2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
Individual Documents
Description:
"Global Affairs Canada today issued the following statement:
“Canada condemns the Myanmar regime’s dissolution of 40 political parties, including the National League for Democracy and Shan Nationalities League for Democracy. These clear attempts to undermine Myanmar’s democratic institutions and to silence opposition voices will only serve to deepen the ongoing crisis in Myanmar and delay the return to a fully democratic and inclusive Myanmar.
“The regimes overruled the democratic wishes of the people of Myanmar when they seized power in a coup on February 1, 2021.
“Canada continues to call for a peaceful return to Myanmar’s democratic path in line with the aspirations of the people of Myanmar. Any political process without inclusive dialogue, with opposition members detained, killed or silenced risks worsening conflict.
“We call on the regime to release those arbitrarily detained, including political leaders, and end the violence and targeting of civilians, grant full and unhindered humanitarian access, and respect its obligations under international law. We also call on the international community to support efforts to hold those responsible for human rights violations and abuses to account; to cease the sale and transfer of arms and equipment, which facilitate atrocities; and to meet the urgent humanitarian needs of Myanmar’s people, including its most vulnerable communities.
“Canada supports the efforts of those working peacefully for an inclusive, peaceful and multiparty democratic Myanmar where the rights of all are protected.”..."
Source/publisher:
Government of Canada
Date of publication:
2023-03-30
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-30
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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"၁။အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၏ ဘဏ္ဍာငွေရှာဖွေရေးအစီအစဉ်များတွင် အတတ်ပညာ၊ အသိပညာ၊ ငွေကြေးအားဖြင့် ပါဝင်ကူညီအားဖြည့်ပေးနေကြသူ တစ်ဦးချင်းစီတိုင်း၏ ကြိုးစားအားထုတ်မှုများကို လေးစားစွာဖြင့် အသိ အမှတ်ပြုအပ်ပါသည်။
၂။အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၊ ကာကွယ်ရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာနအနေဖြင့် နိုင်ငံတကာ Fundraiser များထံမှ တဆင့် Project DragonFly အတွက် အမေရိကန်ဒေါ်လာ (၂.၂) သန်းတိတိကို လက်ခံရရှိသုံးစွဲလျက်ရှိပါသည်။ ရရှိထားသော ရန်ပုံငွေများကို လေကြောင်းရန်ကာကွယ်ရေးကဏ္ဍအတွက် အမေရိကန်ဒေါ်လာ (၁.၄) သန်းနှင့် တန်ပြန်လေကြောင်း တိုက်ခိုက်ရေးကဏ္ဍအတွက် အမေရိကန်ဒေါ်လာ (၈) သိန်း လျာထား သုံးစွဲလျက်ရှိပါသည်။
၃။အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၊ ကာကွယ်ရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာနအနေဖြင့် နိုင်ငံတကာ Fundraiser များနှင့် ပူးပေါင်း လုပ်ဆောင်ခဲ့သည့် ရန်ပုံငွေရှာဖွေရေးစီမံချက်များမှ ရရှိလာသော ရန်ပုံငွေများကို တာဝန်ယူမှု၊ တာဝန်ခံမှုအပြည့်ဖြင့် စနစ်တကျစီမံခန့်ခွဲနေပြီး အလေအလွင့်မရှိ လက်ခံရရှိခဲ့ပါသည်။
၄။Project DragonFly မှ ရရှိခဲ့သော ရန်ပုံငွေများဖြင့် ပြုလုပ်ခဲ့သည့် စစ်ဆင်ရေးအောင်မြင်မှုများကို လုံခြုံရေး အရ သင့်လျော်သည့် အချိန်များတွင် ထုတ်ပြန်သွားမည်ဖြစ်ပါကြောင်း အသိပေးအပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2023-03-30
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-30
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
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"The Burmese military announced on 28th March 2023 that it has banned 40 political parties, including the National League for Democracy (NLD), which has won every election it has been able to contest.
The ban follows the military demanding that the political parties reregister with the military-appointed Union Election Commission, something the parties refused to do as the military has no legitimacy or legal power to set election rules.
The Burmese military have arrested, killed, jailed and tortured NLD members, and closed their offices, but have never gone so far as to impose a complete ban. The ban is a sign of how desperate and insecure the Burmese military are as they face unprecedented resistance after their attempted coup began two years ago.
“The Burmese military banning 40 political parties should be a wake-up call to those in the international community who still think there can be genuine dialogue and compromise with the military,” said Mark Farmaner, Director of Burma Campaign UK. “For decades the Burmese military has held the country back from building democracy, human rights, and economic development. The people of Burma want a future without the Burmese military and the international community should be supporting them in achieving that goal. At the present time, the Burmese military receives far more international support than Burma’s democracy movement, with even the USA and UK still dithering over whether to sanction gas revenues.”
There are no soft-liners or genuine reformers in the military waiting in the wings. The Burmese military is not an institution which can be reformed. Each leader is more hardline and brutal than the last. Even the so-called reform period during the 2010s saw a significant escalation of violence and human rights violations perpetrated against ethnic people in Burma, including genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity.
The plodding pace of the implementation of sanctions enables the Burmese military to continue to receive revenue, arms and equipment, including aviation fuel, which it is using to commit violations of international law against the population of Burma.
“Faced with increased repression, airstrikes, artillery bombardments and a humanitarian crisis, the people of Burma need swift and decisive action to cut off revenue and arms to the Burmese military, including gas revenue and aviation fuel. The pace of sanctions implementation is simply too slow, and people are dying as a result,” said Mark Farmaner.
The 40 political parties listed in Burmese military-controlled state media are:
Lahu National Development Party
Democratic Party (Myanmar)
Kayen National Party
Ta’ang (Palaung) National Party
Party for Democracy and Peace
Shan Nationalities Democratic Party
Wunthanu Democratic Party
National Democratic Party for Development
Ethnic National Development Party (ENDP)
Kaman National Development Party
Bamar People’s Party
National League for Democracy
Democratic Party for a New Society
Myanmar National Congress Party
Asho Chin National Party
Shan National League for Democracy
United National Congress Party
National Prosperity Party
Dawei Nationalities Party
Federal Union Party
Union Pa-O National Organization
Khumi (Khami) National Party
Democratic Party for a New Society
Karen National Party
Mro National Democracy Party
Guiding Star Party
88 Generation Democracy Party
Lhaovo National Unity and Development Party
New Era Union Party
Zo National Region Development Party
National Development Party
Daingnet National Development Party
Arakan League for Democracy Party
Kayah State Democratic Party
National United Democratic Party (NUDP)
The Yeomanry Development Party (YDP)
Chin National League for Democracy Party
Chin National Party (CNP)
Kachin National Party
Alliance of Myanmar’s Worker and Farmer Party (AMWFP)..."
Source/publisher:
"Burma Campaign UK" (London)
Date of publication:
2023-03-29
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-29
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
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Sub-title:
Sharing a survey study on the post-coup socio-economic impact of the women and working peoples from peri-urban areas
Description:
"It is crucial to document all forms of human costs shouldered by different social groups due to the military coup and to recognize and understand all the struggles and resilience strategies deployed and the specific circumstances in which they are being deployed. In this regard, TNI wants to highlight the work of a local partner as they attempt to capture the double burden of ‘post-covid economic stresses’ and ‘military coup’ faced by the urban women laborers and women-headed households living in Hlaintharyar and South Dagon townships of Yangon city.
This past February 1 marked the second year since the Myanmar military staged a coup d'état back in 2021. Within this two-year period, the country saw the highest number of mass displacements, deaths, destruction, and torture in every state and region ever – surpassing any point of time in the country’s history. These atrocities committed by the genocidal military can be seen in the numbers.1 However, other human costs, such as the social, emotional, and economic dimensions may be less visible and harder to capture even though they are important parts of the totality. A particularly tragic outcome of such human costs is the number of people (forty-four cases recorded between 1 Feb 2021 to Sept 2022)2 who are reported to have committed suicide since the coup.
Nevertheless, despite these hard cruel facts, the military dictator continues to face strong resistance in a majority of the country. At the same time, there are ongoing and unsettling debates around what is the ‘right’ kind of resistance. Looking back at the country’s history of colonial occupation, armed conflict, and political oppression, there have been many forms of resistance, and not all were undertaken by established groups. Often, resistance undertaken by ordinary people have not been very overt or highly visible, but this does not mean they were not organized or meaningful. Fast-forward to today, surely the same holds true. While there are circumstances that have clearly led many people to devote themselves completely to the revolution, many others find themselves in other kinds of circumstances where they must keep on working so that their families can survive. Yet these two different scenarios surely only tell part of the story of what is really happening in the lives of real people in either case. In either case, people found themselves in difficult circumstances not of their own choosing that they must find a way to survive and get through.
We must keep in mind that even before the coup, Myanmar had become a country of very high poverty and very deep inequality. People from the rural areas made up an overwhelming majority (87%) of the country’s poor.3 Urban-biased forms of development pursued by the previous governments had pushed waves of rural villagers to the cities in search of work, and more often than not ending up as part of the cheap informal labor force in the growing manufacturing and service industries. Myanmar pays the lowest daily minimum wage in ASEAN since 2018, which is now equivalent to around 2 US$ factoring in current inflation rate, below international poverty line of 2.15 US$ per day.4 Even before the coup, only 2% of the entire workforce is estimated to be employed in the formal sector where workers are eligible to register for social security schemes.5 The rest are effectively overexploited and uncared for. A significant proportion of working people lack access to the most basic public services such as primary health care, reproductive health services, municipal public services, decent housing, and more.
For the majority of people whose lives had already been shattered by various events in previous decades, the coup was a new crisis on top of an already existing crisis. In the early days after the coup, we have seen media reports of hundreds of factory workers from Yangon industrial zones on the streets, one hand grasping a humble lunch box while another gripping into a fist to protest against the coup. Here is where the junta’s iron hammer fell first and with unmitigated harshness. Hlaingtharyar and South Dagon township faced a horrifically ruthless crackdown by the military, killing nearly 100 people which Human Rights Watch described as a massacre.6,7Many workers have since left the area and returned to their villages. But many have no choice but to remain, forced to earn a wage under the close military surveillance, as they try to rebuild their lives on the ruins and look for jobs available from whichever factories.
There is a popular saying that people often use whenever a crisis hits – ‘we are all in the same boat’. It is utterly wrong. Different people live in different contexts based on their social class, ethnicity, race, religion, gender, sexual orientation, and geographical locations. That is why it is so crucial to keep on documenting all forms of human costs shouldered by different social groups due to the military coup and to recognize and understand all the struggles and resilience strategies deployed and the specific circumstances in which they are being deployed.
In this regard, TNI wants to highlight the work of a local partner as they attempt to capture the double burden of ‘post-covid economic stresses’ and ‘military coup’ faced by the urban women laborers and women-headed households living in Hlaintharyar and South Dagon townships of Yangon city. The report investigated increasing pressures faced by the women in the areas of health, children education, safety and security, food, living situation, debt, and psychological impact. Their experiences and struggles deserve our attention and invite us to walk with them toward a fuller understanding of their lives and the multiple meanings of resistance and resilience..."
Source/publisher:
Transnational Institute ( Amsterdam)
Date of publication:
2023-03-29
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-29
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Women's rights, Women and Politics in Burma/Myanmar, Articles, reports and sites relating to women of Burma
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Sub-title:
Military Seeks to Legitimize Rule Through Sham Elections
Description:
"Myanmar’s military junta announced this week that the National League for Democracy (NLD) is among 40 political parties and other groups dissolved for failing to meet a political party registration deadline imposed under the new Political Party Registration Law.
The junta, which staged a military coup on February 1, 2021, claims it wants to hold elections, and promulgated the party registration law on January 26. However, its provisions appear intended to indefinitely delay, rather than facilitate, Myanmar’s return to civilian democratic rule. The law requires existing political parties to reregister within 60 days or be dissolved. But many of the parties – including the NLD – refused to comply, saying that ongoing military oppression prevents proposed elections from being credible.
The 2021 coup resulted in the military overthrow of the newly elected NLD-led government and the detention of elected civilian officials. The junta has since committed numerous abuses including crimes against humanity against protesters and activists, and war crimes in ethnic minority areas. It has also severely restricted freedom of speech, association, and assembly.
The registration law also stacks the deck for the military by prohibiting anyone convicted of a crime from joining a party, effectively disqualifying many opposition leaders, including NLD leader Aung San Suu Kyi and president Win Myint, who are both serving lengthy sentences on politically motivated charges.
Under the new law and earlier martial law orders, any election would be dominated by junta-backed political parties and the military itself, which already holds 25 percent of seats in the national and local legislatures under the 2008 Constitution. But the junta still seems determined to remove the NLD and other independent political parties from polls and install its own parties instead.
In the face of widescale political oppression, genuinely free and fair elections are not possible in Myanmar for the foreseeable future. Concerned governments, including regional partners such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Japan, and India, should not be fooled into thinking that the junta’s new election laws and regulations can be the basis for a credible electoral process. Instead, they should recognize that the junta is merely attempting to legitimize military rule through sham elections..."
Source/publisher:
Human Rights Watch (USA)
Date of publication:
2023-03-29
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-29
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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Description:
"1. NUG recognizes China’s intervention...2. NUG formally cautions PTT over revenue flow to SAC...3. 15 IPDs rescued by alliance group...4. Some women and girls have already become victims of human trafficking...5. NUG urges NGOs and CSOs to seek prior authorization from the relevant Ministries under the NUG..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2023-03-27
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-29
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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1.32 MB
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Description:
"National Unity Government Weekly Press Update (13/2023)..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2023-03-27
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-29
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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2.23 MB
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Description:
"Documented incidents:
Reported on 07-19 March 2023: In Pinlaung township, Taunggyi district, Shan state (South), the Myanmar military and the ethnic armed group Pa-O National Organisation allied with the Myanmar military banned the transport of medicines into the township where IDPs were taking shelter. At the checkpoint in Aungban town, Kalaw township, Taunggyi district, Shan state (South) on the highway heading to Pinlaung township, the Myanmar military seized medicine cargoes on19 March 2023.
Sources: Delta News Agency I, Delta News Agency II, and Facebook 10 March 2023: In Hpakant township, Mohnyin district, Kachin state, a Myanmar military airstrike damaged a Kachin Independence Army (KIA) clinic building, garage, and kitchen, and injured three KIA personnels. Source: Kachin News Group 12 March 2023: In Zar Di village and village tract, Yebyu township, Dawei district, Tanintharyi region, the Myanmar military arrested a retired male health assistant and other two civilians following the killing of a military informant by an unknown armed group in this village. This is the second-time arrest of this health assistant after the 2021 military coup; he was released from the prison just before this incident. The staff member was also a political activist. Sources: Dawei Watch, Democratic Voice of Burma, and Than Lwin Times 13 March 2023: In Tedim town, township, and district, Chin state, PDF Zoland attacked the Myanmar military occupying the district hospital (public, secondary-level). During the armed clashes, although the hospital was functioning, no patients or health care personnels were harmed according to the reports. The military had occupied the hospital for four months before this attack.
The clashes ended with the killing of four soldiers, the military leaving the hospital, and seizing of weapons and accessories of the Myanmar military. Sources: BBC Burmese, Facebook, Mekong News, and Narinjara 14 March 2023: In Myitkyina town, township, and district, Kachin state, the Myanmar military in civilian clothes arrested a female nurse from Myat Mon Private Hospital while she was on duty. She was forced to disclose the location of her partner and both of them were arrested. She was from Sagaing region and has worked in this hospital for five months. Source: The 74 Media 18 March 2023: In Ayadaw town and township, Monywa district, Sagaing region, a female midwife was killed at her private clinic at home by a man and woman impersonating patients. She was shot dead on the spot with gunshot wounds to the head and chest. At the time of the attack, her husband and 10-year-old son were at home, but they were not harmed. The midwife was not affiliated with the Civil Disobedience Movement; her duty station was at Ayadaw township hospital after the 2021 military coup. Sources: Ayadaw Post, Mekong News, and Telegram 19 March 2023: In Hlaing town and township, Yangon (West) district, Yangon region, voluntary aid workers of a local NGO offering ambulance services to the injured and deceased civilians in a road traffic accident were physically abused by a Myanmar military major. Source: Khit Thit Media 20 March 2023: In Sanchaung town and township, Yangon (West) district, Yangon region, a 20-year-old male second-year medical student was killed by a group of gunmen at his home. His aunt was critically injured and a passer-by got a gunshot wound. He passed away after being admitted to the hospital. He was believed to be a military informant having assisted in the arrest of CDM-affiliated medical students and health workers at medical universities. The victim was not affiliated with CDM. His father was a former lieutenant colonel and his brother-in-law was a major in the Myanmar military. Sources: Khit Thit Media, Mekong News, and Telegram 20 March 2023: In Kyeemyindaing town and township, Yangon (West) district, Yangon region, a CDM-affiliated medical student and his/her family members were arrested, and their apartment was sealed and confiscated following the killing of a medical student in Sanchaung township on the same day. Source: Mekong News 21 March 2023: In Pakokku town, township, and district, Magway region, at the military checkpoint near Pakokku bridge, the Myanmar military arrested a doctor who was on her way from Yangon city, Yangon region to Myaing township, Magway region, allegedly to offer health care to the local resistance forces. A civilian lady who reportedly assisted the arrest was also arrested. Sources:
Chindwin News Agency and Telegram..."
Source/publisher:
Insecurity Insight (Geneva) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of publication:
2023-03-21
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-28
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Individual Documents
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"Justice For Myanmar welcomes sanctions imposed by the UK and US on subsidiaries and one individual from Asia Sun Group of Companies, to coincide with the illegal Myanmar junta’s “Armed Forces Day”.
Asia Sun Group of Companies is a key local partner of the Myanmar military junta and is involved in importing, storing and delivering jet fuel to the military.
Asia Sun’s role in the Myanmar military’s jet fuel supply chain was detailed in the Amnesty International report, Deadly Cargo, with research contributed by Justice For Myanmar.
On March 24, 2023, the US sanctioned three Myanmar-registered companies in the Asia Sun network: Asia Sun Group Company Limited, Asia Sun Trading Company Limited and Cargo Link Petroleum Logistics Company Limited.
On March 27, 2023, the UK sanctioned the Singapore-registered Shoon Energy Pte Ltd, which was formerly named Asia Sun Aviation, along with its director and sole owner, Khin Phyu Win.
Amnesty International has revealed that in December 2022, the Swiss and Singapore based Puma Energy transferred its share of National Energy Puma Asia Sun (NEPAS) to Shoon Energy. NEPAS is a joint venture with the junta controlled Myanma Petrochemical Enterprise (MPE) and is responsible for the import, storage and sale of jet fuel.
Shoon Energy is the second Singapore registered company to be sanctioned following the Myanmar military’s illegal coup attempt, and further highlights the role Singapore continues to play as a base for businesses providing funds, arms and jet fuel to the Myanmar military.
The first Singapore business sanctioned since the coup attempt was Star Sapphire Group Pte Ltd, designated by the US on Friday.
In January, the UK sanctioned Asia Sun Trading, its sole director and shareholder Zaw Min Tun, former director and shareholder Win Kyaw Kyaw Aung, and Cargo Link Company Limited.
However, more action is urgently needed to stop the supply of jet fuel to the Myanmar junta, including through a total ban on jet fuel sales to Myanmar, sanctions on MPE and the extension of sanctions to all Asia Sun companies, directors and shareholders, including the key individuals May Thwe Aung and Moe Myint Aung, who remain unsanctioned.
Justice For Myanmar has documented at least 8 subsidiaries of Asia Sun Group of Companies that are directly involved in the jet fuel supply chain, and only four of these companies have been sanctioned in one or more jurisdictions. Asia Sun Group of Companies has at least 40 subsidiaries and 13 associated companies in total.
The illegal junta relies on its air force to wage a war of terror against the people of Myanmar. In the first two months of 2023, Chin Human Rights Foundation documented one airstrike per day in Chin State townships under martial law. In late February, a campaign of indiscriminate airstrikes in Karenni State killed civilians and displaced thousands.
By supplying jet fuel to the Myanmar military, Asia Sun Group of Companies is complicit in the junta’s airstrikes, which amount to atrocity crimes, and all those responsible should be held accountable under international law.
Justice For Myanmar spokesperson Yadanar Maung says: “We welcome the latest round of sanctions from the US and UK targeting the junta’s jet fuel supply chain.
“However more urgently needs to be done to stop the junta from accessing jet fuel, which enables its ongoing air attacks against the people of Myanmar.
“The US, UK, EU and Australia should follow the lead of Canada by imposing a ban on the sale of jet fuel to Myanmar.
“The US, UK, EU, Canada and Australia need to coordinate to sanction MPE and the whole Asia Sun network of companies and individuals, as well all other companies and individuals that continue to supply jet fuel to the Myanmar military.
“The junta’s procurement of arms and jet fuel is enabled by its access to funds. Myanma Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE) remains the biggest source of revenue for the junta and must be targeted to disrupt the junta’s ability to maintain its campaign of terror against the people of Myanmar.
“We urge the US, UK, Canada and Australia to follow the EU and sanction MOGE immediately, as has been repeatedly demanded by civil society and the National Unity Government.
“It is concerning that Asia Sun has continued to operate in Singapore, along with many other companies supporting the junta’s international crimes.
“Recent US and UK sanctions against Singapore companies should be a wake-up call to the Singapore government to act in accordance with its international responsibilities and stop allowing Singaporean companies to support the junta.
“We note Singapore Foreign Minister Dr Vivian Balakrishnan's recent statement committing to a prohibition on the transfer of arms and dual use goods to Myanmar, but comprehensive action needs to be seen.”
More information:
See our data on Asia Sun Group of Companies subsidiaries and directors here, and read Amnesty International’s Deadly Cargo report, with research supported by Justice For Myanmar
Read our joint press release with The Sentry welcoming US sanctions against Star Sapphire Group of Companies, subsidiaries and individuals here
Justice For Myanmar, a group of covert activists campaigning for justice and accountability for the people of Myanmar, is calling for an end to military business and for federal democracy and a sustainable peace..."
Source/publisher:
Justice For Myanmar
Date of publication:
2023-03-28
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-28
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Sanctions, Business and the Military, The Burmese military's role in the economy, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
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150.57 KB 119.92 KB
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Description:
"Two years after carrying out a coup, Myanmar’s generals are planning elections to entrench their role in politics. Amid the widespread resistance to their regime, the polls are bound to intensify armed conflict. Yet there are several ways to keep electoral violence to a minimum.
Overview
The Myanmar regime is undertaking the necessary legal and procedural steps for national elections. It has said it intends to hold the polls as soon it can, perhaps by November, although it has announced no date and delays are possible. Amid the state oppression following the 2021 coup, no election can be credible, especially when much of the population sees a vote as a cynical attempt to supplant the landslide victory of Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD) in 2020. The polls will almost certainly intensify the post-coup conflict, as the regime seeks to force them through and resistance groups seek to disrupt them. Governments in a position to influence Naypyitaw should press the regime to desist from using violence to impose elections. The West should coordinate with Asian allies in insisting that the polls are transparently unfair and dangerous; none should provide electoral assistance. For its part, the National Unity Government (NUG), the parallel authority created by elected lawmakers who were ousted by the coup, should make clear that resistance attacks on electoral targets are unacceptable.
On 1 February 2023, the two-year anniversary of the coup d’état, Myanmar’s military regime unexpectedly (and unconstitutionally) extended the state of emergency by a further six months, thereby postponing polls that had been due to take place by 31 July. The junta claims the elections will inaugurate a return to civilian rule, but every indication is that it wants to enshrine its own political pre-eminence in the country. Its template remains the military-drafted 2008 constitution, which provides as one of its “basic principles” for the military to play the “leading political role” in Myanmar. The coup was intended not to overturn this constitutional order, but to remove Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD from the political landscape, in favour of the military’s vision of sharing power with a civilian administration deferential to its prerogatives. The elections are intended to achieve this outcome, rather than to be any kind of exercise for channelling the will of the people.
The problem for junta leader Senior General Min Aung Hlaing is that his personal interests do not fully align with the military’s institutional objectives. The 2008 constitution was designed to prevent the emergence of a solitary autocrat, dividing authority between the commander-in-chief and the president, who cannot be the same person. But Min Aung Hlaing does not want to share power. Thus, if he aspires to be president, he must be sure that his replacement as commander-in-chief will do his bidding. If he stays on as commander-in-chief, he will need to instal a president who will act as his proxy. To do that, he will need full control of the military’s chosen electoral vehicle, the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), which, in the NLD’s likely absence, is positioned to dominate the polls. The extension of the state of emergency, and corresponding election delay, suggest that Min Aung Hlaing is not yet confident in his plans for the post-election period. He may foresee major competition for the top job, probably a more significant consideration than the prevailing insecurity, his stated reason for putting off the vote.
The lead-up to the polls will almost certainly see a further increase in violence and instability.
Even with more time to prepare, the regime undoubtedly faces huge challenges in rolling out elections. Given the extent of popular opposition to the polls, the military will have to impose them by force – pacifying areas of the country where its hold is tenuous, attempting to deter attacks on electoral targets, and intimidating poll workers and voters into participating. Resistance groups, determined to disrupt the vote, have already killed enumerators in service of that goal. The lead-up to the polls will almost certainly see a further increase in violence and instability.
The NUG thus faces a dilemma. As the main anti-regime political force, it logically wants to express its strong opposition to the elections by encouraging a popular boycott and condemning anyone who participates in or supports the polls. That, however, could be seen as endorsing violence by armed resistance groups against electoral targets, making it easier for the regime – and countries that want to normalise relations with it – to cast the opposition as terrorists. Although the NUG does not have control over many resistance groups, as the opposition’s apex political body its reputation will be damaged by their actions. The NUG should thus issue as soon as possible a set of principles governing dissent from the regime’s elections, stating unambiguously that no one should attack electoral targets.
No foreign government or electoral organisation should provide support for the elections, which the regime would cite as evidence that its polls are legitimate. Foreign governments need to take clear public positions that the conditions are not in place for credible elections. Western countries appear to be already convinced, but others, particularly those in Asia that are anxious to move on from the Myanmar crisis, may be inclined to consider polls a step toward restoring constitutional rule.
Western governments should work with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and its chair, Indonesia, to promote consensus as to the conflict risks of the elections and their lack of credibility. Japan and India – which are presidents of the G7 and G20, respectively, in 2023 and which have tended to pursue self-interested engagement with the Myanmar regime – should adopt more principled stances, given the clear security risks of the elections, and the damage that a business-as-usual approach could do to important alliances in the region and with the West. These countries should use what influence they have with Naypyitaw to press the regime to desist from violently imposing the elections. For its part, the West should engage with Japan and India and encourage them to be more outspoken on the risks of the elections and to deploy their influence with Naypyitaw. It is also worth exploring the space for further steps by the UN Security Council, of which Japan is now a non-permanent member. In December 2022, the Council adopted its first-ever Myanmar resolution, achieving consensus on Myanmar despite the geopolitical rifts at play.
More broadly, countries should work to address the multiple crises in Myanmar by continuing to impose targeted sanctions on the military and its business interests. In particular, they should expand targeted sanctions on senior police and military officers most responsible for post-coup abuses and repression, including in relation to the elections, as well as military-owned or linked companies. They should make clear that election-related repressive violence will be a basis for further sanctions. Donor countries should also continue to provide, and whenever possible increase, assistance to address the humanitarian emergency in Myanmar as well as the long-term health, education and livelihoods needs of its people. It remains extremely challenging to deliver aid in Myanmar. Donors should make funding flexible so as to channel it to the partners that can most effectively reach those in need, including local organisations, and give appropriate amounts of cross-border assistance..."
Source/publisher:
International Crisis Group (Belgium)
Date of publication:
2023-03-28
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-28
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2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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"The sole legitimate Government of Myanmar, the National Unity Government (NUG) welcomes the announcement by the UK government of further targeted sanctions against those enabling the brutal Burmese military's assault on the democratic aspirations of the people of Myanmar.
The announcement comes on the annual Armed Forces Day in Myanmar. Today, the brutal Burmese military leaders celebrate their crimes against humanity against the people of Myanmar by throwing massive military parades. Yesterday, the Government of the United States of America (USA) imposed fresh sanctions against the brutal Burmese military for inflicting terrible pain and unspeakable suffering of the people of Myanmar.
The sanctions will restrict the genocidal Burmese military's access to fuel and military equipment by targeting individuals and entities involved in the supply of military equipment and aviation fuel to the military regime. The entities and individuals sanctioned are:
Shoon Energy Pte Ltd. - a company supplying aviation fuel to the Myanmar Air Force,
Khin Phyu Win - Director and shareholder of Shoon Energy Pte Ltd.,
Tun Min Latt - Director of Star Sapphire Trading Company Limited, a company that supplies restricted goods or technology through its business.
We hope and pray that all the International Communities will join the UK government by taking coordinated, targeted and tougher actions against the brutal Burmese Military. We hope and pray that all International actors will join the UK Government in condemning the inhuman Burmese military's brutal campaign against the people of Myanmar, which has resulted in violence and atrocities against civilians. In the last 24 months alone, the brutal Burmese Military's atrocities have totalled more than 9,000 attacks on civilians, resulting in the deaths of over 3,000 innocent individuals and the inhuman and illegal detention of over 20,000 civilians including President U Win Myint, State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and spiritual leader Rev. Dr. Hkalam Samson. These brutal evils forces of Burmese Military have destroyed over 60,000 homes, schools, churches, and monasteries, displacing more than 1.6 million civilians and causing over 17 million people to face hunger and starvation.
These genocidal attacks by the brutal Burmese military junta have been made possible by the massive supplies of fuel and finances provided to the fascist military. The individuals, groups, organizations, businesses, companies, and countries enabling these atrocities and crimes against humanity must be held accountable. These targeted sanctions are an important step towards holding those responsible for these crimes accountable, and we urge the international partners to maintain pressure on the brutal Burmese Military and support the people of Myanmar in their fight for rule of law, freedom, federal democracy and human rights.
We call on all countries to end the sale and transfer of arms and equipment that facilitate the brutal Burmese military's atrocities and to take similar targeted measures to hold accountable those profiting from, or supporting, the genocidal Burmese Military (Tatmadaw). It is time for the international community to stand with the people of Myanmar and demand an end to the genocidal Burmese Military's brutal campaign against them..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of International Cooperation Myanmar
Date of publication:
2023-03-27
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-28
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Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Sanctions, Business and the Military
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"Burma Campaign UK today welcomed new UK sanctions targeting companies supplying aviation fuel, arms and aircraft parts to the Burmese military. The sanctions follow similar sanctions targeting aviation fuel announced by the USA on 24th March.
The new sanctions target the following:
Shoon Energy, linked to the already sanctioned Asia Sun company, which supplies aviation fuel to the military.
Khin Phyu Win, Director of Shoon Energy.
Tun Min Latt, Director of the Star Sapphire group of companies. He is a Burmese business crony close to the head of the military, Min Aung Hlaing, and also an arms broker and linked to the illegal drug trade.
The updated sanctions list is available here.
It follows Asia Sun Trading and two executives being sanctioned by the UK in February for supplying aviation fuel to the Burmese military.
Since the attempted military coup began on 1st February 2021, the Burmese military have increasingly used airstrikes against civilians and those resisting military rule. More than 1.5 million people have been forced to flee their homes, creating a humanitarian crisis.
These almost daily airstrikes are a violation of international law, with homes, schools, hospitals and medical centres being targeted, as well as churches and other religious buildings.
Stopping the supply of aviation fuel is one of the single most effective things the international community can do to address the human rights and humanitarian crisis in Burma.
“These sanctions are well targeted, prioritising suppliers of aviation fuel and arms brokers, but a complete ban on British companies supplying aviation fuel to Burma is the only way to ensure no British companies are complicit in airstrikes against civilians,” said Anna Roberts, Executive Director of Burma Campaign UK. “The British government has the right policy in seeking to cut off sources of revenue, arms and aviation fuel but they are implementing the policy far too slowly.”..."
Source/publisher:
"Burma Campaign UK" (London)
Date of publication:
2023-03-27
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-27
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Sanctions, Business and the Military, The Burmese military's role in the economy, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
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"The National Unity Government of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar warmly welcomes the United States Department of the Treasury’s announcement of further sanctions against individuals and entities connected to the illegal military junta.
Announced on 24 March 2023, the new measures target two individuals and six entities tied to the junta and its deliberate, widespread and systematic atrocities against civilians.
Significantly, they also take aim at the import, storage and distribution of jet fuel to the junta. Frustrated by the scale and resilience of the Myanmar people’s rights-based revolution and by its own failure to seize power, the junta is escalating its airstrikes against villages, schools and hospitals. According to the UN’s Human Rights Office, the junta has increased its aerial attacks against civilian locations by 141 percent over the past year.
In recent weeks, senior UN officials have condemned the junta at the Human Rights Council, the UN’s premier human rights forum.
UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Volker Türk, told the Council that “[t]he disregard and contempt for human life and human rights that are continuously demonstrated by the military constitute an outrage to the conscience of humanity.”
The UN’s Special Rapporteur on Myanmar, Tom Andrews, urged the Council to take action, pressing that the junta “does not offer any viable path to stability or an end to the human rights crisis in Myanmar because it is the very cause of this crisis”, and that the junta “lacks even a shred of constitutional or democratic legitimacy”.
The latest tranche of United States sanctions joins a growing movement of measures against the junta. In February, the European Union imposed a sixth round of sanctions that targeted the junta’s oil and gas revenues, building on earlier measures aimed at stripping the junta of access to arms, munitions and dual-use items.
The National Unity Government extends its gratitude to the United States for its sustained commitment to the Myanmar people and calls on other members of the international community to take equal action..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Myanmar - NUG
Date of publication:
2023-03-26
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-26
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Sanctions, Business and the Military, Human Rights and international relations
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"What’s new? The Sangha, Myanmar’s Buddhist monks and nuns, have mostly stayed on the sidelines since the February 2021 coup, as monastic communities are divided, and the resistance is pursuing a secular agenda that includes violent action. This stance contrasts with that during previous political turmoil, when they were often prominent.
Why does it matter? The Sangha’s low profile has allowed space for youth – particularly young women – to take on leadership roles in the struggle. This bold departure from generations of male Burman Buddhist gerontocratic leadership in Myanmar is encouraging for the future but could bring a backlash.
What should be done? Policymakers and international donors should carefully monitor shifting views on the appropriate role of Buddhism and the Sangha in Myanmar, looking out for any conservative reaction that could compromise intercommunal relations, social stability, human rights or future democratic development.
Executive Summary
The Myanmar Sangha – the country’s community of Buddhist monks and nuns – has played a mostly marginal role in the anti-regime resistance following the military’s February 2021 coup d’état. The National Unity Government (NUG) and its revolutionary allies are pursuing an agenda that is secular and that embraces armed resistance, both features that the monastic community find hard to reconcile with Buddhist teachings. The Sangha’s step to the side is a break from the past, when monks played a significant and vocal role at moments of political crisis. It has also made room for youth – particularly young women – to take on prominent roles in the struggle, an important shift from a tradition of elderly, male leadership drawn predominantly from the Burman Buddhist majority. While Myanmar’s future path is unclear, these trends are likely to be important as they could herald social upheaval, intercommunal tensions or a conservative counterreaction.
In previous periods of political struggle in Myanmar – the independence movement of the early 20th century, political protests in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, and the 2007 Saffron Revolution – monks were highly visible, despite widespread religious and cultural unease with monastic involvement in political affairs. But since the coup, the Sangha has been divided. Some prominent monks have curried favour with the regime by explicitly supporting it and some others have been vociferous opponents. Most of the monastic community, however, has avoided taking any public position, wary of supporting a secular-minded resistance movement engaged in armed struggle, fearful of the consequences of openly challenging the regime and also reluctant to incur the wrath of public opinion by supporting it.
It seems unlikely that the Sangha will emerge as a strong voice either for or against the junta.
As a result, it seems unlikely that the Sangha will emerge as a strong voice either for or against the junta. Critically, the monks, scholars, resistance fighters and activists interviewed by Crisis Group agreed that even should the monastic community unite behind a particular position, it would be unlikely to influence the conflict’s outcome. Despite his performative religiosity, junta chief Min Aung Hlaing is very unlikely to be convinced by any monk, however venerable, to eschew violence or set a radically different political direction. Nor is the general likely to frame the crisis in religious or Buddhist nationalist terms, as some fear he might do in an attempt to win over the Sangha. It is furthermore improbable that any monastic figure could speak to or influence the myriad anti-coup forces.
Nevertheless, the sidelining of monastic figures, long a key part of Myanmar’s social and political fabric, could have important implications. It represents a bold departure from generations of male Burman Buddhist gerontocratic leadership in the country. Myanmar’s political trajectory is uncertain, and there is no end to the crisis in sight. But this moment is likely to be formative in the country’s political life, irrespective of whether the resistance succeeds in its aim of ousting the regime. Whatever dispensation follows the current tragic phase of Myanmar’s history, the shifting moral and religious value systems in the country, and any backlash, will likely have a major impact on intercommunal relations, politics and conflict.
Bangkok/Brussels, 10 March 2023
I.
Introduction
The Sangha, as Buddhist monks and nuns are collectively known in Myanmar, has often been at the forefront of the country’s political struggles, from the independence movement of the early 20th century to the Saffron Revolution of 2007 and more recent Buddhist nationalist movements.1 It has played this role despite popular sentiment that Buddhist monks should avoid engaging in worldly affairs or commenting on politics. The Sangha consists of around 600,000 individuals.2
This history engendered, on one hand, an expectation among many Myanmar people and outside observers that the monastic community would respond resolutely to the February 2021 coup and the subsequent violence. Many thought monks’ participation would be a vital – possibly determinative – contribution to the anti-military resistance movement. On the other hand, it created a fear that many monks, particularly the more hardline elements, might strongly back the regime. In the event, however, the Sangha is split on the crisis. With a few exceptions, monks have been less prominent at the front lines of protests or in leadership roles in the resistance movement than many expected.
The limited involvement of monks in anti-coup activities has opened space for others.
This report analyses Buddhist monks’ low profile in post-coup politics, as compared with other segments of society, and assesses the reasons for it, including the impact of COVID-19 on monasteries and the differing views of the regime and resistance movements on the proper boundaries between religion and state, as well as relevant gender dynamics. The report also considers the extent to which the limited involvement of monks in anti-coup activities has opened space for others – including women and youth – and allowed for a more secular and pluralistic politics to emerge among those opposing the regime than might have otherwise been possible.
The report draws on detailed interviews with monks active in the resistance and those sitting on the sidelines; nuns (most of whom have kept a low profile); pro-regime and nationalist figures; former monks; leaders of anti-coup armed militias; and religious activists, both Buddhist and non-Buddhist. The research also draws on Crisis Group analysis of social media posts by key influencers, including some of the strongest monastic voices – both those expressing sympathy for the military regime and those opposing the coup – as well as comments made in online discussion of those posts. In addition, Crisis Group reviewed relevant academic and policy research, as well as articles about the Sangha in the Myanmar media.
II.
The Sangha’s Role in Past Political Movements
A.
Pre-colonial Symbiosis
Historically, Myanmar’s kings viewed the Sangha as a troublesome but necessary counterpart to their reign. Kings were responsible for protecting the health and well-being of the Sangha, which for its part tried to ensure – through private words of guidance and, sometimes, careful intervention in secular affairs – that the Myanmar populace had a skilful and meritorious ruler.3
The arrival of the British in 1824 prompted King Mindon, the penultimate Myanmar king, to adopt a protectionist approach to Buddhism. He convened the Fifth Buddhist Synod in 1871 with the aim of ensuring that Buddha’s teachings were recorded correctly and in a standardised way. His action led to expanded access to Burmese translations of the Buddhist canon (the Tipitaka).4
In 1885, when the British defeated Myanmar’s last king, Thibaw, and took full control of the country, the increased accessibility of Buddhists texts empowered the laity to take up religious responsibilities that would previously have been the monarch’s prerogative. These responsibilities included protection of the Sangha, which came to be associated with safeguarding access to Buddhist teachings for all – not just the monastic community or royal class.5 The independence movement was built on this foundation.
B.
The Independence Movement
The British authorities’ decision to leave religious affairs in the hands of those it had colonised was a double-edged sword. The colonial withdrawal of traditional state subsidies for monasteries alongside significant disruption to village economies, another key source of donations, compounded the monasteries’ struggles to finance their daily activities. Colonial rule threatened to undermine the religious and social service functions of monasteries, prompting Myanmar society to rally in the Sangha’s support and triggering a Buddhist revival. The laity created a plethora of associations aimed at providing for the Sangha’s needs, along with a mass religious propagation and reform movement.6
The revival laid the groundwork for organisations such as the Young Men’s Buddhist Association (YMBA) to play a key part in agitating for independence. The role of the Sangha itself in the independence movement was more circumspect. Some monks were very active, in collaboration with groups such as the YMBA. A prominent example is Ashin Ottama, who argued that British rule prevented the country’s Buddhists from reaching enlightenment and thus that securing independence was a religious obligation.7 He was imprisoned many times, becoming a hero for the movement. But such monastic activism did not sit well with the population at large, and many Sangha leaders and other senior Buddhist clergy spoke out against monks’ participation in politics on doctrinal grounds. Some members of the YMBA likewise advocated, albeit unsuccessfully, for the organisation to focus solely on religious matters.8
C.
Post-independence Activism and the Saffron Revolution
Monastic political activism continued after independence, during Ne Win’s socialist one-party rule as well as the period of military dictatorship from 1988 to 2010. Monks resisted the government’s attempts to control and register them in 1965; joined students demonstrating against the government’s failure to hold a public funeral for former UN Secretary-General Thant in 1974; participated in nationwide pro-democracy rallies in 1988; and led a series of protests from 1990 to 1991 that spread from Mandalay across the country – including a symbolic withdrawal of spiritual services from the military – that the regime violently suppressed.9
The most high-profile monastic political action after independence was the 2007 demonstrations, commonly known as the Saffron Revolution.10 What had started as protests led by veteran political activists in response to the military government’s removal of fuel price subsidies morphed into a broad-based monastic movement decrying the socio-economic hardships that monasteries and the general public were facing.11 When the military responded with unprecedented violence, beating protesting monks and raiding monasteries, senior members of the Sangha invoked a religious boycott, as they had in 1990.12 Monks deployed sacred symbols with powerful effect throughout the unrest, with the aim of undermining the military authorities’ legitimacy. For example, when an estimated 10,000 monks marched through Mandalay in October 2007, they chanted the Metta Sutta – a discourse that emphasises sustaining Buddhist “loving kindness” (metta) and compassion, consciously drawing a contrast to the military’s actions.13
III.
Shifting State-Sangha Relations
A.
Relations Following the Saffron Revolution
The junta responded to the Sangha’s role in the Saffron Revolution by expanding the powers of the state-backed Sangha Council.14 The committee, which oversees and regulates the Buddhist clergy, was formed in 1980 as part of an effort to consolidate the military’s control of the monastic community. In 2007, the Sangha Council went beyond its existing role of enforcing monastic discipline by issuing a prohibition on monks’ participation in non-religious activities.15 The ban served to constrain the Sangha, giving the military a way to have dissident monks disrobed, in order to interrogate and imprison them.16 Because of such actions, members of the Sangha and the wider public question the council’s independence, as well as the legitimacy of its authority, given that it strays into politics.
Among the broader Buddhist population, the 70-monk council is generally respected for its scholarship but much less commonly seen as active at the community level. After 2007, many younger activist monks established themselves as pro-democracy voices, often from exile, providing a stark contrast to the Sangha Council’s conservative pronouncements. Though many Myanmar Buddhists question the appropriateness of monks’ engagement in worldly matters, for doctrinal reasons, the expectation that the monastic community should ensure the propagation of the Buddha’s teachings can be used to justify civic action.17
The junta’s credibility suffered a ... blow in 2008, when Cyclone Nargis struck the coast of Myanmar, killing at least 138,000 people.
The junta’s credibility suffered a further blow in 2008, when Cyclone Nargis struck the coast of Myanmar, killing at least 138,000 people. Many people in Myanmar, including some members of the military, believed the storm was some sort of karmic retribution for the violence committed against monks the year before.18 More concretely, it clearly demonstrated the military government’s weak institutional capabilities, which made its relief efforts slow, ineffective and non-transparent.19 Local lay groups, including Buddhist associations, rallied under the leadership of monastic figures such as Sitagu Sayadaw, bringing aid and relief to affected populations.20 In a public sermon in Yangon in 2008, Sitagu Sayadaw discussed the merit of “volunteer social work” (in Burmese, parahita), saying:
Meditating in a room with the doors shut won’t help the [cyclone] victims suffering over there. But most Burmese who traditionally believe in Theravada don’t appreciate the need for compassionate action. That is why I am talking about it to people every day. It is essential to make social merit stronger.21
This emphasis on the meritoriousness of parahita was a natural continuation of the forces set in motion after the Saffron Revolution. Regime efforts to quiet the monks’ political voice pushed them to develop alternative spaces in which they could exert influence and then to allow lay men and women to these activities, in order to cultivate public acceptance thereof. The growth of parahita work gave monks a more prominent role in what would normally be a key function of the secular state – social service provision and disaster relief. It also undermined the Sangha Council, because people in Myanmar came to understand that monastic influence stemmed at least in part from monks’ willingness and ability to advocate on their behalf, something that the council is structurally unable to do.
B.
The Buddhist Nationalist Movement
In 2011, a small group of monks and laypeople appropriated a set of numerological symbols popularised by a booklet published in 1997 under the title 969.22 Led by energetic monks including Ashin Wirathu and Ashin Wimala, the movement was particularly vocal in its insistence that Buddhism was under threat from pernicious internal and external forces. The movement’s dire warnings combined with a simple message to the faithful to “buy Buddhist” (that is, make purchases from Buddhist-owned businesses) resonated strongly and spread across the country.23
In 2013, the 969 movement was in effect banned by the Sangha Council, not because of the anti-Muslim violence that its inflammatory rhetoric had helped trigger, but on the more prosaic doctrinal grounds of its unauthorised use of Buddhist symbolism.24 As a result, it morphed into a new and more powerful incarnation, the Association for the Protection of Race and Religion, widely known by its Burmese acronym, MaBaTha, which continued the 969 movement’s ideology and promoted it far more widely across the country.25
MaBaTha’s rank-and-file members tended to believe that the organisation existed in part to help clarify proper moral practice in a changing society at a time when Myanmar was opening up to the world after decades of isolation under military rule.26 They focused less on the religious actions of individuals and more on shaping the culture as a whole – both its underlying values and its role in promoting suitable behaviour.27 As Melyn McKay writes:
Given that this collective morality is believed to be a precondition for stable democratic governance, members often see MaBaTha’s efforts as enabling the expansion of democratic rights. Moreover, they believe MaBaTha’s work in this regard is essential to managing the fractious and conflictual nature of party politics. Unity, in their view, was a prerequisite to democracy, not a product of it.28
The semi-civilian government of President Thein Sein (2011-2016) did little to rein in MaBaTha, but the Aung San Suu Kyi-led National League for Democracy (NLD) administration, which took power in April 2016, was more suspicious of it. The NLD’s concerns related mainly to MaBaTha’s perceived support for the military-established Union Solidarity and Development Party, the NLD’s main electoral opponent, and some MaBaTha members’ criticisms of Aung San Suu Kyi in the run-up to the 2015 elections.29 In July 2016, the Sangha Council, under pressure from the administration’s Ministry of Religious Affairs, issued a statement declaring that MaBaTha was not a recognised Buddhist organisation – a rebuke but not an outlawing of the organisation.30
In May 2017, the Sangha Council went further, banning MaBaTha’s name and logo. The edict used language that hinted at similarities between MaBaTha and other illegal Buddhist factions whose proponents have been prosecuted and imprisoned.31 Many of the group’s most popular figures challenged the ban, arguing that the Council had overstepped its authority, which is limited to overseeing members of the Sangha, not laypersons who are also part of the group.32 Others claimed that the group was not engaged in inappropriate party politics, but rather the promotion of Buddhism and Buddhist values.33 Yet the Council was unmoved, as were its counterparts at the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Culture, making the political climate increasingly inhospitable for MaBaTha.34
C.
Political Efforts to Constrain MaBaTha
By the end of 2019, many MaBaTha members were demoralised, both by the political pressure they now faced from the NLD administration and by international perceptions that the organisation was extremist.
In 2018, Facebook deplatformed MaBaTha, removing the pages of its most popular members and its national, state and township-level committees.35 It was very difficult thereafter for the organisation to mobilise people in support of its various activities, which significantly dampened its members’ enthusiasm. Seeing the crowds at events dwindle took away the sense many members had that MaBaTha was an unstoppable movement. The feeling of being part of a righteous and preordained struggle slipped away, as did many of the less committed supporters.36
At the same time, sensing the changing political winds, local government bureaucrats had stopped granting applications for MaBaTha events (whether in the group’s name or not) or dragged their feet in reviewing them.37 As Crisis Group has previously pointed out, MaBaTha members – especially women – felt their participation in the group magnified their impact. Raising money to build a school on their own might take months, whereas doing it as a MaBaTha activity could mobilise significant funds in a matter of hours.38 With this amplifying power diminished, and as the sense of invincibility it created evaporated as well, many members found other means of personal and spiritual improvement, filling their free time instead with coursework, meditation retreats or hobbies.39
Young activists ... argued that monks should limit their focus to religion.
All the while, civil society activists were working assiduously to counter MaBaTha ideology both online and offline. Increasingly, support for MaBaTha and its ideology came to be associated with something old and out of touch that signified lack of education. Young activists, in particular, argued that monks should limit their focus to religion, while urging the NLD administration to adopt an explicitly secular approach to government.40
These various pressures meant that by the time the COVID-19 pandemic started in 2020, MaBaTha was largely inactive and many of its local organising networks had dispersed.41 Those within pro-NLD circles had by then also fully embraced the rhetoric – and likely even the notion – that monastic engagement in civic spaces was inappropriate, as had been the NLD’s rallying cry against MaBaTha for years.42 Given that monks were free to demonstrate their commitment to social engagement by meeting community needs via non-political parahita activities, it was difficult for anyone to argue that greater monastic political engagement was necessary to advocate for the needs of the Buddhist polity.
Successive Myanmar governments since 1962, both military and nominally civilian, have made efforts to constrain and control the powerful Sangha, in an extension of pre-colonial patterns of state-Sangha relations. As a result of the more recent dynamics discussed above, however, by the time of the 2021 coup both the legal and moral basis for monastic leadership on civic issues had been called into question.
IV.
Monastic Reactions to the Military Coup
A.
Involvement in Initial Protests and Subsequent Organised Violence
In the first days and weeks following the coup, various monasteries released statements, many of which were rather insipid, taking no clear stance against the coup.43 Curiously, however, some of these statements were released despite the most senior members of these institutions making seemingly contradictory remarks.44 The discrepancy highlights the deep divisions within the Sangha that persist today. Nevertheless, three main groups can be identified.
1.
Those backing the regime
The first group are mostly older, more seasoned monks who have either made their support for the military clear through participation in the regime’s public events and trips, or who have implied their support by focusing their anti-violence messaging on resistance groups, while ignoring the military’s own atrocities. One prominent example is Sitagu Sayadaw, whose high-profile travel to Russia alongside Min Aung Hlaing for a pagoda dedication ceremony in July 2022 was particularly controversial.45 Another is Ashin Chekinda, who also participated in the Russia trip and whom the regime’s Ministry of Religious Affairs promoted to acting rector of the International Theravada Buddhist University in Yangon in 2022.46 Myanmar commentators have made two key arguments about these senior monks:
Both have risen to the seniority they now enjoy in part due to their warm relations with key military figures. Chekinda is noted for having been promoted to the rector’s position ahead of other, more learned monks. Sitagu’s appointment as head of the Shwegyin sect is less surprising given his standing, but still noteworthy in its timing.
Though supporters of the post-coup resistance tend to despise Sitagu, they nevertheless recognise that he faces a dilemma. His numerous social development projects, including education and health-care facilities, would likely suffer were he to oppose the junta, as would the communities that depend on them. But the scale of these problems may be overstated. Such is the national (and international) reputation of these facilities, including their ability to attract other high-quality leaders, that the military authorities might well replace Sitagu as figurehead while leaving the services intact. It is therefore difficult to say for sure whether Sitagu’s support for the regime is driven by the risk to his projects, self-preservation or his ideological leanings.
There is a surprising degree of overlap between the monks who are implicitly or explicitly backing the regime and those who participated in the Saffron Revolution. In interviews, monks emphasised that those who took part in the 2007 demonstrations faced enormous challenges, including targeted attacks on their monasteries and in some cases imprisonment. Some of these monks are disgruntled by what they perceive as the NLD administration’s failure to recognise and reward their sacrifices. A common refrain of MaBaTha monks, for example, is that they supported the democratic transition only to be later “betrayed” by Aung San Suu Kyi and her government, when they clamped down on MaBaTha and made moves toward greater secularism, and again when they elevated a small number of Muslim advisers, notably Ko Ni.47 This sense of grievance was deliberately nurtured by the military over many years, translating into vocal support for the coup among a few of these monks, and weakening the enthusiasm of others for actively opposing it.
The impact of the small group of pro-regime monks should not be overstated.
The impact of the small group of pro-regime monks should not be overstated. The rise and fall of nationalist groups such as MaBaTha over recent years served to identify – and dent the reputations of – the most charismatic military-aligned monks. Pro-NLD and anti-military forces have had several years to chip away at the public’s respect for these monks, and the results are particularly visible among the younger generations most engaged in anti-coup organising.
Though pro-regime monks may attempt to prevent younger monks in their monasteries from participating in anti-regime activities, the pandemic led a significant number of young monks to move from urban locations to rural monasteries closer to their homes just prior to the coup. The influx disrupted traditional student-teacher relations and meant that abbots had less influence over newly arrived young monks.48
In rural areas in particular, monasteries and monks remain highly dependent on the local population for support. Monks must tread especially carefully when they have settled in areas away from their birthplaces. In such situations, they lack strong kinship ties in the area and must be cautious not to provoke a local backlash. Anti-coup organisers have also been highly successful at using social shaming as a means of punishing those with pro-military or even insufficiently pro-revolution tendencies. Monks have accordingly felt pressure to align with community sentiments, which are predominantly anti-regime. They also need to fear being targeted by anti-coup armed actors – who have allegedly killed several monks accused of supporting the regime.49
2.
Those avoiding taking sides
Many monks have remained neutral since the coup, for several reasons. Most importantly, monks who speak out against the junta are likely to face reprisals. These are often violent, as in cases where troops have burned down or demolished monasteries, leaving the nearby faithful without a vital social asset.50 As many monks living around the country hail from Myanmar’s central Dry Zone, where the fighting is intense, loss of their monastery would also likely mean return to an active conflict area, at a time when many are desperately trying to escape.
Many monks have also refrained from supporting the resistance out of disenchantment with the NLD administration for the reasons discussed above. Though the administration did participate in numerous pagoda-building campaigns and other religious events, and Aung San Suu Kyi was involved in donations and other ceremonial activities, the government also spoke about human rights, ethno-religious diversity and secularism in ways that alienated these monks (notwithstanding the fact that many minorities felt the government downplayed their concerns, and in the case of the Rohingya, was complicit in their plight).51
The prominence of armed resistance activities also puts monks in a difficult position when it comes to expressing open support for the revolution. Unlike monks who have made doctrinal arguments in support of violence in certain circumstances, many feel they cannot support such acts, even in response to greater brutality.52 As one monk told Crisis Group:
For me, there are two personalities in one. I am a citizen of the country and a monk. As a citizen, I have to stand up for my rights, for democracy, for freedom, but there are also principles that monks have to follow. Revolution at this point means taking sides, which means killing. This is a power struggle. Everyone supporting either side is complicit in killing.53
As this same monk noted, members of the monastic community sometimes refer to the objective of Buddhism – seeking to achieve nirvana by breaking from the cycle of rebirths – as “revolutionary”, which may lead them to describe the Sangha as supportive of revolutionary action. But this conception of revolution usually translates into a focus on material suffering such as acute poverty, hunger and physical danger, rather than any strong belief in liberation from a particular ruler or preference for one form of government over another.54
In past revolutionary moments, particularly the Saffron Revolution, frustration at widespread economic hardship made it easy to mobilise around the notion that the military – the sole political authority at the time – was the cause of suffering and thus vigorous action to depose them was consistent with Buddhist doctrine.55 Some monastic figures involved in the Saffron Revolution mobilised explicitly in support of democracy, but their stance then was more a rejection of a specific harmful political authority than an embrace of a particular form of government.
The situation is much less clear-cut today. The ousted NLD government, though hamstrung by the 2008 constitution’s limitations on civilian governance, did wield meaningful power. Prior to the pandemic, people across the country were beginning to enjoy a better quality of life and feel much greater hope for the future, even if the improvements were not evenly distributed. As a result, prior to the coup, suffering was seen as having multiple causes, including a global outbreak of disease, rather than stemming from a single incompetent, abusive authority.
Despite broad social rejection of the coup, the junta did not change course, instead deploying extreme violence to consolidate its control.
The way the crisis has developed has also informed some monks’ reluctance to pick a side. Despite broad social rejection of the coup, the junta did not change course, instead deploying extreme violence to consolidate its control. The initial, largely peaceful protest movement thus morphed into armed rebellion. The regime has unleashed brutal repression against both the civil and the armed resistance but failed to quash either; neither is the resistance able to meaningfully challenge the regime’s control of the state apparatus. In this dynamic, many monks feel that the chaos now facing communities is the result of a battle for political control in which both sides are willing to kill to achieve their goals. They conclude that they have less space to engage politically than on previous occasions such as the Saffron Revolution.56 This view is based not on any perception of moral equivalence of the two sides, but rather on the fact that neither offers a clear pathway out of the crisis.
Even those monks who might otherwise lean toward supporting the revolution may worry that doing so contributes to a decline in monastic authority in the country. They are keenly aware that the parallel authority, the National Unity Government (NUG), relies for its armed resistance on the support and sanctuary provided by predominantly Christian ethnic armed groups, which many monks expect will push any future democratic government to adopt a more explicitly secular approach.57
3.
Those openly supporting the revolution
Some monks are openly supporting the revolution, but they acknowledge that their numbers are far smaller than those who took part in the Saffron Revolution. Their engagement takes many forms, and they face several constraints.
Pre-existing groups such as the Peace Sangha Union – a progressive monastic network – are mostly made up of younger monks, although they may have a few members who participated in protests in 1988 or 2007. These groups have taken part in demonstrations, though usually not organising or leading them; they have also supported local defence forces and other anti-regime groups, for example by using their religious status to help transport medicines and other supplies.
There have also been more organic monastic reactions to the coup. For example, 200 to 300 monks joined the daily marches in Mandalay that started on 8 February 2021 and lasted for several months, likely the most active monastic participation in protests anywhere in the country.58 Such activity can create tensions between junior monks and their abbots, who may forbid them from taking to the streets, for various reasons. Some senior monks support the military takeover because they feel the NLD failed to protect Buddhism – and that the military regime will.59 Other abbots act out of concern for the likely consequences, such as the military shuttering monasteries if any of their monks visibly resist the coup. Concerned abbots warned junior monks and novices that if they joined protests, they would have to leave the monastery.60 The senior monks’ fears are not unfounded, with some 60 monks thought to have been detained since the coup, some of whom remain incarcerated. Many others have been forcibly disrobed, and still others have had to go on the run.61
Such monastic support for the revolution, while welcomed by the vast majority of the country who oppose the coup, has done little to sway those who support the military or who are still sitting on the fence. These people typically downplay the importance of monastic opposition to the coup, arguing that monks should not participate in politics, or cast pro-resistance monks as young and not truly committed to their practice – their participation in resistance activities being proof of their unfitness for the religious life.62
On the morning of the coup, the military detained several monks who were prominent supporters of the democratic transition.
On the morning of the coup, the military detained several monks who were prominent supporters of the democratic transition and of Aung San Suu Kyi personally, including Myawaddy Sayadaw; others had to flee to avoid apprehension.63 The coup itself so outraged the public that these arrests had limited additional impact. Subsequently, after citizens took up arms against the coup, the junta promoted the idea that armed resistance groups were a threat to Buddhism due to their attacks on monks.64
While the regime has attempted to portray itself as defending Buddhism, it has not fully embraced a Buddhist nationalist narrative nor sought to elevate MaBaTha. It took more than six months following the coup for the regime to release firebrand monk Ashin Wirathu, who had been imprisoned under the NLD administration (see Section IV.D below). For their part, resistance forces, including the NUG and local defence groups, have declined to frame the political crisis in religious terms, focusing instead on the junta’s illegal overthrow of the elected government and subsequent violence. Nor have resistance forces encouraged their monastic supporters to publicly attack the junta’s religious authority.65
B.
Gender Dynamics and Monastic Participation
The limited role of monks in the post-coup resistance has allowed greater space for new types of leaders to emerge. According to monks that Crisis Group spoke to, the most notable change for them compared with the leadership of the 1988 and 2007 movements is the presence of women, particularly young women.66
Relatedly, anti-regime protests have often been two-pronged, challenging both the military’s rule as well as traditional gender norms. The prominent htamein (sarong) protest involved communities hanging women’s sarongs above the street to act as a de facto barricade, relying on the superstition among many soldiers and policemen that women’s undergarments and skirts weaken men’s charismatic power (hpoun).67 In some places, women and their allies scrawled military leader Min Aung Hlaing’s initials in red marker on menstrual pads before sticking them to walls and telegraph poles. Colourful bras and panties have been affixed to images of military men and their favourite monks.68
The lower status of nuns in Myanmar society means their participation in protests is considered less notable than a monk’s might be.
Not all women have benefited from increased space. According to Crisis Group interviews, the position of nuns has, on the contrary, been further constrained since the coup. Groups like MaBaTha tested the traditional boundaries between religion and state and the limits of monastic activism on social and political issues. By doing so, they created an opening for nuns to take a more visible and active role in both religious and secular public life, but the coup seems to have closed it. The lower status of nuns in Myanmar society means their participation in protests is considered less notable than a monk’s might be and leaves them less likely to be protected from serious harm.
Nuns also face more serious material constraints, as their subordinate position to monks means that, even in normal times, they receive fewer donations and may struggle to survive.69 In the current poor economic conditions, donors with less money to spread around are even more likely to give to monks before nuns. Any time spent away from collecting alms, or on activities that much needed donors might disapprove of, would thus constitute a risk to nuns’ financial survival.
The erosion of nuns’ status has been exacerbated by the loss of opportunities for them to study abroad, in Sri Lanka and elsewhere. For many Myanmar nuns, studying in Sri Lanka provided a unique opportunity to develop a more politically aware and engaged stance, largely from being exposed to the different monastic culture there and especially the political enfranchisement of monks and nuns there (members of the Myanmar Sangha are constitutionally barred from voting or standing for office).70 With such exchange programs likely to be limited for the time being due to Myanmar’s economic crisis, and lack of functional coordination between religious educational institutions and government ministries, Myanmar nuns are likely to become further isolated.
Such isolation may in turn lead to greater conservatism. Nuns have often argued that advanced education was the best way to improve their status as a community.71 Facing more difficult living conditions and denied opportunities to study abroad, many will take refuge in Buddhist educational facilities. Their connection will deepen to the abbots and monasteries best able to sustain their facilities in the post-coup period – which means, predominantly, those who have better relations with the regime.
C.
The Role of the Sangha Council
Even before the coup, the Sangha Council’s legitimacy was weak. Most monks consider ultimate monastic authority to lie in the hands of their monastery’s chief abbot, not the council. Council decisions are mostly about abstract doctrinal matters or involve disciplining monks who drink, gamble or otherwise misbehave. Indeed, many anti-coup monks believe the council has rarely, if ever, embodied an explicit political or social agenda.72 As one activist from Mandalay told Crisis Group:
It is even rumoured that many if not most Sangha Council statements addressing things like religious conflicts are actually drafted by the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Culture, using the council’s name to disguise the political origins of these statements.73
As a result, the Sangha Council as an institution is highly disconnected from the public. People may revere particular monks who sit on the council, but they do so in spite of, not because of, their council role. Even in the monastic community, the council is not regarded as wielding supreme leadership, but rather as an administrative body.74
The fact that, as mentioned above, the Sangha Council is in practice largely subordinate to the Ministry of Religious Affairs, means that it has limited capability to work outside the ministry’s confines. Following the coup, the Council shuttered its subnational offices, which remained closed for one year – longer than many other official agencies’ workplaces. Interviewees told Crisis Group that as monastic pressure mounted to reopen the offices to hold religious exams, it became clear that some subnational members of the Council were being replaced with junta loyalists.
Indeed, the regime has attempted to use the Sangha Council to keep the monastic community under its control. One monk who sits on the Council told Crisis Group that:
The Sangha Council’s members are under the control of the military, and in return the military provides a lot of financial support. Most members do not want to go against the military for these and other reasons, even though they do not like the coup. Some monks, especially anti-coup monks, criticised the Sangha Council a lot, and some of their followers were angry at the way Council members acted with military leaders, but everyone should understand the Council’s position. The members are very old and the military controls everything they do.75
Nevertheless, the regime’s attempts to use the Sangha Council to boost its legitimacy have mostly failed. First, the Council initially put up more resistance to the coup than expected by suspending many activities for months, for example declining to schedule monastic exams.76 Secondly, the national mood has shifted dramatically since the coup, with resistance leaders and others openly condemning the Council as an instrument of the regime. Far more so than under previous periods of military rule, Council members are aware that public perception that a monk is biased toward the military can seriously undermine his following.77
The upshot is that whatever legitimacy the Sangha Council once had – even as a purely administrative body – appears to have mostly evaporated. There is little appetite anywhere in Myanmar for an institution overseen by the military to issue moral edicts about lay or even monastic life. In a sign of the institution’s waning significance, the military’s rumoured detention of Bhamo Sayadaw, the Sangha Council chair, after the coup elicited little outrage amid many other pressing issues.78
D.
The Standpoint of MaBaTha
Many observers had taken it for granted that Buddhist nationalist monks such as Wirathu would rally to support the junta. But members of MaBaTha and similar groups have not come together as a unified force supporting either side. In the early days following the coup, many observers had assumed that Wirathu – detained by the NLD government in November 2020 on sedition and defamation charges – would be released from prison imminently.79 He was discharged only in September 2021, eight months after the coup.80 Shortly before his release, he had posted a scathing video message to VK – the Russian social media platform to which many military and nationalist figures in Myanmar migrated after being kicked off Facebook – complaining that he was in poor health and had been passed over for release despite “prostitutes” having been included in earlier pardons.81 His release was reportedly tied to several conditions, including the confiscation of his property and a ban on giving public sermons or speaking to the media.82
Some observers – who had long assumed that MaBaTha was the military’s creation, or at least that Wirathu and other MaBaTha monks were its puppets – were confused by these developments.83 Yet high-ranking members of the group (such as Insein Ywama Sayadaw) have had to thread the same needle as more moderate monks (such as Oxford Sayadaw), declining to comment directly on the coup to avoid provoking the regime, and instead issuing vague statements urging restraint in a nod to public opinion.84
Some lower-level MaBaTha monks have broken with the organisation’s stance to speak out against the coup and participate in local protests.
Overall, the NLD administration’s weakening of MaBaTha made it difficult for the body to regroup after the coup, and it now faces virtual institutional collapse. Some lower-level MaBaTha monks have broken with the organisation’s stance to speak out against the coup and participate in local protests. Given the highly decentralised nature of MaBaTha, their action was probably unavoidable. But the organisation’s enervation also stems from the fact that, for many members, its purpose was to protect the place of Buddhism in an increasingly liberal and pluralistic society. The coup has overturned that set of assumptions, especially as regards liberalisation, and thus the fears sustaining the group’s Buddhist chauvinist and anti-NLD rhetoric have largely dissipated, replaced with anger at the military’s brutality and incompetence.85
While MaBaTha is largely spent as a political force, its demise has weakened the Sangha’s political influence more broadly. The strongly negative NLD and civil society reaction to its political activism created fertile ground for more secular thinking following the coup, particularly among the new generation of youth activists and armed resistance leaders. As one member of an armed resistance group told Crisis Group:
Our leaders are pressuring the NUG not to work with the Sangha because of the bad image MaBaTha has given it. If you want to move to a federal union, you cannot leverage religion.86
E.
Small-scale Armed Movements
Wirathu’s release from prison, which has been surprisingly uneventful, illustrates how complicated regime-Sangha relations are, and why the regime is hesitant to leverage Buddhist nationalism for its own ends. Though the controversial monk has been raising a mild ruckus in his immediate surroundings – calling a mosque, for example, to complain about the call to prayer – his impact has been muted.87 Calamitous prognostications that his release might exacerbate the conflict by introducing sectarian dimensions have proven exaggerated, with only a few vague rumblings thus far. In his first public sermon, in Bago Region in October 2022, where he was joined by ultra-nationalist Michael Kyaw Myint, who heads the Yeomanry Development Party, he touched on his typical Buddhist nationalist and anti-Muslim themes, but the event attracted only 25 attendees.88
There are reports of underground Buddhist nationalist mobilisation in Mandalay and in parts of Sagaing Region – including Kanbalu township, where two Islamic trainee scholars were killed by alleged pro-regime forces – fuelling fears that regime-aligned nationalist forces may be attempting to reorient the conflict more along religious lines.89
There have also been rumours that Wirathu is the organising force behind a group of former MaBaTha monks, none of whom are especially well loved, who captured headlines for carrying arms and appearing publicly at military ceremonies.90 They reportedly call themselves the pandita (scholar) group. This group should not be seen as evidence of Buddhist nationalist engagement in the conflict on the junta’s behalf. There is no proof that Wirathu is meaningfully involved, and his authority among Buddhist nationalists has often been overstated, as has his closeness to the military (see Section IV.D above).
It is in any case hard to see how monks such as these would be beneficial to pro-regime forces, beyond dispensing occasional religious teachings and services. Rather than a carefully engineered plot to bolster pro-regime forces, the involvement of monks in pro-regime militias is in most cases more likely to be an example of the broader phenomenon that monks in these areas tend to provide pastoral services to whichever local armed group – pro- or anti-regime – happens to be most prominent in their community.
Monks’ ideological perspectives undoubtedly influence their spiritual guidance, and thus their politics may have some impact on the conflict.
Yet monks’ ideological perspectives undoubtedly influence their spiritual guidance, and thus their politics may have some impact on the conflict. For example, a member of an anti-regime defence force told Crisis Group that one of the reasons some of these groups had stopped short of fully backing the NUG was that the monks they sought advice from were not very pro-NUG.91
Wirathu’s release and his subsequent comportment suggest that all the main protagonists see his personal influence, and the charismatic power of monks more generally, as an unstable force that they are wary of unleashing. The military does not trust Wirathu, seeing him as a populist organiser more than a pro-regime ideologue.92 The regime gave him an award in January 2023 to mark the 75th anniversary of independence, but he was one among thousands of recipients from across the political spectrum, including ministers from the deposed NLD administration.93 The award should not be interpreted as an endorsement of the monk or an attempt at rapprochement with him. Although Wirathu is known for taking a strong pro-military stance in recent years, he was also imprisoned by the former military regime in 2003 for his inflammatory sermons.94 To a certain extent, the military’s doubts about Wirathu extend to MaBaTha, some of whose members were prominent participants in the Saffron Revolution (see Section III.A above).
V.
The Silence of the Monks
In the first days and weeks after the coup, the limited monastic participation in protests was in part explained by the COVID-19 situation. Given the typically crowded living quarters and multi-generational nature of large urban monasteries, many monks left these institutions and returned to rural areas where they were less likely to contract the illness.
At the time of the military takeover, many monks were thus far away from the main demonstrations in the cities, spread out in towns and villages in the countryside. In these circumstances, communication and mobilisation were also difficult. Some monks did try to return to the cities to join the protests, but COVID-19 prevention measures and post-coup travel restrictions made it difficult to do so.95 Others, particularly a new generation of young political and social activists, were left to take the vanguard in the demonstrations.
Yet the continued low-profile monastic participation in anti-regime movements, and the political dynamics that have emerged since the coup, suggest that other factors were more significant than COVID-19, particularly the actions and orientation of the resistance and the regime.
A.
The Secular Orientation of the NLD and NUG
An important dynamic at play is the NUG’s reliance on ethnic armed groups for sanctuary and military support. Most NUG members – and members of the resistance’s legislative branch, the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw – are Buddhist, though the movement also includes some Christians.96 But the four ethnic armed groups working most closely with the NUG – the Chin National Front, Kachin Independence Organisation, Karen National Union and Karenni National Progressive Party – have predominantly Christian leaderships and constituencies.97 Given a history of discrimination against non-Buddhists by successive post-independence governments, these groups have traditionally pushed strongly for secularism and the separation of religion and state.98 While extending support to the NUG, they have demanded that any future federal union under restored civilian rule (their declared goal) adhere to a secular agenda.99
In addition to the ethnic armed groups, many of the activists sustaining the NUG’s political struggle are against any close cooperation with the Sangha, because they are opposed to religious influence on the federal framework they are developing.100 Most resistance fighters, who tend to be young, also reject the idea of such cooperation. They feel strongly that monks should keep out of politics both in the current struggle and in the development of a future federal union. One armed resistance group leader told Crisis Group:
The Buddhist majority always influences political matters, and it often decreases trust among different religious groups. We also do not like their influence in our revolution, and we do not trust non-violence as an effective way to tackle the regime.101
To the latter point, armed resistance group members worry that the Sangha’s discomfort with violence may undermine their fighters’ morale. A senior monk in Mandalay told Crisis Group that the revolution “is now about killing one another, but monks have to follow the four parajika [inviolable rules]”.102 Monks are loath to break these rules – one of which prohibits intentionally causing the death of a person – because doing so entails expulsion from the monastic order for life. Thus, monks may provide aid to internally displaced people or others who are suffering as a result of supporting the revolution, and monks may even support the idea of revolution. But because the current revolution is based on armed resistance, many monks feel that they cannot participate, or must become laypersons to do so.103 Another monk from Sagaing Region put it more succinctly: “If a monk holds a weapon, they automatically become a layman.”104
Resistance leaders feel that involving monastic figures in conversations about the future of the democratic, federal state is far beyond monks’ and nuns’ utility and remit.
A further reason for the lack of monastic participation is that the NLD and Myanmar civil society – two key protagonists in the anti-coup movement – were central to undermining MaBaTha, on the basis that monks should not be involved in political issues. Encouraging monks to become involved in the current crisis would thus represent a U-turn that these groups are reluctant to make, as it would undo their years-long efforts to limit monastic influence and authority to religious issues. Indeed, resistance leaders feel that involving monastic figures in conversations about the future of the democratic, federal state is far beyond monks’ and nuns’ utility and remit.105
The role of monks is somewhat more prominent in the Myanmar Buddhist diaspora, in which more traditional views of religion tend to prevail. People in the diaspora are also more removed from the revolution, engaged predominantly in lobbying, solidarity efforts and fundraising (for the NUG, as well as for armed resistance groups).106 The NUG has regular contact with these diaspora communities, including monks, in what is the most direct form of NUG-Sangha collaboration.107
B.
The Regime’s Religious Outreach
Since before the February 2021 coup, Min Aung Hlaing has made energetic efforts to “harvest” merit, in an attempt to boost his power (and, subsequently, improve the odds of the coup’s success).108 For example, for the last five years, he has been building a marble Buddha image 25m high, reputedly the largest of its kind in the world, and state media regularly reports on his inspection visits to the site.109 After the coup, he and other high-ranking military figures also met with countless monks, made numerous donations and visited many pagodas in attempts to give the regime and its coup an air of moral legitimacy.110
Members of the Sangha who spoke to Crisis Group noted that such religious ceremonies should not necessarily be interpreted as signals of monastic support for the coup. They pointed out that monks have been put in a very difficult situation since the military takeover, trying to navigate harsh political realities in a system where the material and legal support of those who wield power (on matters such as land use and other permits) is essential for monastic survival.111
While these displays may have strengthened Min Aung Hlaing’s resolve or belief in his moral fitness to rule, most Myanmar people did not interpret them in that way. His actions have been widely criticised as blatant attempts to use religion to bolster his grip on power. NLD and activist efforts in recent years to combat MaBaTha and its foray into party politics laid the groundwork for this response, heightening the public’s sensitivity to overt politicisation of Buddhism and making people less likely to be swayed.
Many observers expected that Min Aung Hlaing would move quickly to embrace Buddhist nationalism following the coup, because he was known to be close to several prominent nationalist monks and agitators, and because the movement had long been opposed to Aung San Suu Kyi and her NLD.112 So far, he has not done so, for reasons discussed in Section IV.D above.
C.
The Current State of Play
Unlike the NLD in the past, the NUG has not attempted to contest the junta on religious grounds. Rather, the NUG and other resistance forces across the country have embraced a more pluralistic, inclusive approach – which is necessarily also more secular. This stance has prevented them from promoting their popular legitimacy by performing a protector of Buddhism (dhamma raja) role. In this way, they have broken with a central tenet of Myanmar political leadership since before independence, a historic shift. But even as the NUG has promoted a multi-ethnic, inclusive agenda, it has faced little popular criticism for neglecting the majority religion – in contrast to the NLD, which mostly stuck to a Burman Buddhist-centric approach.113
Part of the reason is that young people in the anti-regime resistance movement have developed an aversion to organised Buddhism and Theravada cultural norms more generally. Several popular meme accounts have emerged with names such as Anti-Theravada Movement and Anti-Theravada Memes that take aim at Buddhist institutions and traditions, depicting them as old-fashioned and ill-suited for shepherding society through the modern era and the post-coup crisis.114 Such tropes began to gain traction following the coup.
There is a widely held impression ... that Buddhism is being left behind.
With monks less prominent in the resistance, other leaders, including youth and especially young women, have been able to step into leadership roles (see Section IV.B above). There is a widely held impression – expressed by every monastic figure that Crisis Group spoke to for this report – that Buddhism is being left behind.115 Moreover, there is a pervasive fear that the future of Buddhism and the Sangha in Myanmar looks bleak, whatever the outcome of the current crisis.116 As this very fear underpinned the rise of Buddhist nationalist sentiment across the country in the 2010s, it needs to be closely monitored.117
But these fears of Buddhism in decline may well be unfounded or at least premature. The widespread social and economic destruction wrought by the coup means that many vulnerable people, especially youth, will have to rely on monasteries –the only social institution in Myanmar still able to support them. So long as monasteries continue to accept children for study, the population of monks is likely to remain robust. Similarly, communities in rural areas, who have suffered significant economic hardships from the pandemic and the coup, will remain reliant on monastic aid.
Monastic figures have long been a central part of Myanmar’s social and political life. Any change in this pattern – for example, if the current secular shift becomes an enduring feature of the younger generation’s views or is incorporated into a future politics – would likely foment rural-urban division and social strife, given that most rural Burmans adhere to a more traditional view of Buddhism’s role in society. It would also risk a conservative backlash. The defining challenge of Myanmar’s post-independence history has been to develop a more ethnically and religiously inclusive politics and promote the rights of ethno-religious minorities.
A failure to craft a more inclusive agenda of this kind will keep Myanmar politics stuck in the narrow confines of Burman Buddhist nationalism, from which it has struggled to escape for decades, to the detriment of human rights, intercommunal relations and the nation’s long-term peace and prosperity. Yet if backlash is to be avoided, powerful conservative Buddhist social forces and the Sangha itself cannot be alienated, either. Myanmar’s political trajectory remains uncertain, but in almost any scenario, these issues will be of great importance.
VI.
Future Developments and Recommendations
The coup and its aftermath have redefined the political and social role of Buddhism and monastic institutions. It is therefore important to monitor how moral and religious value systems continue to shift in Myanmar, particularly those that have historically affected social cohesion, human rights and democracy. It may be that the Myanmar equivalent of the Overton window – that is, the range of policies politically acceptable to the public at a given time – is shifting.118 Tracking that shift is important for understanding the trajectory of social and communal relations, conflict and politics in the country.
At the national level, the current low profile of the Sangha has led to a decentralisation of moral leadership, which can bring both benefits and risks. Though centralised institutional power, vested with religious significance, often acts as a constraint on political progress and can further sideline minority populations, loss of faith in these institutions creates a void that may be filled by something else – including charismatic figures who turn out to be demagogic movement leaders. Potential for such movements can be seen in the attention initially attracted by figures such as Wirathu or the lay agitator Michael Kyaw Myint after the 2011 opening of civic space, although their momentum waned under the NLD administration (see Section IV.E above).
When in power, the NLD stuck close to the priorities of its Burman Buddhist political base, rather than attempting to use its political capital to promote a more pluralistic, multi-ethnic and multifaith framework for the country. Any future leaders able to formulate a compelling framework of this latter kind will likely benefit by expanding their political and voter base beyond traditional ethno-political boundaries. They may, however, face strong challenges from Burman Buddhist populist forces. When and if democratic politics will be restored in Myanmar is uncertain at this time. But should that happen, a future competition for power of this kind will have important implications for political stability, minority rights and armed conflict.
Foreign actors ... need to calibrate their interactions with the monastic community at the local level.
Foreign actors also need to calibrate their interactions with the monastic community at the local level. There, monks still play a hugely important religious and social role. Donors and partner organisations should continue to consult them and incorporate their views into project design and implementation. They must also keep in mind, however, that consultations at the moment may put the monastic community at risk of regime retaliation – and so should proceed with due care. International actors should also recognise that they themselves may have lost moral legitimacy in the eyes of those monastic figures and their lay supporters who sympathise with the resistance and see the UN, international NGOs and other agencies as having offered only muted criticism of the coup and subsequent violence, while continuing to work with the regime.
The Sangha’s low profile in the current crisis looks set to continue, with any significant monastic leadership role appearing unlikely. Even more unlikely are Saffron Revolution-style protests. Although it is hard to see any developments that would significantly raise the Sangha’s profile, two possible triggers should be kept in mind. One would be a move by a political aspirant to follow the Sri Lanka model by offering voting rights to members of the Sangha or allowing them to run for political office. While Myanmar political and religious consensus has long been against such a move, it would be highly significant should the possibility be raised. The other trigger would be any move to offer full ordination for women. This eventuality also seems unlikely. But should the idea gain traction and become a progressive cause celebre, it could act as a wedge with uncertain implications for the next generation of aspiring political leaders, who would be caught between alienating the politically engaged young generation that has emerged since the coup and the religiously conservative Buddhist population.
VII.
Conclusion
Myanmar’s Buddhist monks have played a limited role in the post-coup protest and resistance movement, unlike during previous periods of political struggle, such as the 2007 Saffron Revolution. There are many reasons why monks have largely stayed away from involvement, the most important being that the NUG-led resistance does not support their participation. Its largely secular agenda is driven by the legacy of Buddhist nationalist support for the military and by the fact that the NUG – with the encouragement of civil society and its non-Buddhist ethnic allies – is pursuing a multi-ethnic, multi-religious vision for the country. Monastic communities themselves are divided, with some resisting the coup, but many others reluctant to support a secular political movement that has embraced violent resistance and unwilling to risk the consequences of openly challenging the regime.
The Sangha’s low political profile has allowed space for youth, and particularly young women, to take on leadership roles. The longer-term challenge for Myanmar is to develop a more ethnically and religiously inclusive politics and promote the rights of ethno-religious minorities. The trajectory of the Myanmar crisis is unclear, but the secular turn among young people in the resistance movement, if it endures, could help national politics to escape the decades-old confines of Burman Buddhist nationalism. At the same time, it could also alienate conservative social forces and the Sangha itself and risk a backlash. Whatever lies on the other side of the current crisis, balancing these tensions will be essential for Myanmar to achieve long-term peace and prosperity..."
Source/publisher:
International Crisis Group (Belgium)
Date of publication:
2023-03-10
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-26
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Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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"ပြည်ထောင်စုသမ္မတမြန်မာနိုင်ငံတော် အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ အနေဖြင့် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီနှင့် ဆက်စပ်နေသော လူပုဂ္ဂိုလ်နှင့် အဖွဲ့အစည်းများအား အမေရိကန်အစိုးရ၊ ဘဏ္ဍာရေးဌာနမှ အရေးယူပိတ်ဆို့မှုများ ထပ်မံ ချမှတ်ခဲ့သည့်အပေါ် ကြိုဆိုပါသည်။
၂၀၂၃ ခုနှစ် မတ်လ (၂၄) ရက်တွင် ထုတ်ပြန်ခဲ့သည့် အဆိုပါကြေညာချက်သည် အရပ်သားပြည်သူများ အပေါ်ကျူးလွန်နေသည့် ရက်စက်ကြမ်းကြုတ်မှုများ ၊ ကျယ်ကျယ် ပြန့်ပြန့် စနစ်တကျ လုပ်ဆောင်နေမှုများကို ချင့်ချိန်သုံးသပ်လျက် စစ်တပ်နှင့် ဆက်စပ်နေသည့် လူပုဂ္ဂိုလ် (၂)ဦးနှင့် အဖွဲ့အစည်း (၆)ခုတို့အား ရည်ရွယ်ပစ်မှတ်ထား ချမှတ်ခြင်း ဖြစ်ပါသည်။
အရေးယူပိတ်ဆို့မှုတွင် ပိုမိုအရေးပါသည့်အချက်မှာ စစ်တပ်ထံသို့ ဂျက်လေယာဉ်ဆီ တင်သွင်းခြင်း၊ သိုလှောင်ခြင်းနှင့် ဖြန့်ဖြူးခြင်း တို့ကို ရည်ရွယ်ပစ်မှတ်ထား အရေးယူပိတ်ဆို့ခြင်းဖြစ်ပါသည်။ မြန်မာ့ပြည်သူလူထု၏ မိမိကိုယ်ကို ခုခံကာကွယ်ပိုင်ခွင့်အပေါ် အခြေခံသည့် တော်လှန်ရေး၏ အတိုင်းအတာ၊ ကြံ့ကြံ့ခံနိုင်မှုများနှင့် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်၏ ၎င်းတို့ကိုယ်တိုင် အာဏာထိန်းထားနိုင်ခြင်း မရှိမှုတို့ကြောင့်၊ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်သည် ကျေးရွာများ၊ စာသင်ကျောင်းများနှင့် ဆေးရုံများကို လေကြောင်းတိုက်ခိုက်မှုများ အရှိန်မြှင့်တင် လုပ်ဆောင် လာပါသည်။ ကုလသမဂ္ဂလူ့အခွင့်အရေးရုံး၏ အဆိုအရ ပြီးခဲ့သည့်နှစ်အတွင်း အရပ်သား တည်နေရာများအား အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်၏ လေကြောင်းတိုက်ခိုက်မှုမှာ ၁၄၁ ရာခိုင်နှုန်းအထိ မြင့်တက်လာခဲ့ပါသည်။
အဆိုပါ ဖြစ်စဉ်များနှင့် ပက်သက်၍ လူ့အခွင့်အရေးကောင်စီ၌ လွန်ခဲ့သည့် ရက်သတ္တပတ်များက ပြုလုပ်ခဲ့သည့် ကုလသမဂ္ဂလူ့အခွင့်အရေးဖိုရမ်တွင် ကုလသမဂ္ဂတာဝန်ရှိသူများက အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီ အား ပြစ်တင် ရှုံ့ချခဲ့ပါသည်။
ကုလသမဂ္ဂလူ့အခွင့်အရေးဆိုင်ရာမဟာမင်းကြီး Volker Türk က “လူ့အသက်နှင့် လူ့အခွင့်အရေးကို လျစ်လျူရှု ပမာမခန့်ပြုကြောင်း စဉ်ဆက်မပြတ် ပြသနေသည့် အကြမ်း ဖက်စစ်တပ်၏ လုပ်ရပ်သည် လူ့သားများ၏စိတ်ကို နာကြည်းမှု ဖြစ်စေကြောင်း” လူ့အခွင့်အရေးကောင်စီ၌ ပြောကြားခဲ့ပါသည်။
မြန်မာ့လူ့အခွင့်အရေးဆိုင်ရာ ကုလသမဂ္ဂအထူးကိုယ်စားလှယ် Tom Andrews ကလည်း “ စစ်တပ်သည် အဆိုပါပြဿနာများ၏ အဓိကအကြောင်းရင်း ဖြစ်နေသည့်အတွက် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံအတွင်း တည်ငြိမ်မှု သို့မဟုတ် လူ့အခွင့်အရေး ပြဿနာကို အဆုံးသတ်နိုင်မှုတို့အတွက် နည်းလမ်းမရှိကြောင်း” နှင့် “ အကြမ်းဖက် စစ်တပ်သည် ဖွဲ့စည်းပုံအခြေခံဥပဒေအရဖြစ်စေ၊ ဒီမိုကရေစီအရဖြစ်စေ အနည်းငယ်မျှပင် တရားဝင်မှု မရှိကြောင်း” စသဖြင့် ပြောကြားခဲ့ပြီး စစ်တပ်အပေါ် အရေးယူဆောင်ရွက်ရေး အတွက် ကောင်စီသို့ တိုက်တွန်းပြောကြားခဲ့ပါသည်။
အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ် အပေါ် အရေးယူ ဆောင်ရွက်ချက်များတွင် အမေရိကန်ပြည်ထောင်စု၏ အရေးယူ ပိတ်ဆို့မှုများလည်း ပါဝင်လာခဲ့ခြင်း ဖြစ်သည်။ ဥရောပသမဂ္ဂကလည်း အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်၏ ရေနံနှင့် သဘာဝဓာတ်ငွေ့ ရငွေများအပေါ် ပစ်မှတ်ထားသည့် ပိတ်ဆို့မှုများကို ယခုနှစ် ဖေဖော်ဝါရီလတွင် ဆဌမအကြိမ် ချမှတ်ခဲ့ပြီး အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ် အနေဖြင့် စစ်လက်နက်ပစ္စည်းများ၊ ခဲယမ်းမီးကျောက်များနှင့် စစ်ဘက် နည်းပညာများ မရရှိနိုင်ရေးကို လုပ်ဆောင်ခဲ့ပါသည်။
အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ အနေဖြင့် အမေရိကန်ပြည်ထောင်စု၏ မြန်မာပြည်သူများအတွက် တစိုက်မတ်မတ် နှစ်မြှုပ် ဆောင်ရွက်ပေးနေမှုများ အတွက် ကျေးဇူးတင်ရှိပါ ကြောင်းနှင့် နိုင်ငံတကာအသိုင်းအဝိုင်းမှ အခြားအဖွဲ့ဝင်များ ကိုလည်း အလားတူ အရေးယူမှုများ ဆောင်ရွက်ပေးရန် တိုက်တွန်းအပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Myanmar - NUG
Date of publication:
2023-03-26
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-26
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Individual Documents
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National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Sanctions - general, Business and the Military
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"The National Unity Government of Myanmar (NUG) welcomes the government of the United States of America (USA) to promote accountability for the brutal Burmese Military's assault on the democratic aspirations of the people of Myanmar (Burma). In response to the brutal Burmese Military's continued infliction of pain and suffering on the people of Burma, the U.S. Treasury Department has imposed sanctions on two individuals, Tun Min Latt and his spouse Win Min Soe, as well as three entities owned or controlled by Tun Min Latt.
Furthermore, the US government has issued sanctions against jet fuel importation to Burma, informing individuals, businesses, and other persons of the sanctions risks associated with the provision of jet fuel to Burma's military generals and their cronies. These actions align with those taken by Canada, the European Union (EU), and the United Kingdom(UK).
Furthermore, it is important to note that in the last 24 months alone, the brutal Burmese Military's atrocities have totalled more than 9,000 attacks on civilians, resulting in the deaths of over 3,000 innocent individuals and the inhuman and illegal detention of over 20,000 civilians including elected President of Myanmar U Win Myint, elected State Counsellor of Myanmar, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and spiritual leader Rev. Dr. Hkalam Samson. In the last 24 months alone, these brutal evils forces of Burmese Military have destroyed over 60,000 homes, schools, churches, and monasteries, displacing more than 1.6 million civilians, causing over 17 million people to face hunger and starvation and forcing half population of Myanmar to the extreme poverty.
These genocidal attacks by the Burmese military junta have been made possible by the massive supplies of fuel, aviation parts, weapons and finances provided to the fascist military. The individuals, groups, organizations, businesses, companies, and countries enabling these atrocities and crimes against humanity must be held accountable with their partners in crimes.
The United States' actions in imposing sanctions on jet fuel suppliers and military cronies are crucial to saving the lives of millions of people in Myanmar. It is essential to continue taking action that denies the genocidal military of Myanmar the resources it uses to commit these atrocities and crimes against humanity and to support the people of Burma in their struggle for freedom, federal democracy, and human rights..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of International Cooperation Myanmar
Date of publication:
2023-03-25
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-25
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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"Justice For Myanmar and The Sentry welcome the adoption of sanctions today by the United States on Star Sapphire Group of Companies, Star Sapphire Trading Company Limited, Star Sapphire Group Pte. Ltd., and two of their owners, Tun Min Latt and his wife Win Min Soe.
Star Sapphire Group of Companies is a Myanmar conglomerate with diversified interests in trading, power, hospitality, and mining. As revealed by Justice For Myanmar in an April 2022 report, Star Sapphire Group of Companies has substantial business links with theMyanmar military. The United Kingdom sanctioned Star Sapphire Group of Companies in August 2022.
According to the Department of the Treasury’s press release, Tun Min Latt has used his companies “to import military arms and equipment, including drones and aircraft parts” and has acted as Myanmar’s agent with the US-sanctioned Chinese arms manufacturer NORINCO.Alongside institutional links between Star Sapphire Group of Companies and the Myanmar military, significant ties exist between Tun Min Latt and his wife Win Min Soe and the family of junta leader and commander-in-chief of the Myanmar military Min Aung Hlaing. Research by Justice For Myanmar and Reuters published in January 2023 revealed that Tun Min Latt held assets in the names of Min Aung Hlaing’s adult children at the time of Tun Min Latt’s arrest by the Thai police in Bangkok in September 2022.
The arrest was carried out after Tun Min Latt and his associates were charged with drug trafficking and money laundering; he remains incustody in Thailand where his trial is ongoing. Thai police found at the time of his arrest that Tun Min Latt was in possession of the property deed for a luxury Bangkok condominium in the name of Aung Pyae Sone and a checkbook for a Thai bank account in the name of Khin Thiri Thet Mon.
Aung Pyae Sone and Khin Thiri Thet Mon are the adult son and daughter, respectively, of Min Aung Hlaing; both children were sanctioned by the US in March 2021 for having “directly benefitted from their father’s position and malign influence.”
The Sentry and Justice For Myanmar welcome the decision by the US to sanction these military cronies and call for likeminded jurisdictions,including the European Union, United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia, to coordinate efforts to ensure that all of the Star Sapphire entities and owners are sanctioned by each jurisdiction.
Yadanar Maung, spokesperson for Justice For Myanmar, stated: “We welcome the latest round of US sanctions against StarSapphire entities and two of their owners, who have aided and abetted the Myanmar military’s genocide, war crimes, and crimesagainst humanity through financial support and the brokering of arms. These sanctions are also significant for targeting aSingaporean entity for the first time and help send a message that Singapore is no longer safe for Myanmar cronies. Tun Min Lattalso has deep personal ties with the war criminal Min Aung Hlaing and his family, helping them profit from the military’s illegal coup attempt and hide assets offshore. We urge the US and its allies to extend sanctions to the whole Star Sapphire network, including Htet Aung, Khine Wint Mon, Sithu Maung, and Thant Lwin Moe, as well as all other enablers of the illegitimate Myanmar military junta.”
Justyna Gudzowska, director of illicit finance policy at The Sentry, said: “Tun Min Latt, Win Min Soe, and the Star Sapphireentities epitomize the enablers that facilitate business transactions with the Myanmar military in ways that benefit both the genocidal institution and its leadership. These welcome designations act as a warning and deterrent to businesspersons, corporate entities, and financial institutions from Myanmar and beyond that engaging in transactions with the Myanmar military will incur legal and reputational consequences.”
For media inquiries or interview requests for The Sentry, please contact: Greg Hittelman, Director of Communications, [email protected]
For media inquiries for Justice For Myanmar, please contact: Yadanar Maung, Spokesperson, [email protected]
About Justice For Myanmar
Justice For Myanmar is a collective of covert activists working to create a just, peaceful, and federal democratic Myanmar. The collective uses painstaking research, data visualization, and hard-hitting reporting to expose multinational corporations with business ties to the Myanmar military—money that funds inequality, corruption, violence, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. Their work has helped pressure multinational corporations to divest hundreds of millions of dollars from the Myanmar military, led to targeted sanctions, and raised international awareness of the situation in Myanmar.
About The Sentry
(Short descriptor for press use: “The Sentry, an investigative organization that tracks corruption”)
The Sentry is an investigative and policy organization that seeks to disable multinational predatory networks that benefit from violent conflict, repression, and kleptocracy. Pull back the curtain on wars, mass atrocities, and other human rights abuses, and you’ll find grand corruption and unchecked greed. These tragedies persist because the perpetrators rarely face meaningful consequences. The Sentry aims to alter the warped incentive structures that continually undermine peace and good governance. Our investigations follow the money as it is laundered from war zones to financial centers around the world. We provide evidence and strategies for governments, banks, and law enforcement to hold the perpetrators and enablers of violence and corruption to account. These efforts provide new leverage for human rights, peace, and anti-corruption efforts..."
Source/publisher:
Justice For Myanmar
Date of publication:
2023-03-24
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-24
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Sanctions, Business and the Military, The Burmese military's role in the economy, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
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Sub-title:
Indonesia and Australia have different but equally critical roles in bringing the junta to the negotiating table.
Description:
"Since the military coup in February 2022, the people of Myanmar have been subjected to unrelenting violence including indiscriminate airstrikes, mass burning of villages, arbitrary arrests, killings, torture and forced disappearances, among other egregious human rights violations.
Reflecting the gravity of the crisis, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has made an unprecedented divergence from its founding principle of non-interference. In April 2021, ASEAN leaders negotiated a Five-Point Consensus on Myanmar, committing among other things to a cessation of violence and the commencement of “constructive dialogue”. In November 2022, ASEAN acknowledged that “little progress [had been] achieved”. ASEAN resolved that there was a “need for an implementation plan”, and called for support from ASEAN’s “external partners”.
ASEAN’s engagement in the Myanmar crisis thus far is due to the leadership of Indonesia and Malaysia, at times supported by Singapore and the Philippines. Other ASEAN states are more loath to intervene. Singapore’s foreign minister recently stated that “disapprov[al] of the coup … does not give ASEAN a licence to interfere”. With this in mind, if ASEAN has one chance at a political solution to the Myanmar crisis, it is with Indonesia as ASEAN Chair in 2023.
Indonesia has said that ASEAN “must deal” with the crisis in Myanmar, and that as ASEAN Chair it will “spare no effort” to encourage an “inclusive national dialogue”. Bearing in mind ASEAN’s internal constraints and divisions, however, Indonesia faces an uphill battle. As former Indonesian Attorney General Marzuki Darusman observed recently, “much is expected from ASEAN, and therein lies the problem”. Darusman has advised that “if there is going to be any change in Myanmar, it will need to come from outside”. This is reflected in ASEAN’s unusual request in November 2022 for external support.
Australia has a critical role to play in this context. Australia is one of ASEAN and Indonesia’s most important supporters. It has a comprehensive strategic partnership with Indonesia, enshrining a commitment to work together to resolve regional challenges. Australia has explicitly expressed support for the role of the ASEAN Chair in addressing the Myanmar crisis.
The situation in Myanmar tests this cooperation. As a member of the ASEAN family, Indonesia is subject to constraints that Australia is not. From outside the ASEAN family, Australia can lend critical support for Indonesia in its ambition for a political dialogue on Myanmar. There are three steps, in particular, that Australia can take.
The first concerns the setting of the ground for negotiations. As Darusman has stated, this requires a “level playing field” – one on which all political stakeholders, including Myanmar’s National Unity Government (NUG), are recognised and accorded equal footing. Assuming the negotiations are to be ASEAN-led, this requires ASEAN and all other major players to recognise the NUG as legitimately representing the aspirations of the people of Myanmar.
As one of ASEAN’s most important partners, Australia can help the NUG along the road to international recognition. Australia has said it is “open to engagement with the NUG”, but has stopped short of making an explicit statement of recognition or publicly engaging with high-level NUG officials. The European Parliament, by contrast, has formally recognised the NUG. In light of its explicit support for Indonesia’s ambitions as ASEAN Chair, Australia should be at the forefront of coordinated international efforts to boost the NUG’s legitimacy, not lagging behind.
Second, even with a stage set for dialogue, the Myanmar military junta will likely need to be coerced to the negotiating table. Already, the situation is opportune – the junta is losing ground, and the democratic resistance movement is consolidating – but further pressure is required. It is often remarked that the junta is impervious to international isolation, but with access to hundreds of millions of dollars in revenue from oil and gas alone, this has scarcely been put to the test.
Australia currently sanctions just two entities that benefit the junta. Canada, by way of contrast, sanctions 63, the European Union sanctions 18, the United Kingdom sanctions 28 and the United States sanctions 32.
The UN Special Rapporteur on human rights in Myanmar has called on states to “form a working group of governments to develop and implement a coordinated strategy” to deny the junta access to weapons and resources. Australia should be leading this initiative – sanctioning companies that supply fuel and parts to Myanmar’s air force, arms to the junta, and goods to state-owned enterprises in the minerals and energy sectors, and lobbying other states to do the same – with a view of ultimately forcing the junta to ASEAN’s negotiating table.
Finally, recalling ASEAN’s request for external support, Australia could work behind the scenes to urge the United Nations to step up support for ASEAN-led mediation – just as the United Nations has supported regionally led mediation in other parts of the world. Such support could be prompted by a request from ASEAN to the Secretary-General, or alternatively by a Security Council resolution requesting the Secretary-General provide his “good offices”, and strengthening the mandate of his Special Envoy on Myanmar.
Australia likes to say it punches above its weight in global affairs. It has a proud history of peacekeeping and diplomacy in the Indo-Pacific. The political crisis in Myanmar presents an opportunity and an imperative for Australia to demonstrate its diplomatic prowess, and it should not be lost..."
Source/publisher:
"The Interpreter"
Date of publication:
2023-03-22
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-22
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, ASEAN-Burma relations
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"Key Event Details
Location of Incident:
Nyaung Hla village (ညောင်လှရွာ), Tabayin township (ဒီပဲယင်းမြို့နယ်), Sagaing region (စစ်ကိုင်းတိုင်းဒေသကြီး), [22.65276909, 95.41811371].
Date/Time of Incident:
Multiple events between 23-28 January 2023.
Alleged Perpetrator(s) and/or Involvement:
State Administration Council (SAC) forces
A 17 January 2023 announcement from the National Unity Government (NUG) alleges the LIB 364 and LIB 701 (under direction of the LID 77) were responsible.
Summary of Investigation:
SAC forces allegedly entered villages in Tabayin township, setting at least 10 villages on fire. Fires were identified and verified in seven villages between 23-28 January 2023.
Almost the entirety of Nyaung Hla village was levelled by the fires, resulting in damage and destruction to up to 402 houses.
Food supplies - including a rice mill, multiple rice storage facilities, and farm animals - were reportedly damaged, destroyed or killed during the fires in Nyaung Hla and Ma Ya Kan (မရကန် ) villages.
Based on the analysis of identified open source user-generated content (UGC), it is likely that the SAC forces who were active in the area were responsible for these fires.
Summary
On 23 January 2023, SAC forces reportedly entered several villages located at the border of Ye-U (ရေဦး) and Tabayin (ဒီပဲယင်း) townships, and set at least 10 villages alight. On 24 January 2023, sources including Khit Thit News and Radio Free Asia reported that SAC forces burned Nyaung Hla (ညောင်လှ) village, which was home to over 900 households, for the third time since January 2022. The fire resulted in the damage and destruction of hundreds of civilian homes, rice paddies, and a rice mill. Farm animals and an elderly woman were also reportedly killed.
Myanmar Witness has verified and chronolocated the fires in seven out of the reported 10 villages (table 1). Additionally, Myanmar Witness has geolocated additional footage in Nyaung Hla village, where an estimated 402 houses were affected, and verified the destruction of a rice mill. Reports also indicate the damage and destruction of food supplies such as rice paddies and farm animals in some of the affected villages.
Myanmar Witness has identified content indicating the presence of SAC troops during and/or before the fires in and around the affected areas.
Myanmar Witness was able to verify:
At least seven villages were burnt between 23-28 January 2023.
Up to 402 houses in Nyaung Hla Village were damaged or destroyed by the fires.
A rice mill, and reportedly rice storage facilities, were damaged or destroyed in the fire.
Verification and Chronolocation of Fires in Nyaung Hla Village
Verification via FIRMS
Between 23-27 January 2023, The Fire Information for Resource Management System (FIRMS) shows multiple areas of high heat signatures in Nyang Hla village, consistent with the dates of the reported fires (Figure 2).
Verification via Sentinel
The fire locations identified using FIRMS were further analysed using Sentinel satellite imagery. Nyaung Hla and Tha Yet Taw were visibly damaged during the investigated timeframe, corroborating the FIRMS data on 25 January 2023. Additionally, an image from Sentinel hub on the 25 January shows smoke above the area (Figure 3). This can be seen by the discoloration shown in Figure 4 (from 10 January 2023 to 30 January 2023).
Estimating the number of houses affected
Sentinel imagery can also be used to count and estimate the number of damaged or destroyed houses. This is done by overlaying the discoloured area with higher resolution imagery (Figure 5). Using this method, Myanmar Witness was able to estimate that up to 402 houses were damaged or destroyed.
Geolocations
Rice Mill
The fires in Nyaung Hla village visibly damaged a rice mill located in the west of the village. Figure 6 and 7 compare drone footage (UGC) and satellite imagery of the location near the rice mill (blue box), showing the damage incurred by the fire.
Additional images of Nyaung Hla Village
Multiple sources of UGC, both drone and on-ground footage, show clear views of Nyaung Hla village during and after the fires were identified. These pieces of UGC, showing the fire and its aftermath, are verified from different angles below.
Figure 8 shows the geolocation of the middle section of Nyaung Hla village. The boundary (marked by the dotted line) and the white roofed house (marked in a red box) are verified by matching UGC with satellite imagery. The post claims the events took place on 24 and 25 January 2023, corroborating the aforementioned FIRMS and Sentinel data.
Unverified claims
Elderly woman’s remains in Ohn Ta Pin village
On 27 January 2023 it was reported that an elderly woman from Ohn Ta Pin (အုံးတပင်) (22.60137939, 95.34348297) village was killed in a fire set by SAC troops (identified through FIRMS to have occurred on 26 January 2023). Figure 10 shows the alleged remains of the victim found in the ashes.
Burnt rice store piles and farm animals
In Ma Ya Kan village, SAC troops allegedly burned the rice storage building (Figure 11) and damaged an estimated 70 houses. Myanmar Witness was able to verify the fire in the village using Sentinel satellite imagery, but the footage posted online of the burnt rice does not provide enough information to verify its location through geolocation.
Photos allegedly taken in Nyaung Hla village also show the destruction of food supplies. At least four farm animals were reported to have died as a result of the fires, and a partially burnt rice storage building can be seen (Figure 12).
Food shortages for Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)
A local support group reported that a military operation undertaken by an estimated 150 SAC troops in the east of Tabayin township resulted in tens of thousands of internally displaced persons (IDPs). The group appealed for donations as it expected it would face food shortages for the IDPs. These challenges may be exacerbated by the damage and destruction of food supplies caused by the fires.
Perpetrators of the Fires
Several used packages of bullets (Figure 13 a-d) labelled Ka Pa Sa, Defence Industries (ကာကွယ်ရေးပစ္စည်းစက်ရုံ, ကပစ), were allegedly found in Nyaung Hla village. The box in Figure 12a states “Manufactured by Defence Industries”. Figure 12d shows a paper box labelled “KaPaSa (2) 5.56x45mm bullets”, and Figure 12e shows possible rifle grenade casings - the features match the container tube for a 40mm rifle grenable model MG-2 which is used by the Myanmar military. This is determined due to the tube size and cracking of the tube body with the twist off end. While Myanmar Witness cannot verify the location where these boxes and weapons were found, the weapon characteristics and manufacturers signal that they belonged to SAC troops.
Images also circulated online showing messages on a blackboard inside a school building in Nyaung Hla village, both of which contain profanities directed against the PDF (Figure 14). While Myanmar Witness cannot verify the authors of these messages, they were left in a location where SAC troops were allegedly located and weapon boxes were also found.
Future monitoring
Although direct attribution cannot be made to the SAC in this case, SAC troops have an established history of using fire as a weapon against the local resistance forces and civilians in Sagaing region. The continued use of fire by armed forces within Myanmar is concerning; it places civilian lives at risk, creates IDPs, and could destabilise local food supplies. Myanmar Witness will continue to monitor the use of fire in the region..."
Source/publisher:
Myanmar Witness
Date of publication:
2023-03-21
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-21
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Armed conflict in Burma - attacks on civilians
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"Myanmar junta troops have killed two civilians, including one suffering from mental illness, and looted houses while raiding a village in Yesagyo Township, Magwe Region, on Sunday and Monday, according to residents.
The killings were committed by the junta’s special task force that killed 17 Tar Taing villagers in Myinmu Township, Sagaing Region, in early March.
On Sunday, around 80 soldiers, including many wearing resistance uniforms, raided Mee Laung Kyun village in Yesagyo, a resident told The Irrawaddy on Tuesday.
During the raid, more than 50 displaced people from nearby Myaung Township in Sagaing, were detained along with Mee Laung Kyun’s residents while they sheltered at the village monastery. Most of Mee Laung Khun’s residents escaped.
Villager U Maung Han, 50, who was cooking for the displaced at the monastery, was shot dead, a resident said.
A displaced 16-year-old suffered serious shoulder and abdomen injuries after being shot before he escaped, said a representative of Yesagyo People’s Defense Force that provided treatment.
A villager told The Irrawaddy that villager Ko Kaung Myat Soe Oo, 40, who suffered from mental illness, was tortured and killed by junta troops on Monday.
“His head was severely beaten by the soldiers, he was stabbed in his abdomen, legs and throat,” said the resident, who helped cremate the two villagers.
Regime forces were stationed at the village on Monday and Sunday, looting 25 million kyats (around US$8,700 on the black market), gold jewelry and mobile phones from houses and detainees.
They burned two houses and motorbikes at the monastery before leaving on Tuesday morning, leaving all the detainees.
They then burned houses in nearby Pan Nyo village in Myaung Township on Tuesday morning.
Before the raid junta forces had clashed with resistance groups in nearby Yay Lal Kyun for three days, losing six soldiers and suffering many injuries.
The Myingyan Black Tiger resistance group lost its headquarters and two fighters were injured.
During recent raids on resistance strongholds in Ayadaw, Myinmu and Sagaing townships in Sagaing Region, the junta task force beheaded resistance troops, killed civilian detainees and committed acts of sexual violence..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2023-03-21
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-21
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Armed conflict in Burma - attacks on civilians
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"China’s new special envoy to Myanmar, Deng Xijun, has already triggered changes in the country since his appointment in December 2022.
Last week, Deng Xijun met leaders of seven powerful ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) based in northern and eastern Myanmar along the border with China — their third meeting since December.
Before the latest talks, the seven EAOs including Myanmar’s most powerful ethnic army, the United Wa State Army (UWSA), met in UWSA-controlled Wa State. In a joint statement, they thanked China for its work attempting to solve Myanmar’s current crisis.
Deng has also met junta boss Min Aung Hlaing twice. During their second meeting, Deng also met officials from the military regime’s peace negotiation team. Following the meeting, the junta moved battalions based near the Myanmar-China border to resistance strongholds in central and southeastern Myanmar, where they have launched massive offensive operations.
Reinforcements
The Myanmar military has launched large-scale operations in three locations: Kayah State, including Pekon and Pinlaung townships in neighboring southern Shan State, Tanintharyi Region and areas of Magwe Region and Chin State.
The new offensives have been made possible because the regime has moved some 3,000 troops formerly stationed near the Myanmar-China border in Shan State inland to the conflict areas.
Before the reinforcements arrived, junta troops in Kayah and Pekon and Pinlaung townships were under the Eastern Command and Loikaw Regional Operations Command and consisted of the 66th Light Infantry Division.
But strong resistance from Karenni resistance groups — the Karenni Army and the Karenni Nationalities Defense Force — and People’s Defense Forces (PDF) meant that the regime was unable to exert control over Kayah and Pekon and Pinlaung townships.
The military has also declared martial law in Tanintharyi Region’s Dawei and Palaw townships in southern Myanmar, while also deploying troops from Kayah to Karen State, where resistance is also strong. So the junta needed reinforcements in Tanintharyi.
Reinforcements were also needed in Magwe’s Gangaw District and neighboring Chin State, where PDF’s fighting alongside the Chinland Defense Force are making it difficult for the junta to resupply its bases in Chin State.
Despite being overstretched by fighting on multiple fronts, 3,000 reinforcements were found and started to arrive around the end of February.
Soldiers from the 12th Military Operations Command (MOC) based in northern Shan State were sent to Karen State, while troops from the 20th MOC fighting in Karen State were moved to Tanintharyi Region.
Further reinforcements came from 2nd MOC and 17th MOC, who have launched assaults in Yaw Region, an area made up of Gangaw, Htilin, and Saw in Magwe Region’s Gangaw District, and Kyaukhtu on the border of Magwe and Chin State.
Deng’s guarantee
Why couldn’t the regime move troops from northern Shan State before? Why now?
Three of the seven EAOs China’s special envoy met — the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) — have a strong presence in northern Shan State.
They have ties to pro-democracy revolutionary forces that took up arms after the 2021 coup. Thousands of revolutionary fighters have since been trained and armed by the KIA, TNLA and MNDAA. That forced the Myanmar military to keep soldiers from seven MOCs and Northeastern Command in their positions in northern Shan.
So what made the regime take a bold decision to move its troops in the face of such threat? The KIA, TNLA and MNDAA have rejected peace talks with the regime, and are unlikely to reach an immediate truce with the junta no matter what China’s special envoy says to them.
The regime was able to move the troops because of a guarantee made possible by an agreement between Deng and the junta. China does not want to see fighting along the Myanmar-China frontier. So the regime might have promised not to conduct attacks along the border, while Deng assured the junta that EAOs would not attack regime forces along the border.
For the military regime, the major threat now is in central Myanmar, and it won’t think twice about promising China that it will not fight along the border unless it is attacked. And Deng is in a position to pressure EAOs in northern Myanmar not to fight near the frontier with China.
EAOs in north and east Myanmar rely heavily on China for supplies of everything from food and medicine to fuel. So they are not in a position to argue when China makes a demand. That enabled the junta to move its troops without fear of attacks taking place along the border.
Result of Deng’s visits
Deng said he intends to help solve Myanmar’s issue peacefully. So what has been the result of Deng’s flurry of activity since December?
China has got a guarantee of stability at the border, while the Myanmar military got 3,000 troops to reinforce its battalions fighting in central and southeastern Myanmar. That resulted in regime forces slaughtering civilians and torching villages in Pinlaung Township.
The junta’s recent operations and its massacres of civilians are the outcome of an agreement between Deng and the regime. The Myanmar military has gained an advantage and has been able to launch large-scale operations in at least three places.
But for the Myanmar people that agreement has only induced more misery as they suffer the junta’s atrocities..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2023-03-21
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-21
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Armed conflict in Burma - attacks on civilians
Language:
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Description:
"1. Union Election Commission assigned by SAC considered a branch of terrorist organization 15/03/2023.....2. NUG urge international community to support them in ending the SAC’s atrocious crimes 16/03/2023.....3. UN Ambassador Kyaw Moe Tun says terrorist military committed 60 massacre over last 2 years 13/03/2023.....4. Military-organized sham election will create more bloodshed across the country.....5. Nearly 400 million MMK in aid distributed in February
16/03/2023.....6. SAC massacres resulted in 766 civilians dead 16/03/2023.....7. Destroying youth’s education is tantamount to destroying country’s future..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2023-03-20
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-21
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Political History
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1.22 MB
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"National Unity Government Weekly Press Update (12/2023)
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2023-03-20
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-21
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Political History
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"Thank you Mr President,
Special Rapporteur,
Thank you for your sobering update and passionate commitment.
It has been over two years since the military seized power in a coup, plunging Myanmar into crisis.
Myanmar’s people have shown extraordinary resilience in the face of unspeakable atrocities, demonstrating their commitment to democracy and human rights. We continue to stand with them. They are indeed not forgotten, they are not alone.
Across Myanmar, the junta is committing brutal human rights violations and abuses including against Rohingya and other minorities. Thousands of civilians, including children, jailed, tortured and killed. Gender and sexual-based violence rife. Civic space virtually non-existent. Over 17 million people in need of humanitarian assistance, and nearly 2 million people displaced.
Since the coup, the UK has provided over £100 million to support those in need. We must collectively ensure that all responders on the front line are supported and that we innovate to channel resources for the humanitarian response.
Special Rapporteur,
How can the international community ensure access to displaced population inside and outside Myanmar?
Thank you..."
Source/publisher:
Govt. UK (London)
Date of publication:
2023-03-20
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-20
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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"Council Concludes General Debate on the Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights
The Human Rights Council this morning held an interactive dialogue with the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, and started an interactive dialogue with the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Iran. It also concluded its general debate on the promotion and protection of all human rights, civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights, including the right to development.
Thomas H. Andrews, Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, said two years after the military staged an illegal coup in Myanmar, it continued to wage a campaign of violence and oppression to crush widespread public opposition. But while it had utterly failed to stop this opposition, it was succeeding in destroying the nation and assaulting the fundamental human rights of its people. While opposition remained strong, the junta’s escalating assaults on the people of Myanmar were having a devastating impact. Since the coup was launched, more than 3,000 civilians had been killed; more than 1.3 million civilians had been displaced; more than 16,000 political prisoners were behind bars; and 17.6 million people were in dire need of humanitarian assistance. The Special Rapporteur said he regularly received reports of massacres of civilians, including beheadings and dismemberment. Torture and sexual violence remained a constant threat. Unfortunately, Mr. Andrews had also received reports that opposition groups had committed human rights violations, which also must end.
Mr. Andrews said the international community was not doing nearly enough. A minority of Member States and non-State entities continued to provide the junta with weapons, materials to manufacture weapons, or revenue that was being used to commit war crimes and crimes against humanity. This must stop. Those Member States that had taken actions, such as targeted sanctions or weapons bans, had failed to do so in a strategic and coordinated fashion. A working coalition of Member States should be formed to identify actions that would have the greatest impact and then coordinate their implementation. The international community could also do better in supporting the hundreds of thousands who had been forced to flee Myanmar.
In the discussion, speakers said the Special Rapporteur’s report left no doubt about the situation in Myanmar, which was in freefall. The responsibility lay squarely on the Myanmar military, which, more than two years after its coup, inflicted continuous and increasing grave and systematic human rights violations on people across the country. Persons in vulnerable situations, and in particular persons belonging to ethnic and religious minorities, such as the Rohingya, continued to bear the brunt. Despite all this, the people in Myanmar continued their heroic resistance. Some speakers called upon the military to immediately end all forms of violence and abuses, including sexual and gender-based violence, against the people of Myanmar, including children.
One speaker pointed out that this was an internal affair of Myanmar, and that external pressure would only be counter-productive: the Human Rights Council and multilateral bodies should work to bridge differences between parties to the conflict to avoid creating further conflict. Another speaker said the Special Rapporteur’s calls for the imposition of more unilateral coercive measures on Myanmar were rejected: the extreme politicisation of his mandate was reflected in the recommendations in his report, which were selective and based on uncorroborated information.
Speaking in the discussion were the European Union, Netherlands on behalf of a group of countries, Denmark on behalf of the Nordic Baltic States, Pakistan on behalf of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, Liechtenstein, United States, Czech Republic, Republic of Korea, France, Japan, China, Indonesia, Venezuela, Canada, India, Austria, United Kingdom, Malaysia, Spain, Türkyie, Bangladesh, Italy, Malta, the Gambia, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Malawi, Australia, Croatia, Romania, Bulgaria, Thailand, New Zealand, Russian Federation, South Africa, Germany, and Ukraine.
Also speaking were CIVICUS - World Alliance for Citizen Participation, the Organization for Poverty Alleviation and Development, Human Rights Now, Article 19 - International Centre Against Censorship, International Bar Association, Human Rights Institute, Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development, Law Council of Australia, Edmund Rice International Limited, Human Rights Watch, and iuventum e.V.
The Council then started an interactive dialogue with the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Iran.
Javaid Rehman, Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Iran, said the report was being presented today amidst the most serious human rights violations in Iran over the past four decades. Available evidence, including eyewitness testimonies and comments from reliable medical sources, established that Ms. Amini died on 16 September as a result of beatings by the State morality police. As per usual practice, State authorities denied any wrongdoing or misconduct on their part. None of the members of the morality police involved in the death of Ms. Amini had been held accountable. Mr. Rehman stressed that the death of Ms. Amini was not an isolated event but the latest in a long series of extreme violence against women and girls committed by the Iranian authorities. The responsibility of top senior officials in instigating this violence could not be ignored. Protesters, including children, were beaten to death.
Mr. Rehman said at least 527 people, including 71 children, were killed, and hundreds of protesters severely injured. From the very first days of protests, State authorities had tried to shut down all avenues of freedom of expression, with mass arbitrary arrests and detentions. Recently authorities recognised that over 22,000 people had been arrested. Mr. Rehman remained deeply concerned at the continuing and exponentially increasing violations of human rights in the country. The scale and gravity of the violations committed by Iranian authorities pointed to the possible commission of international crimes, notably the crimes against humanity of murder, imprisonment, enforced disappearances, torture, rape and sexual violence, and persecution. In the absence of accountability at the domestic level, Mr. Rehman strongly advocated for the establishment of an independent international fact-finding mission and looked towards fully cooperating with it to ensure justice and accountability for victims of human rights violations.
Iran, speaking as a country concerned, said advocacy for human rights was increasingly mistaken by some States and mandate holders for unwarranted and egotistic purposes, abusing the human rights mechanisms to target certain States; they were void of any value for the protection of human rights. The Council’s mandate was best fulfilled by dialogue and cooperation, in line with non-selectivity and impartiality. The Special Rapporteur’s report, which read like a tragic novel, had been used by some Western media as an attempt to portray the situation of human rights in Iran. The Special Rapporteur was totally in disregard of his mandate, in his lack of impartiality, using biased language, and violating the Code of Conduct. The Iranian people had witnessed nearly three months of terrorist attacks and armed riots, but the Special Rapporteur did not even mention certain terrorist attacks, which left innocent people murdered, and did not mention armed attacks on people in certain provinces.
In the discussion on Iran, many speakers commended the Special Rapporteur for his report. Since the death of Mahsa Amini in the custody of Iran’s so-called “Morality Police” six months ago, the world had witnessed a mass movement while Iran’s leadership had conducted a relentless and violent crackdown on the people of Iran. Some speakers said it was important to renew the mandate while also supporting the work of the newly created Fact-Finding Mission, in the name of women, life, and freedom. Some speakers strongly condemned the use of violence, harassment and detentions against peaceful protesters. Perpetrators of torture, killings and violence, including sexual and gender-based violence, needed to be held accountable.
Some speakers said that abusing the United Nations human rights mechanisms to single out and harass some nations that did not align with the hegemonic and geopolitical interests of the West had nothing to do with the genuine promotion and protection of human rights. This was a violation of the United Nations Charter and of international law. It was hoped that the international community could respect the human rights development path independently chosen by the people of Iran. Of grave concern were the unilateral coercive measures imposed on Iran by other countries, which had undermined the human rights of the Iranian people and gravely affected their rights.
Speaking in the discussion were Estonia on behalf of the Nordic-Baltic countries, European Union, Liechtenstein, United States, Ireland, Germany, Czech Republic, Israel, Belgium, China, Switzerland, Luxembourg, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Costa Rica, North Macedonia, Venezuela, Canada, Zimbabwe, Netherlands, Republic of Moldova, Austria, and United Kingdom.
At the beginning of the meeting, the Council concluded the general debate on agenda item three on the promotion and protection of all human rights, civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights, including the right to development. The general debate started in previous meetings and a summary can be found here and here.
In the general debate, speakers said the promotion and protection of human rights were essential to ensure a more just and equitable world for all. However, in many cases, all around the world, human rights were being violated. Some speakers highlighted increasing cases of horrific violations that occurred in a number of countries, and war and conflict zones against civilians. Violence had become a daily occurrence, with wars, bloodshed and conflicts taking place in many countries. There was a need to move towards serious United Nations-led peace processes and transitional justice needed to be achieved. Some speakers told the Council that over-compliance of businesses and banks with unilateral sanctions led to wide-scoped violations of all economic, social and cultural rights, as well as the right to life in the sanctioned countries.
Speakers called on the Special Procedures to report and discuss the harmful effects of unilateral sanctions in their annual reports and condemn these effects in joint statements.
Speaking in the general debate were World Muslim Congress, International Action for Peace and Sustainable Development, Promotion du Développement Economique et Social, Lidskoprávní organizace Práva a svobody obcanučů Turkmenistánu z.s., Youth in Technology and Arts Network, Association Culturelle des Tamouls en France, Asociacion Cubana de las Naciones Unidas (Cuban United Nations Association), Il Cenacolo, Baha'i International Community, Commission of the Churches on International Affairs of the World Council of Churches, Chunhui Children's Foundation, Human Rights Solidarity Organization, Human Rights and Democratic Participation Centre "SHAMS", Organization for Defending Victims of Violence, Centre Zagros pour les Droits de l'Homme, Samarthanam Trust for the Disabled, and Alliance Internationale pour la défense des Droits et des Libertés.
Speaking in exercise of right of reply were Morocco, Indonesia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia.
The webcast of the Human Rights Council meetings can be found here. All meeting summaries can be found here. Documents and reports related to the Human Rights Council’s fifty-second regular session can be found here.
The Council will reconvene this afternoon at 3 p.m. to continue and conclude the interactive dialogue with the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran, followed by an interactive dialogue with the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, and then an interactive dialogue with the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine.
General Debate on the Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, including the Right to Development
The general debate on agenda item three on the promotion and protection of all human rights, civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights, including the right to development, started in previous meetings and a summary can be found here and here.
General Debate
Speakers, among other things, said the promotion and protection of human rights were essential to ensure a more just and equitable world for all. However, in many cases all around the world, human rights were being violated. Speakers said that in some places, laws had not been effective in removing barriers and decreasing violence against women. Women and girls were often used as human shields and as a tool to incite hatred.
Some speakers highlighted the lack of attention by the Council on the human rights of women suffering the pain, stigma and discrimination associated with obstetric fistula, particularly those in rural areas. Member States were called on to pay more attention to the prevention of obstetric fistula in their policies, strategic plans and budgets. Governments needed to initiate trainings for midwives from local communities, accompanied by incentives to encourage them to return to serve their communities.
Speakers said that during her presentation to the Council, the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief had recalled the important role of States in the protection of the rights of religious minorities. Not only was this in line with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international commitments, but allowing all persons in a given country, irrespective of their religion or belief, to live freely, contributed to the richness and the advancement of society. In spite of this, in certain areas, some religious minorities faced potential exclusion from society. The international community needed to remind authorities of their obligations to guarantee the rights of all to freely practise the religion of their choice without any fear or punishment.
Some speakers highlighted increasing cases of horrific violations that occurred in a number of countries and war and conflict zones against civilians. Violence had become a daily occurrence, with wars, bloodshed and conflicts taking place in many countries. There was a need to move towards serious United Nations-led peace processes and transitional justice needed to be achieved. Terrorism was spreading and groups were becoming more active in human smuggling, in some cases supported by authorities. It was important that they were held accountable.
Council members were invited to impose targeted sanctions on officials who had been credibly accused of war crimes and crimes of genocide. Many speakers also expressed concern about attacks on activists and human rights defenders, who were especially vulnerable and faced torture and death in pre-trial detention. The Council was called on to assess the situation of human rights defenders and take necessary steps to improve it.
Some speakers told the Council that over-compliance of businesses and banks with unilateral sanctions led to wide-scoped violations of all economic, social and cultural rights, as well as the right to life in the sanctioned countries. Unilateral sanctions threatened human lives, and the United Nations treaty bodies were called on to document the deadly impacts of sanctions on targeted populations and offer recommendations on how to provide the victims with compensation and redress. Speakers called on the Special Procedures to report and discuss the harmful effects of unilateral sanctions in their annual reports and condemn these effects in joint statements.
Interactive Dialogue with the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar
Report
The Council has before it the report by the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights inMyanmar, Thomas H. Andrews (A/HRC/52/66).
Presentation of Report
THOMAS H. ANDREWS, Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, said two years after the military staged an illegal coup in Myanmar, it continued to wage a campaign of violence and oppression to crush widespread public opposition. But while it had utterly failed to stop this opposition, it was succeeding in destroying the nation and assaulting the fundamental human rights of its people. Even as they pursued a heroic campaign to save their country, many people from Myanmar had come to believe that a distracted world had forgotten them. The defence of human rights and citizen opposition to the junta of Myanmar had never been stronger. Protests and civil disobedience continued. The junta’s control over territory and the people of Myanmar was eroding. Opposition groups were forging alliances and gaining strength.
The people of Myanmar were exposing the junta’s lie that a military dominated future for Myanmar was inevitable. The junta did not offer any viable path to stability or an end to the human rights crisis in Myanmar because it was the very cause of this crisis. Most Member States recognised this and had acknowledged that the junta lacked even a shred of constitutional or democratic legitimacy. The junta now seemed to be gambling that it could capture a degree of international recognition and a veneer of legitimacy by going through the motions of what they would try to describe as an “election”, and the Special Rapporteur urged the members of this Council to reject this outrageous claim.
While opposition remained strong, the junta’s escalating assaults on the people of Myanmar were having a devastating impact. Since the coup was launched, more than 3,000 civilians had been killed; more than 1.3 million civilians had been displaced; more than 16,000 political prisoners were behind bars; 17.6 million people were in dire need of humanitarian assistance; 58,000 civilian homes and structures had been burned to the ground or otherwise destroyed; and State institutions had been hollowed out and the rule of law had collapsed. The Special Rapporteur said he regularly received reports of massacres of civilians, including beheadings and dismemberment. Torture and sexual violence remained a constant threat. Unfortunately, Mr. Andrews had also received reports that opposition groups had committed human rights violations, which also must end.
The hopeful news was that many world leaders had raised their voice in support of the people of Myanmar. Several nations had backed up their words with action, including targeted economic sanctions and weapons bans. The discouraging news was that the international community was not doing nearly enough. A minority of Member States and non-State entities continued to provide the junta with weapons, materials to manufacture weapons, or revenue that was being used to commit war crimes and crimes against humanity. This must stop. Those Member States that had taken actions, such as targeted sanctions or weapons bans, had failed to do so in a strategic and coordinated fashion. A working coalition of Member States should be formed to identify actions that would have the greatest impact and then coordinate their implementation. The international community could also do better in supporting the hundreds of thousands who had been forced to flee Myanmar. The people of Myanmar continued to demonstrate remarkable courage and tenacity in the defence of their country and the human rights of its people. They deserved solidarity and support.
Discussion
Some speakers said the Special Rapporteur’s report left no doubt about the situation in Myanmar, which was in freefall. The responsibility lay squarely on the Myanmar military, which, more than two years after its coup, inflicted continuous and increasing grave and systematic human rights violations on people across the country. Persons in vulnerable situations, and in particular persons belonging to ethnic and religious minorities such as the Rohingya, continued to bear the brunt. Despite all this, the people in Myanmar continued their heroic resistance.
Speakers, among other things, called upon the military to immediately end all forms of violence and abuses, including sexual and gender-based violence, against the people of Myanmar, including children. The military junta was urged to end the systematic intimidation and reprisals against the people of Myanmar for exercising their human rights and fundamental freedoms. The speakers called on the junta to ensure the immediate and unconditional release of all those arbitrarily detained – including children, political leaders, journalists, human rights defenders, and others. All parties to the conflict were urged to ensure humanitarian access for all persons affected by the situation. The military junta was urged to immediately stop all human rights violations, to lift all martial law orders at once, and to cooperate with the Special Rapporteur as well as the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar. Speakers also called for the effective implementation of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ Five-point Consensus, urging Myanmar to engage constructively with the international community.
Speakers expressed deep concern over the deteriorating humanitarian crisis in Myanmar, and called for unimpeded access of humanitarian assistance to all parts of the country without discrimination. Concern was expressed about reports that the military was increasing its use of airstrikes, thereby indiscriminately bombing villages and camps for internally displaced persons. Speakers condemned all attacks on civilians, including extrajudicial killings, torture, sexual violence, and other human rights violations, many of which could amount to crimes against humanity and war crimes. Human rights abuses committed by Myanmar’s security forces were appalling and showed the depths to which the military would go to consolidate their control without regard for the welfare of the country. It was imperative that the international community take strong action to support the people of Myanmar, prevent further atrocities by the military, and advance a democratic Myanmar.
The deteriorating humanitarian situation within Myanmar and also for refugees that had fled Myanmar, particularly the Rohingya community, was also a matter of concern for many speakers, who urged continuing support for these parties, as well as for the countries hosting and organizations supporting them. There was deep concern for the staggering numbers of displaced populations, which could have a destabilising effect on the region as a whole, and the international community was called upon to continue supporting the people of Myanmar in meeting their urgent humanitarian needs, both inside and outside national borders.
A speaker pointed out that this was an internal affair of Myanmar, and that external pressure would only be counter-productive: the Human Rights Council and multilateral bodies should work to bridge differences between parties to the conflict to avoid creating further conflict. The Special Rapporteur misused his expert status, went beyond his mandate, and vilified legitimate trade between countries, going against the Code of Conduct of the Special Procedures, and should stop smearing and double standards, whilst working to stabilise the situation in Myanmar. Another speaker said the Special Rapporteur’s calls for the imposition of more unilateral coercive measures on Myanmar were rejected: the extreme politicisation of his mandate was reflected in the recommendations in his report, which were selective and based on uncorroborated information. They should be rejected, replaced with dialogue and understanding to encourage the political stability of the country. The Council should cease to use Special Procedure mandates against the countries of the Global South.
Among the questions raised by speakers were: what other ways out did the Special Rapporteur see for a human rights crisis of this scale besides the Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ Five-point Consensus; how could the international community at this time best support the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all persons; how could the international community support the Special Rapporteur’s call to impose a comprehensive arms embargo and refer the situation in Myanmar to the International Criminal Court; what actions could the international community take to help prevent further atrocities by the military and promote accountability for human rights abuses; and how did the Special Rapporteur intend to implement the recommendations in his report, considering that sanctions could further exacerbate the already underfunded humanitarian response in Myanmar?
Concluding Remarks
THOMAS H. ANDREWS, Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, in concluding remarks, said he did not have the time to answer each and every question, but he wished to say to all that his door was open, he welcomed input and questions, even criticism. He had been asked by many what the United Nations could do to address the crisis most effectively: the Security Council passed a strong resolution in December, but more should be done, and it should take action, including an arms embargo, targeted economic sanctions, and that included reference to the International Criminal Court. It was for this reason that he recommended that States that were prepared to take such steps did so in coordination, strategically.
Mr. Andrews said he had been criticised and questioned regarding some points, including the vilification of “normal weapons trade”. What he was vilifying was the murder of thousands of normal people, gross human rights violations, crimes against humanity and war crimes. The reasons these crimes were occurring was because the junta had the means to do so, the weapons and technology: the countries of the world should end that trade that was contributing and enabling these gross human rights violations.
In his report, concerning those who had been forced to leave their homes and their country, he commended all nations who were hosting and caring for them, sheltering them, extending visas, facilitating resettlement, all of which were saving lives. However, more could be done and must be done. There was a grave humanitarian crisis inside and outside Myanmar, and the consequences of not funding these humanitarian response programmes were dire, which was unconscionable, a stain on the conscience of the international community: children and families must be saved. The millions inside Myanmar could not access humanitarian aid, but there were civil society organizations that could help them, although they lacked funding. He appealed to all to fund these critical, critical programmes that could save lives.
He appreciated concerns and questions on whether he was within his mandate: this ongoing crisis included extreme human rights violations that were forcing hundreds of thousands of people across the border, and he believed that their plight should not just be the focus of his attention, but the duty of the Human Rights Council. It was his duty to shine a light on their situation, and his goal was to provide the Council with the information to address the grave human rights violations that were being perpetrated by the junta, which was not only within his mandate, but must be brought to the attention of the international community. Finally, he urged the international community to not recognise any so-called “elections” that the junta would hold.
Interactive Dialogue with the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Iran
Report
Also before the Council is the report by the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Javaid Rehman (A/HRC/52/67).
Presentation of the Report
JAVAID REHMAN, Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Iran, said the report was being presented today amidst the most serious human rights violations in Iran over the past four decades. Mr. Rehman expressed admiration for millions of peace-loving Iranian women, men, girls and boys, who since September had challenged State authorities and joined peaceful protests in all the country’s provinces at the risk of their lives. The report thoroughly examined the circumstances of the death of Ms. Amini in the custody of Iranian morality police three days after her arrest for allegedly not complying with the country’s discriminatory dress code. Available evidence, including eyewitness testimonies and comments from reliable medical sources, established that Ms. Amini died on 16 September as a result of beatings by the State morality police. As per usual practice, State authorities denied any wrongdoing or misconduct on their part. None of the members of the morality police involved in the death of Ms. Amini had been held accountable. Mr. Rehman stressed that her death was not an isolated event but the latest in a long series of extreme violence against women and girls committed by the Iranian authorities.
A month before the death of Ms. Amini, President Raisi signed a decree ordering further repressive measures for “improper hijab”. The responsibility of top senior officials in instigating this violence could not be ignored. Protesters, including children, were beaten to death. At least 527 people, including 71 children, were killed, and hundreds of protesters severely injured. From the very first days of protests, State authorities had tried to shut down all avenues of freedom of expression, with mass arbitrary arrests and detentions. Recently authorities recognised that over 22,000 people had been arrested. Dozens of human rights defenders, at least 600 students, 45 lawyers, 576 civil society activists, 170 women human rights defenders, at least 62 journalists, artists, academics were arbitrarily arrested and detained. Mr. Rehman was outraged that despite appeals by his mandate and by the international community, Iranian authorities had thus far executed at least four persons associated with protests after arbitrary, summary, and sham trials marred by torture allegations. At least 17 protestors had already been sentenced to death and more than 100 currently faced charges that carried the death penalty.
Mr. Rehman remained deeply concerned at the continuing and exponentially increasing violations of human rights in the country. At least 500 persons, including two persons sentenced as children and 13 women, were executed in 2022, the highest number of executions in the past five years. Since January 2023, 143 persons had already been executed following grossly unfair trials. Mr. Rehman was equally alarmed at the continuing violence against women and girls, including coordinated chemical attacks throughout the country against schoolgirls which were repeatedly denied by the Government. The report to the Council in March 2022 and the current report firmly established the conclusion that there was an absence of accountability for serious human rights violations and for crimes under international law within the political, constitutional, and legal system of Iran.
The scale and gravity of the violations committed by Iranian authorities pointed to the possible commission of international crimes, notably the crimes against humanity of murder, imprisonment, enforced disappearances, torture, rape and sexual violence, and persecution. In the absence of accountability at the domestic level, Mr. Rehman strongly advocated for the establishment of an independent international fact-finding mission and looked towards fully cooperating with it to ensure justice and accountability for victims of human rights violations.
Statement by Country Concerned
Iran, speaking as a country concerned, said advocacy for human rights was increasingly mistaken by some States and mandate-holders for unwarranted and egotistic purposes, abusing the human rights mechanisms to target certain States; they were void of any value for the protection of human rights. The Council’s mandate was best fulfilled by dialogue and cooperation, in line with non-selectivity and impartiality. The Council should stand away from stereotyping, and transform so that human rights were no longer used as a tool by some countries. The Special Rapporteur’s report, which read like a tragic novel, had been used by some Western media as an attempt to portray the situation of human rights in Iran. The Special Rapporteur was totally in disregard of his mandate, in his lack of impartiality, using biased language, and violating the Code of Conduct.
The Iranian people had witnessed nearly three months of terrorist attacks and armed riots, but the Special Rapporteur did not even mention certain terrorist attacks, which left innocent people murdered, and did not mention armed attacks on people in certain provinces. He had ignored the release of prisoners, and was still asking for their release. Last year the Special Rapporteur on unilateral coercive measures had visited Iran, and had met with all governmental and non-governmental sectors, and her report explicitly touched upon the human rights violations of the Iranian people by these unilateral coercive measures - there was no mention of this in Mr. Rehman’s report.
Discussion
In the discussion, speakers among other things, commended the Special Rapporteur for his report. Since the death of Mahsa Amini in the custody of Iran’s so-called “Morality Police” six months ago, the world had witnessed a mass movement while Iran’s leadership had conducted a relentless and violent crackdown on the people of Iran. Many were profoundly worried by the violent response by the Iranian security forces to the peaceful protests that followed the killing of Mahsa Amini in police custody. Some speakers said it was important to renew the mandate while also supporting the work of the newly created Fact-Finding Mission, in the name of women, life, and freedom.
For months, the brave people of Iran, especially women and girls, had been facing extreme and unjustified violence and crackdown by the Iranian authorities for exercising their right to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly. Speakers strongly condemned the use of violence, harassment and detentions against peaceful protesters. Perpetrators of torture, killings and violence, including sexual and gender-based violence, needed to be held accountable. Iran was urged to release all persons who were imprisoned or detained for exercising their right to peacefully protest. Speakers also raised concern at the reports of poisoning of thousands of children with gas in study centres.
Some speakers said they strongly opposed the death penalty at all times and in all circumstances, calling upon Iranian authorities to impose an immediate moratorium on executions. The use of the death penalty against peaceful protesters who had been exercising their rights and fundamental freedoms was particularly deplorable. Speakers were appalled at the executions of four protestors by authorities with many more facing charges that may carry the death penalty.
Concern was also expressed about the press freedom and safety of journalists in Iran. Journalists and media workers were being threatened, harassed and detained. Families of Iranians working for foreign media outlets were being intimidated and persecuted. Iran was called upon to release all arbitrarily detained persons, including journalists, media workers and their family members, and to ensure freedom of opinion and expression and access to information, both online and offline.
Many speakers noted that it was regretful that the Special Rapporteur had been unable to visit the country. Iran was urged to fully cooperate with the Special Rapporteur, including by granting full and unhindered access to the country. Now, more than ever, the international community needed to strongly support the Special Rapporteur’s work documenting the Iranian Government’s human rights abuses. His support for the Fact-Finding Mission’s separate, vital work of uncovering the violence perpetrated against protestors was also appreciated.
Some speakers expressed concern over the politically motivated and biased approach against Iran. Abusing the United Nations human rights mechanisms to single out and harass some nations that did not align with the hegemonic and geopolitical interests of the West had nothing to do with the genuine promotion and protection of human rights. This was a violation of the United Nations Charter and of international law. Speakers maintained that Iran was a strong supporter of multilateralism and had demonstrated commitment to human rights. Iran could handle its own domestic issues properly. It was hoped that the international community could respect the human rights development path independently chosen by the people of Iran. Of grave concern were the unilateral coercive measures imposed on Iran by other countries which had undermined the human rights of the Iranian people and gravely affected their rights.
Speakers asked how the Special Rapporteur had engaged with the newly formed Fact-Finding Mission? How could accountability be ensured when the authorities were not willing to cooperate? What cooperation could there be between the Special Rapporteur’s mandate and the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on freedom and expression?..."
Source/publisher:
United Nations Human Rights Council (Geneva)
Date of publication:
2023-03-20
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-20
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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Description:
"The National Unity Government today announces that it is sending a formal demand letter to the PTT Exploration and Production Public Company with respect to flows of funds from the Yadana Project. These funds are enabling the military junta to prosecute its violence against Myanmar people.
This action is necessitated by the ongoing human rights abuses and increased violence that the junta is inflicting on innocent civilians across our country.
The recent dreadful violence in Shan State is the latest in a long series of barbaric acts that have been condemned by the United Nations Security Council, by the United Nations Special Rapporteur and by governments across the world.
The United Nations, in Security Council Resolution 2669, expressed its deep concern at all
forms of violence across the country, and attacks against civilians and civilian
infrastructure, and has demanded an immediate end to all forms of violence throughout the
country.
To this end, it is imperative to stop the flow of foreign currency to the junta. It is this income that enables the junta to purchase the weapons that are being used to kill civilians indiscriminately, to attack hospitals and schools, and to inflict such huge suffering that, according to the United Nations, some 1,704,000 internally displaced persons have had to flee their homes since the coup. A further million people are seeking refuge in our neighbouring countries.
This is an immense human tragedy. All companies and governments should see it as their duty to assist the National Unity Government in stopping the funds to the junta that enable this violence, for the sake of our common humanity.
Impelled by these concerns, the National Unity Government is therefore delivering to PTT a formal demand letter with respect to the Yadana Project.
This letter seeks information on the revenues that have been delivered to the junta under the relevant contracts, as well as monthly reports and other details of work done since the coup.
You sent
The letter lays out that all future payments from the operation of the Yadana Project be delivered to an account that the National Unity Government shall designate, these funds to be retained there for the good of the people of Myanmar.
The National Unity Government seeks in no way to harm PTT, nor to interrupt supply. Our action is designed to enable PTT to ensure that its activities are aligned with fundamental human rights.
We will support PTT in the company's public commitment to follow the advice of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. Our action follows PTT's decision to suspend some of its operations in Myanmar due to what PTT itself has called the "violence and unrest" in the country.
PTT did the right thing in suspending some activities. This letter provides PTT with a further
opportunity to stand up for human rights, and against violence.
We hope that PTT will comply with the terms of our letter, and work with then National Unity Government.
If PTT do not engage with us in this process, we will have no choice but to commence an arbitration under the terms of the appropriate agreement, and to use international law to
stop the use of these funds to pay for the junta's war against the fundamental human rights
and dignity of the people of Myanmar..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2023-03-20
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-20
Grouping:
Individual Documents
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38.64 KB 139.93 KB
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"The Shan Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD) is one of the most powerful political parties in Myanmar. Founded in 1988, the SNLD has strongly rejected the poll proposed by Myanmar’s military regime. The party has decided not to register with the junta-appointed Union Election Commission (UEC), even though the new Political Parties Registration Law enacted by the regime in February requires political parties to re-register with the UEC within two months or face dissolution.
The SNLD won 42 seats in the 2020 general election, the third-highest number of seats at the national level. It also won the second-highest number of seats in the 1990 general election.
One previous SNLD party chair, Khun Tun Oo, resigned from the National Convention staged by the previous military regime to draft the 2008 Constitution. Khun Tun Oo and SNLD party secretary Sai Nyunt Lwin were also prosecuted and jailed on an array of charges including high treason for founding the Shan State Consultative Council in February 2005. The men were released in 2012.
SNLD general secretary Sai Leik talked to The Irrawaddy recently about the party’s decision not to re-register with the junta-controlled UEC, and how the party will continue to play a role in Myanmar’s politics regardless.
We heard that the SNLD will not re-register with the UEC. Why?
Firstly, it is difficult to travel because of security concerns. We don’t have enough time to meet party members and seek their opinions. It is especially difficult to meet our party members in Kayah and Kachin states.
Secondly, we don’t think it is fair to order political parties to re-register when the regime hasn’t announced the day the election will be held. So we have decided not to register.
If you don’t re-register the SNLD faces being dissolved, its members possibly arrested and its assets potentially seized. How will the SNLD survive?
They [the junta] haven’t enacted an election law. And they haven’t announced the day of the election. The military has extended its rule, using what it calls an extraordinary situation as an excuse. So can the election law be enacted in an extraordinary situation?
If we don’t re-register, our registered status will be annulled. But we don’t think the regime will take punitive action for failing to register. There are previous cases. Formerly, they asked political parties to get their financial records audited. But some parties refused and [the military] didn’t do anything to them.
Anyway, as they call it an extraordinary situation, we should expect unusual circumstances and we have braced ourselves for that.
Some ethnic parties have re-registered, saying that elections are the foundation of democracy and that an election will help solve the current political crisis. What is your view on that?
It is just an assumption that an election is the way out of the current political crisis. But the question is when and how that election will be held and what the election law says. Nothing is ready yet. And the most important thing is that we need to make sure that the election can bring about change.
If the election can’t trigger positive change for the country, it can’t be the answer. Rather than one party hastily holding the election, it would be more meaningful if we all work together for a poll that is acceptable and beneficial to the Myanmar people and that the international community would recognize, and that meets the democratic norms and would definitely bring democratization to the country.
How will the SNLD engage in politics if it is dissolved?
We are a member of the Committee for Shan State Unity. We once issued a statement as a member. We have a policy for the peaceful co-existence of all people living in the Union. There are many things that we can do for the betterment for the country, either in the peace process or social welfare work or research work.
We in the SNLD will always do our part for the interests of the country by representing and helping the people. We will continue to help the people..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2023-03-20
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-20
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Political History
Language:
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Sub-title:
52nd session of the UN Human Rights Council
Description:
"More than two years since the military coup in Myanmar, the junta’s atrocities continue to escalate, driving the country ever deeper into a humanitarian and human rights catastrophe.
Meanwhile, the international response to the situation has had no noticeable impact on the military’s crimes against humanity and war crimes.
The junta is unbowed by “statements of condemnation.” Targeted sanctions are critical but they have not been coordinated closely or enforced rigorously enough.
The UN Security Council’s resolution in December was regrettably watered down to contain almost no actionable language. In the three months since it was adopted, the junta’s security forces have arrested over 530 people, sentenced over 420, and killed more than 275 in airstrikes, arson attacks, and summary executions. Just last week about 20 civilians who had taken shelter in a monastery were massacred.
The junta likewise continues to flagrantly disregard ASEAN’s five-point consensus adopted in 2021, which the regional bloc lacks effective tools to enforce.
A new, bolder approach is needed. Myanmar’s generals are not going to change their conduct until the cumulative cost of their atrocities grows too great to bear.
States need to harmonize their efforts to impose real consequences: coordinating and enforcing tougher targeted sanctions to cut off the junta’s access to the extractive revenue, weapons, and aviation fuel enabling its abuses. As ASEAN chair, Indonesia should lead the bloc in supporting these measures as well as accountability efforts to bring justice to the junta’s victims.
The facts on the ground are clear. What are governments waiting for?..."
Source/publisher:
Human Rights Watch (USA)
Date of publication:
2023-03-20
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-20
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Crimes Against Humanity, Ethnic Cleansing, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
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Description:
"Myanmar regime troops on Friday raided Tham Mar Yoe Village, Wetlet Township in the anti-regime stronghold of Sagaing Region, torching 269 houses and killing an elderly resident, according to residents.
Around 110 junta troops raided the village in western Wetlet on Friday afternoon and torched the village for three hours despite not engaging with any resistance forces.
“A 78-year-old woman who had earlier suffered a stroke took refuge in a building in the monastic compound and was killed by the fire,” said Bo Young Ni, the leader of G-Z Brothers Young Ni Force.
Situated on the Shwebo-Monywa road, Tham Mar Yoe has more than 700 households. Currently, residents are returning to the village and clearing up the debris, according to a resident.
“They torched the village while passing on the road. Not even the monastery was spared,” a resident said.
Currently, shelter, palm leaves, rice, oil and other foodstuffs are urgently needed for the fire victims, according to the Wetlet Township People’s Strike Committee.
The troops involved in the raid departed the village for the Ayadaw Township military base’s Training Unit Battalion 10 on six vehicles that evening. Later that evening, G-Z Brothers Young Ni Force used eight land mines to mount two attacks on troops in Ayadaw Township, killing four soldiers.
“We attacked a military vehicle first. Then we attacked again when four soldiers got out of the car to clear the mine. It is certain that four were killed,” Bo Young Ni told The Irrawaddy.
His claim couldn’t be independently verified.
Wetlet Township is a resistance stronghold bordering Shwebo and Ayadaw townships, where armed attacks against the military council are frequent. Villages in those townships are frequently raided by regime troops, who routinely torch homes in the villages..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2023-03-20
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-20
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Armed conflict in Burma - attacks on civilians, Military History
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"ပြည်ထောင်စုသမ္မတမြန်မာနိုင်ငံတော် အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေး အစိုးရအနေဖြင့် ရတနာစီမံကိန်း ၏ ရန်ပုံငွေ ခွဲဝေမှုနှင့် စပ်လျဉ်းသည့် တရားဝင် တောင်းဆိုချက်စာ (demand letter) တရပ်ကို PTT Exploration and Production Public Company ထံ ယနေ့ ပေးပို့အပ်ပါသည်။ အဆိုပါရန်ပုံငွေများသည် ကျွန်ုပ်တို့ မြန်မာ ပြည်သူများအား အကြမ်းဖက်တိုက်ခိုက် နှိပ်စက်သတ်ဖြတ်နိုင်ရန် အာဏာသိမ်းစစ်အုပ်စုအား အထောက်အပံ့ ဖြစ်ထွန်းလျက်ရှိပါသည်။
အဆိုပါ ရန်ပုံငွေများသည် လက်ရှိဖြစ်ပွားလျက်ရှိသော လူ့အခွင့်အရေး ချိုးဖောက်မှုများကို အားဖြည့်ကူညီ လျက်ရှိကာ အပြစ်ကင်းစင်သော နိုင်ငံသူ နိုင်ငံသားများအား အကြမ်းဖက်နိုင်ရန် အထောက်အပံ့ ဖြစ်လျက် ရှိကြောင်း တွေ့ရနိုင်ပါသည်။
မကြာသေးမီက ရှမ်းပြည်နယ်တွင် ဖြစ်ပွားခဲ့သော အကြမ်းဖက်မှုကြီးအပေါ် ကုလသမဂ္ဂလုံခြုံရေးကောင်စီ၊ ကုလသမဂ္ဂမြန်မာနိုင်ငံဆိုင်ရာ အထူးကိုယ်စားလှယ် နှင့် တကမ္ဘာလုံးမှ အစိုးရများစွာက ပြစ်တင်ရှုံ့ချခဲ့ပြီး ဖြစ်ပါသည်။
ကုလသမဂ္ဂလုံခြုံရေးကောင်စီ ဆုံးဖြတ်ချက်အမှတ် ၂၆၆၉ တွင် "နိုင်ငံတဝှမ်းလုံး၌ ဖြစ်ပွားလျက်ရှိသော အကြမ်းဖက်မှု ပုံသဏ္ဍာန် အမျိုးမျိုး နှင့် အရပ်သားများ နှင့် အရပ်သား အခြေခံအဆောက်အဦများအား တိုက်ခိုက် ဖျက်ဆီးမှုများအား ပြင်းထန်စွာစိုးရိမ်ပူပန်ခြင်း" ကိုဖော်ပြခဲ့ပြီး “အဆိုပါ ပုံသဏ္ဍာန်အမျိုးမျိုးသော အကြမ်းဖက်မှုများအား ချက်ခြင်းရပ်ဆိုင်းရန်” ဟု တောင်းဆိုထားခဲ့ပါသည်။
သို့ဖြစ်ပါ၍ စစ်အုပ်စုအား နိုင်ငံခြားငွေစီးဆင်းနေခြင်းအား ရပ်တန့်ရန် အရေးတကြီး လိုအပ်ပါသည်။ အဆိုပါ ဝင်ငွေများဖြင့် စစ်အုပ်စုသည် လက်နက်များဝယ်ယူကာ အရပ်သားပြည်သူများအား သတ်ဖြတ်ခြင်း၊ ဆေးရုံ နှင့် စာသင်ကျောင်းများကို တိုက်ခိုက်ဖျက်ဆီးခြင်းများ လုပ်ဆောင်လျက်ရှိရာ၂၀၂၁ ခု ဖေဖော်ဝါရီ ၁ ရက်နေ့ မှ ယနေ့ထိဆိုလျှင် ကုလသမဂ္ဂမှ ထုတ်ပြန်သောကိန်းဂဏန်းအရ ၁,၇၀၄,၀၀၀ (၁.၇ သန်းကျော်) သော ပြည်သူများသည် မိမိနေအိမ်ကို စွန့်ခွာ၍ ထွက်ပြေးတိမ်းရှောင်ခဲ့ကြရပြီ ဖြစ်ပါသည်။ နောက်ထပ် ပြည်သူ တသန်းကျော်သည်လည်း အိမ်နီးချင်းနိုင်ငံများတွင် ခိုလှုံနေနိုင်ရန် ကြိုးစားလျက်ရှိကြပါသည်။
အဆိုပါ အဖြစ်အပျက်သည် ကြီးမားသော ဝမ်းနည်းဖွယ် ဖြစ်ရပ်ကြီး ဖြစ်ပါသည်။ ကုမ္ပဏီများ နှင့် နိုင်ငံတကာ အစိုးရများအနေဖြင့် စစ်အုပ်စု၏ အကြမ်းဖက်တိုက်ခိုက်မှုများကို လူသားချင်းစာနာသော တာဝန်တရပ်အဖြစ် ဝိုင်းဝန်းကူညီသည့်အနေဖြင့် အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၏ ယခု ရန်ပုံငွေ ဖြတ်တောက်ရေး လုပ်ဆောင် ချက်အပေါ် ဝိုင်းဝန်းကူညီကြရန် တာဝန်ရှိကြပါသည်။
ထို့ကြောင့် အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရသည် ရတနာစီမံကိန်းနှင့် စပ်လျဉ်းသော တရားဝင် တောင်းဆိုချက် စာကို PTT သို့ ပေးပို့လိုက်ပါသည်။
ယခု ပေးပို့သောစာသည် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စုထံ စာချုပ်ပါ အချက်အလက်များကို မမှန်မကန် လိုက်နာ၍ ပေးပို့ခဲ့သော အခွန်အကောက်များ၊ လစဉ် အစီရင်ခံစာများ၊ စစ်အာဏာလုယူပြီးနောက် ဆက်လက်လုပ် ဆောင်ခဲ့သော လုပ်ငန်းများအပေါ် ဖြေရှင်းချက်တောင်းခံခြင်း ဖြစ်ပါသည်။
ထို့အပြင် ရတနာစီမံကိန်း၏ အနာဂတ်ပေးဆောင်မှုအားလုံးသည် မြန်မာပြည်သူများ၏ အကျိုးစီးပွားအတွက် အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရက သဘောတူ လက်ခံသော.. အခြားငွေစာရင်းတခုသို့သာ ဆောင်ရွက်ရန် ညွှန်ကြားခြင်းဖြစ်ပါသည်။
အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရအနေဖြင့် ယခင် အစိုးရအဆက်အဆက်နှင့် ပေါင်းသင်း ဆက်ဆံခဲ့သော PTT အပေါ် ထိခိုက်စေလိုခြင်း အလျဉ်းမရှိပါ။ အလားတူပင် လက်ရှိဆောင်ရွက်နေသာ လုပ်ငန်းများအားလည်း ရပ်တန့်စေလိုခြင်း မရှိပါ။ ကျွန်ုပ်တို့သည် PTT ၏ ဆောင်ရွက်ချက်များအား လူ့အခွင့်အရေးများနှင့် ကိုက်ညီ လျက်ရှိကြောင်း အတည်ပြုနိုင်ရန် အားပေးဆောင်ရွက်ခြင်းဖြစ်ပါသည်။
ကျွန်ုပ်တို့အနေဖြင့် PTT က ပြည်သူလူထုအပေါ် ပေးထားပြီး ကတိကဝတ်ဖြစ်သည့် ကုလသမဂ္ဂလူ့အခွင့် အရေးဆိုင်ရာ မဟာမင်းကြီး၏ အကြံပြုချက်များအပေါ် လိုက်နာလိုခြင်းအား ထောက်ခံပါသည်။ PTT ကပင် လျှင် “အကြမ်းဖက်မှုများနှင့် မငြိမ်မသက်မှုများ" ဟု ဖော်ထုတ်ခဲ့သော မြန်မာနယ်မြေအတွင်း စစ်အုပ်စု လုပ်ဆောင်နေသော လုပ်ရပ်များကြောင့် အချို့လုပ်ငန်းများကို ရပ်တန့်ထားရန် ဆုံးဖြတ်ခဲ့ပြီး ဖြစ်သည်ကို လည်း ဂရုထား၍ ဤတရားဝင် တောင်းဆိုစာကို ထုတ်ပြန်လိုက်ခြင်း ဖြစ်ပါသည်။
ယခုစာသည် PTT အား လူ့အခွင့်အရေးကို လေးစားလိုက်နာ ရပ်တည်ခြင်း နှင့် အကြမ်းဖက်မှုအား ရှောင်ဖယ် ဆန့်ကျင်ခြင်းအတွက် မှတ်ကျောက် တခု ဖြစ်လာစေပါမည်။
ကျွန်ုပ်တို့အနေဖြင့် PTT သည် ယခုစာပါ မူဝါဒများအတိုင်း လိုက်နာလျက် အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရနှင့် ပူးပေါင်းလုပ်ဆောင်သွားလိမ့်မည်ဟု မျှော်လင့်ယုံကြည်ပါသည်။
PTT အနေဖြင့် ယခုစာပါ တောင်းဆိုချက်များအပေါ် ပူးပေါင်းဆောင်ရွက်ခြင်း မပြုပါက ကျွန်ုပ်တို့ အနေဖြင့် စီးပွားရေးဆိုင်ရာ အငြင်းပွားမှုအဖြစ် တရားဝင်အစိုးရတရပ်၏ လုပ်ထုံးလုပ်နည်းများ၊ နိုင်ငံတကာ စည်းမျဉ်း ဥပဒေများနှင့်အညီ လူထု၏ အခြေခံ လူ့အခွင့်အရေးများ နှင့် ဂုဏ်သိက္ခာများ ကျဆုံးခဲ့ရမှုအပေါ် မူတည်၍ စာချုပ်ပါ အတိုင်း စင်္ကာပူနိုင်ငံ အနုညာတ တရားရုံးတွင် တရားစွဲဆိုသွားမည်ဖြစ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2023-03-20
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-20
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Individual Documents
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"၁။ ၂၀၂၃ ခုနှစ်၊ မတ်လ ၂၀ ရက်တွင် ကျရောက်သည့် (၃၅)နှစ်မြောက်၊ ချင်းတော်လှန်ရေးနေ့တွင် ခေတ်အဆက်ဆက် တော်လှန်ရေးအတွင်း အသက်ပေးလှူသွားကြသော ရဲမေရဲဘော်များနှင့် ချင်းလူ မျိုးအားလုံးကို လေးစားစွာ ဦးညွတ်ဂါရဝပြုပါသည်။
၂။ ယနေ့အချိန်အခါသည် စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ်နှင့် အာဏာရှင်မှန်သမျှ အမြစ်ပြတ်ချေမှုန်းရေး၊ ချင်းအမျိုးသားများ၏ ကိုယ်ပိုင်ပြဌာန်းခွင့် ပြန်လည်ရရှိရေးနှင့် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီပြည်ထောင်စု တည်ဆောက်ရေးအတွက် ချင်းအမျိုးသားလက်နက်ကိုင်တော်လှန်ရေး စတင်ခဲ့သည့် (၃၅) နှစ်ပြည့် ချင်းတော်လှန်ရေးနေ့အချိန်အခါဖြစ်ပါသည်။
၃။ … ယခုအခါ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံနေရာအနှံ့အပြားတွင် ဆင်နွှဲနေကြသော နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေးတွင်လည်း အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီအား တော်လှန်တိုက်ပွဲဝင်ရာ၌ CNF/CNA ရဲမေရဲဘော်များ၊ ချင်းဒေသကာ ကွယ်ရေးတပ်ဖွဲ့ဝင်များနှင့် ချင်းလူမျိုးများ၏ စွန့်လွှတ်အနစ်နာခံမှုနှင့် ပေးဆပ်မှုတို့ကို အထူးလေး စားဂုဏ်ယူပါကြောင်း ဖော်ပြလိုပါသည်။ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီ၏ သာလွန်အင်အား အသုံးပြု၍ လူမဆန်သည့် အကြမ်းဖက်တိုက်ခိုက်မှုအပေါင်းကို ရွပ်ရွပ်ချွံချွံပြန်လည် ခုခံတိုက်ခိုက်သည့် ချင်း တော်လှန်ရေးအင်အားစုများ၏ ခိုင်မာသော စိတ်ဓာတ်နှင့် ဇွဲ၊လုံ့လ၊ဝီရီယတို့သည် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံအနှံ့ အပြားမှ တော်လှန်ရေးအင်အားစုများ အားလုံးအတွက် အတုယူလေးစားဖွယ်ဖြစ်ပါသည်။ တစ်ဖက် မှာလည်း အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီ၏ အကြမ်းဖက်မှုများကြောင့် နေရပ်စွန့်ခွာကြရသူများနှင့် အသက်အိုးအိမ်စည်းစိမ် ဆုံးရှုံးကြရသည့် ချင်းလူမျိုးများအားလုံးနှင့် ထပ်တူ ဝမ်းနည်းခံစားရပါ ကြောင်း အလေးအနက်ဖော်ပြလိုပါသည်။
၄။ စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ်အပါအဝင် အာဏာရှင်စနစ်မှန်သမျှ အမြစ်ပြတ်ရေး၊ ချင်းအမျိုးသား၏ ကိုယ်ပိုင်ပြဌာန်းခွင့် ရရှိရေးနှင့် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီပြည်ထောင်စု တည်ဆောက်ရေးအတွက် ချင်း တော်လှန်ရေးအင်အားစုများနှင့် ချင်းတစ်မျိုးသားလုံးမှ ဆထက်တိုး ပိုမိုစွမ်းဆောင်နိုင်ပြီး အောင် မြင်မှုများကို မြန်ဆန်စွာ ရရှိနိုင်ပါစေကြောင်း ဆန္ဒပြုရင်း ဤသဝဏ်လွှာအား ပေးပို့အပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2023-03-20
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-20
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"၁။ ယနေ့ကျရောက်သည့် (၃၅)နှစ်မြောက် ချင်းတော်လှန်ရေးနေ့တွင် ချင်းတိုင်းရင်းသား ညီအစ်ကိုမောင်နှမများနှင့်တကွ ပြည်သူများအားလုံး၏ မဆုတ်မနစ် ဇွဲသတ္တိကြီးမားစွာဖြင့် မတူကွဲပြားမှုများအား တူညီခွန်အားအဖြစ် အသုံးချ၍ အနာဂတ်ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီနိုင်ငံတော် သစ်သို့ လျှောက်လှမ်းရာ ခရီးလမ်းတွင် အာဏာရှင်စနစ် ချုပ်ငြိမ်းရေးအတွက် မိမိတို့၏ တည်ကြည် ခိုင်မာသော ယုံကြည်ချက်အား အမြန်ဆုံးအကောင်အထည်ဖော်ဆောင်နိုင်ပါစေကြောင်း ဆုတောင်း စကားပါးအပ်ပါသည်။
၂။ ချင်းတိုင်းရင်းသားများသည် စုံလင်သော လူမျိုးစုများစွာဖြင့် စုစည်းတည်ရှိခဲ့ကြပြီး အမျိုးသားရေးစိတ်ဓာတ်ပြင်းထန်ကာ သမိုင်းတစ်လျှောက်တွင် သူ့ကျွန်မခံလိုစိတ်၊ နယ်ချဲ့ ဆန့်ကျင်ရေးစိတ်ဓာတ်များ ပြည့်ဝသည့် လူမျိုးများအဖြစ် မှတ်တမ်းတင်နိုင်ခဲ့ပါသည်။ အမျိုးသား တန်းတူညီမျှမှု၊ လွတ်လပ်ခွင့်နှင့် ကိုယ်ပိုင်ပြဋ္ဌာန်းခွင့်တို့အတွက် အာဏာရှင်အဆက်ဆက်အား ခုခံတွန်းလှန်ရင်းဖြင့် ၁၉၈၈ ခုနှစ်၊ မတ်လ (၂၀) ရက်နေ့တွင် ချင်းအမျိုးသားတပ်ဦးကို ဖွဲ့စည်း၍ တော်လှန်စစ်ကို ညီညွတ်စွာ စတင်ခဲ့သည်မှာ ယနေ့ (၃၅) နှစ် တိုင်ခဲ့ပြီ ဖြစ်ပါသည်။
၃။ ခေတ်အဆက်ဆက် နှစ်ပေါင်းများစွာကြာ အာဏာရှင်စနစ်ဆိုးအား ဆန့်ကျင်ရန် တော်လှန်ရေးတိုက်ပွဲများတွင်သာမက ယခု နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေးတပ်ဦးတွင် ကဏ္ဍအသီးသီး၌ တက်ကြွစွာ စုစည်းလှုပ်ရှားပါဝင်ခဲ့ကြသည့် သွေးချင်းညီနောင် ချင်းတော်လှန်ရေး ခေါင်းဆောင် ကြီးများ၊ ချင်းမျိုးချစ်ကျောင်းသားလူငယ်များ၊ မတူညီသော နေရာဒေသများတွင် မှီတင်းနေထိုင် နေကြသော ချင်းတိုင်းရင်းသားများအားလုံး၏ ခိုင်မာတည်ကြည်သော တော်လှန်ရေးစိတ်ဓာတ်အား၊ ဒီမိုကရေစီလူထုလှုပ်ရှားမှုအင်အားနှင့် ကိုယ်ကျိုးစွန့် အသက်ပေးတာဝန်ထမ်းဆောင်မှု ခွန်အား တို့သည် လွန်စွာ ဂုဏ်ယူထိုက်သည်ကို ဖော်ပြလိုပါသည်။
၄။ ချင်းတိုင်းရင်းသား ပြည်သူပြည်သားများအပါအဝင် မိမိတို့ဒီမိုကရေစီ တော်လှန်ရေး အင်အားစုအားလုံး၏ ခိုင်မာသောစည်းလုံးညီညွတ်မှုခွန်အားဖြင့် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီနိုင်ငံတော် သစ်ဆီသို့ အတူတကွလျှောက်လှမ်းနိုင်မည့် ဤနွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေးအောင်ပွဲအား အခက်အခဲ အတားအဆီးများကြားမှ ရင်ဆိုင်ကျော်ဖြတ်နိုင်မည်ဟု လေးနက်စွာယုံကြည်လျက် (၃၅) နှစ်မြောက် ချင်းတော်လှန်ရေးနေ့သဝဏ်လွှာ အား ဂုဏ်ယူစွာ ပေးပို့အပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw
Date of publication:
2023-03-20
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-20
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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"YANGON, Myanmar — When the military seized power in a coup on the morning of Feb. 1, 2021, I grabbed some clothes and other essentials and stumbled out onto the streets of Yangon. I haven’t returned home since.
I lead a group of activists opposed to military rule of Myanmar, and I knew then that the soldiers would soon be coming for me. Since the coup, my colleagues and I have played cat and mouse with security forces in Yangon, Myanmar’s largest city. We organize nonviolent protests — small, quick demonstrations to remind the military that it is not in complete control and to give hope to our citizens.
It’s a dangerous, lonely life.
Nearly all of my time is spent hiding in safe houses — six of them so far. I’m 27 years old and have left my current apartment only a few brief times since July. It’s as if an impenetrable wall had been built, separating me from the world. I can’t go out to see the night sky or go to the market or visit friends. I spend much of my time in Zoom meetings planning street protests with colleagues in my organization, the University Students’ Unions Alumni Force, and other activists. To stay sane, I’ve taken up playing the guitar and force myself to walk around my tiny apartment for 20 minutes each day.
Whenever I feel the urge to go outside and enjoy life, I think about how long it would be before I am arrested, how my arrest would affect the men and women fighting alongside me and how I would no longer be of any use to the resistance. The apartment is both sanctuary and prison.
When friends and comrades are arrested, I grieve. But I have to quickly turn my attention to whether their arrest puts me at risk. I change my cellphone’s SIM card and review interactions with those friends for any incriminating information that military interrogators might squeeze out of them. We have protocols in place for this, useless information that can be given up to divert authorities or buy time. But what if they break my comrade?
The eyes of military intelligence are everywhere, sometimes disguised as fruit sellers or trishaw drivers. So only five people know where I am hiding, people who have either hidden with me or who supply me with groceries, cigarettes and books. I view this not as fate but as my own choice — it feels less depressing that way — and I am consoled by my belief in what I’m doing.
Myanmar’s people have been held captive for too long, first by the British and then, after a period of democracy after the country’s independence in 1948, by a succession of military regimes since 1962.
In 2015, a democratic government won power in elections after a military-led reform process. The military, known as the Tatmadaw, retained significant influence, but it seemed a new era had dawned. Until the 2021 coup.
I’m resolved to fight, but I still miss the normal life I once enjoyed in Yangon, my home city. I’m here, and yet I’m not. I yearn for the simple pleasure of a cup of milk tea in a tea shop. Tea shops are part of Myanmar’s DNA, where people catch up with one another, share news or simply contemplate life. My parents, who worked hard to send me to university, used to run a tea shop, and I loved working there. But in 2015, while a college student, I was arrested for protesting the military’s retention of significant powers that stood in the way of democratic development. By the time I was released the next year, my parents had closed the shop. They couldn’t continue without my help.
After the coup, my parents also went into hiding, fearing that the military would arrest them to get at me. It was the right move; some of my friends’ parents have been arrested for their children’s stance against the coup. I know where my parents are, but I can’t visit or tell them where I am. In Myanmar the price for political activism is paid by the entire family.
Resisting the regime gets more difficult every week. Right after the coup, hundreds of thousands of people took to the streets in protest. But the junta waged a brutal crackdown. So far, the military has killed nearly 3,000 people, arrested more than 17,000 and committed appalling human rights abuses. The real numbers are probably much higher. Thousands have taken up arms against the military, which has responded by massacring civilians and conducting airstrikes that have killed children.
Deadly force, including driving vehicles into crowds, has been used against nonviolent protesters. As a result, what started as hundreds of people joining our flash protests in the months after the coup has dwindled to merely dozens.
But we carry on. Our scouts identify good locations — bustling public places with ample escape routes to safe houses. We carry banners and march, chanting against the junta. Many street vendors and other bystanders voice their support, but they must be careful or risk having their market stalls destroyed or looted or being punished in other ways by security forces. It’s all over in minutes, and our activists melt away.
Last year I boarded a bus in Yangon and asked passengers to follow me in reciting a pledge to seek justice for prominent activists whom the military had recently executed and to fight for justice and equality in Myanmar. They did, raising their hands in the three-fingered opposition salute. Video of the scene was posted online. I had to change safe houses twice soon afterward.
The risks are enormous. A colleague was arrested en route to one of our meetings. Soon after, the military forced him to call us, trying to bait me and others into showing up to a phony meeting. Through code words, my colleague made us aware that he was in custody. We went immediately to his safe house and destroyed anything sensitive: his laptop, phone, camera, memory cards and documents. The military raided the apartment shortly after that.
He was soon forced to call us again. This time we put his girlfriend on the phone, thinking it might be her last chance to hear his voice. He pleaded, “Honey, please show up this time,” but we knew he didn’t mean it. He had planned to ask her to marry him a few days later. Instead, he was headed into the hell of military custody and interrogation.
On the day of the coup two years ago, I saw anger, fear, sorrow and uncertainty on people’s faces as they struggled to comprehend what it meant for them and their country. Today, people barely recognize their lives; severe economic hardship, sky-high inflation, increasing crime and other suffering touch countless families. But we have internalized the shock and are determined to write a happy ending to this dark episode.
Now, in our darkest hour, we must be courageous. We cannot lose hope.
We won’t go back to the old Myanmar. We will create a free and equal society for all, including the Rohingya and other ethnic minorities who have suffered for far too long — a Myanmar based on a federal constitution, equality and compassion and whose values inspire the world.
Source/publisher:
"The New York Times" (USA)
Date of publication:
2023-03-19
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-19
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Anti-coup protesters, Human Rights and international relations
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"Warning: Graphic Content
Myanmar’s junta is deploying massive reinforcements as it steps up its atrocities during its scorched earth campaign aimed at retaking control of the resistance strongholds of Sagaing Region and Chin and Kayah states.
The military regime has lost control of most of the rural areas in Sagaing, Chin and Kayah, while its forces and officials in the towns also face frequent attacks from resistance forces.
Special task forces deployed by the junta have committed war crimes and crimes against humanity against both resistance fighters and civilians including massacres, the beheadings of victims and the use of sexual violence, while also employing indiscriminate air and artillery strikes and looting and burning villages.
The regime atrocities are aimed at deterring civilians from becoming involved in or supporting the resistance movement.
The much greater use of atrocities has been reported recently in Sagaing, as well as Kayah and southern Shan states, and comes after the military regime imposed martial law in February in 40 more townships across four regions and four states including Sagaing and Kayah and Chin states.
Since martial law was imposed, an estimated 5,000 junta reinforcements have been sent to Sagaing and Chin and Kayah States, the strongholds of resistance to the military dictatorship, according to local People’s Defense Forces (PDF) and ethnic armed organizations.
Military observers said the regime’s deployment of more troops seemed to be a desperate attempt to regain control of the resistance strongholds.
Thet Htar Maung, a local military analyst, said he expected more intense fighting in Chin and Kayah states, because the resistance fighters in those regions are better-trained.
“The fighting will be bloodier and more frequent,” he said.
Since February 23, intense clashes have been reported in many townships in Kayah State and the neighboring townships of Pinlaung and Pekon in southern Shan State.
PDFs and the Karenni Nationalities Defense Force (KNDF), the Karenni Army and the Pa-O National Defense Force have been fighting up to 12 Myanmar military columns totaling 2,000 soldiers which have been raiding villages and the forest.
Another 1,000 junta reinforcements have been sent from Mandalay to Sagaing Region in recent days, where several military columns are raiding and torching villages daily in a number of townships.
Fierce clashes have also taken place in Chin State in western Myanmar over the last week.
A combined force of fighters from the Chin National Army (CNA) and Chinland Defense Force (CDF) has been battling junta reinforcements sent from Sagaing’s Kale Township and traveling in a convoy of 30 vehicles, including two armored cars, along the Tedim-Falam Road, according to Salai Htet Ni, the spokesperson of the Chin National Front, the CNA’s political wing.
Fighting also broke out on Thursday in Mindat Township, southern Chin State, when CNA and CDF fighters attacked a regime convoy of 80 vehicles sent from Magwe Region and traveling the Mindat-Kyaukhtu Road.
Days before the arrival of the convoy, five junta fighter jets conducted airstrikes between Magwe Region’s Kyaukhtu and Mindat without any provocation, said Salai Htet Ni.
Terrifying escalation of junta atrocities
On March 11, Myanmar junta troops massacred 22 civilians including three Buddhist monks during a raid on Nam Name Village in Pinlaung Township, southern Shan State.
Having occupied a hill near the village on March 9, the junta soldiers raided Nam Name on March 11 while also shelling the village.
The following day, resistance fighters found the bodies of 22 people, including three monks, who had been shot dead at the village monastery. The resistance said that 11 more village residents who had sheltered at the monastery during the raid are also missing.
Pro-regime Telegram channel Ko Thet shared photos of some of the victims, describing them as PDF and KNDF fighters killed by regime soldiers in Nam Name. Blood can be seen dripping from the victims in the photos.
Regime spokesperson Major General Zaw Min Tun said via-military owned media that PDF fighters were captured in the raid along with weapons.
The Ko Thet Telegram channel has since removed the photos of the victims and accused the KNDF and PDFs of massacring them.
In an online press conference held on March 16 by the human rights ministry of Myanmar’s civilian National Unity Government, Dr. Ye Zaw, a doctor in charge of Kayah State’s medics, said that he had seen the bodies of the Nam Name victims and that most of the victims had been shot multiple times.
Some of the victims had broken limbs and head injuries, indicating that they had been tortured before being killed.
Another junta special task force of around 100 soldiers killed and beheaded 20 resistance members and massacred 16 civilian detainees, including three woman who were raped before being killed, during a series of raids from February 23 to March 15 in Ayadaw, Myinmu and Sagaing townships in Sagaing Region.
On Monday, a Myanmar military detachment shot dead a resistance detainee and beheaded another during an operation in Sagaing’s Khin-U Township, according to local sources.
Regarding the regime’s escalating offensives, the spokesperson for the Karenni military central information committee, Khu Nye Reh, said that the resistance would fight back as best as they can.
“There has to be defense if there’s an offensive and people will have to suffer. But I want to encourage them not to feel bad and to stay with us till the regime is toppled and we get the federal democracy we all dream of,” he said..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2023-03-17
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-17
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Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Political History
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"၁။ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရသည် ပြည်သူလူထုမှ ရွေးကောက်တင်မြှောက်ထား သည့် ပြည်ထောင်စုလွှတ်တော်ကိုယ်စားလှယ်များဖြင့် ဖွဲ့စည်းထားသော ပြည်ထောင်စု လွှတ်တော်ကိုယ်စားပြုကော်မတီက တာဝန်ခံဖွဲ့စည်းထားသည့် ပြည်သူ့အစိုးရ တစ်ရပ်ဖြစ်သည်။
၂။ အာဏာသိမ်း အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီသည် ပြည်သူ့အာဏာကို လက်နက်ဖြင့် မတရားသိမ်းပိုက်ရယူခဲ့သည့်အတွက် ပြည်သူလူထုတစ်ရပ်လုံးက ရရာလက်နက်ဆွဲကိုင်၍ မိမိကိုယ်မိမိ ခုခံကာကွယ်ပိုင်ခွင့်အရ၊ သမိုင်းဝင် ပြည်သူ့နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေးကို တစ်နိုင်ငံလုံးအတိုင်းအတာဖြင့် ဆင်နွှဲနေကြပါသည်။
၃။ ပြည်သူ့နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေး (၂) နှစ် ပြည့်လာသည့်အချိန်တွင် ပြည်သူ့ဦးဆောင်မှု၊ တော်လှန်ရေးအင်အားစုများ၏ တိုက်ပွဲဝင်မှုတို့၏ အသီးအပွင့်အဖြစ် အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေး အစိုးရသည် စိုးမိုးထိန်းချုပ်နယ်မြေများ ရရှိလာခဲ့ပြီဖြစ်ပါသည်။
၄။ အာဏာသိမ်း အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီ၏ လူမဆန်စွာ ရက်စက်ကြမ်းကြုတ်ယုတ်မာ မီးရှို့ သတ်ဖြတ်မှုများကြောင့် ပြည်သူလူထု၏ အသက်အိုးအိမ်စည်းစိမ်များစွာ ဆုံးရှုံးနစ်နာနေ ရသည်မှာ ကမ္ဘာအသိဖြစ်သည်။ ထို့အတွက် မြန်မာပြည်သူလူထုသည် လူသားချင်းစာနာ ကူညီမှုများ များစွာ လိုအပ်လျက်ရှိပါသည်။
၅။ အာဏာသိမ်းအကြမ်းဖက် စစ်ကောင်စီကြောင့် ဒုက္ခရောက်နေကြရသည့် ပြည်သူလူထု၏ နစ်နာဆုံးရှုံးမှုများကို အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရအနေဖြင့် အတတ်နိုင်ဆုံး လူသားစာနာမှုအကူအညီများ ဆောင်ရွက်ပေးလျက်ရှိပါသည်။ နိုင်ငံတကာအဖွဲ့အစည်းများ အနေဖြင့်လည်း အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရနှင့် လက်တွဲ၍ ဝိုင်းဝန်ကူညီပေးကြပါရန်လည်း တိုက်တွန်းအပ်ပါသည်။
၆။ အမှန်စင်စစ် အကူအညီလိုအပ်နေသော ပြည်သူလူထုထံသို့ လူသားချင်းစာနာကူညီ ပေးမှုများ ထိထိရောက်ရောက် ပံ့ပိုးနိုင်ရန်၊ ပေါင်းစပ်ညှိနှိုင်းမှုများဆောင်ရွက်နိုင်ရန်နှင့် တော်လှန်ရေးကာလဖြစ်သည့်အတွက် လုံခြုံရေးဝန်ဆောင်မှုများ ပံ့ပိုးပေးနိုင်ရန် အလို့ငှာ ပြည်တွင်းအစိုးရမဟုတ်သော အဖွဲ့အစည်းများ၊ အရပ်ဘက်အဖွဲ့အစည်းများနှင့် နိုင်ငံတကာ အစိုးရမဟုတ်သောအဖွဲ့စည်းများအနေဖြင့် အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၏ ထိန်းချုပ်နယ် မြေများအတွင်း စစ်တမ်းကောက်ယူခြင်း၊ ဖြတ်သန်းသွားလာခြင်းနှင့် စီမံကိန်းလုပ်ငန်းများ ဆောင်ရွက်ခြင်းတို့အတွက် အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၊ သက်ဆိုင်ရာဝန်ကြီးဌာနများသို့ ကြိုတင်အသိပေးအကြောင်းကြားပြီးမှသာ ဆောင်ရွက်သွားရန် လေးနက်စွာ အသိပေး အပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Home Affairs and Immigration - Myanmar
Date of publication:
2023-03-17
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-17
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"Violence resulting from the brutal military coup is continuing inside Myanmar on an “alarming scale” the UN Special Envoy told a meeting of the General Assembly on Thursday.
Now in its third year, Noeleen Heyzer said that “the impact of the military takeover on the country and its people, has been devasting.”
She thanked Member States for renewing the resolution for the continuation of her mandate and support for an “all-stakeholder approach in promoting a Myanmar-led process, reflective of the will of the people”, to end the suffering and death.
Intensified violence
On 1 February, she said the military had extended its State of Emergency, and intensified the use of force to include more aerial bombing, the burning of civilian homes, and other “grave human rights violations to maintain its grip on power.”
She described the spread of Martial Law to 47 different townships, and the empowering of citizens deemed loyal to the regime, by allowing them to carry guns.
Atrocities, beheadings, and the mutilation of rebel fighters’ bodies have been recorded, together with escalating violence in ethnic areas.
“We just received reports that 28 civilians were killed by the military at a monastery in Southern Shan state this weekend.”
Implacable resistance
She said that despite the brutal repression, widespread and popular resistance continues, by any means possible, across much of Myanmar.
“A generation that benefited from Myanmar’s previous opening up, especially the youth, is now disillusioned, facing chronic hardship and many feeling they have no choice but to take up arms to fight military rule.
Heavy fighting has spread to areas previously unaffected by conflict, she added, putting more civilian lives at risk and further complicating humanitarian operations to save lives amid the fighting.
Collective punishment
She said a “four cuts” strategy put in place by the regime, “which seeks to block access to food, funds, information and recruits – continues to target civilians as collective punishment.”
Ms. Heyzer said the opposition National Unity Government was continuing to point to the brutality of military forces, while also warning resistance militias not to themselves, “perform inhumane acts.”
“With both sides intent on prevailing by force, there is no prospect for a negotiated settlement”, The Special Envoy added.
17.6 million need assistance
The conflict has meant humanitarian needs have risen steadily, with 17.6 million Burmese in need of humanitarian assistance, more than 1.6 million internally displaced, and an estimated 55,000 civilian buildings destroyed since the coup.
She said it was critical, that a Myanmar-led process, reflective of all voices – especially women, youth and minorities – be allowed to decide the country’s future
“Sustainable solutions for the Rohingya people must be built into the design of a peaceful, inclusive and democratic Myanmar”, she added. “Their voices have to be integral to decisions about their own future.”
Rohingya refugees
She reminded ambassadors that more than five years since the forced mass exodus across the border into Bangladesh by the mainly-Muslim Rohingya, the hundreds of thousands of refugees continue to face extreme hardships.
Earlier this month, another massive fire ripped through a Rohingya refugee camp in Cox’s Bazar, affecting 15,000 and the World Food Programme (WFP) has announced it needs to reduce rations for refugees this month due to a severe funding shortfall.
Ms. Heyzer urged Member States to support the 2023 Joint Response Plan for the Rohingya Humanitarian Crisis, which stands at $876 million, adding that “now is not the time for donor fatigue.”
‘Unprecedented solidarity’
She concluded by saying that despite tragedy and deep uncertainty in Myanmar, “there is unprecedented solidarity that has emerged in the country.
“I know that this General Assembly will renew its commitment supporting the will of the people, including the Rohingya, to build a peaceful, just and democratic union of Myanmar for all.”..."
Source/publisher:
UN News Centre
Date of publication:
2023-03-16
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-16
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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"ပြည်ထောင်စုလွှတ်တော်ကိုယ်စားပြုကော်မတီက နှစ်ပတ်လျှင်တစ်ကြိမ် ထုတ်ပြန်ခဲ့သော သတင်းစဉ်များကို pdf file ရယူလိုပါက အောက်ပါ CRPH ဝက်ဘ်ဆိုက်လင့်ခ်မှတစ်ဆင့် ရယူနိုင်ပါသည်။
https://crphmyanmar.org/publication/newsletter/
ပြည်ထောင်စုလွှတ်တော်ကိုယ်စားပြုကော်မတီ..."
Source/publisher:
Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw
Date of publication:
2023-03-16
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-16
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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"1. The National Unity Government (NUG), Karenni State Consultative Council (KSCC), and the Pa-o National Federal Council (PNFC) strongly condemn the massacre by the terrorist military council on March 11th of 22 civilians, including three Buddhist monks and one woman in Nam Nein Village, Pinlong Township, Shan State. We further condemn all the crimes against humanity committed by the Myanmar military. We are committed to seeking justice for the victims and their families.
2. Since the arbitrary seizure of power in 2021, the terrorist Myanmar military council has been using brutal counter-insurgency methods against innocent civilians. They have been entering the villages, killing civilians, raping and executing women, and taking citizens for use as human shields. In addition, the Myanmar military is committing these atrocities with the express purpose of dividing our diverse ethnic and religious communities.
3. The National Unity Government, Karenni State Consultative Council, Pa-O National Federal Council, and the People’s Defense Forces are working in coordination to assist civilians escape military oppression and secure justice.
4. Our organizations are working together, and the relevant ministries of the National Unity Government are engaged in compiling information about all the crimes committed by the Myanmar military, including forwarding witnesses and material evidence to international prosecution organizations. We have urged all civilians, particularly the elderly, women, children, and the disabled, to remain vigilant and evacuate prior to attacks.
5. To safeguard the lives of our people, we ask the international community to provide vital communication technology, equipment, and early warning. We further urge the imposition of sanctions on the Myanmar military and the associates which supply jet fuel, weapons, dual-purpose technology, and other military equipment to the Myanmar army.
6. We call on international legal bodies and the International Criminal Court to expand their current investigations to encompass all crimes committed in Myanmar in order to hold perpetrators to account. We also urge governments to increase pressure on the Myanmar military council by establishing universal jurisdiction in order to try cases of crimes against humanity perpetrated by the Myanmar military council. In doing so, you provide protection to the people of Myanmar and contribute to the building a new, free, and just state.
7. We encourage the international community to support the National Unity Government and its allies in order to bring a speedy resolution to the current crisis and put a stop to the crimes committed by Myanmar military against the people of Myanmar..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2023-03-16
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-16
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Armed conflict in Burma - attacks on civilians
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"၁။ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၊ ကရင်နီပြည်နယ် အတိုင်ပင်ခံကောင်စီ (KSCC)၊ ပအိုဝ်းအမျိုးသားဖက်ဒရယ်ကောင်စီ (PNFC) တို့အနေဖြင့် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စုက ပင်လောင်းမြို့နယ်၊ နမ်းနိန်းရွာရှိ သံဃာတော်(၃) ပါး၊ အမျိုးသမီး (၁) ဦး အပါအဝင် အရပ်သားပြည်သူ (၂၂) ဦးကို ရက်စက်စွာ အစုလိုက်အပြုံလိုက် သတ်ဖြတ်ခဲ့သည့် လုပ်ရပ်အပါအဝင် မတရားအာဏာလုယူထားသည့်ကာလအတွင်း ကျူးလွန်ခဲ့သည့် လူသားမျိုးနွယ်စု အပေါ်ကျူးလွန်သည့် ရာဇဝတ်မှုများ အားလုံးကိုပြင်းထန်စွာရှုတ်ချပြီး တရားမျှတမှု ပြန်လည်ရရှိရေးအတွက် အလေးအနက်ထားဆောင်ရွက်သွားမည်ဖြစ်သည်။
၂။ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စုသည် တိုင်းရင်းသားဒေသများသို့ ဖြတ်လေးဖြတ်စနစ်ကိုကျင့်သုံးကာ ကျေးရွာများအတွင်း စစ်ကြောင်းထိုးဝင်ရောက်လျက်ရှိပြီး အရပ်သားပြည်သူများအား ရက်စက်စွာ သတ်ဖြတ်ခြင်း၊ အမျိုးသမီးများအား မုဒိမ်းကျင့်သတ်ဖြတ်ခြင်း၊ အချို့ရွာသားများအား လူသားဒိုင်းအဖြစ်အသုံးချရန် ဖမ်းဆီးခေါ်ဆောင်သွားပြီးမှ သတ်ဖြတ်ခြင်းများကိုဆက်တိုက် ကျူးလွန် လျက်ရှိသည်။ ထို့အပြင် တိုင်းရင်းသားပြည်နယ်များအတွင်း အတူတကွနေထိုင်နေကြသော တိုင်းရင်းသားလူမျိုးများအကြား ဘာသာရေးအားဖြင့်သော်လည်းကောင်း၊ လူမျိုးအားဖြင့် သော်လည်းကောင်းသွေးခွဲခြင်း၊ တိုင်းရင်းသားလူမျိုးတူညီကြသူသော်လည်း မတူညီသော အစုအဖွဲ့များအကြား သပ်လျှိုသွေးခွဲခြင်းများကို အစဉ်တစိုက်လုပ်ဆောင်နေကြောင်းလည်း သက်သေအထောက်အထားများ အခိုင်အမာဖြင့်တွေ့ရှိနေရသည်။
၃။ အရပ်သားပြည်သူများအနေဖြင့် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စု၏ ဖိနှိပ်သတ်ဖြတ်ခြင်းများ မှ လွတ်ကင်းနိုင်ရေး အတွက် အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၊ သက်ဆိုင်ရာ ပြည်နယ်၊ တိုင်းများမှ အတိုင်ပင်ခံကောင်စီများနှင့် ကာကွယ်ရေးတပ်ဖွဲ့များအားလုံး အတူတကွညှိနှိုင်းလုပ်ဆောင်လျက်ရှိကြောင်း ပြောကြားလိုက်ပါသည်။
၄။ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၏ သက်ဆိုင်ရာဝန်ကြီးဌာနများအနေဖြင့်လည်း အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်က ကျူးလွန်သော ရာဇဝတ်မှုများအားလုံးနှင့် ပတ်သက်ပြီး အချက်အလက်ရယူစုဆောင်းခြင်း၊ လူသက်သေ၊ ပစ္စည်းသက်သေများ ရယူစုဆောင်းခြင်း၊ နိုင်ငံတကာတရားရေးအဖွဲ့အစည်းများသို့ ပေးပို့ခြင်းများအား သက်ဆိုင်ရာအဖွဲ့အစည်းများအားလုံးနှင့် အတူတကွလုပ်ဆောင်လျက်ရှိကြောင်းပြောကြားလိုက်ပါသည်။
၅။ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်သည် အရပ်သားပြည်သူများ၊ သက်ကြီးရွယ်အို၊ အမျိုးသမီး၊ ကလေးသူငယ် နှင့် မသန်စွမ်းတို့ပါ မချန် ရက်ရက်စက်စက် သတ်ဖြတ်လျက်ရှိသောကြောင့် ဒေသခံများအနေဖြင့် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်၏ လှုပ်ရှားဆောင်ရွက်မှုများအပေါ် အမြဲမပြတ် သိရှိစေနိုင်သည့် အစီအမံများ ဆောင်ရွက်ရန်နှင့် ဝင်ရောက်လာပါက ဘေးလွတ်ရာသို့ အလျင်အမြန်ထွက်ခွာ ရှောင်တိမ်းကြပါရန် မေတ္တာရပ်ခံအပ်ပါသည်။
၆။ နိုင်ငံတကာအသိုင်းအဝိုင်းအနေဖြင့်လည်း ပြည်သူလူထု၏ အသက်အိုးအိမ် စည်းစိမ်ကို ကာကွယ်ပေးနိုင်ရန်အတွက် ဆက်သွယ်ရေးဆိုင်ရာ နည်းပညာနှင့် ပစ္စည်းကိရိယာများ၊ ကြိုတင်သတိပေးခြင်း စနစ်ဆိုင်ရာ ပစ္စည်းကိရိယာများစသည်တို့ကို ထောက်ပံ့ပေးနိုင်ပါရန် တောင်းဆိုပါသည်။ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စု နှင့် အပေါင်းအပါများအပေါ် စီးပွားရေးပိတ်ဆို့မှုအပါအဝင် လက်နက်ခဲယမ်းတင်သွင်းရောင်းချမှု၊ စစ်ရေးတွင်အသုံးပြုနိုင်သည့် နည်းပညာပံ့ပိုးမှု၊ လေယာဉ်ဆီ တင်သွင်းမှု နှင့် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ် အသုံးပြုလျက်ရှိသည့် စစ်ရေးဆိုင်ရာ ပစ္စည်းကိရိယာများ တင်သွင်းမှုများကို ပိတ်ပင်တားဆီးခြင်းများ ပြုလုပ်ပေးကြရန် တောင်းဆိုပါသည်။
၇။ နိုင်ငံတကာတရားရေးအဖွဲ့အစည်းများနှင့် International Criminal Courtအနေဖြင့် စုံစမ်းစစ်ဆေးမှုများကိုမြန်မာတစ်နိုင်ငံလုံးအနှံ့ကျူးလွန်မှုများအထိ ချဲ့ထွင်စစ်ဆေးဆောင်ရွက်သွားကြရန် တိုက်တွန်းလိုက်ပါသည်။ ကမ္ဘာ့နိုင်ငံများအနေဖြင့်လည်း စစ်ရာဇဝတ်မှုများကိုကျူးလွန်နေသည့် မြန်မာစစ်ကောင်စီနှင့် ယင်း၏အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်ကို နိုင်ငံအလိုက်အရေးယူဆောင်ရွက်နိုင်မည့် Universal Jurisdictionတရားရုံးများ ဖော်ထုတ်ပြီးထိရောက်စွာလုပ်ဆောင်ခြင်းဖြင့် မြန်မာပြည်သူများ အသက်ဘေးအန္တရာယ်မှ လွတ်မြောက်ပြီး၎င်းတို့လိုချင်သော လွတ်လပ်၍ တရားမျှတသည့် နိုင်ငံတော်သစ် တခုကိုတည်ဆောက်နိုင်ရေးပါဝင်ပံ့ပိုးပေးနိုင်ကြပါရန်တိုက်တွန်းလိုက်ပါသည်။
၈။ နိုင်ငံတကာအသိုင်းအဝိုင်းအနေဖြင့် အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ အပါအဝင် တိုင်းရင်းသားတော်လှန်ရေးအင်အားစုများအားလုံးနှင့် အမြန်ဆုံး ညှိနှိုင်းတိုင်ပင် ကူညီပံ့ပိုးခြင်းအားဖြင့် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စု၏ မြန်မာပြည်သူလူထုတစ်ရပ်လုံးအပေါ် ကျူးလွန်လျက်ရှိသည့် ရာဇဝတ်များ လျင်မြန်စွာ အဆုံးသတ်နိုင်ရေး အစောတလျင် ဆောင်ရွက်ကြပါရန် အလေးအနက် တိုက်တွန်းလိုက်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2023-03-16
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-16
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Armed conflict in Burma - attacks on civilians
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Sub-title:
Civilians are being killed by Russian weapons just like in Ukraine, says special rapporteur Tom Andrews in call for global action
Description:
"Myanmar is a “failing state” and the crisis is getting exponentially worse, a UN special rapporteur for the country has warned, urging countries to adopt the same unified resolve that followed the invasion of Ukraine.
“The same types of weapons that are killing Ukrainians are killing people in Myanmar,” Tom Andrews, special rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, told the Guardian in an interview, citing the supply of Russian weapons to the junta since the coup two years ago. The junta relies heavily on aircraft from China and Russia, and has increasingly resorted to airstrikes to attempt to quell determined resistance forces.
The international response to Myanmar has been inadequate and some countries are continuing to enable the junta’s atrocities, Andrews said, calling for an arms embargo.
“It is unspeakable what is happening and what is so incredibly frustrating is the fact that, as far as most of the world is concerned, this is not happening,” he said.
Instead, the world was “watching a train wreck”, Andrews said. “Myanmar is a failing state, it is in the process of failing and this is happening before our very eyes.”
He spoke ahead of a report, to be presented to the Human Rights Council next week, that details how people who have fled Myanmar face “the risk of arrest, detention, deportation, pushbacks at land and sea” as well as obstruction of their access to the UN’s refugee agency, UNHCR.
Myanmar was plunged into chaos in February 2021 when the military detained the country’s leader, Aung San Suu Kyi, and seized power. The coup has provoked widespread opposition, including both a peaceful civil disobedience movement and an armed resistance. Conflict has spiralled over the past two years, spreading across vast areas of the country, including regions that were once peaceful, where members of the public joined defence groups to fight back against the military.
The military - which analysis suggests has lost territory to the resistance despite having superior weaponry - has increasingly deployed airstrikes, including against schools and medical facilities, as well as scorched earth tactics, in an attempt to stop the resistance.
“As it becomes more dangerous for their troops to operate on the ground they have resorted to these gunships, fighter jets that are dropping bombs on villages and even IDP centres [camps for internally displaced people who have been forced to flee],” said Andrews.
Myanmar’s military has previously denied carrying out atrocities and says its operations target “terrorists”.
A report by the special rapporteur last year said Russia, China, and Serbia were providing the junta with weapons. A recent investigation by Myanmar Witness also found the military was heavily reliant upon Russian or Chinese air assets for its attacks.
Andrews said he recently spoke to a father whose home was destroyed by the military. The father had taken his family to a centre for displaced people; only for it to be bombed. His two daughters, aged 12 and 15, were killed.
The junta launched airstrikes in 10 out of 14 of the country’s administrative divisions during the last six months of 2022, according to Myanmar Witness, with such attacks occurring on an almost daily basis.
Given its reliance on aircraft from China and Russia, the junta has sought to publicly align itself with both nations after the coup. The military, led by Min Aung Hlaing “fawns over Russia”, said Andrews. “He has flown to Moscow, he has praised Putin, they of course seek and secure weapons that they use to commit these atrocity crimes.”
However, Andrews said that other countries are capable of taking more robust strategic action to stop the junta from accessing resources. While many western governments have imposed sanctions, greater coordination was needed, he said.
An arms embargo, and measures to stop aviation fuel from reaching the military should also be adopted. He did not suggest sending weapons to support the resistance, but instead measures to stop weapons or resources from reaching the junta.
Andrews has also backed calls for the UN security council to pass a resolution that will refer the situation in Myanmar to the international criminal court.
Countries have a moral imperative to do “everything possible to squeeze from the junta the means through which they are continuing to attack their people”, said Andrews. It was also in the interests of the international community, especially neighbouring countries, to act, he said.
“Myanmar is a very significant country, it is a nation of 54 million people, located on a very important part of the world between India and China. Already you have seen the impact of the instability that’s there. Thousands and thousands of people every month are running for their lives every month over the border into the region.”
In a report to be presented to the Human Rights Council on 20 March, the special rapporteur said neighbouring governments had forcibly returned people – including military deserters and children – to Myanmar despite the risk of imprisonment, torture, or even execution.
According to the UN, the number of people in need of humanitarian assistance has soared, from 1 million before the coup, to an anticipated 17.6 million in 2023.
“The economy has imploded, you have half of people now living in poverty. You have the collapse of the education system with millions of kids not having the opportunity for an education. The health system has collapsed,” he said. “Things are bad and they are getting exponentially worse.”
Some in Myanmar, while welcoming the support Ukraine has received, have questioned why the international response to the atrocities in their country has differed so vastly, said Andrews. He said that he did not have the answer, adding that some nations were continuing to enable the junta’s crimes.
“There is a moral imperative to not turn our backs on people who are exhibiting extraordinary courage in fighting for their country and their future,” said Andrews..."
Source/publisher:
"The Guardian" (UK)
Date of publication:
2023-03-15
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-15
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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Sub-title:
Myanmar’s journalists are rebuilding independent media with one foot in the country, and one foot out, writes Laure Siegel.
Description:
"As Myanmar’s bloody coup ticks over into its third year, local journalists continue to struggle to sustain and build independent media voices in support of democracy both inside the country and in the growing refugee diaspora.
It’s an evolving ecosystem depending on an underground network, including citizen journalists, philanthropic support, experimentation in distribution and voices — and raw courage in the face of a violent oppression by the Tatmadaw military junta.
The military broke the old system.
“I didn’t want to give up this job. But since the coup, journalists can’t report freely and have to worry about their and their relatives’ safety. So I had to flee.” says a young woman print and TV reporter, now in Thailand.
Journalists were among the first to be hunted down after the military coup, led by General Min Aung Hlaing on February 1, 2021, along with opposition politicians, social workers and activists. In the two years since, four journalists — all working in local media or as freelancers — have been killed and 145 arrested. About 60 remain in detention.
It effectively dismantled the network of democratic media that had spread across the country over the previous decade. Instead, the Myanmar junta became the world’s biggest jailer of journalists relative to population. The Committee for the Protection of Journalists listed Myanmar as the eighth worst country worldwide for impunity for crimes against journalists.
An independent media emerges
Still, the military’s attempts to control the media landscape did not stop a surge in independent outlets and content creation. This period also observed a decrease in popularity of state-controlled media.
Two years after the coup, the top media by audience remain the trusted four: BBC Burmese, Mizzima, Democratic Voice of Burma (DVB) and Voice of America (VOA).
All struggle to monetize this audience, especially as digital advertising prices have collapsed in Myanmar. One million online impressions earns media companies $US10, compared to $US570 in Europe and $US130 in Thailand.
Social media distribution has been constrained as Meta’s platforms have been banned in Myanmar.Now, only half of the country’s internet users who have access to VPNs can still access Meta. According to a survey by the News Consulting Group, only a third of Myanmar Meta users actively use Facebook as a main source of news.
“We have problems with Facebook because they don’t understand that we are covering a war so they regularly categorise our account as “Page at risk”. But only local media are punished for community violations when they publish videos of violent acts, not the big media. So when they block our audience, even though we have one million followers, we only reach 1000 people per post”.- founder of local media covering Myanmar central plains
As the usual revenue models of subscriptions, advertisements and events are denied independent media, most have turned to philanthropic grants to remain sustainable.
This has created an imbalance between the mainly English-language national media and the more poorly resourced, mostly local, media in Myanmar’s languages who lack staff dedicated to accounting or human resource management. Delays in transferring funds also disadvantages reporters relying on grants for their income:
We know how to write stories but we don’t know how to write proposals or grant forms. Our English skills are not good enough to fulfill the diverse requirements of international organizations, so we get less financial support than the big national media. — a local editor.
Most independent media have been forced to operate underground or abroad, mainly in Thailand, Bangladesh and India. At least a thousand Burmese journalists are estimated to live in exile since the coup, including a third in Thailand, often without refugee protections or the legal status that would allow them to pursue professional or educational opportunities. Their properties in Myanmar can still be seized and destroyed and their relatives are vulnerable to being taken hostage to impose pressure to keep quiet.
It’s a “one foot in, one foot out” model that brings big challenges. Despite those challenges, Myanmar’s journalists keep performing their duty of keeping their communities informed.
In-country, local media keeps providing a key link.
“Local media have built a very reliable network of sources over the years: they are our friends, relatives, neighbours. Even the media based in exile on the borderlands can still use the Myanmar telecom network to reach sources inside the country,” local editor.
They face greater risks, too, and have a responsibility to protect those sources — including from unwanted exposure by national or international media.
Hundreds of trainers conduct online and in-person capacity-building training sessions in mobile reporting, investigation, digital safety and feature writing. Organizations such as Myanmar Witness or the Center for Law and Democracy teach both citizen journalists and professional journalists to gather evidence of war crimes that could be used in international court cases.
Despite the electricity and Internet cuts, new distribution formats are being tested and developed, such as SMS, newsletters and podcasts. One prominent example is Kaladan media, the first Rohingya News Agency, which has been based in Bangladesh since 2001. They are one of the founders of the Burma News International (BNI), a network of fifteen independent media groups led by exiled Burmese journalists in India, Bangladesh and Thailand that was launched in 2003.
“We have been consistently challenging, monitoring and investigating the Burma Army Islamophobic narrative. During anti-Muslim violence in Myanmar, our website was hacked for six months and we were blocked on Facebook numerous times because of some users abusively reporting us. Our people don’t have easy access to the Internet so we launched a 30 minutes daily news bulletin, which is broadcasted in communal meeting places in refugee camps via loudspeakers.” — Tin Soe, editor-in-chief of the Kaladan Press Network explains.
Frontier Myanmar continues to run Doh Athan (“Our Voice”) program and local media such as Delta News Agency for the Irrawaddy region and Myaelatt Athan for Sagaing and Magway regions launched podcasts and weekly TV shows.
“We have three podcasts, one about news, one about healthcare and one is called ‘Letter from People Defence Forces’. We are reading on-air letters of pro-democracy fighters to their relatives or girlfriends. It’s a nice format that allows us to connect them with the people as they are trying to survive underground and are isolated from everyone”. A representative for Myaelatt Athan.
Dr. Miemie Winn Byrd, Adjunct Fellow at the East-West Center emphasises: “A successful revolution is at least 75% communication. In the context of Myanmar, I see the way forward as systematising the defection of soldiers, focusing on people’s support and keeping up the international interest”.
In the spirit of building bridges between skills and nationalities, the collective Visual Rebellion Myanmar was co-founded after the coup by Burmese media students and international creatives. A newsroom of journalists and artists based inside Myanmar and around the world produces together in-depth features, research reports, photo stories and documentaries about the impact of the coup from a human perspective. Some of the best content is adapted and translated to other languages, such as a series for French investigative outlet Mediapart.
Visual Rebellion is committed to prioritize story angles where people are agents and not only victims of their fates. This includes the unionization of Myanmar migrant workers in Thailand, the founding of a photo-magazine by Rohingya people in Cox’s Bazar refugee camp, women fighting frontline battles and grassroots coping mechanisms for surviving the economic crisis generated by the coup.
After a year-long scorched-earth campaign in the central plains by military troops, one member of the collective who is native to the area, explained: “I can’t write about dead bodies and burned villages anymore because it is repetitive in its horror, it publicises terrorist actions by the junta which has a deep impact on the moral of the people and it has a huge impact on my mental health as I know the areas and people targeted very well since childhood. We need to find other ways to tell the story”.
As it is estimated that 75 percent of the stories published by Burmese media are coup or conflict related, several audience surveys show a phenomenon of “coup-fatigue”. People would rather read about topics such as commodity prices, health, education and agriculture, as well as weather, refugees, business and international affairs.
Local journalists on the front line
As most international and national media pulled out their staff out of Myanmar, they rely for on the ground information on citizen reporters who sent information, pictures and videos from their phones and are poorly paid, or not paid at all.
It’s forcing a division in the Myanmar media community with different treatment between management-level editors who are often safely re-based abroad and on-the-ground, junior reporters survive on their own in precarious situations. National and international media often use content gathered by local media without compensation.
“Relying on non-professional media workers carries big risks: they struggle with emotional distance, take low-resolution pictures, send them to all media houses and then face copyright issues, some share names of sources online and most are not trained enough to check accuracy. Digital, physical, psycho-social and legal safety is a precondition for producing professional journalism and local citizens can’t fill the void without being given the proper tools.” — Toby Mendel, executive director for the Center of Law and Democracy
The pauperization of the information sector post-coup has pushed down media rates and professional reporters still present in the country now get offered citizen reporter wages. Media workers lack the negotiating power and industry body to obtain fair wages and safety measures, as denounced in the Anti-Theft Wage Campaign by the International Federation of Journalists,
The division drives internal mistrust. The founder of a local media in hiding in a Thai-Myanmar border town, says: “We try to identify military propaganda accounts by the terms they use to refer to the junta. We also know that some “journalists” come to border towns in Thailand to spy on real reporters in exile and report to the military back in Myanmar. Some journalists who were working for pro-military newspapers even get hired by independent media houses nowadays because there is no background check and clearance process anymore. Now anyone can apply for a media job via Messenger by sending some pictures and footage and claiming experience after having attended a two-week training for Citizen Reporters.
A group of reporters in exile has started a consultative process with independent media houses with the goal of creating a new MPC and Code of Conduct, freed from business or military chains, be it from the Burmese army or opposition forces. They also lobby the body in charge of drafting a Federal Democracy Charter, to include a clause about press freedom and journalism protection in the future Constitution.
Whichever political situation emerges from the ongoing conflict, the journalistic community is already engaged in healthy debates about implementing policies of self-regulation, rethinking ownership structure and pushing for inclusion as well as gender and ethnic diversity. A balance between external support and internal reflection is the way for Myanmar media to survive the war of information that is raging in the country..."
Source/publisher:
International Press Institute
Date of publication:
2023-03-15
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-15
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Freedom of opinion and expression: - the situation in Burma/Myanmar - reports, analyses, recommendations, Anti-coup protesters
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Description:
"Quick Take:
More than 3,000 protestors have been killed, 20,000 people arrested, and 55,000 houses burned in the two years since the coup.
Amid former optimism about the prospect of ending military dominance, the ruling NLD party and many observers did not anticipate the coup until the last few months.
The regime promised to hold "free and fair" elections in 2023, but the repeatedly delayed vote is simply a military strategy to escape the ongoing armed conflict and consolidate authority.
HONOLULU (March 15, 2023) -- Last month marked the second anniversary of the military coup in Myanmar that resulted in the country's devastating civil war, with the military arresting more than 20,000 anti-coup protestors, killing more than 3,000, and burning 55,000 houses and buildings. Meanwhile, Myanmar’s GDP plummeted from an average 6% growth rate during the reform period to negative 18% since the coup.
What was shocking to me about the coup was that almost no one seemed to expect it until the last few months. Throughout the prior decade of reform, the main point of contention among the many lawmakers, political analysts, and activists I met was that "the military had enough power under the 2008 constitution, so why would they need to seize power in a risky coup?"
Indeed, in recent decades the world has seen a decline in outright political coup attempts, which create huge risks for would-be dictators, including foreign intervention, economic sanctions, external pressures, and the growth of internal resistance. To avoid such risks, would-be despots today often attempt instead to weaken all political institutions that support democracy in order to rise to power.
Coup motivations
So what prompted the Tatmadaw, or Myanmar’s military establishment, to risk these consequences? In short, the coup was motivated by both personal and institutional factors.
Institutionally, the military was losing power under democratic reforms even though the political system was rigged heavily in its favor. This in turn threatened the system of military-owned business monopolies that have enriched generals and their cronies for generations.
Soe Thane, a close aide to former President Thein Sein, said in his book that the pace of the political transition made many generals nervous, leading to accusations that certain soft-liners among the governing elites were CIA agents. Meanwhile, the emergence of a political alliance between an ex-general who chaired parliament and the popular civilian opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi caused concern and disunity among the military leadership.
The Tatmadaw initially attempted through various means to slow the pace of political liberalization, but it was the Rohingya genocide that really shifted Myanmar's trajectory. The military’s clearance operation against Rohingya Muslims beginning in 2017 resulted in mass rape, burnings, drownings, and other violence that killed at least 9,000 people and forced nearly a million to flee the country, according to The New York Times. Little is known about the military's intentions, but it seems clear that the primary objective was to play a greater role in Myanmar's politics by inflaming ethno-religious strife.
Min Aung Hliang’s personal worries
While the military could have anticipated the massive international pressure that would result from the Rohingya tragedy, apparently commander-in-chief —and later coup leader—Senior General Min Aung Hlaing did not seem to expect that demands for international justice would target him so personally. In addition, he was worried about having to relinquish power as a result of Aung San Suu Kyi's unwillingness to raise his mandatory retirement age.
After the NLD won another landslide victory in 2020, the military resorted to allegations of voter fraud. By late 2020, military-affiliated individuals openly speculated about the prospect of a coup as a warning to the NLD. Finally, when the NLD still refused to accept the Tatmadaw’s efforts to retain its power advantages, Min Aung Hlaing orchestrated the coup on Feb. 1, 2021.
NLD and Western miscalculations
Aung San Suu Kyi's administration, which probably underestimated the real prospect of a coup, has faced widespread criticism for failing to prepare for a counter-coup. And policymakers in the West were also too quick to celebrate Myanmar's previous political transition as a partial victory for their foreign policy.
The reform period was never intended to end military domination. It was rather a masterpiece of former dictator Than Shwe's retirement plan. The end of his personalist regime and the competition for successor between two former generals, Parliament Speaker Shwe Mann and President Thein Sein, were mistakenly seen as a prospect of ending military dominance. But when that dominance was threatened by the overwhelming voice of the people in the 2020 election, Min Aung Hlaing and the military establishment sent in the troops to retake it.
The coup clearly reflects the military’s dissatisfaction with its own 2008 constitution, which reserves 25 percent of parliament seats for active military personnel and allows the military commander-in-chief to independently hold three key ministries—the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Border Affairs, and the Ministry of Home Affairs.
Since Min Aung Hlaing refuses to engage in dialogue with opposition parties, as required by the five-point ASEAN consensus he agreed to in 2021, holding superficially open elections are his government's best remaining prospect for escaping the ongoing conflict and eventually gaining some degree of international legitimacy. But now, two years after the coup, the regime has again extended its state of emergency and imposed martial law in 37 additional townships, again putting off the election. This step reveals nothing more than the generals’ unquenchable desire for even greater authority than they previously possessed..."
Source/publisher:
"East-West Center"
Date of publication:
2023-03-15
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-15
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
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Description:
"၁။ ၂၀၂၀ ရွေးကောက်ပွဲရလဒ်အရပေါ်ပေါက်လာသော မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၏ တစ်ခုတည်းသော တရားဝင် ဥပဒေပြုရေးမဏ္ဍိုင်ဖြစ်သည့် ပြည်ထောင်စုလွှတ်တော်ကိုယ်စားပြုကော်မတီ (CRPH) က နိုင်ငံတော်၏ အာဏာကို မတရားလုယူရန်ကြိုးစားခဲ့သည့် မင်းအောင်လှိုင်ဦးဆောင်သော စစ်အုပ်စုကို အကြမ်းဖက်အုပ်စု အဖြစ် ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ် မတ် လ ၁ ရက်နေ့တွင် ကြေညာချက်အမှတ် (၁၀/၂၀၂၁) ဖြင့် ထုတ်ပြန်ကြေညာ ခဲ့ပြီးဖြစ်သကဲ့သို့ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၏ တစ်ခုတည်းသော တရားဝင် ပြည်သူ့အစိုးရဖြစ်သည့် အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေး အစိုးရကလည်း ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ် ဇွန်လ ၇ ရက်နေ့တွင် စစ်ကောင်စီနှင့် ၎င်းနှင့် ဆက်စပ်လျက်ရှိသော အဖွဲ့အစည်းများအား အကြမ်းဖက်အဖွဲ့အစည်းများအဖြစ် ထပ်ဆင့်သတ်မှတ်ကြေညာခဲ့ပြီးဖြစ်သည်။
၂။ မင်းအောင်လှိုင်ဦးဆောင်သော မြန်မာစစ်တပ်သည် နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေးကာလ (၂) နှစ်ကျော်ကာလအတွင်း ရဟန်းသံဃာများ၊ သက်ကြီးရွယ်အိုများ၊ အမျိုးသမီးများ၊ ကလေးသူငယ်များ၊ မသန်စွမ်းများအပါအဝင် ပြည်သူလူထု (၃၁၂၄) ဦးကို နည်းလမ်းပေါင်းစုံဖြင့် သတ်ဖြတ်ခဲ့သည့်အပြင် အဆိုပါ သတ်ဖြတ်မှုများအတွင်း အရပ်သားပြည်သူ (၇၆၆) ဦး သေဆုံးခဲ့ရသည့် အစုလိုက်အပြုံလိုက်သတ်ဖြတ်မှု ဖြစ်စဉ် (၆၄) ခုရှိခဲ့သည်။ မြန်မာစစ်တပ်နှင့် အပေါင်းအပါများသည် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံတစ်ဝှမ်းရှိ ပြည်နယ်နှင့် တိုင်းအသီးသီးတို့တွင် ၎င်းတို့ ကျူးလွန်ခဲ့၊ ကျူးလွန်ဆဲဖြစ်သော စစ်ရာဇဝတ်မှုများ၊ လူသားမျိုးနွယ်စုအပေါ်ကျူးလွန်သည့် ရာဇဝတ်မှုများ၊ အစုလိုက် အပြုံလိုက် သတ်ဖြတ်မှုများ၊ ပြည်သူလူထု၏ အိုးအိမ်စည်းစိမ်များကို လုယက်ဖျက်ဆီးမှုများ၊ အရပ်သားများ ကို ပစ်မှတ်ထားတိုက်ခိုက်သတ်ဖြတ်မှုများဖြင့် ၎င်းတို့သည် အကြမ်းဖက်အုပ်စုသက်သက်သာ ဖြစ်ကြောင်းကို သက်သေပြလျက်ရှိသလို ၎င်းတို့ ကျူးလွန်ခဲ့သော ပြစ်မှုအချို့အတွက် နိုင်ငံတကာ ဥပဒေများဖြင့် တရားစွဲဆိုခံထားရသော အစုအဖွဲ့တစ်ခုလည်းဖြစ်ပေသည်။
၃။ အကြမ်းဖက်အုပ်စုအဖြစ် ကြေညာခြင်းခံထားရသော၊ နိုင်ငံတကာဥပဒေများဖြင့် တရားစွဲဆိုခံထားရသော အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စုက မတရားအာဏာလုယူထားသည့် အချိန်ကာလအတွင်း ထုတ်ပြန်သော အမိန့်များ၊ ညွှန်ကြားချက်များ၊ ဥပဒေများ အားလုံးသည် အလိုအလျောက်ပျက်ပြယ်ပြီး ဖြစ်သကဲ့သို့ ၎င်းတို့ဖွဲ့စည်းတာဝန် ပေးအပ်သော အဖွဲ့အစည်းများ အားလုံးသည်လည်း အကြမ်းဖက်လက်အောက်ခံအဖွဲ့အစည်းများအဖြစ်သို့ အလိုအလျောက် ကျရောက်ပြီး ဖြစ်သည်။ ထို့အပြင် ပြည်သူလူထုတစ်ရပ်လုံးကလည်း အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်၏ အာဏာလုယူမှုကို နည်းလမ်း မျိုးစုံဖြင့် ယနေ့အချိန်ထိ ဆန့်ကျင်လျက်ရှိပြီး ပြည်သူ့ဆန္ဒအမှန်ကို အတိအလင်း ပြသလျက်ရှိသည်။
၄။ သို့ဖြစ်ပါ၍ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စုက ပြဌာန်းသော ရွေးကောက်ပွဲဥပဒေသည် တရားဝင်မှုမရှိဘဲ အလိုအလျောက်ပျက်ပြယ်ပြီးဖြစ်သကဲ့သို့ ဖွဲ့စည်းတာဝန်ပေးအပ်သော ရွေးကောက်ပွဲကော်မရှင်သည်လည်း အကြမ်းဖက်လက်အောက်ခံအဖွဲ့အစည်းအဖြစ် ကျရောက်လျက်ရှိပေသည်။
၅။ ဥပဒေအဖြစ်သို့ ရောက်ရှိခြင်းမရှိဘဲ ပျက်ပျယ်ပြီးဖြစ်သော စာရွက်စာတမ်းတစ်ခုဖြစ်သည့် ရွေးကောက်ပွဲဥပဒေပါ သတ်မှတ်ချက်များကိုလိုက်နာပြီး အကြမ်းဖက်လက်အောက်ခံအဖွဲ့အစည်း တစ်ခု ဖြစ်သည့် ရွေးကောက်ပွဲကော်မရှင်ထံတွင် သွားရောက်၍ မှတ်ပုံတင်ခြင်းသည် မည်သည့် အကြောင်းပြချက်များ ရှိစေကာမူ ပြည်သူ့ဆန္ဒကို သွေဖယ်ဆန့်ကျင်ပြီး အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စု၏ ဖြစ်တည်မှုကို အတိအလင်း လက်ခံလိုက်ခြင်းဖြစ်သည့်အပြင် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စု အလိုကျ အတူတကွ လိုက်ပါအသုံးချခံကာ ပြည်သူလူထုအား ဖိနှိပ်သတ်ဖြတ်နေမှုကို အားပေးအားမြှောက်ပြုခြင်းပင် ဖြစ်ပေမည်။
၆။ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စုအနေဖြင့် တရားမဝင် အတုအယောင်ရွေးကောက်ပွဲကို ပြည်သူ့ဆန္ဒနှင့်ဆန့်ကျင်၍ အတင်းအကျပ် လုပ်ပွဲများပြုလုပ်ခဲ့ပါကလည်း အဆိုပါ တရားမဝင် အတုအယောင်ရွေးကောက်ပွဲမှ တဆင့် ပေါ်ပေါက်လာမည့် လူပုဂ္ဂိုလ်များ၊ အစုအဖွဲ့များသည် ပြည်သူလူထုကို အမှန်တကယ် ကိုယ်စားပြုသော လွှတ်တော် ကိုယ်စားလှယ်များ၊ လွှတ်တော်များ၊ အစိုးရအဖွဲ့များ ဖြစ်လာမည်မဟုတ်ဘဲ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်၏ ကိုယ်စားလှယ်များ၊ ကိုယ်စားပြု ရုပ်သေးရုပ်များ၊ ရုပ်သေးအစုအဖွဲ့များသာ ဖြစ်လာမည်ဖြစ်သည်။
၇။ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရအနေဖြင့် ပြည်သူလူထုကလွှဲအပ်ထားသော အုပ်ချုပ်ရေးအာဏာကို စွဲကိုင်ကျင့်သုံးနေသည့် တရားဝင် အစိုးရတရပ်ဖြစ်သည်နှင့်အညီ တရားမဝင်သော အကြမ်းဖက် စစ်အုပ်စု၏ လက်အောက်ခံအဖွဲ့အစည်းများ၊ အလိုတူအလိုပါ အဖွဲ့အစည်းများ၊ အားပေးအားမြှောက် ပြုသည့် အဖွဲ့အစည်းများအားလုံးကို အစိုးရနည်းနာဖြင့် ဥပဒေနှင့်အညီ အရေးယူဆောင်ရွက်သွားရန် တာဝန်ရှိ သောကြောင့် အဆိုပါတာဝန်ကို တော်လှန်ရေးအပေါ်သစ္စာပြုကာ ပြည်သူ့ဆန္ဒကို ဦးထိပ်ထားလျက် ဆက်လက်ဆောင်ရွက်သွားမည်ဖြစ်ကြောင်း အသိပေးကြေညာအပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2023-03-15
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-15
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
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"Two European engineering corporations have been paid millions consulting for the Myanmar military junta on harmful hydropower projects, Justice For Myanmar has revealed through an analysis of leaked tax filings, some of which were provided by Distributed Denial of Secrets.
The Swiss arm of the Swedish publicly listed company AFRY AB earned US$4.68 million in service fees for consulting work on the Upper Yeywa and Middle Paunglaung Hydropower Projects in Myanmar from February 2021 to September 2022.
The Myanmar branch of the Austrian-based ILF Group earned US$1.1 million in consulting fees from the junta from February 2021 to April 2022. ILF Group’s local branch is working on another dam scheme in Myanmar, the Tha Htay Hydropower Project.
Both companies are paid by a department of Myanmar’s electricity ministry which is illegally controlled by the military junta. They are advising the junta under tenders awarded in 2020 by the democratically-elected government, preceding the military’s brutal coup attempt.
AFRY did not respond to specific questions from Justice For Myanmar regarding the current status of their operations in Myanmar, but confirmed they have projects in the country.
ILF Group responded, “our activities were discontinued some time ago, and most recently focused on dam stabilization and slope stabilization for spillway purposes.” ILF Group did not disclose the date their activities were discontinued.
Both companies remain registered on Myanmar’s corporate registry.
The illegitimate military junta is building dams while attempting to crush freedom of expression, assembly, and association. Since the military’s coup attempt, the junta has created a state of terror, committing deliberate killings, arbitrary arrests, indiscriminate airstrikes and shelling, rape and torture. The junta has killed more than 3,100 people, and arbitrarily arrested over 20,000.
The Upper Yeywa dam is a 280MW hydropower project on the Namtu River, which is also known as the Myitnge River. It was conceived under the former military dictatorship in Myanmar in 2008, and has been opposed by local communities because of its devastating social and environmental impacts, lack of transparency, threat to ancestral lands and fuelling of conflict.
In 2020, the Shan Human Rights Foundation documented grave human rights violations by the Myanmar military near the Upper Yeywa project, including an extrajudicial killing and torture. The group called on foreign companies to withdraw from the dam project or risk complicity in the Myanmar military’s atrocities.
In December 2022 a local community network, the Namtu River Protectors, warned that more than 40,000 people living in villages near the dam could be impacted by flooding.
Following the military coup attempt, communities have courageously continued to protest the Upper Yeywa Dam, despite grave risks, and a group of workers from the dam project joined the Civil Disobedience Movement against the junta.
On the 2022 International Day of Action for Rivers, communities throughout Shan State protested against the junta’s dam projects, including Upper Yeywa.
The Tha Htay Chaung dam is a 110MW hydropower project in Thandwe Township, Rakhine State. In 2013, a coalition of Rakhine civil society and political parties demanded a halt to the dam, along with other infrastructure developments in the state, until Myanmar has a federal democracy which would ensure ethnic people have control over the management of their resources.
The Middle Paunglaung dam is a 152MW hydropower project on the Paunglaung River, near Naypyidaw. The dam threatens villagers with forced displacement, according to researchers.
Justice For Myanmar calls on AFRY and all other companies to responsibly suspend any remaining work on hydropower projects in Myanmar until there is federal democracy.
In the meantime, Justice For Myanmar calls for AFRY, ILF and all other involved companies to disclose their human rights due diligence and justify their reasoning and decision-making to advise on hydropower projects in Myanmar, and to remediate damage already incurred in accordance with the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights and the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises.
Justice For Myanmar spokesperson Yadanar Maung says: “It is deplorable that AFRY and ILF Group have been collaborating with the Myanmar military junta, supporting socially and environmentally destructive dams while their business partner wages a campaign of terror against the people of Myanmar.
“AFRY and ILF Group have disregarded the voices of local communities and their international human rights responsibilities by carrying out business as usual with war criminals.
“These dams displace communities, destroy livelihoods and harm Myanmar’s rivers, while emboldening an illegal military junta attempting to use infrastructure to gain control of territory.
“We call on AFRY to stop any remaining work for the military junta and for AFRY and ILF to remediate damage already incurred in accordance with the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights and the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises.
“We urge AFRY’s shareholders to take concrete action urgently to ensure the company fulfills its human rights responsibilities, or to divest.”..."
Source/publisher:
Justice For Myanmar
Date of publication:
2023-03-14
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-14
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Business and the Military, Water resources of Burma/Myanmar, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
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"Indonesia has a limited window of opportunity to achieve progress on Myanmar while it chairs ASEAN but that window is already growing smaller. Regional and international support for ASEAN is needed to impose time-bound consequences for Min Aung Hlaing should he continue to flout the ASEAN Five-Point Consensus (5PC), Indonesia is best placed to lead the initiative. ASEAN has insisted so far on treating the crisis in Myanmar as if it were a humanitarian disaster, one that can be ameliorated and contained neatly within Myanmar’s borders through cooperation with the junta. This is, at best, delusional. At worst it makes ASEAN complicit in the mass suffering being inflicted on the Myanmar people by Min Aung Hlaing’s junta. Min Aung Hlaing’s one and only goal is to establish his own rule, heading the junta, in Myanmar, an objective he is prepared to pursue no matter how much destruction he inflicts on the country or how many people he kills. This has been clear from the outset, making ASEAN’s futile fixation with expecting him to suddenly adhere to the 5PC he agreed to two years ago all the more perverse.
The junta has only one strategy: to terrorize the population though the widespread, systematic commission of atrocities. So far, the strategy seems to be failing. In spite of the immense suffering, the people’s support for the revolution is entrenched, and nationwide armed resistance is steadily escalating in response to the junta’s savagery. The junta’s increasing reliance on devastating airstrikes to bomb civilian targets reflects its hemorrhaging of control on the ground. But the scale of the suffering caused by the junta is alarming. Conservative estimates count the number of people in Myanmar who will need humanitarian assistance this year at 17.6 million, while 15.2 million are food insecure. At least 1.5 million people are now internally displaced with thousands more seeking refuge across Myanmar’s borders in neighboring Thailand and India each day. And there are still more than a million Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh. For two long years, the Myanmar people have pleaded for support from the international com-munity and protection from the junta’s violence. They feel totally betrayed.
Indonesia cannot allow this disgraceful injustice to continue. Ending the junta’s violence is a bare minimum expectation, yet ASEAN does not seem to have the necessary leverage over Min Aung Hlaing. Indonesia should lead a regional response that extends beyond ASEAN member states to include democratic allies Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand as well as Myanmar’s immediate neighbor Bangladesh.
China and India’s participation should also be sought but may not be possible, with both countries continuing to supply Min Aung Hlaing’s forces with the weapons it uses to carry out its atrocities. The immediate focus of this ASEAN-Plus initiative should be on ending the junta violence, with clear benchmarks for the junta and time-bound con-sequences if not met. At the same time, ASEAN must begin formal engagement with all stakeholders, primarily the National Unity Government (NUG) as the legitimate government of Myanmar, its allied ethnic revolutionary organizations, Myanmar civil society, and others in the democratic movement. Furthermore, it is critical that ASEAN – and the UN – urgently coordinate humanitarian assistance directly with local actors inside Myanmar, many in resistance-controlled areas including those along the border with Thailand, already providing aid and support to millions of people in dire need. This is the only way to get aid to areas of the country where Min Aung Hlaing is deliberately restricting access as a means of inflicting yet more suffering on the population. If ASEAN and the UN continue giving the junta total control over aid delivery, they are quite simply enabling Min Aung Hlaing’s atrocity strategy. Should ASEAN fail to make concrete progress on Myanmar by the end of the year, it should refer the situation to the UN Security Council, which in December passed its first ever resolution on Myanmar. The Security Council must then use all measures at its disposal, including those un-der Chapter VII of the UN Charter, to act to protect the people of Myanmar from the junta.
Less than 10 short months remain in Indonesia’s term as ASEAN chair before the seat is passed on to Laos. The clock is ticking..."
Source/publisher:
The Jakarta Post
Date of publication:
2023-03-14
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-14
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
ASEAN-Burma relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
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"Key Event Details
Location of Incident: Lanmadaw township (လမ်းမတော်မြို့နယ်), Yangon (ရန်ကုန်မြို့) [16.777583, 96.138917]
Date/Time of Incident: 8 March 2021
Alleged Perpetrator(s) and/or Involvement:
Lon Htein (specific unit not identified)
Myanmar military personnel (specific units not identified)
Summary of Investigation:
At approximately 2300 on 8 March, activists in Lanmadaw seized two vehicles that were part of a convoy they believed to be undercover military. The two vehicles – a car and a lorry carrying a bulldozer – were found to contain several guns and military clothing.
A few hours after the incident, footage verified by Myanmar Witness shows men in police and military fatigues returning to the area; they go from building to building and detain at least 13, and possibly as many as 30 men.
Myanmar Witness has verified 15 separate videos and images and has reconstructed the sequence of events that occurred in Lanmadaw.
It is not known what happened to the men after they were detained.
Executive Summary
Following the 1 February 2021 Coup, Myanmar’s State Administration Council (SAC) has stripped away due process and fair trial rights to detain thousands of protestors, activists and human rights defenders. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) reported that the vast majority of these deprivations of liberty were carried out without respect for the rule of law or in accordance with international human rights standards, therefore constituting arbitrary and unlawful detention.
This series of case studies documents four separate incidents in Yankin, Tamwe, North Okkalapa and Lanmadaw in late February and early March 2021. Three of the reports cover mass detentions of protestors, while the other examines a case of mass detention of community members, following an incident involving alleged undercover military officers in the same area.
This report covers the mass arrests of people in Lanmadaw during the early hours of 9 March 2021. The police raided the area after local people detained five men whom they believed to be undercover military. The two vehicles which the activists apprehended – a car and a lorry carrying a bulldozer – were found to contain several guns and military uniforms Myanmar Witness has identified as belonging to the Myanmar military’s Engineers Corp. A few hours after the incident, footage verified by Myanmar Witness shows men in police and military fatigues returning to the area; they go from building to building and detain at least 13, and possibly as many as 30 men.
These examples of mass detentions are being released to mark two years passing since their occurrence; however, they are by no means exhaustive. Myanmar Witness continues to monitor the deprivation of civilian liberties.
Introduction
On the night of 8 March, at approximately 2300, activists in Lanmadaw seized two vehicles – a car and a lorry carrying a bulldozer – which they believed were part of an undercover military convoy. The locals reported that the two vehicles contained several guns and military clothing.
Following this, Myanmar Witness has verified a series of events which culminated in police and military personnel moving into the area early in the morning of 9 March. They arrested at least 15 men, however social media users claim that the number was as high as 30.
The investigation - a chronological walkthrough
Incidents at night are challenging to verify – images are often dark and chronolocation is not possible due to the lack of shadows. Despite this, Myanmar Witness has been able to verify 15 separate videos and images and has reconstructed the sequence of events that occurred in Lanmadaw, culminating in the arrests of at least 13 individuals.
~2330: A 15-minute Facebook live-stream, geolocated by Myanmar Witness, was shot shortly after the vehicles were stopped (the link has since been removed, however this content was archived by Myanmar Witness). The timestamp on the live video says 2340; however, the live stream post appears as an hour-long clip with the same footage looped. While this reduces confidence in the timestamp, it does fit with accounts from individual social media posts and reporting.
The clip shows a crowd of around 50-100 people gathered at the crossroads of Anawrahta Road and Wa Dan Street. At the start of the video, a grey car is stopped on the south side of the junction and is being inspected by members of the crowd. The crowd shine phone lights into the car, lighting up the backseat, where weapons and other material can be seen wrapped in a white plastic sheet.
On the north side of the junction, a large truck towing a bulldozer is parked. At the 00:44 minute mark in the live stream, it appears the individuals inside the truck try to escape; the doors open and the crowd then run towards the truck and then north up the street, apparently in pursuit of the truck’s occupants. At the 02:17 minute mark, a man who had remained in the truck is seen being restrained by several civilians next to the vehicle. At 02:55, another man is escorted back from the street to the north.
The detained men are then escorted west along the street, while the filmer returns to the grey car. At the 06:00 minute mark, the video shows a man being questioned for several minutes by members of the crowd. The same man is visible at the beginning of the footage (00:10) when a member of the crowd has their arm around him. He tells the crowd he has purchased weapons from a shop nearby, but accepts they will detain him until the morning. The video shows the crowd continuing to inspect the vehicle, and gives a close-up of the car’s number plate.
At around the 10:00 minute mark, the man being questioned is also led west along Anawrahta Road, and the filmer then walks to an assembled crowd at the top of 3rd Street where 4-5 men can be seen on their knees with their hands tied behind their back at the 12:10 minute mark. The filmer then moves down 3rd Street with other members of the crowd, panning back to the detained men.
Photos posted to social media and verified by Myanmar Witness corroborate the events in the video, showing the five men ‘detained’ by the activists, as well as the vehicles and materiel recovered from the grey car.
Another set of images posted to Facebook shows the items and a uniform found at the scene bearing a distinctive insignia, which Myanmar Witness identified as belonging to the Engineers Corp of the Myanmar military. In another image posted on social media (VKontakte), the insignia is shown with writing underneath that reads: “စစ်အင်ဂျင်နီယာ ညွှန်ကြားရေးမှူးရုံး”, which translates as “Military Engineering Administration Office”. This also provides an explanation as to why the suspects were driving a truck with a bulldozer on a trailer.
~0030: According to social media posts from individual accounts, an hour later at around 0030 on 9 March, police and military returned to the area and went from building to building, arresting civilians. Photos and videos posted on social media at the time can be geolocated to 2nd and 3rd Streets, Lanmadaw.
~0041: A video posted to Facebook at 0041 local time shows approximately 15 police officers at the top of 2nd Street, filmed from the south-side of Anawrahta Road (Figure 5 Top Left). Shots are audible in the video but do not appear to be coming from the police in frame.
~0110: Images and videos released on social media provide multiple angles of the police and military on 2nd and 3rd street. For example, a video posted to Twitter at 0110 local time, shows men in police and military uniform breaking down a barricade before entering the street, firing as they walk down the road (Figure 5 Top Right). Police and several men in military fatigues can be seen at the top of the street (Figure 5 Bottom Left and Bottom Right).
Figure 5: [Top Left] Capture (01:48) showing police at the top of 2nd Street. The footage was posted at 0041 (source: link has since been removed, but Myanmar Witness archived it). [Top Right] Capture (00:37) showing police and military moving down 2nd Street (source: redacted due to privacy concerns). [Bottom Left] Capture (00:18) of a video shows a group of police arriving at 2nd Street (source: redacted due to privacy concerns). [Bottom Right] Capture (00:11) shows a second video angle of the police (source: redacted due to privacy concerns).
~0114: A photo posted to Twitter and timestamped at 0114 shows five men lying on the ground face down with their hands behind their back (Figure 6). While the photo is difficult to geolocate from the tight angle, the vehicles match those seen briefly in the 15-minute Facebook live stream analysed above, and the videos of police arriving at the end of 2nd Street (Figure 5 Bottom). As a result, Myanmar Witness was able to geolocate these events to the north end of 3rd Street.
Figure 6: [Top] Photo showing men detained. Military-uniformed men can be seen in the background (Source: Twitter). [Bottom Left] Capture (12:20) from the Facebook Live Video showing white vehicle with black band (source: the link has since been removed, however this content was archived by Myanmar Witness). [Bottom Right] Capture (13:34) from the Facebook Live Video showing the rear of a black saloon (source: the link has since been removed, however this content was archived by Myanmar Witness).
~0116: A second photo released in the same Twitter post, timestamped at 0116, shows another group of men lined up with their hands behind their heads. The dark image is difficult to geolocate, even after brightening with photo-editing software. The width of the street and parking is consistent with 3rd Street and the vehicles are possible matches with those seen at the top of 3rd Street in the Facebook live stream. The timestamp is also consistent with the previous image. While Myanmar Witness cannot verify with absolute confidence, it is likely that the image was taken near the north end of 3rd Street.
Figure 7: [Left] Image posted on twitter (source: Twitter user). [Right] Capture (13:39) from the Facebook Livestream showing a possible match for the vehicle near the top of 3rd Street (source: the link has since been removed, however this content was archived by Myanmar Witness).
Additional footage posted on social media provides two more angles of these men being marched along Anawrahta Road. One, shot from the south side, shows at least 13 men being marched along the street. A second short video from the north shows the same group being taken towards waiting trucks, which were out of shot in the first video. From the movements of the group, we can confirm that the two clips are shot seconds apart. It is not known what happened to these men after they were detained.
Figure 8: [Top] Capture (00:03) of a video showing men being marched along Anawrahta Road. [Bottom] Capture (00:01) of a video showing another angle of the detained men being led to the waiting trucks. (source redacted due to privacy concerns).
Attribution to the Lon Htein (Riot Police) and Myanmar military
By analysing the uniform of the officers involved in this event, Myanmar Witness was able to identify them as members of the Lon Htein (Riot Security Forces) by the red scarves tied around their necks. Due to the darkness and limited imagery, Myanmar Witness was unable to determine which battalion. The Lon Htein are renowned for their brutality and Myanmar Witness has reported on their activity within the Police and Harassment series.
Conclusion and future monitoring
This chronological reconstruction of events shows the lead up to, and detention of, at least 13 individuals following a police raid in Lanmadaw. It is not known what happened to the men after they were detained.
This series of case studies documents a number of early incidents involving violence against protestors and the deprivation of liberty of those who opposed the coup. As these case studies show, in the months following the coup, sound grenades, teargas, and live ammunition have been used on protestors and hundreds were detained.
Two years have passed since these events occurred in Yankin, Tamwe, North Okkalapa and Lanmadaw, and the military continues to crackdown on dissent. Myanmar Witness will continue to monitor the deprivation of civil liberties in Myanmar..."
Source/publisher:
Myanmar Witness
Date of publication:
2023-03-14
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-14
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Political prisoners and other violations in Burma - reports, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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Title: Statement from Karen Rivers Watch for International Day of Action for Rivers and Against Dams
Description:
"Today, on the International Day of Action for Rivers and Against Dams, we celebrate the healthy rivers that play a vital role in our lives, and call on governments, social organizations, and people around the world to stand united in protecting our rivers.
Rivers provide water for agriculture, drinking, and food production and they provide essential ecosystem services for humanity. They are also important for the protection of biodiversity and survival of countless trees, flora, and fauna species. However, living rivers are facing threats due to the building of dams and extraction of water and natural resources. In particular, large-scale hydropower projects built on rivers in Myanmar are having negative effects on the environment and people in river basins.
Large-scale development projects in Myanmar are ignoring the rights of Indigenous and local peoples; their participation rights and rights to their lands. Their rights are not recognised by the centralized system of governance in Myanmar. During the two years since the military coup, environmental damage has increased in Myanmar’s ethnic areas, while civic spaces and mechanisms for taking urgent action have broken down.
After the coup, the State Administration Council (SAC) leader announced the resumption of the Hatgyi dam project on the Salween river in Karen state. Military conflicts have occurred at the proposed Hatgyi Dam site since 2014. Gold mining in rivers, and river sand extraction activities have poisoned the waters and impacted local communities and the environment along the river. Along with militarized development, local people are also losing their livelihoods, homes, and lives due to the military’s air and ground attacks and many are hiding in forests. Humanitarian aid is urgently needed.
We, Karen Rivers Watch, Karen indigenous people, and Karen civil society partner organizations call upon international governments, UN agencies, investors, and individuals to preserve our healthy rivers and their ecosystems, and halt all large-scale hydropower projects on Myanmar’s rivers, which have significant social and environmental impacts. This is especially important at a time when climate change already contributes greatly to environmental degradation.
Today, on the International Day of Action for Rivers and Against Dams, we celebrate the beauty and power of living rivers and renew our commitments to protect them for all people and the planet. We make the following demands:
Karen Nation Union must:
Oppose all large-scale development and resource extraction projects that confiscate lands, destroy forests and threaten local livelihoods.
Implement their existing environmental policies and protect rivers, forests resources, endangered species and valuable resources.
Take action to prevent large business interests profiteering from Kawthoolei’s natural resources.
Resist the military dictatorship, which is perpetuating the centralized system which exploits the resources of ethnic groups, and instead encourage and support local management systems.
National Unity Consultative Council must:
Begin implementing policies to develop a federal resource management system that respects the rights of indigenous peoples and ethnic nationalities.
Blacklist companies and entrepreneurs who invest in or implement natural resources extraction projects which financially support the military.
Cooperate with civil society organizations to advocate to the international community.
International organizations, donors, and UN agencies must:
Terminate all loan programs to companies attempting to build Mega-dam projects that will damage people’s livelihoods and the environment.
Provide cross-border humanitarian aid to those affected by the ongoing conflicts in Burma through ethnics existing infrastructures..."
Source/publisher:
Karen Environmental and Social Action Network
Date of publication:
2023-03-14
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-14
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Water resources of Burma/Myanmar, Dams and other hydropower projects (global, regional), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
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"BANGKOK —
Human rights activists are pushing for the United Nations Security Council to refer Myanmar junta officials to the International Criminal Court, citing what the activists say are ongoing abuses in the Southeast Asian nation.
The comments coincided with a Security Council meeting Monday on the Myanmar crisis.
Human Rights Watch said in a statement that more concrete action needs to be taken against the junta, which seized power more than two years ago, overthrowing the democratically elected government of Aung San Suu Kyi. The military coup sparked mass unrest involving the country’s armed forces, as well as a resistance movement made up of protesters, activists, ousted politicians and an armed wing.
Thousands have been arrested or killed in a military crackdown, according to the latest data from a Thailand-based monitoring group.
The February 1, 2021, coup happened after the military rejected the outcome of November 2020 elections, in which Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy party won in a landslide. The junta claimed widespread electoral fraud, allegations denied by the civilian electoral commission before it was disbanded.
Human Rights Watch is urging the Security Council to build on a December resolution, which demanded an immediate end to the violence and that the junta free all political prisoners, including Suu Kyi and former President Win Myint, who also was ousted. Myanmar is under international sanctions.
“Myanmar’s junta has demonstrated it is impervious to statements of condemnation or concern. Its disregard of the Security Council’s December resolution shows the need for a new resolution imposing strong measures like an arms embargo and targeted sanctions for senior military officials and companies linked to the military,” said Louis Charbonneau, U.N. director at Human Rights Watch.
The council also has called for Myanmar’s democratic institutions to be restored.
On Monday, the U.N.’s special envoy for Myanmar, Noeleen Heyzer, and Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi led a closed-door meeting at U.N. headquarters in New York. Reports say Heyzer likely updated council members about the current situation on the ground in Myanmar, which has seen no letup in conflict since the adoption of the December resolution.
Kyaw Moe Tun, the current Myanmar permanent representative to the U.N., told VOA’s Burmese service that he was frustrated at the lack of progress the resolution has brought, but he hoped for a tangible outcome from Monday’s meeting.
The representative said, “There is no action if the resolution is not implemented, so what is the next step?”
He said the Security Council should take action against the Myanmar military if it fails to comply with the resolution.
May Sabe Phyu, director of the Gender Equality Network, a coalition of organizations advocating for women’s rights in Myanmar, tells the Associated Press the junta has conducted a terror campaign and committed “heinous acts” that constitute crimes against humanity.
Phyu also criticized U.N envoy Heyzer for meeting with Myanmar military chief Min Aung Hlaing and not with the National Unity Government, which was formed by ousted politicians and regional leaders amid the coup, and says it is Myanmar’s legitimate government.
As it stands, all plans to end the crisis have failed to have the desired effect.
The Association of Southeast Nations (ASEAN), a political and economic union of 10 member states in Southeast Asia, adopted a five-step consensus in April 2021 in an attempt to restore peace in Myanmar.
Although Myanmar agreed to the plan, little action was taken, leading to the exclusion of Myanmar’s military leaders from meetings with ASEAN members. Indonesia is ASEAN's current chair, which rotates annually among the member nations.
Charbonneau added in the Human Rights Watch report that Myanmar’s General Min Aung Hlaing has rejected the ASEAN consensus plan. Charbonneau called for Heyzer and Marsudi to push for further punishments.
“The U.N. special envoy and Indonesian foreign minister should make clear to Security Council members that the junta’s killings, torture, unlawful arrests and war crimes demand more targeted action. Cutting off the junta’s supply of money and weapons is a critical next step to stanch the atrocities being carried out every day in the country."
China, India and Russia abstained from December’s resolution vote, but 12 of the 15-member council voted in favor, so the motion was adopted. China and Russia are two of the five permanent Security Council members and have long opposed tough action over Myanmar.
Aung Thu Nyein, a political analyst, believes efforts made by the U.N. and ASEAN have “little leverage” on Myanmar’s issues.
“U.N. is so inefficient as Russia’s aggression against Ukraine has shown as evidence. U.N special envoy on Myanmar, Ms. Noleen Heyzer’s visit was ended, rebuffing a long statement by the junta,” he told VOA. “U.N. as well as ASEAN has little leverage to do with Myanmar’s crisis. If all special envoys on Myanmar, particularly China, Japan, ASEAN and other regional powers can work together, it may drive the junta [to stop].”..."
Source/publisher:
"VOA" (Washington, D.C)
Date of publication:
2023-03-14
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-14
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, International Criminal Court
Language:
more
Description:
"13 March 2023: Violence in Myanmar at the hands of the military has increased in 2023 in direct defiance of United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 2669 and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Five Point Consensus. The UN Security Council must respond to the military’s non-compliance, with action, not mere words, says the Special Advisory Council for Myanmar (SAC-M).
The UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2669 on 21 December 2022. The resolution expressed “deep concern at the ongoing state of emergency imposed by the military in Myanmar on 1 February 2021 and its grave impact on the people of Myanmar” (preambular paragraph 1) and demanded “an immediate end to all forms of violence throughout the country” (operative paragraph 1). Operative demands made by the UN Security Council are considered binding under international law.
Since the resolution was adopted, credible reports indicate that the military has continued to launch airstrikes and artillery fire on civilian targets, massacred civilians and resistance fighters and burned civilian homes and property on a near-daily basis, in the north, northwest, east and southeast of Myanmar. In the past two weeks, cases have been reported of a single military troop beheading up to 18 resistance members and two children, and massacring 16 civilians, including three women who were raped before being killed, across three townships in Sagaing Region.
“Min Aung Hlaing and his military are not only failing to abide by the UN Security Council resolution – they are wilfully defying it,” said Yanghee Lee of SAC-M. “This is the same military that committed genocide against the Rohingya five years ago. Once again, the international community is watching on, this time as they attack an entire country and erode the security of south and southeast Asia. This is a global issue upon which the Security Council must act.”
Two years of democratic resistance have derailed Min Aung Hlaing’s attempt to seize control of Myanmar by force. Rather than change course, Min Aung Hlaing last month announced an extension to his unlawful state of emergency and unilaterally declared martial law in further parts of the country. These announcements have no legal authority but correlate with the commission of increasingly brutal acts of terror by Min Aung Hlaing’s troops.
“For two years, the military has systematically committed acts of terror, as defined under international and Myanmar law, in addition to widespread violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, and serious international criminal offences,” said Chris Sidoti of SAC-M. “The Security Council must act to enforce the military’s compliance with its resolution, including through targeted sanctions on military financial interests, a comprehensive arms embargo and referral to the International Criminal Court.”
Resolution 2669 further called for immediate and concrete actions to “effectively and fully implement ASEAN’s Five Point Consensus agreed on 24 April 2021” (operative paragraph 6). The Security Council will hear reports today from the Special Envoy of the UN Secretary-General on Myanmar and the Foreign Minister of Indonesia, this year’s ASEAN Chair, on UN support for implementation of the Five-Point Consensus.
“The extreme violence being inflicted on the population by the military must stop – this is an absolute minimum requirement for any progress, by ASEAN, by the UN or by anyone else, towards an eventual resolution of the crisis in Myanmar,” said Marzuki Darusman of SAC-M. “The simple truth is that the Five Point Consensus is failing while the junta’s violence intensifies. But Min Aung Hlaing has demonstrated no intention of curbing the atrocities. The UN Security Council must act in support of ASEAN to compel him to do so. There is no other option.”..."
Source/publisher:
Special Advisory Council for Myanmar
Date of publication:
2023-03-13
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-13
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
Language:
more
Description:
"Documented incidents
19 February 2023: In Kume town, Myittha township, Kyaukse district, Mandalay region, several private hospital owners were amongst ten business men arrested by the Myanmar military on accusations of supporting the local resistance forces. Source: Mandalay Free Press
21 February 2023: In Moe Dar Gyi village and village tract, Katha township and district, Sagaing region, a nurse was arrested from her home by the Myanmar military on accusations of providing health care to the local resistance forces. On 25 February, her body was found with a gunshot wound to the forehead and her hands tied behind. Sources: Chindwin News Agency, Delta News Agency, Facebook, Radio Free Asia and Zalen
23 February 2023: In Ma Le Thar village and village tract, Ayadaw township, Monywa district,
Sagaing region, a hospital (public, primary-level) was damaged by a Myanmar military airstrike.
Ground military troops then destroyed medicines and equipment at the hospital. There were no casualties as patients and staff had evacuated due to the anticipated attack. Sources: Delta News Agency and Khit Thit Media
25 February 2023: In Lashio town, township and district, Shan state (North), two female nurses were arrested by the Myanmar military. One appeared in the court on 28 February with the charge of Section 505(A). Source: Democratic Voice of Burma
25 February 2023: In Pa Dat Taing village and village tract, Myinmu township, Sagaing district and region, a sub-rural health centre (public, primary-level), a library and 65 civilian houses were torched by the Myanmar military. Source: Mizzima
26 February 2023: In several villages in Banmauk township, Katha district, Sagaing region, local resistance forces and the Kachin Independence Army reportedly blocked the import of medicines, rice, cooking oil, and salt. Source: Telegram
27 February 2023: In a village in Yinmabin township and district, Sagaing region, the Myanmar military destroyed a CDM-affiliated female public health supervisor who provided health care to the local resistance forces home, along with three homes of local resistance forces. Source: Myaelatt Athan
28 February 2023: In Tha Man Ta Poet (middle) village, Tha Man Ta Poet village tract, Yesgyo township, Pakokku district, Magway region, the Myanmar military seized IED-making materials from a sub-rural health centre (public, primary-level) occupied the local resistance forces. Source:
Telegram
Reported on 02 March 2023: In Bogale town and township, Pyapon district, Ayeyarwady region, a nurse appeared in court on counter terrorism charges. She was arrested in late January 2023 on accusations of links with an alleged local resistance force member. At the time of arrest, she worked at Bogale Township Hospital (public, secondary-level), and was not CDM-affiliated.
Source: Facebook
03 March 2023: In Palaw township, Myeik district, Tanintharyi region, the junta authorities blocked the import of medicines and food items into the township. Source: Than Lwin Times
07 March 2023: In Khin-U town and township, Shwebo district, Sagaing region, a group of gunmen entered the township hospital (public, secondary-level) and robbed 15 wood doors to be used in the construction of a new hospital building. The military accused the local resistance forces of the robbery. Source: Telegram..."
Source/publisher:
Insecurity Insight (Geneva) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of publication:
2023-03-13
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-13
Grouping:
Individual Documents
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"At least 28 people were killed by the Myanmar army at a monastery in southern Shan state, an insurgent group said.
Troops shelled Nan Naint village on Saturday, the Karenni Nationalities Defence Force (KNDF) said.
Myanmar has seen a growing number of deadly battles between its military and armed resistance groups since the junta seized power in a coup two years ago.
Some of the fiercest fighting has been in this region between the capital Nay Pyi Taw and the border with Thailand.
On Saturday, the military's air force and artillery entered the village after the shelling around 16:00 local time (09:30 GMT) and executed villagers they found hiding inside a monastery, the KNDF said.
A video from KNDF - one of several ethnic armies which have joined the fight against the military government - showed at least 21 bodies, including three in the orange robes worn by Buddhist monks, piled up against the monastery. The bodies had what appeared to be multiple gunshot wounds. The video also shows the walls of the monastery peppered with bullet holes.
The Kantarawaddy Times, a local newspaper, quoted a KNDF spokesperson saying: "It was like the [military] made them line up in front of the monastery and brutally shot them all, including the monks."
The group told the BBC it had found the other seven bodies nearby in the tiny village.
Some of the surrounding buildings and houses were also burned down in what the KNDF has said was a military attack on the village.
Devastation from the air in Myanmar's brutal civil war
She treated the resistance, and paid with her life
The group said the villagers had believed taking shelter with the highly-respected monks in the area might guarantee them protection. Others in the village had evacuated before the soldiers arrived.
Details of the incident are difficult to verify, but the savage nature of the attack against unarmed civilians is not new in this part of Myanmar, which has seen some of the strongest resistance to the military junta since a coup two years ago.
The KNDF told the BBC that since 25 February, there had been increased clashes and fighting as junta soldiers had advanced on the Nan Naint area and its monastery.
Nan Naint is on the main route from Shan state to Kayah state, a road the junta believes is critical to arms supply to the insurgent groups fighting against them.
It is also an area with a mixed population of sometimes rival ethnic groups: Pa-O, Shan and Karenni people.
The Pa-O National Organisation and its armed wing are strongly pro-junta in the area. Locals report the army has stepped up efforts to reinforce such pro-junta ethnic militias in the region to challenge the opposition who control the area.
And in recent months, attacks and counter-attacks had paved the way for the escalation on Saturday, observers say.
"The Karenni groups have captured some villages and so the Myanmar military is now shelling them," a village official near the military outpost of Saung Pyaung told the local The Irrawaddy newspaper.
Such fighting has also displaced thousands of people, local aid groups report.
Myanmar's military leaders had been hoping to hold an election this year in the belief this would give their government some badly-needed legitimacy.
But their failure to crush opposition to their rule, even with the extensive use of aerial bombardment in recent months, has made holding an election a near impossible task.
Myanmar has been caught up in a civil war for decades, which escalated after the coup in 2021.
One-and-a-half million people have been displaced, 40,000 homes have been gutted, eight million children are no longer in school, and 15 million people are judged by the UN to be dangerously short of food.
More than 2,900 people have been killed during the junta's crackdown on dissent, according to monitoring group the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners..."
Source/publisher:
"BBC News" (London)
Date of publication:
2023-03-13
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-13
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights Defenders, Armed conflict in Burma - attacks on civilians
Language:
more
Sub-title:
Human Rights Catastrophe Intensifies Since December Resolution
Description:
"The United Nations Security Council should build on its December 2022 resolution on Myanmar by adopting tangible measures to hold the junta accountable for ongoing abuses, Human Rights Watch said. The council will hold a session on Myanmar on March 13, 2023, and hear reports from Noeleen Heyzer, the UN secretary-general’s special envoy on Myanmar, and Retno Marsudi, Indonesia’s foreign minister and head of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) office of the special envoy on Myanmar.
Security Council members should consider the December resolution on Myanmar, which denounced the military’s rights violations since the February 1, 2021 coup, as only a first step to reinvigorate global scrutiny of the junta’s atrocities. The council should take meaningful actions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, including instituting a global arms embargo, referring the country situation to the International Criminal Court, and imposing targeted sanctions on junta leadership and military-owned companies.
“Myanmar’s junta has demonstrated it’s impervious to statements of condemnation or concern,” said Louis Charbonneau, UN director at Human Rights Watch. “Its disregard of the Security Council’s December resolution shows the need for a new resolution imposing strong measures like an arms embargo and targeted sanctions for senior military officials and companies linked to the military.”
Since December, junta security forces have killed at least 263 people through artillery shelling, airstrikes, and arson attacks on villages, as well as torture, rape, and executions in custody, according to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP). The authorities have arrested at least 486 people and sentenced at least 401 over the same period, including teachers, monks, doctors and nurses, lawyers, National League for Democracy (NLD) legislators and party officials, and aid workers.
Most of the convictions have carried sentences of between 10 years to life in prison under “terrorism” or “incitement” provisions put in place or expanded by the junta to broadly criminalize the opposition movement.
The junta has committed widespread and systematic abuses against the civilian population – including extrajudicial killings, torture, and wrongful imprisonment – that amount to crimes against humanity. Many attacks on civilians and villages are apparent war crimes. Since February 2021, security forces have killed more than 3,000 people and arbitrarily arrested over 20,000.
In February, the junta extended its manufactured state of emergency for an additional six months before declaring martial law in 40 new townships across a number of states and regions, transferring all executive and judicial power to the head of the relevant regional military command.
The December council resolution called for “full, safe and unhindered humanitarian access,” expressing deep concern at the “increasingly large numbers of internally displaced persons and dramatic increase in humanitarian need.” However, the Myanmar junta is increasing blockages on humanitarian assistance to prevent aid from reaching populations in need as a form of collective punishment. Since the resolution was adopted, military operations in the southeast and northwest have displaced more than 150,000 civilians, bringing the total number of people displaced since the coup to 1.3 million. Armed clashes have affected almost 80 percent of the country’s townships.
The December resolution contained numerous references to ASEAN, which adopted a “five-point consensus” in April 2021 in response to the Myanmar coup. Junta chief Sr. Gen. Min Aung Hlaing has since rejected each point of the consensus while exploiting the international community’s deference to the regional bloc. As this year’s ASEAN chair, Indonesia should reroute the bloc’s approach to more effectively isolate the Myanmar junta while soliciting ASEAN support for additional Security Council measures and cooperation with other countries’ efforts to block the flow of revenue and arms to the junta.
“The generals have embarked on a scorched earth policy in an attempt to stamp out opposition,” Volker Türk, the UN high commissioner for human rights, reported earlier this month. “The military, emboldened by continuous and absolute impunity, has consistently shown disregard for international obligations and principles. Urgent, concrete action is needed to end this festering catastrophe.”
Security Council members, in light of the junta’s flagrant noncompliance with the ASEAN five-point consensus and December resolution, should use today’s session to identify concrete steps to counter the grave abuses and violations of international human rights and humanitarian law being inflicted daily.
“The UN special envoy and Indonesian foreign minister should make clear to Security Council members that the junta’s killings, torture, unlawful arrests, and war crimes demand more targeted action,” Charbonneau said. “Cutting off the junta’s supply of money and weapons is a critical next step to stanch the atrocities being carried out every day in the country.”..."
Source/publisher:
Human Rights Watch (USA)
Date of publication:
2023-03-13
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-13
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
more
Sub-title:
A People’s Defense Force member died after the junta sent in an attack helicopter.
Description:
"A pro-democracy militia in central Magway region set fire to a junta-controlled oil well after storming a military guard post at a Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise oil field.
Around five junta troops were injured in Thursday’s attack but the People’s Defense Force was hit harder, with one death and seven injuries following a junta airstrike, according to the Myaing People’s Administration Group, which is aligned with the PDF.
Around 40 junta soldiers, police and members of the Pyu Saw Htee militia were stationed at a camp in the oil field when the PDF attacked.
“The PDF forces surrounded Well Two and opened fire (on the guard posts),” Cpt. Mite Tee, administration officer of Myaing township’s western zone told RFA.
“We were able to burn it (the posts) down and had some success but we had to retreat due to a sudden airstrike.”
He said the junta attack helicopter fired around 20 times at the PDF after it set fire to tents at the camp’s gates and entered the camp.
The military junta has not released a statement on the incident and calls to junta spokesman Major Gen. Zaw Min Tun went unanswered Friday.
There are hundreds of oil wells in the Well Two oil field, which produces about 100 barrels per day, according to residents.
Mite Tee told RFA that troops often raid nearby villages to flush out People’s Defense Force members and try to limit attacks.
The junta declared martial law in Magway region’s Myaing, Pauk, Tilin, Gangaw and Saw townships on Feb. 2 this year..."
Source/publisher:
"RFA" (USA)
Date of publication:
2023-03-10
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-10
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Language:
more
Description:
"Today, International Women's Day is being celebrated worldwide, while in Myanmar, a total of 483 women have been killed by the Terrorist Military Council in the past two years, and a total of 3,125 women including State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi are languishing in prison. A total of 11 women have been sentenced to death, and 15 to life imprisonment, with a further 122 women sexually assaulted by the junta's troops. Sexual violence and violence against Myanmar women of various forms now plague the country.
On march 8th, 1857 protests in a New York textile factory to increase wages, gain voting rights, and reduce working hours led to a violent crackdown by authorities. Over a hundred years later, in 1975, the United Nations declared International Women's Day, a day designated to promote and protect women's rights. Myanmar also signed the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) July 22, 1997, and although Myanmar agreed, subsequent terrorist dictators not only ignored the treaty but also failed to implement its provisions for many years. The contract was violated.
Over the past 26 years, terrorist dictators have committed a variety of inhumane acts of violence purposefully and systematically violating Myanmar women's rights and preventing any social progress. In the past 26 years even though Myanmar signed the CEDAW, terrorist dictators were absolutely unwilling to comply with it and this is evident by the statement they release on the day before International Women's Day. Terrorist dictators have committed inhumane crimes against Myanmar women and rather than apologising to Myanmar women for the crimes and abuses the terrorist leaders have committed, and taking legal action and delivering justice, the terrorist dictators instead destroying criminal evidence, torching crime scenes and incinerating dead bodies to hide the signs of torture. Along with this, a cruel 4 cuts policy is also being imposed on the people and violence against Myanmar women continues.
As of the 8th of March, rather than protecting the rights of Myanmar women in accordance with the CEDAW, to which Myanmar is a signatory, and promoting the intellectual, physical, and emotional fortitude of Myanmar women, the junta have instead murdered a total of 483 Myanmar women who have been acting for women's rights and federal democracy in the past two years. Soon after the coup, on February 9th, 2021, peaceful protester Mya Thwet Thwet Khine (မ မြသွဲ့သွဲ့ခိုင်) was shot in the head. Less than a month later on March 3rd, 19 year-old Angel (ကြယ်စင်) was shot in the head. The military have continued their killing spree, most recently on March 1st, 2023 just before International Women's Day where they sexually violated and murdered three women Ma Pan Nwe (မပန်းနွယ်), Ma Pan Twe ( မပန်းသွယ်), Ma Swe Swe Oo (မဆွေဆွေဦး) in the village of Tatai, Sagaing Region.
In addition to the 483 women murdered in the past 24 months, a total of 3,125 Myanmar women, including state counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi have been unjustly detained and junta forces have sexually abused and violated a total of 122 Myanmar women. In the last 24 months, in addition to the unjust executions of Phyo Zayar Taw and Ko Jimmy, a total of 11 Myanmar women have been sentenced to death and a further 15 have been sentenced to life imprisonment. The terrorist dictators use hunger, rape, and arson as weapons, leading to the displacement of 1.6 million people, mostly women and children. More than 50,000 buildings have been set ablaze, and more than 17 million people in Myanmar are affected by famine, again with women and children bearing the brunt of the burden.
We will continue working with international governments and relevant organisations to prosecute terrorist dictators through international legal channels until the people of Myanmar get justice, with no crime left unpunished. Together, we will root out the military dictatorship and restore rights and power to the hands of women and people of Myanmar regardless of race, religion, gender, and ethnicity and build a new federal democracy embracing equality for all the people of Myanmar..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of International Cooperation Myanmar
Date of publication:
2023-03-08
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-10
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Women's rights, Women and Politics in Burma/Myanmar, Articles, reports and sites relating to women of Burma
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"Human Rights Council
Fifty-second session
27 February–31 March 2023
Conference room paper of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar
Summary
Having failed to secure control of Myanmar and recognition by most Member States as legitimate, the military junta, or State Administrative Council (SAC), of Myanmar finds itself at a turning point two years after launching an illegal military coup. As widespread public opposition continues and attacks by its forces on villages intensify, the SAC will step up its efforts to advance its false claim to legitimacy in 2023, including by orchestrating a sham “election.” Its goal is to reverse its international isolation abroad and portray as inevitable its claim as the government of Myanmar to audiences at home, rendering continued popular opposition both dangerous and futile.
Member States of the UN have an important responsibility and role to play in determining whether Myanmar’s military junta will succeed in achieving its goal of being accepted as legitimate and gaining control of a nation in revolt. This conference room paper is presented to Member States as a resource to meeting this responsibility.
The paper addresses the claims of the SAC to be a legitimate government by both examining its claim that its coup was legal under a constitution that it drafted and put into place in 2008 and by applying international standards as established by two core doctrines that have informed the recognition of governments since World War II. The conclusion of this analysis is clear – the SAC’s military coup was illegal and its claim as Myanmar’s government is illegitimate.
The core leadership of the administrative and legislative elements of Myanmar’s democratic government that the SAC prevented from forming have reconstituted in opposition to the SAC. The National Unity Government (NUG), the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH), and the National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC) were created to represent the will of Myanmar’s people, with the NUG forming the administrative side of government in this transitional period. The NUG provides the international community with a credible alternative to the SAC. Applying the same international standards of legitimacy used to examine the legitimacy claims of the SAC, this paper finds that the NUG has a far stronger claim to legitimacy.
The paper also examines in detail Member States’ interactions with the SAC, highlighting those actions that have delegitimized or withheld recognition to the SAC, and those actions by Member States that have created the appearance of legitimacy. The Special Rapporteur urges that Member States who support human rights, democracy, and the aspirations of the people of Myanmar publicly reject the SAC’s false claim as a legitimate government and instead recognize the NUG as the legitimate representative of the people of Myanmar. He also urges Member States to reject the sham elections the SAC is planning to hold by August 2023.
Finally, the Special Rapporteur reiterates his recommendation that the Member States who stand with the people of Myanmar immediately form a working group of governments to develop and implement a coordinated strategy that can deny the SAC the weapons and resources that it requires, while supporting the people of Myanmar with humanitarian and other forms of non-lethal aid..."
Source/publisher:
UN Human Rights Council (Geneva) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of publication:
2023-01-30
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-10
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
UN human rights documents on Myanmar, Human Rights and international relations, Armed conflict and peace-building in Burma - theoretical, strategic and general, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
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Format :
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Size:
1.92 MB
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Description:
"Key Event Details: Location of Incident:
Kyauktada township (ကျောက်တံတား), Yangon city (ရန်ကုန်) [16.776670, 96.163171].
Chanayethazan township (ချမ်းအေးသာဇံ), Mandalay (မန္တလေး), [21.989303, 96.071360].
Date/Time of Incident:
7 March 2021
Alleged Perpetrator(s) and/or Involvement:
Myanmar Police and military personnel
Yangon Division, Operation Command Headquarters No. 4
Summary of Investigation:
Myanmar Witness has verified footage of events in both Yangon and Mandalay which show individuals being beaten repeatedly by men wearing police and military uniforms.
At the incident in Yangon, insignia worn by the military indicates that they were from the Yangon Division of Operation Command Headquarters No.4.
At the incident in Mandalay, Myanmar Witness has verified footage of a person being beaten, kicked, and dragged across the road by several men wearing police and military uniforms, including uniforms belonging to Lon Htein (Riot Police) battalion 4.....Executive Summary: In the months following the February 2021 military coup, Myanmar Witness documented and verified footage of police and military violence against individuals. This mini-series of spot reports documents five separate incidents in Yangon, Mandalay and Sagaing in February and March 2021.
The case studies show police and military personnel beating unarmed individuals, including those already in detention; harassment, intimidation and arrest of medical workers; and the infliction of degrading treatment. They also show evidence of coordination between police and violence by men in civilian clothes. Analysis of rank and insignia clearly visible in the footage enables attribution of responsibility for the violence to the Lon Htein (Riot Security Forces), soldiers from Myanmar military’s Yangon Command, and the 101 Light Infantry Battalion. Additionally, ranking police officers were identified in two incidents.
In the third report of the series, Myanmar Witness has verified footage from two separate incidents showing individuals being beaten by men wearing police and military uniforms. At the incident in Yangon, insignia worn by the military indicates that they were from the Yangon Division of Operation Command Headquarters No.4. At the incident in Mandalay, Myanmar Witness has verified footage of a person being beaten, kicked, and dragged across the road by several men wearing police and military uniforms, including uniforms belonging to Lon Htein (Riot Police) battalion 4.
These examples of police and military brutality are being released to mark two years passing since their occurrence, but they are by no means exhaustive. Myanmar Witness has documented other instances of police and military harassment since the coup, which has been documented in several reports, including: Violence against protestors in North Okkalapa, Bago, and Hlaing Tharyar; and, the deaths of multiple female protestors, including Ma Kyal Sin (Angel) and Daw Tinnwe.....Kyauktada township, Yangon: The investigation walkthrough
Myanmar Witness has verified multiple pieces of user-generated content which show individuals being beaten repeatedly by a group of Myanmar police and military personnel. By analysing a number of allegations alongside these two disparate sources, it appears that these events took place on 7 March 2021.
In footage posted by Tachileik News, multiple people beat individuals who appear to be crouched down in a defensive stance (as seen in figure 1).
Additional footage allegedly from the same day shows the same group of people from a different angle. Multiple protests did occur on this day in Yangon; however, Myanmar Witness cannot confirm that these individuals were protestors or engaged in protest. Below is a comparison of two stills from the two alternative videos showing the same people - identified within both images by coloured boxes.....Geolocating the incident:
By analysing identifiable features in the two videos, Myanmar Witness was able to identify where these individuals were beaten to the corner where Anawrahta Road and Seikkantha Street meet, in Yangon.....Attribution: Myanmar Police and Myanmar military: As seen in the video stills above, there were several police and military personnel involved. By analysing the uniform of the personnel involved in this event, Myanmar Witness was able to identify a high-ranking police officer present at the scene, and the command of the military personnel.
The police officer is wearing a vest and there are clear signs that he has at least two stars on his shoulder rank slide, indicating that he is either a police lieutenant, or a police captain.
The military personnel involved in the incident are wearing a patch on their left arms. Myanmar Witness has been able to identify this as the Yangon Division of Operation Command Headquarters No. 4. Visual confirmation of the match can be seen in Figure 5.....Chanayethazan township, Mandalay The investigation walk through: Footage emerged on social media on 7 March 2021 showing a person dressed in white being beaten, kicked and then dragged across a road by men in Myanmar military uniforms. The events allegedly took place at a ‘multi-school strike’ and led to the arrests and beating of multiple students. Khit Thit media claims that the individual depicted was a second year paramedical student.
Myanmar Witness identified multiple videos and images showing several angles of this specific incident. In the first video, the group of Myanmar military personnel and police are seen kicking the body (source redacted due to privacy concerns), and in the second video they are seen dragging the body away.This specific case is concerning given the level of violence inflicted on the person already in police custody. The individual is clearly injured and after being dragged, one police member continued to strike the individual, who was lying motionless, with a stick (as seen in figure 7). Additional images shared by the Voice of Myanmar show the same individual on the floor as the Myanmar police beat him. By comparing the Khit Thit Media video with the images released by the Voice of Myanmar, it is possible to determine that this is the same incident. They show the same individual being beaten, the same security forces, and it is in the same location (as seen by figure 9). Other images shared on the same day show students from Mandalay’s Technology University protesting, wearing similar white outfits and helmets as the individual being beaten in the figures above.....Geolocating and chronolocating the incident: Myanmar Witness geolocated the footage to Pinya Street, using features seen in the background of the video, such as the small black sign indicating “Love House” and Hotel Iceland, in front of which the violence took place. The location of the shadows cast by the men and the utility poles indicates that the footage was filmed around noon.....Attribution: Myanmar military, police and Riot Police: Members of the Myanmar military, police and Lon Htein (Riot police) are visible within the footage analysed. While the specific units of the military personnel cannot be determined, Lon Htein personnel can be identified by the red scarves tied around their necks. The blue circle on the red scarf states the battalion number; in this case the individuals appear to be from battalion 4.....Conclusion and future monitoring: The Myanmar Police and military were accused of widespread brutality against protestors and civilians following the coup. The excessive violence shown towards individuals as shown in this report signals a culture within both the Myanmar military and the police. Similar acts of brutality occurred in multiple locations on the same day.
This mini-series of spot reports documents five separate incidents in February and March 2021 where the police and military have harassed or mistreated individuals. While these examples are by no means exhaustive, they capture a number of violent tactics employed by the Myanmar security forces to quell rebellion against the coup..."
Source/publisher:
Myanmar Witness
Date of publication:
2023-03-07
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-10
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations, Freedom of opinion and expression: - the situation in Burma/Myanmar - reports, analyses, recommendations
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"In early February, four members of an anti-junta group in the Myanmar city of Mandalay said they received a secret, one-page, handwritten note spirited out of a prison that details two days of clashes and beatings of female political prisoners.
The note, received by the "Anti-Junta Forces Coordination Committee - Mandalay" and since seen by Reuters, provides the first detailed account of a crackdown on defiant female prisoners inside Mandalay's Obo prison that left scores of women injured, according to six activists and lawyers who work with political prisoners.
Two family members of prison inmates contacted the anti-junta group after being told by prison authorities that they couldn't send food and packages to relatives, the four anti-junta group members said.
The group started looking into the matter and, within days, received the note, the four members said.
Two lawyers, two family members of inmates and the human rights minister from Myanmar's exiled parallel civilian government confirmed the information contained in the note. Reuters could not independently verify the authenticity of the note or the details it contains.
A spokesman for Myanmar's military government that has ruled since seizing power in 2021 and two prison department officers did not answer repeated calls over two days from Reuters seeking comment.
The junta has previously denied holding political prisoners, saying people in jail broke the law and were sentenced after due legal process. Human rights organizations have frequently criticized the hearings as kangaroo courts.
Inside the prison, which rights activists say houses some 2,000 political inmates including 330 women, an altercation between an inmate and a prison official on Feb. 3 led to around 150 male prison guards arriving with slingshots, batons and bamboo sticks, the note, written in Burmese, said.
"During that incident, more than 100 female political prisoners were seriously injured including a broken arm, eye injuries and facial bruises," the note said.
The following day, some female prisoners and prison guards faced off again, leading to another bout of violent clashes, according to the note and the lawyers, activists and family members who spoke to Reuters. They said they obtained the information from around a dozen people, including prison wardens, medical staff and inmates.
Serious injuries
All four activists declined to reveal exactly how the note was smuggled out, citing risk to individuals involved in the process and fearful that such routes to leak information from inside the prison may be blocked by authorities.
The activists and lawyers said the note, and the details of the clashes on Feb. 3-4 they pieced together from conversations with prison staff and others, afforded a rare insight into what they described as harsh conditions faced by thousands of prisoners across Myanmar under military rule, including women, who are often given limited food and medicines.
The activists, lawyers and family members interviewed by Reuters asked not to be identified for fear of repercussions as they are working inside Myanmar.
In the second week of February, the parallel civilian government said in a social media post that 150 male guards at Obo prison had "violently beaten up" women inmates, supporting the version of events that the activists, lawyers and family members separately provided to Reuters.
Of the 100 female inmates injured in the clashes, all aged between 20 and 35, 21 were seriously injured, including six who were hit in the head, according to activists and lawyers. The smuggled note did not specify injuries or provide such detailed figures.
Myanmar's jails were inundated by new prisoners in 2021 after the junta seized power from the elected government led by Nobel laureate Aung San Suu Kyi, triggering a wave of protests that has morphed into a guerrilla resistance movement.
Accused by local and international rights activists of rampant abuses in its response, the junta has said that it has a duty to ensure peace and security, and that it is carrying out a legitimate campaign against “terrorists”.
The junta has imprisoned around 16,000 people, more than 3,000 of them women, as of Feb. 28, according to the non-profit Assistance Association for Political Prisoners.
'They used men' to guard women
Aung Myo Min, the human rights minister in Myanmar's exiled parallel civilian government, said Obo prison authorities had violated prison rules by using male guards to handle female inmates.
"As these people are women prisoners, they have to be handled by women prison guards. But they used men,” he told Reuters, echoing similar allegations made separately by activists and lawyers.
Male guards cannot enter dormitories housing female inmates without the presence of women guards and female inmates cannot be physically beaten, according to a copy of a nationwide prison rule book published in 1992 seen by Reuters.
Reuters could not independently verify if there were any female guards present during the incidents on Feb. 3-4 or if the rule book remains current.
"They used excessive force," Aung Myo Min said, adding that his ministry had investigated the violence at Obo prison. He declined to explain how the investigation was conducted and offered no evidence to support the allegation.
The anti-junta group and two Mandalay-based lawyers who work with political prisoners said those involved in the violence were also denied medical care.
"They refused to give medicines to the injured prisoners after beating them severely. We had to use under-the-table methods to be able to send medicine," one lawyer said. Reuters could not independently verify that information.
After the violence, 72 female political prisoners were isolated from other inmates at Obo and dozens were transferred to other jails without their families being notified, according to three activists, two lawyers and two family members..."
Source/publisher:
"Reuters" (UK) via "VOA" (Washington, D.C)
Date of publication:
2023-03-10
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-10
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Political prisoners and other violations in Burma - reports, Freedom of opinion and expression: - the situation in Burma/Myanmar - reports, analyses, recommendations
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"The political implications of ultra-nationalist Buddhist monks and ideologies in Myanmar received much attention in the years before the 2021 military takeover. As Myanmar has turned more violent since the coup, ultra-nationalist monks have been radicalised further. What role are these monks playing in the political landscape of Myanmar today? And what is their rationale for supporting the military?
The coup leader, Commander-in-Chief of the Tatmadaw (Armed Forces of Myanmar) Min Aung Hlaing, marked Myanmar’s 75th Independence Day on 4 January 2023 by honouring hundreds of individuals, including the notorious ultra-nationalist monk U Wirathu who received a medal for patriotism. But similar recognition was absent for U Wirathu’s fellow ultra-nationalist monk, U Warthawa.
U Warthawa has been instrumental in organising and legitimising pro-junta militias in the Pyu Saw Htee group, an ultra-nationalist organisation comprised of local supporters of the military’s USDP party and trained by military veterans. These militias are increasingly doing the Tatmadaw’s dirty work in fighting the resistance from the People’s Defence Force, particularly in the restive Sagaing Region.
In March 2021, the Pyu Saw Htee group headquarters announced the formation of the Pyu Saw Htee as people’s militias to protect the villages, following nationwide resistance against the coup. But by early 2022, the militias were armed with rifles to support military columns and trained directly by the Tatmadaw, organised under the patronage of monks like U Warthawa.
The name Pyu Saw Htee refers to a legendary king from the early Bagan dynasty. The first Pyu Saw Htee militia that supported the government was formed in 1955 as a people’s militia to fight insurgent groups, though that group was dissolved two years later.
The symbolism behind the name refers to the elimination of threats to the capital and is not historically associated with Buddhism or monks. But a year after the coup, the concept re-emerged to describe the network of ultra-nationalists countering the anti-coup resistance. The logo of today’s Pyu Saw Htee group depicts the Sasana flag — the flag of the Buddhist religion — with the image of King Pyu Saw Htee standing on the dead bodies of the enemies of Bagan.
One of our interviewees, a self-described ‘nationalist monk’, said that the term Pyu Saw Htee is used to honour militant efforts, acting as ‘guidelines [which] will help them win against all threats’. He explained that while monks are not meant to participate directly in the militias, they should provide the right guidance ‘for the heroes who protect the family, the village, the society and Buddhism from threats’.
While ultra-nationalist monks in Myanmar are mainly associated with anti-Muslim sentiments, at least three additional key factors contribute to their involvement in the politics of Myanmar.
First, many monks believe that the Buddhist religion is facing an existential threat from external forces. Islam is one part of this perceived threat, but so too is secularisation, modernisation and democracy. The monks see it as their responsibility to preserve what they understand to be the original form of Buddhism.
Second, during the reform period of 2011–2020, the rise of civil society also challenged traditional authority in Myanmar, further threatening the elevated role of the monks as trusted leaders in society.
Third, changes within the relationship between monks and administrators have also shaped ultra-nationalist monks’ involvement in politics. Experiences from the reform period have led these monks to doubt that a civilian administration can protect the Buddhist religion and community and they see themselves as obliged to step in and guide society. As ultra-nationalist monks see the military as closer to the traditional rule of the Buddhist kings than other players in the politics of Myanmar, their agenda is to ensure that the Tatmadaw maintains its role as the protector of the nation, race and religion.
Two years after the 2021 coup, the Tatmadaw is facing its greatest challenge in recent history. The sustained resistance against the junta has stretched the military’s resources and capabilities to their limits. The military’s preferred strategy is to rely on vigilante groups and armed militias to carry some of the load.
The ultra-nationalist monks not only represent religious authority, but they also serve as protectors of legendary King Pyu Saw Htee’s legacy, securing traditional legitimacy for the military regime. As this religious and spiritual justification of violence is highly valuable to the Tatmadaw, the influence of ultra-nationalist monks will likely continue to impact the political landscape in post-coup Myanmar..."
Source/publisher:
East Asia Forum
Date of publication:
2023-03-10
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-10
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Burmese Buddhism and Society
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Description:
"Two years following the Myanmar military's overthrowal of the democratically-elected ruling party on February 1, 2021, thousands of people have been killed in violence sweeping the country while nearly 1.5 million people remain internally displaced.
In Myanmar, food insecurity is on the rise, health and education systems have disintegrated, and nearly half of the population of 55 million people is living below the poverty line.
Rohingya communities continue to suffer from systemic discrimination and a lack of protection mechanisms, including access to legal status within Myanmar. Almost 130,000 Rohingya people remain internally displaced, and over 943,000 live in crowded and increasingly unsafe conditions in Bangladesh.
Disproportionate to the need, Myanmar's Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) was only 41% funded in 2022.
Despite operating under heavy access constraints, security threats, and severe underfunding, INGOs and local NGOs, the backbone of the humanitarian response, provided lifesaving aid under the HRP and reached more than 4 million people.
Myanmar faces extreme access constraints due to attacks on humanitarian staff and the de facto authorities' adoption of bureaucratic and administrative measures that restrict civic space and limit humanitarian operations.
In October 2022, Myanmar's de facto authorities enacted the Organization Registration Law, which introduced the mandatory registration of NGOs, CSOs, and INGOs with strict administrative and potentially criminal penalties for non-compliance.
Aid actors have already responded by expanding their modalities to continue their daily operations, including cash assistance, remote services, engagement with Community Based Organizations, and increased risk assessments.
However, donors have a central role in ensuring humanitarian assistance reaches those most in need by providing robust and flexible funding to all partners allowing for maximum adaptability and optimal support across the country.
Recommendations
Donors should:
Step up humanitarian diplomacy and advocacy efforts to push the Myanmar Armed Forces (MAF) to respect international humanitarian and human rights law and facilitate the work of international and local civil society actors, ensuring unimpeded access to communities in need of assistance.
Host a donor-pledging event to help raise global awareness of the unprecedented level of humanitarian needs in Myanmar and secure appropriate resources to address them. With humanitarian agencies' support, donors must ensure that Myanmar does not become a forgotten crisis.
Step up diplomatic engagement with regional partners, including neighboring India and China, and support their efforts to welcome refugees from Myanmar. They should avoid refoulement, arbitrary arrest, and detention.
Support ASEAN in developing a comprehensive approach for engagement with all conflict parties to secure humanitarian access and deliver principled assistance across Myanmar.
Ensure all stakeholders, including Rohingya, are involved in future conflict de-escalation processes. While refugees have consistently expressed the desire to return to Myanmar once conditions allow, third-country resettlement and complementary pathways should be explored for Rohingya refugees, as prospects for repatriation or formal integration are currently limited.
Provide necessary exemptions in funding requirements and review partnership arrangements for international and national partner organizations to ensure program continuity and financial sustainability in this complex operational environment and expand direct funding opportunities for local organizations. Donors should adopt flexible reporting and due diligence processes to allow NGO and CSO partners to continue safe and sustainable humanitarian operations.
Donors should advocate with financial institutions inside and outside Myanmar to ensure that enhanced financial due diligence measures are applied in a proportionate and risk-sensitive manner so as not to restrict humanitarian aid flows.
The UN Secretariat and UN Security Council should:
Push for greater urgency, prioritization, and tougher action by the UN Security Council on Myanmar, and not delegate the responsibility for solutions to ASEAN, or individual ASEAN member states. A coherent and unified regional strategy and plan will help mobilize robust support and the backing of the international community, including the UN Special Envoy and UN Security Council, in the effective implementation of UNSC Resolution 2669 and help secure necessary technical support for the operationalization of ASEAN's Five-Point Consensus.
The adoption of UNSCR 2669 was an important step. It should be followed up with regular briefings by the UN Secretary General in open meetings of the Security Council on the situation in Myanmar, including progress on the implementation of ASEAN's Five-Point Consensus and other elements of UNSCR 2669.
The UNSC should work towards a follow-up resolution to UNSCR 2669 that will invite the UN Secretary General to periodically provide the Council with written reports on the situation in Myanmar that are then the subject of regular briefings and consultations.
Ensure enhanced support for human rights-focused monitoring, reporting, and accountability, including by extending and resourcing the mandates of the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar and Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar.
Ensure that the humanitarian response is scaled up with a new fit-for-purpose coordination architecture in line with the Peer-to-Peer review recommendations under the strong leadership of a full-time Humanitarian Coordinator. Voices of local humanitarian responders must be included in all key actions and processes in the Myanmar humanitarian response..."
Source/publisher:
InterAction
Date of publication:
2023-03-10
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-10
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
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Sub-title:
Military abandons plans for August elections, dashing naïve hopes that the would-be sham polls provided a path to stability.
Description:
"The junta’s official admission that it lacks control indicates that it has failed to achieve its objective of resurrecting a military government. With a cloud of uncertainty hovering over the elections, the generals are now searching for other possible pathways to consolidate power.
Many in the international community who had pinned their hopes on the junta’s elections as a pathway to peace in Myanmar wrongly believed that the pattern of previous coups — military atrocities paired with a rigged election — would dictate the trajectory this time and lead to stability. It is clear to anyone engaged with the people of Myanmar that things are different this time.
The past 10 years of relative freedom awakened powerful forces in the population that are the bedrock for a movement that remains committed in the face of a murderous mafia junta intent on terrorizing and dividing it. The international community should recognize that the practical path to peace and stability in Myanmar lies through supporting resistance efforts, not the junta.
Reinventing the 2008 Military Constitution
The day before Min Aung Hlaing’s announcement, the regime’s National Defense and Security Council (NDSC) concluded, without any legal justification, that Myanmar had yet to achieve “normal circumstances.” This declaration gave Min Aung Hlaing the justification he sought to extend the junta’s rule.
Provision 425 of the 2008 military constitution authorizes the NDSC “to normally permit two extensions of the prescribed [emergency] duration for a term of six months for each extension” beyond the initial one-year period of martial law mandated by a declaration of a national emergency. (The military declared a state of emergency following the February 1, 2021, coup.) At the end of this two-year-period, the constitution requires that elections must be held within six months. Because these are not “normal” circumstances, the NDSC arbitrarily determined it had the authority to extend its rule by another six months.
Defiance of their own constitutions is nothing new for the military in the history of modern Myanmar. Gen. Ne Win, the father of Myanmar’s military dictatorship, often proclaimed his firm allegiance to the 1947 independence constitution before annulling it in the 1962 coup. Similarly, Gen. Saw Maung, the leader of the September 1988 coup, maintained that the military adhered to Ne Win’s 1974 constitution until it no longer served him — repealing it after his 1988 coup. Myanmar’s latest coup leader is now following in their footsteps.
Dashing Naive Expectations
The junta set the August 2023 election date in hopes that it would provide international legitimacy for its power grab and divide the resistance movement. Junta propaganda stressed the importance of its proposed elections and played up election preparations, making them a focal point for debate within the international community.
Some international observers were lured into believing that the elections would provide an exit for Min Aung Hlaing, disregarding ample evidence that the coup master does not see the elections as an exit, but rather as a means of dividing the resistance, furthering his military objectives and consolidating control. Others made hollow legal arguments, asserting that the military regime had no option but to hold elections according to the constitution — arguments that overlooked the blatant unconstitutionality of the coup itself in 2021.
Despite his repeated attempts to portray the military as the guardian of the 2008 constitution, Min Aung Hlaing’s actions have proven that he is ready to violate the constitution to maintain his own power. Just a few days before the coup, he publicly said that he was prepared to revoke the constitution if need be.
A Military Motivated by Self-Preservation
Myanmar’s modern history is a dark chronicle of the ways a power-hungry military will contort itself and shift its agenda to hold onto power by whatever means necessary. This is truer now than ever because many within the military believe that losing power would mean certain death for themselves and the military itself.
The predominant motive of power-hungry generals is the quest for absolute control of state power, not to protect the constitution or rule of law, seek stability or promote the peoples’ welfare. Indeed, the generals are better understood as a sort of mafia dedicated not to the welfare of the state, but rather to self-preservation and self-interest, regardless of the damage it might cause the country or its people.
The generals are ready to embrace a pyrrhic victory if it assures their survival, no matter how illegitimate, gory and limited it turns out to be. These generals live in their own universe isolated from the civilized world. They embody a mafioso mentality, primarily driven by cynicism, megalomania, bigotry, insecurity, hostility, self-preservation and self-interest. The regime believes it can only survive by dividing the resistance forces and inflicting mass human suffering to pacify the population.
It should be no surprise, therefore, that military rule has never been stable, and the military is widely reviled, including by those not directly involved in the current resistance. When considering a path to stability in Myanmar, the will of the people should dictate. How can a genocidal and incompetent military that has spent two years committing atrocities against its own people be involved in a future government?
Misconceptions Driving International Responses
Many policymakers in the international community tend to view Myanmar’s junta through the prism of their own experience as government actors beholden to a constituency and national interest. No matter how bloodstained and barbaric the junta has been, the international community — particularly Myanmar’s neighbors — cling to hope that military leaders can be reasoned with. The international community mischaracterizes the generals as “rational state actors,” expecting they will act in the interest of Myanmar.
This is a deep misunderstanding of the military, which is a paranoid clique of battle-hardened ultranationalists radicalized and traumatized by decades of warfare. Former Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew labeled Myanmar’s military government that ruled the country before 2010 as “dense” and “stupid,” saying that dealing with the regime is akin to “talking to dead people.” Because Myanmar has been an isolated and distant concern in global politics, it is understandable that relatively few in foreign governments have much experience with the country and its people, let alone its hermetic military leaders.
Misunderstandings about the military have led to mistaken conclusions and harmful actions. They underlie the idea that the junta will engage in a political dialogue process in good faith. And they are the basis of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ (ASEAN) five-point consensus, which has achieved nothing. Despite agreeing to the five-point consensus in 2021, it is no surprise that the junta openly discounted its legitimacy in February saying, “Myanmar views the ASEAN five-point consensus as not a legally binding document.” The junta’s recent extension of emergency rule and relentless violence have made a mockery of the ASEAN plan, which includes an immediate end to violence and dialogue among all parties concerned.
Pathways to Stability
In contemplating the prospects for a negotiated settlement in Myanmar, international actors must understand that the mafioso mentality of the country’s generals does not recognize the value of compromise, only of brute force. Under the current conditions, the generals prefer endless war to negotiation. They will only come to the table when they see they have no path to military victory.
Furthermore, the military has demonstrated repeatedly throughout its history that it will only engage in dialogue with those it sees as its military equals. The military blocked involvement of the Arakan Army (AA) in peace talks, for example, until the AA demonstrated military strength and controlled territory. During the pre-coup peace process, the author once witnessed a general harshly challenge the representative from a small ethnic armed group, asking “how much strength do you have to negotiate with me as an equal?” In recounting the collapse of peace talks in 1981, Brang Seng, the former rebel leader of the Kachin Independence Army, concluded, “We realized that we have been negotiating from a position of weakness. Only when we are united with all the other ethnic groups would we succeed [in negotiation with the military].”
Like ethnic minority communities which have endured decades of military violence, the Myanmar people have suffered deeply at the hands of the generals and understand that the military will only engage in dialogue with their military equals when they see no path to military victory. The people are, therefore, forced to make a painful decision to take up arms to fight against the military.
Without accepting these basic facts, the international community will continue to engage and support the junta’s governing State Administration Council, deepening the military’s delusional belief that it can win and undermining efforts by Myanmar’s people to save their country. Efforts that strengthen the junta only prolong violent conflict and suffering for the Myanmar people. Efforts that strengthen the resistance bring us closer to a negotiated outcome.
There is no path to stability in Myanmar that involves these generals in government. They are reviled by the population. Instability and violent conflict will afflict Myanmar as long as they are in power..."
Source/publisher:
United States Institute of Peace
Date of publication:
2023-03-09
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-10
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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"Human Rights Council
Fifty-second session
28 February–31 March 2023
Agenda item 4
Human rights situations that require the Council’s attention
Situation of human rights in Myanmar
Summary
Two years after Myanmar’s military launched an unconstitutional coup d’état and formed the State Administration Council, the country is in freefall. As opposition groups gain strength and the SAC’s control over territory and the people of Myanmar erodes, the military has doubled down on its brutal tactics, sowing violence and chaos across an everwidening sphere of conflict. In recent months, the military has stepped up aerial attacks, bombing villages, schools, medical facilities, and encampments for internally displaced persons. The SAC’s campaign of mass arson continues, with roughly 58,000 homes and civilian structures burned since the coup. More than 1.3 million people have been displaced in the past two years, and more than 3,000 civilians have been killed.
The SAC continues to suppress all forms of dissent as it attempts to impose a militarydominated future on the people of Myanmar. More than 16,000 political prisoners are now behind bars. The SAC has sought to legitimize its efforts to crush civic space and control local and international organizations by establishing a draconian Organization Registration Law. Despite extending a nationwide state of emergency through July 2023, the junta continues to make plans to hold sham elections in a desperate attempt to claim legitimacy and gain international recognition.
The humanitarian and human rights crisis in Myanmar has had a destabilizing effect on the region. Since the coup, hundreds of thousands of people have fled to neighboring countries in search of safety and opportunity. Countries and communities hosting refugees from Myanmar deserve credit for offering shelter and support to people who, in many cases, have been literally forced to run for their lives. However, considered in its entirety, the international community’s treatment of those fleeing Myanmar has been wholly inadequate.
Myanmar nationals in neighboring countries enjoy few legal protections and face the risk of arrest, detention, deportation, pushbacks at land and sea, and obstruction of their access to UNHCR, refugee status determination, and resettlement. Higher income countries have failed to share responsibility for the crisis, offering paltry resettlement quotas and inadequate contributions to humanitarian relief programs.
In this report, the Special Rapporteur calls on Member States to fulfil their obligations toward people from Myanmar by offering shelter and support, refraining from acts that endanger their human rights, and working towards durable solutions for refugees and other Myanmar nationals outside their country..."
Source/publisher:
UN Human Rights Council (Geneva) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of publication:
2023-03-09
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-10
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Statements and reports by the Special Rapporteur on Myanmar and the High Commissioner for Human Rights to regular sessions of the Human Rights Council, Armed conflict and peace-building in Burma - theoretical, strategic and general, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
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251.5 KB
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"YANGON, MYANMAR —
Two years after Myanmar’s military coup, a handful of young people are still protesting the coup, but, given the military crackdown on protests, the tightened security situation, and financial constraints only a relatively few flash mob protests now occur, and they do so in urban areas.
In these protests, in places such as Yangon and Mandalay, a small group of young people gather briefly, chanting and hanging banners with slogans before dispersing.
The president of Basic Education Student’s Union, part of the All-Burma Federation of Student Unions (ABFSU), who uses the name “Molly” in media interviews for security reasons, said people in Myanmar need to be more aware of the opposition to the now-ruling junta.
“Flash mobs are making people in urban areas nervous. While the revolution goes on for the long run, people are getting back to normal life. They need to wake up to political awareness as well as the armed revolution,” she told VOA.
“We are under 18”
It is young people who, since the coup, who have been most vociferous in trying to take down the regime despite nighttime raids, unlawful arrests, and being chased down or beaten up in the streets.
The student unions federation and the General Strike Committee, the largest combination of groups organizing anti-government protests, told VOA that most of those in the flash mobs are high school students under 18 years of age. While other students return to military-controlled schools, some members of the two organizations have chosen the armed path, actively participating in guerrilla attacks.
Molly and her brother, Nyi Min Thu, joined the protests right after the February 1, 2021, coup. Nyi Min Thu was killed February 25, when the military raided the house where he was hiding.
“After my brother died, I worked harder on the revolution at risk to my life,” Molly said.
More lives at risk
As the coup passes the two-year mark, the military regime has increased its control over big cities. At Yangon and Mandalay intersections, the army has installed checkpoints and put security in place. Junta security forces have arrested young demonstrators by raiding houses and bloodily cracking down during the protests.
According to the ABFSU, some 50 student members have been detained for participating in the anti-junta movement and 30 of them were sentenced to a minimum of two years in prison. In addition, 11 protesters died during military raids.
On February 8 in Yangon’s Mayangone township, a young man wearing a black jacket and jeans pulled out a banner. Another eight young men hiding on the side of the road came out and joined him in holding the banner saying “reject the fascist election.”
“The demonstration lasted only four minutes, but we prepared for it over two weeks,” Kyaw Swar, a 17-year-old protester said, adding that as the military gains more control over cities, being out on the streets has become dangerous.
Flash mob groups said they meet regularly online to discuss protest plans and share information. Usually, they choose a location that the security forces cannot crack down on easily.
"In the past, it took a week to set up a protest in one place. Now, it takes up to a month to plan a protest because of tight security. Normally, protests take place in populated areas such as markets, parks and bus stops where people will notice and soldiers cannot arrest us,” Molly said.
Funding decrease, spending increase
Until mid-2021, there were many strike groups conducting flash mob protests but now only 10 have survived, strike groups said. Similarly, in 2021, at least 40 group members participated in a protest, now only five to 10 participate.
"We used to manage to protest at least four times a month, but now it's very difficult to do it once a month,” said Kyaw Swar.
The military crackdown and arrests are the main reason for fewer protests and protesters, young demonstrators told VOA. Other difficulties include raising funds and finding safe houses.
“Landlords refuse to rent their homes because we are so young,” Molly said. Landlords also refuse to rent to groups of young people because they suspect the young people are protesters or will take other actions against the junta.
Strike groups rely on online fundraising campaign groups and donations from the public. Until end of 2021, ABFSU received more than a million kyat – about $475 – per month, but donations have gradually dropped by half. In contrast, living costs and expenses for protests are rising. Protest groups said they need at least 2 million kyat a month for living and accommodation of 15 people. It costs up to 150,000 kyat to manage a strike.
“Fifteen people are living together in a house to save many. We only eat noodle soup on very difficult days. There are even days I just smoke when I am hungry," a striker who asked not to be named told VOA..."
Source/publisher:
"VOA" (Washington, D.C)
Date of publication:
2023-03-09
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-09
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Anti-coup protesters
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Description:
"The people of Burma have been suffering greatly for many decades under the brutality of the junta. Human rights should not be violated by anyone under any circumstances. For that reason, we present these videos about documenting human rights violations to encourage the emergence of Citizen Human Rights Documenters who can systematically collect and record strong, accurate evidence of human rights violations with the aim to establish justice, rehabilitate victims, and put an end to the cycle of impunity in Burma.
In this second video, we will talk about why we do human rights documentation and what data to collect when human rights violations occur in our communities..."
Source/publisher:
Assistance Association for Political Prisoners
Date of publication:
2023-03-09
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-09
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Various rights: reports of violations against several ethnic groups, Political prisoners and other violations in Burma - reports
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Description:
"China’s appointment of a new special envoy to Myanmar in December last year followed the United Nations’ first resolution on Myanmar in 74 years, and the US Congress’ passage of the Burma Act. Observers say it was not a political coincidence.
The Burma Act authorizes funds and technical assistance for anti-junta forces in Myanmar, including EAOs. The US has pledged to continue to support Myanmar opposition forces inside and outside of Myanmar. The UN resolution demands an end to violence and urges the military junta to release all political prisoners, including ousted leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi.
China’s new special envoy Deng Xijun met seven of Myanmar’s ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) in China’s Yunnan Province in the last week of December. Then he flew to Naypyitaw and met junta chief Min Aung Hlaing. In less than a month, he visited the headquarters of the powerful EAOs including the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), the United Wa State Army (UWSA) and the National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA). His visit was different from previous ones.
Politics
Interestingly, the Chinese envoy was accompanied by the Mandalay-based Chinese consul. The consul did not participate in talks with the EAOs, and the reason Deng brought the consul along with him was not clear.
Secondly, he visited displacement camps in Laiza, the location of the KIA headquarters in Kachin State. It was followed by reports that China would provide assistance in health and education for EAOs as well as displaced civilians, indicating a new level of relationship between China and EAOs at the border.
Thirdly, Deng echoed his predecessor Sun Guoxiang, and urged EAOs to join peace talks and sign the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA). But while Sun said he was acting according to Beijing’s policy, Deng stressed that his urging of the EAOs came at the request of Myanmar junta chief Min Aung Hlaing.
The flurry of activity by Deng after the US Congress’ passage of the Burma Act indicates that China does not want to see US aid and influence reaching EAOs based along the Chinese border.
China will be cautious about potential US influence and possible spying efforts that will come along with its assistance. It will use even greater caution now as tensions are rising over the Taiwan issue. This is why China has made a move to cement ties with EAOs at the border and provide them with non-military assistance.
Myanmar people are interested to see whether China will pressure the EAOs to stop fighting the Myanmar military regime, as some of them are fighting alongside resistance forces from central Myanmar.
Of the EAOs based in northern and northeastern Myanmar along the border, only the UWSA and the NDAA have de facto control of their own territories, so it is inevitable that the five others will continue to fight the Myanmar military to achieve greater status.
The Myanmar military’s policy is that EAOs must disband and turn themselves into militias or border guard forces under its control as per the 2008 Constitution. This will not be acceptable to the KIA, the Shan State Progress Party, the Arakan Army (AA), the Ta’ang National Liberation Army and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), which have high political ambitions and relatively strong armies. So, it is important to keep an eye on the moves of the Chinese special envoy in this regard.
Economy
Some Chinese investment projects have come back to life following the activities of the Chinese special envoy, the Chinese ambassador and the consul to Myanmar. The first one is the Letpadaung copper mining project. Around the end of February, junta troops shelled and raided around eight villages near the copper mine. Soon after junta troops were deployed along the road to the mine, 150 to 250 people believed to be Chinese employees of Wanbao Co. arrived at the copper mine in five vehicles from Monywa.
In a May 5, 2022 statement, Wanbao said mining had been suspended since the coup, but employees were paid their basic salaries, and only a maintenance team was working for maintenance of the mines. There have been reports lately that Wanbao is contacting its Myanmar employees to return to work.
The second one is an agreement with Chinese companies to install wind turbines in Ann, Thandwe and Gwa townships in Rakhine, western Myanmar. The project is scheduled to start in December this year and to be completed in 2025.
The Chinese ambassador attended the agreement signing ceremony, and it is the only Chinese investment project officially announced since the coup. The project emerged as a result of the ceasefire between the Myanmar military and the AA in Rakhine.
The third is construction of the Ruili-Mandalay-Kyaukphyu railroad linking China’s Ruili with Kyaukphyu in Rakhine, an important part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Neither the Myanmar regime nor China have officially talked about the project, but media outlet Frontier Myanmar, citing senior officials of Myanma Railways, reported that the regime and a Chinese company carried out an environmental impact assessment on the railroad construction in 2021-22, and that the first section of the railroad linking Ruili and Mandalay is in the process of being constructed. This is part of the reason China has urged EAOs in northern Myanmar to observe ceasefires and hold talks with the Myanmar military regime.
Shortly after the coup, the Myanmar military granted approval to the China-backed, US$2.5-billion power plant in Meelingyaing in Pathein, Ayeyarwady Region. China has not made any move regarding that project. But it is no coincidence that some Chinese investments have resumed following the trips of the Chinese special envoy this year.
Military
The area along the Chinese border with northern Shan State is overseen by the Myanmar military’s North-Eastern Command. In 2021-22, its presence in the area comprised a light infantry division and seven military operations commands.
Surprisingly, the regime has pulled out three military operations commands or around 30 battalions from the area since early this year, after over 1,000 troops trained by the MNDAA—most of them fighters from central and southern Myanmar who decided to take up arms against the regime following the coup—finished their military training.
Why has the Myanmar military pulled out a large number of troops while its enemy has got over 1,000 new soldiers? Perhaps the regime is taking advantage of the fact that China wants to de-escalate military tensions in northern Shan State for its Ruili-Mandalay railroad.
Thanks to the troops it has pulled out of Shan, the regime has been able to send reinforcements to Kayah (Karenni) State, and Yedashae and Pinlaung, where People’s Defense Force groups (PDFs) and the Karenni Nationalities Defense Force are active, as well as to Karen State.
Conclusion
The latest developments in politics, the economy and the military situation in Myanmar following the UN resolution, Congress’ passage of the Burma Act, and moves by the Chinese special envoy, are interesting. Besides the US and the West, China might also consider the steps of the Indian nationalist government, which is blindly supporting the regime to establish a foothold in Myanmar.
After both China and Russia declined to exercise their veto power and block the UN’s resolution on Myanmar, the regime came to understand that Russia will not go against China regarding important decisions on Myanmar. Since then, the regime has made moves to improve ties with China, after getting too close to Russia over the past two years. Again, the regime is saying China is Myanmar’s good neighbor.
The regime might also be considering seeking advantage in the competition between China and India. The regime replaced its foreign minister in February, appointing a former Myanmar ambassador to the US to the post. Political observers suggest the regime is planning to approach the US.
We have seen complicated diplomatic moves alongside hostilities over the past two years. The parallel National Unity Government (NUG) says it is the only government that can guarantee stability and safety for foreign investors.
We need to monitor the policies and moves of US and Western governments that directly engage the NUG and EAOs; of China, which has avoided getting too close to the NUG though it is engaging with both the regime and EAOs in northern Myanmar; and of Russia and India, which are closely cooperating with the regime.
Following his meeting with EAOs, Deng met junta chief Min Aung Hlaing on Monday in Naypyitaw, the second such meeting since the envoy’s appointment. The two vowed to cooperate in various sectors including the economy. The two discussed the role of China in border security and internal peace in Myanmar. It appears their ties have improved since the previous meeting.
The main question is whether China will turn a blind eye to the wishes of the Myanmar people in its involvement in the Myanmar issue. If it overly focuses on its rivalry with the US and ignores the wishes and popular revolt of the Myanmar people, it will face a stronger response from Myanmar people.
We must pay special attention to Deng’s shuttle trips between the junta chief and EAOs in northern Myanmar. According to credible sources from the border, Deng and seven EAOs in northern Myanmar plan to meet soon for a third time, this time collectively.
China has officially supported ASEAN’s Five-Point Consensus on Myanmar. One of the points is a visit by the ASEAN special envoy to meet all parties concerned. Neither the ASEAN envoy nor the Chinese envoy have yet been able to do this.
If Deng fails to meet all parties concerned and his moves help support the regime politically, economically and militarily, the Myanmar people, especially the armed resistance who are fighting the regime, will not accept it.
If the situation goes on like this, Deng’s move will do more harm than good for the Myanmar people, and anti-Chinese sentiment will rise again, which could result in further complications..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2023-03-09
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-09
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Business and the Military, Burma's economic relations with China, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
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Description:
"Regime troops raided at least 10 villages and torched at least 89 houses in Myaung Township, Sagaing Region over four days this week, according to local resistance forces.
A spokesperson from Civilian Defence and Security Organization of Myaung (CDSOM) said at least 15 houses from Yathit Village and 74 houses from Chaung Zinn Village were destroyed in the regime’s arson attacks.
Residents of Chaung Zin and Yathit villages where houses were burned down by junta troops are now clearing debris and setting up makeshift homes in the daytime. However, they have to flee for their safety when night falls due to the fear of regime drone attacks and artillery strikes, according to local people.
Two columns of regime troops from Light Infantry Battalion 16 and Pyu Saw Htee militia advanced toward Pauk Chaung Village on March 4 at around 3.00 pm and were backed up by another junta column from Kyauk Yit Village, according to witnesses.
Bo Kyar Thit, CDSOM spokesperson, said the local resistance forces in the area joined together and attacked the regime base in Kyauk Yit Village in Myaung Township on March 4.
“All local resistance forces in Myaung Township coalesced to ambush the regime’s base in Kyauk Yit Village on Saturday night at around 9.00 pm after they occupied Pauk Chaung. The attack took 30 minutes. Two junta police officers were killed during our joint attack and a member of a local resistance group was injured,” he said.
The Irrawaddy can’t independently verify the claim.
he regime troops conducted raids and fired artillery shells for the next three days, raiding another nine villages across Myaung Township, injuring two resistance forces, he added.
“Two members from our organization were injured due to the regime’s artillery attack on Tuesday. A civilian from Pauk Chaung Village was also arrested by regime troops,” he said.
The regime troops left Myaung Township and moved toward to their base in Kyi Village on Tuesday, according to the local sources..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2023-03-09
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-09
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Armed conflict in Burma - attacks on civilians
Language:
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Description:
"Myanmar regime forces are continuing to clash with a combined force of Karenni Army (KA) and Karenni Nationalities Defense Force (KNDF) fighters in southern Shan State, with over 5,000 local residents displaced by the fighting.
Clashes broke out again on March 9 near Saung Pyaung Village in Shan’s Pinlaung Township, where junta troops and Karenni resistance fighters clashed for the first time in the township on February 24.
The KA and KNDF launched an attack on a junta outpost in Saung Pyaung on February 24, where military regime soldiers and pro-junta Pa-O National Army (PNA) fighters are based. Pinlaung Township is part of the Pa-O Self-Administered Zone governed by the Pa-O National Organization (PNO), the political wing of the PNA.
More than 5,000 residents from Saung Pyaung and nearby villages have been displaced by the fighting, according to locals and aid groups.
“Clashes broke out again at around 6am near Saung Pyaung, which is located on the border of Pinlaung and Pekon townships. The Karenni groups have captured some villages and so the Myanmar military is now shelling them,” said the administrator of a village near Saung Pyaung, who is currently sheltering at a monastery in Pinlaung Town along with hundreds of other refugees.
Thousands more people from Saung Pyaung, Lone Pyin, Taung Mae Thin, Myauk Sa Lone, Taung Sa Lone, Nam Name and Pin Lon villages are also sheltering in Pinlaung Town, as well as in Pekon Township.
Almost two weeks after being forced to flee, the refugees are in urgent need of supplies.
“We still need food and medicine,” said one displaced female resident of Taung Sa Lone Village whose sister was killed by a regime mortar strike on February 24.
Her family has fled to Pekon Township, where they are receiving help from the Moebye Rescue Team. The team said that some of the refugees from Pinlaung are injured or sick and in need of proper medical treatment and care.
At least three civilians have been killed by regime artillery strikes since the clashes broke out, and another four people injured.
Despite the ongoing fighting, junta chief Min Aung Hlaing visited his ally the PNO leader U Aung Kham Hti on March 7 at his home in Kyauk Ta Lone Gyi Town in the Pa-O Self-Administered Zone, according to regime-controlled media. It is not known what the two men discussed.
However, local observers said that they believed that the regime boss would have been pushing U Aung Kham Hti to help defend the Pa-O Self-Administered Zone. The area is strategically important, as resistance groups from Kayah and Karen states could break through it to reach the Myanmar capital Naypyitaw.
On the day of Min Aung Hlaing’s visit, the PNA released a statement calling on young ethnic Pa-O people to join the PNA to fight the “invaders”.
PNA fighters are currently taxing some villages in their area, with residents saying that each household in the affected villages is having to pay 75,000 kyats each.
The Irrawaddy was unable to contact the PNA for comment..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2023-03-09
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-09
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Internal displacement/forced migration of Karenni villagers, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
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Sub-title:
Myanmar’s military has arrested around 200 people in Hpakant township this month.
Description:
"Army troops have arrested seven people who were using the internet in a tea shop in Myanmar’s northernmost Kachin state as the military tightens its curfew on a township with a strong ethnic militia presence.
Around 20 soldiers entered the shop on Tuesday night and started beating the owner, his wife and daughter, and four people who were drinking tea there. All seven were taken into custody, according to a Hpakant town resident who didn’t want to be named for fear of reprisals.
“The shop was about to close when the troops came in a car and arrested them,” said the local. “Someone told them the daughter was sharing political posts on Facebook.”
The local said the family who owned the Shu Daung Thit Tea Shop were Soe Naing; his wife Nan Kyin; and their daughter Shoon Lae Soe. The four customers have not been identified.
He told RFA the family had been selling tea in Hpakant for almost 30 years and described them as honest people. He said he didn’t know where the troops had taken them.
It’s believed the raid was sparked by fighting between junta troops and Kachin Independence Army joint forces, which broke out the previous morning near a police station in Hpakant.
Locals said a 40-year-old woman called Khin Ma and her 10-year-old daughter, Moe Pwint Phyu, were hit by bullets during the battle, although it's not clear which side fired them.
“Both mother and daughter’s injuries are not serious,” said a woman who also declined to be named.
“It would be better if they were treated in Myitkyina [township’s] hospital but they had to go to the Hpakant hospital as they were afraid of fighting on the way.”
The local said the junta had been firing heavy artillery on Hpakant town in recent weeks and arresting many civilians.
Hpakant is a center for gold and jade production in Myanmar and home to many businesspeople, traders and miners. It has also attracted a lot of Chinese investors who are believed to pay “taxes” to the ethnic Kachin militia in order to operate mines safely.
The junta issued a curfew in Hpakant town shortly after it staged a coup in Feb. 2021 and has started enforcing it strictly this year. RFA data show that troops arrested nearly 200 civilians in the town and nearby villages this month and are still holding 40 of them.
RFA called Win Ye Tun, the junta spokesman for Kachin state seeking comments on the arrest but no one answered..."
Source/publisher:
"RFA" (USA)
Date of publication:
2023-03-09
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-09
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Political prisoners and other violations in Burma - reports, Freedom of opinion and expression: - the situation in Burma/Myanmar - reports, analyses, recommendations
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Description:
"Today, on this International Women’s Day, the NUG welcomes the European Union's strong stance against human rights violations and abuses, particularly gender-based violence against women and girls in Myanmar.
Today, the world marks International Women's Day, while the brave women of Myanmar are mourning the deaths of 483 of their fellow women who have been killed by the genocidal military in the last two years alone.
Today, the Peace-loving women of Myanmar are commemorating two years of the pain and suffering that 3,125 of their fellow women including elected leader of Myanmar Daw Aung San Suu Kyi have been enduring in the brutal junta-run prisons across Myanmar.
Today, the Freedom-loving women of Myanmar are in mourning for the 11 of their fellow women who have been handed death sentences, and the 15 of their fellow women who have been given life sentences by the genocidal military junta in Myanmar.
Today, the Federal-Democracy-loving women of Myanmar are also grieving the inhuman and brutal rape of 122 of their fellow women by the genocidal military junta forces. These victims are sisters, daughters, and mothers of the Nation.
These measures follow the EU's inclusion on International Women’s Day of further individuals and entities from Myanmar on its list of sanctions which include nine individuals and three entities from Myanmar, Russia, South Sudan and Afghanistan on the list of natural and legal persons, entities and bodies subject to EU restrictive measures. Among those targeted by the European Union are Major General Toe Yi, a member of brutal junta forces, the Deputy Minister of Home Affairs for the State Administration Council, and the Office of the Chief of Military Security Affairs, which oversees the management of detention and interrogation centres.
These individuals and entities have been added to the 93 Myanmar individuals and 18 entities already subjected to EU sanctions, demonstrating the EU's steadfast commitment to promoting and safeguarding human rights. This demonstrates the EU's commitment to upholding the fundamental values of human dignity and respect for all individuals, regardless of their gender, race, or nationality. We hope that these sanctions will serve as a strong deterrent and send a clear message that the international community will not tolerate such atrocities..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of International Cooperation Myanmar
Date of publication:
2023-03-08
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-09
Grouping:
Individual Documents
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Sub-title:
Atrocity Alert is a weekly publication by the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect highlighting situations where populations are at risk of, or are enduring, mass atrocity crimes.
Description:
"MYANMAR’S MILITARY CONTINUES ABUSES IN “UNENDING HUMAN RIGHTS CRISIS”
Throughout the two years since Myanmar’s (Burma) military launched a coup in February 2021, they have perpetrated a scorched earth campaign around the country in an effort to quash the opposition, according to a new report from the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). One of the most frequently utilized tactics by the military is the systematic and widespread burning of villages and dwellings. Nearly 39,000 houses around Myanmar have been burnt or destroyed in military operations since February 2022, marking a more than 1,000-fold increase compared to 2021. Sagaing Region – a resistance stronghold in the northwest – was the most impacted, accounting for more than 25,500 homes.
The military’s continued access to aviation fuel has, in part, facilitated the commission of these unlawful and indiscriminate airstrikes. Despite some targeted sanctions, aviation fuel deliveries continue to be offloaded to ports in Myanmar, according to a recent investigation by Amnesty International and Global Witness. Companies in Greece, India, Japan and Switzerland have been involved in fuel shipments. Since mid-2022, OHCHR documented an increase in aerial attacks by the military, as well as the widespread and indiscriminate use of artillery against villages and towns across the country. Although most of the intense violence remains concentrated in northwestern and southeastern Myanmar, OHCHR reported that nearly 80 percent of the country’s 330 townships have been affected by clashes.
Since the coup, populations also face daily human rights violations and abuses, including killings, arbitrary arrests, displacement, torture and enforced disappearances. UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Volker Türk, stated, “There are reasonable grounds to believe that the military and its affiliated militias continue to be responsible for most violations, some of which may constitute crimes against humanity and war crimes,” and stressed that “Tragically, regional and global efforts for peace and restraint have largely fallen on deaf ears. The military, emboldened by continuous and absolute impunity, has consistently shown disregard for international obligations and principles. Urgent, concrete action is needed to end this festering catastrophe.”
The military’s continuous violence and commission of atrocity crimes have sparked an unending human rights and protection crisis. Savita Pawnday, Executive Director of the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, said, “The international community must heed the recommendations of the UN’s Human Rights Office, including urging the UN Security Council to refer the situation in Myanmar to the International Criminal Court. Furthermore, all companies should immediately stop supplying aviation fuel to Myanmar and conduct appropriate human rights due diligence to ensure their supply chains no longer enable the military’s unlawful attacks.”
NICARAGUAN GOVERNMENT IMPLICATED IN POTENTIAL CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY
In a groundbreaking report released on 2 March the UN Human Rights Council (HRC)-mandated Group of Human Rights Experts on Nicaragua (GHRE) concluded that widespread human rights violations that amount to crimes against humanity – including extrajudicial killings, torture, sexual violence, arbitrary detention and politically motivated persecution – have been perpetrated by the Nicaraguan government against civilians. The GHRE identified the National Police, the National Penitentiary System, judges, prosecutors and pro-government armed groups as the main perpetrators, acting under the authority, as well as participation, of President Daniel Ortega and his wife, Vice President Rosario Murillo.
The GHRE warned that systematic violations and abuses, including arbitrary deprivation of nationality, are part of a “deliberate dismantling of democratic institutions and destruction of civic and democratic space,” with the objective to “eliminate, by different means, any opposition in the country.” Since early February, the Ortega government has revoked the citizenship of more than 300 alleged political opponents, 222 of which were forcibly deported to the United States. Investigators warned that these latest measures are a clear indication that the situation continues to worsen.
Following a brutal crackdown on protests in 2018, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), as well as Independent Experts mandated by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, warned that crimes against humanity have been committed by state and affiliated non-state agents. Since then, systematic government repression and a descent into authoritarianism have intensified, with human rights defenders, independent media, students and academics, religious leaders and other alleged opponents targeted for persecution. President Ortega maintains absolute control over the country’s institutions, including the legislature and judiciary, which has failed to address impunity for human rights violations and abuses committed prior to the escalation in 2018 and in the subsequent years. Those unable to flee the country have faced systematic reprisals and criminal prosecutions. Official numbers provided by the GHRE and OHCHR suggest that more than 3,000 nongovernmental organizations were forcibly shut down since December 2018, and no independent media outlet can operate within Nicaragua.
As Nicaragua continues to refuse to engage with regional and international human rights mechanisms, the work of the GHRE remains vital for public monitoring and reporting, as well as for the collection and preservation of evidence of crimes against humanity. During the ongoing 52nd session of the HRC, member states should renew the mandate of the GHRE for a period of two years. Elisabeth Pramendorfer, Nicaragua expert at the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, emphasized that, “States should utilize the evidence collected by the GHRE to pursue accountability for victims, including through universal jurisdiction, and further strengthen a robust individual sanctions regime against high-level perpetrators.”
NEW UN REPORTS HIGHLIGHT CONTINUED ATROCITY CRIMES IN SOUTH SUDAN
On 7 March the UN Human Rights Council (HRC)-mandated Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan (CHRSS) presented its latest report on the country’s human rights situation, detailing ongoing gross human rights violations and atrocities, including widespread attacks against civilians, various incidents of conflict-related sexual violence against women and girls, forced displacement and extrajudicial killings. The violations and abuses have been perpetrated by members of the South Sudanese armed forces, as well as various militias and armed groups.
The Commissioners identified the absence of accountability as a major driver of the human rights and humanitarian crisis, stating that “attacks against civilians persist precisely because perpetrators are confident they will enjoy impunity.” Although the extended transitional period provides an opportunity for the South Sudanese authorities to “begin dismantling an entrenched culture of impunity and to reset the country on a path toward stability and prosperity after years of conflict,” justice for victims and survivors of atrocities continues to be elusive. The Commissioners noted that “effective prosecutions are rare and remain woefully insufficient.”
The latest report of the UN Secretary-General on the Mission in South Sudan also details continued cycles of inter-communal violence, land disputes with ethnic undertones, abductions and reprisal attacks throughout the country. According to the report, the “rapid escalation of subnational violence” and recent cycles of revenge killings threaten the progress made in implementing the 2018 peace agreement. Political leaders have continued to focus on preserving their own personal power, allowing mistrust to reinvigorate ethnic tensions and fuel violence across the country rather than genuinely commit to a political solution. Continuous political competition and mobilization of armed groups is leading to increasing localized conflict, fragmentation and widening ethnic divisions.
Genuine political commitment to the implementation of the outstanding provisions of the peace agreement, including drafting a new constitution and establishing mechanisms under the Constitution-Making Process Act, is crucial for reconciliation and the prevention of further conflict. To break the cycle of impunity, the transitional justice mechanisms under Chapter V of the peace agreement need to be urgently established. Given its invaluable role in monitoring and reporting on atrocity crimes and grave human rights violations, the HRC must extend the mandate of the CHRSS in full, for a period of two years, during its ongoing 52nd session. Juliette Paauwe, South Sudan expert at the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, said, “HRC-mandated investigative mechanisms are particularly important in situations where there are no realistic avenues for justice and accountability in the national context and can serve as an important deterrent. The added value of the CHRSS is self-evident and undeniable, and its work offers some glimpse of hope for justice and accountability to civilians in South Sudan.”..."
Source/publisher:
Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
Date of publication:
2023-03-08
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-08
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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Description:
"The Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), an ethnic Kokang armed group based in northern Shan State’s Kokang region, is playing an increasing part in training and arming resistance groups.
That is quite a turnaround from 2009, when the MNDAA was widely believed to have been destroyed in a Myanmar military offensive. But by the end of 2013, small bands of MNDAA troops were active again to the west of the Salween River that marks the boundary with Kokang.
In early 2015, China’s Global Times reported about the return of MNDAA leader Peng Jiasheng to Kokang. According to locals, the news of his return had already been circulating for nearly a year. So it appears that the MNDAA had been soliciting support in Kokang throughout 2014.
Fresh clashes broke out on February 9, 2015 when an estimated 1,200 to 1,600 MNDAA troops fought their way back into Kokang. Combined with MNDAA administrative, medical, logistical and communications teams, there could have between 1,500 and 2,000 troops entering Kokang.
The Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), and the Arakan Army (AA) reportedly fought alongside the MNDAA in these battles. The Myanmar military brought in large reinforcements over time, with heavy fighting raging in Laukkai, Konkyan and in the hills along the Myanmar-China border.
China made a number of diplomatic protests after Myanmar military artillery shells and bombs repeatedly landed inside China. In one incident, five Chinese villagers were killed and nine others injured in the border city of Lincang in March 2015. In May that year, China imposed a ban on flying along the border and announced that it would organize military drills involving live ammunition for an indefinite period, which effectively de-escalated the fighting between the Myanmar military and the MNDAA.
Neither side disclosed their casualties, but sources estimated that hundreds were killed or wounded. Over 60,000 civilians were displaced by the fighting and fled to Lashio or China. At least 100 civilians were killed in the clashes and many houses were destroyed.
Although the MNDAA was unable to take back control of Laukkai and Konkyan, it was able to establish bases in the hills along the border and in the forest west of the Salween River. The MNDAA also won the sympathy of China’s military and some Chinese people.
New policies after 2015 fighting
MNDAA leaders adopted new political and military perspectives after the 2015 fighting. Peng Jiasheng’s brother Peng Jiafu acknowledged that the MNDAA couldn’t liberate Kokang on its own and needed to forge alliances with other ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) and political groups.
The MNDAA joined the United Nationalities Federal Council and the Federal Political Negotiation and Consultative Council. It also allied with the TNLA and AA, conducting joint military operations with them and supplying arms to the two groups. The MNDAA has also promoted brotherly ties with the United Wa State Army and the National Democratic Alliance Army in Mong La. Like the MNDAA, both those groups formed after splitting from the Communist Party of Burma (CPB).
Expanding its areas of military operations, the MNDAA became active to the west of the Salween River, territory once controlled by the CPB.
Since then, the MNDAA has formed political and supply departments, as well as command and control and artillery battalions. Its political wing is the Myanmar National Truth and Justice Party (MNTJP).
Peng Daxun, a son of Peng Jiasheng, has consolidated his control as the general secretary of the MNTJP, and military chief of the MNDAA. Today, the EAO is estimated to have at least 5,000 well-equipped troops.
The Struggle for Kokang
During talks in 2015, then President Thein Sein told Peng Jiasheng that he could take a rest anywhere in the country. The underlying message was that the Myanmar military wanted him to become a full-time businessman like Lo Hsing Han, a Kokang drug lord, and that the military would support his business endeavors.
As far back as 2009, the then Myanmar military regime wanted Peng Jiasheng to transform the MNDAA into a pro-junta militia or border guard force similar to ones in other parts of Shan and Kachin states. The military twice offered Peng Jiasheng the chance to trade the MNDAA’s weapons for business licenses, but Peng Jiasheng rejected the offers.
While some of Kokang rebels have sided with the Myanmar military, Peng Jiasheng and his supporters chose to fight for the freedom of Kokang. Their resistance was astonishing because Kokang is small and mountainous with a population of less than 100,000 people. Yet while the MNDAA is small, it is a dangerous enemy for the Myanmar military.
Current junta chief Min Aung Hlaing’s destiny is linked to the MNDAA. Min Aung Hlaing commanded the 2009 offensive that drove Peng Jiasheng and the MNDAA out of Kokang. And in 2015, it was again Min Aung Hlaing who led the Myanmar military operation against the MNDAA.
Many Kokang residents fled to China during the 2009 fighting. The 2015 clashes resulted in over 60,000 people – over half the Kokang population – being displaced. Migrant workers fled to Lashio, and ethnic Kokang fled to China. At least 100 civilians died and many houses were destroyed, while 40,000 acres of sugarcane fields were torched, prompting China’s foreign minister to issue a statement asking the Myanmar government to protect the interests of Chinese people in Myanmar. However, the military punished only one Brigadier General.
From 2011 to the end of 2018, the Myanmar military insisted that MNDAA surrender or be excluded from peace talks. Along with the devastation caused by the 2009 and 2015 fighting, that is perhaps the reason why the MNDAA is now opposing the Myanmar military again.
MNDAA and the Spring Revolution
The MNDAA, TNLA and AA have shown support for the resistance since the Spring Revolution began in 2021. But the three EAOs rarely talk about their actions.
The leader of the Karenni Nationalities Defense Force (KNDF), which is fighting the regime, attended the 2022 funeral of Peng Jiasheng. And the Bamar People’s Liberation Army (BPLA) has said that it receives assistance from the MNDAA and its allies, although the group undergoes military training in an area controlled by the Karen National Union’s Brigade 5.
People’s Defense Forces (PDF) in northern Shan State, which are under the command of the parallel National Unity Government (NUG), said last year that they are operating with the MNDAA. But neither the NUG nor the MNDAA have discussed that in public.
But their relationship came under the spotlight when the MNDAA’s new brigade, Brigade 611, graduated and was armed on January 1 this year at its headquarters in northern Shan State. MNDAA deputy military chief Yang Guanhua was present at the ceremony, where 1,228 cadets graduated. A ‘federal’ flag was hoisted and Brigade 611 was referred to as a multi-ethnic brigade. It appears that the brigade was originally intended to be based in Kutkai District, but the plan was later changed as other Spring Revolution forces emerged.
The majority of Brigade 611 fighters are not ethnic Kokang or from northern Shan State, but are young people from other parts of the country who decided to take up arms against the regime after the 2021 coup.
Besides the KNDF, BPLA, and PDFs from northern Shan State, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is also working with the MNDAA. The PLA is said to be the successor of the now defunct CPB, and mainly consists of members of student unions in Sagaing Region’s Shwebo District. So the MNDAA is now helping the younger generation of communists whom it once rebelled against.
The MNDAA is preparing or already providing military training for some 700 members of the PLA, BPLA, and the Sagaing-based Myanmar Royal Dragon Army led by Bo Nagar, one of the leading resistance figures, and two other PDFs. Over 1,000 troops trained by the MNDAA are already fighting the regime.
The fact that the MNDAA is training and arming resistance fighters reflects the group’s financial power and its ability to procure weapons. It also reflects the MNDAA’s growing political ambitions. Along with the Kachin Independence Army, the MNDAA is the EAO that is cooperating the most with the resistance in northern Myanmar. This will create mutual benefits for Kokang and Spring Revolution forces.
Of the forces cooperating with the MNDAA, only a few hundred PDF fighters are under the command of the NUG. Over 1,000 more from the KNDF, BPLA and the Myanmar Royal Dragon Army have no direct engagement with the NUG.
And there are at least six revolutionary groups operating in the territories of the MNDAA’s allies, the AA and TNLA. Those groups are not under the command of the NUG. Separately, they are small groups but when combined they make a strong force. So the MNDAA’s military coalition, which was mainly formed with people from central Myanmar, may take different forms in the future.
The MNDAA can’t distance itself from China. Meanwhile, the NUG, Spring Revolution forces, and EAOs in southern Myanmar have ties to the United States and western countries. China will definitely not want to see western assistance and influence so close to the Myanmar-China border. Some might say that China is involved in the MNDAA’s training and arming of new troops. But there is no proof that China has a policy to arm Spring Revolution forces via the MNDAA.
The MNDAA is fighting for the identity and self-determination of Kokang people. At the same time, it has close ties with China and is involved in the illegal drug trade in the borderlands. But it has also established political and military alliances with other EAOs in northern Myanmar, as well as some Spring Revolution forces. The MNDAA could be a serious threat to the regime. It will be interesting to see what it does for Myanmar’s Spring Revolution in the future..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2023-03-08
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-08
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Spring Revolution
Language:
more
Description:
"1. Only NUG can guarantee stability and international investment 28/02/2023.....2. Defence Ministry plans to accelerate strategic military operations 02/03/2023.....3. 70 health professionals died, 900 arrested in over 2 years of
attempted coup 28/02/2023.....4. NUG submits snapshot on human rights situation in Myanmar report to UNHRC 28/02/2023.....6. Bbrutal massacre of civilians in Tar Taing Village 3/3/2023..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2023-03-06
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-08
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
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"HURFOM: Women in Burma today face many threats to their safety and well-being. On this International Women’s Day, the Human Rights Foundation of Monland (HURFOM) calls for an end to military impunity, which has emboldened the junta to commit crimes of conflict-related sexual violence. Rape continues to be used as a weapon of war to traumatize and intimidate young women and girls. In Southeastern Burma, HURFOM has documented 5 women killed, 9 injured, 32 arrested, and 6 detained since the beginning of 2023. In addition, seventeen female teachers from the Civil Disobedience Movement arrested in February 2023 are still missing.
Since the failed coup on 1 February 2021, HURFOM has documented that over 65 women have been killed, 190 were injured, and 700 were arrested. In addition, out of 125 total enforced disappearances since the coup in Southeastern Burma, 30 have been women in HURFOM target areas of Mon State, Karen State and Tanintharyi region.
Gendered violence persists across the country. Women face ongoing risks as the military junta increases its presence, particularly in areas like Karen State, where opposition to the Burma Army has been fierce and unrelenting. Gendered violence is both targeted and indiscriminate. At the beginning of the year, on 1 January 2023, the junta forces patrolling a local area in Mon State fatally shot two young women riding a motorcycle in the back. The two victims were both severely injured.
In a separate case involving attacks against women, the Burma Army arrested several young women at the end of January 2023, including four from Ye township and six from Abaw village and Kyar-tan village, Mon State. They were tortured and examined at a military training camp. HURFOM reporters from the area confirmed that the junta forces jailed four women detainees out of the ten who were abducted. The victim’s family members have appealed for the truth and justice to emerge. The junta’s treatment of women is entrenched in decades of patriarchal rule and institutions which discriminate heavily based on gender.
HURFOM has reported that various forms of gender-based violence still occur in areas where internally displaced people have fled. Harassment and domestic violence are rising as there are worsening tensions within households due to the lack of food security and livelihoods. Women human rights defenders are working to provide social services that reduce stress in the home, such as clothing and monetary support. Mental health and psychosocial support are critical for war-affected families.
And yet – despite the many challenges facing them, women have persevered. They continue to advocate for their rights and freedoms and for equality to be a pillar for a free and fair Burma. While women continue to take significant risks to protect themselves, their families and their loved ones, the international community must take their plight seriously. More protection for women and girls is needed from the international community. Funding for women-led organizations and supporting cross-border aid is one-way global actors can lend solidarity to those on the ground and offer support during this time of immense uncertainty. They can pursue international accountability mechanisms that hold the regime to account, including for their crimes against women and girls.
Further, HURFOM condemns the ongoing gendered violence. On Women’s Day, and every day, HURFOM calls for gender equality and for all stakeholders to do their part in ending gender-based violence once and for all. As enshrined in the Geneva Convention for the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War states: “Women shall be especially protected against any attack on their honour, in particular against rape, enforced prostitution, or any form of indecent assault.”..."
Source/publisher:
Human Rights Foundation of Monland
Date of publication:
2023-03-08
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-08
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Women's rights, Women and Politics in Burma/Myanmar, Articles, reports and sites relating to women of Burma, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
Language:
more
Sub-title:
In a dire situation, the prominence of women in social, political, and economic life give reason for hope.
Description:
"International Women's Day on 8 March celebrates the social, economic, cultural, and political achievements of women. The day also marks a call for action for accelerating women’s empowerment and gender equality. Why does commemorating the International Women’s Day in Myanmar matter?
I started writing this op-ed wanting to explain to the unborn generation of children why gender equality and the empowerment of women matters in Myanmar today. It is the ingrained hope of a mother wanting to pass on a better future to her child. It is also my call for action to all involved to further advance on gender equality and the empowerment of women as we are facing an erosion of many hard-earned gains in terms of gender equality.
Myanmar’s women and girls have been hit disproportionately hard by the Covid-19 pandemic, the Feb. 1, 2021 coup and the pursuant security, humanitarian, and socio-economic crisis. The economic downturn has led to an increasing pay gap between women and men, and women-led businesses, which are often small and micro-enterprises or in the informal sector, have struggled more to make a recovery.
Access to sexual and reproductive healthcare services has been severely diminished. While reliable figures are not available, all indicators point to an increase in various forms of sexual and gender-based violence across Myanmar, while access to response services and to justice for survivors is often minimal to non-existent.
Why does gender equality matter, will you ask? “If society is like a bird with two wings, if one is broken the bird will not be able to fly” will I answer. If women, who make 52 per cent of the population are not equally represented in decision making bodies, lack equal access to basic rights, equal employment and income opportunities, and continue to face the threat of violence in their day-to-day lives, they will not be able to fully claim and exert their rights, then society will never be able to fully thrive and to use its full socio-economic potential towards a sustainable and prosperous future.
Women in Myanmar have shown tremendous resilience but continue to face unequal access to productive resources, reproductive rights and suffer violence and abuse.
The multiple crises have seen an extraordinary amount of women’s engagement socially and economically, with women playing central and life-saving roles in local and community-level pandemic and humanitarian responses, often in extreme circumstances. Previously marginalized women have begun playing increasingly visible leadership roles, and the unity within the women’s movement is at an all-time high.
Threats of violence
However, all of this has come at a high cost, with individual women leaders and women’s organisations finding themselves under-resourced, often at a risk of depletion and over-burdening, and facing increasing threats and violence both online and in real life for their outspoken and brave leadership.
The 2023 Humanitarian Response Plan reports that women have been hit disproportionately by conflict, the political and economic crisis, and their subsequent economic impacts due to social norms around work, disempowerment in the workplace and their traditional role in their households and communities. Of the 4.5 million people prioritized for life-saving humanitarian support this year, 52 percent are women.
Despite the extremely challenging circumstances, the United Nations in Myanmar together with its local partners will reach 2.3 million women and girls in humanitarian assistance covering prevention and response to gender-based violence, HIV/AIDS prevention, cash transfer and food distribution in 2023.
Undoubtedly, the multiple crises have led to an across-the-board erosion of many hard-earned gains of the past decades in terms of gender equality and women’s empowerment as the ratification of the United Nation Convention on Elimination of All forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) or the National Strategic Plan for the Advancement of Women. But as dire as the situation is in Myanmar, the continued prominence of women in all aspects of social, political, and economic life give reason for hope as well.
To halt the regression of gender equality and women’s empowerment, Myanmar women and women’s rights organizations need the urgent support of the international community, including from UN agencies, to listen to their appeals and to continue advocating on their behalf. This includes adaptive and flexible support to women’s organisations providing aid to populations in need in remote areas relying on their knowledge and networks to be able to localise and deliver aid efficiently and effectively.
A bird with two equally strong and intact wings will fly high and far towards a prosperous and sustainable future. On March 8 and beyond I, on behalf of UN Women, commit to stand for gender equality in Myanmar, today and always..."
Source/publisher:
"RFA" (USA)
Date of publication:
2023-03-08
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-08
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Women's rights, Articles, reports and sites relating to women of Burma, Women and Politics in Burma/Myanmar, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
Language:
more
Description:
"ယနေ့ အပြည်ပြည်ဆိုင်ရာအမျိုးသမီးများနေ့ကို ကမ္ဘာတစ်၀န်းတွင် ကျင်းပနေပါသည်။ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံတွင်မူ လွန်ခဲ့သော(၂) နှစ်အတွင်း အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီက အမျိုးသမီး စုစုပေါင်း(၄၈၃)ဦးကို သတ်ဖြတ်ခြင်း၊ အမျိုးသမီး စုစုပေါင်း(၃၁၂၅) ဦးကို မတရားဖမ်းဆီးချုပ်နှောင်ထားခြင်း၊ အမျိုးသမီး စုစုပေါင်း(၁၁)ဦးကို သေဒဏ်ပေးခြင်း၊ အမျိုးသမီး စုစုပေါင်း(၁၅)ဦးကို တစ်သက်တစ်ကျွန်း ထောင်ဒဏ်ချမှတ်ခြင်း၊ အမျိုးသမီး စုစုပေါင်း (၁၂၂)ဦးကို လိင်ပိုင်းဆိုင်ရာအကြမ်းဖက်ခြင်းတို့နှင့် မြန်မာ့အမျိုးသမီးများကို ပုံစံအမျိုးမျိုးဖြင့် အကြမ်းဖက်လျှက်ရှိပါသည်။
၁၈၅၇ ခုနှစ် နယူးယောက်အထည်ချုပ်စက်ရုံတွင် အမျိုးသမီးများ လုပ်ခလစာတိုးမြင့်ပေးရန်၊ မဲပေးပိုင်ခွင့်ရရှိရန်၊ အလုပ်ချိန်လျှော့ချပေးရန် ဆန္ဒပြတောင်းဆိုရာမှ အမျိုးသမီးများလှုပ်ရှားမှုအစပြုပြီး ၁၉၇၅ ခုနှစ်၊ မတ်လ (၈) ရက်နေ့ကို ကုလသမဂ္ဂမှ အပြည်အပြည်ဆိုင်ရာအမျိုးသမီးများနေ့အဖြစ် တရား၀င်သတ်မှတ်ပေးခဲ့ပါသည်။ အမျိုးသမီးများ အခွင့်အရေးကို မြှင့်တင်ရန်နှင့် အမျိုးသမီးများအခွင့်အရေးကိုကာကွယ်ရန်အတွက် အပြည်ပြည်ဆိုင်ရာအမျိုးသမီးများနေ့ သတ်မှတ်ဖြစ်ပေါ်လာခြင်းဖြစ်သည်။ အမျိုးသမီးများအပေါ် နည်းမျိုးစုံဖြင့် ခွဲခြားဆက်ဆံမှုပပျောက်စေရေး နိုင်ငံတကာသဘောတူစာချုပ်ကို မြန်မာနိုင်ငံအနေဖြင့်လည်း ၁၉၉၇ ခုနှစ်၊ ဇူလိုင်လ (၂၂) ရက်နေ့တွင် လက်မှတ်ရေးထိုးခဲ့သည်။ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံမှ သဘောတူစာချုပ်တွင် လတ်မှတ်ရေးထိုးပါဝင်ခဲ့သော်လည်း အကြမ်းဖက်အာဏာရှင်များသည် သဘောတူစာချုပ်ကို လျစ်လျူရှုသည်သာမက ၎င်းစာချုပ်ကို အကောင်အထည်ဖော်ရန်လုံး၀ပျက်ကွက်ပြီး နှစ်ပေါင်းများစွာ ထိုစာချုပ်ပါအချက်များကို ချိုးဖောက်လာခဲ့သည်။
လွန်ခဲ့သော(၂၆)နှစ်အတွင်း မြန်မာအမျိုးသမီးများအခွင့်အရေးကို ချိုးဖောက်ဖျက်ဆီးပြီး တိုးတက်မှု လုံးဝမရှိအောင် ရည်ရွယ်ချက်ရှိရှိ နည်းအမျိုးမျိုးကို အသုံးပြုပြီး အကြမ်းဖက်အာဏာရှင်များက မြန်မာ့အမျိုးသမီးများအပေါ် လူမဆန်သောအကြမ်းဖက်ခြင်းအမျိုးမျိုးကို ကျူးလွန်ခဲ့ကြသည်။ လွန်ခဲ့သော (၂၆)နှစ်တွင် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံအနေဖြင့် အမျိုးသမီးများဆိုင်ရာ အပြည်ပြည်ဆိုင်ရာစာချုပ်ကိုချုပ်ဆိုခဲ့ပြီးဖြစ်သော်လည်း အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အာဏာရှင်များသည် ၎င်းစာချုပ်ကို လိုက်နာရန် လုံး၀ဆန္ဒမရှိကြောင်း အပြည်ပြည်ဆိုင်ရာအမျိုးသမီးများနေ့မတိုင်မီ တစ်ရက်အလို ယမန်နေ့ကထုတ်ပြန်သော အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီ၏ ထုတ်ပြန်ကြေညာချက်များက အခိုင်အမာသက်သေပြနေပါသည်။ အကြမ်းဖက်အာဏာရှင်များသည် မြန်မာအမျိုးသမီးများအပေါ် လူမဆန်စွာ ကျူးလွန်ထားသောရာဇဝတ်မှုများအတွက် မြန်မာအမျိုးသမီးများကို ၀န်ချတောင်းပန်ပြီး ရာဇဝတ်မှုကျူးလွန်သူ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ခေါင်းဆောင်များကို စာချုပ်ပါ အပြည်ပြည်ဆိုင်ရာဥပဒေနှင့်အညီအရေးယူပြီး တရားမျှတမှုကိုဆောင်ရွက်ရမည့်အစား အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အာဏာရှင်များသည် ကျူးလွန်မှုအထောက်အထားများကို ဖျောက်ဖျက်ပြီး အထောက်အထားများယူမရအောင် အကြမ်းဖက်ခြင်း၊ မီးရှို့သတ်ဖြတ်ခြင်း၊ အထောက်အထားရှိသောနေအိမ်နှင့် နေရာများကိုမီးရှို့ခြင်း၊ ရုပ်အလောင်းများကိုလည်း ညှင်းပန်းနှိပ်စက်ထားသော ထိခိုက်ဒဏ်ရာ အထောက်အထားများယူမရအောင် မီးရှို့အလောင်းဖျောက်ခြင်းနှင့်အတူ ရက်စက်ကြမ်းကြုတ်သော ဖြတ်(၄)ဖြတ်ပေါ်လစီကိုလည်းချမှတ်ပြီး မြန်မာ့အမျိုးသမီးများအပေါ်တွင် ဆက်လက်အကြမ်းဖက်လျှက်ရှိပါသည်။
မတ်လ(၈)ရက်နေ့သည် အပြည်ပြည်ဆိုင်ရာအမျိုးသမီးများနေ့အဖြစ် အပြည်ပြည်ဆိုင်ရာစာချုပ်ပါဥပဒေနှင့်အညီ မြန်မာ့အမျိုးသမီးများ၏အခွင့်အရေးများကို ကာကွယ်စောင့်ရှောက်ပြီး မြန်မာအမျိုးသမီးများ၏ဉာဏ်အား၊ ကာယအား၊ စိတ်ဓာတ်စွမ်းအား တို့ကို မြှင့်တင်ရမည့်အစား ရက်စက်ကြမ်းကြုတ် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အာဏာရှင်များသည် စစ်လက်နက်အသုံးပြု၍ ပြည်သူ့အာဏာကိုလုယူရန် ကြိုးစားသည့် လွန်ခဲ့သော(၂)နှစ်အတွင်း အမျိုးသမီးများ အခွင့်အရေး၊ ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီအရေးတို့ကို အသက်နှင့်လဲပြီးဆောင်ရွက်နေသော မြန်မာ့အမျိုးသမီး စုစုပေါင်း(၄၈၃)ဦးကို လူမဆန်စွာ ရက်ရက်စက်စက် သတ်ဖြတ်ခဲ့ပါသည်။ နေပြည်တော်၊ သပြေကုန်းတွင် ငြိမ်းချမ်းစွာ ဆန္ဒပြနေသော မမြသွဲ့သွဲ့ခိုင်ကို ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ်၊ ဖေဖော်ဝါရီလ (၉) ရက်နေ့တွင် ရက်ရက်စက်စက် ပစ်ခတ်သတ်ဖြတ်ခြင်းမှအစပြု၍ မန္တလေးမြို့၊ ၈၄ လမ်းနှင့် လမ်း ၃၀ ကြားတွင် ငြိမ်းချမ်းစွာဆန္ဒပြနေသော အသက်(၁၉)နှစ်အရွယ် မကြယ်စင်ကို ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ်၊ မတ်လ (၃) ရက်နေ့တွင် ခေါင်းကို သေနတ်ဖြင့်ပစ်သတ်ခဲ့ခြင်းနှင့်တကွ အမျိုးသမီးများအပေါ် ရာဇဝတ်မှုများ မရပ်မနားဘဲ ဆက်တိုက်ကျူးလွန်ခဲ့ရာ အပြည်ပြည်ဆိုင်ရာအမျိုးသမီးများနေ့ကျင်းပရမည့် ယခုအချိန် ၂၀၂၃ ခုနှစ်၊ မတ်လ (၁) ရက်နေ့တွင် စစ်ကိုင်းတိုင်း၊ တာတိုင်ရွာမှာ အမျိုးသမီး(၃)ဦးဖြစ်သည့် မပန်းနွယ်၊ မပန်းသွယ်နှင့် မဆွေဆွေဦးတို့ကို အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စုက အုပ်စုဖွဲ့ လိင်ပိုင်းဆိုင်ရာအကြမ်းဖက်၍ သတ်ဖြတ်ခဲ့ပါသည်။ မျက်မြင်သက်သေထွက်ဆိုချက်များအရ အမျိုးသမီးများကို လူမဆန်သောနည်းလမ်းများဖြင့် ရက်ရက်စက်စက် အကြမ်းဖက်မှု ကျူးလွန်ခဲ့သည်ကို တွေ့ရှိရပါသည်။
အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အာဏာရှင်များသည် လွန်ခဲ့သော (၂၄)လအတွင်း မြန်မာအမျိုးသမီး စုစုပေါင်း (၄၈၃)ဦးကို ရက်ရက်စက်စက် သတ်ဖြတ်သည့်အပြင် လွန်ခဲ့သော(၂၄)လအတွင်း နိုင်ငံတော်အတိုင်ပင်ခံပုဂ္ဂိုလ် ဒေါ်အောင်ဆန်းစုကြည်အပါအ၀င် မြန်မာအမျိုးသမီး စုစုပေါင်း(၃၁၂၅)ဦးကို မတရားဖမ်းဆီးချုပ်နှောင်ထားပြီး မြန်မာအမျိုးသမီး စုစုပေါင်း (၁၂၂)ဦးအပေါ် လိင်ပိုင်းဆိုင်ရာအကြမ်းဖက်ခြင်းကျူးလွန်ခဲ့ပါသည်။ ကိုဖြိုးဇေယျာသော်၊ ကိုဂျင်မီနှင့်အပေါင်းပါ သူရဲကောင်း(၄)ဦးတို့ကို ရက်ရက်စက်စက် ကြိုးပေးကွပ်မျက်သည့်အပြင် လွန်ခဲ့သော (၂၄)လအတွင်း မြန်မာအမျိုးသမီး စုစုပေါင်း (၁၁)ဦးကို သေဒဏ်ချမှတ်ပြီး မြန်မာအမျိုးသမီး စုစုပေါင်း(၁၅)ဦးကို တစ်သက်တစ်ကျွန်းထောင်ဒဏ်များချမှတ်ခဲ့ပါသည်။ လွန်ခဲ့သော(၂၄)လအတွင်း အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အာဏာရှင်များသည် ငတ်မွတ်ခြင်း၊ ဆာလောင်ခြင်းနှင့် ပြည်သူ့အသက်အိုးအိမ်ကို မီးရှို့ခြင်းစသည်တို့ကို လက်နက်သဖွယ် အသုံးပြုပြီး မြန်မာအမျိုးသမီးနှင့် ကလေးများ အများဆုံးပါ၀င်သော လူဦးရေ(၁.၆)သန်းထက်မနည်းကို အိုးမဲ့အိမ်မဲ့ဖြစ်စေခြင်း၊ အသက်အိုးအိမ်(၅)သောင်းထက်မနည်း မီးရှို့ဖျက်ဆီးခြင်း၊ အမျိုးသမီးများနှင့်ကလေးများ အများဆုံးပါ၀င်သည့် မြန်မာ့လူဦးရေ (၁၇)သန်းထက်မနည်းကို အငတ်ဘေးနှင့် ရင်ဆိုင်စေခြင်းစသည့် ရာဇ၀တ်မှုများကို ကျူးလွန်လျှက်ရှိပါသည်။
မြန်မာပြည်သူလူထုများ တရားမျှတမှုမရမချင်း အပြည်ပြည်ဆိုင်ရာဥပဒေလမ်းကြောင်းမှတစ်ဆင့် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အာဏာရှင်များကို အရေးယူရန်သက်ဆိုင်ရာ အပြည်ပြည်ဆိုင်ရာအစိုးရများ၊ အဖွဲ့အစည်းများတွင် တာ၀န်ရှိနေပြီး မြန်မာနိုင်ငံပြည်တွင်းမှာလည်း အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အာဏာရှင်များမှ ကျုးလွန်ထားသောအမှုများကို တစ်ခုမှမချန်ထားခဲ့ဘဲ ဥပဒေနှင့်အညီ အရေးယူ ဆောင်ရွက်သွားရန် ကျွန်တော်တို့အားလုံးမှာ တာ၀န်ရှိနေပါသည်။ ရဲရင့်သတ္တိရှိသော မြန်မာပြည်သူလူထုနှင့် မြန်မာအမျိုးသမီးတို့၏လက်ထဲမှာ တရားမျှတမှုရောက်ရှိလာစေရန်အတွက် စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ်ကို အမြန်ဆုံး အမြစ်ပြတ်ခြေမှုန်းပြီး လူမျိုး၊ ဘာသာ၊ ကျား/မ၊ တိုင်းရင်းသားမရွေး အားလုံးအတွက် "ညီမျှခွင့်တူ ဖမ်းဆုပ်ယူ"နိုင်သည့် ဖက်ဒရယ် ဒီမိုကရေစီနိုင်ငံတော်အသစ်ကို အတူတကွတည်ဆောက်သွားရမည်ဖြစ်သည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of International Cooperation Myanmar
Date of publication:
2023-03-08
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-08
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
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Description:
"National Unity Government Weekly Press Update (10/2023)..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2023-03-06
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-08
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
2.68 MB
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Description:
"Representatives of the illegal Myanmar military junta have been invited to attend the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Workshop on Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism this week, according to a Justice For Myanmar source.
The workshop is set to take place in Bali, Indonesia from March 8 to 10, 2023 and will be co-chaired by the European Union, Indonesia and Laos, with apparent financial support from the German development agency, GIZ. As part of the workshop, the EU is hosting a welcome dinner on March 8.
The ASEAN Regional Forum’s secretariat invited representatives of the Myanmar junta via its Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which then invited the junta’s Ministry of Home Affairs and Central Bank of Myanmar. The Ministry of Home Affairs houses the junta’s police force and prisons department and is directly responsible for ongoing crimes against humanity.
The EU has sanctioned the junta’s home affairs minister and deputy home affairs minister, as well as the junta’s State Administration Council.
The workshop aims to build knowledge and capacity to address the security risks of money laundering and terrorist financing, focussing on the prevention of the financing of terrorism by non-profit organisations related to the intergovernmental Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Recommendation 8.
FATF blacklisted Myanmar in October 2022 over serious deficiencies in countering money laundering, urging countries to conduct enhanced due diligence against the risks emanating from Myanmar.
A group of former United Nations experts, the Special Advisory Council for Myanmar, have established that the Myanmar military junta is a terrorist organisation under Myanmar law and as defined in international law, and it should be treated as such by the international community.
In 2021, the junta illegally declared the National Unity Government (NUG), which is the legitimate government of Myanmar, as a terrorist group. It also designated the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH) and People’s Defence Forces (PDFs) as terrorist organisations.
Since the military’s illegal coup attempt, the junta has created a state of terror, committing deliberate killings, arbitrary arrests, indiscriminate airstrikes and shelling, rape and torture, using counter-terrorism as a pretext. The junta has killed more than 3,100 people, and arbitrarily arrested over 20,000.
As part of its attempt to gain control, the junta illegally introduced an organisation registration law in October 2022 to force non-profits to register with the junta, and disclose funding sources and details about their operations, under threat of imprisonment.
Analysis by the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) found that the junta’s organisation registration law is “wholly incompliant” with international law and standards, violating the right to freedom of association, assembly, opinion, expression, and political participation.
The junta has also increased surveillance of the financial sector. An August 2022 directive by the junta’s Central Bank of Myanmar to mobile money businesses requires users to register a photo of their face, their ID card and phone number, increasing the grave risks of retaliation by the junta to those making payments to the NUG, CRPH, PDFs, civil society and other forces successfully resisting the military’s attempted coup and providing humanitarian aid and basic services to the people.
Justice For Myanmar wrote to the co-chairs of the ARF workshop to express dismay at the invitation of illegal military junta members, to urge that they are disinvited and that an invite is instead extended to the National Unity Government, and to seek clarification on funding arrangements.
A representative of the EU denied responsibility for the Myanmar junta’s participation, saying that invitations for ARF activities are distributed through the ARF Secretariat, and clarified that the EU is not funding the participation of representatives from Myanmar. GIZ responded that they are not financially supporting participants to attend the workshop.
Meanwhile, no response was received from Indonesia or Laos.
Justice For Myanmar requests the co-chairs of the workshop to immediately disinvite the Myanmar military junta and to ban the junta from this and all future ASEAN Regional Forum workshops and events.
Instead, these invitations should be extended to the National Unity Government.
Justice For Myanmar spokesperson Yadanar Maung says: “It is nonsensical for ARF to invite representatives of the Myanmar junta, a terrorist organisation, to a workshop on countering the financing of terrorism. The invite not only legitimises the junta but also provides it with an opportunity to improve their understanding of measures to prevent money laundering and terrorist financing, which may help them to better circumvent these measures as part of their organised, criminal activities.
“By providing the junta with capacity to regulate the transactions of non-profit organisations, ARF is in effect supporting the junta’s crackdown on freedom of association, assembly, opinion, expression, and political participation, which violates international law.
“The invite also undermines the integrity of ARF’s important work to address the security and economic risks linked to money laundering and terrorist financing activities.
“The Myanmar junta is systemically corrupt and uses a vast network of business to fund its ongoing war crimes and crimes against humanity against the people. ARF should treat the junta as a threat to regional economies and security, rather than as a partner.
“JFM calls on ARF to immediately revoke the invite to the military junta, and instead extend an invite to the National Unity Government.
“The EU should use its leverage as a co-host to urge the exclusion of the junta in the upcoming workshop, the EU hosted welcome dinner and all other international meetings and events the EU is part of. Instead, the EU should support and recognise the NUG as the legitimate government of Myanmar.”..."
Source/publisher:
Justice For Myanmar
Date of publication:
2023-03-07
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-07
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Business and the Military, Sanctions, ASEAN-Burma relations
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more
Description:
"During the 52nd session of the UN Human Rights Council, Rita French, the UK's Human Rights Ambassador, delivered a statement on the situation in Myanmar.
Thank you, Mr President.
And thank you, High Commissioner, for your sobering update.
We share your concern at the situation in Myanmar. We condemn the junta’s increasingly brutal tactics, including through indiscriminate air strikes, conflict-related sexual violence and arson attacks. The targeting of civilian infrastructure, including schools, and hospitals and places of worship must cease. Civilians must be protected.
Over 2,600 people have been killed since the coup. Over 19,000 people have been arbitrarily detained. Female pro-democracy activists are increasingly targeted online.
The UK will continue to apply pressure through international fora, targeted sanctions, a comprehensive arms embargo and other means to oppose the junta’s violent and oppressive actions. I am proud that the UK led efforts to secure the first ever UN Security Council Resolution on Myanmar which urges all parties to respect human rights, and to end violence.
Accountability is the only way to end the military’s culture of impunity. Perpetrators must be brought to justice. To this end, the UK has established the Myanmar Witness programme which reports on some of the most egregious human rights violations.
High Commissioner,
How can the international community support access to justice for victims and survivors of sexual violence?
Thank you..."
Source/publisher:
Govt. UK (London)
Date of publication:
2023-03-07
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-07
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
more
Description:
"7 March 2023: Today, the Human Rights Foundation of Monland (HURFOM) releases a new report, “We Dare Not Return,” Displacement and the Denial of Human Rights in Southeastern Burma. The report includes an analysis of the current situation in our respective target areas of Southeastern Burma throughout 2022. The findings draw on interviews with emergency response teams, survivors, and witnesses of the attacks. The Burma Army committed all the crimes documented in the report with complete and total impunity. They are widespread, systematic and indicative of a worsening pattern of violence.
Between 1 January 2022 and 31 December 2022, HURFOM reported that at least 146 people were killed, including 26 women and children. In addition, more than 480 were injured, and nearly 1500 were arbitrarily arrested and detained. The Burma Army continued to target opposition forces, including members of pro-democracy groups. This subsequently led to over 85 cases of enforced disappearances. Dozens of human rights defenders remain in exile for their safety. HURFOM also documented 750 houses burned, including 58 villages. The humanitarian crisis caused by the junta’s destruction has led to over 150 000 people being forcibly displaced in Southeastern Burma.
Throughout the reporting period of 2022, the conditions on the ground caused civilians to feel unsafe. Many villagers that HURFOM spoke to said they ‘dare not return’ to their homes out of fear that they would be arrested, tortured or even killed by the military junta. There are economic and social struggles as villagers cannot work, study or support their families because the presence of the regime has deterred them. On multiple occasions, HURFOM documented Burma Army soldiers indiscriminately firing into villages.
The situation in the third year since the failed coup has not improved. The rapidly deteriorating human rights situation in southeastern Burma requires urgent and immediate attention as more lives are caught in the crossfire daily. International actors and UN bodies must support and enact a no-fly zone in Burma, a global arms embargo, and an urgent and immediate referral of the situation in Burma to the International Criminal Court.
And yet, a sentiment of hope, determination and adversity is still prominent throughout the country as rallying forces join together to defeat and dismantle the junta. The people on the ground in Burma are brave in their unwavering commitment to see an end to military rule. The international community must not let their struggle be in vain. They must use their diplomatic tools and resources to engage meaningfully with civil society organizations and the National Unity Government..."
Source/publisher:
Human Rights Foundation of Monland
Date of publication:
2023-03-07
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-07
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Burma: Internal displacement/forced migration of several ethnic groups., The discussion on humanitarian assistance to Burma, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Armed conflict in Burma - attacks on civilians
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1.24 MB
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Community-based schools and ones operating under the shadow government are filling the gaps.
Description:
"UPDATED at 11:25 A.M. EST on 03-08-2023
Battered by the COVID-19 pandemic, the military coup and an ensuing civil war, Myanmar’s school system is in shambles. The number of high school students registering for a key exam has plunged 80%, parents, teachers and educational experts say.
To protest against the February 2021 coup, some 300,000 teachers and other school staffers walked off their jobs at government-run schools as part of the Civil Disobedience Movement, leaving schools severely understaffed. In response, the junta has suspended more than 11,000 academic staffers and about 125,000 teachers and professors, according to U.S. government data.
Subsequent fighting between the army and rebel groups has displaced thousands, making schooling extremely difficult. Many other families have stopped sending their children to school because they don’t trust the junta, or have sent them to schools run by the shadow National Unity Government.
“People no longer trust their education system,” said a teacher who, like others in this report, refused to be named for security reasons. “And now with the online federal schools and other non-military-operated schools, children can consider what is better for them and which education system can give them more knowledge and skills.”
“That’s why we see that there are fewer and fewer students who are taking the tenth-grade exam in the junta’s schools,” he said.
During the 2019-20 academic year, when the civilian-led National League for Democracy was still in power, nearly 970,800 students registered for the 10th-grade matriculation exam, a benchmark for the country’s educated workforce for decades.
The following year, that number slipped to 312,300, and during the current 2022-23 year, fewer than 179,800 registered for the exam, according to the junta's education data.
Reforms on hold
The coup also put on hold educational reforms that were being carried out by the former NLD government, including increasing budgets for schooling and implementing a strategic plan to transform the country’s education system and improve learning at all levels.
In June 2022, when the Ministry of Education ordered the reopening of primary, middle and high schools across the country for in-person classes for the 2022-2023 academic year, over 7 million of the country’s roughly 12 million students returned to the classroom, according to junta Education Minister Nyunt Pe.
Some of the remaining 5 million students across the country do not attend the schools run by the junta, while some primary, middle and high school teachers say they have not returned to their schools because they do not want to work under the military administration.
Ongoing fighting between the military and ethnic armed groups in conjunction with anti-coup People’s Defense Forces in some of Myanmar’s states and regions have prevented students from attending school.
In response, the shadow National Unity Government, or NUG, had set up its own schools throughout the country.
“As many areas of several states and regions are war zones, exams cannot be held and there are no students to take them,” said Kyaw Ye Lwin, a committee member of NUG’s Federal Democratic Education Cooperation Network.
“Another thing is that NUG has strengthened its educational system on the ground,” he said, with students who attend federal schools trying to take the basic education completion assessment test administered by the NUG’s Ministry of Education. “Due to these factors, the number of students in schools under the junta administration has decreased.”
Separate exam
NUG Education Minister Zaw Wai Soe said that the shadow government is implementing an interim education system throughout the country, and about 90,000 students are taking its own 10th-grade exam.
“We hold practical exams for students in the areas where NUG is in control,” he told RFA. “We hold digital and internet-based exams in the areas where we are not in control yet. We are trying to implement online, practical and digital classes and exams for students in the areas away from our control, too.”
Residents in Sagaing and Magway regions, where fighting has intensified, have set up their own community-based schools so that local teachers can prepare students for the matriculation exam.
“Since the education system here in our area is in accordance with the federal education system, schools here can offer their own lessons,” said a teacher at a community-based school in Magway.
“It’s rather independent,” she said. “There are several different exam designs, too. There are many NUG-recognized schools in Magway, [but] there are hardly any students studying for the exams in the junta schools.”
A parent of a student from Magway’s Yesagyo township told RFA that he enrolled his children in community-based schools because teachers there provide extra help to students.
“The difference between the junta’s schools and our community-based schools is that our community-based schools focus on the people and teach students very well,” he said. “If students need more help, teachers give them more revision time and teach them at their homes, too.”
‘Conflict zone’
Residents of a village in Sagaing region, a hotbed of resistance in northwestern Myanmar, set up a primary school there for children who could not attend state-run schools due to the hostilities, said the school’s founder.
She and four permanent teachers as well as other educators from the Civil Disobedience Movement teach about 150 students at the primary school which opened in June 2022 under the auspices of the NUG, she said.
“Since we are in a conflict zone and a war refugee zone, there are no other schools here,” she told RFA.
“We can now teach music, art and the curriculum to our children,” she said. “Many stationery and teaching accessories are donated to us by well-wishers from faraway places.”
So far, parents of schoolchildren do not seem daunted by an announcement by the junta via state-run media networks on March 1 that authorities will take action against them under the Counterterrorism Law if they enroll students in online schools managed by the NUG. The junta also said that parents must enroll their children only in the junta schools and private schools recognized by the military.
But the teacher at the primary school in a village in Sagaing said children know they have a right to education no matter where they live, regardless of such threats.
“Issuing politicizing orders to stop such rights of the schools and children from benefiting is a very vulgar act,” she said.
Meanwhile, junta-run schools are coping with manpower shortages by piling up work on educators.
“We have to teach eight classes a day,” one high school educator said. “In the past, we could rest for two or three class periods as break time during which we could prepare the lesson plans for the next classes. We used to have extra time to study and preview the lessons before we went into each class. But now, we have very little extra time.”
And new teachers entering the profession are not receiving adequate training, she said.
“With only two days of skill training, teachers cannot be qualified to teach,” the educator said. ‘They do not know their subjects very well. Now we have to coordinate with each other and learn to teach these classes.”..."
Source/publisher:
"RFA" (USA)
Date of publication:
2023-03-07
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-07
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Education in Burma/Myanmar - general, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
more
Description:
"The Republic of the Union of Myanmar welcomes the interactive dialogue with the High Commissioner for Human Rights on Myanmar, as well as OHCHR’s corresponding report on the ‘Situation of human rights in Myanmar since 1 February 2022’.
High Commissioner Türk was blunt in telling the Human Rights Council that “[t]he disregard and contempt for human life and human rights that are continuously demonstrated by the military constitute an outrage to the conscience of humanity.”
OHCHR has also delivered a strong report on the ‘catastrophic’ human rights situation in Myanmar and the illegal military junta’s grave human rights violations and probable crimes against humanity and war crimes. Further, its report catalogues some of the constructive actions taken by the National Unity Government consistent with Myanmar’s international obligations.
OHCHR’s collective updates are strikingly familiar in their content and findings. Each periodic report since the junta’s failed power grab in 2021 has recorded fresh peaks in murders, executions, disappearances, torture, sexual violence, and the junta’s blocking of humanitarian aid and use of forced displacement and starvation as tactics of war.
Emboldened by ‘continuous and absolute impunity’, the junta has intensified its use of heavy weapons against civilians over the past year. According to High Commissioner Türk, airstrikes against civilian locations increased by 141% and artillery shelling of communities, including hospitals, schools and places of worship, increased by over 100%.
OHCHR has also documented clear junta acts of terror and collective punishment, including villagers being burned alive, the hostage-taking of children, and a 1,200% increase in houses burnt or destroyed in junta operations. Significantly, OHCHR attributes these widespread and systematic atrocities to the junta’s leadership:
OHCHR documented consistent tactics and patterns of abuse across the country confirming that the military operates as a solid and coherent structure, implying knowledge of its leadership of commission of atrocities and/or, at minimum, failures to foreseeably prevent them.
Accountability is essential. On behalf of Myanmar, the National Unity Government welcomes OHCHR’s call for the Security Council to refer the situation in the country to the International Criminal Court (ICC), as well as its acknowledgment that no public response has yet been issued by the ICC to the National Unity Government’s July 2021 statement accepting the Court’s jurisdiction for crimes committed in Myanmar since 1 July 2002.
Furthermore, there has been no discernible improvement in the lives of the Rohingya despite the generosity of Myanmar’s neighbours. The Rohingya are no closer to returning home, with OHCHR reporting that conditions in Rakhine State remain unconducive for safe returns and that persistent security concerns have worsened. Yet this situation does not remove the National Unity Government’s responsibility to the Rohingya, including much needed progress on citizenship rights. OHCHR’s report acknowledges that the National Unity Government ‘has committed to abolishing the National Verification system and adopting a new and inclusive citizenship law in accordance with its 2021 “Policy Position on the Rohingya in Rakhine State”’. We stand by these commitments.
The National Unity Government also accepts OHCHR’s calls on all parties to adhere to their international obligations, to ensure full, unrestricted, predictable humanitarian access to all persons in need, and to cooperate with international human rights and accountability mechanisms. Further, we support High Commissioner Türk’s entreaty that all parties strengthen their efforts to ensure civilian protection.
Finally, the National Unity Government fully endorses the High Commissioner’s call on the Council to respect the democratic will of the Myanmar people. To High Commissioner Türk:
[t]he elections of November 2020 made clear that what the people of the country wanted was to continue the hard-won path of democratic reform. It is critical that the country’s future is decided by a process led by the people of Myanmar.
On behalf of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, the National Unity Government will continue to serve in accordance with the democratic will of the people as expressed in 2020 and consistent with Myanmar’s international obligations. We will also strengthen our partnerships with UN Member States to translate recent international momentum on Myanmar, including at the Security Council, into tangible impact on the ground..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Human Rights
Date of publication:
2023-03-07
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-07
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Human Rights and international relations
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73.52 KB 363.28 KB
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"In this second installment of an interview, human rights campaigner Igor Blazevic asks security analyst Anthony Davis what changes we can expect to see this year in the Myanmar resistance’s armed campaign against the junta, as well as likely developments on the international front.
Blazevic: How effective are the resistance attacks on the stockpiles of arms and fuel? Can that be an effective tactic for the resistance?
Davis: Obviously ammunition supplies and aviation fuel are the lifeblood of the military. Without them a war cannot be sustained. The military understands that, and ammunition and fuel dumps will be extremely well protected, not only on the ground but also from drone attack. So, are they worthwhile targets? Absolutely, and I would hope that various ethnic resistance organizations and the Defense Ministry of the NUG are mapping very carefully where these dumps are and how effective security precautions are. There will always be weak spots. Identifying them may take weeks of covert surveillance but taking out a major fuel or ammo dump is a huge coup, materially and psychologically.
At this stage in the war, I’d be surprised to see this type of operation but it’s not impossible, and certainly a worthwhile objective.
Let me add one more aspect. Between fuel and ammunition dumps and various fronts, there are lines of supply along highways and rivers and that is really where the resistance can and must become more effective. That’s where the real vulnerability lies. But to hit supply convoys—and I know this from personal observation—you need well organized units of 20 or 30 men equipped with RPGs [rocket-propelled grenades] and machine guns in addition to IEDs and assault rifles. Plus a level of resistance which is confident about operating along those lines of supply. If you look at the main roads between Yangon and Naypyitaw or Mandalay and Myitkyina, the resistance is probing those areas, but it doesn’t yet have either the confidence and/or probably the logistic support that would allow it to operate in strength. This probably comes further into the war.
Blazevic: What is the role of pro-junta militia? How important are they for the army and can they successfully add manpower to the military?
Davis: The military is putting a lot of stress on recruitment of these militia forces, so clearly they are regarded as important. Why? Because in the countryside, particularly in Sagaing and Magwe, they provide the military with eyes and ears. Many battalions have little or no familiarity with the township in which they operate. So, in terms of local intelligence, the Pyu Saw Htee militia and the villages they operate from are seen as adding to overall capability. How effective they are in purely military terms is another matter. They’re mostly untrained and poorly armed so in some areas may even be more of a liability than an asset if they require army troops to help them out.
Blazevic: How do you evaluate the NUG and resistance chain of command and coordination capacity between the PDFs and ethnic revolutionary organizations? Do you notice any improvement? Is command and coordination getting better or is the resistance still not achieving a sufficient level of coordination?
Davis: That’s an extremely important question and sitting in Bangkok I don’t have as clear an answer as I would like. But I would say that compared to this time last year, there has been significant improvement. We can see that particularly in Karen and Karenni [Kayah] states and also in southern townships of Kachin where they abut northeastern Sagaing. Is this sufficient to produce a strategic impact at this stage in the war? Not yet. One must hope that incremental, gradual success will accelerate matters. There is an old saying in English, “success breeds success,” and it’s very true.
It is obviously critically important that the NUG and its Defense Ministry is liaising regularly with allied ethnic military organizations—Kachin, Karen, Karenni and Chin—and maybe with others that are not direct allies. I believe that is the case already, but that liaison and confidence building must move forward.
At this stage in the war, this cannot and should not be about attempting to organize grand coordinated offensives involving different parts of the country which end up in disappointment and mistrust. It’s ideally about confidence building and sharing experience and best practices. Where improving battlefield coordination is really important is at the township and district levels. Achieving results there will involve ethnic forces with better weaponry and long experience extending operational and tactical command-and-control over new and inexperienced PDFs. This is a lot easier said than done, but it is still worth saying.
Blazevic: What could be the turning point in Myanmar?
Davis: An impossible question to answer, I don’t have a crystal ball. No one knows. Talking about the coming year is more useful and in that time frame personally I don’t foresee any dramatic turning points, more of a long, hard slog, a progression in which the resistance becomes more effective and hopefully better connected while the military finds it increasingly difficult to solve growing problems—military, economic and political. That would be my prediction for this coming year.
That process might be accelerated if there were policy shifts by external players. I’m thinking the United States, India and possibly Thailand, after the May elections. These are key players and it is not inconceivable that ongoing erosion of the military’s capabilities on the battlefield will encourage a corresponding shift in the policies of external actors towards the NUG and the resistance more generally—not overnight changes but slow shifts. To a degree this is something which is already happening on the diplomatic and aid fronts: no dramatic turning points but definitely shifting dynamics.
Blazevic: On several occasions Myanmar people have called for a no-fly zone. Is that something that can happen?
Davis: No, a no-fly zone is not going to happen. Period. Even if the Myanmar Air Force were to conduct major strikes against urban areas captured by resistance forces resulting in the deaths of hundreds, even thousands of civilians—something entirely in their playbook—a no fly zone will still not happen. Why? Because only the United States could enforce one and that would necessitate moving an entire carrier battle group into the Bay of Bengal at a time where the US Navy has its hands more than full in the Asian theater. Even more importantly, it would provoke a very severe reaction from China, diplomatic consternation in ASEAN, and imply US responsibility for the future of a post-Tatmadaw Myanmar at a time when Myanmar is nowhere near the top of US government priorities. Bottom line: this is not the post-Cold War era of the 1990s. We can forget it.
Igor: Let us look at other outside factors. What impact can Western sanctions have? Can the positions of Thailand and India be shifted? It doesn’t look promising so far.
Davis: Sanctions are important politically and symbolically. They reflect the interest of any given state or in the case of the EU, a group of states, to make clear that they are opposed to the military’s attempt to take over Myanmar. Sanctions play a symbolic role but it would be a big mistake to think that sanctions are going to have any real impact on the battlefield in Myanmar in the coming year or two.
Regarding Thailand and India, you said that things don’t look very hopeful. I don’t think that’s necessarily the case if the resistance, PDFs plus ethnic armed organizations can achieve a degree of military momentum. This year is going to be an important, even decisive year in terms of defining trajectories—who’s going up, who’s going down. It won’t be about final victory, but if the resistance can demonstrate military momentum in the right direction that will necessarily impact the policies of important neighbors like India and Thailand. There are unlikely to be official statements, but things will likely shift on the borders in a way that reflects the changing dynamics inside Myanmar. So the military dynamic inside Myanmar is key: that’s what will influence what foreigners think and do, not the other way around.
Blazevic: Can the Myanmar resistance get some military support from outside? Is the US slowly shifting in that direction or is that an unrealistic expectation for the time being?
Davis: It is important to define the terms here. If you’re talking about an arms pipeline, a process of resupply over a period of time with a military objective in mind, I don’t believe there is any possibility of any external player looking to institute such a pipeline.
However, what I am suggesting is that as the military dynamic in Myanmar shifts, you may see states on Myanmar’s borders—Thailand and India most importantly—becoming more inclined to “look the other way” to what weapons are crossing the border courtesy of the “private market”. I’m not suggesting either of those states would agree to join with the West in moving truckloads of weapons to the resistance—even assuming the West were interested in providing weapons. But as they realize the Myanmar military is slowly sinking in this quagmire, they may gradually look to hedge their bets and ask themselves whether the internal conflict dynamics are changing the map? How does that impact our border security? Who do we need to be talking to and dealing with?
Blazevic: Could that include MANPADS—man-portable air defense systems?
Davis: It’s difficult to see that happening. MANPADS are extremely problematic at a range of levels—political, logistical, and in broader security terms. And the resistance as a potential beneficiary is itself far too fragmented. Even assuming an external actor were interested to supply them, to make a difference on the battlefield the resistance would need a supply chain: one or two would achieve nothing. And then you have the problem of where they end up. If you can shoot down an air force jet with a surface-to-air missile, you might also possibly sell it to somebody who wants to shoot down a civilian airliner taking off from Don Mueang airport outside Bangkok. So, risks at every turn. What has happened in Ukraine—and there is no shortage of risk there—is almost certainly not going to happen in Myanmar.
Blazevic: Can Russia be the game changer in Myanmar? Or is Russia simply too weak because of the war in Ukraine to play a game-changing role as it has done in Syria.
Davis: Even without the Ukraine war, Russia was never going to be a game-changer in Myanmar. It would be near impossible to imagine Russia intervening militarily in support of the Naypyitaw regime as it did in Syria, where it had real strategic concerns. But beyond that it’s a solid marriage of convenience in which both parties need the other. We understand the diplomatic and geopolitical implications of Russia’s problems. For its part, the Myanmar military already relies heavily on a range of Russian equipment and is diplomatically thrilled to have at least one admirer.
Practically though what more can this marriage produce? The Myanmar Air Force might benefit from spare parts and perhaps Russian advice in niche areas like air mobile operations, where their record has been unimpressive. But beyond that, actual Russian systems they might need more of—such as attack helicopters or additional Mi-17 transport helicopters or even basic Kamaz trucks—the Russians clearly need themselves. When it comes to fixed-wing aircraft, the Myanmar Air Force can certainly make do with what it has.
At the end of the day, the military is struggling to prosecute a scorched-earth counterinsurgency campaign against their own population, not a high-intensity conventional war. And as we already discussed, their problem is fundamentally about manpower and potentially logistics, not a lack of big-ticket equipment be it from Russia or anywhere else.
There’s also a lot of talk about economic and nuclear cooperation, and even tourism, which unless you’re a Russian male looking to avoid a one-way ride to the front in Ukraine, is something of a joke. But all this talk presupposes that the Myanmar military can reestablish a credible degree of security in the country, which in the coming years is unlikely. So, everything in the non-military sphere is probably more talk than substance.
Anthony Davis is a Bangkok-based security consultant and analyst with extensive field experience on a range of armed conflicts across Asia. He writes primarily for Janes, a security and defense publishing house..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2023-03-07
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-07
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
more
Description:
"In the following interview, human rights campaigner Igor Blazevic asks security analyst Anthony Davis about the state of the civil and armed opposition to the junta, and the condition of the Myanmar military after two years of trying to contain the armed uprising.
Blazevic: Anthony, you are military analyst, but let me start by asking, are multiple forms of civil resistance and disobedience still important factors in Myanmar’s anti-junta uprising? Spring Revolution started with the civil resistance and only later it transformed into the armed resistance as well. What role the civic resistance plays now? Is it still very important factor or the outcome will be decided on the battlefield?
Davis: Civilian mobilization and civic organization is fundamental in underpinning support for any popular armed struggle. This is particularly important in a situation where there is no revolutionary party as an organizing core which is very much the case in Myanmar today: the NLD represented the legitimacy underpinning the popular uprising of 2021 but it is certainly not a revolutionary party going forward. So, if you don’t have that one revolutionary center then civic organizations across the country in different regions become critically important. You can’t have a people’s war without people’s participation, politically, economically, militarily, in terms of the information war — across the whole spectrum. Although the military struggle, in my opinion, will be the decisive element, without the continued support and participation of society through civil organizations, including those supported by the NUG, that military element cannot hope to prevail.
Blazevic: We are already second year of a conflict that is extremely exhausting conflict for the population. Do you see popular support for the revolution and resistance already floundering under the pressure of the military atrocities or you think the resilience of the people of Myanmar is still as strong as it was at the beginning of the uprising?
Davis: That’s a difficult question for me to answer sitting in a comfortable office in Bangkok. But my general impression is that the people of Myanmar are still very much committed to the struggle. They recognize that this is a revolutionary opportunity, which is probably not going to come again – a truly historic opportunity to introduce a new political, social and economic system for Myanmar. I think that awareness is generally felt.
However, there will obviously be areas where the degree of support or of exhaustion varies. What I am hearing is that, if you’re in an urban area of Myanmar, if you’re in Yangon, Mandalay or one of the big cities, life for many people is to a degree normal. I was talking to somebody the other day who just arrived from Yangon and this lady was saying, “I’m not seeing troops on the streets, I do not have to go through checkpoints. Life is largely normal”. So, if you are in an urban area without much disruption, it is reasonable to assume you will want to get back to a normal life, being able to feed your family and do your business as soon as possible.
However, if you are in an area where the war is immediate and real, in Karen state or in Sagaing or Magway or Chin where the fighting is ongoing, where villages are being destroyed, where people are being killed, then I would imagine that there is a very powerful level of anger driving participation. It would depend very much on where you are.
Blazevic: Is Myanmar military being significantly weakened? They are losing soldiers and territory, they face defections, they have recruitment problems. Is Myanmar military still strong enough for a war of attrition? What currently are the main vulnerabilities on Myanmar military?
Davis: From the beginning of the crisis, I have always argued that it would be a very serious mistake to underestimate the strength of the Myanmar military. This is a huge organization which for seven decades has been used not just to running the country but also coming to feel that they own the country — that they somehow represent the essence of Myanmar and have the right to decide what is the best for it and how politics will be played. With this mentality the military has built up over time a very significant degree of organization, internal cohesion, discipline, military resources, and economic power. It would be a bad mistake to underestimate these people simply because the ordinary people of Myanmar have stood up to fight them. They should not be underestimated.
There has been a tendency since the months following the coup to exaggerate the number of defections and desertions from the military as well as their battlefield losses. The media, both in Myanmar and abroad have not done a very good job in looking at this issue of defections, desertions, losses in a realistic manner.
Let’s start with defections and desertions we hear so much about. Because we want to believe it, it’s tempting to think that this is an army on the verge of disintegration. This is clearly not the case. I have looked at the issue closely and talked to well-placed sources inside Myanmar regularly. My assessment, which may of course be wrong, is that desertions and defections may perhaps have totaled somewhere around 3,000, maybe 4,000, from the army and police over two years. In terms of battlefield losses, killed and badly wounded, my best estimate would be somewhere between 10,000 and 15,000 in two years.
So in terms of men who’ve quit the security forces plus those killed or wounded, we’re likely talking less than 20,000. Now this is a military which in terms of combat-capable units numbers somewhere over 100,000 personnel. You can then add to that an essentially militarized police force of not less than 70,000. So in terms of losses, perhaps 15,000 in two years from a military organization that is at least 170,000 strong, maybe more. These are not insignificant losses but they’re certainly not crippling, and I doubt if they are going to produce any dramatic reassessment of how the military looks at this struggle. I would argue that such losses are seen from Naypyidaw as acceptable; that the military believes it can continue to function and fight with this level of loss.
Let me add one other thing as regards defections and desertions. They have almost all been defections of individuals or very small groups of two or three men leaving a unit. What we have not yet seen — and I stress the word ‘yet’ — is an entire unit of 10, 20, 30 men quitting en masse — either by giving up their weapons and going home or joining the resistance. That hasn’t happened. I believe that eventually it may happen but so far it has not, and we need to understand this. It is not a coincidence; it reflects the fact that the Myanmar military is a remarkably disciplined and cohesive organization.
So, if that’s the bad news, is there any good news? Yes: they also have some real weaknesses to contend with. The most fundamental is that they simply do not have enough manpower to suppress resistance across much of Myanmar. Almost every combat unit in Myanmar is undermanned, and overall, the military is overstretched. It’s trying to do too much in too many places. A battalion in the Myanmar army should number around 750 men, officers and other ranks. A typical battalion now today in Myanmar is probably 200 on a very good day, often 150 or less. Not 750, but 150 or less. This is a huge problem.
Air power can only offset this dilemma to a certain extent. And since the last quarter of 2022 there has been a lot of stress, in the media, from the NUG, from PDFs, from civil society, on the impact of air strikes and the fact that the resistance has no anti-aircraft capability. However, I would argue that it’s important not to exaggerate airpower and to understand its limitations. Having spent much of the 1980s working in Afghanistan where Soviet airpower was deployed against village-based guerrilla resistance in much the same way as across Myanmar today, I know a little bit about this. Then it was Mi-24 helicopter gunships and Su-25 ground attack jets; now it’s Mi-24s and YAK-130 jets. These strikes can certainly cause large scale displacement of the civil population. But guerrilla resistance learns to adapt to the threat using camouflage, dispersal and optimum timing for their own attacks. So in a guerrilla environment, the initial psychological and kinetic shock of air power typically diminishes over time.
Where air power can of course be incredibly destructive, both physically and in terms of morale, is when guerrilla forces allow themselves to get bogged down in protracted assaults against army strongpoints or futile attempts to capture urban areas. At this stage in the war the regime in Naypyidaw will absolutely not accept the loss of urban areas. They will destroy them in order to “save” them, killing not only resistance fighters but also their civilian supporters. That will result in civilians saying to the resistance, “thank you very much for coming to our town but you killed half of the population indirectly by attracting airstrikes”. So, for the time being – this year and probably into 2024, depending on how the situation develops — in my opinion at least, it is really important in that the resistance in Myanmar does not attempt to capture urban centers, however tempting that may appear.
So, what do they do? I would argue simply that for the coming year, the focus should be on hitting the military at its point of greatest vulnerability – a plethora of over-extended, undermanned army and police positions spread almost everywhere. The strategy must focus specifically and relentlessly on destroying enemy forces piecemeal and capturing their weapons.
It may be worth making one other comment with regard to the weaknesses of Myanmar military. This is an organization which finds very difficult to conceptualize defeat. Their institutional arrogance and lack of self-doubt have created a mindset in which conceding strategic reverses, let alone outright defeat in almost impossible. It seems likely that at this point they don’t fully understand just how bad their strategic dilemma is. For the resistance, facing an enemy who imagines he can still win when he is actually slowly losing, is undoubtedly an advantage.
Blazevic: You mention that battalions should be 750 men, but now they are only about 150. Where have all those soldiers gone? One more question about logistic. It is often said that the war is won and lost by logistics. How do you estimate the weaknesses of the military in terms of their logistic capacity?
Davis: The answer to the first question is simple. The fact that infantry battalions in the Myanmar military have, give or take, only 150 men is nothing new. This goes back at least 20 years. In the 1990s, after the ‘88 uprising the Myanmar military expanded at a breakneck speed in order essentially to establish a garrison footprint across the entire country. But recruitment for what has always been a voluntary rather than conscription-based army simply could not keep up. They were expanding the number of infantry battalions without having sufficient manpower to fill them, while battalion commanders were – and still are – under pressure to maintain or increase unit strength and happy to inflate the numbers of recruits they were pulling in.
But what is now happening now is that infantry battalions are in action, potentially or actually, not just in certain parts of certain ethnic states — Shan or Kachin or Rakhine – but across the whole country. So under-manning is not a new problem, but today it has become a critical one.
As to logistics, any army is looking essentially at supplying line units with food, ammunition, and fuel. In this respect I don’t think the military is facing problems it cannot solve. If there is one exception, that would be Chin state, where the roads are really bad, often extend over long distances and are few and far between. Resupply in 2021 and 2022 involved very big convoys moving slowly between the main towns — Mindat, Matupi, Hakha, Thantlang. These convoys are extremely vulnerable because they move slowly on bad roads and the areas around them are largely controlled by the Chin resistance. Chin state is a logistical nightmare for the military, and it now depends significantly on helicopters – expensive in terms of fuel costs and, if the resistance can position machine-guns around landing pads, maybe not that safe either.
Karenni state also poses broadly similar logistics problems though probably not to the same degree. But with regard to other fronts across the country, I am not aware of any areas where logistics are a critical headache. There are of course plenty of ambushes and IEDs, especially in Sagaing and northern parts of Magwe. But is that a critical problem anywhere? I don’t think so.
That can of course change if the resistance becomes more effective in not only attacking convoys but temporarily cutting roads. If the resistance in the coming year or two can begin effectively cutting major roads and railways, then the logistics issue has the potential to become a huge problem for the military. But right now, we haven’t reached that point.
Anthony Davis is a Bangkok-based security consultant and analyst with extensive field experience on a range of armed conflicts across Asia. He writes primarily for IHS-Janes, a security and defense publication.
Igor Blazevic is a senior adviser at the Prague Civil Society Centre. Between 2011 and 2016 he worked in Myanmar as the head lecturer of the Educational Initiatives Program..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2023-03-06
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-06
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Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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"EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:
The current conflict in Myanmar began with the 2021 coup d’état. The conflict between the ruling junta and pro-democracry movement has accelerated environmental degradation and hurt Myanmar’s economic standing. Demographic stress has also worsened both from the junta’s lack of attention to urban infrastructure and its targeting of rural villages, increasing the number of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs). The return to military rule has caused a worsening trend for most indicators used to determine the degree of conflict. This diagnostic uses the methodology created by the Country Indicators for Foreign Policy to establish possible short-term scenarios based on indicators of conflict determining trend lines and degree of risk. The military coup has destabilized the country which has resulted in a return to military rule causing a worsening conflict trend and making any peaceful settlement unlikely in the near future.....
Source/publisher:
Carleton University
Date of publication:
2023-03-06
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-06
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Armed conflict and peace-building in Burma - theoretical, strategic and general, Peace processes, ceasefires and ceasefire talks (websites, documents, reports and studies), Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
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"Council Concludes its Interactive Dialogue with the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Afghanistan
The Human Rights Council this afternoon concluded an interactive dialogue on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan, held an interactive dialogue on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, and began an interactive dialogue with the Group of Human Rights Experts on Nicaragua.
Volker Türk, United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, said as Myanmar entered the third year of the crisis generated by military rule, its people continued to suffer profound human rights harms; an expanding humanitarian emergency; continuing impunity of the military authorities; and a deepening economic crisis. Armed conflict continued to grow and military operations now increasingly involved the use of airstrikes, artillery shelling and heavy weaponry against civilians. The latest report detailed a number of incidents being investigated, including hundreds of houses being burned and dozens of people, including children killed by shelling and military raids. Since February 2021, at least 17,572 people had been arrested (including 381 children) with 13,763 remaining in detention. Across the country, 17.6 million people now needed humanitarian assistance, and over 15.2 million faced acute food insecurity. The Rohingya community still remaining in Myanmar continued to face widespread discrimination. There needed to be increased international support, and the continuing proceedings before both the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court warranted every support.
In the discussion on Myanmar, speakers said, among other things, that since the 1 February 2021 coup, the military had brought the country into a perpetual human rights crisis through continuous human rights violations and violations of international humanitarian law, some of which may amount to international crimes. The consistent tactics and patterns of abuse underscored the military’s responsibility for these violations, including indiscriminate airstrikes and artillery attacks against populated areas, village raids and burnings, arbitrary arrests, use of torture, extrajudicial killings, killings of children, attacks on schools and hospitals, military use of schools, sexual and gender-based violence, severe restrictions of fundamental freedoms and many more, with persons belonging to ethnic or religious minorities such as the Rohingya bearing the brunt.
One speaker spoke of regret that Myanmar had not participated in the discussion, stressing respect for its sovereignty. Some speakers said all parties should speak and work in order to help the parties in Myanmar overcome their divergences and problems in order to overcome their differences, and the international community should respect the territorial integrity and national unity of Myanmar in resolving the situation. Dialogue and reconciliation must be the way forward. To not listen to the State concerned precluded hearing about its efforts and the progress made on the ground. Another speaker called for an end to all unilateral coercive measures imposed on Myanmar, which caused immense suffering to the people on the ground.
Speaking in the discussion on Myanmar were European Union, Norway on behalf of a group of countries, France, United States, Japan, Luxembourg, Costa Rica, China, United Nations Children’s Fund, Indonesia, Venezuela, Egypt, Canada, Netherlands, United Kingdom, Malaysia, South Africa, Maldives, Türkiye, Bangladesh, Gambia, Saudi Arabia, Malawi, Australia, Mauritania, Libya, Thailand, Belarus, Botswana, Ireland, Viet Nam, Iran, Russian Federation, Sierra Leone and Pakistan on behalf of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation countries.
Also speaking were the following non-governmental organizations: Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development, China Foundation for Poverty Alleviation, Association Ma’onah for Human Rights and Immigration, Centre pour les Droits Civils et Politiques - Centre CCPR, Society for Threatened Peoples, Edmund Rice International Limited, Lawyers Rights Watch Canada, Amnesty International, International Commission of Jurists, and CIVICUS - World Alliance for Citizen Participation.
The Council then started an interactive dialogue with the Group of Human Rights Experts on Nicaragua.
Jan-Michael Simon, Chair of the Group of Human Rights Experts on Nicaragua, said the Group had investigated alleged human rights abuses and violations committed in Nicaragua since April 2018.
Based on the information analysed, the Group concluded that serious and systematic human rights violations and abuses of human rights took place in Nicaragua during the period covered by the report, perpetuated by government representatives, and those from pro-government groups. Violations included extrajudicial executions, arbitrary detentions, torture and cruel treatment including acts of sexual and gender-based violence, arbitrary deprivation of nationality, and violations of the right to remain in the country, among others. These violations were perpetrated against genuine and perceived opponents of the Nicaraguan Government. The Expert Group concluded that the violations were committed as a pattern of behaviour which was generalised and systematic.
These violations constituted crimes against humanity. These crimes against humanity were committed within the framework of a discriminatory policy against part of the population of Nicaragua, for political motives, intentionally organised from the highest levels of government.
Nicaragua, speaking as the country concerned, said the Government of reconciliation and national unity wished to formally indicate that it had not nor would it ever accept the unilateral appointment of the Members of the Group of Experts in any way, shape or form. This group was nothing less than a smokescreen in order to allow fabrication of facts. The input to it came from certain opposition elements in the country that were putting forth false narratives directed by imperialist powers with the aim of interfering in the nation. No reports were accepted, as they ran counter to the over-arching interests of the State, which was aiming to ensure human rights across the board. Nicaragua did not wish these reports to continue to undermine its institutions and legal order. The reports did not reflect the most basic progress, such as in education, women’s rights, and poverty reduction. Any recommendations put forward lacked objectivity and were tantamount to coercion, since they undermined the efforts of all Nicaraguans.
In the ensuing discussion on Nicaragua, speakers expressed, among other things, outrage for the serious and systematic human rights violations laid out in the reports, including crimes against humanity. The report left no doubt regarding the grave seriousness of the human rights situation in Nicaragua, which continued to deteriorate, and could lead to an even graver humanitarian crisis. The Government should work to ensure the human rights of all Nicaraguans, and ensure accountability and justice for all for the human rights violations listed in the report, including allegations of torture and grave violations of civil and political rights. Multiple speakers welcomed the release of 222 political prisoners by the Government of Nicaragua, but remained gravely concerned about the deterioration of human rights and the rule of law.
Speaking in the discussion on Nicaragua were Chile on behalf of a group of countries, European Union, Luxembourg on behalf of a group of countries, Iceland on behalf of a group of countries, France, United States, Switzerland and Ecuador.
At the beginning of the meeting, the Council concluded its interactive dialogue with the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan.
Richard Bennett, Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan, in concluding remarks, said many interventions had rightly focused on discrimination against women and girls. Even if the situation affecting women and girls was less serious, there would still be a human rights crisis in Afghanistan. There was an increasing number of reports of arbitrary arrests, torture, disappearance and killings, including those of a district governor and former police commander in the past few days, who appeared to have suffered torture before being killed. The Council was implored to consider this on its agenda. Mr. Bennett called on the de-facto authorities to take concrete steps to stop these killings and bring those responsible to justice. Rapidly shrinking civil space was also a concern, described as a “muzzling” of the media in the report.
In the discussion on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan, speakers raised, among other issues, the deep concern over the regressive, disproportionate and discriminatory measures imposed by the de facto authorities on Afghan women and girls, particularly the banning of tertiary education for Afghan women. Speakers urged the de facto authorities to urgently reconsider this decision, which was detrimental to the future generation of Afghanistan. There was also concern about the economic and humanitarian crises that continued to deteriorate in the country.
The situation in Afghanistan was due to United States’ activities in the country, one speaker said, urging the Special Rapporteur to find a way around the effective blocking of Afghan assets by the United States, which undermined Afghanistan’s capacity to move towards sustainable peace and development. Some speakers were disappointed that the Special Rapporteur had not taken note of this in his report, urging him to take into consideration the historical reasons for the crisis, and to call for an end to the blocking of assets.
Speaking in the discussion were Malaysia, South Africa, Spain, Sudan, Australia, Türkiye, New Zealand, Kazakhstan, Italy, Republic of Malta, Chile, Malawi, Montenegro, Austria, Croatia, Namibia, Bulgaria, Pakistan, Argentina, Timor-Leste, Iran, Ukraine, Saudi Arabia, Greece, Russian Federation, Slovenia, and United Kingdom.
Also speaking were the following non-governmental organizations: Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development, Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, Interfaith International Intervention, Save the Children International, International Lesbian and Gay Association, World Organisation against Torture, CIVICUS – World Alliance for Citizen Participation Intervention, International Bar Association, Organisation internationale pour les pays les moins avancés, and Meezaan Centre for Human Rights.
The webcast of the Human Rights Council meetings can be found here. All meeting summaries can be found here. Documents and reports related to the Human Rights Council’s fifty-second regular session can be found here.
The next meeting of the Council will be at 10 a.m. on Tuesday, 7 March, when it will
conclude the interactive dialogue with the Group of Human Rights Experts on Nicaragua followed by an enhanced interactive dialogue on the report of the Commission of Human Rights in South Sudan. The Council will then hear the High Commissioner’s oral update and presentation of reports under item 2, followed by a general debate under item 2 - annual report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and reports of the Office of the High Commissioner and the Secretary-General.
Interactive Dialogue with the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Afghanistan
The interactive dialogue with the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan started in the previous meeting and a summary can be found here.
Discussion on Afghanistan
Some speakers expressed deep concern over the regressive, disproportionate and discriminatory measures imposed by the de facto authorities on Afghan women and girls. Such measures, particularly the banning of tertiary education for Afghan women and girls, contradicted Islamic principles and international human rights law. Speakers urged the de facto authorities to urgently reconsider this decision, which was detrimental to the future generation of Afghanistan. The recent decisions to ban women and girls from higher education, along with the decree barring women from working in national and international non-governmental organizations were yet another stark demonstration of the silencing of the voices of women and girls in the country. Such actions were self-defeating, and would only aggravate the dire socio-economic conditions, as well as maybe being tantamount to gender persecution.
Education was the key to economic well-being and future prosperity in any society, and as such, education in Afghanistan, especially for girls and women, must continue and even increase. The data was clear that educated girls and women contributed very significantly to social and economic well-being. In order to bring together the three pillars of the United Nations: human rights, peace and security, and development, as well as to promote inclusive and comprehensive sustainable development in the region, one speaker proposed to establish a United Nations Regional Hub on Sustainable Development Goals for Central Asia and Afghanistan in Almaty, Kazakhstan, which would coordinate all international programmes aimed at supporting Afghanistan. Speakers appealed repeatedly to Afghanistan to restore access to education for all women and girls within the country, allowing them to achieve development and prosperity.
There was also concern about the economic and humanitarian crises that continued to deteriorate in Afghanistan. The international community should increase its efforts to address these issues through constructive dialogue and cooperation, and help Afghanistan from descending further into insecurity, poverty and isolation. The international community needed to also continue to give coordinated and constructive suggestions to Afghanistan on improving the situation. Afghanistan remained in a dire economic crisis: ensuring stability in the country was critical. Almost the entire population was impacted by the dire situation, with currently 97 per cent of them suffering in various ways.
Fighting impunity and ensuring accountability for the violations of international humanitarian law and human rights violations and abuses was an essential for the stability and peaceful future of all Afghan citizens, speakers said. Today Afghanistan was a dreary place where the Constitution was suspended, the rule of law was subject to interpretation, and the Taliban was ruling through fear and repression. The overwhelming sense of hopelessness, compounded by the economic and humanitarian crises, were deeply affecting the whole of Afghan society. It was therefore crucial to keep providing humanitarian and basic needs assistance.
Efforts should be made by the international community to ensure that Afghanistan adopted a Government that was representative of all parts of Afghan society, including the various ethnic and religious groups, as well as women and girls.
The situation in Afghanistan was due to United States’ activities in the country, one speaker said, urging the Special Rapporteur to find a way around the effective blocking of Afghan assets by the United States, which undermined Afghanistan’s capacity to move towards sustainable peace and development. Some speakers were disappointed that the Special Rapporteur had not taken note of this in his report, urging him to take into consideration the historical reasons for the crisis, and to call for an end to the blocking of assets.
Another issue of deep concern was the situation of millions of children in Afghanistan deprived of essential services, including primary healthcare, education, water and sanitation, while many of them continued to be killed and maimed by landmines and other explosive remnants of war, as well as their recruitment for conflict. The Special Rapporteur was asked, considering the inclusion in his mandate of a child’s rights perspective, what was his assessment on the situation of children and on future prospects? Another question asked was what prospects for positive developments by the authorities he saw in light of the recent setbacks?
Concluding Remarks
RICHARD BENNETT, Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan, thanked all the States and members of civil society for their interventions and questions. Many interventions had rightly focused on discrimination against women and girls. Mr. Bennett welcomed the decision by the Council at the previous session to mandate a specific report on the situation of women and girls at the fifty-third session. Even if the situation affecting women and girls was less serious, there would still be a human rights crisis in Afghanistan. Mr. Bennett was concerned about the extra judicial killings of former civil servants and members of the Afghan security forces, despite the general amnesty issued by the de-facto authorities. There was an increasing number of reports of arbitrary arrests, torture, disappearance, and killings, including those of a district governor and a former police commander in the past few days, who appeared to have suffered torture before being killed. The Council was implored to consider this on their agenda.
Impunity could lead to ongoing animosity and future bloodshed. Mr. Bennett called on the de-facto authorities to take concrete steps to stop these killings and bring those responsible to justice. Rapidly shrinking civil space was also a concern, described as a “muzzling” of the media in the report. There was no independent mechanism to address human rights complaints and bring them to the attention of the authorities. Journalists, human rights defenders and civil society should be able to operate freely without fear, but this was not the case. The banning of education was not supported or justified; this was a universal right. Girls must be allowed to resume their studies alongside boys, and women alongside men at university. The impact of war, compounded by the Taliban’s rule would be intergenerational. If Afghanistan was to have a new generation of leaders tomorrow, they needed basic services today.
Mr. Bennett appreciated the strengthening of his mandate to include the documentation of evidence. There needed to be a stocktake of what mechanisms already existed for accountability, and there needed to be more resources put towards this. It was important to note that accountability should include the right to truth and reparations, as well as criminal accountability. Afghanistan deserved more commitment and engagement from the international community. Mr. Bennett expressed his unwavering admiration and commitment to the Afghan people who strove for human rights.
Interactive Dialogue on the Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar
Report
The Council has before it the report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights on the implementation of the recommendations made by the independent international fact-finding mission on Myanmar (A/HRC/52/21).
Presentation of Report
VOLKER TÜRK, United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, said as Myanmar entered the third year of the crisis generated by military rule, its people continued to suffer profound human rights harms; an expanding humanitarian emergency; continuing impunity of the military authorities; and a deepening economic crisis. Armed conflict continued to grow and military operations now increasingly involved the use of airstrikes, artillery shelling and heavy weaponry against civilians. The latest report detailed a number of incidents being investigated, including hundreds of houses being burned and dozens of people, including children, killed by shelling and military raids.
Airstrikes against civilian locations had increased by 141 per cent in the second year of the military takeover, and artillery shelling of communities had increased by over 100 per cent. Incidents in which homes and neighbourhoods were set on fire had risen by 380 per cent in the second year after the coup, leading to an estimated 1,200 per cent increase in the number of homes destroyed. Since the military takeover, some 39,000 structures had been burned, and people unable to flee risked being burned to death. The more than 1.3 million people displaced since the coup began faced destitution. At least 2,947 civilians had been killed by the military since 2021, including 244 children. More than one third of these confirmed deaths occurred in military custody. Cases had been reported of some armed groups attacking and killing civilians perceived to be working for or with the military. These acts constituted murder and needed to be condemned. It was imperative that the military respected the Security Council’s December resolution, and took steps to end the violence.
On 1 February 2023, the military extended the state of emergency, subjecting civilians to the expanded jurisdiction of military tribunals, with no right to appeal – even upon imposition of the death penalty. Since February 2021, at least 17,572 people had been arrested (including 381 children) with 13,763 remaining in detention. Across the country, 17.6 million people now needed humanitarian assistance, and over 15.2 million faced acute food insecurity.
The Rohingya community still remaining in Myanmar continued to face widespread discrimination. At least 3,500 Rohingya attempted sea crossings in 2022– a 360 per cent increase from 2021. At least 348 of them had died or had gone missing at sea. Mr. Türk appealed to all countries to provide support to people fleeing Myanmar, and to their host communities. There needed to be increased international support, and the continuing proceedings before both the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court warranted every support. Mr. Türk remained concerned by the prospect of new elections taking place in Myanmar and the arbitrary detention of elected political leaders in February 2021. He called on the Council to do its best to deliver humanitarian support directly to Myanmar’s people, and called on United Nations Member States to promote dialogue and sustainable solutions to bring an end to this brutal crisis.
Discussion on Myanmar
In the discussion, some speakers said, among other things, that since the 1 February 2021 coup, the military had brought Myanmar into a perpetual human rights crisis through continuous human rights violations and violations of international humanitarian law, some of which may amount to international crimes. The consistent tactics and patterns of abuse underscored the military’s responsibility for these violations, including indiscriminate airstrikes and artillery attacks against populated areas, village raids and burnings, arbitrary arrests, use of torture, extrajudicial killings, killing of children, attacks on schools and hospitals, military use of schools, sexual and gender-based violence, severe restrictions of fundamental freedoms and many more, with persons belonging to ethnic or religious minorities such as the Rohingya bearing the brunt.
Several speakers expressed continued support to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ five-point consensus, recalling Security Council resolution 26/69 (2022), and demanded an immediate end to all forms of violence throughout the country. United Nations Security Council resolution 26/69 called for the regime to end its violence across the country, release arbitrarily detained prisoners, allow unhindered humanitarian access, protect members of minority groups, and respect the will and democratic aspirations of the people of Myanmar, and there were as yet no signs of results in this direction. Speakers also called for the release of all arbitrarily detained prisoners, the provision of full and unhindered humanitarian access, and the protection of civilians in Myanmar. Further calls were also made for an international arms embargo and targeted economic action to prevent the flow of weapons to the military.
The situation in Rakhine state continued to be tense and fragile, speakers noted. Addressing the root causes of the Rohingya crisis was of paramount important in pursuing a durable resolution to the crisis. Both in Myanmar and beyond, the Rohingyas had become more vulnerable to various discrimination, violence, radicalisation and trafficking. The authorities in Myanmar were urged to fully cooperate with international mechanisms, including the Special Envoys of the Chair of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, as well as those established by this Council, and to step up their efforts to create conducive conditions that would facilitate safe, dignified and voluntary repatriation, including by ensuring justice and accountability.
The international community was urged to apply stronger pressure on the Government of Myanmar, and to stand together to demand an end to the violence and seek a peaceful reconciliation to the crisis. One speaker said the Security Council should refer the situation in Myanmar to the International Criminal Court without delay. The international concerns for a peaceful and prosperous Myanmar must go hand in hand with fulfilling the rights of minorities. All parties should refrain from further violence and the Myanmar authorities should allow access for humanitarian assistance, including through the Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management. International cooperation should be strengthened to prevent further displacement and find a sustainable solution. Space should be made to ensure a democratic and fruitful dialogue, with the participation of all parties.
One speaker spoke of regret that Myanmar had not participated in the discussion, stressing respect for its sovereignty. Some speakers said all parties should speak and work in order to help the parties in Myanmar overcome their divergences and problems in order to overcome their differences, and the international community should respect the territorial integrity and national unity of Myanmar in resolving the situation. Dialogue and reconciliation must be the way forward. To not listen to the State concerned precluded hearing about its efforts and the progress made on the ground. Another speaker called for an end to all unilateral coercive measures imposed on Myanmar, which caused immense suffering to the people on the ground.
For a peaceful future, a vibrant and diverse civil society was indispensable, and there was deep concern about the ongoing repression of civil society organizations in Myanmar. Civil society organizations, including human rights defenders, were being monitored, restricted and harassed. The Organization Registration Act that was introduced last year was another blow for civic space, and a speaker applauded Myanmar’s civilian organizations for their courage and resilience. Their work was indispensable for accountability, women empowerment, and giving youth in Myanmar a voice to shape their future. One speaker pointed out that international human rights mechanisms should, however, operate whilst respecting the sovereignty and territoriality of States, and a genuine concern for human rights was required for human rights without politicisation or bias, operating through cooperation with the Government and repudiation of all unilateral coercive measures and other measures imposed upon the country.
What measures could be taken to reduce violence against civilians and human rights violations and abuses in Myanmar, as well as to ensure accountability for past and ongoing crimes, a speaker asked? Another asked how could the international community help support civil society and human rights defenders under threat in Myanmar? The international community had an obligation to restore even a sliver of hope. Would the High Commissioner recommend that the international community recognise the National Unity Government as the true Government of Myanmar, a speaker asked? How could the international community support Myanmar’s diverse democratic movement to ensure the protection and promotion of human rights, another speaker asked? How could the international community continue to support civil society organizations that were active in Myanmar under these circumstances, so they survived and played their essential role in the future of Myanmar, another speaker asked?
Concluding Remarks
VOLKER TÜRK, United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, said this was an extremely troubling situation: Myanmar was in free-fall, and the international community had to respond in the most effective way possible. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ five-point plan, Security Council resolution 26/69, and the Human Rights Council resolutions set out the expectations of the international community, as well as the benchmarks for a solution. The solution against this background was set out, and the international community needed to look at how these various documents had been disrespected by the authorities. Those Member States with any influence over the authorities should work to ensure that there was a change in the country that brought it back to the plight of the people. This required a coordinated and unified approach, and a number of things could be done in addition to what had been said.
There needed to be an end to arms being sold, and economic measures. The international community must not be engaged in supporting any electoral process that lacked the ability to ensure the participation of all the people of the country in peace and security. Those involved in civil society and national human rights defenders needed to be seen as key interlocutors for any solution. Regarding accountability for past and present human rights violations, this was key to any solution to the crisis, and whatever emerged as a solution would have to have inherent in it transitional justice. Member States could look at universal jurisdiction for crimes committed in Myanmar. There should be full support, politically- and funding-wise, for the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar.
The Rohingya, as well as the countries hosting them, required continued support by the international community. The Government of National Unity and all other representatives of Myanmar civil society must be involved in all attempts to restore democracy and ensure fair elections. The threat to civil society organizations was really existential, human rights defenders faced a myriad of issues, problems and potential risks, and it was vital to continue to alert the world of these risks. Donors should look at flexible and creative means of funding for human rights defenders and civil society organizations to ensure that their work continued, including resettlement and even witness protection.
Interactive Dialogue with the Group of Human Rights Experts on Nicaragua
Report
The Council has before it the report by the Group of Human Rights Experts on Nicaragua (A/HRC/52/63)
Presentation of the Report
JAN-MICHAEL SIMON, Chair of the Group of Human Rights Experts on Nicaragua, presented the conclusions of the investigations carried out by the group over the past year. The Group had investigated alleged human rights abuses and violations committed in Nicaragua since April 2018, to ensure accountability and justice for the victims. The Group had used methodology which included the collection of information from victims and witnesses, as well as the review of judicial records and verified audio visual material. Thanks to technological progress, the team was able to collect information securely and confidentially, including from sources still inside Nicaragua. During the investigation, the Group investigated 149 cases, received more than 150 confidential documents, processed and classified almost 1,500 documents, and conducted 291 face-to-face and remote interviews. Five missions were carried out to areas near the territory of Nicaragua. It had not been possible to carry out investigatory activities in the territory of Nicaragua since access had not been granted by the Nicaraguan Government. Between June and December 2022, 12 communications were sent to the Government of Nicaragua, to request a country visit, open channels of dialogue, and for data and information. The report was sent to the Government for comment before publishing it, but no response had been received, which was regretful. The Group remained open to channels of cooperation and dialogue with Nicaragua.
Based on the information analysed, Mr. Simon said that the Group concluded that serious and systematic human rights violations and abuses of human rights took place in Nicaragua during the period covered by the report, perpetuated by government representatives, and those from pro-government groups. Violations included extrajudicial executions, arbitrary detentions, torture and cruel treatment including acts of sexual and gender-based violence, arbitrary deprivation of nationality, and violations of the right to remain in the country, among others. These violations were perpetrated against genuine and perceived opponents of the Nicaraguan Government. The Expert Group concluded that the violations were committed as pattern of behaviour which was generalised and systematic. These violations constituted crimes against humanity. These crimes against humanity were committed within the framework of a discriminatory policy against part of the population of Nicaragua, for political motives, intentionally organised from the highest levels of government.
Mr. Simon said that the prevailing impunity for the crimes facilitated the escalation of violence. The conclusions reached by the Group were sufficient to justify further investigations. It was recommended that the Nicaraguan authorities immediately release all persons arbitrarily deprived of their liberty, and put an immediate end to violations, abuses and crimes, including persecution for politically motivated reasons. The State should also ensure accountability for victims and implement the necessary measures to guarantee the separation of powers. Nicaragua should cooperate with the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. It was hoped the independent inquiry could bring victims closer to justice.
Statement by the Country Concerned
Nicaragua, speaking as the country concerned, said the Government of reconciliation and national unity wished to formally indicate that it had not nor would it ever accept the unilateral appointment of the Members of the Group of Experts in any way, shape or form. This group was nothing less than a smokescreen in order to allow the fabrication of facts. The input to it came from certain opposition elements in the country that were putting forth false narratives directed by imperialist powers with the aim of interfering in the nation. No reports were accepted, as they ran counter to the over-arching interests of the State, which was aiming to ensure human rights across the board. Nicaragua did not wish these reports to continue to undermine its institutions and legal order. The reports did not reflect the most basic progress, such as in education, women’s rights, and poverty reduction. Any recommendations put forward lacked objectivity and were tantamount to coercion, since they undermined the efforts of all Nicaraguans. Nicaragua was strengthened in its resolve to achieve the highest levels of democratic success, respecting international law and defending it, and called for equal consideration for all.
Discussion on Nicaragua
In the ensuing discussion, speakers expressed, among other things, outrage for the serious and systematic human rights violations laid out in the reports, including crimes against humanity. The report left no doubt regarding the grave seriousness of the human rights situation in Nicaragua, which continued to deteriorate, and could lead to an even graver humanitarian crisis. The Government should work to ensure the human rights of all Nicaraguans, and ensure accountability and justice for all for the human rights violations listed in the report, including allegations of torture and grave violations of civil and political rights.
There was also concern for the disappearance of indigenous persons, and the instrumentalisation of the legislative system to ensure impunity. The authorities should grant access to the country for the Group of Experts, and resume collaboration with it and other international bodies. The international community should not forget that arbitrary detention and the inhumane treatment of political prisoners were not the only instruments by which civil society and human rights defenders were persecuted in the country. The authorities should put an end to any such measures, to restore the fundamental rights of denaturalised dissidents, to stop human rights violations, to restore democracy and to re-engage with the international community. Impunity for human rights violations must end, and all restrictions on civic space must end, with all persons granted the rights of assembly, dissent and expression.
Multiple speakers welcomed the release of 222 political prisoners by the Government of Nicaragua, but remained gravely concerned about the deterioration of human rights and the rule of law, noting that following their expulsion, the regime stripped these individuals, as well as 94 others of their citizenship and reportedly seized their property in Nicaragua. These deplorable acts signalled a significant step backward for the Nicaraguan people and were inconsistent with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which provided that everyone had a right to a nationality.
The conclusion of the Group of Experts that crimes may have been committed as part of a policy emitting from the highest spheres of Government against certain parts of the population was of grave concern, and there should be full and fair investigations ensuring accountability, justice and reparations for victims. Laws should be repealed limiting access to human rights and fundamental freedoms.
The authorities’ refusal to appear before the Committee against Torture last July was deplored, and speakers urged Nicaragua to resume cooperation with the various United Nations mechanisms which had requested access to the country. Another speaker asked how the international community could help the Group of Experts to achieve its mandate and meet its objectives.
The work of the Experts was appreciated, and speakers asked, among other things, what could be done to support the work of civil society organizations within the country? One speaker appealed to the Council to renew the mandate of the Group..."
Source/publisher:
United Nations Human Rights Council
Date of publication:
2023-03-06
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-06
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Education in Burma/Myanmar - general, Human Rights and international relations, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
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"Mr President,
Excellencies,
Colleagues, Friends
Myanmar is a country close to my heart – one that I have travelled to often. At the time of the elections in 2015, I witnessed the complex process of opening to the world that the nation had embarked on, and I was inspired by the hope and optimism that we saw at that time as part of the nation-building process.
The people of Myanmar knew that they faced many challenges. Decades of isolation. Protracted repression. Ethnic nationalism – and particularly severe discrimination, structural exclusion and violence against the Rohingya, many of whom I've met over many years. Lost educational opportunities. Poverty. It was never going to be simple, but there was sincere, whole-hearted hope.
But hope is rare now in Myanmar.
As the country enters the third year of the crisis generated by military rule, its people continue to suffer profound human rights harms; an expanding humanitarian emergency; continuing impunity of the military authorities; and a deepening economic crisis.
Armed conflict has continued to grow in scope and intensity, with attacks on civilians reminiscent of those in 2017, when the military attacked Rohingya communities in Rakhine State.
However, military operations now increasingly involve the use of airstrikes, artillery shelling and heavy weaponry against civilian communities across the country.
Our latest report (A/HRC/52/21) details a number of incidents, investigated by my staff, in which hundreds of houses were burned and dozens of people – including children – killed by shelling and military raids.
Overall, the military increased airstrikes against civilian locations by 141% in the second year of the military takeover. Its artillery shelling of communities, including hospitals, schools and places of worship, increased by over 100%.
Despite official claims that such tactics are aimed at anti-military armed groups, in numerous cases, testimony gathered by my Office has not indicated the presence of such groups.
The military’s use of arson throughout the country echoes its past attacks on civilians in Rakhine State. Incidents in which homes and neighbourhoods have been set on fire have risen by 380% in the second year after the coup -- leading to an estimated 1,200% increase in the number of homes destroyed.
Particularly in Sagaing Region, northwest of Mandalay, we continue to receive daily reports of new incidents, with soldiers reportedly moving from village to village, looting and then setting fire to homes and farms.
UN colleagues indicate that since the military takeover, some 39,000 structures have been burned in villages and towns where the military has operated. Satellite images confirm that numerous incidents have involved destruction of entire villages, while other villages have been set on fire on multiple occasions.
People who are unable to flee risk being burned to death. Those who can escape – over 1.3 million people displaced since the coup was launched – face destitution.
Overall, credible sources have verified that at least 2,947 civilians have been killed by the military and its affiliates since 2021, including 244 children. More than one third of these confirmed deaths occurred in military custody. The actual number of civilian killings is almost certainly far higher.
Excellencies,
The disregard and contempt for human life and human rights that are continuously demonstrated by the military constitute an outrage to the conscience of humanity.
Cases have been reported of some armed groups attacking and killing civilians perceived to be working for or with the military. In some of these incidents, the targets have included family members. Such acts are not in any way a legitimate form of opposition or resistance. They constitute murder and must be condemned.
While I note that the scale of human rights abuses committed by armed groups appears considerably lower than the violations committed by the military, I must emphasise that all armed parties must institute or strengthen efforts to comply with the fundamental principles of international humanitarian law, notably civilian protection.
It is imperative that the military respect the Security Council’s December resolution S/RES/2669 and take steps to end the violence.
Mr President,
On 1 February 2023, two years since seizing power, the military extended the state of emergency, and since then has twice expanded martial law to cover large areas of the northwest and southeast of the country.
This subjects civilians to the expanded jurisdiction of military tribunals, with no right of appeal – even upon imposition of the death penalty. Credible sources verified that since 1 February 2021, at least 17,572 people have been arrested (including 381 children) with 13,763 remaining in detention.
Detainees across the country have reported severe beatings; mock executions; suspension from ceilings without food or water; electrocution; and acts of sexual violence. I condemn this apparently widespread use of torture and ill-treatment, as well as consistent reports of squalid conditions of detention.
The rights to freedom of expression, association, assembly, and movement have been increasingly – it appears, strategically – restricted, and continue to strangle media freedoms and civic space.
Merely “liking” a Facebook post may lead to terrorism charges, with sentences of ten years or more in prison, following opaque trials that do not meet fair trial standards at all.
Additional burdensome restrictions have been imposed on the registration of non-profit organizations and their capacity to function.
The effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on people’s basic subsistence and poverty levels in the country is also alarming.
Across the country, 17.6 million people now need humanitarian assistance, and over 15.2 million face acute food insecurity. At a time of such dire humanitarian needs, these regulations will impede the capacity of many NGOs to deliver essential goods and services.
Excellencies,
The Rohingya community still remaining in Myanmar, which has already endured decades of persecution, continues to face widespread and systematic discrimination in every area of life.
The necessary conditions for voluntary, safe and dignified returns of refugees to Rakhine State simply do not exist, and the over one million Rohingya who remain in forced exile in Bangladesh and other countries, as well as hundreds of thousands who are internally displaced, face a bleak present, and worse future.
Over the past year, thousands more Rohingya have sought to flee unbearable conditions. At least 3,500 attempted sea crossings in 2022– a 360 percent increase from 2021. At least 348 of them died or went missing at sea. It is a tragedy.
In addition, around 2,000 Rohingya people were arrested in 2022 for so-called “unauthorised travel” within Myanmar.
The urgent goals must be recognition of citizenship, and the exercise of rights associated with it, as well as security – repeatedly requested by the Rohingya as essential to conditions that would be conducive for their return.
In the interim, I appeal to all countries to provide continued robust support to people fleeing Myanmar, and to their host communities in the region, notably in Bangladesh. Host countries really need continued and sustained support.
The terrible fire that raged last night across part of the camps in southern Bangladesh where more than one million Rohingya refugees take shelter underscores the precarity of their position. Recent sharp reductions of food rations in the camps – due to shortfalls in funding – compound their hardship and the general insecurity in these camps.
There needs to be increased international support, as well as the provision of education and livelihood opportunities to the refugees, to uphold their dignity and reduce their dependency. I was moved last month to see the gesture of a number of Rohingya, who have lost everything, but nonetheless providing support to earthquake victims in Türkiye and Syria.
There will be no durable vision for the future without accountability for the cruel violence of the past.
The continuing proceedings before both the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court, with respect to the severe violations of the most basic human rights that have been visited upon the Rohingya as a group, simply for who they are, warrant every support.
Mr. President,
I remain deeply concerned by the prospect of new elections taking place in Myanmar while violence spirals out of control, amid mass displacement, and the arbitrary detention of elected political leaders in February 2021, and thousands of others since then, whose only crime was to oppose the military takeover.
The elections of November 2020 made clear that what the people of the country wanted was to continue the hard-won path of democratic reform. It is critical that the country’s future is decided by a process led by the people of Myanmar.
I call on members of this Council to do their utmost to deliver humanitarian support directly to Myanmar’s people, including by channelling operations through grassroots organisations.
And I call on all United Nations Member States to promote dialogue and sustainable solutions that are representative of the will of the Myanmar people, in order to bring an end to this brutal crisis.
The people of Myanmar deserve a better future.
Thank you..."
Source/publisher:
UN Human Rights Council and UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
Date of publication:
2023-03-06
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-06
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Armed conflict and peace-building in Burma - theoretical, strategic and general, Human Rights and international relations, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
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Description:
"The National Unity Government of Myanmar strongly condemns crimes against humanity committed perpetrated by the Myanmar military, including the recent massacre of 17 people in Tatai Village, Sagaing Township, Sagaing Division.
We take seriously our obligation to seek justice. Relevant ministries are collecting information about all the crimes committed by the terrorist army, including mass killings, war crimes, targeted attacks, killings of civilians, looting, and destruction of people's livelihoods and property. We are collecting witness statements and material evidence. We have submitted these to international litigation organizations and are also providing humanitarian aid to the families of victims. The Judicial branch of the National Unity Government is planning to act.
Civilians, including the elderly, women, children and the disabled have been brutally killed by the Military Junta. Therefore, we, NUG, have instructed civilians to be aware of the army’s activities and evacuate immediately as needed. We request international help in communication technology and equipment. We wish to create an early warning system to protect our people.
We further request the International Criminal Court to expand its current investigation into the situation in Bangladesh/Myanmar to cover all Myanmar territory. This would be consistent with the National Unity Government’s Article 12(3) Declaration under the Rome Statute. We request to provide further information for identifying perpetrators and call for states to strongly condemn crimes against humanity in the current UN Human Rights Council and for the adoption of an action-oriented resolution.
We urge the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar (IIMM) to identify national jurisdictions to support prosecutions under the exercise of universal jurisdiction and to expedite the preparation of case files to this end.
We ask countries and international bodies to expand sanctions against the illegal military junta and its associates. Such sanctions must include direct bans on imports of arms, munitions, dual-purpose technology, aviation fuel and other equipment used by the junta to locally manufacture war materiel.
We urge your coordination and support to the National Unity Government and its allies, with a view to ending the crimes committed by the terrorist army against Myanmar’s people..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2023-03-06
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-06
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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32.1 KB 361.75 KB
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"The NUG welcomes the new export restrictions imposed by the U.S Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) on four entities - two Burmese military and security services entities for providing surveillance technology to the military regime. This action shows continued international pressure and condemnation of the military regime's human rights abuses, and supports the efforts of pro-democracy activists and lawmakers in their fight for a return to democratic governance in Myanmar.
We are grateful for the work of the US in placing these important restrictions to slow the military's capacity to continue their campaign of terror and repression. We are hopeful that further targeted sanctions and restrictions will follow, and we hope that more countries follow suit..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of International Cooperation Myanmar
Date of publication:
2023-03-05
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-06
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Business and the Military
Language:
Format :
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Size:
22 KB 73.44 KB
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Description:
"Union Minister of Foreign Affairs of the National Unity Government of Myanmar, H.E. Daw Zin Mar Aung, undertook official visits to the United Kingdom and the United States of America in February 2023. During the visit, H.E. Daw Zin Mar Aung met with senior government officials, including Foreign Ministers, Deputy Foreign Minister, and MPs of the United Kingdom and the United States of America. It was the first time H.E Daw Zin Mar Aung undertook an official visit to the United Kingdom and the second time to the United States of America.
On 6 February 2023, H.E. Daw Zin Mar Aung met with Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs, The Rt Hon James Cleverly, at the office of Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. H.E. Daw Zin Mar Aung expressed her gratitude for imposing new rounds of sanctions by the United Kingdom and UK leadership in the United Nations Security Council.
H.E. Daw Zin Mar Aung also met with UK Members of Parliament. On 6 February 2023, H.E. Daw Zin Mar Aung met with Labour Member of Parliament and Chair of the All Party Parliamentary Group on Burma, Rushanara Ali. They discussed several different topics, including minority people's affairs.
On 6 February 2023, H.E. Daw Zin Mar Aung met with Labour Member of Parliament and Shadow Minister for Asia and the Pacific, Catherine West. They discussed how the UK Parliament could support the democratic movement of Myanmar and more humanitarian aid.
H.E. Daw Zin Mar Aung continued her official visit to the United States of America and met with senior government officials.
On 13 February 2023, H.E. Daw Zin Mar Aung met with the Under Secretary for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights of the United States, Uzra Zeya, who attended the opening ceremony of the office of the National Unity Government of Myanmar at Washington, D.C.
On 14 February 2023, H.E. Daw Zin Mar Aung met with the Deputy Secretary of State, Wendy Sherman, who welcomed the opening of the office of NUG at Washington, D.C., and underlined US commitment to the alliance of democracy and ethnic leaders, justice for all atrocities, and promised to continue to increase pressure on the military junta to end their tyranny and bring a peaceful restoration of democracy. On the same day, she also met with Deputy Assistant to the President and Coordinator for Indo-Pacific Affairs on the National Security Council, Mr. Kurt Campbell.
During the visit, H.E. Daw Zin Mar Aung also had separate meetings with Senator Ben Cardin from Maryland and Mr. Paul Grove from Senate Appropriations Committee.
Myanmar diaspora are the strongest supporters and the largest source of income to Myanmar’s Spring Revolution. H.E. Daw Zin Mar Aung also met with Myanmar diaspora and ethnic groups during her visit to the United Kingdom and the United States of America. During these meetings, Union Minister appreciated their strong support and aspirations for democracy and federal union. These meetings are also a testimony of strong solidarity between the National Unity Government and the people of Myanmar..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Myanmar - NUG
Date of publication:
2023-03-06
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-06
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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47.71 KB 441.63 KB
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"Since the military overthrew a democratically elected government in Myanmar in February 2021, the US has been one of the major nations to publicly denounce the coup and consistently urge for the restoration of democracy.
The United States has continued to support democracy by imposing sanctions on 80 persons and 32 entities so far in an effort to deny the regime the resources it needs to carry out its violent policies and to advance the democratic aspirations of Burma’s citizens. The US also declared that it would hold the Burmese military accountable for brutality against the country’s general populace, particularly the Rohingya group.
In addition to bringing a case against Myanmar’s Junta dictatorship before the International Court of Justice under the Genocide Convention, the US also supported a UN General Assembly resolution that would have prohibited the import of guns into Burma. The US Senate’s recent “Burma Act,” which was passed in December of last year, reinforced the US’s support for democratic organizations like NUG and EAOs.
However, since January 2023, a sudden shift in the US policy with regard to Myanmar is been seen.
Japan’s Prime Minister Fumio Kishida said (Feb 22), his government is appropriately handling Japan’s ‘Bago River Bridge Construction Project’ in Myanmar, being built partly by Japanese construction giant ‘Yokogawa Bridge Corp’. Myanmar Now reported that a steel mill owned by the military-owned conglomerate ‘Myanmar Economic Corporation (MEC)’ was supplying steel for the project and profiting enormously. Human Rights Watch says, from July 2022 to January 2023, Yokogawa Bridge Corp. transferred around US$2 million to MEC for the project, with United States government approval. While the US, UK, EU, Canada, and Australia have sanctioned MEC, doing business with MEC is surprising.
Japan, a close ally of the US, has recently been observed to be more engaged in Burma. Yuhei Sasakawa, the chairman of the Nippon Foundation and Japan’s special representative in Myanmar, mediated cease-fire agreements between the Arakan Army and the military Junta in 2019, 2020, and 2022. The successful negotiation of Sasakawa is creating a positive image of Japan to Myanmar’s military, EAOs and NUG. Two of the five stated main goals of the Sasakawa’s Peace Foundation are to strengthen Japan’s friendship with the United States and increasing Japan’s presence in Asia.
Junta boss Min Aung Hlaing handed the ‘Thiri Pyanchi’ titles and decorations for the strenuous cooperation to bring about peace, development and prosperity in Myanmar, to Hideo Watanabe, chairman of the Japan-Myanmar Friendship Association, also represents Japanese investors in Myanmar. Min Aung Hlaing called Watanabe a “good friend” and thanked him for his efforts to “foster ties between the two countries and two armies, and attract Japanese investment into Myanmar”. These explains a lot. The US through its close allay Japan, expanding its diplomatic, strategic and socioeconomic presence in Myanmar.
What changed US policy towards Burma?
So, what made the US change its stance on Myanmar all of a sudden? Is there any vested interest of Washington in the South Asian country? Yes, they are Russia, China and India.
In the wake of the coup and subsequent Western ostracization, the Myanmar junta established good relations with Russia. While Myanmar receives arms, resources and diplomatic backing from Moscow, Russia got another purchaser of its advanced weaponry in the backdrop of the West’s sanctions. Myanmar’s ruler, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, in addition to visiting Russia thrice, also supported Russia’s military operation in Ukraine.
Myanmar is also a buyer of Russian oil and recently signed an agreement with Moscow to explore nuclear energy in the Southeast Asian country. Top Russian Defense Official Seeks Closer Burma Ties. Myanmar was also invited to become a part of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which includes Russia, and India.
Anthony Davis, a British journalist with over four decades of experience covering conflicts in Asia, gave interview in an online video conference on “Military Possibilities 2023 in Myanmar” and Q&A session held for about 150 Myanmar journalists commented that, China remains an exclusive diplomatic relation with the military Junta, EAOs and NUG. Its socio-economic presence in Myanmar is also remarkable. Myanmar is China’s playground. No one including Myanmar Junta, NUG and EAOs dares to mess with China. He also commented that the possibility of a counter-coup in Myanmar is impossible. Because Myanmar army is well-organized and disciplined.
Now, Biden is witnessing that his atrocious plan to destroy the diplomatic, political and economic interests of Myanmar has backfired, as it ended up establishing a strong partnership between Myanmar and US’s chief adversary i.e., Russia and China. Therefore, in order to break the alliance between Moscow and Naypyidaw and counter the influence of Russia in Southeast Asia, the US has now deployed its ally, Japan, to further its agenda. The US cannot directly grant financial aid to Myanmar’s junta because then it will be obvious that Biden is endeavoring to counter the presence of Russia and China in Southeast Asia. So, the US has approached Japan to bribe Myanmar into switching its loyalty to the West.
It must be noted that this is the same US which earlier was preaching about the significance of democracy in Myanmar and pledged that it will prosecute the Burmese military leaders. However, in the face of the diplomatic, economic and political rise of Russia and China with Myanmar, the US has abandoned all principles of morality and is ready to embrace Myanmar’s junta..."
Source/publisher:
Modern Diplomacy
Date of publication:
2023-03-06
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-06
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
more
Sub-title:
In defiance of prevailing patriarchal norms, young women are playing instrumental roles in the country’s “Spring Revolution.”
Description:
"“You’ve messed with the wrong generation.”
In the days after Myanmar’s military staged a coup in February 2021, sparking mass protests across the country, this became a regular refrain for those opposing the military takeover, appearing on banners, placards and social media posts. Younger people – Generation Z and millennials – were the main driving force behind popular opposition to the power grab, not only on the streets but also within the Civil Disobedience Movement and online. They orchestrated boycotts of military-linked goods, launched fundraising drives for anti-coup activities, and organized “social punishment” campaigns aimed at pressuring individuals to cut ties with the regime.
When the military began ruthlessly cracking down on peaceful protesters, killing hundreds and detaining thousands more, it was again the younger generations who began forming armed groups in urban and rural areas to try to remove the military from power. While determined not to let the junta consolidate power, they also refused to accept a return to the status quo ante, particularly the 2008 constitution, which provides for an elected government to share power with the military.
n that regard, young activists have been instrumental in pushing the “Spring Revolution,” as the anti-coup movement has come to be known, in a more progressive direction, demanding a new constitution, a new political compact with ethnic minorities, more inclusive political structures, and a reframing of relations with the long-persecuted Rohingya. New political entities such as the National Unity Government (NUG), a parallel administration created by elected lawmakers ousted by the coup, were forced to follow their lead, agreeing for example on an inclusive “Federal Democracy Charter” with minorities and other stakeholders, and issuing a policy statement on the Rohingya that promised to end state discrimination.
This was a significant departure from the pre-coup political landscape, when younger people and women had been largely excluded from the corridors of power. Traditional norms reinforced through the five decades of military rule between 1962 and 2011 had concentrated authority in the hands of older men; this was evident not only in the military regime, but also among the country’s various ethnic armed groups, and even in the political opposition under the previous military junta. The transition to semi-civilian rule in 2011 brought a degree of improvement thanks to the more liberal political environment, but patriarchal attitudes remained the norm.
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Aung San Suu Kyi was, of course, a notable exception. But as the Western-educated daughter of Myanmar’s independence hero, she was atypical in a country where women, at best, exercised power informally, often through their husbands. The government she ran during 2016-2021 did little to promote inclusion of women and younger people in political life. Aung San Suu Kyi was the only woman minister in her administration, and while in power, her party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), largely shunned civil society, where youth and women were better represented. It also stalled on key gender-focused legislation, such as the Protection and Prevention of Violence against Women Law.
But after the coup, the youth directly challenged Myanmar’s age and gender norms, and have since secured some tangible progress. The NUG, which is made up of NLD figures, activists, and ethnic minority leaders, has implemented many of the policies that young people have demanded. New anti-regime political structures, including the NUG and National Unity Consultative Council, an advisory body comprising a broader mix of stakeholders, are also more diverse than the NLD-era government and parliament, and consult with younger political leaders regularly.
More broadly, younger people involved in the anti-military struggle say that many older people in their communities view them with a new level of respect – not only because of their bravery and commitment, but also because of their ability and skills. They have become particularly influential in grassroots political movements, such as parallel local administrations formed in areas where the regime no longer has effective control.
“In the past, most people in the community seemed to think that young people weren’t capable because they didn’t have experience and knowledge … now, many have changed their views and they give us opportunities. They realize that the future of the country is in our hands,” explained one young activist, who coordinates regular “flash protests” in an outlying Yangon township.
Yet Myanmar’s patriarchal political culture has not been dispensed with entirely. The Spring Revolution has not swept away the old political order; rather, the new forces that have emerged need to work with existing players, like senior NLD officials and established ethnic armed groups. As a result, familiar patterns of behavior have gradually re-emerged in the new political and armed organizations. Although women have joined newly formed armed groups in unprecedented numbers, undergoing boot camp-style training, they have mostly been relegated to support roles, particularly those traditionally associated with women, such as providing medical care to injured comrades, for which they receive little credit.
The stalled progress has also been evident within the NUG, where younger members lack real influence over decision-making. Rightly or wrongly, this has created an impression of tokenism among many Myanmar people, a perception that has the potential to undermine popular support for the parallel administration. “Of course, the NUG is more inclusive than previous governments, but it’s not at the level we were expecting,” complained one young protest leader from Tanintharyi Region. “There is still gender and age discrimination in new political structures,” agreed a student leader from Sagaing Region. “We need to continue making progress, and the next step is to create more space and give more authority to younger people and women.”
There is a clear self-interest argument for why the NUG and other entities fighting the regime should make their structures more inclusive; at the very least, it would help to shore up support among the resistance’s strongest advocates. But they should also see the bigger picture, beyond potential short-term gain. Traditional patriarchal values have been among the root causes of many of Myanmar’s political, social, and economic failings: its unresolved armed conflicts, its poor health and education systems, and its ethnic and religious tensions.
The leaders of the resistance movement now have an opportunity to start redressing this legacy. While there is still deep uncertainty as to how the current crisis will end, nurturing a greater role for young people and women at this formative time could contribute to making Myanmar a more inclusive society in the long term, particularly when it comes to providing them with political opportunities..."
Source/publisher:
"The Diplomat" (Japan)
Date of publication:
2023-03-06
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-06
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Spring Revolution
Language:
more
Description:
"ပြည်ထောင်စုသမ္မတမြန်မာနိုင်ငံတော်၊ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၊ နိုင်ငံခြားရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာန၊ ပြည်ထောင်စုဝန်ကြီး ဒေါ်ဇင်မာအောင်သည် ဖေဖော်ဝါရီလအတွင်း ယူကေနိုင်ငံနှင့် အမေရိကန်ပြည်ထောင်စုသို့ ခရီးစဥ်များ သွားရောက်ခဲ့ပါသည်။ နိုင်ငံခြားရေးဝန်ကြီး၏ ခရီးစဥ်များအတွင်းတွင် သက်ဆိုင်ရာနိုင်ငံများမှ တာဝန်ရှိပုဂ္ဂိုလ်များ၊ နိုင်ငံခြားဝန်ကြီးဌာနများမှ ဝန်ကြီး၊ ဒုဝန်ကြီးနှင့် အခြားသော တာဝန်ရှိသူများ၊ လွှတ်တော်အမတ်များ နှင့် တွေ့ဆုံဆွေးနွေးခဲ့ပါသည်။ နိုင်ငံခြားရေးဝန်ကြီး ဒေါ်ဇင်မာအောင်သည် ယူကေနိုင်ငံသို့ ပထမဆုံးအကြိမ် သွားရောက်ခဲ့ခြင်း ဖြစ်ပြီး အမေရိကန်ပြည်ထောင်စုသို့ ဒုတိယအကြိမ် သွားရောက်ခဲ့ခြင်း ဖြစ်သည်။
နိုင်ငံခြားရေးဝန်ကြီးသည် ဖေဖော်ဝါရီလ ၆ ရက်နေ့က ယူကေ နိုင်ငံခြားရေးဝန်ကြီး (Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs) James Cleverly နှင့် ယူကေနိုင်ငံခြားရေးဝန်ကြီးရုံးခန်းတွင် တွေ့ဆုံခဲ့ပါသည်။ ထိုသို့တွေ့ဆုံရာတွင် နိုင်ငံခြားရေးဝန်ကြီး ဒေါ်ဇင်မာအောင် အနေနှင့် ယူကေနိုင်ငံ၏ အသစ်ချမှတ်လိုက်သော စီးပွားရေးအရေးယူပိတ်ဆို့မှုများနှင့် UNSC တွင် ယူကေနိုင်ငံ၏ ဦးစီးဦးဆောင်ပြုမှုများအား ကျေးဇူးတင်ရှိပါကြောင်း ပြောကြားခဲ့ပါသည်။
နိုင်ငံခြားရေးဝန်ကြီးဒေါ်ဇင်မာအောင်သည် ယူကေနိုင်ငံခရီးစဥ်အတွင်း လွတ်တော်အမတ်များနှင့် တွေ့ဆုံခဲ့ရာ Labour Party မှ လွှတ်တော်အမတ် နှင့် All Party Parliamentary Group on Burma အဖွဲ့၏ ဥက္ကဌ လည်းဖြစ်သူ Rushanara Ali နှင့်ဖေဖော်ဝါရီလ ၆ ရက်နေ့က တွေ့ဆုံခဲ့ပါသည်။ ထိုသို့တွေ့ဆုံရာတွင် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံရှိ လူနည်းစုများအခွင့်အရေးအပါအဝင် အခြားသော အကြောင်းအရာများကို ဆွေးနွေးခဲ့ပါသည်။
နိုင်ငံခြားရေးဝန်ကြီးဒေါ်ဇင်မာအောင်သည် Labour Party လွှတ်တော်အမတ်နှင့် Shadow Minister for Asia and the Pacific ဖြစ်သူ Catherine West နှင့်လည်း ဖေဖော်ဝါရီလ ၆ ရက်နေ့က ဆက်လက် တွေ့ဆုံခဲ့ပါသည်။ အဆိုပါတွေ့ဆုံမှုတွင် မြန်မာ့နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေးအတွက် ယူကေပါလီမန်မှပိုမိုတိုးမြှင့် ထောက်ခံရေးနှင့် လူသားချင်းစာနာထောက်ထားမှုဆိုင်ရာကိစ္စရပ်များကို ဆွေးနွေးခဲ့ပါသည်။
နိုင်ငံခြားရေးဝန်ကြီးသည် အမေရိကန်ပြည်ထောင်စုသို့ ဆက်လက်ထွက်ခွာလာခဲ့ရာ အမေရိကန်ပြည်ထောင်စု နိုင်ငံခြားရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာနမှ တာဝန်ရှိသူများနှင့် ဆက်လက် တွေ့ဆုံခဲ့ပါသည်။
နိုင်ငံခြားရေးဝန်ကြီးဒေါ်ဇင်မာအောင်သည် ဖေဖော်ဝါရီလ ၁၃ ရက်နေ့ ဝါရှင်တန်ဒီစီရှိ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၊ နိုင်ငံခြားရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာန၏ ရုံးခွဲဖွင့်လှစ်ခြင်း အခမ်းအနားသို့ တက်ရောက်လာသည့် အမေရိကန်ပြည်ထောင်စု လက်ထောက်နိုင်ငံခြားရေးဝန်ကြီး Uzra Zeya နှင့် တွေ့ဆုံ၍ နှုတ်ဆက်စကားပြောကြားခဲ့ပါသည်။
နိုင်ငံခြားရေးဝန်ကြီးဒေါ်ဇင်မာအောင်သည် ဖေဖော်ဝါရီလ ၁၄ ရက်နေ့တွင် အမေရိကန်ပြည်ထောင်စု ဒုတိယနိုင်ငံခြားရေးဝန်ကြီး Wendy Sherman နှင့် တွေ့ဆုံခဲ့ပါသည်။ ထိုသို့တွေ့ဆုံရာတွင် အမေရိကန် ဒုတိယနိုင်ငံခြားရေးဝန်ကြီးအနေနှင့် အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၊ နိုင်ငံခြားရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာန၊ ဝါရှင်တန်ဒီစီရုံးခွဲ ဖွင့်လှစ်ခြင်းအား ကြိုဆိုပါကြောင်း၊ အမေရိကန်ပြည်ထောင်စုအနေနှင့် မြန်မာ့ဒီမိုကရေစီအရေးဆောင်ရွက်နေသူများနှင့် တိုင်းရင်းသားတော်လှန်ရေးအင်အားစုများအား အစဥ်အမြဲ အားပေး ထောက်ခံနေပါကြောင်း၊ စစ်အုပ်စု၏ အကြမ်းဖက်မှုများ အမြန်ဆုံးရပ်တန့်နိုင်ရေး ဖိအားပေး ဆောင်ရွက်သွားမည်ဖြစ်ပြီး ငြိမ်းချမ်းစွာ ဒီမိုကရေစီအသွင်ကူးပြောင်းရေး ကိုလည်း ကူညီအားပေးသွားမည်ဖြစ်ကြောင်း ပြောကြားခဲ့ပါသည်။ ထို့နောက် နိုင်ငံခြားရေးဝန်ကြီး ဒေါ်ဇင်မာအောင်သည် အမေရိကန်အမျိုးသားလုံခြုံရေးကောင်စီ အင်ဒိုပစိဖိတ်ရေးရာဌာန ဥက္ကဌနှင့် ညှိနှိုင်းရေးမှူး၏ လက်ထောက်ညွှန်ကြားရေးမှူးဖြစ်သူ Mr. Kurt Campbell နှင့် လည်း ဆက်လက်တွေ့ဆုံခဲ့ပါသည်။
နိုင်ငံခြားရေးဝန်ကြီးဒေါ်ဇင်မာအောင်သည် Maryland ပြည်နယ် လွှတ်တော်အမတ် Mr. Ben Cardin၊ Senate Appropriations Committee မှ Mr. Paul Grove တို့နှင့်လည်း သီးခြားတွေ့ဆုံမှုများ ပြုလုပ်ခဲ့ပါသည်။
နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေးကာလအတွင်း ပြည်ပရောက် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံသားများ၏ အားပေးထောက်ခံမှုနှင့် ထောက်ပံ့မှုများသည်လည်း လွန်စွာမှအရေးပါ လျက်ရှိရာ နိုင်ငံခြားရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာန၊ ပြည်ထောင်စုဝန်ကြီး ဒေါ်ဇင်မာအောင်သည် ၎င်း၏ ခရီးစဥ်များအတွင်းတွင် ပြည်ပရောက် မြန်မာမိသားစုများ၊ တိုင်းရင်းသားညီအကိုမောင်နှမများနှင့်လည်း ရင်းရင်းနှီးနှီး တွေ့ဆုံခဲ့ပါသည်။ အဆိုပါတွေ့ဆုံပွဲများတွင် နိုင်ငံခြားရေးဝန်ကြီးအနေနှင့် ပြည်ပရောက် မြန်မာမိသားစုများ၊ တိုင်းရင်းသားညီအကိုမောင်နှမများ၏ ဖက်ဒရယ်ပြည်ထောင်စုပေါ်ထွန်းရေးနှင့် ဒီမိုကရေစီအရေး အတွက် စိတ်အားထက်သန်မှုများအား တန်ဖိုးထားကြောင်းပြောကြားခဲ့ပါသည်။ အဆိုပါတွေ့ဆုံပွဲများသည် အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ နှင့် မြန်မာပြည်သူလူထု တသားတည်းရှိကြောင်း ပြယုဂ်လည်းဖြစ်သည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Myanmar - NUG
Date of publication:
2023-03-06
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-06
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
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Description:
"၁။ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရအနေဖြင့် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စုက စစ်ကိုင်းတိုင်း စစ်ကိုင်းမြို့နယ် တာတိုင်ကျေးရွာရှိ ပြည်သူ (၁၇) ဦးကို ရက်စက်စွာ အစုလိုက်အပြုံလိုက် သတ်ဖြတ်ခဲ့သည့် လုပ်ရပ်အပါအဝင် မတရားအာဏာလုယူထားသည့်ကာလအတွင်း ကျူးလွန်ခဲ့သည့် လူသားမျိုးနွယ်စု အပေါ်ကျူးလွန်သည့် ရာဇဝတ်မှု၊ လူအစုံလိုက်အပြုံလိုက်သတ်ဖြတ်မှု၊ စစ်ရာဇဝတ်မှု၊ အရပ်သား ပြည်သူများအပေါ် ပစ်မှတ်ထားတိုက်ခိုက်သတ်ဖြတ်မှု၊ ပြည်သူလူထု၏ အသက်အိုးအိမ်စည်းစိမ်များကို လုယက်ဖျက်ဆီးမှုများ အားလုံးကို ပြင်းထန်စွာရှုတ်ချပြီး တရားမျှတမှု ပြန်လည်ရရှိရေးအတွက် အလေးအနက်ထား ဆောင်ရွက်သွားမည်ဖြစ်သည်။
၂။ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၏ သက်ဆိုင်ရာဝန်ကြီးဌာနများအနေဖြင့်လဲ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ် ကျူးလွန်သော ရာဇဝတ်မှုများအားလုံးနှင့် ပတ်သက်ပြီး အချက်အလက်ရယူစုဆောင်းခြင်း၊ လူသက်သေ၊ ပစ္စည်းသက်သေများ ရယူစုဆောင်းခြင်း၊ နိုင်ငံတကာတရားစွဲအဖွဲ့အစည်းများသို့ ပေးပို့ခြင်း၊ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၏ တရားစီရင်ရေးမဏ္ဍိုင်မှတဆင့် အရေးယူ ဆောင်ရွက်နိုင်ရန် စီမံခြင်း၊ လူသားချင်းစာနာထောက်ထားမှု အကူအညီများပေးပို့ခြင်း စသည့် လုပ်ငန်းဆောင်တာများကို ဆောင်ရွက်လျက်ရှိပါသည်။
၃။ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်သည် အရပ်သားပြည်သူများ၊ သက်ကြီးရွယ်အို၊ အမျိုးသမီး၊ ကလေးသူငယ် နှင့် မသန်စွမ်းတို့ပါ မချန် ရက်ရက်စက်စက် သတ်ဖြတ်လျက်ရှိသောကြောင့် ဒေသခံများအနေဖြင့် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်၏ လှုပ်ရှားဆောင်ရွက်မှုများအပေါ် အမြဲမပြတ် သိရှိစေနိုင်သည့် အစီအမံများ ဆောင်ရွက်ရန်နှင့် ဝင်ရောက်လာပါက ဘေးလွတ်ရာသို့ အလျင်အမြန်ထွက်ခွာ ရှောင်တိမ်းကြပါရန် မေတ္တာရပ်ခံအပ်ပါသည်။ နိုင်ငံတကာအနေနှင့်လည်း ပြည်သူလူထု၏ အသက်အိုးအိမ် စည်းစိမ်ကို ကာကွယ်ပေးနိုင်ရန်အတွက် ဆက်သွယ်ရေးဆိုင်ရာ နည်းပညာနှင့် ပစ္စည်းကိရိယာများ၊ ကြိုတင်သတိပေးခြင်းစနစ်ဆိုင်ရာ ပစ္စည်းကိရိယာများစသည်တို့ကို ထောက်ပံ့ပေးနိုင်ပါရန် တောင်းဆိုပါသည်။
၄။ နိုင်ငံတကာအသိုင်းအဝိုင်းအနေဖြင့် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စုနှင့် အပေါင်းအပါများ အပေါ် စီးပွားရေးပိတ်ဆို့မှုအပါအဝင် လက်နက်ခဲယမ်းတင်သွင်းရောင်းချမှု၊ စစ်ရေးတွင်အသုံးပြုနိုင်သည့် နည်းပညာပံ့ပိုးမှု၊ လေယာဉ်ဆီတင်သွင်းမှု နှင့် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်အသုံးပြုလျက်ရှိသည့် စစ်ရေးဆိုင်ရာ ပစ္စည်းကိရိယာများ တင်သွင်းမှုများကို ပိတ်ပင်တားဆီးခြင်းများ ပြုလုပ်ပေးကြရန် တောင်းဆိုပါသည်။ လက်ရှိကျင်းပပြုလုပ်လျက်ရှိသော ကုလသမဂ္ဂလူ့အခွင့်အရေးကောင်စီ အစည်းအဝေးများ တွင်လည်း အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်၏ ပြည်သူလူထုအပေါ် ညှင်းပမ်းနှိပ်စက် သတ်ဖြတ်နေမှုများအား သိမြင်ဆွေးနွေးကြပြီး ထိရောက်သော လုပ်ဆောင်မှုပါဝင်သည့် ဆုံးဖြတ်ချက်များ ချမှတ်နိုင်ရန် တိုက်တွန်းအပ်ပါသည်။ နိုင်ငံတကာတရားစွဲအဖွဲ့အစည်းများအနေဖြင့် လည်း ၎င်းတို့၏ စုံစမ်းစစ်ဆေးမှုများကို ယခုလက်ရှိ မြန်မာ-ဘင်္ဂလားဒေ့ရှ် ဆက်စပ်ဒေသတွင် သာမကပဲ မြန်မာတစ်နိုင်ငံလုံးအနှံ့ကျူးလွန်မှုများအထိ ချဲ့ထွင်ဆောင်ရွက်ရန် တိုက်တွန်းပါသည်။ Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar (IIMM) အနေဖြင့်လည်း ရရှိထားသော အချက်အလက်များကိုအသုံးပြုပြီး ကျူးလွန်သူများကို အရေးယူနိုင်မည့်နိုင်ငံအလိုက် တရားရုံးများကို ဖော်ထုတ်ပြီး ထိရောက်စွာလုပ်ဆောင်သွားရန် တိုက်တွန်းပါသည်။
၅။ နိုင်ငံတကာအသိုင်းအဝိုင်းအနေဖြင့် အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ အပါအဝင် တော်လှန်ရေး အင်အားစုများအားလုံးနှင့် အမြန်ဆုံး ညှိနှိုင်းတိုင်ပင် ကူညီပံ့ပိုးခြင်းအားဖြင့် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စု၏ မြန်မာပြည်သူလူထုတစ်ရပ်လုံးအပေါ် ကျူးလွန်လျက်ရှိသည့် ရာဇဝတ်များ လျင်မြန်စွာအဆုံးသတ်နိုင်ရေး အစောတလျင် ဆောင်ရွက်ကြပါရန် အလေးအနက် တိုက်တွန်းအပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2023-03-06
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-06
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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pdf
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609.96 KB
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Description:
"၁။ ထူးခြားသော သမိုင်းအစဥ်အလာကို ဖော်ညွှန်း၍ ဂုဏ်ထူးဝိသေသများဖြင့် ပြည့်ဝသည့် ဤနေ့ထူးနေ့မြတ် ပအိုဝ်းအမျိုးသားနေ့တွင် ပအိုဝ်းတိုင်းရင်းသားများ၏ ဇာတိသွေး၊ ဇာတိမာန် များနှင့် ကျေးဇူးတရားတို့အပေါ် သိတတ်နားလည်မှုများအတွက် လွန်စွာ ဝမ်းမြောက်ဂုဏ်ယူ ပါကြောင်း ပြောကြားလိုပြီး ပအိုဝ်းတိုင်းရင်းသားများနှင့်အတူ နိုင်ငံတဝှမ်းရှိ တိုင်းရင်းသား ပြည်သူများအားလုံး ကိုယ်စိတ်နှစ်ပါး ကျန်းမာရွှင်လန်းပါစေကြောင်း မေတ္တာပို့သအပ်ပါသည်။
၂။ ပအိုဝ်းတိုင်းရင်းသားများသည် ဘာသာတရားကို တန်ဖိုးထားလေးစားကြသော လူမျိုးများဖြစ်သည်သာမက ကိုယ်ပိုင်စာပေ၊ ယဉ်ကျေးမှုများဖြင့် သမိုင်းအစဥ်အလာ ထည်ဝါ လှပသော လူမျိုးများဖြစ်ကြပါသည်။ ပအိုဝ်းတိုင်းရင်းသားတို့၏ အနာဂတ်အား ထွန်းလင်း တောက်ပစေခဲ့သည့် သူရိယစန္ဒာမင်း၏ ကျေးဇူးတရားကို ဖော်ညွှန်းရန် ထိုမင်း၏ မွေးနေ့ တပေါင်းလပြည့်နေ့ကို ပအိုဝ်းအမျိုးသားနေ့အဖြစ် သတ်မှတ်ကျင်းပခဲ့ကြသည်မှာ ယနေ့တွင် (၇၄)နှစ်တိုင်ခဲ့ပြီ ဖြစ်ပါသည်။
၃။ ခေတ်အဆက်ဆက်တွင် ပအိုဝ်းတိုင်းရင်းသားခေါင်းဆောင်များသည် လွတ်လပ်ရေး ကြိုးပမ်းမှုတွင် စိတ်အားထက်သန်စွာ ပါဝင်ခဲ့ကြသည်သာမက ယခုနွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေးတွင်လည်း ပအိုဝ်းတိုင်းရင်းသားများသည် ကျရာတာဝန်များ ထမ်းရွက်လျက် အကြမ်းဖက် စစ်အာဏာရှင် အုပ်စု၏ မတရားမှုများကို ခုခံတွန်းလှန်တိုက်ပွဲဝင်လျက်ရှိရာ အရွေ့တစ်ခုသို့ ရောက်ရှိနေပြီ ဖြစ်ပါသည်။ မိမိတို့အားလုံး၏ ခိုင်မာသောယုံကြည်ချက်၊ ဇွဲ၊ သတ္တိတို့ဖြင့် အာဏာရှင်စနစ်ဆိုးအား ဆန့်ကျင်တွန်းလှန်နေစဥ်တွင် အာဏာရှင်တို့၏ ပုံမှန်လုပ်ရိုးလုပ်စဥ်ဖြစ်သော ကောက်ကျစ်သော သွေးခွဲမှုများဖြင့် မိမိတို့တိုင်းရင်းသား ပြည်သူများအကြား စည်းလုံးမှုအင်အားကို ပျက်ပြားစေမည့် လုပ်ရပ်များကိုလည်း အသိ၊ သတိကြီးစွာ သိရှိနားလည်ထားသင့်သည်ကို ဖော်ပြလိုပါသည်။ နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေးတွင် ကိုယ်ကျိုးစွန့်အနစ်နာခံ၍ နိုင်ငံတော်နှင့်ပြည်သူများအတွက် အသက် သွေးချွေး ရင်းနှီးပေးဆပ်ခဲ့ကြသည့် ပအိုဝ်းတိုင်းရင်းသားသွေးချင်းညီနောင်များကိုလည်း လေးစား ဂုဏ်ယူပါကြောင်း မှတ်တမ်းတင်ဖော်ပြလိုပါသည်။
၄။ ပြည်တွင်းပြည်ပရှိ ပအိုဝ်းတိုင်းရင်းသားများနှင့်အတူ တိုင်းရင်းသားပြည်သူများ အားလုံး အနေဖြင့် စည်းလုံးညီညွတ်မှုအင်အားကို အတူတကွဖော်ဆောင်၍ တွဲလက်ခိုင်မာစွာဖြင့် တူညီသော ဘုံပန်းတိုင်ဖြစ်သည့် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီနိုင်ငံတော်သစ်ဆီသို့ အရောက်ချီတက်ရှေ့ဆက်ကြပါစို့ ဟု တိုက်တွန်းရင်း ဤ (၇၄)နှစ်မြောက် ပအိုဝ်းအမျိုးသားနေ့ သဝဏ်လွှာအား ဂုဏ်ယူစွာ ပေးပို့အပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw
Date of publication:
2023-03-05
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-05
Grouping:
Individual Documents
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299.25 KB
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Description:
"Documented incidents
Reported on 08 February 2023: In Dagon Myothit (South) township, Yangon (East) district and region, a private clinic was forced to close down after junta authorities looked for the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM)-affiliated doctor who ran the clinic. Sources: Delta News Agency and Mekong News
Reported on 08 February 2023: Junta authorities and security forces carried out surprise checks of private hospitals and clinics in Dagon Myothit (North), Hlaingtharya, North Okkalapa, and Shwepyithar townships in Yangon region, Mandalay region and Mon state. Sources: Delta News Agency and Mekong News
10 February 2023: In Chanayethazan township, Mandalay district and region, an IED was thrown at the private Shwe-la-yaung Clinic by two men, damaging the door and two vehicles parked outside the clinic. Source: Eleven Media
11 February 2023: In Myit Chay town, Pakokku township and district, Magway region, the military base at Burma Pharmaceutical Industry (BPI) antivenom production and horse husbandry was attacked by local resistance forces, who torched the buildings including factory buildings, and set the horses free. Sources: Delta News Agency, Mawkun Magazine and Mizzima
13 February 2023: On the Mandalay-Mogoke highway, near Kan Hpyu village, Let Kaung Gyi village tract, Madaya township, Aungmyaythazan district, Mandalay region, an ambulance belonging the LNGO Let Pan Hla that was returning to Let Pan Hla village after taking a pregnant woman to hospital in Mandalay town was shot at 16 times, injuring a male ambulance driver in the right upper arm and damaging the windshields, tyres, and body of the vehicle. Sources: BBC Burmese, Myaelattathan, Radio Free Asia and Telegram
Reported on 14 February 2022: In Inn Gyi village and village tract, Katha township and district,
Sagaing region, the public station hospital (primary-level) was occupied by the Myanmar military.
Source: Kachin News Group
14 February 2022: In Mawt Ka Nin village and village tract, Ye township and district, Mon state, a male pharmacy owner was kidnapped by the Myanmar military. Source: Independent Mon News Agency
Reported on 16 February 2023: In North Okkalapa township, Yangon district and region, the junta authorities demanded the staff list of private hospitals and clinics and repeatedly performed surprise checks in search of CDM-affiliated health workers. Source: Democratic Voice of Burma 16 February 2023: In Tu Ywin Boet village and village tract, Myingyan township, a female midwife and her son were shot dead while at the sub-rural public health centre by five men. The Myanmar military accused the local resistance forces of the attack. Sources: Myaelattathan and Telegram 16 February 2023: In Ka De village and village tract, Palaw township, Myeik district, Tanintharyi region, an ambulance, a monastery, vehicles, and 60 civilian houses were torched by the Myanmar military. Source: Tanintharyi Times
Reported on 16 February 2023: Near Hko Mone village and village tract, Kutkai township and district, Shan state (North), a Kachin Independence Army medic and two KIA fighters were killed during armed clashes between KIA and the Myanmar military. Sources: Myitkyina News Journal and Tanintharyi Times
16 February 2023: Near Sein Pat Lel village, Htan Pin Kone village tract, Okpho township,
Thayarwady district, Bago region, a female CDM-affiliated nurse was kidnapped and shot dead by the Myanmar military. She and her husband were under an arrest warrant after the coup. Her husband was arrested and sentenced to three-year imprisonment. The nurse escaped and subsequently served in the areas controlled by ethnic armed groups but was abducted on 29 January 2023 while she was on her way back to the town, accompanied by two local resistance force members, who were killed during the abduction. On 16 February, she was reportedly brought to the place of abduction, forced to locate the base camps of local resistance forces, and then shot dead. Source: Democratic Voice of Burma
18 February 2023: In Thin Gan Tone village, Pa Kar Ri village tract, Dawei township and district,
Tanintharyi region, a sub-rural health centre (public, primary-level) and civilian houses were torched by the Myanmar military. Source: Dawei Watch
19 February 2023: In Nwe Inn village, Chin Pyit village tract, Pale township, Yinmabin district,
Sagaing region, the sub-rural health centre (public, primary-level) was torched by the Myanmar military. Sources: Burma Human Rights Network and Khit Thit Media..."
Source/publisher:
Insecurity Insight (Geneva) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of publication:
2023-02-21
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-04
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"This regular update, covering non-violent movements, conflict trends, human rights violations, and humanitarian developments up to 28 February is produced by Southern Monitor, a local research group.
HIGHLIGHTS & KEY MESSAGES
On 2 February 2023, the State Administration Council (SAC) declared martial law in Palaw and Tanintharyi townships and increased military presence in the area.
In February 2023, a total of 37 armed clashes erupted across all districts in Tanintharyi Region, showing an increase in armed conflict.
A total of 34 deaths and 10 injured due to attacks targeting civilians were reported in February 2023.
More than 200 civilians’ houses were burned down by junta forces in Palaw township.
The number of non-violent movements in Tanintharyi Region increased as protesters staged “silent strikes” across the region.
Local Karen CSOs urged Karen Nation Union (KNU) and Kaw Thoo Lei Army to cease fighting and resolve the conflict peacefully.
KEY FIGURES
3701
Nonviolent actions mobilized by activist groups between February 2021 and February 2023
998
Violent incidents occurred in the region between February 2021 and February 2023
394
People killed by conflict actors between February 2021 and February 2023
28K
People currently displaced by clashes and insecurity since February 2021..."
Source/publisher:
Southern Monitor (Myanmar) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of publication:
2023-02-28
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-04
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Education in Burma/Myanmar - general, Food Security and nutrition in Burma/Myanmar, Public Health, Human Rights and international relations
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"GENEVA (3 March 2023) – Myanmar’s military has created a perpetual human rights crisis through the continuous use of violence, including the killing, arbitrary arrest, torture and enforced disappearance of anti-coup opponents, a report published by the UN Human Rights Office said today.
“Two years after the military launched a coup, the generals have embarked on a scorched earth policy in an attempt to stamp out opposition,” the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Volker Türk, said.
“Tragically, regional and global efforts for peace and restraint have largely fallen on deaf ears. The military, emboldened by continuous and absolute impunity, has consistently shown disregard for international obligations and principles. Urgent, concrete action is needed to end this festering catastrophe.”
The report echoed calls by the Security Council and ASEAN for, among other things, an immediate halt to the violence, the release of all those arbitrarily detained, accountability, and unhindered humanitarian access.
The report documents a litany of human rights abuses from 1 February 2022 to 31 January 2023, accompanied by a sharp rise in violence especially in the north-western and south-eastern parts of Myanmar.
It cites credible sources as having verified the deaths of at least 2,940, and 17,572 arrests by the military and its affiliates since the coup. Nearly 80 per cent of the country’s 330 townships have been impacted by armed clashes.
The military employs its so-called four-cuts approach - including through indiscriminate airstrikes and artillery shelling, razing villages to displace civilian populations, and denial of humanitarian access - to cut off non-State organized armed groups and other anti-military armed elements from access to food, finances, intelligence and recruits.
Among the numerous incidents of airstrikes, on 16 September - in Let Yet Kone village, Tabayin Township, Sagaing - four helicopters opened fire on a school killing at least six children and injuring nine others. After some 60 soldiers deployed from helicopters to the ground, they reportedly raided the village, executing a school technician and five villagers before arresting wounded children and teachers.
In another incident, on 20 October, an airstrike against a newly opened hospital in Man Yu Gyi village, Banmauk Township, Sagaing, killed one woman and injured five others. A source reported that the hospital had been inaugurated a day earlier and victims were all volunteers at the facility.
One of the most frequently used tactics by the military is the systematic and widespread burning of villages and dwellings. Consistent with their modus operandi documented over decades, including in Kachin in 2011 and Rakhine in 2017, UN reports indicated that nearly 39,000 houses nationwide have been burnt or destroyed in military operations since February 2022, representing a more than 1,000-fold increase compared to 2021.
Sagaing was the most affected region, accounting for over 25,500 homes. In an incident on 1 May 2022 in Ah Shey See, Kale Township, Sagaing, satellite images suggest the burning of almost the entire village with 621 structures destroyed. Satellite imagery coupled with interview reports suggest that between 16 and 28 September in Taze Township, Sagaing, the military destroyed 458 houses and damaged another 319 across eight villages during a series of raids and attacks.
The military’s mismanagement of the economy has provoked an economic crisis for much of the population, resulting in the doubling of poverty rates compared to March 2020. Nearly half of the population now lives in poverty, and rural populations are reported to be at risk of starvation as the military imposes further restrictions on access to areas affected by violence and conflict. Compounding the situation, main supply routes and waterways across the country have been blocked, preventing humanitarian actors from reaching 17.6 million people in need.
“The military has also adopted rules, including martial law, intended to target anti-coup opposition and severely restrict the civic space that had significantly contributed to Myanmar’s democratic transition,” Türk said.
“Across Myanmar, people are continuously exposed to violations and crimes, including killings, enforced disappearances, displacement, torture, arbitrary arrests, and sexual violence. There are reasonable grounds to believe that the military and its affiliated militias continue to be responsible for most violations, some of which may constitute crimes against humanity and war crimes,” the UN Human Rights Chief said..."
Source/publisher:
UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of publication:
2023-03-03
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-03
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, UN human rights documents on Myanmar, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Human Rights and international relations
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"1. No (33) Light Infantry Division of the terrorist junta, stationed in Hti Saung Village in Myinmu
Township o f Sagaing raided villages in Myinmu and Sagaing Townships on 1 March 2023.
They captured leader o f Tar Taing Village People's Defence Force Yebaw Michael (aka) Ko
Kyaw Zaw and murdered by dismembering his head, hands and legs and opening his stomach.
They captured 15 civilian villagers including women as human sheield as they left Tar Taing
village on 2 March.
2. Bodies o f five men from the captured civilians were found brutally murdered by the junta forces
near Nyaung Yin Village in Myinmu Town ship on 2 March. They kept 10 remaining civilian
detainees as they continued their raid into Nyaung Nyin Village in Myininu Towship. All of
them were found brutally killed by the junta forces near Kyun Paw Bridge at the border of
Sagaing and Myinmu on 2 March afternoon.
3. The terrorist junta forces burnt 60 out of 78 houses in Tar Taing Village on 2 February 2023.
4. Since these inhumane yet intentional tenori st acts violate international crimes including
massacres, war crimes and crimes against humanity, the Ministry of Human Rights already
communicated the case with international judiciary mechanisms. The ministry will further
attempt to advance the case to prosecute perpetrators at all levels and deliver justice..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Human Rights
Date of publication:
2023-03-03
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-03
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
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"JAKARTA – Dozens of parliamentarians from several Southeast Asian countries urged the ASEAN and the international community at large to take swift and concrete action against the illegal military junta led by Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, and provide real assistance to the pro-democracy forces in Myanmar, following a roundtable discussion on the Myanmar crisis held today in Jakarta.
The discussion, which was part of ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights’ (APHR) annual members’ forum, was held at the Indonesian House of Representatives and included parliamentarians and civil society organizations from Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Timor-Leste and Myanmar itself.
“The crisis in Myanmar is causing a humanitarian catastrophe of gigantic proportions. The junta’s atrocities have displaced hundreds of thousands from their homes. Adding to previous displacements before the coup, the number of internally displaced persons in Myanmar now stands at more than a record 1.3 million. The sole responsible for this disaster is the junta led by Min Aung Hlaing, and it is high time that ASEAN stop treating it with kid gloves. Strong pressure to isolate the Myanmar military is more imperative and urgent than ever,” said Mercy Barends, member of the Indonesian House of Representatives and APHR Chair.
According to the local organization Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP), over 16,000 political prisoners are currently jailed in abysmal conditions, and at least 3,075 people have been killed by the military since the coup, although AAPP believes that the number is likely many times higher.
These conditions also extend to parliamentarians in the country. According to APHR monitoring, 84 members of the national and sub-national parliaments remain in detention, facing not only the risk of torture in prison but also possible risk of execution following the executions of four pro-democracy activists, including former lawmaker Phyo Zeya Thaw. Most ousted parliamentarians continue their work in hiding and are at risk of detention or even death. Some have had their family members harassed and their properties seized by the junta.
“What is happening in Myanmar is an affront to humanity and we, as fellow humans, should take it seriously and not stand idly as the military continues to violate the human rights of the Myanmar people. We, Parliamentarians across Southeast Asia must work together in putting the country back into a path towards democracy. One of the first steps is to recognize the National Unity Government and the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH) as the legitimately elected representatives of the people of Myanmar and involve them in any future negotiations,” said António de Sá Benevides, member of Parliament of Timor Leste and APHR Member.
The International Parliamentary Inquiry (IPI) into the global response to the crisis in Myanmar, which was organized by APHR in 2022, found that the global community has largely failed to provide the help that the people of Myanmar sorely need. ASEAN and the international community at large have hidden behind the Five Point Consensus, which the Myanmar junta has continually and blatantly flouted.
“As Chair of ASEAN this year, the biggest and most democratic country in the region, Indonesia has a duty to step up and tell the generals in Naypyidaw that enough is enough. After the failed approach of Cambodia last year, appeasing the generals and ignoring the pro-democracy movement, Jakarta should put significant pressure on the Myanmar military, and support the pro-democracy forces led by the NUG, if it is serious about solving the crisis,” said Charles Santiago, former member of the Malaysian Parliament, and APHR Co-Chair..."
Source/publisher:
ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights
Date of publication:
2023-03-03
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-03
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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pdf
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143.63 KB
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"Two years after the coup in Myanmar, the recently passed BURMA Act provides new gateways for aid towards Myanmar. Now the US administration must find creative ways to implement them in line with USAID’s new localisation agenda.
March 3, 2023
Dewi
February 1st marked two years since Myanmar’s devastating military coup. Thanks to the Burmese people’s heroic resistance, the junta has lost control over more than half of the country, but has retaliated with a scorched earth campaign of indiscriminate massacres and airstrikes. Myanmar faces a humanitarian crisis – an estimated 18 million people need urgent assistance. Like democracy activists, aid workers are in the military’s crosshairs. The military is blocking sources of aid to suffocate opposition, requiring that the aid agencies work through them, and restricting access to the local population. Networks crossing Myanmar’s borders – outside the regime’s control – offer the most readily available path to alleviating escalating humanitarian suffering.
What is happening in Myanmar
Myanmar’s humanitarian crisis is most dire along its borders. There are over 1.5 million internally displaced people (IDPs) and 72,000 refugees in neighbouring countries. They struggle to receive assistance due to the junta’s aid blockades and lack of formal aid distribution programmes. This crisis is intensified because Thailand, India and Bangladesh continue to restrict cross-border aid. Myanmar’s military, a most unreliable ‘partner’, demands international assistance flow through it, which it inevitably steals or misuses. The military has proven it is an illegitimate actor through ceaseless repression of the Burmese people, genocide of Rohingya and an obstinate refusal to share power. Engaging with the military only invites more death, destruction and instability. Cross-border assistance would reach those desperately in need along Myanmar’s borders without allowing the junta to block or abuse aid delivery.
History of cross-border aid in Myanmar
Neither delivery of cross-border aid nor collaboration with non-state actors on the ground are new to Myanmar. After the military seized power in 1988 and until a partial opening up in 2010, Myanmar was a totalitarian regime. Indigenous community networks across Myanmar’s porous 1,500-mile border provided numerous entry points for informal aid delivery. Funds, technical assistance and supplies flowed across the border with the support of non-state and local civil society that often involved Ethnic Resistance Organisations (EROs). International donors and aid organisations operated, mostly in neighbouring Thailand, to provide assistance without endorsing the regime, and instead built lasting relationships with a range of local actors including community members, EROs and civil society.
Cross-border assistance works
A sterling example of cross-border aid is the Mae Tao Clinic in Mae Sot on the Thailand–Myanmar border. For 30 years, Dr Cynthia Maung and her team have made healthcare accessible to refugees and IDPs amidst the war across the border, treating malaria and diarrhoea, as well as gunshot and landmine injuries. Initiatives like this take advantage of the border rather than operating outside it. One of the clinic’s success stories is the Back Pack Health Worker Team that builds grassroots healthcare knowledge and capability by sending mobile medical teams to conflict areas of Myanmar out of reach of international humanitarian organisations. Ethnic community-based initiatives have also been providing essential services for decades, including health and education to populations in ERO-administered regions, as well as those in refugee camps along the Thailand–Myanmar borders. For example, the Karen National Union’s Karen Education and Culture Department is serving more than 90,000 students across more than 1,000 schools, filling the necessary gap of education provision during times of conflict and when the state education system is hardly operational. Investing in local capacity ensures inclusive and sustainable impacts that help end reliance on the illegitimate military regime for access to aid.
The door for USAID’s localisation agenda is open
The need for cross-border humanitarian assistance is growing along with the military’s atrocities and criminal mismanagement of Myanmar’s economy and social services. Current cross-border assistance, in spite of the heroic efforts of Dr Cynthia Maung and others, is not adequate or sustainable in the face of compounding humanitarian crises. The key is ‘localisation’ of aid – humanitarian agencies and institutional donors must directly fund local groups doing life-saving work.
The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has pledged to localise aid and has established relationships with neighbouring governments with formal aid networks and resources. This empowers local actors to set agendas, develop solutions, and strengthen and deploy capacity, leadership and resources. USAID can help partner countries meet their own development and humanitarian assistance challenges – saving the lives of vulnerable IDPs and refugees – while also ensuring that taxpayer investments produce sustainable, long-term development outcomes, not only in Myanmar but around the world.
USAID Administrator Samantha Power is determined to achieve localisation: ‘Shifting to a model of locally-led development means ceding power over decision making to those who know their problems best.’ For Administrator Power, localisation means sending a larger portion of development and humanitarian assistance directly to local civil society supported by and accountable to local communities. She vowed that 25% of USAID direct funding will go to local entities in the next three years – up from 6.2% in 2021 – and that half of USAID projects over the next 10 years will empower local partners to co-design projects, set priorities, lead implementation and evaluate the impact of aid.
How localisation of assistance will save lives in Myanmar
Local humanitarian actors, being closest to the people, are best at fundraising, mobilising with appropriate caution and channelling assistance into Myanmar through well-established networks that have been built over the years of resistance before the coup. Their efforts – and shared commitment to toppling the regime – build a foundation of trust for more effective assistance. Supporting these humanitarian networks ramps up existing local humanitarian efforts on the borders of Myanmar to not only save lives but prepare citizens to effectively contribute in building a future democratic Myanmar.
Myanmar’s neighbours can and must do more
International donors must step up engagement with the National Unity Government – the rightful opposition and democratic government of Myanmar – and the humanitarian wings of EROs committed to overthrowing the regime. Increased engagement by the US and like-minded countries with Thailand, India and Bangladesh, along with donor support for the already active local networks, could enable aid to reach tens if not hundreds of thousands more people desperately in need. Myanmar’s neighbours should work with local actors and the humanitarian and health agencies of EROs to facilitate aid to areas accessible across borders. EROs and the civil society organisations along the borders are ready and willing implementation partners. Donor governments and international agencies seeking to alleviate suffering and spiralling instability in Myanmar must remind Thailand, India and Bangladesh that it is in their interest to provide support to local actors already providing life-saving aid.
The BURMA Act and the way forward
President Biden’s signing of the BURMA Act on 23 December 2022 marked a new era and opportunity for assistance to Myanmar. The bill authorises the type of localised, cross-border aid that is urgently needed. It is now up to Congress to properly fund it and USAID and its partners to implement it. Myanmar’s democratic forces have made tremendous progress on a self-financed, shoestring budget. The people’s will is undeniable. The military ‘controls less than a quarter of Myanmar’s territory’. Not only is the military losing, it cannot win. With a small investment, the US can change the course of Myanmar. With the support of funding from the BURMA Act, a whole network of clinics, like Dr Cynthia Maung’s, as well as schools administered by EROs or institutes of higher education like Spring University Myanmar, could not only help address a humanitarian crisis, but could also help the Burmese people realise their dream of a stable and democratic Myanmar..."
Source/publisher:
ODI - Humanitarian Practice Network
Date of publication:
2023-03-03
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-03
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Individual Documents
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""ယခုကဲ့သို့ အရပ်သားပြည်သူများအပေါ် ရည်ရွယ်ချက်ရှိရှိ လူမဆန်စွာ အကြမ်းဖက် သတ်ဖြတ်မှု ပြုလုပ်ခြင်းသည် အစုလိုက်အပြုံလိုက်သတ်ဖြတ်မှု၊ စစ်ရာဇဝတ်မှုများ၊ လူသားမျိုးနွယ် အပေါ် ကျူးလွန်သည့် ရာဇဝတ်မှုများအပါအဝင် နိုင်ငံတကာ ရာဇဝတ်မှုများကို ချိုးဖောက်ခြင်း ဖြစ်သည့်အတွက် လူ့အခွင့်အရေးဆိုင်ရာ ဝန်ကြီးဌာနအနေဖြင့် ယခုဖြစ်စဉ်နှင့် ပတ်သက်ပြီး နိုင်ငံတကာ တရားစီရင်ရေး ဆိုင်ရာ ယန္တရားများထံ ပေးပို့ပြီးဖြစ်သည်။ ကျူးလွန်သူ အဆင့်ဆင့်အား အပြစ်ပေး အရေးယူလျက် တရားမျှတမှု ဖော်ဆောင်ရေး ဆက်လက်ကြိုးပမ်း ဆောင်ရွက်သွားမည် ဖြစ်သည်။”..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Human Rights
Date of publication:
2023-03-03
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-03
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
Language:
Format :
pdf
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275.56 KB
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