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Title: Unfreedom Monitor Report: Myanmar
Sub-title: An excerpt from Advox research on digital authoritarianism in Myanmar
Description: "Authoritarian regimes have long had a complicated relationship with media and communications technologies. The Unfreedom Monitor is a Global Voices Advox research initiative examining the growing phenomenon of networked or digital authoritarianism. This extract is of the executive summary of the report on Myanmar, from the series of reports to come out of the research under the Unfreedom Monitor. Read the full report here. The classic debate about whether technology is neutral or not has continued to be widely discussed in the 21st century. Alongside the rise of authoritarianism in general, digital authoritarianism has become a phenomenon of note throughout the world. This report is going to explore characteristics of digital authoritarianism in Myanmar. First, in order to provide the political context of Myanmar, a brief history of democratisation of the country is discussed. After that, the political aggressions that came along with the military coup in 2021 are explained in detail. Then, the report analyses the situation of digital authoritarianism in Myanmar, discussing the oppressive behaviour of the government in cyberspace at length. There are five categories of digital repression of the Myanmar military: internet shutdowns, online censorship, surveillance, targeted persecution of online users, and social media manipulation and disinformation. Against this backdrop comes the digital resistance to the dictatorship by the people of Myanmar through circumvention, migration to and from platforms, and innovative crowdfunding initiatives by the resistance, among others. The intent of this report is to provide a general understanding of digital authoritarianism in Myanmar amid the political unrest as well as a sense of technology’s role in repression by and resistance to a dictatorship. *** By learning about both the repression and resistance sides of Myanmar’s Spring Revolution, it is evident that digital technology is playing a critical role in this revolution. The military is using every possible technology to repress people, inject fear into society and manipulate it. The revolutionists are also employing digital technology to circumvent the restrictions of the military and to employ innovative ways to build the state. The digital resilience of its society will be one of the determining factors of the revolution of Myanmar. This scenario of digital repression is one of the many manifestations that indicate that cyberspace has become a new sovereign territory different from land, sea and air. Information freedom, internet freedom, digital literacy, and media literacy cannot be taken for granted anymore as they now have an impact on people’s physical and digital survival. Therefore, Myanmar’s ongoing revolution to fight against the military’s dictatorship is not just physical anymore — the fact is that whoever harnesses the power of technology in the right way will become the game changer of the revolution..."
Source/publisher: Global Voices
Date of entry/update: 2023-05-08
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Title: Uprisings in Myanmar—Then and Now
Description: "It was hard not to feel a sense of déjà vu when the military stepped in to assume absolute power in February two years ago. It was like 1988 all over again. Demonstrators staged initially peaceful protests in the streets of cities and towns all over the country and were met with bullets from the military. Many were killed, and activists of various kinds fled to the border areas where they linked up with the ethnic rebel armies, which have been resisting central government control for decades. A government truly representing the people was set up and became active mostly in exile. A broader front including some of the ethnic armed groups was formed. And the struggle to topple an immensely unpopular military regime continued without anyone seeming to win the war. Those are the most common superficial observations—because there are fundamental differences between what happened after 1988 and now. As a journalist who has covered Myanmar affairs for more than 40 years—including the 1988 uprising and its aftermath—I have been approached by some close friends who have asked me to explain why the current uprising is not just a repeat of what happened in the late 1980s and early 1990s. First of all, mobile phones and the internet, with their associated digital media and email, did not exist in the 1980s. I was banned from visiting the country at that time, but managed with extreme difficulty to get news through a confidential network of raspy telephone lines and occasional letters, which were hand-delivered to me in Bangkok by trusted contacts. I would not have been able to write my articles for the now defunct Far Eastern Economic Review without the help of those contacts inside the country, and I am forever grateful to them for providing me with up-to-date information, often at great risk to themselves. Photos had to be taken by cumbersome cameras with film, and the rolls smuggled out of the country and developed in Thailand or elsewhere. Some grainy video recordings also made it to safety outside Myanmar, as did printed material ranging from flyers and posters to independently produced newspapers and journals. What has been preserved constitutes important historical material, but it is limited and cannot be compared with what is available online today. Now, nothing happens inside Myanmar—a protest, a gun battle, an assassination or an atrocity—without the outside world getting to know about it within a day or two, or even hours. Young people in Myanmar are very cyber savvy and continue to outsmart the military, which is much less adept at using online technology. At the same time, it is important to remember that the brutality the military unleashed on the protests in the cities and towns in 1988 was far worse than what was witnessed after the 2021 coup. When people took to the streets on Aug. 8, soldiers sprayed automatic rifle fire into crowds of unarmed people not only in Yangon, where even armored vehicles equipped with Bren machine guns were used to crush the demonstrations, but also in Bago, Sagaing, Taunggyi and many other places. An especially bloody and virtually unpublicized event took place in Sagaing on Aug. 11 when troops and policemen commanded by Kyaw Zwa, an army veteran and the local head of the ruling Burma Socialist Program Party as well as chairman of the Sagaing Division’s People’s Council, gunned down at least 100 demonstrators, among them many Buddhist monks. According to estimates by local medical personnel, thousands of civilians—not hundreds as often mentioned in later writings about the uprising—were gunned down by the military in 1988. It would have been 3,000 countrywide in August, and another 1,000 when the military stepped in to reassert their grip on power on Sept. 18, which was also when a new junta, the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), was formed. The carnage prompted about 10,000 mostly young, urban activists to leave their homes and trek through the jungle and over the mountains to remote border areas controlled by the Karen National Union (KNU), the New Mon State Party (NMSP), the Karenni Army, and the Kachin Independence Army (KIA). Only a handful made it to areas in northeastern Shan State where the Communist Party of Burma had its strongholds, and no one went to the area on the Thai border controlled by the drug lord Khun Sa because they knew that he had a tacit business arrangement with the Myanmar military. In January 1996, Khun Sa also surrendered, dissolved his army and moved with his closest business associates to Yangon. The flight to the border led to the formation of a number of alliances and fronts. On Nov. 5, 1988, the All Burma Students’ Democratic Front (ABSDF) was set up at a meeting in Kawmorrah, a KNU camp on the Thai border (which now, incidentally, is called Shwe Kokko, a new town under the control of a junta-allied Border Guard Force—and where many of the newly built casinos are located). Two weeks later, the ethnic Burman resistance and several ethnic armed groups formed the Democratic Alliance of Burma (DAB). Then came the May 18, 1990 election, which resulted in a resounding victory for the National League for Democracy (NLD). But the assembly that was elected was never convened. Instead, the SLORC began arresting elected MPs—and more pro-democracy activists fled to the border. On Dec. 18 that year, they formed the National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma (NCGUB), which in turn led to the formation of a broader front including NLD exiles, members of the NCGUB and the ethnic armed groups called the National Council of the Union of Burma, or NCUB. After the NCGUB was formed, I wrote a then-much-criticized article for the Far Eastern Economic Review titled “Cry of Desperation”. I stressed that no foreign country was likely to recognize the border-based “cabinet” and it was unlikely that it would have any impact on the situation inside Myanmar. The resistance was holed up in camps along Myanmar’s borders and the plethora of groups and acronyms also made sympathizers outside the country confused; who should they listen to and cooperate with? Who was who in the alphabet soup of armies and fronts? I visited the resistance camps on the Myanmar side of the border with Thailand several times and also went to Mangshi and Ruili in Yunnan, China, where I met activists based in Kachin State. It was, to be absolutely frank, not an encouraging sight. I had no reason to doubt the sincerity of the young ABSDF activists who had given up everything to fight for what they believed in. But the way in which they bore uniforms adorned with flashes and insignia, and had their organization structured into numbered military units, made them no different from other armed groups fighting in the jungle-clad frontier areas. And it did not last long. The ABSDF soon split into competing factions and, for a while, there were even two ABSDFs. The activists in Kachin State even turned against each other; one group accused another of being government agents and killed them in a grisly massacre. The DAB collapsed when several of the ethnic armed groups entered into ceasefire agreements with the military. The NCGUB never became more than an acronym. In the mid-1990s, I visited Dr. Cynthia Maung, an ethnic Karen doctor who ran—and still runs—a clinic in the Thai border town of Mae Sot. I asked her what kind of patients from the ABSDF she had received over the years, and she summed it up succinctly: “Well, the first year, it was mostly malaria cases. Then came those with gunshot wounds. Now it’s mostly deliveries.” The activists were young people from urban areas who were not used to the hard life in the jungle, and became sick from malaria and other diseases. Those who were determined to fight and still had some strength left ventured out onto the battlefield, and were often wounded. In the end, many settled down in Mae Sot and other border towns, had children and raised families. Many former activists also ended up in exile, primarily in Europe, Australia, Canada and the United States. What remained of the ABSDF finally gave up the armed struggle and decided to focus on disseminating information about the dictatorship and networking with international NGOs. But that, curiously, did not prevent the ABSDF from being one of eight “armed groups” which signed a so-called “Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement” (NCA) with the military in October 2015. Needless to say, of the signatories, only two—the KNU and the Restoration Council of Shan State—had armies worth the name. On Feb. 18, 2018, the government proudly announced that two more groups, the Lahu Democratic Union and the NMSP, had signed the NCA. But the Lahu outfit is little more than an NGO based in Thailand, and today’s Mon army is tiny compared to what it once was. The NMSP had, in any event, entered into a ceasefire agreement with the military in June 1995, so it was unclear what difference it would make. Although the NCA is a signed agreement and those struck in the late 1980s and 1990s were not (the sole exception being the ceasefire with the KIA, which insisted on having it formalized in writing), there is no reason—and there never was one—to believe that the military would be seriously interested in finding a peaceful, political solution to Myanmar’s civil wars. The KIA came under attack in June 2011 and fighting broke out between the military and the KNU as well as the Chin National Front, another NCA signatory, shortly after the February 2021 coup. It is true that there are some striking similarities between the situation after the 1988 uprising and today. The National Unity Government (NUG), set up by elected MPs and others in April 2021, seems to mirror the NCGUB, and the National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC), which combines Burman and ethnic armies, looks like a contemporary version of the NCUB. But a closer look at today’s resistance reveals that the most obvious difference between then and now, access to the internet, is not the only one. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the activists actually believed that some foreign “uncles” would come and support them. After all, the US Congress had issued statements condemning the dictatorship, and so had the European Union, Australia, and other democracies around the world. Today’s fighters for democracy seem to have no such illusions. They know that Myanmar is not Ukraine and no weapons or other material support will come from abroad. Relying on their own resources, they are fighting with home-made guns and weapons captured from the military and the police, and they have also brought the war to the Myanmar heartland. Although many of the resistance fighters were trained by the Karen or Kachin armies and did get some weapons from them as well, it’s no longer a jungle-based insurgency. Financial support for the struggle comes from the many Myanmar nationals living in exile, including through some imaginative methods like a popular online video game, which also serves as a propaganda tool. It’s now or never. The resistance in the heartland is often lumped together as the “People’s Defense Forces”, or PDFs, but that doesn’t mean that they are under any effective central command. Nor do they necessarily take orders from the NUG. But that also makes them harder to crush, because the military can’t find out who the leaders are, and how and where they operate. There are dozens of local resistance armies that depend on popular support in their respective areas and given the nationwide, deep-rooted hatred of the military, it is not difficult for the activists to mingle with crowds anywhere. It is obvious that the generals messed with the wrong generation when they staged their ill-fated coup. Another important difference is that the economy was in a shambles after the 1988 uprising but, to the surprise of many, the SLORC (renamed the State Peace and Development Council in 1997) managed to not only rebuild but, by attracting foreign investment, also create a fledgling capitalist system to replace the old “socialism” that had prevailed from 1962 to 1988. The economic fallout of the 2021 coup is a severe crisis. Foreign investors are leaving and those who remain are reeling under the effects of boycotts and sanctions. In this area, digital media have made a decisive impact. The true extent of the 1988 massacres was little known outside the country, and although some sanctions were imposed even then, they were limited and had little or no effect. Today, the viciousness of the military is well documented, and anyone doing business with them is named and shamed on the internet. The adversary the pro-democracy forces are facing is also not the same as before. Junta leader and self-appointed prime minister Senior General Min Aung Hlaing lacks the capabilities and military skills of his predecessors. Moreover, he is uncharismatic and every time he appears in public or on the TV, he appears nervous and unsure of himself. But if he is replaced, it would most likely be by someone who is more hardline than he is, such as Vice Senior General Soe Win, who often oversees operations, including devastating air strikes, against any identifiable resistance stronghold; more often than not, these turn out to be villages and entire towns. The military may be more isolated from the public at large than ever before and it has become the country’s most hated institution. There is also little doubt that the various resistance forces continue to enjoy popular support, and two years after the coup they have not given up. Rather, fighting across the country is intensifying. But there is a huge problem facing the resistance forces: They do not today have the weaponry that is needed to defeat the well-armed military with all the firepower it has at its disposal, the most devastating being air power. The military may not win the war, but they also cannot lose. And mediation efforts by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have failed and even backfired on the bloc as it has exposed its weaknesses. Guided by two cardinal principles, noninterference and consensus, there is actually nothing it can do when there is a crisis in a member country. International peacemakers and conflict-resolutionists have time and again shown that their efforts have been a waste of time and money; the generals simply won’t listen and, even if they pretend to, they won’t take any advice from such outsiders. That brings us to the sad reality: the military has been in power under different guises since General Ne Win’s coup in 1962, and nothing is likely to change unless and until there is a split at the top or a mutiny within the ranks. That was true in the late 1980s and remains so today. But such a development could also lead to an even bloodier civil war, a potentially devastating scenario for which the outside world and all those involved in Myanmar must be prepared. Nevertheless, if the military remains united, the decades-long civil wars will continue to bleed the country for years to come—and the main victims will be the people of Myanmar, who are suffering under the brutal rule of a power-obsessed clique of men in green..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update: 2023-05-08
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Title: Myanmar’s Prisoner Release Still Leaves Thousands Detained
Description: "On Wednesday, Myanmar’s military junta announced it would release 2,153 prisoners. These include some convicted under section 505A of the Penal Code, which the junta has used to suppress peaceful dissent in the country. Families will welcome the releases of their loved ones, but the junta’s oppressive policies and practices remain unchanged. Section 505A is a sweeping law that makes any criticism of the junta a criminal offense punishable by up to three years in prison. Many political activists arrested since the coup in February 2021 have been convicted by junta courts under section 505A. The junta stated that the releases were based on “humanitarian grounds” and “for the peace of mind of people” ahead of a Buddhist holiday. It is not clear how many of those released are political prisoners: people arrested for the peaceful exercise of their political rights. Myanmar traditionally marks Buddhist holidays by granting amnesties to prisoners, but data suggests that political prisoners make up only a small fraction of those released. In November last year, the junta released 402 political prisoners out of more than 5,000 prisoners amnestied, according to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP). In January, another amnesty released 7,000 prisoners, including 306 political prisoners. In April, just 13 political prisoners were among 3,000 prisoners released. The junta should immediately be releasing all its political prisoners: 17,000 people who should not have been arrested in the first place. The relatively few released each amnesty really just shows that the junta still does not recognize their detentions are unlawful. Myanmar’s military juntas have long used amnesties as a tool to gain credibility and deflate international pressure ahead of global events. It is unsurprising that the latest amnesty comes ahead of an important meeting of the Association for Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). ASEAN foreign ministers should not be fooled when they meet in Indonesia on May 9. They should avoid lending credibility to the military junta and instead press for the release of all political prisoners, an end to abuses against the junta’s critics, and the return of Myanmar to civilian democratic rule..."
Source/publisher: Junta’s Gesture No Substitute for Lasting Human Rights Changes
Date of entry/update: 2023-05-06
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Title: Regional Overview Asia-Pacific April 2023
Description: "Myanmar: Deadliest military airstrike since the coup carried out in Sagaing region April was the deadliest month in Myanmar for military airstrikes targeting civilians since the military coup. On 11 April, around 170 people, including dozens of women and children, were reportedly killed in a military airstrike in Kanbalu township in Sagaing region. The airstrike targeted villagers as they gathered to mark the opening of a new office of the People's Administration Team (Pa Ah Pha) under the National Unity Government (NUG) in Pa Zi Gyi village.1 The military reportedly dropped two bombs on the area from a fighter jet before opening fire on the crowd using a Mi-35 helicopter gunship.2 Over a week after the initial attack, the military dropped six bombs on the village from a fighter jet. No villagers were injured as most were still in hiding after the previous attack.3 The military claimed that the airstrikes targeted the People's Defense Force, which it claimed was present.4 The military has increasingly resorted to airstrikes targeting civilians as it fails to consolidate control over the country amid ongoing anti-coup resistance..."
Source/publisher: Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project
Date of entry/update: 2023-05-05
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Title: Media advisory: Special Envoy Heyzer visits Beijing to strengthen regional unity to respond to crisis in Myanmar
Description: "BEIJING – During her first visit to Beijing as Special Envoy this week, the Special Envoy of the UN Secretary-General on Myanmar Noeleen Heyzer reinforced the key role of regional countries in addressing the multidimensional crisis in Myanmar. During the visit from 1 to 2 May, Special Envoy Heyzer held discussions with State Councillor and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China Qin Gang and Special Envoy for Asian Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China Deng Xijun. The State Councillor underscored the international community must act prudently and pragmatically to prevent the intensification of the Myanmar conflict and its spillover in the region. He stressed appreciation for the Special Envoy's effective implementation of her mandate and China’s strong support to her role. The Special Envoy emphasized China’s important role in the United Nations including as a permanent member of the UN Security Council and its continued support for ASEAN’s centrality in facilitating a peaceful resolution in the interests of the people of Myanmar, constructive dialogue among all parties as well as the provision of humanitarian assistance. Special Envoy Heyzer stressed that a robust international response to the ongoing crisis in Myanmar required a unified regional effort involving neighbouring countries that can leverage influence towards cessation of violence, civilian protection and stability in Myanmar. In line with the Security Council resolution 2669 (2022) on Myanmar, the Special Envoy continues to closely cooperate with the ASEAN Special Envoy to seek a peaceful and inclusive process towards de-escalating the violence and reaching a sustainable political solution guided by the will and needs of the people..."
Source/publisher: United Nations
Date of entry/update: 2023-05-03
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Title: Myanmar’s Military Is No Longer in Effective Control of the Country
Sub-title: The country’s neighbors continue to treat the military administration like a viable sovereign entity. They risk being left behind by events.
Description: "The military junta that attempted to seize control of Myanmar in February 2021 has failed. Free movement of its personnel is now reduced to the areas south and west of Mandalay in the country’s core. Even there, it is facing daily assassinations and bomb attacks and is barely able to govern due to widespread civil disobedience and a lack of public trust. The Naypyidaw junta, as it is aptly becoming known, is bunkering down wherever it can, reliant on its air force and roaming bands of methed-up soldiers to sow chaos in areas outside of its control. Nonetheless, a group of Myanmar’s neighbors, India, Thailand, Bangladesh, and Laos, seem adamant about treating the junta like a single sovereign entity and nursing it back to strength. Through what’s being called a Track 1.5 dialogue, these countries are seeking to marginalize the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which has been placed by the United Nations and the wider international community in the driving seat of international Myanmar policy. ASEAN had been inching towards a more moderate and critical position on Myanmar, until Thailand launched a separate track of talks aimed at undermining this approach. Track 1.5 talks have included junta officials and aim to bring stability back to the country, in the hope the junta can force through a transition to a slightly more democratic-looking political arrangement, despite continued exclusion of its much more popular political opponents. Even for states that couldn’t care less about the junta’s extreme human rights abuses or other moral concerns, this junta-first approach makes minimal sense, on realist grounds. Naypyidaw’s Loss of Effective Control Maps recently produced by the Free Burma Rangers (FBR), a humanitarian organization working in resistance areas, demonstrate just how limited the Myanmar army’s movement has become since the coup, as a result of the widespread nationwide uprising. The maps show how most major roads outside of the country’s core center are no longer under central authority. The military can still use some of these roads but only as part of well-organized military operations and not without great human and monetary cost. Enjoying this article? Click here to subscribe for full access. Just $5 a month. A panel of senior diplomats called the Special Advisory Council for Myanmar last year released research showing that the junta only had stable control of around 20 percent of the country’s townships. The others were either controlled or heavily contested by ethnic resistance organizations (EROs) and local defense forces. Since the coup, I have spent time in some of the FBR maps’ “white areas” – those where the junta’s movement is “very limited”. The situation varies greatly on the ground, but the maps provide an accurate bird’s eye picture. Some of these areas have been under the control of EROs for decades, some since the country’s independence in 1948. Other “white areas” are newly liberated territories, often where multi-ethnic communities are working together to build bottom-up administration with guidance from EROs, defense forces, the opposition National Unity Government (NUG), or other actors. Many other “white areas” are still vulnerable to incursions by roving bands of the Naypyidaw junta’s military units, who rape, burn, and dismember their way through the townships as part of an “ogre” strategy intended to strike fear into all those who resist. In practice, these units are always defeated and the abuses have simply spurred even more committed resistance from those communities and millions of people across the country. Air strikes and long-range artillery are the most destructive universal threat. Millions of people in resistance areas live under constant remote surveillance by drones, knowing that at any moment this could be followed by a devastating air force sortie. Long-range artillery is a daily occurrence in most resistance areas. During my travels in numerous areas, the sounds of shells followed by reports of civilian casualties have been a daily occurrence. As the FBR maps indicate, the resistance started from a very low bar, given the unmatched power that the Myanmar military had amassed since the last major uprising in 1988. But the key thing to watch is the trajectory of the conflict. The resistance has become increasingly better organized, increasingly more united, in terms of cooperation between EROs, political parties, and activist groups, and has remained consistently determined to see the revolution through. Many analysts have repeatedly claimed the resistance will be crushed or will collapse into disunity but the over-arching trends have consistently moved in the opposite direction. In March, Mandalay Region, the symbolic and strategic heart of the country, became the most active conflict zone in terms of the number of clashes. Meanwhile, rocket attacks on previously well-defended air bases and weapons factories have increased. Conflict is raging in numerous townships within 50 kilometers of the military’s fortress capital Naypyidaw and analysis firms have predicted that clashes in the capital district and surrounding areas will increase considerably this month. It is unlikely that the Naypyidaw junta is on the verge of immediate collapse but it is increasingly looking like a rump state, hunkered down in its trenches, wildly lobbing grenades into the surrounding areas. Nonetheless, for as long as the generals have the most conspicuous elements of state infrastructure down in the trench with them, neighboring countries and the U.N. seem very willing to pretend it is the “de facto authority” of the whole country. Some even want to take steps towards “normalizing” foreign relations with Myanmar in the hope that they can do a re-run of the resource rush that took place under military rule in the 1990s. Dead-end Efforts to Dress the Junta Up as the State Regardless of any basic moral considerations, which neighboring countries may see as a liberal distraction, treating the Naypyidaw junta as a reliable authority is simply impractical. The junta is just not able to implement its political or economic decisions across most of the country’s territory. This is most stark along the country’s long borders with India and Thailand, where its military and police outposts are isolated and starving, and where its administrators were mostly pushed out by local communities two years ago. Enjoying this article? Click here to subscribe for full access. Just $5 a month. For all the obvious problems with China’s extractive economic interests in Myanmar, there are lessons to learn from Beijing’s outcome-oriented pragmatism and its awareness of what is really going on in the country. China half-heartedly recognizes the Naypyidaw junta as the holder of key central infrastructure like visa offices, airports, and banks, but hedges its engagement considerably through its bilateral relations with at least seven powerful ethnic armed organizations and various political parties. China is able to keep its pipelines flowing and its trade gates open in spite of the collapsing Naypyidaw junta, not because of it. Some in neighboring countries claim that the military is holding the country together, fearing an imagined “balkanization” scenario in which Myanmar collapses into an even deeper form of chaos. Aside from the odd implication that Yugoslavia would have been better off as a single country for all eternity, this entire narrative is based on falsehoods. In practice, the resistance movement is far more united across ethnic lines than anything linked to the majoritarian extremist junta ever could be. EROs at the heart of the movement have stated emphatically that their number one priority is keeping the country together and that the military is the source of all division. The NUG was appointed by a National Unity Consultative Council, represented by over a dozen major political parties, ethnic resistance organizations, strike leaders, and others. It is holding talks regularly with a wide range of EROs, including some that are close to China, and its defense forces are cooperating with their armed wings across three area commands. Despite the inevitable and much-discussed internal tensions and ongoing challenges of this political project, unity has only increased month on month, and the levels of ground-level cooperation between disparate forces from different national communities is astounding. The Federal Democracy Charter they agreed on in April 2021 and amended in January 2022 is the foundation for a new union based on ethnic equality and democratic rule. Their political roadmap is miles ahead of anything put forward by the junta, whose only discernible objective is to change the title of its dictator from commander-in-chief to president. The only way it would make any realist sense for Asian countries to continue supporting the junta’s survival is if they believe they stand to benefit from never-ending chaos and instability in Myanmar. This provides an inexhaustible source of cheap labor and ensures their neighbor remains an inward-looking buffer state that could never post a strategic threat. But it also comes with huge economic and social risks and is simply unsustainable. More likely than such Machiavellian machinations, these countries probably just have very limited intelligence of the ground situation and so remain hitched blindly to a failing military that they assume will somehow repeat the events of the 1990s and establish a firm grip on the country. They may want to sign new infrastructure deals with the Naypyidaw junta but it lacks the capacity to provide a modicum of security for such projects, let alone the bureaucracy to manage their implementation or the capital to help finance them. Time for Clarity Unless these states come up with a more realistic and rational strategy, the most likely outcome of the track 1.5 dialogue and their ongoing engagements with the generals is that these states will become increasingly irrelevant and distant from what is actually being implemented on the ground. Countries, companies, and international agencies that find ways to work with resistance actors will be the only ones who can actually have an impact, for better or worse. This also means that countries across the world currently deferring to ASEAN leadership on Myanmar desperately need a new approach or they too will become increasingly irrelevant, while resource-hungry China remains the only country with well-defined goals and a strategy for implementing them. It is time for foreign democracies to take a more direct approach, perhaps through an “ASEAN plus” grouping including Japan, India, Bangladesh, and Western countries. Among the first of their concrete objectives should be to help the resistance remove the military from politics for good, while strengthening state and union-level democratic institutions. The fact that no foreign democracy is able to even explicitly articulate such obvious solutions to this entirely man-made crisis is a strong indication of why so little has been achieved.
Source/publisher: "The Diplomat" (Japan)
Date of entry/update: 2023-05-03
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Title: Report To the Public on 2nd Anniversary of National Unity Government
Description: "Introduction 1.16th April 2023 marked the second anniversary of the formation of the National Unity Government (NUG) with the consent of National Unity Consultative Committee (NUCC). The NUCC is a coalition of political forces representing Myanmar’s people. It includes the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, whose de jure legitimacy rests on electoral victory in the 2020 general election. The NUCC also includes representatives of ethnic revolutionary organizations, civil society, and other political forces with de facto legitimacy derived from their high level of public support. Domestic and international observers deemed the 2020 general election free and fair. Turnout was 75.96%. Over the two years, the NUG has exercised its authority as a legitimate government, recognized and backed by the Myanmar public and has worked hard to reward the public’s trust in cooperation with all the revolutionary forces. International Relations 2. In the last two years, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been meeting with ASEAN, EU and officials from many other countries, informing them of the current political conditions of Myanmar. The Ministry has also worked consistently to mobilize humanitarian aid, seek economic sanctions against the military junta and their family members, seek prosecutions, and help restore democracy in Myanmar. Meetings have also been held with foreign ministers, members of the United States Congress and Senate, and the National Security Adviser to United States President Joe Biden. Not only has the NUG been able to open representative offices in eight countries, including the United States, United Kingdom, Czech Republic, Australia, France, Norway, South Korea, and Japan, it has also managed to give assistance and protection to resident Myanmar citizens, in liaison with relevant authorities in these countries. In addition, it advocated for the incorporation of the Burma Act 2022 into National Defence Authorisation Act 2023. It has also established liaison with parliaments in seven countries. The NUG is also in the process of implementing the Policy on Rohingya in Arakan State. As announced in 2021, NUG policy is that Rohingya will be repatriated with dignity and of free will and be given equal rights in all aspects of law. The NUG has also systematically collected evidence and collated data on 171 atrocities committed by the military junta. These include crimes against humanity and mass killings of ethnic groups. The NUG has submitted the evidence to the UN’s Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar (IIMM) of the Human Rights Council so that justice can be served in the post revolution period. On 1st February it announced that all objections against the case of Ethnic Cleansing of Rohingya People brought against Myanmar by Gambia in the International Court of Justice were withdrawn. With the help of expert organisations with special interests in universal jurisdiction, cases have been brought against the military junta in Germany, Argentina, and Turkey. There will be more prosecutions brought forward in other countries with their help. A case has also been filed against the military council in the International Criminal Court in accordance with the Rome Statute Penal code 12 (3) on 17th July 2021. We will continue to strive to achieve truth and justice. Military Affairs and Defections to the People’s Embrace 3.Within this two-year period, we have been able to assemble a fighting force with manpower stronger than our enemy by, with more than 300 battalions of the People’s Defence Forces (PDF) plus village-based people’s defence forces in 250 townships. By becoming allied with Ethnic Revolutionary Organisations, we have been able to establish a Central Command and Coordination Committee (C3C) and Joint Coordination Committee (J2C), aiming to develop a systematic chain of command in each theatre of the conflict. With monetary help from the Myanmar public and by allying with the Ethnic Revolutionary Forces we have been able to arm the PDFs to a certain standard. We have also been successful in manufacturing arms and munitions ourselves. However, to be able to achieve victory against a well-armed enemy, we are trying hard to source much-needed anti-aircraft weapons. Based on the guerrilla warfare ethos of village-based forces encircling towns, we have been able to make territorial gains in villages and village tracts with the aim of threatening townships and districts held by the enemy and disrupting their line of communications and chain of command as the next step. What started as a phase of strategic defence, has now progressed to the phase of strategic equilibrium. For us to move on to the next phase of strategic counter-offensive we are in the process of trying to acquire strategic armaments. According to our records, during the phase of strategic defence, there was an estimated loss of enemy’s 30,000 lives lost, with 10,000 or so injured. In addition, 13,000 men and women have defected from the army and police force to the public side, acting on their dissent against the coup. Development of Interim Local Government 4. After the development of Interim Local Public Administration Central Committee and its policy advancement in September 2021, to date the NUG has been able to establish Township People’s Administration in 171 Townships in the NUG controlled Free Zones and District level Administrations in 10 districts as well. Administrative offices were set up at the same time as the People’s Police Force was formed for the safety of the public, on 7th June 2022. A 169-strong police force in interim administrative areas is in place, where basic police training takes place together with criminal investigations and gathering of information on the military council with the intention of averting their atrocities. A taxation system has also been instituted in these areas and 10 billion Myanmar Kyats revenue has been collected. The income from taxation has been used for defence and the rebuilding of the local area and humanitarian aid. Regular discussions and consultations with State Consultative Councils and Committees Representing Hluttaw take place to ensure that regional administrations take place in respective in Regions, Divisions and Federal units. On 5th June 2021 the NUG organised and formed the Ministry of Justice with civil servants, judiciary officials, judges and academics who were all part of the Civil Disobedience Movement in order to afford justice and uphold the rule of law for the public during the interim and transition periods. At the moment, in this interim period, there are 25 township law courts with 118 judges who are able to pass judgement on criminal and civil cases. Alliance Relationship 5. The various ministries of the NUG are continually collaborating with our ethnic allies on various aspects of management. This cooperation has not only improved relationships, but also created a strong bond. The Alliance Relationship Committee (ARC) was formed on 4th January 2022 and together all political, military, security, defence and administrative concerns were being coordinated and resolved. The Alliance Relationship Committee, collectively with Ethnic Organisations including the Ethnic Revolutionary Organisations, political parties, revolutionary forces and various consultative councils have all been in consultation and have worked together in matters ranging from humanitarian aid to military affairs, defence, health and education. There have been conferences and meetings to achieve more unity and consensus to rid the country of military dictatorship and work towards building a future federal democracy. Public Services 6. A force of over 100,000 teachers and education officials, who took part in the Civil Disobedience Movement are providing primary education, higher education, vocational training, and teachers’ training nationally, either through online teaching or face to face on the ground teaching and use of digital-based learning methods. There are 70 online schools, 5000 schools on the ground where face-to-face teaching takes place with 60,000 teachers and a student population of over 750,000. There are also pupils using the Digital-based learning methods. There are 304 townships where township education boards have been formed with links to the Ministry of Education. Education Policy of Federal Democracy is being drafted by a combined committee of the NUG-NUCC. Primary Education Congress and Higher Education Congresses have been held and the motions passed at these meetings are being implemented. Basic Education Completion Assessment (BECA) was held February 2023 and April 2023 and 23,000 candidates took part online and 38,877 students sat for the assessment at 329 centres. NUG was able to provide humanitarian assistance worth of 66 billion Myanmar Kyat (USD 2.3 million). This food assistance reaches over 200,000 internally displaced each month. Temporary accommodation, such as tents, has been provided for and to date a total of 2239 tents had been provided for. 798 bomb shelters have been built in schools for pupils to take protection from the terrorist council’s air strikes, and 117 million Kyats has been spent from donation money. Educational leaflets were also printed to inform people about the full range of dangers. 352 aid workers from different states and regions were trained on community level harm reduction and emergency response measures. A needs assessment on humanitarian aid was carried out in 39 townships within Sagaing and Magway divisions, where the number of internally displaced is highest. The assessment has been shared with donor countries, the United Nations, and the ASEAN. In order to reduce civilian casualties and to provide safe humanitarian aid corridors, an inclusive humanitarian aid forum is being established with the help of allied ethnic forces, civil society organisations and allied countries. The “Mind Healer” social media Facebook page, a mental health support program has assisted 823 civilians and 422 CDM civil servants. Support has also been provided to 469 political prisoners, including some transgender prisoners, 400 adolescent political prisoners, 111,914 pregnant and lactating women, and 3,000 people those who needed emergency safe houses and camp training. Data on crimes committed by the military council against children are being documented and reported. The dissemination of information on children’s rights and the prevention of recruitment of child soldiers are widely done. The medical and surgical treatment of people wounded by the military council, providing prosthesis to amputees and performing emergency caesarean sections to deliver babies are all part of the care that is being provided by NUG. The military council is conducting air strikes against hospitals and clinics, as well as ground raids, attacks and arson. To prevent aerial attacks and offer emergency aid, we are providing the necessary training in first aid and procuring emergency kits. In 198 Townships (60% of the townships in the country), there are 66 hospitals, 159 clinics, 250 mobile clinics providing routine and emergency health care with a total of 3,832 health workers of whom 78% are professionals who joined the Civil Disobedience Movement. In addition, the ethnic health organizations have a significant health work force. The total healthcare expenditure was US$ 2,000,000. Civil Disobedience Movement 7. In order to support all civil servants who take part in the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM), the CDM Success Committee was formed on 27th April 2021 with Union Ministers, deputy Ministers, representatives from CRPH and an extensive network of CDMers. This committee submitted the September 2021 CDM Report to UN credential, published the one-year anniversary CDM Information Report and collected the CDM surveys. In addition, budget calculations are being carried out to award the CDM prizes and to make salary payments. About 4,000 million Myanmar Kyats was used to support the emergency needs of 20% of the CDM heroes out of all CDM heroes (210,639) connected with the CDM Success Committee. Ministries are also supporting the CDM staff of their relevant ministries. A CDM/Non-CDM policy was drafted in September 2021 and was approved by the National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC) on 20th January 2023. The CDM Success Committee has now formed a sub-committee to draft the CDM related civil servant law according to the paragraph (3) of the approved “Civil Servant CDM Policy”. Finance & Business Sector 8. The Ministry of Commerce and other ministries, revolutionary forces and strike groups conducted a public boycott campaign of and export prevention of military products. A total fund of 171,677,440 Myanmar Kyat was raised to offer small and medium enterprise loans and for the revolution. The Ministry of Planning, Finance and Investment is stopping the fund flow to the military council, while also raising funds required to fulfil the people’s wish of establishing a federal democracy union. We are working closely with the public, international governments, agencies, revolutionary forces, civil society organisations and community-based organisations. We have published the list of military associated commodities targeted by the boycott, with the aim of reducing the flow of funds to the military council. Regarding the income generation for the necessary funds for the development of the Federal Democratic Union, the following table describes the breakdown of incomes from Spring Lottery, United Bond, End of Dictatorship, Early Partnership Program, NUG pay, Income tax, Revenue and penalties of the Ministry of Planning, Finance and Investment. Table showing National Unity Government’s 2-year Income and Expenditure No Period Programs Income Expenses Comment USD MMK 1 Apr 2021-Apr 2023 Spring Lottery 918,800,000 CDM support 30% was used for Spring Lottery prizes and 70% was used for CDM support 2 Apr 2021-Apr 2023 United Bond 48,000,000 NUG Ministries, Revolutionary forces Cabinet, Security and Defence, Finance Commission agreed projects 3 Apr 2021-Apr 2023 End of Dictatorship 13,500,000 4 Apr 2021-Apr 2023 Early Partnership Program 94,648,000 5 Apr 2021-Apr 2023 NUG Pay 12 billion NUG Pay users DMMK Management team is overseeing the cash flow 6 Apr 2021-Apr 2023 Revenue, tax, Penalties 10 billion Distributed and used according to the NUG Revenue Policy Expenses made as per supervision of Interim Local Governance Central Committee Summary 9. The National Unity Government will continuously analyse its successes and challenges, in order to implement the one-year plan. We are committed to implement the processes that will determine the final battle. We hereby affirm that the National Unity Government, which is based on the will of the entire people, will continue along the path laid out in the Federal Democracy Charter principles towards a Federal Democratic Union, which is the goal of all the revolutionary forces..."
Source/publisher: National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update: 2023-05-03
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Type: Individual Documents
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Title: “အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရဖွဲ့စည်းခြင်း (၂) နှစ်ပြည့် ပြည်သူသို့ အစီရင်ခံတင်ပြခြင်း”
Description: "၁။ ၂၀၂၃ ခုနှစ်၊ ဧပြီလ ၁၆ ရက်နေ့သည် ပြည်တွင်းပြည်ပ ရွေးကောက်ပွဲလေ့လာစောင့် ကြည့်ရေး အဖွဲ့အစည်းများက လွတ်လပ်၍တရားမျှတသော ရွေးကောက်ပွဲအဖြစ် အသိအမှတ်ပြုခဲ့ကြပြီး မဲပေးပိုင်ခွင့် ရှိသူဦးရေ၏ ၇၅.၉၆ ရာခိုင်နှုန်းမဲပေးခဲ့ကြသည့် ၂၀၂၀ ရွေးကောက်ပွဲရလဒ်ကို အခြေခံကာ ပေါ်ပေါက်လာခဲ့သည့် ပြည်ထောင်စုလွှတ်တော် ကိုယ်စားပြုကော်မတီက ၂၀၂၀ ရွေးကောက်ပွဲမှရရှိသော လူထုထောက်ခံမှုအရ တရားဝင်မှု (De Jure Legitimacy) ကိုကိုယ်စားပြုသည့် နိုင်ငံရေးအင်အားစုများနှင့် အခြားနည်းလမ်းများဖြင့် ရရှိသော လူထုထောက်ခံမှုအရ တရားဝင်မှု (De Facto Legitimacy) ကိုကိုယ်စားပြုသော နိုင်ငံရေးအင်အားစု များ၏ တပ်ပေါင်းစုအဖြစ်ဖွဲ့စည်းခဲ့သည့် အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေး အတိုင်ပင်ခံကောင်စီ၏ သဘောတူညီမှုဖြင့် အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရကို ဖွဲ့စည်းကြောင်း ကြေညာခဲ့သည်မှာ (၂) နှစ်တင်းတင်းပြည့်ခဲ့ပြီဖြစ်သည်။ အဆိုပါ (၂) နှစ်တာကာလအတွင်း အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရသည် ပြည်သူလူထုက ပေးအပ်ထားသော ပြည်ထောင်စုသမ္မတမြန်မာနိုင်ငံတော်၏ တရားဝင်အစိုးရတစ်ရပ်အဖြစ် တာဝန်များကို တော်လှန်ရေးအင်အားစု များအားလုံးနှင့် လက်တွဲကာ ဦးလည်မသုန် ကြိုးစားထမ်းရွက်လျက်ရှိကြောင်း ပြည်သူလူထုထံသို့ အစီရင်ခံ တင်ပြအပ်ပါသည်။ နိုင်ငံတကာဆက်ဆံရေး ၂။ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၏ (၂) နှစ်တာအစိုးရသက်တမ်းတွင် နိုင်ငံခြားရေး၀န်ကြီးဌာနသည် အာဆီယံ, EU အပါအ၀င် နိုင်ငံတကာအစိုးရအဖွဲ့ တာဝန်ရှိသူများနှင့် တွေ့ဆုံခဲ့ပြီး မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၏ ပကတိအခြေအနေများကို နိုင်ငံတကာကသိရှိစေရေး၊ လူသားချင်းစာနာထောက်ထားမှု အကူအညီများရရှိရေး၊ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေး အစိုးရအား တရားဝင်အစိုးရအဖြစ် အသိအမှတ်ပြုရေး၊ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စုနှင့် ၄င်းတို့၏ဆက်စပ် မိသားစုဝင်များအား စီးပွားရေးအရပိတ်ဆို့ အရေးယူနိုင်ရေး၊ နိုင်ငံတကာခုံရုံးတွင် ဥပဒေနှင့်အညီ ထိရောက်စွာ အရေးယူဆောင်ရွက်နိုင်ရေးနှင့် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံတွင် ဒီမိုကရေစီပြန်လည်ဖော်ဆောင်နိုင်ရေး တို့အတွက် တောင်းဆို မှုများ၊ ဆွေးနွေးမှုများကို တစိုက်မတ်မတ်လုပ်ဆောင်ခဲ့ပါသည်။ နိုင်ငံခြားရေးဝန်ကြီးများ၊ လွှတ်တော်ကော်မတီ ဥက္ကဌများ၊ လွှတ်တော်အမတ်များ၊ US သမ္မတဂျိုးဘိုင်ဒင်၏ အမျိုးသားလုံခြုံရေးအကြံပေး တို့နှင့်ပါ တွေ့ဆုံဆွေးနွေးမှုများ ဆောင်ရွက်နိုင်ခဲ့သည်။ အမေရိကန်ပြည်ထောင်စု၊ ယူကေနိုင်ငံ၊ ချက်သမ္မတနိုင်ငံ၊ သြစတြေးလျနိုင်ငံ၊ ပြင်သစ်နိုင်ငံ၊ နော်ဝေနိုင်ငံ၊ တောင်ကိုရီးယားနိုင်ငံ၊ ဂျပန်နိုင်ငံစတဲ့ နိုင်ငံပေါင်း (၈) နိုင်ငံတွင် ကိုယ်စားလှယ်ရုံးများကို ဖွင့်လှစ်နိုင်ခဲ့ပြီး အကြောင်းအမျိုးမျိုးကြောင့် နေရပ်စွန့်ခွာခဲ့ရသော မြန်မာ နိုင်ငံသားများအရေးနှင့် ရွှေ့ပြောင်းပြည်သူများ၊ ပြည်ပတွင် အခက်အခဲကြုံနေရသော ပြည်သူများကို အကာအကွယ်ပေးနိုင်ရေး သက်ဆိုင်ရာနိုင်ငံများနှင့် ချိတ်ဆက်ဆောင်ရွက်ခဲ့သည်။ ထို့အပြင် အမေရိကန် ပြည်ထောင်စု အမျိုးသားကာကွယ်ရေး လုပ်ပိုင်ခွင့်အက်ဥပေဒ ၂၀၂၃ တွင် The Burma Act of 2022 ကို ပေါင်းစပ်ထည့်သွင်းနိုင်ရန် ကြိုးပမ်းခြင်းနှင့် နိုင်ငံပေါင်း (၇) နိုင်ငံရှိ လွှတ်တော်များနှင့် ချိတ်ဆက်ဆောင်ရွက် ခြင်းများကို ပြုလုပ်ခဲ့ပါသည်။ ရိုဟင်ဂျာအရေးနှင့်ပတ်သက်၍ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရအနေဖြင့် ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ်က ထုတ်ပြန်ထားခဲ့သည့် “ရခိုင်ပြည်နယ်ရှိ ရိုဟင်ဂျာပြည်သူများဆိုင်ရာ မူ၀ါဒသဘောထား” နှင့်အညီ ရိုဟင်ဂျာပြည်သူများ မိမိတို့နေရပ်သို့ မိမိတို့ကိုယ်ပိုင်ဆန္ဒသဘောဖြင့် ဂုဏ်သိက္ခာရှိရှိ ပြန်လည်အခြေချ နေထိုင်ရေးနှင့် ဥပဒေအရ တန်းတူအခွင့်အရေးရနိုင်ရန်အတွက် လုပ်ဆောင်လျက်ရှိပါသည်။ စစ်ကောင်စီ၏ ရက်စက်ယုတ်မာမှုများအတွက် ဤတော်လှန်ရေး ကာလအလွန်တွင် တရားမျှတ မှုရရှိရေးအတွက် ၎င်းတို့ကျုးလွန်နေသည့် စစ်ရာဇဝတ်မှုများနှင့် မျိုးနွယ်စုအလိုက် သတ်ဖြတ်မှုများကို စနစ်တကျ မှတ်တမ်းကောက်ယူ၊ ပြုစုသိမ်းဆည်းပြီး သက်သေခိုင်လုံသော (၁၇၁) မှုကို မြန်မာနိုင်ငံဆိုင်ရာ ကုလသမဂ္ဂစုံစမ်းစစ်ဆေးရေးအဖွဲ့ (IIMM) ထံသို့ပေးပို့ပေးပြီး ဖြစ်ပါသည်။ အပြည်ပြည်ဆိုင်ရာတရားရုံး (ICJ) တွင် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံနဲ့ ဂမ်ဘီယာနိုင်ငံတို့အကြား တရားရင်ဆိုင်နေဆဲအမှုဖြစ်သော ရိုဟင်ဂျာပြည်သူများ အပေါ် လူမျိုးတုန်းသတ်ဖြတ်မှုနှင့်ပတ်သက်ပြီး ကနဦးကန့်ကွက်ခဲ့မှုအားလုံးကို ပြန်လည်ရုတ်သိမ်းကြောင်း ဖေဖော်ဝါရီလ (၁) ရက် ၂၀၂၂ တွင် ပေးပို့အကြောင်းကြားခဲ့ပါသည်။ ကျွမ်းကျင်သော အဖွဲ့အစည်းများနှင့် ပူးပေါင်းပြီး နိုင်ငံ၏တရားစီရင်ရေးဆိုင်ရာယန္တရား (universal jurisdiction) ကိုအသုံးပြုကာ စစ်ကောင်စီအား ဂျာမနီ၊ အာဂျင်တီးနားနှင့် တူရကီတို့တွင် တရားစွဲဆိုထားပြီး အခြားနိုင်ငံများတွင်လည်း ဆက်လက်စွဲဆိုနိုင်ရန် ကြိုးပမ်းနေသည်။ အပြည်ပြည်ဆိုင်ရာရာဇဝတ်ခုံရုံး (ICC) တွင်လည်း စစ်ကောင်စီအား အမှုတင်သွင်း အရေးယူနိုင်ရန် ရောမသဘောတူစာချုပ် (Rome Statute) ၏ ပုဒ်မ ၁၂(၃) နှင့် အညီတရားစီရင်မှုကိုလက်ခံကြောင်း ဇူလိုင်လ (၁၇) ရက် ၂၀၂၁ တွင်တင်သွင်းခဲ့ကာ အမှန်တရားနဲ့တရားမျှတမှုကိုရရှိရန် ဆက်လက်ကြိုးပမ်း ဆောင်ရွက်သွားမည်ဖြစ်သည်။ စစ်ရေးနှင့် ပြည်သူ့ရင်ခွင်ခိုလှုံမှုအခြေအနေ ၃။ တစ်နိုင်ငံလုံးတွင် PDF တပ်ရင်းနှင့် စစ်ကြောင်း စုစုပေါင်း (၃၀၀) ကျော် ၊ ရပ်ရွာအခြေပြု ပြည်သူ့ ကာကွယ်ရေးအဖွဲ့ (ပကဖ) များကို မြို့နယ်ပေါင်း(၂၅၀)ကျော်တွင် စနစ်တကျဖွဲ့စည်းတည်ထောင်ထား ပြီး လူအင်အား (Man Power) အရ မိမိတို့၏တိုက်ခိုက်ရေးအင်အားသည် ရန်သူ့ထက် “သာလွန် အင်အား” ဖြစ်အောင် ဤအချိန် (၂) နှစ်အတွင်း စုဖွဲ့တည်ဆောက်နိုင်ခဲ့သည်။ မဟာမိတ် တိုင်းရင်းသားတော်လှန်ရေးအဖွဲ့များနှင့် အတူပူးပေါင်းကာ ဗဟိုကွပ်ကဲရေးနှင့် ပေါင်းစပ် ညှိနှိုင်းရေးကော်မတီ (Central Command and Coordination Committee - C3C) ၊ ပူးပေါင်းညှိနှိုင်းရေးကော်မတီ (Joint Coordination Committee - J2C) တို့ကို စုဖွဲ့လုပ်ဆောင်လျက်ရှိသည်။ အစိုးရသက်တမ်း (၂) နှစ်တာ ကာလအတွင်း မဟာမိတ် ERO များနှင့် ခုခံတော်လှန်စစ် ပူးပေါင်းဆောင်ရွက်မှုများမှတဆင့် စနစ်ကျသော ထိန်းချုပ်ကွပ်ကဲမှု စနစ်တစ်ခုအောက်တွင် စစ်ဆင်ရေးနယ်မြေအလိုက် Chain of Command တည်ဆောက် ခြင်းများ ဆောင်ရွက်လျက်ရှိသည်။ ပြည်သူလူထုတရပ်လုံး၏ လှူဒါန်းကူညီမှု၊ မဟာမိတ်တိုင်းရင်းသား တော်လှန်ရေးအဖွဲ့များနှင့် လက်တွဲဆောင်ရွက်မှုတို့ကြောင့် PDF တပ်မတော်အတွက် လက်နက်တပ်ဆင်မှုကို အတိုင်းအတာတစ်ခုအထိ တပ်ဆင်နိုင်ခဲ့ပြီဖြစ်သည်။ ထို့အပြင် ကိုယ်ပိုင်လက်နက်ခဲယမ်း ထုတ်လုပ်ခြင်းကဏ္ဍ သည်လည်း များစွာအောင်မြင် ပေါက်ရောက်နိုင်ခဲ့ပြီဖြစ်သည်။ ရန်သူနှင့် ကောင်းစွာနှိုင်းယှဉ်နိုင်သည့်၊ ပွဲသိမ်းအဆင့် တိုက်ခိုက်နိုင်သည့် လက်နက်အင်အား အခြေအနေသို့ရောက်ရန်၊ လေကြောင်းရန်ကို တန်ပြန် တိုက်ခိုက်နိုင်ရန်၊ ခုခံနိုင်ရန်အတွက် ဗျူဟာမြောက် လက်နက်ပစ္စည်းများ အလုံအလောက် ရရှိနိုင်ရန်လည်း ဆက်လက်ကြိုးပမ်းလျက်ရှိသည်။ “ကျေးလက်ကို အခြေပြု၊ မြို့ပြကို ဝန်းရံ” ဟူသည့် အခြေခံ ပြောက်ကျားစစ်နည်းဗျူဟာနှင့်အညီ ယခုအခါ ကျေးလက်ဒေသအများစုကို မိမိတို့စိုးမိုးနယ်မြေအဖြစ် တည်ဆောက်ခဲ့နိုင်ပြီး တော်လှန်ရေး၏ နောက်တဆင့်အဖြစ် မြို့ပြဒေသများကို ခြိမ်းခြောက်နိုင်ရေး၊ ရန်သူ့ဗျူဟာမြောက် ဆက်သွယ်ထောက်ပို့ရေးလမ်း ကြောင်းများ (Line of Communication) ကို ဖြတ်တောက် ထိန်းချုပ်နိုင်ရေးအတွက် ကြိုးပမ်းလျက်ရှိပါသည်။ စစ်မဟာဗျူဟာအရ ခံစစ် (Phase of Strategic Defense) ဖြင့် စတင်ခဲ့ရသော ပြည်သူ့ခုခံတော်လှန်စစ်သည် ယခုအခါ တန်ပြန်ထိုးစစ်အကြိုကာလ (Phase of Strategic Equilibrium) သို့ အပြည့်အဝရောက်ရှိခဲ့ပြီဖြစ်သည်။ နောက်ဆုံးအဆင့်ဖြစ်သော စစ်မဟာဗျူဟာအရ တန်ပြန်ထိုးစစ်ကာလ (Phase of Strategic Counter Offensive) သို့ ဆက်လက်တက်လှမ်းနိုင်ရေးအတွက် မဟာဗျူဟာမြောက် စစ်လက်နက်ပစ္စည်းများ ရှာဖွေတပ်ဆင်မှုကို အားစိုက်ဆောင်ရွက်လျက်ရှိသည်။ မှတ်တမ်းများအရ ပြည်သူ့ခုခံတွန်းလှန်စစ်အတွင်း ခန့်မှန်းရန်သူ့အင်အား ၃သောင်းခန့် ထိခိုက်သေဆုံးသည် အထိ ချေမှုန်းနိုင်ခဲ့ပြီး (၁) သောင်းကျော် ထိခိုက်ဒဏ်ရာရရှိစေခဲ့သည်။ စစ်အာဏာသိမ်းမှုကို လက်မခံသည့် တပ်မတော်သားနှင့်ရဲ (၁၃,၀၀၀)ဦးကျော် ပြည်သူ့ရင်ခွင်ခိုလှုံ လာခဲ့သည်။ ကြားကာလဒေသန္တရ ပြည်သူ့အုပ်ချုပ်ရေးဖော်ဆောင်မှု ၄။ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရအနေဖြင့် ကြားကာလဒေသန္တရ ပြည်သူ့အုပ်ချုပ်ရေးဖော်ဆောင်မှု ဗဟိုကော်မတီကို ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ် စက်တင်ဘာလမှစတင်၍ ဖွဲ့စည်းပြီး ကြားကာလဒေသန္တရ အုပ်ချုပ်ရေးဖော်ဆောင်မှု လုပ်ငန်းများအား မူဝါများချမှတ်အကောင်အထည်ဖော် ဆောင်ရွက်ခဲ့ရာ လက်ရှိ အချိန်အထိ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ စိုးမိုးထိန်းချုပ်နယ်မြေများတွင် မြို့နယ်ပြည်သူ့ အုပ်ချုပ်ရေး အဖွဲ့များကို (၁၇၁) မြို့နယ်ဖွဲ့စည်းနိုင်ခဲ့ပြီး ခရိုင်ပေါင်း (၁၀) ခရိုင်ကိုလည်း ခရိုင်အဆင့် ပြည်သူ့အုပ်ချုပ်ရေးအဖွဲ့ ဖွဲ့စည်းနိုင်ခဲ့ပြီဖြစ်သည်။ အုပ်ချုပ်ရေးရုံးများနှင့်အတူ ပြည်သူလူထုဘဝလုံခြုံစေရန် ရည်ရွယ်လျက် ပြည်သူ့ရဲတပ်ဖွဲ့ကို ဇွန်လ (၇)ရက် ၂၀၂၂ တွင်စတင်ဖွဲ့စည်းခဲ့ပြီး ယခုအခါ ကြားကာလအုပ်ချုပ်ရေး နယ်မြေ ဒေသများတွင် ရဲတပ်ဖွဲ့ဝင်အင်အား (၁၉၆) ဦးနှင့် အခြေခံရဲသင်တန်းများပို့ချခြင်း၊ ရဲမှုခင်းများစစ်ဆေးခြင်း၊ စစ်ကောင်စီ၏သတင်းများ စုဆောင်းပြီး အကြမ်းဖက်နှိမ်နှင်းခြင်း လုပ်ငန်းစဉ်များ ဆောင်ရွက်လျက်ရှိပါသည်။ အဆိုပါနယ်မြေများတွင် အခွန်စနစ်ကိုလည်း စတင်ကျင့်သုံးနေပြီး ယနေ့အချိန်အထိ အခွန်နှင့် ဒဏ်ကြေးအတွက် မြန်မာကျပ်ငွေ ၁၀ ဘီလီယံကျော်ကောက်ခံရရှိပြီး ဖြစ်ပါသည်။ ၎င်းအခွန်ဘဏ္ဍာငွေများကို မြို့နယ်များအတွင်း လိုအပ်လျက်ရှိသော ဒေသကာကွယ်ရေး၊ ပြန်လည်ထူထောင်ရေးလုပ်ငန်းစဉ်များနှင့် လူသားစာနာလုပ်ငန်းများတွင် ပြန်လည်ခွဲဝေသုံးစွဲလျက်ရှိပါသည်။ ပြည်နယ်အတိုင်ပင်ခံကောင်စီများ၊ လွှတ်တော်ကိုယ်စားပြု ကော်မတီများနှင့်လည်း ပုံမှန်ဆွေးနွေးတိုင်ပင်မှုများပြုလုပ်၍ သက်ဆိုင်ရာတိုင်း ဒေသကြီး/ ပြည်နယ်/ဖက်ဒရယ်ယူနစ်များ၏ ဒေသန္တရအုပ်ချုပ်ရေးလုပ်ငန်း အကောင်အထည်ဖော်ဆောင်မှု များကို တိုင်ပင်ဆောင်ရွက်လျက်ရှိပါသည်။ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရသည် ကြားကာလနှင့် အသွင်ကူး ပြောင်းရေးကာလများတွင် ပြည်သူများကို ကာကွယ်စောင့်ရှောက်မှုပေးနိုင်ရန်နှင့် တရားဥပဒေ စိုးမိုးစေရန် ရည်ရွယ်၍ တရားရေးရာဝန်ကြီးဌာနကို ဇွန်လ (၅) ရက် ၂၀၂၁ခုနှစ်တွင် CDM လှုပ်ရှားမှု၌ ပါဝင်ခဲ့သော နိုင်ငံ့ဝန်ထမ်းများ၊ ဥပဒေအရာရှိများ၊ တရားသူကြီးများ၊ ဥပဒေပညာရှင်များနှင့် ဖွဲ့စည်းခဲ့ပါသည်။ ယခုအခါ မြို့နယ်တရားရုံး (၂၅)ရုံးတွင် တရားသူကြီး (၁၁၈)ဦး ခန့်အပ်ထားရှိပြီး တရားစီရင်ရေးအာဏာများ စတင်ကျင့်သုံးဆောင်ရွက်လျက် ရာဇဝတ်မှုနှင့် တရားမမှုများကို ဖြေရှင်းဆောင်ရွက်နေပြီဖြစ် သည်။ မဟာမိတ်ဆက်ဆံရေး ၅။ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၏ ဝန်ကြီးဌာနများအနေဖြင့်လည်း ၎င်းတို့သက်ဆိုင်ရာကဏ္ဍအလိုက် တိုင်းရင်းသားမဟာမိတ်အင်အားစုများနှင့် ချိတ်ဆက်ကာ ပူးပေါင်းဆောင်ရွက်မှုများ လုပ်ဆောင်လျက်ရှိပြီး ပိုမိုအားကောင်းသောဆက်ဆံရေးကို ထူထောင်နိုင်ခဲ့သည်။ တစ်ဖက်တွင်လည်း မဟာမိတ်ဆက်ဆံရေး ကော်မတီ (ARC) ကို ၂၀၂၂ ခုနှစ်၊ ဇန်နဝါရီလ (၄) ရက်နေ့မှစတင်ဖွဲ့စည်းခဲ့ပြီး နိုင်ငံရေး၊ စစ်ရေး၊ လုံခြုံရေး၊ ကာကွယ်ရေးနှင့် အုပ်ချုပ်ရေးဆိုင်ရာကိစ္စရပ်များကို လက်တွဲညှိနှိုင်းဆောင်ရွက်နိုင်ရန် ကြိုးပမ်းခဲ့ပါသည်။ မဟာမိတ်ဆက်ဆံရေးကော်မတီအနေဖြင့် တိုင်းရင်းသားအဖွဲ့အစည်း ERO များအပါအဝင်၊ နိုင်ငံရေး ပါတီများ၊ တော်လှန်ရေးအင်အားစုများ၊ အတိုင်ပင်ခံကောင်စီများနှင့် သီးခြားတွေ့ဆုံဆွေးနွေးမှုများ ပြုလုပ်ခဲ့ပြီး လူသားချင်းစာနာမှု အကူအညီဆိုင်ရာကိစ္စများအပါအဝင် စစ်ရေး၊ ကာကွယ်ရေး၊ ကျန်းမာရေး၊ ပညာရေး ကဏ္ဍများတွင် ကျယ်ကျယ်ပြန့်ပြန့် လက်တွဲဆောင်ရွက်လျက်ရှိပါသည်။ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စုအား ဖြုတ်ချနိုင်ရေးနှင့် အနာဂတ်ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီပြည်ထောင်စု ထူထောင်ရေးတို့အတွက် နိုင်ငံရေးဆိုင်ရာ သဘောတူညီချက်များရရှိကာ ယခုထက်ပိုမိုသည့် ပူးပေါင်းဆောင်ရွက်မှုများကို စုစည်းညီညွတ်စွာ ဖော်ဆောင်နိုင်ရေး ဆွေးနွေးပွဲများစဉ်ဆက်မပြတ် ပြုလုပ်လျက်ရှိပါသည်။ ပြည်သူ့ဝန်ဆောင်မှု လုပ်ငန်းများ ၆။ ပြည်သူလူထု၏ ပညာရေးအဆက်ပြတ်မှု မဖြစ်စေရေးအတွက် CDM ဆရာ/မများ၊ ပညာရေးဝန် ထမ်းများ စုစုပေါင်းအင်အားတစ်သိန်းခွဲကျော်ဖြင့် အခြေခံပညာ၊ အဆင့်မြင့်ပညာ၊ သက်မွေးဝမ်းကျောင်း ပညာနှင့် ဆရာအတတ်သင်ပညာရပ်များကို တစ်နိုင်ငံလုံးအတိုင်းအတာဖြင့် online, on ground သင် ကြားရေး များအပြင် Digital Based Learning စနစ်များဖြင့် ဝန်ဆောင်မှုများ ပေးလျက်ရှိသည်။ ပညာရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာနနှင့် ချိတ်ဆက်ဆောင်ရွက်နေသော online ကျောင်း (၇၀)ကျော်ရှိပြီး အသိအမှတ်ပြုမူဝါဒနှင့်အညီ ဖွင့်လှစ် သင်ကြားခြင်း၊ on ground ကျောင်းပေါင်း (၅၀၀၀) ကျော်၊ ဆရာ/မပေါင်း (၆၀,၀၀၀) ကျော်နှင့် ကျောင်းသား/ သူပေါင်း (၇၅၀,၀၀၀) ကျော်ခန့် ပညာသင်ကြားလျက်ရှိသည်။ ပညာရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာနနှင့် ချိတ်ဆက်ပြီး မြို့နယ်ပညာရေးဘုတ်အဖွဲ့ကို (၃၀၄) မြို့နယ်တွင်ဖွဲ့စည်းကာ အကောင်အထည်ဖော် ဆောင်ရွက်လျက်ရှိသည်။ ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီ ပညာရေးပေါ်လစီကို NUG-NUCC ပူးပေါင်းလုပ်ငန်းကော်မတီ၏ ပူးပေါင်းပါဝင်မှုနှင့် ဆက်လက်ရေးဆွဲ အကောင်အထည်ဖော်လျက်ရှိသည်။ အခြေခံပညာညီလာခံ၊ အဆင့်မြင့်ပညာညီလာခံတို့ကို ကျင်းပနိုင်ခဲ့ကာ အဆိုပါညီလာခံများမှရရှိသော ဆွေးနွေးဆုံးဖြတ်ချက်များကို အခြေခံ၍ ပညာရေး အကောင်အထည်ဖော်မှုများ ဆောင်ရွက်နေပါသည်။ BECA (Basic Education Completion Assessment) အခြေခံပညာပြီးမြောက်ကြောင်း စစ်ဆေးအကဲဖြတ်ခြင်းကို ၂၀၂၃ ခုနှစ်၊ ဖေဖော်ဝါရီလမှ ဧပြီလအထိ online, offline ဖြေဆိုခဲ့ရာ online အနေဖြင့် ကျောင်းသားပေါင်း (၂၁၀၀၀) ကျော်ဖြေဆိုခဲ့ပြီး စာစစ်ဌာန (၃၂၉) ခုတွင် ကျောင်းသားပေါင်း (၃၈၈၇၇) ဦးဖြေဆိုခဲ့သည်။ PDF ရဲဘော်များလည်း ပါဝင်ဖြေဆိုခဲ့ကြသည်။ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရဖွဲ့စည်းပြီး (၂) နှစ်တာကာလအတွင်း အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီကြောင့် ဘေးဒုက္ခရောက်နေရသော ပြည်သူများအတွက် ငွေကျပ် ၆.၆ဘီလီယံခန့် (USD ၂.၃ မီလီယံ) လူသားချင်းစာနာမှု အကူအညီများ ပေးအပ်နိုင်ခဲ့ပါသည်။ တစ်လလျှင် ပျမ်းမျှစစ်ဘေးရှောင်ပြည်သူ ၂ သိန်းကျော်ကို စားနပ်ရိက္ခာ ထောက်ပံ့ပေးနိုင်ပါသည်။ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စုကြောင့် နေအိမ်များဆုံးရှုံးခဲ့ရသည့် ပြည်နယ်နှင့်တိုင်း အသီးသီးတို့မှ ဒေသခံပြည်သူများအတွက် ယာယီတဲများ ပြန်လည်ဆောက်လုပ်ပေးခဲ့ရာ လက်ရှိအချိန်အထိ ပြည်သူကလှူဒါန်းသည့် ရန်ပုံငွေဖြင့် ယာယီတဲပေါင်း (၂,၂၃၉) လုံးဆောက်လုပ်ပေးပြီးဖြစ်ပါသည်။ အကြမ်းဖက် စစ်ကောင်စီ၏ လေကြောင်းတိုက်ခိုက်မှုများကြောင့် အရပ်သားပြည်သူများ အသက်ဆုံးရှုံးရမှု လျှော့ချနိုင်ရန် ရန်ပုံငွေကျပ် (၁၁၉) သန်းခန့်အသုံးပြု၍ ကြားကာလပညာရေးဖော်ဆောင်နေသော စာသင်ကျောင်းများတွင် ဗုံးခိုကျင်း (၇၉၈) ကျင်းတူးဖော်ပေးခဲ့ပြီးဖြစ်သည်။ထို့အပြင် ဘေးအန္တရာယ်အမျိုးမျိုးနှင့် ပတ်သက်သည့် အသိပညာပေးခြင်း၊ စာစောင်များထုတ်ဝေ ဖြန့်ဖြူးခြင်းနှင့်စာသင်ကျောင်းများတွင် ဇာတ်တိုက်လေ့ကျင့်ခန်း များ ဆောင်ရွက်ပေးခဲ့ပါသည်။ တိုင်းဒေသကြီးနှင့် ပြည်နယ်အသီးသီးမှ လူသားစာနာတာဝန်ခံ စုစုပေါင်း (၃၅၂) ဦးကိုလည်း အရပ်သားထိခိုက်မှုလျှော့ချရေးနှင့် အရေးပေါ်တုံ့ပြန်ရေးလုပ်ငန်းဆိုင်ရာ သင်တန်းများ ပေးအပ်ခဲ့ပါသည်။ နိုင်ငံတကာမှ လူသားချင်းစာနာမှု အကူအညီများရရှိနိုင်ရေးအတွက် စစ်ဘေးရှောင် ပြည်သူအများဆုံးရှိသည့် စစ်ကိုင်းတိုင်းဒေသကြီးနှင့် မကွေးတိုင်းဒေသကြီးအတွင်း မြို့နယ်ပေါင်း (၃၉) မြို့နယ် တွင် လူသားချင်းစာနာကူညီမှုဆိုင်ရာ လိုအပ်ချက်ဆန်းစစ်လေ့လာခြင်း ဆောင်ရွက်ခဲ့ပြီး အစီရင်ခံစာ ကိုလည်း အလှူရှင်နိုင်ငံများ၊ ကုလသမဂ္ဂနှင့်အာဆီယံသို့ ဖြန့်ချီပေးပို့ခဲ့ပါသည်။ ထို့အပြင် အရပ်သားထိခိုက်မှု လျှော့ချရေးနှင့် ဘေးကင်းလုံခြုံသည့် လူသားချင်းစာနာမှုအကူအညီပေးရေးစင်္ကြန်များ ဖော်ဆောင်နိုင်ရန် အလို့ငှာ တိုင်းရင်းသားတော်လှန်ရေးမဟာမိတ်များ၊ အရပ်ဘက်လူမှုရေးအဖွဲ့အစည်းများ၊ မိတ်ဖက်နိုင်ငံများနှင့် ပူးပေါင်း၍ အားလုံးပါဝင်သော လူသားချင်းစာနာကူညီမှုဆိုင်ရာဖိုရမ်တစ်ခု ကျင်းပနိုင်ရေးကိုလည်း စီမံ ဆောင်ရွက်လျက်ရှိပါသည်။ Mind Healer စိတ်ခွန်အားပေးသူများ Facebook စာမျက်နှာမှ အကူအညီလိုအပ် သူများအား နှစ်သိမ့်ဆွေးနွေး အကြံပေးခြင်းကိုလည်း ပြုလုပ်ပေးလျက်ရှိရာ စုစုပေါင်း ပြည်သူ (၈၂၃) ဦးနှင့် CDM ဝန်ထမ်း (၄၂၂) ဦးကို ဝန်ဆောင်မှုပေးနိုင်ခဲ့သည်။ ထောင်တွင်းမတရားဖမ်းဆီးခံရသော နိုင်ငံရေးအကျဉ်းသူများနှင့်လိင်စိတ်ကွဲပြားသူ(၄၆၉) ဦး၊ လူငယ် နိုင်ငံရေး အကျဉ်းသား (၄၀၀) ဦး၊ ကိုယ်ဝန်ဆောင်မိခင်နှင့်နို့တိုက်မိခင်များ (၁၁၁,၉၁၄) ဦး၊ အရေးပေါ် အခြေအနေတွင် နေထိုင်ရန်လိုအပ်မှုနှင့် camp အုပ်ချုပ်မှုသင်တန်း (၃,၀၀၀) ဦးတို့ကို ထောက်ပံ့ပေး ခဲ့သည်။ ထို့အတူ ကလေးများအပေါ် စစ်ကောင်စီမှကျူးလွန်သော ရာဇဝတ်မှုများကို မှတ်တမ်းတင်ခြင်းနှင့် အစီရင်ခံခြင်း၊ ကလေးသူငယ်များနှင့်ပတ်သက်သည့် သတင်းအချက်အလက်များ ဖြန့်ဝေခြင်းနှင့် စုဆောင်း ခြင်း၊ ကလေးစစ်သားစုဆောင်းမှုတားမြစ်ခြင်း လုပ်ငန်းများကိုလည်း ကျယ်ကျယ်ပြန့်ပြန့် ဆောင်ရွက်လျက် ရှိပါသည်။ စစ်ကောင်စီ၏ အကြမ်းဖက်တိုက်ခိုက်မှုကြောင့် ဖြစ်ပေါ်လာသော ထိခိုက်ဒဏ်ရာရမှုများအား ကုသမှုပေးခြင်း၊ ခွဲစိတ်ကုသမှုပြုလုပ်ခြင်း၊ ခြေလက်အင်္ဂါဆုံးရှုံးသူများအား ခြေတုလက်တုတပ်ဆင်ပေးခြင်း၊ အရေးပေါဗိုက်ခွဲကလေးမွေးဖွားပေးခြင်း အစရှိသော ကျန်းမာရေးစောင့်ရှောက်မှုများကိုလည်း လုပ်ဆောင်ပေး လျက်ရှိပါသည်။ ပြည်သူလူထုနှင့် ကျန်းမာရေးစောင့်ရှောက်မှုပေးနေသော ဆေးရုံ/ဆေးခန်းများအား အကြမ်းဖက် စစ်ကောင်စီ၏ လေကြောင်းရန်တိုက်ခိုက်မှု၊ စစ်ကြောင်းထိုးတိုက်ခိုက်မှု၊ မီးရှို့ဖျက်ဆီးမှုစသည့် အကြမ်းဖက် လုပ်ရပ်များမှကာကွယ်နိုင်ရန် ဆောင်ရွက်လျက်ရှိပါသည်။ စာသင်ကျောင်းများ၊ ဆေးရုံများတွင် လေကြောင်းရန်ကာကွယ်ရေးနှင့် အရေးပေါ်ရှေးဦးသူနာပြုစုရေးတို့အတွက် လိုအပ်သောသင်တန်းများနှင့် အရေးပေါ်ဆေးအိတ် ဝယ်ယူရေးအတွက် ထောက်ပံ့မှုများကိုလည်း ပြုလုပ်လျက်ရှိပါသည်။ မြေပြင်တွင် ဆေးရုံပေါင်း (၆၆) ခု၊ ဆေးခန်းပေါင်း (၁၅၉) ခု၊ ရွေ့လျား ဆေးခန်းပေါင်း (၂၅၀) ကျော်တို့ဖြင့် အရေးပေါ် ကျန်းမာရေးစောင့်ရှောက်မှုနှင့် ပဏာမကျန်းမာရေးစောင့်ရှောက်မှုများ ဆောင်ရွက်လျက်ရှိပါသည်။ မြို့နယ်ပေါင်း (၁၉၈) မြို့နယ် (တစ်နိုင်ငံလုံး၏ ၆၀ %) တွင် မြို့နယ်ကျန်းမာရေးတာဝန်ခံများရှိပြီး ဝန်ကြီးဌာနနှင့်လက်တွဲ ချိတ်ဆက်၍ ကျန်းမာရေးဝန်ဆောင်မှုပေးနေသည့် ကျန်းမာရေးလုပ်သားစုစုပေါင်းမှာ (၃,၈၃၂) ဦးဖြစ်ကာ ကျန်းမာရေးလုပ်သားများ၏ (၇၈%) မှာ CDMers များဖြစ်သည်။ ထိုလုပ်သားစုစုပေါင်းထဲတွင် တိုင်းရင်းသား ကျန်းမာရေးအဖွဲ့များ၌ရှိသော ကျန်းမာရေးလုပ်သားများအင်အားပါဝင်ခြင်း မရှိသေးပါ။ ကျန်းမာရေးအသုံးစရိတ် အနေဖြင့် အမေရိကန်ဒေါ်လာ ၂ သန်း သုံးစွဲခဲ့ပြီးဖြစ်သည်။ အာဏာဖီဆန်ရေးလှုပ်ရှားမှု(CDM) ၇။ အာဏာဖီဆန်လှုပ်ရှားမှု (CDM) တွင် ပါဝင်ခဲ့ကြသော CDM ပြည်သူ့သားကောင်းများအား ပံ့ပိုးကူညီမှု ပေးနိုင်ရေးအတွက် ၂၀၂၁ ဧပြီလ ၂၇ ရက်နေ့တွင် အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ ပြည်ထောင်စုဝန်ကြီးများ၊ ဒုတိယဝန်ကြီးများ၊ CRPH ကိုယ်စားလှယ်များပါဝင်၍ CDM Success Committee အားဖွဲ့စည်းခဲ့ကာ CDM လှုပ်ရှားမှုတွင် ပါဝင်ခဲ့သူများနှင့် CDM ကွန်ယက်ချိတ်ဆက်ခြင်း၊ CDM ဆောင်ရွက်မှုအစီရင်ခံစာအား ၂၀၂၁၊ စက်တင်ဘာလတွင် UN Credential အတွက် ထုတ်ပြန်ခြင်း၊ CDM လှုပ်ရှားမှုတစ်နှစ်ပြည့် အထိမ်းအမှတ်အဖြစ် CDM အချက်အလက်အစီရင်ခံစာအား ထုတ်ပြန်ခြင်း၊ CDM စစ်တမ်းကောက်ယူခြင်းတို့ကို ဆောင်ရွက်ခဲ့သည်။ ထို့အပြင် CDM ဆုချီးမြှင့်ရေးနှင့် လစာဘတ်ဂျက်တွက်ချက်မှုများ ဆောင်ရွက်ခြင်း၊ နှစ်ပတ်လည်လုပ်ငန်း တိုးတက်မှုဆိုင်ရာ စစ်တမ်းကောက်ယူ၍ ပိုမိုကောင်းမွန်သောလုပ်ငန်းစဥ်များ ဖော်ဆောင်ရန်လည်း ဆောင်ရွက်လျက်ရှိပါသည်။ CDM Success Committee နှင့်ချိတ်ဆက်ထားသော CDM နိုင်ငံ့သူရဲကောင်း (၂၁၀၆၃၉) အနက်မှ (၂၀%) နှုန်းခန့်၏ အရေးပေါ်လိုအပ်ချက်များအတွက် မြန်မာကျပ်ငွေသန်း (၄,၀၀၀)ခန့် ကူညီထောက်ပံ့ပေးနိုင်ခဲ့ပါသည်။ ဝန်ကြီးဌာနများအနေဖြင့်လည်း ဌာနအလိုက် CDM ဝန်ထမ်းများအား အသီးသီး ကူညီထောက်ပံ့လျက်ရှိသည်။ ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ်၊ စက်တင်ဘာလမှစတင်၍ အာဏာဖီဆန်ရေးလှုပ်ရှားမှုဆိုင်ရာ နိုင်ငံ့ဝန်ထမ်း CDM/ Non CDM မူဝါဒမူကြမ်းအား နိုင်ငံ့ဝန်ထမ်း CDMများ၏ သဘောထားခံယူဆွေးနွေးရေးသားခဲ့ပြီး အမျိုးသား ညီညွတ်ရေးအတိုင်ပင်ခံကောင်စီက ၂၀၂၃ ခုနှစ်၊ ဇန်နဝါရီ လ ၂၀ ရက်တွင် အတည်ပြုထုတ်ပြန်ပေးခဲ့သည်။ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအတိုင်ပင်ခံကောင်စီက အတည်ပြုထုတ်ပြန်ထားသည့် “နိုင်ငံ့ဝန်ထမ်း CDM မူဝါဒ” အပိုဒ် (၃) နှင့်အညီ ဥပဒေကြမ်းတစ်ရပ် ပေါ်ထွန်းလာရေးအတွက် CDM အောင်မြင်ရေးကော်မတီသည် အကြမ်းမဖက်အာဏာဖီဆန်ရေး လှုပ်ရှားမှုဆိုင်ရာ နိုင်ငံ့ဝန်ထမ်းဥပဒေမူကြမ်းရေးဆွဲရေး ကော်မတီတစ်ရပ် ဖွဲ့စည်းကာ ဥပဒေမူကြမ်းရေးဆွဲလျက်ရှိပါသည်။ ဘဏ္ဍာရေးနှင့် စီးပွားရေးကဏ္ဍ ၈။ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၊ စီးပွားရေးနှင့် ကူးသန်းရောင်းဝယ်ရေး ဝန်ကြီးဌာနအနေဖြင့် တော်လှန်ရေးအင်အားစုများ၊ မြေပြင်သပိတ်အဖွဲ့များ၊ ပြည်သူများနှင့်ပူးပေါင်း၍ စစ်တပ်ထုတ်ကုန် သပိတ်မှောက်ကမ်ပိန်းအား ဆောင်ရွက်ခဲ့ခြင်းနှင့် CDM Product များအား ပြည်ပနိုင်ငံများသို့ တင်ပို့ရောင်းချ ခြင်းတို့ကို ဆောင်ရွက်နိုင်ခဲ့ပါသည်။ MSME ချေးငွေများထုတ်ပေးနိုင်ရန်နှင့် တော်လှန်ရေးအတွက် လိုအပ်သောကဏ္ဍများအတွက် ပံ့ပိုးကူညီနိုင်ရန် ရံပုံငွေရှာဖွေခြင်းများကိုလည်း ဆောင်ရွက်ခဲ့ကာ ကျပ်သိန်းပေါင်း (၁၇၁,၆၇၇,၄၄၀) ထိ ကူညီပံ့ပိုးနိုင်ခဲ့သည်။ စီမံကိန်း၊ ဘဏ္ဍာရေးနှင့် ရင်းနှီးမြှုပ်နှံမှုဝန်ကြီးဌာနအနေဖြင့် အာဏာသိမ်းစစ်ကာင်စီထံ စီး၀င်လာမည့် ဘဏ္ဍာငွေကြေးအထောက်အပံ့များကို တားဆီးပိတ်ပင်ခြင်းနှင့် ပြည်သူလူထု၏ လိုလားတောင့်တချက်နှင့်အညီ ပေါ်ပေါက်လာမည့် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီ ပြည်ထောင်စုတည်ဆောက်ရာတွင် အထောက်အပံ့ရစေမည့် ဘဏ္ဍာငွေများ ရရှိစေရေးမူဝါဒ (၂) ရပ် ချမှတ်ဆောင်ရွက်လျက်ရှိပါသည်။ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီ၏ ဝင်ငွေဖြတ်တောက်ပိတ်ဆို့ရေးနှင့်ပတ်သက်၍ ပြည်သူလူထု၊ နိုင်ငံတကာအစိုးရများနှင့် အဖွဲ့အစည်းများ၊ တော်လှန်ရေးအစုအဖွဲ့များ၊ CSO/CBO များနှင့် လက်တွဲပူးပေါင်းဆောင်ရွက်ခဲ့ပြီး စစ်ကောင်စီ၏ ထုတ်ကုန် ပစ္စည်းများကို မသုံးစွဲရေး (Boycott) ပြုလုပ်ရန် စစ်တပ်ထုတ်ကုန်ပစ္စည်းများ၊ စီးပွားရေးလုပ်ငန်းများကို ပြည်သူလူထုသိရှိစေရန် ထုတ်ပြန်ကြေညာထားပါသည်။ ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီ ပြည်ထောင်စုတည်ဆောက်ရာတွင် အထောက်အပံ့ရစေမည့် ဘဏ္ဍာငွေများ ရရှိစေရေးနှင့်စပ်လျဉ်း၍ စီမံကိန်း၊ ဘဏ္ဍာရေးနှင့် ရင်းနှီးမြှုပ်နှံမှုဝန်ကြီးဌာနမှ အကောင်အထည်ဖော် ဆောင်ရွက်လျက်ရှိသော အောင်လံလွှင့်ချီနွေဦးထီ၊ United Bond, EOD, Early Partnership Program, NUGPay, အခွန်၊ အကောက်၊ ဒဏ်ကြေးစသည်တို့မှရရှိသော ဝင်ငွေနှင့်သုံးစွဲမှုခြေပြဇယားမှာ အောက်ပါအတိုင်း ဖြစ်ပါသည်။ နိဂုံး ၉။ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရအနေဖြင့် တစ်နှစ်တာအစီအမံ၏ ရည်မှန်းချက်များ ပေါက်မြောက်အောင်မြင် ရေးနှင့် စိန်ခေါ်မှုများအားကျော်လွှားနိုင်ရေးတို့ကို စဉ်ဆက်မပြတ်လေ့လာသုံးသပ်ကာ အဆုံးသတ်တိုက်ပွဲ အတွက် အဆုံးအဖြတ်ပေးနိုင်မည့် လုပ်ငန်းစဉ်များကို ဆက်လက်ကြိုးပမ်း အကေင်အထည်ဖော် ဆောင်ရွက် သွားမည်ဖြစ်ပါသည်။ ပြည်သူလူထုတစ်ရပ်လုံး၏ သဘောထားဆန္ဒအပေါ် အခြေခံထားသည့် အမျိုးသား ညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရနှင့်တကွ တော်လှန်ရေးအင်အားစုများအားလုံး၏ ရည်မှန်းချက်ပန်းတိုင်ဖြစ်သော ဖက်ဒရယ် ဒီမိုကရေစီပြည်ထောင်စုဆီသို့ ပြည်သူလူထုက ဆုံးဖြတ်ပြဌာန်းသော ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီပဋိညာဉ် လမ်းကြောင်းအတိုင်း ဦးလည်မသုန် ချီတက်ခရီးဆက်သွားမည်ဖြစ်ပါကြောင်း ကတိသစ္စာပြု အစီရင်ခံအပ် ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher: National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update: 2023-05-03
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Type: Individual Documents
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Title: Pekon Hospital Bombing
Description: "Key Event Details Location of Incident: Hsawng Phwe Hospital (ဆောင်းဖွေးဆေးရုံ), Pekon Township (ဖယ်ခုံမြို့နယ်), Shan State (ရှမ်းပြည်နယ်) [19.669828, 96.889449] Date/Time of Incident: 25 April 2023 around 1300 local time Alleged Perpetrator(s) and/or Involvement: Myanmar Air Force (MAF) Summary of Investigation: On 25 April 2023, reportedly around 1300 local time, there were claims of an airstrike in Pekon that affected a local hospital and a nearby internally-displaced people (IDP) camp. Myanmar Witness verified damage to a medical facility, including damage consistent with an possible air attack. Pro and anti-military media appear to agree that the military attacked the area, however pro-military sources claim that the attack took place due to People’s Defence Force (PDF) personnel hiding in the area. Myanmar Witness also verified one injured individual in a nearby IDP camp. Summary According to multiple pro-democracy news sources, including Khit Thit Media and MeKong News, the Myanmar military are alleged to have conducted an airstrike close to Hsawng Phwe Hospital, a medical facility in southern Shan state. The attack allegedly impacted civilians in the area, injuring three people including a nurse. Radio Free Asia has claimed that a military Mi-35 attack helicopter was responsible for the damage, but local Karenni Nationalities Defense Force (KNDF) media stated that a fighter jet was used. People Media, a pro-military media outlet, states that the airstrike was conducted because local PDF and Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP) members were present at this location. Myanmar Witness has been unable to verify this claim, but has verified damage to a medical facility in the area and at least one injured individual in a nearby IDP camp. The attack represents a steady escalation in the use of air power against civilians that has been addressed in the recent report Eyes on the Skies, and is being actively monitored by Myanmar Witness. Myanmar Witness has been able to verify: The location of a damaged medical facility, likely caused by an airstrike after further analysis of the damage caused. Medical equipment in the structure, suggesting it was being used as a medical facility. The location of a refugee camp nearby. The location of at least one person in the refugee camp, an older woman, who sustained injuries to the head. Currently unidentified munitions geolocated to the same area of the potential airstrike; one of the munition fragments allegedly located in the area of the attack could be air-delivered, and is likely associated with the incident. Myanmar Witness is actively monitoring: Claims that the military were involved in the attack and which groups are specifically implicated - Myanmar Witness hasyet to verify user-generated content (UGC) of an aircraft potentially involved. However, the use of aircraft suggests military responsibility, as the only group with access to such military assets. Claims that more than the one individual already identified were injured during the attack. Investigation Walkthrough The military are alleged to have attacked an area in Pekon with airstrikes on 25 April 2023, resulting in the destruction of a medical facility and the injury of civilians in a nearby IDP camp..."
Source/publisher: Myanmar Witness
Date of entry/update: 2023-05-02
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Type: Individual Documents
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Size: 1.38 MB
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Title: National Unity Government: Ministry of Foreign Affairs Statement (8/ 2023)
Sub-title: Statement on Meeting with Mr Ban Ki-moon
Description: "1. Deputy Minister U Moe Zaw Oo of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the National Unity Government of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar had a virtual meeting with Mr Ban Ki-moon, Deputy Chair of the Elders and former Secretary-General of the United Nations on 27th April 2023. 2. The meeting centred around Mr Ban Ki-moon’s recent visit to Myanmar and involved a productive exchange of perspectives on how to effectively move forward to address the current crisis facing Myanmar. 3. In the meeting, Deputy Minister U Moe Zaw Oo expressed his appreciation for the insights shared by Mr Ban Ki-moon, particularly on the significance of finding “a path to an end to violence” and “the importance of all parties playing a role in securing a lasting solution, including the National Unity Government”. Despite Mr Ban Ki-moon’s sincere intentions for his recent visit to Myanmar, Deputy Minister expressed his concern that the junta may seek to exploit this visit for their own advantage. Accordingly, he requested that any further visits to Myanmar be made in consultation with important stakeholders in Myanmar, including the National Unity Government. Deputy Minister also pointed out that the military junta has no right to hold elections and that elections should be conducted according to the newly drafted constitution that is acceptable to all stakeholders and to all ethnic groups in Myanmar. Furthermore, Deputy Minister underscored the need for more coordinated pressure and sanctions from the international community on the military junta which has failed to abide by the ASEAN Five-Point Consensus and the Security Council Resolution 2669. 4. The meeting concluded with an agreement to establish a collaborative working relationship to discuss potential pathways towards resolving the ongoing crisis in Myanmar..."
Source/publisher: Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Myanmar - NUG
Date of entry/update: 2023-04-30
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Type: Individual Documents
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Title: အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ နိုင်ငံခြားရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာန သတင်းထုတ်ပြန်ချက် (၈ / ၂၀၂၃)
Sub-title: NUG နိုင်ငံခြားရေးဒုတိယဝန်ကြီး နှင့် မစ္စတာ ဘန်ကီမွန်း တွေ့ဆုံခဲ့မှုနှင့်စပ်လျဉ်း၍ သတင်းထုတ်ပြန်ချက်
Description: "၁။ ပြည်ထောင်စုသမ္မတမြန်မာနိုင်ငံတော်၊ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၊ နိုင်ငံခြားရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာန၊ ဒုတိယဝန်ကြီးဦးမိုးဇော်ဦးသည် ကုလသမဂ္ဂအတွင်းရေးမှူးချုပ်ဟောင်း ၊ The Elders ၏ ဒုတိယ ဥက္ကဌဖြစ်သူ မစ္စတာ ဘန်ကီမွန်းနှင့် ၂၀၂၃ ခုနှစ် ဧပြီလ ၂၇ ရက် က အွန်လိုင်းမှတဆင့် တွေ့ဆုံ ဆွေးနွေးခဲ့ပါသည်။ ၂။ အစည်းအဝေးတွင် မကြာသေးမီက မြန်မာနိုင်ငံသို့ လာရောက်ခဲ့သည့် မစ္စတာဘန်ကီမွန်း၏ ခရီးစဉ်နှင့်ပတ်သက်၍ အဓိကထားဆွေးနွေးခဲ့ကြပြီး၊ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၏ လက်ရှိ ရင်ဆိုင်နေရသည့် အကျပ် အတည်းများကို ထိရောက်စွာ ကိုင်တွယ်ဖြေရှင်းနိုင်ရန် ရှေ့ဆက်လုပ်ဆောင်နိုင်မည့် နည်းလမ်းများနှင့် စပ်လျဉ်း၍ အမြင်များ ဖလှယ်ဆွေးနွေးခဲ့ကြပါသည်။ ၃။ မစ္စတာ ဘန်ကီမွန်း က “အကြမ်းဖက်မှုများအား အဆုံးသတ်ရန် လမ်းကြောင်း” ရှာဖွေမှုမှာ အရေးပါကြောင်းနှင့် “ရေရှည်တည်တံ့သော အဖြေတစ်ခုကိုရရှိရေး၌ အမျိုးသား ညီညွတ်ရေး အစိုးရအပါအဝင် ပါဝင်သည့် အစုအဖွဲ့အားလုံး၏ အခန်းကဏ္ဍမှာ အရေးပါကြောင်း” စသည် တို့ကို ထောက်ပြပြောဆိုသည့်အပေါ် ဒုတိယဝန်ကြီး ဦးမိုးဇော်ဦးက ကျေးဇူးတင်ရှိပါကြောင်း ပြောကြားခဲ့ပါသည်။ ဆက်လက်၍ ဒုတိယဝန်ကြီးက မစ္စတာ ဘန်ကီမွန်း၏ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံခရီးစဉ်သည် ရည်ရွယ်ချက်မှန်ကန် ကောင်းမွန်သော်လည်း စစ်ကောင်စီက ယင်းခရီးစဉ်အား ၎င်း၏အကျိုးအတွက် အသုံးချရန် ကြိုးပမ်းမည်ကို စိုးရိမ်ကြောင်း ပြောကြားခဲ့ပါသည်။ ထို့ကြောင့် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံသို့ ထပ်မံသွားရောက်မည့် ခရီးစဉ်များရှိပါက အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ အပါအဝင် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံမှ အရေးပါသော သက်ဆိုင်သူများနှင့် တိုင်ပင်ဆွေးနွေးမှုများ လုပ်ဆောင်ရန် မေတ္တာရပ်ခံခဲ့ပါသည်။ စစ်ကောင်စီအနေဖြင့် ရွေးကောက်ပွဲများ ကျင်းပရန် အခွင့်မရှိ သကဲ့သို့၊ ရွေးကောက်ပွဲများ ကျင်းပမည်ဆိုပါကလည်း မြန်မာနိုင်ငံရှိ သက်ဆိုင်သူများအားလုံးနှင့် တိုင်းရင်းသား အဖွဲ့အားလုံးက လက်ခံနိုင်မည့် အသစ် ရေးဆွဲထားသော ဖွဲ့စည်းပုံ အခြေခံဥပဒေအရသာ ကျင်းပ ပြုလုပ်ရမည် ဖြစ်ကြောင်းလည်း ဒုတိယဝန်ကြီးက ထောက်ပြပြောဆို ခဲ့ပါသည်။ ထို့ပြင် အာဆီယံဘုံသဘောတူညီချက် (၅)ရပ်နှင့် လုံခြုံရေးကောင်စီ ဆုံးဖြတ်ချက် အမှတ် (၂၆၆၉) တို့အား လိုက်နာရန် ပျက်ကွက်သည့် စစ်ကောင်စီအပေါ် နိုင်ငံတကာ အသိုင်းအဝိုင်းအနေဖြင့် ပို၍ ဝိုင်းဝန်း ဖိအားပေးမှုနှင့် အရေးယူ ပိတ်ဆို့မှုများ လုပ်ဆောင်ရန် လိုအပ်ကြောင်းစသဖြင့် ဒုတိယဝန်ကြီးက အလေးပေး ပြောကြားခဲ့ ပါသည်။ ၄။ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၌ လက်ရှိဖြစ်ပေါ်နေသော အကျပ်အတည်းများအား ဖြေရှင်းနိုင်ရန်အတွက် ဖြစ်နိုင် ချေရှိသည့်လမ်းကြောင်းများနှင့်စပ်လျဉ်း၍ ဆွေးနွေးမှုများ ဆက်လက်လုပ်ဆောင်နိုင်ရန်အတွက် ပူးပေါင်း ဆောင်ရွက်မှု ဆက်ဆံရေးတစ်ရပ် တည်ဆောက်သွားကြမည်ဟူသော သဘောတူညီချက်ဖြင့် တွေ့ဆုံမှုအား အဆုံးသတ်ခဲ့ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher: Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Myanmar - NUG
Date of entry/update: 2023-04-30
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Title: UN expert urges Japan to step up pressure on Myanmar junta
Description: "TOKYO/GENEVA (28 April 2023) – A UN expert today urged the Japanese government to assume a greater leadership role to address the deteriorating crisis in Myanmar and step up pressure on the country’s military junta. “The international community’s response to the crisis in Myanmar is failing, and that failure has contributed to a lethal downward spiral that is devastating the lives of millions of people”, said Tom Andrews, UN Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in Myanmar at the end of a 10-day official visit to Japan. “I came to Japan because I believe that this country has an essential role to play in resolving the crisis,” Andrews said. “Japan’s leadership will be vital in recalibrating a failing international response to the crisis,” he said. The UN expert called on Japan to work with regional and global allies to weaken the capacity of Myanmar’s military junta to attack its citizens. In a statement (also in Japanese) delivered at the end of his visit, the Special Rapporteur raised the alarm about an impending humanitarian disaster in the Rohingya refugee camps in Bangladesh. Without immediate additional funding, a decision to cut food rations by an additional 20% will be made in the next few weeks, reducing food rations to 27 cents per person per day. The cuts would also potentially eliminate food rations completely for hundreds of thousands. “This is an emergency. Further cuts will leave the Rohingya, already victims of genocidal attacks in Myanmar, at risk of starvation and drive thousands into boats and dangerous land routes in utter desperation,” Andrews warned. He called on the Government of Japan and all Member States to immediately increase humanitarian funding, including by redirecting funding from development programmes in Myanmar. Referring to the worsening situation in Myanmar, Andrews said Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, who has led the junta since the February 2021 coup, had responded to widespread opposition to their rule with barbarism and oppression against the people of Myanmar. “Arbitrary detention, torture and systematic attacks on villages have become hallmarks of the junta. The military is repeatedly attacking civilian populations throughout the country and has quite literally made war on the Myanmar people,” the expert said. He urged Japan to impose targeted economic sanctions on the Myanmar military and its key sources of funding, just as it is doing in response to the crisis in Ukraine. “Economic sanctions that deprive the junta of the resources required to operate its war-making machinery would weaken the capacity of the junta to attack its people,” Andrews said. The expert urged Japan to terminate a Ministry of Defence programme that continues to provide military training to military personnel from Myanmar, referencing credible reports linking previous trainees to military units that have committed atrocities against civilians. Andrews called on the Government of Japan to clearly and consistently renounce the junta’s plan to stage fraudulent national elections as a means of legitimising itself. “It is not possible to hold a genuine election when opposition leaders are arrested, detained, tortured and executed; when key political parties have been dissolved; when it is illegal to criticise the junta; and when journalists are imprisoned for doing their job,” he said. The Special Rapporteur highlighted the upcoming G7 Summit in Hiroshima as an opportunity for Japan to shine a light on the situation in Myanmar before the world. “I urge Prime Minister Kishida to ensure that the Myanmar crisis is high on the G7 agenda and that a strong, unified message and action on Myanmar emerges from the Summit,” the expert said. Mr. Thomas Andrews (United States of America) is the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar. A former member of the US Congress from Maine, Andrews is a Robina Senior Human Rights Fellow at Yale Law School and an Associate of Harvard University’s Asia Center. He has worked with the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs and parliamentarians, NGOs and political parties in Cambodia, Indonesia, Algeria, Croatia, Serbia, Ukraine and Yemen. He has been a consultant for the National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma and the Euro-Burma Network and has run advocacy NGOs including Win Without War and United to End Genocide. The Special Rapporteurs are part of what is known as the Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council. Comprising the largest body of independent experts in the UN Human Rights system, Special Procedures is the general name of the Council's independent fact-finding and monitoring mechanisms that address either specific country situations or thematic issues in all parts of the world. Special Procedures experts work on a voluntary basis; they are not UN staff and do not receive a salary for their work. They are independent from any government or organization and serve in their individual capacity..."
Source/publisher: Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (Geneva)
Date of entry/update: 2023-04-28
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Title: Misinformation, Hate Speech and Ethno-Religious Tensions in Myanmar
Sub-title: A recent massacre reveals how intercommunal grievances can be exploited to undermine national cohesion against the junta.
Description: "In Myanmar, interethnic tensions have improved in the post-coup era as more and more resistance leaders join the call to fight the junta. This shared opposition to military rule has left many people hopeful for the prospect of broader national cohesion in a country that has been beset by various civil and ethnic conflicts for decades. But this moment of national cohesion can also obscure the complex histories and intercommunal grievances that remain unresolved — and a recent massacre in Southern Shan State demonstrates that the military’s violence still has the power to sow discord among a fragmented resistance movement. While evidence clearly pointed toward the junta as the perpetrators of the March 11 massacre, a flood of misinformation and hate speech in the aftermath inflamed local ethno-religious tensions between the region’s Pa-O and Karenni ethnic groups. With a disparate array of resistance groups and actors still formulating a coordinated system for fighting the junta, intercommunal flashpoints like the recent massacre have the potential to derail this fragile coalition and allow the military to divide their opposition. The Nam nein Massacre On March 11, 21 civilians were murdered at Nam nein monastery in Pinlaung township. The victims included a woman, three Buddhist monks and 18 men — all of whom were horrifically tortured before being shot and killed. The day after the massacre, graphic photos from Nam nein circulated on a Telegram channel of junta supporters. The captions praised the Myanmar military for supposedly killing members of the Karenni People’s Defense Forces — the constellation of local armed resistance groups. Although the captions identified the dead as armed combatants, closer inspection clearly showed that they were civilians, and that guns had been planted to make them appear armed post-massacre. On March 14, the military doubled down on the lie, with Major General Zaw Min Tun telling a military media outlet that Myanmar military columns had seized dead bodies and arms at Nam nein, offering clear evidence that the Myanmar military was responsible for this massacre. Key resistance stakeholders from the region — including the Karenni National Defense Force (KNDF), Pa-O National Defense Force, Pa-O National Liberation Organization and the Southern Shan Local Revolution Union — all released statements condemning the violence. Additionally, the National Unity Government, Karenni State Consultative Council and Pa-O National Federal Council issued a joint statement condemning the massacre by the military while pledging justice for the victims and their families. Hate Speech and Misinformation in the Aftermath Despite evidence clearly showing that the Myanmar military was the perpetrator, and broad condemnation from resistance organizations, the junta-aligned Pa-O National Organization (PNO) accused the KNDF of the killing. By disseminating misinformation and hate speech in the immediate aftermath, the military-aligned PNO sought to sow ethno-religious discord between the Buddhist Pa-O community and Christian Karenni community. Just days after the massacre, the PNO organized a rally of 20,000 people denouncing the KNDF and circulated pamphlets with images of the deceased and burning villages. The PNO led chants including “media conceals true news — don’t want” and “terrorists who unlawfully steal the Pa-O people’s properties — don’t want.” Under the hot sun, a Pa-O monk spoke to the rally and characterized the Karenni people as a lower race, describing the KNDF and the Peoples’ Defense Forces broadly as worse than the Islamic State. Another Pa-O monk called for the burning of Karenni villages if the KNDF did not stop the alleged violence, declaring: “They say it is not a religious war. But our three monks have died. And they say it is not a racial war. But all the people [who] died were our Pa-O people. All the burned villages were our Pa-O villages.” These alarming speeches carried themes of ethnic hierarchy, Buddhist nationalism and zealous hatred. Ethno-religious violence in Southern Shan State and Karenni State is rare, especially when compared to the horrific incidents of intercommunal violence in places like Rakhine State and Meiktila. But there are latent tensions in Southern Shan State and neighbouring Karenni State that could be triggered at any time. The massacre in Nam nein and the ensuing misinformation effort could be the spark to ignite these latent tensions and fracture the fragile resistance movement. This fragility remains salient as the Myanmar military and its proxy militias such as the PNO have recently expanded their offensive into Pa-O territory. Reconciling Historical Ethno-Religious Divides The current tensions between the Buddhist Pa-O and the Christian Karenni are recent developments in the conflict landscape. But they represent larger religious tensions that far pre-date the 2021 coup. Myanmar has an infamous history of horrific ethnic discrimination, such as the dehumanizing treatment of the Rohingya. Cases of hate speech have been associated with ethnic mob violence such as the 2014 riots in Mandalay, and data analysis from 2015 measured high levels of ethnic and religious intolerance across Myanmar. In the middle of this are the Christian Karenni, who represent a multi-faceted minority that has long-struggled to achieve political rights and has long-endured violence from the Myanmar military. Buddhist majority governance institutions have long operated discriminatory practices toward religious minorities, and the military junta has a significant relationship with the rise of Buddhist nationalism. This makes the use of Buddhist nationalist language among non-military actors, like the rally organized by the PNO, of particular concern, and such instances should be closely observed as the fragmented resistance movement tries to coalesce. The situation has improved somewhat since the 2021 coup, as public opinion surveys conducted on Facebook indicate broadly improved perceptions of different ethnic groups, particularly the Rohingya — and especially among young people. But while improvements in interethnic relations and perceptions are encouraging, the PNO rallies around Nam nein remind us of the complexity of intercommunal dynamics. It’s also important to note when referencing post-coup public opinion data, that the surveys are often restricted to the few areas with internet access, limiting the ability to capture a sample representative of the public writ large. Further, public perception of the Myanmar military’s violence has serious implications for national cohesion. When the military’s violence is framed as a shared threat among different ethnic groups, this actually can — somewhat counterintuitively — increase negative perceptions of other ethnic groups. The Nam nien massacre and its aftermath is a stark reminder of this complex reality. The discussions around national cohesion against the junta undoubtedly inspire hope. Even more, unity among the resistance will be necessary for the pro-democracy movement to prevail in the conflict. But we should avoid making blanket assessments of complex questions regarding identity, grief and loss, as this can only weaken our understanding of the conflict. Combatting Hate Speech and Misinformation In the near term, combating hate speech and misinformation while navigating complex histories of inter-communal violence is important for maintaining support for the resistance. And in the long term, successfully addressing these challenges will offer a strong foundation for building an inclusive federal democracy. In Southern Shan State, the international community should coordinate with local Pa-O and Karenni organizations to provide humanitarian support for those displaced by violence. Pa-O and Karenni civil society and religious organizations should utilize their influential roles to coordinate campaigns against hate speech and misinformation and to promote stronger ties among their community. Further, Facebook’s parent company, Meta, should take comprehensive action to remove hate speech and misinformation on the site, as social media represents a major avenue through which these kinds of intercommunal tensions are sparked. More broadly, the international community and resistance movement should remain vigilant to on-going patterns of hate speech and misinformation and their potential to exacerbate inter-communal tensions amid the war. Long-term actions to combat them could include the following: The promotion of digital literacy, especially in remote and rural areas, to strengthen the capacity of the public to identify hate speech and misinformation. The establishment of an independent investigation team to secure justice. This could be done by the National Unity Government, in close coordination with local civil society organizations representing both the Pa-O and Karenni communities, to serve as a fact-finding mission and as a reconciliation opportunity through intercommunal dialogue. Right now, the trading of accusations and one-sided statements causes more harm than good, as the Nam nein massacre shows. Resistance actors should engage with other Pa-O actors, not only the resistance-aligned Pa-O organizations like the Pa-O National Federal Council, to reduce further polarization and to search for common ground. For example, while the PNO is roughly aligned with the junta, the PNO has no official or rigid policy for engagement, meaning that there is room for possible dialogue going forward. The international community should look for entry points to support justice and peace in the region. In so doing, inclusiveness and transparency should be prioritized to avoid further division and distrust among or between any groups. Areas of support can include transitional justice or development in the region. Narratives that manipulate the military’s violence to sow division and hatred must be taken seriously. This is the moment when Myanmar needs to build national cohesion across historically divided peoples — not just for the sake of consolidating the country’s various resistance groups, but to lay the groundwork for a peaceful democratic future. .."
Source/publisher: United States Institute of Peace
Date of entry/update: 2023-04-27
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Title: Q&A: Ban Ki-moon’s Unannounced Myanmar Peace Trip Draws Questions
Description: "WASHINGTON — This week former United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon went on an unannounced trip to Myanmar, where he met with the country’s military rulers and urged them to find a peaceful resolution to their more than two-year-old violent political crisis. The statement released about his visit did not say if he met with any opposition leaders, which a member of Myanmar’s opposition National Unity Government criticized in an interview with The Associated Press. Nay Phone Latt, an NUG spokesperson, said international leaders should not meet with the leaders of what he called the country’s “terrorist army.” “If they want to solve the problem of Myanmar, it is important not to ignore the will of the people,” he told AP. For more about Ban’s visit and the effort to find a peaceful resolution in Myanmar, VOA spoke with Chris Sidoti, who was a member of the U.N. Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar from 2017 to 2019. More recently he has formed, along with two other former U.N. experts, the Special Advisory Council for Myanmar, which describes itself as an international group working for human rights, peace, democracy and accountability in Myanmar. This interview has been edited for length and clarity. VOA: What is your initial reaction to Ban Ki-moon’s surprise visit to Myanmar? Chris Sidoti, member of the Special Advisory Council for Myanmar: Well, it was a surprise. It's been known for a while that Ban Ki-moon, on behalf of the Elders, the organization of which he is deputy chair, was keen to go to Myanmar. But there was no indication that the visit had been accepted by the military there, or that it was about to take place. So it was a surprise when it happened. Initial reaction on my part was very much wait and see; it's very hard at this stage to react to the visit as to whether it was worthwhile or not. Because at this point, we don't know very much about it. Mr. Ban has issued, or the Elders have issued on his behalf, a statement about the mission. And in that statement, it indicated what Ban Ki-moon had said to the general, but there was no indication of what the general had said to Ban Ki-moon. So it's very difficult to know - in fact, it's impossible to know at this stage - whether the visit was worthwhile or not, whether it accomplished anything at all, and whether it will achieve its principal purpose of bringing an end to the violence. So we all wait and see. VOA: Why do you think Senior General Min Aung Hlaing invited the former secretary-general to Myanmar during this time of increasing violence? Sidoti: There are a couple of possible explanations. But in the end, we don't know. The possible explanations are that on the one hand, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing might be feeling increasingly isolated and sees a need to attempt to reach out to the international community to show some willingness to engage. Because to date, he has not shown any willingness whatsoever to engage with anybody, not even ASEAN, the primary alliance in which Myanmar is a member. It may be that there is some connection with the obligation of Myanmar to report to the International Court of Justice by around the 24th of May on its implementation of the court's orders in the genocide case. The military tried to postpone the next report until next year. But the International Court of Justice only last week refused that application and ruled that Myanmar must issue its report by the 24th of May. So it could be that Min Aung Hlaing simply wanted to have something positive to say in that report. But this is all speculation. Ultimately, we don't know. Whatever his motives are, however, whether the visit was worthwhile or not will only be able to be judged on the basis of what results are produced. No matter what the general’s motivation was, he has to respond and respond positively to Ban Ki-moon's demand that there be a cessation of the violence for him to get any credit out of this visit at all. VOA: The Myanmar junta focuses on holding elections. Opposition groups like the NUG don't accept the elections, calling them illegitimate. What is your view on the possibility of legitimate elections, given the current environment in Myanmar? Sidoti: Legitimate elections under the junta are absolutely impossible. There are no conceivable circumstances in which free and fair and legitimate and acceptable elections can be held under the junta. It's as simple as that. And that's why, really, they have eased off their preparations for the elections. Originally, they were talking about holding an election in August. But then in February, they extended the state of emergency, and they can't hold an election while the state of emergency is continuing. And just before that, Min Aung Hlaing himself, the head of the junta, acknowledged that the junta controlled less than half the country and was not able, therefore, to conduct elections in more than half the country. So it's absolutely impossible for elections to be held. And although the military is continuing some measure of preparation for the elections, I don't anticipate we will see any attempt to hold an election this year. And indeed, waiting to next year, the military will continue to find it impossible to hold an election that is going to be free and fair and internationally accepted. VOA: We have the ASEAN five-point consensus and the U.N. Security Council's resolution on Myanmar. But we haven't seen implementation of any of these by the junta. The Special Advisory Council on Myanmar has called for more pressure on the military regime to end violence. The NUG has called for anti-aircraft weapons and alarm systems to prevent attacks on civilians. Do you think there is support for that in the international community? Sidoti: The international community has been very slow to provide support for the democratic movement in Myanmar, beyond rhetoric, beyond words, and this is a tragedy. The NUG is calling for defensive weapons. I don't see any prospect at the moment of that being responded to by other countries. But there is much that the international system can do short of providing weaponry. The United Nations itself and ASEAN itself have been notable failures in their commitment to resolving the Myanmar situation. Yes, there is a five-point consensus. Yes, there was a Security Council resolution last December. Both were very positive moves. But both fell far short of what is required. I'm afraid that the Myanmar situation condemns the ineffectiveness of ASEAN and the United Nations. The reputation of these two international organizations is on the line in relation to Myanmar. There is much to be done short of providing weapons, but to date, the U.N., ASEAN and other states have not been prepared to do it..."
Source/publisher: "VOA" (Washington, D.C)
Date of entry/update: 2023-04-27
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Title: Attacks on Health Care in Myanmar (22 March - 04 April 2023)
Description: "Past incident reports: 22 March-04 April; 08-21 March; 22 February-07 March; 08-21 February; All. Past analysis reports: April and September 2022; 1 February 2021 to 10 January 2022; 1 January to 31 March 2022. Join our Myanmar mailing list for regular updates. Visit our website. Follow us on Twitter. If you have additional information on an incident documented here, or a new incident, please get in touch. Help support the protection of health care by sharing this resource. Please copy and paste this link: bit.ly/05-18Apr2023MMRHealth Documented incidents Myanmar 05 April 2023: In Si Thar village and village tract, Shwegu township, Bhamo district, Kachin state, the rural health centre and station hospital, a school and 20 civilian houses were damaged during the air strikes and ground attacks by the Myanmar military. No casualties were reported. Sources: Khit Thit Media, Mandalay Free Press, and Telegram 05 April 2023: In Pakokku town, township and district, Magway region, junta security forces arrested a male civilian for allegedly providing medicines to the local resistance forces. Source: Telegram 06 April 2023: In Mingaladon town and township, Yangon (North) district, Yangon region, at the military airbase in the compound of Yangon International Airport, a military clinic building was burnt and damaged in a handmade electroshock rocket missile attack by the local resistance forces. Source: Irrawaddy As reported on 06 April 2023: In Rakhine state, it has been over eight months the junta has restricted the transport of medicines into and within the state, with an alleged intention to block the access to the Arakan Army to medicine supplies. The blockade impacted civilians. To obtain an approval for the transport of medicines for one time, up to 1,400 USD bribery was required. Source: Narinjara 06 April 2023: In Ah Lel Seik village and village tract, Indaw township, Katha district, Sagaing region, the Myanmar military seized medical and surgical supplies from a civilian house with an alleged reason of health care provision to the local resistance forces. Source: Telegram 07 April 2023: At an undisclosed location in Kayah state, two medical rescue team members were killed during Myanmar military airstrikes. Sources: Chindwin News Agency and Facebook 08 April 2023: In Ta Laing village and village tract, Sagaing township, district, and region, the roof and walls of a rural health centre were damaged during airstrikes by the Myanmar military. The Myanmar military land force destroyed medicines and instruments in the clinic. A school building and 10 civilian houses were also damaged, and three female and two male civilians at the clinic were injured. The junta claimed that the attacks targeted the base camp of local resistance forces, and that they seized weapons from the school building. Sources: Facebook, Mandalay Free Press and Telegram..."
Source/publisher: Insecurity Insight (Geneva) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of entry/update: 2023-04-26
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Title: Proposed Inclusive Humanitarian Forum for Myanmar Should Not Include ASEAN
Description: "The IHF is an issue for the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) Summit in Jakarta on May 5-12 and one of the main concerns is the involvement of ASEAN Humanitarian Assistance Center on Disaster Management (AHA) in the delivery of aid in Myanmar. It is clear that it has neither the experience nor the capacity to deliver the aid, and most importantly, it includes representatives of the junta and is inevitably going to work with the State Administration Council (SAC). This means that not only will aid be inefficiently delivered, but the SAC will also weaponize aid and use it for its own strategic and political advantage whilst depriving the majority of the country, which is controlled by the resistance, from receiving aid. I have heard that United Nations Organization for Coordination of Humanitarian Aid (UNOCHA) and Indonesia want the AHA to take the lead. The National Unity Government (NUG), ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) and civil society organizations (CSOs) involved in the IHF strongly disagree with AHA involvement. The objective of the IHF, which was proposed by the NUG and EAOs, is to find new channels to deliver aid to those seriously affected by the war including those in NUG and EAO controlled areas. This will not happen if the aid is channeled through the AHA or the UN. The situation on the ground is that aid is urgently needed where the vast majority of those in need, such as IDPs, are located and if this doesn’t happen then it will have dire consequences for the whole region. As the UN has demonstrated, aid cannot be delivered to the neediest in non-junta-controlled areas. This is blatantly obvious and should not even need to be stated but the UN continues doing this. I believe the IHF has identified three options, of which only the third makes any sense. The first is that the SAC agrees to a humanitarian pause and allows free passage of aid in NUG and EAO areas via the IHF. This is of course ridiculous and about as likely as a no-fly zone with a US aircraft carrier in the Bay of Bengal. Another option stated is that there is an agreement with donors and countries bordering Myanmar for cross border aid to EAO and NUG areas. This is not quite as ridiculous as the first option but bordering countries would not formally agree to this. India, China and Thailand have, so far, demonstrated their support for the junta. The final option discussed is the only feasible one, namely donors agree to an upscale aid delivered through local networks with a lot more flexibility concerning fund transfers, reporting and any other adaption of existing systems to ensure aid reaches the most in need in EAO and NUG areas quickly and without large overheads. In the IHF the obvious seems to be supported by the NUG, EAOs and CSOs but not by Indonesia and OCHA, who still want the AHA involved and taking the lead. One suspects this may be because of personal rather than humanitarian interests. Paul Greening is an ex-UN senior staff member with over 20 years’ experience in six Asian countries working for six UN agencies and four INGOs. He worked in Sittwe, Rakhine State for the IOM from 2017 to 2020 and since then has been involved in advocacy against the illegal attempted coup and supporting those who have suffered from it..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update: 2023-04-26
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Title: Time Is Running out for Indonesia to Turn the Tide on Myanmar
Sub-title: If Indonesia ends up the steward of ASEAN’s failure over Myanmar, Laos – the next chair – will be the gravedigger.
Description: "There are two ways of looking at Indonesia’s handling of the Myanmar crisis during its once-a-decade stint as ASEAN chair. Either Indonesia has been ASEAN chairman for only a few months so shouldn’t be blamed for having, so far, not come up with a meaningful policy on the Myanmar crisis. Or it only has eight months left as the chair and if it fails to devise a policy, the entire ASEAN-led response could crumble when it hands over the chairmanship next year to Laos, which is sure to steer the regional bloc down the path of greater acceptance of Myanmar’s military junta. Upon the handover, Jakarta needs to have in place more than something resembling a coherent policy toward Myanmar. There needs to be a gift-wrapped policy on which there’s so much accord among member states that Laos cannot walk it back. ASEAN’s policy must be able to sustain itself even when in the hands of the disinterested. Jakarta’s burden is considerable. Create a policy too tough on the junta and some other ASEAN states, who want the bloc to have nothing to do with the Myanmar crisis, won’t be on board. A policy that is too forceful also risks being jettisoned once Indonesian diplomats are no longer in charge. One too weak, though, would be meaningless. After a meeting of ASEAN foreign ministers in early February, Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi said they “reiterated the united approach” on Myanmar. Shayna Bauchner and Andreas Harsono of Human Rights Watch deemed this “a misguided cover falsely equating a diversified approach with weakness.” So far, it seems that Jakarta is favoring silent, backroom diplomacy, and could possibly unveil something later this year. It’s safe to assume that Laos, which takes up the regional chairmanship next year, is not in the least bit interested in democracy in Myanmar. The one-party, communist-run state is hermetic and parochial. It fundamentally believes in the principle of non-involvement in another member state’s affairs. Along with like-minded Thailand, Laos has been engaging with Myanmar’s military junta – formally titled the State Administration Council (SAC) – for some time. Enjoying this article? Click here to subscribe for full access. Just $5 a month. Laos will be the first immediate neighbor of Myanmar to hold the chair since the coup in early 2021. Vientiane is aware that the conflict next door could impact economic activity on their shared Mekong River, a hydropower bonanza for Laos. It knows an uptick in crime at home, which is causing political problems, stems from an explosion of drug activity in Myanmar. As such, Vientiane has every domestic reason to favor an end to the crisis next door (not necessarily the case for the past ASEAN chairs) and the easiest option, it probably reasons, is to help normalize the junta’s rule. In the aftermath of the military coup in February 2021, Vientiane made the blandest of bland statements. Speaking at a United Nations General Assembly session last September, Saleumxay Kommasith, Laos’ foreign minister, said his country “considers the role played by ASEAN as crucial in creating an environment conducive to a return to normalcy in Myanmar and we should continue to engage Myanmar so as to ensure the continuation of delivery of humanitarian assistance to the people of Myanmar and to explore ways and means to ensure Myanmar’s full and effective implementation of the Five-Point Consensus towards tangible outcomes.” One imagines that Saleumxay will become ASEAN’s special envoy to Myanmar next year, as the role tends to change hands along with the chair position – unless Indonesia can make the newly-created “special envoy office” a permanent fitting in Jakarta. Laos sits squarely in the engage-with-the-junta camp. On April 7, for instance, Prime Minister Sonexay Siphandone held a three-way meeting with Thai Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha and Min Aung Hlaing, Myanmar’s junta leader, about cross-border haze pollution. Laos took part in the Thai-led “informal” meeting with junta officials last December. And it reportedly participated in the (again) Thai-led then led “1.5 track dialogue” with Bangladesh, India, and junta representatives in March. A junta official represented Myanmar at the latest Mekong River Commission (MRC) summit in Vientiane this month. The latest “State of Southeast Asia” report, a survey of “elite” opinion published annually by the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, posed several questions about how ASEAN should move forward on the Myanmar crisis. Just 1.9 percent of Loatian elites wanted the bloc “to utilize harder methods to effectively curtail the SAC,” well below the regional average of 18 percent. Some 2.8 percent of Laotian elites said Myanmar should be expelled from ASEAN, again the lowest in the region. The majority (43 percent) said ASEAN shouldn’t interfere, well above the regional average. Vientiane will also be influenced by its main partners. China, its main economic patron, is increasingly siding with the junta in Myanmar. Vietnam, another economic partner, wants to have nothing to do with this crisis. Thailand has shown that it prefers close engagement with the junta, although that might change after a general election next month. Laos has improved ties with Russia over the past year or so, and Moscow is firmly on the side of the junta. Also worth mentioning, Laos is rather distant from Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia, the regional states that purportedly want to develop a more robust ASEAN approach to the crisis. And it is arguably the Southeast Asian state with the least developed ties to Western democracies, which will limit their ability to lobby ASEAN for a response that focuses on democracy and human rights. It’s inconceivable that the junta in Naypyidaw hasn’t partly factored Laos’ chairmanship of ASEAN into its thinking. After all, Laos has already held two national steering committee meetings to prepare for the handover, and spoke about it with Chinese officials on Saleumxay’s recent visit to Beijing. If the junta goes ahead with its plans to hold “elections” this year (which may or may not happen) that would exert even more pressure on Laos, once ASEAN chair, to accept the military’s rule as fait accompli. There cannot be another wasted year; waiting until Malaysia takes the chair in 2025 will be too late. That ought to focus minds in Jakarta, as well as in the rest of the world. It’s the next eight months or nothing. If nothing, Indonesia will be the steward of ASEAN’s failure. Laos will be the gravedigger..."
Source/publisher: "The Diplomat" (Japan)
Date of entry/update: 2023-04-26
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Title: Ban Ki-moon calls for an urgent change of direction in Myanmar
Description: "Media Release: Ban Ki-moon meets military leaders in Myanmar and calls for an immediate cessation of violence and implementation of ASEAN's Five-Point Consensus Ban Ki-moon, Deputy Chair of The Elders and former Secretary-General of the United Nations, visited Myanmar on 23-24 April 2023, to find a path to an end to violence and establishing a peaceful, democratic, inclusive and legitimate government. He met Myanmar’s military leaders and former President Thein Sein to discuss the situation, and emphasised the importance of all parties playing a role in securing a lasting solution, including the National Unity Government. "I came to Myanmar to urge the military to adopt an immediate cessation of violence, and start constructive dialogue among all parties concerned,” Ban Ki-moon said. “My meetings were exploratory. I will do all I can to help the people of Myanmar secure the peace, prosperity and freedom they deserve.” The visit was at the invitation of the Myanmar military. In his meetings in Naypyidaw, Ban Ki-moon stressed the urgency of making progress on implementation of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Five-Point Consensus and last December’s United Nations Security Council Resolution 2669. He supported the international community’s calls for the immediate release by the Myanmar military of all arbitrarily detained prisoners, for constructive dialogue, and for utmost restraint from all parties. Ban Ki-moon reiterated the strong international condemnation of the recent military air strike in Sagaing region, which is estimated to have killed more than 160 civilians, including women and children. He warned that elections must only be held when conditions are in place for them to be free and fair. Holding elections under current conditions risks further violence and division, and the results not being recognised by the people of Myanmar, ASEAN and the wider international community. Support for a full transition to democracy and civilian rule has been a feature of The Elders’ engagement with Myanmar over the past decade, and Ban Ki-moon has a personal history of supporting Myanmar’s progress when UN Secretary-General. " “ASEAN Member States and the wider international community need to show unity and resolve in their commitment to peace and democracy in Myanmar, which is a source of serious international concern. With patient determination, I believe a way forward can be found out of the current crisis. The military must take the first steps”, Ban Ki-moon said...
Source/publisher: The Elders
Date of entry/update: 2023-04-25
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Title: ASEAN must take stronger stance beyond Five-Point Consensus, Southeast Asian MPs say
Description: "On the two-year anniversary of the Five-Point Consensus, lawmakers from Southeast Asia call on ASEAN to acknowledge that the Consensus signed in April 2021 has failed miserably and that the Myanmar junta led by Senior General Min Aung Hlaing should not to be trusted to fulfill the obligations outlined in the proposed agreement. “The recent airstrikes in the Sagaing region, which killed hundreds of civilians, including children, are further evidence that the Myanmar junta is completely unwilling and incapable of adhering to the Five-Point Consensus,” ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights (APHR) Chair and member of the Indonesian House of Representatives Mercy Barends said today. “If ASEAN insists on sticking to an agreement that has proven to be utterly ineffective then it is complicit in the ongoing crimes and atrocities of the junta.” On April 24, 2021, the leaders of nine ASEAN member states and Myanmar junta chief, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, agreed to the following five points: an immediate end to violence in the country; dialogue among all parties; the appointment of a special envoy; humanitarian assistance by ASEAN; and the special envoy’s visit to Myanmar to meet with all parties. The International Parliamentary Inquiry into the global response to the Myanmar coup (IPI), which was organized by APHR, indicated in its final report in November 2022, “it is clear that the FIve-Point Consensus has failed, and a new mode of engagement is needed in its place.” As one witness noted in their testimony to the IPI, from the start, it was “thoroughly clear that Min Aung Hlaing was insincere in signing it and had no intention of following it.” The Consensus’ first point on the cessation of violence has been blatantly ignored by the junta, as evidenced by the ongoing airstrikes and malicious attacks against unarmed civilians. Meanwhile, ASEAN’s intention to provide humanitarian aid, as noted in the IPI report, has been “stymied by a lack of resources and genuine commitment.” The ASEAN Special Envoy position has also proven to be ineffective, especially since it changes along with the ASEAN chair. “ASEAN’s weak-willed approach toward the junta is a complete disgrace. Even after it finally criticized the junta’s airstrikes in Sagaing, the ASEAN Secretary-General still met with the junta’s permanent representative to ASEAN, making any statement of condemnation little more than lip service,” said APHR Co-chair and former Malaysian member of parliament Charles Santiago. “Indonesia’s ‘soft-diplomacy’ approach as ASEAN chair has also yet to yield results and must be urgently reevaluated. Indonesia must take a stronger stance and be transparent on how they are addressing the Myanmar crisis, especially given the limited amount of time left in their chairmanship.” In a roundtable discussion at the Indonesian House of Representatives in Jakarta on March 3, dozens of parliamentarians from several Southeast Asian countries urged ASEAN and the international community at large to take swift and concrete action against the illegal military junta led by Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, and provide real assistance to the pro-democracy forces in Myanmar, including by recognizing the National Unity Government (NUG) and having open and public negotiations that include the NUG, ethnic groups, and other pro-democracy forces. “ASEAN needs to live up to its role as a regional mediator and it needs to do so immediately, starting with Indonesia as chair. Closed-door and informal meetings are no longer enough,” said Santiago. “It is clear that ASEAN needs to negotiate a new agreement that includes the National Unity Government and the representatives of ethnic minorities while providing clear enforcement mechanisms to ensure that the agreement is upheld.”..."
Source/publisher: ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights
Date of entry/update: 2023-04-24
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Title: Celebrating Manau in Northeast India
Description: "From February 12 to 15, hundreds of people gathered in Bordumsa, a village in the Changlang district of northeast India’s Arunachal Pradesh, to celebrate Manau, a Kachin traditional festival. Women in bright, diamond-patterned outfits jingling with silver neck and waist ornaments lined up next to sword-bearing men in longyis and tasseled headbands. Twice a day, they sang and danced in spirals around a set of colorful pillars that serve as a Kachin cultural icon. Manau carries deep cultural significance for Kachin people, but in Myanmar, its celebration has been overshadowed by war since the collapse of a seventeen-year ceasefire between the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) and military in 2011. The ensuing clashes displaced more than 100,000 people, leading many Kachins in Myanmar to boycott the event ever since. This war has only intensified since the February 2021 military coup, pushing the prospects of a festive Manau within the country even farther into the distance. But the Kachin ethnic identity goes beyond international borderlines and has managed to endure these upheavals in northeast India, where a small Kachin community known as Singphos has kept the tradition going Singphos, together with Jinghpaws in Myanmar, make up the largest of six major Kachin tribes along with Lachik, Lawngwaw, Lisu, Rawang and Zaiwa, and like many ethnic groups, their identity predates colonial borders. Kachin people began migrating westward from the Hukawng valley, Sumpi Yang and Putao regions of today’s northern Myanmar in the 16th and 17th centuries, according to Kachin linguist Langjaw Kyangying of Myitkyina. In Assam, they were some of the first people to take up tea cultivation, which remains a popular Singpho livelihood today. Recruited by the British Imperial Army, Singphos also played an active role in India’s struggle for independence. Singphos were first divided into a separate administrative territory from their Kachin kinfolk with the implementation of the Government of India and Government of Burma Acts in 1937. India’s independence from Britain in 1947 and Burma’s a year later further set the two communities on distinct historical paths. Today, Singphos are thought to number in the tens of thousands. Dispersed across the Changlang and Namsai districts of Arunachal Pradesh and the Tinsukia district of Assam state, they live closely with Tai Khamtis, a population known in Myanmar as Hkamti Shans. In Arunachal Pradesh, Singphos are listed among sixteen “scheduled tribes,” granting them certain protections under India’s constitution. Their Manau festival, named Shapawng Yawng after the legendary forefather of Kachin people, has been celebrated annually since 1985. Ten interviews conducted during a visit to this year’s festival and by phone suggest that it offers a rare opportunity to bring geographically-dispersed Kachin people together, and also serves as a vital means of cultural preservation. “As time goes on, some people don’t write their titles as Kachin. Some people intermarry, change their titles and forget their identities,” said Singdu Nong Marip Singpho, a former president of the Singpho Development Society, who like many Singphos uses his ethnic group as his surname. “Before, there were Singphos in different places, but we didn’t know each other and had no reason to gather together. But after forming this Singpho Development Society and organizing the Manau year by year, even if someone forgets what tribe they are, when they see the Manau, they remember.” Kachin folklore offers various legends to describe the origins of Manau, most of which trace the dance’s patterns to the flight of birds. According to a version printed in a Singpho Development Society pamphlet and recounted during two interviews, the dance was introduced to humans by a man named Mading Yau. As the legend goes, Mading Yau had the ability to understand the natural world but was poorly understood by his own community. Banished to a basket hanging from the branch of a banyan tree, he watched birds gather the tree’s fruit and learned their songs, language and flight patterns, which he later taught to the people. According to some versions of the legend, the dance represents the coming together of all the birds in the universe. Manau festivals traditionally commence with the sacrifice of a buffalo to ancestral spirits known as nat jaw. Although the practice continues in India, it has been abandoned in Myanmar, where most Kachins now follow Christianity. The dance encircles a set of four to twelve pillars, each decorated with its own pattern. Two lines led by Naushawng – men wearing robes and hornbill bird headdresses – move in swirling patterns, singing and dancing to music played on drums, gongs and wind instruments. Manau festivals can be held for a variety of purposes including to celebrate prosperity and appeal for further wealth, prepare for war, and celebrate wartime victory. According to Singdu Nong, the Shapawng Yawng festival incorporates several purposes. “We dance to remember our forefather Shapawng Yawng and ask for his blessings, wisdom, wealth and protection,” he said. In her 2005 doctoral thesis for the School of Oriental and African Studies, Dr. Mandy Sadan describes Manau festivals from before the British colonial era as “part of a deeply significant ritual system around which many aspects of socio-cultural and political structure cohered.” In her book Being and Becoming Kachin, published in 2013, she elaborates that these days-long festivals were most strongly defined by offerings to spirits and recitations of the genealogical origins of the host, performed by spirit-priests known as jaiwas. Held for reasons including to mark moments when lineages separated or when communities came together to affirm their kinship, these festivals also enabled Jinghpaw chiefs to consolidate their socio-political positions, according to Sadan. Her research found that between World War I and World War II, the role of Manau shifted, as British colonial administrators began organizing the festivals as a way to strengthen their relationships with Jinghpaw chiefs and headmen and to expand their reach in Upper Burma and the Kachin Hills. By the late 1920s, the British were also using Manau to announce key policies, and the festival’s animist traditions were increasingly overshadowed by its administrative functions. When Burma gained independence from Britain, the central government designated January 10 as Kachin State Day and began organizing Manau festivals in the state capital of Myitkyina to recognize it. Then in 1961, the KIO began its revolution for political autonomy and these events ceased. Instead, the KIO held a Manau festival in its territory to mark the outbreak of armed hostilities. According to Sadan, the festival was the first to explicitly celebrate a pan-Kachin, or Wunpawng, ethno-political identity representing six Kachin subgroups. With the signing of a ceasefire between the military and KIO in 1994, Kachin State Day festivals in Myitkyina resumed, at times attended by both the KIO and military as well as military-aligned KIO splinter groups. But in the years leading up to the ceasefire’s collapse in 2011, the military increasingly took control over these events – an act described by local media outlet Kachin Newsgroup as “akin to cultural genocide.” In February 2011, meanwhile, the KIO held its own Manau festival at its eastern regional headquarters of Mai Ja Yang to commemorate the 50th anniversary of Kachin Revolution Day. By this time, the military had restricted travel to KIO territory, and those attending the festival from areas under its administration had to take a circuitous route via China. War between the military and KIO resumed that June, and Kachin State Day festivals in Myitkyina have since seen a heavy military presence as well as strong opposition from Kachin civil society. At times, Kachin activists have instead used these Manau grounds to hold large protests against armed military offensives. As Manau festivals in Myanmar remain shrouded in controversy, Kachin populations in other countries have carried on the tradition. In the Dehong Dai and Jingpo Autonomous Prefecture of China’s Yunnan province, home to a significant community of Jinghpaw and Zaiwa-speaking people collectively recognized as Jingpo, the festival is known as Munao Zongge and is organized by the Chinese government. Now in its 39th year, it was most recently held this February and included 60,000 attendees according to Chinese state media. The festival is also celebrated in the village of Banmai Sammaki in Thailand’s Chiang Mai province. Established in the late 1970s by ex-KIO members, the village acquired official status in 1982. Shortly after, its residents began holding Manau festivals on the birthday of the late Thai king Bhumibol Adulyadej; the most recent of these festivals was held in 2018. India’s Shapawng Yawng festival, held every February, is organized by the Singpho Development Society. According to Singdu Nong, the festival enables Kachins across the India-Myanmar border to reconnect. “Even though we settled in different countries, we hold this Manau to remember that we are all of one blood,” he said. During this year’s festival, some of those in attendance were Jinghpaws from the Hukawng valley, many of whom are closely related to India’s Singphos. Along with vendors from Myanmar who came to sell souvenirs, they mostly traveled overland, briefly entering Sagaing region from the Hukawng valley before crossing the Pangsau pass. The mountainous border crossing is located on Ledo Road, constructed during World War II to enable the Western Allies to deliver support to China in its fight against Japan. Then, it was nicknamed “Hell Pass” for its difficult terrain. Today, although a bilateral agreement reached in 2018 between India and Myanmar allows local people to travel visa-free within 16 kilometers on either side of the border, travel further inland remains otherwise restricted to the public – with the exception of the Shapawng Yawng festival, when visitors from Myanmar can apply for a permit through Indian border authorities to attend the festival on the condition that they return immediately after. The festival saw particularly large participation from Myanmar for its 25th anniversary in 2009, when those who joined included jade tycoon Sutdu Yup Zau Hkawng. Two years later, however, the Kachin political context dramatically changed with the collapse of the KIO-military ceasefire; since the coup, fighting has further escalated amid a widespread armed uprising against the junta. According to Singdu Nong, such grand events as the 2009 festival are no longer possible due to a tightening of the issuance of border passes by Indian authorities. “The government is very strict about how many people are coming,” he said. “We used to formally invite hundreds of delegates [from Myanmar] with permission from the [Indian] government, but because of the political environment, this year we didn’t invite them. Even if we were to invite them, they wouldn’t have been able to come.” For Kachins from China and other countries, attending the festival is even harder due to a history of territorial disputes between India and China in the Tawang district of Arunachal Pradesh. Foreign nationals wishing to visit the state must apply for a Protected Area Permit through India’s Ministry of Home Affairs. Nnau Brang Nan, a lawyer from Innao, Arunachal Pradesh, described a situation in which Kachins and other ethnic nationalities whose populations span borders became “sandwiched” by geopolitics. Unable to legally visit his relatives in Myitkyina by crossing the land border, he is instead required to apply for a visa through the Myanmar embassy and fly into the country, while Kachin nationals living in Myanmar face a similar dilemma when visiting India. “We have been victimized as an ethnic border race – not only Kachins, but Chins, Nagas, [and other] Tibeto-Burman groups,” he said. “We have to go round and round…That feeling is very painful.” Kachins from Myanmar already living in India are more easily able to join the Manau festival. This year, around a dozen university students traveled from Shillong, the capital of northeastern India’s Meghalaya state, singing songs around a campfire late into the night with their Singpho peers. “After so many years being far away from our own community, this is the first time coming back and getting this vibe of Kachin. It is a very warm feeling,” said Tsam Rawng Seng Maji, who studies political science at North-Eastern Hill University. But he and others expressed concern that the Singpho cultural identity is disappearing. “My main wish is to be united with this Singhpo community and grow with the Singhpo community… [and for the] language and culture not to be erased or vanish,” said Mung Ran Awng, a physics student at the same university. Also joining the festival were a handful of Kachin missionaries from Myanmar who live in India. While the vast majority of Kachins in Myanmar are Christian, most Singphos practice a combination of Theravada Buddhism and the worship of ancestral spirits. Religion appears to be a somewhat sensitive issue between the two communities. “Even when hanging out with friends or visiting neighbors, we have to speak very carefully when the conversation goes to religious topics,” said Hka Tawm Maran, who runs a Kachin Baptist mission school in Inthem, Assam State. Still, she described a general understanding that has developed. “We cannot preach the gospel outside of the [school] compound, but we can practice our religion freely, because they understand that we are Christians and we are also doing our worship,” she said. Nnau Brang Nan, the lawyer from Innao, also said that the two communities were able to overcome their religious differences. “Here in India, we have no religious connections with Kachins in Burma, but the thing making us connected across the border is the culture, tradition, language and belongingness from Majoi Singra Bum,” he said, using the Kachin name for a mountain in today’s Tibet. In addition to its social functions, the Shapawng Yawng Manau festival has encouraged the sharing of Kachin traditions. In 1995, naushawng from Myanmar trained Singpho men to lead the dance. Then in 2009, Langjaw Kyangying, the Kachin linguist from Myitkyina, composed a song for the festival whose lyrics describe the westward migration of Kachin people into today’s northeast India. The festival’s keyboard player, Jau Lat Manje of Margherita, Assam State, studied under a keyboard player from Myanmar in 2018 and then on YouTube. “I was learning music since I was young, so I thought maybe I could try it,” he said. “Now it’s my responsibility. It’s been five years that I’ve been involved, and it feels great.” One role still lacking among India’s Singphos is a buffalo horn player, a rare skill across Kachin society. This year, Salang Magawng Awng joined the festival from Myitkyina, climbing a tall bamboo tower to play three melodies which helped direct the dance’s movements. In further efforts to promote Kachin culture and traditions, the Singpho Development Society organized competitions including in folk tale and essay writing, drawing, and dance. The latter was performed during nightly stage shows alongside singing and a fashion show featuring traditional costumes and talents. The main event on the last night was a performance by Anong Singpho, a Bollywood singer and songwriter who also composed the popular Kachin love song Yu Saalai. In an interview after his performance, he said he hopes to inspire other Singpho youth. “We have so many different kinds of people in our society. Some are good in sports, some are good in music, and some go in different directions – peer pressure, drugs, opium, anything which can harm them and harm their society,” he said. “I hope that some youngsters can take me as a role model.” He is now working on his second Singpho song – a particular challenge because like many Singpho youth, he is not fluent in the language. During the festival, youth from India and Myanmar often spoke English for this reason. Singphos are not alone: the government of Arunachal Pradesh counts 26 “major tribes” and 110 “sub tribes” in the state, each with its own language or dialect. In recent years, however, the state government has taken initiative to promote this diverse linguistic and cultural heritage. In 2022, it launched mother tongue instruction in eight languages alongside Hindi and English. Although Singpho was not among them, the chief minister invited all ethnic communities in the state to prepare textbooks in their mother tongue. The state government has also allocated funds toward the celebration of traditional festivals since 2020, and in January of this year, announced plans to build an Indigenous prayer hall in every district. “In Assam, we do not have facilities regarding our literature and the value of our identity, but in Arunachal…we have the opportunity to promote our culture, identity, language and literature,” said Singdu Nong..."
Source/publisher: "Tea Circle" (Myanmar)
Date of entry/update: 2023-04-24
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Title: ပြည်ထောင်စုသမ္မတမြန်မာနိုင်ငံတော် အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ ပြည်ထောင်စုဝန်ကြီးချုပ် မန်းဝင်းခိုင်သန်းက ချင်းကာကွယ်ရေးတပ်ဖွဲ (မင်းတပ်)၏ (၂) နှစ်ပြည့် တော်လှန်ရေးနေ့ အထိမ်းအမှတ်အခမ်းအနားသို ပေးပိုသည့် နှုတ်ခွန်းဆက်သဝဏ်လွှ
Description: "၁။ ယနေ့ကျရောက်သော ချင်းကာကွယ်ရေးတပ်ဖွဲ(မင်းတပ်)၏ (၂) နှစ်ပြည့် တော်လှန်ရေး နေ့ အခါသမယတွင် ချင်းကာကွယ်ရေးတပ်ဖွဲ(မင်းတပ်)အပါအဝင် ချင်းပြည်တစ်ခုလုံးရှိ နွေဦး တော်လှန်ရေး အင်အားစုများအားလုံး စိတ်၏ ကြံ့ခိုင်သန်စွမ်းခြင်း၊ ကိုယ်၏ကျန်းမာလုံခြုံခြင်းများ ပြည့်ဝကြပါစေကြောင်း ဆုမွန်ကောင်းတောင်းအပ်ပါသည်။ ၂။ ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ်၊ ဖေဖော်ဝါရီလ ၁ ရက်နေ့တွင် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီက နိုင်ငံတော် အာ ဏာကို လုယူသိမ်းပိုက်ပြီးနောက် ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ်၊ ဖေဖော်ဝါရီလ ၈ ရက်နေ့မှစတင်၍ ချင်းပြည်နယ်၊ မင်းတပ်မြိုနယ်အတွင်းရှိ ပြည်သူလူထု၊ တက္ကသိုလ် ကျောင်းသား/သူများနှင့် အရပ်ဘက်အဖွဲ အစည်းများသည် အာဏာသိမ်းမှုကို လက်မခံသည့်အတွက် အကြမ်းမဖက် ဆန္ဒထုတ်ဖော်ခြင်း၊ အစုအဖွဲအသီးသီးမှ ကိုယ်စားလှယ်များပါဝင်ပြီး မင်းတပ်ပြည်သူ့အုပ်ချုပ်ရေးအဖွဲကို ဖွဲစည်းနိုင် ခြင်းနှင့် ချင်းကာကွယ်ရေးတပ်ဖွဲ(မင်းတပ်)ကို ဖွဲစည်းနိုင်ခဲ့ခြင်းတိုဖြင့် နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေးဖြစ် စဉ်အတွင်း မင်းတပ်မြိုနယ်သည် စနစ်တကျ တဆင့်ပြီးတဆင့် ပါဝင်ဆောင်ရွက်ခဲ့သည်ကို တွေ့ ရှိရသည်။ ၃။ ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ်၊ ဧပြီလ၂၄ရက်နေ့တွင် မင်းတပ်မြိုရှိ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီတပ်ဖွဲ၏ ဖမ်း ဆီးချုပ်နှောင်ခံထားရသည့် ငြိမ်းချမ်းစွာ ဆန္ဒထုတ်ဖော်သူ မင်းတပ်ဒေသခံများအား ပြန်လွှတ် ပေးရန် ညှိနှိင်းမှုကို စစ်ကောင်စီဘက်မှ ကတိမတည်၊ ပျက်ကွက်ခဲ့ပြီးနောက် ချင်းကာကွယ်ရေးတပ်ဖွဲ(မင်းတပ်)က ၎င်းတိုအား စစ်ကောင်စီတပ်ဖွဲ၏ လက်ထဲမှ အောင်မြင်စွာ ကယ်ထုတ်နိုင်ခဲ့ သည်ကို အထိမ်းအမှတ်ပြုကာ တော်လှန်ရေးနေ့အဖြစ် သတ်မှတ်ခဲ့သည်ဟု သိရှိရပါသည်။ ၄။ ချင်းကာကွယ်ရေးတပ်ဖွဲ (မင်းတပ်)သည် ချင်းလူမျိုးများ၏ တူမီးတော်လှန်ရေးကို စတင်ခဲ့ သူများပင် ဖြစ်သည်။ ဤ(၂)နှစ်တာကာလအတွင်း မင်းတပ်မြိုနယ်ပြည်သူ့အုပ်ချုပ်ရေးအဖွဲ၏ ဦးဆောင်မှုအောက်၌ အုပ်ချုပ်ရေး၊ တရားစီရင်ရေး၊ ကာကွယ်ရေး၊ ပညာရေး၊ ကျန်းမာရေး၊ ကယ် ဆယ်ရေး၊ စိုက်ပျိုးမွေးမြူရေးအစရှိသော လုပ်ငန်းများကို တော်လှန်ရေးကာလလိုအပ်ချက်များ နှင့်အညီ ထူးခြားအောင်မြင်စွာ အကောင်အထည်ဖော် ဆောင်ရွက်နိုင်ခဲ့ခြင်းတိုအပြင် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ အရပ်ရပ်ရှိ နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေးအင်အားစုများ၏ လေးစားအားကျမှုကို ရရှိခဲ့သည့် ချင်းကာကွယ် ရေးတပ်ဖွဲ(မင်းတပ်)၏ ရဲစွမ်းသတ္တိနှင့် စွမ်းရည်ထက်မြက်သော တိုက်ပွဲဝင်ခဲ့မှုများကိုလည်း မှတ် တမ်းတင် ဂုဏ်ပြုသကဲ့သို၊ အသက်စွန့်သွားခဲ့ကြသည့် သူရဲကောင်းများကိုလည်း အလေးပြုအပ် ပါသည်။ ၅။ နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေး(၂)နှစ်တာအတွင်း မင်းတပ်မြိုနယ်အပါအဝင် ချင်းပြည်အနှံ၌ အကြမ်း ဖက် စစ်ကောင်စီတပ်ဖွဲဝင်များ၏ လူမဆန်သော ရက်စက်ကြမ်းကြုတ်မှုများကြောင့် ထိခိုက် သေဆုံး၊ နာကျင်ကြရသူ အရပ်သားပြည်သူများ၊ တပ်ဖွဲဝင်များ၏ ကျန်ရစ်သူမိသားစုဝင်များနှင့် ထပ်တူခံစားမိပါကြောင်း ဖော်ပြလိုပါသည်။ အထူးသဖြင့် ၂၀၂၃ ခုနှစ်၊ ဧပြီလ ၁၆ ရက်နေ့က မင်းတပ်မြိုနယ်၊ ပန်းပါကျေးရွာကို စစ်ကောင်စီ၏ လေကြောင်းတိုက်ခိုက်မှုကြောင့် အသက် (၄) နှစ်အရွယ် ကလေးငယ်တစ်ဦးအပါအဝင် အရပ်သား(၃)ဦးသေဆုံးခဲ့ရသည်ကိုလည်း အထူးဝမ်း နည်းကြေကွဲရပြီး ကျန်ရစ်သူမိသားစုဝင်များနှင့်ထပ်တူ ယူကြုံးမရဖြစ်ရပါသည်။ ၆။ . ယခုအချိန်တွင် မိမိတိုအနေဖြင့် လက်နက်ကိုင်တော်လှန်ရေးတစ်ရပ်ကို ဆင်နွဲနေကြခြင်း ဖြစ်သည့်အတွက် ထိခိုက်ပေးဆပ်ရမှုများကို မလွဲမရှောင်သာ ကြုံတွေ့ကြရမည်ဖြစ်သည်။ သို သော်လည်း မိမိတို၏ ရည်မှန်းချက် ပန်းတိုင်သိုရောက်သည်အထိ အချင်းချင်း ဖေးမယုံကြည်မှု၊ သစ္စာရှိမှု၊ စည်းလုံးညီညွတ်မှုတိုဖြင့် မဆုတ်မနစ် ဆက်လက် ချီတက်ကြရမည်ဖြစ်သည်။ ရန်သူ သည် မိမိတိုအား ဖျက်ဆီးရန် အချိန်နှင့်အမျှ နည်းလမ်းအမျိုးမျိုးဖြင့် ကြိုးပမ်းအားထုတ်လျှက်ရှိသည်ကို သတိကြီးစွာထားလျက် ဉာဏ်အမြော်အမြင်ရှိရှိ စည်းလုံးညီညွတ်စွာဖြင့် အောင်ပွဲရသည် အထိ ကြိုးပမ်းကြရမည် ဖြစ်ပါသည်။ ၇။ ဤနွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေး(၂)နှစ်တာကာလအတွင်း ချင်းပြည်တပ်ဦး၌ ချင်းကာကွယ်ရေး တပ်ဖွဲ(မင်းတပ်)၏ ခိုင်မာပြတ်သားသော တော်လှန်ရေးစိတ်ဓါတ်နှင့် ကိုယ်ကျိုးစွန့်ပါဝင်ခဲ့မှုများ အား လှိက်လှဲစွာ မှတ်တမ်းတင် ဂုဏ်ပြုရင်း ဤနှုတ်ခွန်းဆက်သဝဏ်လွှာကို ပေးပိုအပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher: National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update: 2023-04-24
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Title: National Unity Government Weekly Press Update (16/2023)
Description: "1. NUG remarks it is in need of international support.....2. NUG negotiates with Thai authorities to release 3 detainees.....3. UN Ambassador Kyaw Moe Tun: Junta’s massacre in Pazigyi village constitutes war crimes and crimes against humanity.....4. NUG sent a report on Kantbalu massacre to UNSC members.....5. NUG recognizes 3 more online schools..."
Source/publisher: National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update: 2023-04-21
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Title: အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ အပတ်စဉ်သတင်းထုတ်ပြန်ချက် ( ၁၆/၂၀၂၃)
Description: "National Unity Government Weekly Press Update (16/2023)..."
Source/publisher: National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update: 2023-04-21
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Title: British Companies: Stop Insuring Aviation Fuel Deliveries to Burma
Description: "Burma Campaign UK today called on five British insurance companies to stop providing insurance cover for deliveries of aviation fuel to Burma. The five companies are: UK P&I, Steamship Mutual, Britannia P&I, North Standard, Shipowners Club. They are mutual insurance clubs which have provided insurance cover (protection and indemnity (P&I) insurance) to vessels which have delivered aviation fuel to Burma. Their role in the supply chain delivering aviation fuel to Burma was exposed in the Amnesty International Report, Deadly Cargo. The report is available here. “Any company involved in the supply chain delivering aviation fuel to Burma is potentially complicit in airstrikes against civilians, and should stop immediately,” said Mark Farmaner, Director of Burma Campaign UK. “Without insurance, vessels cannot deliver aviation fuel.” Since the Burmese military began its attempted coup on 1st February 2021, it has increasingly used airstrikes to try to gain control over the country. The Burmese military use airstrikes indiscriminately and deliberately against civilian targets, including health clinics, schools, homes, religious buildings and camps for people who had fled previous Burma military attacks. On 11th April, a Burmese military airstrike in the Sagaing Region in the north of Burma killed around 170 people, including around 40 children. In February 2022, the British government issued guidance to British companies regarding aviation fuel to Burma. It stated: “The Myanmar military regularly uses air strikes against civilian targets. If dealing with any entity linked to Myanmar’s aviation sector, businesses should conduct thorough supply chain diligence to ensure that commodities such as jet-fuel do not reach the military.” The guidance is available here. In their report, Deadly Cargo, Amnesty International exposed how aviation fuel intended for civilian use was taken by the Burmese military. This means it is impossible to be involved in supplying aviation fuel to Burma and ensure that fuel does not reach the Burmese military. Companies insuring vessels delivering aviation fuel to Burma are not following British government guidance. Despite its own guidance being broken, the British government has failed to impose sanctions preventing British companies being involved in supplying aviation fuel to Burma. Canada has imposed such sanctions. So far, the British government has only sanctioned Burmese companies and individuals which have sold aviation fuel to the Burmese military. “Insurers largely operate behind the scenes but play a vital role in the delivery of aviation fuel to Burma,” said Mark Farmaner. “These companies must now publicly commit that they will no longer provide insurance cover for vessels delivering aviation fuel to Burma.”..."
Source/publisher: "Burma Campaign UK" (London)
Date of entry/update: 2023-04-20
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Title: City of Terror and Darkness: A Life in Post-coup Rangoon
Description: "January 4th of this year marked the 75th anniversary of Burma gaining independence from Great Britain. Normally, there would be nationwide celebrations on Independence Day; in the past, the government would conduct a huge ceremony in the capital, Nay Pyi Taw, while the people around the country would hold fairs and games for everyone to participate in. Some popular games include သံပုံးရိုက် (tan-bone-yite), in which a blindfolded person has to smash an iron container placed approximately ten feet from him, အာလူးကောက် (r-luu-kauk) which is a short-distance marathon where the competitors have to collect potatoes assembled in front of them and put them in a sack, hence the name, which literally means “picking up potatoes.” However, this year, the atmosphere was more subdued. Although the military was keen to celebrate Independence Day’s Diamond Jubilee, the number of fairs and games organized by normal people were much fewer than in previous years. Indeed, when I took a stroll through my neighborhood on that day, I saw that, although utility poles were adorned with flags, only a handful of people turned out to play games. In previous years, a large crowd, children and adults alike, participated in fairs and games. Elderly people were seen sitting on the verandas watching the games. People contributed money to award winners in various competitions. None of this could be seen this year. Independence Day celebrations are not the only events affected by the 2021 military coup. Other annual fairs and special markets attract smaller crowds than usual, too. A fair is held annually near where I live; I do not know who arranges it, but the organizers normally hold it in December. Peddlers from around Rangoon come to display their wares, and most makeshift shops sell food. The fair attracts many people, and sometimes, it takes quite an effort to make your way through the crowd. Last December, the fair was held for the first time in two years, but only a few people came; even I, who frequented the previous year, did not go. On December 23rd, a bomb exploded in the fair, and two people, one of them rumored to be a child, were wounded, further discouraging people from going to fairs. As mentioned above, I left my apartment to walk around my neighborhood on Independence Day. Walking in the evenings is a habit I acquired last year. In 2019, before the COVID-19 pandemic hit the country, I spent my evenings participating in extracurricular activities at the university or at home comfortably watching a new movie. But beginning in March 2022, there have been frequent electricity cuts throughout the country, and sometimes we only get six hours of electricity per day. With so few things to occupy myself with without electricity, I gained the habit of taking a walk in the evening. Before the coup, under the semi-democratic government led by Aung San Suu Kyi, we had electricity 24/7 only, with occasional electricity cuts when the government needed to repair a generator or cut down some branches from the trees, which interfered with electric cables. People are still adjusting to a new normal with power shortages. Officially, the government declared that there would be four hours of electricity cut each day; however, the daily electricity cuts would often last longer. One outcome of electricity cuts is that rechargeable emergency LED light bulbs, mostly imported from China, some of the more expensive ones from Thailand, have become necessary household appliances. If you visit a friend, you will likely see an orange-colored LED bulb hanging from a nail on the wall. Most of the people in Rangoon live in cramped apartments with poor lighting and ventilation. Therefore, it is necessary to have the lights on even during the day. For Rangooners, it has become a chore to charge the lightbulbs whenever the electricity is turned on. Sometimes, we do not have time to recharge emergency light bulbs and cell phones because electricity is cut off without warning. The worst thing is that my laptop’s battery has broken down and, although I could use it when there is electricity, I cannot charge it. I could walk into a nearby IT shop to replace the battery, but I cannot afford it. A young man like me, who does not want to continue my education under the junta-controlled education system, does not have a degree, which makes it hard to get a permanent job. Since the coup, many foreign businesses and companies have left the country, some out of conscience, others due to international sanctions. These departures left these companies’ former staff without jobs. In addition, university students who decided not to attend school under the junta are jostling for the few remaining positions. The result is disastrous. While employers exploit the workers who work for them by cutting their salaries and extending their working hours, it has become extremely difficult for youth without work experience or personal connections to get a job. As if that is not enough, inflation is worsening day by day. In two years, the price of imported commodities has increased twofold. Most consumer goods in Burma come from China and Thailand. Even the price of rice, one of the few things in which Burma is self-sufficient, has increased. According to the data published by The Irrawaddy, the price of rice rose from 52,000 per sack MMK in January 2020 to 100,000 MMK per sack in August 2022. Likewise, the price of gasoline, the most important imported commodity, also increased from 665 MMK per liter in January 2020 to 2400 MMK per liter in August 2022. Common laborers, their families, and the shrinking middle class are hit the hardest. The junta tried to control the rising prices of essential commodities, such as rice and oil, but to no avail. They also forced merchants and shop owners to sell those commodities at a fixed price. Often, you could see people standing for hours in line to buy rice, cooking oil, and eggs at a lower rate. The price of petroleum and IT products also soared. When the global economy declined at the beginning of 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic, we used to joke around that “I will drink gasoline instead of water” because, at that time, a liter of water cost 300MMK, and a liter of gasoline was only 250MMK. Now a liter of gasoline costs around 3000MMK. Foreign currency exchange rates are also rising; the junta ordered banks to exchange foreign currency at fixed prices, but in the black market, you would pay approximately 3000MMK for one US dollar. My stroll through the neighborhood took me to Kan-daw-gyi, or The Royal Lake. A bronze statue of General Aung San stands on the bank near a public park. During colonial times, a statue of King Edward VII stood there, surrounded by beautifully carved marble pillars. It was replaced with the statue of General Aung San after independence. However, the pillars were left intact until a couple of years ago when they were demolished by the municipality. It is only one among many of the early 20th Century structures dismantled to make way for modern steel and concrete abominations. I doubt that there would be many people like me, who mourned for those architectural beauties. Indeed, most of the people I am acquainted with do not care for the beautiful colonial-era buildings built in neoclassical style. In my eyes, they are more than just old buildings. They make Rangoon the Rangoon I know today; they are an integral part of the city. When I see them, most are still standing but in bad condition, they remind me of the days when Rangoon was more cosmopolitan, back when those buildings were gleaming with fresh paint when Rangoon resembled the New York of the East, where Jews, Muslims, Burmans, and Europeans lived in their respective quarters next to each other. Indeed, when you got off the ship to set foot on Rangoon’s soil, there was little chance that the first language you would hear was Burmese. During the previous decade, when Burmese people enjoyed some limited freedom, Yangon Heritage Trust, an organization founded by historian Thant Myint-U, led the effort to renovate and repair old buildings. The organization also installed blue-colored plaques at some of the culturally and politically significant buildings to commemorate them. After the coup, although the junta declared some well-known old buildings as heritage buildings, there have been no visible efforts to preserve them. One of the abandoned buildings which play a significant role in Rangoon’s political role is The Mahatma Gandhi Memorial Building in downtown Rangoon. In 1990, NLD party held a conference there which would later be known as “Gandhi Conference”. Sadly, the building is left to rot and crumble. The outer walls are covered in moss and tree roots; the windows are boarded up, and birds and rodents have made the building their home. There are many other buildings like it declared as “unsuitable for living” and demolished to make way for modern high-rises. At the same time, religious buildings are faring a lot better due to the funds from the devotees. An Armenian Church dedicated to St. John the Baptist, one of the few buildings still standing built in the late 19th Century, is still in good condition. The two great cathedrals of Rangoon, St. Mary’s and the Holy Trinity, also look like they were built yesterday. However, the priests, who run those religious institutions, and many Buddhist monks are under severe criticism for cooperating with the junta. In the past two years, the head of the junta, Senior-general of the armed forces, and self-proclaimed Prime Minister, Min Aung Hlaing, visited churches, mosques, and Buddhist monasteries and met with prominent leaders of various religious communities. Some of the famous religious leaders were heavily censured by their followers. I stood looking at the statue of General Aung San, lost in thought, pondering those matters, oblivious to my surroundings. I was jerked back to reality when two military vehicles sped past the statue, sirens wailing loudly. Both are pick-up mini trucks manufactured by a Chinese automobile maker called FAW, indicating the growing Chinese influence on the country. The soldiers were armed to the teeth, ready to shoot anyone who dared to attack them. During the past months, the sight of military vehicles patrolling the neighborhoods has been common. At important junctions, the military has built dull, grey two-storied buildings with a flat area at the top to observe the buildings’ immediate surroundings constantly. They are equipped with toilets, solar panels, and accommodations for the soldiers on duty. You could always see three or four military personnel and police officers on top of those buildings, chatting idly. People despise the police and military so much that they invented imaginative vocabularies for referring to anything related to the military. For instance, the traffic police are nicknamed “duck egg” after the white round helmets they wear, while the watchtowers are referred to as “dog toilets,” a phrase that equates them with Rangoon’s public toilets. The soldiers, the military vehicles, and the watchtowers combined induce terror and resentment among the civilians. The police and military are regarded not so much as protecting the citizens of Rangoon from danger and harm as foreign forces occupying and oppressing the civilian population. When the military vehicles left, I went over to one of the benches surrounding the statue to sit. A couple of middle-aged women sat on a bench near mine. Although they were not talking very loudly, I could make out their conversation. One of them was explaining to the other about her son’s plan to go to Japan and how difficult it is to get a passport. Hearing this made my mind wander again. Almost all the people I know are studying Japanese. Japanese language schools are popping up around the city like mushrooms after rain, and every bookshop downtown sells Japanese language textbooks. Although I am not planning to immigrate to Japan, I heard that even filling out a registration form for taking the Japanese language exam is very competitive. Getting a passport is almost impossible with so many people trying to get one and so many corrupt officials trying to make a profit out of this collective obsession with going abroad. You have to spend a lot of money to get your hands on the red-covered book. Usually, people from the countryside have to rent accommodation near the passport office since they have to wait two or three days for the passport application process to be complete. With so many young people trying to leave the country, within a decade or two, there would be no educated people left in Burma. It is understandable; there is no opportunity for them here, either educational or economic. As far as the junta is concerned, there are only two things worth doing; making the country presentable to the international community, such as holding a rigged election to create the illusion that Burma is on the road to democracy again, and suppressing all the opposing voices which would disrupt their hold on power. They are not interested in improving the education system, the economy, or the public healthcare system. They would drop the country into a chasm if need be. The number of high school graduates who apply for government-funded universities is also alarmingly low. Many brave teenagers are defying the junta by refusing to enroll in the institutions run by them. The result is that wealthy families send their children to developed countries to pursue tertiary education; most young boys and girls who are not that fortunate try to get out of the country in any way they can. Many study Japanese and try to immigrate to Japan; some try to get a job in the service sector in the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Singapore. It is sad to see so many young people losing their opportunities. Heavy with negative thoughts, I rose from the bench and started to trudge home in the waning dusk. I passed a bus stop where people, some sitting, most standing, carrying lunch boxes in their hands, were waiting for transportation that would carry them to the suburbs. Since the coup, bus fares are also increasing due to the constantly increasing gas price. The quality of public transportation is declining; with high gas prices, bus drivers no longer turn on the air-conditioner, making traveling by bus in Rangoon’s insufferable hot weather a living hell. Occasionally, gangs of bandits would get on the buses and violently take cell phones and valuables from the passengers. People get no protection from anyone. The police are too busy hunting political opponents and the judges are busy staging show trials to sentence them. I walked toward my apartment. My heart was heavy, like every day, and I wondered whether my countenance betrayed my thoughts. The faces of most people I passed were somber and dull. Considering whether I would be happy again living in Rangoon, I ascended the darkened staircase to my sanctuary after another aimless day in the city..."
Source/publisher: Tea Circle (Myanmar)
Date of entry/update: 2023-04-20
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Title: The Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement in Myanmar
Sub-title: Promoting Ethnic Peace or Strengthening State Control?
Description: "The ethnic ‘peace process’ in Myanmar is one of the most labyrinthine in the modern world. Dating back to 1989, a variety of bilateral, multilateral and unilateral initiatives have been underway. In recent years, they were linked by the aspirations of a Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement and 21st Century Panglong Conference. None of these processes have led to inclusive political dialogue or sustainable peace, and both came to a halt with the military coup on 1 February 2021. Since this time, national breakdown has further ensued, and a new cycle of armed conflicts has begun, including in both rural and urban areas that have not seen fighting and displacement in many years. Myanmar today is among the most war-torn lands in both Asia and the world. Using the NCA as a spectrum, this new report by TNI seeks to analyse the most significant attempt to resolve ethnic conflict by negotiation since independence in 1948. Critical issues include the challenges in the negotiation of ceasefires; the failure to implement the NCA, including military violations; endeavours to overcome peace obstacles while the National League for Democracy was in government office; and analysis of how conflict parameters have changed in the fall-out from the 2021 coup. The NCA, though, did not occur in a vacuum. Over the years, a host of other challenges came to overshadow implementation and focus, undermining peace progress on the ground. Key issues include conflict regression in Kachin, Rakhine and Shan States, people’s militia and Border Guard Forces, economic opportunism and exploitation in the ethnic borderlands, and the divergent and ineffective responses by different international actors. Such factors are integral elements in Myanmar’s conflict landscape. Ultimately, there was no single reason why the NCA failed. The lack of inclusion, implementation, political will and political accomplishment are outstanding. Positioned at the heart of these failures is the Tatmadaw or Sit-Tat. After decades in government, the country’s military leaders sought to use the NCA as a mechanism for state control rather than a gateway to ethnic peace and reform. Myanmar was never at peace following the NCA’s 2015 inception. Myanmar is currently in its deepest state of civil war in several decades. Repression, political violence and humanitarian emergency are sweeping every state and region. All the peoples are suffering. It is thus vital that lessons are learned from the bitter experiences of peace failure in the past in order to build a better path to reform and reconciliation in the future. Any new process to address such challenges must be equitable, inclusive, just and sincere among all parties in order to contribute to this essential task..."
Source/publisher: Transnational Institute ( Amsterdam)
Date of entry/update: 2023-04-20
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Title: A Felicitation Letter from the Union Minister to Members of PDF on the Occasion of Myanmar Traditional New Year
Description: "Dear Comrades, On this auspicious day of Myanmar New Year, we bid farewell to the year 1384 and warmly welcome the year 1385. May you be blessed with a safe and healthy year ahead, and may you always remain committed to serving your country and its people. Wishing you a joyful and prosperous New Year! Dear Comrades, The terrorist military is facing a significant crisis, as they are losing ground on all fronts. They are struggling in battlefields, political arenas, economic welfare, and international relations. Even outside of their camps and stations, they do not feel safe, constantly fearing for their lives in what they perceive as enemy territory. Our PDF Tatmadaw is successfully implementing the "People's Warfare Strategy" through the active participation and cooperation of the entire populace. As a result, the terrorist military is facing resistance from the people's revolutionary forces spanning from the northernmost region of Putao to the southernmost areas of Myeik and Dawei. Thanks to the unwavering support and perseverance of our people, we have gained dominance over many rural areas. In addition, urban guerrilla activities in cities such as Yangon, Mandalay, and Naypyitaw have posed a significant threat to the terrorist military. It is clear that the military is no longer able to suppress our people's revolution, both physically and mentally. I would like to extend my sincerest congratulations and appreciation to the entire populace, as well as the members of PDF, for their unwavering efforts in achieving this remarkable progress just before the second anniversary of our armed revolution against the military coup. Dear Comrades, We must remain vigilant and aware of the fact that the terrorist military is making every effort to crush our people's revolution, even in the face of their own crises on all fronts. They are targeting innocent civilians and subjecting them to terror, as they are unable to defeat our PDF Tatmadaw. Their indiscriminate air assaults continue to pose a major threat especially to civilian targets. As is typical of fascist military forces, they are burning and destroying civilian villages with impunity. It is our duty as members of PDF Tatmadaw to protect our people's welfare and stand up against such heinous acts of violence. Dear Comrades, As our People's Revolution and PDF Tatmadaw continue to gain momentum and make progress, it is important to remain vigilant and mindful of a certain situation. The enemy is now resorting to all means to discredit our revolution, tarnish the image of our PDF Tatmadaw, and sow disunity among us. While we fight against the terrorist military, we are also working tirelessly to build a disciplined and strong PDF Tatmadaw that adheres strictly to the code of conduct. You all understand that the effectiveness and efficiency of our PDF Tatmadaw are crucial to the success of this Revolution. Dear Comrades, I cannot overstate the critical importance of unity and strength in our PDF Tatmadaw for the success of our revolution. Each and every one of you has a responsibility to uphold, protect, and promote the positive image of the PDF Tatmadaw. You have the power to enhance the good reputation of our army, but also to tarnish it. To ensure there is no ambiguity, let me make it clear that it is crucial for each and every one of you to comprehend and fully grasp this message. It is imperative that our PDF Tatmadaw continues to maintain its position as a highly respected institution among the public, and a force that is dear to them. Conversely, it is well-known that the terrorist military is nothing more than a group of killers and robbers that is deeply despised by the public. They do not deserve to be referred to as "Tatmadaw" in any manner. Although both groups may hold weapons, the reasons for doing so differ significantly. Our PDF Tatmadaw arms itself to protect and safeguard the welfare of the people, whereas the terrorist military arms itself to kill and torture our own people. It is evident that there is a vast difference in the meaning and essence of holding arms between our PDF Tatmadaw and the terrorist military, and it is important that this difference is fully comprehended. Dear Comrades, As we enter the second year of our people's revolution in 1385, it's crucial that we stand together and continue our struggle with ‘one united voice and effort.’ The success of our revolution and our future depend on the unity and competency of our PDF Tatmadaw. We be able to build the Federal Democracy Union. People’s Revolution Must Prevail!..."
Source/publisher: Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update: 2023-04-17
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Title: Myanmar’s Dictators Have Always Relied on a Brutal Secret Police Force
Description: "Every dictatorship believes it needs a secret police force in order to survive in power, and the more brutal, the more effective. Nazi Germany had its Gestapo, or Geheime Staatspolizei: “The Secret State Police.” The Shah of Iran depended on Savak, the country’s domestic security and intelligence service, and Romania’s dictator Nicolae Ceausescu had his dreaded Securitate, “Department of State Security.” And Myanmar’s generals have their military intelligence service, which over the years has changed its name but always remained a main pillar of state power. But because of its secretive nature, Myanmar’s military intelligence has also on at least two occasions morphed into a state within the state, which became a threat to the established order and, therefore, was purged with some of its leaders receiving lengthy prison sentences. The question of maintaining that blind loyalty is the reason why Myanmar’s current dictator, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, is keeping his top intelligence operatives closer to him than his predecessors did. Lieutenant General Ye Win Oo, head of what since 2020 has been called the Office of Chief of Military Security Affairs (OCMSA), accompanies Min Aung Hlaing at all meetings with the junta-appointed cabinet, to meetings with foreign diplomats, and during trips abroad. Lt-Gen Ye Win Oo went to Russia with Min Aung Hlaing in June 2021 to attend the 9th Moscow Conference on International Security, and again in July 2022 to meet state-owned nuclear energy and weapons companies. During the second trip, Ye Win Oo’s wife Nilar and other spouses of the generals also went along, but more for shopping in Moscow than to participate in any important meetings. Since the 2021 coup, Lt-Gen Ye Win Oo has been responsible for tracking down opponents to the junta and he also runs the military’s interrogation centers where detainees are subjected to torture, which usually includes electric chocks, burning of genitalia, pouring boiling liquid or chemical solutions down the mouths of victims, and rape if those arrested are women. The Internet and social media have made it possible to disseminate such information to the outside world, but the methods are as old as Myanmar’s military intelligence itself. It dates back to General Ne Win, who seized power in 1962 and built up one of Asia’s most ruthless as well as efficient secret police forces. Originally called the Military Intelligence Service (MIS), it was known down to the lowliest non-English speaking peasant as em-eye and everybody feared it. Informants could be everywhere, sometimes even within dissident families. Ne Win was originally trained by the Japanese, in Tokyo in 1940-41 and when they occupied the then Burma 1942-45. US Lieutenant Colonel James Mc Andrew states in his 2007 study of Myanmar’s military intelligence apparatus: “Chosen for both ‘guerilla tactics and clandestine activities’ and ‘special’ leadership training was the future dictator and longtime strongman, Ne Win. Significantly, this curriculum included intelligence training provided by the Kempeitai, the brutal Japanese Military Police and counterintelligence organization. Being selected for Kempeitai is more than noteworthy in hindsight, and it must be viewed as an important early demonstration to Ne Win that maintaining coercive intelligence and counterintelligence organizations were essential to maintaining authoritarian rule.” Ne Win’s trusted intelligence chief for many years was his subordinate Brigadier General Tin Oo — not to be confused with the National League for Democracy (NLD) leader Tin Oo, or Tin U, a retired general and former army chief. ‘MI Tin Oo’, as he became known, was trained by the US’s Central Intelligence Agency on the US-held Pacific island of Saipan in 1957, and so was Lay Maung, who rose to become a top jurist for the military and Myanmar’s foreign minister 1980-1981. In those days, US support for Myanmar’s military was motivated by the fact that it fought against the insurgent Communist Party of Burma, but that cooperation came to an abrupt end in 1961 when the military and the People’s Liberation Army of China began joint operations against remnants of US-supported, nationalist Chinese Kuomintang forces who had been ensconced in eastern Shan State since their defeat in China’s civil war. Even if judicial executions of political opponents were the exception rather than the rule, anyone suspected of having contacts with the political or ethnic opponents of Ne Win’s regime was likely to be arrested and tortured while in jail. The MIS also had its own prison and torture center, the infamous Yay Kyi Aing, or “Clearwater Pond”. Many political prisoners were tortured to death there and in other, smaller MIS-run jails all over the country. The MIS kept a watchful eye not only on ordinary citizens, but especially army officers with perceived liberal ideas, which apart from constant rotations, corruption and institutional brutality contributed to the remarkable cohesiveness of Myanmar’s armed forces. MIS agents also watched politicized exiles living in Britain, West Germany, Thailand, Australia and the USA. For many years, mutual suspicion neutralized them as a political force because no one was ever sure who was an informant or not. In the 1970s and 1980s, the MIS was becoming increasingly powerful, and, at the time, Rodney Tasker characterized MI Tin Oo in the Far Eastern Economic Review: “He and his MIS colleagues were men of the world compared with the other short-sighted, dogmatic figures in the Burmese leadership. They were able to travel abroad, talk freely to foreigners and generally look beyond the rigid confines of the corrupt regime….although ruthless, he built up a reputation as a gregarious, open-minded, charismatic figure — a direct contrast to some of his mole-like colleagues in the leadership.” But in May 1983, Ne Win’s regime suddenly and unexpectedly announced that Tin Oo had been “permitted to resign” along with his former aide, Colonel Bo Ni. They had been purged ostensibly because their wives were corrupt — a charge that could be brought against any army officer in the country. Tin Oo and Bo Ni were subsequently jailed — and the entire MIS apparatus purged as well. The reason behind the move, however, remained a matter for conjecture. It was suggested at the time that the urbane MIS people had become too powerful for comfort and had almost managed to establish another state-within-a-state, which threatened Ne Win’s inner circle of hand-picked, less-than-intelligent yes men. Whatever the reason behind the purge, it had immediate effects on the security situation in the country. On October 9, 1983, 21 people, including four visiting South Korean cabinet ministers, were killed in a powerful explosion in Yangon. Three North Korean military officers were behind the atrocity. One of them was killed in a shoot-out with Burmese security forces, while the other two were captured alive. One of the bombers was executed in 1985, the other remained in Yangon’s Insein Prison until he died of natural causes in 2008. Observers at the time believe that the incident would never have taken place if MI Tin Oo had still been in charge; it clearly indicated that the military intelligence apparatus was no longer what is used to be. A new intelligence chief, General Khin Nyunt, was appointed in 1984. His Directorate of the Defense Services Intelligence (DDSI) soon became almost as efficient as the old outfit, and Khin Nyunt in many ways also resembled Tin Oo; he was fairly young and reasonably bright, but could be exceedingly ruthless whenever this was considered expedient by the old dictator, Ne Win. Less than four years after Khin Nyunt began rebuilding Myanmar’s shattered military intelligence apparatus, the country faced the largest civil unrest in its history. Millions of people nationwide marched against Ne Win’s regime and for a return to the democracy that the country had enjoyed before the 1962 coup. Any regime anywhere would have collapsed under the pressure of an entire population rising up against tyranny. That was not the case with Myanmar’s military-dominated regime, however. Thousands of people were gunned down in the streets of Yangon and elsewhere as the military stepped in, not to overthrow the government but to shore up a regime overwhelmed with popular protest. After the military had crushed the uprising, the DDSI was expanded. By 1991, nine new units were established and the DDSI also operated 19 detention centers, seven of them of Yangon, of which Yay Kyi Aing was still the most notorious. Undercover DDSI agents covered every movement of the NLD’s leaders and other opponents of the regime. However in 2004 Khin Nyunt, who had become prime minister, was ousted and arrested along with up to 3,500 intelligence personnel countrywide, including some 300 senior officers. Khin Nyunt’s fall from grace followed the death of his mentor Ne Win in December 2002. The old general had been placed under house arrest earlier that year, allegedly because of the corrupt behavior of his daughter, Sanda Win, her husband Aye Zaw Win — and the couple’s three unruly grandsons, who had terrorized private businessmen in Yangon with demands for bribes and “protection money.” But few doubted that the move against Ne Win and his family came as preparation for the post-Ne Win era; to make sure that Khin Nyunt’s influence would be limited. The dictator, who had ruled with an iron fist for several decades, was cremated near his home in Yangon. The funeral was attended by a handful of family members and about 20 plainclothes military officers, none especially high-ranking. Khin Nyunt’s ouster was not, as some reports in the foreign media at the time suggested, a power struggle between the “pragmatic” intelligence chief and “hardliners” within the military regime. A more plausible explanation for the purge was that Khin Nyunt and his DDSI had accumulated significant wealth through involvement in a wide range of commercial enterprises. They were building up a state within a state — like the old MI Tin Oo had done in the 1970s — and not sharing their riches with the rest of the military elite. Like Ne Win, the new dictator, Senior General Than Shwe, did not want to have any potential rivals around him, and Khin Nyunt clearly had political ambitions. He was a man not to be trusted. Immediately following the ousting of Khin Nyunt, the latest intelligence outfit, the Office of the Chief of Military Intelligence [the expanded DDSI], was dissolved and an entirely new organization established: the OCMSA, which was placed under more direct military control. It is highly unlikely that Lt- Gen Ye Win Oo will repeat the mistakes which MI Tin Oo and Khin Nyunt committed, and Min Aung Hlaing may, at least for the foreseeable future, be secure. OCMSA remained active throughout the decade of openness from 2011 to 2021, carefully watching the activities of politicians, activists and journalists. But Lt-Gen Ye Win Oo and his men unleashed the full force of the organization’s most brutal operatives after the 2021 coup. According to the rights group the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP), 3,194 people have been killed since then, while 17,075 people have been detained and 5,274 of them have been sentenced by a court. A total of 108 prisoners received the death penalty, 121 of them are in absentia. 150 are currently on death row awaiting execution. So far, according to AAPP’s data, 3,874 have been released from prison. Until the 1988 uprising, Myanmar’s military intelligence conducted only limited operations overseas, mainly collecting information and giving the exiled community a scare. But after the dramatic events of the late 1980s and the subsequent flight of thousands of pro-democracy activists, especially to Thailand, its agents became more operational outside the country. Khin Nyunt’s right-hand man, Colonel Thein Swe sent thugs to beat up activists and, allegedly, ordered murders when he was defense attaché in Bangkok. In the early 1990s, the colonel built up an extensive network among diplomats, spies, informants and some media in Thailand. He was rewarded by being made the top-ranking intelligence officer under Khin Nyunt after he returned to Myanmar. There is now every indication that the OCMSA is even more active in foreign countries. To the surprise of many, not only are regular operatives involved in keeping a watchful eye on activists, journalist and others in Thai cities like Chiang Mai and Mae Sot, but people who once played roles in the pro-democracy movement and the so-called “peace process” during the 2011-2016 U Thein Sein presidency have become informants. At home in Myanmar, as The Irrawaddy has reported, old loyalties to military supremacy remain: even military intelligence operatives who were purged or sidelined in 2004 have been used as advisers. Among them are Colonel Ngwe Tun who was at the Defense Services Academy in Pyin Oo Lwin at the same time as Min Aung Hlaing, Lieutenant Colonel Nyan Linn, who in 1988 was responsible for distributing leaflets condemning democracy leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, Sai Aung Thein who used to serve in Kengtung in Shan State, Myint Htay, an operative who liaised with Pa-O militia leader Aung Kham Hti, Lin Mingxian, another militia leader at Mong La on the Myanmar-China border, and Thein Swe, the horror man of Bangkok who has become a Brigadier General. As Ne Win once put it, lukaun lutaw, which refers to his preference for promoting loyal cronies rather than talented persons. Significantly, Major General Kyaw Win, an intellectual who Than Shwe in 1993 appointed deputy head of DDSI to counterbalance the rising power of Khin Nyunt, has not been seen since the coup. The future of the pro-democracy movement depends on its ability to understand the inner workings of Myanmar’s past and present military intelligence services [which to all intents and purposes have been a secret police], to map the current OCMSA’s activities, and counter them with increased vigilance in the streets — as well as in cyberspace. New, sophisticated electronic surveillance equipment, not available before, has been obtained from firms in Singapore and Israel. And with the military and its most repressive organ of power operating more closely than in the past, domestically as well as in foreign countries, the dangers are real..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update: 2023-04-17
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Title: Myanmar’s ‘Forgotten War’ Lurches Deeper into Horror
Description: "KAYIN STATE, Myanmar, Apr 17 2023 (IPS)- Food is passed around a campfire, and a guitar strums as cool night air tumbles down mountain cliffs, relieving the jungle of its heat. A dozen or so young Myanmar activists – some having just travelled long distances evading military checkpoints, others already living in exile – have come together in a jungle camp for a training course with a difference. Instead of armed combat, their chosen role is enabling the overthrow of the military junta through non-violent means. Conversations are animated, with talk of federal democracy and creating a country that would also give political space and freedom to ethnic minorities. They are joined by soldiers of the rebel Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) protecting the camp deep in southeastern Kayin State. The peaceful setting of the camp belies the horrors of the civil war beyond the mountains that is breaking Myanmar apart. The generals who overthrew a democratically elected government and seized power in 2021 are increasingly responding to a national uprising by waging terror on civilians it calls “terrorists” in an attempt to break their support for armed insurgents. On April 11, the military carried out what is believed to be the deadliest attack of the civil war so far, using air strikes and a helicopter gunship on a village ceremony organised by the parallel and underground National Unity Government (NUG) in Sagaing Region. At least 165 people, including 27 women and 19 children, some performing dances, were killed, according to the NUG. The regime says it was attacking the NUG’s People’s Defence Forces. Over the past two years, artillery and bombing raids using aircraft supplied by China and Russia have targeted schools, IDP camps, hospitals, mosques, Buddhist temples and Christian churches across the country. Tens of thousands of houses have been torched, and more than 1.3 million people displaced since the 2021 coup, according to UN estimates. The barbarity defies belief. In February, a unit of some 150 soldiers known as the Ogre Column were dropped by helicopter in Sagaing and went on a marauding killing spree that lasted weeks. Scores of villagers were killed. Women were raped and shot. Men and boys were beheaded, disembowelled and dismembered. Truth about massacres in wars gone by took months or even years to fully emerge, but in this modern era of mobile phones and social media, the grim evidence is transmitted by survivors within a day or so. Kyaw Soe Win, a veteran activist with the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP), which carefully documents civilian deaths, arrests and extra-judicial killings, shows IPS a picture he has just received on his phone of a man in Sagaing, disembowelled and his organs taken out. Why do they do this? “It is to spread fear and terror,” he says. AAPP, now based in the border town of Mae Sot just inside Thailand, has an exhibition dedicated to victims of successive uprisings against military rule since protests against the first post-independence coup in 1962. Rows of faces and names stare out from the walls, including pictures of some 30 civilians – among them two Save the Children charity workers – who were tortured and burned alive in what is now known as the 2021 Christmas Eve Massacre in Kayah State. “This chapter is different,” Kyaw Soe Win, a former political prisoner, says of the present conflict. “The situation is getting worse and worse. The numbers of political prisoners and fatalities and houses torched are far higher. The junta is oppressing the people and is even more brutal than before.” Sky, a resistance fighter and writer, who uses a nom de guerre, explains in a Mae Sot bar how the insurgency is also very different this time. “After the 1988 student uprising, it took me three years to get an AK-47 and 300 bullets. Now it is much quicker. Now we are getting modified AK-47s through the Wa. They call it a Wa-AK,” he laughs, referring to an autonomous border area run by the heavily armed United Wa State Party. Their one-party narco-state on the border with China stays out of the war but makes money from both sides. “China systematically eroded history after the 1989 Tiananmen massacre, but after the 1988 protests in Myanmar, we still have the whispered stories. This generation knows what is right and wrong,” said Sky. Despite what the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights recently called its “scorched earth policy”, the regime is steadily losing this war in terms of territory and military casualties. “The military is in a very, very difficult situation which is only getting worse,” says Matthew Arnold, an independent policy analyst on Myanmar with previous conflict experience in Afghanistan and Sudan. He says the regime’s forces are “atomised” and “bleeding out in a war of attrition”. In some towns, they are pinned down in police stations and barracks and cannot be reinforced or resupplied for months on end. Because it cannot move freely on the ground over the vast distances to maintain its outposts and impose its authority, the junta is resorting increasingly to air strikes and artillery against civilian populations. Sagaing and the neighbouring region of Magwe are crucial conflict areas. Covering an area bigger than England, they are known as the heartland of the Bamar majority and had been, for decades, a fertile recruiting ground for the Bamar-dominated military. But no more. “There are very few areas of Sagaing where they are not fighting on a regular basis. The junta was hit all over the place in February in Sagaing and Magwe,” says Arnold, who credits resistance forces moving rapidly “from muskets to drones and IEDS” (improvised explosive devices) in inflicting heavy losses. Vulnerable in more remote areas in Chin State in the west and areas of the southeast, the military’s pullback is expected to accelerate as the monsoons come. Thantlang in Chin State, near the border with India, was the first large town to fall to the rebels, although the junta’s bombing raids and artillery made sure that little was left standing. With no air defences, the resistance knows well that if it takes full control of more urban areas, then they are inviting disaster upon the civilian population. Myanmar is, in effect, fragmenting. The regime has a firm grip on the big cities of Yangon, Mandalay and the capital Naypyitaw – where residents say life is bustling and returning to some kind of ‘normal’ with even the makings of a property boom. But beyond, its real control is tenuous and weakening. Fighting a war on many fronts, the regime is trying to follow its practised divide-and-rule tactics of cutting deals and ceasefire pacts with various ethnic armed groups, aided to some extent by China’s influence in border areas. But major ethnic groups in most of the frontier states, such as the KNLA, which has been fighting the world’s longest civil war since 1949, are successfully resisting. A ceasefire with the mostly Buddhist Arakan Army also looks fragile in the western state of Rakhine, where in 2017, the military forced over 700,000 Muslim Rohingya into Bangladesh in a brutal campaign of ethnic cleansing that has brought charges of genocide against Myanmar in the International Court of Justice. “Sadly, a prolonged fragmentation is a possibility, but we must accept that has been a possibility in Myanmar since before the coup of 1962,” David Gum Awng, deputy minister for international cooperation for the NUG shadow administration, tells IPS. “It is natural and unsurprising that EAOs (ethnic armed organisations) are consolidating gains, but the question is what these EAOs plan to do with their territory if and when the democratic forces win,” he adds. The NUG, he says, aims to rid Myanmar of the “abusive and criminal military dictatorship and along with it the military’s obsession with centralised Bamar-Buddhist nationalist rule”, to be replaced by a democratic federal system offering “ethnic minorities genuine self-determination” through negotiations. This significant shift in policy also extends to recognising and reaching out to the Rohingya, with the NUG promising justice and accountability for crimes committed against them by the military, a path towards citizenship, and peaceful repatriation for refugees. Although the NUG is built around remnants of the old guard of the National League for Democracy government ousted in the 2021 coup, its stated intentions have set it apart from the Bamar nationalist leanings of Aung San Suu Kyi, its 77-year-old former leader now held by the junta in solitary confinement. Strengthening but still, difficult ties between the self-proclaimed NUG and the ethnic armed groups are particularly worrying for China. Myanmar’s giant neighbour sees a threat to its long-term strategy of dominating the ethnic groups along its border while keeping Western powers out of a pliant Myanmar with the goal of developing massive infrastructure projects and a secure gateway to the Indian Ocean. Even though it enjoyed favourable relations with Aung San Suu Kyi, China is keeping the NUG at a cold arm’s length while propping up the junta with weaponry and diplomatic protection at the UN. India’s tacit backing for the regime has facilitated its own strategic investments. Much of the rest of Asia, including democracies like Japan and South Korea, are also working to protect their own interests in Myanmar while hoping that engagement with the regime will lead to a negotiated settlement of the war. UN agencies and the INGO aid industry also maintain a presence, mostly ineffectual, in junta-controlled Yangon. This perceived complicity angers the Burmese diaspora, which is busily raising money for aid and weapons for the resistance. Notions of a negotiated settlement with General Min Aung Hlaing’s State Administration Council, as the junta calls itself, are far from the minds of those waging their “forgotten war”. “Thai generals are brothers with the Myanmar military. Singapore banks hold their money. The Burmese feel forgotten,” said one US-based doctor, speaking in Bangkok after taking medical aid to the border. While recognising that the West’s attention and resources are focused on the overriding goal of defeating Russia in Ukraine, the resistance did receive a significant boost last December with the US Burma Act passed by Congress. The act authorises the Biden administration to extend non-lethal aid to “support the people of Burma in their struggle for democracy, freedom, human rights, and justice.” It explicitly mentions the NUG, although not ethnic armed groups. Some Washington-based analysts argue that the legislation does not mark a major US policy shift, but diplomats and experts in the region see it as a highly significant step towards endorsing the NUG and the wider resistance movement. “The US is now saying it wants the resistance to win and has fundamentally shifted the narrative. This is why China is getting worried. Beijing is focused on the discourse of talks and the peace process,” commented one expert in Bangkok who asked not to be named. “There won’t be lethal assistance. The US doesn’t want to be involved in another war now. But there will be more public and diplomatic support of the resistance and pushing other actors not to engage with the junta,” he added. David Gum Aung of the NUG is more cautious, calling the Burma Act “a significant piece of legislation” which makes funds available and opens the door to more sanctions against the regime while “recognising” the NUG. “We can view the Burma Act as a very important document symbolically but less potent practically. Its symbolic value stems largely from the fact that it outlines that the US views the SAC and their caretaker government as illegitimate and does not recognize their authority, their right to represent Myanmar or their justification for the coup.” “We are still sorely in need of all manner of aid, from humanitarian to strategic… but we cannot fall into the trap of assuming that everything the Act makes possible will eventuate,” he said. Thinzar Shunlei Yi, a democracy and youth activist who led anti-coup protests in Yangon and is now in exile, stresses that the broad-based and non-violent Civil Disobedience Movement remains the “backbone of the revolution”. Success, she says, will mean the surrender of the junta, with the people defining what happens to the perpetrators of crimes, whether to be put on trial in domestic courts or through international mechanisms. For her, it also means a social revolution that will tackle “patriarchy, hegemony, racism etc”. Kyaw Soe Win of the AAPP, whose grisly routine is to scroll through fresh images of the dead, says war criminals must be prosecuted to achieve national reconciliation. “We need justice for the survivors and victims,” he says. “Without justice, there can be no reconciliation. There was never any justice before, only impunity through the decades. No action was ever taken.” AAPP has so far documented over 17,000 political prisoners still in detention and the deaths of over 3,100 civilians since the coup, although it knows the actual toll is much higher. Nicholas Koumjian, head of the UN-authorised Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar which is working with AAPP, says credible evidence had been collected of an “array of war crimes and crimes against humanity, including murder, rape, torture, unlawful imprisonment, and deportation or forcible transfer”. Back in the jungle resistance camp, the young activists gather near caves that act as air raid shelters and talk of a future without military rule that will necessitate total reform of the armed forces. Among the group, one was severely tortured in prison, one shot in the leg during street protests and a mother who had to leave her child behind. The annual New Year festival of Thingyan is approaching, and they sing popular songs of love and separation and a homecoming they know may be years away. AAPP is working with the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar to collect and preserve evidence of crimes against international law committed since 2011 to expedite future criminal proceedings. Nicholas Koumjian, head of the IIMM, said on the second anniversary of the coup that credible evidence had been collected of an “array of war crimes and crimes against humanity, including murder, rape, torture, unlawful imprisonment, and deportation or forcible transfer.”..."
Source/publisher: Inter Press Service
Date of entry/update: 2023-04-17
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Title: ဗမာပြည်သူ့လွတ်မြောက်ရေးတပ်တော်(BPLA) တပ်တည်ထောင်ခြင်း (၂) နှစ်ပြည့်အခမ်းအနားသို့ ပေးပို့သော ဂုဏ်ပြုသဝဏ်လွှာ
Description: "၁။ ယနေ့ ကျရောက်သော ဗမာပြည်သူ့လွတ်မြောက်ရေးတပ်တော်(BPLA) တပ်တည်ထောင်ခြင်း (၂) နှစ်ပြည့်အား လှိုက်လှဲစွာ ဂုဏ်ပြုကြိုဆိုပါသည်။ ၂။ ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ် ဖေဖော်ဝါရီလ (၁) ရက်နေ့ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်မှ မတရား အာဏာသိမ်းယူမှုနောက်ပိုင်း စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ်ကျဆုံးရေး၊ တိုင်းရင်းသားပြည်သူလူထုတရပ်လုံး အဖိနှိပ်ခံဘဝမှ လွတ်မြောက်ရေး၊ တရားမျှတမှုရှိပြီး တန်းတူညီမျှသည့် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီ ပြည်ထောင်စုကို ထူထောင်ရေး အစရှိသည့် ရည်မှန်းချက်များဖြင့် ဗမာလူမျိုးစုကိုယ်စား တပ်တော်တရပ်ကို တည်ထောင်လျက် ပြည်သူ့ခုခံတွန်းလှန်စစ်ကို ဆင်နွှဲလာခဲ့သည်မှာ ယနေ့အချိန်တွင် (၂) နှစ်တင်းတင်း ပြည့်မြောက်ခဲ့ပြီ ဖြစ်သည်။ ၃။ ပြည်သူ့ကာကွယ်ရေးတပ်ဖွဲ့များ တည်ထောင်ရာတွင် အဘက်ဘက်မှ ဝိုင်းဝန်းပံ့ပိုးကူညီ လက်တွဲခေါ်ယူပေးသော ညီနောင်မဟာမိတ် တော်လှန်ရေးအဖွဲ့အစည်းများ အားလုံးကို ဗမာပြည်သူလူထုကိုယ်စား မမေ့မလျော့ ကျေးဇူးတင်ရှိနေမည်ဖြစ်သည်။ ၄။ (၂) နှစ်တာ နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေးခရီးအတွင်း အသက်၊သွေး၊ချွေးပေးဆပ် စွန့်လွှတ်ခဲ့ရသော ရဲဘော်များနှင့်တကွ ပြည်သူတစ်ဦးတစ်ယောက်ချင်းစီအား ပြည်သူ့သူရဲကောင်းများအဖြစ် အစဉ်အမြဲ အောက်မေ့သတိရလျက် မပြီးဆုံးသေးသော တော်လှန်ရေးခရီးကို ပိုမိုအားသွန်ခွန်စိုက် ဆက်လက် လျှောက်လှမ်းကြရမည်ဖြစ်သည်။ ၅။ ဗမာပြည်သူ့လွတ်မြောက်ရေးတပ်တော် (BPLA) သည် စစ်စည်းကမ်းသေဝပ်ပြီး စနစ်ကျသည့် တပ်တော်တရပ်ဖြစ်သည်နှင့် အားလျော်စွာ ဘုံရည်းမှန်းချက်၊ ဘုံပန်းတိုင် ရောက်ရှိရေးအတွက် စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ်အား အခြားသော ညီနောင်မဟာမိတ် တော်လှန်ရေး အင်အားစုများ၊ ပြည်သူ့ကာကွယ်ရေးတပ်ဖွဲ့များနှင့် လက်တွဲညီညီ ခုခံတွန်းလှန်တိုက်ပွဲဝင်လျက် အနာဂတ် ဖက်ဒရယ် တပ်မတော်တွင်လည်း ကြီးကြီးမားမားအားဖြည့် ကူညီနိုင်ပါစေဟု နှစ်သစ်ဆုမွန်ကောင်း တောင်းလျက် ယနေ့ ကျရောက်သည့် တပ်တည်ထောင်ခြင်း (၂) နှစ်ပြည့် အခမ်းအနားသို့ ဤသဝဏ်လွှာကို ဂုဏ်ယူစွာဖြင့် ပေးပို့အပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher: Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update: 2023-04-17
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Title: မြန်မာနှစ်သစ်ကူးအထိမ်းအမှတ်အဖြစ် PDF တပ်မတော်သို့ ပေးပို့သည့် ပြည်ထောင်စုဝန်ကြီး၏ တော်လှန်နှစ်သစ် သဝဏ်လွှာ
Description: "ရဲဘော်တို့- ဒီနေ့ဟာ မြန်မာသက္ကရာဇ်အားဖြင့် ၁၃၈၄ ခုနှစ်ကနေ ၁၃၈၅ ခုနှစ်ကို ကူးပြောင်းတဲ့ နှစ်သစ်ကူးနေ့၊ နှစ်ဆန်း (၁) ရက်နေ့ဖြစ်တယ်။ မြန်မာနှစ်သစ်မှာ ရဲဘော်တို့အားလုံး ဘေးဘယာကင်းကွာ ကျန်းမာ၊ ချမ်းသာပြီး တိုင်းပြည်နဲ့လူထုတာဝန်ကို ဆက်လက်ထမ်းပိုး ရွက်ဆောင်နိုင်ကြပါစေလို့ နှစ်သစ်ကူးဆုမွန် တောင်းလိုက် ပါတယ်။ ရဲဘော်တို့- အခုချိန်မှာ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စုဟာ စစ်ရေး၊ နိုင်ငံရေး၊ စီးပွားရေး၊ နိုင်ငံတကာရေး စတဲ့အဖက်ဖက်မှာ အရေးမလှ၊ အကြပ်အတည်းဆိုက်နေတာကို တွေ့မြင်ရမှာဖြစ်တယ်။ စစ်ရေးအရ ကြည့်မယ်ဆိုရင် စစ်အုပ်စုအဖို့ ဒင်းတို့ စစ်စခန်း၊ ရဲစခန်းကနေ အပြင်ထွက်လိုက်တာနဲ့ပဲ “ရန်သူ့နယ်မြေ”၊ “ငါတို့ မလုံခြုံဘူး၊ အသက်အန္တရာယ်ရှိတယ်” ဆိုတဲ့ စိတ်ခံစားချက်ကို ရရှိနေမှာဖြစ်တယ်။ အခု ငါတို့ PDF တပ်မတော်ဟာ ပြည်သူလူထုတရပ်လုံး ပူးပေါင်းပါဝင်မှုနဲ့ ပြည်သူကို အခြေခံတဲ့ “ပြည်သူ့စစ်မဟာဗျူဟာ” ကို စနစ်တကျ စွဲကိုင်၊ ချမှတ်ဆောင်ရွက်နေတာဖြစ်တယ်။ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စုဟာ တနိုင်ငံလုံး နိုင်ငံ့မြောက်ဖျား ပူတာအိုလိုနေရာကနေ ဟိုးတောင်ဖျား မြိတ်၊ ထားဝယ်အထိမှာ ပြည်သူ့တော်လှန်ရေး အင်အားစုတွေနဲ့ စစ်မျက်နှာဖွင့် ရင်ဆိုင်နေရတာဖြစ်တယ်။ အားလုံးရဲ့ စုပေါင်းတိုက်ပွဲဝင် ကြိုးပမ်းမှုကြောင့် အခုဆိုရင် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံရဲ့ ကျေးလက်ဒေသ အများအပြားကို ငါတို့ရဲ့ စိုးမိုးနယ်မြေအဖြစ် ဖော်ဆောင်နိုင်ပြီဖြစ်တယ်။ ဒါ့အပြင် ရန်ကုန်၊ မန္တလေး၊ နေပြည်တော်လို မြို့ကြီးတွေမှာလည်း မြို့ပြပျောက်ကြားလှုပ်ရှားမှုတွေက စစ်အုပ်စုကို စဉ်ဆက်မပျက် ခြိမ်းခြောက်၊ ဒုက္ခပေးနေတာဖြစ်တယ်။ သေချာတာကတော့ အကြမ်းဖက် စစ်အုပ်စုဟာ ငါတို့ပြည်သူ့တော်လှန်ရေးကို အနိုင်ယူ၊ ဖြိုဖျက်နိုင်ဖို့ဆိုတာ ရုပ်ဝတ္ထုအင်အားအရကော စိတ်ဓာတ်အင်အားအရ လုံးဝ မဖြစ်နိုင်တော့ဘူးဆိုတာပဲ။ စစ်အာဏာသိမ်းပြီးနောက် လက်နက်စွဲကိုင် ခုခံတော်လှန်ရေး အချိန် (၂) နှစ်မပြည့်ခင်မှာ ဒီလောက်ထိ အခြေအနေမျိုး ရောက်အောင် ဝိုင်းဝန်းကြိုးပမ်း တိုက်ပွဲဝင်ခဲ့ကြတဲ့ ပြည်သူတရပ်လုံးနဲ့အတူ PDF တပ်မတော်သားအားလုံးကို အထူးဂုဏ်ပြုကြောင်းလည်း ပြောကြားချင်တယ်။ ရဲဘော်တို့- တဖက်မှာလည်း အဖက်ဖက်က အကြပ်အတည်းဆိုက်လာတဲ့ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စုဟာ ပြည်သူ့ တော်လှန်ရေးကို တတ်နိုင်သမျှ ဟန့်တားနှောက်ယှက်ဖို့ ပုံစံမျိုးစုံနဲ့ အားထုတ်ကြိုးပမ်းနေတယ်ဆိုတာကို သတိချပ်ကြဖို့လိုတယ်။ အထူးသဖြင့်၊ ကြွက်မနိုင် ကျီ မီးနဲ့ရှို့ဆိုတာလိုပဲ စစ်အုပ်စုဟာ ငါတို့ PDF တပ်မတော်ကို အနိုင်ယူဖို့ မဖြစ်တော့တဲ့အခါ သာမန်ပြည်သူတွေကို တမင်ဦးတည်ပြီး တိုက်ခိုက်တာတွေ၊ အကြမ်းဖက်တာတွေကို ပိုပြီးလုပ်လာတယ်။ နောက်၊ အခုချိန်မှာ သူတို့ရဲ့ ပဓာနအားသာချက်ဖြစ်တဲ့ လေကြောင်းတိုက်ခိုက်မှုတွေကို စစ်ဘက်-အရပ်ဘက် ပစ်မှတ်မခွဲခြားဘဲ တောက်လျောက်လုပ်နေတယ်။ အရပ်သားပြည်သူ ကျေးရွာတွေကို ပိုပြီး မီးရှို့လာတယ်၊ ဖျက်ဆီးလာတယ်။ ဒါကပြောရရင် ဒင်းတို့ ဖက်ဆစ်တပ်ရဲ့ လုပ်ရိုးလုပ်စဉ်ဖြစ်သလို ငါတို့ PDF တပ်မတော်အနေနဲ့ကတော့ ပြည်သူ့အသက်အိုးအိမ် စည်းစိမ်ကို ပိုပြီး ကာကွယ်စောင့်ရှောက်ပေးနိုင်ဖို့ ကြိုးစားရမှာ ဖြစ်တယ်။ ရဲဘော်တို့- အခုလို ငါတို့ပြည်သူ့တော်လှန်ရေးနဲ့ PDF တပ်မတော်တို့ အရှိန်တခု၊ အခြေအနေတခုကို ရောက်လာတဲ့ အချိန် ငါတို့တွေအားလုံး သတိပြု၊ သတိချပ်ရမယ့် အကြောင်းအရာတခုကိုလည်း ပြောချင်တယ်။ ဒါကတော့ ရန်သူက ငါတို့တော်လှန်ရေးကို ပုံဖျက်ဖို့၊ ငါတို့ PDF တပ်မတော်ရဲ့ ပုံရိပ်ကို ကျဆင်းစေဖို့နဲ့ သွေးခွဲဖြိုဖျက်နိုင်ဖို့ နည်းလမ်းမျိုးစုံက ကြိုးပမ်းလာတာပဲ။ ငါတို့ဟာ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စုကို ခုခံတိုက်ပွဲ ဝင်နေချိန်မှာ တဖက်ကလည်း ငါတို့ PDF တပ်မတော်ကို ကျားကုတ်ကျားခဲ တည်ဆောက်နေရတာလည်း ဖြစ်တယ်။ အမိန့်ပေးကွပ်ကဲမှုစနစ် မှန်ကန်၊ အားကောင်း၊ ခိုင်မာတဲ့ တပ်မတော်တရပ်ဖြစ်ဖို့၊ ကျင့်ဝတ် စည်းကမ်း ကောင်းမွန်တဲ့ တပ်မတော်တရပ်ဖြစ်ဖို့ ငါတို့အားလုံး ကြိုးပမ်း တည်ဆောက်နေတာ ဖြစ်တယ်။ ငါတို့ PDF တပ်မတော်ရဲ့ စွမ်းဆောင်ရည်နဲ့ လုပ်ဆောင်နိုင်မှုဟာ ဒီတော်လှန်ရေးအောင်ပွဲနဲ့ တိုက်ရိုက် အချိုးကျနေတယ်ဆိုတာလည်း ရဲဘော်တို့ နားလည်ကြပြီးဖြစ်တယ်။ ရဲဘော်တို့- ပြည်သူ့တော်လှန်ရေးကြီး အောင်ပွဲဝင်ဖို့အရေးမှာ ငါတို့ PDF တပ်မတော်ကြီး စုစည်းခိုင်မာ အားကောင်း ဖို့က အသက်တမျှ အရေးကြီးတယ်ဆိုတာကို အလေးအနက် ပြောချင်တယ်။ PDF တပ်မတော်ရဲ့ ဂုဏ်သတင်းကောင်းကို ဆက်လက်ထိန်းသိမ်း၊ မြှင့်တင်ကြဖို့ ရဲဘော်တို့ အားလုံးမှာ တာဝန်ကိုယ်စီ ရှိတယ်။ PDFတပ်မတော်ရဲ့ ဂုဏ်ကိုဆောင်နိုင်တာက ရဲဘော်တို့ဖြစ်သလို PDF ရဲ့ ဂုဏ်ကို ကျဆင်းစေနိုင်တာကလည်း ရဲဘော်တို့ပဲ ဖြစ်တယ်။ ဒါကို အားလုံးက အထူးသဘောပေါက် နားလည်ကြစေချင်တယ်။ ငါတို့ရဲ့ PDF တပ်မတော်ဟာ ပြည်သူက အားကိုးတဲ့၊ ပြည်သူက ချစ်မြတ်နိုးတဲ့ ပြည်သူ့အချစ်တော် PDF တပ်မတော်အဖြစ် အမြဲတမ်း ဆက်လက်ရပ်တည်နိုင်ရမှာ ဖြစ်တယ်။ တဖက်က အကြမ်းဖက် စစ်အုပ်စု ကတော့ အားလုံးသိကြတဲ့အတိုင်း ပြည်သူ့ချဉ်ဖတ်၊ပြည်သူ့အော့နှလုံးနာရတဲ့ လက်နက်ကိုင်လူသတ်ဂိုဏ်း၊ ဓားပြဂိုဏ်းအကြီးစားကြီးပဲ ဖြစ်တယ်။ တပ်မတော်ဆိုတဲ့ စကားလုံးနဲ့ အဲ့ဒီအကြမ်းဖက်အဖွဲ့နဲ့လုံးဝ မထိုက် တန်ဘူး။ အခုချိန်မှာ လက်နက်စွဲကိုင်ကြတာချင်း တူပေမယ့် ငါတို့ PDF တပ်မတော်ရဲ့ လက်နက်က ပြည်သူ ကို ကာကွယ်ဖို့၊ ပြည်သူ့အသက်အိုးအိမ်စည်းစိမ်ကို စောင့်ရှောက်ဖို့ ဖြစ်တယ်။ အကြမ်းဖက် အာဏာသိမ်း စစ်အုပ်စုရဲ့ လက်နက်ကတော့ ငါတို့ ပြည်သူကို သတ်ဖို့၊ ဖြတ်ဖို့၊ နှိပ်စက် ဖို့ပဲဖြစ်တယ်။ ငါတို့ PDF တပ်မတော်နဲ့ ဒီအကြမ်းဖက်အုပ်စုဟာ လက်နက်ကိုင်ရခြင်း၊ တည်ရှိရခြင်း အဓိပ္ပာယ်နဲ့ အနှစ်သာရက မိုးနဲ့မြေလို၊ အဖြူနဲ့ အမည်းလို ကွာခြားတယ်၊ ကွာခြားမှလည်း ရမယ်ဆိုတာ ရဲဘော်တို့ သဘောပေါက် နားလည်ပြီးဖြစ်တယ်။ ရဲဘော်တို့- အခု ကူးပြောင်းရောက်ရှိလာတဲ့ မြန်မာနှစ်သစ် ၁၃၈၅ ခုနှစ်ဟာ ငါတို့တော်လှန်ရေးအနေနဲ့ပြောမယ်ဆိုရင် ခုခံတွန်းလှန်စစ် ဒုတိယနှစ် ဖြစ်တယ်။ ဒီနှစ်မှာ ငါတို့တွေ အရင်ထပ်ပိုပြီး ရုန်းကြမယ်၊ ညီကြမယ်၊ တသံတည်းညီ တချီတည်းရုန်းကြဖို့ ဖြစ်တယ်။ ငါတို့တော်လှန်ရေးနဲ့ အရွေ့ဟာ ငါတို့ PDF တပ်မတော်ရဲ့ စုစည်း၊ ညီညွတ်၊ စွမ်းဆောင်နိုင်မှုအပေါ် မူတည်နေတာဖြစ်တယ်။ ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီပြည်ထောင်စု မုချတည်ဆောက်နိုင်ရမည်။ ပြည်သူ့အရေးတော်ပုံ မုချအောင်ရမည်။..."
Source/publisher: Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update: 2023-04-17
[field_licence]
Type: Individual Documents
Language:
Format : pdf
Size: 2.25 MB
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Title: “ဝ” ပြည်နယ် ငြိမ်းချမ်းရေးတည်ဆောက်မှု (၃၄) နှစ်ပြည့်သို့ ပေးပို့သော ဂုဏ်ပြုသဝဏ်လွှာ
Description: "၁။ ယနေ့ ကျရောက်သော “ဝ” ပြည်နယ် ၏ ငြိမ်းချမ်းရေးတည်ဆောက်မှု (၃၄) နှစ်မြောက် နေ့တွင် “ဝ” အမျိုးသားပြည်သူလူထုတရပ်လုံး ကိုယ်စိတ်နှစ်ဖြာ ကျန်းမာ၊ချမ်းသာကြပါစေဟု နှုတ်ခွန်းဆက်သ နှစ်သစ်ဆုမွန်ကောင်းတောင်းလျက် ဝမ်းမြောက်ဂုဏ်ယူကြောင်း ဦးစွာဖော်ပြအပ်ပါသည်။ ၂။ ၁၉၈၉ ခုနှစ် ဧပြီလ (၁၇) ရက်နေ့မှစတင်ခဲ့သည့် ငြိမ်းချမ်းရေးတည်ဆောက်မှုခရီးတွင် “ဝ” ပြည်သူများသည် “ဝ”ပြည်သွေးစည်းညီညွတ်ရေးပါတီ၊ “ဝ”ပြည်သွေးစည်းညီညွတ်ရေးတပ်မတော်၏ ဦးဆောင်ကြိုးပမ်းမှုအောက်တွင် အတူတကွ ရုန်းကန်ကြိုးစားလျက် ဒေသဖွံ့ဖြိုးရေး၊ တည်ဆောက်ရေး လုပ်ငန်းများကို စည်းလုံးညီညွတ်စွာဖြင့် အကောင်အထည်ဖော် ဆောင်ရွက်ခဲ့ကြသောကြောင့် ယနေ့အချိန်တွင် တည်ငြိမ်အေးချမ်း၊ သာယာဝပြော၍ လူမှုစီးပွားဘဝ အာမခံချက်အပြည့်အဝရှိသော လူနေမှုဘဝကို ရရှိခံစား နေထိုင်နေကြပြီဖြစ်သည်။ ၃။ ယနေ့ ပြည်သူလူထုတရပ်လုံး ကြုံတွေ့ခံစားနေရသည့် မတရားအာဏာသိမ်း အကြမ်းဖက် စစ်တပ်၏ အဆုံးစွန်သော ရက်စက်ကြမ်းကြုတ်မှုများနှင့် နှစ်ကာလပေါင်းများစွာသော မတရား ဖိနှိပ်မှုများကို အဆုံးသတ်အမြစ်ဖြတ်ရန်မှာ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်အား အပြီးတိုင်ဖယ်ရှားပြီး ဖက်ဒရယ် ဒီမိုကရေစီပြည်ထောင်စုတရပ်ကို အားလုံးအတူတကွ လက်တွဲထူထောင် ကြရမည်ဖြစ်သည်။ ၄။ “ဝ” ပြည်နယ်၏ ရရှိပြီးသော တည်ငြိမ်အေးချမ်းမှု၊ ဒေသဖွံဖြိုးမှု၊ လူမှုစီးပွားဘဝ ဖွံ့ဖြိုးတိုးတက်မှုများကို ဆက်လက်ခိုင်မာမြင့်မားတိုးတက်စေရန် “ဝ” ပြည်သွေးစည်းညီညွတ်ရေးပါတီ၊ “ဝ” ပြည်သွေးစည်းညီညွတ်ရေးတပ်မတော်၊ “ဝ” ပြည်နယ် ပြည်သူ့အစိုးရတို့သည် ကိုယ်ပိုင်အုပ်ချုပ်ခွင့်၊ ကိုယ်ပိုင်ပြဌာန်းခွင့်များနှင့်အညီ ဦးဆောင်ကြိုးပမ်း ဆောင်ရွက် နိုင်ပါစေကြောင်းနှင့် အနာဂတ်ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီပြည်ထောင်စုကို အတူတကွ လက်တွဲပုံဖော် တည်ထောင်ကြရန် လေးစားစွာဖြင့် တိုက်တွန်းနှိုးဆော်လျက် ယနေ့ ၂၀၂၃ ခုနှစ် ဧပြီလ (၁၇) ရက်နေ့တွင် ကျရောက်သော “ဝ” ပြည်နယ်၏ ငြိမ်းချမ်းရေးတည်ဆောက်မှု (၃၄) နှစ်ပြည့် အခမ်းအနားသို့ ဤသဝဏ်လွှာကို ဂုဏ်ယူစွာဖြင့် ပေးပို့အပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher: Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update: 2023-04-17
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Title: ပြည်ထောင်စုလွှတ်တော်ကိုယ်စားပြုကော်မတီ၏ သတင်းစဉ် အမှတ် (၈)
Description: "ပြည်ထောင်စုလွှတ်တော်ကိုယ်စားပြုကော်မတီက နှစ်ပတ်လျှင်တစ်ကြိမ် ထုတ်ပြန်ခဲ့သော သတင်းစဉ်များကို pdf file ရယူလိုပါက အောက်ပါ CRPH ဝက်ဘ်ဆိုက်လင့်ခ်မှတစ်ဆင့် ရယူနိုင်ပါသည်။ https://crphmyanmar.org/publication/newsletter/ ပြည်ထောင်စုလွှတ်တော်ကိုယ်စားပြုကော်မတီ..."
Source/publisher: Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw
Date of entry/update: 2023-04-16
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Title: Kanbalu: up to 165 people killed in military airstrike, 11 April
Description: "On the morning of Tuesday 11 April 2022, an airstrike by the Myanmar military targeted a celebration in Pazigyi village, in Sagaing region’s Kanbalu township. At least 165 people were killed, including 27 women and 19 children, and at least 30 others injured. Around 300 people were gathered in Pazigyi village to celebrate the opening of a new office for the local People’s Defence Force, anti-coup militias operating under the umbrella of the National Unity Government (NUG). During the ceremony, fighter jets bombed the crowd before a helicopter arrived from which soldiers fired on first responders and those transporting the wounded. That afternoon, the aircraft returned, opening fire on those trying to collect the dead. This is one of the deadliest military attacks on the civilian population since the junta seized power in February 2021. Since the coup, AOAV has recorded 1,958 civilian casualties (786 killed and 1,172 injured) across 988 incidents. Among the civilians harmed, at least 297 were reported as children, 231 as women, and 237 as men..."
Source/publisher: Action on Armed Violence (London) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of entry/update: 2023-04-14
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Title: Statement from Karen Rivers Watch for International Day of Action for Rivers and Against Dams
Description: "Today, on the International Day of Action for Rivers and Against Dams, we celebrate the healthy rivers that play a vital role in our lives, and call on governments, social organizations, and people around the world to stand united in protecting our rivers. Rivers provide water for agriculture, drinking, and food production and they provide essential ecosystem services for humanity. They are also important for the protection of biodiversity and survival of countless trees, flora, and fauna species. However, living rivers are facing threats due to the building of dams and extraction of water and natural resources. In particular, large-scale hydropower projects built on rivers in Myanmar are having negative effects on the environment and people in river basins. Large-scale development projects in Myanmar are ignoring the rights of Indigenous and local peoples; their participation rights and rights to their lands. Their rights are not recognised by the centralized system of governance in Myanmar. During the two years since the military coup, environmental damage has increased in Myanmar’s ethnic areas, while civic spaces and mechanisms for taking urgent action have broken down. After the coup, the State Administration Council (SAC) leader announced the resumption of the Hatgyi dam project on the Salween river in Karen state. Military conflicts have occurred at the proposed Hatgyi Dam site since 2014. Gold mining in rivers, and river sand extraction activities have poisoned the waters and impacted local communities and the environment along the river. Along with militarized development, local people are also losing their livelihoods, homes, and lives due to the military’s air and ground attacks and many are hiding in forests. Humanitarian aid is urgently needed. We, Karen Rivers Watch, Karen indigenous people, and Karen civil society partner organizations call upon international governments, UN agencies, investors, and individuals to preserve our healthy rivers and their ecosystems, and halt all large-scale hydropower projects on Myanmar’s rivers, which have significant social and environmental impacts. This is especially important at a time when climate change already contributes greatly to environmental degradation. Today, on the International Day of Action for Rivers and Against Dams, we celebrate the beauty and power of living rivers and renew our commitments to protect them for all people and the planet. We make the following demands: Karen Nation Union must: Oppose all large-scale development and resource extraction projects that confiscate lands, destroy forests and threaten local livelihoods. Implement their existing environmental policies and protect rivers, forests resources, endangered species and valuable resources. Take action to prevent large business interests profiteering from Kawthoolei’s natural resources. Resist the military dictatorship, which is perpetuating the centralized system which exploits the resources of ethnic groups, and instead encourage and support local management systems. National Unity Consultative Council must: Begin implementing policies to develop a federal resource management system that respects the rights of indigenous peoples and ethnic nationalities. Blacklist companies and entrepreneurs who invest in or implement natural resources extraction projects which financially support the military. Cooperate with civil society organizations to advocate to the international community. International organizations, donors, and UN agencies must: Terminate all loan programs to companies attempting to build Mega-dam projects that will damage people’s livelihoods and the environment. Provide cross-border humanitarian aid to those affected by the ongoing conflicts in Burma through ethnics existing infrastructures..."
Source/publisher: Karen Environmental and Social Action Network
Date of entry/update: 2023-04-14
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Title: Myanmar – France condemns the air strike on the village of Pa Zi Gyi in the strongest terms (11 April 2023)
Description: "France condemns in the strongest possible terms yesterday’s horrific air strike by Myanmar’s forces on the village of Pa Zi Gyi, Myanmar, which left several dozen dead and injured, including children. This latest massacre of civilians is consistent with the Myanmar junta’s strategy, for more than two years now, of indiscriminate violence against the Myanmar people, who reject its illegitimate power grab. France offers its condolences to the victims’ families and loved ones. France will continue to stand firmly with the Myanmar people, whose courage and staunch commitment to democracy we applaud..."
Source/publisher: French Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Date of entry/update: 2023-04-13
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Title: Statement by Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield on the Burma Regime Airstrike
Description: "United States Mission to the United Nations Office of Press and Public Diplomacy For Immediate Release April 13, 2023 Statement by Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield on the Burma Regime Airstrike Today, the UN Security Council discussed the Burma military’s April 11 airstrike in the Sagaing region that killed more than 130 people and injured dozens of others, including children. The United States condemns this latest attack by the Burma military regime, which is yet another example of its disregard for human life and international law. We reiterate our call on the regime to cease all forms of violence, allow unhindered humanitarian access, and respect the genuine and inclusive democratic aspirations of the people of Burma. The regime must abide by its obligations under international humanitarian law, including rules on the protection of civilians. The Security Council must support the full implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 2669 and ASEAN’s Five Point Consensus and promote justice and accountability for the atrocities and abuses committed by Burma’s military regime. The United States will continue to support peace, human rights, and the establishment of a path toward a genuine and inclusive, multi-party democracy in Burma through our work with members of the Security Council, other UN Member States, and regional partners, including ASEAN..."
Source/publisher: United States Mission to the United Nations
Date of entry/update: 2023-04-13
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Title: ASEAN Act Now: Protect the Myanmar People From Atrocities by the Military Junta
Description: "12 April 2023: The international community must take immediate action against the illegal military junta to protect the Myanmar people from escalating junta atrocities and bring its leaders to justice following Tuesday’s shocking airstrikes against civilians, says the Special Advisory Council for Myanmar (SAC-M). At least 100 people, including children, were killed and dozens injured in an horrific aerial attack by junta forces on civilians in Pazigyi village, Kanbalu Township in the Sagaing Region of Myanmar on Tuesday, 11 April 2023. According to local media, junta jets dropped bombs and junta attack helicopters fired machine guns on more than 100 people gathered in the village for the inauguration ceremony of a local civilian administration office on Tuesday morning. The junta then launched a second round of aerial attacks on the village later the same day, as people were attempting to locate and identify the dead. The airstrikes could not have taken place without authorisation from commanders who report directly to the leader of the illegal junta, Min Aung Hlaing, through their chain of command. Only the junta has access to military aircraft in Myanmar. The junta’s violence is in further blatant defiance of United Nations (UN) Security Council resolution 2669, adopted on 21 December 2022, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Five-Point Consensus, that Min Aung Hlaing agreed to with ASEAN leaders on 24 April 2021. The UN and ASEAN are being played for fools by Min Aung Hlaing and the Generals, who believe they will face no consequences for the barbaric violence they continue to inflict on the Myanmar people – violence that includes the 2016 and 2017 Rohingya genocide. The UN Security Council must use its powers under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to enforce the junta’s compliance with its resolution, including through targeted sanctions on military financial interests and aviation fuel, a comprehensive arms embargo and referral to the International Criminal Court. SAC-M calls on the Security Council to convene an emergency meeting this week to consider actions under Chapter VII. ASEAN must use its upcoming summit in May 2023 to adopt complementary punitive actions against the junta, with support from other governments in the region. Support for the democratic resistance in Myanmar must be urgently stepped up, including, as a priority, the provision of cross-border humanitarian assistance delivered directly to those in need. Until the military junta’s violence is ended, there can be no solution to the crisis in Myanmar..."
Source/publisher: Special Advisory Council for Myanmar
Date of entry/update: 2023-04-12
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Title: How Myanmar Junta’s Plan to Deceive World With Sham Election Failed
Description: "The Myanmar junta’s plan to use the National League for Democracy (NLD) to deceive the international community and Myanmar people has failed, as Myanmar’s most popular party will not contest the military regime’s proposed sham poll and has refused to re-register under the junta’s new political parties law. The regime had hoped to persuade the NLD to contest the election, for which there is still no date, so that it would appear legitimate to the outside world. The junta only gave up hope on that plan last month, after waiting over two years to hold an election. Last month, the regime arranged for NLD members to meet jailed former State Counselor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, hoping that they would be able to persuade the NLD leader to re-register her party with the junta-controlled Union Election Commission (UEC). Two NLD central executive committee members traveled to Naypyitaw Prison to meet Suu Kyi on March 25, three days before the deadline for re-registration, to seek advice about whether or not to re-register the party. Suu Kyi refused to meet the pair, but told prison authorities to “get them tea and let them go back”, putting an end to the junta’s plan to deceive the international community and NLD members. The regime’s plan Junta boss Min Aung Hlaing sees an election as a chance to cement the regime’s power politically. However, with local and overseas condemnation of the planned poll, mounting international pressure and armed resistance from the parallel National Unity Government (NUG) and its armed wing the People’s Defense Forces (PDF), the junta is aware that its planned election will fail unless it is also contested by the NLD. The regime naively thought that if the NLD contests the election, the junta would earn some regional and international credibility, while also deceiving the Myanmar people into believing the poll is legitimate. That’s why the junta allowed senior NLD members to meet Daw Aung San Suu Kyi in the hope that she would give her blessing for the party to contest the election. However, if the NLD with Suu Kyi contested the election, the military’s proxy parties would be unlikely to win, as the NLD has won every election it has contested by landslide victories. What the regime really wanted was for the NLD to take part in the poll without Suu Kyi. The previous military dictatorship staged the 1990 and 2010 general elections while Suu Kyi was under house arrest. Min Aung Hlaing also thought that if Daw Aung San Suu Kyi agreed to the NLD re-registering to take part in the poll, it would open up a divide between her and the NLD, as well as the NUG, the PDFs and international community including the United States. And the junta would have been able to prevent Suu Kyi from taking part in the poll as its election laws prevent prisoners from being members of registered political parties. But Daw Aung San Suu Kyi refused even to meet the NLD members sent to sound her out, leaving the regime with no choice but to dissolve the NLD for refusing to re-register under the new political parties law. Junta’s efforts behind the scenes After the 2021 coup, the regime arrested Suu Kyi, as well as the NLD vice-chairs and almost all the NLD’s central executive committee. But it has chosen Daw Sandar Min and Monywa Aung Shin to resurrect the party. Daw Sandar Min, a former NLD Yangon Region lawmaker, confessed that in recent interviews with the media. The junta assigned a military intelligence office to control NLD lawmakers and party members, requiring them to agree not to engage with the NUG and PDFs. It is Daw Sandar Min who has been acting as liaison between the regime and NLD lawmakers and party members. In her media interviews, Daw Sandar Min was careful with her choice of words in talking about the coup. She echoes the Myanmar military’s line, describing the putsch as a “takeover in line with law”, which reflects her ties with the junta. Daw Sandar Min and Monywa Aung Shin have tried in various ways to get permission from Daw Aung San Suu Kyi to re-open NLD party offices that were closed following the coup. “Daw Sandar Min sent letters to Suu Kyi in jail,” a senior NLD member told The Irrawaddy. That is not something that could have been done without the approval of the junta. She also visited Suu Kyi in prison, but in media interviews has admitted that they did not discuss politics and that she left after paying her respects to the ousted State Counselor. According to sources in Naypyitaw, Suu Kyi received Daw Sandar Min, but later told the prison authorities not to deliver letters from Daw Sandar Min anymore, having already told her not to visit again. Another failed meeting confirmed this. On March 25, former NLD Tanintharyi Region chair U Aung Soe and lower house lawmaker U Win Myint Aung, who represented Depayin Township in Sagaing Region, traveled to Naypyitaw Prison, where Suu Kyi is held in solitary confinement. Their visit came just three days before the regime-controlled UEC dissolved the NLD. Daw Sandar Min did not accompany the two men, having been told not to come again. But Suu Kyi’s blunt message to “get them tea and let them go back” shattered the junta’s plan to exploit Suu Kyi and the NLD. Now the regime faces a rerun of the 2010 poll, when proxy parties contested the poll and the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party took office..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update: 2023-04-12
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Title: Pieces of Flesh Were Everywhere: Myanmar Airstrike Survivor
Description: "Myanmar’s regime attacked Pazi Gyi village in Kantbalu Township, Sagaing Region, on Tuesday morning with a fighter jet and Mi-35 assault helicopter while a people’s authority office was being opened. Around 100 civilians, including elderly people, women and children, were killed in the bombing. A resistance fighter, who survived the attack, told The Irrawaddy about the incident. What happened at the ceremony? Resistance fighters to the west reported seeing a jet fighter. But the phone reception was poor and I could not hear clearly. I went outside and saw the fighter. Everyone else saw it too. Those who died didn’t have time to run. Many people were stunned and they died watching the plane. I was lucky because I dived into a roadside ditch. What happened next? It dropped a bomb and there was an explosion and smoke. From the ditch, I could see dead bodies strewn everywhere. I was only around 20 steps from the explosion. People around 20 meters away were injured. We asked the injured to shout out so we knew who could be rescued. We could not identify the victims. Heads were separated from bodies. Children’s limbs were severed. Small pieces of flesh were spread around. We searched for survivors through the jumble of bodies. We tried to send the injured to a clinic while looking out for more attacks. The bombing was at around 8am and around 30 minutes later a Mi-35 strafed the village. It didn’t kill anyone. What is the estimated death toll? The bomb hit a crowd of around 150 people. Some victims were toddlers and other young children. More than 30 people were injured and around 15 survived. There were around 100 fatalities, including about 20 children. Body parts were scattered. Most of the victims were women, including around 10 pregnant women. Only around 10 people escaped with minor injuries. Could you estimate the death toll by body parts? The bodies were unrecognizable. Some were without heads and limbs. We could not identify them. We put them together and burned them. The event was to open a people’s authority office. Were the victims from many villages? Most were Pazi Gyi villagers. Only a few were from other villages. It was still early so the other villagers had not arrived. Was it going to be the only administrative office in the area? The civilian administration office was built outside the village, partly to protect villagers. The office was flattened by a bomb. We didn’t hear screams when it was hit. People could not scream because they were killed immediately. Around 30 mines and shells behind the office ignited and the blasts lasted about an hour. Were the bodies incinerated and can their families be contacted? We burned the bodies together so no one can identify them now. We had to sweep up pieces of flesh with brooms. We have not fully cleaned up. All the villagers have fled. We will only be able to name the victims when they are reported missing. Were any resistance fighters killed? Around 20 resistance fighters were killed but the majority of victims were civilians as the fighters were busy doing chores and were outside the building. What is your response to the attack? How are the villagers coping? It is quite despicable. I don’t complain about attacks if there is fighting in the area but there have only been a few clashes. The attack was one-sided. Women and elderly people have left the area or are hiding in the forests. Some male villagers have returned to the village. My ears are still buzzing and I see pieces of flesh everywhere..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update: 2023-04-12
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Title: Q&A: Tom Andrews, UN Special Rapporteur for Myanmar
Description: "WASHINGTON — The U.N. special rapporteur for Myanmar says the international community, including the U.N. Security Council, is still failing to provide protection against the Myanmar junta’s violent attacks on the people of Myanmar. More than 100 people, including women and children, were killed Tuesday when Myanmar’s military junta bombed the Kanbalu township in the Sagaing region, according to witnesses contacted by VOA Burmese. “More innocent people killed, more children killed, more violations of international law and human rights. We need to stop as an international community and recognize this fact,” Tom Andrews told VOA via Skype on Wednesday. This interview has been edited for length and clarity. VOA: How serious are the Myanmar junta's airstrikes against its own civilians under international law? U.N. Special Rapporteur for Myanmar Tom Andrews: They're extremely serious. First of all, we've seen a significant uptick, a significant increase in the use of fighter jets dropping bombs, the use of helicopter gunships descending on villages and opening fire. There is an increasing use of these types of weapons. These weapons kill without any kind of discrimination. They wipe out entire villages. I've even seen them [bombs] dropped on the centers [for the internally displaced], where people have gone for safety, and children have been killed. These are the characteristics of war crimes. These are the characteristics of crimes against humanity. This is not only unacceptable from a moral point of view, it is illegal from an international law point of view. So we must do more to stop this carnage and impose the fundamental foundations of international law with respect to Myanmar. The people of Myanmar deserve nothing less. VOA: The junta's spokesperson confirmed the Kanbalu airstrike, in which dozens of civilians were reportedly killed, but he said the attacks there were justified because, according to him, the National Unity Government, which had just opened its local office, is an armed terrorist group. What is your view on the junta's response? Andrews: Citizens are not terrorists. Children are not terrorists. Those who are opposed to the junta and its killing of innocent people are not terrorists. They are patriots. They are those who are committed to a just democracy for Myanmar, human rights for Myanmar. These are not crimes. These should be embraced and applauded by everyone. The people of Myanmar, fighting for their future, trying to create justice and human rights for their children, are not terrorists. They are patriots. VOA: What kind of action should the international community, including the U.N. Security Council, take against the junta to protect the Myanmar people? Andrews: Step one is recognize that what has happened to this point is failing. It's simply not working. And more of the same is going to mean more of the same in Myanmar: more innocent people killed, more children killed, more violations of international law and human rights. We need to stop as an international community and recognize this fact. We are failing the people of Myanmar. That's step one. Step two is to examine all of the options that we have to stop this carnage. The international community, even though the U.N. Security Council was not willing to support an action resolution after the invasion of Ukraine, nevertheless formed a coalition. That coalition formed a coordinated strategy to support the people of Ukraine. And the world has worked together to put maximum pressure on Russia and provide maximum support for the people of Ukraine. This is exactly the approach that we need for the people of Myanmar. The international community, who support the people of Myanmar, who condemn these attacks, who support human rights, democracy, need to form an action coalition — not a word coalition — an action coalition in which all the options can be put on the table and examined, and everyone can coordinate these actions together. We need to find the vulnerable spots in the junta, identify them clearly and work together to seize this opportunity to deny them the resources that they need, the weapons that they need, the capacity that they need in order to continue these horrific attacks. That's what the international community needs to do. If we don't do this, then we can only expect that there's going to be more attacks, more carnage, more innocent people killed, more violations of human rights. And frankly, if that happens, then we have aided and abetted those horrific actions that are being taken against the people of Myanmar. VOA: The Rohingya repatriation program, which is being coordinated with the U.N., the Bangladeshi government and the junta itself, is being criticized by human rights organizations because they say it isn’t safe to return to parts of Myanmar. Can you shed some light on the U.N.'s role in the repatriation process, especially regarding its interactions with the junta? Andrews: No one, including the United Nations, should be supporting a repatriation process in which the Rohingya who are in Bangladesh under very harsh conditions are nonetheless brought to Myanmar in very unsafe conditions — conditions that are not conducive whatsoever to a safe, dignified return; repatriation that does not include protection of human rights, protection of citizenship, protection of life and safety. No one should be supporting that kind of repatriation process, because it won't work. It's unfair. We could see even more hardship for those people who are in Bangladesh, who have suffered so much. So, whether it's the United Nations or any other entity, we should not be moving forward with any repatriation process, including a pilot program, under these conditions. VOA: Your position as U.N. special rapporteur has been renewed for another five-year term. What will your main focus be regarding human rights in Myanmar in the short term and in the long term? Andrews: Well, I'm very grateful to have my service as special rapporteur renewed by the Human Rights Council. I will be doing some very basic things going forward with this mandate. Number one, first and foremost, is to listen to the people of Myanmar, those who are providing me with extraordinarily important information and analysis and insight as to what is going on inside of the country, what is going on for those who have escaped the country and what needs to be done, what the United Nations and the international community needs to do. Number two, it is reaching out to those nations who are in a position to provide stronger support for the people of Myanmar and try to engage them in efforts that can do just that. I've been traveling in the region. I was in Thailand this past year. I traveled to Malaysia this past year. I am preparing right now to travel to Japan. I was in the Republic of Korea a few months ago. I'm planning to travel during this year to Indonesia. And I'm going to be doing everything that I can to sit down and work with leaders of the region and leaders throughout the world to make it very clear that it's in no one's interest to allow this catastrophe to continue to unfold before our very eyes. And it's in all of our interests as an international community to work together to support the human rights and justice of Myanmar people and to oppose this military junta. So, that is primarily what is on my agenda as I seek to serve the U.N. Human Rights Council and the United Nations General Assembly in this coming year..."
Source/publisher: "VOA" (Washington, D.C)
Date of entry/update: 2023-04-12
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Title: Screaming people and bodies everywhere: The horrific aftermath of Myanmar junta airstrike that killed 133
Description: "(CNN)— Relatives were still recovering the charred bodies and limbs of victims killed in a military airstrike on a village in central Myanmar Wednesday, a day after one of the deadliest attacks since the junta seized power in a coup two years ago. An eyewitness, who hid in a tunnel during the attack, described a scene of horror as he approached the site of the military airstrike – of children dying, women screaming, and bodies heaped on the ground. At least 133 people, including women and children, were killed after Myanmar’s military junta bombed Kanbalu township in the central Sagaing region on Tuesday, the human rights minister of the ousted shadow National Unity Government Aung Myo Min told CNN. First responders and medical teams haven’t been able to return to the site of the attack because military planes have continued flying over the town, though there have been no further strikes, said Aung Myo Min. At least 20 children were killed in the strike and 50 people injured, according to the Kyunhla activist group, which was at the scene. About 300 people had gathered in Pazigyi Village early on Tuesday morning to celebrate the opening of a local administration office, an eyewitness told CNN on the condition of anonymity because he fears retribution. Families had traveled from nearby villages for the event, where tea and food was offered and which coincided with the start of the Thingyan New Year celebrations. Like much of Sagaing, the area is not under the control of the military junta. The new town office was being opened under the authority of the shadow National Unity Government (NUG), for the people, as part of the anti-junta resistance. “We didn’t have any warning,” the eyewitness said. “Most of the villagers were inside the event, so they didn’t notice the jet.” Just before 8 a.m., a junta aircraft bombed the village where the ceremony was being held, the eyewitness and local media reported. An Mi35 helicopter then circled and fired on the village minutes later, the eyewitness told CNN. “When I arrived at the scene we tried to search for people still alive,” he said. “Everything was terrible. People were dying (as they were being transported) on motorbikes. Children and women. Some lost their heads, limbs, hands. I saw flesh on the road.” The eyewitness said he saw dozens of bodies after the attack, including children as young as five. He said he lost four family members in the strike, and a young child from his village was among the dead. “I saw lots of people coming onto the scene to search for their kids, crying and screaming,” he said. At around 5:30 p.m. the junta jets returned and shot the same place they had bombed that morning, he said. CNN cannot independently verify the incident but the eyewitness’s account matches reports in local media and from the NUG. Videos and images from the aftermath, shown to CNN from witnesses and a local activist group, also show bodies, some burned and in pieces, as well as destroyed buildings, vehicles and debris. Myanmar’s junta spokesman Maj. Gen. Zaw Min Tun confirmed the airstrike on Pazigyi Village and said if civilian casualties occurred it was because they were forced to help “terrorists.” The junta has designated the NUG and resistance groups known as the People’s Defense Force in the country as terrorists. “At 8 a.m…. NUG (National Unity Government) and PDF (People’s Defense Force) conducted an opening ceremony of the public administration office at Pazigyi village,” Zaw Min Tun said on the military’s Myawaddy TV channel. “We had launched the attack on them. We were informed that PDF were killed at that event under the attack. They are opposing our government.” The strike was condemned internationally, with one top UN official saying global indifference to the situation in Myanmar contributed to the attack. “The Myanmar military’s attacks against innocent people, including today’s airstrike in Sagaing, is enabled by world indifference and those supplying them with weapons,” said Tom Andrews, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar. “How many Myanmar children need to die before world leaders take strong, coordinated action to stop this carnage?” The US Department of State said it was “deeply concerned” about the airstrikes and called on the regime to “cease the horrific violence.” “These violent attacks further underscore the regime’s disregard for human life and its responsibility for the dire political and humanitarian crisis in Burma following the February 2021 coup,” it said, using an alternative name for Myanmar. It’s been just over two years since the military seized power, ousting the democratically elected government and jailing its leader Aung San Suu Kyi. In order to crush resistance, the junta regularly carries out airstrikes and ground attacks on what it calls “terrorist” targets. The attacks have killed civilians, including children, and targeted schools, clinics, hospitals and other civilian infrastructure. Whole villages have been burned by junta soldiers and thousands of people have been displaced in the attacks, according to local monitoring groups. Battles between the military and resistance groups unfold daily across Myanmar. These rebel groups, some of whom have aligned with some of the country’s long-established ethnic militias, effectively control parts of the country out of the junta’s reach. Resistance groups and humanitarian organizations have repeatedly accused Myanmar’s military of carrying out mass killings, air strikes and war crimes against civilians in the regions where fighting has raged, charges the junta repeatedly denies – despite a growing body of evidence. “They’re losing control of the country. They’re losing ground. Things are much more unstable on the ground than they’ve ever been,” the UN’s Andrews told CNN on Wednesday. “As a result of that, they’re using air power more and more and, of course, as they do so, more and more civilians are being killed.” On Monday, junta airstrikes hit a town in western Chin state’s Falam Township, killing nine people when bombs dropped on a school, according to local media Myanmar Now and The Irrawaddy. Last week, 8,000 refugees in southern Karen state fled across the border to Thailand, escaping fighting in Myawaddy township, according to a statement from Thailand’s Tak provincial office public relations department, posted to Facebook. In March, at least 22 people, including three monks, were killed at a monastery in southern Shan state. And a military airstrike on a school in Sagaing in September killed at least 13 people, including seven children. The eyewitness to Tuesday’s attack said the “situation in Myanmar is worse now.” “People are dying like dogs or cows. We don’t have any weapons to compare with what the military has. We need the help of the international community,” he said..."
Source/publisher: "CNN" (USA)
Date of entry/update: 2023-04-12
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Title: Southeast Asian lawmakers condemn deportation of three members of Myanmar opposition forces by Thai authorities
Description: "JAKARTA – Parliamentarians from Southeast Asia strongly condemn the decision by the Thai authorities to hand-over three members of Myanmar opposition forces into the hands of junta allies, where they are likely to be tortured, or worse. ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights (APHR) calls on the Thai government and the international community to ensure that such an incident does not happen again. “For far too long, the Thai authorities have been forcing asylum seekers and refugees back to Myanmar where they are at risk of persecution. This is a clear violation of international human rights law, norms and principles,” APHR Chair and member of the Indonesian House of Representatives, Mercy Barends, said today. According to information APHR received from local civil society organizations, on 1 April, three members of a Myanmar opposition group crossed into Thailand to seek medical treatment. On their way to Mae Sot, the three men were stopped at a checkpoint and taken into custody by Thai immigration. Then, on the morning of April 4, the Thai authorities handed them over to the Myanmar junta -allied Border Guard Force (BGF), despite efforts from opposition groups to negotiate a release. Witnesses say that BGF troops shot at the men after the handover. According to media reports, at least one of the men was killed. The fates of the other two remain unclear. Despite sharing an extensive border of more than 2,400 kilometers with Myanmar, the Thai government has not been welcoming to refugees who seek to escape the brutal violence of the Myanmar military. Human rights groups have repeatedly criticized Thailand for sending back those who cross the border. Asylum seekers from Myanmar in Thailand also face a precarious situation, where they lack legal protection and risk being deported at any time. Earlier this year, the Thai government officially adopted the UN Convention Against Torture, which states that “no government organizations or public officials shall expel, deport, or extradite a person to another country where there are substantial grounds for believing that the person would be in danger of torture, cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment, or enforced disappearance.” Releasing these three men into the hands of the Myanmar junta, which has repeatedly arbitrarily arrested, tortured, and at times even extrajudicially executed dissidents, is clearly in violation of this convention. “We urge the Thai government to allow those fleeing conflict in Myanmar to enter Thailand safely and to prioritize their protection. Thai authorities must immediately halt the deportation of citizens from Myanmar who face immense risks to their physical well-being in the hands of the junta,” said Barends. “In light of the upcoming Thai elections, we also urge all Thai political parties and candidates to address human rights concerns on their platforms. Lastly, we call on ASEAN, ASEAN member states, and the international community to put pressure on Thailand to ensure that all people are treated with dignity and that their rights are respected and upheld. No person who faces persecution in the country they are fleeing should be detained and forcibly returned.”..."
Source/publisher: ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights
Date of entry/update: 2023-04-12
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Title: Statement by Foreign Minister Huitfeldt on airstrikes killing civilians in Myanmar
Description: "‘I am horrified by reports of new military airstrikes killing civilians including children in Myanmar’, says Minister of Foreign Affairs Anniken Huitfeldt. ‘All forms of violence including attacks on civilians must end, international humanitarian law respected, and those responsible held accountable, in line with UN Security Council Resolution 2669.’..."
Source/publisher: Norwegian Government
Date of entry/update: 2023-04-12
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Title: Thailand: Myanmar Activists Forcibly Returned
Sub-title: Thai Government Aids Junta’s Persecution of Opposition
Description: "(New York) – Thai immigration officials forcibly returned three Myanmar opposition activists to Myanmar, putting them at grave risk of persecution and other abuses, Human Rights Watch said today. Myanmar junta authorities should immediately reveal the whereabouts of the activists – Thiha, 38, Htet Nay Win, 31, and Saw Phyo Lay, 26 – and any charges against them. On April 1, 2023, Thai authorities arrested the three members of the opposition group Lion Battalion Commando Column in the border town of Mae Sot in Tak province on illegal entry charges. On April 4, Thai immigration officials handed them over to a junta-aligned Border Guard Force in Myawaddy township in Karen State, Myanmar. “Thai officials colluded with the Myanmar junta by unlawfully returning these three opposition activists, whose lives and freedom are threatened,” said Elaine Pearson, Asia director at Human Rights Watch. “Thai authorities disregarded the grave dangers the men face in Myanmar.” Myanmar media reported that the Border Guard Force troops shot and wounded the men when they tried to escape. Informed sources said the men were later handed over to junta security forces. The Thai government has increasingly collaborated with Myanmar’s junta and aligned forces to harass, arrest, and forcibly return asylum seekers, including members of opposition groups who have fled to Thailand since the February 2021 military coup. On March 22, 2023, Thai authorities raided 40 buildings in Mae Sot used by members of the anti-junta People’s Defense Forces and asylum seekers from Myanmar. Since the coup, the Myanmar junta has carried out a nationwide campaign of mass killings, torture, arbitrary arrests, and indiscriminate attacks that amount to crimes against humanity and war crimes. Given the junta’s widespread human rights violations, forcible returns of asylum seekers and refugees to Myanmar violate the international legal principle of nonrefoulement, which prohibits countries from returning anyone to a country where they face a real risk of persecution, torture, or other serious harm. Even though Thailand is not a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention, it is bound to the principle of nonrefoulement under customary international law. In addition, Thailand has ratified the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and signed the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance. Thailand has incorporated the provisions of both treaties into its newly enacted Act on Prevention and Suppression of Torture and Enforced Disappearance. The law prohibits actions to deport or extradite a person to another country where there are substantial grounds for believing that they would be in danger of being tortured or forcibly disappeared. “Thai and Myanmar authorities appear to have cut a deal that puts asylum seekers at grave risk,” Pearson said. “The United Nations and concerned governments should publicly press Thailand to end these serious violations of international law and demand that Myanmar immediately account for the three deported opposition activists.”..."
Source/publisher: Human Rights Watch (USA)
Date of entry/update: 2023-04-12
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Title: “Terrorism from the Sky”: Burmese Junta Bombs Civilians, Killing 100, Escalating Attack on Resistance
Description: "Burma’s military junta carried out its deadliest attack yet on civilians in rebel-held areas when it bombed a meeting of community leaders Tuesday in the Sagaing region, killing an estimated 100 people, including 30 children. The military junta has increasingly used airstrikes to crush the resistance since it seized power in 2021, often targeting schools and clinics run by the opposition. The United Nations has warned of worsening humanitarian and human rights crises in Burma, with mass arrests, torture of prisoners, the killing of civilians, and media repression. To discuss this latest attack and the ongoing crisis in Burma, we’re joined by Maung Zarni, a Burmese scholar, dissident and human rights activist. His recent piece is titled “Myanmar Military’s Acts of Terrorism from the Sky & Savage Beheadings on the Ground.” Transcript This is a rush transcript. Copy may not be in its final form. AMY GOODMAN: We begin today’s show in Burma, where the military junta is escalating its airstrikes on civilians. On Tuesday, it carried out its deadliest attack yet, when it bombed a gathering at a community hall, killing an estimated 100 people, including 30 children. Graphic images posted online and verified by Al Jazeera and other media show burning limbs at the scene. This is how the BBC’s Jonathan Head described the attack, tweeting, quote, “Horrific air strike by military jets and helicopters this morning … Video posted by locals too awful to upload here but they say at least 53 dead, including women & children.” He continued, quote, “I cannot begin to describe how terrible the scenes are at Pa Zi Gyi. So many bodies, so horribly mangled.” Members of Burma’s government-in-exile condemned the attack as a “heinous act” that constitutes “a war crime.” The BBC and others have reported the military junta has increasingly used airstrikes to crush the resistance since it seized power in a 2021 coup, often targeting schools and clinics run by the opposition. This comes as the United Nations has warned of worsening humanitarian and human rights crises in Burma, with mass arrests, torture of prisoners, the killing of civilians, and media repression. For more, we’re joined by Maung Zarni, a Burmese scholar, dissident, human rights activist, co-founder of the Forces of Renewal for Southeast Asia, a grassroots network of pro-democracy scholars and human rights activists across Southeast Asia. His recent piece, titled “Myanmar Military’s Acts of Terrorism from the Sky & Savage Beheadings on the Ground.” Zarni, welcome back to Democracy Now! Can you explain what’s happened in Burma, this latest attack, as you understand it? MAUNG ZARNI: Well, Myanmar military is losing against the armed resistance on the ground that has sprung up since the military coup two years ago, so they are increasingly relying on airstrikes, and they are targeting the most vulnerable among the resistance communities. I mean, the whole country is up in arms. I mean, literally, every single community is involved in some kind of armed resistance against this, you know, 60-years-old military dictatorship. And so, they are trying to terrorize the civilian populations into submission. What happened yesterday at Pa Zi Gyi, a large village not too far from Mandalay, where I grew up — this is the — Sagaing is the Naga province or state from Mandalay division. And what happened was that the — you know, about 800 villagers gather to open the local administrative services office, that the military got wind of the opening ceremony. And they decided that this was an occasion, a legitimate occasion, to target civilians. This is not indiscriminate killing of the mixed armed fighters and the civilians. This is civilian gathering. They knew it, and they targeted the civilians. Targeting civilians for political gains and terrorizing them, it’s — you know, by any definition, it’s terroristic activity. That’s why I called this the terrorism from the sky. AMY GOODMAN: After the airstrike, Zarni, Amnesty International released an appeal titled “Urgent need to suspend aviation fuel as air strikes wreak havoc.” Who is providing the fuel? And what do you think needs to be done? MAUNG ZARNI: Well, you know, turning off the flow of aviation fuel, that is transported through several ASEAN countries, Association of Southeast Asian countries, like Singapore, Thailand, and among others. Yes, they need to be turned off immediately. But, Amy, the problem is not simply that aviation fuel is enabling the regime. What has enabled the regime to carry on as business as usual the increasing use of airstrikes against civilians are three things. One is, you know, the Security Council’s failure to take any meaningful action. As you know, it’s a paralyzed body. And the second is China’s recent resumption of its backing of the military. China decided that they are going to back the military, because the democratic resistance is at least notionally backed by the United States and the European Union. And the third, and also very equally significant, is this deafening silence from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. ASEAN has been a complete failure in the case of Cambodian genocide, Rohingya genocide 40 years later, and it is failing when its member state is using air force to terrorize the civilian population, committing all kinds of, like, atrocious cracking of the military, that uses Russia’s gunship helicopters; the Western democracies’ failure to really back the democratic resistance as it is doing in Ukraine; and, thirdly, the ASEAN’s regional bloc’s complete and utter failure to lift a finger to stop the killings. AMY GOODMAN: Who else is working with the Burmese military? And by the way, just for people to understand the term Burma and Myanmar, the military junta renaming Burma “Myanmar.” We refer to it as Burma. Zarni? MAUNG ZARNI: Well, who else? I mean, a lot of — yeah, of course, like, we could point fingers at Burma’s immediate neighbors, like Thailand or India or China, that are involved in various strategic rivalries or economic contests. But there are also, like, you know, massive number of Western corporations, like from the U.S., from Canada, United Kingdom, European Union, Australia, Japan. And so, this is not that different from what happened in tsarist Russia. You know, a hundred years ago, tsarist Russia was propped up or financially backed by French bankers and English economic and political interests. And against that, the Russian Revolution took place. And that is what is happening today, because, you know, the democratic struggles don’t happen in a vacuum. We are fighting a very, very steep uphill battle. And the United Nations, as a system of political states, are also failing. So there is so much palpable rage and frustration among the Burmese resistance fighters and the society as a whole. And so, but the people have had enough. They are not taking it lying down, you know, the abuses and years of repression. They are fighting. Women are making bombs and involved in like, you know, sabotage operations. Young men, journalists, doctors, engineers, literally thousands of them have joined the armed resistance. Every single Burmese family knows or supports or has a member of a fighter that is against the regime. This is like, you know, 1940s Europe with partisans fighting the Nazi occupation. AMY GOODMAN: Maung Zarni, two years ago, the U.S. government announced it’s, quote, “taking steps to prevent the generals from improperly accessing more than $1 billion in Burmese government funds held in the United States.” Your response to that? And is there a way to funnel that money to the Burmese people? MAUNG ZARNI: Yes. I think, you know, the contrast between the Biden — I mean, it was President Biden who, within 10 days of the coup, walked on the White House press stage and then declared that this — he was going to freeze $1 billion U.S. that belongs to the people of Myanmar. Aung San Suu Kyi’s civilian government deposited that money in the U.S. financial institutions. Biden froze it. That’s the Burmese people’s money. And then, on the other hand, the U.S. administration, as you know, has pumped more than $50 billion U.S. and emptied nearly all the shelves in terms of Pentagon arsenal to support the Ukrainian resistance. You know, we are happy that Ukraine gets support and unity of solidarity among Western nations, but we are fighting a similarly atrocious, Russian-backed regime in Burma, and we are not getting a penny. So, I think we are not asking for American taxpayers to underwrite our liberation struggle. We are simply saying we have $1 billion that Joe Biden froze. Unfreeze that money and make sure that the corruption doesn’t mushroom out of that war chest. And there are ways to manage this wisely and with financial transparency. We cannot fight and win a liberation struggle on empty stomachs and homemade Molotov cocktails, when, you know, the repressive Myanmar military is well armed with Russian-made helicopters and MiG-29 jets and China’s backing, China’s arms. We need to have a level playing field. We are fighting a atrocious 60-year-old military dictatorship that has perpetrated genocide and that is perpetrating a long series of war crimes, crimes against humanity and every grave crimes ever written in international law. Biden needs to unfreeze the money. He gave a speech at the Summit of Democracy, the second summit held in Seoul, and he did not even make a mention of Myanmar, while he praised on bravery of Ukrainian resistance. We are happy that Ukrainian brothers and sisters receive the Western backing, but, you know, we should also be receiving solidarity and support, and material support. AMY GOODMAN: Maung Zarni, we want to thank you so much for being with us, Burmese scholar, dissident, human rights activist, co-founder of the Forces of Renewal for Southeast Asia, or FORSEA, a grassroots network of pro-democracy scholars and human rights activists across Southeast Asia. We’ll link to your “piece”: will lead to your piece, “Myanmar Military’s Acts of Terrorism from the Sky & Savage Beheadings on the Ground.” Next up, the Philippines, where thousands of U.S., Filipino and Australian troops are holding the largest military drills ever, despite Chinese protest. Stay with us..."
Source/publisher: Democracy Now!
Date of entry/update: 2023-04-12
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Title: Airstrikes by Burmese military kill dozens at anti-junta event
Sub-title: Attack targeted opening ceremony for office set up by military’s opponents in Sagaing region of Myanmar
Description: "Myanmar’s military has killed dozens of people in airstrikes on an event organised by its domestic opponents, in what is feared to be one of the deadliest attacks since the junta seized power more than two years ago. Local independent media reported that the attack on Tuesday morning targeted a ceremony marking the opening of an office set up by the military’s opponents in the village of Pa Zi Gyi, in Sagaing region. The national unity government (NUG), which was set up to oppose the junta, said at least 53 people were confirmed dead, 40 were injured and the death toll was expected to rise. “This morning, the Myanmar air force dropped multiple bombs on a civilian gathering of several hundred people, while attack helicopters strafed the crowd,” the NUG’s acting president, Duwa Lashi La, said in a statement. Some local news outlets said residents feared the death toll could be as high as 100. Images shared online that appear to have been taken after the attack showed people in civilian clothes dead on the ground beside a destroyed structure. In a video, a man can be heard saying: “If you have survived, please make a sound.” He tells others: “If you hear a shout, help them. Go, go.” Kyaw Wunna, a rescue worker, told the Than Lwin Times that the new administration building – set up by a local people’s defence force (PDF), a volunteer group fighting to overthrow the military – had been completed only a week ago. Refreshments were being served at the opening ceremony and local people, including children, had attended. On social media, many turned their profile pictures black in tribute to those killed. A rescuer interviewed by the media outlet the Irrawaddy said children aged between three and five had been brought by their mothers to the event. “The corpses cannot be identified since they are all scattered in body parts – legs and heads. After gathering them all, we burned them.” The UN human rights chief Volker Turk said he was “horrified” at the airstrikes, saying that the victims appeared to have included “schoolchildren performing dances, as well as other civilians.” The airstrikes happened at about 8am local time on Tuesday morning, according to the NUG. The Kyunhla activist group, which is volunteering to help the injured, said the military launched another attack later in the day, at 5.35 pm, striking the same area three times. The military, which seized power in a coup in February 2021, provoking widespread opposition among the public, has increasingly launched airstrikes in an attempt to crush a determined armed resistance movement. Strikes have hit schools, medical facilities, religious sites, civilian homes and infrastructure, according to Myanmar Witness, a group of open-source researchers that monitors atrocities. The junta, which relies on Russian and Chinese aircraft, has not commented on Tuesday’s attack. It has previously denied atrocities against civilians and called resistance groups “terrorists” that it says are trying to devastate Myanmar. Duwa Lashi La called for the attack to be condemned. “The military continues its mindless war on our country’s own people. Their sole aim is to consolidate power through death and destruction. They will not succeed. We will continue our fight for a new Myanmar. Our goal is a Myanmar in which such atrocities cannot occur and where power derives from the will of the people, not force of arms,” he said. He asked neighbouring countries to provide humanitarian assistance to Sagaing and other regions engulfed in conflict. Before the coup, the Sagaing region, home to the Buddhist-Bamar majority, had been spared the level of military violence and oppression that has long been inflicted on minorities in border regions. It is now one of the frontlines in the battle against the junta, and has been heavily targeted by airstrikes and the burning of villages. The Amnesty International business and human rights researcher Montse Ferrer said there was an urgent need to suspend the supply of aviation fuel to Myanmar’s military. “This supply chain fuels violations of international humanitarian law, including war crimes, and it must be disrupted in order to save lives,” Ferrer said. “Unlawful air attacks killing and injuring civilians and destroying homes are a trademark of the Myanmar military, which goes to despicable lengths to crush resistance and instil fear in the population. Myanmar’s civilians bear the brunt of these sickening tactics.” The number of people in need of humanitarian assistance has soared since the coup, from 1 million to 17.6 million, according to the UN. Almost 1.8 million people are displaced across Myanmar. Tuesday’s attack comes days before Thingyan, the Burmese new year festival, normally a time for water fights and celebrations in the streets. Since the coup, pro-democracy activists have called for the public to boycott junta-organised events. Last weekend, opposition groups set off several bombs at pavilions built by the military for Thingyan in the cities of Yangon, Mandalay and Mawlamyine, according to a report by Radio Free Asia. Groups have warned of further attacks..."
Source/publisher: "The Guardian" (UK)
Date of entry/update: 2023-04-11
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Title: Around 100 people killed after Myanmar junta attack on village, shadow government says
Description: "(CNN)— Around 100 people, including women and children, have been killed after Myanmar’s military junta bombed the Kant Balu township in the Sagaing region on Tuesday, according to the shadow government of the ousted administration. The attack resulted in the “loss of scores of innocent civilians and injuring many more, including children and pregnant women,” the National Unity Government (NUG)’s Ministry of Labour said in a statement, describing it as a “heinous act” that constitutes “a war crime.” Local news outlet The Irrawaddy reported that a junta aircraft dropped two bombs and fired on the village while people were gathered for the opening of a new town office. The military junta has not yet commented publicly on the alleged attack. CNN has reached out to a military junta spokesperson, but not yet heard back. Photos and videos shared by The Irrawaddy and other local media show bodies of victims, as well as destroyed buildings, vehicles and debris after the air raid. CNN has been unable to confirm the authenticity of the video and photos. The Union Prime Minister of the NUG Mahn Winn Khine Thann said on Twitter he was “heartbroken” by the “aerial massacre.” Thousands of people have been killed across Myanmar since the military seized power in a coup in February 2021. The junta ousted democratically elected leader Aung San Suu Kyi, who was later sentenced to 33 years in jail during secretive trials. It has cracked down on anti-coup protests, arrested journalists and political prisoners, and executed several leading pro-democracy activists, drawing condemnation from the United Nations and rights groups. Two years on, the Southeast Asian country is being rocked by violence and instability. The economy has collapsed, with shortages of food, fuel and other basic supplies. The US last month placed a fresh series of sanctions on two people with alleged ties to the military and three businesses owned by them, a statement from the State Department said..."
Source/publisher: "CNN" (USA)
Date of entry/update: 2023-04-11
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Title: Burma Regime Airstrikes
Description: "We are deeply concerned by today’s reports of a Burma military airstrike in the Sagaing region that killed more than 50 people and injured at least 30 people, including children. This attack follows reports of airstrikes in Chin State on April 10 that killed at least nine people. These violent attacks further underscore the regime’s disregard for human life and its responsibility for the dire political and humanitarian crisis in Burma following the February 2021 coup. The United States calls on the Burma regime to cease the horrific violence, allow unhindered humanitarian access, and to respect the genuine and inclusive democratic aspirations of the people of Burma. The military regime must abide by its obligations under international humanitarian law, including rules on the protection of civilians. The United States will continue to work with the international community to hold the regime accountable for violations and abuses committed in Burma..."
Source/publisher: U.S. Department of State
Date of entry/update: 2023-04-11
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Title: Myanmar: Urgent need to suspend aviation fuel as air strikes wreak havoc
Description: "Responding to reports of deadly air strikes in Sagaing Region’s Kanbulu Township, Amnesty International’s Business and Human Rights Researcher Montse Ferrer said: “Initial reports on deadly air strikes in Sagaing Region are horrifying. Unlawful air attacks killing and injuring civilians and destroying homes are a trademark of the Myanmar military, which goes to despicable lengths to crush resistance and instill fear in the population. Myanmar’s civilians bear the brunt of these sickening tactics. “The relentless air attacks across Myanmar highlight the urgent need to suspend the import of aviation fuel. Amnesty reiterates its calls on all states and businesses to stop shipments that may end up in the hands of the Myanmar Air Force. This supply chain fuels violations of international humanitarian law, including war crimes, and it must be disrupted in order to save lives. “While some meaningful action has been taken, the international community can and must do more to stop attacks on civilians in Myanmar. These air strikes come just ahead of the two-year anniversary of ASEAN’s five-point consensus on Myanmar, which has utterly failed to stop the military’s atrocities. “Instead of taking a back seat, ASEAN must step up and play a leading role in resolving the human rights catastrophe in Myanmar. The United Nations Security Council must find ways to push through effective actions to hold the Myanmar military accountable, including by referring the situation in the country to the International Criminal Court.” Background: On the morning of 11 April, Myanmar’s military carried out air strikes on a village in Kanbulu township, Sagaing Region, according to initial reports and social media footage. An unknown number of people, including children, are believed to have been killed in the attack. Amnesty International has not been able to independently verify the details. Since the coup on 1 February 2021, Amnesty International has documented widespread human rights violations, including war crimes and possible crimes against humanity as part of the military’s crackdown on the opposition across the country. In November 2022, Amnesty International launched a campaign calling for a suspension of the supply of aviation fuel to prevent the Myanmar military from carrying out unlawful air strikes. The investigation also identified companies involved across the supply chain. On the eve of the two-year anniversary of the military coup of 1 February 2021, several countries imposed further sanctions on Myanmar, this time focusing on the aviation fuel industry. Canada’s government moved to prohibit the export, sale, supply or shipment of aviation fuel to the Myanmar military. The UK also announced sanctions targeting two Myanmar companies and two individuals that Amnesty International first identified in Deadly Cargo: Exposing the supply chain that fuels war crimes in Myanmar as playing an essential role in importing, handling and transporting aviation fuel to the Myanmar military’s air force. In March 2023, the UK announced a second round of sanctions targeting individuals and companies exposed in Amnesty International’s latest research on aviation fuel supply to Myanmar. The European Union and the US have also announced sanctions targeting various individuals and entities that played a role in the importation, storage and distribution of aviation fuel to the Myanmar military..."
Source/publisher: "Amnesty International" (UK)
Date of entry/update: 2023-04-11
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Title: ကန့်ဘလူ၊ ပဇီကြီးကျေးရွာ လေကြောင်း တိုက်ခိုက်ခံရမှု ထုတ်ပြန်ချက်
Description: "၁။ စစ်ကိုင်းတိုင်း၊ ကန့်ဘလူမြို့နယ်၊ မလယ်တိုက်နယ်၊ ပဇီကြီးကျေးရွာကို ၂၀၂၃ ခုနှစ်၊ဧပြီလ ၁၁ ရက်၊ ယနေ့မနက်ပိုင်းတွင် အာဏာသိမ်းအကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်က လေကြောင်းတိုက်ခိုက် ခဲ့သည့်အတွက် ကလေးငယ်များနှင့်ကိုယ်ဝန်ဆောင်များအပါအဝင် အရပ်သားပြည်သူ အများအပြား သေဆုံးခဲ့ရသည်။ ၂။ အသက်ဆုံးရှုံးသွားရသူများနှင့် ထိခိုက်ဒဏ်ရာရသူများအတွက် အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၊ ကာကွယ်ရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာနအနေဖြင့် အထူးပင် ဝမ်းနည်းကြေကွဲရကြောင်းနှင့် သက်ဆိုင်သူများ၏ မိသားစု များနှင့်တသားတည်း အတူတကွရှိနေပါကြောင်း အထူး ဖော်ပြလိုသည်။ ၃။ အာဏာသိမ်းအကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်သည် အရပ်သားနှင့် လက်နက်ကိုင်ဟူ၍ သတ်မှတ်ခွဲခြားခြင်းမရှိ အလွန်အကျွံ အင်အားသုံး တိုက်ခိုက်နေကြောင်း ယခုဖြစ်ရပ်က ထပ်မံသက်သေပြနေသလို စစ်ရာဇဝတ်မှု ထပ်မံကျူးလွန်ခြင်းလည်း ဖြစ်သည်။ ၄။ ဤအကြမ်းဖက်လုပ်ရပ်အပါအဝင် အကြမ်းဖက်လုပ်ရပ်များ အားလုံးသည် စက်ဆုတ်ရွံရှာဖွယ် ကောင်းသော စစ်ရာဇဝတ်မှုများ၊ လူသားမျိုးနွယ်စုပေါ် ကျုးလွန်သော ရာဇဝတ်မှုများ ဖြစ်သည်။ ၅။ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံတွင် စစ်အာဏာသိမ်းမှု အဆုံးသတ်ပြီး စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ်ကို မြန်မာ့မြေပေါ်မှ အပြီးတိုင် ဖယ်ရှားနိုင်မှသာ တိုင်းပြည်လူထု တည်ငြိမ်အေးချမ်းမှုရပြီး သာယာဝပြောရေးဆီ ဦးတည် နိုင်မည်ဆိုသည်ကို ယနေ့ဖြစ်ရပ်က ထပ်လောင်း သတိပေးလိုက်သည်ဟု မိမိတို့မှတ်ယူသည်။ ထိခိုက် ဆုံးရှုံးရသည့် လူထုဘဝများအချည်းနှီးမဖြစ်စေရေး၊ တပြိုင်တည်းတွင် စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ်အမြစ်ဖြတ်ရေး ရည်မှန်းချက် အမြန်ဆုံး ပေါက်ရောက်အောင်မြင်စေရေး ပိုမို၍ အစွမ်းကုန် အားထုတ် လုပ်ဆောင်သွားမည့် အကြောင်း အခိုင်အမာ ကတိပြုလိုက်သည်။ ..."
Source/publisher: Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update: 2023-04-11
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Title: (၁၄)နှစ်မြောက် ရက္ခိုင့်တပ်တော်နေ့သို့ ပေးပို့သော ဂုဏ်ပြုသဝဏ်လွှာ
Description: "၁။ ယနေ့ ၂၀၂၃ ခုနှစ် ဧပြီလ (၁၀) ရက်နေ့တွင် ကျရောက်သော (၁၄) နှစ်မြောက် ရက္ခိုင့် တပ်တော်နေ့တွင် ရက္ခိုင့်ရဲဘော်များနှင့်တကွ ရက္ခိုင်ပြည်လူလူထုတရပ်လုံး ကိုယ်စိတ်နှစ်ဖြာ ကျန်းမာ ရွှင်လန်းကြပါစေဟု ဦးစွာပထမ ဆုမွန်ကောင်းတောင်းအပ်ပါသည်။ ၂။ ရက္ခိုင်ပြည်သူထူထု၏ ကိုယ်ပိုင်အုပ်ချုပ်ခွင့်၊ကိုယ်ပိုင်ပြဌာန်းခွင့်၊ကိုယ့်ကံကြမ္မာ ကိုယ်ဖန်တီးနိုင်ခွင့် အပြည့်အဝရရှိရေးအတွက် ရက္ခိုင့်တပ်တော်ကို ဖွဲ့စည်းတည်ထောင်ပြီး တော်လှန်တိုက်ပွဲဝင်လာခဲ့သည်မှာ ယနေ့တွင် (၁၄) နှစ် တိုင်တိုင် ပြည့်မြောက်ခဲ့ပြီဖြစ်ပြီး ရက္ခိုင်ပြည်သူလူထုနှင့် ထပ်တူထပ်မျှ ဝမ်းမြောက် ဂုဏ်ယူပါသည်။ ၃။ (၁၄)နှစ်တာ တော်လှန်ရေး ခရီးကြမ်းအတွင်း အသက်၊ အိုးအိမ်၊ စည်းစိမ်၊ ကိုယ်လက်အင်္ဂါများ စွန့်လွှတ်ပေးလှူခဲ့ကြသော ရက္ခိုင့်အာဇာနည်သူရဲကောင်းများနှင့် ရက္ခိုင်ပြည်သူလူထုတရပ်လုံး ကိုလည်း လေးနက်စွာ အောက်မေ့ဦးညွှတ်အပ်ပါသည်။ ၄။ ယနေ့ တိုင်းပြည်တဝှမ်း လှည်းနေလှေအောင်း မြင်းဇောင်းမကျန် ဆင်နွှဲလျက်ရှိသည့် နွေဦး တော်လှန်ရေး ပြည်သူ့ခုခံတွန်းလှန်စစ်ဆင်တွင် ရက္ခိုင့်တပ်တော်သည် အဖိနှိပ်ခံ ပြည်သူလူထုနှင့်တကွ အတူရပ်တည်ပြီး ဘုံရန်သူအား ပြင်းပြင်းထန်ထန် ခုခံတွန်းလှန်နေသည့်အပြင် တော်လှန်ရေးအင်အားစု များကိုလည်း လက်တွဲကူညီ ပံ့ပိုးပေးလျက်ရှိသည်။ ၅။ ယခုအချိန်အခါတွင် ဘုံရန်သူစစ်ကောင်စီအား အပြီးသတ်ချေမှုန်းနိုင်ရန် မိမိတို့အားလုံးအတူတကွ စုစည်းညီညွတ်စွာဖြင့် ရုန်းကန်ဖောက်ထွက် ကြိုးစားကြရမည်ဖြစ်ပြီး ရက္ခိုင့်တပ်တော်အနေဖြင့် ရက္ခိုင် ပြည်သူလူထု၏ နိုင်ငံရေး၊ အမျိုးသားရေး မျှော်မှန်းချက်များကိုလည်း တပါတည်း အပြည့်အဝ အကောင်အထည်ဖော် ဆောင်ရွက်နိုင်ပါစေကြောင်း ဆုမွန်ကောင်း တောင်းလျက် ၂၀၂၃ ခုနှစ် ဧပြီလ (၁၀)ရက်နေ့တွင် ကျရောက်သည့် (၁၄) နှစ်မြောက် ရက္ခိုင့်တပ်တော်နေ့သို့ ဤသဝဏ်လွှာကို ဂုဏ်ယူစွာဖြင့် ပေးပို့အပ်ပါသည်။ ..."
Source/publisher: Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update: 2023-04-10
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Title: As Myanmar seals corporate data, investors may be implicated in junta’s bid to evade sanctions
Description: "The junta’s move to shut access to the MyCO database will shield military-linked shareholdings and help establish front companies to evade sanctions..... The inability to do due diligence gives foreign investors itching to return all the plausible deniability they need to get in bed with the generals.....In a little-noticed move in September 2022, Myanmar’s military government shut public access to a key part of its online corporate registry to shield the shareholdings of the senior leadership and their families, and to safeguard the establishment of front companies created to evade international sanctions. The Myanmar Companies Online (MyCO) fee-based platform was established with Japanese technical help in August 2018 in accordance with the country’s 2017 Law on Corporations, under the Ministry of Planning and Investment. MyCO listed not just the publicly available corporate information for 120,000 firms, but also detailed personal information on both active and former directors and shareholders, including their ownership stakes, date of appointment, ID numbers, addresses and birth dates. Can an Indonesian general help Asean move Myanmar peace plan along? The public corporate information is still available but the detailed personal information no longer is, although a hacking collective, Distributed Denial of Secrets, has released the data through February 2021 in response to the military’s coup that month. What is the State Administrative Council (SAC), as the junta is formally called, trying to hide? The obvious first answer is the SAC’s self-enrichment. SAC members and their family-owned corporations have won many lucrative contracts in construction, solar power, electrification, road construction and cement. At the time of the coup, there were some 27 known corporations owned by the children of senior military leaders, including members of the SAC. Of the 75 individuals that the US government has sanctioned since the 2021 coup d’état, 22 are the spouses or adult children of senior members of the SAC leadership. Four of the 25 US-sanctioned firms are owned by junta chief Min Aung Hlaing’s children. The junta has been sensitive to reports about its own self-enrichment, including a January exposé on the assets and bank books of Min Aung Hlaing’s children that were found in the Bangkok apartment of a Burmese businessman who was arrested for money laundering and drug smuggling. The generals are also fearful of being seen seizing the assets of supporters of the ousted National League for Democracy government and divvying up the corporate shares among themselves and their cronies. The cash-strapped regime, which failed to quickly consolidate power and is mired in a multi-year, multi-front war, has seen foreign investment and development assistance to the country dry up. Short on cash, it is starting to shed assets. The SAC established a “privatisation commission”, which by mid-2022 had put some 134 assets, including real estate and factories, up for tender. The generals and their cronies are likely benefiting from fire-sale prices, while for foreign investors, there is an incentive to shield their actions due to reputational costs. But the removal of the MyCO platform also helps with the establishment of front companies to evade international sanctions..."
Source/publisher: "South China Morning Post"
Date of entry/update: 2023-04-09
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Title: Myanmar coup: Thousands of Burmese flee to Thailand after intense fighting
Description: "Some 10,000 Burmese people have fled to Thailand to escape fierce fighting between the military and units of a powerful ethnic armed group since Wednesday, Thai authorities said. They are fleeing from Shwe Kokko town, controlled by a pro-military militia and home to Chinese-owned casinos. This is one of the largest cross-border movements of people since a military coup two years ago. The military has not released a statement yet about the fighting. It is the latest in a civil war that has been raging since the coup in February 2021. Two years on, the military government has failed to impose its authority on large areas of the country. It is battling established ethnic armed groups in border areas that have been at war with the military for decades, and recently-formed anti-coup militias that call themselves People's Defence Forces (PDFs) in much of the rest of the country. Many thousands of people have been killed and some 1.4 million have been displaced since the coup. Nearly one third of the country's population is in need of aid, according to the United Nations. The latest fighting broke out after the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) and its allies launched attacks on military outposts and a gate camp near Shwe Kokko on Wednesday. More than 80 people have been killed on both sides, KNLA told BBC Thai. Aid workers in the border regions - Thailand's Mae Sot and Mae Ramat areas - have called for urgent humanitarian assistance as refugees seek shelter in schools, monasteries and rubber farms. "In the long run, we need more donors," said Kay Thi Htwe, a Burmese volunteer at a monastery in Mae Sot, which is hosting 500 refugees. The KNLA has also closed the Myawaddy-Kawkareik Asia highway - one of the main roads to the border - for two weeks starting Friday. Back in Shwe Kokko, the military-aligned Border Guard Forces which controls the enclave is protecting the casinos and warning residents to stay indoors. This comes as the military continues to crush civilian resistance, targeting schools, clinics and villages. Earlier this week, the military said it had arrested 15 teachers who had been giving online classes for a school backed by the exiled National Unity Government (NUG). The teachers were taken from their homes in Mandalay, Saigang and Magway, a member of the General Strike Committee of Basic Education Workers told the BBC. In July, about 30 teachers were reportedly arrested because they worked for an NUG-recognised online school. From the start, education has been a battleground in Myanmar. Teachers were among the first, along with health-workers, to walk out in protest against the coup, and were in the front line of the huge protests called by the Civil Disobedience Movement in the first weeks after the military takeover. When that was crushed, most still refused orders by the military junta that they should return to work, and in May 2020 around 150,000 teachers and university lecturers were dismissed from their jobs. Many decided to go underground, joining schools and clinics in areas where communities had begun an armed struggle against military rule. The military views the establishment of independent schools and clinics as an existential threat. Official figures suggest the number of students taking the 10th grade matriculation exam in state-run schools is now only one fifth of the number doing so before the coup. Teachers working outside the state sector have been branded as terrorists..."
Source/publisher: "BBC News" (London)
Date of entry/update: 2023-04-08
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Title: Myanmar Junta Sentences Jailed Pro-Democracy Activist to Additional 20 Years in Prison
Description: "Myanmar’s military regime has sentenced jailed anti-junta protest leader Ko Wai Moe Naing to an additional 20 years in prison, according to sources close to him. The 28-year-old pro-democracy activist has now been sentenced to 34 years in total, having already been given a 14 year sentence for four charges including incitement and under the Natural Disaster Management Law at trials in August and October last year. Ko Wai Moe Naing, a former student union leader, has been held in Monywa Prison, Sagaing Region since his arrest in April 2021 during an anti-regime rally. On April 5, a junta court in Monywa Prison sentenced Ko Wai Moe Naing to 20 years under five more charges including robbery, rioting and carrying a deadly weapon in a crowd. The activist defended himself at the trial as neither of his two lawyers was able to attend. One has been detained, while the other is in hiding after being made the subject of an arrest warrant. He also has been charged with treason under Article 122 of the Penal Code for leading protests in Monywa and for being affiliated with the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, a grouping of deposed lawmakers that the junta has declared an unlawful organization. Anyone convicted under Article 122 faces a death sentence or life imprisonment. Ko Wai Moe Naing also faces one charge of murder. As of Friday, 3,225 people had been killed by junta forces while 21,276 including elected government leaders have been arrested or detained since the Myanmar military’s 2021 coup, according to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners, which monitors deaths and arrests under the regime..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update: 2023-04-08
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Title: Dr. Sasa’s message on the special occasion of ‘good Friday’
Description: "Nearly two thousand years ago, on a dark and stormy Friday, the lives of billions of people were effected by an earth shattering event. Lightning flashed, thunder rolled, the earth shook and the elements vehemently reacted to a most ghastly scene. Magistrates, religious leaders and common folk alike were awed and fearful at the sight. The silhouettes of the three crosses standing high on the mount were illuminated by the incessant lightning, and a loud cry rang out from the middle cross saying “it is finished!” With this, our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ breathed His last, and His head fell motionless on His chest as He hung from the cross. The significance of His words ring true till this day; “it is finished.” He was betrayed by the people of His time, and yet He willingly laid down His life to pay the price for the sins of the whole world, a price that could only be payed in sinless blood. Those who obey, believe and trust in His ultimate sacrifice need no longer to pay the price for their own sins, for they are covered by the blood of humanity’s Saviour Jesus Christ who died and rose again the third day from death to bring liberty, freedom and salvation from the bondage of sin and sorrow. “God commendeth His love towards us, in that, while we were yet sinners, Christ died for us.” Romans 5:8 At the present, the people of Myanmar have yet again been betrayed by the very institutions who have the duty to protect them. The brutal junta continues to cause intense suffering and pain on the people of Myanmar, pain and suffering that our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ has experienced in even greater measure than any of us. And yet, He overcame all obstacles, and finished His mission of liberating this earth from the clutches of the devil, just as we the people of Myanmar will overcome this cruel junta, and realize our mission of bringing liberty and peace to Myanmar. Truly it is not through our own strength alone that we shall overcome, but united together as one people, with one goal and with the help of God we will surely overcome this trial to obtain our freedoms once and for all. As Jesus was being nailed to the cross, He prayed earnestly to His Father in heaven, “Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do.” Even as He hung dying the most excruciating death, with the weight of all the sins of the world on His shoulders, he requested forgiveness for His murderers. Oh, what love! That a perfect, sinless being should come to this earth, take on the form of a mere human, live a sinless life, and atone for all the sins of this world; past, present and future - this, my friends, is what truly makes this Friday good despite all the bad things happening right now in our homeland. We can take courage therefore in the knowledge that we, the people of Myanmar, are not alone in our fight against brutal military oppression. Emmanuel, “God with us.” Christ vanquished evil once on the cross, and He can just as easily give us the strength and courage to vanquish the evil of this junta, both physically and spiritually. Salvation belongs to God, our redeemer, Father and friend. Through Him, we will dispel the darkness of generations of brutal dictatorships. Through His power we will seek the strength to bring all of the war mongers, criminals and genocide perpetrators to justice. The road to freedom, victory, and prosperity is no easy path, but it is one we have committed our lives to trod, and we will see it through to completion. I implore you, brothers and sisters of Myanmar, from every race, religion, ethnicity and background - now is the time for us to rally, to fully stand together as one, and put an end to this regime through every effort and legal means. I implore you, the international community, to both stand together with us and fully support us, the people and National Unity Government of Myanmar, and help us to rid the earth of this wicked, cruel system of oppression. United together, we can land the final fatal blow on military dictatorship in Myanmar, and rebuild this nation into the peaceful, freedom-loving land that it is meant to be. May you all be strong in the strength of Christ, knowing that the victory in this battle of good and evil has only one outcome, namely, the triumph of good over evil. May God bless you, and may God bless Myanmar!..."
Source/publisher: Ministry of International Cooperation Myanmar
Date of entry/update: 2023-04-07
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Title: Myanmar, Beyond Balkanization
Description: "Following the Feb. 1, 2021 coup, Myanmar is in turmoil. The militarized state is not fragile or failing—it has failed. No amount of either fighting or negotiation will put the country back together. Before the coup, the state had little credibility or legitimacy for many ethnic nationality citizens, who often experienced the Myanmar government and army as violent and predatory invaders of ethnic homelands. Following the coup, the country has no legitimate—or even minimally effective—central government. A generation of young people from the towns and cities has joined forces with a handful of ethnic armed organizations (EAOs, sometimes referred to as ethnic resistance organizations) to oppose the junta, known as the State Administration Council (SAC). People’s Defense Forces (PDFs) established following the coup have proved extraordinarily resilient. As the conflict drags on, those PDFs aligned with EAOs seem most likely to endure. The struggle will be particularly intense in Sagaing and Magwe regions, where PDFs and People’s Administrative Bodies, some aligned with the National Unity Government (NUG), hold on in the face of Myanmar military onslaughts and horrific abuses. It seems highly unlikely that the SAC junta will be able to repeat even the limited achievements of the previous SLORC-SPDC regime, by imposing relatively unchallenged military rule over large parts of the country. The Spring Revolution demonstrates extraordinary resilience, and resistance. However, even if reviled junta supremo Min Aung Hlaing were removed, it is difficult to imagine a scenario in which the Myanmar military agrees to quit politics and “return to the barracks” as the EAOs and NUG have demanded, unless a reform movement emerges within the military. Instead, this conflict will likely be protracted. Attempts to respond pragmatically, based on assumptions that the SAC will eventually prevail and consolidate control, are therefore not well founded. Although countries in the region may be loath to acknowledge it, Myanmar is already caught in a downward spiral. Rather than continuing in denial, policy-makers should accept the realities of post-coup Myanmar: Min Aung Hlaing and his thugs have destroyed an already weak and fragile state. The balkanization of Myanmar is well under way. The challenge now is how to work with this empirical reality, rather than pretending that eventually things will return to normal, under one kind of central government or another. The new realities are messy—but not without opportunity. Instead of shoring up a failed state, the challenge is to identify and support creative responses to this new situation. Local and regional political structures and actors are emerging from the chaos, while longer-established EAOs have found new relevance and vitality. These include EAOs in northern Myanmar which enjoy varying but close relations with China. One key question is under what circumstances they will receive assistance from the giant northern neighbor, in order to reinforce already substantial political autonomy. In exchange for patronage from China (guns, roads and bridges, vaccines) the northern EAOs are under pressure not to attack the SAC, and to protect Chinese assets in Myanmar. Other new actors include criminal syndicates, and those bent on making quick profits by looting the country’s still extensive natural resources. However, many individuals, groups and networks across the country are deeply committed to building a better, fairer Myanmar based on respect, inclusion and a commitment to basic rights. A new federal Myanmar is emerging—painfully, from the bottom up. Federalism has long been considered an important tool for resolving Myanmar’s protracted state-society conflicts and achieving self-determination for ethnic nationality nations. Federalism is a tool for self-determination, rather than an end in itself. It has often been discussed in terms of the need to revise or replace the 2008 constitution, usually in a top-down (“blueprint style”) manner. While constitutional change is arguably necessary, federalism can also be seen as an “emergent phenomenon”, developing out of the existing practices of communities and EAOs, civil society organizations (CSOs) and state-based bodies such as the Karenni State Consultative Council. Before the coup, the challenge in Myanmar was to federalize a constitutionally unified (albeit deeply contested) state, following decades of mostly “low intensity” civil war. Since the latest military takeover, the challenge is to rebuild Myanmar through a new federating process, including important new stakeholders. These issues are particularly relevant in relation to a crisis which affects our entire planet: climate change, which will further destabilize Myanmar in the near future. Key EAOs and CSOs have globally important roles to play in mitigating and adapting to the challenge of climate change. Taking just one example, the best remaining forests in mainland Southeast Asia are located in Kachin and Karen areas. These are key resources in mitigating climate change through “drawing down” carbon into the soil, as well as sites of incredible biodiversity. The administration and services delivered by EAOs and affiliated CSOs include natural resource management and disaster response, providing access to justice, and the delivery of impressive health and education services to vulnerable communities. These are the building blocks of a new (emergent), and networked federalism in Myanmar—based on the autonomy and historical sovereignty of ethnic nations and their natural and human resources. This localization of disaster response is particularly important, given likely reductions in international aid for countries like Myanmar, as climate change and other crises weaken the economic resources and commitment of Western countries—the traditional donors for most aid programs. The challenge is to support resilient “localization” while there is still time. Myanmar as we have known it may not recover for many decades. The country may be a harbinger for the coming failure of “fragile states” across the world, in the face of escalating crises. We are moving into a period of worldwide insecurity and suffering, likely characterized by widespread food shortages. Those who are not deeply alarmed by these scenarios are probably not paying attention. Nevertheless, crises bring opportunities. In the case of Myanmar, these include discarding a failed state, and supporting a new type of adaptive—or “emergent”—federalism. In practical terms, probably the most urgent need is to provide direct financial and technical support to anti-junta EAOs. This should include military equipment, so that EAOs can protect civilians from the SAC’s deadly airstrikes. Ashley South is an independent analyst, and a Research Fellow at Chiang Mai University, specializing in politics and humanitarian issues in Myanmar and Southeast Asia. His views are his own..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update: 2023-04-07
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Title: UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL 52nd session: Statement on the consensus resolution on the situation of human rights in Myanmar
Description: "The Republic of the Union of Myanmar welcomes the Human Rights Council’s adoption by consensus of the resolution on the situation of human rights in Myanmar. Myanmar extends its appreciation to the European Union and to cosponsors. The new resolution is stronger than last year’s text and it capitalises on recent momentum, including the UN Security Council’s historic 2022 resolution on Myanmar which stressed the need to uphold democratic institutions and processes in Myanmar in accordance with the will of the people. As the Human Rights Council’s new resolution confirms, the Myanmar people expressed this democratic will in the general election held on 8 November 2020. The new resolution also condemns the illegal military junta’s deliberate, widespread, indiscriminate and disproportionate use of force against civilians, including airstrikes, killings, torture and sexual and gender-based violence. This established pattern of intentional attacks constitutes likely crimes against humanity in addition to certain war crimes and grave human rights violations and abuses. It is therefore unfortunate that, despite the best efforts of the EU and likeminded States, Human Rights Council Members could not agree on stronger language to block the export, sale, transfer and diversion of arms, munitions and other military equipment including dual-use items to the criminal junta. The junta’s atrocities also demand accountability. The new resolution expresses strong support for accountability processes, including at the International Court of Justice and through the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar’s (IIMM) preparation of case files. Progress must see the International Criminal Court (ICC) recognise the National Unity Government’s article 12(3) declaration issued in July 2021, which accepted the ICC’s jurisdiction over international crimes committed in Myanmar since 1 July 2002. Significantly, the new resolution welcomes the National Unity Government’s pronouncement of its “Policy position on the Rohingya in Rakhine State” on 3 June 2021. The Republic of the Union of Myanmar, as represented by the National Unity Government, recognises the Rohingya as Myanmar citizens and remains committed to replacing the 1982 Citizenship Law and to the voluntary, safe, dignified and sustainable return of Rohingya refugees to their homes in Myanmar. On ASEAN, the resolution supports the regional group’s efforts while expressing deep concern at the lack of progress in implementing the Five-Point Consensus. Accordingly, the Human Rights Council has requested the UN Secretary-General to continue to call the Security Council’s attention to the situation in Myanmar. The Security Council should in turn consider all measures at its disposal, including those under Chapter VII of the UN Charter given the threat that the junta poses to peace and security. The resolution also invites the Secretary-General to ‘offer relevant recommendations to enable more effective work in the future and to strengthen the prevention capacity of the United Nations system’ in follow-up to the Rosenthal report. Acting on this invitation, the Secretary-General should commission an inquiry into whether the UN Country Team in Myanmar is taking adequate steps to avoid a repeat of past UN failures and to meet its obligations under the Secretary-General's Call to Action for Human Rights and under the UNCT’s own ‘programmatic engagement guidelines’. A public report with clear findings and recommendations should follow. Myanmar, as represented by the National Unity Government, supports the Human Rights Council’s extension of the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on Myanmar and accepts the call for an OHCHR country office to be opened. Myanmar will also continue to cooperate with the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Myanmar, the IIMM and other UN mandate-holders, human rights mechanisms and international and regional courts, tribunals and human rights bodies..."
Source/publisher: Ministry of Human Rights
Date of entry/update: 2023-04-05
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Title: အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ အကြမ်းဖက်မှုတိုက်ဖျက်ရေးဗဟိုအဖွဲ့ အမိန့်ကြော်ငြာစာအမှတ် (၀၁/၂၀၂၃)
Description: " အကြမ်းဖက်မှုတိုက်ဖျက်ရေးဗဟိုအဖွဲ့သည် အကြမ်းဖက်မှုတိုက်ဖျက်ရေးဥပဒေ ပုဒ်မ ၆ ၊ ပုဒ်မခွဲ (င)နှင့် ပုဒ်မ ၇၂ ပုဒ်မခွဲ(ခ)ပါ လုပ်ပိုင်ခွင့်ကိုကျင့်သုံး၍ ပြည်ထောင်စုအစိုးရ အဖွဲ့၏ သဘောတူညီချက်ဖြင့် ဤအမိန့်ကြော်ငြာစာကိုထုတ်ပြန်လိုက်သည်။ ၁။ ပြည်ထောင်စုရွေးကောက်ပွဲကော်မရှင်သည် အကြမ်းဖက်အုပ်စုအဖြစ် ကြေညာ ခံထားရသည့် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီကဖွဲ့စည်းထားသော တရားမဝင်အဖွဲ့အစည်း ဖြစ်သည်။ ၂။ အကြမ်းဖက်အုပ်စုအဖြစ် ကြေညာခံထားရသည့် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီက ဖွဲ့စည်း ထားသော ပြည်ထောင်စုရွေးကောက်ပွဲကော်မရှင်သည် ဒီမိုကရေစီနည်းလမ်းတကျ ဆောင်ရွက်နေသည့် နိုင်ငံရေးပါတီများအား ဆက်လက် မရပ်တည်နိုင်စေရန် ရည်ရွယ်၍ မတရားသည့် အမိန့်နှင့် ဥပဒေများ ထုတ်ပြန်ဆောင်ရွက်ခြင်း၊ တိုင်းရင်းသားပြည်သူအများစု က လုံးဝလက်ခံ သဘောတူခြင်းမရှိသည့် ၂၀၀၈ ခုနှစ် ဖွဲ့စည်းပုံအခြေခံဥပဒေအား တည်မြဲ စေရန်ဆောင်ရွက်ခြင်း၊ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အာဏာရှင် နှင့် ၎င်းတို့အားထောက်ခံသည့် လက်တဆုပ်စာ နိုင်ငံရေးပါတီအချို့အား တရားမဝင် ဖြတ်လမ်းနည်းဖြင့် အာဏာရရှိစေရန် နည်းလမ်းမျိုးစုံ အသုံးပြု၍ ဆောင်ရွက်နေခြင်းနှင့် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီ၏ အကြမ်း ဖက်မှုလုပ်ငန်းစဉ်များတွင် ပူးပေါင်းဆောင်ရွက်ခြင်းတို့ကို လုပ်ဆောင်ခဲ့ကြောင်း တွေ့ရ သည်။ ၃။ အကြမ်းဖက်အုပ်စုအဖြစ် ကြေညာခံထားရသည့် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီက ဖွဲ့စည်း ထားသော ပြည်ထောင်စုရွေးကောက်ပွဲကော်မရှင်၏ အထက်ပါလုပ်ဆောင်ချက်များသည် အများပြည်သူအတွင်း ထိတ်လန့်မှုများကိုဖြစ်ပေါ်စေရန်၊ ပြည်တွင်း တရားဝင် နိုင်ငံရေး အဖွဲ့အစည်းများအား ဥပဒေနှင့်မညီသည့် လုပ်ရပ်များကို အတင်းအကြပ်ပြုလုပ်စေရန်နှင့် ဥပဒေနှင့်အညီ ပြုလုပ်ရမည်ကို မပြုလုပ်ဘဲ ရှောင်ရှားစေရန် ရည်ရွယ်ပြီး လုပ်ဆောင်ခဲ့ခြင်း ဖြစ်၍ အကြမ်းဖက်မှုတိုက်ဖျက်ရေးဥပဒေ ပုဒ်မ ၃ ၊ ပုဒ်မခွဲ(ခ)၊ ပုဒ်မခွဲငယ်(၁၃) နှင့် ပုဒ်မခွဲငယ်(၁၆) တို့တွင် ဖော်ပြထားသော အကြမ်းဖက်မှုများကို ကျူးလွန်ကြောင်း စိစစ်တွေ့ ရှိရသည်။ ၄။ သို့ဖြစ်ပါ၍ အကြမ်းဖက်အုပ်စုအဖြစ် ကြေညာခံထားရသည့် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင် စီက ဖွဲ့စည်းထားသော ပြည်ထောင်စုရွေးကောက်ပွဲကော်မရှင်အား အကြမ်းဖက်အဖွဲ့ အစည်းအဖြစ် သတ်မှတ်ကြေညာလိုက်သည်။..."
Source/publisher: National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update: 2023-04-05
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Title: National Unity Government Weekly Press Update (14/2023)
Description: "1. NUG Acting President urges to follow FDC’s basic principles....2. NUG welcomes US further sanctions against the terrorist SAC.....3. many IDPs suffered from various health issues.....4. NUG announce budget breakdown for Project Dragonfly.....5. NUG police force making alliance with Chin police force..."
Source/publisher: National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update: 2023-04-04
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Title: အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ အပတ်စဉ်သတင်းထုတ်ပြန်ချက် ( ၁၄/၂၀၂၃)
Description: "National Unity Government Weekly Press Update (14/2023)..."
Source/publisher: National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update: 2023-04-04
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Title: အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေး အတိုင်ပင်ခံကောင်စီ နှင့် အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ တရားမဝင် ရွေးကောက်ပွဲ ဆန့်ကျင်ရေး ပူးပေါင်း လုပ်ငန်း ကော်မတီ - အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စုထံတွင် မှတ်ပုံမတင်ဘဲ တရားမဝင် အတုအယောင် ရွေးကောက်ပွဲကို ပြည်သူ့သဘောထားဆန္ဒနှင့်အညီ ဆန့်ကျင်ခဲ့ကြသည့် နိုင်ငံရေးပါတီများအား အသိအမှတ်ပြုမှတ်တမ်းတင်ခြင်း
Description: "၁။ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စုက ပြုလုပ်ရန် ကြိုးစားနေသော တရားမဝင် အတုအယောင် ရွေးကောက်ပွဲ နှင့် ပတ်သက်၍ “ဥပဒေအရပ်ရပ်ကို ချိုးဖောက်လျက် နိုင်ငံတော်အာဏာကို အကြမ်းဖက်လုယူရန် ကြိုးစား နေရုံသာမက ပြည်သူလူထု၏ အသက်အိုးအိမ်စည်းစိမ်ကို နေ့စဉ် သတ်ဖြတ်၊ ညှဉ်းပန်း နှိပ်စက် ဖျက်ဆီးနေသော အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စုအနေဖြင့် ရွေးကောက်ပွဲကျင်းပရန် အခွင့်အာဏာ လုံးဝမရှိပေ။ ၎င်းတို့က ကျင်းပမည် ဆိုသော "ရွေးကောက်ပွဲ" ဆိုသည်မှာ လက်ရှိ မြန်မာ့နိုင်ငံရေး အကြပ်အတည်း ပြဿနာ၏ ထွက်ပေါက်အဖြေ လုံးဝမဟုတ်ရုံသာမက ရွေးကောက်ပွဲ ဟူသော အသုံးအနှုန်းကို သုံးစွဲရန်ပင် ထိုက်တန်မှုမရှိသည့် အမှန်တရားကို ဖုံးကွယ်ပုံဖျက်မှု (Deception) သာ ဖြစ်ပေသည်။” ဟု တော်လှန်ရေး အင်အားစုများအနေဖြင့် အတိအလင်း ကြေညာ ထားပြီးဖြစ်သည်။ ၂။ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရကလည်း အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စုက ပြဌာန်းသော ရွေးကောက်ပွဲ ဥပဒေသည် တရားဝင်မှုမရှိဘဲ အလိုအလျောက် ပျက်ပြယ်ပြီးဖြစ်ကြောင်းနှင့် စစ်အုပ်စုက ဖွဲ့စည်းတာဝန် ပေးအပ်သော ရွေးကောက်ပွဲ ကော်မရှင်သည်လည်း အကြမ်းဖက် လက်အောက်ခံ အဖွဲ့အစည်းအဖြစ် ကျရောက်လျက် ရှိကြောင်းကို ၂၀၂၃ ခုနှစ်၊ မတ်လ ၁၅ ရက် က ထုတ်ပြန်ခဲ့သော ကြေညာချက်အမှတ် (၅/၂၀၂၃) တွင် အတိအလင်း ဖော်ပြထားသည်ကို တွေ့ရသည်။ ၃။ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စု၏ ပျက်ပြယ်ပြီးဖြစ်သော ရွေးကောက်ပွဲ ဥပဒေ နိဒါန်းတွင် “စစ်မှန်၍ စည်းကမ်းပြည့်ဝသော ပါတီစုံဒီမိုကရေစီစနစ် ကို လက်ခံကျင့်သုံးသော နိုင်ငံရေးပါတီများ ဖွဲ့စည်းနိုင်ရန်” ဟု သုံးနှုန်းထားသောကြောင့် တိုင်းရင်းသား ပြည်သူလူထုတရပ်လုံး မျှော်မှန်းထား သည့် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီ ရည်မှန်းချက် ပန်းတိုင်ကို ငြင်းပယ်ထားခြင်းဖြစ်သည်။ မှတ်ပုံတင်သော ပါတီများတင်သွင်းရမည့် ဝန်ခံချက် (ဂ) တွင်လည်း “ပြည်ထောင်စုသမ္မတမြန်မာနိုင်ငံတော် ဖွဲ့စည်းပုံအခြေခံဥပဒေကို လေးစားလိုက်နာရေး” ဟူသည့် အချက်ပါဝင်သောကြောင့် ဖျက်သိမ်း ပျက်ပြယ်ပြီးဖြစ်သော ၂၀၀၈ ဖွဲ့စည်းပုံအခြေခံဥပဒေအောက် ပြန်လည် ခေါင်းတိုးဝင်စေသည့် အခင်းအကျင်း ဖြစ်သည်ကိုလည်း သတိပြုကြရန် လိုအပ်ပါသည်။ နိုင်ငံရေးပါတီများ အနေဖြင့် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၏ အနှစ် (၇၀) ကျော်ခဲ့ပြီဖြစ်သော နိုင်ငံရေးပြဿနာ ကို အပြီးတိုင်ဖြေရှင်းရန်အတွက် စိတ်ပိုင်းဖြတ်ပြီးဖြစ်သည့် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံတဝှမ်းလုံးရှိ ပြည်သူလူထုတရပ်လုံးနှင့် မိမိတို့ ဒေသအတွင်းရှိ တိုင်းရင်းသား ပြည်သူများ၏ သဘောထားဆန္ဒတို့ကို အခြေခံ၍ တရားမဝင် အတုအယောင် ရွေးကောက်ပွဲတွင် ပူးပေါင်းပါဝင်ခြင်း မပြုလုပ်ကြပါရန် အလေးအနက် သတိပေးတိုက်တွန်း အပ်ပါသည်။ ၄။ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စုက ဖွဲ့စည်းသော တရားမဝင် အဖွဲ့အစည်းဖြစ်သည့် ရွေးကောက်ပွဲ ကော်မရှင်ထံတွင် မှတ်ပုံမတင်ဘဲ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စု ကျင်းပပြုလုပ်ရန် ကြိုးစားနေသည့် တရားမဝင် အတုအယောင်ရွေးကောက်ပွဲအား လက်မခံ မပူးပေါင်းကြောင်းကို စိန်ခေါ်မှုများ၊ အခက်အခဲများ များစွာရှိနေသည့်ကြားမှပင် ပြည်သူ့ဆန္ဒနှင့်အညီ ဆုံးဖြတ်ကြေညာခဲ့ကြသည့် နိုင်ငံရေးပါတီများအားလုံး၏ ရပ်တည်ချက်နှင့် သဘောထားများကို လေးစားဂုဏ်ယူစွာဖြင့် အသိအမှတ်ပြု မှတ်တမ်းတင်အပ်ပါသည်။ ၅။ ဒီမိုကရေစီနည်းလမ်းတကျဖွဲ့စည်းဖြစ်ပေါ်လာကြသည့် နိုင်ငံရေးပါတီများအား တရား၀င်အာဏာ မရှိသည့် အကြမ်းဖက်လက်အောက်ခံအဖွဲ့အစည်း UEC က ဖျက်သိမ်း ပိုင်ခွင့်မရှိပဲ ဖျက်သိမ်းကြောင်း ကြေညာလိုက်ခြင်းသည် ရှေ့လျှောက်တွင် တရားမဝင် အတုအယောင် ရွေးကောက်ပွဲများဖြင့် အာဏာရှင်စနစ်ကို တည်မြဲစေလျက် ပြည်သူလူထုကို အမြဲကြောက်ရွံ့ နေရမည့် ဘ၀အခြေအနေသို့ သက်ဆင်းစေမည့် အခင်းအကျင်းကို ထပ်မံဖန်တီးလိုက်ခြင်း ပင်ဖြစ်သည်။ ၆။ လာမည့်အနာဂတ်တွင် မိမိတို့က စစ်မှန်သည့်ဒီမိုကရေစီရွေးကောက်ပွဲများ ကျင်းပပြုလုပ်လျက် ပြည်သူ့အာဏာ တည်ဆောက်ခြင်းဖြင့်သာလျင် ပြည်သူများ လိုအပ်မှု၊ ပြည်သူ့လုံခြုံမှုနှင့် ပြည်သူများ၏မျှော်လင့်ချက်ကို ဖြည့်ဆီးပေးနိုင်ပါမည်။ ယင်းသို့ဖြစ်ပေါ်ရရှိရန် တိုင်းရင်းသား ပြည်သူပြည်သားများအားလုံးက လက်ရေတပြင်တည်း ပူးပေါင်းပါ၀င်ကြရန် တိုက်တွန်းပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher: National Unity Government of Myanmar, National Unity Consultative Council
Date of entry/update: 2023-04-03
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Title: Myanmar’s Resilient Revolution
Description: "Myanmar’s Spring Revolution is now in its third year since the February 2021 military coup. Despite facing brutal repression, including arson attacks and aerial bombardment by Myanmar’s state security personnel, ordinary people across the country are continuing to resist the return to dictatorship. What explains the extraordinary resilience of their civil disobedience and armed resistance efforts? Roots of Resilience Many in Myanmar are furious about the return to tyranny and the bleak implications for them, their children, and their country. These grievances have been channeled into the revolutionary struggle over the past two years, which has been sustained by a deeply-ingrained culture of reciprocity, charity, and philanthropy that has developed over decades. Indeed, many of the ideas and practices of self-reliance, reciprocity and moral citizenship now at the core of the Spring Revolution have roots in the fitful post-socialist market reforms of the 1990s and 2000s. In my book, “Outsourcing the Polity: Non-State Welfare, Inequality and Resistance in Myanmar,” I draw on extensive fieldwork to explore the origins of Myanmar’s vibrant non-state welfare sector. Examining the political economy of provincial economic liberalization after the collapse of the Burma Socialist Program Party in 1988, I uncover how state officials encouraged the provision of social aid and public goods by non-state actors. Sub-national military commanders suppressed anti-junta and democratic party activity but permitted ostensibly “apolitical” welfare-oriented village and neighborhood groups to flourish. Meanwhile, regional junta officials issued commercial licenses and tax exemptions to businesspeople who assumed roles as informal civilian administrators and often became patrons of both government-sponsored and grassroots welfare groups. Outsourcing enabled dire state social austerity; the junta of the 1990s slashed social expenditure and used the funds to instead double the size of the armed forces. Alongside often fragile commercial ceasefires reached with ethnic armed elites, transferring social responsibility to the non-state sector allowed Myanmar’s military to focus instead on forcefully expanding the central state into restive borderland regions. Enjoying this article? Click here to subscribe for full access. Just $5 a month. Democratic Outsourcing The legacies of post-1988 social outsourcing continued to shape the character of politics after the military initiated a transition to partial civilian rule in 2011. Both the Thein Sein (2011-2016) and Aung San Suu Kyi (2016-2021) administrations continued to encourage charities, philanthropists, the private sector, and religious communities to perform social welfare and development roles, often in exchange for tax deductions. Rather than turn to the state to deliver social development, communities were told by their elected representatives to rely on each other and the “free market” to solve social problems. Community groups even ran quarantine facilities and fundraised for the government’s vaccination procurement program amid the COVID-19 pandemic, at the encouragement of Aung San Suu Kyi herself. Meanwhile, after 2010, tycoons sought to remake their public reputations and protect their questionably accrued assets from taxation or redistribution by helping to fill the gaps in social provisioning left by decades of austerity. The military’s February 2021 ousting of elected civilian leaders has spawned thousands of new groups in neighborhoods and villages across the country. These networks are helping to support the needy, resource pro-democracy militias, provide education to children fleeing violence and deliver social governance in large areas of the country that are no longer military-controlled. They are also at the vanguard of imagining and enacting alternative social ideals and models to dictatorship which reject the militarization and economic exploitation of the so-called “democratic decade” (2011-2021). Yet few of these groups receive any funds from the international community – even though they are playing crucial humanitarian and social roles. In one township in Sagaing Region, for instance, an alliance of local social actors including welfare groups, militias, traders, and striking teachers are helping to resource and run a network of more than a dozen schools that are educating thousands of young people. Initiatives like theirs currently receive almost no foreign aid but are performing essential social governance functions in the wake of the junta’s administrative collapse in most rural and borderland areas of the country. Foreign governments and humanitarian actors must ensure these networks are far better resourced as the dictatorship continues to cling to power. The remarkable role of non-state welfare actors and ideals in sustaining Myanmar’s democratic struggle has implications for understanding distributive politics, autocratic legacies and civil resistance elsewhere. For now, though it is clear that a new wave of social outsourcing is underway in Myanmar – one that is simultaneously deepening communal self-reliance while also sustaining the fight for a more inclusive and democratic future. This article was originally published by the Center for International Studies at Cornell University. It is reprinted with permission..."
Source/publisher: Cornell University via "The Diplomat" (Japan)
Date of entry/update: 2023-04-02
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Title: A Special Notice of Invitation to the Members of the Military and Police Force, who continue serving the Terrorist Military to join "The People's Embrace" Program
Description: "(1) The Terrorist Military that seized the power through the means of weapons and force, against the will of the people, has been resisted by "the People's Revolution" at all fronts and the people's revolution has been gaining great momentum and is marching forward. (2) The military officers and soldiers of other ranks, and police officers who could not accept the coup d'état of the terrorist military and the military dictatorship started to stand with the people and sought refuge in "the people's embrace" program. A total of 12,327 members of the military and the police force - 3,236 soldiers, 9,091 policemen – and thousands of their family members have already joined the Program as of February 21, 2023. Together with the people, the National Unity Government records and recognizes as "people's heroes" to the comrades who sought to join people's embrace. (3) In order to support those who joined the people's embrace program, the "People Embrace Program Implementation Committee," spearheaded by the Union Prime Minister, the National Unity Government, has been founded and is in full function. Alongside this committee, NUG's ally ethnic resistance organizations (EROs), international organizations, and donor organizations are collaborating to provide systematic and comprehensive support of security, transportation, resettlement, livelihood, and social support for soldiers and police officers who have switched to the people's side. Despite the numerous challenges as it is of revolutionary era, we are doing our best to fulfill the needs of all those who have sought refuge in the people's embrace, even if it is not the most comprehensive, and we intend to continue to provide livehood, employment support and steady incomes in the most comprehensive ways possible. In the post-revolution era, all the heroes who sought refuge in the people's embrace will receive the awards and honors in response to their different degrees of involvement. (4) Currently, some of those who have sought refuge in the people's embrace program have already been voluntarily and actively serving in the People's Defence Force, and they will continue to carry out important duties in the future federal army that will essentially be established in the post-revolution period. (5) From the beginning of the people's revolution until March 2023, anti-fascist measures have been taken and a total of 29,650 terrorist SAC members have been killed, and 11,230 have been injured. We declare that the soldiers and police who remain loyal to the terrorist and war criminal military, who continue to stand against the people, will be considered enemies of the people and the revolution and will face elimination by stronger people's defense measures. Moreover, during the post-revolutionary era, all those, who failed to join the people's embrace program and stood against the people, will be taken legal actions in accordance with the Transitional Justice policy and procedures, in pursuit of truth and justice. (6) The Ministry of Defence of the National Unity Government is continuously increasing the momentum of the People's Resistance Warfare in collaboration with allied ethnic revolutionary organizations. The terrorist military, on the other hand, is facing a huge crisis in all sectors, whether it is political or warfare or economy or diplomacy or international relation. The reality is that it is not possible anymore to prevent the people's revolution, in terms of physical, mental, or manpower. (7) It should also be noted that the people's embrace program is not a never-ending program.Therefore, we strongly encourage the members of the military and police force who continue serving the terrorist military to stand together with the people and join the People's Resistance Warfare against the terrorist military alongside the people before the closure of the People's Embrace Program..."
Source/publisher: Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update: 2023-04-02
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Title: အကြမ်းဖက် အာဏာသိမ်းစစ်တပ်အောက်တွင် ဆက်လက်အမှုထမ်းနေကြသော အရာရှိ၊ အရာခံ၊ အကြပ် စစ်သည်များနှင့် ရဲတပ်ဖွဲ့ဝင်များကို ပြည်သူ့ဘက်သို့ ကူးပြောင်း ရပ်တည်၍ “ပြည်သူ့ရင်ခွင်” ခိုလှုံလာကြရန် အထူးတိုက်တွန်းနှိုးဆော်ချက်
Description: "၁။ ပြည်သူလူထု၏ သဘောထားဆန္ဒကို ဆန့်ကျင်၍ လက်နက်နှင့် အင်အားကို အသုံးပြု အားကိုးကာ အဓမ္မ စစ်အာဏာသိမ်းခဲ့သော အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်ကို ပြည်သူလူထုတရပ်လုံးက ရရာနည်းလမ်းမျိုးစုံဖြင့် ခုခံတိုက်ပွဲဝင်နေကြသည့် “ပြည်သူ့တော်လှန်ရေး” ကြီးသည် ယခု အချိန်တွင် အရှိန်အဟုန်ကောင်းစွာဖြင့် ရှေ့သို့ ဆက်လက်ချီတက်လျက်ရှိပါသည်။ ၂။ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်၏ စစ်အာဏာသိမ်းမှုနှင့် စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ်ကို လက်မခံနိုင်သော အရာရှိ၊ အရာခံ၊ အကြပ် စစ်သည်များနှင့် ရဲတပ်ဖွဲ့ဝင်များစွာသည် စစ်အာဏာသိမ်းပြီးနောက်တွင် ပြည်သူနှင့် အတူ ရပ်တည်၍ ပြည်သူ့ရင်ခွင်သို့ ကူးပြောင်းခိုလှုံလာလျက်ရှိကြရာ ၂၀၂၃ ခုနှစ်၊ ဖေဖော်ဝါရီလ၊ ၂၁ ရက်နေ့ အထိ စစ်သည် (၃၂၃၆) ဦးနှင့် ရဲတပ်ဖွဲ့ဝင် (၉၀၉၁) ဦး၊ စုစုပေါင်း (၁၂၃၂၇) ဦး နှင့်မိသားစုဝင်ဦးရေ ထောင်ကျော် ရှိခဲ့ပြီဖြစ်သည်။ ဤသို့ ပြည်သူ့ရင်ခွင် ခိုလှုံလာသူ ရဲဘော်များကို ပြည်သူများနှင့်အတူ မိမိတို့ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရက “ပြည်သူ့သူရဲကောင်းများ” အဖြစ် လေးလေးနက်နက် မော်ကွန်းတင်၊ အသိအမှတ်ပြုကြပြီးလည်း ဖြစ်ပါသည်။ ၃။ ပြည်သူ့ရင်ခွင်သို့ ကူးပြောင်းခိုလှုံလာသူများကို အဘက်ဘက်က ကူညီဖြည့်ဆည်းနိုင်ရေး အတွက် အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၊ ပြည်ထောင်စု ဝန်ကြီးချုပ်ကိုယ်တိုင် ဦးဆောင်သော “ပြည်သူ့ရင်ခွင် ခိုလှုံရေးအစီအစဉ် အကောင်အထည် ဖော်ဆောင်မှုကော်မတီ” ကို ဖွဲ့စည်း ဆောင်ရွက်လျက်ရှိပါသည်။ အဆိုပါကော်မတီနှင့်အတူ မဟာမိတ် တိုင်းရင်းသားတော်လှန်ရေး အဖွဲ့များ၊ နိုင်ငံတကာအဖွဲ့အစည်းများ၊ အလှူရှင်အဖွဲ့အစည်းများ ဟန်ချက်ညီလက်တွဲကာ ပြည်သူ့ ဘက်သို့ ကူးပြောင်းလာသော စစ်သည်တော် များနှင့် ရဲတပ်ဖွဲ့ဝင်များကို လုံခြုံရေး၊ ကြိုဆိုရေး၊ နေရာချထားရေး၊ စားဝတ်နေရေး၊ လူမှုရေး စသည့် အဘက်ဘက်က ထောက်ပံ့ကူညီရေးအတွက် စနစ်တကျ ဆောင်ရွက်လျက်ရှိသည်။ ထိုသို့ ဆောင်ရွက် ရာတွင် တော်လှန်ရေးကာလ ဖြစ်သည်နှင့်အညီ အပြည့်စုံဆုံး မဟုတ်သည့်တိုင်အောင် ပြည်သူ့ရင်ခွင် ခိုလှုံလာသူအားလုံးအတွက် အတတ်နိုင်ဆုံး အားထုတ်ဖြည့်ဆည်းနေပြီး ဆက်လက်၍ အသက်မွေး ဝမ်းကျောင်းအလုပ်အကိုင်နှင့်ပုံမှန်ဝင်ငွေရရှိရေးအတွက်ပါ စီစဉ်ဆောင်ရွက်လျက်ရှိသည်။ တော်လှန်ရေး အလွန်ကာလတွင်လည်း ဤပြည်သူရင်ခွင် ခိုလှုံလာသူ သူရဲကောင်းများအားလုံးအတွက် ထိုက်တန်သည့် ချီးမြှင့် ဂုဏ်ပြုမှုများ၊ ထောက်ပံ့ကူညီမှုများ ဖြည့်ဆည်းဆောင်ရွက်သွားမည်ဖြစ်သည်။ ၄။ ယခုအခါ ပြည်သူ့ရင်ခွင် ခိုလှုံလာသူများအနက် ရဲဘော်အချို့သည် ၎င်းတို့၏ ဆန္ဒအရ ပြည်သူ့ ကာကွယ်ရေးတပ်မတော်တွင် ပါဝင်အမှုထမ်းလျက်ရှိနေပြီဖြစ်သကဲ့သို့ တော်လှန်ရေး အလွန်ကာလတွင် မဖြစ်မနေ ထူထောင်ရမည့် ဖက်ဒရယ်ပြည်ထောင်စု တပ်မတော်သစ်တွင်လည်း အရေးကြီးသော တာဝန်များ ဆက်လက် ထမ်းဆောင်သွားကြမည်ဖြစ်သည်။ ၅။ ပြည်သူ့ခုခံတွန်းလှန်စစ်စတင်ချိန်မှ ၂၀၂၃ ခုနှစ်၊ မတ်လအထိ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီ လက်အောက်ခံ တပ်ဖွဲ့ဝင် (၂၉၆၅၀)ဦး သေဆုံးပြီး (၁၁၁၂၃၀)ဦး ထိခိုက်ဒဏ်ရာ ရသည် အထိ ချေမှုန်းနိုင် ခဲ့ပြီးဖြစ်သည်။ အကြမ်းဖက်သမားများ၊ စစ်ရာဇဝတ်ကောင်များ ဖြစ်ကြသည့် အာဏာသိမ်းစစ်တပ်ကို သစ္စာခံကာ ပြည်သူလူထု၏ ဆန့်ကျင်ဘက်တွင် ဆက်လက်ရပ်တည် နေကြသော စစ်သား၊ ရဲသားများကိုမူ ပြည်သူ့ရန်သူ၊ တော်လှန်ရေးရန်သူအဖြစ် သတ်မှတ်ရမည်ဖြစ်၍ ပြည်သူ့တော်လှန်ရေးကြီး၏ အရှိန်မြှင့် တိုက်ခိုက်ချေမှုန်းခြင်းကို ခံကြရမည်ဖြစ်ကြောင်းကို တပါတည်း အသိပေးလိုသည်။ အလားတူ တော်လှန်ရေးအလွန်ကာလတွင်လည်း အသွင်ကူးပြောင်းရေးကာလ တရားမျှတမှု (Transitional Justice) ဆိုင်ရာ မူဝါဒ၊ လုပ်ထုံးလုပ်နည်းများနှင့်အညီ အဆိုပါ ပြည်သူ့ရန်သူဖြစ်ခဲ့သူအားလုံးသည် အမှန်တရားနှင့် တရားမျှတမှုအတွက် ဥပဒေနှင့်အညီ အရေးယူ အပြစ်ပေးခံရမည်လည်း ဖြစ်သည်။ ၆။ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၊ ကာကွယ်ရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာနသည် မဟာမိတ် တိုင်းရင်းသား တော်လှန်ရေးအဖွဲ့စည်းများနှင့်အတူ ဟန်ချက်ညီလက်တွဲလျက် ပြည်သူ့ခုခံတွန်းလှန်စစ်ကို အရှိန်အဟုန် ဆက်လက်မြှင့်တင်လျက်ရှိသည်။ တဖက်တွင်မူ အကြမ်းဖက် အာဏာသိမ်းစစ်တပ်အနေဖြင့် နိုင်ငံရေး၊ စစ်ရေး၊ စီးပွားရေး၊ နိုင်ငံတကာ သံခင်းတမန်ခင်းစသည့် အဖက်ဖက်က ချွတ်ခြုံကျ၊ အကျပ်အတည်းဆိုက် နေရုံသာမက ပြည်သူ့တော်လှန်ရေးကို ဟန့်တားနိုင်ရန်အတွက် ရုပ်ဝတ္ထုအင်အား၊ လူအင်အား၊ စိတ်ဓာတ်အင်အားအရ လုံးဝ မဖြစ်နိုင်တော့သည်ကို မြေပြင်အခြေအနေအရ တွေ့ရှိနိုင်မည်ဖြစ်သည်။ ၇။ တော်လှန်ရေး၏ အခြေအနေအရပ်ရပ်အရ ပြည်သူ့ရင်ခွင်ခိုလှုံမှုသည် အမြဲတံခါးဖွင့်ထားမည့် အစီအစဉ် မဟုတ်သည်ကိုလည်း သတိပြုစေလိုသည်။ သို့ပါ၍ အကြမ်းဖက် အာဏာသိမ်းစစ်တပ် အောက်တွင် ဆက်လက်အမှုထမ်းနေကြသော အရာရှိ၊ အရာခံ၊ အကြပ် စစ်သည်များနှင့် ရဲတပ်ဖွဲ့ဝင်များ အနေဖြင့် ပြည်သူ့ရင်ခွင်တံခါးမပိတ်ခင် ပြည်သူ့ဘက်သို့ ကူးပြောင်းရပ်တည်ကြရန်၊ ပြည်သူနှင့်အတူ ပူးပေါင်းလက်တွဲကာ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်ကို ပြန်လည် ခုခံတိုက်ပွဲဝင်သွားနိုင်ရန် အထူးတိုက်တွန်း နှိုးဆော်လိုက်သည်။..."
Source/publisher: Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update: 2023-04-02
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Title: ပြည်ထောင်စုလွှတ်တော်ကိုယ်စားပြုကော်မတီ၏ သတင်းစဉ် အမှတ် (၇)
Description: "ပြည်ထောင်စုလွှတ်တော်ကိုယ်စားပြုကော်မတီက နှစ်ပတ်လျှင်တစ်ကြိမ် ထုတ်ပြန်ခဲ့သော သတင်းစဉ်များကို pdf file ရယူလိုပါက အောက်ပါ CRPH ဝက်ဘ်ဆိုက်လင့်ခ်မှတစ်ဆင့် ရယူနိုင်ပါသည်။ https://crphmyanmar.org/publication/newsletter/ ပြည်ထောင်စုလွှတ်တော်ကိုယ်စားပြုကော်မတီ..."
Source/publisher: Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw
Date of entry/update: 2023-04-01
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Title: Indonesia’s ASEAN Leadership Tested with Myanmar
Description: "Two years ago, following Myanmar’s military coup on February 1, 2021, Indonesia called an emergency summit of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in Jakarta. “The development of the situation in Myanmar is unacceptable and must not continue,” President Joko Widodo announced. On April 24, 2021, the nine ASEAN leaders and Myanmar junta chief, Sr. Gen. Min Aung Hlaing, committed to a five-point consensus intended to chart a path toward dialogue and de-escalation of the crisis. Within days, the junta repudiated the agreement, going on to unleash a reign of atrocities against the Myanmar people that continues today, massacring, torturing, and starving its perceived opposition. Meanwhile, the international community has put ASEAN in the driver’s seat, endlessly reiterating, as in the December UN Security Council resolution on Myanmar, “its full support for ASEAN’s central role in facilitating a peaceful solution.” But with no clear tools or leverage to move forward, ASEAN has been left effectively holding the bag for Myanmar’s descent toward becoming a failed state. “Indonesia is deeply concerned by the military’s lack of commitment to implement the Five-Points Consensus,” Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi told the UN General Assembly in September 2022, following the junta’s execution of four pro-democracy activists. The next month, she reported that the situation was “deteriorating and worsening.” The foreign minister’s frankness suggested Indonesia’s chairmanship of ASEAN in 2023 would bring about a stronger regional response, following Cambodia’s self-admitted foundering last year. But as it wraps up its first quarter as ASEAN chair, Indonesia has fallen short. The chair’s statement at the February Foreign Ministers’ Retreat contained only meek language on Myanmar, toothlessly urging the junta to implement the five-point consensus, which called for an immediate end to violence and constructive dialogue, among other points. Jakarta has offered no clarity on what action will be taken against a member that has grievously violated not only the joint agreement, but the binding ASEAN Charter, which enshrines the principles of democracy, rule of law, and human rights. Behind closed doors, Marsudi reportedly presented a plan to make progress on the consensus at a UN Security Council briefing in March, an outcome of the November 2022 ASEAN Leaders Summit that called for “an implementation plan that outlines concrete, practical and measurable indicators with specific timeline to support the Five-Point Consensus.” But putting any meaningful plan into effect will require a timeline with tangible consequences for the junta’s violations, which should include the threat of suspending Myanmar under article 20 of the ASEAN Charter, covering noncompliance and serious breaches of the Charter. Indonesia should formalize the proposal made by Jokowi at the November summit to expand the ban on junta representatives at ASEAN meetings. Rather than appointing an individual as special envoy to Myanmar, like the previous two chairs, Indonesia has established a special envoy’s office headed by Foreign Minister Marsudi, working alongside longtime diplomat Ngurah Swajaya. The office has been operating “in a low key manner,” a spokesperson told Frontier Myanmar. “Not all diplomatic activities need to be disclosed to the public.” Reported plans for a military envoy have not yet materialized. Grappling with the Myanmar junta’s intransigence has exposed fault lines within the regional bloc. Indonesia and Malaysia, often alongside Singapore and the Philippines, have favored a more vocal approach to Myanmar that has been stymied by Thailand and Cambodia’s expressed reluctance to isolate the junta. The result is a lowest common denominator strategy presented under the guise of “consensus.” Marsudi reported that at their February meeting, the foreign ministers “reiterated the united approach” on Myanmar – a misguided cover falsely equating a diversified approach with weakness. In December, Thailand hosted an “informal” meeting on the crisis with junta officials, attended by Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam, which the other ASEAN members sat out. An opaque Thai-led “1.5 track dialogue” with Laos, Bangladesh, India, and junta representatives followed in mid-March. If Bangkok has no qualms charting its own course without the sign-off of all ASEAN members, why should Indonesia handcuff itself as chair to protect a “consensus” approach that’s serving no one? Indonesia should instead be capitalizing on its leadership role by helping build a coalition of concerned governments, including regional powers as well as Western countries that have hidden behind “ASEAN centrality,” to create pressure that’s layered yet complementary. Gaining buy-in from many if not all ASEAN states as well as Japan and South Korea would strengthen both diplomatic and punitive actions. Jakarta should encourage other governments to toughen sanctions on the junta’s revenues – first and foremost from oil and gas – and to enhance their enforcement of existing measures. It should welcome more concrete action by the Security Council, with steps toward a resolution imposing a global arms embargo, targeted sanctions against the military, and a referral of the situation to the International Criminal Court. Indonesia cannot present itself as a broker or envoy between junta authorities and the outside world unless the punitive actions that the world is imposing are serious enough to get the junta’s attention. “The interests of the Myanmar people must always be the priority,” Jokowi said at the emergency summit in Jakarta two years ago. But the junta’s generals serve neither the country nor its people. Indonesia should be engaging, formally and consistently, with those who do – Myanmar civil society activists and the opposition National Unity Government, among others. Local groups are also key for the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance (AHA Centre) to deliver aid effectively, one of the tasks of the five-point consensus, rather than relying on junta authorities who have misused and weaponized humanitarian assistance. “The criticisms shouldn’t be aimed at ASEAN,” Marsudi said in November. “They should be aimed at the junta.… We did our part.” Certainly, the junta is directly responsible for the crimes against humanity and war crimes it’s committing across the country. But for the millions of people brutally oppressed by the junta, ASEAN has not done its part. Not when there is so much more that Jakarta could be doing, and so much more that needs to be done..."
Source/publisher: Coconuts Jakarta via "Human Rights Watch" (USA)
Date of entry/update: 2023-03-31
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Title: The UN can no longer play dumb to its manipulation by the Myanmar military
Sub-title: The United Nations has played into the military’s hands in Rakhine State, by acquiescing when the regime starved communities of aid and then restored humanitarian access to achieve its war aims.
Description: "When its fragile ceasefire with the Arakan Army collapsed mid last year, the Myanmar military faced early and significant losses on the battlefield. In response, it targeted civilians with violence and some of the harshest restrictions in Rakhine State in decades, including on aid. Only when this extreme pressure on civilians over several months had driven the AA into another ceasefire did the military allow the United Nations and its partners some access to alleviate suffering. UN agencies active in the country were a passive tool in the military’s strategy, providing little resistance to its hostage-holding of civilians. This manipulation of aid is worth examining closely, for the lessons it holds not just for humanitarian actors in Rakhine, but for anyone navigating Myanmar’s conflict zones in the aftermath of the 2021 military coup. This examination should start with the breakdown of a ceasefire between the AA and military that was agreed to in late 2020. This ceasefire turned Rakhine into a rare quiet spot amid the ensuing anti-coup protests and armed resistance, but it also allowed the AA to expand the parallel administrative structures under its political wing, the United League of Arakan, and reinforce its military positions. The rapid consolidation of AA power unnerved the junta, which began arresting dozens of alleged AA affiliates in the first half of last year. Then from August 22, the AA launched new offensives against the military in northern Rakhine’s Maungdaw Township and southern Chin State’s Paletwa Township, spelling the end of the ceasefire. The AA quickly took several key positions from the military, which retaliated by launching airstrikes and shelling civilians in the historic capital of Mrauk-U, far from the site of the offensives. By September 5, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reported that 9,500 people had been newly displaced in Rakhine, joining some 75,000 people already displaced by fighting between 2018 and 2020, and approximately 140,000 Rohingya internally displaced in 2012. The AA’s early gains illustrated its strength on the battlefield, against a military preoccupied with putting down resistance to its 2021 coup elsewhere in the country. With the objective of drawing the fighting with the AA to a quick close, the junta implemented extensive and perhaps unprecedented restrictions on civilians. In early September the junta blocked medicine imports through the state’s land borders and banned shipments through central and northern Rakhine. Soldiers were posted outside Maungdaw General Hospital, preventing nurses from moving medicine without permission, while junta-employed health workers were prohibited from working in rural areas. The junta also suspended public boat transport through central and northern Rakhine. This gravely affected civilians, who rely upon these systems to access jobs and healthcare, as well as food and other imported goods. The tit-for-tat continued when, in early September, the AA seized at least three more strategic camps, while occupying other camps as junta troops retreated. The junta responded by blocking all civilian movement through waterways in central and northern areas of the state – beyond just public transport. Then in mid-September, the junta announced unprecedented bans on international humanitarian aid. Although aid agencies in Rakhine have long faced extensive restrictions, the new regulations blocked access to six entire townships. In November, it extended the humanitarian aid ban to two more townships. Raising the costs of war Insurgent groups like the AA rely heavily on support from communities, without which they would flounder. Rakhine communities feel they have been neglected by the central Myanmar state for decades, and the AA’s promises of self-determination and restoring the former glory of their region have been very successful in winning popular support and legitimacy. For the military, severing the links between communities and insurgent groups is a longstanding approach, designed to starve its opponents of resources, and to make the costs of supporting insurgency too high for communities to sustain. While this approach rarely results in the complete defeat of insurgent foes, whose legitimacy is based in part on opposition to the junta’s barbaric tactics, it has often allowed the military to weaken and contain insurgencies in Myanmar’s borderlands. The new restrictions, however, were not enough to immediately weaken the AA, so the junta increasingly turned to violence against civilians. On September 23, it raided and burnt down houses in a village in Buthidaung Township, using the same indiscriminate violence it used against Rohingya civilians in 2017, and is now inflicting on civilians in central Myanmar. The shelling of urban areas – almost guaranteed to cause civilian casualties – increased in Minbya and Buthidaung townships in early October, while junta troops entered downtown Mrauk-U and villages in Kyauktaw Township, where they fired small arms unprovoked. The junta also tightened its restrictions, erecting new roadblocks on highways and blockading remote villages. Meanwhile, those who continued operating boats for their livelihoods risked being arrested or having their vessels seized. The regime also increased arrests of anyone suspected of supporting the AA, including civil society leaders, monks, village administrators and businesspeople. Yet the military remained under intense military pressure from the AA. The group not only retaliated against the restrictions by blocking military supply lines, but also illustrated its ability to operate across a wide region by launching several attacks in southern Rakhine, far from the main theatre of conflict. In mid-October the junta dramatically escalated its atrocities against civilians. On October 17, junta shelling killed four civilians and injured at least another six. Six days later, three Rohingya men were injured, reportedly due to junta firing from drones, and on October 31 shelling killed three civilians. At the same time, the AA launched repeated attacks on the junta along the Bangladesh border. The intense restrictions had become unbearable by November but had particularly dire implications with the onset of the rice harvest. The Rakhine Farmer’s Union estimated that nearly half of the paddy fields in Rakhine would be left unharvested due to the fighting, creating hardship and food insecurity that could last for years. The situation appeared to reach a tipping point when, on November 10, the AA ambushed a military convoy in Ponnagyun, a short drive from the state capital Sittwe. Junta troops entered nearby Sin Inn Gyi village, where they massacred nine residents and set houses alight. Thousands fled their homes, and the military arrested civilians on suspicion of cooperation with the AA. Days later, the junta shelled civilian areas in Maungdaw, killing at least 10 people and reportedly wounding more than 30 others. A reliable tool On November 26, news broke that the AA and junta had agreed to a new truce, which the former called a “humanitarian pause”. Radio Free Asia reported that at least 45 civilians had been killed and over 100 injured due to the fighting since August, while the UN said more than 16,000 people had been displaced. This brought the total number of people displaced by the multi-year conflict between the AA and military to more than 89,000. The junta has since slowly restored humanitarian access for the UN and its partners, although it remains piecemeal. The regime has also gradually loosened its restrictions on movement and trade, including imports of food and medicine, and allowed farmers to harvest their crops. The junta’s restrictions on aid were part of a larger package designed to push the AA into a ceasefire by depriving civilians of access to food and livelihoods, while simultaneously killing or displacing civilians and destroying their property. This instrumentalisation of international aid is not new and is not unique to Rakhine. The junta blocks aid to communities in areas controlled by resistance forces in southeast Myanmar and elsewhere, while permitting its flow to communities deemed “loyal” to the regime. The camps hosting displaced Rohingya in central Rakhine are perhaps the most egregious example of the military’s manipulation of aid. It has effectively locked Rohingya communities in these camps since 2012, stripping them of documentation and blocking their movement and access to basic healthcare, education and other rights, while counting on UN agencies and their partners to fill the gap year after year. Similarly, this month UN has been in the spotlight for allowing boats from two UN agencies to be used by regime officials travelling from northern Rakhine to refugee camps in Bangladesh, in support of a pilot scheme to repatriate about 1,000 Rohingya. The UN has said its staff faced a “firm request” and had little choice but to lend out the boats, but this apparently violates the UN’s own policies on engaging the regime, as well as its public pronouncements that conditions in northern Rakhine do not allow for the sustainable return of refugees. The UN has never acknowledged its routine manipulation by the military but has instead acted as a reliable tool. It has rarely even acknowledged that the military is the main barrier to aid operations. Its 2023 Humanitarian Response Plan, published in January, notes “access restrictions” last year without mentioning who was chiefly imposing them. Instead, it alleges “interference” by the AA, obscuring the reality that the military is not only the greatest cause of humanitarian need but also the greatest impediment to humanitarian access. The UN is in a difficult position. Its mandate is to provide assistance and relieve suffering within a highly constrained environment. In the short term, responding to openings in access is entirely justifiable. But in the longer term, what is being done to break this pattern of manipulation, when continued cooperation and acquiescence will only embolden the junta and encourage them to target civilians? The UN should start with a reckoning of how it has allowed itself to be instrumentalised year after year across the country without protest. Instead of vilifying resistance groups in its reports, it should consider which organisations have the popular legitimacy to govern, which are interested in alleviating suffering and developing their communities, and which are preoccupied with inflicting that suffering. By failing to reckon with its routine manipulation, the UN is simply facilitating the military’s oppression..."
Source/publisher: "Frontier Myanmar" (Myanmar)
Date of entry/update: 2023-03-31
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Title: Canada condemns dissolution of political parties by Myanmar regime
Description: "Global Affairs Canada today issued the following statement: “Canada condemns the Myanmar regime’s dissolution of 40 political parties, including the National League for Democracy and Shan Nationalities League for Democracy. These clear attempts to undermine Myanmar’s democratic institutions and to silence opposition voices will only serve to deepen the ongoing crisis in Myanmar and delay the return to a fully democratic and inclusive Myanmar. “The regimes overruled the democratic wishes of the people of Myanmar when they seized power in a coup on February 1, 2021. “Canada continues to call for a peaceful return to Myanmar’s democratic path in line with the aspirations of the people of Myanmar. Any political process without inclusive dialogue, with opposition members detained, killed or silenced risks worsening conflict. “We call on the regime to release those arbitrarily detained, including political leaders, and end the violence and targeting of civilians, grant full and unhindered humanitarian access, and respect its obligations under international law. We also call on the international community to support efforts to hold those responsible for human rights violations and abuses to account; to cease the sale and transfer of arms and equipment, which facilitate atrocities; and to meet the urgent humanitarian needs of Myanmar’s people, including its most vulnerable communities. “Canada supports the efforts of those working peacefully for an inclusive, peaceful and multiparty democratic Myanmar where the rights of all are protected.”..."
Source/publisher: Government of Canada
Date of entry/update: 2023-03-30
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Title: The Dissolution of Political Parties in Burma
Description: "We strongly condemn the Burma military regime-controlled Union Election Commission’s decision to abolish 40 political parties, including the National League for Democracy (NLD). The people voted overwhelmingly to re-elect the NLD and other parties in November 2020 national elections. The military regime’s decision to dissolve the political parties shows its continued contempt for the popular will of Burma’s people and multi-party democracy. The military’s ongoing efforts to stifle political dissent and eradicate civic space are designed to further entrench its own power and interests. This action further demonstrates that the regime’s plans for deeply flawed elections, if held, will not represent the will of Burma’s voters. The United States calls on the military regime to reverse course, end the use of violence against the people in Burma, free those it has unjustly detained, and respect its obligations under international law. We remain committed to supporting genuine multiparty democracy, peace, and respect for human rights..."
Source/publisher: U.S. Department of State
Date of entry/update: 2023-03-30
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Title: Secretary-General ‘Deeply Concerned’ by Reports of Military-Appointed Election Commission in Myanmar Dissolving Opposition Parties
Description: 'SG/SM/21754 30 MARCH 2023 The following statement was issued today by the Spokesman for UN Secretary-General António Guterres: The Secretary-General is deeply concerned by reports that the Union Election Commission, appointed by the military in Myanmar, has dissolved 40 opposition parties, including the National League for Democracy (NLD) led by State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. Any attempts to undermine democratic institutions and processes will only deepen the crisis and delay the return to a fully democratic and inclusive Myanmar. The Secretary-General renews his call on neighbouring countries and other Member States to urge the military leadership to adhere to inclusive political processes. The Secretary-General reiterates his call for the immediate release of all arbitrarily detained prisoners, including President Win Myint and State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi..."
Source/publisher: UN Secretary-General
Date of entry/update: 2023-03-30
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Title: သတင်းထုတ်ပြန်ချက် Project DragonFly နှင့် ပတ်သက်သော နောက်ဆက်တွဲအခြေအနေများကို အသိပေးထုတ်ပြန်ခြင်း
Description: "၁။​အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၏ ဘဏ္ဍာငွေရှာဖွေရေးအစီအစဉ်များတွင် အတတ်ပညာ၊ အသိပညာ၊ ငွေကြေးအားဖြင့် ပါဝင်ကူညီအားဖြည့်ပေးနေကြသူ တစ်ဦးချင်းစီတိုင်း၏ ကြိုးစားအားထုတ်မှုများကို လေးစားစွာဖြင့် အသိ အမှတ်ပြုအပ်ပါသည်။ ၂။​အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၊ ကာကွယ်ရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာနအနေဖြင့် နိုင်ငံတကာ Fundraiser များထံမှ တဆင့် Project DragonFly အတွက် အမေရိကန်ဒေါ်လာ (၂.၂) သန်းတိတိကို လက်ခံရရှိသုံးစွဲလျက်ရှိပါသည်။ ရရှိထားသော ရန်ပုံငွေများကို လေကြောင်းရန်ကာကွယ်ရေးကဏ္ဍအတွက် အမေရိကန်ဒေါ်လာ (၁.၄) သန်းနှင့် တန်ပြန်လေကြောင်း တိုက်ခိုက်ရေးကဏ္ဍအတွက် အမေရိကန်ဒေါ်လာ (၈) သိန်း လျာထား သုံးစွဲလျက်ရှိပါသည်။ ၃။​အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၊ ကာကွယ်ရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာနအနေဖြင့် နိုင်ငံတကာ Fundraiser များနှင့် ပူးပေါင်း လုပ်ဆောင်ခဲ့သည့် ရန်ပုံငွေရှာဖွေရေးစီမံချက်များမှ ရရှိလာသော ရန်ပုံငွေများကို တာဝန်ယူမှု၊ တာဝန်ခံမှုအပြည့်ဖြင့် စနစ်တကျစီမံခန့်ခွဲနေပြီး အလေအလွင့်မရှိ လက်ခံရရှိခဲ့ပါသည်။ ၄။​Project DragonFly မှ ရရှိခဲ့သော ရန်ပုံငွေများဖြင့် ပြုလုပ်ခဲ့သည့် စစ်ဆင်ရေးအောင်မြင်မှုများကို လုံခြုံရေး အရ သင့်လျော်သည့် အချိန်များတွင် ထုတ်ပြန်သွားမည်ဖြစ်ပါကြောင်း အသိပေးအပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher: Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update: 2023-03-30
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Title: Burmese Military Ban 40 Political Parties, including National League for Democracy
Description: "The Burmese military announced on 28th March 2023 that it has banned 40 political parties, including the National League for Democracy (NLD), which has won every election it has been able to contest. The ban follows the military demanding that the political parties reregister with the military-appointed Union Election Commission, something the parties refused to do as the military has no legitimacy or legal power to set election rules. The Burmese military have arrested, killed, jailed and tortured NLD members, and closed their offices, but have never gone so far as to impose a complete ban. The ban is a sign of how desperate and insecure the Burmese military are as they face unprecedented resistance after their attempted coup began two years ago. “The Burmese military banning 40 political parties should be a wake-up call to those in the international community who still think there can be genuine dialogue and compromise with the military,” said Mark Farmaner, Director of Burma Campaign UK. “For decades the Burmese military has held the country back from building democracy, human rights, and economic development. The people of Burma want a future without the Burmese military and the international community should be supporting them in achieving that goal. At the present time, the Burmese military receives far more international support than Burma’s democracy movement, with even the USA and UK still dithering over whether to sanction gas revenues.” There are no soft-liners or genuine reformers in the military waiting in the wings. The Burmese military is not an institution which can be reformed. Each leader is more hardline and brutal than the last. Even the so-called reform period during the 2010s saw a significant escalation of violence and human rights violations perpetrated against ethnic people in Burma, including genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. The plodding pace of the implementation of sanctions enables the Burmese military to continue to receive revenue, arms and equipment, including aviation fuel, which it is using to commit violations of international law against the population of Burma. “Faced with increased repression, airstrikes, artillery bombardments and a humanitarian crisis, the people of Burma need swift and decisive action to cut off revenue and arms to the Burmese military, including gas revenue and aviation fuel. The pace of sanctions implementation is simply too slow, and people are dying as a result,” said Mark Farmaner. The 40 political parties listed in Burmese military-controlled state media are: Lahu National Development Party Democratic Party (Myanmar) Kayen National Party Ta’ang (Palaung) National Party Party for Democracy and Peace Shan Nationalities Democratic Party Wunthanu Democratic Party National Democratic Party for Development Ethnic National Development Party (ENDP) Kaman National Development Party Bamar People’s Party National League for Democracy Democratic Party for a New Society Myanmar National Congress Party Asho Chin National Party Shan National League for Democracy United National Congress Party National Prosperity Party Dawei Nationalities Party Federal Union Party Union Pa-O National Organization Khumi (Khami) National Party Democratic Party for a New Society Karen National Party Mro National Democracy Party Guiding Star Party 88 Generation Democracy Party Lhaovo National Unity and Development Party New Era Union Party Zo National Region Development Party National Development Party Daingnet National Development Party Arakan League for Democracy Party Kayah State Democratic Party National United Democratic Party (NUDP) The Yeomanry Development Party (YDP) Chin National League for Democracy Party Chin National Party (CNP) Kachin National Party Alliance of Myanmar’s Worker and Farmer Party (AMWFP)..."
Source/publisher: "Burma Campaign UK" (London)
Date of entry/update: 2023-03-29
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Title: The double burden of ‘post-covid economic stresses’ and ‘military coup’
Sub-title: Sharing a survey study on the post-coup socio-economic impact of the women and working peoples from peri-urban areas
Description: "It is crucial to document all forms of human costs shouldered by different social groups due to the military coup and to recognize and understand all the struggles and resilience strategies deployed and the specific circumstances in which they are being deployed. In this regard, TNI wants to highlight the work of a local partner as they attempt to capture the double burden of ‘post-covid economic stresses’ and ‘military coup’ faced by the urban women laborers and women-headed households living in Hlaintharyar and South Dagon townships of Yangon city. This past February 1 marked the second year since the Myanmar military staged a coup d'état back in 2021. Within this two-year period, the country saw the highest number of mass displacements, deaths, destruction, and torture in every state and region ever – surpassing any point of time in the country’s history. These atrocities committed by the genocidal military can be seen in the numbers.1 However, other human costs, such as the social, emotional, and economic dimensions may be less visible and harder to capture even though they are important parts of the totality. A particularly tragic outcome of such human costs is the number of people (forty-four cases recorded between 1 Feb 2021 to Sept 2022)2 who are reported to have committed suicide since the coup. Nevertheless, despite these hard cruel facts, the military dictator continues to face strong resistance in a majority of the country. At the same time, there are ongoing and unsettling debates around what is the ‘right’ kind of resistance. Looking back at the country’s history of colonial occupation, armed conflict, and political oppression, there have been many forms of resistance, and not all were undertaken by established groups. Often, resistance undertaken by ordinary people have not been very overt or highly visible, but this does not mean they were not organized or meaningful. Fast-forward to today, surely the same holds true. While there are circumstances that have clearly led many people to devote themselves completely to the revolution, many others find themselves in other kinds of circumstances where they must keep on working so that their families can survive. Yet these two different scenarios surely only tell part of the story of what is really happening in the lives of real people in either case. In either case, people found themselves in difficult circumstances not of their own choosing that they must find a way to survive and get through. We must keep in mind that even before the coup, Myanmar had become a country of very high poverty and very deep inequality. People from the rural areas made up an overwhelming majority (87%) of the country’s poor.3 Urban-biased forms of development pursued by the previous governments had pushed waves of rural villagers to the cities in search of work, and more often than not ending up as part of the cheap informal labor force in the growing manufacturing and service industries. Myanmar pays the lowest daily minimum wage in ASEAN since 2018, which is now equivalent to around 2 US$ factoring in current inflation rate, below international poverty line of 2.15 US$ per day.4 Even before the coup, only 2% of the entire workforce is estimated to be employed in the formal sector where workers are eligible to register for social security schemes.5 The rest are effectively overexploited and uncared for. A significant proportion of working people lack access to the most basic public services such as primary health care, reproductive health services, municipal public services, decent housing, and more. For the majority of people whose lives had already been shattered by various events in previous decades, the coup was a new crisis on top of an already existing crisis. In the early days after the coup, we have seen media reports of hundreds of factory workers from Yangon industrial zones on the streets, one hand grasping a humble lunch box while another gripping into a fist to protest against the coup. Here is where the junta’s iron hammer fell first and with unmitigated harshness. Hlaingtharyar and South Dagon township faced a horrifically ruthless crackdown by the military, killing nearly 100 people which Human Rights Watch described as a massacre.6,7Many workers have since left the area and returned to their villages. But many have no choice but to remain, forced to earn a wage under the close military surveillance, as they try to rebuild their lives on the ruins and look for jobs available from whichever factories. There is a popular saying that people often use whenever a crisis hits – ‘we are all in the same boat’. It is utterly wrong. Different people live in different contexts based on their social class, ethnicity, race, religion, gender, sexual orientation, and geographical locations. That is why it is so crucial to keep on documenting all forms of human costs shouldered by different social groups due to the military coup and to recognize and understand all the struggles and resilience strategies deployed and the specific circumstances in which they are being deployed. In this regard, TNI wants to highlight the work of a local partner as they attempt to capture the double burden of ‘post-covid economic stresses’ and ‘military coup’ faced by the urban women laborers and women-headed households living in Hlaintharyar and South Dagon townships of Yangon city. The report investigated increasing pressures faced by the women in the areas of health, children education, safety and security, food, living situation, debt, and psychological impact. Their experiences and struggles deserve our attention and invite us to walk with them toward a fuller understanding of their lives and the multiple meanings of resistance and resilience..."
Source/publisher: Transnational Institute ( Amsterdam)
Date of entry/update: 2023-03-29
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Title: Myanmar Junta Dissolves Political Parties
Sub-title: Military Seeks to Legitimize Rule Through Sham Elections
Description: "Myanmar’s military junta announced this week that the National League for Democracy (NLD) is among 40 political parties and other groups dissolved for failing to meet a political party registration deadline imposed under the new Political Party Registration Law. The junta, which staged a military coup on February 1, 2021, claims it wants to hold elections, and promulgated the party registration law on January 26. However, its provisions appear intended to indefinitely delay, rather than facilitate, Myanmar’s return to civilian democratic rule. The law requires existing political parties to reregister within 60 days or be dissolved. But many of the parties – including the NLD – refused to comply, saying that ongoing military oppression prevents proposed elections from being credible. The 2021 coup resulted in the military overthrow of the newly elected NLD-led government and the detention of elected civilian officials. The junta has since committed numerous abuses including crimes against humanity against protesters and activists, and war crimes in ethnic minority areas. It has also severely restricted freedom of speech, association, and assembly. The registration law also stacks the deck for the military by prohibiting anyone convicted of a crime from joining a party, effectively disqualifying many opposition leaders, including NLD leader Aung San Suu Kyi and president Win Myint, who are both serving lengthy sentences on politically motivated charges. Under the new law and earlier martial law orders, any election would be dominated by junta-backed political parties and the military itself, which already holds 25 percent of seats in the national and local legislatures under the 2008 Constitution. But the junta still seems determined to remove the NLD and other independent political parties from polls and install its own parties instead. In the face of widescale political oppression, genuinely free and fair elections are not possible in Myanmar for the foreseeable future. Concerned governments, including regional partners such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Japan, and India, should not be fooled into thinking that the junta’s new election laws and regulations can be the basis for a credible electoral process. Instead, they should recognize that the junta is merely attempting to legitimize military rule through sham elections..."
Source/publisher: Human Rights Watch (USA)
Date of entry/update: 2023-03-29
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Title: National Unity Government Weekly Press Update (13/2023)
Description: "1. NUG recognizes China’s intervention...2. NUG formally cautions PTT over revenue flow to SAC...3. 15 IPDs rescued by alliance group...4. Some women and girls have already become victims of human trafficking...5. NUG urges NGOs and CSOs to seek prior authorization from the relevant Ministries under the NUG..."
Source/publisher: National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update: 2023-03-29
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Title: National Unity Government: Ministry of Foreign Affairs Statement (7/ 2023) - Statement on the Killing of Three Mizoram Residents in India
Description: "1. On 22 March 2023, three Mizoram residents (Male-2 and Female-1) were killed by a group of unidentified people at a place along the border of Chin State in Myanmar and Mizoram State in India. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the National Unity Government is deeply saddened by this news and our thoughts and prayers are with the families of the victims. 2. The Ministry is concerned about the allegation of such tragic incident against some Myanmar citizens, which has gone viral on social media. 3. The Ministry would like to express its strong support for the efforts of the law enforcement authorities and the local government in their attempts to bring the perpetrators to justice in a fair and just manner. 4. In addition, the Ministry would like to strongly urge Myanmar citizens seeking refuge in India to build mutually respectful relationships with the residents of relevant states and to actively cooperate in the maintenance of regional security and the rule of law..."
Source/publisher: Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Myanmar - NUG
Date of entry/update: 2023-03-29
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Title: အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ နိုင်ငံခြားရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာန သတင်းထုတ်ပြန်ချက် (၇ / ၂၀၂၃) - အိန္ဒိယနိုင်ငံ၊ မီဇိုရမ်ပြည်နယ်သား သုံးဦး သတ်ဖြတ်ခံရမှုနှင့်ပတ်သက်၍ ထုတ်ပြန်ချက်
Description: "၁။ ၂၀၂၃ ခုနှစ် မတ်လ (၂၂) ရက်နေ့တွင် အိန္ဒိယနိုင်ငံ၊ မီဇိုရမ်ပြည်နယ်နှင့် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၊ ချင်းပြည်နယ် ထိစပ်သည့် နယ်စပ်တစ်နေရာ၌ မီဇိုရမ်ပြည်နယ်သား သုံးဦး (ကျား - ၂၊ မ -၁) အား အမည်မသိ လူတစ်စုက သတ်ဖြတ်ခဲ့ကြောင်း သိရှိရသည့် အတွက် အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၊ နိုင်ငံခြားရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာန အနေဖြင့် ကျန်ရစ်သူ မိသားစုဝင်များ နှင့် ထပ်တူ များစွာ စိတ်မကောင်းဖြစ်ရပါသည်။ ၂။ ယင်းဖြစ်ရပ်နှင့်ပတ်သက်၍ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံသားအချို့အား စွပ်စွဲပြောဆိုမှုများလည်း လူမှုကွန်ယက်များတွင် ကျယ်ကျယ်ပြန့်ပြန့်ထွက်ပေါ်လျှက်ရှိသဖြင့် မိမိတို့အနေဖြင့် များစွာ စိုးရိမ်မကင်းဖြစ်မိပါသည်။ ၃။ အမှုမှန်ပေါ်ပေါက်ပြီး ကျုးလွန်သူများအား ဖမ်းဆီးရရှိနိုင်ရေးအတွက် သက်ဆိုင်ရာ ဒေသန္တရအစိုးရနှင့် တရားဥပဒေစိုးမိုးရေးဘက် ဆိုင်ရာတာဝန်ရှိသူများ၏ တရားနည်းလမ်း ကျသော ကြိုးပမ်း အားထုတ် ဆောင်ရွက်မှုများကို မိမိတို့အနေဖြင့် အလေးအနက် ထောက်ခံပါကြောင်း ဖော်ပြလိုပါသည်။ ၄။ အိန္ဒိယနိုင်ငံတွင် ခိုလှုံနေထိုင်နေကြသည့် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံသား စစ်ဘေးရှောင်ပြည်သူများအနေဖြင့် သက်ဆိုင်ရာ ဒေသခံပြည်သူများနှင့် အပြန်အလှန်လေးစားတန်ဖိုးထားမှုရှိသောဆက်ဆံရေးများကို တည်ဆောက်ပြီး၊ ဒေသတွင်း လုံခြုံရေးနှင့် တရားဥပဒေစိုးမိုးရေးထိန်းသိမ်းဆောင်ရွက်မှုများတွင် ပူးပေါင်းကူညီပေးကြပါရန် အလေးအနက် တိုက်တွန်းပန်ကြားအပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher: Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Myanmar - NUG
Date of entry/update: 2023-03-29
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Title: အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ အပတ်စဉ်သတင်းထုတ်ပြန်ချက် ( ၁၃/၂၀၂၃)
Description: "National Unity Government Weekly Press Update (13/2023)..."
Source/publisher: National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update: 2023-03-29
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Title: A Road to Nowhere: The Myanmar Regime’s Stage-managed Elections: Crisis Group Asia Briefing No. 175
Description: "Two years after carrying out a coup, Myanmar’s generals are planning elections to entrench their role in politics. Amid the widespread resistance to their regime, the polls are bound to intensify armed conflict. Yet there are several ways to keep electoral violence to a minimum. Overview The Myanmar regime is undertaking the necessary legal and procedural steps for national elections. It has said it intends to hold the polls as soon it can, perhaps by November, although it has announced no date and delays are possible. Amid the state oppression following the 2021 coup, no election can be credible, especially when much of the population sees a vote as a cynical attempt to supplant the landslide victory of Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD) in 2020. The polls will almost certainly intensify the post-coup conflict, as the regime seeks to force them through and resistance groups seek to disrupt them. Governments in a position to influence Naypyitaw should press the regime to desist from using violence to impose elections. The West should coordinate with Asian allies in insisting that the polls are transparently unfair and dangerous; none should provide electoral assistance. For its part, the National Unity Government (NUG), the parallel authority created by elected lawmakers who were ousted by the coup, should make clear that resistance attacks on electoral targets are unacceptable. On 1 February 2023, the two-year anniversary of the coup d’état, Myanmar’s military regime unexpectedly (and unconstitutionally) extended the state of emergency by a further six months, thereby postponing polls that had been due to take place by 31 July. The junta claims the elections will inaugurate a return to civilian rule, but every indication is that it wants to enshrine its own political pre-eminence in the country. Its template remains the military-drafted 2008 constitution, which provides as one of its “basic principles” for the military to play the “leading political role” in Myanmar. The coup was intended not to overturn this constitutional order, but to remove Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD from the political landscape, in favour of the military’s vision of sharing power with a civilian administration deferential to its prerogatives. The elections are intended to achieve this outcome, rather than to be any kind of exercise for channelling the will of the people. The problem for junta leader Senior General Min Aung Hlaing is that his personal interests do not fully align with the military’s institutional objectives. The 2008 constitution was designed to prevent the emergence of a solitary autocrat, dividing authority between the commander-in-chief and the president, who cannot be the same person. But Min Aung Hlaing does not want to share power. Thus, if he aspires to be president, he must be sure that his replacement as commander-in-chief will do his bidding. If he stays on as commander-in-chief, he will need to instal a president who will act as his proxy. To do that, he will need full control of the military’s chosen electoral vehicle, the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), which, in the NLD’s likely absence, is positioned to dominate the polls. The extension of the state of emergency, and corresponding election delay, suggest that Min Aung Hlaing is not yet confident in his plans for the post-election period. He may foresee major competition for the top job, probably a more significant consideration than the prevailing insecurity, his stated reason for putting off the vote. The lead-up to the polls will almost certainly see a further increase in violence and instability. Even with more time to prepare, the regime undoubtedly faces huge challenges in rolling out elections. Given the extent of popular opposition to the polls, the military will have to impose them by force – pacifying areas of the country where its hold is tenuous, attempting to deter attacks on electoral targets, and intimidating poll workers and voters into participating. Resistance groups, determined to disrupt the vote, have already killed enumerators in service of that goal. The lead-up to the polls will almost certainly see a further increase in violence and instability. The NUG thus faces a dilemma. As the main anti-regime political force, it logically wants to express its strong opposition to the elections by encouraging a popular boycott and condemning anyone who participates in or supports the polls. That, however, could be seen as endorsing violence by armed resistance groups against electoral targets, making it easier for the regime – and countries that want to normalise relations with it – to cast the opposition as terrorists. Although the NUG does not have control over many resistance groups, as the opposition’s apex political body its reputation will be damaged by their actions. The NUG should thus issue as soon as possible a set of principles governing dissent from the regime’s elections, stating unambiguously that no one should attack electoral targets. No foreign government or electoral organisation should provide support for the elections, which the regime would cite as evidence that its polls are legitimate. Foreign governments need to take clear public positions that the conditions are not in place for credible elections. Western countries appear to be already convinced, but others, particularly those in Asia that are anxious to move on from the Myanmar crisis, may be inclined to consider polls a step toward restoring constitutional rule. Western governments should work with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and its chair, Indonesia, to promote consensus as to the conflict risks of the elections and their lack of credibility. Japan and India – which are presidents of the G7 and G20, respectively, in 2023 and which have tended to pursue self-interested engagement with the Myanmar regime – should adopt more principled stances, given the clear security risks of the elections, and the damage that a business-as-usual approach could do to important alliances in the region and with the West. These countries should use what influence they have with Naypyitaw to press the regime to desist from violently imposing the elections. For its part, the West should engage with Japan and India and encourage them to be more outspoken on the risks of the elections and to deploy their influence with Naypyitaw. It is also worth exploring the space for further steps by the UN Security Council, of which Japan is now a non-permanent member. In December 2022, the Council adopted its first-ever Myanmar resolution, achieving consensus on Myanmar despite the geopolitical rifts at play. More broadly, countries should work to address the multiple crises in Myanmar by continuing to impose targeted sanctions on the military and its business interests. In particular, they should expand targeted sanctions on senior police and military officers most responsible for post-coup abuses and repression, including in relation to the elections, as well as military-owned or linked companies. They should make clear that election-related repressive violence will be a basis for further sanctions. Donor countries should also continue to provide, and whenever possible increase, assistance to address the humanitarian emergency in Myanmar as well as the long-term health, education and livelihoods needs of its people. It remains extremely challenging to deliver aid in Myanmar. Donors should make funding flexible so as to channel it to the partners that can most effectively reach those in need, including local organisations, and give appropriate amounts of cross-border assistance..."
Source/publisher: International Crisis Group (Belgium)
Date of entry/update: 2023-03-28
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Title: A Silent Sangha? Buddhist Monks in Post-coup Myanmar
Description: "What’s new? The Sangha, Myanmar’s Buddhist monks and nuns, have mostly stayed on the sidelines since the February 2021 coup, as monastic communities are divided, and the resistance is pursuing a secular agenda that includes violent action. This stance contrasts with that during previous political turmoil, when they were often prominent. Why does it matter? The Sangha’s low profile has allowed space for youth – particularly young women – to take on leadership roles in the struggle. This bold departure from generations of male Burman Buddhist gerontocratic leadership in Myanmar is encouraging for the future but could bring a backlash. What should be done? Policymakers and international donors should carefully monitor shifting views on the appropriate role of Buddhism and the Sangha in Myanmar, looking out for any conservative reaction that could compromise intercommunal relations, social stability, human rights or future democratic development. Executive Summary The Myanmar Sangha – the country’s community of Buddhist monks and nuns – has played a mostly marginal role in the anti-regime resistance following the military’s February 2021 coup d’état. The National Unity Government (NUG) and its revolutionary allies are pursuing an agenda that is secular and that embraces armed resistance, both features that the monastic community find hard to reconcile with Buddhist teachings. The Sangha’s step to the side is a break from the past, when monks played a significant and vocal role at moments of political crisis. It has also made room for youth – particularly young women – to take on prominent roles in the struggle, an important shift from a tradition of elderly, male leadership drawn predominantly from the Burman Buddhist majority. While Myanmar’s future path is unclear, these trends are likely to be important as they could herald social upheaval, intercommunal tensions or a conservative counterreaction. In previous periods of political struggle in Myanmar – the independence movement of the early 20th century, political protests in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, and the 2007 Saffron Revolution – monks were highly visible, despite widespread religious and cultural unease with monastic involvement in political affairs. But since the coup, the Sangha has been divided. Some prominent monks have curried favour with the regime by explicitly supporting it and some others have been vociferous opponents. Most of the monastic community, however, has avoided taking any public position, wary of supporting a secular-minded resistance movement engaged in armed struggle, fearful of the consequences of openly challenging the regime and also reluctant to incur the wrath of public opinion by supporting it. It seems unlikely that the Sangha will emerge as a strong voice either for or against the junta. As a result, it seems unlikely that the Sangha will emerge as a strong voice either for or against the junta. Critically, the monks, scholars, resistance fighters and activists interviewed by Crisis Group agreed that even should the monastic community unite behind a particular position, it would be unlikely to influence the conflict’s outcome. Despite his performative religiosity, junta chief Min Aung Hlaing is very unlikely to be convinced by any monk, however venerable, to eschew violence or set a radically different political direction. Nor is the general likely to frame the crisis in religious or Buddhist nationalist terms, as some fear he might do in an attempt to win over the Sangha. It is furthermore improbable that any monastic figure could speak to or influence the myriad anti-coup forces. Nevertheless, the sidelining of monastic figures, long a key part of Myanmar’s social and political fabric, could have important implications. It represents a bold departure from generations of male Burman Buddhist gerontocratic leadership in the country. Myanmar’s political trajectory is uncertain, and there is no end to the crisis in sight. But this moment is likely to be formative in the country’s political life, irrespective of whether the resistance succeeds in its aim of ousting the regime. Whatever dispensation follows the current tragic phase of Myanmar’s history, the shifting moral and religious value systems in the country, and any backlash, will likely have a major impact on intercommunal relations, politics and conflict. Bangkok/Brussels, 10 March 2023 I. Introduction The Sangha, as Buddhist monks and nuns are collectively known in Myanmar, has often been at the forefront of the country’s political struggles, from the independence movement of the early 20th century to the Saffron Revolution of 2007 and more recent Buddhist nationalist movements.1 It has played this role despite popular sentiment that Buddhist monks should avoid engaging in worldly affairs or commenting on politics. The Sangha consists of around 600,000 individuals.2 This history engendered, on one hand, an expectation among many Myanmar people and outside observers that the monastic community would respond resolutely to the February 2021 coup and the subsequent violence. Many thought monks’ participation would be a vital – possibly determinative – contribution to the anti-military resistance movement. On the other hand, it created a fear that many monks, particularly the more hardline elements, might strongly back the regime. In the event, however, the Sangha is split on the crisis. With a few exceptions, monks have been less prominent at the front lines of protests or in leadership roles in the resistance movement than many expected. The limited involvement of monks in anti-coup activities has opened space for others. This report analyses Buddhist monks’ low profile in post-coup politics, as compared with other segments of society, and assesses the reasons for it, including the impact of COVID-19 on monasteries and the differing views of the regime and resistance movements on the proper boundaries between religion and state, as well as relevant gender dynamics. The report also considers the extent to which the limited involvement of monks in anti-coup activities has opened space for others – including women and youth – and allowed for a more secular and pluralistic politics to emerge among those opposing the regime than might have otherwise been possible. The report draws on detailed interviews with monks active in the resistance and those sitting on the sidelines; nuns (most of whom have kept a low profile); pro-regime and nationalist figures; former monks; leaders of anti-coup armed militias; and religious activists, both Buddhist and non-Buddhist. The research also draws on Crisis Group analysis of social media posts by key influencers, including some of the strongest monastic voices – both those expressing sympathy for the military regime and those opposing the coup – as well as comments made in online discussion of those posts. In addition, Crisis Group reviewed relevant academic and policy research, as well as articles about the Sangha in the Myanmar media. II. The Sangha’s Role in Past Political Movements A. Pre-colonial Symbiosis Historically, Myanmar’s kings viewed the Sangha as a troublesome but necessary counterpart to their reign. Kings were responsible for protecting the health and well-being of the Sangha, which for its part tried to ensure – through private words of guidance and, sometimes, careful intervention in secular affairs – that the Myanmar populace had a skilful and meritorious ruler.3 The arrival of the British in 1824 prompted King Mindon, the penultimate Myanmar king, to adopt a protectionist approach to Buddhism. He convened the Fifth Buddhist Synod in 1871 with the aim of ensuring that Buddha’s teachings were recorded correctly and in a standardised way. His action led to expanded access to Burmese translations of the Buddhist canon (the Tipitaka).4 In 1885, when the British defeated Myanmar’s last king, Thibaw, and took full control of the country, the increased accessibility of Buddhists texts empowered the laity to take up religious responsibilities that would previously have been the monarch’s prerogative. These responsibilities included protection of the Sangha, which came to be associated with safeguarding access to Buddhist teachings for all – not just the monastic community or royal class.5 The independence movement was built on this foundation. B. The Independence Movement The British authorities’ decision to leave religious affairs in the hands of those it had colonised was a double-edged sword. The colonial withdrawal of traditional state subsidies for monasteries alongside significant disruption to village economies, another key source of donations, compounded the monasteries’ struggles to finance their daily activities. Colonial rule threatened to undermine the religious and social service functions of monasteries, prompting Myanmar society to rally in the Sangha’s support and triggering a Buddhist revival. The laity created a plethora of associations aimed at providing for the Sangha’s needs, along with a mass religious propagation and reform movement.6 The revival laid the groundwork for organisations such as the Young Men’s Buddhist Association (YMBA) to play a key part in agitating for independence. The role of the Sangha itself in the independence movement was more circumspect. Some monks were very active, in collaboration with groups such as the YMBA. A prominent example is Ashin Ottama, who argued that British rule prevented the country’s Buddhists from reaching enlightenment and thus that securing independence was a religious obligation.7 He was imprisoned many times, becoming a hero for the movement. But such monastic activism did not sit well with the population at large, and many Sangha leaders and other senior Buddhist clergy spoke out against monks’ participation in politics on doctrinal grounds. Some members of the YMBA likewise advocated, albeit unsuccessfully, for the organisation to focus solely on religious matters.8 C. Post-independence Activism and the Saffron Revolution Monastic political activism continued after independence, during Ne Win’s socialist one-party rule as well as the period of military dictatorship from 1988 to 2010. Monks resisted the government’s attempts to control and register them in 1965; joined students demonstrating against the government’s failure to hold a public funeral for former UN Secretary-General Thant in 1974; participated in nationwide pro-democracy rallies in 1988; and led a series of protests from 1990 to 1991 that spread from Mandalay across the country – including a symbolic withdrawal of spiritual services from the military – that the regime violently suppressed.9 The most high-profile monastic political action after independence was the 2007 demonstrations, commonly known as the Saffron Revolution.10 What had started as protests led by veteran political activists in response to the military government’s removal of fuel price subsidies morphed into a broad-based monastic movement decrying the socio-economic hardships that monasteries and the general public were facing.11 When the military responded with unprecedented violence, beating protesting monks and raiding monasteries, senior members of the Sangha invoked a religious boycott, as they had in 1990.12 Monks deployed sacred symbols with powerful effect throughout the unrest, with the aim of undermining the military authorities’ legitimacy. For example, when an estimated 10,000 monks marched through Mandalay in October 2007, they chanted the Metta Sutta – a discourse that emphasises sustaining Buddhist “loving kindness” (metta) and compassion, consciously drawing a contrast to the military’s actions.13 III. Shifting State-Sangha Relations A. Relations Following the Saffron Revolution The junta responded to the Sangha’s role in the Saffron Revolution by expanding the powers of the state-backed Sangha Council.14 The committee, which oversees and regulates the Buddhist clergy, was formed in 1980 as part of an effort to consolidate the military’s control of the monastic community. In 2007, the Sangha Council went beyond its existing role of enforcing monastic discipline by issuing a prohibition on monks’ participation in non-religious activities.15 The ban served to constrain the Sangha, giving the military a way to have dissident monks disrobed, in order to interrogate and imprison them.16 Because of such actions, members of the Sangha and the wider public question the council’s independence, as well as the legitimacy of its authority, given that it strays into politics. Among the broader Buddhist population, the 70-monk council is generally respected for its scholarship but much less commonly seen as active at the community level. After 2007, many younger activist monks established themselves as pro-democracy voices, often from exile, providing a stark contrast to the Sangha Council’s conservative pronouncements. Though many Myanmar Buddhists question the appropriateness of monks’ engagement in worldly matters, for doctrinal reasons, the expectation that the monastic community should ensure the propagation of the Buddha’s teachings can be used to justify civic action.17 The junta’s credibility suffered a ... blow in 2008, when Cyclone Nargis struck the coast of Myanmar, killing at least 138,000 people. The junta’s credibility suffered a further blow in 2008, when Cyclone Nargis struck the coast of Myanmar, killing at least 138,000 people. Many people in Myanmar, including some members of the military, believed the storm was some sort of karmic retribution for the violence committed against monks the year before.18 More concretely, it clearly demonstrated the military government’s weak institutional capabilities, which made its relief efforts slow, ineffective and non-transparent.19 Local lay groups, including Buddhist associations, rallied under the leadership of monastic figures such as Sitagu Sayadaw, bringing aid and relief to affected populations.20 In a public sermon in Yangon in 2008, Sitagu Sayadaw discussed the merit of “volunteer social work” (in Burmese, parahita), saying: Meditating in a room with the doors shut won’t help the [cyclone] victims suffering over there. But most Burmese who traditionally believe in Theravada don’t appreciate the need for compassionate action. That is why I am talking about it to people every day. It is essential to make social merit stronger.21 This emphasis on the meritoriousness of parahita was a natural continuation of the forces set in motion after the Saffron Revolution. Regime efforts to quiet the monks’ political voice pushed them to develop alternative spaces in which they could exert influence and then to allow lay men and women to these activities, in order to cultivate public acceptance thereof. The growth of parahita work gave monks a more prominent role in what would normally be a key function of the secular state – social service provision and disaster relief. It also undermined the Sangha Council, because people in Myanmar came to understand that monastic influence stemmed at least in part from monks’ willingness and ability to advocate on their behalf, something that the council is structurally unable to do. B. The Buddhist Nationalist Movement In 2011, a small group of monks and laypeople appropriated a set of numerological symbols popularised by a booklet published in 1997 under the title 969.22 Led by energetic monks including Ashin Wirathu and Ashin Wimala, the movement was particularly vocal in its insistence that Buddhism was under threat from pernicious internal and external forces. The movement’s dire warnings combined with a simple message to the faithful to “buy Buddhist” (that is, make purchases from Buddhist-owned businesses) resonated strongly and spread across the country.23 In 2013, the 969 movement was in effect banned by the Sangha Council, not because of the anti-Muslim violence that its inflammatory rhetoric had helped trigger, but on the more prosaic doctrinal grounds of its unauthorised use of Buddhist symbolism.24 As a result, it morphed into a new and more powerful incarnation, the Association for the Protection of Race and Religion, widely known by its Burmese acronym, MaBaTha, which continued the 969 movement’s ideology and promoted it far more widely across the country.25 MaBaTha’s rank-and-file members tended to believe that the organisation existed in part to help clarify proper moral practice in a changing society at a time when Myanmar was opening up to the world after decades of isolation under military rule.26 They focused less on the religious actions of individuals and more on shaping the culture as a whole – both its underlying values and its role in promoting suitable behaviour.27 As Melyn McKay writes: Given that this collective morality is believed to be a precondition for stable democratic governance, members often see MaBaTha’s efforts as enabling the expansion of democratic rights. Moreover, they believe MaBaTha’s work in this regard is essential to managing the fractious and conflictual nature of party politics. Unity, in their view, was a prerequisite to democracy, not a product of it.28 The semi-civilian government of President Thein Sein (2011-2016) did little to rein in MaBaTha, but the Aung San Suu Kyi-led National League for Democracy (NLD) administration, which took power in April 2016, was more suspicious of it. The NLD’s concerns related mainly to MaBaTha’s perceived support for the military-established Union Solidarity and Development Party, the NLD’s main electoral opponent, and some MaBaTha members’ criticisms of Aung San Suu Kyi in the run-up to the 2015 elections.29 In July 2016, the Sangha Council, under pressure from the administration’s Ministry of Religious Affairs, issued a statement declaring that MaBaTha was not a recognised Buddhist organisation – a rebuke but not an outlawing of the organisation.30 In May 2017, the Sangha Council went further, banning MaBaTha’s name and logo. The edict used language that hinted at similarities between MaBaTha and other illegal Buddhist factions whose proponents have been prosecuted and imprisoned.31 Many of the group’s most popular figures challenged the ban, arguing that the Council had overstepped its authority, which is limited to overseeing members of the Sangha, not laypersons who are also part of the group.32 Others claimed that the group was not engaged in inappropriate party politics, but rather the promotion of Buddhism and Buddhist values.33 Yet the Council was unmoved, as were its counterparts at the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Culture, making the political climate increasingly inhospitable for MaBaTha.34 C. Political Efforts to Constrain MaBaTha By the end of 2019, many MaBaTha members were demoralised, both by the political pressure they now faced from the NLD administration and by international perceptions that the organisation was extremist. In 2018, Facebook deplatformed MaBaTha, removing the pages of its most popular members and its national, state and township-level committees.35 It was very difficult thereafter for the organisation to mobilise people in support of its various activities, which significantly dampened its members’ enthusiasm. Seeing the crowds at events dwindle took away the sense many members had that MaBaTha was an unstoppable movement. The feeling of being part of a righteous and preordained struggle slipped away, as did many of the less committed supporters.36 At the same time, sensing the changing political winds, local government bureaucrats had stopped granting applications for MaBaTha events (whether in the group’s name or not) or dragged their feet in reviewing them.37 As Crisis Group has previously pointed out, MaBaTha members – especially women – felt their participation in the group magnified their impact. Raising money to build a school on their own might take months, whereas doing it as a MaBaTha activity could mobilise significant funds in a matter of hours.38 With this amplifying power diminished, and as the sense of invincibility it created evaporated as well, many members found other means of personal and spiritual improvement, filling their free time instead with coursework, meditation retreats or hobbies.39 Young activists ... argued that monks should limit their focus to religion. All the while, civil society activists were working assiduously to counter MaBaTha ideology both online and offline. Increasingly, support for MaBaTha and its ideology came to be associated with something old and out of touch that signified lack of education. Young activists, in particular, argued that monks should limit their focus to religion, while urging the NLD administration to adopt an explicitly secular approach to government.40 These various pressures meant that by the time the COVID-19 pandemic started in 2020, MaBaTha was largely inactive and many of its local organising networks had dispersed.41 Those within pro-NLD circles had by then also fully embraced the rhetoric – and likely even the notion – that monastic engagement in civic spaces was inappropriate, as had been the NLD’s rallying cry against MaBaTha for years.42 Given that monks were free to demonstrate their commitment to social engagement by meeting community needs via non-political parahita activities, it was difficult for anyone to argue that greater monastic political engagement was necessary to advocate for the needs of the Buddhist polity. Successive Myanmar governments since 1962, both military and nominally civilian, have made efforts to constrain and control the powerful Sangha, in an extension of pre-colonial patterns of state-Sangha relations. As a result of the more recent dynamics discussed above, however, by the time of the 2021 coup both the legal and moral basis for monastic leadership on civic issues had been called into question. IV. Monastic Reactions to the Military Coup A. Involvement in Initial Protests and Subsequent Organised Violence In the first days and weeks following the coup, various monasteries released statements, many of which were rather insipid, taking no clear stance against the coup.43 Curiously, however, some of these statements were released despite the most senior members of these institutions making seemingly contradictory remarks.44 The discrepancy highlights the deep divisions within the Sangha that persist today. Nevertheless, three main groups can be identified. 1. Those backing the regime The first group are mostly older, more seasoned monks who have either made their support for the military clear through participation in the regime’s public events and trips, or who have implied their support by focusing their anti-violence messaging on resistance groups, while ignoring the military’s own atrocities. One prominent example is Sitagu Sayadaw, whose high-profile travel to Russia alongside Min Aung Hlaing for a pagoda dedication ceremony in July 2022 was particularly controversial.45 Another is Ashin Chekinda, who also participated in the Russia trip and whom the regime’s Ministry of Religious Affairs promoted to acting rector of the International Theravada Buddhist University in Yangon in 2022.46 Myanmar commentators have made two key arguments about these senior monks: Both have risen to the seniority they now enjoy in part due to their warm relations with key military figures. Chekinda is noted for having been promoted to the rector’s position ahead of other, more learned monks. Sitagu’s appointment as head of the Shwegyin sect is less surprising given his standing, but still noteworthy in its timing. Though supporters of the post-coup resistance tend to despise Sitagu, they nevertheless recognise that he faces a dilemma. His numerous social development projects, including education and health-care facilities, would likely suffer were he to oppose the junta, as would the communities that depend on them. But the scale of these problems may be overstated. Such is the national (and international) reputation of these facilities, including their ability to attract other high-quality leaders, that the military authorities might well replace Sitagu as figurehead while leaving the services intact. It is therefore difficult to say for sure whether Sitagu’s support for the regime is driven by the risk to his projects, self-preservation or his ideological leanings. There is a surprising degree of overlap between the monks who are implicitly or explicitly backing the regime and those who participated in the Saffron Revolution. In interviews, monks emphasised that those who took part in the 2007 demonstrations faced enormous challenges, including targeted attacks on their monasteries and in some cases imprisonment. Some of these monks are disgruntled by what they perceive as the NLD administration’s failure to recognise and reward their sacrifices. A common refrain of MaBaTha monks, for example, is that they supported the democratic transition only to be later “betrayed” by Aung San Suu Kyi and her government, when they clamped down on MaBaTha and made moves toward greater secularism, and again when they elevated a small number of Muslim advisers, notably Ko Ni.47 This sense of grievance was deliberately nurtured by the military over many years, translating into vocal support for the coup among a few of these monks, and weakening the enthusiasm of others for actively opposing it. The impact of the small group of pro-regime monks should not be overstated. The impact of the small group of pro-regime monks should not be overstated. The rise and fall of nationalist groups such as MaBaTha over recent years served to identify – and dent the reputations of – the most charismatic military-aligned monks. Pro-NLD and anti-military forces have had several years to chip away at the public’s respect for these monks, and the results are particularly visible among the younger generations most engaged in anti-coup organising. Though pro-regime monks may attempt to prevent younger monks in their monasteries from participating in anti-regime activities, the pandemic led a significant number of young monks to move from urban locations to rural monasteries closer to their homes just prior to the coup. The influx disrupted traditional student-teacher relations and meant that abbots had less influence over newly arrived young monks.48 In rural areas in particular, monasteries and monks remain highly dependent on the local population for support. Monks must tread especially carefully when they have settled in areas away from their birthplaces. In such situations, they lack strong kinship ties in the area and must be cautious not to provoke a local backlash. Anti-coup organisers have also been highly successful at using social shaming as a means of punishing those with pro-military or even insufficiently pro-revolution tendencies. Monks have accordingly felt pressure to align with community sentiments, which are predominantly anti-regime. They also need to fear being targeted by anti-coup armed actors – who have allegedly killed several monks accused of supporting the regime.49 2. Those avoiding taking sides Many monks have remained neutral since the coup, for several reasons. Most importantly, monks who speak out against the junta are likely to face reprisals. These are often violent, as in cases where troops have burned down or demolished monasteries, leaving the nearby faithful without a vital social asset.50 As many monks living around the country hail from Myanmar’s central Dry Zone, where the fighting is intense, loss of their monastery would also likely mean return to an active conflict area, at a time when many are desperately trying to escape. Many monks have also refrained from supporting the resistance out of disenchantment with the NLD administration for the reasons discussed above. Though the administration did participate in numerous pagoda-building campaigns and other religious events, and Aung San Suu Kyi was involved in donations and other ceremonial activities, the government also spoke about human rights, ethno-religious diversity and secularism in ways that alienated these monks (notwithstanding the fact that many minorities felt the government downplayed their concerns, and in the case of the Rohingya, was complicit in their plight).51 The prominence of armed resistance activities also puts monks in a difficult position when it comes to expressing open support for the revolution. Unlike monks who have made doctrinal arguments in support of violence in certain circumstances, many feel they cannot support such acts, even in response to greater brutality.52 As one monk told Crisis Group: For me, there are two personalities in one. I am a citizen of the country and a monk. As a citizen, I have to stand up for my rights, for democracy, for freedom, but there are also principles that monks have to follow. Revolution at this point means taking sides, which means killing. This is a power struggle. Everyone supporting either side is complicit in killing.53 As this same monk noted, members of the monastic community sometimes refer to the objective of Buddhism – seeking to achieve nirvana by breaking from the cycle of rebirths – as “revolutionary”, which may lead them to describe the Sangha as supportive of revolutionary action. But this conception of revolution usually translates into a focus on material suffering such as acute poverty, hunger and physical danger, rather than any strong belief in liberation from a particular ruler or preference for one form of government over another.54 In past revolutionary moments, particularly the Saffron Revolution, frustration at widespread economic hardship made it easy to mobilise around the notion that the military – the sole political authority at the time – was the cause of suffering and thus vigorous action to depose them was consistent with Buddhist doctrine.55 Some monastic figures involved in the Saffron Revolution mobilised explicitly in support of democracy, but their stance then was more a rejection of a specific harmful political authority than an embrace of a particular form of government. The situation is much less clear-cut today. The ousted NLD government, though hamstrung by the 2008 constitution’s limitations on civilian governance, did wield meaningful power. Prior to the pandemic, people across the country were beginning to enjoy a better quality of life and feel much greater hope for the future, even if the improvements were not evenly distributed. As a result, prior to the coup, suffering was seen as having multiple causes, including a global outbreak of disease, rather than stemming from a single incompetent, abusive authority. Despite broad social rejection of the coup, the junta did not change course, instead deploying extreme violence to consolidate its control. The way the crisis has developed has also informed some monks’ reluctance to pick a side. Despite broad social rejection of the coup, the junta did not change course, instead deploying extreme violence to consolidate its control. The initial, largely peaceful protest movement thus morphed into armed rebellion. The regime has unleashed brutal repression against both the civil and the armed resistance but failed to quash either; neither is the resistance able to meaningfully challenge the regime’s control of the state apparatus. In this dynamic, many monks feel that the chaos now facing communities is the result of a battle for political control in which both sides are willing to kill to achieve their goals. They conclude that they have less space to engage politically than on previous occasions such as the Saffron Revolution.56 This view is based not on any perception of moral equivalence of the two sides, but rather on the fact that neither offers a clear pathway out of the crisis. Even those monks who might otherwise lean toward supporting the revolution may worry that doing so contributes to a decline in monastic authority in the country. They are keenly aware that the parallel authority, the National Unity Government (NUG), relies for its armed resistance on the support and sanctuary provided by predominantly Christian ethnic armed groups, which many monks expect will push any future democratic government to adopt a more explicitly secular approach.57 3. Those openly supporting the revolution Some monks are openly supporting the revolution, but they acknowledge that their numbers are far smaller than those who took part in the Saffron Revolution. Their engagement takes many forms, and they face several constraints. Pre-existing groups such as the Peace Sangha Union – a progressive monastic network – are mostly made up of younger monks, although they may have a few members who participated in protests in 1988 or 2007. These groups have taken part in demonstrations, though usually not organising or leading them; they have also supported local defence forces and other anti-regime groups, for example by using their religious status to help transport medicines and other supplies. There have also been more organic monastic reactions to the coup. For example, 200 to 300 monks joined the daily marches in Mandalay that started on 8 February 2021 and lasted for several months, likely the most active monastic participation in protests anywhere in the country.58 Such activity can create tensions between junior monks and their abbots, who may forbid them from taking to the streets, for various reasons. Some senior monks support the military takeover because they feel the NLD failed to protect Buddhism – and that the military regime will.59 Other abbots act out of concern for the likely consequences, such as the military shuttering monasteries if any of their monks visibly resist the coup. Concerned abbots warned junior monks and novices that if they joined protests, they would have to leave the monastery.60 The senior monks’ fears are not unfounded, with some 60 monks thought to have been detained since the coup, some of whom remain incarcerated. Many others have been forcibly disrobed, and still others have had to go on the run.61 Such monastic support for the revolution, while welcomed by the vast majority of the country who oppose the coup, has done little to sway those who support the military or who are still sitting on the fence. These people typically downplay the importance of monastic opposition to the coup, arguing that monks should not participate in politics, or cast pro-resistance monks as young and not truly committed to their practice – their participation in resistance activities being proof of their unfitness for the religious life.62 On the morning of the coup, the military detained several monks who were prominent supporters of the democratic transition. On the morning of the coup, the military detained several monks who were prominent supporters of the democratic transition and of Aung San Suu Kyi personally, including Myawaddy Sayadaw; others had to flee to avoid apprehension.63 The coup itself so outraged the public that these arrests had limited additional impact. Subsequently, after citizens took up arms against the coup, the junta promoted the idea that armed resistance groups were a threat to Buddhism due to their attacks on monks.64 While the regime has attempted to portray itself as defending Buddhism, it has not fully embraced a Buddhist nationalist narrative nor sought to elevate MaBaTha. It took more than six months following the coup for the regime to release firebrand monk Ashin Wirathu, who had been imprisoned under the NLD administration (see Section IV.D below). For their part, resistance forces, including the NUG and local defence groups, have declined to frame the political crisis in religious terms, focusing instead on the junta’s illegal overthrow of the elected government and subsequent violence. Nor have resistance forces encouraged their monastic supporters to publicly attack the junta’s religious authority.65 B. Gender Dynamics and Monastic Participation The limited role of monks in the post-coup resistance has allowed greater space for new types of leaders to emerge. According to monks that Crisis Group spoke to, the most notable change for them compared with the leadership of the 1988 and 2007 movements is the presence of women, particularly young women.66 Relatedly, anti-regime protests have often been two-pronged, challenging both the military’s rule as well as traditional gender norms. The prominent htamein (sarong) protest involved communities hanging women’s sarongs above the street to act as a de facto barricade, relying on the superstition among many soldiers and policemen that women’s undergarments and skirts weaken men’s charismatic power (hpoun).67 In some places, women and their allies scrawled military leader Min Aung Hlaing’s initials in red marker on menstrual pads before sticking them to walls and telegraph poles. Colourful bras and panties have been affixed to images of military men and their favourite monks.68 The lower status of nuns in Myanmar society means their participation in protests is considered less notable than a monk’s might be. Not all women have benefited from increased space. According to Crisis Group interviews, the position of nuns has, on the contrary, been further constrained since the coup. Groups like MaBaTha tested the traditional boundaries between religion and state and the limits of monastic activism on social and political issues. By doing so, they created an opening for nuns to take a more visible and active role in both religious and secular public life, but the coup seems to have closed it. The lower status of nuns in Myanmar society means their participation in protests is considered less notable than a monk’s might be and leaves them less likely to be protected from serious harm. Nuns also face more serious material constraints, as their subordinate position to monks means that, even in normal times, they receive fewer donations and may struggle to survive.69 In the current poor economic conditions, donors with less money to spread around are even more likely to give to monks before nuns. Any time spent away from collecting alms, or on activities that much needed donors might disapprove of, would thus constitute a risk to nuns’ financial survival. The erosion of nuns’ status has been exacerbated by the loss of opportunities for them to study abroad, in Sri Lanka and elsewhere. For many Myanmar nuns, studying in Sri Lanka provided a unique opportunity to develop a more politically aware and engaged stance, largely from being exposed to the different monastic culture there and especially the political enfranchisement of monks and nuns there (members of the Myanmar Sangha are constitutionally barred from voting or standing for office).70 With such exchange programs likely to be limited for the time being due to Myanmar’s economic crisis, and lack of functional coordination between religious educational institutions and government ministries, Myanmar nuns are likely to become further isolated. Such isolation may in turn lead to greater conservatism. Nuns have often argued that advanced education was the best way to improve their status as a community.71 Facing more difficult living conditions and denied opportunities to study abroad, many will take refuge in Buddhist educational facilities. Their connection will deepen to the abbots and monasteries best able to sustain their facilities in the post-coup period – which means, predominantly, those who have better relations with the regime. C. The Role of the Sangha Council Even before the coup, the Sangha Council’s legitimacy was weak. Most monks consider ultimate monastic authority to lie in the hands of their monastery’s chief abbot, not the council. Council decisions are mostly about abstract doctrinal matters or involve disciplining monks who drink, gamble or otherwise misbehave. Indeed, many anti-coup monks believe the council has rarely, if ever, embodied an explicit political or social agenda.72 As one activist from Mandalay told Crisis Group: It is even rumoured that many if not most Sangha Council statements addressing things like religious conflicts are actually drafted by the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Culture, using the council’s name to disguise the political origins of these statements.73 As a result, the Sangha Council as an institution is highly disconnected from the public. People may revere particular monks who sit on the council, but they do so in spite of, not because of, their council role. Even in the monastic community, the council is not regarded as wielding supreme leadership, but rather as an administrative body.74 The fact that, as mentioned above, the Sangha Council is in practice largely subordinate to the Ministry of Religious Affairs, means that it has limited capability to work outside the ministry’s confines. Following the coup, the Council shuttered its subnational offices, which remained closed for one year – longer than many other official agencies’ workplaces. Interviewees told Crisis Group that as monastic pressure mounted to reopen the offices to hold religious exams, it became clear that some subnational members of the Council were being replaced with junta loyalists. Indeed, the regime has attempted to use the Sangha Council to keep the monastic community under its control. One monk who sits on the Council told Crisis Group that: The Sangha Council’s members are under the control of the military, and in return the military provides a lot of financial support. Most members do not want to go against the military for these and other reasons, even though they do not like the coup. Some monks, especially anti-coup monks, criticised the Sangha Council a lot, and some of their followers were angry at the way Council members acted with military leaders, but everyone should understand the Council’s position. The members are very old and the military controls everything they do.75 Nevertheless, the regime’s attempts to use the Sangha Council to boost its legitimacy have mostly failed. First, the Council initially put up more resistance to the coup than expected by suspending many activities for months, for example declining to schedule monastic exams.76 Secondly, the national mood has shifted dramatically since the coup, with resistance leaders and others openly condemning the Council as an instrument of the regime. Far more so than under previous periods of military rule, Council members are aware that public perception that a monk is biased toward the military can seriously undermine his following.77 The upshot is that whatever legitimacy the Sangha Council once had – even as a purely administrative body – appears to have mostly evaporated. There is little appetite anywhere in Myanmar for an institution overseen by the military to issue moral edicts about lay or even monastic life. In a sign of the institution’s waning significance, the military’s rumoured detention of Bhamo Sayadaw, the Sangha Council chair, after the coup elicited little outrage amid many other pressing issues.78 D. The Standpoint of MaBaTha Many observers had taken it for granted that Buddhist nationalist monks such as Wirathu would rally to support the junta. But members of MaBaTha and similar groups have not come together as a unified force supporting either side. In the early days following the coup, many observers had assumed that Wirathu – detained by the NLD government in November 2020 on sedition and defamation charges – would be released from prison imminently.79 He was discharged only in September 2021, eight months after the coup.80 Shortly before his release, he had posted a scathing video message to VK – the Russian social media platform to which many military and nationalist figures in Myanmar migrated after being kicked off Facebook – complaining that he was in poor health and had been passed over for release despite “prostitutes” having been included in earlier pardons.81 His release was reportedly tied to several conditions, including the confiscation of his property and a ban on giving public sermons or speaking to the media.82 Some observers – who had long assumed that MaBaTha was the military’s creation, or at least that Wirathu and other MaBaTha monks were its puppets – were confused by these developments.83 Yet high-ranking members of the group (such as Insein Ywama Sayadaw) have had to thread the same needle as more moderate monks (such as Oxford Sayadaw), declining to comment directly on the coup to avoid provoking the regime, and instead issuing vague statements urging restraint in a nod to public opinion.84 Some lower-level MaBaTha monks have broken with the organisation’s stance to speak out against the coup and participate in local protests. Overall, the NLD administration’s weakening of MaBaTha made it difficult for the body to regroup after the coup, and it now faces virtual institutional collapse. Some lower-level MaBaTha monks have broken with the organisation’s stance to speak out against the coup and participate in local protests. Given the highly decentralised nature of MaBaTha, their action was probably unavoidable. But the organisation’s enervation also stems from the fact that, for many members, its purpose was to protect the place of Buddhism in an increasingly liberal and pluralistic society. The coup has overturned that set of assumptions, especially as regards liberalisation, and thus the fears sustaining the group’s Buddhist chauvinist and anti-NLD rhetoric have largely dissipated, replaced with anger at the military’s brutality and incompetence.85 While MaBaTha is largely spent as a political force, its demise has weakened the Sangha’s political influence more broadly. The strongly negative NLD and civil society reaction to its political activism created fertile ground for more secular thinking following the coup, particularly among the new generation of youth activists and armed resistance leaders. As one member of an armed resistance group told Crisis Group: Our leaders are pressuring the NUG not to work with the Sangha because of the bad image MaBaTha has given it. If you want to move to a federal union, you cannot leverage religion.86 E. Small-scale Armed Movements Wirathu’s release from prison, which has been surprisingly uneventful, illustrates how complicated regime-Sangha relations are, and why the regime is hesitant to leverage Buddhist nationalism for its own ends. Though the controversial monk has been raising a mild ruckus in his immediate surroundings – calling a mosque, for example, to complain about the call to prayer – his impact has been muted.87 Calamitous prognostications that his release might exacerbate the conflict by introducing sectarian dimensions have proven exaggerated, with only a few vague rumblings thus far. In his first public sermon, in Bago Region in October 2022, where he was joined by ultra-nationalist Michael Kyaw Myint, who heads the Yeomanry Development Party, he touched on his typical Buddhist nationalist and anti-Muslim themes, but the event attracted only 25 attendees.88 There are reports of underground Buddhist nationalist mobilisation in Mandalay and in parts of Sagaing Region – including Kanbalu township, where two Islamic trainee scholars were killed by alleged pro-regime forces – fuelling fears that regime-aligned nationalist forces may be attempting to reorient the conflict more along religious lines.89 There have also been rumours that Wirathu is the organising force behind a group of former MaBaTha monks, none of whom are especially well loved, who captured headlines for carrying arms and appearing publicly at military ceremonies.90 They reportedly call themselves the pandita (scholar) group. This group should not be seen as evidence of Buddhist nationalist engagement in the conflict on the junta’s behalf. There is no proof that Wirathu is meaningfully involved, and his authority among Buddhist nationalists has often been overstated, as has his closeness to the military (see Section IV.D above). It is in any case hard to see how monks such as these would be beneficial to pro-regime forces, beyond dispensing occasional religious teachings and services. Rather than a carefully engineered plot to bolster pro-regime forces, the involvement of monks in pro-regime militias is in most cases more likely to be an example of the broader phenomenon that monks in these areas tend to provide pastoral services to whichever local armed group – pro- or anti-regime – happens to be most prominent in their community. Monks’ ideological perspectives undoubtedly influence their spiritual guidance, and thus their politics may have some impact on the conflict. Yet monks’ ideological perspectives undoubtedly influence their spiritual guidance, and thus their politics may have some impact on the conflict. For example, a member of an anti-regime defence force told Crisis Group that one of the reasons some of these groups had stopped short of fully backing the NUG was that the monks they sought advice from were not very pro-NUG.91 Wirathu’s release and his subsequent comportment suggest that all the main protagonists see his personal influence, and the charismatic power of monks more generally, as an unstable force that they are wary of unleashing. The military does not trust Wirathu, seeing him as a populist organiser more than a pro-regime ideologue.92 The regime gave him an award in January 2023 to mark the 75th anniversary of independence, but he was one among thousands of recipients from across the political spectrum, including ministers from the deposed NLD administration.93 The award should not be interpreted as an endorsement of the monk or an attempt at rapprochement with him. Although Wirathu is known for taking a strong pro-military stance in recent years, he was also imprisoned by the former military regime in 2003 for his inflammatory sermons.94 To a certain extent, the military’s doubts about Wirathu extend to MaBaTha, some of whose members were prominent participants in the Saffron Revolution (see Section III.A above). V. The Silence of the Monks In the first days and weeks after the coup, the limited monastic participation in protests was in part explained by the COVID-19 situation. Given the typically crowded living quarters and multi-generational nature of large urban monasteries, many monks left these institutions and returned to rural areas where they were less likely to contract the illness. At the time of the military takeover, many monks were thus far away from the main demonstrations in the cities, spread out in towns and villages in the countryside. In these circumstances, communication and mobilisation were also difficult. Some monks did try to return to the cities to join the protests, but COVID-19 prevention measures and post-coup travel restrictions made it difficult to do so.95 Others, particularly a new generation of young political and social activists, were left to take the vanguard in the demonstrations. Yet the continued low-profile monastic participation in anti-regime movements, and the political dynamics that have emerged since the coup, suggest that other factors were more significant than COVID-19, particularly the actions and orientation of the resistance and the regime. A. The Secular Orientation of the NLD and NUG An important dynamic at play is the NUG’s reliance on ethnic armed groups for sanctuary and military support. Most NUG members – and members of the resistance’s legislative branch, the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw – are Buddhist, though the movement also includes some Christians.96 But the four ethnic armed groups working most closely with the NUG – the Chin National Front, Kachin Independence Organisation, Karen National Union and Karenni National Progressive Party – have predominantly Christian leaderships and constituencies.97 Given a history of discrimination against non-Buddhists by successive post-independence governments, these groups have traditionally pushed strongly for secularism and the separation of religion and state.98 While extending support to the NUG, they have demanded that any future federal union under restored civilian rule (their declared goal) adhere to a secular agenda.99 In addition to the ethnic armed groups, many of the activists sustaining the NUG’s political struggle are against any close cooperation with the Sangha, because they are opposed to religious influence on the federal framework they are developing.100 Most resistance fighters, who tend to be young, also reject the idea of such cooperation. They feel strongly that monks should keep out of politics both in the current struggle and in the development of a future federal union. One armed resistance group leader told Crisis Group: The Buddhist majority always influences political matters, and it often decreases trust among different religious groups. We also do not like their influence in our revolution, and we do not trust non-violence as an effective way to tackle the regime.101 To the latter point, armed resistance group members worry that the Sangha’s discomfort with violence may undermine their fighters’ morale. A senior monk in Mandalay told Crisis Group that the revolution “is now about killing one another, but monks have to follow the four parajika [inviolable rules]”.102 Monks are loath to break these rules – one of which prohibits intentionally causing the death of a person – because doing so entails expulsion from the monastic order for life. Thus, monks may provide aid to internally displaced people or others who are suffering as a result of supporting the revolution, and monks may even support the idea of revolution. But because the current revolution is based on armed resistance, many monks feel that they cannot participate, or must become laypersons to do so.103 Another monk from Sagaing Region put it more succinctly: “If a monk holds a weapon, they automatically become a layman.”104 Resistance leaders feel that involving monastic figures in conversations about the future of the democratic, federal state is far beyond monks’ and nuns’ utility and remit. A further reason for the lack of monastic participation is that the NLD and Myanmar civil society – two key protagonists in the anti-coup movement – were central to undermining MaBaTha, on the basis that monks should not be involved in political issues. Encouraging monks to become involved in the current crisis would thus represent a U-turn that these groups are reluctant to make, as it would undo their years-long efforts to limit monastic influence and authority to religious issues. Indeed, resistance leaders feel that involving monastic figures in conversations about the future of the democratic, federal state is far beyond monks’ and nuns’ utility and remit.105 The role of monks is somewhat more prominent in the Myanmar Buddhist diaspora, in which more traditional views of religion tend to prevail. People in the diaspora are also more removed from the revolution, engaged predominantly in lobbying, solidarity efforts and fundraising (for the NUG, as well as for armed resistance groups).106 The NUG has regular contact with these diaspora communities, including monks, in what is the most direct form of NUG-Sangha collaboration.107 B. The Regime’s Religious Outreach Since before the February 2021 coup, Min Aung Hlaing has made energetic efforts to “harvest” merit, in an attempt to boost his power (and, subsequently, improve the odds of the coup’s success).108 For example, for the last five years, he has been building a marble Buddha image 25m high, reputedly the largest of its kind in the world, and state media regularly reports on his inspection visits to the site.109 After the coup, he and other high-ranking military figures also met with countless monks, made numerous donations and visited many pagodas in attempts to give the regime and its coup an air of moral legitimacy.110 Members of the Sangha who spoke to Crisis Group noted that such religious ceremonies should not necessarily be interpreted as signals of monastic support for the coup. They pointed out that monks have been put in a very difficult situation since the military takeover, trying to navigate harsh political realities in a system where the material and legal support of those who wield power (on matters such as land use and other permits) is essential for monastic survival.111 While these displays may have strengthened Min Aung Hlaing’s resolve or belief in his moral fitness to rule, most Myanmar people did not interpret them in that way. His actions have been widely criticised as blatant attempts to use religion to bolster his grip on power. NLD and activist efforts in recent years to combat MaBaTha and its foray into party politics laid the groundwork for this response, heightening the public’s sensitivity to overt politicisation of Buddhism and making people less likely to be swayed. Many observers expected that Min Aung Hlaing would move quickly to embrace Buddhist nationalism following the coup, because he was known to be close to several prominent nationalist monks and agitators, and because the movement had long been opposed to Aung San Suu Kyi and her NLD.112 So far, he has not done so, for reasons discussed in Section IV.D above. C. The Current State of Play Unlike the NLD in the past, the NUG has not attempted to contest the junta on religious grounds. Rather, the NUG and other resistance forces across the country have embraced a more pluralistic, inclusive approach – which is necessarily also more secular. This stance has prevented them from promoting their popular legitimacy by performing a protector of Buddhism (dhamma raja) role. In this way, they have broken with a central tenet of Myanmar political leadership since before independence, a historic shift. But even as the NUG has promoted a multi-ethnic, inclusive agenda, it has faced little popular criticism for neglecting the majority religion – in contrast to the NLD, which mostly stuck to a Burman Buddhist-centric approach.113 Part of the reason is that young people in the anti-regime resistance movement have developed an aversion to organised Buddhism and Theravada cultural norms more generally. Several popular meme accounts have emerged with names such as Anti-Theravada Movement and Anti-Theravada Memes that take aim at Buddhist institutions and traditions, depicting them as old-fashioned and ill-suited for shepherding society through the modern era and the post-coup crisis.114 Such tropes began to gain traction following the coup. There is a widely held impression ... that Buddhism is being left behind. With monks less prominent in the resistance, other leaders, including youth and especially young women, have been able to step into leadership roles (see Section IV.B above). There is a widely held impression – expressed by every monastic figure that Crisis Group spoke to for this report – that Buddhism is being left behind.115 Moreover, there is a pervasive fear that the future of Buddhism and the Sangha in Myanmar looks bleak, whatever the outcome of the current crisis.116 As this very fear underpinned the rise of Buddhist nationalist sentiment across the country in the 2010s, it needs to be closely monitored.117 But these fears of Buddhism in decline may well be unfounded or at least premature. The widespread social and economic destruction wrought by the coup means that many vulnerable people, especially youth, will have to rely on monasteries –the only social institution in Myanmar still able to support them. So long as monasteries continue to accept children for study, the population of monks is likely to remain robust. Similarly, communities in rural areas, who have suffered significant economic hardships from the pandemic and the coup, will remain reliant on monastic aid. Monastic figures have long been a central part of Myanmar’s social and political life. Any change in this pattern – for example, if the current secular shift becomes an enduring feature of the younger generation’s views or is incorporated into a future politics – would likely foment rural-urban division and social strife, given that most rural Burmans adhere to a more traditional view of Buddhism’s role in society. It would also risk a conservative backlash. The defining challenge of Myanmar’s post-independence history has been to develop a more ethnically and religiously inclusive politics and promote the rights of ethno-religious minorities. A failure to craft a more inclusive agenda of this kind will keep Myanmar politics stuck in the narrow confines of Burman Buddhist nationalism, from which it has struggled to escape for decades, to the detriment of human rights, intercommunal relations and the nation’s long-term peace and prosperity. Yet if backlash is to be avoided, powerful conservative Buddhist social forces and the Sangha itself cannot be alienated, either. Myanmar’s political trajectory remains uncertain, but in almost any scenario, these issues will be of great importance. VI. Future Developments and Recommendations The coup and its aftermath have redefined the political and social role of Buddhism and monastic institutions. It is therefore important to monitor how moral and religious value systems continue to shift in Myanmar, particularly those that have historically affected social cohesion, human rights and democracy. It may be that the Myanmar equivalent of the Overton window – that is, the range of policies politically acceptable to the public at a given time – is shifting.118 Tracking that shift is important for understanding the trajectory of social and communal relations, conflict and politics in the country. At the national level, the current low profile of the Sangha has led to a decentralisation of moral leadership, which can bring both benefits and risks. Though centralised institutional power, vested with religious significance, often acts as a constraint on political progress and can further sideline minority populations, loss of faith in these institutions creates a void that may be filled by something else – including charismatic figures who turn out to be demagogic movement leaders. Potential for such movements can be seen in the attention initially attracted by figures such as Wirathu or the lay agitator Michael Kyaw Myint after the 2011 opening of civic space, although their momentum waned under the NLD administration (see Section IV.E above). When in power, the NLD stuck close to the priorities of its Burman Buddhist political base, rather than attempting to use its political capital to promote a more pluralistic, multi-ethnic and multifaith framework for the country. Any future leaders able to formulate a compelling framework of this latter kind will likely benefit by expanding their political and voter base beyond traditional ethno-political boundaries. They may, however, face strong challenges from Burman Buddhist populist forces. When and if democratic politics will be restored in Myanmar is uncertain at this time. But should that happen, a future competition for power of this kind will have important implications for political stability, minority rights and armed conflict. Foreign actors ... need to calibrate their interactions with the monastic community at the local level. Foreign actors also need to calibrate their interactions with the monastic community at the local level. There, monks still play a hugely important religious and social role. Donors and partner organisations should continue to consult them and incorporate their views into project design and implementation. They must also keep in mind, however, that consultations at the moment may put the monastic community at risk of regime retaliation – and so should proceed with due care. International actors should also recognise that they themselves may have lost moral legitimacy in the eyes of those monastic figures and their lay supporters who sympathise with the resistance and see the UN, international NGOs and other agencies as having offered only muted criticism of the coup and subsequent violence, while continuing to work with the regime. The Sangha’s low profile in the current crisis looks set to continue, with any significant monastic leadership role appearing unlikely. Even more unlikely are Saffron Revolution-style protests. Although it is hard to see any developments that would significantly raise the Sangha’s profile, two possible triggers should be kept in mind. One would be a move by a political aspirant to follow the Sri Lanka model by offering voting rights to members of the Sangha or allowing them to run for political office. While Myanmar political and religious consensus has long been against such a move, it would be highly significant should the possibility be raised. The other trigger would be any move to offer full ordination for women. This eventuality also seems unlikely. But should the idea gain traction and become a progressive cause celebre, it could act as a wedge with uncertain implications for the next generation of aspiring political leaders, who would be caught between alienating the politically engaged young generation that has emerged since the coup and the religiously conservative Buddhist population. VII. Conclusion Myanmar’s Buddhist monks have played a limited role in the post-coup protest and resistance movement, unlike during previous periods of political struggle, such as the 2007 Saffron Revolution. There are many reasons why monks have largely stayed away from involvement, the most important being that the NUG-led resistance does not support their participation. Its largely secular agenda is driven by the legacy of Buddhist nationalist support for the military and by the fact that the NUG – with the encouragement of civil society and its non-Buddhist ethnic allies – is pursuing a multi-ethnic, multi-religious vision for the country. Monastic communities themselves are divided, with some resisting the coup, but many others reluctant to support a secular political movement that has embraced violent resistance and unwilling to risk the consequences of openly challenging the regime. The Sangha’s low political profile has allowed space for youth, and particularly young women, to take on leadership roles. The longer-term challenge for Myanmar is to develop a more ethnically and religiously inclusive politics and promote the rights of ethno-religious minorities. The trajectory of the Myanmar crisis is unclear, but the secular turn among young people in the resistance movement, if it endures, could help national politics to escape the decades-old confines of Burman Buddhist nationalism. At the same time, it could also alienate conservative social forces and the Sangha itself and risk a backlash. Whatever lies on the other side of the current crisis, balancing these tensions will be essential for Myanmar to achieve long-term peace and prosperity..."
Source/publisher: International Crisis Group (Belgium)
Date of entry/update: 2023-03-26
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Title: “The NUG welcomes the United States of America (USA) to promote accountability for the brutal Burmese Military's assault on the democratic aspirations of the people of Myanmar”
Description: "The National Unity Government of Myanmar (NUG) welcomes the government of the United States of America (USA) to promote accountability for the brutal Burmese Military's assault on the democratic aspirations of the people of Myanmar (Burma). In response to the brutal Burmese Military's continued infliction of pain and suffering on the people of Burma, the U.S. Treasury Department has imposed sanctions on two individuals, Tun Min Latt and his spouse Win Min Soe, as well as three entities owned or controlled by Tun Min Latt. Furthermore, the US government has issued sanctions against jet fuel importation to Burma, informing individuals, businesses, and other persons of the sanctions risks associated with the provision of jet fuel to Burma's military generals and their cronies. These actions align with those taken by Canada, the European Union (EU), and the United Kingdom(UK). Furthermore, it is important to note that in the last 24 months alone, the brutal Burmese Military's atrocities have totalled more than 9,000 attacks on civilians, resulting in the deaths of over 3,000 innocent individuals and the inhuman and illegal detention of over 20,000 civilians including elected President of Myanmar U Win Myint, elected State Counsellor of Myanmar, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and spiritual leader Rev. Dr. Hkalam Samson. In the last 24 months alone, these brutal evils forces of Burmese Military have destroyed over 60,000 homes, schools, churches, and monasteries, displacing more than 1.6 million civilians, causing over 17 million people to face hunger and starvation and forcing half population of Myanmar to the extreme poverty. These genocidal attacks by the Burmese military junta have been made possible by the massive supplies of fuel, aviation parts, weapons and finances provided to the fascist military. The individuals, groups, organizations, businesses, companies, and countries enabling these atrocities and crimes against humanity must be held accountable with their partners in crimes. The United States' actions in imposing sanctions on jet fuel suppliers and military cronies are crucial to saving the lives of millions of people in Myanmar. It is essential to continue taking action that denies the genocidal military of Myanmar the resources it uses to commit these atrocities and crimes against humanity and to support the people of Burma in their struggle for freedom, federal democracy, and human rights..."
Source/publisher: Ministry of International Cooperation Myanmar
Date of entry/update: 2023-03-25
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Title: Discussions on Human Rights, Human Rights Violation and Documentation (3)
Description: "The people of Burma have been suffering greatly for many decades under the brutality of the junta. Human rights should not be violated by anyone under any circumstances. For that reason, we present these videos about documenting human rights violations to encourage the emergence of Citizen Human Rights Documenters who can systematically collect and record strong, accurate evidence of human rights violations with the aim to establish justice, rehabilitate victims, and put an end to the cycle of impunity in Burma. In this second video, we will talk about why we do human rights documentation and what data to collect when human rights violations occur in our communities..."
Source/publisher: Assistance Association for Political Prisoners
Date of entry/update: 2023-03-23
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Title: Can ASEAN forge a political solution in Myanmar?
Sub-title: Indonesia and Australia have different but equally critical roles in bringing the junta to the negotiating table.
Description: "Since the military coup in February 2022, the people of Myanmar have been subjected to unrelenting violence including indiscriminate airstrikes, mass burning of villages, arbitrary arrests, killings, torture and forced disappearances, among other egregious human rights violations. Reflecting the gravity of the crisis, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has made an unprecedented divergence from its founding principle of non-interference. In April 2021, ASEAN leaders negotiated a Five-Point Consensus on Myanmar, committing among other things to a cessation of violence and the commencement of “constructive dialogue”. In November 2022, ASEAN acknowledged that “little progress [had been] achieved”. ASEAN resolved that there was a “need for an implementation plan”, and called for support from ASEAN’s “external partners”. ASEAN’s engagement in the Myanmar crisis thus far is due to the leadership of Indonesia and Malaysia, at times supported by Singapore and the Philippines. Other ASEAN states are more loath to intervene. Singapore’s foreign minister recently stated that “disapprov[al] of the coup … does not give ASEAN a licence to interfere”. With this in mind, if ASEAN has one chance at a political solution to the Myanmar crisis, it is with Indonesia as ASEAN Chair in 2023. Indonesia has said that ASEAN “must deal” with the crisis in Myanmar, and that as ASEAN Chair it will “spare no effort” to encourage an “inclusive national dialogue”. Bearing in mind ASEAN’s internal constraints and divisions, however, Indonesia faces an uphill battle. As former Indonesian Attorney General Marzuki Darusman observed recently, “much is expected from ASEAN, and therein lies the problem”. Darusman has advised that “if there is going to be any change in Myanmar, it will need to come from outside”. This is reflected in ASEAN’s unusual request in November 2022 for external support. Australia has a critical role to play in this context. Australia is one of ASEAN and Indonesia’s most important supporters. It has a comprehensive strategic partnership with Indonesia, enshrining a commitment to work together to resolve regional challenges. Australia has explicitly expressed support for the role of the ASEAN Chair in addressing the Myanmar crisis. The situation in Myanmar tests this cooperation. As a member of the ASEAN family, Indonesia is subject to constraints that Australia is not. From outside the ASEAN family, Australia can lend critical support for Indonesia in its ambition for a political dialogue on Myanmar. There are three steps, in particular, that Australia can take. The first concerns the setting of the ground for negotiations. As Darusman has stated, this requires a “level playing field” – one on which all political stakeholders, including Myanmar’s National Unity Government (NUG), are recognised and accorded equal footing. Assuming the negotiations are to be ASEAN-led, this requires ASEAN and all other major players to recognise the NUG as legitimately representing the aspirations of the people of Myanmar. As one of ASEAN’s most important partners, Australia can help the NUG along the road to international recognition. Australia has said it is “open to engagement with the NUG”, but has stopped short of making an explicit statement of recognition or publicly engaging with high-level NUG officials. The European Parliament, by contrast, has formally recognised the NUG. In light of its explicit support for Indonesia’s ambitions as ASEAN Chair, Australia should be at the forefront of coordinated international efforts to boost the NUG’s legitimacy, not lagging behind. Second, even with a stage set for dialogue, the Myanmar military junta will likely need to be coerced to the negotiating table. Already, the situation is opportune – the junta is losing ground, and the democratic resistance movement is consolidating – but further pressure is required. It is often remarked that the junta is impervious to international isolation, but with access to hundreds of millions of dollars in revenue from oil and gas alone, this has scarcely been put to the test. Australia currently sanctions just two entities that benefit the junta. Canada, by way of contrast, sanctions 63, the European Union sanctions 18, the United Kingdom sanctions 28 and the United States sanctions 32. The UN Special Rapporteur on human rights in Myanmar has called on states to “form a working group of governments to develop and implement a coordinated strategy” to deny the junta access to weapons and resources. Australia should be leading this initiative – sanctioning companies that supply fuel and parts to Myanmar’s air force, arms to the junta, and goods to state-owned enterprises in the minerals and energy sectors, and lobbying other states to do the same – with a view of ultimately forcing the junta to ASEAN’s negotiating table. Finally, recalling ASEAN’s request for external support, Australia could work behind the scenes to urge the United Nations to step up support for ASEAN-led mediation – just as the United Nations has supported regionally led mediation in other parts of the world. Such support could be prompted by a request from ASEAN to the Secretary-General, or alternatively by a Security Council resolution requesting the Secretary-General provide his “good offices”, and strengthening the mandate of his Special Envoy on Myanmar. Australia likes to say it punches above its weight in global affairs. It has a proud history of peacekeeping and diplomacy in the Indo-Pacific. The political crisis in Myanmar presents an opportunity and an imperative for Australia to demonstrate its diplomatic prowess, and it should not be lost..."
Source/publisher: "The Interpreter"
Date of entry/update: 2023-03-22
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Title: Civilian infrastructure and food supplies destroyed in Myanmar military arson attacks
Description: "Key Event Details Location of Incident: Nyaung Hla village (ညောင်လှရွာ), Tabayin township (ဒီပဲယင်းမြို့နယ်), Sagaing region (စစ်ကိုင်းတိုင်းဒေသကြီး), [22.65276909, 95.41811371]. Date/Time of Incident: Multiple events between 23-28 January 2023. Alleged Perpetrator(s) and/or Involvement: State Administration Council (SAC) forces A 17 January 2023 announcement from the National Unity Government (NUG) alleges the LIB 364 and LIB 701 (under direction of the LID 77) were responsible. Summary of Investigation: SAC forces allegedly entered villages in Tabayin township, setting at least 10 villages on fire. Fires were identified and verified in seven villages between 23-28 January 2023. Almost the entirety of Nyaung Hla village was levelled by the fires, resulting in damage and destruction to up to 402 houses. Food supplies - including a rice mill, multiple rice storage facilities, and farm animals - were reportedly damaged, destroyed or killed during the fires in Nyaung Hla and Ma Ya Kan (မရကန် ) villages. Based on the analysis of identified open source user-generated content (UGC), it is likely that the SAC forces who were active in the area were responsible for these fires. Summary On 23 January 2023, SAC forces reportedly entered several villages located at the border of Ye-U (ရေဦး) and Tabayin (ဒီပဲယင်း) townships, and set at least 10 villages alight. On 24 January 2023, sources including Khit Thit News and Radio Free Asia reported that SAC forces burned Nyaung Hla (ညောင်လှ) village, which was home to over 900 households, for the third time since January 2022. The fire resulted in the damage and destruction of hundreds of civilian homes, rice paddies, and a rice mill. Farm animals and an elderly woman were also reportedly killed. Myanmar Witness has verified and chronolocated the fires in seven out of the reported 10 villages (table 1). Additionally, Myanmar Witness has geolocated additional footage in Nyaung Hla village, where an estimated 402 houses were affected, and verified the destruction of a rice mill. Reports also indicate the damage and destruction of food supplies such as rice paddies and farm animals in some of the affected villages. Myanmar Witness has identified content indicating the presence of SAC troops during and/or before the fires in and around the affected areas. Myanmar Witness was able to verify: At least seven villages were burnt between 23-28 January 2023. Up to 402 houses in Nyaung Hla Village were damaged or destroyed by the fires. A rice mill, and reportedly rice storage facilities, were damaged or destroyed in the fire. Verification and Chronolocation of Fires in Nyaung Hla Village Verification via FIRMS Between 23-27 January 2023, The Fire Information for Resource Management System (FIRMS) shows multiple areas of high heat signatures in Nyang Hla village, consistent with the dates of the reported fires (Figure 2). Verification via Sentinel The fire locations identified using FIRMS were further analysed using Sentinel satellite imagery. Nyaung Hla and Tha Yet Taw were visibly damaged during the investigated timeframe, corroborating the FIRMS data on 25 January 2023. Additionally, an image from Sentinel hub on the 25 January shows smoke above the area (Figure 3). This can be seen by the discoloration shown in Figure 4 (from 10 January 2023 to 30 January 2023). Estimating the number of houses affected Sentinel imagery can also be used to count and estimate the number of damaged or destroyed houses. This is done by overlaying the discoloured area with higher resolution imagery (Figure 5). Using this method, Myanmar Witness was able to estimate that up to 402 houses were damaged or destroyed. Geolocations Rice Mill The fires in Nyaung Hla village visibly damaged a rice mill located in the west of the village. Figure 6 and 7 compare drone footage (UGC) and satellite imagery of the location near the rice mill (blue box), showing the damage incurred by the fire. Additional images of Nyaung Hla Village Multiple sources of UGC, both drone and on-ground footage, show clear views of Nyaung Hla village during and after the fires were identified. These pieces of UGC, showing the fire and its aftermath, are verified from different angles below. Figure 8 shows the geolocation of the middle section of Nyaung Hla village. The boundary (marked by the dotted line) and the white roofed house (marked in a red box) are verified by matching UGC with satellite imagery. The post claims the events took place on 24 and 25 January 2023, corroborating the aforementioned FIRMS and Sentinel data. Unverified claims Elderly woman’s remains in Ohn Ta Pin village On 27 January 2023 it was reported that an elderly woman from Ohn Ta Pin (အုံးတပင်) (22.60137939, 95.34348297) village was killed in a fire set by SAC troops (identified through FIRMS to have occurred on 26 January 2023). Figure 10 shows the alleged remains of the victim found in the ashes. Burnt rice store piles and farm animals In Ma Ya Kan village, SAC troops allegedly burned the rice storage building (Figure 11) and damaged an estimated 70 houses. Myanmar Witness was able to verify the fire in the village using Sentinel satellite imagery, but the footage posted online of the burnt rice does not provide enough information to verify its location through geolocation. Photos allegedly taken in Nyaung Hla village also show the destruction of food supplies. At least four farm animals were reported to have died as a result of the fires, and a partially burnt rice storage building can be seen (Figure 12). Food shortages for Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) A local support group reported that a military operation undertaken by an estimated 150 SAC troops in the east of Tabayin township resulted in tens of thousands of internally displaced persons (IDPs). The group appealed for donations as it expected it would face food shortages for the IDPs. These challenges may be exacerbated by the damage and destruction of food supplies caused by the fires. Perpetrators of the Fires Several used packages of bullets (Figure 13 a-d) labelled Ka Pa Sa, Defence Industries (ကာကွယ်ရေးပစ္စည်းစက်ရုံ, ကပစ), were allegedly found in Nyaung Hla village. The box in Figure 12a states “Manufactured by Defence Industries”. Figure 12d shows a paper box labelled “KaPaSa (2) 5.56x45mm bullets”, and Figure 12e shows possible rifle grenade casings - the features match the container tube for a 40mm rifle grenable model MG-2 which is used by the Myanmar military. This is determined due to the tube size and cracking of the tube body with the twist off end. While Myanmar Witness cannot verify the location where these boxes and weapons were found, the weapon characteristics and manufacturers signal that they belonged to SAC troops. Images also circulated online showing messages on a blackboard inside a school building in Nyaung Hla village, both of which contain profanities directed against the PDF (Figure 14). While Myanmar Witness cannot verify the authors of these messages, they were left in a location where SAC troops were allegedly located and weapon boxes were also found. Future monitoring Although direct attribution cannot be made to the SAC in this case, SAC troops have an established history of using fire as a weapon against the local resistance forces and civilians in Sagaing region. The continued use of fire by armed forces within Myanmar is concerning; it places civilian lives at risk, creates IDPs, and could destabilise local food supplies. Myanmar Witness will continue to monitor the use of fire in the region..."
Source/publisher: Myanmar Witness
Date of entry/update: 2023-03-21
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Title: Myanmar Junta Troops Kill and Loot in Village
Description: "Myanmar junta troops have killed two civilians, including one suffering from mental illness, and looted houses while raiding a village in Yesagyo Township, Magwe Region, on Sunday and Monday, according to residents. The killings were committed by the junta’s special task force that killed 17 Tar Taing villagers in Myinmu Township, Sagaing Region, in early March. On Sunday, around 80 soldiers, including many wearing resistance uniforms, raided Mee Laung Kyun village in Yesagyo, a resident told The Irrawaddy on Tuesday. During the raid, more than 50 displaced people from nearby Myaung Township in Sagaing, were detained along with Mee Laung Kyun’s residents while they sheltered at the village monastery. Most of Mee Laung Khun’s residents escaped. Villager U Maung Han, 50, who was cooking for the displaced at the monastery, was shot dead, a resident said. A displaced 16-year-old suffered serious shoulder and abdomen injuries after being shot before he escaped, said a representative of Yesagyo People’s Defense Force that provided treatment. A villager told The Irrawaddy that villager Ko Kaung Myat Soe Oo, 40, who suffered from mental illness, was tortured and killed by junta troops on Monday. “His head was severely beaten by the soldiers, he was stabbed in his abdomen, legs and throat,” said the resident, who helped cremate the two villagers. Regime forces were stationed at the village on Monday and Sunday, looting 25 million kyats (around US$8,700 on the black market), gold jewelry and mobile phones from houses and detainees. They burned two houses and motorbikes at the monastery before leaving on Tuesday morning, leaving all the detainees. They then burned houses in nearby Pan Nyo village in Myaung Township on Tuesday morning. Before the raid junta forces had clashed with resistance groups in nearby Yay Lal Kyun for three days, losing six soldiers and suffering many injuries. The Myingyan Black Tiger resistance group lost its headquarters and two fighters were injured. During recent raids on resistance strongholds in Ayadaw, Myinmu and Sagaing townships in Sagaing Region, the junta task force beheaded resistance troops, killed civilian detainees and committed acts of sexual violence..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update: 2023-03-21
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Title: Myanmar Regime Reinforcements Sent to Resistance Strongholds After China Talks
Description: "China’s new special envoy to Myanmar, Deng Xijun, has already triggered changes in the country since his appointment in December 2022. Last week, Deng Xijun met leaders of seven powerful ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) based in northern and eastern Myanmar along the border with China — their third meeting since December. Before the latest talks, the seven EAOs including Myanmar’s most powerful ethnic army, the United Wa State Army (UWSA), met in UWSA-controlled Wa State. In a joint statement, they thanked China for its work attempting to solve Myanmar’s current crisis. Deng has also met junta boss Min Aung Hlaing twice. During their second meeting, Deng also met officials from the military regime’s peace negotiation team. Following the meeting, the junta moved battalions based near the Myanmar-China border to resistance strongholds in central and southeastern Myanmar, where they have launched massive offensive operations. Reinforcements The Myanmar military has launched large-scale operations in three locations: Kayah State, including Pekon and Pinlaung townships in neighboring southern Shan State, Tanintharyi Region and areas of Magwe Region and Chin State. The new offensives have been made possible because the regime has moved some 3,000 troops formerly stationed near the Myanmar-China border in Shan State inland to the conflict areas. Before the reinforcements arrived, junta troops in Kayah and Pekon and Pinlaung townships were under the Eastern Command and Loikaw Regional Operations Command and consisted of the 66th Light Infantry Division. But strong resistance from Karenni resistance groups — the Karenni Army and the Karenni Nationalities Defense Force — and People’s Defense Forces (PDF) meant that the regime was unable to exert control over Kayah and Pekon and Pinlaung townships. The military has also declared martial law in Tanintharyi Region’s Dawei and Palaw townships in southern Myanmar, while also deploying troops from Kayah to Karen State, where resistance is also strong. So the junta needed reinforcements in Tanintharyi. Reinforcements were also needed in Magwe’s Gangaw District and neighboring Chin State, where PDF’s fighting alongside the Chinland Defense Force are making it difficult for the junta to resupply its bases in Chin State. Despite being overstretched by fighting on multiple fronts, 3,000 reinforcements were found and started to arrive around the end of February. Soldiers from the 12th Military Operations Command (MOC) based in northern Shan State were sent to Karen State, while troops from the 20th MOC fighting in Karen State were moved to Tanintharyi Region. Further reinforcements came from 2nd MOC and 17th MOC, who have launched assaults in Yaw Region, an area made up of Gangaw, Htilin, and Saw in Magwe Region’s Gangaw District, and Kyaukhtu on the border of Magwe and Chin State. Deng’s guarantee Why couldn’t the regime move troops from northern Shan State before? Why now? Three of the seven EAOs China’s special envoy met — the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) — have a strong presence in northern Shan State. They have ties to pro-democracy revolutionary forces that took up arms after the 2021 coup. Thousands of revolutionary fighters have since been trained and armed by the KIA, TNLA and MNDAA. That forced the Myanmar military to keep soldiers from seven MOCs and Northeastern Command in their positions in northern Shan. So what made the regime take a bold decision to move its troops in the face of such threat? The KIA, TNLA and MNDAA have rejected peace talks with the regime, and are unlikely to reach an immediate truce with the junta no matter what China’s special envoy says to them. The regime was able to move the troops because of a guarantee made possible by an agreement between Deng and the junta. China does not want to see fighting along the Myanmar-China frontier. So the regime might have promised not to conduct attacks along the border, while Deng assured the junta that EAOs would not attack regime forces along the border. For the military regime, the major threat now is in central Myanmar, and it won’t think twice about promising China that it will not fight along the border unless it is attacked. And Deng is in a position to pressure EAOs in northern Myanmar not to fight near the frontier with China. EAOs in north and east Myanmar rely heavily on China for supplies of everything from food and medicine to fuel. So they are not in a position to argue when China makes a demand. That enabled the junta to move its troops without fear of attacks taking place along the border. Result of Deng’s visits Deng said he intends to help solve Myanmar’s issue peacefully. So what has been the result of Deng’s flurry of activity since December? China has got a guarantee of stability at the border, while the Myanmar military got 3,000 troops to reinforce its battalions fighting in central and southeastern Myanmar. That resulted in regime forces slaughtering civilians and torching villages in Pinlaung Township. The junta’s recent operations and its massacres of civilians are the outcome of an agreement between Deng and the regime. The Myanmar military has gained an advantage and has been able to launch large-scale operations in at least three places. But for the Myanmar people that agreement has only induced more misery as they suffer the junta’s atrocities..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update: 2023-03-21
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Title: National Unity Government Weekly Press Update (12/2023)
Description: "1. Union Election Commission assigned by SAC considered a branch of terrorist organization 15/03/2023.....2. NUG urge international community to support them in ending the SAC’s atrocious crimes 16/03/2023.....3. UN Ambassador Kyaw Moe Tun says terrorist military committed 60 massacre over last 2 years 13/03/2023.....4. Military-organized sham election will create more bloodshed across the country.....5. Nearly 400 million MMK in aid distributed in February 16/03/2023.....6. SAC massacres resulted in 766 civilians dead 16/03/2023.....7. Destroying youth’s education is tantamount to destroying country’s future..."
Source/publisher: National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update: 2023-03-21
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Title: အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ အပတ်စဉ်သတင်းထုတ်ပြန်ချက် ( ၁၂/၂၀၂၃)
Description: "National Unity Government Weekly Press Update (12/2023)
Source/publisher: National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update: 2023-03-21
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Title: HRC52: Statement on Myanmar
Description: "Thank you Mr President, Special Rapporteur, Thank you for your sobering update and passionate commitment. It has been over two years since the military seized power in a coup, plunging Myanmar into crisis. Myanmar’s people have shown extraordinary resilience in the face of unspeakable atrocities, demonstrating their commitment to democracy and human rights. We continue to stand with them. They are indeed not forgotten, they are not alone. Across Myanmar, the junta is committing brutal human rights violations and abuses including against Rohingya and other minorities. Thousands of civilians, including children, jailed, tortured and killed. Gender and sexual-based violence rife. Civic space virtually non-existent. Over 17 million people in need of humanitarian assistance, and nearly 2 million people displaced. Since the coup, the UK has provided over £100 million to support those in need. We must collectively ensure that all responders on the front line are supported and that we innovate to channel resources for the humanitarian response. Special Rapporteur, How can the international community ensure access to displaced population inside and outside Myanmar? Thank you..."
Source/publisher: Govt. UK (London)
Date of entry/update: 2023-03-20
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Title: Human Rights Council Hears about Reports of Massacres of Civilians in Myanmar and Possible Crimes against Humanity in Iran Following Mass Protests in Both Countries
Description: "Council Concludes General Debate on the Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights The Human Rights Council this morning held an interactive dialogue with the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, and started an interactive dialogue with the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Iran. It also concluded its general debate on the promotion and protection of all human rights, civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights, including the right to development. Thomas H. Andrews, Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, said two years after the military staged an illegal coup in Myanmar, it continued to wage a campaign of violence and oppression to crush widespread public opposition. But while it had utterly failed to stop this opposition, it was succeeding in destroying the nation and assaulting the fundamental human rights of its people. While opposition remained strong, the junta’s escalating assaults on the people of Myanmar were having a devastating impact. Since the coup was launched, more than 3,000 civilians had been killed; more than 1.3 million civilians had been displaced; more than 16,000 political prisoners were behind bars; and 17.6 million people were in dire need of humanitarian assistance. The Special Rapporteur said he regularly received reports of massacres of civilians, including beheadings and dismemberment. Torture and sexual violence remained a constant threat. Unfortunately, Mr. Andrews had also received reports that opposition groups had committed human rights violations, which also must end. Mr. Andrews said the international community was not doing nearly enough. A minority of Member States and non-State entities continued to provide the junta with weapons, materials to manufacture weapons, or revenue that was being used to commit war crimes and crimes against humanity. This must stop. Those Member States that had taken actions, such as targeted sanctions or weapons bans, had failed to do so in a strategic and coordinated fashion. A working coalition of Member States should be formed to identify actions that would have the greatest impact and then coordinate their implementation. The international community could also do better in supporting the hundreds of thousands who had been forced to flee Myanmar. In the discussion, speakers said the Special Rapporteur’s report left no doubt about the situation in Myanmar, which was in freefall. The responsibility lay squarely on the Myanmar military, which, more than two years after its coup, inflicted continuous and increasing grave and systematic human rights violations on people across the country. Persons in vulnerable situations, and in particular persons belonging to ethnic and religious minorities, such as the Rohingya, continued to bear the brunt. Despite all this, the people in Myanmar continued their heroic resistance. Some speakers called upon the military to immediately end all forms of violence and abuses, including sexual and gender-based violence, against the people of Myanmar, including children. One speaker pointed out that this was an internal affair of Myanmar, and that external pressure would only be counter-productive: the Human Rights Council and multilateral bodies should work to bridge differences between parties to the conflict to avoid creating further conflict. Another speaker said the Special Rapporteur’s calls for the imposition of more unilateral coercive measures on Myanmar were rejected: the extreme politicisation of his mandate was reflected in the recommendations in his report, which were selective and based on uncorroborated information. Speaking in the discussion were the European Union, Netherlands on behalf of a group of countries, Denmark on behalf of the Nordic Baltic States, Pakistan on behalf of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, Liechtenstein, United States, Czech Republic, Republic of Korea, France, Japan, China, Indonesia, Venezuela, Canada, India, Austria, United Kingdom, Malaysia, Spain, Türkyie, Bangladesh, Italy, Malta, the Gambia, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Malawi, Australia, Croatia, Romania, Bulgaria, Thailand, New Zealand, Russian Federation, South Africa, Germany, and Ukraine. Also speaking were CIVICUS - World Alliance for Citizen Participation, the Organization for Poverty Alleviation and Development, Human Rights Now, Article 19 - International Centre Against Censorship, International Bar Association, Human Rights Institute, Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development, Law Council of Australia, Edmund Rice International Limited, Human Rights Watch, and iuventum e.V. The Council then started an interactive dialogue with the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Iran. Javaid Rehman, Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Iran, said the report was being presented today amidst the most serious human rights violations in Iran over the past four decades. Available evidence, including eyewitness testimonies and comments from reliable medical sources, established that Ms. Amini died on 16 September as a result of beatings by the State morality police. As per usual practice, State authorities denied any wrongdoing or misconduct on their part. None of the members of the morality police involved in the death of Ms. Amini had been held accountable. Mr. Rehman stressed that the death of Ms. Amini was not an isolated event but the latest in a long series of extreme violence against women and girls committed by the Iranian authorities. The responsibility of top senior officials in instigating this violence could not be ignored. Protesters, including children, were beaten to death. Mr. Rehman said at least 527 people, including 71 children, were killed, and hundreds of protesters severely injured. From the very first days of protests, State authorities had tried to shut down all avenues of freedom of expression, with mass arbitrary arrests and detentions. Recently authorities recognised that over 22,000 people had been arrested. Mr. Rehman remained deeply concerned at the continuing and exponentially increasing violations of human rights in the country. The scale and gravity of the violations committed by Iranian authorities pointed to the possible commission of international crimes, notably the crimes against humanity of murder, imprisonment, enforced disappearances, torture, rape and sexual violence, and persecution. In the absence of accountability at the domestic level, Mr. Rehman strongly advocated for the establishment of an independent international fact-finding mission and looked towards fully cooperating with it to ensure justice and accountability for victims of human rights violations. Iran, speaking as a country concerned, said advocacy for human rights was increasingly mistaken by some States and mandate holders for unwarranted and egotistic purposes, abusing the human rights mechanisms to target certain States; they were void of any value for the protection of human rights. The Council’s mandate was best fulfilled by dialogue and cooperation, in line with non-selectivity and impartiality. The Special Rapporteur’s report, which read like a tragic novel, had been used by some Western media as an attempt to portray the situation of human rights in Iran. The Special Rapporteur was totally in disregard of his mandate, in his lack of impartiality, using biased language, and violating the Code of Conduct. The Iranian people had witnessed nearly three months of terrorist attacks and armed riots, but the Special Rapporteur did not even mention certain terrorist attacks, which left innocent people murdered, and did not mention armed attacks on people in certain provinces. In the discussion on Iran, many speakers commended the Special Rapporteur for his report. Since the death of Mahsa Amini in the custody of Iran’s so-called “Morality Police” six months ago, the world had witnessed a mass movement while Iran’s leadership had conducted a relentless and violent crackdown on the people of Iran. Some speakers said it was important to renew the mandate while also supporting the work of the newly created Fact-Finding Mission, in the name of women, life, and freedom. Some speakers strongly condemned the use of violence, harassment and detentions against peaceful protesters. Perpetrators of torture, killings and violence, including sexual and gender-based violence, needed to be held accountable. Some speakers said that abusing the United Nations human rights mechanisms to single out and harass some nations that did not align with the hegemonic and geopolitical interests of the West had nothing to do with the genuine promotion and protection of human rights. This was a violation of the United Nations Charter and of international law. It was hoped that the international community could respect the human rights development path independently chosen by the people of Iran. Of grave concern were the unilateral coercive measures imposed on Iran by other countries, which had undermined the human rights of the Iranian people and gravely affected their rights. Speaking in the discussion were Estonia on behalf of the Nordic-Baltic countries, European Union, Liechtenstein, United States, Ireland, Germany, Czech Republic, Israel, Belgium, China, Switzerland, Luxembourg, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Costa Rica, North Macedonia, Venezuela, Canada, Zimbabwe, Netherlands, Republic of Moldova, Austria, and United Kingdom. At the beginning of the meeting, the Council concluded the general debate on agenda item three on the promotion and protection of all human rights, civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights, including the right to development. The general debate started in previous meetings and a summary can be found here and here. In the general debate, speakers said the promotion and protection of human rights were essential to ensure a more just and equitable world for all. However, in many cases, all around the world, human rights were being violated. Some speakers highlighted increasing cases of horrific violations that occurred in a number of countries, and war and conflict zones against civilians. Violence had become a daily occurrence, with wars, bloodshed and conflicts taking place in many countries. There was a need to move towards serious United Nations-led peace processes and transitional justice needed to be achieved. Some speakers told the Council that over-compliance of businesses and banks with unilateral sanctions led to wide-scoped violations of all economic, social and cultural rights, as well as the right to life in the sanctioned countries. Speakers called on the Special Procedures to report and discuss the harmful effects of unilateral sanctions in their annual reports and condemn these effects in joint statements. Speaking in the general debate were World Muslim Congress, International Action for Peace and Sustainable Development, Promotion du Développement Economique et Social, Lidskoprávní organizace Práva a svobody obcanučů Turkmenistánu z.s., Youth in Technology and Arts Network, Association Culturelle des Tamouls en France, Asociacion Cubana de las Naciones Unidas (Cuban United Nations Association), Il Cenacolo, Baha'i International Community, Commission of the Churches on International Affairs of the World Council of Churches, Chunhui Children's Foundation, Human Rights Solidarity Organization, Human Rights and Democratic Participation Centre "SHAMS", Organization for Defending Victims of Violence, Centre Zagros pour les Droits de l'Homme, Samarthanam Trust for the Disabled, and Alliance Internationale pour la défense des Droits et des Libertés. Speaking in exercise of right of reply were Morocco, Indonesia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia. The webcast of the Human Rights Council meetings can be found here. All meeting summaries can be found here. Documents and reports related to the Human Rights Council’s fifty-second regular session can be found here. The Council will reconvene this afternoon at 3 p.m. to continue and conclude the interactive dialogue with the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran, followed by an interactive dialogue with the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, and then an interactive dialogue with the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine. General Debate on the Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, including the Right to Development The general debate on agenda item three on the promotion and protection of all human rights, civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights, including the right to development, started in previous meetings and a summary can be found here and here. General Debate Speakers, among other things, said the promotion and protection of human rights were essential to ensure a more just and equitable world for all. However, in many cases all around the world, human rights were being violated. Speakers said that in some places, laws had not been effective in removing barriers and decreasing violence against women. Women and girls were often used as human shields and as a tool to incite hatred. Some speakers highlighted the lack of attention by the Council on the human rights of women suffering the pain, stigma and discrimination associated with obstetric fistula, particularly those in rural areas. Member States were called on to pay more attention to the prevention of obstetric fistula in their policies, strategic plans and budgets. Governments needed to initiate trainings for midwives from local communities, accompanied by incentives to encourage them to return to serve their communities. Speakers said that during her presentation to the Council, the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief had recalled the important role of States in the protection of the rights of religious minorities. Not only was this in line with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international commitments, but allowing all persons in a given country, irrespective of their religion or belief, to live freely, contributed to the richness and the advancement of society. In spite of this, in certain areas, some religious minorities faced potential exclusion from society. The international community needed to remind authorities of their obligations to guarantee the rights of all to freely practise the religion of their choice without any fear or punishment. Some speakers highlighted increasing cases of horrific violations that occurred in a number of countries and war and conflict zones against civilians. Violence had become a daily occurrence, with wars, bloodshed and conflicts taking place in many countries. There was a need to move towards serious United Nations-led peace processes and transitional justice needed to be achieved. Terrorism was spreading and groups were becoming more active in human smuggling, in some cases supported by authorities. It was important that they were held accountable. Council members were invited to impose targeted sanctions on officials who had been credibly accused of war crimes and crimes of genocide. Many speakers also expressed concern about attacks on activists and human rights defenders, who were especially vulnerable and faced torture and death in pre-trial detention. The Council was called on to assess the situation of human rights defenders and take necessary steps to improve it. Some speakers told the Council that over-compliance of businesses and banks with unilateral sanctions led to wide-scoped violations of all economic, social and cultural rights, as well as the right to life in the sanctioned countries. Unilateral sanctions threatened human lives, and the United Nations treaty bodies were called on to document the deadly impacts of sanctions on targeted populations and offer recommendations on how to provide the victims with compensation and redress. Speakers called on the Special Procedures to report and discuss the harmful effects of unilateral sanctions in their annual reports and condemn these effects in joint statements. Interactive Dialogue with the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar Report The Council has before it the report by the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights inMyanmar, Thomas H. Andrews (A/HRC/52/66). Presentation of Report THOMAS H. ANDREWS, Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, said two years after the military staged an illegal coup in Myanmar, it continued to wage a campaign of violence and oppression to crush widespread public opposition. But while it had utterly failed to stop this opposition, it was succeeding in destroying the nation and assaulting the fundamental human rights of its people. Even as they pursued a heroic campaign to save their country, many people from Myanmar had come to believe that a distracted world had forgotten them. The defence of human rights and citizen opposition to the junta of Myanmar had never been stronger. Protests and civil disobedience continued. The junta’s control over territory and the people of Myanmar was eroding. Opposition groups were forging alliances and gaining strength. The people of Myanmar were exposing the junta’s lie that a military dominated future for Myanmar was inevitable. The junta did not offer any viable path to stability or an end to the human rights crisis in Myanmar because it was the very cause of this crisis. Most Member States recognised this and had acknowledged that the junta lacked even a shred of constitutional or democratic legitimacy. The junta now seemed to be gambling that it could capture a degree of international recognition and a veneer of legitimacy by going through the motions of what they would try to describe as an “election”, and the Special Rapporteur urged the members of this Council to reject this outrageous claim. While opposition remained strong, the junta’s escalating assaults on the people of Myanmar were having a devastating impact. Since the coup was launched, more than 3,000 civilians had been killed; more than 1.3 million civilians had been displaced; more than 16,000 political prisoners were behind bars; 17.6 million people were in dire need of humanitarian assistance; 58,000 civilian homes and structures had been burned to the ground or otherwise destroyed; and State institutions had been hollowed out and the rule of law had collapsed. The Special Rapporteur said he regularly received reports of massacres of civilians, including beheadings and dismemberment. Torture and sexual violence remained a constant threat. Unfortunately, Mr. Andrews had also received reports that opposition groups had committed human rights violations, which also must end. The hopeful news was that many world leaders had raised their voice in support of the people of Myanmar. Several nations had backed up their words with action, including targeted economic sanctions and weapons bans. The discouraging news was that the international community was not doing nearly enough. A minority of Member States and non-State entities continued to provide the junta with weapons, materials to manufacture weapons, or revenue that was being used to commit war crimes and crimes against humanity. This must stop. Those Member States that had taken actions, such as targeted sanctions or weapons bans, had failed to do so in a strategic and coordinated fashion. A working coalition of Member States should be formed to identify actions that would have the greatest impact and then coordinate their implementation. The international community could also do better in supporting the hundreds of thousands who had been forced to flee Myanmar. The people of Myanmar continued to demonstrate remarkable courage and tenacity in the defence of their country and the human rights of its people. They deserved solidarity and support. Discussion Some speakers said the Special Rapporteur’s report left no doubt about the situation in Myanmar, which was in freefall. The responsibility lay squarely on the Myanmar military, which, more than two years after its coup, inflicted continuous and increasing grave and systematic human rights violations on people across the country. Persons in vulnerable situations, and in particular persons belonging to ethnic and religious minorities such as the Rohingya, continued to bear the brunt. Despite all this, the people in Myanmar continued their heroic resistance. Speakers, among other things, called upon the military to immediately end all forms of violence and abuses, including sexual and gender-based violence, against the people of Myanmar, including children. The military junta was urged to end the systematic intimidation and reprisals against the people of Myanmar for exercising their human rights and fundamental freedoms. The speakers called on the junta to ensure the immediate and unconditional release of all those arbitrarily detained – including children, political leaders, journalists, human rights defenders, and others. All parties to the conflict were urged to ensure humanitarian access for all persons affected by the situation. The military junta was urged to immediately stop all human rights violations, to lift all martial law orders at once, and to cooperate with the Special Rapporteur as well as the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar. Speakers also called for the effective implementation of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ Five-point Consensus, urging Myanmar to engage constructively with the international community. Speakers expressed deep concern over the deteriorating humanitarian crisis in Myanmar, and called for unimpeded access of humanitarian assistance to all parts of the country without discrimination. Concern was expressed about reports that the military was increasing its use of airstrikes, thereby indiscriminately bombing villages and camps for internally displaced persons. Speakers condemned all attacks on civilians, including extrajudicial killings, torture, sexual violence, and other human rights violations, many of which could amount to crimes against humanity and war crimes. Human rights abuses committed by Myanmar’s security forces were appalling and showed the depths to which the military would go to consolidate their control without regard for the welfare of the country. It was imperative that the international community take strong action to support the people of Myanmar, prevent further atrocities by the military, and advance a democratic Myanmar. The deteriorating humanitarian situation within Myanmar and also for refugees that had fled Myanmar, particularly the Rohingya community, was also a matter of concern for many speakers, who urged continuing support for these parties, as well as for the countries hosting and organizations supporting them. There was deep concern for the staggering numbers of displaced populations, which could have a destabilising effect on the region as a whole, and the international community was called upon to continue supporting the people of Myanmar in meeting their urgent humanitarian needs, both inside and outside national borders. A speaker pointed out that this was an internal affair of Myanmar, and that external pressure would only be counter-productive: the Human Rights Council and multilateral bodies should work to bridge differences between parties to the conflict to avoid creating further conflict. The Special Rapporteur misused his expert status, went beyond his mandate, and vilified legitimate trade between countries, going against the Code of Conduct of the Special Procedures, and should stop smearing and double standards, whilst working to stabilise the situation in Myanmar. Another speaker said the Special Rapporteur’s calls for the imposition of more unilateral coercive measures on Myanmar were rejected: the extreme politicisation of his mandate was reflected in the recommendations in his report, which were selective and based on uncorroborated information. They should be rejected, replaced with dialogue and understanding to encourage the political stability of the country. The Council should cease to use Special Procedure mandates against the countries of the Global South. Among the questions raised by speakers were: what other ways out did the Special Rapporteur see for a human rights crisis of this scale besides the Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ Five-point Consensus; how could the international community at this time best support the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all persons; how could the international community support the Special Rapporteur’s call to impose a comprehensive arms embargo and refer the situation in Myanmar to the International Criminal Court; what actions could the international community take to help prevent further atrocities by the military and promote accountability for human rights abuses; and how did the Special Rapporteur intend to implement the recommendations in his report, considering that sanctions could further exacerbate the already underfunded humanitarian response in Myanmar? Concluding Remarks THOMAS H. ANDREWS, Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, in concluding remarks, said he did not have the time to answer each and every question, but he wished to say to all that his door was open, he welcomed input and questions, even criticism. He had been asked by many what the United Nations could do to address the crisis most effectively: the Security Council passed a strong resolution in December, but more should be done, and it should take action, including an arms embargo, targeted economic sanctions, and that included reference to the International Criminal Court. It was for this reason that he recommended that States that were prepared to take such steps did so in coordination, strategically. Mr. Andrews said he had been criticised and questioned regarding some points, including the vilification of “normal weapons trade”. What he was vilifying was the murder of thousands of normal people, gross human rights violations, crimes against humanity and war crimes. The reasons these crimes were occurring was because the junta had the means to do so, the weapons and technology: the countries of the world should end that trade that was contributing and enabling these gross human rights violations. In his report, concerning those who had been forced to leave their homes and their country, he commended all nations who were hosting and caring for them, sheltering them, extending visas, facilitating resettlement, all of which were saving lives. However, more could be done and must be done. There was a grave humanitarian crisis inside and outside Myanmar, and the consequences of not funding these humanitarian response programmes were dire, which was unconscionable, a stain on the conscience of the international community: children and families must be saved. The millions inside Myanmar could not access humanitarian aid, but there were civil society organizations that could help them, although they lacked funding. He appealed to all to fund these critical, critical programmes that could save lives. He appreciated concerns and questions on whether he was within his mandate: this ongoing crisis included extreme human rights violations that were forcing hundreds of thousands of people across the border, and he believed that their plight should not just be the focus of his attention, but the duty of the Human Rights Council. It was his duty to shine a light on their situation, and his goal was to provide the Council with the information to address the grave human rights violations that were being perpetrated by the junta, which was not only within his mandate, but must be brought to the attention of the international community. Finally, he urged the international community to not recognise any so-called “elections” that the junta would hold. Interactive Dialogue with the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Iran Report Also before the Council is the report by the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Javaid Rehman (A/HRC/52/67). Presentation of the Report JAVAID REHMAN, Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Iran, said the report was being presented today amidst the most serious human rights violations in Iran over the past four decades. Mr. Rehman expressed admiration for millions of peace-loving Iranian women, men, girls and boys, who since September had challenged State authorities and joined peaceful protests in all the country’s provinces at the risk of their lives. The report thoroughly examined the circumstances of the death of Ms. Amini in the custody of Iranian morality police three days after her arrest for allegedly not complying with the country’s discriminatory dress code. Available evidence, including eyewitness testimonies and comments from reliable medical sources, established that Ms. Amini died on 16 September as a result of beatings by the State morality police. As per usual practice, State authorities denied any wrongdoing or misconduct on their part. None of the members of the morality police involved in the death of Ms. Amini had been held accountable. Mr. Rehman stressed that her death was not an isolated event but the latest in a long series of extreme violence against women and girls committed by the Iranian authorities. A month before the death of Ms. Amini, President Raisi signed a decree ordering further repressive measures for “improper hijab”. The responsibility of top senior officials in instigating this violence could not be ignored. Protesters, including children, were beaten to death. At least 527 people, including 71 children, were killed, and hundreds of protesters severely injured. From the very first days of protests, State authorities had tried to shut down all avenues of freedom of expression, with mass arbitrary arrests and detentions. Recently authorities recognised that over 22,000 people had been arrested. Dozens of human rights defenders, at least 600 students, 45 lawyers, 576 civil society activists, 170 women human rights defenders, at least 62 journalists, artists, academics were arbitrarily arrested and detained. Mr. Rehman was outraged that despite appeals by his mandate and by the international community, Iranian authorities had thus far executed at least four persons associated with protests after arbitrary, summary, and sham trials marred by torture allegations. At least 17 protestors had already been sentenced to death and more than 100 currently faced charges that carried the death penalty. Mr. Rehman remained deeply concerned at the continuing and exponentially increasing violations of human rights in the country. At least 500 persons, including two persons sentenced as children and 13 women, were executed in 2022, the highest number of executions in the past five years. Since January 2023, 143 persons had already been executed following grossly unfair trials. Mr. Rehman was equally alarmed at the continuing violence against women and girls, including coordinated chemical attacks throughout the country against schoolgirls which were repeatedly denied by the Government. The report to the Council in March 2022 and the current report firmly established the conclusion that there was an absence of accountability for serious human rights violations and for crimes under international law within the political, constitutional, and legal system of Iran. The scale and gravity of the violations committed by Iranian authorities pointed to the possible commission of international crimes, notably the crimes against humanity of murder, imprisonment, enforced disappearances, torture, rape and sexual violence, and persecution. In the absence of accountability at the domestic level, Mr. Rehman strongly advocated for the establishment of an independent international fact-finding mission and looked towards fully cooperating with it to ensure justice and accountability for victims of human rights violations. Statement by Country Concerned Iran, speaking as a country concerned, said advocacy for human rights was increasingly mistaken by some States and mandate-holders for unwarranted and egotistic purposes, abusing the human rights mechanisms to target certain States; they were void of any value for the protection of human rights. The Council’s mandate was best fulfilled by dialogue and cooperation, in line with non-selectivity and impartiality. The Council should stand away from stereotyping, and transform so that human rights were no longer used as a tool by some countries. The Special Rapporteur’s report, which read like a tragic novel, had been used by some Western media as an attempt to portray the situation of human rights in Iran. The Special Rapporteur was totally in disregard of his mandate, in his lack of impartiality, using biased language, and violating the Code of Conduct. The Iranian people had witnessed nearly three months of terrorist attacks and armed riots, but the Special Rapporteur did not even mention certain terrorist attacks, which left innocent people murdered, and did not mention armed attacks on people in certain provinces. He had ignored the release of prisoners, and was still asking for their release. Last year the Special Rapporteur on unilateral coercive measures had visited Iran, and had met with all governmental and non-governmental sectors, and her report explicitly touched upon the human rights violations of the Iranian people by these unilateral coercive measures - there was no mention of this in Mr. Rehman’s report. Discussion In the discussion, speakers among other things, commended the Special Rapporteur for his report. Since the death of Mahsa Amini in the custody of Iran’s so-called “Morality Police” six months ago, the world had witnessed a mass movement while Iran’s leadership had conducted a relentless and violent crackdown on the people of Iran. Many were profoundly worried by the violent response by the Iranian security forces to the peaceful protests that followed the killing of Mahsa Amini in police custody. Some speakers said it was important to renew the mandate while also supporting the work of the newly created Fact-Finding Mission, in the name of women, life, and freedom. For months, the brave people of Iran, especially women and girls, had been facing extreme and unjustified violence and crackdown by the Iranian authorities for exercising their right to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly. Speakers strongly condemned the use of violence, harassment and detentions against peaceful protesters. Perpetrators of torture, killings and violence, including sexual and gender-based violence, needed to be held accountable. Iran was urged to release all persons who were imprisoned or detained for exercising their right to peacefully protest. Speakers also raised concern at the reports of poisoning of thousands of children with gas in study centres. Some speakers said they strongly opposed the death penalty at all times and in all circumstances, calling upon Iranian authorities to impose an immediate moratorium on executions. The use of the death penalty against peaceful protesters who had been exercising their rights and fundamental freedoms was particularly deplorable. Speakers were appalled at the executions of four protestors by authorities with many more facing charges that may carry the death penalty. Concern was also expressed about the press freedom and safety of journalists in Iran. Journalists and media workers were being threatened, harassed and detained. Families of Iranians working for foreign media outlets were being intimidated and persecuted. Iran was called upon to release all arbitrarily detained persons, including journalists, media workers and their family members, and to ensure freedom of opinion and expression and access to information, both online and offline. Many speakers noted that it was regretful that the Special Rapporteur had been unable to visit the country. Iran was urged to fully cooperate with the Special Rapporteur, including by granting full and unhindered access to the country. Now, more than ever, the international community needed to strongly support the Special Rapporteur’s work documenting the Iranian Government’s human rights abuses. His support for the Fact-Finding Mission’s separate, vital work of uncovering the violence perpetrated against protestors was also appreciated. Some speakers expressed concern over the politically motivated and biased approach against Iran. Abusing the United Nations human rights mechanisms to single out and harass some nations that did not align with the hegemonic and geopolitical interests of the West had nothing to do with the genuine promotion and protection of human rights. This was a violation of the United Nations Charter and of international law. Speakers maintained that Iran was a strong supporter of multilateralism and had demonstrated commitment to human rights. Iran could handle its own domestic issues properly. It was hoped that the international community could respect the human rights development path independently chosen by the people of Iran. Of grave concern were the unilateral coercive measures imposed on Iran by other countries which had undermined the human rights of the Iranian people and gravely affected their rights. Speakers asked how the Special Rapporteur had engaged with the newly formed Fact-Finding Mission? How could accountability be ensured when the authorities were not willing to cooperate? What cooperation could there be between the Special Rapporteur’s mandate and the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on freedom and expression?..."
Source/publisher: United Nations Human Rights Council (Geneva)
Date of entry/update: 2023-03-20
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Title: Powerful Shan Party Refuses to Re-Register Under Myanmar Junta’s New Law
Description: "The Shan Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD) is one of the most powerful political parties in Myanmar. Founded in 1988, the SNLD has strongly rejected the poll proposed by Myanmar’s military regime. The party has decided not to register with the junta-appointed Union Election Commission (UEC), even though the new Political Parties Registration Law enacted by the regime in February requires political parties to re-register with the UEC within two months or face dissolution. The SNLD won 42 seats in the 2020 general election, the third-highest number of seats at the national level. It also won the second-highest number of seats in the 1990 general election. One previous SNLD party chair, Khun Tun Oo, resigned from the National Convention staged by the previous military regime to draft the 2008 Constitution. Khun Tun Oo and SNLD party secretary Sai Nyunt Lwin were also prosecuted and jailed on an array of charges including high treason for founding the Shan State Consultative Council in February 2005. The men were released in 2012. SNLD general secretary Sai Leik talked to The Irrawaddy recently about the party’s decision not to re-register with the junta-controlled UEC, and how the party will continue to play a role in Myanmar’s politics regardless. We heard that the SNLD will not re-register with the UEC. Why? Firstly, it is difficult to travel because of security concerns. We don’t have enough time to meet party members and seek their opinions. It is especially difficult to meet our party members in Kayah and Kachin states. Secondly, we don’t think it is fair to order political parties to re-register when the regime hasn’t announced the day the election will be held. So we have decided not to register. If you don’t re-register the SNLD faces being dissolved, its members possibly arrested and its assets potentially seized. How will the SNLD survive? They [the junta] haven’t enacted an election law. And they haven’t announced the day of the election. The military has extended its rule, using what it calls an extraordinary situation as an excuse. So can the election law be enacted in an extraordinary situation? If we don’t re-register, our registered status will be annulled. But we don’t think the regime will take punitive action for failing to register. There are previous cases. Formerly, they asked political parties to get their financial records audited. But some parties refused and [the military] didn’t do anything to them. Anyway, as they call it an extraordinary situation, we should expect unusual circumstances and we have braced ourselves for that. Some ethnic parties have re-registered, saying that elections are the foundation of democracy and that an election will help solve the current political crisis. What is your view on that? It is just an assumption that an election is the way out of the current political crisis. But the question is when and how that election will be held and what the election law says. Nothing is ready yet. And the most important thing is that we need to make sure that the election can bring about change. If the election can’t trigger positive change for the country, it can’t be the answer. Rather than one party hastily holding the election, it would be more meaningful if we all work together for a poll that is acceptable and beneficial to the Myanmar people and that the international community would recognize, and that meets the democratic norms and would definitely bring democratization to the country. How will the SNLD engage in politics if it is dissolved? We are a member of the Committee for Shan State Unity. We once issued a statement as a member. We have a policy for the peaceful co-existence of all people living in the Union. There are many things that we can do for the betterment for the country, either in the peace process or social welfare work or research work. We in the SNLD will always do our part for the interests of the country by representing and helping the people. We will continue to help the people..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update: 2023-03-20
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Title: Woman, 78, Killed, Hundreds of Homes Torched in Myanmar Junta Raid in Sagaing
Description: "Myanmar regime troops on Friday raided Tham Mar Yoe Village, Wetlet Township in the anti-regime stronghold of Sagaing Region, torching 269 houses and killing an elderly resident, according to residents. Around 110 junta troops raided the village in western Wetlet on Friday afternoon and torched the village for three hours despite not engaging with any resistance forces. “A 78-year-old woman who had earlier suffered a stroke took refuge in a building in the monastic compound and was killed by the fire,” said Bo Young Ni, the leader of G-Z Brothers Young Ni Force. Situated on the Shwebo-Monywa road, Tham Mar Yoe has more than 700 households. Currently, residents are returning to the village and clearing up the debris, according to a resident. “They torched the village while passing on the road. Not even the monastery was spared,” a resident said. Currently, shelter, palm leaves, rice, oil and other foodstuffs are urgently needed for the fire victims, according to the Wetlet Township People’s Strike Committee. The troops involved in the raid departed the village for the Ayadaw Township military base’s Training Unit Battalion 10 on six vehicles that evening. Later that evening, G-Z Brothers Young Ni Force used eight land mines to mount two attacks on troops in Ayadaw Township, killing four soldiers. “We attacked a military vehicle first. Then we attacked again when four soldiers got out of the car to clear the mine. It is certain that four were killed,” Bo Young Ni told The Irrawaddy. His claim couldn’t be independently verified. Wetlet Township is a resistance stronghold bordering Shwebo and Ayadaw townships, where armed attacks against the military council are frequent. Villages in those townships are frequently raided by regime troops, who routinely torch homes in the villages..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update: 2023-03-20
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Title: (၃၅)နှစ်မြောက် ချင်းတော်လှန်ရေးနေ့သို့ ပေးပို့သည့် သဝဏ်လွှာ
Description: "၁။ ယနေ့ကျရောက်သည့် (၃၅)နှစ်မြောက် ချင်းတော်လှန်ရေးနေ့တွင် ချင်းတိုင်းရင်းသား ညီအစ်ကိုမောင်နှမများနှင့်တကွ ပြည်သူများအားလုံး၏ မဆုတ်မနစ် ဇွဲသတ္တိကြီးမားစွာဖြင့် မတူကွဲပြားမှုများအား တူညီခွန်အားအဖြစ် အသုံးချ၍ အနာဂတ်ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီနိုင်ငံတော် သစ်သို့ လျှောက်လှမ်းရာ ခရီးလမ်းတွင် အာဏာရှင်စနစ် ချုပ်ငြိမ်းရေးအတွက် မိမိတို့၏ တည်ကြည် ခိုင်မာသော ယုံကြည်ချက်အား အမြန်ဆုံးအကောင်အထည်ဖော်ဆောင်နိုင်ပါစေကြောင်း ဆုတောင်း စကားပါးအပ်ပါသည်။ ၂။ ချင်းတိုင်းရင်းသားများသည် စုံလင်သော လူမျိုးစုများစွာဖြင့် စုစည်းတည်ရှိခဲ့ကြပြီး အမျိုးသားရေးစိတ်ဓာတ်ပြင်းထန်ကာ သမိုင်းတစ်လျှောက်တွင် သူ့ကျွန်မခံလိုစိတ်၊ နယ်ချဲ့ ဆန့်ကျင်ရေးစိတ်ဓာတ်များ ပြည့်ဝသည့် လူမျိုးများအဖြစ် မှတ်တမ်းတင်နိုင်ခဲ့ပါသည်။ အမျိုးသား တန်းတူညီမျှမှု၊ လွတ်လပ်ခွင့်နှင့် ကိုယ်ပိုင်ပြဋ္ဌာန်းခွင့်တို့အတွက် အာဏာရှင်အဆက်ဆက်အား ခုခံတွန်းလှန်ရင်းဖြင့် ၁၉၈၈ ခုနှစ်၊ မတ်လ (၂၀) ရက်နေ့တွင် ချင်းအမျိုးသားတပ်ဦးကို ဖွဲ့စည်း၍ တော်လှန်စစ်ကို ညီညွတ်စွာ စတင်ခဲ့သည်မှာ ယနေ့ (၃၅) နှစ် တိုင်ခဲ့ပြီ ဖြစ်ပါသည်။ ၃။ ခေတ်အဆက်ဆက် နှစ်ပေါင်းများစွာကြာ အာဏာရှင်စနစ်ဆိုးအား ဆန့်ကျင်ရန် တော်လှန်ရေးတိုက်ပွဲများတွင်သာမက ယခု နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေးတပ်ဦးတွင် ကဏ္ဍအသီးသီး၌ တက်ကြွစွာ စုစည်းလှုပ်ရှားပါဝင်ခဲ့ကြသည့် သွေးချင်းညီနောင် ချင်းတော်လှန်ရေး ခေါင်းဆောင် ကြီးများ၊ ချင်းမျိုးချစ်ကျောင်းသားလူငယ်များ၊ မတူညီသော နေရာဒေသများတွင် မှီတင်းနေထိုင် နေကြသော ချင်းတိုင်းရင်းသားများအားလုံး၏ ခိုင်မာတည်ကြည်သော တော်လှန်ရေးစိတ်ဓာတ်အား၊ ဒီမိုကရေစီလူထုလှုပ်ရှားမှုအင်အားနှင့် ကိုယ်ကျိုးစွန့် အသက်ပေးတာဝန်ထမ်းဆောင်မှု ခွန်အား တို့သည် လွန်စွာ ဂုဏ်ယူထိုက်သည်ကို ဖော်ပြလိုပါသည်။ ၄။ ချင်းတိုင်းရင်းသား ပြည်သူပြည်သားများအပါအဝင် မိမိတို့ဒီမိုက‌‌ရေစီ တော်လှန်ရေး အင်အားစုအားလုံး၏ ခိုင်မာသောစည်းလုံးညီညွတ်မှုခွန်အားဖြင့် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီနိုင်ငံတော် သစ်ဆီသို့ အတူတကွလျှောက်လှမ်းနိုင်မည့် ဤနွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေးအောင်ပွဲအား အခက်အခဲ အတားအဆီးများကြားမှ ရင်ဆိုင်ကျော်ဖြတ်နိုင်မည်ဟု လေးနက်စွာယုံကြည်လျက် (၃၅) နှစ်မြောက် ချင်းတော်လှန်ရေးနေ့သဝဏ်လွှာ အား ဂုဏ်ယူစွာ ပေးပို့အပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher: Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw
Date of entry/update: 2023-03-20
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Title: My Dangerous, Lonely Life in Myanmar’s Resistance
Description: "YANGON, Myanmar — When the military seized power in a coup on the morning of Feb. 1, 2021, I grabbed some clothes and other essentials and stumbled out onto the streets of Yangon. I haven’t returned home since. I lead a group of activists opposed to military rule of Myanmar, and I knew then that the soldiers would soon be coming for me. Since the coup, my colleagues and I have played cat and mouse with security forces in Yangon, Myanmar’s largest city. We organize nonviolent protests — small, quick demonstrations to remind the military that it is not in complete control and to give hope to our citizens. It’s a dangerous, lonely life. Nearly all of my time is spent hiding in safe houses — six of them so far. I’m 27 years old and have left my current apartment only a few brief times since July. It’s as if an impenetrable wall had been built, separating me from the world. I can’t go out to see the night sky or go to the market or visit friends. I spend much of my time in Zoom meetings planning street protests with colleagues in my organization, the University Students’ Unions Alumni Force, and other activists. To stay sane, I’ve taken up playing the guitar and force myself to walk around my tiny apartment for 20 minutes each day. Whenever I feel the urge to go outside and enjoy life, I think about how long it would be before I am arrested, how my arrest would affect the men and women fighting alongside me and how I would no longer be of any use to the resistance. The apartment is both sanctuary and prison. When friends and comrades are arrested, I grieve. But I have to quickly turn my attention to whether their arrest puts me at risk. I change my cellphone’s SIM card and review interactions with those friends for any incriminating information that military interrogators might squeeze out of them. We have protocols in place for this, useless information that can be given up to divert authorities or buy time. But what if they break my comrade? The eyes of military intelligence are everywhere, sometimes disguised as fruit sellers or trishaw drivers. So only five people know where I am hiding, people who have either hidden with me or who supply me with groceries, cigarettes and books. I view this not as fate but as my own choice — it feels less depressing that way — and I am consoled by my belief in what I’m doing. Myanmar’s people have been held captive for too long, first by the British and then, after a period of democracy after the country’s independence in 1948, by a succession of military regimes since 1962. In 2015, a democratic government won power in elections after a military-led reform process. The military, known as the Tatmadaw, retained significant influence, but it seemed a new era had dawned. Until the 2021 coup. I’m resolved to fight, but I still miss the normal life I once enjoyed in Yangon, my home city. I’m here, and yet I’m not. I yearn for the simple pleasure of a cup of milk tea in a tea shop. Tea shops are part of Myanmar’s DNA, where people catch up with one another, share news or simply contemplate life. My parents, who worked hard to send me to university, used to run a tea shop, and I loved working there. But in 2015, while a college student, I was arrested for protesting the military’s retention of significant powers that stood in the way of democratic development. By the time I was released the next year, my parents had closed the shop. They couldn’t continue without my help. After the coup, my parents also went into hiding, fearing that the military would arrest them to get at me. It was the right move; some of my friends’ parents have been arrested for their children’s stance against the coup. I know where my parents are, but I can’t visit or tell them where I am. In Myanmar the price for political activism is paid by the entire family. Resisting the regime gets more difficult every week. Right after the coup, hundreds of thousands of people took to the streets in protest. But the junta waged a brutal crackdown. So far, the military has killed nearly 3,000 people, arrested more than 17,000 and committed appalling human rights abuses. The real numbers are probably much higher. Thousands have taken up arms against the military, which has responded by massacring civilians and conducting airstrikes that have killed children. Deadly force, including driving vehicles into crowds, has been used against nonviolent protesters. As a result, what started as hundreds of people joining our flash protests in the months after the coup has dwindled to merely dozens. But we carry on. Our scouts identify good locations — bustling public places with ample escape routes to safe houses. We carry banners and march, chanting against the junta. Many street vendors and other bystanders voice their support, but they must be careful or risk having their market stalls destroyed or looted or being punished in other ways by security forces. It’s all over in minutes, and our activists melt away. Last year I boarded a bus in Yangon and asked passengers to follow me in reciting a pledge to seek justice for prominent activists whom the military had recently executed and to fight for justice and equality in Myanmar. They did, raising their hands in the three-fingered opposition salute. Video of the scene was posted online. I had to change safe houses twice soon afterward. The risks are enormous. A colleague was arrested en route to one of our meetings. Soon after, the military forced him to call us, trying to bait me and others into showing up to a phony meeting. Through code words, my colleague made us aware that he was in custody. We went immediately to his safe house and destroyed anything sensitive: his laptop, phone, camera, memory cards and documents. The military raided the apartment shortly after that. He was soon forced to call us again. This time we put his girlfriend on the phone, thinking it might be her last chance to hear his voice. He pleaded, “Honey, please show up this time,” but we knew he didn’t mean it. He had planned to ask her to marry him a few days later. Instead, he was headed into the hell of military custody and interrogation. On the day of the coup two years ago, I saw anger, fear, sorrow and uncertainty on people’s faces as they struggled to comprehend what it meant for them and their country. Today, people barely recognize their lives; severe economic hardship, sky-high inflation, increasing crime and other suffering touch countless families. But we have internalized the shock and are determined to write a happy ending to this dark episode. Now, in our darkest hour, we must be courageous. We cannot lose hope. We won’t go back to the old Myanmar. We will create a free and equal society for all, including the Rohingya and other ethnic minorities who have suffered for far too long — a Myanmar based on a federal constitution, equality and compassion and whose values inspire the world.
Source/publisher: "The New York Times" (USA)
Date of entry/update: 2023-03-19
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Title: Atrocities and Reinforcements: Myanmar Regime Tries to Control Resistance Strongholds
Description: "Warning: Graphic Content Myanmar’s junta is deploying massive reinforcements as it steps up its atrocities during its scorched earth campaign aimed at retaking control of the resistance strongholds of Sagaing Region and Chin and Kayah states. The military regime has lost control of most of the rural areas in Sagaing, Chin and Kayah, while its forces and officials in the towns also face frequent attacks from resistance forces. Special task forces deployed by the junta have committed war crimes and crimes against humanity against both resistance fighters and civilians including massacres, the beheadings of victims and the use of sexual violence, while also employing indiscriminate air and artillery strikes and looting and burning villages. The regime atrocities are aimed at deterring civilians from becoming involved in or supporting the resistance movement. The much greater use of atrocities has been reported recently in Sagaing, as well as Kayah and southern Shan states, and comes after the military regime imposed martial law in February in 40 more townships across four regions and four states including Sagaing and Kayah and Chin states. Since martial law was imposed, an estimated 5,000 junta reinforcements have been sent to Sagaing and Chin and Kayah States, the strongholds of resistance to the military dictatorship, according to local People’s Defense Forces (PDF) and ethnic armed organizations. Military observers said the regime’s deployment of more troops seemed to be a desperate attempt to regain control of the resistance strongholds. Thet Htar Maung, a local military analyst, said he expected more intense fighting in Chin and Kayah states, because the resistance fighters in those regions are better-trained. “The fighting will be bloodier and more frequent,” he said. Since February 23, intense clashes have been reported in many townships in Kayah State and the neighboring townships of Pinlaung and Pekon in southern Shan State. PDFs and the Karenni Nationalities Defense Force (KNDF), the Karenni Army and the Pa-O National Defense Force have been fighting up to 12 Myanmar military columns totaling 2,000 soldiers which have been raiding villages and the forest. Another 1,000 junta reinforcements have been sent from Mandalay to Sagaing Region in recent days, where several military columns are raiding and torching villages daily in a number of townships. Fierce clashes have also taken place in Chin State in western Myanmar over the last week. A combined force of fighters from the Chin National Army (CNA) and Chinland Defense Force (CDF) has been battling junta reinforcements sent from Sagaing’s Kale Township and traveling in a convoy of 30 vehicles, including two armored cars, along the Tedim-Falam Road, according to Salai Htet Ni, the spokesperson of the Chin National Front, the CNA’s political wing. Fighting also broke out on Thursday in Mindat Township, southern Chin State, when CNA and CDF fighters attacked a regime convoy of 80 vehicles sent from Magwe Region and traveling the Mindat-Kyaukhtu Road. Days before the arrival of the convoy, five junta fighter jets conducted airstrikes between Magwe Region’s Kyaukhtu and Mindat without any provocation, said Salai Htet Ni. Terrifying escalation of junta atrocities On March 11, Myanmar junta troops massacred 22 civilians including three Buddhist monks during a raid on Nam Name Village in Pinlaung Township, southern Shan State. Having occupied a hill near the village on March 9, the junta soldiers raided Nam Name on March 11 while also shelling the village. The following day, resistance fighters found the bodies of 22 people, including three monks, who had been shot dead at the village monastery. The resistance said that 11 more village residents who had sheltered at the monastery during the raid are also missing. Pro-regime Telegram channel Ko Thet shared photos of some of the victims, describing them as PDF and KNDF fighters killed by regime soldiers in Nam Name. Blood can be seen dripping from the victims in the photos. Regime spokesperson Major General Zaw Min Tun said via-military owned media that PDF fighters were captured in the raid along with weapons. The Ko Thet Telegram channel has since removed the photos of the victims and accused the KNDF and PDFs of massacring them. In an online press conference held on March 16 by the human rights ministry of Myanmar’s civilian National Unity Government, Dr. Ye Zaw, a doctor in charge of Kayah State’s medics, said that he had seen the bodies of the Nam Name victims and that most of the victims had been shot multiple times. Some of the victims had broken limbs and head injuries, indicating that they had been tortured before being killed. Another junta special task force of around 100 soldiers killed and beheaded 20 resistance members and massacred 16 civilian detainees, including three woman who were raped before being killed, during a series of raids from February 23 to March 15 in Ayadaw, Myinmu and Sagaing townships in Sagaing Region. On Monday, a Myanmar military detachment shot dead a resistance detainee and beheaded another during an operation in Sagaing’s Khin-U Township, according to local sources. Regarding the regime’s escalating offensives, the spokesperson for the Karenni military central information committee, Khu Nye Reh, said that the resistance would fight back as best as they can. “There has to be defense if there’s an offensive and people will have to suffer. But I want to encourage them not to feel bad and to stay with us till the regime is toppled and we get the federal democracy we all dream of,” he said..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update: 2023-03-17
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Title: National Unity Government Statement (5/2023) - “Statement on the terrorist Myanmar military council’s preparations on holding an illegal sham election”
Description: "1. On 1st March 2021, the military council led by Min Aung Hlaing, who staged a coup d’état, was declared a terrorist organisation in announcement 10/2021 of the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH), Myanmar’s sole legitimate Parliamentarians, who were conferred legislative authority by Myanmar’s 2020 free, fair, and democratic elections. Subsequently, the sole democratically elected government of Myanmar, the National Unity Government (NUG), the people’s rightful government announced on 7th July 2021 that the military council and all organisations associated with it are deemed terrorist organisations. 2. In the two-years of the Spring Revolution, the Myanmar military council led by Min Aung Hlaing has carried out numerous atrocities which have amounted to brutally killing 3,124 civilians including monks, elderly people, women, children, and disabled people. There have been more than sixty-four massacres committed by the terrorist Military Council in Myanmar where a total of 766 civilians have been brutally killed. Not only there is evidence that the terrorist military council in Myanmar and its lackeys are a terrorist group that has committed and continue to commit crimes all over the nation, in all the states and divisions, they are also guilty of war crimes, crimes against humanity, mass murder, cruel and callous destruction of property and targeting civilians, they are also being prosecuted in some cases in line with international law. 3. As the group has been deemed a terrorist organisation and prosecuted under international law, all the directives, decrees and laws that they have passed in this post-coup period are deemed null and void. And all the organisations that have served under this unlawful group are also deemed terrorist groups. In addition, the populace openly refuses to accept their rule and in defiance continue to hold demonstrations to this day. 4. Accordingly, the election law that the terrorist military council has legislated is not and has never been valid and the election commission, such as it exists following the coup, is also deemed a terrorist organisation. 5. As the election law is null and void and as the election commission is considered to be a terrorist organisation, registering with election commission, for whatever reason it is done, is in essence giving credence to the repression and killings by the terrorist military council against the wishes of the people and siding with them thereby becoming one of their lackeys. 6. If the terrorist military council illegally goes ahead with its proposed sham election, it would result in fraudulent results ending with elected members who do not legitimately represent the people. Likewise, there will emerge false and illegitimate government organisations that do not represent the people but are the puppets and puppet organisations of the terrorist military council. 7. The NUG pledges its loyalty to the Spring Revolution and in accordance with the peoples’ wishes will take action against these illegitimate organisations and groups with the power and the legal authority bestowed upon the NUG by the people..."
Source/publisher: National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update: 2023-03-17
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Title: National Unity Government: Ministry of Home Affairs and Immigration Statemennt (8/2023) - Statement on Travel Authorization
Description: "1. The National Unity Government is the legitimate people’s government formed by the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, comprising elected members of Pyidaungsu Hluttaw. 2. As the terrorist military council unjustly seized power from the people by means of force, the entire population across the country has taken up arms and joined the Spring Revolution in accordance with their right to self-protection. 3. As the Spring Revolution marks the 2nd anniversary, the National Unity Government has gained control over certain territories through the leadership of the people and battles fought by the revolutionary forces. 4. It has been known far and wide that the ongoing inhumane atrocities committed by the terrorist military council have resulted in countless loss of lives and properties of the people of Myanmar. Therefore, there is an urgent need for humanitarian assistance for the affected people. 5. The National Unity Government has been providing as much humanitarian aids as possible to the people for their losses due to the atrocities committed by the terrorist military council. Hence, we urge all international organizations to cooperate with us in providing assistance to the people of Myanmar. 6. In order to ensure effective provision of humanitarian assistance to those in need and to ensure security for aid workers, we strongly urge all local and international non-governmental organizations and civil society organizations to seek prior authorization from the respective ministries of the National Unity Government before taking surveys, implementing projects, and traveling through or within the areas administered by the National Unity Government..."
Source/publisher: Ministry of Home Affairs and Immigration - Myanmar
Date of entry/update: 2023-03-17
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Title: More than two years on, impact of Myanmar military coup ‘devastating’
Description: "Violence resulting from the brutal military coup is continuing inside Myanmar on an “alarming scale” the UN Special Envoy told a meeting of the General Assembly on Thursday. Now in its third year, Noeleen Heyzer said that “the impact of the military takeover on the country and its people, has been devasting.” She thanked Member States for renewing the resolution for the continuation of her mandate and support for an “all-stakeholder approach in promoting a Myanmar-led process, reflective of the will of the people”, to end the suffering and death. Intensified violence On 1 February, she said the military had extended its State of Emergency, and intensified the use of force to include more aerial bombing, the burning of civilian homes, and other “grave human rights violations to maintain its grip on power.” She described the spread of Martial Law to 47 different townships, and the empowering of citizens deemed loyal to the regime, by allowing them to carry guns. Atrocities, beheadings, and the mutilation of rebel fighters’ bodies have been recorded, together with escalating violence in ethnic areas. “We just received reports that 28 civilians were killed by the military at a monastery in Southern Shan state this weekend.” Implacable resistance She said that despite the brutal repression, widespread and popular resistance continues, by any means possible, across much of Myanmar. “A generation that benefited from Myanmar’s previous opening up, especially the youth, is now disillusioned, facing chronic hardship and many feeling they have no choice but to take up arms to fight military rule. Heavy fighting has spread to areas previously unaffected by conflict, she added, putting more civilian lives at risk and further complicating humanitarian operations to save lives amid the fighting. Collective punishment She said a “four cuts” strategy put in place by the regime, “which seeks to block access to food, funds, information and recruits – continues to target civilians as collective punishment.” Ms. Heyzer said the opposition National Unity Government was continuing to point to the brutality of military forces, while also warning resistance militias not to themselves, “perform inhumane acts.” “With both sides intent on prevailing by force, there is no prospect for a negotiated settlement”, The Special Envoy added. 17.6 million need assistance The conflict has meant humanitarian needs have risen steadily, with 17.6 million Burmese in need of humanitarian assistance, more than 1.6 million internally displaced, and an estimated 55,000 civilian buildings destroyed since the coup. She said it was critical, that a Myanmar-led process, reflective of all voices – especially women, youth and minorities – be allowed to decide the country’s future “Sustainable solutions for the Rohingya people must be built into the design of a peaceful, inclusive and democratic Myanmar”, she added. “Their voices have to be integral to decisions about their own future.” Rohingya refugees She reminded ambassadors that more than five years since the forced mass exodus across the border into Bangladesh by the mainly-Muslim Rohingya, the hundreds of thousands of refugees continue to face extreme hardships. Earlier this month, another massive fire ripped through a Rohingya refugee camp in Cox’s Bazar, affecting 15,000 and the World Food Programme (WFP) has announced it needs to reduce rations for refugees this month due to a severe funding shortfall. Ms. Heyzer urged Member States to support the 2023 Joint Response Plan for the Rohingya Humanitarian Crisis, which stands at $876 million, adding that “now is not the time for donor fatigue.” ‘Unprecedented solidarity’ She concluded by saying that despite tragedy and deep uncertainty in Myanmar, “there is unprecedented solidarity that has emerged in the country. “I know that this General Assembly will renew its commitment supporting the will of the people, including the Rohingya, to build a peaceful, just and democratic union of Myanmar for all.”..."
Source/publisher: UN News Centre
Date of entry/update: 2023-03-16
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Title: Remarks by Noeleen Heyzer, Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Myanmar at the General Assembly
Description: "Madame Vice-President, Distinguished Delegates, It is an honour to share my reflection on Myanmar’s urgent crisis and my efforts as the Special Envoy of the UN Secretary-General on Myanmar. I am grateful that the General Assembly in December 2022 renewed its resolution for my role and continued support to my all-stakeholder approach in promoting a Myanmar-led process reflective of the will of the people. In the resolution, Member States called for an immediate end to violence, safe and unimpeded humanitarian access, release of political prisoners and the need to find durable solutions for the Rohingya. It underlines “the need for a peaceful solution for Myanmar, through an inclusive and peaceful dialogue between all parties, in accordance with the will and interests of the people of Myanmar.” Madame Vice-President, In its third year, the impact of the military takeover on the country and its people has been devastating. Violence continues at an alarming scale. On 1 February, the military extended the State of Emergency and intensified its use of force, including aerial bombing, the burning of civilian structures and other grave human rights violations to maintain its grip on power. Martial Law has been extended to 47 townships and the regime has revived a 1977 law allowing civilians it deems “loyal” to carry firearms. In Sagaing Region, the Bamar heartland and once a key recruiting ground for the military, there are recent reports of further atrocities including beheadings and mutilation of People’s Defence Forces (PDF) combatants. Violence continues to escalate in several of the country’s ethnic areas. We just received reports that 28 civilians were killed by the military at a monastery in Southern Shan state this weekend. I also recently met with ethnic Chin leaders who shared that Martial Law is currently in effect in eight out of nine townships in Chin State. They highlighted an increase in airstrikes and indiscriminate shelling targeting civilian areas and displacement sites. People on the ground have implored, “Please, the people are asking countries not to give military arms that are killing us and intensifying the conflict.” Despite brutal repression, widespread popular resistance to the military continues by non-violent and violent means, across much of the country. A generation that benefited from Myanmar’s previous opening up, especially the youth, is now disillusioned, facing chronic hardship and many feeling they have no choice but to take up arms to fight military rule. Heavy fighting has spread to areas previously unaffected by conflict, putting more civilian lives at risk and further complicating humanitarian operations delivering livesaving assistance to the people of Myanmar. The regime’s “four cuts” strategy – which seeks to block access to food, funds, information and recruits – continues to target civilians as collective punishment. The military’s Five-Point Roadmap – its exit strategy – which is supposed to conclude with elections, has been far from a pathway out of the crisis it has created. Despite stated intentions to deliver relief and build conditions for peace, the military has passed an “Organization Registration Law” and “Political Parties Law” that hinder humanitarian operations and shrink democratic space. The regime has accused resistance forces of violence while the National Unity Government (NUG) continues to point to the military’s brutality. The NUG has also condemned killings by the PDFs warning resistance groups not to perform inhumane acts. With both sides intent on prevailing by force, there is no prospect for a negotiated settlement. Humanitarian needs are rising across Myanmar as a result. As of today, 17.6 million people are in need of humanitarian assistance, more than 1.6 million are internally displaced and an estimated 55,000 civilian structures have been destroyed since February 2021. At least 29 per cent of households are facing moderate or severe food insecurity with conflict areas worst affected. Myanmar’s most vulnerable, including Rohingya and other ethnic minorities, the displaced, and women and children, are most gravely impacted. The cost in human suffering will multiply and the political, human rights, humanitarian and socioeconomic crisis will intensify if urgent action is not taken. We must send a strong signal that violence must end and support for democratic voices strengthened to help empower those seeking to chart a way for a peaceful future. Madame Vice-President, The Secretary-General and I have made clear that the military’s proposed elections in the absence of inclusive political dialogue and conditions that permit citizens to freely exercise their political rights without fear or intimidation risk exacerbating the violence. There is no public trust in the regime, whose interest is seen as consolidating its control by making a transition from emergency rule to a longer-term military-backed government. The arbitrary arrests and detention of democratically elected political leaders, civil society actors and journalists continue unabated. While severely underreported, women detainees increasingly face sexual harassment and violence. Madame Vice-President, It is critical that the country’s future is decided by the people through a Myanmar-led process, reflective of all voices especially women, youth and minorities, to ensure the needs of all communities are addressed. Sustainable solutions for the Rohingya people must be built into the design of a peaceful, inclusive and democratic Myanmar. Their voices have to be integral to decisions about their own future. More than five years since the forced mass exodus from Rakhine State, the Rohingya are persecuted and stateless, and continue to suffer extreme hardship, living in difficult conditions and facing tremendous challenges. Earlier this month, another massive fire ripped through a Rohingya refugee camp in Cox’s Bazar, affecting 15,000 people. The World Food Programme (WFP) has announced it needs to reduce rations for Rohingya refugees this month due to a severe funding shortfall amid competing global crises, issuing an urgent call for 125 million dollars to avoid the cut. For the 2023 Joint Response Plan for the Rohingya Humanitarian Crisis, the United Nations and partners have appealed for 876 million dollars. I urge Member States to redouble support to meet this extreme need. Now is not the time for donor fatigue. Madame Vice-President, I take this important opportunity to thank the Government of Bangladesh for showing humanity and immense generosity in carrying disproportionate responsibility in hosting over 1 million Rohingya refugees for more than five years. I also heed Bangladesh’s clear message that the current situation is not sustainable. 2022 was a deadly year for thousands of Rohingya who risked their lives in dangerous sea and land journeys. These increased by 360 per cent between 2021 and 2022 in the absence of progress in addressing the root causes of marginalization guided by the recommendations of the Advisory Commission on Rakhine State. Since my last report to the General Assembly, a humanitarian ceasefire in Rakhine State between the Arakan Army (AA) and Myanmar Armed Forces (MAF) has led to some improvements in humanitarian access in Rakhine. Access to northern Rakhine remains restricted, however, and the situation of the Rohingya remains precarious. Taking advantage of the ceasefire, the State Administration Council (SAC) is preparing for the return of Rohingya refugees and IDPs. I fully support the General Assembly’s call that the return and relocation of displaced persons is carried out in accordance with international standards and best practices. Return cannot be the mere act of closing camps or moving people. It must be a process that achieves durable solutions and guarantees the safety and wellbeing of the population concerned. Issues such as citizenship, freedom of movement, land ownership and access to education, schools and livelihoods must be properly addressed. During my visit to Bangladesh last year, the Rohingya made it clear they want to be engaged directly in decision-making. They feel their exclusion from discussions and decisions about their future has entrenched their marginalization. It is imperative that sustainable solutions for the Rohingya people are integral to Myanmar-led solutions towards a peaceful, democratic and inclusive future. Madame Vice-President, In December, the Security Council adopted an unprecedented resolution on Myanmar, which stressed the importance of close coordination between the UN and ASEAN Special Envoys to address the Myanmar crisis. Three days ago, Indonesia’s Foreign Minister and I briefed the Security Council reinforcing this cooperation between ASEAN, the UN and international partners. We stressed that the people of Myanmar must see concrete progress in the ASEAN Five-Point Consensus, namely de-escalation of violence and unimpeded humanitarian aid towards alleviating the suffering of all communities. The Security Council resolution complements the resolution of the General Assembly and is an opportunity to further develop a coherent international response to the crisis, promoting a Myanmar-led process reflective of the will of the people, the delivery of humanitarian assistance without discrimination, respect for human rights, addressing the root causes of the Rohingya crisis, and to work towards ending violence in all forms. As highlighted by the General Assembly and the Security Council, cooperation with regional organizations such as ASEAN, the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and the European Union is essential and close coordination with these organizations and their respective Envoys, as called for by this Assembly, constitutes a vital part of my work. Madame Vice-President, Despite the grim situation with ongoing challenges, there are clear areas where we can try to make some meaningful progress. In recent interviews with Rohingya mothers, young women and youth rescued during precarious sea journeys, they all had a single message – “we want a future and education.” Education is a powerful tool to transform lives, avoid a “lost generation” and enable the Rohingya to become leaders and contributors upon their voluntary and sustainable return to Myanmar. I deeply appreciate my crucial partnership with the OIC and its Special Envoy in our collaboration to seek practical solutions to the Rohingya crisis, including our initial discussions during my recent visit to Jeddah on the possibility of upscaling education for the Rohingya. Accountability remains essential, and I continue to remain in close contact with the Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights, the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar and the Independent Investigative Mechanism on Myanmar (IIMM). Madame Vice-President, In delivering my mandate, I will continue to focus on reducing the suffering of the people of Myanmar through concrete initiatives and based on continued close engagement with relevant partners and stakeholders, including affected communities. At the request of Myanmar actors, including key ethnic armed organizations, the NUG and humanitarian civil society organizations, I have supported their efforts to establish and convene an Inclusive Humanitarian Forum (IHF), which aims to open up operational space to deliver humanitarian aid through all available channels. The Forum could comprise core group of Member States, notably Myanmar’s neighboring countries and other regional actors, to engage inclusively in seeking a comprehensive assessment of ground realities and identify ways to overcome obstacles for operational actors to more effectively reach those in need. My discussions on the IHF continue to advance, and the Myanmar stakeholders have established a Joint Secretariat that also includes civil society representatives. Already, the IHF discussions with local actors have proven to be an important vehicle driving constructive discussions and building greater solidarity and coherence. I have been working with Indonesia as the new ASEAN Chair. Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi and I are in close cooperation. I have discussed with her the urgency of concrete progress on the ASEAN Five-Point Consensus to contribute to a conducive environment towards the path of national reconciliation. We have also discussed the possibility of a regional framework to protect the Rohingya and all refugees from Myanmar. I echo the call of the Secretary-General to ASEAN leaders at their November Summit to maintain open borders and provide protection and assistance to refugees from Myanmar, in line with the humanitarian and non-political nature of asylum, so that no refugee is forced to return to unsafe conditions in Myanmar. I look forward to visiting Jakarta to further advance our collaboration. Madame Vice-President, It is important we continue to advance the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda on Myanmar, empowering women and youth as change agents. We must amplify their voices and utilize the expertise of those on the ground, listening to them to understand their struggles, and ensure women play leading roles in bringing about positive change to their communities and country. I welcome Member States’ support as I plan to organize a roundtable on Myanmar “Envisioning the Future through Women’s Eyes” ahead of the Security Council Open Debate on WPS later this year, which I hope will be an opportunity to amplify the voices of women leaders on the ground and their important work. Madame Vice-President, Despite the tragedies and deep uncertainty in Myanmar, there is unprecedented solidarity that has emerged in the country. People, especially women and youth across communities, are working together to address old divides along ethnic and religious lines. They are shaping the country’s internal dynamics and politics to reset Myanmar’s democracy, human rights and governance deficit. I know that this General Assembly will renew its commitment supporting the will of the people, including the Rohingya, to build a peaceful, just and democratic union of Myanmar for all. Thank you..."
Source/publisher: United Nations
Date of entry/update: 2023-03-16
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