Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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"ပြည်ထောင်စုလွှတ်တော်ကိုယ်စားပြုကော်မတီက နှစ်ပတ်လျှင်တစ်ကြိမ် ထုတ်ပြန်ခဲ့သော သတင်းစဉ်များကို pdf file ရယူလိုပါက အောက်ပါ CRPH ဝက်ဘ်ဆိုက်လင့်ခ်မှတစ်ဆင့် ရယူနိုင်ပါသည်။
https://crphmyanmar.org/publication/newsletter/
ပြည်ထောင်စုလွှတ်တော်ကိုယ်စားပြုကော်မတီ..."
Source/publisher:
Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-16
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Type:
Individual Documents
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Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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"1. The National Unity Government (NUG), Karenni State Consultative Council (KSCC), and the Pa-o National Federal Council (PNFC) strongly condemn the massacre by the terrorist military council on March 11th of 22 civilians, including three Buddhist monks and one woman in Nam Nein Village, Pinlong Township, Shan State. We further condemn all the crimes against humanity committed by the Myanmar military. We are committed to seeking justice for the victims and their families.
2. Since the arbitrary seizure of power in 2021, the terrorist Myanmar military council has been using brutal counter-insurgency methods against innocent civilians. They have been entering the villages, killing civilians, raping and executing women, and taking citizens for use as human shields. In addition, the Myanmar military is committing these atrocities with the express purpose of dividing our diverse ethnic and religious communities.
3. The National Unity Government, Karenni State Consultative Council, Pa-O National Federal Council, and the People’s Defense Forces are working in coordination to assist civilians escape military oppression and secure justice.
4. Our organizations are working together, and the relevant ministries of the National Unity Government are engaged in compiling information about all the crimes committed by the Myanmar military, including forwarding witnesses and material evidence to international prosecution organizations. We have urged all civilians, particularly the elderly, women, children, and the disabled, to remain vigilant and evacuate prior to attacks.
5. To safeguard the lives of our people, we ask the international community to provide vital communication technology, equipment, and early warning. We further urge the imposition of sanctions on the Myanmar military and the associates which supply jet fuel, weapons, dual-purpose technology, and other military equipment to the Myanmar army.
6. We call on international legal bodies and the International Criminal Court to expand their current investigations to encompass all crimes committed in Myanmar in order to hold perpetrators to account. We also urge governments to increase pressure on the Myanmar military council by establishing universal jurisdiction in order to try cases of crimes against humanity perpetrated by the Myanmar military council. In doing so, you provide protection to the people of Myanmar and contribute to the building a new, free, and just state.
7. We encourage the international community to support the National Unity Government and its allies in order to bring a speedy resolution to the current crisis and put a stop to the crimes committed by Myanmar military against the people of Myanmar..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-16
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Armed conflict in Burma - attacks on civilians
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Sub-title:
Civilians are being killed by Russian weapons just like in Ukraine, says special rapporteur Tom Andrews in call for global action
Description:
"Myanmar is a “failing state” and the crisis is getting exponentially worse, a UN special rapporteur for the country has warned, urging countries to adopt the same unified resolve that followed the invasion of Ukraine.
“The same types of weapons that are killing Ukrainians are killing people in Myanmar,” Tom Andrews, special rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, told the Guardian in an interview, citing the supply of Russian weapons to the junta since the coup two years ago. The junta relies heavily on aircraft from China and Russia, and has increasingly resorted to airstrikes to attempt to quell determined resistance forces.
The international response to Myanmar has been inadequate and some countries are continuing to enable the junta’s atrocities, Andrews said, calling for an arms embargo.
“It is unspeakable what is happening and what is so incredibly frustrating is the fact that, as far as most of the world is concerned, this is not happening,” he said.
Instead, the world was “watching a train wreck”, Andrews said. “Myanmar is a failing state, it is in the process of failing and this is happening before our very eyes.”
He spoke ahead of a report, to be presented to the Human Rights Council next week, that details how people who have fled Myanmar face “the risk of arrest, detention, deportation, pushbacks at land and sea” as well as obstruction of their access to the UN’s refugee agency, UNHCR.
Myanmar was plunged into chaos in February 2021 when the military detained the country’s leader, Aung San Suu Kyi, and seized power. The coup has provoked widespread opposition, including both a peaceful civil disobedience movement and an armed resistance. Conflict has spiralled over the past two years, spreading across vast areas of the country, including regions that were once peaceful, where members of the public joined defence groups to fight back against the military.
The military - which analysis suggests has lost territory to the resistance despite having superior weaponry - has increasingly deployed airstrikes, including against schools and medical facilities, as well as scorched earth tactics, in an attempt to stop the resistance.
“As it becomes more dangerous for their troops to operate on the ground they have resorted to these gunships, fighter jets that are dropping bombs on villages and even IDP centres [camps for internally displaced people who have been forced to flee],” said Andrews.
Myanmar’s military has previously denied carrying out atrocities and says its operations target “terrorists”.
A report by the special rapporteur last year said Russia, China, and Serbia were providing the junta with weapons. A recent investigation by Myanmar Witness also found the military was heavily reliant upon Russian or Chinese air assets for its attacks.
Andrews said he recently spoke to a father whose home was destroyed by the military. The father had taken his family to a centre for displaced people; only for it to be bombed. His two daughters, aged 12 and 15, were killed.
The junta launched airstrikes in 10 out of 14 of the country’s administrative divisions during the last six months of 2022, according to Myanmar Witness, with such attacks occurring on an almost daily basis.
Given its reliance on aircraft from China and Russia, the junta has sought to publicly align itself with both nations after the coup. The military, led by Min Aung Hlaing “fawns over Russia”, said Andrews. “He has flown to Moscow, he has praised Putin, they of course seek and secure weapons that they use to commit these atrocity crimes.”
However, Andrews said that other countries are capable of taking more robust strategic action to stop the junta from accessing resources. While many western governments have imposed sanctions, greater coordination was needed, he said.
An arms embargo, and measures to stop aviation fuel from reaching the military should also be adopted. He did not suggest sending weapons to support the resistance, but instead measures to stop weapons or resources from reaching the junta.
Andrews has also backed calls for the UN security council to pass a resolution that will refer the situation in Myanmar to the international criminal court.
Countries have a moral imperative to do “everything possible to squeeze from the junta the means through which they are continuing to attack their people”, said Andrews. It was also in the interests of the international community, especially neighbouring countries, to act, he said.
“Myanmar is a very significant country, it is a nation of 54 million people, located on a very important part of the world between India and China. Already you have seen the impact of the instability that’s there. Thousands and thousands of people every month are running for their lives every month over the border into the region.”
In a report to be presented to the Human Rights Council on 20 March, the special rapporteur said neighbouring governments had forcibly returned people – including military deserters and children – to Myanmar despite the risk of imprisonment, torture, or even execution.
According to the UN, the number of people in need of humanitarian assistance has soared, from 1 million before the coup, to an anticipated 17.6 million in 2023.
“The economy has imploded, you have half of people now living in poverty. You have the collapse of the education system with millions of kids not having the opportunity for an education. The health system has collapsed,” he said. “Things are bad and they are getting exponentially worse.”
Some in Myanmar, while welcoming the support Ukraine has received, have questioned why the international response to the atrocities in their country has differed so vastly, said Andrews. He said that he did not have the answer, adding that some nations were continuing to enable the junta’s crimes.
“There is a moral imperative to not turn our backs on people who are exhibiting extraordinary courage in fighting for their country and their future,” said Andrews..."
Source/publisher:
"The Guardian" (UK)
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-15
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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"Quick Take:
More than 3,000 protestors have been killed, 20,000 people arrested, and 55,000 houses burned in the two years since the coup.
Amid former optimism about the prospect of ending military dominance, the ruling NLD party and many observers did not anticipate the coup until the last few months.
The regime promised to hold "free and fair" elections in 2023, but the repeatedly delayed vote is simply a military strategy to escape the ongoing armed conflict and consolidate authority.
HONOLULU (March 15, 2023) -- Last month marked the second anniversary of the military coup in Myanmar that resulted in the country's devastating civil war, with the military arresting more than 20,000 anti-coup protestors, killing more than 3,000, and burning 55,000 houses and buildings. Meanwhile, Myanmar’s GDP plummeted from an average 6% growth rate during the reform period to negative 18% since the coup.
What was shocking to me about the coup was that almost no one seemed to expect it until the last few months. Throughout the prior decade of reform, the main point of contention among the many lawmakers, political analysts, and activists I met was that "the military had enough power under the 2008 constitution, so why would they need to seize power in a risky coup?"
Indeed, in recent decades the world has seen a decline in outright political coup attempts, which create huge risks for would-be dictators, including foreign intervention, economic sanctions, external pressures, and the growth of internal resistance. To avoid such risks, would-be despots today often attempt instead to weaken all political institutions that support democracy in order to rise to power.
Coup motivations
So what prompted the Tatmadaw, or Myanmar’s military establishment, to risk these consequences? In short, the coup was motivated by both personal and institutional factors.
Institutionally, the military was losing power under democratic reforms even though the political system was rigged heavily in its favor. This in turn threatened the system of military-owned business monopolies that have enriched generals and their cronies for generations.
Soe Thane, a close aide to former President Thein Sein, said in his book that the pace of the political transition made many generals nervous, leading to accusations that certain soft-liners among the governing elites were CIA agents. Meanwhile, the emergence of a political alliance between an ex-general who chaired parliament and the popular civilian opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi caused concern and disunity among the military leadership.
The Tatmadaw initially attempted through various means to slow the pace of political liberalization, but it was the Rohingya genocide that really shifted Myanmar's trajectory. The military’s clearance operation against Rohingya Muslims beginning in 2017 resulted in mass rape, burnings, drownings, and other violence that killed at least 9,000 people and forced nearly a million to flee the country, according to The New York Times. Little is known about the military's intentions, but it seems clear that the primary objective was to play a greater role in Myanmar's politics by inflaming ethno-religious strife.
Min Aung Hliang’s personal worries
While the military could have anticipated the massive international pressure that would result from the Rohingya tragedy, apparently commander-in-chief —and later coup leader—Senior General Min Aung Hlaing did not seem to expect that demands for international justice would target him so personally. In addition, he was worried about having to relinquish power as a result of Aung San Suu Kyi's unwillingness to raise his mandatory retirement age.
After the NLD won another landslide victory in 2020, the military resorted to allegations of voter fraud. By late 2020, military-affiliated individuals openly speculated about the prospect of a coup as a warning to the NLD. Finally, when the NLD still refused to accept the Tatmadaw’s efforts to retain its power advantages, Min Aung Hlaing orchestrated the coup on Feb. 1, 2021.
NLD and Western miscalculations
Aung San Suu Kyi's administration, which probably underestimated the real prospect of a coup, has faced widespread criticism for failing to prepare for a counter-coup. And policymakers in the West were also too quick to celebrate Myanmar's previous political transition as a partial victory for their foreign policy.
The reform period was never intended to end military domination. It was rather a masterpiece of former dictator Than Shwe's retirement plan. The end of his personalist regime and the competition for successor between two former generals, Parliament Speaker Shwe Mann and President Thein Sein, were mistakenly seen as a prospect of ending military dominance. But when that dominance was threatened by the overwhelming voice of the people in the 2020 election, Min Aung Hlaing and the military establishment sent in the troops to retake it.
The coup clearly reflects the military’s dissatisfaction with its own 2008 constitution, which reserves 25 percent of parliament seats for active military personnel and allows the military commander-in-chief to independently hold three key ministries—the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Border Affairs, and the Ministry of Home Affairs.
Since Min Aung Hlaing refuses to engage in dialogue with opposition parties, as required by the five-point ASEAN consensus he agreed to in 2021, holding superficially open elections are his government's best remaining prospect for escaping the ongoing conflict and eventually gaining some degree of international legitimacy. But now, two years after the coup, the regime has again extended its state of emergency and imposed martial law in 37 additional townships, again putting off the election. This step reveals nothing more than the generals’ unquenchable desire for even greater authority than they previously possessed..."
Source/publisher:
"East-West Center"
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-15
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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"၁။ ၂၀၂၀ ရွေးကောက်ပွဲရလဒ်အရပေါ်ပေါက်လာသော မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၏ တစ်ခုတည်းသော တရားဝင် ဥပဒေပြုရေးမဏ္ဍိုင်ဖြစ်သည့် ပြည်ထောင်စုလွှတ်တော်ကိုယ်စားပြုကော်မတီ (CRPH) က နိုင်ငံတော်၏ အာဏာကို မတရားလုယူရန်ကြိုးစားခဲ့သည့် မင်းအောင်လှိုင်ဦးဆောင်သော စစ်အုပ်စုကို အကြမ်းဖက်အုပ်စု အဖြစ် ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ် မတ် လ ၁ ရက်နေ့တွင် ကြေညာချက်အမှတ် (၁၀/၂၀၂၁) ဖြင့် ထုတ်ပြန်ကြေညာ ခဲ့ပြီးဖြစ်သကဲ့သို့ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၏ တစ်ခုတည်းသော တရားဝင် ပြည်သူ့အစိုးရဖြစ်သည့် အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေး အစိုးရကလည်း ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ် ဇွန်လ ၇ ရက်နေ့တွင် စစ်ကောင်စီနှင့် ၎င်းနှင့် ဆက်စပ်လျက်ရှိသော အဖွဲ့အစည်းများအား အကြမ်းဖက်အဖွဲ့အစည်းများအဖြစ် ထပ်ဆင့်သတ်မှတ်ကြေညာခဲ့ပြီးဖြစ်သည်။
၂။ မင်းအောင်လှိုင်ဦးဆောင်သော မြန်မာစစ်တပ်သည် နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေးကာလ (၂) နှစ်ကျော်ကာလအတွင်း ရဟန်းသံဃာများ၊ သက်ကြီးရွယ်အိုများ၊ အမျိုးသမီးများ၊ ကလေးသူငယ်များ၊ မသန်စွမ်းများအပါအဝင် ပြည်သူလူထု (၃၁၂၄) ဦးကို နည်းလမ်းပေါင်းစုံဖြင့် သတ်ဖြတ်ခဲ့သည့်အပြင် အဆိုပါ သတ်ဖြတ်မှုများအတွင်း အရပ်သားပြည်သူ (၇၆၆) ဦး သေဆုံးခဲ့ရသည့် အစုလိုက်အပြုံလိုက်သတ်ဖြတ်မှု ဖြစ်စဉ် (၆၄) ခုရှိခဲ့သည်။ မြန်မာစစ်တပ်နှင့် အပေါင်းအပါများသည် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံတစ်ဝှမ်းရှိ ပြည်နယ်နှင့် တိုင်းအသီးသီးတို့တွင် ၎င်းတို့ ကျူးလွန်ခဲ့၊ ကျူးလွန်ဆဲဖြစ်သော စစ်ရာဇဝတ်မှုများ၊ လူသားမျိုးနွယ်စုအပေါ်ကျူးလွန်သည့် ရာဇဝတ်မှုများ၊ အစုလိုက် အပြုံလိုက် သတ်ဖြတ်မှုများ၊ ပြည်သူလူထု၏ အိုးအိမ်စည်းစိမ်များကို လုယက်ဖျက်ဆီးမှုများ၊ အရပ်သားများ ကို ပစ်မှတ်ထားတိုက်ခိုက်သတ်ဖြတ်မှုများဖြင့် ၎င်းတို့သည် အကြမ်းဖက်အုပ်စုသက်သက်သာ ဖြစ်ကြောင်းကို သက်သေပြလျက်ရှိသလို ၎င်းတို့ ကျူးလွန်ခဲ့သော ပြစ်မှုအချို့အတွက် နိုင်ငံတကာ ဥပဒေများဖြင့် တရားစွဲဆိုခံထားရသော အစုအဖွဲ့တစ်ခုလည်းဖြစ်ပေသည်။
၃။ အကြမ်းဖက်အုပ်စုအဖြစ် ကြေညာခြင်းခံထားရသော၊ နိုင်ငံတကာဥပဒေများဖြင့် တရားစွဲဆိုခံထားရသော အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စုက မတရားအာဏာလုယူထားသည့် အချိန်ကာလအတွင်း ထုတ်ပြန်သော အမိန့်များ၊ ညွှန်ကြားချက်များ၊ ဥပဒေများ အားလုံးသည် အလိုအလျောက်ပျက်ပြယ်ပြီး ဖြစ်သကဲ့သို့ ၎င်းတို့ဖွဲ့စည်းတာဝန် ပေးအပ်သော အဖွဲ့အစည်းများ အားလုံးသည်လည်း အကြမ်းဖက်လက်အောက်ခံအဖွဲ့အစည်းများအဖြစ်သို့ အလိုအလျောက် ကျရောက်ပြီး ဖြစ်သည်။ ထို့အပြင် ပြည်သူလူထုတစ်ရပ်လုံးကလည်း အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်၏ အာဏာလုယူမှုကို နည်းလမ်း မျိုးစုံဖြင့် ယနေ့အချိန်ထိ ဆန့်ကျင်လျက်ရှိပြီး ပြည်သူ့ဆန္ဒအမှန်ကို အတိအလင်း ပြသလျက်ရှိသည်။
၄။ သို့ဖြစ်ပါ၍ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စုက ပြဌာန်းသော ရွေးကောက်ပွဲဥပဒေသည် တရားဝင်မှုမရှိဘဲ အလိုအလျောက်ပျက်ပြယ်ပြီးဖြစ်သကဲ့သို့ ဖွဲ့စည်းတာဝန်ပေးအပ်သော ရွေးကောက်ပွဲကော်မရှင်သည်လည်း အကြမ်းဖက်လက်အောက်ခံအဖွဲ့အစည်းအဖြစ် ကျရောက်လျက်ရှိပေသည်။
၅။ ဥပဒေအဖြစ်သို့ ရောက်ရှိခြင်းမရှိဘဲ ပျက်ပျယ်ပြီးဖြစ်သော စာရွက်စာတမ်းတစ်ခုဖြစ်သည့် ရွေးကောက်ပွဲဥပဒေပါ သတ်မှတ်ချက်များကိုလိုက်နာပြီး အကြမ်းဖက်လက်အောက်ခံအဖွဲ့အစည်း တစ်ခု ဖြစ်သည့် ရွေးကောက်ပွဲကော်မရှင်ထံတွင် သွားရောက်၍ မှတ်ပုံတင်ခြင်းသည် မည်သည့် အကြောင်းပြချက်များ ရှိစေကာမူ ပြည်သူ့ဆန္ဒကို သွေဖယ်ဆန့်ကျင်ပြီး အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စု၏ ဖြစ်တည်မှုကို အတိအလင်း လက်ခံလိုက်ခြင်းဖြစ်သည့်အပြင် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စု အလိုကျ အတူတကွ လိုက်ပါအသုံးချခံကာ ပြည်သူလူထုအား ဖိနှိပ်သတ်ဖြတ်နေမှုကို အားပေးအားမြှောက်ပြုခြင်းပင် ဖြစ်ပေမည်။
၆။ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စုအနေဖြင့် တရားမဝင် အတုအယောင်ရွေးကောက်ပွဲကို ပြည်သူ့ဆန္ဒနှင့်ဆန့်ကျင်၍ အတင်းအကျပ် လုပ်ပွဲများပြုလုပ်ခဲ့ပါကလည်း အဆိုပါ တရားမဝင် အတုအယောင်ရွေးကောက်ပွဲမှ တဆင့် ပေါ်ပေါက်လာမည့် လူပုဂ္ဂိုလ်များ၊ အစုအဖွဲ့များသည် ပြည်သူလူထုကို အမှန်တကယ် ကိုယ်စားပြုသော လွှတ်တော် ကိုယ်စားလှယ်များ၊ လွှတ်တော်များ၊ အစိုးရအဖွဲ့များ ဖြစ်လာမည်မဟုတ်ဘဲ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်၏ ကိုယ်စားလှယ်များ၊ ကိုယ်စားပြု ရုပ်သေးရုပ်များ၊ ရုပ်သေးအစုအဖွဲ့များသာ ဖြစ်လာမည်ဖြစ်သည်။
၇။ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရအနေဖြင့် ပြည်သူလူထုကလွှဲအပ်ထားသော အုပ်ချုပ်ရေးအာဏာကို စွဲကိုင်ကျင့်သုံးနေသည့် တရားဝင် အစိုးရတရပ်ဖြစ်သည်နှင့်အညီ တရားမဝင်သော အကြမ်းဖက် စစ်အုပ်စု၏ လက်အောက်ခံအဖွဲ့အစည်းများ၊ အလိုတူအလိုပါ အဖွဲ့အစည်းများ၊ အားပေးအားမြှောက် ပြုသည့် အဖွဲ့အစည်းများအားလုံးကို အစိုးရနည်းနာဖြင့် ဥပဒေနှင့်အညီ အရေးယူဆောင်ရွက်သွားရန် တာဝန်ရှိ သောကြောင့် အဆိုပါတာဝန်ကို တော်လှန်ရေးအပေါ်သစ္စာပြုကာ ပြည်သူ့ဆန္ဒကို ဦးထိပ်ထားလျက် ဆက်လက်ဆောင်ရွက်သွားမည်ဖြစ်ကြောင်း အသိပေးကြေညာအပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-15
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Individual Documents
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National Unity Government (NUG), Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
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"Indonesia has a limited window of opportunity to achieve progress on Myanmar while it chairs ASEAN but that window is already growing smaller. Regional and international support for ASEAN is needed to impose time-bound consequences for Min Aung Hlaing should he continue to flout the ASEAN Five-Point Consensus (5PC), Indonesia is best placed to lead the initiative. ASEAN has insisted so far on treating the crisis in Myanmar as if it were a humanitarian disaster, one that can be ameliorated and contained neatly within Myanmar’s borders through cooperation with the junta. This is, at best, delusional. At worst it makes ASEAN complicit in the mass suffering being inflicted on the Myanmar people by Min Aung Hlaing’s junta. Min Aung Hlaing’s one and only goal is to establish his own rule, heading the junta, in Myanmar, an objective he is prepared to pursue no matter how much destruction he inflicts on the country or how many people he kills. This has been clear from the outset, making ASEAN’s futile fixation with expecting him to suddenly adhere to the 5PC he agreed to two years ago all the more perverse.
The junta has only one strategy: to terrorize the population though the widespread, systematic commission of atrocities. So far, the strategy seems to be failing. In spite of the immense suffering, the people’s support for the revolution is entrenched, and nationwide armed resistance is steadily escalating in response to the junta’s savagery. The junta’s increasing reliance on devastating airstrikes to bomb civilian targets reflects its hemorrhaging of control on the ground. But the scale of the suffering caused by the junta is alarming. Conservative estimates count the number of people in Myanmar who will need humanitarian assistance this year at 17.6 million, while 15.2 million are food insecure. At least 1.5 million people are now internally displaced with thousands more seeking refuge across Myanmar’s borders in neighboring Thailand and India each day. And there are still more than a million Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh. For two long years, the Myanmar people have pleaded for support from the international com-munity and protection from the junta’s violence. They feel totally betrayed.
Indonesia cannot allow this disgraceful injustice to continue. Ending the junta’s violence is a bare minimum expectation, yet ASEAN does not seem to have the necessary leverage over Min Aung Hlaing. Indonesia should lead a regional response that extends beyond ASEAN member states to include democratic allies Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand as well as Myanmar’s immediate neighbor Bangladesh.
China and India’s participation should also be sought but may not be possible, with both countries continuing to supply Min Aung Hlaing’s forces with the weapons it uses to carry out its atrocities. The immediate focus of this ASEAN-Plus initiative should be on ending the junta violence, with clear benchmarks for the junta and time-bound con-sequences if not met. At the same time, ASEAN must begin formal engagement with all stakeholders, primarily the National Unity Government (NUG) as the legitimate government of Myanmar, its allied ethnic revolutionary organizations, Myanmar civil society, and others in the democratic movement. Furthermore, it is critical that ASEAN – and the UN – urgently coordinate humanitarian assistance directly with local actors inside Myanmar, many in resistance-controlled areas including those along the border with Thailand, already providing aid and support to millions of people in dire need. This is the only way to get aid to areas of the country where Min Aung Hlaing is deliberately restricting access as a means of inflicting yet more suffering on the population. If ASEAN and the UN continue giving the junta total control over aid delivery, they are quite simply enabling Min Aung Hlaing’s atrocity strategy. Should ASEAN fail to make concrete progress on Myanmar by the end of the year, it should refer the situation to the UN Security Council, which in December passed its first ever resolution on Myanmar. The Security Council must then use all measures at its disposal, including those un-der Chapter VII of the UN Charter, to act to protect the people of Myanmar from the junta.
Less than 10 short months remain in Indonesia’s term as ASEAN chair before the seat is passed on to Laos. The clock is ticking..."
Source/publisher:
The Jakarta Post
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-14
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
ASEAN-Burma relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
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"Key Event Details
Location of Incident: Lanmadaw township (လမ်းမတော်မြို့နယ်), Yangon (ရန်ကုန်မြို့) [16.777583, 96.138917]
Date/Time of Incident: 8 March 2021
Alleged Perpetrator(s) and/or Involvement:
Lon Htein (specific unit not identified)
Myanmar military personnel (specific units not identified)
Summary of Investigation:
At approximately 2300 on 8 March, activists in Lanmadaw seized two vehicles that were part of a convoy they believed to be undercover military. The two vehicles – a car and a lorry carrying a bulldozer – were found to contain several guns and military clothing.
A few hours after the incident, footage verified by Myanmar Witness shows men in police and military fatigues returning to the area; they go from building to building and detain at least 13, and possibly as many as 30 men.
Myanmar Witness has verified 15 separate videos and images and has reconstructed the sequence of events that occurred in Lanmadaw.
It is not known what happened to the men after they were detained.
Executive Summary
Following the 1 February 2021 Coup, Myanmar’s State Administration Council (SAC) has stripped away due process and fair trial rights to detain thousands of protestors, activists and human rights defenders. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) reported that the vast majority of these deprivations of liberty were carried out without respect for the rule of law or in accordance with international human rights standards, therefore constituting arbitrary and unlawful detention.
This series of case studies documents four separate incidents in Yankin, Tamwe, North Okkalapa and Lanmadaw in late February and early March 2021. Three of the reports cover mass detentions of protestors, while the other examines a case of mass detention of community members, following an incident involving alleged undercover military officers in the same area.
This report covers the mass arrests of people in Lanmadaw during the early hours of 9 March 2021. The police raided the area after local people detained five men whom they believed to be undercover military. The two vehicles which the activists apprehended – a car and a lorry carrying a bulldozer – were found to contain several guns and military uniforms Myanmar Witness has identified as belonging to the Myanmar military’s Engineers Corp. A few hours after the incident, footage verified by Myanmar Witness shows men in police and military fatigues returning to the area; they go from building to building and detain at least 13, and possibly as many as 30 men.
These examples of mass detentions are being released to mark two years passing since their occurrence; however, they are by no means exhaustive. Myanmar Witness continues to monitor the deprivation of civilian liberties.
Introduction
On the night of 8 March, at approximately 2300, activists in Lanmadaw seized two vehicles – a car and a lorry carrying a bulldozer – which they believed were part of an undercover military convoy. The locals reported that the two vehicles contained several guns and military clothing.
Following this, Myanmar Witness has verified a series of events which culminated in police and military personnel moving into the area early in the morning of 9 March. They arrested at least 15 men, however social media users claim that the number was as high as 30.
The investigation - a chronological walkthrough
Incidents at night are challenging to verify – images are often dark and chronolocation is not possible due to the lack of shadows. Despite this, Myanmar Witness has been able to verify 15 separate videos and images and has reconstructed the sequence of events that occurred in Lanmadaw, culminating in the arrests of at least 13 individuals.
~2330: A 15-minute Facebook live-stream, geolocated by Myanmar Witness, was shot shortly after the vehicles were stopped (the link has since been removed, however this content was archived by Myanmar Witness). The timestamp on the live video says 2340; however, the live stream post appears as an hour-long clip with the same footage looped. While this reduces confidence in the timestamp, it does fit with accounts from individual social media posts and reporting.
The clip shows a crowd of around 50-100 people gathered at the crossroads of Anawrahta Road and Wa Dan Street. At the start of the video, a grey car is stopped on the south side of the junction and is being inspected by members of the crowd. The crowd shine phone lights into the car, lighting up the backseat, where weapons and other material can be seen wrapped in a white plastic sheet.
On the north side of the junction, a large truck towing a bulldozer is parked. At the 00:44 minute mark in the live stream, it appears the individuals inside the truck try to escape; the doors open and the crowd then run towards the truck and then north up the street, apparently in pursuit of the truck’s occupants. At the 02:17 minute mark, a man who had remained in the truck is seen being restrained by several civilians next to the vehicle. At 02:55, another man is escorted back from the street to the north.
The detained men are then escorted west along the street, while the filmer returns to the grey car. At the 06:00 minute mark, the video shows a man being questioned for several minutes by members of the crowd. The same man is visible at the beginning of the footage (00:10) when a member of the crowd has their arm around him. He tells the crowd he has purchased weapons from a shop nearby, but accepts they will detain him until the morning. The video shows the crowd continuing to inspect the vehicle, and gives a close-up of the car’s number plate.
At around the 10:00 minute mark, the man being questioned is also led west along Anawrahta Road, and the filmer then walks to an assembled crowd at the top of 3rd Street where 4-5 men can be seen on their knees with their hands tied behind their back at the 12:10 minute mark. The filmer then moves down 3rd Street with other members of the crowd, panning back to the detained men.
Photos posted to social media and verified by Myanmar Witness corroborate the events in the video, showing the five men ‘detained’ by the activists, as well as the vehicles and materiel recovered from the grey car.
Another set of images posted to Facebook shows the items and a uniform found at the scene bearing a distinctive insignia, which Myanmar Witness identified as belonging to the Engineers Corp of the Myanmar military. In another image posted on social media (VKontakte), the insignia is shown with writing underneath that reads: “စစ်အင်ဂျင်နီယာ ညွှန်ကြားရေးမှူးရုံး”, which translates as “Military Engineering Administration Office”. This also provides an explanation as to why the suspects were driving a truck with a bulldozer on a trailer.
~0030: According to social media posts from individual accounts, an hour later at around 0030 on 9 March, police and military returned to the area and went from building to building, arresting civilians. Photos and videos posted on social media at the time can be geolocated to 2nd and 3rd Streets, Lanmadaw.
~0041: A video posted to Facebook at 0041 local time shows approximately 15 police officers at the top of 2nd Street, filmed from the south-side of Anawrahta Road (Figure 5 Top Left). Shots are audible in the video but do not appear to be coming from the police in frame.
~0110: Images and videos released on social media provide multiple angles of the police and military on 2nd and 3rd street. For example, a video posted to Twitter at 0110 local time, shows men in police and military uniform breaking down a barricade before entering the street, firing as they walk down the road (Figure 5 Top Right). Police and several men in military fatigues can be seen at the top of the street (Figure 5 Bottom Left and Bottom Right).
Figure 5: [Top Left] Capture (01:48) showing police at the top of 2nd Street. The footage was posted at 0041 (source: link has since been removed, but Myanmar Witness archived it). [Top Right] Capture (00:37) showing police and military moving down 2nd Street (source: redacted due to privacy concerns). [Bottom Left] Capture (00:18) of a video shows a group of police arriving at 2nd Street (source: redacted due to privacy concerns). [Bottom Right] Capture (00:11) shows a second video angle of the police (source: redacted due to privacy concerns).
~0114: A photo posted to Twitter and timestamped at 0114 shows five men lying on the ground face down with their hands behind their back (Figure 6). While the photo is difficult to geolocate from the tight angle, the vehicles match those seen briefly in the 15-minute Facebook live stream analysed above, and the videos of police arriving at the end of 2nd Street (Figure 5 Bottom). As a result, Myanmar Witness was able to geolocate these events to the north end of 3rd Street.
Figure 6: [Top] Photo showing men detained. Military-uniformed men can be seen in the background (Source: Twitter). [Bottom Left] Capture (12:20) from the Facebook Live Video showing white vehicle with black band (source: the link has since been removed, however this content was archived by Myanmar Witness). [Bottom Right] Capture (13:34) from the Facebook Live Video showing the rear of a black saloon (source: the link has since been removed, however this content was archived by Myanmar Witness).
~0116: A second photo released in the same Twitter post, timestamped at 0116, shows another group of men lined up with their hands behind their heads. The dark image is difficult to geolocate, even after brightening with photo-editing software. The width of the street and parking is consistent with 3rd Street and the vehicles are possible matches with those seen at the top of 3rd Street in the Facebook live stream. The timestamp is also consistent with the previous image. While Myanmar Witness cannot verify with absolute confidence, it is likely that the image was taken near the north end of 3rd Street.
Figure 7: [Left] Image posted on twitter (source: Twitter user). [Right] Capture (13:39) from the Facebook Livestream showing a possible match for the vehicle near the top of 3rd Street (source: the link has since been removed, however this content was archived by Myanmar Witness).
Additional footage posted on social media provides two more angles of these men being marched along Anawrahta Road. One, shot from the south side, shows at least 13 men being marched along the street. A second short video from the north shows the same group being taken towards waiting trucks, which were out of shot in the first video. From the movements of the group, we can confirm that the two clips are shot seconds apart. It is not known what happened to these men after they were detained.
Figure 8: [Top] Capture (00:03) of a video showing men being marched along Anawrahta Road. [Bottom] Capture (00:01) of a video showing another angle of the detained men being led to the waiting trucks. (source redacted due to privacy concerns).
Attribution to the Lon Htein (Riot Police) and Myanmar military
By analysing the uniform of the officers involved in this event, Myanmar Witness was able to identify them as members of the Lon Htein (Riot Security Forces) by the red scarves tied around their necks. Due to the darkness and limited imagery, Myanmar Witness was unable to determine which battalion. The Lon Htein are renowned for their brutality and Myanmar Witness has reported on their activity within the Police and Harassment series.
Conclusion and future monitoring
This chronological reconstruction of events shows the lead up to, and detention of, at least 13 individuals following a police raid in Lanmadaw. It is not known what happened to the men after they were detained.
This series of case studies documents a number of early incidents involving violence against protestors and the deprivation of liberty of those who opposed the coup. As these case studies show, in the months following the coup, sound grenades, teargas, and live ammunition have been used on protestors and hundreds were detained.
Two years have passed since these events occurred in Yankin, Tamwe, North Okkalapa and Lanmadaw, and the military continues to crackdown on dissent. Myanmar Witness will continue to monitor the deprivation of civil liberties in Myanmar..."
Source/publisher:
Myanmar Witness
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-14
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Political prisoners and other violations in Burma - reports, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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"BANGKOK —
Human rights activists are pushing for the United Nations Security Council to refer Myanmar junta officials to the International Criminal Court, citing what the activists say are ongoing abuses in the Southeast Asian nation.
The comments coincided with a Security Council meeting Monday on the Myanmar crisis.
Human Rights Watch said in a statement that more concrete action needs to be taken against the junta, which seized power more than two years ago, overthrowing the democratically elected government of Aung San Suu Kyi. The military coup sparked mass unrest involving the country’s armed forces, as well as a resistance movement made up of protesters, activists, ousted politicians and an armed wing.
Thousands have been arrested or killed in a military crackdown, according to the latest data from a Thailand-based monitoring group.
The February 1, 2021, coup happened after the military rejected the outcome of November 2020 elections, in which Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy party won in a landslide. The junta claimed widespread electoral fraud, allegations denied by the civilian electoral commission before it was disbanded.
Human Rights Watch is urging the Security Council to build on a December resolution, which demanded an immediate end to the violence and that the junta free all political prisoners, including Suu Kyi and former President Win Myint, who also was ousted. Myanmar is under international sanctions.
“Myanmar’s junta has demonstrated it is impervious to statements of condemnation or concern. Its disregard of the Security Council’s December resolution shows the need for a new resolution imposing strong measures like an arms embargo and targeted sanctions for senior military officials and companies linked to the military,” said Louis Charbonneau, U.N. director at Human Rights Watch.
The council also has called for Myanmar’s democratic institutions to be restored.
On Monday, the U.N.’s special envoy for Myanmar, Noeleen Heyzer, and Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi led a closed-door meeting at U.N. headquarters in New York. Reports say Heyzer likely updated council members about the current situation on the ground in Myanmar, which has seen no letup in conflict since the adoption of the December resolution.
Kyaw Moe Tun, the current Myanmar permanent representative to the U.N., told VOA’s Burmese service that he was frustrated at the lack of progress the resolution has brought, but he hoped for a tangible outcome from Monday’s meeting.
The representative said, “There is no action if the resolution is not implemented, so what is the next step?”
He said the Security Council should take action against the Myanmar military if it fails to comply with the resolution.
May Sabe Phyu, director of the Gender Equality Network, a coalition of organizations advocating for women’s rights in Myanmar, tells the Associated Press the junta has conducted a terror campaign and committed “heinous acts” that constitute crimes against humanity.
Phyu also criticized U.N envoy Heyzer for meeting with Myanmar military chief Min Aung Hlaing and not with the National Unity Government, which was formed by ousted politicians and regional leaders amid the coup, and says it is Myanmar’s legitimate government.
As it stands, all plans to end the crisis have failed to have the desired effect.
The Association of Southeast Nations (ASEAN), a political and economic union of 10 member states in Southeast Asia, adopted a five-step consensus in April 2021 in an attempt to restore peace in Myanmar.
Although Myanmar agreed to the plan, little action was taken, leading to the exclusion of Myanmar’s military leaders from meetings with ASEAN members. Indonesia is ASEAN's current chair, which rotates annually among the member nations.
Charbonneau added in the Human Rights Watch report that Myanmar’s General Min Aung Hlaing has rejected the ASEAN consensus plan. Charbonneau called for Heyzer and Marsudi to push for further punishments.
“The U.N. special envoy and Indonesian foreign minister should make clear to Security Council members that the junta’s killings, torture, unlawful arrests and war crimes demand more targeted action. Cutting off the junta’s supply of money and weapons is a critical next step to stanch the atrocities being carried out every day in the country."
China, India and Russia abstained from December’s resolution vote, but 12 of the 15-member council voted in favor, so the motion was adopted. China and Russia are two of the five permanent Security Council members and have long opposed tough action over Myanmar.
Aung Thu Nyein, a political analyst, believes efforts made by the U.N. and ASEAN have “little leverage” on Myanmar’s issues.
“U.N. is so inefficient as Russia’s aggression against Ukraine has shown as evidence. U.N special envoy on Myanmar, Ms. Noleen Heyzer’s visit was ended, rebuffing a long statement by the junta,” he told VOA. “U.N. as well as ASEAN has little leverage to do with Myanmar’s crisis. If all special envoys on Myanmar, particularly China, Japan, ASEAN and other regional powers can work together, it may drive the junta [to stop].”..."
Source/publisher:
"VOA" (Washington, D.C)
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-14
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, International Criminal Court
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"13 March 2023: Violence in Myanmar at the hands of the military has increased in 2023 in direct defiance of United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 2669 and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Five Point Consensus. The UN Security Council must respond to the military’s non-compliance, with action, not mere words, says the Special Advisory Council for Myanmar (SAC-M).
The UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2669 on 21 December 2022. The resolution expressed “deep concern at the ongoing state of emergency imposed by the military in Myanmar on 1 February 2021 and its grave impact on the people of Myanmar” (preambular paragraph 1) and demanded “an immediate end to all forms of violence throughout the country” (operative paragraph 1). Operative demands made by the UN Security Council are considered binding under international law.
Since the resolution was adopted, credible reports indicate that the military has continued to launch airstrikes and artillery fire on civilian targets, massacred civilians and resistance fighters and burned civilian homes and property on a near-daily basis, in the north, northwest, east and southeast of Myanmar. In the past two weeks, cases have been reported of a single military troop beheading up to 18 resistance members and two children, and massacring 16 civilians, including three women who were raped before being killed, across three townships in Sagaing Region.
“Min Aung Hlaing and his military are not only failing to abide by the UN Security Council resolution – they are wilfully defying it,” said Yanghee Lee of SAC-M. “This is the same military that committed genocide against the Rohingya five years ago. Once again, the international community is watching on, this time as they attack an entire country and erode the security of south and southeast Asia. This is a global issue upon which the Security Council must act.”
Two years of democratic resistance have derailed Min Aung Hlaing’s attempt to seize control of Myanmar by force. Rather than change course, Min Aung Hlaing last month announced an extension to his unlawful state of emergency and unilaterally declared martial law in further parts of the country. These announcements have no legal authority but correlate with the commission of increasingly brutal acts of terror by Min Aung Hlaing’s troops.
“For two years, the military has systematically committed acts of terror, as defined under international and Myanmar law, in addition to widespread violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, and serious international criminal offences,” said Chris Sidoti of SAC-M. “The Security Council must act to enforce the military’s compliance with its resolution, including through targeted sanctions on military financial interests, a comprehensive arms embargo and referral to the International Criminal Court.”
Resolution 2669 further called for immediate and concrete actions to “effectively and fully implement ASEAN’s Five Point Consensus agreed on 24 April 2021” (operative paragraph 6). The Security Council will hear reports today from the Special Envoy of the UN Secretary-General on Myanmar and the Foreign Minister of Indonesia, this year’s ASEAN Chair, on UN support for implementation of the Five-Point Consensus.
“The extreme violence being inflicted on the population by the military must stop – this is an absolute minimum requirement for any progress, by ASEAN, by the UN or by anyone else, towards an eventual resolution of the crisis in Myanmar,” said Marzuki Darusman of SAC-M. “The simple truth is that the Five Point Consensus is failing while the junta’s violence intensifies. But Min Aung Hlaing has demonstrated no intention of curbing the atrocities. The UN Security Council must act in support of ASEAN to compel him to do so. There is no other option.”..."
Source/publisher:
Special Advisory Council for Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-13
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
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"Burma Campaign UK has today updated its Boycott List of Burmese military-owned companies and brands.
The Boycott Lists names the products and brands of the vast business empire of the Burmese military, enabling individuals, companies, organisations and governments to avoid purchasing goods and services from military companies.
The updated Boycott List is available here.
Five new listings have been added: The Angel Bistro (Pathein), NayPyiDaw Wholesale, Five Star Compound (Yangon), Five Star Port, Thateka Wharf (Yangon), and Gandamar Wholesale. These are not new military companies or brands, most are part of existing companies and brands on the list. They are being added to ensure the Boycott List is as comprehensive as possible.
One entry has been removed. The cargo vessel Yaan Byea has been sold by the military-owned Five Star shipping line.
Military-owned and controlled companies are an important source of revenue for the Burmese military. Buying goods and services from the military increases their revenue and this revenue is used to fund their operations, building their military capacity and paying for the human rights violations they commit.
“The Boycott List enables people in Burma to avoid funding the military, and should also be used by embassies, companies and UN agencies to make sure they are not funding human rights violations,” said Mark Farmaner, Director of Burma Campaign UK. “All embassies and aid donors in Burma should have policies not to buy goods and services from military companies, and that local and international NGOs cannot use their funds to purchase goods and services from military companies.”..."
Source/publisher:
"Burma Campaign UK" (London)
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-13
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Business and the Military, Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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"At least 28 people were killed by the Myanmar army at a monastery in southern Shan state, an insurgent group said.
Troops shelled Nan Naint village on Saturday, the Karenni Nationalities Defence Force (KNDF) said.
Myanmar has seen a growing number of deadly battles between its military and armed resistance groups since the junta seized power in a coup two years ago.
Some of the fiercest fighting has been in this region between the capital Nay Pyi Taw and the border with Thailand.
On Saturday, the military's air force and artillery entered the village after the shelling around 16:00 local time (09:30 GMT) and executed villagers they found hiding inside a monastery, the KNDF said.
A video from KNDF - one of several ethnic armies which have joined the fight against the military government - showed at least 21 bodies, including three in the orange robes worn by Buddhist monks, piled up against the monastery. The bodies had what appeared to be multiple gunshot wounds. The video also shows the walls of the monastery peppered with bullet holes.
The Kantarawaddy Times, a local newspaper, quoted a KNDF spokesperson saying: "It was like the [military] made them line up in front of the monastery and brutally shot them all, including the monks."
The group told the BBC it had found the other seven bodies nearby in the tiny village.
Some of the surrounding buildings and houses were also burned down in what the KNDF has said was a military attack on the village.
Devastation from the air in Myanmar's brutal civil war
She treated the resistance, and paid with her life
The group said the villagers had believed taking shelter with the highly-respected monks in the area might guarantee them protection. Others in the village had evacuated before the soldiers arrived.
Details of the incident are difficult to verify, but the savage nature of the attack against unarmed civilians is not new in this part of Myanmar, which has seen some of the strongest resistance to the military junta since a coup two years ago.
The KNDF told the BBC that since 25 February, there had been increased clashes and fighting as junta soldiers had advanced on the Nan Naint area and its monastery.
Nan Naint is on the main route from Shan state to Kayah state, a road the junta believes is critical to arms supply to the insurgent groups fighting against them.
It is also an area with a mixed population of sometimes rival ethnic groups: Pa-O, Shan and Karenni people.
The Pa-O National Organisation and its armed wing are strongly pro-junta in the area. Locals report the army has stepped up efforts to reinforce such pro-junta ethnic militias in the region to challenge the opposition who control the area.
And in recent months, attacks and counter-attacks had paved the way for the escalation on Saturday, observers say.
"The Karenni groups have captured some villages and so the Myanmar military is now shelling them," a village official near the military outpost of Saung Pyaung told the local The Irrawaddy newspaper.
Such fighting has also displaced thousands of people, local aid groups report.
Myanmar's military leaders had been hoping to hold an election this year in the belief this would give their government some badly-needed legitimacy.
But their failure to crush opposition to their rule, even with the extensive use of aerial bombardment in recent months, has made holding an election a near impossible task.
Myanmar has been caught up in a civil war for decades, which escalated after the coup in 2021.
One-and-a-half million people have been displaced, 40,000 homes have been gutted, eight million children are no longer in school, and 15 million people are judged by the UN to be dangerously short of food.
More than 2,900 people have been killed during the junta's crackdown on dissent, according to monitoring group the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners..."
Source/publisher:
"BBC News" (London)
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-13
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights Defenders, Armed conflict in Burma - attacks on civilians
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Sub-title:
Human Rights Catastrophe Intensifies Since December Resolution
Description:
"The United Nations Security Council should build on its December 2022 resolution on Myanmar by adopting tangible measures to hold the junta accountable for ongoing abuses, Human Rights Watch said. The council will hold a session on Myanmar on March 13, 2023, and hear reports from Noeleen Heyzer, the UN secretary-general’s special envoy on Myanmar, and Retno Marsudi, Indonesia’s foreign minister and head of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) office of the special envoy on Myanmar.
Security Council members should consider the December resolution on Myanmar, which denounced the military’s rights violations since the February 1, 2021 coup, as only a first step to reinvigorate global scrutiny of the junta’s atrocities. The council should take meaningful actions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, including instituting a global arms embargo, referring the country situation to the International Criminal Court, and imposing targeted sanctions on junta leadership and military-owned companies.
“Myanmar’s junta has demonstrated it’s impervious to statements of condemnation or concern,” said Louis Charbonneau, UN director at Human Rights Watch. “Its disregard of the Security Council’s December resolution shows the need for a new resolution imposing strong measures like an arms embargo and targeted sanctions for senior military officials and companies linked to the military.”
Since December, junta security forces have killed at least 263 people through artillery shelling, airstrikes, and arson attacks on villages, as well as torture, rape, and executions in custody, according to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP). The authorities have arrested at least 486 people and sentenced at least 401 over the same period, including teachers, monks, doctors and nurses, lawyers, National League for Democracy (NLD) legislators and party officials, and aid workers.
Most of the convictions have carried sentences of between 10 years to life in prison under “terrorism” or “incitement” provisions put in place or expanded by the junta to broadly criminalize the opposition movement.
The junta has committed widespread and systematic abuses against the civilian population – including extrajudicial killings, torture, and wrongful imprisonment – that amount to crimes against humanity. Many attacks on civilians and villages are apparent war crimes. Since February 2021, security forces have killed more than 3,000 people and arbitrarily arrested over 20,000.
In February, the junta extended its manufactured state of emergency for an additional six months before declaring martial law in 40 new townships across a number of states and regions, transferring all executive and judicial power to the head of the relevant regional military command.
The December council resolution called for “full, safe and unhindered humanitarian access,” expressing deep concern at the “increasingly large numbers of internally displaced persons and dramatic increase in humanitarian need.” However, the Myanmar junta is increasing blockages on humanitarian assistance to prevent aid from reaching populations in need as a form of collective punishment. Since the resolution was adopted, military operations in the southeast and northwest have displaced more than 150,000 civilians, bringing the total number of people displaced since the coup to 1.3 million. Armed clashes have affected almost 80 percent of the country’s townships.
The December resolution contained numerous references to ASEAN, which adopted a “five-point consensus” in April 2021 in response to the Myanmar coup. Junta chief Sr. Gen. Min Aung Hlaing has since rejected each point of the consensus while exploiting the international community’s deference to the regional bloc. As this year’s ASEAN chair, Indonesia should reroute the bloc’s approach to more effectively isolate the Myanmar junta while soliciting ASEAN support for additional Security Council measures and cooperation with other countries’ efforts to block the flow of revenue and arms to the junta.
“The generals have embarked on a scorched earth policy in an attempt to stamp out opposition,” Volker Türk, the UN high commissioner for human rights, reported earlier this month. “The military, emboldened by continuous and absolute impunity, has consistently shown disregard for international obligations and principles. Urgent, concrete action is needed to end this festering catastrophe.”
Security Council members, in light of the junta’s flagrant noncompliance with the ASEAN five-point consensus and December resolution, should use today’s session to identify concrete steps to counter the grave abuses and violations of international human rights and humanitarian law being inflicted daily.
“The UN special envoy and Indonesian foreign minister should make clear to Security Council members that the junta’s killings, torture, unlawful arrests, and war crimes demand more targeted action,” Charbonneau said. “Cutting off the junta’s supply of money and weapons is a critical next step to stanch the atrocities being carried out every day in the country.”..."
Source/publisher:
Human Rights Watch (USA)
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-13
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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"Today, International Women's Day is being celebrated worldwide, while in Myanmar, a total of 483 women have been killed by the Terrorist Military Council in the past two years, and a total of 3,125 women including State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi are languishing in prison. A total of 11 women have been sentenced to death, and 15 to life imprisonment, with a further 122 women sexually assaulted by the junta's troops. Sexual violence and violence against Myanmar women of various forms now plague the country.
On march 8th, 1857 protests in a New York textile factory to increase wages, gain voting rights, and reduce working hours led to a violent crackdown by authorities. Over a hundred years later, in 1975, the United Nations declared International Women's Day, a day designated to promote and protect women's rights. Myanmar also signed the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) July 22, 1997, and although Myanmar agreed, subsequent terrorist dictators not only ignored the treaty but also failed to implement its provisions for many years. The contract was violated.
Over the past 26 years, terrorist dictators have committed a variety of inhumane acts of violence purposefully and systematically violating Myanmar women's rights and preventing any social progress. In the past 26 years even though Myanmar signed the CEDAW, terrorist dictators were absolutely unwilling to comply with it and this is evident by the statement they release on the day before International Women's Day. Terrorist dictators have committed inhumane crimes against Myanmar women and rather than apologising to Myanmar women for the crimes and abuses the terrorist leaders have committed, and taking legal action and delivering justice, the terrorist dictators instead destroying criminal evidence, torching crime scenes and incinerating dead bodies to hide the signs of torture. Along with this, a cruel 4 cuts policy is also being imposed on the people and violence against Myanmar women continues.
As of the 8th of March, rather than protecting the rights of Myanmar women in accordance with the CEDAW, to which Myanmar is a signatory, and promoting the intellectual, physical, and emotional fortitude of Myanmar women, the junta have instead murdered a total of 483 Myanmar women who have been acting for women's rights and federal democracy in the past two years. Soon after the coup, on February 9th, 2021, peaceful protester Mya Thwet Thwet Khine (မ မြသွဲ့သွဲ့ခိုင်) was shot in the head. Less than a month later on March 3rd, 19 year-old Angel (ကြယ်စင်) was shot in the head. The military have continued their killing spree, most recently on March 1st, 2023 just before International Women's Day where they sexually violated and murdered three women Ma Pan Nwe (မပန်းနွယ်), Ma Pan Twe ( မပန်းသွယ်), Ma Swe Swe Oo (မဆွေဆွေဦး) in the village of Tatai, Sagaing Region.
In addition to the 483 women murdered in the past 24 months, a total of 3,125 Myanmar women, including state counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi have been unjustly detained and junta forces have sexually abused and violated a total of 122 Myanmar women. In the last 24 months, in addition to the unjust executions of Phyo Zayar Taw and Ko Jimmy, a total of 11 Myanmar women have been sentenced to death and a further 15 have been sentenced to life imprisonment. The terrorist dictators use hunger, rape, and arson as weapons, leading to the displacement of 1.6 million people, mostly women and children. More than 50,000 buildings have been set ablaze, and more than 17 million people in Myanmar are affected by famine, again with women and children bearing the brunt of the burden.
We will continue working with international governments and relevant organisations to prosecute terrorist dictators through international legal channels until the people of Myanmar get justice, with no crime left unpunished. Together, we will root out the military dictatorship and restore rights and power to the hands of women and people of Myanmar regardless of race, religion, gender, and ethnicity and build a new federal democracy embracing equality for all the people of Myanmar..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of International Cooperation Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-10
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Women's rights, Women and Politics in Burma/Myanmar, Articles, reports and sites relating to women of Burma
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"Dear brothers and sisters, thank you so much indeed for inviting me today. The people of Myanmar have been living under the reign of terror of the genocidal military junta. It has been two years of living Hell, two years of hopelessness and helplessness, two years of losing friends and family, two years of pain and suffering, two years of fear and terror, two years of loss and wandering, two years of death and destruction, two years of attacks on churches and schools, two years of attacks on freedom and democracy, two years of rape and torture, two years of starvation and hunger, two years of atrocities and crimes against humanity, two years of lawlessness, two years of injustice and unrighteousness, two years of darkness and desperation.
At the same time, it has been two years of courage and bravery, two years of Unity in diversity, two years of perseverance and resilience, two years of struggle for freedom and Democracy, two years of struggle for Human Rights and righteousness, two years of strength and wisdom, two years of grace and mercy, two years of faith and trust in God Almighty.
In the last 24 months alone we have seen the Burma Army (Tatmadaw) Junta forces detain more than 20,000 civilians including elected members of parliament, President U Win Myint and State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and more than 9,000 attacks on civilians which have killed more than 3,000 civilians including children and women. More than 50,000 homes, schools, churches, monasteries have been destroyed. More than 1.6 million were forced to become homeless in Refugee and IDP camps. As a result more than 17 million people of Burma are in great in need of Humanitarian Assistance and half the population of the country’s 54 million people are heading towards extreme poverty.
Please join me in prayer for the immediate implementation of the 10 points of the UK - led UN Security Council Resolution on the situation in Myanmar.
Please join me in prayer for immediate implementation of the ASEAN 5 points consensus on Myanmar without further delay.
Please join me in prayer for the immediate and effective implementation of the 8 points of the Burma Act of the US National Defense Authorisation Act (NDAA).
Please join me prayer for justice and accountability for Myanmar through international justice mechanisms, international Court of Justice (ICJ), international Criminal Court (ICC) and Universal Jurisdiction (UJ).
Please join me in prayer for the release of all political prisoners unconditionally, including President U Win Myint, State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and Rev. Dr. Hkalam Samson.
Please join me prayer for the support of freedom fighters, pro-democracy movements such as Ethnic Revolution Organisation (EROs), Civilian Disobedience Movement( CDM ), People Defences Forces (PDFs), Local Defence's Forces (LDF), the Committee Representing the Union Parliament of Myanmar know as CRPH, and National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC).
Please join me in prayer for the immediate recognition of the legitimate representatives of the people of Myanmar, the National Unity Government (NUG) of Myanmar by the international community.
Please join me in prayer for the end of this genocidal military junta’s reign of terror against the people of Myanmar who have suffered so much for so long under brutal military dictatorship.
Please join me in prayer for building a new Myanmar Federal Democratic Union for all people of Myanmar regardless of race, religion, culture, language, gender, background or ethnicity.
Please join me prayer for the kingdom of God, the kingdom of peace and prosperity, the kingdom of justice and righteousness, the kingdom of faith and hope, the kingdom of love and life, the kingdom of freedom and democracy to come sooner rather than later to Myanmar..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of International Cooperation Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-10
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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Size:
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"Key Event Details: Location of Incident:
Kyauktada township (ကျောက်တံတား), Yangon city (ရန်ကုန်) [16.776670, 96.163171].
Chanayethazan township (ချမ်းအေးသာဇံ), Mandalay (မန္တလေး), [21.989303, 96.071360].
Date/Time of Incident:
7 March 2021
Alleged Perpetrator(s) and/or Involvement:
Myanmar Police and military personnel
Yangon Division, Operation Command Headquarters No. 4
Summary of Investigation:
Myanmar Witness has verified footage of events in both Yangon and Mandalay which show individuals being beaten repeatedly by men wearing police and military uniforms.
At the incident in Yangon, insignia worn by the military indicates that they were from the Yangon Division of Operation Command Headquarters No.4.
At the incident in Mandalay, Myanmar Witness has verified footage of a person being beaten, kicked, and dragged across the road by several men wearing police and military uniforms, including uniforms belonging to Lon Htein (Riot Police) battalion 4.....Executive Summary: In the months following the February 2021 military coup, Myanmar Witness documented and verified footage of police and military violence against individuals. This mini-series of spot reports documents five separate incidents in Yangon, Mandalay and Sagaing in February and March 2021.
The case studies show police and military personnel beating unarmed individuals, including those already in detention; harassment, intimidation and arrest of medical workers; and the infliction of degrading treatment. They also show evidence of coordination between police and violence by men in civilian clothes. Analysis of rank and insignia clearly visible in the footage enables attribution of responsibility for the violence to the Lon Htein (Riot Security Forces), soldiers from Myanmar military’s Yangon Command, and the 101 Light Infantry Battalion. Additionally, ranking police officers were identified in two incidents.
In the third report of the series, Myanmar Witness has verified footage from two separate incidents showing individuals being beaten by men wearing police and military uniforms. At the incident in Yangon, insignia worn by the military indicates that they were from the Yangon Division of Operation Command Headquarters No.4. At the incident in Mandalay, Myanmar Witness has verified footage of a person being beaten, kicked, and dragged across the road by several men wearing police and military uniforms, including uniforms belonging to Lon Htein (Riot Police) battalion 4.
These examples of police and military brutality are being released to mark two years passing since their occurrence, but they are by no means exhaustive. Myanmar Witness has documented other instances of police and military harassment since the coup, which has been documented in several reports, including: Violence against protestors in North Okkalapa, Bago, and Hlaing Tharyar; and, the deaths of multiple female protestors, including Ma Kyal Sin (Angel) and Daw Tinnwe.....Kyauktada township, Yangon: The investigation walkthrough
Myanmar Witness has verified multiple pieces of user-generated content which show individuals being beaten repeatedly by a group of Myanmar police and military personnel. By analysing a number of allegations alongside these two disparate sources, it appears that these events took place on 7 March 2021.
In footage posted by Tachileik News, multiple people beat individuals who appear to be crouched down in a defensive stance (as seen in figure 1).
Additional footage allegedly from the same day shows the same group of people from a different angle. Multiple protests did occur on this day in Yangon; however, Myanmar Witness cannot confirm that these individuals were protestors or engaged in protest. Below is a comparison of two stills from the two alternative videos showing the same people - identified within both images by coloured boxes.....Geolocating the incident:
By analysing identifiable features in the two videos, Myanmar Witness was able to identify where these individuals were beaten to the corner where Anawrahta Road and Seikkantha Street meet, in Yangon.....Attribution: Myanmar Police and Myanmar military: As seen in the video stills above, there were several police and military personnel involved. By analysing the uniform of the personnel involved in this event, Myanmar Witness was able to identify a high-ranking police officer present at the scene, and the command of the military personnel.
The police officer is wearing a vest and there are clear signs that he has at least two stars on his shoulder rank slide, indicating that he is either a police lieutenant, or a police captain.
The military personnel involved in the incident are wearing a patch on their left arms. Myanmar Witness has been able to identify this as the Yangon Division of Operation Command Headquarters No. 4. Visual confirmation of the match can be seen in Figure 5.....Chanayethazan township, Mandalay The investigation walk through: Footage emerged on social media on 7 March 2021 showing a person dressed in white being beaten, kicked and then dragged across a road by men in Myanmar military uniforms. The events allegedly took place at a ‘multi-school strike’ and led to the arrests and beating of multiple students. Khit Thit media claims that the individual depicted was a second year paramedical student.
Myanmar Witness identified multiple videos and images showing several angles of this specific incident. In the first video, the group of Myanmar military personnel and police are seen kicking the body (source redacted due to privacy concerns), and in the second video they are seen dragging the body away.This specific case is concerning given the level of violence inflicted on the person already in police custody. The individual is clearly injured and after being dragged, one police member continued to strike the individual, who was lying motionless, with a stick (as seen in figure 7). Additional images shared by the Voice of Myanmar show the same individual on the floor as the Myanmar police beat him. By comparing the Khit Thit Media video with the images released by the Voice of Myanmar, it is possible to determine that this is the same incident. They show the same individual being beaten, the same security forces, and it is in the same location (as seen by figure 9). Other images shared on the same day show students from Mandalay’s Technology University protesting, wearing similar white outfits and helmets as the individual being beaten in the figures above.....Geolocating and chronolocating the incident: Myanmar Witness geolocated the footage to Pinya Street, using features seen in the background of the video, such as the small black sign indicating “Love House” and Hotel Iceland, in front of which the violence took place. The location of the shadows cast by the men and the utility poles indicates that the footage was filmed around noon.....Attribution: Myanmar military, police and Riot Police: Members of the Myanmar military, police and Lon Htein (Riot police) are visible within the footage analysed. While the specific units of the military personnel cannot be determined, Lon Htein personnel can be identified by the red scarves tied around their necks. The blue circle on the red scarf states the battalion number; in this case the individuals appear to be from battalion 4.....Conclusion and future monitoring: The Myanmar Police and military were accused of widespread brutality against protestors and civilians following the coup. The excessive violence shown towards individuals as shown in this report signals a culture within both the Myanmar military and the police. Similar acts of brutality occurred in multiple locations on the same day.
This mini-series of spot reports documents five separate incidents in February and March 2021 where the police and military have harassed or mistreated individuals. While these examples are by no means exhaustive, they capture a number of violent tactics employed by the Myanmar security forces to quell rebellion against the coup..."
Source/publisher:
Myanmar Witness
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-10
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations, Freedom of opinion and expression: - the situation in Burma/Myanmar - reports, analyses, recommendations
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1.69 MB
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"In early February, four members of an anti-junta group in the Myanmar city of Mandalay said they received a secret, one-page, handwritten note spirited out of a prison that details two days of clashes and beatings of female political prisoners.
The note, received by the "Anti-Junta Forces Coordination Committee - Mandalay" and since seen by Reuters, provides the first detailed account of a crackdown on defiant female prisoners inside Mandalay's Obo prison that left scores of women injured, according to six activists and lawyers who work with political prisoners.
Two family members of prison inmates contacted the anti-junta group after being told by prison authorities that they couldn't send food and packages to relatives, the four anti-junta group members said.
The group started looking into the matter and, within days, received the note, the four members said.
Two lawyers, two family members of inmates and the human rights minister from Myanmar's exiled parallel civilian government confirmed the information contained in the note. Reuters could not independently verify the authenticity of the note or the details it contains.
A spokesman for Myanmar's military government that has ruled since seizing power in 2021 and two prison department officers did not answer repeated calls over two days from Reuters seeking comment.
The junta has previously denied holding political prisoners, saying people in jail broke the law and were sentenced after due legal process. Human rights organizations have frequently criticized the hearings as kangaroo courts.
Inside the prison, which rights activists say houses some 2,000 political inmates including 330 women, an altercation between an inmate and a prison official on Feb. 3 led to around 150 male prison guards arriving with slingshots, batons and bamboo sticks, the note, written in Burmese, said.
"During that incident, more than 100 female political prisoners were seriously injured including a broken arm, eye injuries and facial bruises," the note said.
The following day, some female prisoners and prison guards faced off again, leading to another bout of violent clashes, according to the note and the lawyers, activists and family members who spoke to Reuters. They said they obtained the information from around a dozen people, including prison wardens, medical staff and inmates.
Serious injuries
All four activists declined to reveal exactly how the note was smuggled out, citing risk to individuals involved in the process and fearful that such routes to leak information from inside the prison may be blocked by authorities.
The activists and lawyers said the note, and the details of the clashes on Feb. 3-4 they pieced together from conversations with prison staff and others, afforded a rare insight into what they described as harsh conditions faced by thousands of prisoners across Myanmar under military rule, including women, who are often given limited food and medicines.
The activists, lawyers and family members interviewed by Reuters asked not to be identified for fear of repercussions as they are working inside Myanmar.
In the second week of February, the parallel civilian government said in a social media post that 150 male guards at Obo prison had "violently beaten up" women inmates, supporting the version of events that the activists, lawyers and family members separately provided to Reuters.
Of the 100 female inmates injured in the clashes, all aged between 20 and 35, 21 were seriously injured, including six who were hit in the head, according to activists and lawyers. The smuggled note did not specify injuries or provide such detailed figures.
Myanmar's jails were inundated by new prisoners in 2021 after the junta seized power from the elected government led by Nobel laureate Aung San Suu Kyi, triggering a wave of protests that has morphed into a guerrilla resistance movement.
Accused by local and international rights activists of rampant abuses in its response, the junta has said that it has a duty to ensure peace and security, and that it is carrying out a legitimate campaign against “terrorists”.
The junta has imprisoned around 16,000 people, more than 3,000 of them women, as of Feb. 28, according to the non-profit Assistance Association for Political Prisoners.
'They used men' to guard women
Aung Myo Min, the human rights minister in Myanmar's exiled parallel civilian government, said Obo prison authorities had violated prison rules by using male guards to handle female inmates.
"As these people are women prisoners, they have to be handled by women prison guards. But they used men,” he told Reuters, echoing similar allegations made separately by activists and lawyers.
Male guards cannot enter dormitories housing female inmates without the presence of women guards and female inmates cannot be physically beaten, according to a copy of a nationwide prison rule book published in 1992 seen by Reuters.
Reuters could not independently verify if there were any female guards present during the incidents on Feb. 3-4 or if the rule book remains current.
"They used excessive force," Aung Myo Min said, adding that his ministry had investigated the violence at Obo prison. He declined to explain how the investigation was conducted and offered no evidence to support the allegation.
The anti-junta group and two Mandalay-based lawyers who work with political prisoners said those involved in the violence were also denied medical care.
"They refused to give medicines to the injured prisoners after beating them severely. We had to use under-the-table methods to be able to send medicine," one lawyer said. Reuters could not independently verify that information.
After the violence, 72 female political prisoners were isolated from other inmates at Obo and dozens were transferred to other jails without their families being notified, according to three activists, two lawyers and two family members..."
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"Reuters" (UK) via "VOA" (Washington, D.C)
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2023-03-10
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2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Political prisoners and other violations in Burma - reports, Freedom of opinion and expression: - the situation in Burma/Myanmar - reports, analyses, recommendations
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"The political implications of ultra-nationalist Buddhist monks and ideologies in Myanmar received much attention in the years before the 2021 military takeover. As Myanmar has turned more violent since the coup, ultra-nationalist monks have been radicalised further. What role are these monks playing in the political landscape of Myanmar today? And what is their rationale for supporting the military?
The coup leader, Commander-in-Chief of the Tatmadaw (Armed Forces of Myanmar) Min Aung Hlaing, marked Myanmar’s 75th Independence Day on 4 January 2023 by honouring hundreds of individuals, including the notorious ultra-nationalist monk U Wirathu who received a medal for patriotism. But similar recognition was absent for U Wirathu’s fellow ultra-nationalist monk, U Warthawa.
U Warthawa has been instrumental in organising and legitimising pro-junta militias in the Pyu Saw Htee group, an ultra-nationalist organisation comprised of local supporters of the military’s USDP party and trained by military veterans. These militias are increasingly doing the Tatmadaw’s dirty work in fighting the resistance from the People’s Defence Force, particularly in the restive Sagaing Region.
In March 2021, the Pyu Saw Htee group headquarters announced the formation of the Pyu Saw Htee as people’s militias to protect the villages, following nationwide resistance against the coup. But by early 2022, the militias were armed with rifles to support military columns and trained directly by the Tatmadaw, organised under the patronage of monks like U Warthawa.
The name Pyu Saw Htee refers to a legendary king from the early Bagan dynasty. The first Pyu Saw Htee militia that supported the government was formed in 1955 as a people’s militia to fight insurgent groups, though that group was dissolved two years later.
The symbolism behind the name refers to the elimination of threats to the capital and is not historically associated with Buddhism or monks. But a year after the coup, the concept re-emerged to describe the network of ultra-nationalists countering the anti-coup resistance. The logo of today’s Pyu Saw Htee group depicts the Sasana flag — the flag of the Buddhist religion — with the image of King Pyu Saw Htee standing on the dead bodies of the enemies of Bagan.
One of our interviewees, a self-described ‘nationalist monk’, said that the term Pyu Saw Htee is used to honour militant efforts, acting as ‘guidelines [which] will help them win against all threats’. He explained that while monks are not meant to participate directly in the militias, they should provide the right guidance ‘for the heroes who protect the family, the village, the society and Buddhism from threats’.
While ultra-nationalist monks in Myanmar are mainly associated with anti-Muslim sentiments, at least three additional key factors contribute to their involvement in the politics of Myanmar.
First, many monks believe that the Buddhist religion is facing an existential threat from external forces. Islam is one part of this perceived threat, but so too is secularisation, modernisation and democracy. The monks see it as their responsibility to preserve what they understand to be the original form of Buddhism.
Second, during the reform period of 2011–2020, the rise of civil society also challenged traditional authority in Myanmar, further threatening the elevated role of the monks as trusted leaders in society.
Third, changes within the relationship between monks and administrators have also shaped ultra-nationalist monks’ involvement in politics. Experiences from the reform period have led these monks to doubt that a civilian administration can protect the Buddhist religion and community and they see themselves as obliged to step in and guide society. As ultra-nationalist monks see the military as closer to the traditional rule of the Buddhist kings than other players in the politics of Myanmar, their agenda is to ensure that the Tatmadaw maintains its role as the protector of the nation, race and religion.
Two years after the 2021 coup, the Tatmadaw is facing its greatest challenge in recent history. The sustained resistance against the junta has stretched the military’s resources and capabilities to their limits. The military’s preferred strategy is to rely on vigilante groups and armed militias to carry some of the load.
The ultra-nationalist monks not only represent religious authority, but they also serve as protectors of legendary King Pyu Saw Htee’s legacy, securing traditional legitimacy for the military regime. As this religious and spiritual justification of violence is highly valuable to the Tatmadaw, the influence of ultra-nationalist monks will likely continue to impact the political landscape in post-coup Myanmar..."
Source/publisher:
East Asia Forum
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-10
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2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Burmese Buddhism and Society
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"Two years following the Myanmar military's overthrowal of the democratically-elected ruling party on February 1, 2021, thousands of people have been killed in violence sweeping the country while nearly 1.5 million people remain internally displaced.
In Myanmar, food insecurity is on the rise, health and education systems have disintegrated, and nearly half of the population of 55 million people is living below the poverty line.
Rohingya communities continue to suffer from systemic discrimination and a lack of protection mechanisms, including access to legal status within Myanmar. Almost 130,000 Rohingya people remain internally displaced, and over 943,000 live in crowded and increasingly unsafe conditions in Bangladesh.
Disproportionate to the need, Myanmar's Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) was only 41% funded in 2022.
Despite operating under heavy access constraints, security threats, and severe underfunding, INGOs and local NGOs, the backbone of the humanitarian response, provided lifesaving aid under the HRP and reached more than 4 million people.
Myanmar faces extreme access constraints due to attacks on humanitarian staff and the de facto authorities' adoption of bureaucratic and administrative measures that restrict civic space and limit humanitarian operations.
In October 2022, Myanmar's de facto authorities enacted the Organization Registration Law, which introduced the mandatory registration of NGOs, CSOs, and INGOs with strict administrative and potentially criminal penalties for non-compliance.
Aid actors have already responded by expanding their modalities to continue their daily operations, including cash assistance, remote services, engagement with Community Based Organizations, and increased risk assessments.
However, donors have a central role in ensuring humanitarian assistance reaches those most in need by providing robust and flexible funding to all partners allowing for maximum adaptability and optimal support across the country.
Recommendations
Donors should:
Step up humanitarian diplomacy and advocacy efforts to push the Myanmar Armed Forces (MAF) to respect international humanitarian and human rights law and facilitate the work of international and local civil society actors, ensuring unimpeded access to communities in need of assistance.
Host a donor-pledging event to help raise global awareness of the unprecedented level of humanitarian needs in Myanmar and secure appropriate resources to address them. With humanitarian agencies' support, donors must ensure that Myanmar does not become a forgotten crisis.
Step up diplomatic engagement with regional partners, including neighboring India and China, and support their efforts to welcome refugees from Myanmar. They should avoid refoulement, arbitrary arrest, and detention.
Support ASEAN in developing a comprehensive approach for engagement with all conflict parties to secure humanitarian access and deliver principled assistance across Myanmar.
Ensure all stakeholders, including Rohingya, are involved in future conflict de-escalation processes. While refugees have consistently expressed the desire to return to Myanmar once conditions allow, third-country resettlement and complementary pathways should be explored for Rohingya refugees, as prospects for repatriation or formal integration are currently limited.
Provide necessary exemptions in funding requirements and review partnership arrangements for international and national partner organizations to ensure program continuity and financial sustainability in this complex operational environment and expand direct funding opportunities for local organizations. Donors should adopt flexible reporting and due diligence processes to allow NGO and CSO partners to continue safe and sustainable humanitarian operations.
Donors should advocate with financial institutions inside and outside Myanmar to ensure that enhanced financial due diligence measures are applied in a proportionate and risk-sensitive manner so as not to restrict humanitarian aid flows.
The UN Secretariat and UN Security Council should:
Push for greater urgency, prioritization, and tougher action by the UN Security Council on Myanmar, and not delegate the responsibility for solutions to ASEAN, or individual ASEAN member states. A coherent and unified regional strategy and plan will help mobilize robust support and the backing of the international community, including the UN Special Envoy and UN Security Council, in the effective implementation of UNSC Resolution 2669 and help secure necessary technical support for the operationalization of ASEAN's Five-Point Consensus.
The adoption of UNSCR 2669 was an important step. It should be followed up with regular briefings by the UN Secretary General in open meetings of the Security Council on the situation in Myanmar, including progress on the implementation of ASEAN's Five-Point Consensus and other elements of UNSCR 2669.
The UNSC should work towards a follow-up resolution to UNSCR 2669 that will invite the UN Secretary General to periodically provide the Council with written reports on the situation in Myanmar that are then the subject of regular briefings and consultations.
Ensure enhanced support for human rights-focused monitoring, reporting, and accountability, including by extending and resourcing the mandates of the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar and Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar.
Ensure that the humanitarian response is scaled up with a new fit-for-purpose coordination architecture in line with the Peer-to-Peer review recommendations under the strong leadership of a full-time Humanitarian Coordinator. Voices of local humanitarian responders must be included in all key actions and processes in the Myanmar humanitarian response..."
Source/publisher:
InterAction
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-10
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Human Rights and international relations, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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Military abandons plans for August elections, dashing naïve hopes that the would-be sham polls provided a path to stability.
Description:
"The junta’s official admission that it lacks control indicates that it has failed to achieve its objective of resurrecting a military government. With a cloud of uncertainty hovering over the elections, the generals are now searching for other possible pathways to consolidate power.
Many in the international community who had pinned their hopes on the junta’s elections as a pathway to peace in Myanmar wrongly believed that the pattern of previous coups — military atrocities paired with a rigged election — would dictate the trajectory this time and lead to stability. It is clear to anyone engaged with the people of Myanmar that things are different this time.
The past 10 years of relative freedom awakened powerful forces in the population that are the bedrock for a movement that remains committed in the face of a murderous mafia junta intent on terrorizing and dividing it. The international community should recognize that the practical path to peace and stability in Myanmar lies through supporting resistance efforts, not the junta.
Reinventing the 2008 Military Constitution
The day before Min Aung Hlaing’s announcement, the regime’s National Defense and Security Council (NDSC) concluded, without any legal justification, that Myanmar had yet to achieve “normal circumstances.” This declaration gave Min Aung Hlaing the justification he sought to extend the junta’s rule.
Provision 425 of the 2008 military constitution authorizes the NDSC “to normally permit two extensions of the prescribed [emergency] duration for a term of six months for each extension” beyond the initial one-year period of martial law mandated by a declaration of a national emergency. (The military declared a state of emergency following the February 1, 2021, coup.) At the end of this two-year-period, the constitution requires that elections must be held within six months. Because these are not “normal” circumstances, the NDSC arbitrarily determined it had the authority to extend its rule by another six months.
Defiance of their own constitutions is nothing new for the military in the history of modern Myanmar. Gen. Ne Win, the father of Myanmar’s military dictatorship, often proclaimed his firm allegiance to the 1947 independence constitution before annulling it in the 1962 coup. Similarly, Gen. Saw Maung, the leader of the September 1988 coup, maintained that the military adhered to Ne Win’s 1974 constitution until it no longer served him — repealing it after his 1988 coup. Myanmar’s latest coup leader is now following in their footsteps.
Dashing Naive Expectations
The junta set the August 2023 election date in hopes that it would provide international legitimacy for its power grab and divide the resistance movement. Junta propaganda stressed the importance of its proposed elections and played up election preparations, making them a focal point for debate within the international community.
Some international observers were lured into believing that the elections would provide an exit for Min Aung Hlaing, disregarding ample evidence that the coup master does not see the elections as an exit, but rather as a means of dividing the resistance, furthering his military objectives and consolidating control. Others made hollow legal arguments, asserting that the military regime had no option but to hold elections according to the constitution — arguments that overlooked the blatant unconstitutionality of the coup itself in 2021.
Despite his repeated attempts to portray the military as the guardian of the 2008 constitution, Min Aung Hlaing’s actions have proven that he is ready to violate the constitution to maintain his own power. Just a few days before the coup, he publicly said that he was prepared to revoke the constitution if need be.
A Military Motivated by Self-Preservation
Myanmar’s modern history is a dark chronicle of the ways a power-hungry military will contort itself and shift its agenda to hold onto power by whatever means necessary. This is truer now than ever because many within the military believe that losing power would mean certain death for themselves and the military itself.
The predominant motive of power-hungry generals is the quest for absolute control of state power, not to protect the constitution or rule of law, seek stability or promote the peoples’ welfare. Indeed, the generals are better understood as a sort of mafia dedicated not to the welfare of the state, but rather to self-preservation and self-interest, regardless of the damage it might cause the country or its people.
The generals are ready to embrace a pyrrhic victory if it assures their survival, no matter how illegitimate, gory and limited it turns out to be. These generals live in their own universe isolated from the civilized world. They embody a mafioso mentality, primarily driven by cynicism, megalomania, bigotry, insecurity, hostility, self-preservation and self-interest. The regime believes it can only survive by dividing the resistance forces and inflicting mass human suffering to pacify the population.
It should be no surprise, therefore, that military rule has never been stable, and the military is widely reviled, including by those not directly involved in the current resistance. When considering a path to stability in Myanmar, the will of the people should dictate. How can a genocidal and incompetent military that has spent two years committing atrocities against its own people be involved in a future government?
Misconceptions Driving International Responses
Many policymakers in the international community tend to view Myanmar’s junta through the prism of their own experience as government actors beholden to a constituency and national interest. No matter how bloodstained and barbaric the junta has been, the international community — particularly Myanmar’s neighbors — cling to hope that military leaders can be reasoned with. The international community mischaracterizes the generals as “rational state actors,” expecting they will act in the interest of Myanmar.
This is a deep misunderstanding of the military, which is a paranoid clique of battle-hardened ultranationalists radicalized and traumatized by decades of warfare. Former Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew labeled Myanmar’s military government that ruled the country before 2010 as “dense” and “stupid,” saying that dealing with the regime is akin to “talking to dead people.” Because Myanmar has been an isolated and distant concern in global politics, it is understandable that relatively few in foreign governments have much experience with the country and its people, let alone its hermetic military leaders.
Misunderstandings about the military have led to mistaken conclusions and harmful actions. They underlie the idea that the junta will engage in a political dialogue process in good faith. And they are the basis of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ (ASEAN) five-point consensus, which has achieved nothing. Despite agreeing to the five-point consensus in 2021, it is no surprise that the junta openly discounted its legitimacy in February saying, “Myanmar views the ASEAN five-point consensus as not a legally binding document.” The junta’s recent extension of emergency rule and relentless violence have made a mockery of the ASEAN plan, which includes an immediate end to violence and dialogue among all parties concerned.
Pathways to Stability
In contemplating the prospects for a negotiated settlement in Myanmar, international actors must understand that the mafioso mentality of the country’s generals does not recognize the value of compromise, only of brute force. Under the current conditions, the generals prefer endless war to negotiation. They will only come to the table when they see they have no path to military victory.
Furthermore, the military has demonstrated repeatedly throughout its history that it will only engage in dialogue with those it sees as its military equals. The military blocked involvement of the Arakan Army (AA) in peace talks, for example, until the AA demonstrated military strength and controlled territory. During the pre-coup peace process, the author once witnessed a general harshly challenge the representative from a small ethnic armed group, asking “how much strength do you have to negotiate with me as an equal?” In recounting the collapse of peace talks in 1981, Brang Seng, the former rebel leader of the Kachin Independence Army, concluded, “We realized that we have been negotiating from a position of weakness. Only when we are united with all the other ethnic groups would we succeed [in negotiation with the military].”
Like ethnic minority communities which have endured decades of military violence, the Myanmar people have suffered deeply at the hands of the generals and understand that the military will only engage in dialogue with their military equals when they see no path to military victory. The people are, therefore, forced to make a painful decision to take up arms to fight against the military.
Without accepting these basic facts, the international community will continue to engage and support the junta’s governing State Administration Council, deepening the military’s delusional belief that it can win and undermining efforts by Myanmar’s people to save their country. Efforts that strengthen the junta only prolong violent conflict and suffering for the Myanmar people. Efforts that strengthen the resistance bring us closer to a negotiated outcome.
There is no path to stability in Myanmar that involves these generals in government. They are reviled by the population. Instability and violent conflict will afflict Myanmar as long as they are in power..."
Source/publisher:
United States Institute of Peace
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-10
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2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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"YANGON, MYANMAR —
Two years after Myanmar’s military coup, a handful of young people are still protesting the coup, but, given the military crackdown on protests, the tightened security situation, and financial constraints only a relatively few flash mob protests now occur, and they do so in urban areas.
In these protests, in places such as Yangon and Mandalay, a small group of young people gather briefly, chanting and hanging banners with slogans before dispersing.
The president of Basic Education Student’s Union, part of the All-Burma Federation of Student Unions (ABFSU), who uses the name “Molly” in media interviews for security reasons, said people in Myanmar need to be more aware of the opposition to the now-ruling junta.
“Flash mobs are making people in urban areas nervous. While the revolution goes on for the long run, people are getting back to normal life. They need to wake up to political awareness as well as the armed revolution,” she told VOA.
“We are under 18”
It is young people who, since the coup, who have been most vociferous in trying to take down the regime despite nighttime raids, unlawful arrests, and being chased down or beaten up in the streets.
The student unions federation and the General Strike Committee, the largest combination of groups organizing anti-government protests, told VOA that most of those in the flash mobs are high school students under 18 years of age. While other students return to military-controlled schools, some members of the two organizations have chosen the armed path, actively participating in guerrilla attacks.
Molly and her brother, Nyi Min Thu, joined the protests right after the February 1, 2021, coup. Nyi Min Thu was killed February 25, when the military raided the house where he was hiding.
“After my brother died, I worked harder on the revolution at risk to my life,” Molly said.
More lives at risk
As the coup passes the two-year mark, the military regime has increased its control over big cities. At Yangon and Mandalay intersections, the army has installed checkpoints and put security in place. Junta security forces have arrested young demonstrators by raiding houses and bloodily cracking down during the protests.
According to the ABFSU, some 50 student members have been detained for participating in the anti-junta movement and 30 of them were sentenced to a minimum of two years in prison. In addition, 11 protesters died during military raids.
On February 8 in Yangon’s Mayangone township, a young man wearing a black jacket and jeans pulled out a banner. Another eight young men hiding on the side of the road came out and joined him in holding the banner saying “reject the fascist election.”
“The demonstration lasted only four minutes, but we prepared for it over two weeks,” Kyaw Swar, a 17-year-old protester said, adding that as the military gains more control over cities, being out on the streets has become dangerous.
Flash mob groups said they meet regularly online to discuss protest plans and share information. Usually, they choose a location that the security forces cannot crack down on easily.
"In the past, it took a week to set up a protest in one place. Now, it takes up to a month to plan a protest because of tight security. Normally, protests take place in populated areas such as markets, parks and bus stops where people will notice and soldiers cannot arrest us,” Molly said.
Funding decrease, spending increase
Until mid-2021, there were many strike groups conducting flash mob protests but now only 10 have survived, strike groups said. Similarly, in 2021, at least 40 group members participated in a protest, now only five to 10 participate.
"We used to manage to protest at least four times a month, but now it's very difficult to do it once a month,” said Kyaw Swar.
The military crackdown and arrests are the main reason for fewer protests and protesters, young demonstrators told VOA. Other difficulties include raising funds and finding safe houses.
“Landlords refuse to rent their homes because we are so young,” Molly said. Landlords also refuse to rent to groups of young people because they suspect the young people are protesters or will take other actions against the junta.
Strike groups rely on online fundraising campaign groups and donations from the public. Until end of 2021, ABFSU received more than a million kyat – about $475 – per month, but donations have gradually dropped by half. In contrast, living costs and expenses for protests are rising. Protest groups said they need at least 2 million kyat a month for living and accommodation of 15 people. It costs up to 150,000 kyat to manage a strike.
“Fifteen people are living together in a house to save many. We only eat noodle soup on very difficult days. There are even days I just smoke when I am hungry," a striker who asked not to be named told VOA..."
Source/publisher:
"VOA" (Washington, D.C)
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-09
[field_licence]
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Individual Documents
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2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Anti-coup protesters
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"China’s appointment of a new special envoy to Myanmar in December last year followed the United Nations’ first resolution on Myanmar in 74 years, and the US Congress’ passage of the Burma Act. Observers say it was not a political coincidence.
The Burma Act authorizes funds and technical assistance for anti-junta forces in Myanmar, including EAOs. The US has pledged to continue to support Myanmar opposition forces inside and outside of Myanmar. The UN resolution demands an end to violence and urges the military junta to release all political prisoners, including ousted leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi.
China’s new special envoy Deng Xijun met seven of Myanmar’s ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) in China’s Yunnan Province in the last week of December. Then he flew to Naypyitaw and met junta chief Min Aung Hlaing. In less than a month, he visited the headquarters of the powerful EAOs including the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), the United Wa State Army (UWSA) and the National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA). His visit was different from previous ones.
Politics
Interestingly, the Chinese envoy was accompanied by the Mandalay-based Chinese consul. The consul did not participate in talks with the EAOs, and the reason Deng brought the consul along with him was not clear.
Secondly, he visited displacement camps in Laiza, the location of the KIA headquarters in Kachin State. It was followed by reports that China would provide assistance in health and education for EAOs as well as displaced civilians, indicating a new level of relationship between China and EAOs at the border.
Thirdly, Deng echoed his predecessor Sun Guoxiang, and urged EAOs to join peace talks and sign the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA). But while Sun said he was acting according to Beijing’s policy, Deng stressed that his urging of the EAOs came at the request of Myanmar junta chief Min Aung Hlaing.
The flurry of activity by Deng after the US Congress’ passage of the Burma Act indicates that China does not want to see US aid and influence reaching EAOs based along the Chinese border.
China will be cautious about potential US influence and possible spying efforts that will come along with its assistance. It will use even greater caution now as tensions are rising over the Taiwan issue. This is why China has made a move to cement ties with EAOs at the border and provide them with non-military assistance.
Myanmar people are interested to see whether China will pressure the EAOs to stop fighting the Myanmar military regime, as some of them are fighting alongside resistance forces from central Myanmar.
Of the EAOs based in northern and northeastern Myanmar along the border, only the UWSA and the NDAA have de facto control of their own territories, so it is inevitable that the five others will continue to fight the Myanmar military to achieve greater status.
The Myanmar military’s policy is that EAOs must disband and turn themselves into militias or border guard forces under its control as per the 2008 Constitution. This will not be acceptable to the KIA, the Shan State Progress Party, the Arakan Army (AA), the Ta’ang National Liberation Army and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), which have high political ambitions and relatively strong armies. So, it is important to keep an eye on the moves of the Chinese special envoy in this regard.
Economy
Some Chinese investment projects have come back to life following the activities of the Chinese special envoy, the Chinese ambassador and the consul to Myanmar. The first one is the Letpadaung copper mining project. Around the end of February, junta troops shelled and raided around eight villages near the copper mine. Soon after junta troops were deployed along the road to the mine, 150 to 250 people believed to be Chinese employees of Wanbao Co. arrived at the copper mine in five vehicles from Monywa.
In a May 5, 2022 statement, Wanbao said mining had been suspended since the coup, but employees were paid their basic salaries, and only a maintenance team was working for maintenance of the mines. There have been reports lately that Wanbao is contacting its Myanmar employees to return to work.
The second one is an agreement with Chinese companies to install wind turbines in Ann, Thandwe and Gwa townships in Rakhine, western Myanmar. The project is scheduled to start in December this year and to be completed in 2025.
The Chinese ambassador attended the agreement signing ceremony, and it is the only Chinese investment project officially announced since the coup. The project emerged as a result of the ceasefire between the Myanmar military and the AA in Rakhine.
The third is construction of the Ruili-Mandalay-Kyaukphyu railroad linking China’s Ruili with Kyaukphyu in Rakhine, an important part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Neither the Myanmar regime nor China have officially talked about the project, but media outlet Frontier Myanmar, citing senior officials of Myanma Railways, reported that the regime and a Chinese company carried out an environmental impact assessment on the railroad construction in 2021-22, and that the first section of the railroad linking Ruili and Mandalay is in the process of being constructed. This is part of the reason China has urged EAOs in northern Myanmar to observe ceasefires and hold talks with the Myanmar military regime.
Shortly after the coup, the Myanmar military granted approval to the China-backed, US$2.5-billion power plant in Meelingyaing in Pathein, Ayeyarwady Region. China has not made any move regarding that project. But it is no coincidence that some Chinese investments have resumed following the trips of the Chinese special envoy this year.
Military
The area along the Chinese border with northern Shan State is overseen by the Myanmar military’s North-Eastern Command. In 2021-22, its presence in the area comprised a light infantry division and seven military operations commands.
Surprisingly, the regime has pulled out three military operations commands or around 30 battalions from the area since early this year, after over 1,000 troops trained by the MNDAA—most of them fighters from central and southern Myanmar who decided to take up arms against the regime following the coup—finished their military training.
Why has the Myanmar military pulled out a large number of troops while its enemy has got over 1,000 new soldiers? Perhaps the regime is taking advantage of the fact that China wants to de-escalate military tensions in northern Shan State for its Ruili-Mandalay railroad.
Thanks to the troops it has pulled out of Shan, the regime has been able to send reinforcements to Kayah (Karenni) State, and Yedashae and Pinlaung, where People’s Defense Force groups (PDFs) and the Karenni Nationalities Defense Force are active, as well as to Karen State.
Conclusion
The latest developments in politics, the economy and the military situation in Myanmar following the UN resolution, Congress’ passage of the Burma Act, and moves by the Chinese special envoy, are interesting. Besides the US and the West, China might also consider the steps of the Indian nationalist government, which is blindly supporting the regime to establish a foothold in Myanmar.
After both China and Russia declined to exercise their veto power and block the UN’s resolution on Myanmar, the regime came to understand that Russia will not go against China regarding important decisions on Myanmar. Since then, the regime has made moves to improve ties with China, after getting too close to Russia over the past two years. Again, the regime is saying China is Myanmar’s good neighbor.
The regime might also be considering seeking advantage in the competition between China and India. The regime replaced its foreign minister in February, appointing a former Myanmar ambassador to the US to the post. Political observers suggest the regime is planning to approach the US.
We have seen complicated diplomatic moves alongside hostilities over the past two years. The parallel National Unity Government (NUG) says it is the only government that can guarantee stability and safety for foreign investors.
We need to monitor the policies and moves of US and Western governments that directly engage the NUG and EAOs; of China, which has avoided getting too close to the NUG though it is engaging with both the regime and EAOs in northern Myanmar; and of Russia and India, which are closely cooperating with the regime.
Following his meeting with EAOs, Deng met junta chief Min Aung Hlaing on Monday in Naypyitaw, the second such meeting since the envoy’s appointment. The two vowed to cooperate in various sectors including the economy. The two discussed the role of China in border security and internal peace in Myanmar. It appears their ties have improved since the previous meeting.
The main question is whether China will turn a blind eye to the wishes of the Myanmar people in its involvement in the Myanmar issue. If it overly focuses on its rivalry with the US and ignores the wishes and popular revolt of the Myanmar people, it will face a stronger response from Myanmar people.
We must pay special attention to Deng’s shuttle trips between the junta chief and EAOs in northern Myanmar. According to credible sources from the border, Deng and seven EAOs in northern Myanmar plan to meet soon for a third time, this time collectively.
China has officially supported ASEAN’s Five-Point Consensus on Myanmar. One of the points is a visit by the ASEAN special envoy to meet all parties concerned. Neither the ASEAN envoy nor the Chinese envoy have yet been able to do this.
If Deng fails to meet all parties concerned and his moves help support the regime politically, economically and militarily, the Myanmar people, especially the armed resistance who are fighting the regime, will not accept it.
If the situation goes on like this, Deng’s move will do more harm than good for the Myanmar people, and anti-Chinese sentiment will rise again, which could result in further complications..."
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"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-09
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"Regime troops raided at least 10 villages and torched at least 89 houses in Myaung Township, Sagaing Region over four days this week, according to local resistance forces.
A spokesperson from Civilian Defence and Security Organization of Myaung (CDSOM) said at least 15 houses from Yathit Village and 74 houses from Chaung Zinn Village were destroyed in the regime’s arson attacks.
Residents of Chaung Zin and Yathit villages where houses were burned down by junta troops are now clearing debris and setting up makeshift homes in the daytime. However, they have to flee for their safety when night falls due to the fear of regime drone attacks and artillery strikes, according to local people.
Two columns of regime troops from Light Infantry Battalion 16 and Pyu Saw Htee militia advanced toward Pauk Chaung Village on March 4 at around 3.00 pm and were backed up by another junta column from Kyauk Yit Village, according to witnesses.
Bo Kyar Thit, CDSOM spokesperson, said the local resistance forces in the area joined together and attacked the regime base in Kyauk Yit Village in Myaung Township on March 4.
“All local resistance forces in Myaung Township coalesced to ambush the regime’s base in Kyauk Yit Village on Saturday night at around 9.00 pm after they occupied Pauk Chaung. The attack took 30 minutes. Two junta police officers were killed during our joint attack and a member of a local resistance group was injured,” he said.
The Irrawaddy can’t independently verify the claim.
he regime troops conducted raids and fired artillery shells for the next three days, raiding another nine villages across Myaung Township, injuring two resistance forces, he added.
“Two members from our organization were injured due to the regime’s artillery attack on Tuesday. A civilian from Pauk Chaung Village was also arrested by regime troops,” he said.
The regime troops left Myaung Township and moved toward to their base in Kyi Village on Tuesday, according to the local sources..."
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"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
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2023-03-09
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"Myanmar regime forces are continuing to clash with a combined force of Karenni Army (KA) and Karenni Nationalities Defense Force (KNDF) fighters in southern Shan State, with over 5,000 local residents displaced by the fighting.
Clashes broke out again on March 9 near Saung Pyaung Village in Shan’s Pinlaung Township, where junta troops and Karenni resistance fighters clashed for the first time in the township on February 24.
The KA and KNDF launched an attack on a junta outpost in Saung Pyaung on February 24, where military regime soldiers and pro-junta Pa-O National Army (PNA) fighters are based. Pinlaung Township is part of the Pa-O Self-Administered Zone governed by the Pa-O National Organization (PNO), the political wing of the PNA.
More than 5,000 residents from Saung Pyaung and nearby villages have been displaced by the fighting, according to locals and aid groups.
“Clashes broke out again at around 6am near Saung Pyaung, which is located on the border of Pinlaung and Pekon townships. The Karenni groups have captured some villages and so the Myanmar military is now shelling them,” said the administrator of a village near Saung Pyaung, who is currently sheltering at a monastery in Pinlaung Town along with hundreds of other refugees.
Thousands more people from Saung Pyaung, Lone Pyin, Taung Mae Thin, Myauk Sa Lone, Taung Sa Lone, Nam Name and Pin Lon villages are also sheltering in Pinlaung Town, as well as in Pekon Township.
Almost two weeks after being forced to flee, the refugees are in urgent need of supplies.
“We still need food and medicine,” said one displaced female resident of Taung Sa Lone Village whose sister was killed by a regime mortar strike on February 24.
Her family has fled to Pekon Township, where they are receiving help from the Moebye Rescue Team. The team said that some of the refugees from Pinlaung are injured or sick and in need of proper medical treatment and care.
At least three civilians have been killed by regime artillery strikes since the clashes broke out, and another four people injured.
Despite the ongoing fighting, junta chief Min Aung Hlaing visited his ally the PNO leader U Aung Kham Hti on March 7 at his home in Kyauk Ta Lone Gyi Town in the Pa-O Self-Administered Zone, according to regime-controlled media. It is not known what the two men discussed.
However, local observers said that they believed that the regime boss would have been pushing U Aung Kham Hti to help defend the Pa-O Self-Administered Zone. The area is strategically important, as resistance groups from Kayah and Karen states could break through it to reach the Myanmar capital Naypyitaw.
On the day of Min Aung Hlaing’s visit, the PNA released a statement calling on young ethnic Pa-O people to join the PNA to fight the “invaders”.
PNA fighters are currently taxing some villages in their area, with residents saying that each household in the affected villages is having to pay 75,000 kyats each.
The Irrawaddy was unable to contact the PNA for comment..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-09
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Internal displacement/forced migration of Karenni villagers, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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Atrocity Alert is a weekly publication by the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect highlighting situations where populations are at risk of, or are enduring, mass atrocity crimes.
Description:
"MYANMAR’S MILITARY CONTINUES ABUSES IN “UNENDING HUMAN RIGHTS CRISIS”
Throughout the two years since Myanmar’s (Burma) military launched a coup in February 2021, they have perpetrated a scorched earth campaign around the country in an effort to quash the opposition, according to a new report from the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). One of the most frequently utilized tactics by the military is the systematic and widespread burning of villages and dwellings. Nearly 39,000 houses around Myanmar have been burnt or destroyed in military operations since February 2022, marking a more than 1,000-fold increase compared to 2021. Sagaing Region – a resistance stronghold in the northwest – was the most impacted, accounting for more than 25,500 homes.
The military’s continued access to aviation fuel has, in part, facilitated the commission of these unlawful and indiscriminate airstrikes. Despite some targeted sanctions, aviation fuel deliveries continue to be offloaded to ports in Myanmar, according to a recent investigation by Amnesty International and Global Witness. Companies in Greece, India, Japan and Switzerland have been involved in fuel shipments. Since mid-2022, OHCHR documented an increase in aerial attacks by the military, as well as the widespread and indiscriminate use of artillery against villages and towns across the country. Although most of the intense violence remains concentrated in northwestern and southeastern Myanmar, OHCHR reported that nearly 80 percent of the country’s 330 townships have been affected by clashes.
Since the coup, populations also face daily human rights violations and abuses, including killings, arbitrary arrests, displacement, torture and enforced disappearances. UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Volker Türk, stated, “There are reasonable grounds to believe that the military and its affiliated militias continue to be responsible for most violations, some of which may constitute crimes against humanity and war crimes,” and stressed that “Tragically, regional and global efforts for peace and restraint have largely fallen on deaf ears. The military, emboldened by continuous and absolute impunity, has consistently shown disregard for international obligations and principles. Urgent, concrete action is needed to end this festering catastrophe.”
The military’s continuous violence and commission of atrocity crimes have sparked an unending human rights and protection crisis. Savita Pawnday, Executive Director of the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, said, “The international community must heed the recommendations of the UN’s Human Rights Office, including urging the UN Security Council to refer the situation in Myanmar to the International Criminal Court. Furthermore, all companies should immediately stop supplying aviation fuel to Myanmar and conduct appropriate human rights due diligence to ensure their supply chains no longer enable the military’s unlawful attacks.”
NICARAGUAN GOVERNMENT IMPLICATED IN POTENTIAL CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY
In a groundbreaking report released on 2 March the UN Human Rights Council (HRC)-mandated Group of Human Rights Experts on Nicaragua (GHRE) concluded that widespread human rights violations that amount to crimes against humanity – including extrajudicial killings, torture, sexual violence, arbitrary detention and politically motivated persecution – have been perpetrated by the Nicaraguan government against civilians. The GHRE identified the National Police, the National Penitentiary System, judges, prosecutors and pro-government armed groups as the main perpetrators, acting under the authority, as well as participation, of President Daniel Ortega and his wife, Vice President Rosario Murillo.
The GHRE warned that systematic violations and abuses, including arbitrary deprivation of nationality, are part of a “deliberate dismantling of democratic institutions and destruction of civic and democratic space,” with the objective to “eliminate, by different means, any opposition in the country.” Since early February, the Ortega government has revoked the citizenship of more than 300 alleged political opponents, 222 of which were forcibly deported to the United States. Investigators warned that these latest measures are a clear indication that the situation continues to worsen.
Following a brutal crackdown on protests in 2018, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), as well as Independent Experts mandated by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, warned that crimes against humanity have been committed by state and affiliated non-state agents. Since then, systematic government repression and a descent into authoritarianism have intensified, with human rights defenders, independent media, students and academics, religious leaders and other alleged opponents targeted for persecution. President Ortega maintains absolute control over the country’s institutions, including the legislature and judiciary, which has failed to address impunity for human rights violations and abuses committed prior to the escalation in 2018 and in the subsequent years. Those unable to flee the country have faced systematic reprisals and criminal prosecutions. Official numbers provided by the GHRE and OHCHR suggest that more than 3,000 nongovernmental organizations were forcibly shut down since December 2018, and no independent media outlet can operate within Nicaragua.
As Nicaragua continues to refuse to engage with regional and international human rights mechanisms, the work of the GHRE remains vital for public monitoring and reporting, as well as for the collection and preservation of evidence of crimes against humanity. During the ongoing 52nd session of the HRC, member states should renew the mandate of the GHRE for a period of two years. Elisabeth Pramendorfer, Nicaragua expert at the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, emphasized that, “States should utilize the evidence collected by the GHRE to pursue accountability for victims, including through universal jurisdiction, and further strengthen a robust individual sanctions regime against high-level perpetrators.”
NEW UN REPORTS HIGHLIGHT CONTINUED ATROCITY CRIMES IN SOUTH SUDAN
On 7 March the UN Human Rights Council (HRC)-mandated Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan (CHRSS) presented its latest report on the country’s human rights situation, detailing ongoing gross human rights violations and atrocities, including widespread attacks against civilians, various incidents of conflict-related sexual violence against women and girls, forced displacement and extrajudicial killings. The violations and abuses have been perpetrated by members of the South Sudanese armed forces, as well as various militias and armed groups.
The Commissioners identified the absence of accountability as a major driver of the human rights and humanitarian crisis, stating that “attacks against civilians persist precisely because perpetrators are confident they will enjoy impunity.” Although the extended transitional period provides an opportunity for the South Sudanese authorities to “begin dismantling an entrenched culture of impunity and to reset the country on a path toward stability and prosperity after years of conflict,” justice for victims and survivors of atrocities continues to be elusive. The Commissioners noted that “effective prosecutions are rare and remain woefully insufficient.”
The latest report of the UN Secretary-General on the Mission in South Sudan also details continued cycles of inter-communal violence, land disputes with ethnic undertones, abductions and reprisal attacks throughout the country. According to the report, the “rapid escalation of subnational violence” and recent cycles of revenge killings threaten the progress made in implementing the 2018 peace agreement. Political leaders have continued to focus on preserving their own personal power, allowing mistrust to reinvigorate ethnic tensions and fuel violence across the country rather than genuinely commit to a political solution. Continuous political competition and mobilization of armed groups is leading to increasing localized conflict, fragmentation and widening ethnic divisions.
Genuine political commitment to the implementation of the outstanding provisions of the peace agreement, including drafting a new constitution and establishing mechanisms under the Constitution-Making Process Act, is crucial for reconciliation and the prevention of further conflict. To break the cycle of impunity, the transitional justice mechanisms under Chapter V of the peace agreement need to be urgently established. Given its invaluable role in monitoring and reporting on atrocity crimes and grave human rights violations, the HRC must extend the mandate of the CHRSS in full, for a period of two years, during its ongoing 52nd session. Juliette Paauwe, South Sudan expert at the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, said, “HRC-mandated investigative mechanisms are particularly important in situations where there are no realistic avenues for justice and accountability in the national context and can serve as an important deterrent. The added value of the CHRSS is self-evident and undeniable, and its work offers some glimpse of hope for justice and accountability to civilians in South Sudan.”..."
Source/publisher:
Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-08
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"The Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), an ethnic Kokang armed group based in northern Shan State’s Kokang region, is playing an increasing part in training and arming resistance groups.
That is quite a turnaround from 2009, when the MNDAA was widely believed to have been destroyed in a Myanmar military offensive. But by the end of 2013, small bands of MNDAA troops were active again to the west of the Salween River that marks the boundary with Kokang.
In early 2015, China’s Global Times reported about the return of MNDAA leader Peng Jiasheng to Kokang. According to locals, the news of his return had already been circulating for nearly a year. So it appears that the MNDAA had been soliciting support in Kokang throughout 2014.
Fresh clashes broke out on February 9, 2015 when an estimated 1,200 to 1,600 MNDAA troops fought their way back into Kokang. Combined with MNDAA administrative, medical, logistical and communications teams, there could have between 1,500 and 2,000 troops entering Kokang.
The Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), and the Arakan Army (AA) reportedly fought alongside the MNDAA in these battles. The Myanmar military brought in large reinforcements over time, with heavy fighting raging in Laukkai, Konkyan and in the hills along the Myanmar-China border.
China made a number of diplomatic protests after Myanmar military artillery shells and bombs repeatedly landed inside China. In one incident, five Chinese villagers were killed and nine others injured in the border city of Lincang in March 2015. In May that year, China imposed a ban on flying along the border and announced that it would organize military drills involving live ammunition for an indefinite period, which effectively de-escalated the fighting between the Myanmar military and the MNDAA.
Neither side disclosed their casualties, but sources estimated that hundreds were killed or wounded. Over 60,000 civilians were displaced by the fighting and fled to Lashio or China. At least 100 civilians were killed in the clashes and many houses were destroyed.
Although the MNDAA was unable to take back control of Laukkai and Konkyan, it was able to establish bases in the hills along the border and in the forest west of the Salween River. The MNDAA also won the sympathy of China’s military and some Chinese people.
New policies after 2015 fighting
MNDAA leaders adopted new political and military perspectives after the 2015 fighting. Peng Jiasheng’s brother Peng Jiafu acknowledged that the MNDAA couldn’t liberate Kokang on its own and needed to forge alliances with other ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) and political groups.
The MNDAA joined the United Nationalities Federal Council and the Federal Political Negotiation and Consultative Council. It also allied with the TNLA and AA, conducting joint military operations with them and supplying arms to the two groups. The MNDAA has also promoted brotherly ties with the United Wa State Army and the National Democratic Alliance Army in Mong La. Like the MNDAA, both those groups formed after splitting from the Communist Party of Burma (CPB).
Expanding its areas of military operations, the MNDAA became active to the west of the Salween River, territory once controlled by the CPB.
Since then, the MNDAA has formed political and supply departments, as well as command and control and artillery battalions. Its political wing is the Myanmar National Truth and Justice Party (MNTJP).
Peng Daxun, a son of Peng Jiasheng, has consolidated his control as the general secretary of the MNTJP, and military chief of the MNDAA. Today, the EAO is estimated to have at least 5,000 well-equipped troops.
The Struggle for Kokang
During talks in 2015, then President Thein Sein told Peng Jiasheng that he could take a rest anywhere in the country. The underlying message was that the Myanmar military wanted him to become a full-time businessman like Lo Hsing Han, a Kokang drug lord, and that the military would support his business endeavors.
As far back as 2009, the then Myanmar military regime wanted Peng Jiasheng to transform the MNDAA into a pro-junta militia or border guard force similar to ones in other parts of Shan and Kachin states. The military twice offered Peng Jiasheng the chance to trade the MNDAA’s weapons for business licenses, but Peng Jiasheng rejected the offers.
While some of Kokang rebels have sided with the Myanmar military, Peng Jiasheng and his supporters chose to fight for the freedom of Kokang. Their resistance was astonishing because Kokang is small and mountainous with a population of less than 100,000 people. Yet while the MNDAA is small, it is a dangerous enemy for the Myanmar military.
Current junta chief Min Aung Hlaing’s destiny is linked to the MNDAA. Min Aung Hlaing commanded the 2009 offensive that drove Peng Jiasheng and the MNDAA out of Kokang. And in 2015, it was again Min Aung Hlaing who led the Myanmar military operation against the MNDAA.
Many Kokang residents fled to China during the 2009 fighting. The 2015 clashes resulted in over 60,000 people – over half the Kokang population – being displaced. Migrant workers fled to Lashio, and ethnic Kokang fled to China. At least 100 civilians died and many houses were destroyed, while 40,000 acres of sugarcane fields were torched, prompting China’s foreign minister to issue a statement asking the Myanmar government to protect the interests of Chinese people in Myanmar. However, the military punished only one Brigadier General.
From 2011 to the end of 2018, the Myanmar military insisted that MNDAA surrender or be excluded from peace talks. Along with the devastation caused by the 2009 and 2015 fighting, that is perhaps the reason why the MNDAA is now opposing the Myanmar military again.
MNDAA and the Spring Revolution
The MNDAA, TNLA and AA have shown support for the resistance since the Spring Revolution began in 2021. But the three EAOs rarely talk about their actions.
The leader of the Karenni Nationalities Defense Force (KNDF), which is fighting the regime, attended the 2022 funeral of Peng Jiasheng. And the Bamar People’s Liberation Army (BPLA) has said that it receives assistance from the MNDAA and its allies, although the group undergoes military training in an area controlled by the Karen National Union’s Brigade 5.
People’s Defense Forces (PDF) in northern Shan State, which are under the command of the parallel National Unity Government (NUG), said last year that they are operating with the MNDAA. But neither the NUG nor the MNDAA have discussed that in public.
But their relationship came under the spotlight when the MNDAA’s new brigade, Brigade 611, graduated and was armed on January 1 this year at its headquarters in northern Shan State. MNDAA deputy military chief Yang Guanhua was present at the ceremony, where 1,228 cadets graduated. A ‘federal’ flag was hoisted and Brigade 611 was referred to as a multi-ethnic brigade. It appears that the brigade was originally intended to be based in Kutkai District, but the plan was later changed as other Spring Revolution forces emerged.
The majority of Brigade 611 fighters are not ethnic Kokang or from northern Shan State, but are young people from other parts of the country who decided to take up arms against the regime after the 2021 coup.
Besides the KNDF, BPLA, and PDFs from northern Shan State, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is also working with the MNDAA. The PLA is said to be the successor of the now defunct CPB, and mainly consists of members of student unions in Sagaing Region’s Shwebo District. So the MNDAA is now helping the younger generation of communists whom it once rebelled against.
The MNDAA is preparing or already providing military training for some 700 members of the PLA, BPLA, and the Sagaing-based Myanmar Royal Dragon Army led by Bo Nagar, one of the leading resistance figures, and two other PDFs. Over 1,000 troops trained by the MNDAA are already fighting the regime.
The fact that the MNDAA is training and arming resistance fighters reflects the group’s financial power and its ability to procure weapons. It also reflects the MNDAA’s growing political ambitions. Along with the Kachin Independence Army, the MNDAA is the EAO that is cooperating the most with the resistance in northern Myanmar. This will create mutual benefits for Kokang and Spring Revolution forces.
Of the forces cooperating with the MNDAA, only a few hundred PDF fighters are under the command of the NUG. Over 1,000 more from the KNDF, BPLA and the Myanmar Royal Dragon Army have no direct engagement with the NUG.
And there are at least six revolutionary groups operating in the territories of the MNDAA’s allies, the AA and TNLA. Those groups are not under the command of the NUG. Separately, they are small groups but when combined they make a strong force. So the MNDAA’s military coalition, which was mainly formed with people from central Myanmar, may take different forms in the future.
The MNDAA can’t distance itself from China. Meanwhile, the NUG, Spring Revolution forces, and EAOs in southern Myanmar have ties to the United States and western countries. China will definitely not want to see western assistance and influence so close to the Myanmar-China border. Some might say that China is involved in the MNDAA’s training and arming of new troops. But there is no proof that China has a policy to arm Spring Revolution forces via the MNDAA.
The MNDAA is fighting for the identity and self-determination of Kokang people. At the same time, it has close ties with China and is involved in the illegal drug trade in the borderlands. But it has also established political and military alliances with other EAOs in northern Myanmar, as well as some Spring Revolution forces. The MNDAA could be a serious threat to the regime. It will be interesting to see what it does for Myanmar’s Spring Revolution in the future..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-08
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2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Spring Revolution
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"1. Only NUG can guarantee stability and international investment 28/02/2023.....2. Defence Ministry plans to accelerate strategic military operations 02/03/2023.....3. 70 health professionals died, 900 arrested in over 2 years of
attempted coup 28/02/2023.....4. NUG submits snapshot on human rights situation in Myanmar report to UNHRC 28/02/2023.....6. Bbrutal massacre of civilians in Tar Taing Village 3/3/2023..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
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2023-03-08
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"ယနေ့ အပြည်ပြည်ဆိုင်ရာအမျိုးသမီးများနေ့ကို ကမ္ဘာတစ်၀န်းတွင် ကျင်းပနေပါသည်။ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံတွင်မူ လွန်ခဲ့သော(၂) နှစ်အတွင်း အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီက အမျိုးသမီး စုစုပေါင်း(၄၈၃)ဦးကို သတ်ဖြတ်ခြင်း၊ အမျိုးသမီး စုစုပေါင်း(၃၁၂၅) ဦးကို မတရားဖမ်းဆီးချုပ်နှောင်ထားခြင်း၊ အမျိုးသမီး စုစုပေါင်း(၁၁)ဦးကို သေဒဏ်ပေးခြင်း၊ အမျိုးသမီး စုစုပေါင်း(၁၅)ဦးကို တစ်သက်တစ်ကျွန်း ထောင်ဒဏ်ချမှတ်ခြင်း၊ အမျိုးသမီး စုစုပေါင်း (၁၂၂)ဦးကို လိင်ပိုင်းဆိုင်ရာအကြမ်းဖက်ခြင်းတို့နှင့် မြန်မာ့အမျိုးသမီးများကို ပုံစံအမျိုးမျိုးဖြင့် အကြမ်းဖက်လျှက်ရှိပါသည်။
၁၈၅၇ ခုနှစ် နယူးယောက်အထည်ချုပ်စက်ရုံတွင် အမျိုးသမီးများ လုပ်ခလစာတိုးမြင့်ပေးရန်၊ မဲပေးပိုင်ခွင့်ရရှိရန်၊ အလုပ်ချိန်လျှော့ချပေးရန် ဆန္ဒပြတောင်းဆိုရာမှ အမျိုးသမီးများလှုပ်ရှားမှုအစပြုပြီး ၁၉၇၅ ခုနှစ်၊ မတ်လ (၈) ရက်နေ့ကို ကုလသမဂ္ဂမှ အပြည်အပြည်ဆိုင်ရာအမျိုးသမီးများနေ့အဖြစ် တရား၀င်သတ်မှတ်ပေးခဲ့ပါသည်။ အမျိုးသမီးများ အခွင့်အရေးကို မြှင့်တင်ရန်နှင့် အမျိုးသမီးများအခွင့်အရေးကိုကာကွယ်ရန်အတွက် အပြည်ပြည်ဆိုင်ရာအမျိုးသမီးများနေ့ သတ်မှတ်ဖြစ်ပေါ်လာခြင်းဖြစ်သည်။ အမျိုးသမီးများအပေါ် နည်းမျိုးစုံဖြင့် ခွဲခြားဆက်ဆံမှုပပျောက်စေရေး နိုင်ငံတကာသဘောတူစာချုပ်ကို မြန်မာနိုင်ငံအနေဖြင့်လည်း ၁၉၉၇ ခုနှစ်၊ ဇူလိုင်လ (၂၂) ရက်နေ့တွင် လက်မှတ်ရေးထိုးခဲ့သည်။ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံမှ သဘောတူစာချုပ်တွင် လတ်မှတ်ရေးထိုးပါဝင်ခဲ့သော်လည်း အကြမ်းဖက်အာဏာရှင်များသည် သဘောတူစာချုပ်ကို လျစ်လျူရှုသည်သာမက ၎င်းစာချုပ်ကို အကောင်အထည်ဖော်ရန်လုံး၀ပျက်ကွက်ပြီး နှစ်ပေါင်းများစွာ ထိုစာချုပ်ပါအချက်များကို ချိုးဖောက်လာခဲ့သည်။
လွန်ခဲ့သော(၂၆)နှစ်အတွင်း မြန်မာအမျိုးသမီးများအခွင့်အရေးကို ချိုးဖောက်ဖျက်ဆီးပြီး တိုးတက်မှု လုံးဝမရှိအောင် ရည်ရွယ်ချက်ရှိရှိ နည်းအမျိုးမျိုးကို အသုံးပြုပြီး အကြမ်းဖက်အာဏာရှင်များက မြန်မာ့အမျိုးသမီးများအပေါ် လူမဆန်သောအကြမ်းဖက်ခြင်းအမျိုးမျိုးကို ကျူးလွန်ခဲ့ကြသည်။ လွန်ခဲ့သော (၂၆)နှစ်တွင် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံအနေဖြင့် အမျိုးသမီးများဆိုင်ရာ အပြည်ပြည်ဆိုင်ရာစာချုပ်ကိုချုပ်ဆိုခဲ့ပြီးဖြစ်သော်လည်း အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အာဏာရှင်များသည် ၎င်းစာချုပ်ကို လိုက်နာရန် လုံး၀ဆန္ဒမရှိကြောင်း အပြည်ပြည်ဆိုင်ရာအမျိုးသမီးများနေ့မတိုင်မီ တစ်ရက်အလို ယမန်နေ့ကထုတ်ပြန်သော အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီ၏ ထုတ်ပြန်ကြေညာချက်များက အခိုင်အမာသက်သေပြနေပါသည်။ အကြမ်းဖက်အာဏာရှင်များသည် မြန်မာအမျိုးသမီးများအပေါ် လူမဆန်စွာ ကျူးလွန်ထားသောရာဇဝတ်မှုများအတွက် မြန်မာအမျိုးသမီးများကို ၀န်ချတောင်းပန်ပြီး ရာဇဝတ်မှုကျူးလွန်သူ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ခေါင်းဆောင်များကို စာချုပ်ပါ အပြည်ပြည်ဆိုင်ရာဥပဒေနှင့်အညီအရေးယူပြီး တရားမျှတမှုကိုဆောင်ရွက်ရမည့်အစား အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အာဏာရှင်များသည် ကျူးလွန်မှုအထောက်အထားများကို ဖျောက်ဖျက်ပြီး အထောက်အထားများယူမရအောင် အကြမ်းဖက်ခြင်း၊ မီးရှို့သတ်ဖြတ်ခြင်း၊ အထောက်အထားရှိသောနေအိမ်နှင့် နေရာများကိုမီးရှို့ခြင်း၊ ရုပ်အလောင်းများကိုလည်း ညှင်းပန်းနှိပ်စက်ထားသော ထိခိုက်ဒဏ်ရာ အထောက်အထားများယူမရအောင် မီးရှို့အလောင်းဖျောက်ခြင်းနှင့်အတူ ရက်စက်ကြမ်းကြုတ်သော ဖြတ်(၄)ဖြတ်ပေါ်လစီကိုလည်းချမှတ်ပြီး မြန်မာ့အမျိုးသမီးများအပေါ်တွင် ဆက်လက်အကြမ်းဖက်လျှက်ရှိပါသည်။
မတ်လ(၈)ရက်နေ့သည် အပြည်ပြည်ဆိုင်ရာအမျိုးသမီးများနေ့အဖြစ် အပြည်ပြည်ဆိုင်ရာစာချုပ်ပါဥပဒေနှင့်အညီ မြန်မာ့အမျိုးသမီးများ၏အခွင့်အရေးများကို ကာကွယ်စောင့်ရှောက်ပြီး မြန်မာအမျိုးသမီးများ၏ဉာဏ်အား၊ ကာယအား၊ စိတ်ဓာတ်စွမ်းအား တို့ကို မြှင့်တင်ရမည့်အစား ရက်စက်ကြမ်းကြုတ် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အာဏာရှင်များသည် စစ်လက်နက်အသုံးပြု၍ ပြည်သူ့အာဏာကိုလုယူရန် ကြိုးစားသည့် လွန်ခဲ့သော(၂)နှစ်အတွင်း အမျိုးသမီးများ အခွင့်အရေး၊ ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီအရေးတို့ကို အသက်နှင့်လဲပြီးဆောင်ရွက်နေသော မြန်မာ့အမျိုးသမီး စုစုပေါင်း(၄၈၃)ဦးကို လူမဆန်စွာ ရက်ရက်စက်စက် သတ်ဖြတ်ခဲ့ပါသည်။ နေပြည်တော်၊ သပြေကုန်းတွင် ငြိမ်းချမ်းစွာ ဆန္ဒပြနေသော မမြသွဲ့သွဲ့ခိုင်ကို ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ်၊ ဖေဖော်ဝါရီလ (၉) ရက်နေ့တွင် ရက်ရက်စက်စက် ပစ်ခတ်သတ်ဖြတ်ခြင်းမှအစပြု၍ မန္တလေးမြို့၊ ၈၄ လမ်းနှင့် လမ်း ၃၀ ကြားတွင် ငြိမ်းချမ်းစွာဆန္ဒပြနေသော အသက်(၁၉)နှစ်အရွယ် မကြယ်စင်ကို ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ်၊ မတ်လ (၃) ရက်နေ့တွင် ခေါင်းကို သေနတ်ဖြင့်ပစ်သတ်ခဲ့ခြင်းနှင့်တကွ အမျိုးသမီးများအပေါ် ရာဇဝတ်မှုများ မရပ်မနားဘဲ ဆက်တိုက်ကျူးလွန်ခဲ့ရာ အပြည်ပြည်ဆိုင်ရာအမျိုးသမီးများနေ့ကျင်းပရမည့် ယခုအချိန် ၂၀၂၃ ခုနှစ်၊ မတ်လ (၁) ရက်နေ့တွင် စစ်ကိုင်းတိုင်း၊ တာတိုင်ရွာမှာ အမျိုးသမီး(၃)ဦးဖြစ်သည့် မပန်းနွယ်၊ မပန်းသွယ်နှင့် မဆွေဆွေဦးတို့ကို အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စုက အုပ်စုဖွဲ့ လိင်ပိုင်းဆိုင်ရာအကြမ်းဖက်၍ သတ်ဖြတ်ခဲ့ပါသည်။ မျက်မြင်သက်သေထွက်ဆိုချက်များအရ အမျိုးသမီးများကို လူမဆန်သောနည်းလမ်းများဖြင့် ရက်ရက်စက်စက် အကြမ်းဖက်မှု ကျူးလွန်ခဲ့သည်ကို တွေ့ရှိရပါသည်။
အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အာဏာရှင်များသည် လွန်ခဲ့သော (၂၄)လအတွင်း မြန်မာအမျိုးသမီး စုစုပေါင်း (၄၈၃)ဦးကို ရက်ရက်စက်စက် သတ်ဖြတ်သည့်အပြင် လွန်ခဲ့သော(၂၄)လအတွင်း နိုင်ငံတော်အတိုင်ပင်ခံပုဂ္ဂိုလ် ဒေါ်အောင်ဆန်းစုကြည်အပါအ၀င် မြန်မာအမျိုးသမီး စုစုပေါင်း(၃၁၂၅)ဦးကို မတရားဖမ်းဆီးချုပ်နှောင်ထားပြီး မြန်မာအမျိုးသမီး စုစုပေါင်း (၁၂၂)ဦးအပေါ် လိင်ပိုင်းဆိုင်ရာအကြမ်းဖက်ခြင်းကျူးလွန်ခဲ့ပါသည်။ ကိုဖြိုးဇေယျာသော်၊ ကိုဂျင်မီနှင့်အပေါင်းပါ သူရဲကောင်း(၄)ဦးတို့ကို ရက်ရက်စက်စက် ကြိုးပေးကွပ်မျက်သည့်အပြင် လွန်ခဲ့သော (၂၄)လအတွင်း မြန်မာအမျိုးသမီး စုစုပေါင်း (၁၁)ဦးကို သေဒဏ်ချမှတ်ပြီး မြန်မာအမျိုးသမီး စုစုပေါင်း(၁၅)ဦးကို တစ်သက်တစ်ကျွန်းထောင်ဒဏ်များချမှတ်ခဲ့ပါသည်။ လွန်ခဲ့သော(၂၄)လအတွင်း အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အာဏာရှင်များသည် ငတ်မွတ်ခြင်း၊ ဆာလောင်ခြင်းနှင့် ပြည်သူ့အသက်အိုးအိမ်ကို မီးရှို့ခြင်းစသည်တို့ကို လက်နက်သဖွယ် အသုံးပြုပြီး မြန်မာအမျိုးသမီးနှင့် ကလေးများ အများဆုံးပါ၀င်သော လူဦးရေ(၁.၆)သန်းထက်မနည်းကို အိုးမဲ့အိမ်မဲ့ဖြစ်စေခြင်း၊ အသက်အိုးအိမ်(၅)သောင်းထက်မနည်း မီးရှို့ဖျက်ဆီးခြင်း၊ အမျိုးသမီးများနှင့်ကလေးများ အများဆုံးပါ၀င်သည့် မြန်မာ့လူဦးရေ (၁၇)သန်းထက်မနည်းကို အငတ်ဘေးနှင့် ရင်ဆိုင်စေခြင်းစသည့် ရာဇ၀တ်မှုများကို ကျူးလွန်လျှက်ရှိပါသည်။
မြန်မာပြည်သူလူထုများ တရားမျှတမှုမရမချင်း အပြည်ပြည်ဆိုင်ရာဥပဒေလမ်းကြောင်းမှတစ်ဆင့် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အာဏာရှင်များကို အရေးယူရန်သက်ဆိုင်ရာ အပြည်ပြည်ဆိုင်ရာအစိုးရများ၊ အဖွဲ့အစည်းများတွင် တာ၀န်ရှိနေပြီး မြန်မာနိုင်ငံပြည်တွင်းမှာလည်း အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အာဏာရှင်များမှ ကျုးလွန်ထားသောအမှုများကို တစ်ခုမှမချန်ထားခဲ့ဘဲ ဥပဒေနှင့်အညီ အရေးယူ ဆောင်ရွက်သွားရန် ကျွန်တော်တို့အားလုံးမှာ တာ၀န်ရှိနေပါသည်။ ရဲရင့်သတ္တိရှိသော မြန်မာပြည်သူလူထုနှင့် မြန်မာအမျိုးသမီးတို့၏လက်ထဲမှာ တရားမျှတမှုရောက်ရှိလာစေရန်အတွက် စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ်ကို အမြန်ဆုံး အမြစ်ပြတ်ခြေမှုန်းပြီး လူမျိုး၊ ဘာသာ၊ ကျား/မ၊ တိုင်းရင်းသားမရွေး အားလုံးအတွက် "ညီမျှခွင့်တူ ဖမ်းဆုပ်ယူ"နိုင်သည့် ဖက်ဒရယ် ဒီမိုကရေစီနိုင်ငံတော်အသစ်ကို အတူတကွတည်ဆောက်သွားရမည်ဖြစ်သည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of International Cooperation Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-08
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National Unity Government (NUG), Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
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"National Unity Government Weekly Press Update (10/2023)..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-08
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
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"During the 52nd session of the UN Human Rights Council, Rita French, the UK's Human Rights Ambassador, delivered a statement on the situation in Myanmar.
Thank you, Mr President.
And thank you, High Commissioner, for your sobering update.
We share your concern at the situation in Myanmar. We condemn the junta’s increasingly brutal tactics, including through indiscriminate air strikes, conflict-related sexual violence and arson attacks. The targeting of civilian infrastructure, including schools, and hospitals and places of worship must cease. Civilians must be protected.
Over 2,600 people have been killed since the coup. Over 19,000 people have been arbitrarily detained. Female pro-democracy activists are increasingly targeted online.
The UK will continue to apply pressure through international fora, targeted sanctions, a comprehensive arms embargo and other means to oppose the junta’s violent and oppressive actions. I am proud that the UK led efforts to secure the first ever UN Security Council Resolution on Myanmar which urges all parties to respect human rights, and to end violence.
Accountability is the only way to end the military’s culture of impunity. Perpetrators must be brought to justice. To this end, the UK has established the Myanmar Witness programme which reports on some of the most egregious human rights violations.
High Commissioner,
How can the international community support access to justice for victims and survivors of sexual violence?
Thank you..."
Source/publisher:
Govt. UK (London)
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-07
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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Sub-title:
Community-based schools and ones operating under the shadow government are filling the gaps.
Description:
"UPDATED at 11:25 A.M. EST on 03-08-2023
Battered by the COVID-19 pandemic, the military coup and an ensuing civil war, Myanmar’s school system is in shambles. The number of high school students registering for a key exam has plunged 80%, parents, teachers and educational experts say.
To protest against the February 2021 coup, some 300,000 teachers and other school staffers walked off their jobs at government-run schools as part of the Civil Disobedience Movement, leaving schools severely understaffed. In response, the junta has suspended more than 11,000 academic staffers and about 125,000 teachers and professors, according to U.S. government data.
Subsequent fighting between the army and rebel groups has displaced thousands, making schooling extremely difficult. Many other families have stopped sending their children to school because they don’t trust the junta, or have sent them to schools run by the shadow National Unity Government.
“People no longer trust their education system,” said a teacher who, like others in this report, refused to be named for security reasons. “And now with the online federal schools and other non-military-operated schools, children can consider what is better for them and which education system can give them more knowledge and skills.”
“That’s why we see that there are fewer and fewer students who are taking the tenth-grade exam in the junta’s schools,” he said.
During the 2019-20 academic year, when the civilian-led National League for Democracy was still in power, nearly 970,800 students registered for the 10th-grade matriculation exam, a benchmark for the country’s educated workforce for decades.
The following year, that number slipped to 312,300, and during the current 2022-23 year, fewer than 179,800 registered for the exam, according to the junta's education data.
Reforms on hold
The coup also put on hold educational reforms that were being carried out by the former NLD government, including increasing budgets for schooling and implementing a strategic plan to transform the country’s education system and improve learning at all levels.
In June 2022, when the Ministry of Education ordered the reopening of primary, middle and high schools across the country for in-person classes for the 2022-2023 academic year, over 7 million of the country’s roughly 12 million students returned to the classroom, according to junta Education Minister Nyunt Pe.
Some of the remaining 5 million students across the country do not attend the schools run by the junta, while some primary, middle and high school teachers say they have not returned to their schools because they do not want to work under the military administration.
Ongoing fighting between the military and ethnic armed groups in conjunction with anti-coup People’s Defense Forces in some of Myanmar’s states and regions have prevented students from attending school.
In response, the shadow National Unity Government, or NUG, had set up its own schools throughout the country.
“As many areas of several states and regions are war zones, exams cannot be held and there are no students to take them,” said Kyaw Ye Lwin, a committee member of NUG’s Federal Democratic Education Cooperation Network.
“Another thing is that NUG has strengthened its educational system on the ground,” he said, with students who attend federal schools trying to take the basic education completion assessment test administered by the NUG’s Ministry of Education. “Due to these factors, the number of students in schools under the junta administration has decreased.”
Separate exam
NUG Education Minister Zaw Wai Soe said that the shadow government is implementing an interim education system throughout the country, and about 90,000 students are taking its own 10th-grade exam.
“We hold practical exams for students in the areas where NUG is in control,” he told RFA. “We hold digital and internet-based exams in the areas where we are not in control yet. We are trying to implement online, practical and digital classes and exams for students in the areas away from our control, too.”
Residents in Sagaing and Magway regions, where fighting has intensified, have set up their own community-based schools so that local teachers can prepare students for the matriculation exam.
“Since the education system here in our area is in accordance with the federal education system, schools here can offer their own lessons,” said a teacher at a community-based school in Magway.
“It’s rather independent,” she said. “There are several different exam designs, too. There are many NUG-recognized schools in Magway, [but] there are hardly any students studying for the exams in the junta schools.”
A parent of a student from Magway’s Yesagyo township told RFA that he enrolled his children in community-based schools because teachers there provide extra help to students.
“The difference between the junta’s schools and our community-based schools is that our community-based schools focus on the people and teach students very well,” he said. “If students need more help, teachers give them more revision time and teach them at their homes, too.”
‘Conflict zone’
Residents of a village in Sagaing region, a hotbed of resistance in northwestern Myanmar, set up a primary school there for children who could not attend state-run schools due to the hostilities, said the school’s founder.
She and four permanent teachers as well as other educators from the Civil Disobedience Movement teach about 150 students at the primary school which opened in June 2022 under the auspices of the NUG, she said.
“Since we are in a conflict zone and a war refugee zone, there are no other schools here,” she told RFA.
“We can now teach music, art and the curriculum to our children,” she said. “Many stationery and teaching accessories are donated to us by well-wishers from faraway places.”
So far, parents of schoolchildren do not seem daunted by an announcement by the junta via state-run media networks on March 1 that authorities will take action against them under the Counterterrorism Law if they enroll students in online schools managed by the NUG. The junta also said that parents must enroll their children only in the junta schools and private schools recognized by the military.
But the teacher at the primary school in a village in Sagaing said children know they have a right to education no matter where they live, regardless of such threats.
“Issuing politicizing orders to stop such rights of the schools and children from benefiting is a very vulgar act,” she said.
Meanwhile, junta-run schools are coping with manpower shortages by piling up work on educators.
“We have to teach eight classes a day,” one high school educator said. “In the past, we could rest for two or three class periods as break time during which we could prepare the lesson plans for the next classes. We used to have extra time to study and preview the lessons before we went into each class. But now, we have very little extra time.”
And new teachers entering the profession are not receiving adequate training, she said.
“With only two days of skill training, teachers cannot be qualified to teach,” the educator said. ‘They do not know their subjects very well. Now we have to coordinate with each other and learn to teach these classes.”..."
Source/publisher:
"RFA" (USA)
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-07
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Education in Burma/Myanmar - general, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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"In the following interview, human rights campaigner Igor Blazevic asks security analyst Anthony Davis about the state of the civil and armed opposition to the junta, and the condition of the Myanmar military after two years of trying to contain the armed uprising.
Blazevic: Anthony, you are military analyst, but let me start by asking, are multiple forms of civil resistance and disobedience still important factors in Myanmar’s anti-junta uprising? Spring Revolution started with the civil resistance and only later it transformed into the armed resistance as well. What role the civic resistance plays now? Is it still very important factor or the outcome will be decided on the battlefield?
Davis: Civilian mobilization and civic organization is fundamental in underpinning support for any popular armed struggle. This is particularly important in a situation where there is no revolutionary party as an organizing core which is very much the case in Myanmar today: the NLD represented the legitimacy underpinning the popular uprising of 2021 but it is certainly not a revolutionary party going forward. So, if you don’t have that one revolutionary center then civic organizations across the country in different regions become critically important. You can’t have a people’s war without people’s participation, politically, economically, militarily, in terms of the information war — across the whole spectrum. Although the military struggle, in my opinion, will be the decisive element, without the continued support and participation of society through civil organizations, including those supported by the NUG, that military element cannot hope to prevail.
Blazevic: We are already second year of a conflict that is extremely exhausting conflict for the population. Do you see popular support for the revolution and resistance already floundering under the pressure of the military atrocities or you think the resilience of the people of Myanmar is still as strong as it was at the beginning of the uprising?
Davis: That’s a difficult question for me to answer sitting in a comfortable office in Bangkok. But my general impression is that the people of Myanmar are still very much committed to the struggle. They recognize that this is a revolutionary opportunity, which is probably not going to come again – a truly historic opportunity to introduce a new political, social and economic system for Myanmar. I think that awareness is generally felt.
However, there will obviously be areas where the degree of support or of exhaustion varies. What I am hearing is that, if you’re in an urban area of Myanmar, if you’re in Yangon, Mandalay or one of the big cities, life for many people is to a degree normal. I was talking to somebody the other day who just arrived from Yangon and this lady was saying, “I’m not seeing troops on the streets, I do not have to go through checkpoints. Life is largely normal”. So, if you are in an urban area without much disruption, it is reasonable to assume you will want to get back to a normal life, being able to feed your family and do your business as soon as possible.
However, if you are in an area where the war is immediate and real, in Karen state or in Sagaing or Magway or Chin where the fighting is ongoing, where villages are being destroyed, where people are being killed, then I would imagine that there is a very powerful level of anger driving participation. It would depend very much on where you are.
Blazevic: Is Myanmar military being significantly weakened? They are losing soldiers and territory, they face defections, they have recruitment problems. Is Myanmar military still strong enough for a war of attrition? What currently are the main vulnerabilities on Myanmar military?
Davis: From the beginning of the crisis, I have always argued that it would be a very serious mistake to underestimate the strength of the Myanmar military. This is a huge organization which for seven decades has been used not just to running the country but also coming to feel that they own the country — that they somehow represent the essence of Myanmar and have the right to decide what is the best for it and how politics will be played. With this mentality the military has built up over time a very significant degree of organization, internal cohesion, discipline, military resources, and economic power. It would be a bad mistake to underestimate these people simply because the ordinary people of Myanmar have stood up to fight them. They should not be underestimated.
There has been a tendency since the months following the coup to exaggerate the number of defections and desertions from the military as well as their battlefield losses. The media, both in Myanmar and abroad have not done a very good job in looking at this issue of defections, desertions, losses in a realistic manner.
Let’s start with defections and desertions we hear so much about. Because we want to believe it, it’s tempting to think that this is an army on the verge of disintegration. This is clearly not the case. I have looked at the issue closely and talked to well-placed sources inside Myanmar regularly. My assessment, which may of course be wrong, is that desertions and defections may perhaps have totaled somewhere around 3,000, maybe 4,000, from the army and police over two years. In terms of battlefield losses, killed and badly wounded, my best estimate would be somewhere between 10,000 and 15,000 in two years.
So in terms of men who’ve quit the security forces plus those killed or wounded, we’re likely talking less than 20,000. Now this is a military which in terms of combat-capable units numbers somewhere over 100,000 personnel. You can then add to that an essentially militarized police force of not less than 70,000. So in terms of losses, perhaps 15,000 in two years from a military organization that is at least 170,000 strong, maybe more. These are not insignificant losses but they’re certainly not crippling, and I doubt if they are going to produce any dramatic reassessment of how the military looks at this struggle. I would argue that such losses are seen from Naypyidaw as acceptable; that the military believes it can continue to function and fight with this level of loss.
Let me add one other thing as regards defections and desertions. They have almost all been defections of individuals or very small groups of two or three men leaving a unit. What we have not yet seen — and I stress the word ‘yet’ — is an entire unit of 10, 20, 30 men quitting en masse — either by giving up their weapons and going home or joining the resistance. That hasn’t happened. I believe that eventually it may happen but so far it has not, and we need to understand this. It is not a coincidence; it reflects the fact that the Myanmar military is a remarkably disciplined and cohesive organization.
So, if that’s the bad news, is there any good news? Yes: they also have some real weaknesses to contend with. The most fundamental is that they simply do not have enough manpower to suppress resistance across much of Myanmar. Almost every combat unit in Myanmar is undermanned, and overall, the military is overstretched. It’s trying to do too much in too many places. A battalion in the Myanmar army should number around 750 men, officers and other ranks. A typical battalion now today in Myanmar is probably 200 on a very good day, often 150 or less. Not 750, but 150 or less. This is a huge problem.
Air power can only offset this dilemma to a certain extent. And since the last quarter of 2022 there has been a lot of stress, in the media, from the NUG, from PDFs, from civil society, on the impact of air strikes and the fact that the resistance has no anti-aircraft capability. However, I would argue that it’s important not to exaggerate airpower and to understand its limitations. Having spent much of the 1980s working in Afghanistan where Soviet airpower was deployed against village-based guerrilla resistance in much the same way as across Myanmar today, I know a little bit about this. Then it was Mi-24 helicopter gunships and Su-25 ground attack jets; now it’s Mi-24s and YAK-130 jets. These strikes can certainly cause large scale displacement of the civil population. But guerrilla resistance learns to adapt to the threat using camouflage, dispersal and optimum timing for their own attacks. So in a guerrilla environment, the initial psychological and kinetic shock of air power typically diminishes over time.
Where air power can of course be incredibly destructive, both physically and in terms of morale, is when guerrilla forces allow themselves to get bogged down in protracted assaults against army strongpoints or futile attempts to capture urban areas. At this stage in the war the regime in Naypyidaw will absolutely not accept the loss of urban areas. They will destroy them in order to “save” them, killing not only resistance fighters but also their civilian supporters. That will result in civilians saying to the resistance, “thank you very much for coming to our town but you killed half of the population indirectly by attracting airstrikes”. So, for the time being – this year and probably into 2024, depending on how the situation develops — in my opinion at least, it is really important in that the resistance in Myanmar does not attempt to capture urban centers, however tempting that may appear.
So, what do they do? I would argue simply that for the coming year, the focus should be on hitting the military at its point of greatest vulnerability – a plethora of over-extended, undermanned army and police positions spread almost everywhere. The strategy must focus specifically and relentlessly on destroying enemy forces piecemeal and capturing their weapons.
It may be worth making one other comment with regard to the weaknesses of Myanmar military. This is an organization which finds very difficult to conceptualize defeat. Their institutional arrogance and lack of self-doubt have created a mindset in which conceding strategic reverses, let alone outright defeat in almost impossible. It seems likely that at this point they don’t fully understand just how bad their strategic dilemma is. For the resistance, facing an enemy who imagines he can still win when he is actually slowly losing, is undoubtedly an advantage.
Blazevic: You mention that battalions should be 750 men, but now they are only about 150. Where have all those soldiers gone? One more question about logistic. It is often said that the war is won and lost by logistics. How do you estimate the weaknesses of the military in terms of their logistic capacity?
Davis: The answer to the first question is simple. The fact that infantry battalions in the Myanmar military have, give or take, only 150 men is nothing new. This goes back at least 20 years. In the 1990s, after the ‘88 uprising the Myanmar military expanded at a breakneck speed in order essentially to establish a garrison footprint across the entire country. But recruitment for what has always been a voluntary rather than conscription-based army simply could not keep up. They were expanding the number of infantry battalions without having sufficient manpower to fill them, while battalion commanders were – and still are – under pressure to maintain or increase unit strength and happy to inflate the numbers of recruits they were pulling in.
But what is now happening now is that infantry battalions are in action, potentially or actually, not just in certain parts of certain ethnic states — Shan or Kachin or Rakhine – but across the whole country. So under-manning is not a new problem, but today it has become a critical one.
As to logistics, any army is looking essentially at supplying line units with food, ammunition, and fuel. In this respect I don’t think the military is facing problems it cannot solve. If there is one exception, that would be Chin state, where the roads are really bad, often extend over long distances and are few and far between. Resupply in 2021 and 2022 involved very big convoys moving slowly between the main towns — Mindat, Matupi, Hakha, Thantlang. These convoys are extremely vulnerable because they move slowly on bad roads and the areas around them are largely controlled by the Chin resistance. Chin state is a logistical nightmare for the military, and it now depends significantly on helicopters – expensive in terms of fuel costs and, if the resistance can position machine-guns around landing pads, maybe not that safe either.
Karenni state also poses broadly similar logistics problems though probably not to the same degree. But with regard to other fronts across the country, I am not aware of any areas where logistics are a critical headache. There are of course plenty of ambushes and IEDs, especially in Sagaing and northern parts of Magwe. But is that a critical problem anywhere? I don’t think so.
That can of course change if the resistance becomes more effective in not only attacking convoys but temporarily cutting roads. If the resistance in the coming year or two can begin effectively cutting major roads and railways, then the logistics issue has the potential to become a huge problem for the military. But right now, we haven’t reached that point.
Anthony Davis is a Bangkok-based security consultant and analyst with extensive field experience on a range of armed conflicts across Asia. He writes primarily for IHS-Janes, a security and defense publication.
Igor Blazevic is a senior adviser at the Prague Civil Society Centre. Between 2011 and 2016 he worked in Myanmar as the head lecturer of the Educational Initiatives Program..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-06
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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Local URL:
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"EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:
The current conflict in Myanmar began with the 2021 coup d’état. The conflict between the ruling junta and pro-democracry movement has accelerated environmental degradation and hurt Myanmar’s economic standing. Demographic stress has also worsened both from the junta’s lack of attention to urban infrastructure and its targeting of rural villages, increasing the number of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs). The return to military rule has caused a worsening trend for most indicators used to determine the degree of conflict. This diagnostic uses the methodology created by the Country Indicators for Foreign Policy to establish possible short-term scenarios based on indicators of conflict determining trend lines and degree of risk. The military coup has destabilized the country which has resulted in a return to military rule causing a worsening conflict trend and making any peaceful settlement unlikely in the near future.....
Source/publisher:
Carleton University
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-06
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Armed conflict and peace-building in Burma - theoretical, strategic and general, Peace processes, ceasefires and ceasefire talks (websites, documents, reports and studies), Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
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"The National Unity Government of Myanmar strongly condemns crimes against humanity committed perpetrated by the Myanmar military, including the recent massacre of 17 people in Tatai Village, Sagaing Township, Sagaing Division.
We take seriously our obligation to seek justice. Relevant ministries are collecting information about all the crimes committed by the terrorist army, including mass killings, war crimes, targeted attacks, killings of civilians, looting, and destruction of people's livelihoods and property. We are collecting witness statements and material evidence. We have submitted these to international litigation organizations and are also providing humanitarian aid to the families of victims. The Judicial branch of the National Unity Government is planning to act.
Civilians, including the elderly, women, children and the disabled have been brutally killed by the Military Junta. Therefore, we, NUG, have instructed civilians to be aware of the army’s activities and evacuate immediately as needed. We request international help in communication technology and equipment. We wish to create an early warning system to protect our people.
We further request the International Criminal Court to expand its current investigation into the situation in Bangladesh/Myanmar to cover all Myanmar territory. This would be consistent with the National Unity Government’s Article 12(3) Declaration under the Rome Statute. We request to provide further information for identifying perpetrators and call for states to strongly condemn crimes against humanity in the current UN Human Rights Council and for the adoption of an action-oriented resolution.
We urge the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar (IIMM) to identify national jurisdictions to support prosecutions under the exercise of universal jurisdiction and to expedite the preparation of case files to this end.
We ask countries and international bodies to expand sanctions against the illegal military junta and its associates. Such sanctions must include direct bans on imports of arms, munitions, dual-purpose technology, aviation fuel and other equipment used by the junta to locally manufacture war materiel.
We urge your coordination and support to the National Unity Government and its allies, with a view to ending the crimes committed by the terrorist army against Myanmar’s people..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-06
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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Format :
pdf pdf
Size:
32.1 KB 361.75 KB
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Description:
"Union Minister of Foreign Affairs of the National Unity Government of Myanmar, H.E. Daw Zin Mar Aung, undertook official visits to the United Kingdom and the United States of America in February 2023. During the visit, H.E. Daw Zin Mar Aung met with senior government officials, including Foreign Ministers, Deputy Foreign Minister, and MPs of the United Kingdom and the United States of America. It was the first time H.E Daw Zin Mar Aung undertook an official visit to the United Kingdom and the second time to the United States of America.
On 6 February 2023, H.E. Daw Zin Mar Aung met with Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs, The Rt Hon James Cleverly, at the office of Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. H.E. Daw Zin Mar Aung expressed her gratitude for imposing new rounds of sanctions by the United Kingdom and UK leadership in the United Nations Security Council.
H.E. Daw Zin Mar Aung also met with UK Members of Parliament. On 6 February 2023, H.E. Daw Zin Mar Aung met with Labour Member of Parliament and Chair of the All Party Parliamentary Group on Burma, Rushanara Ali. They discussed several different topics, including minority people's affairs.
On 6 February 2023, H.E. Daw Zin Mar Aung met with Labour Member of Parliament and Shadow Minister for Asia and the Pacific, Catherine West. They discussed how the UK Parliament could support the democratic movement of Myanmar and more humanitarian aid.
H.E. Daw Zin Mar Aung continued her official visit to the United States of America and met with senior government officials.
On 13 February 2023, H.E. Daw Zin Mar Aung met with the Under Secretary for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights of the United States, Uzra Zeya, who attended the opening ceremony of the office of the National Unity Government of Myanmar at Washington, D.C.
On 14 February 2023, H.E. Daw Zin Mar Aung met with the Deputy Secretary of State, Wendy Sherman, who welcomed the opening of the office of NUG at Washington, D.C., and underlined US commitment to the alliance of democracy and ethnic leaders, justice for all atrocities, and promised to continue to increase pressure on the military junta to end their tyranny and bring a peaceful restoration of democracy. On the same day, she also met with Deputy Assistant to the President and Coordinator for Indo-Pacific Affairs on the National Security Council, Mr. Kurt Campbell.
During the visit, H.E. Daw Zin Mar Aung also had separate meetings with Senator Ben Cardin from Maryland and Mr. Paul Grove from Senate Appropriations Committee.
Myanmar diaspora are the strongest supporters and the largest source of income to Myanmar’s Spring Revolution. H.E. Daw Zin Mar Aung also met with Myanmar diaspora and ethnic groups during her visit to the United Kingdom and the United States of America. During these meetings, Union Minister appreciated their strong support and aspirations for democracy and federal union. These meetings are also a testimony of strong solidarity between the National Unity Government and the people of Myanmar..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Myanmar - NUG
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-06
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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47.71 KB 441.63 KB
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"Since the military overthrew a democratically elected government in Myanmar in February 2021, the US has been one of the major nations to publicly denounce the coup and consistently urge for the restoration of democracy.
The United States has continued to support democracy by imposing sanctions on 80 persons and 32 entities so far in an effort to deny the regime the resources it needs to carry out its violent policies and to advance the democratic aspirations of Burma’s citizens. The US also declared that it would hold the Burmese military accountable for brutality against the country’s general populace, particularly the Rohingya group.
In addition to bringing a case against Myanmar’s Junta dictatorship before the International Court of Justice under the Genocide Convention, the US also supported a UN General Assembly resolution that would have prohibited the import of guns into Burma. The US Senate’s recent “Burma Act,” which was passed in December of last year, reinforced the US’s support for democratic organizations like NUG and EAOs.
However, since January 2023, a sudden shift in the US policy with regard to Myanmar is been seen.
Japan’s Prime Minister Fumio Kishida said (Feb 22), his government is appropriately handling Japan’s ‘Bago River Bridge Construction Project’ in Myanmar, being built partly by Japanese construction giant ‘Yokogawa Bridge Corp’. Myanmar Now reported that a steel mill owned by the military-owned conglomerate ‘Myanmar Economic Corporation (MEC)’ was supplying steel for the project and profiting enormously. Human Rights Watch says, from July 2022 to January 2023, Yokogawa Bridge Corp. transferred around US$2 million to MEC for the project, with United States government approval. While the US, UK, EU, Canada, and Australia have sanctioned MEC, doing business with MEC is surprising.
Japan, a close ally of the US, has recently been observed to be more engaged in Burma. Yuhei Sasakawa, the chairman of the Nippon Foundation and Japan’s special representative in Myanmar, mediated cease-fire agreements between the Arakan Army and the military Junta in 2019, 2020, and 2022. The successful negotiation of Sasakawa is creating a positive image of Japan to Myanmar’s military, EAOs and NUG. Two of the five stated main goals of the Sasakawa’s Peace Foundation are to strengthen Japan’s friendship with the United States and increasing Japan’s presence in Asia.
Junta boss Min Aung Hlaing handed the ‘Thiri Pyanchi’ titles and decorations for the strenuous cooperation to bring about peace, development and prosperity in Myanmar, to Hideo Watanabe, chairman of the Japan-Myanmar Friendship Association, also represents Japanese investors in Myanmar. Min Aung Hlaing called Watanabe a “good friend” and thanked him for his efforts to “foster ties between the two countries and two armies, and attract Japanese investment into Myanmar”. These explains a lot. The US through its close allay Japan, expanding its diplomatic, strategic and socioeconomic presence in Myanmar.
What changed US policy towards Burma?
So, what made the US change its stance on Myanmar all of a sudden? Is there any vested interest of Washington in the South Asian country? Yes, they are Russia, China and India.
In the wake of the coup and subsequent Western ostracization, the Myanmar junta established good relations with Russia. While Myanmar receives arms, resources and diplomatic backing from Moscow, Russia got another purchaser of its advanced weaponry in the backdrop of the West’s sanctions. Myanmar’s ruler, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, in addition to visiting Russia thrice, also supported Russia’s military operation in Ukraine.
Myanmar is also a buyer of Russian oil and recently signed an agreement with Moscow to explore nuclear energy in the Southeast Asian country. Top Russian Defense Official Seeks Closer Burma Ties. Myanmar was also invited to become a part of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which includes Russia, and India.
Anthony Davis, a British journalist with over four decades of experience covering conflicts in Asia, gave interview in an online video conference on “Military Possibilities 2023 in Myanmar” and Q&A session held for about 150 Myanmar journalists commented that, China remains an exclusive diplomatic relation with the military Junta, EAOs and NUG. Its socio-economic presence in Myanmar is also remarkable. Myanmar is China’s playground. No one including Myanmar Junta, NUG and EAOs dares to mess with China. He also commented that the possibility of a counter-coup in Myanmar is impossible. Because Myanmar army is well-organized and disciplined.
Now, Biden is witnessing that his atrocious plan to destroy the diplomatic, political and economic interests of Myanmar has backfired, as it ended up establishing a strong partnership between Myanmar and US’s chief adversary i.e., Russia and China. Therefore, in order to break the alliance between Moscow and Naypyidaw and counter the influence of Russia in Southeast Asia, the US has now deployed its ally, Japan, to further its agenda. The US cannot directly grant financial aid to Myanmar’s junta because then it will be obvious that Biden is endeavoring to counter the presence of Russia and China in Southeast Asia. So, the US has approached Japan to bribe Myanmar into switching its loyalty to the West.
It must be noted that this is the same US which earlier was preaching about the significance of democracy in Myanmar and pledged that it will prosecute the Burmese military leaders. However, in the face of the diplomatic, economic and political rise of Russia and China with Myanmar, the US has abandoned all principles of morality and is ready to embrace Myanmar’s junta..."
Source/publisher:
Modern Diplomacy
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-06
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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Local URL:
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Sub-title:
In defiance of prevailing patriarchal norms, young women are playing instrumental roles in the country’s “Spring Revolution.”
Description:
"“You’ve messed with the wrong generation.”
In the days after Myanmar’s military staged a coup in February 2021, sparking mass protests across the country, this became a regular refrain for those opposing the military takeover, appearing on banners, placards and social media posts. Younger people – Generation Z and millennials – were the main driving force behind popular opposition to the power grab, not only on the streets but also within the Civil Disobedience Movement and online. They orchestrated boycotts of military-linked goods, launched fundraising drives for anti-coup activities, and organized “social punishment” campaigns aimed at pressuring individuals to cut ties with the regime.
When the military began ruthlessly cracking down on peaceful protesters, killing hundreds and detaining thousands more, it was again the younger generations who began forming armed groups in urban and rural areas to try to remove the military from power. While determined not to let the junta consolidate power, they also refused to accept a return to the status quo ante, particularly the 2008 constitution, which provides for an elected government to share power with the military.
n that regard, young activists have been instrumental in pushing the “Spring Revolution,” as the anti-coup movement has come to be known, in a more progressive direction, demanding a new constitution, a new political compact with ethnic minorities, more inclusive political structures, and a reframing of relations with the long-persecuted Rohingya. New political entities such as the National Unity Government (NUG), a parallel administration created by elected lawmakers ousted by the coup, were forced to follow their lead, agreeing for example on an inclusive “Federal Democracy Charter” with minorities and other stakeholders, and issuing a policy statement on the Rohingya that promised to end state discrimination.
This was a significant departure from the pre-coup political landscape, when younger people and women had been largely excluded from the corridors of power. Traditional norms reinforced through the five decades of military rule between 1962 and 2011 had concentrated authority in the hands of older men; this was evident not only in the military regime, but also among the country’s various ethnic armed groups, and even in the political opposition under the previous military junta. The transition to semi-civilian rule in 2011 brought a degree of improvement thanks to the more liberal political environment, but patriarchal attitudes remained the norm.
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Aung San Suu Kyi was, of course, a notable exception. But as the Western-educated daughter of Myanmar’s independence hero, she was atypical in a country where women, at best, exercised power informally, often through their husbands. The government she ran during 2016-2021 did little to promote inclusion of women and younger people in political life. Aung San Suu Kyi was the only woman minister in her administration, and while in power, her party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), largely shunned civil society, where youth and women were better represented. It also stalled on key gender-focused legislation, such as the Protection and Prevention of Violence against Women Law.
But after the coup, the youth directly challenged Myanmar’s age and gender norms, and have since secured some tangible progress. The NUG, which is made up of NLD figures, activists, and ethnic minority leaders, has implemented many of the policies that young people have demanded. New anti-regime political structures, including the NUG and National Unity Consultative Council, an advisory body comprising a broader mix of stakeholders, are also more diverse than the NLD-era government and parliament, and consult with younger political leaders regularly.
More broadly, younger people involved in the anti-military struggle say that many older people in their communities view them with a new level of respect – not only because of their bravery and commitment, but also because of their ability and skills. They have become particularly influential in grassroots political movements, such as parallel local administrations formed in areas where the regime no longer has effective control.
“In the past, most people in the community seemed to think that young people weren’t capable because they didn’t have experience and knowledge … now, many have changed their views and they give us opportunities. They realize that the future of the country is in our hands,” explained one young activist, who coordinates regular “flash protests” in an outlying Yangon township.
Yet Myanmar’s patriarchal political culture has not been dispensed with entirely. The Spring Revolution has not swept away the old political order; rather, the new forces that have emerged need to work with existing players, like senior NLD officials and established ethnic armed groups. As a result, familiar patterns of behavior have gradually re-emerged in the new political and armed organizations. Although women have joined newly formed armed groups in unprecedented numbers, undergoing boot camp-style training, they have mostly been relegated to support roles, particularly those traditionally associated with women, such as providing medical care to injured comrades, for which they receive little credit.
The stalled progress has also been evident within the NUG, where younger members lack real influence over decision-making. Rightly or wrongly, this has created an impression of tokenism among many Myanmar people, a perception that has the potential to undermine popular support for the parallel administration. “Of course, the NUG is more inclusive than previous governments, but it’s not at the level we were expecting,” complained one young protest leader from Tanintharyi Region. “There is still gender and age discrimination in new political structures,” agreed a student leader from Sagaing Region. “We need to continue making progress, and the next step is to create more space and give more authority to younger people and women.”
There is a clear self-interest argument for why the NUG and other entities fighting the regime should make their structures more inclusive; at the very least, it would help to shore up support among the resistance’s strongest advocates. But they should also see the bigger picture, beyond potential short-term gain. Traditional patriarchal values have been among the root causes of many of Myanmar’s political, social, and economic failings: its unresolved armed conflicts, its poor health and education systems, and its ethnic and religious tensions.
The leaders of the resistance movement now have an opportunity to start redressing this legacy. While there is still deep uncertainty as to how the current crisis will end, nurturing a greater role for young people and women at this formative time could contribute to making Myanmar a more inclusive society in the long term, particularly when it comes to providing them with political opportunities..."
Source/publisher:
"The Diplomat" (Japan)
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-06
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Spring Revolution
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"ပြည်ထောင်စုသမ္မတမြန်မာနိုင်ငံတော်၊ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၊ နိုင်ငံခြားရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာန၊ ပြည်ထောင်စုဝန်ကြီး ဒေါ်ဇင်မာအောင်သည် ဖေဖော်ဝါရီလအတွင်း ယူကေနိုင်ငံနှင့် အမေရိကန်ပြည်ထောင်စုသို့ ခရီးစဥ်များ သွားရောက်ခဲ့ပါသည်။ နိုင်ငံခြားရေးဝန်ကြီး၏ ခရီးစဥ်များအတွင်းတွင် သက်ဆိုင်ရာနိုင်ငံများမှ တာဝန်ရှိပုဂ္ဂိုလ်များ၊ နိုင်ငံခြားဝန်ကြီးဌာနများမှ ဝန်ကြီး၊ ဒုဝန်ကြီးနှင့် အခြားသော တာဝန်ရှိသူများ၊ လွှတ်တော်အမတ်များ နှင့် တွေ့ဆုံဆွေးနွေးခဲ့ပါသည်။ နိုင်ငံခြားရေးဝန်ကြီး ဒေါ်ဇင်မာအောင်သည် ယူကေနိုင်ငံသို့ ပထမဆုံးအကြိမ် သွားရောက်ခဲ့ခြင်း ဖြစ်ပြီး အမေရိကန်ပြည်ထောင်စုသို့ ဒုတိယအကြိမ် သွားရောက်ခဲ့ခြင်း ဖြစ်သည်။
နိုင်ငံခြားရေးဝန်ကြီးသည် ဖေဖော်ဝါရီလ ၆ ရက်နေ့က ယူကေ နိုင်ငံခြားရေးဝန်ကြီး (Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs) James Cleverly နှင့် ယူကေနိုင်ငံခြားရေးဝန်ကြီးရုံးခန်းတွင် တွေ့ဆုံခဲ့ပါသည်။ ထိုသို့တွေ့ဆုံရာတွင် နိုင်ငံခြားရေးဝန်ကြီး ဒေါ်ဇင်မာအောင် အနေနှင့် ယူကေနိုင်ငံ၏ အသစ်ချမှတ်လိုက်သော စီးပွားရေးအရေးယူပိတ်ဆို့မှုများနှင့် UNSC တွင် ယူကေနိုင်ငံ၏ ဦးစီးဦးဆောင်ပြုမှုများအား ကျေးဇူးတင်ရှိပါကြောင်း ပြောကြားခဲ့ပါသည်။
နိုင်ငံခြားရေးဝန်ကြီးဒေါ်ဇင်မာအောင်သည် ယူကေနိုင်ငံခရီးစဥ်အတွင်း လွတ်တော်အမတ်များနှင့် တွေ့ဆုံခဲ့ရာ Labour Party မှ လွှတ်တော်အမတ် နှင့် All Party Parliamentary Group on Burma အဖွဲ့၏ ဥက္ကဌ လည်းဖြစ်သူ Rushanara Ali နှင့်ဖေဖော်ဝါရီလ ၆ ရက်နေ့က တွေ့ဆုံခဲ့ပါသည်။ ထိုသို့တွေ့ဆုံရာတွင် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံရှိ လူနည်းစုများအခွင့်အရေးအပါအဝင် အခြားသော အကြောင်းအရာများကို ဆွေးနွေးခဲ့ပါသည်။
နိုင်ငံခြားရေးဝန်ကြီးဒေါ်ဇင်မာအောင်သည် Labour Party လွှတ်တော်အမတ်နှင့် Shadow Minister for Asia and the Pacific ဖြစ်သူ Catherine West နှင့်လည်း ဖေဖော်ဝါရီလ ၆ ရက်နေ့က ဆက်လက် တွေ့ဆုံခဲ့ပါသည်။ အဆိုပါတွေ့ဆုံမှုတွင် မြန်မာ့နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေးအတွက် ယူကေပါလီမန်မှပိုမိုတိုးမြှင့် ထောက်ခံရေးနှင့် လူသားချင်းစာနာထောက်ထားမှုဆိုင်ရာကိစ္စရပ်များကို ဆွေးနွေးခဲ့ပါသည်။
နိုင်ငံခြားရေးဝန်ကြီးသည် အမေရိကန်ပြည်ထောင်စုသို့ ဆက်လက်ထွက်ခွာလာခဲ့ရာ အမေရိကန်ပြည်ထောင်စု နိုင်ငံခြားရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာနမှ တာဝန်ရှိသူများနှင့် ဆက်လက် တွေ့ဆုံခဲ့ပါသည်။
နိုင်ငံခြားရေးဝန်ကြီးဒေါ်ဇင်မာအောင်သည် ဖေဖော်ဝါရီလ ၁၃ ရက်နေ့ ဝါရှင်တန်ဒီစီရှိ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၊ နိုင်ငံခြားရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာန၏ ရုံးခွဲဖွင့်လှစ်ခြင်း အခမ်းအနားသို့ တက်ရောက်လာသည့် အမေရိကန်ပြည်ထောင်စု လက်ထောက်နိုင်ငံခြားရေးဝန်ကြီး Uzra Zeya နှင့် တွေ့ဆုံ၍ နှုတ်ဆက်စကားပြောကြားခဲ့ပါသည်။
နိုင်ငံခြားရေးဝန်ကြီးဒေါ်ဇင်မာအောင်သည် ဖေဖော်ဝါရီလ ၁၄ ရက်နေ့တွင် အမေရိကန်ပြည်ထောင်စု ဒုတိယနိုင်ငံခြားရေးဝန်ကြီး Wendy Sherman နှင့် တွေ့ဆုံခဲ့ပါသည်။ ထိုသို့တွေ့ဆုံရာတွင် အမေရိကန် ဒုတိယနိုင်ငံခြားရေးဝန်ကြီးအနေနှင့် အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၊ နိုင်ငံခြားရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာန၊ ဝါရှင်တန်ဒီစီရုံးခွဲ ဖွင့်လှစ်ခြင်းအား ကြိုဆိုပါကြောင်း၊ အမေရိကန်ပြည်ထောင်စုအနေနှင့် မြန်မာ့ဒီမိုကရေစီအရေးဆောင်ရွက်နေသူများနှင့် တိုင်းရင်းသားတော်လှန်ရေးအင်အားစုများအား အစဥ်အမြဲ အားပေး ထောက်ခံနေပါကြောင်း၊ စစ်အုပ်စု၏ အကြမ်းဖက်မှုများ အမြန်ဆုံးရပ်တန့်နိုင်ရေး ဖိအားပေး ဆောင်ရွက်သွားမည်ဖြစ်ပြီး ငြိမ်းချမ်းစွာ ဒီမိုကရေစီအသွင်ကူးပြောင်းရေး ကိုလည်း ကူညီအားပေးသွားမည်ဖြစ်ကြောင်း ပြောကြားခဲ့ပါသည်။ ထို့နောက် နိုင်ငံခြားရေးဝန်ကြီး ဒေါ်ဇင်မာအောင်သည် အမေရိကန်အမျိုးသားလုံခြုံရေးကောင်စီ အင်ဒိုပစိဖိတ်ရေးရာဌာန ဥက္ကဌနှင့် ညှိနှိုင်းရေးမှူး၏ လက်ထောက်ညွှန်ကြားရေးမှူးဖြစ်သူ Mr. Kurt Campbell နှင့် လည်း ဆက်လက်တွေ့ဆုံခဲ့ပါသည်။
နိုင်ငံခြားရေးဝန်ကြီးဒေါ်ဇင်မာအောင်သည် Maryland ပြည်နယ် လွှတ်တော်အမတ် Mr. Ben Cardin၊ Senate Appropriations Committee မှ Mr. Paul Grove တို့နှင့်လည်း သီးခြားတွေ့ဆုံမှုများ ပြုလုပ်ခဲ့ပါသည်။
နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေးကာလအတွင်း ပြည်ပရောက် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံသားများ၏ အားပေးထောက်ခံမှုနှင့် ထောက်ပံ့မှုများသည်လည်း လွန်စွာမှအရေးပါ လျက်ရှိရာ နိုင်ငံခြားရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာန၊ ပြည်ထောင်စုဝန်ကြီး ဒေါ်ဇင်မာအောင်သည် ၎င်း၏ ခရီးစဥ်များအတွင်းတွင် ပြည်ပရောက် မြန်မာမိသားစုများ၊ တိုင်းရင်းသားညီအကိုမောင်နှမများနှင့်လည်း ရင်းရင်းနှီးနှီး တွေ့ဆုံခဲ့ပါသည်။ အဆိုပါတွေ့ဆုံပွဲများတွင် နိုင်ငံခြားရေးဝန်ကြီးအနေနှင့် ပြည်ပရောက် မြန်မာမိသားစုများ၊ တိုင်းရင်းသားညီအကိုမောင်နှမများ၏ ဖက်ဒရယ်ပြည်ထောင်စုပေါ်ထွန်းရေးနှင့် ဒီမိုကရေစီအရေး အတွက် စိတ်အားထက်သန်မှုများအား တန်ဖိုးထားကြောင်းပြောကြားခဲ့ပါသည်။ အဆိုပါတွေ့ဆုံပွဲများသည် အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ နှင့် မြန်မာပြည်သူလူထု တသားတည်းရှိကြောင်း ပြယုဂ်လည်းဖြစ်သည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Myanmar - NUG
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-06
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Individual Documents
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National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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Description:
"၁။ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရအနေဖြင့် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စုက စစ်ကိုင်းတိုင်း စစ်ကိုင်းမြို့နယ် တာတိုင်ကျေးရွာရှိ ပြည်သူ (၁၇) ဦးကို ရက်စက်စွာ အစုလိုက်အပြုံလိုက် သတ်ဖြတ်ခဲ့သည့် လုပ်ရပ်အပါအဝင် မတရားအာဏာလုယူထားသည့်ကာလအတွင်း ကျူးလွန်ခဲ့သည့် လူသားမျိုးနွယ်စု အပေါ်ကျူးလွန်သည့် ရာဇဝတ်မှု၊ လူအစုံလိုက်အပြုံလိုက်သတ်ဖြတ်မှု၊ စစ်ရာဇဝတ်မှု၊ အရပ်သား ပြည်သူများအပေါ် ပစ်မှတ်ထားတိုက်ခိုက်သတ်ဖြတ်မှု၊ ပြည်သူလူထု၏ အသက်အိုးအိမ်စည်းစိမ်များကို လုယက်ဖျက်ဆီးမှုများ အားလုံးကို ပြင်းထန်စွာရှုတ်ချပြီး တရားမျှတမှု ပြန်လည်ရရှိရေးအတွက် အလေးအနက်ထား ဆောင်ရွက်သွားမည်ဖြစ်သည်။
၂။ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၏ သက်ဆိုင်ရာဝန်ကြီးဌာနများအနေဖြင့်လဲ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ် ကျူးလွန်သော ရာဇဝတ်မှုများအားလုံးနှင့် ပတ်သက်ပြီး အချက်အလက်ရယူစုဆောင်းခြင်း၊ လူသက်သေ၊ ပစ္စည်းသက်သေများ ရယူစုဆောင်းခြင်း၊ နိုင်ငံတကာတရားစွဲအဖွဲ့အစည်းများသို့ ပေးပို့ခြင်း၊ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၏ တရားစီရင်ရေးမဏ္ဍိုင်မှတဆင့် အရေးယူ ဆောင်ရွက်နိုင်ရန် စီမံခြင်း၊ လူသားချင်းစာနာထောက်ထားမှု အကူအညီများပေးပို့ခြင်း စသည့် လုပ်ငန်းဆောင်တာများကို ဆောင်ရွက်လျက်ရှိပါသည်။
၃။ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်သည် အရပ်သားပြည်သူများ၊ သက်ကြီးရွယ်အို၊ အမျိုးသမီး၊ ကလေးသူငယ် နှင့် မသန်စွမ်းတို့ပါ မချန် ရက်ရက်စက်စက် သတ်ဖြတ်လျက်ရှိသောကြောင့် ဒေသခံများအနေဖြင့် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်၏ လှုပ်ရှားဆောင်ရွက်မှုများအပေါ် အမြဲမပြတ် သိရှိစေနိုင်သည့် အစီအမံများ ဆောင်ရွက်ရန်နှင့် ဝင်ရောက်လာပါက ဘေးလွတ်ရာသို့ အလျင်အမြန်ထွက်ခွာ ရှောင်တိမ်းကြပါရန် မေတ္တာရပ်ခံအပ်ပါသည်။ နိုင်ငံတကာအနေနှင့်လည်း ပြည်သူလူထု၏ အသက်အိုးအိမ် စည်းစိမ်ကို ကာကွယ်ပေးနိုင်ရန်အတွက် ဆက်သွယ်ရေးဆိုင်ရာ နည်းပညာနှင့် ပစ္စည်းကိရိယာများ၊ ကြိုတင်သတိပေးခြင်းစနစ်ဆိုင်ရာ ပစ္စည်းကိရိယာများစသည်တို့ကို ထောက်ပံ့ပေးနိုင်ပါရန် တောင်းဆိုပါသည်။
၄။ နိုင်ငံတကာအသိုင်းအဝိုင်းအနေဖြင့် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စုနှင့် အပေါင်းအပါများ အပေါ် စီးပွားရေးပိတ်ဆို့မှုအပါအဝင် လက်နက်ခဲယမ်းတင်သွင်းရောင်းချမှု၊ စစ်ရေးတွင်အသုံးပြုနိုင်သည့် နည်းပညာပံ့ပိုးမှု၊ လေယာဉ်ဆီတင်သွင်းမှု နှင့် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်အသုံးပြုလျက်ရှိသည့် စစ်ရေးဆိုင်ရာ ပစ္စည်းကိရိယာများ တင်သွင်းမှုများကို ပိတ်ပင်တားဆီးခြင်းများ ပြုလုပ်ပေးကြရန် တောင်းဆိုပါသည်။ လက်ရှိကျင်းပပြုလုပ်လျက်ရှိသော ကုလသမဂ္ဂလူ့အခွင့်အရေးကောင်စီ အစည်းအဝေးများ တွင်လည်း အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်၏ ပြည်သူလူထုအပေါ် ညှင်းပမ်းနှိပ်စက် သတ်ဖြတ်နေမှုများအား သိမြင်ဆွေးနွေးကြပြီး ထိရောက်သော လုပ်ဆောင်မှုပါဝင်သည့် ဆုံးဖြတ်ချက်များ ချမှတ်နိုင်ရန် တိုက်တွန်းအပ်ပါသည်။ နိုင်ငံတကာတရားစွဲအဖွဲ့အစည်းများအနေဖြင့် လည်း ၎င်းတို့၏ စုံစမ်းစစ်ဆေးမှုများကို ယခုလက်ရှိ မြန်မာ-ဘင်္ဂလားဒေ့ရှ် ဆက်စပ်ဒေသတွင် သာမကပဲ မြန်မာတစ်နိုင်ငံလုံးအနှံ့ကျူးလွန်မှုများအထိ ချဲ့ထွင်ဆောင်ရွက်ရန် တိုက်တွန်းပါသည်။ Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar (IIMM) အနေဖြင့်လည်း ရရှိထားသော အချက်အလက်များကိုအသုံးပြုပြီး ကျူးလွန်သူများကို အရေးယူနိုင်မည့်နိုင်ငံအလိုက် တရားရုံးများကို ဖော်ထုတ်ပြီး ထိရောက်စွာလုပ်ဆောင်သွားရန် တိုက်တွန်းပါသည်။
၅။ နိုင်ငံတကာအသိုင်းအဝိုင်းအနေဖြင့် အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ အပါအဝင် တော်လှန်ရေး အင်အားစုများအားလုံးနှင့် အမြန်ဆုံး ညှိနှိုင်းတိုင်ပင် ကူညီပံ့ပိုးခြင်းအားဖြင့် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စု၏ မြန်မာပြည်သူလူထုတစ်ရပ်လုံးအပေါ် ကျူးလွန်လျက်ရှိသည့် ရာဇဝတ်များ လျင်မြန်စွာအဆုံးသတ်နိုင်ရေး အစောတလျင် ဆောင်ရွက်ကြပါရန် အလေးအနက် တိုက်တွန်းအပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-06
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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"၁။ ၂၀၂၃ ခုနှစ်၊ မတ်လ ၅ ရက် (တပေါင်းလပြည့်နေ့)တွင် ကျရောက်သည့် (၇၄) နှစ်မြောက် ပအိုဝ်းအမျိုးသားနေ့ အချိန်အခါသမယတွင် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံအပါအဝင် နိုင်ငံတကာ၌ ရောက်ရှိနေထိုင် နေကြသော ပအိုဝ်းလူမျိုးအားလုံး ကိုယ်စိတ်နှစ်ဖြာ ကျန်းမာလုံခြုံ၍ ဘေးရန်အပေါင်းမှ ကင်းကွာကြ ပါစေကြောင်း ဆုမွန်ကောင်းတောင်းအပ်ပါသည်။
၂။ ၁၉၄၈ ခုနှစ်၊ မတ်လတွင် ဖဆပလအစိုးရ၏ မြေယာခွဲဝေရေးမူဝါဒကို လက်မခံနိုင်ကြသော သထုံဒေသရှိ ပအိုဝ်းလယ်သမား တစ်သောင်းကျော်သည် ပအိုဝ်းတောင်သူအဖွဲ့ချုပ်၏ ဦးဆောင်မှု ဖြင့် သထုံမြို့၊ရေကျော်ဘုန်းကြီးကျောင်းတွင် လူထုစည်းဝေးမှုကြီးတစ်ရပ်ကို ကျင်းပခဲ့သည်။ ယင်း စည်းဝေးမှုကြီးတွင် မြေယာခွဲဝေရေးမူဝါဒကို ပြန်လည်ရုပ်သိမ်းပေးရေးအပါအဝင် မိမိတို့လူမျိုး အမည် “တောင်သူ” ဟု ခေါ်ဆိုရေးသားခြင်း မပြုဘဲ “ပအိုဝ်း” ဟုသာ ခေါ်ဆိုရေးသားပေးရန် တောင်းဆိုခဲ့ကြသည်။ ဤသို့ဖြင့် ၁၉၄၉ ခုနှစ်မှစ၍ တပေါင်းလပြည့်နေ့တွင် ပအိုဝ်းလူမျိုးများ ကျင်းပလေ့ရှိသည့် ကောက်သစ်ပူဇော်ပွဲနေ့ကို ပအိုဝ်းအမျိုးသားနေ့အဖြစ် ပြောင်းလဲကျင်းပရန် ဆုံးဖြတ်ခဲ့ပါသည်။ ထို့ကြောင့် ပအိုဝ်းအမျိုးသားနေ့သည် ပအိုဝ်းလူမျိုးတို့၏ စည်းလုံးညီညွတ်မှုနှင့် အမျိုးဂုဏ်၊ ဇာတိဂုဏ်ကို ဖော်ညွှန်းသည့် နေ့ထူးနေ့မြတ်ပင်ဖြစ်ပါသည်။
၃။ ယနေ့အချိန်အခါတွင် စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ်အပါအဝင် အာဏာရှင်စနစ်ဟူသမျှကို ပြတ်ပြတ် သားသား ဆန့်ကျင်တိုက်ဖျက်ပြီး ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီပြည်ထောင်စုကို တည်ဆောက်လိုသည့် ပအိုဝ်းအင်အားစုများအနေဖြင့် ပအိုဝ်းအမျိုးသားဖက်ဒရယ်ကောင်စီ (Pa-O National Federal Council)၏ ဦးဆောင်မှုတွင် အတူတကွစုစည်းပြီး၊ လက်တွေ့ ကျသည့် နိုင်ငံရေးအခင်းအကျင်းထဲသို့ ဝင်ရောက်ဆင်နွှဲနေကြသည်ကို တွေ့ရှိရသည့်အတွက်လည်း များစွာဝမ်းမြောက်ဂုဏ်ယူမိပါသည်။
၄။ စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ်အောက်တွင် ကျရောက်နေသော ပအိုဝ်းအမျိုးသားနေ့တွင် ပအိုဝ်းအမျိုး သားများအားလုံး စည်းလုံးညီညွတ်ပြီး ပအိုဝ်းအမျိုးသားများ လွတ်မြောက်ရေးနှင့် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုက ရေစီပြည်ထောင်စု တည်ဆောက်ရေးအတွက် ဆထက်တိုး ကြိုးပမ်းဆောင်ရွက်နိုင်ကြပါစေကြောင်း ဆုမွန်ကောင်းတောင်းရင်း ဤသဝဏ်လွှာအား ပေးပို့အပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-05
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Pa-O
Language:
Format :
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375.69 KB
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"1. No (33) Light Infantry Division of the terrorist junta, stationed in Hti Saung Village in Myinmu
Township o f Sagaing raided villages in Myinmu and Sagaing Townships on 1 March 2023.
They captured leader o f Tar Taing Village People's Defence Force Yebaw Michael (aka) Ko
Kyaw Zaw and murdered by dismembering his head, hands and legs and opening his stomach.
They captured 15 civilian villagers including women as human sheield as they left Tar Taing
village on 2 March.
2. Bodies o f five men from the captured civilians were found brutally murdered by the junta forces
near Nyaung Yin Village in Myinmu Town ship on 2 March. They kept 10 remaining civilian
detainees as they continued their raid into Nyaung Nyin Village in Myininu Towship. All of
them were found brutally killed by the junta forces near Kyun Paw Bridge at the border of
Sagaing and Myinmu on 2 March afternoon.
3. The terrorist junta forces burnt 60 out of 78 houses in Tar Taing Village on 2 February 2023.
4. Since these inhumane yet intentional tenori st acts violate international crimes including
massacres, war crimes and crimes against humanity, the Ministry of Human Rights already
communicated the case with international judiciary mechanisms. The ministry will further
attempt to advance the case to prosecute perpetrators at all levels and deliver justice..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Human Rights
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-03
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
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Description:
"JAKARTA – Dozens of parliamentarians from several Southeast Asian countries urged the ASEAN and the international community at large to take swift and concrete action against the illegal military junta led by Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, and provide real assistance to the pro-democracy forces in Myanmar, following a roundtable discussion on the Myanmar crisis held today in Jakarta.
The discussion, which was part of ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights’ (APHR) annual members’ forum, was held at the Indonesian House of Representatives and included parliamentarians and civil society organizations from Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Timor-Leste and Myanmar itself.
“The crisis in Myanmar is causing a humanitarian catastrophe of gigantic proportions. The junta’s atrocities have displaced hundreds of thousands from their homes. Adding to previous displacements before the coup, the number of internally displaced persons in Myanmar now stands at more than a record 1.3 million. The sole responsible for this disaster is the junta led by Min Aung Hlaing, and it is high time that ASEAN stop treating it with kid gloves. Strong pressure to isolate the Myanmar military is more imperative and urgent than ever,” said Mercy Barends, member of the Indonesian House of Representatives and APHR Chair.
According to the local organization Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP), over 16,000 political prisoners are currently jailed in abysmal conditions, and at least 3,075 people have been killed by the military since the coup, although AAPP believes that the number is likely many times higher.
These conditions also extend to parliamentarians in the country. According to APHR monitoring, 84 members of the national and sub-national parliaments remain in detention, facing not only the risk of torture in prison but also possible risk of execution following the executions of four pro-democracy activists, including former lawmaker Phyo Zeya Thaw. Most ousted parliamentarians continue their work in hiding and are at risk of detention or even death. Some have had their family members harassed and their properties seized by the junta.
“What is happening in Myanmar is an affront to humanity and we, as fellow humans, should take it seriously and not stand idly as the military continues to violate the human rights of the Myanmar people. We, Parliamentarians across Southeast Asia must work together in putting the country back into a path towards democracy. One of the first steps is to recognize the National Unity Government and the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH) as the legitimately elected representatives of the people of Myanmar and involve them in any future negotiations,” said António de Sá Benevides, member of Parliament of Timor Leste and APHR Member.
The International Parliamentary Inquiry (IPI) into the global response to the crisis in Myanmar, which was organized by APHR in 2022, found that the global community has largely failed to provide the help that the people of Myanmar sorely need. ASEAN and the international community at large have hidden behind the Five Point Consensus, which the Myanmar junta has continually and blatantly flouted.
“As Chair of ASEAN this year, the biggest and most democratic country in the region, Indonesia has a duty to step up and tell the generals in Naypyidaw that enough is enough. After the failed approach of Cambodia last year, appeasing the generals and ignoring the pro-democracy movement, Jakarta should put significant pressure on the Myanmar military, and support the pro-democracy forces led by the NUG, if it is serious about solving the crisis,” said Charles Santiago, former member of the Malaysian Parliament, and APHR Co-Chair..."
Source/publisher:
ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-03
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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""ယခုကဲ့သို့ အရပ်သားပြည်သူများအပေါ် ရည်ရွယ်ချက်ရှိရှိ လူမဆန်စွာ အကြမ်းဖက် သတ်ဖြတ်မှု ပြုလုပ်ခြင်းသည် အစုလိုက်အပြုံလိုက်သတ်ဖြတ်မှု၊ စစ်ရာဇဝတ်မှုများ၊ လူသားမျိုးနွယ် အပေါ် ကျူးလွန်သည့် ရာဇဝတ်မှုများအပါအဝင် နိုင်ငံတကာ ရာဇဝတ်မှုများကို ချိုးဖောက်ခြင်း ဖြစ်သည့်အတွက် လူ့အခွင့်အရေးဆိုင်ရာ ဝန်ကြီးဌာနအနေဖြင့် ယခုဖြစ်စဉ်နှင့် ပတ်သက်ပြီး နိုင်ငံတကာ တရားစီရင်ရေး ဆိုင်ရာ ယန္တရားများထံ ပေးပို့ပြီးဖြစ်သည်။ ကျူးလွန်သူ အဆင့်ဆင့်အား အပြစ်ပေး အရေးယူလျက် တရားမျှတမှု ဖော်ဆောင်ရေး ဆက်လက်ကြိုးပမ်း ဆောင်ရွက်သွားမည် ဖြစ်သည်။”..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Human Rights
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-03
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
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Sub-title:
Meetings Present Opportunities on Economic Issues, Afghanistan, Myanmar
Description:
"Foreign ministers of Group of Twenty (G20) countries are meeting in New Delhi on March 1-3. US-China tensions and Russia’s war in Ukraine loom large over the meetings, which will be attended by Russia Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, China Foreign Minister Qin Gang, and United States Secretary of State Antony Blinken. Given the highly charged backdrop, are agreements on any issue even possible?
At first glance, you might think not. Governments don’t often agree to statements critical of their own records, so the G20, in adopting any joint communiques, will be silent on many vital issues, including Russia’s war crimes in Ukraine, China’s crimes against humanity in Xingang, Saudi Arabia’s abuses in Yemen, or the US government’s own record on racial justice and immigrants’ rights.
The same goes for India. While visiting democratic leaders may privately raise concerns about India’s steeply worsening human rights record, few will publicly shame their host.
However, some possibilities remain. The G20 has several areas of potential agreement, including measures to address global food security, climate change, and the plight of countries struggling with unmanageable debt or debt defaults.
It’s also conceivable, though admittedly unlikely, that G20 members could agree on stronger measures against Myanmar’s military junta, whose widespread abuses have plunged it into diplomatic isolation.
Another conceivable area of agreement is Afghanistan. After all, international reactions to the Taliban’s increasingly harsh restrictions on women’s rights have been unanimously condemnatory.
The Taliban literally have no defenders on this topic. Saudi Arabia, Iran, and the rest of the 57-nation Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and its International Islamic Fiqh Academy have criticized or expressed concerns, as have almost every member of the G20 – including Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and South Africa – and 12 of 15 members of the United Nations Security Council.
Even Russia and China have agreed to statements criticizing Taliban restrictions on women’s education; both have privately raised concerns with Taliban leaders and neither opposed a strong group statement by Security Council members in December 2022. Probably no country since apartheid South Africa in the 1980s has been more diplomatically isolated on a major human rights issue. This is a stunning level of unanimity in today’s polarized world. But any hope for significant changes in the Taliban’s position will necessitate maintaining it. G20 countries should work to reach a common position condemning the Taliban’s decisions and urging them to reverse course..."
Source/publisher:
"Human Rights Watch" (USA)
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-28
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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Description:
"It was a fraught, reluctant, but urgent and necessary operation. We could rightly call it an “escape mission”.
It was not the first time I had been forced to flee my home country to avoid political persecution—that occurred in 2000, a year after I was freed from the previous military regime’s gulag. Twenty-two years later, I found myself with no choice but to make my escape once again, for the same reason.
It was this month last year—Feb. 23, 2022 to be precise—exactly one year and 23 days after the military seized power, overthrowing an elected government and launching its reign of terror over a population that now lives in fear of arrest, torture and death at the hands of the regime. Its endless violent crackdown on dissent has forced countless anti-coup protesters, students, politicians, artists and members of various professions, including journalists, to flee the country.
A few hours before sunrise on that day in Yangon, Myanmar’s biggest city, a colleague and I headed for a previously arranged location where an unknown driver would be waiting for us. Minutes later, two more colleagues joined us, and the young but calm driver wordlessly drove his old van into the darkness. His assignment was to take us to a remote border town; our mission was to flee our country.
It was something we hated to do.
In the van, it was still too dark to see each other, and we traveled in silence. But I could feel that all of the passengers were overwhelmed with worry and sorrow. For them, it must have been an unfamiliar feeling, as it was the first time they had undertaken such a journey. As for the driver, he must have had concerns of his own: Though he didn’t know we were journalists, he knew he was transporting “fugitives” fleeing the junta’s arbitrary persecution.
Fear of being detained by junta security forces before reaching our destination mingled with the sorrow of leaving our homes and loved ones behind, along with everything that we held dear, or that was simply familiar: a cracked or stained coffee mug; an old dining table around which family members would sit to eat every meal; a stained wall, empty, or perhaps with a tilted painting or yellowing, framed family photograph hung on it; the smell of one’s bed; the stuffy air in one’s rooms or the way sunlight shines through a particular window; a beloved pet; even the everyday noises of the neighborhood—and too many more to name. Nothing can replace such things, nothing feels more valuable or beautiful once taken away. Together, such things, I believe, add up to what we think of as “home”. Without them, there is no home, just a building. Their absence creates a powerful nostalgia for home.
Yes, leaving home was something we all hated to do. But we had to do it to survive.
Three days earlier, junta troops had arrested one of our admin staff who knew the home addresses of all of The Irrawaddy’s employees, including the editors and reporters. He was forced to show the authorities where we lived, making it necessary for us to leave our homes immediately. The group of us in the van were one of the last groups from our publication to leave the country.
After the junta’s ruthless and bloody crackdown on nationwide peaceful anti-coup protests in the early months of 2021, following the coup on Feb. 1, tens of thousands of people fled their homes and many of them left the country. Among them were many dozens of journalists.
As it confronts the sheer scale of the anti-regime movement, the military regime has identified as one of its main enemies the news media, in particular the journalists whose work daily exposes the true colors of the coup leaders—their cruel, inhumane and immoral acts against the entire population. Their work has made the media an enemy of the regime. Myanmar was the world’s third-worst jailer of journalists, with at least 42 journalists behind bars, at the time of the Committee to Protect Journalists’ Dec. 1, 2022 prison census.
In those early days I made the risky—some of my friends said daring—decision to stay inside the country to continue to work as an editor for The Irrawaddy, which by this time had been charged under various repressive laws. I thought I would be able to hide, periodically shifting locations, while continuing to work. In early March, one month after the coup, I went into hiding. This life of concealment and disguising myself in public was manageable for a year, but eventually, moving from one hiding place to another became untenable due to the junta’s oppressive laws, such as the mandatory guest and household registrations, not to mention its manhunt operations targeting us. Friends who offered to hide me at their places became concerned for their own safety, as they were helping a “fugitive journalist”.
With the security situation deteriorating, the arrest of our staff member forced me and my colleagues to make the difficult decision to flee the country. It was an unwanted outcome but the only practical one if we were to survive.
Our car had to stop at every one of the many security checkpoints we encountered throughout the trip. The driver, however, was prepared, and knew how to deal with police and military personnel: He slipped a roll of cash into the palm of the security guard at every checkpoint. He had prepared many rolls of cash ahead of time; his method worked—we were never seriously asked to identify ourselves.
We fled because it’s simply not worth getting arrested, tortured and given lengthy prison sentences, if not killed, for doing the work that is our calling—our work with the pen, with words. No citizen of my country deserves to live and work under this brutal junta and its generals, or any kind of dictatorship or authoritarianism. Our country has endured six decades of this. That should be enough, but it has yet to end. Of course, no one deserves such ruthless rulers; the Ukrainians don’t deserve Vladimir Putin’s invasion and war, either.
I endured plenty of what I didn’t deserve—to understate matters—under the previous regime. As a 19-year-old student, I was handed a 10-year prison sentence for my peaceful anti-regime activities, including publishing a pro-democracy journal, after the 1988 pro-democracy uprising. I managed to survive that harsh eight-year incarceration in two notorious prisons. For what? To carry on what I started—my own revolution against authoritarianism and military dictatorship.
In 2000, one year after my release, I fled my country for the first time, vowing not to be jailed again. In the 13 years of exile that followed, I worked as a journalist, dedicating myself to exposing the real nature of Myanmar’s cruel, greedy generals and other powerful figures. I survived exile, just as I had survived prison. For what? To tell stories: Not only horrific stories of the regime’s inhumanity, but also stories of the resilience of the Myanmar people. To share them with those citizens of our world lucky enough to be spared such experiences, as well as for the future generations, for whom our stories contain valuable lessons of survival.
In the days following the coup in 2021, my friends urged me to leave the country immediately. They said it wasn’t worth it, risking another lengthy imprisonment. But I was stubborn, determined to continue my work from hiding. Why? Because I wanted to share with the world the stories of our people who were suffering and fighting against the brutal regime—I wanted to tell these stories from the ground.
Now, though, having been forced from my country for a second time, I have come to believe that the decision to leave was the correct one—that I need to survive this time, too. The reason is the same: to be able to tell the stories of our terrible, all too “interesting”, times—starting with my own experiences of life under the dictatorship.
After a 12-hour drive, we arrived at a town on the Thai border. The driver took us to a meeting point where a four-wheeled pickup waited for us. The drivers greeted each other familiarly; they seemed to have conducted many such missions since the coup. We moved straight from the van into the second vehicle, a four-wheeled pickup, which set off after a brief exchange of words between the two drivers. Our new driver was actually an officer from an ethnic rebel group. While driving through rebel-held territory he told us that, due to the heightened security situation along the border, his group had stopped smuggling people out of the country. He had made an exception in our case, however, as he had been told that our group was very important. He said: “You are VIPs. That’s why.” I am sure many “VIPs” preceded us in this journey. We thanked him.
A couple of hours later, we reached our destination. All things considered, it was a relatively quick and safe experience. Some of our colleagues weren’t so lucky. Traveling with a baby they endured a horrific, two-day-long ordeal on a different route, though they eventually made it out too.
Our mission was to escape from the hell of military rule.
Mission accomplished. We survived.
But escaping the junta’s persecution was just our first mission. As journalists, our new and greater mission is to continue to report and write about what’s going on in our country under the ruthless military regime, and to explain the larger truths beyond the headlines, both to our own citizens and the world.
The morning after our arrival, all of us did exactly what we had been doing in hiding for the past year: We turned on our laptops. This is the job we have been doing for many years. The difference is that we are no longer in our homes, or in our country. To be suddenly wrenched away from our homes, our loved ones and our cherished belongings leaves one vulnerable to nostalgia. But in nostalgia, along with the slight sadness, there is a positive side, something I remember feeling in my first exiled life: a positive, even pleasurable energy with the power to motivate someone who has been forced from their home to strive to find a way to return.
For me, it’s the beginning of my second life in exile. The first kept me from home for 13 years. For my colleagues, it’s the beginning of their first such life. The bitter truth is that nobody knows how long it will take this time, either. Well… it should no longer matter to me. I am what I am, as I chose who I am. I am sure this rings true for my dedicated colleagues, other journalists and the countless resolute citizens of our country who have been forced to leave their homes for acting in the service of their country.
At the very least, we all need to survive to see the fall of the dictatorship.
That still greater mission remains unaccomplished…"
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-28
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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Description:
"1. Over 500 million MMK distributed in January.....2. Terrorist SAC continues its atrocities across the country 22/02/2023.....3. Civilians and PDF members prepare to take matriculation exam 18/02/2023.....4. Defence Ministry announces its military attack in Magway Region 20/02/2023.....5. NUG and NUCC says mother-tongue based education system be supported.....6. NUG announces vacancy for medical professionals in clinics/ hospitals in interim state or federal units 23/02/2023.....7. NUG pledges to bring justice for the Rohingya issue 22/02/2023..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-28
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
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2.85 MB
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Description:
"National Unity Government Weekly Press Update (9/2023)..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-28
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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Size:
3.35 MB
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Description:
"February 2023 marks the second anniversary of the military coup in Myanmar that ousted its civilian government and cracked down on democratic protests. Lin Htet Myat, a political analyst from Myanmar, assesses the grim situation in the country and offers new approaches that both the international community and the Burmese anti-junta forces should take to facilitate the restoration of democracy. The author argues that the international community must not engage the junta to seek for a peaceful resolution, and instead strengthen material support and communication with anti-junta forces within Myanmar. Meanwhile, Burmese democratic resistance forces should bolster military cooperation among like-minded groups and build trust in preparation for a federal democratic Myanmar.
Two years have passed since the Myanmar’s junta (State Administration Council (SAC)) toppled its civilian government in a coup; however, the resistance movement has not lost its momentum. In light of the second anniversary of the Spring Revolution, pro-democracy activists in Myanmar have recently held a nationwide “silent strike,” rejecting any form of oppressive and predatory military rule.
Meanwhile, the coup leader Senior General Min Aung Hlaing displays no intent to relinquish his power through negotiation. The current military regime has accepted neither the conditions outlined in the speech by the Acting President of the National Unity Government nor the ASEAN’s ‘5-Point Consensus’ (Mcpherson 2022). While the ASEAN has been attempting to appease the SAC, this controversial effort has a bleak outlook. Min Aung Hlaing seeks for a total victory, which resembles the goal of Bashar al-Assad’s Syrian regime.
In such context, unless the international community changes its approach to the crisis, Myanmar will inevitably face protracted stalemate and civil war creating millions of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs). According to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), approximately 1.5 million people have been internally displaced; 39,000 civilian properties have been destroyed; and one-third of the population is in need of critical humanitarian assistance (UNOCHA 2023). Moreover, the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP) reports that nearly 3,000 people, including pro-democracy activists and civilians, have been killed by the junta, while more than 13,000 remain imprisoned.
Call for A New Approach by the International Community
In order to restore democracy in Myanmar, the following actions are suggested:
1. The international community, particularly neighboring countries and the ASEAN, must jettison the “inclusive national dialogue” that engages Min Aung Hlaing and his junta to resolve the Myanmar crisis.
Min Aung Hlaing and his military loyalists are the main culprits of all crimes against humanity committed in Myanmar. In other words, Min Aung Hlaing must not be considered as a stakeholder in seeking peaceful resolution. This article wholeheartedly identifies with Igor Blazevik, a long-time Myanmar observer and human rights campaigner in Prague who argues that the Myanmar junta is “not and can never be a part of any solution.”
International players must free themselves from the illusion that the junta will abide by the ASEAN’s ‘5-Point Consensus.’ As predicted by Lucas Myers from the Wilson Center, the SAC “has crossed the Rubicon, and it is likely to do everything to stay in power” (Myers 2021). Settlement through negotiation is not on the junta’s agenda. According to Ye Myo Hein from Wilson Center, “the only way to bring the generals to the negotiating table may be to force them to realize that they cannot win by military means” (Hein 2022). As such, the SAC and its chief are not rational negotiating partners for the resolution of the ongoing political crisis.
2. The international community must proactively engage with the National Unity Government (NUG), National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC), ethnic resistance organizations (EROs), and other anti-junta alliances to bring about genuine dialogues and pave way for peaceful and prosperous democracy in Myanmar.
The U.S. Government must take the lead in embedding the Burma Act in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). This act enables the United States to provide non-lethal assistance to the NUG and other anti-junta armed groups, such as the People’s Defense Force (PDFs) and EROs. The anti-junta forces in Myanmar needs material assistance, not merely trainings and statements of concern.
Furthermore, Western democracies should provide anti-aircraft rocket launchers to neutralize the junta’s airstrikes (Pongsudhirak 2022). Once the balance is reached on the battlefield, the overstretched junta segments will dramatically lose its capacity to conduct a 4-cut strategy, mainly constituting burning down villages.
In many areas controlled by the NUG/PDFs and EROs, the governance bodies like the People’s Administrations (PaAPha) currently provide services to the IDPs and local communities with highly limited resources (Lipes 2022). However, once the SAC’s airpower is balanced, Burman-majority, ethnic communities will be able to effectively implement humanitarian assistance and resettlement programs. Neutralized airpower would critically weaken both the SAC soldiers’ capacity and morale, compelling the army to engage in negotiations with all stakeholders.
3. The international community should provide humanitarian assistance through every available channel and increase the levels of cross-border aid with flexible banking and reporting rules, as UN Secretary General’s Special Envoy to Myanmar Noleen Heyzer suggests. Measures to protect IDPs and refugees both in and outside mainland Myanmar must be employed in accordance with the ASEAN’s ‘5-Point Consensus’ and other regional frameworks.
UN, U.S., ASEAN, China, India, and other Western democracies should engage and support the NUG, NUCC, and EROs’ alliance platforms to improve coordination with regards to organizing humanitarian assistance and military operations. Doing so will pave the way for genuine negotiations and establishment of federal democratic union of Myanmar once the military is placed under civilian control in the future. Formation of cohesive alliance networks is the key to success for the anti-junta resistance forces.
Call for Internal Reconciliation
As of now, there exists the “Federal Democracy Charter (FDC),” which is a political framework that clearly defines the steps toward the establishment of future federal democratic union in Myanmar (International IDEA 2022). This charter has been drafted by the Committee Represent People’s Parliament (CRPH), mandated by 80% of the MPs elected in the 2020 general election to represent the Union Parliament, and revised by the National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC), and approved by the People Assembly held on January 27-29, 2022.
Yet while meaningful progress is being made to address the long-simmering grievances between Myanmar’s ethnic majority and the minorities, the key to success of the Spring Revolution lies with improved cooperation and coordination among NUG PDFs, local PDFs, and EROs (Hein 2023). Ye Myo Hein points out that the anti-junta forces should not overly focus on the details of the political agreement, as they are unrealistic. Instead, they should increase the military cooperation among within the alliance network and build trust for an inclusive federal state in the future. The NUG must step up to build more viable command-and-control structures, while enforcing a more inclusive code of conduct. This point merits attention, for as explained above, genuine negotiations are only possible when the Myanmar’s military junta is weakened.
The NUG and some EROs have already established the Central Command and Control Committee (C3C); however, some observers point out that although the NUG’s Ministry of Defense (MOD) and the EROs are cooperating at an operational level, strategic cooperation is not implemented. This current situation must change in order to win the revolution.
Conclusion
Some questions brought up by the international players are as follows: What will happen when the SAC loses power? Will the country descend into a failed state? Will the irregular army of PDFs turn against each other? In addressing these questions, Igor Blazevic consistently points out the international community’s need to address what he calls the “stability bias (authoritarian stability is better than chaos caused by anarchy)”, “David and Goliath bias (the asymmetrically powerful junta will inevitably crush all resistance forces)”, and “authoritarian bias (authoritarianism supports authoritarianism).”
Considering the aforementioned biases, the international community is unlikely to exclude the junta and its chief from the negotiation process (ASEAN 2023). Therefore, anti-junta resistance forces are better to focus on institutionalizing and developing the intra-dialogue among key stakeholders to a new level. In doing so, the alliance must prove that they can govern and maintain stability once the current military junta is removed from power and that there will be no power vacuum. Strengthened national-level coalition will provide greater credibility and legitimacy for the anti-junta forces to govern a democratic Myanmar in the future.
Myanmar’s resistance forces deserve no less global attention than those of Ukraine. Creating a peaceful democratic Myanmar is not merely a domestic issue—it is closely intertwined with achieving regional stability. As long as Min Aung Hlaing’s junta retains power, there will be more refugees, IDPs, narcotic drug production, and transnational crimes that will spill over to neighboring countries..."
Source/publisher:
Asia Democracy Research Network
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-27
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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Sub-title:
‘We have to unite.' Protest brings together ethnic groups to take a stand against the military.
Description:
"Braving snow flurries and chanting slogans, roughly 300 members of the Burmese diaspora in the United States marched to the White House over the weekend, demanding an end to the junta’s air strikes and the establishment of a no-fly zone over Myanmar.
“Democracy is coming today, dictatorship is going away,” they chanted as they marched through the streets of Washington on Saturday.
The procession included Buddhist monks, children, young people and middle-aged couples. Many drove hundreds of kilometers through freezing temperatures from as far away as Minnesota and upstate New York to participate.
Dubbed the “Multi-ethnic march,” the protest brought together the diaspora’s varied ethnic groups to take a stand against the military, which took control of the government in a February 2021 coup and has been battling rebel groups ever since.
Nay Htoo, a longtime board member with the Karen Organization of Minnesota, drove for 16 hours through the night with his wife, daughter, and son-in-law to join the event. In his hurry to join the march on time, he left his gloves in the car, leaving his hands pink and raw from the cold, but he insisted it was worth it.
The elderly community leader was one of several speakers to address the crowd at the march, using his speech to call for a swift resolution to the coup and unity amongst the different ethnic groups in standing against the military.
“Every day there are air strikes, people’s houses are damaged, people are dying,” he said, speaking afterwards. “This must stop.”
Reliance on airstrikes
Facing setbacks on the ground and stiff resistance from rebel groups since the coup, the military is increasingly relying on airstrikes in recent months – and many seem to target civilians.
Hundreds of people have been killed and thousands more left homeless by the waves of air strikes and arson attacks. The Sagaing region in the north and Kayin state, in the east, bordering Thailand – both viewed as hotbeds of rebellion – have borne the brunt of the attacks.
The military carried out 57 airstrikes in Kayin state in January alone, killing 13 civilians, including a 2-year-old child and two leaders of the Christian community, according to the Karen National Union.
In October, military jets bombed a concert in northern Myanmar commemorating the founding of an ethnic political group Kachin Independence Organization, killing 63 people – many of them civilians – and wounding 100 more.
‘Reject junta’s sham election’
In Washington, spirits were high despite the snow and rain, with the crowd singing along to the revolutionary anthem, “Blood Oath,” and carrying signs saying, “End deadly air strikes,” and “Reject junta’s sham election” – a reference to vague plans by the military government to hold a vote later this year.
Gen-Z volunteers Grace Mang and Matha Chin, who have been living in the United States for seven years, said it was their first time attending such a protest. They felt compelled to join as one of the few gestures of solidarity available to them from afar.
“There’s nothing much we can do from here, no other way to really show support, so we wanted to come and show we are with them,” said Martha.
The Burmese diaspora in the United States has been mobilizing since the early days of the coup, organizing fundraisers and marches and calling on the U.S. government to ramp up measures against the junta.
The Burma Act, which was passed by Congress in 2022 as part of a military spending bill, allows the United States to engage with the opposition National Unity Government and other opposition groups in exile, as well as to impose further sanctions against the junta. Its enactment paved the way for the NUG to open a shadow embassy in Washington D.C earlier in Feb. 2023.
The importance of inter-ethnic unity to the resistance efforts is one of the key themes emphasized by leaders of the U.S. diaspora.
‘It is everyone's fight’
Aung San ‘Christopher’ Win, a Maramagri activist from Rakhine who also spoke at the march, said the coup had encouraged more Burmese, especially those from majority groups, to address inter-ethnic discrimination.
“Before the coup, few activists would speak up for ethnic minorities like the Chin or the Rohingya,” he said, adding that his own campaigning efforts back in Myanmar had often drawn criticism from majority groups.
He arrived in the United States as a refugee in early 2021 after his political activities made him a target of the military.
The turnout despite the snowy weather shows “how much we want democracy,” said Saw Luh Tort, an organizer from Buffalo, New York.
“The military has been doing divide-and-rule for decades,” he said. “Something they didn’t know was that it would bring us together. It is everyone’s fight.”
Source/publisher:
"RFA" (USA)
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-27
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Type:
Individual Documents
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2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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Sub-title:
Military Greenlights Abuses; Denies Fair Trial Rights
Description:
"On February 22, Myanmar’s junta announced martial law orders for three additional townships in Sagaing Region, after expanding martial law in 37 townships elsewhere in the country earlier this month. A total of 50 townships are now under martial law in Chin, Kachin, Karen, Karenni, and Mon States, as well as in Yangon and Mandalay Regions.
The three townships in Myanmar’s northwest now fall under the executive and judicial jurisdiction of regional military commander Maj. Gen. Than Htike, who has been sanctioned by the European Union for serious human rights violations, including excessive use of force and an attack on a school in Depayin township in September 2022 that killed 11 children.
The Myanmar junta’s application of martial law permits a disproportionate, overbroad and open-ended response. It allows for even further repression of basic rights to free expression, peaceful assembly, and association. In essence, these martial law orders all but guarantee that ongoing military abuses remain unchecked and those responsible unaccountable.
Under martial law, legal proceedings held in military tribunals against alleged coup opponents – closed-door hearings without adequate opportunity to present a defense – deny defendants any semblance of a fair trial.
Defendants on trial before military tribunals face almost certain conviction regardless of the evidence against them. Neither the public, human rights monitors, or foreign diplomats have access to the trials, and defendants have no right of appeal. Since the February 2021 coup, military tribunals have sentenced more than 100 people to death, including 41 tried in absentia.
For two years, Myanmar’s junta has brutalized a population that has bravely opposed military rule. So long as martial law remains in place, it’s clear the military has no intention of changing course. Concerned governments need to hold the junta to account. Member states of the Association for Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), in particular Indonesia as chair of ASEAN, should do more to press Myanmar’s military to end its abuses and restore the civilian democratic government..."
Source/publisher:
"Human Rights Watch" (USA)
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-27
[field_licence]
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Individual Documents
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2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Rule of Law - Burma/Myanmar-specific
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"In a bid to attract foreign funds for the country’s electricity sector, which has been crippled since the coup, the junta has waived tax on investment in the sector.
The junta-appointed Myanmar Investment Commission has announced it will waive tax on production and distribution of renewable energy including solar power. The regime has made electricity a national priority for investment and will exempt or reduce tax on imported materials, machines, equipment, spare parts, and construction materials that are not available in Myanmar, according to the announcement.
Taxes will also be waived for businesses related to electric vehicles, it added.
However, a local businessmen working in the sector commented that electricity production is a long-term project, and foreigners will not be interested in investing unless the country has political and economic stability.
“Projects in the electricity sector take around seven years to break even and you only start to see profits after seven years. Even Chinese companies do not want to invest because of uncertainty in Myanmar. Also, investors would be paid in kyats for their electricity, and the kyat is depreciating. This is also a challenge to potential investors,” he said.
Junta chief Min Aung Hlaing’s family and their cronies have won licenses to operate solar power plants. But they themselves do not want to make huge investments for the long term, and are seeking business partners, he added.
An energy expert told The Irrawaddy: “Foreign investors consider country risk [the risk of investing or lending in a country] as more important than tax exemptions. If a country is unstable, and risk is high, international banks will not grant loans for investment in that country. So, we can’t expect foreign investors to come just because of low tax.”
Another local business owner engaged in electricity production said the regime has introduced tax exemption not out of a desire for electricity sector development but because junta leaders are interested in potential profits from the industry.
The World Bank and other international agencies that had been providing financial and technical assistance for Myanmar’s electricity sector suspended their assistance following the coup. Electricity projects have also stalled.
Suspended projects include a 35-million-euro hydropower plant on the Salween River to be built with loans from French development agency AFD, and a Japan-backed US$ 2 billion LNG (liquefied natural gas) power plant in Thilawa Special Economic Zone in Yangon.
Meanwhile, Hong Kong-based VPower halted electricity generation at its 400-megawatt (MW) LNG power plant in Yangon’s Thaketa Township and 350MW power plant in the Thilawa Special Economic Zone in July 2021, citing rising LNG prices in the international market and depreciation of the kyat against the dollar.
In September that year, VPower announced it had pulled out of two power projects, each with a capacity of 200MW, in Rakhine State’s Kyaukphyu and Mandalay Region’s Myingyan.
In May 2020, the now ousted National League for Democracy government invited bids for the construction of 29 ground-mounted solar projects capable of generating a total of 1 gigawatt of power under a 20-year build-operate-and-own contract. Chinese companies and their consortia won the bids to build 28 of the 29 plants.
The military regime cancelled tenders for 26 solar power projects and blacklisted the Chinese companies after they stalled on the projects following the coup.
Myanmar has suffered rolling blackouts since late 2021 since the regime ow mainly relies on hydropower plants to supply electricity.
The country’s total electricity production capacity currently stands at 3,600 megawatts, with Chinese companies accounting for about 2,000 megawatts and 56 percent of investment in Myanmar’s electricity sector, according to an August 2022 report of the Institute for Strategy and Policy..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-27
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
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2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, The Burmese military's role in the economy
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Description:
"Key Event Details
Location of Incident: Monywa town (မုံရွာမြို့), Sagaing region (စစ်ကိုင်းတိုင်းဒေသကြီး) [22.105255, 95.137446].
Date/Time of Incident: 27 February 2021
Alleged Perpetrator(s) and/or Involvement:
Multiple armed police and military personnel
Several men in civilian clothing
Summary of Investigation:
Myanmar Witness has verified footage showing multiple armed police and military personnel, as well as men dressed in civilian clothing, chasing and using sticks to beat two fleeing and unarmed individuals.
The footage indicates potential coordination between the police and civilians in carrying out the beatings.
The footage also shows soldiers from the military’s 101 Light Infantry Division pointing guns at the individuals who were filming the incident.
Executive Summary
In the months following the February 2021 military coup, Myanmar Witness documented and verified footage of police and military violence against individuals. This mini-series of spot reports documents five separate incidents in Yangon, Mandalay and Sagaing in February and March 2021. The first report of the series focusses on events in Monywa town
The case studies in the series show police and military personnel beating unarmed individuals, including those already apprehended; harassment, intimidation and arrest of medical workers; and the infliction of degrading treatment. Additionally, ranking police officers were identified in two incidents.
In this case study, Myanmar Witness has verified footage showing two unarmed individuals in civilian clothing, believed to be protestors or bystanders to a protest, running away from a water cannon and security forces. Multiple armed police and military personnel, as well as several men dressed in civilian clothing, are seen chasing and using sticks to beat the two fleeing and unarmed individuals.
The videos potentially reveal coordination between police and individuals dressed in civilian clothing. However, it cannot be ascertained from this case study whether the individuals were affiliated with, acting in coordination with, or undercover members of the security forces.
Analysis of rank and insignia, clearly visible in the footage, attributes responsibility of this violence to the Lon Htein (Riot Security Forces), soldiers from Myanmar military’s Yangon Command, and the 101 Light Infantry Division.
Sticks are used to beat the individuals’ head, arms and torso to the extent that one of them appears unable to stand, and a stretcher is brought for him. It also shows soldiers from the military’s 101 Light Infantry Division pointing guns at the individuals who were filming the incident.
To read the full investigation, download the report PDF.
These examples of police and military brutality are being released to mark two years passing since their occurrence; however, they are by no means exhaustive. Myanmar Witness has documented other instances of police and military harassment since the coup, which has been documented in several reports, including: Violence against protestors in North Okkalapa, Bago, and Hlaing Tharyar; and, the deaths of multiple female protestors, including Ma Kyal Sin (Angel) and Daw Tinnwe..."
Source/publisher:
Myanmar Witness
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-27
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
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2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Armed conflict in Burma - attacks on civilians, Human Rights and international relations
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"Religions play a major role in Myanmar’s political history, especially Buddhism. Buddhist monks have been involved with political movements since the colonial eras. The most notable event led by the Sanga (monks) in recent years took place in 2007 when they led the Saffron Revolution. Many monks died, were arrested, and tortured fighting for democracy in Myanmar. It remains the same in the Spring Revolution as we come across the news about monks leading rallies and supporting the resistance in many ways. However, some prominent monks who were once worshipped and respected by the major population in the country have chosen to either neglect the military’s atrocities or plainly side with its leaders. Youths have questioned and called out those monks, vowing that victory at the end of the revolution will get rid of the military dictators and the stereotypical faiths including those religious monks. Curious on what the religious side thinks about it, we spoke to Ven Zawana, a former prisoner of conscience who now resides in New York, fighting yet another battle for the people of Myanmar.
Please tell us about your involvement in the resistance movements under the previous regimes.
I have become involved with the political movement since 1988. I led some rallies in my area. After the military committed the coup, I had to hide somewhere for a few months to escape an arrest. I came back to Yangon in July 1989, becoming an abbot in a monastery in Shwepyithar Township. Since I was the head of the monastery, I had more freedom in helping the politicians who found a safe haven in my facility where they hung out there frequently. In 1990, the prominent monks in Yangon were arrested by the military for leading political movements. I was in the back seat of the activism at that time hence I did not face detention. One day in 1993, military soldiers came to my monastery, asking questions about the students who had spent a few nights in the guest room. They found and seized documents, and tapes that contained political content in the room the young men had stayed in. I was also taken into custody. I confessed that those students had spent time frequently in my monastery, and I had treated them like regular guests. Hence I was charged with multiple violations of laws that were put on those students. In November 1993, I was sentenced to life imprisonment and nine years on top of that. I spent ten months in Insein Prison, later I was transferred to Tharrawaddy Prison (Bago Region) where I did five more years, before being transferred again to serve ten more years in Taungoo Prison (Bago Region). I got released from the Taungoo facility on 18 September 2009 after being locked in for 16 years and a month. Even after the release, I did not have the liberty to move freely since intelligence officers were following me and harassing people I communicated with. I had wished inside the jail that I could visit areas around the Bago Region after my release but I realized my time was running out with military people tailing me all day. I left for Maesot, the border of Thai-Myanmar before eventually heading to the US. I was granted asylum status and have been living in New York for ten years now.
What are your current contributions to the Spring Revolution?
Even before the Spring Revolution, I took notice of the military’s attempts to stir religious disputes by causing chaos in Rakhine State in 2012 (The 2012 Rakhine State riots were a series of conflicts primarily between ethnic Rakhine Buddhists and Rohingya Muslims in northern Rakhine State, Myanmar, though by October Muslims of all ethnicities had begun to be targeted.) followed by the establishment of Ma Ba Tha – Association for the Protection of Race and Religion before 2015. I published books and shared articles online that highlighted the extreme beliefs and acts of Ma Ba Tha. When the coup took place in 2021, I organized the online Sanga (Monk) Network with the intention to remind people about Dhamma (morality) and Ahdhamma (immorality). The page now has 10,000 followers on Facebook, and like-minded monks from all over the world join in to give sermons to people and support the resistance on a regular basis. In addition, I toured the USA with my followers in 2021, visiting 20 cities in 11 states lobbying for the Burma Act, organizing rallies in support of the National Unity Government (NUG), and collecting and handing over donations to the NUG officials. To this day, I am quite active in this resistance, from calling for the United States government to transfer USD 1 Billion to the NUG, to pooling funds for people in Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) and the People’s Defense Forces (PDF).
Many; especially youths have criticized prominent monks such as Sitagu Sayadaw for turning a blind eye to the atrocities of the coup leaders and not having the best interests of the public at heart. And hence they have called for the end of such exploitation of religion or religious-dominant culture along with the dictatorship, please let us know your thoughts on it.
Look, one of the core values of Buddhism is the peace and prosperity of the entire society. If you practice Buddhism, which is the symbol of love, and you turn a blind eye to injustice, that means you are doing the exact opposite of what you preach. When that happens, whatever sermons you give on the topics of peace, love, or caringness, are just plain words coming out of your lips, you don’t convince people anymore. Youths see through that. In my private opinion, I believe the perception of youths on religion has changed in a positive way compared with the past decades. The new education system during a brief period has contributed to that effect.[1] During the previous regimes, our education system was basically a brainwashing scheme. Younger generations have dared to question the status quo, no longer taking the old road that used to lead people to believe whatever the monks preached.
Are you satisfied with the extent of the Buddhist monks’ participation/contributions in this resistance?
Not at all. As I was saying earlier, the education system for the people changed in a positive way recently but monastic education has remained the same. I know a monk who has done very well in academics but he still believes the lie that the country will be converted into an Islamic state if the National League for Democracy (NLD), which is led by the detained leader Aung San Suu Kyi, continues to govern it. His students, young and bright novices, are fed the same concept. This fake news has been systemically injected by the military into the whole country for decades, and many monks remain believing it. Hence, they consider pro-resistance people as traitors of religion and race. It is down to the monastic education system, which is not empowering monks to think freely. To this day, Sangha Maha Nayaka (the governing body of Buddhist monks) does not believe it is appropriate to teach English to monks, arguing that if monks can speak English, they will leave the country. How pathetic!
We have also observed that many monks are actively participating in the movement, backing operations of the PDF members in some cases, while we are grateful for such support, do you think it’s against the religious practices?
For myself, I don’t believe I have committed crimes that will put my own monasticism into question. Yes, I am supporting PDF but the most I can do is provide USD 20 for each ranger in a limited quantity, which is barely sufficient to get food and warmth for them. I am not buying weapons or urging them to kill so I have a clear conscience on that and I will keep doing the same. As for others, I simply see it like this: whoever is making an effort to end the military’s dictatorship is a hero to me, whether it’s a person or a monk. The country will not be peaceful and prosperous as long as these generals are at the helm. The sooner they are gone, the earlier Myanmar benefits. Hence, every single one who works toward toppling the coup leaders is doing a righteous deed. No judgment there whatsoever.
Buddhism has a significant impact on the country. What kind of role do you wish for Buddhism to have in modern Myanmar (beyond the Spring Revolution)?
Every religion will continue to have a significant place in Myanmar. The Spring Revolution has highlighted the good and the evil vividly, not just among people, but also among religious leaders. Post-revolution, faith will be restored based on actual events and beliefs, instead of brainwashing conspiracies and make-believe stories. That day will be beautiful when it eventually comes..."
Source/publisher:
Mohinga Matters via "Democratic Voice of Burma"
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-26
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Individual Documents
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2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Spring Revolution
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"Exiles, alas, are all too common in today’s disrupted world. Myanmar has a variety of them. Some are driven into exile by ethnic cleansing, such as the Rohingya. Some seek safety individually, like the anti-military dissidents since 2001. And millions go overseas to seek employment, especially in Thailand.
Governments in exile are also not an uncommon worldwide political phenomenon. But to have two in one generation in one country not only exceeds the norm, but may be unique in the modern era. Although two can hardly be called a pattern, lessons and expectations, both realistic and illusionary, from these experiences in Myanmar may help enlighten the future and help guide internal and foreign policies.
On 14 February 2023, the US Deputy Secretary of State, Wendy Sherman, met Daw Zin Mar Aung, the National Unity Government’s (NUG) foreign minister, at the newly established, Washington-based headquarters of the NUG. Founded on 16 April 2021, the NUG is composed of members of the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, the parliament elected in November 2020 but ousted by a Myanmar military coup before it could take office on 1 February 2021, as well as representatives of ethnic minority groups and other anti-coup players.
Wendy Sherman’s visit, and other extensive legislative and executive actions by the US, provides the NUG with the moral imprimatur, if not the diplomatic stamp of approval. Although formal diplomatic ties remain with the military regime, ambassadorial replacements between the states have not been approved. Together with an intense lobbying effort by the NUG, extensive economic, political, and social sanctions have been imposed on both military-supported institutions and individual military officials. With widespread Western opprobrium of any actions seen as supportive of the military, US dialogue with the Myanmar military is absent.
For the few foreigners who trace modern Myanmar history, the plot seems to be a replay of an older scenario. But there are critical differences between the four coups that have dominated Myanmar’s history since independence in 1948. The three coups of 1962, 1988, and 2021 were all designed to perpetuate military control over political, economic, and social elements of the then Burma and Myanmar. The 1988 and 2021 coups have similarly resulted in governments in exile, but their effects and expectations are likely to be quite different.
A generation ago, following the coup of 1988, the military promised that it would hold elections that would result in a multi-party “discipline-flourishing democracy.” It did hold such elections in May 1990, which the opposition National League for Democracy swept and the military blatantly ignored. Escaping arrest by the military, some members of the newly elected but unseated legislature formed the National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma (NCGUB) on 18 December 1990 in territory not yet controlled by the military, and then shifted to Thailand.
It lobbied for diplomatic recognition, never granted by the US, but it focused attention on the political plight of the civilian population and engendered widespread international sympathy. In May 1995, the NCGUB held a meeting in Bommersvik Sweden, and Sein Win, a first cousin of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, was elected as its prime minister in exile. In essence, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, or what was purported to be her views since she was under house arrest, made US policy.
The NCGUB moved its offices to the Washington DC area for more effective lobbying. It had remarkable access throughout the Washington power structure. But as the military began the slow, incomplete but encouraging, pattern of reform, and as the US responded to such quiet signals from the military, relations began to improve. In the aftermath of these changes, the NCGUB was dissolved on 14 September 2012.
There are significant differences between 1988 and 2021 both in military promises and actions and in the public’s response. In 2021, the military promised initially that there would be national elections in 2023. Because of the widespread disdain, indeed revolution, against the junta’s rule and national civil unrest, these elections have now been promised for later in 2023 or 2024.
But just as the controlled and manipulated elections of 2010 allowed the military to maintain power through the political process, so there is every indication that the current military regime plans a similar response in the forthcoming political arena. Even if there are significant alterations to the 2008 military-drafted constitution that the military had sworn to uphold unchanged, but is now prepared to modify to ensure continuing military dominance of the political processes, any such changes will attempt to solidify the military’s critical role in Myanmar society.
One overarching commonality of the 1988 and 2021 coups is the clear determination to ensure that Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, through imprisonment, house arrest, or simply age, no longer plays a role in Myanmar’s politics. A major difference is that Suu Kyi advocated political change through peaceful means. Whether that was practical in the Myanmar context may be disputed, but on 7 September 2021 the NUG declared war on the Myanmar military. Although the military’s criminal and rapacious actions far outstrip the violence perpetrated by the NUG and its diverse opposition groups, the moral high ground has at least partly been ceded.
The popular reaction to the 2021 coup has been unprecedented in modern Myanmar. Coupled with the ongoing struggle of ethnic minorities for autonomy, and the exposure of youth to the liberalization of the past decade, tolerance of military atrocities seems to have ended. Anti-military rebellion is apparent even in Bamar areas that were never previously restive, and military violence against the population is unprecedented.
From 2012 until the coup, the country’s youth experienced a degree of freedom, while incomplete, far greater than at any time since the 1962 coup. They do not seem to be willing to settle for less under praetorian rule. The NUG has tried to placate ethnic dissatisfaction with more ethnically diverse leadership, but generations of suspicions abound and are exceedingly difficult to overcome. Throughout the country People’s Defense Forces have been formed and fight military authority, but they lack coordination and the arms necessary for effective resistance.
But the military’s plans for a rigged election that would provide titular legitimacy from their vantage point may be based in part on illusion. Senior military officers have long felt that that they don’t need the West, because of a combination of the state’s natural resources and friendly relations with Russia and China, who protect Myanmar in the United Nations through their veto power and supply the regime with sophisticated weaponry, along with the clear reluctance of Japan, India and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations to impose sanctions.
The generals may be preparing to sit out a decade of Western isolation, after which some US administration will likely make some concessions in response to political face-saving changes within the Myanmar regime. The dilemma is that much of the backbone of state administration is in the hands of retired military, as well as those on active duty. The military‘s future role in Myanmar will exceed what is regarded as normal in modern Western states.
We are witnessing a period of intense propaganda from all sides. Claims for areas and populations controlled, casualties inflicted, and economic conditions are widely promulgated but are in dispute. Yet policy decisions by the internal actors and foreigners are being made based on dubious data and are likely to exacerbate the crises.
Some foreign observers are now rethinking their positions. Some advocate the diplomatic recognition of the NUG, which would entail the closing of Western embassies in Myanmar, and likely either covert or overt arming of the opposition. This would increase the polarization of Russian and Chinese antagonism with the West. Some call for positive reconsideration of the breakup of the state, long advocated by some ethnic groups, to alleviate some of these pressures. That would likely to produce a ‘Balkanized’ regional set of insecurities compounding the myriad dilemmas facing the country and the region.
There is no silver bullet that will solve Myanmar’s multiple dilemmas and foreign response to them without a clear reorganization of the military control system and changes in its leadership. As much as they are needed, such changes seem, alas, a bridge too far. Unfortunately, the next few years are likely to be even worse than the previous two..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-25
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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Sub-title:
Western sanctions should be welcomed but the country’s opposition must do more.
Description:
"Ever since the West turned on the military taps and flooded Ukraine with weapons capable of stopping the Russian advance, the backers of Myanmar’s ousted government have asked: “what about us?” It’s an understandable question.
The National Unity Government (NUG) and its armed wing, the People’s Defense Force (PDF), are in dire need of weaponry as they push the civil war from the jungles into junta-held provincial zones where the military responds with Russian-made fighter jets and artillery.
But the Western response has been limited to sanctions.
The latest sanctions just announced by the European Union include travel bans on 16 individuals and entities, including the junta’s energy minister, high-ranking officers, the ministry of defense and private companies thought to be supplying fuel, arms, and funds to the military.
A number of sources who have advised the PDF on strategy, the NUG on policies and sought military help from the West, including Washington D.C., say perennial issues remain.
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“I have spoken with Congressmen who want to provide military aid but they don’t know who to deal with. The NUG and PDF have no public face. There is no leader that people can rally around, there’s no central point,” said one ASEAN politician who recently returned from the United States.
Unlike Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, few would recognize the leader and acting president of the NUG, Duwa Lashi La, and that’s more than two years after the Myanmar military – also known as the Tatmadaw – ousted an elected government headed by Aung San Suu Kyi.
Observers close to Lashi La, who does not speak English, say he lacks charisma and is reluctant to fill the shoes of Aung San Suu Kyi, who is languishing behind bars, because of old loyalties and his sense of hierarchy.
Aung San Suu Kyi is deservedly recognized by the United Nations as the legitimate leader of Myanmar, despite her fall from grace over her backing of the military during the slaughter of the Rohingya in 2017.
Her ability to carry an audience was formidable and her cult of personality well documented, but her days as Myanmar’s savior are over. There’s just not that much she can do.
Meanwhile, those around Duwa Lashi La have proved barely competent when dealing with journalists outside their comfort zone. Disunity remains a persistent issue among the official 135 major ethnic groups and seven ethnic minority states that contribute to opposition forces.
Latest estimates say the PDF has more than 65,000 troops serving in more than 250 units but there is no single command structure and it would be impossible for each ethnic group to negotiate military aid with countries like the U.S. on their own.
According to the Human Rights Foundation of Monland, a local NGO, much of the latest fighting has taken place in Karen and Mon state and in Tanintharyi Region, which border Thailand. It says the people in Karen State have been harshly impacted, which along with Mon State and the Tanintharyi Region, are being relentlessly and indiscriminately attacked by the junta.
“Destruction of property, including the burning of villages, is ongoing,” it said.
“Thousands more are being forced to flee their homes daily as military impunity and a lack of international action only encourage the junta to commit more atrocity crimes.”
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Thus the NUG leadership desperately needs to step up or move on, more so with Indonesia taking the helm of ASEAN for 2023. It has opened up the prospect of direct negotiations with the NUG, and hopefully, put an end to the dithering and silly political theatrics of the last two years.
The shift in direction matters with the military looking to shore up its legitimacy through rigged, stage-managed elections, which the U.N. special rapporteur for Myanmar, Tom Andrews, has already described as fake because “these are not the conditions for a free and fair election.”
“These are conditions for a fraud that is going to be attempted to be perpetrated against the people of Myanmar,” he quite rightly said. Hence, the NUG needs to get its political act together..."
Source/publisher:
"The Diplomat" (Japan)
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-24
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, National Unity Government (NUG), Sanctions, Business and the Military
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Sub-title:
With the junta in a weaker position, China recalibrates its approach with an eye to expanding its influence in Myanmar.
Description:
"Since late 2022, Beijing has increasingly signaled the limits of its support for Myanmar’s junta against pro-democracy forces and protection against international efforts to hold the army accountable for its crimes. In particular, Beijing has demonstrated a reluctance when doing the junta’s bidding internationally results in significant political costs vis-à-vis its relations with Southeast Asian states or its reputation at the United Nations.
As global pressure on Myanmar’s generals grows, Beijing is particularly sensitive to signals that Western support for Myanmar’s powerful Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) or People’s Defense Forces (PDFs) that are fighting the military may increase. To the extent that the Chinese government senses that such support is on the rise, it will become much more assertive in leveraging its strategic relationships with both the military and the most powerful of the EAOs, which operate on the border in the immediate orbit of China’s influence, to shape the overall trajectory of the conflict.
Rather than seeking to back the military against all odds, Beijing aims to strengthen support for both the military and the most powerful of the EAOs, thereby dramatically increasing Chinese influence in Myanmar. This approach challenges the ability of pro-democracy forces to forge powerful coalitions that might threaten the traditional status quo between the military and the EAOs, because it pushes northern EAOs to distance themselves from what is perceived by Beijing as a Western-backed pro-democracy resistance.
As the United States considers options for implementing the provisions of the recently passed Burma Act, a top priority should be support to inclusive coalitions between the EAOs and the National Unity Government (NUG), the parallel government formed by democratically elected lawmakers. Assistance under the act should carefully consider possible impacts on and prospects for such alliances.
China’s Meandering Response to the Coup
In the immediate aftermath of the February 1, 2021 military coup led by Min Aung Hlaing, China initially took a wait and see approach, seemingly not wanting to burn bridges with either the military or the National League for Democracy (NLD) party, which it had committed to partner with in implementing billions of dollars of strategic infrastructure projects as part of the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor. While Chinese state media parroted the Myanmar army’s propaganda, referring to the coup as a “cabinet reshuffle,” China also sent public signals of the importance of its relationship with the NLD.
Popular concern that China actively supported the military’s crackdown on protesters in the weeks following the coup triggered a rise in anti-China sentiment. Anxiety increased in Beijing after a series of attacks on Chinese business interests culminated in threats that “China’s gas pipelines will be burned.” China responded by increasing pressure on the military, EAOs and the NUG to ensure that all would actively play a role in defending Chinese strategic economic interests in Myanmar. While all these parties responded favorably to Beijing’s request, the military’s propaganda apparatus played to fears in Beijing that pro-democracy resistance forces were directly targeting China’s strategic interests in the country. These interests include a multibillion-dollar oil and gas pipeline that represents the only source of piped natural gas to China’s southwestern provinces, and which accounts for over 10 percent of the gross domestic product of Yunnan Province.
By June 2021, Beijing’s posture had shifted significantly in favor of the junta, with the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs hosting the junta’s top international affairs representative, Wunna Maung Lwin. The Chinese Communist Party had a final public interaction with the NLD in September of that same year. It subsequently ceased inviting the NLD to its international political party engagements. From October 2021 until July 2022, the Chinese government gradually scaled up its relations with the junta, culminating in Beijing cohosting the foreign ministers’ meeting of the Chinese-led Lancang-Mekong Cooperation (LMC) Forum in Myanmar. With Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) once again initiating new business with the junta, Chinese State Councilor Wang Yi announced to the foreign ministers of the LMC countries — Laos, Cambodia, Thailand and Vietnam — that China would partner with Min Aung Hlaing’s regime to host an LMC summit before the end of 2022.
Beijing’s warming ties with Myanmar’s genocidal generals contrasted sharply with the growing calls within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to forge direct ties with the NUG, and to limit high-level interactions with Myanmar’s army. Beijing drew strong criticism from key ASEAN countries, which were concerned that China’s convening of high-level LMC meetings would undermine ASEAN unity and hamper efforts of the body to find a solution to the crisis. Faced with the choice of either upsetting its relationship with ASEAN or disappointing the junta, in late 2022, Beijing opted for the latter. Beijing scrapped plans for an LMC summit in Myanmar, and greater tensions emerged between Min Aung Hlaing and Beijing as it became clear that the military’s poor performance on the battlefield and the unstable business environment would preclude progress on China’s coveted infrastructure connectivity projects.
While the Chinese government had continuously pressured the seven powerful Myanmar EAOs located in northern Shan and Kachin states to negotiate with the military, these EAOs increasingly found themselves facing a weak and incompetent adversary on the battlefield, enabling them to make significant progress recovering territories lost over the two decades before the coup.
In other cases, EAOs such as the United Wa State Army (UWSA) leveraged the chaos to begin a generational change in leadership while also supporting their allies to defeat rival militias to the south of Shan state. These dynamics functioned to further weaken the military, but also served China’s interests insofar as the northern EAOs extend Chinese influence deeper into Myanmar while pushing the frontlines of the fighting further from the Chinese border. By October 2022, a desperate military began deploying its air power to attack key positions held by three of these EAOs: the Myanmar Democratic Alliance Army, the Ta’ang National Liberation Army and the Kachin Independence Army. These attacks failed from both a military and a political standpoint, as the EAOs launched successful counterattacks, giving China a clear picture of the military’s weakness while threating stability on China’s border.
Who Is Interfering in Myanmar?
In December 2022, as tensions between China and Myanmar’s military persisted, two key international developments altered Beijing’s calculations. First was the introduction of a United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution — something which Beijing has traditionally been hostile toward. Yet with global frustrations rising vis-à-vis the junta’s blatant human rights violations and growing security threats triggered by the rising influence of transnational crime groups in Myanmar, China faced a difficult decision over whether to block the resolution. For the first time since China was seated at the UNSC in 1971, it opted to water down rather than veto the resolution on Myanmar.
A second development was the U.S. passage of the Burma Act as part of the National Defense Authorization Act in late December 2022. Particularly significant to the act was the incorporation of language indicating a U.S. intention to provide non-lethal support to both EAOs and PDFs. Myanmar’s junta responded to these developments by condemning the international community’s move and by renewing efforts to court favor with Beijing. This included pledging renewed political support to China on issues such as the South China Sea and Taiwan, as well as launching disinformation campaigns claiming Western-backed PDFs were increasingly perpetrating “terrorist attacks” across Myanmar.
With the weakened junta in an increasingly deferential position, China has once again recalibrated its approach. In late December 2022, China swiftly deployed a new Asian affairs special envoy to Myanmar, Deng Xijun. While Beijing has maintained an envoy since 2013, its most recent envoy, Sun Guoxiang, had been quietly retired in the summer of 2022, with Beijing communicating to the diplomatic community that it would take time for a new appointment to be made. Several nuances around China’s deployment of this new envoy signaled a different direction: 1) no official announcements of the envoy’s appointment were made, 2) the envoy met with the powerful northern EAOs before meeting with the military, and 3) the envoy has pressured the northern EAOs to negotiate with the military and to refuse assistance from the West.
The moves of the new Chinese envoy shine a light on Beijing’s preferred approach to addressing the conflict: pushing for the military and the northern EAOs to forge an agreement that would dramatically increase the autonomy and influence of these groups across the Chinese borderlands in exchange for their support for the military’s efforts to limit the growing power and influence of PDFs and NUG-aligned EAOs, and its moves to organize a sham election. Meanwhile, the evolving position of China’s closest ally in Myanmar, the UWSA, maximizes pressure on the military to accept this deal. In mid-February 2023, at a key UWSA political meeting, the UWSA announced that they would maintain ties with both the military and the NUG, which they see as a “second Myanmar government.”
Chinese SOEs, the Yunnan Provincial Government and Shady Business Networks
With Beijing increasingly leveraging parallel relationships with the most powerful of Myanmar’s EAOs and the military to shape the trajectory of the conflict in its favor, three sets of Chinese actors have emerged as critical lifelines to Myanmar’s army.
First are the powerful Chinese SOEs with deep interests in Myanmar and ties to the military that could enable them to reap windfall contracts should the military succeed. The ChinaPower Company, which entered the market during an earlier period of military rule, is one of the few SOEs both implementing ongoing infrastructure projects as well as initiating new projects. These include an ongoing gas-to-energy project in Rakhine state, which has achieved milestones for completion post-coup. Emboldened by this success, ChinaPower has signed a series of new energy deals with the junta, which it has fast-tracked, bringing over 63 megawatts of new power projects online over the past six months. Chinese state media and the Chinese embassy have aggressively promoted these efforts to present narratives in China of a “new normal,” favorable to Chinese SOEs.
Second is the Yunnan Provincial Government, the current leadership of which includes senior officials with deep personal ties to Myanmar’s army, and which is convinced that the army will never cease to be a key political player in Myanmar. Almost immediately after the coup, the Yunnan Provincial Government appointed a key intellectual backer of the China-Myanmar military relationship to lead the Yunnan Department of Commerce. Li Chenyang, who was one of the initial proponents of the China-Myanmar pipeline project, has led a series of initiatives to align the Yunnan Provincial Government behind the military with the objective of finding a way to reset Yunnan’s economy post-COVID-19. In February 2023, Li led a delegation of Yunnan Provincial Government officials and business representatives to Myanmar for the Yunnan-Myanmar Commercial Forum.
Third are the shady business networks, including China-affiliated transnational criminal organizations, which thrive in kleptocratic and highly unstable contexts like Myanmar. These include criminal syndicates involved in trafficking individuals from across the globe into scam centers, where they are forced at gunpoint to engage in fraud. Post-coup, a series of Chinese business promotion agencies sprang to life in Myanmar, including organizations such as the South Asia Future Company, the China Myanmar Economic Cooperation and Development Promotion Association and the World Peace Ribbon Association. All of these organizations seek to extract concessions or gain preferential access to projects by building close ties to the junta and key crony companies. The World Peace Ribbon Association, which has previously played a role in Beijing’s Belt and Road Forum, featured in a December 2022 business exchange with Min Aung Hlaing, during which the association announced the establishment of a new “hub” in Yangon for the promotion of China’s Belt and Road Initiative projects.
Together, these forces all work to influence Beijing in the direction of enhancing its support to Myanmar’s army and play a key role in advancing the cause of the army in Beijing.
A Possible U.S. Response to Beijing’s Growing Influence in Myanmar
Beijing’s overall posture continues to prioritize a status quo that favors the military over pro-democracy forces. While so, cracks have emerged in the alliance between Beijing and the generals. In particular, China’s growing tolerance for EAOs to challenge the military’s positions on the Chinese border demonstrate one way through which Beijing aims to deepen its leverage over the regime. At the same time, Beijing’s moves risk throwing Myanmar deeper into protracted conflict. While China may think it can leverage its relations with the northern EAOs and the military to weaken pro-democracy forces and check Western influence in Myanmar, this threatens to further balkanize the country. It also represents a fundamental misreading of the Burma Act, which aims to recognize the essential role that Myanmar’s myriad EAOs and PDFs must play in order to achieve the foundation necessary for sustainable peace in the future.
As the United States considers options for implementing the Burma Act, a critical need is to enhance assistance to the formation of inclusive coalitions, which can work together to place Myanmar back on a path toward democracy..."
Source/publisher:
United States Institute of Peace
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-24
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"The military coup of 2021 did more than just destroy Myanmar’s political system. The damage it has wrought extends to every sector, not least the education system. The sector has suffered dire consequences, with 80 percent of Myanmar’s nearly 10 million students rejecting the regime’s education system, according to the Education Ministry of the parallel National Unity Government (NUG).
The takeover came as a particularly devastating blow for one group: Students who passed the matriculation exam in 2020 and refused to study under the regime’s education system lost their opportunity to continue their education. For the striking students, Myanmar Nway-Oo University, a public university, was established in October 2022 under the guidelines of the NUG to provide undergraduate and postgraduate courses as well as vocational courses for striking students. It has an affiliation with Interim University Councils (IUCs), which were founded by striking students and teachers across the country.
Dr. Sai Khaing Myo Tun, the NUG’s deputy minister of education, talked to The Irrawaddy about the shadow government’s plans to meet the education needs of Myanmar’s striking students. He also delineated the promising future of a new education system under a federal democracy and other education policies that will benefit Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) students, resistance forces and disabled persons after the revolution.
What are the Ministry of Education (MOE)’s priorities for filling the education gap for striking students?
We implemented the online education system as the first stage because of the regime’s atrocities on the ground. Initially, we organized and gathered teachers and academic staff for basic education. We urged them to form township education boards and now we have 300 across the country. For higher education, we have 246 Interim University Councils (IUCs) under our authority.
The major change is that the MOE gives autonomy to all academic institutions. This is also part of our policy. All schools have their own administration and management rights. From our side, we provide an up-to-date curriculum and amend it in line with the values of federal democracy. Now, we have 70 online federal schools operating under the MOE’s guidelines across the country.
In addition, we have also set a policy that allows students to pursue education in accordance with their age.
Most important, the MOE has drafted a Federal Democracy Education Policy with the help of experts and the draft policy has already been approved by the NUG. We are now discussing it with the Education Committee of the National Unity Consecutive Council (NUCC). We are also seeking different opinions and voices from ethnic associations, educational institutions and religious organizations. This policy will be out in the near future.
What changes will the Federal Democracy Education Policy bring?
Myanmar’s education was a centralized system in the past. Under a federal democracy’s education system, each school in every state and region will have the authority to implement its own education system.
Ethnic people will have the right to learn in their mother tongue and their own curriculum. There will be more freedom in the education system as it is decentralized.
What challenges does the MOE face in implementing the Federal Democracy Education Policy?
The first challenge is the issue of teacher safety. Secondly, we face a budget shortage as we are an interim government. So, we cannot provide monthly financial support to teachers, but we are trying to find ways to solve this problem. We are seeking help from the international community. The next challenge is that teachers should have a deep understanding of federal democracy, as they will experience changes in the education system.
Is there any possibility of implementing the Federal Democracy Education Policy throughout the country?
There will be some difficulties in regions under the control of the military regime. However, we will implement the education system of a federal democracy in the regions under the control of the NUG, resistance forces and EAOs [ethnic armed organizations]. On the other hand, we don’t see any problem with that because online schools are spreading across the country. So, students will see the gap between the values of our education system and those of the regime’s education. We have already made a good start.
Will Myanmar Nway Oo University (MNOU) and its affiliated IUCs offer degrees ?
Certificates of Completion will be issued to students who finish the formal course by MNOU and the IUCs. The NUG will issue a degree certificate if all parties such as student unions and teacher unions taking part in the revolution agree to it.
Meanwhile, all parties agree to celebrate the convocation on the same day after the revolution.
How will the MOE ensure the credibility of certification issued by public universities and Interim University Councils for students who want to continue their academic journey abroad?
The authority to issue completion certificates rests with the public universities and IUCs. There might be some difficulties for students who don’t have their previous education records on hand. If necessary, the MOE is willing to provide letters of recommendation for students looking to further their studies abroad. We also have a department to deal with international affairs. The good news is that the European Union and the US will help the NUG and resistance forces. We are making connections with them and we are going to negotiate this issue. We’ve already offered courses taught by foreign professors from international universities. I don’t mean to suggest there won’t be difficulties, but all parties will figure this issue out and reach a consensus. We will make it better in order to create more education opportunities for students.
How will the NUG help IUCs that are not able to implement courses?
The NUG has a Board of Education that is responsible for developing curriculums and lessons for students. We can share this teaching content with them. MNOU is also using these lessons. If ICUs cannot implement this on their own, we can form a coalition of universities, the way Kachin State Comprehensive University does. Besides, there are also NUG-accredited private universities, like Spring University Myanmar. We are still in the stage of preparation and we are going step by step.
What are the plans of the NUG to provide education for resistance forces after the revolution?
The MOE has a plan to implement a bridge program for students who cannot access education during the revolution. We will provide an interim program for different students after the revolution. For students who joined the resistance forces, we will allow them to study at a defense university if they want to do so. We will also send them to foreign defense universities. If they want to study abroad, we will organize it for them. Or if they want to enter the workforce, we will provide vocational training for them. Next, we also have a plan to provide education for disabled persons who lost limbs [or other faculties] during the revolution or prior to the coup. The allocation of government expenditures for education may increase to 20 percent after the revolution. It will take time to reach a consensus because we are following democratic principles. On the one hand, there are losses because of the revolution, but on the other hand, we are developing the ability to make changes and build the future..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-23
[field_licence]
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2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Anti-coup protesters
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"The Dawei Democracy Movement Strike Committee called on people to boycott Thai energy giant PTT in Launglon Township, Tanintharyi Region, on Wednesday.
The committee said the boycott was a “fight without arms” as PTT Exploration and Production (PTTEP) and the Petroleum Authority of Thailand (PTT) were helping to fund Myanmar’s junta.
It said PTT and PTTEP are working at Yadana, Yetagun, Zawtika and Shwe offshore gas fields with huge investments, giving large sums to the regime.
“The junta is using this money to buy arms and fuel jet fighters and helicopters. It is murdering people every day with this income so we need to boycott its operations,” said a committee member.
PTT pays the junta over US$500 million a year through its projects with the Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprises in three of the country’s four major gas fields, according to Human Rights Watch (HRW).
HRW reported that the company paid $125 million in taxes in 2019 to the junta’s Ministry of Planning, Finance, and Industry, whose minister Win Shein was recently sanctioned by the US.
In March 2022, PTTEP confirmed that it will be taking over from TotalEngergies’ operation of the Yadana gas field after the French major abandoned the project in protest at junta atrocities.
Energy groups, including TotalEnergies, Chevron and Woodside, all announced their retreat from operations in Myanmar in January last year amid pressure from humanitarian groups.
“We explained about the flow of millions of dollars into the hands of the junta so we have organized the people to join the boycott of PTTEP and all its products, including PTT lubricants,” said a strike committee member.
The committee said it will continue the boycott until blood money stops flowing to the junta..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-22
[field_licence]
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Individual Documents
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2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Burma's economic relations with Thailand
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"Myanmar’s military regime has blocked deliveries of rice and fuel to the jade-mining town of Hpakant in Kachin State since early this month, and residents are now going hungry as a result of shortages.
The junta has cited the presence of Kachin Independence Army (KIA) and People’s Defense Force (PDF) fighters in Hpakant as the reason for the blockade, which is being enforced by regime troops and pro-junta militia members manning checkpoints on the roads leading to the town in central Kachin state.
One female resident of Hpakant told The Irrawaddy: “They [the regime] have blocked deliveries of rice and fuel. The situation in the region is that the military enters and does as it pleases in the town. We can’t buy rice. Shops and gas stations have closed.”
The ban has resulted in the price of normal rice increasing from 40,000 kyats per sack to over 100,000 kyats (around US$40) in the past two weeks alone. The price of gasoline has risen from 3,000 kyats per litre to 5,000 kyats.
At some junta checkpoints, individuals are allowed to bring in rice for their own household consumption, but they have to pay a tax of 3,000 to 5,000 kyats per sack. And only people with ties to the regime are allowed to transport fuel, residents said.
The order to restrict deliveries of rice came from the junta-appointed Kachin State border affairs and security affairs minister. Cargo trucks heading to Hpakant are checked at the Nam Ya checkpoint, and trucks carrying rice are being forced to turn back.
One Hpakant resident said: “I heard that they [the junta] restricted the deliveries because of the KIA and PDFs. Local residents are in trouble. We can’t afford to pay high prices for rice. And every household including children is going hungry.”
Some jade miners who operate small-scale mines have been forced to suspend their operations as a result of the ban on deliveries of fuel.
“We are also experiencing fuel shortages and some jade mines have suspended operations. But miners who have ties to the military are still operating. In Kone San, Chinese companies are still mining despite the fuel shortage,” said a mine owner.
Some residents said the rice and fuel blockade follows frequent resistance attacks on junta checkpoints in Hpakant.
The regime has also often abducted prospectors and displaced people for a ransom starting from one million kyats, according to locals. The junta also imposed a similar ban on rice and fuel deliveries in late 2022, resulting in oil price hikes..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-22
[field_licence]
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Individual Documents
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2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Military History
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"According to the first sentence on Page 1 of the 2015 Defense White Paper, “The Republic of the Union of Myanmar” (was) first founded, not in 1948 as is universally accepted, but “by the Bagan dynasty over a thousand years ago.”
Incredible as it may seem, the “proof” is in the statues of the three kings overlooking the parade ground in Naypyitaw. Any ordinary Bamar seeing them may feel proud of being a descendent of such warrior-kings, and that it’s his/her duty to preserve this land no matter what the consequences are. But we can also ask non Bamar visitors especially Shans, Mons and Arakanese, to Naypyitaw. What their feelings are on seeing these awesome figures. The likely answer may be if the Bamars go on revering kings that forcefully occupied our ancestral lands, their descendants have no right to call for our allegiance to them.
On the other hand, the psychological effect on all of them may be different, if there were, say, statues of Aung San and non-Bamar leaders stood together and held the 1947 Panglong Agreement instead.
Because to them, what the three kings, and later the British, had forged were not unions as claimed but empires. Then Aung San and leaders of the Frontier Areas, notably Chin Hills, Kachin Hills, and the Federated Shan States signed an agreement with the aim to establish a union. We should remember, said the late Shan politician Shwe Ohn, hadn’t it been for the Panglong Agreement, we could have been separate countries. However as far as the non-Bamars are concerned, the terms of the agreement, except for one, have not been fulfilled:
Appointment of Frontier Areas representatives as central government ministers then called counselors which academics term “Shared-rule”. Accordingly, state chief ministers were also union ministers until 1962, but not afterward.
Full autonomy (meaning with its own laws) which academics term as “self-rule”. But far from being able to have their own constitutions, states were not able to choose their own chief ministers without the consent of the prime minister even during the short lived democratic era.
Establishing a Kachin State (With Chin Hills, it became a Special Division until 1974 when the status as a state was accorded)
Human Rights and Democracy
(Tun Myint of Taunggyi, another prominent Shan politician, in his Shan State’s Grievances presentation in 1957, reported bullying, tortures, rapes, Shan girls being sold in cities by TMD soldiers, and providing cash and arms to dissident movements to sow discord. In short, practicing the Divide and Rule policy. “If one compares this kind of behavior to the Japanese excesses, the TMD is clearly enjoying a comfortable lead,” he wrote.
Financial autonomy (meaning the right to manage its own finances as in the British days plus “Bamar one kyat, Shan one kyat”)
Taxes from extraction of minerals and wood were paid to the Shan States during the British era. It also received percentages of various taxes.
One discovers that the financial relationship between Shan and Burma even during those days was not that between the DONOR and RECIPIENT, but in terms of LIABILITY to pay and to receive. It is unfortunate that after we have become free, we have to use the the word “Subsidy”, discrimination even in terms of terminology, said Tun Myint.
Now about the application of the “Burmese One Kyat, Shan One Kyat” principle. According to the 1952-53 Fiscal Year Budget statistics, calculated by population figures from the 1941 census, one finds that while Mainland Burma got 1 kyat, and the Shan State got only 0.48 kyat.
By the time, U Thein Sein became president in 2011, it became worse. Asia Foundation reported that the 14 states and regions received only 3.6% of the total expenditures. Thereby drawing a comment from a Canadian friend, “Why, Khuensai, you are only 3.6% federal.”
Tun Myint concluded that Shan State bore all the characteristics of a colony: political and legal domination, economic dependence, and exploitation.
The situation was such that there were calls for secession, a right provided by the 1947 constitution. As older, cooler headed leaders opted for political means to resolve the crisis, hot-headed and educated young ones decided to choose the armed struggle in 1958.
65 years have passed since then and the result? Neither the secessionists nor the Unionists are winning Especially the former, whose Mong tai Army, the strongest of all anti-military forces, as conceded even by the MIS, was defeated in 1995, after China decided an independent Shanland was against its interests.
As for the Unionists, they have not fared better either.
Panglong Agreement.
However, the Bamar elites had refused to insert the Agreement, let alone discuss it, in the much-vaunted 2015 Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement. The Peace Process that followed it has also steadfastly steered clear of including it in their negotiations, avoiding it as though it were an infectious disease.
After 7 years of negotiations, it has become quite clear nothing significant will be achieved as long as both sides are beating around the bush. And the non-Bamar states, as pointed out by the late Shan politician Tun Myint of Taunggyi in 1957, will continue to be Burmese colonies. Peace will still be an unattainable goal.
It wasn’t like this when we were still under British colonial rule until 75 years ago. The situation was not perfect but we had peace and stability. In the Federated Shan States (as Shan State was known in those days) there were only 2 infantry battalions of the Burma Frontier Force.
On the contrary, today we have a hundred times more battalions in the Shan State alone. And there is no peace. If this situation continues without any glimpse of hope for the people, some suggest perhaps we should ask the British to return and tell us what is going wrong in our country. Why other former colonies like US, India and Malaysia which had suffered under the same “Divide & Rule” British policies are getting ahead while we are still left behind.
The question now is what’s next? Let’s see what fool’s idea I may have about this.
As said earlier, we have fought for Independence but failed. We have also fought for a federal union, still to no avail.
Today the situation is more complex. When I wrote “The Making of a Rebel”, there were only a few tens of thousands of rebels. But now we have hundreds of thousands.
And more options: like elections, reactivation of Daw Suu’s role, diplomacy, supporting non-violent movements, building a golden bridge, as Chinese expert Sun Zi terms it, for the military to retreat across, more sanctions and embargoes, international involvement in peace talks, resetting the media’s role in reshaping society, etc. A mixture of carrots and sticks.
To me, one thing is quite clear. Alone by itself, each of these carrots and sticks won’t work. However, if all or most of them can become parallel lanes of the same road leading in the same direction, there may be hope.
This is not a new idea. The highly respected late Dr. Chao Tzang Yawnghwe, who was both a scholar and armed resistance leader, used to exhort us to apply the principle: Common Goal, Diverse Actions. Like Sun Zi had done earlier with his “qi” (Indirect Approach) and “zheng” (Direct Approach) principles, because one method alone is insufficient to win.
But in order to put it into practice, a competent, dedicated and patient coordination, like Nick Fury did for the Avengers will be necessary. Without people like him, our heroes, however talented they are, would be a long way from winning.
Before I end this article, here’s another fool’s food for thought. Right now, the Three Kings are the present military leaders’ Bible while the Panglong Agreement is the non-Burmans’ Ten Commandments. Until we have a common history text, we may still be living in the same country, but they are worlds apart.
One encouraging fact is that we have not a few historians who follow in the steps of the late Dr. Than Tun, who championed writing history without bias. It will nevertheless take some time. The Oxford Sayadaw Dr. Khammai Dhammasami said it took even experts of the three Buddhist schools 7 years to come up with the Common Buddhist Text.
This means for a common history text, we will need the same growth mindset (in contrast to the fixed mindset). And with the same growth mindset, and a common history text, we can live together happily ever after..."
Source/publisher:
"Shan Herald Agency for News" (Chiang Mai)
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-22
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Armed conflict and peace-building in Burma - theoretical, strategic and general, Peace processes, ceasefires and ceasefire talks (websites, documents, reports and studies)
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"“A free press can, of course, be good or bad, but, most certainly without freedom, the press will never be anything but bad.”
Albert Camus
JAKARTA – In June 1994, the Indonesian government banned three news weeklies --Detik, Editor and Tempo -- triggering a nationwide protest against the government’s repressive regulations against newspapers. Hundreds of young reporters protested against the closures, demanding that the state-sanctioned Indonesian Journalist Association (Persatuan Wartawan Indonesia) should ask President Soeharto to revoke the ban. Being a politically captured group, the PWI instead issued a news release saying that it “understood” Soeharto’s decision.
More than 100 angry journalists, including some senior journalists and columnists, decided to challenge the repressive state by setting up a new union, the Alliance of Independent Journalists (Aliansi Jurnalis Independen). I was one of the group who gathered in August 1994, in a villa in Sirnagalih village, outside Jakarta, where we declared that we wanted to promote press freedom and to fight for the welfare of media workers.
We were not naïve. We knew it was an illegal move because at that time the Indonesian government only permitted a single organization for journalists. We knew that the Information Ministry, the police, the military, as well as the Indonesian Journalists Association would act against us. A few months later, many of these signatories, me among them, lost their jobs or were banned from working for any Indonesian media outlet. The authorities even arrested several journalists and sentenced them to prison terms. Others moved away from Indonesia.
But it was the opening of a new chapter, at least for me, and compelled me to learn about the situation state of media freedom in Asia. I learned about the needs to have readers’ representatives or ombudspersons in each newsroom. Journalists should be transparent about their motives and methods in covering and writing their stories. If they make mistakes, they should make the correction and apologize. Like what Albert Camus, the French author wrote, “A free press can, of course, be good or bad, but, most certainly without freedom, the press will never be anything but bad.”
In January 1995, the new union got an invitation to attend a Hong Kong conference to speak about how media had been banned in Indonesia. In Hong Kong, I met many other Asian journalists, including Jimmy Lai, a media mogul of the Apple Daily in Hong Kong.
Pana Janviroj, then chief editor of The Nation daily in Bangkok, also spoke at the conference. He later asked me to join his newspaper. It was just part of a conversation inside a car that the Freedom Forum, the American group which that the conference, had arranged for us to travel from the Grand Hyatt Hotel in Wanchai to a fancy dinner with the Foreign Correspondents' Club.
After making his offer, Pana asked, “Is that okay?”
The monthly retainer was almost five times my previous salary, plus I could still work for other newspapers. Of course, I said okay. No application letter. No contract. Just a handshake.
He asked me to fly to Bangkok. He introduced me to some of his editors: Kavi Chongkittavorn, Sonny Inbaraj, Steven Gan, Yindee Lertcharoenchok as well as their television broadcaster Thepchai Yong. I began to file my stories in March 1995, working from Jakarta, and later also from Phnom Penh, Yangon and Kuala Lumpur. I covered all sorts of stories, such as Hun Sen ousting Norodom Ranariddh in Cambodia, Myanmar leader Aung San Suu Kyi’s house arrest, the Asian economic crisis, as well as the tension in East Timor. Aung Zaw, a Burmese journalist, also joined us from Chiang Mai, writing mostly about the military junta inside Myanmar.
In Jakarta, I got to know the CNN correspondent Maria Ressa, who covered the 1996 riots when the Soeharto government orchestrated a political attack against an opposition party boss, Megawati Soekarnopoetri.
I began to meet many passionate champions of journalism in South East Asia. Sheila Coronel, who helped set up the Philippines Centre for Investigative Journalism, agreed to train Indonesian journalists in Medan, Jakarta, Yogyakarta, Surabaya, and Makassar in 1997-1998. I also enjoyed the friendship of many Far Eastern Economic Review journalists in Hong Kong.
I then helped establish a number of media rights advocacy groups, including the Institute for the Studies on Free Flow of Information with Goenawan Mohamad, Isaac Santoso, Yosep Adi Prasetyo and others. In Bangkok, Coronel, Chongkittavorn and other journalists set up the South East Asia Press Alliance (SEAPA) in 1997, promoting press freedom in the region.
The Asian economic crisis that started in mid-1997 triggered political instability, and later ethnic and religious violence in Indonesia, and led directly to the fall of the authoritarian President Soeharto in May 1998. Thailand, where the crisis kicked off in July 1997, faced massive economic dislocation that heavily impacted politics and the media. In Malaysia, Prime Minister Mohammed Mahathir, surprisingly, survived the crisis, but ended up putting his deputy Anwar Ibrahim in prison on bogus charges.
The BBC correspondent Jonathan Head broke the news that the new Indonesia president, B.J. Habibie, had agreed, in an interview with him, to hold a referendum in 1999 on the political status of East Timor. But many journalists in Indonesia have borne witness to large-scale sectarian and communal violence in which a total of about 90,000 people have been killed, ranging from sectarian violence in the Moluccas islands to the turmoil in East Timor after the United Nations-organized referendum.
Nascent, independent media faced a lot of challenges because of the Southeast Asian economic crisis, losing advertisement income, cutting their newsroom budgets, and dealing with more complicated political situations, both in their capitals and their many diverse provinces, like Papua in Indonesia, where an independence movement led to a violent crackdown. The media, like many other businesses, were overextended. But my media friends, who were pioneers for media freedom in the region, persisted and ultimately prospered.
Twenty years later
Over these past two decades, those friends went their separate ways. Steven Gan returned to Kuala Lumpur, setting up Malaysiakini. Santoso set up the KBR radio network, sharing his network’s news content with more than 700 radio stations throughout Indonesia. Maria Ressa wrote a book on the Jemaah Islamiyah terror network in South East Asia while staying in Singapore with a fellowship. She later set up Rappler news website in the Philippines, and of course, won the Nobel Peace Prize for her courage in standing up for press freedom. Aung Zaw moved his Irrawaddy magazine operation from Chiang Mai to Yangon, and then after the Myanmar military’s coup in February 2021, moved it back into exile. In Jakarta, Goenawan Mohamad republished his Tempo magazine. These news organizations produced quality journalism. And my friends became award-winning journalists.
Aung San Suu Kyi was released from her house arrest in Myanmar, prompting U.S. President Barack Obama to visit Yangon in November 2012, praising the reform that was taking place in Myanmar. Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy won the 2015 election.
But starting in 2012, the older sectarian and racist instincts arose in Myanmar, with anti-Muslim hate speeches spreading especially in Rakhine State, targeting Rohingya and other Muslim minorities. Hate speech on social media stirred attacks against other Muslims in central and northern Myanmar in 2013. This culminated in August 2017 in massive crimes against humanity and acts of genocide by government forces against the Rohingya.
These developments pointed to a new way to share information. In Myanmar, the main platform was and remains Facebook. Changes in the way that people seek and receive information are challenging the Southeast Asia news media too.
Google, Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, WhatsApp and other social media companies now pose a serious challenge to the popularity and the influence of traditional media. These companies have changed how Indonesians, Filipinos, Thais, Cambodians, and others in Southeast Asia and around the world consume information. Many of these consumers are still learning the difference between real news reporting versus propaganda from an interested party, and don’t fully understand the research, fact checking, writing and editorial review processes that distinguishes solid journalism.
The reality is that journalists are no longer gatekeepers of the news. They have lost the role of helping to determine what information and accounts of events should reach the public, and what doesn’t. With the internet and social media, everyone is now their own circulation manager and editor. Indonesia’s Press Council calculated that Indonesia has now 47,000 “media organizations”, mostly “citizen journalist” website only operations, a massive rise from the only 1,000 or so more formal media organizations that existed in 1998.
In Indonesia, social media has helped fan the flames of division. Religious intolerance plagues Indonesia. Minorities including Christians, Hindus, Buddhists, Ahmadiyah, and Shia Muslims, as well as native faith believers and followers of new religions like Millah Abraham, face discrimination, intimidation, and violence. There is also widespread discrimination against women and LGBT people.
Technology may change but trust – when earned and nurtured – will endure.
In May 2017, a Jakarta court sentenced a former Jakarta governor, Basuki “Ahok” Purnama, a Christian, to two years in prison for blasphemy against Islam. Ahok was accused of defaming Islam during the Jakarta election. More than 150 people have been sent to prison for blasphemy in post-Suharto Indonesia, a huge increase from only 10 cases previously.
Reporters Without Borders, a non-profit organization based in Paris, France, published the first worldwide press freedom index in October 2002, and over the last two decades, it annually recorded the slow decline of press freedom in South East Asia.
In 2022, the situation became worse in most countries in South East Asia. Myanmar remained the worst among these 11 countries. Newly independent East Timor became the freest, having no criminal defamation law, though, as President Jose Ramos-Horta has repeatedly complained, it is still facing resistance to join the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). In general, the other 10 countries get worse – and in this analysis, we can certainly include the single party dictatorship Laos, which the French organization inexplicably didn’t calculate.
Thailand, which unlike other countries in the region, has never been colonized, dropped from the 66th on the chart in 2002 to the 115th in 2022. It shows that Thailand does not necessarily have a better legal infrastructure than the former European colonies like Malaysia, the Philippines, or Vietnam with a Soviet-style legal system. Thailand still maintains the lese majeste law “to protect” the monarchy, including the king, the queen, the heir and the regent-- from defamation. The penalty is 3 to 15 years in prison for each violation, and those charged invariably spend long periods in pretrial detention.....Ranking of press freedom in South East Asia in 2002 and 2022....So why does press freedom, and also democracy, not perform better in economically strong South East Asia?
The Philippines’ ranking has dropped significantly from the 90th in 2002 to the 147th in 2022. Indonesia was once among the best in the world during the rule of President Abdurrahman Wahid, himself a progressive Muslim cleric, with the ranking of the 57th in 2002. Now it is the 117th, among the worst.
Political context and the ‘winner take all’ politics prevalent in the region is obviously a factor. Thailand has had a so-called red shirts versus yellow shirts rivalry since 2006, which includes spates of violence. In 2014, Army chief Prayut Chan-o-cha staged a coup after a decade of this rivalry.
In Singapore, Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong’s People’s Action Party, which has ruled the city-state continuously since its bitter separation from Malaysia in 1965, has a regulatory arsenal that allows the government to directly appoint members of the boards and the editors of the leading media outlets. In Malaysia, the status and activities of the nine Malay monarchies are sacrosanct, extremely sensitive subjects. Any form of commentary or reporting deemed critical of the monarchies can result in prosecution and heavy penalties, leading to self-censorship. Political leaders also use onerous laws and regulations to restrict the press.
The Cambodia democratic transition that started in 1992 with the assistance of the United Nations allowed the emergence of a press that flourished until Prime Minister Hun Sen opened a campaign against independent journalism. Cambodia’s ranking has dropped from the 71 in 2002 to the 142 in 2022.
But coups have proven the most disruptive to the development of a free media. Many countries in the region are familiar with coups. The Myanmar military staged a coup in February 2021, resulting in a broad crackdown against anti-coup protesters that amounted to crimes against humanity, along with massive pressure on journalists.
“When the coup happened, Myanmar’s media industry fell into the darkness,” said an anonymous journalist in the opening of the 20-minute documentary, “Walking Through the Darkness" on how Myanmar journalists fled the cities after the coup and were forced to work in ethnic-controlled areas and in exile in Thailand to keep their news reports coming out.
“Whether the military like us or not, journalism has an important role,” said another Myanmar journalist. “Journalists must be able to do their work.”
Quite clearly, some world leaders were far too optimistic about the path forward for Myanmar, and the durability of democratic rule and a free press in that country when faced with a rights abusing military that believed it was destined to always hold power.
But other countries have shown some progress. Malaysia elected a reformist government for a brief two year period and eventually sent their former prime minister Najib Razak to prison for corruption.
South East Asia, for centuries, has always been a region where global rivalries take place, with bigger power asserting their influence, from Islamic rulers in the Middle East to Chinese kingdoms, from European powers to Indian influence, and now pitting the world’s two largest economies: the United States and China. The South China Sea is a now a hotspot for competition between China and the U.S.
But China scares Hong Kong journalists with its repressive actions. It should not be a surprise that the Reporters Without Borders’ ranking of Hong Kong as the 18th best performing country in 2002 is now down to 148th of 180 countries. The Chinese leader, Xi Jinping, apparently has not learned that over the long term, press freedom is related to economic development and political stability.
The authorities arrested Jimmy Lai last December, symbolizing the drastic decline of media freedom in Hong Kong. in 2020. This is the man who shook my hand at the 1995 conference, sending his regards to my friends back home who were fighting for media freedom in Indonesia
Legal frameworks are playing an important part in restricting press freedom in the region. In Indonesia, harassment, discrimination, and violence directed at religious minorities are facilitated by a legal architecture, introduced in 2006, that purports to maintain “religious harmony.” In practice, it undermines religious freedom. As in Myanmar, some Indonesian journalists find it difficult to separate their religions and their profession.
In Vietnam, the Communist Party maintains a monopoly on political power and allows no challenge to its leadership. Basic rights, including freedom of speech, opinion, press, association, and religion, are restricted. Rights activists and bloggers face harassment, intimidation, physical assault, and imprisonment. The Vietnam state controls all media outlets. The Communist Party demands that they serve as “the voice of party organisations, state organs and social organisations”. The party’s central propaganda department meets weekly in Hanoi to ensure that nothing objectionable is published in media outlets. Party-controlled courts have convicted and sentenced many independent journalists to prison, including Pham Doan Trang, Pham Chi Dung, Nguyen Tuong Thuy, and others.
Similarly, in communist-controlled Laos, it is absolutely impossible to operate an independent news outlet, and the authorities crack down harshly on groups, organizations or individuals who dare criticize the ruling Lao People’s Revolutionary Party, or the government. Migrant workers who criticized the Lao government while they were working in Thailand were subsequently arrested and sentenced to between 15-20 years when they returned to Laos.
In Singapore, two large media groups own all of the major print, radio and broadcast media. MediaCorp is owned by a state investment company. The other, Singapore Press Holdings, is supposed to be privately owned but its directors are appointed by the government. We’re now seeing the New Naratif, an alternative outlet, emerging from Singapore but it is already facing harassment. Meanwhile, The Online Citizen, which played a critical role in independent media in Singapore, has been shut down through harassing lawsuits and regulatory interference, moving their legal entity in Taiwan.
In Manila, President Rodrigo Duterte stripped the ABS-CBN network, the second largest television network in the Philippines, of its franchise in 2020. Luckily, it continues to broadcast online. Multiple harassing legal cases against Maria Ressa and her colleagues at Rappler apparently aim to ultimately shut down the news site. There are no signs so far that things will get better under the new president, Ferdinand Marcos Jr., the son of the late dictator.
Sociocultural context poses many handicaps. In Malaysia, Malay-language media outlets, which are read by the majority of the population, are sometimes subject to more censorship than their counterparts in English, Chinese or Tamil. In Muslim-majority Malaysia and Indonesia, Islam-related issues such as conversion, mandatory hijab, child marriages and apostasy were taboo until recently. However, Indonesian media are increasingly active in covering sexual violence and other crimes in Islamic boarding schools.
Sadly, many Indonesian media outlets also provide too much leeway by failing to regularly report on how local jurisdictions abridge rights. Indonesia has more than 700 regulations and local ordinances, made in the name of Sharia, or Islamic law, that include regulations discriminating against non-Muslim minorities to making mandatory hijab rules.
What Indonesian journalists should use as their guiding reference is the 1945 Constitution, which explicitly guarantees religious freedom and the rights of assembly, association, and expression of opinion. Indonesia, and other countries in the region, should get rid of criminal defamation laws, learning from East Timor.
More countries in South East Asia, should, like Indonesia, ratify core international conventions on human rights. These provide even stronger standards that journalists should follow in pursuing the functional truth in their reporting rather than kowtowing to their countries’ toxic defamation laws.
I understand very well, after working in Bangkok, Kuala Lumpur, Phnom Penh and Jakarta, that South East Asia is a complicated region that is very diverse linguistically, racially, culturally and historically. It has Muslim-majority countries like Brunei, Malaysia, and Indonesia. It also has Buddhist-majority countries like Cambodia, Myanmar and Thailand. The Philippines and East Timor are predominantly Christian countries. Then there are communist countries like Laos and Vietnam. Unlike Africa and Latin America, this region traditionally has had no colonial languages that these countries could use to communicate with each other.
In December 2021, I was very proud when Maria Ressa got the Novel Peace Prize in Oslo, along with the Russian journalist Dmitry Muratov.
These two veteran journalists are not naïve, understanding very well that the prize will not change the situations in their countries. Muratov closed down his Novaya Gazeta newspaper after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Ressa is still facing the legal problems from cases that President Duterte and his government manufactured against her.
When receiving the prize, Maria Ressa said in her speech in Oslo that, “Without facts, you can’t have truth. Without truth, you can’t have trust. Without trust, we have no shared reality, no democracy, and it becomes impossible to deal with the existential problems of our times: climate, coronavirus, now, the battle for truth.”
Ressa called for greater support for independent journalism, for protection of journalists, and to hold accountable those states that target journalists.
In Bahasa Indonesia, we like to say, “Makin bermutu jurnalisme, makin bermutu masyarakat. Makin tidak bermutu jurnalisme, makin tidak bermutu masyarakat.” The more qualified the journalism, the better the quality of the society that it serves. On the other hand, the lower the quality of journalism, the lower the quality of that society.
It is a very clear message indeed. Monarchies, clerics, ethnic leaders, government officials, and the people in South East Asia should understand that message. It’s been two decades, and those messages in support of media freedom are becoming clearer and clearer. South East Asia should promote press freedom and get rid of toxic criminal defamation laws.
It is the only way forward.
Andreas Harsono works for Human Rights Watch in Jakarta. He helped found the Jakarta-based Alliance of Independent Journalists in 1994, and in 2003 he helped create the Pantau Foundation, a journalist training organization also in Jakarta. He presented this paper at the 34th Deutscher Orientalistentag held at Free University Berlin on September 15, 2022.
It will published under the title "Pioniere der Pressefreiheit. Wie ich vom Reporter zum Medienaktivisten wurde" in the (bi-annual) edition Le Monde diplomatique No 33: "Süd.Ost.Asien - Putsche, Palmen, People Power (South East Asia - Coups, Palmtrees, People Power), edited by Sven Hansen and Dorothee d'Aprile for the German edition of Le Monde diplomatique, Berlin May 2023..."
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Human Rights Watch (USA)
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2023-02-22
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2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Freedom of opinion and expression: - the situation in Burma/Myanmar - reports, analyses, recommendations, Freedom of Opinion and Expression - tools for change in Burma/Myanmar
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" Nearly 18 million people – about one-third of Myanmar’s population – need humanitarian aid this year because of civil war and the post-coup economic crisis, according to the latest United Nations estimates.
The numbers needing support continue to rise from the estimated 14 million people needing aid last year. More than 10,000 people were displaced by fighting in southern Kayin State in early January alone, joining more than 1.5 million IDPs across the country.
The UN says it recognises the urgent need to remain in Myanmar and step up humanitarian operations, but it is caught between a hostile military junta imposing restrictions on its activities and a loose network of resistance groups accusing the world body of legitimising an illegal regime.
UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres is also facing increasing criticism for his apparent hands-off leadership in the crisis.
“Almost 18 million people – nearly one-third of the Myanmar population – are estimated to be in humanitarian need nationwide in 2023, with conflict continuing to threaten the lives of civilians in many parts of the country,” said Ramanathan Balakrishnan, UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for Myanmar.
He told IPS that international and local humanitarian aid organisations are “using a range of approaches” in different areas and had reached over four million people in 2022 despite severe underfunding and what he called “heavy bureaucratic and access constraints”.
Balakrishnan defended the importance of the UN’s engagement with General Min Aung Hlaing’s regime, which has ruthlessly crushed dissent since seizing power two years ago and overthrowing the elected government led by Aung San Suu Kyi.
“Principled engagement with all sides is a must to negotiate access and also to advocate on key protection issues. Advocacy to stop the heavy fighting and airstrikes in populated areas that are threatening the safety of both civilians and aid workers is as important as reaching people in need with humanitarian aid,” he said.
Aid workers accuse the junta of further restricting aid operations and blocking urgently needed aid from reaching millions of people. The regime admitted this month it cannot effectively administer about one-third of Myanmar’s townships. But it is able to choke access to some areas controlled by resistance groups and ethnic armed organisations that have been fighting the military for decades.
The junta is seeking to impose its authority with a new law making registration compulsory for national and international non-governmental organizations and associations and introducing criminal penalties for non-registered entities with up to five years of imprisonment.
“Civic space has been decimated in the country already due to the military’s actions, particularly its systematic harassment, arrest, and prosecution of anyone who opposed their coup,” said James Rodehaver, chief of the UN Human Rights Office for South-East Asia (OHCHR) Myanmar Team. “These new rules could greatly diminish what operational space is left for civic organisations to deliver essential goods and services to a population that is struggling to survive.”
Many of the more than one million refugees outside Myanmar also need help. Most are stateless Rohingya Muslims forced out of Rakhine State into Bangladesh in waves of ethnic cleansing before the 2021 coup, with many held in border camps.
The UN’s reputation was already battered before the coup over its handling of the long-festering Rohingya crisis in which it was accused by aid workers and activists of being too accommodating with the Myanmar military. And it has come under further fire since.
In a joint letter last September, more than 600 Burmese civil society organisations said they “condemn in the strongest terms the recent public signing of new agreements and presenting of letters of appointment to the illegitimate Myanmar military junta by UN agencies, funds, programmes and other entities working inside Myanmar.”
“We call on you and all UN entities to immediately cease all forms of cooperation and engagement that lends legitimacy to the illegal, murderous junta,” said the letter addressed to the UN Secretary-General. The signatories argued that letters of appointment and agreements should be presented to what they regard as the legitimate government of Myanmar – the parallel National Unity Government established by ousted lawmakers – and “ethnic revolutionary organisations.”
A Myanmar researcher specialising in civil society and international assistance highlighted the role of Burmese CSOs in delivering aid. “Local CSOs comprehend the complexity of specific local needs in the current crisis as the communities they serve struggle with security concerns and essential public services, including healthcare and education,” said the researcher, who goes by the name Kyaw Swar for fear of security reprisals.
He said that donors and foreign organisations had adopted risk aversion arrangements post-coup, referring to UN and INGO’s costs for capacity-building components and disproportionate country-office operations. “Local CSOs have fewer operations, and risk management options [and] have no choice but to channel international aid to their respective communities.”
UN officials reject the notion that they are legitimising the regime and insist that only by operating in the junta-controlled heartland and also through cross-border assistance can aid be delivered to a substantial part of the population in desperate need.
“The UN finds itself in an almost existential bind. It can’t engage with an oppressive regime without being seen to condone its actions,” commented Charles Petrie, former UN Assistant Secretary-General and former UN chief in Myanmar.
“Somehow, the UN’s senior leadership needs to convince all that engaging in a dialogue with a pariah regime is not the same as supporting it and that it should be judged on the outcome of the discussions rather than being condemned for the simple fact of engaging,” he said.
“But being able to do so successfully implies that it has the level of credibility that right now it still needs to rebuild,” he added.
Questions have also been raised about the apparent lack of hands-on leadership on the part of Guterres. The UN Secretary-General seems to have made little personal intervention beyond routine statements, such as the latest marking the second anniversary of the coup in which he condemned “all forms of violence” and said he “continues to stand in solidarity with the people of Myanmar and to support their democratic aspirations for an inclusive, peaceful and just society and the protection of all communities, including the Rohingya.”
Since the coup and despite the unfolding humanitarian crisis, Guterres is seen as having taken a back seat and delegating to two successive special envoys. This stands in contrast to his predecessor Ban Ki-moon who actively intervened during the Cyclone Nargis disaster in 2008, personally meeting then-junta leader General Than Shwe and negotiating the opening of Myanmar to aid workers.
Petrie suggested Guterres should take a page out of Ban’s book and provide much more active leadership on Myanmar and be “more openly engaged and supportive of the work done by his special envoy.”
While China and Russia lend military and other support to the junta, much of the rest of the diplomatic world has taken a step back from the Myanmar crisis, leaning instead on ASEAN to assume the lead.
But the 10-member bloc has been ineffective so far. It has coordinated an unprecedented shunning of the junta’s leadership in regional meetings, but neighbouring countries – with their own blemished democratic records – are unwilling to penalise the regime. The ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management (AHA Centre) has been charged to respond to the humanitarian crisis, but with no success.
Laetitia van den Assum, the former Dutch ambassador to Myanmar and Thailand, said the aid response would have been more effective if ASEAN had set up a partnership between AHA and experienced UN and other organisations.
“That, in fact, is what happened in the aftermath of Nargis, when under the strong leadership of Dr Surin Pitsuwan, ASEAN and UN worked in tandem. It took time to put the effort together, but ultimately it took off,” van den Assum told IPS.
As with the UN leadership, Lim Jock Hoi, a Bruneian government official who was ASEAN chief until December, was barely noticed on the issue of Myanmar, in stark contrast to Pitsuwan, who helped persuade Than Shwe to accept humanitarian assistance in 2008 when Cyclone Nargis killed over 100,000 people.
“UN agencies like OCHA, WFP and UNICEF, as well as many dedicated INGOs, continue to provide assistance, more often than not under difficult circumstances, and with countless Myanmar civil society organisations playing critical roles,” Van den Assum observed.
“But until now, the SAC [the junta’s State Administration Council] has stood in the way of more effective aid,” she added. “What is missing is an overall agreement between Myanmar and ASEAN about such assistance, how to expand it and how to guarantee that all those in need are served. ASEAN and AHA have not been able to deliver on this.”
Observers point out that AHA is set up to respond to natural disasters and has no experience in intervening with aid in conflict situations.
“That had already become clear in 2018 when AHA was tasked to make recommendations for ASEAN assistance to northern Rakhine state after the enforced deportation of more than 750,000 Rohingya. The initiative died a slow death,” Van den Assum said.
“AHA was not to blame. Rather, ASEAN politicians had taken a decision without first considering whether it was the most advisable approach,” the veteran diplomat said.
No breakthrough is in sight. The junta has extended a state of emergency for another six months, admitting that it lacks control over many areas for the new elections it says it wants to stage but which have already been widely denounced by the resistance as a sham.
“Heavy fighting, including airstrikes, tight security, access restrictions, and threats against aid workers have continued unabated, particularly in the Southeast, endangering lives and hampering humanitarian operations,” the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reported in its latest update..."
Source/publisher:
International Press Institute
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-22
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2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, The discussion on humanitarian assistance to Burma, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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"Myanmar’s civilian National Unity Government (NUG) says an entrepreneur has bought the rights to a gem mine in Mogok Township, Mandalay Region, for US$4 million to fund the revolution.
The NUG invited domestic and foreign businesses last month to invest in 45 gem mining rights in Mogok.
The investor will be granted the mining rights when the dictatorship is ousted, the civilian government said.
The mines will be operated as public-private partnerships with 51 percent held by the government.
The NUG’s Ministry of Planning, Finance and Investment announced on Monday: “We can confirm an overwhelming number of inquiries in the remaining 44 exclusive mining rights by email and through official agents.”
Planning, finance and investment minister U Tin Tun Naing said the Mogok mining rights project aimed to bring justice after gem mining has been monopolized by an elite for decades.
“Those businesses only served the interests of military dictators, so we are fixing this to serve the interests of the people and to ensure the country and its citizens get what they deserve,” said the minister.
The NUG’s planning and finance ministry says more than $100 million has been raised to fund the revolution against the regime.
The funds were raised by selling treasury bonds, auctioning off military-linked properties, including two mansions belonging to junta boss Min Aung Hlaing, and selling yet-to-be-built apartments on military-linked land. The NUG said buyers will be handed keys to their properties once the junta is toppled. The NUG says it has also collected 3 billion kyats in taxes in the areas it controls..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-21
[field_licence]
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2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Gems - mining and trade
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"Junta boss Min Aung Hlaing on Monday handed the Thiri Pyanchi titles and decorations to Hideo Watanabe, chairman of the Japan-Myanmar Friendship Association.
Ultranationalist monk U Wirathu, once dubbed by Time magazine as the “Buddhist Bin Laden” and the Russian defense minister and his deputy were awarded the Thiri Pyanchi title in November last year. The honorary titles were awarded for “strenuous cooperation to bring about peace, development and prosperity in Myanmar”, according to the junta.
Watanabe could not attend the main ceremony in early January so the 90-year-old junta apologist received his title in Naypyitaw on Monday.
Joint secretary of the regime’s governing body, the State Administration Council, Lieutenant General Ye Win Oo, who oversees torture chambers as the military intelligence chief, and Home Affairs Minister Lieutenant General Soe Htut were present. Watanabe also accepted a Thray Sithu title on behalf of former Japanese prime minister Taro Aso.
Min Aung Hlaing called Watanabe a “good friend” and thanked him for his efforts to “foster ties between the two countries and two armies, and attract Japanese investment into Myanmar”.
Watanabe vowed to promote bilateral friendship and boost the development of Myanmar and its military.
He thanked Min Aung Hlaing on behalf of Taro Aso who was busy with election preparation in Japan.
He visited deputy junta chief Soe Win and met the chairman of the military proxy Union Solidarity and Development Party U Khin Yi in November.
Watanabe, a former lawmaker in Japan’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party, represents Japanese investors in Myanmar.
His ties with Min Aung Hlaing go back a decade. They met shortly before and after the military chief staged his coup in February 2021.
Following the military takeover, Watanabe told Japan’s Asahi Shimbun newspaper that Min Aung Hlaing had not staged a coup but “done what he should have in accordance with the law”.
In late May 2021, as the number of civilians killed by the regime passed 800, Watanabe’s son Yusuke, who is secretary general of JMA, wrote in The Diplomat that Min Aung Hlaing’s coup was constitutional and Japan should continue to boost its “special relationship with the Tatmadaw”, meaning honorable military.
Watanabe insisted that he was not siding with the military but “didn’t want people to say that the military was suppressing and killing its own citizens”. He said he believed assurances that Min Aung Hlaing would bring genuine democracy to Myanmar..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-21
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2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Political History
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Soldiers are aggressively patrolling checkpoints along major roadways for the goods.
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"UPDATED at 9:16 A.M. EST on 02-22-23
Residents and internally displaced persons in Myanmar’s war-torn Kayah state are facing a humanitarian emergency as junta forces confiscate food and medicine at dozens of security checkpoints along major land routes in the eastern state as fighting there intensifies, local sources said.
Armed conflict between Myanmar troops and popular militia forces have displaced nearly half of the population of about 450,000 people in Kayah state, a hotbed of resistance to the ruling military regime, which seized power from the elected government two years ago, and has been placed under martial law.
Since May 2021, junta soldiers have heavily shelled residential areas they suspect of harboring resistance fighters, according to a February report issued by ethnic Karenni civil society organizations. The fighting has destroyed roughly 1,200 houses in 87 villages, and displaced 180,000 people, or 40% of the population.
Without adequate supplies of food and medicine, the IDPs, especially children and the elderly, are becoming malnourished and are suffering from subsequent health problems, such as diarrhea, residents and aid workers said.
Humanitarian groups no longer can provide food and medicine to displaced residents because of the junta’s confiscations at road checkpoints, said Helen, an aid worker.
“We can barely provide enough medicine for hospitals and clinics,” she said. “The problem is that no one can transport the supplies in this situation. The transportation is too difficult for us to receive them here.”
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, or UNHCR, tried to provide emergency relief supplies to more than 25,000 IDPs in Loikaw and Demoso townships in early June 2022, but it failed to reach all of them because of aggressive security checkpoints and confiscations, Banyar said.
Soldiers are stopping all cars and motorcycles passing through the nearly 40 checkpoints along central roads and intersections in the state, most of which are in the capital Loikaw, residents said. They are aggressively patrolling roads into and out of Demoso township and Pekon township in adjacent southern Shan state.
Junta forces have been checking vehicles transporting food staples, including rice, salt and cooking oil, at the checkpoints since they were set up in early 2022, said Banyar, director of the Karenni Human Rights Group.
“The junta’s strategic hills sit along the highway connecting us to the town of Taungoo on the west side of Demoso,” he told RFA. “The checkpoints are located on those strategic hills, and in Leiktho village. There is also one checkpoint between Leiktho and Yartho villages. Those are the major checkpoints that are heavily searched.”
'Killing us all'
Junta soldiers could be taking food, medicine and money that they suspect are going to local resistance forces, said El Ni, a displaced person from Demoso township.
But instead, their actions are threatening the survival of the IDPs, he added.
“They block roads, assign more checkpoints and restrict the transport of everything under the excuse of suspecting that the supplies are for the KNDF,” El Ni said, referring to the Karenni Nationalities Defense Force, a network of civilian resistance fighters, Karenni organizations and armed groups in Kayah state.
El Ni and other IDPs received donations of rice, oil, salt, beans, eggs and instant noodles in the years before the checkpoints, though afterward they were lucky if they got rice once a month, he said.
“In that way, I think they are cutting the food and supplies for the IDPs in the state,” he said. “As we are IDPs, we cannot work. We have to rely on the donations of well-wishers for our survival. The junta’s cutting off of our donation supply lines is its way of killing us all.”
One female IDP who gave her name as Naw, said police at a checkpoint confiscated the money and food she had got in Pekon as she made her way back home.
“There is no safety here,” she told RFA. “[Soldiers at] security checkpoints search too strictly with no regard for civilians or IDPs. There is no rule of law either. They just do as they please in many situations.”
In the two years since the military coup, most IDP children have not received regular vaccinations, said an official from the Moebye Emergency Rescue Team.
When the COVID-19 pandemic hit, some children died due to lack of medicine and health care, he told RFA.
About 20 ethnic Karenni children sheltering in an IDP camp in Pekon’s Buu Pyar village suffered from diarrhea in the second week of February, and one of them, a seven-month-old, died on Feb. 14 because of the lack of food and medicine, residents said. Two adults also came down with diarrhea.
RFA could not reach Aung Win Oo, junta spokesman and social affairs minister for Kayah state, for comment..."
Source/publisher:
"RFA Burmese"
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-21
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2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, The discussion on humanitarian assistance to Burma
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The fear the military regime will manipulate ballots in its favor.
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"Myanmar’s ruling junta is considering the use of electronic voting machines in an upcoming election, a move that poses security risks for those who vote against military-backed parties and allow the regime to manipulate the votes using census data, analysts say.
The junta, which unseated the elected government in a Feb. 2021 coup, said previously that it expected to hold general elections in August. But on Feb. 1, the second anniversary of the coup, the regime announced it was extending its state of emergency imposed when it seized power, delaying elections because of ongoing fighting with anti-regime forces throughout Myanmar.
Election fraud has been a long-standing problem in the Southeast Asian nation since the armed forces first seized power in a coup in 1962 and during successive authoritarian regimes. In the past, the military has rigged elections and rejected or annulled voting results.
Junta chief Senior Gen. Min Aung Hlaing, who has vowed to hold a free and fair election, met with Union Election Commission officials in Myanmar’s capital Naypyidaw on Feb. 9 to see a demonstration of new Myanmar Electronic Voting Machines, or MEVMs, in action.
The new electronic voting system links census data and household member registration information and records citizens who vote.
The machine comprises a control unit, balloting unit and verification unit, all powered by a 12-volt battery, according to the online publication The Irrawaddy, citing information from a junta statement.
The junta plans to test the machines with 2,000 mock votes at a polling station, the report said, citing information leaked from the regime-controlled Union Election Commission.
A parliamentary and election observer who declined to be named for security reasons said the new system, which contains personal information and political affiliations, could endanger those who do not vote in protest of the junta’s election.
“International experience is necessary to implement such an electronic voting system,” he said.
“But by neglecting these fine examples and creating an e-voting system only with the inexperienced help of those in the tech community close to the military, it can be concluded that it is probably designed to favor the military-backed party in the election or to threaten people that they have non-voter information records and pressure citizens who will not vote in protest against their unfair elections,” he said.
The observer also said the military junta must be held responsible for the security and personal information of individuals who will or will not vote in the elections if the electronic balloting system is used.
'The door should be open'
Min Aung Hlaing told a National Defense and Security Council meeting on Jan. 31 that it would be up to individuals whether to vote, though it was the government’s responsibility to make the voting possible.
Technology experts told RFA that the most likely electronic voting system to be used is a direct-recording electronic voting machine, or DRE, that requires people to press a button to vote for representatives.
A technology expert, speaking on condition of anonymity for security reasons, said it would take years to develop such an electronic voting system, and that the technology used must be subject to independent scrutiny at any time.
“The door should be open to any impartial and neutral group to check the credibility of the program at any time to know what is written in a program because we don’t know what kind of gaps there are,” he said.
Neither the military nor the Union Election Commission has released any official news or detailed information about the electronic voting system.
RFA could not reach commission member Khin Maung Oo for comment.
Thar Tun Hla, chairman of the Arakan National Party, said the electronic voting system may prove difficult for some voters to use because they do not know how to cast a paper ballot.
“Citizens, let alone the political parties, do not understand how these machines work,” he said. “Voters need to have clear knowledge to use those machines when they vote.”
At a time when it is difficult to even collect accurate demographic information for the ballot right now, the effort to implement an electronic voting system is questionable, political analysts said.
Political observer Than Soe Naing said the election would not be free and fair because the junta could use the new voting system to manipulate votes for an outcome favorable to the military.
“E-voting will enable the military to fabricate the voting data as they see fit,” he said. “That’s why they are using it to their advantage.”..."
Source/publisher:
"RFA Burmese"
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-21
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2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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Brutal punishment against political prisoners is typical in post-coup Myanmar, critics say.
Description:
"Guards injured more than 80 political prisoners at a prison in central Myanmar after an argument turned violent, an incident which observers say is typical in the prison system since the junta took control of the country in a coup more than two years ago.
The incident occurred on Feb. 4 at Mandalay’s Obo Prison while a group of inmates, all female, were in line to get hot water, and some of the women began arguing with the guards.
“That’s when the prison guards came in and beat them. It’s said that the guards who came in and beat included some male staff too,” a family member of one of the prisoners told Radio Free Asia’s Burmese Service on condition of anonymity for security reasons.
“And then the prisoners were punished with solitary confinement. … But I don’t know if [my family member] was among the ones sent to solitary. This is all I know for now. Their news doesn't spread much these days,” the family member said.
Since the junta ousted Myanmar’s democratically elected government in Feb. 2021, it began filling the country’s prisons with pro-democracy activists who were opposed to the coup. Reports have surfaced that these political prisoners are routinely beaten, sent to solitary confinement, transferred to prisons far away from their families, tortured, or even killed in an effort to silence them and dissuade others from resisting junta rule.
In the Feb. 4 incident, the guards employed rubber and wooden batons and slingshots on the crowd. Collectively, the women suffered two lacerated ears, six skull injuries, a broken hand, an eye injury, three slingshot impacts near the eyes, and around 70 milder slingshot injuries, the shadow National Unity Government’s Ministry of Women, Youth and Children Affairs said in a statement on Feb. 15.
According to that statement, 42 of the injured inmates were sent to another prison building, two were sent to solitary confinement, and another 40 were sent to separated cells. Additionally, the prisoners may not receive visits from their families for one month.
RFA contacted Naing Win, the junta spokesman for the prison department, to find out about the situation at Obo Prison, but he did not respond.
Malice against activists
These types of human rights violations against political prisoners are typical of the junta because they hold malice against those who support democracy, Aung Myo Min, the shadow government’s human rights minister told RFA.
“Political prisoners are those who bravely stand for rights and democracy in the fight against the military junta. That’s why they were specifically targeted,” he said. “It’s not just the military officers who arrest them, but the prison officials and staff also hate them because they think that the political prisoners are an extra burden for them. As a result, [they] continue to get tortured and suffer unjust and brutal punishments.”
The Obo prison incident was one of several examples of prison violence in this year alone.
Two inmates were killed and 70 others were injured on Jan. 6 at Pathein Prison in the Ayeyarwady region on Jan. 6.
In the second week of January, about 700 inmates at Yangon’s Insein Prison were suddenly transferred to other prisons. On Jan. 25, two Insein inmates were sent to solitary confinement for reporting problems to prison officials, their relatives and other sources close to them told RFA.
The oppression that inmates suffer is invisible to the public and the international community, an activist who started an inmate advocacy group called “Let’s Send Things to Prisoners,” told RFA.
“I must say that these incidents should never happen whether inside or outside prisons. But since the prisoners are in [authorities’] hands, our words have no effect on them,” the activist said on condition of anonymity for security reasons. “It looks like [inmates] have to endure whatever pain [authorities] inflict on them.
The activist called on the shadow government and other diplomatic officials to work together to make the rest of the world aware of the situation in Myanmar’s prisons.
“Many people are being unfairly tortured in prisons without the people knowing it,” the activist said.
The prison guards should worry that they could one day be found guilty of crimes against the inmates under their charge, Kyaw Win, the executive director of the U.K.-based Burma Human Rights Network, told RFA.
“I’d like to warn the prison authorities, officials, and staff that their personal records are out, and the people know who they are,” he said. “The military generals and officers will just save themselves in the end. They will not care about these low level staff. That’s why these people should see the dangers they are creating for themselves.”
The junta-administered Myanmar National Human Rights Commission released a report on Feb. 2 based on interviews with hundreds of prisoners nationwide, that stated allegations of human rights violations were being seriously investigated, but the report did not specifically mention that any violations were found.
An official of the Thailand-based Assistance Association for Political Prisoners said that the military intentionally commits human rights violations against its imprisoned political opponents.
“Those who allowed, ordered and personally committed such violations and torture will definitely receive punishment for their crimes one day,” the official said. “We hear incidents of such torture happening everywhere and I want to say that those who commit those cruelties will definitely pay for their crimes.”
As of Tuesday the junta has arrested 19,810 people since the beginning of the coup, 15,953 of whom are currently detained, including those who have been sentenced, according to the group’s statistics..."
Source/publisher:
"RFA Burmese"
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-21
[field_licence]
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2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Political prisoners and other violations in Burma - reports
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"Five million children in Myanmar need humanitarian assistance amid armed conflicts across the country, according to a report by the United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF) on Jan. 30.
Three out of 10 children under 5 in Myanmar are stunted due to a lack of proper nutrition. This affects not only their physical growth but also their overall health and future. Moreover, 300,000 children in Myanmar are at risk of preventable diseases due to lack of vaccination, added the UN agency.
Over 1.5 million in Myanmar people have been displaced, with children forced to flee their homes and communities.
Naw Susanna Hla Hla Soe, Minister of Women, Youths and Children Affairs in the parallel National Unity Government, recently talked to The Irrawaddy about the plight of children displaced by fighting.
What kind of help do the five million children need in Myanmar? Health, education or nutrition, what is the priority?
Myanmar is already a poor country with lots of needs. And the government can’t deliver public services in full. The situation has become worse since (the coup in) February 2021, especially for children. According to the UN report, 5 million children are in dire need of support.
They are malnourished and they need to be vaccinated, and they also need schooling. And their lives are especially at risk because of junta raids.
According to the records of our ministry, over 300 children (under 18s) have been arrested. Nineteen children have been jailed, and 289 others were killed by the military. Therefore, the security of children and their rights are the most important requirement.
What does the future hold for children in a country where armed conflicts are escalating?
Their morale will be negatively affected, and so will their health. And their schooling will also be hampered. These are the very children who will lead the country one day. And it will be difficult for them to lead the country if they grow up deprived. [In this case,] the country can’t have a good future.
What must be done for children to get the assistance they need?
On my trips to Karen and Karenni (Kayah) states), I discovered many children in displacement camps. Civilian leaders open schools and provide food for them. But it is not enough. And there have been child casualties every day due to the regime’s deliberate attacks on displacement camps.
So we must stop the junta’s brutality if we are to protect the children. The first thing we must do is stop it from targeting schools and hospitals so as to provide mental security for children. Then we must provide them with access to health care services and education and also carry out programs for their development and leadership.
What will happen to them if they don’t get the assistance in time?
The international community should not ignore this problem. They must help to make sure assistance reaches those children. If it does not, millions of children are at risk of losing their lives. Even if they survive, they will be both mentally and physically deprived and the future of the country will not be good..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-20
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
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2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Children, Children's rights: reports of violations in Burma against more than one ethnic group
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Politics in Myanmar is traditionally the domain of older men, but women and youth have been prominent in resistance to the 2021 military takeover. Giving them a bigger voice could have a positive effect on the country’s political culture, no matter how the crisis ends.
Description:
"What’s new? Young people, particularly young women, have been visible and important contributors to the anti-military resistance, challenging age and gender norms in patriarchal Myanmar society. Yet two years after the coup they remain largely excluded from formal political power, and their role in the opposition movement often goes unacknowledged.
Why does it matter? Older men have traditionally dominated Myanmar politics – Aung San Suu Kyi being a notable exception. Policy priorities are skewed to women’s and youth’s detriment. The outcome of Myanmar’s post-coup crisis is uncertain, but changing norms within the anti-military resistance may well shape politics and society more broadly.
What should be done? The parallel National Unity Government should move beyond tokenism to genuinely include women and youth from diverse backgrounds in decision-making to build its credibility and break down patriarchal barriers. Donors should increase support for women- and youth-led organisations, while anti-regime armed groups should review the gendered way they assign recruits.
I.
Overview
A young generation, particularly women, are at the forefront of Myanmar’s armed and non-violent resistance to the 2021 coup d’état, challenging longstanding age and gender norms and hierarchies. Post-coup opposition movements have created opportunities for these people to take on roles that earlier were off limits. Their power within the movements remains limited, however, and intensified fighting in much of the country further jeopardises it. The National Unity Government and other anti-regime forces have strong normative reasons to address this problem. They would also gain from doing so, in that otherwise they may lose core supporters’ sympathies. They should do more to deepen inclusion, particularly of women and youth from diverse socio-economic and ethnic backgrounds. Armed groups should move from assigning people to posts based on gender, possibly by giving both men and women more choice in how they are deployed. No end is in sight to Myanmar’s crisis and its outcome is far from clear, but changing norms within the resistance are likely to influence the country’s politics and society over time.
Prior to the coup, political power in Myanmar lay almost exclusively in the hands of older men. Aung San Suu Kyi, the elected National League for Democracy (NLD) leader ousted by the coup, was a notable exception, in part because she is Western-educated and the daughter of independence leader Aung San. There was progress toward greater inclusivity during the ten years of semi-civilian rule, between 2011 and 2021, but deeply entrenched conservative attitudes and practical barriers erected during half a century of military dictatorship served to keep most women and young people out of formal politics. In some respects, the NLD was even less inclusive than its predecessor, the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party, to the disappointment of activists, civil society figures and some within the party itself.
The coup has helped bring to the fore a new generation, who were instrumental in launching what they call the Spring Revolution in its aftermath, organising nationwide demonstrations, strikes and boycotts. This younger cohort, including Generation Z and millennials, came of age during the decade of semi-civilian governance and has refused to accept a return to military rule. Their views only hardened as the regime brutally cracked down on their largely peaceful protests. From martyred demonstrators to striking garment workers and teachers leading the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM), they have been a powerful symbol of resistance to the junta. They have used their position to challenge traditional age and gender norms and push a progressive agenda, particularly in the political sphere.
Although women are often active participants behind the scenes [of the resistance] ... their contributions often go unrecognised.
Although these youngsters are the driving force of the movement, they have limited clout in its internal councils. Over time, the more inclusive facets of the revolution, such as street protests and the CDM, have lost influence to newly formed armed resistance groups, which are focused on fighting. Not surprisingly, the division of labour within these groups’ ranks is heavily gendered. Although women are often active participants behind the scenes – for example, crafting homemade weapons or raising money – their contributions often go unrecognised.
Although featuring a significant number of ex-NLD figures, the new anti-regime political structures, such as the National Unity Government (NUG) and National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC), are more diverse than the NLD-era government and parliament. Diversity is more evident in terms of ethnicity than age or gender, however. Although the NUG has several women ministers, most of the top positions remain held by older men. The same is true of Myanmar’s ethnic armed groups, which predate the military takeover but whose sway has grown in the post-coup conflict. Apart from cultural attitudes that favour older male leaders, socio-economic factors remain a barrier to broader inclusion, particularly for women.
Meanwhile, the military regime has closed off what few opportunities existed for younger people, and women of all ages, to exercise political leadership. The junta is dominated by serving and former military officers, making it highly unrepresentative of Myanmar society, and all indications are that general elections planned for late 2023 or early 2024 will bring only cosmetic change. Despite the junta’s claims to the contrary, the vote is intended to entrench military control of nominally civilian structures, such as the national assembly. Directly or indirectly, power will still reside in the military elite, most of whom are older Burman men, possibly with token inclusion of ethnic minorities and women.
With the armed struggle gaining momentum from mid-2021, progress toward greater inclusivity has largely stalled within the resistance. Civil society leaders and foreign technical advisers can provide support, but senior opposition members in bodies such as the NUG will need to throw weight behind any effort to jumpstart such change. Doing so matters not just for the immediate term: while it is far from clear how the tragedy currently befalling Myanmar will shape its future, evolving age and gender norms in the resistance could have a positive lasting impact on Myanmar politics and society. Even beyond important normative concerns, NUG leaders would gain by including women and young people in political decision-making and listening to their perspectives; failure to do so could alienate important sources of support. Meanwhile, civil society groups and NGOs, primarily from Myanmar, should engage the armed resistance – including ethnic armed groups – in discussions about injecting a gender dimension into their own policies, such as by degendering job assignments and addressing harassment.
II.
An Old Man’s World
Younger people and women have historically wielded little formal political power in Myanmar.1 Although the country is ethnically diverse, most of its communities are patriarchal with strong cultures of deference to elders. In many ethnic communities, including the Burman majority, the two dominant institutions are armed groups and organised religions, both of which have tended to reinforce age hierarchy and – to an even greater degree – patriarchal gender norms. Occasional ruptures, notably World War II and the 1962 coup, have overturned the old establishment and brought in groups of younger men to take its place. But these upheavals, if anything, have strengthened the hold of men on power, meaning that the “traditional connection between masculinity and authority remained largely unchanged”.2 Furthermore, the men who had dislodged their elders generally clung to their prerogatives as they aged, in time becoming a new old establishment.
Myanmar’s legacy of conflict ... has only served to strengthen the writ of older men.
Myanmar’s legacy of conflict, with unresolved wars that date back to its independence in 1948 in many of the country’s ethnic areas, has only served to strengthen the writ of older men.3 Over five decades of military rule, from 1962 to 2011, serving and former military officers came to dominate formal political institutions, including government, political parties, the civil service and the judiciary.4 Though independence hero Aung San and many of the country’s first post-independence leaders had emerged from university politics, the military came to see students mainly as a threat to its rule – not entirely without justification, since students led major protests against the socialist regime in 1962, 1974 and 1988.5 During this period, many ethnic minorities formed armed resistance movements to fight for greater autonomy, with men occupying virtually all leadership positions.
After independence, and particularly the 1962 coup, women were barred from serving in the military, except as nurses (and in a few other roles). Given the centrality of the military in Myanmar politics, a major avenue to power was thus closed off to women.
Ethnic Burman women were nevertheless described as something of an exception. They were said to have “high status” and to enjoy “inherent equality” with their male counterparts. Though that was not quite true, Burman women did often have greater rights and freedoms than women elsewhere in Asia, and some rose to prominence in politics, business and other fields.6 Aung San Suu Kyi is the best-known example.7
Flawed as this notion was, the military saw it as useful. After the end of the socialist regime in 1988, the State Law and Order Restoration Council junta seized on it as an ideological prop. The idea became part of what one scholar has described as a project of “Myanmafication” – creation of a national “Myanmar culture” based on Burman Buddhism – that the generals pursued to consolidate their rule after the failure of socialism.8 The military began claiming that all women in Myanmar had “inherent equality” with men. It signed Myanmar up to the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), and vehemently denied the regular reports that its soldiers were perpetrating sexual violence against ethnic minorities.9 By insisting that Myanmar women already had equality – even if the original narrative had extended only to Burman women, and not minorities – the regime in effect reinforced the status quo of exclusion.10
One area in which women and youth were able to build influence was in civil society. After the 1988 uprising, many women and youth from central Myanmar who had participated in the protests fled to border areas to continue their anti-military struggle. Some enlisted in armed movements, such as the newly formed All Burma Students’ Democratic Front, while many others joined or established NGOs. From around the same time, associations affiliated with ethnic armed groups, such as the Karen Women’s Organisation, began to work on strengthening women’s roles in the movements’ armed wings, and were later instrumental in forming the Women’s League of Burma, a border-based NGO that promotes women’s participation in politics. Women were also prominent in civil society in military-controlled parts of Myanmar, even during periods of particularly marked oppression, and their role grew significantly after Cyclone Nargis, in 2008, when international aid to Myanmar – much of it channelled through NGOs and community-based organisations – increased greatly.11
The period leading up to political liberalisation in 2011 saw the military take steps reinforcing the old nexus of maleness, age and political power.
The period leading up to political liberalisation in 2011 saw the military take steps reinforcing the old nexus of maleness, age and political power. It wrote this linkage into the 2008 constitution, which it drafted to facilitate a transition to quasi-civilian rule. The charter nominally granted equal rights to women, but with the caveat that “nothing ... shall prevent appointment of men to the positions that are suitable for men only”. Further, by ensuring the primacy of the military in politics, the constitution in effect blocks women from positions of influence. Nothing in the constitution, meanwhile, prohibits discrimination on the basis of age; on the contrary, it sets a minimum age for all elected and many appointed positions.12
After liberalisation, the military also tried to soften its image as a male-dominated institution. In 2013, it amended its recruitment policies, placing an advertisement for women cadets, and the following year it appointed the first women officers to serve in parliament.13 Recruitment of women to the military-controlled police force also expanded significantly.14 These policies had their limits, however: women cadets were commissioned at a lower rank than their male counterparts, and they were mainly confined to support roles that stunted opportunities for advancement.15 Women entering the military and police force encountered various other kinds of institutionalised discrimination.16 Gendered roles also persisted outside the military, such as in opposition movements, where women were often relegated to jobs behind the scenes.17
Meanwhile, liberalisation created new opportunities for women and youth in the political sphere, if not in the upper echelons. Older men from military backgrounds dominated President Thein Sein’s various cabinets from 2011-2016, as well as national and regional assemblies formed based on the 2010 election results; although two women were appointed as ministers, they were assigned education and social welfare, both portfolios closely associated with “women’s affairs” in most Myanmar people’s minds. The NLD’s success in the 2012 by-elections brought greater diversity to parliament – almost one third of its candidates were women, and many were younger than average – and Thein Sein’s government started engaging with a wide range of social actors, including on policy development.18 Women and younger people were highly visible in civil society, particularly NGOs, but also newly formed student and labour unions.
There were, however, still clear limitations to women and youth participating in political life. Both the military and ethnic armed groups mostly excluded women from the peace process that Thein Sein launched in 2011, and no side ever met the gender quotas that negotiators included in a 2016 framework for political dialogue, which began that year and continued until 2020.19 Although the Department of Social Welfare began drafting a Protection and Prevention of Violence against Women Law in early 2011, in part to bring Myanmar law into compliance with CEDAW, it was never enacted; instead, the government and parliament, under pressure from nationalist groups, passed four “protection of race and religion laws”, including legislation restricting the right of Buddhist women to marry men of other faiths.20 A proposed Ministry of Youth Affairs never came into being. The government did introduce a National Strategic Plan for the Advancement of Women, along with a National Youth Policy, but both of these initiatives “remained largely on paper and did not lead to tangible results”.21
Hopes that the [National League for Democracy], once in power, would drive efforts to break down gender and age hierarchies were quickly dashed.
Hopes that the NLD, once in power, would drive efforts to break down gender and age hierarchies were quickly dashed. In March 2016, soon after winning the election by a landslide, it named an eighteen-member cabinet including only one woman, party leader Aung San Suu Kyi herself, and with an average age of 65; the three youngest members were, ironically, serving officers appointed by the military.22 It later expanded the cabinet to 51 members, but only one other woman joined, making the government more than 95 per cent male. Nearly all key positions in parliament and other national bodies, such as the Union Election Commission, also went to older men, as did state and regional cabinet posts. Party stalwart Win Htein, who was central in the cabinet selection, said many of the NLD women who wanted to run for office were too “green” and “inexperienced”. “The culture here and the religion mean most women are not naturally confident in political situations”, he added.23
But the NLD also largely ignored and even stifled civil society, which had been an important venue where women and younger people could influence decision-making. The NLD was less open to engaging civil society and seeking policy advice than its predecessor, the Union Solidarity and Development Party; it appeared to view activists in particular as troublemakers. It placed restrictions on its legislators that made it difficult for them to participate in civil society initiatives, and in some cases it forced civil society organisations to seek permission before holding public events.24 Activists were routinely subjected to harassment and intimidation, particularly by the security forces, and the increased application of repressive laws had a chilling effect.25 In the bureaucracy, the Union Civil Service Board regularly advertised men-only positions, on the basis that they were not suitable for women.26
The NLD’s second term, scheduled to begin in March 2021, seemed unlikely to bring much change. The party had fielded more women than in the 2015 election, and as a result 17.3 per cent of lawmakers in the incoming legislature would have been women, up from 14.2 per cent in 2016. The new cohort was also slightly younger, with an average age of 53.5 years, compared to 54 years in 2016 and 58 after the 2012 by-elections.27 But despite these modest improvements, there was little to suggest the party was planning to make its cabinet more inclusive. Similarly, neither gender nor youth concerns appeared to be high on its agenda – its manifesto for the 2020 election was almost the same as the one in 2015, and its posture toward civil society did not shift during the campaign.
III.
A New Post-coup Reality
A.
The Youth Take the Lead
When the military seized power in February 2021, younger generations responded decisively. Filling the void left by the arrest of the NLD leaders and a number of prominent older activists, they devised a series of creative campaigns to challenge the new regime. “You’ve messed with the wrong generation” became both a warning and a rallying cry repeated in newspaper headlines around the world in the first days after the coup.28 Although protests in big cities got the most attention, demonstrations erupted across most of the country, bridging urban-rural, socio-economic, ethnic and religious divides.29
Generation Z and millennials have since remained the driving force behind popular resistance to military rule.30 Most members of these age cohorts entered adulthood shortly before or during the period of political liberalisation after 2011 – for example, an estimated 4.8 million members of Generation Z were able to vote for the first time in the November 2020 election. They had few personal memories of military rule, but they equated it in their minds with poverty, isolation and repression. Not only are they unwilling to return to this dark past, but they have also issued demands that go much further, pushing the political debate in a progressive direction.
Labour leaders, human rights activists and student union members ... initiated street protests.
The first public signs of organised resistance emerged the day after the coup, on 2 February, when junior government medical staff launched the CDM, refusing to work for the new regime. Within days, labour leaders, human rights activists and student union members such as Tayzar San, Ei Thinzar Maung, Esther Ze Naw, Moe Sandar Myint and Wai Moe Naing – all in their twenties and early thirties – initiated street protests. Both the CDM and peaceful street protests swelled quickly: millions of people took part in the demonstrations, and hundreds of thousands of civil servants joined the strike. In the capital Naypyitaw, meanwhile, a group of around 70 MPs-elect from the NLD took an “oath of office” on 4 February, in defiance of the military, and established a rival legislative body, the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, the following day; in April, the Committee formed the NUG.
Strikes, protests and parallel parliaments are all established opposition movement tactics in Myanmar.31 But the tech-savvy younger generations combined them with new techniques as well as knowledge from abroad to create hybrid “repertoires of contention”.32 The internet, and more broadly exposure to the outside world over the past decade, not only helped inspire this innovation but also magnified its impact.33 Examples are many and varied. Protesters adopted the three-finger salute from The Hunger Games film series, which people in Hong Kong and Thailand had popularised earlier, but also learned from their peers in those countries how to counteract the effects of tear gas. Themed protests – such as the massive “five twos” demonstration on 22 February, which mobilised an estimated five million protesters – were organised through Facebook, while Twitter was used to share information about #WhatsHappeningInMyanmar with the world.
The importance of the internet in mobilising anti-military movements was evident from the regime’s many efforts to block access to it. These were, however, largely unsuccessful because many users found ways around the restrictions, often thanks to advice they found (and then shared) online.34 Researchers have highlighted the importance of internet-based expertise that was developed prior to the coup, such as advocacy with Facebook (to get the platform to take down hate speech and pro-military propaganda) and digital security training for activists and journalists.35 The mostly younger people working on these issues had less success in lobbying the NLD government, which largely ignored their campaigns for reforming defamation laws and improving digital rights and security. Nevertheless, after the coup, the experience they gained spread to the broader population, playing a “crucial role in enabling a disruptive and resilient grassroots resistance” to the junta’s attempt at “complete autocratization of Myanmar”.36
The internet was important not only for mobilising protests, but also in enabling more open discussion of revolutionary goals among a wide audience. “What really sets this moment apart from other revolutionary moments [in Myanmar] is that a lot of it is online”, commented a gender expert. “This helped … change ideas around gender and age, and when the crackdown came, that debate could still continue online”.37
Both online and in the streets, the anti-coup movement energised many young people who had previously been uninterested in politics.38 A 21-year-old protest leader from Yangon told Crisis Group that prior to February 2021 he had been working in his mother’s business and playing music. On the morning of the coup, she woke him to break the news. He attended the first rallies more out of curiosity than commitment to the cause, but he grew angry at the increasing violence and the mendacity of regime propaganda. By mid-2021, he had become a protest leader, and has remained in the city despite the military’s crackdown, coordinating flash mob protests in his township.39
B.
Women at the Barricades
Young women were highly visible on the protest front lines; by one estimate, they made up 60 per cent of protesters in the initial days after the coup.40 Their presence alone was a direct challenge to the patriarchal values that the regime embodied. When soldiers and police began using live rounds to disperse the protesters, several women were among the first killed. Mya Thwe Thwe Khine, the first protester to fall under the security forces’ fire, and Kyal Sin, a 19-year-old from Mandalay who was shot dead on 3 March while wearing a T-shirt with the words, “Everything will be ok”, became martyrs for the movement, stoking anger at the regime’s brutality.41 The outrage reflected the widely held idea that men have a duty to protect women, who are cast as vulnerable; that the military killed women protesters was thus seen as particularly egregious. When the crackdown intensified, women were often ushered to the rear for their safety, leaving young men to don homemade protective equipment in front of the makeshift barricades.42
In some cases ... the protests were able to turn the regime’s misogyny against it.
In some cases, though, the protests were able to turn the regime’s misogyny against it. In March 2021, protesters in Yangon strung women’s sarongs, known as htamein, high across the streets in both a symbolic denunciation of patriarchal customs and a way to take advantage of them. They were playing on a traditional Burman belief that a man’s innate masculine power, or hpone, is diminished if he passes below a woman’s undergarments.43 Young male protesters showed their disdain for the taboo by walking freely underneath the htamein. But the garments also slowed the security forces in pursuit, who stopped to take them down.44 In a similar vein, women painted sanitary napkins red to simulate blood, hanging them up in the street or attaching them to photos of junta leader Min Aung Hlaing. Women activists have also formed new groups to challenge gender norms and promote solidarity, such as the Women Advocacy Coalition, which is pushing for gender sensitivity in new democratic institutions, and Sisters2Sisters, which draws attention to the military’s use of excessive force and sexual violence against women.
C.
A Force to Reckon With
While the protesters’ initial demands focused on restoring the NLD administration and respecting the results of the 2020 election, they shifted rapidly, with ethnic, gender and religious equality becoming central themes. Protesters called for abolishing the 2008 constitution (drafted under the previous military regime), creating a more equitable political system and establishing a new military – a “federal army” – under civilian control. The emergence of the NUCC in March 2021 and the NUG the following month lent impetus to these goals, including by enshrining them in a Federal Democracy Charter designed to replace the 2008 constitution.45
The charter marks a break with the policies of not only the military, but also the NLD. It goes much further, for example, than the changes to the 2008 constitution that the NLD government attempted to pass in 2015 and 2020, all of which the military vetoed.46 Part 1 of the charter prohibits discrimination on the basis of gender – as the 2008 constitution nominally does – but also makes numerous other references to gender equality, including instituting a 30 per cent quota for women in “different levels of decision-making mechanisms”.47 Additionally, it stipulates the creation of “independent commissions” for women’s rights and children’s rights, youth affairs and gender equality, as well as gender-based violence and domestic violence.48 The interim provisions also say women’s and youth affairs groups should be included in the NUCC and a People’s Assembly.49
The NUG’s composition embodies some of these aspirations. Although Aung San Suu Kyi and NLD President Win Myint – both in detention since the morning of the coup – remain nominally at the head of the NUG, the parallel administration is far more diverse than the previous NLD administration. At the time of writing, women comprise 20 per cent of its cabinet members, while ethnic and religious minorities make up more than 50 per cent. Based on information available, the cabinet members’ average age is 59 years – compared to 65 for the 2016 NLD administration at the start of its term – although the real figure is likely significantly lower.50 The NUCC also has a diverse membership, including representatives of ethnic armed groups and political parties, human rights groups, civil society organisations, the CDM, strike committees and more.51
By the time of the [National Unity Government’s] formation, the anti-military struggle was already taking on a more revolutionary character.
By the time of the NUG’s formation, the anti-military struggle was already taking on a more revolutionary character. Peaceful protests had largely dissipated in the face of the violent crackdown, with at least 750 civilians killed within three months of the coup.52 Thousands of the most determined activists were secretly travelling to the territory of ethnic armed groups for military training, while new anti-military armed groups were forming in many rural areas. On 5 May, the NUG announced the formation of the People’s Defence Force (PDF), and on 7 September it launched a “people’s defensive war”. Some of the hundreds – if not thousands – of new armed groups called themselves PDF units and aligned publicly with the NUG, but many remained independent.53 Most members of both types of PDFs and other anti-military armed groups are young, often still in their teens or early twenties.
In areas where armed resistance to the coup has been strongest, the state’s administrative structures have disintegrated, and younger people have filled the vacuum, taking on leadership roles. In many parts of Sagaing Region, for example, government services are no longer functioning outside major towns. Although the military can still project power into the countryside by carrying out raids (often by using helicopters), resistance groups, which have set up embryonic administrations for delivering services, are the closest thing rural areas have to the state.
In these areas, people in their late thirties or forties – former lawmakers, teachers, military defectors and others – have emerged as community leaders, and are working together with even younger colleagues, particularly former student union members.54 Some older community members, such as village tract administrators and senior monks, have on the other hand lost authority, either because they have not sided with the resistance or because they simply lack the knowledge necessary to exercise influence in the current circumstances. Many, however, are involved in community mobilisation for the resistance, alongside the new, younger leaders.55
Since the coup, women have joined anti-military armed groups, including long-established ethnic armed groups, in unprecedented numbers – often in defiance of their parents and other relatives.56 They are often pictured in mainstream and social media, undergoing boot camp-style training or holding weapons, flying in the face of longstanding beliefs – in particular, that women are too weak or too timid to be soldiers.57 Women have even taken up senior positions in some of the new anti-military groups – something that previously would have been unthinkable – and in a few locations they have formed women-only groups, the most well-known being the Myaung Women Warriors in Sagaing Region. Initially, this group faced pushback from locals, but eventually it gained more acceptance. “At first, parents did not allow their daughters to participate”, a senior group member told Crisis Group. “But over time we managed to grow to more than 300 members. Now some parents even bring their daughters to us”.58
Younger generations have not only provided the soldiers and support workers for newly formed armed groups, but also generated financial and other backing.
Younger generations have not only provided the soldiers and support workers for newly formed armed groups, but also generated financial and other backing. As with the non-violent resistance they orchestrated in the months after the coup, they have leveraged the internet to great effect. By around May 2021, social media posts had shifted from focusing on protests and the CDM to armed struggle, often with motivational hashtags.59 Most importantly, they have spearheaded online fundraising efforts that have generated tens of millions of dollars, if not more, for the NUG and anti-military resistance forces.60 They are also a valuable source of information and intelligence for organisations such as the NUG.
The post-coup upheaval and the importance of young people to the anti-military struggle has created new avenues for them to take on leadership roles and exert influence. One 23-year-old woman Crisis Group interviewed had been a student union leader prior to the coup, but quickly emerged as a protest leader in her region. She is now a member of a nationwide General Strike Coordination Body that regularly engages with the NUG, and she also leads two teams that raise money for PDFs.
We have more opportunities to show our ability. ... The new political structures are listening to us, because they know young people have more diverse and fresh ideas, and new revolutionary methods. ... Young people nowadays are working closely with the old MPs, old government members and so on, and we exchange ideas. This shows how young people are getting more and more power and influence.61
Indeed, the heads of new bodies such as the NUG and NUCC have followed the younger generations’ lead in a number of ways. In March 2021, Myanmar’s permanent representative to the UN, Kyaw Moe Tun, ended a speech announcing his opposition to the regime with the three-finger salute that had emerged among young protesters in the days after the coup; it has since also been adopted by the NUG. The NUG’s cautious endorsement of armed struggle that May came months after many youths had already fled to the territory of ethnic armed groups for military training. The Federal Democracy Charter also reflects the demands of youth-led protest movements. Youth activists were the first even to acknowledge, let alone apologise for, the historical discrimination and violence against the Rohingya, gestures upon which the NUG built in its Rohingya policy.62 They called out discrimination against the LGBT community; the NUG cabinet later included the country’s first openly LGBT minister, Aung Myo Min.
On the ground, youth activists say their communities view them differently since the coup. They are no longer seen as too inexperienced or too young to take on political leadership, and their demonstrated commitment to the anti-military cause – one supported by the majority of people, across generations – means they are treated with a new level of respect. “Everyone has seen the important roles that young people and women are playing in this revolution. ... This has changed people’s perspectives. Norms have been challenged and women feel more empowered to take part in politics”, a young woman who holds a senior position in a newly formed resistance group, the Bamar People’s Liberation Army, told Crisis Group.63
IV.
The Limits of Change
Despite the historic evolution witnessed since the coup, young people and women still face many constraints in pursuing political participation and leadership. Unlike earlier ruptures, such as independence, the old political elite has not been entirely discredited or swept away. Instead, young and old coexist in newly created institutions; as a result, older men have continued, for the most part, to hold sway. In the armed conflict, gender norms are even more difficult to overturn than age-related ones. Even in areas where younger people have come to dominate political leadership, such as in parts of Sagaing Region, men continue to hold most of the top spots. Socio-economic and educational barriers also mean that the few women who reach senior positions tend to be wealthier, Western-educated urbanites. Those from rural areas and middle and working-class backgrounds have fewer opportunities to take on leadership roles.
A.
Resistance-led Political Institutions
Although the NUG cabinet is a significant improvement on the NLD government from an inclusion perspective, it is still far from representative of the Myanmar population. More progress has been made in including ethnic minorities (seven of twenty ministers and twelve of sixteen deputies) than women (four ministers and three deputies), reflecting the NUG’s imperative to build ties with ethnic minorities, and particularly ethnic armed groups, in order to draw on their military prowess in fighting the junta. The NUG cabinet is younger than that of the NLD, but still features many members in their sixties and seventies. A bigger challenge is that younger members tend to be in positions that afford them less influence, and nearly all women have been assigned to what are traditionally perceived as gendered roles, such as health, education and the Ministry of Women, Youths and Children Affairs. The notable exception is Zin Mar Aung, who holds the important foreign affairs portfolio; as with many women who have managed to rise to prominence, she comes from an educated, urban background.64
Even NUG supporters and partners observe that most of these appointments have the appearance of tokenism. Those Crisis Group spoke to noted that some women deputy ministers who resigned from the NUG were replaced by men, and that women in particular “tend to lose their voice” after being appointed to the parallel administration. “It’s not meaningful participation”, one said. “The NUG should take their opinions seriously”.65 Numerous sources, both male and female, echoed this view. “I feel like the young people who have been appointed to the NUG are facing restrictions and cannot show their performance”, said a young protest leader from Yangon.66
The [National Unity Consultative Council] ... falls well short when it comes to women’s equal representation.
Although it features a diverse range of member organisations, and a high proportion of ethnic minority representatives, the NUCC also falls well short when it comes to women’s equal representation. The body’s exact membership has not been made public, but sources told Crisis Group that the proportion of women members was even lower than in the NUG. One NUCC member observed that none of the positions allocated to ethnic armed groups had gone to women.67 In both the NUG and NUCC, men frequently dismiss women who raise gender-related issues. “The women on the NUCC in particular get overpowered”, one source commented. “The men say they will put gender into the agenda, but it’s always the last issue and, before they get to it, they say, ‘Time’s up’”.68
Those who attempt to draw attention to gender barriers are also routinely told that the issue should only be addressed “after we win the revolution”.69 Unlike other important social challenges, like improving relations with ethnic minorities or addressing historical discrimination against the Rohingya, there is less of an imperative for bodies like the NUG to make gender inclusion a priority because leaders do not see it as contributing to the armed struggle. “Norms and perspectives related to gender discrimination have not changed hugely”, commented a women’s right activist. “It’s an ongoing process, ... but the revolution has created opportunities to move toward gender equality”.70
Those in charge of the institutions that have emerged in opposition to military rule have a strong interest in creating genuine opportunities for younger people, particularly women, to participate in decision-making. Generation Z and Millennials have been at the vanguard of the movement, and their support remains an important asset. Although those interviewed by Crisis Group continue to offer strong backing for the movement, many also evince a degree of frustration that the NUG, the NUCC and other bodies have not gone further in overturning gender and age norms through greater inclusivity.71 The movement could strengthen itself by becoming more inclusive – or at least avert the risk of pushing away some of its most important supporters.
What happens within the post-coup resistance could matter for the longer term too. Its political and armed wings have already become an important part of Myanmar’s political landscape. How Myanmar’s conflict will play out is far from clear; whatever happens, the country will likely have to navigate several poles, including the military itself, and a large part of society will likely remain conservative and religious.72 Still, the institutions created as part of the resistance, particularly their political culture and vision, will in all probability influence future phases of the crisis and beyond. Nurturing a greater role for young people in resistance political institutions in particular could help ensure that in the years ahead Myanmar politics is less patriarchal and more diverse. Benefits of that could be wide-ranging, from better prospects of reaching durable peace settlements to more equitable distribution of state resources.
B.
Armed Groups
The evolution from peaceful resistance – protests, boycotts and civil disobedience – to armed struggle has tended to shunt women aside. The focus, particularly in mainstream and social media, has shifted almost entirely to fighting, which is still perceived primarily as a male act. As the conflict has intensified, spreading across much of the country, other forms of resistance have received less attention, relegating women to the background. Some women have been depicted bearing arms, as noted. But they are more commonly shown as victims or saviours, helping deliver aid or care for the displaced, for example. Meanwhile, few women appear to have taken up leadership roles in newly emergent administrative bodies run by resistance forces, which remain dominated by male fighters. One apparent reason is that while administrative bodies and armed groups are nominally separate, in practice there is often a great deal of overlap in personnel, so that men end up in high positions in administration.
Although women are highly visible in newly formed anti-military groups ... they continue to face significant gender barriers.
Although women are highly visible in newly formed anti-military groups, and many have undergone military training, they continue to face significant gender barriers. These groups, which seek to replace the military regime with more equitable governance structures, have in fact often adopted policies that discriminate against women and reinforce gender norms. “Even though we receive the same training, we usually can’t go to the front line”, said a woman PDF member. “Options are very limited for women, other than support roles and other jobs in the villages, like teaching children who can’t go to school”.73 These reports suggest that if the new armed groups do succeed in their military goals, they are unlikely to overturn barriers to gender equality, and may even undermine those within the revolutionary movement working to achieve that goal.74
Most obviously, women are often not allowed to participate in front-line combat, and are instead confined to administrative or support roles. They can also find it difficult to gain the respect of their male colleagues. A woman who holds a senior position in the Bamar People’s Liberation Army said she was allowed to visit the front lines only for observation, to bring rations or to help injured soldiers. Her male colleagues are “shocked” to see a woman at the front, she said, and often uncooperative. She noted that age was also important, citing the example of a younger woman colleague who she believed faced even greater challenges in interacting with male soldiers. But primarily because of their gender, women feel they have to behave differently toward soldiers relative to their male counterparts.
Some will say things like, “I don’t want to talk to you. I’ll talk to someone else”, because they don’t believe in my ability. ... I have to respond to them carefully. You can’t be too humble or too confident.75
Women soldiers are also held back by self-imposed restrictions, although these often appear to be a product of socialisation. For example, a senior Myaung Women Warriors officer said the group had yet to participate in front-line combat because few weapons were available. When her group has managed to secure arms, its members have so far opted to give them to men in allied units, because they themselves believed that their male colleagues were more “capable” soldiers. They see handing over the guns as a choice, not a constraint. The officer stressed, however, that the mere existence of her women-only armed group was a major step forward in Myanmar. “When people talk about PDFs, men are still the first thing that comes into their mind”, she told Crisis Group.76 Some women soldiers have also cited concerns about the risk of suffering sexual violence at the hands of the regime’s military if they were to be captured.77
Some women who have joined armed groups have also reported instances of sexual harassment from their male colleagues. There seem to be no adequate policies in place to prevent or redress such behaviour, which is in part a product of the groups’ masculinist culture. A woman interviewee recounted being verbally harassed multiple times by a fellow soldier, who did such things as ask her unwanted questions about her marital status. “I felt so sad, scared and helpless”, she said. “Finally, I just had to avoid being in places where I knew that he would be”.78 Another source with knowledge of such incidents said the lack of channels to file a complaint was a major problem. “The perpetrators know that women have no one to report the cases to. It has become a great opportunity for perpetrators to commit more harassment”.79
In comparison to the new national institutions, Myanmar’s ethnic armed groups have undergone little structural change since the coup. It is difficult to generalise about these groups’ inclusivity given their diversity in terms of size, influence and political culture. Nevertheless, all are armies first and foremost – albeit, in most cases, with governance and administrative branches – which has translated into a culture of hierarchical male leadership.80 To some extent, the intensified conflict of the past two years appears to have strengthened this culture.81
C.
The Junta
The military regime has rolled back much of the progress on political inclusivity that was made during Myanmar’s decade of liberalisation. Serving and former military officers dominate the upper echelons of the State Administration Council, as the junta calls itself, as well as its Union Government and state and region administrations; civilian members, who are mainly older men, have little political power.82 The junta is unlikely to change in this respect: it is pressing ahead with plans for an election in mid-2023 that is designed to entrench military control of nominally civilian political structures, such as the national assembly. Under this model, it is clear that power will remain in the hands of the military elite, either directly or indirectly, which implies that any inclusion of women and youth – for example, through election to national or state assemblies – will be token.
The junta has ... increasingly targeted civil society, where women and youth play a prominent role.
The regime has also limited political inclusion in other ways. Although he has not formally abrogated the peace process established under former governments, in early 2022 Min Aung Hlaing launched fresh negotiations with ten ethnic armed groups, aiming to dissuade them from joining forces with the post-coup resistance, as well as to secure their support for allowing the forthcoming election to go ahead in their territory.83 As with the slew of ceasefires negotiated from 1989-1995, under the previous junta, the talks have been limited to top military officers and the leaders of participating ethnic armed groups, nearly all of whom are older men.84 The junta has also increasingly targeted civil society, where women and youth play a prominent role. In October 2022, it introduced a new law, the Organisations Registration Law, that makes it mandatory for all NGOS, civil society groups and community associations to register with the junta (it had been voluntary under the old law from 2014) and introduces prison terms for violations of its many prohibitions.85
More generally, official attitudes toward women and youth have reverted to the pre-2011 era. The regime is once again fashioning itself as the patron of a form of “traditional” culture – that is, a highly patriarchal “Myanmar” culture that is primarily based on Burman Buddhism – which only reinforces gender and age hierarchies. While perpetuating the gender equality narrative developed by his military predecessors, Min Aung Hlaing has simultaneously railed at photos circulating on social media of female protesters wearing “indecent clothes contrary to Myanmar culture” and prosecuted celebrities for allegedly posting sexually explicit material online.86 He has complained of Myanmar culture being “abused and misused” on social media, and claimed that “youths are weak in their capacity to preserve their respective ethnic cultures and customs. Hence, during this short time, we have taken steps to promote and revitalise Myanmar’s traditional cultures as much as we can”.87
Min Aung Hlaing has adopted a patronising attitude toward the country’s younger generations, blaming the NLD and NUG for inciting them to reject military rule so stubbornly. He has complained that, when in power, the NLD amended the school curriculum with material “aimed at undermining Myanmar’s traditions and culture”, meaning that “young people lost respect for teachers”.88 His regime has characterised protesters who became resistance fighters as “misused” by the “terrorist” NUG, accusing it of “exploiting apolitical youths” by sending them for training with ethnic armed groups.89 The senior general’s vision for students is that they be “good citizens” who “serve the interests of their local community, regions and state”. Students “should adore patriotic spirit for the country and the nation as well as their religions for further flourishing”, he said, also warning of the dangers of new technologies that “bring misunderstanding and misinformation”.90
Pro-military social media accounts have openly targeted young people who publicly oppose the regime, often by releasing their personal information – a practice known as “doxing”. Some have also published sexually explicit content, such as revenge porn, doctored pornographic images or unfounded allegations of a sexual nature, in order to discredit individual women. In a highly patriarchal society like Myanmar’s, the sexualised nature of many of these attacks on women has had a silencing effect, with some women now afraid to speak up for fear of attracting the attention of pro-military users.91 “Women are targeted more than men ... not just women leaders, but ordinary women from rural areas”, an activist said.92
The economic decline following the coup has hurt everyone in Myanmar, but disproportionately women and the young.
The economic decline following the coup has hurt everyone in Myanmar, but disproportionately women and the young. Schooling has been heavily disrupted, with millions of children and young adults dropping out of the state system since 2019, first due to COVID-19 and then to a boycott of “military slave education”.93 As a result, many have entered the work force early, and are unlikely to return to school.94 Many women and girls, worried about their families amid the economic crisis, are making sacrifices – such as skipping meals – to make sure their children and parents can eat. As a UN report put it, women “are starting to see their future disappear before their eyes. ... The peace, political and economic rights they enjoyed for a decade are disappearing”.95
Crackdowns and poverty have prompted many people, but primarily young adults, to seek to emigrate, through both formal and informal channels.96 Meanwhile, applications to enter the military’s elite Defence Services Academy have reportedly declined sharply since the coup.97 All this evidence suggests that many young people see little future for themselves under direct or indirect military rule.
V.
Changing the Political Culture
The 2021 coup has been a tragedy for the people of Myanmar, but it has also created an opportunity to chip away at gender and age hierarchies, making power structures more inclusive and equitable. In the months after the coup, young people and women pushed a progressive agenda, aspects of which are now enshrined in the NUG’s Federal Democracy Charter. Two years on, women and youth remain integral to the anti-military movement, but the momentum in challenging age and gender norms appears to have stalled. Opposition forces, both political and military, have much work to do to bring greater inclusion to decision-making and give women and youth a more visible public role.
Inclusivity should be a goal in all resistance-led institutions formed since the coup, notably the NUG, the NUCC and state and regional consultative councils. As the most prominent, however, the NUG has a particularly important role to play in seeing this agenda through. While it is more inclusive than the ousted NLD government, women and youth remain underrepresented, and there is a widespread perception among its supporters that those who are involved have little authority. The NUG should endeavour to appoint more women and younger members, from a diversity of ethnic and socio-economic backgrounds, and elevate them to more senior roles – particularly those that traditionally have been a male domain. The NUCC will need to do even more to address its gender imbalance.
These steps alone will not be enough, though; without more substantive change, the NUG risks perpetuating the belief that appointments of women and youth are mere tokenism. Both it and the NUCC need to adopt internal policies that enable younger people and women to influence decision-making. They could both set age and gender quotas. The NUCC could introduce a regular rotation of leadership positions. The NUG, meanwhile, could ensure that women and younger members are encouraged to contribute at high-level internal meetings. More experienced NUG members could also take on formal mentoring roles for their younger counterparts.
This effort will require dedication, and it would benefit from closer cooperation with civil society and support from international technical advisers. Although senior members of both the NUG and NUCC have shown willingness to meet with women and youth movement figures – an improvement upon the NLD government – they do not appear to be taking the concerns of their interlocutors seriously, seemingly viewing them as a low priority. Unless their attitude visibly changes, there is a risk that these new institutions will end up alienating some of their most important allies in the anti-military movement.
The Ministry of Women, Youth and Children Affairs has been one of the more active NUG institutions, but it could still do more. Most of its public activities have focused on humanitarian aid distribution and awareness campaigns, such as the Sixteen Days of Activism against Gender-Based Violence in late 2022. While such activities are welcome, it has a wider role to play in seeking to develop gender and youth-related policies, such as on sexual harassment, that apply across the NUG. It should also focus on amending discriminatory laws and introducing new legislation, such as the long-delayed law on preventing violence against women.98 The NUG and its affiliates control only small parts of the country, but legislative change remains a powerful tool for changing public perceptions and attitudes.
The junta is continuing to amend and enact laws, including on gender and youth-related issues.
What the military regime is doing on this front should spur the NUG to action: the junta is continuing to amend and enact laws, including on gender and youth-related issues. The regime has, for example, amended the Organisations Registration Law to restrict civil society (see Section IV.C), while recent changes to the National Education Law will make it more difficult to teach or use ethnic minority languages in the classroom. It has also said it will enact the Prevention of Violence against Women Law. The NUG can underscore its credentials by being a more competent law-drafting body that works for the benefit of all.
Women’s involvement in armed conflict is a particularly difficult issue to navigate in Myanmar, as elsewhere, given the deeply ingrained perception that women should not be on the front line. Many women trained as combatants have themselves been socialised to believe that they are unfit for battle. But preventing women from taking on front-line duties in order to protect them, or because they are perceived as weak, perpetuates harmful gender norms. It also puts more pressure on male soldiers to live up to a masculinist warrior ideal, when some may be better suited to support roles. As a result, armed groups are not necessarily using their personnel in the most effective way. Keeping women away from the front lines also robs them of opportunities for advancement, leaving the leadership of armed groups predominantly male. While armed groups may have varying approaches to managing this issue – for example, by giving members more options in job assignments or by keeping the newest recruits off the front lines – they should, for a start, stop assigning combatants to particular roles on the basis of their gender.
Armed resistance groups also need to address the issue of sexual harassment before it becomes a more significant problem. Aside from the imperative to stop unacceptable behaviour toward women, failing to address the issue could cause serious damage to the opposition movement in a range of ways, from tarnishing its image, both domestically and internationally, to undermining support among women. The NUG’s Ministry of Women, Youth and Children Affairs could play an important role in facilitating the development of anti-sexual harassment policies for PDFs that have claimed allegiance to it, conducting virtual or in-person training sessions, and putting in place a complaints mechanism it would administer. Armed groups that are independent of the NUG would not necessarily adhere to such a policy, but they might be open to cooperating with the NUG or civil society organisations on the issue.
Myanmar’s independent media also has a role to play in dispelling gender stereotypes.99 Focusing primarily on front-line fighting, as these media outlets now tend to do, reinforces the idea that men are leading the resistance, because they make up the bulk of soldiers. By broadening the focus of reporting to the many ways in which a range of people can and do contribute to the anti-military cause – as was more common in the early months after the coup – the media could better serve the cause of inclusivity, particularly when it comes to gender.
To help drive an inclusive agenda, international donors can ... in-crease support to women and youth-led movements.
To help drive an inclusive agenda, international donors can, for their part, increase support to women and youth-led movements to strengthen their institutional capacity and expand their work in this area. Those groups have already been important conduits for aid to displaced people from both domestic and international sources, but they require core funding in addition to project-based support, and for activities beyond aid delivery. That may require injecting a dose of flexibility into their normal procedures. As many Myanmar civil society groups and NGOs are unregistered – especially those that have formed since the coup – they should in particular relax rules that require grantees to register, and those that regulate how funds are transferred, such as by allowing the use of informal mechanisms rather than banks.
Civil society organisations, meanwhile, should seek to expand their engagement with newly formed anti-military forces beyond humanitarian aid delivery into new areas, such as gender and human rights. Some of those now running anti-military forces, such as PDFs, have a civil society background and are likely to be open to discussions and training on these issues. Such engagement could have a positive impact not only on the armed groups’ policies, but also on those of the new administrative bodies affiliated with them.
The harassment of women activists on social media, particularly by pro-military accounts, is a concerning development. Although intended to discredit the anti-military movement, it has a much wider chilling effect, largely because of the sexual nature of the attacks; women worry that they will become targets if they speak up against the regime. Telegram, in particular, has taken little action to rein in these pro-military actors, who have also caused real-world harm in other ways.100 If Telegram does not start taking content moderation on its platform seriously, lawmakers and regulators in foreign jurisdictions should pressure it to do so: since the regime was banned from Facebook in February 2021, Telegram has become the primary social media platform through which it spreads disinformation and hate. The NUG, which has so far said little about doxing, could help increase the pressure on Telegram by drawing attention to the problem, and possibly by introducing a policy of its own barring the practice.
VI.
Conclusion
The February 2021 military coup has created new opportunities for women and younger people to wield political power. They have seized on a moment of disruption to push politics and society in a more progressive direction, challenging longstanding age and gender norms. Young people have created new political platforms through which to articulate their demands, and forced more established political leaders to not only engage with them, but also to adopt policies that reflect their wishes and demands.
Yet more needs to be done to consolidate initial gains. Despite widespread recognition of their ability, ingenuity and commitment to the cause, young people and women are still struggling to overcome patriarchal beliefs, even within the resistance, about gender roles and the definition of a capable leader. The NUG, the NUCC and ethnic armed groups need to pay greater attention to inclusion, while foreign actors should do whatever they can to encourage the nascent social changes, including by supporting women- and youth-led organisations.
Myanmar’s present crisis looks set to be protracted and its outcome is uncertain, but changing age and gender norms within the resistance may well, over time, shape those in politics and society more broadly. Newly formed anti-military armed groups and political structures – as well as the country’s long-established ethnic armed groups – have a significant amount of influence. Further, the political vision they are fighting for will continue to be salient in the years ahead; this will likely be the case even if the regime cracks down further. Nurturing a greater role for young people and women at this formative time could thus contribute to making Myanmar a more inclusive society, particularly when it comes to political leadership and opportunities, even amid an environment of deep uncertainty..."
Source/publisher:
International Crisis Group (Belgium)
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-16
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2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Spring Revolution
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Over 40 percent of the Karenni population has been forced to flee their homes since May 2021.
Description:
"For decades, the Myanmar military has waged a violent campaign of terror against civilians. Coordinated attempts have sought to drive ethnic groups from their homelands through systematic and widespread violence that has not spared even the most vulnerable. These same militarized acts continue today, contributing to a worsening sense of insecurity.
Our organizations – the Karenni Human Rights Group, the Kayan Women’s Organization, the Karenni National Women’s Organization, and the Kayah State Peace Monitoring Network – recently released a new report, “How can we survive in the future?”: Atrocity Crimes in Karenni State. In the report, we document extensive evidence of war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by the regime in the Karenni areas between May 2021 and September 2022. The junta’s systemic cycle of violence continues unabated. As recently as January 24, 2023, the military used warplanes to target Karenni civilians seeking refuge in internally displaced persons (IDP) camps in Loikaw, the capital of Karenni State.
Karenni (Kayah) State is a small state situated in eastern Myanmar, with an approximate population of 300,000. Another estimated 120,000 Karenni people live in the Pekhon township area to the northwest of the geographic boundary of Karenni State, in southern Shan State. Since May 2021, more than 40 percent of the Karenni population has been forcibly displaced, mostly women and children. The five townships of Loikaw, Hpruso, Shadaw, Deemaw Soe, and Pekhon have been almost entirely abandoned. Whenever our people see Myanmar army soldiers or airplanes approaching, they flee because they know that attacks are imminent. IDPs we interviewed for the report repeatedly shared the trauma they are experiencing from the relentless mortar shelling, bombs, and gunfire.
Dozens have been killed in these attacks, and thousands more have lost their homes and livelihoods. Among the key findings in our report, at least 1,190 homes in 87 Karenni towns, wards, and villages have been heavily damaged or completely destroyed by junta forces, in addition to 33 religious buildings and four medical clinics.
Neither age nor gender matters to the Burmese military. As long as they have bodies shielding their battalions from attacks, they continue to force our people to be human shields for them in conflict zones. We documented six separate incidents of forced labor and the use of civilians as human shields by the Myanmar military, involving at least 65 Karenni civilians, including women and children. Four people were killed while serving as human shields.
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The Myanmar military consistently fails to adhere to basic human rights norms and principles, terrorizing the Karenni population with no rule of law to hold them accountable. Civilians can be killed anytime, and anywhere by the military. They routinely arrest and punish human rights defenders and activists for resisting the will of the junta. We documented the arbitrary arrests of at least 260 Karenni civilians, including 33 women, by junta forces throughout Karenni areas.
At least 115 civilians have been killed while in regime custody over the reporting period. The arbitrary arrests and murders of Karenni civilians are neither isolated cases nor accidents. These human rights violations are part of a pattern of collective punishment to instill fear into the population.
For too long, our Karenni communities have suffered from targeted violence by junta forces. When we have called for peace, they have turned their weapons on us. Global actors must take concrete steps beyond mere “statement diplomacy” to protect the thousands of civilians who live with the daily threat of being murdered by the military regime.
We welcome the recent decisions by the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand to impose new targeted sanctions on the second anniversary of the attempted coup. The U.K. imposed sanctions on individuals and parts of the Asia Sun group involved in the transfer of aviation fuel to the junta’s air force, while Canada prohibited the export, sale, and supply of aviation fuel to the regime. The new U.S. sanctions focus on the Union Election Commission, military-controlled mining entities, and officials in the energy sector.
But in the wake of two years of atrocity crimes, so much more urgently needs to be done to cut sources of arms, aviation fuel, and revenue to Myanmar’s military regime. It requires a concerted, coordinated global effort. The response from the international community has been painfully slow and inadequate. As a result, the junta is emboldened to commit more atrocity crimes with impunity.
Domestically, our legal system cannot hold Myanmar soldiers accountable for their actions, as impunity is embedded in the system. We urge the international community to acknowledge that the junta is responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity – not only in Karenni State, but across the whole country – and act accordingly. There must be international justice and accountability to end the cycle of impunity. The situation in Myanmar demands a referral to the International Criminal Court, which provides a pathway to justice and reparations for the thousands of victims. We also urge states to exercise universal jurisdiction to investigate any individual from Myanmar who may be responsible for committing war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide.
Without justice and accountability, there can be no lasting peace. Our Karenni communities simply want to live in peace and enjoy basic human rights..."
Source/publisher:
"The Diplomat" (Japan)
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-16
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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Sub-title:
Statement on Singapore’s prohibition of arms and dual-use item transfers to Myanmar
Description:
"The National Unity Government strongly welcomes Singapore’s confirmation that it prohibits arms
transfers to the illegal military junta in Myanmar.
H.E. Dr Vivian Balakrishnan, Minister for Foreign Affairs, confirmed the existing ban in a
parliamentary statement on 14 February 2023, highlighting that it was consistent with UN General
Assembly Resolution 75/287 (2021) on the situation in Myanmar, which Singapore voted for.
Foreign Minister Balakrishnan also confirmed that Singapore would not authorise the transfer of dualuse
items "assessed to have potential military application to Myanmar, where there is a serious risk that
they may be used to inflict violence against unarmed civilians" . Putting corporations on notice, the
Foreign Minister added that Singapore would take a “very firm line” against companies who
contravened its laws including those on the transfer and brokering of strategic goods and technology.
The National Unity Government extends its sincere gratitude to the Government of Singapore for its
principled stance, and to Foreign Minister Balakrishnan for his expressions of solidarity with the
Myanmar people.
The National Unity Government remains committed to working in partnership with Myanmar’s fellow
ASEAN Members to end the illegal junta’s atrocities and to advance the peace, security and prosperity
of our region..."
Source/publisher:
President Office - National Unity Government
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-16
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Singapore-Burma relations
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Two years since the coup, the rest of the world remains helpless even as the military has entrenched itself
Description:
"Just over two years since Myanmar’s armed forces, the Tatmadaw, overthrew the duly elected National League for Democracy (NLD) government headed by Aung San Suu Kyi, the country is in a perilous state. The UN estimates that 4.5 million people need life-saving humanitarian support, almost half the population are living in poverty, reversing all the development gains made since 2005, and at least 1.5 million have been displaced. The Burmese scholar Win Myo Thu recently wrote: “Myanmar’s military has gone beyond repression or terrorising ethnic minority groups – it is making war on society as a whole.” The entire country, he concluded, “is now a conflict zone”.
Yet, this disastrous ongoing crisis appears to have gone off the international radar. True, the UN Security Council did adopt a resolution on Myanmar – its first for 74 years – at the end of last year, which called for an immediate end to all forms of violence, the release of all arbitrarily detained prisoners, including Suu Kyi, and urged constructive dialogue and reconciliation and the implementation of the peace plan formulated by the Association of South-East Asian Nations (Asean), to which the country belongs.
However, the UN’s own Special Rapporteur for Myanmar, Thomas Andrews, immediately said the wording didn’t go anywhere near far enough. “Demanding that certain actions be taken without any use of the Security Council’s Chapter VII authority, will not stop the illegal Myanmar junta from attacking and destroying the lives of the 54 million people being held hostage,” he said in a statement. “What is required is action.”
Myanmar’s neighbours China and India both abstained in the vote, as did Russia, which has been supportive of coup leader Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, while the Burma Campaign UK’s director, Mark Farmaner, complained that “the supply of arms doesn’t even get a mention in the resolution”, adding that a global arms embargo ought to have been a “no-brainer first step”.
Perhaps a world that is much preoccupied with other matters has looked to Asean to take the lead. The junta did agree to an Asean “five-point consensus” two months after the coup, but then completely ignored its main demands such as ending violence and facilitating dialogue between all parties. In response to the lack of progress, Asean has banned the country’s generals from regional meetings since August 2022. Last week, Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim said that the grouping “should carve Myanmar out for now”, which many took to mean suspending its membership.
A key rationale for allowing Myanmar to join Asean in 1997 was that it might encourage the generals, who were then in charge, to take the path towards democracy and pluralism. Given that all the reforms have been discarded in favour of an even more brutal military dictatorship, suspension would be a just rebuke.
Indonesia, Asean’s current chair, may be taking a different approach, with President Joko Widodo’s right-hand man, former four-star general Luhut Pandjaitan, tipped to be appointed the association’s special envoy for the country. The suggestion is that a fellow member of the top brass might be best-placed to explain the advantages of Indonesia’s move from being a military-led autocracy under Gen Suharto from 1966 to a democracy in 1998. But Myanmar’s generals cannot understand why Indonesia’s army gave up its privileged “dual function” of guarding the country and dominating politics and the economy. “The Tatmadaw regards that decision as an incomprehensible error,” said Aaron Connelly of Singapore’s International Institute for Strategic Studies.
The situation in the two countries is not analogous in any case. In fact, apart from a brief period of democracy from independence in 1948 until 1962, when Gen Ne Win took over in a coup, the military has always held on to the levers of power – as it continued to do under the 2008 constitution, which left the ministries of home, border affairs and defence and one of the two vice president posts under the Tatmadaw’s control.
It is worth remembering that for many of those decades, the West and its allies did not object too strenuously to this arrangement. Gen Ne Win’s “Burmese Way to Socialism” ideology may have impoverished the country and reduced parts of it to a police state, but, crucially, he was not aligned to the Communist bloc during the Cold War. I have never forgotten a Malaysian cabinet minister from the 1970s telling me: “Ne Win was our friend.”
It was because of the Tatmadaw’s centrality to the country that some argued, before the 2008 constitution and the supposed “roadmap to democracy” announced in 2003, that they had to be a part of the solution. Almost certainly because her assassinated father, Myanmar’s independence hero Aung San, was considered to be the founder of the Tatmadaw, his daughter Suu Kyi has often sounded curiously fond of the institution, if not of the officers who have jailed her time and again, talking of it sometimes as if it was a wayward son.
However, after the 2021 coup and the thousands of deaths for which the Tatmadaw are responsible, as well as what most consider to be their genocidal actions against the ethnic minority Rohingya, it would seem even more unpalatable to negotiate a new settlement with them. But what is the alternative?
Mahn Win Khaing Than, prime minister of the National Unity Government that opposes the junta, said in January 2022 that the solution was total revolution. “Everyone understands now that the military has to be eradicated,” he said. All the country’s many ethnic minorities had come together, he said, and “we would have won a long time ago if they [the Tatmadaw] didn’t have an air force”. Victory, he promised, would be “by the end of this year”.
That hasn’t been the outcome, and probably won’t be anytime soon and no outside power has the appetite for military intervention.
“The country will have to suffer for several decades to come if we don’t win this fight,” was Mahn Win Khaing Than’s bleak prediction a little more than a year ago. That may be true, too. But just because the outside world doesn’t know how to help Myanmar avoid that fate – as it really didn’t have a way to overturn military rule before – is not a reason to forget about it. Don’t let this tragedy disappear from our horizons..."
Source/publisher:
"The National"
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-16
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Type:
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2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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Myanmar’s journalists are rebuilding independent media with one foot in the country, and one foot out, writes Laure Siegel.
Description:
"As Myanmar’s bloody coup ticks over into its third year, local journalists continue to struggle to sustain and build independent media voices in support of democracy both inside the country and in the growing refugee diaspora.
It’s an evolving ecosystem depending on an underground network, including citizen journalists, philanthropic support, experimentation in distribution and voices — and raw courage in the face of a violent oppression by the Tatmadaw military junta.
The military broke the old system.
“I didn’t want to give up this job. But since the coup, journalists can’t report freely and have to worry about their and their relatives’ safety. So I had to flee.” says a young woman print and TV reporter, now in Thailand.
Journalists were among the first to be hunted down after the military coup, led by General Min Aung Hlaing on February 1, 2021, along with opposition politicians, social workers and activists. In the two years since, four journalists — all working in local media or as freelancers — have been killed and 145 arrested. About 60 remain in detention.
It effectively dismantled the network of democratic media that had spread across the country over the previous decade. Instead, the Myanmar junta became the world’s biggest jailer of journalists relative to population. The Committee for the Protection of Journalists listed Myanmar as the eighth worst country worldwide for impunity for crimes against journalists.
An independent media emerges
Still, the military’s attempts to control the media landscape did not stop a surge in independent outlets and content creation. This period also observed a decrease in popularity of state-controlled media.
Two years after the coup, the top media by audience remain the trusted four: BBC Burmese, Mizzima, Democratic Voice of Burma (DVB) and Voice of America (VOA).
All struggle to monetize this audience, especially as digital advertising prices have collapsed in Myanmar. One million online impressions earns media companies $US10, compared to $US570 in Europe and $US130 in Thailand.
Social media distribution has been constrained as Meta’s platforms have been banned in Myanmar.Now, only half of the country’s internet users who have access to VPNs can still access Meta. According to a survey by the News Consulting Group, only a third of Myanmar Meta users actively use Facebook as a main source of news.
“We have problems with Facebook because they don’t understand that we are covering a war so they regularly categorise our account as “Page at risk”. But only local media are punished for community violations when they publish videos of violent acts, not the big media. So when they block our audience, even though we have one million followers, we only reach 1000 people per post”.- founder of local media covering Myanmar central plains
As the usual revenue models of subscriptions, advertisements and events are denied independent media, most have turned to philanthropic grants to remain sustainable.
This has created an imbalance between the mainly English-language national media and the more poorly resourced, mostly local, media in Myanmar’s languages who lack staff dedicated to accounting or human resource management. Delays in transferring funds also disadvantages reporters relying on grants for their income:
We know how to write stories but we don’t know how to write proposals or grant forms. Our English skills are not good enough to fulfill the diverse requirements of international organizations, so we get less financial support than the big national media. — a local editor.
Most independent media have been forced to operate underground or abroad, mainly in Thailand, Bangladesh and India. At least a thousand Burmese journalists are estimated to live in exile since the coup, including a third in Thailand, often without refugee protections or the legal status that would allow them to pursue professional or educational opportunities. Their properties in Myanmar can still be seized and destroyed and their relatives are vulnerable to being taken hostage to impose pressure to keep quiet.
It’s a “one foot in, one foot out” model that brings big challenges. Despite those challenges, Myanmar’s journalists keep performing their duty of keeping their communities informed.
In-country, local media keeps providing a key link.
“Local media have built a very reliable network of sources over the years: they are our friends, relatives, neighbours. Even the media based in exile on the borderlands can still use the Myanmar telecom network to reach sources inside the country,” local editor.
They face greater risks, too, and have a responsibility to protect those sources — including from unwanted exposure by national or international media.
Hundreds of trainers conduct online and in-person capacity-building training sessions in mobile reporting, investigation, digital safety and feature writing. Organizations such as Myanmar Witness or the Center for Law and Democracy teach both citizen journalists and professional journalists to gather evidence of war crimes that could be used in international court cases.
Despite the electricity and Internet cuts, new distribution formats are being tested and developed, such as SMS, newsletters and podcasts. One prominent example is Kaladan media, the first Rohingya News Agency, which has been based in Bangladesh since 2001. They are one of the founders of the Burma News International (BNI), a network of fifteen independent media groups led by exiled Burmese journalists in India, Bangladesh and Thailand that was launched in 2003.
“We have been consistently challenging, monitoring and investigating the Burma Army Islamophobic narrative. During anti-Muslim violence in Myanmar, our website was hacked for six months and we were blocked on Facebook numerous times because of some users abusively reporting us. Our people don’t have easy access to the Internet so we launched a 30 minutes daily news bulletin, which is broadcasted in communal meeting places in refugee camps via loudspeakers.” — Tin Soe, editor-in-chief of the Kaladan Press Network explains.
Frontier Myanmar continues to run Doh Athan (“Our Voice”) program and local media such as Delta News Agency for the Irrawaddy region and Myaelatt Athan for Sagaing and Magway regions launched podcasts and weekly TV shows.
“We have three podcasts, one about news, one about healthcare and one is called ‘Letter from People Defence Forces’. We are reading on-air letters of pro-democracy fighters to their relatives or girlfriends. It’s a nice format that allows us to connect them with the people as they are trying to survive underground and are isolated from everyone”. A representative for Myaelatt Athan.
Dr. Miemie Winn Byrd, Adjunct Fellow at the East-West Center emphasises: “A successful revolution is at least 75% communication. In the context of Myanmar, I see the way forward as systematising the defection of soldiers, focusing on people’s support and keeping up the international interest”.
In the spirit of building bridges between skills and nationalities, the collective Visual Rebellion Myanmar was co-founded after the coup by Burmese media students and international creatives. A newsroom of journalists and artists based inside Myanmar and around the world produces together in-depth features, research reports, photo stories and documentaries about the impact of the coup from a human perspective. Some of the best content is adapted and translated to other languages, such as a series for French investigative outlet Mediapart.
Visual Rebellion is committed to prioritize story angles where people are agents and not only victims of their fates. This includes the unionization of Myanmar migrant workers in Thailand, the founding of a photo-magazine by Rohingya people in Cox’s Bazar refugee camp, women fighting frontline battles and grassroots coping mechanisms for surviving the economic crisis generated by the coup.
After a year-long scorched-earth campaign in the central plains by military troops, one member of the collective who is native to the area, explained: “I can’t write about dead bodies and burned villages anymore because it is repetitive in its horror, it publicises terrorist actions by the junta which has a deep impact on the moral of the people and it has a huge impact on my mental health as I know the areas and people targeted very well since childhood. We need to find other ways to tell the story”.
As it is estimated that 75 percent of the stories published by Burmese media are coup or conflict related, several audience surveys show a phenomenon of “coup-fatigue”. People would rather read about topics such as commodity prices, health, education and agriculture, as well as weather, refugees, business and international affairs.
Local journalists on the front line
As most international and national media pulled out their staff out of Myanmar, they rely for on the ground information on citizen reporters who sent information, pictures and videos from their phones and are poorly paid, or not paid at all.
It’s forcing a division in the Myanmar media community with different treatment between management-level editors who are often safely re-based abroad and on-the-ground, junior reporters survive on their own in precarious situations. National and international media often use content gathered by local media without compensation.
“Relying on non-professional media workers carries big risks: they struggle with emotional distance, take low-resolution pictures, send them to all media houses and then face copyright issues, some share names of sources online and most are not trained enough to check accuracy. Digital, physical, psycho-social and legal safety is a precondition for producing professional journalism and local citizens can’t fill the void without being given the proper tools.” — Toby Mendel, executive director for the Center of Law and Democracy
The pauperization of the information sector post-coup has pushed down media rates and professional reporters still present in the country now get offered citizen reporter wages. Media workers lack the negotiating power and industry body to obtain fair wages and safety measures, as denounced in the Anti-Theft Wage Campaign by the International Federation of Journalists,
The division drives internal mistrust. The founder of a local media in hiding in a Thai-Myanmar border town, says: “We try to identify military propaganda accounts by the terms they use to refer to the junta. We also know that some “journalists” come to border towns in Thailand to spy on real reporters in exile and report to the military back in Myanmar. Some journalists who were working for pro-military newspapers even get hired by independent media houses nowadays because there is no background check and clearance process anymore. Now anyone can apply for a media job via Messenger by sending some pictures and footage and claiming experience after having attended a two-week training for Citizen Reporters.
A group of reporters in exile has started a consultative process with independent media houses with the goal of creating a new MPC and Code of Conduct, freed from business or military chains, be it from the Burmese army or opposition forces. They also lobby the body in charge of drafting a Federal Democracy Charter, to include a clause about press freedom and journalism protection in the future Constitution.
Whichever political situation emerges from the ongoing conflict, the journalistic community is already engaged in healthy debates about implementing policies of self-regulation, rethinking ownership structure and pushing for inclusion as well as gender and ethnic diversity. A balance between external support and internal reflection is the way for Myanmar media to survive the war of information that is raging in the country.
Laure Siegel is a Southeast Asia based reporter for @Mediapart (http://rb.gy/qyvflr) and founder of @VisualRebellion Myanmar // In English (http://bit.ly/2WWnwA2)
This story is supported by the Friedrich Naumann Foundation as part of IPI’s work mapping and sharing the most exciting innovative and local media initiatives globally..."
Source/publisher:
International Press Institute
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-15
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"Abstract: Frequently called the most persecuted minority in the world, the Rohingyas have suffered systematic violence and oppression in Myanmar since the 1970s. Today, the vast majority of the nearly three million Rohingyas are in exile, escaping state-sponsored human rights violations and persecution in the Rakhine state of Myanmar—a place they call “home”. Neighbouring Bangladesh, which currently hosts over a million displaced Rohingya, has been a ‘sanctuary’ for at least the last four decades. A sizable community has also emerged successively in other South-East Asian countries and pockets of Australia, Europe and North America. In this context, bringing together issues at the crossroads of (im)mobilities, online connectivity and the quest for identity, this study examines the role of social media platforms in forming and shaping new types of diaspora activism among the exiled Rohingyas. Drawing on yearlong online ethnographic findings, it unpacks how digital platforms constitute a space for togetherness, where diasporic Rohingya identities are constructed, contested and mediated. Analysing recurring themes and patterns of engagement on these web-based platforms, the paper looks at how diasporic civic and political e-activisms are transforming the very contours of Rohingya identity formation and their pursuit of recognition. Finally, focusing on such a creative constellation of socio-cultural and political issues in virtual space, we demonstrate how Rohingyas practice a politics of resistance and recognition when confronting the policy pretensions of Myanmar’s government.
Introduction
“In the first place, we do not like to be called ‘refugees.’“—Hannah Arendt.
In her classic essay “We Refugees”, Hannah Arendt describes the endless cognitive anxiety amongst the Jews of Europe as they fled the continent and made a new life in exile (Arendt, 2017). She depicts how difficult it is to relate to the psychological effects of political non-existence unless one has traversed the liminal space of a refugee. The contemporaneous of forced displacement, statelessness and the relentless search for a ‘safe place’ and an ‘identity’ across the globe reminds us how recurring and prescient Hannah Arendt’s century-old observation remains. Set within such interconnected trajectories of violence, statelessness and an endless search for identity, this paper puts a spotlight on Myanmar’s displaced Rohingyas—a scattered community in the process of becoming a nascent diaspora as a result of their protracted displacement. Since 2017, after their mass exodus from the Rakhine state into neighbouring Bangladesh, exiled Rohingya communities have started highlighting their plight while asserting a distinct ethnic identity (Ansar & Khaled, 2022; Abraham & Jaehn, 2020). Considering their increasing involvement in social, cultural and political issues on social media platforms, this article explores how the Rohingya diaspora has coalesced in digital spaces to build a transnational identity and how their digital activism has evolved to include a political dimension over time.
Frequently termed ‘the world’s most persecuted minority’, the Rohingyas have been subjected to persistent human rights violations, including ethnic cleansing, statelessness and possibly even genocide (Khaled, 2021; Ansar, 2020; Ibrahim, 2018; Alam, 2018). By introducing punitive policies, Rohingyas have been categorically denied a range of fundamental rights by the Myanmar government, including the freedom of movement, rights to education, primary health facilities, having family, marriage and employment (Ansar & Khaled, 2021; Uddin, 2020). Ethnic cleansing and persecution of Rohingyas in Myanmar and denial of their citizenship (therefore, effectively rendering them stateless) has been the political strategy of the successive military regimes. Today, the vast majority of the nearly three million Rohingyas is displaced, mostly in neighbouring Bangladesh, Malaysia, India and Thailand, as well as in in pockets across Europe, Australia and North America.
The predicament of the Rohingyas essentially remain unresolved in exile. The ambiguity around Rohingya’ s legal status pertaining to their perceived statelessness, irregular migration and lack of comprehensive protection policies in the host countries add to their struggle to survive and sustain. Most Rohingya-hosting Asian countries deny their rights as refugees stipulated in the 1951 Refugee Convention. Their confinement in makeshift settlements and sprawling camps, ambiguous and/or undocumented legal status and host countries’ arbitrary practices create certain mobility constraints, which Aziz (2022, p. 1) refers to as “immobility turn” or limited mobility within “situations of unequal power”. Furthermore, mobility is linked to legality and capacity in modern nation-states, which Rohingyas lack in Myanmar due to draconian military laws banning social gatherings and community mobilisation (Ansar & Khaled, 2022, p. 281). In exile, this “arrested refugee mobilities” (Hoffstaedter, 2019) that the Rohingya community continues to endure produces both horizontal (i.e., spatial/geographic) immobility and vertical (social) immobility, which cyclically compound each other (Jernigan, 2019). Nevertheless, amid such challenges, a diaspora network has grown, especially since 2017, with considerable online imprints. We define the growing digital footprint of the Rohingya community as the emergence of a ‘Rohingya Digital Diaspora’. Highlighting their increasing online participation, our findings reveal how such engagement reinvigorates a collective identity, mobilises civic resistance and builds a virtual ‘community of hope’ by providing material and emotional support.
Reflecting on these evolving Rohingya online engagements, this study makes a threefold contribution to digital diaspora studies. First, we examined how the (re)production of Rohingya identities on social media demonstrates their hybrid, multi-layered and fluid nature. Second, considering the constrained offline space and (im)mobility dynamics, we looked into how access to social media can yield an opportunity for ethnic and religious minorities such as Rohingyas for transnational lobbying, advocacy and agenda-framing towards building a strategic and positive consensus around their cause. Third, while celebrating “digital optimism”, a nuanced reflection on the offline inequalities, such as those manifested by age, gender, internet access, economic status and spatiality, needs to be adequately contextualised.
The debate on Rohingya identity: the unfolding of belonging, exclusion and exile
The nation-state centric identity has always been marked by a high degree of hybridity and ambiguity in post-colonial societies. In South and Southeast Asia, “questions surrounding nationality, citizenship, religion and identity are recurrent themes between the countries once united but separate nation-states now” (Sengupta, 2020, p. 114). Similarly, ethnic and religious identity and space are constantly being contested, refined and reorganised in the political landscape of Myanmar. This is particularly prominent in the bordering Rakhine state, where the formation of Rohingya identity has been heavily influenced by such fluidity (Ansar, 2020, p. 4).
Several issues appear to be decisive when we explore the documentation and broad historical analysis of how questions of Rohingya identity and conflict in the Rakhine state have arrived at this stage. These include: the stripping of the Rohingya citizenship and their statelessness (Uddin, 2020; Holliday, 2014); the role of Rohingyas during the colonial period (Alam, 2018; Ibrahim, 2018); military dictatorship and the emergence of Taing-Yin-tha meaning “national races” (Cheesman, 2017); and religion and the perceived threat from Islam (Ansar, 2020; Kyaw, 2015; Wade, 2017). These are just some of the profound issues to unpack in order to understand the making of the current crisis.
Broadly, three lines of arguments can be identified when exploring the Rohingya identity. First, some scholars claim a historic Rohingya presence in Myanmar (Uddin, 2020; Shafie, 2019; Ibrahim, 2018). Secondly, there are scholars who tend to discredit such narratives that argue Rohingya is a post-colonial political identity promoted by the Muslim political elites in Arakan as a tool to promote their fight for political autonomy after the Second World War (Leider, 2018; Tonkin, 2014). The third line of argument instead takes a critical approach between the two opposing narratives. Going beyond the polarising opinions, it argues that the fundamental question of the process of identity formation and the complex status of the ethnic and religious minorities in post-colonial nation-state formation should be in the spotlight (Ansar, 2020; Sengupta, 2020; Alam, 2018).
One of the watershed moments in modern-day Myanmar’s identity politics is the emergence of Taing-Yin-tha, or “the indigenous races”, under the 1982 citizenship law introduced by the military dictatorship in Myanmar. The concept of Taing-Yin-tha emerged as a decisive political language that provides the guideline of which facts are accepted and rejected in determining membership in Myanmar’s political community. In contemporary Myanmar, Taing-Yin-tha has become an exemplary term of state: a contrivance for political inclusion and exclusion, political eligibility and domination (Cheesman, 2017, p. 462). The Rohingya were not included among the 135 official indigenous races. Consequently, some 2.5 million Rohingyas are excluded from Taing-Yin-tha, making them one of the world’s largest stateless populations. They remain the only community in independent Myanmar whose citizenship is “still unresolved and contested by the government and people”(Kyaw, 2015, p. 50). Going further, Uddin (2020, p.4) argues that Myanmar’s dealing with the Rohingyas is not just a manifestation of their non-citizenship; it is precisely a practice meant to “reduce the Rohingyas to a status lesser than that of human beings”, and thereby push them into a ‘subhuman life’.
From diaspora to digital diaspora: revisiting a complex transformation
Diaspora is a concept subject to various definitions and interpretations (Ponzanesi, 2020). It is defined “as a set of relationships between the homeland, which functions as a centre of gravity, and a periphery of nodes—communities, groups and individuals—who relate to the territory of origin as a centre of gravity but live in different parts of the world” (Ben-David, 2012, p. 461). Earlier studies mainly considered the dispersed population as diaspora, i.e., the Jewish, Greek and Armenian communities in exile. Today, this term shares meanings “with a larger semantic domain that includes words like an immigrant, expatriate, refugee, guest worker, exile community, overseas community, ethnic community” (Tölölyan, 1991, p. 04). While a distinction between various forms of diasporas is plausible, community belongingness, a sense of loss, nostalgia and transnationality are universal features embedded in almost all diaspora communities.
The influence of information and communication technology in the past decade has not only transformed the ways and scales of interactions among diaspora members but also led to a substantial transformation in the modern understanding of diaspora (Marat, 2015; Lobbé, 2021; Bernal, 2020). From structured networks of migrant websites to more personalised WhatsApp and Facebook groups, the wide variety of digital layers is taking the notion of diasporic organisations to a new height (Dekker et al., 2018; Dumitriu, 2012). In this changing milieu, hybrid and multifaceted migrant identities are constructed and negotiated through various discursive means (Georgalou, 2021). The advancements and proliferation of such online communication technologies encouraged a new form of virtual diasporic connections and networks that is gaining prominence as the digital diaspora. This connection reminds the members of “where their roots are, their original home, their sense of belonging, their community” (Ponzanesi, 2020, p. 983).
Emerging scholarship has started to accentuate the evolving nexus between technological advancement, the proliferation of social media and the ability of diaspora populations to create networks and become part of transnational diaspora networks (Alonso & Oiarzabal, 2010; Kapur, 2010; Alunni, 2019). In digital migration studies, research has made a significant contribution to understanding refugees’ engagement with social media and other digital tools to stay in contact with transnational families during their migration, as well as during their process of settlement in the host countries (Alencar et al., 2018; Kaufmann, 2018; Leurs & Smets, 2018). Recent studies on digital diasporas also bring together complex intersections of technology, culture, political economy and agency (Bernal, 2020). For instance, in contrast to the earlier opinion of celebrating digital media as liberating and empowering for marginalised groups (Titifanue et al., 2018), more critical analysis now raises questions regarding the outcome of digital empowerment and whether such tools can bring about changes in the political and social discourse (Taylor & Meissner, 2020; Latonero & Kift, 2018; Papacharissi, 2015).
Scholars also attempted to reveal how big corporations and states use digital platforms to extend their centralised power and use it for surveillance purposes when necessary (Bircan & Korkmaz, 2021; Zuboff, 2019). Furthermore, social media posts and activities are being systematically monitored to validate or disprove the LGBTIQ identity of many refugees requesting asylum in European countries. Targeted social media campaigns and recruitment of paid agents to monitor the Facebook activities of migrants have also become one of the strategies for governments to control and counter immigration (Andreassen, 2021; Brekke & Thorbjørnsrud, 2020). Scholars have also started to highlight the potentially pernicious role of digital tools in stimulating ‘digital nationalism’ by dividing public debate through the establishment of filter ‘bubbles’ and ‘echo chambers’ in which individuals with homogenous political thinking promote ethnocentric ideas and content that align with their views and opinions. (Mihelj & Jiménez-Martínez, 2021; Cardenal et al., 2019; Dubois & Blank, 2017).
There is also growing criticism of the dominant strand of literature on digital migration studies that are heavily focused on the Global North, particularly Europe. Such criticism has become more widespread following the so-called refugee crisis in Europe in 2015, which demands a decentralised approach to diaspora and forced migration studies and input from the perspective of the Global South (Leurs & Smets, 2018). For instance, despite the scale and extent of the Rohingya crisis in Southeast Asia, literature that offers a nuanced understanding of their digital resistance and resilience remains inadequate. To date, we have come across only a few studies that partly address the digital engagement of Rohingya refugees (e.g., Aziz, 2022; Ansar & Khaled, 2022; Abraham & Jaehn, 2020). Taking a gender lens, Ansar & Khaled (2022) presents how social media has widened the scale and scope of Rohingya women activists’ civic participation in exile. In his latest work on Rohingya digital engagements, Aziz shows how digital platforms compensate for the community’s social and spatial immobility through “digitally mediated transnational care” (Aziz, 2022, p. 01). In another recent contribution, he also presents how “the affordances of social media platforms” have facilitated Rohingyas negotiating their protracted experiences of suffering (Aziz, 2022a, p. 4082). With a mix of online and offline platforms, Abraham and Jaehn’s study (2020) shows how “diasporic Rohingya actions go beyond readily understandable demands for justice, accountability, redress” and consciously, or otherwise, take steps to reaffirm collective Rohingya identity (p. 1056). Adding onto these unfolding dynamics, this article brings an organic reflection on this ‘digital diaspora in the making’ and their forms of engagement in online platforms and its manifold implications.
Theoretical and methodological framework
The paper’s theoretical foundations are based on the premise that scattered and oppressed ethnoreligious minorities or endangered groups, frequently organised in diasporas, use the internet to “re-create identities, share opportunities, spread their culture, influence homeland and host-land policy, or create debate about common-interest issues using electronic devices” (Alonso & Oiarzabal, 2010, p. 11). In an “unevenly interconnected world”, digital platforms provide spaces and offer alternatives to tap resources and capacity building, creating links and connectivity for dispersed communities (Ponzanesi, 2020, p. 978). This virtual space acts as “crucial protagonists” (Marino, 2015, p. 01) to manifest “diasporic identity, political activism and sentiment towards homeland” (Marat, 2015, p. 01). Besides, the “low barriers to entry and exit, and non-hierarchical and non-coercive” nature of the internet provides diasporas with a complete package of ‘benefits’ to pursue their socio-political and cultural endeavour on digital platforms (Brinkerhoff, 2009, pp. 47–48). Apart from creating a transnational network of solidarity, it allows the “expression of diverse and contested views” of the community members (Titifanue et al., 2018, p. 02).
Given the access to digital platforms by the exiled Rohingyas and the scale and extent of their virtual engagement, we have employed digital ethnography (Pink, 2013) as a method for observing their activities in virtual space. It is argued that such internet-based observations “can creatively deploy forms of engagement to look at how these sites are socially constructed and, at the same time, are social conduits” with ‘online traces’ such as retweets, hyperlinks and hashtags (Hine, 2009, p. 11). The rapidity with which people across several platforms keep up to date and their willingness to argue and voice opposing perspectives when appropriate via these interconnected networks is even more remarkable (Postill & Pink, 2012). These diverse and fast-changing characteristics have also led to more nuanced and innovative methods of using online ethnography (Pink et al., 2016). We use a ‘discourse-centred’ (Androutsopoulos, 2009) online ethnography and employ a ‘screen-based’ discourse analysis that concentrates on “systemic longitudinal and repeated observations of online-discourse” (Georgalou, 2021, p. 4).
In doing online ethnography, it is also pertinent to acknowledge the limitations of virtual platforms on the findings. For instance, Dicks et al. (2005, p.128) caution that the internet should never be read as a ‘neutral’ observation space, as it always remains a fieldwork setting and, as such, a researcher’s data selection and analyses are always biased by agendas, personal histories and social norms. Besides, the drawback of these research options is that membership of these communities is inherently restricted to the digital ‘haves’ (or at least those with digital social capital) rather than the ‘have nots’, and ethnic/gender digital divides strongly persist (Murthy, 2008). Therefore, like any other data source, social networking websites should be treated in a nuanced or layered fashion and contextualised properly (Murthy, 2008, p. 846).
Informed consent appears to be a crucial aspect of researching online communities. Whether and to what extent informed consent is required remains a contested topic (Willis, 2017, p. 3). According to Association of Internet Researchers (AoIR) ethical guidelines, public forums can be considered more public than conversations in a closed chatroom (Ess and AoIR, 2002: pp. 5, 7). Hence, ‘the greater the acknowledged publicity of the venue, the less obligation there may be to protect individual privacy, confidentiality, right to informed consent, etc.’ (Ess and AoIR, 2002, p. 5). Whiteman (2012, p. 9) also suggests it is preferable to take a contextualised approach to each online situation instead of adhering to generalised, context-free principles. Considering the above observations, the researchers sought ethical guidance from their respective institutions and received prior ethical approval before conducting their research. Furthermore, given the sensitivities of the topic, individual posts, images and tweets shared in this article are blurred to maintain confidentiality and any information that discloses the individual identity has been carefully revisited and avoided when referring to the data and images.
For data collection, we followed two major social media platforms: Facebook and Twitter. We analysed relevant Facebook and Twitter accounts and determined the top ten accounts based on the number of followers, the frequency of postings and the volume of comments. The Facebook pages and Twitter accounts were identified using eight search terms: ‘Rohingya refugee’, ‘Rohingya genocide’, ‘Rohingya women’, ‘exiled Rohingya’, ‘Rohingya activist’, ‘Arakan Rohingya’, ‘United Nations and Rohingya’ and ‘Rohingya in Bangladesh’. The qualitative corpus comprised posts and tweets that were open to the public. The study covers the period from August 2019 to August 2021. One of the authors has near-native fluency in the Rohingya language and initially attempted to explore Facebook pages and Twitter accounts on the Rohingya language despite the absence of Rohingya script, which remains an oral dialect (Aziz, 2022a, p. 4073). It did not yield significant success, prompting searching for relevant online platforms and social media tools using English.Footnote1 For instance, UNHCR in Malaysia has a dedicated website on “The Rohingya language”, which is written in Latin alphabets.Footnote2 Therefore, language and its digital representation bring another important dimension when exploring the Rohingya community’s social media engagement. The use of English in contemporary diaspora presents an ‘interesting cleavage’, as a native language is often considered a salient marker of collective identity (Kumar, 2018). We avoid the discussion at length here as it goes beyond the scope of our study; nonetheless, it is a crucial aspect to shed light on in future research on the Rohingyas. Nevertheless, we do acknowledge there are other platforms, including more private platforms like WhatsApp (Aziz, 2022a). We did not pursue these, as our purpose was to retrieve online and easily accessible data to any random visitor to those webpages.
For analysis, the transcripts of Facebook discussions and tweets were manually inserted into a dataset. This dataset was then transferred and analysed using Max Q.D.A. software to categorise the thematic contents, frequency of words, hashtags and recurring themes. Through this categorisation and coding, key themes emerged. These themes were then merged and clustered thematically, as detailed in the following section.
From exile to online: emergence of a digital Rohingya diaspora
Multiple trajectories, including the construction of a collective Rohingya identity, political and social mobilisation and solidarity with fellow Rohingyas through providing information and long-distance emotional and material support, have emerged as the recurring features of their digital engagements. The internet has effectively bridged geographical barriers amongst Rohingyas with similar concerns by functioning as a ‘mobilising structure’ (Kumar, 2018, p. 11). The proliferation of virtual engagements creates conditions where individuals come together on shared hopes, purposes and objectives, which Tsagarousianou (2007) defined as ‘co-presence’ and Marino (2015) refers to as ‘space making’.
To detail out these manifold engagements, we conduct a two-pronged analysis of the Rohingya diaspora’s digital participation. First, we begin with a focus on the scale of engagement, bringing attention to their growing participation in digital space. Second, we take a more in-depth look at the domains of engagement, highlighting the key aspects that predominate in the interaction that takes place online.
Scale of engagement
Owing to rapid development and relatively easier access to technologies, more Rohingyas are embracing digital platforms to interact with one another and the greater international communities. For example, only three of the ten most followed Facebook pages were created before 2017. Table 1 presents an overview of the ten most popular (in terms of membership) Rohingya Facebook groups active in different parts of the world, where membership reaches as high as 223,000 as of August 2021 (see Table 1).Footnote3..."
Source/publisher:
Nature.com
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-15
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Arakan (Rakhine) State - reports etc. by date (latest first), Discrimination against the Rohingya, Rohingya (cultural, political etc.), Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Burmese refugees in Bangladesh, Human Rights and international relations
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Sub-title:
Karenni activist Neineh Plo says cooperation is key to removing Myanmar’s junta and forming a democratic union.
Description:
"Neineh Plo is an ethnic Karenni activist working with the Coordination Team for Emergency Relief (Karenni) in eastern Myanmar’s Kayah state, situated along the country’s border with Thailand. A former spokesperson for the Karenni National Progressive Party who worked with the deposed National League for Democracy government on Myanmar’s peace process, he recently joined four Karenni organizations in publishing a report documenting war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by junta forces in Kayah state and surrounding areas between May 2021 and September 2022.
Earlier this month, Neineh Plo visited Washington, D.C. and met with U.S. officials, lawmakers, NGOs and U.N. agencies to discuss the report’s findings and how the international community can help hold the junta accountable for its rights violations in Myanmar. During his visit, he spoke with Nay Rein Kyaw of RFA’s Burmese Service about promoting cooperation between Myanmar’s resistance groups in the pursuit of removing the country’s military dictatorship and establishing a federal democratic union.
The following interview has been edited for clarity:
RFA: First of all, thank you for visiting RFA. We have three questions. The first question is, what were your first impressions during your trip to the United States?
Neineh Plo: Well, my first impression during this trip is that the U.S. enjoys freedom of expression. It is freedom of expression that makes programming like RFA’s possible. And it is with this freedom that we enable the voices of the oppressed to be heard by the international community. When these voices are heard, the international community can take action to help liberate them within the societies that oppress them, such as Burma. So, I really appreciate the fact that people have the freedom to express themselves … as that is something we don't have in Burma right now. Burma is under a military dictatorship and all kinds of free speech are banned … so you only hear from the military dictatorship what they want to tell the people. I want to tell the world the concerns of the oppressed people.
RFA: The world is watching the situation in Burma every day. Can you discuss the achievements of the resistance movement within the past two years [since the coup]?
Neineh Plo: Since the military coup two years ago … the people have suffered a lot. More than 1.5 million people are currently displaced internally in the country. But at the same time, we have many young people seeing this injustice and joining the resistance movement, whether it is armed resistance or other forms. And also, we see other people from Burma who were not aware of the plight of ethnic people in the country. Now they have become aware of the oppression that ethnic people have been facing at the hands of the military dictatorship – discrimination, lack of rights in the country. So this resistance movement, in a way, has brought people together against a common enemy, which is the military dictatorship, and then to work together and fight against this dictatorship – to remove it once and for all – and then bring about a new system to this country through the establishment of a federal democratic union.
RFA: So you are seeing more unity in Burma, right?
Neineh Plo: Yes. Now it is the kind of unity that we had not seen before the coup. Before the coup, it was mostly the ethnic groups who were fighting for equality, democracy, self-determination and federalism. Since the coup, we and other groups from Burma have had the opportunity to work with ethnic groups on a common principle, which is a federal democratic union.
But there's a lot more work to do. We are not there yet, but at least we have started this conversation and have worked together on this issue. It is not something that we are all in agreement about ... But at least we have a common understanding on the future of the country, which is that unless we can establish a federal democratic union, we won't be able to make progress. So, I think that is a big achievement.
Sadly, the military dictatorship is still in place and we need to remove them and bring people back home [who have fled since the coup]. And the people of Burma cannot do it alone. We need the international community’s help to remove this military dictatorship, to bring about a regime change in the country, so that we can enjoy sustainable peace.
Unity and international support
RFA: The people of Burma and the international community would like to know whether this movement can win and when that might happen. What is your opinion?
Neineh Plo: First, we need to build unity among all these groups … We have a lot of ethnic resistance organizations, the [shadow] National Unity Government, and the [anti-junta] People’s Defense Force [paramilitary groups], as well as many civil society organizations. All of these groups have to be able to come together and have a single vision ... which is the establishment of a federal democratic union for the future of Burma. With that kind of unity, we will be able to address many different things on the ground.
We also need international support. International support can come in many ways. Currently, we need immediate humanitarian support, and then we will also need international support to hold the military accountable [for its atrocities]. We also need international support to cut supplies to the military and disable the whole military apparatus in the country and eventually remove the military from politics. The people of Burma cannot do it alone – we need coordinated international support, otherwise it will not be effective.
RFA: Do you see a timeframe for victory?
Neineh Plo: I don't want to make a prediction, as I'm not in a position to do so, but if there is unity among the people of Burma and the international community, and if we can build momentum, victory will come sooner than we expect..."
Source/publisher:
"RFA" (USA)
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-15
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Armed conflict in Burma - attacks on civilians
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Sub-title:
Businessman she’s accused of accepting money from testified he donated to educational and healthcare foundation
Description:
"Myanmar’s Supreme Court on Wednesday rejected deposed leader Aung San Suu Kyi’s appeal of two corruption charges, sources close to the court told Radio Free Asia.
Suu Kyi, 77, was sentenced by a military junta court in October to three years in Naypyidaw Prison for two corruption cases that involved charges of accepting money from Maung Weik, a businessman linked to the military.
Maung Weik has testified that that money was not given to Suu Kyi, but donated to be used at the Daw Khin Kyi Foundation, which supports education, healthcare and rural investment.
Suu Kyi’s lawyers have argued that she’s innocent of corruption because the money that Maung Weik gave was found in the foundation’s bank account.
The reason for the Union Supreme Court’s denial of the appeal was unknown.
“The right to appeal is in Article 19 of the Constitution. The right to appeal must be given to anybody,” a court source who has knowledge of the decision said. “It’s ridiculous that the Union Supreme Court did not even grant an appeal.”
The Nobel Peace Prize winner served as Myanmar’s state counselor from 2016 up until the Feb. 1, 2021, coup. She has been sentenced to a total of 33 years in prison in 19 cases.
Suu Kyi's lawyers filed an appeal to the Union Supreme Court on Tuesday for five cases in which Suu Kyi and President Win Myint were accused of buying and leasing a helicopter under the NLD government. They were sentenced on those charges in December..."
Source/publisher:
"RFA" (USA)
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-15
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, About Aung San Suu Kyi, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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Sub-title:
Statement on The Honourable Prime Minister Dato' Seri Anwar Ibrahim’s "The Future of ASEAN" address on 10 February 2023
Description:
"The National Unity Government welcomes The Honourable Prime Minister Dato' Seri Anwar
Ibrahim’s remarks on Myanmar during his "The Future of ASEAN" keynote address on 10
February 2023.
The Malaysian Prime Minister spoke with conviction and authority in calling for a “strong
consensus in giving a strong message to the Myanmar regime" to end its discrimination,
marginalisation, intimidation and perpetration of violence against the people of Myanmar.
Prime Minister Anwar also issued a clear call to action in pressing for new ASEAN
mechanisms to end the junta’s atrocities against the people. This process must see direct
engagement with the National Unity Government, ethnic organisations and Myanmar civil
society, and further pressure piled on the junta including by blocking its representatives from
all ASEAN meetings and forums.
The National Unity Government extends its continued partnership to ASEAN and its full
support to Indonesia as ASEAN Chair. We also express our deep gratitude to Prime Minister
Anwar and to H.E. Dato' Seri Diraja Dr. Zambry Abd. Kadir, Minister of Foreign Affairs of
Malaysia, for their abiding solidarity with the Myanmar people..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-15
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), ASEAN-Burma relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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Sub-title:
“They view themselves as the only ones capable of keeping the country together – something that goes back to the military’s foundation as an anti-colonial fighting force.”
Description:
"More than two years after Myanmar’s military seized power in a coup, the country is in a state of generalized armed conflict and economic dysfunction. What began as a loosely coordinated protest movement against the military takeover has since hardened into a broad front of resistance groups that seeks not just to reverse the coup, but to remove the military entirely from its position of centrality in Myanmar’s political, economic – even social – life.
How the Myanmar armed forces got there, and have since sustained their control over Myanmar and its people – even during the country’s decade of supposed reform in the 2010s – is the subject of a new book by the British journalist Oliver Slow, who lived and worked as a journalist in Myanmar between 2012 and 2020, several years of which he spent as an editor at Frontier Myanmar. His book “Return of the Junta: Why Myanmar’s Military Must Go Back to the Barracks” is due for release on February 23. Now based in London, he spoke to The Diplomat about the roots of a seemingly senseless coup, the ethnic and structural tensions bequeathed by British rule, and whether the country’s increasingly united resistance movement can manage to overcome them.
When the military seized power on February 1, 2021, many observers struggled to understand why the military leadership had taken such a disastrous step, after a decade in which Myanmar had opened its economic and political system. What in your view motivated the takeover? How would you describe the worldview of those at the upper echelons of the armed forces, and how is such a view inculcated?
The short answer I think is that the military was worried that the “transition to democracy” it had initiated a decade earlier risked spiraling out of its control. This wasn’t a transition towards any sort of genuine democracy, but rather an attempt by the ruling generals to gain the legitimacy they desired – particularly from Western powers – while also holding onto the main levers of power.
The transition/roadmap – whatever you wish to call it – was to be achieved through its own rules, by adhering to the 2008 Constitution, which it had passed in a sham referendum just months after Cyclone Nargis devastated large parts of the country.
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There were a couple of shortcomings with this approach. The first was that the people didn’t want to play by these rules. Every chance they’ve had the opportunity to do so, the Myanmar people have said loudly that they don’t want to be ruled by the military – in the elections of 1990, 2015 and 2020, not to mention by-elections in 2012 and 2017.
In all of these votes, the people have overwhelmingly voted for non-military parties, in particular Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD). Now of course she remains hugely popular in the country, but I see this as much more an anti-military vote rather than necessarily a pro-NLD one.
And she didn’t want to play by these rules either, displaying a pretty clear desire to amend the constitution, which I think the generals worried could feasibly happen if the NLD were to rule for another term. The January 2017 assassination of constitutional expert U Ko Ni in broad daylight was a clear message by the military to leave their precious charter alone.
So when the military’s proxy – the Union Solidarity and Development Party – performed even worse in the 2020 election than it had in 2015, I think that was a clear signal to the military rulers that they weren’t going to receive the popular mandate they desired, so they put an end to the experiment in the only way they know how – through violence.
The NLD’s unwillingness to look into these claims of voter fraud was the final straw for them.
In terms of the worldview of the Tatmadaw’s top brass, I think they view themselves as the only ones capable of keeping the country together – something that goes back to the military’s foundation as an anti-colonial fighting force, and through the difficult years after independence when the military did play an important role in keeping the country together.
But the people view the military’s role in the exact opposite way, as responsible for the destruction of the country. I think that’s in large part because of the violence the military has meted out to the people for several decades, but also in the way it has destroyed other aspects of life in Myanmar, including education and the economy.
Based on this worldview, I think the military wants complete control, and essentially for the people to bow down at its feet. Clearly, that’s not happening, and at the other end of the scale, you have most of the population now wanting the military completely removed from power. So, between a military that wants total power, and a resistance that wants the army removed from power, there really is this bottleneck that feels completely immovable at this moment in time.
Your book examines in detail the history of military involvement in Myanmar’s politics from independence in 1948 up to the current iteration of military dictatorship. How is the current phase of military rule, which followed a decade of carefully graduated political and economic opening, different from past eras of direct military rule, and do you see any continuities?
I see a lot of similarities, and a fair few differences.
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I think the main similarity is that they all hold onto this belief that the Tatmadaw is the only institution that can hold the country together. As I mentioned, this goes back to its foundations as an anti-colonial fighting force, its efforts to repel the Kuomintang – a foreign occupier – from northern Burma in the mid-20th century, and the important role the military played in keeping the country intact after independence.
You simply don’t get to the top of the Tatmadaw without subscribing to this belief: it’s drilled into you through your education, through your daily life, through your social circle, through everything you do.
The main difference I see in the current leadership – in particular coup leader Min Aung Hlaing, as after all this is a deeply hierarchical institution – is that it’s much more violent, or at least much more willing to resort to violence to hold onto power. Yes, previous juntas were violent, but I don’t think quite on this scale that we’re seeing – although that could be because it feels backed into a corner by the widespread resistance against it.
I don’t want to claim for a second that previous juntas in Myanmar weren’t violent, but I don’t think we’ve ever seen such sustained violence by its forces across the entire country every day. Again, that could be because the resistance has never been as strong as it is now, but I do believe that the military in Myanmar today is a uniquely immoral institution.
Prior to Myanmar’s independence, the country’s territory had never been under the control of a single, unitary state. What role do you think this challenge – the difficulty of consolidating state control in outlying, ethnic minority-dominated areas of the country – has played in justifying and perpetuating military rule? How much is military rule a symptom of Myanmar’s troubles, and to what degree is it a cause?
Not all of Myanmar’s issues today are the fault of the military alone.
Take British colonialism, for example, which had a pretty devastating impact on Burma. In addition to playing these different ethnic groups off against each other in a form of divide-and-conquer – the legacies of which persist today – they also dismantled most of the institutions that existed in the country at the time.
The British also left behind a hugely unequal country in terms of a tiered education system, as well as one scarred by the brutal Burma Campaign of World War II, not to mention the thousands of weapons that were left behind from that fighting and fueled the insecurity of the early years after independence.
The military likes to blame colonial rule for the problems the country is facing. In fact, just this morning I was reading a piece in state-run media to mark Union Day that essentially blamed “capitalist invaders” for the issues the country is facing.
And there is some element of truth to that – a half-truth, if you will – but let’s not forget that it’s been more than 70 years since independence, and the military has had control of the country for the majority of that time. In that time, it has done almost nothing to lift the lives of the people. Instead, it has built up its own capabilities, filled its own pockets and those of its top brass, and done everything it can to hold onto power. Amid all of this, the people have not only been left to fend for themselves, but also subjected to the military’s violence.
Since the coup, many Myanmar people have expressed intense frustration at the outside world’s inaction in the face of the military’s atrocities, right at the time that Western nations are mounting a joint effort to defend Ukraine from Russian aggression. How in your view should foreign governments deal with the growing political and humanitarian crisis in Myanmar?
I think in large part the frustration is completely fair. While some Western governments have placed sanctions against the military’s business interests, there are still massive gaps in terms of what they could target. These gaps need to be closed as quickly as possible to ensure all steps are taken to ensure the military’s finances are cut off. Every day the military can continue making money, and it will continue meting out violence against the people.
But we also need to be realistic and recognize that Myanmar’s future direction will be driven first and foremost by the dynamics inside the country. It will depend on the likes of those involved in the resistance – in those building parallel administrative systems, providing humanitarian assistance, the National Unity Government, and the armed resistance – as well as whether or not the military has the capabilities to cope with the huge resistance against it.
I would say though, it’s clear that something in the world order is not working when a regime as objectionable as this one can cling to power. Of course, these are sovereign countries, and foreign interference in a country’s affairs is a complicated thing, but the “democratic global order” has shown itself to be pretty ineffective.
Some U.N. departments do incredible work, so this isn’t an attack on the U.N. as a whole, but I have some pretty big questions about the role of the U.N. Security Council in its response. It describes itself as having “primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security,” and here we are two years after the military’s coup with one pretty flimsy resolution. Clearly, a drastic reset is needed in its approach, starting with getting rid of the veto for permanent members.
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Speaking in pragmatic terms, what I think we need to see from democratic countries is more support for the democratic resistance in Myanmar. There are so many remarkable groups doing important work, and these need to be highlighted and supported. Supporting justice initiatives against the military is also important, as is providing humanitarian assistance
In terms of the resistance, I think it’s important to try and engage with the few governments who are allies of the military – your Chinas, Indias, Thailands, and Japans (for as long as Putin hangs onto power, Russia is a lost cause). The democratic resistance needs to be able to make a positive case to these countries about their ability to rule – I don’t think these countries particularly want to support the military, they just see no other option right now.
One of the things that have historically benefited the military is the lack of unity between Myanmar’s various ethnic armed organizations and rebel groups on the one hand, and a simmering mistrust between these groups and the Bamar-dominated National League for Democracy (NLD) on the other. Are you at all optimistic that things have changed since the coup?
I am. One of the few upsides of what’s been happening in Myanmar since the coup has been this new-found unity among the ethnic groups.
I was in Myanmar in 2017, when much of the population pushed the military’s narrative that it had committed no wrongdoing against the Rohingya, so to see so many people apologize for that, and to admit they had fallen for the military’s propaganda, has been incredibly powerful.
Now that’s not to say that any post-Tatmadaw existence in Myanmar is going to be straightforward, and in fact, I think it would be extremely messy and challenging. A lot of these grievances go back a long way, so a lot of trust-building has to be done to show that the change is genuine.
But those looking to emerge as the future rulers of Myanmar have generally put together a positive case for the country’s future – one where federalism, justice, and respect for all are at its core. This is a much more positive vision for the country than the military has ever shown..."
Source/publisher:
"The Diplomat" (Japan)
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-15
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2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Armed conflict in Burma - attacks on civilians, Military History
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"Following the second anniversary of Myanmar’s coup and the junta’s extension of emergency rule for six more months, The Irrawaddy’s editor-in-chief Aung Zaw talks to the US State Department Counsellor Derek Chollet about the extension, possible pressure to prevent the regime from using airstrikes against civilians and reasons for optimism.
Q: How do you view the extension of emergency rule by the regime?
Chollet: I think that this extension of the emergency law by another six months is yet another transparent attempt by the SAC [State Administrative Council] to justify its unlawful rule. It is two years ago that the junta took action to undo the November 2020 election. And of course, it’s been trying ever since to find ways to legitimize itself and to find the way for it to justify its rule.
We are, of course, also ready and prepared for an announcement at some point about holding new elections, which we have been very clear about for the last better part of the last year so that any new elections would be illegitimate. They’d be sham elections.
You cannot hold free and fair elections when you are killing and locking up your political opposition, not allowing political parties to operate and you don’t control 50 percent of your territory.
So this is just the news today which is just another step by the junta that we reject.
Instead of finding ways to perpetuate its unjust rule, we call on the SAC to return Myanmar to the path of democracy and engage in meaningful discussions in which Myanmar can get back on that path.
Q: What pressure could prevent the junta from using airstrikes against civilians?
Chollet: Well, we have seen the horrors only multiply over the last two years in terms of what the junta is willing to do against its own people who, by the way, are firing back on the junta because it’s only hardening the resolve of the opposition.
We have taken steps along with our allies and partners over the last several years now to try to make it harder for the junta to generate revenues and also harder for the junta to acquire arms. Unfortunately, because of the views of some members of the UN Security Council, a ban on arms is not going to be achievable anytime soon, if ever.
Nevertheless, the United States feels the country should not be supplying the junta with military hardware. We have seen countries take a step back in their willingness to engage militarily with the junta. Unfortunately, other countries, like Russia, have only doubled down on their relationship with the junta. And the military relationship has only grown stronger between Myanmar and Russia over the last several years, particularly as the circle of friends that both have had gotten smaller because of what Russia has been doing in Ukraine and what Myanmar has been doing against its own people.
So we took some additional steps with the United States along with allies and partners [on January 31] to try to make it harder for the junta to acquire arms. And we’ll continue in the coming weeks and months to augment those steps, to make it harder for the junta to acquire the capabilities and the spare parts that it needs to prosecute this war.
Q: The Burmese people welcome these moves. The people are united against the junta and the support from Russia. How do you respond to the claims that the US is outsourcing responsibility to ASEAN?
Chollet: Our policy has been rooted in three lines of effort. First was to isolate and punish the junta and to make it harder for the junta to generate revenue and acquire resources and weapons. Second has been to help support the pro-democratic opposition within Myanmar.
That’s been principally through our work with the National Unity Government [NUG], but also beyond that, with the NUCC [National Unity Consultative Council], with the EAOs [ethnic armed organizations] with the PDF [People Defense Force]. We have been engaging with them.
I’ve personally been engaging with them over the last several years, either in person or virtually trying to figure out what they need, give them our best advice and also give them, as best we can, the support that they need.
And the United States is not alone in this effort. We’re working with others in the region and beyond in support of the NUG.
And then, third, to help continue to provide humanitarian assistance to the people of Myanmar. The United States is the largest single donor of humanitarian assistance to the people of Myanmar. We are constantly exploring ways to get that assistance into Myanmar more efficiently, more effectively, to the people that need it the most.
And we will redouble those efforts in the time to come.
What I can say is we have been working very hard, and really the foundation of our policy has been to work very hard with our ASEAN partners.
This is not a matter of outsourcing anything to anyone.
ASEAN, of course, has a vested interest in Myanmar’s future, in Myanmar’s stability and Myanmar being a democracy.
Whether you’re a country that borders Myanmar, whether you’re an ASEAN country that is a littoral state, you have an interest in Myanmar’s future, because Southeast Asia matters so much to the United States for our strategic interests. That’s why Myanmar matters to us. Myanmar matters to the stability of Southeast Asia and the ability of ASEAN countries to reach their full potential. And we very strongly value that partnership with ASEAN as you know.
We are very pleased with the strong steps that ASEAN has taken over the last year to try to make it harder for the regime to gain any sense of legitimacy or recognition by the international community.
When it comes to being able to participate at a political level at meetings such as the US-ASEAN Special Summit that we hosted in Washington back in May, all the way up until the high-level meetings at the end of last year and even the informal ASEAN foreign ministerial meeting that Indonesia is hosting now.
Myanmar will not be represented at the political level. We think that it’s important to maintain that isolation of the regime and the inability of the regime to get any legitimacy or recognition.
At the same time, as I said, we’re working closely with our allies and partners to try to give the opposition as much support as we can.
And just yesterday in Washington, Daniel Kritenbrink, who’s my colleague and our assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, visited the NUG office in Washington.
I will be visiting myself very soon and we’re going to continue that constant dialogue with the NUG and other pro-democracy opposition in Myanmar to figure out how best we can provide a way forward or help them find a way forward in this crisis. I should also note we’re working closely with other international organizations, principally the United Nations, and we’ve all been in close touch.
I’ve personally been in close touch with the UN special envoy for Myanmar, as well as the human rights rapporteur for Myanmar, who’s made some very strong statements, including an important report that was just released on the situation.
The UN Security Council, in a historic first, late last year, finally passed a resolution condemning what was going on inside Myanmar. There were very important steps for the Security Council to be heard on this issue formally through a resolution.
It had issued a statement and had briefings in the past. But I think that’s an indication of the seriousness with which the world is taking this crisis, the fact that the Security Council was finally able to overcome its differences and speak to this issue.
Q: Can the US do more to protect civilians?
Chollet: Well again, we will continue to provide that significant support for the people of Myanmar and the humanitarian assistance as well as support to the National Unity Government and other pro-democracy actors in Myanmar to enable them to gain more capability and prepare them for what we hope and believe will be one day a return to democracy inside Myanmar.
And the National Unity Government, as well as other pro-democracy leaders, has really done some very significant work to think about the future of Myanmar’s Constitution and governance to prepare for that day, which we hope will come soon when Myanmar will return to democracy.
And it’s important to note this will be a different country than it was on January 31, 2021. It will be a different democracy.
And I think the opposition and National Unity Government and their colleagues have learned a lot about some of the challenges that the previous democratic government in Myanmar had, as well as, of course, what’s been going on now, and taking that into account for the future democracy of Myanmar.
And we will continue to find ways to support that democratic opposition and the people of Myanmar. The Burma Act, which was passed by the US Congress late last year, was a bipartisan piece of legislation.
We, the Biden administration, worked very closely with our Republican and Democrat colleagues on Capitol Hill to help craft that legislation.
We are fully supportive of that act. And that gives us some important new tools that we plan to use to help the people of Myanmar realize their democratic destiny.
Q: What is the status of the NDAA Burma Act? Has implementation started?
Chollet: We have started to implement the various components of that act. Of course, some of those components are going to take a while to begin implementing.
But one of the things that we believe is so important about it is again, it registered and symbolized the bipartisan commitment in Washington to the support that we believe we need to give to the people of Myanmar, to the democratic opposition inside Myanmar.
And we are going to be working with our allies and partners in the region and beyond to coordinate our efforts because we believe that we are much stronger when we are working together on these issues.
And the people of Myanmar deserve our support, given the tremendous hardship they’ve been facing that you have done such a terrific job covering this crisis from the very beginning. We’re going to continue to do our part so that when we meet again a year from now, we’re talking about the democratic path that Myanmar is on, not the bloody hardships that the junta is perpetrating against its people.
Q: Why are you so optimistic in the face of this brutality?
Chollet: Well, again, part of the job is.
Q: Could Thailand do more?
Chollet: It’s important to be a successful diplomat, you have to have some degree of optimism. You have to be really realistic too. Even when you’re faced with a crisis like Myanmar, which there’s a lot to be pessimistic about, I have gained optimism.
During the [February 1] silent strike the scope is yet another symbol of the tremendous resilience, spirit and strength of Myanmar’s civil society, of its pro-democracy, not just leaders, but everyday citizens who want a better life for themselves and are willing to stand up and push back against this brutal junta.
The resilience and strength of Myanmar’s civil society have surprised the junta.
I don’t think they expected it was going to be this kind of fight when they took the steps they took two years ago. So that gives me hope and optimism.
And the work that the NUG and other pro-democracy groups have done over the last two years gives me hope for a more democratic future.
That said we have to be realistic. This is going to be tough. There are going to be many tough days ahead. Unfortunately, the continued airstrikes mean we have to realistically expect some of that to continue now.
But we need to continue to work hard to put that to an end, to find ways to cut off the regime’s ability to access resources and weapons and strengthen the opposition. That’s something we are committed to.
And the countries of the region are critical parts of that. Thailand is a critical ally of the United States. We’ve been treaty allies now for decades. Thailand has a very long border with Myanmar, and a lot of its core national security interests are at stake.
I can tell you we have a running dialogue with our partners in Thailand in person and over the phone about the way forward there. Thailand is a critical ally with a lot at stake and we are working closely with them.
And the other members of ASEAN, whether it was Cambodia last year as ASEAN chair, Brunei in 2021 or this year, of course, we’re looking forward to working closely, even more closely with our good friends in Jakarta as they are chairing ASEAN through this year.
It’s very important that we are working together, US, ASEAN, but also more broadly, the UK, Canada, Australia, Japan, Korea and other countries with interest and influence in the situation in Myanmar.
Q: Many powerful cronies close to the regime remain unpunished by sanctions.
Chollet: We recently announced a new set of sanctions against individuals and entities, including some of those individuals who are most closely associated with Myanmar’s ability to generate revenues from energy as well as the arms trade.
We will continue to be looking at any individual or entity who’s associated with those efforts, and they should know that more is coming, and they should stop these activities because if they don’t, they will be punished. And again, this is not just the United States doing this, its partners like the UK, Australia, Canada and others. The EU has imposed significant sanctions as well.
What we’re seeing is the world, not just Southeast Asia, but increasingly the balance of the rest of the world, come down against what the junta is doing and be willing to take significant steps to ensure the junta pays the price for what it’s doing..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-15
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2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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"Documented incidents:
23 January 2023: In Pu Tein Pyin village, Kyauk Hmaw village tract, Yinmabin township and district, Sagaing region, two ambulances along with a religious building and nine civilian houses were torched by the Myanmar military during a raid on the village. Source: Radio Free Asia
24 January 2023: In Monywa town, township, and district, Sagaing region, the Myanmar military seized an ambulance owned by the LNGO Pyi-taw-thar during a raid at Shwe Let Pan monastery.
Three monks and five civilians were arrested and the ambulance was later used for election campaign activities. Sources: Democratic Voice of Burma and The 74 Media
25 January 2023: In Thaketa township, Yangon district, Yangon region, the junta authorities inspected private hospitals and clinics to see if they employed Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM)-affiliated health workers. Source: Mekong News
26 January 2023: In Dagon Myothit township, Yangon district and region, around 100 junta authorities and military and police forces inspected the Grand Yangon Private Hospital. The ward administrators and police forces also inspected two private clinics Kyal-sin-thit and Aye-chan-say reportedly to see whether they employed CDM-affiliated health workers. Source: Mekong News Reported on 26 January 2023: In Yangon district and region, the junta authorities asked for employee lists from private hospitals and clinics, closely monitored local pharmacies, and issued warnings not to employ CDM-affiliated health workers. The police and intelligence forces reportedly impersonated patients to track down CDM-affiliated health workers. Source: Delta News Agency
26 January 2023: In Pa Du village and village tract, Sagaing township, district and region, an armed group entered a station hospital, threatened the guard, and took away a portable X-ray machine, an operating table, an oxygen concentrator, and medicines. The hospital was not functioning at the time of the attack. The junta authorities accused the local resistance forces of this attack. Source: Telegram..."
Source/publisher:
Insecurity Insight
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-14
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations, Public Health, Spring Revolution
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Sub-title:
Harsh New Measures Would Crush Party Participation in Politics
Description:
"(Sydney) – Myanmar’s new political parties law will prevent key members of the political opposition from running in upcoming elections, Human Rights Watch said today. The law, announced on January 26, 2023, adds to concerns that the vote now slated for August will lack all credibility and be used merely to try to legitimize further military control.
The Political Party Registration Law, which repeals 2010 legislation, prohibits anyone previously convicted of a crime or serving a prison term from joining a political party. This disqualifies many senior members of the National League for Democracy (NLD), including the party leader, Aung San Suu Kyi and President Win Myint, both serving lengthy sentences on fabricated charges. The military overthrew the newly elected NLD-led government on February 1, 2021.
“Myanmar’s junta adopted the Political Party Registration Law not only to rig the planned elections but to try to obtain legitimacy for a military-controlled state,” said Manny Maung, Myanmar researcher at Human Rights Watch. “The junta is creating a system to crush all political opposition and derail any possible return to democratic civilian rule.”
The new law states that existing political parties must reregister within 60 days of the law’s enactment or risk being dissolved, and disqualifies any political group declared as an “unlawful association or terrorist organization under any existing law.” The junta has already declared the opposition National Unity Government (NUG) and its parliamentary body, the Committee Representing the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (the Union Parliament) as “terrorist organizations” for alleged attacks against the military since the coup.
The law requires political groups seeking to put forward electoral candidates to have at least 100,000 members within three months of registering, a huge increase from 1,000 in the previous law, and a prohibitive bar for most parties. It also requires national political parties to have funds of at least 100 million kyat (US$47,000) to qualify for registration, far more than most smaller parties can afford. For regional or state parties, the minimum amount required in the party coffers is 10 million kyat ($4,700). These requirements will make it nearly impossible for smaller ethnic and minority parties to take part in elections, Human Rights Watch said.
The NLD responded that it “steadfastly” objected to any election under the military junta, and that it refused to register. Other smaller parties, such as the Kayah State Democracy and the Kayan National Party, also said they will not register and therefore face dissolution. Some ethnic minority parties such as the Shan Nationalities Democratic Party and the United Democracy Party have indicated they plan to register.
The People’s Defense Forces, which are anti-junta militias, have indicated that they aim to disrupt preparations for the elections and have attacked some junta personnel conducting a population survey that could be used to assemble voter rolls. This raises concerns that members of political parties that register under the new law could also be targeted.
On February 1, 2023, the junta extended the state of emergency in the country for six months. On February 2, the junta imposed new martial law orders in 37 additional townships in Chin, Karen, Karenni, Magway and Mon States, and Bago, Sagaing, and Tanintharyi Regions. The orders impose curfews and curb freedom of association and movement, restricting political parties from organizing.
The military-drafted 2008 Constitution, although designed to perpetuate military control, requires the state to enact laws to allow political parties to organize for the “flourishing of a genuine, disciplined multi-party democratic system.” Under the new law and additional martial law orders, any election would be dominated by junta-backed political parties and the military itself, which already holds 25 percent of seats in the national and local legislatures under the 2008 Constitution.
The Political Parties Registration Law fails to meet international standards in respecting the rights of political parties to organize and stand for election. Under international law, voters should have the right to freely choose their candidates, and any conditions placed on political party and candidate registration should be reasonable and non-discriminatory.
Establishing a credible, pluralistic, and rights respecting electoral system is essential to holding genuine democratic elections in which voters freely choose their representatives. Despite the limitations imposed by the 2008 Constitution, in November 2020, voters exercised their right to choose their government, a right that the military denied by staging a coup.
Concerned governments, including regional partners such as member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Japan, and India, should condemn the political parties law and ensure that they do not lend credibility to the junta’s attempt to legitimize military control through sham elections.
The United Kingdom, the United States, and European Union member states should coordinate with other like-minded governments to strengthen and enforce targeted sanctions against senior junta officials and military entities in Myanmar.
“The 2021 military coup strangled the hopes of the Myanmar people who had voted in credible elections in 2020,” Maung said. “Concerned governments need to put concerted pressure on the junta to return to a democratically elected civilian government.”..."
Source/publisher:
Human Rights Watch (USA)
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-14
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
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2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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National Unity Government’s new shadow embassy comes after Congress passed the Burma Act.
Description:
"Myanmar's opposition National Unity Government officially opened a shadow embassy in Washington on Monday, with a U.S. State Department official at the event using a speech to reject the legitimacy of elections planned by the military junta later this year.
The so-called NUG has set up a government-in-exile after the military took power from a democratically elected government in a February 2021 coup.
The foreign minister of this shadow government, Zin Mar Aung, said at the opening that the passage of the Burma Act as part of last year’s defense spending bill enabled her shadow government to officially open the office.
“The NUG's office was able to be opened after the U.S. government enacted the Burma Act, which includes promises to encourage and support Myanmar's democracy,” Zin Mar Aung said, noting the office would play an important role in the NUG's fight for democracy.
She said the “presence of U.S. government officials at the office opening … signaled the state of official engagement” between the United States and the NUG in the wake of the Burma Act.
Election legitimacy
Uzra Zeya, the U.S. undersecretary of state for civilian security, democracy, and human rights, told the ceremony the United States was committed to the restoration of democracy in Myanmar.
“The U.S. government continues to encourage and support Myanmar's return to the path of inclusive democracy as contained in the Burma Act,” Zeya said. “The deputy foreign minister also said that it is important for the United States and the countries in the region not to accept the fake election that will be held by the military junta.”
The comments reflect those previously made by U.S. State Department counselor Derek Chollet, who had dismissed the legitimacy of any elections held by Myanmar’s junta under current circumstances.
“Any election that the regime might have … will have no chance of being free or fair, given that the regime has imprisoned or intimidated nearly all critical potential contenders, and indeed does not control nearly 50% of Burma's territory,” Chollet told reporters Jan. 31.
Among other things, the Burma Act allows the U.S. State Department to engage directly with Myanmar’s opposition groups, including the NUG, and forces it to develop a coherent program of sanctions against the military junta.
New home base
Monday’s event was also attended by NUG Deputy Foreign Minister Moe Zaw Oo and Myanmar’s U.N. ambassador, Kyaw Moe Tun, who has held onto the post to which he was appointed before the coup.
Moe Zaw Oo said the new office would prove an important home base.
“This office represents the ministry of foreign affairs of the National Unity Government,” Moe Zaw Oo said. “We have opened this office here as we want to build stronger diplomatic relations with the United States. We also have plans to build relations with the Congress, the Senate and the House of Representatives that are all here.”
He said the office would “do anything and everything for the revolution,” including leading relations with international institutions based in the United States that might be able to help the shadow government.
“We are going to interact with them, too,” he said. “Similarly, we are going to engage with the people of Myanmar origin in the United States encouraging and supporting the Myanmar people and the revolution, for their support, financial contributions and donations.”..."
Source/publisher:
"RFA" (USA)
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-14
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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Description:
"National Unity Government Weekly Press Update (7/2023)..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-14
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Type:
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Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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"1. We solemnly salute CDM activists and hold them to the highest regard for the sacrifices they made and their moral stand, for always standing righteously with the people and for fighting together with them.
2. On the other hand, we to a certain extent must understand and empathize with the real life struggles of non-CDM people trying to survive under coercion and repression.
3. What we should and can appeal to all non-CDM public servants is to not politically co-operate with the SAC and to not actively participate in their mechanisms of repression, as well as to not willingly serve the military dictatorship. Moreover, revolutionary forces should continuously impart the non- CDM public servants with knowledge and guidance on how they can confidentially support the revolution and be a part of it.
4. The backbone of the CDM policy should include planning and implementing programs that provide the essential needs for the CDM people for their survival and wellbeing. The CDM policy must include sections that provide full guarantees for the future of CDM activists.
5. The CDM is one of the political movements. We should consider a variety of ways for CDM activists so that they can actively participate in this political process. Every revolutionary force has a major responsibility to organize CDM activists and help them transform from being a vital mass protest force to become part of a united powerful revolutionary coalition. We must organize, build up and transform our revolutionary associates to become our allies, and our allies to become our comrades.
6. Most critically, we should find ways to help CDM activists to learn political thought and ideology, and at the same time help them with details on methods to strengthen their emancipatory struggle and coping mechanisms for their everyday survival. This should include accessing UN mechanisms and programs as well as getting assistance through NGOS, INGOs, and negotiating with Ethnic Revolutionary Organizations (EROS) for CDM activists to seek safe shelter, essential aid, evacuating and relocating CDM activists to liberated areas, and deliberating and discussing political thought and ideology with CDM activists.
7. By all means, we should try to help CDM activists to establish unions such as workers union or Public Servants Union, and help these unions to become active members of the political struggle.
8. We took a position that non-CDM people are not a fundamental alliance force for our struggle. At the same time, they are not the main target we should allocate our resources to stage an attack.
9. We should always let those who want to join the CDM movement know that they are welcome anytime, that it is better late than never. The door should be left wide open for them. Although the CDM and non-CDM people may subscribe to different political values and take different paths when passing through the tumultuous history of our time, we should not forget that each and every one is living under multiple forms of oppression perpetrated by the same military dictatorship.
10. Since oppression by the SAC has become more intense, those who initially refused to join the CDM movement are now joining, such as in Myaing region. In other cases, after the liberated areas gradually expanded, more and more non- CDM people are joining the movement, such as in Sagaing region. We should take notes of such phenomena.
11. In terms of formulating CDM policy, instead of a blanket approach, we should consider a stratified approach, that involves making different policies for different areas considering complex contexts and nuances, such as liberated areas, ERO territories, contested areas where both SAC and revolutionary forces are vying for control, and areas dominated by SAC.
12. We must consult and coordinate with EROS when formulating a CDM policy that concerns their constituencies and those who took shelter in their territory. We believe action speaks louder than words. It is not enough to superficially espouse "equality for all nationalities, and rights of ethnic people for self determination" but rather we must prove our determination with actual actions as suggested above.
13. It is vital to develop and implement an education policy in which rights to education and learning, and provision of essential education services are guaranteed. Absolutely, there is no moral ground for any political faction to interfere or take away these rights.
14. We should not allow our individual emotions and grievances get in the way of making a political policy for everyone. Likewise, we do not make a broad national policy just because "we had made political sacrifices" or "we endure hardships daily as a result of our belief". If we project our own bitter suffering too much over the policies we are making, we may knock the policy items away from the intended results we want to achieve, and the subsequent implementing strategies may go wrong. In fact, what matter most is that we hold together between different political allies, care for each other and pave our own way to the future.
15. It is crystal clear that the journey ahead is a long struggle. We believe that to unify, persuade and organize as much as possible is the most suitable and practical tactics for the revolution to triumph.
16. Judgements and punishments should only be considered when inevitable. Some conundrums might not be suitable to be solved at present. It is wise to postpone or sequence some issues, until the time and space is ripe.
17. Striving in every possible way for the triumph of the people's revolution should be our priority. We believe some questions will become easier to answer after the revolution is victorious. Some issues may shrink or fade away while some may find their own solution instantly. Therefore, we solemnly urge you to focus your precious efforts to the single most important task at our hand that is uprooting the military dictatorship through the means of politics, diplomatic and armed revolution..."
Source/publisher:
All Burma Federation of Student Unions
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-13
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"A reshuffle of the regime’s cabinet on the two-year anniversary of the coup earlier this month saw the junta boss offering “jobs for the boys”. Most of the new appointees are ex-generals while some are also friends of Min Aung Hlaing.
Nepotism has been a feature of Min Aung Hlaing’s leadership since he became military chief in 2011, with critics condemning a promotion policy that eschews merit in favor of connections.
He appointed former Brigadier-General Khin Yi as immigration minister following the coup, before installing him late last year as head of the military’s proxy Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), a position critical for Min Aung Hlaing’s planned poll. The junta boss is related to Khin Yi by marriage.
Min Aung Hlaing had also appointed former Colonel Wunna Maung Lwin as foreign minister. The ex-colonel’s wife Daw Lin Lin Tin is cousin to the junta’s chief’s wife Kyu Kyu Hla.
Wunna Maung Lwin was replaced earlier this month after the regime suffered increasing diplomatic isolation since the coup. Normally, he would have been forced to step down after his efforts failed to woo western countries including the US.
But Min Aung Hlaing has reserved a seat for his relative by marriage in the regime’s governing body, the State Administration Council.
Another nepotistic appointment is former Major-General Maung Maung Ohn, who became the Information Minister. His daughter Ei Moh Moh Aung is close friends with the junta chief’s daughter, Khin Thiri Thet Min.
New foreign minister
U Wunna Maung Lwin was replaced by U Than Swe, who was part of the Defense Services Academy (DSA) 16th intake. He retired as a colonel in 2000.
Than Swe was a long-time Myanmar diplomat, serving as ambassador to the United States under the previous regime’s State Peace and Development Council and ex-general Thein Sein’s quasi-civilian government. As ambassador, he arranged for President Thein Sein’s visit to the US in 2012. U Thein Sein was accompanied on the trip by President’s Office minister U Aung Min, U Soe Thane, and immigration minister U Khin Yi. The Burmese delegation visited the Washington D.C. headquarters of Radio Free Asia, where U Aung Min gave an interview stressing the importance of US support.
Observers interpret Than Swe’s appointment as an attempt to rekindle ties with western countries including the US as the regime loses ground on the diplomatic front.
Former military intelligence officer U Aung Ling Htut, who has been living in the US, believes the regime will find it almost impossible to re-engage with the US, partly because it has no intermediaries like the previous military regime did, and partly because the junta has become too close to Russia.
Than Swe was assigned to lead the country’s anti-corruption commission last year before he was made the foreign minister on Feb. 1. As the anti-graft body’s chair, he is believed to have played a role in prosecuting civilian leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi on charges of corruption.
Generals become ministers, chief ministers
Former Brig-Gen Aung Thaw became minister of hotels and tourism in the reshuffle. He was a classmate of Min Aung Hlaing in the 19th intake of the DSA. He retired from the Navy after reaching the rank of Brig-General.
He served as the deputy defense minister in the U Thein Sein government. He contested the 2020 general election in Yangon’s Cocokyun Township on a USDP ticket.
He became Myanmar-Russia Friendship Association chairman following the 2021 coup and has accompanied the junta boss on his Russia trips.
With no known experience in tourism, it will be interesting to see how he attempts to revive an industry devastated by the double impact of COVID-19 and the coup. Perhaps he has just been tasked with wooing Russian tourists to Myanmar.
Four former lieutenant-generals who retired after reaching pensionable age following the coup have been appointed to senior positions in the Feb. 1 reshuffle, with three becoming chief ministers – of Kayah (Karenni) and Shan states and Ayeyarwady Region – and one becoming a Union minister.
The latter is new Agriculture, Livestock and Irrigation Minister U Min Naung. He joined the 66th intake of Officer Training School before serving as chief of Eastern Central Command, chief of Bureau of Special Operations 4, and Military Inspector General.
Following the coup, he was appointed secretary of the junta’s National Solidarity and Peacemaking Negotiation Committee.
The Agriculture and Irrigation Ministry became notorious for ‘fringe benefits’ under the previous junta, the State Law and Order Restoration Council. Since then, its ministers and directors-general have amassed huge wealth, with one director-general rumored to have become as rich as a crony and able to lend money to banks.
The new Shan State chief minister, U Aung Zaw Aye, is a former lieutenant-general who led the Bureau of Special Operations 2. He oversaw military operations in Kayah and Shan state after the coup.
Former Lt-Gen Zaw Myo Tin and former Lt-Gen air defense chief Tin Maung Win became chief ministers of Kayah State and Ayeyarwady Region respectively.
Former Col Htein Lin, who served as Rakhine State security and border affairs minister in the U Thein Sein government, was appointed Rakhine State chief minister in the Feb. 1 reshuffle.
In the two years since the coup, nearly 1,000 military personnel have been transferred to government departments. And more are expected to fill the ministries as military rule continues.
There will also be more generals in the leadership. And there will undoubtedly be more nepotistic appointments and promotions for relatives and friends of Min Aung Hlaing and his family..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-13
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Arming civilians could escalate violence nationwide, possibly leading to widespread civil war, experts warn.
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"Myanmar’s junta has revived a 1977 law that allows civilians it deems “loyal to the state” to own firearms, a move experts worry will escalate violence by arming pro-junta groups fighting armed resistance groups opposed to military rule.
The junta’s Ministry of the Interior issued the order to revive the law on Jan. 31, a day before the second anniversary of the Feb. 1, 2021 coup, according to a leaked junta document and media reports.
The law allows five types of firearms without permits: 9mm pistols and revolvers, 12-gauge or smaller shotguns, hunting rifles, and air guns. Handguns larger than 9mm, assault rifles, and submachine guns can also be owned with a permit.
“This new amendment is designed for a wider range of weapons,” a Yangon-based lawyer told Radio Free Asia’s Burmese Service. “People who want to carry weapons now know what kinds of weapons they are allowed to carry.”
The lawyer, who requested anonymity to speak freely, said that allowing civilians to carry weapons could pose a greater threat to the country's security.
“Now, defense groups such as pro-junta militias … can legally take up arms issued to them by the military,” he said. “This could lead to many other problems related to the misuse of these weapons … and we can’t say it’s enough to simply register the weapons you carry.”
The law says those applying for the right to bear arms must demonstrate “loyalty to the state, a good character, and a need to carry weapons,” with no criminal record or history of mental instability.
Once their application is approved, the law mandates that licensed arms bearers must participate in the “suppression of crime and vice” if directed, and are responsible for “protecting the life and properties of the people” within the framework of the established rules.
The military wants its supporters armed to shore up its fighting forces, said Kaung Thu Win, a leader of the Civil Disobedience Movement, which led widespread protests and strikes in the months following the coup.
“They think that they will get help once they allow their supporters to take up arms. For example, armed pro-junta militias may report the presence of the [resistance] members to the military or fight them on their own,” he said. “By this new policy, the junta has given the pro-junta groups more rights to carry out more forceful attacks on the resistance forces under the law.”
The army has already been arming pro-junta militia groups, said political analyst Than Soe Naing. The law merely legalizes it.
“This new attempt is to arm people … such as members of the [pro-military] Union Solidarity Development Party, low-level civilian administration officials like ward and township administrators and their staff,” he said. “This is because the military junta can no longer guarantee their security and they now have to protect themselves.”
It also means that if ordered, these newly armed people must cooperate in military operations against the resistance.
RFA reached out to Maj. Gen. Zaw Min Tun, the junta spokesman, by phone Monday to inquire about the newly enacted policy, but his phone rang unanswered.
But Zaw Min Tun confirmed to the local “Popular News” media outlet on Monday that the regime will allow those who “adhere to discipline” to own guns.
“There are calls from the people demanding their security,” he said. “We are going to allow the ones who really need to defend themselves, those who are under threat and those who can handle them in a disciplined manner [to bear arms]."
Padoh Man Man, the spokesman of the Karen National Union armed ethnic group’s fifth brigade, said the policy is worrisome because it may lead to unnecessary shootings and killings.
"About 3 years ago, the military adopted a policy for a mandatory military service for citizens 18 years and older, but they could not implement it successfully,” he said. “This new policy is their second attempt to do that. This is really a seriously worrisome situation for our country.”
Organizations on both sides of the political spectrum said that resistance forces are shooting and killing people suspected of being junta informants, while the military is arresting and killing those it accuses of being resistance members.
The military reported that 5,443 government officials, chief administrators, monks, and children were killed across the country between Feb. 1, 2021 and Jan. 25, 2023, and another 4,577 injured.
Thailand’s Assistance Association for Political Prisoners said that, as of Monday, authorities in Myanmar had killed 2,988 civilians throughout the country since the military coup.
Civil war imminent?
Sunday was Union Day in Myanmar, a holiday commemorating the 1947 Panglong agreement which united the various parts of the country prior to its independence from Britain. However, escalating violence means that the country is headed toward a wider civil war, according to a statement by the Peace Process Steering Team, formed by representatives of armed ethnic organizations and tasked with negotiating with the junta for peace.
Junta leader Senior Gen. Min Aung Hlaing said in a Union Day speech that the country is “a long way from peace” due to interference by various local and foreign groups, without providing details.
Saw Mya Raza Lin, the deputy chairman of the Arakan Liberation Party, one of the country’s ethnic armed groups, said that it is time for stakeholders to have an open discussion.
“It’s still necessary to negotiate. We need to have a serious discussion about the constitution, as well as for other sectors,” he said. “The revolution is a protracted feud that will take many years, and those in power may be concerned that the country will be separated into many smaller parts.”
He said ethnic groups want their right to self-determination, so both parties must be transparent in negotiations.
The steering team statement said that the country must solve its current political problems through peaceful means, and suggested that the junta’s power grab had led to a general crisis, including international sanctions.
Last year was supposed to have been the “Year of Peace” after the junta declared a nationwide ceasefire and invited many of the ethnic armed groups for talks. Instead, the junta expanded an offensive against armed resistance groups nationwide, including by ordering airstrikes and artillery strikes.
A meeting of the junta on Jan. 31 revealed that only 198 of Myanmar’s 330 townships are currently “stable,” and that 19,444 battles have been fought since the coup.
According to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 1.5 million people across the country have been forced to flee their homes due to armed conflict and insecurity..."
Source/publisher:
"RFA" (USA)
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-13
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2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Military History
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"Authors: Adam Simpson, University of South Australia, Thomas Kean, International Crisis Group, and Susan Park, University of Sydney
In the two years since the military coup in February 2021, Myanmar’s natural environment has deteriorated as the embryonic legal and regulatory regime that was emerging during the decade of political and economic reforms has unravelled.
Gold mining has significantly increased, particularly in Kachin and Shan States, causing extensive social and environmental problems. The military has issued new mining permits while informal or illegal mining has also proliferated, causing deforestation, erosion and flooding while also damaging fisheries by polluting waterways with toxic sediment.
Kachin State is also emerging as a key site for highly polluting rare earths mining. While the illicit export of rare earth elements across the border to China has been occurring for years, export activity has boomed since the coup. Attempts by previous governments to regulate these polluted areas have failed since the coup due to a lack of effective oversight. Some of the revenue may be helping the military crush dissent.
But just when Myanmar’s environment needs its defenders the most, environmental activists find themselves facing a plethora of new pressures and security concerns.
Myanmar’s environmental activists, and civil society more broadly, are no strangers to political restrictions. During half a century of earlier authoritarian military rule, activism was largely confined to ethnic ‘liberated areas’ or border zones beyond the reach of the military. This situation began to change during Myanmar’s decade of political and economic reforms starting in 2011, when environmental activists could openly challenge infrastructure projects, mines and government decisions for the first time.
Since the 2021 military coup, the increasingly complex situation in Myanmar has severely impacted environmental movements. The safety of activists has become much more perilous under the new and highly restrictive Organisation Registration Law enacted in October 2022. The coup has resulted in three key impacts on Myanmar’s environmental movements — fracturing, fragmentation and transformation.
A process of fracturing has occurred since the collapse of many environmental NGOs, civil society organisations and community-based organisations as a result of the coup and the subsequent societal conflict. Some activists have simply abandoned activism due to security concerns, cutting all communication with networks of former colleagues to avoid scrutiny from the security services.
A similar fracturing process occurred after the 2014 Thai coup, which resulted in a dramatic reduction in environmental activism in Thailand. But the impacts of the coup in Myanmar on environmental activism have been significantly larger in proportion to the level of extreme disruption and repression across the entire society.
Environmental movements have also experienced fragmentation since many activists have been forced to relocate for safety reasons. Activists have gravitated towards more liberal spaces beyond the reach of the military regime by fleeing to ‘liberated’ areas run by sympathetic ethnic armed groups or seeking refuge abroad, usually in Thailand, from where they can continue environmental activities through other means.
Fragmentation has also occurred due to the additional difficulties in communication and transport since the coup. Internet shutdowns in various areas have made it difficult for networks to remain in contact and many activists have changed their phone numbers for security reasons, making it hard to reconnect. Even where the internet and mobile connections operate, new restrictions on major social media platforms have disrupted networks. Travel across Myanmar is also much more difficult due to higher costs, limited connections and regular checkpoints. Environmental activists and groups now often work on their own, or network in very limited ways.
Environmental movements have been transformed in a variety of ways since the coup. Activists have adopted new strategies to continue their work inside nominally state-controlled areas of Myanmar. In regions where the military remains largely in control, activists have shifted their work to rural areas where the military’s reach is weaker.
Some environmental activists have changed their role completely by shifting to the provision of humanitarian aid, while other activists have transitioned from working non-violently to joining the military struggle for democracy under the People’s Defence Forces, part of the armed resistance that emerged after the coup, or pre-existing ethnic armed groups.
The ability of activists to openly challenge environmentally destructive activities has virtually evaporated. Activists can appeal to international actors for support, but the influence of international organisations is much reduced. During the decade of reform, civil society organisations could complain to the International Secretariat of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative if the government failed to consider their concerns. After the coup, Myanmar was suspended from the initiative due to political instability. These types of international actors simply no longer have any leverage over Myanmar.
Two years after the military coup, with the international community’s attention focused on Ukraine, Myanmar’s environment is experiencing serious degradation and the communities that rely on it for their existence are facing threats to their safety and livelihoods. Meanwhile, Myanmar’s environmental activists who once shined light on these issues now face constant repression and threats to their own security. There is no easy solution, but if even a sliver of the world’s attention and resources that have been expended on Ukraine were directed towards Myanmar instead, then a way out of the present quagmire would seem more likely..."
Source/publisher:
East Asia Forum
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-13
[field_licence]
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2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Environmentalists of Burma/Myanmar, Human Rights and international relations
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"UNAIDS has joined a list of United Nations agencies working with Myanmar’s junta while shunning the legitimate civilian National Unity Government (NUG).
The agencies claim they are being pragmatic to address civilian humanitarian needs. But this is disingenuous.
The existing approach leaves large numbers to shelter in camps or forests with insufficient food and healthcare.
Myanmar’s citizens who are most in need are those specifically targeted by the regime’s arson raids and airstrikes. And they are being abandoned by the international community.
UN agencies’ access is restricted to areas where the junta will allow them to deliver aid.
These international bodies have allowed the junta to weaponize aid, blocking off areas where the junta is attacking civilians and cutting aid.
All UN agencies and international NGOs working in Myanmar should do a small moral and efficiency test by making a simple spreadsheet for 2022 showing their total budgets allocated for Myanmar. The next column could show how much was spent outside the country, paying for offices in New York, Geneva or London.
Another column could show the cost of operations in Myanmar, including offices, cars, expat salaries, accommodation for foreign staff and travel to other regional offices set up since the 2021 coup. Additional costs for keeping most of the expat staff outside Myanmar since the 2021 coup should be added here.
One column should show the wages paid to staff from Myanmar and the cost of aid deliveries to territory under junta control.
The most important column should show money spent on delivering aid to liberated territory and territories that are the target of junta scorched-earth operations.
A final column would show income left unspent because access to those in need has been blocked by the regime.
An additional column could show money spent on training, online capacity-building and communication programs.
International agencies often waste budget surpluses on training, online programs, consultancy fees and analytical papers.
Comparing the total budget to the actual money spent on those outside junta control would expose an embarrassing imbalance.
Open disclosure of UN and other NGO budgets would expose how little is being spent on those most in need.
By refusing to engage with the NUG, UN agencies and other NGOs are failing Myanmar.
People in Sagaing and Magwe regions and Chin, Kachin, Shan, Kayah and Karen states tell me that UN agencies are failing to fulfill their briefs.
Instead, they appease the junta in the hope that it will allow them to continue operating in a restricted manner.
Foreign staff claim they are doing their best in a highly complex, restrictive and risky environment. But these are manipulative and self-interested claims.
An alternative is possible and easy to do. Aid money should be divided into two pots: to be distributed by organizations operating with the junta and those delivering aid to non-junta territory.
UN agencies, NGOs and civil society organizations accessing the second “pot”, with funds earmarked for aid deliveries in territories not controlled by the junta, must have offices outside Yangon and must not engage with the regime. They should also sign deals with the NUG and civilian structures allied to the ethnic armed organizations instead.
Aid to regions outside junta control should be greater given the deeper need of people outside regime control.
This alternative approach could provide resources and capacity for Myanmar-driven “humanitarian resistance”, harnessing contributions from Myanmar’s diaspora, which already provides the most aid and takes the highest risks.
A simple division could unlock largely weaponized or paralyzed aid deliveries.
The policy change might force the junta to lift its restrictions on aid because it will want to retain funding to affiliated agencies, like the Myanmar Red Cross.
Igor Blazevic is a senior adviser at the Prague Civil Society Centre. Between 2011 and 2016 he worked in Myanmar as the head lecturer of the Educational Initiatives Program..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-13
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
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2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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"From the first imposed sanctions against Myanmar in 1997, the United States takes a historical stride by passing the Burma Act 2021 as a law before 2022 ended. President Biden signed the Act into a law on Dec. 23, that has been passed by both the House and Senate. Originally, the bill was a response to the military coup in Myanmar, however, the initial version of it got rejected in the Senate back then.
Myanmar has been listed as a “country of particular concern (CPC)” under US policy. The Southeast Asian nation’s infamous reputation is a result of its history of violating human rights and religious freedom. As Myanmar transitioned gradually to democracy under the leadership of Aung San Suu Kyi, such “concerns” began to see a new beginning. But in February of 2021, the military imprisoned the state counselor Suu Kyi, overthrew the elected government NLD, and seized control of the country, reversing the hard-won progress. The Burma Act is an acknowledgment of the bravery of Myanmar’s people, who have been rebelling against the military’s repression, quitting their jobs, and taking the fight to the streets for nearly two years since then and could prove to be a game changer for them.
Answer to Junta’s intransigence
The United States has traditionally maintained a “democracy first” approach in its involvement with Myanmar, and the newly enacted legislation provides the Biden administration with three prospects for advancing the restoration of democracy in Myanmar. First, the Act permits the United States to provide assistance and communicate directly with anti-junta groups such as NUG, the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, PDF, and EAOs. Potential consultations with EAOs are very necessary, as their altercations with the military and democratic institutions have been superficial at best, and the US has overlooked them all along; without their involvement, the speech for ethnic reconciliation in the Burma Act will remain rhetorical.
Under the Act, $450 million will be provided in financial aid to help with humanitarian needs, sustain the civil disobedience movement, protect the political prisoners, support activists, media, and military defectors along with financial support to the civil society organizations in Myanmar who have been essential in the pro-democracy movement reaching the pleas of people of Myanmar to the international stage.
Second, the law mandates the administration to impose sanctions on senior army officials and entities which operate in the defense sector, state-owned commercial businesses, and individuals linked with the junta’s economic backing within six months. This will place considerable pressure on the Junta, which has repeatedly demonstrated its economic ineptitude in dealing with financial crises.
Lastly, the legislation has also taken into account of the Rohingya issue, the US has to facilitate international justice mechanisms to hold the military accountable for their campaign of 2017 against the Rohingyas. Humanitarian assistance has been ensured for the Rohingya refugees even prior to the Act, as in 2021, $205 million has been provided for the community.
Is it enough?
The Burma Act is packed with optimism and assurances, but whether it will hold water or not, is a discussion that will fuel itself in the coming times. Although an honest attempt, it does have its flaws.
Most sanction measures are discretionary, not mandatory which is a letdown at a moment when the civilians are preparing for a spring revolution against the military. Even the most anticipated sanction measures against Myanmar’s state-owned oil and gas company, MOGE, haven’t also been finalized stating that such action needs reports of cost and benefit, when cutting it out would have been a huge blow to the regime as it’s their main financial asset. The fact that US oil conglomerate Chevron is involved with MOGE’s operations in a particular gas field, Yadana, doesn’t help US cause. Leaving Junta’s dominant hand free, it will be hard for any other measures to free Myanmar from Junta’s claws.
The act also posits to provide “non-lethal” aid to the anti-junta movement meaning no support of arms and weaponry. But when countries like China and Russia are supplying Junta with weapons, a more robust policy to support the training of the anti-Junta forces could have been expected. Although the US has also called for a denunciation of China and Russia’s cooperation with Myanmar through the UN, in light of the current situation in Ukraine, such a demand is unlikely to amount to anything. It’s also frustrating that in comparison with Ukraine, the aid to Myanmar is insignificant.
The US efforts for Myanmar’s freedom ask for more in the existing context where countries like China, Russia, India, Japan, Thailand, and Vietnam are cutting US strategy to isolate the Junta. The US needs a more coherent implementation strategy for Burma Act if it really wants to get above the geopolitics and support the people of Myanmar in their fight to reconstitute democracy..."
Source/publisher:
The Geopolitics
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-12
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Rule of Law - global and regional
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Myanmar is still in the midst of a protracted low-intensity conflict that could stretch on for years without any side being able to assert nation-wide control, possibly leaving in its wake a highly fractured, fragmented and balkanised polity.
Description:
"February 1, 2023 marked the second anniversary of the military ‘coup’ in Myanmar that aborted the return of the National League of Democracy (NLD) for its second term of government after its landslide victory in the November 2020 elections (following the first in 2015) under the military-drafted 2008 constitution.
In the immediate aftermath of the coup, the military detained, arrested and eventually sentenced President Win Myint, State Counsellor and NLD leader, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and other opposition figures to long terms in prison on flimsy charges, declared a one-year state of emergency, and constituted a State Administration Council (SAC) to run the day-to-day affairs of the country. Together with subsequent developments, they have effectively reversed the democratic ‘transition’ initiated by Sr. Gen. Than Shwe, Sr. Gen. Min Aung Hlaing’s politically more astute predecessor, through his seven-stage ‘road map’ towards a ‘discipline-flourishing democracy’ that was supposedly ‘fulfilled’ with elections that brought the reformist, military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) to power in Myanmar in 2010.
Despite the fierce use of force first against peaceful protestors and a widespread Civil Disobedience Movement, started by government doctors in Yangon, and then against spontaneously proliferated new ‘People’s Defence Forces’ (PDFs) in Bamar and ethnic areas and several long-standing ethnic armed organisations (EAOs), the military has not been able to stabilise the situation.
The violence has resulted in close to 3,000 deaths documented by the Association for the Assistance of Political Prisoners (AAPP, and up to 30,000 according to other estimates), thousands if not tens of thousands arrested, four judicial executions (including a member of parliament), and an estimated million and a half displaced in Myanmar and outside (including an estimated 50,000 refugees in India) as a result of brute repression, intimidation by security forces and regime-affiliated vigilante groups, arson, artillery, air power and scorched earth policies on the part of the military that has elicited a widespread armed resistance and retaliation on the part of the citizenry.
It is for all practical purposes, a war by the Tatmadaw (as the Myanmar military as the vanguards of Burma’s independence was respectfully called) on its own people uncluttered by labels of ‘majoritarian’, sectarian, ethnic, religious, minority, ‘left’, ‘right’ or ‘communist’, and conversely, a ‘people’s war’ using largely guerilla tactics against the Tatmadaw. Even those EAOs, which have been kept out of the conflict for tactical or political reasons, have been at odds with the Tatmadaw historically and not responded to peace overtures by the latter.
In response to the coup, the political opposition has formed a National Unity Government (NUG) underpinned by a more broad-based National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC), a committee of ousted elected parliamentarians, the Committee Representing the Pyidaunsu Hluttaw (CRPH), a Charter for a Federal Democratic Union, and a Defence Ministry and military ‘high command’, and announced a ‘defensive war’ against the military (that has at times turned offensive targeting of government officials and collaborators).
The regime has labelled the NUG as a ‘terrorist’ organisation, but the ‘people’s war’ is more than just a struggle for democracy or a federal union, or a civil war. It is more appropriately now a violent struggle for freedom (although not widely understood as one), and arguably a culmination of Burma’s independence movement that remained stunted and appropriated by the Tatmadaw and never really evolved into a mass movement as it did in India.
Though one may not know this from the Indian media, Myanmar is currently in the midst of a protracted low intensity conflict that (like Iraq, Libya, Syria or Afghanistan) could stretch on for years without any side being able to assert nation-wide control or authority, possibly leaving in its wake a highly fractured, fragmented and balkanised polity: a military government operating out of Nay Pyi Taw, Yangon, Mandalay, state capitals and garrison centres using superior force but unable to control the rest and increasingly prone to attacks, sabotage and de-legitimization within; a patchwork of ethnic armed organisations with large areas under their control or contested by the Myanmar Army; and local ‘peoples’ defence forces and governments, or even small ‘de facto’ self-governed enclaves or ‘statelets’ with greater or lesser capacity to provide security or governance in the Bamar heartland (as it has been through much of its history outside its three periods of empire under the Bagan dynasty, the Toungoo and Konbaung) that could take years, if not decades, to merge within a single national authority, whether civilian or military, government or opposition, under the right conditions in the territory that we know today as Myanmar.
Yet, side by side with this breakdown of authority and threat to the unity and integrity of Myanmar, there is a new-found empathy and solidarity among the victims of military rule, the ethnic minorities, the Bamar majority especially youth, and even the hapless Rohingya; and sharpening and clarification of fault-lines that have clouded Myanmar’s journey to nation-hood since the advent of the British, that provides a glimmer of hope that the idea of a federal (or confederal), democratic ‘Union’ of Burma is alive and could, under the right conditions, constitute the basis of a new Myanmar.
Currently, neither side has the power to decisively overpower the other. The opposition has the numbers but not the forces, weapons and unified military leadership to overthrow the Tatmadaw, while the army has the brute force to intimidate civilians, burn villages, and attack, shell and bomb resistance strongholds. On balance, it is the People Defence Forces (PDFs) and EAOs that are gaining ground, not the military, and power is subtly shifting to the more powerful EAOs. According to a leaked State Administrative Committee (SAC) document, 12 of the 14 provinces of Myanmar suffered nearly 18,000 attacks by opposition forces since 2021, 220 out of 330 townships in Myanmar are heavily contested and 132 highly insecure and in need of reinforcement.
Other reports suggest that only 30 of the Myanmar Army’s 230-plus infantry battalions of a 120,000-man army are believed to enjoy effective dominance. Recruitment is falling, and there have been hundreds of defections and desertions (although they are reported to be declining), and none senior enough to reveal any foment or split in the Army itself. Nevertheless, according to various estimates, over 50% of Myanmar territory is under the control of diverse resistance or opposition forces, going up to anywhere between 70-80% in some states like Chin state bordering India.
As if in tacit recognition of the Myanmar Army’s failure to regain control and hold planned elections in August 2023, the military-dominated National Defence and Security Council of Myanmar announced a further six-month extension of emergency (beyond the ‘normal’ two six-month extensions) on January 31 on the eve of the second anniversary of the coup, followed by the declaration of Martial Law in 37 townships in four ‘Regions’ marking largely ethnic Bamar provinces (Sagaing, Magwey, Bago and Thanintharyi), and four ‘States’ inhabited predominantly by ethnic minority groups (Chin, Kayah, Kayin and Mon), in addition to six townships (five in Yangon and one in Chin state) declared earlier.
Of these, Sagaing and Chin state, and Rakhine, which is outside this list but strongly contested by the Arakan Army, are adjacent to India’s North East. Martial law combines all security, administrative, executive and judicial authority in the hands of regional military commanders and empowers them to take summary life and death decisions without legal assistance to the accused or appeal against rulings, with only the death sentence to be approved by the military high command. They set the stage for even more egregious violations of human rights and potential war crimes on the part of the military.
Yet, despite a recent December 2022 United National Security Council Resolution 2669 (its first on Myanmar since 1948 on which Russia, China and India abstained), Myanmar remains in the penumbra of international and domestic media and political attention left largely to the ASEAN of which Myanmar is a member and its April 21, 2021 five-point consensus, to resolve.
This may be partly explained by developments in Afghanistan, Ukraine and East Asia where the US and the West have been more deeply involved or the protagonists have been geo-political rivals like Russia and China, or even a retrenchment in the US and Western commitment to democracy worldwide except in areas of core strategic concern against which Myanmar is so far, a distraction.
But that does not explain the near silence and pro-forma expressions of concern by Indian government representatives and spokespersons to what is happening in Myanmar both in terms of violence, suffering, displacement and lives lost, and the security, stability and future of a country of strategic importance to India in its immediate eastern neighborhood sharing a sensitive 1,600 km border across four North Eastern states and a similar length with Yunnan province of China. It is also a lynchpin of India’s ‘Look East’ and ‘Act East policies’ for which successive Indian governments have taken strategic and development initiatives since the turn of the millennium, including major projects like the Trilateral Highway and Kaladan Multimodal project, to regain its historical and civilisational influence that it lost over centuries especially during the 50-year period of military rule in Burma since the 1960s.
Nor does it explain the lack of sympathy on the part of the Union and concerned state governments other than Mizoram towards Myanmar refugees fleeing violence and persecution who are being rounded up and detained in hastily converted detention camps against local sentiments as ‘illegal migrants’ owing to a lack of a definition of a refugee, or a formal refugee law or being a signatory to the UN Convention on Refugees and its Protocols.
Given conditions in Myanmar, typically, the refugees do not have travel papers or visas and therefore ipso facto liable for immigration violations. Unlike India’s other neighbours, even Pakistan, they are not covered by any police reporting mechanism or a Foreigners Regional Registration Office (FRRO) near their point of entry where they can report on arrival. Nor is there a local office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees where they can apply for refugee status. They remain undocumented and fugitive. Lacking papers, they cannot even travel to state capitals or Delhi to report or register.
In effect, the refugees fall in the cracks between a non-existent refugee law, and the Foreigners and Citizenship Acts where they cannot even count on the most basic human rights (facing anomalies like juveniles under indefinite detention and denial of birth certificates for new-borns) because of lack of immigration, refugee or citizenship status.
Yet, none of these legal obstacles have come in the way in the past in dealing with Tibetan refugees, East Pakistanis (later Bangladeshis) and Sri Lankan Tamils when they faced persecution, indicating, if there is any doubt, that these are essentially political decisions. Fortunately, border security, police, para-military and judicial authorities on the ground have been restrained in their approach to the refugees while watchful of illegal activities like arms or drug smuggling (to which a senior Assam Rifles Commander and family in Manipur tragically lost their lives in an ambush). Nevertheless, concerns about clarity on law, burden sharing by the centre and signs of refugee fatigue remain.
Some of this ‘estrangement’ can be attributed to a reaction to colonial rule in Myanmar in which Indians were an instrument, and psychological amnesia that has afflicted India-Myanmar relations as a result of insular military rule in Myanmar since the 1960s until 2010 when a large Indian community was forced out by xenophobic policies (and since faded away), and the two countries virtually fell off each other’s neighbourhood maps.
But it has also to do with how our priorities and reflexes as a nation have changed from one that valued freedoms that we ourselves fought for, to one that has greater faith in authoritarianism than democratic politics to preserve its ‘national’, security and other interests in the neighbourhood in the name of ‘realism’, justifying ties with the junta but not the NUG.
Ironically, this change can be traced to the failure of pro-freedom policies pursued in the 1980s when India supported both the pro-democratic agitation in Burma and the Tamil cause in Sri Lanka, but has become more marked recently.
Unlike in the 1960s and 1980s, when turmoil in Myanmar was closely reported in the Indian official and private media and sustained by an expatriate Indian community and Burmese exiles, daily news of Myanmar is now the preserve of anxious Myanmar watchers and social media followers. There is little public awareness let alone understanding of events in Myanmar. Even the mainstream strategic observers seem stuck in a post-1990s policy correction when the military was able to reassert its authority against democratic forces by use of force, entering mutually beneficial cease-fires with ethnic armed organisations brokered by the Chinese and appealing to Bamar-Buddhist nationalism, corralling the Indian government to temper its pro-democracy stance to deal with the Generals to address its security needs.
Over time, it also led to a misplaced faith in the Myanmar Army as the best guarantor of India’s security interests vis-à-vis both IIGs and China. This faith is inexplicable. While Myanmar has acted against IIGs from time to time at India’s request, and India and Myanmar also have separate agreements on ‘coordinated patrolling’ on the land and maritime borders, it has more often played ducks and drakes with IIGs in Myanmar, harbouring and maintaining a cozy relationship with them over decades ostensibly on ‘humanitarian’ grounds and using them to settle internal scores when opportune, while objecting to any corresponding gesture to Myanmar refugees or insurgents on India’s part.
Unlike Bhutan and Bangladesh which flushed out Indian insurgents on their soil as friendly gestures, India’s approach to IIGs in Myanmar has been more intelligence-based, and Myanmar’s approach has been to cooperate, acquiesce, leak information or rebuff Indian requests as it has suited them. It is a transactional relationship, not one which India needs to be beholden to the Tatmadaw for, and one that India too could play but apparently does not.
India has used the Indian Armed Forces as a tool of diplomacy to build trust and confidence between the two Armed Forces quite effectively over the last 25 years to the extent that the foreign secretary and chief of army staff could undertake a joint visit to Nay Pyi Taw towards the end of the term of the NLD government. But too much reliance on the military relationship may now be hindering Indian diplomacy from clearly seeing the reality in Myanmar. It can still be used judiciously to steer Myanmar to a more constructive path for which a new approach is needed.
Source/publisher:
"The Wire"
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-11
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Individual Documents
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2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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"SINGAPORE — In Myanmar’s biggest city, Yangon, soldiers patrol the streets at all hours. Police officers stop pedestrians at random, hauling them to jail if they show signs of sympathy for the opposition. Poverty rates in the city have tripled, according to the United Nations, and crime is rife.
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It has been two years since Myanmar’s military ousted its democratic government in a coup, plunging swaths of the Southeast Asian country, also known as Burma, into violent conflict. The junta has crushed free expression, imprisoning journalists, revoking the licenses of independent news outlets and gone to other lengths to limit visibility into the realities of life under military rule.
To capture the struggles of quotidian life, The Washington Post asked three of Yangon’s residents to share their experiences on a single day late last month, each recounting in a series of voice messages the arc of their day. All three are members of a young generation that came of age as democratic rule arrived in Myanmar in the early 2010s and then saw it snuffed out.
Willion, one of a dwindling number of journalists in the city, tried to avoid a run-in with authorities. Sam, a small-business owner, wrestled with the contempt he felt toward the soldiers swarming his city. South of downtown, power outages left Hannway, a young activist, struggling to connect to the revolutionary movement for which she’d put her education on hold. They are being identified by their English instead of Burmese names to limit the chances of repercussions.
Daybreak
Willion, 30, sat up straighter when he heard his neighbors stir. He’d stayed up in case the police arrived for one of their random checks. Opening his laptop, he blinked at the clock at the bottom right corner: 7:13 a.m. He’d made it through another night.
The authorities had been going after journalists like him since the coup. A few weeks ago, police arrested one of Willion’s co-workers, seizing his phone, which had photos and messages implicating Willion. As a precaution, he’d been moving every few days, he said, traveling with a backpack that had just his laptop, a hard drive and a few sets of clothes.
Willion sat back against the wall, his face lit by the laptop screen. He was preparing a presentation on citizen journalism, showing people in conflict-ridden parts of the country how they could document the military’s atrocities. But he was tired, and there was a lot on his mind.
He hadn’t seen his parents in almost a year, and his mother had recently been hospitalized for a heart condition, he said. He wanted to visit but that meant devising a safe route across town. The military had spies across the city and a new Chinese-built surveillance system equipped with advanced facial recognition technology. As he weighed the risks, Willion felt his head grow heavy.
Farther east, past a river, Sam, 36, was driving to work.
A fire had broken out in his middle-class neighborhood overnight, consuming a house and its residents. On his morning walk, neighbors told him the police never responded. Sam wasn’t surprised. Every day, he read reports of banks being robbed in broad daylight, and people being murdered in their homes. The authorities almost never caught the perpetrators.
He glanced out the window. Traffic had slowed around a government building guarded by a garrison. Sam looked at the soldiers in uniform, most of them young men, and thought the same thing he always did at this point in his commute.
“I hope they get sent to the front line and die.”
As a Buddhist, he knew he shouldn’t think such thoughts, he said. But looking at the soldiers wielding their guns reminded him of the young activists shot dead on the streets of Yangon.
Sam’s office was dark when he arrived. He groaned. He blamed them for this, too.
Energy suppliers pulled out of Myanmar after the coup, and in recent months, rebel armies had started to attack transmission lines to hurt the junta. At Hannway’s family home, the blackout had shut down running water.
At a tea shop for Myanmar exiles, songs from home and resistance in the air
Hannway, in her early 20s, heard her parents in the kitchen figuring out what to do. She rolled over in bed and looked at her phone — 10:30 a.m. Two years ago, she recalled, she’d be in class by this time studying to be a doctor. But when the military seized power, she’d chosen to participate in a civil disobedience movement (CDM) aimed at crippling the health-care system.
She scrolled through messages that came overnight.
“They’re investigating CDM students,” read one from a friend. “Be careful.”
Afternoon
Hannway paced around the kitchen. It’d been four hours, and the power was still out. Her mother tried to calm her down, but the message from her friend had unnerved her.
News had started to spread recently that the military planned to punish boycotting students like her. For her safety, she rarely left her house, she said. She killed time by taking online language classes and working remotely on projects supporting the resistance movement. But without electricity, she couldn’t do even that. How long could she keep on like this?
Hannway checked the time — 2:27 p.m. There was a virtual meeting with some CDM doctors in three minutes. The WiFi was still out.
Sam, too, felt the military had made so many aspects of life harder.
He was at a tea shop north of Hannway’s home, meeting a friend vexed over whether to re-enroll his children in government schools. Sam didn’t know what to say. He had his own frustrations: He’d been forced to spend money on generators and solar-powered batteries because of the blackouts; he was facing surging costs of food and gas; the local currency wouldn’t stop falling in value so his small business had to keep raising its prices.
Passing by soldiers on his way back to the office, he felt bile rising inside him again. Why, he asked, were they everywhere?
A love story, forged in Myanmar’s political strife, ends in execution
At 5:30 p.m., after a few hours of sleep, Willion finally prepared to leave his apartment. On his phone, he logged out of his usual social media accounts and into fake profiles that showed no links to journalism. He scrubbed personal messages and contacts, then scanned the Telegram groups where people shared sightings of soldiers in the city. Nothing too alarming.
He flagged down a cab for the hospital. But minutes after leaving his complex, he saw a congregation of soldiers outside a nearby hotel. He squinted through the window — authorities had cuffed three men, he said. Soldiers were interrogating passersby.
Willion fought the instinct to take out his phone to film what was happening. There were too many of them.
Securing his face mask, he slunk deeper into his seat. He had to get to the hospital.
Nightfall
Before the coup, Sam liked to explore Yangon’s various neighborhoods on foot. But he was wary these days about appearing suspicious so he kept his walks to the public parks. Lined with palm trees and often empty, they were one of the only remaining reprieves from the military’s hold over the city, he said.
Strolling as the sun set, Sam let himself relax.
He didn’t want to keep praying for those soldiers to die. Every time he did, he heard his mother’s voice telling him to “keep kindness in his heart.” But it was hard when he woke up each morning to videos of villages set on fire and accounts of rape and torture. Where was he supposed to find the humanity?
He saw three older men walking briskly in the park. As they drew closer, Sam could hear they were talking loudly about Gen. Min Aung Hlaing, the junta leader. One made a joke, turning the general’s name into a curse word, and the other two guffawed, their pot bellies shaking.
Sam smiled as he listened. It sounded for a moment like old Yangon, he said. He wondered if he should strike up a conversation. But maybe they would think he was an informant. He kept walking.
Back in her bedroom, after dinner, Hannway settled in front of her laptop. The electricity was finally back. She pulled up a “click-to-donate” site, where people could get advertisers to send a few cents per click to a cause. The money raised by this site was going toward rebel groups.
Hannway tapped her index finger repeatedly. She felt deflated, she said. She missed attending lectures and visiting old bookshops; she missed the rigor of having an ambition. She thought, as she often did at night, about a friend — a woman serving 20 years in prison after being caught at a safe house for activists.
Hannway felt something turn inside her. She couldn’t give up, she told herself. She didn’t have the right.
As the world moves on, Myanmar confronts a mounting, hidden toll
It was dark by the time Willion reached the hospital. His mother looked better than he expected, but it still made him sad he couldn’t care for his family. A relative had passed away recently, his mother said. It would probably be safer for everyone, he told her, if he didn’t attend the funeral.
After returning home, Willion logged back into his real social media accounts. There’d been renewed fighting in the country’s central Sagaing region, and citizen journalists had sent him reports earlier in the day that soldiers had set fire to seven houses. Once he compiled more information, he’d distribute it to other outlets. But his sources had suddenly gone dark. Maybe the junta had jammed the signal. He hoped it was that.
Just after midnight, Willion warmed up dinner. He’d have to find another place to stay in a few days, once people in the neighborhood started to recognize his face.
But, for now, he’d spend another night awake, waiting for daybreak.
Diamond reported from Yangon..."
Source/publisher:
"The Washington Post"
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-09
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Military History, Human Rights and international relations, Spring Revolution
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"If you’ve followed what’s happened in Myanmar the past two years, the photos of the Assumption Church in Chan Thar village probably won’t shock you. They show its 129-year-old belltower blackened by upward licks of smoke, a mound of grey ash at its entrance, smoke from the remains of a nearby convent rising against a cobalt sky. When soldiers set fire to the compound last month, it was only the latest in a cascade of desperately cruel acts, all with the aim of crushing resistance to the coup of 1 February 2021. They beheaded two men in the same Sagaing village last June.
Beheadings, shootings, beatings, airstrikes: horrors on near daily display for anyone wanting to look, alongside less gruesome strategies of arrest and harassment designed to punish civil disobedience and silence expressions of online and offline dissent. Religious buildings have been key targets: churches but also Buddhist monasteries, notwithstanding the generals’ claim to serve as Buddhism’s protector. Fire has been a key tool, as it was during the 2017 campaign against the Rohingya, which the US last year said constituted a genocide.
Satellite images of scorched villages show the situation most clearly. Some 30,000 structures are thought to have been burned since the coup—from Karen State in the east to Chin State in the west, where airstrikes in January sent hundreds fleeing across the mountainous Indian border. Just as this Christian-majority region has been a stronghold of the resistance, so the Chin diaspora have been key advocates labouring to raise Myanmar’s plight to international consciousness. In the run-up to the recent passage through Congress of the US Burma Act, which promises deepened sanctions and expanded aid, Chin churches across the American heartland showed videos instructing congregants on how to lobby their local representatives.
Catholic doctrine on the Assumption teaches that, at the end of her life, Mary was taken up—assumed—into heaven, her body and soul intact. There were Old Testament precedents; on account of his zeal, the prophet Elijah was taken up in a chariot of fire. Mary’s assumption is said to anticipate the future salvation of humanity. In Myanmar, many have taken salvation into their own hands. In 2021, once the initial waves of protest were met with bullets from the military, or Sit-Tat, and indifference from an international community that some hoped would be their saviour, the Spring Revolution took a guerrilla turn.
Across the country hundreds of People’s Defence Force (PDF) groups have been at war with the Sit-Tat ever since. Sagaing has been a hotbed, east of the Chin Hills and west of Mandalay. Once spared much of the cruelty that the Sit-Tat has for decades inflicted on Myanmar’s borderlands, this central Anya (or “upstream”) region is now also a target for collective punishment.
“They arrived around 8 a.m. on Saturday,” one Chan Thar resident told The Irrawaddy. “They torched houses the whole day. They then stayed in the church compound, and left this morning after torching the church.” It was the soldiers’ fourth arson attack in the village since last May, reducing its houses from 600 to fewer than forty. Its mostly Catholic population descend from Portuguese mercenaries and traders who arrived in the sixteenth century, centuries before the three Anglo-Burmese wars that brought Burma under the Raj.
The most famous of these Portuguese, the Lisbon-born Filipe de Brito, came via Goa and served the King of Arakan with such distinction that he was made Governor of the growing shipping port of Syriam—now Thanlyin, a township across the Bago River from today’s Yangon. Other Portuguese mercenaries joined him, as did Jesuit priests. Conversions followed. In 1602, de Brito went out on his own, coming into conflict not only with his former Arakan master but with the King of Ava, Anaukpetlun.
De Brito’s troops shared something of the Sit-Tat’s approach to religion, looting pagodas, destroying Buddha images, and melting down bells for weapons. When Anaukpetlun captured Syriam in 1613, his men impaled de Brito and marched hundreds of surviving Portuguese prisoners north to Ava. It was their descendants who, after generations of intermarriage, built the Assumption Church in 1894. Also a descendant is Cardinal Charles Bo, the current Archbishop of Yangon. Criticised for his ongoing dealings with the junta, Bo’s hosting of the coup leader Min Aung Hlaing at a recent Christmas Mass, only a month after soldiers burnt houses in the Cardinal’s own home village, came as little surprise.
More surprising perhaps are the findings of a recent report detailing the extent to which the Sit-Tat has become self-sufficient in the domestic production of many of the weapons it uses against its own people, as well as the degree to which this production is relying on raw materials supplied by companies from a dozen foreign countries. “The West, in lieu of arming the resistance,” one analyst wrote of the report’s implications, “could increase pressure on its allies in Taiwan, Ukraine, Israel and Singapore to end all support.”
From Filipe de Brito to Min Aung Hlaing, violence in Myanmar has long had an outside: connections to circuits of capital and commerce—and, occasionally, concern—extending from its Anya heartland to its maritime and mountain borders, and far beyond..."
Source/publisher:
Mekong Review
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-09
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
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2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Political History
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"• The junta has killed at least 2,688 civilians and arrested 17,573 as of 31 Jan. Burma now has 1,584,300 IDPs.
• The regime began to compile voter lists in preparations for its sham 2023 ‘election.’ Resistance groups attacked census agents in several locations, killing at least 13.
• The junta adopted a new Political Parties Registration Law that will allow the military-aligned USDP to run unchallenged and lead to the dissolution of the NLD.
• UNHCR reported that over 3,500 Rohingya attempted to flee Bangladesh and Burma by sea in 2022, up from 700 in 2021. At least 348 died or went missing; the highest figure since 2014.
• Australia, Canada, the UK, and the US announced new sanctions, but stopped short of sanctioning the junta's main cash cow..."
Source/publisher:
ALTSEAN-Burma
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-08
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
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2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations, Political History
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Sub-title:
Malaysia’s former foreign minister speaks to RFA about the crisis in Myanmar
Description:
"Radio Free Asia talked with Malaysia’s former Foreign Minister Saifuddin Abdullah, who was often a strong advocate for ASEAN to take stronger action on the crisis in Myanmar. He spoke about the current geopolitical situation in the country and ASEAN’s reaction to it, as well as where things stand with the shadow National Unity Government that opposes the junta in the last two years since the Feb. 1, 2021, military coup.
RFA: What do you think about the situation in Myanmar currently?
Abdullah: Well, it is now already two years after the coup d’etat and things are getting worse day by day. More than 18,500 clashes, more than 1.2 million people are internally displaced, Many thousands have been killed, Civilians killed, and civilians arrested. Your president [Win Myint] and Aung San Suu Kyi are now behind bars for 12 years and 33 years. These are all very, very unfair. It was a kangaroo court that made the decision.
So things are getting worse for the people. But I salute the people of Myanmar because they have been steadfast in fighting against the junta since two years ago. And even before that, we know the story of the struggle of the Myanmar people.
The confidence-building work done by the NUG and the NUCC seems very fruitful. I understand people are talking to each other more today compared to before. All the stakeholders I have met the NUG, the NUCC and some of the other stakeholders more than once before, and I understand that they are working together very hard, including with the People's Defense Force militias. And the Myanmar diaspora, those who are living as refugees outside, are always in contact with the fighters and activists in the country. I think after two years, they are very resilient. And I think this is something that I really take my hat off to the people of Myanmar.
RFA: What do you think about ASEAN? So far we don’t see any significant response from ASEAN.
Abdullah: ASEAN decided to do the five-point consensus. Unfortunately, the five-point consensus has not shown any real progress, not even on humanitarian assistance.
But this year, the chair of ASEAN is Indonesia. I am very hopeful that President Jokowi and Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi will do more. Both are very passionate. I have spoken to Retno Marsudi many, many times. I think she will put a lot more effort into getting the five-point consensus working.
However, when I met the foreign minister of the NUG, she was very polite in telling me that the five-point consensus is not sufficient. I don't know. I know that for them it is not going to work. It is something that was done without consultation with the NUG, the NUCC and the other stakeholders so they do not have any hope for the five-point consensus. But they were very polite to me saying that it is not enough.
So I think ASEAN has to have more of a sense of urgency, and I had spoken to my colleagues when I was Foreign Minister saying that ASEAN must have a framework with a straightforward end game, that is, to bring back democracy to the people of Myanmar. Until and unless you have a clear framework with a straightforward end game, this will not end. So the people will still suffer. I think ASEAN and the international community must have a higher sense of urgency in helping the people of Myanmar.
RFA: So, do you think Indonesia can persuade the Myanmar junta to go with the ASEAN five-point consensus? Would that be enough?
Abdullah: I'm very hopeful that Indonesia, as chair of ASEAN, can do something. I understand that Jakarta is planning to send generals to speak to the junta. I don't know what the objective is, but perhaps we can try, you know, many ways of talking to the junta. But at the same time, whether we like it or not, ASEAN must engage NUG and the NUCC officially, because this is the only way to do it. We have spoken to the junta many, many times. Nothing happened. So this is the time, two years after the coup d'etat. We must engage the NUG and the NUCC.
RFA: Do you think ASEAN will do it?
Abdullah: I know Retno Marsudi has met, or, if not her, her team has met NUG and the NUCC.That I know for a fact. And that I think is a good beginning.
RFA: So do you think ASEAN is going to officially contact NUG?
Abdullah: There are at least three ASEAN member states who are of the opinion that we should engage openly with the NUG and the NUCC. Malaysia has spoken about it. Indonesia has spoken about it. I'm sorry, I cannot mention the other ASEAN member state. I will let them say it in public themselves.
RFA: And what is the Malaysian government's stance on the Myanmar crisis?
Abdullah: Well, I have not spoken to the current foreign minister, but Malaysia's foreign policy is normally very stable. We normally continue from where we stood in the past. So I am hoping that the current prime minister and foreign minister will continue what we were already doing. But on a personal level, I am still engaging my friends. Of course, as a former foreign minister, It's not official, but I am still talking to them and sending whatever messages that need to be sent to people that need to receive those messages.
RFA: Yeah. Since the coup in Myanmar, a lot of Myanmar people have crossed the border and at least a thousand people arrived in Malaysia from Myanmar, maybe some illegally. There were reports that the Malaysian government deported some of the refugees who were detained. So what should the Malaysian government do about Myanmar migrants who are here?
Abdullah: There are two things here. Number one, we are not a signatory to the International Convention on Refugees, but we have always been very helpful, including to people from Myanmar. We have about 180,000 people from Myanmar in Malaysia. Most of them are Rohingya, but there are non-Rohingya residents too. I think what has happened [the deportation] is regretful, something that I really don't know. It may have happened when I wasn't in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, or maybe when I was there, but it was something that didn't come to my attention because there are many agencies involved in this kind of program.
What Malaysia really needs is a proper and better management system for refugees. What I know is that a new amendment to a directive from Malaysia's National Security Council is now on the table. And I'm very hopeful that we can quickly amend or improve the way we manage refugees and people asking for asylum and continue working with UNHCR so that we can prevent deportation, especially unnecessary deportation from happening again.
RFA: Are you aware that on February 1st, Myanmar's people participated in a silent strike to show their defiance of the junta? What are your thoughts on that?
Abdullah: I really salute them. I think they are being very brave and very bold and very resilient. They are steadfast in showing their opposition to the junta. The silent strike I thought is a very innovative way to demonstrate, you know, that they don't fear the junta and they are continuing with the struggle.
And this is where I keep on saying that ASEAN and the international community must not fail the Myanmar people. They are daring and they are willing. So we from our side must be equally willing, if not so daring, but must be more willing to help them.
RFA: Do you have any suggestions for the NUG government?
Abdullah: No, I think NUG knows what needs to be done. I always believe that the pro-democracy struggle of the people of Myanmar must be led by the people of Myanmar. And for the Myanmar people. I understand that NUG is your elected government.
RFA: Is the United Nations doing enough for Myanmar?
Abdullah: The United Nations Secretary-General has appointed Dr. Noeleen Heyzer as the special envoy. I think she is also trying her best. She is working on a new program to provide better education for Myanmar refugees who are now outside Myanmar but also looking for funding to help the NGOs who are working within Myanmar to provide education.
I understand this is not going to be very easy, but this is one area that I understand she is trying to work on. But the international community, whether it is through the U.N. or other platforms, must do more. For example, sanctioning military assets - We must stop the supply of military assets, and military equipment, including fuel for aviation, especially. Because so long as the junta can fly the plane, they will still bomb people, including children attending school. So we must stop the supply of military assets, equipment, and fuel.
RFA: Any final message to the Myanmar people?
Abdullah: I think the people of Myanmar are a strong people. They are very bold. They're very brave and they're willing and daring. And I am very, very confident that there is light at the end of the tunnel. All I'm hoping for is for the international community, especially ASEAN, to have more urgency to assist the people of Myanmar..."
Source/publisher:
"RFA" (USA)
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-08
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"Myanmar’s trade with Thailand has steeply declined since the 2021 coup as the junta imposes restrictions to prevent weapons from reaching resistance forces.
Border trade declined from over US$4 billion in 2019-20 to $3.6 billion in the 2022-23 financial year, which ends on March 31, according to the junta’s Ministry of Commerce.
Goods sold in the Thai border town of Mae Sot are largely out of stock across the frontier in Myawaddy because traders can only import if they also export to Thailand, according to a trader in Myawaddy.
“I have got all the documents needed to import fertilizers. But I can’t import because I am running a trade deficit of about 4 million baht [$119,000]. We haven’t made exports of that value. It is causing delays. Many other traders are facing the same problems,” the trader told The Irrawaddy.
The regime imposed restrictions, including that the value of imports and exports must be equal, and the payments must be made in dollars or baht through a junta-controlled bank. It has also required traders to seek approval from Myanmar’s Food and Drug Administration to import and export.
Meanwhile, trade is often delayed by frequent fighting along the border. Traders also have to pay high taxes along the route.
“This is our living so we continue to do what we have been doing. The risks are high but we continue,” said the trader.
The junta closed the Thai border at Htee Khee in Tanintharyi Region in April last year after a resistance attack on a police station on the Dawei-Htee Khee road.
The border gate was a major trading point and the closest crossing to Bangkok. Myanmar mainly exports fish, coal, lead and food to Thailand via Htee Khee and imports diesel, cooking gas, food and consumer goods.
A Tanintharyi trader said: “The Htee Khee gate has been closed since last year. Some are trading via Mawtaung and Kawthoung.”
Trade through Htee Khee was already in steady decline, falling from $2 billion in 2019-20 to $1.7 billion in 2020-21 and $1 billion in 2021-22, according to the junta’s Commerce Ministry. The ministry claimed that Htee Khee trade totaled $1.7 billion from April 1 to November 30 last year, despite the gate being closed since April.
The trader said: “I think it is the cost of gas imports. Trade through Mawtaung and Kawthoung has also declined. Trade is hopeless. It is unlikely that it will return to pre-coup levels. And we feel unsafe.”
Trade through Mawtaung was $7 million from April 1 to November 30 last year and there are no figures for the Mese border in Kayah State since the coup.
The Thai border crossings are at Myawaddy, Tachilek, Kawthoung, Myeik, Htee Khee, Mawtaung and Mese but only Tachilek, Myawaddy, Kawthoung, Myeik and Mawtaung are now open.
The regime has restricted imports of fertilizer and food and Myawaddy’s trade is currently dominated by construction materials and consumer goods.
The junta-controlled Trade Department this month told exporters to submit a list of their exports and seek online transport approval. The department will then issue a QR code for shipping.
Trucks have to show the QR code at checkpoints. The system is being trialed this month at the borders at Myawaddy and Muse and Chin Shwe Haw in Shan State.
Myawaddy’s exports are mainly rice, rice powder, rubber and crops like pepper, while imports include food, consumer goods, building materials, industrial raw materials and machinery..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-08
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"There are 17 major ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) in Myanmar and the civilian National Unity Government (NUG) says eight of them are cooperating politically or militarily to bring down the junta.
NUG spokesman U Nay Phone Latt told The Irrawaddy: “We are cooperating [with EAOs] in practical terms. I can’t name them for various reasons but you can find them in reports from the frontlines.”
Observers have stressed the importance of interaction between the NUG and EAOs in defeating the regime and we will examine the extent of cooperation since the February 2021 coup.
The EAOs fall into four broad categories: those publicly cooperating with the NUG; groups supporting the NUG behind the scenes; organizations expressing sympathy for the NUG despite holding talks with the regime; and groups that are in talks with the regime and shunning the NUG.
EAOs that cooperate with the NUG
The Kachin Independence Army, Karen National Union (KNU), Karenni National Progressive Party, Chin National Front and All Burma Students Democratic Front all cooperate with the NUG.
They have provided military training for many of the estimated 65,000 resistance fighters that have appeared since the coup.
The Kawthoolei Army led by Major General Saw Nerdah Mya, which has split from the KNU following the coup, also fights alongside resistance forces.
Six EAOs say they cooperate with the NUG and the civilian government has formed three regional commands to ensure military cooperation between the groups.
Region one oversees northern and western Myanmar, region two covers southern areas and region three oversees central and eastern zones.
The NUG’s Central Command and Coordination Committee formed in October 2021 includes leaders from allied EAOs.
The parallel government cooperates on a political level to provide administrative duties in liberated territories.
The Interim Chin National Consultative Council, Kachin Political Interim Coordination Team, Karenni State Consultative Council, Mon State Interim Coordination Committee, Pa-O National Federal Council and Ta’ang Political Consultative Council are all working with the NUG.
They are political coalitions representing ethnic minorities.
EAOs providing hidden support
The powerful Three Brotherhood Alliance of the Arakan Army (AA), Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) is not conducting military operations with the NUG but it provides training and weapons to resistance forces.
MNDAA Brigade 611 that was armed in early January is a combination of at least six resistance groups, including the Bamar People’s Liberation Army, which is allied to the NUG.
The AA has trained resistance fighters in western Magwe Region and the TNLA has trained volunteers from Mandalay Region.
EAOs with sympathy for the NUG
Several EAOs have shown an understanding for the NUG’s armed struggle without making any public statements.
The United Wa State Army, Shan State Progress Party and National Democratic Alliance Army have ceasefires with the regime and have held talks with the junta but not conceded to its demands.
During talks last month in Naypyitaw, the regime demanded the three groups stop supporting the NUG and its allied groups. They rejected the junta’s demand.
A source told The Irrawaddy: “They asked us to sign an agreement not to support and sell arms to the resistance groups. We didn’t accept that. There was a heated argument and we threatened to walk out if they kept insisting that we sign.”
A source said the three groups feared the public would believe the junta’s misleading statements about the discussions.
The three groups clearly share an understanding with resistance forces, analysts have said.
EAOs in talks with the junta
Seven EAOs that are signatories to the 2015 Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement, including the Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS), New Mon State Party (NMSP), Democratic Karen Benevolent Army, Karen National Liberation Army Peace Council, Arakan Liberation Party, Pa-O National Liberation Organization and a Lahu Democratic Union splinter group, only engage with the junta.
Only the RCSS and NMSP have relatively large armies while the others have few or no troops.
They have said they prefer to follow political means to solve problems and need to engage in dialogue with the junta.
Junta chief Min Aung Hlaing has conferred honorary titles like Wunna Kyawhtin on some of their leaders. There is no open hostility towards the NUG from the groups.
The people will decide these groups’ fate, said U Nay Phone Latt.
“If they back Min Aung Hlaing’s terrorist military, they will be considered criminals. Some might be cooperating for their group’s survival. And some may be looking for an alternative path. Ultimately, it is the people who will decide their fate,” said the NUG spokesman.
Will cooperation with the NUG increase?
Only a third of EAOs with an estimated 40,000 troops in total are fully cooperating with the NUG.
Around a third of the groups are only partially involved in the revolution while about 7 percent of EAOs troops are allied with the junta.
There has been more military than political cooperation, ethnic leaders say.
Padoh Mahn Mahn, the KNU spokesman in Papun District, said: “The military cooperation is clear. We fight the dictatorship. We fight to defend the people. But political agreements are yet to develop properly.”
The NUG has reached a general agreement on establishing a federal democracy but is yet to ratify a constitution guaranteeing self-determination and equality.
“We haven’t been able to design an interim constitution that is satisfactory on equality and self-determination for ethnic minorities. Military cooperation has reached a satisfactory level but political cooperation is weak,” Padoh Mahn Mahn said.
U Nay Phone Latt said the NUG will realize the promises made by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s father General Aung San in the 1947 Panglong Agreement. The NUG opposes racial chauvinism and guarantees equality and self-determination within a federation, he said.
“While we can absolutely guarantee these things, there are also other issues that must only be decided through broader consultation with stakeholders in the future. The NUG is an interim government and we are not in a position to guarantee future policies,” said the NUG spokesman.
An observer said it is difficult for NUG and EAOs to reach political agreements because of their differing backgrounds and experiences.
“It is difficult to agree new systems of government. It will also be influenced by which revolutionary groups achieve success,” she said.
Another observer called for greater cooperation with allied EAOs. “The NUG must persuade neutral EAOs to join the fight, presenting overwhelming numbers to guarantee victory over the junta,” he said..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-07
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2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Spring Revolution
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"1. Acting President’s Facebook account hacked2/2/2023...2. Nearly 3000 civilians died over 2 years of revolution1/02/2023...3. Defence Ministry reports attack against SAC aircraft3/2/2023...4. Human Rights Minister U Aung Myo Min urges French Government to take more measures...5. NUG calls on UN and international community to block all attempts by the SAC to legitimise through sham elections...6. NUG Foreign Minister hopes 2023 will be turning point for foreign support...7. Education Ministry calls for applications for the primary education course (2nd phase)
3/2/2023..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-07
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"On December 23, 2022, President Biden signed into law the James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (NDAA 2023; P.L. 117–263). Included in the NDAA 2023 was a modified version of the Burma Unified through Rigorous Military Accountability Act (BURMA Act; H.R. 5497) that was passed by the House of Representatives on April 6, 2022. A similar companion bill, S. 2937, had been introduced in the Senate and referred to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, but received no further action.
The inclusion of the BURMA Act in the NDAA 2023 was praised by many interested parties in Myanmar and around the world, based on the assumption that it would result in increased U.S. pressure on Myanmar’s military junta, the State Administrative Council (SAC), and provide more aid to the people of Myanmar. A closer examination of the provisions of the BURMA Act, however, reveals that it is unlikely to result in major changes in U.S. policy in Myanmar.
Provisions of the Modified BURMA Act
The version of the BURMA Act that was incorporated into the NDAA 2023 is significantly different from either the version passed by the House of Representatives or the one introduced in the Senate. Virtually all of their respective provisions were modified or altered to reduce the overall scope and impact of the act. According to one source, these changes were made in response to objections from the Biden administration or in order to obtain the support necessary to pass in the Senate.
The NDAA’s BURMA Act contains seven separate elements pertaining to U.S. policy in Myanmar. These sections include a general statement on U.S. policy (section 5569); the authorization of the imposition of new sanctions (section 5570 and 5571); requirements for the coordination of U.S. policy (section 5572); a call for greater efforts at the United Nations (section 5573); the authorization of appropriations for assistance for Burma (section 5575, 5576 and 5577); authorization of assistance for “efforts against human rights abuses” in Myanmar (section 5578); and a limitation on the imposition of sanctions on imports from Myanmar (section 5579).
The statement of U.S. policy is a general statement of “support the people of Burma in their struggle for democracy, freedom, human rights, and justice.” This section calls for support of those opposing the military junta, explicitly mentioning the National Unity Government (NUG), but not the ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) or the People’s Defense Forces (PDFs). In addition, the act says it is U.S. policy to support a “credible process” for the restoration of civilian rule, reform of the Burmese military, and the protection of the rights of minority groups. It also requires accountability for perpetrators of human rights violations in Myanmar, as well as accountability for China and Russia for their alleged “support of the Burmese military.” Another component of U.S. policy, according to the BURMA Act, is the continued provision of humanitarian assistance for victims of violence still within Myanmar, as well as those in the “surrounding region.” Finally, the act calls for the unconditional release of all political prisoners in Myanmar.
The sanctions provisions of the BURMA Act stipulate obligatory sanctions on “senior officials of the Burmese military or security forces of Burma,” the SAC and its military-appointed cabinet, entities “that primarily operate in the defense sector of the Burmese economy,” and certain state-owned commercial enterprises. These obligatory sanctions are to be imposed no later than 180 days after enactment, or by June 21, 2023.
In addition, it authorizes, but does not require, the president to impose sanctions on the Myanma Oil and Gas Enterprise, state-owned enterprises that are not operating in the extractive or industrial sector and financially benefit the Burmese military, spouses, and adult children of persons sanctioned under the BURMA Act, foreign persons who have aided or assisted with the coup and supporting the SAC, and “any Burmese entity that provides materiel in the Burmese military.” The stipulated sanctions are the freezing of assets held in the United States or are held by a U.S. entity, the denial of foreign exchange transactions, and a ban on visas to enter the United States.
In terms of policy coordination, the BURMA Act requires the Department of State’s Office of Sanctions Coordination to “develop a comprehensive strategy for the implementation of the full range of United States diplomatic capabilities to implement Burma-related sanctions . . .” The strategy is to not only cover multiagency coordination within the U.S. government, but also international efforts to impose multilateral sanctions, including pressuring China and Russia to “support multilateral action against the Burmese military.”
Regarding the United Nations, the BURMA Act requires the president to “direct the United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States to spur greater action by the United Nations” regarding Burma. This includes “pushing the United Nations Security Council” to consider a condemnation of the 2021 military coup, the imposition of a “global arms embargo,” a termination of assistance to SAC, and passage of “multilateral sanctions against the Burmese military.”
The BURMA Act also authorizes the appropriation of funds for FY 2023 to 2027 for various forms of assistance, including “programs to strengthen federalism in and among ethnic states in Burma, including for non-lethal assistance for Ethnic Armed Organizations in Burma.” Assistance may also be provided for “efforts to establish an inclusive and representative democracy in Burma;” “technical and non-lethal support” for the EAOs, PDFs, and “pro-democracy movement organizations;” and programs to “investigate and document atrocities in Burma.” The act also stipulates that none of this assistance is to be made available to the SAC, the Burmese military, or any entity controlled by either the SAC or the Burmese military.
The act authorizes the secretary of state to also provide assistance to “appropriate civilian or international entities” to identify suspected “war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide in Burma;” “collect, document and protect evidence” of those suspected crimes; and conduct investigations of the alleged crimes. The act explicitly includes the United Nations’ Independent Investigation Mechanism for Myanmar (IIMM).
The final section of the BURMA Act excludes the imposition of sanctions on the importation of goods under the authority of the act. For purposes of the BURMA Act, “goods” are defined as “any article, natural or man-made substance, material, supply or manufactured product, including inspection and test equipment and excluding technical data.”
Implications for U.S. Policy
The provisions of the BURMA Act in the NDAA 2023 underwent substantial changes from the bills introduced in the House of Representatives and the Senate, reducing their overall impact on U.S. policy. The sanctions provisions, for example, are comparatively limited in scope than those in the original bills. In addition, both the obligatory and discretionary sanctions authorized in the BURMA Act could be imposed using existing authority provided by previous acts, such as the Tom Lantos Block Burmese JADE (Junta's Anti-Democratic Efforts) Act of 2008 (JADE Act; P.L. 110–286). Enforcement of the sanctions provisions of the JADE Act were waived by Executive Order 13742 and Executive Order 14014, but could be reinstated by President Biden at any time.
Another major change was the elimination of the position of special coordinator for Burmese Democracy from the BURMA Act. In both the House and Senate versions, the secretary of state was authorized to “designate an official of the Department of State” to coordinate the multiagency implementation of U.S. policy in Burma. This position was similar to one established in the JADE Act, which was eventually eliminated in response to years of complaints by the State Department. The special coordinator position could have led to the creation of a more effective and realistic policy in Myanmar, after years of drift dating back to the late Obama administration.
The assistance provisions of the BURMA Act were also significantly reduced in scope and specificity. In the bills introduced in each chamber, the assistance provisions listed many forms of assistance to be provided, including aid for refugees in “Bangladesh, Thailand, and the surrounding region;” internally displaced persons; voluntary resettlement; “promotion of ethnic and religious tolerance;” “primary, secondary, and tertiary education for displaced children,” and “political prisoners.”
One potentially important detail is the assistance provisions of the BURMA Act is the authorization of “non-lethal assistance” to Myanmar’s EAOs, PDFs and “pro-democracy movement organizations.” This detail is significant in two ways. First, it explicitly designates the EAOs and PDFs as possible recipients of “non-lethal assistance.” The Biden administration has, in general, refrained from direct mention of relations with the EAOs and PDFs, choosing to focus more on its engagement with the NUG.
Second, the authorization of “non-lethal assistance” provides the Biden administration with the opportunity to adopt a more liberal interpretation of what forms of military aid it can provide to the EAOs and PDFs. In Syria and Ukraine, for example, “non-lethal assistance” allowed the provision of uniforms, protective armor, armored military vehicles, radar equipment and medical equipment and supplies. It remains to be seen as how broadly the Biden administration will interpret this provision of the BURMA Act.
Overall, the BURMA Act requires little change in U.S. policy in Myanmar. However, it does give the Biden administration the discretionary authority to make major changes, if it wishes to do so. In addition, the BURMA Act should also be viewed as an indication that Congress thinks that the Biden administration should take a more active role in supporting the pro-democracy forces in Myanmar in their efforts to overthrow the SAC and establish a democratic government in the country.
Michael F. Martin is an adjunct fellow (non-resident) with the Southeast Asia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C..."
Source/publisher:
Center for Strategic & International Studies
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-07
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"National Unity Government Weekly Press Update (6/2023)..."
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National Unity Government of Myanmar
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2023-02-07
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"(Chiang Mai, Thailand) The Karenni Human Rights Group, the Kayan Women’s Organization, the Karenni National Women’s Organization, and the Kayah State Peace Monitoring Network today released a new report, “How can we survive in the future?”: Atrocity Crimes in Karenni State. The report documents human rights violations amounting to war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by junta forces in Burma’s Karenni State and surrounding areas between May 2021 and September 2022.
The serious violations of international human rights and international humanitarian law committed by junta forces include both indiscriminate and targeted attacks on Karenni civilian populations, murder and mass killings, widespread destruction of civilian property, forced displacement on a massive scale, arbitrary arrest and detention, torture and cruel treatment, sexual violence, and using Karenni civilians as forced labor and human shields.
“The Burmese Army continues to conduct militarized activities, including the use of heavy artillery against civilians in Karenni State. Women and children are the most vulnerable in conflict. Civilians across the country, including Karenni State, have been forced to flee their homes and move to the jungle. The situation has become increasingly unstable due to armed clashes,” said Mie Mie, Chairperson of the Karenni National Women’s Organization.
1,190 homes in 87 Karenni towns, wards and villages have been either heavily damaged or completely destroyed by junta forces. At least 180,000 Karenni people have been forcibly displaced, which is more than 40 percent of the estimated total Karenni population. Up to 70 percent of internally displaced people (IDP) are women and children. Some families have been displaced multiple times, as IDP sites come under attack by junta forces.
An internally displaced woman interviewed for the report whose home was destroyed by the regime’s mortar shelling said, “I lost everything. I don’t know where to take my children to stay and hide. I am really afraid and I don’t know where we can keep running safely.”
The report also documents the arbitrary arrests of at least 260 Karenni civilians including 33 women by junta forces throughout Karenni State and neighboring areas. 115 Karenni civilians were documented to have been unlawfully killed while in Burmese military custody over the reporting period, including in three mass killing events.
Based on legal analysis of the data collected, the report finds that members of the Burmese military have committed the war crimes of attacking civilians, attacking protected objects, pillaging, murder, torture, cruel treatment, and displacing civilians in Karenni State. The conduct likely also amounts to the crimes against humanity of imprisonment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, murder, torture, enslavement, other inhumane acts, and forced displacement.
The four Karenni organizations urged the international community to pursue justice and accountability to end the cycle of impunity for the Burmese military. This should include referral of the situation in Burma to the International Criminal Court, which would provide a pathway to justice and reparations for the thousands of Karenni victims. They also renewed calls for the international community to take concrete steps beyond ‘statement diplomacy’ to protect the thousands of civilians who live with the daily threat of being murdered by the military regime. These steps should include imposing a coordinated global arms embargo on the Burmese military and sanctioning aviation fuel supply in a bid to end deadly air strikes..."
Source/publisher:
Karenni Human Rights Group, Kayan Women’s Organization, Karenni National Women’s Organization, Kayah State Peace Monitoring Network
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-06
[field_licence]
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2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Armed conflict in Burma - attacks on civilians
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"Myanmar’s economy has seen a dramatic downturn in the aftermath of the 2021 coup, with figures suggesting a contraction of at least 30%. Yet, even as households return to a state of “everyday economic survival,” to borrow a phrase from political scientist Ardeth Thawnghmung—with news outlets reporting rising unemployment and starvation—Myanmar’s real estate market has surged in both popularity and pricing. Industry reporting and coverage in national media suggest that market rates for land and property have doubled, and even tripled, in some areas—a statistic that underscores what has long been true in Myanmar: for many, land is the most reliable စုဗူး or savings jar.
Since the coup, the instability of other assets has buttressed peoples’ beliefs in the stability of investments in land. The value of the Myanmar kyat has fallen by nearly half, even as the junta has effectively banned foreign currency. Gold prices spiked to a record high of over 3.5 million kyats per tical last August. Investments in cars, another established asset in Myanmar, have dropped off, mirroring global trends that reflect pandemic-era supply chain disruptions and, more recently, sky-high gas prices. But, if land remains one of a very few ways to store value in Myanmar’s unfolding crises, important issues linger: Who buys land, who sells land, and how? These questions are perennial insofar as they intersect with historical dynamics of property and inequality. Yet, the current context also demands understanding how and why the land market—like Myanmar’s population more broadly—has increasingly migrated online.
Since 2019, we have conducted in situ and digital ethnography to trace shifts in land transactions as they moved onto social media. While brokers have, historically, swapped land documents, contracts, and cash around tables in teashops or in front of township land registration offices, during COVID-19 lockdowns, many began to advertise online. While the actors brokering land deals remain largely the same, their methods have transformed. Facebook—Myanmar’s dominant social media platform—has become especially popular as a tool for buying and selling land. We followed brokers, sellers, and buyers as they created or joined new pages and groups devoted to the sale of land. We reviewed dozens of rapidly growing public groups across Myanmar, many hosting tens of thousands of members, focusing on real estate groups that specialized in land sold in peri-urban Yangon, where plots of all sizes were in high demand as investments in proposed “new city” areas. Through close analysis of the advertisements and commentary in these groups, as well as interviews with group members, we charted the booms and busts of an unruly online property market. Our open-access article, recently published by Antipode: A Radical Journal of Geography, shows that these digital activities have remade Myanmar’s land market in four significant ways.
First, Facebook activity drove shifts in how land is used and valued. While land has always been bought, sold, and traded in Myanmar, it used to be a slow, intimate, and illicit affair, conducted on the black market in the context of close, trusted relationships and largely for livelihood purposes. As Stephen Huard has explained, in Myanmar, land is conventionally tied up in personal relations of inheritance, obligation, and stewardship, above and beyond the law. Ownership was rooted in the responsibility to maintain land as a source of ongoing security—a task which usually involved maintaining its capacity for agriculture. On Facebook, however, advertisements rarely discussed the land’s suitability for farming; instead, and especially in the coming “new city,” plots were promoted to far-flung businessmen and investors who, as one commenter asserted, “will never farm there.” Rather than noting soil quality, access to water, or elevation, Facebook’s land brokers instead highlighted details such as the distance to special economic zones, deep seaports, and other nearby projects, assuring potential buyers that soon-to-be developed, peri-urban areas were sure sites of profitable investment. Such transformations are in line with larger patterns of speculative urbanization across Asia, but we demonstrate how Facebook posts, photos, and real-time interactions accelerated the transformation of rice paddies into real estate.
Second, Facebook expanded the scope of the land market, drawing in more people, in more places. Historically, research on brokerage in Myanmar has underscored the personal form of guarantee central to brokers’ work. Trusting a broker has long required clients have confidence in an individuals’ dependability and expertise in navigating a poorly regulated real estate market, rife with false documentation. One-to-one brokerage relationships were epitomized by bonds of trust, developed within close-knit familial, social, and geographic contexts. Yet, on Facebook, we observed that these intimate ties have splintered into a series of broader and more depersonalized online associations, what social media scholar danah boyd calls “networked publics.” On Facebook, middle-class, often first-time, buyers can browse listings for investment in peri-urban Yangon or a cool weather retirement in Pyin Oo Lwin. They look not only to brokers for assurance; instead, they rely on a collective perspective shared by Facebook group members that certifies the prudence of a purchase, posting queries about proper procedures and lucrative parcels. Meanwhile, brokers post images of sellers’ legal documents and piles of cash as evidence of legitimate and successful sales, branding their businesses to ever-expanding publics.
Third, brokers’ activity on Facebook amplified the urgency and speed of transactions. Price was no longer primarily based on the labor of a particular broker working to flip a single plot, but rather on a frenzy of hurried, online interactions. Increasingly, those we interviewed—buyers, sellers, and brokers, alike—struggled to “keep up” as more and more land was exchanged, at higher and higher prices. As one real estate agent we interviewed put it: “At the very beginning, there was a lot of land and a lot of people wanted to sell and cash out, and at that time, the price was cheap. And then, they started doing this on Facebook, and the price went up super high.” By January 2021, the month prior to the coup, many brokers we interviewed wished the land market would slow back down. Combined with land’s transformation into an asset and the expansion of brokerage, these rapid transactions enact what we call “networks of speculation.”
This brings us to a final, and perhaps the most significant, shift; Facebook intensified risk for those with the most to lose. Over the course of our research, we watched as farmers and other precarious landowners, first-time investors, and petty brokers all sought to weather the land market’s booms and busts, as land that would have barely garnered US$2,000 in 2018 had was suddenly selling for US$25,000 in 2020. Sellers rushed to liquidate to avoid missing out; brokers found that the speed and intensity of the Facebook land market was too much; buyers worried prices would crash before they could resell the high-value plots they had amassed. Ultimately, we found that the volatility of unregulated transactions intensified danger for all but the wealthiest investors involved in these Facebook-based markets. While Myanmar’s unregulated and often illicit land market has always been risky, Facebook raised the stakes for those unable to “wait out” the market’s booms and busts, and the reach of the platform enlisted a larger and less well-resourced subset of the population into sales that stretched far beyond trusted contacts.
This final point is all-the-more critical in the wake of Myanmar’s 2021 coup and the resulting economic collapse, which, together, have set off a real estate boom driven by fear, specifically the lack of confidence in Myanmar’s military-led financial institutions. Frontier has reported that after banks eased restrictions on withdrawals, many in Myanmar chose to redirect their savings from bank accounts and into land holdings. For those without established relationships with a trusted broker, or with little confidence in their ability to navigate the land market on their own, Facebook has become the predominant platform for seeking out available plots as well as experts who can guide new investors’ purchases. Our current work is tracking the rise of scams in Facebook-mediated land markets.
This inadvertent manifestation of platform power presents a new twist on generic global stories about digital transformations in property, which tend to focus on sites explicitly designed for renting, buying and selling (think Zillow or Airbnb). Crucially, and for the reasons our article underscores, brokers’ creative re-appropriation of the platform for buying and selling land exposes users to greater and more far-reaching risks. How Facebook’s role in Myanmar’s land market could be shifted to ensure—rather than undercut—forms of stability being sought by Myanmar’s majority is a critical political question for platforms and for their users, in and beyond the country. As the resistance seeks to shatter the military’s hold on land and resource wealth and most people struggle to stay afloat, online buying, selling, and speculating is shifting the ground beneath their feet.
The research upon which this article and Tea Circle post is based was conducted with the support of multiple collaborators based in Myanmar, who prefer to remain anonymous at this time. We are very grateful for their time and insights.
Courtney T. Wittekind is a Postdoctoral Associate at Yale University’s Program in Agrarian Studies, where she researches new forms of real estate speculation emerging in Myanmar and, particularly, in peri-urban Yangon..."
Source/publisher:
"Tea Circle" (Myanmar)
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-06
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Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Business and the Military, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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