Human Rights and international relations
Individual Documents
Description:
"This regular update, covering non-violent movements, conflict trends, human rights violations, and humanitarian developments up to 28 February is produced by Southern Monitor, a local research group.
HIGHLIGHTS & KEY MESSAGES
On 2 February 2023, the State Administration Council (SAC) declared martial law in Palaw and Tanintharyi townships and increased military presence in the area.
In February 2023, a total of 37 armed clashes erupted across all districts in Tanintharyi Region, showing an increase in armed conflict.
A total of 34 deaths and 10 injured due to attacks targeting civilians were reported in February 2023.
More than 200 civilians’ houses were burned down by junta forces in Palaw township.
The number of non-violent movements in Tanintharyi Region increased as protesters staged “silent strikes” across the region.
Local Karen CSOs urged Karen Nation Union (KNU) and Kaw Thoo Lei Army to cease fighting and resolve the conflict peacefully.
KEY FIGURES
3701
Nonviolent actions mobilized by activist groups between February 2021 and February 2023
998
Violent incidents occurred in the region between February 2021 and February 2023
394
People killed by conflict actors between February 2021 and February 2023
28K
People currently displaced by clashes and insecurity since February 2021..."
Source/publisher:
Southern Monitor (Myanmar) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of publication:
2023-02-28
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-04
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Education in Burma/Myanmar - general, Food Security and nutrition in Burma/Myanmar, Public Health, Human Rights and international relations
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"JAKARTA — Parliamentarians in Southeast Asia continue to face risk of reprisal simply for exercising their mandate or expressing their political opinions, according to the latest annual Parliamentarians At Risk report from ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights (APHR), launched today in Jakarta.
“The increasing risks, both physical and otherwise, faced by parliamentarians in the region are totally unacceptable and a matter of the utmost concern. Parliamentarians are the representatives of the people and their safety and freedom reflect the health of the democracies in which they work. We call on ASEAN, as well as ASEAN member states, to implement sufficient protections for them and put pressure on those governments that are arbitrarily and unjustly persecuting their lawmakers,” said Mercy Barends,member of the Indonesian House of Representatives and APHR Chair.
The year 2022 saw a worsening trend for parliamentarians at risk in the region, particularly in Myanmar, where MPs face increasing dangers in the aftermath of the 1 February 2021 coup d’état. One lawmaker, Kyaw Myo Min, was tortured to death in detention and a former lawmaker, Phyo Zeya Thaw, was executed together with three political prisoners in Myanmar. The number of parliamentarians detained across Southeast Asia remains high at 85, with 84 in Myanmar and former senator Leila de Lima in the Philippines.
“Even Myanmar MPs who have managed to take refuge in neighboring countries such as Thailand remain in a very precarious situation. Dozens of them are living in towns along the Thai-Myanmar border and find themselves constantly harassed by the police as undocumented migrants, in constant fear of being detained or, even worse, be repatriated to their country, where they would face arrest, likely torture or even worse, at the hands of the junta,” said Charles Santiago, former member of the Malaysian Parliament, and APHR Co-Chair.
Outside of Myanmar, particularly in Cambodia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand, cases of physical attacks remain rare, but governments often resort to politically motivated charges against opposition parliamentarians. Reprisals and threats are not only of a judicial nature. Parliamentarians also face online harassment, and being the victims of both disinformation campaigns as well as hate speech.
In Cambodia, the government of Prime Minister Hun Sen has conducted a series of mass trials and convicted more than 100 members and supporters of the Cambodia National Rescue Party (CNRP), including a number of former lawmakers in absentia. Political persecution and intimidation by the government against members and supporters of the opposition parties, human rights defenders, land rights and environment protection activists, and journalists are expected to continue escalating in the lead up to the next general election, expected to be held in July 2023.
“Hun Sen and his party have been slowly building a one-party dictatorship over the years. The process has been so slow that few have noticed, but the signs are unmistakably clear and have resulted in an almost totalitarian state. The international community must hold Hun Sen’s government to account for its widespread human rights violations and ensure the opposition parties and their candidates are able to contest in the 2023 general election in a free and fair environment with a level playing field before it is too late,” said Kasit Piromya, former Thai Foreign Minister and APHR Board Member.
Meanwhile, in Malaysia and the Philippines, online disinformation and hate speech against MPs continue to be widespread. Opposition parliamentarians in both the Philippines and Thailand also often face judicial harassment through the use of overly broad legislation, while the continued existence of draconian laws such as the Sedition Act and the Communication and Multimedia Act in Malaysia remain a threat that hangs over the heads of potential government critics.
“The use of laws as weapons against politicians is nothing but a perversion of the rule of law, one of the cornerstones of a democracy. In several countries across Southeast Asia, laws and courts are used as instruments of those in power, rather than what they should be: instruments to prevent or stop abuses. It is necessary to hold those governments that abuse their power to account and make them understand that they are not above the law,” said Mu Sochua, former member of parliament from Cambodia and APHR Board Member..."
Source/publisher:
ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights
Date of publication:
2023-03-04
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-04
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Freedom of opinion and expression: - the situation in Burma/Myanmar - reports, analyses, recommendations, Freedom of Opinion and Expression - tools for change in Burma/Myanmar, Human Rights and international relations, Political prisoners and other violations in Burma - reports
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"INTRODUCTION:
This report, prepared by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, describes the overall human rights situation in Myanmar, including that of Rohingya Muslims and other minorities.
The Office does not have access to Myanmar; findings are based on over 96 interviews and meetings with victims, survivors and corroborated by satellite imagery, verified multimedia files, and credible open-source information as well as regular collaboration, data and information exchanges within the UN system. Figures of casualties likely represent an underestimation of the reality on the ground.....
CONTEXT:
Two years after the military coup, people in Myanmar remain exposed to daily human rights violations.
Myanmar’s conflict landscape has changed dramatically, highlighting concerns for the protection of civilians. By late 2021, and throughout 2022, violence intensified especially in the north-west and south-east, deployment of airstrikes and artillery shelling, mass burnings of villages to displace civilian populations, and denial of humanitarian access.
The military also unilaterally adopted rules to decimate anti-coup opposition and to dismantle the expanded civic space that had significantly contributed to Myanmar’s development. with the military employing its “four-cuts” strategy: indiscriminate..."
Source/publisher:
UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of publication:
2023-02-28
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-03
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, UN human rights documents on Myanmar, Human Rights and international relations
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pdf
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2.53 MB
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"GENEVA (3 March 2023) – Myanmar’s military has created a perpetual human rights crisis through the continuous use of violence, including the killing, arbitrary arrest, torture and enforced disappearance of anti-coup opponents, a report published by the UN Human Rights Office said today.
“Two years after the military launched a coup, the generals have embarked on a scorched earth policy in an attempt to stamp out opposition,” the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Volker Türk, said.
“Tragically, regional and global efforts for peace and restraint have largely fallen on deaf ears. The military, emboldened by continuous and absolute impunity, has consistently shown disregard for international obligations and principles. Urgent, concrete action is needed to end this festering catastrophe.”
The report echoed calls by the Security Council and ASEAN for, among other things, an immediate halt to the violence, the release of all those arbitrarily detained, accountability, and unhindered humanitarian access.
The report documents a litany of human rights abuses from 1 February 2022 to 31 January 2023, accompanied by a sharp rise in violence especially in the north-western and south-eastern parts of Myanmar.
It cites credible sources as having verified the deaths of at least 2,940, and 17,572 arrests by the military and its affiliates since the coup. Nearly 80 per cent of the country’s 330 townships have been impacted by armed clashes.
The military employs its so-called four-cuts approach - including through indiscriminate airstrikes and artillery shelling, razing villages to displace civilian populations, and denial of humanitarian access - to cut off non-State organized armed groups and other anti-military armed elements from access to food, finances, intelligence and recruits.
Among the numerous incidents of airstrikes, on 16 September - in Let Yet Kone village, Tabayin Township, Sagaing - four helicopters opened fire on a school killing at least six children and injuring nine others. After some 60 soldiers deployed from helicopters to the ground, they reportedly raided the village, executing a school technician and five villagers before arresting wounded children and teachers.
In another incident, on 20 October, an airstrike against a newly opened hospital in Man Yu Gyi village, Banmauk Township, Sagaing, killed one woman and injured five others. A source reported that the hospital had been inaugurated a day earlier and victims were all volunteers at the facility.
One of the most frequently used tactics by the military is the systematic and widespread burning of villages and dwellings. Consistent with their modus operandi documented over decades, including in Kachin in 2011 and Rakhine in 2017, UN reports indicated that nearly 39,000 houses nationwide have been burnt or destroyed in military operations since February 2022, representing a more than 1,000-fold increase compared to 2021.
Sagaing was the most affected region, accounting for over 25,500 homes. In an incident on 1 May 2022 in Ah Shey See, Kale Township, Sagaing, satellite images suggest the burning of almost the entire village with 621 structures destroyed. Satellite imagery coupled with interview reports suggest that between 16 and 28 September in Taze Township, Sagaing, the military destroyed 458 houses and damaged another 319 across eight villages during a series of raids and attacks.
The military’s mismanagement of the economy has provoked an economic crisis for much of the population, resulting in the doubling of poverty rates compared to March 2020. Nearly half of the population now lives in poverty, and rural populations are reported to be at risk of starvation as the military imposes further restrictions on access to areas affected by violence and conflict. Compounding the situation, main supply routes and waterways across the country have been blocked, preventing humanitarian actors from reaching 17.6 million people in need.
“The military has also adopted rules, including martial law, intended to target anti-coup opposition and severely restrict the civic space that had significantly contributed to Myanmar’s democratic transition,” Türk said.
“Across Myanmar, people are continuously exposed to violations and crimes, including killings, enforced disappearances, displacement, torture, arbitrary arrests, and sexual violence. There are reasonable grounds to believe that the military and its affiliated militias continue to be responsible for most violations, some of which may constitute crimes against humanity and war crimes,” the UN Human Rights Chief said..."
Source/publisher:
UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of publication:
2023-03-03
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-03
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, UN human rights documents on Myanmar, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Human Rights and international relations
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Description:
"Human Rights Council
Fifty-second session 27 February–31 March 2023
Agenda items 2 and 4
Annual report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
Human rights situations that require the Council’s attention
Summary
Prepared pursuant to Human Rights Council resolution 47/1, this report identifies trends and patterns of human rights violations that occurred in Myanmar between 1 February 2022 and 31 January 2023. Two years after launching a coup, the military has brought the country into a perpetual human rights crisis through continuous use of violence, including killing, arbitrarily arresting, torturing, forcibly disappearing, prosecuting, and sentencing anti-coup opponents. Urgent, concrete actions are needed to ensure that all people in Myanmar enjoy their fundamental rights and freedoms. Recommendations are made to all parties, including military authorities, the ‘National Unity Government’, and the international community.
Introduction and methodology
In resolution 47/1, the Human Rights Council requested the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to monitor and follow up on the implementation of the recommendations made by the independent international fact-finding mission, including those on accountability, and to continue to track progress in the situation of human rights in Myanmar, including of Rohingya Muslims and other minorities, with the support of specialist experts and in complementarity to the work of the Independent Mechanism for Myanmar and reports of the Special Rapporteur and to present…a written report at its 52nd session.
This report covers human rights concerns documented by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) between 1 February 2022 and 31 January 2023 analyzing verified patterns of human rights violations and of international crimes committed by the Myanmar military and other groups. It highlights relevant trends and patterns in respect of violations of international human rights, humanitarian, and criminal law.
OHCHR collected testimonies and information from primary sources, including victims, survivors, witnesses, and satellite images, and verifiable secondary sources – all of which underwent a credibility assessment in accordance with OHCHR’s standard methodology. Without access to Myanmar, OHCHR conducted its documentation activities remotely. A total of 96 interviews were conducted with on-the-ground sources despite significant challenges, including long-term, localized internet shutdowns. OHCHR organized formal and informal consultations with civil society and non-governmental organizations, thematic experts, and other relevant interlocutors. This report also reflects regular collaboration, data and information exchanges within the United Nations (UN) system. OHCHR submitted questionnaires to the Myanmar military authorities and the ‘National Unity Government’; their responses are explicitly referenced in the report.
Given the continuous protection and personal safety risks people in Myanmar face daily, OHCHR has prioritized the safety of interlocutors above all other considerations. Factual determinations of incidents and patterns were made where there were reasonable grounds to believe that relevant incidents had occurred. Figures of casualties likely represent an underestimation of realities on the ground..."
Source/publisher:
United Nations Human Rights Council (Geneva)
Date of publication:
2023-02-24
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-03
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
UN human rights documents on Myanmar, Reports on sessions of the Commission on Human Rights, The UN and Burma - news and commentary, Human Rights and international relations
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"JAKARTA – Dozens of parliamentarians from several Southeast Asian countries urged the ASEAN and the international community at large to take swift and concrete action against the illegal military junta led by Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, and provide real assistance to the pro-democracy forces in Myanmar, following a roundtable discussion on the Myanmar crisis held today in Jakarta.
The discussion, which was part of ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights’ (APHR) annual members’ forum, was held at the Indonesian House of Representatives and included parliamentarians and civil society organizations from Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Timor-Leste and Myanmar itself.
“The crisis in Myanmar is causing a humanitarian catastrophe of gigantic proportions. The junta’s atrocities have displaced hundreds of thousands from their homes. Adding to previous displacements before the coup, the number of internally displaced persons in Myanmar now stands at more than a record 1.3 million. The sole responsible for this disaster is the junta led by Min Aung Hlaing, and it is high time that ASEAN stop treating it with kid gloves. Strong pressure to isolate the Myanmar military is more imperative and urgent than ever,” said Mercy Barends, member of the Indonesian House of Representatives and APHR Chair.
According to the local organization Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP), over 16,000 political prisoners are currently jailed in abysmal conditions, and at least 3,075 people have been killed by the military since the coup, although AAPP believes that the number is likely many times higher.
These conditions also extend to parliamentarians in the country. According to APHR monitoring, 84 members of the national and sub-national parliaments remain in detention, facing not only the risk of torture in prison but also possible risk of execution following the executions of four pro-democracy activists, including former lawmaker Phyo Zeya Thaw. Most ousted parliamentarians continue their work in hiding and are at risk of detention or even death. Some have had their family members harassed and their properties seized by the junta.
“What is happening in Myanmar is an affront to humanity and we, as fellow humans, should take it seriously and not stand idly as the military continues to violate the human rights of the Myanmar people. We, Parliamentarians across Southeast Asia must work together in putting the country back into a path towards democracy. One of the first steps is to recognize the National Unity Government and the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH) as the legitimately elected representatives of the people of Myanmar and involve them in any future negotiations,” said António de Sá Benevides, member of Parliament of Timor Leste and APHR Member.
The International Parliamentary Inquiry (IPI) into the global response to the crisis in Myanmar, which was organized by APHR in 2022, found that the global community has largely failed to provide the help that the people of Myanmar sorely need. ASEAN and the international community at large have hidden behind the Five Point Consensus, which the Myanmar junta has continually and blatantly flouted.
“As Chair of ASEAN this year, the biggest and most democratic country in the region, Indonesia has a duty to step up and tell the generals in Naypyidaw that enough is enough. After the failed approach of Cambodia last year, appeasing the generals and ignoring the pro-democracy movement, Jakarta should put significant pressure on the Myanmar military, and support the pro-democracy forces led by the NUG, if it is serious about solving the crisis,” said Charles Santiago, former member of the Malaysian Parliament, and APHR Co-Chair..."
Source/publisher:
ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights
Date of publication:
2023-03-03
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-03
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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143.63 KB
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"Two years after the coup in Myanmar, the recently passed BURMA Act provides new gateways for aid towards Myanmar. Now the US administration must find creative ways to implement them in line with USAID’s new localisation agenda.
March 3, 2023
Dewi
February 1st marked two years since Myanmar’s devastating military coup. Thanks to the Burmese people’s heroic resistance, the junta has lost control over more than half of the country, but has retaliated with a scorched earth campaign of indiscriminate massacres and airstrikes. Myanmar faces a humanitarian crisis – an estimated 18 million people need urgent assistance. Like democracy activists, aid workers are in the military’s crosshairs. The military is blocking sources of aid to suffocate opposition, requiring that the aid agencies work through them, and restricting access to the local population. Networks crossing Myanmar’s borders – outside the regime’s control – offer the most readily available path to alleviating escalating humanitarian suffering.
What is happening in Myanmar
Myanmar’s humanitarian crisis is most dire along its borders. There are over 1.5 million internally displaced people (IDPs) and 72,000 refugees in neighbouring countries. They struggle to receive assistance due to the junta’s aid blockades and lack of formal aid distribution programmes. This crisis is intensified because Thailand, India and Bangladesh continue to restrict cross-border aid. Myanmar’s military, a most unreliable ‘partner’, demands international assistance flow through it, which it inevitably steals or misuses. The military has proven it is an illegitimate actor through ceaseless repression of the Burmese people, genocide of Rohingya and an obstinate refusal to share power. Engaging with the military only invites more death, destruction and instability. Cross-border assistance would reach those desperately in need along Myanmar’s borders without allowing the junta to block or abuse aid delivery.
History of cross-border aid in Myanmar
Neither delivery of cross-border aid nor collaboration with non-state actors on the ground are new to Myanmar. After the military seized power in 1988 and until a partial opening up in 2010, Myanmar was a totalitarian regime. Indigenous community networks across Myanmar’s porous 1,500-mile border provided numerous entry points for informal aid delivery. Funds, technical assistance and supplies flowed across the border with the support of non-state and local civil society that often involved Ethnic Resistance Organisations (EROs). International donors and aid organisations operated, mostly in neighbouring Thailand, to provide assistance without endorsing the regime, and instead built lasting relationships with a range of local actors including community members, EROs and civil society.
Cross-border assistance works
A sterling example of cross-border aid is the Mae Tao Clinic in Mae Sot on the Thailand–Myanmar border. For 30 years, Dr Cynthia Maung and her team have made healthcare accessible to refugees and IDPs amidst the war across the border, treating malaria and diarrhoea, as well as gunshot and landmine injuries. Initiatives like this take advantage of the border rather than operating outside it. One of the clinic’s success stories is the Back Pack Health Worker Team that builds grassroots healthcare knowledge and capability by sending mobile medical teams to conflict areas of Myanmar out of reach of international humanitarian organisations. Ethnic community-based initiatives have also been providing essential services for decades, including health and education to populations in ERO-administered regions, as well as those in refugee camps along the Thailand–Myanmar borders. For example, the Karen National Union’s Karen Education and Culture Department is serving more than 90,000 students across more than 1,000 schools, filling the necessary gap of education provision during times of conflict and when the state education system is hardly operational. Investing in local capacity ensures inclusive and sustainable impacts that help end reliance on the illegitimate military regime for access to aid.
The door for USAID’s localisation agenda is open
The need for cross-border humanitarian assistance is growing along with the military’s atrocities and criminal mismanagement of Myanmar’s economy and social services. Current cross-border assistance, in spite of the heroic efforts of Dr Cynthia Maung and others, is not adequate or sustainable in the face of compounding humanitarian crises. The key is ‘localisation’ of aid – humanitarian agencies and institutional donors must directly fund local groups doing life-saving work.
The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has pledged to localise aid and has established relationships with neighbouring governments with formal aid networks and resources. This empowers local actors to set agendas, develop solutions, and strengthen and deploy capacity, leadership and resources. USAID can help partner countries meet their own development and humanitarian assistance challenges – saving the lives of vulnerable IDPs and refugees – while also ensuring that taxpayer investments produce sustainable, long-term development outcomes, not only in Myanmar but around the world.
USAID Administrator Samantha Power is determined to achieve localisation: ‘Shifting to a model of locally-led development means ceding power over decision making to those who know their problems best.’ For Administrator Power, localisation means sending a larger portion of development and humanitarian assistance directly to local civil society supported by and accountable to local communities. She vowed that 25% of USAID direct funding will go to local entities in the next three years – up from 6.2% in 2021 – and that half of USAID projects over the next 10 years will empower local partners to co-design projects, set priorities, lead implementation and evaluate the impact of aid.
How localisation of assistance will save lives in Myanmar
Local humanitarian actors, being closest to the people, are best at fundraising, mobilising with appropriate caution and channelling assistance into Myanmar through well-established networks that have been built over the years of resistance before the coup. Their efforts – and shared commitment to toppling the regime – build a foundation of trust for more effective assistance. Supporting these humanitarian networks ramps up existing local humanitarian efforts on the borders of Myanmar to not only save lives but prepare citizens to effectively contribute in building a future democratic Myanmar.
Myanmar’s neighbours can and must do more
International donors must step up engagement with the National Unity Government – the rightful opposition and democratic government of Myanmar – and the humanitarian wings of EROs committed to overthrowing the regime. Increased engagement by the US and like-minded countries with Thailand, India and Bangladesh, along with donor support for the already active local networks, could enable aid to reach tens if not hundreds of thousands more people desperately in need. Myanmar’s neighbours should work with local actors and the humanitarian and health agencies of EROs to facilitate aid to areas accessible across borders. EROs and the civil society organisations along the borders are ready and willing implementation partners. Donor governments and international agencies seeking to alleviate suffering and spiralling instability in Myanmar must remind Thailand, India and Bangladesh that it is in their interest to provide support to local actors already providing life-saving aid.
The BURMA Act and the way forward
President Biden’s signing of the BURMA Act on 23 December 2022 marked a new era and opportunity for assistance to Myanmar. The bill authorises the type of localised, cross-border aid that is urgently needed. It is now up to Congress to properly fund it and USAID and its partners to implement it. Myanmar’s democratic forces have made tremendous progress on a self-financed, shoestring budget. The people’s will is undeniable. The military ‘controls less than a quarter of Myanmar’s territory’. Not only is the military losing, it cannot win. With a small investment, the US can change the course of Myanmar. With the support of funding from the BURMA Act, a whole network of clinics, like Dr Cynthia Maung’s, as well as schools administered by EROs or institutes of higher education like Spring University Myanmar, could not only help address a humanitarian crisis, but could also help the Burmese people realise their dream of a stable and democratic Myanmar..."
Source/publisher:
ODI - Humanitarian Practice Network
Date of publication:
2023-03-03
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-03
Grouping:
Individual Documents
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"Aviation fuel shipments to Myanmar have continued despite the military’s ongoing war crimes, Amnesty International and Global Witness said today, after they identified more companies involved in the supply chain.
“We have traced new shipments of aviation fuel that have likely ended up in the hands of Myanmar’s military, which has consistently conducted unlawful air strikes. These attacks regularly kill civilians, including children, yet planes can only take off if they have fuel,” said Montse Ferrer, Amnesty International’s Researcher and Advisor on Business and Human Rights.
“Since the military’s coup in 2021, it has brutally suppressed its critics and attacked civilians from the ground and the air. Supplies of aviation fuel reaching the military enable these war crimes. These shipments must stop now.”
Hanna Hindstrom, Senior Investigator at Global Witness, which helped conduct the research, said: “We urge anyone involved in this trade to put people before profits and to cease supplying the fuel that facilitates these atrocities. We call on more states to enact or reinforce controls to prevent these supplies.”
Montse Ferrer said: “It is troubling that the Swiss-registered multinational fuel company Puma Energy, which committed to withdraw from Myanmar in October 2022, decided to sell its aviation fuel assets to a Myanmar business group which has imported fuel for the military.”
Deadly Cargo – Companies fuelling Myanmar’s military
On 3 November 2022, Amnesty International published Deadly Cargo, a report on the country’s aviation fuel supply chain that links national, regional and global companies to the Myanmar military.
Amnesty International, Global Witness and Burma Campaign UK have now identified other companies involved in aviation fuel transactions, which are likely to have reached the military in recent months.
One shipment involved the oil tanker Prime V, which sailed from Sikka in India on 28 November 2022. On or about 10 December, Prime V offloaded Jet A-1 grade aviation fuel at the former Puma Energy Aviation Sun Co. Ltd. (PEAS) terminal in the port of Thilawa in Myanmar.
One of the companies involved in this transaction is Reliance Industries Ltd of India, which owns the terminal from which Prime V departed. Sea Trade Marine, a Greek company, is the beneficial owner of Prime V, while Japan’s P&I Club provided the protection and indemnity (P&I) insurance. Amnesty International contacted the companies, yet only Japan P&I Club responded, saying that it complied with applicable sanctions at the time, and that its insurance cover may be terminated if a vessel is involved in illegal activity. There is no suggestion that the Prime V broke applicable laws in this delivery.
Details of an October shipment have also been obtained recently, showing that the tanker Big Sea 104 left the Bangchak Oil Refinery in Bangkok Port in Thailand on or about 8 October 2022.It arrived at Thilawa about a week later and offloaded 12,592 tonnes of Jet A-1, according to data from Kpler, a commodities information company, at the former PEAS terminal.
The refinery from which the ship departed is owned by publicly listed Thai company Bangchak Corporation Plc. Prima Marine Plc, another Thai company, is the beneficial owner of Big Sea 104, while Luxembourg-based The Shipowners’ P&I Club provided the insurance. None of these companies responded to Amnesty International’s letters.
“Each of these companies played a role in ensuring the Myanmar military continues to have access to aviation fuel to conduct unlawful air strikes. This has to end. All companies should stop their involvement in the aviation fuel supply chain to Myanmar,” said Montse Ferrer.
Sale of Puma Energy assets in Myanmar raises human rights concerns
At the time these two shipments arrived, the port terminal was controlled by the Myanmar subsidiary of Swiss and Singapore-based Puma Energy. In October 2022, Puma Energy said it was withdrawing from Myanmar after selling its assets to what it called a “locally owned private company” from which it claimed to have obtained undertakings to comply with “Human Rights laws” and not use assets to commit human rights violations.
Amnesty International has established that this buyer is Shoon Energy, formerly called Asia Sun Aviation, and that the sale was completed in December 2022.
Shoon Energy is part of a Myanmar business conglomerate, called Asia Sun, which imported aviation fuel on behalf of the military and distributed it to air bases. Following Puma Energy’s departure, this conglomerate now manages the main aviation fuel terminal in Thilawa port, Yangon, and, jointly with military-controlled Myanmar Petroleum Products Enterprise, the import and distribution of aviation fuel across the country.
Last month the UK and EU imposed sanctions on individuals and companies behind the Asia Sun group for their ties to the provision of aviation fuel to the Myanmar air force. Ahead of these sanctions, however, the Asia Sun conglomerate changed several of its companies’ names to Shoon Energy.
Montse Ferrer said: “Puma Energy has stated that the buyer of its Myanmar assets has undertaken to ‘comply with Human Rights law’. However, given the close relationship between Shoon Energy and the Myanmar military we are concerned this assurance is essentially meaningless.”
International community must act
Since companies continue to export aviation fuel to Myanmar, even while knowing the role that it plays in enabling war crimes being committed by the military, the international community must act.
Amnesty International and Global Witness have previously laid out a path forward: countries should suspend the export and transport of aviation fuel to Myanmar. Importantly, they should also suspend the provision of third-party services such as insurance, shipping or financial services to vessels involved in the shipment of aviation fuel to Myanmar.
Hanna Hindstrom said: “The international community has the tools in place to enact these restrictions. We should do what is in our power to reduce the Myanmar military’s capacity for terrorizing civilians.”
Background
According to the Myanmar Institute for Peace and Security, the military conducted 104 air strikes in 2021, and 243 in 2022.
On 1 February 2023, the second anniversary of the military coup in Myanmar, Canada and the UK announced measures to prevent aviation fuel from reaching the military, including targeted sanctions on Myanmar companies and individuals. On 20 February 2023 the EU sanctioned Asia Sun group and associated entities Asia Sun Trading and Asia Sun Energy.
In response to Amnesty International’s investigations for Deadly Cargo, the global shipping company Wilhelmsen said it would cease providing shipping services to any vessel transporting aviation fuel to Myanmar.
Korean Pan Ocean has also stated it would no longer allow its vessels to transport aviation fuel to Myanmar, and Thai Oil said it would put on hold any shipments of aviation fuel to Myanmar..."
Source/publisher:
"Amnesty International" (UK)
Date of publication:
2023-03-01
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-01
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Crimes Against Humanity, Amnesty International reports on Burma/Myanmar, Human Rights and international relations
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Sub-title:
Meetings Present Opportunities on Economic Issues, Afghanistan, Myanmar
Description:
"Foreign ministers of Group of Twenty (G20) countries are meeting in New Delhi on March 1-3. US-China tensions and Russia’s war in Ukraine loom large over the meetings, which will be attended by Russia Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, China Foreign Minister Qin Gang, and United States Secretary of State Antony Blinken. Given the highly charged backdrop, are agreements on any issue even possible?
At first glance, you might think not. Governments don’t often agree to statements critical of their own records, so the G20, in adopting any joint communiques, will be silent on many vital issues, including Russia’s war crimes in Ukraine, China’s crimes against humanity in Xingang, Saudi Arabia’s abuses in Yemen, or the US government’s own record on racial justice and immigrants’ rights.
The same goes for India. While visiting democratic leaders may privately raise concerns about India’s steeply worsening human rights record, few will publicly shame their host.
However, some possibilities remain. The G20 has several areas of potential agreement, including measures to address global food security, climate change, and the plight of countries struggling with unmanageable debt or debt defaults.
It’s also conceivable, though admittedly unlikely, that G20 members could agree on stronger measures against Myanmar’s military junta, whose widespread abuses have plunged it into diplomatic isolation.
Another conceivable area of agreement is Afghanistan. After all, international reactions to the Taliban’s increasingly harsh restrictions on women’s rights have been unanimously condemnatory.
The Taliban literally have no defenders on this topic. Saudi Arabia, Iran, and the rest of the 57-nation Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and its International Islamic Fiqh Academy have criticized or expressed concerns, as have almost every member of the G20 – including Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and South Africa – and 12 of 15 members of the United Nations Security Council.
Even Russia and China have agreed to statements criticizing Taliban restrictions on women’s education; both have privately raised concerns with Taliban leaders and neither opposed a strong group statement by Security Council members in December 2022. Probably no country since apartheid South Africa in the 1980s has been more diplomatically isolated on a major human rights issue. This is a stunning level of unanimity in today’s polarized world. But any hope for significant changes in the Taliban’s position will necessitate maintaining it. G20 countries should work to reach a common position condemning the Taliban’s decisions and urging them to reverse course..."
Source/publisher:
"Human Rights Watch" (USA)
Date of publication:
2023-02-28
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-28
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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Description:
"It was a fraught, reluctant, but urgent and necessary operation. We could rightly call it an “escape mission”.
It was not the first time I had been forced to flee my home country to avoid political persecution—that occurred in 2000, a year after I was freed from the previous military regime’s gulag. Twenty-two years later, I found myself with no choice but to make my escape once again, for the same reason.
It was this month last year—Feb. 23, 2022 to be precise—exactly one year and 23 days after the military seized power, overthrowing an elected government and launching its reign of terror over a population that now lives in fear of arrest, torture and death at the hands of the regime. Its endless violent crackdown on dissent has forced countless anti-coup protesters, students, politicians, artists and members of various professions, including journalists, to flee the country.
A few hours before sunrise on that day in Yangon, Myanmar’s biggest city, a colleague and I headed for a previously arranged location where an unknown driver would be waiting for us. Minutes later, two more colleagues joined us, and the young but calm driver wordlessly drove his old van into the darkness. His assignment was to take us to a remote border town; our mission was to flee our country.
It was something we hated to do.
In the van, it was still too dark to see each other, and we traveled in silence. But I could feel that all of the passengers were overwhelmed with worry and sorrow. For them, it must have been an unfamiliar feeling, as it was the first time they had undertaken such a journey. As for the driver, he must have had concerns of his own: Though he didn’t know we were journalists, he knew he was transporting “fugitives” fleeing the junta’s arbitrary persecution.
Fear of being detained by junta security forces before reaching our destination mingled with the sorrow of leaving our homes and loved ones behind, along with everything that we held dear, or that was simply familiar: a cracked or stained coffee mug; an old dining table around which family members would sit to eat every meal; a stained wall, empty, or perhaps with a tilted painting or yellowing, framed family photograph hung on it; the smell of one’s bed; the stuffy air in one’s rooms or the way sunlight shines through a particular window; a beloved pet; even the everyday noises of the neighborhood—and too many more to name. Nothing can replace such things, nothing feels more valuable or beautiful once taken away. Together, such things, I believe, add up to what we think of as “home”. Without them, there is no home, just a building. Their absence creates a powerful nostalgia for home.
Yes, leaving home was something we all hated to do. But we had to do it to survive.
Three days earlier, junta troops had arrested one of our admin staff who knew the home addresses of all of The Irrawaddy’s employees, including the editors and reporters. He was forced to show the authorities where we lived, making it necessary for us to leave our homes immediately. The group of us in the van were one of the last groups from our publication to leave the country.
After the junta’s ruthless and bloody crackdown on nationwide peaceful anti-coup protests in the early months of 2021, following the coup on Feb. 1, tens of thousands of people fled their homes and many of them left the country. Among them were many dozens of journalists.
As it confronts the sheer scale of the anti-regime movement, the military regime has identified as one of its main enemies the news media, in particular the journalists whose work daily exposes the true colors of the coup leaders—their cruel, inhumane and immoral acts against the entire population. Their work has made the media an enemy of the regime. Myanmar was the world’s third-worst jailer of journalists, with at least 42 journalists behind bars, at the time of the Committee to Protect Journalists’ Dec. 1, 2022 prison census.
In those early days I made the risky—some of my friends said daring—decision to stay inside the country to continue to work as an editor for The Irrawaddy, which by this time had been charged under various repressive laws. I thought I would be able to hide, periodically shifting locations, while continuing to work. In early March, one month after the coup, I went into hiding. This life of concealment and disguising myself in public was manageable for a year, but eventually, moving from one hiding place to another became untenable due to the junta’s oppressive laws, such as the mandatory guest and household registrations, not to mention its manhunt operations targeting us. Friends who offered to hide me at their places became concerned for their own safety, as they were helping a “fugitive journalist”.
With the security situation deteriorating, the arrest of our staff member forced me and my colleagues to make the difficult decision to flee the country. It was an unwanted outcome but the only practical one if we were to survive.
Our car had to stop at every one of the many security checkpoints we encountered throughout the trip. The driver, however, was prepared, and knew how to deal with police and military personnel: He slipped a roll of cash into the palm of the security guard at every checkpoint. He had prepared many rolls of cash ahead of time; his method worked—we were never seriously asked to identify ourselves.
We fled because it’s simply not worth getting arrested, tortured and given lengthy prison sentences, if not killed, for doing the work that is our calling—our work with the pen, with words. No citizen of my country deserves to live and work under this brutal junta and its generals, or any kind of dictatorship or authoritarianism. Our country has endured six decades of this. That should be enough, but it has yet to end. Of course, no one deserves such ruthless rulers; the Ukrainians don’t deserve Vladimir Putin’s invasion and war, either.
I endured plenty of what I didn’t deserve—to understate matters—under the previous regime. As a 19-year-old student, I was handed a 10-year prison sentence for my peaceful anti-regime activities, including publishing a pro-democracy journal, after the 1988 pro-democracy uprising. I managed to survive that harsh eight-year incarceration in two notorious prisons. For what? To carry on what I started—my own revolution against authoritarianism and military dictatorship.
In 2000, one year after my release, I fled my country for the first time, vowing not to be jailed again. In the 13 years of exile that followed, I worked as a journalist, dedicating myself to exposing the real nature of Myanmar’s cruel, greedy generals and other powerful figures. I survived exile, just as I had survived prison. For what? To tell stories: Not only horrific stories of the regime’s inhumanity, but also stories of the resilience of the Myanmar people. To share them with those citizens of our world lucky enough to be spared such experiences, as well as for the future generations, for whom our stories contain valuable lessons of survival.
In the days following the coup in 2021, my friends urged me to leave the country immediately. They said it wasn’t worth it, risking another lengthy imprisonment. But I was stubborn, determined to continue my work from hiding. Why? Because I wanted to share with the world the stories of our people who were suffering and fighting against the brutal regime—I wanted to tell these stories from the ground.
Now, though, having been forced from my country for a second time, I have come to believe that the decision to leave was the correct one—that I need to survive this time, too. The reason is the same: to be able to tell the stories of our terrible, all too “interesting”, times—starting with my own experiences of life under the dictatorship.
After a 12-hour drive, we arrived at a town on the Thai border. The driver took us to a meeting point where a four-wheeled pickup waited for us. The drivers greeted each other familiarly; they seemed to have conducted many such missions since the coup. We moved straight from the van into the second vehicle, a four-wheeled pickup, which set off after a brief exchange of words between the two drivers. Our new driver was actually an officer from an ethnic rebel group. While driving through rebel-held territory he told us that, due to the heightened security situation along the border, his group had stopped smuggling people out of the country. He had made an exception in our case, however, as he had been told that our group was very important. He said: “You are VIPs. That’s why.” I am sure many “VIPs” preceded us in this journey. We thanked him.
A couple of hours later, we reached our destination. All things considered, it was a relatively quick and safe experience. Some of our colleagues weren’t so lucky. Traveling with a baby they endured a horrific, two-day-long ordeal on a different route, though they eventually made it out too.
Our mission was to escape from the hell of military rule.
Mission accomplished. We survived.
But escaping the junta’s persecution was just our first mission. As journalists, our new and greater mission is to continue to report and write about what’s going on in our country under the ruthless military regime, and to explain the larger truths beyond the headlines, both to our own citizens and the world.
The morning after our arrival, all of us did exactly what we had been doing in hiding for the past year: We turned on our laptops. This is the job we have been doing for many years. The difference is that we are no longer in our homes, or in our country. To be suddenly wrenched away from our homes, our loved ones and our cherished belongings leaves one vulnerable to nostalgia. But in nostalgia, along with the slight sadness, there is a positive side, something I remember feeling in my first exiled life: a positive, even pleasurable energy with the power to motivate someone who has been forced from their home to strive to find a way to return.
For me, it’s the beginning of my second life in exile. The first kept me from home for 13 years. For my colleagues, it’s the beginning of their first such life. The bitter truth is that nobody knows how long it will take this time, either. Well… it should no longer matter to me. I am what I am, as I chose who I am. I am sure this rings true for my dedicated colleagues, other journalists and the countless resolute citizens of our country who have been forced to leave their homes for acting in the service of their country.
At the very least, we all need to survive to see the fall of the dictatorship.
That still greater mission remains unaccomplished…"
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2023-02-28
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-28
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
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Description:
"1.As more than two years have passed since the coup d'état on February 1, 2021, various parts of the country are still experiencing violence. As a result, the humanitarian situation in Myanmar continues to deteriorate further. According to the Humanitarian Response Plan for Myanmar announced by the United Nations on January 25, 17.6 million people, including internally displaced persons, are in need of humanitarian assistance.
2.Under these circumstances, the Government of Japan has provided a total of more than US$47 million in humanitarian assistance since the coup d'état, through international organizations and NGOs etc., directly benefiting the people of Myanmar.
3.In response to the rapid increase of the need of humanitarian assistance due to deteriorating situation since last year, the Government of Japan has decided to provide additional humanitarian assistance totaling approximately US$60.3 million (approximately 7 billion 77.7 million yen). Specifically, through international organizations such as UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP and AHA Centre, the Government of Japan will provide food, medical items and shelters as well as water and sanitation infrastructure, nutrition improvement, medical services, access to education, and measures to combat illegal drugs.
4.The Government of Japan will continue to actively provide humanitarian assistance, while urging the Myanmar side to allow safe and unhindered humanitarian access..."
Source/publisher:
Government of Japan
Date of publication:
2023-02-28
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-28
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Education in Burma/Myanmar - general, Food Security and nutrition in Burma/Myanmar, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
more
Description:
"February 2023 marks the second anniversary of the military coup in Myanmar that ousted its civilian government and cracked down on democratic protests. Lin Htet Myat, a political analyst from Myanmar, assesses the grim situation in the country and offers new approaches that both the international community and the Burmese anti-junta forces should take to facilitate the restoration of democracy. The author argues that the international community must not engage the junta to seek for a peaceful resolution, and instead strengthen material support and communication with anti-junta forces within Myanmar. Meanwhile, Burmese democratic resistance forces should bolster military cooperation among like-minded groups and build trust in preparation for a federal democratic Myanmar.
Two years have passed since the Myanmar’s junta (State Administration Council (SAC)) toppled its civilian government in a coup; however, the resistance movement has not lost its momentum. In light of the second anniversary of the Spring Revolution, pro-democracy activists in Myanmar have recently held a nationwide “silent strike,” rejecting any form of oppressive and predatory military rule.
Meanwhile, the coup leader Senior General Min Aung Hlaing displays no intent to relinquish his power through negotiation. The current military regime has accepted neither the conditions outlined in the speech by the Acting President of the National Unity Government nor the ASEAN’s ‘5-Point Consensus’ (Mcpherson 2022). While the ASEAN has been attempting to appease the SAC, this controversial effort has a bleak outlook. Min Aung Hlaing seeks for a total victory, which resembles the goal of Bashar al-Assad’s Syrian regime.
In such context, unless the international community changes its approach to the crisis, Myanmar will inevitably face protracted stalemate and civil war creating millions of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs). According to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), approximately 1.5 million people have been internally displaced; 39,000 civilian properties have been destroyed; and one-third of the population is in need of critical humanitarian assistance (UNOCHA 2023). Moreover, the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP) reports that nearly 3,000 people, including pro-democracy activists and civilians, have been killed by the junta, while more than 13,000 remain imprisoned.
Call for A New Approach by the International Community
In order to restore democracy in Myanmar, the following actions are suggested:
1. The international community, particularly neighboring countries and the ASEAN, must jettison the “inclusive national dialogue” that engages Min Aung Hlaing and his junta to resolve the Myanmar crisis.
Min Aung Hlaing and his military loyalists are the main culprits of all crimes against humanity committed in Myanmar. In other words, Min Aung Hlaing must not be considered as a stakeholder in seeking peaceful resolution. This article wholeheartedly identifies with Igor Blazevik, a long-time Myanmar observer and human rights campaigner in Prague who argues that the Myanmar junta is “not and can never be a part of any solution.”
International players must free themselves from the illusion that the junta will abide by the ASEAN’s ‘5-Point Consensus.’ As predicted by Lucas Myers from the Wilson Center, the SAC “has crossed the Rubicon, and it is likely to do everything to stay in power” (Myers 2021). Settlement through negotiation is not on the junta’s agenda. According to Ye Myo Hein from Wilson Center, “the only way to bring the generals to the negotiating table may be to force them to realize that they cannot win by military means” (Hein 2022). As such, the SAC and its chief are not rational negotiating partners for the resolution of the ongoing political crisis.
2. The international community must proactively engage with the National Unity Government (NUG), National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC), ethnic resistance organizations (EROs), and other anti-junta alliances to bring about genuine dialogues and pave way for peaceful and prosperous democracy in Myanmar.
The U.S. Government must take the lead in embedding the Burma Act in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). This act enables the United States to provide non-lethal assistance to the NUG and other anti-junta armed groups, such as the People’s Defense Force (PDFs) and EROs. The anti-junta forces in Myanmar needs material assistance, not merely trainings and statements of concern.
Furthermore, Western democracies should provide anti-aircraft rocket launchers to neutralize the junta’s airstrikes (Pongsudhirak 2022). Once the balance is reached on the battlefield, the overstretched junta segments will dramatically lose its capacity to conduct a 4-cut strategy, mainly constituting burning down villages.
In many areas controlled by the NUG/PDFs and EROs, the governance bodies like the People’s Administrations (PaAPha) currently provide services to the IDPs and local communities with highly limited resources (Lipes 2022). However, once the SAC’s airpower is balanced, Burman-majority, ethnic communities will be able to effectively implement humanitarian assistance and resettlement programs. Neutralized airpower would critically weaken both the SAC soldiers’ capacity and morale, compelling the army to engage in negotiations with all stakeholders.
3. The international community should provide humanitarian assistance through every available channel and increase the levels of cross-border aid with flexible banking and reporting rules, as UN Secretary General’s Special Envoy to Myanmar Noleen Heyzer suggests. Measures to protect IDPs and refugees both in and outside mainland Myanmar must be employed in accordance with the ASEAN’s ‘5-Point Consensus’ and other regional frameworks.
UN, U.S., ASEAN, China, India, and other Western democracies should engage and support the NUG, NUCC, and EROs’ alliance platforms to improve coordination with regards to organizing humanitarian assistance and military operations. Doing so will pave the way for genuine negotiations and establishment of federal democratic union of Myanmar once the military is placed under civilian control in the future. Formation of cohesive alliance networks is the key to success for the anti-junta resistance forces.
Call for Internal Reconciliation
As of now, there exists the “Federal Democracy Charter (FDC),” which is a political framework that clearly defines the steps toward the establishment of future federal democratic union in Myanmar (International IDEA 2022). This charter has been drafted by the Committee Represent People’s Parliament (CRPH), mandated by 80% of the MPs elected in the 2020 general election to represent the Union Parliament, and revised by the National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC), and approved by the People Assembly held on January 27-29, 2022.
Yet while meaningful progress is being made to address the long-simmering grievances between Myanmar’s ethnic majority and the minorities, the key to success of the Spring Revolution lies with improved cooperation and coordination among NUG PDFs, local PDFs, and EROs (Hein 2023). Ye Myo Hein points out that the anti-junta forces should not overly focus on the details of the political agreement, as they are unrealistic. Instead, they should increase the military cooperation among within the alliance network and build trust for an inclusive federal state in the future. The NUG must step up to build more viable command-and-control structures, while enforcing a more inclusive code of conduct. This point merits attention, for as explained above, genuine negotiations are only possible when the Myanmar’s military junta is weakened.
The NUG and some EROs have already established the Central Command and Control Committee (C3C); however, some observers point out that although the NUG’s Ministry of Defense (MOD) and the EROs are cooperating at an operational level, strategic cooperation is not implemented. This current situation must change in order to win the revolution.
Conclusion
Some questions brought up by the international players are as follows: What will happen when the SAC loses power? Will the country descend into a failed state? Will the irregular army of PDFs turn against each other? In addressing these questions, Igor Blazevic consistently points out the international community’s need to address what he calls the “stability bias (authoritarian stability is better than chaos caused by anarchy)”, “David and Goliath bias (the asymmetrically powerful junta will inevitably crush all resistance forces)”, and “authoritarian bias (authoritarianism supports authoritarianism).”
Considering the aforementioned biases, the international community is unlikely to exclude the junta and its chief from the negotiation process (ASEAN 2023). Therefore, anti-junta resistance forces are better to focus on institutionalizing and developing the intra-dialogue among key stakeholders to a new level. In doing so, the alliance must prove that they can govern and maintain stability once the current military junta is removed from power and that there will be no power vacuum. Strengthened national-level coalition will provide greater credibility and legitimacy for the anti-junta forces to govern a democratic Myanmar in the future.
Myanmar’s resistance forces deserve no less global attention than those of Ukraine. Creating a peaceful democratic Myanmar is not merely a domestic issue—it is closely intertwined with achieving regional stability. As long as Min Aung Hlaing’s junta retains power, there will be more refugees, IDPs, narcotic drug production, and transnational crimes that will spill over to neighboring countries..."
Source/publisher:
Asia Democracy Research Network
Date of publication:
2023-02-24
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-27
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
more
Sub-title:
‘We have to unite.' Protest brings together ethnic groups to take a stand against the military.
Description:
"Braving snow flurries and chanting slogans, roughly 300 members of the Burmese diaspora in the United States marched to the White House over the weekend, demanding an end to the junta’s air strikes and the establishment of a no-fly zone over Myanmar.
“Democracy is coming today, dictatorship is going away,” they chanted as they marched through the streets of Washington on Saturday.
The procession included Buddhist monks, children, young people and middle-aged couples. Many drove hundreds of kilometers through freezing temperatures from as far away as Minnesota and upstate New York to participate.
Dubbed the “Multi-ethnic march,” the protest brought together the diaspora’s varied ethnic groups to take a stand against the military, which took control of the government in a February 2021 coup and has been battling rebel groups ever since.
Nay Htoo, a longtime board member with the Karen Organization of Minnesota, drove for 16 hours through the night with his wife, daughter, and son-in-law to join the event. In his hurry to join the march on time, he left his gloves in the car, leaving his hands pink and raw from the cold, but he insisted it was worth it.
The elderly community leader was one of several speakers to address the crowd at the march, using his speech to call for a swift resolution to the coup and unity amongst the different ethnic groups in standing against the military.
“Every day there are air strikes, people’s houses are damaged, people are dying,” he said, speaking afterwards. “This must stop.”
Reliance on airstrikes
Facing setbacks on the ground and stiff resistance from rebel groups since the coup, the military is increasingly relying on airstrikes in recent months – and many seem to target civilians.
Hundreds of people have been killed and thousands more left homeless by the waves of air strikes and arson attacks. The Sagaing region in the north and Kayin state, in the east, bordering Thailand – both viewed as hotbeds of rebellion – have borne the brunt of the attacks.
The military carried out 57 airstrikes in Kayin state in January alone, killing 13 civilians, including a 2-year-old child and two leaders of the Christian community, according to the Karen National Union.
In October, military jets bombed a concert in northern Myanmar commemorating the founding of an ethnic political group Kachin Independence Organization, killing 63 people – many of them civilians – and wounding 100 more.
‘Reject junta’s sham election’
In Washington, spirits were high despite the snow and rain, with the crowd singing along to the revolutionary anthem, “Blood Oath,” and carrying signs saying, “End deadly air strikes,” and “Reject junta’s sham election” – a reference to vague plans by the military government to hold a vote later this year.
Gen-Z volunteers Grace Mang and Matha Chin, who have been living in the United States for seven years, said it was their first time attending such a protest. They felt compelled to join as one of the few gestures of solidarity available to them from afar.
“There’s nothing much we can do from here, no other way to really show support, so we wanted to come and show we are with them,” said Martha.
The Burmese diaspora in the United States has been mobilizing since the early days of the coup, organizing fundraisers and marches and calling on the U.S. government to ramp up measures against the junta.
The Burma Act, which was passed by Congress in 2022 as part of a military spending bill, allows the United States to engage with the opposition National Unity Government and other opposition groups in exile, as well as to impose further sanctions against the junta. Its enactment paved the way for the NUG to open a shadow embassy in Washington D.C earlier in Feb. 2023.
The importance of inter-ethnic unity to the resistance efforts is one of the key themes emphasized by leaders of the U.S. diaspora.
‘It is everyone's fight’
Aung San ‘Christopher’ Win, a Maramagri activist from Rakhine who also spoke at the march, said the coup had encouraged more Burmese, especially those from majority groups, to address inter-ethnic discrimination.
“Before the coup, few activists would speak up for ethnic minorities like the Chin or the Rohingya,” he said, adding that his own campaigning efforts back in Myanmar had often drawn criticism from majority groups.
He arrived in the United States as a refugee in early 2021 after his political activities made him a target of the military.
The turnout despite the snowy weather shows “how much we want democracy,” said Saw Luh Tort, an organizer from Buffalo, New York.
“The military has been doing divide-and-rule for decades,” he said. “Something they didn’t know was that it would bring us together. It is everyone’s fight.”
Source/publisher:
"RFA" (USA)
Date of publication:
2023-02-27
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-27
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
more
Description:
"1. Introduction
The Ministry of Human Rights of the National Unity Government has prepared this snapshot of (he
human rights situation in Myanmar as a resource for delegations in advance of HRC52.
2. Human rights situation on the ground
The people of Myanmar have shown remarkable unity and resolve in defending their democracy, rights,
and freedoms and in protecting their communities against mounting atrocities by the illegal military
junta. The National Unity Government, consistent with its democratic mandate, continues to lead from
inside Myanmar. The National Unity Government and its ethnic partners also exercise significant and
growing territorial control and are providing essential public services and humanitarian assistance.
The people’s rights-based revolution has, however, come with appalling costs. The illegal military
junta’s failed power grab has plunged Myanmar into spiraling human rights and humanitarian criscs.
According to High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Turk, over the past two years " by nearly
every feasible measurement, and in every area of human rights - economic, social and cultural, as much
as civil and political - Myanmar has profoundly regressed."1
In February 2023. the junta murdered over 3.000 civilian children, women, and men. Some it shot dead
during peaceful protests. Others it bombarded with war-zone artillery, targeted with jets, or burned to
death. In July 2022, the junta executed four pro-democracy activists including a former parliamentarian
under the facade of legal process, revealing the scale of its contempt for the rule of law and international
norms. Its reach for the death penalty provoked shock from High Commissioner Turk, who issued a
statement in December condemning the junta’s sentencing of more than 130 people to death, including
at least seven university students, in sham military courts.2
Almost 16,000 civilians remain arbitrarily detained and subject to torture and sexual violence. And
close to 1.3 million people have been driven from their homes, many pushed into neighbouring
countries. These new homeless have been added to the hundreds of thousands of Myanmar nationals
particularly the Rohingya - already forcibly displaced by earlier waves of military atrocities. The junta
also continues to block people’s access to food, aid, medicine, and vaccines as a tactic of war.
3. Emblematic incidents
Myanmar is a party to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and a number of international human rights
treaties.3 All parties in Myanmar arc also bound by relevant rules of customary international law that
apply to non-international armed conflicts. Consistent with its obligations, the National Unity
Government has issued an Article 12(3) declaration under the Rome Statute granting the International Criminal Court countrywide jurisdiction dating back to 2002. For its part, the junta has increased the
frequency and severity of its attacks against civilians, particularly its aerial assaults.
Last October, the Special Rapporteur on Myanmar, Thomas H. Andrews, reported to the General
Assembly that junta forces had 'systematically bombed and burned villages and massacred innocent
civilians.' This widespread and systematic pattern of deliberate attacks, which includes the targeting of
schools and civilian gatherings, likely comprises war crimes and crimes against humanity in addition
to grave human rights violations.
The Ministry of Human Rights has documented the following emblematic incidents since HRC51 in
September 2022.
On 8 October 2022, near Phayar Lay Kone and Ngar Pan Chaung villages in Wot Lot Township,
Sagaing Region,4 two junta tighter jets and two Mi-35 helicopters attacked a People’s Defence Force
(PDF) training school. The attack reportedly lasted for around 30 minutes. Following the incident, one
of the helicopters attacked a primary school in Phayar Lay Kone village. Junta ground troops also
entered the area, near Phayar Lay Kone and Ngar Pan Chaung villages, where they murdered two
civilian men.
On 24 October 2022, the junta conducted an airstrike on an outdoor concert in the village of A Nang
Pa in Hpakant Township of Kachin State, killing at least 80 people including singers, musicians, and
other artists on and near the main stage.5 There were no combatants or legitimate military targets in the
vicinity of the concert.
Attacks by Light Infantry Battalions (LIB) 361,368, and 369 in Sagaing Region also intensified to new
peaks between November 2022 and January 2023. On 9 January 2023, a joint operation comprising
junta troops and "Pyu Saw Htee” members (pro-junta proxy militias) raided Taepin and Shangon
villages and detained and killed three local men. The charred bodies of these three villagers were
discovered on 10 and 11 January.
Since October 2022, the situation in Sagaing Region and Kachin States has become alarming due to the
increased and repeated pattern of directly attacking villagers in operations including the sequence of
aerial attacks, shelling, deploying troops on the ground, and opening the path for light infantry
operations.6
In late January and early February 2023, junta troops launched arson attacks against 14 villages in
Sagaing Region, destroying thousands of civilian homes and structures and displacing an estimated
10,000 people.7 These attacks form part of a larger pattern of the deliberate destruction of homes, critical
infrastructure, and the natural environment to force large-scale displacement, and as such constitutes
yet another example of continuing widespread, systematic, and methodological violence against
civilians intensified over the past year.
The above incidents, which represent a small sample, each involved the direction of deliberate targeted
attacks against civilians and civilian objects. In addition to the killing and maiming of civilians, junta
attacks continue to see the intentional destruction o f protected objects and properly including schools,
healthcare facilities, places of worship, homes, livestock, and crops.
Junta attacks are also properly viewed as acts of collective punishment and as part of a systematic
strategy to inflict terror upon the civilian population. As then Acting High Commissioner Nada Al-
Nashi f said in her IIRC51 update, " the Myanmar military’s offensives throughout the country are designed not only to target its opponents but also to punish any communities it deems to be supporting
them."8
Furthermore, the junta’s aerial attacks have seen its aircraft compromise the airspace o f Myanmar’s
neighbours during sorties against civilians, threatening the peace and security of the broader region.
4. Momentum at the UN
At HRC51, then Acting High Commissioner A l-Nashif described the situation in Myanmar as a " rapid
downward spiral, with growing suffering, fear, and insecurity”, and called for “urgent action... to
reverse this catastrophic situation".9 At that same session, addressing the junta’s economic interests, the
Acting High Commissioner reported that the junta “continued its exploitation of the country's resources
to advance its own interests and fuel a campaign of violence and repression against Myanmar’s people.”
id
HRC52 is a crucial opportunity fora strengthened address of the situation in Myanmar. In a groundswell
of activity, recent months have seen ASEAN Leaders issue a call for United Nations (UN) and
international support, which in turn empowered the Security Council to adopt its first-ever resolution
on Myanmar (2669) in December. Significantly, the resolution confirmed the Council’s support for the
will of the Myanmar people, demanded an immediate end to the junta's violence, stressed the need for
full, safe, and unimpeded humanitarian access to all people in need, and repeated calls for the release
of all arbitrarily detained persons. The Human Rights Council must seize on this momentum.
5. Recommendations
The National Unity Government offers the following recommendations in advance of HRC52.
To the Human R ights Council:
• Process the request of the Permanent Representative of Myanmar to the United Nations in
New York to represent M yanmar at the Council, along with other appointed members of his
delegation. This is consistent with the General Assembly's rules and the Permanent
Representative’s rights and privileges. Crucially, it will also restore the voice of the Myanmar
people at the Council
• Adopt a stronger resolution on the human rights situation in Myanmar that expresses support
for the National Unity Government and its ethnic partners, condemns junta atrocities, calls
for sanctions and arms import bans on the junta, prioritises the delivery of humanitarian
assistance, advances accountability, and blocks any junta attempts to hold sham elections
• Push the Security Council to keep Myanmar on its agenda and to leverage the threat of
Chapter V II measures against the junta
• Encourage the International Criminal Court to expand its current investigation into the
situation in Bangladesh/Myanmar to cover all Myanmar territory, in line with the National
Unity Government’s Article 12(3) Declaration under the Rome Statute
• Support the II.MM’s efforts to secure prosecutions, including by encouraging direct
cooperation by States under the exercise of universal jurisdiction
• Support the United Nations Country Team in Myanmar to implement the recommendations
set out in the Rosenthal Report and monitor its progress, including by requesting continued
reporting on its implementation efforts • Act on the recommendations of the Special Rapporteur on Myanmar
• Expand the resources available to O H C H R ' s Myanmar Team to make them commensurate
to the scale of the Team's mandate and reporting obligations.
To the UN Member States:
• Take individual and collective action to immediately end the direct or indirect supply, sale,
transfer, or diversion of arms, munitions, and other military equipment and related materials
of all types, dual-purpose technology, and aviation fuel to the junta, as well as technical
training, financial resources or services, advice, or other services or assistance related to such
arms and related materials to the junta. UN Member States should also strip the junta of cash
revenues through strengthened economic measures against its business enterprises including
its oil and gas interests
• Work with the National Unity Government, its ethnic and civil society partners, Myanmar's
neighbours, and the ASEAN AHA Centre to secure the cross-border delivery of urgently
needed food, aid, and medicine
• Formally recognize the National Unity Government as the legitimate representative of
Myanmar and its people based on the results of the 2020 general election, and block any junta
attempts to hold sham elections
• Use national courts to prosecute junta members under the exercise of universal jurisdiction
• Support ASEAN to reframe the Five Point Consensus to better reflect the realities on the
ground in Myanmar, to advance the democratic will of the Myanmar people, to approve the
cross-border delivery of urgently needed aid including through established ethnic and civil
society networks and chains, and to protect Myanmar asylum-seekers and refugees in ASEAN
countries at all limes and respect non-refoulement
• Ban all junta members and representatives from attending or participating in UN meetings,
conferences, and other events..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Human Rights
Date of publication:
2023-02-27
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-27
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Human Rights and international relations
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"SITUATION ANALYSIS
Description of the crisis
Entering 2023, it has been two years since the military intervention on 1 February 2021. The country context has become more complex due to the extent of political and civic disorders, including a series of armed clashes, including the use of airstrikes, artillery shells, and heavy weapons between the Myanmar Armed Forces (MAF) and various Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) and People’s Defence Forces (PDFs) in different states and regions. The economic situation has remained fragile due to transport blocks, locally increased demands, currency devaluation and rampant inflation that has led the prices of the basic food basket and items, fuel, and transportation to increase sharply. Almost half the population in the country is estimated to be living in poverty due to the political crisis and the pre-existing impacts of the Covid-19 pandemic.
Despite rising humanitarian needs, access to humanitarian assistance has been severely undermined by the heavy restrictions of people’s movements, the imposition of systematic roadblocks, the blackouts and internet shutdowns, and the lengthy bureaucratic processes for approvals through checkpoints at the ground level. Furthermore, a new Organization Registration Law was established for international NGOs, national NGOs and Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) since 28 October 2022, which has potential to further limit the work of humanitarian actors in Myanmar. Twice in the course of 2022, ACAPS2 identified Myanmar as one of only four country contexts in the world in which there are extreme constraints for humanitarian access, highlighting the challenges that continue to be faced by all humanitarian organisations, as well as by affected populations seeking to reach humanitarian assistance.
Armed conflicts and clashes have escalated and are still ongoing in states and regions across the country. This has already forced nearly 1.2 million people to flee their homes since the military intervention, out of more than 1.5 million internally displaced in total as of 26 December 2022, living in informal settlements across the country. An estimated 34,380 civilian properties, including houses, churches, monasteries and schools, have been burnt or destroyed since February 2021.
The highest displacements are in the Northwest where 795,600 people (47,200 IDPs in Chin, 124,400 IDPs in Magway and 624,000 IDPs in Sagaing) remain displaced since February 2021. Conflicts and threats have continued to rise across Chin, Magway, and Sagaing due to sustained fighting between MAF and PDFs there, including airstrikes, mortar fires, and ambushes. As a result, security checks and roadblocks have remained tight, affecting movements on roads and waterways and thereby reducing and hindering the capacity of aid workers to deliver humanitarian services.
Many townships in the Northwest also continue to face internet shutdowns.
In the Southeast of the country, armed clashes have continued between the MAF and the joint forces of Karenni Nationalities Defence Forces (KNDF), Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) and local PDFs in various townships of Southern Shan, Kayah, Kayin and Mon States, and Eastern Bago and Tanintharyi Regions. There have been reports of airstrikes and artillery fires, resulting in civilian casualties including children. Prohibition of access to many townships in Southern Shan and Kayah State has remained in place with an increased number of checkpoints and tight scrutiny measures, restricting the movement of humanitarian partners into the area. Since the end of September 2022, overall displacements have increased across the Southeast. As of 26 December 2022, around 339,000 people are displaced in the different townships of the Southeast.
Armed clashes between the MAF and the joint forces of Kachin Independent Army (KIA) and PDFs have continued to increase in several townships in Kachin State, including Hpakant and Myitkyina. On 23 October 2022, an airstrike reportedly killed and injured many people including civilians, also displacing around 3,000 people in several villages in Hpakant town. In October and November 2022, a series of continued heavy artillery fires and shelling have been reported in several villages in Hpakant township, including reports of killed civilians and a partially destroyed primary school at Momauk town and, leaving many more people displaced in religious compounds of various townships in Kachin State. Security has been tense in and around Myitkyina due to the heavy reinforcements of the MAF outside the town and military operations associated with the surrounding area.
As of 19 December 2022, there has been a total of more than 90,500 IDPs in Rakhine State. Despite the informal ceasefire agreement between the MAF and the Arakan Army (AA), more than 42 civilians have been reportedly killed during the fighting between August and November 2022, displacing more than 39,000 people in Rakhine and Paletwa township in Chin State. In addition, movement restrictions and roadblocks have caused severe hardship for civilians in the area.
As of 26 December 2022, there were reportedly around 17,300 people displaced in informal settlements in Northern Shan State due to the armed clashes between the MAF and various EAOs. Forced recruitment is one of the major security concerns in Southern Shan State. A total of 153 civilians have been abducted for forced recruitment in various townships of Northern Shan State since January 20221, either for involuntary labour by the military or as fighters by ethnic armed groups or other groups..."
Source/publisher:
International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of publication:
2023-02-27
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-27
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Food Security and nutrition in Burma/Myanmar, Public Health, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Format :
pdf
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1.66 MB
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"Key Event Details
Location of Incident: Monywa town (မုံရွာမြို့), Sagaing region (စစ်ကိုင်းတိုင်းဒေသကြီး) [22.105255, 95.137446].
Date/Time of Incident: 27 February 2021
Alleged Perpetrator(s) and/or Involvement:
Multiple armed police and military personnel
Several men in civilian clothing
Summary of Investigation:
Myanmar Witness has verified footage showing multiple armed police and military personnel, as well as men dressed in civilian clothing, chasing and using sticks to beat two fleeing and unarmed individuals.
The footage indicates potential coordination between the police and civilians in carrying out the beatings.
The footage also shows soldiers from the military’s 101 Light Infantry Division pointing guns at the individuals who were filming the incident.
Executive Summary
In the months following the February 2021 military coup, Myanmar Witness documented and verified footage of police and military violence against individuals. This mini-series of spot reports documents five separate incidents in Yangon, Mandalay and Sagaing in February and March 2021. The first report of the series focusses on events in Monywa town
The case studies in the series show police and military personnel beating unarmed individuals, including those already apprehended; harassment, intimidation and arrest of medical workers; and the infliction of degrading treatment. Additionally, ranking police officers were identified in two incidents.
In this case study, Myanmar Witness has verified footage showing two unarmed individuals in civilian clothing, believed to be protestors or bystanders to a protest, running away from a water cannon and security forces. Multiple armed police and military personnel, as well as several men dressed in civilian clothing, are seen chasing and using sticks to beat the two fleeing and unarmed individuals.
The videos potentially reveal coordination between police and individuals dressed in civilian clothing. However, it cannot be ascertained from this case study whether the individuals were affiliated with, acting in coordination with, or undercover members of the security forces.
Analysis of rank and insignia, clearly visible in the footage, attributes responsibility of this violence to the Lon Htein (Riot Security Forces), soldiers from Myanmar military’s Yangon Command, and the 101 Light Infantry Division.
Sticks are used to beat the individuals’ head, arms and torso to the extent that one of them appears unable to stand, and a stretcher is brought for him. It also shows soldiers from the military’s 101 Light Infantry Division pointing guns at the individuals who were filming the incident.
To read the full investigation, download the report PDF.
These examples of police and military brutality are being released to mark two years passing since their occurrence; however, they are by no means exhaustive. Myanmar Witness has documented other instances of police and military harassment since the coup, which has been documented in several reports, including: Violence against protestors in North Okkalapa, Bago, and Hlaing Tharyar; and, the deaths of multiple female protestors, including Ma Kyal Sin (Angel) and Daw Tinnwe..."
Source/publisher:
Myanmar Witness
Date of publication:
2023-02-27
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-27
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Armed conflict in Burma - attacks on civilians, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
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pdf
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875.3 KB
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Description:
"Exiles, alas, are all too common in today’s disrupted world. Myanmar has a variety of them. Some are driven into exile by ethnic cleansing, such as the Rohingya. Some seek safety individually, like the anti-military dissidents since 2001. And millions go overseas to seek employment, especially in Thailand.
Governments in exile are also not an uncommon worldwide political phenomenon. But to have two in one generation in one country not only exceeds the norm, but may be unique in the modern era. Although two can hardly be called a pattern, lessons and expectations, both realistic and illusionary, from these experiences in Myanmar may help enlighten the future and help guide internal and foreign policies.
On 14 February 2023, the US Deputy Secretary of State, Wendy Sherman, met Daw Zin Mar Aung, the National Unity Government’s (NUG) foreign minister, at the newly established, Washington-based headquarters of the NUG. Founded on 16 April 2021, the NUG is composed of members of the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, the parliament elected in November 2020 but ousted by a Myanmar military coup before it could take office on 1 February 2021, as well as representatives of ethnic minority groups and other anti-coup players.
Wendy Sherman’s visit, and other extensive legislative and executive actions by the US, provides the NUG with the moral imprimatur, if not the diplomatic stamp of approval. Although formal diplomatic ties remain with the military regime, ambassadorial replacements between the states have not been approved. Together with an intense lobbying effort by the NUG, extensive economic, political, and social sanctions have been imposed on both military-supported institutions and individual military officials. With widespread Western opprobrium of any actions seen as supportive of the military, US dialogue with the Myanmar military is absent.
For the few foreigners who trace modern Myanmar history, the plot seems to be a replay of an older scenario. But there are critical differences between the four coups that have dominated Myanmar’s history since independence in 1948. The three coups of 1962, 1988, and 2021 were all designed to perpetuate military control over political, economic, and social elements of the then Burma and Myanmar. The 1988 and 2021 coups have similarly resulted in governments in exile, but their effects and expectations are likely to be quite different.
A generation ago, following the coup of 1988, the military promised that it would hold elections that would result in a multi-party “discipline-flourishing democracy.” It did hold such elections in May 1990, which the opposition National League for Democracy swept and the military blatantly ignored. Escaping arrest by the military, some members of the newly elected but unseated legislature formed the National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma (NCGUB) on 18 December 1990 in territory not yet controlled by the military, and then shifted to Thailand.
It lobbied for diplomatic recognition, never granted by the US, but it focused attention on the political plight of the civilian population and engendered widespread international sympathy. In May 1995, the NCGUB held a meeting in Bommersvik Sweden, and Sein Win, a first cousin of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, was elected as its prime minister in exile. In essence, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, or what was purported to be her views since she was under house arrest, made US policy.
The NCGUB moved its offices to the Washington DC area for more effective lobbying. It had remarkable access throughout the Washington power structure. But as the military began the slow, incomplete but encouraging, pattern of reform, and as the US responded to such quiet signals from the military, relations began to improve. In the aftermath of these changes, the NCGUB was dissolved on 14 September 2012.
There are significant differences between 1988 and 2021 both in military promises and actions and in the public’s response. In 2021, the military promised initially that there would be national elections in 2023. Because of the widespread disdain, indeed revolution, against the junta’s rule and national civil unrest, these elections have now been promised for later in 2023 or 2024.
But just as the controlled and manipulated elections of 2010 allowed the military to maintain power through the political process, so there is every indication that the current military regime plans a similar response in the forthcoming political arena. Even if there are significant alterations to the 2008 military-drafted constitution that the military had sworn to uphold unchanged, but is now prepared to modify to ensure continuing military dominance of the political processes, any such changes will attempt to solidify the military’s critical role in Myanmar society.
One overarching commonality of the 1988 and 2021 coups is the clear determination to ensure that Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, through imprisonment, house arrest, or simply age, no longer plays a role in Myanmar’s politics. A major difference is that Suu Kyi advocated political change through peaceful means. Whether that was practical in the Myanmar context may be disputed, but on 7 September 2021 the NUG declared war on the Myanmar military. Although the military’s criminal and rapacious actions far outstrip the violence perpetrated by the NUG and its diverse opposition groups, the moral high ground has at least partly been ceded.
The popular reaction to the 2021 coup has been unprecedented in modern Myanmar. Coupled with the ongoing struggle of ethnic minorities for autonomy, and the exposure of youth to the liberalization of the past decade, tolerance of military atrocities seems to have ended. Anti-military rebellion is apparent even in Bamar areas that were never previously restive, and military violence against the population is unprecedented.
From 2012 until the coup, the country’s youth experienced a degree of freedom, while incomplete, far greater than at any time since the 1962 coup. They do not seem to be willing to settle for less under praetorian rule. The NUG has tried to placate ethnic dissatisfaction with more ethnically diverse leadership, but generations of suspicions abound and are exceedingly difficult to overcome. Throughout the country People’s Defense Forces have been formed and fight military authority, but they lack coordination and the arms necessary for effective resistance.
But the military’s plans for a rigged election that would provide titular legitimacy from their vantage point may be based in part on illusion. Senior military officers have long felt that that they don’t need the West, because of a combination of the state’s natural resources and friendly relations with Russia and China, who protect Myanmar in the United Nations through their veto power and supply the regime with sophisticated weaponry, along with the clear reluctance of Japan, India and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations to impose sanctions.
The generals may be preparing to sit out a decade of Western isolation, after which some US administration will likely make some concessions in response to political face-saving changes within the Myanmar regime. The dilemma is that much of the backbone of state administration is in the hands of retired military, as well as those on active duty. The military‘s future role in Myanmar will exceed what is regarded as normal in modern Western states.
We are witnessing a period of intense propaganda from all sides. Claims for areas and populations controlled, casualties inflicted, and economic conditions are widely promulgated but are in dispute. Yet policy decisions by the internal actors and foreigners are being made based on dubious data and are likely to exacerbate the crises.
Some foreign observers are now rethinking their positions. Some advocate the diplomatic recognition of the NUG, which would entail the closing of Western embassies in Myanmar, and likely either covert or overt arming of the opposition. This would increase the polarization of Russian and Chinese antagonism with the West. Some call for positive reconsideration of the breakup of the state, long advocated by some ethnic groups, to alleviate some of these pressures. That would likely to produce a ‘Balkanized’ regional set of insecurities compounding the myriad dilemmas facing the country and the region.
There is no silver bullet that will solve Myanmar’s multiple dilemmas and foreign response to them without a clear reorganization of the military control system and changes in its leadership. As much as they are needed, such changes seem, alas, a bridge too far. Unfortunately, the next few years are likely to be even worse than the previous two..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2023-02-25
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-25
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
more
Sub-title:
With the junta in a weaker position, China recalibrates its approach with an eye to expanding its influence in Myanmar.
Description:
"Since late 2022, Beijing has increasingly signaled the limits of its support for Myanmar’s junta against pro-democracy forces and protection against international efforts to hold the army accountable for its crimes. In particular, Beijing has demonstrated a reluctance when doing the junta’s bidding internationally results in significant political costs vis-à-vis its relations with Southeast Asian states or its reputation at the United Nations.
As global pressure on Myanmar’s generals grows, Beijing is particularly sensitive to signals that Western support for Myanmar’s powerful Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) or People’s Defense Forces (PDFs) that are fighting the military may increase. To the extent that the Chinese government senses that such support is on the rise, it will become much more assertive in leveraging its strategic relationships with both the military and the most powerful of the EAOs, which operate on the border in the immediate orbit of China’s influence, to shape the overall trajectory of the conflict.
Rather than seeking to back the military against all odds, Beijing aims to strengthen support for both the military and the most powerful of the EAOs, thereby dramatically increasing Chinese influence in Myanmar. This approach challenges the ability of pro-democracy forces to forge powerful coalitions that might threaten the traditional status quo between the military and the EAOs, because it pushes northern EAOs to distance themselves from what is perceived by Beijing as a Western-backed pro-democracy resistance.
As the United States considers options for implementing the provisions of the recently passed Burma Act, a top priority should be support to inclusive coalitions between the EAOs and the National Unity Government (NUG), the parallel government formed by democratically elected lawmakers. Assistance under the act should carefully consider possible impacts on and prospects for such alliances.
China’s Meandering Response to the Coup
In the immediate aftermath of the February 1, 2021 military coup led by Min Aung Hlaing, China initially took a wait and see approach, seemingly not wanting to burn bridges with either the military or the National League for Democracy (NLD) party, which it had committed to partner with in implementing billions of dollars of strategic infrastructure projects as part of the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor. While Chinese state media parroted the Myanmar army’s propaganda, referring to the coup as a “cabinet reshuffle,” China also sent public signals of the importance of its relationship with the NLD.
Popular concern that China actively supported the military’s crackdown on protesters in the weeks following the coup triggered a rise in anti-China sentiment. Anxiety increased in Beijing after a series of attacks on Chinese business interests culminated in threats that “China’s gas pipelines will be burned.” China responded by increasing pressure on the military, EAOs and the NUG to ensure that all would actively play a role in defending Chinese strategic economic interests in Myanmar. While all these parties responded favorably to Beijing’s request, the military’s propaganda apparatus played to fears in Beijing that pro-democracy resistance forces were directly targeting China’s strategic interests in the country. These interests include a multibillion-dollar oil and gas pipeline that represents the only source of piped natural gas to China’s southwestern provinces, and which accounts for over 10 percent of the gross domestic product of Yunnan Province.
By June 2021, Beijing’s posture had shifted significantly in favor of the junta, with the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs hosting the junta’s top international affairs representative, Wunna Maung Lwin. The Chinese Communist Party had a final public interaction with the NLD in September of that same year. It subsequently ceased inviting the NLD to its international political party engagements. From October 2021 until July 2022, the Chinese government gradually scaled up its relations with the junta, culminating in Beijing cohosting the foreign ministers’ meeting of the Chinese-led Lancang-Mekong Cooperation (LMC) Forum in Myanmar. With Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) once again initiating new business with the junta, Chinese State Councilor Wang Yi announced to the foreign ministers of the LMC countries — Laos, Cambodia, Thailand and Vietnam — that China would partner with Min Aung Hlaing’s regime to host an LMC summit before the end of 2022.
Beijing’s warming ties with Myanmar’s genocidal generals contrasted sharply with the growing calls within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to forge direct ties with the NUG, and to limit high-level interactions with Myanmar’s army. Beijing drew strong criticism from key ASEAN countries, which were concerned that China’s convening of high-level LMC meetings would undermine ASEAN unity and hamper efforts of the body to find a solution to the crisis. Faced with the choice of either upsetting its relationship with ASEAN or disappointing the junta, in late 2022, Beijing opted for the latter. Beijing scrapped plans for an LMC summit in Myanmar, and greater tensions emerged between Min Aung Hlaing and Beijing as it became clear that the military’s poor performance on the battlefield and the unstable business environment would preclude progress on China’s coveted infrastructure connectivity projects.
While the Chinese government had continuously pressured the seven powerful Myanmar EAOs located in northern Shan and Kachin states to negotiate with the military, these EAOs increasingly found themselves facing a weak and incompetent adversary on the battlefield, enabling them to make significant progress recovering territories lost over the two decades before the coup.
In other cases, EAOs such as the United Wa State Army (UWSA) leveraged the chaos to begin a generational change in leadership while also supporting their allies to defeat rival militias to the south of Shan state. These dynamics functioned to further weaken the military, but also served China’s interests insofar as the northern EAOs extend Chinese influence deeper into Myanmar while pushing the frontlines of the fighting further from the Chinese border. By October 2022, a desperate military began deploying its air power to attack key positions held by three of these EAOs: the Myanmar Democratic Alliance Army, the Ta’ang National Liberation Army and the Kachin Independence Army. These attacks failed from both a military and a political standpoint, as the EAOs launched successful counterattacks, giving China a clear picture of the military’s weakness while threating stability on China’s border.
Who Is Interfering in Myanmar?
In December 2022, as tensions between China and Myanmar’s military persisted, two key international developments altered Beijing’s calculations. First was the introduction of a United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution — something which Beijing has traditionally been hostile toward. Yet with global frustrations rising vis-à-vis the junta’s blatant human rights violations and growing security threats triggered by the rising influence of transnational crime groups in Myanmar, China faced a difficult decision over whether to block the resolution. For the first time since China was seated at the UNSC in 1971, it opted to water down rather than veto the resolution on Myanmar.
A second development was the U.S. passage of the Burma Act as part of the National Defense Authorization Act in late December 2022. Particularly significant to the act was the incorporation of language indicating a U.S. intention to provide non-lethal support to both EAOs and PDFs. Myanmar’s junta responded to these developments by condemning the international community’s move and by renewing efforts to court favor with Beijing. This included pledging renewed political support to China on issues such as the South China Sea and Taiwan, as well as launching disinformation campaigns claiming Western-backed PDFs were increasingly perpetrating “terrorist attacks” across Myanmar.
With the weakened junta in an increasingly deferential position, China has once again recalibrated its approach. In late December 2022, China swiftly deployed a new Asian affairs special envoy to Myanmar, Deng Xijun. While Beijing has maintained an envoy since 2013, its most recent envoy, Sun Guoxiang, had been quietly retired in the summer of 2022, with Beijing communicating to the diplomatic community that it would take time for a new appointment to be made. Several nuances around China’s deployment of this new envoy signaled a different direction: 1) no official announcements of the envoy’s appointment were made, 2) the envoy met with the powerful northern EAOs before meeting with the military, and 3) the envoy has pressured the northern EAOs to negotiate with the military and to refuse assistance from the West.
The moves of the new Chinese envoy shine a light on Beijing’s preferred approach to addressing the conflict: pushing for the military and the northern EAOs to forge an agreement that would dramatically increase the autonomy and influence of these groups across the Chinese borderlands in exchange for their support for the military’s efforts to limit the growing power and influence of PDFs and NUG-aligned EAOs, and its moves to organize a sham election. Meanwhile, the evolving position of China’s closest ally in Myanmar, the UWSA, maximizes pressure on the military to accept this deal. In mid-February 2023, at a key UWSA political meeting, the UWSA announced that they would maintain ties with both the military and the NUG, which they see as a “second Myanmar government.”
Chinese SOEs, the Yunnan Provincial Government and Shady Business Networks
With Beijing increasingly leveraging parallel relationships with the most powerful of Myanmar’s EAOs and the military to shape the trajectory of the conflict in its favor, three sets of Chinese actors have emerged as critical lifelines to Myanmar’s army.
First are the powerful Chinese SOEs with deep interests in Myanmar and ties to the military that could enable them to reap windfall contracts should the military succeed. The ChinaPower Company, which entered the market during an earlier period of military rule, is one of the few SOEs both implementing ongoing infrastructure projects as well as initiating new projects. These include an ongoing gas-to-energy project in Rakhine state, which has achieved milestones for completion post-coup. Emboldened by this success, ChinaPower has signed a series of new energy deals with the junta, which it has fast-tracked, bringing over 63 megawatts of new power projects online over the past six months. Chinese state media and the Chinese embassy have aggressively promoted these efforts to present narratives in China of a “new normal,” favorable to Chinese SOEs.
Second is the Yunnan Provincial Government, the current leadership of which includes senior officials with deep personal ties to Myanmar’s army, and which is convinced that the army will never cease to be a key political player in Myanmar. Almost immediately after the coup, the Yunnan Provincial Government appointed a key intellectual backer of the China-Myanmar military relationship to lead the Yunnan Department of Commerce. Li Chenyang, who was one of the initial proponents of the China-Myanmar pipeline project, has led a series of initiatives to align the Yunnan Provincial Government behind the military with the objective of finding a way to reset Yunnan’s economy post-COVID-19. In February 2023, Li led a delegation of Yunnan Provincial Government officials and business representatives to Myanmar for the Yunnan-Myanmar Commercial Forum.
Third are the shady business networks, including China-affiliated transnational criminal organizations, which thrive in kleptocratic and highly unstable contexts like Myanmar. These include criminal syndicates involved in trafficking individuals from across the globe into scam centers, where they are forced at gunpoint to engage in fraud. Post-coup, a series of Chinese business promotion agencies sprang to life in Myanmar, including organizations such as the South Asia Future Company, the China Myanmar Economic Cooperation and Development Promotion Association and the World Peace Ribbon Association. All of these organizations seek to extract concessions or gain preferential access to projects by building close ties to the junta and key crony companies. The World Peace Ribbon Association, which has previously played a role in Beijing’s Belt and Road Forum, featured in a December 2022 business exchange with Min Aung Hlaing, during which the association announced the establishment of a new “hub” in Yangon for the promotion of China’s Belt and Road Initiative projects.
Together, these forces all work to influence Beijing in the direction of enhancing its support to Myanmar’s army and play a key role in advancing the cause of the army in Beijing.
A Possible U.S. Response to Beijing’s Growing Influence in Myanmar
Beijing’s overall posture continues to prioritize a status quo that favors the military over pro-democracy forces. While so, cracks have emerged in the alliance between Beijing and the generals. In particular, China’s growing tolerance for EAOs to challenge the military’s positions on the Chinese border demonstrate one way through which Beijing aims to deepen its leverage over the regime. At the same time, Beijing’s moves risk throwing Myanmar deeper into protracted conflict. While China may think it can leverage its relations with the northern EAOs and the military to weaken pro-democracy forces and check Western influence in Myanmar, this threatens to further balkanize the country. It also represents a fundamental misreading of the Burma Act, which aims to recognize the essential role that Myanmar’s myriad EAOs and PDFs must play in order to achieve the foundation necessary for sustainable peace in the future.
As the United States considers options for implementing the Burma Act, a critical need is to enhance assistance to the formation of inclusive coalitions, which can work together to place Myanmar back on a path toward democracy..."
Source/publisher:
United States Institute of Peace
Date of publication:
2023-02-24
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-24
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
748.54 KB
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Sub-title:
Junta Should Drop Charges, Free Rev. Hkalam Samson, Others Wrongly Held
Description:
"(Sydney) – Myanmar’s military junta should drop politically motivated charges against the Kachin Baptist leader Reverend Hkalam Samson and immediately release him, Human Rights Watch said today. Rev. Samson’s next hearing, on counterterrorism law charges, which only his lawyer is permitted to attend, is scheduled for February 21, 2023, at a special court inside Myitkyina prison.
“The junta’s politically motivated case against Rev. Hkalam Samson, who is internationally renowned for his humanitarian and community work, shows that no one is safe in Myanmar,” said Elaine Pearson, Asia director at Human Rights Watch. “The junta should drop the baseless charges against Rev. Samson and immediately and unconditionally release him.”
On December 5, 2022, junta immigration officials and police arrested Rev. Samson at Mandalay International Airport, preventing him from leaving the country. Junta authorities have not disclosed his whereabouts but are apparently holding him at Myitkyina prison where the hearings are being held in a closed court. His family have not been allowed to see or communicate with him since his arrest.
In December, the junta charged Rev. Samson under section 17 of the Unlawful Associations Act for allegedly meeting with ethnic Kachin armed group leaders in January 2022, and section 505A of the penal code for “incitement” after holding a group prayer with members of the opposition National Unity Government (NUG). The offenses carry prison terms of up to 3 years each. The junta frequently uses vaguely worded and loosely interpreted provisions in its penal code to imprison peaceful activists. The hearings for these two charges concluded on February 14 with no verdict.
On February 14, the junta announced an additional charge against Rev. Samson under section 52A of the counterterrorism law for allegedly meeting with a member of the opposition National Unity Government, punishable by up to seven years in prison.
Rev. Samson, 65, is the former head of the Kachin Baptist Convention and is chairman of the Kachin National Consultative Assembly, which facilitated peace talks with the previous National League for Democracy party civilian government.
In 2019, he was among a group of 27 representatives from 17 countries to meet then US President Donald Trump in Washington, DC to highlight the plight of victims of ethnic and religious persecution. Shortly after the trip, the military opened a case against him for his comments at the White House criticizing Myanmar’s persecution of Christian minority groups. The authorities dropped the case after the US State Department expressed concern.
Since the military coup in February 2021, junta security forces have carried out deadly crackdowns against the political opposition to military rule, arbitrarily detained more than 19,000 people, and committed numerous crimes against humanity and war crimes across the country, documented by Human Rights Watch and other groups.
Myanmar’s junta courts are neither independent nor provide basic fair trial rights. Many trials are held in grossly unjust closed-door military tribunals or in “special courts” inside prison facilities where detainees gain access to their lawyer only on the day of their trial.
United Nations member countries, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), in particular, Indonesia as chair of ASEAN, and other concerned governments should press the junta to immediately release all those wrongfully detained or imprisoned, including Rev. Samson.
“The prosecution of a high-profile Kachin religious figure like Rev. Samson is a heavy-handed attempt to chill all dissent among ethnic minority leaders,” Pearson said. “ASEAN and other concerned governments should press for the release of Rev. Samson and others wrongfully detained since the February 2021 coup..."
Source/publisher:
Human Rights Watch (USA)
Date of publication:
2023-02-20
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-20
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Freedom of opinion and expression: - the situation in Burma/Myanmar - reports, analyses, recommendations, Human Rights and international relations
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Description:
"DHAKA – Nearly six years into the Rohingya refugee crisis, for the first time WFP is forced to cut back its lifesaving assistance for all Rohingya living in the camps in Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh. Starting 1 March, WFP will have to reduce its General Food Assistance voucher value from US$12 to US$10 per person per month, due to a US$125 million funding shortfall.
“This is a devastating blow to the Rohingya and an equally devastating blow to the humanitarian community,” said Domenico Scalpelli, WFP Country Director in Bangladesh. “With other critical services already dwindling, the repercussions of the ration cut – even if just two dollars – will be dire.”
Unlike other vulnerable groups, the Rohingya have limited employment opportunities in the camps, relying almost entirely on humanitarian assistance to meet their food and other essential needs.
With the support of donors and partners, WFP has been providing food, nutrition and other critical assistance to Rohingya men, women and children since their exodus from Myanmar in 2017.
Today all Rohingya – nearly 1 million of them – receive food assistance via vouchers currently valued at US$12 per person per month. Families can choose from over 40 dry and fresh food items at WFP outlets throughout the camps.
Despite concerted humanitarian efforts, 45 percent of Rohingya families are not eating a sufficient diet and malnutrition has been widespread in the camps. The Global Acute Malnutrition rate for children stands at 12 percent – just below the 15 percent WHO ‘Emergency’ threshold but still categorized as ‘Serious’. Some 40 percent of children have stunted growth and 40 percent of pregnant and breastfeeding women are anaemic - all this is before the ration cut.
“With each ration cut, malnutrition will certainly rise. With each ration cut, families will increasingly resort to dangerous strategies to cope. Sadly, women, adolescent girls and children will be the worst affected. We must do everything possible to keep the vital humanitarian assistance they depend on intact,” said Scalpelli.
Without an immediate funding boost, further ration cuts to the blanket food assistance programme are also imminent into the year..."
Source/publisher:
World Food Programme (Rome)
Date of publication:
2023-02-17
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-17
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
WFP (World Food Programme), Human Rights and international relations, Burmese refugees in Bangladesh
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Description:
"KEY DISPLACEMENT FIGURES
73,000 Estimated refugee movements to neighbouring countries since 1 February 2021
1,086,000 Refugees and asylum-seekers from Myanmar in neighbouring countries as of 30 June 2022
1,254,000 Estimated total internally displaced persons (IDPs) within Myanmar, displaced since 1 February 2021 Source: UN in Myanmar
1,584,000 Estimated total internally displaced persons (IDPs) within Myanmar as of 30 January 2023
HIGHLIGHTS
According to the UN, an estimated 1,584,000 internally displaced people (IDPs) were reported across the country as of 30 January 2023, including 1,254,000 people newly displaced since 1 February 2021.
In the North-West, conflict continued to intensify across Chin State and Sagaing and Magway Regions following a reported increase in air strikes, landmine incidents, arbitrary arrests and the destruction of properties. Indiscriminate fire in Chin and Sagaing resulted in new displacements and cross-border movements between Myanmar and India. IDPs and host communities are also experiencing shortages of food and other basic necessities due to movement restrictions.
In the South-East, conflict in various parts of the region impeded access to education, healthcare, and livelihoods. An uptick in airstrikes, indiscriminate shelling and explosions close to town centres in multiple States and Regions, including Kayin State, Mon State, Bago (East) and Tanintharyi Regions, was reported. IDPs remained concerned about their reduced access to food and basic commodities, particularly in Kayah and Shan (South) States and Tanintharyi Region.
In Kachin and Shan (North), frequent airstrikes, shelling and explosive remnants are putting civilian lives at risk. Arbitrary arrests, forced labour and the destruction and theft of civilian properties was also reported.
In Rakhine and Chin (South) States, the informal November 2022 ceasefire between the Arakan Army (AA) and the Tatmadaw continues to hold althoug remains fragile amid fears conflict will resume at the end of the cultivation season. Communities are vigilant and limiting their movement in case the ceasefire unravels. The humanitarian response in Buthidaung, Maungdaw, Rathedaung, Mrauk-U, Minbya and Myebon is focused on life-saving support (food and healthcare) following the introduction of new restrictions on UN agencies and INGOs by the de facto authorities in mid-September 2022.
RESPONSE
Myanmar
In Kachin and Shan (North) States, IDPs pursued avenues that allow them to rebuild their lives despite the limited prospects for lasting solutions after the events of February 2021. In this regard, UNHCR and partners completed a pilot programme providing small grants for various community-led projects in six solutions sites in Bhamo Township, Kachin State. These grants act as ‘seed money’ and are designed to encourage communities to use their own resources and assets to improve their environment. Through these grants, the communities were able to facilitate road rehabilitation work, expand access to clean water supplies, and support community halls. In addition, UNHCR and partners distributed various core relief items (CRIs), including mosquito nets, sleeping mats, blankets, and buckets to 1,169 IDPs (270 families). As part of the COVID-19 response, over 7,000 face masks were also distributed in IDP camps in Kachin State..."
Source/publisher:
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (Geneva)
Date of publication:
2023-02-17
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-17
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
UNHCR (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees), Education in Burma/Myanmar - general, Food Security and nutrition in Burma/Myanmar, Public Health, Human Rights and international relations
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Over 40 percent of the Karenni population has been forced to flee their homes since May 2021.
Description:
"For decades, the Myanmar military has waged a violent campaign of terror against civilians. Coordinated attempts have sought to drive ethnic groups from their homelands through systematic and widespread violence that has not spared even the most vulnerable. These same militarized acts continue today, contributing to a worsening sense of insecurity.
Our organizations – the Karenni Human Rights Group, the Kayan Women’s Organization, the Karenni National Women’s Organization, and the Kayah State Peace Monitoring Network – recently released a new report, “How can we survive in the future?”: Atrocity Crimes in Karenni State. In the report, we document extensive evidence of war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by the regime in the Karenni areas between May 2021 and September 2022. The junta’s systemic cycle of violence continues unabated. As recently as January 24, 2023, the military used warplanes to target Karenni civilians seeking refuge in internally displaced persons (IDP) camps in Loikaw, the capital of Karenni State.
Karenni (Kayah) State is a small state situated in eastern Myanmar, with an approximate population of 300,000. Another estimated 120,000 Karenni people live in the Pekhon township area to the northwest of the geographic boundary of Karenni State, in southern Shan State. Since May 2021, more than 40 percent of the Karenni population has been forcibly displaced, mostly women and children. The five townships of Loikaw, Hpruso, Shadaw, Deemaw Soe, and Pekhon have been almost entirely abandoned. Whenever our people see Myanmar army soldiers or airplanes approaching, they flee because they know that attacks are imminent. IDPs we interviewed for the report repeatedly shared the trauma they are experiencing from the relentless mortar shelling, bombs, and gunfire.
Dozens have been killed in these attacks, and thousands more have lost their homes and livelihoods. Among the key findings in our report, at least 1,190 homes in 87 Karenni towns, wards, and villages have been heavily damaged or completely destroyed by junta forces, in addition to 33 religious buildings and four medical clinics.
Neither age nor gender matters to the Burmese military. As long as they have bodies shielding their battalions from attacks, they continue to force our people to be human shields for them in conflict zones. We documented six separate incidents of forced labor and the use of civilians as human shields by the Myanmar military, involving at least 65 Karenni civilians, including women and children. Four people were killed while serving as human shields.
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The Myanmar military consistently fails to adhere to basic human rights norms and principles, terrorizing the Karenni population with no rule of law to hold them accountable. Civilians can be killed anytime, and anywhere by the military. They routinely arrest and punish human rights defenders and activists for resisting the will of the junta. We documented the arbitrary arrests of at least 260 Karenni civilians, including 33 women, by junta forces throughout Karenni areas.
At least 115 civilians have been killed while in regime custody over the reporting period. The arbitrary arrests and murders of Karenni civilians are neither isolated cases nor accidents. These human rights violations are part of a pattern of collective punishment to instill fear into the population.
For too long, our Karenni communities have suffered from targeted violence by junta forces. When we have called for peace, they have turned their weapons on us. Global actors must take concrete steps beyond mere “statement diplomacy” to protect the thousands of civilians who live with the daily threat of being murdered by the military regime.
We welcome the recent decisions by the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand to impose new targeted sanctions on the second anniversary of the attempted coup. The U.K. imposed sanctions on individuals and parts of the Asia Sun group involved in the transfer of aviation fuel to the junta’s air force, while Canada prohibited the export, sale, and supply of aviation fuel to the regime. The new U.S. sanctions focus on the Union Election Commission, military-controlled mining entities, and officials in the energy sector.
But in the wake of two years of atrocity crimes, so much more urgently needs to be done to cut sources of arms, aviation fuel, and revenue to Myanmar’s military regime. It requires a concerted, coordinated global effort. The response from the international community has been painfully slow and inadequate. As a result, the junta is emboldened to commit more atrocity crimes with impunity.
Domestically, our legal system cannot hold Myanmar soldiers accountable for their actions, as impunity is embedded in the system. We urge the international community to acknowledge that the junta is responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity – not only in Karenni State, but across the whole country – and act accordingly. There must be international justice and accountability to end the cycle of impunity. The situation in Myanmar demands a referral to the International Criminal Court, which provides a pathway to justice and reparations for the thousands of victims. We also urge states to exercise universal jurisdiction to investigate any individual from Myanmar who may be responsible for committing war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide.
Without justice and accountability, there can be no lasting peace. Our Karenni communities simply want to live in peace and enjoy basic human rights..."
Source/publisher:
"The Diplomat" (Japan)
Date of publication:
2023-02-16
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-16
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
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Sub-title:
Two years since the coup, the rest of the world remains helpless even as the military has entrenched itself
Description:
"Just over two years since Myanmar’s armed forces, the Tatmadaw, overthrew the duly elected National League for Democracy (NLD) government headed by Aung San Suu Kyi, the country is in a perilous state. The UN estimates that 4.5 million people need life-saving humanitarian support, almost half the population are living in poverty, reversing all the development gains made since 2005, and at least 1.5 million have been displaced. The Burmese scholar Win Myo Thu recently wrote: “Myanmar’s military has gone beyond repression or terrorising ethnic minority groups – it is making war on society as a whole.” The entire country, he concluded, “is now a conflict zone”.
Yet, this disastrous ongoing crisis appears to have gone off the international radar. True, the UN Security Council did adopt a resolution on Myanmar – its first for 74 years – at the end of last year, which called for an immediate end to all forms of violence, the release of all arbitrarily detained prisoners, including Suu Kyi, and urged constructive dialogue and reconciliation and the implementation of the peace plan formulated by the Association of South-East Asian Nations (Asean), to which the country belongs.
However, the UN’s own Special Rapporteur for Myanmar, Thomas Andrews, immediately said the wording didn’t go anywhere near far enough. “Demanding that certain actions be taken without any use of the Security Council’s Chapter VII authority, will not stop the illegal Myanmar junta from attacking and destroying the lives of the 54 million people being held hostage,” he said in a statement. “What is required is action.”
Myanmar’s neighbours China and India both abstained in the vote, as did Russia, which has been supportive of coup leader Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, while the Burma Campaign UK’s director, Mark Farmaner, complained that “the supply of arms doesn’t even get a mention in the resolution”, adding that a global arms embargo ought to have been a “no-brainer first step”.
Perhaps a world that is much preoccupied with other matters has looked to Asean to take the lead. The junta did agree to an Asean “five-point consensus” two months after the coup, but then completely ignored its main demands such as ending violence and facilitating dialogue between all parties. In response to the lack of progress, Asean has banned the country’s generals from regional meetings since August 2022. Last week, Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim said that the grouping “should carve Myanmar out for now”, which many took to mean suspending its membership.
A key rationale for allowing Myanmar to join Asean in 1997 was that it might encourage the generals, who were then in charge, to take the path towards democracy and pluralism. Given that all the reforms have been discarded in favour of an even more brutal military dictatorship, suspension would be a just rebuke.
Indonesia, Asean’s current chair, may be taking a different approach, with President Joko Widodo’s right-hand man, former four-star general Luhut Pandjaitan, tipped to be appointed the association’s special envoy for the country. The suggestion is that a fellow member of the top brass might be best-placed to explain the advantages of Indonesia’s move from being a military-led autocracy under Gen Suharto from 1966 to a democracy in 1998. But Myanmar’s generals cannot understand why Indonesia’s army gave up its privileged “dual function” of guarding the country and dominating politics and the economy. “The Tatmadaw regards that decision as an incomprehensible error,” said Aaron Connelly of Singapore’s International Institute for Strategic Studies.
The situation in the two countries is not analogous in any case. In fact, apart from a brief period of democracy from independence in 1948 until 1962, when Gen Ne Win took over in a coup, the military has always held on to the levers of power – as it continued to do under the 2008 constitution, which left the ministries of home, border affairs and defence and one of the two vice president posts under the Tatmadaw’s control.
It is worth remembering that for many of those decades, the West and its allies did not object too strenuously to this arrangement. Gen Ne Win’s “Burmese Way to Socialism” ideology may have impoverished the country and reduced parts of it to a police state, but, crucially, he was not aligned to the Communist bloc during the Cold War. I have never forgotten a Malaysian cabinet minister from the 1970s telling me: “Ne Win was our friend.”
It was because of the Tatmadaw’s centrality to the country that some argued, before the 2008 constitution and the supposed “roadmap to democracy” announced in 2003, that they had to be a part of the solution. Almost certainly because her assassinated father, Myanmar’s independence hero Aung San, was considered to be the founder of the Tatmadaw, his daughter Suu Kyi has often sounded curiously fond of the institution, if not of the officers who have jailed her time and again, talking of it sometimes as if it was a wayward son.
However, after the 2021 coup and the thousands of deaths for which the Tatmadaw are responsible, as well as what most consider to be their genocidal actions against the ethnic minority Rohingya, it would seem even more unpalatable to negotiate a new settlement with them. But what is the alternative?
Mahn Win Khaing Than, prime minister of the National Unity Government that opposes the junta, said in January 2022 that the solution was total revolution. “Everyone understands now that the military has to be eradicated,” he said. All the country’s many ethnic minorities had come together, he said, and “we would have won a long time ago if they [the Tatmadaw] didn’t have an air force”. Victory, he promised, would be “by the end of this year”.
That hasn’t been the outcome, and probably won’t be anytime soon and no outside power has the appetite for military intervention.
“The country will have to suffer for several decades to come if we don’t win this fight,” was Mahn Win Khaing Than’s bleak prediction a little more than a year ago. That may be true, too. But just because the outside world doesn’t know how to help Myanmar avoid that fate – as it really didn’t have a way to overturn military rule before – is not a reason to forget about it. Don’t let this tragedy disappear from our horizons..."
Source/publisher:
"The National"
Date of publication:
2023-02-16
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-16
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
more
Sub-title:
Myanmar’s journalists are rebuilding independent media with one foot in the country, and one foot out, writes Laure Siegel.
Description:
"As Myanmar’s bloody coup ticks over into its third year, local journalists continue to struggle to sustain and build independent media voices in support of democracy both inside the country and in the growing refugee diaspora.
It’s an evolving ecosystem depending on an underground network, including citizen journalists, philanthropic support, experimentation in distribution and voices — and raw courage in the face of a violent oppression by the Tatmadaw military junta.
The military broke the old system.
“I didn’t want to give up this job. But since the coup, journalists can’t report freely and have to worry about their and their relatives’ safety. So I had to flee.” says a young woman print and TV reporter, now in Thailand.
Journalists were among the first to be hunted down after the military coup, led by General Min Aung Hlaing on February 1, 2021, along with opposition politicians, social workers and activists. In the two years since, four journalists — all working in local media or as freelancers — have been killed and 145 arrested. About 60 remain in detention.
It effectively dismantled the network of democratic media that had spread across the country over the previous decade. Instead, the Myanmar junta became the world’s biggest jailer of journalists relative to population. The Committee for the Protection of Journalists listed Myanmar as the eighth worst country worldwide for impunity for crimes against journalists.
An independent media emerges
Still, the military’s attempts to control the media landscape did not stop a surge in independent outlets and content creation. This period also observed a decrease in popularity of state-controlled media.
Two years after the coup, the top media by audience remain the trusted four: BBC Burmese, Mizzima, Democratic Voice of Burma (DVB) and Voice of America (VOA).
All struggle to monetize this audience, especially as digital advertising prices have collapsed in Myanmar. One million online impressions earns media companies $US10, compared to $US570 in Europe and $US130 in Thailand.
Social media distribution has been constrained as Meta’s platforms have been banned in Myanmar.Now, only half of the country’s internet users who have access to VPNs can still access Meta. According to a survey by the News Consulting Group, only a third of Myanmar Meta users actively use Facebook as a main source of news.
“We have problems with Facebook because they don’t understand that we are covering a war so they regularly categorise our account as “Page at risk”. But only local media are punished for community violations when they publish videos of violent acts, not the big media. So when they block our audience, even though we have one million followers, we only reach 1000 people per post”.- founder of local media covering Myanmar central plains
As the usual revenue models of subscriptions, advertisements and events are denied independent media, most have turned to philanthropic grants to remain sustainable.
This has created an imbalance between the mainly English-language national media and the more poorly resourced, mostly local, media in Myanmar’s languages who lack staff dedicated to accounting or human resource management. Delays in transferring funds also disadvantages reporters relying on grants for their income:
We know how to write stories but we don’t know how to write proposals or grant forms. Our English skills are not good enough to fulfill the diverse requirements of international organizations, so we get less financial support than the big national media. — a local editor.
Most independent media have been forced to operate underground or abroad, mainly in Thailand, Bangladesh and India. At least a thousand Burmese journalists are estimated to live in exile since the coup, including a third in Thailand, often without refugee protections or the legal status that would allow them to pursue professional or educational opportunities. Their properties in Myanmar can still be seized and destroyed and their relatives are vulnerable to being taken hostage to impose pressure to keep quiet.
It’s a “one foot in, one foot out” model that brings big challenges. Despite those challenges, Myanmar’s journalists keep performing their duty of keeping their communities informed.
In-country, local media keeps providing a key link.
“Local media have built a very reliable network of sources over the years: they are our friends, relatives, neighbours. Even the media based in exile on the borderlands can still use the Myanmar telecom network to reach sources inside the country,” local editor.
They face greater risks, too, and have a responsibility to protect those sources — including from unwanted exposure by national or international media.
Hundreds of trainers conduct online and in-person capacity-building training sessions in mobile reporting, investigation, digital safety and feature writing. Organizations such as Myanmar Witness or the Center for Law and Democracy teach both citizen journalists and professional journalists to gather evidence of war crimes that could be used in international court cases.
Despite the electricity and Internet cuts, new distribution formats are being tested and developed, such as SMS, newsletters and podcasts. One prominent example is Kaladan media, the first Rohingya News Agency, which has been based in Bangladesh since 2001. They are one of the founders of the Burma News International (BNI), a network of fifteen independent media groups led by exiled Burmese journalists in India, Bangladesh and Thailand that was launched in 2003.
“We have been consistently challenging, monitoring and investigating the Burma Army Islamophobic narrative. During anti-Muslim violence in Myanmar, our website was hacked for six months and we were blocked on Facebook numerous times because of some users abusively reporting us. Our people don’t have easy access to the Internet so we launched a 30 minutes daily news bulletin, which is broadcasted in communal meeting places in refugee camps via loudspeakers.” — Tin Soe, editor-in-chief of the Kaladan Press Network explains.
Frontier Myanmar continues to run Doh Athan (“Our Voice”) program and local media such as Delta News Agency for the Irrawaddy region and Myaelatt Athan for Sagaing and Magway regions launched podcasts and weekly TV shows.
“We have three podcasts, one about news, one about healthcare and one is called ‘Letter from People Defence Forces’. We are reading on-air letters of pro-democracy fighters to their relatives or girlfriends. It’s a nice format that allows us to connect them with the people as they are trying to survive underground and are isolated from everyone”. A representative for Myaelatt Athan.
Dr. Miemie Winn Byrd, Adjunct Fellow at the East-West Center emphasises: “A successful revolution is at least 75% communication. In the context of Myanmar, I see the way forward as systematising the defection of soldiers, focusing on people’s support and keeping up the international interest”.
In the spirit of building bridges between skills and nationalities, the collective Visual Rebellion Myanmar was co-founded after the coup by Burmese media students and international creatives. A newsroom of journalists and artists based inside Myanmar and around the world produces together in-depth features, research reports, photo stories and documentaries about the impact of the coup from a human perspective. Some of the best content is adapted and translated to other languages, such as a series for French investigative outlet Mediapart.
Visual Rebellion is committed to prioritize story angles where people are agents and not only victims of their fates. This includes the unionization of Myanmar migrant workers in Thailand, the founding of a photo-magazine by Rohingya people in Cox’s Bazar refugee camp, women fighting frontline battles and grassroots coping mechanisms for surviving the economic crisis generated by the coup.
After a year-long scorched-earth campaign in the central plains by military troops, one member of the collective who is native to the area, explained: “I can’t write about dead bodies and burned villages anymore because it is repetitive in its horror, it publicises terrorist actions by the junta which has a deep impact on the moral of the people and it has a huge impact on my mental health as I know the areas and people targeted very well since childhood. We need to find other ways to tell the story”.
As it is estimated that 75 percent of the stories published by Burmese media are coup or conflict related, several audience surveys show a phenomenon of “coup-fatigue”. People would rather read about topics such as commodity prices, health, education and agriculture, as well as weather, refugees, business and international affairs.
Local journalists on the front line
As most international and national media pulled out their staff out of Myanmar, they rely for on the ground information on citizen reporters who sent information, pictures and videos from their phones and are poorly paid, or not paid at all.
It’s forcing a division in the Myanmar media community with different treatment between management-level editors who are often safely re-based abroad and on-the-ground, junior reporters survive on their own in precarious situations. National and international media often use content gathered by local media without compensation.
“Relying on non-professional media workers carries big risks: they struggle with emotional distance, take low-resolution pictures, send them to all media houses and then face copyright issues, some share names of sources online and most are not trained enough to check accuracy. Digital, physical, psycho-social and legal safety is a precondition for producing professional journalism and local citizens can’t fill the void without being given the proper tools.” — Toby Mendel, executive director for the Center of Law and Democracy
The pauperization of the information sector post-coup has pushed down media rates and professional reporters still present in the country now get offered citizen reporter wages. Media workers lack the negotiating power and industry body to obtain fair wages and safety measures, as denounced in the Anti-Theft Wage Campaign by the International Federation of Journalists,
The division drives internal mistrust. The founder of a local media in hiding in a Thai-Myanmar border town, says: “We try to identify military propaganda accounts by the terms they use to refer to the junta. We also know that some “journalists” come to border towns in Thailand to spy on real reporters in exile and report to the military back in Myanmar. Some journalists who were working for pro-military newspapers even get hired by independent media houses nowadays because there is no background check and clearance process anymore. Now anyone can apply for a media job via Messenger by sending some pictures and footage and claiming experience after having attended a two-week training for Citizen Reporters.
A group of reporters in exile has started a consultative process with independent media houses with the goal of creating a new MPC and Code of Conduct, freed from business or military chains, be it from the Burmese army or opposition forces. They also lobby the body in charge of drafting a Federal Democracy Charter, to include a clause about press freedom and journalism protection in the future Constitution.
Whichever political situation emerges from the ongoing conflict, the journalistic community is already engaged in healthy debates about implementing policies of self-regulation, rethinking ownership structure and pushing for inclusion as well as gender and ethnic diversity. A balance between external support and internal reflection is the way for Myanmar media to survive the war of information that is raging in the country.
Laure Siegel is a Southeast Asia based reporter for @Mediapart (http://rb.gy/qyvflr) and founder of @VisualRebellion Myanmar // In English (http://bit.ly/2WWnwA2)
This story is supported by the Friedrich Naumann Foundation as part of IPI’s work mapping and sharing the most exciting innovative and local media initiatives globally..."
Source/publisher:
International Press Institute
Date of publication:
2023-02-15
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-15
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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Description:
"Abstract: Frequently called the most persecuted minority in the world, the Rohingyas have suffered systematic violence and oppression in Myanmar since the 1970s. Today, the vast majority of the nearly three million Rohingyas are in exile, escaping state-sponsored human rights violations and persecution in the Rakhine state of Myanmar—a place they call “home”. Neighbouring Bangladesh, which currently hosts over a million displaced Rohingya, has been a ‘sanctuary’ for at least the last four decades. A sizable community has also emerged successively in other South-East Asian countries and pockets of Australia, Europe and North America. In this context, bringing together issues at the crossroads of (im)mobilities, online connectivity and the quest for identity, this study examines the role of social media platforms in forming and shaping new types of diaspora activism among the exiled Rohingyas. Drawing on yearlong online ethnographic findings, it unpacks how digital platforms constitute a space for togetherness, where diasporic Rohingya identities are constructed, contested and mediated. Analysing recurring themes and patterns of engagement on these web-based platforms, the paper looks at how diasporic civic and political e-activisms are transforming the very contours of Rohingya identity formation and their pursuit of recognition. Finally, focusing on such a creative constellation of socio-cultural and political issues in virtual space, we demonstrate how Rohingyas practice a politics of resistance and recognition when confronting the policy pretensions of Myanmar’s government.
Introduction
“In the first place, we do not like to be called ‘refugees.’“—Hannah Arendt.
In her classic essay “We Refugees”, Hannah Arendt describes the endless cognitive anxiety amongst the Jews of Europe as they fled the continent and made a new life in exile (Arendt, 2017). She depicts how difficult it is to relate to the psychological effects of political non-existence unless one has traversed the liminal space of a refugee. The contemporaneous of forced displacement, statelessness and the relentless search for a ‘safe place’ and an ‘identity’ across the globe reminds us how recurring and prescient Hannah Arendt’s century-old observation remains. Set within such interconnected trajectories of violence, statelessness and an endless search for identity, this paper puts a spotlight on Myanmar’s displaced Rohingyas—a scattered community in the process of becoming a nascent diaspora as a result of their protracted displacement. Since 2017, after their mass exodus from the Rakhine state into neighbouring Bangladesh, exiled Rohingya communities have started highlighting their plight while asserting a distinct ethnic identity (Ansar & Khaled, 2022; Abraham & Jaehn, 2020). Considering their increasing involvement in social, cultural and political issues on social media platforms, this article explores how the Rohingya diaspora has coalesced in digital spaces to build a transnational identity and how their digital activism has evolved to include a political dimension over time.
Frequently termed ‘the world’s most persecuted minority’, the Rohingyas have been subjected to persistent human rights violations, including ethnic cleansing, statelessness and possibly even genocide (Khaled, 2021; Ansar, 2020; Ibrahim, 2018; Alam, 2018). By introducing punitive policies, Rohingyas have been categorically denied a range of fundamental rights by the Myanmar government, including the freedom of movement, rights to education, primary health facilities, having family, marriage and employment (Ansar & Khaled, 2021; Uddin, 2020). Ethnic cleansing and persecution of Rohingyas in Myanmar and denial of their citizenship (therefore, effectively rendering them stateless) has been the political strategy of the successive military regimes. Today, the vast majority of the nearly three million Rohingyas is displaced, mostly in neighbouring Bangladesh, Malaysia, India and Thailand, as well as in in pockets across Europe, Australia and North America.
The predicament of the Rohingyas essentially remain unresolved in exile. The ambiguity around Rohingya’ s legal status pertaining to their perceived statelessness, irregular migration and lack of comprehensive protection policies in the host countries add to their struggle to survive and sustain. Most Rohingya-hosting Asian countries deny their rights as refugees stipulated in the 1951 Refugee Convention. Their confinement in makeshift settlements and sprawling camps, ambiguous and/or undocumented legal status and host countries’ arbitrary practices create certain mobility constraints, which Aziz (2022, p. 1) refers to as “immobility turn” or limited mobility within “situations of unequal power”. Furthermore, mobility is linked to legality and capacity in modern nation-states, which Rohingyas lack in Myanmar due to draconian military laws banning social gatherings and community mobilisation (Ansar & Khaled, 2022, p. 281). In exile, this “arrested refugee mobilities” (Hoffstaedter, 2019) that the Rohingya community continues to endure produces both horizontal (i.e., spatial/geographic) immobility and vertical (social) immobility, which cyclically compound each other (Jernigan, 2019). Nevertheless, amid such challenges, a diaspora network has grown, especially since 2017, with considerable online imprints. We define the growing digital footprint of the Rohingya community as the emergence of a ‘Rohingya Digital Diaspora’. Highlighting their increasing online participation, our findings reveal how such engagement reinvigorates a collective identity, mobilises civic resistance and builds a virtual ‘community of hope’ by providing material and emotional support.
Reflecting on these evolving Rohingya online engagements, this study makes a threefold contribution to digital diaspora studies. First, we examined how the (re)production of Rohingya identities on social media demonstrates their hybrid, multi-layered and fluid nature. Second, considering the constrained offline space and (im)mobility dynamics, we looked into how access to social media can yield an opportunity for ethnic and religious minorities such as Rohingyas for transnational lobbying, advocacy and agenda-framing towards building a strategic and positive consensus around their cause. Third, while celebrating “digital optimism”, a nuanced reflection on the offline inequalities, such as those manifested by age, gender, internet access, economic status and spatiality, needs to be adequately contextualised.
The debate on Rohingya identity: the unfolding of belonging, exclusion and exile
The nation-state centric identity has always been marked by a high degree of hybridity and ambiguity in post-colonial societies. In South and Southeast Asia, “questions surrounding nationality, citizenship, religion and identity are recurrent themes between the countries once united but separate nation-states now” (Sengupta, 2020, p. 114). Similarly, ethnic and religious identity and space are constantly being contested, refined and reorganised in the political landscape of Myanmar. This is particularly prominent in the bordering Rakhine state, where the formation of Rohingya identity has been heavily influenced by such fluidity (Ansar, 2020, p. 4).
Several issues appear to be decisive when we explore the documentation and broad historical analysis of how questions of Rohingya identity and conflict in the Rakhine state have arrived at this stage. These include: the stripping of the Rohingya citizenship and their statelessness (Uddin, 2020; Holliday, 2014); the role of Rohingyas during the colonial period (Alam, 2018; Ibrahim, 2018); military dictatorship and the emergence of Taing-Yin-tha meaning “national races” (Cheesman, 2017); and religion and the perceived threat from Islam (Ansar, 2020; Kyaw, 2015; Wade, 2017). These are just some of the profound issues to unpack in order to understand the making of the current crisis.
Broadly, three lines of arguments can be identified when exploring the Rohingya identity. First, some scholars claim a historic Rohingya presence in Myanmar (Uddin, 2020; Shafie, 2019; Ibrahim, 2018). Secondly, there are scholars who tend to discredit such narratives that argue Rohingya is a post-colonial political identity promoted by the Muslim political elites in Arakan as a tool to promote their fight for political autonomy after the Second World War (Leider, 2018; Tonkin, 2014). The third line of argument instead takes a critical approach between the two opposing narratives. Going beyond the polarising opinions, it argues that the fundamental question of the process of identity formation and the complex status of the ethnic and religious minorities in post-colonial nation-state formation should be in the spotlight (Ansar, 2020; Sengupta, 2020; Alam, 2018).
One of the watershed moments in modern-day Myanmar’s identity politics is the emergence of Taing-Yin-tha, or “the indigenous races”, under the 1982 citizenship law introduced by the military dictatorship in Myanmar. The concept of Taing-Yin-tha emerged as a decisive political language that provides the guideline of which facts are accepted and rejected in determining membership in Myanmar’s political community. In contemporary Myanmar, Taing-Yin-tha has become an exemplary term of state: a contrivance for political inclusion and exclusion, political eligibility and domination (Cheesman, 2017, p. 462). The Rohingya were not included among the 135 official indigenous races. Consequently, some 2.5 million Rohingyas are excluded from Taing-Yin-tha, making them one of the world’s largest stateless populations. They remain the only community in independent Myanmar whose citizenship is “still unresolved and contested by the government and people”(Kyaw, 2015, p. 50). Going further, Uddin (2020, p.4) argues that Myanmar’s dealing with the Rohingyas is not just a manifestation of their non-citizenship; it is precisely a practice meant to “reduce the Rohingyas to a status lesser than that of human beings”, and thereby push them into a ‘subhuman life’.
From diaspora to digital diaspora: revisiting a complex transformation
Diaspora is a concept subject to various definitions and interpretations (Ponzanesi, 2020). It is defined “as a set of relationships between the homeland, which functions as a centre of gravity, and a periphery of nodes—communities, groups and individuals—who relate to the territory of origin as a centre of gravity but live in different parts of the world” (Ben-David, 2012, p. 461). Earlier studies mainly considered the dispersed population as diaspora, i.e., the Jewish, Greek and Armenian communities in exile. Today, this term shares meanings “with a larger semantic domain that includes words like an immigrant, expatriate, refugee, guest worker, exile community, overseas community, ethnic community” (Tölölyan, 1991, p. 04). While a distinction between various forms of diasporas is plausible, community belongingness, a sense of loss, nostalgia and transnationality are universal features embedded in almost all diaspora communities.
The influence of information and communication technology in the past decade has not only transformed the ways and scales of interactions among diaspora members but also led to a substantial transformation in the modern understanding of diaspora (Marat, 2015; Lobbé, 2021; Bernal, 2020). From structured networks of migrant websites to more personalised WhatsApp and Facebook groups, the wide variety of digital layers is taking the notion of diasporic organisations to a new height (Dekker et al., 2018; Dumitriu, 2012). In this changing milieu, hybrid and multifaceted migrant identities are constructed and negotiated through various discursive means (Georgalou, 2021). The advancements and proliferation of such online communication technologies encouraged a new form of virtual diasporic connections and networks that is gaining prominence as the digital diaspora. This connection reminds the members of “where their roots are, their original home, their sense of belonging, their community” (Ponzanesi, 2020, p. 983).
Emerging scholarship has started to accentuate the evolving nexus between technological advancement, the proliferation of social media and the ability of diaspora populations to create networks and become part of transnational diaspora networks (Alonso & Oiarzabal, 2010; Kapur, 2010; Alunni, 2019). In digital migration studies, research has made a significant contribution to understanding refugees’ engagement with social media and other digital tools to stay in contact with transnational families during their migration, as well as during their process of settlement in the host countries (Alencar et al., 2018; Kaufmann, 2018; Leurs & Smets, 2018). Recent studies on digital diasporas also bring together complex intersections of technology, culture, political economy and agency (Bernal, 2020). For instance, in contrast to the earlier opinion of celebrating digital media as liberating and empowering for marginalised groups (Titifanue et al., 2018), more critical analysis now raises questions regarding the outcome of digital empowerment and whether such tools can bring about changes in the political and social discourse (Taylor & Meissner, 2020; Latonero & Kift, 2018; Papacharissi, 2015).
Scholars also attempted to reveal how big corporations and states use digital platforms to extend their centralised power and use it for surveillance purposes when necessary (Bircan & Korkmaz, 2021; Zuboff, 2019). Furthermore, social media posts and activities are being systematically monitored to validate or disprove the LGBTIQ identity of many refugees requesting asylum in European countries. Targeted social media campaigns and recruitment of paid agents to monitor the Facebook activities of migrants have also become one of the strategies for governments to control and counter immigration (Andreassen, 2021; Brekke & Thorbjørnsrud, 2020). Scholars have also started to highlight the potentially pernicious role of digital tools in stimulating ‘digital nationalism’ by dividing public debate through the establishment of filter ‘bubbles’ and ‘echo chambers’ in which individuals with homogenous political thinking promote ethnocentric ideas and content that align with their views and opinions. (Mihelj & Jiménez-Martínez, 2021; Cardenal et al., 2019; Dubois & Blank, 2017).
There is also growing criticism of the dominant strand of literature on digital migration studies that are heavily focused on the Global North, particularly Europe. Such criticism has become more widespread following the so-called refugee crisis in Europe in 2015, which demands a decentralised approach to diaspora and forced migration studies and input from the perspective of the Global South (Leurs & Smets, 2018). For instance, despite the scale and extent of the Rohingya crisis in Southeast Asia, literature that offers a nuanced understanding of their digital resistance and resilience remains inadequate. To date, we have come across only a few studies that partly address the digital engagement of Rohingya refugees (e.g., Aziz, 2022; Ansar & Khaled, 2022; Abraham & Jaehn, 2020). Taking a gender lens, Ansar & Khaled (2022) presents how social media has widened the scale and scope of Rohingya women activists’ civic participation in exile. In his latest work on Rohingya digital engagements, Aziz shows how digital platforms compensate for the community’s social and spatial immobility through “digitally mediated transnational care” (Aziz, 2022, p. 01). In another recent contribution, he also presents how “the affordances of social media platforms” have facilitated Rohingyas negotiating their protracted experiences of suffering (Aziz, 2022a, p. 4082). With a mix of online and offline platforms, Abraham and Jaehn’s study (2020) shows how “diasporic Rohingya actions go beyond readily understandable demands for justice, accountability, redress” and consciously, or otherwise, take steps to reaffirm collective Rohingya identity (p. 1056). Adding onto these unfolding dynamics, this article brings an organic reflection on this ‘digital diaspora in the making’ and their forms of engagement in online platforms and its manifold implications.
Theoretical and methodological framework
The paper’s theoretical foundations are based on the premise that scattered and oppressed ethnoreligious minorities or endangered groups, frequently organised in diasporas, use the internet to “re-create identities, share opportunities, spread their culture, influence homeland and host-land policy, or create debate about common-interest issues using electronic devices” (Alonso & Oiarzabal, 2010, p. 11). In an “unevenly interconnected world”, digital platforms provide spaces and offer alternatives to tap resources and capacity building, creating links and connectivity for dispersed communities (Ponzanesi, 2020, p. 978). This virtual space acts as “crucial protagonists” (Marino, 2015, p. 01) to manifest “diasporic identity, political activism and sentiment towards homeland” (Marat, 2015, p. 01). Besides, the “low barriers to entry and exit, and non-hierarchical and non-coercive” nature of the internet provides diasporas with a complete package of ‘benefits’ to pursue their socio-political and cultural endeavour on digital platforms (Brinkerhoff, 2009, pp. 47–48). Apart from creating a transnational network of solidarity, it allows the “expression of diverse and contested views” of the community members (Titifanue et al., 2018, p. 02).
Given the access to digital platforms by the exiled Rohingyas and the scale and extent of their virtual engagement, we have employed digital ethnography (Pink, 2013) as a method for observing their activities in virtual space. It is argued that such internet-based observations “can creatively deploy forms of engagement to look at how these sites are socially constructed and, at the same time, are social conduits” with ‘online traces’ such as retweets, hyperlinks and hashtags (Hine, 2009, p. 11). The rapidity with which people across several platforms keep up to date and their willingness to argue and voice opposing perspectives when appropriate via these interconnected networks is even more remarkable (Postill & Pink, 2012). These diverse and fast-changing characteristics have also led to more nuanced and innovative methods of using online ethnography (Pink et al., 2016). We use a ‘discourse-centred’ (Androutsopoulos, 2009) online ethnography and employ a ‘screen-based’ discourse analysis that concentrates on “systemic longitudinal and repeated observations of online-discourse” (Georgalou, 2021, p. 4).
In doing online ethnography, it is also pertinent to acknowledge the limitations of virtual platforms on the findings. For instance, Dicks et al. (2005, p.128) caution that the internet should never be read as a ‘neutral’ observation space, as it always remains a fieldwork setting and, as such, a researcher’s data selection and analyses are always biased by agendas, personal histories and social norms. Besides, the drawback of these research options is that membership of these communities is inherently restricted to the digital ‘haves’ (or at least those with digital social capital) rather than the ‘have nots’, and ethnic/gender digital divides strongly persist (Murthy, 2008). Therefore, like any other data source, social networking websites should be treated in a nuanced or layered fashion and contextualised properly (Murthy, 2008, p. 846).
Informed consent appears to be a crucial aspect of researching online communities. Whether and to what extent informed consent is required remains a contested topic (Willis, 2017, p. 3). According to Association of Internet Researchers (AoIR) ethical guidelines, public forums can be considered more public than conversations in a closed chatroom (Ess and AoIR, 2002: pp. 5, 7). Hence, ‘the greater the acknowledged publicity of the venue, the less obligation there may be to protect individual privacy, confidentiality, right to informed consent, etc.’ (Ess and AoIR, 2002, p. 5). Whiteman (2012, p. 9) also suggests it is preferable to take a contextualised approach to each online situation instead of adhering to generalised, context-free principles. Considering the above observations, the researchers sought ethical guidance from their respective institutions and received prior ethical approval before conducting their research. Furthermore, given the sensitivities of the topic, individual posts, images and tweets shared in this article are blurred to maintain confidentiality and any information that discloses the individual identity has been carefully revisited and avoided when referring to the data and images.
For data collection, we followed two major social media platforms: Facebook and Twitter. We analysed relevant Facebook and Twitter accounts and determined the top ten accounts based on the number of followers, the frequency of postings and the volume of comments. The Facebook pages and Twitter accounts were identified using eight search terms: ‘Rohingya refugee’, ‘Rohingya genocide’, ‘Rohingya women’, ‘exiled Rohingya’, ‘Rohingya activist’, ‘Arakan Rohingya’, ‘United Nations and Rohingya’ and ‘Rohingya in Bangladesh’. The qualitative corpus comprised posts and tweets that were open to the public. The study covers the period from August 2019 to August 2021. One of the authors has near-native fluency in the Rohingya language and initially attempted to explore Facebook pages and Twitter accounts on the Rohingya language despite the absence of Rohingya script, which remains an oral dialect (Aziz, 2022a, p. 4073). It did not yield significant success, prompting searching for relevant online platforms and social media tools using English.Footnote1 For instance, UNHCR in Malaysia has a dedicated website on “The Rohingya language”, which is written in Latin alphabets.Footnote2 Therefore, language and its digital representation bring another important dimension when exploring the Rohingya community’s social media engagement. The use of English in contemporary diaspora presents an ‘interesting cleavage’, as a native language is often considered a salient marker of collective identity (Kumar, 2018). We avoid the discussion at length here as it goes beyond the scope of our study; nonetheless, it is a crucial aspect to shed light on in future research on the Rohingyas. Nevertheless, we do acknowledge there are other platforms, including more private platforms like WhatsApp (Aziz, 2022a). We did not pursue these, as our purpose was to retrieve online and easily accessible data to any random visitor to those webpages.
For analysis, the transcripts of Facebook discussions and tweets were manually inserted into a dataset. This dataset was then transferred and analysed using Max Q.D.A. software to categorise the thematic contents, frequency of words, hashtags and recurring themes. Through this categorisation and coding, key themes emerged. These themes were then merged and clustered thematically, as detailed in the following section.
From exile to online: emergence of a digital Rohingya diaspora
Multiple trajectories, including the construction of a collective Rohingya identity, political and social mobilisation and solidarity with fellow Rohingyas through providing information and long-distance emotional and material support, have emerged as the recurring features of their digital engagements. The internet has effectively bridged geographical barriers amongst Rohingyas with similar concerns by functioning as a ‘mobilising structure’ (Kumar, 2018, p. 11). The proliferation of virtual engagements creates conditions where individuals come together on shared hopes, purposes and objectives, which Tsagarousianou (2007) defined as ‘co-presence’ and Marino (2015) refers to as ‘space making’.
To detail out these manifold engagements, we conduct a two-pronged analysis of the Rohingya diaspora’s digital participation. First, we begin with a focus on the scale of engagement, bringing attention to their growing participation in digital space. Second, we take a more in-depth look at the domains of engagement, highlighting the key aspects that predominate in the interaction that takes place online.
Scale of engagement
Owing to rapid development and relatively easier access to technologies, more Rohingyas are embracing digital platforms to interact with one another and the greater international communities. For example, only three of the ten most followed Facebook pages were created before 2017. Table 1 presents an overview of the ten most popular (in terms of membership) Rohingya Facebook groups active in different parts of the world, where membership reaches as high as 223,000 as of August 2021 (see Table 1).Footnote3..."
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Nature.com
Date of publication:
2023-02-15
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-15
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Individual Documents
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Arakan (Rakhine) State - reports etc. by date (latest first), Discrimination against the Rohingya, Rohingya (cultural, political etc.), Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Burmese refugees in Bangladesh, Human Rights and international relations
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"Following the second anniversary of Myanmar’s coup and the junta’s extension of emergency rule for six more months, The Irrawaddy’s editor-in-chief Aung Zaw talks to the US State Department Counsellor Derek Chollet about the extension, possible pressure to prevent the regime from using airstrikes against civilians and reasons for optimism.
Q: How do you view the extension of emergency rule by the regime?
Chollet: I think that this extension of the emergency law by another six months is yet another transparent attempt by the SAC [State Administrative Council] to justify its unlawful rule. It is two years ago that the junta took action to undo the November 2020 election. And of course, it’s been trying ever since to find ways to legitimize itself and to find the way for it to justify its rule.
We are, of course, also ready and prepared for an announcement at some point about holding new elections, which we have been very clear about for the last better part of the last year so that any new elections would be illegitimate. They’d be sham elections.
You cannot hold free and fair elections when you are killing and locking up your political opposition, not allowing political parties to operate and you don’t control 50 percent of your territory.
So this is just the news today which is just another step by the junta that we reject.
Instead of finding ways to perpetuate its unjust rule, we call on the SAC to return Myanmar to the path of democracy and engage in meaningful discussions in which Myanmar can get back on that path.
Q: What pressure could prevent the junta from using airstrikes against civilians?
Chollet: Well, we have seen the horrors only multiply over the last two years in terms of what the junta is willing to do against its own people who, by the way, are firing back on the junta because it’s only hardening the resolve of the opposition.
We have taken steps along with our allies and partners over the last several years now to try to make it harder for the junta to generate revenues and also harder for the junta to acquire arms. Unfortunately, because of the views of some members of the UN Security Council, a ban on arms is not going to be achievable anytime soon, if ever.
Nevertheless, the United States feels the country should not be supplying the junta with military hardware. We have seen countries take a step back in their willingness to engage militarily with the junta. Unfortunately, other countries, like Russia, have only doubled down on their relationship with the junta. And the military relationship has only grown stronger between Myanmar and Russia over the last several years, particularly as the circle of friends that both have had gotten smaller because of what Russia has been doing in Ukraine and what Myanmar has been doing against its own people.
So we took some additional steps with the United States along with allies and partners [on January 31] to try to make it harder for the junta to acquire arms. And we’ll continue in the coming weeks and months to augment those steps, to make it harder for the junta to acquire the capabilities and the spare parts that it needs to prosecute this war.
Q: The Burmese people welcome these moves. The people are united against the junta and the support from Russia. How do you respond to the claims that the US is outsourcing responsibility to ASEAN?
Chollet: Our policy has been rooted in three lines of effort. First was to isolate and punish the junta and to make it harder for the junta to generate revenue and acquire resources and weapons. Second has been to help support the pro-democratic opposition within Myanmar.
That’s been principally through our work with the National Unity Government [NUG], but also beyond that, with the NUCC [National Unity Consultative Council], with the EAOs [ethnic armed organizations] with the PDF [People Defense Force]. We have been engaging with them.
I’ve personally been engaging with them over the last several years, either in person or virtually trying to figure out what they need, give them our best advice and also give them, as best we can, the support that they need.
And the United States is not alone in this effort. We’re working with others in the region and beyond in support of the NUG.
And then, third, to help continue to provide humanitarian assistance to the people of Myanmar. The United States is the largest single donor of humanitarian assistance to the people of Myanmar. We are constantly exploring ways to get that assistance into Myanmar more efficiently, more effectively, to the people that need it the most.
And we will redouble those efforts in the time to come.
What I can say is we have been working very hard, and really the foundation of our policy has been to work very hard with our ASEAN partners.
This is not a matter of outsourcing anything to anyone.
ASEAN, of course, has a vested interest in Myanmar’s future, in Myanmar’s stability and Myanmar being a democracy.
Whether you’re a country that borders Myanmar, whether you’re an ASEAN country that is a littoral state, you have an interest in Myanmar’s future, because Southeast Asia matters so much to the United States for our strategic interests. That’s why Myanmar matters to us. Myanmar matters to the stability of Southeast Asia and the ability of ASEAN countries to reach their full potential. And we very strongly value that partnership with ASEAN as you know.
We are very pleased with the strong steps that ASEAN has taken over the last year to try to make it harder for the regime to gain any sense of legitimacy or recognition by the international community.
When it comes to being able to participate at a political level at meetings such as the US-ASEAN Special Summit that we hosted in Washington back in May, all the way up until the high-level meetings at the end of last year and even the informal ASEAN foreign ministerial meeting that Indonesia is hosting now.
Myanmar will not be represented at the political level. We think that it’s important to maintain that isolation of the regime and the inability of the regime to get any legitimacy or recognition.
At the same time, as I said, we’re working closely with our allies and partners to try to give the opposition as much support as we can.
And just yesterday in Washington, Daniel Kritenbrink, who’s my colleague and our assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, visited the NUG office in Washington.
I will be visiting myself very soon and we’re going to continue that constant dialogue with the NUG and other pro-democracy opposition in Myanmar to figure out how best we can provide a way forward or help them find a way forward in this crisis. I should also note we’re working closely with other international organizations, principally the United Nations, and we’ve all been in close touch.
I’ve personally been in close touch with the UN special envoy for Myanmar, as well as the human rights rapporteur for Myanmar, who’s made some very strong statements, including an important report that was just released on the situation.
The UN Security Council, in a historic first, late last year, finally passed a resolution condemning what was going on inside Myanmar. There were very important steps for the Security Council to be heard on this issue formally through a resolution.
It had issued a statement and had briefings in the past. But I think that’s an indication of the seriousness with which the world is taking this crisis, the fact that the Security Council was finally able to overcome its differences and speak to this issue.
Q: Can the US do more to protect civilians?
Chollet: Well again, we will continue to provide that significant support for the people of Myanmar and the humanitarian assistance as well as support to the National Unity Government and other pro-democracy actors in Myanmar to enable them to gain more capability and prepare them for what we hope and believe will be one day a return to democracy inside Myanmar.
And the National Unity Government, as well as other pro-democracy leaders, has really done some very significant work to think about the future of Myanmar’s Constitution and governance to prepare for that day, which we hope will come soon when Myanmar will return to democracy.
And it’s important to note this will be a different country than it was on January 31, 2021. It will be a different democracy.
And I think the opposition and National Unity Government and their colleagues have learned a lot about some of the challenges that the previous democratic government in Myanmar had, as well as, of course, what’s been going on now, and taking that into account for the future democracy of Myanmar.
And we will continue to find ways to support that democratic opposition and the people of Myanmar. The Burma Act, which was passed by the US Congress late last year, was a bipartisan piece of legislation.
We, the Biden administration, worked very closely with our Republican and Democrat colleagues on Capitol Hill to help craft that legislation.
We are fully supportive of that act. And that gives us some important new tools that we plan to use to help the people of Myanmar realize their democratic destiny.
Q: What is the status of the NDAA Burma Act? Has implementation started?
Chollet: We have started to implement the various components of that act. Of course, some of those components are going to take a while to begin implementing.
But one of the things that we believe is so important about it is again, it registered and symbolized the bipartisan commitment in Washington to the support that we believe we need to give to the people of Myanmar, to the democratic opposition inside Myanmar.
And we are going to be working with our allies and partners in the region and beyond to coordinate our efforts because we believe that we are much stronger when we are working together on these issues.
And the people of Myanmar deserve our support, given the tremendous hardship they’ve been facing that you have done such a terrific job covering this crisis from the very beginning. We’re going to continue to do our part so that when we meet again a year from now, we’re talking about the democratic path that Myanmar is on, not the bloody hardships that the junta is perpetrating against its people.
Q: Why are you so optimistic in the face of this brutality?
Chollet: Well, again, part of the job is.
Q: Could Thailand do more?
Chollet: It’s important to be a successful diplomat, you have to have some degree of optimism. You have to be really realistic too. Even when you’re faced with a crisis like Myanmar, which there’s a lot to be pessimistic about, I have gained optimism.
During the [February 1] silent strike the scope is yet another symbol of the tremendous resilience, spirit and strength of Myanmar’s civil society, of its pro-democracy, not just leaders, but everyday citizens who want a better life for themselves and are willing to stand up and push back against this brutal junta.
The resilience and strength of Myanmar’s civil society have surprised the junta.
I don’t think they expected it was going to be this kind of fight when they took the steps they took two years ago. So that gives me hope and optimism.
And the work that the NUG and other pro-democracy groups have done over the last two years gives me hope for a more democratic future.
That said we have to be realistic. This is going to be tough. There are going to be many tough days ahead. Unfortunately, the continued airstrikes mean we have to realistically expect some of that to continue now.
But we need to continue to work hard to put that to an end, to find ways to cut off the regime’s ability to access resources and weapons and strengthen the opposition. That’s something we are committed to.
And the countries of the region are critical parts of that. Thailand is a critical ally of the United States. We’ve been treaty allies now for decades. Thailand has a very long border with Myanmar, and a lot of its core national security interests are at stake.
I can tell you we have a running dialogue with our partners in Thailand in person and over the phone about the way forward there. Thailand is a critical ally with a lot at stake and we are working closely with them.
And the other members of ASEAN, whether it was Cambodia last year as ASEAN chair, Brunei in 2021 or this year, of course, we’re looking forward to working closely, even more closely with our good friends in Jakarta as they are chairing ASEAN through this year.
It’s very important that we are working together, US, ASEAN, but also more broadly, the UK, Canada, Australia, Japan, Korea and other countries with interest and influence in the situation in Myanmar.
Q: Many powerful cronies close to the regime remain unpunished by sanctions.
Chollet: We recently announced a new set of sanctions against individuals and entities, including some of those individuals who are most closely associated with Myanmar’s ability to generate revenues from energy as well as the arms trade.
We will continue to be looking at any individual or entity who’s associated with those efforts, and they should know that more is coming, and they should stop these activities because if they don’t, they will be punished. And again, this is not just the United States doing this, its partners like the UK, Australia, Canada and others. The EU has imposed significant sanctions as well.
What we’re seeing is the world, not just Southeast Asia, but increasingly the balance of the rest of the world, come down against what the junta is doing and be willing to take significant steps to ensure the junta pays the price for what it’s doing..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2023-02-15
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-15
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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Description:
"The United States, through the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), is providing an additional $50 million in humanitarian assistance for emergency food and nutrition assistance in Burma, where increased displacements, armed conflict, and growing food insecurity are compounding existing needs. According to the United Nations’s recently released Humanitarian Needs Overview, more than 17 million people across Burma, almost one in three, are now in need of humanitarian assistance in 2023, compared to less than one million in 2020.
With this new funding, USAID will work with the United Nations World Food Program (WFP) to treat and prevent malnutrition in conflict-affected states, helping more than 750,000 people. This assistance includes providing monthly food rations, as well as nutrition commodities for children under five, and pregnant and lactating women.
USAID remains committed to providing immediate and emergency life saving support to people in need throughout Burma and commends those working peacefully towards an inclusive and democratic future for the people of Burma..."
Source/publisher:
United States Agency for International Development (Washington, D.C.)
Date of publication:
2023-02-15
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-15
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
The discussion on humanitarian assistance to Burma, GONGOs (Government-Organised "NGOs"), Human Rights and international relations
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Description:
"Documented incidents:
23 January 2023: In Pu Tein Pyin village, Kyauk Hmaw village tract, Yinmabin township and district, Sagaing region, two ambulances along with a religious building and nine civilian houses were torched by the Myanmar military during a raid on the village. Source: Radio Free Asia
24 January 2023: In Monywa town, township, and district, Sagaing region, the Myanmar military seized an ambulance owned by the LNGO Pyi-taw-thar during a raid at Shwe Let Pan monastery.
Three monks and five civilians were arrested and the ambulance was later used for election campaign activities. Sources: Democratic Voice of Burma and The 74 Media
25 January 2023: In Thaketa township, Yangon district, Yangon region, the junta authorities inspected private hospitals and clinics to see if they employed Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM)-affiliated health workers. Source: Mekong News
26 January 2023: In Dagon Myothit township, Yangon district and region, around 100 junta authorities and military and police forces inspected the Grand Yangon Private Hospital. The ward administrators and police forces also inspected two private clinics Kyal-sin-thit and Aye-chan-say reportedly to see whether they employed CDM-affiliated health workers. Source: Mekong News Reported on 26 January 2023: In Yangon district and region, the junta authorities asked for employee lists from private hospitals and clinics, closely monitored local pharmacies, and issued warnings not to employ CDM-affiliated health workers. The police and intelligence forces reportedly impersonated patients to track down CDM-affiliated health workers. Source: Delta News Agency
26 January 2023: In Pa Du village and village tract, Sagaing township, district and region, an armed group entered a station hospital, threatened the guard, and took away a portable X-ray machine, an operating table, an oxygen concentrator, and medicines. The hospital was not functioning at the time of the attack. The junta authorities accused the local resistance forces of this attack. Source: Telegram..."
Source/publisher:
Insecurity Insight
Date of publication:
2023-02-07
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-14
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations, Public Health, Spring Revolution
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452.35 KB
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Description:
"In late-November / early-December the MAU conducted a second-round survey of displaced households in Chin State to understand challenges they face. The study is based on a probability sample representing 1900 households currently or previously enrolled in cash assistance programs. MAU reports are available online at www.themimu.info/market-analysis-unit.
KEY FINDINGS
Seventy-nine percent of IDP households were still displaced in early-December, and 15% were returnees;
The portion of IDPs living in temporary shelters rose and the portion in displaced sites fell, while three-in-five IDP households continued to live in host homes;
Ten percent of IDP households were living outside their original township, and 3% had left Chin State;
Security and food access improved since September, but health care and nutrition remained poor for many;
Access to medicines worsened in December and health care remained poor for more than half;
Fewer households described their freedom of movement as poor, but one-quarter were still unable to travel to a food market in the past thirty days;
More households used cash assistance to buy food compared to three months earlier, and fewer used credit;
Food insecurity measures improved, likely due to changes in security, mobility and seasonal supply.
The number of displaced persons in Chin State grew in late-2022, despite reports of fewer conflict events. According to data from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Project (ACLED), the number of conflict-related events in Chin State declined from September to December 2022, reaching their lowest point in more than one year (see Figure 1).1 UN estimates also suggest slower growth in the number of IDP in Chin State during part of this period. IDP counts in Chin State were unchanged in September and October, although in November they increased from 45,800 to 53,700.2 Indeed, Chin State continued to experience clashes in late-2022, and many IDPs struggled not only with the continued threat of armed conflict but also poor access to nutritious food, health care, education and adequate livelihood opportunities to meet their basic needs. As armed conflict continues to disrupt critical market systems, more data is needed on the conditions of IDPs in Chin State.
The MAU surveyed current and former IDP households primarily from Thantlang township about their living conditions and market access. The survey of roughly 380 households represents a population of more than 1900 currently- or previously-displaced households which enrolled in one or more cash assistance programs. The study focussed on displacement status, household living conditions, financial resources, access to markets/ goods and food security. The study is not intended to represent all IDPs in Chin State, nor is it intended as an evaluation of the effectiveness of cash programs there.
The study includes the results of an earlier survey of the same population in late-August / early-September 2022..."
Source/publisher:
Myanmar Information Management Unit (Myanmar) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of publication:
2023-02-14
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-14
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Education in Burma/Myanmar - general, Food Security and nutrition in Burma/Myanmar, Public Health, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Format :
pdf
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3.53 MB
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Sub-title:
Harsh New Measures Would Crush Party Participation in Politics
Description:
"(Sydney) – Myanmar’s new political parties law will prevent key members of the political opposition from running in upcoming elections, Human Rights Watch said today. The law, announced on January 26, 2023, adds to concerns that the vote now slated for August will lack all credibility and be used merely to try to legitimize further military control.
The Political Party Registration Law, which repeals 2010 legislation, prohibits anyone previously convicted of a crime or serving a prison term from joining a political party. This disqualifies many senior members of the National League for Democracy (NLD), including the party leader, Aung San Suu Kyi and President Win Myint, both serving lengthy sentences on fabricated charges. The military overthrew the newly elected NLD-led government on February 1, 2021.
“Myanmar’s junta adopted the Political Party Registration Law not only to rig the planned elections but to try to obtain legitimacy for a military-controlled state,” said Manny Maung, Myanmar researcher at Human Rights Watch. “The junta is creating a system to crush all political opposition and derail any possible return to democratic civilian rule.”
The new law states that existing political parties must reregister within 60 days of the law’s enactment or risk being dissolved, and disqualifies any political group declared as an “unlawful association or terrorist organization under any existing law.” The junta has already declared the opposition National Unity Government (NUG) and its parliamentary body, the Committee Representing the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (the Union Parliament) as “terrorist organizations” for alleged attacks against the military since the coup.
The law requires political groups seeking to put forward electoral candidates to have at least 100,000 members within three months of registering, a huge increase from 1,000 in the previous law, and a prohibitive bar for most parties. It also requires national political parties to have funds of at least 100 million kyat (US$47,000) to qualify for registration, far more than most smaller parties can afford. For regional or state parties, the minimum amount required in the party coffers is 10 million kyat ($4,700). These requirements will make it nearly impossible for smaller ethnic and minority parties to take part in elections, Human Rights Watch said.
The NLD responded that it “steadfastly” objected to any election under the military junta, and that it refused to register. Other smaller parties, such as the Kayah State Democracy and the Kayan National Party, also said they will not register and therefore face dissolution. Some ethnic minority parties such as the Shan Nationalities Democratic Party and the United Democracy Party have indicated they plan to register.
The People’s Defense Forces, which are anti-junta militias, have indicated that they aim to disrupt preparations for the elections and have attacked some junta personnel conducting a population survey that could be used to assemble voter rolls. This raises concerns that members of political parties that register under the new law could also be targeted.
On February 1, 2023, the junta extended the state of emergency in the country for six months. On February 2, the junta imposed new martial law orders in 37 additional townships in Chin, Karen, Karenni, Magway and Mon States, and Bago, Sagaing, and Tanintharyi Regions. The orders impose curfews and curb freedom of association and movement, restricting political parties from organizing.
The military-drafted 2008 Constitution, although designed to perpetuate military control, requires the state to enact laws to allow political parties to organize for the “flourishing of a genuine, disciplined multi-party democratic system.” Under the new law and additional martial law orders, any election would be dominated by junta-backed political parties and the military itself, which already holds 25 percent of seats in the national and local legislatures under the 2008 Constitution.
The Political Parties Registration Law fails to meet international standards in respecting the rights of political parties to organize and stand for election. Under international law, voters should have the right to freely choose their candidates, and any conditions placed on political party and candidate registration should be reasonable and non-discriminatory.
Establishing a credible, pluralistic, and rights respecting electoral system is essential to holding genuine democratic elections in which voters freely choose their representatives. Despite the limitations imposed by the 2008 Constitution, in November 2020, voters exercised their right to choose their government, a right that the military denied by staging a coup.
Concerned governments, including regional partners such as member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Japan, and India, should condemn the political parties law and ensure that they do not lend credibility to the junta’s attempt to legitimize military control through sham elections.
The United Kingdom, the United States, and European Union member states should coordinate with other like-minded governments to strengthen and enforce targeted sanctions against senior junta officials and military entities in Myanmar.
“The 2021 military coup strangled the hopes of the Myanmar people who had voted in credible elections in 2020,” Maung said. “Concerned governments need to put concerted pressure on the junta to return to a democratically elected civilian government.”..."
Source/publisher:
Human Rights Watch (USA)
Date of publication:
2023-02-14
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-14
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
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Sub-title:
National Unity Government’s new shadow embassy comes after Congress passed the Burma Act.
Description:
"Myanmar's opposition National Unity Government officially opened a shadow embassy in Washington on Monday, with a U.S. State Department official at the event using a speech to reject the legitimacy of elections planned by the military junta later this year.
The so-called NUG has set up a government-in-exile after the military took power from a democratically elected government in a February 2021 coup.
The foreign minister of this shadow government, Zin Mar Aung, said at the opening that the passage of the Burma Act as part of last year’s defense spending bill enabled her shadow government to officially open the office.
“The NUG's office was able to be opened after the U.S. government enacted the Burma Act, which includes promises to encourage and support Myanmar's democracy,” Zin Mar Aung said, noting the office would play an important role in the NUG's fight for democracy.
She said the “presence of U.S. government officials at the office opening … signaled the state of official engagement” between the United States and the NUG in the wake of the Burma Act.
Election legitimacy
Uzra Zeya, the U.S. undersecretary of state for civilian security, democracy, and human rights, told the ceremony the United States was committed to the restoration of democracy in Myanmar.
“The U.S. government continues to encourage and support Myanmar's return to the path of inclusive democracy as contained in the Burma Act,” Zeya said. “The deputy foreign minister also said that it is important for the United States and the countries in the region not to accept the fake election that will be held by the military junta.”
The comments reflect those previously made by U.S. State Department counselor Derek Chollet, who had dismissed the legitimacy of any elections held by Myanmar’s junta under current circumstances.
“Any election that the regime might have … will have no chance of being free or fair, given that the regime has imprisoned or intimidated nearly all critical potential contenders, and indeed does not control nearly 50% of Burma's territory,” Chollet told reporters Jan. 31.
Among other things, the Burma Act allows the U.S. State Department to engage directly with Myanmar’s opposition groups, including the NUG, and forces it to develop a coherent program of sanctions against the military junta.
New home base
Monday’s event was also attended by NUG Deputy Foreign Minister Moe Zaw Oo and Myanmar’s U.N. ambassador, Kyaw Moe Tun, who has held onto the post to which he was appointed before the coup.
Moe Zaw Oo said the new office would prove an important home base.
“This office represents the ministry of foreign affairs of the National Unity Government,” Moe Zaw Oo said. “We have opened this office here as we want to build stronger diplomatic relations with the United States. We also have plans to build relations with the Congress, the Senate and the House of Representatives that are all here.”
He said the office would “do anything and everything for the revolution,” including leading relations with international institutions based in the United States that might be able to help the shadow government.
“We are going to interact with them, too,” he said. “Similarly, we are going to engage with the people of Myanmar origin in the United States encouraging and supporting the Myanmar people and the revolution, for their support, financial contributions and donations.”..."
Source/publisher:
"RFA" (USA)
Date of publication:
2023-02-14
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-14
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
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Description:
"Authors: Adam Simpson, University of South Australia, Thomas Kean, International Crisis Group, and Susan Park, University of Sydney
In the two years since the military coup in February 2021, Myanmar’s natural environment has deteriorated as the embryonic legal and regulatory regime that was emerging during the decade of political and economic reforms has unravelled.
Gold mining has significantly increased, particularly in Kachin and Shan States, causing extensive social and environmental problems. The military has issued new mining permits while informal or illegal mining has also proliferated, causing deforestation, erosion and flooding while also damaging fisheries by polluting waterways with toxic sediment.
Kachin State is also emerging as a key site for highly polluting rare earths mining. While the illicit export of rare earth elements across the border to China has been occurring for years, export activity has boomed since the coup. Attempts by previous governments to regulate these polluted areas have failed since the coup due to a lack of effective oversight. Some of the revenue may be helping the military crush dissent.
But just when Myanmar’s environment needs its defenders the most, environmental activists find themselves facing a plethora of new pressures and security concerns.
Myanmar’s environmental activists, and civil society more broadly, are no strangers to political restrictions. During half a century of earlier authoritarian military rule, activism was largely confined to ethnic ‘liberated areas’ or border zones beyond the reach of the military. This situation began to change during Myanmar’s decade of political and economic reforms starting in 2011, when environmental activists could openly challenge infrastructure projects, mines and government decisions for the first time.
Since the 2021 military coup, the increasingly complex situation in Myanmar has severely impacted environmental movements. The safety of activists has become much more perilous under the new and highly restrictive Organisation Registration Law enacted in October 2022. The coup has resulted in three key impacts on Myanmar’s environmental movements — fracturing, fragmentation and transformation.
A process of fracturing has occurred since the collapse of many environmental NGOs, civil society organisations and community-based organisations as a result of the coup and the subsequent societal conflict. Some activists have simply abandoned activism due to security concerns, cutting all communication with networks of former colleagues to avoid scrutiny from the security services.
A similar fracturing process occurred after the 2014 Thai coup, which resulted in a dramatic reduction in environmental activism in Thailand. But the impacts of the coup in Myanmar on environmental activism have been significantly larger in proportion to the level of extreme disruption and repression across the entire society.
Environmental movements have also experienced fragmentation since many activists have been forced to relocate for safety reasons. Activists have gravitated towards more liberal spaces beyond the reach of the military regime by fleeing to ‘liberated’ areas run by sympathetic ethnic armed groups or seeking refuge abroad, usually in Thailand, from where they can continue environmental activities through other means.
Fragmentation has also occurred due to the additional difficulties in communication and transport since the coup. Internet shutdowns in various areas have made it difficult for networks to remain in contact and many activists have changed their phone numbers for security reasons, making it hard to reconnect. Even where the internet and mobile connections operate, new restrictions on major social media platforms have disrupted networks. Travel across Myanmar is also much more difficult due to higher costs, limited connections and regular checkpoints. Environmental activists and groups now often work on their own, or network in very limited ways.
Environmental movements have been transformed in a variety of ways since the coup. Activists have adopted new strategies to continue their work inside nominally state-controlled areas of Myanmar. In regions where the military remains largely in control, activists have shifted their work to rural areas where the military’s reach is weaker.
Some environmental activists have changed their role completely by shifting to the provision of humanitarian aid, while other activists have transitioned from working non-violently to joining the military struggle for democracy under the People’s Defence Forces, part of the armed resistance that emerged after the coup, or pre-existing ethnic armed groups.
The ability of activists to openly challenge environmentally destructive activities has virtually evaporated. Activists can appeal to international actors for support, but the influence of international organisations is much reduced. During the decade of reform, civil society organisations could complain to the International Secretariat of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative if the government failed to consider their concerns. After the coup, Myanmar was suspended from the initiative due to political instability. These types of international actors simply no longer have any leverage over Myanmar.
Two years after the military coup, with the international community’s attention focused on Ukraine, Myanmar’s environment is experiencing serious degradation and the communities that rely on it for their existence are facing threats to their safety and livelihoods. Meanwhile, Myanmar’s environmental activists who once shined light on these issues now face constant repression and threats to their own security. There is no easy solution, but if even a sliver of the world’s attention and resources that have been expended on Ukraine were directed towards Myanmar instead, then a way out of the present quagmire would seem more likely..."
Source/publisher:
East Asia Forum
Date of publication:
2023-02-13
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-13
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Environmentalists of Burma/Myanmar, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
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Description:
"UNAIDS has joined a list of United Nations agencies working with Myanmar’s junta while shunning the legitimate civilian National Unity Government (NUG).
The agencies claim they are being pragmatic to address civilian humanitarian needs. But this is disingenuous.
The existing approach leaves large numbers to shelter in camps or forests with insufficient food and healthcare.
Myanmar’s citizens who are most in need are those specifically targeted by the regime’s arson raids and airstrikes. And they are being abandoned by the international community.
UN agencies’ access is restricted to areas where the junta will allow them to deliver aid.
These international bodies have allowed the junta to weaponize aid, blocking off areas where the junta is attacking civilians and cutting aid.
All UN agencies and international NGOs working in Myanmar should do a small moral and efficiency test by making a simple spreadsheet for 2022 showing their total budgets allocated for Myanmar. The next column could show how much was spent outside the country, paying for offices in New York, Geneva or London.
Another column could show the cost of operations in Myanmar, including offices, cars, expat salaries, accommodation for foreign staff and travel to other regional offices set up since the 2021 coup. Additional costs for keeping most of the expat staff outside Myanmar since the 2021 coup should be added here.
One column should show the wages paid to staff from Myanmar and the cost of aid deliveries to territory under junta control.
The most important column should show money spent on delivering aid to liberated territory and territories that are the target of junta scorched-earth operations.
A final column would show income left unspent because access to those in need has been blocked by the regime.
An additional column could show money spent on training, online capacity-building and communication programs.
International agencies often waste budget surpluses on training, online programs, consultancy fees and analytical papers.
Comparing the total budget to the actual money spent on those outside junta control would expose an embarrassing imbalance.
Open disclosure of UN and other NGO budgets would expose how little is being spent on those most in need.
By refusing to engage with the NUG, UN agencies and other NGOs are failing Myanmar.
People in Sagaing and Magwe regions and Chin, Kachin, Shan, Kayah and Karen states tell me that UN agencies are failing to fulfill their briefs.
Instead, they appease the junta in the hope that it will allow them to continue operating in a restricted manner.
Foreign staff claim they are doing their best in a highly complex, restrictive and risky environment. But these are manipulative and self-interested claims.
An alternative is possible and easy to do. Aid money should be divided into two pots: to be distributed by organizations operating with the junta and those delivering aid to non-junta territory.
UN agencies, NGOs and civil society organizations accessing the second “pot”, with funds earmarked for aid deliveries in territories not controlled by the junta, must have offices outside Yangon and must not engage with the regime. They should also sign deals with the NUG and civilian structures allied to the ethnic armed organizations instead.
Aid to regions outside junta control should be greater given the deeper need of people outside regime control.
This alternative approach could provide resources and capacity for Myanmar-driven “humanitarian resistance”, harnessing contributions from Myanmar’s diaspora, which already provides the most aid and takes the highest risks.
A simple division could unlock largely weaponized or paralyzed aid deliveries.
The policy change might force the junta to lift its restrictions on aid because it will want to retain funding to affiliated agencies, like the Myanmar Red Cross.
Igor Blazevic is a senior adviser at the Prague Civil Society Centre. Between 2011 and 2016 he worked in Myanmar as the head lecturer of the Educational Initiatives Program..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2023-02-13
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-13
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
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Description:
"Highlights:
Myanmar continues to experience a severe - and worsening - humanitarian and human rights crisis. Conflict and violence have escalated across the country, impacting children and their families and displacing more than 1.5 million people.
Access of conflict-affected populations to services and delivery of humanitarian assistance has been further constrained by restrictions imposed on movement of both people and goods.
Grave violations of child rights have increased in 2022 compared with 2021.There has also been an eightfold increase in the number of abductions in 2022. As of December 2022 at least 670 children had been killed or maimed by armed actors since the military takeover in February 2021
In 2022, UNICEF received US$ 33.92 million, representing 22 per cent of its Myanmar Humanitarian Action for Children appeal of US$ 151.4 million. Despite the gap, UNICEF and its partner reached close to one million children and their families.
FUNDING OVERVIEW AND PARTNERSHIPS
In 2022, Myanmar continued to struggle with unprecedented political, socioeconomic and human rights issues and humanitarian crises.
The 2022 Myanmar Humanitarian Needs Overview estimated that 14.4 million people, including 5 million children, needed assistance.
UNICEF Myanmar Country Office appealed for US$151.4 million to help displaced people and host communities across the country.
Despite a number of challenges: restrictions in accessing affected communities, high levels of uncertainty about security and the funding gap significantly impacted the programmes, UNICEF was able to reach close to 1 million children and their families.
By the end of 2022, UNICEF Myanmar had received US$33.92 million (including US$10.74 million carried forward from 2021), representing 22 per cent of the amount appealed for. The funding was generously contributed by the Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance (USAID/BHA), the European Commission's Humanitarian Office (ECHO), the German Federal Foreign Office, the Global Thematic Fund, Denmark, Japan, Norway, the Korean Committee for UNICEF, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) and the World Health Organization.
These funds were used to deliver much needed services in nutrition, health, water sanitation and hygiene (WASH), education and child protection.
In 2023, UNICEF, with continued support from the donors, will scale up programmes and approaches to reach more vulnerable children and communities. UNICEF expresses its sincere appreciation to all private and public sector donors for their contributions in supporting the children of Myanmar..."
Source/publisher:
UN Children's Fund (Myanmar) via Reliefweb (New York)
Date of publication:
2023-02-13
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-13
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
UNICEF (United Nations Children's Fund), Education in Burma/Myanmar - general, Public Health, Food Security and nutrition in Burma/Myanmar, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
7.1 MB
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Sub-title:
Myanmar is still in the midst of a protracted low-intensity conflict that could stretch on for years without any side being able to assert nation-wide control, possibly leaving in its wake a highly fractured, fragmented and balkanised polity.
Description:
"February 1, 2023 marked the second anniversary of the military ‘coup’ in Myanmar that aborted the return of the National League of Democracy (NLD) for its second term of government after its landslide victory in the November 2020 elections (following the first in 2015) under the military-drafted 2008 constitution.
In the immediate aftermath of the coup, the military detained, arrested and eventually sentenced President Win Myint, State Counsellor and NLD leader, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and other opposition figures to long terms in prison on flimsy charges, declared a one-year state of emergency, and constituted a State Administration Council (SAC) to run the day-to-day affairs of the country. Together with subsequent developments, they have effectively reversed the democratic ‘transition’ initiated by Sr. Gen. Than Shwe, Sr. Gen. Min Aung Hlaing’s politically more astute predecessor, through his seven-stage ‘road map’ towards a ‘discipline-flourishing democracy’ that was supposedly ‘fulfilled’ with elections that brought the reformist, military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) to power in Myanmar in 2010.
Despite the fierce use of force first against peaceful protestors and a widespread Civil Disobedience Movement, started by government doctors in Yangon, and then against spontaneously proliferated new ‘People’s Defence Forces’ (PDFs) in Bamar and ethnic areas and several long-standing ethnic armed organisations (EAOs), the military has not been able to stabilise the situation.
The violence has resulted in close to 3,000 deaths documented by the Association for the Assistance of Political Prisoners (AAPP, and up to 30,000 according to other estimates), thousands if not tens of thousands arrested, four judicial executions (including a member of parliament), and an estimated million and a half displaced in Myanmar and outside (including an estimated 50,000 refugees in India) as a result of brute repression, intimidation by security forces and regime-affiliated vigilante groups, arson, artillery, air power and scorched earth policies on the part of the military that has elicited a widespread armed resistance and retaliation on the part of the citizenry.
It is for all practical purposes, a war by the Tatmadaw (as the Myanmar military as the vanguards of Burma’s independence was respectfully called) on its own people uncluttered by labels of ‘majoritarian’, sectarian, ethnic, religious, minority, ‘left’, ‘right’ or ‘communist’, and conversely, a ‘people’s war’ using largely guerilla tactics against the Tatmadaw. Even those EAOs, which have been kept out of the conflict for tactical or political reasons, have been at odds with the Tatmadaw historically and not responded to peace overtures by the latter.
In response to the coup, the political opposition has formed a National Unity Government (NUG) underpinned by a more broad-based National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC), a committee of ousted elected parliamentarians, the Committee Representing the Pyidaunsu Hluttaw (CRPH), a Charter for a Federal Democratic Union, and a Defence Ministry and military ‘high command’, and announced a ‘defensive war’ against the military (that has at times turned offensive targeting of government officials and collaborators).
The regime has labelled the NUG as a ‘terrorist’ organisation, but the ‘people’s war’ is more than just a struggle for democracy or a federal union, or a civil war. It is more appropriately now a violent struggle for freedom (although not widely understood as one), and arguably a culmination of Burma’s independence movement that remained stunted and appropriated by the Tatmadaw and never really evolved into a mass movement as it did in India.
Though one may not know this from the Indian media, Myanmar is currently in the midst of a protracted low intensity conflict that (like Iraq, Libya, Syria or Afghanistan) could stretch on for years without any side being able to assert nation-wide control or authority, possibly leaving in its wake a highly fractured, fragmented and balkanised polity: a military government operating out of Nay Pyi Taw, Yangon, Mandalay, state capitals and garrison centres using superior force but unable to control the rest and increasingly prone to attacks, sabotage and de-legitimization within; a patchwork of ethnic armed organisations with large areas under their control or contested by the Myanmar Army; and local ‘peoples’ defence forces and governments, or even small ‘de facto’ self-governed enclaves or ‘statelets’ with greater or lesser capacity to provide security or governance in the Bamar heartland (as it has been through much of its history outside its three periods of empire under the Bagan dynasty, the Toungoo and Konbaung) that could take years, if not decades, to merge within a single national authority, whether civilian or military, government or opposition, under the right conditions in the territory that we know today as Myanmar.
Yet, side by side with this breakdown of authority and threat to the unity and integrity of Myanmar, there is a new-found empathy and solidarity among the victims of military rule, the ethnic minorities, the Bamar majority especially youth, and even the hapless Rohingya; and sharpening and clarification of fault-lines that have clouded Myanmar’s journey to nation-hood since the advent of the British, that provides a glimmer of hope that the idea of a federal (or confederal), democratic ‘Union’ of Burma is alive and could, under the right conditions, constitute the basis of a new Myanmar.
Currently, neither side has the power to decisively overpower the other. The opposition has the numbers but not the forces, weapons and unified military leadership to overthrow the Tatmadaw, while the army has the brute force to intimidate civilians, burn villages, and attack, shell and bomb resistance strongholds. On balance, it is the People Defence Forces (PDFs) and EAOs that are gaining ground, not the military, and power is subtly shifting to the more powerful EAOs. According to a leaked State Administrative Committee (SAC) document, 12 of the 14 provinces of Myanmar suffered nearly 18,000 attacks by opposition forces since 2021, 220 out of 330 townships in Myanmar are heavily contested and 132 highly insecure and in need of reinforcement.
Other reports suggest that only 30 of the Myanmar Army’s 230-plus infantry battalions of a 120,000-man army are believed to enjoy effective dominance. Recruitment is falling, and there have been hundreds of defections and desertions (although they are reported to be declining), and none senior enough to reveal any foment or split in the Army itself. Nevertheless, according to various estimates, over 50% of Myanmar territory is under the control of diverse resistance or opposition forces, going up to anywhere between 70-80% in some states like Chin state bordering India.
As if in tacit recognition of the Myanmar Army’s failure to regain control and hold planned elections in August 2023, the military-dominated National Defence and Security Council of Myanmar announced a further six-month extension of emergency (beyond the ‘normal’ two six-month extensions) on January 31 on the eve of the second anniversary of the coup, followed by the declaration of Martial Law in 37 townships in four ‘Regions’ marking largely ethnic Bamar provinces (Sagaing, Magwey, Bago and Thanintharyi), and four ‘States’ inhabited predominantly by ethnic minority groups (Chin, Kayah, Kayin and Mon), in addition to six townships (five in Yangon and one in Chin state) declared earlier.
Of these, Sagaing and Chin state, and Rakhine, which is outside this list but strongly contested by the Arakan Army, are adjacent to India’s North East. Martial law combines all security, administrative, executive and judicial authority in the hands of regional military commanders and empowers them to take summary life and death decisions without legal assistance to the accused or appeal against rulings, with only the death sentence to be approved by the military high command. They set the stage for even more egregious violations of human rights and potential war crimes on the part of the military.
Yet, despite a recent December 2022 United National Security Council Resolution 2669 (its first on Myanmar since 1948 on which Russia, China and India abstained), Myanmar remains in the penumbra of international and domestic media and political attention left largely to the ASEAN of which Myanmar is a member and its April 21, 2021 five-point consensus, to resolve.
This may be partly explained by developments in Afghanistan, Ukraine and East Asia where the US and the West have been more deeply involved or the protagonists have been geo-political rivals like Russia and China, or even a retrenchment in the US and Western commitment to democracy worldwide except in areas of core strategic concern against which Myanmar is so far, a distraction.
But that does not explain the near silence and pro-forma expressions of concern by Indian government representatives and spokespersons to what is happening in Myanmar both in terms of violence, suffering, displacement and lives lost, and the security, stability and future of a country of strategic importance to India in its immediate eastern neighborhood sharing a sensitive 1,600 km border across four North Eastern states and a similar length with Yunnan province of China. It is also a lynchpin of India’s ‘Look East’ and ‘Act East policies’ for which successive Indian governments have taken strategic and development initiatives since the turn of the millennium, including major projects like the Trilateral Highway and Kaladan Multimodal project, to regain its historical and civilisational influence that it lost over centuries especially during the 50-year period of military rule in Burma since the 1960s.
Nor does it explain the lack of sympathy on the part of the Union and concerned state governments other than Mizoram towards Myanmar refugees fleeing violence and persecution who are being rounded up and detained in hastily converted detention camps against local sentiments as ‘illegal migrants’ owing to a lack of a definition of a refugee, or a formal refugee law or being a signatory to the UN Convention on Refugees and its Protocols.
Given conditions in Myanmar, typically, the refugees do not have travel papers or visas and therefore ipso facto liable for immigration violations. Unlike India’s other neighbours, even Pakistan, they are not covered by any police reporting mechanism or a Foreigners Regional Registration Office (FRRO) near their point of entry where they can report on arrival. Nor is there a local office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees where they can apply for refugee status. They remain undocumented and fugitive. Lacking papers, they cannot even travel to state capitals or Delhi to report or register.
In effect, the refugees fall in the cracks between a non-existent refugee law, and the Foreigners and Citizenship Acts where they cannot even count on the most basic human rights (facing anomalies like juveniles under indefinite detention and denial of birth certificates for new-borns) because of lack of immigration, refugee or citizenship status.
Yet, none of these legal obstacles have come in the way in the past in dealing with Tibetan refugees, East Pakistanis (later Bangladeshis) and Sri Lankan Tamils when they faced persecution, indicating, if there is any doubt, that these are essentially political decisions. Fortunately, border security, police, para-military and judicial authorities on the ground have been restrained in their approach to the refugees while watchful of illegal activities like arms or drug smuggling (to which a senior Assam Rifles Commander and family in Manipur tragically lost their lives in an ambush). Nevertheless, concerns about clarity on law, burden sharing by the centre and signs of refugee fatigue remain.
Some of this ‘estrangement’ can be attributed to a reaction to colonial rule in Myanmar in which Indians were an instrument, and psychological amnesia that has afflicted India-Myanmar relations as a result of insular military rule in Myanmar since the 1960s until 2010 when a large Indian community was forced out by xenophobic policies (and since faded away), and the two countries virtually fell off each other’s neighbourhood maps.
But it has also to do with how our priorities and reflexes as a nation have changed from one that valued freedoms that we ourselves fought for, to one that has greater faith in authoritarianism than democratic politics to preserve its ‘national’, security and other interests in the neighbourhood in the name of ‘realism’, justifying ties with the junta but not the NUG.
Ironically, this change can be traced to the failure of pro-freedom policies pursued in the 1980s when India supported both the pro-democratic agitation in Burma and the Tamil cause in Sri Lanka, but has become more marked recently.
Unlike in the 1960s and 1980s, when turmoil in Myanmar was closely reported in the Indian official and private media and sustained by an expatriate Indian community and Burmese exiles, daily news of Myanmar is now the preserve of anxious Myanmar watchers and social media followers. There is little public awareness let alone understanding of events in Myanmar. Even the mainstream strategic observers seem stuck in a post-1990s policy correction when the military was able to reassert its authority against democratic forces by use of force, entering mutually beneficial cease-fires with ethnic armed organisations brokered by the Chinese and appealing to Bamar-Buddhist nationalism, corralling the Indian government to temper its pro-democracy stance to deal with the Generals to address its security needs.
Over time, it also led to a misplaced faith in the Myanmar Army as the best guarantor of India’s security interests vis-à-vis both IIGs and China. This faith is inexplicable. While Myanmar has acted against IIGs from time to time at India’s request, and India and Myanmar also have separate agreements on ‘coordinated patrolling’ on the land and maritime borders, it has more often played ducks and drakes with IIGs in Myanmar, harbouring and maintaining a cozy relationship with them over decades ostensibly on ‘humanitarian’ grounds and using them to settle internal scores when opportune, while objecting to any corresponding gesture to Myanmar refugees or insurgents on India’s part.
Unlike Bhutan and Bangladesh which flushed out Indian insurgents on their soil as friendly gestures, India’s approach to IIGs in Myanmar has been more intelligence-based, and Myanmar’s approach has been to cooperate, acquiesce, leak information or rebuff Indian requests as it has suited them. It is a transactional relationship, not one which India needs to be beholden to the Tatmadaw for, and one that India too could play but apparently does not.
India has used the Indian Armed Forces as a tool of diplomacy to build trust and confidence between the two Armed Forces quite effectively over the last 25 years to the extent that the foreign secretary and chief of army staff could undertake a joint visit to Nay Pyi Taw towards the end of the term of the NLD government. But too much reliance on the military relationship may now be hindering Indian diplomacy from clearly seeing the reality in Myanmar. It can still be used judiciously to steer Myanmar to a more constructive path for which a new approach is needed.
Source/publisher:
"The Wire"
Date of publication:
2023-02-11
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-11
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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more
Description:
"It's been happening for a decade. Every year as South Asia's monsoon season ends in late October and the dry season begins, rickety boats overloaded with ethnic Rohingya leave Bangladesh and Myanmar. They head into the Bay of Bengal, en route to Malaysia, for the promise of work and greater freedoms. Many of these boats never reach their destination, and over the last few months - as in previous years - hundreds have drowned at sea.
This week, ministers from across the Asia region are convening in Adelaide for the 8th Ministerial Conference of the Bali Process on People Smuggling, Trafficking in Persons and Related Transnational Crime, an intergovernmental forum co-chaired by Indonesia and Australia. The dire situation facing Rohingya at sea should be at the top of the meeting's agenda.
This year's sailing season has been one of the deadliest yet. The United Nations refugee agency, UNHCR, says that of more than 3,500 Rohingya who attempted sea crossings in the Andaman Sea and Bay of Bengal in 2022, nearly 350 died or are missing at sea. "Confirmed reports are, however, only the tip of the iceberg," UNHCR noted. "Given most bodies are never found and many missing persons never reported."
Family members of Rohingya recently stranded at sea told Human Rights Watch that their relatives encountered Thai and Malaysian naval authorities who refused to help them.
Dil Mohammad's sister-in-law left the camps in Bangladesh in late November.
The smugglers or traffickers "moved them around to different places for 25 days before the main boat started its journey toward Malaysia," he said. "[They] gave them food as long as we kept sending them money."
The boat engine broke down off the coast of Thailand and they were stranded at sea. "My sister-in-law said they weren't given food or drinking water for six days. She could barely talk, her voice was fading. My niece stopped talking and stopped crying, too."
Nurul Amin's sister left the Bangladesh camps in November to join her husband in Malaysia. When the boat broke down, he said, children began dying. He said a Thai navy vessel approached the stranded boat in December. "Four Rohingya jumped into the sea thinking the navy boat would rescue them," Nurul said. "They were never found. The navy boat didn't rescue anyone."
Several rescued boats carrying hundreds of Rohingya have disembarked in Aceh, Indonesia, after weeks at sea without food or water, with dozens dead. Others remain at sea. One boat with about 180 Rohingya has been missing since December, with all on board presumed dead.
Many of the Rohingya embark on these high-risk journeys to escape growing restrictions and hopelessness in refugee camps in Bangladesh and unending oppression and violence in Myanmar's western Rakhine State. They flee out of desperation and vulnerability, knowing they face weeks or months on unseaworthy boats, subject to abuse by smugglers and traffickers, at risk of starving or drowning at sea, only to confront the threat of forced labor, exploitation, or immigration detention. They pay US$700 to $2,000 for the journey.
UNHCR estimates that as many as 170,000 Rohingya embarked on smugglers' boats from 2012 to 2015. Following the peak of the crisis in May 2015, the Bali Process reviewed the regional response and members acknowledged that "unilateral, unplanned and unprepared responses led to deaths, inadequate/delayed access to basic services, refusal of landing/entry."
The resulting 2016 Bali Declaration set out a comprehensive approach to irregular migration in the region, centred on protecting the needs of refugees and migrants. A consultation mechanism and task force were set up to improve the emergency response to refugee flows, including "detection, search and rescue, disembarkation and shelter management."
But the emergency response mechanism has never been activated.
At the Ministerial Conference this week, officials should make good on their commitments from six years ago. Responsibility for the security of the Rohingya rests primarily with Myanmar, but extends to the countries where they seek refuge and the broader international community, which can provide resources and support.
Burden sharing and collective responsibility, as called for in the Bali Declaration, demands action, not just words: responding to refugee boats in distress, coordinating search-and-rescue operations, taking boats ashore to the nearest safe port, and providing humanitarian aid. Turning away boats at sea violates international law and abandons a community that has faced abuse and neglect everywhere they turn.
Governments endorsing the Bali Process should pledge to assist the Rohingya with work and residency permits and exert coordinated and unified pressure on the Myanmar junta to end the abuses that compel Rohingya to flee.
Meanwhile, the dry season, and the departure of boats, continues through May. Bangladesh's tightening of security has led smugglers and traffickers to move people overland into Myanmar before setting sail.
"Sometimes, the people on the boats get arrested," a Rohingya man said. "Sometimes the boats sink and they die in the sea. But people still take the risk, because they say they can't stay at home detained in the camp, and they don't think they will ever be free."..."
Source/publisher:
The Canberra Times (Canberra) via Human Rights Watch (USA)
Date of publication:
2023-02-09
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-09
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Discrimination against the Rohingya, Rohingya (cultural, political etc.)
Language:
more
Description:
"SINGAPORE — In Myanmar’s biggest city, Yangon, soldiers patrol the streets at all hours. Police officers stop pedestrians at random, hauling them to jail if they show signs of sympathy for the opposition. Poverty rates in the city have tripled, according to the United Nations, and crime is rife.
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It has been two years since Myanmar’s military ousted its democratic government in a coup, plunging swaths of the Southeast Asian country, also known as Burma, into violent conflict. The junta has crushed free expression, imprisoning journalists, revoking the licenses of independent news outlets and gone to other lengths to limit visibility into the realities of life under military rule.
To capture the struggles of quotidian life, The Washington Post asked three of Yangon’s residents to share their experiences on a single day late last month, each recounting in a series of voice messages the arc of their day. All three are members of a young generation that came of age as democratic rule arrived in Myanmar in the early 2010s and then saw it snuffed out.
Willion, one of a dwindling number of journalists in the city, tried to avoid a run-in with authorities. Sam, a small-business owner, wrestled with the contempt he felt toward the soldiers swarming his city. South of downtown, power outages left Hannway, a young activist, struggling to connect to the revolutionary movement for which she’d put her education on hold. They are being identified by their English instead of Burmese names to limit the chances of repercussions.
Daybreak
Willion, 30, sat up straighter when he heard his neighbors stir. He’d stayed up in case the police arrived for one of their random checks. Opening his laptop, he blinked at the clock at the bottom right corner: 7:13 a.m. He’d made it through another night.
The authorities had been going after journalists like him since the coup. A few weeks ago, police arrested one of Willion’s co-workers, seizing his phone, which had photos and messages implicating Willion. As a precaution, he’d been moving every few days, he said, traveling with a backpack that had just his laptop, a hard drive and a few sets of clothes.
Willion sat back against the wall, his face lit by the laptop screen. He was preparing a presentation on citizen journalism, showing people in conflict-ridden parts of the country how they could document the military’s atrocities. But he was tired, and there was a lot on his mind.
He hadn’t seen his parents in almost a year, and his mother had recently been hospitalized for a heart condition, he said. He wanted to visit but that meant devising a safe route across town. The military had spies across the city and a new Chinese-built surveillance system equipped with advanced facial recognition technology. As he weighed the risks, Willion felt his head grow heavy.
Farther east, past a river, Sam, 36, was driving to work.
A fire had broken out in his middle-class neighborhood overnight, consuming a house and its residents. On his morning walk, neighbors told him the police never responded. Sam wasn’t surprised. Every day, he read reports of banks being robbed in broad daylight, and people being murdered in their homes. The authorities almost never caught the perpetrators.
He glanced out the window. Traffic had slowed around a government building guarded by a garrison. Sam looked at the soldiers in uniform, most of them young men, and thought the same thing he always did at this point in his commute.
“I hope they get sent to the front line and die.”
As a Buddhist, he knew he shouldn’t think such thoughts, he said. But looking at the soldiers wielding their guns reminded him of the young activists shot dead on the streets of Yangon.
Sam’s office was dark when he arrived. He groaned. He blamed them for this, too.
Energy suppliers pulled out of Myanmar after the coup, and in recent months, rebel armies had started to attack transmission lines to hurt the junta. At Hannway’s family home, the blackout had shut down running water.
At a tea shop for Myanmar exiles, songs from home and resistance in the air
Hannway, in her early 20s, heard her parents in the kitchen figuring out what to do. She rolled over in bed and looked at her phone — 10:30 a.m. Two years ago, she recalled, she’d be in class by this time studying to be a doctor. But when the military seized power, she’d chosen to participate in a civil disobedience movement (CDM) aimed at crippling the health-care system.
She scrolled through messages that came overnight.
“They’re investigating CDM students,” read one from a friend. “Be careful.”
Afternoon
Hannway paced around the kitchen. It’d been four hours, and the power was still out. Her mother tried to calm her down, but the message from her friend had unnerved her.
News had started to spread recently that the military planned to punish boycotting students like her. For her safety, she rarely left her house, she said. She killed time by taking online language classes and working remotely on projects supporting the resistance movement. But without electricity, she couldn’t do even that. How long could she keep on like this?
Hannway checked the time — 2:27 p.m. There was a virtual meeting with some CDM doctors in three minutes. The WiFi was still out.
Sam, too, felt the military had made so many aspects of life harder.
He was at a tea shop north of Hannway’s home, meeting a friend vexed over whether to re-enroll his children in government schools. Sam didn’t know what to say. He had his own frustrations: He’d been forced to spend money on generators and solar-powered batteries because of the blackouts; he was facing surging costs of food and gas; the local currency wouldn’t stop falling in value so his small business had to keep raising its prices.
Passing by soldiers on his way back to the office, he felt bile rising inside him again. Why, he asked, were they everywhere?
A love story, forged in Myanmar’s political strife, ends in execution
At 5:30 p.m., after a few hours of sleep, Willion finally prepared to leave his apartment. On his phone, he logged out of his usual social media accounts and into fake profiles that showed no links to journalism. He scrubbed personal messages and contacts, then scanned the Telegram groups where people shared sightings of soldiers in the city. Nothing too alarming.
He flagged down a cab for the hospital. But minutes after leaving his complex, he saw a congregation of soldiers outside a nearby hotel. He squinted through the window — authorities had cuffed three men, he said. Soldiers were interrogating passersby.
Willion fought the instinct to take out his phone to film what was happening. There were too many of them.
Securing his face mask, he slunk deeper into his seat. He had to get to the hospital.
Nightfall
Before the coup, Sam liked to explore Yangon’s various neighborhoods on foot. But he was wary these days about appearing suspicious so he kept his walks to the public parks. Lined with palm trees and often empty, they were one of the only remaining reprieves from the military’s hold over the city, he said.
Strolling as the sun set, Sam let himself relax.
He didn’t want to keep praying for those soldiers to die. Every time he did, he heard his mother’s voice telling him to “keep kindness in his heart.” But it was hard when he woke up each morning to videos of villages set on fire and accounts of rape and torture. Where was he supposed to find the humanity?
He saw three older men walking briskly in the park. As they drew closer, Sam could hear they were talking loudly about Gen. Min Aung Hlaing, the junta leader. One made a joke, turning the general’s name into a curse word, and the other two guffawed, their pot bellies shaking.
Sam smiled as he listened. It sounded for a moment like old Yangon, he said. He wondered if he should strike up a conversation. But maybe they would think he was an informant. He kept walking.
Back in her bedroom, after dinner, Hannway settled in front of her laptop. The electricity was finally back. She pulled up a “click-to-donate” site, where people could get advertisers to send a few cents per click to a cause. The money raised by this site was going toward rebel groups.
Hannway tapped her index finger repeatedly. She felt deflated, she said. She missed attending lectures and visiting old bookshops; she missed the rigor of having an ambition. She thought, as she often did at night, about a friend — a woman serving 20 years in prison after being caught at a safe house for activists.
Hannway felt something turn inside her. She couldn’t give up, she told herself. She didn’t have the right.
As the world moves on, Myanmar confronts a mounting, hidden toll
It was dark by the time Willion reached the hospital. His mother looked better than he expected, but it still made him sad he couldn’t care for his family. A relative had passed away recently, his mother said. It would probably be safer for everyone, he told her, if he didn’t attend the funeral.
After returning home, Willion logged back into his real social media accounts. There’d been renewed fighting in the country’s central Sagaing region, and citizen journalists had sent him reports earlier in the day that soldiers had set fire to seven houses. Once he compiled more information, he’d distribute it to other outlets. But his sources had suddenly gone dark. Maybe the junta had jammed the signal. He hoped it was that.
Just after midnight, Willion warmed up dinner. He’d have to find another place to stay in a few days, once people in the neighborhood started to recognize his face.
But, for now, he’d spend another night awake, waiting for daybreak.
Diamond reported from Yangon..."
Source/publisher:
"The Washington Post"
Date of publication:
2023-02-09
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-09
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Military History, Human Rights and international relations, Spring Revolution
Language:
more
Description:
"• The junta has killed at least 2,688 civilians and arrested 17,573 as of 31 Jan. Burma now has 1,584,300 IDPs.
• The regime began to compile voter lists in preparations for its sham 2023 ‘election.’ Resistance groups attacked census agents in several locations, killing at least 13.
• The junta adopted a new Political Parties Registration Law that will allow the military-aligned USDP to run unchallenged and lead to the dissolution of the NLD.
• UNHCR reported that over 3,500 Rohingya attempted to flee Bangladesh and Burma by sea in 2022, up from 700 in 2021. At least 348 died or went missing; the highest figure since 2014.
• Australia, Canada, the UK, and the US announced new sanctions, but stopped short of sanctioning the junta's main cash cow..."
Source/publisher:
ALTSEAN-Burma
Date of publication:
2023-02-08
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-08
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations, Political History
Language:
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328.46 KB
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Sub-title:
Malaysia’s former foreign minister speaks to RFA about the crisis in Myanmar
Description:
"Radio Free Asia talked with Malaysia’s former Foreign Minister Saifuddin Abdullah, who was often a strong advocate for ASEAN to take stronger action on the crisis in Myanmar. He spoke about the current geopolitical situation in the country and ASEAN’s reaction to it, as well as where things stand with the shadow National Unity Government that opposes the junta in the last two years since the Feb. 1, 2021, military coup.
RFA: What do you think about the situation in Myanmar currently?
Abdullah: Well, it is now already two years after the coup d’etat and things are getting worse day by day. More than 18,500 clashes, more than 1.2 million people are internally displaced, Many thousands have been killed, Civilians killed, and civilians arrested. Your president [Win Myint] and Aung San Suu Kyi are now behind bars for 12 years and 33 years. These are all very, very unfair. It was a kangaroo court that made the decision.
So things are getting worse for the people. But I salute the people of Myanmar because they have been steadfast in fighting against the junta since two years ago. And even before that, we know the story of the struggle of the Myanmar people.
The confidence-building work done by the NUG and the NUCC seems very fruitful. I understand people are talking to each other more today compared to before. All the stakeholders I have met the NUG, the NUCC and some of the other stakeholders more than once before, and I understand that they are working together very hard, including with the People's Defense Force militias. And the Myanmar diaspora, those who are living as refugees outside, are always in contact with the fighters and activists in the country. I think after two years, they are very resilient. And I think this is something that I really take my hat off to the people of Myanmar.
RFA: What do you think about ASEAN? So far we don’t see any significant response from ASEAN.
Abdullah: ASEAN decided to do the five-point consensus. Unfortunately, the five-point consensus has not shown any real progress, not even on humanitarian assistance.
But this year, the chair of ASEAN is Indonesia. I am very hopeful that President Jokowi and Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi will do more. Both are very passionate. I have spoken to Retno Marsudi many, many times. I think she will put a lot more effort into getting the five-point consensus working.
However, when I met the foreign minister of the NUG, she was very polite in telling me that the five-point consensus is not sufficient. I don't know. I know that for them it is not going to work. It is something that was done without consultation with the NUG, the NUCC and the other stakeholders so they do not have any hope for the five-point consensus. But they were very polite to me saying that it is not enough.
So I think ASEAN has to have more of a sense of urgency, and I had spoken to my colleagues when I was Foreign Minister saying that ASEAN must have a framework with a straightforward end game, that is, to bring back democracy to the people of Myanmar. Until and unless you have a clear framework with a straightforward end game, this will not end. So the people will still suffer. I think ASEAN and the international community must have a higher sense of urgency in helping the people of Myanmar.
RFA: So, do you think Indonesia can persuade the Myanmar junta to go with the ASEAN five-point consensus? Would that be enough?
Abdullah: I'm very hopeful that Indonesia, as chair of ASEAN, can do something. I understand that Jakarta is planning to send generals to speak to the junta. I don't know what the objective is, but perhaps we can try, you know, many ways of talking to the junta. But at the same time, whether we like it or not, ASEAN must engage NUG and the NUCC officially, because this is the only way to do it. We have spoken to the junta many, many times. Nothing happened. So this is the time, two years after the coup d'etat. We must engage the NUG and the NUCC.
RFA: Do you think ASEAN will do it?
Abdullah: I know Retno Marsudi has met, or, if not her, her team has met NUG and the NUCC.That I know for a fact. And that I think is a good beginning.
RFA: So do you think ASEAN is going to officially contact NUG?
Abdullah: There are at least three ASEAN member states who are of the opinion that we should engage openly with the NUG and the NUCC. Malaysia has spoken about it. Indonesia has spoken about it. I'm sorry, I cannot mention the other ASEAN member state. I will let them say it in public themselves.
RFA: And what is the Malaysian government's stance on the Myanmar crisis?
Abdullah: Well, I have not spoken to the current foreign minister, but Malaysia's foreign policy is normally very stable. We normally continue from where we stood in the past. So I am hoping that the current prime minister and foreign minister will continue what we were already doing. But on a personal level, I am still engaging my friends. Of course, as a former foreign minister, It's not official, but I am still talking to them and sending whatever messages that need to be sent to people that need to receive those messages.
RFA: Yeah. Since the coup in Myanmar, a lot of Myanmar people have crossed the border and at least a thousand people arrived in Malaysia from Myanmar, maybe some illegally. There were reports that the Malaysian government deported some of the refugees who were detained. So what should the Malaysian government do about Myanmar migrants who are here?
Abdullah: There are two things here. Number one, we are not a signatory to the International Convention on Refugees, but we have always been very helpful, including to people from Myanmar. We have about 180,000 people from Myanmar in Malaysia. Most of them are Rohingya, but there are non-Rohingya residents too. I think what has happened [the deportation] is regretful, something that I really don't know. It may have happened when I wasn't in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, or maybe when I was there, but it was something that didn't come to my attention because there are many agencies involved in this kind of program.
What Malaysia really needs is a proper and better management system for refugees. What I know is that a new amendment to a directive from Malaysia's National Security Council is now on the table. And I'm very hopeful that we can quickly amend or improve the way we manage refugees and people asking for asylum and continue working with UNHCR so that we can prevent deportation, especially unnecessary deportation from happening again.
RFA: Are you aware that on February 1st, Myanmar's people participated in a silent strike to show their defiance of the junta? What are your thoughts on that?
Abdullah: I really salute them. I think they are being very brave and very bold and very resilient. They are steadfast in showing their opposition to the junta. The silent strike I thought is a very innovative way to demonstrate, you know, that they don't fear the junta and they are continuing with the struggle.
And this is where I keep on saying that ASEAN and the international community must not fail the Myanmar people. They are daring and they are willing. So we from our side must be equally willing, if not so daring, but must be more willing to help them.
RFA: Do you have any suggestions for the NUG government?
Abdullah: No, I think NUG knows what needs to be done. I always believe that the pro-democracy struggle of the people of Myanmar must be led by the people of Myanmar. And for the Myanmar people. I understand that NUG is your elected government.
RFA: Is the United Nations doing enough for Myanmar?
Abdullah: The United Nations Secretary-General has appointed Dr. Noeleen Heyzer as the special envoy. I think she is also trying her best. She is working on a new program to provide better education for Myanmar refugees who are now outside Myanmar but also looking for funding to help the NGOs who are working within Myanmar to provide education.
I understand this is not going to be very easy, but this is one area that I understand she is trying to work on. But the international community, whether it is through the U.N. or other platforms, must do more. For example, sanctioning military assets - We must stop the supply of military assets, and military equipment, including fuel for aviation, especially. Because so long as the junta can fly the plane, they will still bomb people, including children attending school. So we must stop the supply of military assets, equipment, and fuel.
RFA: Any final message to the Myanmar people?
Abdullah: I think the people of Myanmar are a strong people. They are very bold. They're very brave and they're willing and daring. And I am very, very confident that there is light at the end of the tunnel. All I'm hoping for is for the international community, especially ASEAN, to have more urgency to assist the people of Myanmar..."
Source/publisher:
"RFA" (USA)
Date of publication:
2023-02-08
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-08
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Individual Documents
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2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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"Key Updates:
• Migration options for Afghans are shrinking: Migration and resettlement pathways for Afghans have been constrained by multiple challenges, including restricted mobility within and across Afghan borders, increased crackdowns in Pakistan, the reception crisis in Belgium, and the Canadian sponsorship quota system, among others.
• Andaman Sea crossings rise sixfold in 2022 when compared to 2021: UNHCR has drawn attention to a “dramatic increase” in the number of people - predominantly Rohingya - attempting dangerous Andaman Sea crossings in 2022. Several hundred are feared dead or missing.
• New pathways in the pipeline for Bangladeshi migrant workers: The Bangladesh government has entered into talks with the European Union, Libya, and Russia towards establishing potential pathways for Bangladeshi migrant workers.
• There is a need for better policy and responses to climate-induced human mobility: The increased intensity and frequency of natural disasters driven by climate change has uprooted millions in Bangladesh and Pakistan, yet little progress has been made to address the issue.
• Anti-Torture Act passed and National Screening Mechanism criteria outlined in Thailand: While many remain sceptical over aspects of implementation, the passage of the Anti-Torture Act and the establishment of criteria for the National Screening Mechanism signify positive progress in instituting protection frameworks for refugees and asylum seekers in Thailand.
• Detention conditions in Australia remain dire: Criticism of a new agreement between the Australian government and the Management and Training Corporation - a US based private prison operator - have increased as the government moved to block the UN from accessing detention facilities, particularly sections that provide mental healthcare assistance..."
Source/publisher:
Mixed Migration Centre
Date of publication:
2023-02-08
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-08
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Public Health, Rohingya (cultural, political etc.)
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3.91 MB
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"On December 23, 2022, President Biden signed into law the James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (NDAA 2023; P.L. 117–263). Included in the NDAA 2023 was a modified version of the Burma Unified through Rigorous Military Accountability Act (BURMA Act; H.R. 5497) that was passed by the House of Representatives on April 6, 2022. A similar companion bill, S. 2937, had been introduced in the Senate and referred to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, but received no further action.
The inclusion of the BURMA Act in the NDAA 2023 was praised by many interested parties in Myanmar and around the world, based on the assumption that it would result in increased U.S. pressure on Myanmar’s military junta, the State Administrative Council (SAC), and provide more aid to the people of Myanmar. A closer examination of the provisions of the BURMA Act, however, reveals that it is unlikely to result in major changes in U.S. policy in Myanmar.
Provisions of the Modified BURMA Act
The version of the BURMA Act that was incorporated into the NDAA 2023 is significantly different from either the version passed by the House of Representatives or the one introduced in the Senate. Virtually all of their respective provisions were modified or altered to reduce the overall scope and impact of the act. According to one source, these changes were made in response to objections from the Biden administration or in order to obtain the support necessary to pass in the Senate.
The NDAA’s BURMA Act contains seven separate elements pertaining to U.S. policy in Myanmar. These sections include a general statement on U.S. policy (section 5569); the authorization of the imposition of new sanctions (section 5570 and 5571); requirements for the coordination of U.S. policy (section 5572); a call for greater efforts at the United Nations (section 5573); the authorization of appropriations for assistance for Burma (section 5575, 5576 and 5577); authorization of assistance for “efforts against human rights abuses” in Myanmar (section 5578); and a limitation on the imposition of sanctions on imports from Myanmar (section 5579).
The statement of U.S. policy is a general statement of “support the people of Burma in their struggle for democracy, freedom, human rights, and justice.” This section calls for support of those opposing the military junta, explicitly mentioning the National Unity Government (NUG), but not the ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) or the People’s Defense Forces (PDFs). In addition, the act says it is U.S. policy to support a “credible process” for the restoration of civilian rule, reform of the Burmese military, and the protection of the rights of minority groups. It also requires accountability for perpetrators of human rights violations in Myanmar, as well as accountability for China and Russia for their alleged “support of the Burmese military.” Another component of U.S. policy, according to the BURMA Act, is the continued provision of humanitarian assistance for victims of violence still within Myanmar, as well as those in the “surrounding region.” Finally, the act calls for the unconditional release of all political prisoners in Myanmar.
The sanctions provisions of the BURMA Act stipulate obligatory sanctions on “senior officials of the Burmese military or security forces of Burma,” the SAC and its military-appointed cabinet, entities “that primarily operate in the defense sector of the Burmese economy,” and certain state-owned commercial enterprises. These obligatory sanctions are to be imposed no later than 180 days after enactment, or by June 21, 2023.
In addition, it authorizes, but does not require, the president to impose sanctions on the Myanma Oil and Gas Enterprise, state-owned enterprises that are not operating in the extractive or industrial sector and financially benefit the Burmese military, spouses, and adult children of persons sanctioned under the BURMA Act, foreign persons who have aided or assisted with the coup and supporting the SAC, and “any Burmese entity that provides materiel in the Burmese military.” The stipulated sanctions are the freezing of assets held in the United States or are held by a U.S. entity, the denial of foreign exchange transactions, and a ban on visas to enter the United States.
In terms of policy coordination, the BURMA Act requires the Department of State’s Office of Sanctions Coordination to “develop a comprehensive strategy for the implementation of the full range of United States diplomatic capabilities to implement Burma-related sanctions . . .” The strategy is to not only cover multiagency coordination within the U.S. government, but also international efforts to impose multilateral sanctions, including pressuring China and Russia to “support multilateral action against the Burmese military.”
Regarding the United Nations, the BURMA Act requires the president to “direct the United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States to spur greater action by the United Nations” regarding Burma. This includes “pushing the United Nations Security Council” to consider a condemnation of the 2021 military coup, the imposition of a “global arms embargo,” a termination of assistance to SAC, and passage of “multilateral sanctions against the Burmese military.”
The BURMA Act also authorizes the appropriation of funds for FY 2023 to 2027 for various forms of assistance, including “programs to strengthen federalism in and among ethnic states in Burma, including for non-lethal assistance for Ethnic Armed Organizations in Burma.” Assistance may also be provided for “efforts to establish an inclusive and representative democracy in Burma;” “technical and non-lethal support” for the EAOs, PDFs, and “pro-democracy movement organizations;” and programs to “investigate and document atrocities in Burma.” The act also stipulates that none of this assistance is to be made available to the SAC, the Burmese military, or any entity controlled by either the SAC or the Burmese military.
The act authorizes the secretary of state to also provide assistance to “appropriate civilian or international entities” to identify suspected “war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide in Burma;” “collect, document and protect evidence” of those suspected crimes; and conduct investigations of the alleged crimes. The act explicitly includes the United Nations’ Independent Investigation Mechanism for Myanmar (IIMM).
The final section of the BURMA Act excludes the imposition of sanctions on the importation of goods under the authority of the act. For purposes of the BURMA Act, “goods” are defined as “any article, natural or man-made substance, material, supply or manufactured product, including inspection and test equipment and excluding technical data.”
Implications for U.S. Policy
The provisions of the BURMA Act in the NDAA 2023 underwent substantial changes from the bills introduced in the House of Representatives and the Senate, reducing their overall impact on U.S. policy. The sanctions provisions, for example, are comparatively limited in scope than those in the original bills. In addition, both the obligatory and discretionary sanctions authorized in the BURMA Act could be imposed using existing authority provided by previous acts, such as the Tom Lantos Block Burmese JADE (Junta's Anti-Democratic Efforts) Act of 2008 (JADE Act; P.L. 110–286). Enforcement of the sanctions provisions of the JADE Act were waived by Executive Order 13742 and Executive Order 14014, but could be reinstated by President Biden at any time.
Another major change was the elimination of the position of special coordinator for Burmese Democracy from the BURMA Act. In both the House and Senate versions, the secretary of state was authorized to “designate an official of the Department of State” to coordinate the multiagency implementation of U.S. policy in Burma. This position was similar to one established in the JADE Act, which was eventually eliminated in response to years of complaints by the State Department. The special coordinator position could have led to the creation of a more effective and realistic policy in Myanmar, after years of drift dating back to the late Obama administration.
The assistance provisions of the BURMA Act were also significantly reduced in scope and specificity. In the bills introduced in each chamber, the assistance provisions listed many forms of assistance to be provided, including aid for refugees in “Bangladesh, Thailand, and the surrounding region;” internally displaced persons; voluntary resettlement; “promotion of ethnic and religious tolerance;” “primary, secondary, and tertiary education for displaced children,” and “political prisoners.”
One potentially important detail is the assistance provisions of the BURMA Act is the authorization of “non-lethal assistance” to Myanmar’s EAOs, PDFs and “pro-democracy movement organizations.” This detail is significant in two ways. First, it explicitly designates the EAOs and PDFs as possible recipients of “non-lethal assistance.” The Biden administration has, in general, refrained from direct mention of relations with the EAOs and PDFs, choosing to focus more on its engagement with the NUG.
Second, the authorization of “non-lethal assistance” provides the Biden administration with the opportunity to adopt a more liberal interpretation of what forms of military aid it can provide to the EAOs and PDFs. In Syria and Ukraine, for example, “non-lethal assistance” allowed the provision of uniforms, protective armor, armored military vehicles, radar equipment and medical equipment and supplies. It remains to be seen as how broadly the Biden administration will interpret this provision of the BURMA Act.
Overall, the BURMA Act requires little change in U.S. policy in Myanmar. However, it does give the Biden administration the discretionary authority to make major changes, if it wishes to do so. In addition, the BURMA Act should also be viewed as an indication that Congress thinks that the Biden administration should take a more active role in supporting the pro-democracy forces in Myanmar in their efforts to overthrow the SAC and establish a democratic government in the country.
Michael F. Martin is an adjunct fellow (non-resident) with the Southeast Asia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C..."
Source/publisher:
Center for Strategic & International Studies
Date of publication:
2023-02-06
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-07
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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"Two years ago, in February 2021, Myanmar’s military carried out a coup, overthrowing a democratically elected government and detaining many of its leaders. Since then the junta’s security forces have engaged in a broad crackdown against opposition to military rule, committing numerous crimes against humanity and war crimes across the country, widely documented by Human Rights Watch and other groups.
France and the European Union have been vocal in condemning the military’s atrocities. The French government supported the United Nations General Assembly and UN Human Rights Council in 2021 in adopting resolutions calling on the military to end abuses and restore civilian rule. France also backed several rounds of EU economic sanctions and travel bans on senior military leaders and military-owned conglomerates that fund the military’s rule.
More recently, on December 21, France supported a UN Security Council resolution on Myanmar, denouncing the military’s rights violations since the coup. The resolution fell short of imposing a global arms embargo, but its adoption reflects the junta’s growing international isolation. The fact that Russia and China abstained instead of vetoing the resolution signals that even the junta’s few friends are losing interest in defending them.
None of this, however, has been enough to change the junta’s conduct or calculations. The military has continued to carry out mass killings, arbitrary arrests, torture, sexual violence, and military attacks on civilians in conflict areas. Since the coup, the military has detained at least 17,000 anti-coup protesters and killed over 2,800 demonstrators and bystanders. The military still blocks humanitarian aid from reaching millions of displaced people and others at risk, and in Rakhine State—where the ethnic Rohingya have faced years of crimes against humanity, including apartheid—security forces have imposed new restrictions on movement and aid, making food and water shortages worse and paving the way for increased preventable diseases and severe malnutrition.
The junta’s leaders may appear dismissive about their international reputation, but they may be more sensitive to an increased focus on their potential criminal liability. UN members should more stridently raise the prospect of jurisdiction over crimes against humanity by the International Criminal Court. Thus far, such calls have been inadequate to press the Security Council to vote for an ICC referral.
Another way to get the Myanmar junta’s attention would be for key governments to more effectively target the military’s economic lifeblood, in particular, foreign currency revenues that the military obtains from exports like natural gas, metals, gemstones, and timber—funds it uses to purchase weapons, military equipment, and fuel.
The economic sanctions imposed so far by the US, EU, and UK, which were meant to curtail these revenue streams, haven’t been tough enough—or been enforced enough—to meaningfully impact the junta. Asian countries such as Singapore and Japan that could help enforce these sanctions through anti-money laundering laws, have not done so. The junta evidently has not felt compelled to change its conduct.
In the most egregious example, banks continue to process and send to military-controlled entities US dollar revenues from natural gas exports to Thailand and China. This is due in part to the fact that the US and UK have not matched EU sanctions on the natural gas revenues—which are paid in USD, not Euros. France, Germany, and other EU members need to press the US and UK to impose matching sanctions.
Enforcement also needs to be ramped up. EU and Asian banks processing US dollar and Euro transactions continue to make payments to sanctioned entities. The US and EU continue to allow imports of valuable teak wood auctioned off by sanctioned entities. Meanwhile, several Japanese, Korean, and Singaporean companies and banks—many of them with multinational operations that place them in part under US and EU legal jurisdictions—have continued to do business with military-owned entities.
France and others often point to the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) as a means for resolving the crisis in Myanmar, even though the bloc has little power or cohesion. In April 2021, ASEAN did manage to negotiate a Five-Point Consensus with the Myanmar military, meant to lead to dialogue and de-escalation. But the military repudiated it within days and the abuses only increased. Since then, ASEAN has been unable to meaningfully impact the military’s decision making. When the junta executed four political prisoners in July 2022—Myanmar’s first use of the death penalty in over three decades—one ASEAN leader, Malaysia, called the executions a “mockery” of ASEAN’s efforts.
As China and Russia continue to shamefully block more robust multilateral action, France, together with other EU member states, should redouble efforts to coordinate with the US, EU at large and other Western and Asian parnters to ensure that sanctions are strengthened and enforced effectively. Tougher actions can stem the flow of foreign funding and curb the military’s ability to buy weapons and sustain its operations, and help ASEAN and other intermediaries convince them that they need to move away from brutality and start taking steps toward restoring democratic rule.
The status quo approach is not working. France and its European partners need to do more to stem the junta’s brutality and help the people of Myanmar, who continue to call for the international community to help..."
Source/publisher:
Mediapart via "Human Rights Watch" (USA)
Date of publication:
2023-02-06
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-06
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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more
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"It has been two years since the Myanmar military coup on February 1, 2021. Yet Australia still has not sanctioned a single member of Myanmar's military or any of their business interests for widespread human rights violations since the coup.
Australia is now an outlier among like-minded countries including the United States, United Kingdom, European Union, and Canada, which have imposed a total of hundreds of sanctions on individuals and entities in response to the junta's abuses.
Repeated calls for Australia to follow the lead of its traditional allies have not exactly fallen on deaf ears, rather we are told targeted sanctions are still under "active" consideration. While many human rights activists and civil society groups accepted this position while the junta was holding the Australian economist Sean Turnell, this excuse no longer carries any weight following his release in November.
Myanmar's junta has been responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity, widely documented by human rights groups including Human Rights Watch. The military and police are implicated in mass killings, arbitrary arrests and detention, torture, sexual violence, and attacks on civilians in conflict areas including indiscriminate ground and air attacks. At least 17,000 anti-coup protesters have been arbitrarily arrested and over 2,800 killed, although the real figures are most likely much higher.
The junta has blocked desperately needed humanitarian aid from reaching millions of displaced people and others at risk, in violation of international humanitarian law. Across the country, security forces have imposed new travel restrictions and have attacked aid workers, blocked access to roads and aid convoys, destroyed non-military supplies and shut down telecommunications services. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs estimates that at least 17.6 million people are in dire need of humanitarian assistance. Fighting since the coup has displaced more than one million people internally, while another 70,000 refugees have fled into neighbouring countries.
In Myanmar's Rakhine State, new restrictions on movement and aid affecting ethnic Rohingya camps and villages have made food and water shortages worse, increasing cases of preventable diseases and severe malnutrition. Escalating hostilities between the Arakan Army armed group and the Myanmar military have resulted in Rohingya and Rakhine civilian deaths, arbitrary arrests, and displacement.
Myanmar is gripped by fear and violence. The military's execution of four political prisoners in July 2022 after egregiously unfair trials was Myanmar's first use of the death penalty in over three decades. The civilian leader Aung San Suu Kyi is serving a 33-year sentence after sham military trials for corruption, incitement, breaching the Official Secrets Act, and other politically motivated charges. Every day, it becomes more dangerous for dissenters to speak out for fear of imprisonment, torture, or death.
On December 21, 2022, the United Nations Security Council adopted a resolution on Myanmar, denouncing the military's rights violations since the coup. The resolution fell short of calls for a global arms embargo, but the fact that it passed reflects the junta's growing isolation. Russia, China, and India notably abstained, signalling that even the junta's few friends have lost interest in defending the intransigent military.
Throughout all this, people in Myanmar have remained defiant in opposing the military's abusive grip on the country. But there remains the elephant in the room: Why have some democratic countries such as Australia, which have expressed sympathy for the plight of Myanmar's people, not taken meaningful action?
In December, Foreign Minister Penny Wong announced new targeted sanctions against Russia and Iran for grave human rights violations. But Myanmar was conspicuously absent from the list.
Australia's reluctance to impose targeted sanctions on Myanmar seems to reflect an unwillingness to upset the regional status quo. No member state of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has imposed measures on Myanmar, and Australia does not appear willing to go out on a limb as it seeks to improve relations with its Asian neighbours. But two years after the coup, Australia's risk-averse human rights foreign policy is doing nothing to protect Myanmar people's lives.
Instead, Australia should take the regional lead in imposing concrete measures to curtail the junta's abuses. It should coordinate with ASEAN member states to impose targeted sanctions on senior military officials and their major revenue streams.
Revenue from Myanmar's business interests pays for the military's crimes. Imposing sanctions on key individuals and entities can stop the flow of foreign funding, curbing the military's ability to buy weapons and sustain its operations. Ending the junta's widespread abuses needs a global commitment, including from Australia, to stand in solidarity with the people of Myanmar..."
Source/publisher:
The Canberra Times (Canberra) via Human Rights Watch (USA)
Date of publication:
2023-02-05
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-05
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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"This regular update, covering non-violent movements, conflict trends, human rights violations, and humanitarian developments up to 31 January is produced by Southern Monitor, a local research group. The next monthly situation update will be issued in February 2023.
HIGHLIGHTS & KEY MESSAGES
In January 2023, a total of 33 armed clashes erupted across all districts in Tanintharyi Region, showing an increase in armed conflict.
A total of 33 casualties (25 deaths and 8 injured) due to attacks targeting civilians were reported in January 2023.
More than 33 civilians’ houses were burned down by junta forces following armed clashes in Palaw and Dawei Townships.
More than 7,000 people are displaced in Tanintharyi Region.
Humanitarian assistance has been largely impeded due to access constraints, and a widespread ban on transport of dry rations and medicines. Displaced populations are in dire need of dry rations, adequate shelter and warm clothing..."
Source/publisher:
Southern Monitor (Myanmar) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of publication:
2023-02-05
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-05
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Education in Burma/Myanmar - general, Food Security and nutrition in Burma/Myanmar, Human Rights and international relations
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1.27 MB
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"Minister: Good afternoon, everyone. We have just concluded the first ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting for this year, chaired by Indonesia. I will start off by making remarks on three themes. First, on Timor-Leste; second, Myanmar; and then more specific details on the ASEAN agenda itself.
First, what made this meeting different was the participation, for the first time, of Timor-Leste as an observer. You may recall that our leaders gave in-principle approval for Timor-Leste’s (ASEAN) membership, and they are in the process of transiting through an objective, criteria-based roadmap. On a bilateral basis, I reassured the foreign minister of Timor-Leste that Singapore stands in full support. In particular, we have got an ASEAN Readiness Support package for Timor-Leste, basically to help them enhance their capability, human resource development, as well as both diplomatic and economic tools so that Timor-Leste eventually can participate fully in all the responsibilities and obligations of ASEAN membership. Their presence at this first meeting was important. I think they were very pleased to have this chance.
The next topic, which consumed a fair amount of bandwidth, obviously is the situation in Myanmar. Unfortunately, it is not getting better. In fact, our ground reports indicated that the situation may actually be worsening. Within ASEAN itself, we reaffirmed the importance (of) the centrality of the Five-Point Consensus that our leaders agreed upon, in April 2021, here in Jakarta in this very building. I think it is worth emphasising that there will be no resolution unless there is an honest to goodness attempt at national reconciliation. The violence must stop, political detainees need to be released. In particular, President Win Myint and State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi need to be released. That is an essential prerequisite for national reconciliation to occur amongst all the stakeholders. On the part of ASEAN, Indonesia is Chair and now taking over as Special Envoy. It is committed to continue to try to engage all stakeholders. I think this is critical. Without the participation and active engagement of all stakeholders, you are not going to get peace, you are not going to get national reconciliation. So, we will have to wait and see. One key point which we all emphasised is that the rate limiting factor for progress is not ASEAN – it is really the stakeholders within Myanmar itself. So, we will have to wait and see. But on our part, ASEAN will do our best to facilitate, encourage, promote, and also in the meantime, do our best to deliver humanitarian assistance because we know that many people in Myanmar are actually suffering.
The next area that we focused on is ASEAN itself. We start first from an optimistic position. This is a bustling, dynamic region – 661 million people, (and) 60% of us in ASEAN are below the age of 35. The combined GDP is at US$ 3 trillion but in fact, it is set to double within the next two decades. If we succeed in that, ASEAN, as a whole, will become the fourth largest economy in the world. We start with great potential.
The more specific pillars which we are focusing on – first, the digital pillar. We are looking at advancing negotiations on the ASEAN Digital Economy Framework (Agreement). What this means is internally, first, enhancing digital literacy in our population. Next, improving digital connectivity between our countries. Further, to enable cross-border flows of data because that is an essential element of a digital economy. The purpose of all these ultimately, is to integrate our digital economies to enhance opportunities in an inclusive way for both big and small businesses, as well as our external partners who want to participate in harvesting the many bountiful opportunities that the digital economy provides for Southeast Asia. Ultimately, what we should see as part of digital integration is further interoperability of our systems. For instance, digital payment systems, trade facilitation, customs clearance, and all the other elements and ultimately, (to) also create within ASEAN, an atmosphere that promotes start-ups, entrepreneurship, and innovation. On digital economy, there is a lot going on, and it is an area replete with opportunities.
The next pillar that we looked at within ASEAN is the green economy. All of us need to decarbonise or at least reduce the carbon footprint of all our economies, and in particular, to help facilitate the transition towards renewable energy. One particular project, the power integration project (involving) Laos, Thailand, Malaysia, and Singapore, which has already begun – we really hope that this will be a pathfinder, ultimately, to an ASEAN energy grid. If we look at Southeast Asia as a whole, there is more than enough energy resources, and in particular, renewable energy. But getting the connectivity, getting policy frameworks, getting the bilateral and multilateral arrangements that will bring us across the threshold into a vibrant green economy for ASEAN – it is a very tantalising prospect.
The other area which we are looking at is what we call the blue economy. This is about the sustainable, resilient approach to using, conserving, and developing our maritime resources. This is important because so much of Southeast Asia has a great maritime heritage and resource, and developing this in an inclusive, fair, sustainable, and resilient way is crucial. It is another engine, another area replete with opportunities. So, looking at the digital, green economy and blue economy – our homework is set for us.
We of course, also reviewed developments beyond our region. In particular, the fact that the hot war in Europe, in Ukraine is still on, (and) the superpower rivalry between (the) US and China still continues. Our pitch to the larger world and to ASEAN’s external partners is – look at ASEAN, look at Southeast Asia, on our own merits and not just as another proxy arena for contest, but on our merits.
In particular, in Southeast Asia, what we are interested in is trade and investment. We hope that all our external partners that I have named: US, China, Europe and beyond look to Southeast Asia as an arena where they can invest, where they can trade and in a non-binary, non-exclusive manner; because our organising principle is overlapping circle of friends.
It has been a very useful first meeting to kick off the year. We will see how things develop. There will always be surprises in the way the events unfold.
Hariz Baharudin (ST): My question is on Timor-Leste: you mentioned it earlier, but I wanted to ask you a bit more about it. This has been the first meeting they are attending, and the first they have been attending after they have been granted observer status. Your thoughts about their presence in these ASEAN meetings and what this means for the bloc? Also, what the reaction has been from the other ASEAN ministers, your counterparts, and how Timor-Leste has added onto ASEAN?
Minister: It is significant that they are here, participating as an Observer and having full access to all the ASEAN discussions and topics of interest. Just that presence is important.
Second, in terms of reception, I think everyone is fully supportive of their full participation. We look forward ultimately to their full membership. But membership of ASEAN carries with it heavy responsibilities and obligations. I think Timor-Leste is also now getting a better and deeper appreciation of just how heavy that load of responsibilities and obligations will be. I would say that everyone is welcoming them, but we know that it is quite a steep climb up that hill. Certainly, in the case of Singapore, we are fully committed to helping Timor-Leste climb that hill, and to have the capacity to fulfill all the obligations and responsibilities.
Tan Min-Wei (Mothership): We were wanting to ask whether the crisis in Myanmar was affecting ASEAN unity, particularly with a fear that there might be different opinions on how to handle the situation, and whether blocs might emerge from that?
Minister: Let me address that head-on. I think all of us are acutely aware of the need to maintain ASEAN unity. I would start off by saying that the way the crisis unfolds in Myanmar, and the impact. For instance, if things get far worse and you get heavy flows of refugees, obviously it affects the immediate neighbours more than it affects those who are further away. To say that there are different levels of anxiety and concern is a fair statement. Having said that, and I can tell you that I can tell you that we discussed this quite directly amongst each other, (and) we also agreed that there is a need to maintain ASEAN unity and certain common purpose. What we agreed on is that that we all double down on the ASEAN Five-Point Consensus. We are all completely united in our calls for cessation of violence, for national reconciliation, for the need to engage all stakeholders, and on the need to continue to support people of Myanmar through the delivery of humanitarian assistance. To summarise, there may be different emphasis on concerns, but there is certainly unity, and a common purpose in affirming and in fulfilling and implementing the ASEAN leaders Five-Point Consensus.
Leong Wai Kit (CNA): You mentioned that neighbouring countries may be concerned about the overflow of refugees. And this is quite in line with what UN Special Envoy Noeleen Heyzer has said. She has been rallying for ASEAN to do something together to give them better protection. Can I ask Minister, what do you think Singapore can do in that respect? She also mentioned that within that framework, there is also a possibility of a violence monitoring system. How do you envision such a system to be such that it can reduce the violence there?
Minister: I would take a step back and say the most important thing is to stop the violence internally, to begin the process of national reconciliation, for everyone within Myanmar to sit at the same table as equals and to have sincere dialogue. Let us not lose sight of the critical importance of that. If that can be achieved, or at least make progress starting that process, I think that will lower the temperature, it will lower the level of violence and certainly lower the probability of outflow of refugees. That must still be our focus. Having said that, I do not know how long it will take before we reach that. We do need to be acutely aware of the humanitarian (aspect) and to the extent that we can deliver the assistance within Myanmar in a fair, open, transparent and inclusive way also will help to ensure that people do not need to leave Myanmar to seek safety, security and the necessities of life. These are areas in which ASEAN can help in concrete ways and we will continue to look for opportunities. But I must emphasise we do need the military authorities to cooperate in this process as well. It is an area of ongoing work.
Yun Zhou (LHZB): I would like to draw your attention to the broader region which ASEAN is situated. Just yesterday, Secretary Blinken announced that that he will be postponing his visit to Beijing after the US detected a Chinese surveillance balloon in their airspace. I would like to get your thoughts on what bearing will these developments have for Sino-US relations and for ASEAN, how does it see itself maintaining agency and centrality between the two superpowers?
Minister: I think it is a pity that this long-anticipated visit by Secretary Blinken to Beijing has been postponed. It illustrates how easy it is for unexpected incidents – in this case, it was a balloon that was drifting across continental United States – how easy it is for unexpected incidents to derail scheduled occasions for meetings and engagement. And this is why ASEAN is paying such close attention to the fraught relationship between the US and China. Speaking from a Southeast Asian perspective, the more they engage, the more they meet, the more open lines of communications, the better. It reduces misunderstanding.
Hopefully both sides exercise sufficient self-restraint and reduce the prospects of such incidents. Even as we saw in December, two aircrafts the J11 aircraft from the Chinese Air Force and the US reconnaissance – the RC135 came within 6 metres of each other. The less there are of such incidents, which bring with them risks – both known risks and unknown risks – the better. We need less of them. We hope that in the medium term, at least, the US and China can achieve a modus vivendi.
From a Southeast Asian perspective, not only do we hope that they achieve a modus vivendi, we want them to engage us on our own merits and not through the prism of rivalry between the two superpowers. Our clear and consistent message to both the US and China is that trade and investment is strategy in Southeast Asia. That is what we are looking for. Southeast Asia is replete with opportunities for more trade (and) more investments by both China and the US. This is not a zero-sum game. It is one in which, the more both sides and Europe are engaged with Southeast Asia, the more opportunities – truly a win-win formulation for everyone. That is the message which we are trying to convey, and of course, our hope that they do achieve a modus vivendi and overcome this current danger of actions – sometimes deliberate, sometimes unintended, leading into an escalatory spiral of action, reaction, and unnecessarily raising temperature.
Again, it is just a reminder that the world is not in a settled, calm condition. There are still many things that can go wrong in the course of the next year or two. We all need to be vigilant, careful, and to focus both on dealing with immediate problems, whilst also expanding opportunities for the medium and long term.
All in all, ASEAN remains relevant. ASEAN maintaining unity and centrality is crucial. I would say, from this meeting at least, the sense of the interactions with my colleagues, is that everyone recognises this, and that is positive. But bear in mind the fact that globally, we are still living in a dangerous world and there are many things that can go wrong – collisions and bumps in the night. You just need to be careful. But remember that there are great prospects for growth in Southeast Asia..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Singapore
Date of publication:
2023-02-04
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-04
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
ASEAN-Burma relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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Description:
"This regular update, covering humanitarian developments up to 27 January, is produced by OCHA Myanmar in collaboration with the Inter-Cluster Coordination Group and UN agencies. Response figures are based on self-reporting by organizations to clusters. The next humanitarian update will be issued at the end of February 2023.
HIGHLIGHTS & KEY MESSAGES
• Two years since the 2021 military takeover, humanitarian needs are on the rise and the operational environment is further worsening.
• 17.6 million people - nearly one third of the population - are estimated to be in humanitarian need in 2023.
• The humanitarian community has launched a $764m Response Plan for 2023. It prioritizes 4.5 million people with severe needs for life saving support, predominantly in conflict-affected rural areas.
• Heavy fighting, including airstrikes, tight security, access restrictions, and threats against aid workers have continued unabated, particularly in the Southeast, endangering lives and hampering humanitarian operations.
• As of 23 January, 1.2 million people remain displaced by conflict and insecurity since the military takeover in February 2021, bringing the total number of internally displaced people (IDPs) across Myanmar to more than 1.5 million.
• Since the pause in fighting between the Arakan Army (AA) and the Myanmar Armed Forces (MAF) in Rakhine, the access environment has slowly improved although the ceasefire remains fragile.
• Humanitarians are closely monitoring the impact of new NGO registration requirements on the delivery of life-saving support in 2023.
• Despite severe access constraints and drastic underfunding, humanitarians were able to deliver life-saving assistance to more than 3.9 million people in 2022.
KEY FIGURES
1.5M Total people currently internally displaced across Myanmar
1.2M People currently displaced by clashes and insecurity since February 2021
330K People internally displaced due to conflict prior to February 2021, mainly in Rakhine, Kachin, Chin, and Shan
39K Civilian properties estimated burnt or destroyed since February 2021.
*Displacement figures fluctuate during any given month. These figures represent the number of people currently displaced. Cumulative numbers for returns and displacement are not always available.
SITUATION OVERVIEW
Two years since the 2021 military takeover, the people of Myanmar continue to endure a political, human rights, health, economic and humanitarian crisis that has caused civilian casualties and a surge in displacement, pushed thousands into poverty, and exposed people to daily protection threats.
The 2023 Humanitarian Needs Overview (HNO) estimates that 17.6 million - almost one in three Myanmar people - are now in humanitarian need. Increasing numbers of people are now facing daily protection threats and are living in fear amid the violence sweeping the country. In 2023, protection risks including killing and injury due to heavy fighting and landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW), arrest and detention, forced recruitment, and human trafficking among others, continue to prevail, especially in hardto-reach conflict areas. As of 23 January, 1.2 million people remain displaced by conflict and insecurity since the military takeover in February 2021, bringing the total number of internally displaced people (IDPs) across Myanmar to more than 1.5 million. With surging displacement, the resources of host communities and those on the move are being rapidly depleted. Nutritious food is becoming increasingly scarce and more unaffordable due to inflation. Parents are worrying about their children’s future prospects after years of missed schooling, while the sick are continuing to miss out on medicines and life-saving treatment because of health service interruptions. Stateless Rohingya people continue to face restrictions on their movement that have left them almost completely dependent on assistance for survival.
The grim situation outlined in the HNO makes a scaled-up, context-adapted, and people-centered humanitarian response essential in 2023 to prevent loss of life and reduce suffering. The 2023 Myanmar Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) requests US$764 million to reach 4.5 million people most in need of life-saving humanitarian support, predominantly in conflict-affected rural areas. The Plan is heavily prioritized and makes a compelling case for a more robust donor contribution to the response that will be delivered through a new fit-for-purpose coordination architecture and an enhanced localization strategy. The 2023 plan focuses on hard-to-reach rural areas and those with the most severe needs while being realistic about potential reach given access and capacity constraints. The Plan outlines the dire need for improved humanitarian access to conflict-affected areas and the removal of bureaucratic obstacles to the delivery of assistance. Heading into 2023, humanitarian organizations are facing an increasingly constrained operational environment. Bureaucratic and physical impediments to access are hampering the ability of humanitarian partners to provide protection and assistance. Humanitarians are closely monitoring the impacts of new NGO registration requirements introduced by the de facto authorities amid fears they will limit the ability of many organizations to deliver assistance and result in escalating unmet needs. The humanitarian community has proposed a six-month moratorium on implementation of the requirements to allow time to ensure services are not interrupted..."
Source/publisher:
UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (New York) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of publication:
2023-02-02
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-02
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Education in Burma/Myanmar - general, Food Security and nutrition in Burma/Myanmar, Public Health, Human Rights and international relations
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"The EU has released over €43 million to address the humanitarian needs of people in Myanmar, as well as those of Rohingya refugees and their host communities in Bangladesh.
In Myanmar, the EU will provide over €18 million to respond to the dramatic escalation in needs following the military takeover of 2021. The funding will allow humanitarian partners to ensure the provision of life-saving support such as protection, food, shelter, healthcare and education.
The EU will also continue to support the efforts of Bangladesh in responding to the Rohingya refugee crisis by providing over €23 million, part of which will also contribute to implement disaster preparedness programmes in the country. A further dedicated allocation of €2 million will help address the needs of Rohingya and other refugees in neighbouring countries, such as Indonesia and Malaysia.
Background
In Myanmar, 17.6 million people are expected to be in need of humanitarian assistance in 2023, a dramatic increase from 1 million in 2021. A third of those in need are children.
Over 5 years after large-scale violence forced hundreds of thousands of Rohingya people to flee Rakhine State in Myanmar, Bangladesh still hosts almost 1 million refugees. Rohingya refugees live in precarious and deteriorating conditions, with the majority located in the congested refugee camp in Cox's Bazar, where they are entirely dependent on humanitarian aid.
The EU has been providing humanitarian aid to people in Myanmar since 1994, and in Bangladesh since 2002. With this additional funding, EU humanitarian aid for Myanmar now totals over €68 million since 2021. Support for Rohingya refugees, their host communities, and disaster preparedness efforts in Bangladesh since the beginning of the Rohingya crisis in 2017 now stands at over €242 million..."
Source/publisher:
European Commission's Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations
Date of publication:
2023-02-01
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-01
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Food Security and nutrition in Burma/Myanmar, Education in Burma/Myanmar - general, Public Health
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"Washington, DC – The International Republican Institute (IRI) released the following statement on the second anniversary of the military coup in Burma.
“Today, IRI recognizes the bravery and resilience of the Burmese people who continue to struggle for freedom and democracy despite grave risks to their safety and livelihoods. Their dedication to democratic values and building a government that respects human dignity is truly inspiring.
“IRI strongly condemns the military regime’s brutal tactics and ongoing human rights abuses as it conducts an indiscriminate and violent campaign against its citizens. This includes torturing civilians, burning villages and homes, and committing sexual and gender-based violence which only pushes the country deeper into a political and economic crisis.
“It’s time for the military junta to immediately stop these attacks and allow unimpeded humanitarian access to vulnerable populations. Further, the regime’s attempt to legitimize its grip on power through a sham elections process later this year is nothing more than a smokescreen and should be firmly rejected by the international community.
“IRI remains steadfast in supporting Burma’s pro-democracy movement and their desire for a free and democratic future.”..."
Source/publisher:
International Republican Institute
Date of publication:
2023-02-01
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-01
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
more
Description:
"We, the undersigned organizations specializing in election observation, electoral and democracy assistance, committed to the Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation1 and to upholding the integrity and credibility of such endeavours, denounce and distance ourselves from the sham “election” that the illegal and illegitimate military junta of Myanmar, the State Administrative Council (SAC), and the illegitimate “Union Election Commission” it has established, are currently planning for later this year.
We also express an urgent request to the international community to deny the SAC any technical, material, or symbolic support for such sham elections. We encourage UN Member States to join us and make their opposition to the junta’s electoral exercise widely known, including through individual and joint statements, and resolutions at the UN Security Council, the UN General Assembly, and the UN Human Rights Council.
The Myanmar junta has been systematically and massively violating the human rights of the people to such a degree that the free expression of their will cannot be ensured. It is impossible to hold a genuine election under current conditions in Myanmar, which include the arrest, detention, torture, and execution of leaders of the most widely supported political party and other politicians and civic activists; as well as the harassment, jailing and torture of journalists. Those who criticize the coup and the military junta and protect the internationally recognized valid elections of 2020 are considered criminals and are persecuted. It should also be noted that 21 officials from the legitimate Union Election Commission are still being held in detention following the coup as a result of their involvement in the 2020 elections.2 Genuine democratic elections cannot be achieved unless human rights and fundamental freedoms can be exercised, including freedom of expression, assembly, and association, as was largely the case in 2020. The evidence is overwhelming that the SAC denies the exercise of any of these freedoms.
Genuine democratic elections are an expression of sovereignty, which belongs to the people of a country, the free expression of whose will provides the basis for the authority and legitimacy of government. The SAC can make no claim to democratic legitimacy, i.e., representing the will of the people as expressed through elections.
Our organizations are committed to conducting systematic, comprehensive, and accurate gathering of information concerning the laws, processes and institutions related to the conduct of elections. We assess factors concerning the overall electoral environment. We analyze this information impartially and draw conclusions about the character of electoral processes based on the highest standards for accuracy of information and impartiality of analysis. Where possible, we offer recommendations for improving the integrity and effectiveness of electoral processes. No recommendations that we could offer on this sham “election” could cure the falsity of the process other than for the SAC to follow the call of the United Nations General Assembly to “to respect the will of the people as freely expressed by the results of the general election of 8 November 2020, to end the state of emergency, to respect all human rights of all the people of Myanmar and to allow the sustained democratic transition of Myanmar.” The implementation of a sham “election” will not bring stability in Myanmar. It will only contribute to increasing violence and polarization, worsen the crisis caused by the military coup, and further threats to regional and international stability and security..."
Source/publisher:
Asian Network for Free Elections, International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, National Democratic Institute, International Republican Institute
Date of publication:
2023-01-31
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-01
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations, Rule of Law - Burma/Myanmar-specific
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"Today marks two years since the attempted military coup in Burma. Over the last two years, the people of Burma have bravely resisted the junta’s violent attempt to take total control of the country. In the face of mass, unwavering public resistance, the junta continues to increase its campaign of brutality and savagery as it carries out killings, torture, forced disappearances, sexual violence, and airstrikes against the civilian population throughout the country.
Burma Human Rights Network (BHRN) has so far documented from 1st February 2021 to 31stDecember 2022. According to the documentation, the total number of civilians killed by the junta reached 3160 people. There were 363 people who were tortured and killed within 24 hours of their arrest by the junta. Arson attacks by the junta forces on civilian properties across the country destroyed 46,350 houses. Sagaing Division has the largest rates of all the above-mentioned crimes committed by the junta. Freedom of religion and belief was also significantly violated during the period, with hundreds of religious buildings burned and destroyed, including Churches, Buddhist monasteries, and Mosques.
While these events have garnered international attention, other forms of structural violence and human rights violations of Burma’s Muslim minorities has continued to occur largely under the radar, with particularly severe violations against the Rohingya people. Since the coup, Rohingya and other Muslim minorities have been subjected to tightened restrictions on their fundamental freedoms and are increasingly at risk of being subjected to further atrocity crimes.
Since the coup, the junta has imposed new movement restrictions and aid blockages on Rohingya camps and villages. The junta has arrested thousands of Muslims, hundreds of them children, for ‘unauthorized’ travel. Those arrested face a maximum of five years in prison. According to the Burma Human Rights Network’s (BHRN) documentation from 1 February 2021 to December 2022, at least 2,840 Rohingya were arrested and detained for traveling outside their communities without getting prior permission showing a sharp uptick in the number of arrests since the coup. BHRN has also documented 70 cases of other Muslim minorities being arbitrarily arrested.
The junta and its supporters continue to use divisive and hateful rhetoric targeting non-Buddhist religious groups to divide the resistance and deflect and divert attention from the coup. While religious oppression has been a longstanding issue in Burma, the coup emboldened the junta to further persecute, marginalize, and incite violence against the Rohingya and other Muslim minorities throughout the country. From 1 February 2021 until January 2023, BHRN has documented over 539 incidents of hate-speech targeting Muslims by junta supporters on social media including Facebook, Telegram, and junta-backed journals.
BHRN and other human rights groups have also documented cases of the junta looting, burning and destroying properties, shops, and places of worship of Muslim communities. BHRN documentation shows that more than 770 houses in Muslim villages were burned down by the junta in Sagaing region since the start of the coup. BHRN documentation shows the junta has killed at least 81 Muslims since 1 February 2021.
“Amidst all this violence and brutality, the international response to the coup has proceeded in a slow and fragmented manner, falling short of the Burma people’s expectations. The longer the international community waits to act, the more emboldened the junta will become as it continues to commit atrocities. The situation in Myanmar requires an immediate and cohesive international response”, said Kyaw Win, Executive Director of BHRN.
The Burma Human Rights Network (BHRN) calls on governments worldwide to:
Redouble efforts to pursue international legal action against the junta, including by joining the Gambia’s case at the International Court of Justice and by actively pursuing investigations and prosecutions under the principle of universal jurisdiction like those in Turkey, Argentina, and Germany.
Work together to strengthen international sanctions to cut off the Burma military from the revenue funding its abusive operations.
Increase engagement and recognize the National Unity Government, ethnic resistance organizations, and leaders of the civil disobedience movement.
Additionally, BHRN calls on:
ASEAN to coordinate strong action against the junta, block the junta from all its meetings, and support UN member states in enforcing sanctions and a global arms embargo against the junta.
Neighbouring countries, including India, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, Bangladesh, to devise a comprehensive regional response to the refugee crisis, provide protection, support, and humanitarian and legal aid to all refugees fleeing Burma, and to authorize emergency cross-border aid to internally displaced persons in Burma.
The UN Security Council (UNSC) to end its inaction and refer the situation in Burma to the International Criminal Court or establish a separate criminal tribunal to investigate and prosecute the full spectrum of atrocity crimes in Burma. The UNSC should also impose a binding global arms embargo including a prohibition on security assistance, the sale and transfer of arms, dual-use technology, and suspend the supply of aviation fuel.
The international community to not recognise the pseudo-election that the junta plans to conduct in August this year. There must be recognition that the same junta that overthrew a Democratically elected government does not have any credibility to conduct the election.
Organisation’s Background
BHRN is based in London and operates across Burma/Myanmar working for human rights, minority rights and religious freedom in the country. BHRN has played a crucial role in advocating for human rights and religious freedom with politicians and world leaders..."
Source/publisher:
Burma Human Rights Network
Date of publication:
2023-02-01
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-01
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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pdf
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"1 February 2023: Two years after launching the attempted coup, the Myanmar military junta has failed to impose its political agenda on Myanmar. The international community must now step-up support for the federal democracy movement as the only way forward for Myanmar, said the Special Advisory Council for Myanmar (SAC-M).
SAC-M hosted a press conference yesterday, on Tuesday 31 January 2023, to mark the two-year anniversary of the start of the military coup in Myanmar. The members of SAC-M commented on the growing regional crisis caused by the military in Myanmar, as well as recent developments in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and United Nations (UN) relevant to Myanmar.
SAC-M founding member Yanghee Lee spoke about the outright refusal of the Myanmar people to accept the military coup. “The junta cannot succeed,” said Lee. “This time the old playbook won’t work – the movement has come too far, and the people have had enough. The only path to peace and stability in Myanmar now, is through finally realising the people’s will and long-held aspirations for a genuine federal democracy.”
SAC-M founding member Marzuki Darusman discussed the challenges facing Indonesia as chair of ASEAN in 2023. “Indonesia will need to push ASEAN to finally come to terms with the reality that the situation in Myanmar is a political conflict between the junta and the democracy movement,” said Darusman. “As ASEAN Chair for one very short year, Indonesia should try to lay down the groundwork for a realistic, sound and durable political solution. It is imperative that Indonesia acknowledges the reality of the NUG and works with it, as a party to the conflict, to find a solution.”
Chris Sidoti, also a founding member of SAC-M, commented on the recent developments in the UN and international system, including the adoption of the Security Council’s first resolution on Myanmar, the continued rejection of the military junta by the General Assembly, and the ongoing investigations at the International Court of Justice and International Criminal Court in relation to the Rohingya genocide. However, Sidoti explained, these steps have all been inadequate.
“We, the international system, are challenged, as we go into the third year of this attempted coup. We are challenged to respond far more adequately, far more effectively and far more actively than we have done in the past,” said Sidoti.
All three members of SAC-M dismissed the junta’s stated plan to hold elections in 2023 as yet another attempt to gain power that fails to comply even with the military’s own constitution. “The international community must recognise that whatever the military in Myanmar is doing right now has no constitutional basis,” said Lee.
However, the members of SAC-M concurred that a non-violent solution to the conflict must be found, but that the nature of that solution is not yet clear, and with Min Aung Hlaing leading the military, appears unlikely.
As the coup, and the terrible toll it is taking on the people of Myanmar, enters its third year, SAC-M calls on the international community to close in on accountability by establishing an ad hoc tribunal for Myanmar, and to finally step up, and recognise Myanmar’s National Unity Government..."
Source/publisher:
Special Advisory Council for Myanmar
Date of publication:
2023-02-01
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-01
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations, International Criminal Court (Myanmar)
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Sub-title:
Today marks the second anniversary of the murderous coup by the Myanmar military, which has killed nearly 3,000 people including dozens of children.
Description:
"In a statement released yesterday, the Council of Global Unions has called for renewed global efforts to restore democracy and for official recognition of Myanmar’s National Unity Government (NUG). Following the vicious military coup, the NUG was formed by members of Myanmar’s elected government to coordinate international opposition to the military coup.
The brutal repression carried out by the junta since the coup has included the killing and the arbitrary detention of trade union representatives, as highlighted in last year’s ITUC Global Rights Index.
Along with economic and diplomatic pressure on the junta itself, a key focus must be placed on the involvement of global multinational companies that continue to do business with the junta, including through supply chain inputs that feed the military’s domestic arms industry.
“This corrupt and brutal junta must feel the full weight of international pressure. The people of Myanmar need international solidarity, and the ITUC and the entire global trade union movement will continue to stand with them and their national trade union centre, the CTUM,” said ITUC Deputy General Secretary Owen Tudor.
Source/publisher:
International Trade Union Confederation
Date of publication:
2023-02-01
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-01
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
more
Description:
"Two years ago today, the Burma Army made clear their sinister intentions for the country’s future. Despite an overwhelming victory in the 2020 election for the National League for Democracy, the junta’s coup was a desperate bid for legitimacy. It declared fraud without evidence while hijacking the systems in place that permitted a free and fair election to take place. Their failed coup has brought nothing but destruction while making a mockery of the rule of law. The Human Rights Foundation of Monland (HURFOM) rejects the junta’s tyranny and calls for immediate international intervention to hold the military Generals accountable for their mass crimes.
In Southeastern Burma, in particular, Mon State, Karen State and Tanintharyi region, the Burma Army has committed murder, torture, sexual assault and rape, arbitrary arrests and destruction of property, and many others. Innocent people have been killed in their homes, while others have been arbitrarily arrested, detained, and tortured. The regime has replaced judges with those willing to abide by its totalitarian, militarized agenda. The atrocities perpetrated are ongoing. They are systematic, widespread, and take place with impunity. Without action, the junta-backed battalions are encouraged to continue their campaign of terror.
The world must not forget about the plight of the people in Burma. Every day has become one of survival. Livelihood opportunities have been forcibly put on hold as fighting in civilian areas makes it unsafe, if not impossible, to resume their daily work. Landmines litter their villages and farms. Children are also forced to continue their learning in the jungle as the junta targets schools in air and ground strikes. Women and young girls detained in military custody are not safe. HURFOM has observed an escalation of conflict-related sexual violence since 1 February 2021. The chaos and fear-fueled environment created by the junta has led to over 100,000 civilians fleeing their homes in Southeastern Burma alone. Country-wide, there are over one million who are internally displaced.
With so much injustice regularly being enforced, the international community must intervene. A global arms embargo would end weapon access for the Burma Army, who carelessly fire their guns into villages. Sanctions on aviation fuel would stop the air strikes that killed children in their schools. Finally, a long overdue referral of the Burma Army to the International Criminal Court would set an important precedent that no one is above the law.
The military Generals and their soldiers have blood on their hands. The future of Burma belongs to those who believe that everyone is equal and deserving of their fundamental human rights. The global community must use their platforms and diplomatic will to change the course of history. This begins with measures and concrete steps that prosecute Min Aung Hlaing and end his legacy of tyranny..."
Source/publisher:
Human Rights Foundation of Monland
Date of publication:
2023-02-01
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-01
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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"Dear President von der Leyen,
Dear HR/VP Borrell,
Dear President Michel,
Dear President Metsola,
On the occasion of the second anniversary of the coup d’état in Myanmar, we, the undersigned Myanmar diaspora organizations and organizations based in Europe that support democracy and federalism in Myanmar, call on the European Union and EU Member States to significantly increase their response to the human rights and humanitarian crisis being caused by one of the worst military regimes in the world.
The EU and its Member States have rightly shown remarkable unity, agility and resolute determination to support Ukraine against the criminal Russian aggression, as well as readiness to support Belarus’ democratic movement after stolen elections and a brutal crackdown.
We expect and hope that the EU and its Member States can take a clear position towards the similar scale of suffering and equally heroic resistance by the people of Myanmar. While the EU and some Member States have taken important measures thus far, the military’s atrocities and war of terror against the people of Myanmar deserve a more urgent response than is currently taken in the EU. That is why we call on the EU to take a stronger and more proactive position and to become more active in addressing the crisis in Myanmar.
The junta has failed to consolidate power and is gradually losing control to the determined and constantly growing resistance. In a very similar manner to Putin in Ukraine, the regime is primarily relying on violence, terror and the intentional targeting of the civilian population and civilian infrastructure. The military’s two other strategies – to try to divide the anti-junta alliance through sham “peace talks”; and win legitimacy through manipulated fake elections – will not work either. However, every single additional month that the junta is able to continue this highly destructive and futile effort to seize power is causing deep economic and social damage that will be increasingly difficult to repair.
The EU has previously shown great support for the “democratic transition” in the decade prior to the coup, with hundreds of millions of Euros being invested in supporting the capacity of governance institutions, civil society and the peace process and in education reform, justice sector reform, and much more. Yet, after the coup, almost all of the support was suspended, instead of continuing this critical support to the legitimate authorities of the country, currently represented by the CRPH, NUCC and NUG.
Despite having called for the results of the 2020 elections to be respected, the EU and its Member States have failed to properly engage and support the National Unity Government (NUG), the government appointed by the parliament elected in those very elections. The NUG, the National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC) and its allies including EROs and CSOs are the ones who are currently driving all the reforms of the country the EU has previously supported: democratisation, education, justice, health care, inclusion and an actual peace process with the first serious debates about federalism in the country since the military coup of 1962.
We therefore call upon the EU and its Member States:
– To engage, cooperate with and fund the NUG, CRPH, NUCC, ethnic states’ consultative councils and other political representative bodies of the EROs to enable them to build their capacity. The broad alliance that stands behind the Federal Democratic Charter is the only grouping in Myanmar that, with support, can end both the current conflict and the decades of civil war and must be a key policy goal for the EU.
– We welcome recent higher level public meetings between the EU and EU Member States representatives and NUG representatives. However, in order to send a strong message to the Myanmar military and send a strong message of solidarity to the people of Myanmar, such meetings should now take place at Prime Ministerial and Presidential level.
– Fund the NUG’s and EROs’ public services. They have proven to be committed to providing services – health care, education, judiciary and more – that the military is intentionally denying and destroying. Significant EU funding will help consolidate these critically important services and go a long way to prevent an otherwise rapidly deepening state collapse.
– Fund the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) because it is another pillar on which the revival of essential public services can and should be built. The junta is chasing, arresting, harassing and even torturing, imprisoning and killing members of the CDM, who are essential professionals needed for the reconstruction of the public sector.
– Convene an emergency meeting of all Member States that support human rights in Myanmar, as suggested by the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, Thomas H. Andrews, to launch a focused, coordinated, and strategic initiative to deprive the military of the weapons, finances, and legitimacy it utilizes to sustain its campaign of violence and the suppression of the democratic aspirations of the people of Myanmar.
– Fund humanitarian aid through cross-border mechanisms and local humanitarian and community-based organisations and remove stifling bureaucratic requirements that overburden local CSOs. Current over-reliance on the multi-lateral funding mechanisms administered through UNOPS and INGOs is failing to reach the most vulnerable segments of the population in the most urgent need. By massively scaling up aid to and through non-registered civil society organisations and cross border mechanisms, the EU will be able to reach millions of the most in need in the country.
– Deny legitimacy; make sure that the representatives of the illegal regime are not invited to official events funded or organized by EU and European states’ bodies (e.g. International Peace and the Rule of Law project funded by the German Federal Foreign Office).
– Send a clear message refuting the junta’s electoral deception; engage other partners, particularly in ASEAN, not to endorse or support the sham elections. The “electoral performance” will not fulfill the definition of a free and fair election since the representatives of political parties opposing the regime are being imprisoned, persecuted, exiled or killed. At the same time, any support for the elections is a violation of the ‘do no harm’ imperative since there has already been an increase in violence across the country to resist voter registration.
– Support efforts in the UN Security Council to refer the Myanmar situation to the International Criminal Court (ICC), or establish an independent Ad-hoc Tribunal on Myanmar.
– Call on the International Criminal Court (ICC) to accept the declaration lodged by the NUG, under Article 12(3) of the Rome Statute, accepting the Court’s jurisdiction with respect to international crimes committed within Myanmar territory.
– Continue to support the International Court of Justice (ICJ) case of Gambia against Myanmar in order to achieve full accountability for the crime of genocide against the Rohingya.
– EU and Member States must do all they can to sanction aviation fuel. Indiscriminate air attacks by helicopters and jets on the civilian population has resulted in thousands of deaths, countless more made homeless and has created a human rights and humanitarian crisis.
– Increase the monitoring and enforcement of existing sanctions. Continue the existing policy of regular new rounds of sanctions targeting sources of revenue and arms to the Myanmar military but significantly increase the pace of implementation. New sanction targets should be identified in cooperation with US and UK partners, and seek to persuade Australia, South Korea, Singapore and Japan to join the EU in new sanctions rounds.
– Sanction Russian, Chinese, Indian and Pakistani companies supplying the Myanmar military with arms and begin high level dialogue with India and Pakistan to persuade them to stop supplying arms to the Myanmar military.
– Introduce programs to assist democracy activists, journalists, and CSO actors who are persecuted by the junta and have fled to neighbouring countries where they have no safety. Such programs, including simplified visa granting, relocations and humanitarian help should be thoroughly aimed, selective, coordinated and flexible.
– EU and its Member States urgently need to prepare a coordinated policy on how to provide, in case of necessity, protection to Myanmar passport holders who are currently in the territory of the EU, particularly to those who are studying. There are clear signs that military embassies may soon deny Myanmar citizens abroad, who are only permitted two-year passports, the possibility of renewing their passports. This will pressure citizens of Myanmar into an involuntary and risky return to the country.
– Open a channel of communication and consult with Myanmar diaspora organizations based in Europe and European solidarity organizations, such as the ones undersigned in this letter.
We are aware that on many of these requests there has already been some welcome steps in the right direction, but these efforts need to be scaled up and sped up. Lessons learned from the appeasement of Putin and the current crisis in Ukraine should be applied to the crisis in Myanmar.
As these demands show, there is much the EU and its Member States can do to actively support the people of Myanmar in their struggle. While they will determine the future of their country, outside support can help tip the balance in their favour. The EU Parliament has already shown support for many of these demands – it is now up to the EU and its Member States to show similar determination. The fight against authoritarianism is global; a federal, democratic Myanmar instead of a dictatorship sponsored by Putin is in the EU’s vital interests.
If the EU and its Member States apply just a small proportion of the determination they have shown in Ukraine to Myanmar as well, it would have a significant positive impact. The people of Myanmar, who have shown so much resilience and courage in their struggle for democracy, deserve it..."
Source/publisher:
"Burma Campaign UK" (London)
Date of publication:
2023-02-01
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-01
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Individual Documents
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Description:
"On the second anniversary of the military coup in Myanmar of February 1, 2021, the Open Society Foundations are calling on the international community to step up pressure on Myanmar’s military rulers to bring about a rapid and peaceful return to civilian rule.
In particular, Open Society is urging Indonesia to draw on its own experience of transitioning from decades under military rule to democracy in the late 1990s to help negotiate a political resolution in Myanmar. As the new Chair of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Indonesia is uniquely placed to lead a diplomatic response in 2023 and encourage other leaders in the region to take meaningful action.
This must include making it clear to the ruling State Administration Council junta that a planned military-run election in August will in no way legitimize its illegal rule—given the exclusion and continued imprisonment of the civilian leaders overwhelmingly endorsed in the November 2020 general election, including Aung San Suu Kyi and President Win Myint of the National League for Democracy.
Open Society notes that it has previously urged Myanmar’s regional and international partners:
To impose a full arms embargo on the Myanmar armed forces—against the background of human rights and humanitarian law abuses including repeated attacks on civilians in ethnic minority areas; arbitrary arrests and executions; and the suppression of peaceful protests
To expand sanctions targeting senior military leaders
To recognize the civilian National Unity Government, formed by elected lawmakers in exile in April 2021, as the legitimate representative of Myanmar
To support the work of the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar established by the UN Human Rights Council in September 2018 and other efforts to ensure accountability for abuses
To increase support for the delivery of much-needed humanitarian aid to all areas of Myanmar
Open Society began supporting Myanmar’s democracy movement in exile in the 1990s and established a presence in the country in 2017 after the transition to civilian rule. Before the 2021 military coup, Open Society Myanmar worked with government and civil society groups on issues that included: expanding inclusive education and access to health care; supporting drug policy reform; protecting the rights of ethnic and religious minorities; and supporting democratic institutions..."
Source/publisher:
Open Society Foundations
Date of publication:
2023-02-01
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-01
Grouping:
Individual Documents
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Description:
"February 1st marks the second anniversary of the military coup in Myanmar. As of 23 January 2023 (UNHCR), the number of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) reached to 1.2 million since the coup – it previously was 330,000. The ongoing crisis has disrupted access to safe, inclusive, and quality education for children and youth with the potential of creating a lost generation.
The Universal Declaration for Human Rights outlines 30 rights and freedoms that belong to all people including the right to education. Jesuit Refugee Service (JRS) is committed to ensuring that children who are forced to flee their homes and communities are not deprived of their right to education and their path to a hopeful and productive future. Education provides stability and a sense of normalcy; it engenders hope while preparing refugees to meet future challenges.
Today, children in Myanmar cannot access basic learning, let alone higher education, due to the current conflict. Education is disrupted, schools are attacked, and many are closed. Children are forced to flee from one place to another making it nearly impossible to go to school. Without the ability to exercise their basic rights and fundamental freedoms, they will not be able to determine their own future.
The Story of Tinwin: The Transformative Power of the Storybook
Tinwin, a seven-year-old boy, lives in a temporary site fleeing from the life-threatening violence occurring in his hometown. While the temporary site is called “temporary”, he has no idea how long this momentariness of fear and displacement would last. He and his family have been living in this temporary shelter for already a year.
After he arrived at the temporary site, he did not want to go to school because he was afraid that his family would run away. When a child has no idea what’s going to happen to their life and family tomorrow, it is very difficult to trust that everything will be fine. He also really missed his home and his friends in the neighborhood.
Amidst the distress, what could calm Tinwin down is the storybook. The colorful book with images could bring him to another fantasy world. A place where there is no fear. Tinwin usually asks his mother to read out the stories for him. The storybook is what makes him smile.
“He will ask me to read books, and if he likes the story, he asks me to read again and again, and I have to read it repeatedly,” says his mother.
Over time, his mother has observed positive changes in him. He’s no longer afraid to go to school and sometimes brings friends home to read books together.
He will ask me to read books, and if he likes the story, he asks me to read again and again.
TINWIN'S MOTHER
The mother, a person who read the storybook for Tinwin, observed a big change in Tinwin’s mind. Every time they are exploring the imaginary world, Tinwin is calm, happy, and has no worries. The storybook is not only important for Tinwin himself but also for his family, who really love and care about his feelings. Tinwin started to bring friends home to read the storybook and play. It is difficult for a child to think of the future when there is no sense of safety and certainty. However, Tinwin has a strong belief in his dream. Tinwin wants to be a doctor.
“I want to put medicines to the wound like a medic.”
The story of Tinwin reflects how much education can impact the life of a child and why education should not be under attack in times of conflict. Rather, investments in school materials, infrastructure, and teachers are critical for the people of Myanmar and all children and youth affected by conflict and crisis.
JRS calls for displaced children inside and outside Myanmar to have access to humanitarian assistance including safe, inclusive, uninterrupted, and quality education programs. The shooting, shelling, and bombing of schools and community buildings must cease immediately. The lack of attention from the international community has prolonged this crisis and an immediate solution through peaceful political mechanisms must be achieved.
After two years of violence and destruction, the people of Myanmar deserve more and must not be forgotten..."
Source/publisher:
Jesuit Refugee Service
Date of publication:
2023-02-01
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-01
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Education in Burma/Myanmar - general, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
more
Description:
"Geneva, 1 February 2023 – Today marks exactly two years since the Myanmar military sent tanks into the streets in an effort to remove the elected government. Over this time, we have seen a dramatic increase in the number of serious international crimes systematically committed across the country. We have collected credible evidence documenting the commission of an array of war crimes and crimes against humanity, including murder, rape, torture, unlawful imprisonment, and deportation or forcible transfer. We are analyzing this evidence and preparing case files to hold perpetrators of these crimes responsible so that they will one day face justice.
There is strong evidence that thousands of people have been unlawfully imprisoned, and that they have been subject to torture and other forms of physical and mental abuse, as well as rape and other forms of sexual violence. These incidents are widespread and systematic, suggesting that they are not isolated events but rather the implementation of an organizational policy.
There is also compelling evidence of widespread crimes committed in the various armed conflicts that are ongoing in Myanmar. Civilians and civilian objects, such as residential homes, have been repeatedly and intentionally targeted or subject to indiscriminate attack. These attacks are war crimes, and they enable perpetrators to commit other serious international crimes such as forcible transfer and forcible displacement, often accompanied by the burning of civilian homes in villages considered supportive of armed groups. The Mechanism is focusing its investigations on specific incidents where the impact on victims is the most severe, and we are looking at crimes committed by both security forces and armed groups.
Through our analysis of interview statements, documentation, videos, photographs, geospatial imagery, and social media material, we are finding evidence showing who is responsible for these crimes. Our investigations are constrained by the lack of cooperation by the Myanmar military authorities who are in a position to provide highly relevant and essential information. Multiple requests to them for information and access to the country have so far gone unanswered. Nevertheless, we have collected substantial, credible and direct information from numerous sources, including survivors, eyewitnesses and defectors who have provided crucial information about the crimes and the individuals responsible. We are inspired by the Myanmar people’s courage in sharing information with us, and we have systems in place to keep their evidence and testimonies confidential and secure.
Just as we are sharing evidence with those working on ongoing cases concerning the Rohingya at the International Criminal Court, the International Court of Justice and in Argentina, we are also preparing evidence that can be shared with national, regional or international courts who will one day prosecute those responsible for crimes committed since 1 February 2021.
Perpetrators should be aware that serious international crimes have no statute of limitations. This means that there is no time limit for perpetrators to be prosecuted. The road to justice may be long, but the Mechanism is preserving and analyzing the evidence now so that it will be immediately available for use by relevant judicial authorities in the future. The cycle of impunity will end, and there will one day be accountability and justice for these heinous crimes.
Information on how to communicate securely and confidentially with the Mechanism can be found at https://iimm.un.org/contact-us/confidential-and-sensitive-communications/
The Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar (IIMM or Mechanism) was created by the United Nations Human Rights Council in 2018 to collect and analyze evidence of the most serious international crimes and other violations of international law committed in Myanmar since 2011. It aims to facilitate justice and accountability by preserving and organizing this evidence and preparing case files for use in future prosecutions of those responsible in national, regional and international courts. For more information visit https://iimm.un.org/ or contact [email protected]..."
Source/publisher:
Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar
Date of publication:
2023-02-01
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-01
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Rule of Law - Burma/Myanmar-specific
Language:
more
Description:
"Today marks the second anniversary of the military coup in Myanmar that took place on 1 February 2021. The Asian Network for Free Elections (ANFREL) continues to stand in unwavering solidarity with the people of Myanmar who have suffered greatly under the brutal regime and condemns the junta’s plan for a sham election.
We remember those who have lost their lives or freedoms in pursuit of democracy. We continue to vehemently condemn the military junta’s flagrant violations of human rights, including the use of lethal force against peaceful protesters, the arbitrary imprisonment of political leaders, activists, government officials and journalists, the infringement of fundamental freedoms, and the atrocities committed against civilians.
As the junta plans to hold a sham election this year to legitimize its rule, we categorically denounce this so-called election as illegal and illegitimate. Genuine, free, and fair democratic elections cannot take place in Myanmar unless fundamental human rights and freedoms are upheld, which is currently not the case in Myanmar. The junta holds no legitimate position nor rightful authority to conduct any elections, and any outcome from such an exercise will not represent the will of the people.
The new Political Parties Registration Law introduced by the junta in late January makes it virtually impossible for most parties to stand any chance in the sham election. All parties must re-register within two months or face immediate dissolution, and those intending to contest nationwide must recruit 100,000 members within 90 days, establish offices in at least half of the country’s 330 townships and be able to contest in half of all constituencies. It is now even more evident that the draconian conditions eliminate all chances of a democratic election.
The international community must acknowledge that any election held by the junta is nothing but a sham, and will be illegitimate and invalid. It is imperative that the international community takes further measures to restore democracy in Myanmar if no positive progress is achieved. The plight of the people in Myanmar demands the collective efforts of the international community, including ASEAN and its new chair Indonesia, to guarantee that they are able to enjoy their democratic rights and liberties without fear of repression..."
Source/publisher:
Asian Network for Free Elections
Date of publication:
2023-02-01
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-01
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations, Rule of Law - Burma/Myanmar-specific
Language:
more
Description:
"n the period from the coup on 1 February 2021 to 30 September 2022, 671 incidents of violence against health care were reported in Myanmar. During this time at least 750 health workers were arrested, hospitals were raided on 140 occasions, and at least 56 health workers were killed. Between April and September 2022, 111 incidents affecting health care were reported, highlighting the extent to which the Myanmar health system remains under attack despite a small overall decrease of reported incidents. This report focuses on these 111 incidents (previous reports covered the periods 1 February 2021 to 10 January 2022 and 1 January to 31 March 2022)..."
Source/publisher:
Insecurity Insight via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of publication:
2023-02-01
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-01
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
2.19 MB
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Description:
"SITUATION AT A GLANCE:
4.5 MILLION People Targeted for Humanitarian Assistance in Burma UN – January 2023
1.2 MILLION IDPs in Burma Displaced Since February 2021 UNHCR – January 2023
1.5 MILLION People Displaced in Burma UNHCR – January 2023
1.5 MILLION People Targeted by 2022 Rohingya Humanitarian Crisis Joint Response Plan UN – March 2022
950,972 Estimated Number of Refugees in Bangladesh UNHCR – November 2022
The 2023 Burma HRP targets approximately 4.5 million people for life-saving humanitarian assistance, of an estimated 17.6 million people in need, reflecting a significant rise in humanitarian needs countrywide since the February 1, 2021, coup d’état.
Hostilities between the MAF and EAOs continued across Burma in early 2023, particularly in northern Shan State and southeastern areas of the country, displacing 68,700 individuals nationwide.
At least 348 Rohingya refugees died attempting to leave Burma and Bangladesh via perilous boat journeys across the Andaman Sea and the Bay of Bengal in search of safety and livelihood opportunities during 2022..."
Source/publisher:
US Agency for International Development (Washington, D.C.) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of publication:
2023-01-31
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-31
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
263.18 KB
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Description:
"A joint statement by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union, and the Foreign Ministers of Albania, Armenia, Australia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Canada, the Federated States of Micronesia, Georgia, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Montenegro, New Zealand, North Macedonia, Norway, the Republic of Korea, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, the Republic of Palau, Serbia, Switzerland, Ukraine, the United Kingdom and the United States, on the two year anniversary of the military coup in Myanmar:
“On 1 February 2021, the Myanmar military staged a coup d’état and seized power against the will of the people, plunging the country into a deep political, economic and humanitarian crisis.
“Over the last two years, the people of Myanmar have courageously demonstrated their commitment to a democratic country, demanding respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and showing determined resilience in the face of unspeakable atrocities.
“Since the coup, the military regime has violently cracked down on any form of opposition, including peaceful protests. Credible reports indicate that thousands of civilians, including children, have been jailed, tortured and killed.
“There are mounting reports that air strikes, bombardments and the mass burning of villages and places of worship have targeted civilians and civilian infrastructure. Reports of torture and sexual violence by the security forces are widespread. The prolonged conflict has seen thousands of civilian casualties, over 17 million people in need and 1.5 million people displaced from their homes.
“We welcome and support the central role of ASEAN in addressing the crisis in Myanmar, including the efforts of the ASEAN Chair and ASEAN Special Envoy to Myanmar.
“We welcome the UN Security Council Resolution 2669 (2022) on the situation in Myanmar which calls for the immediate cessation of violence and the upholding of universal human rights, the provision of full and unhindered humanitarian access and the protection of civilians. It calls on the military regime to effectively and fully implement ASEAN’s Five-Point Consensus, and to immediately release all arbitrarily detained prisoners, including President Win Myint and State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi. It reaffirms our support for the ASEAN Special Envoy to Myanmar and the UN Special Envoy to Myanmar and encourages their close coordination. It also urges all parties in Myanmar to work constructively with both Envoys to commence dialogue to seek a peaceful solution.
“The military overruled the democratic wishes of the people of Myanmar as expressed in the November 2020 General Election, when they seized power on 1 February 2021. We reiterate our call for the return of Myanmar to a democratic path. The military regime must end violence and create space for meaningful and inclusive dialogue to allow for any democratic process to resume.
“We once again call on all members of the international community to support all efforts to hold those responsible for human rights violations and abuses to account; to cease the sale and transfer of arms and equipment which facilitate atrocities; and to meet the urgent humanitarian needs of Myanmar’s people, including its most vulnerable communities.
“We remain resolute in our support for all those working peacefully towards an inclusive and democratic future for the people of Myanmar.”..."
Source/publisher:
Government of Canada
Date of publication:
2023-01-31
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-31
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Language:
more
Description:
"BANGKOK – The Special Envoy of the United Nations Secretary-General on Myanmar Noeleen Heyzer today highlighted key areas for concrete action where greater regional and international unity can support a Myanmar-led process to end the violence and suffering and help Myanmar return to the path of democracy guided by the will of the people. In her urgent call, the Special Envoy focused on humanitarian aid without discrimination and through all available channels, a unified position on the military’s plans for elections, and protection of civilians including both people inside Myanmar and refugees.
Over the past two years, the military’s disruption of Myanmar’s democratic transition has inflicted enormous damage on the country and people, and led to a multidimensional crisis spanning severe humanitarian, human rights and socio-economic consequences with serious regional ramifications. As of the end of last year, 15.2 million people were food insecure, more than 1.5 million internally displaced and an estimated 34,000 civilian structures had been destroyed since the military takeover. The Rohingya people in refugee camps and those remaining in the country, as well as other marginalized communities, are at heightened risk with 2022 marking one of the deadliest years for people forced to undertake perilous sea journeys.
The Special Envoy renewed the United Nations’ solidarity with the people of Myanmar and the need for protection of all communities, which the United Nations Secretary-General reinforced in his recent statement. She reiterated the Secretary-General’s concern regarding the military’s stated intention to hold elections, which threatens to worsen the violence and instability in the absence of inclusive political dialogue and conditions that permit citizens to freely exercise their political rights without fear or intimidation.
The Special Envoy urgently calls for greater unity and commitment among the international community in three key areas:
First, the international community, and particularly donors and Myanmar’s neighbours, must come together with humanitarian actors including local humanitarian networks to scale up urgently needed assistance to all those in need without discrimination and through all available channels. A commitment to increase levels of cross-border aid, along with more flexible banking and reporting rules, will facilitate humanitarian support to people most in need.
Second, the international community must forge a stronger unified position regarding the military’s potential elections which will fuel greater violence, prolong the conflict and make the return to democracy and stability more difficult.
Third, the international community must implement measures to increase protection for civilians inside Myanmar as well as for Myanmar refugees in the wider region. Such measures could include an on-the-ground monitoring mechanism as part of the implementation of ASEAN’s Five-Point Consensus and its commitment to stop the violence in Myanmar, and regional frameworks for the protection of refugees and forcibly displaced people.
“It is inconceivable any form of peaceful and democratic transition can be initiated by those perpetrating harm on their own citizens,” Special Envoy Heyzer said. “The violence has to stop, including the aerial bombings and burning of civilian infrastructure along with military’s ongoing arrests of political leaders, civil society actors and journalists.”
Guided by her ongoing consultations with women and youth, ethnic, political and community leaders, and refugee representatives, the Special Envoy is focusing on the following four areas: an Inclusive Humanitarian Forum; upscaling access to education for Rohingya refugees and host communities; regional frameworks for the protection of refugees and forcibly displaced people; and advancing the Women, Peace and Security agenda in Myanmar..."
Source/publisher:
United Nations Myanmar
Date of publication:
2023-01-31
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-31
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Armed conflict and peace-building in Burma - theoretical, strategic and general
Language:
more
Sub-title:
Foreign Governments Should Target Military Junta’s Main Revenue Sources
Description:
"(Bangkok) – Myanmar’s junta, in the two years since the military coup, has expanded its use of deadly force and repressive measures to squelch all dissent, Human Rights Watch said today. Foreign governments should coordinate increased pressure on the junta to establish fundamental freedoms and democratic civilian rule.
On February 1, 2021, the Myanmar military detained the country’s elected civilian officials, including de facto leader Aung San Suu Kyi. Since then, the junta has brutally cracked down on any opposition and severely restricted freedoms of speech, association, and assembly. At least 17,000 protesters and activists have been arrested and 2,900 killed, according to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners, a nongovernmental group. The security forces have carried out arbitrary arrests, torture, sexual violence, mass killings, and other abuses that amount to crimes against humanity.
“Myanmar’s military junta has spent the two years since the coup engaged in a worsening spiral of atrocities against the people of Myanmar that amount to crimes against humanity and war crimes,” said Elaine Pearson, Asia director at Human Rights Watch. “Instead of proceeding with inevitably bogus ‘elections’ in August, Myanmar’s generals should be facing international consequences for their crimes.”
During expanded military operations, junta forces have been responsible for attacks on civilians that amount to war crimes against ethnic minority populations in Kachin, Karen, Karenni, and Shan States. The military has used “scorched earth” tactics, burning villages in Magway and Sagaing Regions.
The junta has blocked humanitarian aid from reaching millions of displaced people and others at risk in conflict areas. In Rakhine State – where Rohingya have long faced systematic abuse and discrimination that amount to crimes against humanity, including persecution and apartheid – security forces have imposed new restrictions on movement and aid. The restrictions have worsened food and water shortages and increased the risk of preventable diseases and severe malnutrition.
The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) estimates that at least 17.6 million people in Myanmar are in dire need of humanitarian assistance. Fighting since the coup has displaced over 1 million people internally, while another 70,000 refugees have fled to neighbouring countries.
On December 21, 2022, a landmark UN Security Council resolution on Myanmar denounced the military’s rights violations since the coup but fell short of imposing a global arms embargo or referring the country situation to the International Criminal Court. Russia and China abstained from the vote, signalling the junta’s growing international isolation. Council members should pursue follow-up action by imposing an arms embargo as well as targeted sanctions on junta leadership and military-owned companies.
Concerned governments should more effectively target the military’s main revenue sources, particularly foreign currency revenues that the military obtains from exports like natural gas, metals, gemstones, and timber and uses to purchase weapons, military equipment, and fuel, Human Rights Watch said.
Targeted economic sanctions imposed by Canada, the European Union, United Kingdom, and United States have been limited in effectiveness because of poor enforcement. Other key governments such as Australia, Japan, and member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have failed to enact any targeted sanctions since the coup.
ASEAN leaders have barred Myanmar military leaders from attending high-level ASEAN meetings. In 2022, some ASEAN leaders began to criticize the junta publicly, noting the junta’s failure to implement the Five-Point Consensus plan that the junta and ASEAN agreed upon in April 2021.
In 2023, Indonesia’s chairmanship of ASEAN will be in part measured by its ability to press the junta on its ongoing human rights violations, Human Rights Watch said. At the February 3-4 meeting of ASEAN foreign ministers in Jakarta, Indonesia should propose an April 2023 deadline for the junta’s progress in meeting the commitments of the Five-Point Consensus. If the junta leaders maintain their inaction on the consensus, ASEAN member countries should commit to concrete engagement with other governments and the UN to hold the junta accountable for its grave abuses.
The junta has slated fraudulent “elections” for August, passing the Parties Registration Law on January 27. The law provides for restrictions on any party that refuses to “cooperate” with the junta. Any individual or party that the junta deems to be an “insurgent,” “terrorist,” or “unlawful” association is prohibited from participating, effectively barring the shadow civilian National Unity Government and many ethnic minority parties. Foreign governments should not treat the proposed elections as legitimate, such as by sending election monitors or providing technical assistance.
“Myanmar’s junta is trying to establish a veneer of credibility by going through the motions of holding ‘elections,’ but the international community shouldn’t be fooled or browbeaten into recognizing this sham,” Pearson said. “You can’t hold a free and fair election when you deny every basic right to your people and lock up or disqualify political opponents.”
EU member states, the US, and UK should improve coordination to strengthen sanctions against senior officials and military-owned companies. Tougher actions could help stem the flow of foreign funding, curb the military’s ability to buy weapons and materials, and help ASEAN and other intermediaries press the junta to end rampant rights violations and establish civilian democratic rule.
“Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore in particular should signal to the US and EU that they will support strengthening and enforcing existing sanctions against the junta,” Pearson said. “Without stronger targeted sanctions, the Myanmar military will only tighten its brutal grip on the population.”..."
Source/publisher:
"Human Rights Watch" (USA)
Date of publication:
2023-01-31
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-31
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations, Crimes Against Humanity
Language:
more
Description:
"Myanmar’s junta—the State Administration Council (SAC)—is illegal and illegitimate, the UN human rights expert on Myanmar said today. He called for the international community to deny the SAC legitimacy, create a coalition of member states to enforce strong, coordinated sanctions against the SAC, and support the National Unity Government which has a stronger claim to legitimacy.
On the eve of the second anniversary of the military coup in Myanmar which deposed the democratically elected government, UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of Human Rights in Myanmar Tom Andrews, issued a new report that lays bare the junta’s flawed claims to be the legitimate government of Myanmar.
“Two years ago, the military deposed a democratically elected government in an unconstitutional coup. The unrelenting violence that it unleashed on the people of Myannar has created a widespread human rights, humanitarian, and economic crisis and galvanised nationwide opposition,” the Special Rapporteur said.
“The conclusion is clear – the SAC’s military coup was illegal and its claim as Myanmar’s government is illegitimate and a new, coordinated international response to the crisis is imperative,” Andrews said.
In “Illegal and Illegitimate: Examining the Myanmar Military’s Claim as the Government of Myanmar and the International Response,” Andrews demonstrates why, under international standards, the junta is not a legitimate government and must not be recognised or engaged with by the international community.
Andrews warned that the junta was planning to seek legitimacy in 2023 by orchestrating a sham “election.” He urged member States, international organisations and election monitoring groups not to provide technical support to the SAC in its efforts to appear legitimate. “Instead they should explicitly denounce what will be a farcical exercise designed to perpetuate military control of Myanmar’s political system,” the UN expert said.
Andrews’ report also examines Member States’ interactions with the SAC, highlighting actions that have delegitimised or withheld recognition to the SAC, and actions by Member States that have created the appearance of legitimacy.
“Importantly, the international community has, by and large, refused to accept the SAC’s claim to be the legitimate government of Myanmar,” said Andrews.
However, the expert pointed to a small minority of States, including Belarus, China, India, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and Sri Lanka, that have implicitly supported the junta’s claim as the government of Myanmar by taking actions that are tantamount to recognition. “These actions include presenting diplomatic credentials to SAC leadership, strengthening economic and military relations with the SAC, and—in the case of at least Belarus and India—publicly engaging with the SAC on its plans to hold sham elections,” Andrews said.
“Even governments that have engaged the SAC, however, recognise the plain truth—the junta lacks legitimacy,” the Special Rapporteur said. For example, during consultations for the report, Vietnam told the Special Rapporteur, "[C]ontact, exchange and cooperation activities with Myanmar within bilateral settings or ASEAN frameworks should not be interpreted as or equated with a recognition of the military government or the State Administration Council.”
Addressing ASEAN Member States separately in his report, the UN Special Rapporteur noted that the regional grouping was divided on policy vis-à-vis Myanmar’s junta.
“Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Singapore have reduced diplomatic engagement with the SAC and rejected its claims of legitimacy. Some of these Member States have also engaged with the National Unity Government. Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam have chosen to engage with the SAC,” Andrews said.
“ASEAN States must distance themselves from the SAC, condemn its actions and support enforcement of international sanctions in their jurisdictions, while increasing engagement with the National Unity Government,” he said. “I urge all Member States, but particularly those that have already imposed costs on the junta, to initiate a strategic approach to strengthen, coordinate and enforce economic sanctions and an arms embargo on the SAC and provide more robust humanitarian aid to the millions in desperate need,” the UN expert urged.
“Governments that recognise or support to the SAC are propping up a brutal junta that operates in flagrant violation of international human rights law,” he said.
Andrews urged Member States to provide recognition to the NUG as the legitimate representative of the people of Myanmar and begin providing appropriate support to help ensure its sustainability.
“The SAC is seeking to turn back the clock, close the door on Myanmar’s democratic opening, and through violence and force, destroy the advancements in human rights and economic opportunities that Myanmar’s people began to enjoy over the past decade,” the Special Rapporteur said. “For the sake of the human rights of the people of Myanmar, the SAC must not be allowed to achieve this outcome.”..."
Source/publisher:
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (Geneva)
Date of publication:
2023-01-31
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-31
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Human Rights and international relations
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Description:
"From January to December 2022, the junta troops violated numerous human rights abuses and committed international crimes such as war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide in various parts of Myanmar. National Unity
Government, Ministry of Human Rights collaborated with Network for Human Rights Documentation (Burma) – ND-Burma, Equality Myanmar and Spring Archive to provide summary review on the military regime’s human rights violations.....Regions where most human rights violations reported: The region where the junta troops committed the most human rights violations was the Sagaing Region, with 783 cases, followed by Magway Region with 311 and
Yangon Region where the country’s commercial hub is located with 171.
Most human rights violations were reported in Sagaing Region’s Kalay, KhinU and Yinmarbin Township. 81 human rights violations were recorded in Kalay, 61 in KhinU and 57 in Yinmarbin Township. There were 30 types of human rights violations in these three townships.
Among the states, Rakhine State has the highest number of human rights violations with 138 cases. Kyauktaw Township has the highest number of human rights
abuses with 24 cases. Junta soldiers have committed 18 types of human rights violations in Rakhine State.....The most common forms of human rights violations: Arbitrary arrest and arbitrary arrest are the most common violations of human rights, followed by the burning of public housing and property. Firing heavy weapons into civilian areas is the third most common violation committed by the junta troops.
One of the most serious human rights violations by the military regime is the execution of anti-authoritarian activists, students, and civil servants who joined the
Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM). The second human rights violation is the extrajudicial killing of detainees in the military's notorious interrogation centers, and the third is the inhumane dismemberment and dumping of bodies in rural areas.....General review: The military regime had not been able to suppress the people’s resistance against
the military coup by ground force alone in 2022. Junta troops launched attacks on antiregime forces’ camps across the country with the support of aerial bombings and
artillery strikes. The junta troops have repeatedly fired at villages, homes and schools that are not military targets.
With the aim of destroying the local people’s strong support for the People’s Defence Forces, the regime armed the pro-regime militias called “Pyu Saw Htee”
through the military proxy Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) members
and extreme Buddhist nationalists. Pyu Saw Htee members have targeted killings of local people and National League for Democracy party members, and the military columns have repeatedly raided and torched villages where the anti-dictatorship revolutionary movement is strong, systematically and extensively..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Human Rights
Date of publication:
2023-01-31
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-31
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Human Rights and international relations, Spring Revolution, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
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pdf
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1.85 MB
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Description:
"To mark two years since the February 1, 2021 coup by the military junta in Myanmar, Refugees International Director for Africa, Asia, and the Middle East Daniel P. Sullivan released the following statement:
“The two years of upheaval following the attempted takeover of the country by Myanmar’s military junta has left a path of devastation across the country. Myanmar’s unprecedented displacement and humanitarian need stemming from the coup is yet to plateau. Rather, as the UN predicts, fully one-third of the population is set to be in need of humanitarian assistance, and the numbers of people forced to flee their homes is set to rise precipitously from the current 1.5 million people displaced to more than 2.4 million in the year ahead. This does not count the million Rohingya refugees who were forced to flee the genocide that preceded the coup at the hands of the very same military leaders.
Two years into this nightmare, the United States and likeminded countries must step up pressure on the military junta, including through coordinated targeted sanctions on the junta and those supporting it, whether in the form of weapons, aviation fuel, or proceeds from the oil and gas sectors.
More immediately, to stem the tide of suffering unleashed by Myanmar’s military junta, it is essential that the United States and other donor countries press the junta for unfettered humanitarian access and support the local groups best placed to deliver aid throughout the country, including, vitally, across borders.
Without these measures, the people of Myanmar will be condemned to even more suffering at the hands of this regime.”..."
Source/publisher:
Refugees International
Date of publication:
2023-01-30
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-30
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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Description:
"Introduction:
Under the Myanmar Community Resilience Project (MCRP), the World Bank will be supporting World Food Programme’s (WFP’s) proposed interventions within the scope of its life-saving food and nutrition assistance to conflict-affected populations in Rakhine State in Myanmar. The objective of the MCRP is to maintain and build resilience of vulnerable populations to enable their future development. This Stakeholder Engagement Plan (SEP) has been prepared to comply with the World Bank Environmental and Social Standard 10 on Stakeholder Engagement and covers the interventions supported by the Project that will be implemented by WFP. During the prepartion of activites under the MCRP, WFP has and will provide stakeholders with timely, relevant, understandable and accessible information, and consult with them in a culturally appropriate manner, which is free of manipulation, interference, coercion, discrimination and intimidation. The SEP outlines the ways in which the WFP has and will continue to communicate with project stakeholders and includes the description of the grievance mechanism/community feedback mechanism used by WFP for people to raise concerns, provide feedback, or make complaints about any activities related to the project. This mechanism is essential to the success of the project to ensure smooth collaboration between the WFP and local communities, as well as to minimize and mitigate environmental and social risks related to the proposed activities..."
Source/publisher:
World Food Programme (Rome) via reliefweb (New York)
Date of publication:
2023-01-30
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-30
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
WFP (World Food Programme), Food Security and nutrition in Burma/Myanmar, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
1.21 MB
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Description:
"1 February marks second anniversary of Myanmar’s brutal military regime
Nearly 3,000 people killed, 1.5 million internally displaced, more than 13,000 detained in inhumane conditions, and at least 100 sentenced to death
‘Solidarity has never been more important….The international community cannot let another day pass before taking additional effective steps to stop the military’s atrocities ’ – Ming Yu Hah
The Myanmar military continues to arbitrarily arrest, torture and murder people with impunity two years after it seized power, Amnesty International said today, as it called for increased global action and solidarity ahead of the anniversary on 1 February.
Since the 2021 coup, nearly 3,000 people have been killed, 1.5 million have been internally displaced, more than 13,000 are still detained in inhumane conditions, and four people are known to have been executed, while at least 100 have been sentenced to death. In addition to this, 7.8 million children are not in school.
The military’s onslaught against anyone who is suspected to oppose its rule has caused widespread fear and led to grave human rights violations - including the use of air and ground attacks against civilians.
Ming Yu Hah, Amnesty International’s Deputy Regional Director for Campaigns, said:
“There is no denying that the military is able to carry out its nationwide assault on human rights because of the shockingly inadequate global response to this crisis, which risks being forgotten - we can’t let that happen.
“This anniversary should highlight the need for urgent global action from countries around the world, and the Association for Southeast Asian Nations needs to protect the people of Myanmar who remain under daily siege from the military.
“Speaking up for those in Myanmar who risk lengthy jail sentences, torture and death in custody for expressing peaceful defiance is not a trivial gesture. Solidarity has never been more important, as it can raise people’s spirits and show them they are not alone in their darkest hour.
“While many governments have heeded calls to action, it is not yet enough to stop the military’s grave violations. The international community cannot let another day pass, let alone another two years, before taking additional effective steps to stop the military’s atrocities.”
Resistance continues
Despite grave danger and persecution, brave individuals within Myanmar have continued to pursue peaceful protests. In the lead up to and on the day of the anniversary, Amnesty is participating in solidarity protests, vigils and events in cities around the world, including in Bangkok and Seoul.
But the United Nations as well as governments around the world must do more than send messages of support. The recent historic UN Security Council resolution on Myanmar was welcome progress, but much more is needed from those in power, who must urgently apply pressure on the military to release all those arbitrarily detained for peacefully exercising their human rights.
The UN Security Council must also refer the situation in Myanmar to the International Criminal Court and impose a comprehensive global arms embargo that covers all weapons, munitions, dual-use technology, as well as other military and security equipment, training and any additional forms of assistance.
Stop aviation fuel supply
Countries and companies need to suspend the direct and indirect supply, sale or transfer - including transit, trans-shipment and brokering - of aviation fuel to Myanmar until effective mechanisms are in place to ensure it will not be used to carry out devastating air strikes and commit serious violations of international human rights law or international humanitarian law.
Last November, Amnesty launched a campaign calling for a suspension of the supply of aviation fuel to prevent the Myanmar military from carrying out unlawful air strikes. The investigation also identified companies involved across the supply chain.
Since the coup on 1 February 2021, Amnesty has documented widespread human rights violations, including war crimes and possible crimes against humanity as part of the military’s crackdown on the opposition across the country. See Amnesty’s Myanmar page for more information..."
Source/publisher:
"Amnesty International" (UK)
Date of publication:
2023-01-30
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-30
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations, International Criminal Court (Myanmar)
Language:
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Description:
"The following statement was issued today by the Spokesman for UN Secretary-General António Guterres:
1 February marks two years since the Myanmar military overturned and arbitrarily detained members of the democratically elected civilian Government, including President U Win Myint and State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. The Secretary-General continues to stand in solidarity with the people of Myanmar and to support their democratic aspirations for an inclusive, peaceful and just society and the protection of all communities, including the Rohingya. He strongly condemns all forms of violence as the multidimensional crisis continues to deteriorate and fuel serious regional implications.
The Secretary-General welcomes the 21 December 2022 adoption of Security Council resolution 2669 (2022) as an important step and underlines the urgency for strengthened international unity. As called for by the Security Council, the Secretary-General’s Special Envoy will coordinate closely with the new Special Envoy of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Chair to engage intensively with all relevant parties in Myanmar to achieve an end to the violence and to support a return to democracy.
The Secretary-General is concerned by the military’s stated intention to hold elections amid intensifying aerial bombardment and burning of civilian houses, along with ongoing arrests, intimidation and harassment of political leaders, civil society actors and journalists. Without conditions that permit the people of Myanmar to freely exercise their political rights, the proposed polls risk exacerbating instability.
The United Nations is committed to staying in Myanmar and addressing the multiple vulnerabilities arising from the military’s actions since February 2021. This requires full and unhindered access to all affected communities as well as prioritizing the safety and security of the United Nations agencies and its partners. The Secretary-General renews his call for neighbouring countries and other Member States to urge the military leadership to respect the will and needs of the people of Myanmar and adhere to democratic norms..."
Source/publisher:
UN Secretary-General
Date of publication:
2023-01-30
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-30
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, UN Secretary-General's statements on Burma/Myanmar
Language:
more
Description:
"PHNOM PENH, CAMBODIA —
As Indonesia assumes the rotating chair of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations for 2023, pressure is mounting on Jakarta to formalize an appropriate response to member Myanmar’s military – the Tatmadaw – which seized power from an elected government two years ago.
Analysts said the descent into civil war had effectively annulled a much-touted ASEAN peace plan, known as the five-point consensus, but added that it had paved the way for Indonesian President Joko Widido to take a new, much stronger line against Tatmadaw chief General Min Aung Hlaing.
Ross Milosevic, director of Phnom Penh-based Risk Analysis & Resources International, said Myanmar had sorely tested the remaining nine ASEAN countries and the group’s response, led by two of the association’s smaller members – Brunei and Cambodia – since the Feb. 1, 2021, coup, had fallen short of expectations.
“ASEAN has always had that noninterference landscape in their policy, but facts are facts, and this plan has been a disaster. I don’t think ASEAN has handled the situation in a correct way,” he said.
Charles Santiago, from the ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights group, agreed, saying there had been no dialogue, as stressed under the consensus, and after two years the plan has “been dead for a long time, it’s over, it’s dead, it’s completely buried.”
Myanmar was banned from annual ASEAN summits when Brunei held the chair in 2021 and again by Cambodia last year.
But both countries failed to negotiate with the opposition National Unity Government, or NUG, or its armed People’s Defense Force, or PDF.
Phnom Penh even attempted to normalize relations between the Tatmadaw and ASEAN, which outraged many but ultimately failed amid atrocities that have claimed at least 2,700 lives. Another 13,600 people are under detention and more than 1 million civilians have been displaced.
Santiago said a decision by the junta to call “promised elections” possibly for August would prove farcical because laws governing the polls would make it impossible for the NUG and other political parties to compete. It would also risk cementing a stark divide inside ASEAN.
Within ASEAN, Santiago said Thailand, Cambodia and Laos would support any result legitimizing the military’s control of a civilian government while outside the bloc Myanmar’s ruling junta leader Min Aung Hlaing could also count on support from China, Russia and India.
“Indonesia should talk to Malaysia, to Singapore and possibly Philippines and if Brunei is on the same page, to say that this election cannot go on though because it will make a fool of ASEAN and ASEAN will look like a pariah region for all over the world,” he told VOA.
Vietnam was too difficult to read given the current leadership shakeup, he added.
Indonesia, by geography, population and economic clout is the ASEAN powerhouse. It is the world’s third-largest democracy, has solid ties with the West and is part of an Islamic troika within ASEAN, alongside Brunei and Malaysia.
Jakarta has begun laying the groundwork for its year at the ASEAN helm. Indonesian Coordinating Minister for Maritime Affairs and Investment Luhut Panjaitan told Bloomberg News on the sidelines of the recent World Economic Forum that the Tatmadaw should “let someone else who is qualified manage this country.”
At the same time, Indonesian Foreign Affairs Minister Retno Marsudi announced she will establish an office of ASEAN special envoy on Myanmar to engage with all parties involved.
That prompted a terse statement from the junta, warning ASEAN not to “engage with any terrorist groups and unlawful associations [recognized] by the Government of Myanmar.”
Analysts said Jakarta’s options could go much further and include handing the NUG Myanmar’s seat in ASEAN, freezing all ties with the junta, global sanctions on military-owned companies, and an absolute arms embargo.
That would include aviation fuel, a no-fly zone, designated safe zones for those fleeing the conflict, and the provision of humanitarian aid that failed to materialize under the five-point consensus.
“It [Indonesia] is an effective country in the sense of the economy and it has a high engagement with the rest of the world – and this will put an incredible amount of pressure on Myanmar and the Tatmadaw,” Milosevic told VOA, adding: “This is a civil war.”
A September briefing paper by the Special Advisory Council for Myanmar, a prodemocracy group of experts, claimed Min Aung Hlaing and the military do not have sufficient effective control of the country to warrant engagement with the outside world.
The paper applied international standards in determining which side in the conflict best meets the criteria used to establish control of a state and found the NUG and resistance groups had “effective control” over 52% of the country.
It found the Tatmadaw is being actively contested by the PDF and other resistance forces across 23% of Myanmar’s countryside and that the military can only claim to hold stable control over 17% of the country.
There are 135 distinct ethnic groups in Myanmar. Of them, 14 alliances make up the PDF, which Milosevic said were using hit-and-run, guerrilla-type tactics used by the Viet Cong during the Vietnam War and had pushed the conflict from the jungles to provincial towns.
“The PDF are taking the fight to the Tatmadaw and they’re winning on the ground but the Tatmadaw are using their airpower and making it very difficult for the PDF and the ethnic tribes and it’s going to get worse.
“The dry season has just started and the PDF, they are forcibly changing the whole strategy of the Tatmadaw – they’re being ambushed on a daily basis – and this is an effective way just like the Viet Cong did during the Vietnam War,” he said.
Santiago said Myanmar was expected to be the priority when Indonesia hosts a foreign ministers retreat on Feb. 3-4 amid “frank and open” discussions to be held behind closed doors to establish ASEAN’s foreign policy agenda for the year.
“The next meeting of the foreign ministers is going to be a very difficult one because the purpose of that meeting is supposed to iron out the mandate given to them by the heads of government in order to help facilitate the five-point consensus that was established two years ago.
“But I think recent developments have overtaken the need for such a discussion,” he said..."
Source/publisher:
"VOA" (Washington, D.C)
Date of publication:
2023-01-29
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-29
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
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Sub-title:
Statement on International Jurisdiction
Description:
"1. The Ministry of Human Rights (MOHR) of the National Unity Government welcomes the growing number of criminal cases around the world brought against members of Myanmar's failed military junta under the exercise of universal jurisdiction.
2. Universal jurisdiction allows nationals courts to prosecute atrocity crimes, such as crimes against humanity and war crimes, committed on foreign soil by foreign nationals. In the case of Myanmar, this enables countries with universal jurisdiction to use their courts to bring junta members to justice, including for their atrocity crimes against the Rohingya.
3. An ethnically diverse group of survivors and witnesses supported by Fortify Rights recently requested German authorities to open an investigation into military atrocity crimes in Myanmar, including genocide against the Rohingya as well as subsequent crimes committed by the junta since its failed coup. The National Unity Government urges German authorities to act on this request.
4. The Myanmar Accountability Project (MAP) has also launched a case in Turkey accusing the
military junta of crimes against humanity including torture. MAP is also supporting legal proceedings
in Indonesia aimed at opening the possibility of trials there under the universal jurisdiction, and it will
soon announce legal action against the illegal junta in the Philippines.
5. Furthermore, Argentine courts have accepted a case brought by the Burmese Rohingya Organization UK (BROUK) against the Myanmar security forces for genocide against the Rohingya people.
6. In pledging its support for these efforts, the National Unity Government extends its deep appreciation to all associated national authorities and rights groups for their commitment to justice and
accountability in Myanmar. 7. We call upon all United Nations member states to extend similar support to accountability efforts,
particularly those that exercise universal jurisdiction.
8. Myanmar is experiencing a tidal wave of criminal violence and atrocities at a level and scale not seen in the region since Pol Pot unleashed the Khmer Rouge's reign of terror on Cambodia in the 1970s.
9. The people of Myanmar look to international courts and accountability mechanisms for support in ending the impunity, in holding perpetrators to account, and in delivering justice to victims and their families. The gravity of situation in Myanmar demands action now..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Human Rights
Date of publication:
2023-01-17
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-27
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Human Rights and international relations
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39.97 KB
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"GENEVA (27 January 2023) – Two years after the Myanmar military launched a coup against the democratically-elected government, the country has sunk deeper than ever into crisis and has undergone a wholesale regression in human rights, UN Human Rights Chief Volker Türk said today.
“By nearly every feasible measurement, and in every area of human rights – economic, social and cultural, as much as civil and political – Myanmar has profoundly regressed,” he said, reflecting on the spiralling crisis since the attempted coup of 1 February 2021.
“Despite clear legal obligations for the military to protect civilians in the conduct of hostilities, there has been consistent disregard for the related rules of international law. Far from being spared, civilians have been the actual targets of attacks – victims of targeted and indiscriminate artillery barrages and air strikes, extrajudicial executions, the use of torture, and the burning of whole villages.”
“At this somber time, I want to acknowledge the courage of all those whose lives have been lost in the struggle for freedom and dignity in Myanmar, and the continuing pain and suffering of their families and loved ones.”
According to credible sources at least 2,890 people have died at the hands of the military and others working with them, of whom at least 767 were initially taken into custody. This is almost certainly an underestimation of the number of civilians killed as a result of military action. A staggering further 1.2 million people have been internally displaced, and over 70,000 have left the country - joining over one million others, including the bulk of the country’s Rohingya Muslim population, who fled sustained persecution and attacks over the past decades.
Credible information indicates that over 34,000 civilian structures, including homes, clinics, schools and places of worship, have been burned over the past two years. Myanmar’s economy has collapsed with nearly half of the population now living below the poverty line.
Since the coup was launched, the military has imprisoned the democratically elected leadership of the country and, in subsequent months, detained over 16,000 others – most of whom face specious charges in military-controlled courts, in flagrant breach of due process and fair trial rights, linked to their refusal to accept the military’s actions.
“There must be a way out of this catastrophic situation, which sees only deepening human suffering and rights violations on a daily basis,” said Türk. “Regional leaders, who engaged the military leadership through ASEAN, agreed a Five-Point Consensus that Myanmar’s generals have treated with disdain.”
“Two of the critical conditions that were agreed - to cease all violence and to allow humanitarian access - have not been met. In fact, we have seen the opposite. Violence has spiralled out of control and humanitarian access has been severely restricted.”
The High Commissioner pointed to other measures that would be crucial to a political foundation for resolving the crisis: the release of all political prisoners, including State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi and President U Win Myint, as called for by the UN Security Council; inclusive dialogue with all parties -- involving both the ASEAN Chair and the UN Special Envoy; and allowing the UN Human Rights Office meaningful access to the country to monitor the situation independently and impartially.
“Restoring respect for human rights is a key to ending this crisis, to end this situation where Myanmar’s generals are trying to prop up through brute force a decades-old system in which they answer to no-one but themselves,” said Türk.
“Those responsible for the daily attacks against civilians and the human rights violations must be held accountable. The military needs to be brought under real, effective civilian oversight. This will be difficult to achieve, but these elements are critical to restoring any semblance of democratic rule, security and stability to the country.”
In its first year of independence, Myanmar was among the first Member States of the United Nations to vote in favour of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Sadly, as we mark 75 years since the Declaration’s adoption, the military is actively engaged in violating its fundamental values, principles and rights enshrined in it,” the High Commissioner said.
“How can a military that purports to defend the country have brought their own people – from all parts of Myanmar’s rich and diverse society – to such a point of desperation?”
“Last month, the Security Council united to adopt a path-breaking resolution that demanded an immediate end to the violence, among other urgent steps. Now it is time for the world to come together to take common actions to stop the killing, protect the people of Myanmar, and ensure respect for their universal human rights.”..."
Source/publisher:
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (Geneva)
Date of publication:
2023-01-27
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-27
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
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Sub-title:
နိုင်ငံတကာ တရားစီရင်ပိုင်ခွင့်ဆိုင်ရာ ထုတ်ပြန်ကြေညာချက်
Description:
"၁။ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရအနေဖြင့် ရှံးနိမ့်နေပြီဖြစ်သော အာဏာသိမ်းစစ်အုပ်စု အဖွဲ့ဝင်များက ပိုမိုတိုးမြင့် ကျူးလွန်လျှက်ရှိသည့် ရာဇဝတ်မှုများအား နိုင်ငံတကာတရားစီရင်ပိုင်ခွင့် စည်းမျဉ်းမူဘောင်များအပေါ်အခြေခံ၍ အရေးယူနိုင်ရန် ကမ္ဘာတဝှမ်းတွင် ကြိုးပမ်းနေမှုများ တိုးပွားလာနေသည့်အပေါ် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၊ လူ့အခွင့်အရေးဆိုင်ရာဝန်ကြီးဌာန အနေဖြင့် ကြိုဆိုအပ်ပါသည်။
၂။ လူသားမျိုးနွယ်ပေါ် ကျူးလွန်သည့် ရာဇဝတ်မှု ၊ စစ်ရာဇဝတ်မှု နှင့် လူမျိုးတုန်းသတ်ဖြတ်မှု အစရှိသော ရက်စက်ကြမ်းကြုတ်သည့် ရာဇဝတ်မှုကျူးလွန်သူများကို မည်သည့်နေရာတွင် ကျူးလွန်ခဲ့ပါစေ ပြည်တွင်းတရားစီရင်ရေး အခွင့်အာဏာအား အသုံးပြု၍ စစ်ဆေးစီရင်ပိုင်ခွင့်ကို ကမ္ဘာတဝှမ်းရှိ ပြည်တွင်း တရားရုံးများအား နိုင်ငံတကာတရားစီရင်ပိုင်ခွင့်က ခွင့်ပြုပေးအပ်ထားသည်။
၃။ အာဏာသိမ်းစစ်အုပ်စုက ကျူးလွန်ခဲ့သည့် ရိုဟင်ဂျာလူမျိုးတုန်း သတ်ဖြတ်မှုနှင့် အာဏာသိမ်းရန် ကြိုးပမ်းချိန်မှစ၍ ကျူးလွန်ခဲ့သော ရက်စက်ကြမ်းကြုတ်သည့် ရာဇဝတ်မှုများကို စတင်စစ်ဆေး နိုင်စေရန်အတွက် မတူကွဲပြားသော တိုင်းရင်းသားအုပ်စုများမှ လွတ်မြောက်ကျန်ရစ်သူများနှင့် သက်သေများက Fortify Rights ၏ ထောက်ပံ့ကူညီမှုဖြင့် ဂျာမဏီအာဏာပိုင်များထံသို့ မကြာသေးမီကပင် တောင်းဆိုတင်ပြခဲ့ပါသည်။ ဂျာမဏီအာဏာပိုင်များအနေဖြင့် ထိုကိစ္စအား အထူးအလေးထား ဆောင်ရွက်ပေးပါရန် မိမိတို့အနေဖြင့် တိုက်တွန်းအပ်ပါသည်။
၄။ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံတာဝန်ရှိမှုပရောဂျက် (Myanmar Accountability Project) သည် နှိပ်စက်ညှဥ်းပမ်းမှု အပါအဝင် လူသားမျိုးနွယ်အပေါ် ကျူးလွန်သည့် ရာဇဝတ်မှုများအား ကျူးလွန်သည်ဟု စွပ်စွဲခံနေရသည့် စစ်တပ်ကို အရေးယူဆောင်ရွက်နိုင်စေရန်အတွက် တူရကီနိုင်ငံတွင် တရားစွဲဆိုမှုစတင်ခဲ့ပါသည်။ ထို့ပြင် အင်ဒိုနီးရှားနိုင်ငံတွင် နိုင်ငံတကာတရားစီရင်ပိုင်ခွင့်ကို အသုံးပြု၍ တရားစွဲဆိုနိုင်စေရန် တရားရေးဆိုင်ရာ စည်းမျဥ်းများကို ပံ့ပိုးပေးနေသည့်အပြင် အာဏာသိမ်းစစ်အုပ်စုအား ဖိလစ်ပိုင်နိုင်ငံတွင် အလားတူ ဥပဒေအရအရေးယူနိုင်ရန် ဆောင်ရွက်နေလျက်ရှိပါသည်။
၅။ ထို့အပြင် ယူကေနိုင်ငံရှိ ဗမာ့ရိုဟင်ဂျာအဖွဲ့အစည်း (BROUK) က တင်သွင်းခဲ့သည့် မြန်မာ့လုံခြုံရေးအဖွဲ့များက ရိုဟင်လူမျိုးများအပေါ် ကျူးလွန်ခဲ့သည့် ရာဇဝတ်မှုနှင့်ပတ်သက်သည့် တိုင်ကြားမှုကို အာဂျင်တီ’နားနိုင်ငံရှိ တရားရုံးက လက်ခံခဲ့ပြီးဖြစ်ပါသည်။
၆။ ဤမူဘောင်များအား ကျင့်သုံး၍ တရားမျှတမှုနှင့် တာဝန်ခံမှုများ အားကောင်းလာစေရန် ဆောင်ရွက်နေသည့် လူ့အခွင့်အရေးအဖွဲ့အစည်းများနှင့် ပြည်တွင်း အာဏာပိုင်များ ပိုမိုတိုးပွားလာသည်ကို တွေ့မြင်ရခြင်းမှာ အလွန်စိတ်အားတက်စရာပင်ဖြစ်ပါသည်။
၇။ ကမ္ဘာ့ကုလသမဂ္ဂ အဖွဲ့ဝင်နိုင်ငံများအားလုံး အထူးသဖြင့် နိုင်ငံတကာတရားစီရင်ပိုင်ခွင့် စည်းမျဉ်းမူဘောင်ကို ကျင့်သုံးပိုင်ခွင့်ရှိသော နိုင်ငံများအနေဖြင့် အလားတူပံ့ပိုးပေးမှုများ ဆောင်ရွက်ရန် တောင်းဆိုအပ်ပါသည်။
၈။ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံသည် ၁၉၇၀ ခုနှစ် ကမ္ဘောဒီယားနိုင်ငံတွင် Pol Pot ခေါင်းဆောင်သည့် ခမာနီအကြမ်းဖက် အုပ်စိုးမှုကို ဖြိုခွင်းခဲ့ချိန်မှစ၍ အရှေ့အာရှတွင် မမြင်တွေ့ဖူးသော အလွန်မြင့်မားသည့် အကြမ်းဖက်မှု လှိုင်းလုံးကြီးနှင့် ရင်ဆိုင်ကြုံတွေ့နေရလျက်ရှိသည်။
၉။ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံပြည်သူများအနေဖြင့် အပြစ်ရှိသူအား အပြစ်ပေးမှုမှကင်းလွတ်နေခြင်းအား ရပ်တန့်ပြီး ကျူးလွန်သူများကို တာဝန်ခံမှုရှိစေခြင်း၊ ကျူးလွန်ခံရသူများနှင့် ၎င်းတို့မိသားစုဝင်များအတွက် တရားဥပဒေဖော်ဆောင်မှုများ ပေါ်ပေါက်လာမည်ဟု မျှော်လင့်အပ်ပါသည်။ တနေ့တခြား ပိုမိုဆိုးဝါးလာနေသည့် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၏ အခြေအနေများကို ထိုအရာများကို ချက်ချင်းလုပ်ဆောင်ပေးရန် တောင်းဆိုနေလျက်ရှိပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Human Rights
Date of publication:
2023-01-27
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-27
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Individual Documents
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National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Human Rights and international relations
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"While conflict continues in Myanmar in the aftermath of the military coup, the political crisis in Rakhine State is often overlooked. Here the Rohingya emergency shows no sign of ending, but the growing strength of the United League of Army/Arakan Army is changing the landscape on the ground. In the aftermath of a ‘humanitarian’ ceasefire, Kyaw Lynn analyses political trends in this commentary, examining why the ULA/AA has become an influential actor in any likely resolution of the Rohingya crisis. Inter-community approaches and understandings will be key.
While the question of Rohingya repatriation remains under grave challenge, the movement and exodus of the Rohingya population from inside and outside of Arakan (Rakhine State) has lately been increasing. According to the October report of the Burma Human Rights Network, the number of Rohingya arrested for travelling without official permission during 2022 is 2,075, which is higher than the previous year. In recent weeks, it was also reported that around 250 Rohingya people on two boats attempting to approach Malaysia were trapped in the Malacca Straits due to engine failure. The reports said that there was another boat carrying around 180 people but still missing.
The implications are clear. For Rohingya people who seek to migrate to a foreign country the dangerous sea route has become a critical alternative because they are more likely to be arrested through land routes by car or train inside Myanmar. Meanwhile the process intended to protect the rights of the Rohingya people continues at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague. But this is doing little to alleviate the situation of Rohingya communities inside Arakan or in the refugee camps in Bangladesh who find less hope for their future. International actions appear to be at an impasse.
As these crises continue, new questions have arisen during the past year in finding solutions to the Rohingya crisis with the emergence of a new actor, the United League of Arakan/Arakan Army (ULA/AA), in the politics of Arakan. This is especially the case in northern parts of Rakhine State bordering Bangladesh where the majority of the Rohingya population lives.
To put the situation in context: the ULA is the political wing of the Arakan Army, which was established in April 2009 under the leadership of Gen. Twan Mrat Naing in an area controlled by the Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO) along the China border. Since this time, the group has been consistently training and arming new members while joining the armed struggle with allied forces, notably the KIO, (Kokang) Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army and Ta’ang National Liberation Army, against the Myanmar military, mostly in Kachin and northern Shan states. The group is also said to have a military base in territories controlled by the Karen National Union near the Thailand border, which is mainly used for logistics and new recruitment.
While the first arrival of AA soldiers into the Arakan battlefield is difficult to exactly date, many observers have noted that, since 2015, AA soldiers with arms and military equipment can be found in forest areas of Paletwa township, Chin State, and bordering areas with Bangladesh and India. Subsequently, intensive and more frequent clashes against the Myanmar military in Rakhine State began in mid-2018, reaching a peak in 2019 and ending in late 2020 with a ‘de facto’ or ‘informal’ ceasefire just after the 2020 general election. The ULA/AA had emerged as a major force, with consequences that are still developing.
This ‘first’ ULA/AA ceasefire brought new changes not just in Arakan politics but also to Myanmar as a whole. For nationwide politics, it means that the armed conflict between the Myanmar military and ethnic armed organisations is no longer confined to the China and Thailand borders. The ceasefire also demonstrated the de facto acceptance by Myanmar military leaders of the existence of the AA in Arakan, a position that they had previously rejected. Equally important, the truce caused a change in the gravity of the political centre from electoral political parties to armed groups, notably the ULA/AA, which controls executive functions and administers the judiciary in large swathes of territory in rural areas of the northern and central townships in Rakhine State.
The scale of this build-up, in turn, increased tensions with an older but small, and less popular, Rakhine armed group known as the ‘Arakan Liberation Party/Army’ (ALP/ALA). A signatory of the 2015 Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement, the ALP/ALA is mostly perceived as a force supporting the military State Administration Council (SAC) by both the ULA/AA leadership and the majority Rakhine population. In the past, there were attempts to merge the two movements together, but there have also been confrontations, including clashes on the Bangladesh and India borders. As a sign of the worsening situation, the ULA arrested at least ten ALP members during the past year, accusing them of collaborating with the SAC in surveillance activities and arresting civilians and ULA/AA members.
In the latest incident on the evening of 4 January, the ALP/ALA’s military chief and two junior colleagues were assassinated in a car in the state capital Sittwe. The ALP accused the ULA, charges which the ULA denied. Instead, the party spokesperson pointed to internal divisions within the ALP leadership or the possibility of political manipulation by a third party (possibly the SAC) which wanted to further complicate relations between them. To date, however, neither side has provided effective evidence to support their positions, while the SAC has remained surprisingly silent about these deaths.
As these events testify, Rakhine State today has ceasefires but it does not have peace. As in the rest of the country, new approaches are essential if lasting peace and justice are to be achieved.
RELATED
The Nature of Parallel Governance and Its Impact on Arakan Politics
A Myanmar Commentary by Kyaw Lynn
POST-ELECTION CRISIS IN POLITICAL TRANSITION MYANMAR COMMENTARY
Article by Kyaw Lynn
Publication date:
24 February 2022
The ‘de facto’ or ‘informal’ ceasefire
For the moment, the Sittwe assassinations are dominating the media headlines. But it has not detracted attention in Arakan from the ULA/AA’s emergence as a potential actor in solving the Rohingya crisis. In particular, a state-building and nation-building agenda, announced by the ULA Chairman Gen. Twan Mrat Naing in April 2021, raised questions about how the ULA leadership intend to handle the role of the Rohingya community in Rakhine State. This is a question that became ever more pertinent during the first 20 months of ‘informal’ ceasefire following its 2020 inception.
During this time, the ULA claimed to include the local Rohingya community in its military, judiciary and administrative sectors. The situation on the ground remained very difficult, exacerbated by the SAC coup in February 2021. But whether relations by the ULA towards the local Rohingya community were satisfying or not, some positive changes could be seen when it came to social cohesion and political inclusion with the ULA authorities in the field. This marked a new climate in inter-community affairs.
A more challenging phase, however, began when armed clashes broke out between the Myanmar military and AA near Rohingya villages in Maungdaw and Buthidaung townships between August and November 2022. Unlike previous rounds of conflict, the negative impact of the fighting visibly affected not just the local Rakhine population but also the Rohingya and other minority communities. Negative consequences ranged from the blockage of trade, travel and humanitarian assistance to the displacement of villagers, civilian casualties and human rights violations.
The ULA/AA was now visibly in the front-line of the Rohingya crisis in northern Rakhine State, a position that became even clearer when a new ‘humanitarian’ ceasefire was agreed with the SAC in late November. This resulted in affirming the AA’s ground control over many parts of Maungdaw and Buthidaung townships. In consequence, as 2023 begins, the ULA appears as one of the most responsible and visible stakeholders in any process of refugee repatriation from Bangladesh. Clearly, relations with the Rohingya community have approached a critical time. But the future path will not be easy, and there will be yet more complex scenarios ahead.
Engagement by the ULA towards the Rohingya issue
For the present, approaches by the ULA towards the Rohingya issue need to be analyzed based upon two key issues: its policy stand on the question of a repatriation process, and its governance policy toward the Rohingya community inside Arakan.
On 19 September 2022, for the first time since the 2017 ‘regional clearance’ operations by the Myanmar military against the Rohingya population in north Arakan, the ULA/AA spokesperson stated the movement’s position on refugee repatriation from Bangladesh:
"Some people consider the ULA has a responsibility for the resolution of the Rohingya crisis. If it is to be so, there shall be two things. First, the international community and Bangladesh should recognize the ULA/AA as the main stakeholder in the resolution of this crisis. Secondly, Bangladesh and other Great Powers, including the United Nations, should give full support and stand together with us."
To date, there have been few visible responses from the Rohingya population or international community on the ULA’s position. But this policy statement can be seen as a more active move by the ULA leadership regarding refugee repatriation and resolution of the Rohingya crisis as a whole. In a highly difficult landscape, ULA leaders have always regarded the issue as a political suicide that could bring them into the ‘enemy’s trap’ – a reference to the political ‘divide-and-rule’ games played by the Myanmar military.
Indeed, after the ULA statement, there were rumours of political plots in Rakhine State by the SAC involved from behind. These included the secret distribution during the night of pamphlets in markets and houses in urban areas of Mrauk-U and Sittwe asking: "Why are there Bengali people in the AA if they march in line with the “Way of Rakhita?" and ‘Do you know that the AA is supported by the OIC and Muslim countries?’ At the same time, some pro-SAC media also started to raise provocative questions like ‘Why did the AA say to receive back Bengali refugees if they are really fighting for the Rakhine people?’
As history has shown, there are no easy answers for those seeking to accelerate the finding of just solutions. The Rohingya crisis has become a complex admixture of various components, including the protection of human rights, the rights to citizenship, international investigations by the ICJ and International Criminal Court, grievances over communal violence, competing historical narratives, and perceived threats of political extremism. The outcome is a highly polarized environment and different opinions among the various actors, including between the majority Rakhine population and the Western international community, which has empathetically stood on the side of the Rohingya community regarding the rights to citizenship and human rights issues for most of the time.
Despite these difficulties, it seems that the ULA leadership have decided they have to consider their stand on the two issues of repatriation and governance policy toward the Rohingya population as a matter of necessity rather than of choice. They cannot afford to disappoint the different sides if their key political destinations are to be achieved with tangible results. Currently, the ULA leadership appears to believe that building better relations with the remaining Rohingya population inside Arakan is fundamental and more pragmatic in showing their political will in inter-community relations not just to international observers but also to the rest of the Rohingya population outside of the state.
Promoting reconciliation among the members of various communities in Arakan, as well as inclusion of Rohingya communities within local administration, are clearly essential. In this regard, the ULA authorities have been conducting two critical ‘missions’ to support the involvement of the Rohingya community in the state.
The first mission is mainly implemented through the participation of various community members in the celebration of events like football matches, traditional wrestling ‘Krin’ festivals and music ‘live-show performances’ on culturally-important days in ULA-controlled rural areas. Rohingya community, religious, and youth leaders have been invited by ULA officials and media agencies allowed to publicize these gatherings with news and photos. Following a football event in January 2022 in Kyauktaw township, a Rohingya community leader said:
"I believe that the essence of the football match held by the ULA is to achieve social cohesion and community reconciliation among the diverse groups, and we were also allowed to discuss and participate in it from the beginning."
Through these activities, it is safe to argue that social interaction between Rohingya and Rakhine communities in ULA-controlled rural areas is comparatively higher than that in SAC-controlled urban and suburban areas.
In the second mission to promote inter-community understanding, ULA governing bodies have included the local Rohingya population in various departments, including the military, police, administration, taxation and judiciary. In a well-publicized example, the ULA released a video in May 2020 in which a Rohingya soldier serving in the AA questioned some Rohingya locals in Buthidaung township regarding a criminal case in their own language. Similar confirmation can be found in the administrative sector in an interview with the Chairman of Minbya township Muslim Council who said:
"The local ULA officers recognize and respect our organization. When they make a decision, they first consult and negotiate with the village administrators, including us, and there is very little corruption. As the ULA governance came to exist in my area, there are fewer crimes like theft, murder, and criminal gang activities."
Despite these developments, there are still open questions over the extent to which the ULA leadership tolerates inclusion of the Rohingya community in decision-making processes and political representation in the longer-term. In addition, there have been accusations against AA soldiers over human rights violations during the recent clashes with the Myanmar military in Maungdaw and Buthidaung townships. In some cases, the ULA authorities investigated the cases and imprisoned the perpetrators with what were considered to be appropriate punishments. But challenges remain, and different perceptions continue.
The ULA leadership and Rakhine community, for example, believe that conflict negatively impacts not only on the Rohingya but also Rakhine and other nationalities who are struggling for the sake of a better future for all people of Arakan. In contrast, a large segment of the Rohingya community might still consider their situation as between a rock and a hard place where they are still uncertain of gaining tangible benefits as political instability continues in the country.
For community understandings to develop in Arakan, it is thus necessary that this difference in views over the reasons and consequences for armed struggle are reconciled with the formation of shared communication platforms in the different layers of society. Despite the current ceasefire, there are no roadmaps to peace in the territory today.
The matrix of Arakan Politics
Despite coming from various ideologies, parties and personal backgrounds, almost all the key Rakhine political leaders and actors agree on one crucial opinion when it comes to the priorities in Arakan politics. That is, they believe that the first and most fundamental issue is the lack of political self-determination; the second is the question of the Rohingya crisis; and the third is the issue of foreign investments in Arakan, especially from China and India, including resource and revenue sharing. In their thoughts, achieving the first political demand is critical for the resolution of the second and third issues. Thus, in their perception, it is essential to approach challenges from this structural perspective to resolve the Rohingya crisis.
Moving forward from this viewpoint is difficult. In a more comprehensive framework in political conceptions, the Rohingya crisis can also be viewed as the negative consequence of having ill relations between three edges of a triangle: the Myanmar State, the Rakhine community and the Rohingya community in which they have very different perceptions. Although many observers analyze the root causes of the problem based on bilateral relations between the Rohingya community and Myanmar State (or ‘Burmese’ state/community in a broader sense), further factors include the hostile relations between the central state and Rakhine community as well as the ways in which the interests of the Rakhine and Rohingya communities have historically been marginalized or downplayed. Rakhine and Rohingya relations are of vital importance.
Against this backdrop, there are two key reasons why the different dimensions to these relationships must be addressed as part of any solution to the Rohingya crisis. First, any critical development on the Rohingya issue that fails to accommodate the differences in opinion and strategy between the Myanmar State and leading Rakhine political organizations, such as the ULA/AA, will not be sustainable or achievable. In the current political climate, both the SAC and rival National Unity Government represent substitutes for the Myanmar State and, in future politics, one might endure as the only political entity. But, unlike other parts of the country, even a de facto or de jure peace agreement between the Myanmar military and Arakan Army will not be sustainable if they have disagreements or a lack of understanding regarding resolution of the Rohingya crisis.
Equally important, inter-community relations must be addressed to bring lasting peace. This leads to the second reason for promoting reconciliation and shared objectives between the different communities. Although Rakhine and Rohingya populations presently seem to have more understanding and sympathy due to common sufferings (humanitarian crises and human rights violations) and a common enemy (Myanmar military), a shared vision regarding their respective places in future Arakan society is still needed. This situation is also analyzed in a recent report conducted by the Institute for Peace and Governance, an Arakan-based non-governmental organization.*
As experiences around the world have shown, community reconciliation in a divided land like Arakan is a long-term process. It cannot be accessed without ‘forgiveness’ regarding past crimes among members of the communities in the first place. And it is also a process that includes five key steps: developing a shared vision of an interdependent and fair society; acknowledging and dealing with the past; building positive relationships; facilitating significant cultural and attitudinal change; and, finally, enabling meaningful social, economic and political change.
For the moment, politics in Arakan have not reached such a stage. Currently, the state of reconciliation among the members of different communities varies on the basis of socio-economic interactions, political environment and existing relationships in a particular area. In general, inter-community interaction in central Arakan townships, such as Mrauk-U, Kyauktaw and Minbya, is comparatively higher than in the northernmost townships of Maungdaw and Buthidaung.
Promoting community reconciliation will therefore be essential for the smooth implementation of a refugee repatriation process, and the success of this process will be the measurement of the state of reconciliation between the two communities. Equally important, recent developments in Arakan demonstrate that the role of the ULA/AA, which has both competitive power relations with the Nay Pyi Taw government as well as authority and influence over the Rakhine population, will be critical in bringing productive changes in the resolution of the Rohingya crisis.
RELATED
Arakan (Rakhine State): A Land in Conflict on Myanmar’s Western Frontier
LAND POLICY IN MYANMAR ETHNIC CONFLICT IN MYANMAR
Report by Martin Smith
Publication date:
18 December 2019
Conclusion
The Rohingya crisis remains challenging for all domestic and international actors, and there is no simple way of finding a magic solution. The political crisis in the country has deepened more and more since the February 2021 coup. The possibility of refugee repatriation from Bangladesh and the broader scope of resolving the Rohingya emergency are less hopeful. And the emergence of the ULA as a new actor in Arakan politics creates new questions about old problems in resolving the Rohingya crisis.
Presently, the role of the ULA in addressing the Rohingya crisis is becoming more visible. This is especially apparent after the second round of armed clashes between the Myanmar military and AA since the 2020 ceasefire recently ended, resulting in de facto control by the ULA/AA of territories along the border with Bangladesh and rural areas in Maungdaw and Buthidaung townships. These areas are inhabited by a majority of the Rohingya population and are the places where repatriated refugees are to be rehabilitated. Thus relations between the ULA authorities and Rohingya community will have impact not only on the lives of the local people but the wishes of the refugee population in Bangladesh.
In general, it can be summarized that there are two basic – and opposite – hypothetical viewpoints that can be taken regarding the emerging role of the ULA in addressing the Rohingya crisis. The first and more pessimistic position is that the appearance of the ULA/AA as a new actor in Arakan politics can be seen as an arming of Rakhine ethno-nationalism which is a challenge for the Rohingya people in Arakan and will only make the process of solving the crisis more complex. But the second and more optimistic view is that the emergence of the ULA as a more potent and visionary political actor – different from other Rakhine parties that seek to mobilize the people on the basis of ethno-nationalism to challenge the central government – will produce a more united landscape for all marginalized groups to work together. If this is the case, it is trusted that the new political dynamics will bring light for reconciliation between the different communities against common sufferings and the common enemy.
Important shifts in the Arakan landscape are currently underway. While challenges lie ahead in relations between the ULA and Rohingya population, there have been positive developments, especially in inter-community relations and political inclusion. For this reason, a balanced viewpoint should be taken regarding current ULA-Rohingya relations. It is still early to be too optimistic. But it is also too late to be a pessimist..."
Source/publisher:
Transnational Institute ( Amsterdam)
Date of publication:
2023-01-26
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-26
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Arakan (Rakhine) State - reports etc. by date (latest first), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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"JAKARTA – Parliamentarians from Southeast Asia urge the Thai government to stop engaging with the Myanmar junta, led by Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, as it continues committing all sorts of atrocities against its own population in order to cement its power after the failed coup d’état in February 2021. They also petition the Thai authorities to provide help to refugees and asylum seekers fleeing persecution and military attacks from the neighboring country.
The call to disengage the junta comes after a meeting between the top leaders of the Myanmar and Thai armed forces in Rakhine State, western Myanmar. The Chief of the Royal Thai Armed Forces, General Chalermphon Srisawasdi, and Min Aung Hlaing met on 20 January with the aim of “further cementing mutual trust, mutual understanding and friendly ties between the two armed forces,” according to media controlled by the Myanmar junta.
As the high-level meeting was taking place, the Myanmar military was launching indiscriminate airstrikes in a village located in Sagaing region, killing at least seven villagers and injuring over thirty. On several occasions, stray shells have landed in Thai territory when the Myanmar military was conducting aerial attacks in neighboring Karen and Karenni states.
“By engaging with the junta, the Thai military and government are turning into enablers of the crimes against humanity that it is perpetrating on a daily basis. No geopolitical interests can justify that. The junta has also shown utter disrespect to ASEAN, of which Thailand is also a member, by disregarding the Five Point Consensus it signed three months after the coup. No ASEAN member state should have ‘friendly ties’ with a military that has turned Myanmar into a center of instability which is threatening the whole region,” said Charles Santiago, former Member of Parliament in Malaysia, and Co-Chairperson of ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights (APHR).
The Five Point Consensus was signed by the ASEAN member states and the Myanmar junta in April 2021 to put an end to the violence, seek a negotiated solution to the conflict and address the humanitarian crisis. As APHR has repeatedly stated, Min Aung Hlaing has not shown any willingness to comply with its terms from the beginning. The report of the International Parliamentary Inquiry into the global response to the crisis in Myanmar (IPI), organized by APHR, urged ASEAN to abandon the Five Point Consensus in its present form, as it has clearly failed.
“As we demanded in our IPI report, ASEAN should engage the National Unity Government (NUG) of Myanmar, as the legitimate authority of the country, and re-negotiate a new consensus with it and aligned ethnic organizations. ASEAN decided early on not to invite representatives of the junta to high-level meetings, and countries like Malaysia and its current Chair, Indonesia, have shown willingness to engage the NUG. By meeting Ming Aung Hlaing, Thailand is undermining those efforts and furthering divisions within the regional group,” said Santiago.
In this vein, Thailand hosted a meeting in December to discuss the crisis in Myanmar, attended by the foreign ministers of the Myanmar junta, Laos and Cambodia, as well as the deputy foreign minister of Vietnam. Significantly, Malaysia, the Philippines, Indonesia and Singapore did not attend.
Thailand and Myanmar share a border of over 2,400 kilometers, and the attacks by the junta have displaced hundreds of thousands. Yet Thailand refuses to accept refugees fleeing the onslaught of the Myanmar military on the other side of the border, often pushing back those who cross it after a few days or even a few hours, as human rights organizations have often denounced in the last two years. Asylum seekers from the neighboring country do not fare much better in Thailand, where they have no legal protection and live in constant fear of deportation.
“Thailand has a history of welcoming refugees from Laos, Cambodia or Vietnam since the 20th century wars in Indochina. The government should open its borders to the refugees fleeing war in the Myanmar ethnic states along its borders, and provide legal protections to those who seek political asylum, including defectors from the Myanmar military. It should also facilitate cross-border aid by local civil society organizations and international NGOs. Once again, on these issues the main interlocutors the Thai government should engage with in Myanmar are the NUG, aligned ethnic organizations, and the vibrant civil society, not a criminal military completely unable to solve the crisis it has created,” said Santiago..."
Source/publisher:
ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights
Date of publication:
2023-01-26
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-26
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Karen and other refugees from Burma in Thailand - general reports and articles, Human Rights and international relations
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"Since the Myanmar military’s attempted coup in February 2021, over 60 foreign governments and international organisations (including United Nations entities) have provided support for the illegal military junta, directly and indirectly supporting its campaign of terror.
The report, titled Developing a Dictatorship: How governments and international organisations are supporting the illegal Myanmar military junta - and what must be done to stop this, provides details of the organisations and the forms of support they have provided.
Key findings include:
22 foreign governments;
26 intergovernmental organisations (including 14 United Nations entities);
8 foreign financial institutions; and
8 other international organisations are implicated.
The report covers four main types of support for the military junta:
political support through diplomatic relations and actions that legitimise and enable the junta to take decisions on behalf of Myanmar in international forums;
technical cooperation that enables the transfer of knowledge and skills to the junta and those who serve their interests;
financial support that may flow through development initiatives, loan disbursements, direct purchases from, or indirect business dealings with, companies and other entities controlled by the junta, as well as the development of infrastructure that may serve the junta financially and strategically; and
renting property such as hotel rooms, office spaces and residences from military-linked businesses.
The report includes 18 detailed case studies and provides clear recommendations for what must be done to prevent the illegal military junta from gaining further funds, resources and power.
It also provides an analysis of the legal considerations and consequences for international organisations found to be supporting the military junta.
Justice For Myanmar spokesperson Yadanar Maung says: “It has been two years since the Myanmar military’s attempted coup. Over 2,700 people have been killed and more than 13,600 people are still detained.
“The junta is waging a scorched earth campaign against the people of Myanmar, carrying out indiscriminate airstrikes and shelling, and has caused a humanitarian catastrophe with more than 1.1 million displaced.
“So far, the international community has taken insufficient action to end the flow of funds and resources that enables the military junta’s campaign of terror.
“It’s clear that some foreign governments and international organisations are not only neglecting to help the people of Myanmar, but they are also actively supporting the military junta that is committing war crimes and crimes against humanity against the people.
“All forms of support for the military junta are unacceptable – from inviting the military junta to represent Myanmar at international meetings to providing training to junta members and spending millions of dollars at military-linked hotels.
“The National Unity Government as the legitimate government of Myanmar needs to be invited to international meetings on behalf of Myanmar.
“All financial ties to the Myanmar military must be cut, and targeted sanctions must be imposed.
“We call on foreign governments and international organisations to take immediate action to end all forms of support for the military junta.”
Among the organisations named in the report, 13 have recently taken action towards ending their support for the military junta..."
Source/publisher:
Justice For Myanmar
Date of publication:
2023-01-25
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-25
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Business and the Military, Sanctions, Human Rights and international relations
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130.19 KB 96.55 KB
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"Atrocity Alert is a weekly publication by the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect highlighting situations where populations are at risk of, or are enduring, mass atrocity crimes.
MYANMAR MILITARY CONTINUES ASSAULT ON SAGAING, DISPLACING THOUSANDS OF CIVILIANS
In recent days Myanmar’s (Burma) military has continued to launch airstrikes and raids throughout the resistance stronghold of Sagaing Region in northern Myanmar, perpetrating likely war crimes and crimes against humanity. Following three days of intense clashes with local resistance groups and airstrikes on civilian targets, between 22-23 January junta forces burned houses in Moetar village, Katha Township. More than 15,000 residents from 10 villages across Katha Township fled their homes as a result of the attacks. Over 7,000 civilians were also forced to flee on 23-24 January after military soldiers raided and torched villages along the border of Depayin and Ye-U townships in Sagaing Region.
Myanmar’s military – the Tatmadaw – has consistently perpetrated airstrikes and raids in the nearly two years since the coup in order to invoke terror, maintain control and quell dissent. In December 2022 junta soldiers conducted arson attacks on 30 villages in Depayin Township alone, destroying over 3,000 houses and five monasteries. According to the independent rights group Data for Myanmar, junta forces had burned an estimated 36,500 houses in Sagaing Region as of December. In a statement during December, Tom Andrews, the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, said, “The systematic gross human rights violations — amounting to war crimes and crimes against humanity — being perpetrated daily on the people of Myanmar by an illegal military junta requires strong, coordinated action… and accountability for crimes the military has committed to date.”
As the airstrikes and raids against Sagaing continue, civil society has recently taken an important step to advance justice and accountability for the military’s past and current atrocities. On 24 January human rights group Fortify Rights and 16 people from Myanmar filed a criminal complaint in Germany under the principle of universal jurisdiction against Myanmar’s military generals and others. The complaint accuses the Tatmadaw of committing genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity during its so-called “clearance operations” against the Rohingya in 2017 and since the coup.
August 2022 marked the five-year anniversary of the clearance operations against the Rohingya, and 1 February will mark the second anniversary of the deadly coup. Liam Scott, Myanmar expert at the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, said, “Although there are a series of ongoing accountability initiatives and mechanisms, the military has enjoyed impunity for its atrocities for too long. This lack of accountability has emboldened the military to continue perpetrating abuses throughout Myanmar, such as the scorched earth campaign and airstrikes in Sagaing. It is time to ensure that the victims and survivors receive the justice they deserve.” German authorities should take up the complaint and open an investigation to help ensure that those responsible for these grave crimes are held to account.
INTERNATIONAL HOLOCAUST REMEMBRANCE DAY
On Friday, 27 January, the international community will commemorate International Holocaust Remembrance Day, honoring the millions of victims of the Holocaust, and the 78th anniversary of the liberation of the Auschwitz-Birkenau concentration camp. The systematic persecution and extermination of more than six million Jews, including more than a million murdered within the confines of Auschwitz, remains one of the darkest chapters in human history.
In addition to commemorating victims, International Holocaust Remembrance Day also recognizes the role of educational programs in teaching about the Holocaust in order to educate future generations on the tools to prevent genocides. This year’s theme, “Home and Belonging,” highlights the humanity of Holocaust victims and survivors, as well as the dangers of hate speech, antisemitism, Holocaust distortion and denial and prejudice. In recent years the hatred and antisemitism that begat the Holocaust is experiencing a resurgence around the world, with a worrying rise in neo-Nazism, hate speech and Holocaust denial. Despite the Holocaust being one of the most well documented mass atrocities in history, Holocaust denial and distortion has been amplified on social media platforms with ease.
By systematically negating the facts of history, genocide deniers manufacture doubt, seed discord and mistrust, strengthen contested narratives about the past, present and future, and create conditions that may lead to the recurrence of atrocities. Genocide denial is not only an attempt to minimize or redefine the scale and severity of the crimes committed, but it also often contributes to the dehumanization of survivors and victims.
Savita Pawnday, Executive Director of the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, said, “On this International Holocaust Remembrance Day, the Global Centre stands with and honors all of the victims of the Holocaust and of Nazism. Auschwitz-Birkenau is a warning from history of the consequences of indifference and inaction in the face of mass atrocities. If we do not resist those who deny the humanity of others, we risk repeating the horrors of the past.”
As history has taught us, genocide does not happen overnight. Genocide is preventable if warning signs – such as hate speech and systemic discrimination and marginalization – are taken seriously and followed by early action. Member states should institute education curriculums that inculcate values and behaviors that counter hate and prejudice. States should also incorporate modules on preventing and responding to atrocity crimes in their education system, including modules on how to prevent and to resist incitement.
VENEZUELAN HUMAN RIGHTS CHAMPION FELICIANO REYNA NAMED MARTIN ENNALS LAUREATE
On 19 January Venezuelan human rights activist Feliciano Reyna Ganteaume was selected as Laureate for the prestigious Martin Ennals Award, which honors individuals and organizations who have shown exceptional commitment to defending and promoting human rights. Laureates are selected by a jury of 10 of the world’s leading human rights organizations. The jury also selected Delphine Djiraibé from Chad and Khurram Parvez from Kashmir for the 2023 Award, emphasizing that each Laureate has “dedicated over 30 years of their lives to building movements which brought about justice for victims or delivered medicines to the marginalized.”
In 1995 Reyna founded Acción Solidaria – an organization pioneering the provision of medication and treatment to Venezuelans living with HIV/AIDS. Since then, he has worked tirelessly as a highly respected human rights activist and has been at the forefront of efforts to respond to the ongoing multidimensional crisis in Venezuela, which has led more than 7 million people to leave the country since 2014. Reyna, together with a large coalition of Venezuelan human rights defenders, has been instrumental in mobilizing the UN Human Rights Council to establish an independent investigative mechanism into alleged crimes against humanity in Venezuela. Elisabeth Pramendorfer, Venezuela expert and Geneva Representative of the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, emphasized that, “The overwhelming celebration to this announcement is a testament to Feliciano’s legacy, integrity and his impact on vulnerable communities in Venezuela. The jury’s decision also honors civil society organizations across Venezuela that have emerged as the primary actors in providing humanitarian assistance and supporting victims of state-led violence.”
The announcement comes at a time when human rights defenders in Venezuela continue to face systematic repression by the government. In February 2021 the Global Centre joined 11 international organizations in condemning the targeted harassment, reprisals and restrictions against Venezuelan civil society partners. Since then, the government has continued its crackdown on civic space. In a preliminary discussion on 24 January, the Venezuelan National Assembly provisionally approved draft legislation aimed at restricting international support – and essentially criminalizing – the work of civil society organizations. At the time of writing, Javier Tarazona, Director of the Venezuelan human rights group FundaRedes, has spent 573 days in arbitrary detention for documenting egregious abuses along Venezuela’s border areas.
The Global Centre honors the three Martin Ennals Laureates, whose recognition highlights the tireless work of human rights defenders around the world who fight for the rights of victims often at immense personal risk. We call on all states and UN bodies and agencies to actively support and protect human rights defenders and civil society organizations, as well as promote safe and open civic space..."
Source/publisher:
Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
Date of publication:
2023-01-25
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-25
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Language:
more
Description:
"New report exposes 60+ foreign governments & international organisations supporting military junta
Our new report, Developing a Dictatorship, details over 60 foreign governments, intergovernmental organisations (including UN entities), foreign financial institutions and other international organisations providing support for the military junta.
The report includes 18 detailed case studies illustrating these forms of support and outlines the ways in which the military junta stands to benefit politically and financially through inclusion in international decision-making forums, development assistance, technical cooperation, loans, infrastructure projects and more.
It provides clear recommendations for what must be done to prevent the illegal military junta from gaining further funds, resources and power.
Among the organisations named in the report, 13 have recently taken action towards ending their support for the military junta..."
Source/publisher:
Justice For Myanmar
Date of publication:
2023-01-25
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-25
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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Format :
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5.31 MB 583.81 KB 237.54 KB
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"Key highlights:
Based on the remote Consolidated Approach for Reporting Indicators of Food Security (rCARI), 27 percent of households are considered food insecure and, according to the Food Insecurity Experience Scale (FIES), 29 percent are recently moderately or severely food insecure.
The states and regions of Chin, Kayah, Kayin, Rakhine and Sagaing had the worst food security outcomes across all indicators.
The reliance on food-related coping strategies has increased, particularly the consumption of less preferred or less expensive food, employed by four out of ten households.
One in two households had to rely on crisis and emergency coping mechansisms that are more difficult to reverse and likely to reduce future income streams and production levels. Asset-depletion among farmers could be a contributing factor to poor production. Poor production is associated with food insecurity at a household level, but there are also concerns for future agricultural production.
Sustained retrenchment of the area planted compared to previous rounds was reported.
The 2022 main rainfed paddy crop, which accounts for more than 80 percent of the annual production, was expected to be below-average as harvest was approaching at the time of the survey. The share of farmers that reported a drop in production has grown from 45 percent in the second round, to 49 percent in the third round and 54 percent in the current round.
Farmers in Rakhine State expect particularly poor production. In Chin, Magway, Sagaing, Tanintharyi and Yangon, a high share of households also expect harvest to be below normal.
Forty-seven percent of livestock producers experienced a decrease in herd/flock size, particularly among swine and poultry producers. The incidence of livestock diseases decreased, and market access improved, but the share of reported difficulties accessing feed and pastures has increased.
Households in conflict-affected areas, rural households, female-headed households, households with debt, and those vulnerable to economic shocks had the worst food security outcomes.
These findings suggest a need for food assistance to the most vulnerable households and agricultural assistance to support production in the upcoming season..."
Source/publisher:
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations and World Food Programme via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of publication:
2023-01-25
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-25
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
WFP (World Food Programme), Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), Agriculture in Burma/Myanmar: general and research, Food Security and nutrition in Burma/Myanmar, Human Rights and international relations
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814.8 KB
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"Response Plan Overview:
The Myanmar Humanitarian Response Plan requests US$764 million to reach 4.5 million people prioritized for life-saving humanitarian support (52 per cent women, 32 percent children and 13 per cent with disability).
The people of Myanmar have entered 2023 facing an unprecedented political, socioeconomic, human rights and humanitarian crisis with residual needs persisting from previous years, and new needs flowing from security and conflict dynamics since the military takeover on 1 February 2021. Almost half the population is thought to be living in poverty in 2023, wiping out the impressive development gains made since 2005.1 The number of people on the move as a result of conflict and depleted coping capacity has sky-rocketed in 2022 and stands at 1.5 million at the start of 2023.2 Price hikes, severe inflation, movement restrictions, armed conflict and violence have forced many of the most vulnerable people to resort to crisis or emergency coping strategies to buy food and other basic supplies, often negatively impacting on their safety, well-being, and dignity. This multi-dimensional humanitarian crisis is now affecting the whole country, posing grave protection risks for civilians, limiting access to services and deepening food insecurity.
The grim outlook outlined in the HNO makes a scaled-up, context-adapted humanitarian response essential in 2023 to prevent loss of life and reduce suffering. This response will be delivered through coordination architecture that is more fi t-for-purpose as recommended by a 2022 P2P review of the response. A new HCT Localization Strategy and workstream, also recommended by the P-2-P report, will be central to response delivery in 2023.
The UN SERRP will also have a critical complementary nexus role to play in 2023 by preventing more people from slipping into humanitarian need by addressing the root causes of the crisis, targeting those who are impoverished and at-risk but not yet in humanitarian need, supporting people to build their resilience and recover from humanitarian situations, and pivoting available development resources to reach those with urgent needs whom humanitarians are not able to reach due to funding constraints through different kinds of support. Nexus interventions under the SERRP will complement the HRP by increasing access to services and strengthening the communities’ socioeconomic resilience, as well as contributing to preventing people from slipping into situations where they must rely on humanitarian assistance for survival.
After a broader urban and rural response was implemented in 2022, addressing the humanitarian consequences and most severe economic impacts of COVID-19, as well as the conflict, the humanitarian response strategy in 2023 follows a slightly narrower geographical scope of action. In agreement with the development community in Myanmar, the HRP in 2023 will focus predominantly on people in need in rural areas, essentially transitioning the signifi cant caseload of vulnerable people in peri-urban and urban areas to development partners for more durable support through programming focused on resilience, prevention, and improved living conditions.
The HRP is strategically aimed at providing life-saving assistance to those immediately affected by shocks, including people who are displaced, as well as those who are acutely crisis-affected and have humanitarian needs. The response will aim to alleviate suffering for people facing acute vulnerabilities such as mental and physical disability; those using dangerous coping strategies; internally displaced people and returnees; and those living in households headed by women, children, or the elderly. There is a heavy emphasis on addressing food insecurity in the Response Plan given the worsening national trends and enormous needs revealed in the HNO analysis for 2023. Protection responses and advocacy are a top priority that will be implemented through systematic information collection, protection monitoring and analysis, guided by the HCT’s newly updated Protection Strategy.
The focus will be on identifying people with specific needs and reaching the most at-risk with life-saving and emergency protection services that reduce the adoption of negative coping strategies and improve people’s safety and dignity.
In 2022, humanitarian partners demonstrated their ability to scale up their response in the difficult new operating environment reaching at least 3.9 million people3 out of the 6.2 million people targeted for assistance in the HRP by September using adopting flexible response modalities to ensure continuity of operations. However, this assistance has not been as multi-sectoral or as weighted towards new conflict areas as planned due to gross under-funding and heavy access constraints.
Despite a shrinking space for the humanitarian response, operational partners continue to have presence and capacity across the country and are committed to staying and delivering a well-coordinated life-saving response amid increasingly challenging circumstances in 2023. With all clusters (except Logistics) fully activated nationally, humanitarian organizations have gone to great lengths to expand their footprint into areas of new need and are reaching increasing numbers of people affected by the expanding conflict. In addition to established partners who have demonstrated the scope to expand their existing response, a major effort is ongoing to link up with new partners, particularly local organizations, to increase access and reach, especially into hard-to-reach, conflict areas. At the start of 2023, 219 operational cluster partners stand ready to provide life-saving assistance to people in need, a significant increase from the 130 partners operational in quarter 1 of 2022.4
In 2023, humanitarians will continue to try all viable avenues to deliver assistance and alleviate the suffering of affected people, recognizing that there are some areas that are easier for certain actors to reach than others - especially at-scale. Those who are in-country will continue working to keep an internal window of access to affected people open - often by supporting local partners working heroically in the deep field - while simultaneously coordinating with those who are delivering assistance through remote modalities. Expanded humanitarian access, especially to conflict-affected areas, is vital to delivering on the HRP’s aims and partners will continue to employ a principled approach to access negotiations. To deepen access in all areas of the country and enable humanitarian organizations to deliver assistance, the revitalized Humanitarian Access Working Group (HAWG) will guide analysis, access and civil-military coordination and advocacy.
Alternative delivery approaches, including cash, remote and private sector modalities will continue to be explored to reach more people in the constrained environment. In line with standard global approaches, humanitarians will continue to engage with all sides to secure access to people in need of humanitarian support and raise protection concerns with parties to the conflict. Such engagement is a practical necessity to ensure staff can safely enter conflict areas to deliver assistance. Politicization of this practical humanitarian engagement and instrumentalization of humanitarian actors in 2022 has put staff in danger and there are concerns about the safety of aid workers in this highly charged environment. To ensure no one is left behind, humanitarian workers in Myanmar must be allowed to do their jobs free from restrictions and harassment, in line with all the protections afforded to them under International Humanitarian Law (IHL).
Despite the predominant public discourse, humanitarian focus group discussions (FGDs) with affected people in different parts of the country over the past year have consistently suggested that the most vulnerable people want humanitarians to continue with our existing work to meet their urgent and immediate needs, whatever way they can. These less visible but very vulnerable people who are receiving vital assistance continue to tell humanitarian actors that their help is a lifeline and that they are fearful of it stopping.
The response will continue to emphasize the importance of enhancing AAP work, reinforcing Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (PSEA); preventing and responding to Gender-Based Violence (GBV); strengthening gender, mental health and psychosocial support (MHPSS); and promoting and delivering on disability inclusion. Humanitarian systems will be strengthened through dedicated technical working groups on these areas, as well as other cross-cutting and thematic topics. Cash will play an increasingly important role in the restrictive operational environment as a means to get assistance to people in need. Cash coordination will be scaled up in 2023 with an in-depth review planned on the feasibility of moving to a genuine multi-purpose cash approach, encompassing the breadth of the humanitarian response in 2024..."
Source/publisher:
UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (New York) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of publication:
2023-01-25
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-25
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
UN System humanitarian assistance, Agricultural Economics, Food Security and nutrition in Burma/Myanmar, Public Health, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
9.55 MB (Original version) -149 pages
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Description:
"KEY HIGHLIGHTS:
103,524 people received core relief items comprising kitchen sets, blankets and sleeping mats, ensuring their basic needs were met.
37,773 people received shelter support for safe and dignified living conditions while in displacement.
3,643 people with specific needs benefited from cash assistance to meet their basic needs.....
POPULATION OF CONCERN:
600,000 Estimated Rohingya in Rakhine State, of which some 152,000 are living in displacement camps as well as among the host community since 2012.
1.5 M Internally displaced people (IDP) living in Rakhine, Chin, Kachin, Shan, Kayin and Mon States, and Bago (East), Tanintharyi, Sagaing and Magway Regions (as of 26 December 2022). An estimated 1,175,300 people are displaced due to the resumption and intensification of clashes between the Tatmadaw and ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) and/or People’s Defense Forces (PDF) after 1 February 2021. Some 99,588 people remain displaced in Rakhine and Chin States following the Arakan Army/Tatmadaw conflict (as of 19 December 2022).
Source/publisher:
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (Geneva) via Reliefweb (New York)
Date of publication:
2023-01-25
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-25
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
UNHCR (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees), Public Health, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Format :
pdf
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923.02 KB
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Sub-title:
Fortify Rights and 16 individual complainants seek accountability for Rohingya genocide and coup-related atrocities
Description:
"Fortify Rights and 16 individual complainants from Myanmar filed a criminal complaint with the Federal Public Prosecutor General of Germany under the principle of universal jurisdiction against senior Myanmar military generals and others for genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, Fortify Rights announced today.
The 215-page complaint and more than 1,000 pages of annexes provide evidence to assist the Office of the Federal Prosecutor to investigate and prosecute those responsible for the Rohingya genocide as well as atrocity crimes related to the military junta’s coup d’état launched on February 1, 2021.
February 1, 2023 marks the second anniversary of the deadly coup and crackdown in Myanmar, and August 2022 marked five years since the Myanmar military’s most egregious attacks on the Rohingya people. However, the individuals responsible for crimes related to both have yet to be held accountable.
“An ethnically diverse and united front of survivors from throughout Myanmar are bringing this case to seek justice and accountability,” said Matthew Smith, Chief Executive Officer and co-founder at Fortify Rights. “Despite international attention and several ongoing accountability initiatives, the Myanmar military still enjoys complete impunity, and that must end. These crimes cannot go unpunished. Germany’s universal jurisdiction law is a global model for combatting impunity for the worst crimes and providing access to justice for survivors of atrocities no matter where the crimes occur or where the survivors are located.”
Universal jurisdiction is a legal principle enabling a state to prosecute individuals responsible for mass atrocity crimes—genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes—regardless of where the crimes occurred or the nationality of the perpetrator or victims. Universal jurisdiction is typically reserved for “international crimes,” which are so severe that they represent offenses against the entire international community.
The criminal complaint was filed on January 20, 2023. Fortify Rights is represented by Covington & Burling LLP, which has offices in Germany.
Approximately half of the 16 individual complainants survived the Rohingya genocide and Myanmar military-led “clearance operations” in Rakhine State in 2016 and 2017, and approximately half survived post-coup atrocities in states and regions throughout the country in 2021 and 2022.
The complainants include six women and ten men who represent several ethnicities in Myanmar, including Arakanese (Rakhine), Burman, Chin, Karen, Karenni, Mon, and Rohingya. They include students, scholars, farmers, human rights defenders, businesspersons, former village heads, and homemakers. All the complainants survived or witnessed crimes in Myanmar, and many have since fled the country. At the time of writing, the complainants are located in several countries, including Myanmar, Bangladesh, India, Malaysia, Germany, and the U.S.
Two of the complainants—“M.K.” (not their real initials) and Nickey Diamond—are presently situated in Germany and have retained German legal counsel for matters related to the complaint announced today. They both experienced and witnessed crimes in Myanmar in 2017 and 2021, respectively.
“We trust in Germany to open an investigation and seek justice for genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes committed by the military and its leaders in Myanmar,” said Nickey Diamond, who is also a member of the Board of Directors at Fortify Rights. “This is the time to end impunity and ensure the military perpetrators and others no longer get away with their crimes.”
“F.K.” (not her real initials) is a 51-year-old Rohingya woman complainant who survived genocidal attacks in Rakhine State in 2017. In August 2017, soldiers and non-Rohingya residents of Rakhine State entered her village in northern Rakhine State, burned houses, and prevented residents of the village from fleeing. Individuals under the military’s control raped F.K.’s daughter-in-law while F.K. was in earshot and as soldiers beat her in an adjacent room. The Myanmar military killed seven members of her family in the attack on her village and, in a separate incident, cut her with a knife, leaving permanent scars. F.K. witnessed piles of dead bodies of Rohingya civilians in her village and military soldiers stabbing, beating, and killing numerous Rohingya men and children. Soldiers killed one child as he begged them for drinking water.
F.K. told Fortify Rights: “The Myanmar government and military have been trying to vanish our Rohingya community for 50 years. . . As a Rohingya woman, I want justice for the genocide so that it does not happen again. As a Rohingya complainant, I am ready to file the UJ [universal jurisdiction] case.”
The complaint announced today alleges that the Myanmar military systematically killed, raped, tortured, imprisoned, disappeared, persecuted, and committed other acts that amount to genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes in violation of the German Code of Crimes Against International Law. The complaint includes substantial evidence showing that senior military junta officials exercised superior responsibility over subordinates who committed crimes, knew about their subordinates’ crimes, and failed to take any action to prevent the crimes from happening and to punish the perpetrators.
The complaint is on file with the German authorities and is not publicly available.
In the complaint, Fortify Rights and the complainants request that the German Prosecutor open an investigation into specific military officials and others who, according to evidence, are liable for mass atrocity crimes. The complaint also requests that the German authorities open a “structural investigation” into the situation in Myanmar, which would uncover numerous other crimes in various locations and affecting other ethnic groups not otherwise covered by the complaint.
Thi Da, one of the complainants, is a 35-year-old ethnic-Chin woman and mother of three. In September 2021, the Myanmar military arbitrarily arrested and tortured her husband, Ngai Kung, 35. Following his arrest, Thi Da received no official information about her husband’s whereabouts and well-being, rendering it an enforced disappearance. Myanmar junta soldiers reportedly informed a group of pastors that her husband was killed. At the time of writing, Thi Da does not know what happened to him.
“I’m still angry with the [Myanmar junta] soldiers,” said Thi Da to Fortify Rights. “They don’t think of us as people and treat us like animals or objects.”
In addition to the complainants’ testimonies to the Prosecutor General, the complaint draws on more than 1,000 interviews with survivors of international crimes in Myanmar conducted by Fortify Rights since 2013 as well as leaked documents and information provided by Myanmar military and police deserters and others that shed light on the military’s operations, crimes, and command structures.
More than 1,000 pages of annexes accompany the complaint and include additional documentation of atrocity crimes in Myanmar that may be of service to the German authorities, including revelatory reports by Fortify Rights, U.N. Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar Tom Andrews, the U.N. Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar, and others.
An investigation and subsequent prosecution of these crimes under German law would serve to punish those who have committed the gravest of crimes, prevent future crimes by perpetrators in Myanmar, and signal to other would-be perpetrators in Myanmar and elsewhere that accountability for atrocity crimes cannot be avoided, said Fortify Rights.
As part of this complaint, several Myanmar civil society organizations agreed to cooperate with the German authorities, including the Chin Human Rights Organization, the Karen Human Rights Group, the Karenni Human Rights Group, the Human Rights Foundation of Monland, the Burmese Rohingya Organization U.K, and an organized network of Myanmar lawyers working throughout the country.
Similarly, as part of this complaint, prominent human rights defenders from Myanmar and several senior U.N. officials, diplomats, and others have agreed to be resource persons for the German prosecutor in this case. They include U.N. Special Rapporteur Tom Andrews; former U.N. special rapporteurs Tomas Quintana and Yanghee Lee; former Dutch Ambassador Laetitia van den Assum; former Thai Ambassador Kobsak Chutikul; members of the U.N. Fact-Finding Mission Marzuki Darusman and Chris Sidoti; President of Robert F. Kennedy Human Rights Kerry Kennedy; and others.
An investigation and subsequent prosecutions in Germany of the atrocity crimes detailed in the complaint would not duplicate other international accountability efforts underway but would only add to the mounting evidence about the Myanmar military’s crimes, said Fortify Rights. Other efforts include an investigation by the International Criminal Court (ICC), a genocide case at the International Court of Justice (ICJ), and a universal jurisdiction case in Argentina for crimes related to the Rohingya genocide.
Specifically, in 2019, the ICC authorized an investigation into crimes perpetrated by Myanmar authorities against Rohingya where at least part of the crime was committed on the territory of Bangladesh or another State under ICC jurisdiction. At present, the ICC cannot investigate and prosecute any international crime completed entirely in Myanmar, and thus the investigation would not encompass the vast majority of the crimes against Rohingya alleged in the complaint. The ICC is also not investigating crimes against humanity or war crimes that occurred in the aftermath of the February 2021 coup d’état.
In 2019, the Republic of The Gambia brought a case against Myanmar at the ICJ in The Hague, alleging Myanmar is responsible for genocide against the Rohingya people. While it is a critically important case, the ICJ proceeding concerns only State responsibility for Myanmar’s violation of its obligations under the Genocide Convention. The ICJ does not hold individuals criminally accountable, and no individuals will face repercussions through that court for crimes uncovered in that proceeding.
Also in 2019, Rohingya human rights defender Maung Tun Khin of the Burmese Rohingya Organization U.K. (BROUK) and six Rohingya women survivors filed a petition urging an Argentinian court to investigate, under universal jurisdiction, crimes committed with impunity against Rohingya in Myanmar. That judicial investigation is ongoing; however, while critically important, the case in the Argentinian courts currently focuses only on a specific region and does not address war crimes or the conduct surrounding the attacks against Rohingya in 2016 and 2017 or crimes against humanity in connection with the coup d’état. Moreover, unlike German law, Argentine law does not prescribe a punishment for the crime of genocide, so there is no applicable penalty for the offense. Rather, a perpetrator can be convicted in Argentina in the context of genocide but would be punished for “ordinary” crimes committed, such as homicide, rape, or unlawful detention. Maung Tun Khin and BROUK have agreed to cooperate with German authorities on the complaint submitted by Fortify Rights and others.
The German authorities are well-placed to fill present gaps left by the currently pending accountability mechanisms, said Fortify Rights.
In 2019, Fortify Rights began exploring international legal options for survivors in Myanmar to pursue criminal prosecutions under universal jurisdiction. The organization researched and analyzed the feasibility of 16 jurisdictions in Europe, Africa, and South America that provide access to justice for atrocity crimes committed outside their national borders, ultimately deciding to file the complaint in Germany.
Under German law, the Prosecutor has the ultimate discretion to bring a case under universal jurisdiction. The Prosecutor should do so in particular when important witnesses to atrocities are present in Germany, which is the case regarding the complaint announced today.
German prosecutors are currently conducting more than 100 investigations into international crimes related to other countries and contexts. The Prosecutor General has also undertaken numerous structural investigations into atrocity crimes, which have led to several trials. German courts have heard cases dealing with torture in Syrian prisons as well as crimes by members of Da’esh, including against the Yazidi community.
In March 2022, the German Prosecutor opened a structural investigation into Russian war crimes in Ukraine.
In a statement to the United Nations on October 22, 2022, the Permanent Mission of Germany to the U.N. stated:
While we would prefer to have the most serious crimes under international law tried by international tribunals, in particular the ICC if the applicable complementarity criteria are met, the Code of Crimes against International Law allows us to work towards accountability for these crimes on a national level . . . The message is clear: those who commit atrocities cannot feel safe. They will eventually be held accountable. There is no safe haven for perpetrators of international crimes against criminal prosecution in Germany. Justice will be served for the victims and survivors.
Investigations by German authorities into international crimes can also potentially be used in prosecutions in venues and jurisdictions outside Germany.
“Germany is in a unique position to help thwart impunity in Myanmar,” said Matthew Smith. “Fortify Rights and the individual complainants are poised and ready to assist German prosecutors. An investigation now will help ensure that those responsible for these heinous crimes are held to account and punished, whether in Germany or elsewhere.”
Excerpts from select complainants’ statements to the German authorities:
[T]he military found where we were hiding and started firing at us. My mother told me to run away to save my life, so I jumped into the river . . . I saw bullets coming like drops of rain . . . When I realized I lost my family, I felt totally broken inside. My village was burned before my eyes. There is not a single home left. I lost everything.
—Statement of Rohingya Complainant “J.H.” (not actual initials)
[The military] surrounded the village . . . [and] began tying people up. At one point, I recall that the military entered the downstairs of the house [where we were hiding] and shot a seven- or eight-year-old boy in the kitchen. His brain spread across the floor . . . The soldiers then tried grabbing me . . . I fell and became unconscious. After I became unconscious, I did not know where my baby had been taken . . . I kept screaming for my baby child.
—Statement of Rohingya Complainant “S.B.” (not actual initials)
After the coup occurred, . . . I was told [by my contacts in the Ministry of Home Affairs] that if I was captured, I would most likely be tortured and/or killed. Around March 10, 2021, I and my family escaped . . . We often were forced to dig our own bomb shelters to avoid the threat of airstrikes of our entirely civilian encampments, as other such civilian areas were constantly being targeted by the Tatmadaw.
—Statement of Myanmar coup Complainant Nickey Diamond
In the days following the military coup, the police arrested people who helped the protestors. My friend was arrested for giving water to the protesters. Because I gave them [the protestors] shelter, I knew that I would be arrested. When Muslims are arrested, they are often killed or disappeared. I am a huge target for the military because of my human rights work, identity as a Rohingya Muslim, and my political views. I believed that I would be killed if I was arrested . . . I have feared for my life since the coup..."
Source/publisher:
"Fortify Rights"
Date of publication:
2023-01-24
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-24
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity, Ethnic Cleansing
Language:
Format :
pdf pdf
Size:
290.8 KB 179.1 KB
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Sub-title:
Call for Sanctions on Aviation Fuel to Save the Lives of Myanmar People
Description:
"The military junta is continuing to conduct airstrikes against civilians throughout Myanmar.
Hundreds of people have been killed in these airstrikes. Pilots and commanders are targeting
schools and hospitals in offensive and unwarranted actions that constitute clear war crimes and
amount to crimes against humanity.
In its Resolution 2669 of December 2022, the United Nations Security Council expressed its deep
concern at "violent attacks undertaken by the vicious junta against civilians and civilian
infrastructure, including educational, health and energy infrastructure and facilities, and attacks on
businesses and public properties." The Council demanded “an immediate end to all forms of
violence."
We welcome the Resolution.
The National Unity Government, on behalf of the people of Myanmar, now calls for immediate and
effective sectoral sanctions on aviation fuel to halt the supply of aviation fuel to the military. This
is an urgent and necessary step that potentially will save thousands of lives.
Members of the Security Council and international sanctions regimes must act decisively to halt this trade
in aviation fuel, for the sake of Myanmar and its people.
The Myanmar military must be cut off from the resources which enable their bloody atrocities against their
own people..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Myanmar - NUG
Date of publication:
2023-01-23
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-23
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
26.13 KB
Local URL:
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Sub-title:
Cognyte’s technology has allegedly helped the junta target rebel groups and civilians.
Description:
"Human rights groups are criticizing a reported deal between Myanmar’s military and an Israeli tech firm for intercept spyware, accusing the company of aiding and abetting the junta in crimes against humanity.
Israel’s Cognyte Software won a tender to sell the intercept spyware to Myanmar shortly before the February 2021 coup, when the military ousted the democratically elected government, documents obtained by activist group Justice for Myanmar showed.
Intercept spyware allows governments to listen to telephone calls, read text messages and emails, and determine the whereabouts of internet users without having to go through internet and telecommunications companies.
These documents, which detailed the Myanmar military’s plan to install “lawful interception” tools on telecommunications networks, were the basis of a legal complaint in Israel, and a letter associated with the documents called for the country to ban Cognyte’s marketing and export license.
“The term ‘lawful interception’ creates a false impression of normalcy that obscures the fact that Israelis are once again aiding and abetting crimes against humanity,” Israeli human rights leader Eitay Mack, who led the effort to file the complaint.
Such a deal would violate a 2017 ban imposed by Israel's Supreme Court on defense transfers to Myanmar, the campaign for which was also headed by Mack.
Used to violate human rights
Rights groups, observers, and the shadow National Unity Government say that the junta has been using the technology to violate its citizens’ human rights.
“We can say that Israel is one of the top countries in surveillance tech. That’s why the technical support that the Myanmar military received from [Cognyte] must be really sophisticated and effective,” Kyaw Saw Han, a security analyst, told Radio Free Asia’s Burmese Service.
He said the intercept spyware will have a negative impact on civilians by further depriving them of their freedom to communicate. The junta has already imposed draconian restrictions on the internet in some parts of the country, and has blocked access to Facebook.
With the spyware, the military could listen in on people’s private conversations or even record them, Kyaw Saw Han said.
“It will especially hurt the resistance forces that are operating in this political situation,” he said, referring to armed groups opposed to the junta, many of which sprung up after the coup.
Rebel groups believe they have been compromised by the intercept technology, although they don’t have proof, Khun Daniel of the Karenni National Progressive Party told RFA.
“Their ground activities, food transportation and guerrilla operations have been hindered and many members have been arrested because of the information insecurity caused by the military’s use of such equipment,” he said.
But the technology empowers the junta not only against armed enemies. It can also use the tech against civilians, said Yadanar Maung, a Justice for Myanmar spokesperson.
Call for Israeli government to take action
He said the military can eavesdrop and intercept the phone calls of political activists, journalists and civilians that can lead to arrests, torture and even killings.
That is why Justice for Myanmar has requested that the Israeli government take action against those responsible for the reported deal between Cognyte and the military.
“If a company provides equipment to assist an organization in aggressively and cruelly torture and kill innocent civilians, or if such support is found, they are also partially complicit in these crimes, according to legal and literal point of view,” Sai Kyi Zin Soe, a political analyst, told RFA.
But Thein Tun Oo, the executive director of the Thayninga Institute for Strategic Studies, which is made up of former military officers, told RFA that the technology is very effective in helping them with “counter-terrorism threats” – addressing security threats to the military and government leaders.
“It is no longer uncommon to violate and eavesdrop on the personal information of individuals. There have been many cases when we can prevent certain security-related threats just by such interception,” he said. “If this system can actually run at full power, it would be very beneficial.”
Thein Tun Oo said that although human rights groups are urging countries to impose an arms embargo against Myanmar, it will not be effective because large international arms companies tend to prioritize their economic interests.
RFA attempted to contact Cognyte and a spokesperson for the junta for comment on Friday, but received no reply as of Monday.
13 countries fingered, including US
According to a Jan. 16 report by the Special Advisory Council for Myanmar, a group of independent experts working to support human rights efforts in the country, the Myanmar military is using weapons technologies and raw materials for producing weapons from companies in 13 countries including the United States, France, Australia, Japan, Germany, India, Singapore, China and Ukraine.
Kyaw Zaw, the spokesman for the president’s office of the shadow National Unity Government, told RFA that the world must stop providing the junta with military tools.
“The NUG government wants to request that governments, including Israel, order an injunction to prevent any equipment, whether it's non-weapons technology, or communication technology or any technology that supports violence, from being sold to the Myanmar military, because it is committing inhumane violence in Myanmar.”
He said that the United Nations and the international community need to sanction companies that cooperate with the Myanmar military junta.
Although the UN Security Council passed a resolution on the crisis in Myanmar on Dec. 21, the decision does not yet include a ban on arms sales to the Myanmar military. Russia and China–key suppliers of weaponry to the junta–would have veto power over such a proposal.
Yanghee Lee, a member of the Special Advisory Council for Myanmar, said “Foreign companies are enabling Myanmar’s military to produce weapons it uses to commit daily rights atrocities against the Myanmar people.”
In order to protect the people of Myanmar, the council in its report urged UN member countries to block the support that the Myanmar military receives, including taking targeted action against arms dealers and those responsible for supplying weapons factories..."
Source/publisher:
"RFA" (USA)
Date of publication:
2023-01-23
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-23
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
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Sub-title:
မြန်မာပြည်သူများ၏ အသက်အိုးအိမ်များကို ကာကွယ်နိုင်ရေးအတွက် လေယာဥ်ဆီများ ကန့်သတ်ပိတ်ဆို့အရေးယူနိုင်ရန် တောင်းဆိုမှု
Description:
"အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စုသည် ပြည်သူများအား ဦးတည်ချက်ထားသည့် လေကြောင်းတိုက်ခိုက်မှုများကို မြန်မာပြည်အနှံ့ အပြားတွင် ကျူးလွန်လျက်ရှိပါသည်။ စစ်လေယာဥ်မှူးများနှင့် ၎င်းတို့ကို ညွှန်ကြားစေခိုင်းသည့်စစ်အရာရှိများသည်စာသင်ကျောင်းများနှင့် ဆေးရုံများကို ဦးတည်ချက်ထား ရမ်းကားပြီးကြောင်းကျိုးဆီလျော်မှုမရှိသည့်တိုက်ခိုက်မှုများကိုကျူးလွန်နေခြင်းသည်သိသာထင်ရှားသောစစ်ရာဇဝတ်မှုများနှင့်လူသားမျိုးနွယ်စုအပေါ်ကျူးလွန်နေသည့် ရာဇဝတ်မှုများ ဖြစ်ပါသည်။
ကုလသမဂ္ဂလုံခြုံရေးကောင်စီ ၏ ၂၀၂၂ ခုနှစ် ဒီဇင်ဘာတွင် ထုတ်ပြန်ခဲ့သည့် ဆုံးဖြတ်ချက် အမှတ် (၂၆၆၉) တွင် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စု အနေဖြင့် ပြည်သူလူထု နှင့် ပြည်သူပိုင် အဆောက်အအုံများ (ပညာရေး၊ကျန်းမာရေး၊လျှပ်စစ်ဓာတ်အားဖြန့်ချိရေးဆိုင်ရာ အဆောက်အအုံများ နှင့် ဆက်စပ် အဆောက် အအုံများ)နှင့်စီးပွားရေးနှင့်အများပြည်သူပိုင် အဆောက် အအုံများ အပေါ်တွင် ကျူးလွန် လျက်ရှိ သည့် အကြမ်းဖက်တိုက်ခိုက်မှုများအားအထူးစိုးရိမ်မိကြောင်း ဖော်ပြထားပါသည်။ အဆိုပါ အကြမ်းဖက်မှုနည်းလမ်းပေါင်းစုံကိုလည်း ချက်ခြင်းရပ်တန့်ရန် တောင်းဆိုထားပါသည်။
မိမိတို့ အနေနှင့် အဆိုပါဆုံးဖြတ်ချက်အား ကြိုဆိုပါသည်။
စစ်အုပ်စု၏ စစ်လေယာဥ်ဆီများဝယ်ယူရရှိနေခြင်းကို တားဆီးပိတ်ပင်နိုင်ရေးအတွက် ထိရောက်မှုရှိသော အရေးယူပိတ်ဆို့မှုများ ပြုလုပ်ပေးပါရန် အမျိုးသား ညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရမှ မြန်မာပြည်သူများကိုယ်စား တောင်းဆိုအပ်ပါသည်။ အဆိုပါအရေးယူမှုသည် မြန်မာပြည်သူလူထု၏ ထောင်ပေါင်းများစွာသော အသက်အိုးအိမ်စည်းစိမ်ကို ကာကွယ်ပေးနိုင်လိမ့်မည် ဖြစ်ပါသည်။
စစ်အုပ်စု၏ လေယာဥ်ဆီများ ဝယ်ယူရရှိနေမှုကို ထိထိရောက်ရောက်တားဆီး ပိတ်ပင်မှုများ ပြုလုပ်ရေး အား ကုလသမဂ္ဂ လုံခြုံရေးကောင်စီအဖွဲ့ဝင် နိုင်ငံများနှင့် နိုင်ငံတကာ ပိတ်ဆို့အရေးယူရေးအဖွဲ့များ အနေဖြင့် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံနှင့် မြန်မာပြည်သူလူထု အတွက် မဖြစ်မနေ ဆောင်ရွက်ပေးသင့်ပါသည်။
အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စု ၏ ပြည်သူလူထုအပေါ် သွေးချောင်းစီးသည့် အကြမ်းဖက်လုပ်ရက်များကို ဆက်လက် လုပ်ဆောင်နိုင်နေစေသည့် အရင်းအမြစ်များအား မဖြစ်မနေ ဖြတ်တောက် အရေးယူရမည် ဖြစ်ပါ သည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Myanmar - NUG
Date of publication:
2023-01-23
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-23
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Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Human Rights and international relations
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"The Special Advisory Council for Myanmar (SAC-M) – composed of former UN officials – released a 76-page report on 16 January 2023, entitled “Fatal Business: Supplying the Myanmar Military’s Weapon Production.” The report highlights that at least 13 countries in the European Union, Asia, and North America have been found to be providing support for the production of armaments by the Myanmar military council, which has been perpetrating brutal human rights abuses in Myanmar.
This issue of Burma News International (BNI) – Myanmar Peace Monitor (MPM) Weekly News Review looks at the SAC-M report and other points to ponder..."
Source/publisher:
Myanmar Peace Monitor
Date of publication:
2023-01-21
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-21
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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"Three decades on from the nationwide uprising in Myanmar in 1988, the country has been shaken by another whirlwind of contention against military rule. Yet this time it has widened into a revolutionary uproar, which has not abated since the army seized control — again — in February 2021.
Almost two years after General Min Aung Hlaing’s coup d’état shut down a decade of democratic experiments, the opposition to, and resentment against, the new junta is yet to dwindle away. The peaceful — even joyful — popular protests that filled Myanmar’s urban and rural areas after the army seized government in early 2021 were quickly superseded by armed resistance against the new military government. In stark contrast with the aftermath of the 1988 coup, the resistance has withstood some of the most ruthless counterinsurgency operations ever conducted by the military, especially over the course of 2022.
The People’s Defence Forces (PDF) and local resistance groups have mushroomed and effectively engaged in guerrilla warfare up to the point of achieving a dominant position in critical areas during 2022 — in particular in the Sagaing and Magwe regions, as well as in the Chin and Kayah States. Long-standing insurgent groups such as the Kachin Independence Organisation and the Karen National Union have trained and equipped many groups in a coordinated mobilisation effort against the armed forces unseen even back in 1988.
Small flash mob rallies against the regime continue to be held on an almost daily basis in villages across the country and boycotting military-owned businesses remains a popular tool of protest. Defying the military government for the past two years, politicians lawfully elected in 2020, social activists, students and ethnic leaders have gathered around the National Unity Government (NUG) and relentlessly pushed for its international recognition. They have not yet had much success.
But small, if symbolic, victories have recently been won. At the United Nations Ambassador Kyaw Moe Tun — who was appointed by former state counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi’s government — is still holding Myanmar’s seat two years after Min Aung Hlaing’s junta sought to remove him.
In December 2022, the UN Security Council adopted its first ever resolution on Myanmar, expressing deep concerns about the ongoing violence and state of emergency. Although it was non-binding, the resolution urged for the release of political prisoners, including Aung San Suu Kyi, who was recently sentenced by a farcical court to 33 years in prison. Strikingly, neither China nor Russia vetoed the UN initiative.
In the same month, the US House of Representatives passed new legislation allowing for non-lethal American assistance to be delivered to the NUG and other resistance groups in Myanmar. ASEAN has also proved much less accommodating towards the new junta, in stark comparison with the regional organisation’s cosy relationship with Than Shwe’s regime in the 1990s and 2000s. Several leaders in the region have already expressed scepticism about the upcoming general elections planned by Min Aung Hlaing’s government.
Yet there is still little to celebrate two years after the coup. Frustration, if not outrage, at the lack of commitment by the outside world is palpable. In light of what a Western-led coalition has offered Ukraine to defeat Russia’s assault since February 2022, activists from Myanmar have called for similar aid. The anti-junta movement has met with plenty of sympathy worldwide but with little material support apart from the backing of various diasporic communities.
Myanmar’s national economy, already battered in 2020 and 2021 by the COVID-19 pandemic, is now in disarray. Alongside Iran and North Korea, Myanmar is unenviably under international financial watch, because it is blacklisted by the influential watchdog Financial Action Task Force.
People across the country and its borderlands have returned to the informal economy and family networks for survival, while the underground and criminal worlds have blossomed. In the context of a brutal repression unabated since the coup, hundreds of thousands of young people have also sought refuge and fortune across Myanmar’s borders as a means to send money back home to their parents.
There has been an unprecedented desire for unity and change among young people and grassroots organisations since the 2021 coup. Social activists, aspiring politicians and students from sexual and ethnic minorities have mobilised in a gripping collective action grounded on common goals of equality, federalism and a future without men in uniforms running the show. This is where the battle lies.
But not everything is as thrilling as a revolutionary call. Cynicism runs deep within a fractured society at war with its soldiers for so many decades. Factional infighting within and between resistance forces, clashes over tactics and duelling visions of democracy remain salient features of anti-coup politics.
What comes next is unclear. There is no indication that the country may quickly move either away from junta rule through a swift military victory of resistance forces, or towards another version of a functioning electoral authoritarian regime guarded by a besieged military.
Across Myanmar’s postcolonial history, its people, whether farmers, students or civil servants, have grown up through cycles of repression and protests. They will, no doubt, continue to rise up in anger and hope in coming months, buoyed by the energy and moral power of legitimate protests against authoritarian rule. They will also, echoing the two decades of advocacy which followed the 1988 coup, continue to voice their impatience, if not discontent, with a dithering outside world.
Renaud Egreteau is Associate Professor with the Department of Public and International Affairs at City University of Hong Kong. He recently authored Crafting Parliament in Myanmar’s Disciplined Democracy, 2011-2021 (Oxford University Press, 2022)..."
Source/publisher:
"East Asia Forum" (Australia)
Date of publication:
2023-01-20
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-20
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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Description:
"20 December 2022: In Pathein town, township and district, Ayeyarwady region, the junta court handed 15 year imprisonment to a male medical doctor with the charges under Counter Terrorism Laws. He was a station medical officer at the primary-level, public station hospital in Hlay Gyi Tet village and village tract, Thabaung township, Pathein district before being arrested in 2021.
Sources: Facebook and Myanma Platform
28 December 2022: In Insein town and township, Yangon district, Yangon region, the junta court in prison handed three-year imprisonment to a male aid worker from the LNGO Nurture AIDS Centre (NAC) for one of the three charges filed against him under Counter Terrorism Laws and Money Laundering Eradication Law. The NAC was founded by the National League of Democracy political party. Sources: Khit Thit Media and Radio Free Asia
29 December 2022: In Mon state, the state health department issued a memo forbidding private clinics and hospitals from employing health workers who were under the charges and/or who were not holding valid and current licences. This act was understood to aim at health workers affiliated with the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM). The news attached the memo for Mon state but it was believed that this rule had been reinforced in all states and regions. The Myanmar military inspected private hospitals in Mawlamyine town, township and district, Mon state whether CDM-affiliated health care workers were employed. Sources: Delta News Agency and Khit Thit Media
30 December 2022: In Kyi village and village tract, Tabayin township, Shwebo district, Sagaing region, an ambulance and around 500 houses were set on fire by the Myanmar military. Source:
Ayeyarwaddy Times
31 December 2022: In Mahaaungmyay and Chanayethazan townships, Mandalay city and region, it was confirmed that five private hospitals forced to close down by the Myanmar military on 27 December were no longer functioning. Many patients forced to leave from the affected hospitals lacked access to health care since the remaining public and private hospitals did not have the capacity to admit them. Sources: Eleven Media and Mandalay Free Press
31 December 2022: A leaked document of the military junta listed nine medical doctors to be abducted as the result of the interrogation of the male urologist abducted on 25 December 2022.
The nine doctors on the hunt were 30 to 45 years old, four of them were urologists, and five were assistant surgeons. They were affiliated with the CDM and were working at the private hospitals in Mandalay city. Sources: Khit Thit Media and Mandalay Free Press
01 January 2023: On Chaung Taung bridge, near Chaung Taung village and village tract, Ye township and district, Mon state, a female midwife and another female civilian were shot and injured. The reports varied, with some outlets suggesting they were accidentally shot by junta police and others that the attacks were intentional due to the victims’ refusal to abide by the local by-laws. Sources: Ayeyarwaddy Times and Democratic Voice of Burma
04 January 2023: In the prison in Myeik town, township and district, Tanintharyi region, the Myanmar military regime rearrested a male doctor despite being pardoned on that day. He was arrested on 09 April 2021 and handed a three-year imprisonment on charges of allegedly causing fear and spreading false news. Sources: Chindwin News Agency, Democratic Voice of Burma, and Mizzima
Reported on 04 January 2023: In Hpa-An town, township and district, Kayin state, the Military Hospital, under the Directorate of Medical Services, stopped offering treatment to civilians following armed clashes between the Myanmar military and the joint forces of the Karen National Liberation Army and local resistance forces which started on 31 December 2022. Source: Karen Information Centre
05 January 2023: In Kyain Seikgyi town, township and district, Kayin state, the Myanmar military occupied the township hospital after forcing dozens of patients to immediately leave the building..
This event took place following the armed clashes between the Myanmar military and the joint forces of the Karen National Liberation Army and local resistance forces which started on 31 December 2022 and was heightened on 04 January 2023. Source: Democratic Voice of Burma 06 January 2023: In Kutkai town and township, Muse district, Shan state, the Myanmar military inspected private clinics and arrested a CDM–affiliated health worker who worked at a rural health centre. Source: Democratic Voice of Burma
07 January 2023: In Ler Htoo Poe area, Me Tu village tract, Dwelo township, Mutraw district Kayin state, a local clinic and seven houses were damaged by bombs dropped by the Myanmar military air forces. Sources: Facebook and Delta News Agency Reported on 07 January 2023: Update: In Taung Lay Lone village and village tract, Taunggyi township and district, Shan state, the junta court handed a ten year imprisonment to a male aid worker in January for allegedly supporting local resistance forces. He was the leader of the LNGO Blood Donor Association and was arrested on 10 October 2022. Source: Mekong News
08 January 2023: Seven national and local networks of CDM–affiliated health workers in Myanmar issued a joint statement warning the health workers who were not affiliated with the CDM to stop providing information of the former groups to the junta; and if the health workers working for the junta ignored the warning, actions would be taken. Source: CDM Medical Network
09 January 2023: In Pale town and township, Yinmabin district, Sagaing region, the local resistance forces allegedly arrested a 33 year old female nurse, her husband, and her eight-year-old daughter from the township hospital, using them as human shields while retreating from the armed clashes. This event took place after the armed clashes between the local resistance forces and the Myanmar military in Pale town. Sources: Facebook and Telegram
Reported on 10 January 2023: In Mandalay city, Mandalay region, many CDM–affiliated health workers do not have access to health care since neither public nor private hospitals offer treatment to them in fear of the military junta. Source: Mandalay Free Press
10 January 2023: In Chanayethazan and Mahaaungmyay townships, Mandalay city and region, the Myanmar military raided two private hospitals, inspected whether any CDM–affiliated health workers had been employed, and arrested the owners of the Duwun Specialist Clinic and Diagnostic Centre, and Kyal Sin Lin Hospital for allegedly employing CDM health workers. Duwun Hospital continued services despite the arrest. Patients at Kyal Sin Lin Hospital were forced to leave no later than 11 January, and the hospital had to be closed down; however, the hospital had not been sealed or confiscated yet. The owner of Kyal Sin Lin Hospital was previously arrested in September 2022. Sources: Mandalay Free Press, Mekong News and Myanmar Now..."
Source/publisher:
Insecurity Insight (Geneva) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of publication:
2023-01-19
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-19
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Individual Documents
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473.34 KB
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Sub-title:
Call on Myanmar’s neighbours to block the illegal military junta’s use of their airspace for its atrocity operations
Description:
"1. On 10th and 11th January 2023, illegal military junta fighter jets bombarded Camp Victoria,
which serves as the headquarters of the Chin National Front (CNF) on the India-Myanmar
border. A number of civilians were reportedly killed and injured in the aerial attack, and
civilian infrastructure, including three homes and a local hospital, were destroyed.
2. According to Chin National Front sources, the junta jets entered Indian airspace during the
course of the attack. Other sources on the ground reported that some junta bombs hit Indian
territory.
3. This is not the first time that the illegal military junta has used the airspace of its neighbours
during its atrocity operations, with Bangladesh and Thailand earlier examples. Nor is it the
first time that junta bombs have struck foreign soil during such air raids.
4. The National Unity Government therefore calls on Myanmar’s neighbours, in the interests
of regional peace and security and the protection of civilians, to block the illegal military
junta's use of their airspace for its aerial attacks.
5. This is consistent with the United Nations Security Council’s condemnation of attacks
against civilians and civilian infrastructure in its resolution 2669, its demand for an
immediate end to all forms of violence, and its urging of restraint and de-escalation..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Myanmar - NUG
Date of publication:
2023-01-17
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-17
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Human Rights and international relations
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20.76 KB
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"This is a summary of what was said by UNHCR spokesperson Shabia Mantoo – to whom quoted text may be attributed – at today's press briefing at the Palais des Nations in Geneva.
More than 3,500 desperate Rohingya attempted deadly sea crossings in 39 boats in the Andaman Sea and the Bay of Bengal in 2022, according to the latest data from UNHCR, the UN Refugee Agency. This represents a 360 per cent increase on the year before when some 700 people made similar journeys.
In the absence of a comprehensive regional response to address these perilous maritime movements, UNHCR warns that more people will die on the high seas, under the watch of many coastal States.
UNHCR has recorded an alarming rise in the death toll. At least 348 individuals died or went missing at sea in 2022, making it one of the deadliest years since 2014.
Some 3,040 individuals who undertook the sea journey disembarked in 2022, primarily in Myanmar, Malaysia, Indonesia and Bangladesh. Nearly 45 per cent of those who disembarked were women and children.
In the last two months of 2022, four boats carrying over 450 Rohingya disembarked in Aceh, Indonesia. One boat carrying over 100 Rohingya disembarked in Sri Lanka. One boat is feared to have sunk in early December with approximately 180 individuals on board. Several boats that departed in December remained at sea as of the end of the year.
Calls by UNHCR to maritime authorities in the region to rescue and disembark people in distress have gone unheeded with many boats adrift for weeks.
Most boats departed from Myanmar and Bangladesh, highlighting the growing sense of desperation amongst Rohingya in those two countries. Those who have disembarked report that they undertook these dangerous sea journeys in an effort to find protection, security, family reunification, and livelihoods in other countries. Among them are victims of trafficking, unaccompanied and separated children, and survivors of sexual- and gender-based violence.
The current crisis in the Bay of Bengal and the Andaman Sea is a crisis of solidarity. The Bali Process, a forum for policy dialogue, information sharing and cooperation to address people smuggling, human trafficking and related transnational crime, will hold its 8th Ministerial meeting in February. UNHCR repeats its call for prompt search and rescue and timely disembarkation in a place of safety, and for support to countries where Rohingya refugees are disembarked. We call on countries to redouble efforts to prevent human smuggling and trafficking.
There is also a need for humanitarian responsibility to be more evenly distributed among countries in the region to ensure protection responses are predictable, equitable, and sustainable.
The region and the international community need to support efforts to address the root causes of displacement in Myanmar. Until these are resolved, refugees will continue to undertake dangerous journeys in search of safety..."
Source/publisher:
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (Geneva)
Date of publication:
2023-01-17
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-17
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
UNHCR (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees), Human Rights and international relations, Public Health
Language:
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Sub-title:
မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၏အိမ်နီးချင်းနိုင်ငံများအနေဖြင့် မိမိတို့၏လေကြောင်းပိုင်နက်များကို အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စု၏ ဆိုးရွားသော လေကြောင်းတိုက်ခိုက်မှုများ အတွက် အသုံးပြုခွင့် မပေးရန် တောင်းဆိုခြင်း
Description:
"၁။ ၂၀၂၃ ခုနှစ်၊ ဇန်နဝါရီလ ၁၀ ရက်နေ့ နှင့် ၁၁ ရက်နေ့များတွင် ချင်းအမျိုးသားတပ်ဦး (CNF) ဗဟိုဌာနချုပ်တည်ရှိရာ အိန္ဒိယ-မြန်မာနယ်စပ်ရှိ Camp Victoria ကို အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စုက ဂျက်တိုက် လေယာဉ်များဖြင့် ဗုံးကြဲတိုက်ခိုက်ခဲ့သည်။ အဆိုပါတိုက်ခိုက်မှုကြောင့် အရပ်သား အများအပြား ထိခိုက် ဒဏ်ရာရသေကြေခဲ့ရပြီး၊ လူနေအိမ်သုံးလုံးနှင့် နေ့စဥ်ဝန်ဆောင်မှုပေးနေသည့် ဒေသန္တရ ဆေးကုသဆောင် တစ်ဆောင်အပါအဝင် အရပ်သားအခြေခံအဆောက်အအုံများ ထိခိုက်ပျက်စီး ခဲ့ကြောင်း သိရှိရသည်။
၂။ အဆိုပါတိုက်ခိုက်မှုတွင် အိမ်နီးချင်း အိန္ဒိယနိုင်ငံ၏လေပိုင်နက်ထဲသို့ ကျူးကျော်ဝင်ရောက် အသုံးချမှု ဖြစ်ပေါ်ခဲ့ကြောင်း ချင်းအမျိုးသားတပ်ဦးမှ ပေးပို့သောသတင်းတင်ပြချက်များအရ သိရှိရသည်။ အခြားသော မြေပြင်သတင်းရင်းမြစ်များအရလည်း အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စု၏ ဗုံးကြဲမှုများသည် အိန္ဒိယ ပိုင်နက်အတွင်းသို့ပင် ကျရောက်ခဲ့ကြောင်းသိရှိရပါသည်။
၃။ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စုသည် အိမ်နီးချင်းနိုင်ငံများ၏ လေပိုင်နက်များကို ကျူးကျော်အသုံးပြု၍ ရမ်းကားတိုက်ခိုက်မှုများကျူးလွန်ခြင်းသည် ပထမဆုံးအကြိမ် မဟုတ်ဘဲ အခြားသော အိမ်နီးချင်းနိုင်ငံများဖြစ်သည့် ထိုင်း နှင့် ဘင်္ဂလားဒေ့ရှ်နိုင်ငံများ၏လေပိုင်နက်များကိုလည်း ကျူးကျော်အသုံးပြုခဲ့သည့် အစဥ်အလာများ ဖြစ်ပေါ်ခဲ့သည်ကို တွေ့ရှိခဲ့ရပြီးဖြစ်သည်။
၄။ သို့ဖြစ်ပါ၍ ဒေသတွင်းလုံခြုံရေး၊ တည်ငြိမ်ရေးနှင့် ပြည်သူတို့၏အသက်အိုးအိမ်များ ဘေးကင်း လုံခြုံရေးကို ရှေးရှု၍ မြန်မာပြည်သူတို့၏ အိမ်နီးချင်းနိုင်ငံများအနေဖြင့် မိမိတို့၏လေပိုင်နက်များကို အသုံးပြု၍ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံပြည်သူများကို လေကြောင်းမှ အကြမ်းဖက်တိုက်ခိုက်နေခြင်းများ ကျူးလွန် နေသည့် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စု၏ လုပ်ရပ်များအား ခွင့်ပြုခြင်း မပြုပါရန် မေတ္တာရပ်ခံ တောင်းဆို လိုက်သည်။
၅။ အဆိုပါတောင်းဆိုမှုသည် အရပ်သားများနှင့် အများပြည်သူပိုင် အဆောက်အအုံများကို တိုက်ခိုက်ခြင်းအား ဆန့်ကျင်ရှုံ့ချထားသည့် ကုလသမဂ္ဂလုံခြုံရေးကောင်စီ၏ ဆုံးဖြတ်ချက်အမှတ် - ၂၆၆၉ အရ ဖြစ်ပြီး အဆိုပါဆုံးဖြတ်ချက်တွင် အကြမ်းဖက်လုပ်ရပ်များ လုပ်ဆောင်နေခြင်းကို ချက်ချင်း ရပ်တန့်ရန်၊ အကြမ်းဖက်လုပ်ရပ်များ ဆက်လက်ဖြစ်ပေါ်နေခြင်းကို တားဆီးဟန့်တားရန် တောင်းဆိုသည့် အချက်များလည်း ပါဝင်ပါသည်။
နိုင်ငံခြားရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာန
အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Myanmar - NUG
Date of publication:
2023-01-17
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-17
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Human Rights and international relations
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"Following the attempted coup in February 2021, Myanmar’s military1 has relied on an arsenal of weapons2 to carry out summary executions, massacres and other human rights atrocities in response to peaceful protests and growing anti-coup armed resistance in Myanmar. Analysis of witness statements and of video and photographic evidence in relation to such human rights violations shows security forces armed with a variety of locally produced firearms, including sniper rifles,3 MA-1 semi-automatic rifles,4 and Uzi-replica BA-93 and BA-94 sub-machine guns.5 In addition, analysis of images of weapons used by soldiers and the military-controlled Myanmar police force shows that much of the small arms ammunition used against peaceful protestors in 2021 carries the headstamp marking of the Myanmar military’s Directorate of Defence Industries (DDI), confirming local manufacture.6
Since the late 1950s, and in particular with the coming to power of the so-called State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) military junta in 1988, Myanmar’s military has invested significantly in strengthening its domestic capacity to produce weapons as a necessary means for releasing the military from a dependence on external supplies. This ambition is illustrated by:
the initial establishment of weapon production factories in Yangon and in the central, Bamar- majority parts of the country and the continuous establishment of new factories, including some that have yet to become fully operational;
the progressive increase in stockpiles of strategic raw materials to ensure adequate and uninterrupted supply for continuous in-country production of weapons;
the modernisation of auxiliary industries – such as iron and steel plants – to provide necessary materials for production;7
the continuous upgrading of existing weapons and diversification of production lines; and
the strategic diversification of sourcing bases (countries and companies) to limit the impacts of current and potential future sanctions and embargoes.
As a result, Myanmar’s military has gradually become largely self-sufficient in manufacturing a range of weapons. By way of illustration, the DDI currently has an extremely robust production capacity for small arms8 to meet its operational needs,9 which are focussed almost exclusively on the brutal internal suppression of the Myanmar population.
As its atrocities mount, the military’s need to further insulate itself from economic and external diplomatic pressure will likely lead to increased efforts aimed at the modernisation of existing weapon factories, the construction of additional factories and the development of auxiliary domestic industries for supplying the factories with necessary raw materials.
Despite robust production capabilities, however, the DDI is still reliant on international supplies, including for a variety of raw materials, parts and components and end-items, as well as machinery and technology, for the sustained production – both licensed and un-licensed10 – of the weapons in its arsenal.
This report maps out the Myanmar military’s in-country weapon production which takes place at factories commonly referred to as KaPaSa (after the Burmese name for the Directorate of Defence Industries, Karkweye Pyitsee Setyone) or, in the military’s own terms, as “Defence Industry” factories (DI). The report provides an overview of some of the critical supplies that appear to enable this production, and it identifies companies whose products are currently used by the DDI to successfully sustain its weapon manufacturing at scale.11 The report also identifies companies that enable the DDI to purchase products by brokering deals or otherwise acting as intermediaries for the DDI.12 In doing so, these companies also enable Myanmar’s military to continue to commit gross human rights violations, amounting to crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide.
This report by the Special Advisory Council for Myanmar (SAC-M) finds that:
Some of the DDI’s production appears to be taking place under license (including expired licenses). However, the licensing situation for many of the weapons currently produced at the KaPaSa factories remains unclear. Whether licensed or unlicensed production, the DDI appears to have obtained the technology and know-how to produce a variety of its weapons through various types of transfer of technology (ToT) deals. Over the years, the types of ToT deals that the DDI has entered into with companies – including State-owned companies – from Italy and (then) West Germany, Singapore, Israel, South Korea, North Korea, China and Ukraine have included the receipt of entire weapon production plants (turn-key projects), receipt of direct support from engineers associated with the owner of the technology, joint venture agreements, and KaPaSa factory staff being trained by original license-holders. Some companies that have provided ToTs to the DDI appear to have received commercial contracts, including in Myanmar’s oil and gas sector, in exchange.
While the DDI is able to partially produce and domestically source some of the critical raw materials used for its arms production, it still imports important quantities of such materials, including from China through the China State-owned company China North Industries Group Corporation Limited (NORINCO). China has also played an important role in supporting the establishment and operation of auxiliary industries, such as iron and steel plants and copper mines, that are either directly connected with weapon production factories in Myanmar or whose outputs feed the factories’ production. The DDI is currently also seeking to invest in iron and steel plants in the country, including in Pyin Oo Lwin, Mandalay Region. Consequently, foreign companies involved in the extraction and/or processing of certain raw materials in Myanmar may find themselves contributing to, or being directly linked to, sustaining the Myanmar armed forces’ arms production capabilities.
The DDI also depends on imports of parts and components ready to be used in weapons made in the KaPaSa factories, including fuses, cast boosters, detonating caps, igniters and electric detonators. Available data indicates that many of these parts and components come from companies domiciled in India and China. Information obtained by SAC-M suggests that the poor quality of many of the Chinese products upon which the DDI depends has prompted the DDI to progressively turn to other countries, including India, for critical supplies, and that the DDI is planning for other countries, including India, to play an increasingly important role for the weapon production industry in Myanmar. Several companies domiciled in India have also been identified as supplying the DDI with end-items such as optical sights to be fitted to made-in-Myanmar small arms such as sniper rifles. The military’s need to import optical sights is likely to continue as the military is moving towards the increased use of optical sights in its small arms and light weapons design and manufacture.
Automated machining is a critical step for weapon manufacturing at scale and modern Computer Numerical Control (CNC) machines with turning, milling and grinding functions, as well as electro-discharge machines, play a critical role. SAC-M has identified machines manufactured by companies legally domiciled in Austria, Germany, Japan, Taiwan and the United States (US) that are currently used by the Myanmar military at its weapon production factories. SAC-M has also identified various software programmes made by companies legally domiciled in France, Israel and Germany currently being used at KaPaSa factories for operating some of the CNC machines.
Singapore functions as a strategic transit point for potentially significant volumes of items – including certain raw materials – that feed the Myanmar military’s weapon production. Companies domiciled in Singapore have been identified as brokering deals and exporting items to the DDI or to associated civilian front companies for the military in Myanmar. In addition, according to credible information received by SAC-M, Taiwan functions as an important transit point for the DDI’s purchase of high precision CNC machines, including from European manufacturers, for KaPaSa arms manufacturing. In addition, individuals formerly associated with Myanmar’s armed forces suggest that, with the assistance of Mottama Holdings Limited – a Myanmar-based conglomerate and reportedly the current intermediary between the DDI and Chinese arms industry company NORINCO – the DDI also regularly sends CNC machines from KaPaSa factories to Taiwan where they are serviced by technicians associated with the European manufacturers of the machines, after which they are shipped back to Myanmar and to the DDI. It appears as though the absence of Taiwanese sanctions on Myanmar facilitates these types of transactions and shipments to and from Myanmar for the performance of critical maintenance.
The leader of the Myanmar military, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, and his top military leaders must be held accountable for the human rights violations that they have perpetrated. However, this report emphasises that concrete action must also be taken to address the corporate responsibility to respect human rights in Myanmar. This requires action both by the companies that have been identified in this report and by their home governments.
Under international human rights law, all States have a duty to protect against human rights abuses by third parties, including business enterprises, through appropriate policies, regulation and adjudication. In relation to the manufacturing and export of weapons and associated items and machinery specifically, this expectation is reflected in several multilateral agreements of relevance to the arms industry, including the Arms Trade Treaty13 and dual-use goods regimes, such as the Wassenaar Arrangement,14 the European Union (EU) Dual-Use Goods Regulation15 and current sanctions regimes that apply to Myanmar.16 For the home States of the companies that have been identified, adhering to these legal provisions requires them to apply export controls on a number of items – including sub-components, end-items and machinery and technology – that could be used for arms production.
At present, it is unclear to what extent the home States of companies have upheld this responsibility in relation to the products that have been identified in use at the Myanmar military’s weapon production factories and auxiliary industries. SAC-M recommends that the home States identified in this report investigate and, as relevant, initiate administrative and/or legal proceedings against the companies whose parts and components, end-items and machinery and technology are relied upon by the Myanmar military’s Directorate of Defence Industries. States should also adopt targeted sanctions against the KaPaSa, its leadership and its network of brokers that have been identified in this report.
Companies have a responsibility to respect human rights. This means that they should act with due diligence to avoid infringing on the human rights of others and to address adverse human rights impacts with which they are involved.17 The responsibility to respect is independent of States’ abilities and/or willingness to fulfil their human rights obligations. In practical terms, and in relation to the Myanmar military’s weapon production, meeting this responsibility means that companies are expected to apply their own due diligence in relation to the risks of potential harmful end-use of their products,18 and to put in place measures to prevent or mitigate such risks. For products that are covered by export controls, companies are not absolved of the responsibility to respect human rights by the mere fact that their home State has granted the necessary export permits. Companies identified in the report should immediately stop doing business with the Myanmar military’s Directorate of Defence Industries and associated military entities and civilian front companies for the Myanmar military, and they should investigate how their products have ended up being used for the manufacturing of arms by the military in Myanmar. Beyond this, companies should also take steps to prevent future harmful end-use of their products through robust due diligence to identify, prevent, and mitigate the risk of harm associated with the sale/licensing and deployment of their products. In relation to harms that have already been suffered by civilians in Myanmar, companies should provide for, or cooperate in, the remediation of such harms, including by collaborating with any future legal or administrative proceedings.
Lastly, it should be noted that this report does not undertake the immense task of mapping out the Myanmar military’s arms production and associated value chains19 in their entirety. Undertaking such an endeavour is a key recommendation of this report. Put differently, additional, longer-term research is needed to identify additional critical supplies with a view to disrupting the Myanmar military’s weapon production. This undertaking would fill an important gap in the current research on Myanmar’s armed forces, which tends to focus on the military’s acquisition of weapons from elsewhere, rather than weapons that are made in the country. To this end, SAC-M encourages interested parties to follow-up on the present research where it has left off. To sustain such future work, SAC-M invites the submission of information, on a continuous basis, that could lead to the identification of additional companies that supply or support the Myanmar military in its manufacturing of weapons.20
PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY
Since the military’s crackdown on the 1988 pro-democracy uprising, arms embargoes and sanctions have been imposed on Myanmar by foreign governments. So far as arms are concerned, these types of measures have principally sought to prohibit the trade of military or dual-use goods that may be used by the Myanmar military for internal suppression. Important as they may be, these measures have not been fully effective in preventing the military from committing atrocities against the civilian population. On the one hand, this failure stems from the fact that several UN member states continue to sell weapons to the military.21 An equally important factor, however, is the fact that Myanmar’s military can produce a large variety of weapons in-country.
Weapons made in the country’s so-called KaPaSa factories have been, and continue to be, used by Myanmar’s military for widespread, systematic and indiscriminate attacks on civilians, as evidenced in publicly available reports and video/photographic evidence, and corroborated by information received by SAC-M from individuals formerly associated with the Myanmar armed forces or experts on made-in-Myanmar weapons. For example:
Post-coup military offensives in Karenni / Kayah State have involved the systematic and massive use of landmines – including locally produced M14 anti-personnel landmines – in and around villages in south-eastern Karenni / Kayah State, acts that may amount to war crimes.22 Photographs reviewed by the Land Mine and Cluster Munition Monitor indicate that antipersonnel landmines manufactured by Myanmar were captured from the Myanmar Armed Forces by non-state armed groups every month from January to September 2022 and in virtually every part of the country.23 In August 2022, antipersonnel mines manufactured by and in the possession of the Myanmar military were captured in both the northwest and southwest of the country, indicating extensive mine use by the armed forces.24
Following the 2021 attempted coup, the military and police responded to peaceful protests with in- country made weapons – including a variety of rifles25 and grenades26 – to assassinate protestors.
In March 2019, during armed conflict between the military and the Arakan Army (AA), at least five people were killed when the army opened fire on Say Taung village in northern Rahkine, using rounds and artillery produced at a KaPaSa factory.27 Throughout the two-year period of conflict with the AA, the military regularly fired into villages in Rakhine State with locally produced small arms and ammunition, injuring or killing civilians, damaging civilian houses and other structures, and causing mass displacement. Investigation into military attacks in Rakhine in 2019 also indicates that the military systematically fired explosive weapons with wide area effects, including locally produced mortars and associated projectiles, into civilian areas.28
The military’s genocidal atrocities inflicted on Rohingya in Rakhine State in 2016 and 2017 involved the killing of Rohingya civilians by the military and Border Guard Police using a variety of DDI-made small arms, including the MA-3 MK I and G3 rifles used during the Inn Din massacre.29
In short: weapons produced by the Myanmar military in-country at its KaPaSa factories have been used in the military’s widespread and systematic attacks against civilian targets, prior to, during and after the 2021 attempted military coup, and continue to be so.
Over a period of one year, SAC-M has mapped out the Myanmar armed forces’ in-country weapon production and the value chains that enable this production. The research has entailed open- source investigation, including review of user-generated content in Burmese and English posted on a wide variety of social media forums and discussion groups (open and closed). SAC-M has also reviewed leaked budget-related documents (2016-2021) from the Myanmar military-controlled Ministry of Defence (MOD) and the DDI as well as shipment records from subscription-based import/export databases. In addition, SAC-M has interviewed approximately 30 individuals, including former soldiers of the Myanmar armed forces as well as weapon experts and experts on the weapon manufacturing industry in Southeast Asia broadly and Myanmar specifically.31,32
SAC-M hopes that this report will contribute to a greater understanding of the Myanmar military’s weapon production and the global value chains that feed this production to ensure that more effective international action can be taken to protect the rights of the Myanmar people, including through targeted sanctions, engagement with identified companies to prevent future supplies reaching the DDI and the network of KaPaSa factories and, as necessary, targeted accountability-oriented proceedings..."
Source/publisher:
Special Advisory Council for Myanmar
Date of publication:
2023-01-16
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-16
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations, Discrimination against the Rohingya
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"Yangon has always faced challenges associated with rapid urbanization. Following the twin crises of COVID-19 and military takeover, the city’s inhabitants face unprecedented new pressures. The poverty rate in Yangon was projected to triple — from 13.7 percent in 2017 to 41.9 percent in 2022 — with the city set to be resident to some of the largest numbers of poor people while needing the highest level of resources to lift people out of poverty. In addition, men and women in Yangon must contend with poor legal protections, limited economic opportunities, inflated costs of living and an unhealthy environment.
To better understand the experiences, challenges and emerging needs of households in Yangon, UNDP and UN Women conducted a baseline survey comparing households in eight townships of Yangon with the remaining townships in Yangon. The study was undertaken to gather empirical evidence to ensure the anticipated activities of the Urban Resilience Project – URP are appropriate, and to provide a baseline for future programme monitoring and evaluation.
The survey, conducted over the phone with interviews lasting approximately 20 minutes, involved 3,000 respondents. The survey comprises questions on household finances, employment and livelihoods, safety and security, access to basic services, including health and education. The report provides comparisons between the 8 URP townships and the rest of Yangon.
This baseline survey is one of the benchmarks to help measure the impact of URP. It captures the situation as it currently stands and confirms the priorities for urban interventions focused on responding to the growing needs and vulnerabilities of households. In future years, a follow-up survey may be undertaken to re-evaluate the socio-economic situation in the eight townships compared to the rest of Yangon, permitting impact analysis of any interventions to support households within the townships..."
Source/publisher:
UN Development Programme and UN Women
Date of publication:
2023-01-16
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-16
Grouping:
Individual Documents
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2.07 MB (Original version) - 57 pages
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"KEY DISPLACEMENT FIGURES:
72,000 Estimated refugee movements to neighbouring countries since 1 February 2021
1,086,000 Refugees and asylum-seekers from Myanmar in neighbouring countries as of 30 June 2022
1,215,000 Estimated total internally displaced persons (IDPs) within Myanmar, displaced since 1 February 2021 Source: UN in Myanmar
1,545,000 Estimated total internally displaced persons (IDPs) within Myanmar as of 9 January 2023 Source: UN in Myanmar
HIGHLIGHTS
According to the UN, an estimated 1,545,000 people were reported internally displaced within Myanmar as of 9 January, including 1,215,000 people newly displaced since 1 February 2021.
In Kachin and Shan (North), the protection risks faced by many communities continued to increase because of the intensifying conflict. In response, communities limited their own movements (particularly in the evenings) due to the risk of forced recruitment, robbery, physical assault, and arbitrary arrests. The situation has also been further compounded by their inadequate access to livelihoods, which is making it difficult for communities to meet their basic needs.
In the North-West, the security situation remained volatile across Chin State and Sagaing and Magway Regions, as indiscriminate attacks continue to drive displacement. Movement restrictions have also pushed up the cost of essential goods and sparked shortages of food and other basic commodities.
In Rakhine and Chin (South) States, following the announcement of an informal ceasefire between the Tatmadaw and the Arakan Army (AA) in late November 2022, roadways were reopened to enable the movement of civilians and goods between Yangon-Sittwe and within most of Rakhine State (North). However, rising criminality in Rakhine North (State) continues to exacerbate insecurity. Currently, most of the humanitarian response in Buthidaung, Maungdaw, Rathedaung, Mrauk-U, Minbya and Myebon remains limited to life-saving activities such as food and health after de facto authorities introduced new restrictions on UN agencies and INGOs in mid-September 2022.
In the South-East, the security situation across all states and regions remained unpredictable with frequent airstrikes and indiscriminate shelling being reported. Access to education continued to be challenging for many children, which increased their exposure to negative coping mechanisms such as child labour. Limited access to food, shelter materials and basic medicine were other challenges brought about by the volatile context..."
Source/publisher:
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (Geneva) via Reliefweb (New York)
Date of publication:
2023-01-16
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-16
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
UNHCR (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees), Education in Burma/Myanmar - general, Public Health, Human Rights and international relations
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12.14 MB
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"Context, crisis, impacts and needs The people of Myanmar continue to pay a high price for two years of political instability, sparked by the 1 February 2021 military takeover of the democratically elected National League For Democracy (NLD) Government. The takeover unleashed an unprecedented political, socioeconomic, and humanitarian crisis on top of the continuing impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, sending the country into a dangerous spiral of conflict and poverty. The political situation has prompted an escalation in fighting across the country, characterized by violations of iInternational Humanitarian Law (IHL) and International Human Rights Law (IHRL), including aerial bombardment, burning of homes,
and other indiscriminate attacks in civilian areas by the military, as well as use of land mines and other explosive ordnance (EO), and recruitment of minors by multiple armed actors. This has resulted in significant displacement, human suffering, asset depletion, rising food insecurity and reversal of many of the development gains made in recent years. Almost half the country is estimated to be living in poverty as a result of both the political situation and legacy impacts from the pandemic.
The spate of violence, including attacks and clashes, across Myanmar throughout 2022 had a severe impact on the physical and mental well-being of millions of people. Displacement surged to record levels in 2022. Nearly 1.2 million people have fled their homes since 1 February 2021, bringing the total number of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Myanmar to a staggering 1.5 million as of 26 December 2022, with no signs that displacement is slowing down heading into 2023. On top of this, the rapid depreciation of the Myanmar Kyat, inflation, movement restrictions and active fighting are causing a reduction in food production and are pushing the price of food beyond the reach of many families.
Despite the immense needs and commitment of international and national organizations, humanitarian assistance and access to affected people remained heavily restricted in 2022, essentially increasing reliance on local networks of responders in conflict areas. Administrative barriers for travelauthorizations (TAs), incidents of detention and arrest of humanitarian actors, intimidation and harassment, and frequent security checkpoints all constrained humanitarian access to people in need in 2022. Restrictions on telecommunications and internet networks further hindered timely and safe humanitarian access and assistance to people in need.
Evolution of needs 2022-2023 With no respite from conflict or political and economic turbulence in sight, 2023 will be another year of dire struggle for the people of Myanmar. A total of 17.6 million people are expected to be in need of humanitarian assistance in 2023, up from 14.4 million last year and 1 million people before the military takeover. A third of those in need are children.
2023 is expected to witness continued political instability, ongoing or escalating armed conflict, persistent displacement, slow or stagnant economic growth, as well as continued interruptions and poor access to basic services. Continued or increased intensity and frequency of armed conflict will result in more communities being displaced: an additional 1.4 million people are projected to flee their homes in 2023, taking the total displaced population to 2.7 million. Protection risks, especially in hard-to-reach conflict areas, are expected to continue, including increased EO threats, forced recruitment, human trafficking, and human rights violations. Agricultural disruptions due to conflict and displacement, EO-contaminated land, and high input prices will have a serious impact on the national economy and food availability in the country.
The number of people experiencing food insecurity will rise to 15.2 million people in 2023, up from 13.2 million in 2022.
Scope of analysis Given the dramatic deterioration in the situation over the course of 2021 and 2022, the anticipated depth of needs in new areas, and the overall deterioration of the food security and livelihoods situation country- wide, the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) has continued using the broader, national analysis of the humanitarian situation and needs in Myanmar in2023. The 2023 numbers reflect the unprecedented scale and humanitarian consequences of the current crisis, especially for women and children and other vulnerable groups. The methodology and scope of analysis frame the situation in Myanmar as a whole- of-country, complex and multi-dimensional crisis, where there are grave protection concerns and risks, and food insecurity is deepening, requiring scaled-up humanitarian, nexus and development interventions to stop people slipping into more severe need, including acute malnutrition.
Population groups The HCT will continue to deploy a vulnerability-sensitive approach in 2023 covering displaced, returned, stateless and crisis-affected people where they have humanitarian needs. The approach covers those who are more directly “shock-affected,” such as displaced populations, returned, resettled, or integrated IDPs, and non-displaced stateless people. A broader group of “other crisis-affected people with humanitarian needs” includes those affected by natural disasters; IDP host communities; people living in high conflict areas with restricted access to basic services to support their own survival; people with severe protection needs (employing negative coping mechanisms; victims of trafficking, exploitation and the most vulnerable migrants with humanitarian needs; EO victims; people with multiple vulnerabilities); non-displaced people in moderate or severe food insecurity or those who are facing malnutrition, people affected by other severe shocks who are unable to support their own survival.
In a bid to more accurately reflect and plan for the scale of displacement and IDP needs, the HCT has projected likely displacement through until the end of 2023. While actual displacement as of 26 December 2022 stands at 1.5 million, the Humanitarian Needs Overview (HNO) has anticipated that displacement will continue to grow at a similar rate as 2022 during 2023, meaning there would be 2.7 million people displaced and in need by year’s end. The Needs Monitoring and Analysis Working Group (NMA WG) used a combination of data to develop this common displacement planning figure including looking at movement trends, 2023 scenarios and assumptions,expert opinion, and a severity scale analysis on displacement drivers, trends, and the presence of armed groups. A similar planning figure has been projected for returns (512,000 people) and for those likely to need humanitarian assistance as a result of natural disasters in 2023 (50,000 people). This disaster impact figure was developed based on an analysis of historical trends which vary significantly from year-to- year, despite Myanmar being one of the most disaster- prone countries in the world.
This HNO applies protection, gender, age, disability, mental health, and accountability lenses to its analysis with sex and age disaggregated data used throughout, where it is available.
Humanitarian conditions, severity, and people in need The number of people estimated to have humanitarian needs was calculated using the globally-endorsed Joint Intersectoral Analysis Framework (JIAF) approach, which looks holistically at the needs facing people in Myanmar and measures the severity of these needs. This severity analysis shows that the spread of the crisis is such that the entire population of 56 million people is now facing some level of need.
Two thirds (67 per cent) are in stress, a quarter (23 per cent) are in severe need and almost one tenth (8 per cent) are facing extreme needs. In 2023, a much higher proportion of the population has been identified as being in these more serious needs categories compared to 2022, which is the result of the cumulative impact of expanding conflict, economic instability, negative coping strategies and unmet needs since the military takeover.
Two nationwide datasets were available and heavily relied on to inform this evidence-based analysis, providing a higher level of confidence in results than 2022 due to improved ability to verify and triangulate data. The first was a Multi-Sector Needs Analysis (MSNA) conducted across Myanmar for the first time using a hybrid approach with in person and remote data collection. The second was the latest round fo the joint Food Security and Livelihood Assessment by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the World Food Programme (WFP), conducted between August and September 2022 in 14 regions and states. Together, these nationwide datasets were used to determine the severity of need and intersectoral vulnerability calculations, as well as forming the basis for much of the sectoral needs analyses. The Food Security and Livelihood Assessment, conducted in 2021 and also in April 2022, allows for comparisons of the food security situation over time, while the MSNA allows for a multi-sectoral understanding of needs across population groups..."
Source/publisher:
UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (New York) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of publication:
2023-01-15
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-15
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Agriculture in Burma/Myanmar: general and research, Climate Change - Burma/Myanmar: general, Biodiversity - global and regional, Food Security and nutrition in Burma/Myanmar, Human Rights and international relations
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Sub-title:
Statement on the Establishment of the Office of Special Envoy
Description:
"The National Unity Government of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar warmly
welcomes the establishment of the Office of Special Envoy, as announced by H.E. Retno L.P.
Marsudi, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Indonesia.
We are confident that Foreign Minister Retno will bring dedication and determination to her
role as Head of the Office.
To further raise the bar of ASEAN’s Myanmar response, the Minister’s likely appointment
of a new Special Envoy should see the role made full-time, and the Office of Special Envoy
allocated human and financial resources matched to the mandate’s importance and scope.
Indonesia’s leadership of ASEAN arrives at a critical moment for Myanmar and amidst a
groundswell of momentum. ASEAN Leaders' call for support from the United Nations and external
partners at the recent ASEAN Summits enabled the UN Security Council to adopt its historic first
resolution on the situation in Myanmar. Significantly, this binding resolution confirmed the Security
Council's support for the will of the Myanmar people, demanded an immediate end to the illegal
military junta’s violence, and stressed the need for full, safe and unimpeded humanitarian access to
all people in need.
The National Unity Government extends its full support and cooperation to Indonesia as
ASEAN Chair and to Foreign Minister Retno as Head of the Office of Special Envoy..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Myanmar - NUG
Date of publication:
2023-01-13
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-13
Grouping:
Individual Documents
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National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Human Rights and international relations
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Sub-title:
အထူးကိုယ်စားလှယ်ရုံး ဖွင့်လှစ်ခြင်းနှင့်စပ်လျဉ်း၍ သတင်းထုတ်ပြန်ချက်
Description:
"မြန်မာနိုင်ငံဆိုင်ရာ အာဆီယံအထူးကိုယ်စားလှယ်ရုံး ဖွင့်လှစ်လိုက်ကြောင်း အင်ဒိုနီးရှားနိုင်ငံ၊ နိုင်ငံခြားရေးဝန်ကြီး H.E. Retno L.P. Marsudi မှ ကြေညာခဲ့ခြင်းအပေါ် အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေး အစိုးရမှ ကြိုဆိုပါသည်။
နိုင်ငံခြားရေးဝန်ကြီး Ms Retno မှ အထူးကိုယ်စားလှယ်ရုံး အကြီးအကဲအနေဖြင့် ၎င်း၏ တာဝန်ဝတ္တရားများကို အားသွန်ခွန်စိုက် တစိုက်မတ်မတ်ကြိုးပမ်းဆောင်ရွက်သွားမည်ဟု မိမိတို့ အစိုးရမှ ယုံကြည်ပါသည်။
ထို့အပြင် အာဆီယံ၏ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံအပေါ် တုံ့ပြန်မှု အရှိန်ကို ပိုမိုမြှင့်တင်နိုင်ရန်အတွက် Ms Retno မှ အထူးကိုယ်စားလှယ်အသစ် ခန့်အပ်လာပါက အထူးကိုယ်စားလှယ် မှ ၎င်း၏တာဝန် ဝတ္တရားများကို အချိန်ပြည့် လုပ်ဆောင်သွားနိုင်ဖွယ်ရှိကြောင်းနှင့် အထူးကိုယ်စားလှယ်ရုံး အနေ ဖြင့်လည်း အရေးကြီးသော နယ်ပယ်နှင့်ကဏ္ဍအလိုက် လူသားအရင်းအမြစ်များနှင့် ဘဏ္ဍာရေး အရင်းအမြစ်များကို ခွဲဝေချထားသည်ကို တွေ့မြင်ရပါသည်။
အာဆီယံတွင် အင်ဒိုနီးရှားနိုင်ငံ၏ ခေါင်းဆောင်မှု စတင်သည့်အချိန်သည် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံအရေးနှင့် စပ်လျဉ်းပြီး လူထု၏သဘောထား တဟုန်ထိုးမြင့်တက်နေသည့်ကာလ ဖြစ်သည့်အပြင် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံအတွက် အရေးပါသော အခိုက်အတန့်နှင့်လည်း ကိုက်ညီနေ ပါသည်။ မကြာသေးမီက ကျင်းပပြုလုပ်ခဲ့သော အာဆီယံ ထိပ်သီးအစည်းအဝေးများတွင် ကုလသမဂ္ဂနှင့် ပြင်ပ မိတ်ဖက်နိုင်ငံများထံမှ ထောက်ခံမှုရရှိရန် အာဆီယံ ခေါင်းဆောင်များ၏ တောင်းဆိုမှုကြောင့် ကုလသမဂ္ဂလုံခြုံရေးကောင်စီသည် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံတွင် ဖြစ်ပေါ်လျက်ရှိသော အခြေအနေများနှင့် ပတ်သက်သည့် သမိုင်းဝင်သော ပထမဆုံး ဆုံးဖြတ်ချက်ကို ချမှတ်နိုင်ခဲ့ ပါသည်။ ဥပဒေအရ ချည်နှောင်မှုရှိသည့် အဆိုပါဆုံးဖြတ်ချက်သည် မြန်မာပြည်သူများ၏ သဘောဆန္ဒများ ကို လုံခြုံရေးကောင်စီမှ ထောက်ခံကြောင်း ပြသလိုက်သည်သာမက အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စု၏ ဥပဒေမဲ့ အကြမ်းဖက်လုပ်ရပ်များကို ချက်ချင်းရပ်တန့်ရန် တောင်းဆို ထားသည်ကိုလည်း တွေ့ရှိရပါသည်။ ထို့အပြင် အဆိုပါ ဆုံးဖြတ်ချက်တွင် လူသားချင်းစာနာ ထောက်ထားမှု အကူအညီများကို ပြည့်ပြည့်ဝဝ၊ လုံလုံခြုံခြုံ၊ အဟန့်အတားမရှိ အကူအညီ လိုအပ်နေသူများထံသို့ ပေးအပ်နိုင်ရန် လိုအပ်သည်ကိုလည်း အလေးထားဖော်ပြထားသည်ကို တွေ့ရှိရပါသည်။
အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရအနေဖြင့် အင်ဒိုနီးရှားနိုင်ငံမှ အာဆီယံဥက္ကဋ္ဌအဖြစ် တာဝန် ထမ်းဆောင်ခြင်းနှင့် နိုင်ငံခြားရေးဝန်ကြီး Ms Retno မှ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံဆိုင်ရာ အာဆီယံအထူး ကိုယ်စားလှယ်ရုံး၏ အကြီးအကဲအဖြစ်တာဝန်ထမ်းဆောင်ခြင်းတို့အပေါ် အပြည့်အဝထောက်ခံပါ ကြောင်းနှင့် ပူးပေါင်းဆောင်ရွက်မှုများလည်း ပြုလုပ်သွားမည်ဖြစ်ကြောင်း ထုတ်ပြန်ကြေညာ အပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Myanmar - NUG
Date of publication:
2023-01-13
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-13
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Human Rights and international relations
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Sub-title:
From brutal murders and military parades to jailed opponents, Min Aung Hlaing is true to the tyrant’s playbook. The worldwide fight for democracy has to be fought here
Description:
"It’s a country where children are imprisoned, tortured and sexually abused. Hundreds have been killed since the military coup two years ago. In total, more than 2,600 people have been murdered and nearly 17,000 detained by a brutal regime led by a genocidal war criminal. In case you’re wondering, this isn’t Ukraine and it isn’t Vladimir Putin.
The criminal in question is Myanmar’s junta boss, Gen Min Aung Hlaing, who struts about in a uniform adorned with meaningless decorations and gaudy gold braid. As a general rule, the more medals a dictator wears, the more absurd and dangerous they are. This killer, this bigoted bomber of villages, schools and hospitals, this displacer of millions, is right up there with the worst of them.
Min Aung Hlaing “celebrated” Myanmar’s 75th independence anniversary from Britain last week with a big military parade silently boycotted by most Burmese. Days earlier, he slapped yet another prison term on Aung San Suu Kyi, the democratically elected leader he deposed. True to the tyrant’s playbook, the junta plans sham elections this year that will exclude its opponents.
Addressing a sullen nation, Min Aung Hlaing thanked countries which have declined to join the EU, US and UK in imposing sanctions. It was a roll call of shame. “We are closely working with China, India, Thailand, Laos and Bangladesh ... for border stability and development,” he said. He might have mentioned Russia, too, his main arms supplier.
What the general failed to say is the junta’s grip on power is weakening in the teeth of growing political and armed resistance from an umbrella group, the People’s Defence Force, so-called ethnic armed organisation (EAOs), and the exiled, civilian-led national unity government.
Despite regime efforts to suppress independent reporting, much of Myanmar appears to be in a state of semi-permanent insurrection, punctuated by junta atrocities. Yet to succeed, disparate resistance groups need to forge a united front, Scot Marciel, a former US ambassador, suggested.
“The junta may be able to stay in power for some time just through pure brutality, but there’s no evidence at all that [it] will be able to stabilise or effectively govern the country or gain any kind of popular support,” Marciel told the Irrawaddy news website last week. “They [the resistance] have to show ... they present a stable alternative.”
It’s plain Myanmar’s people need help. So what more should the “international community” be doing? As the former colonial power, Britain is lead country on Myanmar at the UN. Notwithstanding foreign secretary James Cleverly’s recent boasts in the Guardian, its good-faith efforts have proven largely ineffectual over the years.
As is so often the case, hopes are pinned on the US. The 2023 National Defense Authorization Act authorises the Biden administration to provide non-lethal assistance and funding to opposition organisations, political prisoners and civil society groups. But it is unclear what, if anything, the White House may do next.
If the world really wants to end Myanmar’s suffering, and bring Min Aung Hlaing to heel, China – in theory – is best placed to try. Huge business and infrastructure investments afford it unmatched leverage. It cares nought for democracy, but chronic instability on its border is not in Beijing’s interest.
Self-serving calculations, not principles, explain China’s unexpected decision not to veto last month’s first-ever UN security council resolution on Myanmar, which called for an end to violence and the freeing of all political prisoners. Following Beijing’s lead, Russia also abstained. Now comes the hard part: ensuring the junta complies.
The UN, like Myanmar’s opposition, needs a united front. To work, it must also include India’s government which, as with Ukraine, puts money before morality; Bangladesh, which is struggling to cope with a million Burmese Rohingya Muslim refugees; and Thailand and other Association of South-East Asian Nations (Asean) members.
But Asean is split. Its “five-point consensus” peace plan has stalled. Some states fantasise the junta’s sham elections will provide genuine legitimacy. Even recent tragedies involving Rohingya boat people have left regional leaders largely unmoved.
The Burma Campaign UK pressure group complains the UN resolution does not go far enough, with no mention, for example, of a long-sought global arms embargo. “Russia, China and India are using their seats on the security council to protect their profitable dodgy arms deals with the Burmese military,” said UK director Mark Farmaner.
Trying to maintain momentum, activists want the UK and other governments to block supplies of aviation fuel, to stop the junta launching air strikes. Too many international companies still do business in Myanmar, they say. Legal action alleging a Rohingya genocide is under way at the UN’s International Court of Justice – but the process will take years.
Who else can deter the junta? Religious leaders might be expected to help. But the regime assiduously courts majority Buddhist opinion. Last week it honoured Wirathu, an ultra-nationalist monk notorious for anti-Islam rhetoric who was once dubbed the “face of Buddhist terror”.
Disappointingly, Catholic leaders feted Min Aung Hlaing at a Christmas service at Holy Trinity cathedral in Yangon. Cardinal Charles Maung Bo prayed for peace, apparently forgiving of the fact his parishioner’s stormtroopers frequently burn churches – and attacked his home village last year.
Bottom line: all concerned actors, international and domestic, must join together to dethrone the region’s worst regime since the Khmer Rouge terrorised Cambodia. “What is required is action,” Tom Andrews, UN rapporteur on Myanmar, declared last month. “Systematic, gross human rights violations, amounting to war crimes and crimes against humanity, [are] being perpetrated daily on the people of Myanmar.”
What could be clearer? If the 21st century’s defining global struggle for democracy, justice and civil liberties is to have any hope of succeeding, it must be fought here, too..."
Source/publisher:
"The Guardian" (UK)
Date of publication:
2023-01-08
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-08
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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Description:
"Spokesperson for the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights: Jeremy Laurence
The release of political prisoners in Myanmar is not only a relief to those unfairly detained, but also their families. Importantly, however, we take this opportunity to call for the release of the thousands of others who remain in detention for opposing military rule. Even as news emerged about the amnesty to mark the country's independence day, we continued to receive reports of people being detained for opposing military rule, many of whom have been subjected to torture and ill-treatment. Such detentions are not only intended to silence the junta’s critics, but are also designed to instil fear.
As we mark the 75th anniversary this year of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the High Commissioner has called for an end to arbitrary detention once and for all. This week he called on governments and all detaining authorities globally to put the milestone Declaration into action by granting an amnesty, pardon or by simply releasing all those detained for exercising their rights.
The pathway out of Myanmar’s crisis is not by locking people up – it is by allowing them to freely, fully, and effectively participate in political life..."
Source/publisher:
UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
Date of publication:
2023-01-06
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-06
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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Description:
"There is no doubt that China in just a couple of decades has transformed itself from a poor Asian country into an economic, political and even military superpower. But little attention has been paid to the way in which China has also established a media and information imperium with tentacles spreading all over the world.
That would not be especially remarkable, had it not been for the way in which China’s ruling communist party is using its own media outlets, and the influence those exercise over newspaper, internet sites and blogs in some other countries, to promote its own undemocratic system as an alternative to “liberal democracy”, as well as peddling misinformation about, for instance, the situation in its ethnic minority regions of Xinjiang and Tibet.
China’s propaganda apparatus even tries to influence other countries domestic policies by planting false news and manipulating public figures. In Beijing’s Global Media Offensive: China’s Uneven Campaign to Influence Asia and the World, Joshua Kurlantzick, a senior fellow for Southeast Asia at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), examines China’s global media offensive and how the leaders in Beijing are increasingly cooperating with their comrades in Moscow in their efforts to become global media influencers.
China has, as Kurlantzick points out, often failed to reap gains from its efforts, but it has been successful in exporting “its political and internet control models” to some like-minded regimes in Asia — among them Myanmar, Cambodia and Vietnam. These campaigns, Kurlantzick argues, may “not only help protect the ruling Party [in China]; they may also help China build alliances with autocracies and undermine press freedoms, human rights, and democracy across the globe.” CFR may be a United States (US)-based think-tank but it is independent and non-partisan, and often publishes reports critical of Washington and its policies.
Although Kurlanzick’s study focuses on the media, it should also be mentioned in this context that Reuters, on July 11 last year, identified three Chinese companies that have supplied Myanmar with cameras with facial recognition capabilities which now are in place in cities all over the country, enabling the junta to track down and identify opponents to the dictatorship. Two of the three companies – the Shenzhen-based technology giant Huawei Technologies and Zhejiang Dahua Technology in Hangzhou in Zhejiang province – did not respond to Reuters request for comment. The third company, Hikvision, another partly state-owned company also based in Hangzhou, issued a vague and ambiguous statement saying that the company had never sold any equipment “directly to Myanmar government authorities.”
Hikvision claimed also that it had not provided Myanmar with facial recognition technology. But The Irrawaddy has learned from industry sources that Hikvision has used local Chinese and Myanmar middlemen to transfer such equipment to the junta, and that such indirect sales to Myanmar have increased dramatically over the past year. Chinese companies have also supplied the military regime with technology that makes it possible to monitor the internet, hack into independent websites, and control the flow of news from Myanmar to the outside world.
Kurlantzick quotes a speech at the United Nations (UN) by China’s then president Hu Jintao in 2005 as an early example of how Beijing has for years been trying to sell its version of authoritarianism to the outside world by stating that all states should have “respect for countries’ right to choose independently their own social systems and paths of development.” Needless to say, that is impossible in Myanmar and other dictatorships because the people in those countries have no right to elect their own governments. No one has “chosen” to be oppressed and ruled by a small group of ruthless villains who have usurped power. But the leaders in Beijing probably don’t care what ordinary people think. China’s model is fairly straight-forward: authoritarian rule, not democracy, leads to economic development. And, to some extent, that notion has been accepted by rulers and politicians in some Asian, African and South American countries.
China’s charm offensive, which began in the late 20th and early 21st centuries has, in some ways, not been that different from the so-called “soft power” efforts pursued for years by many Western countries, among them the US, France and the United Kingdom, as well as the European Union. China has established Confucius Institutes in a host of foreign countries and, on the surface, they don’t seem to be that different from the United States Information Service, the British Council or Alliance Française.
But the Confucius Institutes go much further then its Western equivalents. According to Kurlantzick, the US Senate’s Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations found in a report issued on February 19, 2019, that many American universities had allowed Confucius Institutes to be set up on their campuses “with minimal oversight and little knowledge of the Chinese governance of the Confucius Institute program, even though the institutes can come with strings that compromise academic freedom.”
The decision to name its institutes after the Chinese philosopher Confucius (actually a Latinized form of Kong Fuzi, or ‘Master Kong’), who is believed to have lived from 551 to 479 BCE, could not have been an easy one to make. During the last three years of his life, 1973-76, the old Chinese dictator Mao Zedong and his wife Jiang Qing launched a campaign called “Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius”. Lin was of course Lin Piao, Mao’s former heir who allegedly planned to stage a coup and then tried to escape to the Soviet Union. But the plane crashed under mysterious circumstances in Mongolia in September 1971 and, as a possible opponent to Mao, he was branded “an enemy of the people”.
Confucius, Mao and Jiang claimed, had stood for feudalism, slavery and the denigration of women. Traces of Confucian thought which still remained in the consciousness of the Chinese people in the 1970s thus hindered the country’s development, Mao and Jiang argued.
In today’s ‘reformed’ China, the Confucius Institutes are overseen by China’s United Front Work Department (UFWD), a department that is directly controlled by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. It is known to be gathering intelligence and managing relations with individuals and organizations inside and outside China.
UFWD operatives and local informants working for the outfit are, among other things, suspected of monitoring overseas popular protests against Beijing and its policies. That happened in Hong Kong during the pro-democracy demonstrations there in 2019-2020. Further away from China’s immediate periphery, there were demonstrations outside China’s embassy in Yangon, which must have shattered the powerholders in Beijing. China, a longtime supporter of the Myanmar military, was and has never been popular among the public at large. Hence, China’s support for the junta’s efforts to identify opponents to military rule, whether they are spotted by surveillance cameras in public, or identified through policing of the internet.
Apart from the Confucius Institutes, another major way in which the Chinese leadership is trying to influencing public opinion in foreign countries, Kurlantzick states, is “contents-sharing deals” with media in selected countries. They are offered free dispatches from the official, government-controlled news agency Xinhua and programs aired by Chinese national television in return for having some of their material appear in Chinese media. In Thailand, the Matichon Group, of which the well-respected website Khaosod is a part, announced a content-sharing deal with Xinhua in 2019.
Khaosod began running Xinhua articles for free and among the first pieces were articles on the 2019 Hong Kong protests that portrayed the demonstrators as “tools of Western agitators” and Xinjiang as a place where “equality, solidarity and harmony among ethnic groups and religions have prevailed.” People in the region were also supposed to be “enjoying peace and stability.” According to human rights groups, the Chinese authorities have detained as many as a million Muslim Uyghurs in Xinjiang and have perpetrated widespread sexual violence against local women.
A report from the UN’s High Commissioner for Human Rights, released in August last year, concluded that “serious human rights violations have been committed,” including “arbitrary and discriminatory detention of members of Uyghur and other predominantly Muslim groups” which, it asserted, “may constitute international crimes, in particular crimes against humanity.” When the Matichon Group was criticized by, for instance Tyler Roney writing for Foreign Policy, for striking a deal with Xinhua, the response from a Khaosod editor was that “there are two sides to a story” and “we believe in the judgment of our readers.”
Elsewhere in the region, government-controlled TV stations in Laos, Cambodia and Timor Leste have links with Chinese media firms. In Cambodia, the government has also created a new set of rules governing its domestic internet which copies China’s internet laws. In Vietnam, whose relations with China have not, to say the least, always been smooth, the authorities have emulated not only China’s model of state power but also implemented new cyberspace legislation akin to that in China.
Kurlantzick also points out that in Myanmar, “the junta government, which seized power in February 2021, quickly tried to implement new cyberspace laws and regulations similar to China’s internet laws.” Xinhua frequently quotes news material from junta mouthpieces such as The Global New Light of Myanmar and The Mirror. Chinese state media has also signed content-sharing deals with Chinese-language outlets in Myanmar, at least at some stage, while in 2012, China Radio International signed an agreement with Myanmar state TV to broadcast Chinese shows.
More controversially, in 2018 the Dehong Group in Yunnan that publishes Pauk Phaw entered into a content-sharing agreement with the Myitkyina News Journal, which before the coup was one of Kachin State’s most respected newspapers. Myitkyina News Journal’s editors stated after the deal was struck that they had hoped to get sources in China. The paper is still being published, but as a website and on Facebook. Several of its editors had to flee after the 2021 coup.
Naturally, since it examines a global media effort, Kurlantzick’s book deals with not only Southeast Asia’s media, but also the rest of the world and especially Africa, where China’s often not-so-subtle charm offensive has been easier to observe and discern. The book is a brilliant account of how Beijing’s multi-pronged campaign is unfolding, and it should be read by anyone interested in press freedom and what China’s leaders are doing to manipulate the media throughout the world, so as to control democratic forces at home and in other countries..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2023-01-05
Date of entry/update:
2023-01-05
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
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