Human Rights and international relations
Individual Documents
Description:
"Key Event Details
Location of Incident: Hsawng Phwe Hospital (ဆောင်းဖွေးဆေးရုံ), Pekon Township (ဖယ်ခုံမြို့နယ်), Shan State (ရှမ်းပြည်နယ်) [19.669828, 96.889449]
Date/Time of Incident:
25 April 2023 around 1300 local time
Alleged Perpetrator(s) and/or Involvement:
Myanmar Air Force (MAF)
Summary of Investigation:
On 25 April 2023, reportedly around 1300 local time, there were claims of an airstrike in Pekon that affected a local hospital and a nearby internally-displaced people (IDP) camp.
Myanmar Witness verified damage to a medical facility, including damage consistent with an possible air attack.
Pro and anti-military media appear to agree that the military attacked the area, however pro-military sources claim that the attack took place due to People’s Defence Force (PDF) personnel hiding in the area.
Myanmar Witness also verified one injured individual in a nearby IDP camp.
Summary
According to multiple pro-democracy news sources, including Khit Thit Media and MeKong News, the Myanmar military are alleged to have conducted an airstrike close to Hsawng Phwe Hospital, a medical facility in southern Shan state. The attack allegedly impacted civilians in the area, injuring three people including a nurse.
Radio Free Asia has claimed that a military Mi-35 attack helicopter was responsible for the damage, but local Karenni Nationalities Defense Force (KNDF) media stated that a fighter jet was used. People Media, a pro-military media outlet, states that the airstrike was conducted because local PDF and Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP) members were present at this location. Myanmar Witness has been unable to verify this claim, but has verified damage to a medical facility in the area and at least one injured individual in a nearby IDP camp. The attack represents a steady escalation in the use of air power against civilians that has been addressed in the recent report Eyes on the Skies, and is being actively monitored by Myanmar Witness.
Myanmar Witness has been able to verify:
The location of a damaged medical facility, likely caused by an airstrike after further analysis of the damage caused.
Medical equipment in the structure, suggesting it was being used as a medical facility.
The location of a refugee camp nearby.
The location of at least one person in the refugee camp, an older woman, who sustained injuries to the head.
Currently unidentified munitions geolocated to the same area of the potential airstrike; one of the munition fragments allegedly located in the area of the attack could be air-delivered, and is likely associated with the incident.
Myanmar Witness is actively monitoring:
Claims that the military were involved in the attack and which groups are specifically implicated - Myanmar Witness hasyet to verify user-generated content (UGC) of an aircraft potentially involved. However, the use of aircraft suggests military responsibility, as the only group with access to such military assets.
Claims that more than the one individual already identified were injured during the attack.
Investigation Walkthrough
The military are alleged to have attacked an area in Pekon with airstrikes on 25 April 2023, resulting in the destruction of a medical facility and the injury of civilians in a nearby IDP camp..."
Source/publisher:
Myanmar Witness
Date of publication:
2023-05-02
Date of entry/update:
2023-05-02
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Armed conflict in Burma - attacks on civilians, Human Rights and international relations
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pdf
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Description:
"Gil Francis Arevalo
This article explores factors affecting the overall integration and mainstreaming of the response-wide accountability to affected people (AAP) in Myanmar since the internal conflict escalated in 2021. The military seized control in 2021, resulting in the violent crackdown on protests against the de facto government, displacing nearly 1.2 million people in the process.
Understanding longstanding barriers
From August to November 2022, in partnership with the subnational implementing and operational partners of the Protection, Camp Coordination/Camp Management and Shelter clusters, a series of localised AAP capacity-building sessions, community consultations and toolsvalidations were conducted in the following critical areas: Lashio (Shan North), Myitkyina (Kachin), and Taunggyi (Shan).
Due to access and security issues, an online contextualised training was provided to the Northeast Region, which includes local partners from Chin, Sagaing, and Magway.CSOssupporting the subnational protection coordination mechanism in the Northeast Region conducted various community consultations in geographically isolated areas and stressed the gaps in dealing with feedback and making the feedback system more responsive.
Among the general feedback received is that while the humanitarian community in Myanmar may have made efforts to advance AAP in 2022, including the establishment of the national AAP working group, a collective AAP mechanism with a responsive system has not been rolled out to at-risk communities and affected populations in a systematic, predictable and inclusive manner. Despite the creation of a ‘collective’ AAP workplan and several agencies investing in small projects to improve the process, people in need still have very little influence over the design of humanitarian interventions. Even the multi-sectoral needs assessment (MSNA) conducted in 2022 under the Myanmar Humanitarian Fundwas criticised by implementing partners for not sufficiently consulting persons with disabilities, people with special needs and other vulnerable groups of affected people. The inclusion of some accountability questions in the assessment itself was characterised as an afterthought or part of a tick-box exercise to ensure there were AAP components in the assessment.
Adding to this is the unnecessary pressure of adapting and translating into Burmese various global guidelines, protocols, and other technical components on AAP. Contextualising these to address both immediate lifesaving needs and those that arise as people’s circumstances change, takes time. More time is lost in bureaucratic processes: for example, each agency within the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) has its own interpretation of what constitutes collective AAP, resulting in a disjointed approach. This is particularly egregious given that local actors are mostly excluded from providing crucial input, so international agencies end up coordinating AAP in Myanmar. This also means that local actors have less access to funding. The final straw is that this fragmentation exists alongside a genuine demand for AAP that far exceeds the supply, resulting in significant gaps in coverage..."
Source/publisher:
ODI - Humanitarian Practice Network
Date of publication:
2023-05-02
Date of entry/update:
2023-05-02
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
The discussion on humanitarian assistance to Burma, Human Rights and international relations
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Sub-title:
Statement on Meeting with Mr Ban Ki-moon
Description:
"1. Deputy Minister U Moe Zaw Oo of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the National Unity Government of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar had a virtual meeting with Mr Ban Ki-moon, Deputy Chair of the Elders and former Secretary-General of the United Nations on 27th April 2023.
2. The meeting centred around Mr Ban Ki-moon’s recent visit to Myanmar and involved a productive exchange of perspectives on how to effectively move forward to address the current crisis facing Myanmar.
3. In the meeting, Deputy Minister U Moe Zaw Oo expressed his appreciation for the insights shared by Mr Ban Ki-moon, particularly on the significance of finding “a path to an end to violence” and “the importance of all parties playing a role in securing a lasting solution, including the National Unity Government”. Despite Mr Ban Ki-moon’s sincere intentions for his recent visit to Myanmar, Deputy Minister expressed his concern that the junta may seek to exploit this visit for their own advantage. Accordingly, he requested that any further visits to Myanmar be made in consultation with important stakeholders in Myanmar, including the National Unity Government. Deputy Minister also pointed out that the military junta has no right to hold elections and that elections should be conducted according to the newly drafted constitution that is acceptable to all stakeholders and to all ethnic groups in Myanmar. Furthermore, Deputy Minister underscored the need for more coordinated pressure and sanctions from the international community on the military junta which has failed to abide by the ASEAN Five-Point Consensus and the Security Council Resolution 2669.
4. The meeting concluded with an agreement to establish a collaborative working relationship to discuss potential pathways towards resolving the ongoing crisis in Myanmar..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Myanmar - NUG
Date of publication:
2023-04-30
Date of entry/update:
2023-04-30
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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pdf
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28.05 KB
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Sub-title:
NUG နိုင်ငံခြားရေးဒုတိယဝန်ကြီး နှင့် မစ္စတာ ဘန်ကီမွန်း တွေ့ဆုံခဲ့မှုနှင့်စပ်လျဉ်း၍ သတင်းထုတ်ပြန်ချက်
Description:
"၁။ ပြည်ထောင်စုသမ္မတမြန်မာနိုင်ငံတော်၊ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၊ နိုင်ငံခြားရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာန၊ ဒုတိယဝန်ကြီးဦးမိုးဇော်ဦးသည် ကုလသမဂ္ဂအတွင်းရေးမှူးချုပ်ဟောင်း ၊ The Elders ၏ ဒုတိယ ဥက္ကဌဖြစ်သူ မစ္စတာ ဘန်ကီမွန်းနှင့် ၂၀၂၃ ခုနှစ် ဧပြီလ ၂၇ ရက် က အွန်လိုင်းမှတဆင့် တွေ့ဆုံ ဆွေးနွေးခဲ့ပါသည်။
၂။ အစည်းအဝေးတွင် မကြာသေးမီက မြန်မာနိုင်ငံသို့ လာရောက်ခဲ့သည့် မစ္စတာဘန်ကီမွန်း၏ ခရီးစဉ်နှင့်ပတ်သက်၍ အဓိကထားဆွေးနွေးခဲ့ကြပြီး၊ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၏ လက်ရှိ ရင်ဆိုင်နေရသည့် အကျပ် အတည်းများကို ထိရောက်စွာ ကိုင်တွယ်ဖြေရှင်းနိုင်ရန် ရှေ့ဆက်လုပ်ဆောင်နိုင်မည့် နည်းလမ်းများနှင့် စပ်လျဉ်း၍ အမြင်များ ဖလှယ်ဆွေးနွေးခဲ့ကြပါသည်။
၃။ မစ္စတာ ဘန်ကီမွန်း က “အကြမ်းဖက်မှုများအား အဆုံးသတ်ရန် လမ်းကြောင်း” ရှာဖွေမှုမှာ အရေးပါကြောင်းနှင့် “ရေရှည်တည်တံ့သော အဖြေတစ်ခုကိုရရှိရေး၌ အမျိုးသား ညီညွတ်ရေး အစိုးရအပါအဝင် ပါဝင်သည့် အစုအဖွဲ့အားလုံး၏ အခန်းကဏ္ဍမှာ အရေးပါကြောင်း” စသည် တို့ကို ထောက်ပြပြောဆိုသည့်အပေါ် ဒုတိယဝန်ကြီး ဦးမိုးဇော်ဦးက ကျေးဇူးတင်ရှိပါကြောင်း ပြောကြားခဲ့ပါသည်။ ဆက်လက်၍ ဒုတိယဝန်ကြီးက မစ္စတာ ဘန်ကီမွန်း၏ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံခရီးစဉ်သည် ရည်ရွယ်ချက်မှန်ကန် ကောင်းမွန်သော်လည်း စစ်ကောင်စီက ယင်းခရီးစဉ်အား ၎င်း၏အကျိုးအတွက် အသုံးချရန် ကြိုးပမ်းမည်ကို စိုးရိမ်ကြောင်း ပြောကြားခဲ့ပါသည်။ ထို့ကြောင့် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံသို့ ထပ်မံသွားရောက်မည့် ခရီးစဉ်များရှိပါက အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ အပါအဝင် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံမှ အရေးပါသော သက်ဆိုင်သူများနှင့် တိုင်ပင်ဆွေးနွေးမှုများ လုပ်ဆောင်ရန် မေတ္တာရပ်ခံခဲ့ပါသည်။ စစ်ကောင်စီအနေဖြင့် ရွေးကောက်ပွဲများ ကျင်းပရန် အခွင့်မရှိ သကဲ့သို့၊ ရွေးကောက်ပွဲများ ကျင်းပမည်ဆိုပါကလည်း မြန်မာနိုင်ငံရှိ သက်ဆိုင်သူများအားလုံးနှင့် တိုင်းရင်းသား အဖွဲ့အားလုံးက လက်ခံနိုင်မည့် အသစ် ရေးဆွဲထားသော ဖွဲ့စည်းပုံ အခြေခံဥပဒေအရသာ ကျင်းပ ပြုလုပ်ရမည် ဖြစ်ကြောင်းလည်း ဒုတိယဝန်ကြီးက ထောက်ပြပြောဆို ခဲ့ပါသည်။ ထို့ပြင် အာဆီယံဘုံသဘောတူညီချက် (၅)ရပ်နှင့် လုံခြုံရေးကောင်စီ ဆုံးဖြတ်ချက် အမှတ် (၂၆၆၉) တို့အား လိုက်နာရန် ပျက်ကွက်သည့် စစ်ကောင်စီအပေါ် နိုင်ငံတကာ အသိုင်းအဝိုင်းအနေဖြင့် ပို၍ ဝိုင်းဝန်း ဖိအားပေးမှုနှင့် အရေးယူ ပိတ်ဆို့မှုများ လုပ်ဆောင်ရန် လိုအပ်ကြောင်းစသဖြင့် ဒုတိယဝန်ကြီးက အလေးပေး ပြောကြားခဲ့ ပါသည်။
၄။ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၌ လက်ရှိဖြစ်ပေါ်နေသော အကျပ်အတည်းများအား ဖြေရှင်းနိုင်ရန်အတွက် ဖြစ်နိုင် ချေရှိသည့်လမ်းကြောင်းများနှင့်စပ်လျဉ်း၍ ဆွေးနွေးမှုများ ဆက်လက်လုပ်ဆောင်နိုင်ရန်အတွက် ပူးပေါင်း ဆောင်ရွက်မှု ဆက်ဆံရေးတစ်ရပ် တည်ဆောက်သွားကြမည်ဟူသော သဘောတူညီချက်ဖြင့် တွေ့ဆုံမှုအား အဆုံးသတ်ခဲ့ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Myanmar - NUG
Date of publication:
2023-04-30
Date of entry/update:
2023-04-30
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
129.56 KB
Local URL:
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Description:
"Canal+ and its satellite partner, Thaicom, are broadcasting Myanmar military junta propaganda against their responsibilities under the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, the OECD Guidelines, and international law and norms.
The illegal Myanmar military junta uses television for psychological warfare as part of its campaign of terror against the people, in breach of international law, and this content is broadcast by Canal+ and Thaicom.
Canal+ operates a subscription television business in Myanmar in partnership with the crony company Forever Group, launched in 2018. Forever Group is a longstanding broadcast partner of the military and was formerly sanctioned by the EU.
Canal+ is a subsidiary of the French corporation, Vivendi SA, which also owns Gameloft, Dailymotion and Havas Group.
In 2019, Canal+ signed a capacity agreement with the Thai publicly listed satellite corporation Thaicom to broadcast content through the satellite, Thaicom 6.
Thaicom has deep links to the Myanmar military. It formerly broadcast the army’s Myawaddy TV (MWD) channels and Thaicom has its own service agreement with Myanmar Radio and Television (MRTV), which was renewed in 2021.
MWD is run by the Directorate of Public Relations and Psychological Warfare of the Office of the Commander-in-Chief (Army), Soe Win, who is sanctioned by the EU. MRTV is run by the Ministry of Information, illegally controlled by the military. The junta’s information minister, Maung Maung Ohn, has also been sanctioned by the EU.
By broadcasting MWD, MRTV and the junta’s international propaganda channel, MITV, Canal+ and Thaicom regularly distribute images of individuals that the junta has captured as claimed members of the People’s Defence Forces, and are routinely subject to torture, arbitrary imprisonment and death in junta custody.
The broadcast of these images are against the spirit of Article 13(2) of the Third Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (1949): “prisoners of war must at all times be protected, particularly against acts of violence or intimidation and against insults and public curiosity.”
Article 13(2) can be interpreted as applicable to “any materials that enable individual prisoners to be identified must normally be regarded as subjecting them to public curiosity and, therefore, may not be transmitted, published or broadcast.”
While Article 13(2) originally applied to international armed conflict, Protocol II extends the application of the Geneva Conventions to non-international armed conflicts.
France and Thailand have both ratified Protocol II, and as such have a responsibility to prevent companies in their territory from violating the Geneva Conventions.
Images of prisoners shown on MRTV and broadcast by Canal+ and Thaicom include close-ups of individuals detained by the junta with signs of torture, such as swollen faces and with their names identified.
Canal+ and Thaicom also broadcast content that refers to Rohingya as “Bengali”, a term associated with the military's genocidal intent because it is intended to Other and dehumanise Rohingya.
By doing so, the junta, which unlawfully claims to be the government of Myanmar, is disregarding the Provisional Measures imposed by the International Court of Justice in The Gambia v. Myanmar case under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide prohibiting, among other actions, incitement to genocide.
Recent content include footage of Rohingya arbitrarily detained when trying to flee the conditions imposed on them by the genocidal military, which include confinement in camps that amounts to the crime of apartheid.
Canal+ has enhanced corporate human rights responsibilities because of its status as a multinational enterprise. It should follow the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises that obligates multinational enterprises to "consider additional standards" and to pay particular attention to situations of armed conflict and the applicability of international humanitarian law.
Justice For Myanmar spokesperson Yadanar Maung says: "The genocidal Myanmar military is waging a campaign of terror against the people of Myanmar, in which it uses media for psychological warfare, spreading fear, disinformation and hate.
“By broadcasting MWD, MRTV and MITV, major weapons of the junta’s propaganda arsenal, Canal+ and Thaicom are blatantly disregarding their human rights responsibilities and obligations under international law.
“Through the broadcast of the junta’s images of captured PDFs, Canal+ and Thaicom are making a commodified spectacle of prisoners of war, against the spirit of the Geneva Conventions, which their home countries, France and Thailand, are signatory to.
“The fact that Canal+ and Thaicom also transmit content that refers to Rohingya as 'Bengali', disregards the Provisional Measures imposed by the ICJ that prohibit the direct and public incitement of genocide.
“Canal+ and Thaicom are broadcasting MWD and MRTV's use of the term ‘Bengali’, knowing it is a genocidal slur.
“We call on Canal+ and Thaicom to immediately stop broadcasting junta propaganda and to abide by their responsibilities under the OECD Guidelines and international law.
“France and Thailand, who are responsible for the conduct of companies in their territories, should take urgent steps to ensure that their companies are upholding international law and norms in their business in Myanmar.”
Canal+ and Thaicom did not respond to questions from Justice For Myanmar..."
Source/publisher:
Justice For Myanmar
Date of publication:
2023-04-28
Date of entry/update:
2023-04-28
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Crimes Against Humanity, Human Rights and international relations, Business and the Military
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143.23 KB
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"The Swedish engineering firm AFRY has announced its intention to withdraw from Myanmar, where it has been involved in controversial hydropower projects for over two decades. The undersigned organisations welcome the move to stop doing business with the military junta but remain deeply concerned about AFRY’s delayed response and failure to realise the gravity of its dealings with the Myanmar military.
AFRY’s decision to leave Myanmar comes after criticism from local and international human rights organisations. AFRY allegedly disregarded sustained opposition from communities affected by its dam projects, and continued to cooperate with and receive payments from Myanmar authorities after the military coup in 2021. According to leaked documents, obtained by Justice For Myanmar, AFRY received almost USD 5 million in consultancy fees directly from the Department of Hydropower Implementation of the junta’s electricity ministry.
AFRY’s conduct in Myanmar raises serious questions about the company’s human rights due diligence procedures. It took the company more than two years after the attempted military coup to announce its exit, and it chose to do business with the Department of Hydropower Implementation after it was illegally taken over by the Myanmar military, which stands accused of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. AFRY’s cooperation with the junta continued despite EU sanctions on the State Administration Council and junta leadership.
Now that AFRY has announced its intention to withdraw from Myanmar, we urge the company to:
Immediately end all technical support and cooperation with the military junta.
Make public its human rights due diligence in relation to its Myanmar operations, including the evidence to support its conclusion that “AFRY has not contributed to any violations of human rights.”
Take all measures necessary to ensure a responsible exit from Myanmar in line with the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights and the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises.
Investigate any negative impact on human rights that might have occurred as a result of AFRY operations in Myanmar, in close dialogue with affected local communities. All negative impact must be properly remediated.
The company’s shareholders and financiers, including several big Swedish banks, should also act to ensure that the company takes these necessary steps, which are in line with the investors’ own human rights commitments..."
Source/publisher:
Justice For Myanmar
Date of publication:
2023-04-28
Date of entry/update:
2023-04-28
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Business and the Military, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
more
Description:
"TOKYO/GENEVA (28 April 2023) – A UN expert today urged the Japanese government to assume a greater leadership role to address the deteriorating crisis in Myanmar and step up pressure on the country’s military junta.
“The international community’s response to the crisis in Myanmar is failing, and that failure has contributed to a lethal downward spiral that is devastating the lives of millions of people”, said Tom Andrews, UN Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in Myanmar at the end of a 10-day official visit to Japan.
“I came to Japan because I believe that this country has an essential role to play in resolving the crisis,” Andrews said.
“Japan’s leadership will be vital in recalibrating a failing international response to the crisis,” he said. The UN expert called on Japan to work with regional and global allies to weaken the capacity of Myanmar’s military junta to attack its citizens.
In a statement (also in Japanese) delivered at the end of his visit, the Special Rapporteur raised the alarm about an impending humanitarian disaster in the Rohingya refugee camps in Bangladesh. Without immediate additional funding, a decision to cut food rations by an additional 20% will be made in the next few weeks, reducing food rations to 27 cents per person per day. The cuts would also potentially eliminate food rations completely for hundreds of thousands.
“This is an emergency. Further cuts will leave the Rohingya, already victims of genocidal attacks in Myanmar, at risk of starvation and drive thousands into boats and dangerous land routes in utter desperation,” Andrews warned.
He called on the Government of Japan and all Member States to immediately increase humanitarian funding, including by redirecting funding from development programmes in Myanmar.
Referring to the worsening situation in Myanmar, Andrews said Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, who has led the junta since the February 2021 coup, had responded to widespread opposition to their rule with barbarism and oppression against the people of Myanmar. “Arbitrary detention, torture and systematic attacks on villages have become hallmarks of the junta. The military is repeatedly attacking civilian populations throughout the country and has quite literally made war on the Myanmar people,” the expert said.
He urged Japan to impose targeted economic sanctions on the Myanmar military and its key sources of funding, just as it is doing in response to the crisis in Ukraine.
“Economic sanctions that deprive the junta of the resources required to operate its war-making machinery would weaken the capacity of the junta to attack its people,” Andrews said.
The expert urged Japan to terminate a Ministry of Defence programme that continues to provide military training to military personnel from Myanmar, referencing credible reports linking previous trainees to military units that have committed atrocities against civilians.
Andrews called on the Government of Japan to clearly and consistently renounce the junta’s plan to stage fraudulent national elections as a means of legitimising itself. “It is not possible to hold a genuine election when opposition leaders are arrested, detained, tortured and executed; when key political parties have been dissolved; when it is illegal to criticise the junta; and when journalists are imprisoned for doing their job,” he said.
The Special Rapporteur highlighted the upcoming G7 Summit in Hiroshima as an opportunity for Japan to shine a light on the situation in Myanmar before the world.
“I urge Prime Minister Kishida to ensure that the Myanmar crisis is high on the G7 agenda and that a strong, unified message and action on Myanmar emerges from the Summit,” the expert said.
Mr. Thomas Andrews (United States of America) is the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar. A former member of the US Congress from Maine, Andrews is a Robina Senior Human Rights Fellow at Yale Law School and an Associate of Harvard University’s Asia Center. He has worked with the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs and parliamentarians, NGOs and political parties in Cambodia, Indonesia, Algeria, Croatia, Serbia, Ukraine and Yemen. He has been a consultant for the National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma and the Euro-Burma Network and has run advocacy NGOs including Win Without War and United to End Genocide.
The Special Rapporteurs are part of what is known as the Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council. Comprising the largest body of independent experts in the UN Human Rights system, Special Procedures is the general name of the Council's independent fact-finding and monitoring mechanisms that address either specific country situations or thematic issues in all parts of the world. Special Procedures experts work on a voluntary basis; they are not UN staff and do not receive a salary for their work. They are independent from any government or organization and serve in their individual capacity..."
Source/publisher:
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (Geneva)
Date of publication:
2023-04-28
Date of entry/update:
2023-04-28
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
more
Description:
"KEY HIGHLIGHTS
95,000 people received core relief items comprising kitchen sets, blankets and sleeping mats, ensuring their basic needs were met.
11,500 people received shelter support for safe and dignified living conditions while in displacement.
8,300 people with specific needs benefited from cash assistance to meet their basic needs.
POPULATION OF CONCERN 1.8 M
Internally displaced people (IDP) living in Rakhine, Chin, Kachin, Shan, Kayin, Kayah and Mon States, and Bago (East), Tanintharyi, Sagaing and Magway Regions (as of 31 March 2023). According to UN sources, an estimated 1,4 million people have been displaced due to the resumption and intensification of clashes between the Tatmadaw and ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) and/or People’s Defense Forces (PDF) after 1 February 2021. 630,000 Estimated Rohingya in Rakhine State, of which some 147,000 are living in displacement camps as well as among the host community since 2012..."
Source/publisher:
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (Geneva) via Reliefweb (New York)
Date of publication:
2023-04-27
Date of entry/update:
2023-04-27
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
UNHCR (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
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pdf
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747.01 KB
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Sub-title:
A recent massacre reveals how intercommunal grievances can be exploited to undermine national cohesion against the junta.
Description:
"In Myanmar, interethnic tensions have improved in the post-coup era as more and more resistance leaders join the call to fight the junta. This shared opposition to military rule has left many people hopeful for the prospect of broader national cohesion in a country that has been beset by various civil and ethnic conflicts for decades. But this moment of national cohesion can also obscure the complex histories and intercommunal grievances that remain unresolved — and a recent massacre in Southern Shan State demonstrates that the military’s violence still has the power to sow discord among a fragmented resistance movement.
While evidence clearly pointed toward the junta as the perpetrators of the March 11 massacre, a flood of misinformation and hate speech in the aftermath inflamed local ethno-religious tensions between the region’s Pa-O and Karenni ethnic groups. With a disparate array of resistance groups and actors still formulating a coordinated system for fighting the junta, intercommunal flashpoints like the recent massacre have the potential to derail this fragile coalition and allow the military to divide their opposition.
The Nam nein Massacre
On March 11, 21 civilians were murdered at Nam nein monastery in Pinlaung township. The victims included a woman, three Buddhist monks and 18 men — all of whom were horrifically tortured before being shot and killed.
The day after the massacre, graphic photos from Nam nein circulated on a Telegram channel of junta supporters. The captions praised the Myanmar military for supposedly killing members of the Karenni People’s Defense Forces — the constellation of local armed resistance groups.
Although the captions identified the dead as armed combatants, closer inspection clearly showed that they were civilians, and that guns had been planted to make them appear armed post-massacre. On March 14, the military doubled down on the lie, with Major General Zaw Min Tun telling a military media outlet that Myanmar military columns had seized dead bodies and arms at Nam nein, offering clear evidence that the Myanmar military was responsible for this massacre.
Key resistance stakeholders from the region — including the Karenni National Defense Force (KNDF), Pa-O National Defense Force, Pa-O National Liberation Organization and the Southern Shan Local Revolution Union — all released statements condemning the violence. Additionally, the National Unity Government, Karenni State Consultative Council and Pa-O National Federal Council issued a joint statement condemning the massacre by the military while pledging justice for the victims and their families.
Hate Speech and Misinformation in the Aftermath
Despite evidence clearly showing that the Myanmar military was the perpetrator, and broad condemnation from resistance organizations, the junta-aligned Pa-O National Organization (PNO) accused the KNDF of the killing. By disseminating misinformation and hate speech in the immediate aftermath, the military-aligned PNO sought to sow ethno-religious discord between the Buddhist Pa-O community and Christian Karenni community.
Just days after the massacre, the PNO organized a rally of 20,000 people denouncing the KNDF and circulated pamphlets with images of the deceased and burning villages. The PNO led chants including “media conceals true news — don’t want” and “terrorists who unlawfully steal the Pa-O people’s properties — don’t want.”
Under the hot sun, a Pa-O monk spoke to the rally and characterized the Karenni people as a lower race, describing the KNDF and the Peoples’ Defense Forces broadly as worse than the Islamic State. Another Pa-O monk called for the burning of Karenni villages if the KNDF did not stop the alleged violence, declaring: “They say it is not a religious war. But our three monks have died. And they say it is not a racial war. But all the people [who] died were our Pa-O people. All the burned villages were our Pa-O villages.”
These alarming speeches carried themes of ethnic hierarchy, Buddhist nationalism and zealous hatred. Ethno-religious violence in Southern Shan State and Karenni State is rare, especially when compared to the horrific incidents of intercommunal violence in places like Rakhine State and Meiktila.
But there are latent tensions in Southern Shan State and neighbouring Karenni State that could be triggered at any time. The massacre in Nam nein and the ensuing misinformation effort could be the spark to ignite these latent tensions and fracture the fragile resistance movement. This fragility remains salient as the Myanmar military and its proxy militias such as the PNO have recently expanded their offensive into Pa-O territory.
Reconciling Historical Ethno-Religious Divides
The current tensions between the Buddhist Pa-O and the Christian Karenni are recent developments in the conflict landscape. But they represent larger religious tensions that far pre-date the 2021 coup.
Myanmar has an infamous history of horrific ethnic discrimination, such as the dehumanizing treatment of the Rohingya. Cases of hate speech have been associated with ethnic mob violence such as the 2014 riots in Mandalay, and data analysis from 2015 measured high levels of ethnic and religious intolerance across Myanmar.
In the middle of this are the Christian Karenni, who represent a multi-faceted minority that has long-struggled to achieve political rights and has long-endured violence from the Myanmar military. Buddhist majority governance institutions have long operated discriminatory practices toward religious minorities, and the military junta has a significant relationship with the rise of Buddhist nationalism. This makes the use of Buddhist nationalist language among non-military actors, like the rally organized by the PNO, of particular concern, and such instances should be closely observed as the fragmented resistance movement tries to coalesce.
The situation has improved somewhat since the 2021 coup, as public opinion surveys conducted on Facebook indicate broadly improved perceptions of different ethnic groups, particularly the Rohingya — and especially among young people.
But while improvements in interethnic relations and perceptions are encouraging, the PNO rallies around Nam nein remind us of the complexity of intercommunal dynamics. It’s also important to note when referencing post-coup public opinion data, that the surveys are often restricted to the few areas with internet access, limiting the ability to capture a sample representative of the public writ large.
Further, public perception of the Myanmar military’s violence has serious implications for national cohesion. When the military’s violence is framed as a shared threat among different ethnic groups, this actually can — somewhat counterintuitively — increase negative perceptions of other ethnic groups. The Nam nien massacre and its aftermath is a stark reminder of this complex reality.
The discussions around national cohesion against the junta undoubtedly inspire hope. Even more, unity among the resistance will be necessary for the pro-democracy movement to prevail in the conflict. But we should avoid making blanket assessments of complex questions regarding identity, grief and loss, as this can only weaken our understanding of the conflict.
Combatting Hate Speech and Misinformation
In the near term, combating hate speech and misinformation while navigating complex histories of inter-communal violence is important for maintaining support for the resistance. And in the long term, successfully addressing these challenges will offer a strong foundation for building an inclusive federal democracy.
In Southern Shan State, the international community should coordinate with local Pa-O and Karenni organizations to provide humanitarian support for those displaced by violence. Pa-O and Karenni civil society and religious organizations should utilize their influential roles to coordinate campaigns against hate speech and misinformation and to promote stronger ties among their community. Further, Facebook’s parent company, Meta, should take comprehensive action to remove hate speech and misinformation on the site, as social media represents a major avenue through which these kinds of intercommunal tensions are sparked.
More broadly, the international community and resistance movement should remain vigilant to on-going patterns of hate speech and misinformation and their potential to exacerbate inter-communal tensions amid the war. Long-term actions to combat them could include the following:
The promotion of digital literacy, especially in remote and rural areas, to strengthen the capacity of the public to identify hate speech and misinformation.
The establishment of an independent investigation team to secure justice. This could be done by the National Unity Government, in close coordination with local civil society organizations representing both the Pa-O and Karenni communities, to serve as a fact-finding mission and as a reconciliation opportunity through intercommunal dialogue. Right now, the trading of accusations and one-sided statements causes more harm than good, as the Nam nein massacre shows.
Resistance actors should engage with other Pa-O actors, not only the resistance-aligned Pa-O organizations like the Pa-O National Federal Council, to reduce further polarization and to search for common ground. For example, while the PNO is roughly aligned with the junta, the PNO has no official or rigid policy for engagement, meaning that there is room for possible dialogue going forward.
The international community should look for entry points to support justice and peace in the region. In so doing, inclusiveness and transparency should be prioritized to avoid further division and distrust among or between any groups. Areas of support can include transitional justice or development in the region.
Narratives that manipulate the military’s violence to sow division and hatred must be taken seriously. This is the moment when Myanmar needs to build national cohesion across historically divided peoples — not just for the sake of consolidating the country’s various resistance groups, but to lay the groundwork for a peaceful democratic future. .."
Source/publisher:
United States Institute of Peace
Date of publication:
2023-04-27
Date of entry/update:
2023-04-27
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
more
Description:
"WASHINGTON —
This week former United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon went on an unannounced trip to Myanmar, where he met with the country’s military rulers and urged them to find a peaceful resolution to their more than two-year-old violent political crisis.
The statement released about his visit did not say if he met with any opposition leaders, which a member of Myanmar’s opposition National Unity Government criticized in an interview with The Associated Press. Nay Phone Latt, an NUG spokesperson, said international leaders should not meet with the leaders of what he called the country’s “terrorist army.”
“If they want to solve the problem of Myanmar, it is important not to ignore the will of the people,” he told AP.
For more about Ban’s visit and the effort to find a peaceful resolution in Myanmar, VOA spoke with Chris Sidoti, who was a member of the U.N. Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar from 2017 to 2019. More recently he has formed, along with two other former U.N. experts, the Special Advisory Council for Myanmar, which describes itself as an international group working for human rights, peace, democracy and accountability in Myanmar.
This interview has been edited for length and clarity.
VOA: What is your initial reaction to Ban Ki-moon’s surprise visit to Myanmar?
Chris Sidoti, member of the Special Advisory Council for Myanmar: Well, it was a surprise. It's been known for a while that Ban Ki-moon, on behalf of the Elders, the organization of which he is deputy chair, was keen to go to Myanmar. But there was no indication that the visit had been accepted by the military there, or that it was about to take place. So it was a surprise when it happened. Initial reaction on my part was very much wait and see; it's very hard at this stage to react to the visit as to whether it was worthwhile or not. Because at this point, we don't know very much about it.
Mr. Ban has issued, or the Elders have issued on his behalf, a statement about the mission. And in that statement, it indicated what Ban Ki-moon had said to the general, but there was no indication of what the general had said to Ban Ki-moon. So it's very difficult to know - in fact, it's impossible to know at this stage - whether the visit was worthwhile or not, whether it accomplished anything at all, and whether it will achieve its principal purpose of bringing an end to the violence. So we all wait and see.
VOA: Why do you think Senior General Min Aung Hlaing invited the former secretary-general to Myanmar during this time of increasing violence?
Sidoti: There are a couple of possible explanations. But in the end, we don't know. The possible explanations are that on the one hand, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing might be feeling increasingly isolated and sees a need to attempt to reach out to the international community to show some willingness to engage. Because to date, he has not shown any willingness whatsoever to engage with anybody, not even ASEAN, the primary alliance in which Myanmar is a member. It may be that there is some connection with the obligation of Myanmar to report to the International Court of Justice by around the 24th of May on its implementation of the court's orders in the genocide case. The military tried to postpone the next report until next year. But the International Court of Justice only last week refused that application and ruled that Myanmar must issue its report by the 24th of May. So it could be that Min Aung Hlaing simply wanted to have something positive to say in that report. But this is all speculation. Ultimately, we don't know.
Whatever his motives are, however, whether the visit was worthwhile or not will only be able to be judged on the basis of what results are produced. No matter what the general’s motivation was, he has to respond and respond positively to Ban Ki-moon's demand that there be a cessation of the violence for him to get any credit out of this visit at all.
VOA: The Myanmar junta focuses on holding elections. Opposition groups like the NUG don't accept the elections, calling them illegitimate. What is your view on the possibility of legitimate elections, given the current environment in Myanmar?
Sidoti: Legitimate elections under the junta are absolutely impossible. There are no conceivable circumstances in which free and fair and legitimate and acceptable elections can be held under the junta. It's as simple as that. And that's why, really, they have eased off their preparations for the elections. Originally, they were talking about holding an election in August. But then in February, they extended the state of emergency, and they can't hold an election while the state of emergency is continuing. And just before that, Min Aung Hlaing himself, the head of the junta, acknowledged that the junta controlled less than half the country and was not able, therefore, to conduct elections in more than half the country. So it's absolutely impossible for elections to be held. And although the military is continuing some measure of preparation for the elections, I don't anticipate we will see any attempt to hold an election this year. And indeed, waiting to next year, the military will continue to find it impossible to hold an election that is going to be free and fair and internationally accepted.
VOA: We have the ASEAN five-point consensus and the U.N. Security Council's resolution on Myanmar. But we haven't seen implementation of any of these by the junta. The Special Advisory Council on Myanmar has called for more pressure on the military regime to end violence. The NUG has called for anti-aircraft weapons and alarm systems to prevent attacks on civilians. Do you think there is support for that in the international community?
Sidoti: The international community has been very slow to provide support for the democratic movement in Myanmar, beyond rhetoric, beyond words, and this is a tragedy. The NUG is calling for defensive weapons. I don't see any prospect at the moment of that being responded to by other countries.
But there is much that the international system can do short of providing weaponry. The United Nations itself and ASEAN itself have been notable failures in their commitment to resolving the Myanmar situation. Yes, there is a five-point consensus. Yes, there was a Security Council resolution last December. Both were very positive moves. But both fell far short of what is required.
I'm afraid that the Myanmar situation condemns the ineffectiveness of ASEAN and the United Nations. The reputation of these two international organizations is on the line in relation to Myanmar. There is much to be done short of providing weapons, but to date, the U.N., ASEAN and other states have not been prepared to do it..."
Source/publisher:
"VOA" (Washington, D.C)
Date of publication:
2023-04-27
Date of entry/update:
2023-04-27
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
more
Sub-title:
Japan Should Suspend Non-Humanitarian Aid to Junta
Description:
"On April 26, after months awaiting a response, Japan’s Foreign Ministry announced it had received confirmation from Myanmar’s military junta that it misused two Japan-funded civilian vessels to transport soldiers and weapons in Rakhine State in September 2022.
A Japanese Foreign Ministry spokesperson said Japan protested the misuse and the junta “expressed regret over the situation,” saying it will do its “utmost to prevent recurrence.”
Human Rights Watch first revealed the incident in October 2022 after analyzing letters from Myanmar officials that stated that two of three vessels delivered by Japan between 2017 and 2019 had been used to transport more than 100 soldiers and materiel to the town of Buthidaung in Rakhine State, where the military is fighting the Arakan Army, an ethnic armed group. The Japanese government had been requesting information from the junta following that reporting.
Since Myanmar’s military staged a coup on February 1, 2021, security forces have killed more than 3,400 people and arrested over 21,000, with more than 17,000 currently detained, according to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners. In recent weeks, the military has been implicated in airstrikes in Sagaing State that killed dozens of civilians, and a ground assault in Magway Region that burned a Japan-funded hospital. In March, 22 people were massacred after the military captured a town in Shan State, with many of the victims bearing marks of torture, according to the coroner.
Prior to the coup, Myanmar’s security forces committed crimes against humanity and genocidal acts against the Rohingya Muslim minority in Rakhine State, forcing them to flee to Bangladesh, where nearly a million Rohingya are currently living in overcrowded refugee camps. An estimated 600,000 Rohingya remain in Rakhine State, where they are subject to persecution and violence, denied proper freedom of movement, and cut off from access to adequate food, health care, education, and livelihoods.
The Myanmar military’s egregious and ongoing rights violations should be reason enough for the Japanese government to reject the junta’s hollow promise to abide by international law.
A lukewarm response will only embolden the junta at the expense of Japan’s reputation, including with the people of Myanmar whom the Japanese government seeks to assist. Japan should instead suspend non-humanitarian aid to Myanmar and impose targeted sanctions on military leaders and military-owned conglomerates..."
Source/publisher:
Human Rights Watch (USA)
Date of publication:
2023-04-27
Date of entry/update:
2023-04-27
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Crimes Against Humanity, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
more
Description:
"Past incident reports: 22 March-04 April; 08-21 March; 22 February-07 March; 08-21 February; All.
Past analysis reports: April and September 2022; 1 February 2021 to 10 January 2022; 1 January to 31 March 2022.
Join our Myanmar mailing list for regular updates. Visit our website. Follow us on Twitter. If you have additional information on an incident documented here, or a new incident, please get in touch. Help support the protection of health care by sharing this resource. Please copy and paste this link: bit.ly/05-18Apr2023MMRHealth
Documented incidents
Myanmar
05 April 2023: In Si Thar village and village tract, Shwegu township, Bhamo district, Kachin state, the rural health centre and station hospital, a school and 20 civilian houses were damaged during the air strikes and ground attacks by the Myanmar military. No casualties were reported. Sources: Khit Thit Media, Mandalay Free Press, and Telegram
05 April 2023: In Pakokku town, township and district, Magway region, junta security forces arrested a male civilian for allegedly providing medicines to the local resistance forces. Source: Telegram
06 April 2023: In Mingaladon town and township, Yangon (North) district, Yangon region, at the military airbase in the compound of Yangon International Airport, a military clinic building was burnt and damaged in a handmade electroshock rocket missile attack by the local resistance forces. Source: Irrawaddy
As reported on 06 April 2023: In Rakhine state, it has been over eight months the junta has restricted the transport of medicines into and within the state, with an alleged intention to block the access to the Arakan Army to medicine supplies. The blockade impacted civilians. To obtain an approval for the transport of medicines for one time, up to 1,400 USD bribery was required. Source: Narinjara
06 April 2023: In Ah Lel Seik village and village tract, Indaw township, Katha district, Sagaing region, the Myanmar military seized medical and surgical supplies from a civilian house with an alleged reason of health care provision to the local resistance forces. Source: Telegram
07 April 2023: At an undisclosed location in Kayah state, two medical rescue team members were killed during Myanmar military airstrikes. Sources: Chindwin News Agency and Facebook
08 April 2023: In Ta Laing village and village tract, Sagaing township, district, and region, the roof and walls of a rural health centre were damaged during airstrikes by the Myanmar military. The Myanmar military land force destroyed medicines and instruments in the clinic. A school building and 10 civilian houses were also damaged, and three female and two male civilians at the clinic were injured. The junta claimed that the attacks targeted the base camp of local resistance forces, and that they seized weapons from the school building. Sources: Facebook, Mandalay Free Press and Telegram..."
Source/publisher:
Insecurity Insight (Geneva) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of publication:
2023-04-26
Date of entry/update:
2023-04-26
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Public Health, Human Rights and international relations
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Format :
pdf
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465.23 KB
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Description:
"The IHF is an issue for the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) Summit in Jakarta on May 5-12 and one of the main concerns is the involvement of ASEAN Humanitarian Assistance Center on Disaster Management (AHA) in the delivery of aid in Myanmar.
It is clear that it has neither the experience nor the capacity to deliver the aid, and most importantly, it includes representatives of the junta and is inevitably going to work with the State Administration Council (SAC). This means that not only will aid be inefficiently delivered, but the SAC will also weaponize aid and use it for its own strategic and political advantage whilst depriving the majority of the country, which is controlled by the resistance, from receiving aid.
I have heard that United Nations Organization for Coordination of Humanitarian Aid (UNOCHA) and Indonesia want the AHA to take the lead. The National Unity Government (NUG), ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) and civil society organizations (CSOs) involved in the IHF strongly disagree with AHA involvement.
The objective of the IHF, which was proposed by the NUG and EAOs, is to find new channels to deliver aid to those seriously affected by the war including those in NUG and EAO controlled areas. This will not happen if the aid is channeled through the AHA or the UN. The situation on the ground is that aid is urgently needed where the vast majority of those in need, such as IDPs, are located and if this doesn’t happen then it will have dire consequences for the whole region. As the UN has demonstrated, aid cannot be delivered to the neediest in non-junta-controlled areas. This is blatantly obvious and should not even need to be stated but the UN continues doing this.
I believe the IHF has identified three options, of which only the third makes any sense. The first is that the SAC agrees to a humanitarian pause and allows free passage of aid in NUG and EAO areas via the IHF. This is of course ridiculous and about as likely as a no-fly zone with a US aircraft carrier in the Bay of Bengal. Another option stated is that there is an agreement with donors and countries bordering Myanmar for cross border aid to EAO and NUG areas. This is not quite as ridiculous as the first option but bordering countries would not formally agree to this. India, China and Thailand have, so far, demonstrated their support for the junta. The final option discussed is the only feasible one, namely donors agree to an upscale aid delivered through local networks with a lot more flexibility concerning fund transfers, reporting and any other adaption of existing systems to ensure aid reaches the most in need in EAO and NUG areas quickly and without large overheads.
In the IHF the obvious seems to be supported by the NUG, EAOs and CSOs but not by Indonesia and OCHA, who still want the AHA involved and taking the lead. One suspects this may be because of personal rather than humanitarian interests.
Paul Greening is an ex-UN senior staff member with over 20 years’ experience in six Asian countries working for six UN agencies and four INGOs. He worked in Sittwe, Rakhine State for the IOM from 2017 to 2020 and since then has been involved in advocacy against the illegal attempted coup and supporting those who have suffered from it..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2023-04-26
Date of entry/update:
2023-04-26
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
ASEAN-Burma relations, Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
more
Description:
"Media Release: Ban Ki-moon meets military leaders in Myanmar and calls for an immediate cessation of violence and implementation of ASEAN's Five-Point Consensus
Ban Ki-moon, Deputy Chair of The Elders and former Secretary-General of the United Nations, visited Myanmar on 23-24 April 2023, to find a path to an end to violence and establishing a peaceful, democratic, inclusive and legitimate government.
He met Myanmar’s military leaders and former President Thein Sein to discuss the situation, and emphasised the importance of all parties playing a role in securing a lasting solution, including the National Unity Government.
"I came to Myanmar to urge the military to adopt an immediate cessation of violence, and start constructive dialogue among all parties concerned,” Ban Ki-moon said.
“My meetings were exploratory. I will do all I can to help the people of Myanmar secure the peace, prosperity and freedom they deserve.”
The visit was at the invitation of the Myanmar military. In his meetings in Naypyidaw, Ban Ki-moon stressed the urgency of making progress on implementation of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Five-Point Consensus and last December’s United Nations Security Council Resolution 2669. He supported the international community’s calls for the immediate release by the Myanmar military of all arbitrarily detained prisoners, for constructive dialogue, and for utmost restraint from all parties.
Ban Ki-moon reiterated the strong international condemnation of the recent military air strike in Sagaing region, which is estimated to have killed more than 160 civilians, including women and children.
He warned that elections must only be held when conditions are in place for them to be free and fair. Holding elections under current conditions risks further violence and division, and the results not being recognised by the people of Myanmar, ASEAN and the wider international community.
Support for a full transition to democracy and civilian rule has been a feature of The Elders’ engagement with Myanmar over the past decade, and Ban Ki-moon has a personal history of supporting Myanmar’s progress when UN Secretary-General.
"
“ASEAN Member States and the wider international community need to show unity and resolve in their commitment to peace and democracy in Myanmar, which is a source of serious international concern. With patient determination, I believe a way forward can be found out of the current crisis. The military must take the first steps”, Ban Ki-moon said...
Source/publisher:
The Elders
Date of publication:
2023-04-25
Date of entry/update:
2023-04-25
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, ASEAN-Burma relations, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Format :
pdf pdf
Size:
327.36 KB 335.06 KB
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"On the two-year anniversary of the Five-Point Consensus, lawmakers from Southeast Asia call on ASEAN to acknowledge that the Consensus signed in April 2021 has failed miserably and that the Myanmar junta led by Senior General Min Aung Hlaing should not to be trusted to fulfill the obligations outlined in the proposed agreement.
“The recent airstrikes in the Sagaing region, which killed hundreds of civilians, including children, are further evidence that the Myanmar junta is completely unwilling and incapable of adhering to the Five-Point Consensus,” ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights (APHR) Chair and member of the Indonesian House of Representatives Mercy Barends said today. “If ASEAN insists on sticking to an agreement that has proven to be utterly ineffective then it is complicit in the ongoing crimes and atrocities of the junta.”
On April 24, 2021, the leaders of nine ASEAN member states and Myanmar junta chief, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, agreed to the following five points: an immediate end to violence in the country; dialogue among all parties; the appointment of a special envoy; humanitarian assistance by ASEAN; and the special envoy’s visit to Myanmar to meet with all parties.
The International Parliamentary Inquiry into the global response to the Myanmar coup (IPI), which was organized by APHR, indicated in its final report in November 2022, “it is clear that the FIve-Point Consensus has failed, and a new mode of engagement is needed in its place.” As one witness noted in their testimony to the IPI, from the start, it was “thoroughly clear that Min Aung Hlaing was insincere in signing it and had no intention of following it.”
The Consensus’ first point on the cessation of violence has been blatantly ignored by the junta, as evidenced by the ongoing airstrikes and malicious attacks against unarmed civilians. Meanwhile, ASEAN’s intention to provide humanitarian aid, as noted in the IPI report, has been “stymied by a lack of resources and genuine commitment.” The ASEAN Special Envoy position has also proven to be ineffective, especially since it changes along with the ASEAN chair.
“ASEAN’s weak-willed approach toward the junta is a complete disgrace. Even after it finally criticized the junta’s airstrikes in Sagaing, the ASEAN Secretary-General still met with the junta’s permanent representative to ASEAN, making any statement of condemnation little more than lip service,” said APHR Co-chair and former Malaysian member of parliament Charles Santiago. “Indonesia’s ‘soft-diplomacy’ approach as ASEAN chair has also yet to yield results and must be urgently reevaluated. Indonesia must take a stronger stance and be transparent on how they are addressing the Myanmar crisis, especially given the limited amount of time left in their chairmanship.”
In a roundtable discussion at the Indonesian House of Representatives in Jakarta on March 3, dozens of parliamentarians from several Southeast Asian countries urged ASEAN and the international community at large to take swift and concrete action against the illegal military junta led by Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, and provide real assistance to the pro-democracy forces in Myanmar, including by recognizing the National Unity Government (NUG) and having open and public negotiations that include the NUG, ethnic groups, and other pro-democracy forces.
“ASEAN needs to live up to its role as a regional mediator and it needs to do so immediately, starting with Indonesia as chair. Closed-door and informal meetings are no longer enough,” said Santiago. “It is clear that ASEAN needs to negotiate a new agreement that includes the National Unity Government and the representatives of ethnic minorities while providing clear enforcement mechanisms to ensure that the agreement is upheld.”..."
Source/publisher:
ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights
Date of publication:
2023-04-24
Date of entry/update:
2023-04-24
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations, ASEAN-Burma relations
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"Today marks the second anniversary since ASEAN agreed on the Five Point Consensus in response
to the military coup in Myanmar. The Myanmar military has ignored calls from the international
community to stop the violence. Moreover, since the coup, the Myanmar military has committed war
crimes and possible crimes against humanity. ASEAN leaders must step up and address the situation
in Myanmar without further delay. Amnesty International has assessed ASEAN’s five points
consensus using concrete evidence as examples where relevant, and highlights its failures:
1) First, there shall be immediate cessation of violence in Myanmar and all parties shall exercise
utmost restraint.
The Myanmar military authorities executed at least four people, sentenced at least 123 people to
death, and arrested 21,334 people – with 17,446 people still detained, according to the Assistance
Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP). The security forces tortured detainees, killed at least 3,239
people, including unlawful attacks killing and injuring civilians through the use of deadly air strikes,
extrajudicial executions, artillery shelling, banned landmines, and cluster munitions. According to the
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), since the coup, the
fighting has displaced 1.4 million people inside the country, burned or destroyed 60,000 civilian
properties and pushed 75,400 people to seek refuge in neighboring countries. The military authorities
also detained and imprisoned at least 2,000 Rohingyas since the coup for ‘unauthorized travel’
outside of Rakhine State. These numbers illustrate the fact that the Myanmar military does not plan to
cease violence or exercise restraint against civilians.
2) Second, constructive dialogue among all parties concerned shall commence to seek a
peaceful solution in the interests of the people.
In July 2022, the Myanmar military executed four people, including an activist and one member of
the National League for Democracy (NLD). As of December 2022, the Myanmar military sentenced
Aung San Suu Kyi to 33 years in prison in grossly unfair trials, in completely untransparent
procedures. In October, Magway District Court sentenced ex-NLD parliamentarian Win Myint Hlaing
to 148 years in prison on terror-related charges. Around the same time, activists Aung Khant, Kyaw
Thet and Hnin Maung were sentenced to prison terms of between 95 and 225 years under the Counter-Terrorism Law. Likewise, the Myanmar military continues to target and imprison politicians
from the opposition groups. The Myanmar military authorities are using the justice system as an
oppressive tool to silence and collectively punish any voice of dissent. On 7 April 2023, Reverend
Samson, Kachin religious and community leader, was sentenced to six years in prison on charges of
unlawful association, defamation and terrorism. These charges are used as a tool by the Myanmar
military to silence and punish people for exercising their freedom of speech. A constructive dialogue
is not possible if people are unfairly imprisoned and arbitrarily detained. The Myanmar military must
release all those detained and imprisoned for their peaceful opposition to the coup and to the
military’s human rights violations.
3) Third, a special envoy of the ASEAN Chair shall facilitate mediation of the dialogue process,
with the assistance of the Secretary General of ASEAN.
In March 2022, the ASEAN Special Envoy for Myanmar visited Myanmar for the first time. The
Special Envoy met with Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, but the military reportedly denied him to
meet with any civil society groups, or members of the NLD, which had won the most seats in the
2020 election. The Myanmar military also rejected the Special Envoy’s request to meet with Aung San
Suu Kyi. This failure to meet with anyone other than the Myanmar military leadership shows that
ASEAN has not been able to facilitate mediation.
4) Fourth, ASEAN shall provide humanitarian assistance through the AHA Centre.
In October 2022, the Myanmar military enacted the Organization Registration Law, severely restricting
the right to freedom of association by imposing criminal penalties on national and international
humanitarian organizations if they do not register with the authorities. The enactment severely
impedes desperately needed humanitarian aid. Amnesty International has documented the military
authorities obstructing lifesaving humanitarian aid through cumbersome administrative restrictions
and attacking camps for internally displaced people. Massive aerial bombing, indiscriminate shelling,
and massacres by the military are causing large numbers of casualties and displacements – further
increasing the need for humanitarian assistance. UNOCHA estimates that a total of 17.6 million
people, including more than nine million women and girls, would require humanitarian assistance in
2023. In December 2021, two humanitarian workers were among those killed in a massacre by the
military in Kayah State. UNOCHA’s end year report also indicates that “Myanmar recorded the
second highest number of aid workers killed globally in 2022, and the fourth highest number of aid
workers injured”. The AHA Centre has also failed to provide anywhere close to adequate
humanitarian assistance to the population in need.
5) Fifth, the special envoy and delegation shall visit Myanmar to meet with all parties concerned.
See point 2 and 3 above.
In response to ASEAN’s failure to implement the five-point consensus, Amnesty International urges
ASEAN and ASEAN member states to make the following recommendations to the Myanmar military:
1) Immediately stop dropping aerial bombs on civilians and carrying out indiscriminate attacks by
ground and air in violation of international humanitarian law.
2) Lift internet blackouts, administrative and other arbitrary restrictions on humanitarian aid, stop
attacks on humanitarian workers, and allow unimpeded access to national and international
humanitarian organizations, so that they can reach all civilians in need.
3) Release all detainees arbitrarily detained or unjustly imprisoned through grossly unfair trials
since the coup.
4) Immediately halt acts of intimidation, arrests, or torture and other ill-treatment of media
workers, healthcare workers and others who peacefully joined the Civil Disobedience
Movement.
5) Release all Rohingyas arbitrarily detained for exercising their right to freedom of movement
and halt the military’s role in any plans to forcibly return Rohingyas from Cox’s Bazar and
Bashan Char camps..."
Source/publisher:
Amnesty International (UK)
Date of publication:
2023-04-24
Date of entry/update:
2023-04-24
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Political prisoners and other violations in Burma - reports, Freedom of Movement, violations of in Burma/Myanmar, Human Rights and international relations, Freedom of opinion and expression: - the situation in Burma/Myanmar - reports, analyses, recommendations, Crimes Against Humanity
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"KAYIN STATE, Myanmar, Apr 17 2023 (IPS)- Food is passed around a campfire, and a guitar strums as cool night air tumbles down mountain cliffs, relieving the jungle of its heat.
A dozen or so young Myanmar activists – some having just travelled long distances evading military checkpoints, others already living in exile – have come together in a jungle camp for a training course with a difference. Instead of armed combat, their chosen role is enabling the overthrow of the military junta through non-violent means.
Conversations are animated, with talk of federal democracy and creating a country that would also give political space and freedom to ethnic minorities. They are joined by soldiers of the rebel Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) protecting the camp deep in southeastern Kayin State.
The peaceful setting of the camp belies the horrors of the civil war beyond the mountains that is breaking Myanmar apart. The generals who overthrew a democratically elected government and seized power in 2021 are increasingly responding to a national uprising by waging terror on civilians it calls “terrorists” in an attempt to break their support for armed insurgents.
On April 11, the military carried out what is believed to be the deadliest attack of the civil war so far, using air strikes and a helicopter gunship on a village ceremony organised by the parallel and underground National Unity Government (NUG) in Sagaing Region.
At least 165 people, including 27 women and 19 children, some performing dances, were killed, according to the NUG. The regime says it was attacking the NUG’s People’s Defence Forces.
Over the past two years, artillery and bombing raids using aircraft supplied by China and Russia have targeted schools, IDP camps, hospitals, mosques, Buddhist temples and Christian churches across the country. Tens of thousands of houses have been torched, and more than 1.3 million people displaced since the 2021 coup, according to UN estimates.
The barbarity defies belief. In February, a unit of some 150 soldiers known as the Ogre Column were dropped by helicopter in Sagaing and went on a marauding killing spree that lasted weeks. Scores of villagers were killed. Women were raped and shot. Men and boys were beheaded, disembowelled and dismembered.
Truth about massacres in wars gone by took months or even years to fully emerge, but in this modern era of mobile phones and social media, the grim evidence is transmitted by survivors within a day or so.
Kyaw Soe Win, a veteran activist with the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP), which carefully documents civilian deaths, arrests and extra-judicial killings, shows IPS a picture he has just received on his phone of a man in Sagaing, disembowelled and his organs taken out.
Why do they do this? “It is to spread fear and terror,” he says.
AAPP, now based in the border town of Mae Sot just inside Thailand, has an exhibition dedicated to victims of successive uprisings against military rule since protests against the first post-independence coup in 1962. Rows of faces and names stare out from the walls, including pictures of some 30 civilians – among them two Save the Children charity workers – who were tortured and burned alive in what is now known as the 2021 Christmas Eve Massacre in Kayah State.
“This chapter is different,” Kyaw Soe Win, a former political prisoner, says of the present conflict. “The situation is getting worse and worse. The numbers of political prisoners and fatalities and houses torched are far higher. The junta is oppressing the people and is even more brutal than before.”
Sky, a resistance fighter and writer, who uses a nom de guerre, explains in a Mae Sot bar how the insurgency is also very different this time.
“After the 1988 student uprising, it took me three years to get an AK-47 and 300 bullets. Now it is much quicker. Now we are getting modified AK-47s through the Wa. They call it a Wa-AK,” he laughs, referring to an autonomous border area run by the heavily armed United Wa State Party. Their one-party narco-state on the border with China stays out of the war but makes money from both sides.
“China systematically eroded history after the 1989 Tiananmen massacre, but after the 1988 protests in Myanmar, we still have the whispered stories. This generation knows what is right and wrong,” said Sky.
Despite what the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights recently called its “scorched earth policy”, the regime is steadily losing this war in terms of territory and military casualties.
“The military is in a very, very difficult situation which is only getting worse,” says Matthew Arnold, an independent policy analyst on Myanmar with previous conflict experience in Afghanistan and Sudan. He says the regime’s forces are “atomised” and “bleeding out in a war of attrition”. In some towns, they are pinned down in police stations and barracks and cannot be reinforced or resupplied for months on end.
Because it cannot move freely on the ground over the vast distances to maintain its outposts and impose its authority, the junta is resorting increasingly to air strikes and artillery against civilian populations.
Sagaing and the neighbouring region of Magwe are crucial conflict areas. Covering an area bigger than England, they are known as the heartland of the Bamar majority and had been, for decades, a fertile recruiting ground for the Bamar-dominated military. But no more.
“There are very few areas of Sagaing where they are not fighting on a regular basis. The junta was hit all over the place in February in Sagaing and Magwe,” says Arnold, who credits resistance forces moving rapidly “from muskets to drones and IEDS” (improvised explosive devices) in inflicting heavy losses.
Vulnerable in more remote areas in Chin State in the west and areas of the southeast, the military’s pullback is expected to accelerate as the monsoons come.
Thantlang in Chin State, near the border with India, was the first large town to fall to the rebels, although the junta’s bombing raids and artillery made sure that little was left standing. With no air defences, the resistance knows well that if it takes full control of more urban areas, then they are inviting disaster upon the civilian population.
Myanmar is, in effect, fragmenting.
The regime has a firm grip on the big cities of Yangon, Mandalay and the capital Naypyitaw – where residents say life is bustling and returning to some kind of ‘normal’ with even the makings of a property boom. But beyond, its real control is tenuous and weakening.
Fighting a war on many fronts, the regime is trying to follow its practised divide-and-rule tactics of cutting deals and ceasefire pacts with various ethnic armed groups, aided to some extent by China’s influence in border areas.
But major ethnic groups in most of the frontier states, such as the KNLA, which has been fighting the world’s longest civil war since 1949, are successfully resisting. A ceasefire with the mostly Buddhist Arakan Army also looks fragile in the western state of Rakhine, where in 2017, the military forced over 700,000 Muslim Rohingya into Bangladesh in a brutal campaign of ethnic cleansing that has brought charges of genocide against Myanmar in the International Court of Justice.
“Sadly, a prolonged fragmentation is a possibility, but we must accept that has been a possibility in Myanmar since before the coup of 1962,” David Gum Awng, deputy minister for international cooperation for the NUG shadow administration, tells IPS.
“It is natural and unsurprising that EAOs (ethnic armed organisations) are consolidating gains, but the question is what these EAOs plan to do with their territory if and when the democratic forces win,” he adds.
The NUG, he says, aims to rid Myanmar of the “abusive and criminal military dictatorship and along with it the military’s obsession with centralised Bamar-Buddhist nationalist rule”, to be replaced by a democratic federal system offering “ethnic minorities genuine self-determination” through negotiations.
This significant shift in policy also extends to recognising and reaching out to the Rohingya, with the NUG promising justice and accountability for crimes committed against them by the military, a path towards citizenship, and peaceful repatriation for refugees.
Although the NUG is built around remnants of the old guard of the National League for Democracy government ousted in the 2021 coup, its stated intentions have set it apart from the Bamar nationalist leanings of Aung San Suu Kyi, its 77-year-old former leader now held by the junta in solitary confinement.
Strengthening but still, difficult ties between the self-proclaimed NUG and the ethnic armed groups are particularly worrying for China. Myanmar’s giant neighbour sees a threat to its long-term strategy of dominating the ethnic groups along its border while keeping Western powers out of a pliant Myanmar with the goal of developing massive infrastructure projects and a secure gateway to the Indian Ocean.
Even though it enjoyed favourable relations with Aung San Suu Kyi, China is keeping the NUG at a cold arm’s length while propping up the junta with weaponry and diplomatic protection at the UN. India’s tacit backing for the regime has facilitated its own strategic investments.
Much of the rest of Asia, including democracies like Japan and South Korea, are also working to protect their own interests in Myanmar while hoping that engagement with the regime will lead to a negotiated settlement of the war. UN agencies and the INGO aid industry also maintain a presence, mostly ineffectual, in junta-controlled Yangon.
This perceived complicity angers the Burmese diaspora, which is busily raising money for aid and weapons for the resistance. Notions of a negotiated settlement with General Min Aung Hlaing’s State Administration Council, as the junta calls itself, are far from the minds of those waging their “forgotten war”.
“Thai generals are brothers with the Myanmar military. Singapore banks hold their money. The Burmese feel forgotten,” said one US-based doctor, speaking in Bangkok after taking medical aid to the border.
While recognising that the West’s attention and resources are focused on the overriding goal of defeating Russia in Ukraine, the resistance did receive a significant boost last December with the US Burma Act passed by Congress.
The act authorises the Biden administration to extend non-lethal aid to “support the people of Burma in their struggle for democracy, freedom, human rights, and justice.” It explicitly mentions the NUG, although not ethnic armed groups.
Some Washington-based analysts argue that the legislation does not mark a major US policy shift, but diplomats and experts in the region see it as a highly significant step towards endorsing the NUG and the wider resistance movement.
“The US is now saying it wants the resistance to win and has fundamentally shifted the narrative. This is why China is getting worried. Beijing is focused on the discourse of talks and the peace process,” commented one expert in Bangkok who asked not to be named.
“There won’t be lethal assistance. The US doesn’t want to be involved in another war now. But there will be more public and diplomatic support of the resistance and pushing other actors not to engage with the junta,” he added.
David Gum Aung of the NUG is more cautious, calling the Burma Act “a significant piece of legislation” which makes funds available and opens the door to more sanctions against the regime while “recognising” the NUG.
“We can view the Burma Act as a very important document symbolically but less potent practically. Its symbolic value stems largely from the fact that it outlines that the US views the SAC and their caretaker government as illegitimate and does not recognize their authority, their right to represent Myanmar or their justification for the coup.”
“We are still sorely in need of all manner of aid, from humanitarian to strategic… but we cannot fall into the trap of assuming that everything the Act makes possible will eventuate,” he said.
Thinzar Shunlei Yi, a democracy and youth activist who led anti-coup protests in Yangon and is now in exile, stresses that the broad-based and non-violent Civil Disobedience Movement remains the “backbone of the revolution”.
Success, she says, will mean the surrender of the junta, with the people defining what happens to the perpetrators of crimes, whether to be put on trial in domestic courts or through international mechanisms. For her, it also means a social revolution that will tackle “patriarchy, hegemony, racism etc”.
Kyaw Soe Win of the AAPP, whose grisly routine is to scroll through fresh images of the dead, says war criminals must be prosecuted to achieve national reconciliation.
“We need justice for the survivors and victims,” he says. “Without justice, there can be no reconciliation. There was never any justice before, only impunity through the decades. No action was ever taken.”
AAPP has so far documented over 17,000 political prisoners still in detention and the deaths of over 3,100 civilians since the coup, although it knows the actual toll is much higher.
Nicholas Koumjian, head of the UN-authorised Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar which is working with AAPP, says credible evidence had been collected of an “array of war crimes and crimes against humanity, including murder, rape, torture, unlawful imprisonment, and deportation or forcible transfer”.
Back in the jungle resistance camp, the young activists gather near caves that act as air raid shelters and talk of a future without military rule that will necessitate total reform of the armed forces. Among the group, one was severely tortured in prison, one shot in the leg during street protests and a mother who had to leave her child behind.
The annual New Year festival of Thingyan is approaching, and they sing popular songs of love and separation and a homecoming they know may be years away.
AAPP is working with the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar to collect and preserve evidence of crimes against international law committed since 2011 to expedite future criminal proceedings. Nicholas Koumjian, head of the IIMM, said on the second anniversary of the coup that credible evidence had been collected of an “array of war crimes and crimes against humanity, including murder, rape, torture, unlawful imprisonment, and deportation or forcible transfer.”..."
Source/publisher:
Inter Press Service
Date of publication:
2023-04-17
Date of entry/update:
2023-04-17
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Burma: Internal displacement/forced migration of several ethnic groups., Human Rights and international relations
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Description:
"1.The National Unity Government is responding to the union level disaster of significantly
large number of deaths and injured people due to the military council's air strikes at Pazigyi
village, Kant Balu Township, Sagaing division. The relief and emergency response activities
are being provided in a timely manner under the supervision of union level ministries and
the coordination with the various officials in Sagaing region..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2023-04-16
Date of entry/update:
2023-04-16
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Various rights: reports of violations against several ethnic groups, Human Rights and international relations
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293.05 KB 2.53 MB
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"MOHR's report on kantbalu massacre sent to the UNSC members and other States calling for punitive measures under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, including a global ban on the sale and transfer of arms, munitions, dual-use items and aviation fuel to the junta, the targeting of junta financial interests, and a referral of the situation in Myanmar to the International Criminal Court. The UN Secretary-General, acting under Article 99 of the Charter, must give full support to this effort.....လူ့အခွင့်အရေးဆိုင်ရာဝန်ကြီးဌာနသည် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်က ကျုးလွန်ခဲ့သည့် ကန့်ပလူမြို့နယ်၊ ပဇီကြီးကျေးရွာအစုလိုက်အပြုံလိုက်သတ်ဖြတ်ခံခဲ့ရမှု ဖြစ်စဉ်နှင့် ပတ်သက်သည့် တိကျသေချာသော သတင်းအချက်အလက်များပါဝင်သည့် အောက်ဖော်ပြပါ အစီရင်ခံစာတစောင်အား ကုလသမဂ္ဂလုံခြုံရေးကောင်စီနှင့် ၎င်း၏ အဖွဲ့ဝင်များထံ ပေးပို့ခဲ့ပြီးဖြစ်ပါသည်။
ကန့်ပလူ၊ပဇီကြီးကျေးရွာ ဖြစ်စဉ်တင်မကဘဲ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်ကျုးလွန်ခဲ့သော ပြစ်မှုများကိုပါ အထောက်အထားခိုင်လုံစွာ တင်သွင်းထားပြီး လုံခြုံရေးကောင်စီအနေဖြင့်
ကုလသမဂ္ဂ ပဋိညာဉ်စာတမ်း အခန်း ၇ ပါ ပြစ်ဒဏ်ချမှတ်မှု ဖော်ပြချက်အရ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်အား လက်နက်၊ ခဲယမ်းမီးကျောက်များ၊စစ်ရေးတွင်ပြောင်းလဲအသုံးပြုနိုင်သောပစ္စည်းများ နှင့် လေကြောင်းလောင်စာဆီများ ရောင်းချခြင်းနှင့် လွှဲပြောင်းခြင်းတို့အပေါ် တကမ္ဘာလုံးက တားမြစ်ပိတ်ပင်ခြင်း၊ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်၏ ဘဏ္ဍာရေး အကျိုးစီးပွားများကို ပစ်မှတ်ထားပြီးပိတ်ဆို့ခြင်းနှင့် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီ၏ ရာဇဝတ်မှုများကို နိုင်ငံတကာ ရာဇ၀တ်ခုံရုံးသို့ လွှဲပြောင်းပေးခြင်းလုပ်ဆောင်ရန် တောင်းဆိုထားပါသည်။
ထို့ပြင်ပဋိညာဉ်စာတမ်း၏ အပိုဒ် ၉၉ အရ ကုလသမဂ္ဂ အထွေထွေအတွင်းရေးမှူးချုပ်သည် ထိုတောင်းဆိုချက်များအတွက် ကြိုးပမ်းအားထုတ်မှုကို အပြည့်အဝ ထောက်ခံရမည်ဖြစ်သည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Human Rights
Date of publication:
2023-04-14
Date of entry/update:
2023-04-14
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Crimes Against Humanity, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
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pdf
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114.97 KB
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"On the morning of Tuesday 11 April 2022, an airstrike by the Myanmar military targeted a celebration in Pazigyi village, in Sagaing region’s Kanbalu township. At least 165 people were killed, including 27 women and 19 children, and at least 30 others injured.
Around 300 people were gathered in Pazigyi village to celebrate the opening of a new office for the local People’s Defence Force, anti-coup militias operating under the umbrella of the National Unity Government (NUG). During the ceremony, fighter jets bombed the crowd before a helicopter arrived from which soldiers fired on first responders and those transporting the wounded. That afternoon, the aircraft returned, opening fire on those trying to collect the dead.
This is one of the deadliest military attacks on the civilian population since the junta seized power in February 2021.
Since the coup, AOAV has recorded 1,958 civilian casualties (786 killed and 1,172 injured) across 988 incidents. Among the civilians harmed, at least 297 were reported as children, 231 as women, and 237 as men..."
Source/publisher:
Action on Armed Violence (London) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of publication:
2023-04-13
Date of entry/update:
2023-04-14
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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"1. NUG and NUCC jointly acknowledge political parties boycotting the SAC’s sham election.....2. Older persons suffering heavily from military atrocities.....3. UN ambassador Kyaw Moe Tun urges international community to remain vigilant on military’s attempt to establish a smallscale nuclear reactor.....4. $9.42M raised for revolution, 75% spent on food.....5. 417 Battles occurred in No. 1 military region with 649 SAC’s troops dead.....6. NUG declares military controlled UEC a terrorist entity..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2023-04-10
Date of entry/update:
2023-04-14
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Individual Documents
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National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Human Rights and international relations
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Title: Statement from Karen Rivers Watch for International Day of Action for Rivers and Against Dams
Description:
"Today, on the International Day of Action for Rivers and Against Dams, we celebrate the healthy rivers that play a vital role in our lives, and call on governments, social organizations, and people around the world to stand united in protecting our rivers.
Rivers provide water for agriculture, drinking, and food production and they provide essential ecosystem services for humanity. They are also important for the protection of biodiversity and survival of countless trees, flora, and fauna species. However, living rivers are facing threats due to the building of dams and extraction of water and natural resources. In particular, large-scale hydropower projects built on rivers in Myanmar are having negative effects on the environment and people in river basins.
Large-scale development projects in Myanmar are ignoring the rights of Indigenous and local peoples; their participation rights and rights to their lands. Their rights are not recognised by the centralized system of governance in Myanmar. During the two years since the military coup, environmental damage has increased in Myanmar’s ethnic areas, while civic spaces and mechanisms for taking urgent action have broken down.
After the coup, the State Administration Council (SAC) leader announced the resumption of the Hatgyi dam project on the Salween river in Karen state. Military conflicts have occurred at the proposed Hatgyi Dam site since 2014. Gold mining in rivers, and river sand extraction activities have poisoned the waters and impacted local communities and the environment along the river. Along with militarized development, local people are also losing their livelihoods, homes, and lives due to the military’s air and ground attacks and many are hiding in forests. Humanitarian aid is urgently needed.
We, Karen Rivers Watch, Karen indigenous people, and Karen civil society partner organizations call upon international governments, UN agencies, investors, and individuals to preserve our healthy rivers and their ecosystems, and halt all large-scale hydropower projects on Myanmar’s rivers, which have significant social and environmental impacts. This is especially important at a time when climate change already contributes greatly to environmental degradation.
Today, on the International Day of Action for Rivers and Against Dams, we celebrate the beauty and power of living rivers and renew our commitments to protect them for all people and the planet. We make the following demands:
Karen Nation Union must:
Oppose all large-scale development and resource extraction projects that confiscate lands, destroy forests and threaten local livelihoods.
Implement their existing environmental policies and protect rivers, forests resources, endangered species and valuable resources.
Take action to prevent large business interests profiteering from Kawthoolei’s natural resources.
Resist the military dictatorship, which is perpetuating the centralized system which exploits the resources of ethnic groups, and instead encourage and support local management systems.
National Unity Consultative Council must:
Begin implementing policies to develop a federal resource management system that respects the rights of indigenous peoples and ethnic nationalities.
Blacklist companies and entrepreneurs who invest in or implement natural resources extraction projects which financially support the military.
Cooperate with civil society organizations to advocate to the international community.
International organizations, donors, and UN agencies must:
Terminate all loan programs to companies attempting to build Mega-dam projects that will damage people’s livelihoods and the environment.
Provide cross-border humanitarian aid to those affected by the ongoing conflicts in Burma through ethnics existing infrastructures..."
Source/publisher:
Karen Environmental and Social Action Network
Date of publication:
2023-04-14
Date of entry/update:
2023-04-14
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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"KEY DISPLACEMENT FIGURES
84,400 - Estimated refugee movements to neighbouring countries since 1 February 2021
1,086,000 - Refugees and asylum-seekers from Myanmar in neighbouring countries as of 30 June 2022
1,477,000 - Estimated total internally displaced persons (IDPs) within Myanmar, displaced since 1 February 2021
1,805,000 - Estimated total internally displaced persons (IDPs) within Myanmar as of 10 April 2023
HIGHLIGHTS
According to the UN, an estimated 1,805,000 internally displaced people (IDPs) were reported across the country as of 10 April 2023, including 1,477,000 people newly displaced since 1 February 2021.
In the North-West, the situation remains extremely volatile, particularly in Magway and Sagaing Regions following the declaration of Martial Law in 26 Townships. This elevated civilians’ risk of arbitrary arrest and detention and sparked an uptick in the number of clashes, checkpoints and destruction of properties.
In the South-East, indiscriminate and targeted shelling, airstrikes, clashes and destruction of properties was reported in Bago (East) and Tanintharyi Regions and Kayin, Kayah, Mon and Shan (South) States. Landmines and explosive remnants of war posed serious protection risks to civilians, especially women and children, and limited IDPs’ access to farmland for livelihoods and areas of origin.
In Kachin and Shan (North), civilian safety also deteriorated. Conflict in areas of IDP returns or planned returns heightened the security risks and reduced livelihoods opportunities for returnees and IDPs. In Shan State (North), protection risks such as forced recruitment continue to be reported.
In Rakhine and Chin (South) States, the informal November 2022 ceasefire between the Arakan Army (AA) and the Tatmadaw continues to hold. In Rakhine State (Central), concerns over IDPs who returned to areas with security and protection risks persists. Stringent restrictions on the Rohingya population’s freedom of movement, access to medical assistance, education and other basic services remain in place. Fears over IDP camp closures and safety in areas of relocation or return continue to be raised by IDPs..."
Source/publisher:
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (Geneva) via Reliefweb (New York)
Date of publication:
2023-04-14
Date of entry/update:
2023-04-14
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
UNHCR (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees), Food Security and nutrition in Burma/Myanmar, Public Health, Human Rights and international relations
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"ASEAN strongly condemns the reported recent air strikes carried out by the Myanmar Armed Forces in Pa Zi Gyi Village, Kanbalu Township, Sagaing Region of Myanmar, that claimed the lives of at least dozens of civilians.
All forms of violence must end immediately, particularly the use of force against civilians.
This would be the only way to create a conducive environment for an inclusive national dialogue to find a sustainable peaceful solution in Myanmar.
We reiterate ASEAN’s commitment to continue assisting Myanmar in seeking a workable and durable solution to the ongoing crisis through promoting the full implementation of the Five-Point Consensus..."
Source/publisher:
ASEAN Secretariat
Date of publication:
2023-04-13
Date of entry/update:
2023-04-13
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, ASEAN-Burma relations, Human Rights and international relations
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"Documented incidents
Myanmar
23 March 2023: In Kaing Taw Ma village and village tract, Myaing township, Pakokku district,
Magway region, the Myanmar military torched a public hospital and civilian houses. Source:
Facebook
25 March 2023: In Demoso township and district, Kayah state, the side window of an ambulance was damaged by artillery fire in armed clashes between the Myanmar military and a joint force of the Karenni Nationalities Defence Force and local resistance forces. Sources: Facebook and Facebook II
30 March 2023: In Htee Poe Ka Loe village and village tract, Demoso township and district, Kayah state, Myanmar military airstrikes hit trenches near a health facility, causing IDPs sheltering at the facility to flee and damaging a nearby school. Sources: Myanmar Now and Myanmar Now II
31 March 2023: In Nyaung Pin Thar village and village tract, Tigyaing township, Katha district,
Sagaing region, the Myanmar military torched a public hospital and over 200 civilian houses.
Sources: DVB, Facebook, and Twitter
Reported on 02 April 2023: In Madupi township and district, Chin state, the junta authorities have restricted the transport of medicine into the township since January 2023, causing medicine shortages. To access health care outside of Madupi township, civilians need junta-approved travel authorisation. Source: Irrawaddy
02 April 2023: Near Let Pan Kan village, Chauk Kan village tract, Pakokku township and district,
Magway region, a landmine detonated damaging the bonnet, front and back windshields of an ambulance. The Myanmar military accused the local resistance forces of this attack. Source:
Telegram
03 April 2023: In Pyigyitagon township, Mandalay district and region, the junta-appointed ward administrator and private clinic owner was shot dead in front of London Clinic, and his nephew critically injured. The local resistance force Aung Si Taw declared responsibility for the attack and claimed the victim was a military informant. Sources: Facebook, Mandalay Free Press, and Mizzima..."
Source/publisher:
Insecurity Insight (Geneva) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of publication:
2023-04-13
Date of entry/update:
2023-04-13
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"On the morning of Easter Monday, 10th of April 2023, the genocidal military junta once again targeted a Christian Village School in Webula town, Falam Township, Chin State by conducting barbaric bombardment which killed nine and critically wounded three innocent civilians including a pastor, school headmaster, teacher, school children, and women. This barbaric attack on the Christian population during our holiest week, the week of Good Friday, Easter Sunday, and Easter Monday is totally inhumane. We condemn in the strongest possible terms all acts of terrorism and crimes against humanity. These horrific attacks are part of the genocidal military junta’s brutal campaign of attacks against the Christian population. On the Christmas Eve, 24th December 2021, the genocidal military junta burned and killed 35 innocent civilians including children and the staff members of “Save the Children” in Hpruso Karenni State. New Year’s week, on 6th of January 2022, the genocidal military junta brutally tortured and killed 10 innocent civilians including children and journalist in Matupi Chin State.
The Webula massacre victims are:
1. Rev. J Saw Za Thang (Local Church Pastor)
2. Thawng Za UK (School Headmaster)
3. Daw Thian Sung
4. Salai Biak Hlai Ceu (12 years old)
5. Sayama Za Hnem Kim (School Teacher, 31 years old)
6. Salai Nathan Hrin Sang
7. Salai Noah San Lian
8. Daw Saw Hlai Kim
9. Chit Min Tu
Our deepest condolences, prayers and thoughts are with the families, relatives, and loved ones who are left behind in these horrific attacks. The words cannot describe the sadness, pain and suffering, death and destruction that have been poured upon the innocent people of Myanmar by the evil forces of the genocidal military generals.
The international Community has the power to stop these crimes against humanity being carried out against the people of Myanmar by taking immediate and decisive action. The genocidal military generals in Myanmar do not understand words, only actions. Our neighbours, ASEAN, the regional and International community, the UN Security Council, and International Criminal Court (ICC), and the entire free and democratic world must stand firm together in solidarity with the people of Myanmar in this darkest moment in our history. Defeating the brutal evil forces and perpetrators of crimes against humanity in Myanmar and Ukraine is a victory for the whole world.
The people of Ukraine and the people of Myanmar are facing the same fighter jets from Russia. The people of Myanmar and Ukraine are fighting for the course of democracy and freedom not only for ourselves but to make the whole world a better place for all. This world must break free from the global coordinated evil forces and cruel criminals. This darkness must be defeated for the light of freedom, peace, and prosperity to come for all humanity. If we rise up together for good then all these evils will fall immediately. The world cannot afford to lose this fight for freedom and justice. There is no other way than the way of life and peace. To have life, together we must win the struggle against the forces of death..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of International Cooperation Myanmar
Date of publication:
2023-04-13
Date of entry/update:
2023-04-13
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Human Rights and international relations
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"France condemns in the strongest possible terms yesterday’s horrific air strike by Myanmar’s forces on the village of Pa Zi Gyi, Myanmar, which left several dozen dead and injured, including children. This latest massacre of civilians is consistent with the Myanmar junta’s strategy, for more than two years now, of indiscriminate violence against the Myanmar people, who reject its illegitimate power grab. France offers its condolences to the victims’ families and loved ones.
France will continue to stand firmly with the Myanmar people, whose courage and staunch commitment to democracy we applaud..."
Source/publisher:
French Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Date of publication:
2023-04-13
Date of entry/update:
2023-04-13
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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"United States Mission to the United Nations
Office of Press and Public Diplomacy
For Immediate Release
April 13, 2023
Statement by Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield on the Burma Regime Airstrike
Today, the UN Security Council discussed the Burma military’s April 11 airstrike in the Sagaing region that killed more than 130 people and injured dozens of others, including children.
The United States condemns this latest attack by the Burma military regime, which is yet another example of its disregard for human life and international law. We reiterate our call on the regime to cease all forms of violence, allow unhindered humanitarian access, and respect the genuine and inclusive democratic aspirations of the people of Burma. The regime must abide by its obligations under international humanitarian law, including rules on the protection of civilians.
The Security Council must support the full implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 2669 and ASEAN’s Five Point Consensus and promote justice and accountability for the atrocities and abuses committed by Burma’s military regime.
The United States will continue to support peace, human rights, and the establishment of a path toward a genuine and inclusive, multi-party democracy in Burma through our work with members of the Security Council, other UN Member States, and regional partners, including ASEAN..."
Source/publisher:
United States Mission to the United Nations
Date of publication:
2023-04-13
Date of entry/update:
2023-04-13
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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"12 April 2023: The international community must take immediate action against the illegal military junta to protect the Myanmar people from escalating junta atrocities and bring its leaders to justice following Tuesday’s shocking airstrikes against civilians, says the Special Advisory Council for Myanmar (SAC-M).
At least 100 people, including children, were killed and dozens injured in an horrific aerial attack by junta forces on civilians in Pazigyi village, Kanbalu Township in the Sagaing Region of Myanmar on Tuesday, 11 April 2023.
According to local media, junta jets dropped bombs and junta attack helicopters fired machine guns on more than 100 people gathered in the village for the inauguration ceremony of a local civilian administration office on Tuesday morning. The junta then launched a second round of aerial attacks on the village later the same day, as people were attempting to locate and identify the dead.
The airstrikes could not have taken place without authorisation from commanders who report directly to the leader of the illegal junta, Min Aung Hlaing, through their chain of command. Only the junta has access to military aircraft in Myanmar.
The junta’s violence is in further blatant defiance of United Nations (UN) Security Council resolution 2669, adopted on 21 December 2022, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Five-Point Consensus, that Min Aung Hlaing agreed to with ASEAN leaders on 24 April 2021. The UN and ASEAN are being played for fools by Min Aung Hlaing and the Generals, who believe they will face no consequences for the barbaric violence they continue to inflict on the Myanmar people – violence that includes the 2016 and 2017 Rohingya genocide.
The UN Security Council must use its powers under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to enforce the junta’s compliance with its resolution, including through targeted sanctions on military financial interests and aviation fuel, a comprehensive arms embargo and referral to the International Criminal Court. SAC-M calls on the Security Council to convene an emergency meeting this week to consider actions under Chapter VII.
ASEAN must use its upcoming summit in May 2023 to adopt complementary punitive actions against the junta, with support from other governments in the region.
Support for the democratic resistance in Myanmar must be urgently stepped up, including, as a priority, the provision of cross-border humanitarian assistance delivered directly to those in need.
Until the military junta’s violence is ended, there can be no solution to the crisis in Myanmar..."
Source/publisher:
Special Advisory Council for Myanmar
Date of publication:
2023-04-12
Date of entry/update:
2023-04-12
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Military History, Human Rights and international relations
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"The Myanmar junta’s plan to use the National League for Democracy (NLD) to deceive the international community and Myanmar people has failed, as Myanmar’s most popular party will not contest the military regime’s proposed sham poll and has refused to re-register under the junta’s new political parties law.
The regime had hoped to persuade the NLD to contest the election, for which there is still no date, so that it would appear legitimate to the outside world. The junta only gave up hope on that plan last month, after waiting over two years to hold an election.
Last month, the regime arranged for NLD members to meet jailed former State Counselor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, hoping that they would be able to persuade the NLD leader to re-register her party with the junta-controlled Union Election Commission (UEC).
Two NLD central executive committee members traveled to Naypyitaw Prison to meet Suu Kyi on March 25, three days before the deadline for re-registration, to seek advice about whether or not to re-register the party.
Suu Kyi refused to meet the pair, but told prison authorities to “get them tea and let them go back”, putting an end to the junta’s plan to deceive the international community and NLD members.
The regime’s plan
Junta boss Min Aung Hlaing sees an election as a chance to cement the regime’s power politically.
However, with local and overseas condemnation of the planned poll, mounting international pressure and armed resistance from the parallel National Unity Government (NUG) and its armed wing the People’s Defense Forces (PDF), the junta is aware that its planned election will fail unless it is also contested by the NLD.
The regime naively thought that if the NLD contests the election, the junta would earn some regional and international credibility, while also deceiving the Myanmar people into believing the poll is legitimate.
That’s why the junta allowed senior NLD members to meet Daw Aung San Suu Kyi in the hope that she would give her blessing for the party to contest the election.
However, if the NLD with Suu Kyi contested the election, the military’s proxy parties would be unlikely to win, as the NLD has won every election it has contested by landslide victories. What the regime really wanted was for the NLD to take part in the poll without Suu Kyi.
The previous military dictatorship staged the 1990 and 2010 general elections while Suu Kyi was under house arrest.
Min Aung Hlaing also thought that if Daw Aung San Suu Kyi agreed to the NLD re-registering to take part in the poll, it would open up a divide between her and the NLD, as well as the NUG, the PDFs and international community including the United States. And the junta would have been able to prevent Suu Kyi from taking part in the poll as its election laws prevent prisoners from being members of registered political parties.
But Daw Aung San Suu Kyi refused even to meet the NLD members sent to sound her out, leaving the regime with no choice but to dissolve the NLD for refusing to re-register under the new political parties law.
Junta’s efforts behind the scenes
After the 2021 coup, the regime arrested Suu Kyi, as well as the NLD vice-chairs and almost all the NLD’s central executive committee. But it has chosen Daw Sandar Min and Monywa Aung Shin to resurrect the party.
Daw Sandar Min, a former NLD Yangon Region lawmaker, confessed that in recent interviews with the media.
The junta assigned a military intelligence office to control NLD lawmakers and party members, requiring them to agree not to engage with the NUG and PDFs.
It is Daw Sandar Min who has been acting as liaison between the regime and NLD lawmakers and party members.
In her media interviews, Daw Sandar Min was careful with her choice of words in talking about the coup. She echoes the Myanmar military’s line, describing the putsch as a “takeover in line with law”, which reflects her ties with the junta.
Daw Sandar Min and Monywa Aung Shin have tried in various ways to get permission from Daw Aung San Suu Kyi to re-open NLD party offices that were closed following the coup.
“Daw Sandar Min sent letters to Suu Kyi in jail,” a senior NLD member told The Irrawaddy. That is not something that could have been done without the approval of the junta.
She also visited Suu Kyi in prison, but in media interviews has admitted that they did not discuss politics and that she left after paying her respects to the ousted State Counselor.
According to sources in Naypyitaw, Suu Kyi received Daw Sandar Min, but later told the prison authorities not to deliver letters from Daw Sandar Min anymore, having already told her not to visit again. Another failed meeting confirmed this.
On March 25, former NLD Tanintharyi Region chair U Aung Soe and lower house lawmaker U Win Myint Aung, who represented Depayin Township in Sagaing Region, traveled to Naypyitaw Prison, where Suu Kyi is held in solitary confinement. Their visit came just three days before the regime-controlled UEC dissolved the NLD.
Daw Sandar Min did not accompany the two men, having been told not to come again. But Suu Kyi’s blunt message to “get them tea and let them go back” shattered the junta’s plan to exploit Suu Kyi and the NLD.
Now the regime faces a rerun of the 2010 poll, when proxy parties contested the poll and the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party took office..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2023-04-12
Date of entry/update:
2023-04-12
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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Description:
"Myanmar’s regime attacked Pazi Gyi village in Kantbalu Township, Sagaing Region, on Tuesday morning with a fighter jet and Mi-35 assault helicopter while a people’s authority office was being opened.
Around 100 civilians, including elderly people, women and children, were killed in the bombing.
A resistance fighter, who survived the attack, told The Irrawaddy about the incident.
What happened at the ceremony?
Resistance fighters to the west reported seeing a jet fighter. But the phone reception was poor and I could not hear clearly. I went outside and saw the fighter. Everyone else saw it too. Those who died didn’t have time to run.
Many people were stunned and they died watching the plane. I was lucky because I dived into a roadside ditch.
What happened next?
It dropped a bomb and there was an explosion and smoke. From the ditch, I could see dead bodies strewn everywhere.
I was only around 20 steps from the explosion. People around 20 meters away were injured. We asked the injured to shout out so we knew who could be rescued.
We could not identify the victims. Heads were separated from bodies. Children’s limbs were severed. Small pieces of flesh were spread around.
We searched for survivors through the jumble of bodies. We tried to send the injured to a clinic while looking out for more attacks.
The bombing was at around 8am and around 30 minutes later a Mi-35 strafed the village. It didn’t kill anyone.
What is the estimated death toll?
The bomb hit a crowd of around 150 people. Some victims were toddlers and other young children. More than 30 people were injured and around 15 survived. There were around 100 fatalities, including about 20 children.
Body parts were scattered. Most of the victims were women, including around 10 pregnant women. Only around 10 people escaped with minor injuries.
Could you estimate the death toll by body parts?
The bodies were unrecognizable. Some were without heads and limbs. We could not identify them. We put them together and burned them.
The event was to open a people’s authority office. Were the victims from many villages?
Most were Pazi Gyi villagers. Only a few were from other villages. It was still early so the other villagers had not arrived.
Was it going to be the only administrative office in the area?
The civilian administration office was built outside the village, partly to protect villagers. The office was flattened by a bomb. We didn’t hear screams when it was hit. People could not scream because they were killed immediately. Around 30 mines and shells behind the office ignited and the blasts lasted about an hour.
Were the bodies incinerated and can their families be contacted?
We burned the bodies together so no one can identify them now. We had to sweep up pieces of flesh with brooms. We have not fully cleaned up.
All the villagers have fled. We will only be able to name the victims when they are reported missing.
Were any resistance fighters killed?
Around 20 resistance fighters were killed but the majority of victims were civilians as the fighters were busy doing chores and were outside the building.
What is your response to the attack? How are the villagers coping?
It is quite despicable. I don’t complain about attacks if there is fighting in the area but there have only been a few clashes.
The attack was one-sided. Women and elderly people have left the area or are hiding in the forests. Some male villagers have returned to the village.
My ears are still buzzing and I see pieces of flesh everywhere..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2023-04-12
Date of entry/update:
2023-04-12
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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"(CNN)—
Relatives were still recovering the charred bodies and limbs of victims killed in a military airstrike on a village in central Myanmar Wednesday, a day after one of the deadliest attacks since the junta seized power in a coup two years ago.
An eyewitness, who hid in a tunnel during the attack, described a scene of horror as he approached the site of the military airstrike – of children dying, women screaming, and bodies heaped on the ground.
At least 133 people, including women and children, were killed after Myanmar’s military junta bombed Kanbalu township in the central Sagaing region on Tuesday, the human rights minister of the ousted shadow National Unity Government Aung Myo Min told CNN.
First responders and medical teams haven’t been able to return to the site of the attack because military planes have continued flying over the town, though there have been no further strikes, said Aung Myo Min.
At least 20 children were killed in the strike and 50 people injured, according to the Kyunhla activist group, which was at the scene.
About 300 people had gathered in Pazigyi Village early on Tuesday morning to celebrate the opening of a local administration office, an eyewitness told CNN on the condition of anonymity because he fears retribution. Families had traveled from nearby villages for the event, where tea and food was offered and which coincided with the start of the Thingyan New Year celebrations.
Like much of Sagaing, the area is not under the control of the military junta. The new town office was being opened under the authority of the shadow National Unity Government (NUG), for the people, as part of the anti-junta resistance.
“We didn’t have any warning,” the eyewitness said. “Most of the villagers were inside the event, so they didn’t notice the jet.”
Just before 8 a.m., a junta aircraft bombed the village where the ceremony was being held, the eyewitness and local media reported. An Mi35 helicopter then circled and fired on the village minutes later, the eyewitness told CNN.
“When I arrived at the scene we tried to search for people still alive,” he said. “Everything was terrible. People were dying (as they were being transported) on motorbikes. Children and women. Some lost their heads, limbs, hands. I saw flesh on the road.”
The eyewitness said he saw dozens of bodies after the attack, including children as young as five. He said he lost four family members in the strike, and a young child from his village was among the dead.
“I saw lots of people coming onto the scene to search for their kids, crying and screaming,” he said.
At around 5:30 p.m. the junta jets returned and shot the same place they had bombed that morning, he said.
CNN cannot independently verify the incident but the eyewitness’s account matches reports in local media and from the NUG.
Videos and images from the aftermath, shown to CNN from witnesses and a local activist group, also show bodies, some burned and in pieces, as well as destroyed buildings, vehicles and debris.
Myanmar’s junta spokesman Maj. Gen. Zaw Min Tun confirmed the airstrike on Pazigyi Village and said if civilian casualties occurred it was because they were forced to help “terrorists.”
The junta has designated the NUG and resistance groups known as the People’s Defense Force in the country as terrorists.
“At 8 a.m…. NUG (National Unity Government) and PDF (People’s Defense Force) conducted an opening ceremony of the public administration office at Pazigyi village,” Zaw Min Tun said on the military’s Myawaddy TV channel.
“We had launched the attack on them. We were informed that PDF were killed at that event under the attack. They are opposing our government.”
The strike was condemned internationally, with one top UN official saying global indifference to the situation in Myanmar contributed to the attack.
“The Myanmar military’s attacks against innocent people, including today’s airstrike in Sagaing, is enabled by world indifference and those supplying them with weapons,” said Tom Andrews, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar.
“How many Myanmar children need to die before world leaders take strong, coordinated action to stop this carnage?”
The US Department of State said it was “deeply concerned” about the airstrikes and called on the regime to “cease the horrific violence.”
“These violent attacks further underscore the regime’s disregard for human life and its responsibility for the dire political and humanitarian crisis in Burma following the February 2021 coup,” it said, using an alternative name for Myanmar.
It’s been just over two years since the military seized power, ousting the democratically elected government and jailing its leader Aung San Suu Kyi. In order to crush resistance, the junta regularly carries out airstrikes and ground attacks on what it calls “terrorist” targets.
The attacks have killed civilians, including children, and targeted schools, clinics, hospitals and other civilian infrastructure. Whole villages have been burned by junta soldiers and thousands of people have been displaced in the attacks, according to local monitoring groups.
Battles between the military and resistance groups unfold daily across Myanmar. These rebel groups, some of whom have aligned with some of the country’s long-established ethnic militias, effectively control parts of the country out of the junta’s reach.
Resistance groups and humanitarian organizations have repeatedly accused Myanmar’s military of carrying out mass killings, air strikes and war crimes against civilians in the regions where fighting has raged, charges the junta repeatedly denies – despite a growing body of evidence.
“They’re losing control of the country. They’re losing ground. Things are much more unstable on the ground than they’ve ever been,” the UN’s Andrews told CNN on Wednesday. “As a result of that, they’re using air power more and more and, of course, as they do so, more and more civilians are being killed.”
On Monday, junta airstrikes hit a town in western Chin state’s Falam Township, killing nine people when bombs dropped on a school, according to local media Myanmar Now and The Irrawaddy.
Last week, 8,000 refugees in southern Karen state fled across the border to Thailand, escaping fighting in Myawaddy township, according to a statement from Thailand’s Tak provincial office public relations department, posted to Facebook.
In March, at least 22 people, including three monks, were killed at a monastery in southern Shan state. And a military airstrike on a school in Sagaing in September killed at least 13 people, including seven children.
The eyewitness to Tuesday’s attack said the “situation in Myanmar is worse now.”
“People are dying like dogs or cows. We don’t have any weapons to compare with what the military has. We need the help of the international community,” he said..."
Source/publisher:
"CNN" (USA)
Date of publication:
2023-04-12
Date of entry/update:
2023-04-12
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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"JAKARTA – Parliamentarians from Southeast Asia strongly condemn the decision by the Thai authorities to hand-over three members of Myanmar opposition forces into the hands of junta allies, where they are likely to be tortured, or worse. ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights (APHR) calls on the Thai government and the international community to ensure that such an incident does not happen again.
“For far too long, the Thai authorities have been forcing asylum seekers and refugees back to Myanmar where they are at risk of persecution. This is a clear violation of international human rights law, norms and principles,” APHR Chair and member of the Indonesian House of Representatives, Mercy Barends, said today.
According to information APHR received from local civil society organizations, on 1 April, three members of a Myanmar opposition group crossed into Thailand to seek medical treatment. On their way to Mae Sot, the three men were stopped at a checkpoint and taken into custody by Thai immigration. Then, on the morning of April 4, the Thai authorities handed them over to the Myanmar junta -allied Border Guard Force (BGF), despite efforts from opposition groups to negotiate a release. Witnesses say that BGF troops shot at the men after the handover. According to media reports, at least one of the men was killed. The fates of the other two remain unclear.
Despite sharing an extensive border of more than 2,400 kilometers with Myanmar, the Thai government has not been welcoming to refugees who seek to escape the brutal violence of the Myanmar military. Human rights groups have repeatedly criticized Thailand for sending back those who cross the border. Asylum seekers from Myanmar in Thailand also face a precarious situation, where they lack legal protection and risk being deported at any time.
Earlier this year, the Thai government officially adopted the UN Convention Against Torture, which states that “no government organizations or public officials shall expel, deport, or extradite a person to another country where there are substantial grounds for believing that the person would be in danger of torture, cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment, or enforced disappearance.” Releasing these three men into the hands of the Myanmar junta, which has repeatedly arbitrarily arrested, tortured, and at times even extrajudicially executed dissidents, is clearly in violation of this convention.
“We urge the Thai government to allow those fleeing conflict in Myanmar to enter Thailand safely and to prioritize their protection. Thai authorities must immediately halt the deportation of citizens from Myanmar who face immense risks to their physical well-being in the hands of the junta,” said Barends. “In light of the upcoming Thai elections, we also urge all Thai political parties and candidates to address human rights concerns on their platforms. Lastly, we call on ASEAN, ASEAN member states, and the international community to put pressure on Thailand to ensure that all people are treated with dignity and that their rights are respected and upheld. No person who faces persecution in the country they are fleeing should be detained and forcibly returned.”..."
Source/publisher:
ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights
Date of publication:
2023-04-12
Date of entry/update:
2023-04-12
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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more
Description:
"‘I am horrified by reports of new military airstrikes killing civilians including children in Myanmar’, says Minister of Foreign Affairs Anniken Huitfeldt.
‘All forms of violence including attacks on civilians must end, international humanitarian law respected, and those responsible held accountable, in line with UN Security Council Resolution 2669.’..."
Source/publisher:
Norwegian Government
Date of publication:
2023-04-12
Date of entry/update:
2023-04-12
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
more
Description:
"Burma’s military junta carried out its deadliest attack yet on civilians in rebel-held areas when it bombed a meeting of community leaders Tuesday in the Sagaing region, killing an estimated 100 people, including 30 children. The military junta has increasingly used airstrikes to crush the resistance since it seized power in 2021, often targeting schools and clinics run by the opposition. The United Nations has warned of worsening humanitarian and human rights crises in Burma, with mass arrests, torture of prisoners, the killing of civilians, and media repression. To discuss this latest attack and the ongoing crisis in Burma, we’re joined by Maung Zarni, a Burmese scholar, dissident and human rights activist. His recent piece is titled “Myanmar Military’s Acts of Terrorism from the Sky & Savage Beheadings on the Ground.”
Transcript
This is a rush transcript. Copy may not be in its final form.
AMY GOODMAN: We begin today’s show in Burma, where the military junta is escalating its airstrikes on civilians. On Tuesday, it carried out its deadliest attack yet, when it bombed a gathering at a community hall, killing an estimated 100 people, including 30 children. Graphic images posted online and verified by Al Jazeera and other media show burning limbs at the scene.
This is how the BBC’s Jonathan Head described the attack, tweeting, quote, “Horrific air strike by military jets and helicopters this morning … Video posted by locals too awful to upload here but they say at least 53 dead, including women & children.” He continued, quote, “I cannot begin to describe how terrible the scenes are at Pa Zi Gyi. So many bodies, so horribly mangled.”
Members of Burma’s government-in-exile condemned the attack as a “heinous act” that constitutes “a war crime.”
The BBC and others have reported the military junta has increasingly used airstrikes to crush the resistance since it seized power in a 2021 coup, often targeting schools and clinics run by the opposition.
This comes as the United Nations has warned of worsening humanitarian and human rights crises in Burma, with mass arrests, torture of prisoners, the killing of civilians, and media repression.
For more, we’re joined by Maung Zarni, a Burmese scholar, dissident, human rights activist, co-founder of the Forces of Renewal for Southeast Asia, a grassroots network of pro-democracy scholars and human rights activists across Southeast Asia. His recent piece, titled “Myanmar Military’s Acts of Terrorism from the Sky & Savage Beheadings on the Ground.”
Zarni, welcome back to Democracy Now! Can you explain what’s happened in Burma, this latest attack, as you understand it?
MAUNG ZARNI: Well, Myanmar military is losing against the armed resistance on the ground that has sprung up since the military coup two years ago, so they are increasingly relying on airstrikes, and they are targeting the most vulnerable among the resistance communities. I mean, the whole country is up in arms. I mean, literally, every single community is involved in some kind of armed resistance against this, you know, 60-years-old military dictatorship. And so, they are trying to terrorize the civilian populations into submission.
What happened yesterday at Pa Zi Gyi, a large village not too far from Mandalay, where I grew up — this is the — Sagaing is the Naga province or state from Mandalay division. And what happened was that the — you know, about 800 villagers gather to open the local administrative services office, that the military got wind of the opening ceremony. And they decided that this was an occasion, a legitimate occasion, to target civilians. This is not indiscriminate killing of the mixed armed fighters and the civilians. This is civilian gathering. They knew it, and they targeted the civilians. Targeting civilians for political gains and terrorizing them, it’s — you know, by any definition, it’s terroristic activity. That’s why I called this the terrorism from the sky.
AMY GOODMAN: After the airstrike, Zarni, Amnesty International released an appeal titled “Urgent need to suspend aviation fuel as air strikes wreak havoc.” Who is providing the fuel? And what do you think needs to be done?
MAUNG ZARNI: Well, you know, turning off the flow of aviation fuel, that is transported through several ASEAN countries, Association of Southeast Asian countries, like Singapore, Thailand, and among others. Yes, they need to be turned off immediately.
But, Amy, the problem is not simply that aviation fuel is enabling the regime. What has enabled the regime to carry on as business as usual the increasing use of airstrikes against civilians are three things.
One is, you know, the Security Council’s failure to take any meaningful action. As you know, it’s a paralyzed body.
And the second is China’s recent resumption of its backing of the military. China decided that they are going to back the military, because the democratic resistance is at least notionally backed by the United States and the European Union.
And the third, and also very equally significant, is this deafening silence from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. ASEAN has been a complete failure in the case of Cambodian genocide, Rohingya genocide 40 years later, and it is failing when its member state is using air force to terrorize the civilian population, committing all kinds of, like, atrocious cracking of the military, that uses Russia’s gunship helicopters; the Western democracies’ failure to really back the democratic resistance as it is doing in Ukraine; and, thirdly, the ASEAN’s regional bloc’s complete and utter failure to lift a finger to stop the killings.
AMY GOODMAN: Who else is working with the Burmese military? And by the way, just for people to understand the term Burma and Myanmar, the military junta renaming Burma “Myanmar.” We refer to it as Burma. Zarni?
MAUNG ZARNI: Well, who else? I mean, a lot of — yeah, of course, like, we could point fingers at Burma’s immediate neighbors, like Thailand or India or China, that are involved in various strategic rivalries or economic contests. But there are also, like, you know, massive number of Western corporations, like from the U.S., from Canada, United Kingdom, European Union, Australia, Japan.
And so, this is not that different from what happened in tsarist Russia. You know, a hundred years ago, tsarist Russia was propped up or financially backed by French bankers and English economic and political interests. And against that, the Russian Revolution took place. And that is what is happening today, because, you know, the democratic struggles don’t happen in a vacuum. We are fighting a very, very steep uphill battle. And the United Nations, as a system of political states, are also failing. So there is so much palpable rage and frustration among the Burmese resistance fighters and the society as a whole.
And so, but the people have had enough. They are not taking it lying down, you know, the abuses and years of repression. They are fighting. Women are making bombs and involved in like, you know, sabotage operations. Young men, journalists, doctors, engineers, literally thousands of them have joined the armed resistance. Every single Burmese family knows or supports or has a member of a fighter that is against the regime. This is like, you know, 1940s Europe with partisans fighting the Nazi occupation.
AMY GOODMAN: Maung Zarni, two years ago, the U.S. government announced it’s, quote, “taking steps to prevent the generals from improperly accessing more than $1 billion in Burmese government funds held in the United States.” Your response to that? And is there a way to funnel that money to the Burmese people?
MAUNG ZARNI: Yes. I think, you know, the contrast between the Biden — I mean, it was President Biden who, within 10 days of the coup, walked on the White House press stage and then declared that this — he was going to freeze $1 billion U.S. that belongs to the people of Myanmar. Aung San Suu Kyi’s civilian government deposited that money in the U.S. financial institutions. Biden froze it. That’s the Burmese people’s money.
And then, on the other hand, the U.S. administration, as you know, has pumped more than $50 billion U.S. and emptied nearly all the shelves in terms of Pentagon arsenal to support the Ukrainian resistance. You know, we are happy that Ukraine gets support and unity of solidarity among Western nations, but we are fighting a similarly atrocious, Russian-backed regime in Burma, and we are not getting a penny.
So, I think we are not asking for American taxpayers to underwrite our liberation struggle. We are simply saying we have $1 billion that Joe Biden froze. Unfreeze that money and make sure that the corruption doesn’t mushroom out of that war chest. And there are ways to manage this wisely and with financial transparency. We cannot fight and win a liberation struggle on empty stomachs and homemade Molotov cocktails, when, you know, the repressive Myanmar military is well armed with Russian-made helicopters and MiG-29 jets and China’s backing, China’s arms. We need to have a level playing field. We are fighting a atrocious 60-year-old military dictatorship that has perpetrated genocide and that is perpetrating a long series of war crimes, crimes against humanity and every grave crimes ever written in international law.
Biden needs to unfreeze the money. He gave a speech at the Summit of Democracy, the second summit held in Seoul, and he did not even make a mention of Myanmar, while he praised on bravery of Ukrainian resistance. We are happy that Ukrainian brothers and sisters receive the Western backing, but, you know, we should also be receiving solidarity and support, and material support.
AMY GOODMAN: Maung Zarni, we want to thank you so much for being with us, Burmese scholar, dissident, human rights activist, co-founder of the Forces of Renewal for Southeast Asia, or FORSEA, a grassroots network of pro-democracy scholars and human rights activists across Southeast Asia. We’ll link to your “piece”: will lead to your piece, “Myanmar Military’s Acts of Terrorism from the Sky & Savage Beheadings on the Ground.”
Next up, the Philippines, where thousands of U.S., Filipino and Australian troops are holding the largest military drills ever, despite Chinese protest. Stay with us..."
Source/publisher:
Democracy Now!
Date of publication:
2023-04-12
Date of entry/update:
2023-04-12
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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Sub-title:
Attack targeted opening ceremony for office set up by military’s opponents in Sagaing region of Myanmar
Description:
"Myanmar’s military has killed dozens of people in airstrikes on an event organised by its domestic opponents, in what is feared to be one of the deadliest attacks since the junta seized power more than two years ago.
Local independent media reported that the attack on Tuesday morning targeted a ceremony marking the opening of an office set up by the military’s opponents in the village of Pa Zi Gyi, in Sagaing region.
The national unity government (NUG), which was set up to oppose the junta, said at least 53 people were confirmed dead, 40 were injured and the death toll was expected to rise.
“This morning, the Myanmar air force dropped multiple bombs on a civilian gathering of several hundred people, while attack helicopters strafed the crowd,” the NUG’s acting president, Duwa Lashi La, said in a statement.
Some local news outlets said residents feared the death toll could be as high as 100.
Images shared online that appear to have been taken after the attack showed people in civilian clothes dead on the ground beside a destroyed structure. In a video, a man can be heard saying: “If you have survived, please make a sound.” He tells others: “If you hear a shout, help them. Go, go.”
Kyaw Wunna, a rescue worker, told the Than Lwin Times that the new administration building – set up by a local people’s defence force (PDF), a volunteer group fighting to overthrow the military – had been completed only a week ago. Refreshments were being served at the opening ceremony and local people, including children, had attended.
On social media, many turned their profile pictures black in tribute to those killed.
A rescuer interviewed by the media outlet the Irrawaddy said children aged between three and five had been brought by their mothers to the event. “The corpses cannot be identified since they are all scattered in body parts – legs and heads. After gathering them all, we burned them.”
The UN human rights chief Volker Turk said he was “horrified” at the airstrikes, saying that the victims appeared to have included “schoolchildren performing dances, as well as other civilians.”
The airstrikes happened at about 8am local time on Tuesday morning, according to the NUG. The Kyunhla activist group, which is volunteering to help the injured, said the military launched another attack later in the day, at 5.35 pm, striking the same area three times.
The military, which seized power in a coup in February 2021, provoking widespread opposition among the public, has increasingly launched airstrikes in an attempt to crush a determined armed resistance movement. Strikes have hit schools, medical facilities, religious sites, civilian homes and infrastructure, according to Myanmar Witness, a group of open-source researchers that monitors atrocities.
The junta, which relies on Russian and Chinese aircraft, has not commented on Tuesday’s attack. It has previously denied atrocities against civilians and called resistance groups “terrorists” that it says are trying to devastate Myanmar.
Duwa Lashi La called for the attack to be condemned. “The military continues its mindless war on our country’s own people. Their sole aim is to consolidate power through death and destruction. They will not succeed. We will continue our fight for a new Myanmar. Our goal is a Myanmar in which such atrocities cannot occur and where power derives from the will of the people, not force of arms,” he said.
He asked neighbouring countries to provide humanitarian assistance to Sagaing and other regions engulfed in conflict.
Before the coup, the Sagaing region, home to the Buddhist-Bamar majority, had been spared the level of military violence and oppression that has long been inflicted on minorities in border regions. It is now one of the frontlines in the battle against the junta, and has been heavily targeted by airstrikes and the burning of villages.
The Amnesty International business and human rights researcher Montse Ferrer said there was an urgent need to suspend the supply of aviation fuel to Myanmar’s military.
“This supply chain fuels violations of international humanitarian law, including war crimes, and it must be disrupted in order to save lives,” Ferrer said. “Unlawful air attacks killing and injuring civilians and destroying homes are a trademark of the Myanmar military, which goes to despicable lengths to crush resistance and instil fear in the population. Myanmar’s civilians bear the brunt of these sickening tactics.”
The number of people in need of humanitarian assistance has soared since the coup, from 1 million to 17.6 million, according to the UN. Almost 1.8 million people are displaced across Myanmar.
Tuesday’s attack comes days before Thingyan, the Burmese new year festival, normally a time for water fights and celebrations in the streets. Since the coup, pro-democracy activists have called for the public to boycott junta-organised events.
Last weekend, opposition groups set off several bombs at pavilions built by the military for Thingyan in the cities of Yangon, Mandalay and Mawlamyine, according to a report by Radio Free Asia. Groups have warned of further attacks..."
Source/publisher:
"The Guardian" (UK)
Date of publication:
2023-04-11
Date of entry/update:
2023-04-11
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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Description:
"(CNN)— Around 100 people, including women and children, have been killed after Myanmar’s military junta bombed the Kant Balu township in the Sagaing region on Tuesday, according to the shadow government of the ousted administration.
The attack resulted in the “loss of scores of innocent civilians and injuring many more, including children and pregnant women,” the National Unity Government (NUG)’s Ministry of Labour said in a statement, describing it as a “heinous act” that constitutes “a war crime.”
Local news outlet The Irrawaddy reported that a junta aircraft dropped two bombs and fired on the village while people were gathered for the opening of a new town office.
The military junta has not yet commented publicly on the alleged attack. CNN has reached out to a military junta spokesperson, but not yet heard back.
Photos and videos shared by The Irrawaddy and other local media show bodies of victims, as well as destroyed buildings, vehicles and debris after the air raid. CNN has been unable to confirm the authenticity of the video and photos.
The Union Prime Minister of the NUG Mahn Winn Khine Thann said on Twitter he was “heartbroken” by the “aerial massacre.”
Thousands of people have been killed across Myanmar since the military seized power in a coup in February 2021.
The junta ousted democratically elected leader Aung San Suu Kyi, who was later sentenced to 33 years in jail during secretive trials. It has cracked down on anti-coup protests, arrested journalists and political prisoners, and executed several leading pro-democracy activists, drawing condemnation from the United Nations and rights groups.
Two years on, the Southeast Asian country is being rocked by violence and instability. The economy has collapsed, with shortages of food, fuel and other basic supplies.
The US last month placed a fresh series of sanctions on two people with alleged ties to the military and three businesses owned by them, a statement from the State Department said..."
Source/publisher:
"CNN" (USA)
Date of publication:
2023-04-11
Date of entry/update:
2023-04-11
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
more
Description:
"We are deeply concerned by today’s reports of a Burma military airstrike in the Sagaing region that killed more than 50 people and injured at least 30 people, including children. This attack follows reports of airstrikes in Chin State on April 10 that killed at least nine people. These violent attacks further underscore the regime’s disregard for human life and its responsibility for the dire political and humanitarian crisis in Burma following the February 2021 coup.
The United States calls on the Burma regime to cease the horrific violence, allow unhindered humanitarian access, and to respect the genuine and inclusive democratic aspirations of the people of Burma. The military regime must abide by its obligations under international humanitarian law, including rules on the protection of civilians. The United States will continue to work with the international community to hold the regime accountable for violations and abuses committed in Burma..."
Source/publisher:
U.S. Department of State
Date of publication:
2023-04-11
Date of entry/update:
2023-04-11
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
more
Description:
"On the morning of April 11th, 2023, the genocidal military junta carried out a
barbaric bombardment on the innocent civilians of Pazigyee Village, Sagaing. The
terrorist attack has resulted in countless tragic deaths and injuries, including many
among the elderly, women, and children. The genocidal military junta maintains a
semblance of control through brutal terroristic tactics, continues to escalate their
violent campaign of airstrikes throughout the nation. It is imperative that we,
domestically and internationally, recognise the ruthless and illegitimate nature of the
junta and unite to put an end to their heinous crimes against humanity.
We urgently call upon the International Community, including the UN Security
Council, neighbouring and Western Nations, ASEAN Member States, and all free
and Democratic Countries to take immediate and effective action to protect the
people of Myanmar. To prevent the junta from carrying out further violent airstrikes
on innocent civilians, we call for the establishment of a no-fly zone over Myanmar.
Additionally, stricter and more effective targeted sanctions must be imposed, in
particular those related to the importation of aviation fuel, arms, and munitions to
genocidal military junta; the purchase of oil, gas, and other natural resources from
Myanmar; and seizing foreign assets from those responsible for these atrocities.
Most importantly, the perpetrators must be held accountable for their crimes
against humanity. This can be achieved through investigation and prosecution in
international criminal courts (ICC), the issuing of international arrest warrants, travel
bans, and business bans. Moreover, the provision of support to civil society
organisations in Myanmar working for human rights and democracy is essential. It is
important that we work together to bring an end to the junta's reign of terror and
strive towards a brighter, more peaceful future for the people of Myanmar.
The National Unity Government remains resolute in our commitment to protecting
our people and bringing justice to those affected. In addition, we would like to
reassure that our ministry's priority has been to gather information and take action
to assist those impacted by this heinous crime. Our thoughts and prayers go out to
the victims of the Pazigyee village, Kantbalu airstrikes, and we extend our deepest
condolences, thoughts and prayers to their remaining family members and love
ones. Again, we implore the international community to stand with Myanmar people
in solidarity as we work towards a democratic and peaceful future for Myanmar..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of International Cooperation Myanmar
Date of publication:
2023-04-11
Date of entry/update:
2023-04-11
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Human Rights and international relations, International Criminal Court
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"Changes in Context
Throughout 2022, the people of Myanmar faced an unprecedented political, human rights, and humanitarian crisis that posed grave protection risks for civilians, limiting access to vital services including health and education, and causing worsening food insecurity. Humanitarian needs deepened across the country as conflict raged unabated, causing record levels of displacement, destruction of property, and explosive ordnance contamination, especially in the country’s Northwest and Southeast.
Forced recruitment of civilians, including of children, by armed groups jumped dramatically in 2022, while the use of heavy weapons such as airstrikes and artillery fire resulted in civilian casualties, damage to properties and constant threats to civilian safety. Access for humanitarian responders was heavily constrained, with bureaucratic blockages around registration, travel, banking, and visas, undermining the quality and reach of operations. Throughout the year, surging inflation forced up the prices of essential commodities, food items, and fuel, adding to financial stress for vulnerable households, worsening poverty and increasing the cost of humanitarian operations. Despite these barriers, humanitarians stayed and delivered, reaching a record 4.4 million people in need.
Expansion of conflict
Clashes and attacks escalated across multiple states and regions in Myanmar throughout 2022, affecting the lives of civilians on a much wider scale, further compounding their already stressed living conditions.
Fighting between the Myanmar Armed Forces (MAF) and various Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) and People’s Defence Forces (PDFs) escalated, particularly in the Northwest and Southeast, in 2022. The humanitarian and security situations in the Southeast deteriorated, with armed clashes and heavy use of air strikes and shelling occurring in all states and regions. Fighting in Kayin escalated in Lay Kay Kaw Town in Myawaddy Township in December 2021 resulting in the displacement of thousands of civilians both within the state and across Myanmar’s borders. Intense armed clashes occurred in many townships in eastern Bago, Kayah, Mon, southern Shan, and Tanintharyi. The presence of military troops in residential areas, reports of indiscriminate shooting, destruction of civilian properties, including houses, schools, churches and monasteries, and reports of landmine incidents in multiple locations across the country’s southeast all remained major protection concerns at year’s end.
The security situation in Chin, Magway and Sagaing in the Northwest continued to deteriorate throughout the year, with a dramatic increase in the number of displaced people and growing civilian protection threats amid armed clashes between the MAF and various PDFs. Large-scale burning and destruction of civilian properties was reported across the Northwest. As of 26 December 2022, more than 795,000 people remained displaced across the Northwest due to conflict and insecurity since the 2021 military takeover (68 per cent of all new IDPs nationwide).
Disruption of electricity and internet services in various parts of Myanmar, particularly in conflictaffected areas in the Northwest and Southeast, significantly hindered information-sharing and other communications among residents, undermining remote humanitarian assessments and engagement with affected people. Despite the growing humanitarian needs reported during the year, heavy restrictions were imposed on the transportation of rice, medicine, and fuel in conflict areas.
The situation in Rakhine and southern Chin, which had remained relatively calm since November 2020 following the lull in fighting between the Arakan Army (AA) and the MAF, again turned towards active conflict in August 2022. The use of heavy weapons, airstrikes, landmines, and mortar shelling occurred in multiple townships, mainly in Buthidaung, Maungdaw, and Rathedaung in northern Rakhine and Kyauktaw, Minbya, and Mrauk-U in central Rakhine. In a new dynamic, conflict between the AA and the MAF also spread into southern Rakhine in 2022. Security measures across many townships limited people’s movement, partially obstructing the delivery of humanitarian assistance. On 15 September 2022, the de facto authorities prohibited international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) and the United Nations from accessing six key townships – Buthidaung, Maungdaw, Minbya, Mrauk-U,
Myebon, and Rathedaung. An additional two townships were also added in early November (Pauktaw and Sittwe). An informal ceasefire was reached between the AA and the MAF later in November which allowed for the relaxation of some movement restrictions and at year’s end humanitarian partners were working to use the window of opportunity to deliver and pre-position much-needed supplies in communities that had been cut off during the preceding months of fighting.
This new outbreak of conflict placed Myanmar at ACAPS' highest ranking for the risk of ‘‘rapid and marked deterioration” within an existing crisis.4 It affected both Rohingya and Rakhine communities who have been caught between the two forces. Overall, close to 23,350 people remained displaced in Rakhine and Paletwa Township of Chin as a result of the resumed conflict between the AA and the MAF, bringing the total number of IDPs from past and present AA-MAF conflict to close to 97,000, as of 5 December 2022, according to UN figures. IDPs from this conflict are now being encouraged to return home by the de facto authorities but there are concerns that this is premature given that many people’s land or houses have been occupied, and because people’s places of origin are now contaminated by explosive ordnance. Efforts are being made to ensure that all returns are voluntary, safe and dignified.
The situation in northern Shan remained unstable in 2022 with continued clashes between the MAF and EAOs and among EAOs. Moreover, PDFs have become more involved in the conflict in northern Shan. The armed clashes led to multiple cases of new displacement. According to UN figures, as of 26 December 2022, approximately 8,300 people remained in temporary displacement sites and protracted camps in northern Shan, while 61,900 people (including IDPs displaced from Kayah) remained displaced in southern Shan.
In Kachin, armed conflict that resumed between the MAF and the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) following the 2021 military takeover continued in many townships throughout 2022. The intensification of armed clashes varied from roadside attacks to aerial bombardment and deployment of heavy weapons. The involvement of PDFs in the fighting became more frequent in 2022, as many formed alliances with the KIA against the MAF. Airstrikes with dozens of civilian casualties were also reported across Kachin. As of 26 December 2022, an estimated 13,600 people were internally displaced in Kachin because of fighting and insecurity since the February 2021 military takeover, according to the UN’s figures. This is in addition to the 91,500 people who were already displaced prior to 2021..."
Source/publisher:
UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (New York) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of publication:
2023-04-11
Date of entry/update:
2023-04-11
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Agriculture in Burma/Myanmar: general and research, Education in Burma/Myanmar - general, Food Security and nutrition in Burma/Myanmar, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
6.17 MB
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Description:
"Responding to reports of deadly air strikes in Sagaing Region’s Kanbulu Township, Amnesty International’s Business and Human Rights Researcher Montse Ferrer said:
“Initial reports on deadly air strikes in Sagaing Region are horrifying. Unlawful air attacks killing and injuring civilians and destroying homes are a trademark of the Myanmar military, which goes to despicable lengths to crush resistance and instill fear in the population. Myanmar’s civilians bear the brunt of these sickening tactics.
“The relentless air attacks across Myanmar highlight the urgent need to suspend the import of aviation fuel. Amnesty reiterates its calls on all states and businesses to stop shipments that may end up in the hands of the Myanmar Air Force. This supply chain fuels violations of international humanitarian law, including war crimes, and it must be disrupted in order to save lives.
“While some meaningful action has been taken, the international community can and must do more to stop attacks on civilians in Myanmar. These air strikes come just ahead of the two-year anniversary of ASEAN’s five-point consensus on Myanmar, which has utterly failed to stop the military’s atrocities.
“Instead of taking a back seat, ASEAN must step up and play a leading role in resolving the human rights catastrophe in Myanmar. The United Nations Security Council must find ways to push through effective actions to hold the Myanmar military accountable, including by referring the situation in the country to the International Criminal Court.”
Background:
On the morning of 11 April, Myanmar’s military carried out air strikes on a village in Kanbulu township, Sagaing Region, according to initial reports and social media footage. An unknown number of people, including children, are believed to have been killed in the attack. Amnesty International has not been able to independently verify the details.
Since the coup on 1 February 2021, Amnesty International has documented widespread human rights violations, including war crimes and possible crimes against humanity as part of the military’s crackdown on the opposition across the country.
In November 2022, Amnesty International launched a campaign calling for a suspension of the supply of aviation fuel to prevent the Myanmar military from carrying out unlawful air strikes. The investigation also identified companies involved across the supply chain.
On the eve of the two-year anniversary of the military coup of 1 February 2021, several countries imposed further sanctions on Myanmar, this time focusing on the aviation fuel industry.
Canada’s government moved to prohibit the export, sale, supply or shipment of aviation fuel to the Myanmar military. The UK also announced sanctions targeting two Myanmar companies and two individuals that Amnesty International first identified in Deadly Cargo: Exposing the supply chain that fuels war crimes in Myanmar as playing an essential role in importing, handling and transporting aviation fuel to the Myanmar military’s air force.
In March 2023, the UK announced a second round of sanctions targeting individuals and companies exposed in Amnesty International’s latest research on aviation fuel supply to Myanmar.
The European Union and the US have also announced sanctions targeting various individuals and entities that played a role in the importation, storage and distribution of aviation fuel to the Myanmar military..."
Source/publisher:
"Amnesty International" (UK)
Date of publication:
2023-04-11
Date of entry/update:
2023-04-11
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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Sub-title:
Statement condemning the illegal military junta’s horrific aerial attack on Kanbalu Township of Sagaing Region
Description:
"This Sagaing attack comes just a day after junta air strikes in Va and Waibula villages of Palan Township in Chin State that killed nine civilians and destroyed homes and school buildings. These combined aerial attacks showcase the junta’s escalating terror campaign against the Myanmar people, despite the repeated condemnation of ASEAN Leaders and the UN Security Council. Only last week, on 4 April, the UN’s Human Rights Council passed a consensus resolution that condemned the junta’s deliberate, widespread, indiscriminate and disproportionate use of force against civilians and called on the junta to immediately cease all air strikes. The junta has answered in the only way it know how – through intensified atrocities and bloodshed..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Human Rights
Date of publication:
2023-04-11
Date of entry/update:
2023-04-11
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Crimes Against Humanity, Human Rights and international relations
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"The following statement was issued today by the Spokesman for UN Secretary-General António Guterres:
The Secretary-General strongly condemns the attack by the Myanmar Armed Forces today in Kanbalu Township in Sagaing Region. He calls for those responsible to be held accountable.
The Secretary-General offers his deepest condolences to the families of the victims and calls for those injured to be allowed urgent medical treatment and access to assistance.
The Secretary-General condemns all forms of violence and reaffirms the primacy of protection of civilians, in accordance with international humanitarian law. He reiterates his call for the military to end the campaign of violence against the Myanmar population throughout the country, in line with Security Council resolution 2669 (2022)..."
Source/publisher:
UN Secretary-General
Date of publication:
2023-04-11
Date of entry/update:
2023-04-11
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, UN Secretary-General's statements on Burma/Myanmar, Human Rights and international relations
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Description:
"We have learnt that the Myanmar Military Council committed airstrike on the civilians gathering in Pazigyee Village, Kantbalu Township, Sagain Region on 11 April, 2023 resulting the bloody massacre of innocent civilians and injuring many more, including children and women.
We, the Ministry of Justice, the National Unity Government extended our deepest sympathies and condolences to those who lost their lives and those who were injured in the tragic incident.
In this case, the Myanmar Military Council has intentionally and purposely committed brutal massacre of innocent civilians of Myanmar, war crimes and crimes against humanity. We, as the Ministry of Justice strongly condemn all terrorist acts committed against Myanmar innocent civilians and officially announced that we will try our best to get justice for those who suffered and all those perpetrators with impunity will be investigated and punished as they deserve..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Justice - NUG
Date of publication:
2023-04-11
Date of entry/update:
2023-04-11
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Human Rights and international relations
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21.03 KB
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Sub-title:
စစ်ကိုင်းတိုင်း၊ ကန့်ဘလူမြို့နယ်ကို အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စုမှ ဆိုးရွားစွာ လေကြောင်းမှ တိုက်ခိုက်မှုအပေါ် ရှုတ်ချကြောင်း ထုတ်ပြန်ချက်
Description:
""အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စုအနေဖြင့် အာဆီယံခေါင်းဆောင်များနှင့် ကုလသမဂ္ဂလုံခြုံရေးကောင်စီ ၏ စဉ်ဆက်မပြတ် ရှုတ်ချမှုများကို မျက်ကွယ်ပြုလျက် မြန်မာပြည်သူများအပေါ် အကြမ်းဖက်မှု ပိုမိုဆိုးရွားစွာ ကျူးလွန်နေလျက်ရှိကြောင်း လေကြောင်းမှ ယခုကဲ့သို့ ပူးတွဲတိုက်ခိုက်မှုများက ဖော်ပြလျက်ရှိသည်။
ယခင်တစ်ပတ် ဧပြီလ (၄ )ရက် နေ့ကပင် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စု၏ အရပ်သားများအပေါ် ရည်ရွယ်ချက်ရှိရှိ၊ ကျယ်ကျယ်ပြန့်ပြန့်၊ အရပ်ဘက် စစ်ဘက် ပစ်မှတ်ခွဲခြားမှုမရှိ၊ မတန်တဆအင်အားသုံး တိုက်ခိုက်မှုများအပေါ် ရှုတ်ချကြောင်း ဆုံးဖြတ်ချက်တရပ်ကို ကုလသမဂ္ဂ လူ့အခွင့်အရေးကောင်စီအနေဖြင့် ဘုံသဘောတူညီချက်ဖြင့် ချမှတ်ခဲ့ပြီး၊ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စု၏ လေကြောင်းတိုက်ခိုက်မှုများအားလုံးကို ရပ်တန့်ရန် တောင်းဆိုခဲ့ပြီးဖြစ်သည်။ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စုသည် ထိုသို့သော ဆုံးဖြတ်ချက်ကိုပင်လျှင် ပိုမိုဆိုးရွားပြင်းထန်သော သတ်ဖြတ်မှု၊ သွေးချောင်းစီးမှုဖြင့် တုံ့ပြန်ခဲ့ပြီဖြစ်သည်။”..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Human Rights
Date of publication:
2023-04-11
Date of entry/update:
2023-04-11
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Crimes Against Humanity, Human Rights and international relations
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"Situation in Numbers
5,600,000 children in need of humanitarian assistance
17,600,000 people in need (HRP 2023)
1,438,600 Internally displaced people after 1 February 2021 (UNHCR)
52,200 People displaced to neighbouring countries since 1 February 2021
328,000 people living in protracted displacement before February 2021
Highlights
The humanitarian and human rights situation in Myanmar remains volatile in the first quarter of 2023, with continuing displacement in the north-west and south-east. The number of people displaced nationally reached 1,766,600 with a slight decrease for those prior to 1 February 2021, now 328,000 displaced compared to previous report indicating 330,400.
In Kachin, Shan and Rakhine states displaced people were instructed to return to their place of origins by the end of March, but with limited information on safe return or assistance.
31,187 people received primary health care services, and 465 children aged 9–18 months were vaccinated against measles in Rakhine, Kachin, and Shan with the assistance of partner organizations.
Under the Bright Start programme, 71,155 people received telemedicine consultation services, including 59,936 consultations for children under 5 and 11,219 consultations for pregnant women. The programme also provided 1,360 investigations of antenatal care for pregnant women and 32 investigations for children under 5.
Funding Overview and Partnerships
UNICEF Myanmar Country Office is appealing for US$169.6 million in 2023 to address the needs of the 2.8 million people it has targeted, including an estimated 1.9 million children. During the reporting period, UNICEF secured US$19.15 million, 11.3 per cent of its Humanitarian Action for Children (HAC) appeal. UNICEF has received this generous support from the Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance (BHA), the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the United States Fund for UNICEF, the Humanitarian Aid Department of the European Commission (ECHO), the Government of Japan, the Government of Norway, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), the World Health Organization (WHO), Gavi the vaccine alliance and through Global Humanitarian Thematic Funding. UNICEF and its partners continue to deliver much-needed services covering nutrition, health, HIV/AIDS, water sanitation and hygiene (WASH), education, child protection, gender-based violence in emergencies, protection against sexual exploitation and abuse, social protection and cash-based programming, accountability to affected populations (AAP), humanitarian leadership and cluster coordination. The programmes hope to scale up services to the targeted populations, especially to children in need, with continued support from donors. UNICEF expresses its sincere appreciation to all private and public sector donors for their contributions to supporting the children of Myanmar.
Situation Overview & Humanitarian Needs
Armed conflicts continue across Myanmar, particularly in the southeast and northwest where there is regular heavy fighting, air strikes, artillery shelling and the destruction of civilian properties. The humanitarian and human rights situation in Myanmar remains volatile in the first quarter of 2023, with continued new displacement, especially in the north-west and south-east. The number of people displaced rose to 1.77 million across the country at the end of March1 up from 1.66 at the end of February.
The situation is particularly acute in Sagaing Region, where there are 744,000 displaced people (as of 27 March 2023). Armed clashes are continuing and access to the region by road is blocked. Nationally, tight security measures have also restricted the delivery of supplies in northwest and southeast regions in particular, there are reports of luggage and supplies being inspected at several checkpoints, leading to delays in partner movements necessary for the implementation and monitoring of activities.
Alongside these new displacements, there has been an increased focus by some state-level authorities for people in protracted displacement to return to their villages of origin. In Kachin, Shan and Rakhine states, local authorities instructed people living in displacement sites to return to their place of origins by the end of March. However, limited information on support for safe return has been provided and many displaced people remain concerned regarding safety, security, and lack of basic services in their places of origin. In some locations, populations have been offered some assistance, but this has been inconsistent across locations and generally considered to be insufficient to meet immediate basic needs. To date, due to access limitations, it has not been possible to carry out assessments in the majority of return locations.
In Kayah (Karenni) State, the south-east regions, approximately 20,000 newly displaced people need food, medicines, and tarpaulins to make temporary shelters. Water shortage is another emerging issue with the lack of hygiene causing rashes and diarrhoea among children under 5. Most of the camps are far from any hospital or clinic making it difficult for people to seek medical assistance. Estimates suggest that a high percentage of displaced people, particularly women and children, are suffering from depression and trauma after losing their homes, property and/or family members..."
Source/publisher:
UN Children's Fund (New York) via Reliefweb (New York)
Date of publication:
2023-04-07
Date of entry/update:
2023-04-07
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
UNICEF (United Nations Children's Fund), Human rights and education, Public Health, Human Rights and international relations
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pdf
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412.24 KB
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"Nearly two thousand years ago, on a dark and stormy Friday, the lives of billions of people were effected by an earth shattering event. Lightning flashed, thunder rolled, the earth shook and the elements vehemently reacted to a most ghastly scene. Magistrates, religious leaders and common folk alike were awed and fearful at the sight. The silhouettes of the three crosses standing high on the mount were illuminated by the incessant lightning, and a loud cry rang out from the middle cross saying “it is finished!” With this, our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ breathed His last, and His head fell motionless on His chest as He hung from the cross. The significance of His words ring true till this day; “it is finished.” He was betrayed by the people of His time, and yet He willingly laid down His life to pay the price for the sins of the whole world, a price that could only be payed in sinless blood. Those who obey, believe and trust in His ultimate sacrifice need no longer to pay the price for their own sins, for they are covered by the blood of humanity’s Saviour Jesus Christ who died and rose again the third day from death to bring liberty, freedom and salvation from the bondage of sin and sorrow. “God commendeth His love towards us, in that, while we were yet sinners, Christ died for us.” Romans 5:8
At the present, the people of Myanmar have yet again been betrayed by the very institutions who have the duty to protect them. The brutal junta continues to cause intense suffering and pain on the people of Myanmar, pain and suffering that our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ has experienced in even greater measure than any of us. And yet, He overcame all obstacles, and finished His mission of liberating this earth from the clutches of the devil, just as we the people of Myanmar will overcome this cruel junta, and realize our mission of bringing liberty and peace to Myanmar. Truly it is not through our own strength alone that we shall overcome, but united together as one people, with one goal and with the help of God we will surely overcome this trial to obtain our freedoms once and for all. As Jesus was being nailed to the cross, He prayed earnestly to His Father in heaven, “Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do.” Even as He hung dying the most excruciating death, with the weight of all the sins of the world on His shoulders, he requested forgiveness for His murderers. Oh, what love! That a perfect, sinless being should come to this earth, take on the form of a mere human, live a sinless life, and atone for all the sins of this world; past, present and future - this, my friends, is what truly makes this Friday good despite all the bad things happening right now in our homeland.
We can take courage therefore in the knowledge that we, the people of Myanmar, are not alone in our fight against brutal military oppression. Emmanuel, “God with us.” Christ vanquished evil once on the cross, and He can just as easily give us the strength and courage to vanquish the evil of this junta, both physically and spiritually. Salvation belongs to God, our redeemer, Father and friend. Through Him, we will dispel the darkness of generations of brutal dictatorships. Through His power we will seek the strength to bring all of the war mongers, criminals and genocide perpetrators to justice. The road to freedom, victory, and prosperity is no easy path, but it is one we have committed our lives to trod, and we will see it through to completion.
I implore you, brothers and sisters of Myanmar, from every race, religion, ethnicity and background - now is the time for us to rally, to fully stand together as one, and put an end to this regime through every effort and legal means. I implore you, the international community, to both stand together with us and fully support us, the people and National Unity Government of Myanmar, and help us to rid the earth of this wicked, cruel system of oppression. United together, we can land the final fatal blow on military dictatorship in Myanmar, and rebuild this nation into the peaceful, freedom-loving land that it is meant to be.
May you all be strong in the strength of Christ, knowing that the victory in this battle of good and evil has only one outcome, namely, the triumph of good over evil.
May God bless you, and may God bless Myanmar!..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of International Cooperation Myanmar
Date of publication:
2023-04-07
Date of entry/update:
2023-04-07
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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"This regular update, covering humanitarian developments up to 27 March, is produced by OCHA Myanmar in collaboration with the Inter-Cluster Coordination Group and UN agencies. Response figures are based on self-reporting by organizations to clusters. The next humanitarian update will be issued at the end of April 2023.
HIGHLIGHTS & KEY MESSAGES
Heavy fighting continues in many parts of the country, generating new humanitarian needs and further restricting the movement of goods and people.
Conflict and other threats to the safety of civilians have intensified, particularly in the country’s Northwest which is now hosting the almost a million displaced people.
As of 27 March, almost 1.8 million people remain displaced across the country. This includes more than 1.4 people who have been internally displaced by conflict and insecurity since February 2021.
Concerns persist over moves to close displacement camps in many parts of the country while many IDPs remain worried about safety and livelihoods opportunities in their places of origin.
Humanitarian operations continue to be hampered by a range of physical and administrative obstacles.
The ceasefire between the Arakan Army (AA) and the Myanmar Armed Forces (MAF) in Rakhine is still holding although it remains fragile.
In 2023, 17.6 million people - nearly one third of the population - are estimated to be in humanitarian need.
In 2023, the humanitarian community has prioritized support for 4.5 million people with severe needs, predominantly in conflict affected rural areas.
A quarter of the way into the year, the US$764m Humanitarian Response Plan is only 8 per cent funded.
KEY FIGURES
1.8M Total people currently internally displaced across Myanmar
1.4M People currently displaced by clashes and insecurity since February 2021
328K People internally displaced due to conflict prior to February 2021, mainly in Rakhine, Kachin, Chin, and Shan
60K Civilian properties estimated burnt or destroyed since February 2021.
SITUATION OVERVIEW
Overview Section
An alarming humanitarian situation continues to unfold in Myanmar, with ongoing armed clashes in multiple states and regions, particularly in the Northwest and the Southeast, driving rising humanitarian needs.
The overall number of IDPs continues to rise. According to the latest UN figures as of 27 March, the total number of IDPs in Myanmar stands at almost 1.8 million. This includes more than 1.4 million people who remain displaced by conflict and insecurity since the military takeover, and more than 328,000 people who were already displaced from previous conflicts. Of the total IDPs since the military takeover, the Northwest is hosting the highest number - now 971,700 IDPs - followed by the Southeast - 429,800 IDPs. IDPs are living in precarious conditions in camps and informal sites, often in jungles and forests. Moves continue by the de facto authorities to close displacement camps in various parts of the country, including Kachin, Shan, Chin and Rakhine. Humanitarians remain concerned that some IDPs might have to move prematurely, while clashes are ongoing or while conditions are not safe or suitable because of explosive ordnance contamination, destruction of housing, poor access to services and lack of livelihoods.
Humanitarian partners estimate that 17.6 million people are in need in 2023. The 2023 Humanitarian Response Plan targets 4.5 million of those in most severe need, predominantly in conflict-affected rural areas. A quarter of the way into 2023, just 8 per cent of the required funds have been received according to FTS. A dramatic increase in funding and an expansion of access will be critical for the humanitarian community to reach those prioritized for lifesaving assistance this year.
In 2022, humanitarian organizations were able to reach at least 4.4 million people with assistance, but this support was not as deep or sustained as planned due to access constraints and severe underfunding..."
Source/publisher:
UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (New York) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of publication:
2023-04-06
Date of entry/update:
2023-04-06
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Education in Burma/Myanmar - general, Food Security and nutrition in Burma/Myanmar, Public Health, Human Rights and international relations
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1 MB
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"Myanmar: Military targets civilians in Sagaing region and southern Shan state
Incidents of violence targeting civilians by state forces increased in March compared to the previous month. In Sagaing region, a column composed of Light Infantry Division 99 troops, which has come to be known as the ‘Ogre Column,’ carried out a number of civilian killings as it made its way across the region. Several civilians were reportedly killed following a raid on Tar Taing village in Sagaing township early in the month. A few weeks after the violence in Tar Taing, on 19 March, coup leader Min Aung Hlaing visited the Northwestern Regional Command base in Monywa.1 The military’s campaign of violence in the region falls under the Northwestern Regional Command.2 Meanwhile, as fighting between the military and resistance forces intensified in Kayah and southern Shan states, resistance groups reported that the military had killed dozens of people in Nan Neint village in southern Shan state.3
Afghanistan: Political violence involving the Islamic State increases
The Islamic State (IS) in Afghanistan was reportedly involved in at least twelve political violence events in March, marking a fourfold increase compared to the previous month. Over the past months, IS has targeted Taliban officials amid ongoing Taliban operations against the group. On 27 March, a IS suicide bomber reportedly killed six employees of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This marked the second attack on the ministry in 2023. Earlier in the month, the Balkh governor was killed in an IS suicide bombing. In addition to IS targeting Taliban officials, on 11 March, IS also targeted journalists in a bomb attack on a ceremony honoring journalists in Mazar-e-Sharif city in Balkh province. IS claimed they carried out the attack against journalists for their involvement in the “war and instigation against IS.”4
Pakistan: PTI-led demonstrations spike as Imran Khan faces corruption case
Supporters of Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf (PTI) chairman and former Prime Minister Imran Khan took to the streets across Pakistan in March against attempts to arrest Khan over non-compliance with a court summons in a corruption case. Outside Khan’s residence in Lahore, hundreds of his supporters threw stones and petrol bombs at police to thwart his arrest.5 On 18 March, Khan arrived in Islamabad for a court hearing amid clashes between PTI activists and police outside the judicial complex. In his absence, police entered and searched his residence in Lahore, clashing with PTI activists present at the site.6 Pakistan police have arrested hundreds of PTI activists for violence during the demonstrations.7 Khan has dismissed the corruption allegations as being politically motivated and has reiterated concerns about his personal safety following an assassination attempt last year. The latest developments come amid ongoing demonstrations by the PTI demanding early national elections, which are currently scheduled for later this year.8
Bangladesh: Rohingya refugees subject to increasing violence
Rohingya refugees continue to be the target of increasing violence in Bangladesh. While this violence is underreported, several refugees were killed by unidentified assailants in at least eight distinct attacks in Cox’s Bazar in March. The attacks come amid ongoing tensions between the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army and the Rohingya Solidarity Organization, rival armed Rohingya groups active in the camps. Earlier in the month, the two groups clashed. A subsequent fire in one of the refugee camps, which left thousands homeless, was thought to stem from this conflict.9
Philippines: Negros Oriental governor killed amid ongoing targeting of local administrators
On 4 March, nine people were reportedly killed when unidentified assailants targeted Negros Oriental Governor Roel Degamo, killing him along with a barangay chairman, barangay councilor, and six other civilians. The attack took place at the governor’s home in Barangay San Isidro in Pamplona, Negros Oriental. The killing came a month after the Supreme Court declared Degamo the winner of the governorship over his rival, Pryde Henry Teves, who was initially declared the winner.10 The Department of Justice is investigating Teves’s brother, a congressman, for allegedly orchestrating the attack. Following the governor’s killing, President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. called for a crackdown on illegal firearms and private armies. Since the beginning of the year, ACLED has recorded dozens of attacks on local administrators in the Philippines..."
Source/publisher:
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project
Date of publication:
2023-04-06
Date of entry/update:
2023-04-06
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Burmese refugees in Bangladesh, Discrimination against the Rohingya, Rohingya (cultural, political etc.)
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"MYANMAR
Conflict involving artillery fire and frequent airstrikes continued in multiple states and regions during the reporting period. In Kachin, there were airstrikes in Hpakant Township, explosions in Mohnyin Township and military operations including civilian arrests in many villages in Hpakant, Shwegue and Sumprabum townships in March. Consequently, more than 1,300 people from several villages in Shwegu Township in Kachin were displaced in early March and are being hosted in 10 displacement sites and forest areas in the same township. Newly displaced people reportedly require food, shelter and other essential relief items and humanitarian partners are working to respond to their needs.
As of 27 March 2023, almost 1.8 million people remained displaced across the country, according to the latest UN figures. This includes more than 1.4 million people displaced since the military takeover..."
Source/publisher:
UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (New York) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of publication:
2023-04-05
Date of entry/update:
2023-04-05
Grouping:
Individual Documents
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Format :
pdf
Size:
2.29 MB
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"The Republic of the Union of Myanmar welcomes the Human Rights Council’s adoption by consensus of the resolution on the situation of human rights in Myanmar. Myanmar extends its appreciation to the European Union and to cosponsors.
The new resolution is stronger than last year’s text and it capitalises on recent momentum, including the UN Security Council’s historic 2022 resolution on Myanmar which stressed the need to uphold democratic institutions and processes in Myanmar in accordance with the will of the people. As the Human Rights Council’s new resolution confirms, the Myanmar people expressed this democratic will in the general election held on 8 November 2020.
The new resolution also condemns the illegal military junta’s deliberate, widespread, indiscriminate and disproportionate use of force against civilians, including airstrikes, killings, torture and sexual and gender-based violence. This established pattern of intentional attacks constitutes likely crimes against humanity in addition to certain war crimes and grave human rights violations and abuses.
It is therefore unfortunate that, despite the best efforts of the EU and likeminded States, Human Rights Council Members could not agree on stronger language to block the export, sale, transfer and diversion of arms, munitions and other military equipment including dual-use items to the criminal junta.
The junta’s atrocities also demand accountability. The new resolution expresses strong support for accountability processes, including at the International Court of Justice and through the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar’s (IIMM) preparation of case files. Progress must see the International Criminal Court (ICC) recognise the National Unity Government’s article 12(3) declaration issued in July 2021, which accepted the ICC’s jurisdiction over international crimes committed in Myanmar since 1 July 2002.
Significantly, the new resolution welcomes the National Unity Government’s pronouncement of its “Policy position on the Rohingya in Rakhine State” on 3 June 2021. The Republic of the Union of Myanmar, as represented by the National Unity Government, recognises the Rohingya as Myanmar citizens and remains committed to replacing the 1982 Citizenship Law and to the voluntary, safe, dignified and sustainable return of Rohingya refugees to their homes in Myanmar.
On ASEAN, the resolution supports the regional group’s efforts while expressing deep concern at the lack of progress in implementing the Five-Point Consensus. Accordingly, the Human Rights Council has requested the UN Secretary-General to continue to call the Security Council’s attention to the situation in Myanmar. The Security Council should in turn consider all measures at its disposal, including those under Chapter VII of the UN Charter given the threat that the junta poses to peace and security.
The resolution also invites the Secretary-General to ‘offer relevant recommendations to enable more effective work in the future and to strengthen the prevention capacity of the United Nations system’ in follow-up to the Rosenthal report. Acting on this invitation, the Secretary-General should commission an inquiry into whether the UN Country Team in Myanmar is taking adequate steps to avoid a repeat of past UN failures and to meet its obligations under the Secretary-General's Call to Action for Human Rights and under the UNCT’s own ‘programmatic engagement guidelines’. A public report with clear findings and recommendations should follow.
Myanmar, as represented by the National Unity Government, supports the Human Rights Council’s extension of the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on Myanmar and accepts the call for an OHCHR country office to be opened. Myanmar will also continue to cooperate with the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Myanmar, the IIMM and other UN mandate-holders, human rights mechanisms and international and regional courts, tribunals and human rights bodies..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Human Rights
Date of publication:
2023-04-05
Date of entry/update:
2023-04-05
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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"SITUATION AT A GLANCE:
4.5 MILLION People Targeted for Humanitarian Assistance in Burma
UN – January 2023
1.4 MILLION IDPs in Burma Displaced Since February 2021
UNHCR – March 2023
1.7 MILLION People Displaced in Burma
UNHCR– March 2023
950,972 Estimated Number of Refugees in Bangladesh
UNHCR – November 2022
1.5 MILLION People Targeted by 2023 Rohingya Humanitarian Crisis Joint Response Plan
UN – March 2023
• Military authorities in Burma declare martial law in 47 townships across Burma, hindering the operations of relief actors and exacerbating protection risks faced by violence-affected populations.
• Fire in a Cox’s Bazar District Rohingya refugee camp on March 5 displaces over 5,200 individuals and damages or destroys more than 2,800 refugee shelters, as well as nearly 160 camp facilities.
• The UN 2023 Rohingya Humanitarian Crisis JRP targets approximately 1.5 million people in Cox’s Bazar and Bhasan Char to receive life-saving assistance..."
Source/publisher:
US Agency for International Development (Washington, D.C.) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of publication:
2023-04-04
Date of entry/update:
2023-04-04
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Food Security and nutrition in Burma/Myanmar, Human Rights and international relations, Burmese refugees in Bangladesh, Internal displacement/forced migration of Rohingyas
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232.91 KB
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Description:
"Myanmar’s Spring Revolution is now in its third year since the February 2021 military coup. Despite facing brutal repression, including arson attacks and aerial bombardment by Myanmar’s state security personnel, ordinary people across the country are continuing to resist the return to dictatorship. What explains the extraordinary resilience of their civil disobedience and armed resistance efforts?
Roots of Resilience
Many in Myanmar are furious about the return to tyranny and the bleak implications for them, their children, and their country. These grievances have been channeled into the revolutionary struggle over the past two years, which has been sustained by a deeply-ingrained culture of reciprocity, charity, and philanthropy that has developed over decades. Indeed, many of the ideas and practices of self-reliance, reciprocity and moral citizenship now at the core of the Spring Revolution have roots in the fitful post-socialist market reforms of the 1990s and 2000s.
In my book, “Outsourcing the Polity: Non-State Welfare, Inequality and Resistance in Myanmar,” I draw on extensive fieldwork to explore the origins of Myanmar’s vibrant non-state welfare sector. Examining the political economy of provincial economic liberalization after the collapse of the Burma Socialist Program Party in 1988, I uncover how state officials encouraged the provision of social aid and public goods by non-state actors. Sub-national military commanders suppressed anti-junta and democratic party activity but permitted ostensibly “apolitical” welfare-oriented village and neighborhood groups to flourish. Meanwhile, regional junta officials issued commercial licenses and tax exemptions to businesspeople who assumed roles as informal civilian administrators and often became patrons of both government-sponsored and grassroots welfare groups.
Outsourcing enabled dire state social austerity; the junta of the 1990s slashed social expenditure and used the funds to instead double the size of the armed forces. Alongside often fragile commercial ceasefires reached with ethnic armed elites, transferring social responsibility to the non-state sector allowed Myanmar’s military to focus instead on forcefully expanding the central state into restive borderland regions.
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Democratic Outsourcing
The legacies of post-1988 social outsourcing continued to shape the character of politics after the military initiated a transition to partial civilian rule in 2011. Both the Thein Sein (2011-2016) and Aung San Suu Kyi (2016-2021) administrations continued to encourage charities, philanthropists, the private sector, and religious communities to perform social welfare and development roles, often in exchange for tax deductions. Rather than turn to the state to deliver social development, communities were told by their elected representatives to rely on each other and the “free market” to solve social problems.
Community groups even ran quarantine facilities and fundraised for the government’s vaccination procurement program amid the COVID-19 pandemic, at the encouragement of Aung San Suu Kyi herself. Meanwhile, after 2010, tycoons sought to remake their public reputations and protect their questionably accrued assets from taxation or redistribution by helping to fill the gaps in social provisioning left by decades of austerity.
The military’s February 2021 ousting of elected civilian leaders has spawned thousands of new groups in neighborhoods and villages across the country. These networks are helping to support the needy, resource pro-democracy militias, provide education to children fleeing violence and deliver social governance in large areas of the country that are no longer military-controlled. They are also at the vanguard of imagining and enacting alternative social ideals and models to dictatorship which reject the militarization and economic exploitation of the so-called “democratic decade” (2011-2021).
Yet few of these groups receive any funds from the international community – even though they are playing crucial humanitarian and social roles. In one township in Sagaing Region, for instance, an alliance of local social actors including welfare groups, militias, traders, and striking teachers are helping to resource and run a network of more than a dozen schools that are educating thousands of young people. Initiatives like theirs currently receive almost no foreign aid but are performing essential social governance functions in the wake of the junta’s administrative collapse in most rural and borderland areas of the country. Foreign governments and humanitarian actors must ensure these networks are far better resourced as the dictatorship continues to cling to power.
The remarkable role of non-state welfare actors and ideals in sustaining Myanmar’s democratic struggle has implications for understanding distributive politics, autocratic legacies and civil resistance elsewhere. For now, though it is clear that a new wave of social outsourcing is underway in Myanmar – one that is simultaneously deepening communal self-reliance while also sustaining the fight for a more inclusive and democratic future.
This article was originally published by the Center for International Studies at Cornell University. It is reprinted with permission..."
Source/publisher:
Cornell University via "The Diplomat" (Japan)
Date of publication:
2023-04-02
Date of entry/update:
2023-04-02
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
more
Sub-title:
The United Nations has played into the military’s hands in Rakhine State, by acquiescing when the regime starved communities of aid and then restored humanitarian access to achieve its war aims.
Description:
"When its fragile ceasefire with the Arakan Army collapsed mid last year, the Myanmar military faced early and significant losses on the battlefield. In response, it targeted civilians with violence and some of the harshest restrictions in Rakhine State in decades, including on aid. Only when this extreme pressure on civilians over several months had driven the AA into another ceasefire did the military allow the United Nations and its partners some access to alleviate suffering. UN agencies active in the country were a passive tool in the military’s strategy, providing little resistance to its hostage-holding of civilians.
This manipulation of aid is worth examining closely, for the lessons it holds not just for humanitarian actors in Rakhine, but for anyone navigating Myanmar’s conflict zones in the aftermath of the 2021 military coup. This examination should start with the breakdown of a ceasefire between the AA and military that was agreed to in late 2020. This ceasefire turned Rakhine into a rare quiet spot amid the ensuing anti-coup protests and armed resistance, but it also allowed the AA to expand the parallel administrative structures under its political wing, the United League of Arakan, and reinforce its military positions.
The rapid consolidation of AA power unnerved the junta, which began arresting dozens of alleged AA affiliates in the first half of last year. Then from August 22, the AA launched new offensives against the military in northern Rakhine’s Maungdaw Township and southern Chin State’s Paletwa Township, spelling the end of the ceasefire.
The AA quickly took several key positions from the military, which retaliated by launching airstrikes and shelling civilians in the historic capital of Mrauk-U, far from the site of the offensives. By September 5, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reported that 9,500 people had been newly displaced in Rakhine, joining some 75,000 people already displaced by fighting between 2018 and 2020, and approximately 140,000 Rohingya internally displaced in 2012.
The AA’s early gains illustrated its strength on the battlefield, against a military preoccupied with putting down resistance to its 2021 coup elsewhere in the country. With the objective of drawing the fighting with the AA to a quick close, the junta implemented extensive and perhaps unprecedented restrictions on civilians.
In early September the junta blocked medicine imports through the state’s land borders and banned shipments through central and northern Rakhine. Soldiers were posted outside Maungdaw General Hospital, preventing nurses from moving medicine without permission, while junta-employed health workers were prohibited from working in rural areas. The junta also suspended public boat transport through central and northern Rakhine. This gravely affected civilians, who rely upon these systems to access jobs and healthcare, as well as food and other imported goods.
The tit-for-tat continued when, in early September, the AA seized at least three more strategic camps, while occupying other camps as junta troops retreated. The junta responded by blocking all civilian movement through waterways in central and northern areas of the state – beyond just public transport.
Then in mid-September, the junta announced unprecedented bans on international humanitarian aid. Although aid agencies in Rakhine have long faced extensive restrictions, the new regulations blocked access to six entire townships. In November, it extended the humanitarian aid ban to two more townships.
Raising the costs of war
Insurgent groups like the AA rely heavily on support from communities, without which they would flounder. Rakhine communities feel they have been neglected by the central Myanmar state for decades, and the AA’s promises of self-determination and restoring the former glory of their region have been very successful in winning popular support and legitimacy.
For the military, severing the links between communities and insurgent groups is a longstanding approach, designed to starve its opponents of resources, and to make the costs of supporting insurgency too high for communities to sustain. While this approach rarely results in the complete defeat of insurgent foes, whose legitimacy is based in part on opposition to the junta’s barbaric tactics, it has often allowed the military to weaken and contain insurgencies in Myanmar’s borderlands.
The new restrictions, however, were not enough to immediately weaken the AA, so the junta increasingly turned to violence against civilians. On September 23, it raided and burnt down houses in a village in Buthidaung Township, using the same indiscriminate violence it used against Rohingya civilians in 2017, and is now inflicting on civilians in central Myanmar. The shelling of urban areas – almost guaranteed to cause civilian casualties – increased in Minbya and Buthidaung townships in early October, while junta troops entered downtown Mrauk-U and villages in Kyauktaw Township, where they fired small arms unprovoked.
The junta also tightened its restrictions, erecting new roadblocks on highways and blockading remote villages. Meanwhile, those who continued operating boats for their livelihoods risked being arrested or having their vessels seized. The regime also increased arrests of anyone suspected of supporting the AA, including civil society leaders, monks, village administrators and businesspeople.
Yet the military remained under intense military pressure from the AA. The group not only retaliated against the restrictions by blocking military supply lines, but also illustrated its ability to operate across a wide region by launching several attacks in southern Rakhine, far from the main theatre of conflict.
In mid-October the junta dramatically escalated its atrocities against civilians. On October 17, junta shelling killed four civilians and injured at least another six. Six days later, three Rohingya men were injured, reportedly due to junta firing from drones, and on October 31 shelling killed three civilians. At the same time, the AA launched repeated attacks on the junta along the Bangladesh border.
The intense restrictions had become unbearable by November but had particularly dire implications with the onset of the rice harvest. The Rakhine Farmer’s Union estimated that nearly half of the paddy fields in Rakhine would be left unharvested due to the fighting, creating hardship and food insecurity that could last for years.
The situation appeared to reach a tipping point when, on November 10, the AA ambushed a military convoy in Ponnagyun, a short drive from the state capital Sittwe. Junta troops entered nearby Sin Inn Gyi village, where they massacred nine residents and set houses alight. Thousands fled their homes, and the military arrested civilians on suspicion of cooperation with the AA. Days later, the junta shelled civilian areas in Maungdaw, killing at least 10 people and reportedly wounding more than 30 others.
A reliable tool
On November 26, news broke that the AA and junta had agreed to a new truce, which the former called a “humanitarian pause”. Radio Free Asia reported that at least 45 civilians had been killed and over 100 injured due to the fighting since August, while the UN said more than 16,000 people had been displaced. This brought the total number of people displaced by the multi-year conflict between the AA and military to more than 89,000.
The junta has since slowly restored humanitarian access for the UN and its partners, although it remains piecemeal. The regime has also gradually loosened its restrictions on movement and trade, including imports of food and medicine, and allowed farmers to harvest their crops.
The junta’s restrictions on aid were part of a larger package designed to push the AA into a ceasefire by depriving civilians of access to food and livelihoods, while simultaneously killing or displacing civilians and destroying their property. This instrumentalisation of international aid is not new and is not unique to Rakhine. The junta blocks aid to communities in areas controlled by resistance forces in southeast Myanmar and elsewhere, while permitting its flow to communities deemed “loyal” to the regime.
The camps hosting displaced Rohingya in central Rakhine are perhaps the most egregious example of the military’s manipulation of aid. It has effectively locked Rohingya communities in these camps since 2012, stripping them of documentation and blocking their movement and access to basic healthcare, education and other rights, while counting on UN agencies and their partners to fill the gap year after year.
Similarly, this month UN has been in the spotlight for allowing boats from two UN agencies to be used by regime officials travelling from northern Rakhine to refugee camps in Bangladesh, in support of a pilot scheme to repatriate about 1,000 Rohingya. The UN has said its staff faced a “firm request” and had little choice but to lend out the boats, but this apparently violates the UN’s own policies on engaging the regime, as well as its public pronouncements that conditions in northern Rakhine do not allow for the sustainable return of refugees.
The UN has never acknowledged its routine manipulation by the military but has instead acted as a reliable tool. It has rarely even acknowledged that the military is the main barrier to aid operations. Its 2023 Humanitarian Response Plan, published in January, notes “access restrictions” last year without mentioning who was chiefly imposing them. Instead, it alleges “interference” by the AA, obscuring the reality that the military is not only the greatest cause of humanitarian need but also the greatest impediment to humanitarian access.
The UN is in a difficult position. Its mandate is to provide assistance and relieve suffering within a highly constrained environment. In the short term, responding to openings in access is entirely justifiable. But in the longer term, what is being done to break this pattern of manipulation, when continued cooperation and acquiescence will only embolden the junta and encourage them to target civilians?
The UN should start with a reckoning of how it has allowed itself to be instrumentalised year after year across the country without protest. Instead of vilifying resistance groups in its reports, it should consider which organisations have the popular legitimacy to govern, which are interested in alleviating suffering and developing their communities, and which are preoccupied with inflicting that suffering. By failing to reckon with its routine manipulation, the UN is simply facilitating the military’s oppression..."
Source/publisher:
"Frontier Myanmar" (Myanmar)
Date of publication:
2023-03-31
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-31
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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more
Description:
"Global Affairs Canada today issued the following statement:
“Canada condemns the Myanmar regime’s dissolution of 40 political parties, including the National League for Democracy and Shan Nationalities League for Democracy. These clear attempts to undermine Myanmar’s democratic institutions and to silence opposition voices will only serve to deepen the ongoing crisis in Myanmar and delay the return to a fully democratic and inclusive Myanmar.
“The regimes overruled the democratic wishes of the people of Myanmar when they seized power in a coup on February 1, 2021.
“Canada continues to call for a peaceful return to Myanmar’s democratic path in line with the aspirations of the people of Myanmar. Any political process without inclusive dialogue, with opposition members detained, killed or silenced risks worsening conflict.
“We call on the regime to release those arbitrarily detained, including political leaders, and end the violence and targeting of civilians, grant full and unhindered humanitarian access, and respect its obligations under international law. We also call on the international community to support efforts to hold those responsible for human rights violations and abuses to account; to cease the sale and transfer of arms and equipment, which facilitate atrocities; and to meet the urgent humanitarian needs of Myanmar’s people, including its most vulnerable communities.
“Canada supports the efforts of those working peacefully for an inclusive, peaceful and multiparty democratic Myanmar where the rights of all are protected.”..."
Source/publisher:
Government of Canada
Date of publication:
2023-03-30
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-30
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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more
Description:
"We strongly condemn the Burma military regime-controlled Union Election Commission’s decision to abolish 40 political parties, including the National League for Democracy (NLD).
The people voted overwhelmingly to re-elect the NLD and other parties in November 2020 national elections. The military regime’s decision to dissolve the political parties shows its continued contempt for the popular will of Burma’s people and multi-party democracy. The military’s ongoing efforts to stifle political dissent and eradicate civic space are designed to further entrench its own power and interests. This action further demonstrates that the regime’s plans for deeply flawed elections, if held, will not represent the will of Burma’s voters.
The United States calls on the military regime to reverse course, end the use of violence against the people in Burma, free those it has unjustly detained, and respect its obligations under international law. We remain committed to supporting genuine multiparty democracy, peace, and respect for human rights..."
Source/publisher:
U.S. Department of State
Date of publication:
2023-03-30
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-30
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Articles and reports about the NLD, Human Rights and international relations
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Description:
'SG/SM/21754
30 MARCH 2023
The following statement was issued today by the Spokesman for UN Secretary-General António Guterres:
The Secretary-General is deeply concerned by reports that the Union Election Commission, appointed by the military in Myanmar, has dissolved 40 opposition parties, including the National League for Democracy (NLD) led by State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. Any attempts to undermine democratic institutions and processes will only deepen the crisis and delay the return to a fully democratic and inclusive Myanmar.
The Secretary-General renews his call on neighbouring countries and other Member States to urge the military leadership to adhere to inclusive political processes.
The Secretary-General reiterates his call for the immediate release of all arbitrarily detained prisoners, including President Win Myint and State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi..."
Source/publisher:
UN Secretary-General
Date of publication:
2023-03-30
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-30
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Armed conflict and peace-building in Burma - theoretical, strategic and general, Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
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Sub-title:
Military Seeks to Legitimize Rule Through Sham Elections
Description:
"Myanmar’s military junta announced this week that the National League for Democracy (NLD) is among 40 political parties and other groups dissolved for failing to meet a political party registration deadline imposed under the new Political Party Registration Law.
The junta, which staged a military coup on February 1, 2021, claims it wants to hold elections, and promulgated the party registration law on January 26. However, its provisions appear intended to indefinitely delay, rather than facilitate, Myanmar’s return to civilian democratic rule. The law requires existing political parties to reregister within 60 days or be dissolved. But many of the parties – including the NLD – refused to comply, saying that ongoing military oppression prevents proposed elections from being credible.
The 2021 coup resulted in the military overthrow of the newly elected NLD-led government and the detention of elected civilian officials. The junta has since committed numerous abuses including crimes against humanity against protesters and activists, and war crimes in ethnic minority areas. It has also severely restricted freedom of speech, association, and assembly.
The registration law also stacks the deck for the military by prohibiting anyone convicted of a crime from joining a party, effectively disqualifying many opposition leaders, including NLD leader Aung San Suu Kyi and president Win Myint, who are both serving lengthy sentences on politically motivated charges.
Under the new law and earlier martial law orders, any election would be dominated by junta-backed political parties and the military itself, which already holds 25 percent of seats in the national and local legislatures under the 2008 Constitution. But the junta still seems determined to remove the NLD and other independent political parties from polls and install its own parties instead.
In the face of widescale political oppression, genuinely free and fair elections are not possible in Myanmar for the foreseeable future. Concerned governments, including regional partners such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Japan, and India, should not be fooled into thinking that the junta’s new election laws and regulations can be the basis for a credible electoral process. Instead, they should recognize that the junta is merely attempting to legitimize military rule through sham elections..."
Source/publisher:
Human Rights Watch (USA)
Date of publication:
2023-03-29
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-29
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
more
Description:
"1. On 22 March 2023, three Mizoram residents (Male-2 and Female-1) were killed by a group of unidentified people at a place along the border of Chin State in Myanmar and Mizoram State in India. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the National Unity Government is deeply saddened by this news and our thoughts and prayers are with the families of the victims.
2. The Ministry is concerned about the allegation of such tragic incident against some Myanmar citizens, which has gone viral on social media.
3. The Ministry would like to express its strong support for the efforts of the law enforcement authorities and the local government in their attempts to bring the perpetrators to justice in a fair and just manner.
4. In addition, the Ministry would like to strongly urge Myanmar citizens seeking refuge in India to build mutually respectful relationships with the residents of relevant states and to actively cooperate in the maintenance of regional security and the rule of law..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Myanmar - NUG
Date of publication:
2023-03-29
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-29
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
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21.78 KB
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"၁။ ၂၀၂၃ ခုနှစ် မတ်လ (၂၂) ရက်နေ့တွင် အိန္ဒိယနိုင်ငံ၊ မီဇိုရမ်ပြည်နယ်နှင့် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၊ ချင်းပြည်နယ် ထိစပ်သည့် နယ်စပ်တစ်နေရာ၌ မီဇိုရမ်ပြည်နယ်သား သုံးဦး (ကျား - ၂၊ မ -၁) အား အမည်မသိ လူတစ်စုက သတ်ဖြတ်ခဲ့ကြောင်း သိရှိရသည့် အတွက် အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၊ နိုင်ငံခြားရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာန အနေဖြင့် ကျန်ရစ်သူ မိသားစုဝင်များ နှင့် ထပ်တူ များစွာ စိတ်မကောင်းဖြစ်ရပါသည်။
၂။ ယင်းဖြစ်ရပ်နှင့်ပတ်သက်၍ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံသားအချို့အား စွပ်စွဲပြောဆိုမှုများလည်း လူမှုကွန်ယက်များတွင် ကျယ်ကျယ်ပြန့်ပြန့်ထွက်ပေါ်လျှက်ရှိသဖြင့် မိမိတို့အနေဖြင့် များစွာ စိုးရိမ်မကင်းဖြစ်မိပါသည်။
၃။ အမှုမှန်ပေါ်ပေါက်ပြီး ကျုးလွန်သူများအား ဖမ်းဆီးရရှိနိုင်ရေးအတွက် သက်ဆိုင်ရာ ဒေသန္တရအစိုးရနှင့် တရားဥပဒေစိုးမိုးရေးဘက် ဆိုင်ရာတာဝန်ရှိသူများ၏ တရားနည်းလမ်း ကျသော ကြိုးပမ်း အားထုတ် ဆောင်ရွက်မှုများကို မိမိတို့အနေဖြင့် အလေးအနက် ထောက်ခံပါကြောင်း ဖော်ပြလိုပါသည်။
၄။ အိန္ဒိယနိုင်ငံတွင် ခိုလှုံနေထိုင်နေကြသည့် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံသား စစ်ဘေးရှောင်ပြည်သူများအနေဖြင့် သက်ဆိုင်ရာ ဒေသခံပြည်သူများနှင့် အပြန်အလှန်လေးစားတန်ဖိုးထားမှုရှိသောဆက်ဆံရေးများကို တည်ဆောက်ပြီး၊ ဒေသတွင်း လုံခြုံရေးနှင့် တရားဥပဒေစိုးမိုးရေးထိန်းသိမ်းဆောင်ရွက်မှုများတွင် ပူးပေါင်းကူညီပေးကြပါရန် အလေးအနက် တိုက်တွန်းပန်ကြားအပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Myanmar - NUG
Date of publication:
2023-03-29
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-29
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Individual Documents
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National Unity Government (NUG), Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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"Documented incidents:
Reported on 07-19 March 2023: In Pinlaung township, Taunggyi district, Shan state (South), the Myanmar military and the ethnic armed group Pa-O National Organisation allied with the Myanmar military banned the transport of medicines into the township where IDPs were taking shelter. At the checkpoint in Aungban town, Kalaw township, Taunggyi district, Shan state (South) on the highway heading to Pinlaung township, the Myanmar military seized medicine cargoes on19 March 2023.
Sources: Delta News Agency I, Delta News Agency II, and Facebook 10 March 2023: In Hpakant township, Mohnyin district, Kachin state, a Myanmar military airstrike damaged a Kachin Independence Army (KIA) clinic building, garage, and kitchen, and injured three KIA personnels. Source: Kachin News Group 12 March 2023: In Zar Di village and village tract, Yebyu township, Dawei district, Tanintharyi region, the Myanmar military arrested a retired male health assistant and other two civilians following the killing of a military informant by an unknown armed group in this village. This is the second-time arrest of this health assistant after the 2021 military coup; he was released from the prison just before this incident. The staff member was also a political activist. Sources: Dawei Watch, Democratic Voice of Burma, and Than Lwin Times 13 March 2023: In Tedim town, township, and district, Chin state, PDF Zoland attacked the Myanmar military occupying the district hospital (public, secondary-level). During the armed clashes, although the hospital was functioning, no patients or health care personnels were harmed according to the reports. The military had occupied the hospital for four months before this attack.
The clashes ended with the killing of four soldiers, the military leaving the hospital, and seizing of weapons and accessories of the Myanmar military. Sources: BBC Burmese, Facebook, Mekong News, and Narinjara 14 March 2023: In Myitkyina town, township, and district, Kachin state, the Myanmar military in civilian clothes arrested a female nurse from Myat Mon Private Hospital while she was on duty. She was forced to disclose the location of her partner and both of them were arrested. She was from Sagaing region and has worked in this hospital for five months. Source: The 74 Media 18 March 2023: In Ayadaw town and township, Monywa district, Sagaing region, a female midwife was killed at her private clinic at home by a man and woman impersonating patients. She was shot dead on the spot with gunshot wounds to the head and chest. At the time of the attack, her husband and 10-year-old son were at home, but they were not harmed. The midwife was not affiliated with the Civil Disobedience Movement; her duty station was at Ayadaw township hospital after the 2021 military coup. Sources: Ayadaw Post, Mekong News, and Telegram 19 March 2023: In Hlaing town and township, Yangon (West) district, Yangon region, voluntary aid workers of a local NGO offering ambulance services to the injured and deceased civilians in a road traffic accident were physically abused by a Myanmar military major. Source: Khit Thit Media 20 March 2023: In Sanchaung town and township, Yangon (West) district, Yangon region, a 20-year-old male second-year medical student was killed by a group of gunmen at his home. His aunt was critically injured and a passer-by got a gunshot wound. He passed away after being admitted to the hospital. He was believed to be a military informant having assisted in the arrest of CDM-affiliated medical students and health workers at medical universities. The victim was not affiliated with CDM. His father was a former lieutenant colonel and his brother-in-law was a major in the Myanmar military. Sources: Khit Thit Media, Mekong News, and Telegram 20 March 2023: In Kyeemyindaing town and township, Yangon (West) district, Yangon region, a CDM-affiliated medical student and his/her family members were arrested, and their apartment was sealed and confiscated following the killing of a medical student in Sanchaung township on the same day. Source: Mekong News 21 March 2023: In Pakokku town, township, and district, Magway region, at the military checkpoint near Pakokku bridge, the Myanmar military arrested a doctor who was on her way from Yangon city, Yangon region to Myaing township, Magway region, allegedly to offer health care to the local resistance forces. A civilian lady who reportedly assisted the arrest was also arrested. Sources:
Chindwin News Agency and Telegram..."
Source/publisher:
Insecurity Insight (Geneva) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of publication:
2023-03-21
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-28
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"Two years after carrying out a coup, Myanmar’s generals are planning elections to entrench their role in politics. Amid the widespread resistance to their regime, the polls are bound to intensify armed conflict. Yet there are several ways to keep electoral violence to a minimum.
Overview
The Myanmar regime is undertaking the necessary legal and procedural steps for national elections. It has said it intends to hold the polls as soon it can, perhaps by November, although it has announced no date and delays are possible. Amid the state oppression following the 2021 coup, no election can be credible, especially when much of the population sees a vote as a cynical attempt to supplant the landslide victory of Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD) in 2020. The polls will almost certainly intensify the post-coup conflict, as the regime seeks to force them through and resistance groups seek to disrupt them. Governments in a position to influence Naypyitaw should press the regime to desist from using violence to impose elections. The West should coordinate with Asian allies in insisting that the polls are transparently unfair and dangerous; none should provide electoral assistance. For its part, the National Unity Government (NUG), the parallel authority created by elected lawmakers who were ousted by the coup, should make clear that resistance attacks on electoral targets are unacceptable.
On 1 February 2023, the two-year anniversary of the coup d’état, Myanmar’s military regime unexpectedly (and unconstitutionally) extended the state of emergency by a further six months, thereby postponing polls that had been due to take place by 31 July. The junta claims the elections will inaugurate a return to civilian rule, but every indication is that it wants to enshrine its own political pre-eminence in the country. Its template remains the military-drafted 2008 constitution, which provides as one of its “basic principles” for the military to play the “leading political role” in Myanmar. The coup was intended not to overturn this constitutional order, but to remove Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD from the political landscape, in favour of the military’s vision of sharing power with a civilian administration deferential to its prerogatives. The elections are intended to achieve this outcome, rather than to be any kind of exercise for channelling the will of the people.
The problem for junta leader Senior General Min Aung Hlaing is that his personal interests do not fully align with the military’s institutional objectives. The 2008 constitution was designed to prevent the emergence of a solitary autocrat, dividing authority between the commander-in-chief and the president, who cannot be the same person. But Min Aung Hlaing does not want to share power. Thus, if he aspires to be president, he must be sure that his replacement as commander-in-chief will do his bidding. If he stays on as commander-in-chief, he will need to instal a president who will act as his proxy. To do that, he will need full control of the military’s chosen electoral vehicle, the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), which, in the NLD’s likely absence, is positioned to dominate the polls. The extension of the state of emergency, and corresponding election delay, suggest that Min Aung Hlaing is not yet confident in his plans for the post-election period. He may foresee major competition for the top job, probably a more significant consideration than the prevailing insecurity, his stated reason for putting off the vote.
The lead-up to the polls will almost certainly see a further increase in violence and instability.
Even with more time to prepare, the regime undoubtedly faces huge challenges in rolling out elections. Given the extent of popular opposition to the polls, the military will have to impose them by force – pacifying areas of the country where its hold is tenuous, attempting to deter attacks on electoral targets, and intimidating poll workers and voters into participating. Resistance groups, determined to disrupt the vote, have already killed enumerators in service of that goal. The lead-up to the polls will almost certainly see a further increase in violence and instability.
The NUG thus faces a dilemma. As the main anti-regime political force, it logically wants to express its strong opposition to the elections by encouraging a popular boycott and condemning anyone who participates in or supports the polls. That, however, could be seen as endorsing violence by armed resistance groups against electoral targets, making it easier for the regime – and countries that want to normalise relations with it – to cast the opposition as terrorists. Although the NUG does not have control over many resistance groups, as the opposition’s apex political body its reputation will be damaged by their actions. The NUG should thus issue as soon as possible a set of principles governing dissent from the regime’s elections, stating unambiguously that no one should attack electoral targets.
No foreign government or electoral organisation should provide support for the elections, which the regime would cite as evidence that its polls are legitimate. Foreign governments need to take clear public positions that the conditions are not in place for credible elections. Western countries appear to be already convinced, but others, particularly those in Asia that are anxious to move on from the Myanmar crisis, may be inclined to consider polls a step toward restoring constitutional rule.
Western governments should work with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and its chair, Indonesia, to promote consensus as to the conflict risks of the elections and their lack of credibility. Japan and India – which are presidents of the G7 and G20, respectively, in 2023 and which have tended to pursue self-interested engagement with the Myanmar regime – should adopt more principled stances, given the clear security risks of the elections, and the damage that a business-as-usual approach could do to important alliances in the region and with the West. These countries should use what influence they have with Naypyitaw to press the regime to desist from violently imposing the elections. For its part, the West should engage with Japan and India and encourage them to be more outspoken on the risks of the elections and to deploy their influence with Naypyitaw. It is also worth exploring the space for further steps by the UN Security Council, of which Japan is now a non-permanent member. In December 2022, the Council adopted its first-ever Myanmar resolution, achieving consensus on Myanmar despite the geopolitical rifts at play.
More broadly, countries should work to address the multiple crises in Myanmar by continuing to impose targeted sanctions on the military and its business interests. In particular, they should expand targeted sanctions on senior police and military officers most responsible for post-coup abuses and repression, including in relation to the elections, as well as military-owned or linked companies. They should make clear that election-related repressive violence will be a basis for further sanctions. Donor countries should also continue to provide, and whenever possible increase, assistance to address the humanitarian emergency in Myanmar as well as the long-term health, education and livelihoods needs of its people. It remains extremely challenging to deliver aid in Myanmar. Donors should make funding flexible so as to channel it to the partners that can most effectively reach those in need, including local organisations, and give appropriate amounts of cross-border assistance..."
Source/publisher:
International Crisis Group (Belgium)
Date of publication:
2023-03-28
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-28
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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"The National Unity Government of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar warmly welcomes the United States Department of the Treasury’s announcement of further sanctions against individuals and entities connected to the illegal military junta.
Announced on 24 March 2023, the new measures target two individuals and six entities tied to the junta and its deliberate, widespread and systematic atrocities against civilians.
Significantly, they also take aim at the import, storage and distribution of jet fuel to the junta. Frustrated by the scale and resilience of the Myanmar people’s rights-based revolution and by its own failure to seize power, the junta is escalating its airstrikes against villages, schools and hospitals. According to the UN’s Human Rights Office, the junta has increased its aerial attacks against civilian locations by 141 percent over the past year.
In recent weeks, senior UN officials have condemned the junta at the Human Rights Council, the UN’s premier human rights forum.
UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Volker Türk, told the Council that “[t]he disregard and contempt for human life and human rights that are continuously demonstrated by the military constitute an outrage to the conscience of humanity.”
The UN’s Special Rapporteur on Myanmar, Tom Andrews, urged the Council to take action, pressing that the junta “does not offer any viable path to stability or an end to the human rights crisis in Myanmar because it is the very cause of this crisis”, and that the junta “lacks even a shred of constitutional or democratic legitimacy”.
The latest tranche of United States sanctions joins a growing movement of measures against the junta. In February, the European Union imposed a sixth round of sanctions that targeted the junta’s oil and gas revenues, building on earlier measures aimed at stripping the junta of access to arms, munitions and dual-use items.
The National Unity Government extends its gratitude to the United States for its sustained commitment to the Myanmar people and calls on other members of the international community to take equal action..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Myanmar - NUG
Date of publication:
2023-03-26
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-26
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Sanctions, Business and the Military, Human Rights and international relations
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"What’s new? The Sangha, Myanmar’s Buddhist monks and nuns, have mostly stayed on the sidelines since the February 2021 coup, as monastic communities are divided, and the resistance is pursuing a secular agenda that includes violent action. This stance contrasts with that during previous political turmoil, when they were often prominent.
Why does it matter? The Sangha’s low profile has allowed space for youth – particularly young women – to take on leadership roles in the struggle. This bold departure from generations of male Burman Buddhist gerontocratic leadership in Myanmar is encouraging for the future but could bring a backlash.
What should be done? Policymakers and international donors should carefully monitor shifting views on the appropriate role of Buddhism and the Sangha in Myanmar, looking out for any conservative reaction that could compromise intercommunal relations, social stability, human rights or future democratic development.
Executive Summary
The Myanmar Sangha – the country’s community of Buddhist monks and nuns – has played a mostly marginal role in the anti-regime resistance following the military’s February 2021 coup d’état. The National Unity Government (NUG) and its revolutionary allies are pursuing an agenda that is secular and that embraces armed resistance, both features that the monastic community find hard to reconcile with Buddhist teachings. The Sangha’s step to the side is a break from the past, when monks played a significant and vocal role at moments of political crisis. It has also made room for youth – particularly young women – to take on prominent roles in the struggle, an important shift from a tradition of elderly, male leadership drawn predominantly from the Burman Buddhist majority. While Myanmar’s future path is unclear, these trends are likely to be important as they could herald social upheaval, intercommunal tensions or a conservative counterreaction.
In previous periods of political struggle in Myanmar – the independence movement of the early 20th century, political protests in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, and the 2007 Saffron Revolution – monks were highly visible, despite widespread religious and cultural unease with monastic involvement in political affairs. But since the coup, the Sangha has been divided. Some prominent monks have curried favour with the regime by explicitly supporting it and some others have been vociferous opponents. Most of the monastic community, however, has avoided taking any public position, wary of supporting a secular-minded resistance movement engaged in armed struggle, fearful of the consequences of openly challenging the regime and also reluctant to incur the wrath of public opinion by supporting it.
It seems unlikely that the Sangha will emerge as a strong voice either for or against the junta.
As a result, it seems unlikely that the Sangha will emerge as a strong voice either for or against the junta. Critically, the monks, scholars, resistance fighters and activists interviewed by Crisis Group agreed that even should the monastic community unite behind a particular position, it would be unlikely to influence the conflict’s outcome. Despite his performative religiosity, junta chief Min Aung Hlaing is very unlikely to be convinced by any monk, however venerable, to eschew violence or set a radically different political direction. Nor is the general likely to frame the crisis in religious or Buddhist nationalist terms, as some fear he might do in an attempt to win over the Sangha. It is furthermore improbable that any monastic figure could speak to or influence the myriad anti-coup forces.
Nevertheless, the sidelining of monastic figures, long a key part of Myanmar’s social and political fabric, could have important implications. It represents a bold departure from generations of male Burman Buddhist gerontocratic leadership in the country. Myanmar’s political trajectory is uncertain, and there is no end to the crisis in sight. But this moment is likely to be formative in the country’s political life, irrespective of whether the resistance succeeds in its aim of ousting the regime. Whatever dispensation follows the current tragic phase of Myanmar’s history, the shifting moral and religious value systems in the country, and any backlash, will likely have a major impact on intercommunal relations, politics and conflict.
Bangkok/Brussels, 10 March 2023
I.
Introduction
The Sangha, as Buddhist monks and nuns are collectively known in Myanmar, has often been at the forefront of the country’s political struggles, from the independence movement of the early 20th century to the Saffron Revolution of 2007 and more recent Buddhist nationalist movements.1 It has played this role despite popular sentiment that Buddhist monks should avoid engaging in worldly affairs or commenting on politics. The Sangha consists of around 600,000 individuals.2
This history engendered, on one hand, an expectation among many Myanmar people and outside observers that the monastic community would respond resolutely to the February 2021 coup and the subsequent violence. Many thought monks’ participation would be a vital – possibly determinative – contribution to the anti-military resistance movement. On the other hand, it created a fear that many monks, particularly the more hardline elements, might strongly back the regime. In the event, however, the Sangha is split on the crisis. With a few exceptions, monks have been less prominent at the front lines of protests or in leadership roles in the resistance movement than many expected.
The limited involvement of monks in anti-coup activities has opened space for others.
This report analyses Buddhist monks’ low profile in post-coup politics, as compared with other segments of society, and assesses the reasons for it, including the impact of COVID-19 on monasteries and the differing views of the regime and resistance movements on the proper boundaries between religion and state, as well as relevant gender dynamics. The report also considers the extent to which the limited involvement of monks in anti-coup activities has opened space for others – including women and youth – and allowed for a more secular and pluralistic politics to emerge among those opposing the regime than might have otherwise been possible.
The report draws on detailed interviews with monks active in the resistance and those sitting on the sidelines; nuns (most of whom have kept a low profile); pro-regime and nationalist figures; former monks; leaders of anti-coup armed militias; and religious activists, both Buddhist and non-Buddhist. The research also draws on Crisis Group analysis of social media posts by key influencers, including some of the strongest monastic voices – both those expressing sympathy for the military regime and those opposing the coup – as well as comments made in online discussion of those posts. In addition, Crisis Group reviewed relevant academic and policy research, as well as articles about the Sangha in the Myanmar media.
II.
The Sangha’s Role in Past Political Movements
A.
Pre-colonial Symbiosis
Historically, Myanmar’s kings viewed the Sangha as a troublesome but necessary counterpart to their reign. Kings were responsible for protecting the health and well-being of the Sangha, which for its part tried to ensure – through private words of guidance and, sometimes, careful intervention in secular affairs – that the Myanmar populace had a skilful and meritorious ruler.3
The arrival of the British in 1824 prompted King Mindon, the penultimate Myanmar king, to adopt a protectionist approach to Buddhism. He convened the Fifth Buddhist Synod in 1871 with the aim of ensuring that Buddha’s teachings were recorded correctly and in a standardised way. His action led to expanded access to Burmese translations of the Buddhist canon (the Tipitaka).4
In 1885, when the British defeated Myanmar’s last king, Thibaw, and took full control of the country, the increased accessibility of Buddhists texts empowered the laity to take up religious responsibilities that would previously have been the monarch’s prerogative. These responsibilities included protection of the Sangha, which came to be associated with safeguarding access to Buddhist teachings for all – not just the monastic community or royal class.5 The independence movement was built on this foundation.
B.
The Independence Movement
The British authorities’ decision to leave religious affairs in the hands of those it had colonised was a double-edged sword. The colonial withdrawal of traditional state subsidies for monasteries alongside significant disruption to village economies, another key source of donations, compounded the monasteries’ struggles to finance their daily activities. Colonial rule threatened to undermine the religious and social service functions of monasteries, prompting Myanmar society to rally in the Sangha’s support and triggering a Buddhist revival. The laity created a plethora of associations aimed at providing for the Sangha’s needs, along with a mass religious propagation and reform movement.6
The revival laid the groundwork for organisations such as the Young Men’s Buddhist Association (YMBA) to play a key part in agitating for independence. The role of the Sangha itself in the independence movement was more circumspect. Some monks were very active, in collaboration with groups such as the YMBA. A prominent example is Ashin Ottama, who argued that British rule prevented the country’s Buddhists from reaching enlightenment and thus that securing independence was a religious obligation.7 He was imprisoned many times, becoming a hero for the movement. But such monastic activism did not sit well with the population at large, and many Sangha leaders and other senior Buddhist clergy spoke out against monks’ participation in politics on doctrinal grounds. Some members of the YMBA likewise advocated, albeit unsuccessfully, for the organisation to focus solely on religious matters.8
C.
Post-independence Activism and the Saffron Revolution
Monastic political activism continued after independence, during Ne Win’s socialist one-party rule as well as the period of military dictatorship from 1988 to 2010. Monks resisted the government’s attempts to control and register them in 1965; joined students demonstrating against the government’s failure to hold a public funeral for former UN Secretary-General Thant in 1974; participated in nationwide pro-democracy rallies in 1988; and led a series of protests from 1990 to 1991 that spread from Mandalay across the country – including a symbolic withdrawal of spiritual services from the military – that the regime violently suppressed.9
The most high-profile monastic political action after independence was the 2007 demonstrations, commonly known as the Saffron Revolution.10 What had started as protests led by veteran political activists in response to the military government’s removal of fuel price subsidies morphed into a broad-based monastic movement decrying the socio-economic hardships that monasteries and the general public were facing.11 When the military responded with unprecedented violence, beating protesting monks and raiding monasteries, senior members of the Sangha invoked a religious boycott, as they had in 1990.12 Monks deployed sacred symbols with powerful effect throughout the unrest, with the aim of undermining the military authorities’ legitimacy. For example, when an estimated 10,000 monks marched through Mandalay in October 2007, they chanted the Metta Sutta – a discourse that emphasises sustaining Buddhist “loving kindness” (metta) and compassion, consciously drawing a contrast to the military’s actions.13
III.
Shifting State-Sangha Relations
A.
Relations Following the Saffron Revolution
The junta responded to the Sangha’s role in the Saffron Revolution by expanding the powers of the state-backed Sangha Council.14 The committee, which oversees and regulates the Buddhist clergy, was formed in 1980 as part of an effort to consolidate the military’s control of the monastic community. In 2007, the Sangha Council went beyond its existing role of enforcing monastic discipline by issuing a prohibition on monks’ participation in non-religious activities.15 The ban served to constrain the Sangha, giving the military a way to have dissident monks disrobed, in order to interrogate and imprison them.16 Because of such actions, members of the Sangha and the wider public question the council’s independence, as well as the legitimacy of its authority, given that it strays into politics.
Among the broader Buddhist population, the 70-monk council is generally respected for its scholarship but much less commonly seen as active at the community level. After 2007, many younger activist monks established themselves as pro-democracy voices, often from exile, providing a stark contrast to the Sangha Council’s conservative pronouncements. Though many Myanmar Buddhists question the appropriateness of monks’ engagement in worldly matters, for doctrinal reasons, the expectation that the monastic community should ensure the propagation of the Buddha’s teachings can be used to justify civic action.17
The junta’s credibility suffered a ... blow in 2008, when Cyclone Nargis struck the coast of Myanmar, killing at least 138,000 people.
The junta’s credibility suffered a further blow in 2008, when Cyclone Nargis struck the coast of Myanmar, killing at least 138,000 people. Many people in Myanmar, including some members of the military, believed the storm was some sort of karmic retribution for the violence committed against monks the year before.18 More concretely, it clearly demonstrated the military government’s weak institutional capabilities, which made its relief efforts slow, ineffective and non-transparent.19 Local lay groups, including Buddhist associations, rallied under the leadership of monastic figures such as Sitagu Sayadaw, bringing aid and relief to affected populations.20 In a public sermon in Yangon in 2008, Sitagu Sayadaw discussed the merit of “volunteer social work” (in Burmese, parahita), saying:
Meditating in a room with the doors shut won’t help the [cyclone] victims suffering over there. But most Burmese who traditionally believe in Theravada don’t appreciate the need for compassionate action. That is why I am talking about it to people every day. It is essential to make social merit stronger.21
This emphasis on the meritoriousness of parahita was a natural continuation of the forces set in motion after the Saffron Revolution. Regime efforts to quiet the monks’ political voice pushed them to develop alternative spaces in which they could exert influence and then to allow lay men and women to these activities, in order to cultivate public acceptance thereof. The growth of parahita work gave monks a more prominent role in what would normally be a key function of the secular state – social service provision and disaster relief. It also undermined the Sangha Council, because people in Myanmar came to understand that monastic influence stemmed at least in part from monks’ willingness and ability to advocate on their behalf, something that the council is structurally unable to do.
B.
The Buddhist Nationalist Movement
In 2011, a small group of monks and laypeople appropriated a set of numerological symbols popularised by a booklet published in 1997 under the title 969.22 Led by energetic monks including Ashin Wirathu and Ashin Wimala, the movement was particularly vocal in its insistence that Buddhism was under threat from pernicious internal and external forces. The movement’s dire warnings combined with a simple message to the faithful to “buy Buddhist” (that is, make purchases from Buddhist-owned businesses) resonated strongly and spread across the country.23
In 2013, the 969 movement was in effect banned by the Sangha Council, not because of the anti-Muslim violence that its inflammatory rhetoric had helped trigger, but on the more prosaic doctrinal grounds of its unauthorised use of Buddhist symbolism.24 As a result, it morphed into a new and more powerful incarnation, the Association for the Protection of Race and Religion, widely known by its Burmese acronym, MaBaTha, which continued the 969 movement’s ideology and promoted it far more widely across the country.25
MaBaTha’s rank-and-file members tended to believe that the organisation existed in part to help clarify proper moral practice in a changing society at a time when Myanmar was opening up to the world after decades of isolation under military rule.26 They focused less on the religious actions of individuals and more on shaping the culture as a whole – both its underlying values and its role in promoting suitable behaviour.27 As Melyn McKay writes:
Given that this collective morality is believed to be a precondition for stable democratic governance, members often see MaBaTha’s efforts as enabling the expansion of democratic rights. Moreover, they believe MaBaTha’s work in this regard is essential to managing the fractious and conflictual nature of party politics. Unity, in their view, was a prerequisite to democracy, not a product of it.28
The semi-civilian government of President Thein Sein (2011-2016) did little to rein in MaBaTha, but the Aung San Suu Kyi-led National League for Democracy (NLD) administration, which took power in April 2016, was more suspicious of it. The NLD’s concerns related mainly to MaBaTha’s perceived support for the military-established Union Solidarity and Development Party, the NLD’s main electoral opponent, and some MaBaTha members’ criticisms of Aung San Suu Kyi in the run-up to the 2015 elections.29 In July 2016, the Sangha Council, under pressure from the administration’s Ministry of Religious Affairs, issued a statement declaring that MaBaTha was not a recognised Buddhist organisation – a rebuke but not an outlawing of the organisation.30
In May 2017, the Sangha Council went further, banning MaBaTha’s name and logo. The edict used language that hinted at similarities between MaBaTha and other illegal Buddhist factions whose proponents have been prosecuted and imprisoned.31 Many of the group’s most popular figures challenged the ban, arguing that the Council had overstepped its authority, which is limited to overseeing members of the Sangha, not laypersons who are also part of the group.32 Others claimed that the group was not engaged in inappropriate party politics, but rather the promotion of Buddhism and Buddhist values.33 Yet the Council was unmoved, as were its counterparts at the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Culture, making the political climate increasingly inhospitable for MaBaTha.34
C.
Political Efforts to Constrain MaBaTha
By the end of 2019, many MaBaTha members were demoralised, both by the political pressure they now faced from the NLD administration and by international perceptions that the organisation was extremist.
In 2018, Facebook deplatformed MaBaTha, removing the pages of its most popular members and its national, state and township-level committees.35 It was very difficult thereafter for the organisation to mobilise people in support of its various activities, which significantly dampened its members’ enthusiasm. Seeing the crowds at events dwindle took away the sense many members had that MaBaTha was an unstoppable movement. The feeling of being part of a righteous and preordained struggle slipped away, as did many of the less committed supporters.36
At the same time, sensing the changing political winds, local government bureaucrats had stopped granting applications for MaBaTha events (whether in the group’s name or not) or dragged their feet in reviewing them.37 As Crisis Group has previously pointed out, MaBaTha members – especially women – felt their participation in the group magnified their impact. Raising money to build a school on their own might take months, whereas doing it as a MaBaTha activity could mobilise significant funds in a matter of hours.38 With this amplifying power diminished, and as the sense of invincibility it created evaporated as well, many members found other means of personal and spiritual improvement, filling their free time instead with coursework, meditation retreats or hobbies.39
Young activists ... argued that monks should limit their focus to religion.
All the while, civil society activists were working assiduously to counter MaBaTha ideology both online and offline. Increasingly, support for MaBaTha and its ideology came to be associated with something old and out of touch that signified lack of education. Young activists, in particular, argued that monks should limit their focus to religion, while urging the NLD administration to adopt an explicitly secular approach to government.40
These various pressures meant that by the time the COVID-19 pandemic started in 2020, MaBaTha was largely inactive and many of its local organising networks had dispersed.41 Those within pro-NLD circles had by then also fully embraced the rhetoric – and likely even the notion – that monastic engagement in civic spaces was inappropriate, as had been the NLD’s rallying cry against MaBaTha for years.42 Given that monks were free to demonstrate their commitment to social engagement by meeting community needs via non-political parahita activities, it was difficult for anyone to argue that greater monastic political engagement was necessary to advocate for the needs of the Buddhist polity.
Successive Myanmar governments since 1962, both military and nominally civilian, have made efforts to constrain and control the powerful Sangha, in an extension of pre-colonial patterns of state-Sangha relations. As a result of the more recent dynamics discussed above, however, by the time of the 2021 coup both the legal and moral basis for monastic leadership on civic issues had been called into question.
IV.
Monastic Reactions to the Military Coup
A.
Involvement in Initial Protests and Subsequent Organised Violence
In the first days and weeks following the coup, various monasteries released statements, many of which were rather insipid, taking no clear stance against the coup.43 Curiously, however, some of these statements were released despite the most senior members of these institutions making seemingly contradictory remarks.44 The discrepancy highlights the deep divisions within the Sangha that persist today. Nevertheless, three main groups can be identified.
1.
Those backing the regime
The first group are mostly older, more seasoned monks who have either made their support for the military clear through participation in the regime’s public events and trips, or who have implied their support by focusing their anti-violence messaging on resistance groups, while ignoring the military’s own atrocities. One prominent example is Sitagu Sayadaw, whose high-profile travel to Russia alongside Min Aung Hlaing for a pagoda dedication ceremony in July 2022 was particularly controversial.45 Another is Ashin Chekinda, who also participated in the Russia trip and whom the regime’s Ministry of Religious Affairs promoted to acting rector of the International Theravada Buddhist University in Yangon in 2022.46 Myanmar commentators have made two key arguments about these senior monks:
Both have risen to the seniority they now enjoy in part due to their warm relations with key military figures. Chekinda is noted for having been promoted to the rector’s position ahead of other, more learned monks. Sitagu’s appointment as head of the Shwegyin sect is less surprising given his standing, but still noteworthy in its timing.
Though supporters of the post-coup resistance tend to despise Sitagu, they nevertheless recognise that he faces a dilemma. His numerous social development projects, including education and health-care facilities, would likely suffer were he to oppose the junta, as would the communities that depend on them. But the scale of these problems may be overstated. Such is the national (and international) reputation of these facilities, including their ability to attract other high-quality leaders, that the military authorities might well replace Sitagu as figurehead while leaving the services intact. It is therefore difficult to say for sure whether Sitagu’s support for the regime is driven by the risk to his projects, self-preservation or his ideological leanings.
There is a surprising degree of overlap between the monks who are implicitly or explicitly backing the regime and those who participated in the Saffron Revolution. In interviews, monks emphasised that those who took part in the 2007 demonstrations faced enormous challenges, including targeted attacks on their monasteries and in some cases imprisonment. Some of these monks are disgruntled by what they perceive as the NLD administration’s failure to recognise and reward their sacrifices. A common refrain of MaBaTha monks, for example, is that they supported the democratic transition only to be later “betrayed” by Aung San Suu Kyi and her government, when they clamped down on MaBaTha and made moves toward greater secularism, and again when they elevated a small number of Muslim advisers, notably Ko Ni.47 This sense of grievance was deliberately nurtured by the military over many years, translating into vocal support for the coup among a few of these monks, and weakening the enthusiasm of others for actively opposing it.
The impact of the small group of pro-regime monks should not be overstated.
The impact of the small group of pro-regime monks should not be overstated. The rise and fall of nationalist groups such as MaBaTha over recent years served to identify – and dent the reputations of – the most charismatic military-aligned monks. Pro-NLD and anti-military forces have had several years to chip away at the public’s respect for these monks, and the results are particularly visible among the younger generations most engaged in anti-coup organising.
Though pro-regime monks may attempt to prevent younger monks in their monasteries from participating in anti-regime activities, the pandemic led a significant number of young monks to move from urban locations to rural monasteries closer to their homes just prior to the coup. The influx disrupted traditional student-teacher relations and meant that abbots had less influence over newly arrived young monks.48
In rural areas in particular, monasteries and monks remain highly dependent on the local population for support. Monks must tread especially carefully when they have settled in areas away from their birthplaces. In such situations, they lack strong kinship ties in the area and must be cautious not to provoke a local backlash. Anti-coup organisers have also been highly successful at using social shaming as a means of punishing those with pro-military or even insufficiently pro-revolution tendencies. Monks have accordingly felt pressure to align with community sentiments, which are predominantly anti-regime. They also need to fear being targeted by anti-coup armed actors – who have allegedly killed several monks accused of supporting the regime.49
2.
Those avoiding taking sides
Many monks have remained neutral since the coup, for several reasons. Most importantly, monks who speak out against the junta are likely to face reprisals. These are often violent, as in cases where troops have burned down or demolished monasteries, leaving the nearby faithful without a vital social asset.50 As many monks living around the country hail from Myanmar’s central Dry Zone, where the fighting is intense, loss of their monastery would also likely mean return to an active conflict area, at a time when many are desperately trying to escape.
Many monks have also refrained from supporting the resistance out of disenchantment with the NLD administration for the reasons discussed above. Though the administration did participate in numerous pagoda-building campaigns and other religious events, and Aung San Suu Kyi was involved in donations and other ceremonial activities, the government also spoke about human rights, ethno-religious diversity and secularism in ways that alienated these monks (notwithstanding the fact that many minorities felt the government downplayed their concerns, and in the case of the Rohingya, was complicit in their plight).51
The prominence of armed resistance activities also puts monks in a difficult position when it comes to expressing open support for the revolution. Unlike monks who have made doctrinal arguments in support of violence in certain circumstances, many feel they cannot support such acts, even in response to greater brutality.52 As one monk told Crisis Group:
For me, there are two personalities in one. I am a citizen of the country and a monk. As a citizen, I have to stand up for my rights, for democracy, for freedom, but there are also principles that monks have to follow. Revolution at this point means taking sides, which means killing. This is a power struggle. Everyone supporting either side is complicit in killing.53
As this same monk noted, members of the monastic community sometimes refer to the objective of Buddhism – seeking to achieve nirvana by breaking from the cycle of rebirths – as “revolutionary”, which may lead them to describe the Sangha as supportive of revolutionary action. But this conception of revolution usually translates into a focus on material suffering such as acute poverty, hunger and physical danger, rather than any strong belief in liberation from a particular ruler or preference for one form of government over another.54
In past revolutionary moments, particularly the Saffron Revolution, frustration at widespread economic hardship made it easy to mobilise around the notion that the military – the sole political authority at the time – was the cause of suffering and thus vigorous action to depose them was consistent with Buddhist doctrine.55 Some monastic figures involved in the Saffron Revolution mobilised explicitly in support of democracy, but their stance then was more a rejection of a specific harmful political authority than an embrace of a particular form of government.
The situation is much less clear-cut today. The ousted NLD government, though hamstrung by the 2008 constitution’s limitations on civilian governance, did wield meaningful power. Prior to the pandemic, people across the country were beginning to enjoy a better quality of life and feel much greater hope for the future, even if the improvements were not evenly distributed. As a result, prior to the coup, suffering was seen as having multiple causes, including a global outbreak of disease, rather than stemming from a single incompetent, abusive authority.
Despite broad social rejection of the coup, the junta did not change course, instead deploying extreme violence to consolidate its control.
The way the crisis has developed has also informed some monks’ reluctance to pick a side. Despite broad social rejection of the coup, the junta did not change course, instead deploying extreme violence to consolidate its control. The initial, largely peaceful protest movement thus morphed into armed rebellion. The regime has unleashed brutal repression against both the civil and the armed resistance but failed to quash either; neither is the resistance able to meaningfully challenge the regime’s control of the state apparatus. In this dynamic, many monks feel that the chaos now facing communities is the result of a battle for political control in which both sides are willing to kill to achieve their goals. They conclude that they have less space to engage politically than on previous occasions such as the Saffron Revolution.56 This view is based not on any perception of moral equivalence of the two sides, but rather on the fact that neither offers a clear pathway out of the crisis.
Even those monks who might otherwise lean toward supporting the revolution may worry that doing so contributes to a decline in monastic authority in the country. They are keenly aware that the parallel authority, the National Unity Government (NUG), relies for its armed resistance on the support and sanctuary provided by predominantly Christian ethnic armed groups, which many monks expect will push any future democratic government to adopt a more explicitly secular approach.57
3.
Those openly supporting the revolution
Some monks are openly supporting the revolution, but they acknowledge that their numbers are far smaller than those who took part in the Saffron Revolution. Their engagement takes many forms, and they face several constraints.
Pre-existing groups such as the Peace Sangha Union – a progressive monastic network – are mostly made up of younger monks, although they may have a few members who participated in protests in 1988 or 2007. These groups have taken part in demonstrations, though usually not organising or leading them; they have also supported local defence forces and other anti-regime groups, for example by using their religious status to help transport medicines and other supplies.
There have also been more organic monastic reactions to the coup. For example, 200 to 300 monks joined the daily marches in Mandalay that started on 8 February 2021 and lasted for several months, likely the most active monastic participation in protests anywhere in the country.58 Such activity can create tensions between junior monks and their abbots, who may forbid them from taking to the streets, for various reasons. Some senior monks support the military takeover because they feel the NLD failed to protect Buddhism – and that the military regime will.59 Other abbots act out of concern for the likely consequences, such as the military shuttering monasteries if any of their monks visibly resist the coup. Concerned abbots warned junior monks and novices that if they joined protests, they would have to leave the monastery.60 The senior monks’ fears are not unfounded, with some 60 monks thought to have been detained since the coup, some of whom remain incarcerated. Many others have been forcibly disrobed, and still others have had to go on the run.61
Such monastic support for the revolution, while welcomed by the vast majority of the country who oppose the coup, has done little to sway those who support the military or who are still sitting on the fence. These people typically downplay the importance of monastic opposition to the coup, arguing that monks should not participate in politics, or cast pro-resistance monks as young and not truly committed to their practice – their participation in resistance activities being proof of their unfitness for the religious life.62
On the morning of the coup, the military detained several monks who were prominent supporters of the democratic transition.
On the morning of the coup, the military detained several monks who were prominent supporters of the democratic transition and of Aung San Suu Kyi personally, including Myawaddy Sayadaw; others had to flee to avoid apprehension.63 The coup itself so outraged the public that these arrests had limited additional impact. Subsequently, after citizens took up arms against the coup, the junta promoted the idea that armed resistance groups were a threat to Buddhism due to their attacks on monks.64
While the regime has attempted to portray itself as defending Buddhism, it has not fully embraced a Buddhist nationalist narrative nor sought to elevate MaBaTha. It took more than six months following the coup for the regime to release firebrand monk Ashin Wirathu, who had been imprisoned under the NLD administration (see Section IV.D below). For their part, resistance forces, including the NUG and local defence groups, have declined to frame the political crisis in religious terms, focusing instead on the junta’s illegal overthrow of the elected government and subsequent violence. Nor have resistance forces encouraged their monastic supporters to publicly attack the junta’s religious authority.65
B.
Gender Dynamics and Monastic Participation
The limited role of monks in the post-coup resistance has allowed greater space for new types of leaders to emerge. According to monks that Crisis Group spoke to, the most notable change for them compared with the leadership of the 1988 and 2007 movements is the presence of women, particularly young women.66
Relatedly, anti-regime protests have often been two-pronged, challenging both the military’s rule as well as traditional gender norms. The prominent htamein (sarong) protest involved communities hanging women’s sarongs above the street to act as a de facto barricade, relying on the superstition among many soldiers and policemen that women’s undergarments and skirts weaken men’s charismatic power (hpoun).67 In some places, women and their allies scrawled military leader Min Aung Hlaing’s initials in red marker on menstrual pads before sticking them to walls and telegraph poles. Colourful bras and panties have been affixed to images of military men and their favourite monks.68
The lower status of nuns in Myanmar society means their participation in protests is considered less notable than a monk’s might be.
Not all women have benefited from increased space. According to Crisis Group interviews, the position of nuns has, on the contrary, been further constrained since the coup. Groups like MaBaTha tested the traditional boundaries between religion and state and the limits of monastic activism on social and political issues. By doing so, they created an opening for nuns to take a more visible and active role in both religious and secular public life, but the coup seems to have closed it. The lower status of nuns in Myanmar society means their participation in protests is considered less notable than a monk’s might be and leaves them less likely to be protected from serious harm.
Nuns also face more serious material constraints, as their subordinate position to monks means that, even in normal times, they receive fewer donations and may struggle to survive.69 In the current poor economic conditions, donors with less money to spread around are even more likely to give to monks before nuns. Any time spent away from collecting alms, or on activities that much needed donors might disapprove of, would thus constitute a risk to nuns’ financial survival.
The erosion of nuns’ status has been exacerbated by the loss of opportunities for them to study abroad, in Sri Lanka and elsewhere. For many Myanmar nuns, studying in Sri Lanka provided a unique opportunity to develop a more politically aware and engaged stance, largely from being exposed to the different monastic culture there and especially the political enfranchisement of monks and nuns there (members of the Myanmar Sangha are constitutionally barred from voting or standing for office).70 With such exchange programs likely to be limited for the time being due to Myanmar’s economic crisis, and lack of functional coordination between religious educational institutions and government ministries, Myanmar nuns are likely to become further isolated.
Such isolation may in turn lead to greater conservatism. Nuns have often argued that advanced education was the best way to improve their status as a community.71 Facing more difficult living conditions and denied opportunities to study abroad, many will take refuge in Buddhist educational facilities. Their connection will deepen to the abbots and monasteries best able to sustain their facilities in the post-coup period – which means, predominantly, those who have better relations with the regime.
C.
The Role of the Sangha Council
Even before the coup, the Sangha Council’s legitimacy was weak. Most monks consider ultimate monastic authority to lie in the hands of their monastery’s chief abbot, not the council. Council decisions are mostly about abstract doctrinal matters or involve disciplining monks who drink, gamble or otherwise misbehave. Indeed, many anti-coup monks believe the council has rarely, if ever, embodied an explicit political or social agenda.72 As one activist from Mandalay told Crisis Group:
It is even rumoured that many if not most Sangha Council statements addressing things like religious conflicts are actually drafted by the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Culture, using the council’s name to disguise the political origins of these statements.73
As a result, the Sangha Council as an institution is highly disconnected from the public. People may revere particular monks who sit on the council, but they do so in spite of, not because of, their council role. Even in the monastic community, the council is not regarded as wielding supreme leadership, but rather as an administrative body.74
The fact that, as mentioned above, the Sangha Council is in practice largely subordinate to the Ministry of Religious Affairs, means that it has limited capability to work outside the ministry’s confines. Following the coup, the Council shuttered its subnational offices, which remained closed for one year – longer than many other official agencies’ workplaces. Interviewees told Crisis Group that as monastic pressure mounted to reopen the offices to hold religious exams, it became clear that some subnational members of the Council were being replaced with junta loyalists.
Indeed, the regime has attempted to use the Sangha Council to keep the monastic community under its control. One monk who sits on the Council told Crisis Group that:
The Sangha Council’s members are under the control of the military, and in return the military provides a lot of financial support. Most members do not want to go against the military for these and other reasons, even though they do not like the coup. Some monks, especially anti-coup monks, criticised the Sangha Council a lot, and some of their followers were angry at the way Council members acted with military leaders, but everyone should understand the Council’s position. The members are very old and the military controls everything they do.75
Nevertheless, the regime’s attempts to use the Sangha Council to boost its legitimacy have mostly failed. First, the Council initially put up more resistance to the coup than expected by suspending many activities for months, for example declining to schedule monastic exams.76 Secondly, the national mood has shifted dramatically since the coup, with resistance leaders and others openly condemning the Council as an instrument of the regime. Far more so than under previous periods of military rule, Council members are aware that public perception that a monk is biased toward the military can seriously undermine his following.77
The upshot is that whatever legitimacy the Sangha Council once had – even as a purely administrative body – appears to have mostly evaporated. There is little appetite anywhere in Myanmar for an institution overseen by the military to issue moral edicts about lay or even monastic life. In a sign of the institution’s waning significance, the military’s rumoured detention of Bhamo Sayadaw, the Sangha Council chair, after the coup elicited little outrage amid many other pressing issues.78
D.
The Standpoint of MaBaTha
Many observers had taken it for granted that Buddhist nationalist monks such as Wirathu would rally to support the junta. But members of MaBaTha and similar groups have not come together as a unified force supporting either side. In the early days following the coup, many observers had assumed that Wirathu – detained by the NLD government in November 2020 on sedition and defamation charges – would be released from prison imminently.79 He was discharged only in September 2021, eight months after the coup.80 Shortly before his release, he had posted a scathing video message to VK – the Russian social media platform to which many military and nationalist figures in Myanmar migrated after being kicked off Facebook – complaining that he was in poor health and had been passed over for release despite “prostitutes” having been included in earlier pardons.81 His release was reportedly tied to several conditions, including the confiscation of his property and a ban on giving public sermons or speaking to the media.82
Some observers – who had long assumed that MaBaTha was the military’s creation, or at least that Wirathu and other MaBaTha monks were its puppets – were confused by these developments.83 Yet high-ranking members of the group (such as Insein Ywama Sayadaw) have had to thread the same needle as more moderate monks (such as Oxford Sayadaw), declining to comment directly on the coup to avoid provoking the regime, and instead issuing vague statements urging restraint in a nod to public opinion.84
Some lower-level MaBaTha monks have broken with the organisation’s stance to speak out against the coup and participate in local protests.
Overall, the NLD administration’s weakening of MaBaTha made it difficult for the body to regroup after the coup, and it now faces virtual institutional collapse. Some lower-level MaBaTha monks have broken with the organisation’s stance to speak out against the coup and participate in local protests. Given the highly decentralised nature of MaBaTha, their action was probably unavoidable. But the organisation’s enervation also stems from the fact that, for many members, its purpose was to protect the place of Buddhism in an increasingly liberal and pluralistic society. The coup has overturned that set of assumptions, especially as regards liberalisation, and thus the fears sustaining the group’s Buddhist chauvinist and anti-NLD rhetoric have largely dissipated, replaced with anger at the military’s brutality and incompetence.85
While MaBaTha is largely spent as a political force, its demise has weakened the Sangha’s political influence more broadly. The strongly negative NLD and civil society reaction to its political activism created fertile ground for more secular thinking following the coup, particularly among the new generation of youth activists and armed resistance leaders. As one member of an armed resistance group told Crisis Group:
Our leaders are pressuring the NUG not to work with the Sangha because of the bad image MaBaTha has given it. If you want to move to a federal union, you cannot leverage religion.86
E.
Small-scale Armed Movements
Wirathu’s release from prison, which has been surprisingly uneventful, illustrates how complicated regime-Sangha relations are, and why the regime is hesitant to leverage Buddhist nationalism for its own ends. Though the controversial monk has been raising a mild ruckus in his immediate surroundings – calling a mosque, for example, to complain about the call to prayer – his impact has been muted.87 Calamitous prognostications that his release might exacerbate the conflict by introducing sectarian dimensions have proven exaggerated, with only a few vague rumblings thus far. In his first public sermon, in Bago Region in October 2022, where he was joined by ultra-nationalist Michael Kyaw Myint, who heads the Yeomanry Development Party, he touched on his typical Buddhist nationalist and anti-Muslim themes, but the event attracted only 25 attendees.88
There are reports of underground Buddhist nationalist mobilisation in Mandalay and in parts of Sagaing Region – including Kanbalu township, where two Islamic trainee scholars were killed by alleged pro-regime forces – fuelling fears that regime-aligned nationalist forces may be attempting to reorient the conflict more along religious lines.89
There have also been rumours that Wirathu is the organising force behind a group of former MaBaTha monks, none of whom are especially well loved, who captured headlines for carrying arms and appearing publicly at military ceremonies.90 They reportedly call themselves the pandita (scholar) group. This group should not be seen as evidence of Buddhist nationalist engagement in the conflict on the junta’s behalf. There is no proof that Wirathu is meaningfully involved, and his authority among Buddhist nationalists has often been overstated, as has his closeness to the military (see Section IV.D above).
It is in any case hard to see how monks such as these would be beneficial to pro-regime forces, beyond dispensing occasional religious teachings and services. Rather than a carefully engineered plot to bolster pro-regime forces, the involvement of monks in pro-regime militias is in most cases more likely to be an example of the broader phenomenon that monks in these areas tend to provide pastoral services to whichever local armed group – pro- or anti-regime – happens to be most prominent in their community.
Monks’ ideological perspectives undoubtedly influence their spiritual guidance, and thus their politics may have some impact on the conflict.
Yet monks’ ideological perspectives undoubtedly influence their spiritual guidance, and thus their politics may have some impact on the conflict. For example, a member of an anti-regime defence force told Crisis Group that one of the reasons some of these groups had stopped short of fully backing the NUG was that the monks they sought advice from were not very pro-NUG.91
Wirathu’s release and his subsequent comportment suggest that all the main protagonists see his personal influence, and the charismatic power of monks more generally, as an unstable force that they are wary of unleashing. The military does not trust Wirathu, seeing him as a populist organiser more than a pro-regime ideologue.92 The regime gave him an award in January 2023 to mark the 75th anniversary of independence, but he was one among thousands of recipients from across the political spectrum, including ministers from the deposed NLD administration.93 The award should not be interpreted as an endorsement of the monk or an attempt at rapprochement with him. Although Wirathu is known for taking a strong pro-military stance in recent years, he was also imprisoned by the former military regime in 2003 for his inflammatory sermons.94 To a certain extent, the military’s doubts about Wirathu extend to MaBaTha, some of whose members were prominent participants in the Saffron Revolution (see Section III.A above).
V.
The Silence of the Monks
In the first days and weeks after the coup, the limited monastic participation in protests was in part explained by the COVID-19 situation. Given the typically crowded living quarters and multi-generational nature of large urban monasteries, many monks left these institutions and returned to rural areas where they were less likely to contract the illness.
At the time of the military takeover, many monks were thus far away from the main demonstrations in the cities, spread out in towns and villages in the countryside. In these circumstances, communication and mobilisation were also difficult. Some monks did try to return to the cities to join the protests, but COVID-19 prevention measures and post-coup travel restrictions made it difficult to do so.95 Others, particularly a new generation of young political and social activists, were left to take the vanguard in the demonstrations.
Yet the continued low-profile monastic participation in anti-regime movements, and the political dynamics that have emerged since the coup, suggest that other factors were more significant than COVID-19, particularly the actions and orientation of the resistance and the regime.
A.
The Secular Orientation of the NLD and NUG
An important dynamic at play is the NUG’s reliance on ethnic armed groups for sanctuary and military support. Most NUG members – and members of the resistance’s legislative branch, the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw – are Buddhist, though the movement also includes some Christians.96 But the four ethnic armed groups working most closely with the NUG – the Chin National Front, Kachin Independence Organisation, Karen National Union and Karenni National Progressive Party – have predominantly Christian leaderships and constituencies.97 Given a history of discrimination against non-Buddhists by successive post-independence governments, these groups have traditionally pushed strongly for secularism and the separation of religion and state.98 While extending support to the NUG, they have demanded that any future federal union under restored civilian rule (their declared goal) adhere to a secular agenda.99
In addition to the ethnic armed groups, many of the activists sustaining the NUG’s political struggle are against any close cooperation with the Sangha, because they are opposed to religious influence on the federal framework they are developing.100 Most resistance fighters, who tend to be young, also reject the idea of such cooperation. They feel strongly that monks should keep out of politics both in the current struggle and in the development of a future federal union. One armed resistance group leader told Crisis Group:
The Buddhist majority always influences political matters, and it often decreases trust among different religious groups. We also do not like their influence in our revolution, and we do not trust non-violence as an effective way to tackle the regime.101
To the latter point, armed resistance group members worry that the Sangha’s discomfort with violence may undermine their fighters’ morale. A senior monk in Mandalay told Crisis Group that the revolution “is now about killing one another, but monks have to follow the four parajika [inviolable rules]”.102 Monks are loath to break these rules – one of which prohibits intentionally causing the death of a person – because doing so entails expulsion from the monastic order for life. Thus, monks may provide aid to internally displaced people or others who are suffering as a result of supporting the revolution, and monks may even support the idea of revolution. But because the current revolution is based on armed resistance, many monks feel that they cannot participate, or must become laypersons to do so.103 Another monk from Sagaing Region put it more succinctly: “If a monk holds a weapon, they automatically become a layman.”104
Resistance leaders feel that involving monastic figures in conversations about the future of the democratic, federal state is far beyond monks’ and nuns’ utility and remit.
A further reason for the lack of monastic participation is that the NLD and Myanmar civil society – two key protagonists in the anti-coup movement – were central to undermining MaBaTha, on the basis that monks should not be involved in political issues. Encouraging monks to become involved in the current crisis would thus represent a U-turn that these groups are reluctant to make, as it would undo their years-long efforts to limit monastic influence and authority to religious issues. Indeed, resistance leaders feel that involving monastic figures in conversations about the future of the democratic, federal state is far beyond monks’ and nuns’ utility and remit.105
The role of monks is somewhat more prominent in the Myanmar Buddhist diaspora, in which more traditional views of religion tend to prevail. People in the diaspora are also more removed from the revolution, engaged predominantly in lobbying, solidarity efforts and fundraising (for the NUG, as well as for armed resistance groups).106 The NUG has regular contact with these diaspora communities, including monks, in what is the most direct form of NUG-Sangha collaboration.107
B.
The Regime’s Religious Outreach
Since before the February 2021 coup, Min Aung Hlaing has made energetic efforts to “harvest” merit, in an attempt to boost his power (and, subsequently, improve the odds of the coup’s success).108 For example, for the last five years, he has been building a marble Buddha image 25m high, reputedly the largest of its kind in the world, and state media regularly reports on his inspection visits to the site.109 After the coup, he and other high-ranking military figures also met with countless monks, made numerous donations and visited many pagodas in attempts to give the regime and its coup an air of moral legitimacy.110
Members of the Sangha who spoke to Crisis Group noted that such religious ceremonies should not necessarily be interpreted as signals of monastic support for the coup. They pointed out that monks have been put in a very difficult situation since the military takeover, trying to navigate harsh political realities in a system where the material and legal support of those who wield power (on matters such as land use and other permits) is essential for monastic survival.111
While these displays may have strengthened Min Aung Hlaing’s resolve or belief in his moral fitness to rule, most Myanmar people did not interpret them in that way. His actions have been widely criticised as blatant attempts to use religion to bolster his grip on power. NLD and activist efforts in recent years to combat MaBaTha and its foray into party politics laid the groundwork for this response, heightening the public’s sensitivity to overt politicisation of Buddhism and making people less likely to be swayed.
Many observers expected that Min Aung Hlaing would move quickly to embrace Buddhist nationalism following the coup, because he was known to be close to several prominent nationalist monks and agitators, and because the movement had long been opposed to Aung San Suu Kyi and her NLD.112 So far, he has not done so, for reasons discussed in Section IV.D above.
C.
The Current State of Play
Unlike the NLD in the past, the NUG has not attempted to contest the junta on religious grounds. Rather, the NUG and other resistance forces across the country have embraced a more pluralistic, inclusive approach – which is necessarily also more secular. This stance has prevented them from promoting their popular legitimacy by performing a protector of Buddhism (dhamma raja) role. In this way, they have broken with a central tenet of Myanmar political leadership since before independence, a historic shift. But even as the NUG has promoted a multi-ethnic, inclusive agenda, it has faced little popular criticism for neglecting the majority religion – in contrast to the NLD, which mostly stuck to a Burman Buddhist-centric approach.113
Part of the reason is that young people in the anti-regime resistance movement have developed an aversion to organised Buddhism and Theravada cultural norms more generally. Several popular meme accounts have emerged with names such as Anti-Theravada Movement and Anti-Theravada Memes that take aim at Buddhist institutions and traditions, depicting them as old-fashioned and ill-suited for shepherding society through the modern era and the post-coup crisis.114 Such tropes began to gain traction following the coup.
There is a widely held impression ... that Buddhism is being left behind.
With monks less prominent in the resistance, other leaders, including youth and especially young women, have been able to step into leadership roles (see Section IV.B above). There is a widely held impression – expressed by every monastic figure that Crisis Group spoke to for this report – that Buddhism is being left behind.115 Moreover, there is a pervasive fear that the future of Buddhism and the Sangha in Myanmar looks bleak, whatever the outcome of the current crisis.116 As this very fear underpinned the rise of Buddhist nationalist sentiment across the country in the 2010s, it needs to be closely monitored.117
But these fears of Buddhism in decline may well be unfounded or at least premature. The widespread social and economic destruction wrought by the coup means that many vulnerable people, especially youth, will have to rely on monasteries –the only social institution in Myanmar still able to support them. So long as monasteries continue to accept children for study, the population of monks is likely to remain robust. Similarly, communities in rural areas, who have suffered significant economic hardships from the pandemic and the coup, will remain reliant on monastic aid.
Monastic figures have long been a central part of Myanmar’s social and political life. Any change in this pattern – for example, if the current secular shift becomes an enduring feature of the younger generation’s views or is incorporated into a future politics – would likely foment rural-urban division and social strife, given that most rural Burmans adhere to a more traditional view of Buddhism’s role in society. It would also risk a conservative backlash. The defining challenge of Myanmar’s post-independence history has been to develop a more ethnically and religiously inclusive politics and promote the rights of ethno-religious minorities.
A failure to craft a more inclusive agenda of this kind will keep Myanmar politics stuck in the narrow confines of Burman Buddhist nationalism, from which it has struggled to escape for decades, to the detriment of human rights, intercommunal relations and the nation’s long-term peace and prosperity. Yet if backlash is to be avoided, powerful conservative Buddhist social forces and the Sangha itself cannot be alienated, either. Myanmar’s political trajectory remains uncertain, but in almost any scenario, these issues will be of great importance.
VI.
Future Developments and Recommendations
The coup and its aftermath have redefined the political and social role of Buddhism and monastic institutions. It is therefore important to monitor how moral and religious value systems continue to shift in Myanmar, particularly those that have historically affected social cohesion, human rights and democracy. It may be that the Myanmar equivalent of the Overton window – that is, the range of policies politically acceptable to the public at a given time – is shifting.118 Tracking that shift is important for understanding the trajectory of social and communal relations, conflict and politics in the country.
At the national level, the current low profile of the Sangha has led to a decentralisation of moral leadership, which can bring both benefits and risks. Though centralised institutional power, vested with religious significance, often acts as a constraint on political progress and can further sideline minority populations, loss of faith in these institutions creates a void that may be filled by something else – including charismatic figures who turn out to be demagogic movement leaders. Potential for such movements can be seen in the attention initially attracted by figures such as Wirathu or the lay agitator Michael Kyaw Myint after the 2011 opening of civic space, although their momentum waned under the NLD administration (see Section IV.E above).
When in power, the NLD stuck close to the priorities of its Burman Buddhist political base, rather than attempting to use its political capital to promote a more pluralistic, multi-ethnic and multifaith framework for the country. Any future leaders able to formulate a compelling framework of this latter kind will likely benefit by expanding their political and voter base beyond traditional ethno-political boundaries. They may, however, face strong challenges from Burman Buddhist populist forces. When and if democratic politics will be restored in Myanmar is uncertain at this time. But should that happen, a future competition for power of this kind will have important implications for political stability, minority rights and armed conflict.
Foreign actors ... need to calibrate their interactions with the monastic community at the local level.
Foreign actors also need to calibrate their interactions with the monastic community at the local level. There, monks still play a hugely important religious and social role. Donors and partner organisations should continue to consult them and incorporate their views into project design and implementation. They must also keep in mind, however, that consultations at the moment may put the monastic community at risk of regime retaliation – and so should proceed with due care. International actors should also recognise that they themselves may have lost moral legitimacy in the eyes of those monastic figures and their lay supporters who sympathise with the resistance and see the UN, international NGOs and other agencies as having offered only muted criticism of the coup and subsequent violence, while continuing to work with the regime.
The Sangha’s low profile in the current crisis looks set to continue, with any significant monastic leadership role appearing unlikely. Even more unlikely are Saffron Revolution-style protests. Although it is hard to see any developments that would significantly raise the Sangha’s profile, two possible triggers should be kept in mind. One would be a move by a political aspirant to follow the Sri Lanka model by offering voting rights to members of the Sangha or allowing them to run for political office. While Myanmar political and religious consensus has long been against such a move, it would be highly significant should the possibility be raised. The other trigger would be any move to offer full ordination for women. This eventuality also seems unlikely. But should the idea gain traction and become a progressive cause celebre, it could act as a wedge with uncertain implications for the next generation of aspiring political leaders, who would be caught between alienating the politically engaged young generation that has emerged since the coup and the religiously conservative Buddhist population.
VII.
Conclusion
Myanmar’s Buddhist monks have played a limited role in the post-coup protest and resistance movement, unlike during previous periods of political struggle, such as the 2007 Saffron Revolution. There are many reasons why monks have largely stayed away from involvement, the most important being that the NUG-led resistance does not support their participation. Its largely secular agenda is driven by the legacy of Buddhist nationalist support for the military and by the fact that the NUG – with the encouragement of civil society and its non-Buddhist ethnic allies – is pursuing a multi-ethnic, multi-religious vision for the country. Monastic communities themselves are divided, with some resisting the coup, but many others reluctant to support a secular political movement that has embraced violent resistance and unwilling to risk the consequences of openly challenging the regime.
The Sangha’s low political profile has allowed space for youth, and particularly young women, to take on leadership roles. The longer-term challenge for Myanmar is to develop a more ethnically and religiously inclusive politics and promote the rights of ethno-religious minorities. The trajectory of the Myanmar crisis is unclear, but the secular turn among young people in the resistance movement, if it endures, could help national politics to escape the decades-old confines of Burman Buddhist nationalism. At the same time, it could also alienate conservative social forces and the Sangha itself and risk a backlash. Whatever lies on the other side of the current crisis, balancing these tensions will be essential for Myanmar to achieve long-term peace and prosperity..."
Source/publisher:
International Crisis Group (Belgium)
Date of publication:
2023-03-10
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-26
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2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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"The people of Burma have been suffering greatly for many decades under the brutality of the junta. Human rights should not be violated by anyone under any circumstances. For that reason, we present these videos about documenting human rights violations to encourage the emergence of Citizen Human Rights Documenters who can systematically collect and record strong, accurate evidence of human rights violations with the aim to establish justice, rehabilitate victims, and put an end to the cycle of impunity in Burma.
In this second video, we will talk about why we do human rights documentation and what data to collect when human rights violations occur in our communities..."
Source/publisher:
Assistance Association for Political Prisoners
Date of publication:
2023-03-23
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-23
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Racial or ethnic discrimination in Burma: reports of violations against several groups, Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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"Thank you Mr President,
Special Rapporteur,
Thank you for your sobering update and passionate commitment.
It has been over two years since the military seized power in a coup, plunging Myanmar into crisis.
Myanmar’s people have shown extraordinary resilience in the face of unspeakable atrocities, demonstrating their commitment to democracy and human rights. We continue to stand with them. They are indeed not forgotten, they are not alone.
Across Myanmar, the junta is committing brutal human rights violations and abuses including against Rohingya and other minorities. Thousands of civilians, including children, jailed, tortured and killed. Gender and sexual-based violence rife. Civic space virtually non-existent. Over 17 million people in need of humanitarian assistance, and nearly 2 million people displaced.
Since the coup, the UK has provided over £100 million to support those in need. We must collectively ensure that all responders on the front line are supported and that we innovate to channel resources for the humanitarian response.
Special Rapporteur,
How can the international community ensure access to displaced population inside and outside Myanmar?
Thank you..."
Source/publisher:
Govt. UK (London)
Date of publication:
2023-03-20
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-20
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2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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"Council Concludes General Debate on the Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights
The Human Rights Council this morning held an interactive dialogue with the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, and started an interactive dialogue with the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Iran. It also concluded its general debate on the promotion and protection of all human rights, civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights, including the right to development.
Thomas H. Andrews, Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, said two years after the military staged an illegal coup in Myanmar, it continued to wage a campaign of violence and oppression to crush widespread public opposition. But while it had utterly failed to stop this opposition, it was succeeding in destroying the nation and assaulting the fundamental human rights of its people. While opposition remained strong, the junta’s escalating assaults on the people of Myanmar were having a devastating impact. Since the coup was launched, more than 3,000 civilians had been killed; more than 1.3 million civilians had been displaced; more than 16,000 political prisoners were behind bars; and 17.6 million people were in dire need of humanitarian assistance. The Special Rapporteur said he regularly received reports of massacres of civilians, including beheadings and dismemberment. Torture and sexual violence remained a constant threat. Unfortunately, Mr. Andrews had also received reports that opposition groups had committed human rights violations, which also must end.
Mr. Andrews said the international community was not doing nearly enough. A minority of Member States and non-State entities continued to provide the junta with weapons, materials to manufacture weapons, or revenue that was being used to commit war crimes and crimes against humanity. This must stop. Those Member States that had taken actions, such as targeted sanctions or weapons bans, had failed to do so in a strategic and coordinated fashion. A working coalition of Member States should be formed to identify actions that would have the greatest impact and then coordinate their implementation. The international community could also do better in supporting the hundreds of thousands who had been forced to flee Myanmar.
In the discussion, speakers said the Special Rapporteur’s report left no doubt about the situation in Myanmar, which was in freefall. The responsibility lay squarely on the Myanmar military, which, more than two years after its coup, inflicted continuous and increasing grave and systematic human rights violations on people across the country. Persons in vulnerable situations, and in particular persons belonging to ethnic and religious minorities, such as the Rohingya, continued to bear the brunt. Despite all this, the people in Myanmar continued their heroic resistance. Some speakers called upon the military to immediately end all forms of violence and abuses, including sexual and gender-based violence, against the people of Myanmar, including children.
One speaker pointed out that this was an internal affair of Myanmar, and that external pressure would only be counter-productive: the Human Rights Council and multilateral bodies should work to bridge differences between parties to the conflict to avoid creating further conflict. Another speaker said the Special Rapporteur’s calls for the imposition of more unilateral coercive measures on Myanmar were rejected: the extreme politicisation of his mandate was reflected in the recommendations in his report, which were selective and based on uncorroborated information.
Speaking in the discussion were the European Union, Netherlands on behalf of a group of countries, Denmark on behalf of the Nordic Baltic States, Pakistan on behalf of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, Liechtenstein, United States, Czech Republic, Republic of Korea, France, Japan, China, Indonesia, Venezuela, Canada, India, Austria, United Kingdom, Malaysia, Spain, Türkyie, Bangladesh, Italy, Malta, the Gambia, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Malawi, Australia, Croatia, Romania, Bulgaria, Thailand, New Zealand, Russian Federation, South Africa, Germany, and Ukraine.
Also speaking were CIVICUS - World Alliance for Citizen Participation, the Organization for Poverty Alleviation and Development, Human Rights Now, Article 19 - International Centre Against Censorship, International Bar Association, Human Rights Institute, Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development, Law Council of Australia, Edmund Rice International Limited, Human Rights Watch, and iuventum e.V.
The Council then started an interactive dialogue with the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Iran.
Javaid Rehman, Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Iran, said the report was being presented today amidst the most serious human rights violations in Iran over the past four decades. Available evidence, including eyewitness testimonies and comments from reliable medical sources, established that Ms. Amini died on 16 September as a result of beatings by the State morality police. As per usual practice, State authorities denied any wrongdoing or misconduct on their part. None of the members of the morality police involved in the death of Ms. Amini had been held accountable. Mr. Rehman stressed that the death of Ms. Amini was not an isolated event but the latest in a long series of extreme violence against women and girls committed by the Iranian authorities. The responsibility of top senior officials in instigating this violence could not be ignored. Protesters, including children, were beaten to death.
Mr. Rehman said at least 527 people, including 71 children, were killed, and hundreds of protesters severely injured. From the very first days of protests, State authorities had tried to shut down all avenues of freedom of expression, with mass arbitrary arrests and detentions. Recently authorities recognised that over 22,000 people had been arrested. Mr. Rehman remained deeply concerned at the continuing and exponentially increasing violations of human rights in the country. The scale and gravity of the violations committed by Iranian authorities pointed to the possible commission of international crimes, notably the crimes against humanity of murder, imprisonment, enforced disappearances, torture, rape and sexual violence, and persecution. In the absence of accountability at the domestic level, Mr. Rehman strongly advocated for the establishment of an independent international fact-finding mission and looked towards fully cooperating with it to ensure justice and accountability for victims of human rights violations.
Iran, speaking as a country concerned, said advocacy for human rights was increasingly mistaken by some States and mandate holders for unwarranted and egotistic purposes, abusing the human rights mechanisms to target certain States; they were void of any value for the protection of human rights. The Council’s mandate was best fulfilled by dialogue and cooperation, in line with non-selectivity and impartiality. The Special Rapporteur’s report, which read like a tragic novel, had been used by some Western media as an attempt to portray the situation of human rights in Iran. The Special Rapporteur was totally in disregard of his mandate, in his lack of impartiality, using biased language, and violating the Code of Conduct. The Iranian people had witnessed nearly three months of terrorist attacks and armed riots, but the Special Rapporteur did not even mention certain terrorist attacks, which left innocent people murdered, and did not mention armed attacks on people in certain provinces.
In the discussion on Iran, many speakers commended the Special Rapporteur for his report. Since the death of Mahsa Amini in the custody of Iran’s so-called “Morality Police” six months ago, the world had witnessed a mass movement while Iran’s leadership had conducted a relentless and violent crackdown on the people of Iran. Some speakers said it was important to renew the mandate while also supporting the work of the newly created Fact-Finding Mission, in the name of women, life, and freedom. Some speakers strongly condemned the use of violence, harassment and detentions against peaceful protesters. Perpetrators of torture, killings and violence, including sexual and gender-based violence, needed to be held accountable.
Some speakers said that abusing the United Nations human rights mechanisms to single out and harass some nations that did not align with the hegemonic and geopolitical interests of the West had nothing to do with the genuine promotion and protection of human rights. This was a violation of the United Nations Charter and of international law. It was hoped that the international community could respect the human rights development path independently chosen by the people of Iran. Of grave concern were the unilateral coercive measures imposed on Iran by other countries, which had undermined the human rights of the Iranian people and gravely affected their rights.
Speaking in the discussion were Estonia on behalf of the Nordic-Baltic countries, European Union, Liechtenstein, United States, Ireland, Germany, Czech Republic, Israel, Belgium, China, Switzerland, Luxembourg, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Costa Rica, North Macedonia, Venezuela, Canada, Zimbabwe, Netherlands, Republic of Moldova, Austria, and United Kingdom.
At the beginning of the meeting, the Council concluded the general debate on agenda item three on the promotion and protection of all human rights, civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights, including the right to development. The general debate started in previous meetings and a summary can be found here and here.
In the general debate, speakers said the promotion and protection of human rights were essential to ensure a more just and equitable world for all. However, in many cases, all around the world, human rights were being violated. Some speakers highlighted increasing cases of horrific violations that occurred in a number of countries, and war and conflict zones against civilians. Violence had become a daily occurrence, with wars, bloodshed and conflicts taking place in many countries. There was a need to move towards serious United Nations-led peace processes and transitional justice needed to be achieved. Some speakers told the Council that over-compliance of businesses and banks with unilateral sanctions led to wide-scoped violations of all economic, social and cultural rights, as well as the right to life in the sanctioned countries.
Speakers called on the Special Procedures to report and discuss the harmful effects of unilateral sanctions in their annual reports and condemn these effects in joint statements.
Speaking in the general debate were World Muslim Congress, International Action for Peace and Sustainable Development, Promotion du Développement Economique et Social, Lidskoprávní organizace Práva a svobody obcanučů Turkmenistánu z.s., Youth in Technology and Arts Network, Association Culturelle des Tamouls en France, Asociacion Cubana de las Naciones Unidas (Cuban United Nations Association), Il Cenacolo, Baha'i International Community, Commission of the Churches on International Affairs of the World Council of Churches, Chunhui Children's Foundation, Human Rights Solidarity Organization, Human Rights and Democratic Participation Centre "SHAMS", Organization for Defending Victims of Violence, Centre Zagros pour les Droits de l'Homme, Samarthanam Trust for the Disabled, and Alliance Internationale pour la défense des Droits et des Libertés.
Speaking in exercise of right of reply were Morocco, Indonesia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia.
The webcast of the Human Rights Council meetings can be found here. All meeting summaries can be found here. Documents and reports related to the Human Rights Council’s fifty-second regular session can be found here.
The Council will reconvene this afternoon at 3 p.m. to continue and conclude the interactive dialogue with the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran, followed by an interactive dialogue with the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, and then an interactive dialogue with the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine.
General Debate on the Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, including the Right to Development
The general debate on agenda item three on the promotion and protection of all human rights, civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights, including the right to development, started in previous meetings and a summary can be found here and here.
General Debate
Speakers, among other things, said the promotion and protection of human rights were essential to ensure a more just and equitable world for all. However, in many cases all around the world, human rights were being violated. Speakers said that in some places, laws had not been effective in removing barriers and decreasing violence against women. Women and girls were often used as human shields and as a tool to incite hatred.
Some speakers highlighted the lack of attention by the Council on the human rights of women suffering the pain, stigma and discrimination associated with obstetric fistula, particularly those in rural areas. Member States were called on to pay more attention to the prevention of obstetric fistula in their policies, strategic plans and budgets. Governments needed to initiate trainings for midwives from local communities, accompanied by incentives to encourage them to return to serve their communities.
Speakers said that during her presentation to the Council, the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief had recalled the important role of States in the protection of the rights of religious minorities. Not only was this in line with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international commitments, but allowing all persons in a given country, irrespective of their religion or belief, to live freely, contributed to the richness and the advancement of society. In spite of this, in certain areas, some religious minorities faced potential exclusion from society. The international community needed to remind authorities of their obligations to guarantee the rights of all to freely practise the religion of their choice without any fear or punishment.
Some speakers highlighted increasing cases of horrific violations that occurred in a number of countries and war and conflict zones against civilians. Violence had become a daily occurrence, with wars, bloodshed and conflicts taking place in many countries. There was a need to move towards serious United Nations-led peace processes and transitional justice needed to be achieved. Terrorism was spreading and groups were becoming more active in human smuggling, in some cases supported by authorities. It was important that they were held accountable.
Council members were invited to impose targeted sanctions on officials who had been credibly accused of war crimes and crimes of genocide. Many speakers also expressed concern about attacks on activists and human rights defenders, who were especially vulnerable and faced torture and death in pre-trial detention. The Council was called on to assess the situation of human rights defenders and take necessary steps to improve it.
Some speakers told the Council that over-compliance of businesses and banks with unilateral sanctions led to wide-scoped violations of all economic, social and cultural rights, as well as the right to life in the sanctioned countries. Unilateral sanctions threatened human lives, and the United Nations treaty bodies were called on to document the deadly impacts of sanctions on targeted populations and offer recommendations on how to provide the victims with compensation and redress. Speakers called on the Special Procedures to report and discuss the harmful effects of unilateral sanctions in their annual reports and condemn these effects in joint statements.
Interactive Dialogue with the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar
Report
The Council has before it the report by the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights inMyanmar, Thomas H. Andrews (A/HRC/52/66).
Presentation of Report
THOMAS H. ANDREWS, Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, said two years after the military staged an illegal coup in Myanmar, it continued to wage a campaign of violence and oppression to crush widespread public opposition. But while it had utterly failed to stop this opposition, it was succeeding in destroying the nation and assaulting the fundamental human rights of its people. Even as they pursued a heroic campaign to save their country, many people from Myanmar had come to believe that a distracted world had forgotten them. The defence of human rights and citizen opposition to the junta of Myanmar had never been stronger. Protests and civil disobedience continued. The junta’s control over territory and the people of Myanmar was eroding. Opposition groups were forging alliances and gaining strength.
The people of Myanmar were exposing the junta’s lie that a military dominated future for Myanmar was inevitable. The junta did not offer any viable path to stability or an end to the human rights crisis in Myanmar because it was the very cause of this crisis. Most Member States recognised this and had acknowledged that the junta lacked even a shred of constitutional or democratic legitimacy. The junta now seemed to be gambling that it could capture a degree of international recognition and a veneer of legitimacy by going through the motions of what they would try to describe as an “election”, and the Special Rapporteur urged the members of this Council to reject this outrageous claim.
While opposition remained strong, the junta’s escalating assaults on the people of Myanmar were having a devastating impact. Since the coup was launched, more than 3,000 civilians had been killed; more than 1.3 million civilians had been displaced; more than 16,000 political prisoners were behind bars; 17.6 million people were in dire need of humanitarian assistance; 58,000 civilian homes and structures had been burned to the ground or otherwise destroyed; and State institutions had been hollowed out and the rule of law had collapsed. The Special Rapporteur said he regularly received reports of massacres of civilians, including beheadings and dismemberment. Torture and sexual violence remained a constant threat. Unfortunately, Mr. Andrews had also received reports that opposition groups had committed human rights violations, which also must end.
The hopeful news was that many world leaders had raised their voice in support of the people of Myanmar. Several nations had backed up their words with action, including targeted economic sanctions and weapons bans. The discouraging news was that the international community was not doing nearly enough. A minority of Member States and non-State entities continued to provide the junta with weapons, materials to manufacture weapons, or revenue that was being used to commit war crimes and crimes against humanity. This must stop. Those Member States that had taken actions, such as targeted sanctions or weapons bans, had failed to do so in a strategic and coordinated fashion. A working coalition of Member States should be formed to identify actions that would have the greatest impact and then coordinate their implementation. The international community could also do better in supporting the hundreds of thousands who had been forced to flee Myanmar. The people of Myanmar continued to demonstrate remarkable courage and tenacity in the defence of their country and the human rights of its people. They deserved solidarity and support.
Discussion
Some speakers said the Special Rapporteur’s report left no doubt about the situation in Myanmar, which was in freefall. The responsibility lay squarely on the Myanmar military, which, more than two years after its coup, inflicted continuous and increasing grave and systematic human rights violations on people across the country. Persons in vulnerable situations, and in particular persons belonging to ethnic and religious minorities such as the Rohingya, continued to bear the brunt. Despite all this, the people in Myanmar continued their heroic resistance.
Speakers, among other things, called upon the military to immediately end all forms of violence and abuses, including sexual and gender-based violence, against the people of Myanmar, including children. The military junta was urged to end the systematic intimidation and reprisals against the people of Myanmar for exercising their human rights and fundamental freedoms. The speakers called on the junta to ensure the immediate and unconditional release of all those arbitrarily detained – including children, political leaders, journalists, human rights defenders, and others. All parties to the conflict were urged to ensure humanitarian access for all persons affected by the situation. The military junta was urged to immediately stop all human rights violations, to lift all martial law orders at once, and to cooperate with the Special Rapporteur as well as the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar. Speakers also called for the effective implementation of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ Five-point Consensus, urging Myanmar to engage constructively with the international community.
Speakers expressed deep concern over the deteriorating humanitarian crisis in Myanmar, and called for unimpeded access of humanitarian assistance to all parts of the country without discrimination. Concern was expressed about reports that the military was increasing its use of airstrikes, thereby indiscriminately bombing villages and camps for internally displaced persons. Speakers condemned all attacks on civilians, including extrajudicial killings, torture, sexual violence, and other human rights violations, many of which could amount to crimes against humanity and war crimes. Human rights abuses committed by Myanmar’s security forces were appalling and showed the depths to which the military would go to consolidate their control without regard for the welfare of the country. It was imperative that the international community take strong action to support the people of Myanmar, prevent further atrocities by the military, and advance a democratic Myanmar.
The deteriorating humanitarian situation within Myanmar and also for refugees that had fled Myanmar, particularly the Rohingya community, was also a matter of concern for many speakers, who urged continuing support for these parties, as well as for the countries hosting and organizations supporting them. There was deep concern for the staggering numbers of displaced populations, which could have a destabilising effect on the region as a whole, and the international community was called upon to continue supporting the people of Myanmar in meeting their urgent humanitarian needs, both inside and outside national borders.
A speaker pointed out that this was an internal affair of Myanmar, and that external pressure would only be counter-productive: the Human Rights Council and multilateral bodies should work to bridge differences between parties to the conflict to avoid creating further conflict. The Special Rapporteur misused his expert status, went beyond his mandate, and vilified legitimate trade between countries, going against the Code of Conduct of the Special Procedures, and should stop smearing and double standards, whilst working to stabilise the situation in Myanmar. Another speaker said the Special Rapporteur’s calls for the imposition of more unilateral coercive measures on Myanmar were rejected: the extreme politicisation of his mandate was reflected in the recommendations in his report, which were selective and based on uncorroborated information. They should be rejected, replaced with dialogue and understanding to encourage the political stability of the country. The Council should cease to use Special Procedure mandates against the countries of the Global South.
Among the questions raised by speakers were: what other ways out did the Special Rapporteur see for a human rights crisis of this scale besides the Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ Five-point Consensus; how could the international community at this time best support the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all persons; how could the international community support the Special Rapporteur’s call to impose a comprehensive arms embargo and refer the situation in Myanmar to the International Criminal Court; what actions could the international community take to help prevent further atrocities by the military and promote accountability for human rights abuses; and how did the Special Rapporteur intend to implement the recommendations in his report, considering that sanctions could further exacerbate the already underfunded humanitarian response in Myanmar?
Concluding Remarks
THOMAS H. ANDREWS, Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, in concluding remarks, said he did not have the time to answer each and every question, but he wished to say to all that his door was open, he welcomed input and questions, even criticism. He had been asked by many what the United Nations could do to address the crisis most effectively: the Security Council passed a strong resolution in December, but more should be done, and it should take action, including an arms embargo, targeted economic sanctions, and that included reference to the International Criminal Court. It was for this reason that he recommended that States that were prepared to take such steps did so in coordination, strategically.
Mr. Andrews said he had been criticised and questioned regarding some points, including the vilification of “normal weapons trade”. What he was vilifying was the murder of thousands of normal people, gross human rights violations, crimes against humanity and war crimes. The reasons these crimes were occurring was because the junta had the means to do so, the weapons and technology: the countries of the world should end that trade that was contributing and enabling these gross human rights violations.
In his report, concerning those who had been forced to leave their homes and their country, he commended all nations who were hosting and caring for them, sheltering them, extending visas, facilitating resettlement, all of which were saving lives. However, more could be done and must be done. There was a grave humanitarian crisis inside and outside Myanmar, and the consequences of not funding these humanitarian response programmes were dire, which was unconscionable, a stain on the conscience of the international community: children and families must be saved. The millions inside Myanmar could not access humanitarian aid, but there were civil society organizations that could help them, although they lacked funding. He appealed to all to fund these critical, critical programmes that could save lives.
He appreciated concerns and questions on whether he was within his mandate: this ongoing crisis included extreme human rights violations that were forcing hundreds of thousands of people across the border, and he believed that their plight should not just be the focus of his attention, but the duty of the Human Rights Council. It was his duty to shine a light on their situation, and his goal was to provide the Council with the information to address the grave human rights violations that were being perpetrated by the junta, which was not only within his mandate, but must be brought to the attention of the international community. Finally, he urged the international community to not recognise any so-called “elections” that the junta would hold.
Interactive Dialogue with the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Iran
Report
Also before the Council is the report by the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Javaid Rehman (A/HRC/52/67).
Presentation of the Report
JAVAID REHMAN, Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Iran, said the report was being presented today amidst the most serious human rights violations in Iran over the past four decades. Mr. Rehman expressed admiration for millions of peace-loving Iranian women, men, girls and boys, who since September had challenged State authorities and joined peaceful protests in all the country’s provinces at the risk of their lives. The report thoroughly examined the circumstances of the death of Ms. Amini in the custody of Iranian morality police three days after her arrest for allegedly not complying with the country’s discriminatory dress code. Available evidence, including eyewitness testimonies and comments from reliable medical sources, established that Ms. Amini died on 16 September as a result of beatings by the State morality police. As per usual practice, State authorities denied any wrongdoing or misconduct on their part. None of the members of the morality police involved in the death of Ms. Amini had been held accountable. Mr. Rehman stressed that her death was not an isolated event but the latest in a long series of extreme violence against women and girls committed by the Iranian authorities.
A month before the death of Ms. Amini, President Raisi signed a decree ordering further repressive measures for “improper hijab”. The responsibility of top senior officials in instigating this violence could not be ignored. Protesters, including children, were beaten to death. At least 527 people, including 71 children, were killed, and hundreds of protesters severely injured. From the very first days of protests, State authorities had tried to shut down all avenues of freedom of expression, with mass arbitrary arrests and detentions. Recently authorities recognised that over 22,000 people had been arrested. Dozens of human rights defenders, at least 600 students, 45 lawyers, 576 civil society activists, 170 women human rights defenders, at least 62 journalists, artists, academics were arbitrarily arrested and detained. Mr. Rehman was outraged that despite appeals by his mandate and by the international community, Iranian authorities had thus far executed at least four persons associated with protests after arbitrary, summary, and sham trials marred by torture allegations. At least 17 protestors had already been sentenced to death and more than 100 currently faced charges that carried the death penalty.
Mr. Rehman remained deeply concerned at the continuing and exponentially increasing violations of human rights in the country. At least 500 persons, including two persons sentenced as children and 13 women, were executed in 2022, the highest number of executions in the past five years. Since January 2023, 143 persons had already been executed following grossly unfair trials. Mr. Rehman was equally alarmed at the continuing violence against women and girls, including coordinated chemical attacks throughout the country against schoolgirls which were repeatedly denied by the Government. The report to the Council in March 2022 and the current report firmly established the conclusion that there was an absence of accountability for serious human rights violations and for crimes under international law within the political, constitutional, and legal system of Iran.
The scale and gravity of the violations committed by Iranian authorities pointed to the possible commission of international crimes, notably the crimes against humanity of murder, imprisonment, enforced disappearances, torture, rape and sexual violence, and persecution. In the absence of accountability at the domestic level, Mr. Rehman strongly advocated for the establishment of an independent international fact-finding mission and looked towards fully cooperating with it to ensure justice and accountability for victims of human rights violations.
Statement by Country Concerned
Iran, speaking as a country concerned, said advocacy for human rights was increasingly mistaken by some States and mandate-holders for unwarranted and egotistic purposes, abusing the human rights mechanisms to target certain States; they were void of any value for the protection of human rights. The Council’s mandate was best fulfilled by dialogue and cooperation, in line with non-selectivity and impartiality. The Council should stand away from stereotyping, and transform so that human rights were no longer used as a tool by some countries. The Special Rapporteur’s report, which read like a tragic novel, had been used by some Western media as an attempt to portray the situation of human rights in Iran. The Special Rapporteur was totally in disregard of his mandate, in his lack of impartiality, using biased language, and violating the Code of Conduct.
The Iranian people had witnessed nearly three months of terrorist attacks and armed riots, but the Special Rapporteur did not even mention certain terrorist attacks, which left innocent people murdered, and did not mention armed attacks on people in certain provinces. He had ignored the release of prisoners, and was still asking for their release. Last year the Special Rapporteur on unilateral coercive measures had visited Iran, and had met with all governmental and non-governmental sectors, and her report explicitly touched upon the human rights violations of the Iranian people by these unilateral coercive measures - there was no mention of this in Mr. Rehman’s report.
Discussion
In the discussion, speakers among other things, commended the Special Rapporteur for his report. Since the death of Mahsa Amini in the custody of Iran’s so-called “Morality Police” six months ago, the world had witnessed a mass movement while Iran’s leadership had conducted a relentless and violent crackdown on the people of Iran. Many were profoundly worried by the violent response by the Iranian security forces to the peaceful protests that followed the killing of Mahsa Amini in police custody. Some speakers said it was important to renew the mandate while also supporting the work of the newly created Fact-Finding Mission, in the name of women, life, and freedom.
For months, the brave people of Iran, especially women and girls, had been facing extreme and unjustified violence and crackdown by the Iranian authorities for exercising their right to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly. Speakers strongly condemned the use of violence, harassment and detentions against peaceful protesters. Perpetrators of torture, killings and violence, including sexual and gender-based violence, needed to be held accountable. Iran was urged to release all persons who were imprisoned or detained for exercising their right to peacefully protest. Speakers also raised concern at the reports of poisoning of thousands of children with gas in study centres.
Some speakers said they strongly opposed the death penalty at all times and in all circumstances, calling upon Iranian authorities to impose an immediate moratorium on executions. The use of the death penalty against peaceful protesters who had been exercising their rights and fundamental freedoms was particularly deplorable. Speakers were appalled at the executions of four protestors by authorities with many more facing charges that may carry the death penalty.
Concern was also expressed about the press freedom and safety of journalists in Iran. Journalists and media workers were being threatened, harassed and detained. Families of Iranians working for foreign media outlets were being intimidated and persecuted. Iran was called upon to release all arbitrarily detained persons, including journalists, media workers and their family members, and to ensure freedom of opinion and expression and access to information, both online and offline.
Many speakers noted that it was regretful that the Special Rapporteur had been unable to visit the country. Iran was urged to fully cooperate with the Special Rapporteur, including by granting full and unhindered access to the country. Now, more than ever, the international community needed to strongly support the Special Rapporteur’s work documenting the Iranian Government’s human rights abuses. His support for the Fact-Finding Mission’s separate, vital work of uncovering the violence perpetrated against protestors was also appreciated.
Some speakers expressed concern over the politically motivated and biased approach against Iran. Abusing the United Nations human rights mechanisms to single out and harass some nations that did not align with the hegemonic and geopolitical interests of the West had nothing to do with the genuine promotion and protection of human rights. This was a violation of the United Nations Charter and of international law. Speakers maintained that Iran was a strong supporter of multilateralism and had demonstrated commitment to human rights. Iran could handle its own domestic issues properly. It was hoped that the international community could respect the human rights development path independently chosen by the people of Iran. Of grave concern were the unilateral coercive measures imposed on Iran by other countries which had undermined the human rights of the Iranian people and gravely affected their rights.
Speakers asked how the Special Rapporteur had engaged with the newly formed Fact-Finding Mission? How could accountability be ensured when the authorities were not willing to cooperate? What cooperation could there be between the Special Rapporteur’s mandate and the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on freedom and expression?..."
Source/publisher:
United Nations Human Rights Council (Geneva)
Date of publication:
2023-03-20
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-20
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
more
Sub-title:
52nd session of the UN Human Rights Council
Description:
"More than two years since the military coup in Myanmar, the junta’s atrocities continue to escalate, driving the country ever deeper into a humanitarian and human rights catastrophe.
Meanwhile, the international response to the situation has had no noticeable impact on the military’s crimes against humanity and war crimes.
The junta is unbowed by “statements of condemnation.” Targeted sanctions are critical but they have not been coordinated closely or enforced rigorously enough.
The UN Security Council’s resolution in December was regrettably watered down to contain almost no actionable language. In the three months since it was adopted, the junta’s security forces have arrested over 530 people, sentenced over 420, and killed more than 275 in airstrikes, arson attacks, and summary executions. Just last week about 20 civilians who had taken shelter in a monastery were massacred.
The junta likewise continues to flagrantly disregard ASEAN’s five-point consensus adopted in 2021, which the regional bloc lacks effective tools to enforce.
A new, bolder approach is needed. Myanmar’s generals are not going to change their conduct until the cumulative cost of their atrocities grows too great to bear.
States need to harmonize their efforts to impose real consequences: coordinating and enforcing tougher targeted sanctions to cut off the junta’s access to the extractive revenue, weapons, and aviation fuel enabling its abuses. As ASEAN chair, Indonesia should lead the bloc in supporting these measures as well as accountability efforts to bring justice to the junta’s victims.
The facts on the ground are clear. What are governments waiting for?..."
Source/publisher:
Human Rights Watch (USA)
Date of publication:
2023-03-20
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-20
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Crimes Against Humanity, Ethnic Cleansing, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
more
Sub-title:
More than five years after hundreds of thousands fled Myanmar, conditions in Bangladesh are deteriorating
Description:
"The hungry and desperate are now much more so. Last month, the rations to Rohingya living in the world’s largest refugee camp – Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh – were slashed. Another drastic cut is due next month. This is, as a UN expert warned, a matter of life and death. The Rohingya have lived on a knife edge for too long.
Their suffering made global headlines in 2017, when the Myanmar military, supported by militias, launched a murderous campaign that took thousands of lives, forced 700,000 to flee Rakhine state for Bangladesh and was described by a UN human rights expert as genocide. In the last two years, what little attention has been paid to Myanmar has focused on the military’s coup and attempts to crush civilian resistance. But the suffering of the Rohingya began decades ago and continues to this day, even outside Rakhine state. Many had fled before, returning (not always by choice) when they were assured it was safe. It was not. They experienced discrimination and repression, military operations, pogroms and the stripping of their citizenship. The 600,000 or so who remain in Myanmar are confined to camps, subject to government violence and denied essential services.
“There was no peace … wherever they went,” the Guardian journalist Kaamil Ahmed writes in his new book, I Feel No Peace: Rohingya Fleeing Over Seas and Rivers. “The Rohingya have run from the Burmese troops who kill them to their Bangladeshi counterparts, who have policed their lives in a different way, looming over them in their exile then turning the screw when governments decide they need to return to Myanmar.”
Conditions in Bangladesh have become so poor that the number attempting dangerous sea crossings to Malaysia or Indonesia increased fivefold last year, to more than 3,500, at the cost of around a tenth of those lives. Earlier this month, a huge blaze tore through one of the camps at Cox’s Bazar, leaving an estimated 12,000 people without shelter – the latest in a series of fires endangering lives and destroying the meagre possessions that the refugees can still muster. It has been blamed on the armed gangs that menace, rob and murder inhabitants in the camps. Rohingya complain that Bangladeshi police have failed to root out the violence, and instead harass and extort from them.
Dhaka wants UN help to move more Rohingya to Bhasan Char, an island highly vulnerable to cyclones. Officials portray it as an opportunity for a fresh start; refugees have described dangerous and prison-like conditions. The Rohingya have reason to be cynical about the UN, given the refugee agency’s previous treatment of them.
Bangladesh is an impoverished nation grappling with a major humanitarian crisis, and it needs help to do better. The support offered in 2017 rapidly dwindled, even before Covid, the Ukraine war and soaring food prices. The World Food Programme says it needs $125m (£103m) just to avoid further ration cuts in a community where malnutrition is already rife. The US has pledged $26m (£21m), but overall the response has been lacklustre. The UK’s promise of a £5m package does not come close to compensating for the cuts it imposed when it slashed the aid budget in 2021. What the Rohingya ultimately need is citizenship in Myanmar to safely return when they wish to, but failing that, resettlement would allow them to establish new lives and flourish instead of dwelling in perpetual insecurity. They need not only food now, but a future..."
Source/publisher:
"The Guardian" (UK)
Date of publication:
2023-03-19
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-19
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Rohingya (cultural, political etc.), Burmese refugees in Bangladesh, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
more
Description:
"YANGON, Myanmar — When the military seized power in a coup on the morning of Feb. 1, 2021, I grabbed some clothes and other essentials and stumbled out onto the streets of Yangon. I haven’t returned home since.
I lead a group of activists opposed to military rule of Myanmar, and I knew then that the soldiers would soon be coming for me. Since the coup, my colleagues and I have played cat and mouse with security forces in Yangon, Myanmar’s largest city. We organize nonviolent protests — small, quick demonstrations to remind the military that it is not in complete control and to give hope to our citizens.
It’s a dangerous, lonely life.
Nearly all of my time is spent hiding in safe houses — six of them so far. I’m 27 years old and have left my current apartment only a few brief times since July. It’s as if an impenetrable wall had been built, separating me from the world. I can’t go out to see the night sky or go to the market or visit friends. I spend much of my time in Zoom meetings planning street protests with colleagues in my organization, the University Students’ Unions Alumni Force, and other activists. To stay sane, I’ve taken up playing the guitar and force myself to walk around my tiny apartment for 20 minutes each day.
Whenever I feel the urge to go outside and enjoy life, I think about how long it would be before I am arrested, how my arrest would affect the men and women fighting alongside me and how I would no longer be of any use to the resistance. The apartment is both sanctuary and prison.
When friends and comrades are arrested, I grieve. But I have to quickly turn my attention to whether their arrest puts me at risk. I change my cellphone’s SIM card and review interactions with those friends for any incriminating information that military interrogators might squeeze out of them. We have protocols in place for this, useless information that can be given up to divert authorities or buy time. But what if they break my comrade?
The eyes of military intelligence are everywhere, sometimes disguised as fruit sellers or trishaw drivers. So only five people know where I am hiding, people who have either hidden with me or who supply me with groceries, cigarettes and books. I view this not as fate but as my own choice — it feels less depressing that way — and I am consoled by my belief in what I’m doing.
Myanmar’s people have been held captive for too long, first by the British and then, after a period of democracy after the country’s independence in 1948, by a succession of military regimes since 1962.
In 2015, a democratic government won power in elections after a military-led reform process. The military, known as the Tatmadaw, retained significant influence, but it seemed a new era had dawned. Until the 2021 coup.
I’m resolved to fight, but I still miss the normal life I once enjoyed in Yangon, my home city. I’m here, and yet I’m not. I yearn for the simple pleasure of a cup of milk tea in a tea shop. Tea shops are part of Myanmar’s DNA, where people catch up with one another, share news or simply contemplate life. My parents, who worked hard to send me to university, used to run a tea shop, and I loved working there. But in 2015, while a college student, I was arrested for protesting the military’s retention of significant powers that stood in the way of democratic development. By the time I was released the next year, my parents had closed the shop. They couldn’t continue without my help.
After the coup, my parents also went into hiding, fearing that the military would arrest them to get at me. It was the right move; some of my friends’ parents have been arrested for their children’s stance against the coup. I know where my parents are, but I can’t visit or tell them where I am. In Myanmar the price for political activism is paid by the entire family.
Resisting the regime gets more difficult every week. Right after the coup, hundreds of thousands of people took to the streets in protest. But the junta waged a brutal crackdown. So far, the military has killed nearly 3,000 people, arrested more than 17,000 and committed appalling human rights abuses. The real numbers are probably much higher. Thousands have taken up arms against the military, which has responded by massacring civilians and conducting airstrikes that have killed children.
Deadly force, including driving vehicles into crowds, has been used against nonviolent protesters. As a result, what started as hundreds of people joining our flash protests in the months after the coup has dwindled to merely dozens.
But we carry on. Our scouts identify good locations — bustling public places with ample escape routes to safe houses. We carry banners and march, chanting against the junta. Many street vendors and other bystanders voice their support, but they must be careful or risk having their market stalls destroyed or looted or being punished in other ways by security forces. It’s all over in minutes, and our activists melt away.
Last year I boarded a bus in Yangon and asked passengers to follow me in reciting a pledge to seek justice for prominent activists whom the military had recently executed and to fight for justice and equality in Myanmar. They did, raising their hands in the three-fingered opposition salute. Video of the scene was posted online. I had to change safe houses twice soon afterward.
The risks are enormous. A colleague was arrested en route to one of our meetings. Soon after, the military forced him to call us, trying to bait me and others into showing up to a phony meeting. Through code words, my colleague made us aware that he was in custody. We went immediately to his safe house and destroyed anything sensitive: his laptop, phone, camera, memory cards and documents. The military raided the apartment shortly after that.
He was soon forced to call us again. This time we put his girlfriend on the phone, thinking it might be her last chance to hear his voice. He pleaded, “Honey, please show up this time,” but we knew he didn’t mean it. He had planned to ask her to marry him a few days later. Instead, he was headed into the hell of military custody and interrogation.
On the day of the coup two years ago, I saw anger, fear, sorrow and uncertainty on people’s faces as they struggled to comprehend what it meant for them and their country. Today, people barely recognize their lives; severe economic hardship, sky-high inflation, increasing crime and other suffering touch countless families. But we have internalized the shock and are determined to write a happy ending to this dark episode.
Now, in our darkest hour, we must be courageous. We cannot lose hope.
We won’t go back to the old Myanmar. We will create a free and equal society for all, including the Rohingya and other ethnic minorities who have suffered for far too long — a Myanmar based on a federal constitution, equality and compassion and whose values inspire the world.
Source/publisher:
"The New York Times" (USA)
Date of publication:
2023-03-19
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-19
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Anti-coup protesters, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
more
Description:
"Myanmar:
This morning, the Secretary-General’s Special Envoy on Myanmar, Noeleen Heyzer, briefed the General Assembly.She said that the military takeover in Myanmar, which is now in its third year, has had a devastating impact on the country and its people as violence continues at an alarming rate, adding that despite the brutal repression, widespread popular resistance to the military continues by non-violent and violent means across much of the country.
I will be taking her to the Security Council stakeout soon, you will know when that happens..."
Source/publisher:
UN Department of Global Communications
Date of publication:
2023-03-16
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-16
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, The UN and Burma - news and commentary, UN human rights documents on Myanmar
Language:
more
Description:
"Violence resulting from the brutal military coup is continuing inside Myanmar on an “alarming scale” the UN Special Envoy told a meeting of the General Assembly on Thursday.
Now in its third year, Noeleen Heyzer said that “the impact of the military takeover on the country and its people, has been devasting.”
She thanked Member States for renewing the resolution for the continuation of her mandate and support for an “all-stakeholder approach in promoting a Myanmar-led process, reflective of the will of the people”, to end the suffering and death.
Intensified violence
On 1 February, she said the military had extended its State of Emergency, and intensified the use of force to include more aerial bombing, the burning of civilian homes, and other “grave human rights violations to maintain its grip on power.”
She described the spread of Martial Law to 47 different townships, and the empowering of citizens deemed loyal to the regime, by allowing them to carry guns.
Atrocities, beheadings, and the mutilation of rebel fighters’ bodies have been recorded, together with escalating violence in ethnic areas.
“We just received reports that 28 civilians were killed by the military at a monastery in Southern Shan state this weekend.”
Implacable resistance
She said that despite the brutal repression, widespread and popular resistance continues, by any means possible, across much of Myanmar.
“A generation that benefited from Myanmar’s previous opening up, especially the youth, is now disillusioned, facing chronic hardship and many feeling they have no choice but to take up arms to fight military rule.
Heavy fighting has spread to areas previously unaffected by conflict, she added, putting more civilian lives at risk and further complicating humanitarian operations to save lives amid the fighting.
Collective punishment
She said a “four cuts” strategy put in place by the regime, “which seeks to block access to food, funds, information and recruits – continues to target civilians as collective punishment.”
Ms. Heyzer said the opposition National Unity Government was continuing to point to the brutality of military forces, while also warning resistance militias not to themselves, “perform inhumane acts.”
“With both sides intent on prevailing by force, there is no prospect for a negotiated settlement”, The Special Envoy added.
17.6 million need assistance
The conflict has meant humanitarian needs have risen steadily, with 17.6 million Burmese in need of humanitarian assistance, more than 1.6 million internally displaced, and an estimated 55,000 civilian buildings destroyed since the coup.
She said it was critical, that a Myanmar-led process, reflective of all voices – especially women, youth and minorities – be allowed to decide the country’s future
“Sustainable solutions for the Rohingya people must be built into the design of a peaceful, inclusive and democratic Myanmar”, she added. “Their voices have to be integral to decisions about their own future.”
Rohingya refugees
She reminded ambassadors that more than five years since the forced mass exodus across the border into Bangladesh by the mainly-Muslim Rohingya, the hundreds of thousands of refugees continue to face extreme hardships.
Earlier this month, another massive fire ripped through a Rohingya refugee camp in Cox’s Bazar, affecting 15,000 and the World Food Programme (WFP) has announced it needs to reduce rations for refugees this month due to a severe funding shortfall.
Ms. Heyzer urged Member States to support the 2023 Joint Response Plan for the Rohingya Humanitarian Crisis, which stands at $876 million, adding that “now is not the time for donor fatigue.”
‘Unprecedented solidarity’
She concluded by saying that despite tragedy and deep uncertainty in Myanmar, “there is unprecedented solidarity that has emerged in the country.
“I know that this General Assembly will renew its commitment supporting the will of the people, including the Rohingya, to build a peaceful, just and democratic union of Myanmar for all.”..."
Source/publisher:
UN News Centre
Date of publication:
2023-03-16
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-16
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
more
Description:
"Madame Vice-President, Distinguished Delegates,
It is an honour to share my reflection on Myanmar’s urgent crisis and my efforts as the Special Envoy of the UN Secretary-General on Myanmar.
I am grateful that the General Assembly in December 2022 renewed its resolution for my role and continued support to my all-stakeholder approach in promoting a Myanmar-led process reflective of the will of the people.
In the resolution, Member States called for an immediate end to violence, safe and unimpeded humanitarian access, release of political prisoners and the need to find durable solutions for the Rohingya.
It underlines “the need for a peaceful solution for Myanmar, through an inclusive and peaceful dialogue between all parties, in accordance with the will and interests of the people of Myanmar.”
Madame Vice-President,
In its third year, the impact of the military takeover on the country and its people has been devastating.
Violence continues at an alarming scale. On 1 February, the military extended the State of Emergency and intensified its use of force, including aerial bombing, the burning of civilian structures and other grave human rights violations to maintain its grip on power.
Martial Law has been extended to 47 townships and the regime has revived a 1977 law allowing civilians it deems “loyal” to carry firearms.
In Sagaing Region, the Bamar heartland and once a key recruiting ground for the military, there are recent reports of further atrocities including beheadings and mutilation of People’s Defence Forces (PDF) combatants.
Violence continues to escalate in several of the country’s ethnic areas. We just received reports that 28 civilians were killed by the military at a monastery in Southern Shan state this weekend.
I also recently met with ethnic Chin leaders who shared that Martial Law is currently in effect in eight out of nine townships in Chin State. They highlighted an increase in airstrikes and indiscriminate shelling targeting civilian areas and displacement sites.
People on the ground have implored, “Please, the people are asking countries not to give military arms that are killing us and intensifying the conflict.”
Despite brutal repression, widespread popular resistance to the military continues by non-violent and violent means, across much of the country.
A generation that benefited from Myanmar’s previous opening up, especially the youth, is now disillusioned, facing chronic hardship and many feeling they have no choice but to take up arms to fight military rule.
Heavy fighting has spread to areas previously unaffected by conflict, putting more civilian lives at risk and further complicating humanitarian operations delivering livesaving assistance to the people of Myanmar.
The regime’s “four cuts” strategy – which seeks to block access to food, funds, information and recruits – continues to target civilians as collective punishment.
The military’s Five-Point Roadmap – its exit strategy – which is supposed to conclude with elections, has been far from a pathway out of the crisis it has created.
Despite stated intentions to deliver relief and build conditions for peace, the military has passed an “Organization Registration Law” and “Political Parties Law” that hinder humanitarian operations and shrink democratic space.
The regime has accused resistance forces of violence while the National Unity Government (NUG) continues to point to the military’s brutality.
The NUG has also condemned killings by the PDFs warning resistance groups not to perform inhumane acts.
With both sides intent on prevailing by force, there is no prospect for a negotiated settlement.
Humanitarian needs are rising across Myanmar as a result. As of today, 17.6 million people are in need of humanitarian assistance, more than 1.6 million are internally displaced and an estimated 55,000 civilian structures have been destroyed since February 2021.
At least 29 per cent of households are facing moderate or severe food insecurity with conflict areas worst affected.
Myanmar’s most vulnerable, including Rohingya and other ethnic minorities, the displaced, and women and children, are most gravely impacted.
The cost in human suffering will multiply and the political, human rights, humanitarian and socioeconomic crisis will intensify if urgent action is not taken.
We must send a strong signal that violence must end and support for democratic voices strengthened to help empower those seeking to chart a way for a peaceful future.
Madame Vice-President,
The Secretary-General and I have made clear that the military’s proposed elections in the absence of inclusive political dialogue and conditions that permit citizens to freely exercise their political rights without fear or intimidation risk exacerbating the violence.
There is no public trust in the regime, whose interest is seen as consolidating its control by making a transition from emergency rule to a longer-term military-backed government.
The arbitrary arrests and detention of democratically elected political leaders, civil society actors and journalists continue unabated.
While severely underreported, women detainees increasingly face sexual harassment and violence.
Madame Vice-President,
It is critical that the country’s future is decided by the people through a Myanmar-led process, reflective of all voices especially women, youth and minorities, to ensure the needs of all communities are addressed.
Sustainable solutions for the Rohingya people must be built into the design of a peaceful, inclusive and democratic Myanmar. Their voices have to be integral to decisions about their own future.
More than five years since the forced mass exodus from Rakhine State, the Rohingya are persecuted and stateless, and continue to suffer extreme hardship, living in difficult conditions and facing tremendous challenges.
Earlier this month, another massive fire ripped through a Rohingya refugee camp in Cox’s Bazar, affecting 15,000 people.
The World Food Programme (WFP) has announced it needs to reduce rations for Rohingya refugees this month due to a severe funding shortfall amid competing global crises, issuing an urgent call for 125 million dollars to avoid the cut.
For the 2023 Joint Response Plan for the Rohingya Humanitarian Crisis, the United Nations and partners have appealed for 876 million dollars.
I urge Member States to redouble support to meet this extreme need. Now is not the time for donor fatigue.
Madame Vice-President,
I take this important opportunity to thank the Government of Bangladesh for showing humanity and immense generosity in carrying disproportionate responsibility in hosting over 1 million Rohingya refugees for more than five years.
I also heed Bangladesh’s clear message that the current situation is not sustainable.
2022 was a deadly year for thousands of Rohingya who risked their lives in dangerous sea and land journeys. These increased by 360 per cent between 2021 and 2022 in the absence of progress in addressing the root causes of marginalization guided by the recommendations of the Advisory Commission on Rakhine State.
Since my last report to the General Assembly, a humanitarian ceasefire in Rakhine State between the Arakan Army (AA) and Myanmar Armed Forces (MAF) has led to some improvements in humanitarian access in Rakhine.
Access to northern Rakhine remains restricted, however, and the situation of the Rohingya remains precarious.
Taking advantage of the ceasefire, the State Administration Council (SAC) is preparing for the return of Rohingya refugees and IDPs.
I fully support the General Assembly’s call that the return and relocation of displaced persons is carried out in accordance with international standards and best practices.
Return cannot be the mere act of closing camps or moving people. It must be a process that achieves durable solutions and guarantees the safety and wellbeing of the population concerned.
Issues such as citizenship, freedom of movement, land ownership and access to education, schools and livelihoods must be properly addressed.
During my visit to Bangladesh last year, the Rohingya made it clear they want to be engaged directly in decision-making. They feel their exclusion from discussions and decisions about their future has entrenched their marginalization.
It is imperative that sustainable solutions for the Rohingya people are integral to Myanmar-led solutions towards a peaceful, democratic and inclusive future.
Madame Vice-President,
In December, the Security Council adopted an unprecedented resolution on Myanmar, which stressed the importance of close coordination between the UN and ASEAN Special Envoys to address the Myanmar crisis.
Three days ago, Indonesia’s Foreign Minister and I briefed the Security Council reinforcing this cooperation between ASEAN, the UN and international partners.
We stressed that the people of Myanmar must see concrete progress in the ASEAN Five-Point Consensus, namely de-escalation of violence and unimpeded humanitarian aid towards alleviating the suffering of all communities.
The Security Council resolution complements the resolution of the General Assembly and is an opportunity to further develop a coherent international response to the crisis, promoting a Myanmar-led process reflective of the will of the people, the delivery of humanitarian assistance without discrimination, respect for human rights, addressing the root causes of the Rohingya crisis, and to work towards ending violence in all forms.
As highlighted by the General Assembly and the Security Council, cooperation with regional organizations such as ASEAN, the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and the European Union is essential and close coordination with these organizations and their respective Envoys, as called for by this Assembly, constitutes a vital part of my work.
Madame Vice-President,
Despite the grim situation with ongoing challenges, there are clear areas where we can try to make some meaningful progress.
In recent interviews with Rohingya mothers, young women and youth rescued during precarious sea journeys, they all had a single message – “we want a future and education.”
Education is a powerful tool to transform lives, avoid a “lost generation” and enable the Rohingya to become leaders and contributors upon their voluntary and sustainable return to Myanmar.
I deeply appreciate my crucial partnership with the OIC and its Special Envoy in our collaboration to seek practical solutions to the Rohingya crisis, including our initial discussions during my recent visit to Jeddah on the possibility of upscaling education for the Rohingya.
Accountability remains essential, and I continue to remain in close contact with the Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights, the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar and the Independent Investigative Mechanism on Myanmar (IIMM).
Madame Vice-President,
In delivering my mandate, I will continue to focus on reducing the suffering of the people of Myanmar through concrete initiatives and based on continued close engagement with relevant partners and stakeholders, including affected communities.
At the request of Myanmar actors, including key ethnic armed organizations, the NUG and humanitarian civil society organizations, I have supported their efforts to establish and convene an Inclusive Humanitarian Forum (IHF), which aims to open up operational space to deliver humanitarian aid through all available channels.
The Forum could comprise core group of Member States, notably Myanmar’s neighboring countries and other regional actors, to engage inclusively in seeking a comprehensive assessment of ground realities and identify ways to overcome obstacles for operational actors to more effectively reach those in need.
My discussions on the IHF continue to advance, and the Myanmar stakeholders have established a Joint Secretariat that also includes civil society representatives.
Already, the IHF discussions with local actors have proven to be an important vehicle driving constructive discussions and building greater solidarity and coherence.
I have been working with Indonesia as the new ASEAN Chair. Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi and I are in close cooperation. I have discussed with her the urgency of concrete progress on the ASEAN Five-Point Consensus to contribute to a conducive environment towards the path of national reconciliation.
We have also discussed the possibility of a regional framework to protect the Rohingya and all refugees from Myanmar. I echo the call of the Secretary-General to ASEAN leaders at their November Summit to maintain open borders and provide protection and assistance to refugees from Myanmar, in line with the humanitarian and non-political nature of asylum, so that no refugee is forced to return to unsafe conditions in Myanmar.
I look forward to visiting Jakarta to further advance our collaboration.
Madame Vice-President,
It is important we continue to advance the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda on Myanmar, empowering women and youth as change agents.
We must amplify their voices and utilize the expertise of those on the ground, listening to them to understand their struggles, and ensure women play leading roles in bringing about positive change to their communities and country. I welcome Member States’ support as I plan to organize a roundtable on Myanmar “Envisioning the Future through Women’s Eyes” ahead of the Security Council Open Debate on WPS later this year, which I hope will be an opportunity to amplify the voices of women leaders on the ground and their important work.
Madame Vice-President,
Despite the tragedies and deep uncertainty in Myanmar, there is unprecedented solidarity that has emerged in the country. People, especially women and youth across communities, are working together to address old divides along ethnic and religious lines. They are shaping the country’s internal dynamics and politics to reset Myanmar’s democracy, human rights and governance deficit.
I know that this General Assembly will renew its commitment supporting the will of the people, including the Rohingya, to build a peaceful, just and democratic union of Myanmar for all.
Thank you..."
Source/publisher:
United Nations
Date of publication:
2023-03-16
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-16
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
UN human rights documents on Myanmar, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
more
Sub-title:
Civilians are being killed by Russian weapons just like in Ukraine, says special rapporteur Tom Andrews in call for global action
Description:
"Myanmar is a “failing state” and the crisis is getting exponentially worse, a UN special rapporteur for the country has warned, urging countries to adopt the same unified resolve that followed the invasion of Ukraine.
“The same types of weapons that are killing Ukrainians are killing people in Myanmar,” Tom Andrews, special rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, told the Guardian in an interview, citing the supply of Russian weapons to the junta since the coup two years ago. The junta relies heavily on aircraft from China and Russia, and has increasingly resorted to airstrikes to attempt to quell determined resistance forces.
The international response to Myanmar has been inadequate and some countries are continuing to enable the junta’s atrocities, Andrews said, calling for an arms embargo.
“It is unspeakable what is happening and what is so incredibly frustrating is the fact that, as far as most of the world is concerned, this is not happening,” he said.
Instead, the world was “watching a train wreck”, Andrews said. “Myanmar is a failing state, it is in the process of failing and this is happening before our very eyes.”
He spoke ahead of a report, to be presented to the Human Rights Council next week, that details how people who have fled Myanmar face “the risk of arrest, detention, deportation, pushbacks at land and sea” as well as obstruction of their access to the UN’s refugee agency, UNHCR.
Myanmar was plunged into chaos in February 2021 when the military detained the country’s leader, Aung San Suu Kyi, and seized power. The coup has provoked widespread opposition, including both a peaceful civil disobedience movement and an armed resistance. Conflict has spiralled over the past two years, spreading across vast areas of the country, including regions that were once peaceful, where members of the public joined defence groups to fight back against the military.
The military - which analysis suggests has lost territory to the resistance despite having superior weaponry - has increasingly deployed airstrikes, including against schools and medical facilities, as well as scorched earth tactics, in an attempt to stop the resistance.
“As it becomes more dangerous for their troops to operate on the ground they have resorted to these gunships, fighter jets that are dropping bombs on villages and even IDP centres [camps for internally displaced people who have been forced to flee],” said Andrews.
Myanmar’s military has previously denied carrying out atrocities and says its operations target “terrorists”.
A report by the special rapporteur last year said Russia, China, and Serbia were providing the junta with weapons. A recent investigation by Myanmar Witness also found the military was heavily reliant upon Russian or Chinese air assets for its attacks.
Andrews said he recently spoke to a father whose home was destroyed by the military. The father had taken his family to a centre for displaced people; only for it to be bombed. His two daughters, aged 12 and 15, were killed.
The junta launched airstrikes in 10 out of 14 of the country’s administrative divisions during the last six months of 2022, according to Myanmar Witness, with such attacks occurring on an almost daily basis.
Given its reliance on aircraft from China and Russia, the junta has sought to publicly align itself with both nations after the coup. The military, led by Min Aung Hlaing “fawns over Russia”, said Andrews. “He has flown to Moscow, he has praised Putin, they of course seek and secure weapons that they use to commit these atrocity crimes.”
However, Andrews said that other countries are capable of taking more robust strategic action to stop the junta from accessing resources. While many western governments have imposed sanctions, greater coordination was needed, he said.
An arms embargo, and measures to stop aviation fuel from reaching the military should also be adopted. He did not suggest sending weapons to support the resistance, but instead measures to stop weapons or resources from reaching the junta.
Andrews has also backed calls for the UN security council to pass a resolution that will refer the situation in Myanmar to the international criminal court.
Countries have a moral imperative to do “everything possible to squeeze from the junta the means through which they are continuing to attack their people”, said Andrews. It was also in the interests of the international community, especially neighbouring countries, to act, he said.
“Myanmar is a very significant country, it is a nation of 54 million people, located on a very important part of the world between India and China. Already you have seen the impact of the instability that’s there. Thousands and thousands of people every month are running for their lives every month over the border into the region.”
In a report to be presented to the Human Rights Council on 20 March, the special rapporteur said neighbouring governments had forcibly returned people – including military deserters and children – to Myanmar despite the risk of imprisonment, torture, or even execution.
According to the UN, the number of people in need of humanitarian assistance has soared, from 1 million before the coup, to an anticipated 17.6 million in 2023.
“The economy has imploded, you have half of people now living in poverty. You have the collapse of the education system with millions of kids not having the opportunity for an education. The health system has collapsed,” he said. “Things are bad and they are getting exponentially worse.”
Some in Myanmar, while welcoming the support Ukraine has received, have questioned why the international response to the atrocities in their country has differed so vastly, said Andrews. He said that he did not have the answer, adding that some nations were continuing to enable the junta’s crimes.
“There is a moral imperative to not turn our backs on people who are exhibiting extraordinary courage in fighting for their country and their future,” said Andrews..."
Source/publisher:
"The Guardian" (UK)
Date of publication:
2023-03-15
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-15
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
more
Description:
"Quick Take:
More than 3,000 protestors have been killed, 20,000 people arrested, and 55,000 houses burned in the two years since the coup.
Amid former optimism about the prospect of ending military dominance, the ruling NLD party and many observers did not anticipate the coup until the last few months.
The regime promised to hold "free and fair" elections in 2023, but the repeatedly delayed vote is simply a military strategy to escape the ongoing armed conflict and consolidate authority.
HONOLULU (March 15, 2023) -- Last month marked the second anniversary of the military coup in Myanmar that resulted in the country's devastating civil war, with the military arresting more than 20,000 anti-coup protestors, killing more than 3,000, and burning 55,000 houses and buildings. Meanwhile, Myanmar’s GDP plummeted from an average 6% growth rate during the reform period to negative 18% since the coup.
What was shocking to me about the coup was that almost no one seemed to expect it until the last few months. Throughout the prior decade of reform, the main point of contention among the many lawmakers, political analysts, and activists I met was that "the military had enough power under the 2008 constitution, so why would they need to seize power in a risky coup?"
Indeed, in recent decades the world has seen a decline in outright political coup attempts, which create huge risks for would-be dictators, including foreign intervention, economic sanctions, external pressures, and the growth of internal resistance. To avoid such risks, would-be despots today often attempt instead to weaken all political institutions that support democracy in order to rise to power.
Coup motivations
So what prompted the Tatmadaw, or Myanmar’s military establishment, to risk these consequences? In short, the coup was motivated by both personal and institutional factors.
Institutionally, the military was losing power under democratic reforms even though the political system was rigged heavily in its favor. This in turn threatened the system of military-owned business monopolies that have enriched generals and their cronies for generations.
Soe Thane, a close aide to former President Thein Sein, said in his book that the pace of the political transition made many generals nervous, leading to accusations that certain soft-liners among the governing elites were CIA agents. Meanwhile, the emergence of a political alliance between an ex-general who chaired parliament and the popular civilian opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi caused concern and disunity among the military leadership.
The Tatmadaw initially attempted through various means to slow the pace of political liberalization, but it was the Rohingya genocide that really shifted Myanmar's trajectory. The military’s clearance operation against Rohingya Muslims beginning in 2017 resulted in mass rape, burnings, drownings, and other violence that killed at least 9,000 people and forced nearly a million to flee the country, according to The New York Times. Little is known about the military's intentions, but it seems clear that the primary objective was to play a greater role in Myanmar's politics by inflaming ethno-religious strife.
Min Aung Hliang’s personal worries
While the military could have anticipated the massive international pressure that would result from the Rohingya tragedy, apparently commander-in-chief —and later coup leader—Senior General Min Aung Hlaing did not seem to expect that demands for international justice would target him so personally. In addition, he was worried about having to relinquish power as a result of Aung San Suu Kyi's unwillingness to raise his mandatory retirement age.
After the NLD won another landslide victory in 2020, the military resorted to allegations of voter fraud. By late 2020, military-affiliated individuals openly speculated about the prospect of a coup as a warning to the NLD. Finally, when the NLD still refused to accept the Tatmadaw’s efforts to retain its power advantages, Min Aung Hlaing orchestrated the coup on Feb. 1, 2021.
NLD and Western miscalculations
Aung San Suu Kyi's administration, which probably underestimated the real prospect of a coup, has faced widespread criticism for failing to prepare for a counter-coup. And policymakers in the West were also too quick to celebrate Myanmar's previous political transition as a partial victory for their foreign policy.
The reform period was never intended to end military domination. It was rather a masterpiece of former dictator Than Shwe's retirement plan. The end of his personalist regime and the competition for successor between two former generals, Parliament Speaker Shwe Mann and President Thein Sein, were mistakenly seen as a prospect of ending military dominance. But when that dominance was threatened by the overwhelming voice of the people in the 2020 election, Min Aung Hlaing and the military establishment sent in the troops to retake it.
The coup clearly reflects the military’s dissatisfaction with its own 2008 constitution, which reserves 25 percent of parliament seats for active military personnel and allows the military commander-in-chief to independently hold three key ministries—the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Border Affairs, and the Ministry of Home Affairs.
Since Min Aung Hlaing refuses to engage in dialogue with opposition parties, as required by the five-point ASEAN consensus he agreed to in 2021, holding superficially open elections are his government's best remaining prospect for escaping the ongoing conflict and eventually gaining some degree of international legitimacy. But now, two years after the coup, the regime has again extended its state of emergency and imposed martial law in 37 additional townships, again putting off the election. This step reveals nothing more than the generals’ unquenchable desire for even greater authority than they previously possessed..."
Source/publisher:
"East-West Center"
Date of publication:
2023-03-15
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-15
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
more
Description:
"HIGHLIGHTS
According to the UN, an estimated 1,704,000 internally displaced people (IDPs) were reported across the country as of 6 March 2023, including 1,376,000 people newly displaced since 1 February 2021.
Risk of arrest and detention significantly increased during the reporting period after de facto authorities extended the country’s state of emergency for another six-months and imposed martial law in 47 Townships across the country on 2 February.
In the North-West, the situation was highly volatile, notably in Magway and Sagaing Regions, where frequent airstrikes, arson attacks and landmine incidents sparked new displacements within Myanmar and to neighboring India. Telecommunications, including internet services, remained unstable and hampered humanitarian access and assistance to people in need.
In the South-East, heavy fighting, shelling, landmine incidents and roadblocks were reported in multiple states and regions, including near town centers and IDP sites. The forced return of displaced people in Palaw Township, Tanintharyi Region, was reported following the declaration of martial law. School-aged children’s access to education has also been affected by this heightened insecurity.
In Kachin and Shan (North), civilian injuries and casualties continue to be reported following an increase in landmines and other explosive remnants. An uptick in robberies and kidnapping for ransom incidents has also been reported.
In Rakhine and Chin (South) States, the informal November 2022 ceasefire between the Arakan Army (AA) and Tatmadaw is holding. Humanitarian access has improved although remains limited in its geographic scope. Landmines and explosive remnants continue to pose serious protection risks coupled with reports of forced recruitment amid competing power dynamics in areas controlled by parties to the conflict. There was an increase in irregular movement and trafficking as people – notably Rohingya – undertook dangerous sea and land journeys in search of protection, family reunification and livelihoods opportunities in other countries. In parallel, IDPs continued to raise concerns about the impending IDP camp closures and safety risks in areas of relocation or return..."
Source/publisher:
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (Geneva) via Reliefweb (New York)
Date of publication:
2023-03-15
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-15
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
UNHCR (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees), Education in Burma/Myanmar - general, Public Health, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
8.78 MB
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Description:
"13 March 2023: Violence in Myanmar at the hands of the military has increased in 2023 in direct defiance of United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 2669 and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Five Point Consensus. The UN Security Council must respond to the military’s non-compliance, with action, not mere words, says the Special Advisory Council for Myanmar (SAC-M).
The UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2669 on 21 December 2022. The resolution expressed “deep concern at the ongoing state of emergency imposed by the military in Myanmar on 1 February 2021 and its grave impact on the people of Myanmar” (preambular paragraph 1) and demanded “an immediate end to all forms of violence throughout the country” (operative paragraph 1). Operative demands made by the UN Security Council are considered binding under international law.
Since the resolution was adopted, credible reports indicate that the military has continued to launch airstrikes and artillery fire on civilian targets, massacred civilians and resistance fighters and burned civilian homes and property on a near-daily basis, in the north, northwest, east and southeast of Myanmar. In the past two weeks, cases have been reported of a single military troop beheading up to 18 resistance members and two children, and massacring 16 civilians, including three women who were raped before being killed, across three townships in Sagaing Region.
“Min Aung Hlaing and his military are not only failing to abide by the UN Security Council resolution – they are wilfully defying it,” said Yanghee Lee of SAC-M. “This is the same military that committed genocide against the Rohingya five years ago. Once again, the international community is watching on, this time as they attack an entire country and erode the security of south and southeast Asia. This is a global issue upon which the Security Council must act.”
Two years of democratic resistance have derailed Min Aung Hlaing’s attempt to seize control of Myanmar by force. Rather than change course, Min Aung Hlaing last month announced an extension to his unlawful state of emergency and unilaterally declared martial law in further parts of the country. These announcements have no legal authority but correlate with the commission of increasingly brutal acts of terror by Min Aung Hlaing’s troops.
“For two years, the military has systematically committed acts of terror, as defined under international and Myanmar law, in addition to widespread violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, and serious international criminal offences,” said Chris Sidoti of SAC-M. “The Security Council must act to enforce the military’s compliance with its resolution, including through targeted sanctions on military financial interests, a comprehensive arms embargo and referral to the International Criminal Court.”
Resolution 2669 further called for immediate and concrete actions to “effectively and fully implement ASEAN’s Five Point Consensus agreed on 24 April 2021” (operative paragraph 6). The Security Council will hear reports today from the Special Envoy of the UN Secretary-General on Myanmar and the Foreign Minister of Indonesia, this year’s ASEAN Chair, on UN support for implementation of the Five-Point Consensus.
“The extreme violence being inflicted on the population by the military must stop – this is an absolute minimum requirement for any progress, by ASEAN, by the UN or by anyone else, towards an eventual resolution of the crisis in Myanmar,” said Marzuki Darusman of SAC-M. “The simple truth is that the Five Point Consensus is failing while the junta’s violence intensifies. But Min Aung Hlaing has demonstrated no intention of curbing the atrocities. The UN Security Council must act in support of ASEAN to compel him to do so. There is no other option.”..."
Source/publisher:
Special Advisory Council for Myanmar
Date of publication:
2023-03-13
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-13
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
Language:
more
Description:
"Documented incidents
19 February 2023: In Kume town, Myittha township, Kyaukse district, Mandalay region, several private hospital owners were amongst ten business men arrested by the Myanmar military on accusations of supporting the local resistance forces. Source: Mandalay Free Press
21 February 2023: In Moe Dar Gyi village and village tract, Katha township and district, Sagaing region, a nurse was arrested from her home by the Myanmar military on accusations of providing health care to the local resistance forces. On 25 February, her body was found with a gunshot wound to the forehead and her hands tied behind. Sources: Chindwin News Agency, Delta News Agency, Facebook, Radio Free Asia and Zalen
23 February 2023: In Ma Le Thar village and village tract, Ayadaw township, Monywa district,
Sagaing region, a hospital (public, primary-level) was damaged by a Myanmar military airstrike.
Ground military troops then destroyed medicines and equipment at the hospital. There were no casualties as patients and staff had evacuated due to the anticipated attack. Sources: Delta News Agency and Khit Thit Media
25 February 2023: In Lashio town, township and district, Shan state (North), two female nurses were arrested by the Myanmar military. One appeared in the court on 28 February with the charge of Section 505(A). Source: Democratic Voice of Burma
25 February 2023: In Pa Dat Taing village and village tract, Myinmu township, Sagaing district and region, a sub-rural health centre (public, primary-level), a library and 65 civilian houses were torched by the Myanmar military. Source: Mizzima
26 February 2023: In several villages in Banmauk township, Katha district, Sagaing region, local resistance forces and the Kachin Independence Army reportedly blocked the import of medicines, rice, cooking oil, and salt. Source: Telegram
27 February 2023: In a village in Yinmabin township and district, Sagaing region, the Myanmar military destroyed a CDM-affiliated female public health supervisor who provided health care to the local resistance forces home, along with three homes of local resistance forces. Source: Myaelatt Athan
28 February 2023: In Tha Man Ta Poet (middle) village, Tha Man Ta Poet village tract, Yesgyo township, Pakokku district, Magway region, the Myanmar military seized IED-making materials from a sub-rural health centre (public, primary-level) occupied the local resistance forces. Source:
Telegram
Reported on 02 March 2023: In Bogale town and township, Pyapon district, Ayeyarwady region, a nurse appeared in court on counter terrorism charges. She was arrested in late January 2023 on accusations of links with an alleged local resistance force member. At the time of arrest, she worked at Bogale Township Hospital (public, secondary-level), and was not CDM-affiliated.
Source: Facebook
03 March 2023: In Palaw township, Myeik district, Tanintharyi region, the junta authorities blocked the import of medicines and food items into the township. Source: Than Lwin Times
07 March 2023: In Khin-U town and township, Shwebo district, Sagaing region, a group of gunmen entered the township hospital (public, secondary-level) and robbed 15 wood doors to be used in the construction of a new hospital building. The military accused the local resistance forces of the robbery. Source: Telegram..."
Source/publisher:
Insecurity Insight (Geneva) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of publication:
2023-03-13
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-13
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
448.78 KB
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Description:
"Burma Campaign UK has today updated its Boycott List of Burmese military-owned companies and brands.
The Boycott Lists names the products and brands of the vast business empire of the Burmese military, enabling individuals, companies, organisations and governments to avoid purchasing goods and services from military companies.
The updated Boycott List is available here.
Five new listings have been added: The Angel Bistro (Pathein), NayPyiDaw Wholesale, Five Star Compound (Yangon), Five Star Port, Thateka Wharf (Yangon), and Gandamar Wholesale. These are not new military companies or brands, most are part of existing companies and brands on the list. They are being added to ensure the Boycott List is as comprehensive as possible.
One entry has been removed. The cargo vessel Yaan Byea has been sold by the military-owned Five Star shipping line.
Military-owned and controlled companies are an important source of revenue for the Burmese military. Buying goods and services from the military increases their revenue and this revenue is used to fund their operations, building their military capacity and paying for the human rights violations they commit.
“The Boycott List enables people in Burma to avoid funding the military, and should also be used by embassies, companies and UN agencies to make sure they are not funding human rights violations,” said Mark Farmaner, Director of Burma Campaign UK. “All embassies and aid donors in Burma should have policies not to buy goods and services from military companies, and that local and international NGOs cannot use their funds to purchase goods and services from military companies.”..."
Source/publisher:
"Burma Campaign UK" (London)
Date of publication:
2023-03-13
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-13
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Business and the Military, Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
more
Description:
"KEY DISPLACEMENT FIGURES
75,400 Estimated refugee movements to neighbouring countries since 1 February 2021
1,086,000 Refugees and asylum-seekers from Myanmar in neighbouring countries as of 30 June 2022
1,376,000 Estimated total internally displaced persons (IDPs) within Myanmar, displaced since 1 February 2021 Source: UN in Myanmar
1,704,000 Estimated total internally displaced persons (IDPs) within Myanmar as of 6 March 2023 Source: UN in Myanmar
HIGHLIGHTS
According to the UN, an estimated 1,704,000 internally displaced people (IDPs) were reported across the country as of 6 March 2023, including 1,376,000 people newly displaced since 1 February 2021.
Risk of arrest and detention significantly increased during the reporting period after de facto authorities extended the country’s state of emergency for another six-months and imposed martial law in 47 Townships across the country on 2 February.
In the North-West, the situation was highly volatile, notably in Magway and Sagaing Regions, where frequent airstrikes, arson attacks and landmine incidents sparked new displacements within Myanmar and to neighboring India. Telecommunications, including internet services, remained unstable and hampered humanitarian access and assistance to people in need.
In the South-East, heavy fighting, shelling, landmine incidents and roadblocks were reported in multiple states and regions, including near town centers and IDP sites. The forced return of displaced people in Palaw Township, Tanintharyi Region, was reported following the declaration of martial law. School-aged children’s access to education has also been affected by this heightened insecurity.
In Kachin and Shan (North), civilian injuries and casualties continue to be reported following an increase in landmines and other explosive remnants. An uptick in robberies and kidnapping for ransom incidents has also been reported.
In Rakhine and Chin (South) States, the informal November 2022 ceasefire between the Arakan Army (AA) and Tatmadaw is holding. Humanitarian access has improved although remains limited in its geographic scope. Landmines and explosive remnants continue to pose serious protection risks coupled with reports of forced recruitment amid competing power dynamics in areas controlled by parties to the conflict. There was an increase in irregular movement and trafficking as people – notably Rohingya – undertook dangerous sea and land journeys in search of protection, family reunification and livelihoods opportunities in other countries. In parallel, IDPs continued to raise concerns about the impending IDP camp closures and safety risks in areas of relocation or return..."
Source/publisher:
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (Geneva) via Reliefweb (New York)
Date of publication:
2023-03-10
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-13
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
UNHCR (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees), Education in Burma/Myanmar - general, Food Security and nutrition in Burma/Myanmar, Public Health, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
8.78 MB
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Sub-title:
Human Rights Catastrophe Intensifies Since December Resolution
Description:
"The United Nations Security Council should build on its December 2022 resolution on Myanmar by adopting tangible measures to hold the junta accountable for ongoing abuses, Human Rights Watch said. The council will hold a session on Myanmar on March 13, 2023, and hear reports from Noeleen Heyzer, the UN secretary-general’s special envoy on Myanmar, and Retno Marsudi, Indonesia’s foreign minister and head of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) office of the special envoy on Myanmar.
Security Council members should consider the December resolution on Myanmar, which denounced the military’s rights violations since the February 1, 2021 coup, as only a first step to reinvigorate global scrutiny of the junta’s atrocities. The council should take meaningful actions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, including instituting a global arms embargo, referring the country situation to the International Criminal Court, and imposing targeted sanctions on junta leadership and military-owned companies.
“Myanmar’s junta has demonstrated it’s impervious to statements of condemnation or concern,” said Louis Charbonneau, UN director at Human Rights Watch. “Its disregard of the Security Council’s December resolution shows the need for a new resolution imposing strong measures like an arms embargo and targeted sanctions for senior military officials and companies linked to the military.”
Since December, junta security forces have killed at least 263 people through artillery shelling, airstrikes, and arson attacks on villages, as well as torture, rape, and executions in custody, according to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP). The authorities have arrested at least 486 people and sentenced at least 401 over the same period, including teachers, monks, doctors and nurses, lawyers, National League for Democracy (NLD) legislators and party officials, and aid workers.
Most of the convictions have carried sentences of between 10 years to life in prison under “terrorism” or “incitement” provisions put in place or expanded by the junta to broadly criminalize the opposition movement.
The junta has committed widespread and systematic abuses against the civilian population – including extrajudicial killings, torture, and wrongful imprisonment – that amount to crimes against humanity. Many attacks on civilians and villages are apparent war crimes. Since February 2021, security forces have killed more than 3,000 people and arbitrarily arrested over 20,000.
In February, the junta extended its manufactured state of emergency for an additional six months before declaring martial law in 40 new townships across a number of states and regions, transferring all executive and judicial power to the head of the relevant regional military command.
The December council resolution called for “full, safe and unhindered humanitarian access,” expressing deep concern at the “increasingly large numbers of internally displaced persons and dramatic increase in humanitarian need.” However, the Myanmar junta is increasing blockages on humanitarian assistance to prevent aid from reaching populations in need as a form of collective punishment. Since the resolution was adopted, military operations in the southeast and northwest have displaced more than 150,000 civilians, bringing the total number of people displaced since the coup to 1.3 million. Armed clashes have affected almost 80 percent of the country’s townships.
The December resolution contained numerous references to ASEAN, which adopted a “five-point consensus” in April 2021 in response to the Myanmar coup. Junta chief Sr. Gen. Min Aung Hlaing has since rejected each point of the consensus while exploiting the international community’s deference to the regional bloc. As this year’s ASEAN chair, Indonesia should reroute the bloc’s approach to more effectively isolate the Myanmar junta while soliciting ASEAN support for additional Security Council measures and cooperation with other countries’ efforts to block the flow of revenue and arms to the junta.
“The generals have embarked on a scorched earth policy in an attempt to stamp out opposition,” Volker Türk, the UN high commissioner for human rights, reported earlier this month. “The military, emboldened by continuous and absolute impunity, has consistently shown disregard for international obligations and principles. Urgent, concrete action is needed to end this festering catastrophe.”
Security Council members, in light of the junta’s flagrant noncompliance with the ASEAN five-point consensus and December resolution, should use today’s session to identify concrete steps to counter the grave abuses and violations of international human rights and humanitarian law being inflicted daily.
“The UN special envoy and Indonesian foreign minister should make clear to Security Council members that the junta’s killings, torture, unlawful arrests, and war crimes demand more targeted action,” Charbonneau said. “Cutting off the junta’s supply of money and weapons is a critical next step to stanch the atrocities being carried out every day in the country.”..."
Source/publisher:
Human Rights Watch (USA)
Date of publication:
2023-03-13
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-13
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
more
Description:
"GENEVA (13 March 2023) – Myanmar’s military junta is orchestrating an online campaign of terror, and weaponising social media platforms to crush democratic opposition, UN experts* said today.
“Online rhetoric has spilled into real world terror, with military supporters using social media to harass and incite violence against pro-democracy activists and human rights defenders,” the experts said. “Women have been targeted and severely harmed,” they said.
According to the experts, pro-junta accounts regularly use hateful, sexualised, and discriminatory rhetoric in an attempt to discredit women activists and human rights defenders. “Gendered abuse has caused many women to cut back their online activism and retreat from public life,” they said.
The UN experts warned that messaging and social media platforms – Telegram in particular – have become a hotbed of pro-military activity. “Since the coup, pro-junta actors have taken advantage of Telegram's lax approach to content moderation and gaps in its terms of service. They have attracted tens of thousands of followers by posting violent and misogynistic content,” the experts said.
They noted that women are often targets of so-called “doxxing”, the act of publishing private information, including names and addresses, about individuals without their consent. These attacks are frequently accompanied by calls for violence or arrest by junta forces. “Doxxed” women have also been accused of having sexual relations with Muslim men or supporting the Muslim population – a common ultranationalist, discriminatory and Islamophobic narrative in Myanmar.
“Failing to cement its grip on power by locking up political prisoners and gunning down peaceful protesters, the junta has escalated its ruthless suppression of dissent to virtual spaces,” the experts said. They explained that the junta was terrified of women’s power to mobilise resistance to military rule in online spaces.
“Every day, women are being threatened online with sexualised violence because they are standing up for human rights, opposing the military’s attempted rule, and fighting for a return to a democratic path. ‘Doxxing’ and other forms of online harassment add to the multiple threats that women activists human rights defenders and independent associations are already facing in Myanmar,” they said.
After being made aware of these offenses, and shortly before the publication of critical reports detailing abuse on its platform, Telegram blocked at least 13 pro-military accounts, although at least one of the worst offending channels is back online.
While welcoming Telegram’s recent actions, the experts said more needed to be done. “Unless Telegram fundamentally changes its approach to content moderation in Myanmar, it is likely that pro-military actors will simply open new accounts and continue their campaign of harassment,” they said.
The experts urged Telegram and other social media platforms to meet their responsibilities to identify, prevent, and mitigate human rights abuses. “Tech companies must ensure that their services do not contribute to human rights abuses, including gender-based violence and discrimination, arbitrary arrest, the right to privacy, and the suppression of freedom of expression, peaceful assembly, both online and offline, and association,” they said.
"Telegram and other social media companies must allocate the necessary resources to protect the human rights of their users," the experts said, referring to the targeting of women and the need to monitor content in Burmese and ethnic languages in close coordination with local organisations and actors..."
Source/publisher:
United Nations Human Rights Council
Date of publication:
2023-03-13
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-13
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Racial or ethnic discrimination in Burma: reports of violations against several groups, Women's rights
Language:
more
Description:
"The Myanmar Information Management Unit / MIMU is a service of the United Nations in Myanmar, provided by UNDP working together with the UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator. It supports better informed decision-making and analysis in emergency, humanitarian, development and peace-related activities, providing a model of the nexus approach.
Despite many challenges, MIMU has remained a widely used and trusted resource which has been used extensively in this period. Agencies continued to contribute to MIMU’s 5W and Assessment tracking tools, and useful tools such as the MIMU Map Maker and MIMU Pcoder were updated to support agencies' work for Myanmar's people. The MIMU website also remained a central point for dissemination of information relevant to activities across sectors as well as those relevant to the COVID and humanitarian response.
Taking advantage of the widespread use of online tools by MIMU users and partners, we fine-tuned virtual approaches to further extend the reach of our meetings and trainings countrywide, including through new online training courses on Tableau, PowerBI, Basic mapping, and Advanced Excel.
We also extended the understanding of specific aspects of vulnerability in Myanmar through in-depth analyses on the changing sources of drinking water, disability, household amenities, and the impact of climate change and environmental degradation on disaster risk in different areas of the country.
Throughout 2022, the MIMU team continued to ensure relevant and user-friendly products, while maintaining relationships with a wide variety of partners and stakeholders, including local and international NGOs and CSOs, United Nations, Red Cross agencies, international organisations, development partners, and researchers..."
Source/publisher:
Myanmar Information Management Unit (Myanmar) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of publication:
2023-03-10
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-10
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
The discussion on humanitarian assistance to Burma, Human Rights and international relations
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219.45 KB 385.77 KB
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"Dear brothers and sisters, thank you so much indeed for inviting me today. The people of Myanmar have been living under the reign of terror of the genocidal military junta. It has been two years of living Hell, two years of hopelessness and helplessness, two years of losing friends and family, two years of pain and suffering, two years of fear and terror, two years of loss and wandering, two years of death and destruction, two years of attacks on churches and schools, two years of attacks on freedom and democracy, two years of rape and torture, two years of starvation and hunger, two years of atrocities and crimes against humanity, two years of lawlessness, two years of injustice and unrighteousness, two years of darkness and desperation.
At the same time, it has been two years of courage and bravery, two years of Unity in diversity, two years of perseverance and resilience, two years of struggle for freedom and Democracy, two years of struggle for Human Rights and righteousness, two years of strength and wisdom, two years of grace and mercy, two years of faith and trust in God Almighty.
In the last 24 months alone we have seen the Burma Army (Tatmadaw) Junta forces detain more than 20,000 civilians including elected members of parliament, President U Win Myint and State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and more than 9,000 attacks on civilians which have killed more than 3,000 civilians including children and women. More than 50,000 homes, schools, churches, monasteries have been destroyed. More than 1.6 million were forced to become homeless in Refugee and IDP camps. As a result more than 17 million people of Burma are in great in need of Humanitarian Assistance and half the population of the country’s 54 million people are heading towards extreme poverty.
Please join me in prayer for the immediate implementation of the 10 points of the UK - led UN Security Council Resolution on the situation in Myanmar.
Please join me in prayer for immediate implementation of the ASEAN 5 points consensus on Myanmar without further delay.
Please join me in prayer for the immediate and effective implementation of the 8 points of the Burma Act of the US National Defense Authorisation Act (NDAA).
Please join me prayer for justice and accountability for Myanmar through international justice mechanisms, international Court of Justice (ICJ), international Criminal Court (ICC) and Universal Jurisdiction (UJ).
Please join me in prayer for the release of all political prisoners unconditionally, including President U Win Myint, State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and Rev. Dr. Hkalam Samson.
Please join me prayer for the support of freedom fighters, pro-democracy movements such as Ethnic Revolution Organisation (EROs), Civilian Disobedience Movement( CDM ), People Defences Forces (PDFs), Local Defence's Forces (LDF), the Committee Representing the Union Parliament of Myanmar know as CRPH, and National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC).
Please join me in prayer for the immediate recognition of the legitimate representatives of the people of Myanmar, the National Unity Government (NUG) of Myanmar by the international community.
Please join me in prayer for the end of this genocidal military junta’s reign of terror against the people of Myanmar who have suffered so much for so long under brutal military dictatorship.
Please join me in prayer for building a new Myanmar Federal Democratic Union for all people of Myanmar regardless of race, religion, culture, language, gender, background or ethnicity.
Please join me prayer for the kingdom of God, the kingdom of peace and prosperity, the kingdom of justice and righteousness, the kingdom of faith and hope, the kingdom of love and life, the kingdom of freedom and democracy to come sooner rather than later to Myanmar..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of International Cooperation Myanmar
Date of publication:
2023-03-09
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-10
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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Format :
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49.52 KB 311.24 KB
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Description:
"Human Rights Council
Fifty-second session
27 February–31 March 2023
Conference room paper of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar
Summary
Having failed to secure control of Myanmar and recognition by most Member States as legitimate, the military junta, or State Administrative Council (SAC), of Myanmar finds itself at a turning point two years after launching an illegal military coup. As widespread public opposition continues and attacks by its forces on villages intensify, the SAC will step up its efforts to advance its false claim to legitimacy in 2023, including by orchestrating a sham “election.” Its goal is to reverse its international isolation abroad and portray as inevitable its claim as the government of Myanmar to audiences at home, rendering continued popular opposition both dangerous and futile.
Member States of the UN have an important responsibility and role to play in determining whether Myanmar’s military junta will succeed in achieving its goal of being accepted as legitimate and gaining control of a nation in revolt. This conference room paper is presented to Member States as a resource to meeting this responsibility.
The paper addresses the claims of the SAC to be a legitimate government by both examining its claim that its coup was legal under a constitution that it drafted and put into place in 2008 and by applying international standards as established by two core doctrines that have informed the recognition of governments since World War II. The conclusion of this analysis is clear – the SAC’s military coup was illegal and its claim as Myanmar’s government is illegitimate.
The core leadership of the administrative and legislative elements of Myanmar’s democratic government that the SAC prevented from forming have reconstituted in opposition to the SAC. The National Unity Government (NUG), the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH), and the National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC) were created to represent the will of Myanmar’s people, with the NUG forming the administrative side of government in this transitional period. The NUG provides the international community with a credible alternative to the SAC. Applying the same international standards of legitimacy used to examine the legitimacy claims of the SAC, this paper finds that the NUG has a far stronger claim to legitimacy.
The paper also examines in detail Member States’ interactions with the SAC, highlighting those actions that have delegitimized or withheld recognition to the SAC, and those actions by Member States that have created the appearance of legitimacy. The Special Rapporteur urges that Member States who support human rights, democracy, and the aspirations of the people of Myanmar publicly reject the SAC’s false claim as a legitimate government and instead recognize the NUG as the legitimate representative of the people of Myanmar. He also urges Member States to reject the sham elections the SAC is planning to hold by August 2023.
Finally, the Special Rapporteur reiterates his recommendation that the Member States who stand with the people of Myanmar immediately form a working group of governments to develop and implement a coordinated strategy that can deny the SAC the weapons and resources that it requires, while supporting the people of Myanmar with humanitarian and other forms of non-lethal aid..."
Source/publisher:
UN Human Rights Council (Geneva) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of publication:
2023-01-30
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-10
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
UN human rights documents on Myanmar, Human Rights and international relations, Armed conflict and peace-building in Burma - theoretical, strategic and general, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
1.92 MB
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Description:
"Key Event Details: Location of Incident:
Kyauktada township (ကျောက်တံတား), Yangon city (ရန်ကုန်) [16.776670, 96.163171].
Chanayethazan township (ချမ်းအေးသာဇံ), Mandalay (မန္တလေး), [21.989303, 96.071360].
Date/Time of Incident:
7 March 2021
Alleged Perpetrator(s) and/or Involvement:
Myanmar Police and military personnel
Yangon Division, Operation Command Headquarters No. 4
Summary of Investigation:
Myanmar Witness has verified footage of events in both Yangon and Mandalay which show individuals being beaten repeatedly by men wearing police and military uniforms.
At the incident in Yangon, insignia worn by the military indicates that they were from the Yangon Division of Operation Command Headquarters No.4.
At the incident in Mandalay, Myanmar Witness has verified footage of a person being beaten, kicked, and dragged across the road by several men wearing police and military uniforms, including uniforms belonging to Lon Htein (Riot Police) battalion 4.....Executive Summary: In the months following the February 2021 military coup, Myanmar Witness documented and verified footage of police and military violence against individuals. This mini-series of spot reports documents five separate incidents in Yangon, Mandalay and Sagaing in February and March 2021.
The case studies show police and military personnel beating unarmed individuals, including those already in detention; harassment, intimidation and arrest of medical workers; and the infliction of degrading treatment. They also show evidence of coordination between police and violence by men in civilian clothes. Analysis of rank and insignia clearly visible in the footage enables attribution of responsibility for the violence to the Lon Htein (Riot Security Forces), soldiers from Myanmar military’s Yangon Command, and the 101 Light Infantry Battalion. Additionally, ranking police officers were identified in two incidents.
In the third report of the series, Myanmar Witness has verified footage from two separate incidents showing individuals being beaten by men wearing police and military uniforms. At the incident in Yangon, insignia worn by the military indicates that they were from the Yangon Division of Operation Command Headquarters No.4. At the incident in Mandalay, Myanmar Witness has verified footage of a person being beaten, kicked, and dragged across the road by several men wearing police and military uniforms, including uniforms belonging to Lon Htein (Riot Police) battalion 4.
These examples of police and military brutality are being released to mark two years passing since their occurrence, but they are by no means exhaustive. Myanmar Witness has documented other instances of police and military harassment since the coup, which has been documented in several reports, including: Violence against protestors in North Okkalapa, Bago, and Hlaing Tharyar; and, the deaths of multiple female protestors, including Ma Kyal Sin (Angel) and Daw Tinnwe.....Kyauktada township, Yangon: The investigation walkthrough
Myanmar Witness has verified multiple pieces of user-generated content which show individuals being beaten repeatedly by a group of Myanmar police and military personnel. By analysing a number of allegations alongside these two disparate sources, it appears that these events took place on 7 March 2021.
In footage posted by Tachileik News, multiple people beat individuals who appear to be crouched down in a defensive stance (as seen in figure 1).
Additional footage allegedly from the same day shows the same group of people from a different angle. Multiple protests did occur on this day in Yangon; however, Myanmar Witness cannot confirm that these individuals were protestors or engaged in protest. Below is a comparison of two stills from the two alternative videos showing the same people - identified within both images by coloured boxes.....Geolocating the incident:
By analysing identifiable features in the two videos, Myanmar Witness was able to identify where these individuals were beaten to the corner where Anawrahta Road and Seikkantha Street meet, in Yangon.....Attribution: Myanmar Police and Myanmar military: As seen in the video stills above, there were several police and military personnel involved. By analysing the uniform of the personnel involved in this event, Myanmar Witness was able to identify a high-ranking police officer present at the scene, and the command of the military personnel.
The police officer is wearing a vest and there are clear signs that he has at least two stars on his shoulder rank slide, indicating that he is either a police lieutenant, or a police captain.
The military personnel involved in the incident are wearing a patch on their left arms. Myanmar Witness has been able to identify this as the Yangon Division of Operation Command Headquarters No. 4. Visual confirmation of the match can be seen in Figure 5.....Chanayethazan township, Mandalay The investigation walk through: Footage emerged on social media on 7 March 2021 showing a person dressed in white being beaten, kicked and then dragged across a road by men in Myanmar military uniforms. The events allegedly took place at a ‘multi-school strike’ and led to the arrests and beating of multiple students. Khit Thit media claims that the individual depicted was a second year paramedical student.
Myanmar Witness identified multiple videos and images showing several angles of this specific incident. In the first video, the group of Myanmar military personnel and police are seen kicking the body (source redacted due to privacy concerns), and in the second video they are seen dragging the body away.This specific case is concerning given the level of violence inflicted on the person already in police custody. The individual is clearly injured and after being dragged, one police member continued to strike the individual, who was lying motionless, with a stick (as seen in figure 7). Additional images shared by the Voice of Myanmar show the same individual on the floor as the Myanmar police beat him. By comparing the Khit Thit Media video with the images released by the Voice of Myanmar, it is possible to determine that this is the same incident. They show the same individual being beaten, the same security forces, and it is in the same location (as seen by figure 9). Other images shared on the same day show students from Mandalay’s Technology University protesting, wearing similar white outfits and helmets as the individual being beaten in the figures above.....Geolocating and chronolocating the incident: Myanmar Witness geolocated the footage to Pinya Street, using features seen in the background of the video, such as the small black sign indicating “Love House” and Hotel Iceland, in front of which the violence took place. The location of the shadows cast by the men and the utility poles indicates that the footage was filmed around noon.....Attribution: Myanmar military, police and Riot Police: Members of the Myanmar military, police and Lon Htein (Riot police) are visible within the footage analysed. While the specific units of the military personnel cannot be determined, Lon Htein personnel can be identified by the red scarves tied around their necks. The blue circle on the red scarf states the battalion number; in this case the individuals appear to be from battalion 4.....Conclusion and future monitoring: The Myanmar Police and military were accused of widespread brutality against protestors and civilians following the coup. The excessive violence shown towards individuals as shown in this report signals a culture within both the Myanmar military and the police. Similar acts of brutality occurred in multiple locations on the same day.
This mini-series of spot reports documents five separate incidents in February and March 2021 where the police and military have harassed or mistreated individuals. While these examples are by no means exhaustive, they capture a number of violent tactics employed by the Myanmar security forces to quell rebellion against the coup..."
Source/publisher:
Myanmar Witness
Date of publication:
2023-03-07
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-10
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations, Freedom of opinion and expression: - the situation in Burma/Myanmar - reports, analyses, recommendations
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
1.69 MB
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Description:
"Two years following the Myanmar military's overthrowal of the democratically-elected ruling party on February 1, 2021, thousands of people have been killed in violence sweeping the country while nearly 1.5 million people remain internally displaced.
In Myanmar, food insecurity is on the rise, health and education systems have disintegrated, and nearly half of the population of 55 million people is living below the poverty line.
Rohingya communities continue to suffer from systemic discrimination and a lack of protection mechanisms, including access to legal status within Myanmar. Almost 130,000 Rohingya people remain internally displaced, and over 943,000 live in crowded and increasingly unsafe conditions in Bangladesh.
Disproportionate to the need, Myanmar's Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) was only 41% funded in 2022.
Despite operating under heavy access constraints, security threats, and severe underfunding, INGOs and local NGOs, the backbone of the humanitarian response, provided lifesaving aid under the HRP and reached more than 4 million people.
Myanmar faces extreme access constraints due to attacks on humanitarian staff and the de facto authorities' adoption of bureaucratic and administrative measures that restrict civic space and limit humanitarian operations.
In October 2022, Myanmar's de facto authorities enacted the Organization Registration Law, which introduced the mandatory registration of NGOs, CSOs, and INGOs with strict administrative and potentially criminal penalties for non-compliance.
Aid actors have already responded by expanding their modalities to continue their daily operations, including cash assistance, remote services, engagement with Community Based Organizations, and increased risk assessments.
However, donors have a central role in ensuring humanitarian assistance reaches those most in need by providing robust and flexible funding to all partners allowing for maximum adaptability and optimal support across the country.
Recommendations
Donors should:
Step up humanitarian diplomacy and advocacy efforts to push the Myanmar Armed Forces (MAF) to respect international humanitarian and human rights law and facilitate the work of international and local civil society actors, ensuring unimpeded access to communities in need of assistance.
Host a donor-pledging event to help raise global awareness of the unprecedented level of humanitarian needs in Myanmar and secure appropriate resources to address them. With humanitarian agencies' support, donors must ensure that Myanmar does not become a forgotten crisis.
Step up diplomatic engagement with regional partners, including neighboring India and China, and support their efforts to welcome refugees from Myanmar. They should avoid refoulement, arbitrary arrest, and detention.
Support ASEAN in developing a comprehensive approach for engagement with all conflict parties to secure humanitarian access and deliver principled assistance across Myanmar.
Ensure all stakeholders, including Rohingya, are involved in future conflict de-escalation processes. While refugees have consistently expressed the desire to return to Myanmar once conditions allow, third-country resettlement and complementary pathways should be explored for Rohingya refugees, as prospects for repatriation or formal integration are currently limited.
Provide necessary exemptions in funding requirements and review partnership arrangements for international and national partner organizations to ensure program continuity and financial sustainability in this complex operational environment and expand direct funding opportunities for local organizations. Donors should adopt flexible reporting and due diligence processes to allow NGO and CSO partners to continue safe and sustainable humanitarian operations.
Donors should advocate with financial institutions inside and outside Myanmar to ensure that enhanced financial due diligence measures are applied in a proportionate and risk-sensitive manner so as not to restrict humanitarian aid flows.
The UN Secretariat and UN Security Council should:
Push for greater urgency, prioritization, and tougher action by the UN Security Council on Myanmar, and not delegate the responsibility for solutions to ASEAN, or individual ASEAN member states. A coherent and unified regional strategy and plan will help mobilize robust support and the backing of the international community, including the UN Special Envoy and UN Security Council, in the effective implementation of UNSC Resolution 2669 and help secure necessary technical support for the operationalization of ASEAN's Five-Point Consensus.
The adoption of UNSCR 2669 was an important step. It should be followed up with regular briefings by the UN Secretary General in open meetings of the Security Council on the situation in Myanmar, including progress on the implementation of ASEAN's Five-Point Consensus and other elements of UNSCR 2669.
The UNSC should work towards a follow-up resolution to UNSCR 2669 that will invite the UN Secretary General to periodically provide the Council with written reports on the situation in Myanmar that are then the subject of regular briefings and consultations.
Ensure enhanced support for human rights-focused monitoring, reporting, and accountability, including by extending and resourcing the mandates of the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar and Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar.
Ensure that the humanitarian response is scaled up with a new fit-for-purpose coordination architecture in line with the Peer-to-Peer review recommendations under the strong leadership of a full-time Humanitarian Coordinator. Voices of local humanitarian responders must be included in all key actions and processes in the Myanmar humanitarian response..."
Source/publisher:
InterAction
Date of publication:
2023-03-10
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-10
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
more
Sub-title:
Military abandons plans for August elections, dashing naïve hopes that the would-be sham polls provided a path to stability.
Description:
"The junta’s official admission that it lacks control indicates that it has failed to achieve its objective of resurrecting a military government. With a cloud of uncertainty hovering over the elections, the generals are now searching for other possible pathways to consolidate power.
Many in the international community who had pinned their hopes on the junta’s elections as a pathway to peace in Myanmar wrongly believed that the pattern of previous coups — military atrocities paired with a rigged election — would dictate the trajectory this time and lead to stability. It is clear to anyone engaged with the people of Myanmar that things are different this time.
The past 10 years of relative freedom awakened powerful forces in the population that are the bedrock for a movement that remains committed in the face of a murderous mafia junta intent on terrorizing and dividing it. The international community should recognize that the practical path to peace and stability in Myanmar lies through supporting resistance efforts, not the junta.
Reinventing the 2008 Military Constitution
The day before Min Aung Hlaing’s announcement, the regime’s National Defense and Security Council (NDSC) concluded, without any legal justification, that Myanmar had yet to achieve “normal circumstances.” This declaration gave Min Aung Hlaing the justification he sought to extend the junta’s rule.
Provision 425 of the 2008 military constitution authorizes the NDSC “to normally permit two extensions of the prescribed [emergency] duration for a term of six months for each extension” beyond the initial one-year period of martial law mandated by a declaration of a national emergency. (The military declared a state of emergency following the February 1, 2021, coup.) At the end of this two-year-period, the constitution requires that elections must be held within six months. Because these are not “normal” circumstances, the NDSC arbitrarily determined it had the authority to extend its rule by another six months.
Defiance of their own constitutions is nothing new for the military in the history of modern Myanmar. Gen. Ne Win, the father of Myanmar’s military dictatorship, often proclaimed his firm allegiance to the 1947 independence constitution before annulling it in the 1962 coup. Similarly, Gen. Saw Maung, the leader of the September 1988 coup, maintained that the military adhered to Ne Win’s 1974 constitution until it no longer served him — repealing it after his 1988 coup. Myanmar’s latest coup leader is now following in their footsteps.
Dashing Naive Expectations
The junta set the August 2023 election date in hopes that it would provide international legitimacy for its power grab and divide the resistance movement. Junta propaganda stressed the importance of its proposed elections and played up election preparations, making them a focal point for debate within the international community.
Some international observers were lured into believing that the elections would provide an exit for Min Aung Hlaing, disregarding ample evidence that the coup master does not see the elections as an exit, but rather as a means of dividing the resistance, furthering his military objectives and consolidating control. Others made hollow legal arguments, asserting that the military regime had no option but to hold elections according to the constitution — arguments that overlooked the blatant unconstitutionality of the coup itself in 2021.
Despite his repeated attempts to portray the military as the guardian of the 2008 constitution, Min Aung Hlaing’s actions have proven that he is ready to violate the constitution to maintain his own power. Just a few days before the coup, he publicly said that he was prepared to revoke the constitution if need be.
A Military Motivated by Self-Preservation
Myanmar’s modern history is a dark chronicle of the ways a power-hungry military will contort itself and shift its agenda to hold onto power by whatever means necessary. This is truer now than ever because many within the military believe that losing power would mean certain death for themselves and the military itself.
The predominant motive of power-hungry generals is the quest for absolute control of state power, not to protect the constitution or rule of law, seek stability or promote the peoples’ welfare. Indeed, the generals are better understood as a sort of mafia dedicated not to the welfare of the state, but rather to self-preservation and self-interest, regardless of the damage it might cause the country or its people.
The generals are ready to embrace a pyrrhic victory if it assures their survival, no matter how illegitimate, gory and limited it turns out to be. These generals live in their own universe isolated from the civilized world. They embody a mafioso mentality, primarily driven by cynicism, megalomania, bigotry, insecurity, hostility, self-preservation and self-interest. The regime believes it can only survive by dividing the resistance forces and inflicting mass human suffering to pacify the population.
It should be no surprise, therefore, that military rule has never been stable, and the military is widely reviled, including by those not directly involved in the current resistance. When considering a path to stability in Myanmar, the will of the people should dictate. How can a genocidal and incompetent military that has spent two years committing atrocities against its own people be involved in a future government?
Misconceptions Driving International Responses
Many policymakers in the international community tend to view Myanmar’s junta through the prism of their own experience as government actors beholden to a constituency and national interest. No matter how bloodstained and barbaric the junta has been, the international community — particularly Myanmar’s neighbors — cling to hope that military leaders can be reasoned with. The international community mischaracterizes the generals as “rational state actors,” expecting they will act in the interest of Myanmar.
This is a deep misunderstanding of the military, which is a paranoid clique of battle-hardened ultranationalists radicalized and traumatized by decades of warfare. Former Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew labeled Myanmar’s military government that ruled the country before 2010 as “dense” and “stupid,” saying that dealing with the regime is akin to “talking to dead people.” Because Myanmar has been an isolated and distant concern in global politics, it is understandable that relatively few in foreign governments have much experience with the country and its people, let alone its hermetic military leaders.
Misunderstandings about the military have led to mistaken conclusions and harmful actions. They underlie the idea that the junta will engage in a political dialogue process in good faith. And they are the basis of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ (ASEAN) five-point consensus, which has achieved nothing. Despite agreeing to the five-point consensus in 2021, it is no surprise that the junta openly discounted its legitimacy in February saying, “Myanmar views the ASEAN five-point consensus as not a legally binding document.” The junta’s recent extension of emergency rule and relentless violence have made a mockery of the ASEAN plan, which includes an immediate end to violence and dialogue among all parties concerned.
Pathways to Stability
In contemplating the prospects for a negotiated settlement in Myanmar, international actors must understand that the mafioso mentality of the country’s generals does not recognize the value of compromise, only of brute force. Under the current conditions, the generals prefer endless war to negotiation. They will only come to the table when they see they have no path to military victory.
Furthermore, the military has demonstrated repeatedly throughout its history that it will only engage in dialogue with those it sees as its military equals. The military blocked involvement of the Arakan Army (AA) in peace talks, for example, until the AA demonstrated military strength and controlled territory. During the pre-coup peace process, the author once witnessed a general harshly challenge the representative from a small ethnic armed group, asking “how much strength do you have to negotiate with me as an equal?” In recounting the collapse of peace talks in 1981, Brang Seng, the former rebel leader of the Kachin Independence Army, concluded, “We realized that we have been negotiating from a position of weakness. Only when we are united with all the other ethnic groups would we succeed [in negotiation with the military].”
Like ethnic minority communities which have endured decades of military violence, the Myanmar people have suffered deeply at the hands of the generals and understand that the military will only engage in dialogue with their military equals when they see no path to military victory. The people are, therefore, forced to make a painful decision to take up arms to fight against the military.
Without accepting these basic facts, the international community will continue to engage and support the junta’s governing State Administration Council, deepening the military’s delusional belief that it can win and undermining efforts by Myanmar’s people to save their country. Efforts that strengthen the junta only prolong violent conflict and suffering for the Myanmar people. Efforts that strengthen the resistance bring us closer to a negotiated outcome.
There is no path to stability in Myanmar that involves these generals in government. They are reviled by the population. Instability and violent conflict will afflict Myanmar as long as they are in power..."
Source/publisher:
United States Institute of Peace
Date of publication:
2023-03-09
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-10
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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Sub-title:
Chinese Communist Party plays ‘leading role’ in promoting autocracy, think tank says.
Description:
"The Chinese Communist Party plays “a leading role in promoting authoritarian norms” around the world as some leaders show a willingness to collaborate in spreading new forms of repression, according to a report from Washington-based think tank Freedom House.
However, even as democratic freedom suffers global setbacks, fundamental rights continue to have “an appeal and capacity for renewal” in places like Myanmar, where people have shown they are willing to risk their lives in pursuit of freedom, the report found.
Among the 56 countries listed as “Not Free” around the world, North Korea, China and Myanmar were listed as among “the worst of the worst.” Additionally, out of 39 countries in the Asia-Pacific region, nine were listed as “not free” and 13 were deemed only “partly free.”
“Political rights and civil liberties declined across the region as authoritarian forces moved to consolidate their power,” the report said. “The trend was most dramatic in Afghanistan and Myanmar, where elected civilian leaders were forced from office.”
The report noted the arrests in early 2022 of prominent pro-democracy politicians in Hong Kong who took part in primary elections to consolidate the democratic opposition. They continued to be detained through December’s Legislative Council balloting – something that Freedom House said “underscored Beijing’s success in dismantling the territory’s semi-democratic institutions.”
Crackdowns in Asia also affected journalists and civil society movements, especially in countries whose institutions were already vulnerable, the report said.
China, Myanmar
“In China, one of the world’s most restrictive media environments, journalists faced heightened scrutiny and rigorous political indoctrination when attempting to renew their press licenses, and even individuals who engaged in solitary forms of protest were punished with prison sentences,” it said.
The biggest contraction in freedom took place in Myanmar, which has seen the widespread arrests of civilian political leaders following the 2021 military coup d’etat, Freedom House said.
“Over a thousand people have been killed as security forces crack down on pro-democracy protests, and thousands of others have been thrown in jail and tortured,” the report said. “The military authorities imposed curfews, repeatedly shut down the internet, raided universities, and searched for human rights defenders and pro-democracy activists to arrest.”
The country’s recent turmoil is “another sign that international deterrents against antidemocratic behavior are losing force,” the report said. However, Freedom House noted that “a widespread civil disobedience movement against the military coup has persisted in the face of violent reprisals.”
Resistance has denied the military regime “legitimacy and crippled its ability to function as a government, reflecting both the people’s commitment to democracy and the power it gives them to shape events.”
In Singapore, authorities forced one of the few independent news outlets to close after its license was suspended. And in Thailand, authorities expanded their ability to prosecute people for publishing news that could incite fear in the public.
China’s leading role
Worldwide, the enemies of liberal democracy “are accelerating their attacks” as regimes “have become more effective at co-opting or circumventing the norms and institutions meant to support basic liberties, and at providing aid to others who wish to do the same,” the report said, noting that there have been 16 consecutive years of decline in global freedom.
“The leaders of China, Russia, and other dictatorships have succeeded in shifting global incentives, jeopardizing the consensus that democracy is the only viable path to prosperity and security, while encouraging more authoritarian approaches to governance,” it said.
The Chinese Communist Party “offers an alternative to democracies as a source of international support and investment, helping would-be autocrats to entrench themselves in office, adopt aspects of the CCP governance model, and enrich their regimes while ignoring principles like transparency and fair competition,” the report said.
“At the same time, the CCP has used its vast economic clout and even military threats to suppress international criticism of its own violations of democratic principles and human rights, for instance by punishing governments and other foreign entities that criticize its demolition of civil liberties in Hong Kong or question its expansive territorial claims.”
Freedom House pointed to a Marriott hotel’s refusal to host a November 2021 World Uyghur Congress gathering in the Czech Republic, saying it preferred to observe “political neutrality.” New Zealand’s Parliament also refrained from identifying Beijing’s actions in Xinjiang province as a genocide after the trade minister said such language could hurt economic relations with China.
Turkey was once a haven for Uyghurs fleeing China, but the country “has increasingly shifted its stance to meet Beijing’s demands” by making it more difficult for Uyghurs to obtain permanent residence permits, the report found..."
Source/publisher:
"RFA" (USA)
Date of publication:
2023-03-09
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-09
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Economic, social and cultural rights, Freedom of opinion and expression: - the situation in Burma/Myanmar - reports, analyses, recommendations
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Atrocity Alert is a weekly publication by the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect highlighting situations where populations are at risk of, or are enduring, mass atrocity crimes.
Description:
"MYANMAR’S MILITARY CONTINUES ABUSES IN “UNENDING HUMAN RIGHTS CRISIS”
Throughout the two years since Myanmar’s (Burma) military launched a coup in February 2021, they have perpetrated a scorched earth campaign around the country in an effort to quash the opposition, according to a new report from the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). One of the most frequently utilized tactics by the military is the systematic and widespread burning of villages and dwellings. Nearly 39,000 houses around Myanmar have been burnt or destroyed in military operations since February 2022, marking a more than 1,000-fold increase compared to 2021. Sagaing Region – a resistance stronghold in the northwest – was the most impacted, accounting for more than 25,500 homes.
The military’s continued access to aviation fuel has, in part, facilitated the commission of these unlawful and indiscriminate airstrikes. Despite some targeted sanctions, aviation fuel deliveries continue to be offloaded to ports in Myanmar, according to a recent investigation by Amnesty International and Global Witness. Companies in Greece, India, Japan and Switzerland have been involved in fuel shipments. Since mid-2022, OHCHR documented an increase in aerial attacks by the military, as well as the widespread and indiscriminate use of artillery against villages and towns across the country. Although most of the intense violence remains concentrated in northwestern and southeastern Myanmar, OHCHR reported that nearly 80 percent of the country’s 330 townships have been affected by clashes.
Since the coup, populations also face daily human rights violations and abuses, including killings, arbitrary arrests, displacement, torture and enforced disappearances. UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Volker Türk, stated, “There are reasonable grounds to believe that the military and its affiliated militias continue to be responsible for most violations, some of which may constitute crimes against humanity and war crimes,” and stressed that “Tragically, regional and global efforts for peace and restraint have largely fallen on deaf ears. The military, emboldened by continuous and absolute impunity, has consistently shown disregard for international obligations and principles. Urgent, concrete action is needed to end this festering catastrophe.”
The military’s continuous violence and commission of atrocity crimes have sparked an unending human rights and protection crisis. Savita Pawnday, Executive Director of the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, said, “The international community must heed the recommendations of the UN’s Human Rights Office, including urging the UN Security Council to refer the situation in Myanmar to the International Criminal Court. Furthermore, all companies should immediately stop supplying aviation fuel to Myanmar and conduct appropriate human rights due diligence to ensure their supply chains no longer enable the military’s unlawful attacks.”
NICARAGUAN GOVERNMENT IMPLICATED IN POTENTIAL CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY
In a groundbreaking report released on 2 March the UN Human Rights Council (HRC)-mandated Group of Human Rights Experts on Nicaragua (GHRE) concluded that widespread human rights violations that amount to crimes against humanity – including extrajudicial killings, torture, sexual violence, arbitrary detention and politically motivated persecution – have been perpetrated by the Nicaraguan government against civilians. The GHRE identified the National Police, the National Penitentiary System, judges, prosecutors and pro-government armed groups as the main perpetrators, acting under the authority, as well as participation, of President Daniel Ortega and his wife, Vice President Rosario Murillo.
The GHRE warned that systematic violations and abuses, including arbitrary deprivation of nationality, are part of a “deliberate dismantling of democratic institutions and destruction of civic and democratic space,” with the objective to “eliminate, by different means, any opposition in the country.” Since early February, the Ortega government has revoked the citizenship of more than 300 alleged political opponents, 222 of which were forcibly deported to the United States. Investigators warned that these latest measures are a clear indication that the situation continues to worsen.
Following a brutal crackdown on protests in 2018, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), as well as Independent Experts mandated by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, warned that crimes against humanity have been committed by state and affiliated non-state agents. Since then, systematic government repression and a descent into authoritarianism have intensified, with human rights defenders, independent media, students and academics, religious leaders and other alleged opponents targeted for persecution. President Ortega maintains absolute control over the country’s institutions, including the legislature and judiciary, which has failed to address impunity for human rights violations and abuses committed prior to the escalation in 2018 and in the subsequent years. Those unable to flee the country have faced systematic reprisals and criminal prosecutions. Official numbers provided by the GHRE and OHCHR suggest that more than 3,000 nongovernmental organizations were forcibly shut down since December 2018, and no independent media outlet can operate within Nicaragua.
As Nicaragua continues to refuse to engage with regional and international human rights mechanisms, the work of the GHRE remains vital for public monitoring and reporting, as well as for the collection and preservation of evidence of crimes against humanity. During the ongoing 52nd session of the HRC, member states should renew the mandate of the GHRE for a period of two years. Elisabeth Pramendorfer, Nicaragua expert at the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, emphasized that, “States should utilize the evidence collected by the GHRE to pursue accountability for victims, including through universal jurisdiction, and further strengthen a robust individual sanctions regime against high-level perpetrators.”
NEW UN REPORTS HIGHLIGHT CONTINUED ATROCITY CRIMES IN SOUTH SUDAN
On 7 March the UN Human Rights Council (HRC)-mandated Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan (CHRSS) presented its latest report on the country’s human rights situation, detailing ongoing gross human rights violations and atrocities, including widespread attacks against civilians, various incidents of conflict-related sexual violence against women and girls, forced displacement and extrajudicial killings. The violations and abuses have been perpetrated by members of the South Sudanese armed forces, as well as various militias and armed groups.
The Commissioners identified the absence of accountability as a major driver of the human rights and humanitarian crisis, stating that “attacks against civilians persist precisely because perpetrators are confident they will enjoy impunity.” Although the extended transitional period provides an opportunity for the South Sudanese authorities to “begin dismantling an entrenched culture of impunity and to reset the country on a path toward stability and prosperity after years of conflict,” justice for victims and survivors of atrocities continues to be elusive. The Commissioners noted that “effective prosecutions are rare and remain woefully insufficient.”
The latest report of the UN Secretary-General on the Mission in South Sudan also details continued cycles of inter-communal violence, land disputes with ethnic undertones, abductions and reprisal attacks throughout the country. According to the report, the “rapid escalation of subnational violence” and recent cycles of revenge killings threaten the progress made in implementing the 2018 peace agreement. Political leaders have continued to focus on preserving their own personal power, allowing mistrust to reinvigorate ethnic tensions and fuel violence across the country rather than genuinely commit to a political solution. Continuous political competition and mobilization of armed groups is leading to increasing localized conflict, fragmentation and widening ethnic divisions.
Genuine political commitment to the implementation of the outstanding provisions of the peace agreement, including drafting a new constitution and establishing mechanisms under the Constitution-Making Process Act, is crucial for reconciliation and the prevention of further conflict. To break the cycle of impunity, the transitional justice mechanisms under Chapter V of the peace agreement need to be urgently established. Given its invaluable role in monitoring and reporting on atrocity crimes and grave human rights violations, the HRC must extend the mandate of the CHRSS in full, for a period of two years, during its ongoing 52nd session. Juliette Paauwe, South Sudan expert at the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, said, “HRC-mandated investigative mechanisms are particularly important in situations where there are no realistic avenues for justice and accountability in the national context and can serve as an important deterrent. The added value of the CHRSS is self-evident and undeniable, and its work offers some glimpse of hope for justice and accountability to civilians in South Sudan.”..."
Source/publisher:
Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
Date of publication:
2023-03-08
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-08
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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Description:
"INTRODUCTION:
TBC has been working with the displaced and conflict-affected people of southeastern Myanmar for almost forty years to address humanitarian needs and protection concerns of people impacted by fighting and recurrent displacement and to support rights-based and community-led approaches to peace and development.
This document outlines the current context and TBC’s primary ambitions and commitments for 2023 – 2025. It details the four strategic directions that will guide programming in Thailand and southeastern Myanmar. It was developed in close consultation with the TBC board, members, staff , partners and other stakeholders.....VISION:
TBC envisions a future where displaced communities can realise human rights and embrace diversity to live in safety and with dignity.....MISSION: TBC is an alliance of civil society organisations working together with displaced and conflict-affected people of southeastern Myanmar to address humanitarian needs and to support rights-based and community driven approaches in pursuit of justice, peace and development....CORE VALUES:
DIGNITY AND RESPECT
JUSTICE AND EQUITY
TRUST AND INTEGRITY
MEANINGFUL PARTICIPATION AND LEADERSHIP
STRATEGIC DIRECTIONS (2023-25)
1. PRIORITISE THE HUMANITARIAN IMPERATIVE:
Address the humanitarian needs of displaced and conflict-affected communities, with a focus on especially vulnerable people. Provide equitable access for displaced communities to food, shelter and non-food items.
2. REINFORCE RESILIENCE AND RECOVERY:
Mitigate the longer-term impact of displacement on food security and nutrition. Enhance nutrition, environmental hygiene, climate-smart agriculture, small businesses and access to employment for displaced and conflict-affected communities.
3. PROMOTE PROTECTION AND SAFER FUTURES:
Reduce the exposure of displaced and conflict-affected communities to harm and mobilise safe and dignified pathways. Defend human rights including access to human security in Myanmar, temporary shelter and work in Thailand and resettlement to third countries.
4. STRENGTHEN LOCAL GOVERNANCE:
Diversify representation and enhance accountability in the ownership and oversight of programs and services. Responsibly and transparently manage change in collaboration with refugee and civil society partners, local authorities, donors and other stakeholders..."
Source/publisher:
The Border Consortium (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2023-02-07
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-07
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Food Security and nutrition in Burma/Myanmar, Public Health, Human Rights and international relations
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14.44 MB 10.16 MB 10.39 MB 9.95 MB
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"During the 52nd session of the UN Human Rights Council, Rita French, the UK's Human Rights Ambassador, delivered a statement on the situation in Myanmar.
Thank you, Mr President.
And thank you, High Commissioner, for your sobering update.
We share your concern at the situation in Myanmar. We condemn the junta’s increasingly brutal tactics, including through indiscriminate air strikes, conflict-related sexual violence and arson attacks. The targeting of civilian infrastructure, including schools, and hospitals and places of worship must cease. Civilians must be protected.
Over 2,600 people have been killed since the coup. Over 19,000 people have been arbitrarily detained. Female pro-democracy activists are increasingly targeted online.
The UK will continue to apply pressure through international fora, targeted sanctions, a comprehensive arms embargo and other means to oppose the junta’s violent and oppressive actions. I am proud that the UK led efforts to secure the first ever UN Security Council Resolution on Myanmar which urges all parties to respect human rights, and to end violence.
Accountability is the only way to end the military’s culture of impunity. Perpetrators must be brought to justice. To this end, the UK has established the Myanmar Witness programme which reports on some of the most egregious human rights violations.
High Commissioner,
How can the international community support access to justice for victims and survivors of sexual violence?
Thank you..."
Source/publisher:
Govt. UK (London)
Date of publication:
2023-03-07
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-07
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
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Description:
"The Republic of the Union of Myanmar welcomes the interactive dialogue with the High Commissioner for Human Rights on Myanmar, as well as OHCHR’s corresponding report on the ‘Situation of human rights in Myanmar since 1 February 2022’.
High Commissioner Türk was blunt in telling the Human Rights Council that “[t]he disregard and contempt for human life and human rights that are continuously demonstrated by the military constitute an outrage to the conscience of humanity.”
OHCHR has also delivered a strong report on the ‘catastrophic’ human rights situation in Myanmar and the illegal military junta’s grave human rights violations and probable crimes against humanity and war crimes. Further, its report catalogues some of the constructive actions taken by the National Unity Government consistent with Myanmar’s international obligations.
OHCHR’s collective updates are strikingly familiar in their content and findings. Each periodic report since the junta’s failed power grab in 2021 has recorded fresh peaks in murders, executions, disappearances, torture, sexual violence, and the junta’s blocking of humanitarian aid and use of forced displacement and starvation as tactics of war.
Emboldened by ‘continuous and absolute impunity’, the junta has intensified its use of heavy weapons against civilians over the past year. According to High Commissioner Türk, airstrikes against civilian locations increased by 141% and artillery shelling of communities, including hospitals, schools and places of worship, increased by over 100%.
OHCHR has also documented clear junta acts of terror and collective punishment, including villagers being burned alive, the hostage-taking of children, and a 1,200% increase in houses burnt or destroyed in junta operations. Significantly, OHCHR attributes these widespread and systematic atrocities to the junta’s leadership:
OHCHR documented consistent tactics and patterns of abuse across the country confirming that the military operates as a solid and coherent structure, implying knowledge of its leadership of commission of atrocities and/or, at minimum, failures to foreseeably prevent them.
Accountability is essential. On behalf of Myanmar, the National Unity Government welcomes OHCHR’s call for the Security Council to refer the situation in the country to the International Criminal Court (ICC), as well as its acknowledgment that no public response has yet been issued by the ICC to the National Unity Government’s July 2021 statement accepting the Court’s jurisdiction for crimes committed in Myanmar since 1 July 2002.
Furthermore, there has been no discernible improvement in the lives of the Rohingya despite the generosity of Myanmar’s neighbours. The Rohingya are no closer to returning home, with OHCHR reporting that conditions in Rakhine State remain unconducive for safe returns and that persistent security concerns have worsened. Yet this situation does not remove the National Unity Government’s responsibility to the Rohingya, including much needed progress on citizenship rights. OHCHR’s report acknowledges that the National Unity Government ‘has committed to abolishing the National Verification system and adopting a new and inclusive citizenship law in accordance with its 2021 “Policy Position on the Rohingya in Rakhine State”’. We stand by these commitments.
The National Unity Government also accepts OHCHR’s calls on all parties to adhere to their international obligations, to ensure full, unrestricted, predictable humanitarian access to all persons in need, and to cooperate with international human rights and accountability mechanisms. Further, we support High Commissioner Türk’s entreaty that all parties strengthen their efforts to ensure civilian protection.
Finally, the National Unity Government fully endorses the High Commissioner’s call on the Council to respect the democratic will of the Myanmar people. To High Commissioner Türk:
[t]he elections of November 2020 made clear that what the people of the country wanted was to continue the hard-won path of democratic reform. It is critical that the country’s future is decided by a process led by the people of Myanmar.
On behalf of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, the National Unity Government will continue to serve in accordance with the democratic will of the people as expressed in 2020 and consistent with Myanmar’s international obligations. We will also strengthen our partnerships with UN Member States to translate recent international momentum on Myanmar, including at the Security Council, into tangible impact on the ground..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Human Rights
Date of publication:
2023-03-07
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-07
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Human Rights and international relations
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"In this second installment of an interview, human rights campaigner Igor Blazevic asks security analyst Anthony Davis what changes we can expect to see this year in the Myanmar resistance’s armed campaign against the junta, as well as likely developments on the international front.
Blazevic: How effective are the resistance attacks on the stockpiles of arms and fuel? Can that be an effective tactic for the resistance?
Davis: Obviously ammunition supplies and aviation fuel are the lifeblood of the military. Without them a war cannot be sustained. The military understands that, and ammunition and fuel dumps will be extremely well protected, not only on the ground but also from drone attack. So, are they worthwhile targets? Absolutely, and I would hope that various ethnic resistance organizations and the Defense Ministry of the NUG are mapping very carefully where these dumps are and how effective security precautions are. There will always be weak spots. Identifying them may take weeks of covert surveillance but taking out a major fuel or ammo dump is a huge coup, materially and psychologically.
At this stage in the war, I’d be surprised to see this type of operation but it’s not impossible, and certainly a worthwhile objective.
Let me add one more aspect. Between fuel and ammunition dumps and various fronts, there are lines of supply along highways and rivers and that is really where the resistance can and must become more effective. That’s where the real vulnerability lies. But to hit supply convoys—and I know this from personal observation—you need well organized units of 20 or 30 men equipped with RPGs [rocket-propelled grenades] and machine guns in addition to IEDs and assault rifles. Plus a level of resistance which is confident about operating along those lines of supply. If you look at the main roads between Yangon and Naypyitaw or Mandalay and Myitkyina, the resistance is probing those areas, but it doesn’t yet have either the confidence and/or probably the logistic support that would allow it to operate in strength. This probably comes further into the war.
Blazevic: What is the role of pro-junta militia? How important are they for the army and can they successfully add manpower to the military?
Davis: The military is putting a lot of stress on recruitment of these militia forces, so clearly they are regarded as important. Why? Because in the countryside, particularly in Sagaing and Magwe, they provide the military with eyes and ears. Many battalions have little or no familiarity with the township in which they operate. So, in terms of local intelligence, the Pyu Saw Htee militia and the villages they operate from are seen as adding to overall capability. How effective they are in purely military terms is another matter. They’re mostly untrained and poorly armed so in some areas may even be more of a liability than an asset if they require army troops to help them out.
Blazevic: How do you evaluate the NUG and resistance chain of command and coordination capacity between the PDFs and ethnic revolutionary organizations? Do you notice any improvement? Is command and coordination getting better or is the resistance still not achieving a sufficient level of coordination?
Davis: That’s an extremely important question and sitting in Bangkok I don’t have as clear an answer as I would like. But I would say that compared to this time last year, there has been significant improvement. We can see that particularly in Karen and Karenni [Kayah] states and also in southern townships of Kachin where they abut northeastern Sagaing. Is this sufficient to produce a strategic impact at this stage in the war? Not yet. One must hope that incremental, gradual success will accelerate matters. There is an old saying in English, “success breeds success,” and it’s very true.
It is obviously critically important that the NUG and its Defense Ministry is liaising regularly with allied ethnic military organizations—Kachin, Karen, Karenni and Chin—and maybe with others that are not direct allies. I believe that is the case already, but that liaison and confidence building must move forward.
At this stage in the war, this cannot and should not be about attempting to organize grand coordinated offensives involving different parts of the country which end up in disappointment and mistrust. It’s ideally about confidence building and sharing experience and best practices. Where improving battlefield coordination is really important is at the township and district levels. Achieving results there will involve ethnic forces with better weaponry and long experience extending operational and tactical command-and-control over new and inexperienced PDFs. This is a lot easier said than done, but it is still worth saying.
Blazevic: What could be the turning point in Myanmar?
Davis: An impossible question to answer, I don’t have a crystal ball. No one knows. Talking about the coming year is more useful and in that time frame personally I don’t foresee any dramatic turning points, more of a long, hard slog, a progression in which the resistance becomes more effective and hopefully better connected while the military finds it increasingly difficult to solve growing problems—military, economic and political. That would be my prediction for this coming year.
That process might be accelerated if there were policy shifts by external players. I’m thinking the United States, India and possibly Thailand, after the May elections. These are key players and it is not inconceivable that ongoing erosion of the military’s capabilities on the battlefield will encourage a corresponding shift in the policies of external actors towards the NUG and the resistance more generally—not overnight changes but slow shifts. To a degree this is something which is already happening on the diplomatic and aid fronts: no dramatic turning points but definitely shifting dynamics.
Blazevic: On several occasions Myanmar people have called for a no-fly zone. Is that something that can happen?
Davis: No, a no-fly zone is not going to happen. Period. Even if the Myanmar Air Force were to conduct major strikes against urban areas captured by resistance forces resulting in the deaths of hundreds, even thousands of civilians—something entirely in their playbook—a no fly zone will still not happen. Why? Because only the United States could enforce one and that would necessitate moving an entire carrier battle group into the Bay of Bengal at a time where the US Navy has its hands more than full in the Asian theater. Even more importantly, it would provoke a very severe reaction from China, diplomatic consternation in ASEAN, and imply US responsibility for the future of a post-Tatmadaw Myanmar at a time when Myanmar is nowhere near the top of US government priorities. Bottom line: this is not the post-Cold War era of the 1990s. We can forget it.
Igor: Let us look at other outside factors. What impact can Western sanctions have? Can the positions of Thailand and India be shifted? It doesn’t look promising so far.
Davis: Sanctions are important politically and symbolically. They reflect the interest of any given state or in the case of the EU, a group of states, to make clear that they are opposed to the military’s attempt to take over Myanmar. Sanctions play a symbolic role but it would be a big mistake to think that sanctions are going to have any real impact on the battlefield in Myanmar in the coming year or two.
Regarding Thailand and India, you said that things don’t look very hopeful. I don’t think that’s necessarily the case if the resistance, PDFs plus ethnic armed organizations can achieve a degree of military momentum. This year is going to be an important, even decisive year in terms of defining trajectories—who’s going up, who’s going down. It won’t be about final victory, but if the resistance can demonstrate military momentum in the right direction that will necessarily impact the policies of important neighbors like India and Thailand. There are unlikely to be official statements, but things will likely shift on the borders in a way that reflects the changing dynamics inside Myanmar. So the military dynamic inside Myanmar is key: that’s what will influence what foreigners think and do, not the other way around.
Blazevic: Can the Myanmar resistance get some military support from outside? Is the US slowly shifting in that direction or is that an unrealistic expectation for the time being?
Davis: It is important to define the terms here. If you’re talking about an arms pipeline, a process of resupply over a period of time with a military objective in mind, I don’t believe there is any possibility of any external player looking to institute such a pipeline.
However, what I am suggesting is that as the military dynamic in Myanmar shifts, you may see states on Myanmar’s borders—Thailand and India most importantly—becoming more inclined to “look the other way” to what weapons are crossing the border courtesy of the “private market”. I’m not suggesting either of those states would agree to join with the West in moving truckloads of weapons to the resistance—even assuming the West were interested in providing weapons. But as they realize the Myanmar military is slowly sinking in this quagmire, they may gradually look to hedge their bets and ask themselves whether the internal conflict dynamics are changing the map? How does that impact our border security? Who do we need to be talking to and dealing with?
Blazevic: Could that include MANPADS—man-portable air defense systems?
Davis: It’s difficult to see that happening. MANPADS are extremely problematic at a range of levels—political, logistical, and in broader security terms. And the resistance as a potential beneficiary is itself far too fragmented. Even assuming an external actor were interested to supply them, to make a difference on the battlefield the resistance would need a supply chain: one or two would achieve nothing. And then you have the problem of where they end up. If you can shoot down an air force jet with a surface-to-air missile, you might also possibly sell it to somebody who wants to shoot down a civilian airliner taking off from Don Mueang airport outside Bangkok. So, risks at every turn. What has happened in Ukraine—and there is no shortage of risk there—is almost certainly not going to happen in Myanmar.
Blazevic: Can Russia be the game changer in Myanmar? Or is Russia simply too weak because of the war in Ukraine to play a game-changing role as it has done in Syria.
Davis: Even without the Ukraine war, Russia was never going to be a game-changer in Myanmar. It would be near impossible to imagine Russia intervening militarily in support of the Naypyitaw regime as it did in Syria, where it had real strategic concerns. But beyond that it’s a solid marriage of convenience in which both parties need the other. We understand the diplomatic and geopolitical implications of Russia’s problems. For its part, the Myanmar military already relies heavily on a range of Russian equipment and is diplomatically thrilled to have at least one admirer.
Practically though what more can this marriage produce? The Myanmar Air Force might benefit from spare parts and perhaps Russian advice in niche areas like air mobile operations, where their record has been unimpressive. But beyond that, actual Russian systems they might need more of—such as attack helicopters or additional Mi-17 transport helicopters or even basic Kamaz trucks—the Russians clearly need themselves. When it comes to fixed-wing aircraft, the Myanmar Air Force can certainly make do with what it has.
At the end of the day, the military is struggling to prosecute a scorched-earth counterinsurgency campaign against their own population, not a high-intensity conventional war. And as we already discussed, their problem is fundamentally about manpower and potentially logistics, not a lack of big-ticket equipment be it from Russia or anywhere else.
There’s also a lot of talk about economic and nuclear cooperation, and even tourism, which unless you’re a Russian male looking to avoid a one-way ride to the front in Ukraine, is something of a joke. But all this talk presupposes that the Myanmar military can reestablish a credible degree of security in the country, which in the coming years is unlikely. So, everything in the non-military sphere is probably more talk than substance.
Anthony Davis is a Bangkok-based security consultant and analyst with extensive field experience on a range of armed conflicts across Asia. He writes primarily for Janes, a security and defense publishing house..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2023-03-07
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-07
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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"In the following interview, human rights campaigner Igor Blazevic asks security analyst Anthony Davis about the state of the civil and armed opposition to the junta, and the condition of the Myanmar military after two years of trying to contain the armed uprising.
Blazevic: Anthony, you are military analyst, but let me start by asking, are multiple forms of civil resistance and disobedience still important factors in Myanmar’s anti-junta uprising? Spring Revolution started with the civil resistance and only later it transformed into the armed resistance as well. What role the civic resistance plays now? Is it still very important factor or the outcome will be decided on the battlefield?
Davis: Civilian mobilization and civic organization is fundamental in underpinning support for any popular armed struggle. This is particularly important in a situation where there is no revolutionary party as an organizing core which is very much the case in Myanmar today: the NLD represented the legitimacy underpinning the popular uprising of 2021 but it is certainly not a revolutionary party going forward. So, if you don’t have that one revolutionary center then civic organizations across the country in different regions become critically important. You can’t have a people’s war without people’s participation, politically, economically, militarily, in terms of the information war — across the whole spectrum. Although the military struggle, in my opinion, will be the decisive element, without the continued support and participation of society through civil organizations, including those supported by the NUG, that military element cannot hope to prevail.
Blazevic: We are already second year of a conflict that is extremely exhausting conflict for the population. Do you see popular support for the revolution and resistance already floundering under the pressure of the military atrocities or you think the resilience of the people of Myanmar is still as strong as it was at the beginning of the uprising?
Davis: That’s a difficult question for me to answer sitting in a comfortable office in Bangkok. But my general impression is that the people of Myanmar are still very much committed to the struggle. They recognize that this is a revolutionary opportunity, which is probably not going to come again – a truly historic opportunity to introduce a new political, social and economic system for Myanmar. I think that awareness is generally felt.
However, there will obviously be areas where the degree of support or of exhaustion varies. What I am hearing is that, if you’re in an urban area of Myanmar, if you’re in Yangon, Mandalay or one of the big cities, life for many people is to a degree normal. I was talking to somebody the other day who just arrived from Yangon and this lady was saying, “I’m not seeing troops on the streets, I do not have to go through checkpoints. Life is largely normal”. So, if you are in an urban area without much disruption, it is reasonable to assume you will want to get back to a normal life, being able to feed your family and do your business as soon as possible.
However, if you are in an area where the war is immediate and real, in Karen state or in Sagaing or Magway or Chin where the fighting is ongoing, where villages are being destroyed, where people are being killed, then I would imagine that there is a very powerful level of anger driving participation. It would depend very much on where you are.
Blazevic: Is Myanmar military being significantly weakened? They are losing soldiers and territory, they face defections, they have recruitment problems. Is Myanmar military still strong enough for a war of attrition? What currently are the main vulnerabilities on Myanmar military?
Davis: From the beginning of the crisis, I have always argued that it would be a very serious mistake to underestimate the strength of the Myanmar military. This is a huge organization which for seven decades has been used not just to running the country but also coming to feel that they own the country — that they somehow represent the essence of Myanmar and have the right to decide what is the best for it and how politics will be played. With this mentality the military has built up over time a very significant degree of organization, internal cohesion, discipline, military resources, and economic power. It would be a bad mistake to underestimate these people simply because the ordinary people of Myanmar have stood up to fight them. They should not be underestimated.
There has been a tendency since the months following the coup to exaggerate the number of defections and desertions from the military as well as their battlefield losses. The media, both in Myanmar and abroad have not done a very good job in looking at this issue of defections, desertions, losses in a realistic manner.
Let’s start with defections and desertions we hear so much about. Because we want to believe it, it’s tempting to think that this is an army on the verge of disintegration. This is clearly not the case. I have looked at the issue closely and talked to well-placed sources inside Myanmar regularly. My assessment, which may of course be wrong, is that desertions and defections may perhaps have totaled somewhere around 3,000, maybe 4,000, from the army and police over two years. In terms of battlefield losses, killed and badly wounded, my best estimate would be somewhere between 10,000 and 15,000 in two years.
So in terms of men who’ve quit the security forces plus those killed or wounded, we’re likely talking less than 20,000. Now this is a military which in terms of combat-capable units numbers somewhere over 100,000 personnel. You can then add to that an essentially militarized police force of not less than 70,000. So in terms of losses, perhaps 15,000 in two years from a military organization that is at least 170,000 strong, maybe more. These are not insignificant losses but they’re certainly not crippling, and I doubt if they are going to produce any dramatic reassessment of how the military looks at this struggle. I would argue that such losses are seen from Naypyidaw as acceptable; that the military believes it can continue to function and fight with this level of loss.
Let me add one other thing as regards defections and desertions. They have almost all been defections of individuals or very small groups of two or three men leaving a unit. What we have not yet seen — and I stress the word ‘yet’ — is an entire unit of 10, 20, 30 men quitting en masse — either by giving up their weapons and going home or joining the resistance. That hasn’t happened. I believe that eventually it may happen but so far it has not, and we need to understand this. It is not a coincidence; it reflects the fact that the Myanmar military is a remarkably disciplined and cohesive organization.
So, if that’s the bad news, is there any good news? Yes: they also have some real weaknesses to contend with. The most fundamental is that they simply do not have enough manpower to suppress resistance across much of Myanmar. Almost every combat unit in Myanmar is undermanned, and overall, the military is overstretched. It’s trying to do too much in too many places. A battalion in the Myanmar army should number around 750 men, officers and other ranks. A typical battalion now today in Myanmar is probably 200 on a very good day, often 150 or less. Not 750, but 150 or less. This is a huge problem.
Air power can only offset this dilemma to a certain extent. And since the last quarter of 2022 there has been a lot of stress, in the media, from the NUG, from PDFs, from civil society, on the impact of air strikes and the fact that the resistance has no anti-aircraft capability. However, I would argue that it’s important not to exaggerate airpower and to understand its limitations. Having spent much of the 1980s working in Afghanistan where Soviet airpower was deployed against village-based guerrilla resistance in much the same way as across Myanmar today, I know a little bit about this. Then it was Mi-24 helicopter gunships and Su-25 ground attack jets; now it’s Mi-24s and YAK-130 jets. These strikes can certainly cause large scale displacement of the civil population. But guerrilla resistance learns to adapt to the threat using camouflage, dispersal and optimum timing for their own attacks. So in a guerrilla environment, the initial psychological and kinetic shock of air power typically diminishes over time.
Where air power can of course be incredibly destructive, both physically and in terms of morale, is when guerrilla forces allow themselves to get bogged down in protracted assaults against army strongpoints or futile attempts to capture urban areas. At this stage in the war the regime in Naypyidaw will absolutely not accept the loss of urban areas. They will destroy them in order to “save” them, killing not only resistance fighters but also their civilian supporters. That will result in civilians saying to the resistance, “thank you very much for coming to our town but you killed half of the population indirectly by attracting airstrikes”. So, for the time being – this year and probably into 2024, depending on how the situation develops — in my opinion at least, it is really important in that the resistance in Myanmar does not attempt to capture urban centers, however tempting that may appear.
So, what do they do? I would argue simply that for the coming year, the focus should be on hitting the military at its point of greatest vulnerability – a plethora of over-extended, undermanned army and police positions spread almost everywhere. The strategy must focus specifically and relentlessly on destroying enemy forces piecemeal and capturing their weapons.
It may be worth making one other comment with regard to the weaknesses of Myanmar military. This is an organization which finds very difficult to conceptualize defeat. Their institutional arrogance and lack of self-doubt have created a mindset in which conceding strategic reverses, let alone outright defeat in almost impossible. It seems likely that at this point they don’t fully understand just how bad their strategic dilemma is. For the resistance, facing an enemy who imagines he can still win when he is actually slowly losing, is undoubtedly an advantage.
Blazevic: You mention that battalions should be 750 men, but now they are only about 150. Where have all those soldiers gone? One more question about logistic. It is often said that the war is won and lost by logistics. How do you estimate the weaknesses of the military in terms of their logistic capacity?
Davis: The answer to the first question is simple. The fact that infantry battalions in the Myanmar military have, give or take, only 150 men is nothing new. This goes back at least 20 years. In the 1990s, after the ‘88 uprising the Myanmar military expanded at a breakneck speed in order essentially to establish a garrison footprint across the entire country. But recruitment for what has always been a voluntary rather than conscription-based army simply could not keep up. They were expanding the number of infantry battalions without having sufficient manpower to fill them, while battalion commanders were – and still are – under pressure to maintain or increase unit strength and happy to inflate the numbers of recruits they were pulling in.
But what is now happening now is that infantry battalions are in action, potentially or actually, not just in certain parts of certain ethnic states — Shan or Kachin or Rakhine – but across the whole country. So under-manning is not a new problem, but today it has become a critical one.
As to logistics, any army is looking essentially at supplying line units with food, ammunition, and fuel. In this respect I don’t think the military is facing problems it cannot solve. If there is one exception, that would be Chin state, where the roads are really bad, often extend over long distances and are few and far between. Resupply in 2021 and 2022 involved very big convoys moving slowly between the main towns — Mindat, Matupi, Hakha, Thantlang. These convoys are extremely vulnerable because they move slowly on bad roads and the areas around them are largely controlled by the Chin resistance. Chin state is a logistical nightmare for the military, and it now depends significantly on helicopters – expensive in terms of fuel costs and, if the resistance can position machine-guns around landing pads, maybe not that safe either.
Karenni state also poses broadly similar logistics problems though probably not to the same degree. But with regard to other fronts across the country, I am not aware of any areas where logistics are a critical headache. There are of course plenty of ambushes and IEDs, especially in Sagaing and northern parts of Magwe. But is that a critical problem anywhere? I don’t think so.
That can of course change if the resistance becomes more effective in not only attacking convoys but temporarily cutting roads. If the resistance in the coming year or two can begin effectively cutting major roads and railways, then the logistics issue has the potential to become a huge problem for the military. But right now, we haven’t reached that point.
Anthony Davis is a Bangkok-based security consultant and analyst with extensive field experience on a range of armed conflicts across Asia. He writes primarily for IHS-Janes, a security and defense publication.
Igor Blazevic is a senior adviser at the Prague Civil Society Centre. Between 2011 and 2016 he worked in Myanmar as the head lecturer of the Educational Initiatives Program..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2023-03-06
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-06
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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"Council Concludes its Interactive Dialogue with the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Afghanistan
The Human Rights Council this afternoon concluded an interactive dialogue on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan, held an interactive dialogue on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, and began an interactive dialogue with the Group of Human Rights Experts on Nicaragua.
Volker Türk, United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, said as Myanmar entered the third year of the crisis generated by military rule, its people continued to suffer profound human rights harms; an expanding humanitarian emergency; continuing impunity of the military authorities; and a deepening economic crisis. Armed conflict continued to grow and military operations now increasingly involved the use of airstrikes, artillery shelling and heavy weaponry against civilians. The latest report detailed a number of incidents being investigated, including hundreds of houses being burned and dozens of people, including children killed by shelling and military raids. Since February 2021, at least 17,572 people had been arrested (including 381 children) with 13,763 remaining in detention. Across the country, 17.6 million people now needed humanitarian assistance, and over 15.2 million faced acute food insecurity. The Rohingya community still remaining in Myanmar continued to face widespread discrimination. There needed to be increased international support, and the continuing proceedings before both the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court warranted every support.
In the discussion on Myanmar, speakers said, among other things, that since the 1 February 2021 coup, the military had brought the country into a perpetual human rights crisis through continuous human rights violations and violations of international humanitarian law, some of which may amount to international crimes. The consistent tactics and patterns of abuse underscored the military’s responsibility for these violations, including indiscriminate airstrikes and artillery attacks against populated areas, village raids and burnings, arbitrary arrests, use of torture, extrajudicial killings, killings of children, attacks on schools and hospitals, military use of schools, sexual and gender-based violence, severe restrictions of fundamental freedoms and many more, with persons belonging to ethnic or religious minorities such as the Rohingya bearing the brunt.
One speaker spoke of regret that Myanmar had not participated in the discussion, stressing respect for its sovereignty. Some speakers said all parties should speak and work in order to help the parties in Myanmar overcome their divergences and problems in order to overcome their differences, and the international community should respect the territorial integrity and national unity of Myanmar in resolving the situation. Dialogue and reconciliation must be the way forward. To not listen to the State concerned precluded hearing about its efforts and the progress made on the ground. Another speaker called for an end to all unilateral coercive measures imposed on Myanmar, which caused immense suffering to the people on the ground.
Speaking in the discussion on Myanmar were European Union, Norway on behalf of a group of countries, France, United States, Japan, Luxembourg, Costa Rica, China, United Nations Children’s Fund, Indonesia, Venezuela, Egypt, Canada, Netherlands, United Kingdom, Malaysia, South Africa, Maldives, Türkiye, Bangladesh, Gambia, Saudi Arabia, Malawi, Australia, Mauritania, Libya, Thailand, Belarus, Botswana, Ireland, Viet Nam, Iran, Russian Federation, Sierra Leone and Pakistan on behalf of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation countries.
Also speaking were the following non-governmental organizations: Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development, China Foundation for Poverty Alleviation, Association Ma’onah for Human Rights and Immigration, Centre pour les Droits Civils et Politiques - Centre CCPR, Society for Threatened Peoples, Edmund Rice International Limited, Lawyers Rights Watch Canada, Amnesty International, International Commission of Jurists, and CIVICUS - World Alliance for Citizen Participation.
The Council then started an interactive dialogue with the Group of Human Rights Experts on Nicaragua.
Jan-Michael Simon, Chair of the Group of Human Rights Experts on Nicaragua, said the Group had investigated alleged human rights abuses and violations committed in Nicaragua since April 2018.
Based on the information analysed, the Group concluded that serious and systematic human rights violations and abuses of human rights took place in Nicaragua during the period covered by the report, perpetuated by government representatives, and those from pro-government groups. Violations included extrajudicial executions, arbitrary detentions, torture and cruel treatment including acts of sexual and gender-based violence, arbitrary deprivation of nationality, and violations of the right to remain in the country, among others. These violations were perpetrated against genuine and perceived opponents of the Nicaraguan Government. The Expert Group concluded that the violations were committed as a pattern of behaviour which was generalised and systematic.
These violations constituted crimes against humanity. These crimes against humanity were committed within the framework of a discriminatory policy against part of the population of Nicaragua, for political motives, intentionally organised from the highest levels of government.
Nicaragua, speaking as the country concerned, said the Government of reconciliation and national unity wished to formally indicate that it had not nor would it ever accept the unilateral appointment of the Members of the Group of Experts in any way, shape or form. This group was nothing less than a smokescreen in order to allow fabrication of facts. The input to it came from certain opposition elements in the country that were putting forth false narratives directed by imperialist powers with the aim of interfering in the nation. No reports were accepted, as they ran counter to the over-arching interests of the State, which was aiming to ensure human rights across the board. Nicaragua did not wish these reports to continue to undermine its institutions and legal order. The reports did not reflect the most basic progress, such as in education, women’s rights, and poverty reduction. Any recommendations put forward lacked objectivity and were tantamount to coercion, since they undermined the efforts of all Nicaraguans.
In the ensuing discussion on Nicaragua, speakers expressed, among other things, outrage for the serious and systematic human rights violations laid out in the reports, including crimes against humanity. The report left no doubt regarding the grave seriousness of the human rights situation in Nicaragua, which continued to deteriorate, and could lead to an even graver humanitarian crisis. The Government should work to ensure the human rights of all Nicaraguans, and ensure accountability and justice for all for the human rights violations listed in the report, including allegations of torture and grave violations of civil and political rights. Multiple speakers welcomed the release of 222 political prisoners by the Government of Nicaragua, but remained gravely concerned about the deterioration of human rights and the rule of law.
Speaking in the discussion on Nicaragua were Chile on behalf of a group of countries, European Union, Luxembourg on behalf of a group of countries, Iceland on behalf of a group of countries, France, United States, Switzerland and Ecuador.
At the beginning of the meeting, the Council concluded its interactive dialogue with the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan.
Richard Bennett, Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan, in concluding remarks, said many interventions had rightly focused on discrimination against women and girls. Even if the situation affecting women and girls was less serious, there would still be a human rights crisis in Afghanistan. There was an increasing number of reports of arbitrary arrests, torture, disappearance and killings, including those of a district governor and former police commander in the past few days, who appeared to have suffered torture before being killed. The Council was implored to consider this on its agenda. Mr. Bennett called on the de-facto authorities to take concrete steps to stop these killings and bring those responsible to justice. Rapidly shrinking civil space was also a concern, described as a “muzzling” of the media in the report.
In the discussion on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan, speakers raised, among other issues, the deep concern over the regressive, disproportionate and discriminatory measures imposed by the de facto authorities on Afghan women and girls, particularly the banning of tertiary education for Afghan women. Speakers urged the de facto authorities to urgently reconsider this decision, which was detrimental to the future generation of Afghanistan. There was also concern about the economic and humanitarian crises that continued to deteriorate in the country.
The situation in Afghanistan was due to United States’ activities in the country, one speaker said, urging the Special Rapporteur to find a way around the effective blocking of Afghan assets by the United States, which undermined Afghanistan’s capacity to move towards sustainable peace and development. Some speakers were disappointed that the Special Rapporteur had not taken note of this in his report, urging him to take into consideration the historical reasons for the crisis, and to call for an end to the blocking of assets.
Speaking in the discussion were Malaysia, South Africa, Spain, Sudan, Australia, Türkiye, New Zealand, Kazakhstan, Italy, Republic of Malta, Chile, Malawi, Montenegro, Austria, Croatia, Namibia, Bulgaria, Pakistan, Argentina, Timor-Leste, Iran, Ukraine, Saudi Arabia, Greece, Russian Federation, Slovenia, and United Kingdom.
Also speaking were the following non-governmental organizations: Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development, Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, Interfaith International Intervention, Save the Children International, International Lesbian and Gay Association, World Organisation against Torture, CIVICUS – World Alliance for Citizen Participation Intervention, International Bar Association, Organisation internationale pour les pays les moins avancés, and Meezaan Centre for Human Rights.
The webcast of the Human Rights Council meetings can be found here. All meeting summaries can be found here. Documents and reports related to the Human Rights Council’s fifty-second regular session can be found here.
The next meeting of the Council will be at 10 a.m. on Tuesday, 7 March, when it will
conclude the interactive dialogue with the Group of Human Rights Experts on Nicaragua followed by an enhanced interactive dialogue on the report of the Commission of Human Rights in South Sudan. The Council will then hear the High Commissioner’s oral update and presentation of reports under item 2, followed by a general debate under item 2 - annual report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and reports of the Office of the High Commissioner and the Secretary-General.
Interactive Dialogue with the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Afghanistan
The interactive dialogue with the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan started in the previous meeting and a summary can be found here.
Discussion on Afghanistan
Some speakers expressed deep concern over the regressive, disproportionate and discriminatory measures imposed by the de facto authorities on Afghan women and girls. Such measures, particularly the banning of tertiary education for Afghan women and girls, contradicted Islamic principles and international human rights law. Speakers urged the de facto authorities to urgently reconsider this decision, which was detrimental to the future generation of Afghanistan. The recent decisions to ban women and girls from higher education, along with the decree barring women from working in national and international non-governmental organizations were yet another stark demonstration of the silencing of the voices of women and girls in the country. Such actions were self-defeating, and would only aggravate the dire socio-economic conditions, as well as maybe being tantamount to gender persecution.
Education was the key to economic well-being and future prosperity in any society, and as such, education in Afghanistan, especially for girls and women, must continue and even increase. The data was clear that educated girls and women contributed very significantly to social and economic well-being. In order to bring together the three pillars of the United Nations: human rights, peace and security, and development, as well as to promote inclusive and comprehensive sustainable development in the region, one speaker proposed to establish a United Nations Regional Hub on Sustainable Development Goals for Central Asia and Afghanistan in Almaty, Kazakhstan, which would coordinate all international programmes aimed at supporting Afghanistan. Speakers appealed repeatedly to Afghanistan to restore access to education for all women and girls within the country, allowing them to achieve development and prosperity.
There was also concern about the economic and humanitarian crises that continued to deteriorate in Afghanistan. The international community should increase its efforts to address these issues through constructive dialogue and cooperation, and help Afghanistan from descending further into insecurity, poverty and isolation. The international community needed to also continue to give coordinated and constructive suggestions to Afghanistan on improving the situation. Afghanistan remained in a dire economic crisis: ensuring stability in the country was critical. Almost the entire population was impacted by the dire situation, with currently 97 per cent of them suffering in various ways.
Fighting impunity and ensuring accountability for the violations of international humanitarian law and human rights violations and abuses was an essential for the stability and peaceful future of all Afghan citizens, speakers said. Today Afghanistan was a dreary place where the Constitution was suspended, the rule of law was subject to interpretation, and the Taliban was ruling through fear and repression. The overwhelming sense of hopelessness, compounded by the economic and humanitarian crises, were deeply affecting the whole of Afghan society. It was therefore crucial to keep providing humanitarian and basic needs assistance.
Efforts should be made by the international community to ensure that Afghanistan adopted a Government that was representative of all parts of Afghan society, including the various ethnic and religious groups, as well as women and girls.
The situation in Afghanistan was due to United States’ activities in the country, one speaker said, urging the Special Rapporteur to find a way around the effective blocking of Afghan assets by the United States, which undermined Afghanistan’s capacity to move towards sustainable peace and development. Some speakers were disappointed that the Special Rapporteur had not taken note of this in his report, urging him to take into consideration the historical reasons for the crisis, and to call for an end to the blocking of assets.
Another issue of deep concern was the situation of millions of children in Afghanistan deprived of essential services, including primary healthcare, education, water and sanitation, while many of them continued to be killed and maimed by landmines and other explosive remnants of war, as well as their recruitment for conflict. The Special Rapporteur was asked, considering the inclusion in his mandate of a child’s rights perspective, what was his assessment on the situation of children and on future prospects? Another question asked was what prospects for positive developments by the authorities he saw in light of the recent setbacks?
Concluding Remarks
RICHARD BENNETT, Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan, thanked all the States and members of civil society for their interventions and questions. Many interventions had rightly focused on discrimination against women and girls. Mr. Bennett welcomed the decision by the Council at the previous session to mandate a specific report on the situation of women and girls at the fifty-third session. Even if the situation affecting women and girls was less serious, there would still be a human rights crisis in Afghanistan. Mr. Bennett was concerned about the extra judicial killings of former civil servants and members of the Afghan security forces, despite the general amnesty issued by the de-facto authorities. There was an increasing number of reports of arbitrary arrests, torture, disappearance, and killings, including those of a district governor and a former police commander in the past few days, who appeared to have suffered torture before being killed. The Council was implored to consider this on their agenda.
Impunity could lead to ongoing animosity and future bloodshed. Mr. Bennett called on the de-facto authorities to take concrete steps to stop these killings and bring those responsible to justice. Rapidly shrinking civil space was also a concern, described as a “muzzling” of the media in the report. There was no independent mechanism to address human rights complaints and bring them to the attention of the authorities. Journalists, human rights defenders and civil society should be able to operate freely without fear, but this was not the case. The banning of education was not supported or justified; this was a universal right. Girls must be allowed to resume their studies alongside boys, and women alongside men at university. The impact of war, compounded by the Taliban’s rule would be intergenerational. If Afghanistan was to have a new generation of leaders tomorrow, they needed basic services today.
Mr. Bennett appreciated the strengthening of his mandate to include the documentation of evidence. There needed to be a stocktake of what mechanisms already existed for accountability, and there needed to be more resources put towards this. It was important to note that accountability should include the right to truth and reparations, as well as criminal accountability. Afghanistan deserved more commitment and engagement from the international community. Mr. Bennett expressed his unwavering admiration and commitment to the Afghan people who strove for human rights.
Interactive Dialogue on the Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar
Report
The Council has before it the report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights on the implementation of the recommendations made by the independent international fact-finding mission on Myanmar (A/HRC/52/21).
Presentation of Report
VOLKER TÜRK, United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, said as Myanmar entered the third year of the crisis generated by military rule, its people continued to suffer profound human rights harms; an expanding humanitarian emergency; continuing impunity of the military authorities; and a deepening economic crisis. Armed conflict continued to grow and military operations now increasingly involved the use of airstrikes, artillery shelling and heavy weaponry against civilians. The latest report detailed a number of incidents being investigated, including hundreds of houses being burned and dozens of people, including children, killed by shelling and military raids.
Airstrikes against civilian locations had increased by 141 per cent in the second year of the military takeover, and artillery shelling of communities had increased by over 100 per cent. Incidents in which homes and neighbourhoods were set on fire had risen by 380 per cent in the second year after the coup, leading to an estimated 1,200 per cent increase in the number of homes destroyed. Since the military takeover, some 39,000 structures had been burned, and people unable to flee risked being burned to death. The more than 1.3 million people displaced since the coup began faced destitution. At least 2,947 civilians had been killed by the military since 2021, including 244 children. More than one third of these confirmed deaths occurred in military custody. Cases had been reported of some armed groups attacking and killing civilians perceived to be working for or with the military. These acts constituted murder and needed to be condemned. It was imperative that the military respected the Security Council’s December resolution, and took steps to end the violence.
On 1 February 2023, the military extended the state of emergency, subjecting civilians to the expanded jurisdiction of military tribunals, with no right to appeal – even upon imposition of the death penalty. Since February 2021, at least 17,572 people had been arrested (including 381 children) with 13,763 remaining in detention. Across the country, 17.6 million people now needed humanitarian assistance, and over 15.2 million faced acute food insecurity.
The Rohingya community still remaining in Myanmar continued to face widespread discrimination. At least 3,500 Rohingya attempted sea crossings in 2022– a 360 per cent increase from 2021. At least 348 of them had died or had gone missing at sea. Mr. Türk appealed to all countries to provide support to people fleeing Myanmar, and to their host communities. There needed to be increased international support, and the continuing proceedings before both the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court warranted every support. Mr. Türk remained concerned by the prospect of new elections taking place in Myanmar and the arbitrary detention of elected political leaders in February 2021. He called on the Council to do its best to deliver humanitarian support directly to Myanmar’s people, and called on United Nations Member States to promote dialogue and sustainable solutions to bring an end to this brutal crisis.
Discussion on Myanmar
In the discussion, some speakers said, among other things, that since the 1 February 2021 coup, the military had brought Myanmar into a perpetual human rights crisis through continuous human rights violations and violations of international humanitarian law, some of which may amount to international crimes. The consistent tactics and patterns of abuse underscored the military’s responsibility for these violations, including indiscriminate airstrikes and artillery attacks against populated areas, village raids and burnings, arbitrary arrests, use of torture, extrajudicial killings, killing of children, attacks on schools and hospitals, military use of schools, sexual and gender-based violence, severe restrictions of fundamental freedoms and many more, with persons belonging to ethnic or religious minorities such as the Rohingya bearing the brunt.
Several speakers expressed continued support to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ five-point consensus, recalling Security Council resolution 26/69 (2022), and demanded an immediate end to all forms of violence throughout the country. United Nations Security Council resolution 26/69 called for the regime to end its violence across the country, release arbitrarily detained prisoners, allow unhindered humanitarian access, protect members of minority groups, and respect the will and democratic aspirations of the people of Myanmar, and there were as yet no signs of results in this direction. Speakers also called for the release of all arbitrarily detained prisoners, the provision of full and unhindered humanitarian access, and the protection of civilians in Myanmar. Further calls were also made for an international arms embargo and targeted economic action to prevent the flow of weapons to the military.
The situation in Rakhine state continued to be tense and fragile, speakers noted. Addressing the root causes of the Rohingya crisis was of paramount important in pursuing a durable resolution to the crisis. Both in Myanmar and beyond, the Rohingyas had become more vulnerable to various discrimination, violence, radicalisation and trafficking. The authorities in Myanmar were urged to fully cooperate with international mechanisms, including the Special Envoys of the Chair of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, as well as those established by this Council, and to step up their efforts to create conducive conditions that would facilitate safe, dignified and voluntary repatriation, including by ensuring justice and accountability.
The international community was urged to apply stronger pressure on the Government of Myanmar, and to stand together to demand an end to the violence and seek a peaceful reconciliation to the crisis. One speaker said the Security Council should refer the situation in Myanmar to the International Criminal Court without delay. The international concerns for a peaceful and prosperous Myanmar must go hand in hand with fulfilling the rights of minorities. All parties should refrain from further violence and the Myanmar authorities should allow access for humanitarian assistance, including through the Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management. International cooperation should be strengthened to prevent further displacement and find a sustainable solution. Space should be made to ensure a democratic and fruitful dialogue, with the participation of all parties.
One speaker spoke of regret that Myanmar had not participated in the discussion, stressing respect for its sovereignty. Some speakers said all parties should speak and work in order to help the parties in Myanmar overcome their divergences and problems in order to overcome their differences, and the international community should respect the territorial integrity and national unity of Myanmar in resolving the situation. Dialogue and reconciliation must be the way forward. To not listen to the State concerned precluded hearing about its efforts and the progress made on the ground. Another speaker called for an end to all unilateral coercive measures imposed on Myanmar, which caused immense suffering to the people on the ground.
For a peaceful future, a vibrant and diverse civil society was indispensable, and there was deep concern about the ongoing repression of civil society organizations in Myanmar. Civil society organizations, including human rights defenders, were being monitored, restricted and harassed. The Organization Registration Act that was introduced last year was another blow for civic space, and a speaker applauded Myanmar’s civilian organizations for their courage and resilience. Their work was indispensable for accountability, women empowerment, and giving youth in Myanmar a voice to shape their future. One speaker pointed out that international human rights mechanisms should, however, operate whilst respecting the sovereignty and territoriality of States, and a genuine concern for human rights was required for human rights without politicisation or bias, operating through cooperation with the Government and repudiation of all unilateral coercive measures and other measures imposed upon the country.
What measures could be taken to reduce violence against civilians and human rights violations and abuses in Myanmar, as well as to ensure accountability for past and ongoing crimes, a speaker asked? Another asked how could the international community help support civil society and human rights defenders under threat in Myanmar? The international community had an obligation to restore even a sliver of hope. Would the High Commissioner recommend that the international community recognise the National Unity Government as the true Government of Myanmar, a speaker asked? How could the international community support Myanmar’s diverse democratic movement to ensure the protection and promotion of human rights, another speaker asked? How could the international community continue to support civil society organizations that were active in Myanmar under these circumstances, so they survived and played their essential role in the future of Myanmar, another speaker asked?
Concluding Remarks
VOLKER TÜRK, United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, said this was an extremely troubling situation: Myanmar was in free-fall, and the international community had to respond in the most effective way possible. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ five-point plan, Security Council resolution 26/69, and the Human Rights Council resolutions set out the expectations of the international community, as well as the benchmarks for a solution. The solution against this background was set out, and the international community needed to look at how these various documents had been disrespected by the authorities. Those Member States with any influence over the authorities should work to ensure that there was a change in the country that brought it back to the plight of the people. This required a coordinated and unified approach, and a number of things could be done in addition to what had been said.
There needed to be an end to arms being sold, and economic measures. The international community must not be engaged in supporting any electoral process that lacked the ability to ensure the participation of all the people of the country in peace and security. Those involved in civil society and national human rights defenders needed to be seen as key interlocutors for any solution. Regarding accountability for past and present human rights violations, this was key to any solution to the crisis, and whatever emerged as a solution would have to have inherent in it transitional justice. Member States could look at universal jurisdiction for crimes committed in Myanmar. There should be full support, politically- and funding-wise, for the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar.
The Rohingya, as well as the countries hosting them, required continued support by the international community. The Government of National Unity and all other representatives of Myanmar civil society must be involved in all attempts to restore democracy and ensure fair elections. The threat to civil society organizations was really existential, human rights defenders faced a myriad of issues, problems and potential risks, and it was vital to continue to alert the world of these risks. Donors should look at flexible and creative means of funding for human rights defenders and civil society organizations to ensure that their work continued, including resettlement and even witness protection.
Interactive Dialogue with the Group of Human Rights Experts on Nicaragua
Report
The Council has before it the report by the Group of Human Rights Experts on Nicaragua (A/HRC/52/63)
Presentation of the Report
JAN-MICHAEL SIMON, Chair of the Group of Human Rights Experts on Nicaragua, presented the conclusions of the investigations carried out by the group over the past year. The Group had investigated alleged human rights abuses and violations committed in Nicaragua since April 2018, to ensure accountability and justice for the victims. The Group had used methodology which included the collection of information from victims and witnesses, as well as the review of judicial records and verified audio visual material. Thanks to technological progress, the team was able to collect information securely and confidentially, including from sources still inside Nicaragua. During the investigation, the Group investigated 149 cases, received more than 150 confidential documents, processed and classified almost 1,500 documents, and conducted 291 face-to-face and remote interviews. Five missions were carried out to areas near the territory of Nicaragua. It had not been possible to carry out investigatory activities in the territory of Nicaragua since access had not been granted by the Nicaraguan Government. Between June and December 2022, 12 communications were sent to the Government of Nicaragua, to request a country visit, open channels of dialogue, and for data and information. The report was sent to the Government for comment before publishing it, but no response had been received, which was regretful. The Group remained open to channels of cooperation and dialogue with Nicaragua.
Based on the information analysed, Mr. Simon said that the Group concluded that serious and systematic human rights violations and abuses of human rights took place in Nicaragua during the period covered by the report, perpetuated by government representatives, and those from pro-government groups. Violations included extrajudicial executions, arbitrary detentions, torture and cruel treatment including acts of sexual and gender-based violence, arbitrary deprivation of nationality, and violations of the right to remain in the country, among others. These violations were perpetrated against genuine and perceived opponents of the Nicaraguan Government. The Expert Group concluded that the violations were committed as pattern of behaviour which was generalised and systematic. These violations constituted crimes against humanity. These crimes against humanity were committed within the framework of a discriminatory policy against part of the population of Nicaragua, for political motives, intentionally organised from the highest levels of government.
Mr. Simon said that the prevailing impunity for the crimes facilitated the escalation of violence. The conclusions reached by the Group were sufficient to justify further investigations. It was recommended that the Nicaraguan authorities immediately release all persons arbitrarily deprived of their liberty, and put an immediate end to violations, abuses and crimes, including persecution for politically motivated reasons. The State should also ensure accountability for victims and implement the necessary measures to guarantee the separation of powers. Nicaragua should cooperate with the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. It was hoped the independent inquiry could bring victims closer to justice.
Statement by the Country Concerned
Nicaragua, speaking as the country concerned, said the Government of reconciliation and national unity wished to formally indicate that it had not nor would it ever accept the unilateral appointment of the Members of the Group of Experts in any way, shape or form. This group was nothing less than a smokescreen in order to allow the fabrication of facts. The input to it came from certain opposition elements in the country that were putting forth false narratives directed by imperialist powers with the aim of interfering in the nation. No reports were accepted, as they ran counter to the over-arching interests of the State, which was aiming to ensure human rights across the board. Nicaragua did not wish these reports to continue to undermine its institutions and legal order. The reports did not reflect the most basic progress, such as in education, women’s rights, and poverty reduction. Any recommendations put forward lacked objectivity and were tantamount to coercion, since they undermined the efforts of all Nicaraguans. Nicaragua was strengthened in its resolve to achieve the highest levels of democratic success, respecting international law and defending it, and called for equal consideration for all.
Discussion on Nicaragua
In the ensuing discussion, speakers expressed, among other things, outrage for the serious and systematic human rights violations laid out in the reports, including crimes against humanity. The report left no doubt regarding the grave seriousness of the human rights situation in Nicaragua, which continued to deteriorate, and could lead to an even graver humanitarian crisis. The Government should work to ensure the human rights of all Nicaraguans, and ensure accountability and justice for all for the human rights violations listed in the report, including allegations of torture and grave violations of civil and political rights.
There was also concern for the disappearance of indigenous persons, and the instrumentalisation of the legislative system to ensure impunity. The authorities should grant access to the country for the Group of Experts, and resume collaboration with it and other international bodies. The international community should not forget that arbitrary detention and the inhumane treatment of political prisoners were not the only instruments by which civil society and human rights defenders were persecuted in the country. The authorities should put an end to any such measures, to restore the fundamental rights of denaturalised dissidents, to stop human rights violations, to restore democracy and to re-engage with the international community. Impunity for human rights violations must end, and all restrictions on civic space must end, with all persons granted the rights of assembly, dissent and expression.
Multiple speakers welcomed the release of 222 political prisoners by the Government of Nicaragua, but remained gravely concerned about the deterioration of human rights and the rule of law, noting that following their expulsion, the regime stripped these individuals, as well as 94 others of their citizenship and reportedly seized their property in Nicaragua. These deplorable acts signalled a significant step backward for the Nicaraguan people and were inconsistent with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which provided that everyone had a right to a nationality.
The conclusion of the Group of Experts that crimes may have been committed as part of a policy emitting from the highest spheres of Government against certain parts of the population was of grave concern, and there should be full and fair investigations ensuring accountability, justice and reparations for victims. Laws should be repealed limiting access to human rights and fundamental freedoms.
The authorities’ refusal to appear before the Committee against Torture last July was deplored, and speakers urged Nicaragua to resume cooperation with the various United Nations mechanisms which had requested access to the country. Another speaker asked how the international community could help the Group of Experts to achieve its mandate and meet its objectives.
The work of the Experts was appreciated, and speakers asked, among other things, what could be done to support the work of civil society organizations within the country? One speaker appealed to the Council to renew the mandate of the Group..."
Source/publisher:
United Nations Human Rights Council
Date of publication:
2023-03-06
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-06
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Education in Burma/Myanmar - general, Human Rights and international relations, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
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Description:
"Mr President,
Excellencies,
Colleagues, Friends
Myanmar is a country close to my heart – one that I have travelled to often. At the time of the elections in 2015, I witnessed the complex process of opening to the world that the nation had embarked on, and I was inspired by the hope and optimism that we saw at that time as part of the nation-building process.
The people of Myanmar knew that they faced many challenges. Decades of isolation. Protracted repression. Ethnic nationalism – and particularly severe discrimination, structural exclusion and violence against the Rohingya, many of whom I've met over many years. Lost educational opportunities. Poverty. It was never going to be simple, but there was sincere, whole-hearted hope.
But hope is rare now in Myanmar.
As the country enters the third year of the crisis generated by military rule, its people continue to suffer profound human rights harms; an expanding humanitarian emergency; continuing impunity of the military authorities; and a deepening economic crisis.
Armed conflict has continued to grow in scope and intensity, with attacks on civilians reminiscent of those in 2017, when the military attacked Rohingya communities in Rakhine State.
However, military operations now increasingly involve the use of airstrikes, artillery shelling and heavy weaponry against civilian communities across the country.
Our latest report (A/HRC/52/21) details a number of incidents, investigated by my staff, in which hundreds of houses were burned and dozens of people – including children – killed by shelling and military raids.
Overall, the military increased airstrikes against civilian locations by 141% in the second year of the military takeover. Its artillery shelling of communities, including hospitals, schools and places of worship, increased by over 100%.
Despite official claims that such tactics are aimed at anti-military armed groups, in numerous cases, testimony gathered by my Office has not indicated the presence of such groups.
The military’s use of arson throughout the country echoes its past attacks on civilians in Rakhine State. Incidents in which homes and neighbourhoods have been set on fire have risen by 380% in the second year after the coup -- leading to an estimated 1,200% increase in the number of homes destroyed.
Particularly in Sagaing Region, northwest of Mandalay, we continue to receive daily reports of new incidents, with soldiers reportedly moving from village to village, looting and then setting fire to homes and farms.
UN colleagues indicate that since the military takeover, some 39,000 structures have been burned in villages and towns where the military has operated. Satellite images confirm that numerous incidents have involved destruction of entire villages, while other villages have been set on fire on multiple occasions.
People who are unable to flee risk being burned to death. Those who can escape – over 1.3 million people displaced since the coup was launched – face destitution.
Overall, credible sources have verified that at least 2,947 civilians have been killed by the military and its affiliates since 2021, including 244 children. More than one third of these confirmed deaths occurred in military custody. The actual number of civilian killings is almost certainly far higher.
Excellencies,
The disregard and contempt for human life and human rights that are continuously demonstrated by the military constitute an outrage to the conscience of humanity.
Cases have been reported of some armed groups attacking and killing civilians perceived to be working for or with the military. In some of these incidents, the targets have included family members. Such acts are not in any way a legitimate form of opposition or resistance. They constitute murder and must be condemned.
While I note that the scale of human rights abuses committed by armed groups appears considerably lower than the violations committed by the military, I must emphasise that all armed parties must institute or strengthen efforts to comply with the fundamental principles of international humanitarian law, notably civilian protection.
It is imperative that the military respect the Security Council’s December resolution S/RES/2669 and take steps to end the violence.
Mr President,
On 1 February 2023, two years since seizing power, the military extended the state of emergency, and since then has twice expanded martial law to cover large areas of the northwest and southeast of the country.
This subjects civilians to the expanded jurisdiction of military tribunals, with no right of appeal – even upon imposition of the death penalty. Credible sources verified that since 1 February 2021, at least 17,572 people have been arrested (including 381 children) with 13,763 remaining in detention.
Detainees across the country have reported severe beatings; mock executions; suspension from ceilings without food or water; electrocution; and acts of sexual violence. I condemn this apparently widespread use of torture and ill-treatment, as well as consistent reports of squalid conditions of detention.
The rights to freedom of expression, association, assembly, and movement have been increasingly – it appears, strategically – restricted, and continue to strangle media freedoms and civic space.
Merely “liking” a Facebook post may lead to terrorism charges, with sentences of ten years or more in prison, following opaque trials that do not meet fair trial standards at all.
Additional burdensome restrictions have been imposed on the registration of non-profit organizations and their capacity to function.
The effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on people’s basic subsistence and poverty levels in the country is also alarming.
Across the country, 17.6 million people now need humanitarian assistance, and over 15.2 million face acute food insecurity. At a time of such dire humanitarian needs, these regulations will impede the capacity of many NGOs to deliver essential goods and services.
Excellencies,
The Rohingya community still remaining in Myanmar, which has already endured decades of persecution, continues to face widespread and systematic discrimination in every area of life.
The necessary conditions for voluntary, safe and dignified returns of refugees to Rakhine State simply do not exist, and the over one million Rohingya who remain in forced exile in Bangladesh and other countries, as well as hundreds of thousands who are internally displaced, face a bleak present, and worse future.
Over the past year, thousands more Rohingya have sought to flee unbearable conditions. At least 3,500 attempted sea crossings in 2022– a 360 percent increase from 2021. At least 348 of them died or went missing at sea. It is a tragedy.
In addition, around 2,000 Rohingya people were arrested in 2022 for so-called “unauthorised travel” within Myanmar.
The urgent goals must be recognition of citizenship, and the exercise of rights associated with it, as well as security – repeatedly requested by the Rohingya as essential to conditions that would be conducive for their return.
In the interim, I appeal to all countries to provide continued robust support to people fleeing Myanmar, and to their host communities in the region, notably in Bangladesh. Host countries really need continued and sustained support.
The terrible fire that raged last night across part of the camps in southern Bangladesh where more than one million Rohingya refugees take shelter underscores the precarity of their position. Recent sharp reductions of food rations in the camps – due to shortfalls in funding – compound their hardship and the general insecurity in these camps.
There needs to be increased international support, as well as the provision of education and livelihood opportunities to the refugees, to uphold their dignity and reduce their dependency. I was moved last month to see the gesture of a number of Rohingya, who have lost everything, but nonetheless providing support to earthquake victims in Türkiye and Syria.
There will be no durable vision for the future without accountability for the cruel violence of the past.
The continuing proceedings before both the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court, with respect to the severe violations of the most basic human rights that have been visited upon the Rohingya as a group, simply for who they are, warrant every support.
Mr. President,
I remain deeply concerned by the prospect of new elections taking place in Myanmar while violence spirals out of control, amid mass displacement, and the arbitrary detention of elected political leaders in February 2021, and thousands of others since then, whose only crime was to oppose the military takeover.
The elections of November 2020 made clear that what the people of the country wanted was to continue the hard-won path of democratic reform. It is critical that the country’s future is decided by a process led by the people of Myanmar.
I call on members of this Council to do their utmost to deliver humanitarian support directly to Myanmar’s people, including by channelling operations through grassroots organisations.
And I call on all United Nations Member States to promote dialogue and sustainable solutions that are representative of the will of the Myanmar people, in order to bring an end to this brutal crisis.
The people of Myanmar deserve a better future.
Thank you..."
Source/publisher:
UN Human Rights Council and UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
Date of publication:
2023-03-06
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-06
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Armed conflict and peace-building in Burma - theoretical, strategic and general, Human Rights and international relations, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
Language:
more
Description:
"Since the military overthrew a democratically elected government in Myanmar in February 2021, the US has been one of the major nations to publicly denounce the coup and consistently urge for the restoration of democracy.
The United States has continued to support democracy by imposing sanctions on 80 persons and 32 entities so far in an effort to deny the regime the resources it needs to carry out its violent policies and to advance the democratic aspirations of Burma’s citizens. The US also declared that it would hold the Burmese military accountable for brutality against the country’s general populace, particularly the Rohingya group.
In addition to bringing a case against Myanmar’s Junta dictatorship before the International Court of Justice under the Genocide Convention, the US also supported a UN General Assembly resolution that would have prohibited the import of guns into Burma. The US Senate’s recent “Burma Act,” which was passed in December of last year, reinforced the US’s support for democratic organizations like NUG and EAOs.
However, since January 2023, a sudden shift in the US policy with regard to Myanmar is been seen.
Japan’s Prime Minister Fumio Kishida said (Feb 22), his government is appropriately handling Japan’s ‘Bago River Bridge Construction Project’ in Myanmar, being built partly by Japanese construction giant ‘Yokogawa Bridge Corp’. Myanmar Now reported that a steel mill owned by the military-owned conglomerate ‘Myanmar Economic Corporation (MEC)’ was supplying steel for the project and profiting enormously. Human Rights Watch says, from July 2022 to January 2023, Yokogawa Bridge Corp. transferred around US$2 million to MEC for the project, with United States government approval. While the US, UK, EU, Canada, and Australia have sanctioned MEC, doing business with MEC is surprising.
Japan, a close ally of the US, has recently been observed to be more engaged in Burma. Yuhei Sasakawa, the chairman of the Nippon Foundation and Japan’s special representative in Myanmar, mediated cease-fire agreements between the Arakan Army and the military Junta in 2019, 2020, and 2022. The successful negotiation of Sasakawa is creating a positive image of Japan to Myanmar’s military, EAOs and NUG. Two of the five stated main goals of the Sasakawa’s Peace Foundation are to strengthen Japan’s friendship with the United States and increasing Japan’s presence in Asia.
Junta boss Min Aung Hlaing handed the ‘Thiri Pyanchi’ titles and decorations for the strenuous cooperation to bring about peace, development and prosperity in Myanmar, to Hideo Watanabe, chairman of the Japan-Myanmar Friendship Association, also represents Japanese investors in Myanmar. Min Aung Hlaing called Watanabe a “good friend” and thanked him for his efforts to “foster ties between the two countries and two armies, and attract Japanese investment into Myanmar”. These explains a lot. The US through its close allay Japan, expanding its diplomatic, strategic and socioeconomic presence in Myanmar.
What changed US policy towards Burma?
So, what made the US change its stance on Myanmar all of a sudden? Is there any vested interest of Washington in the South Asian country? Yes, they are Russia, China and India.
In the wake of the coup and subsequent Western ostracization, the Myanmar junta established good relations with Russia. While Myanmar receives arms, resources and diplomatic backing from Moscow, Russia got another purchaser of its advanced weaponry in the backdrop of the West’s sanctions. Myanmar’s ruler, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, in addition to visiting Russia thrice, also supported Russia’s military operation in Ukraine.
Myanmar is also a buyer of Russian oil and recently signed an agreement with Moscow to explore nuclear energy in the Southeast Asian country. Top Russian Defense Official Seeks Closer Burma Ties. Myanmar was also invited to become a part of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which includes Russia, and India.
Anthony Davis, a British journalist with over four decades of experience covering conflicts in Asia, gave interview in an online video conference on “Military Possibilities 2023 in Myanmar” and Q&A session held for about 150 Myanmar journalists commented that, China remains an exclusive diplomatic relation with the military Junta, EAOs and NUG. Its socio-economic presence in Myanmar is also remarkable. Myanmar is China’s playground. No one including Myanmar Junta, NUG and EAOs dares to mess with China. He also commented that the possibility of a counter-coup in Myanmar is impossible. Because Myanmar army is well-organized and disciplined.
Now, Biden is witnessing that his atrocious plan to destroy the diplomatic, political and economic interests of Myanmar has backfired, as it ended up establishing a strong partnership between Myanmar and US’s chief adversary i.e., Russia and China. Therefore, in order to break the alliance between Moscow and Naypyidaw and counter the influence of Russia in Southeast Asia, the US has now deployed its ally, Japan, to further its agenda. The US cannot directly grant financial aid to Myanmar’s junta because then it will be obvious that Biden is endeavoring to counter the presence of Russia and China in Southeast Asia. So, the US has approached Japan to bribe Myanmar into switching its loyalty to the West.
It must be noted that this is the same US which earlier was preaching about the significance of democracy in Myanmar and pledged that it will prosecute the Burmese military leaders. However, in the face of the diplomatic, economic and political rise of Russia and China with Myanmar, the US has abandoned all principles of morality and is ready to embrace Myanmar’s junta..."
Source/publisher:
Modern Diplomacy
Date of publication:
2023-03-06
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-06
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
more
Description:
"Documented incidents
Reported on 08 February 2023: In Dagon Myothit (South) township, Yangon (East) district and region, a private clinic was forced to close down after junta authorities looked for the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM)-affiliated doctor who ran the clinic. Sources: Delta News Agency and Mekong News
Reported on 08 February 2023: Junta authorities and security forces carried out surprise checks of private hospitals and clinics in Dagon Myothit (North), Hlaingtharya, North Okkalapa, and Shwepyithar townships in Yangon region, Mandalay region and Mon state. Sources: Delta News Agency and Mekong News
10 February 2023: In Chanayethazan township, Mandalay district and region, an IED was thrown at the private Shwe-la-yaung Clinic by two men, damaging the door and two vehicles parked outside the clinic. Source: Eleven Media
11 February 2023: In Myit Chay town, Pakokku township and district, Magway region, the military base at Burma Pharmaceutical Industry (BPI) antivenom production and horse husbandry was attacked by local resistance forces, who torched the buildings including factory buildings, and set the horses free. Sources: Delta News Agency, Mawkun Magazine and Mizzima
13 February 2023: On the Mandalay-Mogoke highway, near Kan Hpyu village, Let Kaung Gyi village tract, Madaya township, Aungmyaythazan district, Mandalay region, an ambulance belonging the LNGO Let Pan Hla that was returning to Let Pan Hla village after taking a pregnant woman to hospital in Mandalay town was shot at 16 times, injuring a male ambulance driver in the right upper arm and damaging the windshields, tyres, and body of the vehicle. Sources: BBC Burmese, Myaelattathan, Radio Free Asia and Telegram
Reported on 14 February 2022: In Inn Gyi village and village tract, Katha township and district,
Sagaing region, the public station hospital (primary-level) was occupied by the Myanmar military.
Source: Kachin News Group
14 February 2022: In Mawt Ka Nin village and village tract, Ye township and district, Mon state, a male pharmacy owner was kidnapped by the Myanmar military. Source: Independent Mon News Agency
Reported on 16 February 2023: In North Okkalapa township, Yangon district and region, the junta authorities demanded the staff list of private hospitals and clinics and repeatedly performed surprise checks in search of CDM-affiliated health workers. Source: Democratic Voice of Burma 16 February 2023: In Tu Ywin Boet village and village tract, Myingyan township, a female midwife and her son were shot dead while at the sub-rural public health centre by five men. The Myanmar military accused the local resistance forces of the attack. Sources: Myaelattathan and Telegram 16 February 2023: In Ka De village and village tract, Palaw township, Myeik district, Tanintharyi region, an ambulance, a monastery, vehicles, and 60 civilian houses were torched by the Myanmar military. Source: Tanintharyi Times
Reported on 16 February 2023: Near Hko Mone village and village tract, Kutkai township and district, Shan state (North), a Kachin Independence Army medic and two KIA fighters were killed during armed clashes between KIA and the Myanmar military. Sources: Myitkyina News Journal and Tanintharyi Times
16 February 2023: Near Sein Pat Lel village, Htan Pin Kone village tract, Okpho township,
Thayarwady district, Bago region, a female CDM-affiliated nurse was kidnapped and shot dead by the Myanmar military. She and her husband were under an arrest warrant after the coup. Her husband was arrested and sentenced to three-year imprisonment. The nurse escaped and subsequently served in the areas controlled by ethnic armed groups but was abducted on 29 January 2023 while she was on her way back to the town, accompanied by two local resistance force members, who were killed during the abduction. On 16 February, she was reportedly brought to the place of abduction, forced to locate the base camps of local resistance forces, and then shot dead. Source: Democratic Voice of Burma
18 February 2023: In Thin Gan Tone village, Pa Kar Ri village tract, Dawei township and district,
Tanintharyi region, a sub-rural health centre (public, primary-level) and civilian houses were torched by the Myanmar military. Source: Dawei Watch
19 February 2023: In Nwe Inn village, Chin Pyit village tract, Pale township, Yinmabin district,
Sagaing region, the sub-rural health centre (public, primary-level) was torched by the Myanmar military. Sources: Burma Human Rights Network and Khit Thit Media..."
Source/publisher:
Insecurity Insight (Geneva) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of publication:
2023-02-21
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-04
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
457.28 KB
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Description:
"This regular update, covering humanitarian developments up to 27 February, is produced by OCHA Myanmar in collaboration with the Inter-Cluster Coordination Group and UN agencies. Response figures are based on self-reporting by organizations to clusters. The next humanitarian update will be issued at the end of March 2023.
HIGHLIGHTS & KEY MESSAGES
• Humanitarian needs are rising across Myanmar and the operational environment is tightening. Martial law is now declared in 47 townships across multiple states and regions.
• Concerns persist around the impact of new registration requirements on humanitarian operations.
• In the first two months of 2023, more than 154,000 people have been internally displaced and are living in precarious conditions in camps and informal sites often in jungles and forests. This brings the total number of IDPs since the military takeover to 1.3 million. As of 27 February, more than 1.6 million remain displaced from previous and current conflicts.
• Heavy fighting continues, particularly in Kachin, the Southeast, and Northwest, endangering lives and hampering humanitarian operations.
• The ceasefire between the Arakan Army (AA) and the Myanmar Armed Forces (MAF) in Rakhine is still holding and the access environment has improved.
• Humanitarians reached a record 4.4 million people with assistance in 2022, however the support was not as deep or multi-sectoral as planned due to access constraints and severe underfunding.
• Some 17.6 million people - nearly one third of the population - are estimated to be in humanitarian need in 2023. The humanitarian community has prioritized support for 4.5 million people with severe needs, predominantly in conflict affected rural areas.
• Generous funding to the US$764m Humanitarian Response Plan for 2023 is critically important to make this work possible.
KEY FIGURES*
1.6M
Total people currently internally displaced across Myanmar
1.3M
People currently displaced by clashes and insecurity since February 2021
328K
People internally displaced due to conflict prior to February 2021, mainly in Rakhine, Kachin, Chin, and Shan
55K
Civilian properties estimated burnt or destroyed since February 2021.
*Displacement figures fluctuate during any given month. These figures represent the number of people currently verified as displaced. Cumulative numbers for returns and displacement are not always available.
SITUATION OVERVIEW
Two months into 2023, reports of civilian casualties, displacement and destruction of civilian properties have continued. As of 27 February 2023, more than 1.6 million remained displaced across the country, according to the latest UN figures. This includes more than 1.3 million people who were displaced since the military takeover and more than 328,000 people who were displaced from previous conflicts. Of the total IDPs since the military takeover, the Northwest is hosting the highest number - now 915,000 people - followed by the Southeast - 379,200 people. IDPs are living in precarious situations in camps and informal sites, often in jungles and forests, with large-scale returns impossible due to the intensity of fighting, landmines, destruction of homes through aerial bombardment, and loss of livelihoods.
Humanitarian partners estimate that 17.6 million people are in need in 2023. The 2023 Humanitarian Response Plan targets 4.5 million people with the most severe needs, predominantly in conflict-affected rural areas. This will require the removal of physical and bureaucratic impediments to humanitarian access and more generous funding than was received last year (41 per cent of requirements in 2022). Two months into 2023, the humanitarian response plan is only two per cent funded. Generous funding for humanitarian interventions this year is critical.
In 2022, humanitarians were able to reach a record 4.4 million people, including 750,00 IDPs, with at least one form of assistance, at least once, however the assistance wasn’t as deep, multi-sectoral or sustained as planned due to underfunding and severe access constraints. This reach includes 900,000 people in the Southeast, more than 660,000 people in Rakhine, more than 500,000 people in the Northeast and almost 270,000 people in the Northwest..."
Source/publisher:
UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (New York) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of publication:
2023-03-04
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-04
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Education in Burma/Myanmar - general, Food Security and nutrition in Burma/Myanmar, Public Health, Human Rights and international relations, UN System humanitarian assistance
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pdf
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