Human Rights and international relations
Individual Documents
Description:
"On 1 February 2021 the Myanmar armed forces (known as the Tatmadaw) seized control of the country following a general election that the National League for Democracy (NLD) party won by a landslide. The military junta that the Tatmadaw established to run the country is officially known as the State Administration Council (SAC). Over the period February–November 2021 hundreds of people, including children, were killed and many injured during nationwide Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) protests against the coup and violent SAC crackdowns on those opposing it.
Doctors and nurses were arrested for providing medical care to protesters, health workers were injured while providing care to protesters, ambulances were destroyed, and health facilities were raided. In the first few months of 2022 health care in Myanmar continued to be under attack.
By the end of 2021 what began as an urban-based protest movement had escalated into a wider conflict extending into the countryside. In September the opposition National Unity Government (NUG) declared war on the Tatmadaw. Shortly after, the Tatmadaw began a brutal offensive throughout the country, razing villages, damaging or destroying health infrastructure with artillery or air strikes, and blocking medical aid to opposition-controlled areas.
This update to the one-year report published in February has been prepared by Insecurity Insight, as part of the Safeguarding Health in Conflict Coalition (SHCC). It highlights reported incidents of violence against health workers, facilities, and transport in Myanmar between 1 January and 31 March 2022 to highlight the impact on the health system as a whole. It does not include information on violence against patients. It is drawn from credible information that is available in local, national, and international news outlets, online databases, and social media reports..."
Source/publisher:
Insecurity Insight (Geneva) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of publication:
2022-05-24
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-24
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Anti-coup protesters, Public Health, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Format :
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418.12 KB
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Description:
"(Tokyo, May 23, 2022) – A Myanmar air force lieutenant colonel who received military training in Japan is deployed with forces that have been implicated in serious abuses in Myanmar’s central Magway Region, Human Rights Watch and Justice For Myanmar said today. The Japanese government should immediately halt its training program and investigate whether other program participants are involved in operations involving laws-of-war violations.Myanmar Air Force Lt. Col. Hlwan Moe received training at Japan’s Air Command and Staff College from August 2016 to March 2017, according to the All Japan Defense Association and a defense ministry document. A media outlet reported that Hlwan Moe is a deputy commander, and two well-connected sources said he is based at Magway Air Base. Heavy fighting in the Magway Region since the February 2021 coup, including armed clashes and airstrikes, has displaced over 50,000 civilians. The Myanmar military has committed summary executions, arson, and other abuses, including possible indiscriminate airstrikes in Magway, media have reported.“The Myanmar military’s long history of committing war crimes with impunity should have been enough evidence for Japan that its military training program was going to risk making Japan complicit in atrocities,” said Teppei Kasai, Asia program officer at Human Rights Watch. “The Japanese government should give up its absurd, wishful thinking that its training program can change the Myanmar military’s abusive culture.”
Hlwan Moe’s name, rank, position, and military ID 2321 are identified in a list of Myanmar air force personnel reportedly involved in airstrikes since 2021 that was leaked to Khit Thit Media, a Myanmar media group that published it in January 2022. Two sources with connections to Myanmar military personnel, who reviewed Hlwan Moe’s photograph, confirmed his name, military ID and rank.
Since 2015, the Japanese government has accepted cadets and officers from Myanmar under article 100 of the Self-Defense Forces Act, which permits training and educating foreign nationals in Defense Ministry facilities with the defense minister’s approval. In 2021, following the coup, Japan accepted two cadets and two officers. In 2022, Japan again accepted two cadets and two officers for training.
Human Rights Watch in December 2021 called on the Japanese government to immediately suspend the training program because it risks making Japan complicit in military atrocities. At the time, a Japanese Defense Ministry official replied that the ministry did not have any information about what the cadets and officers trained in Japan were doing once back in Myanmar.
During a parliamentary committee session on security on April 26, 2022, however, a Defense Ministry official said the defense ministry “knows to a certain extent” what “positions” they currently hold, but declined to disclose any details due to Japan’s “relationship” with “the other country.” For decades, the Myanmar military has been responsible for war crimes in long-running armed conflicts with ethnic armed groups, and crimes against humanity and acts of genocide against ethnic Rohingya in Rakhine State.Since the February 2021 coup, junta security forces have carried out serious abuses including mass killings, torture, arbitrary arrests, and indiscriminate attacks on civilians that amount to crimes against humanity and war crimes. The security forces have killed over 1,800 people, including at least 130 children, and arbitrarily arrested over 13,000, according to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners. The military has expanded abusive operations in ethnic minority areas and against anti-junta armed groups, displacing more than 550,000 people, while deliberately blocking aid to populations in need as a form of collective punishment.
The military has carried out targeted and indiscriminate attacks on civilians, including airstrikes and heavy artillery barrages, causing loss of life and property. Accounts from displaced people and aid workers suggest that the junta has continued to use the military’s longstanding “four cuts” strategy, in which the armed forces maintain control of an area by isolating and terrorizing the civilian population. The United Nations special rapporteur on human rights in Myanmar, in his February report on government weapons sales to the Myanmar military, said that jet aircraft, attack helicopters, armored vehicles, light and heavy artillery, missiles, and rockets were being used against civilians.Since the coup, the Japanese government has called for a restoration of democratic rule and the release of elected government officials, including Aung San Suu Kyi. On March 28, 2021, Japan’s Defense Ministry issued a joint statement with 11 other countries criticizing the military’s attacks against “unarmed civilians.” The Japanese government halted new non-humanitarian Official Development Assistance (ODA) projects earlier in 2021 while allowing existing aid projects to continue. The Japanese Diet passed a resolution in June that condemned the coup and called for a “swift restoration of the democratic political system.”
“It is inexcusable for Japan to continue to train cadets from the Myanmar military, knowing that it commits atrocity crimes,” said Yadanar Maung, spokesperson for Justice For Myanmar. “Japan’s cadet training program emboldens the junta and provides support to military personnel that may be used in the commission of crimes against the people of Myanmar. We call on the Japanese government to immediately halt these trainings and take concrete steps to stop the Myanmar military from committing grave violations, including ending business with the Myanmar military and its conglomerates.”
Source/publisher:
Justice For Myanmar
Date of publication:
2022-05-23
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-23
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
Format :
pdf pdf
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79.08 KB 100.21 KB
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Sub-title:
US, Japan, India, Australia Should Address Crises Across Region
Description:
"(Tokyo) – Leaders of the United States, Japan, India, and Australia should reach agreements on new measures to address human rights crises and democratic backsliding in Asia, Human Rights Watch said today. The Quad, a security alliance of the leaders of the four countries, is meeting in Tokyo on May 22, 2022.
“The Quad needs to place Asia’s massive human rights and humanitarian crises at the heart of its discussions and decisions,” said John Sifton, Asia advocacy director at Human Rights Watch. “Although each has vastly different causes and features, the human rights crises in Afghanistan, Myanmar, North Korea, and Sri Lanka should all be high on the security agenda.”
A central purpose of the Quad alliance is to counter the rising authoritarian influence of the Chinese government in Asia. To advance that goal, the Quad needs to better promote human rights institutions, democratic governance, and the rule of law domestically and regionally, Human Rights Watch said. Quad leaders should reach common positions on addressing major human rights crises in the region and speak publicly on specific concerns.
On Myanmar, Quad leaders need to move beyond relying on the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and its failed “five point consensus.” Quad leaders, along with like-minded ASEAN members Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore, should agree on a stronger, coordinated effort to steer the Myanmar junta toward reform, including by increasing restrictions on its foreign currency revenues and weapons purchases.
Like-minded countries should develop a clear, time-bound approach to pressure the junta to end its abuses. The approach should include imposing and better enforcing new sanctions on oil and gas revenues, as well as on human rights abusers and military entities. Quad countries should support a United Nations Security Council resolution imposing a global arms embargo on Myanmar, which purchases large amounts of weapons from both China and Russia.
On Afghanistan, Quad leaders should agree to coordinate with other governments to press the Taliban to abandon their restrictive and abusive policies and practices, including bans on women’s secondary schooling and restrictions on women’s travel, employment, and dress. Japan, India, and Australia should urge the US to reach an agreement with Taliban authorities about restrictions in place on the Afghanistan Central Bank and on World Bank-administered assistance for education and health. These restrictions are severely exacerbating the country’s economic situation and are driving its humanitarian crisis.
On North Korea, Quad leaders should agree to integrate human rights issues into diplomatic approaches and support including human rights benchmarks in any future negotiations with Kim Jong Un and the North Korean government. They should also discuss outreach to the government to offer assistance to address the gravely deteriorating economic and humanitarian situation and the new Covid-19 outbreak.
On Sri Lanka, Quad leaders should recognize that the roots of the country’s current economic and political crisis lie in longstanding corruption and a lack of transparency, and that the route to stability and economic recovery depends on increasing respect for human rights, strengthening the rule of law, and ensuring accountability. The Quad should support economic programs, including from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), that seek to protect the most vulnerable from the worst effects of the economic crisis, while promoting political reforms to better protect fundamental rights and seek justice for past abuses.
Quad leaders should recognize that their credibility to speak on human rights abuses also requires addressing the many deficiencies in their own records. Human Rights Watch has extensively raised serious human rights issues for decades with the governments of the US, Japan, India, and Australia.
“The Quad should recognize that working to improve the human rights of people in Asia is consistent with addressing the authoritarianism of the Chinese government,” Sifton said. “Genuine security in the region depends on people in Asia being able to fully exercise their fundamental human rights and democratic freedoms.”..."
Source/publisher:
"Human Rights Watch" (USA)
Date of publication:
2022-05-19
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-19
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Burma/Myanmar's Foreign relations, general, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
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Title: 17th May, International Day Against Homophobia, Biphobia and Transphobia (IDAHOBIT) Statement
Description:
"Today marks the International Day Against Homophobia, Biphobia and Transphobia
(IDAHOBIT) with the theme of "Our Bodies, Our Lives, Our Rights”. This year's theme is a
reminder that every individual as a human being has a right to live free and in dignity. Acts of
discrimination, intimidation, or harassment in any sphere, whether public or private, based on
a person's manifestation or expression of their sexual orientation, gender identity or gender
expression must be condemned.
While the world is celebrating the International Day Against Homophobia, Biphobia, and
Transphobia globally, LGBTIO people in Myanmar are facing sexual assault, targeted arrests,
torture, and gender-based violence perpetrated by the illegal military junta.
Following the military Coup of the 1st February 2021, the LGBTQ community marched in the
streets alongside other communities to protest against the military takeover and call for the
return o f democracy. Consequently, we suffered the loss o f many LGBTQ at the hands o f the
military. Many queer people have been unlawfully detained or were issued warrants for their
arrests by the military. Many had to flee, have been displaced or are in hiding due to being
aggressively pursued. Records show that many LGBTQ individuals, who worked in the
government sectors participate in the civil disobedience movement, the vital pail o f the
revolution.
If arrested, members o f the LGBTQ community are held in prisons that reflect their gender at
bhth - leaving them especially vulnerable to sexual abuse and verbal and physical humiliation
and discrimination by officers. Torture during interrogation is rife for all prisoners, such as
whipping, electric shocks, burning with cigarettes, guards who whip their genitalia against the
victim's faces, and rape them with guns and bottles. Transgender women in male jails are also
subjected to rape, sexual assault, and abuse by other prisoners due to their gender identity.
The Ministry of Human Rights hereby commemorates the fallen LGBTIQ heroes, who risked
then lives fighting for democracy. We hereby honour the LGBTIQ heroes who are actively
contributing to the Spring Revolution across the country.
The Ministry of Human Rights also empathizes with LGBTIQ citizens whose human rights
were violated by the military, and we memorialize then bravery for speaking out on this
International Day Against Homophobia, Biphobia and Transphobia. We salute the LGBTIQ
community members who stood up for freedom, safety, justice, and equality throughout the
history of military regime, and those who still resist the military regime to this day.
The Ministry of Human Rights pledges to fight alongside the LGBTIQ community for the
respect of their basic human rights and support all those who aspire to build a federal
democratic Myanmar that values equality and celebrates diversity..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Human Rights
Date of publication:
2022-05-17
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-17
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Human Rights and international relations, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
Language:
Format :
pdf pdf
Size:
105.01 KB 263.5 KB
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Description:
"
17th May, International Day Against Homophobia, Biphobia and Transphobia (IDAHOBIT) Statement..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Human Rights
Date of publication:
2022-05-17
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-17
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Human Rights and international relations, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
325.06 KB
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Description:
"The MIMU 5W gathers inputs from participating humanitarian and development agencies on Who is doing What,
Where, When and for Whom across Myanmar. It is normally conducted every 6 months and provides information on agencies’ activities at various levels (village/village tract/township, and IDP camps).
In total, 209 agencies participated in the March 2022 round of the MIMU 5W, providing information on their humanitarian and development activities across 22 sectors and 157 sub-sectors as defined by technical/sector working groups. 5W reporting is quite comprehensive for projects of INGO, UN and Red Cross agencies, but there is underreporting of activities for local NGOs and CBOs, since not all are participating. Note that Agencies must report to a sufficiently detailed level (village or camp level) for their work to be reflected fully in the MIMU 5W products.
This Overview describes projects reported as under implementation in Rakhine as of March 25th, 2022. Further information on planned and recently completed projects is available from the 5W dataset, which can be requested by 5W Partners. Projects under implementation can also be viewed on our interactive dashboards - 5W Township Dashboard and 5W Village Tract Dashboard.
1. Organisations active in Rakhine State as of March 25th, 2022
In total, 72 agencies reported activities in Rakhine state: 37 are engaged in Development-focused projects (700 village tracts/towns), 26 are engaged in support to other vulnerable groups (not IDP related, 267 village tracts/towns), 32 are engaged in activities which target IDP and Host Communities (419 village tracts/towns and 27 camps) and 22 are active in IDP-focused activities (104 village tracts/towns and 27 camps). IDP-related projects were reported in a total of 30 camps or camp-like settings.
A total of 134 projects were reported in Rakhine State: 41% of the projects involve work with IDPs (54 IDP & Host Community or IDP-only focused projects), and 59% have a focus on other populations (80 Other Vulnerable Groups and/or Development-focused projects).
Non-IDP focused projects (Other Vulnerable Groups and/or Development activities): 57 organisations reported 80 village or township-based projects under implementation in 813 village tracts/towns. The majority are implemented by INGOs. Most of the reported projects are in Maungdaw (68 village tracts/towns), Ponnagyun (64), Buthidaung (63), Rathedaung (59), Thandwe (58), Minbya (57), Mrauk-U (57), Toungup (55), Kyaukpyu (52), Kyauktaw (51), Myebon (47), Ramree (45), Pauktaw (42), Gwa (35), Ann (31), Sittwe (28), Munaung (1).
IDP & Host Community and IDP-only focused activities: 39 organisations reported 54 projects under implementation in 441 village tracts/towns and 30 IDP camps. The majority are implemented by INGOs and UN agencies. Most of these projects are in Ponnagyun (85 village tracts/towns, 0 camp), Rathedaung (67, 0), Minbya (54, 1), Kyauktaw (50, 1), Myebon (48, 2), Buthidaung (38, 0), Mrauk-U (35, 1), Sittwe (23, 18), Maungdaw (21, 0), Pauktaw (15, 6), Ann (3, 0), Kyaukpyu (2, 1)..."
Source/publisher:
Myanmar Information Management Unit (Myanmar) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of publication:
2022-05-12
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-12
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Agriculture in Burma/Myanmar: general and research, Climate Change - Burma/Myanmar: general, Education in Burma/Myanmar - general, Public Health, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
2.66 MB
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Description:
"As leaders from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) meet in the United States for a two-day summit, Amnesty International urges them to spotlight the violence and human rights violations in Myanmar.
“The Five-Point Consensus is a failure and did not stop the Myanmar military from perpetrating more human rights violations against the Myanmar people following the 2021 military coup,” Emerlynne Gil, Amnesty International’s Deputy Regional Director for Research, said.
“The ASEAN must concede that the human rights violations in Myanmar have now become a regional concern. The Myanmar military’s violence against its own people has not only made people feel unsafe but it has also led to the deterioration of the country’s economy. Right now, thousands of people are fleeing or attempting to flee to neighboring countries like Thailand and Malaysia not only to seek safety, but also to find work and feed their families.
“ASEAN Member States should formulate a more detailed blueprint to hold Myanmar’s military accountable for human rights violations and address urgent needs, including committing to non-refoulement of refugees fleeing violence, facilitating desperately needed humanitarian assistance, and adding their voices to calls for a global arms embargo. ASEAN Member States should also act bilaterally to achieve these goals if consensus within the bloc cannot be reached.
“As host of the summit, the Biden administration should center discussions on the ongoing human rights violations in Myanmar and in the region more broadly. The regional trends we’ve seen in recent years – escalating repression, constraints on civil society, and intolerance for political dissent – are antithetical to the free and open Indo-Pacific to which the US government is purportedly committed to supporting and will never be realized if human rights are ignored.”
Background:
Almost all leaders from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations are expected to attend the 12-13 May summit in Washington, which will mark 45 years of US-ASEAN relations.
Myanmar’s Min Aung Hlaing, who seized power in the 1 February, 2021 coup, was not invited as part of efforts to distance the bloc from the senior general, who has not implemented the Five-Point Consensus he agreed to in April 2021.
The Consensus was mainly aimed at stopping the violence against protesters, supplying humanitarian aid, and increasing dialogue. Since it was adopted, the situation in Myanmar has further spiraled out of control. Since the start of this coup, Myanmar’s military has killed more than 1,800 people, according to one monitoring group, and detained more than 10,000.
Armed resistance groups have also sprung up in response to the bloody crackdown, while peaceful protests, though much smaller than at the beginning of the coup, have continued despite grave risks.
Myanmar’s civilian leader Aung San Suu Kyi, who was ousted in the pre-dawn hours of the coup, has been hit with an array of bogus charges and convictions, as have many of her allies..."
Source/publisher:
Amnesty International (UK)
Date of publication:
2022-04-12
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-12
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
ASEAN-Burma relations, Human Rights and international relations, Amnesty International reports on Burma/Myanmar, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
Language:
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Description:
"To the Institute of Economics and Peace:
Dear Steve Killelea, Board of Directors,
As scholars and analysts who specialise in politics and society in Myanmar, we express deep concern over your recent Global Terrorism Index report, in which the Institute of Economics and Peace (IEP) depicts anti-junta resistance in Myanmar as “terrorism”. Indeed, we strongly disagree with your overall depiction of events in Myanmar, which is analytically flawed, morally bankrupt, and politically problematic.
According to your report, the “country with the largest total increases in deaths from terrorism was Myanmar, where the number of people killed rose from 24 in 2020 to 521 in 2021… Anti-junta armed groups were responsible for over half of terrorism deaths in Myanmar in 2021. The majority of deaths occurred during attacks targeting government and military personnel.”
The examples that you cite for what you call “deaths from terrorism” are attacks on military personnel by anti-junta forces, such as:
“Gunmen killed 40 soldiers in the Sagaing region. No group had claimed responsibility, but local media said that anti-junta groups were responsible for the attack“
or a “bomb targeting a military convoy of eight vehicles killed thirty soldiers in the Magway region. The Yesagyo Peoples’ Defence Force, an anti-junta armed group, claimed responsibility for the attack.”
This is analytically flawed. Defining terrorism as targeting military targets contradicts most academic definitions of terrorism, including your own definition on p.6 of the Global Terrorism Index, where you define terrorism as a ‘the systematic threat or use of violence whether for or in opposition to established authority, with the intention of communicating a political, religious or ideological message to a group larger than the victim group, by generating fear and so altering (or attempting to alter) the behaviour of the larger group. Your report consequently exempts “acts of warfare, either irregular or conventional”.
While there is a lack of definite agreement on the phenomenon of terrorism, most academic literature, indeed, differentiates between “guerrilla” and “terrorist” violence for good reason. Guerrillas seek to effectuate political change by targeting the state and its agents. They commonly do so by means of irregular warfare (precisely as in the above examples provided in your report).
Terrorists, in contrast, intentionally target civilians in order to achieve their goals. The direct targets of terrorism (civilians) serve as “message generators” in the process of “violence-based communication” with the main target of terrorism (e.g., the state or society). Their aim is to spark terror amongst civilian populations. Your report cites no such incidents in Myanmar.
This is also why guerrillas can abide by International Humanitarian Law (IHL). In fact, the IHL regulating non-international armed conflict – by Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, as well as Additional Protocol II – renders armed forces as legitimate military targets (terrorist violence stands, by definition, in contradiction of IHL because of its targeting of civilians).
Attacks on soldiers by non-state resistance forces in Myanmar are thus clearly within the bounds of the laws of war as long as they follow the principles of distinction and proportionality. Nothing in your report suggests that they do not. Even if one included attacks on police forces, the situation in Myanmar remains firmly within these legal boundaries. This is because police forces in Myanmar are under direct control of the military, regularly act in support of military troops, and frequently use battlefield-grade weaponry, such as assault rifles. Anti-junta forces do not target civilians in order to generate fear and alter the behavior of a larger group. They target their state opponent directly.
But presenting non-state armed resistance forces that engage in irregular warfare against legitimate military targets as terrorists is not only analytically flawed. It is also morally bankrupt given a context of state terrorism, i.e., a situation where the state itself uses indiscriminate violence against civilian populations in order to punish and intimidate its opponents. A truthful report of the biggest terrorist attacks in Myanmar in the past year, would thus not be the killing of 40 soldiers in Sagaing or 30 soldiers in Magwai, as cited in your report.
Instead, the biggest terrorist attacks in the last year were the massacres in Hlaing Tharyar in March 2021 and Bago, where security forces killed more than 65 and 80 unarmed civilians during peaceful protests respectively. And, this is just the tip of the iceberg of state terrorism in Myanmar, where security forces have committed countless atrocities for decades, including genocide, and continue doing so, for instance, through systematically destroying civilian settlements across Myanmar, in what the United Nations special envoy for human rights in Myanmar, rightly describes as “a campaign of terror”.
Notwithstanding these disturbing shortcomings, international think tanks like yours produce “facts” about the world, breaking down complex politics into easily digestible pieces of information for political stakeholders, including policymakers. This is why the distortion of reality in your report ultimately becomes politically problematic. It serves to delegitimize the legitimate and lawful actions of anti-junta guerrillas in Myanmar as unlawful terrorism. In doing so, your report mobilizes the same narrative as the military junta in Myanmar. In effect – and in contradiction to its claim of being non-partisan – the IEP is legitimizing and normalizing a terror regime that has illegally toppled a democratically elected government and couped itself to power.
We thus demand that IEP retracts or corrects the sections of your report related to Myanmar, bringing the depicted empirical reality into compliance with academic definitions of terrorism, including your own. Moreover, we demand a public statement that includes an apology to the anti-junta forces in Myanmar for your wrongful depiction of their legitimate and lawful resistance.
Sincerely,
Dr David Brenner, Lecturer, Department of International Relations, University of Sussex
Georg Bauer, PhD candidate, Department of History, University of Vienna
Dr Hans Steinmüller, Associate Professor, Department of Anthropology, LSE
Dr Laurence Cox, Associate Professor, National University of Ireland Maynooth
Dr. Charlie Thame, Assistant Professor, Faculty of Political Science, Thammasat University
Dr John Buchanan, Associate, Asia Center, Harvard University
Dr Ronan Lee, Doctoral Prize Fellow, Loughborough University London
Dr. Su Lin Lewis, Associate Professor, University of Bristol
Dr. Jonathan Saha, Associate Professor, University of Durham
Dr Chika Watanabe, Senior Lecturer, University of Manchester
Dr Alexandre Pelletier, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Laval University
Dr Jenny Hedström, Associate Professor, Swedish Defence University
Dr Matthew J Walton, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Toronto
Dr Elisabeth Olivius, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, Umeå University
Professor Bridget Anderson, University of Bristol
Associate Professor Anthony Ware, School of Humanities & Social Sciences, Deakin University, Australia
Dr. Gerard McCarthy, Research Fellow, National University of Singapore Asia Research Institute
Htet Min Lwin, PhD student, Department of Humanities, York University, Toronto
Dr Adam Simpson, Senior Lecturer, International Studies, University of South Australia
Dr Morten B. Pedersen, Senior Lecturer, International Politics, University of New South Wales Canberra
Christopher Lamb, Honorary Associate Professor, University of Melbourne; President, Australia Myanmar Institute
Dr Joseph Lo Bianco, Emeritus Professor, Melbourne Graduate School of Education, University of Melbourne
Dr Charlotte Galloway, Honorary Associate Professor, Australian National University, Canberra
Dr Patrick Meehan, Department of Development Studies, SOAS University of London
Kim Jolliffe, independent researcher focused on security and conflict in Myanmar
Dr Kevin Woods, Research Fellow, East-West Center, Hawai’i
Dr Susan Banki, Senior Lecturer, University of Sydney
Dr Nick Cheesman, Associate Professor, Australian National University
Dr Kate Crosby, Professor of Buddhist Studies, King’s College, London
Luke James Corbin, PhD Researcher, Australian National University
Dr Kristina Kironska, Senior Researcher, Palacky University Olomouc
Dr. Mike McGovern, Professor, University of Michigan
Dr. Elliott Prasse-Freeman, Assistant Professor, National University of Singapore
Kei Nemoto, Professor, Sophia University, Tokyo
Adam Czarnota, Professor, Wroclaw University, Wroclaw & Honorary Associate Professor, UNSW Sydney
Dr. Leedom Lefferts, Carolina Asia Center, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, North Carolina
Prof. Dr. Judith Beyer, Head of the Working Group “Social and Political Anthropology”, University of Konstanz. Germany
Dominique Dillabough-Lefebvre, PhD Candidate, Department of Anthropology, LSE
Chu May Paing, PhD Researcher, University of Colorado Boulder
Dr. Sai Latt, Research Affiliate, York University, Toronto, Canada, Chiangmai University, Thailand
Anders Kirstein Moeller, PhD Student, Department of Geography, NUS
Dr. Nicola Tannenbaum, Emeritus Professor of Anthropology, Lehigh University, Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, USA
Tharaphi Than, Associate Professor, Northern Illinois University
Dr Tin Mar Oo, MSc Student, Post Graduate School of Politics and Science, University of Edinburgh
Kristian Stokke, Professor, Department of Sociology and Human Geography, University of Oslo
Dr Peter Bjorklund, Independent post-doc Researcher, University of Manchester, United Kingdom
Dr Michael Edwards, Postdoctoral Fellow, University of Cambridge
Dr Sharon Bell, Independent Researcher, Aotearoa, New Zealand
Dr Leanne M. Kelly, Postdoctoral Research Fellow, Deakin University, Melbourne
Dr Johanna Garnett, Lecturer in Peace Studies, University of New England, Armidale
Dr Bill Vistarini, Australian National University (Retired)
Dr Anne Décobert, Lecturer, School of Social and Political Sciences, The University of Melbourne
Matt Schissler, Doctoral Candidate, Department of Anthropology, University of Michigan
Godwin Yidana, PhD Researcher in Peace Studies, University of New England, Armidale, Australia.
Professor Melissa Crouch, Faculty of Law & Justice, University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia
Dr Renaud Egreteau, Associate Professor, Department of Asian and International Studies, City University of Hong Kong
Dorothy Mason, Researcher, Department of Political and Social Change, Australian National University
Dr. Roger Lee Huang, Lecturer in Counterterrorism and Political Violence, Macquarie University
Dr. Wen-Chin Chang, Research Fellow, Academia Sinica
Moe Thuzar, Doctoral Candidate, History Department, National University of Singapore
Dr Yuri Takahashi, Lecturer in Burmese, Australian National University
Aung Kaung Myat, MPhil Candidate, University of Hong Kong
Peter Suante, PhD Researcher, The Department of Education, The University of Hong Kong
Dr R.J. May, Emeritus Fellow, Australian National University
Dr. Lisa Brooten, Associate Professor, College of Arts and Media, Southern Illinois University Carbondale, USA
Dr Michael Breen, Senior Lecturer in Public Policy, The University of Melbourne
Dr Vicki-Ann Ware, Senior Lecturer, School of Humanities and Social Sciences, Deakin University, Australia
Mr. Tual Sawn Khai, PhD researcher in Sociology and Social Policy, School of Graduate Studies, Lingnan University, Hong Kong
Professor Bill Pritchard, Professor in Human Geography, The University of Sydney
Jack Jenkins Hill, PhD candidate, Department of Anthropology, University College London (UCL)
David Scott Mathieson, Independent analyst and author specializing on Burma
Dr Cecile Medail, Visiting Fellow, Department of Political and Social Change, Australian National University
Dr Elisabeth Jean Wood, Co-Director of Agrarian Studies and Professor of Political Science, International and Area Studies, Yale University
Dr. Rosalie Metro, Assistant Teaching Professor, Department of Learning, Teaching, and Curriculum, University of Missouri-Columbia
Dr Tomas Cole, Department of Social Anthropology, Stockholm University
Dr Dominique Caouette, Professor of Political Science, Université de Montréal
Prof. David I. Steinberg, Distinguished Professor of Asian Studies Emeritus, Georgetown University
James F. Cerretani, Goldsmiths, University of London, Anthropology
Dr Elin Bjarnegård, Associate Professor, Department of Government, Uppsala University
Martin Smith, author and independent analyst on conflict in Myanmar
Siew Han Yeo, PhD Candidate, University of Toronto
Dr Anna Plunket, Lecturer in International Relations, King’s College London
Dr Jasnea Sarma, Lecturer in Political Geography, University of Zurich
Minn Tent Bo, London based Independent Consultant focused on human rights, democracy and elections in Myanmar
Leigh Mitchell, London-based Independent Consultant focused on governance, development finance/effectiveness and investment in Myanmar
Samia C. Akhter-Khan, PhD candidate, Department of Health Service & Population Research, King’s College London
Ambassador Kelley Currie (ret.)
Dr Andrew Fagan, Director of Human Rights Centre, at the University of Essex
Nora Wuttke, PhD Researcher, SOAS University of London
Catherine Morris, Independent researcher, and Associate of the Centre for Asia-Pacific Initiatives, University of Victoria
Prof. James C. Scott, Sterling Professor of Political Science and Anthropology, Yale University
Professor Lee Jones, Professor of Political Economy and International Relations, Queen Mary University of London
Dr Liyun Wendy Choo, Professional Teaching Fellow, University of Auckland
Dr Sally Bamford, Alumni, Australian National University
Dr. Francesco Buscemi, Research Fellow, Einaudi Foundation
Dr Justine Chambers, Postdoctoral Researcher, Danish Institute for International Studies
Professor Kirsten McConnachie, Professor of Socio-Legal Studies, Faculty of Law, University of East Anglia
Professor Martin Krygier AM, Gordon Samuels Professor of Law and Social Theory, University of New South Wales, Sydney
Ponpavi Sangsuradej, PhD Researcher. Faculty of History. SOAS, University of London
Alex Moodie, PhD Candidate, School of Government and International Affairs, Durham University
Vishnu Prasad, PhD Candidate, Department of Geography & Environment, London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE)
Paul Taylor, Technical Adviser and Independent Myanmar Researcher
Dr. Stephen Campbell, Assistant Professor, School of Social Sciences, Nanyang Technological University
Dr. Ardeth Maung Thawnghmung, Professor, Political Science Department, University of Massachusetts Lowell
Thawng Za Pum, Doctoral student, Institute of Political Science, University of Erlangen–Nuremberg
Francesca Chiu, PhD Researcher, School of International Development, University of East Anglia
Oren Samet, PhD Candidate, Department of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley
Greg Tyrosvoutis, EdD Candidate, Department of Leadership, Higher and Adult Education, University of Toronto
Richard Roewer, Research Fellow, German Institute for Global and Area Studies, DPhil Student, University of Oxford
Dr Kerstin Duell, Goethe University Frankfurt
Khin Thet San, Research Fellow, South Asia Institute, SOAS, University of London
Dr Stefano Ruzza, Associate Professor, Department of Cultures, Politics and Society, University of Turin..."
Source/publisher:
"Tea Circle" (Myanmar)
Date of publication:
2022-05-11
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-11
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Economy and social justice (global), Human Rights and international relations, The Burmese military's role in the economy
Language:
more
Sub-title:
As conflicts continue and global priorities change, even the most sympathetic communities can lose their enthusiasm for hosting
Description:
"Countries in Europe have opened their borders and homes to Ukrainians fleeing Russian aggression. Of course, Ukrainians are far from the first group of refugees to need shelter and welcome from host countries.
Refugees are vulnerable people who, because of limited opportunities in refugee camps, can be exposed to human trafficking, criminal activities, drug peddling, prostitution and radicalization.
There have already been concerns that Ukrainian refugees are being targeted for human or sex trafficking by organized groups and individuals.
But a refugee crisis doesn’t simply end with placing vulnerable, often traumatized people in congested camps or even family homes. As conflicts continue and global priorities change, even the most sympathetic communities can lose their enthusiasm for hosting.
Bangladesh, a highly populated country with its own challenges and resource constraints, has become in the last five years one of the leading countries hosting displaced people.
More than one million Rohingya refugees from Myanmar entered Bangladesh in 2017, living mainly in makeshift camps in Ukhiya and Teknaf, two areas in the Cox’s Bazar district.
In the early days, Bangladeshi communities were lauded for their response to the influx of Rohingya refugees, providing lifesaving assistance before the state, non-governmental organizations and the international community.
The Bangladeshi government has been working with various humanitarian actors to ensure that various essential needs such as food, shelter, cooking materials, healthcare and education are met in the camps.
But any positive camp conditions are overshadowed by government policies that restrict the Rohingyas’ movement and right to work. What’s more, in 2019 barbed wire was erected around the camps.
Although host communities were initially highly compassionate and supportive, recently there has been tension. The situation is an example of how sympathetic communities can become frustrated, angry or even hostile over time.
We believe this can offer some important insights into how the Ukrainian refugee crisis could play out if the enthusiasm and resources dry up in the coming months.
We interviewed 20 members of the host community and 20 Bangladeshi humanitarian workers, who described a decline in sympathy towards the Rohingyas. The findings surprised us and may not be representative of the entire Rohingya population living in Bangladesh.
We interviewed Rohingya refugees for a previous study and found that they felt extremely grateful to the Bangladeshi hosts for their hospitality. But, host communities’ increasingly negative perception of Rohingya refugees threatens their peaceful coexistence. As one humanitarian worker said:
Many local people had to abandon their houses and land that are now located inside the Rohingya camps. After the settlement of Rohingyas in the camps, when [locals] tried to access or use their lands again, they were regularly countered by the Rohingyas who are very compact as a group. People [locals] once welcomed are now quite aggressive towards them, [which has] resulted in violent clashes.
There have been many allegations leveled against the Rohingyas, including that they are involved in radical extremist activities and pose security threats. Bangladesh’s prime minister has openly called the Rohingyas a “burden.”
Rohingyas in Bangladeshi camps have been lured by criminal gangs and human traffickers and become involved in various criminal activities and drug peddling. One community leader cited this as a factor behind the recent contempt, saying they are taking part in “evil deeds.”
Bangladesh officially recognizes the Rohingyas as “Forcibly Displaced Myanmar Nationals” instead of refugees, which prevents them from being able to work. Recent evidence suggests that as a result of this, many Rohingyas have resorted to petty crimes and theft. As one humanitarian worker told us:
Previously, there were very few incidents but now, these are frequent. Every night something is being stolen from the houses of the local community. Also, thousands of humanitarian workers live here and usually possess mobile phones, laptops or other electronic items. Their houses are also targets for theft.
Like in the early days of the current Rohingya crisis, there has been a certain amount of positivity and enthusiasm about hosting Ukrainian refugees. However, there might also be some early signs of exhaustion and a tinge of skepticism, as we have observed in Bangladesh.
If a crisis is dealt with on an ad-hoc basis and not addressed as a long-term issue, refugees may turn to alternative risky opportunities which might put them in harm’s way. As we have seen in Bangladesh, this could jeopardize the whole objective of supporting the refugees.
There are concerns about the resource availability that would be required to host the large number of Ukrainian refugees. Already, there is evidence that some Ukrainians may be taken advantage of through the systems designed to help them.
It is important to have a longer-term plan for jobs, safety and healthcare among the hosting governments, EU, UN bodies and civil society organizations that are actively involved in hosting the Ukrainian refugees, so the situation does not follow the precedent set in Bangladesh.
Palash Kamruzzaman is Senior Lecturer in Social Policy, University of South Wales, and Bulbul Siddiqi, Associate Professor in Anthropology and Sociology, North South University.
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article..."
Source/publisher:
"Asia Times" (Hong Kong)
Date of publication:
2022-05-11
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-11
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Arakan (Rakhine) State - reports etc. by date (latest first), Rohingya (cultural, political etc.), Human Rights and international relations
Language:
more
Description:
"The United Nations Secretary-General's Special Envoy on Myanmar, Noeleen Heyzer, welcomes the convening of the Consultative Meeting on ASEAN Humanitarian Assistance to Myanmar on 6 May and strongly urges ASEAN leaders and donors to prioritise principled engagement with diverse local humanitarian networks to effectively deliver aid to all communities in need.
Over the past few months, the Special Envoy has held extensive engagements with some of Myanmar’s civil society organisations and local humanitarian networks who have been at the frontline in addressing the widening crisis amid escalating violence and increasing displaced populations. These groups have called for unhindered and safe humanitarian access to facilitate delivery of assistance without discrimination. The key messages from local humanitarian networks are clear: there is a need for the utmost respect of international humanitarian law and humanitarian principles; urgently needed humanitarian aid must not be instrumentalised for political purposes; military infrastructure must not be legitimised through aid delivery; and there is a need not only for more donor funding but also for donor flexibility to support local humanitarian actors and networks with access to hard-to-reach conflict affected areas, including internally displaced people, border communities and civilians affected by conflict, including in urban areas.
In Myanmar’s currently violent, unstable and insecure context, effective delivery of humanitarian aid requires firm commitment by all aid actors to adhere to international humanitarian law. Given the complexity of Myanmar’s conflict it is imperative that humanitarian assistance is delivered through a diverse range of channels, without discrimination or favour, and reaches the most vulnerable in every part of the country. Safe and unimpeded access for all aid actors is non-negotiable. It is imperative that we build strong, effective and equal partnerships with local and informal humanitarian networks, who have unique access, local knowledge and established trust on the ground, to support the delivery of humanitarian assistance to the people, especially in the hardest-to-reach areas, including through cross border assistance.
We must recognise the current conflict has a disproportionate impact on women and children. The Special Envoy's consultations with women community leaders have highlighted the urgent need for humanitarian support and protection for women and children, capacity building to address gender-based violence and stronger connection to regional and global women leaders. The Special Envoy urges the global community to give women a key role in any humanitarian consultation, as women can help identify the most vulnerable and help monitor effective delivery along humanitarian principles. Reflective of the Secretary-General's commitment to the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda, we must actively engage women to fully address the humanitarian and protection needs of the people and amplify their voices for a future federal democratic union of peace, stability and shared prosperity..."
Source/publisher:
United Nations Myanmar
Date of publication:
2022-05-03
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-10
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, ASEAN-Burma relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
more
Description:
"An international terrorism monitor missed the mark when it labeled a resistance attack on soldiers as terrorism, which may only serve to embolden the real terrorists in Myanmar: the military.
A defining feature of military rule in Myanmar has been the use of mass violence against civilians to cause terror for political gain.
From massacres of unarmed protesters, to late-night raids and often fatal torture sessions, to burning down entire villages where resistance forces operate and slaughtering their civilian inhabitants: every successful tactic the military has used to quash dissent has been rooted in creating fear.
It’s textbook terrorism. As the country crumbles around them, instilling terror in the hearts of the general population seems to be the only thing the junta is any good at. So it came as a surprise to many when the Institute for Economics and Peace indicated a rise in terrorism in Myanmar not due to heinous military violence, but due to resistance attacks.
Perplexingly, IEP’s 2022 Global Terrorism Index report said the “most devastating” attack of 2021 in Myanmar was when resistance forces killed 40 soldiers in Sagaing Region’s Katha Township on September 20. IEP says it uses TerrorismTracker to collect data, and it supposedly does not include “irregular or conventional” warfare. It’s hard to understand, therefore, how killing 40 enemy troops during a civil war could be classified as terrorism.
The report does not include any of the many military massacres of unarmed civilians, such as the slaughter of over 60 protesters in Hlaing Tharyar in March 2021, or the killing of more than 80 in Bago the following month. There’s no consistent definition of terrorism that could include killing soldiers in battle but not encompass massacring civilians with the intention of making the rest of the population too afraid to resist. It seems to hinge entirely on the idea that violence is the sole purview of the state.
Given the junta seized power illegally, has no representation at the United Nations, and hasn’t been officially recognised as the government of Myanmar by even one country, the Tatmadaw is closer to a rogue militant group than a professional armed force, let alone a state or government.
While TerrorismTracker also excludes deaths caused by “civil unrest”, this is an overly broad term that could apply to almost anything. It also appears IEP uses it inconsistently. In the 2017, 2019 and 2020 Global Terrorism Index reports, IEP included attacks on protesters in Afghanistan and Iraq in its list of terrorist attacks. Why would these incidents qualify, while the military’s crackdowns do not?
One explanation might be preconceived notions about what terrorism looks like. At its core, the Myanmar military is a racial and religious extremist group that often ludicrously justifies its use of violence as necessary to protect Buddhism. Swap that out for Islam and maybe IEP would have an easier time seeing it as a terrorist organisation.
There are some attacks that have been attributed to resistance groups that could qualify as terrorism. Bombing electricity offices with the intention of making civilians too afraid to pay their electricity bills, for example. These incidents could and should be included, although it seems likely that a fair accounting would show the military has committed more terrorist attacks, with higher civilian casualties, than the resistance.
If IEP wants to measure attacks on security forces or general non-state violence, then by all means include resistance attacks on soldiers and police. But don’t call it terrorism without a more consistent definition of what that actually means.
This is where it gets tricky. There is no universal, international standard for terrorism, partly because the term is so politically charged. Most definitions include acts of violence designed to intimidate a population or to influence a government or international organisation.
The terrorism label also has implications for perceptions of legitimacy. The junta has not only declared anti-coup armed groups to be terrorist organisations, but also the National Unity Government, in an attempt to discredit them. The fact is though, that the NUG was appointed by elected lawmakers, while the military junta illegally seized power after losing an election. By calling resistance attacks terrorism, but not using the term to describe the military, IEP has taken a side in the legitimacy dispute while presenting itself as neutral.
This matters because the Global Terrorism Index report could actually cause more acts of terrorism in Myanmar, by giving more fodder to the military’s propaganda machine. The junta has long justified its use of disproportionate violence by claiming that all its opponents are terrorists – even unarmed peaceful protesters.
In 2021, the BBC investigated a series of military massacres committed in July that left 40 civilians dead in Kani Township, also in Sagaing Region. Junta spokesperson Zaw Min Tun later justified the shocking tactics by describing resistance fighters as terrorists, and insisting the military was “using appropriate force in order to achieve a reasonable level of security”.
The IEP report did not mention these massacres – but by labelling resistance attacks as terrorism it helped bolster the military’s excuse for committing them. The risk is that if the military thinks this delusional narrative is gaining traction internationally, it will only feel emboldened to continue using outrageous violence. The result will be more deaths, more destruction and more terror in Myanmar..."
Source/publisher:
"Frontier Myanmar" (Myanmar)
Date of publication:
2022-05-10
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-10
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
more
Description:
"Hlyan Htet, 6, keeps close to his mother these days and does not venture far. “I have friends, but my best friend is a dog from downstairs. We play every evening together,” says Hlyan Htet.
Although Hlyan Htet’s innocent charm shines through, his mother, Hnin Hnin, says the events of the past two years have taken their toll on him. “I was having problems in my marriage, then the first wave of COVID-19 came, and then the current crisis unfolded, one after the other.”
The COVID-19 pandemic has disrupted Hlyan Htet’s early education and socialization. At first, “Mommy taught me at home,” Hlyan Htet says. Fortunately, Hlyan Htet has access to the Internet and he is still excited by his lessons offered online via Zoom.
“I also love drawing,” says Hlyan Htet.
However, the distressing circumstances of last year’s events has had a huge impact on Hlyan Htet. “My son started having trouble controlling his emotions and became overly attached and clingy to me. He gets up with me, since he doesn’t want to be left alone in bed, and, even when I pray, he sits beside me,” recalls, Hnin Hnin.
Hlyan Htet is not alone in his distress and behavioural response to these compounding situations. COVID-19 has left 12 million children out of school for over a year and the current crisis is further undermining their mental health and psychosocial well-being. Many have witnessed violence and attacks, and some have been victims, leaving them mentally, if not physically, scarred.
In response, UNICEF and its partners have been expanding psychosocial services for children and young people. This includes individual counselling, peer-support groups for adolescents and young people, and a national mental health and psychosocial advice helpline for children which is available in several ethnic languages.
In July 2021, Hlyan Htet started participating in one of the virtual psychosocial activities, Little Pyit Tine Htaungs, named after one of Myanmar’s traditional brightly coloured egg-shaped toys that always stand upright when thrown.
Hnin Hnin found this service on the Facebook page of Metanoia, UNICEF partner and mental health services and resource centre in Yangon. One of Metanoia’s staff explains the process. First, virtual helpline operators register participants and explain the activities on offer. Children over the age of 7 fill in pre-assessment and post-assessment forms, or a caregiver fills in the forms on their behalf if the child is under the age of 7. The three-day sessions are adapted to three age groups: 4–12 years, 13–17 years and 18–29 years. The younger children “learn to understand emotions and empathy, respect and boundaries, and identity while doing arts and crafts activities,” says the Metanoia staff member, while the older age groups focus on “understanding reactions to crisis, practising stabilization techniques, promoting a sense of safety, maintaining hope, staying connected and strengthening efficacy to overcome crisis.”
After group sessions, participants are usually offered a counselling session. “We request parents to give them [their children] personal space during these sessions. We will then talk with parents, and sometimes we find it’s them who needs therapy, not their child,” says the Metanoia staff member.
Hnin Hnin says, “It’s really great and I’ve been recommending it to everyone.” She says that single parents, like her, are struggling with raising children during these times of crisis.
“This project definitely helped them and their children.”
Both Hlyan Htet and his mother also received individual therapy sessions from a counsellor. “He got close to the counsellor,’ says his mother. “He was even asking me about her since he dreamt of her.” After some sessions, “he has gained more control (over his emotions), except that he won’t let me disappear from his sight,” says Hnin Hnin..."
Source/publisher:
United Nations Children's Fund
Date of publication:
2022-05-10
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-10
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
UNICEF (United Nations Children's Fund), Education in Burma/Myanmar - general, COVID-19 (Coronavirus), Human Rights and international relations, Children
Language:
more
Description:
"Highlights
Escalation of conflict in the northwest and southeast regions resulted in increased numbers of internally displaced person (IDP), to 327,400 and 186,200 IDPs in these two regions respectively. The ongoing clashes and movement restrictions in the northwest are impeding access and delivery of humanitarian assistance.
As of 25 April 2022, 578,200 people were displaced nationally since the 1 February 2021 military takeover.
9,084 children under the age of 7 and 1,007 pregnant women in peri-urban Yangon benefited from primary health care services through the “Bright Start: Mobile-based health microinsurance” pilot programme.
Since the beginning of 2022, a total of 53,332 people, including 36,258 children, have accessed critical child protection services nationally through 28 partners. Services include access to mental health and psychosocial support, gender-based violence risk mitigation, prevention and response interventions as well as explosive ordnance risk education.
Funding Overview and Partnerships
The UNICEF Myanmar Country Office is appealing for US$ 151.4 million to deliver humanitarian assistance to displaced populations across the country. The Myanmar Humanitarian Needs Overview estimates that a total of 14.4 million people are in need of assistance this year. In 2022, UNICEF received generous support from the governments of Japan,
Denmark and UN OCHA Global Humanitarian Thematic funding to support Child Protection, Water Sanitation and Hygiene, Education, Health and Nutrition programme and response. These funds will contribute to delivering services to affected populations. The UNICEF Humanitarian Action for Children (HAC) currently has a funding gap of 82 per cent.
Without this funding, targeted populations especially children who need basic social services will not be able to receive assistance. UNICEF expresses its gratitude to all donors, private and public, for their contributions to supporting the children of Myanmar.
Situation Overview & Humanitarian Needs
The humanitarian situation in Myanmar continues to deteriorate with intense clashes between the Myanmar Armed Forces (MAF), Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) and the People’s Defence Forces (PDFs). Intensified clashes between MAF and PDFs were reported in the northwest and southeast region where MAF used heavy artillery, airstrikes, and torched and destroyed civilian properties. As of 25 April 2022, an estimated 578,200 people were internally displaced including more than 327,400 people in the northwest and 186,200 in the southeast, accounting for almost 89 per cent of the national displacement figures since the military takeover of 1 February 20211 . Increased use of landmines and explosive ordnance in conflict-affected areas has been reported. More than 8,200 houses and public places such as churches, monasteries and schools were destroyed or burned down, mainly in Sagaing (4,416), Magway (1,751), and Chin (1,071), Kayah (819)2 .
In the northwest region, frequent displacements of IDPs have been reported, as children and their families are struggling to escape the surge of conflict affecting the area. In Sagaing, one of the most affected regions, an estimated 240,600 people are in need of humanitarian assistance. However, numerous challenges are being faced such as the security risks posed by the escalation of conflict, the increased number of checkpoints, the travel restrictions and transportation of supplies, and the limited number of humanitarian partners, all factors severely hampering the humanitarian response capacity to reach the people in need..."
Source/publisher:
UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) (New York) via Reliefweb (New York)
Date of publication:
2022-04-30
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-09
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
UNICEF (United Nations Children's Fund), Education in Burma/Myanmar - general, Public Health, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
463.1 KB
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Description:
"HIGHLIGHTS
Armed clashes across Myanmar continued to trigger displacement and affect civilians. As of 2 May 2022, there were an estimated 936,700 internally displaced persons (IDPs) across Myanmar including 590,100 newly displaced since 1 February 2021.
In the South-East, the security situation continued to deteriorate with intensified armed clashes), including indiscriminate artillery shelling. Landmines continue to pose grave protection risks for civilians and restrict access to farmland, markets, hospitals and schools. In the South-East, the majority of IDPs are located in Kayah State (89,700), Kayin State (82,000), Shan State South (49,800), as well as in Mon State (18,000), Tanintharyi Region (9,100) and Bago Region (900).
In Kachin and Shan (North) states, there is increasing restriction of movement, including physical obstacles on some main roads as well as fear of arrest or detention. This in turn impacts access to basic services and livelihoods opportunities of displaced people. In Shan (North) State, while no new displacement has been reported, forced recruitment and landmines remained key protection issues for civilians.
In the North-West, the situation remained tense with continued armed clashes, including aerial attacks, and reports of human rights violations. The main needs of IDPs are food, core relief items, healthcare and shelter. In Chin State, some displaced people came back to their place of origin to check their properties. They are however unable to return home permanently because of the presence of armed groups or because their homes have been destroyed. In the North-West, displacement figures remain high with 240,600 IDPs in Sagaing Region, 50,500 in Magway Region and 36,300 in Chin State, with very limited humanitarian access.
In Rakhine State, while some return movements have been observed from Rakhine displacement sites as a result of conflict, mainly in Sittwe, Pauktaw, and Minbya townships, Rakhine IDPs continue to raise concerns related to their security. Their return is hindered by the presence of antipersonnel mines, lack of access to livelihoods and lack of reliable information for them to make informed and free decisions to return to their places of origin/choice.
The Rohingya population continues to suffer serious limitations on their enjoyment of basic human rights, such as freedom of movement, education and healthcare..."
Source/publisher:
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (Geneva) via Reliefweb (New York)
Date of publication:
2022-05-04
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-09
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
UNHCR (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees), Food Security and displacement in Burma, Food Security and nutrition in Burma/Myanmar, Public Health, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
8.63 MB
more
Description:
"The volatile situation in Myanmar following the 01 February 2021 coup has increased armed conflict and subsequent population displacement both within the country and across borders, including in Thailand.
Since 17 March, 2,655 Myanmar refugees have crossed into Thailand, according to the Royal Thai Government (RTG). The refugees have sought safety in Tak province and there are 1,543 refugees remaining on the Thai side of the border according to the RTG.
Refugees are sheltered in temporary safety areas (TSA), which are placed under the general jurisdiction of the Royal Thai Army by the Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) established by the RTG in March 2021.
SITUATION OVERVIEW ON THE THAI MYANMAR BORDER
In Kayin State, the Tatmadaw conducted airstrikes on 10 April, targeting opposition groups as fresh fighting broke out for control of the town of Lay Kay Kaw in Myawaddy Township. The Tatmadaw is believed to be reinforcing the area with more manpower. Lay Kay Kaw has mainly been under the control of the Karen National Union (KNU) in recent months, but the Tatmadaw has at times sought to reassert control, and fighting broke out last December. The KNU reported that March had been the deadliest month for the Tatmadaw in 2022, with more than 400 soldiers killed in over 500 clashes.
On 15 and 17 April, heavy fighting took place in the area opposite Umphang District. Myanmar troops and its ally, the Border Guard Force (BGF), are in control of the regions from Lay Kay Kaw to Waw Lay. The Tatmadaw have expanded their military presence in Law Kay Kaw, Thay Baw Boe, U Kra Tha, and Kanele Tha.
They have carried out a series of airstrikes and surveillance in these areas. The offensive has resumed with both air and ground operations. Myanmar troops and the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) are now stationed in strategic locations along the border opposite Mae Sot and Phop Phra districts. In the Tanintharyi region, fighting near the Thai border has been defused. On 17 and 18 April, protests against the Military occurred in Taku Village and Pulaw Township in Myeik District and Ye Phyu township - Dawei district.
As of 2 May, there have been 578,200 internally displaced people (IDPs) in Myanmar since February, of whom 236,000 are in the southeast provinces – Kayah, Shan, Kayin, Mon States, and Tanintharyi and Bago regions..."
Source/publisher:
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (Geneva) via Reliefweb (New York)
Date of publication:
2022-05-05
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-06
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
UNHCR (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
8.63 MB
more
Description:
"This is the US Campaign for Burma’s fifteenth monthly On-The-Ground in Burma briefer! This month’s briefer will review the recent U.S. genocide determination and the necessary steps to turn the Rohingya genocide recognition into action, as well as share a response from leaders from the Rohingya Women’s Development Network (RWDN), Karenni National Women’s Organization (KNWO), and the Karen Human Rights Group (KHRG).
This month’s briefer includes:
April highlights
An in-depth analysis on the U.S. genocide determination and the necessary steps moving forward
Four major policy recommendations
Responses to the genocide determination from the RWDN, KNWO, and the KHRG
An overview of IDP issues and rights abuses in each ethnic state and central Burma
As the conflict escalates in Burma between the pro-junta militias, anti-coup forces, and the military, so has the violence and rights deprivations in ethnic regions and central Burma. Without strong tangible action, the Burmese junta will continue to commit crimes against humanity with impunity..."
Source/publisher:
U.S. Campaign for Burma
Date of publication:
2022-05-06
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-06
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations, Genocide, International Criminal Court (Myanmar)
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
1.77 MB
Local URL:
more
Description:
"The United Nations Secretary-General's Special Envoy on Myanmar, Noeleen Heyzer, welcomes the convening of the Consultative Meeting on ASEAN Humanitarian Assistance to Myanmar on 6 May and strongly urges ASEAN leaders and donors to prioritise principled engagement with diverse local humanitarian networks to effectively deliver aid to all communities in need.
Over the past few months, the Special Envoy has held extensive engagements with some of Myanmar’s civil society organisations and local humanitarian networks who have been at the frontline in addressing the widening crisis amid escalating violence and increasing displaced populations. These groups have called for unhindered and safe humanitarian access to facilitate delivery of assistance without discrimination. The key messages from local humanitarian networks are clear: there is a need for the utmost respect of international humanitarian law and humanitarian principles; urgently needed humanitarian aid must not be instrumentalised for political purposes; military infrastructure must not be legitimised through aid delivery; and there is a need not only for more donor funding but also for donor flexibility to support local humanitarian actors and networks with access to hard-to-reach conflict affected areas, including internally displaced people, border communities and civilians affected by conflict, including in urban areas.
In Myanmar’s currently violent, unstable and insecure context, effective delivery of humanitarian aid requires firm commitment by all aid actors to adhere to international humanitarian law. Given the complexity of Myanmar’s conflict it is imperative that humanitarian assistance is delivered through a diverse range of channels, without discrimination or favour, and reaches the most vulnerable in every part of the country. Safe and unimpeded access for all aid actors is non-negotiable. It is imperative that we build strong, effective and equal partnerships with local and informal humanitarian networks, who have unique access, local knowledge and established trust on the ground, to support the delivery of humanitarian assistance to the people, especially in the hardest-to-reach areas, including through cross border assistance.
We must recognise the current conflict has a disproportionate impact on women and children. The Special Envoy's consultations with women community leaders have highlighted the urgent need for humanitarian support and protection for women and children, capacity building to address gender-based violence and stronger connection to regional and global women leaders. The Special Envoy urges the global community to give women a key role in any humanitarian consultation, as women can help identify the most vulnerable and help monitor effective delivery along humanitarian principles. Reflective of the Secretary-General's commitment to the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda, we must actively engage women to fully address the humanitarian and protection needs of the people and amplify their voices for a future federal democratic union of peace, stability and shared prosperity..."
Source/publisher:
United Nations Secretary-General
Date of publication:
2022-05-03
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-04
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
ASEAN-Burma relations, Human Rights and international relations, The discussion on humanitarian assistance to Burma
Language:
more
Description:
"Today marks the first anniversary of the Ministry of Human Rights of the National Unity Government of
the Republic of the Union of Myanmar.
The National Unity Government (NUG) is committed to Myanmar's international obligations to respect,
protect and fulfill human rights. Since its inception, the Ministry of Human Rights has been charged with
leading these efforts, which have included:
• the investigation and documentation of alleged violations and abuses of human rights, in support of
accountability and in consultation with local and international civil society
• human rights mainstreaming across NUG policies and programs
• the development and dissemination of human rights education materials, including television content
and infographics, video clips and animations shared on social media
• engagement with United Nations forums, mechanisms, agencies and experts, including the Human
Rights Council, the Special Rapporteur on Myanmar, and the Independent Investigative Mechanism
for Myanmar
• the strengthening of diplomatic relations with States and regional organisations
• engagement with international and local journalists and media outlets in support of access to
information and press freedom.
Significantly, these activities have been implemented in the face of escalating atrocities by the illegal
military junta - atrocities that multiple senior United Nations officials have determined to likely comprise
grave human rights violations and abuses, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.
The Ministry of Human Rights also partnered with other NUG ministries in developing the Government's
Policy Position on the Rohingya, the Military Code of Conduct for People's Resistance Forces, and the
Policy for Protection of Women and Children in Conflict.
The Ministry will continue to support the NUG's engagement with the International Criminal Court and
the International Court of Justice in pursuit of accountability, including for atrocity crimes directed against
the Rohingya and other minorities..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Human Rights
Date of publication:
2022-05-03
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-04
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Human Rights and international relations
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" The Burmese military junta’s systematic and widespread escalation of violence
following its attempt to seize power on 1 February 2021, has created a humanitarian
crisis that poses a grave threat to regional human security.
During 1 Feb 2021 – 15 Apr 2022, there were 10,786 armed clashes and attacks on
civilians, more than in Syria, Yemen, Iraq, or Afghanistan in the same period. The
junta has killed at least 2,146 and arrested at least 13,282 civilians. Those killed
and/or detained include elected MPs, journalists, humanitarian workers, civil
society members, and students. In the first 41⁄2 months of 2022 alone (1 Jan - 15
Apr), there were 3,134 such incidents involving air strikes, artillery shelling and
other battlefield tactics, in every State/Region and the capital territory.
The systematic targeting of civilians, in addition to intensifying the humanitarian
crisis, also amount to atrocity crimes that continue to drive up the number of
internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees from Burma. According to UNHCR,
614,000 people have been displaced since the coup attempt, adding to over one
million people displaced by pre-existing armed conflict and abuses. These
populations, further affected by ongoing attacks and blocks on humanitarian aid,
are in desperate need of protection, shelter, food, water, medicine, and other aid.
Humanitarian need is greatest in border regions in Burma’s southeast and west,
where conflict is particularly high relative to the population size, where the junta
continues to block or destroy aid from others.
It is imperative for ASEAN members to facilitate cross-border aid, partnering with
like-minded countries and organizations, in the interests of regional human security
and its own credibility.
The Burma military has a long history of violence
against, displacement of, and disregard for the
humanitarian needs of ethnic minority populations,
particularly at the country’s borders. This was shown
clearly in the first months of the COVID-19 pandemic
during 2020, when the military continued its
widespread violence, gave minimal aid or blocked aid
to border regions, and destroyed ethnic health
checkpoints for detecting COVID.
On 1 February 2021, the military attempted to launch
a coup. It locked hundreds of parliamentarians—set to
convene parliament that day—in their lodgings; put
others under house arrest; and took others to jail. Since
that time it has only increased its detentions and other
targeting of politicians. It also responded to
nationwide peaceful resistance with shocking
violence, escalating attacks that have resulted in
nationwide conflict.
The intensity of conflict and attacks on civilians is not uniform. Although junta troops have torched
villages and towns in central Burma, raided them, and arrested civilians there, the humanitarian
implications of its onslaught have been worse in areas traditionally targeted by the military. The
following maps show (1) raw conflict numbers by State/Region and (2) adjusted for population, mindful
that the border zones already suffer a legacy of decades-long conflict and deprivation prior to the coup.
Intensifying the humanitarian emergency and impeding humanitarian assistance
The junta’s violence has had terrible consequences for Burma’s civilian population. According to the
UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), as of 4 Apr 2022 there were 561,000 internally displaced persons
(IDPs) in Burma and 53,000 refugees from Burma who had been displaced after 1 Feb 2021, in addition
to hundreds of thousands of people previously displaced. In other words, as of 4 Apr, there were at least
1.89 million displaced persons in Burma and just across its borders in neighboring countries.1
These
numbers are likely significant underestimates, based on local reporting.
The junta has worked to prevent others from
providing humanitarian aid or healthcare to
vulnerable populations. In June 2021, junta
troops blocked aid for Karenni IDPs, and
destroyed an ambulance bringing humanitarian
aid to Moebye Township (Shan State). The
ambulance reportedly contained 80 sacks of rice,
medicine, and medical equipment.2
In July 2021,
the junta reportedly allowed only around 450kg
of rice to enter Mindat (Chin State) each day—
not enough to feed residents—despite a ceasefire
and humanitarian agreement.3
Junta troops have arrested volunteers for
assisting IDPs in Chin, Karen, Karenni, Shan,
Mandalay, and Sagaing States/Regions. 4
International NGOs have alerted the world that
the junta was blocking aid and using systematic
efforts to starve people and prevent them from
accessing healthcare.5
Junta troops have particularly targeted Burma’s
healthcare sector: As of 10 Jan 2022, there had
been at least 415 attacks and threats against
health workers, facilities, and transports; 30
health workers killed; 286 arrested or detained;
and 128 attacks on healthcare facilities. This
focus on the health workers stems from the
perception that they began the civil disobedience
movement.6
Junta troops have also targeted IDP camps and
their populations, killing those in need and
further preventing others from being able to
help. In January 2022 in Karenni State, staff and
patients fled a Loikaw hospital amid clashes and
junta-imposed electricity blackouts;7
and junta
planes bombed two IDP camps, killing at least
six IDPs.8
Amid conflict in Karen State, junta
planes bombed a hospital for the second time in
January, and attacked refugee camps.9
Activists and vulnerable communities from urban areas and central Burma have also fled to border
areas, where they seek refuge from the junta’s terror. These populations join those in need in border
areas, and their presence has also served as a pretext for further junta military attacks, such as those in
Lay Kay Kaw, Karen State,10 which have displaced over 10,000 people.
The scope of need – up by 1,300%
As a result of these actions, along with the junta’s mishandling of the economy and the COVID-19
pandemic, millions of people are living hand to mouth, in intense insecurity. In December 2021, the
UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) said that 14.4 million people in
Burma would need humanitarian assistance in 2022, a 1,300% increase from its prediction for 2021.11
While need is high nationwide, the severity of need is highest in border regions. According to OCHA,
by December 2021 there were 526,000 IDPs in “extreme” need, across the southeast (Southern Shan,
Karenni, Eastern Bago, Karen, Mon, and Tanintharyi), northwest (Chin, Sagaing), northeast (Kachin,
Northern Shan), as well as in Magway and Rakhine. Since that time, over 5,000 people have crossed
the border into Thailand, and many have sought shelter on either side of the Moei river, which divides
the two countries;12 the UNHCR and Thai officials estimated in April 2022 that 17,000 people had
crossed into Thailand since February 2021.13 Furthermore, the enormous number of people in need even
in areas fully under junta control demonstrates that the junta is either unwilling or unable to meet
people’s basic needs.
Numerous challenges prevent delivery of humanitarian aid within Burma. From the OCHA report:
While international and local humanitarian organizations [...] have stayed and delivered
during the recent crises, attacks on health workers and severe access constraints (particularly
in conflict areas) are resulting in unmet needs with a multiplier effect into 2022. A number of
Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) and International Non-Government Organizations
(INGOs) ...had their offices raided, materials confiscated and leaders arrested. Disregard for
human rights and international humanitarian law by parties to the conflict is becoming
increasingly common, and the operating environment for humanitarian workers has worsened
with continued attacks on health and education facilities and personnel [...].14
Community-based and border-based organizations part of the solution
Non-governmental health organizations already have infrastructure for healthcare delivery, and have
ably provided healthcare in border areas for decades, including emergency public health responses to
displaced persons during the pandemic. They coordinate through the Ethnic Health Committee (EHC),
comprised of independent Community-Based Health Organizations (CBHOs) and Ethnic Health
Organizations (EHOs) under the structure of ethnic organizations such as the Karen National Union
(KNU), Karenni National Peoples’ Party (KNPP), New Mon State Party (NMSP), Shan State-based,
and Burmese groups.
Ethnic health providers have already played a key role in responding to the pandemic, and are now
organizing vaccine distribution in ethnic areas. The Chin National Front started administering
Covishield vaccines on 15 Aug 2021. The New Mon State Party opened five temporary medical centers
and 18 checkpoints in the areas it controls, and is reportedly conducting a vaccination campaign. With
the help of the Chinese Red Cross, the Kachin Independence Organization has vaccinated at least 20,000
people, and the Shan State Progress Party has similarly vaccinated over 3,000 people.
Civilian and humanitarian aid groups have shown they are serious about combating COVID-19, as well
as poor healthcare generally, and could make significant progress with additional funds. The National
Unity Government (NUG)—Myanmar’s civilian government—has created a National Health
Committee and a National-Level Commission on COVID-19, and established itself as a willing liaison
between foreign donors and local communities.
ASEAN can lead the way in facilitating aid, but this must involve cross-border assistance. Otherwise,
the bloc risks undermining a multi-stakeholder approach and making its intervention dangerously
political and one-sided – aligned with the junta which has been the root cause of this threat to regional
human security.
Cross-border aid essential
In light of the desperate humanitarian situation in and outside of Burma, and conflict-related and other
junta-imposed impediments to providing in-country assistance, it is critical that foreign states and
organizations facilitate the flow of cross-border aid.
Furthermore, sole reliance on cooperation with the junta would be misguided and inexpedient, and
would exacerbate pre-existing humanitarian gaps in Burma. The military has proven time and again
that it is not a responsible steward of humanitarian aid or any other assistance for the people of Burma.
Its presence, even alongside foreign aid providers, is likely to frighten communities, and the junta is
liable to use aid as a means to further securitization and commission of atrocity crimes.15
It is notable that Adelina Kamal, former Executive Director of the ASEAN Humanitarian Assistance
(AHA) Centre, is among the loudest voices calling for ASEAN, Burma’s neighbors, the UN Special
Envoy on Myanmar, and other international actors to support humanitarian aid that goes through non-
state actors in Burma, such as community-based health organizations.16
Funding already exists for cross-border aid. On 10 Aug, the US Department of State announced an aid
package of more than US 50 million to provide life-saving protections, food and shelter, health care,
WASH, and support to people being persecuted and displaced in Burma.17 On 12 Aug, US Ambassador
to the UN Linda Thomas-Greenfield met virtually with Dr Cynthia Maung—head of the NUG’s
COVID-19 Task Force—to discuss US contributions to the COVID-19 relief effort.18
In October 2021, 397 local and allied groups co-signed a letter, calling on International Financial
Institutions (IFIs) to repurpose hundreds of millions of dollars in frozen Burma aid to support effective
COVID-19 assistance for border-based ethnic communities and prisoners in Burma.19
The first step forward towards a sustainable solution to strengthen community resilience and
significantly mitigate the crisis’ destabilizing impacts on the ASEAN region, would be to restart and
scale up cross-border aid programs that were present on that Thai-Burmese border in the 1980s – 2000s.
It is imperative that the management and implementation of such efforts be organized with the inclusion
of and implementation by community-based organizations that already have the trust and cooperation
of affected communities on the ground..."
Source/publisher:
ALTSEAN-BURMA
Date of publication:
2022-04-26
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-29
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Armed conflict in Burma - attacks on civilians, Human Rights and international relations, Burma: Internal displacement/forced migration of several ethnic groups., The discussion on humanitarian assistance to Burma
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"AUNG OAK AWW
In the cold and dark winter nights, refugees sleep beside the Moei river with no shelter or blankets. Their only resources are donations from regional civil society organisations (CSOs)*: *Myanmar migrant-based community-based organisations (CBOs) in Thailand, Karen region-based CSOs and some Thailand CSOs. Thailand CSOs are sanctioned by the Royal Thai Army, and cooperate with Myanmar’s revolutionary forces such as the KNLA, People’s Defense Force (PDF), and select forces within the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA). The international community, on the other hand, has had no concrete plan to help Myanmar refugees and residents struggling with the effects of Tatmadaw attacks in southern Myanmar.
As conflict broke out between the Myanmar Tatmadaw (military) and Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) forces in “peace township” Lay Kay Kaw in December 15, 2021, serious artillery shootings and air strikes by the Tatmadaw resulted in thousands fleeing to Thailand. This conflict was only one of many effects of the ongoing armed conflict since the Myanmar coup of February 1, 2021.
What the international aid community and governments urgently need to push now is cooperation between the Thai government and ASEAN to accept new refugees in Thailand, to ensure cross-border humanitarian assistance for IDPs on the Thailand-Myanmar border. This can be achieved by cooperating with effective third sectors actors on the ground to distribute aid for those in need. In addition, Myanmar refugee and migrant-focused CSOs such as border-based charities, Myanmar migrant workers associations, and ethnic region-based CSOs must be allowed to freely operate in the border regions.
In southeast and southern Myanmar, the KNLA, the Karen National Defense Organization (KNDO) (the armed wings of the Karen National Union) and the Karenni Army (KA) (the armed wing of the Karenni National Progressive Party), are giving thousands of urban Burmese military training and mobilising the People’s Defense Forces (PDFs), Karenni Nationalities Defense Forces (KNDFs) and Burma People’s Liberation Army (BPLA). These two ethnic armed organisations (EAOs) control areas which are adjacent to the Thailand border, an area currently under siege by Tatmadaw offensives. Populations in these areas are facing the high risk of crimes against humanity. These offensives will likely increase in the future, resulting in further displacement as the number of refugees to Thailand increase.
Refugees fleeing armed conflict need to have safe refuge in areas far from the Tatmadaw’s air strikes and artillery; they should not be asked to return to dangerous zones as previous refugees have been forced to. After the airstrikes on March 27, 2021, residents of Mutraw (Papun) district fled to the Thai-Myanmar border, but were turned around by Thai border authorities. Similarly, refugees fleeing a Tatmadaw invasion of Lay Kay Kaw areas were turned back to Myanmar.
“We have been living between these two riverbanks for more than two months. When fighting closes in on the Myanmar side, we cross the Moei river and stay on the Thai side. We are asked to return to the Myanmar side when the artillery shelling stops,” a resident of Lay Kaw Kaw staying in Moei riverbank, shared with me.
Recent visits by the United Nations (UN) special envoy to Thailand have appealed to Prayuth Chan-Ocha, the Thai Prime Minister to provide assistance to Myanmar refugees, IDPs, and the restoration of democracy in Myanmar. The two-day visit by Washington’s senior officials in the second week of October, 2021 also called for Thailand to ensure cross-border life-saving assistance along the Myanmar border. But Bangkok has no formal policy for long-term Myanmar refugees on their border.
However, as the Moso massacre in Karenni state demonstrates, provision of cross-border lifesaving assistance is not possible while the Tatmadaw continues to target civilian populations with air strikes and artillery shelling. The Tatmadaw has even cut off food and medical supplies to their operation areas.
It is imperative that the UN, US, ASEAN and neighboring member states like Thailand ensure the security of aid routes from CBOs and CSOs along the Thai-Myanmar border; these plans must include new concrete plans to aid refugees within Thailand’s borders. Yet, at the time of writing, Thailand is drafting more restrictive NGO law, which is bound to affect the humanitarian assistance available at the border.
The main concern of activists and revolutionaries within the Myanmar community so far has been the effect of international legitimacy on the junta regime’s culture of impunity; many fear that international recognition will give the military free rein to continue the perpetration of serious war crimes, kleptocracy, and the oppression of people in Myanmar.
International aid agencies in Myanmar who have tried to engage with the junta have incurred the anger of Myanmar activists and social workers, and consequently, “social punishment” on sites like Facebook. The international community needs to engage with the right local partners to provide aid effectively on the Thailand-Myanmar border.
Myanmar refugees and migrant-focused CSOs have the experience with providing aid in the border areas and social capital with the war on community. During the Lay Kay Kaw airstrikes, for example, Myanmar refugees and migrant-focused CSOs such as border-based charities, Myanmar migrant workers associations, and ethnic region-based CSOs provided aid to refugees with local funding, access which international organisations could not provide. These third sector actors are vital partners for international and long-term access and distribution to aid in Myanmar.
These partners include three key groups. First, Myanmar migrant-based CBOs, especially migrant workers associations in Thailand, are essential intermediaries––despite not being well-known as refugee aid providers. These CBOs are well-established across Thailand, particularly in cities like Mae Sot and Samut Sakhon (Mahachai). Their contributions have provided aid to people in Myanmar long before and after the coup in February 2021.
The second effective third sector actor is ethnic region-based CSOs, such as Karen and Karenni regional organisations who are also essential providers of cross-border humanitarian assistance. They have extensive experience with providing aid in the southern Myanmar, an area plagued by decades-long armed conflict since the 1990s between the Tatmadaw and ethnic armed groups in Karen and Karenni region-based areas. These ethnic region-based CSOs have been the main service providers in healthcare and education and advocates for human rights and environmental issues.
Third, cross-border based charities and refugee camps at the Thai-Myanmar border, particularly in Mae Hong Son, Tak, and, Kanchanaburi are also familiar with international aid, and already possess good institutional support and structures to manage refugee affairs. These CSOs have the network for humanitarian assistances and cross border aid distribution. Because of their institutional capacity and background, these CSOs would be effective service providers if the Bangkok government agrees to new refugee camps at Thailand side.
Tatmadaw offensives in the last few months have not only targeted and destroyed civilian livelihoods and homes; their actions include a wide range of crimes against humanity. If international agencies are eager to provide aid, they should be careful to avoid any engagement with the junta regime, or risk eliminating humanitarian assistance for those who need it most: refugees on the Thai-Burma border in Karen and Karenni state, and IDPs in Karen and Karenni regions.
Relying upon these third-sector organisations also helps to mediate between international agencies and local humanitarian organisations, thereby avoiding engagement with the junta which would anger many in the resistance movement in Myanmar. More attention needs to be given to these border-based actors, as they are the most realistic means of distributing much-needed aid in Myanmar now.
Maung Oak Aww (pseudonym) is a researcher based on the Thailand-Myanmar border. His research specialises in the role of civil society organisations and war on populations in southern Myanmar..."
Source/publisher:
New Mandala via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of publication:
2022-04-29
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-29
Grouping:
Individual Documents
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"A small state containing the serenity of the Ngwe Taung Dam. Home to many ethnic groups and tribes. A land of breath-taking nature: waterfalls, mountains, and caves. For all its beauty, Kayah State is now seeing violence that is tearing families from their homes.
Following intense clashes, several thousand people from Loikaw, Demoso, Hpruso and Pekon were forced to seek refuge in Southern Shan State. They are now sheltering in monasteries, churches or staying with relatives across Taunggyi, Hsiseng, Ping Long, Nyaung Shwe, Kalaw, Pinthadaya, Lawt Sauk and Laikha townships.
Our teams were able to visit some of these displaced families to support them.
For many among the displaced, this is the first time they have had to leave their homes. It is hard to adjust. Many wait anxiously for the opportunity to return, often with little hope. For families, the uncertainty leads to concerns about the future – with no end in sight given the ongoing clashes.
Since January this year, ICRC teams in Lashio and the Myanmar Red Cross Society (MRCS), have visited several sites where people displaced from Kayah have sought shelter. We conducted rapid assessments, to see what families needed urgently and tried our best to meet these fundamental needs.
During a first rapid assessment, we worked together with the MRCS to plan next steps in a humanitarian response. Our engineers focused on access to clean water and shelter. Other team members sought to ensure families would have enough food, or tried to reconnect family members who had been separated. Our teams spoke with people about their experiences and planned logistics to help provide future support.
Many of those who were displaced are seeking shelter in urban areas, but some have been forced to shelter in the rural countryside, where access to water and electricity can be more challenging. Temporary electricity blackouts remain common. But support from local monasteries and churches has helped in the short term. Bringing what they could carry, some of those who were displaced also took care of their immediate needs: blankets, sleeping mats, mosquito nets, and small supplies of food. But it is planning for the longer-term needs of these displaced communities that remains a concern.
Displacement due to armed conflict also causes loss of livelihoods. For safety, jobs are left behind. Some of those who left Kayah are trying to earn a daily wage by finding work, but job opportunities are hard to come across. Traveling further afield to find work is also a risk, compared to the relative safety of temporary shelter in a church or monastery. Displacement makes all these life decisions more challenging.
To help as much as possible in the short term, we provided useful items such as dignity and hygiene kits, as well as food. We did this work together with the MRCS – from planning to distribution.
"Our team is a mix of many technicians, including engineers and others who help respond in emergencies, so that we can address the most urgent needs as fast as possible".
While churches, monasteries and host communities are helping many of those who are displaced, concerns remain over the rising likelihood of food shortages in the long run.
Our team is still on the ground, working together with communities affected by conflict and the MRCS to monitor and identify the most urgent needs. There is more work to be done..."
Source/publisher:
International Committee of the Red Cross (Geneva) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of publication:
2022-04-29
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-29
Grouping:
Individual Documents
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"One year on, since adopting the Five-Point Consensus on Myanmar, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and its member states have not achieved any progress in addressing the human rights and humanitarian crisis perpetrated by the military junta.
We, the undersigned organisations, condemn the inaction of ASEAN and urge the regional bloc to move beyond the Consensus and align its efforts with the international community to immediately and meaningfully address the dire situation in Myanmar.
The ASEAN Five-Point Consensus (FPC), agreed upon by nine ASEAN Member states and the junta’s leader Senior General Ming Aung Hlaing, on 24 April 2021, stipulated the commitment of the regional bloc to make efforts to stop the violence in the country immediately and for all parties to exercise utmost restraint, foster constructive dialogue and to provide humanitarian assistance in Myanmar. Disappointingly, none of these action points has been meaningfully achieved.
In the past year, the brutal regime in Myanmar has actively undermined the spirit and content of the FPC and continued its systematic violations that amount to atrocity crimes, leading to more than 1700 killings while more than ten thousand political prisoners have been arbitrarily arrested and detained. The junta leader has also refused to cooperate with the regional bloc after the ASEAN leaders disinvited the Myanmar delegation from the ASEAN Summit in October 2021. We note that ASEAN has failed to take further, comprehensive actions and continues to allow junta representatives to attend scores of other ASEAN meetings, thus undermining the important political stand to exclude them from the Summit.
It has been one year since the FPC was adopted, but our organisations have observed no significant progress in improving the human rights situation on the ground. Hanging on to the FPC absent significant progress only prolongs the daily terror and deprivation civilians suffer in Myanmar while eroding ASEAN’s credibility and legitimacy.
Despite the commitment to engage with all stakeholders, ASEAN has shown ongoing reluctance to engage with the de-facto government of Myanmar, the National Unity Government. On the contrary, Prime Minister Hun Sen of Cambodia, in his position as the current ASEAN Chair, together with the current ASEAN Envoy to Myanmar, Deputy Prime Minister Prak Sokhonn, visited the junta chief Ming Aung Hlaing in Myanmar in January 2022 – a move that was undertaken without agreement from other ASEAN leaders. Civil society in the region condemned the action as ‘rogue diplomacy’, dramatically weakening ASEAN’s collective leverage to solve the Myanmar crisis. The delegation did not engage with the NUG and detained President U Win Myint and State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, the civil disobedience movement, and ethnic armed groups during the visit. On 27 April 2022, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi was once again sentenced to five years in prison on trumped-up corruption charges, further confirming ASEAN’s ineptitude in resolving the crisis in Myanmar.
During a speech on 28 March 2022, Ming Aung Hlaing called on ethnic armed groups not to engage with ‘terrorist groups’ – referring to the NUG, which had been branded as a terrorist organisation by the junta in 2021 and whose staff are facing arrest warrants. The junta also has deliberately weaponised humanitarian aid to obtain legitimacy from the regional bloc and international community.
As the junta has shown no commitment to respect the FPC, our organisations urge ASEAN leaders to move beyond it and explore alternative solutions to address the crisis in Myanmar meaningfully. One year of inaction is more than enough. The regional bloc, together with the international community, must ensure that any alternative solution should not delay the implementation of concrete action against the junta as demanded by civil society globally, including increasing sanctions, imposing an arms embargo and ensuring accountability..."
Source/publisher:
Civicus (Johannesburg)
Date of publication:
2022-04-27
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-29
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Armed conflict in Burma - attacks on civilians, Human Rights Defenders, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
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"Few people in the West or even in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) know who is who when it comes to the ministers of Myanmar’s junta. But one minister they should know is U Ko Ko Hlaing, as he is the military regime’s Minister for International Cooperation and the junta’s point man for dealing with the international community.
U Ko Ko Hlaing is also the chair of the Working Committee on Supervision of United Nations (UN) Agencies and International Non-Governmental Organizations in Myanmar. In addition, he is the head of the Task Force on Humanitarian Assistance, meaning that the 65-year-old oversees international aid efforts in Myanmar. His recent visitors include David Carden, the deputy humanitarian coordinator for the UN in Myanmar. If those jobs were not enough, in February the former Lieutenant Colonel also led Myanmar’s defense at the International Court of Justice in the Netherlands against allegations of genocide committed by the Myanmar military.
Furthermore, he was among the few people ASEAN’s Special Envoy for Myanmar, Prak Sokhonn, met when he was in Myanmar last month. The envoy discussed humanitarian assistance issues with U Ko Ko Hlaing. He impressed the special envoy’s delegation with his friendliness and his 75-minute long discussion with the envoy was praised for being fruitful.
But what foreign visitors don’t know is that U Ko Ko Hlaing has been a staunch apologist for not only this military dictatorship but the previous one as well. He is infamous among the Myanmar people, many of whom refer to him scornfully as “Frog and Fish Catcher Ko Ko Hlaing” or “Candle Ko Ko Hlaing”. Looking back at his career, it is easy to understand why that is.
Junta leader Senior General Min Aung Hlaing has appointed a number of ministers and advisors who previously served in U Thein Sein’s quasi-civilian government. U Ko Ko Hlaing, who served as the chief political advisor to U Thein Sein, is one of them.
He is also a confidant of former dictator Senior General Than Shwe. U Ko Ko Hlaing graduated from the 18th intake of the Defense Services Academy, and he and two of his classmates are reportedly regular visitors to Than Shwe’s residence in the Myanmar capital Naypyitaw.
One of those classmates is U Than Htay, the current chair of the military’s proxy Union Solidarity and Development Party. The other is retired Lieutenant General Wai Lwin, who served as defense minister in U Thein Sein’s administration and organized pro-military rallies in Yangon ahead of Min Aung Hlaing’s February 1, 2021 coup.
U Ko Ko Hlaing did not hold high military or civil positions in Than Shwe’s regime, unlike his two classmates, but he played an important part in the regime’s propaganda efforts as a writer and researcher. In 2004, he resigned as a Lieutenant Colonel from the research department of the defense ministry and transferred to the Information Ministry.
Under Information Minister U Kyaw Hsan in the regime’s State Peace and Development Council government, he served as an advisor to the information ministry, often publishing pro-military books as well as newspaper articles.
One of his most notorious articles concerned Cyclone Nargis, which in May 2008 swept through Ayeyarwady Region and southern Myanmar, killing over 138,000 people and destroying and damaging some 750,000 buildings. In the immediate aftermath of the worst recorded natural disaster in Myanmar’s history U Ko Ko Hlaing, writing under the pseudonym ‘Hlaing Aung’, wrote that the Shwedagon Pagoda – Myanmar’s most sacred Buddhist site – could now be seen clearly from a distance and worshipped with ease, thanks to Nargis having blown down so many trees in Yangon.
At the time, U Ko Ko Hlaing was living near Shwedagon Pagoda in Bahan Township. But while he was enjoying the view of the Shwedagon from his home, hundreds of thousands of residents in the hard-hit Ayeyarwady Region were left homeless by Nargis and were struggling without food and shelter amid the rotting corpses of humans and animals.
To make matters worse, U Ko Ko Hlaing argued in his article that as the Ayeyarwady Region is rich in fertile soil and water resources, its shattered residents could catch frogs and fish to eat along with the vegetables that grow in the region. Defending the xenophobic refusal of Than Shwe’s regime to allow international aid into Myanmar, U Ko Ko Hlaing said that the meals he suggested were tasty and nutritious and more than enough for Nargis refugees to survive on, so they had no need for chocolate bars donated by the international community.
The article was published in the regime-run English-language newspaper, The New Light of Myanmar, and attracted hordes of disparaging remarks from both local and international readers.
Despite that, U Ko Ko Hlaing continued to be favored by the generals and, in 2011, was appointed as chief political advisor to then President U Thein Sein. Later, his wife Daw Thida Tin transferred from the education ministry to the information ministry. She is currently serving as Deputy Director-General of the Information and Public Relations Department.
From being a propagandist who dared not use his real name and was told what to write by the military regime, U Ko Ko Hlaing became an important figure as a presidential advisor. But his old habit of defending the boss he served was far from over.
When Myanmar experienced long and frequent power cuts in 2014, U Ko Ko Hlaing again aroused controversy by saying: “I want to say with goodwill. Why don’t you switch off lights and light candles at your homes? Everything will be fine then.”
After U Thein Sein’s government lost the 2015 general election to the National League for Democracy (NLD), U Ko Ko Hlaing left Naypyitaw to serve as an advisor to the Myanmar Study Department of Yunnan University in Kunming, China. From there, he criticized the NLD government’s handling of Chinese investments, and was personally engaged in promoting the interests of Chinese companies in Myanmar.
He returned to Naypyitaw when Min Aung Hlaing appointed him as Minister for International Cooperation Minister. U Ko Ko Hlaing is just a year older than the coup leader, who graduated from the Defense Services Academy in 1977, a year after U Ko Ko Hlaing became a commissioned officer.
U Ko Ko Hlaing has continued his propaganda efforts for his new boss, doing his best to cover up the regime’s human rights violations. After many people died in July and August last year due to the regime’s weak handling of the COVID-19 pandemic, he wrote a number of articles blaming striking health workers and western countries for failing to provide vaccines.
“I don’t want to complain, but I have to. Western countries that have long said that Myanmar is on the verge of collapse due to COVID-19 and is in urgent need of international assistance have not yet provided a single dose of COVID-19 vaccines. The US$350 million lent by the International Monetary Fund to remedy the COVID-hit economy was part of the US$1 billion frozen by Uncle Sam. Nearly US$300 million in loans long promised by the Asian Development Bank and the World Bank for the health of the people and agriculture has been stalled in the name of sanctions,” he wrote in junta-controlled newspapers.
Earlier this year in February, in another sign of the regime’s faith in him, U Ko Ko Hlaing was chosen to lead Myanmar’s defense of the Myanmar military at the International Court of Justice in the Netherlands against genocide allegations.
In short, if you mention international cooperation minister U Ko Ko Hlaing to any ordinary Myanmar people you meet, you will see puzzlement on their faces as they have no idea who he is. But if you try “Frog and Fish Catcher Ko Ko Hlaing” or “Candle Ko Ko Hlaing”, they will reply: “Yes, the regime’s stooge”.
The international community needs to be mindful, too, that the façade of ‘friendly’ minister U Ko Ko Hlaing hides a long-time apologist for military dictatorships..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2022-04-28
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-28
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Military History, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
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Description:
"The Asia Justice Coalition is a network of organizations whose purpose is to promote justice and accountability for gross violations of international human rights law and serious violations of international humanitarian law in Asia, and to contribute to the fulfillment of the rights of victims and their families.
In response to a call for input by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, the Asia Justice Coalition – which the Global Centre is a member of – provided its observations on the impact on the human rights of children and youth due to continuing and extensive arms transfers to Myanmar. This input covers the increase in both international arms transfers to Myanmar and the use of child soldiers in Myanmar, as well as the consequent impact on the enjoyment of human rights of children and youth in Myanmar.
Arms transfers facilitate the commission of serious violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law, in particular in the current context in Myanmar. The proliferation of arms also contributes to the rise of recruitment of child soldiers with an increase in conflict and the ready availability of arms. The submission further shows the direct and indirect impact of the arms supply on the enjoyment of both civil and political, as well as economic, social, and cultural rights by children and youth..."
Source/publisher:
Asia Justice Coalition via Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
Date of publication:
2022-04-26
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-27
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Armed conflict and peace-building in Burma - theoretical, strategic and general, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
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279.32 KB (Original version) - 14 pages
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"Executive Summary
Authored by Medway, Gonzalez, Win, Kyaw, Russo. August 2021
The Humanitarian Assistance and Resilience Programme Facility (HARP-F) was established as an intermediary grant distribution mechanism for the UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) humanitarian funding in Myanmar. The challenging and ever-changing operating context required a flexible and adaptable funding instrument that could support partner delivery in such circumstances.
These characteristics were built into the design of the HARP-F from the outset.
This evaluation sought to understand why and how HARP-F and its partners used different remote management approaches, how these approaches compared to those described in the literature, whether the preparedness undertaken was helpful and whether HARP-F and partners were able to manage the multiple risks faced through remote management. The evaluation was conducted in a period of significant crisis in Myanmar, largely due to the ongoing Covid-19 pandemic and the military coup. Consequently, all interactions with stakeholders were conducted remotely, by a team of both national and international consultants, using a mixed methodology incorporating quantitative and qualitative inquiry.
Our conclusions
HARP-F’s flexibility and adaptability as a fund distribution mechanism was highly appreciated by partners.
The most localised responses, whether led by national or international partners, have been best placed to sustain delivery through the pandemic and coup.
The formal instruments HARP-F developed to support remote partnership, specifically the Remote Management Partnership toolkit was not applied by partners but was, nonetheless, aligned with many of the operational adaptations that partners actually took.
HARP-F’s approach was well aligned with documented good practice.
Donors will continue to need intermediaries in Myanmar. They should be clearer about their accountability and reporting requirements and ensure the capacity of any intermediaries that succeed HARP-F is in place to meet such requirements.
We also make 19 specific recommendations for any intermediary organisations that follow HARP-F. The recommendations are structured around four of the research questions mentioned above, namely how, what, preparedness and risk management. HARP-F has already taken action in some of these areas where there was a self-evident need to take action, such as in the creation of a flexible budget line in each grant to facilitate quick responses to unanticipated emergencies. These are summarized on the next page..."
Source/publisher:
Crown Agents and Humanitarian Assistance and Resilience Programme via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of publication:
2022-04-27
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-27
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
The discussion on humanitarian assistance to Burma, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Format :
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2.6 MB (Original version) - 57 pages 1.39 MB 1.41 MB
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Description:
"Executive Summary
Authored by The Operations Partnership,December 2021.
WHAT IS HARP-F?
The Humanitarian Assistance and Resilience Programme Facility (HARP-F) is a UK Government Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) initiative launched in 2016. HARP-F is the grant-funding mechanism, and the largest component of the wider Humanitarian Assistance and Resilience Programme. It is managed by Crown Agents. It has so far committed £74.7 million, reaching 1.69 million conflict-affected people via 76 grants, across 8 sectors and in collaboration with 55 partners.
WHY REVIEW HARP-F MULTI-YEAR WASH FUNDING?
Since 2016, HARP-F has been the largest funding mechanism for humanitarian water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) support in Myanmar. Over the last 6 years HARP-F WASH programming has supported 315,000 conflict-affected people in Kachin, Northern Shan, Rakhine and Chin States, with grants totalling £22.4 million.
The case for multi-year humanitarian funding was established as part of the Grand Bargain in 2016. Since then, HARP-F has been the main provider of multi-year humanitarian WASH funding in Myanmar, providing 95% of all humanitarian WASH multi-year funding in Myanmar between 2017 and 2021.
This strategic review outlines what has been learned about WASH multi-year funding and identifies where, and how, this learning could be applied in the future. 71 specialists, representing 22 organisations, were consulted via key informant interviews (KII) and focus groups. This included staff from HARP-F, FCDO, the WASH cluster and from the majority of key WASH actors working in Myanmar.
7 KEY LESSONS LEARNED FROM HARP-F MULTI-YEAR WASH PROGRAMMING
Provision of “Long term” multi-year funding (>24 months) was a key factor in supporting substantial advances in community ownership and management of WASH services in a challenging operating environment (central Rakhine IDP camps)
“Medium term” multi-year funding (12-24 months) was effective in supporting a structured process of local NGO capacity development (mostly evidenced in Kachin/NSS). It was crucial to maintain coordination with other capacity building providers for this funding to be effective. 96% of WASH actors consulted in this review agreed that HARP-F funding has been effective in empowering local and national actors.
Multi-year funding of any duration (12 months or more) helped implementing agencies build programme quality and led to administrative and operational cost savings in comparison to typical short term humanitarian funding. This is consistent with previous research on multi-year funding. 93% of WASH actors consulted in this review agreed that multi-year funding substantially increased programmatic impact. Those consulted reported that more time was spent on creating value with targeted communities rather than meeting the increased administrative requirements that back-to-back short-term funding involves.
A contextualised strategy framework for WASH programming was helpful in guiding HARP-F support to partners, HARP-F funding decisions and HARP-F partner planning. It outlined relevant approaches to sustainability and resilience for the key operating contexts in Rakhine and Kachin States.
HARP-F recognised the difficulty that a funding gap would present for local NGOs and tried to mitigate the risk of this happening. Local NGOs do not typically benefit from the funding reserves that many INGOs have. Given the effort invested by HARP-F and partners in LNGO capacity development it was crucial that HARP-F found ways to ensure sustained funding for local NGOs working in a protracted crisis.
The M&E approach needed to be better at capturing outcomes and learning. There would be increased benefit from multi-year funding, and stronger evidence for the future, if M&E approaches were designed to understand emerging long-term outcomes and learning. A results/outputs focused humanitarian M&E approach is not sufficient.
Multi-year thinking and planning was encouraged alongside multi-year funding. The HARP-F experience shows that multi-year funding is not the only tool that can support programme quality, efficiency and longer-term WASH outcomes. In a protracted crisis multi-year planning approaches should be encouraged at all levels. There were examples of this happening in Myanmar at both the WASH cluster and implementing organisation levels.
APPLYING THIS LEARNING
There was a significant scale-up of the humanitarian response during 2021 to respond to new needs following the military takeover in February. Unfortunately, the situation continues to be unstable and unpredictable. Humanitarian access remains a significant challenge. Humanitarian organisations have set an ambitious target of assisting 6.2 million people in 2022. The financial ask identified in the Humanitarian Response Plan is three-times that of 2021.
HARP-F will end its programming in March 2022. Since HARP-F currently supports 95% of multi-year WASH projects, it is critical for other funding organisations to consider financing multi-year WASH projects.
Continued funding from new sources is important for the sustainability of capacity investments made in communities and local NGOs via HARP-F.
There is a risk that the current level of uncertainty in Myanmar could dissuade donors from making multiyear funding commitments. However, short-term funding will yield only short-term results. It seems highly likely that humanitarian access will continue to be a critical problem. Well supported and capacitated community organisations and local NGOs may be the only lifeline available to provide humanitarian assistance and protection to the most vulnerable in many locations.
Continuing and deepening support to communities and local NGOs is a critical strategy for the overall response. Multi-year funding is the most effective way to accomplish this in WASH, and in many other sectors.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Humanitarian actors and donors in Myanmar should
Advocate for multi-year WASH funding, especially where long term outcomes are envisioned, or access constraints are likely to be sustained. Multi-year grants with a duration of 2 years or more (in keeping with the OECD definition) are preferred because of the increased efficiency and programme impact gains that can be achieved over such a period.
Where multi-year funding is not possible, adopt multi-year plans at the agency, donor and cluster levels. Meanwhile, the situation at community level should be closely monitored to help identify when the situation is sufficiently stable for multi-year funding.
Consider adopting multi-year funding and planning modalities for emergency response programming, employing an adaptive management approach. This can also provide a framework that will enable local NGO response capacities to be further strengthened.
Humanitarian, development and peace actors in Myanmar should
Continue to build linkages between humanitarian, development and peacebuilding mechanisms in order to maximise coherence and shared impact. This coordination becomes increasingly important the more that humanitarian multi-year funding is supported.
The Global WASH cluster should
Examine how the cluster funding matrix could better capture data relevant to multi-year funding.
Original project duration and project extension information is important, as is disaggregated data on primary grants and sub-grants (duration and financial value). If this information is collected, it can more readily be used to track progress against Grand Bargain commitments towards “Quality funding” and “More support and funding for local and national responders”..."
Source/publisher:
Crown Agents and Humanitarian Assistance and Resilience Programme via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of publication:
2022-04-07
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-27
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
The discussion on humanitarian assistance to Burma, Human Rights and international relations, Rural development in Burma/Myanmar
Language:
Format :
pdf pdf pdf
Size:
2.71 MB (Original version) - 45 pages, 1.15 MB 1.17 MB
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Description:
"The U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF)
has monitored and reported on religious freedom conditions in
Afghanistan for more than two decades, but 2021 was particularly difficult. Following U.S. withdrawal from the country, the Taliban
took control on August 15, 2021. The Taliban’s victory was calamitous
for many reasons, including the detrimental effect it had on religious
freedom. USCIRF has long raised concern that the Taliban’s brutal application of its extremist interpretation of Sunni Islam violates the freedom
of religion or belief of all Afghans who do not adhere to that interpretation, including Muslims and adherents of other faiths or beliefs.
With the Taliban’s return to power, religious freedom conditions
in Afghanistan, and the overall human rights situation, significantly
deteriorated in 2021. Religious minorities faced harassment, detention,
and even death due to their faith or beliefs. The one known Jew and
most Hindus and Sikhs fled the country. Christian converts, Baha’is,
and Ahmadiyya Muslims practiced their faith in hiding due to fear of
reprisal and threats from the Taliban. Years of progress toward more
equitable access to education and representation of women and girls
disappeared. Throughout 2021, USCIRF consistently called attention
to the escalating persecution of religious minorities in the country,
including in two virtual events, two podcast episodes, and a factsheet.
Given the sharp decline in religious freedom conditions witnessed in the country in 2021, USCIRF recommends in this Annual
Report that the U.S. Department of State designate Afghanistan under
the Taliban’s de facto government as a “country of particular concern”
(CPC) under the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (IRFA).
The last such recommendation by USCIRF was in 2001, right before
the ousting of the previous Taliban regime that controlled most of the
country starting in 1996.
Even before its return to power, the Taliban presented a grave
threat to religious freedom, including in 2020 and the first half of 2021.
The group committed violent attacks, excluded religious minorities,
and punished residents in areas under their control in accordance
with their extreme interpretation of Islam. The government
of Afghanistan, under then
President Ashraf Ghani, faced
difficulties maintaining territorial
control and security, impacting
the safety of religious minority
communities. Given these
conditions, USCIRF in its 2021
Annual Report recommended
that the Taliban be designated
as an “entity of particular concern” (EPC) under IRFA and that Afghanistan be placed on the State
Department’s Special Watch List (SWL), a lesser category than CPC.
The State Department has designated the Taliban as an EPC every
year since its first set of EPC designations in 2018, most recently in
November 2021. The State Department caveated that this designation
was based on information analyzed as of August 15, 2021, before the
Taliban’s takeover as the de facto governing authority.
The crisis in Afghanistan should serve as a collective call to action
to ensure the protection of the most vulnerable religious communities
around the globe. Beyond Afghanistan, this report sounds the alarm
regarding the deterioration of religious freedom conditions in a range
of other countries and provides policy recommendations to the U.S.
government to respond to violations occurring in these places. This
year, these countries include the Central African Republic (CAR), which
USCIRF removed from last year’s annual report following improvements in religious freedom conditions, after previously reporting
on the country since 2015. During 2021, Central African authorities
and their partners committed egregious and ongoing violations of
religious freedom in CAR—including targeted abductions, torture,
and killings of Muslims—which led USCIRF to reinstate its recommendation to place CAR on the SWL.
USCIRF is also concerned about the potential for backsliding in
countries that did not meet the CPC or SWL standard this year, particularly Sudan, where the October 2021 military takeover threatens
recent advancements in religious freedom protections made by the
civilian-led transitional government. USCIRF continues to monitor the
situation in Sudan closely. In all contexts where the freedom of religion
or belief is violated or under threat, we urge the U.S. government
to actively promote this fundamental right and protect persecuted
religious communities.
About This Report
Created by IRFA, USCIRF is an independent, bipartisan U.S. government advisory body, separate from the U.S. Department of State, that
monitors and reports on religious freedom abroad and makes policy
recommendations to the president, secretary of state, and Congress.
USCIRF bases these recommendations on the provisions of its
authorizing legislation and the
standards in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the
International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR), and
other international documents.
USCIRF’s mandate and annual
reports are different from, and
complementary to, the mandate
and annual reports of the State
Department’s Office of International Religious Freedom.
USCIRF’s 2022 Annual Report assesses religious freedom
violations and progress in 27 countries during calendar year 2021
and makes independent recommendations for U.S. policy. The key findings, recommendations, and analysis in this report are based on
a year’s research by USCIRF, including hearings, meetings, and briefings, and are approved by a majority vote of Commissioners. Under
the statute, each Commissioner has the option to include a statement
with his or her own individual views. Although USCIRF was not able
to travel in 2021 to observe religious freedom conditions abroad
due to the coronavirus pandemic, USCIRF was able to meet virtually
with various stakeholders to further substantiate reports received
throughout the year.
The report’s primary focus is on two groups of countries: first,
those that USCIRF recommends the State Department should
designate as CPCs under IRFA, and second, those that USCIRF recommends the State Department should place on its SWL. The report
also includes USCIRF’s recommendations of nonstate actors
for designation by the State
Department as EPCs under
IRFA. In addition, the report
analyzes the U.S. government’s
implementation of IRFA during
the reporting year and provides
recommendations to bolster
overall U.S. efforts to advance
freedom of religion or belief
abroad. It also includes a section
discussing key trends and developments in religious freedom
globally during the reporting
period, including in countries that are not recommended for CPC or
SWL status. This year, that section covers topics including the COVID19 pandemic and religious freedom, blasphemy and hate speech law
enforcement, transnational repression of religious freedom, religious
intolerance in Europe, deterioration of religious freedom conditions in
South Asia, and political upheaval raising religious freedom concerns.
Finally, the report’s last section highlights key USCIRF recommendations that the U.S. government has implemented since USCIRF’s
previous annual report.
In this report, USCIRF uses the terms “religious freedom,” “freedom of religion,” and “freedom of religion or belief” interchangeably
to refer to the broad right to freedom of thought, conscience, and
religion or belief—including the right to nonbelief—protected under
international human rights law.
Standards for CPC, SWL, and
EPC Recommendations
IRFA defines CPCs as countries where the government engages in
or tolerates “particularly severe” violations of religious freedom. It
defines the State Department’s SWL for countries where the government engages in or tolerates “severe” violations of religious freedom.
Under IRFA, particularly severe violations of religious freedom
mean “systematic, ongoing, [and] egregious violations . . . , including
violations such as—(A) torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; (B) prolonged detention without charges; (C)
causing the disappearance of persons by the abduction or clandestine
detention of those persons; or (D) other flagrant denial of the right to
life, liberty, or the security of persons.” Although the statute does not
specifically define severe violations of religious freedom, in making
SWL recommendations USCIRF interprets it to mean violations that
meet two of the elements of IRFA’s systematic, ongoing, and egregious standard (i.e., that the violations are systematic and ongoing,
systematic and egregious, or ongoing and egregious).
To meet the legal standard for designation as an EPC, a nonstate
group must engage in particularly severe violations of religious freedom, as defined above, and must also be “a nonsovereign entity that
exercises significant political power and territorial control; is outside
the control of a sovereign government; and often employs violence
in pursuit of its objectives.”
The Annual Report highlights the countries and entities that, in
USCIRF’s view, merit CPC, SWL, or EPC designation; it is intended to
focus U.S. policymakers’ attention on the worst violators of religious
freedom globally. The fact that a country or nonstate group is not
covered in this report does not
mean it did not violate religious
freedom during the reporting
year. It only means that based
on the information available to
USCIRF, the conditions during
that year did not, in USCIRF’s
view, meet the high threshold—
the perpetration or toleration
of particularly severe or severe
violations of religious freedom—required to recommend
the country or nonstate group
for CPC, SWL, or EPC designation. In the case of a nonstate
group, it also could mean that the group did not meet other statutory requirements, such as exercising significant political power and
territorial control.
USCIRF monitors and has concerns about religious freedom
conditions abroad, including violations of freedom of religion or belief
perpetrated or tolerated by governments and entities not covered
in this report. The full range of USCIRF’s work on a wide variety of
countries and topics can be found at www.uscirf.gov.
USCIRF’s 2022 CPC, SWL, and
EPC Recommendations
For 2022, based on religious freedom conditions in 2021, USCIRF
recommends that the State Department:
• Redesignate as CPCs the following 10 countries: Burma, China,
Eritrea, Iran, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan;
• Designate as additional CPCs the following five countries:
Afghanistan, India, Nigeria, Syria, and Vietnam;
• Maintain on the SWL the following three countries: Algeria,
Cuba, and Nicaragua;
• Include on the SWL the following nine countries: Azerbaijan,
CAR, Egypt, Indonesia, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Turkey, and
Uzbekistan;
• Redesignate as EPCs the following seven nonstate actors:
al-Shabaab, Boko Haram, the Houthis, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham
(HTS), Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), Islamic State
in West Africa Province (ISWAP) (also referred to as ISIS-West
Africa), and Jamaat Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM).
The conditions supporting the CPC or SWL recommendation
for each country are described in the relevant country chapters of
this report. The conditions supporting the EPC recommendations for
Boko Haram and ISWAP are described in the Nigeria chapter and for
HTS in the Syria chapter.
For al-Shabaab, the Houthis, ISGS, and JNIM, the EPC recommendations are based on the following conditions:
Although al-Shabaab’s territorial control continued to shrink, the
group actively operated in the southern and southcentral regions of
Somalia in 2021. The terrorist group carried out a series of deadly
attacks in Somalia and in neighboring Kenya against both Muslims
and non-Muslims. Reportedly, the group carried out amputations,
floggings, and executions of Muslims who disagreed with its interpretation of Sunni Islam. In Lamu County, Kenya, a priest reported that
the group attacked Christians and destroyed a church.
In 2021, the Houthi movement, formally known as Ansar Allah,
expanded its territorial holdings throughout Yemen. In March 2021,
Houthi leader Abdul Malik al-Houthi accused the United States of
“seeking to establish Baha’i, Ahmadiyya and atheist [communities] in
Yemen in order to undermine Islam.” The group forced Yemenis living
in Houthi-controlled areas to take indoctrination “trainings,” even when
these trainings were contrary to their religious beliefs. Prison officials
also forced detainees to take Islamic religious trainings as a condition
for their release, even when the detainees were not Muslim. The group’s
slogan, posted widely throughout Houthi-controlled areas in Yemen,
includes the phrase “a curse on the Jews,” and the tiny remaining
Jewish community faced ongoing and severe repression from Houthi
authorities. Houthi authorities
continued to detain Jewish prisoner of conscience Libi Marhabi
despite a court order for his
release. Houthi authorities also
continued to prosecute Baha’is
released from prison in 2020 and
blocked Baha’i bank accounts
in March 2021. Christians,
especially converts, were also
persecuted by Houthi authorities. In 2021, Houthi authorities
detained two Christian convert
priests and arrested a Christian
man on charges of apostasy and promoting Christianity.
In 2021, militant Islamist groups ISGS and JNIM continued to
control territory in parts of Mali and Niger. While reporting during the
calendar year is sparse, these groups likely continued trends of executing individuals with differing religious beliefs, restricting religious
practice and preaching, and imposing harsh punishments based on a
singular interpretation of Islamic law.
Violations of Human Rights on the Basis of Religion
USCIRF’s mission is to advance international freedom of religion or
belief (FoRB) by independently assessing and unflinchingly confronting threats to this fundamental right. Within this conception, USCIRF
is committed to addressing human rights violations perpetrated based
on the coercive enforcement of interpretations of religion and has
done so since it was created by Congress in 1998. USCIRF fulfills this
commitment through its reporting, advocacy, and policy recommendations to the president, secretary of state, and Congress.
Some foreign governments enforce laws and policies that permit
or condone violations of human rights of minority groups and other
vulnerable communities on the basis of religion. Under international
human rights law, however, religion is not a legitimate justification for
egregiously violating individuals’ fundamental rights. As explained
by the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Committee—the body
of independent experts charged with interpreting provisions of the
ICCPR—the existence of a state or majority religion cannot result in
the impairment of the rights of individuals under the ICCPR. International law requires states to respect FoRB and other human rights for
everyone, equally. Thus, states must not coercively enforce religious
interpretations on individuals or communities who do not adhere to
those interpretations. Individuals and religious communities enjoy
the right to hold and follow diverse views on religious precepts free
from government interference. Governments are accountable to
international human rights standards guaranteeing FoRB and other
fundamental human rights to all.
To that end, USCIRF has provided qualitative and quantitative information in its annual reports, publications, and other work
(see Appendix 4) highlighting problematic laws and policies of foreign countries that permit or condone violations of human rights
of minority groups and other vulnerable communities on the basis
of religion. Some of USCIRF’s key recent activities on this topic are
discussed below.
Throughout 2021, USCIRF published products and held public
events that provide examples of states’ abuses of human rights on the
basis of religion. USCIRF’s Country Update: Iran, released in August
2021, detailed how the Iranian
government uses religion as a
basis for violating the rights of
its citizens, including by executing members of its lesbian,
gay, bisexual, transgender, and
intersex (LGBTI) community.
USCIRF’s September 2021
Country Update: Saudi Arabia
described Saudi authorities’
enforcement of the government’s interpretation of Sunni
Islam and the country’s guardianship system, which severely
limits women’s rights. These themes were further explored in USCIRF’s
December 2021 hearing on “State-Sanctioned Religious Freedom
Violations and Coercion by Saudi Arabia and Iran.”
Additionally, USCIRF released a factsheet on Religious Minorities
in Afghanistan in October 2021, outlining the Taliban’s imposition of
its strict interpretation of Sunni Islam that violates the freedom of
religion or belief of Afghanistan’s religious minorities and others who
do not share the same religious beliefs. USCIRF further highlighted the
impact of the coercive application of these beliefs on religious minorities and other vulnerable Afghans during the “USCIRF Conversation:
Update on At-Risk Religious Communities in Afghanistan” event held
in October 2021. Also in October, USCIRF released a factsheet on
Religious Freedom Violations in the Republic of Chechnya describing
how the Chechen dictatorship maintains hegemony through the
imposition of a purported “traditional” version of Islam, including by
conducting violent purges of the LGBTI community and witch hunts
that often target elderly women. In November 2021, USCIRF published
Country Update: Malaysia addressing how the implementation of religion-based law in Malaysia’s dual court system can violate religious
freedom and related rights. In this report, USCIRF details the use of
these religious laws to target members of vulnerable groups, such as
Malaysia’s Muslim LGBTI community.
USCIRF also conducted research on the coercive enforcement
of interpretations of religion by nonstate actors, particularly EPCs. In
November 2021, USCIRF published a report on EPCs and Religious
Freedom, which outlines the human rights responsibilities of EPCs and
other armed nonstate actors. USCIRF also released reports on Violent
Islamist Groups in the Central Sahel and Violent Islamist Groups in
Northern Nigeria, which address the imposition of a strict interpretation of Shari’a by EPCs and other violent Islamist groups in these areas
and its impact on human rights.
USCIRF continued to highlight the ways in which the enforcement
of blasphemy or apostasy laws, which are based on religious interpretations, undermines human rights—including freedom of religion
or belief and freedom of expression—and often targets vulnerable
religious and other communities. Commission reports on this topic
published in 2021 include Country Update: Egypt, Factsheet on Religious Freedom Violations in Kano State, Nigeria, and Factsheet on
Ahmadiyya Muslims. At the end of 2021, USCIRF’s FoRB Victims List
showcased 73 victims targeted under blasphemy or apostasy laws.
USCIRF’s 2021 work on other problematic laws based on religious
interpretations included the March factsheet on The Use of Shari’a as
Religious Justification for Capital Punishment against LGBTI Persons
discussing how such laws violate the human dignity and rights of
LGBTI persons and embolden societal hostility, discrimination, and
violence against them.
In addition to the work described above, USCIRF also raises
awareness on these issues through its public hearings, briefings, and
other events, which seek to highlight the Commission’s research and
recommendations and showcase diverse panelists offering a variety of
perspectives. In May 2021, for example, USCIRF hosted an event with
Nasreldin Mufrih, Sudan’s then Minister of Religious Affairs, where
he provided an update on how the country’s transitional government
was addressing the previous regime’s violations of human rights
based on religion. These efforts were further discussed in USCIRF’s
Policy Update on Sudan, released in November 2021. In February, a
USCIRF event focused on ways the U.S. government can protect and
assist refugees and asylum seekers, including those fleeing the coercive enforcement of religion. During 2021, USCIRF’s podcast series,
Spotlight, offered in-depth analysis about developments that have
implications for religious freedom and other human rights. Examples
of episodes that discuss the official imposition of religious norms
include Pakistan’s Laws that Enable Islamist Extremism, Hazara Community Threatened in Afghanistan, Enforcing Blasphemy Laws Have
Dire Consequences, Religious Restrictions in Iran, and Governments
Using Shari’a to Impose Death Sentences on LGBTI Persons.
Information on all of USCIRF’s activities can be found at
https://www.uscirf.gov/..."
Source/publisher:
The United States Commission on International Religious Freedom
Date of publication:
2022-04-26
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-26
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Freedom of opinion and expression: - the situation in Burma/Myanmar - reports, analyses, recommendations, Inter-Communal violence and discrimination - Myanmar - General articles and analysis, Rohingya (cultural, political etc.)
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"Your Excellencies,
It has been a year since a Five-Point Consensus on Myanmar was reached at the ASEAN Leaders’ Meeting between all ASEAN leaders and Senior General Min Aung Hlaing to address the deteriorating political and humanitarian crisis triggered by his illegal coup d’état.
In this year, Commander in Chief Min Aung Hlaing has totally failed to implement any of the Five Point Consensus. Given this failure, it is time for ASEAN to move on to sanctioning him for the continued suffering he is inflicting on the people of Myanmar and his blatant disregard for his regional partners.
Over this period, the Myanmar military has unleashed an all-out war over its people which according to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights consists of “systematic and widespread human rights violations and abuses” that may amount to “war crimes and crimes against humanity.” These crimes include the arbitrary arrests of thousands of anti-junta activists and their family members; the routine torture of detainees, often with lethal consequences; the shooting of unarmed protesters, air strikes against civilians in Myanmar’s ethnic areas, the burning of whole villagers, and extrajudicial killings.
In the face of these atrocities, ASEAN must now accept the fact, repeatedly demonstrated over the last months, that Commander in Chief Min Aung Hlaing, has no intention whatsoever of abiding by the Consensus unless he feels a strong pressure to do so.
In APHR’s original joint response we offered suggestions and support to ensure that the implementation of the Five Point Consensus makes a positive contribution to improve the situation on the ground. It is in the same spirit that we now urge you to take the following steps, in order to stop the Myanmar military’s atrocities, hold the perpetrators accountable, and initiate a real process towards peace and democratization.
First, ASEAN must thoroughly re-consider the role and appointment mechanism of the Special Envoy to Myanmar, in view of the poor record of the previous and current holder of this admittedly difficult position.
As it stands now, the Special Envoy does not represent ASEAN as such, but the group’s Chair, and thus changes every year, making it extremely difficult to maintain a coherent policy over time. Also, both of the Special Envoys appointed so far have been high officials in their respective ministries of foreign affairs, for whom their missions as special envoys was not their only, or even top, priority.
In order to make the position more effective, the Special Envoy should be exclusively dedicated to this mission, appointed on a long-term basis, and respond to ASEAN as a whole, rather than the rotating Chair position. ASEAN members should establish clear and comprehensive terms of reference that make explicit the tasks, mandate and authority entailed by the role of Special Envoy; as well as allocate the necessary resources to carry out the mission.
Second, when the Five-Point Consensus was agreed last year, APHR pointed out that the lack of a timeframe and enforcement mechanisms rendered it virtually toothless. Given that atrocities continued to be committed, unabated by the State Administration Council over the past year, it is high time for the junta to face real consequences for their criminal actions. Such consequences should include the suspension of Myanmar’s membership in ASEAN; travel bans for Min Aung Hlaing and the members of his State Administration Council (SAC) in the region; targeted sanctions against the leaders of the coup, those responsible for committing crimes against humanity and their economic interests.
Third, the Consensus calls for “a constructive dialogue among all parties” in order “to seek a peaceful solution” to the conflict unleashed by the military, and gives the ASEAN Special Envoy the mission to facilitate such a dialogue. One year later, neither of the Special Envoys have made any progress on this, having only met representatives of the military, and not a single representative of the National Unity Government of Myanmar (NUG), which represents the democratically elected government and receives support from the majority of the Myanmar people.
Therefore, we urge ASEAN to immediately and publicly meet with the NUG. Representatives of Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs) must also be included in further dialogue to ensure that all voices are heard.
Finally, the coup has triggered an economic catastrophe on the 54 million inhabitants of Myanmar. More than half are now in poverty, while the country’s economy has shrunk by a staggering 18%, according to the World Bank. Provision and distribution of aid is now a matter of the utmost urgency and necessity.
ASEAN’s plan to deliver aid through the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on disaster management (AHA Centre) has not only been insufficient but has also manifestly not reached out to the people in need. Instead, ASEAN should immediately begin to work with Myanmar’s local community-based and civil society organisations, as well as relevant international agencies, to effectively provide aid directly to the people in need. Given the scale of the aid required and the military’s history of blocking the delivery of humanitarian aid, collaboration with agencies experienced in running humanitarian operations in Myanmar will help ensure that ASEAN’s intervention abides by the “do no harm” principle.
We also urge neighboring countries, particularly ASEAN member, Thailand, to allow those fleeing persecution and violence to cross its borders, to seek asylum and receive humanitarian aid.
Lastly, we urge ASEAN’s Dialogue Partners and the wider international community to support ASEAN in ensuring it can take up the regional leadership role required to respond to a situation of this gravity, including by supporting the implementation of the above recommendations.
The question to ASEAN leaders now is: will you allow the military to continue committing war crimes and crimes against humanity, and threaten the human security and economic development of the region for another year?
ASEAN’s credibility depends on its ability to act in accordance with the reality of the situation in Myanmar. The group cannot expect the military to abide by the terms of the Five-Point Consensus or to any international or humanitarian norm for that matter. It is imperative that the member states escalate measures to put real pressure on the military to stop it from brutalizing its own population and turning the country into a failed state, and do all they can to work towards the fulfillment of the Myanmar people’s aspirations for peace and democracy.
Sincerely,
ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights (APHR)
CC: ASEAN Dialogue Partners..."
Source/publisher:
ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights
Date of publication:
2022-04-24
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-24
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, ASEAN-Burma relations
Language:
Format :
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Size:
158.09 KB 94.3 KB 197.67 KB 107.96 KB
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Description:
"Executive Summary:
This report explores the current socio-political developments in Myanmar and how they affect Thailand. It also investigates Thailand’s perception of the Myanmar crisis and how the Thai government’s responses. This report provides insights into the effects of the 2021 Myanmar coup and subsequent crises on Thailand and helps us better
understand Thailand’s foreign policy position and conduct. Our study is exploratory and descriptive, drawing insights
from documentary research, in-depth interviews, participation in seminars and talks, and field visits to border areas
between Thailand and Myanmar.
We recognize three significant changes in the socio-political dynamics in Myanmar since the coup:
• The perception of the Bamar people, the major ethnic group, toward minorities has become more positive.
• The military as an institution is crumbling, losing its power grip in many areas, with a growing number of defections.
• Myanmar people are united against the junta and have the new aspiration of turning their country into a federal state
Our study also found that the ongoing crisis in Myanmar has affected Thailand in five areas, namely: migration, transborder security, economic affairs, diplomacy, and geopolitics. Specifically:
• Thailand has experienced more migrants and refugees from Myanmar. We categorize them into three groups:
1) people who crossed into Thailand temporarily—mainly via the natural passes—before returning home; 2)
economic migrants who hope to integrate into Thailand’s labor forces; and 3) activists and high-profile individuals opposed to the coup, some of whom would like to get resettled in a third country.
• The 2021 Myanmar coup also posed threats to Thai nationals living along the border areas and inside Thailand.
Cross-border gunfire affect the properties of residents who live in the border area. There were also concerns
about the operations of the Myanmar military inside Thailand, the increasing drug activities, and public health
challenges.
• The ongoing Myanmar crisis disrupted cross-border trade and regular economic affairs.
• The military coup in Myanmar significantly eroded the trust that the two countries have built over the years,
leading to a new challenge of choosing who among the conflicting parties Thailand should engage with in the
trust rebuilding process.
• The Myanmar crisis led to potential geopolitical rivalry between major powers, putting Thailand in a strategic
dilemma as it faced political pressures from these powers.
In this report, we posit that Thai officials have followed the political developments in Myanmar very closely since
the 2021 coup. The ‘burden of proximity’ makes the government mainly concerned about the influx of the displaced
persons and Myanmar’s opposition parties. Thailand also acknowledges other security, economic, and international
relations impacts. Since the coup, the Thai government’s responses to the Myanmar crisis—while being shaped by
bureaucrats—are business as usual with an ad hoc feature.
Thailand’s business-as-usual foreign affairs consist of dual-track diplomacy: military-to-military and government-to-government, led by the Royal Thai Armed Forces (RTAF) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) accordingly. Besides, local villagers also establish local mechanisms for cross-border collaboration with Myanmar people.
We argue that the application of business as usual to conduct its foreign relations makes Thailand appear to support
the junta though not announced openly. This practice puts Thailand at risk of being condemned by Myanmar people
and the international community amid the growing opposition against the Myanmar junta domestically and internationally.
Thailand has also used ASEAN as a platform to engage with Myanmar. However, the Thai government is reactive
rather than proactive in dealing with its neighbour. To respond to the immediate effects of the Myanmar crisis—especially the influx of migrants and refugees, Thai officials have adopted ad hoc measures as an add-on feature to
the business-as-usual model, including the management of the forcibly displaced and Thai civilians. This practice is
planned for a short-period implementation until the situation in Myanmar stabilises.
In conclusion, we believe that the Thai government’s policy position towards Myanmar is vague and calls on the Thai
government to be more proactive. We propose a ‘flexible approach’ for Thailand to engage with Myanmar. Our policy
recommendation consists of three core components:
2
• Assisting Myanmar refugees
We develop a ‘flexible humanitarian model’ based on the humanitarian-development nexus, allowing Thailand
to assist the forcibly displaced while protecting its national interest.
• Pursuing flexible engagement with the junta
We propose ‘flexible engagement,’ guided by the vision of the late Dr. Surin Pitsuwan, former ASEAN Secretary
General, in which Thailand communicates its position towards Myanmar openly and reserves the right to put
pressure on the junta. This approach also guides us to urge Thailand to be more forceful in pressuring the Nay
Pyi Taw regime using the ASEAN platform.
• Endorsing federalism in Myanmar
Amid the ongoing civil war, we strongly recommend that the Thai government engage with other stakeholders
inside Myanmar beyond the establishments, especially the National Unity Government (NUG), the National
Unity Consultative Council (NUCC), and ethnic armed organizations (EAOs), who have increasingly supported
federalism. We believe that Myanmar’s federalism should be in the interest of Thailand since it will potentially
bring lasting peace to the country..."
Source/publisher:
The University of Queensland
Date of publication:
2022-04-00
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-22
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations, Thailand-Burma relations
Language:
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Sub-title:
The upcoming U.S.-ASEAN special summit stands in jarring juxtaposition to last year’s “Summit for Democracy” — to which most ASEAN states didn’t merit an invitation.
Description:
"The Biden administration on April 16 announced that the White House will host a special summit with members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) on May 12.
Invitees include Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte, an unrepentant and undiplomatic architect of mass killings in the name of a “war on drugs” under investigation by the International Criminal Court. (“I don’t care about human rights,” he said last year.) A bevy of other autocratic leaders are also invited, including Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen, a former Khmer Rouge commander turned kleptocrat who has been in power for over 36 years. The invitation was first made by U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken in a December 14 speech in Jakarta, but dates were not finalized until now.
The summit stands in jarring juxtaposition to last year’s “Summit for Democracy,” and the administration’s rhetoric about human rights and democracy, including in Blinken’s speech inviting ASEAN to the United States.
“Freedom is about the ability to write your future and have a say in what happens in your community and your country, no matter who you are or who you know,” Blinken said in December. The administration is hoping to foster a “free and open Indo-Pacific.”
ASEAN countries are neither free nor open.
Myanmar is led by a coup-installed junta and a military with a long track record of unfettered brutality. While the U.S. and other ASEAN members have decided the country can only send a “non-political” representative, the invitation is still a stunning twist coming only weeks after the administration formally determined that the military committed crimes against humanity and genocide against Muslim Rohingya. It has only been a little over a year since the military’s February 2021 coup and jailing of Aung San Suu Kyi and other civilian officials. The country’s senior military leadership and much of its military-owned industries are under U.S. sanctions.
Vietnam, a one-party authoritarian state, does not hold democratic elections and has imprisoned hundreds of critics, dissidents, and journalists. Laos is a similarly repressive one-party state. Brunei’s absolute monarch, Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah, exercises exclusive and unchecked authority and has been in power since 1967. The country has no elections, free media, or meaningful rights protections.
Thailand, once a genuine democracy, suffered a military coup in 2014 led by General Prayut Chan-o-cha, which led to rule by a junta, then the adoption of a new constitution entrenching military rule and allowing engineered elections in 2019 that Prayut, predictably, won. Authorities have arrested democracy activists and critics of the monarchy, dissolved a major opposition party, and suppressed youth-led democracy protests, often violently. There have been numerous cases of torture as well as enforced disappearances.
Cambodia’s leader, Hun Sen, who has manipulated or stolen outright every election since 1993, has now largely eliminated the political opposition and independent media. Over 60 political prisoners are jailed on bogus criminal charges.
Singapore, too, has an overwhelmingly repressive government. (The Biden administration did not invite them to the Summit for Democracy.) Citizens face severe restrictions on free expression, association, and peaceful assembly through overly broad criminal laws and regulations, including aggressive internet content laws, that are regularly enforced.
And even Indonesia and Malaysia, the standout ASEAN democracies, are seeing worsening conditions for women, religious minorities, and LGBTQ people, and increasing use of overbroad criminal defamation, sedition, and other laws to prosecute critics.
The Biden administration needs to adopt more coherent principles for supporting nations in Asia without sacrificing the promotion of human rights. A key problem in the Biden administration’s Asia rhetoric is that it too often conflates human freedoms and rights with the “freedoms” and “rights” of governments not to be coerced by other governments (i.e., by the Chinese government). When Blinken in December cited a “rules-based order” in Asia meant to “protect the right of all countries to choose their own path, free from coercion, free from intimidation,” he was not talking about human freedoms. He was dressing up “countering the Chinese government” in the language of liberty.
During the summit in May, the president should speak publicly about human rights and freedoms — including by noting the United States’ own poor record — and he and other U.S. officials should prominently raise key rights concerns with attendees during informal bilateral meetings at the summit, known as “pull asides.”
On Myanmar, Biden should press ASEAN members to abandon their failed ASEAN “consensus” approach to diplomacy with the junta and instead join a coordinated international effort to increase pressure to convince the junta to steer toward reform, including by increasing restrictions on the junta’s foreign currency revenues and capacities to purchase weapons. Biden should also encourage stronger bilateral diplomatic efforts by individual ASEAN members who can most effectively communicate with the junta: Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand.
Human rights, justice, rule of law, and individual freedoms are forces which, as much as alliances and partnerships, serve as bulwarks to the increasingly repressive forces of the Chinese and Russian governments. Overlooking abuses by supposed allies only undermines the international human rights system further and makes the world less safe..."
Source/publisher:
The Diplomat (Tokyo) via Human Rights Watch (USA)
Date of publication:
2022-04-22
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-22
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
ASEAN-Burma relations, Human Rights and international relations, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
Language:
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Description:
"Overview
Myanmar’s already-stalled democratic transition was completely derailed in February 2021, when the military, known as the Tatmadaw, seized control of the government, arresting dozens of senior government officials and preventing the newly elected parliament from convening. The National League for Democracy (NLD), which won a sweeping victory in the November 2020 elections, led a broad-based opposition to the takeover, organizing a country-wide Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) that continued throughout the year. Protesters were met with indiscriminate violence from military forces, and journalists, activists, and ordinary people risked criminal charges and detention for voicing dissent. Armed conflict between the military and ethnic rebel groups continued, as did the forced displacement of hundreds of thousands of Rohingya, a mostly Muslim ethnic minority.
Key Developments in 2021
Alleging fraud and irregularities in the November 2020 elections, the military carried out a coup in February, hours before the newly elected parliament was due to be seated. After taking power, the military declared a state of emergency, imposed a broad-based communications shutdown, expanded the range of laws used to punish dissent, and arrested dozens of political and cultural figures—including both President Win Myint and State Counselor Aung San Suu Kyi.
A group of ousted elected lawmakers formed the National Unity Government (NUG) in April as an alternate power base to the military regime. The widely popular NUG operated as a shadow government throughout the year, with its members in hiding or in exile.
In August, Min Aung Hlaing declared himself prime minister and head of a caretaker government that would enforce military rule until August 2023, when the military has promised to hold new elections.
The widespread CDM gathered steam in the weeks after the coup and continued throughout the year, involving multiple political parties and civil society groups. By the end of the year, more than 11,000 protesters had been arrested, almost 1,400 had been killed by military forces, and nearly 2,000 faced criminal charges handed down by the junta, while others were subjected to grave abuses, including torture, in overcrowded prisons.
Fighting between the army and ethnic minority groups in Chin, Kachin, Karen, Rakhine, and Shan States intensified during the year, displacing thousands of civilians and limiting free movement. Ethnic rebel groups provided sanctuary to those seeking to escape the military regime.
Political Rights
A Electoral Process
A1 0-4 pts
Was the current head of government or other chief national authority elected through free and fair elections? 0 4
Under the 2008 military-drafted constitution, the legislature elects the president, who serves as chief of state and head of government and makes a number of key ministerial appointments. Military members of the legislature have the right to nominate one of the three presidential candidates, and the elected members of each chamber nominate the other two. The candidate with the largest number of votes in a combined parliamentary vote wins the presidency; the other two candidates become vice presidents, ensuring that a military nominee is always either president or vice president. The commander in chief of the armed forces retained broad powers under the 2008 constitution, including control over security-related cabinet ministries (home, defense, and border affairs), and is selected through an opaque process by the military-dominated National Defense and Security Council (NDSC).
A new president was set to be selected in early 2021, following the November 2020 parliamentary elections; this process was disrupted by the February 2021 military coup, which dissolved parliament and installed a military junta led by the unelected Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, head of the armed forces. President Win Myint and State Counselor Aung San Suu Kyi, de facto leader of the NLD, were both detained in the early hours of the coup, along with over one hundred other political leaders. In early December, the military regime sentenced Win Myint and Suu Kyi to four years’ imprisonment on charges of incitement; soon after, the sentences were reduced to two years. In addition, Suu Kyi has been charged with illegally importing communications equipment, violating pandemic restrictions, corruption, electoral fraud, and breaching the Official Secrets Act. The military retained control of the government throughout 2021.
Score Change: The score declined from 2 to 0 because the president and reelected civilian government officials were ousted in a military coup.
A2 0-4 pts
Were the current national legislative representatives elected through free and fair elections? 0 4
The bicameral Assembly of the Union consists of the 440-seat lower House of Representatives and the 224-seat upper House of Nationalities. Representatives serve five-year terms. A quarter of the seats in both houses are reserved for the military and are filled through appointment by the commander in chief of the armed forces. The remainder are filled through direct elections in a first-past-the-post system.
The 2020 parliamentary elections featured significant flaws, including the exclusion of many Muslim candidates and the disenfranchisement of hundreds of thousands of Rohingya. The Union Election Commission (UEC) canceled voting in a number of conflict-affected districts, preventing about one million people from electing new representatives. Other electoral flaws included limited access of opposition parties to state-run media during the campaign period and pandemic-related restrictions on in-person campaigning.
The NLD won a convincing majority in the overall popular vote, taking 138 of the 168 elected seats in the upper house, 258 of the 330 elected seats in the lower house, and 501 of 660 elected seats across 14 state and regional legislatures. The military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) refused to accept the election results, alleging widespread fraud.
In February 2021, hours before a new session of parliament was set to begin, the military seized control of the government, imposing a state of emergency, dissolving parliament, and preventing elected representatives from taking their seats. Several elected officials were detained, and hundreds more were placed under house arrest.
Score Change: The score declined from 2 to 0 because the military coup prevented recently elected members of parliament from convening.
A3 0-4 pts
Are the electoral laws and framework fair, and are they implemented impartially by the relevant election management bodies? 0 4
Various features of the electoral framework have undermined the democratic nature of recent elections. These include the military’s role in presidential nominations and appointments to both chambers of parliament, as well as rigid citizenship laws and excessive residency requirements that prevent large numbers of people from voting or standing for office.
The UEC, which is responsible for electoral administration, is empowered to adjudicate complaints against itself. Its members are appointed by the president and confirmed by the legislature, which has only limited authority to reject nominees. In 2020, UEC decisions to limit or cancel voting in several dozen townships populated by ethnic minority groups, as well as its rules surrounding access to and censorship of broadcast time allotted to political parties, were criticized as lacking sufficient transparency and disenfranchising voters.
After seizing power in February 2021, military leadership cited the USDP’s fraud allegations, flaws in electoral administration during the 2020 elections, and the NLD’s “failure” to address alleged voter list irregularities to justify rejecting the 2020 election results and deposing the elected government. The military regime also dissolved the UEC before reinstating the body with all new members, later charging a number of former UEC commissioners with electoral fraud. In July, the new UEC officially overturned the results of the November 2020 vote, and the following month, Min Aung Hlaing announced that new elections would be held in August 2023, extending the military’s initial one-year timeline.
Less than a month after taking power, the military regime proposed that the current first-past-the-post system be replaced with a proportional representation system. In October, the reconstituted UEC announced that it plans to introduce the change prior to the country’s next elections despite widespread criticism of the proposed change, which opposition parties claim is an attempt to keep the military in power.
Score Change: The score declined from 1 to 0 because the military effectively suspended the constitution and overturned existing electoral laws, rejecting election results that had been confirmed by the Union Election Commission.
B Political Pluralism and Participation
B1 0-4 pts
Do the people have the right to organize in different political parties or other competitive political groupings of their choice, and is the system free of undue obstacles to the rise and fall of these competing parties or groupings? 1 4
Party competition in the lead-up to the 2020 elections was robust, with 7,000 candidates from more than 90 parties participating, including the NLD, the USDP, and regionally based ethnic parties. Following the February 2021 coup, political parties continued to function, despite facing considerable restrictions and harassment. A number of prominent lawmakers and nonmilitary political leaders have been arrested by the military regime, and some have been charged with criminal offenses and put on trial, including much of the NLD leadership.
Following the 2021 coup, a group of previously elected officials unseated by the military regime formed the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH), which claims to represent a legitimate parliament and perform the duties of an elected government. In April, the CRPH established the National Unity Government (NUG), a resistance government largely made up of ousted NLD politicians. Throughout 2021, the NUG operated as an alternate power structure with influence over small pockets of the country, and organized countrywide opposition to the coup. Shortly after the NUG was formed, Myanmar’s military leadership classified the NUG, its armed People’s Defense Force (PDF), and the CRPH as terrorist organizations, which could result in prosecution and detention for anyone who communicates with the groups’ members.
The constitution contains a requirement that political parties be loyal to the state, which carries the potential for abuse. Laws allow penalties, including deregistration, for political parties that accept support from foreign governments or religious bodies, or that are deemed to have abused religion for political purposes or disrespected the constitution. In August 2021, the UEC announced plans to conduct financial audits of political parties, which many opposition leaders fear will be used to justify dissolving certain parties.
Score Change: The score declined from 3 to 1 due to the mass arrest of political party leaders and the suspension of ordinary political activity during the military coup and state of emergency.
B2 0-4 pts
Is there a realistic opportunity for the opposition to increase its support or gain power through elections? 1 4
The military’s constitutional prerogatives, as well as its close ties to the USDP, limit the degree to which any other force can secure control over the executive or the legislature through elections. Despite such limitations, the NLD won a convincing majority in the November 2020 elections. Following the coup in February 2021, the military announced that new elections would be held within a year; in August, Min Aung Hlaing announced that the military’s timeline had been extended, and new elections would not be held until August 2023. While there was no immediate electoral opportunity through which the opposition could gain power during 2021, the shadow NUG gained strength as an alternative power base, due in part to its ability to fundraise and form alliances.
Score Change: The score declined from 2 to 1 because the military’s seizure of power sharply reduced the prospects of a change in government through elections.
B3 0-4 pts
Are the people’s political choices free from domination by forces that are external to the political sphere, or by political forces that employ extrapolitical means? 0 4
After the NLD came to power in 2015, the military’s ability to influence electoral outcomes lessened, though it maintained considerable power over political affairs. The November 2020 elections, however, resulted in the defeat of the military’s civilian proxy party, which was widely viewed as an endorsement of Aung San Suu Kyi’s civilian government. The military refused to accept the election results, and in February 2021, seized control of the government. Following the coup, the military used force to contain the widespread protests against military rule that continued throughout the year—including the arrest of political leaders and civilian protestors, excessive violence and custodial abuse, and mass killings—in an attempt to secure its takeover.
Score Change: The score declined from 2 to 0 due to the military leadership’s consistent and widespread use of armed force to secure its rule and control political outcomes during and after the coup.
B4 0-4 pts
Do various segments of the population (including ethnic, racial, religious, gender, LGBT+, and other relevant groups) have full political rights and electoral opportunities? 1 4
Members of Myanmar’s Buddhist and ethnic Bamar majority hold most senior leadership positions in the country, including in major national political parties, the pre-2021 civilian government, and the military. Members of ethnic and religious minority groups face restrictions on their political rights and electoral opportunities, including through discriminatory citizenship, residency, and party registration laws.
The 1982 Citizenship Law does not allow for anyone who entered the country or is descended from someone who entered the country after 1948 to become a full citizen with political rights. Naturalization of spouses is only allowed if the spouse holds a Foreigner’s Registration Certificate from before the law’s enactment. The majority of the mainly Muslim Rohingya were rendered stateless by the 1982 Citizenship Law, which also dictates that only those who are descended from ethnic groups deemed to be native to the country prior to 1823 are considered full citizens. A 2015 presidential decree revoked the temporary identification cards that had allowed Rohingya to vote, and most of the 600,000 Rohingya remaining in Myanmar were unable to vote in the 2020 elections.
Women remain underrepresented in the government and civil service, due largely to societal biases that discourage their political participation. Notwithstanding the prominence of Aung San Suu Kyi, whose father led Myanmar’s independence struggle, few women have achieved ministerial-level appointments.
Following the February 2021 coup, the General Strike Committee of Nationalities (GSCN) was formed by members of 29 ethnic groups. The GSCN was established to support antimilitary protests and present the coordinated demands of Myanmar’s minority groups, which include an end to military rule and the creation of a federal democratic union. The NUG and CRPH have also made a concerted effort to include members of Myanmar’s ethnic groups, and have formed alliances with many of the country’s Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) in opposition to Tatmadaw rule.
C Functioning of Government
C1 0-4 pts
Do the freely elected head of government and national legislative representatives determine the policies of the government? 0 4
In February 2021, the military deposed the sitting government, prevented newly elected representatives from taking office, and assumed full control over all areas of government policy. The 2008 constitution allows the military to dissolve the civilian government and the parliament and rule directly if the president declares a state of emergency. The military used this provision to execute the 2021 coup; after arresting senior government leaders, military forces declared a state of emergency and assumed control of the government.
Effective governance and control over territory in some regions remains contested between the armed forces and ethnic minority rebel groups. Following the 2021 coup, many of these groups offered protection for those fleeing from military violence.
Since May 2021, the NUG, composed of previously elected representatives, has operated as a shadow government with considerable popularity and legitimacy, although it does not exercise control over state institutions or decision-making.
Score Change: The score declined from 2 to 0 because the military coup prevented duly elected executive and legislative representatives from taking office and determining government policy.
C2 0-4 pts
Are safeguards against official corruption strong and effective? 1 4
Despite government initiatives aimed at curbing official corruption, it remains rampant at both the national and local levels. An Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC), established in 2014, had brought a number of cases against high-ranking officials. Following the 2021 coup, the military brought multiple corruption charges against Aung San Suu Kyi, including bribery; she has denied the charges, and no evidence was produced in trial hearings apart from witness statements. In December, the military regime brought a corruption charge against Win Myint.
Privatization of state-owned companies and other economic reforms in recent years have allegedly benefited family members and associates of military and government officials. After the February 2021 coup, the children of high-ranking military leaders allegedly attempted to use their connections to secure lucrative supply contracts and other kickbacks.
C3 0-4 pts
Does the government operate with openness and transparency? 0 4
After the Tatmadaw took power in 2021, the already limited transparency mechanisms of the previous government were dismantled; oversight by civil society groups and the media has been completely suppressed under military rule.
The military also owns an extensive network of “crony companies” whose revenues enable it to avoid accountability and public oversight and engage in human rights violations with impunity, according to a UN report released in 2019.
Score Change: The score declined from 1 to 0 because the military leadership further suppressed state and nonstate transparency mechanisms following the coup, including oversight by legislators, independent media, and civil society groups.
Add Q
Is the government or occupying power deliberately changing the ethnic composition of a country or territory so as to destroy a culture or tip the political balance in favor of another group? -4
The central authorities have long used violence, displacement, and other tactics to alter the demographics of states with ethnic unrest or insurgencies. The Rohingya in Rakhine State have faced particularly harsh restrictions for decades, including limits on family size and the ability and right to marry, the denial of legal status and social services, and disenfranchisement and loss of citizenship. Human rights experts and the United Nations have labeled the abuses against the Rohingya as crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing, and many have argued that they constitute either genocide or a precursor to genocide.
In 2017, repression against the Rohingya escalated; military operations across the northern part of the state led to reports of torture, rape, indiscriminate killings, and the burning of villages, worsening already dire humanitarian conditions and causing 740,000 Rohingya refugees to join the 200,000 others already in Bangladesh. Aung San Suu Kyi, then head of state, did not explicitly acknowledge or condemn such organized official violence against Rohingya civilians; there has been little meaningful accountability for the atrocities. In 2020, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled that mass human rights violations had been committed against the Rohingya and ordered the government to implement emergency measures to protect the group; proceedings at the ICJ continued in 2021.
Though the UN’s Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar (IIMM) continued to collect evidence and interview witnesses in 2021, the February 2021 coup and subsequent closure of the country limited international observers’ access to Myanmar, further frustrating efforts to hold perpetrators accountable.
Civil Liberties
D Freedom of Expression and Belief
D1 0-4 pts
Are there free and independent media? 1 4
Following the coup in 2021, the military seized control of state-owned broadcast media, took private broadcasters off the air, and severely restricted internet access, including access to social media platforms and news outlets. Licenses for several independent media organizations were rescinded in March. However, a number of independent media outlets continued to provide news coverage, operating in hiding and in exile.
In February, the military amended sections of the criminal code and the Electronic Transactions Law to include provisions criminalizing antiregime statements. Human rights groups have warned that the amendments disproportionately affect independent media outlets, and enable the regime to easily detain and prosecute journalists. Dozens of journalists have been forced to flee following the military’s crackdown on press freedoms; according to the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), more than 100 journalists were arrested in 2021. Though the regime released several journalists throughout the year, many of those jailed face criminal charges.
D2 0-4 pts
Are individuals free to practice and express their religious faith or nonbelief in public and private? 1 4
The constitution provides for freedom of religion. It distinguishes Buddhism as the majority religion, but also recognizes Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, and animism. The government occasionally interferes with religious assemblies and attempts to control the Buddhist clergy. Authorities discriminate against minority religious groups—particularly Muslims—in practice, refusing them permission to hold gatherings and restricting educational activities, proselytization, and construction and repair of houses of worship.
Anti-Muslim hate speech and discrimination have been amplified by social media, and by some state institutions and mainstream news websites. The officially illegal Buddha Dhamma Parahita Foundation, formerly known as Ma Ba Tha, agitates for the protection of Buddhist privileges, urges boycotts against Muslim-run businesses, and disseminates anti-Muslim propaganda. Muslims face systematic discrimination in obtaining identity cards, and “Muslim-free” villages have been established with the complicity of officials.
D3 0-4 pts
Is there academic freedom, and is the educational system free from extensive political indoctrination? 0 4
Political activity on university campuses is generally restricted, and universities are not autonomous. Student unions—which have historically been important advocates for human rights—are discouraged, have no formal registration mechanisms, and are viewed with suspicion by authorities. A 2018 directive from the Ministry of Education required students to submit detailed information in order to get permission to hold events on campus.
University students and staff played a key role in antimilitary protests and strikes following the February 2021 coup; in March, the military stormed dozens of universities, seizing control of the campuses and arresting hundreds of students and faculty members. In May, more than 11,000 university staff were suspended for striking in protest against the military coup, and those who were not suspended were pressured into declaring allegiance to the ruling junta.
Score Change: The score declined from 1 to 0 because universities were subjected to military raids and mass staff suspensions after students and faculty expressed opposition to the coup.
D4 0-4 pts
Are individuals free to express their personal views on political or other sensitive topics without fear of surveillance or retribution? 1 4
Private discussion and personal expression—already constrained by state surveillance and laws inhibiting online speech—became more difficult following the 2021 coup. Upon taking power, the regime enacted sweeping revisions of existing legal code, removing several key human rights protections, including those against arbitrary surveillance. The legal reforms also included amendments to the penal code that severely curtailed freedom of expression. In March, the military banned the use of circumvention tools such as virtual private networks (VPNs) and other communications technology in an attempt to keep people from evading surveillance.
Hundreds of people were arrested and prosecuted under the revised legal code, usually for comments made online; hundreds of others have been forced into hiding or exile to avoid arrest, and a smaller number were killed in protests or targeted for attack.
Score Change: The score declined from 2 to 1 due to mass arrests of social media users and new restrictions on communications technology in the wake of the coup.
E Associational and Organizational Rights
E1 0-4 pts
Is there freedom of assembly? 0 4
Freedom of assembly has been increasingly restricted in recent years. A blanket ban on protests in 11 townships of central Yangon has been in place since 2017, and in 2020, an extended internet shutdown in parts of Rakhine and Chin states severely impeded activists’ ability to organize protests. Unauthorized demonstrations are punishable with up to six months in prison under the Peaceful Assembly and Peaceful Procession Law; a variety of other vaguely defined violations can draw lesser penalties.
After the 2021 coup, freedom of assembly was violently curtailed in response to widespread antimilitary protests. Within a week of taking power, the military banned all gatherings of more than five people, imposed a strict curfew, and began using lethal and indiscriminate force against peaceful protesters. Widespread internet restrictions were also deployed to hinder the organization of protests. Military violence in response to protests continued throughout the year, resulting in the deaths of hundreds of protesters and the arrest of thousands more.
Score Change: The score declined from 1 to 0 due to the military’s crackdown on protests following the coup, which included curfews, mass arrests, internet shutdowns, and the extensive use of lethal force.
E2 0-4 pts
Is there freedom for nongovernmental organizations, particularly those that are engaged in human rights– and governance-related work? 1 4
The ability of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to engage in human rights– and governance-related work significantly decreased after the 2021 military coup. Activists face arrest and prosecution, and many prominent activists have been forced to go into hiding or exile; in some cases, family members of activists have been arrested as a pressure tactic. In March, the regime introduced new restrictions on NGO activity, including pausing all NGO registration and renewal processes, and began to heavily monitor NGO bank activity. NGOs were increasingly subject to harassment and interference by authorities throughout the year, and a large number of NGOs effectively shut down or disbanded. Despite such limitations, a number continue to quietly monitor human rights abuses and engage in advocacy with international stakeholders.
Score Change: The score declined from 2 to 1 because the military increased pressure on human rights activists following the coup, in part by detaining their family members, and the broader crisis obstructed the work of humanitarian organizations.
E3 0-4 pts
Is there freedom for trade unions and similar professional or labor organizations? 1 4
Union activity took root in Myanmar following the lifting of the ban on trade unions in 2011, despite weak legal protections for workers against abuse by employers. In 2021, unions played a leading role in organizing antimilitary protests and strikes immediately following the coup. In response, military authorities declared most unions illegal, and conducted violent raids and mass arrests in areas populated by striking union workers; the regime also threatened dozens of key leaders with arrest, causing many to flee. By June, thousands of civil servants and private sector employees had been fired for their participation in the widespread CDM.
Score Change: The score declined from 2 to 1 due to a wave of reprisals against unions that participated in civil disobedience actions, including bans, raids, dismissals, arrests, and extrajudicial killings.
F Rule of Law
F1 0-4 pts
Is there an independent judiciary? 0 4
The judiciary is not independent. Judges are nominated by the president, and lawmakers can reject the choice only if it is clearly proven that the nominee does not meet the legal qualifications for the post. The courts generally adjudicate cases in accordance with the government’s interests, particularly in major cases with political implications.
Following the February 2021 coup, the military regime took control of Myanmar’s judicial system.
F2 0-4 pts
Does due process prevail in civil and criminal matters? 0 4
Following the 2021 military coup, revisions to the criminal code and the imposition of an indefinite state of emergency allowed the regime to remove existing safeguards against arbitrary arrest and detention. In March, the Tatmadaw declared martial law in 11 townships of Yangon and Mandalay, enabling military tribunals to impose death sentences on civilians; by the end of 2021, military tribunals had sentenced more than 90 civilians to death.
The number of political prisoners rose dramatically in 2021; most were arrested while protesting, although dozens of prominent political leaders and several cultural figures were specifically targeted. According to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP), as of December 2021, 11,296 individuals had been arrested; an additional 1,964 arrest warrants remained open.
Score Change: The score declined from 1 to 0 due to the suspension of existing safeguards against abuse of power by security forces and the widespread use of arbitrary arrest and detention during the military coup and state of emergency.
F3 0-4 pts
Is there protection from the illegitimate use of physical force and freedom from war and insurgencies? 0 4
The February 2021 military coup resulted in a sharp increase in civilian exposure to violence, armed conflict, and the illegitimate use of physical force. Indiscriminate shelling and aerial attacks, the destruction of villages, extrajudicial killings, forced disappearances, arbitrary detentions, torture, rape, and other abuses by the military escalated during 2021. In December, 40 civilians were burned alive by military forces in Kayah State.
Long-standing armed conflicts between ethnic rebel groups and the central government continued in 2021 in Shan, Kachin, Kayin, Chin, and Rakhine States. Even ethnically Bamar areas, particularly Sagaing Region and major urban centers including Yangon and Mandalay, experienced high levels of violent conflict between Tatmadaw forces and antimilitary protesters. Military attacks on peaceful protesters, including the use of lethal force, took place across the country; in response, civilian youth across the country formed armed people’s defense forces (PDFs) that carried out guerilla attacks against military targets. After the NUG declared a “people’s war” against the military in September, it engaged in efforts to coordinate among the shadow government, the PDFs, and ethnic rebel groups.
The number of displaced civilians increased throughout the year, with those displaced by earlier rounds of fighting in ethnic areas joined by those fleeing the newly installed military regime; between February and December, more than 400,000 civilians were displaced.
Prisons in Myanmar are severely overcrowded, and conditions for inmates are sometimes life-threatening. Following the coup, prison conditions further deteriorated, as numbers of detainees rapidly increased and grave abuses that had been prevalent during previous periods of military rule resurfaced. Sanitary conditions in prisons are extremely poor, and authorities have reportedly taken few measures to curb the spread of the COVID-19 virus within the prison system; in 2021, at least 12 inmates died after contracting COVID-19, and hundreds more tested positive for the virus.
F4 0-4 pts
Do laws, policies, and practices guarantee equal treatment of various segments of the population? 0 4
Some of the country’s worst human rights abuses, commonly committed by federal military troops, are against ethnic and religious minority populations. The government’s failure to protect victims, conduct investigations, and punish perpetrators is well documented. The post-coup period in 2021 was characterized by further deterioration in the country’s human rights situation and a lack of accountability for offenders.
Ethnic minority groups such as the Shan, Mon, Chin, Karen, and Kachin, as well as non-Rohingya Muslims, also face some societal discrimination, while the ethnic Bamar, Buddhist majority retains a privileged position.
In addition to conflict-related violence, women are subject to discrimination in employment, against which there are no explicit legal protections. A number of laws create a hostile environment for LGBT+ residents. Same-sex sexual activity is criminalized, and police reportedly harass, extort, and physically and sexually abuse LGBT+ people.
G Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights
G1 0-4 pts
Do individuals enjoy freedom of movement, including the ability to change their place of residence, employment, or education? 1 4
Prior to 2021, freedom of internal travel for Myanmar citizens was generally respected outside of conflict zones. However, after the coup in February 2021, movement was increasingly restricted across the country. The military erected road blocks and checkpoints; enforced exit controls, curfews, and residency rules for private dwellings that require reporting overnight guests; engaged in violent raids of neighborhoods and villages; and regularly responded with disproportionate force to ongoing civic action. Some high-profile dissidents were arrested as they attempted to leave Myanmar by air, while thousands more have fled to neighboring countries by land despite the dangers posed by military forces.
Additionally, Myanmar’s large population of stateless residents remain subject to significant restrictions on their movement, particularly the 600,000 Rohingya who remain in Rakhine State and are confined to designated camps and villages; those who attempt to travel outside these areas are regularly arrested and detained.
G2 0-4 pts
Are individuals able to exercise the right to own property and establish private businesses without undue interference from state or nonstate actors? 1 4
Disputes over land grabbing and business projects that violate human rights are common. Myanmar’s property-transfer laws prohibit transfers to or from a foreigner except in certain state-approved cases of inheritance, and require registration of foreign-owned property. Stateless residents, including the Rohingya, cannot legally buy or sell property or set up a business.
Instances of forced eviction and displacement, confiscation, lack of sufficient compensation, and direct violence against landholders by state security officials abound. Court cases are frequently brought against farmers for trespassing on land that was taken from them. The resumption of armed hostilities following the coup led to military attacks and arbitrary destruction of property—including entire villages—in 2021.
Multiple sources continued to report that Rohingya land and property have been razed, confiscated, appropriated, or built on, often with the direct involvement of the military, and sometimes under the guise of development assistance.
G3 0-4 pts
Do individuals enjoy personal social freedoms, including choice of marriage partner and size of family, protection from domestic violence, and control over appearance? 1 4
Men and women formally enjoy equal rights on personal status issues, though there are restrictions on marriages of Buddhist women to non-Buddhist men. Laws that might protect women from domestic abuse and rape are weak and poorly enforced, and such violence is an acute and persistent problem. The army has a record of using rape as a weapon of war against ethnic minority women, and security personnel typically enjoy impunity for sexual violence. Following the 2021 coup, numerous instances of gender-based violence were reported by detainees.
G4 0-4 pts
Do individuals enjoy equality of opportunity and freedom from economic exploitation? 1 4
Human trafficking, forced labor, child labor, and the recruitment of child soldiers are serious problems in Myanmar. Child soldiers are enlisted by the military and ethnic rebel groups, which also recruit civilians for forced labor. Various commercial and other interests continue to use forced labor despite a formal ban on the practice. Trafficking victims include women and girls subjected to forced sex work and domestic servitude, as well as women who are sold as brides to men in China—an expanding practice in some ethnic minority states. People displaced by ongoing conflicts are especially vulnerable to sexual and labor exploitation..."
Source/publisher:
Freedom House (Washington, D.C.)
Date of publication:
2022-04-22
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-22
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
more
Description:
"Failure to stop violence one year after ASEAN’s adoption of its Five-Point Consensus
Activists inside Myanmar resorting to flash mobs and silent strikes to avoid crackdown
Plainclothes military forces disguise themselves as fruit sellers and trishaw drivers as part of the repressive surveillance system
Military retaliates against family members of activists
Myanmar’s brave activists are still pursuing peaceful protests despite grave danger and numerous challenges, Amnesty International said today, one year after the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) adopted a Five-Point Consensus that has abjectly failed to stop the violence in the country.
In recent months, Amnesty International conducted in-depth interviews with 17 people who have continued to take part in non-violent protests across five of Myanmar’s states and regions. The interviewees were from a diverse array of protest groups, including LGBTQ and women’s rights organizations.
One of the most popular methods of protesting has been “flash mobs” where activists run through the streets for a few minutes before dispersing to avoid being shot, arrested or run over by military vehicles.
The public has also held “silent strikes” across the country, during which shops and businesses shut down, roads emptied, and people stayed home to show defiance to military rule.
Across Myanmar, activists and human rights defenders have been distributing pamphlets on buses, posting messages against the military on walls with stickers or spray paint, and encouraging boycotts of goods and services with ties to the military.
“These activists urgently need the support of the international community in the form of a global arms embargo to stop the Myanmar military from using weapons of warfare to kill peaceful protesters,” said Emerlynne Gil, Amnesty International’s Deputy Regional Director for Research.
These activists urgently need the support of the international community in the form of a global arms embargo to stop the Myanmar military from using weapons of warfare to kill peaceful protesters.
Emerlynne Gil, Amnesty International’s Deputy Regional Director for Research
“The ASEAN must call on the Myanmar military authorities to immediately stop all violence against peaceful protestors in line with the stalled Five-Point Consensus. It should do so now to prevent the Myanmar people from further suffering.”
“It must also continue to unequivocally condemn all human rights violations in Myanmar and call for the release of all individuals who are arbitrarily detained.”
“THEY TRIED TO HIT ME”
In the days immediately following the coup, Amnesty International and many other human rights groups urged the military to stop the use of unlawful and lethal force against peaceful protesters. The violence has since prompted many to join armed resistance groups, which are active throughout the country.
Amnesty International has called on the military to exercise restraint, abide by international law, and for law enforcement duties to be fully resumed by police.
These calls have gone unheeded. More than 1,700 people have now been killed, and more than 13,000 arrested since the military took power, according to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners.
Activists and human rights defenders interviewed by Amnesty International described witnessing or experiencing abuses by military forces while demonstrating, including shootings, beatings, and attempts to ram vehicles into protests.
The brutal response of the military had an enormous impact on the nonviolent protest movement. During the latter part of 2021, there was a noticeable decrease in the number of people who joined protests in the streets.
“We went from tens of thousands to thousands, thousands to hundreds, and hundreds to around twenty,” said Thiri*, a university student in Mandalay who said she had no interest in politics before the coup but is now one of the leaders of a women’s protest group.
We went from tens of thousands to thousands, thousands to hundreds, and hundreds to around twenty.
Thiri*, university student in Mandalay
However, the reduced number of protesters taking to the streets may also be a matter of strategy. Some of the activists that Amnesty International spoke with said they were intentionally organizing the protests in smaller groups to keep everyone safe.
Rina, a university student and member of the General Strike Committee in Yangon, said that it had become “too dangerous” to protest in large groups.
She participated in a flash mob with around 20 other people on 5 December 2021 and she recounted to Amnesty International that on that day, as they gathered, a military truck drove straight into them. “As I was running, I saw some of the other people who joined in the flash mob had been hit [by the military truck]. Some of them were rolling on the pavement.”
In the Kachin State capital of Myitkyina, a university student who has been protesting with the University of Myitkyina Students’ Union, said that they usually go out in smaller groups because “if there are too many people in the protest, it is easier to get arrested.”
Zin Mar, another university student who is a protest leader in Monywa, said that although her protest group sometimes had to reduce the number of people demonstrating for security reasons, they were determined to continue. “We will always come out whenever we can,” she said.
Min Thu, a high school student who is a leading member of the Mandalay Youth Strike Committee, has witnessed unmarked vehicles which he believes to belong to the military and police accelerate into protesters during at least three instances. In October 2021, a motorcycle nearly hit him when he was about to join a protest.
“Just before we started the protest, they tried to hit me [with the vehicle] from the front,” Min Thu said. “I escaped by going to the nearest road and then they got down from their vehicle and pointed guns at me. They didn’t shoot me because they had blocked all the angles, and they thought they would arrest me.” He told Amnesty International that he dodged onto a side street and barely escaped.
In Sagaing region’s Salingyi and Yinmarbin townships, poet and engineer Yar Zar has regularly organized people across villages to protest since March of last year, and was at two protests when soldiers and police opened fire at the crowd.
To avoid encountering soldiers, he and his team carefully prepare routes along narrow, unpaved streets. He is one of several people who told Amnesty International that they also rely on volunteers to check and make sure the route is clear before they demonstrate.
“When we protest in the village, some protesters who act as lookouts escort us so we can avoid the military. Once they have passed, we start our protest again,” said Phyu, a village protest leader in Thayetchaung township, Tanintharyi region.
Protest groups have also been distributing pamphlets and using social media to call for a boycott of goods and services with ties to the military, and have been posting anti-coup messages in public spaces.
LIFE ON THE RUN
Many activists described to Amnesty International how they felt like they were constantly watched and followed by civilian informants known as dalans or by soldiers and police wearing civilian clothes and driving unmarked vehicles.
Myat Min Khant of the All Burma Federation of Student Unions said that the military and police roam streets disguised as fruit sellers or trishaw, motorcycle, or taxi drivers and embed themselves among the people to surveil anyone daring to express dissent.
There are also numerous checkpoints in towns and cities around the country. People are stopped at random, and their belongings are searched by soldiers and police. Thus, activists either leave their devices at home or delete messages and applications on devices when they go out for fear that they could be arrested.
Surveillance by the military adds to the challenges in organizing protests, according to Moe Thouk, a protest leader with the General Strike Committee in Yangon.
They use CCTV cameras to follow activists, employ dalans in every ward to gather information, and arrest activists while wearing civilian clothes, he said. “They roam around places where protests often take place. We need to carefully choose the right place [to protest] and rely on scouts for safety,” said Moe Thouk.
Most of the activists who spoke to Amnesty International said that they have left their homes for safety reasons, and several of them have not been able to be back home at all since February 2021.
“If I go back home, the military may be waiting to arrest me,” said Nan Lin of the University Students’ Union Alumni Force. “Even my family members do not know my whereabouts.”
If I go back home, the military may be waiting to arrest me…even my family members do not know my whereabouts.
Nan Lin, University Students’ Union Alumni Force
BP, a protest leader who has demonstrated on the streets of Kalay, Sagaing region every day since 7 February 2021, said that a convoy of five vehicles full of soldiers raided his family home three times in one day in September 2021. He is one of four protesters interviewed who said their homes have been raided after they have left and gone into hiding.
But while they fear going home, many of these activists said it is becoming harder and harder to find safe places to hide. BP told Amnesty International that he regularly sees strangers who he believes are plainclothes informants loitering near the vicinity where activists are staying or following them on motorbikes while carrying walkie-talkies.
U Yaw, a monk from Ayeyarwady region who has been actively protesting since the early days after the coup, had been in hiding since March 2021 when his monastery was raided. During the raid, as U Yaw hid in a toilet stall, he overheard soldiers saying that if they found him, they should “just shoot him dead and get rid of him.”
He fled to Mandalay and resumed protesting, but soldiers and police raided the monastery there where he was hiding in June. He took shelter in another monastery which was raided by soldiers and police in September 2021.
He escaped just in time, but the soldiers and police confiscated his identification documents and cash. U Yaw continued to protest despite the risks.
THREATENING FAMILY MEMBERS
In many cases, soldiers and police have taken into custody family members and loved ones of activists if they were unable to find the activists and arrest them, including a politicians’ 94-year-old mother and an activist’s four-year-old daughter, according to media reports
In April 2021, soldiers and police raided the house of Arkar, an activist who had gone into hiding.
“Because they couldn’t find me and arrest me, they arrested my mother,” he said. “I got a call from the police station and I was told that I should give myself up in exchange for the freedom of my mother.”
Arkar did not turn himself in, and his relatives were able to negotiate his mother’s release the next day by paying a bribe. Arkar’s family have since moved to a new home to avoid further reprisals. Arkar is one of four people who told Amnesty International that their families were forced to leave their homes because of safety concerns.
In November 2021, the military attempted to raid the house of another protest leader who had gone into hiding. “When they arrived, they started shooting, but they went to the wrong house. They mistakenly went to our neighbor’s house and one woman was killed because of the shooting,” the activist said.
Her family was able to escape but she has not contacted them since for fear that she would be putting their lives at further risk. She is currently moving from place to place, and said she has trouble sleeping due to fear of arrest.
“We have to be vigilant 24 hours a day. We get startled even when we just hear a cat jumping onto the roof. We worry about getting arrested when we go out, and when we are in the house, we are scared they will come in and arrest us. We have completely lost our sense of security,” she said.
We have to be vigilant 24 hours a day. We get startled even when we just hear a cat jumping onto the roof.
Protest leader
She is determined, though, to continue organizing peaceful protests. “I cannot sit quietly when I see injustice,” she told Amnesty International.
A resolve to keep protesting nonviolently is shared by many of the activists.
“Despite the immense dangers and hardships, there are still many activists and human rights defenders who choose to remain in Myanmar and who are unwavering in their commitment to continue peacefully protesting and expressing their dissent,” Amnesty’s Emerlynne Gil said.
Many of them said they continue their peaceful protests to inspire more people in the country to action and to give people hope. “The main reason I continue protesting is so that the people do not become divided or lose enthusiasm, and so that they can get strength by seeing us,” said the monk in Mandalay, U Yaw.
“Although our lives are in danger, we choose to continue. We will keep asking the world to help us because people are being killed in Myanmar,” said Zin Mar, the protest leader in Monywa.
*Note to editors: In several cases pseudonyms have been used at the request of interviewees..."
Source/publisher:
Amnesty International (UK)
Date of publication:
2022-04-22
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-22
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations, Anti-coup protesters
Language:
more
Description:
"On March 9, 2022, human rights advocacy groups Inclusive Development International (IDI) and
ALTSEAN-Burma published a report titled “The Myanmar ESG Files: How ‘responsible investment’ is
enabling a military dictatorship.” The report documents how hundreds of funds carrying the ESG
(Environmental, Social and Governance) label hold at least $13.4 billion worth of shares in 33
corporations linked with the Myanmar military.
According to the report, the 33 companies including Japanese companies have armed and funded the
Myanmar military. Data compiled by IDI show that ESG-labeled funds continued to hold shares in these
companies even after the genocide against the Rohingya in 2017 and the crackdown following last
year’s coup. Mekong Watch reiterates its concern over these Japanese companies continuing their
businesses in Myanmar despite the risk of providing financial support to the Myanmar military's
international crimes and grave human rights violations, including murder, arbitrary detention, sexual
violence, forced disappearances, and torture.
The following Japanese companies are listed in the report. The description of each company is drawn
from the report unless otherwise noted.
Daiwa House Industry
A Daiwa House Industry subsidiary, Fujita Corporation, entered into a real estate joint venture
to develop a project called the Y Complex in Myanmar. Rent payments for this project flows to
the Quartermaster General, which oversees procurement for the Myanmar military. In an email
response to Inclusive Development International, Daiwa House Industry did not dispute these
findings, but said that it had suspended development of the project on the day of the coup.
KDDI Corp
KDDI Corporation and Sumitomo Corporation founded a telecommunication subsidiary in
Myanmar which jointly operates the state-owned Myanmar Posts and Telecommunications
(MPT). MPT collaborates with the military’s domestic surveillance program, according to a 2022
U.S. State Department report. That surveillance program allows the military to search and seize
people’s belongings and intercept phone data without a warrant.
Kirin Holdings
Kirin Holdings jointly owns Myanmar Brewery with the military-controlled Myanmar Economic
Holdings Limited. In addition, according to the 2019 U.N. fact-finding report, Kirin Holdings Pte
Ltd., provided financial support to the military for “clearance operations” against the Rohingya.
Marubeni Group
According to the Burma Campaign UK, the company is involved in the development of the
Shweli 3 dam in Northern Shan State, which is in a conflict zone and is opposed by local
residents. Marubeni is also a developer of the Thilawa Special Economic Zone. Marubeni
remains on the Burma Campaign UK’s Dirty List.
Sumitomo Corp
Sumitomo Corporation and KDDI Corporation, founded a telecommunication subsidiary in
Myanmar which jointly operates the state-owned Myanmar Posts and Telecommunications
(MPT). MPT collaborates with the military’s domestic surveillance program, according to a 2022
U.S. State Department report. That surveillance program allows the military to search and seize
people’s belongings and intercept phone data without a warrant.
* Note by Mekong Watch: Sumitomo Corporation is also a developer of the Thilawa Special
Economic Zone along with Marubeni.
Tokyo Tatemono
Tokyo Tatemono entered into a real estate joint venture to develop a project called the Y
Complex in Myanmar. Rent payments for this project flows to the Quartermaster General, which
oversees procurement for the Myanmar military. In an email response to Inclusive Development
International, Tokyo Tatemono said that it did not believe its money was flowing to the military
and that it had not paid any fees since the coup.
Toshiba Corp
According to the Burma Campaign UK, a subsidiary supplies turbines for the controversial
Upper Yeywa dam in Shan State. Security forces protecting the investment allegedly committed
serious human rights violations, including extrajudicial killings and torture. Toshiba remains on
the Burma Campaign UK’s Dirty List.
In addition to the seven companies above, we have pointed out that Japan’s JX Nippon Oil & Gas
Exploration (a part of the ENEOS Group), Yokogawa Bridge Corporation (wholly-owned subsidiary of
Yokogawa Bridge Holdings), and Mitsubishi Corporation have ties to the Myanmar military. JX and
Mitsubishi have shares in the Yetagun gas field which is an important source of revenue for the military.
Yokogawa Bridge is working in cooperation with the military conglomerate Myanmar Economic
Corporation (MEC) on the Bago River Bridge Construction project, which is backed by Japan’s Official
Development Assistance. Further, in addition to the Yetagun gas project, Mitsubishi Corporation is a
developer of the Thilawa Special Economic Zone along with Marubeni and Sumitomo, two of the
Japanese companies listed in the report by IDI and Altsean. In terms of ESG investing, ENEOS,
Yokogawa Electric Corporation (major shareholder of Yokogawa Bridge Holdings), and Mitsubishi are
listed in the “FTSE Blossom Japan Index” created by FTSE Russell, which is one of the ESG indexes
for Japanese companies adopted by Japan’s Government Pension Investment Fund (GPIF).
ESG investing is supposed to encourage corporate respect for human rights, but it is clear that in
Myanmar, investment by ESG-labeled funds has little to do with how much consideration corporations
are actually giving to human rights. Yuka Kiguchi, Executive Director of Mekong Watch, stated: "ESG
investing is becoming increasingly popular in Japan, but not enough analysis is being done on what
exactly such investment is supporting. Regarding companies operating in Myanmar, individual projects
should be examined to ensure that funds do not flow to the military and that human rights and
environmental impacts are avoided.”..."
Source/publisher:
Mekong Watch
Date of publication:
2022-04-12
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-22
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Business and the Military, The Burmese military's role in the economy, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
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"Key Updates
• Afghan evacuees are stuck in legal limbo: Months after hundreds of thousands of Afghan nationals were evacuated from Afghanistan after the Taliban takeover, many remain stuck in resettlement limbo in the western countries.
• Myanmar and Bangladesh resume talks on repatriating Rohingya refugees: While the two countries agreed on a repatriation date in June, many Rohingya refugees in Cox’s Bazar say they are unwilling to return to Myanmar before a series of long-standing issues are addressed, including the granting of full citizenship rights and protection from persecution.
• Rohingya refugees continue onward movements from Bangladesh: On 25 March, 57 Rohingya refugees were captured by the Bangladeshi authorities while attempting to leave for Malaysia by a trawler. This was the second boat to attempt to leave Bangladesh in the first quarter of 2022.
• Escalating conflicts on multiple fronts displaced thousands of people in Myanmar: Fighting has intensified in Kayah and Kayin states since December 2021, creating volatile new conflict zones. In Kayah alone, up to 170,000 people have been internally displaced and forced to seek shelter in community centers, churches, the jungle, or in the neighboring Shan state after a January military crackdown.
• Refugees and migrants across the region still face barriers to accessing COVID-19 vaccine and treatment: Refugees and migrants in countries such as Thailand and Indonesia continue to face critical vaccine inequality due to logistical and administrative challenges.
• Refugees in Australia’s offshore processing centers are eligible for resettlement in New Zealand:
On 24 March, Australia announced that up to 450 refugees from its regional processing centers will be resettled in New Zealand over the next three years..."
Source/publisher:
Mixed Migration Centre
Date of publication:
2022-04-21
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-21
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Public Health, Rohingya (cultural, political etc.)
Language:
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pdf
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3.83 MB (Original version) - 17 pages
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"1. INTRODUCTION
An estimated 1.8 billion people–almost one quarter of the world’s population–lived in fragile states in 2020. This share is expected to grow to 26 percent in 2030 and 31 percent in 2050 (OECD 2020). Moreover, three-quarters of the extreme poor in the world reside in fragile states (OECD 2020). Yet, despite the enormous importance of these areas for reducing global poverty and food insecurity, there is relatively little research on livelihoods and trade because safe and reliable data collection is often a challenge. Access to food, food prices, and the functioning of food value chains are critical when states fail but, insights into the functioning of agricultural markets and food value chains are rare within such conflict-affected areas. In this paper, we examine agricultural value chains in Myanmar during a period of major political instability. Myanmar’s military seized control of the country in a coup on February 1, 2021, setting the country down a path of widespread violence and major economic collapse. In protest of the coup, Myanmar’s people organized a Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) and worker strikes, which led to disruptions in service delivery of both public institutions and private businesses. Banks closed to in-person services and faced severe liquidity shortages, limiting businesses’ ability to pay employees and suppliers, and for residents to access their money. Access to formal and informal credit mostly dried up. Internet access and communication was restricted. Violence and insecurity rose sharply after the coup. Cumulatively, these disruptions had major economic consequences as GDP declined by 18 percent and poverty rates increased to between 40 and 50 percent of Myanmar’s population (Boughton et al. 2021, World Bank 2021, UNDP 2021). We study the rice value chain for two reasons. First, rice is the main staple in Myanmar, accounting for 51 and 62 percent of urban and rural calories consumed, respectively, making it crucial for food security in the country. It is also the predominant crop for a large number of farmers and an important export. Second, approximately 70 percent of rice that is consumed is purchased. Value chains are therefore essential in assuring sales of paddy from farmers, milling of paddy to rice, and distribution of rice to consumers. Rice is typically traded over large distances in the country, implying that coup-related disruptions in the functioning of the value chain coup will be widely felt. To study the rice value chain, we use unique primary data collected by phone before and after the coup at the midstream (rice millers) and downstream (retail food vendors) and combine these data with a number of secondary datasets. We look at three research topics. First, we assess the extent of the disruptions to the rice value chain following the military coup by investigating disruptions midstream and downstream, and rice availability in retail markets. Second, we analyze the size of processing and distribution margins within the value chain and assess how they have been affected by the coup. Third, we look at spatial price dispersion from the mills to food vendors comparing rice prices before and after the coup using a market-pair regression methodology of miller-vendor pairs with miller and vendor fixed effects. We test what explanatory variables of price dispersion used in international literature matter in this context and to what extent these factors have been affected by the instability. We examine travel costs (Minten and Kyle 1999, Minten et al. 2016), border crossings (as a proxy for export market access) (Aker et al. 2014), and differences of ethnic group composition between markets (Aker et al. 2014, Robinson 2016). We also assess the direct effects of measures of violent events in sending and receiving markets on price dispersion. Our data reveal significant business disturbances for food vendors and rice millers after the coup linked to banking and transport. Yet, despite these challenges, local trade and milling continued, though at lower activity levels than normal, assuring availability of rice in most retail markets in the country. Upstream, farm prices and milling margins were found to be mostly stable after the coup. However, we see increases in retail rice prices by 11 percent on average. Simulation results of these increased distribution margins indicate sizable welfare costs for rice consumers and producers, estimated at almost 0.5 billion USD at the national level (equivalent to about 3 percent of agricultural GDP in 2020). Regressions reveal that spatial price dispersion increased after the coup with the distance between mills and vendors widening the price differences. Violence near mills or vendors, which increased dramatically during the coup, also increased price dispersion. However, in contrast with previous findings (Aker et al. 2014, Robinson 2016), we find that differences in ethnic composition of sending and receiving townships/markets did not affect dispersion. Price dispersion further decreased with proximity of food vendors to land borders, possibly due to the price reducing effects of competition from exports in those markets. However, the border effect was weakened severely during periods of border closures. The results indicate that the most severe effect of the coup on retail prices were found in the areas furthest away from export opportunities and major production zones that were affected by violence. When the state fails to assume its normal role and private sector activities are curtailed, it is crucial that agricultural value chains continue to function well to ensure food security and to prevent increases in food retail prices to avoid further suffering of vulnerable households. Our findings indicate that easing transport restrictions, stabilizing fuel prices, and facilitating safe spatial arbitrage of food products would reduce the welfare costs of market disruptions by preventing food price inflation while assuring remunerative prices for farmers. To the extent possible, maintaining safe border trade of agricultural commodities may help stabilize prices in the domestic market. Finally, as mobile phone use is often widespread, even in a failed state, close monitoring of a number of important aspects in such environments can take place and should therefore be encouraged. The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we provide important background information on the political conflict and the rice value chain in Myanmar. The econometric specification used to empirically test price changes during the crisis is discussed in Section 3 along with our data and survey methods. Section 4 illustrates the disruptions noted in the value chain. Section 5 presents graphical analyses of price and margin changes, revealing retail price increases following the coup, as well as price regressions results. Section 6 discusses the implications of our results and section 7 concludes by summarizing the key results and by discussing main policy implications..."
Source/publisher:
International Food Policy Research Institute
Date of publication:
2022-04-18
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-19
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Agriculture in Burma/Myanmar: general and research, Food Security and nutrition in Burma/Myanmar, Human Rights and international relations
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"A recent job posting for the international non-profit organization Search for Common Ground sought a “proactive, dynamic and experienced” person to work in their Yangon office on “Youth, Peace and Security”. The posting failed to mention the February 1 2021 military coup, but did proclaim that “Search Myanmar is at an exciting stage and has been trying to reach a new level of growth, scaling up…to support its strategy in-country to support Myanmar in its priorities of peace, development and democratic change.” I’m not sure “exciting stage” is the apt characterization for contemporary Myanmar. Search is also looking for a Conflict Analyst, a Project Director, a Gender and Diversity Consultant and several other positions.
There has been a flurry of new job postings in the international development space in Myanmar, many of which avoid mentioning the coup. When the issue does arise, it is referred to as a ‘military takeover’, likely because the Ministry of Information under the junta’s State Administration Council (SAC) banned the use of the term ‘coup’, as well as the terms ‘junta’ and ‘regime’. It all contributes to a strained return to normalcy, as the United Nations (UN), international organizations, and Western embassies all contrive to rationalize the relentless bad news from around the country.
Filling jobs is prosaic way to keep busy. Nor does aid money spend itself. Although it would be a demonstration of common decency if job postings didn’t talk about “exciting opportunities” when so many potential applicants have been killed in street protests, are in prison, have gone underground to continue civil disobedience, have been exiled, or have chosen to take up arms against a brutal and illegal military system. That rather limits the pool of applicants, something which they could have acknowledged in their ‘search’ for common ground.
In the aftermath of the first anniversary of Myanmar’s putsch, there was the inevitable slew of morosely serious ‘webinars’, which blend into a distant droning sound of helplessness until one discerns the rising signals of reengagement amongst many international donors and diplomats. There are signs big and small, from the woeful visit of outgoing Australian Ambassador Andrea Faulkner to SAC head Senior General Min Aung Hlaing in Naypyitaw in early April, obviously on instructions from the Australian government, obtuse statements from diplomats in Yangon, to continued recruitment of multiple positions that scream business as usual and the continued operations of programs that a coup would normally halt.
The UN’s most superfluous agency, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), has also advertised for a new Myanmar country director. Yet the UNODC Asia Pacific Regional Director, the studiously self-promoting Jeremy Douglas with his steely Elliot Ness-like intensity, has been spouting alarmist nonsense about a post-coup explosion of crystal methamphetamine production and the perfect conditions for criminal enterprises, given that the Myanmar Police Force (MPF) is otherwise occupied suppressing dissent. The rise of meth production in northern Shan State preceded the coup by years, the MPF only arrest low-level traffickers and users, not major players protected by the military, and the UNODC hasn’t had much success in drug eradication in Myanmar in several decades.
Also, the UN’s common position doesn’t permit any interaction with the Myanmar military or police, so what exactly would the successful applicant be doing? The job posting states; “Keep abreast with the latest developments and trends in Myanmar regarding all areas under UNODC mandates and advise on possible policy and operational responses; Represent UNODC’s position and interests in Myanmar and liaise with Government’s institutions [in line with the common UN position], civil society, regional and international aid agencies and financial institutions, and the media.” So really not much of any use. Or is it the thin edge of a wedge of reengagement? UNODC permitted the attendance of an SAC official at the UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs several weeks after the coup, and it worked closely with the MPF on drafting the 2014 Anti-Terrorism Law, so its new country head should be watched closely.
The World Food Programme (WFP), arguably one of the the most important agencies operating given the scale of food insecurity and conflict-induced displacement, recently released its ‘2021 Highlights’, not exactly a very conflict-sensitive title. It referred not to a coup d’etat or widespread atrocities, but to a “Political Crisis…Myanmar military stages a takeover prompting near paralysis of economy and public services”, while the number of people receiving assistance increased by one million. An overall tepid description of what the WFP continues to call a ‘crisis’.
UN Secretary General Special Envoy Noeleen Heyzers efforts have also dissolved into bland formula, especially after she was pilloried for her remarks (or misstatement) on ‘power sharing’ in late January. Her April 1 visit to Cambodia resulted in a limp concoction of generalities as she pledged to: “continue to amplify the voices of the people of Myanmar and encourage international action based on an accurate assessment of the situation…continue to engage with all key stakeholders, focusing on helping articulate the bottom-lines and conditions needed for momentum towards any talks about talks in the greater interest of peace, stability and democracy.” It’s as if the coup didn’t happen, the SAC doesn’t exist, or that the military regime isn’t the primary perpetrator of the violence she hopes to quell. Stringing inoffensive words together sends clear signals for the UN inside Myanmar and others to get back to work.
The UN Office Coordinating Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) has also distributed a clear set of Joint Operating Standards (JOS) that are a model of rectitude and humanitarian impartiality. However, when one sees this contained in the JOS, “this engagement must be principled and should never be considered political legitimization, recognition of – or support to – a party of conflict”, the question is how much legitimization the UN as a whole is bestowing on the SAC as a matter of course? The appointment of the American humanitarian expert Liam Mahony to be an advisor to the UN Humanitarian Country Team in Yangon may provide answers to this. Mahony produced a number of excoriating reports on the UN and international NGO’s failures in Rakhine State, “A Slippery Slope” and in 2018 “Time to Break Old Habits”, about the massive failures of the international community to prevent the atrocities against Rohingya Muslims.
The promise of peace has been exhumed in other ways than just Search Myanmar. The 11-donor Joint Peace Fund (JPF), a US$100 million Ponzi scheme of Western donor avarice and incompetence, has staged a Lazarus-like rebirth with a new strategy: “Following the military takeover…the JPF conducted a major restructuring of its operations to support national stakeholders seeking to resolved the decades-old conflict…(a)n interim strategy was developed as a basis for JPF support to peace process stakeholders during a transition period from January to December 2022…that strengthens local conflict management mechanisms – enabling actors to mitigate the impact of violent conflict on civilians – and retains the foundations for actors to communicate and negotiate to end conflict and violence.”
In other words, we utterly failed at supporting peace between 2016 to 2021, so give us more money and during a multisided civil war sparked by a military coup we can resolve it. There is an astonishingly misplaced optimism in this interim strategy. The JPF is recruiting a Senior Conflict Analyst (meaning foreigner), National Conflict Analyst (meaning someone from Myanmar), Senior Gender Advisor, and two other National Gender Advisors. The ‘Roles and Responsibilities’ of all these positions are highly unlikely to be achieved in any meaningful way, and will contribute little beyond having lunch at the Alamanda Inn’s French restaurant in Yangon’s Golden Valley Green Zone
The central normalizer must be the European Union (EU), maintaining its massive My Justice program (justice in Myanmar?) implemented by the British Council, the Oxfam-directed Durable Peace Program, and the unfortunately mistimed Nexus Response Mechanism (NRM), a US$50 million fund to to “implement innovative, flexible, and rights-based activities at the nexus of the humanitarian, development, and peace sectors…(the) objective is to contribute to long-term peace and national reconciliation, security, stability and sustainable development by reducing the vulnerability, building the resilience, and protecting the rights of conflict and disaster affected communities across Myanmar”, which sounds like a planning document from 2016, not the Myanmar of 2022. To be continuing a project with the Orwellian title of ‘Durable Peace’ in the current carnage is surreal, if not sick. This from a donor who instituted the much derided MyPol police reform scheme, and injected 175 million euros directly into the National League for Democracy’s (NLD) education budget [out of a total grant of 221 million euros], and was a major donor to the JPF.
Compounding the EU’s post-coup cognitive dissonance, EU Ambassador Ranieri Sabatucci’s slew of snarky tweets are enraging many inside Myanmar and he seems determined to pick fights with anyone but the SAC. One of his most recent tweets stated that “#Myanmar social media is full of trollers, located abroad (sic). They judge/speculate without knowledge of the facts. Their insults and aggression discourage healthy pluralistic debates. The result, could be shrinking of democratic space on social media. They should not succeed.” If only Ambassador Sabatucci put as much effort into ensuring the SAC won’t succeed.
The EU exemplifies the two-step strategy of normalization. Back home in Brussels, impose sanctions, make strong speeches and resolutions from the EU Parliament, but in the halls of the European External Action Service (EEAS) seek ways to recover the relationship. Throwing money doesn’t work, but it makes the EU feel useful, and important.
Much of this post-coup normalization is being orchestrated by the all-enveloping efforts of the United Nations Office of Project Services (UNOPS), a benign-sounding behemoth of a project-implementing bureaucracy that has been criticized for its slow pace of adaptation to the post-coup reality, and being predisposed to accommodating authority regardless of its credentials. If the James Bond franchise ever had an UN agency as an evil nemesis, it would be UNOPS, where donors send so much bulk funding to be dispersed with the tenderness of a wood chipper.
Arrayed on the other ‘side’ of this normalizing pathology is a mirror image complex of advisors and consultants to the parallel National Unity Government, and various anti-SAC forces. They operate in twilight and obscurity far more than the worker drones of the UN, equally unaccountable and their utility rarely questioned. Who are they and what are they up to? What role did they play in supporting the military or the NLD over the past several years?
They will likely have their complicity in the deficiencies of the NLD expunged as unfortunate association. Yet in light of the recent US government designation of the Rohingya genocide, it would behoove Western donors to ensure they are not paying engorged salaries to anyone in Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s former inner circle who cooperated in the attempted cover-up of major atrocities. In fact, any of the opportunists who were orbiting Naypyitaw under the NLD government should automatically be highly suspect. If for no other reason than their obscene salaries.
As feeding frenzies go, it’s perhaps not as fulsome as the early years of the ‘transition’ or the boom years of the post-2015 election when massive development funds were creating major opportunities for the moneyed classes of the international development set. Think of today’s repurposing of so much money that cannot legally be implemented inside Myanmar as a ‘decent interval’ before the West eventually downscales from the country to a pre-Cyclone Nargis mentality and funding mechanisms. This would return the country to a site of sanctions and condemnation, and funneling the bulk of aid to warehoused Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh, cross-border assistance to the unremitting attrition warfare of eastern Myanmar, occasional food deliveries to the rural resistance zones of Sagaing and Magwe regions, and undulating optimism at the prospect of ‘durable solutions’ to resolve ten years of protracted displacement of 100,000 people in Kachin and northern Shan states, and the potential funding windfall it may bring to international agencies to assist.
But then anything connected to governance, peace, human rights, or the scams of social cohesion, have a markedly limited role in the current conflict. It is open to question how much genuine utility they had even before 2020, when the peace process was clearly dead and projects of governance were circumscribed by an autarkic and incompetent ruling party.
So why do so many of these actors remain engaged? Pay checks and lifestyles, is a simple explanation. By at least mid-2021 there was already an exodus of foreign technical experts to other countries, much the same as the stampede of people from Afghanistan and Cambodia into Yangon in 2014.
It is now clear that Ukraine has almost permanently distracted media and diplomatic attention away from not just Myanmar, but Yemen, Ethiopia and the Congo. Many Western donors have already calculated their post-pandemic and post-‘takeover’ priorities to resume trade with Southeast Asia, which compels the charade of Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) centrality in resolving the Myanmar crisis. As the one-year anniversary of agreeing the Five Point Consensus approaches later this month, any optimism that there will be progress any time soon is clearly strained or delusional, yet it hasn’t prohibited a movement towards ‘living with the SAC’.
It is as if an orchestra of connivance is tuning its instruments, readying itself to build to a crescendo of credible normalization that doesn’t look like the betrayal of Myanmar it really is. But every job advertisement, qualified statement, self-lobotomized tweet, call for ASEAN to take the lead, or addition to the bonfire of pointless knowledge, is actively assisting the SAC in solidifying its rule. On behalf of the people of Myanmar, who are not drowning, but waving, its craven cynicism should be challenged at every turn..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2022-04-19
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-19
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations, The discussion on humanitarian assistance to Burma
Language:
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Description:
"This regular update, covering humanitarian developments up to 12 April, is produced by OCHA Myanmar in collaboration with the Inter-Cluster Coordination Group and UN agencies. The next humanitarian update will be issued in May 2022.
HIGHLIGHTS & KEY MESSAGES
• Across Myanmar, as of 11 April, 912,700 men, women and children remain displaced. This includes 566,100 people displaced by the conflict and insecurity since the military takeover in February last year. For the first time, displacement in the northwest has exceeded 300,000 people.
• Humanitarians continue providing critical life-saving assistance to displaced people and host communities wherever they can, including through local partners in the face of serious access constraints.
• Increasing challenges are being reported by clusters around roadblocks and checkpoints, transportation of supplies and incomplete coverage by local partners in several conflict areas.
• Despite access challenges and funding shortfalls, food security partners have reached 1.4 million people with life-saving assistance – a quarter of the Cluster’s target for 2022.
• The Nutrition Cluster is facing pipeline breaks for both preventative and therapeutic nutrition supplies as early as June.
• Amid escalating dangers from landmines and explosive ordnance in conflict areas, clusters have agreed to scale-up mainstreaming of risk education across all sectors.
• There remains high risk of transmission of acute watery diarrhoea (AWD) in protracted IDP camps in Rakhine amid significant WASH gaps, as well as reliance on water trucking, and potentially boating, at the peak of the dry season in some areas.
• Shelter repair gaps in Rakhine’s IDP camps are a significant concern heading into the monsoon season with more than 550 longhouses, sheltering more than 28,000 IDPs, considered structurally unsound and in urgent need of reconstruction.
• Preparedness plans are being updated ahead of the rainy season to ensure a timely and efficient response in the event of an emergency in high-risk areas.
• Funding for the 2022 Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP), which requests US$826 million to reach 6.2 million people in need of life-saving support, is critical. Only 5 per cent ($37.2 million) of required funds have been received at the end of the first quarter of 2022 (FTS). All clusters are underfunded, which impedes their ability to respond to the growing needs and gaps in response.
KEY FIGURES
912K People internally displaced across Myanmar
566K People currently displaced by clashes and insecurity since February 2021
346K People internally displaced mainly in Rakhine, Kachin, Chin, and Shan due to conflict prior to February 2021
8K Civilian properties estimated burnt or destroyed since February 2021.
Displacement figures fluctuate during any given month. These figures represent the number of people currently displaced.
Cumulative numbers for returns and displacement are not always available.
SITUATION OVERVIEW
Ongoing fighting in the country’s east and northwest has exacerbated the humanitarian and displacement situation.
The use of heavy weapons, including airstrikes and artillery fire, as well as landmines and the presence of explosive remnants of war (ERW) continues to claim lives and pose risks to the safety and security of the civilian population, especially Internally Displaced People (IDPs). Since the military takeover, at least 1,600 people, including over 100 children, have been killed, and thousands injured or maimed according to Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR).2 During the first two months of 2022, UNICEF recorded 53 casualties from landmines and ERW alone. (See page 5 of this update for more details)
Hundreds of thousands of men, women, boys and girls have fled their homes for safety since the February military takeover, many of them forced to move multiple times exposing people to grave protection risks. As of 11 April 2022, the number of new IDPs since the military takeover in 2021 stands at 566,100, according to UN figures, bringing the total number of IDPs across the country to 912,700. In addition, it is estimated that 36,100 people from Myanmar are currently displaced in neighbouring countries. This includes 34,500 in India and 1,600 in Thailand.
At least 8,262 houses and other civilian properties, including churches monasteries, schools, and markets have reportedly been either burnt down or destroyed, mainly in Sagaing and Magway regions and Chin and Kayah states. (See page 3 of this update for more details)
The stressful financial situation already facing many vulnerable families after COVID-19 and the recent conflict has been placed under further strain by fresh price rises, especially for fuel since the start of the conflict in Ukraine which has impacted on global supply. According to WFP price monitoring, the price of fuel has increased by 18 per cent from February to March 2022 and is more than double the price (up 133 per cent) compared to February 2021.3The next round of monthly data is expected to show even steeper hikes. This has serious implications for people’s ability to purchase food and other essentials and if it becomes protracted, will also have an impact on the cost of humanitarian operations in 2022. In the HRP 2022, clusters anticipated continued inflation (ranging from 15-35 per cent depending on the cluster) but the ICCG will conduct a fresh stocktake of these impacts in the coming weeks.
Against this backdrop of conflict, the monsoon season is now approaching, placing another burden on the lives of vulnerable and displaced people in high-risk areas and adding new urgency to addressing shelter and NFI funding gaps. While the first storm of the season reached the Rakhine coast with limited impact at the end of March, the weather system was a timely opportunity to refresh preparedness planning. In the lead up to the storm, the de facto Rakhine State authorities evacuated some 300 people to a primary school in Yone Ka Htoe village in Gwa township and at least 90 vulnerable IDPs, including elderly people and persons with disabilities, were relocated to cyclone shelters in Sittwe. The de facto authorities immediately activated the respective township-level Disaster Management Committees (DMCs), instructed Village Tract leaders to prepare cyclone shelters around camp areas to accommodate Rohingya IDPs in Sittwe and put in place a plan to relocate IDPs in Pauktaw township to high ground, if needed. Each district office of the Department of Disaster Management stored non-food items to cover 1,000 families as part of the initial response. Operational humanitarian partners in Rakhine immediately undertook preparedness activities at the sub-national level, disseminating disaster preparedness messages around cyclone, flood and landslide risks in Rohingya languages in camps in Sittwe and in Pauktaw townships. The Inter-Cluster Coordination Group (ICCG) also convened an emergency meeting in Yangon to take stock of preparedness actions before the storm hit. Humanitarian partners have been recently updating their national emergency response preparedness plans for 2022 in preparation for the monsoon season and in the event of an emergency, will coordinate with the relevant de facto authorities to ensure an immediate and efficient response.
Overall, humanitarian actors, in close coordination with local partners, continue providing critical life-saving assistance to the most affected people but face ongoing challenges in addressing urgent needs due to access constraints and funding shortfalls. To meet their obligations to people in need, humanitarian actors, including the UN, international and national NGOs, need quicker, simpler and more predictable access processes. Visa, banking, registration, and MOU blockages remain major obstacles to effective response and must urgently be resolved. It is critical that new banking rules introduced by the Central Bank on foreign currency transactions do not hamper the ability of humanitarian organizations from accessing funding for life-saving work. Significant funding gaps persist, a quarter of the way into 2022. To date, only 5 per cent ($37.1 million) of the $826 million requested in the 2022 Humanitarian Response Plan, has been received (FTS). Continued underfunding of this magnitude will have life-threatening consequences for millions of people in 2022. Donors are urged to give generously, in solidarity with the people of Myanmar to save lives and protect hard-fought development gains while there is still a window to do so. Donors and funding recipients are also reminded of the importance of up-to-date and complete reporting of funding flows to the Financial Tracking Service to ensure that a clear picture of gaps is available to support decision-making..."
Source/publisher:
UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (New York) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of publication:
2022-04-19
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-19
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Public Health, Education in Burma/Myanmar - general, Food Security and nutrition in Burma/Myanmar, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Format :
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725.92 KB
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Description:
"The volatile situation in Myanmar following the 01 February 2021 coup has resulted in increased armed conflict and subsequent population displacement both within the country and across borders, including into Thailand.
Since 17 March, 2,437 Myanmar refugees have crossed into Thailand, according to the Royal Thai Government (RTG). The refugees have sought safety in Umphang and Phop Phra districts, Tak province.
Refugees are sheltered in temporary safety areas (TSA), which are placed under the general jurisdiction of the Royal Thai Army in accordance with the Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) established by the RTG in March 2021.
SITUATION OVERVIEW ON THE THAI MYANMAR BORDER
In Kayah, clashes have been erupting and escalating since the Karen National Union (KNU) sent a letter to the Tatmadaw on 7 March, demanding the Military withdraw from the KNU controlled area – Brigade 6. As a result, 2,437 Myanmar refugees have fled the upsurge of violence in Kayah State into Phop Phra and Umphang Districts, Tak Province, since 17 March 2022. Out of this number, 869 have returned to Myanmar.
Although some refugees have gone back to Myanmar, the Royal Thai Government (RTG) continues to record new arrivals. As of 13 April 2022, the RTG reported that 1,514 Myanmar individuals remain on the Thai side of the border in Tak Province, Thailand.
In Myanmar, the situation continues to deteriorate, with conflicts intensifying and spreading further. In the South-East, intensified daily clashes continued between the Tatmadaw and Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA). Fighting occurs over a large area, with incidents reported in Kayin State’s Hpapun, Kawkareik, Myawaddy, Kyainseikgyi townships, Mon State’s Kyaikhto and Bago Region’s Shwegyin Township. Intensified clashes have also been reported in several areas of the Tanintharyi Region between the Tatmadaw, KNLA, and People’s Defence Force (PDF), including Myeik and Palaw townships. In Kayah State, clashes continue to be reported in Demoso Township. Nearby Pekon Township in Shan State (South) has also been affected by fighting..."
Source/publisher:
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (Geneva) via Reliefweb (New York)
Date of publication:
2022-04-18
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2022-04-19
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UNHCR (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees), Human Rights and international relations, Karen and other refugees from Burma in Thailand - general reports and articles
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"Today, the Peace Corps announced that the agency will close its post in Myanmar. Peace Corps Chief Executive Officer Carol Spahn issued the following statement in response:
“Due to continued instability, unrest and armed conflict created by the military coup in Myanmar, the Peace Corps is unable to plan for the safe return of Volunteers. After careful consideration, we will now begin the process of closing our Peace Corps/Myanmar post.
“We are grateful for the support of the Embassy in Yangon, the State Department and all of our partners. And, we are incredibly thankful for our staff and the people of Myanmar, especially those who joined us as we worked together towards our shared goals. Our work and the relationships will live on in the enduring bonds that have been formed in the name of world peace and friendship.
“While we are unable to send Volunteers back to Myanmar in the foreseeable future, we are hard at work sending Volunteers back to posts worldwide as health and safety conditions permit. We stand ready to reengage with Myanmar when the conditions would allow for a safe return.”
A total of 87 Volunteers served Myanmar communities to support English education, between the post opening in 2016 and the global evacuation in March 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
About the Peace Corps: The Peace Corps is an international service network of volunteers, community members, host country partners and staff who are driven by the agency’s mission of world peace and friendship. At the invitation of governments around the world, Peace Corps volunteers work alongside community members on locally-prioritized projects in the areas of education, health, environment, agriculture, community economic development and youth development. Through service, members of the Peace Corps network develop transferable skills and hone intercultural competencies that position them to be the next generation of global leaders. Since President John F. Kennedy established the Peace Corps in 1961, more than 240,000 Americans have served in 142 countries worldwide. For more information, visit peacecorps.gov and follow us on Facebook..."
Source/publisher:
Peace Corps (Washington, D.C.)
Date of publication:
2022-04-18
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-18
Grouping:
Individual Documents
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"EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Burma’s military overthrew the democratically elected civilian government via a coup d’etat on February 1, declaring a state of emergency and transferring all executive, legislative, and judicial authorities to the State Administration Council, an authoritarian military-run administrative organization led by armed forces commander in chief Min Aung Hlaing. The military detained key elected civilian leaders and dissolved all national and subnational legislatures, including the Union Parliament, forcing many elected members to flee their homes and offices or face potential arrest. On February 5, elected parliamentarians from the National League for Democracy and allied political parties formed the Committee Representing the Union Parliament, which subsequently declared the regime “illegitimate” and the 2008 constitution abolished before proclaiming a “National Unity Government” on April 16.
The Myanmar Police Force is primarily responsible for internal security. The Border Guard Police is administratively part of the Myanmar Police Force but operationally distinct. Both fall under the regime’s Ministry of Home Affairs, led by an active-duty military general and itself subordinate to the military command. The armed forces under the Ministry of Defense are responsible for external security but are engaged almost exclusively in internal activities, including combat against ethnic armed groups. Members of the regime security forces continued to commit numerous gross violations of human rights.
Regime security forces arrested State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi, President Win Myint, and other leading members of the civilian government and National League for Democracy on February 1. Nationwide prodemocracy protests following the coup and the Civil Disobedience Movement, continuing as of November, opposed and disrupted efforts by the regime to exert full administrative control over governing institutions. The regime responded with repressive tactics such as the mass arrest of its political opponents and the use of widespread lethal violence against unarmed persons, including men, women, and children. Fighting between the military and ethnic armed organizations escalated, and the National Unity Government announced on April 16 that it would establish armed People’s Defense Force groups that would cooperate with various ethnic armed organizations.
Significant human rights issues included credible reports of: unlawful or arbitrary killings, including extrajudicial killings; forced disappearances; torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment and punishment by the regime; gender-based violence by the regime; harsh and life-threatening prison conditions; arbitrary arrest or detention; political prisoners or detainees; politically motivated reprisals against individuals in another country; serious problems with the independence of the judiciary; arbitrary or unlawful interference with privacy; punishment of family members for offenses allegedly committed by an individual; serious abuses in a conflict, including reportedly unlawful or widespread civilian harm, enforced disappearances or abductions, and torture and physical abuses or punishment; unlawful recruitment or use of child soldiers; serious restrictions on free expression and media, including violence or threats of violence against journalists, unjustified arrests or prosecutions of journalists, and censorship; and the existence of criminal libel laws; substantial interference with the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association; particularly severe restrictions on religious freedom; restrictions on freedom of movement; the inability of citizens to change their government peacefully through free and fair elections; serious and unreasonable restrictions on political participation; serious government corruption; lack of investigation of and accountability for gender-based violence; trafficking in persons; crimes involving violence or threats targeting members of national and ethnic minority groups; the existence of laws criminalizing consensual same-sex sexual conduct between adults, although those laws were rarely enforced; significant restrictions on workers’ freedom of association, including violence and threats against labor activists; and the use of forced and child labor, including the worst forms of child labor.
There continued to be almost complete impunity for abuses by the regime security forces. There was no credible information that the regime took actions to prosecute or punish officials responsible for human rights abuses or corruption.
Some ethnic armed organizations and Peoples Defense Force groups or members committed human rights abuses, including killings, disappearances, physical abuse and degrading treatment, and failure to protect local populations in conflict zones.
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person
A. ARBITRARY DEPRIVATION OF LIFE AND OTHER UNLAWFUL OR POLITICALLY MOTIVATED KILLINGS
There were numerous reports that regime security forces committed arbitrary or unlawful killings of civilians, prisoners, and other persons in their power. According to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP), which noted that the actual number was likely to be much higher, there were 1,300 verified reports of persons killed by the regime as of November 22. Some ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) and Peoples Defense Force (PDF) groups or members committed human rights abuses, including killings, disappearances, physical abuse and degrading treatment, and failure to protect local populations in conflict zones (see also section 1.g.). Examples include the following.
On February 9, Mya Thwate Khaing was shot in the head by police while peacefully protesting the military coup in the capital, Nay Pyi Taw. She was taken to the hospital but died of her injuries several days later. Her death was widely considered the first fatality in the protest movement that began on February 2.
On February 28, regime security forces killed as many as 26 persons in eight cities and injured scores during a day of massive nationwide demonstrations against the regime. According to multiple media reports, eyewitnesses accounts, and documentary evidence, police arrested hundreds and used tear gas, flash-bang grenades, rubber bullets, and live rounds in confronting demonstrators.
On March 11, regime security forces shot and killed at least 11 persons in five cities according to multiple media reports, eyewitness accounts, and photographic evidence. Regime security forces used live rounds against unarmed demonstrators in addition to the use of tear gas, flash-bang grenades, and rubber bullets.
On March 27, a national holiday known as Armed Forces Day, regime security forces killed more than 100, including 13 children, across the country according to media reports, eyewitness accounts, and social media posts. Regime security forces met demonstrations on March 28 with further violence, killing at least 22 more individuals.
According to media reports, in April regime security forces continued to kill demonstrators and other civilians, including, on April 9, at least 28 persons in Bago Region. The killing came as regime security forces confronted demonstrators and sought to clear residents’ makeshift barricades.
In May the Chin Human Rights Organization reported that the military cremated the bodies of two civilians who were allegedly tortured to death by regime security forces in Chin State’s capital Hakha.
In July local media reported the death of 40 civilians allegedly killed by the military in Sagaing’s Kani Township. According to a local resident who spoke with the news website Irrawaddy, “Junta troops raided our villages. We fled and found corpses when we came back to the villages.”
In July local media reported the rape and killing of a 55-year-old woman by three soldiers in Kachin State. The military acknowledged the incident after the family filed a complaint, but no action was known to have been taken against the alleged perpetrators.
In September local media reported the King Cobra civilian defense group killed an alleged regime informant in Sagaing Region. King Cobra claimed its members committed 26 other killings.
AAPP alleged that at least 100 political prisoners died due to torture inflicted by authorities between February 1 and September 9. Well-known poet Khet Thi, who wrote the line, “They shoot in the head, but they don’t know the revolution is in the heart,” was reportedly tortured to death by regime security forces. The 45-year-old was detained on May 8 and died the following day in transit to the hospital in Monywa, Magway Region.
B. DISAPPEARANCE
There were numerous reports of disappearances allegedly committed by the regime.
C. TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN, OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT
The law prohibits torture; however, members of regime security forces reportedly tortured and otherwise abused suspects, prisoners, detainees, and others. Such incidents occurred, for example, during interrogations and were widely documented across the country. Alleged harsh interrogation techniques were designed to intimidate and disorient and included severe beatings and deprivation of food, water, and sleep. Other reported interrogation methods described in news reports included rubbing salt into wounds and depriving individuals of oxygen until they passed out.
A 19-year-old prodemocracy supporter told local media that on April 9, he was taken to a military compound on the outskirts of Bago Township, Bago Region where “the commander tied my hands from the back and used small scissors to cut my ears, the tip of my nose, my neck and my throat.”
In April media reported regime forces struck Wai Moe Naing, a high-profile Muslim protest leader and a Muslim, with an unmarked vehicle during a motorbike demonstration in Monywa.
Transgender writer Han Nwe Oo shared on social media that while in detention she was ridiculed for being transgender, sexually assaulted, and faced “atrocious” interrogation for two days at a military camp inside Mandalay Palace, Mandalay Region in September.
According to nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), women in custody were subjected to sexual assault, gender-based violence, and verbal abuse. Police in some cases verbally abused women who reported rape. Women who reported sexual assault faced further abuse by police and the possibility of being sued for impugning the dignity of the perpetrator. On July 19, the UN special rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders noted “[w]omen human rights defenders are particularly at risk in remote rural areas and are often beaten and kicked before being sent to prison where they may face torture and sexual violence with no medical care provided.”
In one case in April, Human Rights Watch (HRW) reported that security force members severely beat and sexually assaulted a female detainee accused of involvement in small-scale bomb attacks against regime targets in Rangoon. Her injuries were so severe she struggled to eat or urinate. Her cellmate reported similar treatment.
Also in April, local media reported that a high school student from Rangoon was arrested with her mother and described how she was “touched by a police officer who told me he could kill me and make me disappear.”
In Rangoon a journalist detained in March told media he witnessed police burn a detained female journalist with cigarettes and threaten to rape her if she did not provide information on her involvement in prodemocracy activities.
Impunity for rights abuses was pervasive for security force leaders and members. There was no credible evidence that the regime took action to investigate incidents or punish alleged perpetrators of abuses or to include human rights training as part of its overall training of regime security forces. The regime routinely denied responsibility for atrocities. For example, in April local media reported that the regime issued a blanket denial of abuses during a meeting with the UN special envoy for Burma, rejecting her allegations as “one-sided,” while denying it had killed children, among other atrocities.
Prison and Detention Center Conditions
Conditions in prisons, labor camps, and military detention facilities were reportedly harsh and frequently life threatening due to overcrowding; degrading and abusive treatment; and inadequate access to medical care (including COVID-19 treatment) and basic needs, including food, shelter, and hygiene.
Physical Conditions: There were 48 known prisons and 50 known labor camps in 2020. Women and men were held separately. Some prisons held pretrial detainees together with convicted prisoners. Children were sometimes held in pretrial detention with adults. More than 20,000 inmates were serving court-mandated sentences in labor camps located across the country in 2020; data were not available for the reporting year. The Associated Press reported on October 28 that the military had transformed dozens of public facilities (e.g., community halls) into interrogation centers across the country after the coup.
Several reports document poor conditions within prison facilities, including inadequate sewage systems, insufficient – and often inedible – rations, and a lack of basic necessities. Overcrowding was reportedly a serious problem in many prisons and labor camps. According to AAPP, occupancy at Insein Prison, the country’s largest, was nearly three times its intended capacity prior to the military coup.
Medical care was inadequate, and this reportedly contributed to deaths in custody. Prisons failed to adopt measures to protect prisoners from COVID-19, and there were widespread reports of COVID-19 transmission, illness, and deaths among prisoners. Despite regular regime reporting at national and subnational levels on COVID-19 cases and deaths, the regime failed to make data available on the impact of COVID-19 in prisons. According to AAPP, COVID-19 vaccinations were limited only to high-profile prisoners. In addition to COVID-19, prisoners suffered from other health problems, including malaria, heart disease, high blood pressure, tuberculosis, skin diseases, and intestinal illnesses caused or exacerbated by unhygienic conditions and spoiled food. There were also numerous reports of political prisoners being denied medical services.
Former prisoners complained of poorly maintained physical structures that provided no protection from the elements and were infested with rodents, snakes, and molds.
Conditions for women were deplorable, with a lack of access to sufficient toilets and no privacy. Prison guards denied requests for sanitary products for menstruation and other basic hygiene products. After the coup, sexual violence, gender harassment, and humiliation by officials increased.
In September human rights watchdog Just Power reported that a prominent human rights activist suffered from deteriorating health conditions as a result of her “unjust arrest and detention.” According to the report, regime security forces denied her access to health services, including to medicines provided by her family.
Administration: Prisoners and detainees could sometimes submit complaints to judicial authorities prior to the coup, but there was no clear legal or administrative protection for this right. There is no credible evidence of prisoners and detainees submitting complaints after the coup. Some prisons prevented full adherence to religiously based codes of personal conduct, ostensibly due to space restrictions and security concerns.
In April local media reported that a journalist fasting in observance of Ramadan was accused of staging a hunger strike and sent to solitary confinement at Insein Prison.
Independent Monitoring: The Department of Corrections in the Ministry of Home Affairs operated the prisons and labor camp system.
The International Committee for the Red Cross had no access to prisons, labor camps, or military detention sites during the year. After March 2020, the Ministry of Home Affairs under the deposed civilian government claimed it could not allow access because of COVID-19 prevention measures. After the coup, the military continued to deny access to all prisons and detention sites.
The UN Office on Drugs and Crime did not have access to prisons or labor camps and on February 1, ended cooperative capacity-building programs with the Department of Corrections. The drug and crime office continued to provide limited COVID-19-related personal protective equipment and primary basic health care assistance (e.g., infection prevention and control supplies) directly to the prisons.
D. ARBITRARY ARREST OR DETENTION
The law does not prohibit arbitrary arrest. Persons held generally did not have the right to appeal the legality of their arrest or detention either administratively or before a court. The law allows authorities to order the detention without charge or trial of anyone they believe is performing or might perform any act that endangers the sovereignty and security of the state or public peace and tranquility.
Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees
Incommunicado detention was common. Since the coup, the regime detained politicians, election officials, journalists, activists, protesters, and Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) members and refused to confirm their locations in violation of international law, according to HRW. In August AAPP reported that an estimated 5,000 individuals listed by the regime as “under detention” were in unknown locations, accounting for approximately 82 percent of arrests since the coup. Even when the whereabouts of prisoners was known, prisoners were regularly denied access to lawyers and family members.
After the coup, the military regime suspended aspects of privacy protection law to legalize arrests and private property searches without a warrant.
Authorities may hold suspects in pretrial detention for two weeks (with a possible two-week extension) before bringing them before a judge or informing them of their charges. The regime is not, however, obliged to respect this provision of the law. There is a functioning bail system, although the courts regularly denied bail to prodemocracy supporters. There were numerous reports that authorities did not inform family members or attorneys of arrests in a timely manner, did not disclose their location, and regularly denied family visitations.
Arbitrary Arrest: There were numerous reports of arbitrary arrest, including detention by the regime in unknown locations. Since the coup, regime security forces have made at least 8,000 arrests and more than 6,500 of those individuals remain in some form of detention.
In May, HRW reported the arrest of a lawyer defending a deposed local political leader after a court hearing in Nay Pyi Taw and the arrest of lawyer defending a political prisoner in Ayeyarwady Region. In June, HRW reported the arrest of a lawyer defending more than 120 political prisoners in Kachin State.
In July, UN human rights experts expressed concern about the arbitrary arrest of human rights defenders, citing credible information of such treatment of human rights defenders, including labor rights and student activists.
According to AAPP, among those the regime detained as of September were more than 175 family members of prodemocracy supporters, including 15 children. In August, for example, a family member delivering food and medicine to a political prisoner was detained at Insein Prison for six days. In September regime security forces reportedly arrested the wife and young child of a human rights activist to coerce his surrender. The activist was charged under terrorism legislation for supporting the CDM. His wife and child were missing as of December.
According to the independent news service Myanmar Now, a 14-year-old boy was detained in Taungtha Township, Mandalay Region in September by the regime to coerce his father, a former local National League for Democracy (NLD) leader, to turn himself in to police. The boy’s mother told a reporter, “They came for my husband and took the kid, saying they needed him to show them where dad was.…I keep waiting for his release. I don’t want anything else; I just want my son back.”
Pretrial Detention: Prior to the coup, judges and police sometimes colluded to extend detentions. According to the Independent Lawyers’ Association in 2020, arbitrary and lengthy pretrial detentions resulted from lengthy, complicated legal procedures and widespread corruption. These problems continued following the coup, worsened by the regime’s ability to detain persons indefinitely without trial. For those facing trial, detention prior to and during trials sometimes equaled or exceeded the sentence after conviction. The regime amended the legal aid law in May, removing the right to legal aid services during pretrial detention. Additional amendments limited legal aid for stateless persons, asylum seekers, foreigners, and migrant workers.
Detainee’s Ability to Challenge Lawfulness of Detention before a Court: Although habeas corpus exists in national law, regime security forces violated this law by arresting and detaining individuals without following proper procedures. Arbitrary arrest or detention was drastically increased to suppress political dissent, according to AAPP and detainees had limited ability to meaningfully challenge the lawfulness of detention before a court due to its lack of judicial independence from the regime.
E. DENIAL OF FAIR PUBLIC TRIAL
The constitution provides for an independent judiciary, a protection the regime has not respected. On February 4, the regime dismissed five NLD-appointed justices of the Supreme Court and replaced them with justices who support the regime. The remaining four justices, including the chief justice, were holdovers from the previous military junta.
In February the regime declared martial law in numerous townships across the country and transferred judicial (and executive) power to regional military commanders in several cities. In martial law courts, defendants have few or no rights, including access to legal counsel and the right of appeal (except in cases involving the death penalty, which may be appealed to armed forces commander in chief Min Aung Hlaing). The hearings are abbreviated, the verdict is reached within one or two sessions, and the sentences are typically the maximum penalties allowed. According to regime public announcements, by November, 61 cases were heard in martial law courts, with 280 defendants convicted and sentenced, including at least 80 defendants sentenced to death.
Judicial corruption was a significant problem. According to NGOs, officials at all levels received illegal payments at all stages of the legal process for purposes ranging from influencing routine matters to substantive decisions, such as fixing the outcome of a case.
Trial Procedures
Although no formal changes to trial procedures in civilian courts were made following the coup, the lack of judicial independence leaves much to the interpretation of the regime. The law provides for the right to a fair and public trial but also grants broad exceptions, effectively allowing the regime to violate these rights at will. While the right to counsel remains in the law, many defense lawyers were unwilling to handle prodemocracy cases due to fear for their personal safety. According to HRW, at least six lawyers handling political cases were arrested since the coup. Defendants do not enjoy a presumption of innocence or, even when the law provides for them, the rights to be informed promptly and in detail of the charges against them; to be present at their trial; to free interpretation; or to receive adequate representation. There is no right to adequate time and facilities to prepare a defense. Trial procedures were also affected by COVID-19 pandemic mitigation measures.
Political Prisoners and Detainees
The regime detained and arrested politicians, election officials, journalists, activists, protesters, religious activists, and CDM members. Political prisoners were not always held separately from the prison’s general population. Many political prisoners were held incommunicado.
Many former political prisoners were subject to surveillance and restrictions following their release, including the inability to secure identity or travel documents. AAPP estimated that there were more than 6,000 political prisoners as of year’s end.
Deposed state counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi was arrested on February 1 and held in an unknown location. She faced 11 separate charges for a range of offenses running from interacting with a crowd during the COVID-19 pandemic to sedition. Her trial was closed to the public and the regime placed a gag order on her attorneys so that the attorneys could not communicate with the public about her case. On December 6, she was convicted of inciting unrest and violating COVID-19 restrictions and sentenced to four years in prison. Also arrested February 1, deposed president Win Myint, was tried on the same charges and also convicted and sentenced to four years’ imprisonment. Just hours after the news of guilty verdicts for Aung San Suu Kyi and Win Myint broke on December 6, state media announced that the regime had “reduced [their] sentences…by two years.” The regime announcement also highlighted that the two would remain detained in their unknown locations, in conditions reportedly equivalent to house arrest.
Amnesty: The regime included some political prisoners among the more than 23,000 inmates released to mark Union Day on February 12. The regime released all those who met set criteria (e.g., not charged under Section 505 of the penal code, which criminalizes disseminating information that could agitate or cause security forces or state officials to mutiny), with no specific leniency for political prisoners. According to some human rights activists, the regime used the general pardon order to make space available for more political prisoners.
Amnesty was also granted to several high-profile ethnic Rakhine politicians, including Aye Maung and writer Wai Hin Aung, sentenced to long jail sentences for high treason under the deposed NLD government. In September the regime also released controversial ultranationalist Buddhist monk Ashin Wirathu, charged with sedition by the deposed government for comments he made during a 2019 promilitary rally.
Politically Motivated Reprisal against Individuals Located Outside the Country
Bilateral Pressure: There were credible reports that the regime attempted to pressure the Thai government to impose stricter control on movement across the border with Burma to undermine the ability of prodemocracy supporters from organizations, including the National Unity Government (NUG) and the Committee Representing the Union Parliament that created it, to depart the country.
Civil Judicial Procedures and Remedies
The law allows complainants to use provisions of the penal code and laws of civil procedure to seek civil remedies for human rights abuses. Individuals and organizations may not appeal an adverse decision to regional human rights bodies but may make complaints to the Myanmar National Human Rights Commission. After the coup, the ability of complainants to raise human rights abuses through the judicial system or the commission was limited.
Property Seizure and Restitution
Under the 2008 Constitution the state owns all land, although there is a limited amount of freehold land, and the law allows for registration and sale of private land ownership rights. Most land is held in long-term lease, meaning that while the government still owns this leasehold, private parties may lease land on a long-term basis with a general expectation that the leasehold would automatically roll over upon its expiration. The law provides for compensation when the government acquires privately held land for a public purpose; however, the postcoup situation is unclear. The government may also declare land unused or “vacant” and assign it to foreign investors or designate it for other uses. There is no judicial review of land ownership or confiscation decisions; administrative bodies subject to regime control make final decisions on land use and registration. The law does not favor recognition of traditional land tenure systems (customary tenure). There were numerous reports that the regime used its authority to seize property of prodemocracy supporters.
In March the regime reportedly seized assets worth approximately $3.8 million from staff members of a foundation accused of financially supporting the CDM.
In September the regime Anti-Terrorism Central Committee released a public notice requiring landlords to provide a list of tenants to their ward administration offices or face confiscation of the property.
As of November 15, credible media reports indicated that the regime has seized approximately 70 properties owned by NLD officials. The regime’s amendment of three laws enabled the extrajudicial seizure of property owned by defendants. The regime has also seized properties belonging to members of the Committee Representing the Union Parliament and NUG or their families.
F. ARBITRARY OR UNLAWFUL INTERFERENCE WITH PRIVACY, FAMILY, HOME, OR CORRESPONDENCE
The law protected privacy and the security of the home, but enforcement of these rights was limited after the coup. Unannounced nighttime household checks were common. The law does not protect the privacy of correspondence or other communications. The regime regularly monitored private electronic communications through online surveillance; there were numerous reports that the regime monitored prodemocracy supporters.
On March 1, the New York Times reported that the military employed invasive dual-use surveillance, hacking, and forensic technologies to monitor and target critics and protesters. Before the coup, the military built an “electronic warfare capability” and bought surveillance technology, including cell phone-hacking tools to monitor prodemocracy activists.
In July local news outlet Frontier Myanmar reported that the regime ordered mobile phone companies to install equipment to enable them to monitor calls, text messages, and locations of selected users, flagging each time they use words such as “protest” or “revolution.” Mention of these words may trigger heavier surveillance or be used as evidence against those being watched. The regime also monitored social media use, including data from visited websites, as well as conversations in public and private chat groups. According to the magazine Frontier Myanmar, this “cybersecurity team” was based inside the police’s Special Branch, a notorious surveillance department that heavily monitored suspected dissidents in the previous era of junta rule.
G. CONFLICT-RELATED ABUSES
After the coup, escalating conflict between the regime and joint EAOs-PDF groups focused on the northwest part of the country, with frequent fighting in Chin State and Sagaing and Magway Region. Conflict was also reported in Kachin, Kayah, and Karen States and in the Mandalay, Bago, and Tanintharyi Regions. Conflict between the military and the Arakan Army (AA) in Rakhine State declined following the coup because of a pre-coup de facto ceasefire. In March the regime removed the Arakan Army from its designated list of terrorist organizations; however, local media reported clashes between the AA and the military on November 9 after the military entered an AA-controlled area in the border area of Maungdaw Township.
Fighting between EAOs in Shan State continued.
Reports of killings, disappearances, excessive use of force, disregard for civilian life, sexual violence, and other abuses committed by regime security forces and some EAOs and PDF groups were common.
The NUG issued a code of conduct for PDF groups in June and included a call to respect human rights in its September 7 “people’s defensive war” declaration. No data was available to measure the impact of the NUG’s efforts to prevent human rights abuses by PDF groups.
Killings: Deliberate killings and deaths due to excessive or unjustified use of force by the regime were reported. For example:
On March 3, regime security forces killed at least 24 persons across the country in confrontations with peaceful demonstrators. In one Rangoon neighborhood alone, at least seven protesters died and 17 were critically wounded in a confrontation with regime security forces. Over the March 13-14 weekend, regime security forces shot and killed demonstrators indiscriminately across the country, killing at least 42.
In May a young mother in Magway’s Salin Township reportedly died from indiscriminate military fire during a raid. According to Myanmar Now, the raid was in response to prodemocracy graffiti.
In July, NUG-designated Minister for Human Rights Aung Myo Min reported that the military killed at least 32 civilians and displaced more than 6,000 residents from 13 villages in Sagaing’s Debeyin Township during intensified military operations targeting EAO and PDF strongholds.
In September the military was suspected of killing and mutilating five civilians in Magway’s Gangaw Township. According to the Irrawaddy, the victims were shot, and in some cases mutilated or showed signs of torture.
Also in September, the Irrawaddy reported on the killing of 18 civilians in Magway’s Yaw village perpetrated by the military. One resident recalled, “Most of them were shot in the head. Their heads were broken, and their brains spilled out like a ripe papaya that has fallen from a tree.” An 86-year-old resident was found tied up, with signs that he had been beaten to death.
In late September, according to a Radio Free Asia report, security forces responding to an attack by local defense forces in Thantlang, Chin State, shot and killed Baptist pastor Cung Biak Hum as he and others tried to extinguish fires the forces set. When his body was recovered, his ring finger was cut off and the wedding ring apparently stolen.
On December 5, regime security forces violently suppressed prodemocracy protesters in Rangoon. Tactics included, according to numerous reports, ramming a police vehicle directly into a crowd, killing five and injuring another 15. Escalating violence between the military and EAOs exposed many children to violence. AAPP reported in September that 61 children were killed in military-EAO conflicts.
Physical Abuse, Punishment, and Torture: There were reports of such abuses by EAOs and PDF forces. In December Myanmar Now reported the targeting of alleged military informants and others seen as sympathetic to the regime. In June commanders of the Karen National Defense Army, the armed wing of the Karen National Union, confirmed Karen National Defense Army soldiers killed 25 alleged military spies and detained 22 others for approximately one week near Waw Lay, Myawaddy Township, Karen State.
Child Soldiers: The military and some EAOs (Kachin Independence Army, AA, Ta’ang National Liberation Army, Karen National Liberation Army, Shan State Army, and Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army) were listed in the UN secretary-general’s 2021 Annual Report on Children and Armed Conflict as perpetrators of the unlawful recruitment and use of children. There were no data on PDF groups. Meaningful use of the National Complaint Mechanism, focused on the elimination of forced labor but which also prohibits the use and recruitment of child soldiers, was limited after the coup. There was no credible evidence that the regime or EAOs prosecuted offenders.
Also see the Department of State’s Trafficking in Persons Report at www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/.
Other Conflict-related Abuse: According to numerous local media reports, UN counterparts, and NGOs the regime restricted the passage of relief supplies, including medical supplies, and access by international humanitarian organizations to conflict-affected areas including in Kachin, Chin, Kayah, Karen, Tanintharyi, and Shan States. HRW reported on December 13 that restrictions on humanitarian assistance imposed by the regime since the coup were creating a “nationwide humanitarian catastrophe.” The United Nations estimated that the number of persons needing assistance would go from one million before the coup to 14.4 million by 2022. On November 8, the United Nations stated, “access to many people in desperate need across the country remains extremely limited due to bureaucratic impediments put in place by the armed forces.” HRW further reported that the military has seized food deliveries meant for displaced populations and arrested individuals on “suspicion of supporting aid efforts.” Visas for aid workers have also been delayed or denied. UNICEF reported in October that “the need to procure travel authorization [from the regime] remains a major access impediment and a high constraint factor for the humanitarian partners’ capacity to reach people in need.”
The regime reportedly forced civilians to act as human shields, carry supplies, or serve in other support roles. In September the Karen National Union reported to a local media outlet that approximately 300 civilians, including a number of women and children, were forced by regime security forces to perform military support duties. In September, Democratic Voice Burma reported that more than 100 soldiers abducted five local residents to act as guides for regime security forces in Kachin State.
As of September, the World Health Organization reported 260 attacks on health-care workers since the coup, representing 39 percent of such attacks globally during the year. In a February case, a doctor was arrested in Rangoon for providing first aid to prodemocracy supporters who had been shot while peacefully protesting. In July the Irrawaddy reported that the regime arrested five volunteer doctors working on COVID-19 prevention activities after luring them to a house under false pretenses.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties
A. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, INCLUDING FOR MEMBERS OF THE PRESS AND OTHER MEDIA
The 2008 Constitution provides that “every citizen shall be at liberty in the exercise of expressing and publishing freely their convictions and opinions,” but it contains the broad and ambiguous caveat that exercise of these rights must “not be contrary to the laws enacted for national security, prevalence of law and order, community peace and tranquility, or public order and morality.” The postcoup regime led a full-scale crackdown on freedom of expression.
Freedom of Expression: Freedom of speech was severely limited. Those who spoke openly against the regime or in favor of the NLD, NUG, or democracy more broadly risked abuse and punishment by authorities. On September 4, poet and activist Maung Saungkha was convicted under Section 19 of this law after he placed a banner over a highway during a protest marking the one-year anniversary of restrictions on mobile internet communications in parts of Rakhine and Chin States. Maung Saungkha chose to pay a fine of 30,000 kyat ($22.50) rather than serve a 15-day prison sentence.
The regime used the Law Protecting the Privacy and Security of the Citizens to allow authorities to review content on individuals’ cell phones at checkpoints and during neighborhood raids. The regime reportedly employed violence and targeted killings to silence critics in civil society. Violence against persons engaged in speech deemed antiregime was allegedly used by proregime ultranationalist Buddhist groups as well as security forces and included maiming, kidnapping, and torture. The regime intimidated many prodemocracy voices among the public who previously spoke openly about politically sensitive topics. (See also “Internet Freedom,” below.)
A prodemocracy activist in Rangoon said during a media interview that regime security forces beat him as authorities transported him to a local interrogation center in February. The next morning, he was unable to eat due to injuries he had sustained during his first night in detention. He reported being tortured for days and only released after signing a statement denying the use of torture by the regime.
Freedom of Expression for Members of the Press and Other Media, Including Online Media: Prior to the coup, independent media outlets were active and able to operate despite many official and unofficial restrictions, economic hardship, and an uncertain business environment. After the coup, analysts reported the closure of 71 media outlets, ranging from well-known national, regional, and ethnic media to small Facebook pages. Regime crackdowns on media resulted in the arrest, detention, loss of work, and forced exile of more than 1,000 journalists, editors, and media staff – approximately 50 percent of pre-coup total. For example, two Kamayut Media journalists were arrested in March, one was released on June 15 and the other remained in detention at year’s end. In Mandalay the regime arrested and subsequently released freelance journalists. Eleven media and the Voice Daily self-censored and avoided criticism of the regime. The Myanmar Times and Union Daily have ceased publication, and Irrawaddy, Frontier, and Myanmar Now operated mostly in exile from outside the country.
In May the regime banned satellite dishes to restrict access to international news. The regime offered three public television channels – two controlled by the Ministry of Information and one controlled by the military. Two private companies that had strong links to the previous military regime continued to broadcast six free-to-air television channels. The regime and regime-linked businesspersons controlled eight FM radio stations. In August the NUG launched Radio NUG, a clandestine service that provided two 30-minute reports daily with prodemocracy content.
Violence and Harassment: The regime subjected journalists and other media workers to violence, harassment, detention, and intimidation for their reporting. According to AAPP, at least 95 journalists were unjustly arrested after February, and more than half of those remained in detention as of November. Among journalists detained by the regime were reporters from the Associated Press, the Ayeyarwady Times News, and many more outlets. In April the New York Times reported that many journalists stopped wearing helmets or vests marked with the word “PRESS,” did not publish under their own names, and avoided sleeping at home. On December 14, local media reported that freelance photojournalist and graphic designer Soe Naing died in regime custody after his arrest on December 10 while covering the “Silent Strike.” Soe Naing reportedly died after a violent interrogation, marking the first known death of a journalist while in regime custody since the coup.
Authorities arrested Polish photojournalist Robert Bociaga on March 11 in Shan State and deported him after he was held in detention for 13 days.
In April authorities detained Yuki Kitazumi, a Japanese freelance journalist, and accused him of supporting prodemocracy protests. Authorities released and deported Kitazumi in May.
Censorship or Content Restrictions: After the coup, the regime banned independent media outlets that did not self-censor reporting on the prodemocracy movement. The regime also banned using certain terminology in reporting, such as “junta,” “coup d’etat,” and “military council.” The Myanmar Times suspended publication on February 21 after many of its staff quit to protest the leadership’s decision to follow the regime order not to describe the military takeover as a “coup.” On March 8, the regime banned broadcast, online, and print media Mizzima, Democratic Voice Burma, Khit Thit Media, Myanmar Now, and 7Day News from broadcasting or reporting on any platform. Each of these media organizations had extensively covered the protests, including on their social media pages. The regime later revoked the licenses of three ethnic-minority-run outlets: Myitkyina News Journal from Kachin State, Tachileik News Agency from Shan State, and 74 other media outlets suspended their operations in response.
Libel/Slander Laws: Even before the coup, the military could and did use various legal provisions, such as a criminal defamation clause in the telecommunications law, to restrict freedom of expression. After the coup, the regime primarily relied on Section 505 of the penal code to prosecute journalists. Following his arrest on March 3 in Bago Region, a reporter covering prodemocracy protests from the radio and television company Democratic Voice Burma was the first after the coup to be charged under this section of the law. According to media reports, he was brutally beaten and seriously injured during his arrest. On May 3, he was sentenced to three years in prison. In June two other journalists were sentenced to two years in prison. According to the Committee to Protect Journalists, at least 24 journalists were facing charges under the broadened Section 505A that includes penalties for spreading “false news.”
National Security: Although the regime prosecuted some media critics using laws related to national security, in general the regime used other methods to pursue its critics. The regime designated the NUG and related prodemocracy groups as terrorist organizations but as of November had not arrested or tried any members of these on terrorist charges.
Internet Freedom
The regime surveilled and censored online content, restricted access to the internet, and prosecuted its online critics. Even before the coup, the telecommunications law included broad provisions giving the government the power to temporarily block and filter content for the “benefit of the people.” According to Freedom House, the regime, the military, and promilitary groups pressured users to remove antiregime and prodemocracy content. Myanmar law does not explicitly include provisions to force the removal of content or provide for intermediary liability, although some sections of law are so overly broad and vague that they may be used to justify forced content removal. Regime authorities instead used, or threatened to use, other criminal provisions of law to pressure internet users to remove content.
The regime limited users’ ability to communicate anonymously by requiring users to register all SIM cards. Subscribers were required to provide their name, national registration document, birthday, address, citizenship, and gender to register a SIM card; noncitizens must provide their passports. Telecommunications companies reportedly required some subscribers to include information beyond the bounds of the regulations, including their ethnicity.
Telecommunications and internet surveillance allegedly contributed to violent crackdowns on citizens, including physical assaults and enforced disappearances in retaliation for online and offline activities.
During the February protests, social media was a crucial vehicle for demonstrators and activist leaders to organize and encourage support for the prodemocracy movement. That month the regime censored social media websites, such as Facebook and Twitter, used by prodemocracy groups and protesters to resist the regime. Throughout the period since the coup, authorities allegedly arrested Facebook users found to have posted antiregime content or used profile photos with text supporting, for example, recognition of the NUG at the United Nations. Amnesty International reported in October that the regime arrested a prodemocracy supporter from his home in Rangoon for posting a picture on Facebook showing someone stepping on a photo of commander in chief Min Aung Hlaing. Authorities also reportedly arrested and detained individuals who followed Facebook, Twitter, and other pages of prodemocracy actors. Online news sites such as those of the BBC, Singapore-based CNA, and CNN were banned after the coup. Most individuals relied on virtual private networks to access independent online news.
In the days following the coup, Netblocks, a London-based service that tracks internet disruptions, reported “a near-total internet shutdown,” with connectivity falling to just 16 percent of normal levels. While internet connectivity later largely returned, occasional reports of targeted cuts across the country continued. For example, on September 15, the Irrawaddy reported that the regime cut off internet access in several townships in Sagaing and Mandalay Regions believed to be PDF strongholds.
In May media reported that the regime shared a “whitelist” of at least 1,200 approved websites with local internet service providers and telecommunications companies. The approved “whitelist” included nearly 50 companies in the banking and financial sector, more than 20 delivery services, and more than 60 entertainment sites, including Instagram, YouTube, Netflix, and Tinder. The whitelist further specified that some social media sites were permitted if “used by many customers for business purposes.”
Following the coup, the regime twice imposed nationwide internet blackouts to suppress the prodemocracy movement, followed by nightly internet blackouts for an extended period. The regime routinely used internet blackouts as a tool against its opponents including in Chin State and Sagaing and Magway Regions. These measures hampered daily business activities and consumer spending. The NGO Freedom House singled out the country for heavy criticism in its Freedom on the Net 2021 report due to the military’s shutting down the internet, blocking social media, and forcing tech companies to hand over personal data as part of its efforts to consolidate power after the coup. Freedom House documented a 14-point decline in internet freedom indicators, the largest ever recorded in its report.
Academic Freedom and Cultural Events
The regime restricted academic freedom and cultural events. Violent crackdowns by the regime on student and teacher prodemocracy supporters affected at least 60 schools and university campuses across the country. The regime reportedly dismissed or arrested dozens of university staff, and suspended thousands more for their involvement in the CDM. In May the Irrawaddy reported that the regime Education Ministry dismissed 41 striking staff members, including 14 officials from the Higher Education Department. The Institute for International Education Scholar Rescue Fund reported receiving numerous requests for support from academic personnel targeted by the regime since the coup. The regime also targeted prominent prodemocracy cultural figures including filmmakers, writers, singers, and actors. In March organizers of the Wathan Film Festival issued a statement on behalf of visual artists, cartoonists, comedians, actors, writers, and poets, calling on the global creative community to show solidarity with the population.
In November Myanmar Now reported that a teacher from Mandalay Region participating in the CDM died hours after his arrest. A colleague of the 40-year-old high school teacher shared, “We were only told that he died during the interrogation…his body was all wrapped up with only his face exposed.”
B. FREEDOMS OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION
The regime curtailed the exercise of the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association.
Freedom of Peaceful Assembly
In the initial days after the coup, hundreds of thousands of individuals took to the streets peacefully to protest the military takeover and demand the release of Aung San Suu Kyi. On February 8, the regime ordered curfews and restrictions on the size of gatherings that effectively banned peaceful public demonstrations across the country, although demonstrations continued, nonetheless. Regime security forces met protesters with increasing violence and lethal force. According to numerous reports in local media, small-scale prodemocracy protests continued across the country as of November despite violent intimidation and suppression by security forces.
Freedom of Association
The regime restricted the right to freedom of association. The law on registering organizations stipulates voluntary registration for local NGOs and removes punishments for noncompliance for both local and international NGOs. Prior to the coup, the government interpreted the law as requiring NGOs that received foreign funding to register with the government. After the coup, the regime required banks to report on all foreign funds received by both local and international NGOs.
C. FREEDOM OF RELIGION
See the Department of State’s International Religious Freedom Report at www.state.gov/religiousfreedomreport/.
D. FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT AND THE RIGHT TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY
The law does not protect freedom of internal movement, foreign travel, emigration, or repatriation. Local regulations limit the rights of citizens to settle and reside anywhere in the country. Authorized officials may require the registration of foreigners’ movements and require foreigners to register every change of address exceeding 24 hours.
In-country Movement: Regional and local orders, directives, and instructions restricted freedom of movement. The regime increased restrictions on freedom of movement after the coup. Numerous local media reports described regime security force roadblocks and the random searches of private cars and taxis. Nightly curfews in Rangoon and several other cities also restricted movement, as did a reinstated requirement that all visitors register with the local ward administrator. Local media reported that the regime harassed, including by seizing ambulances, health-care workers when medical emergencies required them to break curfew. Due to escalating conflict with the military, the NUG and EAOs warned civilians to travel only in case of an emergency. For example, the Thantlang Revolutionary Campaign informed residents in September not to go out after 7 p.m., not to go hunting or into the jungle unless absolutely necessary, and to take extra care when traveling. COVID-19 mitigation regulations also contributed to restriction of movement.
Limitations on freedom of movement for Rohingya in Rakhine State were unchanged. Rohingya may not move freely; they must obtain travel authorization to leave their township. In contrast to the pre-coup rule that Rohingya traveling without documentation could return to their homes without facing immigration charges, the regime’s General Administration Department issued a directive resuming legal actions against Rohingya traveling without permission in Sittwe and Kyauktaw.
Foreign Travel: The regime restricted foreign travel by prodemocracy supporters and expanded measures to increase oversight. According to an official order dated May 13, “The authorities have directed airlines that all bookings for departures from Myanmar must be made at least 10 days in advance of the intended departure and be shared with [the] Ministry of Foreign Affairs.” The regime also reportedly cancelled, or refused to issue, passports to prodemocracy supporters. The regime notified the diplomatic community in Thailand and India that it had taken this action against multiple prodemocracy leaders. Numerous prodemocracy supporters expressed concern for their security and safety if they tried to leave the country by air, and at least one person reported being denied boarding because she was related to an NLD member. COVID-19 mitigation efforts also restricted foreign travel.
E. STATUS AND TREATMENT OF INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS
The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimated that 296,000 recently arrived individuals were living as internally displaced persons (IDPs) as of December 17 due to postcoup violence in Southeast Burma, Kachin and Shan States, and Northwest Burma. A total of 666,000 persons were internally displaced in the country as of December 1. Decades of conflict between the central government and ethnic communities, exacerbated by the coup and the COVID-19 pandemic, resulted in large numbers of primarily ethnic-minority IDPs in ethnic-dominated parts of the country.
In June the United Nations estimated that more than 100,000 persons had fled their homes to escape conflict and risked starving in Kayah State alone. Myanmar Now reported on June 16 that the Karenni Nationalities Defense Force announced the temporary suspension of attacks on the military amid the growing crisis.
The regime has systematically obstructed humanitarian relief. In June local media reported that the military burned bags of rice, barrels of cooking oil, and other staples that locals from southern Shan State gathered to support those displaced from an escalation in fighting. In September, for example, amid an escalation in conflict, the military blocked humanitarian supply routes to 50,000 IDPs in Chin State, according to Radio Free Asia. According to local media, fighting erupted in Lay Kay Kaw Township, Karen State, the evening of December 14 between opposition forces and regime security, displacing at least 4,000 individuals including local residents and prodemocracy supporters seeking safe haven in the area. Democratic Voice Burma news reported that regime security forces continued to shoot at civilians as they fled for safety. HRW reported in December that the regime has imposed travel restrictions on humanitarian workers, blocked access roads and aid convoys, and destroyed nonmilitary supplies.
F. PROTECTION OF REFUGEES
The regime did not always cooperate with UNHCR or other humanitarian organizations in providing protection and assistance to refugees, returning refugees, asylum seekers, or other persons of concern.
Access to Asylum: The law does not provide for granting asylum or refugee status, and the government has not established a system for providing protection to refugees. UNHCR did not register any asylum seekers during the year.
G. STATELESS PERSONS
The law defines a “national ethnic group” as a racial and ethnic group that can prove origins in the country dating back to 1823, a year prior to British colonization, and the regime officially recognized 135 “national ethnic groups” whose members are automatically granted full citizenship. The law also establishes two forms of citizenship short of full citizenship: associate and naturalized. Citizens in these two categories are unable to run for political office; form a political party; serve in the military, police, or public administration; inherit land or money; or pursue certain professional degrees, such as medicine and law. Only members of the third generation of associate or naturalized citizens are able to acquire full citizenship.
Rohingya, most of whom are Muslim, are not recognized as a “national ethnic group” and the vast majority are stateless as a result. Following the forced displacement of more than 740,000 Rohingya to Bangladesh in 2017, up to 600,000 Rohingya were estimated to remain in Rakhine State. Some Rohingya may be technically eligible for full citizenship. The process involves additional official scrutiny and was complicated by logistical difficulties, including travel restrictions and significant gaps in understanding the Burmese language. In practice this also required substantial bribes to regime officials, and even then, it did not result in equality with other full citizens. In particular, only Rohingya were required to go through an additional step of applying for the National Verification Card, through which they receive identity documents that describe them as “Bengali.” Regime officials treat Rohingya with the presumption of noncitizenship. This could lead to discrimination in access to public services and a wide range of societal discrimination.
There were also significant numbers of stateless persons and persons with undetermined nationality, including persons of Chinese, Indian, and Nepali descent. Although these latter groups did not face the same level of official and social discrimination as Rohingya, the regime granted members of these groups only the lesser rights, and imposed the greater restrictions, of associate and naturalized citizenship. The regime did not single these groups out the same way as Rohingya when obtaining citizenship.
The law does not provide any form of citizenship (or associated rights) for children born in the country whose parents are stateless.
Section 3. Freedom to Participate in the Political Process
Prior to the coup, the constitution provided citizens a limited ability to choose their government through elections held by secret ballot. The military deposed the democratically elected parliament and dissolved the Union Election Commission (UEC), appointing a former military major general to replace the ousted UEC chairman. On July 26, the military regime UEC announced that it had annulled the results of the November 2020 general elections, which domestic and international observers assessed as largely reflective of the will of the electorate, despite some identified irregularities and local election cancellations in some ethnic areas.
On October 16, the regime UEC announced that upcoming regional elections were cancelled across most of Rakhine State and in various other ethnic areas in Kachin State, Shan State and elsewhere.
The regime used laws against terrorism to arrest and punish groups and individuals who were active in the country’s precoup political life. The regime designated the NUG, the Committee Representing the Union Parliament, and PDF groups as unlawful terrorist organizations. According to the law, anyone associated with these groups could face 10 years to life in prison, although no one had come to trial as of year’s end.
ELECTIONS AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION
Recent Elections: Observers considered the 2020 national elections to be generally reflective of the will of the population, notwithstanding some structural shortcomings. The NLD, chaired by Aung San Suu Kyi, won more than 80 percent of the 1,150 contested seats at the state, regional, and union levels in those elections. The NLD won 396 of 476 races for national assembly seats; a military-affiliated party won 33, and various ethnic parties took 47 seats. The 2008 constitution bars Aung San Suu Kyi from the presidency due to her marriage to a British national.
Political Parties and Political Participation: Political parties faced narrowing political space amid regime investigations and threats to ban them from competing in elections. Political parties not aligned with the military were denied the rights to assemble and protest peacefully. The military regime, moreover, conducted politically motivated investigations into prodemocracy political parties and their leaders, particularly the NLD. In May the UEC began investigations into the 93 registered political parties, including financial audits. In an August 27 letter, the UEC threatened that if political parties did not submit financial statements, their party registration could be suspended.
Participation of Women and Members of Minority Groups: No laws limit the participation of women in the political process, and they did participate in elections. Laws limiting the citizenship status of many ethnic minority groups (see “Stateless Persons” above) also limited their rights to participate in political life. Women and members of historically marginalized and minority groups were underrepresented in government prior to the coup. Some policies (as opposed to laws and regulations) limited women’s participation in practice.
In the 2020 general elections, 194 women were elected to parliament.
Section 4. Corruption and Lack of Transparency in Government
Since the coup, the Anti-Corruption Commission has regularly targeted deposed NLD politicians and other former civilian government leaders for prosecution under anticorruption law. As of November, the commission charged at least 45 former NLD and civilian government officials, including Aung San Suu Kyi, former president Win Myint, union-level ministers, and state and region ministers appointed by the previous government. Most observers considered these charges baseless.
Corruption was widespread in all dimensions of political life, including especially the judicial system. Petty extortion by police was paralleled by more serious graft at higher levels, such as demanding bribes from victims to conduct criminal investigations.
Corruption: Although corruption was widespread, unlike the civilian government it overthrew, the regime used corruption laws almost exclusively against opponents, as noted. Such cases, which often relied on coerced testimony, did not provide an accurate picture of actual corruption.
Section 5. Governmental Posture Towards International and Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights
The regime did not allow domestic human rights organizations to function independently. Human rights NGOs were able to open offices and operate, but reported harassment, monitoring by authorities, and arbitrary detention. The regime, for example, sometimes pressured hotels and other venues not to host meetings organized by activists or civil society groups. Regime security forces also raided and damaged NGO offices. These restrictions went beyond standard COVID-19 mitigation efforts.
The United Nations or Other International Bodies: The regime systematically denied attempts by the United Nations and other international organizations and NGOs to investigate human rights abuses or to access the locations of alleged abuses. Foreign human rights activists and advocates, including representatives from international NGOs, continued to be restricted to short-term visas that required them to leave the country periodically for renewal. Several international NGOs’ local partners were repeatedly asked to show financial statements and other documents that revealed their relationship with foreign funders.
The regime refused to cooperate with or grant access to the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar created by the UN Human Rights Council to investigate alleged atrocities in the country.
The regime continued to refuse entry to the UN special rapporteur on the human rights situation in the country. While the prior civilian government permitted the UN secretary-general’s special envoy for Burma to open an office in the country in 2019, the regime denied the envoy and her staff permission to enter the country after the coup.
Government Human Rights Bodies: The Myanmar National Human Rights Commission has the power to conduct independent inquiries, and in some cases may call for investigations into abuses. In fact the commission had limited ability to operate as a credible, independent mechanism. Before the coup, the commission investigated some incidents of human rights abuses, but no investigations took place after February 1. The commission released photos of commission members visiting prisons, labor camps, and police detention facilities between May and June. No findings from the visits were released. The NUG established a Human Rights Ministry, which pledged to document human rights abuses committed by regime security forces. The Independent Commission of Enquiry for Rakhine State has not been active since the coup.
Section 6. Discrimination and Societal Abuses
WOMEN
Rape and Domestic Violence: Rape of women and men is illegal but remained a significant problem, and the regime did not enforce the law effectively. Rape of a woman outside of marriage carries a maximum sentence of 20 years in prison. Spousal rape is not a crime unless the wife is younger than the legal age of marriage (which may vary according to ethnicity or religion), and the penalty is a maximum of two years in prison. The law prohibits committing bodily harm against another person, but there are no laws specifically against domestic violence or spousal abuse unless the wife is younger than the legal age of marriage. Overlapping and at times contradictory legal provisions complicated implementation of these limited protections.
Domestic violence against women, including spousal abuse, remained a serious problem. Abuse within families was prevalent and considered socially acceptable. Spousal abuse or domestic violence was difficult to measure because the government did not maintain comprehensive statistics and survivor typically did not report it, although the government attempted to document cases, and reported cases were on the rise.
Sexual Harassment: The law prohibits sexual harassment and prescribes a maximum penalty of two years in prison if the harassment involves physical contact. Harassment is punishable by a fine or up to one year in prison. The regime did not report information on the prevalence of the problem, and many of these crimes were unreported. NGOs reported regime police investigators were not sensitive to survivors and rarely followed through with investigations or prosecutions.
Reproductive Rights: There were no reports of coerced abortion or involuntary sterilization on the part of government authorities. The law allows the government to impose coercive birth-spacing requirements – 36 months between children – if the president or national government designates “special regions” for health care based on factors such as population, migration rate, natural resources, birth rates, and food availability. In such special regions, the government may create special health-care organizations to perform various tasks, including establishing family planning regulations. The government did not designate any such special regions.
In Rakhine State, local authorities prohibited Rohingya families from having more than two children, although some Rohingya with household registration documents reportedly circumvented the law.
The law otherwise limits the right of individuals to manage their reproductive health. Access to sexual and reproductive health services, including emergency contraception, for sexual violence survivors through public and private facilities was very limited and further exacerbated by the collapse of the public-health system after the coup. While September reports from Population Services International indicated that demand for oral contraceptives increased significantly in Rangoon after the coup, access to family planning was limited in rural areas. Economic hardship and security concerns in conflict-affected regions also limited access to family planning.
The Department of Social Welfare adapted gender-based violence services to COVID-19 restrictions, including expanding virtual platforms for online training.
The United Nations estimated in 2017 that the maternal mortality rate nationwide was 250 deaths per 100,000 live births. No more recent reliable data were available. The 2017 National Maternal Death Surveillance and Response Report stated that the maternal mortality ratio was highest in Shan, Chin, and Ayeyarwady States. NGOs regularly reported throughout the year that humanitarian access and movement restrictions among Rohingya limited access to health-care services and contributed to maternal mortality rates in Rakhine State being higher than the national average. Complications resulting from unsafe abortions were also a leading cause of maternal deaths.
Other major factors influencing maternal mortality included poverty; the high rate of home births (63 percent; a number that likely rose after the coup); limited availability of and access to comprehensive sexual and reproductive health services and information, including contraception, and maternal and newborn health services; low coverage of antenatal care visits; and the lack of access to services from appropriately trained and skilled birth attendants and other trained community health workers.
Discrimination: By law women enjoy the same legal status and rights as men, including property and inheritance rights and religious and personal status, but regime officials did not enforce the law. Communities around the country implemented customary law to address matters of marriage, property, and inheritance that differed from the provisions of statutory law and which was often discriminatory against women. The law requires equal pay for equal work, but the formal sector did not respect this requirement, and the regime did not actively enforce it. NGOs reported other forms of workplace discrimination were common (see also section 7.d.). The law restricts the ability of Buddhist women to marry non-Buddhist men by requiring public notification prior to any such marriage and allowing objections to the marriage to be raised in court. The law was rarely enforced. Poverty affected women disproportionately.
SYSTEMIC RACIAL OR ETHNIC VIOLENCE AND DISCRIMINATION
Wide-ranging governmental and societal discrimination against members of minority groups persisted, including in areas such as education, housing, employment, and access to health services. Members of ethnic minority groups constituted 30 to 40 percent of the population. The seven ethnic minority states comprised approximately 60 percent of the national territory, and a significant number of minorities also resided in majority ethnic Burmese regions. Rohingya continued to face severe discrimination based on their ethnicity and religion, although conflict between the military and ethnic Rakhine populations de-escalated.
CHILDREN
Birth Registration: The law automatically confers full citizenship to children when both parents are from one of the 135 recognized national ethnic groups and to some children who meet other citizenship requirements. Second generation children may acquire full citizenship if at least one parent has full citizenship. Third generation children of associate or naturalized citizens may acquire full citizenship. Many long-term residents in the country, including Rohingya, are not among the recognized national ethnic groups, and thus their children are not automatically conferred citizenship (see also section 2.g.). There were significant rural-urban disparities in birth registration, with an informal or almost nonexistent process in small, rural villages. Birth registration is required to obtain a national identification card, and it can provide important protections for children, particularly against child labor, early marriage, and underage recruitment into the armed forces and ethnic armed groups.
Education: By law, education is compulsory, free, and universal through the fourth grade (up to age 10). This leaves children ages 10 through 13 vulnerable to child labor, since they are not required to attend school and are not legally permitted to work (the minimum age for work is 14). Burmese is the mandatory language of instruction in public schools. The national education plan does not allow for other languages of instruction, although some public schools taught ethnic languages as extra subjects. Schools were often unavailable in remote communities and conflict areas, and access to them for internally displaced and stateless children was also limited.
In June the regime ordered all primary and secondary schools to reopen, after closing in 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic. According to the Myanmar Teacher’s Federation, more than 90 percent of students did not return on June 2 as mandated. The teachers’ federation reported that almost one-third of teachers from the primary to university level were suspended for participating in the CDM. A suspended teacher from Rangoon told international media in May, “I’m not afraid of arrest and torture. I’m afraid of becoming a teacher who teaches the students propaganda.” In early July the regime ordered all primary and secondary schools closed due to the third wave of COVID-19; the schools reopened before year’s end.
UNICEF reported in July that the regime and prodemocracy groups conducted 180 attacks against schools and school personnel and that the military used education facilities for military purposes in at least 157 cases.
Child Abuse: The laws were neither adequate to deter child abuse nor enforced. The United Nations reported in July that hundreds of children were killed or maimed and approximately 1,000 arrested in postcoup demonstrations and clashes. The chairperson of the Child Rights Convention described children as “under siege” since the coup.
Child, Early, and Forced Marriage: The law stipulates different minimum ages for marriage based on religion and gender. The minimum age for Buddhists is 18, while the minimum age for non-Buddhists is 16 for boys and 15 for girls. Child marriage occurred, especially in rural areas. There were no reliable statistics on forced marriage.
Sexual Exploitation of Children: End Child Prostitution in Asian Tourism (ECPAT), a Bangkok-based international NGO, characterized the problem of children experiencing sexual abuse and violence as “widespread,” despite the scarcity of data. Lifetime migrants constituted 20 percent of the country’s population, and the children who accompany them faced higher risks of sexual exploitation, forced marriage, and trafficking, according to UNICEF.
The law prohibits the commercial sexual exploitation of children, including pimping; separate provisions within the penal code prohibit sex with a minor younger than 14. The penalty for the purchase and sale of commercial sex acts from a child younger than 18 is 10 years in prison. The law prohibits child pornography and specifies a minimum penalty of two years’ imprisonment and a modest fine. The law on child rights prescribes a penalty of one to seven years in prison, a substantial fine, or both, for sex trafficking and forced marriage. If a survivor is younger than 14, the law considers any sexual act to constitute statutory rape. The maximum sentence for statutory rape is two years in prison when the survivor is between ages 12 and 14, and 10 years to life in prison when the survivor is younger than 12. The law against trafficking in persons requires a demonstration of force, fraud, or coercion to constitute a child sex-trafficking offense. The deposed civilian government introduced these laws. ECPAT cited a lack of monitoring and evaluation mechanisms as well as publicly available data to ascertain the effectiveness of implementation.
Displaced Children: The United Nations estimated that as of October there were more than 589,000 IDPs, approximately 37 percent of whom were children.
International Child Abductions: The country is not a party to the 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. See the Department of State’s Annual Report on International Parental Child Abduction at https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/International-Parental-Child-Abduction/for-providers/legal-reports-and-data/reported-cases.html.
ANTI-SEMITISM
There was one synagogue in Rangoon serving a very small and primarily expatriate Jewish population. There were no reports of anti-Semitic acts.
TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS
See the Department of State’s Trafficking in Persons Report at https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/.
PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES
The law prohibits discrimination against persons with physical, sensory, intellectual, and mental disabilities. While the law requires job protection, equal access to education, and access to public transportation, there was no meaningful enforcement. According to the Eden Center for Disabled Children, children with disabilities had a lower school attendance rate than their peers. COVID-19 mitigation restrictions and the coup further limited access to services, including education and programs focused on reducing stigma and discrimination against persons with disabilities.
Military veterans with disabilities in urban areas received official benefits on a priority basis, usually a civil service job at pay equivalent to rank. Official assistance to civilians with disabilities in principle included two-thirds of pay for a maximum of one year for a temporary disability and a tax-free stipend for permanent disability.
HIV AND AIDS SOCIAL STIGMA
Official and societal violence and discrimination, including employment discrimination, against persons with HIV or AIDS, continued. Reports of abuse included verbal insults, harassment, threats, and physical assault. Significant legal, social, and financial barriers impeded access to services for persons with HIV or AIDS. These barriers included stigma, unhelpful gender norms, poor infrastructure, an entrenched drug trade, political instability, and the COVID-19 pandemic. Laws criminalizing behaviors that increased the risk of acquiring HIV or AIDS fueled stigma and discrimination against persons engaged in these behaviors and impeded their access to HIV prevention, treatment, and care services.
The regime paused most high-level efforts to address these matters due to political instability and reduced engagement with the regime by persons and groups concerned with them.
ACTS OF VIOLENCE, CRIMINALIZATION, AND OTHER ABUSES BASED ON SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND GENDER IDENTITY
Although consensual sexual activity between men remained a criminal offense, political reforms in prior years made it easier for the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, and intersex (LGBTQI+) community to hold public events and openly participate in society. Discrimination, stigma, and a lack of acceptance among the general population persisted. Transgender persons, for example, were subject to police harassment, and their identity was not recognized. After the coup, reported violence against LGBTQI+ persons increased. As of July the NUG minister of human rights claimed at least 12 LGBTQI+ community members died and another 73 were arrested while peacefully protesting against the regime. As of November, at least 65 LGBTQI+ community members remained in detention, and 28 were either in hiding or had fled to areas not under regime control. According to Radio Free Asia, LGBTQI+ prodemocracy supporters were targeted for humiliation by regime after arrest including sexual insults, taunts, mocking of clothing, and physical abuse.
There were reports of discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity in employment. Many LGBTQI+ individuals faced significant barriers to education and employment if they were vocal or visible about their status. LGBTQI+ persons reported facing discrimination from health-care providers, including public shaming.
A 2019 report by the British Council found mixed views on whether LGBTQI+ persons could be accepted in the culture: fifty percent of respondents rejected the idea. Overall, those polled were more willing to accept LGBTQI+ persons in the abstract but were less so when the person in question was a specific individual, such as a relative or politician.
Section 7. Worker Rights
A. FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION AND THE RIGHT TO COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
After the military coup on February 1, the regime committed widespread abuses against organized labor, including the unlawful detention and extrajudicial killing of labor union leaders and members for exercising their fundamental freedoms and basic human rights. After the coup, labor laws often went unenforced or were enforced primarily against organized labor and labor activists and in the interests of business owners and the regime.
The military declared at least 16 labor unions illegal and issued arrest warrants for more than 85 union leaders, including 11 of the Confederation of Trade Unions of Myanmar, and many union leaders remained in prison or missing. There were numerous reported raids of trade union offices and union leaders’ homes. More than a dozen union leaders were killed.
The law provides for the right of workers to form and join independent unions, bargain collectively, and conduct strikes. The law permits labor organizations to demand the reinstatement of workers dismissed for union activity, but it does not explicitly prohibit antiunion discrimination in the form of demotions or mandatory transfers, nor does it offer protection for workers seeking to form a union. The law does not provide adequate protection for workers from dismissal before a union is officially registered. The law prohibits civil servants and personnel of the security services and police from forming unions. The law permits workers to join unions only within their category of trade or activity, and the definition of trade or activity lacks clarity. Basic labor organizations must have a minimum of 30 workers and register through township registrars via the Chief Registrar’s Office of the regime Ministry of Labor, Immigration, and Population (Ministry of Labor). The law permits labor federations and confederations to affiliate with international union federations and confederations.
The law provides for voluntary registration for local NGOs, including labor NGOs working on labor matters, as long as they do not receive foreign funding. The military authorities interfered in the operations of the International Labor Organization (ILO) country office, including through the continued imposition of banking restrictions, the denial of visa extensions for ILO officials, and the denial of tax exemptions.
The law provides unions the right to represent workers, to negotiate and bargain collectively with employers, and to send representatives to a conciliation body or tribunal; however, there were reports that employers dismissed union leaders with impunity or with military support. The law stipulates that a management committee, including government and nongovernmental representatives, in the special economic zones be the first instance arbiter in disputes between employers and employees.
In March, however, the military took control and imposed martial law over two major industrial zones located in Hlain Thar Yar and Shwe Pyi Thar Townships, Rangoon Region, as well as other townships with a high concentration of industrial and manufacturing enterprises. Labor representatives alleged that some employers hired military-affiliated security guards to harass and intimidate workers, sometimes leading to fatal violence when disputes arose. On March 16 at Xing Jia shoe factory, the employer reportedly called in police to deal with a dispute with a group of workers seeking their pay. The police opened fire and killed at least six workers.
The law provides the right to strike in most sectors with significant requirements such as the permission of the relevant labor federations. The law prohibits strikes addressing problems not directly relevant to labor matters. The law does not permit strikes or lockouts in essential services such as water, electric, or health. Lockouts are permitted in public utility services (including transportation; cargo and freight; postal; sanitation; information, communication, and technology; energy; petroleum; and financial sectors), with a minimum of 14 days’ notice provided to the relevant labor organizations and conciliation body. Strikes in public utility services generally require the same measures as in other sectors, but seven days’ advance notice and negotiation between workers and management is required before the strike takes place in order to determine maintenance of minimum service levels.
The government did not effectively enforce labor laws related to freedom of association. Penalties for violations of related labor laws were commensurate with those for other laws involving denials of civil rights; however, laws were enforced primarily against independent trade unions and not employers.
After the coup, strikes and collective worker action led to retaliation by the military, including workers forced to return to work at gunpoint. On February 19, shipping and jetty workers in Mandalay went on strike to support the CDM. There were reports that the military tried, at gun point, to force the workers back to work, but large crowds gathered to block and drive the military away. The military fired into the crowd, killing protesters. The military evicted striking railway worker and their families, forcing them to flee.
After a national work stoppage began on March 8, the military publicly stated that all public sector workers must return or face criminal charges. There were reports of at least 1,100 public-sector workers from various departments receiving some form of threat or discipline because of participation in the CDM.
Workers at some unionized factories negotiated leave agreements so they would be granted leave to attend the demonstrations. Employer refusal, in some cases, led to work stoppages. There are numerous reports of workers fired for participating in the CDM. Many reported postings at factories saying workers would be fired if they participated in the CDM.
Worker organizations reported that formal dispute settlement and court procedures were not effective at enforcing labor laws. After the coup, there were multiple reports of worker disputes handled with military interference.
Labor organizations also reported that local labor offices imposed unnecessary bureaucratic requirements for union registration that were inconsistent with the law.
The Confederation of Trade Unions in Myanmar reported the arrest and harassment of trade unionists by regime security forces after the coup, including the secretary general of Myanmar Infrastructure, Craft and Service who was detained in June when the regime raided the infrastructure, craft, and service union office in Mandalay. Labor sources reported the secretary general was not allowed to meet any visitors or access legal aid while in detention. In a separate case, regime authorities detained the director of the Solidarity Trade Union of Myanmar at his office in April. Labor sources reported the regime denied the director access to medicine and other necessary health care to manage her chronic illness while in detention. The regime released the director in October as part of a general amnesty and without pursuing formal charges. On October 12, a military tribunal also sentenced two union organizers, U Yen Tu Htauk and Ma Kyi Par Lay, to life in prison.
B. PROHIBITION OF FORCED OR COMPULSORY LABOR
The law prohibits most forms of forced or compulsory labor, although insufficient barriers exist for the use of forced labor by the military and penal institutions. The law also provides for the punishment of persons who impose forced labor on others. The law provides criminal penalties for forced labor violations; penalties differ depending on whether the military, the government, or a private citizen committed the violation. The penalties were commensurate with analogous serious crimes such as kidnapping. The regime did not effectively enforce the law, particularly in the areas where significant conflict was occurring.
In early 2020 the government established a forced-labor complaints mechanism under the Ministry of Labor. There were no data available on the functioning of or the number of cases reported to or processed by the mechanism since the coup. The ILO expressed profound concern over practices of the military authorities, including the use of forced labor.
The regime threatened CDM members with criminal charges if they did not return to work (see also section 7.a.).
Also see the Department of State’s Trafficking in Persons Report at https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/.
C. PROHIBITION OF CHILD LABOR AND MINIMUM AGE FOR EMPLOYMENT
The law prohibits the worst forms of child labor, although the regime did not meaningfully enforce the law. The law sets the minimum age at 14 for work in certain sectors, including shops and factories; the law establishes special provisions for “youth employment” for those older than 14. There is, however, no minimum age for work for all sectors in which children were employed, including agriculture and informal work. The law prohibits employees younger than 16 from working in a hazardous environment, but the government did not issue a list of hazardous jobs. Some sector-specific laws identify activities that are prohibited for children younger than 18. Penalties under the Child Rights Law were analogous to other serious crimes, such as kidnapping.
Children worked mostly as street vendors, refuse collectors, restaurant and teashop attendants, garment workers, and domestic workers. Children often worked in the informal economy, in some instances exposing them to drugs and petty crime, risk of arrest, commercial sexual exploitation, HIV, AIDS, and other sexually transmitted infections (see also section 6). Children were also vulnerable to forced labor in teashops, agriculture and forestry, gem production, begging, and other fields. In rural areas children routinely worked in family agricultural activities, occasionally in situations that potentially involved forced labor. Child labor was also reported in the extraction of rubies and jade and the manufacture of rubber and bricks.
Also see the Department of Labor’s Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor at https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/resources/reports/child-labor/findings/ and the Department of Labor’s List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor at https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/reports/child-labor/list-of-goods .
D. DISCRIMINATION WITH RESPECT TO EMPLOYMENT AND OCCUPATION
Labor laws and regulations do not prohibit employment discrimination. Restrictions against women in employment exist based on social and cultural practices and beliefs. Women remained underrepresented in most traditionally male-dominated occupations (forestry, carpentry, masonry, and fishing) and were effectively barred from them by hiring practices and cultural barriers. Women were not legally prohibited from any employment except in underground mines. The law governing hiring of civil service personnel states that nothing shall prevent the appointment of men to “positions that are suitable for men only,” with no further definition of what constitutes positions “suitable for men only.”
There were reports that government and private actors practiced discrimination that impeded Muslim-owned businesses’ operations and undercut their ability to hire and retain labor, maintain proper working standards, and secure public and private contracts. There were reports of discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity in employment, including the denial of promotions and firing of LGBTQI+ persons. Activists reported limited job opportunities for many openly gay and lesbian persons and noted a general lack of support from society. Activists reported that in addition to general societal discrimination, persons with HIV or AIDS faced employment discrimination in both the public and private sectors, including suspensions and the loss of employment following positive results from mandatory workplace HIV testing.
E. ACCEPTABLE CONDITIONS OF WORK
Wage and Hour Laws: The official minimum daily wage was above the poverty line. The minimum wage covers all sectors and industries and applies to all workers in the formal sector except those in businesses with fewer than 15 employees. The law requires the minimum wage to be revised every two years. The government also established tripartite committees in the Special Economic Zones responsible for setting wage levels and an inspector for each zone.
The workweek is 44 hours per week for factories. For shops and other establishments, it is 48 hours per week. Although the law in general states that overtime should not exceed 12 hours per work week, the law allows up to 16 hours of overtime when special matters require additional overtime. Overtime for factory workers is regulated under a separate directive that limits overtime to 20 hours per week. The law also stipulates that an employee’s total working hours cannot exceed 11 hours per day (including overtime and a one-hour break). Laws did not apply to those in the informal sector or self-employed.
Occupational Safety and Health: The 2019 Occupational Safety and Health law sets standards for occupational safety, health, and welfare. The Ministry of Labor has the authority to suspend businesses operating at risk to worker health and safety until risks are remediated.
Labor unions reported instances in which workers could not remove themselves from situations that endangered their health or safety without jeopardizing their employment. Unions reported that workers concerned about COVID-19 positive cases in factories were nonetheless required to work.
The Ministry of Labor’s Factories and General Labor Laws Inspection Department oversees labor conditions in the private sector. Inspectors were authorized to make unannounced inspections and initiate sanctions.
The regime did not effectively enforce the law. Penalties for wage and hour violations were commensurate with those for similar violations, but penalties for safety and health violations were not. The number of labor law inspectors and factory inspectors was insufficient to address wage, salary, overtime, occupational safety and health standards, and other matters adequately. In some sectors other ministries regulated occupational safety and health laws (e.g., the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, and Irrigation).
Informal Sector: Observers agreed the great majority of the country’s workers were in the informal sector. Wage, hours and occupational safety and health laws did not apply to those in the informal sector or self-employed.
Informal workers’ jobs were less secure during the COVID-19 pandemic. For example, in April 2020 the Ministry of Health ordered that no more than 50 workers could be present at a construction site. One of the largest employers of informal labor was the construction sector. The postcoup regime retained the policy.
Informal-sector jobs usually lacked basic benefits such as social and legal protections. In at-risk industries – defined as having occupational hazards, volatile payment structures, and ease in exploiting labor rights – on average, one in five workers had an informal work arrangement, although the proportion was even higher in manufacturing, construction, recreation, and personal services. In addition, nearly two-thirds of the workers in medium- to high-risk industries were employed informally..."
Source/publisher:
United States Department of State
Date of publication:
2022-04-13
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-16
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2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Human Rights and international relations, Human Rights Defenders, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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"The massive scale of nationwide strikes held in Myanmar over Thingyan sends a powerful message that democratic resistance to the military coup will continue into the New Year. Even under sustained attack, the resistance is holding its ground against the military junta and laying the foundations of a future federal democracy, says the Special Advisory Council for Myanmar (SAC-M).
Myanmar’s streets have been emptied for days when they would usually be packed with people joining water festivities for Thingyan, to wash away sins of the previous year and celebrate the New Year in Myanmar. The New Year itself falls on Sunday 17 April.
The empty streets are an act of nationwide resistance to the military junta, which attempted to seize power in a coup last year and is trying to create a perception that the situation in Myanmar is normalising. The junta is reported to have forced its own employees to take part in official Thingyan festivities in a vain attempt to bolster participation.
“The massive New Year strikes in Myanmar send a powerful message that the people’s commitment to democratic resistance continues,” said Chris Sidoti of SAC-M. “The military wants to present the situation as normalising – with these strikes the people of Myanmar are demonstrating very clearly that it is not.”
In early April alone, junta forces are reported to have set fire to hundreds of homes across townships in Magway, Mandalay and Sagaing regions. Junta forces have waged a months-long campaign of arson across central and northwest Myanmar in an attempt to crush strong local resistance to the coup there.
Days before Thingyan, junta forces launched deadly airstrikes and artillery against civilian targets in the Karen State town of Lay Kay Kaw in Karen National Union territory, as part of a sustained and devasting campaign of aerial bombardment against allied democratic resistance forces in the southeast.
The military junta’s forces have repeatedly committed mass atrocities in deliberate acts of terror as part of a sustained, widespread and systematic attack on the civilian population since it launched the coup last year. The attack has devastated lives but has not resulted in the military gaining greater control over the country.
“The democratic resistance in Myanmar has held its ground against the military junta over the past year. Indeed, there is now less territory in Myanmar under the control of the military than there was twelve months ago,” said Marzuki Darusman of SAC-M. “The junta had expected to subdue the people within days of its ill-fated February coup of last year, in the manner of a similar case in Ukraine. That seems to be a fatal mistake.”
The one-year anniversary of the appointment of the National Unity Government of Myanmar (NUG) by the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw also falls over Thingyan, on Saturday 16 April. Along with Ethnic Revolutionary Organisations (EROs), the National Unity Consultative Council, political parties and protest groups, these institutions are working to shape a future Myanmar pursuant to the Federal Democracy Charter, albeit while under constant attack from the junta.
“The National Unity Government formed one year ago. Since then, it has taken vital steps to lay the foundations of a future federal democracy in Myanmar, such as accepting the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court to end the impunity that has devasted Myanmar for so long,” said Yanghee Lee of SAC-M. “What is missing in this picture is the international support for the people of Myanmar. Where is it?”
As Myanmar enters a New Year, a time of renewed hope, SAC-M is calling on the international community to finally step up and recognise the NUG as the legitimate government of Myanmar. The NUG is deserving of recognition as the government of Myanmar, according to internationally accepted criteria. States must increase political and financial support to the NUG, including by granting the NUG access to US$1 billion of Myanmar assets frozen by the United States Government after the coup.
States must massively increase cross-border assistance to Myanmar through the NUG and EROs, with supply lines coming from neighbouring countries, in order to effectively address the junta-made humanitarian crisis in Myanmar.
Finally, SAC-M is calling for a global three cuts strategy against the junta through the imposition and enforcement of a comprehensive global arms embargo against Myanmar, targeted economic sanctions against senior junta members and military aligned businesses, and referral of the situation in Myanmar to the International Criminal Court..."
Source/publisher:
Special Advisory Council for Myanmar
Date of publication:
2022-04-15
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-15
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"Today I would like to extend my best wishes to our people for the upcoming Thingyan’s New Year. It is a tragedy that for the second year in a row we are unable to celebrate Thingyan and the Burmese new year. Since the military coup, our people have been suffering and facing a great many challenges and difficulties. In tradition, Thingyan is a time to wash away the sins and evil of the last year and to usher in the new year with good deeds and blessings.
This Thingyan the genocidal military junta-SAC hopes to wash away our determination and spirit with our blood. It is a blood-stained Thingyan and the people of Myanmar refuse to participate in the military's travesty of a festival. A staged mockery of our cherished traditions in service of a false image of a country at peace and under control. But we have shown the world that we do not, and we will never surrender nor give up on our fight for freedom, peace, and federal democracy. We have shown our courage and resilience to end genocidal military dictatorship. Myanmar will not know peace until the genocidal military are defeated and democracy is restored.
The brave and peace-loving people of Myanmar truly deserve freedom and federal democracy. The day will yet come when we can purify our nation of the military's evil and wash away their darkness with the purest water of freedom, self-determination, and federal democracy. But that day is not today. Although we cannot celebrate, we must take time to consider the few blessings we have. We are pushing the military back more and more each day. It is a slow battle but we are winning. May this new year bring our country the freedom, true federal democracy and all the rights that we have lost at the hands of the genocidal military junta in Myanmar..."
Source/publisher:
Dr. Sasa via Ministry of International Cooperation Myanmar
Date of publication:
2022-04-14
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-14
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"Myanmar’s military has terrorized the country with systematic and widespread human rights violations and abuses, since staging a coup in February 2021. The military junta, also called Tatmadaw, has killed some 1,700 people, displaced half a million people, and hunger levels are growing. This humanitarian crisis must be addressed by the international community: the people of Myanmar need to be supported.
The U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights condemned Myanmar security forces’ violations of international human rights in a March 15, 2022 report, stating, “The military and security forces have shown a flagrant disregard for human life, bombarding populated areas with airstrikes and heavy weapons and deliberately targeting civilians, many of whom have been shot in the head, burned to death, arbitrarily arrested, tortured or used as human shields.”
The crisis in Myanmar requires urgent action, and the people need immediate assistance. The civilians have been unable to receive necessary aid, food, shelter, or healthcare due to the military blockades for over a year now. The Human Rights Council should call for U.N. member states to halt the flow of weapons into Myanmar, while imposing stronger sanctions. The international community should be more urgent in their response. They can assist local groups that are trying to bring aid to trapped communities within the country: a collective effort has the potential to be more substantial and sustainable.
The military took over in Myanmar last February, the day before the Parliament of Myanmar was due to swear in the 2020 elected officials, thereby preventing this from occurring. As peaceful pro-democracy demonstrations commenced in the country, the ruthless military responded with firing rocket launchers and burning down homes to put down the movement. According to The New York Times, Myanmar protestors believe that they should fight the Tatmadaw on its own terms, so they are training with firearms and hand grenades in the jungles. This could lead to a civil war. Since February 2021, the crisis has escalated: the military is blocking humanitarian aid in an effort to curb the anti-coup movement and force the population into submission. The U.N. estimates that the number of people needing assistance has grown from one million before the coup to 14.4 million now, including more than five million children. So far, the United States, the United Kingdom, and the European Union have imposed sanctions on military officials.
The Tatmadaw has committed serious human rights violations and abuses, some of which may be considered war crimes or crimes against humanity. The Myanmar population is in dire need of assistance as they have been deprived of the necessary means to survive. The United Nations should call for more critical action to protect the civilians and halt this crisis..."
Source/publisher:
The Organization for World Peace
Date of publication:
2022-04-14
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-14
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Individual Documents
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2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, The UN and Burma - news and commentary, Human Rights and international relations
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The Bush Institute welcomes the launch of US-ASEAN Business Council Institute’s Myanmar Scholarship Fund.
Description:
"More than one year after the unlawful coup in Burma that disregarded the will of the people and overthrew the democratically elected civilian government, we at the George W. Bush Institute remain deeply saddened and concerned by the plight and suffering of the Burmese people.
Challenges to freedom in places like Burma remind us that what happens around the world matters to us here at home. Tyrants who trample the rights of their own people will not hesitate to trample those of their neighbors. They will spread violence, chaos, and corruption across sovereign borders and cyberspace.
That’s why it’s incumbent upon free societies to stand against the threat posed by authoritarian regimes. Governments, individual citizens, civil society, and businesses all have roles in supporting democracy worldwide. That commitment creates a more peaceful and prosperous world benefiting all of us.
Even though the situation in Burma may look dark now, the desire for liberty continues to burn. We must remain committed to supporting the brave Burmese people. At the Bush Institute, we have invested in developing young leaders in Burma, and we’re proud to see others like the US-ASEAN Business Council Institute (USABCI) doing the same.
USABCI’s Myanmar Scholarship Fund demonstrates the innovative approach that is needed to support the Burmese people today while also looking toward tomorrow. This program allows a new generation of Burmese youth to get a top tier education and develop the skills needed to lead. It also demonstrates the crucial role of American engagement in uplifting those struggling for freedom.
And we remain confident that the fruits of such efforts will ultimately be the restoration of a free and democratic Burma..."
Source/publisher:
George W. Bush Presidential Center
Date of publication:
2022-04-11
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-14
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, USA-Burma relations
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Description:
"On 6th April the U.S. House of Representatives finally passed the BURMA Act (H.R.5497), which calls for action on justice and accountability, increased aid to IDPs, activists and others, and more sanctions to target revenue to the military. The BURMA Act received bipartisan support.
The passing of the BURMA Act came after significant lobbying by members of communities from Burma in the USA, and US and international civil society organisations.
Since the attempted military coup on 1st February 2021, the USA has shown a lack of leadership in mobilising international action to promote human rights and democracy in Burma. The pace of implementation of sanctions has been too slow and too limited, and there has been insufficient support for cross-border aid. Despite a recent determination of genocide against the Rohingya, no practical action on accountability has followed. The USA has not used its diplomatic weight internationally to persuade more countries to adopt arms embargoes.
The USA has taken no action to stop the flow of gas revenue to the Burmese military, one of the biggest sources of revenue to the military. While the European Union has taken action by sanctioning MOGE, the Biden administration seems more concerned about Chevron’s profits and not inconveniencing Thailand than taking effective action to cut funding to a military which is committing war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide.
The BURMA Act (S.2937) now faces an uncertain future in the Senate due to the lack of support from key Republicans, in particular Senator Mitch McConnell, and Senator Todd Young. It is not clear why these two Senators are refusing to support the BURMA Act and ensure it is voted on in the Senate. The lack of bipartisan support as a result of their actions is protecting the Burmese military from effective action which could cut the flow of revenue and arms and help saves lives.
“In the UN Security Council, Russia and China use their veto power to block action against the Burmese military. Senators McConnell and Young are the Russia and China of the US Senate, protecting the Burmese military against action to cut their supply of money and arms,” said Mark Farmaner, Director of Burma Campaign UK. “At the present time American companies can’t sell arms to the Burmese military but they can provide the military with revenue which they use to buy arms from Russia. No-one in the Biden administration has explained why they think this policy makes sense.”
Burma Campaign UK is calling on its supporters and members of the public worldwide to email the two Senators calling on them to stop blocking the BURMA Act..."
Source/publisher:
"Burma Campaign UK" (London)
Date of publication:
2022-04-13
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-13
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, USA-Burma relations, Human Rights and international relations
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"In Myanmar, the political and economic crisis following the COVID-19 pandemic and the overthrow of the civilian authorities on Feburary 1st, 2021 has led to an explosion in humanitarian needs.
Access to essential goods has become more difficult, and tensions and violence in the country have led to significant population displacement. The shortages observed concern access to food, drinking water, sanitation and hygiene as well as health and education. Hundreds of thousands of people are now extremely vulnerable.
The situation could quickly become even more dramatic with the arrival of the dry season: the increased drought that hits the country every year during this period confronts the population with a water scarcity. The water shortages particularly affect the displaced population, including the Rohingya communities living in the camps on the Pauktaw islets in Arakan State.
LOGISTICAL CHALLENGE
To meet these critical needs, SOLIDARITÉS INTERNATIONAL has been securing water supplies for the Pauktaw camps since 2012. This is a major logistical challenge as the water has to be pumped from a distance, transported by boat and then transferred from the coast to the camps via a pipeline system so that it can be treated and distributed to the population. This requires a great deal of coordination between the different actors involved in these operations. “It is also very important to be able to adapt to daily constraints such as tide times and possible breakdowns,” says Jean-Loup Gouot, country director of the Myanmar mission.
Hygiene kits consisting of soap and other essential hygiene products (toothbrushes, toothpaste, detergent, sanitary towels, etc.) are also distributed and awareness-raising sessions on good hygiene practices are held.
The NGO’s mobilisation is crucial in that it enables the people it supports to drink drinking water, cook and wash.
Our aim is to reduce the risks of spreading diseases and epidemics caused by the ingestion of unsafe water and lack of hygiene,” says Jean-Loup Gouot.
It also allows people living in the camps to work.
Before, fetching water took a long time because the available water source was far from my home. As the head of the household, I didn’t have enough time to fetch water and work,” says Adumaw Gyi, a resident of Kyein Ni Pyin camp.
Access to water remains quantitatively limited. The needs are such that it is sometimes difficult to provide more than 10 litres of water per day per person, half the minimum recommended by the World Health Organisation.
FINANCIAL CHALLENGE
Humanitarian actors and donors must respond to emerging needs following the health crisis and the coup, while continuing to meet pre-existing needs.
In this context, SOLIDARITÉS INTERNATIONAL is having difficulty securing the funds it needs to make its activities possible in the Pauktaw IDP camps in Arakan State, home to more than 23,700 Rohingya, including nearly 6,000 children.
The stakes are high and the support of all in this response will allow this population to limit the risk of spreading serious waterborne diseases within the camps (cholera, acute diarrhoea, etc.) but also to better contain the spread of COVID-19. This risk is all the more worrying as the populations concerned have no access to health structures and their freedom of movement is restricted..."
Source/publisher:
Solidarités International
Date of publication:
2022-04-12
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-12
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Food Security and nutrition in Burma/Myanmar, Human Rights and international relations, Education in Burma/Myanmar - general
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"1. Introductio n
Good morning.
I am honoured to attend the United Stales Holocaust Memorial Museum today, and I am
grateful to have been guided through its exhibitions.
The contents o f the Museum are devastating. The horrors that humanity has inflicted on groups
o f persons because o f their ethnic, racial or religious identity would be unthinkable were they
not recorded here and in similar institutions.
That makes this Museum essential it forces us to confront what we have collectively
committed, what we have allowed to occur, and what we are cursed to re live If we do not
correct course.
Yet the lessons o f history seem lost on us. As the Museum's case studies document, the
Holocaust was followed by atrocities and acts o f genocide in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in
Cambodia, and in Rwanda to name o n ly a few places. As I speak, reports are emerging o f
Ukrainian streets strewn with civilian bodies, and o f the unearthing o f mass graves.
2. M y a nm a r
As these cases show, atrocities can occur anywhere. No region has been spared. And it is with
terrible shame that Myanmar now features in the Museum’s collection in an exhibition entitled
Burma 's Path to Genocide.
On the 2 V o f March o f this year. Secretary o f Slate Anthony Blinken announced that after
careful, rigorous investigation and scrutiny, the United S tates Government had determined that
the Myanmar military' s 2 0 17 attacks against the Rohingya in Rakhine State amounted to
genocide and to crimes against humanity.
In a single wave o f atrocities in 2 0 17, thousands o f Rohingya were killed and disappeared and
close to a million were forcibly displaced. Rape and sexual v iolence, including mass gang rape,
were used as part o f a deliberate strategy to intimidate, terrorise o r punish the Rohingya as a
tactic o f war. Hundreds o f villages were razed.
Years later, hundreds o f thousands o f Rohingya remain displaced not only from their villages
and homes, but from the country to which they belong.
1
The U.S. Government' s determination followed longstanding calls by independent experts
including the United Nations (UN) Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on
Myanmar - for Myanmar' s military leadership to be investigated and prosecuted for genocide,
crimes against humanity and war crimes against the Rohingya.
Nor were these crimes limited to the Rohingya and Rakhine State. As the UN Fact-Finding
Mission found, military atrocities were also directed against ethnic groups in Kachin and Shan
States.
Today, the historic impunity enjoyed by the Myanmar military has enabled its leadership to
commit now countrywide atrocities at the helm of an illegal military junta. The targeted few
have become the many.
3. The National Unity Government
The National Unity Government of Myanmar acknowledges with great shame that historic
exclusionary and discriminatory policies, practices and rhetoric against the Rohingya laid the
ground for atrocities. Over the course of decades, these atrocities recurred in waves. The
Holocaust Museum captures this in a section of the Burma exhibition entitled 'a history o f
persecution'. That is, a history of dehumanisation.
In June 2020, the National Unity Government issued a Policy Position on the Rohingya in
Rakhine State. This Policy acknowledged that grave crimes and atrocities had been committed
against the Rohingya by the military. It also made clear that the National Unity Government
would pursue accountability.
The U.S. Government' s determination of genocide is timely given that the International Court
of Justice the World Court is hearing a case brought by The Gambia against Myanmar
under the Genocide Convention. It is our hope that the U.S.’s determination will be instructive
to the Court and its deliberations.
The National Unity Government continues to extend every offer of support, including
evidence, to the Court. We remain determined to represent Myanmar in the case by displacing
the present representatives of the military junta, and we will accept and fully comply with
whatever the Court decides.
Furthermore, the National Unity Government has lodged an Article 12(3) Declaration with the
Registrar of the International Criminal Court (ICC) on behalf of Myanmar, accepting the ICC' s
jurisdiction with respect to international crimes - including genocide - committed in the
country since 1 July 2002. We stand ready to provide the ICC with evidence and, in the interim,
continue to share evidence and corroborative materials with the UN's Independent
Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar.
In my meetings with senior government officials over the coming days, I will strongly
encourage the U.S. to use its permanent membership of the UN Security Council to refer the
situation in Myanmar to the ICC.
4. Practical steps
The legal determination of atrocity crimes and of genocide would be of great significance in
recognising the horrors occasioned against the Rohingya and other Myanmar communities,
and, crucially, in securing accountability.
Judicial decisions, however, must be joined by practical steps. The National Unity
Government's Policy Position on the Rohingya commits to the safe, voluntary, dignified, and
sustainable returns of all Rohingya refugees and internally displaced persons. It also commits
2
to comprehensive legislative and policy reform on citizenship, and to ensuring equality of
rights and opportunity for all.
5. Conclusion
Myanmar' s Federal Democracy Charter envisages a nation founded on peace, justice, equality,
human rights, and the protection of minorities.
For now. this remains a vision. Since its failed coup d ' etat of 1 February 2021, the illegal
military junta has escalated its atrocities and acts of terror to levels unprecedented in modern
Myanmar.
Peaceful protestors have been shot dead in the streets by snipers. Children have been murdered
in their homes. Young people have been disappeared. Thousands more remain arbitrarily
detained, with corresponding reports of torture, rape and sexual violence. Civilians have been
burned alive. Air strikes and shelling are targeting villages. Yet again, homes have been razed
and hundreds of thousands of people have been displaced.
But the people will prevail. We have formed a rights-based resistance based on democratic
values and fundamental freedoms. We have deployed civil disobedience. We have gathered in
peaceful protests. We are acting in self-defence to protect our communities.
And once we do prevail, once our vision becomes our lived reality, it will remain the duty of
this Museum and of the international community to ensure that Myanmar never forgets the
atrocities and horrors that it committed against its own people.
Thank you..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Human Rights
Date of publication:
2022-04-04
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-11
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Human Rights and international relations
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"- ကုလသမဂ္ဂ လူ့အခွင့်အရေးကောင်စီ ၄၉ ကြိမ်မြောက် ပုံမှန်အစည်းအဝေးတွင် လူ့အခွင့်အရေးဆိုင်ရာ ပြည်ထောင်စုဝန်ကြီး ဦးအောင်မျိုးမင်း တင်ပြခဲ့သည့် တောင်းဆိုချက်များ
- ကုလသမဂ္ဂ လူ့အခွင့်အရေးကောင်စီ ၄၉ ကြိမ်မြောက် ပုံမှန်အစည်းအဝေးတွင် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၏ လူ့အခွင့်အရေး အခြေအနေများဆိုင်ရာ ဆုံးဖြတ်ချက်နှင့် ပတ်သက်သည့် ထုတ်ပြန်ကြေငြာချက်
- စစ်ကိုင်းတိုင်းအတွင်း ဖမ်းဆီး သတ်ဖြတ်ခံရမှုများ
- မန္တလေးတိုင်းအတွင်း ဖမ်းဆီး သတ်ဖြတ်ခံရမှုများ
- မကွေးတိုင်းအတွင်း ဖမ်းဆီး သတ်ဖြတ်ခံရမှုများ
- နိုင်ငံတဝန်းရှိ ဖမ်းဆီး၊ သတ်ဖြတ်၊ ဖိနှိပ်နေမှုများ
"လူ့အခွင့်အရေးဆိုင်ရာ သတင်းလွှာအား နှစ်ပတ်တစ်ကြိမ်ထုတ်ပြန်ပါမည်။"..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Human Rights
Date of publication:
2022-04-06
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-11
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
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"HIGHLIGHTS:
The security situation remained tense across Myanmar with armed clashes which continued to trigger displacement. As of 4 April 2022, there were an estimated 907,500 Internally Displaced persons (IDPs) across Myanmar including 560,900 newly displaced since 1 February 2021. These include 234,600 internally displaced persons (IDPs) in South-East Myanmar and 227,300 IDPs in the North-West.
In the South-East, intensified armed clashes continued with incidents reported in Kayin State’s Hpapun, Kawkareik, Myawaddy and Kyainseikgyi townships, Mon State’s Kyaikhto Township and Bago Region’s Shwegyin Township. In Myawaddy Township, Kayin State, some 1,700 IDPs who were already displaced in IDP sites or living in villages on the riverbanks that borders Thailand have arrived in Tak border villages after they fled clashes which began at the end of March 2022. In Kayin State, some 1,500 IDPs have returned to their place of origin in Kawkareik Township due to fewer armed clashes over the past weeks. Clashed have however intensified in Southern Kawkareik, resulting in new displacements. Clashes intensified in Kayin, Mon and Kaya States and in Tanintharyi Region. There were reports of the killing of civilians during airstrikes and shelling. In Palaw Township, Tanintharyi Region, some 1,000 IDPs living in displacements sites are in urgent need of food assistance. In the South-East, the majority of IDPs are located in Kayah State (92,600), Kayin State (74,00), Shan State South (50,600), as well as in Mon State (7,600), Tanintharyi Region (8,900) Bago Region (900)
In Rakhine State, return movements of IDPs from Ann Township to their areas of origin increased significantly with over 300 families returning during the reporting period. The decision to return is triggered by a combination of factors including livelihood opportunities.
In the North-West, armed clashes continue to displace families. The number of IDPs crossed the 300,000 mark this month. In Chin State, around 1,500 new displacements were reported in Kanpetlet Township due to fear of clashes. Displacement numbers are expected to further increase as security operations and armed clashes continue. In the North-West, clashes have resulted in 227,300 IDPs in Sagaing Region, 45,000 in Magway Region and 36,300 in Chin State.
In Kachin and Shan (North) states, the security situation remained tense and fighting continued in multiple townships. In urban areas such as Hpakant and Myitkyina, explosive devices continue to feature heavily in armed conflict incidents reported, while in more rural areas, such as Mohnyin, Mansi, Putao, and Waingmaw, clashes, including the use of artillery and airstrikes, have continued. In Shan State (North), clashes decreased compared to February 2022, while fighting in northeastern Shan State (Muse) has continued. There was also less new displacement in both Kachin and Shan (North) states in March compared to February 2022. Some IDPs displaced in February from Putao Township to Myitkyina Town also returned to their villages with the facilitation of local community leaders..."
Source/publisher:
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (Geneva) via Reliefweb (New York)
Date of publication:
2022-04-09
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-09
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
UNHCR (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees), Food Security and nutrition in Burma/Myanmar, Public Health, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
8.29 MB
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Description:
"Identity-based violence and hate speech are rising in South and Southeast Asia. Yet actors working to address these issues often do so in isolation and/or lack support to magnify their impact. Networks for Peace uses its regional convening power to collectively engage and support civil society organizations and key influencers in advancing tolerance and peaceful coexistence, mitigating growing polarization of ethnic and religious identities across the region.
Working with partners in Burma, Cambodia, Laos, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and with the Central Tibetan Administration, Networks for Peace fosters intra- and interfaith harmony and social cohesion through grants, capacity building, research, and regional knowledge sharing.
STRENGTHENING ORGANIZATIONS AND REGIONAL NETWORKS
Networks for Peace’s regional approach focuses on strengthening organizational capacity while providing networking opportunities for a broad range of civil society organizations and key influencers, including women, youth, religious actors, faith-based organizations, and the private sector. Networks for Peace activities focus on: (i) promoting intra- and interfaith harmony; (2) addressing dangerous speech and amplifying positive narratives of peace and inclusivity; and (3) promoting regional youth champions to foster greater understanding and tolerance among different ethnic and religious communities. Additionally, Networks for Peace programming integrates key elements of USAID’s Women, Peace, and Security strategy empowering women and marginalized groups through inclusion and meaningful participation in activities.
EXPANDING KNOWLEDGE AND LEARNING
Networks for Peace is expanding civil society organizations’ access to evidence-based research, knowledge, tools, and resources to better understand religious nationalism and promote religious tolerance in South and Southeast Asia. By enhancing partners’ access to learning resources, Networks for Peace enables regional partners and stakeholders to design and implement more strategic interventions improving the effectiveness of their advocacy and peacebuilding efforts.
KEY ACCOMPLISHMENTS
Networks for Peace held consultations with over 200 organizations and key influencers across Burma, Cambodia, Laos, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and the Central Tibetan Administration and Tibetans in exile in India to better understand the context related to ethnic and religious conflict across each country and explore avenues to effectively promote peace and inclusivity.
Networks for Peace regional exchanges provided critical forums for 208 civil society representatives and key influencers (60 percent women) to share experiences and best practices across multiple countries on issues such as interfaith and intrafaith dialogue, the role of women and youth in peacebuilding, and addressing online misinformation and dangerous speech.
Since 2020, Networks for Peace has trained 146 persons (64 percent women) to advance gender equality or female empowerment through their roles in public or private sector institutions or organizations. Since then, 211 local women have participated substantively in Networks for Peace regional and in-country activities.
Networks for Peace employs a Gender Equality and Social Inclusion (GESI) lens to ensure that women and marginalized groups are empowered and meaningfully included in all aspects of its partner networks’ operations. With Networks for Peace guidance, a regional network was able to incorporate GESI principles in the selection of its project participants. This led to a more inclusive and diverse group of regional peacebuilder participants, comprised of Buddhist monks, female clergies, and representatives from marginalized groups.
Networks for Peace regional events, workshops, and grants have supported in-country and cross-border collaboration among organizations working to promote intra- and interfaith harmony and address dangerous speech. For example, following their participation in a Networks for Peace activity, a tech company in Burma and a Sri Lankan civil society organization have explored areas for collaboration and are now jointly implementing a project to adapt an existing dangerous speech monitoring platform. In Thailand, through their participation in Networks for Peace partnership building exchanges, three Thai private tech companies and a local civil society organization are establishing a Dangerous Speech Monitoring and Mitigation Network to coordinate their respective activities..."
Source/publisher:
US Agency for International Development (Washington, D.C.) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of publication:
2022-04-08
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-08
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Armed conflict and peace-building in Burma - theoretical, strategic and general, Human Rights and international relations
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207.68 KB
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Sub-title:
Meeting with alleged war criminal a betrayal of Myanmar people that will be used as propaganda to legitimise unlawful government, critics say
Description:
"Australia’s ambassador to Myanmar met alleged war criminal and coup leader, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing on Wednesday, in a meeting the junta claims discussed “enhancement of cooperation” between the two countries.
Pictures published by the state-run Global New Light of Myanmar newspaper show Australia’s ambassador, Andrea Faulkner, and military attache, meeting with the coup leader in the Myanmar capital Naypyidaw.
Senior General Min Aung Hlaing led the Myanmar military’s pogrom against the ethnic minority Rohingya in 2017, which killed more than 25,000 people and forced more than 700,000 to flee the country, and he engineered a military coup in February 2021, later declaring himself prime minister.
Min Aung Hlaing has been recommended by the UN for investigation and prosecution for war crimes and genocide, and personally sanctioned by the US, EU, UK and Canada, but not by Australia.
Advocates for Myanmar’s elected government argued the meeting between the coup leader and the representative of a western democracy, would be used as a propaganda tool by the junta to legitimise its unlawful control of Myanmar. Justice for Myanmar’s Yadanar Maung described Australia’s decision to take the meeting as “an act of betrayal” of the Myanmar people.
Manny Maung, a researcher for Human Rights Watch, said the meeting was “deeply unacceptable” and “only serves to lend credibility to a military junta that is accused of committing war crimes and crimes against humanity”.
The meeting has been prominently reported by Myanmar’s state-controlled media, in Burmese, and in English for international audiences. Several pictures of the meeting have been published, including one of the Senior General presenting the ambassador with a painting as a gift.
The regime reported that Wednesday’s meeting, in the parlour of Min Aung Hlaing’s office, discussed “the further maintenance of good relations between two countries, enhancement of cooperation in various sectors between governments and peoples of both countries”.
It described the CRPH, the elected exiled Myanmar parliament, and the NUG, the exiled National Unity Government , as “terrorists”.
Before Senate estimates on Thursday, Katrina Cooper, the deputy secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, was questioned by Greens senator Janet Rice over the junta’s reports that the meeting discussed “cooperation in various sectors” and “maintenance of good relations”.
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Cooper would not comment on the junta’s characterisation of the meeting, but said there were no areas of cooperation with the junta and that the ambassador “asked for a number of things”.
“She reiterated Australia’s concern about the situation in Myanmar, she urged the Myanmar military to cease violence, release arbitrary detainees, engage in dialogue and ensure unimpeded access for humanitarian assistance.”
The meeting between Australia’s ambassador, who is finishing her posting, and Min Aung Hlaing on Wednesday was one of at least eight meetings or phone calls Australian diplomats and defence officials have had with junta representatives since the coup last February, estimates heard.
Rice asked if engaging with the junta risked legitimising its control of the country.
Cooper defended Australia’s position, arguing its “limited” engagement with the regime “give us an opportunity to speak directly to the regime”, including to call for an end to violence and grant humanitarian access.
“We don’t consider that the engagement we’ve had to date legitimises the current regime.”
But Yadanar Maung said the military junta was a terrorist organisation and ‘Australia’s continued engagement with it was “an act of betrayal to its own democracy”.
She said the meeting would be used to legitimise the military’s forcible seizure of control of the country.
“The latest meeting has given fodder for the junta’s domestic propaganda and is part of a pattern of complicity that stands out from Australia’s democratic allies. Australia has still failed to impose any targeted sanctions on the Myanmar junta and military businesses in response to the coup attempt and the military’s ongoing atrocities, and Australia’s Future Fund continues to invest in companies doing business with the military, including an arms supplier.”
Analysis prepared by the Australian Council for International Development (Acfid) shows the US, the UK, Canada and the EU have imposed sanctions against a total of 196 individuals and 172 entities, including subsidiaries, as of February.
The chief executive of Acfid, Marc Purcell, said Australia’s failure to impose any additional sanctions against the generals since the coup 14 months ago was “increasingly glaring” compared with actions taken by other like-minded countries.
Cooper said the government weighed up “a number of important considerations” when deciding on possible sanctions, including consular matters such as the ongoing “arbitrary detention” of the Australian academic, Prof Sean Turnell. Turnell was an economic adviser to the democratically elected Myanmar government..."
Source/publisher:
"The Guardian" (UK)
Date of publication:
2022-04-07
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-07
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
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Description:
"Myanmar authorities should immediately and unconditionally release journalist Win Naing Oo and stop using terrorism charges to imprison independent reporters, the Committee to Protect Journalists said Wednesday.
A special court in Obo Prison, in the central city of Mandalay, on Tuesday, April 5, sentenced Win Naing Oo, chief reporter with the local Channel Mandalay TV news station, to five years in prison under Section 52(a) of the Counter Terrorism Law, a provision that outlaws acts of organizing or participating in a terrorist group, knowingly concealing or harboring a terrorist group, or giving permission for a terrorist group to use a building or gather, according to a report by The Irrawaddy and data compiled by local rights group the Assistance Association of Political Prisoners.
Win Naing Oo was arrested on August 31, 2021, in Mandalay, according to news reports and CPJ research. He was initially charged under Article 505(a) of the penal code, a broad provision that criminalizes “any attempt to cause fear, spread false news or agitate directly or indirectly a criminal offense against a government employee” or that “causes their hatred, disobedience, or disloyalty toward the military and the government.”
“Journalist Win Naing Oo should be released immediately and unconditionally, and allowed to continue his work of reporting the news without fear of reprisal,” said Shawn Crispin, CPJ’s senior Southeast Asia representative. “The military regime’s bid to equate journalism with terrorism marks a dark and preposterous turn in its brutal campaign to stifle Myanmar’s free press.”
The 505(a) charge was changed in mid-October to one of terrorism, according to a Myanmar Now report. A defense lawyer cited in The Irrawaddy report said Win Naing Oo has no plans to appeal his conviction, which found that he was involved with a local anti-military People’s Defense Force in Mandalay’s Sint Kaing Township.
Win Naing Oo’s arrest came in the wake of the military’s February 1, 2021, democracy-suspending coup and subsequent protests. The military junta cracked down on Myanmar’s independent media, detaining dozens of journalists. Myanmar is the world’s second-worst jailer of journalists, trailing only China, with at least 26 behind bars at the time of CPJ’s December 1, 2021, prison census.
CPJ messaged Channel Mandalay TV on Facebook for information on Win Naing Oo’s case, but did not receive any response. The Myanmar Ministry of Information did not immediately reply to CPJ’s emailed request for comment..."
Source/publisher:
Committee to Protect Journalists (New York)
Date of publication:
2022-04-06
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-06
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Political prisoners and other violations in Burma - reports, Human Rights and international relations, Human Rights Defenders, Freedom of opinion and expression: - the situation in Burma/Myanmar - reports, analyses, recommendations
Language:
more
Description:
"U.S. Senate Republican Leader Mitch McConnell (R-KY) issued the following statement after meeting yesterday with Thomas Vajda, U.S. Ambassador to Burma:
“I appreciated the opportunity to meet with Ambassador Vajda and discuss the United States’ support for the people of Burma. Since last year’s military coup, the Tatmadaw has taken increasingly violent measures to suppress dissent. They continue to detain thousands of political prisoners, including my friend Aung San Suu Kyi and the Australian economist Sean Turnell.
“I was proud to include language in the most recent National Defense Authorization Act that will help lay the groundwork to push back against the junta’s repression, support democratic actors like the National Unity Government and National Unity Consultative Council, and provide humanitarian support that bypasses the Tatmadaw. The Ambassador and I discussed ways the United States and our partners in the region can build on these efforts moving forward.
“The people of Burma deserve our full support in their long struggle toward self-government and democracy. Along with Kentucky’s vibrant communities from Burma, I will continue to fight for that goal.”..."
Source/publisher:
Mitch McConnell Republican leader
Date of publication:
2022-04-06
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-06
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, USA-Burma relations, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
Language:
more
Description:
"Washington, DC – Today, Representative Gregory W. Meeks, Chair of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, issued the following statement regarding the passage of his legislation, the “Burma Unified Through Rigorous Military Accountability Act of 2021”, or BURMA Act, by the U.S. House of Representatives.
“Today’s passage of my BURMA Act sends a clear message to the Burmese military that there will be accountability for their brutal and illegal February 1st 2021 coup, and for its subsequent crimes against humanity and human rights atrocities that have cost over 1,700 lives and displaced nearly half a million people. Together with last month’s formal determination by the Biden Administration that the Burmese military committed a genocide against Rohingya, the passage of the BURMA Act reaffirms the United States’ leadership to protect human rights and democratic values and ensure accountability and justice. I am proud to stand with the Burmese people who are fighting for their freedom.”
A PDF of the BURMA Act can be found here, and key provisions include:
Authorization to impose sanctions on individuals and entities who helped stage the February 1, 2021 coup d’état and are responsible for the subsequent repression of fundamental freedoms, human rights abuses, use of indiscriminate violence towards civilians, and other gross atrocities.
Authorization for a new position at the State Department, a Special Coordinator for Burmese Democracy, to promote an international effort to impose and enforce multilateral sanctions on Burma and coordinate United States Government interagency efforts on Burma.
Authorization for support to civil society and for humanitarian assistance in Burma, Bangladesh, Thailand, and the surrounding region.
Call for the United States to pressure the United Nations to take more decisive action with regards to Burma.
A report on the military’s genocide, crimes against humanity, and other atrocities against Rohingya and other ethnic minorities in Burma..."
Source/publisher:
House Foreign Affairs Committee
Date of publication:
2022-04-06
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-06
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, The discussion on humanitarian assistance to Burma, Genocide, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
157.44 KB (Original version) - 56 pages
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Description:
"To: Members of the U.S. Congress :
Subject: Pass the B.U.R.M.A. Act, Open Letter Signed by the Diaspora of Burma in America and Endorsed by the CSOs and CBOs inside Burma and Global Solidarity Organization to the United State Congress to Pass the Burma Unified through Rigorous Military Accountability (BURMA) Act of 2021
Dear United States Representatives and Senators,
We, the diaspora with our roots from all various regions of Burma residing in the United States, with the endorsement by civil society organizations and community-based organizations inside Burma and global solidarity organizations, write to express our support for the BURMA Act and request its expedited passage into law. Since October 6th, 2021, when 242 Burmese diaspora, local CSOs inside Burma, community-based organizations, and civil society organizations signed an open letter to the United States Congress to support the BURMA Act of 2021, the situation on the ground has only worsened.
As of March 26th, 2022, the military junta had killed 1,707 civilians and arbitrarily arrested 12,970 people according to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners AAPP (Burma). Moreover, the military-perpetrated ongoing airstrikes and heavy artillery launches in ethnic areas had resulted in 1.2 million persons of concern, including 810,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) and 600,000 stateless Rohingyas being forced to flee homes for their lives according to the latest UNHCR report.
We welcome the latest set of actions by the United States to reaffirm its ongoing support for Burma’s democracy in particular through Senator McConnell-led amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act of 2022, additional treasury sanctions on March 25, 2022, a letter of support for Burmese democracy signed by 14 Senators and Members of Congress urging Secretary Blinken and State Department to take actions, the passage of S. Res 35 in the Senate, and US Government’s Rohingya Genocide Determination. We thank Representative Meeks, Representative Bera, and Representative Chabot for their joint statement on the one-year anniversary, and their continued demonstration of support for the democracy and freedom of the people in Burma. We also recognize the House Foreign Affairs Committee’s show of bipartisan support for the BURMA Act on October 21, 2021, and 102 cosponsors from both the House and Senate.
The humanitarian and democracy aid authorized in the BURMA Act are sorely needed, as is the investigation into the oil and gas industry, the accountability for the military’s ongoing war crimes, Rohingya genocide and atrocity crimes against ethnic minorities, and a special coordinator position to make sure it all gets done. The sanction language of the Burma Act targets the junta’s finances in ways that can hurt the regime while sparing the people from additional suffering.
We, the undersigned, urgently request the United States Congress to pass the BURMA Act of 2021 in consideration of the countless lives taken away by the murderous military junta and the dangers that the authoritarian regime imposes on human rights and democracy. We acknowledge the bipartisan support we have received from the House of Representatives and we call for the same unified support by our Senators. As Martin Luther King Jr. once said, “Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere”, we look forward to our democratically-elected Congress taking swift, concrete actions in holding the junta accountable for their crimes and supporting the civilian’s efforts in building Burma’s path to democracy..."
Source/publisher:
58 diaspora organizations in the United States and endorsed by 87 Civil Societies inside Burma and across the globe
Date of publication:
2022-03-27
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-06
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Anti-coup protesters, Human Rights and international relations, Human Rights Defenders, Genocide, Rohingya (cultural, political etc.)
Language:
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Description:
"Statement on the Resolution on the Human Rights Situation in Myanmar..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Human Rights
Date of publication:
2022-04-02
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-05
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
530.46 KB
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Description:
"SITUATION OVERVIEW
The people of Myanmar are dealing with an evolving humanitarian crisis where humanitarian needs have continued to escalate since the third wave of COVID-19 in 2021 and the ongoing political unrest since Myanmar’s military intervention on 1 February 2021.
The country is now entering the second year of this crisis, where ongoing inter-factional tensions have fueled its complexity and multi-dimensional characteristics. The Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) continues to be supported by many in Myanmar, impacting public services, including health, schools, and government administrations in states and regions across the country.
Clashes and targeted attacks between various armed actors, including the People’s Defence Forces (PDFs), ethnic armed organizations (EAOs), and the Myanmar Armed Forces (MAF), continue and have intensified in several states/regions. Simmering historical tensions exist across certain key states, and, in some locations, these tensions have become exacerbated as a consequence of military intervention. Numerous new forces have emerged, and several ethnic armed groups, established many years before the military intervention, have become increasingly recommitted to the insurgency resulting in fighting occurring in areas that have been without conflict for decades.
Some sources have recorded nearly 13,000 political violence and protest events throughout 2021. The degree of violence against civilians has been severe. The number of casualties has increased, while thousands of houses and the properties of other civilians have been burnt down or destroyed. This has triggered multiple large scale population displacements. As of 28 February 2022, roughly 873,000 people have been internally displaced in Myanmar. About 502,600 people have been displaced by insecurity and the increased vulnerability of host and resident communities in affected areas since 1 February 2021. The northwest part of Myanmar (Sagaing, Magway and Chin) has recorded the highest level of new internal displacements, with 246,600 internally displaced persons (IDPs) (49 per cent), followed by the southeast part of Myanmar (Kayin, Kayah, and Shan) with 233,600 IDPs contributing 46.5 per cent. Displaced populations face significant challenges in access to basic needs and services, specifically, food, healthcare, shelter materials, clean water, and sanitation facilities.
Myanmar is also experiencing a socio-economic crisis exacerbated by the protracted COVID-19 epidemic. The local currency, the Kyat, has fluctuated with a significant drop in value by 60 per cent in the month of September 2021, while costs for food items, fuel, and other essential goods have soared. In September 2021, inflation increased to 7.3 per cent. The International Labour Organization (ILO) estimates that in 2021, some 1.6 million jobs were lost, leaving only 18.9 million women and men employed. The farming, construction, garment, tourism, and hospitality industries are among the hardest hit. The economic and political volatility is projected to have driven almost half of the population into poverty in 2022.
The 2022 Humanitarian Needs Overview (HNO) for Myanmar, which was published on 31 December 2021, predicts that approximately a quarter of the population (14.4 million people – 4.9 million women and five million children) will be classified as requiring humanitarian support during 2022, up from about one million people in need before February 2021. This increase is driven by the social, economic and health impacts of COVID-19, worsening food insecurity, and the mass movement of the population since the events of 1 February 2021 and subsequent need for protection. These factors have generated an array of new needs and exacerbated the vulnerability of specific groups.
The HNO analysis estimated that 14 out of 15 states and regions in Myanmar are now within the critical threshold for acute malnutrition. Prices for key commodities in some states and regions have increased significantly, resulting in some food items no longer being affordable to many families. At the beginning of 2022, fuel prices increased by 14-18 per cent from the previous month. Compared to the pre-crisis period through to March 2022, fuel prices skyrocketed by 82-150 per cent, impacting transportation costs and contributing to unpredictable commodity prices.
Humanitarian access to reach conflict-affected populations remains a major challenge for the Myanmar Red Cross Society (MRCS) and other humanitarian organizations. Travel restrictions are currently in place due to the security context, military checkpoints, stringent administrative authorization requirements, and COVID-19 regulations.
This has impacted the distribution of humanitarian resources, direct support from personnel and disrupted monitoring and evaluation activities, including data collection and verification. Several private companies have withdrawn and/or halted services in Myanmar, which has impacted transportation, the supply chain, and costs, eventually delaying humanitarian assistance from reaching those most in need.
With continuous dialogue and advocacy efforts with all stakeholders and state administrators, the MRCS gradually secured safe access to wider vulnerable populations. This engagement is based on autonomous Red Cross Red Crescent-led needs assessments and a decision-making process that supports independent humanitarian action. The MRCS collaborates with both International Red Cross Red Crescent Movement (the Movement) and non-Movement partners, such as UN agencies, to deliver assistance to broader geographic areas. The National Society remains flexible and adaptive to the dynamic operational context to reach the most vulnerable and affected populations whilst ensuring compliance with security protocols for mobilizing personnel.
EMERGENCY APPEAL REVISION
This revision of the IFRC Emergency Appeal addresses the rapidly evolving operational context and the resulting increase in humanitarian needs across Myanmar. Accordingly, it also extends the timeframe of the appeal by one year. This revised Emergency Appeal endeavours to maintain operational relevance and responsiveness for the provision of humanitarian assistance, including preparedness, to the affected populations. Note that the title of this revised emergency appeal has subsequently been changed from ‘civil unrest’ to ‘complex emergency’, reflecting the evolving humanitarian situation. Information describing the accomplishments achieved under the Emergency Appeal, up until 30 November 2021, is accessible in Operations Update No. 2.
TARGETING
Through the revised Emergency Appeal, at least 202,000 people deemed the most vulnerable, will be provided with essential humanitarian support provided by the MRCS in 14 states and regions. This support will encompass emergency first aid and ambulance services, expanded basic health care services, livelihood support, and in-kind assistance to address basic needs. The geographic focus was initially on states and regions where civil unrest, clashes and protests took place, with humanitarian support primarily consisting of emergency first aid and ambulance services. The interventions are now further prioritized for Kayah, Kayin, Shan, and Chin states and the regions of Magway and Sagaing. These areas have been most affected by the crisis and are currently where the needs remain unmet. Given the dynamic nature of this emergency, the MRCS has pre-empted the likelihood of needing to broaden the geographic scope of the response to other states and will therefore remain prepared for and responsive to meeting emerging humanitarian needs in close coordination with Movement partners active in these areas, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).
Targeting will prioritize groups in the most vulnerable locations and includes the following categories:
Peri-urban areas with socio-economic challenges with relief needs focused on major cities.
Regions/states with existing vulnerabilities with populations at risk of increased displacement.
Hard-to-reach areas where the MRCS has managed to secure access to deliver humanitarian assistance.
At the district/local level, further prioritization will be given to the following groups:
People directly affected physically, psychologically, or socio-economically by violence in hot spots.
People affected by the emerging violence and who are newly displaced.
Vulnerable and affected people in periurban areas with socio-economic challenges.
People in regions/states with existing vulnerabilities and at risk of increased displacement.
Displaced people deciding to return to their homes, safely and voluntarily.
Within this geographic focus, household targeting will include additional vulnerability criteria. The vulnerability criteria will focus on women/child-headed households, pregnant or lactating women, persons with disabilities, the elderly, those suffering from chronic illnesses and families with children under five years old..."
Source/publisher:
International Federation of Red Cross And Red Crescent Societies (Geneva) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of publication:
2022-04-02
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-03
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Food Security and nutrition in Burma/Myanmar, Human Rights and international relations, Public Health
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"SITUATION AT A GLANCE
6.2 MILLION
People Targeted for Humanitarian Assistance in Burma
UN – January 2022
558,000
People Displaced Since February 2021 Who Remain IDPs in Burma
UNHCR – March 2022
126,000
IDPs Originally Displaced in 2012 in Rakhine State IDP Sites
UN – December 2021
1.5 MILLION
People in Need and Targeted by 2022 Rohingya Humanitarian Crisis JRP
UN – March 2022
923,179
Estimated Number of Refugees in Bangladesh
UNHCR – February 2022
More than 558,000 people remain displaced throughout Burma as of March 28 due to escalating violence since February 2021, representing the greatest level of displacement since the coup d’état in the country to date.
The UN releases the 2022 Bangladesh JRP on March 29, requesting $881 million to reach nearly 1.5 million individuals with humanitarian assistance during the year.
The USG announces more than $152 million in additional funding to support the Burma and Bangladesh regional humanitarian response..."
Source/publisher:
United States Agency for International Development (Washington, D.C.) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of publication:
2022-04-01
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-02
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Food Security and nutrition in Burma/Myanmar, Public Health, Burma: Internal displacement/forced migration of several ethnic groups.
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247.02 KB
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Description:
"The Republic of the Union of Myanmar welcomes the adoption of the resolution on the Situation of
human rights in Myanmar by the Human Rights Council, and extends its appreciation to the European
Union and to cosponsors.
The resolution condemns in the strongest terms the unlawful actions of the illegal military junta. It
catalogues junta crimes that include deliberate killings, abductions and enforced disappearances,
arbitrary arrest, torture and other ill-treatment, sexual and gender-based violence, forced
displacement of civilians including Rohingya and other persons belonging to minorities, forced labour,
the destruction and burning of homes, continued attacks on medical and humanitarian relief
personnel, the use of facilities functioning as schools, hospitals and houses of worship for military
purposes, the use of landmines, and the severe curtailment of fundamental freedoms including
opinion and expression, peaceful assembly and association.
Myanmar also welcomes the resolution's:
• call for respect for the democratic will of the people as expressed by the results of the general
elections of 8 November 2020, and its full support for the Myanmar people's aspirations for
democracy and civilian government
• demand for the release of all persons arbitrarily detained, for all perpetrators of violations and
abuses to be held accountable, and for the provision of justice and reparations to victims and
survivors
• renewal of the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar.
Yet the resolution represents a series of missed opportunities to sharpen the Council's responses to
the illegal junta. Where the text condemns the junta's use of air strikes and shelling against civilians,
it stops short of calling on States to cease the direct and indirect supply, sale or transfer of weapons,
munitions, military equipment and materials to the junta and its forces and representatives. This is a
clear failure to act on the significant findings of the Special Rapporteur's Conference Room Paper on
'UN Member States' Arms Transfers to the Myanmar Military'.1
The text also falls short in its push for accountability. While continued monitoring and reporting on
the human rights situation in Myanmar is essential, there is already ample evidence.
In September 2018, the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar called for the
now junta leader Min Aung Hlaing to be investigated and prosecuted for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, including against the Rohingya.2 In September 2021, the Head of the
Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar (IIMM) said that collected materials indicated
that the military junta's crimes were 'widespread and systematic in nature'.3
Findings are piled high, now justice is needed. The IIMM's intensive efforts must lead to prosecutions
and if appropriate jurisdictions cannot be identified then one must be created in the absence of a
referral to the International Criminal Court (ICC).
The resolution also relies too heavily on previously agreed language, with many asks rendered
unrealistic since the failed coup d'e'tat of 1 February 2021 or having already been met by Myanmar.
For instance, Myanmar as represented by the National Unity Government lodged an Article 12(3)
Declaration with the Registrar of the ICC in July 2021, accepting the Court's jurisdiction with respect
to international crimes committed in Myanmar since 1 July 2002.
Myanmar, consistent with the Council's expression of support for the people's democratic aspirations,
reads many of the resolution's asks as directed to the National Unity Government - the legitimate
representative of the people. Accordingly, Myanmar will:
• progressively repeal or amend laws that have historically been applied to curb the exercise of
fundamental freedoms and to target dissent. This includes provisions of the Penal Code, the
Unlawful Associations Act, the Official Secrets Act, and the Telecommunications Law to bring
them into line with international human rights standards
• take legislative and policy steps to protect and to ensure equal treatment of and opportunities
for ethnic and religious minorities, including the Rohingya. This includes repeal of the Race and
Religion Protection Laws of 2015 to ensure freedom of religious belief
• take continuing steps to secure the voluntary, safe, and dignified repatriation to Myanmar of
Rohingya who were forced to flee Rakhine State to neighbouring countries on account of
military atrocities. Myanmar will also replace the Citizenship Law of 1982 with a law that bases
citizenship on birth in Myanmar or birth anywhere as a child of Myanmar citizens
• take continuing steps to prevent the recruitment and use of children in armed conflict and to
eliminate child and forced labour
• accede to the Rome Statute of the ICC, further to its Article 12(3) Declaration
• fully cooperate with the Special Rapporteur on Myanmar and other Special Procedures
mandate-holders
• support the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights to establish a country presence
in Myanmar
• continue to cooperate with the IIMM and international and regional courts, tribunals and
human rights bodies
• continue to engage with the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Myanmar in support of
the fulfilment of her mandate.
Myanmar will also continue to partner with the UN Country Team and with individual UN agencies,
funds and programmes, particularly in securing humanitarian access and providing humanitarian
assistance. Myanmar however remains deeply disappointed by the Secretary-General's report on
'progress made in the implementation of follow-up action to the recommendations' set out in the
Rosenthal Report.4 The resolution's corresponding 'invitation' to the Secretary-General to offer 'relevant
recommendations to enable more effective work in the future' and to 'strengthen the prevention
capacity' of the UN system is vague and insufficient.
Myanmar therefore repeats its calls for an independent and wide-ranging inquiry led by international
experts into the UN's progress in implementing follow-up actions to the Rosenthal Report, with an
added focus on the UN's response since 1 February 2021. The inquiry should produce and deliver to
the Human Rights Council a comprehensive public report with findings and recommendations..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Human Rights
Date of publication:
2022-04-02
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-02
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Human Rights and international relations, International Criminal Court (Myanmar)
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"On 27 Mar, junta leader Min Aung Hlaing vowed to “annihilate the opposition.” As of 31 Mar, the junta had arrested at least 13,040 civilians, including politicians, activists, and journalists, and killed at least 2,053 civilians. The junta got dirtier in its tactics. It funded paramilitary groups, enacted “legislation” allowing it to conscript police into its war, used social media channels to discredit and hunt down its opposition, and demanded that hospitals turn over patient records to undermine treatment of opponents. Cities across Burma struggled with power blackouts as electricity production fell to a quarter of the national demand. Outages disrupted water distribution and business operations, while rising fuel prices made the use of generators unsustainable..."
Source/publisher:
ALTSEAN-BURMA, Asia Democracy Network, Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development, Burma Human Rights Network, Initiatives for International Dialogue, International Federation for Human Rights, Progressive Voice and US Campaign for Burma
Date of publication:
2022-04-01
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-01
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations, Freedom of Movement, violations of in Burma/Myanmar, Human Rights Defenders, Anti-coup protesters
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851.32 KB (Original version) - 23 pages
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"In continuation of her close cooperation with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Special Envoy visited the Kingdom of Cambodia. This mission was undertaken against the backdrop of escalating violence throughout Myanmar, as bombings and other excesses committed are compounding multiple vulnerabilities facing millions of people struggling for survival.
The Special Envoy held frank and constructive discussion with the ASEAN Chair His Excellency Mr. Samdech Akka Moha Sena Padei Techo Hun Sen, Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Cambodia and the ASEAN Special Envoy His Excellency Mr. Prak Sokhonn, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, with a view to fostering meaningful and effective implementation of the ASEAN Five-Point Consensus.
This important collaboration has been part of the Special Envoy’s close engagement with all ASEAN Foreign Ministers who, in their February statement, encouraged the ASEAN Special Envoy to coordinate closely with the Special Envoy of the United Nations Secretary-General on Myanmar to ensure synergy.
In her interactions with Member States, including during recent visits to the United Nations Headquarters in New York and Washington D.C., in the Security Council and through various Regional Organizations, the Special Envoy has continued to stress the urgency for coherent international backing of a unified regional approach supportive of a Myanmar-led process reflective of the will of the people.
Recalling the importance highlighted by the Security Council and General Assembly for the Special Envoy to maintain communication and engage intensively with all relevant parties in Myanmar, the Special Envoy shared her comprehensive assessment of the somber ground realities and sentiments among a range of domestic stakeholders as she sought to strengthen complementarity to the work of ASEAN.
In this respect, the Special Envoy’s extensive discussions with the Cambodian Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister focused on helping align the implementation of the Five-Point Consensus with the will and needs of the people, without further delay. She stressed it was paramount for ASEAN to listen carefully to all voices on the ground in supporting durable peace and national reconciliation. The Special Envoy emphasized that indicators and results on the ground were urgently needed, adding any goodwill towards protecting the people of Myanmar and their livelihoods needed to be demonstrated in concrete terms.
The Special Envoy highlighted she will continue to amplify the voices of the people of Myanmar and encourage international action based on an accurate assessment of the situation. She will also continue to engage with all key stakeholders, focusing on helping articulate the bottom-lines and conditions needed for momentum towards any talks about talks in the greater interest of peace, stability and democracy.
Such engagement will include the UN-ASEAN Women, Peace and Security (WPS) platform which will be co-chaired with Her Excellency Ms. Retno Marsudi, Foreign Minister of Indonesia. This platform would advance the humanitarian and protection agenda at the local level, especially for women and children who are disproportionately impacted by the violence, and to amplify the voices and vision of women and young people as agents of change.
The Special Envoy urged the Prime Minister to leverage his influence on Myanmar’s Commander-in-Chief to de-escalate violence and serve the greater interests of the people. In the context of her own potential visit to Myanmar, the Special Envoy and the Prime Minster discussed the importance of convincing the military leadership that any stability requires the immediate cessation of hostilities and a genuinely inclusive approach. A federal democratic union must be pursued in accordance with the will of the people, grounded firmly in the ASEAN Charter and the norms and values of the United Nations.
In her discussion with the ASEAN Special Envoy, Special Envoy Heyzer appreciated his sustained efforts in Myanmar to address obstacles in delivering humanitarian assistance, and his follow up proposals including a Consultative Meeting, and further discussions on visit outcomes such as the ASEAN Troika mechanism, the Friends of Myanmar, and the Humanitarian Corridor Arrangement. She highlighted the importance of effective humanitarian assistance to all people in need without discrimination. This will require safe and unhindered access to all affected areas and the delivery of aid through all existing channels.
In this regard, the Special Envoy reinforced the importance of an expanded approach to providing humanitarian assistance, adding that a robust ASEAN-UN umbrella, which both Envoys could co-facilitate to deliver assistance to affected communities through all existing channels and address the multiple priority needs of the people across the country. This would include civilian protection as well as food security, socio-economic resilience, humanitarian and COVID-19 assistance.
The Special Envoy’s discussions in Phnom Penh also stressed that addressing the plight of the Rohingya needed to be part and parcel of any broader solution for a genuinely inclusive Myanmar. She urged ASEAN to redouble its efforts to help support durable solutions for Rohingya remaining in Rakhine as a key confidence builder.
There is an urgency to help the people of Myanmar realize, in concrete terms, their desire for a peaceful, democratic and inclusive future. ASEAN and the broader international community have a responsibility to amplify and support the will of the people. It is also the obligation of any responsible military to protect its citizens and respect their aspirations. She reiterated her commitment to working closely with ASEAN and its members towards this end, making available the wide array of comparative advantages and expertise of the United Nations to reinforce and complement regional action..."
Source/publisher:
United Nations Secretary-General
Date of publication:
2022-04-01
Date of entry/update:
2022-04-01
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, ASEAN-Burma relations, The discussion on humanitarian assistance to Burma
Language:
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Description:
"Introduction
In 2005, the United Nations member states unanimously made a commitment to protect populations from the most serious crimes, namely genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity.1 Known as the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ principle, or R2P, this commitment emphasises the primary responsibility by states to protect their own populations from these crimes, and the responsibility of the international community to support one another in their prevention.2 Recognising that atrocities are not random events but develop in a dynamic process and require the existence of an environment conducive to their occurrence, the United Nations Special Advisers on the Prevention of Genocide and the Responsibility to Protect developed a methodological framework in 2014 that enables the identification of warning signs indicating the existence of such circumstances. The Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes (hereinafter ‘the framework’) sets out a series of Risk Factors and corresponding Indicators that enable stakeholders to identify high-risk developments in situations of serious human rights violations, domestic instability and crisis, pinpoint gaps in existing prevention capacities and promote necessary responses. The framework serves as a working tool for the monitoring and assessment of atrocity risks and as an early warning mechanism to support the prevention of their commission.3
The following atrocity crimes risk assessment applies the framework to the Republic of the Union of Myanmar (hereinafter ‘Myanmar’). It identifies the most pressing risk factors and provides recommendation on future steps that can be taken by relevant stakeholders to address risks of atrocities being committed.
Since the last atrocity risk assessment of the situation in Myanmar conducted in 2019, there have been significant domestic developments that have reshaped the climate for the commission of atrocity crimes in Myanmar. The risk of atrocity crimes, specifically crimes against humanity and war crimes, is very high and the risk of genocide remains high. The military coup d’état on 1 February 2021 has resulted in a large movement of civil disobedience, the establishment of a shadow government under the leadership of former NLD politicians and its formation of an armed resistance force. The brutal crackdown by the military in response to nationwide anti-junta protests has led many civilians to take up arms and join armed resistance forces. Renewed conflict between long-standing ethnic armed groups and the military, the emergence of new local armed militias, as well as violent clashes between the military and resistance forces have dragged the country into another civil war. The means and methods deployed by the Tatmadaw against political dissidents, civilians and members of the armed resistance already meet the threshold of crimes against humanity and war crimes but indicate the risk of further escalations of the situation.
These developments occur amidst a multi-dimensional economic and humanitarian crisis that has reached new records in unemployment rates and in the number of internally displaced people in dire need of humanitarian assistance. The global COVID-19 pandemic had severe impacts not only on an already buckling health sector, but has seen many people forced out of employment and into a state of severe food insecurity. The political unrest following the military coup, which resulted in an international response of targeted sanctions, withdrawal of foreign aid and foreign investment and an increase of unemployment across the entire country’s labour force, has caused a stagnation of Myanmar’s economy and pushed the country to the brink of an economic collapse. The large-scale disobedience movements in response to the coup, disruptions in supply chains as well as the junta’s regular shutdowns of telecommunication services, internet and power outages have paralysed essential sectors and much of the country’s infrastructure. In addition, atrocities committed against the Rohingya community during the military’s ‘clearance operations’ in Rakhine State in 2017 and 2018 remain unaddressed and have further nourished a climate of prevailing impunity and injustice. Hundreds of thousands of displaced Rohingya remain in detainment camps with restricted access of humanitarian aid delivery, while being denied freedoms of movement, access to basic goods, such as food and health care, and the right to a safe, dignified and voluntary return.
While the international community has stepped up its efforts to provide humanitarian aid to Myanmar, the UN and its member States remain divided over the political disputes over power. While the majority of States condemned the military coup and refuse to recognise the military junta as the legitimate government, international response to the military use of force has been limited to targeted sanctions against senior military leaders and the exclusion of its representatives from regional summits. A stronger engagement by key regional actors, such as ASEAN member States and their newly appointed Special Envoy, and a concerted response by international actors including the UN Security Council is required to put a halt to the excessive use of force by the military against the population, to delegitimise the military junta’s claim to power and assist the country in returning to its path towards a peaceful democratic transition that is capable of addressing past injustices and building a resilient and independent national State apparatus in conformity with international human rights standards..."
Source/publisher:
The University of Queensland
Date of publication:
2022-03-31
Date of entry/update:
2022-03-31
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Anti-coup protesters, Human Rights and international relations, Genocide, International Criminal Court (Myanmar), International Court of Justice (ICJ) - Myanmar
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1.3 MB (Original version) - 51 pages
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The UK's Permanent Representative to the UN in Geneva, Ambassador Simon Manley, delivered this statement during the 2022 Rohingya Joint Response Plan.
Description:
"Thank you Honourable State Minister Shahriar Alam, High Commissioner Grandi and Director-General Vitorino.
Thank you for giving voice to the refugees. As we enter the fifth year of this tragic crisis, we must inject renewed energy to address both its causes and symptoms. We need a long-term solution that enables the Rohingya to return voluntarily and safely to Myanmar, as soon as conditions allow. And we must make progress on accountability for the atrocities committed in Myanmar. The UK will continue to press for these objectives in New York at the UN Security Council and here in Geneva at the Human Rights Council. We will not allow this crisis and its causes to be forgotten.
We remain deeply grateful to Bangladesh for its continued hosting of the refugees. The UK is committed to supporting Bangladesh in managing the refugee crisis while the Rohingya remain. For our current financial year, we originally provided £27.6 million to the response. We are pleased to announce that we have increased this by a further £9m. This brings the UK’s total support since 2017 to £330 million.
UK support for this year includes a new contribution to the UN’s response on Bhasan Char, which now forms part of the overall response. In providing UK support, we welcome the commitment for relocations to be voluntary and for the Rohingya to be able to travel between the island and Cox’s Bazar.
At the same time, there is a need for the Rohingya to lead safe, dignified and purposeful lives both on Bhasan Char and in the Cox’s Bazar camps, where the vast majority will continue to live. There should be equal opportunities in both locations.
At last year’s launch, we emphasised the importance of education and livelihoods. Progress on both issues has sadly been frustrated, including of course by the impact of COVID. Thankfully, schools are now open. We hope to see a step change this year in access to quality education, particularly for girls, and some form of recognition or certification for their studies. And we hope a skills framework will be launched in the coming months and linked to livelihood opportunities.
These are critical ingredients to prepare the Rohingya for their eventual return home. But also to combat worsening criminality and insecurity in the camps. These issues are particularly affecting women and girls, many of whom suffer appalling abuse and exploitation.
The world faces unparalleled humanitarian needs, including in Yemen, Ethiopia, Syria, Afghanistan and now Ukraine. Against that background, and with resources already stretched by the pandemic and inflation, it is essential that we structure our collective efforts in a way which maximises the value of the money we spend, takes a longer-term perspective and optimises the range of different resources, including bilateral and multilateral development funding.
I would like to thank all those involved in the response in Bangladesh, from the Honourable Prime Minister down. The UK remains focused on the plight of the Rohingya and the strain this protracted crisis places on Bangladesh.
And, we remain firmly committed to working together to improve the situation for the Rohingya while they are in Bangladesh and the communities that host them, and to working with others to resolve the underlying causes of the crisis, including through the restoration of democracy and an end to the repression and impunity in Myanmar..."
Source/publisher:
Govt. UK (London)
Date of publication:
2022-03-29
Date of entry/update:
2022-03-30
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Burmese refugees in Bangladesh, Rohingya (cultural, political etc.)
Language:
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Description:
"This is the first case to be brought in a foreign jurisdiction for crimes committed by the Myanmar junta since the coup in 2021. The complaint was filed at the Prosecutor’s Office in Istanbul by the Lawyer, Gülden Sönmez, acting for MAP on behalf of victims who were tortured at the notorious Ye Kyi Ain “Interrogation Centre” in Yangon.
“The military junta acted in a strict chain of command, committing crimes in a systematic, widespread and pre-planned manner,” said Gülden Sönmez. “Turkey is a signatory to the UN Convention Against Torture and an investigation must be initiated based on universal jurisdiction against the generals and commanders involved in these crimes, as well as those who actually committed the torture.”
In the file lodged with the Turkish authorities, evidence of severe torture has been presented along with the identities of named perpetrators. MAP and Ms Sonmez are demanding that those responsible should be arrested and extradited to Turkey to face justice and in order to prevent ongoing crimes.
“Turkey showed great sensitivity to the persecution of Myanmar’s Rohingya Muslims in 2017,” said MAP Director, Chris Gunness, who was in Istanbul for the case, “and there is growing support here, not just for humanitarian intervention, but for targeted legal action against the Myanmar Generals for the atrocity crimes they and their henchmen are committing on a daily basis.”
Turkey has been supportive of the genocide case against the Myanmar junta at the International Criminal Court in the Hague and the Turkish government voted for robust UN General Assembly action in a strongly worded resolution in June last year which condemned the coup and called on UN member states to impose a global arms embargo. The government in Ankara has also supported the decision of the UN General Assembly to deny recognition to the Myanmar junta.
Since the coup, the use of torture has become widespread and systematic, raising it to the level of international crimes. A report by the UN Human Rights Council found that since the coup, 325 people including 26 children had been tortured to death. The report concluded that “hundreds, if not thousands, have been subjected to torture.”
“The absence of meaningful action to prevent these ongoing crimes makes universal jurisdiction cases even more important,” according to Gunness. “The Security Council has been hamstrung by the threat of Russian and Chinese vetos and ASEAN has been hopelessly divided. In this context, it is vitally important that UN member states, such as Turkey, support criminal accountability in their national courts.”..."
Source/publisher:
Myanmar Accountability Project
Date of publication:
2022-03-29
Date of entry/update:
2022-03-30
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Human Rights and international relations, International Criminal Court (Myanmar)
Language:
more
Description:
"President Joseph R. Biden, Jr. is honored to welcome Prime Minister of the Republic of Singapore Lee Hsien Loong to Washington, D.C. The U.S.-Singapore strategic partnership is anchored in our shared respect for the rules-based international order, adherence to international law, and the principles enshrined in the United Nations Charter – including respect for sovereignty, the peaceful resolution of disputes, cooperation among nations, and fundamental human rights. These principles have underpinned decades of unprecedented peace and stability as well as economic and social development, in the Indo-Pacific region and around the world.
The United States and Singapore recognize that threats to the UN Charter and rules-based international order anywhere, including Russia’s unprovoked attack on Ukraine, place peace and prosperity everywhere at risk. The war in Ukraine has a negative impact on the Indo-Pacific region, which already faces many complex challenges. Taken together, the opportunities and challenges of the 21st century demand deeper cooperation between us.
The leaders welcome the enduring strength of the bilateral strategic partnership, marked by Singapore’s unique status as a Major Security Cooperation Partner, by the 5,400 U.S. companies that call Singapore home, by the countries’ close people-to-people ties, and by the series of high-level bilateral visits during the first year of the Biden-Harris Administration. The leaders resolve to further expand bilateral cooperation, taking bold new steps to drive broad-based economic growth and innovation, raise infrastructure standards in the region, address the climate crisis, promote health security, increase supply chain resilience, improve cybersecurity, ensure the long-term sustainability of outer space activities, and more. As we strengthen our partnership, we will promote a world in which all nations, large and small, can stand together as equals to tackle the most pressing challenges of our era and deliver for our people.
Upholding the Rules-Based International Order
President Biden reiterates the sustained and growing commitment of the United States to its allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific region, as described in the Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States. President Biden and Prime Minister Lee reaffirm their strong support for ASEAN Centrality and the ASEAN-centered regional architecture. Prime Minister Lee welcomes President Biden’s invitation to ASEAN leaders for a historic ASEAN-U.S. Special Summit in Washington, D.C. The leaders highlight the success of the U.S.-Singapore Third Country Training Program, which has received more than 1700 officials from across ASEAN. The United States seeks cooperation with all partners who share our objectives in the Indo-Pacific region, and to that end, we welcome the Quad’s support for ASEAN Centrality, deeper economic integration, addressing of regional challenges, and promotion of an open, inclusive, stable and secure Indo-Pacific region and a rules-based order. We also welcome the enhanced engagement of European and regional partners in Southeast Asia and the broader Indo-Pacific region.
The United States and Singapore emphasize our unwavering commitment to the principles of sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity, and condemn Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine, which clearly violates international law, including the United Nations Charter. The United States and Singapore recognize the need to preserve a world in which borders cannot be changed by force and state-to-state relations are guided by international law. Given the unprovoked attack on Ukraine, many countries across the Atlantic and the Pacific, including the United States and Singapore, have imposed their own financial sanctions and export controls against Russian entities. The United States and Singapore will ensure the effective implementation of their respective measures. The United States and Singapore are deeply concerned about the deteriorating humanitarian crisis in and around Ukraine, and call on all parties to allow safe and unfettered passage of civilians, facilitate unhindered access to humanitarian assistance for those in need in Ukraine, protect civilians, and respect human rights.
Amid global security challenges, the United States and Singapore continue to build on our partnership to pursue our shared interests. The leaders reaffirm a shared commitment to the goal of the complete denuclearization and the establishment of a permanent peace on the Korean Peninsula. Both leaders call on the DPRK to engage in serious and sustained diplomacy and emphasize the importance of full implementation of relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions. The leaders underscore the importance of peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region and encourage the peaceful resolution of disputes. President Biden and Prime Minister Lee also reflected on the close counterterrorism partnership shared by the United States and Singapore, and Singapore’s support of the United States relocation efforts related to Afghanistan last year.
In the maritime domain, the United States and Singapore reaffirm the right of freedom of navigation and overflight and other lawful uses of the seas accorded by international law, including the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). We reaffirm the need to pursue peaceful resolution of disputes in accordance with international law, including UNCLOS, which sets out the legal framework within which all activities in the oceans and seas must be carried out. We respect states’ ability to conserve, sustainably develop, and effectively manage their maritime natural resources in accordance with international law, including UNCLOS. We reaffirm that all concerned parties must abide by the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, and reiterate our support for ASEAN-led efforts to develop an effective and substantive Code of Conduct for the South China Sea that upholds the legitimate rights and interests of all parties and is consistent with UNCLOS. We also affirm the importance of acting consistently with the relevant Standards and Recommended Practices of the International Civil Aviation Organization, and the relevant instruments and conventions of the International Maritime Organization.
The United States and Singapore share deep concerns about the situation in Myanmar and the challenges it poses to regional stability. We continue to call for an end to violence against civilians in Myanmar, the release of all political detainees, including State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi, President Win Myint and foreign detainees; unhindered humanitarian access; and for Myanmar to return to its path of democratic transition. We appreciate the constructive role played by Singapore and ASEAN in facilitating a peaceful solution in the interest of the people of Myanmar, and we call for the Myanmar military regime to urgently implement the ASEAN Five Point Consensus. We are concerned the crisis has reversed years of economic progress in Myanmar and increased the risk of illicit finance.
Driving Inclusive Prosperity and Addressing Emerging Challenges
President Biden and Prime Minister Lee underscore their shared commitment to promoting broad-based economic growth in the United States, in Singapore, and throughout the region. They reaffirm the close collaboration between the United States and Singapore on developing an Indo-Pacific economic framework with regional partners that will expand cooperation on trade, supply chains, clean energy, decarbonization, infrastructure, tax, and anti-corruption. They welcome Thailand’s leadership as host of Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) in 2022, and look forward to the United States hosting APEC in 2023. The leaders reviewed ongoing efforts to facilitate regional trade and increase supply chain resilience and looked forward to the implementation of the U.S.-ASEAN Economic Futures initiative.
The leaders also look forward to expanding economic cooperation under the U.S.-Singapore Partnership for Growth and Innovation (PGI), which aims to secure inclusive growth for our economies and regions in new and forward-looking areas: digital economy, energy and environmental technology, advanced manufacturing, and health services. New initiatives announced under the PGI include the development of interoperable ethical Artificial Intelligence governance frameworks, and plans for a U.S. business development mission to Singapore to facilitate new business opportunities and strengthen partnerships in advanced manufacturing.
President Biden and Prime Minister Lee commit to deepening cooperation between the United States and Singapore on high quality infrastructure development in the region. To that end, the United States and Singapore renewed and expanded the MOU to deepen cooperation on infrastructure development to cover new collaborations in green and sustainable infrastructure projects in the region that address social and economic needs and promote inclusive, private sector-led growth.
The climate crisis poses an existential threat to the world. Recognizing the need to enhance ambition in this decisive decade, the United States has put forward an ambitious target to achieve a 50-52 percent reduction from 2005 levels in economy-wide net greenhouse gas pollution in 2030 and to reach net-zero greenhouse gas emissions by no later than 2050, and Singapore has announced it will raise its climate ambition to achieve net-zero emissions by or around mid-century, and will be making a formal revision to both its Nationally Determined Contribution and Long-Term Low-Emissions Development Strategy (LEDS) later this year after consulting closely with key stakeholders. We commit to strengthening the U.S.-Singapore Climate Partnership, and we look forward to working with other countries to implement the Paris Agreement. President Biden and Prime Minister Lee recognize that decarbonizing the shipping sector is essential to transitioning to a clean energy economy and they commit to working together to advance green shipping, including by establishing alternative bunkering infrastructure for the provision of low- and zero-carbon fuels at our ports.
The United States and Singapore highlight their shared commitment to bolstering global health security and building back better from the COVID-19 pandemic, and preparing for further pandemics and other shocks to health systems. We must work with allies and partners to strengthen and finance vaccine readiness and accelerate efforts to control COVID-19 globally, for example by working with global health organizations such as the World Health Organization, GAVI, the Vaccine Alliance, and the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations.
The United States and Singapore affirm the importance of ensuring that critical and emerging technologies foster an open, accessible, and secure technology ecosystem, based on mutual trust, confidence, and respect for a rules-based international order. To this end, we commit to increasing resiliency in our technology supply chains, and developing robust approaches to data governance and security, seeking consistency and interoperability where feasible. We also plan to explore R&D and other collaborations, including through the PGI, in order to progress towards affordable, resilient, secure and interoperable advanced high-speed wireless communications (“NextG”) in the Indo-Pacific region.
The United States and Singapore maintain a strong and growing partnership on cybersecurity. We seek global adherence to the UN framework of responsible state behavior in cyberspace and pledge to deepen our cooperation on combating cyber threats, promoting resilience, and securing our critical infrastructure, amongst other issues. We welcome the establishment of the United States-Singapore Cyber Dialogue to cement our cross institutional linkages to jointly tackle cybersecurity issues. We will continue to jointly lead critical efforts in the International Counter Ransomware Initiative to tackle the surge in ransomware attacks worldwide.
The United States and Singapore believe in the importance of creating a safe, stable, secure, and sustainable space environment that facilitates space exploration, science, and commercial activities that benefit all of humanity. President Biden welcomes Singapore’s commitment to the Artemis Accords. President Biden and Prime Minister Lee also welcome the convening of a United States-Singapore Space Dialogue.
Today’s challenges all demand closer cooperation between us. For many decades the United States and Singapore have worked together to overcome the challenges of the day, and we will continue to do so, with determination and resolve. Together, we are deepening our strategic partnership to seize opportunities and address emerging threats. We are defending and strengthening the rules-based international order that has long supported global security and prosperity, and will continue to do so long into the future..."
Source/publisher:
The White House (Washington, D.C.)
Date of publication:
2022-03-29
Date of entry/update:
2022-03-30
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Individual Documents
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"Though it comes far too late, the decision of the US government to finally formally determine that the violence perpetrated by the Myanmar military against the Rohingya in 2017 in Rakhine State amounts to genocide and crimes against humanity is welcomed by 357 Myanmar CSOs and regional and international partners.
This announcement comes after over four years of tireless repeated efforts by Rohingya, supported by human rights groups within Myanmar and across the world in solidarity with their cause. They have continued to seek justice and accountability, the recognition of their rights, including the restoration of their citizenship, equal rights, freedom of movement, and for safe, voluntary and dignified return of Rohingya to their homes in Rakhine State.
As the long-awaited recognition of the atrocity crimes being determined by the US government is here, urgent actions must be taken towards criminal prosecution for these crimes and to ensure the protection of the remaining Rohingya in Rakhine State whose situation continues to be dire. Otherwise, this determination will languish as rhetoric and only serve to further embolden the Myanmar military that not only continues to implement its policies of genocide and persecute the remaining 600,000 Rohingya in Rakhine State, but is committing war crimes and crimes against humanity against the people across the country.
The same military that committed genocide against the Rohingya are committing massacres, airstrikes, extrajudicial killings, arbitrary mass arrests, sexual and gender-based violence, violence against children and mass displacement following its attempted coup – an attempt that failed, largely due to courageous and united resistance from the people of Myanmar in defense of their democracy.
At the 49th Session of the UN Human Rights Council, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, stated that systematic abuses by the military junta may amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity, including deliberately targeting civilians with airstrikes and burning people alive. The impunity enjoyed by the Myanmar military must end and this can only be achieved through swift and rigorous justice and accountability.
We call on the United States Government to:
Recommend the UN Security Council adopt a resolution referring the situation in Myanmar to the ICC;
Recommend the International Criminal Court to accept the declaration lodged by the Myanmar government, the National Unity Government, under Article 12(3) of the Rome Statute accepting the Court’s jurisdiction with respect to international crimes committed in Myanmar territory since 1 July 2002;
Formally support the ongoing case against Myanmar at the International Court of Justice brought forward by The Gambia, including financial and legal assistance;
Call on the Congress to Pass the Burma Unified through Rigorous Military Accountability Act of 2021 (BURMA Act 2021);
Impose further targeted sanctions against the military and its leadership, military businesses including specifically targeting Myanma Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE), military-linked business partners and network of arms dealers;
Increase aid to Rohingya genocide survivors in Bangladesh and other countries, and advocate for Bangladesh to adopt sustainable policies for hosting Rohingya refugees, including immediate access to education for all Rohingya children.
Direct USAID to coordinate emergency humanitarian aid provision efforts, including through cross-border channels, for the aid to reach to most vulnerable populations of more than 889,000 IDPs resulted from the military violence and airstrikes, and combat COVID-19, by providing resources and working in equal and meaningful partnership and collaboration with ethnic and community-based humanitarian and civil society organizations;
Coordinate to impose a global arms embargo on the Myanmar military; and,
Sanction the supply of jet fuel to the Myanmar military to end airstrikes..."
Source/publisher:
357 Civil Society Organizations
Date of publication:
2022-03-29
Date of entry/update:
2022-03-29
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Genocide, Ethnic Cleansing, International Criminal Court (Myanmar), International Court of Justice (ICJ) - Myanmar, Human Rights and international relations
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"မြန်မာစစ်တပ်ခေါင်းဆောင်များကို တရားစွဲဆိုရမည်
နောက်ကျပြီးမှဖြစ်သော်လည်း ၂၀၁၇ ခုနှစ် ရခိုင်ပြည်နယ်တွင် ရိုဟင်ဂျာလူမျိုးများအပေါ် မြန်မာစစ်တပ်မှ ကျူးလွန်ခဲ့သည့် အကြမ်းဖက်မှုများက လူမျိုးတုံးသတ်ဖြတ်မှုနှင့် လူသားမျိုးနွယ်အပေါ် ဆန့်ကျင်သော ရာဇဝတ်မှုများ မြောက်ကြောင်း တရားဝင်အသိအမှတ်ပြုသည့် အမေရိကန်အစိုးရ၏ ဆုံးဖြတ်ချက်ကို မြန်မာအရပ်ဘက်လူထုအဖွဲ့အစည်းများ၊ နှင့် ဒေသတွင်းနှင့် နိုင်ငံတကာ မိတ်ဖက်အဖွဲ့အစည်း ပေါင်း ၃၅၇ ဖွဲ့တို့က ကြိုဆိုလိုက်သည်။
ဤဆုံးဖြတ်ချက်သည် ရိုဟင်ဂျာများ၏ လေးနှစ်ကျော်ကြာအောင် မလျှော့သော ဇွဲလုံ့လ ကြိုးပမ်းအားထုတ်မှုနှင့်အတူ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံနှင့် ကမ္ဘာတစ်ဝှမ်းရှိ လူ့အခွင့်အရေးအဖွဲ့များ၏ သွေးစည်းညီညွတ်သော ပံ့ပိုးကူညီမှုတို့ကြောင့် ဖြစ်ပေါ်လာခြင်း ဖြစ်သည်။ ရိုဟင်ဂျာများသည် ၎င်းတို့အတွက် တရားမျှတမှုနှင့် တာဝန်ယူမှု တာဝန်ခံမှု ရှိလာစေရေး၊ နှင့် ၎င်းတို့၏ နိုင်ငံသားဖြစ်မှု ပြန်လည်ရရှိရေး၊ လွတ်လပ်စွာသွားလာလှုပ်ရှားခွင့်နှင့် ရခိုင်ပြည်နယ်တွင်ရှိသော ၎င်းတို့၏ နေအိမ်များသို့ ဘေးကင်းလုံခြုံစွာဖြင့် ၎င်းတို့သဘောဆန္ဒအလျောက် ဂုဏ်သိက္ခာရှိစွာ နေရပ်ပြန်နိုင်ရေး တို့အပါအဝင် ၎င်းတို့၏ အခွင့်အရေး ပြန်လည်အသိအမှတ်ပြုခံရရေးအတွက် ဆက်လက်ကြိုးစားလုပ်ဆောင်နေကြသည်။
ထိုရက်စက်ကြမ်းကြုတ်သော ရာဇဝတ်မှုများအပေါ် ကာလရှည်ကြာစောင့်စားနေခဲ့ရသည့် အမေရိကန်အစိုးရ၏ ဆုံးဖြတ်ချက်နောက်တွင် ထိုရာဇဝတ်မှုများအတွက် ရာဇဝတ်ဆိုင်ရာတရားစွဲဆိုမှုများ ပြုလုပ်ရေး ဦးတည်သော အရေးယူဆောင်ရွက်မှုများ အရေးတကြီးလုပ်ဆောင်ရန် လိုအပ်သည်။ သို့မဟုတ်ပါက ဤဆုံးဖြတ်ချက်သည် စကားလုံးသက်သက်အဖြစ် အရာမရောက်ဘဲ ရှိနေမည့်အပြင် ၎င်း၏ လူမျိုးတုံးသတ်ဖြတ်မှုဆိုင်ရာ မူဝါဒများ ဆက်လက် အကောင်အထည်ဖော်ဆောင်နေခြင်းနှင့် ရခိုင်ပြည်နယ်တွင် ကျန်ရှိနေသေးသော ရိုဟင်ဂျာလူဦးရေ ၆၀၀,၀၀၀ အပေါ် ဖိနှိပ်ခြင်း လုပ်ဆောင်နေရုံသာမက နိုင်ငံတစ်ဝှမ်းရှိ ပြည်သူများအပေါ်တွင်လည်း စစ်ရာဇ၀တ်မှုများနှင့် လူသားမျိုးနွယ်အပေါ် ဆန့်ကျင်သော ရာဇ၀တ်မှုများ ကျူးလွန်နေသာ မြန်မာစစ်တပ်ကို ပိုမို၍ပင် အတင့်ရဲလာစေမည် ဖြစ်သည်။
ရိုဟင်ဂျာများအပေါ် လူမျိုးတုံးသတ်ဖြတ်မှု ကျူးလွန်ခဲ့သည့် ယင်းစစ်တပ်ကပင် ဒီမိုကရေစီကာကွယ်ရာတွင် ရဲရင့်ပြတ်သား စည်းလုံးညီညွတ်သော မြန်မာပြည်သူများ၏ စုပေါင်းခုခံဆန့်ကျင် မှုကြောင့် ကျရှုံးနေသော ၎င်းတို့၏ အာဏာသိမ်းရေး ကြိုးပမ်းမှုနောက်ပိုင်းတွင် အရပ်သားပြည်သူများအပေါ် အစုလိုက်အပြုံလိုက် သတ်ဖြတ်မှုများ၊ လေကြောင်းတိုက်ခိုက်မှုများ၊ ဥပဒေမဲ့သတ်ဖြတ်မှုများ၊ မတရား အစုလိုက်အပြုံလိုက် ဖမ်းဆီးမှုများ၊ လိင်ပိုင်းဆိုင်ရာနှင့် ကျား-မ ကွဲပြားမှုအပေါ်အခြေခံသည့် အကြမ်းဖက်မှုများ၊ ကလေးသူငယ်များအပေါ် အကြမ်းဖက်မှုများနှင့် အစုလိုက် အပြုံလိုက် နေရပ်စွန့်ခွာထွက်ပြေးတိမ်းရှောင်ရ စေမှုများကို ကျူးလွန်နေသည်။
ကုလသမဂ္ဂလူ့အခွင့်အရေးကောင်စီ၏ ၄၉ ကြိမ်မြောက် ပုံမှန်အစည်းအဝေးတွင် အရပ်သားပြည်သူ များအပေါ် လေကြောင်းတိုက်ခိုက်မှုများနှင့် အရှင်လတ်လတ် မီးရှို့သတ်ဖြတ်မှုများကို ရည်ရွယ်ချက်ရှိရှိ ပစ်မှတ်ထားလုပ်ဆောင်မှုများ အပါအဝင် မြန်မာစစ်အုပ်စု၏ စနစ်တကျ ချိုးဖောက်မှုများသည် စစ်ရာဇဝတ်မှုများနှင့် လူသားမျိုးနွယ်အပေါ် ဆန့်ကျင်သော ရာဇဝတ်မှုများ မြောက်နိုင်ဖွယ်ရှိသည်ဟု ကုလသမဂ္ဂလူ့အခွင့်အရေးမဟာမင်းကြီးက ထုတ်ဖော်ပြောဆိုခဲ့သည်။ မြန်မာစစ်တပ်မှ ရရှိနေသော ပြစ်ဒဏ်ကင်းလွတ်ခွင့်ကို အဆုံးသတ်ရမည်ဖြစ်ပြီး ယင်းကို မြန်ဆန်တင်းကျပ်သော တရားမျှတမှုနှင့် တာဝန်ယူမှု တာဝန်ခံမှု ဖော်ဆောင်ခြင်းတို့မှတစ်ဆင့်သာ ရရှိနိုင်မည် ဖြစ်သည်။
အမေရိကန်အစိုးရမှ အောက်ပါအချက်များကို လုပ်ဆောင်ရန် မိမိတို့မှ တောင်းဆိုလိုက်သည် –
မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၏ အခြေအနေကို နိုင်ငံတကာရာဇဝတ်ခုံရုံး (ICC) သို့ လွှဲပြောင်းပေးရန်အတွက် ကုလသမဂ္ဂလုံခြုံရေး ကောင်စီမှ ဆုံးဖြတ်ချက်တစ်ခု ချမှတ်ရေး အကြံပြုတိုက်တွန်းရန်၊
၂၀၀၂ ခုနှစ် ဇူလိုင်လ ၁ ရက်နေ့မှစတင်၍ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံပိုင်နက်အတွင်း ကျုးလွန်ခဲ့သော နိုင်ငံတကာရာဇ၀တ်မှုများနှင့် စပ်လျဉ်း၍ ရောမသဘောတူစာချုပ် အပိုဒ် ၁၂(၃)အရ ICC တရားရုံး၏ တရားစီရင်ပိုင်ခွင့်ကို လက်ခံကြောင်း တင်သွင်းသော မြန်မာအစိုးရဖြစ်သည့် အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ (NUG) ၏ ကြေညာစာတမ်းကို လက်ခံရေး ICC တရားရုံးအား တိုက်တွန်းရန်၊
ဂမ်ဘီယာနိုင်ငံမှ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံအပေါ် နိုင်ငံတကာတရားရုံး (ICJ) တွင် လက်ရှိစွဲဆိုထားသည့် အမှုအား ငွေကြေးနှင့် ဥပဒေဆိုင်ရာ ပံ့ပိုးကူညီမှုများ အပါအဝင် တရားဝင် ထောက်ခံအားပေးရန်၊
စစ်တပ်အား တင်းကျပ်သော တာဝန်ယူမှု တာဝန်ခံမှု ရှိလာစေခြင်းမှတစ်ဆင့် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ စုပေါင်းညီညွတ်ရေးဆိုင်ရာဥပဒေ ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ် (BURMA Act 2021) ကို အတည်ပြုပြဌာန်းနိုင်ရန်အတွက် ကွန်ဂရက်အား တောင်းဆိုရန်၊
မြန်မာ့ရေနံနှင့် သဘာဝဓာတ်ငွေ့လုပ်ငန်း (MOGE)၊ စစ်တပ်နှင့် ဆက်နွယ်နေသော စီးပွားရေးမိတ်ဖက် များနှင့် လက်နက်ရောင်းဝယ်သူ ကွန်ရက်များအပေါ် ပစ်မှတ်ထား အရေးယူပိတ်ဆို့မှုများ အပါအဝင် မြန်မာစစ်တပ်နှင့် ၎င်း၏ ခေါင်းဆောင်များအပေါ် ပစ်မှတ်ထား အရေးယူပိတ်ဆို့မှုများ ပိုမိုလုပ်ဆောင်ရန်၊
လူမျိုးတုံးသတ်ဖြတ်မှုမှ အသက်ရှင်ကျန်ရစ်သည့် ဘင်္ဂလားဒေ့ရှ်နိုင်ငံနှင့် အခြားနိုင်ငံများရှိ ရိုဟင်ဂျာများအတွက် အကူအညီအထောက်အပံ့များ တိုးမြှင့်ပေးရေး၊ နှင့် ရိုဟင်ဂျာ ကလေးသူငယ်များအတွက် ပညာရေး လက်လှမ်းမီစေရေး အပါအဝင် ရိုဟင်ဂျာဒုက္ခသည်များ လက်ခံထားရေးနှင့်ပတ်သက်၍ ဘင်္ဂလားဒေ့ရှ်နိုင်ငံအနေဖြင့် ရေရှည်တည်တံ့သော မူဝါဒများ ချမှတ်လာစေရေး စည်းရုံးလှုံ့ဆော်ရန်၊
စစ်တပ်၏ အကြမ်းဖက်မှုများနှင့် လေကြောင်းတိုက်ခိုက်မှုများကြောင့် ထိခိုက်အလွယ်ဆုံးသော ပြည်တွင်း နေရပ်စွန့်ခွာထွက်ပြေးတိမ်းရှောင်ရသူ (IDP) ၈၈၉,၀၀၀ ကျော်ထံသို့ အကူအညီများ ရောက်ရှိစေရန်အတွက် နယ်စပ်ဖြတ်ကျော် လမ်းကြောင်းများတစ်ဆင့် အပါအဝင် လူသားချင်းစာနာ ထောက်ထားမှုဆိုင်ရာ အရေးပေါ်အကူအညီ ပံ့ပိုးနိုင်ရေး ကြိုးပမ်းမှုများ ညှိနှိုင်းဆောင်ရွက်ရန်အပြင် COVID-19 တိုက်ဖျက်ရေးအတွက် တိုင်းရင်းသားနှင့် လူထုအခြေပြု လူသားချင်းစာနာထောက်ထားမှု ဆိုင်ရာ အဖွဲ့အစည်းများနှင့် အရပ်ဘက်လူထုအဖွဲ့အစည်းများကို အရင်းအမြစ်များ ထောက်ပံ့ပေးခြင်းနှင့် အဓိပ္ပါယ်ပြည့်ဝစွာဖြင့် တန်းတူသောမိတ်ဖက်များအဖြစ် ပူးပေါင်းဆောင်ရွက်ရန် USAID အား ညွှန်ကြားရန်၊
မြန်မာစစ်တပ်အပေါ် ကမ္ဘာလုံးဆိုင်ရာ လက်နက်ခဲယမ်းရောင်းချမှု ပိတ်ဆို့ရေး ချမှတ်နိုင်ရန်အတွက် ညှိနှိုင်းဆောင်ရွက်ရန်၊ နှင့်
မြန်မာစစ်တပ်၏ လေကြောင်းတိုက်ခိုက်မှုကို ရပ်တန့်စေရန်အတွက် လေယာဥ်ဆီတင်ပို့ရောင်းချမှုကို ပိတ်ဆို့ရန်။..."
Source/publisher:
357 Civil Society Organizations
Date of publication:
2022-03-29
Date of entry/update:
2022-03-29
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Genocide, Ethnic Cleansing, Human Rights and international relations, Discrimination against the Rohingya, International Criminal Court (Myanmar), International Court of Justice (ICJ) - Myanmar
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Sub-title:
Betting on ASEAN’S Fruitless Diplomacy Undermines International Action
Description:
"Days after the Myanmar military coup on February 1, 2021, the Japanese and Australian governments publicly “confirmed” they would “closely coordinate together regarding the situation in Myanmar.” Since then, they have repeatedly expressed “grave concerns” about human rights abuses in Myanmar while pledging to “work together closely.”
On March 3, Australia adopted new regulations that give it the ability to sanction Myanmar entities and individuals connected to the junta. This is long overdue given that in the past year Myanmar’s military has killed 1,700 people and arbitrarily arrested thousands. Sadly, it’s still an open question whether Australia or Japan will do much more than continue to talk tough and do little about the region’s deepening human rights crisis.
The two regional partners have taken some small steps on Myanmar. Japan issued statements condemning the coup and froze new non-humanitarian aid, while its Diet passed a resolution calling for the restoration of a democratic system. Similarly, Australia redirected its aid program away from junta-related entities and suspended its defense cooperation with Myanmar. A parliamentary committee examining Australia’s response to the coup urged the government to further pursue the restoration of civilian rule as a foreign policy objective.
However, Tokyo and Canberra have failed to coordinate with democratic allies such as the United Kingdom, United States, European Union, and Canada in taking further concrete action to pressure the Myanmar military, or Tatmadaw. Rather than imposing targeted sanctions on military leaders and military-owned entities, as the four allies have done, Japan and Australia have effectively bet all their chips on the Five-Point Consensus of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the principle of “ASEAN centrality.” It’s been a losing bet.
Since ASEAN released its five-point consensus last April, there has been no progress on any of the listed issues. The junta has been unwilling to meet even ASEAN’s low bar, and instead has exploited the international community’s deference to ASEAN to keep delaying any substantive action. Meanwhile, Tokyo and Canberra conveniently hide behind the ASEAN fig leaf, refraining from enacting targeted sanctions, and thus undermining the international community’s efforts to hold the Tatmadaw accountable for its atrocities.
In late March 2022, Cambodia’s foreign minister and ASEAN’s special envoy, Prak Sokhonn, met Myanmar military leader Min Aung Hlaing to advocate for the five-point consensus, including a ceasefire. However, Prak Sokhonn himself claimed there was little progress. Myanmar’s junta barred Sakonn from meeting with Aung San Suu Kyi and other imprisoned leaders of the National League for Democracy party, which won the November 2020 election in a landslide.
In January, the United Nations high commissioner for human rights, Michelle Bachelet, said that “the actions taken by the U.N. Security Council and by ASEAN have been insufficient to convince Myanmar’s military to cease its violence.” Tokyo and Canberra should heed her call.
Since early 2021, Japan’s ruling and opposition lawmakers have discussed passing a U.S. Magnitsky-style law, which would allow the Japanese government to sanction violators of international human rights outside of the country. Late last year, Prime Minister Kishida Fumio said he will continue to “consider” such a law. Lawmakers have also advocated using the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act, predominantly used to sanction human rights violators in response to U.N. Security Council resolutions.
But the Japanese government remains passive about imposing sanctions. Last April, then-Foreign Minister Motegi Toshimitsu disparaged the idea of coordinating with other countries to sanction Tatmadaw leaders, claiming without evidence that it would not lead to a “productive outcome.”
Australia, meanwhile, passed the Autonomous Sanctions Amendment Act in late 2021, enabling the government to impose targeted financial sanctions and travel bans. The government said that the new law will allow it to “respond more flexibly and swiftly to a range of situations of international concern, including in collaboration” with Australia’s close allies and partners when in the national interest. Despite pressure from civil society groups and opposition politicians, the government has been unwilling to use the new measures against the Myanmar junta.
The Australian government has said that Myanmar’s junta is “impervious” to international pressure and that sanctions would provide “very little, if any, positive impact to the people on the ground.” But this ignores calls by Myanmar’s people for targeted sanctions and the tangible role that sanctions played in the previous decade in pressuring the military to embark on the reform process. In their decision to embrace Myanmar’s shaky democratization, other governments eased the pressure too early.
Past blanket sanctions were devastating for ordinary people in Myanmar, meaning that coordinated and targeted sanctions with robust enforcement will be key. The military’s financial interests and relationships have become more integrated into the global economy, offering even greater opportunities for effective sanctions.
With the necessary laws in place, the stage is set for Japan and Australia to do more than simply deflect and defer to ASEAN. Tokyo and Canberra should swiftly place targeted sanctions against Tatmadaw leaders and military-owned entities. In addition to sanctions, the two democracies should also push other governments to support a U.N. Security Council resolution calling for an arms embargo on Myanmar. Myanmar’s junta needs to be shown there are both immediate and longer-term consequences for their grievous abuses..."
Source/publisher:
The Diplomat via Human Rights Watch
Date of publication:
2022-03-27
Date of entry/update:
2022-03-28
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Sanctions, Business and the Military, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, The Burmese military's role in the economy, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
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Description:
"Last week, the Biden administration formally announced its determination that violence committed against the Rohingya by Myanmar’s military (the Tatmadaw) amounts to genocide and crimes against humanity. In response, the following statement is attributable to Lindsey Green, MA, program officer, Program on Sexual Violence in Conflict Zones, at Physicians for Human Rights (PHR):
“PHR welcomes the Biden administration’s formal determination that violence perpetrated by the Tatmadaw against Myanmar’s Rohingya minority constitutes genocide and crimes against humanity. The U.S. government’s acknowledgement of and future action on this issue are important steps toward justice for the Rohingya and a commitment to ensure meaningful accountability for crimes committed in Myanmar.
“It is past time the international community acknowledge the systematic violence perpetrated against the Rohingya as a coordinated effort to expel them from their homeland, and that the Rohingya see justice and accountability for those most responsible. For 15 years, PHR has used science and medicine to document and call attention to human rights abuses in Myanmar. Through medical evaluations and first-hand accounts from Rohingya survivors, we have corroborated evidence of widespread and systematic violence, including sexual and gender-based violence, burning of villages, shootings, and beatings, targeting the Rohingya in northern Rakhine state since August 2017. Thousands have been killed and more than 740,000 people have been forced to flee their homes due to years of persecution, abuse, and ethnic violence.
“The need for intervention by the international community to stop the ongoing military coup and end violence against all people in Myanmar, including the Rohingya, is paramount. This determination is a major step, not only in further validating the crimes committed against the Rohingya, but also because it initiates a number of more severe consequences and policy actions that the United States is obligated to pursue. PHR urges the U.S. government to hold Myanmar’s security forces accountable for their brutal crimes by passing the BURMA Act, continue to issue robust political and economic sanctions against military leaders and their affiliated entities, and supporting international efforts for justice and accountability for genocide.
“Most critically, the Rohingya community must lead in the process of determining what remedies, including repatriations, rehabilitation, and mental health and trauma-related support are owed to them for the violations they have endured. No one government or intergovernmental organization can accurately assess the severe trauma, life-changing disabilities, and immeasurable losses the Rohingya have experienced. It is imperative their voices be centered in this process now and in the future.”..."
Source/publisher:
Physicians for Human Rights (New York)
Date of publication:
2022-03-28
Date of entry/update:
2022-03-28
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Genocide, Human Rights and international relations, Discrimination against the Rohingya, Rohingya (cultural, political etc.)
Language:
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Description:
"Following is a joint statement on Armed Forces Day in Myanmar issued by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union and the Foreign Ministers of Albania, Australia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Canada, Georgia, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, Montenegro, New Zealand, North Macedonia, Norway, Palau, Republic of Korea, Serbia, Switzerland, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
Begin text:
On Armed Forces Day, we remember those killed and displaced by violence over the last year, including at least 100 people killed on this day alone one year ago.
Some countries continue to supply lethal assistance to Myanmar’s military regime, enabling its violence and repression. We urge all countries to support the people of Myanmar by immediately stopping the sale or transfer of arms, military equipment, materiel, dual-use equipment, and technical assistance to Myanmar, in line with UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/75/287. We reiterate our call on the military to cease its violence and restore Myanmar’s path to democracy..."
Source/publisher:
United States Department of State
Date of publication:
2022-03-26
Date of entry/update:
2022-03-26
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Freedom of Movement, violations of in Burma/Myanmar, Human Rights Defenders, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
Language:
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Sub-title:
Stronger Economic Measures, Arms Embargo Needed Against Military
Description:
" Myanmar’s Armed Forces Day on March 27, 2022, is an opportunity for foreign governments to take stronger action against the military’s widespread abuses, Human Rights Watch said today.
Concerned governments should strengthen economic sanctions against junta members and other senior military officers, as well as military-owned conglomerates. The United Nations Security Council should urgently adopt a global arms embargo against Myanmar and refer the country situation to the International Criminal Court.
“Governments joining Myanmar’s Armed Forces Day celebrations are celebrating the military’s brutal suppression of its own people,” said Manny Maung, Myanmar researcher at Human Rights Watch. “Governments should instead participate by enacting targeted sanctions against the generals and military businesses.”
On March 26, 2021, the state MRTV news channel announced that anti-coup demonstrators “should learn from the tragedy of earlier ugly deaths that you can be in danger of getting shot to the head and back” and warned that “parents should also talk their children out of it [joining protests], let’s not waste lives for nothing.” This language was widely interpreted to signal that the security forces were planning to respond with force to planned protests on March 27.
The next day, Myanmar security forces killed as many as 163 anti-coup protesters in deadly crackdowns. It was most likely the deadliest single day since country-wide protests broke out against the February 1, 2021 military coup.
Since the coup, security forces have killed over 1,600 people and detained more than 12,000. Over 500,000 people have been internally displaced and the junta is deliberately blocking aid to populations in need as a form of collective punishment. Human Rights Watch has documented the military’s numerous abuses against the population that amount to crimes against humanity and war crimes.
A joint report by Fortify Rights and the Schell Center for International Human Rights at Yale Law School, released on March 24, 2022, identifies 61 senior military and police officials who ordered abuses or are otherwise directly implicated in crimes committed against the population in the first six months after the coup.
In recent weeks, there have been increasing reports of Myanmar military airstrikes and use of heavy weapons causing civilian loss of life and property. The UN special rapporteur on human rights in Myanmar, in his February report on government sales of weapons to the Myanmar military, said that jet aircraft, attack helicopters, armored vehicles, light and heavy artillery, missiles, and rockets were being used against civilians. More than 400 of the attacks reported occurred in Sagaing Region in northwestern Myanmar, where most civilian fatalities have recently occurred. The report identified Belarus, China, India, Israel, Pakistan, Russia, Serbia, South Korea, and Ukraine as having transferred arms to Myanmar since 2018 that could be used to attack civilians.
Other countries such as Japan have not ended military ties and continue to provide training to the Myanmar military despite its long record of human rights abuses. Since 2015, Myanmar military cadets and officers have received academic and military training at Japan’s National Defense Academy and Japan Self-Defense Forces facilities. The Japanese government should immediately suspend the program and cut other military ties, or risk being complicit in the military’s atrocities.
The UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights condemned Myanmar security forces’ violations of international human rights and humanitarian law in a March 15 report, and said the military was deliberately targeting civilians, many of whom were shot in the head, burned to death, arbitrarily arrested, tortured, or used as human shields.
On March 21, the US government formally determined that the Myanmar military committed the crime of genocide and crimes against humanity against ethnic Rohingya Muslims in Rakhine State. The US and like-minded governments should seek justice for grave international crimes against the Rohingya and other ethnic groups, as well as against the anti-coup protesters, and impose stronger economic measures against the military leadership, Human Rights Watch said.
The UN Security Council – largely because of concerns of a Chinese or Russian veto – has not taken substantive action in response to the Myanmar military’s atrocities. Nevertheless, the council should impose an arms embargo on Myanmar and refer the situation in Rakhine State to the International Criminal Court.
“The UN Security Council should act to help end the suffering of Myanmar’s people,” Maung said. “UN member countries should not keep waiting for the Security Council, however, and should take all possible action at the UN General Assembly and unilaterally to promote justice for Myanmar.”..."
Source/publisher:
Human Rights Watch (USA)
Date of publication:
2022-03-25
Date of entry/update:
2022-03-25
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Discrimination against the Rohingya, Human Rights and international relations
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"March 24 is observed as the International Day for the Right to the Truth Concerning Gross Human Rights Violations and for the Dignity of Victims, marking the day Archbishop Oscar Arnulfo Romero of El Salvador was assassinated on March 24th, 1980 for denouncing violations of human rights.
The military coup in Myanmar/Burma on February 1st, 2021 exacerbated the number and intensity of gross human rights violation across the country. Since the military seized power, civilians have become victims of arbitrary arrest, torture, targeted and indiscriminate killing, airstrikes, shelling and other violent abuses at the hands of the Burma Army. According to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners, 1,687 civilians have already been killed since the coup, though the number is likely much higher. Across the country, over 800,000 civilians are displaced and living under constant threat to their physical security and mental health[1]. Those who have become victims still await justice, while their perpetrators are yet to be punished and continue to commit further human rights violations. On the other hand, State Administration Council is continuing to commit human rights violation with impunity and there is no accountability from any perpetrator.
In Southeast Burma where armed conflict has been happening for more than seven decades, local communities are subjected to widespread human rights violations, especially by armed actors. The ethnic minorities in Southeast Burma has been systematically targeted and attacked by the Burma Army. According to KHRG’s documentation, the majority of the victims of human rights violations or their families have never received remediation for what they have suffered due to the culture of impunity within armed groups, especially within the Burma Army. The Burma Army has been committing forced disappearance, rape, murder, torture, the deliberate destruction of civilian property, and other forms of human rights abuses without facing any repercussions, whereas the victims and families of the victims have had to endure the long-lasting impacts of the abuses.
Since the coup, conflict has escalated again in Southeast Burma and dozens of villagers have been killed by airstrikes, shelling, landmine explosions, and other forms of violent attacks, including while being used as human shields. Civilians have also been systematically used as forced labour by the Burma Army. While accountability for past abuses has not been realised, further abuses are being committed by the Burma Army. KHRG calls upon the international community to take resolute action against the Burma Army, its military-owned businesses, and any entity that works with the Burma Army in an effort in diminish human rights abuses in Burma, end military impunity, restore accountability and justice, and assist victims of gross human rights abuses.
The countless victims of human rights violations and their families deserve and have the right to know the truth, receive justice, and be able to live their lives with dignity. The penetrators must be held accountable for the violations they have committed during both times of war and peace. It is the responsibilities of all to ensure the right to the truth concerning gross human rights violations and the dignity of victims.
KHRG would like to acknowledge those who have suffered human rights violations and victims who continue to wait for justice. KHRG also pays tribute to those who have suffered or lost their lives while striving to raise awareness to human rights violations in Burma..."
Source/publisher:
Karen Human Rights Group
Date of publication:
2022-03-24
Date of entry/update:
2022-03-24
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Political prisoners and other violations in Burma - reports, Freedom of Movement, violations of in Burma/Myanmar, Burma: Internal displacement/forced migration of several ethnic groups., Armed conflict in Burma - attacks on civilians
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"SITUATION OVERVIEW
In 2021, the people of Myanmar faced an unprecedented political, socioeconomic, human rights and humanitarian crisis with needs escalating dramatically since the military takeover on 1 February and a severe COVID-19 third wave.
The expansion of armed conflict into new areas and the formation of new armed elements drove increased displacement, as well as exacerbating existing or generating new protection and assistance needs. The number of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) within Myanmar rose substantially in 2021. According to the UN, of the 690,000 IDPs in Myanmar as of 27 December 2021, an estimated 52 per cent were women and 34 per cent were children. Of these, 320,000 were displaced by armed conflict and unrest since 1 February 2021. The majority of the new displacement occurred in Myanmar's northwest and southeast, as well as in Kachin and Shan states. IDPs have been forced to live in terrible conditions – some in camps, some in host communities and others in the jungle, without adequate food, shelter, sanitation, and medical care. In 2021, local organizations and partners provided basic assistance to previously and newly displaced people and host communities, where possible. However, IDPs and host communities continued to face shortages of food and livelihoods support, clothes, relief items and COVID-19 preventative supplies, largely due to the fighting, as well as restrictions on access, movement and transport. The new IDPS are in addition to the hundreds of thousands of people already living in protracted displacement in Kachin, Kayin, Rakhine and Shan states prior to February 2021.
The military takeover and the large-scale Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) that followed heavily impacted the economy and the already fragile public service sector in 2021, further restricting people’s access to essential basic social services such as education and health. The crisis caused severe interruptions to basic health services, risking long-term consequences for the health and well-being of Myanmar’s population. The health sector has been under enormous strain due to both the CDM and COVID-19. The CDM resulted in severe reductions in the available public health workforce with many health staff walking out of public facilities in protest, at a time when health services were needed most due to the pandemic. The impact of staffing interruptions was compounded by repeated attacks on healthcare and the occupation of health facilities by parties to the conflict, further reducing the options available to affected people and resulting in unmet needs. Significant portions of the community were also unwilling to seek care through public services where they were provided by the de facto authorities. While NGOs, Ethnic Health Organizations (EAOs) and private health services tried to cover the gap, they were not able to fully compensate for the breakdown of public services. Access to education was also heavily disrupted. Due to the combined effects of COVID-19 and the military takeover, nearly all of Myanmar’s 12 million school aged children missed out on almost two years of education in 2020 and 2021.
These inter-related risks also exacerbated pre-existing needs among already vulnerable women, girls, men and boys, including stateless Rohingya people and people living in protracted displacement, predominantly in the country’s northeast and southwest. The crisis deepened the needs of these population groups because of reduced livelihoods opportunities, aggravated by the increase in prices of basic goods. At the same time, access constraints due to COVID and the current political crisis undermined the quality and predictability of humanitarian assistance delivered to extremely aid-dependent communities. This was especially true of assistance to stateless Rohingya people in Rakhine, who are among the country’s most vulnerable people. As with new conflict areas, access to people with pre-existing needs in rural locations was particularly affected, leaving considerable gaps and unmet needs.
According to UNDP, the 2021 economic and political turmoil has driven almost half of the population (25 million people) into poverty in 2022, wiping out the impressive gains made since 2005. Increasing numbers of vulnerable women, girls, men and boys exhausted their coping capacity and slipped into humanitarian need for the first time. Price hikes, COVID-19 movement restrictions and ongoing insecurity forced the most marginalized and vulnerable people to resort to emergency coping strategies in order to buy food and other essential supplies, often negatively impacting their safety, well-being and dignity. The sale of productive assets was especially worrying as this is very difficult to reverse. In some states and regions, prices for crucial household commodities rose significantly, making some food items increasingly unaffordable. Farming incomes were affected by lower wholesale prices for some crops, higher input prices, lower farm gate prices and limited access to credit, affecting agricultural livelihoods and food supplies. COVID-19 related border closures reduced agricultural export earnings and made essential farming inputs less available and more expensive.
Monsoon floods in July and August 2021 affected more than 120,000 people across various parts of the country, resulting in crop losses and further contributing to food insecurity.
The compounding crises of 2021 profoundly and disproportionally impacted women and girls, as well as people with disability in Myanmar. The impacts of COVID-19 restrictions and the worsening security situation resulted in a continued heavy burden of care for women looking after sick family members and children who were unable to return to school. This impacted women's availability to engage in paid work and further strained households financially. Women-headed households and women previously employed in sectors such as the garment industry were particularly affected. Women health workers involved in the CDM and those previously employed at health facilities that were targeted, occupied or shut down also faced negative financial impacts. People with disabilities faced additional safety and security risks. They also regularly faced challenges in accessing basic services as they were unable to reach service points due to their impairment and stressed communities were unable to provide the same level of support..."
Source/publisher:
UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (New York) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of publication:
2022-03-24
Date of entry/update:
2022-03-24
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Human Rights and international relations, Food Security and nutrition in Burma/Myanmar, Public Health
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1.35 MB
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"24 March 2022: The international community must ensure that leaders of the Myanmar military are prosecuted for genocide in international courts without further delay, following the United States (US) government determination that genocide was committed against the Rohingya, says the Special Advisory Council for Myanmar (SAC-M).
SAC-M welcomes the important US government determination that genocide and crimes against humanity were committed against the Rohingya in Myanmar. The determination could not be more urgent, having been delayed for three and a half years after the State Department’s own report documenting the atrocity crimes was first released, and as the military continues to commit massive violations against peoples across Myanmar.
“It is now incumbent on the US and the wider international community to ensure that leaders of the Myanmar military are held to account through criminal prosecutions in international courts,” said Marzuki Darusman of SAC-M. “Accountability for the Myanmar military’s crimes against the Rohingya is urgently needed in addition to the proceedings seeking to determine Myanmar’s State responsibility for genocide before the International Court of Justice.”
One million Rohingya refugees continue to live in restricted camps in Bangladesh, with thousands more living precariously in other countries neighbouring Myanmar. Rohingya that remain in Myanmar are confined either to internment camps or remote villages and face ongoing violence and persecution from the military and security forces.
“Ensuring accountability for the grave crimes committed against the Rohingya is not only an obligation of the international community and an issue of justice for the victims. Without justice and accountability, there is no chance of ending the massive oppression and horrific violence still faced by the Rohingya and other peoples across Myanmar,” said Chris Sidoti of SAC-M. “The military will continue to commit atrocities unless and until its leaders are made accountable.”
SAC-M also welcomes the US government’s commitment of funding to the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar (IIMM), which is tasked with collecting evidence of the most serious international crimes and violations of international law in Myanmar, and with preparing files for criminal proceedings. However, at present, there remains no court willing and able to take such proceedings. Without a court able to act, the work of the IIMM is in vain.
The National Unity Government of Myanmar has accepted the full jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court in Myanmar dating back to 2002, as well as that of the International Court of Justice in the case brought by The Gambia under the Genocide Convention, but these efforts have so far been ignored by the courts.
“If the international community will not engage with Myanmar’s democratically elected representatives in their efforts to secure justice and accountability, then the obligation falls to the international community itself to ensure – without further delay – that there is a tribunal with necessary jurisdiction where leaders of the Myanmar military can be prosecuted for genocide. If the International Criminal Court fails to undertake prosecution of Myanmar military leaders, this may require the establishment of an ad hoc tribunal,” said Yanghee Lee of SAC-M. “The US Genocide determination is another important step towards justice for the Rohingya, but we cannot stop there.”..."
Source/publisher:
Special Advisory Council for Myanmar
Date of publication:
2022-03-24
Date of entry/update:
2022-03-24
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Genocide, International Criminal Court (Myanmar), Human Rights and international relations, Discrimination against the Rohingya
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91.16 KB
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"In historic determination, U.S. Government acknowledges Rohingya genocide
(WASHINGTON, D.C., March 21, 2022)—United Nations Member States should publicly acknowledge the Rohingya genocide in Myanmar and ensure the U.N. Security Council refers the situation to the International Criminal Court (ICC), said Fortify Rights today. In a historic determination, the Government of the United States today announced that the Myanmar military is responsible for committing genocide against the Rohingya people.
“It is a signaling and remarkable milestone for Rohingya victims and survivors that the U.S. has formally determined that the violence committed against Rohingya by the Myanmar military amounts to genocide and crimes against humanity,” said Zaw Win, Human Rights Specialist at Fortify Rights. “It has been a long-term expectation for the Rohingya community. Declaring that what happened to the Rohingya is in fact genocide should spur international accountability efforts and make it more difficult for the Myanmar military to continue its atrocity crimes.”
Speaking at a briefing organized by the U.S. Department of State at the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken announced the determination, saying: “Beyond the Holocaust, the United States has concluded that genocide was committed seven times. Today marks the eighth, as I’ve determined that members of the Burmese military committed genocide and crimes against humanity against Rohingya.”
Fortify Rights is in Washington D.C. attending the briefing.
In November 2019, The Gambia filed a case against Myanmar at the International Court of Justice in The Hague, the U.N.’s highest court, for failing to prevent or punish genocide against Rohingya Muslims. The case is ongoing.
In September 2018, the ICC granted the Chief Prosecutor jurisdiction to investigate and possibly prosecute the crime against humanity of forced deportation of Rohingya to Bangladesh, as well as persecution and other inhumane acts. Last month, the Chief Prosecutor, Karim Khan, concluded his first visit to Bangladesh as part of the ongoing investigation.
While the ICC is investigating forced deportation, it is not yet investigating the crime of genocide against Rohingya, and the ICC has not yet accepted the National Unity Government of Myanmar’s declaration delegating jurisdiction of the court.
Fortify Rights documented the Rohingya genocide for several years, including in detailed reports dating back to 2015. In 2017, the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum and Fortify Rights published a joint report documenting mounting evidence of genocide against Rohingya in northern Rakhine State, which Secretary Blinken cited today.
In a 160-page report in 2018, Fortify Rights also exposed how the Myanmar military and civilian perpetrators prepared for and carried out genocide against Rohingya Muslims in Rakhine State. The report details how the Myanmar Army massacred Rohingya people, systematically raped women and girls, and razed hundreds of villages in northern Rakhine State. The attacks continued for several weeks, forcing more than 700,000 Rohingya to escape to Bangladesh.
Fortify Rights previously identified 22 senior military and police officials responsible for the 2016 and 2017 attacks. Myanmar Commander-in-Chief Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, who also launched a bloody coup d’état on February 1, 2021, is at the top of the list.
The Myanmar authorities have also attempted to erase Rohingya identity and survivors have experienced an enduring mental health crisis.
“While today’s determination of genocide and crimes against humanity are focused on Rohingya, it’s also important to recognize that for decades the Burmese military has committed killings, rape and other atrocities against members of other ethnic and religious minority groups,” Secretary Blinken said during his remarks, recognizing the military’s longstanding and ongoing perpetration of atrocities in Myanmar. “Reports of these abuses are widespread. They are well-documented. They’ve occurred in states across Burma [Myanmar]. That history and the determination that we’re making today are fundamental to understanding Burma’s current crisis.”
Later this week, on March 24, Fortify Rights will publish a new 193-page report detailing the first six months of the Myanmar military’s post-coup attacks on the people of Myanmar.
U.N. Security Council members should immediately put forward a resolution to refer the situation in Myanmar to the ICC, said Fortify Rights. U.N. Member States should also acknowledge the legitimacy of the National Unity Government of Myanmar and get fully behind its efforts to delegate jurisdiction to the Court.
“Secretary Blinken’s announcement is historic for the Rohingya and all people of Myanmar and also for wider efforts to prevent and remedy genocide,” said Matthew Smith, Chief Executive Officer at Fortify Rights. “We’re grateful for all those who worked to make this happen. To prevent genocide, governments must at least acknowledge it when it happens, which is precisely what the U.S. government did today.”..."
Source/publisher:
Fortify Rights
Date of publication:
2022-03-21
Date of entry/update:
2022-03-24
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Genocide, International Criminal Court (Myanmar), Human Rights and international relations
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" Thank you very much, and good morning, everyone. Stu, thank you for those very kind words, but also thank you for so many decades of extraordinary service to this country and to its ideals.
This is something of a sacred place for me. Every time I walk through these doors, it has the same impact. And so I’m grateful to Sara and her leadership of this institution; Naomi, who walked us through the extraordinary exhibit on the story, the plight of the Rohingya that we’ll be talking about today. I urge everyone: Come, see this. Experience this. It will speak incredibly powerful to you.
To the entire team behind this essential institution, behind the exhibit, thank you for your enduring efforts to teach us the darkest parts of history – and the work you’re doing to strive that the past does not become prologue. It’s your efforts that make this museum a living memorial. That is the incredible enduring power of this institution.
One of the unsettling truths of the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum is that there’s never a time I visit here when its lessons do not feel deeply resonant. But I have to tell you, I can recall few times when that history felt so urgent, or the responsibility it imparts on all of us so pressing.
As we meet, the Russian Government continues to wage its unprovoked, brutal war on Ukraine. Each day brings more harrowing attacks, more innocent men, women, and children killed.
That includes the five people who were killed in a strike on March 1st, on a TV tower and the surrounding area on the outskirts of Kyiv, the same site where, just over 80 years ago, 33,771 Jews were killed by the Nazis in just 2 days. Babyn Yar.
Ukraine is home to nearly 10,000 Holocaust survivors, including an 88-year-old woman, Natalia Berezhnaya of Odessa. Here’s what she said in a recent interview, and I quote: “It’s hard to wrap my mind around the fact that in 1941, I had to hide in the basement of this building, and that I’m going to have to do that again now.”
The Kremlin has tried to justify this war by falsely claiming that it’s intervening to stop genocide, abusing the term that we reserve for the gravest atrocities, disrespecting every victim of this heinous crime. Yet even as we are working to increase international pressure on the Kremlin to end this unjustified war, we know there are many other places in the world where horrific atrocities are being committed. Over recent weeks, as I’ve spoken with diplomats from around the world about Ukraine, I’ve also heard a constant refrain. Many of them say, “Yes, we stand with the people of Ukraine. But we must also stand with the people suffering atrocities in other places.”
Like Xinjiang, where the Chinese Government continues to commit genocide and crimes against humanity against predominantly Muslim Uyghurs and other minority groups. Like the atrocities committed in the conflict in Ethiopia by all parties to that conflict, as well as by Eritrean forces. And like the recent flare-up in Darfur, Sudan, which raises alarming echoes of past acts of genocide by Bashir’s government forces and the Janjaweed. Standing with victims of atrocities is what brings me here today.
One of my responsibilities as Secretary is determining, on behalf of the United States, whether atrocities have been committed. It’s an immense responsibility that I take very seriously, particularly given my family’s history.
Beyond the Holocaust, the United States has concluded that genocide was committed seven times. Today marks the eighth, as I have determined that members of the Burmese military committed genocide and crimes against humanity against Rohingya.
It’s a decision that I reached based on reviewing a factual assessment and legal analysis prepared by the State Department, which included detailed documentation by a range of independent, impartial sources, including human rights organizations like Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, as well as our own rigorous fact-finding.
Among those sources was a joint report, published in November 2017, by the museum’s Simon-Skjodt Center for the Prevention of Genocide and the human rights group, Fortify Rights; and the museum’s determination, in December 2018, that there is compelling evidence that Burmese military committed crimes against humanity and genocide against Rohingya.
Given the gravity of this determination, it was also important that this administration conduct its own analysis of the facts and the law. (Inaudible) instances, the military used similar tactics targeting Rohingya: the razing of villages, killing, rape, torture, and other horrific abuses.
The military’s attacks in 2016 forced nearly 100,000 Rohingya to flee to Bangladesh. In 2017, attacks killed more than 9,000 Rohingya, and forced more than 740,000 to seek refuge in Bangladesh.
Let me take a moment to share some findings of this report, because they are a key part of how I arrived at my own determination.
The report was based on a survey of more than 1,000 Rohingya refugees living in Bangladesh, all of whom were displaced by the violence in 2016 or 2017. Three-quarters of those interviewed said that they personally witnessed members of the military kill someone. More than half witnessed acts of sexual violence. One in five witnessed a mass-casualty event – that is, the killing or injuring of more than 100 people in a single incident.
These percentages matter. They demonstrate that these abuses were not isolated cases. The attack against Rohingya was widespread and systematic, which is crucial for reaching a determination of crimes against humanity.
The evidence also points to a clear intent behind these mass atrocities – the intent to destroy Rohingya, in whole or in part. That intent has been corroborated by the accounts of soldiers who took part in the operation and later defected, such as one who said he was told by his commanding officer to, and I quote, “shoot at every sight of a person,” end quote – burn villages, rape and kill women, orders that he and his unit carried out.
Intent is evident in the racial slurs shouted by members of the Burmese military as they attacked Rohingya, the widespread attack on mosques, the desecration of Korans.
Intent is evident in the soldiers who bragged about their plans on social media, such as a lieutenant in the 33rd Light Infantry Division who, as he was deployed to Rakhine State in August 2017, wrote on his Facebook page, and I quote: “If they’re Bengali, they’ll be killed.” His unit is among those reported to have committed atrocities.
Intent is evident in public comments by Min Aung Hlaing, the commander-in-chief of the Burmese military, who was overseeing the operation. On September 1, 2017, as soldiers were razing villages, killing, torturing, raping men, women, and children, he said this, and I quote: “The Bengali problem was a longstanding one that has become an unfinished job… The government in office is taking great care in solving it,” end quote.
This is the same man who, in 2021, would lead the military coup to overthrow Burma’s democratically-elected government, and who currently heads its repressive regime.
Intent is evident in the preparatory steps that soldiers took in the days leading up to the atrocities. In the village of Maung Nu, for example, soldiers started by confiscating Rohingyas’ kitchen knives and machetes. Then they imposed a curfew. Then they tied pieces of red cloth outside the homes of Rohingya and at a local mosque. And then, only then, did the killing start.
Intent is evident in the military’s efforts to prevent Rohingya from escaping, like soldiers blocking exits to villages before they began their attacks, sinking boats full of men, women, and children as they tried to flee to Bangladesh. This demonstrates the military’s intent went beyond ethnic cleansing to the actual destruction of Rohingya.
Percentages, numbers, patterns, intent: these are critically important to reach the determination of genocide. But at the same time, we must remember that behind each of these numbers are countless individual acts of cruelty and inhumanity.
Nura, a mother of four, begged soldiers not to rape her in front of her children, but she said, “They did what they wanted to my body.”
Harsa’s 12-year-old son was torn from her arms and forced to lie face down in front of her before soldiers began to stomp on his head and neck.
It’s painful to even read these accounts. And I ask you, I ask each and every one of you listening, put yourself in their place. Imagine this was your own child. Imagine. These stories force us to reckon with the immeasurable pain wrought by every heinous abuse.
That pain ripples outward, from the individual victims and survivors to loved ones, to friends, to entire communities. That is something I saw with my own step-father, Samuel Pisar, who carried with him the loss of his mother, his father, his little sister, and the horrors he’d experienced in the Holocaust, for the rest of his life.
We also must remember these individuals as more than victims, but rather as whole human beings, as mothers, as fathers, as sons, daughters.
People like Jomila and her 15-year-old son, Jahingir, whose story is part of the exhibit that I saw just a little while ago. Jahingir was one of dozens of Rohingya executed by soldiers in August 2017. (1) He was a boy with bright, inquisitive eyes, a dedicated student, who always had a book in his hand.
When soldiers arrived at his village, he hid his books, fearing soldiers would steal them. After he was killed, his mother carried those books with her as she fled to Bangladesh. She still carries them today.
Jomila is one Rohingya mother who lost a child. Out of thousands.
There’s another fundamental lesson in the Holocaust Museum’s powerful exhibit, which is found in its title: “Burma’s Path” – Burma’s Path – “to Genocide.” That’s the groundwork for genocide, the fact that it is laid far in advance, over years, even decades, through a steady process of dehumanization and demonization.
For example, tomorrow, March 22nd, is the day that the Nazis opened their first concentration camp, in Dachau, just 10 miles from Munich. That occurred in 1933, a dozen years – a dozen years – before my stepfather would be sent to that camp after his time in Majdanek and Auschwitz.
The museum’s exhibit that I toured shows us the long path to genocide in Burma, how Rohingya, who had been an integral part of Burma’s society for generations, saw their rights, saw their citizenship methodically stripped away.
In 1962, when the military staged its first coup, it canceled all Rohingya-language programming on the state-run broadcasting service.
In 1978, when the military used a nationwide campaign to register so-called foreigners as a pretext to terrorize Rohingya, forcing more than 200,000 to flee to Bangladesh.
In 1991, when soldiers carried out killings, rapes, massive destruction of Rohingya communities as part of the military’s so-called “Clean and Beautiful Nation,” driving an additional 250,000 Rohingya to Bangladesh.
The path is a familiar one, mirroring in so many ways the path to the Holocaust and other genocides.
We see it in the segregation of Rohingya into internally displaced persons camps in Rakhine State, the requirement that all Rohingya households register with the government.
We see it in Burma’s 1982 citizenship law, which effectively excluded Rohingya from citizenship and denied them full political rights, echoing the 1935 Nuremberg Laws that stripped Jews of their German citizenship.
We see parallels in the dehumanizing hate speech. Rohingya were compared to fleas, to thorns, to an invasive species, just at Tutsis were compared to cockroaches, and Jews to rats and parasites.
Understanding the contours of this path is a core part of the Holocaust Museum’s mission. It’s crucial to all of us who are committed to living up to the maxim of “Never again.” By learning to spot the signs of the worst atrocities, we’re empowered to prevent them.
And while today’s determination of genocide and crimes against humanity is focused on Rohingya, it’s also important to recognize that for decades the Burmese military has committed killings, rape, and other atrocities against members of other ethnic and religious minority groups. Reports of these abuses are widespread; they’re well documented. They’ve occurred in states across Burma. That history, and the determination we’re making today, are fundamental to understanding Burma’s current crisis.
Many of the military leaders who oversaw the genocidal campaign against Rohingya, including the general who led it, were also involved in abuses committed against other ethnic and religious minority groups. They’re the same military leaders who overthrew Burma’s democratically elected government on February 1st, 2021 and seized power. Since the coup, we’ve seen the Burmese military use many of the same tactics, only now the military is targeting anyone it sees as opposing or undermining its repressive rule: student protestors, pro-democracy activists, striking workers, journalists, health workers.
Twenty-two-year-old Thinzar Hein was a nursing student who went to protests to provide medical care to the wounded. On March 28, 2021, she was tending to three injured people at a protest in Monywa when soldiers approached and shot her in the head.
On December 24th, 2021, the military massacred at least 35 people, including women, children, two humanitarian aid workers in Kayah State, and then burned their bodies. According to a doctor who examined the bodies, almost every victim’s skull was fractured.
Since seizing power, the military has killed more than 1,670 men, women, and children, and unjustly detained at least 12,800 more in abysmal conditions.
The similarities in these atrocities underscore a fundamental truth of this museum and of history: People who are willing to commit atrocities against one group of people can swiftly be turned against another. This is the warning of the well-known poem by Martin Niemöller on the walls of this museum, which begins, as so many of us know, “First they came for the socialists, and I did not speak out…”
And for those who did not realize it before the coup, the brutal violence that has followed has made clear that there is no one the Burmese military won’t come for. No one is safe from atrocities under its rule. And so more people in Burma now recognize that ending this crisis, restoring the path to democracy, starts with ensuring the human rights of all people in the country, including Rohingya.
The similarities also matter for the purpose of truth and accountability, something the United States has been working toward since the abuses occurred and continues to do to this day. The passage of time does not diminish this responsibility; if anything, it only makes our quest more urgent.
We strongly supported the UN Fact Finding Mission for Myanmar, and we’re doing the same for its successor, the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar, as it collects, preserves, and analyzes evidence of the most serious international crimes in Burma. We’re providing a wide range of support, including information, resources. And today, I can announce that we’re also contributing nearly a million dollars in additional funding.
We have also shared information with The Gambia in connection with the case it has filed against Burma under the Genocide Convention at the International Court of Justice for the atrocities committed against Rohingya.
Even as we lay the foundation for future accountability, we’re also working to stop the military’s ongoing atrocities, press for the release of all those unjustly detained, support the people of Burma as they strive to put the country back on the track to democracy.
Alongside allies and partners, we’re imposing significant costs on the leaders who bear the greatest responsibility for atrocities. We’ve imposed targeted sanctions on 65 individuals, including top military commanders, senior officials, their family members. We’ve applied sanctions or export controls on 26 entities that were either implicated in human rights abuses or generate revenue for the military and its leaders. And we’ve prevented the regime from plundering Burma’s overseas reserves.
In June 2021, we’ve led efforts at the UN General Assembly to pass a resolution calling on member states to stop the flow of arms into Burma, which 119 countries supported and only one voted against. And in January, we joined 35 nations in calling for an end to the provision of all arms, materiel, and technical assistance to the Burmese military. All governments have a responsibility to keep the pressure on – a report released last month by the UN Special Rapporteur on human rights in Burma found that China, Russia, and Serbia have all continued to supply the regime with weapons used against civilians since the coup.
We’re working closely with our allies and partners – in Asia, around Europe, at the G7, the United Nations, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation – to deny the regime the international access and credibility it craves.
We’re supporting ASEAN’s efforts to end the regime’s violence and seek a peaceful resolution to the crisis through its Five-Point Consensus, and we appreciate the work of ASEAN’s special envoy, Cambodia’s Foreign Minister Prak Sokhonn, who arrived in Burma today for his first visit as envoy. The foreign minister’s experience – and that of his country in enduring a genocide – gives crucial perspective on the issues at hand.
The United States also continues to provide significant support to help meet the immediate humanitarian needs of Rohingya and all affected by their persecution – nearly $1.6 billion since 2017 for everything from shelter and education, specialized mental health and psychosocial support for the victims of trauma.
I want to recognize the exceptional generosity of Bangladesh in hosting over 900,000 Rohingya refugees, including its recent efforts to vaccinate hundreds of thousands of Rohingya as part of its national COVID-19 vaccination campaign.
I’ve spoken today about the path to genocide. But let me close by saying something about the path out of genocide.
Today’s determination is one step on that path as it tells Rohingya, and victims in particular, that the United States government recognizes the gravity of the atrocities committed against them. And it affirms Rohingyas’ human rights and dignity, something the Burmese military has tried to destroy.
In the wake of the coup, we’ve seen growing solidarity with Rohingya across Burma, including an important commitment by the “National Unity Government” to ensure that the human rights of Rohingya – and of all ethnic and religious minority groups – are respected.
Of course, the path out of genocide also runs through justice. And while today that justice may feel elusive, to look around this room is to get a sense of just how determined people are to end the Burmese military’s decades-long impunity. And there are many of us.
Rohingya activists who have dedicated their lives to defending the rights of members of their community, several of whom are here today. And thank you for being with us.
Local and international human rights organizations, which have spent years documenting atrocities against Rohingya and other ethnic and religious groups in Burma.
Members of the United States Congress, who have demonstrated sustained bipartisan leadership in condemning the atrocities committed against Rohingya, providing humanitarian assistance, supporting the democratic aspirations of the people of Burma.
And of course, the courageous Rohingya survivors who have been willing to come forward to share their stories, to provide accounts of what they experienced.
The case files are growing. The Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar alone has collected more than 1.5 million items of evidence and information, including witness testimonies, documents, messages, photos, videos, geospatial imagery, social media pages.
Efforts are moving forward, not only at the International Court of Justice, but also through the International Criminal Court and through the domestic courts of Argentina, in a case brought under universal jurisdiction.
The day will come when those responsible for these appalling acts will have to answer for them.
Ultimately, the path out of genocide also leads home. Last week, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees released a report based on interviews with thousands of Rohingya refugees across the region. It found that, despite all they have endured, despite decades of being told they do not belong, two out of three Rohingya refugees still want to be able to return home to Burma one day – as long as they can do it safely, with dignity, with human rights, which is not possible now.
And so, with today’s determination, the United States reaffirms its broader commitment to accompany Rohingya on this path out of genocide – toward truth, toward accountability, toward a home that will welcome them as equal members, that will respect their human rights and dignity, alongside that of all people in Burma..."
Source/publisher:
United States Department of State
Date of publication:
2022-03-21
Date of entry/update:
2022-03-23
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Atrocities against Groups - documents, Discrimination against the Rohingya
Language:
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Title: Statement on the report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar
Description:
"The Republic of the Union of Myanmar welcomes the report of the Special Rapporteur on the
situation of human rights in Myanmar,1 as well as his Conference Room Paper on 'UN Member
States' Arms Transfers to the Myanmar Military'.2
Myanmar extends its full support to the Special Rapporteur and will grant him access to the country.
This same cooperation is offered to all mandate-holders. Myanmar therefore issues a standing
invitation to the Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council.
The Special Rapporteur's latest report catalogues horrors on an 'immense' scale by the illegal
military junta. These atrocities include murders, executions, enslavement, torture and inhumane
treatment, rape and sexual violence, the forcible transfer and displacement of communities, the use
of human shields, forced recruitment, the destruction of property, pillaging, and the weaponisation
of humanitarian aid.
In a finding shared by the High Commissioner for Human Rights,3 the Special Rapporteur confirms
that these acts constitute probable crimes against humanity and war crimes.
In horrific accounts, the Special Rapporteur documents junta methods of torture that include
stabbings, shocking with electrical devices, burning of skin and genitalia, the ripping out of
fingernails, stress positions and deprivation of food and water. A displaced Karenni man recounts the
killing of his two teenage daughters by junta bombardment. His daughters, he says, were 'thrown in
different directions. The stomach and lower body... blown to pieces.'
The Special Rapporteur goes on to record more junta acts of terror - the burning of bodies, the
ramming of peaceful protestors with vehicles, the use of sexual violence as a weapon of war, the
continued dehumanisation and exclusion of the Rohingya, the hostage taking and use of children as
human shields, and the likely targeting of LGBTQ detainees because of their sexual orientation.
At the heart of these atrocities lies a deeper shame: that they have long been known to the Human
Rights Council yet allowed to escalate. Myanmar shares the Special Rapporteur's profound disappointment with 'the failure of the international community to act decisively to help prevent
atrocities and hold perpetrators accountable'.
Where Myanmar stands in firm solidarity with the people of Ukraine, it also acknowledges the
Special Rapporteur's insight that our people are similarly 'under siege by a brutal and relentless
military attack' - indeed, as the Special Rapporteur’s Conference Room Paper documents, one
armed by a common aggressor.
Myanmar accepts the Special Rapporteur’s recommendations, particularly those addressed to the
National Unity Government, and supports the Special Rapporteur’s calls on UN Member States to:
• increase humanitarian assistance to the people of Myanmar
• immediately halt the sale or transfer of weapons and dual-use technology to Myanmar and
ensure that aviation fuel is not transferred to the Myanmar military
• exert strong, sustained pressure on the military junta including through coordinated, targeted
economic sanctions and embargoes of weapons and dual-use technology
• support efforts to hold perpetrators of atrocity crimes accountable in impartial and
independent courts, including the International Criminal Court, International Court of Justice
and national courts in countries with universal jurisdiction laws
• recognise the National Unity Government as representing the sovereign will of the people of
Myanmar and as a trusted source and partner to engage in the distribution of humanitarian,
health, education and other support for the people of Myanmar.
Myanmar, in closing, expresses its continued gratitude to the Special Rapporteur for his tireless
commitment to its people..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Human Rights
Date of publication:
2022-03-21
Date of entry/update:
2022-03-23
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Human Rights and international relations, Discrimination/violence against women: reports of violations in Burma, Right to Life: reports of violations in Burma
Language:
Format :
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88.09 KB
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Description:
"Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC),
comprised of seven countries from South Asia and Southeast Asia namely Bangladesh, Bhutan,
India, Myanmar, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Thailand, is scheduled to hold its 5th Summit on March 30
which will be hosted by Sri Lanka.
The biennial summit is a conference where leaders of member states come together to discuss
and make highest policy decisions for peace, prosperity and sustainability of Bay of Bengal
region. The 4th summit held in Nepal in 2018 was attended by Myanmar president U Win Myint.
On 1st, February, 2021, Myanmar military attempted to seize power from the civilian
government. It has been 400 days since for Myanmar people of all ethnics and religions, who
have categorically rejected and resisted the military’s coup attempt, risking their lives to defend
democracy and end military tyranny by all means as they strive for a federal democratic system.
To this end, the military junta’s coup attempt to seize control of the country has failed.
Coup leader Min Aung Hlaing sent his remark representing Myanmar at the 24th anniversary of
BIMSTEC in June 2021 and in BIMSTEC’s announcement of his message, he was referred to as
honorary chairman of the State Administration Council of Myanmar. In December 2021, Myanmar
military was invited to take part in military exercises of BIMSTEC countries in India and, in
addition, there are records that Myanmar military representatives attended many of BIMSTEC
meetings as country representatives.
Most of the members of BIMSTEC are democracy countries, yet BIMSTEC have provided
legitimacy to the Myanmar military that is a terrorist organization that has killed 2,313 people
just because they protested against the military and detained 11,564 civilians (Grim data
collected by the Media Monitoring Collective, MMC from February 2021 to January 2022). The
Junta has arrested democracy and human rights activists and defenders and deliberately
targeting civilians with airstrikes, ground military attacks, setting villages on fires and committing
mass killings. The military’s campaign of terror has forced over 500,000 people to flee their
homes, further deepening the humanitarian crisis. These grave violations of human rights amount
to crimes against humanity and war crimes that have been collectively condemned by the people
of Myanmar and international community together.
BIMSTEC risks compliciting in Myanmar military’s atrocities crimes by continuing to invite
coup leader Min Aung Hlaing as representative of Myanmar to the 5th BIMSTEC summit in 2022
as it will lend legitimacy to the Myanmar military and further embolden them to continue its
atrocity crimes against the people.
Such action will only cause additional pain and serve as salt to the wound of the people of
Myanmar who are already suffering from atrocities by Myanmar military on a daily basis.
We, the undersigned organizations in solidarity with Myanmar across the globe demand the
following:
1. BIMSTEC must disassociate itself and cut all ties with the military council members which
was established by the Myanmar military who have been accused of committing genocide, war
crimes and many acts of crimes against humanity.
2. The demands of democracy movement and spring revolution of Myanmar people must
be respected and recognized.
3. There cannot be a peaceful, prosperous, and sustainable Bay of Bengal region, if
democracy and human rights cease to thrive. We call on leaders of BIMSTEC member states to
discuss and decide on the issues of Myanmar in consideration of humanity and human dignity..."
Source/publisher:
136 Myanmar Civil Society Organizations
Date of publication:
2022-03-23
Date of entry/update:
2022-03-23
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Human Rights and international relations, Freedom of Movement, violations of in Burma/Myanmar, Anti-coup protesters
Language:
Format :
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Size:
124.07 KB
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Sub-title:
Youth groups made up of Rakhine and Rohingya members are coming up with solutions to shared challenges in Myanmar’s ethnically divided Rakhine State.
Description:
"On a blue-sky winter’s day in Myanmar’s western Rakhine State, hundreds of people from two neighbouring villages – one populated by ethnic Rakhine people and the other by the minority Rohingya ethnic group – stream into an open field. The atmosphere is cheerful and festive as crowds gather around a large makeshift sports ground.
As a football match between teams made up of Rakhine and Rohingya players commences, Myint Swe looks on with pride. “It took several weeks of planning for us to organize this event,” says the 32-year-old from Pyar La Chaung, the Rakhine village.
Also watching from the sidelines is 20-year-old Maung Kyaw Maung from Pyin Chay, the Rohingya village that is 10 minutes away by foot from the Rakhine one. “Youths from both villages came together to make this possible,” he says.
The duo is part of an eight-member youth group that organized the event. Officially called the Youth Development Committee, it is made up of four young people from the two villages who were elected by their respective communities to come up with solutions to shared challenges and to organize joint activities like the football match.
Stories of collaboration across ethnic lines are relatively rare in Rakhine State, where ethnic and religious divisions have long impacted intercommunal relations. While the region has been largely spared the violence experienced in other parts of Myanmar following the military takeover of 1 February 2021, historical wounds from previous conflicts have yet to fully heal.
There have been several waves of violence and displacement since the early 1990s. Among the most significant were intercommunal violence in 2012 and, five years later, the crisis that forced more than 740,000 Rohingya to flee across the border to Bangladesh. In total, some 1.6 million Rohingya are living as refugees, mainly in Bangladesh, Malaysia and India. Another 148,000 out of 600,000 Rohingya remaining in Myanmar are displaced across Rakhine State.
See also: UNHCR steps up aid for displaced in Myanmar as conflict intensifies
Their prospects for being able to return home in the near future remain slim. In addition to the continued insecurity affecting both the Rohingya and the Rakhine communities, Rakhine State is a region with limited economic opportunities.
The Rohingya live in particularly precarious conditions after decades of being denied basic rights, including citizenship, freedom of movement and access to basic services such as education and health care. While improvements to living conditions have been made in the last decade, there has been no tangible progress in the areas of citizenship and documentation.
As part of efforts to address these challenges, UNHCR, the UN Refugee Agency, has been working with partners to foster greater social cohesion between the two ethnic groups, and reduce the likelihood of future intercommunal violence.
The successful organization of the sports day event involving the Rakhine and Rohingya villages is the culmination of a year-long rural youth empowerment project run by ACTED, an international NGO and partner of UNHCR.
“Youths play a special role in shaping intercommunal dynamics,” explains Htin Kyaw Min, a project manager at ACTED. “They can act as changemakers in strengthening dialogue, decision-making, and conflict resolution, not only within, but also between their communities.”
“We have a lot in common.”
The Youth Development Committee Maung Kyaw Maung and Myint Swe are part of, is one of six established by ACTED under the project. Members of each group are given training on leadership, peacebuilding, business development, vocational skills and first aid, among other things. They then work with village elders and administrators to identify needs and implement joint solutions benefitting both communities.
The training has inspired members to come up with income-generating activities that serve both their communities. “The business development training gave us the idea to buy tables and chairs which are used for community events like today’s sports day. When not in use, we plan to rent them out to other villages to generate some income,” says Myint Swe. “We want to use the money earned to finish construction of a road linking both our villages.”
By promoting social integration and economic empowerment for both the Rakhine and Rohingya communities, the youth empowerment project aims to foster conditions that will help restore the fundamental rights of the Rohingya and pave the way for them to return home safely.
“We have a lot in common,” says Myint Swe, noting that both villages lack education, but especially the Rohingya one. “We try our best to help one another gain more skills. Knowledge is very important and helps to maintain peace.”
“Previously, interaction between our villages was less frequent,” says Maung Kyaw Maung. “Now, we are on friendlier terms with each other.”..."
Source/publisher:
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (Geneva)
Date of publication:
2022-03-23
Date of entry/update:
2022-03-23
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Discrimination against the Rohingya, Arakan (Rakhine) State - reports etc. by date (latest first)
Language:
more
Description:
"Today, Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken announced that the United States has determined that the Burmese military committed genocide and crimes against humanity against the Rohingya people.
All of us are grateful for the committed and forceful advocacy of Rohingya survivors of this genocide---survivors who have already demonstrated unimaginable resilience and bravery in the face of horror---as well as a range of organizations who have worked to document the Burmese military's crimes. Genocide is the intentional attempt to destroy a group of people, and the evidence that the Burmese military sought to eradicate the Rohingya is extensive and searing. As a result of the military's atrocities, women were forced to gather their families and flee under cover of darkness. Young children witnessed their families slaughtered, and their parents assaulted. From Burma to Bangladesh, hundreds of thousands of survivors have left behind the lives they knew, forced to choose the uncertainty of escape over the certain death of staying behind.
Today's genocide determination is an important step in bringing accountability on behalf of Rohingya survivors and victims. As Secretary Blinken noted, the United States is supporting the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar and sharing information with The Gambia to support the case it is pursuing against Burma under the Genocide Convention at the International Court of Justice. The United States is also the world's leading donor in providing the survivors of this genocide with life-saving assistance. We provide urgent humanitarian assistance to nearly one million Rohingya refugees who currently live in Bangladesh---in the world's largest refugee settlement in Cox's Bazar district---as well as the hundreds of thousands of Rohingya and millions of other conflicted-affected people who remain in Burma.
Working alongside our partners, USAID and the U.S. Department of State's Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration will continue to provide food, livelihoods, nutrition, and protection services, among other assistance, to millions of refugees, IDPs and host community members throughout Burma and across the Cox's Bazar district. And we will continue to do everything possible to support the 620,000 ethnic Rohingya who remain in Rakhine State in Burma where their lives continue to be severely restricted.
In recognizing these atrocities as genocide, we acknowledge not just the horrific nature of the violence perpetrated by the Burmese military, but our obligation to support the Rohingya in their pursuit of justice..."
Source/publisher:
US Agency for International Development (Washington, D.C.) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of publication:
2022-03-21
Date of entry/update:
2022-03-22
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Language:
more
Description:
"Human Rights Council
Forty-ninth session
28 February–1 April 2022
Summary
The Myanmar junta is committing gross human rights violations against the people of Myanmar. It is bombing villages indiscriminately, forcibly displacing hundreds of thousands. Its troops have engaged in mass killings on numerous occasions and tortured dozens to death. It is criminalizing basic human rights, including the right to express dissent—both on the streets and online. It is actively committing probable crimes against humanity and war crimes.
This paper examines a key aspect of the international community’s response to the Myanmar military’s illegal coup and these subsequent violations of international law – the supply of weapons to the military junta that are used to attack the people of Myanmar. It also makes recommendations to reduce the flow of weapons to the junta and save lives.
The paper details known arms transfers from Member States to Myanmar since 2018, and in particular since the military coup on 1 February 2021, that could be used by the Myanmar military to attack civilians. The Special Rapporteur also discusses the legality of these transfers, applying international humanitarian law, customary international law related to state responsibility, and the Arms Trade Treaty, where applicable.
As the Myanmar military’s attacks against civilians escalate, it is critical that Member States immediately consider how they might alter their response to this crisis. This can begin by examining the role of the Security Council and Member States since the junta’s coup one year ago. How have the actions, or inaction, of the Security Council and Member States contributed to the crisis in Myanmar? What changes can and must be made to save lives, reduce human suffering, and protect the human rights of the Myanmar people?
Amongst his recommendations, the Special Rapporteur urges the Security Council to impose a comprehensive arms embargo and targeted economic sanctions against the Myanmar military. At the very least, he urges Member States of the Security Council to immediately propose a resolution to stop the flow of weapons that are actively being used by the military junta to attack Myanmar civilians: jet aircraft, attack helicopters, armored vehicles, light and heavy artillery, missiles and rockets that can be used to target ground targets, artillery shells, and small arms. The choice between action and inaction is literally a matter of life and death..."
Source/publisher:
UN Human Rights Council (Geneva) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of publication:
2022-03-21
Date of entry/update:
2022-03-22
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
UN human rights documents on Myanmar, Human Rights and international relations, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
924.44 KB (Original version) - 39 pages
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Description:
"The Human Rights Council this morning discussed the situation of human rights in Myanmar and in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. It heard the High Commissioner say that the human rights of the people of Myanmar were in profound crisis and that accountability remained crucial to any solution to the crisis in Myanmar. The Council also heard the Special Rapporteur speak about the most serious human rights violations in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the need to pursue accountability, urging a stop of crimes against humanity like the political prison camps in the country.
Michelle Bachelet, United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, said that the human rights of the people of Myanmar were in profound crisis. Myanmar was increasingly at risk of State collapse, with shattered economic, education, health, and social protection systems. The High Commissioner remained acutely concerned for the safety and rights of human rights defenders and other civil society actors. Military authorities systematically used arrests and detentions as a tool to target and intimidate people who opposed them. The plight of the Rohingya people – a population persecuted for decades - remained dire, with no solution in sight. In conclusion, the High Commissioner stated that accountability remained crucial to any solution to this crisis.
In the ensuing debate on Myanmar, some speakers welcomed the efforts of the High Commissioner’s Office to assess the gravity of human rights violations in Myanmar. Calls were made for an immediate end to violence against the civilian population and for the release of all political prisoners. Speakers condemned any discrimination against minorities, as well as the systematic use of violence and arbitrary detentions, torture and enforced disappearances. Speakers condemned the military coup. Some speakers regretted that Myanmar, as a country concerned, was unable to participate in the dialogue and supported all parties to find a political solution through dialogue to restore social stability and to restart the democratic process in the country. Multilateral institutions such as the Human Rights Council should help Myanmar to solve the current situation rather than supporting external intervention.
Speaking during the discussion on Myanmar were the European Union, Pakistan on behalf of the Organization of Islamic Conference, Canada, Germany, Malaysia, Luxembourg, Viet Nam, China, Spain, Netherlands, Russian Federation, Cambodia, Indonesia, Australia, Mauritania, Bangladesh, Romania, United Kingdom, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Bulgaria, India, Switzerland, Gambia, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and France.
Also speaking were Human Rights Commission of Malaysia, Edmund Rice International Limited, Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development, Centre for Civil and Political Rights, Baptist World Alliance, International Humanist and Ethical Union, Article 19 International Centre Against Censorship, International Bar Association, CIVICUS, Organization for Poverty Alleviation and Development, and International Commission of Jurists.
The Council then held an interactive dialogue with the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.
Tomás Ojea Quintana, Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, said that he had been consistent on the need to implement a two-track approach: highlighting the most serious human rights violations in the country and the need to pursue accountability, alongside offering constructive engagement with the Government to seek improvement of the human rights situation on the ground. It was imperative for the Government to cease ongoing crimes against humanity, including through the system of kwanliso (political prison camps), and to undertake a process of accountability. Cooperation actually allowed in recent years had led to some advancements in addressing economic, social and cultural rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.
In the ensuing discussion, some speakers shared the great concerns expressed in the Special Rapporteur’s report and called on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to fully engage with the mandate. Regrettably the report only confirmed what was already known, which was that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea violated its citizens’ human rights and basic freedom. They deplored the attitude of a regime which cut off all links with the outside world, including access to humanitarian aid. Some speakers commended the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea for the promotion and protection of the human rights of its population and denounced a report based on disinformation. They were opposed to specific mandates against countries, particularly when the country concerned did not consent to them.
Speaking in the interactive dialogue on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea were European Union, Norway on behalf of Nordic-Baltic countries, Liechtenstein, Cuba, Syria, Venezuela, France, China, Switzerland, Sri Lanka, Cambodia, Australia, Ireland, Republic of Korea, Belarus, United States, United Kingdom, Zimbabwe, Czech Republic, Albania, Nicaragua, Viet Nam, South Sudan, Burundi, Eritrea, Lao People’s Democratic Republic New Zealand, Iran and Japan.
Also speaking were Christian Solidarity Worldwide, Human Rights Watch, UN Watch, Ingenieurs du Monde, and People for Successful Korean Reunification.
The webcast of the Human Rights Council meetings can be found here. All meeting summaries can be found here. Documents and reports related to the Human Rights Council’s forty-ninth regular session can be found here.
The Council will reconvene at 3 p.m. this afternoon to hold separate interactive dialogues with the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, and with the High Commissioner on her oral update on the implementation of the recommendations made by the group of independent experts on accountability for human rights violations in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. It will then hold a general debate on agenda item four on human rights situations that require the Council’s attention.
Interactive Dialogue with the High Commissioner on the Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar
Documentation
The Council has before it (A/HRC/49/72) report of the High Commissioner on the human rights situation in Myanmar since 1 February 2021
Presentation of Report
MICHELLE BACHELET, United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, said that 13 months after the military coup of 1 February 2021, the human rights of the people of Myanmar were in profound crisis. Harsh repression of the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly, expression and information – including Internet access – had not quelled the country's rejection of the coup. Most protests had been expressed peacefully, regardless, the military had met all dissent - both acts of civil disobedience and acts of violence - in the same manner: with the use of lethal force, mass arbitrary arrests, and the use of torture. Since February 2021, over half a million people had been forced to flee their homes, with at least 15,000 recorded as fleeing the country. They added to the nearly 340,000 people internally displaced before February 2021 and over one million refugees, most of them Rohingya.
Ms. Bachelet said that Myanmar was increasingly at risk of State collapse, with shattered economic, education, health, and social protection systems. The collapse of the health system had had devastating consequences for Myanmar’s COVID-19 response. The country's precious development gains had been destroyed by conflict and the military’s abuse of power. The High Commissioner remained acutely concerned for the safety and rights of human rights defenders and other civil society actors. Military authorities systematically used arrests and detentions as a tool to target and intimidate people who opposed them. The plight of the Rohingya people – a population persecuted for decades - remained dire, with no solution in sight.
In conclusion, the High Commissioner said that accountability remained crucial to any solution to this crisis. Human rights violations and crimes being committed today by Myanmar's military forces were built upon the impunity with which they perpetrated the slaughter of the Rohingya four years ago – and other, similar, operations against ethnic minorities over many previous decades. Clearly, there would need to be a political pathway to restore democracy and civilian rule. But such dialogue could not and would not displace the urgent need to hold to account those responsible for severe human rights violations. The people of Myanmar deserved, and overwhelmingly demanded, justice. Ms. Bachelet urged stronger efforts to advance tangible results from the five-point consensus achieved by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations in April 2021 as so far, there had been little progress.
Discussion
In the ensuing debate, speakers thanked the High Commissioner for her report and welcomed the efforts of her Office to assess the gravity of human rights violations in Myanmar. Cases of discrimination were on the rise. The persecution of minorities was increasing the risk to the security of the entire region. Speakers called for an immediate end to violence against civilian populations and for the release of all political prisoners. They condemned any discrimination against minorities, as well as the systematic use of violence and arbitrary detentions, torture and enforced disappearances. Such blatant violations were condemned and concerns over violence against civilians and human rights defenders were expressed. Speakers condemned the military coup. They expressed concerns over the level of violence and called on the military leadership to end all forms of violence, to ensure accountability and to end impunity for all human rights violations.
Some speakers urged the de facto authority to respect the Human Rights Council and all other United Nations mechanisms, fully cooperate with them, and cease reprisal against those mechanisms. The scale of human rights violations exacerbated the tragedy faced by the Rohingya population. Humanitarian access should be free and unhindered. Concerns over the supply of weapons to Myanmar were expressed. The international community should cease all transfers of weapons to Myanmar. Member States were urged to prevent the sale of weapons and military assistance to Myanmar. The army was continuing its brutal oppression instead of respecting international humanitarian law.
Some speakers regretted that Myanmar, as a country concerned, was unable to participate in the dialogue and supported all parties to find a political solution through dialogue to restore social stability and to restart the democratic process in the country. The current problem in Myanmar was for the people of Myanmar to solve and external pressure would only be counterproductive. Multilateral institutions such as the Human Rights Council should help Myanmar to solve the current situation rather than support external intervention. Speakers supported the efforts of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and reiterated the importance of a prosperous and peaceful Myanmar. They were supportive of the constructive role of the Association to work with Myanmar to advance the implementation of the consensus.
Concluding Remarks on Myanmar
MICHELLE BACHELET, United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, responding to the question on what more could be done to prevent a further spiral of human rights violations in Myanmar, including against women and children, said she was concerned about this, and the impact it could have across the country, and the Office had observed increasingly brutal tactics and use of heavy power. Villages were being razed to the ground. Women in detention were experiencing violation and degrading treatment, including torture, and both men and lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender persons had been sexually assaulted at police stations. Children had been detained in various areas; some were being prosecuted and two had been given the death penalty. Steps had been identified to end the spiral: to stop the military oppression, to release detainees, and to restore democracy, among others. It was important for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations to support this. The report set out clear additional actionable recommendations that could assist the people of Myanmar and which highlighted the actions that the international community could take, including sanctions on military-linked economic interests. It was important for all stakeholders in the democratic movement and ethnic groups to be consulted in any efforts to solve the situation.
There had been a complete breakdown of the national system to ensure economic and social rights: millions had lost their jobs, the price of basic commodities had soared, and public health care systems were collapsing. Women teachers had gone without pay. There was an urgent need for humanitarian assistance in all parts of Myanmar. It was important to ensure the maximum involvement of civil society and humanitarian organizations in delivering aid, as they enjoyed the recognition of the people. Accountability should be ensured for serious human rights violations, as well as international crimes, which should be addressed as a solution for any sustainable political situation in the country. There should be a comprehensive transitional justice policy, ensuring the rights of victims and allowing victims to make their voices heard. The Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar was aiding this in the context of international standards. The different processes involved should collaborate to avoid overlap, and to ensure accountability in full. The High Commissioner said she fully supported the call for the creation of a conducive, dignified and sustainable return of the Rohingya to their own lands. There would be no sustainable solution unless these key issues could be addressed.
Interactive Dialogue with the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
Documentation
The Council has before it (A/HRC/49/74) report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Tomás Ojea Quintana.
Presentation of Report
TOMÁS OJEA QUINTANA, Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, said that over the past six years, he had raised concerns about the coercive system of governance that deprived the fundamental freedoms of the people in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. He had been consistent on the need to implement a two-track approach: highlighting the most serious human rights violations in the country and the need to pursue accountability, alongside offering constructive engagement with the Government to seek the improvement of the human rights situation on the ground. It was imperative for the Government to cease ongoing crimes against humanity, including through the system of kwanliso (political prison camps), and to undertake a process of accountability. Until that happened, efforts should be pursued to refer the situation to the International Criminal Court or to create an ad hoc tribunal or comparable mechanism to determine individual criminal responsibility. Alternatives based on principles of universal or extraterritorial jurisdiction should also be tried, while preserving information that may be used in future processes needed to continue. Accountability also involved developing a historical record, memorialisation, reparation, and truth-telling exercises, which were necessary to guarantee the rights of victims.
Cooperation actually allowed in recent years had led to some advancements in addressing economic, social and cultural rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the rights of persons with disabilities, the plight of Korean separated families, and the Japanese abductions issue, among others, the Special Rapporteur said. The participation of the Government over the past six years in some United Nations mechanisms and training activities should be acknowledged and built upon to maximise space for cooperation in areas such as conditions in detention and the treatment of detainees, food, health, water and sanitation, adequate housing and labour standards. Mr. Ojea Quintana believed that the ongoing deterioration of the human rights situation in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea was linked to the country’s ever-increasing isolation from the international community. At this point in time, the crucial challenge was to not recreate a new cycle of escalation of tensions on the Korean Peninsula, which could rapidly and dangerously destabilise the region. In his view, a diplomatic approach towards peace and the denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula, which would build upon previous negotiations and was combined with proactive engagement on the human rights situation, was the only way forward.
Discussion
In the ensuing discussion, speakers shared the great concerns expressed in the Special Rapporteur’s report and called on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to fully engage with the mandate. They condemned the country’s lack of respect for the fundamental human rights of its population. Regrettably, the report only confirmed what was already known, which was that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea violated its citizens’ human rights and basic freedoms. Every simple act or gesture was controlled in order to prevent acts of dissent. Speakers were frustrated at the lack of progress when it came to improving the human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, which was witnessing serious and systematic violations, and exaggerated isolation. They deplored the attitude of a regime which had cut off all links with the outside world, including access of humanitarian aid.
Speakers called on the authorities to put a stop to all human rights violations and resume cooperation with the United Nations. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea showed little signs of decreasing the exaggerated isolation of its population which started at the beginning of the pandemic and this was concerning. The complete closure of the borders had exacerbated the challenges faced by the country. The situation continued to be dire every day. Speakers urged the Government to allow full access to humanitarian aid. The necessity to open the borders to allow the evacuation of people for medical reasons was highlighted. There was no rule of law, no free elections, no free media and no free civil society. The Government should work more closely with the human rights system.
Some speakers denounced discriminatory mechanisms such as country specific mandates and highlighted that the Universal Periodic Review should be the path forward to tackle human rights violations. They were against selective and politically motivated resolutions and mandates such as the one on Myanmar. Mechanisms imposed against the will of States concerned only contributed to manipulating human rights. Country specific initiatives were known to fail. Speakers regretted the report’s lack of impartiality and called on the Special Rapporteur to stop this unconstructive approach. Calls for the lifting of the unilateral coercive measures that harmed the economic development of Myanmar and violated its people human rights were made. Myanmar’s sovereignty needed to be respected.
Interim Remarks
TOMÁS OJEA QUINTANA, Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, regretted that there was no representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea at the meeting, and a complete lack of cooperation in any way. This needed to change, as it was connected to the dialogue between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea, as well as with international bodies. The level of isolation of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea was concerning, as it ensured that there was no space for dialogue. The Government had taken a range of measures that had had a considerable impact on not only economic, social and cultural rights but also civil and political rights. The international community should ensure full engagement, including to ensure full vaccination of the people against COVID-19.
It was up to the Government to accept the aid of the international community, and this would hopefully ensure the opening of the borders and the return of the humanitarian agencies and the United Nations country team, which presently could not carry out operations on the ground. The Special Rapporteur said his last report to the Council included a road map and hoped that the Office of the High Commissioner would take account of that. He hoped the report would serve as a catalyst for all thematic mandates in interacting with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. He encouraged thematic Rapporteurs, such as the one on water and sanitation, to develop and continue a relationship with the Government. Ultimately, the responsibility lay with the Government to promote and protect the human rights of its people. The Council would not allow crimes against humanity to continue: for that, it did not only require statements, or even resolutions, but concrete acts and measures on accountability; this was crucial to deter and prevent ongoing crimes against humanity within the country.
Discussion
Some speakers welcomed the report and endorsed its recommendations. They were gravely concerned about the further deterioration of the situation of human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. as well as the prolonged border closure. They called for full access to medical staff involved in the COVID-19 response. Concerns were expressed about the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea laws on reactionary thought and culture, which included the death penalty for access to foreign content. There was no freedom of thoughts and Christians were particularly at risk. Defectors who returned faced violence and execution. The speakers said the Special Rapporteur had a critical role to play and must hold the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to account.
Some speakers commended the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea for the promotion and protection of the human rights of its population and denounced a report based on disinformation. The Human Rights Council should not be used to impose pressure on the international affairs of States. The speakers were opposed to specific mandates against countries, particularly when the country concerned did not consent to them. Country specific mandates did not produce the intended outcome in terms of improvement of promotion and protection of human rights. Speakers did not recognise the dubious methods of preparing a report based on fake information and fake evidence. Calls were made on the Council to refrain from making politically motivated decisions. The Council should stop using double standards because it would only undermine the effective protection of human rights. The Universal Periodic Review was the only effective tool to protect human rights. Speakers urged countries to cease all unilateral coercive measures against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.
Concluding Remarks
TOMÁS OJEA QUINTANA, Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, said his report, which was his last one to the Council, acknowledged that the Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea had taken the initiative to establish cooperation with the Human Rights Council. There was interaction with the Council in the context of the Universal Periodic Review, and there had been progress in reporting to treaty bodies, and there was also contact with the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, and a capacity-building session held in Geneva. This reflected the impartial nature of his report, which was drawn up using the principle of independence. He had stood ready to listen to the points of view of the authorities of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. It was important for all Special Rapporteurs and his mandate in particular - that the report reflected the point of view of the country concerned. His reports had always been completely impartial and based on his findings as an independent expert, and he had always shunned bias, selectivity, politicisation and double standards.
Regarding the engagement of the authorities of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, these were relevant to other mandates as well. For this mandate, it would be important to establish a relationship with the countries surrounding the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea as well. Trust must be built so that crucial issues could be addressed. He urged the neighbours of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and other countries in the region to develop contacts with the mandate. Regarding expectations of aid, for example food, the international community needed to know from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea what were their expectations, and transparent information was required. On the rights of women in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, this issue was addressed in the reports: there were in fact reports of wide-spread violations of women’s rights in the country, and this must be addressed in the dialogue with the authorities. The majority of escapees from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea had a tumultuous journey during which they were exposed to all sorts of human rights violations. Those working on human rights in the country were concerned about heightened tensions on the Korean peninsula. Tensions and isolation made it impossible to open up channels to discuss human rights, but diplomatic means must be used to open these up for the future. The Secretary-General must be empowered to play a more relevant role in diplomacy on the peninsula. It was frustrating to not be able to make more progress in the situation of human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, and the Human Rights Council must be able to overcome this frustration by using all the mechanisms at its disposal in the United Nations system..."
Source/publisher:
United Nations Human Rights Council and The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
Date of publication:
2022-03-21
Date of entry/update:
2022-03-22
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, UN human rights documents on Myanmar, Human Rights and international relations
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"The Human Rights Council this afternoon held an interactive dialogue with the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, heard the presentation of an oral update on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and began a general debate on its agenda item four on human rights situations that require the Council’s attention.
Thomas Andrews, Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, said he regretted to inform the Human Rights Council that since his last report, the human right situation in Myanmar had not only failed to improve, it had deteriorated significantly. In fact, the Myanmar junta’s war against the people of Myanmar had intensified. The generals responsible for these escalating horrors were guilty of crimes against humanity, including the crimes of murder, enslavement, displacement and forcible transfer, enforced disappearance, torture, rape, and sexual violence. The international community and all Member States of the United Nations must stand with and for the people of Myanmar with not only words, but even more importantly, with action.
In the discussion on Myanmar, speakers said the findings of the report were shocking and revealed the magnitude of the human rights crisis in Myanmar. The brutal and inhumane attacks must cease immediately, and all those arrested must be released. The attacks on civilians must cease immediately. The humanitarian crisis in the country had been deliberately exacerbated by attacks on humanitarian personnel and the blocking of humanitarian aid. These were blatant violations of international law. Those guilty of human rights violations must be held accountable. Some speakers said that the report contained biases and major imbalances with information from unsubstantiated sources. The Special Rapporteur had abused his status and stepped beyond his mandate by manipulating facts in an attempt to influence the work of United Nations bodies and serve the political agenda of certain countries, voiding his code of conduct and damaging further the situation on the ground.
Ilze Brands Kehris, United Nations Assistant Secretary‑General for Human Rights, presented the oral update of the High Commissioner on the implementation of the recommendations made by the group of independent experts on accountability for human rights violations in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. She said that the Office continued to lay foundations for future accountability with respect to violations of human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, including by gathering, analysing and preserving information on human rights violations in the country, some of which may rise to the level of international crimes. The Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea should commit to systemic reforms needed to end all human rights violations and to hold those responsible to account.
The Council then held a general debate on agenda item four on human rights situations that require the Council’s attention. Some speakers said that the principles of universality, objectivity and impartiality should guide the Council’s work under this agenda item, and that all civil and political rights and economic, social and cultural rights, including the right to development, should be treated equally. States had a primary responsibility to ensure the safety of internally displaced persons in situations of armed conflict, including their return and full restoration of their human rights. The Council should remain aware of the devastating impact of terrorism, hold accountable the countries that supported terrorist groups, and work to limit the impact of terrorists on human rights. The Council had a duty to take meaningful actions to combat the rise of racism, xenophobia, Islamophobia and hate speech, particularly online.
Speaking on Myanmar were European Union, Pakistan (on behalf of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation), Sweden (on behalf of a group of countries), Liechtenstein, Libya, United Arab Emirates, Malaysia, Maldives, Japan, France, Venezuela, Luxembourg, China, Indonesia, Australia, Ireland, Republic of Korea, Bangladesh, United States, Serbia, Belgium, Turkey, Czech Republic, Albania, Malawi, New Zealand, Canada, Timor-Leste, Sierra Leone and Gambia.
Also speaking were Access Now, Human Rights Now, Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development, Centre pour les Droits Civiques et Politiques, Christian Solidarity Worldwide, Human Rights Watch, Lawyers Rights Watch Canada, the International Federation For Human Rights League (FIDH), the European Center for Law and Justice and the Meezaan Center for Human Rights,
Speaking in the general debate on agenda item four were: France (on behalf of the European Union), Pakistan (on behalf of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation), Poland (on behalf of a group of countries), China (on behalf of a group of countries), Azerbaijan (on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement), Morocco (on behalf of the group of Arab States), Venezuela (on behalf of a group of countries), Germany, Finland, Luxembourg, China, France, Venezuela, Cuba, Japan, India, Netherlands, Armenia, Pakistan, Indonesia, Lithuania, Russian Federation, Republic of Korea, United States, United Kingdom, Bolivia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Sudan, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Philippines, Israel, Estonia, Spain, Switzerland and Austria.
The webcast of the Human Rights Council meetings can be found here. All meeting summaries can be found here. Documents and reports related to the Human Rights Council’s forty-ninth regular session can be found here.
The Council is scheduled to reconvene at 9 a.m. on Tuesday, 22 March, to continue the general debate under agenda item four, followed by a panel discussion on public policies on COVID-19 at 10 a.m.
Interactive Dialogue with the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar
Documentation
The Council has before it (A/HRC/49/76) report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar on the situation of human rights in Myanmar.
Presentation of the Report
THOMAS ANDREWS, Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, said he regretted to inform the Human Rights Council that since his last report, the human right situation in Myanmar had not only failed to improve, it had deteriorated significantly. In fact, the Myanmar junta’s war against the people of Myanmar had intensified. More than 1,600 civilians had now been killed by the junta; nearly 10,000 were now arbitrarily detained; more than half a million had been displaced since the coup began, bringing the number of internally displaced persons to well over 800,000; in the last two and a half months alone – since the beginning of this year - more than 4,500 homes and other civilian structures had been destroyed; basic human rights such as freedom of expression, assembly and association had been criminalised; many regions of the country that had not seen sustained fighting since World War II were now in a state of non-international armed conflict; and the 600,000 Rohingya remaining in Rakhine State after the military-led genocidal attacks in 2016-2017 were under constant threat, nearly a quarter of them confined in de facto internment camps while nearly all continued to be denied the right to citizenship, movement, and other fundamental rights.
The generals responsible for these escalating horrors were guilty of crimes against humanity, including the crimes of murder, enslavement, displacement and forcible transfer, enforced disappearance, torture, rape, and sexual violence. Junta forces had also committed war crimes, including wilful killing, destruction of property, torture and inhumane treatment, pillaging, rape, and displacement of civilians, among other crimes. Of course, only a competent court could render such judgments with legal authority and international justice was sorely needed to hold those who were responsible for these horrible, ongoing crimes fully accountable.
The consequences of the junta’s coup were being felt by tens of millions of people - nearly the entire population of Myanmar. The military junta had driven Myanmar into a humanitarian catastrophe marked by a crumbling health infrastructure, half the nation falling into poverty, rampant inflation, and the cruel and outrageous blocking of the delivery of aid to those in desperate need. It was critical to focus on the fact that the nightmare that continued to unfold in Myanmar, day in and day out, was happening to real people, real families whose lives were being crushed by a murderous junta. The military junta of Myanmar, and their accomplices, must be held accountable! The international community and all Member States of the United Nations must stand with and for the people of Myanmar with not only words, but even more importantly, with action. For the growing numbers of men, women and children in Myanmar, it was a matter of life and death.
Discussion
In the ensuing interactive debate, speakers said the findings were shocking, and revealed the magnitude of the human rights crisis in Myanmar. The brutal and inhumane attacks must cease immediately, and all those arrested must be released. The attacks on civilians must cease immediately. The humanitarian crisis in the country had been deliberately exacerbated by attacks on humanitarian personnel and the blocking of humanitarian aid. These were blatant violations of international law. Those guilty of human rights violations must be held accountable. The acute suffering in the country could only end if Myanmar was brought back to the path of democracy, as highlighted by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations in its Five Point Consensus. The attacks against the Rohingya Muslims were deplored, and concerns were expressed that no progress had been made to ensure their safe and voluntary return to their lands.
Myanmar must cooperate with the United Nations and all relevant human rights mechanisms and implement all recommendations, including providing citizenship for the Rohingya and the return of all forcibly displaced persons. It was now more than a year since the brutal military coup, and in recent months the violence had escalated, with air strikes, torture, and attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure, all committed by the military forces. The continued repression of the right to freedom of speech, including the harassment of journalists and civil society, was also of great concern. The humanitarian crisis was only growing, and safe humanitarian access to international actors must be ensured.
Some speakers said that country-specific mandates established without the agreement of the country concerned were against the spirit of consensus that should reign in the Council. The report contained biases and major imbalances with information from unsubstantiated sources. These politicised mandates impeded dialogue on the promotion and protection of human rights. It was important to bolster spaces for cooperation, as otherwise the efforts to consolidate democracy and strengthen human rights came to nothing. The Council should cease to hold these hostile mandates against countries of the South. They were an interference into the sovereignty of these countries. The Universal Periodic Review mechanism was the best place for dealing with country-specific issues. The absence of Myanmar at the meeting was saddening. The Special Rapporteur had abused his status and stepped beyond his mandate by manipulating facts in an attempt to influence the work of United Nations bodies and serve the political agenda of certain countries, voiding his code of conduct and damaging further the situation on the ground. He should stay within his mandate and within the principles of objectivity and impartiality, and work to stabilise the situation in Myanmar.
Concluding Remarks
THOMAS ANDREWS, Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, said that he appreciated the thoughtful comments and questions. On the role of the international community to reduce the violent attacks against freedom of expression in Myanmar, the Special Rapporteur said that in the absence of a Security Council resolution issuing an arms embargo, Member States should hold arms deliveries and reduce revenue transfer with more economic sanctions. It took considerable revenue to supply and equip the military structure. Mr. Andrews said it was necessary to create a multinational task force to identify, hunt down and freeze the assets of Myanmar, as Myanmar’s assets belonged to the people of Myanmar, and they were being used to attack the rightful owner of these assets, the people of Myanmar. The national liberty government should be recognised as the representative of the people of Myanmar. Member States should support the efforts to hold perpetrators of atrocities to account. States that had universal jurisdiction should make preparations to file charges against Myanmar’s security officials. They should support filing under the International Criminal Court and ensure the full funding of the United Nations humanitarian response.
The Special Rapporteur continued to believe that a comprehensive resolution, including sanctions under the International Criminal Court, should be put in front of the Security Council, or at least one prohibiting the transfer of weapons to Myanmar as well as sanctions against entities which imported and exported weapons to Myanmar. Arms facilitators should be sanctioned. International investors should examine the extent to which their investments supported the atrocities and how they could prevent and mitigate their human rights impacts, including terminating those investments if needed. On the criticism addressed to the Council and his mandate, he stated, "with all due respect", that he stood by the facts in his report and specified that he would address any criticism. The report was within his mandate and his responsibility. The arms deal that he had documented had resulted in horrible violations of human rights and it was his responsibility to document them as well as address progress on the recommendations of the Fact-Finding Mission. His report was not based on speculation, it was based on facts and facts spoke for themselves.
Concerning the situation of the Rohingya, Mr. Andrews said that 600,000 of them in Rakhine state continued to have their human rights violated, facing restrictions that could have life or death consequences, given the current conditions. He considered the situation in Rakhine state to be unconducive for the return of refugees in Bangladesh. He hoped to travel to countries belonging to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations in the coming months to hear their vision of the situation. He fully supported the Five Point Consensus. The Special Rapporteur further welcomed the collaboration with the European Union envoy and reiterated that Member States should consider him as a source of information and recommendations. Concluding by addressing the impact of the military coup on children, the Special Rapporteur specified that the crisis in public health would have a long-term impact on the development of children and that the violation of their human rights may account to war crimes or crimes against humanity. Some 188 children were detained as political prisoners because they had participated in peaceful protests. Some had been tortured and denied medical care. He was further extremely concerned over the recruitment of child soldiers and the use of children as human shields. The collapse of health care services would have a devastating impact on children, such as the lack of routine immunisation, which could result in 33,000 deaths this year.
Presentation of the Oral Update of the High Commissioner on the Implementation of the Recommendations made by the Group of Independent Experts on Accountability for Human Rights Violations in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
ILZE BRANDS KEHRIS, United Nations Assistant Secretary‑General for Human Rights, presenting the oral update of the High Commissioner on the implementation of the recommendations made by the group of independent experts on accountability for human rights violations in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, said the Office continued to lay foundations for future accountability with respect to violations of human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, including by gathering, analysing and preserving information on human rights violations in the country, some of which may rise to the level of international crimes. It had taken forward processes of gathering information on specific violations, in particular by interviewing escapees from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Over the last year, there had been a significant reduction in the number of escapees leaving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, principally as a result of COVID-19 related restrictions. Member States with escapees on their territory should ensure full and unhindered access for the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights to them, in particular recent arrivals. Persons repatriated to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea faced a significant likelihood of torture and other serious human rights violations. Member States should provide them with full protection against the risk of refoulement and safe pathways in accordance with international human rights and refugee law obligations.
Information received by the Office of the High Commissioner continued to suggest that there were reasonable grounds to believe that crimes against humanity had been committed in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and may be ongoing. The Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea should commit to systemic reforms, end all human rights violations, and hold those responsible to account. An acknowledgment of the existence of serious human rights violations was a first step to this end. In the absence of any such commitment, however, it was incumbent on the international community to pursue accountability avenues, whether through referral to the International Criminal Court, or the establishment of an ad hoc tribunal or another comparable mechanism. Member States should also consider supporting complementary approaches at national levels, including criminal proceedings in accordance with international standards under accepted principles of extraterritorial and universal jurisdiction, and relevant civil litigation. Long-term peace and stability on the Korean peninsula could only be achieved if victims’ rights to truth, justice and accountability for violations suffered in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea were addressed adequately and in a timely manner.
General Debate on Human Rights Situations that Require the Council’s Attention
In the general debate, speakers said that the principles of universality, objectivity and impartiality should guide the Council’s work under this agenda item, and all civil and political rights and economic, social and cultural rights, including the right to development, should be treated equally. Local situations and challenges should be considered in this regard. The Council should aim to ensure dialogue and cooperation. Selective applications of the agenda item were of concern: each situation should be dealt with on its own merit, and not from a politicised approach. The promotion and protection of human rights and the commitment to fulfil obligations to ensure the enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all should be ensured from a non-selective perspective.
The Council needed to function in a non-politicised, cooperative and objective manner. Country-selective mandates ran counter to the Charter of the Council and ran counter to human rights issues. The Universal Periodic Review was one of the founding mechanisms of the Human Rights Council to address human rights issues, putting all countries on an equal footing in a spirit of cooperation and harmonious discussion, and this was the tool for discussion of such issues. A country’s human rights record must be judged by the inhabitants of the country, and not by the standards of others. Human rights had become a bargaining chip, and this should be reversed.
States had a primary responsibility to ensure the safety of internally displaced persons in situations of armed conflict, including their return and full restoration of their human rights. Post-conflict rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts were vital for continued peace. The impact of terrorism and conflict on the right to life of persons globally was of concern, as it posed a serious threat to democracy and the rule of law. The Council should remain aware of the devastating impact of terrorism, hold accountable the countries that supported terrorist groups, and work to limit the impact on human rights.
The Council should promote and protect the fundamental freedoms and human rights of Muslim persons and communities against the rise of Islamophobia worldwide. The Council had a duty to take meaningful action to combat the rise of racism, xenophobia and hate speech, particularly online. Human rights should be promoted and protected without discrimination or ambiguity.
The Council should also actively monitor and report on the conditions of foreign occupations and disputes in those countries involved. Everyone had the right to respect of the law by all and without discrimination. Contempt for international humanitarian law and international human rights law was inexcusable, and attacks on civilian infrastructure, such as schools and hospitals, constituted war crimes. All countries should ensure that they fully respected international humanitarian law and international human rights law. World-wide civic space was rapidly being restricted, and this should be combatted effectively to ensure that civil society had sufficient space to operate freely. This restriction was being seen in too many countries around the world. Democracy must be supported, and all States should repeal laws restricting civil space and ensure a space, both offline and online, where civil society could pursue their activities free from violence and threats of violence.
The situation of indigenous rights in some countries was also of concern, as in the past they had seen violations of their human rights and fundamental freedoms, with their land taken, and their culture forcibly eliminated. Indigenous children were forcibly taken from their families and interned in schools, where they died unnatural deaths. Indigenous peoples in many countries were subject to systemic discrimination and inequality, marginalised at the bottom of society. Their situation had further deteriorated due to the impact of the pandemic. Countries involved should act immediately, investigate thoroughly, hold the guilty accountable, provide reparations, and ensure that such situations could not be repeated by taking all necessary measures to eliminate discrimination.
The situation of women and girls in many countries was of great concern, where they faced sexual assault, trafficking, and other serious human rights violations. In the context of the global fight against the pandemic, health workers should be recognised as human rights workers, and they should be defended as such..."
Source/publisher:
United Nations Human Rights Council
Date of publication:
2022-03-21
Date of entry/update:
2022-03-22
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
UN human rights documents on Myanmar, Human Rights and international relations, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
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"The Biden administration has declared that Myanmar's military has committed genocide against the Rohingya minority.
The US has seen evidence pointing to a clear intent to destroy the Rohingya, with reports of killings, mass rape and arson, Secretary of State Antony Blinken said on Monday.
Hundreds of thousands of Rohingya Muslims have fled Myanmar since the military crackdown that began in 2017.
More than 6,000 people were killed in the first month of the onslaught.
Speaking at the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington DC, Mr Blinken called the attacks against Rohingya "widespread and systematic".
He said said the administration's determination was based on a review by the US state department that included documents gathered by organisations like Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, as well as independent research by the US.
Mr Blinken announced the US would provide $1m (£758,000) in new funding for the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar, which continues to examine atrocities.
A case against Myanmar, also called Burma, was opened at the International Court of Justice in 2019.
"The day will come when those responsible for these appalling acts will have to answer for them," Mr Blinken said.
Myanmar: What has been happening since the coup?
A civilian government was in charge when the military launched its campaign, but in 2021 the military took power in a coup. Mr Blinken said that since the coup, the military continues to use the same tactics.
"For those who did not realise it before the coup, the brutal violence unleashed by the military since February 2021 has made clear that no one in Burma will be safe from atrocities so long as it is in power," he said.
The Rohingya, who numbered about one million in Myanmar before the attacks on them, are one of the many ethnic minorities in the country.
Rohingya Muslims represent the largest percentage of Muslims in Myanmar, with the majority living in Rakhine state.
But the government of Myanmar, a predominantly Buddhist country, denies the Rohingya citizenship and even excluded them from the 2014 census, refusing to recognise them as a people.
When US President Joe Biden took office 14 months ago, Mr Blinken pledged to conduct a fresh review of the issue.
Two previous US investigations failed to reach a conclusion.
A ruling of genocide does not automatically lead to punitive action by the US, but it is hoped it will put pressure on the Myanmar military.
"It's going to make it harder for them to commit further abuses," a senior State Department official told Reuters.
There has so far been no comment from the military authorities in Myanmar..."
Source/publisher:
BBC News (London)
Date of publication:
2022-03-22
Date of entry/update:
2022-03-22
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"The National Unity Government (NUG) welcomes the determination by the United States Government that the Myanmar military’s 2017 attacks against the Rohingya in Rakhine State amounted to genocide and crimes against humanity.
This finding follows calls, including by the Rohingya community and the United Nations (UN) Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar for the military leadership to be investigated and prosecuted for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes against the Rohingya.
The NUG acknowledges that discriminatory practices and rhetoric against the Rohingya also laid the ground for these atrocities. The impunity enjoyed by the military’s leadership has since enabled their direction of countrywide crimes at the helm of an illegal military junta. Those crimes against the Myanmar people continue until today by the military.
The determination by the US is timely as the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Special Rapporteur on Myanmar address the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva. The UN HRC will next week adopt a new resolution on Myanmar.
The NUG stands by its ‘Policy Position on the Rohingya in Rakhine State’ issued in June 2021. The Policy commits to the safe, voluntary, dignified, and sustainable return of Rohingya refugees and internally displaced persons, and to comprehensive legislative and policy reform in support of citizenship, equality in rights and opportunity, and justice and reparations.
The NUG encourages the United States to support the United Nations Security Council to refer the situation in Myanmar to the International Criminal Court (ICC). In July 2021, the NUG lodged an Article 12(3) Declaration with the Registrar of the ICC on behalf of Myanmar, accepting the Court’s jurisdiction with respect to international crimes committed in the country since 1 July 2002.
Justice and accountability must follow this determination..."
Source/publisher:
President Office, National Unity Government
Date of publication:
2022-03-22
Date of entry/update:
2022-03-22
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), International Criminal Court (Myanmar), Genocide, Human Rights and international relations
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"The Republic of the Union of Myanmar welcomes the report of the United Nations (UN) High
Commissioner for Human Rights on the situation of human rights in Myanmar since 1 February
2021.1
Myanmar restates its commitment to partnership and close cooperation with the Office of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and its Myanmar Team.
Myanmar also accepts without question its obligations under international law and is committed to
securing justice and accountability. It therefore welcomes the High Commissioner’s recognition of
the National Unity Government’s filing of a declaration under Article 12(3) of the Rome Statute of
the International Criminal Court, and its engagement with the International Court of Justice in the
proceedings initiated by The Gambia under the Genocide Convention.
The High Commissioner's report catalogues 'egregious violations' and military junta violence 'on a
massive scale', including acts:
that may amount to crimes against humanity... in particular, murder, forcible transfer of
population, imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of
fundamental rules of international law, torture, persecution against any identifiable group or
collectively on political grounds, enforced disappearances, and other inhumane acts... When
linked to an armed conflict, some of these acts may also amount to war crimes.2
Consistent with preliminary analysis reported by the Independent Investigative Mechanism for
Myanmar (IIIM),3 the High Commissioner concludes that:
there are reasonable grounds to believe that acts by the Tatmadaw were carried out in the
context of a widespread and systematic attack directed against civilian populations, and in
apparent pursuance of an organisational policy.4
Significantly, the High Commissioner, the IIMM and the Special Rapporteur on the situation of
human rights in Myanmar5 have all concluded that the military junta has carried out probable
international crimes of the highest order.
And yet, as the High Commissioner goes on to concede, 'international efforts to encourage a
lessening of violence and de-escalation of rhetoric and provocation have fallen on deaf ears'.
Myanmar remains caught in a 'downward spiral of violence, characterized by increasingly brutal
repression' and '[a]ctions taken by the international community in response to the situation in
Myanmar have remained limited in scope and impact on the ground'.
The international community has abandoned the people of Myanmar. Confronting a foreignarmed
and funded military junta that, to the High Commissioner, has induced 'a human rights
catastrophe and humanitarian emergency', the people have resorted to self-reliance and selfdefence.
The High Commissioner rightly observes that 'the will of the people has clearly not been broken.
They remain committed to see a return to democracy and to institutions that reflect their will and
aspirations.' The junta has not seized power nor has it achieved military or martial rule. Frustrated
by its failed coup d'etat, its escalating atrocities are the desperate acts of war criminals.
Myanmar supports the High Commissioner’s recommendations, including her calls for:
• the immediate release of all prisoners detained, prosecuted and/or sentenced in relation to
acts of political expression, free association, and rights to protest and free assembly
• full cooperation with the Special Envoys of the Secretary-General and ASEAN Chair
• full cooperation with international accountability mechanisms.
Myanmar also supports the High Commissioner’s calls on UN Member States to:
• extend protection for all individuals crossing international borders, including members of the
Rohingya population, provide immediate humanitarian assistance and ensure any returns
movements are conducted in a dignified and voluntary manner
• support the referral of the situation in Myanmar to the International Criminal Court
• take immediate action to prevent the supply of arms to the Myanmar military and apply
targeted sanctions on military economic interests as appropriate.
Finally, the Republic of the Union of Myanmar calls on the UN and its Member States to:
• ensure that UN humanitarian assistance in Myanmar is delivered through the National Unity
Government, Ethnic Organisations, international and local non-governmental organisations,
and civil society and community-based organisations
• establish an independent and wide-ranging inquiry led by international experts into the UN’s
progress in its implementation of follow-up actions to the Rosenthal Report, with an added
focus on the UN’s response since 1 February 2021. The inquiry should produce and deliver to
the Human Rights Council a comprehensive public report with findings and recommendations
• act on the Special Rapporteur on Myanmar’s call6 for the National Unity Government to be
recognised as representing the sovereign will of the people of Myanmar and as a trusted
source and partner to engage in the distribution of humanitarian, health, education and other
support for the people of Myanmar..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Human Rights
Date of publication:
2022-03-21
Date of entry/update:
2022-03-22
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Human Rights and international relations
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"1. We, the Committee Representing Py idaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH), welcome the
remarks of US Secretary o f State Antony Blinken made at the Holocaust
Memorial Museum on 21st March. We welcome the determination of the US
government about the crimes committed by the Myanmar’s army on Rohingya
over the past decades as genocide and crimes against humanity based on
evidences, witnesses and reports of independent international human rights
organizations.
2. We believe such determination would be of much assistance for the attempts
o f international judicial institution including International Court of Justice -
ICJ and International Criminal Court - ICC in seeking justice and
accountability for the Rohingya people.
3. At present, Myanmar’s brutal military is continuing violence, brutal crimes
including war crimes and human rights violations against all ethnic
nationalities and ethnic and religious minorities at every corner o f the country
and thousands o f displaced people have fled from their home to quite secure
places. The junta’s security forces have unlawfully killed more than 1,690 and
has illegally arrested more than 12,850 citizens since the coup in Myanmar.
4. We would like to highlight the fact that today’s violations by the military is the
same with the military has committed such heinous crimes against Rohingya
in recent years. We seriously request the international community to help us
prevent such crimes from being committed continuously by the military at the
same time when we arc seeking the justice and accountability for the victims
o f the inhumane crimes.
5. The unprovoked aggression of the Russian Federation to the Ukraine proves
that regional an d international stability has been severely damaged due to the
dangerous acts of the authoritarian regime across the globe. We strongly
request the international community to continue the efforts of taking actions
regarding the crimes committed by the Myanmar military junta like a foreign
occupier against its own people in the same way and manner the international
community has been protesting against the actions of aggressors on Ukraine
and its people..."
Source/publisher:
Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw
Date of publication:
2022-03-22
Date of entry/update:
2022-03-22
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), International Court of Justice (ICJ) - Myanmar, International Criminal Court (Myanmar), Human Rights and international relations
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"The Biden administration has formally determined that Myanmar's military committed genocide and crimes against humanity against the Rohingya, a US official told CNN on Sunday.
US Secretary of State Antony Blinken will publicly announce the determination, which human rights groups have been advocating for years, at the US Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington, DC, on Monday.
Reuters first reported on the administration's recognition of genocide.
Until now, the US had stopped short of declaring the atrocities -- including mass killings and rape -- committed in 2017 against the Muslim minority Rohingya population a genocide. The violence forced nearly a million people to flee, and the United Nations recommended that top military officials face genocide charges.
"I applaud the Biden administration for finally recognizing the atrocities committed against the Rohingya as genocide. While this determination is long overdue, it is nevertheless a powerful and critically important step in holding this brutal regime to account," Democratic Sen. Jeff Merkley, a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said in a statement Sunday.
America, the Oregon Democrat said, "must lead the world to make it clear that atrocities like these will never be allowed to be buried unnoticed, no matter where they occur."
A US State Department report released quietly in 2018 found that violence against the Rohingya in Myanmar's northern Rakhine State was "extreme, large-scale, widespread, and seemingly geared toward both terrorizing the population and driving out the Rohingya residents."
The State Department has sanctioned a number of Myanmar military officials, including commander-in-chief Min Aung Hlaing, for their role in committing those human rights abuses.
This story has been updated with comments from Sen. Jeff Merkley..."
Source/publisher:
CNN Politics
Date of publication:
2022-03-21
Date of entry/update:
2022-03-21
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"The Burmese Rohingya Organisation UK (BROUK) welcomes today’s determination by the United States’ Department of State that genocide has been committed against the Rohingya people.
“The US determination of the crime of genocide against us is a momentous moment and must lead to concrete action to hold the Burmese military accountable for their crimes,” said Tun Khin, President of the Burmese Rohingya Organisation UK.
In 2018, United States investigators produced a 15,000 page investigation documenting atrocities committed in 2017 against the Rohingya, which included more than 13,000 instances of “grave human rights violations”, including gang rapes, crucifixions, mutilations, and of children being burned or drowned, and of families being locked inside homes that had been set alight.
Also in 2018 the United Nations Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar published the results of its investigation, finding that the human rights violations committed against the Rohingya amounted to genocide. In 2019 the Fact-Finding Mission stated that the genocide was ongoing.
“This designation lets Rohingya know that their voices have been heard amid the cruel suffering they continue to endure,” said Tun Khin. “In Burma the Rohingya face denial of our identity, our rights and denial of the human rights violations committed against us. Rohingya faced genocide, one of the most terrible crimes imaginable, and then faced the international community not even acknowledging it had happened. Today the US has gone a long way to correcting that.”
Since the attempted military coup on 1st February 2021, the Burmese military has used deadly force across the country. Half a million people have been displaced and around 12,000 people arrested. 600,000 Rohingya remain in Burma and there are concerns that the military may once again whip up nationalist prejudice against the Rohingya in an attempt to deflect people from resistance to military rule.
“There is no doubt that being allowed to get away with genocide of the Rohingya encouraged the military to think it could get away with holding a coup as well,” said Tun Khin. “Accountability for Rohingya genocide will not just help protect the Rohingya, it will help protect all the people of Burma.”
The Burmese Rohingya Organisation UK calls for the US and other countries to follow this determination with concrete action against the military. This should include:
Sanction Myanmar Oil & Gas Enterprise (MOGE), Myanmar Foreign Trade Bank and other entities facilitating the flow of gas revenue to the military.
Join the Rohingya genocide case at the International Court of Justice.
Systematically sanction military, state-owned and private Burmese companies helping to finance the Burmese military.
Sanction Burmese companies involved in the supply and manufacture of arms for the military.
Sanction the supply of aviation fuel to Burma to help stop airstrikes against civilians.
Apply pressure on countries supplying arms to the Burmese military to persuade them to stop.
Support in principle for the referral of Burma to the International Criminal Court.
Significantly increased aid to genocide survivors in Bangladesh and other countries, and advocate for Bangladesh to adopt long-term policies for hosting Rohingya refugees, including immediate access to education for all Rohingya children..."
Source/publisher:
Burmese Rohingya Organisation UK
Date of publication:
2022-03-21
Date of entry/update:
2022-03-21
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Genocide, Discrimination against the Rohingya, Ethnic Cleansing, Human Rights and international relations
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"Ambassador Simon Manley, UK Permanent Representative to the UN in Geneva, delivered the UK's statement at the Human Rights Council on the situation in Myanmar. He strongly condemned the military regime’s human rights violations, including against Rohingya and other ethnic and religious minorities.
Thank you, Mr President.
High Commissioner: thank you for your alarming report.
It’s clear that last year’s coup continues to bring acute suffering to the people of Myanmar. The country is plunging ever deeper into political, economic and humanitarian crises.
We condemn in the strongest possible terms the targeting of civilians. Civilians, including humanitarian workers, and civilian infrastructure, must be protected from violence by all parties.
Lifesaving humanitarian assistance must continue, and there must be unobstructed humanitarian access to reach Myanmar’s most vulnerable people.
We strongly condemn the military regime’s human rights violations, including against Rohingya and other ethnic and religious minorities. Efforts must accelerate to eliminate statelessness and systematic discrimination against minorities. There can be no solution to the Rohingya crisis until they are recognised as citizens of Myanmar. One crucial step is to reform the 1982 Citizenship Law.
The impact of the coup on freedoms of expression, assembly and association has been alarming. Human rights defenders, journalists, and other media workers have been detained, targeted and killed. This must stop.
High Commissioner,
What can the international community do to ensure that people are able to express their political opinions without fear or threat of violence?..."
Source/publisher:
Govt. UK (London)
Date of publication:
2022-03-21
Date of entry/update:
2022-03-21
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Racial or ethnic discrimination in Burma: reports of violations against several groups, UK-Burma relations
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"The United Nations (UN) Secretary General’s dismissal of the crisis in Myanmar and past UN failure is shameful and plays to the advantage of the Myanmar military, says the Special Advisory Council for Myanmar (SAC-M).
In 2019, an independent inquiry into UN involvement in Myanmar from 2010 to 2018 found that “systemic and structural failures” rendered the UN system impotent in the face of massive human rights violations, including the genocidal atrocities committed against the Rohingya by the Myanmar military. Myanmar is now being subjected to a nationwide attack by that same military, which has been trying – and failing – to gain control over the country for the past thirteen months and has driven Myanmar to become a human rights catastrophe. In this context, the UN Secretary-General issued a report to the UN Human Rights Council last week on progress made in implementing the recommendations of the inquiry.
“The Secretary General’s report shamefully dismisses the scale and gravity of the current crisis in Myanmar and provides no information on how the UN is actually responding inside the country,” said Yanghee Lee of SAC-M. “The report highlights the reinvigorated role of the UN Resident Coordinators – the top in-country UN official – as the centre piece of UN system reform but fails to mention that Myanmar has not had a Resident Coordinator for extended periods over the past four years. The position is currently vacant and has been for six months. The report merely reads like an advertisement for the work the UN is doing in various countries, not in Myanmar where a brutal coup is still taking place.”
The Secretary General’s report was presented to the Human Rights Council by the UN Assistant Secretary-General (ASG) for the Middle East, Asia and the Pacific, in the absence of a Resident Coordinator for Myanmar. The ASG seemed ill-informed of the situation in Myanmar and provided inaccurate information to Member States during the interactive dialogue by stating that the military is the de facto authority.
“It is simply not the case that the military is the de facto authority in Myanmar. The majority of the territory is not under the military’s control, and it has no ability to exercise ordinary government functions,” said Marzuki Darusman of SAC-M. “It is no wonder the UN system continues to fail the people of Myanmar, even in their gravest hour of need, if the entire response is predicated on a false assumption that serves only the military. The UN is evidently partial to the junta.”
The people of Myanmar and allied democratic actors under the National Unity Government of Myanmar continue to resist the military’s onslaught and defend their democracy at huge personal cost, as the military inflicts atrocities that likely amount to crimes against humanity and war crimes across the country. The Government has sought to engage with the International Criminal Court and International Court of Justice to halt the atrocities and bring the leaders of the military to justice, but their efforts have so far been ignored.
“The Secretary General, heads of UN agencies and UN Member States need to ask themselves just whose side they are on,” said Chris Sidoti of SAC-M. “Is it the people of Myanmar and their elected representatives? Or is it the leaders of a brutal military who should be prosecuted for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes? As things currently stand, the answer to that is not clear at all...”
Source/publisher:
Special Advisory Council for Myanmar
Date of publication:
2022-03-21
Date of entry/update:
2022-03-21
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Human Rights Defenders, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
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97.69 KB
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" Violent repression of the largely Muslim Rohingya population in Myanmar amounts to genocide, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken said Monday, a declaration intended to both generate international pressure and lay the groundwork for potential legal action.
Watch the briefing in the player above.
Authorities made the determination based on confirmed accounts of mass atrocities on civilians by Myanmar’s military in a widespread and systematic campaign against the ethnic minority, Blinken said in a speech at the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum.
It is the eighth time since the Holocaust that the U.S. has concluded a genocide has occurred. The secretary of state noted the importance of calling attention to inhumanity even as horrific attacks occur elsewhere in the world, including Ukraine.
“Yes, we stand with the people of Ukraine,” he said. “And we must also stand with people who are suffering atrocities in other places.”
The government of Myanmar, also known as Burma, is already under multiple layers of U.S. sanctions since a military coup ousted the democratically elected government in February 2021. Thousands of civilians throughout the country have been killed and imprisoned as part of ongoing repression of anyone opposed to the ruling junta.
The determination that a genocide has occurred could lead other nations to increase pressure on the government, which is already facing accusations of genocide at the International Court of Justice in The Hague.
“As we lay the foundation for future accountability, we’re also working to stop the military’s ongoing atrocities, and support the people of Burma as they strive to put the country back on the path to democracy,” Blinken said.
Rohingya, from Muslim Myanmar’s western Rakhine state, faced systematic persecution at the hands of the Buddhist majority for decades under both the military junta that ruled the nation for decades as well as the democratically elected government.
WATCH: Meet the new generation driving Myanmar’s resistance
More than 700,000 Rohingya have fled from Buddhist-majority Myanmar to refugee camps in Bangladesh since August 2017, when the military launched an operation aimed at clearing them from the country following attacks by a rebel group.
The status of the plight of the Rohingya had been under extended review by U.S. government legal experts since the Trump administration, given potential legal ramifications of such a finding. The delay in the determination had drawn criticism from both inside and outside the government.
“While this determination is long overdue, it is nevertheless a powerful and critically important step in holding this brutal regime to account,” said Oregon Sen. Jeff Merkley.
Human rights groups also welcomed the determination, which is similar to findings already made by other countries, including Canada, France and Turkey.
“The U.S. determination of the crime of genocide against us is a momentous moment and must lead to concrete action to hold the Burmese military accountable for their crimes,” said Tun Khin, president of the Burmese Rohingya Organisation UK.
Human Rights Watch said the U.S. and other governments should seek justice for crimes carried out by the military and impose stronger sanctions against its leadership.
“The U.S. government should couple its condemnations of Myanmar’s military with action,” said John Sifton, the group’s Asia advocacy director. “For too long, the U.S. and other countries have allowed Myanmar’s generals to commit atrocities with few real consequences.”
A 2018 State Department report documented instances of Myanmar’s military razing villages and carrying out rapes, tortures and mass killings of civilians since at least 2016. Blinken said evidence showed the violence wasn’t isolated, but part of a systematic program that amounts to crimes against humanity.
“The evidence also points to a clear intent behind these mass atrocities, the intent to destroy Rohingya, in whole or in part, through killings, rape, and torture,” he said.
Previous determinations of genocide by the U.S. include campaigns against Uyghurs and other largely Muslim minorities in China as well as in Bosnia, Rwanda, Iraq and Darfur..."
Source/publisher:
PBS News Hour
Date of publication:
2022-03-21
Date of entry/update:
2022-03-21
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"Please see below statement from Refugees International Deputy Director for Africa, Asia, and the Middle East Daniel P. Sullivan:
“The United States will finally recognize the crimes committed against the Rohingya people for what they are: genocide and crimes against humanity. The U.S. genocide declaration is a welcome and profoundly meaningful step. It is also a solid sign of commitment to justice for all the people who continue to face abuses by the military junta to this very today.
Rohingya refugees and diaspora have long called for this recognition, with the support of Members of Congress, legal experts, and advocacy groups like Refugees International alike. This is a day to celebrate a significant victory. But it is also time to redouble efforts to hold the perpetrators of that genocide accountable and to prevent future atrocities.
The United States must now use the momentum of this genocide determination to spur concrete actions. While several steps have been taken to increase pressure on the Burmese junta since its coup in February 2021, effective global coordination is lacking. The United States must use the gravity of the genocide determination to lead a new diplomatic push, including with Myanmar’s neighbors in Southeast Asia, for further targeted sanctions, an arms embargo, and support for evidence collection and accountability efforts before the International Criminal Court and International Court of Justice.
The United States can also show solidarity with Rohingya survivors by maintaining humanitarian assistance for the million Rohingya who have sought refuge in Bangladesh and by working with Bangladesh to offer resettlement to Rohingya refugees in the United States.”
Refugees International has urged U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken to make a Rohingya genocide determination, including through a joint letter from 95 organizations. The letter builds on Refugees International’s efforts with the previous U.S. administration as part of the #CallitGenocide campaign, which included a nearly 9,000-signature petition and a legal and human rights experts letter (signed by two senior officials in the Biden administration). Refugees International’s analysis on why the attacks on the Rohingya constitute genocide can be found here..."
Source/publisher:
Refugees International via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of publication:
2022-03-20
Date of entry/update:
2022-03-20
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Burmese refugees in Bangladesh, Human Rights and international relations, Genocide, Discrimination against the Rohingya
Language:
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Description:
"This regular update, covering humanitarian developments from 1 February to 15 March, is produced by OCHA Myanmar in collaboration with the Inter-Cluster Coordination Group and UNHCR. The next humanitarian update will be issued in April 2022.
HIGHLIGHTS & KEY MESSAGES
Civilians continue to bear the brunt of the conflict, which has further escalated in northwest and southeast Myanmar.
As of 14 March 2022, there were an estimated 889,900 Internally Displaced People (IDPs) across Myanmar including 519,500 people newly displaced since the military takeover and 370,400 IDPs in protracted displacement from previous crises. Overall displacement figures fluctuated during the month in light of recent small-scale and often shortlived returns.
Humanitarian actors continue providing critical lifesaving assistance to displaced people and host communities wherever they can, including through local partners amid serious access challenges.
Increasing challenges are being reported by clusters around transportation of supplies into conflict areas.
An inter-agency mission in Kachin and northern Shan has identified significant response gaps and escalating needs due to protracted displacement from continuing armed confrontations between the Myanmar Armed Forces (MAF) and Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) and among different EAOs.
Preparedness efforts and COVID-19 preventative supplies provided by humanitarian partners have contributed to management of the fourth wave in February. After a surge in February, new cases have slowed in early March.
Additional funding for the 2022 Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) which requests US$826 million to reach 6.2 million people in need of life-saving support is critical. Almost a quarter of the way into the year, a number of clusters are reporting major resource gaps with no funding yet received by some sectors in 2022.
KEY FIGURES
889.9K
Internally displaced persons across Myanmar
519.5K
People currently displaced across Myanmar by clashes and insecurity since February 2021
370K
People remain internally displaced in Rakhine, Kachin, Chin and Shan due to conflict before February 2021
5.6K
Estimated civilian properties, including houses, churches, monasteries and schools burnt or destroyed since February 2021.
SITUATION OVERVIEW
The security and humanitarian situations remained tense across Myanmar during the reporting period. Armed clashes between the Myanmar Armed Forces (MAF) and Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs), and People’s Defense Forces (PDFs) have continued unabated in multiple states and regions, with heavy weapons, including airstrikes and artillery fire in various locations, resulting in casualties among the civilian population, destruction of properties and further displacement.
Civilians have been injured and killed by shelling, gunfire, landmines, explosive remnants of war (ERW), and unexploded ordnance (UXO). Since the military takeover, at least 1,600 people, including over 100 children, have been killed, and thousands injured or maimed according to OHCHR. Landmines and other ERW and UXO are an increasing concern as growing numbers of displaced people move through conflict areas. In 2021, 88 civilians, including 19 women and 19 children, were killed and another 196 people, including 33 women and 55 children, were injured from landmines and ERW, according to UNICEF. Shan State recorded the highest (38 per cent) of the total casualties, followed by Rakhine (17 per cent) and Kachin (18 per cent) states. Children represented 27 per cent of casualties from landmine and ERW incidents countrywide. In the past year, many families have been forced to flee their homes and villages, often more than once, for safety with a surge in displacement in January, February and early March 2022.
Across Myanmar, as of 14 March 2022, 889,900 people remain displaced. This includes 519,500 people displaced by conflict and insecurity since 1 February. The majority of IDPs are women and girls. The fighting has also caused unprecedented destruction of civilian properties, including houses, across the country. As of 7 March 2022, more than 5,640 houses, churches, monasteries, schools, and markets had been either burnt down or destroyed across Myanmar, mainly in Chin and Kayah states and Sagaing and Magway regions.
Prices for basic commodities have significantly increased compared to December 2021, building off an already highlevel post-takeover, largely due to increased fuel costs, deteriorating exchange rates, transport and import restrictions, and supply disruptions caused by insecurity, adding an additional burden on families. Between February 2021 and February 2022, the prices of basic food items increased by nearly 30 per cent across Myanmar. Nearly half the population (46 per cent) is estimated to be living in poverty in 2022 according to UNDP. COVID-19 continues to add additional suffering and complexity with a fourth wave still impacting the country, although case numbers have started to subside in early March. Women are carrying an unequal economic burden from both the pandemic and the political situation as households struggle to make ends meet. Reports from the World Bank and International Labour Organization (ILO) show that the socio-economic impact of the crisis has disproportionately affected women and girls. According to the ILO, 580,000 women were estimated to have lost their employment within the first six months of 2021.
To address this unprecedented situation, humanitarian actors in Myanmar have prepared a Humanitarian Response Plan for 2022, requesting US$826 million to reach 6.2 million people in need of life-saving humanitarian support. Fifty two (52) per cent of the people targeted are women. The Plan remains desperately underfunded (see cluster section for sectoral breakdowns of funding gaps).
Annually, 8 March marks International Women’s Day and is a global opportunity to celebrate women achievements, raise awareness on women’s equality, and lobby for accelerated gender parity. This year’s theme was “gender equal today for a sustainable tomorrow”. The United Nations in Myanmar issued a statement on this day reiterating “its commitment to put women and girls at the centre of its development and humanitarian response to the ongoing crises in the country, to ensure that their needs are met, and to support their role and agency in shaping a future path for their country.” To achieve this, humanitarian actors need the urgent financial support of donor member states to save the lives and future of millions of women and girls in Myanmar..."
Source/publisher:
UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (New York) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of publication:
2022-03-19
Date of entry/update:
2022-03-19
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), The discussion on humanitarian assistance to Burma, Food Security and nutrition in Burma/Myanmar, Human Rights and international relations
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"The Republic of the Union of Myanmar restates its commitment to partnership and close
coordination with the United Nations (UN) Resident Coordinator a.i. in Myanmar, the United Nations
Country Team (UNCT), and with individual UN agencies, funds and programmes.
Myanmar is however deeply disappointed by the Secretary-General's report on 'progress made in
the implementation of follow-up action to the recommendations’ set out in the Rosenthal Report,
which addressed systemic UN failures of the Rohingya in Rakhine State.
In his opening remarks at HRC46 a year ago, the Secretary-General warned that Myanmar was a
"perfect storm of upheaval".1 The situation has since sharply deteriorated, prompting the High
Commissioner for Human Rights to repeatedly label it as a human rights "catastrophe". As the High
Commissioner has recently reported, the military junta's escalating atrocities include acts:
that may amount to crimes against humanity... in particular, murder, forcible transfer of
population, imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of
fundamental rules of international law, torture, persecution against any identifiable group or
collectively on political grounds, enforced disappearances, and other inhumane acts... When
linked to an armed conflict, some of these acts may also amount to war crimes.2
Yet the Secretary-General's report ignores the human rights situation in Myanmar and says little on
the UNCT's responses to it. Confusingly, the report allocates as much space to discussion of the
UNCTs in Chile, the Philippines, Mexico and Sri Lanka as it does to Myanmar.
The Rosenthal Report found that the UN system in Myanmar had collectively failed to convey the
UN's 'principled concerns regarding grave human rights violations’.3 The content of the Secretary-
General's report suggests that this remains the status quo.
While the report speaks of the 'transformative vision of human rights’ set out in the Secretary-
General's Call to Action and confirms that 'human rights are the responsibility of each and every
United Nations actor', it stops short of clarifying how this transformative vision will reach the Myanmar people and through what principled UN actions. Mention is made of the UNCT's Human
Rights Strategy - adopted in July 2020 - without address of whether and if so how it has been
updated to respond to the junta-induced human rights crisis.
The report also discusses the central role of the Resident Coordinator in formulating a 'common
position for the UNCT regarding engagement with the military authorities’ without clarifying what
concrete steps - informed by the UNCT’s Engagement Guidelines - have been taken to ensure that
legitimacy is not granted to the military junta. The junta, significantly, is led by individuals that the
Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar recommended be investigated and
prosecuted for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, including against the Rohingya.
The Republic of the Union of Myanmar’s concerns with the Secretary-General's report are
compounded by its late release, and by the failure of the Resident Coordinator a.i. to participate in
the enhanced interactive dialogue as requested by the Human Rights Council.4 When added to the
continuing delay in the appointment of a permanent Resident Coordinator, this shows an alarming
lack of seriousness in confronting a "perfect storm of upheaval".
A repeat of past UN failures seems inevitable if this approach continues. The cost will borne out in
civilian lives, only to be followed by renewed pledges of "never again” and reactivated cycles of
internal inquiry.
Myanmar therefore strongly recommends that the Secretary-General:
• Establishes an independent and wide-ranging inquiry led by international experts into the
UN’s progress in its implementation of follow-up actions to the Rosenthal Report, with an
added focus on the UN’s response since 1 February 2021. The inquiry should produce and
deliver to the Human Rights Council a comprehensive public report with findings and
recommendations
• Ensures that UN humanitarian assistance in Myanmar is delivered through the National Unity
Government, Ethnic Organisations, international and local non-governmental organisations,
and civil society and community-based organisations
• Commissions a new UNCT Human Rights Strategy, with all UN projects and programmes to be
screened for human rights compliance and conflict-sensitivity and informed by due diligence,
risk assessments and the do no harm principle. Priority must also be given to the protection of
Myanmar national UN employees
• Expedites the appointment of a permanent Resident Coordinator in Myanmar, in consultation
with the National Unity Government and civil society
• Provides the Resident Coordinator and the High Commissioner’s Myanmar Team with
additional resources and access to expertise in support of their respective human rights
mandates
• Makes public the UNCT’s Engagement Guidelines on UN interactions with the military junta
• Ensures the future participation of the Resident Coordinator in enhanced interactive dialogues
and other such events as requested by the Human Rights Council..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Human Rights
Date of publication:
2022-03-19
Date of entry/update:
2022-03-19
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
The Secretary-General's reports on the situation of human rights in Myanmar (English), Human Rights and international relations, National Unity Government (NUG)
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Sub-title:
Support Arms Embargo, Stronger Targeted Sanctions
Description:
"(Geneva) – The United Nations Human Rights Council should adopt a strategy for accountability in Myanmar to end abuses by the military junta, Human Rights Watch said today. The council will discuss Myanmar and the new report by the UN Human Rights Office at its meeting on March 21, 2022.
The Human Rights Council resolution should call for all UN member states to prevent the flow of weapons into Myanmar and impose stronger, targeted economic sanctions against individuals implicated in abuses and military interests. The resolution should also urge the UN Security Council to refer Myanmar to the International Criminal Court.
“The UN Human Rights Council should respond to Myanmar’s human rights and humanitarian crisis with urgency and purpose,” said Lucy McKernan, deputy UN advocacy director at Human Rights Watch. “The rights council should take strong action against security forces that have never faced consequences for their numerous crimes.”
Since the February 1, 2021, coup, Myanmar’s junta has carried out a brutal nationwide crackdown to suppress those opposing military rule. The junta’s systematic and pervasive abuses, including mass killings, torture, arbitrary arrests, and indiscriminate attacks on civilians, amount to crimes against humanity and war crimes.
The UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights condemned Myanmar security forces’ violations of international human rights and humanitarian law in a March 15 report, stating:
The military and security forces have shown a flagrant disregard for human life, bombarding populated areas with airstrikes and heavy weapons and deliberately targeting civilians, many of whom have been shot in the head, burned to death, arbitrarily arrested, tortured or used as human shields.
In recent weeks, there have been increasing reports of Myanmar military airstrikes and use of heavy weapons causing civilian loss of life and property. The UN special rapporteur on human rights in Myanmar, in his February report on government sales of weapons to the Myanmar military, said that jet aircraft, attack helicopters, armored vehicles, light and heavy artillery, missiles, and rockets are being used against civilians. More than 400 of the attacks reported occurred in Sagaing Region in northwestern Myanmar, where most civilian fatalities have recently occurred.
The Human Rights Council, in addition to calling on all UN member countries to prevent the transfer of weapons to Myanmar, should also call for all revenues from oil, gas, timber, and gems that flow to the military and help finance the abuses to be put into an escrow account for the Myanmar people until a democratically elected civilian government is restored.
Since the coup, security forces have killed at least 1,600 people and detained more than 12,000, according to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners. Over 500,000 people have been internally displaced since the coup, while tens of thousands have fled as refugees to Thailand and India, according to the UN refugee agency, UNHCR.
In many parts of the country, the junta is deliberately blocking aid to populations as a form of collective punishment. The UN estimates that the number of people needing assistance has grown from 1 million before the coup to 14.4 million, including more than 5 million children. About 25 million people, or half the population, are estimated to be below the national poverty line.
Internet shutdowns remain in parts of the country after the junta imposed rolling nationwide shutdowns and blocked access to social media following the coup. Under international human rights standards, internet-based restrictions must be necessary and proportionate. Blanket internet shutdowns are a form of collective punishment that hinder access to information and communications needed for daily life, which is particularly vital during times of crisis.
“Senior General Min Aung Hlaing and other junta leaders have been able to brutally quash protests and dissent with minimal international interference,” McKernan said. “The Human Rights Council should urgently push back against these abuses and lead the international response to protect rights and advance accountability in Myanmar...”
Source/publisher:
Human Rights Watch (USA)
Date of publication:
2022-03-18
Date of entry/update:
2022-03-18
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Business and the Military, Sanctions, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
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Description:
"UN Secretary-General’s new report whitewashes the UN’s historical failures in Myanmar
The United Nations’ ‘systemic failures’ in Myanmar remain unaddressed amid grave crimes committed by the Myanmar military
[18 March 2022, Geneva] Progressive Voice and the Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development (FORUM-ASIA) express deep disappointment at the UN Secretary-General’s follow up report to the 2019 ‘brief and independent inquiry’ in the UN involvement in Myanmar from 2010 to 2018 (Rosenthal Report).
The Rosenthal Report found ‘systemic failures’ and ‘structural shortcomings’ in the UN’s handling of the Rohingya crisis.
The issues outlined in the report, which describes the presence of the UN in Myanmar as “dysfunctional”, remain unresolved, including the absence of a clear and unified strategy, lack of horizontal and vertical communication and coordination within the UN systems, and bureaucratic dysfunction.
Despite the lack of progress, the Secretary-General’s report paints a rosy picture of a “new generation of UN Country Teams, under the leadership of an empowered, independent reinvigorated Resident Coordinators” as one of the hallmarks of its reforms in response to the Rosenthal Report.
However, the report fails to mention that, ironically, since the Rosenthal report, Myanmar has repeatedly been without a permanent Resident Coordinator for prolonged periods, and even in the midst of the current catastrophic crisis, the position has been left vacant for six months and counting.
Moreover, the Secretary-General’s proposed solution merely repackages past failed programs, a ‘business as usual’ approach in the face of catastrophe.
Khin Ohmar of Progressive Voice said: ‘The UN is once again making the same mistakes and repeating its cycle of failure in responding to the Myanmar military’s grave human rights violations and atrocity crimes. In highlighting ‘empowered’ and ‘reinvigorated Resident Coordinator’ system in other countries, while overlooking the abysmal lack of UN leadership in Myanmar since the Rohingya genocide in 2017, the report whitewashes the UN’s historical and continuing failures in Myanmar. The UN Secretary-General has lacked impetus in rallying nations towards meaningful actions to stop the military’s violence and protect the people in the wake of the coup, opting for a ‘business as usual’ mentality in the face of grievous human rights violations.
‘The UN must take immediate action to ensure institutional accountability for its actions in Myanmar. This is vital for the UN to prove its own mandate and rebuild trust from the people of Myanmar and victims and survivors of human rights violations – those whom the UN system should be protecting, and yet continues to fail.’
FORUM-ASIA said: ‘The UN’s ‘systemic failure’ in Myanmar during the Rohingya crisis must be addressed at the highest levels of the UN system. Before Myanmar, similar patterns of failures have contributed to grave violations in Sri Lanka. The UN’s leadership has so far been anemic and has not demonstrated genuine willingness and commitment to address and remedy its own failures and shortcomings. There must be a comprehensive and independent inquiry and review of the UN system that failed the people of Myanmar. The UN must ensure accountability and end these repetitive cycles and patterns of negligence and dysfunction in responding to crises in Myanmar and around the world.’
The appalling lack of leadership on Myanmar in the UN system, even prior to the 1 February 2021 failed military coup has again contributed to UN’s failure to implement a coherent system-wide response to grave violations of human rights and atrocity crimes being committed by the military.
‘Evidently, the UN severely lacks a coherent protection framework in its response to the ongoing human rights catastrophe in Myanmar’, said the groups.
“A brief and independent inquiry into the involvement of the United Nations in Myanmar from 2010 to 2018 – Report of the Secretary-General”, issued during the UN Human Rights Council’s 49th Regular Session is supposed to track the progress in the implementation of recommendations of the Rosenthal Report and follow-up action to enable effective work of the UN and to strengthen prevention capacity of the UN System..."
Source/publisher:
FORUM-ASIA and Progressive Voice
Date of publication:
2022-03-18
Date of entry/update:
2022-03-18
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, The Secretary-General's reports on the situation of human rights in Myanmar (English), Freedom of Movement, violations of in Burma/Myanmar
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229.94 KB
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Description:
"Human Rights Council
Forty-ninth session
28 February–1 April 2022
Agenda item 4 Human rights situations that require the Council’s attention
Summary
Thirteen months after launching a coup against the government, an illegal military junta has waged a relentless war against the people of Myanmar and their fundamental rights. The results have been devastating. Junta forces have killed at least 1,600 civilians and displaced over 500,000. Half of the population has fallen into poverty. The World Health Organization is now projecting that there will be over 47,000 preventable deaths in Myanmar this year. Thirteen million people face food insecurity.
This report highlights some of the most serious human rights violations in Myanmar during the period September 2021 through February 2022. It documents the military’s violent attacks on civilian populations, including airstrikes, mortaring, arson, extrajudicial killings, and the use of forced labor and human shields. The report describes the junta’s campaign to arrest and imprison activists, journalists, peaceful protesters and other opponents. It documents the junta’s criminalization of fundamental rights such as freedom of speech and assembly. It also shares the experiences of those who have faced torture and other illtreatment during periods of detention. Many of these attacks constitute probable crimes against humanity and/or war crimes, and perpetrators must be brought to justice.
The report describes the efforts of the people of Myanmar to oppose the military junta and defend their nation. Led by large numbers of young people, including many young women, protest organizers have demonstrated great skill, tenacity and creativity in the mobilization of opposition despite the near constant threat of imprisonment or death. The Special Rapporteur is inspired by their conviction and tireless efforts.
To succeed, the people of Myanmar need a much stronger level of support from the international community. The report concludes with specific recommendations that he urges UN Security Council and Member States to take.
I. Introduction
More than 13 months after overthrowing a democratically elected government, the Myanmar junta has intensified its war against the people of Myanmar. The military has escalated its indiscriminate attacks against civilians using jet fighters, attack helicopters and heavy artillery, and soldiers have burned entire villages to the ground. Civilians and combatants have been tortured, raped, executed and used as human shields.
The scale of these atrocities is immense. According to conservative estimates, at least 1,600 civilians have been killed by the junta’s forces. Nearly 10,000 people are currently detained because of their opposition to military rule, and the junta has amended the legal code to further criminalize the exercise of fundamental rights including the rights to freedom of expression and assembly. More than 500,000 people have been displaced since the coup bringing the current number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Myanmar to over 800,000. Tens of thousands who have sought safety in Bangladesh, India and Thailand have joined the approximately one million refugees from Myanmar in neighboring countries.
Many of the junta’s human rights violations constitute probable crimes against humanity and war crimes. Those responsible must be held to account.
This report highlights some of the most serious human rights concerns in Myanmar during the period September 2021 through February 2022. It documents the military’s violent attacks on civilian populations, including airstrikes, mortaring, arson, extrajudicial killings, and the use of forced labor and human shields. These attacks have created and exacerbated the dire humanitarian crisis that now grips the country, threatening the livelihoods, health and lives of millions. The report describes the junta’s campaign to arrest and imprison thousands of activists, journalists, peaceful protesters and other opponents. It also shares the experiences of those who have faced torture and other ill-treatment during periods of detention. The Special Rapporteur describes the particular dangers and human rights challenges faced by women and children and outlines the junta’s efforts to criminalize and otherwise suppress fundamental rights and freedoms. This report also describes the dire human rights situation for Rohingya populations in Rakhine State, including those who are confined to IDP camps.
In December 2021, the Special Rapporteur traveled to Bangladesh, as part of his overall assessment of the human rights situation of the Rohingya people of Myanmar. In an annex to this report, the Special Rapporteur reflects on his trip, noting the role that the people and government of Bangladesh played in saving untold numbers of Rohingya as they fled the genocidal attacks of the Myanmar military in Rakhine State. He makes recommendations with respect to the protection of and support to Rohingya in the refugee camps in Cox’s Bazar and on Bhasan Char island.
The report follows the publication in February 2022 of the Special Rapporteur’s conference paper on arms sales to the Myanmar military (A/HRC/49/CRP.1). It underscores concerns raised in the paper, namely that several nations continue to sell or authorize the transfer of weapons of war to the Myanmar military, despite knowledge that the weapons are almost certain to be used in attacks against civilians. These transfers violate international law.
Many people in Myanmar—including the victims of human rights abuses and their family members, some of whom are highlighted in this report—have told the Special Rapporteur that they are profoundly disappointed with the failure of the international community to act decisively to help prevent atrocities and hold perpetrators accountable. The Special Rapporteur reiterates his call to the UN Security Council to adopt a resolution imposing an arms embargo and targeted economic sanctions against the Myanmar military and referring the situation in Myanmar to the International Criminal Court. He elaborates steps that Member States should take in the absence of Security Council action. The Special Rapporteur notes the strong and swift action taken by Member States on behalf of the people of Ukraine and implores the international community to act similarly to protect the people of Myanmar. They too are under siege by a brutal and relentless military attack.
The Special Rapporteur reiterates his deep admiration for the courage and resilience of the Myanmar people. He has been inspired by the bravery of survivors of human rights violations who have taken great personal risks to speak with him, by the resourcefulness of activists who have found new and creative ways to challenge military rule, and by the resilience of communities that have repeatedly rebounded from attacks over many months, years or decades. The Special Rapporteur is honored to share their stories, and their words, in this report. He is also grateful to the non-governmental and civil society organizations, human rights defenders, local human rights groups, Member States and United Nations programs and agencies that contributed to this report..."
Source/publisher:
UN Human Rights Council via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of publication:
2022-03-16
Date of entry/update:
2022-03-17
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Statements and reports by the Special Rapporteur on Myanmar and the High Commissioner for Human Rights to regular sessions of the Human Rights Council, Education in Burma/Myanmar - general, Food Security and nutrition in Burma/Myanmar, Public Health, Human Rights and international relations
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603.09 KB (Original version) - 28 pages
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"Human Rights Council
Forty-ninth session
28 February–1 April 2022
Agenda item 4
Human rights situations that require the Council’s attention
Progress made in the implementation of follow-up action to the recommendations of the “A Brief and Independent Inquiry into the Involvement of the United Nations in Myanmar from 2010 to 2018” to strengthen the prevention capacity of the United Nations system*
Report of the Secretary-General
Summary
In resolution 73/264 on the “Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar”, the UN General Assembly noted “the recommendation by the fact-finding mission on the conduct of a comprehensive, independent inquiry into the involvement of the United Nations in Myanmar since 2011 and encourage[d] the United Nations system to follow up on the issues raised and to ensure that all engagement with Myanmar takes into account, and addresses, human rights concerns.” Pursuant to General Assembly resolution 73/264 of 22 December 2018, and to resolution 39/2 Adopted by the Human Rights Council, the Secretary-General appointed Mr. Gert Rosenthal in December 2018 to conduct an independent inquiry into the involvement of the United Nations in Myanmar from 2010 to 2018. Following oral presentations to the Human Rights Council on the findings and implementation of the recommendations of Mr. Rosenthal’s review in 2020 and 2021, Human Rights Council resolution 46/21 (March 2021) invited the Secretary-General to provide a written report on progress made in the implementation of follow-up action to enable more effective work in the future and to strengthen the prevention capacity of the United Nations system.
**I. Introduction **
In resolution 73/264 on the “Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar”, the UN General Assembly noted “the recommendation by the fact-finding mission on the conduct of a comprehensive, independent inquiry into the involvement of the United Nations in Myanmar since 2011 and encourage[d] the United Nations system to follow up on the issues raised and to ensure that all engagement with Myanmar takes into account, and addresses, human rights concerns.”1 Pursuant to General Assembly resolution 73/264 of 22 December 2018,2 and to resolution 39/2 Adopted by the Human Rights Council,3 the Secretary-General appointed Mr. Gert Rosenthal in December 2018 to conduct an independent inquiry into the involvement of the United Nations in Myanmar from 2010 to 2018.
Mr. Rosenthal’s observations can be categorised as three sets of interrelated areas and challenges to be addressed: (i) UN structures, coordination, information sharing and decisionmaking;
(ii) interaction with the host government; (iii) interaction with other Member States (both within UN bodies and bilaterally) and the wider international community, including international NGOs.
Following oral presentations to the Human Rights Council on the findings and implementation of the recommendations of Mr. Rosenthal’s review in 2020 and 2021, Human Rights Council resolution 46/214 (March 2021) invited the Secretary-General to provide a written report on progress made in the implementation of follow-up action to enable more effective work in the future and to strengthen the prevention capacity of the United Nations system.
Since Mr. Rosenthal’s review, the Secretary-General launched his Call to Action for Human Rights (Call to Action), which promotes a transformative vision of human rights across the United Nations system, recognising human rights as offering solutions and tools, and as speaking to the aspirations of every human being. The initiative underlines that “human rights are the responsibility of each and every United Nations actor and that a culture of human rights must permeate everything we do, in the field, at regional level and at Headquarters”.5 It also makes clear the link between human rights protection and prevention. The present report should be read in conjunction with efforts underway in the context of the Call to Action, as well as Our Common Agenda,6 launched by the Secretary-General in September 2021. Our Common Agenda contains recommendations across four broad areas, including a new social contract anchored in human rights.
Together, the Call to Action and Our Common Agenda provide the UN system with the necessary frameworks, coherence, and momentum, to ensure that human rights is placed at the centre of our efforts across the three pillars, as envisaged in Mr. Rosenthal’s review..."
Source/publisher:
UN Human Rights Council via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of publication:
2022-03-15
Date of entry/update:
2022-03-16
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
The Secretary-General's reports on the situation of human rights in Myanmar (English), Human Rights and international relations, UN Human Rights pages on Myanmar
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"JAKARTA – Southeast Asian parliamentarians have called on the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to take urgent and immediate steps to alleviate the suffering of Myanmar’s people in response to a report the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) submitted to the Human Rights Council this week. The report found that the military has engaged in “systematic and widespread human rights violations and abuses”, some of which may amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity.
“We’re soon approaching one year since ASEAN agreed on the Five Point Consensus, a year in which the bloc’s disastrous failure to make progress on these points has effectively given the Myanmar military license to commit what this UN report has concluded may amount to the gravest crimes against humanity,” said Charles Santiago, chair of ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights (APHR) and a Malaysian Member of Parliament (MP). “Security forces have shown a flagrant disregard for human life, using air raids and heavy weapons on populated areas, deliberately targeting civilians.”
“Meanwhile, the current ASEAN Chair, Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen, has attempted to engage with the criminal junta of Min Aung Hlaing unilaterally, undermining and delaying any meaningful steps ASEAN might have taken to save lives. ASEAN is politically and morally responsible for addressing this catastrophic situation in Myanmar, directly caused by the military junta,” Santiago said.
In addition to accusing the military’s State Administration Council (SAC) of manipulating the “legal framework to facilitate military rule”, it said the military’s seizure of power has left the country facing “violence on a massive scale”, including arbitrary detentions, unnecessary and disproportionate use of force against peaceful protesters, extrajudicial killings and ill-treatment and torture in custody.
The report was published on the same day that Hun Manith, the son of ASEAN Chair Hun Sen, welcomed a Myanmar military delegation to Phnom Penh for the 19th ASEAN Military Intelligence Meeting. APHR condemns this meeting as a potential legimitization of the junta, whose crimes against the people continue to mount.
It is little wonder that the report specifically named ASEAN for failing to achieve tangible results, APHR added. The other ASEAN members must push Cambodia, as the current chair, for concrete actions to address the crisis. The OHCHR report further supports the clear and urgent need for the regional bloc to respond, or risk increased damage to its already weakening credibility.
ASEAN, and specifically its Chair, must immediately discontinue inviting any other junta representatives to all ASEAN official meetings until there is an end to violence, all political prisoners are freed, and the will of the people for fully-fledged democracy has been heard, APHR said.
ASEAN must also begin a dialogue with the National Unity Government in accordance with its own consensus and, as the UN OHCHR report puts it, for the “international community (to) do everything within its power to support the people of Myanmar and turn this human rights catastrophe into an opportunity”.
“It is shocking that more than 14 milllion people in Myanmar, a fifth of the population, are in need of life-saving humanitarian assistance, and yet ASEAN has still only provided aid to support the COVID-19 response. The Five-Point Consensus plan to provide aid through the ASEAN Humanitarian Assistance Center was doomed to fail from the start, but it is not too late to act. ASEAN should now focus its collective political will to help people in need and support local non-state actors and networks that the people already trust to distribute aid,” Santiago said..."
Source/publisher:
ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights
Date of publication:
2022-03-16
Date of entry/update:
2022-03-16
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
ASEAN-Burma relations, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Human Rights and international relations
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