China to support Min Aung Hlaing. Chinese envoys have not been allowed to meet Aung San Suu Kyi and China is not happy with the NLD ban. Despite these concerns, a strategic triad alliance between China, Russia and Myanmar is emerging. Perhaps this is a convenient relationship for the three partners, but it is viewed cynically by Myanmar’s civilians. Demonstrations have intensified and the pipeline has been attacked three times since Qin’s visit. The parallel National Unity Government has declared Chinese investments illegal. For Min Aung Hlaing, the alliance is a question of survival. He badly needs economic, political and military support and so has chosen to ignore resentment against increased Chinese influence. Meanwhile, China’s Ambassador to Myanmar Chen Hai met with Myanmar’s Home Affairs Minister and urged him to crack down on the internet fraud and gambling hub Shwe Kokko run by Chinese criminals on the border with Thailand. The Ambassador urged Myanmar to rescue the people trafficked and trapped by Shwe Kokko. But their headquarters are guarded by the Border Guard Forces of the military, which have stakes in the business. China clearly wants Min Aung Hlaing to get control over matters affecting Chinese interests before it sends an invitation for an official visit to Beijing. The military uses its Russian fighter aircraft and helicopters to bomb civilians, while troops have been burning villages and murdering civilians. The resistance is without a firm coherent command, needs more international help and depends on EAOs opposing the regime. But the resistance will not give up until there is substantial change. Any mediation seems impossible and the generals are used to cope with international sanctions. China’s support of Min Aung Hlaing is bad for the resistance and the humanitarian crisis. If China’s support for Myanmar continues to be guided by a desire to serve its own interests, prospects for changing the situation will remain dim..."
Source/publisher: "East Asia Forum" (Australia)
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-17
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Title: Transcript of Minister for Foreign Affairs Dr Vivian Balakrishnan's and United States Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken’s Joint Press Availability, 16 June 2023
Description: "United States Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken: Vivian, Foreign Minister, it is wonderful to have you here at the State Department. We have actually worked closely together since the last time I was in government, and I value the conversations we have had over many years. One of the things that I can say very clearly is that every time I have an opportunity to spend time with (the) Foreign Minister, I learn something, and I am grateful for that. Singapore is for the United States, a true partner. Having the opportunity today to discuss so many issues that bring us together, regionally, bilaterally in the first instance, regionally but also globally, was very, very beneficial. If I could, let me just begin with a few words about my upcoming visit to the People's Republic of China (PRC), since we are leaving tonight on that trip. We look forward to having a series of meetings with senior officials in Beijing, building on the engagements that we have had with the PRC since President Biden and President Xi met in Bali late last year. To summarise it, the trip has three objectives. First, to establish open and empowered communications so that our two countries responsibly manage our relationship, including by discussing challenges, by addressing misperceptions and avoiding miscalculations. Second, to advance US interests and values, and those we share with allies and partners around the world, including speaking directly and candidly about our very real concerns on a range of issues. Third, to explore the potential for cooperation on transnational challenges, global economic stability, illicit synthetic drugs, climate, global health, where our countries’ interests intersect and the rest of the world expects us to cooperate. Intense competition requires sustained diplomacy to ensure that competition does not veer into confrontation or conflict. Again, that is what the world expects of both the United States and China. Now, our friends in Singapore and Southeast Asia more broadly, are essential to realising what is a shared vision for a free and open, a prosperous, a secure, a connected, a resilient Indo-Pacific where people or goods or ideas can travel freely, where rules are applied fairly and transparently. Indeed, for six decades now, the strategic partnership between the United States and Singapore, rooted in respect for the rules based international order, has helped strengthen peace and stability in the region and around the world. I reaffirmed to the Foreign Minister that ASEAN is at the heart of our Indo-Pacific strategy. The United States supports ASEAN centrality, and we see a considerable convergence between our own Indo-Pacific strategy and ASEAN’s Outlook on the Indo-Pacific, epitomised by a shared belief in inclusive economic growth, transparency and the rule of law. Vivian and I discussed Russia and the ongoing war of aggression against Ukraine. Singapore has consistently stood up for Ukraine sovereignty, its territorial integrity, its independence, as well as the United Nations Charter in which those principles are embedded, and joined the United States and our allies and partners in enacting sanctions that are taking a toll on Russia's war machine. We will continue to support Ukraine as we work toward a just and lasting peace, one based on the principles that I laid out recently in Helsinki. Respect for human rights and self-determination are also being challenged in Burma, where the military’s coup and the brutal crackdown continues to harm civilians, to deprive them of their right to choose their own path and threatens regional stability. We appreciate Singapore and ASEAN’s critical role in seeking a peaceful solution. United States will continue to impose strong sanctions against those perpetrating atrocities. We welcome Singapore's partnership in maintaining the necessary economic pressure. Our two countries are also seizing new opportunities to work together – from space and cyber, to supply chain resiliency, to clean energy. We spent some time talking about that. As part of the green shipping challenge launched at COP 27 last year, Singapore recently announced an MOU with the ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach to upgrade digital infrastructure and to reduce emissions. We are partnering to advance our clean energy across ASEAN, including the ASEAN power grid, which will facilitate renewable energy development, deployment throughout the region, and help Singapore transition to net zero emissions by 2050. And as part of our expanded US-Singapore Climate Change Partnership, we are announcing today, new and enhanced areas of cooperation from reducing deforestation to encouraging energy efficient buildings. All this collaboration is rooted in one of our strongest bilateral relationships in the Indo-Pacific. American companies, we talked about this as well, are the largest source of foreign direct investment in Singapore. We are working to grow our economies even faster, and even fairer through the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF), of which Singapore was an early and enthusiastic supporter. Singapore is also a critical security partner, hosting American ships and aircraft, sending pilots to train in the skies above Arizona and Idaho. For evidence of our robust people-to-people ties, one need look only for example at Singapore's Cabinet, where over half the ministers including Prime Minister Lee has studied in the United States. President (Halimah) Yacob is also a distinguished alum of the State Department's International Visitors Leadership Program, proving that we have a pretty good eye for talent. Recently, the Prime Minister urged the people of Singapore “to think boldly, to aim high, to seek far”. Those are wise and powerful words, and I look forward to that spirit continuing to guide the close partnership between Singapore and the United States. Minister Vivian Balakrishnan: Thank you, Tony. It is always special to meet you here. I think we have been meeting regularly for about seven years, including in different incarnations. So, I will confess to being biased, but I think the United States is very blessed to have the ultimate consummate diplomat in you, and more so at this very testing, trying and challenging times. It is an honour to be here and thank you for the opportunity to discuss a wide range of issues just now. We first reaffirmed the excellent, long-standing, close, stable relationship between the United States and Singapore, and I should add, our shared commitment to a rules-based international order, and the fact that it was the United States seven, eight decades ago, which envisioned, underwrote and supported this rules-based international order. Even now as we go through challenging times, I think we need to reaffirm the importance of such a system. We also covered a range of bilateral, regional and global issues. On the bilateral front, everyone knows that we have got a very robust economic relationship. We are in that special category which is defined as a Major Security Cooperation Partner of the United States. But we have not stood still. We are also expanding into new frontiers. You have just mentioned the updated United States-Singapore Climate Partnership, and this will focus on collaboration in five areas, including regional energy transition in Southeast Asia, and low and zero emission solutions. Watch this space, there is a lot happening. We are also working in other areas like cybersecurity, all the more pertinent now with the challenges that we are facing. We also signed the Artemis Accords last year – that is another whole new frontier for collaboration. I mentioned just now that in fact for 33 years, we have had a Memorandum of Understanding regarding the United States use of our facilities, both naval and aviation. Again, that has been a symbol of our belief that the United States’ strategic presence and contribution to our part of the world has provided stability, has provided opportunity and helped to underwrite the peace which we should never take for granted. Singapore is home today to over 5,700 United States companies. I also made the point that the United States investments in Singapore exceed what the United States has invested in Japan, China and ROK (Republic of Korea) combined. If you consider how small Singapore is, that statistic becomes all the more remarkable. On the other side of that same equation, Singapore's investments into the United States and US exports to Singapore support more than 250,000 jobs in America itself. I know it is not just about trade for its own sake, but also in terms of jobs and opportunities for people on both sides. I also wanted to commend the very active regional engagement by President Biden’s Administration, with your shepherding of the efforts in our part of the world. The fact that President Biden attended the ASEAN Summit in Phnom Penh last year, and the President also hosted the ASEAN-US Special Summit in Washington in May last year – that sent a very strong signal of engagement. We also elevated the ASEAN-US relations to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership last year, and it is not just a form of words but the real substance, the real deal. We also look forward to working with you to align the US Indo-Pacific strategy with the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific, and we hope that there will be further discussions hopefully, when the President and you can visit our part of the world for the ASEAN meetings, the East Asia Summit, (and) the ASEAN-US Summit as well either here or in our part of the world in the near future. I think the point is, we do want to reaffirm the critical importance of the US anchoring your strategic engagement in our part of the world. I made the point that there is in fact a deep reservoir of goodwill and trust, and you have many partners in the Asia Pacific. Maybe others may not be as explicit as we are in saying how welcome you are, but I gave you the assurance that everyone wants to see you engage in our part of the world. The IPEF, which we also discussed, is another strong reaffirmation of the US commitment to the economic agenda in Asia Pacific. We welcome the substantial conclusion of the negotiations on the second pillar of the IPEF, which focuses on supply chains. We hope that the remaining pillars of the IPEF will include meaningful provisions that will lead to concrete benefits, and even greater regional integration. Finally, I know you have got a big visit coming up. I believe you are leaving tonight. I wanted to say that we commend your efforts. This is a very important and critical moment, not just for the United States and China. The rest of the world will be watching. So, we hope and believe that you will be able to manage the differences, but more importantly, establish open channels of communication, build mutual trust and understanding. I wish you a smooth-sailing and successful visit. Thank you, again, for hosting me. Thank you for this chance to, as always, have very open and sincere discussions, and I wish you all the best. Simon Lewis (Reuters): First to the Foreign Minister, Dr Balakrishnan. The Secretary mentioned that Myanmar came up in your discussions. I wondered if I could ask you for Singapore's position on an initiative by the caretaker government in Thailand to re-engage with Myanmar's military junta and reportedly inviting the junta back into ASEAN meetings. Is that something that Singapore would support? I would also be interested in your response to the recent report by the UN Special Rapporteur on Myanmar, on human rights in Myanmar, who identified $254 million worth of goods that have come through Singaporean entities to the Myanmar military, so I am interested in your response to that. And for the Secretary, I am also interested in your view on whether ASEAN nations including Singapore, also Thailand, should be doing more to stop the violence in Myanmar. And specifically on Thailand, I wonder if we could get your view on efforts to form a new government there. Are you concerned about the Thai military trying to cling onto power despite the pretty clear results of the election? And just an additional one because it is breaking news. President Putin has said that tactical nuclear weapons have been deployed to Belarus. Secretary, what is the US response to that, and are there consequences for Russia and Belarus? Thank you. Minister: Well, thank you. I think I counted at least three questions. Let me get back to first principles. We condemn the coup in Myanmar, and the ongoing violence against civilians, the instability in the country, the setback to national reconciliation and the enormous impact on the economy. Unfortunately, it is now more than two years. We have not seen any signs of improvement. From an ASEAN perspective, we have the Five-Point Consensus and we haven’t seen any significant progress in fulfilling the Five-Point Consensus. So we believe it would be premature to re-engage with the junta at the Summit level or even at the Foreign Minister level and in fact, our leaders at the recent ASEAN Summit reaffirmed this position. Having said that, the ASEAN Chair Indonesia is engaging across a wide spectrum of stakeholders and the key point is this – you do need everyone, ultimately, to sit down and negotiate. I do not know how long it will take. The last time, it took 25 years for some form of democratic transition to occur in Myanmar. I hope it will not take that long. But it is very important for the rest of us. Whilst we are in favour of reconciliation and more dialogue, we obviously want to make sure that the level of violence goes down. And certainly, from Singapore's perspective, our policy is that we should all do our best to make sure arms, or even dual-use items which can be used to inflict harm and injury on civilians, should be proscribed. I noted Tom Andrews’ report, and one line in it is worth quoting. He said that “there are no indications that the government of Singapore has approved or is involved in the shipment of arms and associate materials to the Myanmar military”. But more importantly, we are also engaging Tom Andrews because any specific information which he has access to and which we can use for investigations or, if need be, to prosecute companies or entities which are breaching our laws and our policies on arms and dual-use – rest assured, we will get to the bottom of it. But the bigger question is, when will peace come back? Tony, I am afraid I remain pessimistic. Secretary Blinken: You can sign my name onto every word of what Foreign Minister just said, including unfortunately, the pessimism that he expressed at the end, which we share. But everything that Minister said, I ascribe to as well. We are very focused on supporting ASEAN efforts to move forward towards a resolution that ends the violence, that frees people in jail, that puts Burma back on a democratic path. The Five-Point Consensus that the junta signed onto, has not been, to state the obvious, advanced, much less met. And it is very important that we continue, all of us, to sustain the appropriate pressure on the junta and look for ways to engage the opposition in Burma and find every possible avenue to advance Burma’s return to the democratic path, to an end of the violence, to the freedom of people who have been unjustly imprisoned. And in all of these efforts, we are working, the United States and Singapore, very closely together both through ASEAN and on a bilateral basis. With regard to Thailand. I simply say that our full expectation is that the government will be formed pursuant to the laws of Thailand. That is our expectation. That is the expectation of people in Thailand as well. With regard to the reports about Belarus, we have seen comments that were made in the last few hours. We will continue to monitor the situation very closely and very carefully. We have no reason to adjust our own nuclear posture. We do not see any indications that Russia is preparing to use their nuclear weapon. President (Biden) said again this week that we remain committed to the defence of NATO - every inch of its territory. That is our north star. We are very focused on that. I would just note that one of President Putin’s claims for starting his brutal invasion of Ukraine, one of the many rationales he gave at various points, was ostensibly to prevent the threat of Ukraine reacquiring the nuclear weapons that it gave up when the Soviet Union dissolved, and Ukraine voluntarily gave up the weapons they inherited, along with Belarus and Kazakhstan. It would be rather ironic, among many other things for President Putin to now be talking about putting nuclear weapons on the territory of a neighbouring state again, including a state that gave up the nuclear weapons that it inherited when the Soviet Union dissolved. As for Belarus itself, this is just another example of Lukashenko making irresponsible, provocative choices to cede control of Belarus’ sovereignty against the will of the Belarusian people. Nirmal Ghosh (Straits Times): Minister, you have spoken about new frontiers in relationship with the United States. Could you elaborate a bit on that? You have mentioned the Climate Partnership, cybersecurity and so forth - a few more specifics if you could share. Secondly, as have been mentioned, a lot of the world is watching the Secretary's forthcoming visit to China. I wonder if you could give us a Singapore and/or a Southeast Asian view of US-China relations. Mr Secretary, could you also speak to that latter part about ASEAN centrality and how it all fits into the Indo Pacific strategy? Minister: Thank you Nirmal. I used to be the Minister of Environment before this incarnation. So, I was heavily involved with the final negotiations for the Paris Agreement. One observation which I will make is that we would not have arrived at the agreement in Paris if it had not been for the confluence of strategic and environmental interests of the United States and China. I can tell you that from direct experience. That is why tonight's trip is so important, because there are many global planetary issues - climate pandemics, even cybersecurity, which require the United States and China to work off the same page and be key pillars for a global system which will help increase resilience to threats to welfare, health, and prosperity for people all over the world. So you (Blinken) go with our full support. But having said that, speaking now as a diplomat, I want to make this plea. Please do not put too much weight on poor Tony's shoulders. The fact is diplomats need time and space and sometimes just some quiet time to engage in some honest-to-goodness conversations without having to put out a tweet every hour or two. The trip is essential, but not sufficient. There are fundamental differences in outlook, in values, and it takes time for mutual respect and strategic trust to be built. So, it is important, but I am also making the plea. I hope people do not have excessive expectations on that front. On your question about the new frontiers, I already mentioned the Climate Partnership, and there are five focal areas under that partnership which include the regional energy transition. Second, low- and zero-emission technologies and solutions. Third, nature-based solutions and carbon markets. And lastly, urban decarbonisation resilience and capacity building. And even in all these areas, you can see that there are obvious opportunities for synergy and cooperation between the United States and Singapore not just for our own sake, but in our region as well. I mentioned the Artemis Accords, so outer space is certainly another frontier. And of course, we have been working very closely, especially in last couple of years on cybersecurity, because that is a clear and present frontier where there is both risk and opportunity. So, watch this space. Secretary Blinken: I think the Foreign Minister has captured it very, very well on all fronts. With regard to ASEAN, I simply want to note and emphasise something I noted before. If you look at our own Indo-Pacific Strategy, and you then look at the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific, the coincidence of these approaches, these strategies, these visions are very, very strong, and very, very high. And that speaks to why we do put a premium on ASEAN Centrality, and why as Vivian pointed out, starting with President Biden, we have had significant re-engagement with ASEAN over the last two and a half years. Economic growth, inclusive economic growth, transparency, the rule of law. We also work on discrete issues in areas that have a real impact on the lives of people in the region, as well as in the United States, whether it is climate, whether it is energy, whether it is global health. All of these are front and centre in what we are doing and one of the things that we talked about today is Burma. And of course, in ASEAN meetings and US-ASEAN engagement maybe that tends to get the headlines, and it is usually important. But if you look at the agenda that we are actually pursuing, both at the meetings that we have in the day in, day out, it is a very broad universe of issues of subjects, all of which go to the needs, the aspirations, the hopes of people in the ASEAN region and in the United States. Minister: So, watch what we do, not just what we say, and you will see that there is a full range of activities for the United States and its engagement with ASEAN. Jennifer Hansler (Cable News Network): Thank you. Mr Secretary, on Iran, how would you characterise the ongoing inter-talks with Tehran? Would you say that you are optimistic that an understanding can be reached between the two sides on constraining Iran's growing nuclear program? And the Omani Foreign Minister said earlier this week that he believes the two sides are close on a deal for the detainees? Do you agree with that characterisation? Moving on to the China detainee issue are you committed to raising the case of Kai Li, Mark Swidan, and David Lin in your meetings in Beijing? More broadly, to both you Mr Secretary and Mr Foreign Minister, given what you said about this not being sufficient, are you optimistic that this will lead the way to continued meetings, continued dialogues between the US and China, including on the military-to-military front? Thank you. Secretary Blinken: With regard to Iran, some of the reports that we have seen about an agreement on nuclear matters or for that matter on detainees are simply not accurate and not true. On the nuclear side of the equation, we are determined to ensure that Iran never acquires a nuclear weapon. We remain convinced that the best way to do that is through diplomacy. We have not taken any option off the table – you have heard that clearly from the President. But we continue to believe that diplomacy would be the most effective path forward but there is no agreement, and reports to the contrary, are simply inaccurate. When it comes to our detained citizens in Iran, nothing would please me more than to be able to say that we have an agreement that secures their release, but that too, would not be accurate. It is something we continue to work on, intensely on a regular basis. And that is separate and apart from the conversations we have on nuclear matters, but I am not in a position to say that we have an agreement. With regard to the visit - two things. One, yes, I will be raising the detainees. This has been an ongoing conversation with the PRC, and something that for me is always at the top of my list - that is, looking out for the security and wellbeing of Americans around the world, including those who are being detained in one way or another, including arbitrarily. More broadly, what we are working to do on this trip is to really carry forward what President Biden and President Xi agreed to in Bali at the end of last year, which was to establish sustained, regular lines of communication at senior levels across our governments, precisely so that we can make sure that we are communicating as clearly as possible to avoid as best possible misunderstandings and miscommunications. Because if we want to make sure, as we do, that the competition that we have with China does not veer into conflict, the place you start is with communicating. So, we will see what comes from this visit but this is directly in response to what the two Presidents agreed in Bali last November. As to what comes next, let us see how the visit goes. I think Vivian said it very well. This is an important, but insufficient step because there is a lot of work to be done. I note as well, that even as we are trying to make sure, through better communications, that the competition does not veer into conflict, we are also looking at areas where we might cooperate in the interests of the American people, in the interests of China and its people but also in the interests of people around the world. One of the clear demand signals that that we get, including from our close friends and partners, is that both the United States and the PRC will responsibly manage this relationship and look for areas where our cooperation might produce results that benefit not only our own people, but people around the world, including in the region, so we will be looking at that as well. Minister: Well, the only thing I can add there is perhaps a perspective from Southeast Asia. First, if you look a hundred years down the road, we see both China and the United States being a clear presence for the century and beyond. Second, we see the United States remaining a Pacific partner and power and stakeholder. We do not want you to go away. Secretary Blinken: And we are not. Minister: Third, if you look at the challenges confronting the world right now, and we have enumerated - climate, pandemics, cyber, opportunities in outer space - we will need, even as the world transits into a multipolar world, now more than ever, a rules-based multilateral system with institutions and processes fit for purpose and updated where necessary. This requires the United States and China to achieve a modus vivendi. So, this trip is important, it is essential, but it does not stop there. I think Tony knows the views for all of us in Southeast Asia. The more you travel and engage, the better. As I said, I am biased because he is a friend, and I can think of no better diplomat at this point in time. His cool, rational, emollient way to deal with some very fundamental differences, because China and the US are not going to converge and become one identical entity. The challenge for all of us, both mentally, emotionally, and diplomatically, is to hold sometimes contrarian thoughts in one mind. And this is the challenge of the century. Fifty years ago, when Henry Kissinger went to Beijing, it completely reordered the strategic furniture in the globe. We are coming close to a point when this will be necessary again. So, we all watch with interest and concern and some optimism, because we all have to be optimistic, otherwise you will not keep trying. So, let us support these efforts. And let us see where you will take it. Benji Hyer (Channel News Asia): We have heard Washington and Singapore's position on US-China relations. I wanted to ask your perspective on ties between Russia and China. How much is what they call the “friendship with no limits” between Moscow and Beijing a concern for the US Secretary of State and Foreign Minister for the Indo-Pacific and ASEAN? Secretary Blinken: You have heard us speak to this on a number of occasions in recent months, and it entirely depends on the practical manifestations of that partnership, with that friendship. I will let China and Russia address how they view their partnership. But we have been very clear, for example, about the importance of countries not providing Russia with the kind of assistance that it can use to advance its aggression in Ukraine. Equally, we have been open and welcoming of efforts and initiatives of countries including, for example, China, to try to play a positive role in diplomacy that can advance a just and durable peace in Ukraine. As it happens right now, there are, I think, representatives from six or seven African countries who are in Ukraine also trying to advance that proposition. I would note the terrible irony of the fact that while they were in Kyiv, more missiles from Russia rained down on the Ukrainian capital, but I will leave that to others to underscore that particular irony. But as with many countries, we want to ensure that no one is adding fuel to this fire Russia is making and if countries by the same token can play a positive, productive role, including China, in trying to find a path to a just and durable peace, that is something we welcome as well. Minister: Well, Singapore is a tiny city state. We have only been independent for almost 58 years. So, I hope you understand, from our perspective, the UN Charter, international law and the precepts of sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity are sacrosanct for us. We have no other alternative. And therefore, for us, this invasion is something which we have to take a stand on and we have. That is expressed in our votes at the General Assembly and in some specific sanctions that we have taken against Russia. It is something which we do not do routinely or lightly, but it is an expression of how strongly we feel on this matter. I cannot speak for China, but I would say that, at least in their interactions with us and in their public statements, China has affirmed the importance of territorial integrity, independence, and sovereignty. Like Tony, I hope that their efforts will bear fruit. You really have to pray for peace, because we know that at the end of the day, you will end up at the negotiating table. But right now, blood is being shed and lives are being lost for perhaps, marginal leverage on the negotiating table, and as humanitarians, all of us must feel the pain and the tragedy of this situation. I think we all want peace. When it will be achieved, I do not know, but we all want peace..."
Source/publisher: Ministry of Foreign Affairs Singapore
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-17
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Title: Burma: Human Rights in the Aftermath of the Coup
Description: "Announcement: Please join the Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission for a hearing on human rights in Burma in the aftermath of the February 2021 coup d’état. On February 1, 2021, in response to the November 2020 election in which Nobel Laureate Aung San Suu Kyi’s political party, the National League for Democracy, won a parliamentary majority, the Burmese military undertook a coup d’état, installed a junta and arrested Aung San Suu Kyi and other NLD leaders. Burma’s multiethnic population reacted with protests and general strikes that were violently suppressed, generating widespread political and armed resistance that has drawn on the decades-long fight for greater autonomy in ethnic regions. The military has repeatedly used lethal force against peaceful protestors, waged offensives, including with airstrikes, against ethnic minority militias, and allegedly committed a wide range of other human rights violations and infractions of international humanitarian law, including targeted killings, burning of villages, and sexual violence. According to the State Department, since the coup nearly 3,000 people have been killed, nearly 17,000 detained, and more than 1.5 million displaced. Steps taken by the United States, the UN, ASEAN and other international actors with the goal of restoring democracy in Burma, including imposing sanctions, have not succeeded to date. The junta has announced that it intends to hold nationwide elections at some point in 2023, but the State Department has said the elections “cannot be free and fair” under current conditions. Meanwhile, 900,000 forcibly displaced Rohingya, victims and survivors of crimes against humanity and genocide, remain in Bangladesh with no solution to their crisis on the horizon. Witnesses will review the human rights situation in Burma in the aftermath of the coup; discuss the response of the United States and the international community, including implementation of Executive Order 14014 and BURMA Act provisions as well as accountability initiatives; and offer recommendations for policymakers. This hearing will be open to Members of Congress, congressional staff, the interested public, and the media. The hearing will be livestreamed via the Commission website and will also be available for viewing on the House Digital Channel service. For any questions, please contact Kimberly Stanton (for Co-Chair McGovern) or Mark Milosch (for Co-Chair Smith)..."
Source/publisher: Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-16
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Title: “Why would they target us?”: Exploring patterns of the Burma Army's retaliatory abuses against villagers across Southeast Burma
Description: "Introduction Since the 2021 military coup, the Burma military junta, calling itself the State Administration Council (SAC), has carried out violent attacks against civilians throughout the country in an effort to crush all dissent and opposition to its rule. These attacks include assaults against villages and abuses against villagers in Southeast Burma. Since the coup, KHRG has received reports of increased human rights violations committed in Karen State, in particular where the Burma Army has targeted civilians instead of armed groups. While the United Nations’ Security Council has acknowledged the SAC’s targeting of civilians, little analysis has focused on the underlying logic that informs these attacks, particularly in ethnic states. Without an in-depth investigation into these patterns of abuse, the struggles of villagers and the conflict dynamics in Karen State cannot be fully understood. A careful investigation into these matters can also inform national, regional and international measures to protect civilians in Burma and to advance meaningful peace and justice in the country. For these reasons, this report provides an analysis of the Burma Army’s practices of deliberately targeting civilians in Karen State, looking specifically at how villagers in Southeast Burma understand and articulate human rights violations committed by the Burma Army. The report examines patterns of retaliatory abuses, as recounted by villagers, as well as other incidents of violence against villagers in the region documented by KHRG since the 2021 coup. The report clarifies the illegal and inhumane consequences of the SAC’s activities and identifies several factors underlying the SAC’s violence against civilians: the SAC targets villagers, considering them as “enemies”, averse to the regime due to their support of anti-coup protests or because of their perceived link with ethnic armed groups. SAC military also commits abuses against villagers to spread terror in the region and impose their rule, as well as to deter attacks by local armed forces against them. Under-supplied SAC soldiers also loot villagers’ properties. On numerous occasions, the targeting of nearby villages occurs after skirmishes between SAC and local resistance forces in the area. Lastly, villagers who refuse to comply with SAC orders are often targeted in overt retaliation. Military attacks against civilians are not accidental, nor are they the result of the Burma Army’s inability to distinguish civilian targets from military ones. Instead, these attacks are deeply rooted in an established practice of scapegoating in Southeast Burma, wherein villagers are blamed as a group for their perceived opposition to the military. Villagers are subjected to collective punishment, as the SAC launches punitive attacks against them for acts committed by other individuals considered to belong to the same group. By targeting civilians this way, the SAC violates international law, including by committing war crimes and crimes against humanity. Key Findings The military junta regularly targets civilians in Southeast Burma, in a deliberate manner, instead of directing their attacks to armed resistance groups, which has devastating and outspread consequences for local communities. These abuses take the form of air strikes and indiscriminate shelling towards villages, shooting villagers on sight and arbitrarily arresting them, and destroying and looting their properties, among others. Several distinct, yet often overlapping patterns can be identified in villagers’ testimonies explaining the mechanisms behind the SAC’s targeting of civilians. These patterns share a notion of scapegoating and collective punishment linked to the Burma military’s perception of villagers in Karen State as opponents and thereby prompting any retaliatory action against them, leading to grave abuses against civilians. Conventional understandings of the conflict in Southeast Burma fail to grasp key conflict dynamics on the ground. The reality is not a two-party conflict between the SAC troops and ethnic armed organisations (EAOs), with neutral civilians collaterally impacted. Rather, civilians are targeted intentionally and systematically by the military junta, thus showing its disregard for human life and its illegitimacy. The SAC attacks launched against civilians are in breach of international human rights, humanitarian and criminal law, particularly the interdiction of discrimination against any person on arbitrary grounds, as well as the prohibition of targeting civilians based on the principle of distinction between military and civilian targets. Military leaders must be prosecuted as such. Armed conflict is only one end of the spectrum of resistance against military control within society in Karen State, and villagers’ agency strategies are key to the civilian opposition against the military. Such efforts should be creatively supported, and conflict-sensitive understandings of the situation should be included in regional and international discourses and responses in Burma aiming for the protection of civilians and meaningful peace. Villagers’ voices and demands for decisive measures against and protection from SAC’s abuses are met with inaction by the international community, enabling the human rights and humanitarian crisis to worsen. Moreover, the lack of a meaningful response may push villagers towards taking up arms, and increase militarisation in the country. Recommendations To the international community, ASEAN, NGOs, funding agencies, and individual governments: Acknowledge that the military junta is the root cause of the current human rights and humanitarian crisis, and refrain from giving any legitimacy to the junta, including by signing agreements with them and presenting credentials to them. Call on ASEAN to suspend Burma’s ASEAN membership until a democratically-elected civilian government is restored; abandon the current Five-Point Consensus and develop a new plan that addresses the critiques outlined by numerous stakeholders; and cooperate with international and local actors to end the junta’s violence against the people of Burma. Support current investigations and proceedings to prosecute junta leaders, and seek out all additional opportunities (through ad hoc tribunals, universal jurisdiction and other mechanisms) to hold the Burma military accountable for its vast array of crimes. Broaden the scope of accountability in future proceedings to include SAC crimes committed against Karen peoples, not yet covered by current investigations, as well as to investigate the war crime of collective punishment and the crime against humanity of persecution. Increase financial support for and collaboration with local human rights organisations and actors operating on the ground to ensure that the widest representation of voices and experiences of oppressed peoples in Burma are considered. Acknowledging the SAC practice of purposely targeting civilians in Southeast Burma, ensure increased and adequate humanitarian assistance and protection, including support for victims of air strikes, displacement, property destruction, torture, arbitrary arrest, and other abuses. Ensure that the SAC is unable to hold decision-making power over the distribution of aid, and that funds are not indirectly being rerouted through the SAC. Consult and include local actors and communities in decision-making regarding humanitarian response and the resolution of the crisis, and prioritise and strengthen methods of service delivery and communication that rely on local CSO/CBOs and ethnic service providers. Urge neighbouring countries to ensure that their authorities do not deny entry to people crossing the border seeking refuge, as well as to allow the passage of aid into Burma through cross-border aid organisations and local CSOs already operating in the area. Suspend exports of aviation fuel and all arms transfers to Burma, including weapons, munitions, surveillance technologies, and other military and security equipment, and take action to avoid contributing to these supply chains, whether directly or indirectly. Support coordinated and targeted sanctions against junta officials suspected of responsibility for international crimes and other serious violations of international law, as well as against their affiliated companies..."
Source/publisher: Karen Human Rights Group
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-16
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Title: Counting Myanmar’s Dead: Reported Civilian Casualties since the 2021 Military Coup
Description: "Executive Summary This study finds that at least 6,337 civilians were reported as killed and 2,614 as wounded for political reasons in Myanmar in the twenty months between the military coup of February 1, 2021, and September 30, 2022. This is a larger number than is normally cited in the media, and yet it is only an estimate, based on reported killings gathered from reliable media reports. The actual total is surely higher since many killings have likely gone unreported. Our research indicates that even establishing an accurate total for just the reported civilian killings from any single available dataset is essentially impossible, due to selection bias with respect to sources. This is true of the Township-based Conflict Monitoring System (TCMS) dataset, which is maintained by the Myanmar Institute for Peace and Security (MIPS) and provides the main basis for this study. We have thus combined several datasets to arrive at an approximate total figure. This report defines civilians as individuals who are neither combatants nor members of armed organizations, and who do not take part directly in hostile actions. The report does not join the debate over what kinds of violence constitute a violation of international humanitarian law. Our study aims to demonstrate that the total reported number of conflict-driven civilian fatalities is higher than the figures cited in reports compiled by various international actors, including the United Nations. The study briefly discusses the reported killings of individuals alleged to have been members of a Pyu Saw Htee or militia force associated with the Myanmar military. Since we have been unable to ascertain the veracity of these allegations, we have taken them at face value and have not counted these particular individuals as civilians. The escalation of violence against civilians in Myanmar began shortly after the February 2021 coup, when the new military regime suppressed non-violent protests by means of brutal crackdowns, arrests, torture, and killings. The Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP) identified 884 protest-related killings by the security forces. After the initial phase of repression of the anti-junta protest, political violence continued at a lower level, which then escalated and reached a monthly peak of 492 registered killings in December 2021. The repression of the non-violent protests led to the formation of local resistance groups, such as Local Defense Forces (LDF) and People’s Defense Forces (PDFs), which acquired arms and training from Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs). These groups launched attacks against military units, police targets, and civil servants who allegedly supported the arrest of protesters by actively supporting the military. The media reports also showed that resistance groups themselves killed some civil servants who did not join the Civil Disobedience Movement. The military responded with raids against villages suspected of harboring PDFs. The retaliatory violence triggered a wave of politically motivated murders by both sides, with the military targeting suspected PDF fighters and supporters, and the PDFs targeting alleged informers and collaborators. The military then responded by arming local militias. Given this dynamic, political violence is likely to escalate further, and perhaps reach catastrophic proportions. The epicenter of the escalated violence has been the Sagaing and Magway regions, which are mainly populated by Myanmar’s ethnic Burman majority population, and which had not experienced armed struggle in decades prior to the coup. This study finds that politically motivated murders, and not collateral killings in connection with armed clashes, constituted the dominant form of violence against civilians in both urban and rural areas in the 20-month period after the coup. This was especially true in regions populated by the ethnic Burman majority and in the two major cities of Yangon and Mandalay. Sixty-seven percent of the reported civilian fatalities were politically motivated murders. The four regions—Sagaing, Magway, Mandalay, and Yangon—have seen the highest number of civilian deaths due both to the repression in the first six months after the coup and to politically motivated murders in the subsequent months. In contrast to the aftermath of the 1988 military crackdown against the protestors in Yangon and other places, when the main fighting took place in ethnic minority areas, in the period from 2021–2022, the Burman majority population suffered the most from political violence. A key purpose of this study is to demonstrate that ample multimedia evidence is available to systematically track the number of civilian killings in Myanmar. Much evidence may be found in the social media, where perpetrators often post images, videos, and accounts of their actions. Additionally, traditional media and local news sources have reported a great number of killings, often with a high degree of accuracy. These reports, compiled by local journalists, are available on Facebook, Telegram, and other social media platforms. While we emphasize that the Myanmar military holds sole responsibility for instigating the trend of violence when it repressed the non-violent protests, our study calls for more research both to understand the large number of politically motivated murders of civilians that occurred afterward and to identify the perpetrators. The study calculates that the Myanmar military (Tatmadaw), police, and affiliated militia were responsible for 3,003 reported civilian deaths (including protestors), between February 1, 2021, and September 30, 2022. In the same 20-month period, anti-coup resistance groups or EAOs killed 2,152 civilians, and unspecified perpetrators killed at least 1,170 civilians. Our study also shows that determining the category to which some of the unspecified perpetrators belong is possible by identifying their victims. (For categories of perpetrators, see Table 8 below.) One objective of this study is to lay a groundwork for investigating each and every incident. The military regime plans to hold a sham election in August 2023, which the opposition has vowed to disrupt. Even though the election is likely to be delayed, the risk of election-related violence remains high. There have been media reports of election-related violence and explicit threats against the political parties that decided to register their parties with the Union Election Commission (UEC) and civil servants working on behalf of the UEC. The scale, trend, and acceptance of violence against civilians by supporters of both the military regime and the resistance groups are worrying. There is potential for politicide, with large-scale retaliatory killings should the violence escalate. On the basis of our research, we would like to suggest that the United Nations (UN) create a system to observe and document the murder of civilians in Myanmar, in accordance with Security Council Resolution 2669. This resolution demands the cessation of all violence and encourages restraint and the reduction of tensions. The proposed system should maintain a current tally of civilian deaths, modelled on the one that the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) uses to track civilian deaths in Ukraine. Furthermore, our study urges all participants in the conflict to begin a conversation about safeguarding civilians and halting the continuous killing of civilians in conflict zones and major cities..."
Source/publisher: Peace Research Institute Oslo
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-13
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Title: New report documents over 6,000 civilians killed in 20 months since Myanmar coup – significantly higher than previously reported
Description: "A report released today by the Peace Research Institute Oslo finds that at least 6,000 civilians were killed in the first 20 months following Myanmar’s military coup in 2021. This is significantly higher than reported by international bodies, including the United Nations. “Our data shows that the human toll of the conflict is higher than previously reported, and while the junta is clearly the main killer, anti-junta forces also have large amounts of blood on their hands,” said Stein Tønnesson, Research Professor at the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) and the co-author of the study. The report, ‘Counting Myanmar’s Dead - Reported Civilian Casualties since the 2021 Military Coup,’ uses the Township-based Conflict Monitoring System maintained by Myanmar Institute for Peace and Security, and two other datasets as the main sources for compiling figures. It found that the Myanmar military, police and affiliated militia were responsible for over 3,000 reported civilian deaths between 1 February 2021 and 30 September 2022. In the same 20-month period, anti-coup resistance groups killed over 2,000 civilians, and unspecified perpetrators killed at least 1,000 civilians. The actual totals are no doubt higher since many killings have likely gone unreported. In addition, the study found that politically motivated murders, and not collateral killings in connection with armed clashes, constituted the main form of violence against civilians in both urban and rural areas in the 20-month period after the coup. This was especially true in regions populated by the ethnic Burman majority, including the two major cities of Yangon and Mandalay. At least 67 percent of reported civilian fatalities were politically motivated murders. Four regions – Sagaing, Magway, Mandalay and Yangon – have seen the highest number of civilian deaths due both to the repression in the first six months after the coup and to targeted political murders in subsequent months. The military regime plans to hold a general election in the second half of 2023, where the National League for Democracy, which won the elections by a landslide in 2015 and 2020, and other important opposition parties will not be able to partake. The risk of election-related violence is high. There have already been reports of conflict incidents, and of threats against civil servants working on behalf of the regime’s election. “Civilians in Myanmar are bracing themselves for a steep escalation in violence. There is huge potential for politicide, with large-scale retaliatory killings, if the civil war escalates to a next level. This report should set off alarm bells to world bodies like the UN and ASEAN,” warned Dr. Min Zaw Oo, a Global Fellow at PRIO and director of the Myanmar Institute of Peace and Security, the lead author of the report. The study recommends that the UN improve its system to observe and document the murder of civilians in Myanmar, in accordance with Security Council Resolution 2669, regardless of the perpetrators’ political affiliation. This resolution demands the cessation of all violence and encourages restraint and the reduction of tensions. The report also urges all sides to the conflict to begin a dialogue on protecting civilians. For more information or to arrange an interview: Contact Michelle Delaney, Communication Director at the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) | [email protected] | mobile 0047 941 65 579. Click here to download the whole report, ‘Counting Myanmar’s dead - Reported Civilian Casualties since the 2021 Military Coup.’ Click here to access the Township-based Conflict Monitoring System and two other datasets used for the report..."
Source/publisher: Norwegian Refugee Council via Reliefweb (New York)
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-13
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Title: Public interest infrastructure: Digital alternatives in our data-driven world and journalism's role getting there
Description: "This report examines why digital infrastructures are crucial to the work and survival of independent media, particularly in Majority World countries, and why the current infrastructures are a serious threat to press freedom, access to information and democracy. It also presents inspiration, examples and recommendations to what a broad range of factors can do to create alternative public interest infrastructure and explains why media is a crucial actor to include in these processes. First, a timeline introduces the key shifts in media and information distribution throughout time. The first chapter, Digital infrastructure that serves the public interest, outlines basic elements of what public interest infrastructure is and why the scale of our current problems in the digital space forces us to focus more on locally anchored alternatives. It is based on a range of interviews and public events over the past year and a half with leading journalists and tech experts, including IMS partners, from around the world. Moving closer to the local context, Online risks and social resilience in Myanmar analyses the advantages and dangers of current digital infrastructures in Myanmar, particularly regarding social media and messaging tools. The analysis looks into how digital platforms have increased trust levels and direct communication, but also concludes that the price of these developments has been very high, and that the services posed a threat to the public’s safety after the military coup on 1 February 2021. Building on leading academic research, Who controls the internet in Myanmar presents a mapping and analysis of the ownership and control of Myanmar’s digital infrastructure, from cell towers and undersea cables to apps, and its consequences for local media and the public. The researchers conclude that the military is in a prime position to turn the country into a digital dictatorship. The last chapter, How to get there: reimagine, build and scale in the public interest, analyses and proposes what steps independent media, the media development community, global and local communities, governments and donors can take towards creating digital infrastructures that better serve the public interest locally and globally, while introducing solutions that excites us – like local, slow-moving social media platforms and a tool to measure the public interest value of an organisation’s current and future tech procurements. Finally, the report rounds off with a list of recommendations to catalyse the ambitious work towards the vision of public interest infrastructure. These reflect that we need to join, form and support coalitions with diverse skills and a shared vision at local, regional and global levels..."
Source/publisher: International Media Support (Denmark)
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-12
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Title: “News is life and death to us”: Understanding media audiences in post-coup Myanmar
Description: "This report provides insights into the media habits of the population of Myanmar following the 2021-military coup as well as people’s news concepts, trust levels and media literacy levels. This publication presents the findings from an audience study carried out by IMS and Nyan Corridor in June-August 2022. Due to difficulties with data collection in the current situation, the conclusions of the study apply mainly to the subset of the population that can be said to be in opposition of the military coup. The study found that the 2021 military coup has significantly altered the media environment of the country, causing audiences to change their habits and understandings of both media and news. The military’s crackdown on independent media has made it far more difficult for people to access independent news and information and many struggle to navigate in the polarised society that is also reflected in the media landscape. The conflict is on everyone’s mind and people actively seek out information to stay updated and make informed decisions for themselves and their families. Mainstream media outlets such as Mizzima and DVB are seen as trusted sources of information where content is produced based on ethical principles, but they are unfortunately not always able of providing needed information from a hyperlocal level. In these cases, audiences rely on local media or online community media (eg. Facebook groups for specific local areas) for information. There is no doubt that social media plays a vital role in Myanmar. Compared to the findings from an audience research study IMS conducted in 2018, where television was the preferred medium for news and information, most Burmese today rely on social media. Facebook is by far the most used platform, but people are beginning to be more vary as to how they use Facebook and leave traces of their whereabouts and political opinions. People may fear that liking, commenting or sharing news from non-military media can have consequences for their safety and security. People are in general far more conscious about their media usage and digital habits and take extra measures to protect themselves and their online identity. For instance, by using VPN servers when accessing social media and news sites or leaving their smart phones at home when leaving the house to avoid it being scrutinized by authorities. Media literacy levels also appear to have been elevated with people checking sources and fact-checking information they encounter online. This is a positive development in a country that until recently saw very low levels of media literacy and understanding of dis/misinformation on social media. Based on the findings, the report ends with 11 recommendations directed towards both the Myanmar media and the organisations and institutions that supports the media. IMS hopes that these recommendations can serve as inspiration for the continuous support to sustain independent media in a post-coup Myanmar and ensure that the population continue to have access to relevant and reliable news and information..."
Source/publisher: International Media Support (Denmark)
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-12
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Title: Six Villagers Killed in Three Days
Description: "Dear friends, We are very sad to share this news with you. The Burma Army troops in Moebya, Shan State, have killed at least six civilians over the last three days. The first three, shot to death on 6 June, were men. One of them was shot to death at 1000 on 6 June; another was hit by a 60 mm mortar (photos below) at 1630 as he was gardening. Then, while we were there trying to comfort the family of the man killed by the mortar, another civilian was shot dead by the Burma Army, on the far western side of town. The Burma military has three positions around the town, and most people have fled. However, some have tried to stay so that they can finish their harvest. The following day, on 7 June, the Burma military patrolled into the village and captured 12 villagers and yesterday, on 8 June, three of them were shot dead. They were all in the same family, two women, Maw Maw Oo, 31 years old, and Thein Gi Oo, 29 years old. With them was their father, Aye Win Oo, 57 years old. All three were shot in the head and their bodies dumped on the street. When the bodies were recovered, the two women showed signs of torture and rape. We just finished burying them today. As we were comforting the family, we heard from other villagers that three more villagers had been executed, but we haven’t found the bodies yet. These six villagers, trying to stay out of the war yet murdered anyway, are some of the over two thousand who have been killed by the Burma Army since the coup of 1 February 2021. Here in southern Shan State, there have been almost daily airstrikes, heavy mortar barrages, and shooting by Burma Army troops. In Burma, there are over three million people internally displaced now and everyone’s living in fear. There is no safe place. Please pray with us for the families and for change in Burma and for countries of goodwill to join in and help..."
Source/publisher: Free Burma Rangers
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-10
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Title: Burmanisation and Buddhisation: Accelerating the Decline of Religious Rights in Myanmar
Description: "Executive Summary: Burmanisation and Buddhisation: Accelerating the Deterioration of Religious Rights in Myanmar outlines how the 2021 military coup in Myanmar has accelerated the deterioration of rights, especially of religious minorities in the country. Article 34 of the Myanmar constitution enshrines the right to freedom of religion or belief (FoRB) to ensure that religious freedom is respected for all citizens, regardless of their ethnic and religious background. However, the constitution also contains provisions that prioritise Buddhism, the dominant religion in Myanmar, over other religions. Additionally, Myanmar’s military has backtracked on the initial engagement by the earlier democratically-elected government in the mid-2010s to sign and ratify international human rights covenants like the ICCPR and ICERD. This further hinders the sustainability of freedom of religion or belief in the country, given its past and present limited or non-observance to international human rights standards. Successive governments, both military and non-military, since colonial independence, have prioritised and promoted Bamar culture and Buddhism, known as Burmanisation and Buddhisation. However, this has severely limited the religious rights of non-Buddhist and non-Bamar individuals and communities. Following the 2021 coup, Myanmar’s State Administration Council has intensified pressure on the rights of ethnic and religious minority groups, through aggressive Burmanisation and Buddhisation policies. These policies are pursued through the following three measures: 1) using pre-coup legislation that is oppressive in nature and undermines the rights of ethno-religious minorities, 2) ignoring existing constitutional provisions that ensure the protection of freedom of religion or belief; and 3), refusing to implement the recommendations made via UN human rights mechanisms by member states. As a result, the military has not only stalled the democratisation process but regressed the country into an accelerated deterioration of human rights, including religious rights. This report presents evidence of four main ways in which religious rights are being deteriorated in Myanmar: 1) targeting of pro-federalism ethno-religious communities; 2) damage, destruction and occupation of religious sites; 3) arbitrary detentions and killings of ethno-religious minorities; 4) persecution of Muslim Rohingya. Although these impacts are primarily felt by members of ethno-religious minorities, Bamar people and Buddhists have also been affected, especially if they support or are suspected of supporting those resisting the junta. Given the rapidly deteriorating state of rights, especially that of religious minorities and the ongoing conflict that exists between the pro-democracy and pro-military groups, this report recommends the following multi-stakeholder actions: the international community should use its mechanisms to monitor, engage, and denounce FoRB violations and explore diplomatic ways to engage with Myanmar’s leaders to review discriminatory laws and stop the violence. INGOs should collaborate with local groups by receiving first-hand accounts of rights violations for international dissemination and provide technical and financial support to them. Local civil society organisations should safely monitor and raise awareness among the population of their religious rights. Collectively, these efforts can help improve the state of religious rights in Myanmar, particularly for members of minority groups, ensuring that they can practise their chosen religion without being targeted or harassed..."
Source/publisher: Asia Centre
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-09
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Title: KNDF’s Message On 2nd Anniversary Of Establishment – Issue 107
Description: "The military press release on the 2nd anniversary of the establishment of the Karenni Nationalities Defense Force (KNDF) said that the administrative mechanism of the military council in Karenni State (Kayah) is now only in Loikaw. Founded on 31 May, 2021, the KNDF has formed 22 battalions and six military strategies. Our BNI-Myanmar Peace Monitor’s weekly news review for this week highlights the 2nd anniversary of the establishment of the KNDF and military and political shifts in Karenni (Kayah) State.....၂ နှစ်ပြည့် KNDF ၏ ကရင်နီဒေသဆိုင်ရာ သတင်းစကား ကရင်နီပြည် (ကယား) အတွင်း အာဏာသိမ်းစစ်ကောင်စီ၏ အုပ်ချုပ်ရေးယန္တရားသည် လွိုင်ကော်မြို့ တစ်မြို့တည်းတွင်သာ ရှိတော့သည်ဟု ကရင်နီအမျိုးသားများကာကွယ်ရေးတပ် (KNDF) ဖွဲ့စည်းထူထောင်ခြင်း ၂ နှစ်ပြည့် စစ်ရေးသတင်းထုတ်ပြန်ချက်က ဆိုပါသည်။ ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ် မေလ ၃၁ ရက်တွင် ဖွဲ့စည်းခဲ့သည့် KNDF သည် ယခုအခါ စစ်ဗျူဟာ (၆) ဗျူဟာဖြင့် တပ်ရင်းပေါင်း ၂၂ ရင်းကို အခိုင်အမာ ဖွဲ့စည်းထားနိုင်ပြီဟုလည်း ဆိုပါသည်။ ယခုတစ်ပတ် BNI-Myanmar Peace Monitor ၏ အပတ်စဉ်သတင်းသုံးသပ်ချက်တွင် KNDF တည်ထောင်ခြင်း ၂ နှစ်ပြည့်နှင့်အတူ ကရင်နီပြည် (ကယား) ဒေသတွင်း စစ်ရေး၊ နိုင်ငံရေးအရွေ့များကို လေ့လာတင်ပြထားပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher: Myanmar Peace Monitor
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-09
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Title: Deadly Encounters: Killings of civilians by armed actors in Southeast Burma (October 2022 - April 2023) Share This:
Description: "1. Introduction “If they shoot anyone they see [on sight] like this, all villagers will be gone.” Testimony of Saw N---, a 51-year-old villager from O--- village, Kaw Nweh village tract, Kaw T’Ree Township, Dooplaya District.[1] Since the 2021 coup[2], the human rights and security situation in locally-defined Karen State[3] has worsened, with reports of violations committed by the State Administration Council (SAC)[4] increasing in the region, including air strikes, indiscriminate shelling, burning of civilian properties, arbitrary arrests, torture and deprivation of humanitarian aid. Killing cases are also regularly reported to KHRG across all seven districts in its operation area, with at least 45 cases of killings reported between January 2022 and April 2023. Of these, 22 took place in the past few months, between October 2022 and April 2023. The actual number of killing incidents is likely much higher than this. This briefing paper took as its subject of analysis 14 cases of killings of civilians by armed groups across Karen State, committed between October 2022 and April 2023, underlining their deep impact on the communities regarding villagers' safety and livelihood. Of the cases analysed for this briefing paper, 11 incidents were perpetrated by the SAC and its allied forces, and three were committed by local resistance armed groups. This paper provides a contextual and historical overview of the unsafe situation in Southeast Burma. It then shows evidence and patterns of killing incidents faced by villagers, in particular when encountering soldiers while travelling. It concludes with a security and legal analysis of the situation in the region, and ends with a set of policy recommendations for stakeholders. 2. Contextual overview: Decades of abuses, renewed since 2021 The 2021 coup, staged by the State Administration Council (SAC), provoked a storm of pro-democracy protests throughout the country in opposition to the regime, known locally as the Spring Revolution, and escalated the civil war between the military and local ethnic armed organisations throughout Burma. Early peaceful pro-democracy protests and the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM)[5] began in the cities, especially in Yangon, with the goal to restore the civilian government. The military responded violently to the peaceful protests: at least 3,520 civilians who joined the pro-democracy movement have been killed by the military junta since the coup, with the exact number likely to be much higher, according to Assistance Association of Political Prisoners (AAPP).[6] Many people supporting anti-coup efforts in Burma, especially CDM and National League for Democracy (NLD)[7] members, have fled to territories under the control of ethnic armed groups like Karen State,[8] after the Karen National Union (KNU)[9] released, in the early days after the coup, their position rejecting the military junta and providing help and protection for all civilians who sought safety.[10] Human rights violations in Southeast Burma, however, did not start with the 2021 coup. They are closely linked with military policies adopted by the Burma Army as early as the 1960s, and with the impunity enjoyed by their military leaders for past violations. One of those policies, the “four cuts” strategy, aimed to target civilians and sever alleged ties between ethnic armed groups and local communities, by cutting off their access to food, funds, intelligence, and recruits. Shoot-on-sight policies were also adopted by the military in ethnic states. Such policies led to countless human rights violations over the past 70 years, causing widespread fear among the civilian population. In 1994, Naw P---, a 27-year-old female villager from Hpa-an District, told KHRG: “Now I’m still afraid. I never want to see SLORC[11] [Burma Army] soldiers again. If I hear of them, I'll run away. If we don't run, they shoot us, and if we run, they also shoot at us. The soldiers said: ‘Don't run away’ but then they shot at us, so we must run to escape.”[12] In such an atmosphere of terror and hostility, where any contact with Burma Army soldiers was potentially fatal, civilians lived in constant fear for their lives. 30 years later, and in particular after the coup, soldiers continue to shoot at villagers following the same patterns as in the past, leading to a resurgence of killing cases. 3. Factual summary: Deliberate killings of civilians This chapter presents incidents of killings of civilians by the SAC from October 2022 to April 2023, documented by KHRG in its operational area. Three patterns can be identified in the incidents: KHRG data shows that Burma Army soldiers killed villagers by (1) shooting them on sight; (2) chasing the villagers that were fleeing these encounters and murdering them; or by (3) halting civilians they encountered, before arresting, torturing and killing them. Local resistance armed groups have also committed killings of civilians, reportedly. A. “Shoot on sight” policy Since the 2021 coup, villagers in Southeast Burma risk being targeted by SAC soldiers whenever they move. Out of the 14 incidents documented between October 2022 and April 2023 analysed for this report, six incidents involved male villagers who were shot on sight, and killed, as they were on their way to support their families’ livelihood. One incident of shooting-on-sight took place in Doo Tha Htoo District, one in Taw Oo District, one in Kler Lwee Htoo District, one in Mu Traw District, and two incidents took place in Dooplaya District. For instance, on March 24th 2023, during a patrolling mission, ten SAC Infantry Battalion (IB)[13] #8 soldiers from Bilin Town, led by Lance Sergeant Moe Zaw, kept guard for their troop’s security beside a road in Q--- village, Daw Ya village tract, Tha Htoo Township, Doo Tha Htoo District. At about 11:30 am, two villagers, aged 18, were travelling by foot to work on construction in the village, when they encountered the SAC troops patrolling. When the SAC soldiers from IB #8 saw the villagers, they shot and killed both of them on the road.[14] On December 31st 2022, at around 7 am, the Northern Thandaung Aye Chan Yay Armed Group[15] attacked the SAC Light Infantry Battalion (LIB)[16] #413 at Hton Bo Gyi army camp, located near A--- village, Baw Saw Law area, Daw Hpa Hkoh Township, Taw Oo District. An hour after the fighting, at around 8:30 am, Saw Aung Thu Ya Than, a local villager from Leik Tho Town, unaware of the clash, was travelling to Toungoo Town with his motorbike to buy food for his family to celebrate New Year's Day [under the Gregorian calendar]. Before he crossed an SAC checkpoint, the SAC soldiers posted there hid nearby. As witnessed by local villagers, when the villager had already passed the checkpoint, the SAC soldiers fatally shot him in the back. The victim’s family did not receive any compensation for this arbitrary killing. Instead, the SAC forced them to pay a fee to retrieve the villager’s body and his motorbike.[17] In Dooplaya District, one incident took place on April 3rd 2023, at 10:00 am, when SAC soldiers temporarily based in the monastery in Cb--- village, Aww Hpa Kyi village tract, Kaw T’Ree Township, shot and killed a villager beside the monastery, as he was on his way to Kawkareik Town.[18] Another incident took place on April 24th 2023, at 11:00 pm, on Kyainseikyi Town Road, Kyainseikyi Township, when the SAC IB #32 shot and killed a 28-year-old Muslim villager named K---. The villager was living in the Noh Poe refugee camp, located in Thailand’s Tak province, but had left the camp at 8:00 pm to go to Kyainseikyi Town for a visit.[19] On the morning of October 22nd 2022, after a fight broke out with the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA)[20] at R--- place, S--- village, T’Hkaw Pwa village tract, Moo Township, Kler Lwee Htoo District, a woman was shot and killed by an SAC battalion [unknown number]. The villager had been sick and was unable to flee fast enough, so the soldiers reached her. After killing her, the SAC soldiers also looted her money and jewellery.[21] In Mu Traw District, on February 7th 2023, at 4:30 pm, SAC soldiers from IB #349, based at Hpah Ghaw Loh army camp, Saw Muh Plaw village tract, Lu Thaw Township, shot at Saw W--- and Saw H---, from Y--- village, Saw Muh Plaw village tract. The two villagers were on their way back home after hunting in the forest at A--- [place] to feed their families. Two bullets hit 28-year-old Saw W--- and penetrated his head, killing him on the spot. Saw H--- fled the shooting by crawling silently among the bushes, before running away. He was fired at by the SAC soldiers again, but was able to escape. Villagers went to the incident place the next day and brought back Saw W---’s corpse to their hiding site in E--- area. Saw H--- recalled: “When I heard the sound of gunfire, he [the victim] fell down next to me. He laid on my chest and [was] bleeding. I looked at him, he was not breathing. I crawled among the dense bushes and the SAC soldiers chased me from behind. I could not run as the bushes were so dense. I got [out] from the bushes slowly […]. Then, the SAC soldiers stopped firing. Then, the SAC soldiers fired a few more [rounds]. After that, I went down to the stream and went up to the mountain.”[22] The cases mentioned above show the SAC's practice of shooting villagers on sight. Since the coup, the SAC is by default hostile to anyone they encounter travelling in Southeast Burma, and hence villagers face serious risks to their lives. When villagers face SAC soldiers on the road, fleeing and running away often appears to be their only option, even though SAC soldiers do not hesitate to shoot fugitives. B. Shooting of fugitives As illustrated above, SAC soldiers often kill villagers whenever they see them. Many villagers, therefore, choose to flee as fast as they can whenever they see the SAC, fearing arrest, detention, torture, disappearance and killing. Although posing a risk to their lives, this strategy sometimes allows villagers to escape. For this reason, many villagers reported that they flee when they see SAC soldiers. For instance, on January 13th 2023, the SAC based in Wa Ma village marched to Wah Ma Hkee village, Wah Ma village tract, Noh T’Kaw Township, Dooplaya District. The soldiers broke villagers’ doors, entered their houses, searched their properties and looted the villagers’ chickens. On the same day, fighting broke out between the SAC and the KNLA in T--- village, Wah Ma village tract. After the fighting, two villagers encountered the SAC, who ordered them to stop on the road. As the villagers did not stop, the SAC shot and arrested them. Villagers assumed that the two villagers were tortured and killed.[23] In another case, on March 12th 2023, the SAC Light Infantry Division (LID)[24] #77, IB #598 and #589 combined forces marched to four village tracts in Hsaw Htee Township, Kler Lwee Htoo District, in the KNU-controlled territory. On March 13th 2023, at around 10 am, the SAC troops entered Bb--- village, where they encountered three local villagers driving on a motorbike on the road. The villagers were coming from an internally displaced persons (IDPs) site to check their homes and to get some food for the KNLA. When they saw the SAC, the villagers stopped the motorbike immediately and ran, while the SAC soldiers shot at them. One of the villagers, Saw V---, was hit and the other two escaped. According to the two survivors, Saw V--- did not die on the spot when hit, as they heard him cry for help. However, the two villagers were too afraid to return and help him due to the SAC troops’ presence. The SAC troops camped in Bb--- village for two days. On March 15th 2023, villagers retrieved the corpse of Saw V---, and saw wounds on his back and injuries in his head and brain. His clothes had also been changed to a KNLA soldier uniform that was too small for him. The local authorities and villagers assumed that after he got wounded on his back, the SAC shot and killed him, and then changed his clothes. Due to this incident, Saw V---’s family members and other Bb--- villagers had to flee outside of the village. A local villager explained to KHRG that, the “SAC did it [change clothes to a KNLA uniform] in order to claim that this villager was a KNLA soldier, and they could get credit for killing one KNLA soldier and report it to their upper leader. The SAC did it to claim he [Saw V---] is [a soldier] from the KNLA, and not a villager.” [25] In Mergui-Tavoy District, on October 17th 2022, a 40-year-old villager named U X---, from Z--- village, Ler K’ Saw Township, was shot and killed by the SAC as he was travelling with his son to buy a generator in Bokepyin Town, to support his family’s livelihood. The SAC soldiers who guarded the road ordered them to stop, but they were scared of the SAC, so they ran away. The SAC soldiers then shot at them. His son survived, but since he got hit in his back and elbow, he had to get medical treatment. All these incidents show the constant feeling of fear prevalent among villagers in Karen State, caused by increased and indiscriminate SAC attacks. Any encounter with SAC soldiers can be fatal, so villagers run away when they meet SAC soldiers on the road. High militarisation and harmful military policies abovementioned, such as the four cuts, might encourage SAC soldiers to open fire on fleeing villagers, with no regard for human life. Many times, villagers are just shot on sight by SAC for no apparent reason. C. Torture and killing after arrest The villagers know from decades of experience that meeting with the SAC often leads to arrests, torture, detention, and death. For instance, on October 15th 2022, fighting broke out between about 200 SAC soldiers and KNLA Battalion #3, Company #1, as the SAC entered Pyin Ka Do Kon village tract, Kyeh Htoh Township, Doo Tha Htoo District. On October 21st, a combination of several SAC troops of about 100 soldiers entered I--- village, Pyin Ka Do Kon village tract and looted villagers’ properties, and burned nine villagers’ houses, including U J---’s house. Before the SAC troops arrived, all I--- villagers fled, but U J--- decided to return to the village to look after his house and other properties, after taking his children to a safe place. He encountered these SAC troops just before he arrived in his village. The SAC arrested him, tortured him and then killed him next to his house. After the SAC left I--- village, the village head returned to the village through the forest to look for U J---. The village head saw the corpse of U J--- near his house. His head had been blown apart, which villagers assumed was done by a gunshot.[26] In Taw Oo District, two villagers from L--- village, Per Htee area, Htaw Ta Htoo Township, were going to look for turmeric in another village on April 7th 2023. The two villagers encountered SAC LID #22 soldiers on the way, who arrested them for unknown reasons. When local villagers learned that the two villagers had disappeared, they searched for them and found their corpses on April 16th 2023. Villagers reported that the two victims were not wearing military uniforms when they left the village, but when they saw their corpses, one of them was in a soldier uniform, and their hands were tied behind their backs with nylon. [27] D. Killings by local armed resistance group The 2021 coup resulted in increased militarisation in Southeast Burma, including the appearance of new armed groups, which has created a more unsafe environment for villagers. Villagers do not only have to be constantly afraid of being killed by SAC troops, but also of being killed by local armed groups that operate in the communities if suspected of being spies. For instance, on February 2nd 2023, the local People Defence Force (PDF)[28] troops came to M--- village, M’No Ro area, Ler K’Hsaw Township, Mergui-Tavoy District and arrested three villagers including the M--- village administrator, and took the three villagers with them, accusing them of being SAC spies. They released the two villagers, but not the village administrator. The M--- village administrator was U F---, a 70-year-old elder. The PDF troops killed him while detained. Villagers found his corpse on the morning of February 5th 2023.[29] Although less common than SAC attacks, killings of civilians by local armed groups constitute human rights violations, are illegal under the law of armed conflict, and worsen the security context of villagers in Karen State. 4. Analysis: Impacts on villagers’ lives and violations of international law and standards In a context where villagers are facing violent attacks from SAC soldiers, every encounter with them could be fatal. Killings in Southeast Burma usually follow a pattern: during or following military activities, the SAC soldiers come across villagers in nearby areas and kill them. For this reason, villagers try to avoid meeting with SAC soldiers but, in many instances, villagers cannot avoid these encounters because they are caught by surprise by the arrival of the soldiers near their village, or because they meet them on the road. The SAC then arrests, detains, tortures, disappears and kills villagers. If villagers flee to avoid such deadly encounters, they are usually shot at. This Burma Army practice of attacking civilians in Karen State is not something new. As explained above, it is linked to harmful ideologies prevailing through the Burma Army, picturing villagers as potential enemies due, in part, to perceived links or alignment with resistance groups. These ideologies fuel the Burma Army’s "four cuts" strategy and shoot-on-sight policies, still enforced in Karen State today. Decades of such human rights violations have generated widespread terror and traumatised communities. This context of fear, increased militarisation, and constant suspicion generates tension in the region, also tied to cases of local armed resistance groups killing civilians suspected to be SAC informants. The SAC practice of killing civilians on sight impacts villagers’ security and lives. Cultivating and working in a field, travelling to town to buy items, or any other ordinary activities of villagers’ daily lives becomes a dangerous exercise; any road can become a trap, and even remaining in their village can be deadly. This creates a deep fear for villagers in Southeast Burma, specifically towards the SAC. This fear makes it harder for them to go and work on their farmlands to secure their livelihood, particularly while the SAC is present in the area, or after a member of the community has been killed. If villagers are not able to work on their farmlands, go to the market to sell and buy essential products, or commute to their place of work and earn money, their livelihoods are also threatened. The SAC often targets male villagers: of all incidents analysed for this report, all but one of the killings reported to KHRG concerned male villagers. Therefore, the families of victims are also deeply impacted by fear and livelihood insecurity after the death of the main breadwinner. Faced with these human rights violations, villagers utilise avoidance strategies, which have been used for decades in Southeast Burma. The SAC is continually arresting, torturing and killing civilians in rural communities, so villagers evade these abuses by fleeing right after they receive information about SAC presence in or near their communities, and by running for their lives when they see SAC troops on the way. As mentioned above, they do so at great risk to their lives. The killings of civilians violate international law. The ‘right to life’ is one of the most fundamental of all human rights, found in the third article of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), and essential to accomplish ‘human dignity’, set out in the very first article of the Declaration. All authorities have a duty to respect it, protect it, and fulfil it. Life is not protected only in times of peace, but also in times of war, since murder is prohibited according to the 89th rule of customary International Humanitarian Law (IHL). The targeting of civilians is also forbidden by the very first customary rule of IHL, while acts of violence made to terrorise the civilian population are prohibited by its second rule. The SAC is moreover trying to conceal that it kills civilians, by disguising the bodies with military uniforms or by disappearing the victims. The way in which the SAC kills civilians is against the 87th rule of customary IHL, which requires treating people humanly. The grave breach of such fundamental prohibitions constitutes war crimes and, if committed as part of a widespread and systematic attack against the civilian population, the act of murder is also a crime against humanity. Furthermore, the consequences that killings and the climate of fear have on the livelihood of villagers are compromising numerous other rights, such as the right to food, the right to security of person, or the right to an adequate standard of living. Torture is also prohibited in all the bodies of international law, to the point that it constitutes an ius cogens rule, which applies at all times and in all situations. As evidenced by the incidents being continuously documented by KHRG, the security and human rights situation in Southeast Burma has continued to worsen since the 2021 coup. In particular, a constantly high number of cases of killings of villagers have been reported to KHRG throughout 2022 and 2023. Urgent action needs to be taken in order to immediately protect civilians in Burma, as the SAC systematically targets and kills civilians, in blatant disregard for human life and international laws and standards. Moreover, the longer time the SAC enjoys impunity for their attacks, the more the situation in Karen State will worsen, leading to further violations, terror and insecurity. In turn, this will mean heavier, deeper impacts for communities and further help needed to accomplish peace, welfare and justice for ethnic villagers in rural Burma. 5. Recommendations For international stakeholders, NGOs, and regional and foreign governments: Acknowledge the grave crimes committed by the military junta and refrain from supporting it or granting it legitimacy, including by signing agreements with it, presenting it with credentials, and inviting its leaders to international forums and functions. Support local civil society, community-based organisations (CSO/CBOs) and ethnic service providers that prioritise human rights, including by working with them to develop support systems for victims of violations, including for the relatives of villagers killed, arrested and tortured by SAC soldiers and other local armed groups. Support efforts to hold the Burma military accountable for its vast array of crimes in impartial and independent courts, including the International Criminal Court (ICC), International Court of Justice (ICJ), and national courts in countries with universal jurisdiction laws. Broaden the scope of accountability of international investigations to include crimes committed against Karen peoples, not yet covered by current proceedings. Support coordinated and targeted sanctions against junta officials suspected of being responsible for carrying out international crimes and other serious violations of international law. For armed groups: Give orders to the soldiers to end their attacks on civilians and abide by human rights and international humanitarian law, and make sure that those orders are respected at all times. Respect the exercise of the right to life, including by ending the arresting, torturing, and killing of civilians and by protecting their livelihood. Footnotes: [1] Unpublished raw data from March 20th 2023. [2] On February 1st 2021, the Burma Army deposed the democratically elected government led by the National League for Democracy (NLD), transferred power to Min Aung Hlaing, the Commander in-Chief of Myanmar’s Armed Forces, and invalidated the NLD’s landslide victory in the November 2020 General Election. [3] Karen State, or Kaw Thoo Lei, as defined by the Karen National Union (KNU), covers Kayin State, Tanintharyi Region and parts of Mon State and Bago Region. The KNU uses different boundaries and location names for the areas under its control, dividing Karen State into seven districts. Karen State, located in Southeast Burma, is primarily inhabited by ethnic Karen people. Most of the Karen population resides in the largely rural areas of Southeast Burma, living alongside other ethnic groups, including Bamar, Shan, Mon and Pa’Oh. [4] The State Administration Council (SAC) is the executive governing body created in the aftermath of the February 1st 2021 military coup. It was established by Senior General Min Aung Hlaing on February 2nd 2021, and is composed of eight military officers and eight civilians. The chairperson serves as the de facto head of government of Burma/Myanmar and leads the Military Cabinet of Myanmar, the executive branch of the government. Min Aung Hlaing assumed the role of SAC chairperson following the coup. [5] On February 2nd 2021, healthcare workers at state-run hospitals and medical facilities across Myanmar spearheaded what is being referred to as a Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) consisting of labour strikes in protest against the February 1st 2021 military coup. The movement quickly spread to include civil servants from all sectors of the government who are walking off their jobs as a way of non-recognition and non-participation in the military regime. Because of the popularity of the movement, and its seminal role in wider protests across the country, some people have begun using it as a catch-all phrase to include other protest forms like boycotts and pot-banging. On February 2nd 2021, healthcare workers across Myanmar spearheaded a Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) and initiated labour strikes to protest against the February 1st 2021 military coup. The movement quickly spread to other branches of public service, eventually turning into to a nationwide, large-scale civil disobedience campaign. [6] See: aappb.org/?lang=en [7] The National League for Democracy (NLD) is the political party that governed Burma/Myanmar from 2016 to January 2021. Led by Aung San Suu Kyi, the NLD won landslide victories in the 2015 and 2020 General Elections. The NLD government was deposed by the Burma Army in the February 2021 Myanmar coup d'état, after which elected President Win Myint and State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi were detained, along with ministers, their deputies and members of Parliament. [8] KHRG, “Military Atrocities and Civilian Resilience: Testimonies of injustice, insecurity and violence in Southeast Myanmar during the 2021 coup”, November 2021. [9] The Karen National Union is the main Karen group opposing the government. [10] Burma News International, “KNU Offer Anti-Coup Protestors' its Protection”, February 2021. [11] The State Law and Order Restoration Council, which replaced the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) following the September 18th 1988 coup d’état by then General Saw Maung (later Senior General). The SLORC was officially dissolved in 1997 by Senior General Than Shwe and was replaced by the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC). [12] KHRG, “SLORC Shootings & Arrests of Refugees”, January 1995. [13] An Infantry Battalion (IB) of the Burma Army comprises 500 soldiers. However, most Infantry Battalions in the Tatmadaw are under-strength with less than 200 soldiers. Yet up-to-date information regarding the size of battalions is hard to come by, particularly following the signing of the National Ceasefire Agreement (NCA). They are primarily used for garrison duty but are sometimes used in offensive operations. [14] Unpublished raw data from March 31st 2023. [15] Aye Chan Yay A’pweh, which translates as ‘Peace Group’, is a (former) government-sponsored militia first formed in 1998, led by U Ko Gyi. It is sometimes referred to as the Northern Thandaung Aye Chan Yay A’Pweh. It has operated mainly out of a base in the upper region of the Kyaung Haung area in Daw Hpa Hkoh Township, Taw Oo District near the Karenni State border, but there are also small camps in Daw Hpa Hkoh Township, Taw Oo District. The group previously made a peace agreement with the Tatmadaw in 1998, but since the 2021 military coup, it has engaged in armed conflict with the military junta. [16] A Tatmadaw Light Infantry Battalion (LIB) comprises 500 soldiers. However, most Light Infantry Battalions in the Tatmadaw are under-strength with less than 200 soldiers. Yet up-to-date information regarding the size of battalions is hard to come by, particularly following the signing of the NCA. LIBs are primarily used for offensive operations, but they are sometimes used for garrison duties. [17] KHRG, “Taw Oo District Incident Report: A villager died after he was shot by SAC troops in Daw Hpa Hkoh Township, December 2022”, January 2023. [18] Unpublished raw data from April 6th 2023. [19] Unpublished raw data from April 24th 2023. [20] The Karen National Liberation Army is the armed wing of the Karen National Union. [21] Unpublished raw data from October 2022. [22] KHRG, “Mu Traw District Incident Report: A villager was fatally shot by SAC soldiers while hunting in the forest, February 2023”, April 2023. [23] Unpublished raw data from January 25th 2023. [24] A Light Infantry Division (LID) of the Tatmadaw is commanded by a brigadier general, and consists of ten light infantry battalions specially trained in counter-insurgency, jungle warfare, search and destroy operations against ethnic insurgents . They were first incorporated into the Tatmadaw in 1966. LIDs are organised under three Tactical Operations Commands, commanded by a colonel, three battalions each and one reserve, one field artillery battalion, one armoured squadron and other support units. Each division is directly under the command of the Chief of Staff (Army). [25] Unpublished raw data from March 29th 2023. [26] Unpublished raw data from January 12th 20023. [27] Unpublished raw data from April 28th 2023. [28] The People’s Defence Force (PDF) is an armed resistance established independently as local civilian militias operating across the country. Following the February 1st 2021 military coup and the ongoing brutal violence enacted by the junta, the majority of these groups began working with the National Unity Government (NUG), a body claiming to be the legitimate government of Burma/Myanmar, which then formalized the PDF on May 5th 2021 as a precursor to a federal army..."
Source/publisher: Karen Human Rights Group
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-08
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Title: Human Rights Situation weekly update (June 1 to 7, 2023)
Description: "Military Junta troops launched an airstrike and dropped bombs in Kachin State, Shan State, and Bago Region from June 1st to 7th. Military junta arrested more than 70 civilians and used them as human shields in Sagaing Region and Mandalay Region. Pro Military’ Junta Pyusawhtee militias tortured and killed 2 women in Htantabin Township, Yangon Region. Military Junta troops burnt and killed a civilian from Sintgu Township in Mandalay Region. 3 civilians including a child were killed and 16 people including 2 children were injured by the Military’s heavy and light artillery attacks. Civilians’ properties were burnt and damaged by the Military Junta dropping bombs..."
Source/publisher: Network for Human Rights Documentation-Burma
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-08
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Title: Myanmar: Lawyers Face Harassment, Arrests
Sub-title: Junta’s Crackdown on Defense Counsel Reflects Broader Attack on Justice System
Description: "Lawyers in Myanmar defending anti-coup protesters and critics have faced threats, arrest, and prosecution by the military junta. Those detained have been tortured and mistreated. The military authorities impose systematic obstacles and restrictions on lawyers, impeding their work. The junta has created closed courts inside prisons that violate fair trial rights to fast-track politically sensitive cases. Myanmar’s junta should urgently restore civilian democratic rule. Concerned governments should impose targeted sanctions against junta members implicated in abuses, seek referral of Myanmar to the International Criminal Court, and adopt a global arms embargo. (Bangkok) – The Myanmar military junta has threatened and harassed lawyers trying to defend the rights of protesters and others arbitrarily detained since the February 1, 2021 coup, Human Rights Watch said in a report released today. The 39-page report, “‘Our Numbers are Dwindling’: Myanmar’s Post-Coup Crackdown on Lawyers,” examines the junta authorities’ pattern of harassment, surveillance, arrests, and in some cases torture of lawyers since the coup, particularly those taking on political cases. At least 32 lawyers have been arrested and placed in pretrial detention with little evidence supporting the charges against them, according to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners. “At every turn, Myanmar’s lawyers have faced systematic, junta-imposed obstacles and restrictions impeding their work,” said Manny Maung, Myanmar researcher at Human Rights Watch. “The military authorities should immediately release all those arbitrarily detained and stop harassing lawyers.” Since the coup, the junta has arrested and detained thousands of anti-coup activists and critics and prosecuted many for incitement and terrorism in summary trials that do not meet international fair trial standards. Myanmar’s already tenuous justice system has declined drastically, failing to uphold basic due process rights. The junta has created “special courts,” closed courts inside prisons to fast-track political cases. Military tribunals hold summary trials in townships where martial law has been declared. Despite the systematic impediments imposed by the military authorities, lawyers still try to defend the human rights of those arrested. Human Rights Watch interviewed 19 defense lawyers and 7 legal advisers to international nongovernmental organizations working inside the Myanmar military junta’s special courts system. All 19 lawyers said they had experienced intimidation and surveillance by junta authorities. In some cases, the junta authorities appear to have targeted lawyers in reprisal for representing activists charged with sedition, incitement, or terrorism. Lawyers also reported ill treatment or torture of detained colleagues. Several sources familiar with the situation of Tin Win Aung, a high court lawyer from Mandalay Region, said he suffered a broken arm and leg, and had to have a feeding tube inserted into his stomach after beatings by security force personnel during pretrial detention. One lawyer who spoke to Human Rights Watch shortly after her release from prison said police blindfolded her, placed her in stress positions, and deprived her of food and water during interrogation. Inside special courts, lawyers and their clients face numerous problems, including being forbidden to privately communicate or discuss their cases prior to hearings. Lawyers said that junta officials frequently obstructed or prevented them from carrying out their professional duties, denying suspects their rights to due process and a fair trial. In the 47 townships in which the junta has imposed martial law, military tribunals also adjudicate criminal cases involving civilian defendants. The military tribunals also typically operate in prisons. Suspects may not have access to a lawyer, and trials are summary and invariably result in convictions and heavier sentences. The United Nations Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers set out standards that governments should adopt in their national legislation and to ensure that lawyers can exercise their proper role. These principles address access to lawyers and legal services, special criminal justice safeguards, and lawyers’ freedom of expression and association. Myanmar junta authorities have routinely acted contrary to the Basic Principles. The ability of lawyers to exercise their functions freely and independently is central to the capacity of the justice system to protect fair trial rights. Lawyers need confidential access to their clients to be able to provide prompt, unhindered, and accurate legal advice and ensure the right to a fair trial. Although Myanmar is not a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the right to a fair trial is recognized as customary international law and a responsibility of Myanmar as a UN member state. Foreign governments and regional organizations concerned about the disastrous human rights situation in Myanmar should adopt a range of measures against the military junta, including targeted sanctions against members implicated in abuses and military-linked companies, referring Myanmar to the International Criminal Court, and a global arms embargo. In pressing for the release of political prisoners, all governments should raise the harassment and jailing of lawyers, and seek to improve their ability to defend those imprisoned, often for years, for peacefully protesting the junta’s abuses. “The junta authorities are making up the rules as they go, to subjugate and discredit the very people trying to protect the fundamental right to a fair trial,” Maung said. “Concerned governments should act swiftly to ensure that the courageous remaining lawyers trying to protect those rights are not silenced.” “‘Our Numbers are Dwindling’: Myanmar’s Post-Coup Crackdown on Lawyers” is available at: https://www.hrw.org/report/2023/06/08/our-numbers-are-dwindling/myanmars-post-coup-crackdown-lawyers Selected Accounts Lawyer from Yangon speaking to Human Rights Watch, October 2022: "We are heavily surveilled; we’re told [by the judges] that we can’t ask witnesses certain questions; we receive threats from prison officials, intelligence units, and random people. They take down our names, take photos of us, come to our houses, and watch from outside. The lawyers who are going into the special courts inside the prisons are harassed the most. They have all our details so there is a constant threat hanging over us." Lawyer describing to Human Rights Watch the torture and mistreatment of the senior lawyer, Tin Win Aung, during his detention at Mandalay’s Oh-Bo prison, October 2022: "His legs were stretched and cuffed in a wooden shackle. Then they would roll a heavy stick across his tibia, then they stand on his legs, so his tibia bones were fractured. They kicked his chest and back … There were also injuries like being cut with knives. His leg bones were mostly fractured. From the impact of a kick into his chest and back, his lungs were damaged too." Lawyer outside Yangon speaking to Human Rights Watch after her release, in April 2023: "They blindfolded me and took me away, to what I assume was a police station. When we got there, I was ordered to kneel down and raise my head for a photograph – they kept my hands tied behind my back. They kept me at the station for a while, then they came to take me to the interrogation place in blindfold … I was still blindfolded and forced to kneel down with my arms tied behind my back and questioned like that for hours each time." Lawyer speaking to Human Rights Watch in February 2023 shortly after she went into hiding to escape a junta-issued warrant for her arrest: "In the courtroom, I now have to worry about not getting myself detained rather than speaking the truth. This is especially true when I have to represent political cases. Everyone at the court knows who I am, and the court has all my credentials and personal information. The junta can detain me at any time, and they can and will make up any reasons they want."..."
Source/publisher: "Human Rights Watch" (USA)
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-08
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Title: On-The-Ground in Burma: Issue 28
Description: "This is the US Campaign for Burma’s 28th monthly On-The-Ground in Burma briefer! This month’s briefer will discuss the devastation following Cyclone Mocha and the struggle of civilians in impacted areas. This briefer also features an interview with a resettled refugee in the U.S. This month’s briefer includes: May highlights An analysis on the aftermath of Cyclone Mocha and the difficulties of those in impacted areas Four major policy recommendations A feature interview with a resettled refugee in the U.S. An overview of IDP issues and rights abuses in each ethnic state and central Burma As the conflict escalates in Burma between the pro-junta militias, anti-coup forces, and the military, so has the violence and rights deprivations in ethnic regions and central Burma. Without strong tangible action, the Burmese junta will continue to commit crimes against humanity with impunity..."
Source/publisher: US Campaign for Burma
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-07
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Title: TJC Withdraws Burmese Gems From Sale
Description: "Burma Campaign UK today welcomed a decision by TJC to withdraw Burmese rubies from sale. TJC is one of the biggest TV shopping channels and online jewellery retailers in the UK. In a letter to Burma Campaign UK, TJC stated that following the military coup in February 2021 it had an official policy not to source gems from Burma, and the Burmese rubies it had been selling on its website were listed in error. After receiving correspondence from Burma Campaign UK, the Burmese rubies had been withdrawn from sale. TJC stated: “First and foremost, I want to assure you that we share your concerns and ethical values regarding the situation in Myanmar. Following the military coup in 2021, we made a conscientious decision to withdraw all Burmese jewellery items from our inventory, as we understood the gravity of the situation and the importance of taking a stand against human rights violations. Unfortunately, due to an unintended oversight, some Burmese jewellery items were mistakenly listed for sale on our platform. As soon as we became aware of this error, we took immediate action to rectify the situation. The listings were promptly removed, and we have taken steps to ensure that such an oversight does not occur again in the future.” Burma Campaign UK has written to 40 of the biggest and highest profile jewellery retailers in the UK asking them to demonstrate that the gems they sell are not sourced from Burma/Myanmar in ways which help fund the Burmese military. Following the attempted military coup, which began in February 2021, the Burmese military now dominates Burma’s gems industry, which is potentially worth $2bn per year. Through its own private companies, control of the state-owned enterprises and government ministries, control of trade routes into areas not under its control, legal and illegal trade, and the business interests of military family members, the Burmese military extracts revenue from the gems industry in numerous ways. This revenue can be used by the Burmese military to buy arms and equipment and so funds the human rights violations they commit. “It is impressive that TJC had proactively decided not to source gems from Burma following the coup,” said Mark Farmaner, Director of Burma Campaign UK. “TJC deserve praise for taking an ethical stance on this issue. We hope that other British jewellery retailers will do the same.”..."
Source/publisher: "Burma Campaign UK" (London)
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-07
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Title: National Unity Government Weekly Press Update (22/2023)
Description: "1. NUG Acting President transfers authority to establish & manage Interim Central Bank to the MOPFI.....2. NUG wishes Sagaing Forum to con-solidate and coordinate revolutionary forces.....3. Ministry of Defence announces Yangon Regional Military Battalion 5101 established.....4. Defence Ministry calls for application of health professionals to serve as military medical staff.....5. Over 400 battles occurred in No. 1 Military Region in April.....6. Cyclone Mocha has exacerbated the suffering of 2 million IDPs and triggered floods & landslides that affected an estimated 1.6 civilians.....7. Education Ministry urges all to keep boycotting the SAC’s education institutes.....8. Basic Education Completion Certificate be released in February, 2024.....9. Home Affairs and Immigration Minister U Lwin Ko Latt meets with PDF members at the Bago military front.....10. NUG’s acting president Duwa Lashi La visits and supports people affected by Cyclone Mocha.....11. People’s Defence Forces battalions in Sagaing armed by the Ministry of Defense.....12. PDF, Special Operation Force and the allies raided Kyar Inn Seik Gyi police Station and offices.....13. Minister Daw Zin Mar Aung, Ministry of Foreign Affair met with the special envoy of the Secretary-General.....14. NUG announces nearly 240 million kyat allocated for people affected by Cyclone Mocha..."
Source/publisher: National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-06
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Title: အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ အပတ်စဉ်သတင်းထုတ်ပြန်ချက် ( ၂၂/၂၀၂၃)
Description: "National Unity Government Weekly Press Update (17/2023)..."
Source/publisher: National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-06
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Title: Airstrike and massacre in Pinlaung
Description: "Key Event Details Location of Incident: Nam Neint village (နန်းနိမ့်), Pinlaung Township (ပင်လောင်း), Shan State (ရှမ်း) [19.900822, 96.836592]. Date/Time of Incident: 11 March 2023 Alleged Perpetrator(s) and Involvement: Myanmar Military Pa-O National Army (military-allied forces) Karenni Nationalities Defense Force (KNDF) People’s Defence Forces (PDF) Summary of Investigation: Pinlaung township has experienced a number of reported clashes taking place between the military, military-allied forces, and local defence forces in the area. Eleven days before the incident at Nam Neint village, reports of an airstrike four kilometres away in Tawng Me Thin (တောင်မဲသင်း) village were verified by Myanmar Witness. Myanmar Witness geolocated user-generated content (UGC) showing Nam Neint village on fire and identified FIRMS data that suggests this fire took place on 11 March 2023. This fire was seen burning between 0715 local time and 1045 local time. Images of deceased individuals were geolocated by Myanmar Witness to Nam Neint village. The images indicate that the individuals had died very recently, and fires were captured still burning. Although the capture date of the various pieces of UGC in this investigation cannot be verified, Myanmar Witness determined that the incident almost certainly took place on 11 March 2023, likely between 0715 and 0847 local time. While the perpetrators cannot be conclusively identified, there is information to suggest that the Myanmar military were present in the area at the time. Warning: This report contains graphic imagery. Summary On 27 February 2023 in Pinlaung Township, Southern Shan State, The Karenni National Defense Force (KNDF) and the People's Defense Forces (PDF) attacked a Pa-O National Organization (PNO) checkpoint near the village of Tawng Me Thin village. At least 10 Myanmar military and PNO personnel were reportedly killed in this incident. The PNO is a military-aligned organisation, with an armed wing: the Pa-O National Army (PNA). They have known ties to the Union and Solidary Development Party (USDP). Due to the fighting in the region, many villagers from Tawng Me Thin and the surrounding villages were reportedly forced to flee to other villages in Pinlaung (ပင်လောင်း) and Naungtayar sub-Township (နောင်တရားမြို့နယ်ခွဲ). On 28 February 2023, reports on social media claimed that Tawng Me Thin village was hit by an airstrike. Myanmar Witness identified footage showing a Myanmar Air Force (MAF) K-8 aircraft flying over Tawng Me Thin village. In the footage, the village appears to have been attacked with the aircraft; however, Myanmar Witness could not verify the date this incident took place. On 11 March 2023, the Myanmar military allegedly raided Nam Neint village, burning homes and killing more than 20 residents - including at least three monks. Civilians allegedly hid inside the monastery compound while the military burned down homes. Myanmar Witness has verified several images showing at least 22 separate deceased individuals in the monastery compound, as well as evidence of burnt homes. The images of bodies are time stamped to 11 March 2023, but could not be independently chronolocated. However, NASA’s Fire Information for Resource Management System (FIRMS) confirms the presence of fire in Nam Neint village on 11 March 2023. Using Suncalc, Myanmar Witness analysed some of the identified UGC and broadly chronolocated its origin to be between 0715 and 0847 local time. Location Pinlaung township in southern Shan State is located within the Pa-O Self-Administered Zone, which is jointly controlled by PNO and the Myanmar military (Figure 1). The township is at the junction of Naypyidaw (နေပြည်တော်), Taunggyi (တောင်ကြီး), and Loikaw (လွိုင်ကော်). Between 24 February to 1 March 2023, clashes were reported between Myanmar military forces, their allies the PNA, and joint KNDF and PDF forces. A skirmish on 27 February 2023 reportedly left nine individuals from the Myanmar military and PNA joint forces dead. According to a citizen from Pinlaung township, this occurred when joint defence forces (KNDF and PDF) attacked a Myanmar military and PNA joint checkpoint on the road between Long Pyin (လုံးပျဉ်) and Tawng Me Thin village. An airstrike in Tawng me Thin village on 28 February (analysed within this report) led to the displacement of up to 6000 people from neighbouring villages. This was followed by ground attacks in Nam Neint village which left up to 22 people dead. The Tawng me Thin village Airstrike - 28 February On 28 February 2023, Tawng Me Thin village was allegedly attacked with an airstrike. Myanmar Witness was able to geolocate footage showing a MAF aircraft carrying out an airstrike in Tawng Me Thin village (Figure 3). In the footage, at the 0.06 second mark, a fighter jet identified by Myanmar Witness as a K-8, passes over the village and drops ordinance at around 19.888637, 96.872788. This immediately causes a flash and smoke to rise from the affected area (Figure 4)..."
Source/publisher: Myanmar Witness
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-05
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Title: The Myanmar junta kills … and the rest of the world looks away
Sub-title: Since the coup in 2021 the carnage has been unceasing, meanwhile Russia and China continue to send weapons
Description: "The problem is not that governments around the world are unaware of what is happening in Myanmar. It’s that they are not doing nearly enough to stop it. Since the military seized power in a coup in early 2021, it has terrorised the country, killed, tortured and imprisoned thousands of citizens, broken countless laws, and made a mockery of the UN. The carnage is unceasing, yet only occasionally does it hit the international headlines. One such moment came in April when the junta bombed the village of Pazigyi, in Sagaing region. More than 160 people, including children, were killed by what Human Rights Watch said was a thermobaric, fuel-air vacuum bomb, followed by helicopter gunship attacks. “The ordnance detonated with deadly impact, ripping the bodies of men, women and children open, turning their skin to ash, and inflicting critical shrapnel wounds,” a UN report said. Myanmar’s dictator, General Min Aung Hlaing, is as paranoid as he is brutal. He has banned opposition political parties, silenced the media, and jailed the country’s elected leader, Aung San Suu Kyi. An estimated 1.38 million people have been displaced. That’s in addition to hundreds of thousands of Rohingya refugees, victims of what investigators say may be genocide. “Systematic, gross human rights violations, amounting to war crimes and crimes against humanity, [are] being perpetrated daily on the people of Myanmar,” the UN’s special rapporteur declared.. Wanton destruction of Myanmar’s democracy has produced growing, guerrilla-style popular resistance under the umbrella of the People’s Defence Forces, backed by ethnic militias. About 13,000 regime soldiers and police have defected The result is de facto civil war. The military has lost control of large areas, as we report. A government in exile – the National Unity Government – is trying to rally international support. The US, the UK and the EU have imposed several rounds of sanctions on the regime, including an arms embargo, but their efforts are undercut by China, Russia, India and others. While condemning the junta, the Asean regional grouping is split – and has proved ineffectual, too. China could probably stop the killing if it wanted. But it values Myanmar’s natural resources and ports above human rights and democracy. The UN says Beijing has supplied the junta with $254m in arms since the coup. Russia, whose $400m in weapons sales include the helicopter gunships used to kill the Pazigyi villagers, joins China at the UN to protect the junta from tougher international action..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-04
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Title: National Unity Government Weekly Press Update (21/2023)
Description: "1. Prime Minister urges enhanced efforts to maintain effective communication in areas under NUG’s control.....2. Military junta obstructs humanitarian aid delivery.....3. NUG Ministry of Defence reports 700 injuries and 600 fatalities among military troops in March.....4. Maung Swan Htet, a medical student, recognized as a hero of the Spring Revolution.....5. NUG condemns violence against health services by the military council.....6. Assistance provided to households affected by Cyclone “Mokha”..."
Source/publisher: National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-03
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Title: National Unity Government: Ministry of Foreign Affairs Statement (12/ 2023)
Sub-title: Statement on the Foreign Minister’s meeting with UN Special Envoy on Myanmar Dr. Noeleen Heyzer
Description: "Union Minister of Foreign Affairs Daw Zin Mar Aung welcomed her in-person meeting with the UN Secretary-General's Special Envoy on Myanmar Dr. Noeleen Heyzer on 2 June 2023. In a broad discussion, the Foreign Minister accepted Dr. Heyzer's decision to conclude her assignment and expressed the National Unity Government’s appreciation for her commitment to her mandate. Dr. Heyzer brought considerable energy and experience to her role and made determined efforts, particularly in pursuing humanitarian assistance for communities in desperate need and in elevating Myanmar women’s voices. Yet, as Dr. Hezyer concedes, the significant obstacles she faced as Special Envoy were made worse by a lack of international resolve on Myanmar. Consequently, during her term the illegal military junta escalated its widespread atrocities, ignored UN Security Council and General Assembly demands, and frustrated efforts to implement ASEAN’s Five Point Consensus. In recent weeks, the junta has also prevented UN agencies from delivering aid to communities devastated by Cyclone Mocha including in Rakhine state, with UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Turk stating that the 'damage and loss of life was both foreseeable and avoidable - and is clearly linked with the systematic denial of human rights’. This exposes the junta’s ongoing weaponisation of aid for military gain and its sustained persecution of the Rohingya. It is therefore time for UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres to take the lead on Myanmar. The gravity of the situation and the vacuum created by the Special Envoy’s departure requires the Secretary-General's use of his own good offices. Over two years ago, the Secretary-General affirmed the 'unwavering support of the United Nations to the people of Myanmar in their pursuit of democracy, peace, human rights and the rule of law'. This must see the Secretary-General personally prioritise the stopping of the slaughter and a political solution that upholds the Myanmar people’s democratic will..."
Source/publisher: Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Myanmar - NUG
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-03
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Title: The Sagaing Forum: Delving Into New Military-Political Landscapes – Issue 106
Description: "Sagaing has been the strongest resistance stronghold during the Spring Revolution in Myanmar. The region hosts the largest number of People’s Defense Forces-Local Defense Forces (PDFs LDFs) leading an armed revolution against the Myanmar’s military regime. The civil war has also produced the largest number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Sagaing. At the same time, the region has seen the worst destruction at the hands of Myanmar army troops, coupled with all forms of brutality. On the one hand, there have always been disputes between PDFs-LDFs, all of whom have the common goal of eliminating the military dictatorship. Nevertheless, Sagaing’s defensive war against the military regime continues unabated. This is also the region where unarmed, nonviolent strikes still occur on the ground. On the last two days of May, the “Sagaing Forum” was convened and the military and administrative affairs of the region were discussed. Our Burma News International (BNI) – Myanmar Peace Monitor (MPM) Weekly News Review examines the new military and political landscapes at the Sagaing Forum based on relevant news and data.....စစ်ကိုင်းဖိုရမ်နှင့် စစ်ရေး၊ နိုင်ငံရေး အခင်းအကျင်းအသစ်များကို မျှော်ကြည့်ခြင်း စစ်ကိုင်းသည် အာဏာသိမ်းစစ်ကောင်စီတပ်များအား ခုခံတော်လှန်စစ် အပြင်းထန်ဆုံးဒေသ ဖြစ်သည်။ အာ ဏာသိမ်းစစ်ကောင်စီတပ်အား ခုခံတော်လှန်စစ်ဆင်နွှဲနေကြသော မြို့ပြဒေသအလိုက် ပြည်သူ့ကာကွယ်ရေး တပ်ဖွဲ့(PDF-LDF) အများဆုံးဒေသ ဖြစ်သည်။ စစ်၏ ဘေးထွက်ဆိုးကျိုးအဖြစ် နေရပ်စွန့်ခွာထွက်ပြေးတိမ်း ရှောင်နေကြရသည့် စစ်ဘေးရှောင်ပြည်သူအရေအတွက်တွင်လည်း နိုင်ငံတဝှမ်းလုံးအတွင်း စစ်ကိုင်တိုင်းသည် အများဆုံး ဖြစ်သည်။ အာဏာသိမ်းစစ်ကောင်စီတပ်များ၏ မီးရှို့ဖျက်ဆီးမှုစာရင်းတွင်လည်း စစ်ကိုင်းသည် ထိပ်ဆုံးတွင် ရပ်တည်နေသည်။ အာဏာသိမ်းစစ်အုပ်စု၏ ဖိနှိပ်မှု၊ ရက်စက်ကြမ်းကြုတ်မှုပုံသဏ္ဍာန်မျိုးစုံကို စစ်ကိုင်းတွင် တွေ့ရသည်။ အခြားတဖက်တွင်လည်း စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ် အမြစ်ပြုတ်ချေမှုန်းရေးဆိုသည့် ဦးတည်ချက်တူညီစွာ ပေါက်ဖွား လာကြသည့် PDF-LDF များအချင်းအချင်းအကြား အငြင်းပွားမှုများကို မကြာခနဆိုသလို တွေ့ရတတ်သည်။ သို့ သော် စစ်ကိုင်းသည် အာဏာသိမ်းစစ်အုပ်စုအား ခုခံတော်လှန်စစ်ဆင်နွှဲရာတွင်တော့ အရှိန်အဟုန်မြင့်တက်နေ ဆဲဖြစ်သည်။ လက်နက်မဲ့အကြမ်းမဖက်နည်းဖြင့် ငြိမ်းချမ်းစွာဆန္ဒဖော်ထုတ်လျက်ရှိသည့် မြေပြင်သပိတ်စစ် ကြောင်းများကိုလည်း စစ်ကိုင်းတိုင်းအတွင်း တွေ့မြင်နေရဆဲဖြစ်သည်။ ၂၀၂၃ခုနှစ် မေလ၏ နောက်ဆုံးနှစ်ရက် တွင်တော့ စစ်ကိုင်းတိုင်းအတွက် “စစ်ကိုင်းဖိုရမ်”ကို ကျင်းပကာ တွေ့ဆုံဆွေးနွေးဖြစ်ခဲ့ကြသည်ဟု ဆိုပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher: Myanmar Peace Monitor
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-03
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Title: အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ နိုင်ငံခြားရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာန သတင်းထုတ်ပြန်ချက် (၁၂ / ၂၀၂၃)
Description: "အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၊ နိုင်ငံခြားရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာန၊ ပြည်ထောင်စုဝန်ကြီး ဒေါ်ဇင်မာအောင်နှင့် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံဆိုင်ရာ ကုလသမဂ္ဂအထူးကိုယ်စားလှယ် ဒေါက်တာနိုလင်းဟေဇာတို့ တွေ့ဆုံခဲ့မှုဆိုင်ရာ သတင်းထုတ်ပြန်ချက် အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၊ နိုင်ငံခြားရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာန၊ ပြည်ထောင်စုဝန်ကြီး ဒေါ်ဇင်မာအောင်နှင့် ကုလသမဂ္ဂ အတွင်းရေးမှူးချုပ်၏ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံဆိုင်ရာ အထူးကိုယ်စားလှယ် ဒေါက်တာ နိုလင်းဟေဇာ တို့သည် ၂၀၂၃ ခုနှစ်၊ ဇွန်လ ၂ ရက်နေ့၌ လူချင်း တွေ့ဆုံခဲ့မှု အပေါ် နိုင်ငံခြားရေးဝန်ကြီး ဒေါ်ဇင်မာအောင် မှ ကြိုဆိုပါသည်။ ဆွေးနွေးမှုအတွင်း နိုင်ငံခြားရေးဝန်ကြီးသည် ဒေါက်တာဟေဇာ၏ အထူးကိုယ်စားလှယ်ဆိုင်ရာ တာဝန်ဝတ္တရားများ အဆုံးသတ်ရန် ဆုံးဖြတ်မှုကို အသိအမှတ်ပြု လက်ခံကြောင်းနှင့် အမျိုးသား ညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ အနေဖြင့် အထူးကိုယ်စားလှယ်၏ လုပ်ငန်းတာဝန်များနှင့် ပတ်သက်၍ ဒေါက်တာ ဟေဇာ၏ နှစ်မြှုပ်ဆောင်ရွက်ခဲ့မှုများကို အသိအမှတ်ပြုကြောင်း ထုတ်ဖော်ပြောကြား ခဲ့သည်။ ဒေါက်တာဟေဇာသည် အထူးကိုယ်စားလှယ်၏ တာဝန်များကို ထမ်းဆောင်ရာတွင် မြောက်မြား စွာသော အတွေ့အကြုံ၊ အင်အား စိုက်ထုတ်မှု များဖြင့် စိတ်ပိုင်းဖြတ်မှုခိုင်မာစွာ ကြိုးပမ်းဆောင်ရွက် ခဲ့သည်။ အထူးသဖြင့် အကူအညီ အလွန်အမင်း လိုအပ်နေသည့် လူမှုအသိုက်အဝန်းများ အတွက် လူသားချင်း စာနာ ထောက်ထားမှု ဆိုင်ရာ အကူအညီများ ရရှိရန်နှင့် မြန်မာ အမျိုးသမီးများ၏ ထုတ်ဖော် ဖွင့်ဟမှု အသံများအား မြှင့်တင်ပေးနိုင်ရန်တို့အတွက် ဆောင်ရွက်ပေးခဲ့သည်။ သို့သော်လည်း ဒေါက်တာ ဟေဇာ ဝန်ခံ ပြောကြားသည့် အတိုင်း မြန်မာနိုင်ငံနှင့် ပတ်သက်၍ နိုင်ငံတကာ အသိုင်းအဝိုင်း၏ ဖြေရှင်းဆောင်ရွက်မှု ကင်းမဲ့ခြင်းသည် အထူးကိုယ်စားလှယ် အဖြစ် ဆောင်ရွက်ရာတွင် ၎င်းရင်ဆိုင်ကြုံတွေ့ခဲ့ရသည့် အခက်အခဲ အတားအဆီးများကို ပိုမိုခက်ခဲ ဆိုးရွား စေခဲ့သည်။ ရလဒ် အနေဖြင့် ၎င်း၏ အထူးကိုယ်စားလှယ် သက်တမ်း အတွင်း တရားမဝင် စစ်အုပ်စုသည် ယင်း၏ ကြမ်းကြုတ် ရက်စက် ယုတ်မာမှု များကို ကျယ်ကျယ်ပြန့်ပြန့် တိုးမြှင့် လုပ်ဆောင်ခဲ့သည့် အပြင် ကုလသမဂ္ဂ လုံခြုံရေးကောင်စီနှင့် ကုလသမဂ္ဂ အထွေထွေညီလာခံ တို့၏ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံဆိုင်ရာ တောင်းဆိုချက်များကို လျစ်လျူရှုကာ အာဆီယံ အဖွဲ့ကြီးနှင့် သဘောတူညီ ထားသည့် သဘောတူညီချက် (၅)ချက်ကို အကောင်အထည်ဖော်ရန် ကြိုးပမ်းမှုများကိုလည်း ဟန့်တား နှောင့်ယှက်ခဲ့သည်။ မကြာသေးသော သီတင်းပတ်များအတွင်း စစ်အုပ်စုသည် ရခိုင်ပြည်နယ် အပါအဝင် ဆိုင်ကလုန်းမိုခါကြောင့် ထိခိုက်ပျက်စီးခဲ့ရသည့် လူမှုအသိုက်အဝန်းများသို့ ကုလသမဂ္ဂ အဖွဲ့အစည်းများမှ ပေးပို့မည့် ကယ်ဆယ်ကူညီထောက်ပံ့ရေး ပစ္စည်းများအား ဟန့်တားခဲ့သည့် အတွက် ကုလသမဂ္ဂ လူ့အခွင့်အရေးဆိုင်ရာ မဟာမင်းကြီး Volker Türkကပင် "အသက်သေဆုံးမှုနှင့် ဆုံးရှုံးပျက်စီးရမှုတို့မှာ ကြိုတင်သိမြင်၍ ရှောင်ရှားနိုင်သည့်ကိစ္စရပ်များ ဖြစ်သည့်အတွက် လူ့အခွင့်အရေးကို စနစ်တကျ ပိတ်ပင်နေမှုအား ထင်ရှားစွာ တွေ့မြင်နိုင်ကြောင်း" ထုတ်ပြန်ပြောကြားခဲ့သည်။ ယင်းလုပ်ရပ်က စစ်အုပ်စုအနေဖြင့် စစ်ရေးအသာရလိုမှုအတွက် ကူညီထောက်ပံ့မှုများကို လက်နက်သဖွယ် ဆက်လက် အသုံးချနေမှုနှင့် ရိုဟင်ဂျာများအား ဆက်လက်ဖိနှိပ်နေမှုကို ဖော်ပြနေခြင်းပင် ဖြစ်သည်။ သို့ဖြစ်ရာ ယခုအချိန်သည် ကုလသမဂ္ဂအတွင်းရေးမှူးချုပ်အန်တိုနီယို ဂူတားရက်စ်အနေဖြင့် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံနှင့် ပတ်သက်၍ ဦးဆောင် လမ်းပြဆောင်ရွက်ရမည့် အချိန်ဖြစ်သည်။ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၏ လက်ရှိအခြေအနေကြီးလေးမှုနှင့် အထူးကိုယ်စားလှယ်၏တာဝန်ရပ်ဆိုင်းမှုမှ ဖြစ်ပေါ် လာမည့် လပ်ဟာမှုတို့ကြောင့် အတွင်းရေးမှူးချုပ်အနေဖြင့် ကုလသမဂ္ဂအဖွဲ့အစည်းများအား ကောင်းစွာ အသုံးချရန် လိုအပ်လျက် ရှိပါသည်။ လွန်ခဲ့သည့် (၂)နှစ်ကျော်ကာလ၌ "ဒီမိုကရေစီ၊ ငြိမ်းချမ်းရေး၊ လူ့အခွင့်အရေးနှင့် တရားဥပဒေ စိုးမိုးမှုဆိုင်ရာ မြန်မာပြည်သူလူထု၏ ကြိုးပမ်းမှုအတွက် ကုလသမဂ္ဂအနေဖြင့် မမှိတ်မသုန် အထောက်အကူပေးသွားမည်" ဖြစ်ကြောင်း အတွင်းရေးမှူးချုပ်က အခိုင်အမာ ပြောကြားခဲ့သည်။ သို့ဖြစ်ရာ အစုလိုက်အပြုံလိုက် သတ်ဖြတ်နေမှုများကို ရပ်တန့်ရန်နှင့် မြန်မာပြည်သူလူထု၏ ဒီမိုကရေစီရေးရာ စိတ်ဆန္ဒကို ဖော်ဆောင်နိုင်မည့် နိုင်ငံရေး အဖြေတစ်ရပ် ထွက်ပေါ်လာရန် အတွင်းရေးမှူးချုပ်အနေဖြင့် ကိုယ်တိုင်ကိုယ်ကျ ဦးစားပေးဆောင်ရွက်ရန် လိုအပ်လျက်ရှိပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher: Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Myanmar - NUG
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-03
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Title: အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ အပတ်စဉ်သတင်းထုတ်ပြန်ချက် ( ၂၁/၂၀၂၃)
Description: "National Unity Government Weekly Press Update (21/2023) ..."
Source/publisher: National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-03
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Type: Individual Documents
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Title: “How can we survive in the future?”: Atrocity Crimes in Karenni State - အနာဂါတ်မှာ ဘယ်လိုရှင်သန်မလဲ – ကရင်နီပြည်နယ်မှရက်စက်ကြမ်းကြုတ်သော ရာဇဝတ်မှုများ
Description: "Executive Summary: Following the attempted coup on 1 February 2021, thousands of Karenni people participated in the peaceful mass protest movement against military rule that spread across the country. After the regime’s brutal crackdown and killings of peaceful protestors, young people in Karenni State set up barricades and roadblocks and took up arms to defend themselves. Some joined the Karenni Nationalities Defense Forces, while others joined local Peoples Defense Forces groups. Since May 2021 the junta has attempted to exert control over Karenni State through rapid militarization. Military reinforcements are routinely deployed across townships in Karenni State and neighboring areas. At the same time, the Burmese military has ruthlessly employed its counter-insurgency strategy known as the “four cuts.” This deliberately targets civilians, viewing them as the support base for armed resistance groups, and aims to cut off access to four essentials: food, funds, intelligence, and recruits. As part of its collective punishment strategy, the Burmese military has occupied villages across Karenni State, razing civilian infrastructure, setting up temporary outposts, and planting landmines around villages. When soldiers from the Burmese military retreat from a village, they typically burn down civilian homes. The first part of this report documents serious violations of international human rights and international humanitarian law. These include both indiscriminate and targeted attacks on Karenni civilian populations, murder and mass killings, widespread destruction of civilian property, forced displacement on a massive scale, arbitrary arrest and detention, torture and cruel treatment, sexual violence, and using Karenni civilians as forced labor and human shields. It also describes the humanitarian crisis facing at least 180,000 Karenni internally displaced people (IDPs). More than 40 percent of the estimated total Karenni population has been forcibly displaced, the vast majority of them women and children. The five townships of Loikaw, Hpruso, Shadaw, Deemaw Soe and Pekhon have been almost entirely abandoned. Already traumatized by the violations they have experienced, IDPs live in constant fear of renewed attacks by junta forces. Many IDPs have been displaced multiple times. Junta forces continue their assaults on Karenni towns, villages, and IDP sites unabated. In many cases, IDPs’ homes have been destroyed and they have nowhere to return to. The uncertainties they face about the future are paralyzing as they struggle to maintain hope. The second part of this report contextualizes its findings with legal analysis. In summary, it is reasonable to conclude that members of the Burmese military have committed the war crimes of attacking civilians, attacking protected objects, pillaging, murder, torture, cruel treatment and displacing civilians in Karenni State. The conduct of the Burmese military likely also constitutes the crimes against humanity of imprisonment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, murder, torture, enslavement, other inhumane acts, and forced displacement when considered in the context of a widespread or systematic ‘attack’ against the civilian population in Burma, committed with the requisite knowledge of the attack. The Burmese military can commit these atrocity crimes with impunity because the international community does not hold them accountable, even though it has a legal and moral obligation to do so. A series of important steps must be taken to ensure that individual perpetrators from the Burmese military are held accountable. This includes referral of the situation in Burma to the International Criminal Court, which provides a pathway to justice and reparations for the thousands of victims. Without justice and accountability, there can be no lasting peace for Karenni communities. This report also urges the international community to take action beyond mere ‘statement diplomacy’ to protect the thousands of civilians who live with the daily threat of being murdered by the military regime. This should include imposing a coordinated global arms embargo on the Burmese military and sanctioning aviation fuel supply in a bid to end deadly airstrikes on civilian populations..."
Source/publisher: Karenni Human Rights Group, Kayan Women’s Organization, Karenni National Women’s Organization, Kayah State Peace Monitoring Network
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-03
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Title: Can the Sagaing Forum Take Myanmar’s Spring Revolution to the Next Level?
Description: "Sagaing Region has seen some of the strongest and most widespread resistance to the Myanmar military’s February 2021 attempted coup. In the face of the ongoing crisis in Sagaing, where villagers have been subjected to fear, violence and destruction of their villages at the hands of the military junta, a beacon of hope has emerged in the form of the Sagaing Forum as a regional political platform. This new political initiative can in the medium term address the pressing challenges faced by the region’s communities, while aiming to build up local and subnational governance structures to build trust and support cohesion within Sagaing’s pro-democracy movement. The question here lies in whether the Forum can strengthen local and subnational networks to increase collaboration within Sagaing Region, which could help bring the resistance to the next level. Plight of villagers and political challenges For more than two years, the people of Sagaing have endured unimaginable hardships. The military junta’s “four-cuts” strategy, aimed at isolating and weakening resistance movements, has been deployed ruthlessly, leaving villagers trapped in a cycle of violence and oppression. The scorched-earth policy and arbitrary arrests have resulted in the destruction of thousands of villages, leaving communities devastated and displaced. As of Feb. 28, 2023, junta troops and affiliated groups have burned down 60,459 homes across the country, according to Data for Myanmar. In Sagaing alone more than 50,000 houses have been destroyed. The major challenges faced by local actors and the National Unity Government (NUG) in countering military offensives are substantial, despite the individual strength of civil society and local People’s Defense Forces (PDFs). The absence of involvement by civil society groups in regional policies, and district and township-level appointments, which are directly made by key ministries such as the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Home Affairs within the NUG, has resulted in a lack of ownership. This lack of ownership not only creates a lack of coordination, but also makes it increasingly difficult to counter the military’s offensives. Moreover, in vast territorial regions like Sagaing, there is still a lack of a regional political body that can provide guidance to local PDFs and enable regional administrators to implement responsive and inclusive governance practices and policies. The birth of the Sagaing Forum After more than six months of dedicated deliberation, local community groups have come together in a series of bi-weekly Zoom and in-person meetings, totaling almost 20 gatherings. Their purpose has been to navigate through the political storms and remain resolute in their pursuit of establishing a political platform that fosters common ground and shared goals. These deliberations have involved representatives from over 25 out of the 37 townships, making it a comprehensive and inclusive process. Some township administrators directly appointed by the NUG have also attended the Forum. Interestingly, the name “Sagaing Forum” itself was coined by the participating groups. The Forum’s leadership comprises a diverse range of individuals, including Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) teachers, campaigners, and local PDFs, who demonstrate a remarkable level of resilience, perseverance, and adeptness in navigating the complexities and obstacles that arise during discussions and message management. As an observer, I have had the privilege of occasionally attending these meetings, including the groups’ informal discussions with the NUG and Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH), exploring the group’s aspirations and envisioning their future path. They have had meaningful discussions, though the NUG and CRPH were not well informed enough in advance. It is worth noting that although invited, the Committee Representing Sagaing Hluttaw (CRSH), as a regional people’s elected body, was unable to participate due to their ongoing activities related to “important matters” surrounding politics, administration, defense, and humanitarian aid with the NUG, and they kindly requested an excuse. Though some NLD Sagaing representatives elected in the 2020 election attended individually, I wondered if the Forum (held May 30-31 for the first time) representing local stakeholders from more than 28 townships was not “important” enough for the CRSH to spend time with? Bottom-up approach Amid the current chaotic circumstances, the emergence of the Sagaing Forum brings a ray of hope. It represents a fresh and bottom-up approach to addressing the challenges faced by the region. Instead of relying on conventional methods, the Forum aims to foster collaboration, dialogue, and inclusive decision-making processes. Its ultimate objective is to establish a federal unit, advocating the NUG, CRPH and CRSH to be inclusive and responsive, steering away from divisive approaches. The Forum’s efforts are essential in creating a positive path forward for Sagaing, offering a glimpse of optimism amidst the prevailing challenges. Among political approaches, the Sagaing Forum could stand out as a zero-to-one innovation in a Buddhist Bamar-dominated region. It signifies a departure from the conventional top-down models and embraces a bottom-up perspective, emphasizing the voices and needs of the local communities. By doing so, the Forum recognizes the importance of empowering those directly affected by the crisis and involving them in shaping their own future. In the face of immense challenges and suffering endured by the people of Sagaing, the Sagaing Forum emerges as a beacon of hope, offering a pathway towards a brighter future. Its bottom-up approach, centered on inclusivity, local empowerment, and collaborative decision-making, signifies a profound shift in political engagement. By prioritizing the immediate needs of affected communities and striving for sustainable solutions, the Sagaing Forum lays the groundwork for a more reconciled and resilient Sagaing Region. As we reflect on the transformative power of changing political dynamics, let us ponder the following questions: How can other regions draw inspiration from the Sagaing Forum? What lessons can we learn about the potential for inclusive approaches to shape a better future for the people of Myanmar? Additionally, we must consider whether the Sagaing Forum can propel the Spring Revolution to new heights, bringing about significant progress and positive change. Zaw Tuseng, a former pro-democracy activist, is founder and president of the Myanmar Policy Institute (MPI). The MPI was formed recently to mobilize Myanmar researchers to formulate policies and institutionalize the policymaking process for Myanmar. He holds an Executive Master of Public Administration degree from Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-02
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Title: Myanmar’s Interrupted Transition: The Democratic Instinct Survives
Description: "MongMao, Andra & Marte Nilsen (2023) Myanmar’s Interrupted Transition: The Democratic Instinct Survives, PRIO Policy Brief, 4. Oslo: PRIO. ​Myanmar’s democratic transition was interrupted by the 2021 coup. Ten years of progress and reform were reversed, returning the country to military dictatorship. Yet the transition has not completely failed. Rather, the coup pushed democratic actors, norms and behavior outside Myanmar’s formal political institutions and processes. These actors have been re-constituted in a broad-based resistance to authoritarian governance, aspiring to civilian rule within a new federal constitution. The changes are transformational. They occur as escalating civil conflict, social resistance and international isolation are eroding the military’s traditional sources of power and legitimacy. Brief Points Myanmar’s 2020 election results signaled an epistemic shift in Myanmar society, favoring a democratic system and rejecting a political role for the military. A new multi-ethnic political and military alliance has emerged since the 2021 coup. The alliance poses a credible challenge to the military’s dominance. As a result, the military’s ability to control Myanmar’s political and economic affairs appears to be declining. The opposition is developing an alternative democratic governing structure that may provide a pathway out of the cycle of authoritarian rule and conflict. Unity within the opposition is fragile, and it currently lacks the strength needed to overcome the military’s advantages derived from controlling state institutions and resources. International support should focus on actions that promote opposition unity while focusing on critical regime vulnerabilities, especially constraining access to arms and economic resources that are critical to the military’s war effort..."
Source/publisher: Peace Research Institute Oslo
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-02
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Title: National Unity Government Weekly Press Update (20/2023)
Description: "1. NUG launched 1 million USD fund for the Cyclone Mocha affected communities, calling for humanitarian support from the international community.....2. SAC controlled police station taken over in Salin Township, Magway region.....3. NUG remarks ASEAN Chairs should progress commitments made by ASEAN Leaders.....4. SAC’s controlled mobility contributed to hundred of Rohyingya deaths in Cyclone Mocha, NUG Minister remarks.....5. Nealy 7 billion MMK of humanitarian aid distributed in 2 years..."
Source/publisher: National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-02
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Title: အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ အပတ်စဉ်သတင်းထုတ်ပြန်ချက် ( ၂၀/၂၀၂၃)
Description: "National Unity Government Weekly Press Update (20/2023)..."
Source/publisher: National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-02
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Title: Human Rights Situation weekly update (May 22 to 31, 2023)
Description: "Human Rights Violations took place in States and Regions from May 22 to 31, 2023 Military Junta troops launched an airstrike, heavy artillery attacked, and dropped bombs in Sagaing Region, Kayin State, and Shan State from May 22nd to 31st. Civilian houses and buildings were destroyed by 500lb highly explosive bombs and attacking heavy and light artillery. The head of the Prison who works for the Military Junta beat and tortured the political prisoners from Myingyan Prison from Mandalay Region, Thayarwady Prison from Bago Region, and Kyaiksagaw Prison as a result some died by being held in solitary confinement. 3 civilians were burned and killed within a week by the Military Junta’s soldiers. 8 civilians including an under-age child were tortured and killed under interrogation by the Junta troop in Kawthaung, Tanintharyi Region. 5 youths were shot and killed on the road No, 2 near Economic University, Ywathagyi, and arrested 16 youths in Sanchaung Township, Yangon Region. SNA under the Military Junta command, is threatening the civilians, forcing and recruiting new soldiers in Banmauk Township, Sagaing Region..."
Source/publisher: Network for Human Rights Documentation-Burma
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-01
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Title: National Unity Government of Myanmar: Ordinance 1/2023
Description: "In accordance with the Federal Democratic Charter Part II, Interim Constitutional Arrangements, Chapter (4) Section (25), Subsections (b) and (c), the National Unity Government of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar hereby issues this ordinance as follows: 1. After the coercive usurpation of state power by the terrorist armed forces on the 1st of February 2021, it has come to pass that the banking sector, among numerous others, has experienced substantial decline and degradation. Subsequent to February 2021, the financial institutions falling under the purview of the central banking mechanism controlled by the terrorist armed forces, in disregard of their obligations to safeguard the interests of depositors, have been compelled to operate in accordance with the dictates of the aforementioned armed forces, consequently causing severe and intolerable losses on the populace. 2. Furthermore, the foreign exchange reserves belonging rightfully to the people are being appropriated for the procurement and production of weaponry, including but not limited to jet fuel; these resources being subsequently employed in terrorist acts of violence and killing against the populace. 3. Thus, with the intent to alleviate the losses of the people, to regulate and rectify the banking sector, and to forestall and safeguard the foreign exchange reserves belonging to the people from misuse in terrorist endeavours of the military, the Union Government hereby delegates authority to the Ministry of Planning and Finance to establish and constitute an interim central bank with the following functions and duties: (a) to conduct international and domestic operations as befitting a central banking authority of Myanmar, (b) to exercise oversight and issue licences to companies and institutions applying to operate as banks and financial institutions, and (c) in carrying out functions under clauses (a) and (b) above, to issue orders, regulations, rules and notifications subject to the approval of the National Unity Government. 4. – (a) The interim Central Bank shall be governed by a Board of Directors, (b) The chairman of the Board of Directors shall be the Governor of the interim Central Bank; the Union Minister of the Ministry of Planning, Finance and Investment is hereby appointed Governor of the interim Central Bank in addition to his current duties. 5. This ordinance shall come into effect on the 1st day of June, 2023..."
Source/publisher: National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-01
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Title: အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ ဥပဒေကဲ့သို့ အာဏာတည်သောအမိန့် (၁/၂၀၂၃)
Description: "ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီပဋိညာဉ် အစိတ်အပိုင်း(၂)၊ ကြားကာလဖွဲ့စည်းပုံအခြေခံဥပဒေဆိုင်ရာ အစီအမံ၊ အခန်း (၄)၊ ပုဒ်မ (၂၅)၊ ပုဒ်မခွဲ (ခ)နှင့်(ဂ) အရ ပြည်ထောင်စုသမ္မတမြန်မာနိုင်ငံတော်၊ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရသည် ဥပဒေကဲ့သို့ အာဏာတည်သောအမိန့်ကို အောက်ပါအတိုင်း ထုတ်ပြန်လိုက်သည်။ ၁။ ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ်၊ ဖေဖော်ဝါရီလ (၁) ရက်နေ့တွင် နိုင်ငံတော်အာဏာအား အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်မှ အဓမ္မလုယူပြီးနောက် အဖက်ဖက်မှပျက်စီးယိုယွင်းမှုများအနက် ဘဏ်လုပ်ငန်းကဏ္ဍလည်း တခုအပါအဝင် ဖြစ်သည်။ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်၏ဗဟိုဘဏ်က ထိန်းချုပ်ထားသော ဘဏ်များသည် ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ် ဖေဖော်ဝါရီလမှ စတင်၍ ဘဏ်တခုအနေဖြင့် စောင့်ထိန်းရမည့် အပ်ငွေအပ်နှံသူ ပြည်သူများ၏ အကျိုးစီးပွားကို မကြည့်ရှုဘဲ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်အလိုကျ ဆောင်ရွက်ခဲ့ကြသည့် အတွက် ပြည်သူများအနေဖြင့် နစ်နာဆုံးရှုံးမှုများစွာ ခံစားနေကြရသည်။ ၂။ ထို့အပြင် အများပြည်သူပိုင် နိုင်ငံခြားအရန်ငွေ (Foreign Exchange Reserve) များကိုလည်း ပြည်သူများအားအကြမ်းဖက်သတ်ဖြတ်ရာ၌ အသုံးပြုသည့် လေယာဉ်ဆီအပါအဝင် လက်နက်နှင့် လက်နက်ထုတ်လုပ်ရေးပစ္စည်းများ ဝယ်ယူရာတွင် သုံးစွဲလျှက်ရှိသည်။ ၃။ သို့ပါ၍ ပြည်သူများ၏ နစ်နာဆုံးရှုံးမှုများကို အချိန်မီကုစားနိုင်ရန်၊ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၏ ဘဏ်လုပ်ငန်းကဏ္ဍကို ထိရောက်စွာ ထိန်းကျောင်းတည့်မတ်နိုင်ရန်နှင့် အများပြည်သူပိုင် နိုင်ငံခြားအရန်ငွေအား အကြမ်းဖက်လုပ်ရပ်များတွင် အသုံးပြုနေခြင်းကို တားဆီးကာကွယ်နိုင်ရန် အတွက် အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၊ ပြည်ထောင်စုအစိုးရအဖွဲ့သည် အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၊ စီမံကိန်း၊ ဘဏ္ဍာရေးနှင့် ရင်းနှီးမြှုပ်နှံမှုဝန်ကြီးဌာနအား အောက်ပါတာဝန်များ ဆောင်ရွက်နိုင်ရန် အလို့ငှာ ကြားကာလဗဟိုဘဏ် (Interim Central Bank) အဖြစ် အာဏာအပ်နှင်းလိုက်သည်- (က) နိုင်ငံတကာနှင့် ဒေသတွင်း ဗဟိုဘဏ်များနည်းတူ ဗဟိုဘဏ်တရပ်အနေဖြင့် ဆောင်ရွက်ရမည့် လုပ်ငန်းတာဝန်များကို အကောင်အထည်ဖော်ရန်၊ (ခ) ဘဏ်နှင့် ငွေရေးကြေးရေးအဖွဲ့အစည်း လိုင်စင်လျှောက်ထားလာသည့် အဖွဲ့အစည်း၊ ကုမ္ပဏီများအား စိစစ်၍ လုပ်ငန်းလိုင်စင်ထုတ်ပေးရန်၊ (ဂ) အထက်အပိုဒ် (က) နှင့် (ခ) ပါ တာဝန်များကိုဆောင်ရွက်ရာတွင် လိုအပ်သော အမိန့်၊ စည်းမျဉ်း၊ စည်းကမ်း၊ ကြေညာချက်တို့ကို အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရအဖွဲ့၏ ခွင့်ပြုချက်ဖြင့် ထုတ်ပြန် ဆောင်ရွက်သွားရန်၊ ၄။ (က) ကြားကာလဗဟိုဘဏ်ကို ဒါရိုက်တာအဖွဲ့ ဖွဲ့စည်း၍ စီမံခန့်ခွဲရမည်။ (ခ) ဒါရိုက်တာအဖွဲ့၏ ဥက္ကဋ္ဌသည် ကြားကာလ ဗဟိုဘဏ်ဥက္ကဋ္ဌဖြစ်ပြီး အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၊ စီမံကိန်း၊ ဘဏ္ဍာရေးနှင့် ရင်းနှီးမြှုပ်နှံမှုဝန်ကြီးဌာန၊ ပြည်ထောင်စုဝန်ကြီးအား ကြားကာလဗဟိုဘဏ်ဥက္ကဋ္ဌအဖြစ် ယင်း၏လက်ရှိတာဝန်များ အပြင် ပူးတွဲတာဝန်ထမ်းဆောင်ရန် တာဝန်အပ်နှင်းလိုက်သည်။ ၅။ ဥပဒေကဲ့သို့ အာဏာတည်သော ဤအမိန့်သည် ၂၀၂၃ ခုနှစ်၊ ဇွန်လ ၁ ရက်နေ့မှစ၍ စတင်အာဏာတည်ရမည်။..."
Source/publisher: National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-01
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Title: Devastation in Karen State
Description: "Executive Summary Since September 2022, Myanmar Witness has been monitoring events in Kyainseikgyi township, which has been the site of clashes between the KNLA and Myanmar military. This report investigates claims that the Myanmar Air Force (MAF) carried out several airstrikes in the township between October 2022 and January 2023. On 6 October 2022, at around 0300 hours, a military fighter jet allegedly bombed Mae Kasa village (မက္ကသာရွာ), about 10 kilometres east of the Phayar Taung military post which had been captured by the KNLA a few weeks earlier. Myanmar Witness has identified and geolocated imagery which shows significant damage to a building in the Dhamma Rakkhita Monastery grounds (ဓမ္မရက္ခိတဘုန်းကြီးကျောင်း). Additionally, satellite imagery was used to verify a date window within which damage to the roof occurred. The monastery grounds had provided a site of refuge for internally displaced people (IDP). During November and December 2022, and January 2023, KIC News reported that the MAF carried out four air strikes on the Thabyu mining pits, about 22 kilometres north of Mae Kasa village, killing at least three civilians. Myanmar Witness has identified and geolocated images of the destruction of structures in the area, specifically related to the 16 November airstrike and the 25 January airstrikes. On 16 November 2022, General Zaw Min Tun, the head of the State Administrative Council's (SAC) press team, confirmed that a MAF offensive to ‘maintain the security of the region’ took place in the township. This confirms that the MAF was operating aircraft in the area and provides added weight to allegations of other airstrikes between October 2022 and January 2023. Myanmar Witness has provided in-depth reporting on the nationwide use of airstrikes by the MAF in the Eyes on the Sky report, and will continue to monitor and investigate further incidents. Background and Context According to online news sources including Myanmar Now and Khit Thit Media, on 28 September, following clashes between the KNLA and Myanmar military, a joint force of the KNLA and the PDF attacked and captured the Phayar Taung military post (ဘုရားတောင်စခန်းကုန်း) situated on the road connecting Kyainseikgyi town (ကြာအင်းဆိပ်ကြီးမြို့) and Phayar Thone Su town (ဘုရားသုံးဆူမြို့). More than 10 SAC troops (exact number differs between 11 and 13) were reportedly killed, including the deputy battalion commander of the Myanmar military, and their weapons were seized. The Karen National Union (KNU) reported that the Myanmar Air Force (MAF) bombed the Dhamma Rakkhita Monastery in Mae Kasa village at around 0300 hours on 6 October 2022, severely damaging a building. The monastery was previously used by local charities, for Shinbyu ceremonies, and religious festivals. It was also used to house internally displaced people (IDP) from Mae Kasa and surrounding villages. The individuals who had been taking refuge in the Dhamma Rakkhita Monastery have been forced to relocate to Phayar Thone Su town and nearby places due to the frequent sighting of fighter jets, according to Khit Thit Media. The township remained a site of tension over the next few months. Between November 2022 and January 2023, three people were killed, eight were injured, and buildings were damaged during MAF airstrikes on the mining blocks of Thabyu Mine (သပြုသတ္တုမိုင်း), about 21 kilometres north of Mae Kasa village (မက္ကသာရွာ), according to reports by Khit Thit Media. There were also reports of ground clashes on the morning of 4 January 2023, when the KNLA and PDF joint forces attacked Light Infantry Battalion (LIB) 32 and LIB-283, based in Kyainseikgyi township, and set a number of buildings on fire, according to Mizzima News..."
Source/publisher: Myanmar Witness
Date of entry/update: 2023-05-31
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Title: Japan’s railway projects risk aiding & abetting Myanmar junta’s crimes
Description: "Japan has continued railway improvement projects following the Myanmar military’s illegal coup attempt, a Justice For Myanmar investigation based on public sources and leaked documents has revealed. Japanese multinational corporations have received millions in revenue from Myanma Railways under projects financed by loans from the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) that were awarded before the attempted coup. Myanma Railways is a state agency unlawfully controlled by the junta. Following the coup attempt, an estimated 90% of its 30,000 workers courageously joined the Civil Disobedience Movement, refusing to work under the junta and risking their lives and livelihoods. The continuation of the railway improvement projects legitimises the junta and provides it with increased logistical capacity. The junta uses trains to move troops, arms and other supplies as it commits atrocity crimes across Myanmar with total impunity. Through the project, the Japanese government and the corporations involved risk aiding and abetting the junta’s international crimes by providing it with logistical support. JICA told Justice For Myanmar that under the bilateral agreement, which was made before the coup attempt, the projects shall not be used for military purposes. However, the Japanese government and the corporations involved are unable to prevent misuse by the junta. Recently, the junta was caught misusing boats donated by Japan for civilian use to move troops in Arakan State. Japan made a complaint to the junta about it last month, but details of any further action have not been made public. Under the railway improvement projects, work is being carried out by multinational corporations from Japan and the EU, in partnership with Myanmar military crony companies. Public sources and leaked documents, including from Distributed Denial of Secrets, show: The Spanish corporation Construcciones y Auxiliar de Ferrocarriles (CAF) and Mitsubishi Corporation are supplying new trains to the junta. Daiwa House subsidiary Fujita Corporation, Sumitomo Corporation and Nippon Signal Co. Ltd. are doing track and station upgrades, bridgework and work on signal and communication equipment under a contract signed in 2019. Fujita received revenues of 29.7 billion kyat from Myanma Railways for work on the Yangon to Bago section of the project in 2022, equivalent to over US$15 million, according to leaked tax filings. Tekken Corporation and Rinkai Nissan Construction are working on the Bago to Nyaunglebin section of the track under a deal awarded in 2018, while Tokyu Construction is working on the Nyaunglebin to Taungoo section, with Toenec Corporation doing signalling and communications upgrades. Justice For Myanmar calls on the Japanese government and the businesses involved in the railways improvement projects to immediately suspend work until Myanmar’s transition to federal democracy. Japan should stand with the people of Myanmar and fulfil its international obligations by imposing sanctions on the junta and its business interests and suspending all official development assistance projects in Myanmar. The Spanish government should investigate CAF’s business with the military junta and take swift action if EU sanctions have been breached. Justice For Myanmar spokesperson Yadanar Maung says: “By allowing its railway improvement projects to continue, the Japanese government is legitimising the junta and providing it with resources that will support its campaign of terror against the people of Myanmar. “Since its illegal coup attempt, the junta has killed more than 3,500 people and arbitrarily arrested over 22,700. Mass atrocities are being committed by the junta daily, including indiscriminate airstrikes, shelling, rape and torture. “By continuing the project, Japan and major multinational corporations risk complicity in these international crimes. “Japan needs to get on the right track for the people of Myanmar, suspend all official development assistance projects, and impose sanctions on the junta and its businesses. “Myanma Railways are part of the Myanmar military cartel, and the businesses working with it need to responsibly cut ties, in accordance with their international human rights obligations. “The role of CAF raises serious questions for the Spanish government and the EU over continued business links with the junta that need to be addressed.”..."
Source/publisher: Justice For Myanmar
Date of entry/update: 2023-05-30
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Title: Jewellery Retailers Challenged on Burma/Myanmar Gems Sourcing
Description: "Burma Campaign UK is writing to 40 of the biggest and highest profile jewellery retailers in the UK asking them to demonstrate that the gems they sell are not sourced from Burma/Myanmar in ways which help fund the Burmese military. Following the attempted military coup, which began in February 2021, the Burmese military now dominates Burma’s gems industry, which is potentially worth $2bn per year. Through its own private companies, control of the state-owned enterprises and government ministries, control of trade routes into areas not under its control, legal and illegal trade, and the business interests of military family members, the Burmese military extracts revenue from the gems industry in numerous ways. This revenue can be used by the Burmese military to buy arms and equipment and so funds the human rights violations they commit. Research by Burma Campaign UK shows that most retailers do not specify the origin country of gems, such as rubies, which they sell. “Some retailers may not be aware of the risks of funding the Burmese military when they sell gems from Burma. We want to draw these risks to their attention and give them the opportunity to do the right thing,” said Mark Farmaner, Director of Burma Campaign UK. In the United States, a ‘Genocide Gems’ campaign run by the International Campaign for the Rohingya has persuaded Cartier, Harry Winston and Tiffany to stop sourcing gems from Burma. The Burmese military stands accused of genocide at the International Court of Justice and is being investigated for crimes against humanity at the International Criminal Court. Numerous United Nations and human rights organisations have documented war crimes by the Burmese military. The Burmese military is currently unleashing an unprecedented wave of atrocities and repression across the entire country as it desperately seeks to consolidate the coup. Weapons designed for fighting armies have been unleashed against the civilian population. Airstrikes and long-range artillery are used on a daily basis, creating a human rights and humanitarian crisis. Schools, hospitals and religious buildings are deliberately targeted, forcing more than 2 million people to flee their homes. More than 22,000 people have been arrested, with political prisoners subjected to torture and sexual violence after arrest. Executions are taking place again for the first time in decades. There is no freedom of speech, media organisations are banned or heavily censored, and internet access restricted or completely blocked. Burma’s democracy movement is calling on the international community to do everything it can to help cut the economic lifeline of the Burmese military. Gems are a major potential source of revenue. Any international company engaging in the trade or retail sale of gems from Burma needs to be able to provide evidence that the gems it is selling have not helped to fund the Burmese military and the human rights violations they commit. If they cannot do so, they must commit to ending sales. We will be publishing a report based on the responses we receive from companies. Companies which are selling gems from Burma and cannot demonstrate that the gems they sell do not fund the Burmese military will be named and shamed in the report and face public campaigns, including boycotts. We will then consider high profile campaigns against these companies, including placing them on our ‘Dirty List’ of companies helping to fund the Burmese military, and consumer boycott campaigns. “People don’t want to wear jewellery which has helped pay for soldiers who rape children and bomb schools,” said Mark Farmaner. “Companies have a responsibility to ensure they are not funding human rights violations and those which don’t act responsibly face significant reputational damage.”..."
Source/publisher: "Burma Campaign UK" (London)
Date of entry/update: 2023-05-30
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Title: Monthly Overview: While Cyclone Mocha Threatened to Destabilise Civilian Livelihoods and Safety, the Military Junta Continued to Deploy Attacks
Description: "Human Rights Foundation of Monland (HURFOM) In the wake of Cyclone Mocha, civilians in Burma braced for the worst as the powerful storm threatened lives and caused widespread destruction. While local emergency response teams worked to put preventative measures and safety protocols in place, the military junta continued to bombard civilians with air and ground attacks. Their immense suffering, even in the wake of a natural disaster, did not deter the regime from their attacks. The cyclone has affected the whole region, and yet days into the first week of May, the military junta deployed a series of targeted airstrikes on civilians in Southeastern Burma. A joint statement with the Karen Human Rights Group and the Karen Peace Support Network condemned attacks on 10 May by soldiers from Light Infantry Battalion (LIB) #599 under Military Operations Command (MOC) #13, together with other junta-backed infantry divisions and battalions. The attacks killed nearly 20 people, including several children. Between 7 and 14 May 2023, the Human Rights Foundation of Monland (HURFOM) reported that the military was responsible for carrying out three airstrikes which bombed six villages in Ye Township, Mon State, on May 7, 8, and May 14 in western Dawei. These attacks led 1200 to 1500 residents to flee their homes as displacement continued to be fueled by the relentless raids and assaults by the regime. During this period, in Kyaukgyi Township (KNU areas), more than fifty civilian homes were also destroyed by the junta, including a religious building and a school. Residents have also continued to face abuse and threats by junta-supported administrators. Since the regime reformed its gun laws and made it more accessible to purchase and use weapons, many Administrators in Mudon Township bought guns from the black market. “ “They threaten villagers with their guns,” said a villager. The junta-backed Ministry of the Interior issued the order to revive the 1977 law allowing ‘loyal’ civilians to bear arms on January 31, 2023, a day before the second anniversary of the attempted coup. Since then, Mon State administrators have obtained guns. To access and own a weapon, any individual must make an application and need final approval from the Ministry of Home Affairs. Still, Administrators in Mudon Township have been able to get them quickly. Now, junta-backed defence groups such as pro-junta militias and administrators can ‘legally’ take up arms issued to them by the junta, and the military overlooks their misconduct. This could lead to many other problems related to the misuse of these weapons, and we are worrying about the life and properties of the people. On the other hand, it also means that if ordered, these armed people must cooperate in junta operations against the resistance, according to Mudon villagers. Guns obtained from the black market are illegal, but Administrators are pro-military, and critics of the policy note that the military simply overlooks their misconduct. Extortion and bribery persist as the junta targets key routes to illicit funds from ordinary people. The military increased the operation of thirty-seven checkpoints along the Tanintharyi Highway and has been committing illegal taxation and extortion against travellers and vehicle drivers, according to local sources and travellers using this 180-mile-long motor highway. HURFOM fieldworkers were able to speak with various locals and reliable sources. All believed that these were the results of the permission of the central junta administration to their security troops to utilize policies due to inadequate support from the State/Region levels to their security forces: “It is as if they can earn their daily incomes at the bottom level. This means more extortions, illegal levying of taxes, arbitrary arrests, and demanding ransom. As you know, we could only earn a maximum of 12.000 MMK a day, but we are forced to pay various illegal taxes, sometimes extorted money or properties, and unjust taxation. So, imagine how much cash we left in our hands to feed my family? A 50-year-old mini truck driver from Ye, Mon State, stated. “Even the daily road users, such as local farmers, rubber plantation workers, and even local inhabitants, are suffering,” a 30-year-old Tavoyan rubber plantation farmer from a village in Yebyu Township told reporters, adding, “We have to encounter thieves and criminals in our daily life while crossing their checkpoints and security gates. From Mahlawe Taung tollgate, Yebyu Township, Tanintharyi Region, to Myeik Township, Southern Region, travelers and vehicle drivers estimated that various junta forces had operated more than 37 checkpoints and tollgates along the 180 miles long highway. “Before the coup, there were only seven tollgates for road tax. After the coup, the regime occupied all these tollgates for security reasons and added another thirty tollgates and checkpoints along the road to the Southern Region,” a truck driver who has to use this highway daily said. “The military will justify their checkpoints for ‘security’ reasons. However, behind the scenes, the daily income from here is not even used to support their military families. Significant top-down corruption exists here,” a former Civil Servant from Myeik Township expressed his view on May 1. In addition, the junta’s arrest and detainment of innocent people is ongoing. Those who stand firm in their beliefs and pro-democracy opinions are being targeted. Three people were arrested the first week of May, including a young man arrested on May 4. These young people were abducted for their views shared on social media, including their condemnation of the extrajudicial killings committed by the junta. “The latest arrest case occurred in the early morning of May 4, 2023,” a neighbour told HURFOM. A group of plainclothes police and military intelligence officers surrounded the house of Ko Paing Thu, a young resident of Phet-Kalate village, Kyaik Hto Township, Mon State, who the junta forces have arrested for commenting to condemn the military’s inhumane mass killings. Two related incidents occurred after civilians were abducted for condemning atrocities committed by the regime. The Administration Department detained and charged all three young men in Kyaik Hto Township. “Two of them were accused of being associated with the People’s Defense Forces (PDFs) after the junta troops inspected their mobile phones,” a reliable source close to the police said. “My son is innocent, living and working in the welding metals workshop in the family business. We will try to face this case legally,” the father of Paing Thu, told the reporter. Recently, the junta’s intelligence network has been monitoring youth activist accounts like Paing Thu’s Facebook since the beginning of this year and has conducted in-depth surveillance systems across the State. Anyone caught commenting or writing about the National Unity Government or news related to the pro-democracy movement is tracked by the well-trained technology groups financed and supported by the junta, according to a staff of the Civil Disobedience Movement from the Ministry of Home Affairs, Mon State. HURFOM also reported aid workers having their rights violated by the junta. The military is weaponizing aid delivery. More than 40 civilians, including members of charity service volunteers, were abducted and interrogated by the Junta Forces in Kawkareik township, Karen State. HURFOM’s field report stated that 42 people had been abducted between 9 and 11 May. The detainees were members of the free funeral service, rescue ambulance charity members, former school teachers, and ordinary civilians, including former civil servants in Kawkareik. “Yes, I can confirm all arrests. As far as I know, social workers are based in Kawkareik township. They are now being held in a military interrogation center,” said a family spokesperson. “For a long time, the administrative council wanted to blame social charity service members and social relief groups for their operations. Now they are targeting them directly,” said a former social group member, referring to the pressure on social workers by the junta council. “I heard they came to arrest with detailed wanted lists and profiles. This must be the first time many people have been arrested in Kawkareik. Today, they were knocking on the doors of other neighbourhoods who they suspected,” said a woman close to ‘Palae Phyu’ local charity group. Since the coup, at least five social workers in Kawkareik District have been arrested and charged with violating the counter-terrorism Law in connection with the local armed groups, according to HURFOM records. Throughout May 2023, HURFOM also reported a rise in the number of people being abducted by the junta and used as human shields. The junta troops are committing crimes against humanity in Tanintharyi Region by arresting local civilians and forcing them to be their guides through armed conflicts. This is also a direct violation of the law of war, reported local Dawei residents. On April 26, when the military troops marched towards the Ra-nge and Waerik villages in Thayet Chaung Township, Dawei District, nearly 100 local people were arrested and released two days later by demanding ransom payments. “Those who can be redeemed with money are released quickly,” said a villager. Villagers continue to be arrested and subjected to severe abuse. According to International Humanitarian Law, using human shields is strictly prohibited. This is also stated in the Geneva Convention. The fact that the military regime carelessly embarks on missions intended to devastate communities makes it clear that they act with impunity. According to local sources, the junta forces that entered the villages in eastern Dawei these days arrested at least ten villagers from three villages in the area and used them as human shields along with its troops on 21 May 2023: “At least five or five villagers from the village of Dar Thwe Kyauk were taken away and forced to go ahead and act as guides. Also, they entered Ah Nya Pyar village, arrested two more people, and then went down to U Yin Kyi village,” said the locals. A field report from the northern Dawei District indicated that the junta forces and their alliance militias entered the village with about fifty troops. They arrested nearly thirty local workers as human shields on the morning of May 8, 2023. The local sources confirmed that those detained and used as human shields worked in a plantation near Wet Chaung village, Pagaw-Soon village tract, Yebyu Township. “The local farm workers were arrested on the morning of May 8 when they left for work. After that, the junta forces took the villagers as their protection to the operation area where they wanted to go. The detainees were all taken with hands tied in the back,” said another anonymous source from the administrative area of KNU Brigade No.4. According to the ground information received by HURFOM, six women were arrested on the evening of May 8, with twenty people from Wet Chaung Village in Yebyu Township. “The first junta battalion is a joint unit of Infantry Battalion No.273 and Infantry Battalion No.406. The troop force is about 20 or 30 soldiers. They captured people from Wet Chaung village and used them as human shields. Another junta military column entered the nearby Kha Mout Chaung and seized the properties belonging to the locals. They took another ten villagers from Kha Mout Chaung when they left the village,” said an eyewitness source. Those who escaped said that while stationed at the school in Kha Mout Chaung village, the junta troops broke into some houses in the village and looted valuables and other livestock. “The use of human shields is a war crime. No other armed actor has done such a despicable act in this age,” a spokesman for the local PDF said while condemning the act as a war crime and a severe crime against humanity. “Since we are resisting the junta council to minimize the harm to the people, we will not fight if there is a possibility that the people will be affected by the fighting on both sides. The junta military is taking advantage of this and attacking our forces in this area,” he continued. Another worrying observation by HURFOM over this last month is that the houses and properties of those accused of supporting the revolutionary movement continue to be seized in Karen and Mon states. According to local people, the junta sealed off the houses and properties of those accused of disseminating and supporting the People’s Defense Forces in Karen State and Mon State and issued arrest warrants for the fugitives. Between 10 to 14 May, soldiers isolated the properties of five civilians. They confiscated their homes in Myawaddy and Kyaik Hto due to unjust accusations. Across two days between 12 and 14 May, two local people from Kyaik Hto, Mon state, were arrested by the junta and charged with the deeply flawed and controversial anti-terrorism act. Their homes and shops were sealed. The estimated value of the houses and properties contained by the regime is worth more than one hundred million kyats. According to HURFOM’s previous data, there have been eight cases of seized assets in Myawaddy and fourteen cases in Thaton District, including Kyaik Hto in Mon State. During the last weeks of the month, the military also targeted young women, some as young as 15 and detained them for unjust causes. On May 19, family members reported that the junta in Launglon, Dawei arrested a 16-year-old. She has not been heard from since 22 May. According to family members and friends, the junta arrested Ma Yin Phuu Pwit, a teenager. She was taken away at a family-owned restaurant in Maungmakan Beach: “Military intelligence came first in civilian clothes with the exact names of the person and store. Then the junta soldiers from the Moungmakan police station arrived in a car and arrested our daughter.” Almost all police forces came and arrested her in civilian clothes. The resident said, “Yin Phuu Pwit is a person who sells and buys online, and it is not yet known exactly why she was arrested. Usually, the junta targets successful people. The military constantly watches them. We don’t know precisely whether Yin Phuu Pwit has shared current movement-related posts or written comments,” another resident assumed. “One possibility is that, like previous cases, the junta military arrested her on suspicion of helping the revolution.” A few days later, another young woman was abducted by the junta. According to local sources, Ma Chaw Su Ther, who lives in Maung Ngan quarter, Mon State, was abducted by the junta intelligence at 3 PM on May 22 for allegedly ‘spreading false news’ on social media. The detainee is 21 years old. She was arrested at home. The junta said they found information on her Facebook which could ‘negate to the state and public unrest.’ Ma Chaw Su Ther (Mi) was sentenced and charged with 56/2023, section 505-A of the Penal Code at the court. Currently, many social network users are being monitored. Women and young girls continue to be targeted by the military junta. The lawlessness has also disrupted pathways of accountability for survivors of sexual violence. Mon women’s groups are warning of increased child sexual abuse incidents in villages across Mon State with no action being taken by the authorities. Women’s groups cannot assist the victims due to the political crisis and security concerns. “We’ve heard many cases of child rape in villages. We’re in a difficult situation to help the victims. The rule of law has failed in Burma, and the police haven’t handled these cases,” said a Mon women leader. Since the coup, the rights of children have been widely violated. The number of domestic violence and sexual abuse cases has also increased. Due to security concerns, it is difficult to get detailed information on the exact number. Junta-appointed village administrators have blocked the legal trials of cases involving child sexual abuse, making it difficult to pursue justice for the victims. Mon women’s groups also mention the junta for freeing convicted child rapists. Further, the increasing surveillance and abuse of law show the deeply worrying extent to which the junta is willing to go to create an illusion of legitimacy. In reality, the people have widely rejected the military and will continue working toward their freedom and dismantling militarized systems. These acts of violence are rooted in the sinister legacy of the military junta. Unless true and meaningful accountability ensures the regime and those complicit in all crimes are held responsible in a court of law, these crimes will continue to occur. Situation Overview Karen State The HURFOM documentation team reported heavy attacks against civilians in Karen State. The assaults came when no active fighting resulted in severe injuries to women and children. Indiscriminate in nature, the ongoing brutalities by the junta have created an atmosphere of deep insecurity and fear throughout the State. According to the Karen National Union (KNU) Central Information Department from Brigaed No. 3, the junta forces shot a 23-year-old Karen villager dead in Kyauk Kyi Township, Nyuang Lay Bin District Bago region. They inhumanely tortured another two villagers during the interrogation in the military camp. On May 3 at 7:20 PM, Saw Lay Lay Htoo, a resident of Tagondai Ward, Natthankwin Town, Kyauk Kyi Township, Nyaung Lay Bin District, was reportedly shot dead by security troops in front of Natthankwin General Hospital while returning to work from Yay Twin Kon Ward. A witness who went to help Saw Lay Lay Htoo told reporters the junta soldiers opened fire. The perpetrator was one of the patrolling officers on their sentry duty returning from Bon-Tha-Taw Ward: “I heard a gunshot and found the body on the road. No one dares goes to see him,” she said. The victim’s motorcycle and the body were lying on the road. The wallet and phone belongings were taken away. Junta battalions are continuously firing at the residences of the local people with artillery weapons. In some cases, although there was no armed conflict in the area, local people, including women and children, were killed or injured when they opened fire on community homes with artillery. On May 5, LIB No. 97, based in Kawkareik Township, fired artillery at 7:30 am. A 58-year-old woman was injured. “Artillery motors fell into our village and exploded. They continued firing until nightfall, some of which exploded in the courtyard,” said a local source. The victim, Naw Ma Latt, age 58, from the middle quarter of the village, was hit by artillery on the right side of her head. It’s not life-threatening, but it needs a lot of treatment. Currently, there are no medical teams in the village. LIB No.97 and military troops at Hlaing Wa Hill constantly fired artillery mortars around the town. Due to that random fire, Kawkareik residents are terrified of explosions that sometimes hit their quarters. “Their military base is at Hlaing Wa Hill, and no one dares to go out to work and eat because they are shooting randomly from there. More than ten people were injured and died when they opened fire. Local people, including their livestock animals, faced every loss of homes, property, and livelihoods. Most of the firing came from LIB No.97. Although there was no fight, they just wanted to shoot randomly. On the one hand, we are facing the risk of life, and on the other hand, we are all facing famine”, said a resident. Attacks can happen at any time. Artillery shells exploded in the brick factory site near the exit of Kawkareik town, in Karen State, at around 6:00 AM on May 6. One civilian was killed, and six were injured during the explosion. According to an anonymous witness, the military troops were based in the hills on the eastern side of Kawkareik town. They fired many artillery indiscriminate shots toward the local Karen villages. Many of these shootings fell near residential areas and inside the neighbourhood. Some houses were destroyed and burnt by mortar shells. The villagers fled from their homes when they heard the shots fired. Some of those who couldn’t run were sheltering in trenches. All six civilians injured by the mortar shells fired by the military troops were not local villagers. According to a resident near the house, they were killed and wounded while temporarily moving here due to job opportunities. “Almost all the houses and neighbourhoods in this area can be said to be battlefields. The military troops are stationed in at least three places around this area and firing daily. Nowhere can be said to be safe anymore. Travelling from one place to another is no longer easy for work or other matters. It becomes really difficult to work for a living. We also need humanitarian support. Many people are fleeing and staying near this city. I would like to request the donors and social groups to support us,” a fifty-year-old who spoke to HURFOM said. On 7 May, the junta carried out indiscriminate attacks, despite no armed conflict in the area. The regime deployed airstrikes to bomb a village where Karen people lived in Ye Township, Mon State. It happened twice on the night of May 7 and the morning of May 8. Due to this sudden aerial attack, at least eight local villagers were seriously injured. Three were in critical condition, and an estimated 500 local villagers fled their homes in War Pa Tae village, a Karen ethnic majority village located in Bay Lamu village tract. One of the villagers fleeing the attack said that the military started the aerial attack with an air jet on May 7: “We heard the sound of a jet plane at 11:00 PM. We immediately realized it was not a typical plane sound and ran to hide in the ditch by our homes. As expected, the sound of a bomb explosion began near the school.” There has not been any fighting or conflict around Chaung Hnit Kwa, War Pa Tae, and Tha Pa Taw villages. “I can’t understand why they came to fight with an airstrike,” said a local villager. As many as eight villagers were injured in the bomb attack, three of whom were seriously injured. Two Tha Pa Taw village members inside their hut outside War Pa Tae village were also injured by the attack on May 8. At least five houses, one school, and other village buildings were destroyed. Approximately 500 local people from three villages Chaung Hnit Kwa, Bay Lamu and Tha Pa Taw villages and the surrounding areas, who fled from the attack. According to independent sources of two villagers from Tha Pa Taw village (a neighbouring village of War Pa Tae village), due to air strikes on May 7th and 8th, residents of Tha Pa Taw and other villages are fleeing the war. Three members of the PDF in the area were killed, and at least five were injured. However, HURFOM is still trying to confirm this information. At present, the villagers from Chaung Hnit Kwa, Bay Lamu, Tha Pa Taw and other villages who fled from the fighting are hiding in the jungles in the southeast of Ye Township (west side of the mountain) and are areas that rescue and social charity groups cannot reach the moment. Children, women, and the elderly are the most affected by war. Food, drinking water, and accommodation are urgently needed, said a KNU Battalion Medical Team No.16 member. Destruction of property is yet another crime being committed by the junta during their clearance operations. According to the field data collected from the evening of May 9, at 5 am, a village Church, a primary school run by the community, and an estimated 20 homes were demolished by the Junta artillery weapons in Poe-Lo-Noh-Pho village, Kyaukgyi township, Nyaung Lay Bin district. “The troops must have been from LIB No.439 or the Artillery Regiment Command No.351. They destroyed these buildings with artillery mortars from their base station, three kilometres from this village,” said a KNU Brigade No.3 member who did not want to be named. Even earlier that day, the junta troops attacked and raided Lae Wai Gyi village in Kyaukgyi Township, destroying more than 30 houses. A school, a church, and all other buildings of the nursery school and the common area were also burnt down by the same troops, according to the field research conducted by the documentation team from Brigade 3 areas. Lae Wai Kyi and Poe-Lo-Noh-Pho villages in Kyaukgyi Township have more than 120 houses and a population of more than 1,200. According to KNU Brigade No.3, most residents have been fleeing due to such comprehensive clean-up operations and have been unable to return to their homes. Since May 13, 2023, the military has been destroying asphalt roads connecting villages in Kawkareik Township, Karen State: “They also destroyed the road near the Taung Kyar Inn Bridge. The Vice Commander of the LIB 343 LIB supervised the destruction. They destroyed roads with a backhoe. Now about 30 villages have lost connection with Kawkareik. All villagers are in trouble,” said a local farmer. On May 13, the military also destroyed roadways connecting Southern Kawkareik, and on May 14, they destroyed the section of the road between Kawkareik – Kyaik Done Road and Ka Mile Gone Road. Then, they destroyed an asphalt road nearby Taung Kyar Inn Bridge on May 17. “We can’t transport fruits from our plantation or sell fruits and vegetables farmed in our villages. We can’t do anything. We have to use the Kyarinnseikyi route to go to Mawlamyine, and it’s very far away. We are all struggling with transportation,” said a Kaw Ka Rate Town fruit seller. After destroying roads, the military junta indiscriminately launched artillery attacks targeting villages alongside the Hong Tha Yaw River. “They are afraid that the revolutionary forces will enter the town and attack them. This is why they’ve destroyed the roads,” said a Kaw Ka Rate resident. On 21 May, artillery shots killed an innocent child, injured two, and forced more than 12,000 villagers from nine villages to flee their homes. The junta’s indiscriminate firing into villages with artillery weapons persists in Nyaung Lay Pin District. According to the information received on the morning of May 20, 2023, the junta military’s joint forces LIB No.599, LIB No.590, IB No.44, and IB No.84 opened fire with more than 50 shots in Sa Wae and Kyung Taw villages in Mu Township. These areas are all controlled by the Karen National Union in eastern Bago, on the border of Mon State. Since the early morning of May 18, these collective forces have been shooting continuously from the outside of the village where they are stationed. Until now, a 14-year-old boy has died. And then, a 47-year-old woman and another 18-year-old boy were injured by mortar shells. In addition to the casualties, many houses and livestock, including a monastery, were destroyed, confirmed by those fleeing the two villages. According to local officials from KNU Brigade 3, food, supplies and accommodation assistance in new places are urgently needed. According to a ground report released by KNU Brigade 6’s information Department, on May 23, at 11:30 PM, the junta air forces deployed two bombs with a jet fighter. The attack damaged some homes and a church in Kha Lae Law Kyae village in Maw Khee village tract, Kawkaraik, Karen State. It is believed to have come directly from the Nay Pyi Taw Air Force Base. There were no casualties, but the church was destroyed entirely. Religious buildings continued to be destroyed, as are places people use often. We have been fighting from war for four decades.” On May 22, one school, two residential houses, and one common wooden hall were damaged due to two shootings by a drone in Nyaung Kon village, Mu Township, #Karen KNU Administrative area. According to information from ground service providers, as many as 21,880 civilians were displaced during May 2023 due to indiscriminate aerial attacks and Artillery firing by the junta council battalions. Out of the 55 local residents of Kawkareik #Karen who were arbitrarily abducted and interrogated by the Junta forces, only four were released by paying ransom demands, according to the families. Sources close to the released villagers confirmed that the remaining 50 arbitrarily arrested are being tortured and detained daily, even in an army interrogation center. Based on groundless accusations of information and financial support to the joint forces of Karen National Liberation Army and People’s Defense Force based in Kawkareik township, a total of 54 people from Kawkaraik were arrested and interrogated in a military camp from May 7 to 22 by the Junta forces. Last May 25, about 4 people from this group were released because the relevant family members decided to ransom them at the Junta’s demand. Although it could not be confirmed how much was paid for each person, outside information stated that each person was paid more than 20 lakhs Myanmar Kyat. Sources close to some detainees conveyed that about 50 inmates who could not pay for ransom have lost contact with their family members. “These people were arrested on false accusations that they were helping Captain Kyaw Thet, who equipped defensive resilience operations in this area and Kyar Phyu (white tiger) armed troops. The perpetrator troop is the Infantry Battalion IB#97, based out of the city of Hlaing Bawk,” he said. Among the more than 50 residents who were abducted from May 1 to May 21, about 4 have been freed after paying money, but some of them have not been able to communicate with their family members, said a person close to the family members of those arrested. According to sources close to the village administrator, in addition, the villages outside the town, such as Sawhe, Nyaung Kile, Htee Po San, Hlaing Sein, Nyaung Nile and Yan Kok village administrators were also detained and interrogated on May 22. They were released after being demanded to report the activities of the local defence armed groups to the Junta and the general administrative department. Currently, the Junta military is working to eliminate village-to-village roads and highways in Kawkareik Township so that the other armed forces in the area cannot easily use them. Aircraft and drones frequently fly around, firing Artillery upon suspecting villages or areas and persistently making a threat, and the residents are still fleeing from their homes. Mon State Indiscriminate junta artillery fire at local villagers in Bilin Township, Mon State continues as civilians are routinely injured due to such attacks. On May 6, at 9 PM, the military fired several artillery mortars into Ah Lu Lay village, Bilin Township. According to the ground news team, at least one woman ..and one man was injured. As a result of the attack, more than 300 villagers fled, and some still could not return homes. A 40-year-old man said that the Army often attacks Ah Lu Lay village. At least a dozen artillery mortars were fired indiscriminately by the junta forces stationed at the foothills of Along Taung and in front of the school, injuring two civilians from Ah Lu Lay: “Three houses were damaged due to heavy weapons. One couple, husband and wife, also were injured and had to flee.” Although their injuries are not life-threatening, the villagers are overwhelmed with fear due to constant attacks. These attacks led to another 300 IDPs from this area. There is no opportunity to work for their livelihoods, and a lack of security prevents humanitarian aid. We are suffering a lot here,” said a resident. “Artillery mortar shells burst into the village, and U Nay Myo Kyaw’s arm and Daw Khin San Yi’s face were badly hit by the artillery shells,” said eyewitnesses. “It will be difficult to return to a normal state and to return to work to earn a living, even though it was not life-threatening,” said the neighbors who fled to a secure place. On the morning of 18 May, a witness confirmed that a 35-year-old innocent villager from Ah Nin village, Thanbyuzayat, Mon State, was shot dead in the clash between the junta-backed forces and the KNU troops. The military and joint forces of the militia entered the village of Ah Nin and deployed troops at night. They raided the houses of unsuspecting people. Many villagers were trapped inside the town. Individuals from outside did not dare to enter. They fled to farms and other villages for shelter. Junta forces have been stationed around the village of Ah Nin in Thanbyuzayat Township, Mon State, since the beginning of the evening of May 17. The village has been controlled and blocked, trapping more than 300 villagers. The KNU came from outside the village to surround the junta’s troops stationed inside. The military started firing their guns, killing a 35-year-old individual. It is still unknown who he was. The villagers are very concerned and afraid of impending disaster from being used as hostages since the military has been stationed around the village. Tanintharyi Region The Junta Council sealed off the assets of a local businessman for allegedly supporting the local armed forces and detained him for over a month. On May 6, in Kawthaung District #southern Taninthayi Region, residents said that a group of junta forces, including the GAD and military officers, seized the property of one local businessman in Bokpyin Township. The victim, U Aung Zaw Oo, is an anti-Regime Activist and a local businessman from Kamar-Chaung village, and his family opened a gas station business a few years ago. “On that day (May 6), his Gas Station, the house, and the tea shop, as well as the entire plot of land, have been sealed and seized by the joint SAC troops,” according to the local witnesses. U Aung Zaw Oo was arrested by the junta forces at his home on April 4 on the unjust accusation of supporting the People’s Defense Forces and charged with section 50 (J) of the existing anti-terrorist law. He was arrested and confined until today at the police station in Bokpyin. On April 4, 4 residents, including U Aung Zaw Oo, were arrested, and 3 of them were released 6 days later, but U Aung Zaw Oo continued to be detained, and more than a month later, his family’s property was sealed. “Whenever the Junta forces and their intelligence in Bokpyin town receive suspicious information about the revolution, they arrest and inspect people. In some cases, the seizures were carried out before the accused were found guilty in court and had their property confiscated. Meaning the Junta forces have wholly disregarded the law.” A 39-year-old law specialist stated. “The punishment of someone not responsible for any alleged wrongdoing is prohibited under international rules for armed conflict.” He continued. Homes and other properties belonging to anti-regime activists have not been sealed in Bokpyin township for a long time. “The most expensive assets and properties have been seized (by the Junta) this time,” said a resident of Bokpyin Town told HURFOM. The Junta troops attacked the People’s Defense Armed Forces and committed two cases of arbitrarily arresting and torturing the residents with false accusations in townships of the Tanintharyi Region. There is a constant flow of violence, sometimes resulting in murder. According to the field team’s report on May 9, the local eyewitnesses confirmed that two men from the village of Wae Yit village in Thayet-Chaung Township, Dawei District, Tanintharyi Region, were stopped and searched, then arrested and beaten by the junta troops with false accusations and were injured. The incident occurred on the morning of May 9, 2023. “The victims, Ko Myo Myint Lay, over 40 years old, and Ko Kang Kang, 30, who live from hand-to-mouth, were tied their hands from the back and severely beaten by the soldiers with their gun butts and kicked by the boots.” A 40-year-old eyewitness from Wae Yit said. “The troop must be from Infantry Battalion No.403 or 404. Right now, they are the only ones patrolling around this village and enforcing the military offensive against the PDFs in the areas,” said a 25-year-old resident. It was not detailed why the two male villagers were arrested and beaten. According to a source close to the victims, the support allegations are likely connected with a local PDF group. “The forces that arrested and beat Ko Kang Kang were junta military stationed at Tha Win Wa village Police Station. They were from IB No.403. When they went to Ya Nge village, they met Ko Myo Myint Lay again and beat them up. Friends of Ko Kang Kang confirmed that he suffered a fractured head, and Ko Myo Myint Lay had a broken rib due to the beating. “I am pretty sure both detainees were not associated with any political movements or armed groups,” he continued. On May 9, around 9:30 pm, about 50 military council soldiers were fully armed and stationed at the Ya Nge village monastery in Thayet-Chuang Township. They went around the village to forcefully raid unsuspicious homes and cause irritation. Some villagers (an estimated 70 households) did not dare to stay in their houses and fled to nearby places. Early morning of May 10, the junta military consisting of more than 30 soldiers from Infantry Battalion No.403 raided Nyaung Zin village in Thayet Chaung Township, #Dawei, abducted about 14 local villagers, including five women, and beat them on the road, according to eyewitnesses. Before entering the village, they stormed into Nyaung Zin village, threatening to shoot with weapons from two lorries. A 40-year-old villager told the incident on the evening of May 10 that most of those arrested were villagers who went out to shop for food in the morning, “We usually see that they go in by military trucks and lorries. This time, the junta forces used civilian trucks, like a lorry truck carrying stones or a garbage truck. They indiscriminately fired into the village and grabbed the villagers they saw on the street that morning. The majority of the detainees were young men. Those who refused to detain were kicked in the boots and hit by gun butts. It happened around 6:30 in the morning,” said the residents. According to the sources of three local villagers, these perpetrators’ units were from the Junta’s Light Infantry Battalion LIB No.403, operating under the Coastal Regiment Command based in #Dawei. “One of us saw their badges and mentioned LIB 403. Some troops searched the houses along the road in the middle village,” said a 50-year-old witness from Nyaung Zin. All 14 detainees were confirmed interrogated and beaten on the side of the road until 2:00 pm; later on, four men were taken away with their faces covered and their hands tied behind their backs, the residents said. Nyaung Zin Village is a large village on the Dawei-Myeik highway, about 8 miles away from Dawei. Last April 23, more than 90 local people, including 3 children, were arrested in Ya Nge village by the junta military during the local operation; some were released in the following days. However, the remaining villagers have not been released yet. According to local sources, the junta has increased their presence in Dawei City, Tanintharyi Region. The city entrance and exit have been more stringent, and suspects have been arrested on various charges. Sources close to the victims confirmed about eight people, including local women, were arrested in one night on May 17. “All the main roads leading into Dawei, including the small lanes, are under strict control by the junta and Pyu Saw Htee militias. There is suspicion since there is more control and inspection.” On 17 May, three women and five men were arrested overnight. The youngest person who was abducted at 11:40 pm was a 17-year-old boy. Some of those arrested are not from Dawei, but they hold different regions of ID cards. Patrols and house checks are still being conducted outside the city. Local witnesses said that on May 17, six Dawei residents and two others from far away were arrested in one night. Residents also stated that they opened fire at several points with heavy weapons before entering the village: “The sound of gunfire and artillery started at 9 PM. We heard around 10 gunshots and several explosions. Their forces consisted of around 150 junta soldiers, and they entered this side yesterday morning,” said a 50-year-old villager from the area. Villages in this area, such as Pa Kari, Pa Khab and Tha Yat Ngok villages have been repeatedly raided by junta troops for the past 6 months, which also forced most of the local residents (an estimated 8,000) to flee and evacuate for a long time. Most villagers of U Yin Kyi, Dar Thwe Kyauk, and Ah Nya Pyar villages, which had been raided recently, are local farmers who rely on farming, orchard, and plantation for their livelihoods. Villagers reported that 9 residents of Bang La Moot village and East Maw Ton village in Tanintharyi township, who have been arbitrarily arrested since May 22, have not been released. “All 9 were arrested as a group on the night of May 22 by the Artillery Unit No.306 and the joint unit of LIB No.557 for allegedly supporting the Local Defense Forces. It was around 9PM. About 3 women from East Maw Ton village and Panut village were included. It is confirmed that it was unknown at which military camp they were taken and detained. Last week, the junta entered Panut village of Bang La Moot village tract and arrested four male villagers. It cannot be confirmed yet whether they have been released or not. The number of disappearances in Tanintharyi, where the arrests are being made, has increased from 5 to 16 now. Due to arbitrary arrests by the junta military, who made various accusations and tortures during the interrogation, three suspected prisoners died while detained and examined. “Nowadays, arrests are often made with specific information.” This is a sign that informers are always in the community. On May 22, they arrested a lot of men at Panut Nge. They went to the houses and arrested people with the exact list of names. They gave various reasons to arrest. There is even an accusation of involvement in the violence that goes beyond supporting the revolution,” said a local man. According to the information received this morning, the arrested victims are being detained and examined in Artillery Unit No.306 and LIB No.557. Until now, no one has been released yet. On May 20, a total of 10, 7 elderly women and 3 men from Yebyu village, Taninthayi township, were arrested by the junta military, and some half of them were released. Key Findings Inflation across all target areas has devastatingly affected civilians who cannot meet their basic needs. The extortion of civilians is ongoing. Residents of Thanbyuzayat reported that the Ward Administrative Chairman is arbitrarily levying money from the people to reconstruct the district administration office that was destroyed by a mine explosion. Mon women’s groups are warning of increased child sexual abuse incidents in villages across Mon State with no action being taken by the authorities. Clashes have led to forced internal displacement in Burma as instability and tensions move people from their homes. Police and junta-backed militias continue to initiate door-to-door checks and arrest those on their wanted lists. Motorcycles, mobile devices, and money are confiscated and extorted from civilians at checkpoints stationed by the junta deliberately along critical routes. Civilians are forced to pay excessive bribes to retrieve their possessions. However, very few were able to afford the high costs. Torture remains rampant in Burma and across target areas where innocent civilians are subjected to gruelling, horrifying acts by the junta to extract information. The international community, including UN bodies and ASEAN, is not responding swiftly enough to the situation in Burma, which demands urgent attention and consequences for the junta. Military impunity remains deeply ingrained in the institutions representing the Tatmadaw, which only encourages the junta to continue perpetrating human rights violations. Children are targeted by the military junta and deprived of basic needs, including medical attention, food, education, and the right to live safely. The junta’s arbitrary arrests and unlawful detention are ongoing, as are warrantless raids and indiscriminate firing into civilian areas. Recommendations The Human Rights Foundation of Monland immediately calls for the following: A referral of the situation on the ground in Burma is to be made immediately by the United Nations Security Council to the International Criminal Court. Concerted and coordinated action by global actors for an urgently mandated international arms embargo which would prevent the free flow of weapons into the hands of the murderous junta. Aviation fuel sanctions to put an effective end to the airstrikes in Burma, which have contributed to significant loss of life, particularly among innocent civilians. Targeted sanctions on military junta officials and their families and holds on their financial assets and possessions undercut their ability to conduct corrupt business dealings abroad. Strengthened and renewed protection mechanisms grant civilians who are vulnerable and at risk of assault a position where they can access justice referral and accountability pathways. Renewed and continued funding support for local organizations responding to the needs of their communities on the ground. Crossborder aid pathways must be accessed, and all humanitarian aid must be in the hands of local actors. Foreign investors in Burma must immediately cease their operations and withdraw their involvement from all development projects in the country, including but not limited to airports, seaports, and cement businesses. An abrupt and immediate halt to the use of torture by the military junta, and further, we call for investigations to probe the unlawful deaths of civilians in Burma who have been tortured to death, as well as those who have been forced to endure trauma and long-term injuries as a result..."
Source/publisher: Human Rights Foundation of Monland
Date of entry/update: 2023-05-30
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Title: Myanmar military arrests civil disobedience movement teacher in Ayeyarwady
Sub-title: The junta claims she had a document connecting her to the shadow National Unity Government
Description: "Junta troops have arrested a teacher in Myanmar’s southwestern Ayeyarwady region claiming she has links to the shadow National Unity Government, according to pro-junta Telegram messaging channels. Residents of Bogale township told RFA Tuesday that 30-year-old Theint Theint Soe was arrested on May 23. She has been working as a teacher for eight years and participated in the civil disobedience movement following the February 2021 military coup, the locals said. “Her husband was arrested a week earlier. The teacher was arrested on the same day that her husband was released,” said a resident who didn’t want to be named for fear of reprisals. “She was arrested for allegedly supporting participants in the civil disobedience movement.” Residents said Theint Theint Soen was being held at Bogale Police Station but it was not clear what laws she had been accused of breaking. Telegram channels that support the junta said she was arrested because a document certified by the shadow National Unity Government board of education was found with her. Nearly 300 civil disobedience movement teachers have been arrested since the 2021 coup, according to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners..."
Source/publisher: "RFA" (USA)
Date of entry/update: 2023-05-30
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Title: Myanmar reporter gets additional ten-year sentence for covering protest
Description: "Reporters Without Borders (RSF) urges the UN special rapporteur on the human rights situation in Myanmar to take up the case of a video reporter who has just been sentenced to an additional ten years in prison on a terrorism charge for covering a flash mob protest in Yangon. The special rapporteur should press for new sanctions against Myanmar’s generals, RSF says. The ten-year sentence was passed on 26 May on Myanmar Press Photo Agency video reporter Hmu Yadanar Khet Moh Moh Tun in the utmost secrecy inside Insein prison, a notorious jail located in a northern suburb of Yangon, Myanmar largest city. Asking not to be identified, her lawyer told RSF that Hmu Yadanar was convicted under article 50 (j) of Myanmar’s terrorism law, which penalises the “financing of terrorism.” She was already given a three-year sentence under a separate penal code charge last December. All she did was film a flash mob-style protest in Yangon on 5 December 2021 that had been organised on social media. Despite sustaining serious head and leg injuries when soldiers ran her down with a military vehicle as she filmed the protest, she has been held ever since. “By imposing this additional ten-year sentence on Hmu Yadanar, the military junta led by Gen. Min Aung Hlaing has yet again demonstrated the extraordinary scale of the tyranny to which reporters are subjected to Myanmar. We urge Tom Andrews, the UN special rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, to take up this high symbolic case in order to seek effective international sanctions against its military rulers. Daniel Bastard Head of RSF’s Asia-Pacific desk The three-year sentence that Hmu Yadanar already received last December was imposed on a charge of inciting rebellion under article 505 (a) of the penal code. Her lawyer said she has decided not to appeal against her latest sentence to avoid giving an appeal court any chance to lengthen it. Hmu Yadanar is one of a total of 70 journalists and media workers currently held in Myanmar’s prisons, according to RSF’s press freedom barometer..."
Source/publisher: Reporters Without Borders (Paris)
Date of entry/update: 2023-05-30
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Title: Villages burn in Sagaing
Description: "Key Event Details Location of Incident: Multiple villages in Sagaing Township (စစ်ကိုင်းမြို့နယ်), Sagaing Region (စစ်ကိုင်းတိုင်းဒေသကြီး): TheInn Sa Village (အင်းစရွာ) [22.118200, 95.694976] Taung Kyar Village (တောင်ကြားရွာ) [22.099079, 95.705261] Mu Thar Village (မူးသာရွာ) [22.106790, 95.658927] Ma Gyi Kone Village (မကျီးကုန်းရွာ) [22.108310, 95.665611] Taung Myo Village (တောင်မြို့ရွာ) [22.080650, 95.667137] Ywar Htaung Village (ရွာထောင်ရွာ)‌ [22.065469, 95.646293] Ywar Thit Village (ရွာသစ်ရွာ) [22.068687, 95.656561] Ta Pa Yin Kwe Village (တပုရင်းကွဲရွာ) [22.049150, 95.669937] Date/Time of Incident: 20 - 24 April 2023 Alleged Perpetrator(s) and/or Involvement: Light Infantry Division (LID) 99 People’s Defence Forces (PDF) Summary of Investigation: It is alleged that the Myanmar military’s LID 99 set fire to eight villages, causing the mass displacement of residents, following PDF activity in the area. Myanmar Witness verified (to varying levels) six of the eight fires through NASA’s Fire Information for Resource Management System (FIRMS), satellite imagery analysis and analysis of user-generated content (UGC). They occurred in villages in close proximity to one another between 20-25 April 2023. Fires in Inn Sa and Ta Pa Yin Kwe villages were verified using FIRMS, Sentinel and UGC. Fires in Mu Thar and Taung Kyar villages allegedly destroyed 400 houses. Myanmar Witness assessed Sentinel imagery and believes that fires occurred between 20-25 April 2023. While no UGC could be geolocated of the remaining villages, FIRMS registered fire data in Ywar Thit on 23 April 2023, and Sentinel data reveals fire damage in Taung Myo and Ywar Htaung villages between 20-25 April. The fires in Ma Gyi Kone (မကျီးကုန်းရွာ) and Taung Kyar could not be verified due to a lack of UGC, FIRMS data or satellite imagery. Following these events, reports of mass displacement and a graphic beheading surfaced online. Myanmar Witness will continue to search for verifiable information. Summary On 20 April 2023, a column of around 100 military personnel entered Sagaing through Myinmu Township (မြင်းမူမြို့နယ်), according to Mandalay Free Press. Eight villages were allegedly set on fire between 20 - 24 April 2023 according to multiple media sources, reportedly causing mass displacement and the destruction of civilian infrastructure. According to Khit Thit, the systematic burning of villages by the military was retaliation for a People Defense Force (PDF) attack in Kywei Pon (ကြွယ်ပုံ) — an alleged Pyu Saw Htee aligned village — on 13 April 2023. The unnamed PDF group allegedly attacked the military’s Thingyan festival in Kywei Pon with a drone. According to a report by the Security Administration Council (SAC), eight people, including five children, were killed and 30 others were injured in the attack. Myanmar Witness has been unable to verify these claims. Myanmar Witness verified six of the eight fires through FIRMS, satellite imagery analysis and analysis of user-generated content (UGC). They occurred in villages in close proximity to one another between 20-25 April 2023. For example, Myanmar Witness geolocated UGC of the destruction of civilian infrastructure in Inn Sa (အင်းစ) and Ta Pa Yin Kwe (တပုရင်းကွဲရွာ) and chronolocated the UGC to within the time period investigated. It is claimed that another two villages, Mu Thar (မူးသာ) and Taung Kyar (တောင်ကြား), were set on fire on 21 April 2023, resulting in the destruction of 400 houses. By analysing the visible changes to the ground on Sentinel imagery, Myanmar Witness believes that it is likely that fires occurred between 20-25 April 2023. While no UGC could be geolocated of the remaining villages, FIRMS registered fire data in Ywar Thit (ရွာသစ်ရွာ) on 23 April 2023, and Sentinel data indicates fire damage in Taung Myo (တောင်မြို့ရွာ) and Ywar Htaung (ရွာထောင်ရွာ)‌ between 20-25 April. The fires in Ma Gyi Kone (မကျီးကုန်းရွာ) and Taung Kyar could not be verified due to a lack of UGC, FIRMS data or satellite imagery. Social media claims related to these fires, the displacement of civilians, and troop movements places responsibility for the fires and destruction with the Myanmar military. Myanmar Witness has collected these claims; however, has been unable to verify them. The fires occurred in villages in close proximity to one another, in an area where there was alleged PDF activity. Myanmar Witness continues to monitor information related to these events to build a picture for accountability. Myanmar Witness has been able to verify the following: Fire in Inn Sa. Geolocation of images of fire-damaged structures, including a monastery, which were likely taken on 21 April 2023. FIRMS and Sentinel data corroborates that Inn Sa was on fire on 21 April 2023. Fire in Ta Pa Yin Kwe. Geolocation of UGC showing burn damage to structures. FIRMS data indicates the fire damage occurred on 23 April 2023. Fire in Ywar Thit. FIRMS data indicates fires on 23 April 2023. Loss of vegetation consistent with fire damage in six of eight villages. Sentinel imagery shows a loss of vegetation, allegedly burned by the military, between 20 April 2023 and 25 April 2023. The investigation walkthrough Myanmar Witness has identified UGC, FIRMS data and satellite imagery which has allowed the verification of six out of eight reported fires. Additionally, Myanmar Witness has identified claims related to Myanmar military troop movements which could signal attribution for these fires; however, Myanmar Witness has been unable to verify these claims at present. The following map provides an overview of the investigated events..."
Source/publisher: Myanmar Witness
Date of entry/update: 2023-05-29
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Title: Myanmar: PEN member now serving 54-year prison sentence.
Description: "24 May 2023: PEN International is dismayed at the decision of Myanmar’s military junta to sentence writer, activist, and PEN Myanmar member, Wai Moe Naing to 20 years’ imprisonment for committing high treason. Already serving a 34-year prison sentence following several convictions in retaliation for his peaceful advocacy against the military coup of 1 February 2021, this latest unjust conviction follows rushed legal proceedings that violated fair trial norms. PEN International continues to call for the immediate and unconditional release of all those unjustly detained by the military junta for their peaceful expression in Myanmar, including Wai Moe Naing. On 19 May 2023, Wai Moe Naing was convicted of high treason for his role as a protest leader and sentenced to 20 years’ imprisonment under Article 122 of Myanmar’s Penal Code, narrowly avoiding a potential death sentence. Already serving a sentence of 34 years’ imprisonment, this latest ruling results in a combined total of 54 years in prison. ‘From the military junta's efforts to silence Wai Moe Naing, it is obvious that the regime fears his voice. When he was first assaulted and detained in April 2021, he was engaged in non-violent advocacy, holding peaceful rallies in order to explain how the military's seizure of power violated Myanmar's undemocratic 2008 constitution. It is a cruel injustice that Wai Moe Naing has been convicted of high treason by the same regime that has so brutally betrayed the people of Myanmar. We demand his immediate and unconditional release’, said Ma Thida, Chair of PEN International’s Writers in Prison Committee. A further trial on a remaining charge of murder remains. The charge is reported to relate to the killing of two police officers in the Monywa district, in central Myanmar but no evidence has emerged that links Wai Moe Naing to the crime. Wai Moe Naing’s friends and family have rejected the accusation of murder on the strongest possible terms. As reported previously, two of Wai Moe Naing’s legal representatives have been arrested, with many others now unwilling to represent him out of fear of retaliation from the military junta, raising ongoing concerns over Wai Moe Naing’s ability to defend himself according to international fair trial norms. PEN International considers that Wai Moe Naing’s long-term imprisonment represents a complete disregard of his right to a fair trial and is illustrative of the military junta’s willingness to use Myanmar’s legal system as a means to further its repression of dissenting voices. Background Wai Moe Naing is a writer, activist, and member of PEN Myanmar. He began writing as a student, with his first short story being published in Teen Magazine at the age of 13. His writing has since been published in several literary outlets, including Khit Yanantthit Magazine and Pae Tin Tharn Journal. Prior to the military coup in February 2021, Wai Moe Naing had already developed a reputation as a committed non-violent activist due to his long-standing involvement student unions and youth groups, which included his affiliation with the Peacock Generation, a satirical poetry troupe who had several of its members detained in 2019 for allegedly criticising the military during a performance. In the immediate aftermath of the military coup, Wai Moe Naing rose to prominence as a leader of the anti-coup protest movement and was among those who popularised the idea of banging pots and pans as a non-violent act of resistance to the military junta’s rule. Wai Moe Naing was arrested on 15 April 2021 by junta forces after they reportedly used an unmarked vehicle to ram Wai Moe Naing while he was driving on a moped as part of a protest rally in the Monywa district. When he tried to escape on foot, a group of armed men disembarked and attacked him and a female protestor before detaining them both. On 12 August 2022, Wai Moe Naing was found guilty of multiple counts of incitement under section 505(A) of Myanmar’s Penal Code, which has been routinely used by the military junta to target critics of the regime. Following his conviction, Wai Moe Naing was initially sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment. According to reports, Wai Moe Naing did not appeal the court’s ruling, stating that the allegations were not committed by him, so there was nothing to appeal. On 20 October 2022, Wai Moe Naing was sentenced to a further four years’ imprisonment on an additional count of incitement and for violating Article 25 of Natural Disaster Management Law, a charge that has been cynically used to clamp down on public rallies following the authorities' classification of COVID-19 as a 'natural disaster'. On 5 April 2023, Wai Moe Naing was convicted of several charges, including rioting, robbery and incitement, and sentenced to a further 20 years’ imprisonment, resulting in a cumulative total of 34 years in prison. For more information about PEN International’s work on Myanmar please see Impunity Reigns – Writers resist, PEN International’s 2022 Case List, which documents 115 cases of persecuted writers worldwide, including Wai Moe Naing..."
Source/publisher: PEN International
Date of entry/update: 2023-05-26
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Title: International coordination meeting on Myanmar sanctions efforts
Sub-title: UK Sanctions Coordinator met with US, EU and Canadian counterparts to discuss continued cooperation on Myanmar sanctions efforts.
Description: "On 24 May, the Sanctions Coordinators for the United Kingdom, United States, Canada, and the services in charge of sanctions policy and implementation of the European Commission and the European External Action Service met to continue to assess and align ongoing efforts related to sanctions on Myanmar. The partners discussed the significant scope of actions taken since the military coup in February 2021, ongoing coordination efforts, and the importance of continued information and target sharing to support sanctions packages. The UK announced further sanctions on 31 January and 27 March 2023, targeting suppliers to the Myanmar regime of military equipment and other material being used to attack its civilians. The partners identified the continued need for sustained direct cooperation in order to restrict the regime’s ability to carry out atrocities against the people of Myanmar and pressure the regime to change course to restore the country’s path toward genuine and inclusive democracy..."
Source/publisher: Govt. UK (London)
Date of entry/update: 2023-05-25
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Title: More Than 40 Tanintharyi Civilians Detained by Myanmar Junta in Week
Description: "Myanmar’s junta troops have detained more than 40 civilians within a week over alleged links to resistance groups in Tanintharyi Region. Resistance groups have stepped up attacks on regime forces in Myanmar’s southernmost region, leading to retaliation against civilians. On Tuesday Guerilla Dawei and Dawei Dragon People’s Defence Force raided Launglon Township police station, the regime’s military intelligence and immigration offices. The groups issued a statement saying the operations did not involve the Launglon community. But the junta later detained four Launglon civilians, Ko Hlaing Nay Oo, Ma Swe Zin Htet, Ma Thet Thet Aye and her husband, according to residents. On Tuesday a junta convoy was attacked with a bomb near Kyauk Ka Nyar village in Yebyu Township, injuring an officer. On Wednesday troops raided homes in the village and detained 20 residents. Arrests were also reported in Palaw, Tanintharyi, Dawei and Thayetchaung townships. Seven Kyauk Kar villagers in Palaw Township were detained on May 19 after a junta-appointed administrator was killed by a resistance bomb. At the weekend 10 owners of food and grocery stalls and tea shops in Yay Phyu village, Tanintharyi Township, were detained after junta informants reported that resistance groups bought food from them, residents said. Only five have been released. A man and couple in Tanintharyi Township were detained after at least five junta troops were killed in a resistance bomb attack, a resident said. Six Pa Nat Nge villagers were detained in the township and they remain in custody, a resident told The Irrawaddy. In Dawei, 12 people were detained as human shields after resistance groups in the township ambushed troops on their way back from burning down houses in U Yin Gyi village on Saturday. A 17-year-old was held after the others were freed when the troops reached safety. The teenager reportedly remains in detention because of what the troops found on his phone. His condition is unknown. On Sunday Maung Kyaw Htet Aung, 17, and a female 15-year-old were detained in Thayetchaung Township after their phones were inspected by junta troops at a checkpoint. “Their parents are very concerned for them. Now they are still being detained and interrogated,” said a relative of Maung Kyaw Htet Aung. Wai Yan Soe, a student activist in Dawei. said the junta was now behaving in Tanintharyi Region like it always had in Myanmar’s ethnic-minority states. “People must be careful and should stay alert to the dangers at all times,” he added. Southern Monitor, which researches the conflict in Tanintharyi Region, reported that at least 394 people have been killed and over 28,000 displaced since the 2021 coup..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update: 2023-05-25
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Title: National Unity Government - Statement No. 07/2023
Description: "The National Unity Government of Myanmar calls today on the Chair of ASEAN, Republic of Indonesia and member states of ASEAN to withdraw the invitation that has been issued to Thet Khaing Win, a minister of State Administration Council (SAC) of Myanmar, to attend meetings with ASEAN Health Ministers. Since his appointment by the military council, Thet Khaing Win has presided over the complete collapse of Myanmar's healthcare system. He is placing all our children, the future of the country at high risk by aiding and abetting and advising the military junta to block immunization program and delivery of medications to millions of children throughout the country. An entire population of people with health needs – from children needing vaccines to adults with chronic and emergency health conditions - is being starved of the international help they need. He is directly responsible by his acts and his omissions for immense human suffering. The military council of which he is a cabinet member has continued to target hospitals and medical professionals. Hospitals have been attacked from the air and patients have been slaughtered in their beds. Eighty-eight health workers have been murdered for seeking to fulfil their vocations since February 2021. Many now languish in prisons. Attacks on healthcare violate international humanitarian law and article 19 of Geneva Convention. Thet Khaing Win is an abuser of human rights, actively denying healthcare to the people of his country. Thet Khaing Win is under sanction from the United States, the European Union, Switzerland and other countries. The invitation issued to Thet Khaing Win to attend the ASEAN Finance and Health Ministers Meetings in Jakarta on 24-25 August will bring shame upon ASEAN, and will diminish ASEAN's repeated commitments to support human rights in Myanmar. The people of Myanmar look to ASEAN to uphold their right to health, and not to give comfort to a man who is stripping this right from them. He has no place amongst ASEAN's health leaders and must be excluded from these meetings..."
Source/publisher: National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update: 2023-05-25
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Title: Five British Insurers Added to ‘Dirty List’ for Aviation Fuel Deliveries to Burma
Description: "FIVE BRITISH INSURERS ADDED TO ‘DIRTY LIST’ FOR AVIATION FUEL DELIVERIES TO BURMA May 23, 2023 FacebookTwitterWhatsApp Burma Campaign UK added five British insurance companies to the ‘Dirty List’ after they failed to give a commitment to stop providing insurance cover for deliveries of aviation fuel to Burma. The five companies are: UK P&I, Steamship Mutual, Britannia P&I, North Standard and Shipowners’ Club. They are mutual insurance clubs which have provided insurance cover (protection and indemnity (P&I) insurance) to vessels which have delivered aviation fuel to Burma. Their role in the supply chain delivering aviation fuel to Burma was exposed in the Amnesty International Report, Deadly Cargo. The report is available here. “The Burmese military are using airstrikes indiscriminately against civilians, even against schools and hospitals, and insurance is a vital part of the supply chain delivering aviation fuel to Burma,” said Mark Farmaner, Director of Burma Campaign UK. Since the Burmese military began its attempted coup on 1 February 2021, it has increasingly used airstrikes to try to gain control over the country. On 11th April, a Burmese military airstrike in the Sagaing Region in the north of Burma killed around 170 people, including around 40 children. In February 2022 the British government issued guidance to British companies to avoid involvement in the supply of aviation fuel to the Burmese military. These companies are ignoring the guidance. “These insurance clubs have clearly taken a decision not to add delivery of aviation fuel to their cover exclusions, despite knowing this means they may insure aviation fuel that reaches the Burmese military and is used to kill civilians,” said Mark Farmaner. “This is the definition of putting profit before principle.”..."
Source/publisher: "Burma Campaign UK" (London)
Date of entry/update: 2023-05-23
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Title: Human Rights Situation weekly update (May 15 to 21, 2023)
Description: "Military junta troops launched an airstrike and dropped bombs in Myawaddy, Kayin State and Demoso, Kayah State from May 15th to 21st. Junta troops also launched an airstrike, dropped bombs and cut off the Tele communication and mobile data in Mawlite Township, Sagaing Region.Military Junta troops arrested ‌about 60 civilians including the children from Kani Township and Shwebo Township in Sagaing Region as hostages. The military’s head of the prison in Thayarwady Prison established a terrorist group named Eagle Group in the prison and ordered them to commit human rights abuses against the relocated political prisoners by beating, torturing, and forcing labor in Thayarwady Prison. Military Junta troops and Pyusawhtee force arrested the locals, threatened and still extorted money in Shwebo Township and Kyunhla Township in Sagaing Region. In the East Bago region, the military troops arrested the civilians who were crossing the 4 miles gate which is part of the Taungoo- Thandaung Road and extorted from them.4 civilians died including a child and 2 were injured by the Military’s heavy and light attacks..."
Source/publisher: Network for Human Rights Documentation-Burma
Date of entry/update: 2023-05-22
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Title: ASEAN Must Change Or Face Inevitable Decline – Analysis
Description: "The 42nd ASEAN Summit and Related Meetings in Indonesia remain the most critical crossroads for the immediate and long term relevance and fate of ASEAN’s role in the region and beyond. It exposes the most consequential crossroads with the lingering Myanmar debacle that bears the futility of ASEAN’s approach, unchecked tensions in the South China Sea, futile efforts for conflict prevention mechanisms, growing autocratic trends and disregard for human rights and other structural economic and geopolitical challenges, both cumulatively and further erode ASEAN’s relevance and expose its deep lying systemic weaknesses. ASEAN was born out of a common fear of communism and external threat, and it remains the same for now. However, the capacity to stand up to external threats from a collective joint deterrence and capacity point of view remains lost. Indonesia will want to be seen as the ever strong ASEAN leader and will want to take lead in solving the Myanmar issue and in providing a clear platform and guidelines for South China Sea stability through fast tracked Code of Conduct (CoC) and a flurry of backdoor diplomacy for Myanmar. It races against time and pressure to be seen as the most important regional and ASEAN leader, fresh from its G20 and global diplomatic success, and would want to set the right tone before handing over to Laos, knowing well that by then, momentum might drop due to entrenched affiliation with Beijing and the potential pressure applied, as happened previously. The Myanmar crisis and the growing tensions in the South China Sea are just two of the main indicators highlighting the failed approach of ASEAN in being limited by its inability to exert credible and solid measures. Jakarta realizes this, and so do other member states. However, decades of stable status quo benefit derivation have created a common reluctance for significant shifts that would alter regime and regional security. Historical regional cohesiveness in the region is primarily tied by trade and economic relativity and common yearning for security assurances. The region is primarily shaped by economic and security importance, and openings for value based and normative moral high ground for strong value driven developmental essence are inadequate, unlike the EU.The region remains trapped by its own ignorance and utopian belief of its decades old ASEAN Way approach and de-escalation of conflict through idealistic dependence on non-confrontational approach and conflict prevention mechanisms through its different tiers and channels of dialogues. Fears and wariness on China’s ambitions for the region, the quest to deny the West’s containment foothold in the region, the agenda in the South China Sea and the fallout of a full blown Taiwan conflict, all create a perfect firestorm for both a declining impact of dialogue building efforts and the efficacy of confidence building measures. The West sees ASEAN as a lost cause in standing up against China and containment measures, while China wants ASEAN to remain in its status quo of neutrality, which means a freer option for China to expand its grip and reign and a denial of space for the West. ASEAN has repeatedly yearned for stability and status quo, in fear of a repeat of the Cold War divide and has created a flurry of mechanisms from the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) to the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and SEANWFZ,among others, but has been futile and toothless in getting the required stability in the SCS with a toothless response to Beijing’s coercive tactics. The desired stability and peace has failed to materialise and the efforts have been threatened by the growing security dilemma and eventual arms race in the scramble for survival. It cannot shed its trap of its founding principles, and cannot afford to intimidate Beijing, while at the same time cannot solicit greater Western assurances either. It remains trapped in its own worst game. ASEAN has no capacity in hard or soft power to push for greater deterrence in order to secure its aim of stability in the region, and will need external involvement and support. Ironically, this will also break its own yearning for neutrality. Years of ASEAN and regional strategic ambiguity and strategic status quo maintenance have only provided a three pronged result. Firstly, it gives ASEAN the weakest returns and makes it even weaker with its trapped dogma and inability to provide credible solutions apart from the futile preventive mechanisms and confidence building measures. Secondly, it denies the full space needed for the West to galvanise collective regional cohesion and unity in creating a more able and credible shield and deterrent effectiveness. Thirdly, it gives Beijing the biggest space and green light to further deepen its hard power postures and build on the increasing pie of influence and dominance in the South China Sea and the region. The divide is apparent and growing as a result, in the continental state grip (Laos, Myanmar and Cambodia) and the archipelago states (Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Philippines) The region and ASEAN bask in the false sense of security from its avoidance of the hard truth and in refraining from directly challenging the risks in the region, while hoping for tacit Western counterbalancing act especially in direct economic and trade support. While the region has no qualms in being quick to embrace RCEP, the BRI and direct economic overtures from Beijing, it faces a reluctant move to quickly embrace the IPEF. The Indo Pacific Economic Forum (IPEF) is no match for its Chinese counterparts in terms of capital and trade capacity, and it does come with the moral high ground values of labour standards, climate initiatives, normative democratic adherence and human rights. All these are as unappealing to the region as a carrot to a lion. The SEANWFZ is a futile effort from the start, as none of the big nuclear powers has signed and that China would use this as an opening to state its soft power push by having the narrative that it has the nuclear and global responsibility to sign unlike the West, all the while knowing that it can always have the option to ignore the agreement should push comes to shove, just like what it did in the 2016 arbitration ruling on the SCS. The same goes for the CoC, the same opening exploited by Beijing to portray its diplomatic clout and to buy support, but knowing full well that it still can dictate the same moves should they be warranted. Declining deterrence impact will only worsen the depth of the arms race, and further weaken the region’s collective resolve. There is only so much the returns from Track I and II diplomacy can do, if policymakers are reluctant to initiate bold changes to the set-up. Hypocrisy and self-trap are laid bare, from the chastising of Washington for doing so little for ASEAN financially and economically but continued to yearn for its defensive support, to pushing for deeper Washington trade commitment but boasting of its strict neutrality approach. ASEAN needed external capacity to effectively enforce binding agreements in the future CoC or to keep UNCLOS adherence, but cannot afford to directly solicit these hard power deterrence and to maintain ASEAN’s concept. AUKUS is actually serving as the most effective deterrent, and ASEAN knows it will help, but cannot welcome it due to its self limitation. Direct bilateral defence engagement and overtures and agreements with the West as can be seen now in the Philippines and increasingly others, are meant to secure individual states but also will give the region needed assurance and credible hard power deterrence. ASEAN needs to change its principles and be bold in calling out law defying behaviours by external parties, especially China, to ensure that it walks the talk of maintaining regional stability. Failure to address the current systemic shortcomings will see it fade into irrelevance. For it to be relevant in the future, changes in its orientations and non interference stand are a must. It will have to adopt a more EU-like common policy on defence and re-enact movements of the old SEATO concept with the help of the West with a regional NATO like framework. This remains the realistic and needed framework in dealing with both Beijing’s increasing bellicosity and continuous strategy in the region and in ensuring ASEAN’s strength and relevance. The founding principles of non interference and consensus decision making have what held member states together, forming a platform for the autocrats, monarchs, democracies. These principles assured the regime survival and security from the prying interference and influence by external parties and ASEAN. These also serve as the needed assurance against third party and external influencing factors and the need to cede sovereignty in certain segments to a supranational entity like the EU. However, the negative implications have been proven to serve more towards regional short term interests and individual internal regime security more than future long term collective interests. Mutual distrusts and mistrusts, economic disparity, intra trade deficiencies, redundancy, internal peer competition – these are some of the many structural deficiencies affecting ASEAN. The returns from ASEAN affiliation as a grouping are dwindling in the long term, as member states seek external support individually to safeguard their survival. External moves on individual states including Japan’s OSA, upcoming potential JAPHUS alliance , individual direct bilateral engagement by external powers and others, all reflect the failed efficacy of ASEAN. It has also given rise to various mini lateral engagements, each with a specific tailor made agenda in upping the survival interests of states. Erosion of trust and stability in expectations and predictions of behaviours have further pushed member states to seek their own survival and assurances and gave rise to arms race and perpetual security dilemma. ASEAN remains ill equipped to handle the fallout from South China Sea or the potentiality of a full blown Taiwanese conflict. The ASEAN Outlook on the Indo Pacific offers nothing more than the usual parameters of safe play and continuous dependence on futile past efforts. By harping on diplomatic moves through quiet and backdoor approaches and expanded dialogue mechanisms, these only provide temporary cooling off measures without tackling the root causes of regional security dilemma, arms race and prisoner’s dilemma. ASEAN now faces critical crossroads and tough choice to make, it has been trapped between a rock and a hard place for decades, but lack the audacity to implement significant changes.It wanted to remain neutral and hoping that this will prevent the worst outcome and will bring desired stability, but has persistently failed. ASEAN members will prioritise their own national survival and interests above the interests of the region and the grouping, with little interest to commit more than desired especially regarding the political survival of the ruling regimes and governments. Little incentivisation efforts can be seen in chasing the regional standard of imposing greater rules, criteria and norms in setting the high standards and concepts of regionalism as in the case of the EU. Lacking a rewarding, resilient and sustainable future and returns from the regional grouping in the long term projection, member states find better stature and assurances from the existing external power that provides these lifelines and assurances. The time is now for ASEAN leaders to be fully committed and open to admitting the mistakes of the past, and for them to chart their own legacy to enact credible changes that will ensure the region’s future sustainability and survival. It will not be their legacy alone, as it will provide lasting assurances and legacies for the nations..."
Source/publisher: "Eurasia Review"
Date of entry/update: 2023-05-19
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Title: MFA Spokesperson’s Comments on the Report of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar
Description: "In response to media queries on the latest report released by United Nations Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar Tom Andrews, the MFA Spokesperson said: “UN Special Rapporteur Tom Andrews noted in his report that the Singapore Government prohibits the transfer of arms to Myanmar. Singapore also does not authorise the transfer of dual-use items which have been assessed to have potential military application to Myanmar where there is a serious risk that they may be used to inflict violence against unarmed civilians. Special Rapporteur Andrews has also noted that “there are no indications the Government of Singapore has approved, or is involved in, the shipment of arms and associated materials to the Myanmar military.” Singapore has taken a principled position against the Myanmar military’s use of lethal force against unarmed civilians and has worked to prevent the flow of arms into Myanmar as called for in United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolution A/RES/75/287 “The Situation in Myanmar”. We appreciate the Special Rapporteur’s efforts to provide information to aid Singapore’s investigations into whether any offences were committed under Singapore law. Singapore will not hesitate to take action against any individual or entity which contravenes our laws. In the meantime, the Singapore Government remains committed to providing humanitarian assistance to support the people of Myanmar. We will continue to work with our fellow ASEAN Member States and the United Nations to facilitate peace and national reconciliation in Myanmar.”..."
Source/publisher: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Singapore
Date of entry/update: 2023-05-19
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Title: Myanmar Junta Court Hands Death Sentence to 5 Resistance Members
Description: "Five resistance members accused of shooting dead four police officers on a Yangon train were sentenced to death by a junta court at Insein Prison on Monday, according to lawyers familiar with the case. Suspects Ko Kyaw Win Soe, Ko Kaung Pyae Sone Oo, Ko San Min Aung, Ko Zayar Phyoe and Ma Myat Phyo Pwint were handed death sentences under the counter-terrorism law and separately given life sentences under the Arms Act (1949). A court source confirmed the sentence, saying Monday’s verdicts were delivered by a civilian court rather than martial court, as in previous such cases. On August 14, 2021, six policemen working as guards on a Circular Railway train travelling from Yangon’s Central Station to Kyemindaing in the city’s west were shot at close range by three members of an anti-regime urban guerrilla group. Four of the police officers were killed on the spot while two were injured, and their firearms seized. The targeted attack came one week after five resistance movement members jumped to their deaths from a four-story building to evade raiding troops. Two of the five died on the spot. In September, the regime arrested five out of 16 people it suspected of being involved in the train attack. The Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP) also verified that five men detained over the incident were sentenced to death this week. AAPP said in its daily brief issued yesterday that since the February 1, 2021, coup, a total of 3,520 people, including pro-democracy activists and civilians, have been killed in military crackdowns against the pro-democracy movement. Junta courts have sentenced a total of 158 people to death since the coup. Among those executed were four prominent pro-democracy figures including politicians U Jimmy and Ko Phyo Zeya Thaw..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update: 2023-05-19
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Title: Myanmar Protest Leader Gets Extra 20 Years in Jail for High Treason
Description: "Jailed anti-junta protest leader Ko Wai Moe Naing was found guilty of high treason on Friday and sentenced to an additional 20 years by a junta court on Friday, taking his total sentence to 54 years. The 28-year-old pro-democracy activist was violently arrested on April 15, 2021, when junta troops rammed him with a car as he led a motorbike protest in Monywa, Sagaing Region. Ko Wai Moe Naing has faced 10 charges, including sedition, unlawful assembly, abduction with the intent to murder, murder and treason, for his role in Monywa’s protests after the February 1 coup. The junta sentenced him to 34 years in prison under eight charges. The Monywa Prison court on Friday used Article 122 of the Penal Code to add 20 years to his sentence for high treason. A source said Ko Wai Moe Naing saw his mother for a few minutes and was in good health. Monywa People’s Strike Committee denounced the sentence and called for the release of all political prisoners. “Regime leader Min Aung Hlaing and his fellow junta leaders are the only people to have committed high treason,” the committee said on Friday. Ko Wai Moe Naing, a former student union leader and committee member, has been held in Monywa Prison since his arrest. He also faces another murder charge in relation to the killing of two police officers. Since the 2021 coup, more than 3,500 people have been killed and over 22,400 people have been incarcerated with around 18,000 still behind bars, according to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update: 2023-05-19
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Title: Open Letter to G7 on the worrying state of human rights and democracy in Myanmar and Cambodia
Description: "To: G7 Leaders H.E. Justin Trudeau, Prime Minister of Canada H.E. Emmanuel Macron, President of France H.E. Olaf Scholz, Chancellor of Germany H.E. Giorgio Meloni, Prime Minister of Italy H.E. Fumio Kushida, Prime Minister of Japan H.E. Rishi Sunak, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom H.E. Joseph R. Biden, President of the United States of America 19 May 2023 Your Excellencies, We, ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights, are writing to express our grave concerns about the state of human rights and democracy in Southeast Asia, particularly with regard to Myanmar and Cambodia. We are monitoring the increasing authoritarian tendencies in the region, with continued human rights violations and attacks on political opponents and activists by authoritarian governments in Brunei, Viet Nam, and Lao PDR, as well as a trend of shrinking civic space, even in nominally democratic countries such as Indonesia, Singapore and the Philippines. We are deeply troubled by these developments, and we believe that if the situations in Myanmar and Cambodia are allowed to go on without a serious response from the international community, repressive and undemocratic regimes will be further emboldened, endangering the progress in democracy and human rights that has been achieved in the region in the past few decades. Since the coup d’etat led by Senior General Min Aung Hlaing in February 2021, the political and humanitarian situation in the country has continued to deteriorate and has reached alarming levels. In the past two years, the Myanmar military has waged an all-out war on its own people, through he arbitrary arrests of thousands of anti-junta activists and their family members; the routine use of torture of detainees, often with lethal consequences; the shooting of unarmed protesters, air strikes against civilians in Myanmar’s ethnic areas, the burning of whole villagers, and extrajudicial killings. Last year, the junta also executed four political prisoners, including former lawmaker Phyo Zeya Thaw and prominent activist Kyaw Min Yu, widely known as ‘Ko Jimmy’. These death sentences were the first known judicial executions in Myanmar since 1988 and show the increasing brutality of Min Aung Hlaing’s regime. Most recently, air strikes in the Sagaing Region have killed more than 160 civilians, including children. According to an investigation by Human Rights Watch, the Myanmar military used “thermobaric” munitions during the air strikes, a violation of international human rights law and an apparent war crime. Throughout all these atrocities, the junta has largely gone unchecked. While ASEAN leaders agreed on a Five-Point Consensus on Myanmar with Min Aung Hlaing in April 2021, the junta leader has since clearly demonstrated that he has no intention to abide by the agreement, and ASEAN leaders have displayed little desire to pressure him to do so. The latest statement from the regional bloc following the 42nd ASEAN Summit earlier this month shows an utter lack of urgency and gives little hope that ASEAN will change its approach to Myanmar. The International Parliamentary Inquiry into the global response to the Myanmar coup (IPI), which was organized by APHR, wrote in its final report last year that the international community has largely failed to support the pro-democracy movement in Myanmar. It is more crucial than ever to correct this failure and make sure that the junta faces consequences for its actions and put an end to their ability to bring further death and destruction upon the people of Myanmar. We therefore urge the G7 to take swift and firm measures against the illegal military junta led by Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, and provide real assistance to the pro-democracy forces in Myanmar. Those measures should include targeted economic sanctions against the military junta, a comprehensive arms embargo including on aviation fuel, and referral of the situation in Myanmar to the International Criminal Court or the establishment of an ad hoc tribunal. Another worrying situation is the one in Cambodia, whose continuing descent into authoritarianism is of great concern and does not bode well for the region. The situation related to human rights and democracy has drastically deteriorated in Cambodia in recent years, notably since Prime Minister Hun Sen used the country’s courts to dissolve the opposition Cambodia National Rescue Party (CNRP) in 2017, shortly after it had run his Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) close in successive nationwide elections. This year alone, Hun Sen has openly threatened opposition supporters with legal and physical violence, while his regime has shut down one of the country’s last remaining independent media outlets Voice of Democracy (VOD) and sentenced former CNRP leader Kem Sokha to 27 years of house arrest on trumped-up treason charges. Earlier this week, the Cambodian National Election Commission (NEC) rejected the registration of the main opposition Candlelight Party for the upcoming July elections on administrative grounds, in what was clearly a manufactured bureaucratic obstacle designed to block the Candlelight Party from competing in the elections by any means possible. The government of Hun Sen appears determined to drive the final nail into the coffin of Cambodia’s democracy, which is guaranteed by the Paris Peace Agreements of 1991. Any elections held under the present circumstances cannot possibly be free and fair. We therefore urge the G7 to pressure the Cambodian government to unconditionally release all political prisoners, halt the constant harassment and prosecution of political opponents, and allow for the will of the people to prevail through a free and fair electoral process, first by creating an environment that allows for opposition parties to register for and compete in the upcoming elections. If the Hun Sen regime persists in trying to hamstring the opposition, then the G7 must refuse to accord legitimacy to July elections as it is becoming increasingly clear that Hun Sen is intent on using the elections as just another tool to consolidate his power. Unless the international community takes some form of action now, nothing will prevent Hun Sen from further solidifying his decades-long dictatorship by eliminating any semblance of a democratic system. Your Excellencies, as you yourselves have come to power in democratically-held elections in countries with strong human rights protections, we are sure that you recognize and understand the importance of human rights and democracy to the prosperity and well-being of a nation. We have confidence in your commitment to these principles and hope that you will demonstrate that commitment by coming to the aid of the people of Myanmar and Cambodia. Recognizing the powerful role you play as leaders of the largest advanced economies in the world, we urge you to take immediate and decisive action to change the course in both countries. Doing so will have a significant impact on neighboring countries in Southeast Asia and will pave the way for a more politically stable region where lasting peace becomes attainable and where economic development can take place with the people’s best interests at the center.
Source/publisher: ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights
Date of entry/update: 2023-05-19
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Title: Signs of desperation as the Myanmar junta rotates commanders
Sub-title: The rotation will bring in new commanders showing even less restraint in targeting civilians to please the junta.
Description: "Holed up in his palace in Naypyitaw, Myanmar Senior Gen. Min Aung Hlaing, must be apoplectic. Over two years since seizing power in the Feb. 1, 2021 coup, the military has still not consolidated power. Despite vowing to crush the opposition, the junta leader had to acknowledge recently that 132 of Myanmar’s 330 townships–42 percent–were not under government control. The shadow opposition National Unity Government, their People’s Defense Forces (PDFs), and allied ethnic resistance organizations, have held their own and enjoy overwhelming popular legitimacy. The military’s supply lines, through the once safe ethnic majority Bamar heartland, are increasingly vulnerable and casualties are mounting. The exasperation of the leadership is palpable and manifest in several key ways. First, the military has increased its attacks on civilians in an attempt to terrorize them into submission through collective punishments and reprisals. The military is waging a scorched earth campaign and has arsoned over 65,000 homes, 48,000 in Sagaing alone. The regime has stepped up their use of air assaults, a glaring admission that they are unable to deploy troops on the ground. And when they do, they will often dragoon civilians to serve as human shields. Second, the regime has increased their reliance on pro-military militias and death squads. Third, so desperate to defeat the NUG this year, the military increased its own budget by 51 percent, despite the moribund economy and diminished revenue streams. Fourth, the regime has increased its cash rewards for members of the PDFs to surrender with their weapons. These offers are clearly caveated and do not amount to blanket immunity, but the expenditures do factor in the soaring rates of poverty caused by the junta’s mismanagement. Fifth, when things are going badly, the military leadership tends to micromanage. In February, Min Aung Hlaing met with the leadership of the Western Command in Rakhine. The following month, he made an inspection tour of the headquarters of the Northwest Command that is overseeing the campaigns in Sagaing and Chin States. The previous month, the junta placed 14 townships in Sagaing, five in the Magway region, and four in Chin state under martial law. These trips outside of Naypyitaw are all the more notable because Min Aung Hlaing rarely leaves the fortress capital, and he travels with a small army of bodyguards.. That’s no profile in courage compared to the NUG’s acting president, Duwa Lashi La, who has made multiple trips to visit front line troops. Light Infantry Divisions But an unappreciated sign of frustration is the rotation of commanders in the face of battlefield losses and failed offensives. Myanmar’s military is divided into 14 different Regional Commands and six Bureaus of Special Operations. Myanmar’s military is smaller than often reported, roughly 150,000 soldiers, with the air force and navy adding 50-60,000 more personnel. Yet only 70,000 are frontline troops. The majority of kinetic operations are conducted by 10 Light Infantry Divisions (LIDs), which should be about 20,000 men in total, divided into roughly 100 battalions. The Light Infantry Battalions are the shock and awe troops. They are the best armed and equipped, the most mobile, and by far the most lethal. They are operating at a decreased levels. According to Ye Myo Hein, the majority of these are under 150 men each, well below the already lowered 200-man floor. They are the troops that the regime has relied on to achieve its strategic goals, including the 2017-2018 ethnic cleansing of the Rohingya. Today the 99th LID’s such as the “Ogre Column” in Sagaing do the bulk of the scorched earth operations against civilians. The majority of forces are territorial, and deployed in static and defensive positions, where they are increasingly surrounded and harassed by PDFs and EROs. Their resupply of food, munitions, and fuel is increasingly perilous and sporadic. Estimates of the current strength of LIDs, given a conservative casualty rate of 15 percent, is around 16-17,000 men. Recruitment has slowed and the operational tempo for the troops is unsustainable. All of this compounds poor battlefield performance and the frustration of the leadership. Even fewer restraints in targeting One of the most important indicators of the regime’s frustration is rotation of operational commanders. Between February 2021 and July 2022, only two of the 14 regional military commanders were rotated. In August 2022, five were replaced. Since then, four more others were rotated out, including Major General Myat Thet Oo, the Southeastern Commander in March 2023. Two other lieutenant generals, Khin Hlaing and Thant Hlaing who oversaw operations in Karen and Sagaing States were sacked in February-March 2022. Since October 2022, three commanders of the six Bureaus of Special Operations, all lieutenant generals, have likewise been rotated out. At the operational level, there have been fewer rotations in the past six months than expected. The 11th LID commander was promoted to be the commander of the Southeast Regional Military Command. But the heads of the 44th and 77th were transferred to non-operational billets. The commander of the 88th LID had a horizontal transfer to the 77th. Part of this is the annual reshuffle, though the tempo has increased in the past six months. Almost all of these officers moved on to non-operational positions including at the Myanmar Economic Corporation or the Defense Services Technological Academy. The junta is careful to make sure all get soft landings. Issues around the rotation of operational level leaders are compounded by battlefield losses, which are not insignificant. Between January 2023 and mid-May, 20 mid-level officers were killed, including four colonels, six lieutenant colonels, and 10 majors, based on open source reporting. While a sign of frustration, the rotation of commanders is bad news for Myanmar’s people. The replacements will be even more sycophantic and slavish to the State Administrative Council leadership. Zealotry and a desire to prove themselves will lead to even fewer restraints in targeting. While the NUG has outperformed militarily, it’s incumbent that the regime’s colonels and one-star generals–the people who actually have to execute the war and who are not getting their cut of the windfall of plundered wealth that the leaders of the SAC are taking for themselves–realize that the war cannot be won. The rotation of commanders should be a further reminder, not just a sign of the leadership’s exasperation..."
Source/publisher: "RFA" (USA)
Date of entry/update: 2023-05-19
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Title: UN expert says Myanmar imported $1 billion in arms since coup, much of it from Russia and China
Description: "Myanmar’s ruling military junta has imported at least $1 billion in weapons and military-related equipment since its bloody coup, according to a new United Nations report which said much of the equipment was coming from individuals and businesses in Russia, China and Singapore. Army general Min Aung Hlaing seized power in February 2021, ending Myanmar’s brief experiment with democracy, jailing former leader Aung San Suu Kyi and plunging the impoverished Southeast Asian nation into a raging civil conflict that continues to this day. Battles between the military and resistance groups unfold daily across the country. Airstrikes and ground attacks on what the military calls “terrorist” targets occur regularly and have killed thousands of civilians, often including children, according to monitoring group. Whole villages have been burned down by junta soldiers and schools, clinics and hospitals destroyed as a result of the attacks, according to local monitoring groups. Tom Andrews, the UN Special Rapporteur on Myanmar, published a new report on Wednesday that detailed transfers of arms and raw materials and identified “254 unique suppliers” to the Myanmar military since the coup. “Since the coup, the Myanmar military has imported at least $1 billion worth of arms and dual use goods to support the military’s domestic arms manufacturing,” Andrews wrote. In 94% of the transactions Myanmar’s military was listed as the ultimate receiver “eliminating any doubt of who the end recipient would be,” Andrews added. The report, which used trade data and spanned more than 50 pages, listed $406 million in sales from Russian entities and $267 million from China, including some state-owned companies. The report also found $254 million in imports originating from Singapore. Andrews said he received no informatio indicating that the government of Singapore had approved military sales or transferred arms to Myanmar’s military – unlike with Russia and China. In response to a request for comment from CNN, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs accused the special rapporteur of going “beyond his own authorization to smear normal military trade of sovereign countries without warrant, distorting facts and confusing the public.” The comments did not address the specific allegations or transactions detailed in Andrews’ report. CNN has also approached authorities in Russia and Singapore for a response on the report’s findings. Citing a recent deadly attack carried out last month by the Myanmar Air Force on a village in the northwestern Sagaing region, the UN report listed several weapons which were used that included Yak-130 aircraft and Mi-35 helicopters supplied by Russia and raw materials from “private entities in Singapore, China and Thailand.” “Bombs were released over Pazigyi village in the Kanbalu township, Sagaing region… hitting their intended target: a ceremony attended by approximately 300 people, including dozens of children, marking the opening of a (local) administrativae office,” the report said. “The ordinance detonated with deadly impact – ripping the bodies of men, women and children open, turning their skin to ash and inflicting critical shrapnel wounds.” “The attack is yet another example of the Myanmar junta’s probable crimes against humanity and war crimes… and also how (it) is using internationally supplied arms and associated materials to commit atrocities,” the UN said. Andrews said sanctions against Myanmar’s generals were “easily circumvented” and ineffective. “Those providing these weapons are able to avoid sanctions by using front companies and creating new ones while counting on lax enforcement,” Andrews said. “The good news is that we now know who is supplying these arms and the jurisdictions in which they operate. Member states now need to step up and stop the flow of these arms.” He called on the international community to stop more arms from going to the Myanmar military. Singapore has previously addressed the topic of arms sales to Myanmar since the coup. Speaking during a parliamentary session in February, Foreign Affairs Minister Vivian Balakrishnan addressed allegations from experts at the Special Advisory Council for Myanmar (SAC-M) who claimed that Singapore was “functioning as a strategic transit point for potentially significant volumes of items” contributing toward military production by the Myanmar military. “Singapore complies strictly with our international obligations on international arms sales and transfers, as well as UN sanctions and embargoes against any country,” Balakrishnan said. “Singapore submits regular reports to the UN Register of Conventional Arms… the government of Singapore decided to prohibit the transfer of arms to Myanmar and also decided not to authorize the transfer of dual-use items assessed to have potential military application to Myanmar.” “We will not hesitate to take action against those who contravene our laws.”...ဓ
Source/publisher: "CNN" (USA)
Date of entry/update: 2023-05-19
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Title: U.S. Embassy Statement on Cyclone Mocha Response Efforts
Description: "As the widespread devastation caused by Cyclone Mocha becomes known, we join the people of Myanmar in mourning those lost and are taking immediate action to support humanitarian response efforts. Through the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the United States is providing an initial $200,000 to supplement ongoing relief activities. This additional funding will provide for critical shelter, water, sanitation, and hygiene assistance in Rakhine and Chin States. In the days prior to Cyclone Mocha’s landfall, U.S. government partners mobilized humanitarian response operations, including prepositioning emergency food, shelter materials, core relief items, and medical supplies. The U.S. government is working with partners on the ground to evaluate impact and priority needs. It is critical that humanitarian organizations be able to access and serve those communities most in need. The United States is committed to continuing to help those affected in the days, weeks, and months ahead..."
Source/publisher: U.S. Embassy in Burma
Date of entry/update: 2023-05-17
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Title: Tortured, beheaded and dismembered
Sub-title: A series of violent events in Sagaing
Description: "WARNING: GRAPHIC - This report contains extremely graphic imagery and links to graphic imagery shared online. While efforts have been made to blur details, the report contains information which some readers may find distressing. To read the full report, download the PDF. Key Event Details Location of Incidents: Ma Le Thar village (မလဲသာ) (22.115030, 95.455742) in Ayadaw township Pa Dat Taing village (ပဒတ္တိုင်း) (22.074770, 95.448303) in Myinmu township Kan Taw village (ကန်တော်) (22.027901,95.569941) in Myinmu township Tar Taing village (တာတိုင်) (21.933220, 95.644867) in Sagaing township Let Ka Pin village (လက္ကပင်) (21.87949944, 95.48097992) in Myinmu township Swea Lwe Oh village (ဆွဲလွဲအို) (21.79330063, 95.3681488) in Myaung township Than Bo village (သံဘို) (22.72942924, 95.67418671) in Khin-U township Ta Ga Nan village (တဂဏန်း) (22.53455925, 95.68533325) in Shwebo township Date/Time of Incident: Multiple events between 23 February and 2 April 2023 Alleged Perpetrator(s) and/or Involvement: Light Infantry Division (LID) 99, based in Meikhtila LID Commander: Major General Than Htike No. 8 Military Training School, Shwebo township Summary of Investigation: Myanmar Witness has investigated allegations related to 8 incidents of violence in Sagaing. 6 of these incidents involved the beheading of at least one individual. One mass killing in Tar Taing led to the deaths of 17 individuals, including one beheading. Myanmar Witness has found that at least 33 people were killed in the 8 incidents investigated, 12 of whom were beheaded. Myanmar Witness identified, and where possible verified, imagery and video footage associated with these events, including images showing dismembered and beheaded bodies. Myanmar Witness also identified and geolocated footage of a beheading near Myaung. Many sources claim that the Light Infantry Division (LID) 99, under the command of Major General Than Htike, is responsible for six of the incidents. Locals report that the beheadings in Than Bo (incident 7) was carried out by the Security Administrative Council (SAC) No. 8 Military Training School from Shwebo township. Images showing SAC soldiers were identified but not verified in association with events in Let Ka Pin. The SAC released a statement admitting that SAC soldiers were responsible for a clash in Tar Taing. Executive Summary Between 23 February and 2 April 2023, a Myanmar military column reportedly traversed through part of the Sagaing region, conducting mass killings, fires, rapes, and raids in several villages. Myanmar Witness has identified, and where possible verified, imagery and video footage associated with a number of these events, which show bodies that were tortured, beheaded and dismembered. Myanmar Witness has found that at least 33 people were killed in the 8 incidents investigated, 12 of whom were beheaded. This report investigates claims related to the following events: Airstrike and ground troop incursion: Ma Le Thar Myanmar military raid: Pa Dat Taing Beheadings: Kan Taw Mass killing and beheading: Tar Taing Detention, mass killing and beheadings: Let Ka Pin Beheading: Swea Lwe Oh Beheadings: Than Bo Beheading, dismembering and rape: Ta Ga Nan Sagaing has been a focal point of resistance since the Coup. These 8 incidents identified, and where possible verified, by Myanmar Witness, show a pattern of excessive violence by the perpetrators. In a number of these cases the individuals were killed and then beheaded. As the beheadings serve no functional purpose, they represent a dramatic and horrific warning to those resisting military rule..."
Source/publisher: Myanmar Witness
Date of entry/update: 2023-05-13
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Title: Is Myanmar an existential threat for ASEAN?
Description: "While the defence strategic review shows Australia is focused on building capability through AUKUS, its declassified version fails to note a significant threat to regional security—Myanmar. Myanmar’s junta is a threat to regional stability that could cause problems for Australia for years to come. Australia has enjoyed relative stability across its northern outlook for decades, partly due to the peace and economic prosperity offered by ASEAN. While many commentators speculate about threats to ASEAN, such as China’s illegal behaviour in the South China Sea, ASEAN’s failure of unity in responding to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and even the impact of AUKUS, none of these are as serious as its response to the situation in Myanmar. The international community has relied on ASEAN leadership to address the crisis in Myanmar, yet the bloc has failed to generate meaningful progress. Non-interference in the affairs of fellow member states is a thread running through ASEAN’s six fundamental principles, but the list is silent on what it should do in cases of genocide or other serious human rights violations. Attempts to influence Myanmar via soft diplomacy have so far failed to end the junta’s rule or its war crimes. ASEAN’s five-point consensus has been utterly ignored by the junta. In February 2023, it was reported that a Japanese businessman negotiated a ceasefire between Myanmar’s military and an ethnic group in Rakhine state. The Myanmar military has waged war against many ethnic armed organisations like this since independence in 1948, arguably creating the world’s longest civil war. Since the February 2021 coup in which the military ceased its power-sharing arrangement with Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy, state-initiated violence has massively increased, with an estimated 3,400 political prisoners killed and many more imprisoned. ASEAN’s non-interference principle has left the bloc dithering on what to do about its wayward member, even as its chair, Indonesia, asserts the need to resolve the crisis. Yet it was a Japanese businessman, not ASEAN, who held sufficient influence to broker a ceasefire. Investment by China has muted the effect of divestment from Myanmar, meaning the junta hasn’t suffered much in terms of drawbacks. There is even talk of China’s using Myanmar to bypass the ‘Malacca dilemma’ of transporting its goods through Southeast Asia to and from the Middle East and Europe. China’s opportunism in Myanmar is at the direct expense of ASEAN and Australian interests. The lack of consequences for the Myanmar military only serves to encourage other disgruntled actors in the region to act out—consider, for example, Thailand’s various military coups and Cambodia’s crackdown on independent media—and could be a hint of things to come. ASEAN needs to draw a line in the sand. If a brutal civil war in which the army murders civilians and arrests Australian economic advisers for doing their jobs isn’t enough for ASEAN to take more drastic action, what is? As the situation forces foreign investors into expensive divestment from a once-burgeoning democracy, can they trust that other regional investments won’t go the same way? Serious sanctions must be on the table. If other member states see the junta as getting away with murder for the sake of maintaining power, it may degrade norms across the region. If ASEAN’s centrality wanes to the point of regional instability, China will step in, and Australia will be in for a panic much worse than it experienced over Solomon Islands. Decaying norms within ASEAN display a weakness of values at a time when values-based investments are as important to its stability as ever. ASEAN must choose whether to let this decay continue or to find ways to side with the civilian population of Myanmar and create enduring peace in the region. This decision must occur before Myanmar is scheduled to become ASEAN chair in 2026. Thirty years from now, we may find that ASEAN’s management of Myanmar over these next few years had a greater influence on Australia’s strategic interests than we appreciated at the time..."
Source/publisher: Australian Strategic Policy Institute
Date of entry/update: 2023-05-11
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Title: Note to Correspondents: In first mission to India, Special Envoy Heyzer calls for regional unity for de-escalation of violence, release of political prisoners and return to civilian rule based on the will of the people
Description: "NEW DELHI, 11 May 2023 – The Special Envoy of the UN Secretary-General on Myanmar Noeleen Heyzer today reinforced that a unified regional approach supporting Myanmar-led solutions, in accordance with the will and needs of the people, can make tangible progress on the ground, urgently address the suffering of the people and prevent a catastrophe in the heart of Asia. In her first visit to New Delhi as UN Special Envoy from 9 to 10 May, the Special Envoy held discussions with Minister of External Affairs of India H.E. Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, Foreign Secretary Vinay Mohan Kwatra and Joint Secretary (Bangladesh-Myanmar) Smita Pant. Underlining that India as a neighbouring country has been particularly impacted by the situation in Myanmar, Indian officials emphasized the need for immediate cessation of violence by all sides and fostering dialogue for return of peace, stability and democracy in Myanmar. Indian officials also reiterated their support to the efforts of the UN and ASEAN. Special Envoy Heyzer highlighted India’s key role in the United Nations and as a leader of the Global South holding the current presidency of the G20. She appreciated India’s constructive efforts towards peaceful resolution of the situation in Myanmar and also expressed the United Nations’ gratitude to the Government and people of India for generously hosting over 53,000 people from Myanmar, acknowledging the major challenges facing Myanmar’s neighbouring countries affected by the escalating conflict and violence. In this context, the Special Envoy reinforced the need for concrete steps to resolve the crisis and build the foundation for sustainable peace and a return to civilian rule based on the will of the people, such as cessation of violence, immediate release of all political prisoners, including State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi and President Win Myint, and unimpeded humanitarian assistance through all available channels reaching the most vulnerable in areas of active conflict. Guided by both the UN General Assembly and UN Security Council, Special Envoy Heyzer continues to closely cooperate with the ASEAN Special Envoy to create a conducive environment for inclusive dialogue and a political solution to the Myanmar crisis..."
Source/publisher: UN Secretary-General
Date of entry/update: 2023-05-11
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Title: UN Envoy Calls for Unity Among Regional Players to Solve Myanmar Crisis
Description: "The United Nations (UN) Special Envoy for Myanmar said a unified regional approach guided by the will of Myanmar people can make progress in solving the country’s crisis during her Tuesday meeting with government officials in India. UN envoy Noeleen Heyzer met with India’s Minister for External Affairs Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, Foreign Secretary Vinay Mohan Kwatra and Joint Secretary (Bangladesh-Myanmar) Smita Pant in New Delhi. Myanmar has been wracked by violence since the military’s 2021 coup. The putsch met with nationwide public opposition which the military regime responded to with deadly force, triggering armed resistance across the country. Along with China, India is Myanmar’s most powerful neighbor and has been impacted by the crisis in Myanmar, with over 53,000 refugees from Myanmar currently sheltering in border regions in India, according to the Office of the UN Special Envoy to Myanmar. During the meeting, the Indian officials told Noeleen Heyzer that there is a need for an immediate cessation of violence by all sides and the fostering of dialogue for the return of peace, stability and democracy in Myanmar. Heyzer said a unified regional approach supporting Myanmar-led solutions, in accordance with the will and needs of the people, can make tangible progress on the ground. “The Special Envoy reinforced the need for concrete steps to resolve the crisis and a return to civilian rule based on the will of the people, such as cessation of violence, immediate release of all political prisoners, including State Counselor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and President U Win Myint, and unimpeded humanitarian assistance through all available channels,” said the Office of the UN Special Envoy in a statement. Prior to her meeting with India’s external affairs minister, Noeleen Heyzer met with China’s foreign minister Qin Gang, and was told that the international community should support all parties in Myanmar and restart the political transition process through political dialogue in order to bring peace to the country. “We need to act prudently and pragmatically to prevent escalating tensions and a spillover of the crisis,” said Qin. Currently, both India and China have engaged with the junta in Myanmar. Along with Myanmar’s other neighbors, they participated in the Thailand-initiated Track 1.5 roundtable as a way of opening additional channels for dialogue among stakeholders affected by the Myanmar crisis. The roundtable — its second meeting was lately hosted by India — came after the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Five-Point Consensus peace plan stalled, after the military regime failed to honor its commitments. Noeleen Heyzer visited Myanmar last year and met with junta chief Min Aung Hlaing, but no progress was made on breaking the political deadlock in the country..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update: 2023-05-11
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Title: Chinese Foreign Minister’s Visit Reignites Anti-China Protests in Myanmar
Description: "Anti-China protests have broken out across Myanmar following last week’s meetings between Beijing’s foreign minister Qin Gang and Myanmar’s military dictators. China stepped up its engagement with Myanmar’s regime with the visit by the most senior Chinese representative to Naypyitaw since the 2021 coup. Qin met junta boss Min Aung Hlaing and former dictator Than Shwe. Following the visit, activists, students’ union members and general strike committees across the country launched an online campaign, sharing the message, “Hey China: stop killing Myanmar’s people by supporting fascist criminals,” in Chinese and English. Protests were staged in Yangon and Yinmabin, Salingyi and Letpadaung in Sagaing Region, where the Chinese flag was burned. Following the February 2021 coup, the Chinese Embassy in Myanmar faced daily protests in which hundreds of thousands of protesters demanded that their neighbor stop supporting the military. China said the takeover was an internal affair not requiring foreign intervention and failed to denounce deadly crackdowns on protesters, despite widespread international condemnation. At the time there were calls for a boycott of Chinese products and threats to China-backed projects and pipelines. In the following months, there were a few attacks on China’s pipelines in Mandalay Region. Letpadaung General Strike Committee in Salingyi, which is home to the Chinese-run copper mines, stated that the Chinese meetings fueled anti-China anger. “We strongly say that our people do not want any country or government to cooperate with the regime,” the committee announced. Yangon activists warned China that public anger would grow if it continued to work with the junta. On Tuesday, a flash mob in the city called on China to respect the will of the people and to respect Myanmar’s sovereignty, instead of protecting dictators Min Aung Hlaing and Than Shwe. Prominent activist Dr Tayzar San wrote that the neighbors would have to coexist after the fall of the dictatorship and there were many good examples of friendly, close bilateral relations over centuries. Positive relations cannot be built with a terrorist regime, the activist said. “If the Chinese government continues to support the fascist military like this, China will enter the list of Myanmar’s common enemies. We have a serious message and both countries will face the consequences,” Dr Tayzar San added. Myanmar’s civilian National Unity Government also criticized Qin’s visit saying the “terrorist” junta offers no stability with its brutal killings, arbitrary arrests and arson attacks. It said public consent was the only way to achieve long-term stability in Myanmar..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update: 2023-05-10
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Title: Myanmar: Give our future back
Description: "I heard a knock while I was sleeping in my apartment; I thought it was too early and I wasn’t expecting any guests. I opened the door and saw my friend’s face, shocked. He said to me: ‘They arrested Aung San Su Kyi.’ I replied, laughing: ‘Is it a prank?’ He showed me a screenshot of a news article and told me it wasn’t a joke. I just looked at him, confused. He kept telling me to pack some things, that they are arresting other activists too. ‘They may also have your profile and it’s safer for you to go back to your hometown.’ I am May and I am a citizen of Myanmar. Just over two years ago, on the night of 31 January, I had gone to bed without any worries for the future I was facing. The night before, I was joking with my friends about a coup. Even though I got some information from the international community about a coup the week before, I didn’t believe it. But then it happened. I didn’t encounter the 88 uprisings, so I didn’t prepare for anything. I randomly packed some clothes and followed him. When I was out on the main road, Yangon was quiet, like a ghost town. No cars, no buses, just a few people walking the streets in fear. When people saw me with a bag, they suggested that I better stay home, it isn’t safe to travel anymore. I tried to call my mom, but I couldn’t reach her. I was scared and worried about what would happen to us. There was no internet or phone service. As I was walking to the bus station, I saw people overcrowding the grocery stores. I couldn’t get a bus and there was no taxi willing to take me home. My friend came with me the whole way to the bus station and said I could stay with his family for few days instead. On the 3rd of February, the labor union started the peaceful protest in Yangon, and I was able to go back home. My hometown, Bago, started a peaceful protest against the coup the next day. A friend from the Student Union led the protest and I was supporting behind the scenes. The civil disobedience movement got stronger; people were joining the peaceful protest in the hope of getting the democracy back. I still remember the chanting we shouted in hope: ‘We are youth, give our future back!’ ‘We are youth, we have dreams!’ Sorrowful days On the 8th of February, a car rammed into the protest group and a civilian, Nyi Nyi Oo was killed in Mandalay. The next day, 19 year old Mya Thwe Thwe Khaing was shot by police and died ten days later. With each passing day, the death toll grew higher. People were arrested arbitrarily. The days were filled with sorrows, and the nights with fear that someone would knock on our door and drag us out. By the 9th of April, my usually peaceful hometown Bago was facing an inconceivable situation. At 4am I heard the sound of bombing in the area the protest was based in. I tried to support the protestors by offering food, clothes and pepper spray, but I couldn’t reach my friends in the protest camp. The police barricaded those areas, and no one could enter: no ambulance, no cars, no doctors. We heard gunshots and bombing non-stop from 4am until 4pm, but we couldn’t even get close enough to document what was happening. I reported the situation in Bago to several embassies, asking for help, but all I got back was: “we’re really sorry and hope you are safe”. I was safe, but my friends weren’t. One day saw the killing of at least 82 people. My friend, who was one of the protest leaders, had their house destroyed. The next day, I received strange phone calls – I was somehow being tracked by the junta. For my family’s safety, I left my hometown at great risk. I reached out to a friend from Thailand, who sent me an invitation letter to apply for a visa. I left the country. When the plane wheels took off, I felt relieved on one hand and guilty on the other. One day I heard that someone I worked closely with had been arrested. On another I heard that some young people had been killed. On another: the military had set fire to and destroyed an entire village, killing the villagers and children. I heard these stories repeatedly. I am numb to the feelings, though sometimes I know it would be better to cry. I see photos of people being killed and houses being destroyed without even knowing my feelings anymore. I feel hopeless and powerless to help. Like me, many civilians in Myanmar are in a hopeless situation. Some had to cross the border to Thailand and India, some are stuck in villages without basic supplies. 13,088 people are currently in detention. 121 people have been sentenced in absentia. 139 people have been sentenced to death.Many have lost their jobs, and many became refugees. Yet the citizens of Myanmar haven’t received any protection from United Nations organizations and international governments. The military junta has merely been condemned. The coup affected everyone, but minorities face more struggles in detention and are targeted more often. In April 2021 a Muslim muezzin was found hanging in a mosque within Yangon Region – he was more likely killed by the military than by suicide. Soldiers opened fire inside the Sule Mosque in Mandalay, killing a person sleeping after fasting. Several churches were bombed by the military in Kayah region. Those who look Indian face more torture in detention and sometimes end up being killed, like Ko Lin Paing Soe, a Gurkha student killed in custody. Still I hope Before the coup, I was working for minority rights in Myanmar, based in Yangon and advocating for the citizenship rights of minorities. Since the day of the coup, we citizens of Myanmar don’t feel safe for our lives and our future. Things are getting worse day by day. We hope that if we can resist it, we will get our democracy back. We protested peacefully, but the military junta can do everything to hold power. The junta doesn’t care if people live or die. Myanmar was not a peaceful country before the coup. Yet, we still hoped to build a better community. We worked so hard to raise awareness about religious freedoms and advocate for peaceful communities. But today, everything we had dreamed for minorities has been lost. The government we voted for was taken away, the democracy we longed for, for years, is gone and the whole country turned into a slaughter field. I hope to get democracy back. The junta took the future from the youth while our country was moving forward. I hope international governments will deny the military junta as the government of Myanmar and accept the legitimacy of the National Unity Government. I hope the National Unity Government works for the safety and equality of all citizens, including Rohingya and all minorities. I hope I can return to my family and spend time with them without fear of arrest. I hope I can see my friends and colleagues again. I hope that everyone in Myanmar can heal from these nightmares..."
Source/publisher: Minority Rights Group
Date of entry/update: 2023-05-10
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Title: Amendment of the National Education Law and other language-in-education developments following the 2021 military coup in Myanmar (Part 2)
Description: "Nicolas Salem-Gervais, Summer Aung, Amber Spreelung, Ja Seng, Jung Benatar, and Chan* outline the evolving language-in-education landscape following the coup, within and beyond military-controlled territory in Part 2 of a 2-part post. *Some authors used pseudonyms for security purposes. Read Part 1. In addition to spurring the partial collapse of the state education system and yielding a confusing language-in-education policy from the SAC (see Part 1), the 2021 military coup has profoundly affected the education landscape outside military-controlled schools and territories, notably in its linguistic dimension. The NUG has indeed committed to a Federal Democracy Education Policy and non-state education systems and schools have been expanding or (re)appearing. In the following sections, we try to outline the NUG’s language-in-education policy, before moving on to three brief case studies. An evolving language-in-education landscape, amidst conflict Seemingly inspired to some extent by the National Network for Education Reform pre-coup proposals and in line with the Federal Democracy Charter, the NUG has reiterated its pledge to mother-tongue based multilingual education (MTB-MLE) formulated in its (draft) Federal Democracy Education Policy released in September 2021 (and which should be transformed into a more final document in the near future). This policy entails a trilingual system (mother tongue, national language, international language) in primary and middle schools. This model, in comparison to what was being deployed under previous governments, is thus much more ambitious, with extensively documented, multiple and genuine potential benefits, but also a number of tradeoffs and/or challenges to deal with, particularly in the most linguistically heterogeneous regions. With federalism as a core inspiration, the (draft) Federal Democracy Education Policy entails a great deal of decentralization, with school education councils being in charge to decide, among other things, the language(s) of instruction, and with the possibility for each township and each ethnic region within a Region or State to develop local curricula in accordance with their respective State/Region framework and with the approval of the State/Region Education Council. Following the coup, pro-revolution higher education institutions such as Spring University Myanmar have been offering online classes for learning several ethnic languages (including Mon, Tai Long, Sgaw and West Pwo Karen, Jinghpaw, Rakhine and Tedim Chin). At the basic education level, multiple education programs, some of them directly accredited or supported by the NUG, have come to provide “interim education” (ကြားကာလပညာရေး) in “people’s schools” (ပြည်သူ့ပညာရေးကျောင်း), among other administrative functions, in regions where the military-controlled state administration has collapsed, which include large parts of Sagaing and Magway Regions. In ethnic minority regions, these education programs rely to different extents on local languages, with both educational and ethnic identity mobilization objectives – in alignment with the perspectives articulated in the Federal Democracy Charter and the Federal Democracy Education Policy – amidst a dramatically disrupted political context and a daily reality marked by conflict, displacement, threats of violence, and often an extremely acute lack of resources. The sections that follow aim at providing a brief outline of some of the many significant language-in-education post-coup developments. The three case-studies – Kayah/Karenni, Chin and Kachin States – have been selected because of their relevance to our perspectives and the availability, access, and interest of researchers in our team. Other key geographies/organizations are not included here, and a comprehensive understanding of the multiple, complex, and rapidly evolving dynamics taking place in often dramatically difficult contexts is beyond the scope and ambitions of this post. Kayah/Karenni State Kayah (Karenni) State has been hit extremely hard by post-coup armed conflict, with up to two-thirds of its population displaced by the crackdown on resistance groups as the military is striving to secure the main roads. According to the Karenni Civil Society Network’s April 2023 figures, since the coup more than 200,000 people in Kayah State have become IDPs, over 1,100 have been killed, arrested or injured, and more than 2,600 CDM education staff have been dismissed. In multiple instances, schools have been directly targeted by military attacks, including airstrikes. The number of students enrolled in Kayah’s State government schools has plummeted in comparison with pre-coup figures, with SAC MoE statistics showing a drop of 87.5% in students sitting the matriculation exam in 2022-23 when compared with 2018-19. The vast majority of formal education in this state now appears to happen outside of schools controlled by the military regime. Rather, provision occurs through schooling led by CDMers and by Ethnic Basic Education Providers (EBEPs), in alignment with the perspective of a federal education as articulated by the NUG but often operating independently of the NUG. Kayah/Karenni State is one of the many ethnolinguistically diverse regions of Myanmar: a total of nine languages (Kayah, Kayan, Kayaw, Gaybar, Yintelay, Manumanaw, as well as Tai Long, Sgaw Karen and Pa-o) were being introduced as subjects in its government schools in 2019-20 as part of the local curriculum. As elsewhere, this diversity remains one of the key challenges in the post-coup context, and the realization of an inclusive Karenni identity has been set as a priority by the Karenni State Consultative Council, a revolutionary body formed in April 2021 that works in partnership with the NUG and National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC). Amidst the partial collapse of State administration and a new impetus for a federal education system since the coup, several networks of schools using different combinations of languages have been operating in the midst of conflict and forced displacement, although many face an acute lack of basic school supplies. In townships such as Demoso, community schools run by CDMers are seeking support from local and national resistance organizations, and the Karenni Education Department (KnED) has expanded its network of schools while also developing a MTB-MLE approach in the Karenni/Kayah language. Within interim community-based schools, lessons inconsistent with Federal Democracy — History first and foremost — are being omitted, and a Karenni National History book was finalized in September 2022. Similarly, Kayan New Generation Youth (KNGY) has started to implement in 2022-23 a MTB-MLE program through a curriculum produced by the Central Kayan Literature and Culture Committee (using Pekon region’s main dialect, often considered of high status and adopted as the Kayan standard since the early 2000s). In addition to an education center with a strong focus on Karenni and English languages in eastern Demoso, a number of post-secondary options, such as Youth Academy College and New Horizon, have been working in partnership with Spring University Myanmar toward ongoing projects of creating Diploma programs. These higher education courses include local languages, cultures, and histories, although finding teachers for some of the local languages has constituted a challenge in the current context. New post-secondary education programs have also included a transnational focus, such as preparation courses towards Thai and international universities. Chin State Following staunch local resistance and the constitution of the Chin Defense Forces as early as March-April 2021, Chin State has also been extremely disrupted by the coup. Particularly hard-hit regions include Thantalang (see also here), Mindat, and bordering areas of Sagaing and Magway Regions. According to the Chin Human Rights Organization, two years after the coup a quarter of the state’s population has been displaced (including both refugees and IDPs). In addition to hundreds of deaths, close to 1,500 people have been arrested and over 2,000 houses and religious buildings have been destroyed; tens of thousands have fled to the neighboring Indian state of Mizoram, with reportedly thousands of children in government and private schools, as well as many out-of school children. Characterized by a sharp mountainous topography, Chin State (and its neighboring regions) is home to a great ethnolinguistic diversity, even by Myanmar’s standards: prior to the 2021 military coup, 24 languages and counting were in the process of being introduced as subjects in its government schools, while multiple and often challenging projects to select (or even create) one or several main/common languages were underway. This diversity remains one of the challenges to the mobilization of a common identity, yet the coup has also contributed to strengthening a sense of belonging to an overarching Chin nation. The Chin State administration and schooling system has collapsed to a significant extent outside of some major towns and roads. Township-level People’s Administration Bodies (PABs), in general alignment with the NUG’s federalist perspectives (but not under its direct authority), have taken over with associated education departments (some community schools also seem to operate independently). These local education systems run in extremely difficult conditions, with volunteer or quasi-volunteer (sometimes CDM) teachers in the context of an acute lack of resources, and deal with major security threats. In some cases, they operate both sides of the border with India: for instance, the Matupi township education committee runs 150 schools, some of which are located inside Mizoram, which lead towards the NUG’s Basic Education Completion Assessment (BECA). In terms of curriculum, these schools usually follow to some extent the national framework but with various degrees of adaptation to the local contexts. Local Chin languages tend to be included, both as subjects and “classroom languages” (oral media of instruction — a situation which is not new in Chin State). In some cases, most of the schooling seems to be conducted through local Chin languages, which is described as a very positive development by the newly established education administration, and with Burmese as a subject in primary schools. As the national history curriculum in its current version is perceived as irrelevant for Chin State and incompatible with federal education, ongoing projects also include the development of a Chin history curriculum, with 80% on the history of the Chin Nation (ချင်းပြည်ထောင်သမိုင်းကြောင်း) and 20% of local content (မိမိဒေသ သမိုင်းကြောင်း). Kachin State Experiencing conflict since 2011, Kachin State has also been profoundly disrupted by the coup and its consequences. The Kachin Independence Organization (KIO), one of the Myanmar military’s most long standing and redoubtable opponents, has been largely aligned with the NUG’s federal perspectives. In the wake of the coup in 2021 and 2022, the KIO’s education system has experienced a major increase in the number of enrolled students from diverse ethno-linguistic backgrounds, which is not unlike the experiences of the Karen National Union’s (KNU) Karen Education and Culture Department (KECD). However, its model in terms of language-in-education (with, so far, Kachin language and culture as an additional subject alongside the national curriculum and as a “classroom language”) seems to have required less adaptation than KNU’s Karen-medium education system, which recently opened additional Karen language classes to help this new population of students overcome language challenges. Similar to the KNU, the KIO shelters CDMers from the education sector, who have become involved in a variety of online and in-person education projects. The graduates of KIO’s high schools can enroll in a number of higher education institutions, notably those located in its territory. This includes the newly opened Kachin State Comprehensive University, which was jointly established by the KIO, the NUG, and CDM teachers, and has recently held the first graduation ceremonies of programs in literary and scientific subjects. In Kachin State, the SAC, in line with previous military governments, has carried on with its divide and rule strategy (a practice itself largely rooted in Myanmar’s colonial past); other regional armed groups have different political stances and strategies vis-à-vis the junta. Some schools controlled by the military regime have been reopening in Kachin State, particularly in the more remote regions where alternatives are lacking and access to the internet is scarce (in addition to other challenges of alternative online schooling). Despite financial incentive, however, the extent of this reopening is limited and the schools’ educational standards often seem questionable. The Kachin Baptist Convention’s church-based education programs have been revived, retaking to some extent the role churches had between the early decades of the 20th century and the mid-1960s with full-time teaching. These schools tend to at least partially follow the (Burmese language) national curriculum, but some prefer a curriculum in English. Different combinations of Jinghpaw and other local languages are also used in these schools, which seem to gather children from very diverse populations. Other recent language-in-education developments in Kachin State include an increasing popularity of Chinese schools, which tend to be affordable and open academic, as well as at times professional, avenues towards Taiwan, Hong Kong and mainland China. Several Kachin National Schools (Myusha Jawng / Myu Shalat Jawng), which started before the coup, also run in urban centers and constitute an alternative to government education, using Jinghpaw and English as the main media of instruction. Amidst dramatic situations of conflict and with new impetus for an education in line with federalist perspectives, the coup has profoundly altered Myanmar’s education landscape, which more than ever resembles a battlefield. Regarding language-in-education policy, the SAC, in contrast with its communication in state-media, has made major legislative steps back in the schools under its control, which have experienced a severe drop in enrolment and attractivity (see Part 1). Meanwhile, non-state education systems and schools in Kayah/Karenni, Chin and Kachin States (and assuredly in other States/Regions) are largely integrating local languages and have been expanding or appearing, often in extremely precarious contexts, in general alignment with federalist perspective, and with various degrees of collaboration with the NUG. At a time of great disruption and great political uncertainties for Myanmar and its populations, one of the few predictions that seems safe to make is that education, ethnic identities and, at their intersection, language-in-education matters will remain among the core aspects of Myanmar’s longstanding and unresolved issues, and thereby one of the key components of any durable political solutions. This two-part article is dedicated to Mael Raynaud (1976-2022). It is part of a research project involving several organizations, inside and outside of Myanmar, including the Institut de Recherche sur l’Asie du Sud-Est Contemporaine (IRASEC), Mahidol University’s Institute of Human Rights and Peace Studies (IHRP), and CASE. The six authors all work/study in the field of education, in very diverse positions and locations, inside and outside of Myanmar. We wish to warmly thank all the reviewers for their close readings and constructive comments..."
Source/publisher: "Tea Circle" (Myanmar)
Date of entry/update: 2023-05-09
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Title: ASEAN Leaders’ Statement on the Recent Attack on a Convoy of the AHA Centre and ASEAN Monitoring Team in Myanmar
Description: "We were deeply concerned with ongoing violence in Myanmar and urged the immediate cessation of all forms of violence and the use of force to create a conducive environment for the safe and timely delivery of humanitarian assistance and inclusive national dialogues. We supported the statement of the President of the Republic of Indonesia as the Chair of ASEAN on 8 May 2023 in response to the recent attack on a convoy of the AHA Center and the ASEAN Monitoring Team in Myanmar. We condemned the attack and underlined that the perpetrators must be held accountable. We supported the efforts of the Chair of ASEAN, including its continued engagements with all stakeholders in Myanmar, to encourage progress in the implementation of the Five-Point Consensus..."
Source/publisher: Association of Southeast Asian Nations
Date of entry/update: 2023-05-09
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Title: Minister for Foreign Affairs Dr Vivian Balakrishnan's Written Reply to Parliamentary Question on ASEAN's Response to the Situation in Myanmar, 9 May 2023
Description: "Mr Christopher de Souza: To ask the Minister for Foreign Affairs what is the ASEAN leadership intending to do in light of continued and increasing violence and human rights violations in Myanmar. REPLY ASEAN Chair Indonesia has strongly condemned the recent airstrikes by the Myanmar military, or Tatmadaw, in Sagaing Region, Myanmar on 11 April 2023. Singapore supports this statement. Any attack on civilians is reprehensible and cannot be condoned. Such acts of violence contradict the Five-Point Consensus formulated by the ASEAN Leaders and accepted by Senior General Min Aung Hlaing at their meeting on 24 April 2021 in Jakarta. Given the limited progress in the implementation of the Five-Point Consensus, the Leaders, at the ASEAN Summits in November 2022, agreed on a series of steps to send a clear signal to the Tatmadaw. Indonesia has been engaging stakeholders to encourage inclusive dialogue in Myanmar. It has called for the cessation of violence and taken steps to facilitate humanitarian assistance to the people of Myanmar. Myanmar’s neighbours outside of ASEAN and our external partners, including the UN, also have important roles to play in working with ASEAN to address the crisis and facilitate national reconciliation in Myanmar. Nevertheless, the rate limiting factor for progress in the implementation of the Five-Point Consensus is not ASEAN or our external partners, but the stakeholders within Myanmar, especially the Tatmadaw. We should continue to press the Tatmadaw to cease violence and implement the Five-Point Consensus swiftly and fully..."
Source/publisher: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Singapore
Date of entry/update: 2023-05-09
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Title: Myanmar’s Corrupt Air Force Gets big Budget Raise as Airstrikes Escalate
Description: "The Myanmar military’s budget has increased every year since Min Aung Hlaing became its chief in 2011. The budget of the air force in particular has jumped significantly, as new aircraft have been purchased and the military regime has become increasingly reliant on air attacks to combat the resistance movement. For the 2023-24 fiscal year, the junta has approved a defense budget of almost US$2.7 billion, an increase of US$920 million on the previous year. However, until very recently the air force budget was comparatively small. According to a separate defense expenditure list acquired by The Irrawaddy that the military did not submit to parliament, the air force’s expenditure for the 2019-20 fiscal year totaled US$376 million. That amount did not include aviation fuel bills and salaries. At that time, Myanmar was dealing with the COVID-19 pandemic and holding the 2020 general election. There were some clashes between the Myanmar military and the Arakan Army in northern Rakhine State. But overall the period saw the fewest clashes since Min Aung Hlaing became the military chief in 2011. As the air force’s spending was around US$376 million during that period of relative calm, its spending might reach US$1 billion per year between 2021 and 2023. But half of the budget usually ends up in the pockets of generals, officers and cronies. U Kyaw Min Oo, the owner of Sky Aviator Co, who was born to an ordinary family in Ayeyarwady Region’s Mawlamyinegyun Township, amassed huge wealth in the decade after he was awarded licenses to supply the air force. The crony has limited edition Mercedes cars in his garage. Brigadier-General Kyaw Moe Thet, who served as the commander of an air base in Mandalay’s Tada-U Township, is one of the beneficiaries of business deals involving the air force. He sponsors artists with millions of kyats. Among the artists are Yone Lay and J Fire. The general also owns dozens of land plots in Mandalay, each worth hundreds of thousands of US dollars. Even richer are the air force chief and his relatives who have accumulated immense wealth within a few years to join the country’s ‘League of Cronies.’ The structure of the Myanmar Air Force was based on the UK’s Royal Air Force, with three key departments — procurement, engineering and administration — designed to exercise checks and balances in procurement and usage of equipment, thereby preventing corruption. But the air force has become increasingly corrupt since 1988. Under the previous military regime, the State Law and Order Restoration Council, the air force stopped inviting open tenders for the procurement of new aircraft, spare parts and maintenance. Instead, licenses were awarded to those who were close to the air force leadership. Back then, the sister-in-law of Vice Senior General Maung Aye, known as Daw Daisy, was the key middleperson in procuring aircraft for the air force. Business owners awarded licenses paid commission to the likes of Daw Daisy and the generals. But under Min Aung Hlaing, the children of generals have established their own companies to supply the military. Notable examples include Ivan Htet, the son of former air force chief General Maung Maung Kyaw, who established Alliance Engineering Service to supply the air force. General Maung Maung Kyaw’s nephew and niece, U Lin Htet and Daw Mon Yee, also made fortunes by supplying and providing maintenance services for the air force. It was easy money for the generals and their suppliers, as all they need to do is to cook the books by charging higher prices for items and services provided to the air force. So the generals awarded licenses to supply the air force to their relatives. Companies have to give commission to both the military chief and air force chief for business deals made with the air force. The head of the air force reportedly gets at least five per cent of the value of each deal. Among the middlemen who helped purchase aircraft, helicopters and parts under former military dictator Than Shwe were U Tay Za, who runs the Htoo Group of Companies, and Dr. Naing Htut Aung, who owns Gate Way International. U Tay Za has close ties with former air force head General Myat Hein. The general’s son worked for U Tay Za’s company. Since Min Aung Hlaing became the military chief in 2011, his son and daughter, General Maung Maung Kyaw’s children and U Kyaw Min Oo have monopolized business with the air force. U Kyaw Min Oo previously worked for U Tay Za, while his younger brother served as the commander of an air force Mi-17 squadron. Mahar Sit Thu Gyi Co, which supplies the air force, is owned by Min Aung Hlaing’s daughter Khin Thiri Thet Mon. Aircraft need different types of maintenance after flying for certain hours. It is a business with huge profits. The annual maintenance cost for a MiG-29 fighter is over US$4.6 million, while a Yak-130 bomber’s maintenance costs US$2.1 million, according to air force figures. But the actual cost is 50 per cent less, according to some air force officers. In the 2019-20 fiscal year, the Myanmar military spent US$2.4 million on two Mi-35P assault helicopters from Belarus. One of them crashed in 2021 because they were substandard, according to air force officials. The military regime is increasingly reliant on its air force to combat the growing resistance movement. But while the junta’s airstrikes cause ever-greater civilian casualties, senior air force officers and their cronies are getting even richer..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update: 2023-05-09
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Title: Amendment of the National Education Law and other language-in-education developments following the 2021 military coup in Myanmar (Part 1)
Description: "Nicolas Salem-Gervais, Summer Aung, Amber Spreelung, Ja Seng, Jung Benatar, and Chan* outline the evolving language-in-education landscape following the coup, within and beyond military-controlled territory in Part 1 of a 2-part post. *Some authors used pseudonyms for security purposes. Education ranks high among the sectors most impacted by the 2021 military coup and its aftermath. Following a long history of involvement in Myanmar’s successive political struggles, scores of students and school and university teachers have been at the forefront of the protests and subsequent resistance movements, notably the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM). Choosing to participate in the revolution either with their chalk (“မြေဖြူကိုင်ပြီးတော်လှန်မယ်”) or trading it for a gun (မြေဖြူကိုင်သည့် လက်မှသည် သေနတ်ကိုင်သည့် လက်အဖြစ်သို့), many have sacrificed their careers, their family life, their homes and even their lives to oppose the return of a military dictatorship. To a greater extent than at any time in Burma/Myanmar’s history, the education sector itself has become a battlefield. After two years of interruption in response to the Covid pandemic and the immediate repercussions of the coup, the State Administrative Council (SAC) has been attempting to reopen schools and universities, starting with the urban areas under its control. It has aimed for a return to “business as usual” despite an at least 40% drop in overall basic education student enrolments (the drop in matriculation exam enrolment, in 2022-23 as compared with 2019-20, is much steeper: around 83% according to official figures). Amidst the SAC’s official declarations repeatedly asserting the role of schooling in the fostering of core military values, such as “patriotism” and “discipline”, sending or not sending their children back to schools controlled by the military regime has been an extremely difficult choice for many, notably among low-income families. In contrast, the National Unity Government (NUG) has been striving to set-up a parallel, pro-revolution and progressive-leaning education system, of federalist inspiration, in the regions controlled by the People’s Defense Forces (PDFs) and other allied groups as well as online. In multiple instances, schools and education personnel have been struck by violent attacks by the military, and at times by other actors, resulting in injuries and deaths of both students and teachers, sometimes in unspeakable circumstances. Teachers working for NUG-affiliated schools have repeatedly been arrested, sometimes condemned to life sentences, and parents also risk prosecution under the Anti-Terrorism Act for enrolling their children in these schools. Predictably, these profound disruptions and climate of violence surrounding education often have disastrous consequences, including on children’s mental health. For many decades, Ethnic Basic Education Providers (EBEPs), which include some of the Ethnic Armed Organizations’ (EAOs) education departments as well as other and newly formed organizations (see Part 2), have been providing education and relying to different extents on their respective languages. In the post-coup context, the EAOs offer diverse and potentially shifting political stances vis-à-vis the junta and the NUG. Some of the major organizations, including the Karen National Union, Kachin Independence Organization, Karenni National Progressive Party, as well as the historical and newly formed Chin groups, are currently in conflict against the SAC. These EAOs, among those sometimes referred to as Ethnic Resistance Organization (EROs), are militarily aligned with the NUG (in accordance with the federalist perspectives it has put forward), actively involved in education (but with diverse levels of actual collaboration with the NUG’s Ministry of Education), and working to different extents with CDMers. Major legislative steps backward In this greatly disrupted context, where education is at the heart of battles between vastly different conceptions of the nation, the state and the society — and with the 2008 Constitution being void as far as the NUG and allied groups are concerned, — the SAC amended the 2014-2015 National Education Law in October 2022. This amendment entails, among other things, the nullification of articles allowing the formation of teachers and students’ unions (section 4(c) which was added in the 2015 version of the law, following the 2014 students protests), and the modification of the composition and prerogatives of the National Education (formerly “Policy”) Commission (sections 5 and 6). In terms of language-in-education policy, many observers also did not fail to notice major steps backward at the basic education level, firmly condemning them as evidence of the military’s Burmese chauvinism. Almost a decade ago, the promulgation of the 2014 National Education Law (which was amended in 2015) sparked controversy around several aspects of its content and was faced by reiterated demands for a proper mother tongue-based multilingual education (MTB-MLE) policy. Although debatable in many regards, these legislative developments were nonetheless part of a process, along with UNICEF work and advocacy for multilingual education, to noteworthy steps towards including ethnic minority languages and cultures in government schools in the late 2010s through some extent of decentralization to the States and Regions and including the development of local curricula. Although implementation was often slow, imperfect, and contingent upon many factors, this framework offered the possibility to teach ethnic minority languages as subjects in government schools a few periods every week and to use them as “classroom languages” (oral media of instruction — different from MTB-MLE) when relevant. The 2022 amendment to the National Education Law by the SAC, in addition to reducing the prerogatives of the regional governments in education (nullification of 49(f) granting them the freedom to administer educational matters), explicitly suppresses the possibility of using ethnic minority languages as “classroom languages” through the amendment of article 43(b), from: “If there is a need, an ethnic language can be used alongside Myanmar as a classroom language at the basic education level.” to: “Myanmar language shall be used as the classroom language at the basic education level.” Similarly, the amendment of article 44 unambiguously restricts the teaching of ethnic minority languages as subjects to the primary level (Grades 1-5), from: “In Divisions or States, teaching of ethnic languages and literature can be implemented by Division or State governments, starting at the primary level and gradually expanding (to higher grades). ” to: “Learning ethnic literature and languages in regions and states shall be undertaken at the basic education primary level under the relevant region or state government.” These major steps back towards a more monolingual and monolithic conception of language-in-education policy potentially have two sets of consequences: not only do they limit the usage of ethnic minority languages in government schools themselves, but they also hinder the possibilities of recognition and bridging with non-state ethnic education systems, which typically use their respective languages to a wider extent, as documented in several studies. Many non-state ethnic education systems are far from being on any kind of speaking terms with the military-controlled MoE at the moment, but some of the organizations which are not currently in open conflict may be wondering what the mid-to-long-term implications of such an amendment might be for them. This backwards shift in language inclusion must also be situated in the perspective of a national education system which does not seem on track to offer attractive perspectives in the foreseeable future, including in terms of the development of analytical skills and of recognition outside of Myanmar, while alternatives largely grounded in ethnic identity and often eager to connect with transnational/international avenues are developing in the border areas (see Part 2). Contradictory signals Interestingly, in parallel to this tightening legislative framework, the SAC has recently been communicating heartily regarding the teaching of ethnic minority languages in universities and in basic education schools, as well as the hiring and training of the Teaching Assistants (TA) and Language Teachers (LT) in charge of these subjects. In March 2021, the SAC chairman “instructed to appoint more TA/LT and provide decent salaries,” reiterating these instructions in September 2022. Ministry of Ethnic Affairs (MoEA) officials frequently include in their speeches the ubiquitous saying of warning against the “disappearance” of ethnic groups as a consequence of failing to protect their languages (စာပျောက်ရင် လူမျိုးပျောက်မယ် and variations around that formula). During the late months of 2022, short trainings for the improvements of these ethnic language teachers’ skills were organized in several States and Regions (including Karen, Kachin, Mon, Tanintharyi, Ayeyarwady, Magway and Yangon) with ceremonies held in the local Education Colleges and widely reported in military-controlled media. These were followed in late 2022 and early 2023 by public donations from the MoEA to some of the Literature and Culture Committees (LCCs, some of which may have been compelled to reluctantly participate), including in Mon State (see also here) and Bago Region, as well as other education ceremonies involving some of the LLCs and the regional authorities. Incidentally, perplexing articles (original here) have seemingly advocated for MTB-MLE and could be spotted in the state media for 2023 International Mother Language Day, underlining the contradictions between the SAC’s desire to project an image of inclusivity and actual legislative reforms under its rule. In 2017 and the following years until the Covid pandemic and the coup, the civilian government began a process of hiring more than 11,000 ethnic languages TAs and creating the opportunity for the matriculation exam holders among them to pursue their training in Education Colleges and to ultimately become full-fledged teachers. In each State and Region, the LCCs attached to each ethnic group were playing a central role in this process by designing the curricula, selecting the teachers, and training them. Although from many stakeholders’ standpoint the overall language-in-education policy was not going far enough, these developments were nonetheless generally perceived (see also here) as a noteworthy step forward, linking ethnic languages to job opportunities and increasing the proportion of teachers able to use and teach ethnic minority languages in government schools, with potentially genuine long-term educational and political benefits for the country. Critically, although the process was still young, some of the EAO’s education departments were involved in the development of their respective State local curricula. In the post-coup context, however, the SAC’s interest for ethnic languages teachers and willingness to appoint TAs belies other motives. In 2021, after an increase of their salaries, some of the TAs who did not choose to join CDM were promoted in order to “fill the gaps” and replace the missing workforce among primary school teachers. Late 2022 speeches in the Education Colleges suggest that the TAs could be perceived as a reserve of a (rather docile) workforce, constituted of individuals in often precarious positions who would be grateful for a substantial promotion. Wearing colorful ethnic costumes during the ceremonies as reported in the state media, these TAs not only contribute to illustrating the idea of an ethnically inclusive education system but may also be seen as a credible vehicle to convey the military’s national narrative into schooling. The reports of the trainings given to the TAs in Education Colleges seem to emphasize their role as a kind of civics (စာရိတ္တနှင့်ပြည်သူ့နီတိ) teacher in charge of upholding “Union spirit” (ပြည်ထောင်စုစိတ်ဓာတ်), “patriotism” (မျိုးချစ်စိတ်ဓာတ်), and the “unity of the national races” (တိုင်းရင်းသားစည်းလုံး ညီညွတ်ရေး), all of which have been core concepts of the central state, and particularly of the various military governments, for many decades. Some of these speeches even exhort the TAs to contribute to “အမျိုးစောင့်” (protecting/defending the race/religion), a concept commonly used by Buddhist and nationalist hardliners (probably understood as inclusive of all the “national races” in this case). Despite this communication and reiterated objectives in the state media, in practice the teaching of ethnic minority languages seems at best very unsystematic in the schools controlled by the military regime that have reopened. While the teaching of some ethnic languages in the schools under the SAC MoE has recently been the topic of bilateral negotiations in order to be more systematic (and possibly going beyond the primary level in some regions), elsewhere the interruption of education due to the pandemic and CDM in reaction to the coup, as well as delayed salaries for the TAs, have often led to the disappearance of local languages classes. Overall, the opportunistic prioritization of short-sighted political benefits, including the desire to hold elections for which the SAC needs the participation of a credible number of ethnic parties, seems to be at odds with the military’s monolithic conception of the Myanmar nation. This contradiction is also found in the SAC’s language-in-education policy, which is rather confusing: a desire to seize upon previous governments’ reforms to project an image of inclusivity in its political communication; a drive towards using ethnic language teachers to instill the military’s values and conception of the nation in the students’ heads; the granting of privileges to groups willing to negotiate with the military in the frame of what resembles a classic divide-and-rule strategy; but also decisive legislative steps backward and very unsystematic teaching of ethnic minority languages in the schools controlled by the junta MoE. Meanwhile, in large chunks of the country’s territory, non-state education systems, largely relying on local languages, have been expanding or have appeared since the coup (see Part 2). This two-part article is dedicated to Mael Raynaud (1976-2022). It is part of a research project involving several organizations, operating inside and outside of Myanmar, including the Institut de Recherche sur l’Asie du Sud-Est Contemporaine (IRASEC), Mahidol University’s Institute of Human Rights and Peace Studies (IHRP), and CASE. The six authors all work/study in the field of education, in very diverse positions and locations, inside and outside of Myanmar. We wish to warmly thank all the reviewers for their close readings and constructive comments..."
Source/publisher: "Tea Circle" (Myanmar)
Date of entry/update: 2023-05-08
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Title: The Attack on AHA Centre Convoy
Description: "We are deeply concerned by reports that unknown assailants in Burma shot at an ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management (AHA Centre) convoy under military escort. Just ahead of the ASEAN Leaders’ Summit, these attacks in Shan State come as the regime’s violence and disregard for the rule of law have led to greater instability on the ground, all while the regime has continued to neglect its commitments under the ASEAN Five-Point Consensus, including ceasing its violence and enabling unhindered humanitarian access. The United States calls on Burma’s military regime to meaningfully implement the Five-Point Consensus and respect the democratic aspirations of the people who have demonstrated they do not want to live another day under the military’s tyranny. The military regime must abide by its obligations under international humanitarian law, including rules on the protection of diplomatic personnel and civilians. The United States will continue to work with ASEAN and our allies and partners across the international community to support Burma on the path to long-term inclusive, democratic governance..."
Source/publisher: U.S. Department of State
Date of entry/update: 2023-05-08
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