2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
Individual Documents
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"State-owned arms company Yantra India Limited has shipped multiple 122mm barrels to the Myanmar military in October 2022 in likely breach of international law, a Justice For Myanmar investigation has found.
The 122mm barrels appear to be for howitzers that are produced in Myanmar by the Office of the Chief of Defence Industries (OCDI), also known as the Directorate of Defence Industries, a unit of the military that is sanctioned by the US, UK, EU and Canada.
The barrels were sent to a company owned by the Myanmar military arms broker, Kyaw Kyaw Htun, who Justice For Myanmar previously exposed for importing fuzes from the Indian company Sandeep Metalcraft to be used by the Myanmar military for the detonation of munitions. Kyaw Kyaw Htun and his network not yet been sanctioned.
Yantra India Limited is an official public sector undertaking operating under the Department of Defence Production of the Indian Ministry of Defence. Yantra’s exports of 122mm barrels to Myanmar follows several other known exports of weapons and weapon components from Indian companies after the Myanmar military’s attempted coup, including a remote controlled weapon station from the majority state-owned company, Bharat Electronics Limited.
Since the military’s illegal coup attempt, the junta has murdered protesters, shelled villages and conducted indiscriminate airstrikes, killing more than 3,000 people and displacing over 1.2 million. The latest shipment comes as the military junta continues to commit war crimes and crimes against humanity, including with howitzers.
The Myanmar army has recently been recorded firing 122mm howitzer rounds into civilian areas. For example, on 6 December 2022, the military fired rounds from a 122mm howitzer to the outskirts of Namsai Hkahku in Hpakant Township, Kachin State. On 13 December 2022, 122mm howitzer rounds were fired in Bhamo Township, Kachin State.
The fact that Yantra India Ltd is a fully state-owned company, coupled with the fact that Indian arms manufacturing companies have continued to supply weapons after the attempted coup, show India’s serious disregard for international humanitarian law and norms of conduct contained in the Wassenaar Arrangement.
Justice For Myanmar calls on India to immediately impose an arms embargo on the Myanmar military junta, which is a terrorist organisation under Myanmar law and as defined in international law, and cease all training and other military support.
Justice For Myanmar spokesperson Yadanar Maung says: "India is directly supporting the junta’s indiscriminate attacks against civilians by allowing the export of barrels that that the junta will use in its continued gross violations of international law.
“As a democracy and a neighbour of Myanmar, we appeal to the Indian government to stand with the people of Myanmar, not war criminals and their illegitimate junta.
“India must immediately stop arming the Myanmar military junta and uphold its obligations under international humanitarian law.
“We urge fellow members of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (the Quad), Australia, Japan and the USA, to use their influence to stop the flow of arms from India to the Myanmar military.
“It is disappointing that Kyaw Kyaw Htun and his network has not been sanctioned, despite clear evidence of their complicity in the junta’s war crimes and crimes against humanity through the brokering of arms and surveillance equipment.
“We call for urgent sanctions against Kyaw Kyaw Htun, his businesses and associates, along with all other enablers of the junta.”..."
Source/publisher:
Justice For Myanmar
Date of publication:
2023-03-01
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-01
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Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Business and the Military, Sanctions, The Burmese military's role in the economy
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"Aviation fuel shipments to Myanmar have continued despite the military’s ongoing war crimes, Amnesty International and Global Witness said today, after they identified more companies involved in the supply chain.
“We have traced new shipments of aviation fuel that have likely ended up in the hands of Myanmar’s military, which has consistently conducted unlawful air strikes. These attacks regularly kill civilians, including children, yet planes can only take off if they have fuel,” said Montse Ferrer, Amnesty International’s Researcher and Advisor on Business and Human Rights.
“Since the military’s coup in 2021, it has brutally suppressed its critics and attacked civilians from the ground and the air. Supplies of aviation fuel reaching the military enable these war crimes. These shipments must stop now.”
Hanna Hindstrom, Senior Investigator at Global Witness, which helped conduct the research, said: “We urge anyone involved in this trade to put people before profits and to cease supplying the fuel that facilitates these atrocities. We call on more states to enact or reinforce controls to prevent these supplies.”
Montse Ferrer said: “It is troubling that the Swiss-registered multinational fuel company Puma Energy, which committed to withdraw from Myanmar in October 2022, decided to sell its aviation fuel assets to a Myanmar business group which has imported fuel for the military.”
Deadly Cargo – Companies fuelling Myanmar’s military
On 3 November 2022, Amnesty International published Deadly Cargo, a report on the country’s aviation fuel supply chain that links national, regional and global companies to the Myanmar military.
Amnesty International, Global Witness and Burma Campaign UK have now identified other companies involved in aviation fuel transactions, which are likely to have reached the military in recent months.
One shipment involved the oil tanker Prime V, which sailed from Sikka in India on 28 November 2022. On or about 10 December, Prime V offloaded Jet A-1 grade aviation fuel at the former Puma Energy Aviation Sun Co. Ltd. (PEAS) terminal in the port of Thilawa in Myanmar.
One of the companies involved in this transaction is Reliance Industries Ltd of India, which owns the terminal from which Prime V departed. Sea Trade Marine, a Greek company, is the beneficial owner of Prime V, while Japan’s P&I Club provided the protection and indemnity (P&I) insurance. Amnesty International contacted the companies, yet only Japan P&I Club responded, saying that it complied with applicable sanctions at the time, and that its insurance cover may be terminated if a vessel is involved in illegal activity. There is no suggestion that the Prime V broke applicable laws in this delivery.
Details of an October shipment have also been obtained recently, showing that the tanker Big Sea 104 left the Bangchak Oil Refinery in Bangkok Port in Thailand on or about 8 October 2022.It arrived at Thilawa about a week later and offloaded 12,592 tonnes of Jet A-1, according to data from Kpler, a commodities information company, at the former PEAS terminal.
The refinery from which the ship departed is owned by publicly listed Thai company Bangchak Corporation Plc. Prima Marine Plc, another Thai company, is the beneficial owner of Big Sea 104, while Luxembourg-based The Shipowners’ P&I Club provided the insurance. None of these companies responded to Amnesty International’s letters.
“Each of these companies played a role in ensuring the Myanmar military continues to have access to aviation fuel to conduct unlawful air strikes. This has to end. All companies should stop their involvement in the aviation fuel supply chain to Myanmar,” said Montse Ferrer.
Sale of Puma Energy assets in Myanmar raises human rights concerns
At the time these two shipments arrived, the port terminal was controlled by the Myanmar subsidiary of Swiss and Singapore-based Puma Energy. In October 2022, Puma Energy said it was withdrawing from Myanmar after selling its assets to what it called a “locally owned private company” from which it claimed to have obtained undertakings to comply with “Human Rights laws” and not use assets to commit human rights violations.
Amnesty International has established that this buyer is Shoon Energy, formerly called Asia Sun Aviation, and that the sale was completed in December 2022.
Shoon Energy is part of a Myanmar business conglomerate, called Asia Sun, which imported aviation fuel on behalf of the military and distributed it to air bases. Following Puma Energy’s departure, this conglomerate now manages the main aviation fuel terminal in Thilawa port, Yangon, and, jointly with military-controlled Myanmar Petroleum Products Enterprise, the import and distribution of aviation fuel across the country.
Last month the UK and EU imposed sanctions on individuals and companies behind the Asia Sun group for their ties to the provision of aviation fuel to the Myanmar air force. Ahead of these sanctions, however, the Asia Sun conglomerate changed several of its companies’ names to Shoon Energy.
Montse Ferrer said: “Puma Energy has stated that the buyer of its Myanmar assets has undertaken to ‘comply with Human Rights law’. However, given the close relationship between Shoon Energy and the Myanmar military we are concerned this assurance is essentially meaningless.”
International community must act
Since companies continue to export aviation fuel to Myanmar, even while knowing the role that it plays in enabling war crimes being committed by the military, the international community must act.
Amnesty International and Global Witness have previously laid out a path forward: countries should suspend the export and transport of aviation fuel to Myanmar. Importantly, they should also suspend the provision of third-party services such as insurance, shipping or financial services to vessels involved in the shipment of aviation fuel to Myanmar.
Hanna Hindstrom said: “The international community has the tools in place to enact these restrictions. We should do what is in our power to reduce the Myanmar military’s capacity for terrorizing civilians.”
Background
According to the Myanmar Institute for Peace and Security, the military conducted 104 air strikes in 2021, and 243 in 2022.
On 1 February 2023, the second anniversary of the military coup in Myanmar, Canada and the UK announced measures to prevent aviation fuel from reaching the military, including targeted sanctions on Myanmar companies and individuals. On 20 February 2023 the EU sanctioned Asia Sun group and associated entities Asia Sun Trading and Asia Sun Energy.
In response to Amnesty International’s investigations for Deadly Cargo, the global shipping company Wilhelmsen said it would cease providing shipping services to any vessel transporting aviation fuel to Myanmar.
Korean Pan Ocean has also stated it would no longer allow its vessels to transport aviation fuel to Myanmar, and Thai Oil said it would put on hold any shipments of aviation fuel to Myanmar..."
Source/publisher:
"Amnesty International" (UK)
Date of publication:
2023-03-01
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-01
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Crimes Against Humanity, Amnesty International reports on Burma/Myanmar, Human Rights and international relations
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"1. During January and February 2023, the military junta launched airstrikes on health facilities, arrested and brutally killed healthcare workers, and committed terrorist attacks on the public as follows;
(1.1) On 10th January 2023 and 11th January 2023, the terrorist military launched airstrikes on Camp Victoria which was situated in the camp of Chin National Front (CNF), Chin State, the two female comrades and three male comrades from CNF were killed by those airstrikes. It also destroyed the outpatient department, the warehouse for the storage of medicine, and people’s houses too.
(1.2) On 21st January 2023, the terrorist military launched an airstrike on a public hospital in the village of Ba Hin, Myaing Township, Magway Region. Because of those airstrikes, Ba Hin public hospital was destroyed instantaneously, including an X-ray machine, and killed one innocent woman (62-year-old) nearby this hospital. Fortunately, the hospital staff and patients (a total of 90 people) including the pregnant women, and orthopedic patients escaped from this incident.
(1.3) On 19th February 2023, the terrorist military raided Nwe Inn Village, Pale Township, Sagaing Region, and intentionally destroyed the rural health center only by firing.
(1.4) From 21st to 25th February 2023, the terrorist military destroyed and fired on Min village, Malaethar village, and Kanyin village in Ayadaw township, Sagaing Region. And also the airstrike was launched at the high school compound, and hospital land and destroyed the medicines and medical equipment in the hospital in these villages.
(1.5) A CDM nurse, Daw May Zune Moe, who delivered a baby in one of the remote jungles has returned to Okpho Township, Bago Region and was investigated together with two comrades of the People's Defence Force (PDF) by the terrorist military near Kyauk Phyu Taung Village, Aye Mya Thar Yar, Oakpho township on 29th January 2023. The two PDF comrades were killed at the scene of investigation with live ammunition, while this nurse tried to run and hide from the hand of the terrorist military. However, she was arrested, inhumane interrogation was done, and was killed on 16th February 2023.
(1.6) A staff nurse who participated in the Civil disobedience movement (CDM) from Falam General Hospital, Chin State, and lived in her hometown Moedargyi Village, Katha Township, Sagaing Region, was arrested in her village on 16th February 2023 during the raiding by the military junta and killed on 21st February 2023.
2. The military junta took the power of our elected government on 1st February 2021, within two years of the coup, the military junta brutally killed (70) healthcare workers, injured over (780) healthcare workers, arrested more than (900) healthcare workers, and attacked and destroyed (54) ambulances and (160) health facilities.
3. Those inhumane attacks of the terrorist military, targeted intentionally to the healthcare workers, health facilities and health system, are breaking the Geneva Conventions, Resolutions of the UN Security Council, and International Humanitarian and Human Rights laws.
4. The Ministry of Health, National Unity Government, condemns those extremely inhumane acts of violence by the terrorist military group and we strongly urge the international community to take vigorous and urgent action in order to immediately halt the military junta’s escalating war crimes and crimes against humanity in Myanmar in the strongest possible terms.
5. The Ministry is deeply saddened and offers our deep condolence to the families of the innocent people who have fallen at the hands of the terrorist military council. The Ministry also vows to seek judicial redress for the lives of those innocent members of the public and healthcare workers. We pledge that the terrorist military council and its lackeys see justice served on them and that the military dictatorship is uprooted and we will, together with the public, strive towards building a Federal Democratic Union..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Health - National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2023-02-28
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-01
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Individual Documents
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"1. After the military junta coup in the country, Myanmar citizens have been suffering from the deterioration of human security. The NUG has endeavored to end the socio-economic system and other human security catastrophes that Myanmar people are facing.
2. The Ministry of Home Affairs and Immigration of the National Unity Government of Myanmar - MoHAI-NUG announced that from 1st of March 2023, all children of Myanmar citizens living abroad can apply for a birth certificate Registration.
3. Therefore, the people of Myanmar shall contact the MoHAI Birth Certificate Form and the Facebook page of the Immigration Department of MoHAI-NUG to apply for a Birth Certificate Registration Card.
Lwin Ko Latt
Union Minister of the Ministry of Home Affairs and Immigration
National Unity Government..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Home Affairs and Immigration - NUG
Date of publication:
2023-03-01
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-01
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Individual Documents
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27.41 KB 198.5 KB
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"၁။ ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ် ဖေဖော်ဝါရီလ(၁)ရက်နေ့တွင် မင်းအောင်လှိုင် ဦးဆောင်သော အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်မှ နိုင်ငံတော်အာဏာအား အဓမ္မလုယူသိမ်းပိုက်ခဲ့ပြီးနောက် နိုင်ငံတော်၏ နိုင်ငံရေး၊ စီးပွားရေး၊ ကျန်းမာရေးနှင့် ပညာရေးအပါအဝင် ကဏ္ဍအသီးသီး၌ အလုံးစုံ ယိုယွင်းပျက်စီးလျက်ရှိကြောင်း ပြည်သူလူထုအများ သိရှိကြပြီးဖြစ်ပါသည်။ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရအနေဖြင့် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံသား ပြည်သူလူထုများ ရင်ဆိုင်နေရသော စီးပွားပျက်ကပ်များ၊ လူနေမှုဘဝ မလုံခြုံမှုများ၊ ဘေးဒုက္ခများမှ လျော့ပါးသက်သာနိုင်ရေး အတွက် အဘက်ဘက်မှ အတတ်နိုင်ဆုံး ကြိုးစားဆောင်ရွက်လျက် ရှိပါသည်။
၂။ ထို့အတူ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၊ ပြည်ထဲရေး နှင့် လူဝင်မှုကြီးကြပ်ရေး ဝန်ကြီးဌာန အနေဖြင့်လည်း အကြောင်းအမျိုးမျိုးကြောင့် ပြည်ပနိုင်ငံများသို့ ရောက်ရှိ နေကြသော မြန်မာနိုင်ငံသား မိဘနှစ်ပါးမှ မွေးဖွားသည့်သားသမီးများအတွက် မွေးစာရင်း လက်မှတ် ထုတ်ပေးရေး လုပ်ငန်းအား ၂၀၂၃ ခုနှစ် ၊ မတ် လ (၁) ရက် နေ့မှစ၍ ဆောင်ရွက် ပေးသွားမည် ဖြစ်ပါသဖြင့် ပြည်ပရောက် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံသားများသိရှိ၊ လျှောက်ထား ဆောင်ရွက်နိုင်ရေး ဤကြေညာချက်အား အသိပေး ထုတ်ပြန် ရခြင်း ဖြစ်ပါသည်။
၃။ သို့ဖြစ်ပါ၍ ပြည်ပရောက် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံသားများအနေဖြင့် မိမိတို့ သား/သမီးများအတွက် မွေးစာရင်းလက်မှတ် လျှောက်ထားထုတ်ယူနိုင်ရေးအတွက် ပြည်ထဲရေးနှင့် လူဝင်မှုကြီးကြပ်ရေး ဝန်ကြီးဌာန၏ website လိပ်စာ https://mohai.nugmyanmar.org/ နှင့် Immigration Department of MoHAI-NUG Facebook page တို့သို့ ဆက်သွယ်ချိတ်ဆက်၍ ဆောင်ရွက်နိုင်ပြီ ဖြစ်ကြောင်း အသိပေး ကြေညာအပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Home Affairs and Immigration - NUG
Date of publication:
2023-03-01
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-01
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"၁။ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီသည် ၂၀၂၃ ခုနှစ်၊ ဇန်နဝါရီလနှင့် ဖေဖော်ဝါရီလ (၂) လအတွင်း ကျန်းမာရေးကဏ္ဍအပေါ် လေကြောင်းတိုက်ခိုက်မှုများ၊ ကျန်းမာရေးဝန်ထမ်းများကို ဖမ်းဆီး၊ နှိပ်စက်၊ သတ်ဖြတ်မှုများနှင့် အခြားအကြမ်းဖက်မှုများကို လူမဆန်စွာ ဆက်တိုက်ကျူးလွန်ခဲ့ သည့်အနက် အဖြစ်အပျက်အချို့ကို အောက်ပါအတိုင်း တွေ့ရှိရပါသည်-
(က) (၁၀-၁-၂၀၂၃) နှင့် (၁၁-၁-၂၀၂၃) ရက်နေ့တို့တွင် ချင်းအမျိုးသားတပ်ဦး (CNF) ဌာနချုပ် တည်ရှိရာ Camp Victoria စခန်းကို အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်က လေကြောင်းတိုက်ခိုက်မှု ပြုလုပ်ခဲ့ရာ ချင်းအမျိုးသားတပ်ဦးမှ ရဲမေ (၂) ဦးနှင့် ရဲဘော် (၃) ဦး ကျဆုံးခဲ့ရပြီး ပြင်ပလူနာကုသဆောင်၊ ဆေးစတိုနှင့် လူနေအိမ်များ ပျက်စီးဆုံးရှုံးခဲ့ရသည်။
(ခ) (၂၁-၁-၂၀၂၃) ရက်နေ့တွင် မကွေးတိုင်းဒေသကြီး၊ မြိုင်မြို့နယ်၊ ဗဟင်းတိုက်နယ် ဆေးရုံကို အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်က ရဟတ်ယာဉ်ဖြင့် ပစ်ခတ်တိုက်ခိုက်ခဲ့ရာ ဆေးရုံ အနီးရှိ ဒေါ်ကြည်၊ အသက် (၆၂) နှစ် ကျည်ထိမှန် သေဆုံးခဲ့ပြီး ဆေးရုံရှိ ဓာတ်မှန်စက် အပါအဝင် ဆေးရုံနံရံနှင့် အဆောက်အအုံများ ထိခိုက်ပျက်စီးခဲ့သည်။ ကျန်းမာရေး ဝန်ထမ်းများနှင့် လူနာများမှာ အချိန်မီ တိမ်းရှောင်နိုင်၍ ဘေးကင်းခဲ့ပါသည်။
(ဂ) (၁၉-၂-၂၀၂၃) ရက်နေ့တွင် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်သည် စစ်ကိုင်းတိုင်းဒေသကြီး၊ ပုလဲ မြို့နယ်၊ နွယ်အင်းကျေးရွာသို့ ဝင်ရောက်စီးနင်းခဲ့ပြီး ကျေးရွာရှိ ကျေးလက်ကျန်းမာရေး ဌာနခွဲ ဆေးခန်း (၁) ခုတည်းကိုသာ ရည်ရွယ်ချက်ရှိရှိ မီးရှို့ဖျက်ဆီးခဲ့သည်။
(ဃ) (၂၁-၂-၂၀၂၃) ရက်နေ့မှ (၂၅-၂-၂၀၂၃) ရက်နေ့အတွင် စစ်ကိုင်းတိုင်းဒေသကြီး၊ အရာတော်မြို့နယ်ရှိ မင်းရွာ၊ မလဲသာရွာနှင့် ကန်ရင်းရွာတို့ကို အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်က မီးရှို့ဖျက်ဆီးခဲ့ကြောင်း၊ ထို့ပြင် ကျေးရွာအတွင်းရှိ အထက်တန်းကျောင်းနှင့် ဆေးရုံ ကိုပါ ရဟတ်ယာဥ်ဖြင့် ပစ်ခတ်တိုက်ခိုက်ခဲ့ပြီး ဆေးရုံအတွင်းရှိ ဆေးနှင့် ဆေး ပစ္စည်းများကိုပါ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်သားများက ဖျက်ဆီးသွားကြောင်း သိရှိရသည်။
(င) (၂၉-၁-၂၀၂၃) ရက်နေ့တွင် တောထဲတစ်နေရာတွင် မွေးလူနာကုသပေးပြီး အုတ်ဖိုမြို့ထဲသို့ ပြန်လာသော ပဲခူးတိုင်းဒေသကြီး၊ အုတ်ဖိုမြို့နယ်၊ အေးမြသာယာ တိုက်နယ်ဆေးရုံမှ CDM သူနာပြုဆရာမ ဒေါ်မေဇွန်မိုးသည် အုတ်ဖိုမြို့နယ်၊ အေးမြသာယာအုပ်စု၊ ကျောက်ဖြူတောင်ကျေးရွာအနီးရှိ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်၏ ခမရ (၆) စစ်ဆေးရေးဂိတ်တွင် PDF ရဲဘော် (၂) ဦးနှင့်အတူ စစ်ဆေးခံရရာ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်သားများက PDF ရဲဘော် (၂) ဦးကို နေရာတွင် ပစ်ခတ်သတ်ဖြတ် ခဲ့ကြောင်း၊ သူနာပြုဆရာမမှာ ထွက်ပြေးပုန်းအောင်းခဲ့သော်လည်း အကြမ်းဖက် စစ်တပ်က ဖမ်းမိသွားခဲ့ကြောင်း၊ စစ်ကြောရေးတွင် နှိပ်စက်ခဲ့ပြီးနောက် (၁၆-၂-၂၀၂၃) ရက်နေ့တွင် အုတ်ဖိုမြို့နယ်၊ ထန်းပင်ကုန်းကျေးရွာအနီး၌ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်က သူနာပြုဆရာမ ဒေါ်မေဇွန်မိုးကို မုဒိမ်းကျင့်၍ ပစ်ခတ်သတ်ဖြတ်ခဲ့ကြောင်း သိရှိရသည်။
(စ) (၁၆-၂-၂၀၂၃) ရက်နေ့တွင် ချင်းပြည်နယ်၊ ဖလမ်းပြည်သူ့ဆေးရုံမှ CDM အထက်တန်း သူနာပြုဆရာမ ဒေါ်သဲသဲဝင်းသည် ၎င်း၏ ဇာတိရွာဖြစ်သည့် ကသာမြို့နယ်၊ မိုးဒါးကြီးကျေးရွာတွင် နေထိုင်နေစဉ် ရွာသို့ စစ်ကြောင်းထိုးလာသော အကြမ်းဖက် စစ်တပ်က သူနာပြုဆရာမကို ဖမ်းဆီး၍ (၂၁-၂-၂၀၂၃) ရက်နေ့တွင် သတ်ဖြတ်ခဲ့ကြောင်း သိရှိရသည်။
၂။ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်သည် (၁-၂-၂၀၂၁) ရက်နေ့တွင် အာဏာသိမ်းရန် ကြိုးပမ်းခဲ့ပြီးနောက်ပိုင်း (၂) နှစ်တာ ကာလအတွင်း ကျန်းမာရေးဝန်ထမ်း (၇၀) ဦးခန့်ကို သတ်ဖြတ်ခြင်း၊ (၉၀၀) ဦးခန့် ကို ဖမ်းဆီးခြင်းနှင့် (၇၈၀) ဦးကျော်ကို ထိခိုက်ဒဏ်ရာရစေခြင်း၊ ဆေးရုံ/ဆေးခန်း (၁၆၀) ကျော်ကို ဖျက်ဆီးခြင်းတို့အား ကျူးလွန်ခဲ့ကြောင်း တွေ့ရှိရပါသည်။
၃။ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီက ကျန်းမာရေးကဏ္ဍအပေါ် ရည်ရွယ်ချက်ရှိရှိ ပစ်မှတ်ထား၍ အကြမ်းဖက် တိုက်ခိုက်နေခြင်းသည် ဂျီနီဗာကွန်ဗန်းရှင်း (Geneva Conventions)၊ ကမ္ဘာ့ကုလသမဂ္ဂ လုံခြုံရေးကောင်စီ ဆုံးဖြတ်ချက်များ၊ နိုင်ငံတကာဥပဒေများနှင့် ပြည်တွင်းဥပဒေများကို ပြောင်ပြောင်တင်းတင်း ချိုးဖောက်နေခြင်း ဖြစ်ပါသည်။
၄။ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီ၏ အဆိုပါအကြမ်းဖက်လုပ်ရပ်များကို အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၊ ကျန်းမာရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာနက ပြင်းထန်စွာ ရှုတ်ချလိုက်ပြီး နိုင်ငံတကာ အသိုင်းအဝိုင်းအနေဖြင့် ဖြစ်နိုင်သည့် နည်းလမ်းမှန်သမျှကို အသုံးပြု၍ အမြန်ဆုံး ထိရောက်စွာ တားဆီးအရေးယူ ဆောင်ရွက်ကြပါရန် တိုက်တွန်းအပ်ပါသည်။
၅။ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၊ ကျန်းမာရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာနသည် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီ၏ လက်ချက်ဖြင့် ကျဆုံးခဲ့ရသော ကျန်းမာရေးလုပ်သားများ၊ တော်လှန်ရေးရဲဘော်များ၊ အပြစ်မဲ့ ပြည်သူများ၏ မိသားစုများနှင့်ထပ်တူ ကြေကွဲဝမ်းနည်းရပါသည်။ ဝန်ကြီးဌာနအနေဖြင့် အပြစ်မဲ့ကျဆုံးခဲ့ရသူများအတွက် တရားမျှတမှုကို မဖြစ်မနေ ပြန်လည်ရယူပေးမည်ဖြစ်ပြီး အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီနှင့်အတူ အကြမ်းဖက်လုပ်ရပ်များတွင် ပါဝင်ခဲ့သူများအားလုံးကို ပြည်သူ့တရားဥပဒေနှင့်အညီ ပြင်းထန်စွာ တုံ့ပြန်အရေးယူမည် ဖြစ်ပါသည်။ ဝန်ကြီးဌာနသည် စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ် ကျရှုံးပြီး ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီ ပြည်ထောင်စုကြီး ပေါ်ပေါက်လာသည် အထိ တိုင်းရင်းသားပြည်သူလူထုတစ်ရပ်လုံးနှင့် လက်တွဲ၍ အစွမ်းကုန် ကြိုးပမ်းတိုက်ပွဲဝင် သွားမည်ဖြစ်ကြောင်း ကတိသစ္စာပြု၊ ထုတ်ပြန်အပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2023-02-28
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-01
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"It was a fraught, reluctant, but urgent and necessary operation. We could rightly call it an “escape mission”.
It was not the first time I had been forced to flee my home country to avoid political persecution—that occurred in 2000, a year after I was freed from the previous military regime’s gulag. Twenty-two years later, I found myself with no choice but to make my escape once again, for the same reason.
It was this month last year—Feb. 23, 2022 to be precise—exactly one year and 23 days after the military seized power, overthrowing an elected government and launching its reign of terror over a population that now lives in fear of arrest, torture and death at the hands of the regime. Its endless violent crackdown on dissent has forced countless anti-coup protesters, students, politicians, artists and members of various professions, including journalists, to flee the country.
A few hours before sunrise on that day in Yangon, Myanmar’s biggest city, a colleague and I headed for a previously arranged location where an unknown driver would be waiting for us. Minutes later, two more colleagues joined us, and the young but calm driver wordlessly drove his old van into the darkness. His assignment was to take us to a remote border town; our mission was to flee our country.
It was something we hated to do.
In the van, it was still too dark to see each other, and we traveled in silence. But I could feel that all of the passengers were overwhelmed with worry and sorrow. For them, it must have been an unfamiliar feeling, as it was the first time they had undertaken such a journey. As for the driver, he must have had concerns of his own: Though he didn’t know we were journalists, he knew he was transporting “fugitives” fleeing the junta’s arbitrary persecution.
Fear of being detained by junta security forces before reaching our destination mingled with the sorrow of leaving our homes and loved ones behind, along with everything that we held dear, or that was simply familiar: a cracked or stained coffee mug; an old dining table around which family members would sit to eat every meal; a stained wall, empty, or perhaps with a tilted painting or yellowing, framed family photograph hung on it; the smell of one’s bed; the stuffy air in one’s rooms or the way sunlight shines through a particular window; a beloved pet; even the everyday noises of the neighborhood—and too many more to name. Nothing can replace such things, nothing feels more valuable or beautiful once taken away. Together, such things, I believe, add up to what we think of as “home”. Without them, there is no home, just a building. Their absence creates a powerful nostalgia for home.
Yes, leaving home was something we all hated to do. But we had to do it to survive.
Three days earlier, junta troops had arrested one of our admin staff who knew the home addresses of all of The Irrawaddy’s employees, including the editors and reporters. He was forced to show the authorities where we lived, making it necessary for us to leave our homes immediately. The group of us in the van were one of the last groups from our publication to leave the country.
After the junta’s ruthless and bloody crackdown on nationwide peaceful anti-coup protests in the early months of 2021, following the coup on Feb. 1, tens of thousands of people fled their homes and many of them left the country. Among them were many dozens of journalists.
As it confronts the sheer scale of the anti-regime movement, the military regime has identified as one of its main enemies the news media, in particular the journalists whose work daily exposes the true colors of the coup leaders—their cruel, inhumane and immoral acts against the entire population. Their work has made the media an enemy of the regime. Myanmar was the world’s third-worst jailer of journalists, with at least 42 journalists behind bars, at the time of the Committee to Protect Journalists’ Dec. 1, 2022 prison census.
In those early days I made the risky—some of my friends said daring—decision to stay inside the country to continue to work as an editor for The Irrawaddy, which by this time had been charged under various repressive laws. I thought I would be able to hide, periodically shifting locations, while continuing to work. In early March, one month after the coup, I went into hiding. This life of concealment and disguising myself in public was manageable for a year, but eventually, moving from one hiding place to another became untenable due to the junta’s oppressive laws, such as the mandatory guest and household registrations, not to mention its manhunt operations targeting us. Friends who offered to hide me at their places became concerned for their own safety, as they were helping a “fugitive journalist”.
With the security situation deteriorating, the arrest of our staff member forced me and my colleagues to make the difficult decision to flee the country. It was an unwanted outcome but the only practical one if we were to survive.
Our car had to stop at every one of the many security checkpoints we encountered throughout the trip. The driver, however, was prepared, and knew how to deal with police and military personnel: He slipped a roll of cash into the palm of the security guard at every checkpoint. He had prepared many rolls of cash ahead of time; his method worked—we were never seriously asked to identify ourselves.
We fled because it’s simply not worth getting arrested, tortured and given lengthy prison sentences, if not killed, for doing the work that is our calling—our work with the pen, with words. No citizen of my country deserves to live and work under this brutal junta and its generals, or any kind of dictatorship or authoritarianism. Our country has endured six decades of this. That should be enough, but it has yet to end. Of course, no one deserves such ruthless rulers; the Ukrainians don’t deserve Vladimir Putin’s invasion and war, either.
I endured plenty of what I didn’t deserve—to understate matters—under the previous regime. As a 19-year-old student, I was handed a 10-year prison sentence for my peaceful anti-regime activities, including publishing a pro-democracy journal, after the 1988 pro-democracy uprising. I managed to survive that harsh eight-year incarceration in two notorious prisons. For what? To carry on what I started—my own revolution against authoritarianism and military dictatorship.
In 2000, one year after my release, I fled my country for the first time, vowing not to be jailed again. In the 13 years of exile that followed, I worked as a journalist, dedicating myself to exposing the real nature of Myanmar’s cruel, greedy generals and other powerful figures. I survived exile, just as I had survived prison. For what? To tell stories: Not only horrific stories of the regime’s inhumanity, but also stories of the resilience of the Myanmar people. To share them with those citizens of our world lucky enough to be spared such experiences, as well as for the future generations, for whom our stories contain valuable lessons of survival.
In the days following the coup in 2021, my friends urged me to leave the country immediately. They said it wasn’t worth it, risking another lengthy imprisonment. But I was stubborn, determined to continue my work from hiding. Why? Because I wanted to share with the world the stories of our people who were suffering and fighting against the brutal regime—I wanted to tell these stories from the ground.
Now, though, having been forced from my country for a second time, I have come to believe that the decision to leave was the correct one—that I need to survive this time, too. The reason is the same: to be able to tell the stories of our terrible, all too “interesting”, times—starting with my own experiences of life under the dictatorship.
After a 12-hour drive, we arrived at a town on the Thai border. The driver took us to a meeting point where a four-wheeled pickup waited for us. The drivers greeted each other familiarly; they seemed to have conducted many such missions since the coup. We moved straight from the van into the second vehicle, a four-wheeled pickup, which set off after a brief exchange of words between the two drivers. Our new driver was actually an officer from an ethnic rebel group. While driving through rebel-held territory he told us that, due to the heightened security situation along the border, his group had stopped smuggling people out of the country. He had made an exception in our case, however, as he had been told that our group was very important. He said: “You are VIPs. That’s why.” I am sure many “VIPs” preceded us in this journey. We thanked him.
A couple of hours later, we reached our destination. All things considered, it was a relatively quick and safe experience. Some of our colleagues weren’t so lucky. Traveling with a baby they endured a horrific, two-day-long ordeal on a different route, though they eventually made it out too.
Our mission was to escape from the hell of military rule.
Mission accomplished. We survived.
But escaping the junta’s persecution was just our first mission. As journalists, our new and greater mission is to continue to report and write about what’s going on in our country under the ruthless military regime, and to explain the larger truths beyond the headlines, both to our own citizens and the world.
The morning after our arrival, all of us did exactly what we had been doing in hiding for the past year: We turned on our laptops. This is the job we have been doing for many years. The difference is that we are no longer in our homes, or in our country. To be suddenly wrenched away from our homes, our loved ones and our cherished belongings leaves one vulnerable to nostalgia. But in nostalgia, along with the slight sadness, there is a positive side, something I remember feeling in my first exiled life: a positive, even pleasurable energy with the power to motivate someone who has been forced from their home to strive to find a way to return.
For me, it’s the beginning of my second life in exile. The first kept me from home for 13 years. For my colleagues, it’s the beginning of their first such life. The bitter truth is that nobody knows how long it will take this time, either. Well… it should no longer matter to me. I am what I am, as I chose who I am. I am sure this rings true for my dedicated colleagues, other journalists and the countless resolute citizens of our country who have been forced to leave their homes for acting in the service of their country.
At the very least, we all need to survive to see the fall of the dictatorship.
That still greater mission remains unaccomplished…"
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2023-02-28
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-28
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
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"1.As more than two years have passed since the coup d'état on February 1, 2021, various parts of the country are still experiencing violence. As a result, the humanitarian situation in Myanmar continues to deteriorate further. According to the Humanitarian Response Plan for Myanmar announced by the United Nations on January 25, 17.6 million people, including internally displaced persons, are in need of humanitarian assistance.
2.Under these circumstances, the Government of Japan has provided a total of more than US$47 million in humanitarian assistance since the coup d'état, through international organizations and NGOs etc., directly benefiting the people of Myanmar.
3.In response to the rapid increase of the need of humanitarian assistance due to deteriorating situation since last year, the Government of Japan has decided to provide additional humanitarian assistance totaling approximately US$60.3 million (approximately 7 billion 77.7 million yen). Specifically, through international organizations such as UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP and AHA Centre, the Government of Japan will provide food, medical items and shelters as well as water and sanitation infrastructure, nutrition improvement, medical services, access to education, and measures to combat illegal drugs.
4.The Government of Japan will continue to actively provide humanitarian assistance, while urging the Myanmar side to allow safe and unhindered humanitarian access..."
Source/publisher:
Government of Japan
Date of publication:
2023-02-28
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-28
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Education in Burma/Myanmar - general, Food Security and nutrition in Burma/Myanmar, Human Rights and international relations
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"Since September 2022, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) of the National Unity Government has organized a number of trainings on International Humanitarial Law (IHL) in cooperation with Principles of Humanity.
The IHL trainings have been provided to members of People’s Defence Force (PDF) and People’s Defence Organizations (PDO) under the MoD in different military divisions and regions.
This is another bold step the MoD has taken to ensure combatants under its command and control follow international norms and standards while engaging in an armed conflict.
MoD will continue to organize further IHL trainings for its defence forces across Myanmar in 2023 and beyond.
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2023-02-28
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-28
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
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"1. Over 500 million MMK distributed in January.....2. Terrorist SAC continues its atrocities across the country 22/02/2023.....3. Civilians and PDF members prepare to take matriculation exam 18/02/2023.....4. Defence Ministry announces its military attack in Magway Region 20/02/2023.....5. NUG and NUCC says mother-tongue based education system be supported.....6. NUG announces vacancy for medical professionals in clinics/ hospitals in interim state or federal units 23/02/2023.....7. NUG pledges to bring justice for the Rohingya issue 22/02/2023..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2023-02-27
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-28
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
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"အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၊ ကာကွယ်ရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာနသည် Principles of Humanity အဖွဲ့၏ ပူးပါင်းပံ့ပိုးကူညီမှုဖြင့် ၂၀၂၂ ခုနှစ်၊ စက်တင်ဘာလမှစ၍ နိုင်ငံတကာလူသားချင်းဆိုင်ရာဥပဒေ (International Humanitarian Law) သင်တန်းများကို စီစဉ်ကျင်းပလျက်ရှိပါသည်။
အဆိုပါသင်တန်းများအား စစ်တိုင်းနှင့် စစ်ဒေသအသီးသီးတွင် တိုက်ပွဲဝင်နေကြသော ကာကွယ်ရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာနလက်အောက်ရှိ ပြည်သူ့ကာကွယ်ရေးတပ်မတော် (People’s Defence Force) တပ်ဖွဲ့ဝင်များနှင့် ပြည်သူ့ကာကွယ်ရေးအဖွဲ့ - ပကဖ (People’s Defence Organization) အဖွဲ့ဝင်များ အတွက် ပို့ချပေးခဲ့ခြင်း ဖြစ်ပါသည်။
ကာကွယ်ရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာန၏ အမိန့်စီးဆင်းမှုအောက်တွင်ရှိနေကြသော တိုက်ပွဲဝင်ရဲဘော်၊ ရဲမေ များအနေနှင့် လက်နက်ကိုင်ပဋိပက္ခဆိုင်ရာ နိုင်ငံတကာစည်းကမ်းသတ်မှတ်ချက်များနှင့် စံချိန် စံညွှန်း များအတိုင်း တသွေမတိမ်း လိုက်နာကျင့်သုံးကြစေရန်အလို့ငှာ ဤသင်တန်းများကို စီစဉ်ကျင်းပခြင်း ဖြစ်ပါသည်။
ကာကွယ်ရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာနအနေဖြင့် နိုင်ငံတကာလူသားချင်းဆိုင်ရာဥပဒေသင်တန်းများကို မြန်မာနိုင်ငံတဝှမ်းရှိ ပြည်သူ့ကာကွယ်ရေးအဖွဲ့အစည်းများအတွက် ၂၀၂၃ ခုနှစ်အတွင်းတွင်သော် လည်းကောင်း၊ ၂၀၂၃ ခုနှစ်အလွန်တွင်သော်လည်းကောင်း ဆက်လက်ကျင်းပသွားမည်ဖြစ်ကြောင်း ထုတ်ပြန် ကြေညာအပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2023-02-28
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-28
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
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"National Unity Government Weekly Press Update (9/2023)..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2023-02-27
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-28
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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"February 2023 marks the second anniversary of the military coup in Myanmar that ousted its civilian government and cracked down on democratic protests. Lin Htet Myat, a political analyst from Myanmar, assesses the grim situation in the country and offers new approaches that both the international community and the Burmese anti-junta forces should take to facilitate the restoration of democracy. The author argues that the international community must not engage the junta to seek for a peaceful resolution, and instead strengthen material support and communication with anti-junta forces within Myanmar. Meanwhile, Burmese democratic resistance forces should bolster military cooperation among like-minded groups and build trust in preparation for a federal democratic Myanmar.
Two years have passed since the Myanmar’s junta (State Administration Council (SAC)) toppled its civilian government in a coup; however, the resistance movement has not lost its momentum. In light of the second anniversary of the Spring Revolution, pro-democracy activists in Myanmar have recently held a nationwide “silent strike,” rejecting any form of oppressive and predatory military rule.
Meanwhile, the coup leader Senior General Min Aung Hlaing displays no intent to relinquish his power through negotiation. The current military regime has accepted neither the conditions outlined in the speech by the Acting President of the National Unity Government nor the ASEAN’s ‘5-Point Consensus’ (Mcpherson 2022). While the ASEAN has been attempting to appease the SAC, this controversial effort has a bleak outlook. Min Aung Hlaing seeks for a total victory, which resembles the goal of Bashar al-Assad’s Syrian regime.
In such context, unless the international community changes its approach to the crisis, Myanmar will inevitably face protracted stalemate and civil war creating millions of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs). According to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), approximately 1.5 million people have been internally displaced; 39,000 civilian properties have been destroyed; and one-third of the population is in need of critical humanitarian assistance (UNOCHA 2023). Moreover, the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP) reports that nearly 3,000 people, including pro-democracy activists and civilians, have been killed by the junta, while more than 13,000 remain imprisoned.
Call for A New Approach by the International Community
In order to restore democracy in Myanmar, the following actions are suggested:
1. The international community, particularly neighboring countries and the ASEAN, must jettison the “inclusive national dialogue” that engages Min Aung Hlaing and his junta to resolve the Myanmar crisis.
Min Aung Hlaing and his military loyalists are the main culprits of all crimes against humanity committed in Myanmar. In other words, Min Aung Hlaing must not be considered as a stakeholder in seeking peaceful resolution. This article wholeheartedly identifies with Igor Blazevik, a long-time Myanmar observer and human rights campaigner in Prague who argues that the Myanmar junta is “not and can never be a part of any solution.”
International players must free themselves from the illusion that the junta will abide by the ASEAN’s ‘5-Point Consensus.’ As predicted by Lucas Myers from the Wilson Center, the SAC “has crossed the Rubicon, and it is likely to do everything to stay in power” (Myers 2021). Settlement through negotiation is not on the junta’s agenda. According to Ye Myo Hein from Wilson Center, “the only way to bring the generals to the negotiating table may be to force them to realize that they cannot win by military means” (Hein 2022). As such, the SAC and its chief are not rational negotiating partners for the resolution of the ongoing political crisis.
2. The international community must proactively engage with the National Unity Government (NUG), National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC), ethnic resistance organizations (EROs), and other anti-junta alliances to bring about genuine dialogues and pave way for peaceful and prosperous democracy in Myanmar.
The U.S. Government must take the lead in embedding the Burma Act in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). This act enables the United States to provide non-lethal assistance to the NUG and other anti-junta armed groups, such as the People’s Defense Force (PDFs) and EROs. The anti-junta forces in Myanmar needs material assistance, not merely trainings and statements of concern.
Furthermore, Western democracies should provide anti-aircraft rocket launchers to neutralize the junta’s airstrikes (Pongsudhirak 2022). Once the balance is reached on the battlefield, the overstretched junta segments will dramatically lose its capacity to conduct a 4-cut strategy, mainly constituting burning down villages.
In many areas controlled by the NUG/PDFs and EROs, the governance bodies like the People’s Administrations (PaAPha) currently provide services to the IDPs and local communities with highly limited resources (Lipes 2022). However, once the SAC’s airpower is balanced, Burman-majority, ethnic communities will be able to effectively implement humanitarian assistance and resettlement programs. Neutralized airpower would critically weaken both the SAC soldiers’ capacity and morale, compelling the army to engage in negotiations with all stakeholders.
3. The international community should provide humanitarian assistance through every available channel and increase the levels of cross-border aid with flexible banking and reporting rules, as UN Secretary General’s Special Envoy to Myanmar Noleen Heyzer suggests. Measures to protect IDPs and refugees both in and outside mainland Myanmar must be employed in accordance with the ASEAN’s ‘5-Point Consensus’ and other regional frameworks.
UN, U.S., ASEAN, China, India, and other Western democracies should engage and support the NUG, NUCC, and EROs’ alliance platforms to improve coordination with regards to organizing humanitarian assistance and military operations. Doing so will pave the way for genuine negotiations and establishment of federal democratic union of Myanmar once the military is placed under civilian control in the future. Formation of cohesive alliance networks is the key to success for the anti-junta resistance forces.
Call for Internal Reconciliation
As of now, there exists the “Federal Democracy Charter (FDC),” which is a political framework that clearly defines the steps toward the establishment of future federal democratic union in Myanmar (International IDEA 2022). This charter has been drafted by the Committee Represent People’s Parliament (CRPH), mandated by 80% of the MPs elected in the 2020 general election to represent the Union Parliament, and revised by the National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC), and approved by the People Assembly held on January 27-29, 2022.
Yet while meaningful progress is being made to address the long-simmering grievances between Myanmar’s ethnic majority and the minorities, the key to success of the Spring Revolution lies with improved cooperation and coordination among NUG PDFs, local PDFs, and EROs (Hein 2023). Ye Myo Hein points out that the anti-junta forces should not overly focus on the details of the political agreement, as they are unrealistic. Instead, they should increase the military cooperation among within the alliance network and build trust for an inclusive federal state in the future. The NUG must step up to build more viable command-and-control structures, while enforcing a more inclusive code of conduct. This point merits attention, for as explained above, genuine negotiations are only possible when the Myanmar’s military junta is weakened.
The NUG and some EROs have already established the Central Command and Control Committee (C3C); however, some observers point out that although the NUG’s Ministry of Defense (MOD) and the EROs are cooperating at an operational level, strategic cooperation is not implemented. This current situation must change in order to win the revolution.
Conclusion
Some questions brought up by the international players are as follows: What will happen when the SAC loses power? Will the country descend into a failed state? Will the irregular army of PDFs turn against each other? In addressing these questions, Igor Blazevic consistently points out the international community’s need to address what he calls the “stability bias (authoritarian stability is better than chaos caused by anarchy)”, “David and Goliath bias (the asymmetrically powerful junta will inevitably crush all resistance forces)”, and “authoritarian bias (authoritarianism supports authoritarianism).”
Considering the aforementioned biases, the international community is unlikely to exclude the junta and its chief from the negotiation process (ASEAN 2023). Therefore, anti-junta resistance forces are better to focus on institutionalizing and developing the intra-dialogue among key stakeholders to a new level. In doing so, the alliance must prove that they can govern and maintain stability once the current military junta is removed from power and that there will be no power vacuum. Strengthened national-level coalition will provide greater credibility and legitimacy for the anti-junta forces to govern a democratic Myanmar in the future.
Myanmar’s resistance forces deserve no less global attention than those of Ukraine. Creating a peaceful democratic Myanmar is not merely a domestic issue—it is closely intertwined with achieving regional stability. As long as Min Aung Hlaing’s junta retains power, there will be more refugees, IDPs, narcotic drug production, and transnational crimes that will spill over to neighboring countries..."
Source/publisher:
Asia Democracy Research Network
Date of publication:
2023-02-24
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-27
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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Sub-title:
‘We have to unite.' Protest brings together ethnic groups to take a stand against the military.
Description:
"Braving snow flurries and chanting slogans, roughly 300 members of the Burmese diaspora in the United States marched to the White House over the weekend, demanding an end to the junta’s air strikes and the establishment of a no-fly zone over Myanmar.
“Democracy is coming today, dictatorship is going away,” they chanted as they marched through the streets of Washington on Saturday.
The procession included Buddhist monks, children, young people and middle-aged couples. Many drove hundreds of kilometers through freezing temperatures from as far away as Minnesota and upstate New York to participate.
Dubbed the “Multi-ethnic march,” the protest brought together the diaspora’s varied ethnic groups to take a stand against the military, which took control of the government in a February 2021 coup and has been battling rebel groups ever since.
Nay Htoo, a longtime board member with the Karen Organization of Minnesota, drove for 16 hours through the night with his wife, daughter, and son-in-law to join the event. In his hurry to join the march on time, he left his gloves in the car, leaving his hands pink and raw from the cold, but he insisted it was worth it.
The elderly community leader was one of several speakers to address the crowd at the march, using his speech to call for a swift resolution to the coup and unity amongst the different ethnic groups in standing against the military.
“Every day there are air strikes, people’s houses are damaged, people are dying,” he said, speaking afterwards. “This must stop.”
Reliance on airstrikes
Facing setbacks on the ground and stiff resistance from rebel groups since the coup, the military is increasingly relying on airstrikes in recent months – and many seem to target civilians.
Hundreds of people have been killed and thousands more left homeless by the waves of air strikes and arson attacks. The Sagaing region in the north and Kayin state, in the east, bordering Thailand – both viewed as hotbeds of rebellion – have borne the brunt of the attacks.
The military carried out 57 airstrikes in Kayin state in January alone, killing 13 civilians, including a 2-year-old child and two leaders of the Christian community, according to the Karen National Union.
In October, military jets bombed a concert in northern Myanmar commemorating the founding of an ethnic political group Kachin Independence Organization, killing 63 people – many of them civilians – and wounding 100 more.
‘Reject junta’s sham election’
In Washington, spirits were high despite the snow and rain, with the crowd singing along to the revolutionary anthem, “Blood Oath,” and carrying signs saying, “End deadly air strikes,” and “Reject junta’s sham election” – a reference to vague plans by the military government to hold a vote later this year.
Gen-Z volunteers Grace Mang and Matha Chin, who have been living in the United States for seven years, said it was their first time attending such a protest. They felt compelled to join as one of the few gestures of solidarity available to them from afar.
“There’s nothing much we can do from here, no other way to really show support, so we wanted to come and show we are with them,” said Martha.
The Burmese diaspora in the United States has been mobilizing since the early days of the coup, organizing fundraisers and marches and calling on the U.S. government to ramp up measures against the junta.
The Burma Act, which was passed by Congress in 2022 as part of a military spending bill, allows the United States to engage with the opposition National Unity Government and other opposition groups in exile, as well as to impose further sanctions against the junta. Its enactment paved the way for the NUG to open a shadow embassy in Washington D.C earlier in Feb. 2023.
The importance of inter-ethnic unity to the resistance efforts is one of the key themes emphasized by leaders of the U.S. diaspora.
‘It is everyone's fight’
Aung San ‘Christopher’ Win, a Maramagri activist from Rakhine who also spoke at the march, said the coup had encouraged more Burmese, especially those from majority groups, to address inter-ethnic discrimination.
“Before the coup, few activists would speak up for ethnic minorities like the Chin or the Rohingya,” he said, adding that his own campaigning efforts back in Myanmar had often drawn criticism from majority groups.
He arrived in the United States as a refugee in early 2021 after his political activities made him a target of the military.
The turnout despite the snowy weather shows “how much we want democracy,” said Saw Luh Tort, an organizer from Buffalo, New York.
“The military has been doing divide-and-rule for decades,” he said. “Something they didn’t know was that it would bring us together. It is everyone’s fight.”
Source/publisher:
"RFA" (USA)
Date of publication:
2023-02-27
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-27
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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Description:
"1. Introduction
The Ministry of Human Rights of the National Unity Government has prepared this snapshot of (he
human rights situation in Myanmar as a resource for delegations in advance of HRC52.
2. Human rights situation on the ground
The people of Myanmar have shown remarkable unity and resolve in defending their democracy, rights,
and freedoms and in protecting their communities against mounting atrocities by the illegal military
junta. The National Unity Government, consistent with its democratic mandate, continues to lead from
inside Myanmar. The National Unity Government and its ethnic partners also exercise significant and
growing territorial control and are providing essential public services and humanitarian assistance.
The people’s rights-based revolution has, however, come with appalling costs. The illegal military
junta’s failed power grab has plunged Myanmar into spiraling human rights and humanitarian criscs.
According to High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Turk, over the past two years " by nearly
every feasible measurement, and in every area of human rights - economic, social and cultural, as much
as civil and political - Myanmar has profoundly regressed."1
In February 2023. the junta murdered over 3.000 civilian children, women, and men. Some it shot dead
during peaceful protests. Others it bombarded with war-zone artillery, targeted with jets, or burned to
death. In July 2022, the junta executed four pro-democracy activists including a former parliamentarian
under the facade of legal process, revealing the scale of its contempt for the rule of law and international
norms. Its reach for the death penalty provoked shock from High Commissioner Turk, who issued a
statement in December condemning the junta’s sentencing of more than 130 people to death, including
at least seven university students, in sham military courts.2
Almost 16,000 civilians remain arbitrarily detained and subject to torture and sexual violence. And
close to 1.3 million people have been driven from their homes, many pushed into neighbouring
countries. These new homeless have been added to the hundreds of thousands of Myanmar nationals
particularly the Rohingya - already forcibly displaced by earlier waves of military atrocities. The junta
also continues to block people’s access to food, aid, medicine, and vaccines as a tactic of war.
3. Emblematic incidents
Myanmar is a party to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and a number of international human rights
treaties.3 All parties in Myanmar arc also bound by relevant rules of customary international law that
apply to non-international armed conflicts. Consistent with its obligations, the National Unity
Government has issued an Article 12(3) declaration under the Rome Statute granting the International Criminal Court countrywide jurisdiction dating back to 2002. For its part, the junta has increased the
frequency and severity of its attacks against civilians, particularly its aerial assaults.
Last October, the Special Rapporteur on Myanmar, Thomas H. Andrews, reported to the General
Assembly that junta forces had 'systematically bombed and burned villages and massacred innocent
civilians.' This widespread and systematic pattern of deliberate attacks, which includes the targeting of
schools and civilian gatherings, likely comprises war crimes and crimes against humanity in addition
to grave human rights violations.
The Ministry of Human Rights has documented the following emblematic incidents since HRC51 in
September 2022.
On 8 October 2022, near Phayar Lay Kone and Ngar Pan Chaung villages in Wot Lot Township,
Sagaing Region,4 two junta tighter jets and two Mi-35 helicopters attacked a People’s Defence Force
(PDF) training school. The attack reportedly lasted for around 30 minutes. Following the incident, one
of the helicopters attacked a primary school in Phayar Lay Kone village. Junta ground troops also
entered the area, near Phayar Lay Kone and Ngar Pan Chaung villages, where they murdered two
civilian men.
On 24 October 2022, the junta conducted an airstrike on an outdoor concert in the village of A Nang
Pa in Hpakant Township of Kachin State, killing at least 80 people including singers, musicians, and
other artists on and near the main stage.5 There were no combatants or legitimate military targets in the
vicinity of the concert.
Attacks by Light Infantry Battalions (LIB) 361,368, and 369 in Sagaing Region also intensified to new
peaks between November 2022 and January 2023. On 9 January 2023, a joint operation comprising
junta troops and "Pyu Saw Htee” members (pro-junta proxy militias) raided Taepin and Shangon
villages and detained and killed three local men. The charred bodies of these three villagers were
discovered on 10 and 11 January.
Since October 2022, the situation in Sagaing Region and Kachin States has become alarming due to the
increased and repeated pattern of directly attacking villagers in operations including the sequence of
aerial attacks, shelling, deploying troops on the ground, and opening the path for light infantry
operations.6
In late January and early February 2023, junta troops launched arson attacks against 14 villages in
Sagaing Region, destroying thousands of civilian homes and structures and displacing an estimated
10,000 people.7 These attacks form part of a larger pattern of the deliberate destruction of homes, critical
infrastructure, and the natural environment to force large-scale displacement, and as such constitutes
yet another example of continuing widespread, systematic, and methodological violence against
civilians intensified over the past year.
The above incidents, which represent a small sample, each involved the direction of deliberate targeted
attacks against civilians and civilian objects. In addition to the killing and maiming of civilians, junta
attacks continue to see the intentional destruction o f protected objects and properly including schools,
healthcare facilities, places of worship, homes, livestock, and crops.
Junta attacks are also properly viewed as acts of collective punishment and as part of a systematic
strategy to inflict terror upon the civilian population. As then Acting High Commissioner Nada Al-
Nashi f said in her IIRC51 update, " the Myanmar military’s offensives throughout the country are designed not only to target its opponents but also to punish any communities it deems to be supporting
them."8
Furthermore, the junta’s aerial attacks have seen its aircraft compromise the airspace o f Myanmar’s
neighbours during sorties against civilians, threatening the peace and security of the broader region.
4. Momentum at the UN
At HRC51, then Acting High Commissioner A l-Nashif described the situation in Myanmar as a " rapid
downward spiral, with growing suffering, fear, and insecurity”, and called for “urgent action... to
reverse this catastrophic situation".9 At that same session, addressing the junta’s economic interests, the
Acting High Commissioner reported that the junta “continued its exploitation of the country's resources
to advance its own interests and fuel a campaign of violence and repression against Myanmar’s people.”
id
HRC52 is a crucial opportunity fora strengthened address of the situation in Myanmar. In a groundswell
of activity, recent months have seen ASEAN Leaders issue a call for United Nations (UN) and
international support, which in turn empowered the Security Council to adopt its first-ever resolution
on Myanmar (2669) in December. Significantly, the resolution confirmed the Council’s support for the
will of the Myanmar people, demanded an immediate end to the junta's violence, stressed the need for
full, safe, and unimpeded humanitarian access to all people in need, and repeated calls for the release
of all arbitrarily detained persons. The Human Rights Council must seize on this momentum.
5. Recommendations
The National Unity Government offers the following recommendations in advance of HRC52.
To the Human R ights Council:
• Process the request of the Permanent Representative of Myanmar to the United Nations in
New York to represent M yanmar at the Council, along with other appointed members of his
delegation. This is consistent with the General Assembly's rules and the Permanent
Representative’s rights and privileges. Crucially, it will also restore the voice of the Myanmar
people at the Council
• Adopt a stronger resolution on the human rights situation in Myanmar that expresses support
for the National Unity Government and its ethnic partners, condemns junta atrocities, calls
for sanctions and arms import bans on the junta, prioritises the delivery of humanitarian
assistance, advances accountability, and blocks any junta attempts to hold sham elections
• Push the Security Council to keep Myanmar on its agenda and to leverage the threat of
Chapter V II measures against the junta
• Encourage the International Criminal Court to expand its current investigation into the
situation in Bangladesh/Myanmar to cover all Myanmar territory, in line with the National
Unity Government’s Article 12(3) Declaration under the Rome Statute
• Support the II.MM’s efforts to secure prosecutions, including by encouraging direct
cooperation by States under the exercise of universal jurisdiction
• Support the United Nations Country Team in Myanmar to implement the recommendations
set out in the Rosenthal Report and monitor its progress, including by requesting continued
reporting on its implementation efforts • Act on the recommendations of the Special Rapporteur on Myanmar
• Expand the resources available to O H C H R ' s Myanmar Team to make them commensurate
to the scale of the Team's mandate and reporting obligations.
To the UN Member States:
• Take individual and collective action to immediately end the direct or indirect supply, sale,
transfer, or diversion of arms, munitions, and other military equipment and related materials
of all types, dual-purpose technology, and aviation fuel to the junta, as well as technical
training, financial resources or services, advice, or other services or assistance related to such
arms and related materials to the junta. UN Member States should also strip the junta of cash
revenues through strengthened economic measures against its business enterprises including
its oil and gas interests
• Work with the National Unity Government, its ethnic and civil society partners, Myanmar's
neighbours, and the ASEAN AHA Centre to secure the cross-border delivery of urgently
needed food, aid, and medicine
• Formally recognize the National Unity Government as the legitimate representative of
Myanmar and its people based on the results of the 2020 general election, and block any junta
attempts to hold sham elections
• Use national courts to prosecute junta members under the exercise of universal jurisdiction
• Support ASEAN to reframe the Five Point Consensus to better reflect the realities on the
ground in Myanmar, to advance the democratic will of the Myanmar people, to approve the
cross-border delivery of urgently needed aid including through established ethnic and civil
society networks and chains, and to protect Myanmar asylum-seekers and refugees in ASEAN
countries at all limes and respect non-refoulement
• Ban all junta members and representatives from attending or participating in UN meetings,
conferences, and other events..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Human Rights
Date of publication:
2023-02-27
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-27
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Format :
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155.6 KB
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Sub-title:
Military Greenlights Abuses; Denies Fair Trial Rights
Description:
"On February 22, Myanmar’s junta announced martial law orders for three additional townships in Sagaing Region, after expanding martial law in 37 townships elsewhere in the country earlier this month. A total of 50 townships are now under martial law in Chin, Kachin, Karen, Karenni, and Mon States, as well as in Yangon and Mandalay Regions.
The three townships in Myanmar’s northwest now fall under the executive and judicial jurisdiction of regional military commander Maj. Gen. Than Htike, who has been sanctioned by the European Union for serious human rights violations, including excessive use of force and an attack on a school in Depayin township in September 2022 that killed 11 children.
The Myanmar junta’s application of martial law permits a disproportionate, overbroad and open-ended response. It allows for even further repression of basic rights to free expression, peaceful assembly, and association. In essence, these martial law orders all but guarantee that ongoing military abuses remain unchecked and those responsible unaccountable.
Under martial law, legal proceedings held in military tribunals against alleged coup opponents – closed-door hearings without adequate opportunity to present a defense – deny defendants any semblance of a fair trial.
Defendants on trial before military tribunals face almost certain conviction regardless of the evidence against them. Neither the public, human rights monitors, or foreign diplomats have access to the trials, and defendants have no right of appeal. Since the February 2021 coup, military tribunals have sentenced more than 100 people to death, including 41 tried in absentia.
For two years, Myanmar’s junta has brutalized a population that has bravely opposed military rule. So long as martial law remains in place, it’s clear the military has no intention of changing course. Concerned governments need to hold the junta to account. Member states of the Association for Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), in particular Indonesia as chair of ASEAN, should do more to press Myanmar’s military to end its abuses and restore the civilian democratic government..."
Source/publisher:
"Human Rights Watch" (USA)
Date of publication:
2023-02-27
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-27
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Rule of Law - Burma/Myanmar-specific
Language:
more
Description:
"In a bid to attract foreign funds for the country’s electricity sector, which has been crippled since the coup, the junta has waived tax on investment in the sector.
The junta-appointed Myanmar Investment Commission has announced it will waive tax on production and distribution of renewable energy including solar power. The regime has made electricity a national priority for investment and will exempt or reduce tax on imported materials, machines, equipment, spare parts, and construction materials that are not available in Myanmar, according to the announcement.
Taxes will also be waived for businesses related to electric vehicles, it added.
However, a local businessmen working in the sector commented that electricity production is a long-term project, and foreigners will not be interested in investing unless the country has political and economic stability.
“Projects in the electricity sector take around seven years to break even and you only start to see profits after seven years. Even Chinese companies do not want to invest because of uncertainty in Myanmar. Also, investors would be paid in kyats for their electricity, and the kyat is depreciating. This is also a challenge to potential investors,” he said.
Junta chief Min Aung Hlaing’s family and their cronies have won licenses to operate solar power plants. But they themselves do not want to make huge investments for the long term, and are seeking business partners, he added.
An energy expert told The Irrawaddy: “Foreign investors consider country risk [the risk of investing or lending in a country] as more important than tax exemptions. If a country is unstable, and risk is high, international banks will not grant loans for investment in that country. So, we can’t expect foreign investors to come just because of low tax.”
Another local business owner engaged in electricity production said the regime has introduced tax exemption not out of a desire for electricity sector development but because junta leaders are interested in potential profits from the industry.
The World Bank and other international agencies that had been providing financial and technical assistance for Myanmar’s electricity sector suspended their assistance following the coup. Electricity projects have also stalled.
Suspended projects include a 35-million-euro hydropower plant on the Salween River to be built with loans from French development agency AFD, and a Japan-backed US$ 2 billion LNG (liquefied natural gas) power plant in Thilawa Special Economic Zone in Yangon.
Meanwhile, Hong Kong-based VPower halted electricity generation at its 400-megawatt (MW) LNG power plant in Yangon’s Thaketa Township and 350MW power plant in the Thilawa Special Economic Zone in July 2021, citing rising LNG prices in the international market and depreciation of the kyat against the dollar.
In September that year, VPower announced it had pulled out of two power projects, each with a capacity of 200MW, in Rakhine State’s Kyaukphyu and Mandalay Region’s Myingyan.
In May 2020, the now ousted National League for Democracy government invited bids for the construction of 29 ground-mounted solar projects capable of generating a total of 1 gigawatt of power under a 20-year build-operate-and-own contract. Chinese companies and their consortia won the bids to build 28 of the 29 plants.
The military regime cancelled tenders for 26 solar power projects and blacklisted the Chinese companies after they stalled on the projects following the coup.
Myanmar has suffered rolling blackouts since late 2021 since the regime ow mainly relies on hydropower plants to supply electricity.
The country’s total electricity production capacity currently stands at 3,600 megawatts, with Chinese companies accounting for about 2,000 megawatts and 56 percent of investment in Myanmar’s electricity sector, according to an August 2022 report of the Institute for Strategy and Policy..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2023-02-27
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-27
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, The Burmese military's role in the economy
Language:
more
Description:
"Key Event Details
Location of Incident: Monywa town (မုံရွာမြို့), Sagaing region (စစ်ကိုင်းတိုင်းဒေသကြီး) [22.105255, 95.137446].
Date/Time of Incident: 27 February 2021
Alleged Perpetrator(s) and/or Involvement:
Multiple armed police and military personnel
Several men in civilian clothing
Summary of Investigation:
Myanmar Witness has verified footage showing multiple armed police and military personnel, as well as men dressed in civilian clothing, chasing and using sticks to beat two fleeing and unarmed individuals.
The footage indicates potential coordination between the police and civilians in carrying out the beatings.
The footage also shows soldiers from the military’s 101 Light Infantry Division pointing guns at the individuals who were filming the incident.
Executive Summary
In the months following the February 2021 military coup, Myanmar Witness documented and verified footage of police and military violence against individuals. This mini-series of spot reports documents five separate incidents in Yangon, Mandalay and Sagaing in February and March 2021. The first report of the series focusses on events in Monywa town
The case studies in the series show police and military personnel beating unarmed individuals, including those already apprehended; harassment, intimidation and arrest of medical workers; and the infliction of degrading treatment. Additionally, ranking police officers were identified in two incidents.
In this case study, Myanmar Witness has verified footage showing two unarmed individuals in civilian clothing, believed to be protestors or bystanders to a protest, running away from a water cannon and security forces. Multiple armed police and military personnel, as well as several men dressed in civilian clothing, are seen chasing and using sticks to beat the two fleeing and unarmed individuals.
The videos potentially reveal coordination between police and individuals dressed in civilian clothing. However, it cannot be ascertained from this case study whether the individuals were affiliated with, acting in coordination with, or undercover members of the security forces.
Analysis of rank and insignia, clearly visible in the footage, attributes responsibility of this violence to the Lon Htein (Riot Security Forces), soldiers from Myanmar military’s Yangon Command, and the 101 Light Infantry Division.
Sticks are used to beat the individuals’ head, arms and torso to the extent that one of them appears unable to stand, and a stretcher is brought for him. It also shows soldiers from the military’s 101 Light Infantry Division pointing guns at the individuals who were filming the incident.
To read the full investigation, download the report PDF.
These examples of police and military brutality are being released to mark two years passing since their occurrence; however, they are by no means exhaustive. Myanmar Witness has documented other instances of police and military harassment since the coup, which has been documented in several reports, including: Violence against protestors in North Okkalapa, Bago, and Hlaing Tharyar; and, the deaths of multiple female protestors, including Ma Kyal Sin (Angel) and Daw Tinnwe..."
Source/publisher:
Myanmar Witness
Date of publication:
2023-02-27
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-27
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Armed conflict in Burma - attacks on civilians, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
875.3 KB
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Description:
"As evidence grows of British companies’ involvement in Burma’s gas industry, Burma Campaign UK is calling on the British government to sanction the military-controlled Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise.
The British government must take action to prevent British companies being involved in Burma’s gas industry, which earns the Burmese military more than $2bn a year. They must also work with allies to prevent gas revenue reaching the Burmese military.
British involvement in Burma’s gas industry includes:
InterMoor, a subsidiary of British company Acteon Group, has been working on the Shwe gas project in Burma.
A holding company in Bermuda, a British overseas territory, is being used by Canadian company MTI Energy to purchase a 41% stake in the Yadana gas project.
Burma Campaign UK is working to confirm information about British insurance companies insuring vessels and infrastructure for gas projects in Burma.
“British companies involved in the gas industry in Burma are facilitating an industry which enables the Burmese military to receive billions of dollars,” said Mark Farmaner, Director of Burma Campaign UK. “Gas sales provide revenue which the Burmese military can use for the purchase of arms and equipment, including the jets used for airstrikes against civilians.”
The British government has a policy of systematically identifying and sanctioning sources of revenue, arms and equipment to the Burmese military. However, the policy is being implemented too slowly.
Burma Campaign UK is calling on Foreign Secretary James Cleverly MP to speed up the implementation of sanctions against other sources of revenue and arms.
The British government should seek to find creative ways of preventing gas revenue reaching the Burmese military, such as the creation of escrow accounts and sanctioning international bank accounts of MOGE.
Burma Campaign UK is asking supporters to write to the Foreign Secretary calling on him to sanction MOGE..."
Source/publisher:
"Burma Campaign UK" (London)
Date of publication:
2023-02-27
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-27
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Sanctions, Business and the Military, The Burmese military's role in the economy, Oil and gas, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
Language:
more
Description:
"Religions play a major role in Myanmar’s political history, especially Buddhism. Buddhist monks have been involved with political movements since the colonial eras. The most notable event led by the Sanga (monks) in recent years took place in 2007 when they led the Saffron Revolution. Many monks died, were arrested, and tortured fighting for democracy in Myanmar. It remains the same in the Spring Revolution as we come across the news about monks leading rallies and supporting the resistance in many ways. However, some prominent monks who were once worshipped and respected by the major population in the country have chosen to either neglect the military’s atrocities or plainly side with its leaders. Youths have questioned and called out those monks, vowing that victory at the end of the revolution will get rid of the military dictators and the stereotypical faiths including those religious monks. Curious on what the religious side thinks about it, we spoke to Ven Zawana, a former prisoner of conscience who now resides in New York, fighting yet another battle for the people of Myanmar.
Please tell us about your involvement in the resistance movements under the previous regimes.
I have become involved with the political movement since 1988. I led some rallies in my area. After the military committed the coup, I had to hide somewhere for a few months to escape an arrest. I came back to Yangon in July 1989, becoming an abbot in a monastery in Shwepyithar Township. Since I was the head of the monastery, I had more freedom in helping the politicians who found a safe haven in my facility where they hung out there frequently. In 1990, the prominent monks in Yangon were arrested by the military for leading political movements. I was in the back seat of the activism at that time hence I did not face detention. One day in 1993, military soldiers came to my monastery, asking questions about the students who had spent a few nights in the guest room. They found and seized documents, and tapes that contained political content in the room the young men had stayed in. I was also taken into custody. I confessed that those students had spent time frequently in my monastery, and I had treated them like regular guests. Hence I was charged with multiple violations of laws that were put on those students. In November 1993, I was sentenced to life imprisonment and nine years on top of that. I spent ten months in Insein Prison, later I was transferred to Tharrawaddy Prison (Bago Region) where I did five more years, before being transferred again to serve ten more years in Taungoo Prison (Bago Region). I got released from the Taungoo facility on 18 September 2009 after being locked in for 16 years and a month. Even after the release, I did not have the liberty to move freely since intelligence officers were following me and harassing people I communicated with. I had wished inside the jail that I could visit areas around the Bago Region after my release but I realized my time was running out with military people tailing me all day. I left for Maesot, the border of Thai-Myanmar before eventually heading to the US. I was granted asylum status and have been living in New York for ten years now.
What are your current contributions to the Spring Revolution?
Even before the Spring Revolution, I took notice of the military’s attempts to stir religious disputes by causing chaos in Rakhine State in 2012 (The 2012 Rakhine State riots were a series of conflicts primarily between ethnic Rakhine Buddhists and Rohingya Muslims in northern Rakhine State, Myanmar, though by October Muslims of all ethnicities had begun to be targeted.) followed by the establishment of Ma Ba Tha – Association for the Protection of Race and Religion before 2015. I published books and shared articles online that highlighted the extreme beliefs and acts of Ma Ba Tha. When the coup took place in 2021, I organized the online Sanga (Monk) Network with the intention to remind people about Dhamma (morality) and Ahdhamma (immorality). The page now has 10,000 followers on Facebook, and like-minded monks from all over the world join in to give sermons to people and support the resistance on a regular basis. In addition, I toured the USA with my followers in 2021, visiting 20 cities in 11 states lobbying for the Burma Act, organizing rallies in support of the National Unity Government (NUG), and collecting and handing over donations to the NUG officials. To this day, I am quite active in this resistance, from calling for the United States government to transfer USD 1 Billion to the NUG, to pooling funds for people in Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) and the People’s Defense Forces (PDF).
Many; especially youths have criticized prominent monks such as Sitagu Sayadaw for turning a blind eye to the atrocities of the coup leaders and not having the best interests of the public at heart. And hence they have called for the end of such exploitation of religion or religious-dominant culture along with the dictatorship, please let us know your thoughts on it.
Look, one of the core values of Buddhism is the peace and prosperity of the entire society. If you practice Buddhism, which is the symbol of love, and you turn a blind eye to injustice, that means you are doing the exact opposite of what you preach. When that happens, whatever sermons you give on the topics of peace, love, or caringness, are just plain words coming out of your lips, you don’t convince people anymore. Youths see through that. In my private opinion, I believe the perception of youths on religion has changed in a positive way compared with the past decades. The new education system during a brief period has contributed to that effect.[1] During the previous regimes, our education system was basically a brainwashing scheme. Younger generations have dared to question the status quo, no longer taking the old road that used to lead people to believe whatever the monks preached.
Are you satisfied with the extent of the Buddhist monks’ participation/contributions in this resistance?
Not at all. As I was saying earlier, the education system for the people changed in a positive way recently but monastic education has remained the same. I know a monk who has done very well in academics but he still believes the lie that the country will be converted into an Islamic state if the National League for Democracy (NLD), which is led by the detained leader Aung San Suu Kyi, continues to govern it. His students, young and bright novices, are fed the same concept. This fake news has been systemically injected by the military into the whole country for decades, and many monks remain believing it. Hence, they consider pro-resistance people as traitors of religion and race. It is down to the monastic education system, which is not empowering monks to think freely. To this day, Sangha Maha Nayaka (the governing body of Buddhist monks) does not believe it is appropriate to teach English to monks, arguing that if monks can speak English, they will leave the country. How pathetic!
We have also observed that many monks are actively participating in the movement, backing operations of the PDF members in some cases, while we are grateful for such support, do you think it’s against the religious practices?
For myself, I don’t believe I have committed crimes that will put my own monasticism into question. Yes, I am supporting PDF but the most I can do is provide USD 20 for each ranger in a limited quantity, which is barely sufficient to get food and warmth for them. I am not buying weapons or urging them to kill so I have a clear conscience on that and I will keep doing the same. As for others, I simply see it like this: whoever is making an effort to end the military’s dictatorship is a hero to me, whether it’s a person or a monk. The country will not be peaceful and prosperous as long as these generals are at the helm. The sooner they are gone, the earlier Myanmar benefits. Hence, every single one who works toward toppling the coup leaders is doing a righteous deed. No judgment there whatsoever.
Buddhism has a significant impact on the country. What kind of role do you wish for Buddhism to have in modern Myanmar (beyond the Spring Revolution)?
Every religion will continue to have a significant place in Myanmar. The Spring Revolution has highlighted the good and the evil vividly, not just among people, but also among religious leaders. Post-revolution, faith will be restored based on actual events and beliefs, instead of brainwashing conspiracies and make-believe stories. That day will be beautiful when it eventually comes..."
Source/publisher:
Mohinga Matters via "Democratic Voice of Burma"
Date of publication:
2023-02-26
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-26
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Spring Revolution
Language:
more
Description:
"My beloved Myanmar Community and Chin people in London, the United Kingdom, Mingalarpar to you all. Thank you for inviting me today on the special occasion of the 75th Anniversary of Chin National Day. A day which has everything to do with the 76th anniversary of the signing of the independent agreement known as Panglong agreement which led to the Burma’s independence from Britain. Before British rule in Burma, for centuries the Chin people enjoyed self-administration, self-determination, and political autonomy. We had our own kings and royal family and were never ruled by an outside power.
75 years ago, if the independence agreement based on Federal Democratic values and principles had been implemented, Chinland could have become a flourishing kingdom in Myanmar just as the UK flourishes. It could have been as vibrant and prosperous as Hong Kong or Singapore are today. But 75 years of failure to implement federal democratic principles, has left the Chin kingdom broken and weak; the victim of three quarters of a century of military oppression, and now officially the poorest state in Myanmar where conditions are gradually worsening to those of North Korea. Sadly, we are marking today 75 years of oppression and attacks on our federal democratic values and principles by a brutal repressive dictatorship. Due to the 75 years of oppression by the horrific dictatorship, the Chin people have not only lost their self-determination, self-administration, and political autonomy but have also suffered genocidal attacks from successive brutal dictators. Despite these genocidal attacks, the brave people of Myanmar have never given up on freedom and democracy and their commitment to federal democracy are strong and unshakeable. We are fighting for freedom and democracy here in Asia as the brave people of Ukraine, our brothers and sisters in spirit, are fighting there in Europe. The victory belongs to the brave peoples of Myanmar and Ukraine.
In the last 24 months alone, the genocidal military junta have carried out more than 9,000 attacks on the people of Burma, killed more than 3,000 unarmed civilians, arrested more than 20,000 people including duly elected officials, members of Parliament, President U Win Myint, and State counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, and have wilfully destroyed more than 50,000 homes, schools, churches, and monasteries. These horrific atrocities have forced more than 1.6 million into homeless and they are now living as refugees and IDPs. Furthermore, as a result of the military's cruelty, more than 17 million people across Burma are great in need of humanitarian assistance - compared to less than 1 million in 2020. One in three people are now in acute need of humanitarian aid and half population of Myanmar are forced to live in extreme poverty. The brutal military junta are using disease, hunger, and starvation as weapons.
We, the National Unity Government of Myanmar (NUG) are grateful to the British Parliament and the government of the UK for their constructive engagements and solidarity. The brave people of Myanmar are thankful to the people and the leaders of the UK for your generous response to the humanitarian crisis by providing more than £45 million in aid to Myanmar in 2022/2023. Myanmar is thankful to the UK for leading a strong, coordinated international response to the brutal military coup in Burma through the UK's G7 Presidency. Myanmar is grateful to the UK for all the efforts you have made to secure the first UN Security Council Resolution on the situation in Myanmar. Myanmar is thankful to the UK for building a global coalition of countries who are committed to preventing the flow of arms to the brutal murderous military in Myanmar. Myanmar is grateful to the UK for securing commitments of the UN General Assembly and UN Human Rights Council, and the coordinated and joint statement of 47 countries specifically regarding arms sales to genocidal military generals in Burma. Myanmar is grateful to the UK for imposing sanctions against the illegitimate military ruling body, the brutal military high command, and key revenue streams for the military including state owned enterprises, military owned companies, conglomerates and key defense sector entities responsible for providing weapons to genocidal military.
But sadly, this is not enough. The genocidal military junta's network is large and they will continue to find ways to skirt sanctions and restrictions. There are many powerful allies who continue to engage with them and arm the military in order to expand their own spheres of influence and to bring about a new reign of dictatorial oppression and the cheap labour and resources that offers them. The fate of over 54 million people hangs in the balance. If we lose this fight, Myanmar's people will become slaves in their own towns, villages, and homes. Forced to work to death to line the pockets of cronies and generals as the nation burns around them. The UK must act to help save the people of Myanmar, and keep both the dream of implementation of the independence agreements and the hope of federal democracy alive. To many in our community, the UK represents a hope for peace, freedom, democracy, and a chance to seek a better life, and provide a better life for our children, and our children's children. Sadly, our people have been beset, for three quarters of a century, by a violent military dictatorship hell-bent on eradicating our people, our language, our culture, our faith, and our way of life. We are eternally grateful to those who have helped us in our time of need, who have harboured and sheltered our refugees and supported the victims of the military's brutality, but in truth, we do not want to be refugees. We do not want to have to find better lives and opportunities away from our homeland. Our dream is to build a stable and prosperous new Myanmar in which we can live and thrive, where we can know peace and prosperity, and where we can finally live and breathe without fear of violent arbitrary attacks, shelling, arson, rape, and starvation. The military's barbarism knows no bounds and the more ground they lose in this war, the more savage they become. It is for this reason that we must again turn to the UK and ask her to lend a helping hand in the cause for justice, freedom and humanity.
The UK is one of the West's leading powers, a strategic ally of the EU, the US, the vital international leader, a leading member of G7, and a permanent member and pen-holder of the UN Security Council. These strategic positions in international leadership and the historical connection between the UK and Burma place the UK in a uniquely privileged position to engage with the Myanmar crisis. This war is not merely a war for the future of Myanmar, it is a test case for the principles of democracy and freedom against the continuation of corruption and military repression in all of South East Asia. There are many actors working to undermine the revolution for fear of what a functioning popular democracy would mean for dictatorships in the region. They are desperate to crush the people's democratic movement as a warning to all other subjugated and oppressed peoples hoping to throw off the yoke of their own dictatorships. The eyes of the region, and indeed the entire world, are on this conflict, and the outcome will have long reaching ramifications democracy the world over. The UK must engage quickly and decisively with the cause of the people, the cause of freedom and democracy. Dictatorship is a cancer, and the UK stands as one of the few great bastions of democracy holding back the spread of this disease.
We ask the UK to pressure the UN, her strategic partners, and the international community generally, to intervene in the Myanmar crisis, to see the ASEAN 5 point consensus implemented, to see the 10 points of the UK led UN Security Council Resolution on the situations in Myanmar implemented and to act to protect civilian lives . We also ask the UK to apply the principle of universal jurisdiction as enshrined in the Geneva Conventions, to take seriously the crimes against humanity and war crimes committed by the the military and to actively pursue the guilty parties and attempt to secure justice for their victims through the international mechanisms the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the International Criminal Court (ICC). And most importantly, we ask that the UK formally recognise the NUG, NUCC, and CRPH as lawful and legitimate representatives of Myanmar in conjunction with declaring the military junta, SAC, and so-called “caretaker government” to be unjust, illegitimate, and unlawful, and refusing to engage with them officially.
Many Britons are deeply concerned about the deteriorating humanitarian situation, and have contributed heavily over the decades to helping to improve Myanmar's development, human rights, and democracy. The UK has a long and vaunted history of foreign aid and advocacy in the cause of human development and political liberation. We all hope and wish fervently that one day Myanmar can know the same peace and prosperity that the UK knows. This is a desire deep within many Britons and we ask the UK to help make this dream a reality..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of International Cooperation
Date of publication:
2023-02-25
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-25
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Chin (Zo)- economic, social, cultural, political
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
83.92 KB
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Description:
"Exiles, alas, are all too common in today’s disrupted world. Myanmar has a variety of them. Some are driven into exile by ethnic cleansing, such as the Rohingya. Some seek safety individually, like the anti-military dissidents since 2001. And millions go overseas to seek employment, especially in Thailand.
Governments in exile are also not an uncommon worldwide political phenomenon. But to have two in one generation in one country not only exceeds the norm, but may be unique in the modern era. Although two can hardly be called a pattern, lessons and expectations, both realistic and illusionary, from these experiences in Myanmar may help enlighten the future and help guide internal and foreign policies.
On 14 February 2023, the US Deputy Secretary of State, Wendy Sherman, met Daw Zin Mar Aung, the National Unity Government’s (NUG) foreign minister, at the newly established, Washington-based headquarters of the NUG. Founded on 16 April 2021, the NUG is composed of members of the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, the parliament elected in November 2020 but ousted by a Myanmar military coup before it could take office on 1 February 2021, as well as representatives of ethnic minority groups and other anti-coup players.
Wendy Sherman’s visit, and other extensive legislative and executive actions by the US, provides the NUG with the moral imprimatur, if not the diplomatic stamp of approval. Although formal diplomatic ties remain with the military regime, ambassadorial replacements between the states have not been approved. Together with an intense lobbying effort by the NUG, extensive economic, political, and social sanctions have been imposed on both military-supported institutions and individual military officials. With widespread Western opprobrium of any actions seen as supportive of the military, US dialogue with the Myanmar military is absent.
For the few foreigners who trace modern Myanmar history, the plot seems to be a replay of an older scenario. But there are critical differences between the four coups that have dominated Myanmar’s history since independence in 1948. The three coups of 1962, 1988, and 2021 were all designed to perpetuate military control over political, economic, and social elements of the then Burma and Myanmar. The 1988 and 2021 coups have similarly resulted in governments in exile, but their effects and expectations are likely to be quite different.
A generation ago, following the coup of 1988, the military promised that it would hold elections that would result in a multi-party “discipline-flourishing democracy.” It did hold such elections in May 1990, which the opposition National League for Democracy swept and the military blatantly ignored. Escaping arrest by the military, some members of the newly elected but unseated legislature formed the National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma (NCGUB) on 18 December 1990 in territory not yet controlled by the military, and then shifted to Thailand.
It lobbied for diplomatic recognition, never granted by the US, but it focused attention on the political plight of the civilian population and engendered widespread international sympathy. In May 1995, the NCGUB held a meeting in Bommersvik Sweden, and Sein Win, a first cousin of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, was elected as its prime minister in exile. In essence, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, or what was purported to be her views since she was under house arrest, made US policy.
The NCGUB moved its offices to the Washington DC area for more effective lobbying. It had remarkable access throughout the Washington power structure. But as the military began the slow, incomplete but encouraging, pattern of reform, and as the US responded to such quiet signals from the military, relations began to improve. In the aftermath of these changes, the NCGUB was dissolved on 14 September 2012.
There are significant differences between 1988 and 2021 both in military promises and actions and in the public’s response. In 2021, the military promised initially that there would be national elections in 2023. Because of the widespread disdain, indeed revolution, against the junta’s rule and national civil unrest, these elections have now been promised for later in 2023 or 2024.
But just as the controlled and manipulated elections of 2010 allowed the military to maintain power through the political process, so there is every indication that the current military regime plans a similar response in the forthcoming political arena. Even if there are significant alterations to the 2008 military-drafted constitution that the military had sworn to uphold unchanged, but is now prepared to modify to ensure continuing military dominance of the political processes, any such changes will attempt to solidify the military’s critical role in Myanmar society.
One overarching commonality of the 1988 and 2021 coups is the clear determination to ensure that Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, through imprisonment, house arrest, or simply age, no longer plays a role in Myanmar’s politics. A major difference is that Suu Kyi advocated political change through peaceful means. Whether that was practical in the Myanmar context may be disputed, but on 7 September 2021 the NUG declared war on the Myanmar military. Although the military’s criminal and rapacious actions far outstrip the violence perpetrated by the NUG and its diverse opposition groups, the moral high ground has at least partly been ceded.
The popular reaction to the 2021 coup has been unprecedented in modern Myanmar. Coupled with the ongoing struggle of ethnic minorities for autonomy, and the exposure of youth to the liberalization of the past decade, tolerance of military atrocities seems to have ended. Anti-military rebellion is apparent even in Bamar areas that were never previously restive, and military violence against the population is unprecedented.
From 2012 until the coup, the country’s youth experienced a degree of freedom, while incomplete, far greater than at any time since the 1962 coup. They do not seem to be willing to settle for less under praetorian rule. The NUG has tried to placate ethnic dissatisfaction with more ethnically diverse leadership, but generations of suspicions abound and are exceedingly difficult to overcome. Throughout the country People’s Defense Forces have been formed and fight military authority, but they lack coordination and the arms necessary for effective resistance.
But the military’s plans for a rigged election that would provide titular legitimacy from their vantage point may be based in part on illusion. Senior military officers have long felt that that they don’t need the West, because of a combination of the state’s natural resources and friendly relations with Russia and China, who protect Myanmar in the United Nations through their veto power and supply the regime with sophisticated weaponry, along with the clear reluctance of Japan, India and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations to impose sanctions.
The generals may be preparing to sit out a decade of Western isolation, after which some US administration will likely make some concessions in response to political face-saving changes within the Myanmar regime. The dilemma is that much of the backbone of state administration is in the hands of retired military, as well as those on active duty. The military‘s future role in Myanmar will exceed what is regarded as normal in modern Western states.
We are witnessing a period of intense propaganda from all sides. Claims for areas and populations controlled, casualties inflicted, and economic conditions are widely promulgated but are in dispute. Yet policy decisions by the internal actors and foreigners are being made based on dubious data and are likely to exacerbate the crises.
Some foreign observers are now rethinking their positions. Some advocate the diplomatic recognition of the NUG, which would entail the closing of Western embassies in Myanmar, and likely either covert or overt arming of the opposition. This would increase the polarization of Russian and Chinese antagonism with the West. Some call for positive reconsideration of the breakup of the state, long advocated by some ethnic groups, to alleviate some of these pressures. That would likely to produce a ‘Balkanized’ regional set of insecurities compounding the myriad dilemmas facing the country and the region.
There is no silver bullet that will solve Myanmar’s multiple dilemmas and foreign response to them without a clear reorganization of the military control system and changes in its leadership. As much as they are needed, such changes seem, alas, a bridge too far. Unfortunately, the next few years are likely to be even worse than the previous two..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2023-02-25
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-25
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
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Description:
"ချစ်ခင်လေးစားအပ်ပါသော UK နိုင်ငံ၊ London မြို့ရှိ မြန်မာအဖွဲ့အစည်းနှင့် ချင်းပြည်သူများအားလုံး မင်္ဂလာပါ။ (၇၅) ကြိမ်မြောက် ချင်းအမျိုးသားနေ့ အခမ်းအနားတွင် ဖိတ်ကြားသည့်အတွက် အထူးကျေးဇူးတင်ရှိပါသည်။ (၇၅) ကြိမ်မြောက် ချင်းအမျိုးသားနေ့သည် ဗြိတိသျှအုပ်ချုပ်ရေးမှ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံလွတ်လပ်ရေးကို အသက်သွင်းပေးသော လွတ်လပ်ရေးစာချုပ်နှင့် သမိုင်း၀င်စာချုပ်ဖြစ်သည့် (၇၆) ကြိမ်မြောက် ပင်လုံစာချုပ် ချုပ်ဆိုသောနေ့နှင့် တိုက်ရိုက် ဆက်စပ်နေပါသည်။ ချင်းပြည်နယ်သည် ဗြိတိသျှကိုလိုနီခေတ် မတိုင်ခင်ကတည်းကပင် သူ့စော်ဘွားနှင့်သူ ကိုယ်ပိုင်အုပ်ချုပ်ခွင့်၊ ကိုယ်ပိုင်ပြဌာန်းခွင့်နှင့် ကိုယ့်ကံကြမ္မာကိုယ်ဖန်တီးခွင့် အပြည့်အဝဖြင့် ရာစုနှစ်ပေါင်းများစွာ နေလာခဲ့သော ပြည်နယ်ဖြစ်ပြီး ချင်းသမိုင်းတွင် ဗြိတိသျှအုပ်ချုပ်ရေးကလွဲပြီး အခြားပြင်ပမှ အုပ်ချုပ်ခြင်း မရှိခဲ့ပေ။
လွန်ခဲ့သော (၇၅)နှစ်အတွင်း ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရက်တစ်တန်ဖိုးနှင့် အနှစ်သာရများ အပေါ်အခြေခံသည့် ပင်လုံစာချုပ်ကို ချင်းပြည်နယ်တွင် အကောင်အထည်ဖော်ခဲ့လျှင် ချင်းပြည်နယ်သည် UK နိုင်ငံရှိပြည်နယ်များှကဲ့သို့လည်းကောင်း၊ ဟောင်ကောင် (Hong Kong) ဒေသနှင့် စင်ကာပူနိုင်ငံ (Singapore) ကဲ့သို့လည်းကောင်း ဖြစ်နိုင်ချေ အပြည့်အဝရှိသည့် ပြည်နယ်ဖြစ်သော်ငြားလည်းပဲ (၇၅)နှစ်အတွင်း ပင်လုံစာချုပ်ကို အကောင်အထည်ဖော်ရန် ပျက်ကွက်ခဲ့ခြင်းနှင့် ခေတ်အဆက်ဆက် အာဏာရှင်တို့၏ ရက်စက်ယုတ်မာခြင်းကြောင့် ယနေ့ချင်းပြည်နယ်သည် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံမှာ အဆင်းရဲဆုံး ပြည်နယ်ဖြစ်လာပြီး မြန်မာနိုင်ငံသည်လည်း ကမ္ဘာမှာ အဆိုးရွားဆုံးဖြစ်သည့် မြောက်ကိုရီးယား(North Korea) ထက် ပိုမိုဆိုးရွားသော အခြေအနေကို ရောက်ရှိနေပြီဖြစ်ပါသည်။ ယနေ့ချင်းလူမျိုးများသည် (၇၅)နှစ်အတွင်း ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီ၏အနှစ်သာရနဲ့ ချမ်းသာကြွယ်ဝမှုကို ကျင်းပနေရမည့်အစား၊ (၇၅)နှစ်အတွင်း ရက်စက်ကြမ်းကြုတ်သော စစ်အာဏာရှင်များ၏ ဖိနှိပ်ချုပ်ချယ်ခြင်း၊ ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီ ကတိကဝတ်များ၊ တန်ဖိုး အနှစ်သာရများအားလုံးကို တိုက်ခိုက်ဖျက်ဆီးခြင်းကိုသာ ခံစားနေရပါသည်။ အာဏာရှင်များ၏ ရက်စက်ယုတ်မာခြင်းကြောင့် ချင်းပြည်နယ်သည် ပင်လုံစာချုပ်ပါ အခွင့်အရေးအားလုံးကို ဆုံးရှုံးသွားခဲ့ပြီး ယနေ့တွင် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၏ တရားဝင် အဆင်းရဲဆုံးပြည်နယ် ဖြစ်လာသည်သာမက အာဏာရှင်များ၏ လူမျိုးတုံး တိုက်ခိုက်ခြင်းကြောင့် ချင်းလူမျိုးများသည် လူမျိုးတုံးနိုင်ခြေရှိသည့် အနေအထားကို ရောက်ရှိနေပြီဖြစ်ပါသည်။ ဤကဲ့သို့ ချင်းလူမျိုးတို့၏ လွတ်လပ်ရေးနှင့် ဒီမိုကရေစီကို အတိုက်အခိုက်ခံနေရသော်လည်း ချင်းပြည်သူများ၏ ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီ သံဓိဌာန်သည် ခိုင်မြဲလှသည်။
မြန်မာပြည်သူလူထုနှင့် ယူကရိန်းပြည်သူလူထုသည် လွတ်လပ်ရေးနှင့် ဒီမိုကရေစီအရေး၏ရှေ့မှာ တစ်ညီတစ်ညွတ်တည်းရပ်တည်နေပြီး လွတ်လပ်ရေးနှင့် ဒီမိုကရေစီအရေးအတွက် ယူကရိန်းပြည်သူလူထုများသည် ဥရောပတိုက်မှာ တိုက်ပွဲ၀င် တော်လှန်နေသကဲ့သို့ မြန်မာပြည်သူလူထုများသည်လည်း အာရှတိုက်မှာ အလွန်ဆိုးရွားသော စစ်အာဏာရှင်များကို တော်လှန်နေပါသည်။ အရေးတော်ပုံအောင်ပွဲသည် မြန်မာပြည်သူလူထုနှင့် ယူကရိန်းပြည်သူလူထုတို့၏လက်ထဲမှာ ရောက်ရှိနေပြီဖြစ်ပါသည်။
လွန်ခဲ့သော (၂၄)လအတွင်း ရက်စက်ယုတ်မာသော အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အာဏာရှင်များသည် အပြစ်မဲ့ပြည်သူလူထုအပေါ် အကြိမ်ပေါင်း(၉)ထောင်ထက်မနည်း အကြမ်းဖက်တိုက်ခိုက်ခြင်းကြောင့် အပြစ်မဲ့ပြည်သူလူထု (၃)ထောင်ထက်မနည်း အသက်များဆုံးရှုံးသွားခဲ့ရပါသည်။ ဒီမိုကရေစီနည်းဖြင့် လူထုရွေးကောက်တင်မြောက်ထားသော သမ္မတကြီးဦး၀င်းမြင့်၊ နိုင်ငံတော်အတိုင်ပင်ခံပုဂ္ဂိုလ် ဒေါ်အောင်ဆန်းစုကြည်နှင့်အတူ အပြစ်မဲ့ပြည်သူလူထု (၂)သောင်းကျော်ကိုလည်း မတရားဖမ်းဆီးချုပ်နှောင်ထားပြီး လူနေအိမ်၊ စာသင်ကျောင်း၊ ဘုရားကျောင်း၊ ဘုန်းကြီးကျောင်းအပါအ၀င် ပြည်သူလူထု၏ အိုးအိမ်ပေါင်း (၅)သောင်းကျော်ကို ရက်ရက်စက်စက် ဗုံးကြဲတိုက်ခိုက် မီးရှို့ဖျက်စီးခြင်းများ ပြုလုပ်ခဲ့ပါသည်။ နေ့စဉ်နှင့်အမျှ လူ့အခွင့်အရေး ချိုးဖောက်ခြင်းများနှင့်အတူ စစ်ရာဇ၀တ်မှူကို ကျူးလွန်လျှက်ရှိပါသည်။ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အာဏာရှင်များသည် မြန်မာပြည်သူလူထုအပေါ် စစ်ကြေငြာပြီး ရက်စက်ယုတ်မာစွာ လူမဆန်အကြမ်းဖက်တိုက်ခိုက်ခြင်းကြောင့် ပြည်သူလူထု (၁.၆)သန်းထက်မနည်း ဒုက္ခသည်ဘ၀မှာ ဆင်းရဲနွမ်းပါးမှုပေါင်းများစွာ ခံစားနေရပါသည်။ ၂၀၂၀ ခုနှစ်မှာ လူဦးရေ (၁)သန်းအောက် လူသားချင်းစာနာ ထောက်ထားရေးအကူအညီ လိုအပ်သည်မှ ယနေ့ ၂၀၂၃ခုနှစ်တွင် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံလူဦးရေ (၁၇)သန်းကျော်သည် အငတ်ဘေးနှင့် ရင်ဆိုင်နေရပြီး လူသားချင်းဆိုင်ရာ စာနာထောက်ထားရေးအကူအညီများ မြောက်များစွာလိုအပ်နေသည့် အခြေအနေကို ဆိုးရွားစွာရောက်ရှိလာခဲ့ပါသည်။ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံလူဦးရေတဝက်ခန့်သည် အလွန်ဆင်းရဲနွမ်းပါးမှုအောက်အခြေအနေကို ရောက်ရှိနေပြီဖြစ်ကာ မြန်မာပြည်သူ (၃)ယောက်တွင် (၁)ယောက်မှာ ငတ်မွတ်ခေါင်းပါးသည့်အခြေအနေ ရောက်ရှိနေပြီး တစ်တိုင်းပြည်လုံး အလွန်ဆိုးရွားသောဒုက္ခကို ခံစားနေရပြီဖြစ်ပါသည်။ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အာဏာရှင်များသည် စစ်လက်နက်သာမက ငတ်မွတ်ခေါင်းပါးခြင်း၊ ရောဂါနှင့် ဆင်းရဲဒုက္ခပေါင်းများစွာကို လက်နက်သဖွယ်အသုံးပြုပြီး မြန်မာပြည်သူထူထုကို အကြမ်းဖက် တိုက်ခိုက်လျှက်ရှိပါသည်။
ကျွန်တော်တို့ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ (NUG) အနေဖြင့် မြန်မာ့သမိုင်း၏ အမှောင်ဆုံးကာလမှာ UK အစိုးရနှင့် လွှတ်တော်အမတ်များ၏ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံအပေါ်ထိရောက်သော ပူးပေါင်းဆောင်ရွက်မှုများနှင့် ခိုင်မာသော ရပ်တည်မှုများအတွက် အလွန်ကျေးဇူးတင်ပါသည်။ ၂၀၂၂/၂၀၂၃ ခုနှစ်အတွင်း မြန်မာနိုင်ငံကို လူသားချင်းစာနာမှု အကူအညီများပေးဖို့ရန်အတွက် ပေါင် (၄၅) သန်း ရက်ရက်ရောရောလှူဒါန်းခြင်းအပေါ် မြန်မာပြည်သူလူထုကိုယ်စား အထူးကျေးဇူးတင်ကြောင်း ပြောကြားလိုပါသည်။ UK အနေဖြင့် G7 ၏ ဥဣဌ (Presidency )မှတဆင့် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံရှိ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီအား ထိရောက်ပြီး ပြင်းထန်သည့် နိုင်ငံတကာတုံ့ပြန်မှုများတွင် ခေါင်းဆောင်မှုပေးသည့်အတွက် အလွန်ကျေးဇူးတင်ပါသည်။ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၏ အခြေအနေနှင့် ပတ်သက်ပြီး မြန်မာ့သမိုင်းတွင် ပထမဆုံးအကြိမ်အဖြစ် UN Security Council က ဆုံးဖြတ်ချက်ချမှတ်ရာတွင် ဦးဆောင်ကူညီပေးသည့်အတွက် ကျေးဇူးတင်ပါသည်။ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံရှိ လူသတ်အကြမ်းဖက် စစ်ကောင်စီများထံ စစ်လက်နက်စီးဆင်းမှုများကို ကာကွယ်ဖြတ်တောက်နိုင်ရန်အတွက် ကမ္ဘာလုံးဆိုင်ရာ နိုင်ငံများကို စုစည်းနိုင်ခြင်းအတွက် UK ကိုအထူးကျေးဇူးတင်ပါသည်။ လူမျိုးတုံးသတ်ဖြတ်သည့် စစ်တပ်အပေါ် လက်နက်ရောင်းချမှုနှင့် ပတ်သက်ပြီး ရှုတ်ချသည့် အကြောင်းကို ကမ္ဘာ့နိုင်ငံပေါင်း (၄၇)နိုင်ငံမှ ထိရောက်သော ထုတ်ပြန်ကြေညာချက်ထုတ်နိုင်ခြင်း၊ UN Human Rights Council နှင့် UN General Assembly တို့တွင် မြန်မာအပေါ်ရပ်တည်ချက် ခိုင်ခိုင်မာမာ ပြသခြင်းကြောင့် ကျေးဇူးတင်ပါသည်။ လူမျိုးတုံးသတ်ဖြတ်သည့် စစ်တပ်ကို စစ်လက်နက်များ ပံ့ပို့းပေးသည့် စစ်တပ်ပိုင် ကုမ္မဏီများ၊ စီးပွားရေးလုပ်ငန်းများအပါအဝင် စစ်တပ်နှင့် ဆက်စပ်သည့် စီးပွားရေးလုပ်ငန်းများအားလုံး၏ ငွေကြေးစီးဆင်းမှု ဖြတ်တောက်ခြင်းနှင့် စစ်ခေါင်းဆောင်များအား ဒဏ်ခတ်အရေးယူပိတ်ဆို့ခြင်းအတွက် ကျေးဇူးတင်ပါသည်။
သို့သော် ဤဒဏ်ခတ်ပိတ်ဆို့မှုများသည် မလုံလောက်သေးကြောင်း ဝမ်းနည်းစွာဖြင့် တွေ့ရှိရပါသည်။ အဘယ်ကြောင့်ဆိုသော် မြန်မာစစ်အာဏာရှင်များ၏ ကွန်ယက် (Network) များသည် ကြီးမားကျယ်ပြန့်လှပြီး သူတို့သည် ဒဏ်ခတ်ပိတ်ဆို့ခြင်းနှင့် ကန့်သတ်ခြင်းများကို မသမာသောနည်းလမ်းများဖြင့် ရှောင်ရှားမည်ကို ကျွန်တော်တို့သိပါသည်။ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ခေါင်းဆောင်များ၏ မဟာမိတ်များသည် သူတို့ကို ဆက်လက်ကူညီနေပြီး အကြမ်းဖက်ခြင်းများ ပိုမိုပြင်းထန်လာအောင် စစ်ခေါင်းဆောင်များကို လက်နက်များထောက်ပံ့ခြင်း၊ အကူအညီပေးခြင်းများ ပြုလုပ်နေသဖြင့် သူတို့နှင့် သူတို့၏ မဟာမိတ်များသည် ပိုမိုဆိုးရွားသော အာဏာရှင်စနစ်အသစ်ကို ဖော်ဆောင်ရန်ကြိုးစားနေပါသည်။ သို့သော် သူတို့ကျရှုံးသွားပါလိမ့်မည်။ အောင်မြင်ခြင်းသည် ရဲရင့်သတ္တိရှိသော မြန်မာပြည်သူလူထုနှင့် အတူရှိသည်။ မြန်မာပြည်သူလူထု (၅၄)သန်းကျော်၏ အနာဂတ်သည် မြန်မာပြည်သူလူထု၏ လက်ထဲ၌သာရှိသည်။ သို့သော် လက်ရှိတွင် ပြည်သူတို့၏ ကံကြမ္မာသည် အကျပ်အတည်း တစ်ခုကြားတွင် ကျရောက်နေပါသည်။ အကယ်၍ အရေးတော်ပုံကြီးသည် ခရီးအဆုံးအထိမရောက်ပဲ လမ်းခုလတ် ခရီးတစ်ဝက်အထိသာဖြစ်ခဲ့လျှင် မြန်မာပြည်သူလူထုကြီးသည် သူတို့၏ နေအိမ်၊ ရပ်ရွာ၊ မြို့ များထဲတွင်ပင် ရက်စက်ယုတ်မာသော စစ်အာဏာရှင်များ၏ ကျေးကျွန်များ ဖြစ်သွားကြလိမ့်မည်ဖြစ်သည်။ စစ်အာဏာရှင်များသည် နိုင်ငံ၏ ချမ်းသာကြွယ်ဝမှုများကို ခိုးယူသည်မျှမကပဲ နှစ်ပေါင်းများစွာ မြန်မာပြည်သူလူထုကို အတင်းအဓ္ဓမ ကျွန်ပြုပြီး သူတို့၏ ချမ်းသာကြွယ်ဝမှုများကို တည်ဆောက်လာခဲ့ပြီး ယနေ့တွင် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံသည် သူတို့၏ ရှေ့မှောက်မှာ လောင်ကျွမ်းလျှက်ရှိပါသည်။
ထို့ကြောင့် UK နိုင်ငံသည် မြန်မာပြည်သူလူထုကို လိုအပ်သော အကူအညီများပေးရန် များစွာလိုအပ်နေပြီး မြန်မာပြည်သူများ၏ ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီအိပ်မက်ကို ဆက်လက်ရှင်သန်ဖို့ အကောင်အထည်ဖော်ဆောင်ရာတွင် UK နိုင်ငံသည် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံအတွက် အရေးကြီးသော နိုင်ငံဖြစ်သည်။ UK နိုင်ငံသည် ကျွန်တော်တို့ ပြည်သူလူထုအများအပြားအတွက် ယနေ့ခေတ်အတွင်သာမကပဲ နောင်လာနောင်သား ခေတ်အဆက်ဆက်အတွက်ပါ မျှော်လင့်ခြင်း၊ ငြိမ်းချမ်းခြင်း၊ လွတ်လပ်ခြင်းနှင့် ဒီမိုကရေစီကို ကိုယ်စားပြုနေပြီး၊ ပိုမိုကောင်းမွန်သောဘဝနှင့် မျှော်လင့်ခြင်းများစွာကိုပေးသောနိုင်ငံလည်း ဖြစ်ပါသည်။ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အာဏာရှင်များသည် ကျွန်တော်တို့ ပြည်သူလူထုများကို ရာစုနှစ်ပေါင်းများစွာ အကြမ်းဖက်ခြင်း၊ ရက်စက်ယုတ်မာခြင်း၊ လူမျိုးတုံးတိုက်ခိုက်ခြင်း၊ ကျွန်တော်တို့၏ စာပေနှင့် ယဉ်ကျေးမှုအမွေအနှစ်များ၊ ယုံကြည်ခြင်းနှင့် လွတ်လပ်ခွင့်များကို တိုက်ရိုက် တိုက်ခိုက်ခြင်းများကို ရည်ရွယ်ချက်ရှိရှိ ကျူးလွန်ခဲ့ကြပါသည်။ ကျွန်တော်တို့အလိုအပ်ဆုံးသောအချိန်တွင် လက်ကမ်းကူညီဖေးမပေးကြသောနိုင်ငံနှင့် လူထုအားလုံးကို ထာဝရကျေးဇူးတင်ရှိပြီး အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အာဏာရှင်များ၏ အကြမ်းဖက်တိုက်ခိုက်ခြင်း အမျိုးမျိုးမှ အသက်အန္တရာယ် လွတ်မြောက်လာကြသော ဒုက္ခသည်အများအပြားကို နေရာထိုင်ခင်းများ စီစဉ်ပေးပြီး လက်ခံကြည့်ရှုစောင့်ရှောက်ပေးကြသည့်အတွက်ကြောင့်အထူးကျေးဇူးတင်ရှိကြောင်း ပြောကြားလိုပါသည်။ သို့သော် ကျွန်တော်တို့သည် ဒုက္ခသည်ဖြစ်ရန် လုံးဝဆန္ဒမရှိသလို၊ ကျွန်တော်တို့သည် အမိပြည်အမိမြေမှာ တိုက်ခိုက်ခြင်းခံခဲ့ရသည့်အတွက် ဆက်လက်ရှင်သန်၍ မရတော့သည့်အနေအထားကို ရောက်ရှိနေပါသည်။ ကျွန်တော်တို့သည် တည်ငြိမ်အေးချမ်းသောချင်းပြည်၊ ကိုယ့်ကံကြမ္မာကိုယ်ဖန်တီးသော ချင်းပြည်၊ လူ့အခွင့်အရေးနှင့် ပြည့်ဝနေသော ချင်းပြည်ကို ပြန်လည်တည်ဆောက်သွားရန်အတွက် အခိုင်အမာ သံဓိဌာန် ချပြီးဖြစ်ပါသည်။ ယုတ်မာသော စစ်အာဏာရှင်များ၏ အကြမ်းဖက်တိုက်ခိုက်ခြင်းများ၊ ဗုံးကြဲတိုက်ခိုက်ခြင်းများ၊ လူမျိုးတုံးတိုက်ခိုက်ခြင်းများ၊ ဆာလောင်ငတ်မွတ်ခေါင်းပါးခြင်းများအားလုံး မရှိတော့ပဲ ချင်းပြည်သူလူထုများသည် ငြိမ်းချမ်းရေး လေကို လွတ်လပ်စွာ ရှုရှိုက်ပြီး ဖွံံ့ဖြိုးတိုးတက်သောဘဝကို အပြည့်အဝရယူနိုင်သည့် ချင်းပြည်အသစ်ကို ကျွန်တော်တို့ တည်ဆောက်ရန် အခိုင်အမာ သံဓိဌာန်ချပြီး ဖြစ်ပါသည်။ ကျွန်တော်တို့ ရင်ဆိုင်နေရသော အကြမ်းဖက် စစ်အာဏာရှင်များသည် လူမဆန်ခြင်းနှင့် နယ်နိမိတ်စည်း အကန့်အသတ်မရှိသော ရက်စက်ခြင်းများကို ပိုမိုကျူးလွန်လျှက်ရှိပြီး သူတို့ ရှုံးနိမ့်လေလေ သူတို့၏ ရက်စက်ယုတ်မာခြင်းက ပြင်းထန်မြင့်တက်လေဖြစ်သည်ကို တွေ့ရပါသည်။ ထို့ကြောင့် ကျွန်တော်တို့ မြန်မာပြည်သူလူထုကို တရားမျှတမှုရရှိစေရန်နှင့် လူသားချင်းစာနာထောက်ထားမှုများအတွက် အကူအညီပေးနိုင်ရန် UK နိုင်ငံကို မေတ္တာရပ်ခံလိုပါသည်။
UK နိုင်ငံသည် အနောက်နိုင်ငံတွင် ဦးဆောင်သော အင်အားကြီးနိုင်ငံ တစ်နိုင်ငံဖြစ်သည်သာမကပဲ EU ၊ US တို့နှင့် မဟာမိတ်နိုင်ငံဖြစ်ပြီး၊ အပြည်ပြည်ဆိုင်ရာတွင် မရှိမဖြစ် အရေးပါသော နိုင်ငံတစ်နိုင်ငံ၊ G7 အဖွဲ့တွင် ခေါင်းဆောင်နိုင်ငံ၊ UN Security Council ၏ အမြဲတမ်းအဖွဲ့ဝင်နှင့် Penholder နိုင်ငံဖြစ်သည့်အပြင် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံနှင့် သမိုင်းကြောင်းများစွာရှိထားသည့် နိုင်ငံလည်းဖြစ်နေသောကြောင့် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံအရေးကို ပူးပေါင်းဆောင်ရွက် ကူညီဖြေရှင်းရာတွင် အရေးကြီးသောနိုင်ငံ ဖြစ်နေပါသည်။ ဤမြန်မာ့နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေးသည် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၏ အနာဂတ်တစ်ခုတည်းအတွက် သာမဟုတ်ပါ။ ဤတော်လှန်ရေးကြီးသည် အရှေ့တောင်အာရှဒေသ (South East Asia) တစ်ဝန်းလုံးမှာ ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီနှင့် လူ့အခွင့်အရေးများကို တိုက်ရိုက်တိုက်ခိုက် ဖျက်ဆီးနေသည့် ရက်စက်ယုတ်မာသော စစ်အာဏာရှင်များအားလုံးကို တော်လှန်နေသည့် အရေးတော်ပုံကြီးလည်း ဖြစ်ပါသည်။ ထို့ကြောင့် အာရှတိုက်အတွင်း အာဏာရှင်များသည် မြန်မာ့နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေးကို အနှောက်အယှက်ပေးသော အာဏာရှင်များဖြစ်နေပြီး မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ ဒီမိုကရေစီရရှိခြင်းသည် သူတို့အတွက် နစ်နာခြင်းဖြစ်မည်ကို ကြောက်ရွံ့နေကြပါသည်။ ထို့ကြောင့် ပြည်သူ့တော်လှန်ရေးကို ဖြိုခွဲပြီး ဒီမိုကရေစီ လှုပ်ရှားမှုဟူသမျှကို ရက်ရက်စက်စက် တိုက်ခိုက်နေကြပါသည်။ အာရှတိုက်၏မျက်လုံးများနှင့် ကမ္ဘာ၏မျက်လုံးများသည် လွတ်လပ်ရေး၊ ဒီမိုကရေစီနှင့် ရက်စက်သော အာဏာရှင်စနစ်အကြား တိုက်ပွဲအပေါ်ကျရောက်နေပြီး ဤတော်လှန်ရေးကြီး၏ရလဒ်သည် အာရှတိုက်အပြင် တစ်ကမ္ဘာလုံးအတွက် ဒီမိုကရေစီအရေးနှင့် ပတ်သက်လာလျှင် အရေးကြီးလာမည်ဖြစ်သည်။ အာဏာရှင်စနစ်သည် ဆိုးရွားလှသော ကင်ဆာရောဂါနှင့် တူနေပြီး UK နိုင်ငံသည် ဒီမိုကရေစီအရေးနှင့် ပတ်သက်လာလျှင် ၎င်းကင်ဆာရောဂါ မပျံ့နှံ့ရလေအောင် ထိန်းချုပ်တားဆီးပေးသော နိုင်ငံများအနက် အရေးကြီးသော နိုင်ငံတစ်နိုင်ငံ ဖြစ်ပါသည်။
မြန်မာနိုင်ငံအပေါ် ASEAN သဘောတူညီချက် (၅)ချက်ကို မြန်မာ့မြေပြင်ပေါ်မှာ အမြန်ဆုံးအကောင်အထည်ဖော်ရန် အရေးကြီးနေပြီး UK နိုင်ငံအနေဖြင့် ASEAN ၏အချက်(၅)ချက်နှင့် UN Security Council ၏ ဆုံးဖြတ်ချက် (၁၀)ချက်ကို အမြန်ဆုံးအကောင်အထည်ဖော်နိုင်ရန်အတွက် လုပ်ဆောင်ပေးစေလိုပါသည်။ UK နိုင်ငံ၏ Universal Juridiction ဥပဒေအရ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ခေါင်းဆောင်များကို တရားစွဲပြီး သူတို့ကျူးလွန်ထားသော လူ့အခွင့်အရေးချိုးဖောက်ခြင်း အများအပြား၊ လူမျိုးတုံးသတ်ဖြတ်ခြင်းနှင့် စစ်ရာဇဝတ်မှုများ အားလုံးအတွက် ဥပဒေအရ အရေးယူပေးပြီး မြန်မာပြည်သူများ တရားမျှတမှုရရှိစေရေးကိုလည်း ပူးပေါင်းဆောင်ရွက်ပေးနိုင်ရန် မေတ္တာရပ်ခံလိုပါသည်။ အရေးကြီးဆုံးမှာ UK နိုင်ငံအနေဖြင့် NUG၊ NUCC ၊ CRPH တို့ကို မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၏ တရားဝင်ကိုယ်စားပြု အစိုးရအဖွဲ့အစည်းများအဖြစ် အသိအမှတ်ပြုပေးသည်သာမက မြန်မာနိုင်ငံနှင့်ပတ်သက်လာလျှင် ကျွန်တော်တို့နှင့် တရားဝင် ပူးပေါင်းပြီး ဆောင်ရွက်ပေးနိုင်ရန်လည်း မေတ္တာရပ်ခံလိုပါသည်။ UK နိုင်ငံအနေဖြင့် ဤကဲ့သို့ NUG၊ NUCC၊ CRPH တို့ကို တရားဝင် အသိအမှတ်ပြုခြင်းအားဖြင့် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ခေါင်းဆောင်များကို အသိအမှတ်မပြုခြင်း၊ မပေါင်းသင်းမဆက်ဆံခြင်း၊ မပူးပေါင်းခြင်းနှင့် သူတို့၏တရားမဝင်ခြင်းကို ထုတ်ဖော်ပြသခြင်းလည်းဖြစ်ပါသည်။
UK ပြည်သူ အများအပြားသည် မြန်မာပြည်သူများ ရင်ဆိုင်နေရသော အကျပ်အတည်းကြီး အပေါ်မှာ စိတ်ပူပေးသည့်အတွက်လည်း အထူးကျေးဇူးတင်ရှိကြောင်း ဖော်ပြလိုပါသည်။ UK နိုင်ငံသည် ဒုက္ခရောက်နေသော နိုင်ငံခြားပြည်သူများသို့ အကူအညီပေးရေးနှင့် လိုအပ်ချက်များကို Advocacy လုပ်ပေးပြီး လူသားချင်းစာနာထောက်ထားရေး၊ လူနေမှုဖွံ့ဖြိုးတိုးတက်ရေးနှင့် နိုင်ငံရေးအရ လွတ်မြောက်ရေးကို ကူညီပံ့ပိုးပေးလေ့ရှိသည့် သမိုင်းရှိသည်ကို ကျွန်တော်တို့ ခွန်အားယူမိပါသည်။ တနေ့ကျလျှင် ကျွန်တော်တို့၏မြန်မာနိုင်ငံသည်လည်း UK နိုင်ငံကဲ့သို့ ငြိမ်းချမ်းရေးကိုတွေ့မြင်လာပြီး ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီကပေးသော လွတ်လပ်ခြင်းအခွင့်အရေးကို အပြည့်အဝ ခံစားနိုင်ကြလိမ့်မည်ဟု အမြဲတမ်းဆုမွန်ကောင်းတောင်းပြီး မျှော်လင့်နေမိပါသည်။ UK ပြည်သူအများအပြား၏စိတ်ထဲတွင် ဤအိပ်မက်နှင့် မျှော်လင့်ခြင်းများသည် ရှင်သန်နေပြီး ဤအိပ်မက်နှင့် မျှော်လင့်ခြင်းများကို မြန်မာ့မြေပြင်ပေါ်မှာ အမှန်တကယ် ဖြစ်လာနိုင်စေဖို့ရန်အတွက် UK နိုင်ငံအနေဖြင့် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံကို တတ်နိုင်သော အကူအညီဟူသမျှ ပေးလာလိမ့်မည်ဟု မျှော်လင့်တောင့်တရင်း နိဂုံးချုပ်အပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of International Cooperation Myanmar
Date of publication:
2023-02-25
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-25
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Chin (Zo)- economic, social, cultural, political
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Format :
pdf
Size:
1.39 MB
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Description:
"ABSTRACT
Evidence is scarce on how conflict affects technology adoption and consequent agricultural productivity in fragile states, an important topic given the high share of the extreme poor living in fragile environments globally. Our study contributes to filling this knowledge gap by using unique large-scale data on rice producers in Myanmar before and after a military coup in 2021, leading to a surge of conflicts in the country. We find that the increase in violent events significantly changed rice productivity. Specifically, increases in fatal violent events between 2020 and 2021 reduced rice Total Factor Productivity (TFP) – a measure of how efficiently agricultural inputs are used to produce rice – by about 4 percent on average in the short-run. Moreover, poorer farmers are more affected by conflict, as seen through an increased output elasticity to agricultural equipment owned, indicating reduced output resilience for less-capital owning, and therefore poorer, farmers. This seems partly due to reduced access to agricultural extension services, which would otherwise help farmers maintain productivity, even with limited capital ownership, through substitution with human capital and skills. Lower mechanization service fees partly mitigate these effects. Our results consistently hold for both short- and long-run production functions, across various specifications, and in Upper and Lower Myanmar. These findings suggest that containing and reducing violent events is critical in restoring rice productivity. Improved access to extension services, as well as to cheap mechanization service provision to mitigate lack of equipment ownership, could compensate for these losses and boost the productivity of farmers, especially for those with less production capital, in such fragile settings..."
Source/publisher:
International Food Policy Research Institute (Washington, D.C.) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of publication:
2023-02-24
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-24
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Agriculture in Burma/Myanmar: general and research, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Armed conflict in Burma - attacks on civilians, Sustainable agriculture - Burma/Myanmar
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Format :
pdf
Size:
1.56 MB
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Sub-title:
Western sanctions should be welcomed but the country’s opposition must do more.
Description:
"Ever since the West turned on the military taps and flooded Ukraine with weapons capable of stopping the Russian advance, the backers of Myanmar’s ousted government have asked: “what about us?” It’s an understandable question.
The National Unity Government (NUG) and its armed wing, the People’s Defense Force (PDF), are in dire need of weaponry as they push the civil war from the jungles into junta-held provincial zones where the military responds with Russian-made fighter jets and artillery.
But the Western response has been limited to sanctions.
The latest sanctions just announced by the European Union include travel bans on 16 individuals and entities, including the junta’s energy minister, high-ranking officers, the ministry of defense and private companies thought to be supplying fuel, arms, and funds to the military.
A number of sources who have advised the PDF on strategy, the NUG on policies and sought military help from the West, including Washington D.C., say perennial issues remain.
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“I have spoken with Congressmen who want to provide military aid but they don’t know who to deal with. The NUG and PDF have no public face. There is no leader that people can rally around, there’s no central point,” said one ASEAN politician who recently returned from the United States.
Unlike Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, few would recognize the leader and acting president of the NUG, Duwa Lashi La, and that’s more than two years after the Myanmar military – also known as the Tatmadaw – ousted an elected government headed by Aung San Suu Kyi.
Observers close to Lashi La, who does not speak English, say he lacks charisma and is reluctant to fill the shoes of Aung San Suu Kyi, who is languishing behind bars, because of old loyalties and his sense of hierarchy.
Aung San Suu Kyi is deservedly recognized by the United Nations as the legitimate leader of Myanmar, despite her fall from grace over her backing of the military during the slaughter of the Rohingya in 2017.
Her ability to carry an audience was formidable and her cult of personality well documented, but her days as Myanmar’s savior are over. There’s just not that much she can do.
Meanwhile, those around Duwa Lashi La have proved barely competent when dealing with journalists outside their comfort zone. Disunity remains a persistent issue among the official 135 major ethnic groups and seven ethnic minority states that contribute to opposition forces.
Latest estimates say the PDF has more than 65,000 troops serving in more than 250 units but there is no single command structure and it would be impossible for each ethnic group to negotiate military aid with countries like the U.S. on their own.
According to the Human Rights Foundation of Monland, a local NGO, much of the latest fighting has taken place in Karen and Mon state and in Tanintharyi Region, which border Thailand. It says the people in Karen State have been harshly impacted, which along with Mon State and the Tanintharyi Region, are being relentlessly and indiscriminately attacked by the junta.
“Destruction of property, including the burning of villages, is ongoing,” it said.
“Thousands more are being forced to flee their homes daily as military impunity and a lack of international action only encourage the junta to commit more atrocity crimes.”
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Thus the NUG leadership desperately needs to step up or move on, more so with Indonesia taking the helm of ASEAN for 2023. It has opened up the prospect of direct negotiations with the NUG, and hopefully, put an end to the dithering and silly political theatrics of the last two years.
The shift in direction matters with the military looking to shore up its legitimacy through rigged, stage-managed elections, which the U.N. special rapporteur for Myanmar, Tom Andrews, has already described as fake because “these are not the conditions for a free and fair election.”
“These are conditions for a fraud that is going to be attempted to be perpetrated against the people of Myanmar,” he quite rightly said. Hence, the NUG needs to get its political act together..."
Source/publisher:
"The Diplomat" (Japan)
Date of publication:
2023-02-24
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-24
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, National Unity Government (NUG), Sanctions, Business and the Military
Language:
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Sub-title:
Prime Minister Should Fulfill Pledge by Stopping Payments, Imposing Sanctions
Description:
"During a televised parliamentary budget session on Wednesday, February 22, Japan’s Prime Minister Fumio Kishida said his government will “appropriately handle” a development aid project in Myanmar that is benefiting the country’s abusive military. Yoshimasa Hayashi, the Japanese foreign minister, echoed the prime minister’s public pledge to take appropriate action.
The leaders’ comments came in response to questions from an opposition politician about Japan’s Bago River Bridge Construction Project, being built partly by Japanese construction giant Yokogawa Bridge Corp. In March 2021, Myanmar Now reported that a steel mill owned by the military-owned conglomerate Myanmar Economic Corporation (MEC) was supplying steel for the project and “profiting enormously.” Financial transactions analyzed by Human Rights Watch show that from July 2022 to January 2023, Yokogawa Bridge Corp. transferred around US$2 million to MEC for the project, with United States government approval.
MEC generates vast revenue through businesses in sectors including manufacturing, mining, and telecommunications, according to a 2019 report by the United Nations-backed Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar. The US, United Kingdom, European Union, Canada, and Australia have sanctioned MEC and Myanmar’s other military conglomerate, Myanmar Economic Holdings Limited, for their role in generating significant revenues that help fund military abuses.
Since the February 2021 military coup, Myanmar’s military has been responsible for widespread and systematic human rights abuses, including extrajudicial killings, torture, and indiscriminate attacks on civilians that amount to crimes against humanity and war crimes.
Prior to the coup, Myanmar’s security forces committed crimes against humanity and genocidal acts against the Rohingya Muslim minority in Rakhine State, forcing thousands to flee to Bangladesh, where about 900,000 Rohingya are currently living in overcrowded camps. An estimated 600,000 Rohingya remain in Rakhine State, where they are subject to persecution and violence, confined to camps and villages without freedom of movement, and cut off from access to adequate food, health care, education, and livelihoods.
If Japan’s prime minister and foreign minister are serious about “swiftly restor[ing] Myanmar’s democratic political system,” they should fulfill their own pledge and take concrete action. This means stopping payments to MEC, suspending all non-humanitarian aid to Myanmar, and imposing targeted economic sanctions on military leaders and military-owned conglomerates..."
Source/publisher:
Human Rights Watch (USA)
Date of publication:
2023-02-24
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-24
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Sanctions, Business and the Military, The Burmese military's role in the economy
Language:
more
Sub-title:
With the junta in a weaker position, China recalibrates its approach with an eye to expanding its influence in Myanmar.
Description:
"Since late 2022, Beijing has increasingly signaled the limits of its support for Myanmar’s junta against pro-democracy forces and protection against international efforts to hold the army accountable for its crimes. In particular, Beijing has demonstrated a reluctance when doing the junta’s bidding internationally results in significant political costs vis-à-vis its relations with Southeast Asian states or its reputation at the United Nations.
As global pressure on Myanmar’s generals grows, Beijing is particularly sensitive to signals that Western support for Myanmar’s powerful Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) or People’s Defense Forces (PDFs) that are fighting the military may increase. To the extent that the Chinese government senses that such support is on the rise, it will become much more assertive in leveraging its strategic relationships with both the military and the most powerful of the EAOs, which operate on the border in the immediate orbit of China’s influence, to shape the overall trajectory of the conflict.
Rather than seeking to back the military against all odds, Beijing aims to strengthen support for both the military and the most powerful of the EAOs, thereby dramatically increasing Chinese influence in Myanmar. This approach challenges the ability of pro-democracy forces to forge powerful coalitions that might threaten the traditional status quo between the military and the EAOs, because it pushes northern EAOs to distance themselves from what is perceived by Beijing as a Western-backed pro-democracy resistance.
As the United States considers options for implementing the provisions of the recently passed Burma Act, a top priority should be support to inclusive coalitions between the EAOs and the National Unity Government (NUG), the parallel government formed by democratically elected lawmakers. Assistance under the act should carefully consider possible impacts on and prospects for such alliances.
China’s Meandering Response to the Coup
In the immediate aftermath of the February 1, 2021 military coup led by Min Aung Hlaing, China initially took a wait and see approach, seemingly not wanting to burn bridges with either the military or the National League for Democracy (NLD) party, which it had committed to partner with in implementing billions of dollars of strategic infrastructure projects as part of the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor. While Chinese state media parroted the Myanmar army’s propaganda, referring to the coup as a “cabinet reshuffle,” China also sent public signals of the importance of its relationship with the NLD.
Popular concern that China actively supported the military’s crackdown on protesters in the weeks following the coup triggered a rise in anti-China sentiment. Anxiety increased in Beijing after a series of attacks on Chinese business interests culminated in threats that “China’s gas pipelines will be burned.” China responded by increasing pressure on the military, EAOs and the NUG to ensure that all would actively play a role in defending Chinese strategic economic interests in Myanmar. While all these parties responded favorably to Beijing’s request, the military’s propaganda apparatus played to fears in Beijing that pro-democracy resistance forces were directly targeting China’s strategic interests in the country. These interests include a multibillion-dollar oil and gas pipeline that represents the only source of piped natural gas to China’s southwestern provinces, and which accounts for over 10 percent of the gross domestic product of Yunnan Province.
By June 2021, Beijing’s posture had shifted significantly in favor of the junta, with the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs hosting the junta’s top international affairs representative, Wunna Maung Lwin. The Chinese Communist Party had a final public interaction with the NLD in September of that same year. It subsequently ceased inviting the NLD to its international political party engagements. From October 2021 until July 2022, the Chinese government gradually scaled up its relations with the junta, culminating in Beijing cohosting the foreign ministers’ meeting of the Chinese-led Lancang-Mekong Cooperation (LMC) Forum in Myanmar. With Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) once again initiating new business with the junta, Chinese State Councilor Wang Yi announced to the foreign ministers of the LMC countries — Laos, Cambodia, Thailand and Vietnam — that China would partner with Min Aung Hlaing’s regime to host an LMC summit before the end of 2022.
Beijing’s warming ties with Myanmar’s genocidal generals contrasted sharply with the growing calls within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to forge direct ties with the NUG, and to limit high-level interactions with Myanmar’s army. Beijing drew strong criticism from key ASEAN countries, which were concerned that China’s convening of high-level LMC meetings would undermine ASEAN unity and hamper efforts of the body to find a solution to the crisis. Faced with the choice of either upsetting its relationship with ASEAN or disappointing the junta, in late 2022, Beijing opted for the latter. Beijing scrapped plans for an LMC summit in Myanmar, and greater tensions emerged between Min Aung Hlaing and Beijing as it became clear that the military’s poor performance on the battlefield and the unstable business environment would preclude progress on China’s coveted infrastructure connectivity projects.
While the Chinese government had continuously pressured the seven powerful Myanmar EAOs located in northern Shan and Kachin states to negotiate with the military, these EAOs increasingly found themselves facing a weak and incompetent adversary on the battlefield, enabling them to make significant progress recovering territories lost over the two decades before the coup.
In other cases, EAOs such as the United Wa State Army (UWSA) leveraged the chaos to begin a generational change in leadership while also supporting their allies to defeat rival militias to the south of Shan state. These dynamics functioned to further weaken the military, but also served China’s interests insofar as the northern EAOs extend Chinese influence deeper into Myanmar while pushing the frontlines of the fighting further from the Chinese border. By October 2022, a desperate military began deploying its air power to attack key positions held by three of these EAOs: the Myanmar Democratic Alliance Army, the Ta’ang National Liberation Army and the Kachin Independence Army. These attacks failed from both a military and a political standpoint, as the EAOs launched successful counterattacks, giving China a clear picture of the military’s weakness while threating stability on China’s border.
Who Is Interfering in Myanmar?
In December 2022, as tensions between China and Myanmar’s military persisted, two key international developments altered Beijing’s calculations. First was the introduction of a United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution — something which Beijing has traditionally been hostile toward. Yet with global frustrations rising vis-à-vis the junta’s blatant human rights violations and growing security threats triggered by the rising influence of transnational crime groups in Myanmar, China faced a difficult decision over whether to block the resolution. For the first time since China was seated at the UNSC in 1971, it opted to water down rather than veto the resolution on Myanmar.
A second development was the U.S. passage of the Burma Act as part of the National Defense Authorization Act in late December 2022. Particularly significant to the act was the incorporation of language indicating a U.S. intention to provide non-lethal support to both EAOs and PDFs. Myanmar’s junta responded to these developments by condemning the international community’s move and by renewing efforts to court favor with Beijing. This included pledging renewed political support to China on issues such as the South China Sea and Taiwan, as well as launching disinformation campaigns claiming Western-backed PDFs were increasingly perpetrating “terrorist attacks” across Myanmar.
With the weakened junta in an increasingly deferential position, China has once again recalibrated its approach. In late December 2022, China swiftly deployed a new Asian affairs special envoy to Myanmar, Deng Xijun. While Beijing has maintained an envoy since 2013, its most recent envoy, Sun Guoxiang, had been quietly retired in the summer of 2022, with Beijing communicating to the diplomatic community that it would take time for a new appointment to be made. Several nuances around China’s deployment of this new envoy signaled a different direction: 1) no official announcements of the envoy’s appointment were made, 2) the envoy met with the powerful northern EAOs before meeting with the military, and 3) the envoy has pressured the northern EAOs to negotiate with the military and to refuse assistance from the West.
The moves of the new Chinese envoy shine a light on Beijing’s preferred approach to addressing the conflict: pushing for the military and the northern EAOs to forge an agreement that would dramatically increase the autonomy and influence of these groups across the Chinese borderlands in exchange for their support for the military’s efforts to limit the growing power and influence of PDFs and NUG-aligned EAOs, and its moves to organize a sham election. Meanwhile, the evolving position of China’s closest ally in Myanmar, the UWSA, maximizes pressure on the military to accept this deal. In mid-February 2023, at a key UWSA political meeting, the UWSA announced that they would maintain ties with both the military and the NUG, which they see as a “second Myanmar government.”
Chinese SOEs, the Yunnan Provincial Government and Shady Business Networks
With Beijing increasingly leveraging parallel relationships with the most powerful of Myanmar’s EAOs and the military to shape the trajectory of the conflict in its favor, three sets of Chinese actors have emerged as critical lifelines to Myanmar’s army.
First are the powerful Chinese SOEs with deep interests in Myanmar and ties to the military that could enable them to reap windfall contracts should the military succeed. The ChinaPower Company, which entered the market during an earlier period of military rule, is one of the few SOEs both implementing ongoing infrastructure projects as well as initiating new projects. These include an ongoing gas-to-energy project in Rakhine state, which has achieved milestones for completion post-coup. Emboldened by this success, ChinaPower has signed a series of new energy deals with the junta, which it has fast-tracked, bringing over 63 megawatts of new power projects online over the past six months. Chinese state media and the Chinese embassy have aggressively promoted these efforts to present narratives in China of a “new normal,” favorable to Chinese SOEs.
Second is the Yunnan Provincial Government, the current leadership of which includes senior officials with deep personal ties to Myanmar’s army, and which is convinced that the army will never cease to be a key political player in Myanmar. Almost immediately after the coup, the Yunnan Provincial Government appointed a key intellectual backer of the China-Myanmar military relationship to lead the Yunnan Department of Commerce. Li Chenyang, who was one of the initial proponents of the China-Myanmar pipeline project, has led a series of initiatives to align the Yunnan Provincial Government behind the military with the objective of finding a way to reset Yunnan’s economy post-COVID-19. In February 2023, Li led a delegation of Yunnan Provincial Government officials and business representatives to Myanmar for the Yunnan-Myanmar Commercial Forum.
Third are the shady business networks, including China-affiliated transnational criminal organizations, which thrive in kleptocratic and highly unstable contexts like Myanmar. These include criminal syndicates involved in trafficking individuals from across the globe into scam centers, where they are forced at gunpoint to engage in fraud. Post-coup, a series of Chinese business promotion agencies sprang to life in Myanmar, including organizations such as the South Asia Future Company, the China Myanmar Economic Cooperation and Development Promotion Association and the World Peace Ribbon Association. All of these organizations seek to extract concessions or gain preferential access to projects by building close ties to the junta and key crony companies. The World Peace Ribbon Association, which has previously played a role in Beijing’s Belt and Road Forum, featured in a December 2022 business exchange with Min Aung Hlaing, during which the association announced the establishment of a new “hub” in Yangon for the promotion of China’s Belt and Road Initiative projects.
Together, these forces all work to influence Beijing in the direction of enhancing its support to Myanmar’s army and play a key role in advancing the cause of the army in Beijing.
A Possible U.S. Response to Beijing’s Growing Influence in Myanmar
Beijing’s overall posture continues to prioritize a status quo that favors the military over pro-democracy forces. While so, cracks have emerged in the alliance between Beijing and the generals. In particular, China’s growing tolerance for EAOs to challenge the military’s positions on the Chinese border demonstrate one way through which Beijing aims to deepen its leverage over the regime. At the same time, Beijing’s moves risk throwing Myanmar deeper into protracted conflict. While China may think it can leverage its relations with the northern EAOs and the military to weaken pro-democracy forces and check Western influence in Myanmar, this threatens to further balkanize the country. It also represents a fundamental misreading of the Burma Act, which aims to recognize the essential role that Myanmar’s myriad EAOs and PDFs must play in order to achieve the foundation necessary for sustainable peace in the future.
As the United States considers options for implementing the Burma Act, a critical need is to enhance assistance to the formation of inclusive coalitions, which can work together to place Myanmar back on a path toward democracy..."
Source/publisher:
United States Institute of Peace
Date of publication:
2023-02-24
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-24
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2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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"၁။ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၊ ကျန်းမာရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာနနှင့် ကြားကာလ ပြည်နယ်/ ဖက်ဒရယ် ယူနစ်များအတွင်းရှိ ဆေးရုံ/ဆေးခန်းများတွင် တာဝန်ထမ်းဆောင်နိုင်ရန် အောက်ဖော်ပြပါ တာဝန်များအတွက် လျှောက်လွှာ တင်သွင်းနိုင်ပါသည်။
(က) ၂၀၂၃ ခုနှစ်၊ ဖေဖော်ဝါရီလ (၂၃) ရက်နေ့မှ မတ်လ (၁၆) ရက်နေ့အတွင်း လျှောက်ထား ရမည့် ရာထူးနေရာများ
၁။ အထူးကုဆရာဝန်များ
၂။ ဆရာဝန်များ
၃။ သွားနှင့်ခံတွင်း အထူးကုဆရာဝန် များ
၄။ သွားနှင့်ခံတွင်း ဆရာဝန်များ
၅။ အထူးကုဘွဲ့လွန်သင်တန်းသားများ
၆။ ဆေးနှင့် ဆေးနှီးနွှယ်ဆိုင်ရာ ဒီပလိုမာဘွဲ့ ရရှိသူများ
၇။ သူနာပြုများ
၈။ ဆေးဘက်ဆိုင်ရာ နည်းပညာ တက္ကသိုလ်များမှ ဒီပလိုမာ/ ဘွဲ့ ရရှိသူများ
၉။ ဆေးဝါးတက္ကသိုလ်များမှ ဘွဲ့ရရှိသူများ
၁၀။ တိုင်းရင်းဆေးပညာရှင်များ
(ခ) ၂၀၂၃ ခုနှစ်၊ မတ်လ (၁၇) ရက်နေ့မှ ဧပြီလ (၇) ရက်နေ့အတွင်း လျှောက်ထားရမည့် ရာထူးနေရာများ
၁။ ကျန်းမာရေးမှူးများ (HA)
၂။ အမျိုးသမီးကျန်းမာရေးဆရာမများ (LHV)
၃။ သားဖွားဆရာမများ (Midwife)
၄။ ပြည်သူ့ကျန်းမာရေးကြီးကြပ်-၁ များ (PHS-1)
၅။ ပြည်သူ့ကျန်းမာရေးကြီးကြပ်-၂ များ (PHS-2)
၂။ လျှောက်ထားသူသည် -
(က) ပြည်ထောင်စုမြန်မာနိုင်ငံဖွား ဖြစ်ရမည်။
(ခ) ကျန်းမာရေးကောင်းမွန်သူ ဖြစ်ရမည်။
(ဂ) နိုင်ငံ့ဝန်ထမ်းဖြစ်ပါက CDM ဝန်ထမ်း ဖြစ်ရမည်။ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီနှင့် ပတ်သက်မှု မရှိသူ ဖြစ်ရမည်။
(ဃ) နိုင်ငံ့ဝန်ထမ်းမဟုတ်ပါက အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီနှင့် ပတ်သက်မှု မရှိသူ ဖြစ်ရမည်။
(င) အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၊ ကျန်းမာရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာနနှင့် ကြားကာလ ပြည်နယ်/ ဖက်ဒရယ်ယူနစ်များက တာဝန်ချထားမည့် နေရာဒေသများသို့ သွားရောက်၍ တာဝန်ထမ်းဆောင်နိုင်သူ ဖြစ်ရမည်။
၃။ လျှောက်ထားလိုသူများအနေဖြင့် “စာပိုဒ် ၁။ (က) နှင့် ၁။ (ခ)” တို့တွင် ပါရှိသည့် ရာထူးနေရာ များအလိုက် သတ်မှတ်ထားသော ရက်များအတွင်း နေ့စဉ် ပိတ်ရက်မရှိ၊ နံနက် (၁၀) နာရီမှ ည (၈) နာရီအထိ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၊ ကျန်းမာရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာန၊ လူ့စွမ်းအားအရင်းအမြစ် ဌာန၏ Telegram Account - https://t.me/HR_MOHNUG သို့မဟုတ် Telegram Username - @HR_MOHNUG တွင် လျှောက်လွှာပုံစံများ ထုတ်ယူ၍ ပေးပို့လျှောက်ထားနိုင်ပါသည်။
၄။ ဝန်ထမ်းစိစစ်ရွေးချယ်ခန့်အပ်ရေးကော်မတီက အတည်ပြုရွေးချယ်ခြင်း ခံရသူများသည် တာဝန်ချထားမည့်နေရာများအတွက် လိုအပ်သည့် သင်တန်းများကို သတ်မှတ်အစီအစဉ်များ အတိုင်း တက်ရောက်ရမည်ဖြစ်ပြီး ဝန်ကြီးဌာနနှင့် ကြားကာလ ပြည်နယ်/ ဖက်ဒရယ်ယူနစ်များ၏ အစီအစဉ်ဖြင့် ဒေသအသီးသီးသို့ တာဝန်ချထားမည်ဖြစ်ပါသည်။
၅။ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၊ ကျန်းမာရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာနနှင့် ကြားကာလ ပြည်နယ်/ ဖက်ဒရယ် ယူနစ်များတွင် တော်လှန်ရေးကာလနှင့် ကြားကာလ ကျန်းမာရေးစောင့်ရှောက်မှုလုပ်ငန်းများ၌ ပါဝင်ဆောင်ရွက်လျက်ရှိသည့် ကျန်းမာရေးသူရဲကောင်းများအတွက် လက်ရှိကာလအတွင်း လူမှုဘဝလုံခြုံမှုနှင့် လုပ်ငန်းခွင်လုံခြုံမှုများကို ကာကွယ်စောင့်ရှောက်မှုများ ပေးအပ်နိုင်ရန် အစီအစဉ်များ ချမှတ်ထားရှိပြီး တော်လှန်ရေးအလွန်ကာလတွင်လည်း ဘဝအာမခံချက်များနှင့် အထူးအခွင့်အရေးများကို ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီမူဝါဒများနှင့်အညီ ပေးအပ်သွားမည်ဖြစ်ပါသည်။
၆။ ဝန်ကြီးဌာနသည် CDM လှုပ်ရှားမှုတွင် ပါဝင်ဆောင်ရွက်နေသည့် ကျန်းမာရေးအင်အားစုများနှင့် တော်လှန်ရေးကာလအတွင်း အခက်အခဲအမျိုးမျိုးကြား၌ ကျန်းမာရေးစောင့်ရှောက်မှုပေးနေသူ ကျန်းမာရေးသူရဲကောင်းများအားလုံးကို အထူးအသိအမှတ်ပြု၊ ဂုဏ်ပြုမှတ်တမ်းတင်အပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Health - National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2023-02-23
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-23
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"The military coup of 2021 did more than just destroy Myanmar’s political system. The damage it has wrought extends to every sector, not least the education system. The sector has suffered dire consequences, with 80 percent of Myanmar’s nearly 10 million students rejecting the regime’s education system, according to the Education Ministry of the parallel National Unity Government (NUG).
The takeover came as a particularly devastating blow for one group: Students who passed the matriculation exam in 2020 and refused to study under the regime’s education system lost their opportunity to continue their education. For the striking students, Myanmar Nway-Oo University, a public university, was established in October 2022 under the guidelines of the NUG to provide undergraduate and postgraduate courses as well as vocational courses for striking students. It has an affiliation with Interim University Councils (IUCs), which were founded by striking students and teachers across the country.
Dr. Sai Khaing Myo Tun, the NUG’s deputy minister of education, talked to The Irrawaddy about the shadow government’s plans to meet the education needs of Myanmar’s striking students. He also delineated the promising future of a new education system under a federal democracy and other education policies that will benefit Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) students, resistance forces and disabled persons after the revolution.
What are the Ministry of Education (MOE)’s priorities for filling the education gap for striking students?
We implemented the online education system as the first stage because of the regime’s atrocities on the ground. Initially, we organized and gathered teachers and academic staff for basic education. We urged them to form township education boards and now we have 300 across the country. For higher education, we have 246 Interim University Councils (IUCs) under our authority.
The major change is that the MOE gives autonomy to all academic institutions. This is also part of our policy. All schools have their own administration and management rights. From our side, we provide an up-to-date curriculum and amend it in line with the values of federal democracy. Now, we have 70 online federal schools operating under the MOE’s guidelines across the country.
In addition, we have also set a policy that allows students to pursue education in accordance with their age.
Most important, the MOE has drafted a Federal Democracy Education Policy with the help of experts and the draft policy has already been approved by the NUG. We are now discussing it with the Education Committee of the National Unity Consecutive Council (NUCC). We are also seeking different opinions and voices from ethnic associations, educational institutions and religious organizations. This policy will be out in the near future.
What changes will the Federal Democracy Education Policy bring?
Myanmar’s education was a centralized system in the past. Under a federal democracy’s education system, each school in every state and region will have the authority to implement its own education system.
Ethnic people will have the right to learn in their mother tongue and their own curriculum. There will be more freedom in the education system as it is decentralized.
What challenges does the MOE face in implementing the Federal Democracy Education Policy?
The first challenge is the issue of teacher safety. Secondly, we face a budget shortage as we are an interim government. So, we cannot provide monthly financial support to teachers, but we are trying to find ways to solve this problem. We are seeking help from the international community. The next challenge is that teachers should have a deep understanding of federal democracy, as they will experience changes in the education system.
Is there any possibility of implementing the Federal Democracy Education Policy throughout the country?
There will be some difficulties in regions under the control of the military regime. However, we will implement the education system of a federal democracy in the regions under the control of the NUG, resistance forces and EAOs [ethnic armed organizations]. On the other hand, we don’t see any problem with that because online schools are spreading across the country. So, students will see the gap between the values of our education system and those of the regime’s education. We have already made a good start.
Will Myanmar Nway Oo University (MNOU) and its affiliated IUCs offer degrees ?
Certificates of Completion will be issued to students who finish the formal course by MNOU and the IUCs. The NUG will issue a degree certificate if all parties such as student unions and teacher unions taking part in the revolution agree to it.
Meanwhile, all parties agree to celebrate the convocation on the same day after the revolution.
How will the MOE ensure the credibility of certification issued by public universities and Interim University Councils for students who want to continue their academic journey abroad?
The authority to issue completion certificates rests with the public universities and IUCs. There might be some difficulties for students who don’t have their previous education records on hand. If necessary, the MOE is willing to provide letters of recommendation for students looking to further their studies abroad. We also have a department to deal with international affairs. The good news is that the European Union and the US will help the NUG and resistance forces. We are making connections with them and we are going to negotiate this issue. We’ve already offered courses taught by foreign professors from international universities. I don’t mean to suggest there won’t be difficulties, but all parties will figure this issue out and reach a consensus. We will make it better in order to create more education opportunities for students.
How will the NUG help IUCs that are not able to implement courses?
The NUG has a Board of Education that is responsible for developing curriculums and lessons for students. We can share this teaching content with them. MNOU is also using these lessons. If ICUs cannot implement this on their own, we can form a coalition of universities, the way Kachin State Comprehensive University does. Besides, there are also NUG-accredited private universities, like Spring University Myanmar. We are still in the stage of preparation and we are going step by step.
What are the plans of the NUG to provide education for resistance forces after the revolution?
The MOE has a plan to implement a bridge program for students who cannot access education during the revolution. We will provide an interim program for different students after the revolution. For students who joined the resistance forces, we will allow them to study at a defense university if they want to do so. We will also send them to foreign defense universities. If they want to study abroad, we will organize it for them. Or if they want to enter the workforce, we will provide vocational training for them. Next, we also have a plan to provide education for disabled persons who lost limbs [or other faculties] during the revolution or prior to the coup. The allocation of government expenditures for education may increase to 20 percent after the revolution. It will take time to reach a consensus because we are following democratic principles. On the one hand, there are losses because of the revolution, but on the other hand, we are developing the ability to make changes and build the future..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2023-02-23
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-23
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Anti-coup protesters
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"The Dawei Democracy Movement Strike Committee called on people to boycott Thai energy giant PTT in Launglon Township, Tanintharyi Region, on Wednesday.
The committee said the boycott was a “fight without arms” as PTT Exploration and Production (PTTEP) and the Petroleum Authority of Thailand (PTT) were helping to fund Myanmar’s junta.
It said PTT and PTTEP are working at Yadana, Yetagun, Zawtika and Shwe offshore gas fields with huge investments, giving large sums to the regime.
“The junta is using this money to buy arms and fuel jet fighters and helicopters. It is murdering people every day with this income so we need to boycott its operations,” said a committee member.
PTT pays the junta over US$500 million a year through its projects with the Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprises in three of the country’s four major gas fields, according to Human Rights Watch (HRW).
HRW reported that the company paid $125 million in taxes in 2019 to the junta’s Ministry of Planning, Finance, and Industry, whose minister Win Shein was recently sanctioned by the US.
In March 2022, PTTEP confirmed that it will be taking over from TotalEngergies’ operation of the Yadana gas field after the French major abandoned the project in protest at junta atrocities.
Energy groups, including TotalEnergies, Chevron and Woodside, all announced their retreat from operations in Myanmar in January last year amid pressure from humanitarian groups.
“We explained about the flow of millions of dollars into the hands of the junta so we have organized the people to join the boycott of PTTEP and all its products, including PTT lubricants,” said a strike committee member.
The committee said it will continue the boycott until blood money stops flowing to the junta..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2023-02-22
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-22
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Burma's economic relations with Thailand
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Sub-title:
Radar technology, automatic rifles and air defense systems sold to junta despite human rights abuses
Description:
"India, the world’s largest democracy, has nurtured closer relations with Myanmar’s military junta over the past two years, including providing weapons at least four times since the 2021 coup d'etat, two humanitarian and advocacy organizations in India said.
The Indian government and Indian companies sold radar technologies and remote control air defense systems to Myanmar’s military government in 2021, said India for Myanmar, which helps refugees from the war-torn country who have fled to neighboring India.
Last year, heavy artillery weapons, detonators for bombs and thermal imaging devices used with automatic rifles and scopes were sold, the group said. And in a show of support for the junta, Indian Ambassador Vinay Kumar attended the military council's Independence Day ceremony on Jan. 4, it said.
“We have found out that India is keeping the same relationship with the Myanmar junta just as it
was with the previous civilian government before the military coup,” said Salai Dokhar, founder of India for Myanmar.
“I must say that India … recognizes and keeps closer relations with the military junta than Russia and China do,” Dokhar said.
A UN report from last September said that Russia, Serbia and China have also supplied lethal weaponry since the coup. The report from the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights also noted that an Indian state-owned enterprise supplied a remote-controlled weapons air defense station.
RFA attempted to contact the Indian Embassy in Myanmar for comment since last week but got no response.
Weapons and technology
India for Myanmar listed in a news release last month four instances in which India had provided weapons and technology to the junta after the coup.
In June 2021, India government-owned Bharat Electronics Limited sold radar technology to the junta. The following month, the same company sold a remote-control air-defense system, according to India for Myanmar, the group said.
In 2022, India's Tonbo Imaging delivered telescopes used in automatic and sniper rifles. And last March, Indian company Sandeep Metalcraft delivered fuses to be used in bombs and grenades by Myanmar’s military.
The UN report said Sandeep Metalcraft sold Myanmar fuses for ammunition for the Carl Gustaf recoilless rifle. Another India-based organization, Justice for Myanmar, said the Myanmar military had used 84mm Carl Gustaf rounds during attacks in ethnic areas.
An Indian official noted to a UN Special Rapporteur that “Myanmar and India share important security issues along its 1,700 km shared border and in the Bay of Bengal,” according to another report from the UN.
The official said that “any arms transfers that may have been made were based on commitments that were made with Myanmar’s civilian government before the attempted coup.”
‘Inexcusable’
“India’s supply of fuses to the Myanmar military is inexcusable,” Justice For Myanmar spokesperson Yadanar Maung said in the news release. “India is directly supporting the junta’s indiscriminate attacks against civilians by allowing the export of key components in the very weapons the military is using to commit war crimes and crimes against humanity.”
Other ties between the two governments, according to India for Myanmar, include a meeting between Kumar and junta ministers Ko Ko Hlaing and Khin Yi in April and July 2022 in which they discussed cooperation in collecting data for the 2024 census.
Also, in November, Indian Foreign Secretary Vinay Mohan Kwatra visited junta chief Sr. Gen. Min Aung Hlaing, India for Myanmar said.
The lack of support for the efforts of pro-democratic groups in Myanmar partly stems from India’s ruling party, said Saiai Ceu Bik Thawng, chairman of the Interim Chin National Consultative Council.
“If only the Congress Party were the government of India in the place of BJP (Bharatiya Janata Party), it would be much different,” he said. “Their foreign policies are different. During the 1988 uprising in Myanmar, India officially stood for the revolutionary groups.”
Of course, another factor is that India must keep the junta from drawing too close with China, Salai Ceu Bik Thaw said..."
Source/publisher:
"RFA Burmese"
Date of publication:
2023-02-22
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-22
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Individual Documents
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Description:
"Myanmar’s military regime has blocked deliveries of rice and fuel to the jade-mining town of Hpakant in Kachin State since early this month, and residents are now going hungry as a result of shortages.
The junta has cited the presence of Kachin Independence Army (KIA) and People’s Defense Force (PDF) fighters in Hpakant as the reason for the blockade, which is being enforced by regime troops and pro-junta militia members manning checkpoints on the roads leading to the town in central Kachin state.
One female resident of Hpakant told The Irrawaddy: “They [the regime] have blocked deliveries of rice and fuel. The situation in the region is that the military enters and does as it pleases in the town. We can’t buy rice. Shops and gas stations have closed.”
The ban has resulted in the price of normal rice increasing from 40,000 kyats per sack to over 100,000 kyats (around US$40) in the past two weeks alone. The price of gasoline has risen from 3,000 kyats per litre to 5,000 kyats.
At some junta checkpoints, individuals are allowed to bring in rice for their own household consumption, but they have to pay a tax of 3,000 to 5,000 kyats per sack. And only people with ties to the regime are allowed to transport fuel, residents said.
The order to restrict deliveries of rice came from the junta-appointed Kachin State border affairs and security affairs minister. Cargo trucks heading to Hpakant are checked at the Nam Ya checkpoint, and trucks carrying rice are being forced to turn back.
One Hpakant resident said: “I heard that they [the junta] restricted the deliveries because of the KIA and PDFs. Local residents are in trouble. We can’t afford to pay high prices for rice. And every household including children is going hungry.”
Some jade miners who operate small-scale mines have been forced to suspend their operations as a result of the ban on deliveries of fuel.
“We are also experiencing fuel shortages and some jade mines have suspended operations. But miners who have ties to the military are still operating. In Kone San, Chinese companies are still mining despite the fuel shortage,” said a mine owner.
Some residents said the rice and fuel blockade follows frequent resistance attacks on junta checkpoints in Hpakant.
The regime has also often abducted prospectors and displaced people for a ransom starting from one million kyats, according to locals. The junta also imposed a similar ban on rice and fuel deliveries in late 2022, resulting in oil price hikes..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2023-02-23
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-22
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Military History
Language:
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Description:
"1. NUG Acting President remarks friendships & alliance with
neighbor countries should be established 14/2/2023.....2. NUG welcomes Singapore’s prohibition of arms
transfers to Myanmar 16/2/2023.....3. PDF and its alliance strategically attack 19 military targets in Magway Region
15/2/2023.....4. Defence Ministry calls for volunteer air scouts
16/2/2023.....5. Education Ministry partners with EdX to deliver tertiary education programs for up to 5000 students
16/2/2023.....6. Home Affairs Minister says systematic efforts being made to install administrative mechanisms in the ever growing democratic areas12/2/2023..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2023-02-20
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-22
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
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Format :
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Size:
1.54 MB
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Description:
"Last week, the #US, through the U.S. Agency for International Development #USAID , announced providing an additional $50 Million USD for the humanitarian assistance for emergency food and nutrition assistance in #Myanmar.
The NUG is grateful for the commitment of the US government in providing immediate and timely humanitarian support to the people of Myanmar. The junta has been indiscriminately targeting civilians and villages with the use of heavy weapons and artillery air strikes that result in increased displacements with large humanitarian assistance needs. The support from the USAID will greatly benefit those who are in need of humanitarian assistance across the country. We once again would like to express our sincere gratitude towards the US government for their kind assistance to Myanmar people..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of International Cooperation Myanmar
Date of publication:
2023-02-21
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-22
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, The discussion on humanitarian assistance to Burma
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22.01 KB
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"“A free press can, of course, be good or bad, but, most certainly without freedom, the press will never be anything but bad.”
Albert Camus
JAKARTA – In June 1994, the Indonesian government banned three news weeklies --Detik, Editor and Tempo -- triggering a nationwide protest against the government’s repressive regulations against newspapers. Hundreds of young reporters protested against the closures, demanding that the state-sanctioned Indonesian Journalist Association (Persatuan Wartawan Indonesia) should ask President Soeharto to revoke the ban. Being a politically captured group, the PWI instead issued a news release saying that it “understood” Soeharto’s decision.
More than 100 angry journalists, including some senior journalists and columnists, decided to challenge the repressive state by setting up a new union, the Alliance of Independent Journalists (Aliansi Jurnalis Independen). I was one of the group who gathered in August 1994, in a villa in Sirnagalih village, outside Jakarta, where we declared that we wanted to promote press freedom and to fight for the welfare of media workers.
We were not naïve. We knew it was an illegal move because at that time the Indonesian government only permitted a single organization for journalists. We knew that the Information Ministry, the police, the military, as well as the Indonesian Journalists Association would act against us. A few months later, many of these signatories, me among them, lost their jobs or were banned from working for any Indonesian media outlet. The authorities even arrested several journalists and sentenced them to prison terms. Others moved away from Indonesia.
But it was the opening of a new chapter, at least for me, and compelled me to learn about the situation state of media freedom in Asia. I learned about the needs to have readers’ representatives or ombudspersons in each newsroom. Journalists should be transparent about their motives and methods in covering and writing their stories. If they make mistakes, they should make the correction and apologize. Like what Albert Camus, the French author wrote, “A free press can, of course, be good or bad, but, most certainly without freedom, the press will never be anything but bad.”
In January 1995, the new union got an invitation to attend a Hong Kong conference to speak about how media had been banned in Indonesia. In Hong Kong, I met many other Asian journalists, including Jimmy Lai, a media mogul of the Apple Daily in Hong Kong.
Pana Janviroj, then chief editor of The Nation daily in Bangkok, also spoke at the conference. He later asked me to join his newspaper. It was just part of a conversation inside a car that the Freedom Forum, the American group which that the conference, had arranged for us to travel from the Grand Hyatt Hotel in Wanchai to a fancy dinner with the Foreign Correspondents' Club.
After making his offer, Pana asked, “Is that okay?”
The monthly retainer was almost five times my previous salary, plus I could still work for other newspapers. Of course, I said okay. No application letter. No contract. Just a handshake.
He asked me to fly to Bangkok. He introduced me to some of his editors: Kavi Chongkittavorn, Sonny Inbaraj, Steven Gan, Yindee Lertcharoenchok as well as their television broadcaster Thepchai Yong. I began to file my stories in March 1995, working from Jakarta, and later also from Phnom Penh, Yangon and Kuala Lumpur. I covered all sorts of stories, such as Hun Sen ousting Norodom Ranariddh in Cambodia, Myanmar leader Aung San Suu Kyi’s house arrest, the Asian economic crisis, as well as the tension in East Timor. Aung Zaw, a Burmese journalist, also joined us from Chiang Mai, writing mostly about the military junta inside Myanmar.
In Jakarta, I got to know the CNN correspondent Maria Ressa, who covered the 1996 riots when the Soeharto government orchestrated a political attack against an opposition party boss, Megawati Soekarnopoetri.
I began to meet many passionate champions of journalism in South East Asia. Sheila Coronel, who helped set up the Philippines Centre for Investigative Journalism, agreed to train Indonesian journalists in Medan, Jakarta, Yogyakarta, Surabaya, and Makassar in 1997-1998. I also enjoyed the friendship of many Far Eastern Economic Review journalists in Hong Kong.
I then helped establish a number of media rights advocacy groups, including the Institute for the Studies on Free Flow of Information with Goenawan Mohamad, Isaac Santoso, Yosep Adi Prasetyo and others. In Bangkok, Coronel, Chongkittavorn and other journalists set up the South East Asia Press Alliance (SEAPA) in 1997, promoting press freedom in the region.
The Asian economic crisis that started in mid-1997 triggered political instability, and later ethnic and religious violence in Indonesia, and led directly to the fall of the authoritarian President Soeharto in May 1998. Thailand, where the crisis kicked off in July 1997, faced massive economic dislocation that heavily impacted politics and the media. In Malaysia, Prime Minister Mohammed Mahathir, surprisingly, survived the crisis, but ended up putting his deputy Anwar Ibrahim in prison on bogus charges.
The BBC correspondent Jonathan Head broke the news that the new Indonesia president, B.J. Habibie, had agreed, in an interview with him, to hold a referendum in 1999 on the political status of East Timor. But many journalists in Indonesia have borne witness to large-scale sectarian and communal violence in which a total of about 90,000 people have been killed, ranging from sectarian violence in the Moluccas islands to the turmoil in East Timor after the United Nations-organized referendum.
Nascent, independent media faced a lot of challenges because of the Southeast Asian economic crisis, losing advertisement income, cutting their newsroom budgets, and dealing with more complicated political situations, both in their capitals and their many diverse provinces, like Papua in Indonesia, where an independence movement led to a violent crackdown. The media, like many other businesses, were overextended. But my media friends, who were pioneers for media freedom in the region, persisted and ultimately prospered.
Twenty years later
Over these past two decades, those friends went their separate ways. Steven Gan returned to Kuala Lumpur, setting up Malaysiakini. Santoso set up the KBR radio network, sharing his network’s news content with more than 700 radio stations throughout Indonesia. Maria Ressa wrote a book on the Jemaah Islamiyah terror network in South East Asia while staying in Singapore with a fellowship. She later set up Rappler news website in the Philippines, and of course, won the Nobel Peace Prize for her courage in standing up for press freedom. Aung Zaw moved his Irrawaddy magazine operation from Chiang Mai to Yangon, and then after the Myanmar military’s coup in February 2021, moved it back into exile. In Jakarta, Goenawan Mohamad republished his Tempo magazine. These news organizations produced quality journalism. And my friends became award-winning journalists.
Aung San Suu Kyi was released from her house arrest in Myanmar, prompting U.S. President Barack Obama to visit Yangon in November 2012, praising the reform that was taking place in Myanmar. Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy won the 2015 election.
But starting in 2012, the older sectarian and racist instincts arose in Myanmar, with anti-Muslim hate speeches spreading especially in Rakhine State, targeting Rohingya and other Muslim minorities. Hate speech on social media stirred attacks against other Muslims in central and northern Myanmar in 2013. This culminated in August 2017 in massive crimes against humanity and acts of genocide by government forces against the Rohingya.
These developments pointed to a new way to share information. In Myanmar, the main platform was and remains Facebook. Changes in the way that people seek and receive information are challenging the Southeast Asia news media too.
Google, Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, WhatsApp and other social media companies now pose a serious challenge to the popularity and the influence of traditional media. These companies have changed how Indonesians, Filipinos, Thais, Cambodians, and others in Southeast Asia and around the world consume information. Many of these consumers are still learning the difference between real news reporting versus propaganda from an interested party, and don’t fully understand the research, fact checking, writing and editorial review processes that distinguishes solid journalism.
The reality is that journalists are no longer gatekeepers of the news. They have lost the role of helping to determine what information and accounts of events should reach the public, and what doesn’t. With the internet and social media, everyone is now their own circulation manager and editor. Indonesia’s Press Council calculated that Indonesia has now 47,000 “media organizations”, mostly “citizen journalist” website only operations, a massive rise from the only 1,000 or so more formal media organizations that existed in 1998.
In Indonesia, social media has helped fan the flames of division. Religious intolerance plagues Indonesia. Minorities including Christians, Hindus, Buddhists, Ahmadiyah, and Shia Muslims, as well as native faith believers and followers of new religions like Millah Abraham, face discrimination, intimidation, and violence. There is also widespread discrimination against women and LGBT people.
Technology may change but trust – when earned and nurtured – will endure.
In May 2017, a Jakarta court sentenced a former Jakarta governor, Basuki “Ahok” Purnama, a Christian, to two years in prison for blasphemy against Islam. Ahok was accused of defaming Islam during the Jakarta election. More than 150 people have been sent to prison for blasphemy in post-Suharto Indonesia, a huge increase from only 10 cases previously.
Reporters Without Borders, a non-profit organization based in Paris, France, published the first worldwide press freedom index in October 2002, and over the last two decades, it annually recorded the slow decline of press freedom in South East Asia.
In 2022, the situation became worse in most countries in South East Asia. Myanmar remained the worst among these 11 countries. Newly independent East Timor became the freest, having no criminal defamation law, though, as President Jose Ramos-Horta has repeatedly complained, it is still facing resistance to join the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). In general, the other 10 countries get worse – and in this analysis, we can certainly include the single party dictatorship Laos, which the French organization inexplicably didn’t calculate.
Thailand, which unlike other countries in the region, has never been colonized, dropped from the 66th on the chart in 2002 to the 115th in 2022. It shows that Thailand does not necessarily have a better legal infrastructure than the former European colonies like Malaysia, the Philippines, or Vietnam with a Soviet-style legal system. Thailand still maintains the lese majeste law “to protect” the monarchy, including the king, the queen, the heir and the regent-- from defamation. The penalty is 3 to 15 years in prison for each violation, and those charged invariably spend long periods in pretrial detention.....Ranking of press freedom in South East Asia in 2002 and 2022....So why does press freedom, and also democracy, not perform better in economically strong South East Asia?
The Philippines’ ranking has dropped significantly from the 90th in 2002 to the 147th in 2022. Indonesia was once among the best in the world during the rule of President Abdurrahman Wahid, himself a progressive Muslim cleric, with the ranking of the 57th in 2002. Now it is the 117th, among the worst.
Political context and the ‘winner take all’ politics prevalent in the region is obviously a factor. Thailand has had a so-called red shirts versus yellow shirts rivalry since 2006, which includes spates of violence. In 2014, Army chief Prayut Chan-o-cha staged a coup after a decade of this rivalry.
In Singapore, Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong’s People’s Action Party, which has ruled the city-state continuously since its bitter separation from Malaysia in 1965, has a regulatory arsenal that allows the government to directly appoint members of the boards and the editors of the leading media outlets. In Malaysia, the status and activities of the nine Malay monarchies are sacrosanct, extremely sensitive subjects. Any form of commentary or reporting deemed critical of the monarchies can result in prosecution and heavy penalties, leading to self-censorship. Political leaders also use onerous laws and regulations to restrict the press.
The Cambodia democratic transition that started in 1992 with the assistance of the United Nations allowed the emergence of a press that flourished until Prime Minister Hun Sen opened a campaign against independent journalism. Cambodia’s ranking has dropped from the 71 in 2002 to the 142 in 2022.
But coups have proven the most disruptive to the development of a free media. Many countries in the region are familiar with coups. The Myanmar military staged a coup in February 2021, resulting in a broad crackdown against anti-coup protesters that amounted to crimes against humanity, along with massive pressure on journalists.
“When the coup happened, Myanmar’s media industry fell into the darkness,” said an anonymous journalist in the opening of the 20-minute documentary, “Walking Through the Darkness" on how Myanmar journalists fled the cities after the coup and were forced to work in ethnic-controlled areas and in exile in Thailand to keep their news reports coming out.
“Whether the military like us or not, journalism has an important role,” said another Myanmar journalist. “Journalists must be able to do their work.”
Quite clearly, some world leaders were far too optimistic about the path forward for Myanmar, and the durability of democratic rule and a free press in that country when faced with a rights abusing military that believed it was destined to always hold power.
But other countries have shown some progress. Malaysia elected a reformist government for a brief two year period and eventually sent their former prime minister Najib Razak to prison for corruption.
South East Asia, for centuries, has always been a region where global rivalries take place, with bigger power asserting their influence, from Islamic rulers in the Middle East to Chinese kingdoms, from European powers to Indian influence, and now pitting the world’s two largest economies: the United States and China. The South China Sea is a now a hotspot for competition between China and the U.S.
But China scares Hong Kong journalists with its repressive actions. It should not be a surprise that the Reporters Without Borders’ ranking of Hong Kong as the 18th best performing country in 2002 is now down to 148th of 180 countries. The Chinese leader, Xi Jinping, apparently has not learned that over the long term, press freedom is related to economic development and political stability.
The authorities arrested Jimmy Lai last December, symbolizing the drastic decline of media freedom in Hong Kong. in 2020. This is the man who shook my hand at the 1995 conference, sending his regards to my friends back home who were fighting for media freedom in Indonesia
Legal frameworks are playing an important part in restricting press freedom in the region. In Indonesia, harassment, discrimination, and violence directed at religious minorities are facilitated by a legal architecture, introduced in 2006, that purports to maintain “religious harmony.” In practice, it undermines religious freedom. As in Myanmar, some Indonesian journalists find it difficult to separate their religions and their profession.
In Vietnam, the Communist Party maintains a monopoly on political power and allows no challenge to its leadership. Basic rights, including freedom of speech, opinion, press, association, and religion, are restricted. Rights activists and bloggers face harassment, intimidation, physical assault, and imprisonment. The Vietnam state controls all media outlets. The Communist Party demands that they serve as “the voice of party organisations, state organs and social organisations”. The party’s central propaganda department meets weekly in Hanoi to ensure that nothing objectionable is published in media outlets. Party-controlled courts have convicted and sentenced many independent journalists to prison, including Pham Doan Trang, Pham Chi Dung, Nguyen Tuong Thuy, and others.
Similarly, in communist-controlled Laos, it is absolutely impossible to operate an independent news outlet, and the authorities crack down harshly on groups, organizations or individuals who dare criticize the ruling Lao People’s Revolutionary Party, or the government. Migrant workers who criticized the Lao government while they were working in Thailand were subsequently arrested and sentenced to between 15-20 years when they returned to Laos.
In Singapore, two large media groups own all of the major print, radio and broadcast media. MediaCorp is owned by a state investment company. The other, Singapore Press Holdings, is supposed to be privately owned but its directors are appointed by the government. We’re now seeing the New Naratif, an alternative outlet, emerging from Singapore but it is already facing harassment. Meanwhile, The Online Citizen, which played a critical role in independent media in Singapore, has been shut down through harassing lawsuits and regulatory interference, moving their legal entity in Taiwan.
In Manila, President Rodrigo Duterte stripped the ABS-CBN network, the second largest television network in the Philippines, of its franchise in 2020. Luckily, it continues to broadcast online. Multiple harassing legal cases against Maria Ressa and her colleagues at Rappler apparently aim to ultimately shut down the news site. There are no signs so far that things will get better under the new president, Ferdinand Marcos Jr., the son of the late dictator.
Sociocultural context poses many handicaps. In Malaysia, Malay-language media outlets, which are read by the majority of the population, are sometimes subject to more censorship than their counterparts in English, Chinese or Tamil. In Muslim-majority Malaysia and Indonesia, Islam-related issues such as conversion, mandatory hijab, child marriages and apostasy were taboo until recently. However, Indonesian media are increasingly active in covering sexual violence and other crimes in Islamic boarding schools.
Sadly, many Indonesian media outlets also provide too much leeway by failing to regularly report on how local jurisdictions abridge rights. Indonesia has more than 700 regulations and local ordinances, made in the name of Sharia, or Islamic law, that include regulations discriminating against non-Muslim minorities to making mandatory hijab rules.
What Indonesian journalists should use as their guiding reference is the 1945 Constitution, which explicitly guarantees religious freedom and the rights of assembly, association, and expression of opinion. Indonesia, and other countries in the region, should get rid of criminal defamation laws, learning from East Timor.
More countries in South East Asia, should, like Indonesia, ratify core international conventions on human rights. These provide even stronger standards that journalists should follow in pursuing the functional truth in their reporting rather than kowtowing to their countries’ toxic defamation laws.
I understand very well, after working in Bangkok, Kuala Lumpur, Phnom Penh and Jakarta, that South East Asia is a complicated region that is very diverse linguistically, racially, culturally and historically. It has Muslim-majority countries like Brunei, Malaysia, and Indonesia. It also has Buddhist-majority countries like Cambodia, Myanmar and Thailand. The Philippines and East Timor are predominantly Christian countries. Then there are communist countries like Laos and Vietnam. Unlike Africa and Latin America, this region traditionally has had no colonial languages that these countries could use to communicate with each other.
In December 2021, I was very proud when Maria Ressa got the Novel Peace Prize in Oslo, along with the Russian journalist Dmitry Muratov.
These two veteran journalists are not naïve, understanding very well that the prize will not change the situations in their countries. Muratov closed down his Novaya Gazeta newspaper after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Ressa is still facing the legal problems from cases that President Duterte and his government manufactured against her.
When receiving the prize, Maria Ressa said in her speech in Oslo that, “Without facts, you can’t have truth. Without truth, you can’t have trust. Without trust, we have no shared reality, no democracy, and it becomes impossible to deal with the existential problems of our times: climate, coronavirus, now, the battle for truth.”
Ressa called for greater support for independent journalism, for protection of journalists, and to hold accountable those states that target journalists.
In Bahasa Indonesia, we like to say, “Makin bermutu jurnalisme, makin bermutu masyarakat. Makin tidak bermutu jurnalisme, makin tidak bermutu masyarakat.” The more qualified the journalism, the better the quality of the society that it serves. On the other hand, the lower the quality of journalism, the lower the quality of that society.
It is a very clear message indeed. Monarchies, clerics, ethnic leaders, government officials, and the people in South East Asia should understand that message. It’s been two decades, and those messages in support of media freedom are becoming clearer and clearer. South East Asia should promote press freedom and get rid of toxic criminal defamation laws.
It is the only way forward.
Andreas Harsono works for Human Rights Watch in Jakarta. He helped found the Jakarta-based Alliance of Independent Journalists in 1994, and in 2003 he helped create the Pantau Foundation, a journalist training organization also in Jakarta. He presented this paper at the 34th Deutscher Orientalistentag held at Free University Berlin on September 15, 2022.
It will published under the title "Pioniere der Pressefreiheit. Wie ich vom Reporter zum Medienaktivisten wurde" in the (bi-annual) edition Le Monde diplomatique No 33: "Süd.Ost.Asien - Putsche, Palmen, People Power (South East Asia - Coups, Palmtrees, People Power), edited by Sven Hansen and Dorothee d'Aprile for the German edition of Le Monde diplomatique, Berlin May 2023..."
Source/publisher:
Human Rights Watch (USA)
Date of publication:
2023-02-22
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-22
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Freedom of opinion and expression: - the situation in Burma/Myanmar - reports, analyses, recommendations, Freedom of Opinion and Expression - tools for change in Burma/Myanmar
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" Nearly 18 million people – about one-third of Myanmar’s population – need humanitarian aid this year because of civil war and the post-coup economic crisis, according to the latest United Nations estimates.
The numbers needing support continue to rise from the estimated 14 million people needing aid last year. More than 10,000 people were displaced by fighting in southern Kayin State in early January alone, joining more than 1.5 million IDPs across the country.
The UN says it recognises the urgent need to remain in Myanmar and step up humanitarian operations, but it is caught between a hostile military junta imposing restrictions on its activities and a loose network of resistance groups accusing the world body of legitimising an illegal regime.
UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres is also facing increasing criticism for his apparent hands-off leadership in the crisis.
“Almost 18 million people – nearly one-third of the Myanmar population – are estimated to be in humanitarian need nationwide in 2023, with conflict continuing to threaten the lives of civilians in many parts of the country,” said Ramanathan Balakrishnan, UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for Myanmar.
He told IPS that international and local humanitarian aid organisations are “using a range of approaches” in different areas and had reached over four million people in 2022 despite severe underfunding and what he called “heavy bureaucratic and access constraints”.
Balakrishnan defended the importance of the UN’s engagement with General Min Aung Hlaing’s regime, which has ruthlessly crushed dissent since seizing power two years ago and overthrowing the elected government led by Aung San Suu Kyi.
“Principled engagement with all sides is a must to negotiate access and also to advocate on key protection issues. Advocacy to stop the heavy fighting and airstrikes in populated areas that are threatening the safety of both civilians and aid workers is as important as reaching people in need with humanitarian aid,” he said.
Aid workers accuse the junta of further restricting aid operations and blocking urgently needed aid from reaching millions of people. The regime admitted this month it cannot effectively administer about one-third of Myanmar’s townships. But it is able to choke access to some areas controlled by resistance groups and ethnic armed organisations that have been fighting the military for decades.
The junta is seeking to impose its authority with a new law making registration compulsory for national and international non-governmental organizations and associations and introducing criminal penalties for non-registered entities with up to five years of imprisonment.
“Civic space has been decimated in the country already due to the military’s actions, particularly its systematic harassment, arrest, and prosecution of anyone who opposed their coup,” said James Rodehaver, chief of the UN Human Rights Office for South-East Asia (OHCHR) Myanmar Team. “These new rules could greatly diminish what operational space is left for civic organisations to deliver essential goods and services to a population that is struggling to survive.”
Many of the more than one million refugees outside Myanmar also need help. Most are stateless Rohingya Muslims forced out of Rakhine State into Bangladesh in waves of ethnic cleansing before the 2021 coup, with many held in border camps.
The UN’s reputation was already battered before the coup over its handling of the long-festering Rohingya crisis in which it was accused by aid workers and activists of being too accommodating with the Myanmar military. And it has come under further fire since.
In a joint letter last September, more than 600 Burmese civil society organisations said they “condemn in the strongest terms the recent public signing of new agreements and presenting of letters of appointment to the illegitimate Myanmar military junta by UN agencies, funds, programmes and other entities working inside Myanmar.”
“We call on you and all UN entities to immediately cease all forms of cooperation and engagement that lends legitimacy to the illegal, murderous junta,” said the letter addressed to the UN Secretary-General. The signatories argued that letters of appointment and agreements should be presented to what they regard as the legitimate government of Myanmar – the parallel National Unity Government established by ousted lawmakers – and “ethnic revolutionary organisations.”
A Myanmar researcher specialising in civil society and international assistance highlighted the role of Burmese CSOs in delivering aid. “Local CSOs comprehend the complexity of specific local needs in the current crisis as the communities they serve struggle with security concerns and essential public services, including healthcare and education,” said the researcher, who goes by the name Kyaw Swar for fear of security reprisals.
He said that donors and foreign organisations had adopted risk aversion arrangements post-coup, referring to UN and INGO’s costs for capacity-building components and disproportionate country-office operations. “Local CSOs have fewer operations, and risk management options [and] have no choice but to channel international aid to their respective communities.”
UN officials reject the notion that they are legitimising the regime and insist that only by operating in the junta-controlled heartland and also through cross-border assistance can aid be delivered to a substantial part of the population in desperate need.
“The UN finds itself in an almost existential bind. It can’t engage with an oppressive regime without being seen to condone its actions,” commented Charles Petrie, former UN Assistant Secretary-General and former UN chief in Myanmar.
“Somehow, the UN’s senior leadership needs to convince all that engaging in a dialogue with a pariah regime is not the same as supporting it and that it should be judged on the outcome of the discussions rather than being condemned for the simple fact of engaging,” he said.
“But being able to do so successfully implies that it has the level of credibility that right now it still needs to rebuild,” he added.
Questions have also been raised about the apparent lack of hands-on leadership on the part of Guterres. The UN Secretary-General seems to have made little personal intervention beyond routine statements, such as the latest marking the second anniversary of the coup in which he condemned “all forms of violence” and said he “continues to stand in solidarity with the people of Myanmar and to support their democratic aspirations for an inclusive, peaceful and just society and the protection of all communities, including the Rohingya.”
Since the coup and despite the unfolding humanitarian crisis, Guterres is seen as having taken a back seat and delegating to two successive special envoys. This stands in contrast to his predecessor Ban Ki-moon who actively intervened during the Cyclone Nargis disaster in 2008, personally meeting then-junta leader General Than Shwe and negotiating the opening of Myanmar to aid workers.
Petrie suggested Guterres should take a page out of Ban’s book and provide much more active leadership on Myanmar and be “more openly engaged and supportive of the work done by his special envoy.”
While China and Russia lend military and other support to the junta, much of the rest of the diplomatic world has taken a step back from the Myanmar crisis, leaning instead on ASEAN to assume the lead.
But the 10-member bloc has been ineffective so far. It has coordinated an unprecedented shunning of the junta’s leadership in regional meetings, but neighbouring countries – with their own blemished democratic records – are unwilling to penalise the regime. The ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management (AHA Centre) has been charged to respond to the humanitarian crisis, but with no success.
Laetitia van den Assum, the former Dutch ambassador to Myanmar and Thailand, said the aid response would have been more effective if ASEAN had set up a partnership between AHA and experienced UN and other organisations.
“That, in fact, is what happened in the aftermath of Nargis, when under the strong leadership of Dr Surin Pitsuwan, ASEAN and UN worked in tandem. It took time to put the effort together, but ultimately it took off,” van den Assum told IPS.
As with the UN leadership, Lim Jock Hoi, a Bruneian government official who was ASEAN chief until December, was barely noticed on the issue of Myanmar, in stark contrast to Pitsuwan, who helped persuade Than Shwe to accept humanitarian assistance in 2008 when Cyclone Nargis killed over 100,000 people.
“UN agencies like OCHA, WFP and UNICEF, as well as many dedicated INGOs, continue to provide assistance, more often than not under difficult circumstances, and with countless Myanmar civil society organisations playing critical roles,” Van den Assum observed.
“But until now, the SAC [the junta’s State Administration Council] has stood in the way of more effective aid,” she added. “What is missing is an overall agreement between Myanmar and ASEAN about such assistance, how to expand it and how to guarantee that all those in need are served. ASEAN and AHA have not been able to deliver on this.”
Observers point out that AHA is set up to respond to natural disasters and has no experience in intervening with aid in conflict situations.
“That had already become clear in 2018 when AHA was tasked to make recommendations for ASEAN assistance to northern Rakhine state after the enforced deportation of more than 750,000 Rohingya. The initiative died a slow death,” Van den Assum said.
“AHA was not to blame. Rather, ASEAN politicians had taken a decision without first considering whether it was the most advisable approach,” the veteran diplomat said.
No breakthrough is in sight. The junta has extended a state of emergency for another six months, admitting that it lacks control over many areas for the new elections it says it wants to stage but which have already been widely denounced by the resistance as a sham.
“Heavy fighting, including airstrikes, tight security, access restrictions, and threats against aid workers have continued unabated, particularly in the Southeast, endangering lives and hampering humanitarian operations,” the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reported in its latest update..."
Source/publisher:
International Press Institute
Date of publication:
2023-02-22
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-22
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, The discussion on humanitarian assistance to Burma, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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"National Unity Government Weekly Press Update (8/2023)..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2023-02-20
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-22
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
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"Dear my beloved Chin people of Launceston, leaders of Launceston Chin Community of Tasmania State, Mr. Mayor of Launceston, honourable Premier of Tasmania State, the state officials, and honourable members of Parliament of Australia, Mingalarpar to you all. Thank you for inviting me today on this special occasion of the 75th Anniversary of Chin National Day which has everything to do with the 76th anniversary of the signing of the Panglong agreement which was a historical agreement that led to the Burma’s independence from Britain. 75 years ago, if the Panglong agreement had been implemented, Chin state could have become a flourishing state in Myanmar just as Tasmania is in the Australia. Chin state could have been as vibrant and prosperous as Hong Kong or Singapore are today but 75 years of failure to implement the Panglong agreement, has left Chin State broken and weak; the victim of three quarters of a century of military oppression, and now officially become the poorest state in Myanmar where conditions are gradually worsening to those of North Korea. Sadly, we are marking today 75 years of oppression and attacks on our Federal Democratic values and principles by a brutal repressive dictatorship. Before British rule, for centuries the Chin people enjoyed self-administration, self-determination, and political autonomy. We had our own kings and royal family and were never ruled by an outside power. Due to the 75 years of oppression by the horrific dictatorship, the Chin people have not only lost their self-determination, self-administration, and political autonomy but have also suffered genocidal attacks from successive brutal dictators.
In the last 24 months alone, the genocidal military junta have carried out more than 9,000 attacks on the people of Burma, killed more than 3,000 unarmed civilians, arrested more than 20,000 people including the duly elected officials, members of Parliament, President U Win Myint and State counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, and have wilfully destroyed more than 50,000 homes, schools, churches, and monasteries. These horrific atrocities have forced more than 1.6 million into homeless and they are now living as refugees and IDPs. Furthermore, as a result of the military's cruelty, more than 17 million people across Burma are great in needs of humanitarian assistance - compare to less than 1 million in 2020. One in three people are now acute in need of humanitarian aid and half population of Myanmar are being forced to live in extreme poverty. The brutal military junta are using diseases, hunger and starvation as weapons.
We the Chin people have much to be grateful for to Australia. Alongside America, Australia is host to one of the largest Chin communities in the world. Australia has given much to us and we, in turn, have offered a broad range of skills and contributions to Australia. To many in our community, Australia represents a hope for peace, freedom, democracy, and a chance to seek a better life, and provide a better life for our children, and our children's children. Sadly, our people have been beset, for three quarters of a century, by a violent military dictatorship hell-bent on eradicating our people, our language, our culture, our faith, and our way of life. We are eternally grateful to those who have helped us in our time of need, who have harboured and sheltered our refugees and supported the victims of the military's brutality, but in truth, we do not want to be refugees. We do not want to have to find better lives and opportunities away from our homeland. Our dream is to build a stable and prosperous Chinland , New Chin State in which we can live and thrive, where we can know freedom, peace and prosperity, and where we can finally live and breathe without fear of violent arbitrary attacks, shelling, arson, genocidal attacks, and starvation. The military's barbarism knows no boundary and the more ground they lose in this war, the more savage they become. It is for this reason that we must again turn to Australia and ask her to lend a helping hand in the cause for justice and humanity.
Australia is a vital bridge between Asia and the West. As a strategic partner of ASEAN, a member of the Quad, and a member of G20, Australia is in a uniquely privileged position to engage with the Myanmar crisis. This Myanmar’s Spring Revolution is not merely a Revolution for the future of Myanmar, it is a test case for the principles of democracy and freedom against the continuation of corruption and military repression in all of South East Asia. There are many actors working to undermine the revolution for fear of what a functioning popular democracy would mean for dictatorships in the region. They are desperate to crush the people's democratic movement as a warning to all other subjugated and oppressed peoples hoping to throw off the yoke of their own dictatorships. The eyes of the region, and indeed the entire world, are on this conflict between freedom-democracy and tyranny- dictatorships, and the outcome will have long reaching ramifications democracy the world over. Australia must engage quickly and decisively with the cause of the people, the cause of democracy. Dictatorship is a cancer, and Australia stands as one of the few great bastions of democracy holding back the spread of this disease.
Australia has already done much to hinder the junta's efforts. Australia has not only accepted our refugees, but has placed sanctions on the junta and their associated businesses, crucially including MEC and MEHL, the two largest corporate entities under the military's control. But sadly, this is not enough. The junta's network is large and so we knew that they will continue to find ways to skirt sanctions and restrictions. There are many powerful allies who continue to engage with and arm the military in order to expand their own spheres of influence and to bring about a new reign of dictatorial oppression and the cheap labour and resources that offers them. But they will failed and victory belongs to the brave people of Myanmar. The future of over 54 million people of Myanmar are in the hands of the brave people of Myanmar but their fate hangs in the balance. If we lose this fight, Myanmar's people will become slaves to brutal military in their own homes. Forced to work to death to line the pockets of cronies and generals as the nation burns around them. Australia must act to help save the people of Myanmar, and keep the dream of democracy alive.
We ask Australia to pressure ASEAN and Myanmar to see the 5 point consensus implemented immediately. We ask that Australia protest and block Myanmar's military from engaging with ASEAN Defence Ministers’s plus (ADMM Plus) meeting and attending any associated meetings. We ask Australia also to apply the principle of universal jurisdiction as enshrines in Australian law, to take seriously the crimes against humanity and war crimes committed by the the military and to actively pursue the guilty parties and attempt to secure justice for their victims. And most importantly, we ask that Australia formally recognise the NUG, NUCC, and CRPH as lawful and legitimate representatives of Myanmar in conjunction with declaring the military junta, SAC, and so-called “caretaker government” to be unjust, illegitimate, and unlawful, and refusing to engage with them officially.
We are so thankful that many Australians are deeply concerned about the deteriorating humanitarian situation, and luminaries like Sean Turnell have given so much and sacrificed even more for the cause of Burmese emancipation. We reiterate our sincerest appreciations. Australia has a long and vaunted history of foreign aid and advocacy in the cause of human development and political liberation. It is for these reasons that so many Australians are themselves migrants or the descendants of migrants who fled from brutal autocratic regimes. Australia is a glimmer of hope, an image of what the world could be, and those who have made it to the bless country are proud to call themselves Australian and to contributes, with both hands and a full heart, to the land they now call home. And yet, there exists in us all a deep spiritual connection to our homelands. The places we were born, or where our forebears were born. Many still wish to return, or hope that one day their children might see the land of their ancestors. We all hope and wish fervently that one day our countries of origin can know the same peace and prosperity that Australia knows. This is a desire deep within many Australians and we ask Australia to help make this dream become a reality in Myanmar..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of International Cooperation Myanmar
Date of publication:
2023-02-20
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-21
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Individual Documents
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74.95 KB
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"Myanmar’s civilian National Unity Government (NUG) says an entrepreneur has bought the rights to a gem mine in Mogok Township, Mandalay Region, for US$4 million to fund the revolution.
The NUG invited domestic and foreign businesses last month to invest in 45 gem mining rights in Mogok.
The investor will be granted the mining rights when the dictatorship is ousted, the civilian government said.
The mines will be operated as public-private partnerships with 51 percent held by the government.
The NUG’s Ministry of Planning, Finance and Investment announced on Monday: “We can confirm an overwhelming number of inquiries in the remaining 44 exclusive mining rights by email and through official agents.”
Planning, finance and investment minister U Tin Tun Naing said the Mogok mining rights project aimed to bring justice after gem mining has been monopolized by an elite for decades.
“Those businesses only served the interests of military dictators, so we are fixing this to serve the interests of the people and to ensure the country and its citizens get what they deserve,” said the minister.
The NUG’s planning and finance ministry says more than $100 million has been raised to fund the revolution against the regime.
The funds were raised by selling treasury bonds, auctioning off military-linked properties, including two mansions belonging to junta boss Min Aung Hlaing, and selling yet-to-be-built apartments on military-linked land. The NUG said buyers will be handed keys to their properties once the junta is toppled. The NUG says it has also collected 3 billion kyats in taxes in the areas it controls..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2023-02-21
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-21
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Gems - mining and trade
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"Junta boss Min Aung Hlaing on Monday handed the Thiri Pyanchi titles and decorations to Hideo Watanabe, chairman of the Japan-Myanmar Friendship Association.
Ultranationalist monk U Wirathu, once dubbed by Time magazine as the “Buddhist Bin Laden” and the Russian defense minister and his deputy were awarded the Thiri Pyanchi title in November last year. The honorary titles were awarded for “strenuous cooperation to bring about peace, development and prosperity in Myanmar”, according to the junta.
Watanabe could not attend the main ceremony in early January so the 90-year-old junta apologist received his title in Naypyitaw on Monday.
Joint secretary of the regime’s governing body, the State Administration Council, Lieutenant General Ye Win Oo, who oversees torture chambers as the military intelligence chief, and Home Affairs Minister Lieutenant General Soe Htut were present. Watanabe also accepted a Thray Sithu title on behalf of former Japanese prime minister Taro Aso.
Min Aung Hlaing called Watanabe a “good friend” and thanked him for his efforts to “foster ties between the two countries and two armies, and attract Japanese investment into Myanmar”.
Watanabe vowed to promote bilateral friendship and boost the development of Myanmar and its military.
He thanked Min Aung Hlaing on behalf of Taro Aso who was busy with election preparation in Japan.
He visited deputy junta chief Soe Win and met the chairman of the military proxy Union Solidarity and Development Party U Khin Yi in November.
Watanabe, a former lawmaker in Japan’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party, represents Japanese investors in Myanmar.
His ties with Min Aung Hlaing go back a decade. They met shortly before and after the military chief staged his coup in February 2021.
Following the military takeover, Watanabe told Japan’s Asahi Shimbun newspaper that Min Aung Hlaing had not staged a coup but “done what he should have in accordance with the law”.
In late May 2021, as the number of civilians killed by the regime passed 800, Watanabe’s son Yusuke, who is secretary general of JMA, wrote in The Diplomat that Min Aung Hlaing’s coup was constitutional and Japan should continue to boost its “special relationship with the Tatmadaw”, meaning honorable military.
Watanabe insisted that he was not siding with the military but “didn’t want people to say that the military was suppressing and killing its own citizens”. He said he believed assurances that Min Aung Hlaing would bring genuine democracy to Myanmar..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2023-02-21
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-21
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Political History
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Sub-title:
Soldiers are aggressively patrolling checkpoints along major roadways for the goods.
Description:
"UPDATED at 9:16 A.M. EST on 02-22-23
Residents and internally displaced persons in Myanmar’s war-torn Kayah state are facing a humanitarian emergency as junta forces confiscate food and medicine at dozens of security checkpoints along major land routes in the eastern state as fighting there intensifies, local sources said.
Armed conflict between Myanmar troops and popular militia forces have displaced nearly half of the population of about 450,000 people in Kayah state, a hotbed of resistance to the ruling military regime, which seized power from the elected government two years ago, and has been placed under martial law.
Since May 2021, junta soldiers have heavily shelled residential areas they suspect of harboring resistance fighters, according to a February report issued by ethnic Karenni civil society organizations. The fighting has destroyed roughly 1,200 houses in 87 villages, and displaced 180,000 people, or 40% of the population.
Without adequate supplies of food and medicine, the IDPs, especially children and the elderly, are becoming malnourished and are suffering from subsequent health problems, such as diarrhea, residents and aid workers said.
Humanitarian groups no longer can provide food and medicine to displaced residents because of the junta’s confiscations at road checkpoints, said Helen, an aid worker.
“We can barely provide enough medicine for hospitals and clinics,” she said. “The problem is that no one can transport the supplies in this situation. The transportation is too difficult for us to receive them here.”
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, or UNHCR, tried to provide emergency relief supplies to more than 25,000 IDPs in Loikaw and Demoso townships in early June 2022, but it failed to reach all of them because of aggressive security checkpoints and confiscations, Banyar said.
Soldiers are stopping all cars and motorcycles passing through the nearly 40 checkpoints along central roads and intersections in the state, most of which are in the capital Loikaw, residents said. They are aggressively patrolling roads into and out of Demoso township and Pekon township in adjacent southern Shan state.
Junta forces have been checking vehicles transporting food staples, including rice, salt and cooking oil, at the checkpoints since they were set up in early 2022, said Banyar, director of the Karenni Human Rights Group.
“The junta’s strategic hills sit along the highway connecting us to the town of Taungoo on the west side of Demoso,” he told RFA. “The checkpoints are located on those strategic hills, and in Leiktho village. There is also one checkpoint between Leiktho and Yartho villages. Those are the major checkpoints that are heavily searched.”
'Killing us all'
Junta soldiers could be taking food, medicine and money that they suspect are going to local resistance forces, said El Ni, a displaced person from Demoso township.
But instead, their actions are threatening the survival of the IDPs, he added.
“They block roads, assign more checkpoints and restrict the transport of everything under the excuse of suspecting that the supplies are for the KNDF,” El Ni said, referring to the Karenni Nationalities Defense Force, a network of civilian resistance fighters, Karenni organizations and armed groups in Kayah state.
El Ni and other IDPs received donations of rice, oil, salt, beans, eggs and instant noodles in the years before the checkpoints, though afterward they were lucky if they got rice once a month, he said.
“In that way, I think they are cutting the food and supplies for the IDPs in the state,” he said. “As we are IDPs, we cannot work. We have to rely on the donations of well-wishers for our survival. The junta’s cutting off of our donation supply lines is its way of killing us all.”
One female IDP who gave her name as Naw, said police at a checkpoint confiscated the money and food she had got in Pekon as she made her way back home.
“There is no safety here,” she told RFA. “[Soldiers at] security checkpoints search too strictly with no regard for civilians or IDPs. There is no rule of law either. They just do as they please in many situations.”
In the two years since the military coup, most IDP children have not received regular vaccinations, said an official from the Moebye Emergency Rescue Team.
When the COVID-19 pandemic hit, some children died due to lack of medicine and health care, he told RFA.
About 20 ethnic Karenni children sheltering in an IDP camp in Pekon’s Buu Pyar village suffered from diarrhea in the second week of February, and one of them, a seven-month-old, died on Feb. 14 because of the lack of food and medicine, residents said. Two adults also came down with diarrhea.
RFA could not reach Aung Win Oo, junta spokesman and social affairs minister for Kayah state, for comment..."
Source/publisher:
"RFA Burmese"
Date of publication:
2023-02-21
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-21
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, The discussion on humanitarian assistance to Burma
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Sub-title:
The fear the military regime will manipulate ballots in its favor.
Description:
"Myanmar’s ruling junta is considering the use of electronic voting machines in an upcoming election, a move that poses security risks for those who vote against military-backed parties and allow the regime to manipulate the votes using census data, analysts say.
The junta, which unseated the elected government in a Feb. 2021 coup, said previously that it expected to hold general elections in August. But on Feb. 1, the second anniversary of the coup, the regime announced it was extending its state of emergency imposed when it seized power, delaying elections because of ongoing fighting with anti-regime forces throughout Myanmar.
Election fraud has been a long-standing problem in the Southeast Asian nation since the armed forces first seized power in a coup in 1962 and during successive authoritarian regimes. In the past, the military has rigged elections and rejected or annulled voting results.
Junta chief Senior Gen. Min Aung Hlaing, who has vowed to hold a free and fair election, met with Union Election Commission officials in Myanmar’s capital Naypyidaw on Feb. 9 to see a demonstration of new Myanmar Electronic Voting Machines, or MEVMs, in action.
The new electronic voting system links census data and household member registration information and records citizens who vote.
The machine comprises a control unit, balloting unit and verification unit, all powered by a 12-volt battery, according to the online publication The Irrawaddy, citing information from a junta statement.
The junta plans to test the machines with 2,000 mock votes at a polling station, the report said, citing information leaked from the regime-controlled Union Election Commission.
A parliamentary and election observer who declined to be named for security reasons said the new system, which contains personal information and political affiliations, could endanger those who do not vote in protest of the junta’s election.
“International experience is necessary to implement such an electronic voting system,” he said.
“But by neglecting these fine examples and creating an e-voting system only with the inexperienced help of those in the tech community close to the military, it can be concluded that it is probably designed to favor the military-backed party in the election or to threaten people that they have non-voter information records and pressure citizens who will not vote in protest against their unfair elections,” he said.
The observer also said the military junta must be held responsible for the security and personal information of individuals who will or will not vote in the elections if the electronic balloting system is used.
'The door should be open'
Min Aung Hlaing told a National Defense and Security Council meeting on Jan. 31 that it would be up to individuals whether to vote, though it was the government’s responsibility to make the voting possible.
Technology experts told RFA that the most likely electronic voting system to be used is a direct-recording electronic voting machine, or DRE, that requires people to press a button to vote for representatives.
A technology expert, speaking on condition of anonymity for security reasons, said it would take years to develop such an electronic voting system, and that the technology used must be subject to independent scrutiny at any time.
“The door should be open to any impartial and neutral group to check the credibility of the program at any time to know what is written in a program because we don’t know what kind of gaps there are,” he said.
Neither the military nor the Union Election Commission has released any official news or detailed information about the electronic voting system.
RFA could not reach commission member Khin Maung Oo for comment.
Thar Tun Hla, chairman of the Arakan National Party, said the electronic voting system may prove difficult for some voters to use because they do not know how to cast a paper ballot.
“Citizens, let alone the political parties, do not understand how these machines work,” he said. “Voters need to have clear knowledge to use those machines when they vote.”
At a time when it is difficult to even collect accurate demographic information for the ballot right now, the effort to implement an electronic voting system is questionable, political analysts said.
Political observer Than Soe Naing said the election would not be free and fair because the junta could use the new voting system to manipulate votes for an outcome favorable to the military.
“E-voting will enable the military to fabricate the voting data as they see fit,” he said. “That’s why they are using it to their advantage.”..."
Source/publisher:
"RFA Burmese"
Date of publication:
2023-02-21
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-21
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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Sub-title:
Brutal punishment against political prisoners is typical in post-coup Myanmar, critics say.
Description:
"Guards injured more than 80 political prisoners at a prison in central Myanmar after an argument turned violent, an incident which observers say is typical in the prison system since the junta took control of the country in a coup more than two years ago.
The incident occurred on Feb. 4 at Mandalay’s Obo Prison while a group of inmates, all female, were in line to get hot water, and some of the women began arguing with the guards.
“That’s when the prison guards came in and beat them. It’s said that the guards who came in and beat included some male staff too,” a family member of one of the prisoners told Radio Free Asia’s Burmese Service on condition of anonymity for security reasons.
“And then the prisoners were punished with solitary confinement. … But I don’t know if [my family member] was among the ones sent to solitary. This is all I know for now. Their news doesn't spread much these days,” the family member said.
Since the junta ousted Myanmar’s democratically elected government in Feb. 2021, it began filling the country’s prisons with pro-democracy activists who were opposed to the coup. Reports have surfaced that these political prisoners are routinely beaten, sent to solitary confinement, transferred to prisons far away from their families, tortured, or even killed in an effort to silence them and dissuade others from resisting junta rule.
In the Feb. 4 incident, the guards employed rubber and wooden batons and slingshots on the crowd. Collectively, the women suffered two lacerated ears, six skull injuries, a broken hand, an eye injury, three slingshot impacts near the eyes, and around 70 milder slingshot injuries, the shadow National Unity Government’s Ministry of Women, Youth and Children Affairs said in a statement on Feb. 15.
According to that statement, 42 of the injured inmates were sent to another prison building, two were sent to solitary confinement, and another 40 were sent to separated cells. Additionally, the prisoners may not receive visits from their families for one month.
RFA contacted Naing Win, the junta spokesman for the prison department, to find out about the situation at Obo Prison, but he did not respond.
Malice against activists
These types of human rights violations against political prisoners are typical of the junta because they hold malice against those who support democracy, Aung Myo Min, the shadow government’s human rights minister told RFA.
“Political prisoners are those who bravely stand for rights and democracy in the fight against the military junta. That’s why they were specifically targeted,” he said. “It’s not just the military officers who arrest them, but the prison officials and staff also hate them because they think that the political prisoners are an extra burden for them. As a result, [they] continue to get tortured and suffer unjust and brutal punishments.”
The Obo prison incident was one of several examples of prison violence in this year alone.
Two inmates were killed and 70 others were injured on Jan. 6 at Pathein Prison in the Ayeyarwady region on Jan. 6.
In the second week of January, about 700 inmates at Yangon’s Insein Prison were suddenly transferred to other prisons. On Jan. 25, two Insein inmates were sent to solitary confinement for reporting problems to prison officials, their relatives and other sources close to them told RFA.
The oppression that inmates suffer is invisible to the public and the international community, an activist who started an inmate advocacy group called “Let’s Send Things to Prisoners,” told RFA.
“I must say that these incidents should never happen whether inside or outside prisons. But since the prisoners are in [authorities’] hands, our words have no effect on them,” the activist said on condition of anonymity for security reasons. “It looks like [inmates] have to endure whatever pain [authorities] inflict on them.
The activist called on the shadow government and other diplomatic officials to work together to make the rest of the world aware of the situation in Myanmar’s prisons.
“Many people are being unfairly tortured in prisons without the people knowing it,” the activist said.
The prison guards should worry that they could one day be found guilty of crimes against the inmates under their charge, Kyaw Win, the executive director of the U.K.-based Burma Human Rights Network, told RFA.
“I’d like to warn the prison authorities, officials, and staff that their personal records are out, and the people know who they are,” he said. “The military generals and officers will just save themselves in the end. They will not care about these low level staff. That’s why these people should see the dangers they are creating for themselves.”
The junta-administered Myanmar National Human Rights Commission released a report on Feb. 2 based on interviews with hundreds of prisoners nationwide, that stated allegations of human rights violations were being seriously investigated, but the report did not specifically mention that any violations were found.
An official of the Thailand-based Assistance Association for Political Prisoners said that the military intentionally commits human rights violations against its imprisoned political opponents.
“Those who allowed, ordered and personally committed such violations and torture will definitely receive punishment for their crimes one day,” the official said. “We hear incidents of such torture happening everywhere and I want to say that those who commit those cruelties will definitely pay for their crimes.”
As of Tuesday the junta has arrested 19,810 people since the beginning of the coup, 15,953 of whom are currently detained, including those who have been sentenced, according to the group’s statistics..."
Source/publisher:
"RFA Burmese"
Date of publication:
2023-02-21
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-21
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Political prisoners and other violations in Burma - reports
Language:
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Description:
"The #NUG welcomes the 6th round of #EU sanctions against 9 individuals and 7 entities in response to escalation of violence, human rights violations and crimes against humanity.
The 9 individuals include the Minister of Energy and high-ranking officers from the military, home affairs, police force, members of SAC and arms brokers. The 7 entities include Military arms procurement bodies and private companies supplying fuel and arms to the military.
These new sanctions are significant measures to tackle a worsening conflict and in particular ongoing air strikes against civilians amid a range of other barbaric attacks by the military. The junta has been indiscriminately targeting civilians and villages with the use of heavy weapons and artillery air strikes. Coordinated and targeted sanctions such as these are necessary to lessen human rights violations and crimes against humanity by the military regime.
We are grateful for the work of the EU government in placing these important sanctions to slow the military's capacity to continue their campaign of terror and repression. We are hopeful that further targeted sanctions will follow, and we hope that more countries follow suit. We once again request that all governments and the international community immediately place aggressive, targeted sanctions on the military regime and those who support and supply them.
Myanmar Spring Revolution will prevail!..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of International Cooperation Myanmar
Date of publication:
2023-02-21
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-21
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Business and the Military, Sanctions
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28.32 KB 143.47 KB
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Description:
"Justice For Myanmar welcomes sanctions imposed by the EU on members of the terrorist Myanmar military junta, its arms brokers and jet fuel suppliers, more than two years after the military’s illegal coup attempt.
Arms brokers targeted in the latest round of sanctions include Aung Hlaing Oo, Sit Taing Aung and Kyaw Min Oo, along with the companies Dynasty International, International Gateways Group and Sky Aviator Company Limited.
Aung Hlaing Oo and Dynasty International have both had business with EU companies, and future activities will be prevented through these sanctions.
Aung Hlaing Oo has been a longstanding business partner of the Finnish energy corporation, Wärtsilä, and won two junta power plant tenders in 2022 in a consortium with Dongfeng Electric International Corporation. Wärtsila have told Justice For Myanmar they ended business with MCM after US sanctions, but refused to disclose details.
Dynasty International brokered the supply and maintenance of G120TP aircraft from the German corporation, Grob Aircraft SE. In response to recent questions in parliament from Die Linke, the German government stated they are not aware of the sale of Grob G120TP aircraft to the Myanmar Air Force.
The EU has also importantly designated Asia Sun Group, which brokers the supply of jet fuel to the junta and stands complicit in its international crimes. This will help disrupt the supply of jet fuel to the junta, which it needs for its continued indiscriminate airstrikes.
The new designations fill major gaps in the EU’s sanctions regime, targeting key arms brokers and military institutions.
These include the Myanmar military’s Office of the Quarter Master General, Directorate of Procurement and Directorate of Defence Industries, which were sanctioned by the US, UK and Canada in December 2021 and January 2022.
The new EU sanctions come as the people of Myanmar continue to courageously resist the junta in the face of its nationwide campaign of terror, ensuring its attempted coup fails.
The junta’s response to mass resistance has been the continued commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity, murdering over 3,000 people, arbitrarily arresting over 19,000 more, displacing 1.1 million people and carrying out indiscriminate attacks across Myanmar, enabled by the supply of funds, arms and jet fuel.
Justice For Myanmar spokesperson Yadanar Maung says: “We welcome the latest round of sanctions from the EU, targeting junta members and agencies, along with their arms brokers and jet fuel suppliers, which are complicit in ongoing war crimes and crimes against humanity.
“The people of Myanmar have sustained mass resistance to the military’s brutal and illegal coup attempt and its campaign of terror, ensuring that the coup and the junta’s sham so-called ‘elections’ will not succeed.
“While these latest sanctions are a positive step in cutting the junta’s access to resources, far more needs to be done to coordinate sanctions that systematically target the junta’s sources of revenue, arms and jet fuel.
“In particular, we call on the US to follow the EU, UK and Canada in targeting the military’s jet fuel supply chain, and we call on the US, UK and Canada to follow the EU and swiftly sanction Myanma Oil and Gas Enterprise, which is the junta’s biggest source of foreign revenue.
“The EU needs to urgently expand its sanctions to target more individuals and businesses that enable the junta's access to funds and arms, in coordination with its allies.
“Democracies in the region, including Japan, South Korea and India, must also step up, end business with the junta, and impose targeted sanctions on the junta and its conglomerates.”..."
Source/publisher:
Justice For Myanmar
Date of publication:
2023-02-20
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-20
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Language:
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Description:
"Dear my beloved Chin people of Tulsa, respected leaders of Myanmar Community of Tulsa, Oklahoma, USA honourable State officials, Mingalarpar to you all. Thank you for inviting me today on this special occasion of the 75th anniversary of Chin National Day. Thank you for all your efforts to make Oklahoma a true friend state to Chin State in Myanmar based on our shared federal democratic values and principles. Thank you also for your efforts to include the Burma Act into the NDAA. Thank you for your efforts and prayers for UN Security Council on the Resolution regarding the situation in Myanmar. Thank you for your support for Myanmar refugees, IDPs, PDFs, CDFs, EROs, the CRPH, NUG, and NUCC. Thank you for your solidarity with the brave people of Myanmar in this darkest moment in our history as your predecessors, the founding fathers always stood strong for the Federal Democratic values and principles in which they believed. The brave people of Myanmar are committed to those same Federal Democratic values and principles and remain firm and unshakeable in their resolve despite 75 years of oppression by the brutal dictatorship.
The 75th Anniversary of Chin National Day has everything to do with the 76th anniversary of the signing of the Panglong agreement which was a historical agreement that led to the Burma’s independence from Britain. In fact, Chin National Day was supposed to mark the implementation of the Panglong agreement which was based on Federal Democratic values and principles. 75 years ago, if the Panglong agreement had been implemented, Chin state could have become a flourishing state in Myanmar just as Oklahoma is a flourishing state in the USA. Chin state could have been as vibrant and prosperous as Hong Kong or Singapore are today but 75 years of failure to implement the Panglong agreement, has left Chin state broken and weak; the victim of three quarters of a century of military oppression, and now officially become the poorest state in Myanmar where conditions are gradually worsening to those of North Korea.
In fact, the 75th anniversary of Chin National Day is supposed to be marking 75 years of the fulfilment of the promise of self-administration, political autonomy, and self-determination for the Chin people. Sadly, we are marking today 75 years of oppression, 75 years of attacks on our Federal Democratic values and principles by a brutal repressive dictatorship. Before British rule, for centuries the Chin people enjoyed self-administration, self-determination, and political autonomy. We had our own kings and royal family and were never ruled by an outside power. Due to the 75 years of oppression by the horrific dictatorship, the Chin people have not only lost their self-determination, self-administration, and political autonomy but have also suffered genocidal attacks from successive brutal dictators.
Despite these genocidal attacks, our ancestors fought hard for freedom and federal democracy which were lost completely under the reign of terror carried out by the brutal military junta. Today I would like to take this opportunity to pay my respects to our ancestors for their bravery and courage. Our ancestors fought hard for freedom not only in Asia but also in Europe during the First World War (WWI). Our ancestors passed on this noble duty to retake our freedom for which we have fought and struggled as a people for the last 75 years. This sacred duty is in your hands and in my hands. We cannot afford to fail our ancestors in this undertaking. Today I also would like to take this opportunity to salute our brave men and women who are risking their lives everyday in the fight for freedom and federal democracy. This revolution of Myanmar is being fought not only for our generation, but for our children, grandchildren, and many generations to come so that they may live in freedom, justice, peace and prosperity. The burden of revolution is heavy but dear friends, freedom is worth the sacrifice.
In the last 24 months alone, the genocidal military junta have carried out more than 9,000 attacks on the people of Burma, killed more than 3,000 unarmed civilians, arrested more than 20,000 people including the duly elected President U Win Myint and State counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, and have wilfully destroyed more than 50,000 homes, schools, churches, and monasteries. These horrific atrocities have forced more than 1.6 million into homeless and they are now living as refugees and IDPs. Furthermore, as a result of the military's cruelty, more than 17 million people across Burma are great in needs of humanitarian assistance - compare to less than 1 million in 2020. One in three people are now acute in need of humanitarian aid and half population of Myanmar are being forced to live in extreme poverty. The brutal military junta are using diseases, hunger and starvation as weapons.
This is the same causes that the brave people of Ukraine are fighting for. In fact, the Myanmar crisis is Asia’s Ukraine crisis. Therefore, we are united with our Ukrainian brothers and sisters in the struggle for freedom and democracy, they are fighting in Europe and we, the brave people of Myanmar, are fighting here in Asia. Victory belongs to the brave peoples of Myanmar and Ukraine.
Respected leaders and my beloved people, in order to accomplish this mission to root out the brutal oppressive military dictatorship, and to begin building the new state of Chinland and the new federal democratic union of Myanmar, we need your continuous help, prayers, support, and above all action to push for the immediate and inclusive implementation of the 8 points of Burma Act of NDAA, the 10 points of UN Security Council Resolution in Myanmar and the 5 points of ASEAN Consensus on Myanmar. If the international community fails to implement these 23 points on the ground in Myanmar, we will see a return to the failures of the implementation of the Panglong agreement 75 years ago; a failure Myanmar cannot afford.
My friends, my brothers and sisters, let us be very clear that the future of Chinland is in the hands of the Chin people. The future of the Chin people depends on our faith and hope for the future and our commitment and prayers to Almighty God. Its amazing to see great revival taking place in Asbury University of USA, we need the same revival to take place among our generation Z. If possible please take 1 hour of the 24 hours a day to commit yourself to Almighty God in prayer for seeking God’s Kingdom and His Righteousness. The greater our commitment and the stronger our trust in God, the sooner we will see the glorious future which awaits us all. We know that good will defeat evil, the light will overcome darkness, and we also know that freedom will be victory over tyranny and federal democracy will replace the evil oppressive military dictatorship.
I hope and pray that Oklahoma of USA will fully become a true friend state for the future federal democratic Chin state of Myanmar. I hope and pray that the 8 points of the Burma Act of NDAA, the 10 points of UN Security Council Resolution in Myanmar, and the 5 points of ASEAN Consensus on Myanmar will immediately be implemented on the ground in Myanmar. I hope and pray that you will help us to stop genocidal military generals from attending ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus) meetings. I hope and pray that we will soon end the 75 years of oppression, pain, suffering, deaths and destruction. I hope and pray that the dream of Chinland will become a reality sooner rather than later. I hope and pray that we will soon see a free Myanmar, a new Myanmar of federal democracy for all her people, regardless of race, religion, gender, language, colour, culture, ethnicity, and background so that we may make this world a better place for all.....လေးစားအပ်ပါသော Tulsa မြို့ ၊Oklahoma ပြည်နယ်၊ USA ရှိ ချင်းပြည်သူလူထုများ၊ Myanmar Community of Tulsa ခေါင်းဆောင်များ၊ ပြည်နယ် အုပ်ချုပ်ရေးမှူးနှင့် ပြည်နယ်မှူးများအားလုံး မင်္ဂလာပါ။ (၇၅)ကြိမ်မြောက် ချင်းအမျိုးသားနေ့အခမ်းအနားတွင် ဖိတ်ကြားသည့်အတွက် အထူးကျေးဇူးတင်ပါသည်။ USA Oklahoma ပြည်နယ်ကို မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ ချင်းပြည်နယ်နှင့် True Friend ပြည်နယ်ဖြစ်လာအောင် ကြိုးစား ပူးပေါင်းဆောင်ရွက်ပေးခြင်းကြောင့်လည်းကောင်း၊ BURMA Act ဥပဒေကို NDAA ဥပဒေတွင် အတည်ပြုရာမှာ အဘက်ဘက်မှ ပူးပေါင်းဆောင်ရွက်ပေးခြင်းကြောင့်လည်းကောင်း၊ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၏ အခြေအနေနှင့် ပတ်သက်ပြီး UN Security Council Resolution ဆုံးဖြတ်ချက် ကျနိုင်ဖို့ရန်အတွက် ပူးပေါင်းဆောင်ရွက်ပေးခြင်း ၊ ဆုတောင်းပေးခြင်း ကြောင့်လည်းကောင်း၊ US အစိုးရအဖွဲ့အစည်းများ၊ US အစိုးရမဟုတ်သော အဖွဲ့အစည်းများမှတဆင့် မြန်မာပြည်သူလူထုများ၊ Refugee/IDP များ၊ CDM များ၊ PDF/CDF များ၊ EROs များ၊ CRPH၊ NUG နှင့် NUCC များအား ကူညီပံ့ပိုးပေးသည့်အတွက်လည်းကောင်း အထူးကျေးဇူးတင်ရှိပါကြောင်းနှင့် ဘုရားသခင် ကောင်းချီးပေးပါစေကြောင်း ပြောကြားလိုပါသည်။ USA ရှိ ဘိုးဘွားများက ရာစုနှစ်ပေါင်းများစွာ ဖက်ဒရယ် ဒီမိုကရေစီ၏ တန်ဖိုးကိုယုံကြည်ပြီး ၄င်းတန်ဖိုးများကို အသက်သွင်းကာ ၄င်းတန်ဖိုးများနှင့်အတူ အမြဲတမ်းရပ်တည်သကဲ့သို့ ယနေ့ အမေရိကန်ပြည်ထောင်စု ပြည်သူများသည်လည်း ရဲရင့်သတ္တိရှိသော မြန်မာပြည်သူလူထုကြီးနှင့်အတူ ဤအမှောင်ဆုံးသောကာလမှာ အတူတကွ ရပ်တည်ပေးသောကြောင့် အထူးကျေးဇူးတင်ရှိပါသည်။ ရဲရင့်သတ္တိရှိသောမြန်မာပြည်သူလူထုကြီး၏ ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီအတွက် ပေးဆပ်ခြင်းနှင့် သစ္စာရှိခြင်းသည် ခိုင်မာလှပြီး နှစ်ပေါင်း(၇၅)နှစ်အတွင်း ရက်စက်ကြမ်းကြုတ်သော အာဏာရှင်စနစ်ကပင်လျှင် မြန်မာပြည်သူလူထုကြီး၏ ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီ စိတ်ဓာတ်ကို မဖျက်စီးနိုင်ပါ။
(၇၅)ကြိမ်မြောက် ချင်းအမျိုးသားနေ့သည် (၇၆) ကြိမ်မြောက် ပင်လုံစာချုပ် ချုပ်ဆိုသောနေ့နှင့် တိုက်ရိုက် ဆက်စပ်နေပြီး ပင်လုံစာချုပ်သည် ဗြိတိသျှအုပ်ချုပ်ရေးမှ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံလွတ်လပ်ရေးကို အသက်သွင်းပေးသော သမိုင်း၀င်စာချုပ်ဖြစ်သည်။ အမှန်စင်စစ်အားဖြင့် ချင်းအမျိုးသားနေ့သည် မြန်မာ့လွတ်လပ်ရေးစာချုပ်ဖြစ်သည့် ပင်လုံစာချုပ်ကြီး၏ ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီ ကတိက၀တ်များကို အကောင်အထည်ဖော်နိုင်ရန်အတွက် ပေါ်ပေါက်လာခဲ့ပါသည်။ လွန်ခဲ့သော (၇၅)နှစ်အတွင်း ပင်လုံစာချုပ်ကြီးကို ချင်းပြည်နယ်တွင် အကောင်အထည်ဖော်ခဲ့လျှင် ချင်းပြည်နယ်သည် USA တွင် ဖက်ဒရယ် ပြည်နယ်တစ်ခုဖြစ်သော Oklahoma ပြည်နယ်ကဲ့သို့လည်းကောင်း၊ ဟောင်ကောင် (Hong Kong) နှင့် စင်ကာပူနိုင်ငံ (Singapore) ကဲ့သို့လည်းကောင်း ဖြစ်နိုင်ချေ အပြည့်အဝရှိသော်ငြားလည်းပဲ (၇၅)နှစ်အတွင်း ပင်လုံစာချုပ်ကို ချင်းပြည်နယ်တွင် အကောင်အထည်ဖော်ရန် ပျက်ကွက်ခဲ့ခြင်းနှင့် ခေတ်အဆက်ဆက် အာဏာရှင်တို့၏ ရက်စက်ယုတ်မာခြင်းကြောင့် ယနေ့ချင်းပြည်နယ်သည် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံမှာ အဆင်းရဲဆုံးသောပြည်နယ်ဖြစ်လာပြီး မြန်မာနိုင်ငံသည်လည်း ကမ္ဘာမှာ အဆိုးရွားဆုံးဖြစ်သည့် မြောက်ကိုရီးယား(North Korea) ထက် ပိုမိုဆိုးရွားသော အခြေအနေကို ရောက်ရှိနေပြီဖြစ်ပါသည်။
(၇၅)ကြိမ်မြောက် ချင်းအမျိုးသားနေ့သည် အမှန်စင်စစ်ပြောရမည်ဆိုလျှင် ပင်လုံစာချုပ်၏ ကတိကဝတ်များဖြစ်သော ကိုယ်ပိုင်အုပ်ချုပ်ခွင့်ရသောနေ့၊ ကိုယ်ပိုင်ပြဌာန်းခွင့်ရသောနေ့နှင့် ကိုယ့်ကံကြမ္မာကိုယ့်ဖန်တီးခွင့်ရသောနေ့ အထိမ်းအမှတ်ဖြစ်သော်ငြားလည်းပဲ လက်တွေ့မှာမူ (၇၅)နှစ်အတွင်း ချင်းပြည်နယ်သည် ပင်လုံစာချုပ်ပါအခွင့်အရေးများအားလုံးကို ဆုံးရှုံးသွားပြီး ယုတ်မာသော အာဏာရှင်များ၏ နည်းအမျိုးမျိုး ဖိနှိပ်ချုပ်ချယ်ခြင်းကိုသာ ခါးစီးခံခဲ့ရပါသည်။ ချင်းပြည်နယ်သည် ဗြိတိသျှ ကိုလိုနီခေတ်မတိုင်ခင်ကတည်းကပင် သူ့စော်ဘွားနှင့်သူ ကိုယ်ပိုင်အုပ်ချုပ်ခွင့်၊ ကိုယ်ပိုင်ပြဌာန်းခွင့်နှင့် ကိုယ့်ကံကြမ္မာကိုယ့်ဖန်တီးခွင့် အပြည့်အဝဖြင့် ရာစုနှစ်ပေါင်းများစွာနေလာခဲ့သော ပြည်နယ်ဖြစ်ပြီး ချင်းသမိုင်းတွင် ဗြိတိသျှအုပ်ချုပ်ရေးကလွဲပြီး အခြားပြင်ပမှ အုပ်ချုပ်ခြင်း မရှိခဲ့ပေ။ သို့သော် အာဏာရှင်များ၏ ရက်စက်ယုတ်မာခြင်းကြောင့် ချင်းပြည်နယ်သည် ပင်လုံစာချုပ်ပါ အခွင့်အရေးအားလုံးကို ဆုံးရှုံးသွားခဲ့ပြီး ယနေ့တွင် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၏ တရားဝင် အဆင်းရဲဆုံးပြည်နယ်ဖြစ်လာသည်သာမက အာဏာရှင်များ၏ လူမျိုးတုံး တိုက်ခိုက်ခြင်းကြောင့် ချင်းလူမျိုးများသည် လူမျိုးတုံးနိုင်ခြေရှိသည့် အနေအထားကို ရောက်ရှိနေပြီဖြစ်ပါသည်။ ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီ အနှစ်သာရအားလုံးကို ဆုံးရှုံးသွားအောင် တိုက်ခိုက်သည်သာမက ချင်းလူမျိုးများ လူမျိုးတုံးအောင် တိုက်ခိုက်လာသည့် အလွန်ရက်စက်ယုတ်မာသော အာဏာရှင်များကို ခေတ်အဆက်ဆက်တော်လှန်လာခဲ့သော ဘိုးဘွားများ၊ ချင်းအမျိုးသား သူရဲကောင်းများအားလုံး၏ ရဲရင့်သောသတ္တိကိုလည်း လေးစားစွာဖြင့် အလေးပြုအပ်ပါသည်။ ဘိုးဘွားများ၊ ချင်းအမျိုးသား သူရဲကောင်းများသည် လွတ်လပ်ရေးအတွက် အသက်ကိုလဲပြီး အာဏာရှင်များကို တော်လှန်လာခဲ့သည်မှာ မြန်မာပြည်၊ အာရှတိုက်တွင်သာမက ပထမကမ္ဘာစစ်ကတည်းကပင် ဥရောပတိုက်မှာ ကမ္ဘာ့လွတ်လပ်ရေးအတွက် တိုက်ပွဲ၀င်ခဲ့သော ချင်းဘိုးဘွားသူရဲကောင်းထောင်ကျော်တို့၏ သမိုင်းရှိခဲ့ပါသည်။
လွန်ခဲ့သော (၇၅)နှစ်အတွင်း ဆုံးရှုံးသွားသည့် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီအရေးနှင့် ချင်းပြည်လွတ်လပ်ရေးကိုပြန်ရဖို့ရန်အတွက် ဘိုးဘွားမိဘခေတ်ကတည်းက တော်လှန်လာခဲ့သော အာဏာရှင်အမြစ်ပြတ်တော်လှန်ရန် သမိုင်းပေးသောတာ၀န်သည် ယနေ့ ကျွန်တော်တို့လက်ထဲသို့ ရောက်ရှိလာပြီဖြစ်သည်။ သမိုင်းကပေးအပ်လာသော ဤတာဝန်ကို မပျက်မကွက်ထမ်းဆောင်ရန် လိုအပ်ပါသည်။ ဤတော်လှန်ရေးကြီးသည် ကျွန်တော်တို့ ခေတ်အတွက်သာမက နောင်လာနောင်သား သားစဉ်မြေးဆက်များအားလုံးအတွက် ကိုယ်ပိုင်အုပ်ချုပ်ခွင့်၊ လွတ်လပ်ခွင့်၊ ကိုယ်ပိုင်ပြဌာန်းခွင့်နှင့် ကိုယ့်ကံကြမ္မာကိုယ့်ဖန်တီးခွင့်ကိုပေးမည့် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီ အပြည့်အဝရရှိနိုင်ရန်အတွက် တော်လှန်ရေးကြီးဖြစ်သောကြောင့် တန်ဖိုးကြီးလှပြီး တာဝန်လည်းကြီးလှပါသည်။
လွန်ခဲ့သော (၂၄)လအတွင်း ရက်စက်ယုတ်မာသော အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အာဏာရှင်များသည် အပြစ်မဲ့ပြည်သူ လူထုအပေါ် အကြိမ်ပေါင်း(၉)ထောင်ထက်မနည်း အကြမ်းဖက်တိုက်ခိုက်ခြင်းကြောင့် အပြစ်မဲ့ပြည်သူလူထု (၃)ထောင်ထက်မနည်း အသက်များဆုံးရှုံးသွားခဲ့ရပါသည်။ ဒီမိုကရေစီနည်းနဲ့ လူထုရွေးကောက်တင်မြောက်ထားသောသမ္မတကြီးဦး၀င်းမြင့်၊ နိုင်ငံတော်အတိုင်ပင်ခံပုဂ္ဂိုလ် ဒေါ်အောင်ဆန်းစုကြည်နှင့်အတူ အပြစ်မဲ့ပြည်သူလူထု (၂)သောင်းကျော်ကိုလည်း မတရားဖမ်းဆီးချုပ်နှောင်ထားပြီး လူနေအိမ်၊ စာသင်ကျောင်း၊ ဘုရားကျောင်း၊ ဘုန်းကြီးကျောင်းအပါအ၀င် ပြည်သူလူထု၏ အိုးအိမ်ပေါင်း (၅)သောင်းကျော်ကို ရက်ရက်စက်စက် ဗုံးကြဲတိုက်ခိုက် မီးရှို့ဖျက်စီးခြင်းများပြုလုပ်ခဲ့ပါသည်။ နေ့စဉ် လူ့အခွင့်အရေးချိုးဖောက်ခြင်းများစွာနှင့်အတူ စစ်ရာဇ၀တ်မှူကို ကျူးလွန်လျှက်ရှိပါသည်။ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အာဏာရှင်များသည် မြန်မာပြည်သူလူထုအပေါ် စစ်ကြေငြာပြီး ရက်စက်ယုတ်မာစွာ လူမဆန်အကြမ်းဖက်တိုက်ခိုက်ခြင်းကြောင့် ပြည်သူလူထု (၁.၆)သန်းထက်မနည်း ဒုက္ခသည်ဘ၀မှာ ဆင်းရဲနွမ်းပါးမှူပေါင်းများစွာ ခံစားနေရပါသည်။ ၂၀၂၀ ခုနှစ်မှာ လူဦးရေ (၁)သန်းအောက် လူသားချင်းစာနာထောက်ထားရေးအကူအညီ လိုအပ်သည်မှ ယနေ့ ၂၀၂၃ခုနှစ်တွင် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံလူဦးရေ (၁၇)သန်းကျော်သည် အငတ်ဘေးနှင့် ရင်ဆိုင်နေရပြီး လူသားချင်းဆိုင်ရာ စာနာထောက်ထားရေးအကူအညီများ မြောက်များစွာလိုအပ်နေသည့် အခြေအနေကို ဆိုးရွားစွာရောက်ရှိလာခဲ့ပါသည်။ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံလူဦးရေတဝက်ခန့်သည် အလွန်ဆင်းရဲနွမ်းပါးမှုအောက်အခြေအနေကို ရောက်ရှိနေပြီး မြန်မာပြည်သူ (၃)ယောက်တွင် (၁)ယောက်မှာ ငတ်မွတ်ခေါင်းပါးနေသည့်အခြေအနေသို့ ကျရောက်နေပြီး တစ်တိုင်းပြည်လုံး အလွန်ဆိုးရွားသောဒုက္ခကို ခံစားနေရပြီဖြစ်ပါသည်။ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အာဏာရှင်များသည် စစ်လက်နက်သာမက ငတ်မွတ်ခြင်း၊ ခေါင်းပါးခြင်း၊ ရောဂါနှင့် ဆင်းရဲဒုက္ခပေါင်းများစွာကို လက်နက်သဖွယ်အသုံးပြုပြီး မြန်မာပြည်သူထူထုကို အကြမ်းဖက် တိုက်ခိုက်လျှက်ရှိပါသည်။
ယူကရိန်းပြည်သူလူထုများသည်လည်း မြန်မာပြည်သူလူထုနည်းတူ လွတ်လပ်ရေးနှင့် ဒီမိုကရေစီရေးအတွက် တိုက်ပွဲ၀င်နေပါသည်။ အမှန်စင်စစ်ပြောရမည်ဆိုလျှင် မြန်မာ့အရေးသည် အာရှတိုက်၏ ယူကရိန်းအရေးဖြစ်ပါသည်။ ထို့ကြောင့် မြန်မာပြည်သူလူထုနှင့် ယူကရိန်းပြည်သူလူထုသည် လွတ်လပ်ရေးနှင့် ဒီမိုကရေစီရေး၏ ရှေ့မှာ တစ်ညီတစ်ညွတ်တည်း ရပ်တည်နေပြီး ယူကရိန်းပြည်သူလူထုများသည် ဥရောပတိုက်မှာ လွတ်လပ်ရေးနှင့် ဒီမိုကရေစီအရေးအတွက် တိုက်ပွဲ၀င် တော်လှန်နေသကဲ့သို့ မြန်မာပြည်သူလူထုများသည်လည်း အာရှတိုက်မှာ လွတ်လပ်ရေးနှင့် ဒီမိုကရေစီအရေးအတွက် တိုက်ပွဲ၀င်ပြီး အလွန်ဆိုးရွားသော စစ်အာဏာရှင်များကို တော်လှန်နေပါသည်။ အရေးတော်ပုံအောင်ပွဲသည် မြန်မာပြည်သူလူထုနှင့် ယူကရိန်းပြည်သူလူထုတို့၏လက်ထဲမှာ ရောက်ရှိနေပြီဖြစ်ပါသည်။
ချစ်ခင်လေးစားအပ်ပါသော ပြည်သူလူထုများ၊ ခေါင်းဆောင်များ၊ ပြည်နယ်အုပ်ချုပ်ရေးမှူး၊ ပြည်နယ်မှူးများ၊ အရာရှိများ ခင်ဗျာ။ မြန်မာ့နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေးကို အမြန်ဆုံး အောင်မြင်ပြီး စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ်ကို အမြန်ဆုံး အမြစ်ပြတ်ချေမှုန်း၍ ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီနိုင်ငံတော်အသစ်ကို အမြန်ဆုံး တည်ဆောက်နိုင်ရန်အတွက် အားလုံး၏ပူးပေါင်းဆောင်ရွက်ခြင်း၊ ဆက်လက်အကူအညီပေးခြင်း၊ ဆုတောင်းခြင်း၊ ထောက်ခံအားပေးခြင်းများကို လိုအပ်လျှက်ရှိပါသည်။ အထူးသဖြင့် လိုအပ်နေသည်မှာ Burma Act/NDAA ဥပဒေပါ အချက်(၈)ချက်၊ ကုလသမဂ္ဂ လုံခြုံရေးကောင်စီ (UN Security Council)၏ ဆုံးဖြတ်ချက်(၁၀)ချက်နှင့် ASEAN ၏ ဆုံးဖြတ်ချက် (၅)ချက်များဖြစ်သည့် စုစုပေါင်း (၂၃)ချက်ကို မြန်မာနိုင်ငံတွင် အမြန်ဆုံး ဘက်ပေါင်းစုံမှ လက်တွေ့အကောင်အထည်ဖော်ရန်အတွက် အလွန်လိုအပ်နေပါသည်။ သက်ဆိုင်ရာအပြည်ပြည်ဆိုင်ရာအဖွဲ့အစည်းများမှ အထက်ပါအချက် (၂၃)ချက်ကို မြန်မာမြေပြင်တွင် အကောင်အထည်ဖော်ခြင်း ပျက်ကွက်ခဲ့လျှင် ချင်းသမိုင်းတွင် ပင်လုံစာချုပ်ပါ အချက်များအားလုံးကို (၇၅)နှစ်အတွင်း အကောင်အထည်ဖော်ရန် ပျက်ကွက်ခြင်းကြောင့် ခံစားခဲ့ရသော နောက်ဆက်တွဲပြဿနာများကဲ့သို့ ထပ်မဖြစ်ရလေအောင် ဂရုတစိုက်ပူးပေါင်းဆောင်ရွက်ကြရန် အလွန်အရေးကြီးလှပါသည်။ ဤအချက်(၂၃)ချက်ကို အကောင်အထည်ဖော်ခြင်း ပျက်ကွက်မှု၏ဒဏ်ကို မြန်မာနိုင်ငံသည် လုံး၀ခံနိုင်မည်မဟုတ်ပါ။
ချစ်ခင်လေးစားအပ်ပါသော မိတ်ဆွေများ၊ ညီအစ်ကိုမောင်နှမများ ခင်ဗျာ။ ဤအရာများကို ရှင်းရှင်းလင်းလင်းဖြစ်စေချင်ပါသည်။ ချင်းပြည်နယ်၏ အနာဂတ်သည် ချင်းပြည်သူလူထုများ၏ လက်ထဲတွင်ရှိပြီး ချင်းပြည်သူလူထုကြီး၏ အနာဂတ်သည် ချင်းပြည်သူလူထုများ၏ အသက်ရှင်သောထာ၀ရဘုရားကို ယုံကြည်ခြင်း၊ မျှော်လင့်ခြင်း၊ ဆုတောင်းခြင်းအပေါ်မှာ များစွာ မူတည်နေပါသည်။ USA တက္ကသိုလ်တစ်ခုဖြစ်သော Asbury University မှာ နိုးထမှုဖြစ်နေသည်ကို များစွာခွန်အား ယူမိပါသည်။ ထိုကဲ့သို့သော နိုးထမှု(Revival) သည် ကျွန်တော်တို့၏ Generation Z အကြားမှာလည်း ရှိလာနိုင်ရန်အတွက် ဆုတောင်းကြပါရန်နှင့် ဖြစ်နိုင်လျှင် တနေ့(၂၄)နာရီမှာ အနည်းဆုံး(၁)နာရီအချိန်ယူပြီး ဘုရားသခင်၏ နိုင်ငံတော်နှင့် ဖြောင့်မတ်ခြင်းအတွက် အသက်ရှင်သောထာ၀ရဘုရားထံ ဆုတောင်းဆက်ကပ်ကြပါရန် အလေးအနက်တိုက်တွန်းလိုပါသည်။ ချင်းပြည်သူလူထုများ ဘုရားကိုယုံကြည်ခြင်း အားကောင်းလေလေ ဘုရားပြင်ဆင်ပေးထားသော ကြီးမားသည့်အနာဂတ်နှင့် နီးလေလေဖြစ်ပြီး ဘုရားနှင့်အတူ ရှေ့သို့ဆက်လက် ချီတက်လျှင် အောင်ပွဲသည် မနီးမဝေးမှာ ချင်းပြည်သူလူထုကို စောင့်မျှော်နေပါသည်။ အကောင်းသည် အဆိုးကို အနိုင်ယူပြီး အလင်းသည် အမှောင်ကို ဖြိုခွင်းသကဲ့သို့ ရက်စက်ယုတ်မာသော စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ်ဆိုးကြီးကို ကိုယ့်ကံကြမ္မာကိုယ့်ဖန်တီးခွင့်ကို အပြည့်အ၀ပေးသော ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီစနစ်က အမြစ်ပြတ်ချေမှုန်းမည်ဖြစ်သည်။
USA Oklahoma ပြည်နယ်နှင့် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံရှိ ချင်းပြည်နယ်သည် True Friend State အပြည့်အဝ ဖြစ်လာပါစေကြောင်း ဆုမွန်ကောင်းတောင်းလျှက် မျှော်လင့်နေပါသည်။ Burma Act/NDAA ဥပဒေပါ အချက် (၈)ချက်၊ UN Security Council ဆုံးဖြတ်ချက် (၁၀) ချက်၊ ASEAN ဆုံးဖြတ်ချက် (၅)ချက်များကို မြန်မာမြေပြင်ပေါ်မှာ အမြန်ဆုံး အကောင်အထည်ဖော်နိုင်ပါစေကြောင်း တိုက်တွန်းလျှက် မျှော်လင့်နေပါသည်။ ထို့အတူ ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus)ကို အကြမ်းဖက် စစ်ခေါင်းဆောင်များ တက်ရောက်ရန် ပြင်ဆင်နေခြင်းကို ဝိုင်း၀န်းပြီး တားမြစ်နိုင်ကြလိမ့်မည်ဟု မျှော်လင့်မိပါသည်။ (၇၅)နှစ်အတွင်း ချုပ်နှောင်ခြင်း၊ နာကျင်ခြင်း၊ ဆင်းရဲဒုက္ခရောက်ခြင်း၊ သေဆုံးခြင်း၊ ဆုံးရှုံးခြင်းများ အားလုံးကို အမြန်ဆုံး ချုပ်ငြိမ်းပြီး နိဂုံးချုပ်နိုင်လိမ့်မည်ဟု မျှော်လင့်ပါသည်။ ချင်းပြည်နယ်နှင့် ချင်းပြည်သူများ၏ အိပ်မက်များ အမြန်ဆုံး အမှန်တကယ် ဖြစ်လာပြီး ပြည့်၀သော ဘ၀ခံစားမှုကို ရရှိနိုင်ကြပါစေဟု ဆုမွန်ကောင်းတောင်းအပ်ပါသည်။ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံတွင် အကြမ်းဖက်စစစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ် အမြန်ဆုံး ချုပ်ငြိမ်းပြီး လူမျိုး၊ ဘာသာ၊ ကျား/မ၊ တိုင်းရင်းသား၊ ဆင်းရဲ/ချမ်းသာမရွေး မြန်မာပြည်သူလူထုအားလုံးအတွက် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံတော်အသစ်ဖြစ်သော ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီနိုင်ငံတော်ကြီးကို အမြန်ဆုံး အကောင်အထည်ဖော် တည်ဆောက်နိုင်ပါစေကြောင်း ဆုမွန်ကောင်းတောင်းအပ်ပါသည်။ (၇၅)နှစ်အတွင်း ပျက်ကွက်ခဲ့သော ပင်လုံစာချုပ်ပါ အချက်များအားလုံးကို နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေး အမြန်ဆုံး အတူတကွ အောင်မြင်ခြင်းအားဖြင့် ချင်းပြည်နယ်ကို ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရက်တစ်ပြည်နယ် (Federal Democratic State)အဖြစ် အကောင်အထည်ဖော်ပြီး ချင်းပြည်သူလူထုအားလုံး ကိုယ်ပိုင်ပြဌာန်းခွင့်၊ လွတ်လပ်ခွင့်၊ ကိုယ့်ကံကြမ္မာကိုယ့် ဖန်တီးခွင့်များ အမြန်ဆုံး ခံစားနိုင်ကြပါစေကြောင်း ဆုမွန်ကောင်းတောင်းပေးရင်း နိဂုံးချုပ်အပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of International Cooperation Myanmar
Date of publication:
2023-02-19
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-20
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Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Chin (Zo)- economic, social, cultural, political
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"Five million children in Myanmar need humanitarian assistance amid armed conflicts across the country, according to a report by the United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF) on Jan. 30.
Three out of 10 children under 5 in Myanmar are stunted due to a lack of proper nutrition. This affects not only their physical growth but also their overall health and future. Moreover, 300,000 children in Myanmar are at risk of preventable diseases due to lack of vaccination, added the UN agency.
Over 1.5 million in Myanmar people have been displaced, with children forced to flee their homes and communities.
Naw Susanna Hla Hla Soe, Minister of Women, Youths and Children Affairs in the parallel National Unity Government, recently talked to The Irrawaddy about the plight of children displaced by fighting.
What kind of help do the five million children need in Myanmar? Health, education or nutrition, what is the priority?
Myanmar is already a poor country with lots of needs. And the government can’t deliver public services in full. The situation has become worse since (the coup in) February 2021, especially for children. According to the UN report, 5 million children are in dire need of support.
They are malnourished and they need to be vaccinated, and they also need schooling. And their lives are especially at risk because of junta raids.
According to the records of our ministry, over 300 children (under 18s) have been arrested. Nineteen children have been jailed, and 289 others were killed by the military. Therefore, the security of children and their rights are the most important requirement.
What does the future hold for children in a country where armed conflicts are escalating?
Their morale will be negatively affected, and so will their health. And their schooling will also be hampered. These are the very children who will lead the country one day. And it will be difficult for them to lead the country if they grow up deprived. [In this case,] the country can’t have a good future.
What must be done for children to get the assistance they need?
On my trips to Karen and Karenni (Kayah) states), I discovered many children in displacement camps. Civilian leaders open schools and provide food for them. But it is not enough. And there have been child casualties every day due to the regime’s deliberate attacks on displacement camps.
So we must stop the junta’s brutality if we are to protect the children. The first thing we must do is stop it from targeting schools and hospitals so as to provide mental security for children. Then we must provide them with access to health care services and education and also carry out programs for their development and leadership.
What will happen to them if they don’t get the assistance in time?
The international community should not ignore this problem. They must help to make sure assistance reaches those children. If it does not, millions of children are at risk of losing their lives. Even if they survive, they will be both mentally and physically deprived and the future of the country will not be good..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2023-02-20
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-20
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Children, Children's rights: reports of violations in Burma against more than one ethnic group
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"Until the Myanmar military’s 2021 coup, assassinations involving guns were rare in the country, with the notable exception of the shooting of prominent lawyer U Ko Ni outside Yangon International Airport in 2017.
But since the putsch, assassinations involving guns have become increasingly common and are now happening on an almost daily basis.
Over 5,000 military sympathizers, alleged informants, members of the military’s proxy Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), junta officials and employees have been killed since the coup, with another 4,000 injured, said junta boss Min Aung Hlaing at a meeting of the National Defense and Security Council on February 1.
Having failed to protect its supporters and workers, the junta is now attempting to remedy that by amending the Arms Act. A new policy issued by the regime’s Ministry of Home Affairs will allow junta supporters to hold weapons to protect themselves.
The military has already turned much of the country into a battlefield. Now it is bringing arms into society itself, a sign surely of more bloodshed to come.
Under the new policy, arms and ammunition will be issued to civilians who agree to participate in local security and law enforcement in their states and regions. In other words, the new policy will allow regime supporters to fight for the junta in plain clothes.
Citizens over the age of 18 will be issued licenses allowing them to hold five different types of weapons including pistols and hunting rifles. The arms are intended for USDP members, military supporters, former military personnel, administrators, and business owners.
“In the past, licenses to hold arms were only granted to prominent cronies like U Tay Za and U Aung Ko Win. Now it appears that weapons licenses will be given to many business people,” said a source close to the regime.
U Tay Za, a notorious arms broker and long-time military crony, used to buy arms from overseas and present them to generals who were close to him, added the source.
“Generals have some of the best foreign-made guns in the world. Every general has more than one gun, apart from the one issued to them by the Ka Pa Sa [the Myanmar military’s Directorate of Defense Industries],” said the source.
In Myanmar, only the Ministry of Home Affairs is allowed to import weapons and ammunition, and citizens are prohibited from buying guns from abroad.
But it has been a long time since cronies were able to import weapons to present to generals or to use for hunting and shooting sports, said a source from the home affairs ministry.
“The weapons seized from Phyo Ko Ko Tint San were imported that way,” said the source.
Phyo Ko Ko Tint San, the son of U Tint San, the sports minister in U Thein Sein’s administration, was arrested on October 15, 2017, after two pistols and ammunition, as well as narcotics, were discovered in his backpack at Naypyitaw Airport. Police went on to seize more than 20 guns from his hotel, company offices and houses in Naypyitaw and Yangon. In 2020, Phyo Ko Ko Tint San was sentenced to 30 years to prison.
Under the new regime policy, pro-junta militias and security organizations will be allowed to hold pistols, rifles and automatic weapons with permits issued by the home affairs ministry. This is similar to the way the Myanmar military previously armed ethnic militias in Shan State to combat ethnic armed organizations operating there.
Since the coup, the regime has formed militias known as Pyu Saw Htee to fight the resistance in Sagaing, Magwe and Mandalay regions.
The move to arm civilians comes at a time when the junta is facing ever-growing resistance nationwide from People’s Defense Forces and ethnic armed organizations.
“This plan amounts to pushing military supporters into the killing fields. There will be more pre-emptive attacks and more bloodshed,” said a soldier who has joined the Civil Disobedience Movement.
Government employees, administrators and military supporters in the 37 townships where the regime has imposed martial law will be given priority in the issuing of gun licenses, according to information leaked from the home affairs ministry.
In the two years since the coup, weapons have already flooded into civilian society. Military supporters have publicly asked to be armed at junta press conferences so that they can respond to resistance attacks and the regime has now agreed to their demands.
Notorious ultranationalist and USDP member U Hla Swe has been urging the regime to allow supporters to have licensed guns.
He said in an interview that some junta-appointed ministers have asked him how they could acquire arms. He has said that he will apply for licenses to hold two guns.
“In fact, all the administrators, [junta-allied] politicians and business owners have guns already. And the regime is now making it legal by asking them to apply for licenses,” said a source in the capital Naypyitaw.
There have already been frequent firefights between junta officials, Pyu Saw Htee and PDFs in the resistance stronghold of Sagaing Region.
“Soldiers and police only come to wards during their patrols. They are usually in police stations and security outposts for the rest of the time. But ward administrators are always in their ward. So they face a greater security threat,” said one politician.
However, there is a risk that the new policy will backfire on the regime.
“They [junta supporters] face the risk of their guns being grabbed. And there is also the risk of officials defecting along with their guns,” said a striking police officer.
Police and ward administrators will know who has weapons in their areas, as people applying for the new gun licenses will have to apply to their ward administrators and local police first.
Eligible citizens will be allowed hold up to three different types of weapons per person under the new policy. Government employees will be permitted to hold an automatic weapon in addition to the three different types of gun.
Ammunition will also be issued. The new policy allows 50 bullets for each pistol and 100 bullets for each automatic weapon. Neither telescopic sights nor silencers will be allowed under the policy.
Retired lieutenant colonel and former National League for Democracy member U Kyaw Zeya wrote on his Facebook page: “I am not holding arms again at this age. I am happy to die if someone comes and kills me.”
“It is the duty of the Myanmar military to protect the people,” he added.
Military lobbyists are calling for arming all officials down to the level of 100-household administrators.
But there are concerns about the new guns being used to attack non-Buddhists, as the ultranationalist Buddhist association Ma Ba Tha are military supporters. And there are also concerns about the guns fueling an increase in crime.
The price of weapons on the black market along the Myanmar-Thailand border has increased by at least five times since the coup, according to arms experts.
“The price will increase again if the military issues the licenses,” said a weapon expert.
The military’s ordnance factories can produce both pistols and bullets, and they have the capacity to manufacture to order, said a striking soldier.
Junta spokesman Major General Zaw Min Tun has told pro-regime media outlets that the junta will legalize the establishment of weapons-manufacturing companies.
More than 3,000 civilians have died at the hands of the junta since the coup, according to a February 17 statement from the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners. Now it seems that many more will die as a result of the regime’s new policy of issuing weapons to its supporters..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2023-02-20
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-20
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Political History
Language:
more
Description:
"Two years after the military coup staged in Myanmar/Burma on 1st February 2021, the Council adopted today restrictive measures against 9 persons and 7 entities in view of the continuing escalation of violence, grave human rights violations and threats to the peace, security and stability in Myanmar/Burma.
The sanctioned individuals include the Minister for Energy, prominent businessmen who have supported the regime’s repression with arms and dual use goods, and high-ranking officers in the Myanmar armed forces that are closely associated with the regime. Also listed are politicians and administrators from the Yangon Region involved in the process of death sentences and execution of four democracy activists in July 2022, and in Kachin State, where they oversaw air strikes, massacres, raids, arson and the use of human shields committed by the military.
The listed entities include departments of the Ministry of Defence and a state-owned enterprise under its jurisdiction, as well as private companies supplying fuel, arms and funds to the military.
Restrictive measures currently apply to a total of 93 individuals and 18 entities. Those designated are subject to an asset freeze and a travel ban, which prevents them from entering or transiting through EU territory. In addition, EU persons and entities are prohibited to make funds available to those listed.
Other EU restrictive measure will remain in place: the embargo on arms and equipment and export restrictions on equipment for monitoring communications which might be used for internal repression, the export ban on dual-use goods for use by the military and border guard police, and the prohibition of military training and cooperation with the Tatmadaw.
The restrictive measures come in addition to the withholding of EU financial assistance directly going to the government and the freezing of all EU assistance that may be seen as legitimising the junta.
The EU condemns in the strongest possible terms the grave human rights violations, including sexual and gender-based violence, the persecution of civil society, human rights defenders and journalists, attacks on the civilian population, targeting also children and persons belonging to ethnic and religious minorities across the country, and recent deadly air strikes on civilian targets, including on schools and hospitals, by the Myanmar armed forces. Those responsible for the coup, as well as the perpetrators of violence and gross human rights violations, should be held accountable. The EU reiterates its call for increased international preventive action, including an arms embargo in order to cease the sale and transfer of arms and equipment, as they facilitate the military’s atrocities.
All hostilities must stop immediately. The military authorities must fully respect international humanitarian law, and put an end to the indiscriminate use of force.
The European Union supports ASEAN’s and the UN´s efforts to help Myanmar to find a peaceful solution to the crisis and welcomes the UN Security Council’s adoption of Resolution 2669 on Myanmar. Myanmar should swiftly and faithfully implement ASEAN’s Five-Point Consensus, as reiterated at the 40th and 41st ASEAN Summits in November 2022, and at the EU-ASEAN Commemorative Summit in December 2022.
The relevant legal acts have been published in the Official Journal of the European Union.
Background
In February 2021, the Council adopted conclusions condemning in the strongest terms the military coup carried out in Myanmar/Burma.
On 31 January 2023, the High Representative issued a declaration on behalf of the EU on the 2nd anniversary of the military take-over stating that, in the absence of any swift progress on the situation in Myanmar, the EU stood ready to adopt further restrictive measures against those directly responsible for and those abetting the undermining of democracy and the serious human rights violations in the country.
The Council has imposed restrictive measures against those responsible for the military coup staged in Myanmar/Burma on 1 February 2021, and the subsequent military and police repression against peaceful demonstrators on 22 March, 19 April and 21 June 2021, and 21 February and 8 November 2022..."
Source/publisher:
Council of the European Union
Date of publication:
2023-02-20
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-20
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Sanctions, Business and the Military, The Burmese military's role in the economy, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
Language:
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Sub-title:
Junta Should Drop Charges, Free Rev. Hkalam Samson, Others Wrongly Held
Description:
"(Sydney) – Myanmar’s military junta should drop politically motivated charges against the Kachin Baptist leader Reverend Hkalam Samson and immediately release him, Human Rights Watch said today. Rev. Samson’s next hearing, on counterterrorism law charges, which only his lawyer is permitted to attend, is scheduled for February 21, 2023, at a special court inside Myitkyina prison.
“The junta’s politically motivated case against Rev. Hkalam Samson, who is internationally renowned for his humanitarian and community work, shows that no one is safe in Myanmar,” said Elaine Pearson, Asia director at Human Rights Watch. “The junta should drop the baseless charges against Rev. Samson and immediately and unconditionally release him.”
On December 5, 2022, junta immigration officials and police arrested Rev. Samson at Mandalay International Airport, preventing him from leaving the country. Junta authorities have not disclosed his whereabouts but are apparently holding him at Myitkyina prison where the hearings are being held in a closed court. His family have not been allowed to see or communicate with him since his arrest.
In December, the junta charged Rev. Samson under section 17 of the Unlawful Associations Act for allegedly meeting with ethnic Kachin armed group leaders in January 2022, and section 505A of the penal code for “incitement” after holding a group prayer with members of the opposition National Unity Government (NUG). The offenses carry prison terms of up to 3 years each. The junta frequently uses vaguely worded and loosely interpreted provisions in its penal code to imprison peaceful activists. The hearings for these two charges concluded on February 14 with no verdict.
On February 14, the junta announced an additional charge against Rev. Samson under section 52A of the counterterrorism law for allegedly meeting with a member of the opposition National Unity Government, punishable by up to seven years in prison.
Rev. Samson, 65, is the former head of the Kachin Baptist Convention and is chairman of the Kachin National Consultative Assembly, which facilitated peace talks with the previous National League for Democracy party civilian government.
In 2019, he was among a group of 27 representatives from 17 countries to meet then US President Donald Trump in Washington, DC to highlight the plight of victims of ethnic and religious persecution. Shortly after the trip, the military opened a case against him for his comments at the White House criticizing Myanmar’s persecution of Christian minority groups. The authorities dropped the case after the US State Department expressed concern.
Since the military coup in February 2021, junta security forces have carried out deadly crackdowns against the political opposition to military rule, arbitrarily detained more than 19,000 people, and committed numerous crimes against humanity and war crimes across the country, documented by Human Rights Watch and other groups.
Myanmar’s junta courts are neither independent nor provide basic fair trial rights. Many trials are held in grossly unjust closed-door military tribunals or in “special courts” inside prison facilities where detainees gain access to their lawyer only on the day of their trial.
United Nations member countries, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), in particular, Indonesia as chair of ASEAN, and other concerned governments should press the junta to immediately release all those wrongfully detained or imprisoned, including Rev. Samson.
“The prosecution of a high-profile Kachin religious figure like Rev. Samson is a heavy-handed attempt to chill all dissent among ethnic minority leaders,” Pearson said. “ASEAN and other concerned governments should press for the release of Rev. Samson and others wrongfully detained since the February 2021 coup..."
Source/publisher:
Human Rights Watch (USA)
Date of publication:
2023-02-20
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-20
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Freedom of opinion and expression: - the situation in Burma/Myanmar - reports, analyses, recommendations, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
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Description:
"Burma Campaign UK today welcomed new European Union sanctions targeting the Burmese military and associates facilitating their crimes.
Nine people and seven companies/entities have been added to the list of those sanctioned.
This round of sanctions is well targeted, focusing on suppliers of aviation fuel, arms brokers, military procurement entities and members of the Burmese military and associated bodies.
The new sanctions apply to:
Aviation fuel supplier
Asia Sun Group
9 Individuals
Hlaing Oo, Chair of Myanmar Chemical and Machinery (MCM), who has brokered arms and equipment to the Burmese military.
Sit Taing Aung, who has brokered arms and equipment to the Burmese military.
Kyaw Min Oo, Director of Sky Aviator, who has brokered arms and equipment to the Burmese military.
Moe Aung, Commander-in-Chief of the Myanmar Navy.
Maung Maung Aye, Chief of General Staff for the Myanmar army, navy, and air force.
Myo Myint Aung, Yangon Region economic Minister of the State Administration Council (SAC).
Zin Min Htet, Deputy Minister for Home Affairs and Chief of the Myanmar Police Force.
Ko Ko Maung, Regional Military Commander in Kachin State.
Myo Myint Oo, Union Minister for Energy.
3 Military arms procurement bodies
Myanmar Office of the Quarter Master General, Myanmar Directorate of Defense Industries, Myanmar Directorate of Defense Procurement.
3 Arms Brokers
Dynasty Group of Companies, International Gateways Group of Company Limited (IGG), and Sky Aviator Company Limited.
The new sanctions legislation is available here.
“These new EU sanctions are right on target, aimed at limiting airstrikes and supplies of arms and equipment, as well as targeting individuals responsible for serious human rights violations,” said Anna Roberts, Executive Director of Burma Campaign UK. “The EU has the right approach, but they are moving too slowly to implement these sanctions. The delay in cutting off sources of revenue, arms, and equipment is costing lives.”
There were only two rounds of EU Burma sanctions in 2022, despite the increased use of airstrikes against civilian targets, the first executions of political prisoners in decades, and the number of political prisoners reaching an all-time record high of more than 13,000.
Last week, the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners – Burma reported that the number of those killed since the attempted coup began has reached 3,000. This figure is an underestimate because of the challenges of documentation in many parts of the country.
“Two years on from the coup, there are hundreds of companies and individuals which should be sanctioned, but have not been,” said Anna Roberts. “The people of Burma are doing everything they can to resist military rule and defend human rights, but the same can’t be said for the EU, UK or USA. The EU is implementing the right policy, but far too slowly.”..."
Source/publisher:
"Burma Campaign UK" (London)
Date of publication:
2023-02-20
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-20
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Buddhist Economics, Sanctions, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, The Burmese military's role in the economy
Language:
more
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2023-02-20
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-20
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
464.38 KB
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Description:
"၁။ယနေ့သည် ချင်းလူမျိုးများအားလုံး အလေးအမြတ်ထားသည့် ဂုဏ်ယူဖွယ် နေ့ထူးနေ့မြတ် တစ်ရက် ဖြစ်သည်။ နှစ်စဉ် ဖေဖော်ဝါရီလ (၂၀) ရက်နေ့တွင် ကျရောက်သော ချင်းအမျိုးသားနေ့သည် ယနေ့တွင် စိန်ရတု အထိမ်းအမှတ် (၇၅) နှစ် တိုင်တိုင် ပြည့်မြောက်ခဲ့ပြီဖြစ်သည်။ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၊ ကာကွယ်ရေး ဝန်ကြီးဌာန အနေဖြင့် (၇၅) နှစ်မြောက် စိန်ရတု ချင်းအမျိုးသားနေ့အား ချင်းလူမျိုးများနှင့် ထပ်တူထပ်မျှ အလေးထားဂုဏ်ယူပါကြောင်းနှင့် ပြည်ထောင်စု အတွင်းသာမက ကမ္ဘာ့အနယ်နယ်အရပ်ရပ်တွင် ရောက်ရှိ နေထိုင်ကြသော ချင်းလူမျိုးများ အားလုံး စိတ္တသုခ၊ ကာယသုခ နှစ်ဖြာပြည့်စုံပါစေကြောင်း ဦးစွာ ဆုမွန်ကောင်း တောင်းအပ်ပါသည်။
၂။ဗြိတိသျှကိုလိုနီလက်အောက်သို့ ချင်းပြည်မကျရောက်မီ ချင်းအမျိုးသားများသည် ကိုယ်ပိုင်အုပ်ချုပ်မှု၊ ကိုယ်ပိုင်ယဉ်ကျေးမှုစာပေ၊ ကိုယ်ပိုင်ဓလေ့ထုံးတမ်းများဖြင့် သမိုင်းအစဉ်အလာ ကြီးမားစွာ အစဉ်အဆက် နေထိုင်ခဲ့ကြသည်။
၃။ဗြိတိသျှကိုလိုနီနယ်ချဲ့အား ရွပ်ရွပ်ချွံချွံ ခုံခံတွန်းလှန်သည်မှစ၍ ပင်လုံစာချုပ်တွင် လက်မှတ်ရေးထိုးပြီး တောင်တန်းပြည်မ အတူတကွ လွတ်လပ်ရေး အရယူနိုင်ခဲ့သည်အထိ ချင်းလူမျိုးများ၏ ရဲရင့်မှု၊ စွန့်လွှတ် အနစ်နာခံမှုများသည် သမိုင်းတွင် ဂုဏ်ရောင်ပြောင်စွာ စွဲထင်ကျန်လျက်ရှိသည်။ အလားတူပင် နွေဦး တော်လှန်ရေးတွင်လည်း ချင်းလူမျိုးများ၏ ဦးဆောင်ပေးဆပ် တိုက်ပွဲဝင်နေမှုများကို အထင်းသား မြင်တွေ့ နိုင်သည်။
၄။၁၉၄၈ ခုနှစ် ဖေဖော်ဝါရီလ (၁၉) ရက်နေ့မှ (၂၂) ရက်နေ့အထိ ချင်းပြည်နယ်၊ ဖလမ်းမြို့တွင် လွတ်လပ်ရေးနေ့ အောင်ပွဲသဘင်အခမ်းအနားနှင့် လူထုညီလာခံကြီးကျင်းပခဲ့သည်။ ထိုလူထုညီလာခံကြီးသို့ နိုင်ငံတော်သမ္မတ စပ်ရွှေသိုက်၊ ချင်းရေးရာဝန်ကြီး ပူဝမ္မသူးမောင်း၊ ပြန်ကြားရေးဝန်ကြီးဦးညိုထွန်း၊ တိုင်းမင်းကြီး စည်သူဦးသိမ်းမောင်တို့အပြင် ချင်းဝိသေသတိုင်းတစ်ခုလုံးမှ ချင်းလူထုကိုယ်စားလှယ်များလည်း တက်ရောက် ကြသည်။ ဖေဖော်ဝါရီလ (၂၀) ရက်နေ့ လူထုညီလာခံကြီးတွင် တိုက်သူကြီးများအုပ်ချုပ်မှု စနစ်ဟောင်းမှ ဒီမိုကရေစီအုပ်ချုပ်မှု စနစ်သစ်သို့ ကူးပြောင်းရန် အဆိုကို တက်ရောက်လာသော ချင်းကိုယ်စားလှယ်ကြီးများမှ ဒီမိုကရေစီနည်းလမ်းတကျ မဲခွဲဆုံးဖြတ် အတည်ပြုနိုင်ခဲ့သည်။
၅။အဆိုပါနေ့ကို အစွဲပြု၍ ၁၉၅၀ ခုနှစ် အောက်တိုဘာလ(၉) ရက်နေ့တွင် ကျင်းပသော ချင်းရေးရာကောင်စီ အစည်းအဝေးတွင် တက်ရောက်လာကြသူများအားလုံးမှ ချင်းအမျိုးသားနေ့အဖြစ် တညီတညွတ်တည်း သဘောတူ သတ်မှတ်အတည်ပြုခဲ့ကြသည်။ ချင်းလူမျိုးများ၏ ရိုးရာယဉ်ကျေးမှု ဓလေ့ထုံးတမ်းများကို မပျောက်မပျက် ထိန်းသိမ်းပြီး ချင်းအမျိုးသားနေ့ အထိမ်းအမှတ် အခမ်းအနားများကို ကမ္ဘာ့နယ်ပယ် အရပ်ရပ်တွင် စည်းကားသိုက်မြိုက် ဂုဏ်ယူစွာ ကျင်းပလာခဲ့သည်မှာ ယနေ့တိုင်ပင် ဖြစ်သည်။
၆။အာဏာရှင်တော်လှန်ရေး အဆက်ဆက်မှသည် ယနေ့ ပြည်သူလူထုတရပ်လုံး ပါဝင်ဆင်နွှဲနေသည့် ပြည်သူ့တော်လှန်ရေးကြီးအတွင်း အသက်၊အိုးအိမ်၊စည်းစိမ် စွန့်လွှတ်ပေးဆပ်တိုက်ပွဲ ဝင်လျက်ရှိသော ချင်းအမျိုးသားအာဇာနည်များ၊ သူရဲကောင်းများနှင့်တကွ ချင်းပြည်သူများအားလုံးကိုလည်း လေးနက်စွာ အောက်မေ့ဦးညွှတ် အပ်ပါသည်။
၇။ပြည်သူ့တော်လှန်ရေးကြီးနှင့် ပြည်သူလူထုတရပ်လုံး၏ ဘုံပန်းတိုင်ဖြစ်သော ကိုယ်ပိုင်အုပ်ချုပ်ခွင့်၊ ကိုယ်ပိုင်ပြဌာန်းခွင့်၊ တန်းတူရေးနှင့် တရားမျှတမှု အပြည့်အဝရှိသည့် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီပြည်ထောင်စုသစ်ကို ထူထောင်နိုင်ရန် ဘုံရန်သူ စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ်ဆိုးအား အမြစ်ဖြတ်ချေမှုန်းရန် အတူတကွ လက်တွဲပြီး “တသံတည်းညီ၊တချီတည်းရုန်း” ကြိုးစားလျှောက်လှမ်းကြပါစို့ဟု တိုက်တွန်းပြောကြားလျက် ယနေ့ ၂၀၂၃ ခုနှစ် ဖေဖော်ဝါရီလ (၂၀) ရက်နေ့တွင် ကျရောက်သည့် (၇၅) နှစ်မြောက် စိန်ရတု အထိမ်းအမှတ် ချင်းအမျိုးသားနေ့သို့ ဤသဝဏ်လွှာအား ဂုဏ်ယူစွာဖြင့် ပေးပို့အပ်ပါသည်။
ကာကွယ်ရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာနအမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2023-02-20
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-20
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
314.15 KB
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"Dear my beloved Chin people of Indiana, respected leaders of Chin Community of Indiana (CCI), Chin Baptist Churches of USA (CBC- USA), Burma Advocacy Group of USA, honourable Senator Todd Young, honourable Governor and all Indiana state officials, Mingalarpar to you all. Thank you for inviting me today on this special occasion of the 75th anniversary of Chin National Day. Thank you for all your efforts to make Indiana a twin state to Chin state in Myanmar based on our shared federal democratic values and principles. Thank you also for your efforts to include the Burma Act into the NDAA. Thank you for your leadership at UN Security Council on the Resolution regarding the situation in Myanmar. Thank you for your support for Myanmar refugees, IDPs, PDFs, CDFs, EROs, the CRPH, NUG, and NUCC. Thank you for your solidarity with the brave people of Myanmar in this darkest moment in our history as your predecessors, the founding fathers always stood strong for the Federal Democratic values and principles in which they believed. The brave people of Myanmar are committed to those same Federal Democratic values and principles and remain firm and unshakeable in their resolve despite 75 years of oppression by the brutal dictatorship.
The 75th Anniversary of Chin National Day has everything to do with the 76th anniversary of the signing of the Panglong agreement which was a historical agreement that led to the Burma’s independence from Britain. In fact, Chin National Day was supposed to mark the implementation of the Panglong agreement which was based on Federal Democratic values and principles. 75 years ago, if the Panglong agreement had been implemented, Chin state could have become a flourishing state in Myanmar just as Indiana is a flourishing state in the USA. Chin state could have been as vibrant and prosperous as Hong Kong or Singapore are today but 75 years of failure to implement the Panglong agreement, has left Chin state broken and weak; the victim of three quarters of a century of military oppression, and now officially become the poorest state in Myanmar where conditions are gradually worsening to those of North Korea.
In fact, the 75th anniversary of Chin National Day is supposed to be marking 75 years of the fulfilment of the promise of self-administration, political autonomy, and self-determination for the Chin people. Sadly, we are marking today 75 years of oppression, 75 years of attacks on our Federal Democratic values and principles by a brutal repressive dictatorship. Before British rule, for centuries the Chin people enjoyed self-administration, self-determination, and political autonomy. We had our own kings and royal family and were never ruled by an outside power. Due to the 75 years of oppression by the horrific dictatorship, the Chin people have not only lost their self-determination, self-administration, and political autonomy but have also suffered genocidal attacks from successive brutal dictators.
Despite these genocidal attacks, our ancestors fought hard for freedom and federal democracy which were lost completely under the reign of terror carried out by the brutal military junta. Today I would like to take this opportunity to pay my respects to our ancestors for their bravery and courage. Our ancestors passed on this noble duty to retake our freedom for which we have fought and struggled as a people for the last 75 years. This sacred duty is in your hands and in my hands. We cannot afford to fail our ancestors in this undertaking. Today I also would like to take this opportunity to salute our brave men and women who are risking their lives everyday in the fight for freedom and federal democracy. This revolution of Myanmar is being fought not only for our generation, but for our children, grandchildren, and many generations to come so that they may live in freedom, justice, peace and prosperity. The burden of revolution is heavy but dear friends, freedom is worth the sacrifice.
In the last 24 months alone, the genocidal military junta have carried out more than 9,000 attacks on the people of Burma, killed more than 3,000 unarmed civilians, arrested more than 20,000 people including the duly elected president U Win Myint and State counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, and have wilfully destroyed more than 50,000 homes, schools, churches, and monasteries. These horrific atrocities have forced more than 1.6 million into homeless and they are now living as refugees and IDPs. Furthermore, as a result of the military's cruelty, more than 17 million people across Burma are great in needs of humanitarian assistance - compare to less than 1 million in 2020. One in three people are now acute in need of humanitarian aid and half population of Myanmar are being forced to live in extreme poverty. The brutal military junta are using hunger and starvation as weapons.
This is the same causes that the brave people of Ukraine are fighting for. In fact, the Myanmar crisis is Asia’s Ukraine crisis. Therefore, we are united with our Ukrainian brothers and sisters in the struggle for freedom and democracy, they are fighting in Europe and we, the brave people of Myanmar, are fighting here in Asia. Victory belongs to the brave peoples of Myanmar and Ukraine.
Respected leaders, honourable Senator Todd Young, honourable Governor, officials, and my beloved people, in order to accomplish this mission to root out the brutal oppressive military dictatorship, and to begin building the new state of Chinland and the new federal democratic union of Myanmar, we need your continuous help, prayers, support, and above all action to push for the immediate and inclusive implementation of the 8 points of Burma Act of NDAA, the 10 points of UN Security Council Resolution in Myanmar and the 5 points of ASEAN Consensus on Myanmar. If the international community fails to implement these 23 points on the ground in Myanmar, we will see a return to the failures of the implementation of the Panglong agreement 75 years ago; a failure Myanmar cannot afford.
My friends, my brothers and sisters, let us be very clear that the future of Chinland is in the hands of the Chin people. The future of the Chin people depends on our faith and hope for the future and our commitment and prayers to Almighty God. Its amazing to see great revival taking place in Asbury University of USA, we need the same revival to take place among our generation Z. If possible please take 1 hour of the 24 hours a day to commit yourself to Almighty God in prayer for seeking God’s Kingdom and His Righteousness. The greater our commitment and the stronger our trust in God, the sooner we will see the glorious future which awaits us all. We know that good will defeat evil, the light will overcome darkness, and we also know that freedom will be victory over tyranny and federal democracy will replace the evil oppressive military dictatorship.
I hope and pray that Indiana will fully become a twin state for the future federal democratic Chin state of Myanmar. I hope and pray that the 8 points of the Burma Act of NDAA, the 10 points of UN Security Council Resolution in Myanmar, and the 5 points of ASEAN Consensus on Myanmar will immediately be implemented on the ground in Myanmar. I hope and pray that you will help us to stop genocidal military generals from attending ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus) meetings. I hope and pray that we will soon end the 75 years of oppression, pain, suffering, deaths and destruction. I hope and pray that the dream of Chinland will become a reality sooner rather than later. I hope and pray that we will soon see a free Myanmar, a new Myanmar of federal democracy for all her people, regardless of race, religion, gender, language, colour, culture, ethnicity, and background so that we may make this world a better place for all.....လေးစားအပ်ပါသော USA Indiana ပြည်နယ်ရှိ ချင်းပြည်သူလူထုများ၊ Chin Community of Indiana၊ Chin Baptist Churches of USA (CBC-USA)၊ Burma Advocacy Group of USA ခေါင်းဆောင်များ၊ US Indiana ပြည်နယ် Senator လွှတ်တော်ကိုယ်စားလှယ် Senator Todd Young နှင့်တကွ Indiana ပြည်နယ် အုပ်ချုပ်ရေးမှူးနှင့် ပြည်နယ်မှူးများအားလုံး မင်္ဂလာပါ။ (၇၅)ကြိမ်မြောက် ချင်းအမျိုးသားနေ့အခမ်းအနားတွင် ဖိတ်ကြားသည့်အတွက် အထူးကျေးဇူးတင်ပါသည်။ USA Indiana ပြည်နယ်ကို မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ ချင်းပြည်နယ်နှင့် အမွှာပြည်နယ် ဖြစ်လာအောင် ကြိုးစား ပူးပေါင်းဆောင်ရွက်ပေးခြင်းကြောင့်လည်းကောင်း၊ BURMA Act ဥပဒေကို NDAA ဥပဒေတွင် အတည်ပြုရာမှာ အဘက်ဘက်မှ ပူးပေါင်းဆောင်ရွက်ပေးခြင်းကြောင့်လည်းကောင်း၊ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၏ အခြေအနေနှင့် ပတ်သက်ပြီး UN Security Council Resolution ဆုံးဖြတ်ချက် ကျနိုင်ဖို့ရန်အတွက် ပူးပေါင်းဆောင်ရွက်ပေးခြင်းကြောင့်လည်းကောင်း၊ US အစိုးရအဖွဲ့အစည်းများ၊ US အစိုးရမဟုတ်သော အဖွဲ့အစည်းများမှတဆင့် မြန်မာပြည်သူလူထုများ၊ Refugee/IDP များ၊ CDM များ၊ PDF/CDF များ၊ EROs များ၊ CRPH၊ NUG နှင့် NUCC များအား ကူညီပံ့ပိုးပေးသည့်အတွက်လည်ကောင်း အထူးကျေးဇူးတင်ရှိပါကြောင်းနှင့် ဘုရားသခင် ကောင်းချီးပေးပါစေကြောင်း ပြောကြားလိုပါသည်။ USA ရှိ ဘိုးဘွားများက ရာစုနှစ်ပေါင်းများစွာ ဖက်ဒရယ် ဒီမိုကရေစီ၏ တန်ဖိုးကိုယုံကြည်ပြီး ၄င်းတန်ဖိုးများကို အသက်သွင်းကာ ၄င်းတန်ဖိုးများနှင့်အတူ အမြဲတမ်းရပ်တည်သကဲ့သို့ ယနေ့ အမေရိကန်ပြည်ထောင်စု ပြည်သူများသည်လည်း ရဲရင့်သတ္တိရှိသော မြန်မာပြည်သူလူထုကြီးနှင့်အတူ ဤအမှောင်ဆုံးသောကာလမှာ အတူတကွ ရပ်တည်ပေးသောကြောင့် အထူးကျေးဇူးတင်ရှိပါသည်။ ရဲရင့်သတ္တိရှိသောမြန်မာပြည်သူလူထုကြီး၏ ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီအတွက် ပေးဆပ်ခြင်းနှင့် သစ္စာရှိခြင်းသည် ခိုင်မာလှပြီး နှစ်ပေါင်း(၇၅)အတွင်း ရက်စက်ကြမ်းကြုတ်သော အာဏာရှင်စနစ်ကပင်လျင် မြန်မာပြည်သူလူထုကြီး၏ ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီစိတ်ဓာတ်ကို မဖျက်စီးနိုင်ပါ။
(၇၅)ကြိမ်မြောက် ချင်းအမျိုးသားနေ့သည် (၇၆) ကြိမ်မြောက် ပင်လုံစာချုပ် ချုပ်ဆိုသောနေ့နှင့် တိုက်ရိုက် ဆက်စပ်နေပြီး ပင်လုံစာချုပ်သည် ဗြိတိသျှအုပ်ချုပ်ရေးမှ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံလွတ်လပ်ရေးကို အသက်သွင်းပေးသော သမိုင်း၀င်စာချုပ်ဖြစ်သည်။ အမှန်စင်စစ်အားဖြင့် ချင်းအမျိုးသားနေ့သည် မြန်မာ့လွတ်လပ်ရေးစာချုပ်ဖြစ်သည့် ပင်လုံစာချုပ်ကြီး၏ ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီ ကတိက၀တ်များကို အကောင်အထည်ဖော်နိုင်ရန်အတွက် ပေါ်ပေါက်လာခဲ့ပါသည်။ လွန်ခဲ့သော (၇၅)နှစ်အတွင်း ပင်လုံစာချုပ်ကြီးကို ချင်းပြည်နယ်တွင် အကောင်အထည်ဖော်ခဲ့လျှင် ချင်းပြည်နယ်သည် USA တွင် ဖက်ဒရယ် ပြည်နယ်တစ်ခုဖြစ်သော Indiana ပြည်နယ်ကဲ့သို့လည်းကောင်း၊ ကမ္ဘာ့အလယ်တွင် အချမ်းသာဆုံး ဒေသတစ်ခုဖြစ်လာသော ဟောင်ကောင် (Hong Kong) ကဲ့သို့လည်းကောင်း၊ လွတ်လပ်သော မြို့နိုင်ငံအဖြစ် ယနေ့ကမ္ဘာ့အချမ်းသာဆုံးနိုင်ငံ တစ်ခုဖြစ်လာသည့် စင်ကာပူနိုင်ငံ (Singapore) ကဲ့သို့လည်းကောင်း ဖြစ်နိုင်ချေ အပြည့်အဝရှိသော်ငြားလည်းပဲ (၇၅)နှစ်အတွင်း ပင်လုံစာချုပ်ကို ချင်းပြည်နယ်တွင် အကောင်အထည်ဖော်ရန် ပျက်ကွက်ခဲ့ခြင်းနှင့် ခေတ်အဆက်ဆက် အာဏာရှင်တို့၏ ရက်စက်ယုတ်မာခြင်းကြောင့် ယနေ့ချင်းပြည်နယ်သည် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံမှာ အဆင်းရဲဆုံးသောပြည်နယ်ဖြစ်လာပြီး မြန်မာနိုင်ငံသည်လည်း ကမ္ဘာမှာ အဆိုးရွားဆုံးဖြစ်သည့် မြောက်ကိုရီးယား(North Korea) ထက် ပိုမိုဆိုးရွားသော အခြေအနေကို ရောက်ရှိနေပြီဖြစ်ပါသည်။
(၇၅)ကြိမ်မြောက် ချင်းအမျိုးသားနေ့သည် အမှန်စင်စစ်ပြောရမည်ဆိုလျင် ပင်လုံစာချုပ်၏ ကတိကဝတ်များဖြစ်သော ကိုယ်ပိုင်အုပ်ချုပ်ခွင့်ရသောနေ့၊ ကိုယ်ပိုင်ပြဌာန်းခွင့်ရသောနေ့နှင့် ကိုယ့်ကံကြမ္မာကိုယ့်ဖန်တီးခွင့်ရသောနေ့ အထိမ်းအမှတ်ဖြစ်သော်ငြားလည်းပဲ လက်တွေ့မှာမူ (၇၅)နှစ်အတွင်း ချင်းပြည်နယ်သည် ပင်လုံစာချုပ်ပါအခွင့်အရေးများအားလုံးကို ဆုံးရှုံးသွားပြီး ယုတ်မာသော အာဏာရှင်များ၏ နည်းအမျိုးမျိုး ဖိနှိပ်ချုပ်ချယ်ခြင်းကိုသာ ခါးစီးခံခဲ့ရပါသည်။ ချင်းပြည်နယ်သည် ကိုလိုနီခေတ်မတိုင်ခင်ကတည်းကပင် သူ့စော်ဘွားနှင့်သူ ကိုယ်ပိုင်အုပ်ချုပ်ခွင့်၊ ကိုယ်ပိုင်ပြဌာန်းခွင့်နှင့် ကိုယ့်ကံကြမ္မာကိုယ့်ဖန်တီးခွင့် အပြည့်အဝဖြင့် ရာစုနှစ်ပေါင်းများစွာနေလာခဲ့သော ပြည်နယ်ဖြစ်ပြီး ချင်းသမိုင်းတွင် ဗြိတိသျှအုပ်ချုပ်ရေးကလွဲပြီး အခြားပြင်ပမှ အုပ်ချုပ်ခြင်း မရှိခဲ့ပေ။ သို့သော် အာဏာရှင်များ၏ ရက်စက်ယုတ်မာခြင်းကြောင့် ချင်းပြည်နယ်သည် ပင်လုံစာချုပ်ပါ အခွင့်အရေးအားလုံးကို ဆုံးရှုံးသွားခဲ့ပြီး ယနေ့တွင် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၏ တရားဝင် အဆင်းရဲဆုံးပြည်နယ်ဖြစ်လာသည်သာမက အာဏာရှင်များ၏ လူမျိုးတုံး တိုက်ခိုက်ခြင်းကြောင့် ချင်းလူမျိုးများသည် လူမျိုးတုံးနိုင်ခြေရှိသည့် အနေအထားကို ရောက်ရှိနေပြီဖြစ်ပါသည်။ ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီ အနှစ်သာရအားလုံးကို ဆုံးရှုံးသွားအောင် တိုက်ခိုက်သည်သာမက ချင်းလူမျိုးများ လူမျိုးတုံးအောင် တိုက်ခိုက်လာသည့် အလွန်ရက်စက်ယုတ်မာသော အာဏာရှင်များကို ခေတ်အဆက်ဆက်တော်လှန်လာခဲ့သော ဘိုးဘွားများ၊ ချင်းအမျိုးသား သူရဲကောင်းများအားလုံး၏ ရဲရင့်သောသတ္တိကိုလည်း လေးစားစွာဖြင့် အလေးပြုအပ်ပါသည်။
လွန်ခဲ့သော (၇၅)နှစ်အတွင်း ဆုံးရှုံးသွားသည့် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီအရေးနှင့် ချင်းပြည်လွတ်လပ်ရေးကိုပြန်ရဖို့ရန်အတွက် ဘိုးဘွားမိဘခေတ်ကတည်းက တော်လှန်လာခဲ့သော အာဏာရှင်အမြစ်ပြတ်တော်လှန်ရန် သမိုင်းပေးသောတာ၀န်သည် ယနေ့ ကျွန်တော်တို့လက်ထဲသို့ ရောက်ရှိလာပြီဖြစ်သည်။ သမိုင်းကပေးအပ်လာသော ဤတာဝန်ကို မပျက်မကွက်ထမ်းဆောင်ရန် လိုအပ်ပါသည်။ ဤတော်လှန်ရေးကြီးသည် ကျွန်တော်တို့ ခေတ်အတွက်သာမက နောင်လာနောင်သား သားစဉ်မြေးဆက်များအားလုံးအတွက် ကိုယ်ပိုင်အုပ်ချုပ်ခွင့်၊ လွတ်လပ်ခွင့်၊ ကိုယ်ပိုင်ပြဌာန်းခွင့်နှင့် ကိုယ့်ကံကြမ္မာကိုယ့်ဖန်တီးခွင့်ကိုပေးမည့် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီ အပြည့်အဝရရှိနိုင်ရန်အတွက် တော်လှန်ရေးကြီးဖြစ်သောကြောင့် တန်ဖိုးကြီးလှပြီး တာဝန်လည်းကြီးလှပါသည်။
ရက်စက်ယုတ်မာသော အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အာဏာရှင်များသည် လွန်ခဲ့သော (၂၄)လအတွင်း အပြစ်မဲ့ပြည်သူလူထုအပေါ် အကြိမ်ပေါင်း(၉)ထောင်ထက်မနည်း အကြမ်းဖက်တိုက်ခိုက်ခြင်းကြောင့် အပြစ်မဲ့ပြည်သူလူထု (၃)ထောင်ထက်မနည်း အသက်များဆုံးရှုံးသွားခဲ့ရပါသည်။ ဒီမိုကရေစီနည်းနဲ့ လူထုရွေးကောက်တင်မြောက်ထားသောသမ္မတကြီးဦး၀င်းမြင့်၊ နိုင်ငံတော်အတိုင်ပင်ခံ ဒေါ်အောင်ဆန်းစုကြည်နှင့်အတူ အပြစ်မဲ့ပြည်သူလူထု (၂)သောင်းကျော်ကိုလည်း မတရားဖမ်းဆီးချုပ်နှောင်ခြင်းထားပြီး လူနေအိမ်၊ စာသင်ကျောင်း၊ ဘုရားကျောင်း၊ ဘုန်းကြီးကျောင်းအပါအ၀င် ပြည်သူလူထု၏ အိုးအိမ်ပေါင်း (၅)သောင်းကျော်ကို ရက်ရက်စက်စက် ဗုံးကြဲတိုက်ခိုက် မီးရှို့ဖျက်စီးခြင်းများပြုလုပ်ခဲ့ပါသည်။ နေ့စဉ် လူ့အခွင့်အရေးချိုးဖောက်ခြင်းများစွာနှင့်အတူ စစ်ရာဇ၀တ်မှူကို ကျူးလွန်လျက်ရှိပါသည်။ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အာဏာရှင်များသည် မြန်မာပြည်သူလူထုအပေါ် စစ်ကြေငြာပြီး ရက်စက်ယုတ်မာစွာ လူမဆန်အကြမ်းဖက်တိုက်ခိုက်ခြင်းကြောင့် ပြည်သူလူထု (၁.၆)သန်းထက်မနည်း ဒုက္ခသည်ဘ၀မှာ ဆင်းရဲနွမ်းပါးမှူပေါင်းများစွာ ခံစားနေရပါသည်။ ၂၀၂၀ခုနှစ်မှာ လူဦးရေ (၁)သန်းအောက် လူသားချင်းစာနာထောက်ထားရေးအကူအညီ လိုအပ်သည်မှ ယနေ့ ၂၀၂၃ခုနှစ်တွင် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံလူဦးရေ (၁၇)သန်းကျော်သည် အငတ်ဘေးနှင့် ရင်ဆိုင်နေရပြီး လူသားချင်းဆိုင်ရာ စာနာထောက်ထားရေးအကူအညီများ မြောက်များစွာလိုအပ်နေသည့် အခြေအနေကို ဆိုးရွားစွာရောက်ရှိလာခဲ့ပါသည်။ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံလူဦးရေတဝက်ခန့်သည် အလွန်ဆင်းရဲနွမ်းပါးမှုအောက်အခြေအနေကို ရောက်ရှိနေပြီး မြန်မာပြည်သူ (၃)ယောက်တွင် (၁)ယောက်မှာ ငတ်မွတ်ခေါင်းပါးနေသည့်အခြေအနေသို့ ကျရောက်နေပြီး တစ်တိုင်းပြည်လုံး အလွန်ဆိုးရွားသောဒုက္ခကို ခံစားနေရပြီဖြစ်ပါသည်။ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အာဏာရှင်များသည် စစ်လက်နက်သာမက ငတ်မွတ်ခြင်း၊ ခေါင်းပါးခြင်း၊ ရောဂါနှင့် ဆင်းရဲဒုက္ခပေါင်းများစွာကို လက်နက်သဖွယ်အသုံးပြုပြီး မြန်မာပြည်သူထူထုကို အကြမ်းဖက် တိုက်ခိုက်လျက်ရှိပါသည်။
ယူကရိန်းပြည်သူလူထုများသည်လည်း မြန်မာပြည်သူလူထုနည်းတူ လွတ်လပ်ရေးနှင့် ဒီမိုကရေစီရေးအတွက် တိုက်ပွဲ၀င်နေပါသည်။ အမှန်စင်စစ်ပြောရမည်ဆိုလျင် မြန်မာ့အရေးသည် အာရှတိုက်၏ ယူကရိန်းအရေးဖြစ်ပါသည်။ ထို့ကြောင့် မြန်မာပြည်သူလူထုနှင့် ယူကရိန်းပြည်သူလူထုသည် လွတ်လပ်ရေးနှင့် ဒီမိုကရေစီရေး၏ ရှေ့မှာ တစ်ညီတစ်ညွတ်တည်း ရပ်တည်နေပြီး ယူကရိန်းပြည်သူလူထုများသည် ဥရောပတိုက်မှာ လွတ်လပ်ရေးနှင့် ဒီမိုကရေစီအရေးအတွက် တိုက်ပွဲ၀င် တော်လှန်နေသကဲ့သို့ မြန်မာပြည်သူလူထုများသည်လည်း အာရှတိုက်မှာ လွတ်လပ်ရေးနှင့် ဒီမိုကရေစီအရေးအတွက် တိုက်ပွဲ၀င်ပြီး အလွန်ဆိုးရွားသော စစ်အာဏာရှင်များကို တော်လှန်နေပါသည်။ အရေးတော်ပုံအောင်ပွဲသည် မြန်မာပြည်သူလူထုနှင့် ယူကရိန်းပြည်သူလူထုတို့၏လက်ထဲမှာ ရောက်ရှိနေပြီဖြစ်ပါသည်။
ချစ်ခင်လေးစားအပ်ပါသော ပြည်သူလူထုများ၊ ခေါင်းဆောင်များ၊ လွှတ်တော်ကိုယ်စားလှယ် Senator Todd Youngနှင့်တကွ ပြည်နယ်အုပ်ချုပ်ရေးမှူး၊ ပြည်နယ်မှူးများ၊ အရာရှိများ ခင်ဗျာ။ မြန်မာ့နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေးကို အမြန်ဆုံး အောင်မြင်ပြီး စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ်ကို အမြန်ဆုံး အမြစ်ပြတ်ချေမှုန်း၍ ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီနိုင်ငံတော်အသစ်ကို အမြန်ဆုံး တည်ဆောက်နိုင်ရန်အတွက် အားလုံး၏ပူးပေါင်းဆောင်ရွက်ခြင်း၊ ဆက်လက်အကူအညီပေးခြင်း၊ ဆုတောင်းခြင်း၊ ထောက်ခံအားပေးခြင်းများကို လိုအပ်လျှက်ရှိပါသည်။ အထူးသဖြင့် လိုအပ်နေသည်မှာ Burma Act/NDAA ဥပဒေပါ အချက်(၈)ချက်၊ ကုလသမဂ္ဂ လုံခြုံရေးကောင်စီ (UN Security Council)၏ ဆုံးဖြတ်ချက်(၁၀)ချက်နှင့် ASEAN ၏ ဆုံးဖြတ်ချက် (၅)ချက်များဖြစ်သည့် စုစုပေါင်း (၂၃)ချက်ကို မြန်မာနိုင်ငံတွင် အမြန်ဆုံး ဘက်ပေါင်းစုံမှ လက်တွေ့အကောင်အထည်ဖော်ရန်အတွက် အလွန်လိုအပ်နေပါသည်။ သက်ဆိုင်ရာအပြည်ပြည်ဆိုင်ရာအဖွဲ့အစည်းများမှ အထက်ပါအချက် (၂၃)ချက်ကို မြန်မာမြေပြင်တွင် အကောင်အထည်ဖော်ခြင်း ပျက်ကွက်ခဲ့လျှင် ချင်းသမိုင်းတွင် ပင်လုံစာချုပ်ပါ အချက်များအားလုံးကို (၇၅)နှစ်အတွင်း အကောင်အထည်ဖော်ရန် ပျက်ကွက်ခြင်းကြောင့် ခံစားခဲ့ရသော နောက်ဆက်တွဲပြဿနာများကဲ့သို့ ထပ်မဖြစ်ရလေအောင် ဂရုတစိုက်ပူးပေါင်း ဆောင်ရွက်ကြရန် အလွန်အရေးကြီးလှပါသည်။ ဤအချက်(၂၃)ချက်ကို အကောင်အထည်ဖော်ခြင်းပျက်ကွက်မှု၏ဒဏ်ကို မြန်မာနိုင်ငံသည် လုံး၀ခံနိုင်မည်မဟုတ်ပါ။
ချစ်ခင်လေးစားအပ်ပါသော မိတ်ဆွေများ၊ ညီအစ်ကိုမောင်နှမများ ခင်ဗျာ။ ဤအရာများကို ရှင်းရှင်းလင်းလင်းဖြစ်စေချင်ပါသည်။ ချင်းပြည်နယ်၏ အနာဂတ်သည် ချင်းပြည်သူလူထုများ၏ လက်ထဲတွင်ရှိပြီး ချင်းပြည်သူလူထုကြီး၏ အနာဂတ်သည် ချင်းပြည်သူလူထုများ၏ အသက်ရှင်သောထာ၀ရဘုရားကို ယုံကြည်ခြင်း၊ မျှော်လင့်ခြင်း၊ ဆုတောင်းခြင်းအပေါ်မှာ များစွာ မူတည်နေပါသည်။ USA တက္ကသိုလ်တစ်ခုဖြစ်သော Asbury University မှာ နိုးထမှုဖြစ်နေသည်ကို များစွာခွန်အား ယူမိပါသည်။ ထိုကဲ့သို့သော နိုးထမှု(Revival) သည် ကျွန်တော်တို့၏ Generation Z အကြားမှာလည်း ရှိလာနိုင်ရန်အတွက် ဆုတောင်းကြပါရန်နှင့် ဖြစ်နိုင်လျှင် တနေ့(၂၄)နာရီမှာ အနည်းဆုံး(၁)နာရီအချိန်ယူပြီး ဘုရားသခင်၏ နိုင်ငံတော်နှင့် ဖြောင့်မတ်ခြင်းအတွက် အသက်ရှင်သောထာ၀ရဘုရားထံ ဆုတောင်းဆက်ကပ်ကြပါရန် အလေးအနက်တိုက်တွန်းလိုပါသည်။ ချင်းပြည်သူလူထုများ ဘုရားကိုယုံကြည်ခြင်း အားကောင်းလေလေ ဘုရားပြင်ဆင်ပေးထားသော ကြီးမားသည့်အနာဂတ်နှင့် နီးလေလေဖြစ်ပြီး ဘုရားနှင့်အတူ ရှေ့သို့ဆက်လက် ချီတက်လျှင် အောင်ပွဲသည် မနီးမဝေးမှာ ချင်းပြည်သူလူထုကို စောင့်မျှော်နေပါသည်။ အကောင်းသည် အဆိုးကို အနိုင်ယူပြီး အလင်းသည် အမှောင်ကို ဖြိုခွင်းသကဲ့သို့ ရက်စက်ယုတ်မာသော စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ်ဆိုးကြီးကို ကိုယ့်ကံကြမ္မာကိုယ်ဖန်တီးခွင့်ကို အပြည့်အ၀ပေးသော ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီစနစ်က အမြစ်ပြတ်ချေမှုန်းမည်ဖြစ်သည်။
Indiana ပြည်နယ်နှင့် ချင်းပြည်နယ်သည် ပြည်နယ်အမွှာ အပြည့်အဝ ဖြစ်လာပါစေကြောင်း ဆုမွန်ကောင်းတောင်းလျက် မျှော်လင့်နေပါသည်။ Burma Act/NDAA ဥပဒေပါ အချက် (၈)ချက်၊ UN Security Council ဆုံးဖြတ်ချက် (၁၀) ချက်၊ ASEAN ဆုံးဖြတ်ချက် (၅)ချက်များကို မြန်မာမြေပြင်ပေါ်မှာ အမြန်ဆုံး အကောင်အထည်ဖော်နိုင်ပါစေကြောင်း တိုက် တွန်းလျှက် မျှော်လင့်နေပါသည်။ ထို့အတူ ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus)ကို အကြမ်းဖက် စစ်ခေါင်းဆောင်များ တက်ရောက်ရန် ပြင်ဆင်နေခြင်းကို ဝိုင်း၀န်းပြီး တားမြစ်နိုင်ကြလိမ့်မည်ဟု မျှော်လင့်မိပါသည်။ (၇၅)နှစ်အတွင်း ချုပ်နှောင်ခြင်း၊ နာကျင်ခြင်း၊ ဆင်းရဲဒုက္ခရောက်ခြင်း၊ သေဆုံးခြင်း၊ ဆုံးရှုံးခြင်းများ အားလုံးကို အမြန်ဆုံး ချုပ်ငြိမ်းပြီး နိဂုံးချုပ်နိုင်လိမ့်မည်ဟု မျှော်လင့်ပါသည်။ ချင်းပြည်နယ်နှင့် ချင်းပြည်သူများ၏ အိပ်မက်များ အမြန်ဆုံး အမှန်တကယ် ဖြစ်လာပြီး ပြည့်၀သော ဘ၀ခံစားမှုကို ရရှိနိုင်ကြပါစေဟု ဆုမွန်ကောင်းတောင်းအပ်ပါသည်။ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံတွင် အကြမ်းဖက်စစစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ် အမြန်ဆုံး ချုပ်ငြိမ်းပြီး လူမျိုး၊ ဘာသာ၊ ကျား/မ၊ တိုင်းရင်းသား၊ ဆင်းရဲ/ချမ်းသာမရွေး မြန်မာပြည်သူလူထုအားလုံးအတွက် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံတော်အသစ်ဖြစ်သော ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီနိုင်ငံတော်ကြီးကို အမြန်ဆုံး အကောင်အထည်ဖော် တည်ဆောက်နိုင်ပါစေကြောင်း ဆုမွန်ကောင်းတောင်းအပ်ပါသည်။ (၇၅)နှစ်အတွင်း ပျက်ကွက်ခဲ့သော ပင်လုံစာချုပ်ပါ အချက်များအားလုံးကို နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေး အမြန်ဆုံး အတူတကွ အောင်မြင်ခြင်းအားဖြင့် ချင်းပြည်နယ်ကို ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရက်တစ်ပြည်နယ် (Federal Democratic State)အဖြစ် အကောင်အထည်ဖော်ပြီး ချင်းပြည်သူလူထုအားလုံး ကိုယ်ပိုင်ပြဌာန်းခွင့်၊ လွတ်လပ်ခွင့်၊ ကိုယ့်ကံကြမ္မာကိုယ့် ဖန်တီးခွင့်များ အမြန်ဆုံး ခံစားနိုင်ကြပါစေကြောင်း ဆုမွန်ကောင်းတောင်းပေးရင်း နိဂုံးချုပ်အပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of International Cooperation Myanmar
Date of publication:
2023-02-18
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-19
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Chin (Zo)- economic, social, cultural, political
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Sub-title:
Politics in Myanmar is traditionally the domain of older men, but women and youth have been prominent in resistance to the 2021 military takeover. Giving them a bigger voice could have a positive effect on the country’s political culture, no matter how the crisis ends.
Description:
"What’s new? Young people, particularly young women, have been visible and important contributors to the anti-military resistance, challenging age and gender norms in patriarchal Myanmar society. Yet two years after the coup they remain largely excluded from formal political power, and their role in the opposition movement often goes unacknowledged.
Why does it matter? Older men have traditionally dominated Myanmar politics – Aung San Suu Kyi being a notable exception. Policy priorities are skewed to women’s and youth’s detriment. The outcome of Myanmar’s post-coup crisis is uncertain, but changing norms within the anti-military resistance may well shape politics and society more broadly.
What should be done? The parallel National Unity Government should move beyond tokenism to genuinely include women and youth from diverse backgrounds in decision-making to build its credibility and break down patriarchal barriers. Donors should increase support for women- and youth-led organisations, while anti-regime armed groups should review the gendered way they assign recruits.
I.
Overview
A young generation, particularly women, are at the forefront of Myanmar’s armed and non-violent resistance to the 2021 coup d’état, challenging longstanding age and gender norms and hierarchies. Post-coup opposition movements have created opportunities for these people to take on roles that earlier were off limits. Their power within the movements remains limited, however, and intensified fighting in much of the country further jeopardises it. The National Unity Government and other anti-regime forces have strong normative reasons to address this problem. They would also gain from doing so, in that otherwise they may lose core supporters’ sympathies. They should do more to deepen inclusion, particularly of women and youth from diverse socio-economic and ethnic backgrounds. Armed groups should move from assigning people to posts based on gender, possibly by giving both men and women more choice in how they are deployed. No end is in sight to Myanmar’s crisis and its outcome is far from clear, but changing norms within the resistance are likely to influence the country’s politics and society over time.
Prior to the coup, political power in Myanmar lay almost exclusively in the hands of older men. Aung San Suu Kyi, the elected National League for Democracy (NLD) leader ousted by the coup, was a notable exception, in part because she is Western-educated and the daughter of independence leader Aung San. There was progress toward greater inclusivity during the ten years of semi-civilian rule, between 2011 and 2021, but deeply entrenched conservative attitudes and practical barriers erected during half a century of military dictatorship served to keep most women and young people out of formal politics. In some respects, the NLD was even less inclusive than its predecessor, the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party, to the disappointment of activists, civil society figures and some within the party itself.
The coup has helped bring to the fore a new generation, who were instrumental in launching what they call the Spring Revolution in its aftermath, organising nationwide demonstrations, strikes and boycotts. This younger cohort, including Generation Z and millennials, came of age during the decade of semi-civilian governance and has refused to accept a return to military rule. Their views only hardened as the regime brutally cracked down on their largely peaceful protests. From martyred demonstrators to striking garment workers and teachers leading the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM), they have been a powerful symbol of resistance to the junta. They have used their position to challenge traditional age and gender norms and push a progressive agenda, particularly in the political sphere.
Although women are often active participants behind the scenes [of the resistance] ... their contributions often go unrecognised.
Although these youngsters are the driving force of the movement, they have limited clout in its internal councils. Over time, the more inclusive facets of the revolution, such as street protests and the CDM, have lost influence to newly formed armed resistance groups, which are focused on fighting. Not surprisingly, the division of labour within these groups’ ranks is heavily gendered. Although women are often active participants behind the scenes – for example, crafting homemade weapons or raising money – their contributions often go unrecognised.
Although featuring a significant number of ex-NLD figures, the new anti-regime political structures, such as the National Unity Government (NUG) and National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC), are more diverse than the NLD-era government and parliament. Diversity is more evident in terms of ethnicity than age or gender, however. Although the NUG has several women ministers, most of the top positions remain held by older men. The same is true of Myanmar’s ethnic armed groups, which predate the military takeover but whose sway has grown in the post-coup conflict. Apart from cultural attitudes that favour older male leaders, socio-economic factors remain a barrier to broader inclusion, particularly for women.
Meanwhile, the military regime has closed off what few opportunities existed for younger people, and women of all ages, to exercise political leadership. The junta is dominated by serving and former military officers, making it highly unrepresentative of Myanmar society, and all indications are that general elections planned for late 2023 or early 2024 will bring only cosmetic change. Despite the junta’s claims to the contrary, the vote is intended to entrench military control of nominally civilian structures, such as the national assembly. Directly or indirectly, power will still reside in the military elite, most of whom are older Burman men, possibly with token inclusion of ethnic minorities and women.
With the armed struggle gaining momentum from mid-2021, progress toward greater inclusivity has largely stalled within the resistance. Civil society leaders and foreign technical advisers can provide support, but senior opposition members in bodies such as the NUG will need to throw weight behind any effort to jumpstart such change. Doing so matters not just for the immediate term: while it is far from clear how the tragedy currently befalling Myanmar will shape its future, evolving age and gender norms in the resistance could have a positive lasting impact on Myanmar politics and society. Even beyond important normative concerns, NUG leaders would gain by including women and young people in political decision-making and listening to their perspectives; failure to do so could alienate important sources of support. Meanwhile, civil society groups and NGOs, primarily from Myanmar, should engage the armed resistance – including ethnic armed groups – in discussions about injecting a gender dimension into their own policies, such as by degendering job assignments and addressing harassment.
II.
An Old Man’s World
Younger people and women have historically wielded little formal political power in Myanmar.1 Although the country is ethnically diverse, most of its communities are patriarchal with strong cultures of deference to elders. In many ethnic communities, including the Burman majority, the two dominant institutions are armed groups and organised religions, both of which have tended to reinforce age hierarchy and – to an even greater degree – patriarchal gender norms. Occasional ruptures, notably World War II and the 1962 coup, have overturned the old establishment and brought in groups of younger men to take its place. But these upheavals, if anything, have strengthened the hold of men on power, meaning that the “traditional connection between masculinity and authority remained largely unchanged”.2 Furthermore, the men who had dislodged their elders generally clung to their prerogatives as they aged, in time becoming a new old establishment.
Myanmar’s legacy of conflict ... has only served to strengthen the writ of older men.
Myanmar’s legacy of conflict, with unresolved wars that date back to its independence in 1948 in many of the country’s ethnic areas, has only served to strengthen the writ of older men.3 Over five decades of military rule, from 1962 to 2011, serving and former military officers came to dominate formal political institutions, including government, political parties, the civil service and the judiciary.4 Though independence hero Aung San and many of the country’s first post-independence leaders had emerged from university politics, the military came to see students mainly as a threat to its rule – not entirely without justification, since students led major protests against the socialist regime in 1962, 1974 and 1988.5 During this period, many ethnic minorities formed armed resistance movements to fight for greater autonomy, with men occupying virtually all leadership positions.
After independence, and particularly the 1962 coup, women were barred from serving in the military, except as nurses (and in a few other roles). Given the centrality of the military in Myanmar politics, a major avenue to power was thus closed off to women.
Ethnic Burman women were nevertheless described as something of an exception. They were said to have “high status” and to enjoy “inherent equality” with their male counterparts. Though that was not quite true, Burman women did often have greater rights and freedoms than women elsewhere in Asia, and some rose to prominence in politics, business and other fields.6 Aung San Suu Kyi is the best-known example.7
Flawed as this notion was, the military saw it as useful. After the end of the socialist regime in 1988, the State Law and Order Restoration Council junta seized on it as an ideological prop. The idea became part of what one scholar has described as a project of “Myanmafication” – creation of a national “Myanmar culture” based on Burman Buddhism – that the generals pursued to consolidate their rule after the failure of socialism.8 The military began claiming that all women in Myanmar had “inherent equality” with men. It signed Myanmar up to the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), and vehemently denied the regular reports that its soldiers were perpetrating sexual violence against ethnic minorities.9 By insisting that Myanmar women already had equality – even if the original narrative had extended only to Burman women, and not minorities – the regime in effect reinforced the status quo of exclusion.10
One area in which women and youth were able to build influence was in civil society. After the 1988 uprising, many women and youth from central Myanmar who had participated in the protests fled to border areas to continue their anti-military struggle. Some enlisted in armed movements, such as the newly formed All Burma Students’ Democratic Front, while many others joined or established NGOs. From around the same time, associations affiliated with ethnic armed groups, such as the Karen Women’s Organisation, began to work on strengthening women’s roles in the movements’ armed wings, and were later instrumental in forming the Women’s League of Burma, a border-based NGO that promotes women’s participation in politics. Women were also prominent in civil society in military-controlled parts of Myanmar, even during periods of particularly marked oppression, and their role grew significantly after Cyclone Nargis, in 2008, when international aid to Myanmar – much of it channelled through NGOs and community-based organisations – increased greatly.11
The period leading up to political liberalisation in 2011 saw the military take steps reinforcing the old nexus of maleness, age and political power.
The period leading up to political liberalisation in 2011 saw the military take steps reinforcing the old nexus of maleness, age and political power. It wrote this linkage into the 2008 constitution, which it drafted to facilitate a transition to quasi-civilian rule. The charter nominally granted equal rights to women, but with the caveat that “nothing ... shall prevent appointment of men to the positions that are suitable for men only”. Further, by ensuring the primacy of the military in politics, the constitution in effect blocks women from positions of influence. Nothing in the constitution, meanwhile, prohibits discrimination on the basis of age; on the contrary, it sets a minimum age for all elected and many appointed positions.12
After liberalisation, the military also tried to soften its image as a male-dominated institution. In 2013, it amended its recruitment policies, placing an advertisement for women cadets, and the following year it appointed the first women officers to serve in parliament.13 Recruitment of women to the military-controlled police force also expanded significantly.14 These policies had their limits, however: women cadets were commissioned at a lower rank than their male counterparts, and they were mainly confined to support roles that stunted opportunities for advancement.15 Women entering the military and police force encountered various other kinds of institutionalised discrimination.16 Gendered roles also persisted outside the military, such as in opposition movements, where women were often relegated to jobs behind the scenes.17
Meanwhile, liberalisation created new opportunities for women and youth in the political sphere, if not in the upper echelons. Older men from military backgrounds dominated President Thein Sein’s various cabinets from 2011-2016, as well as national and regional assemblies formed based on the 2010 election results; although two women were appointed as ministers, they were assigned education and social welfare, both portfolios closely associated with “women’s affairs” in most Myanmar people’s minds. The NLD’s success in the 2012 by-elections brought greater diversity to parliament – almost one third of its candidates were women, and many were younger than average – and Thein Sein’s government started engaging with a wide range of social actors, including on policy development.18 Women and younger people were highly visible in civil society, particularly NGOs, but also newly formed student and labour unions.
There were, however, still clear limitations to women and youth participating in political life. Both the military and ethnic armed groups mostly excluded women from the peace process that Thein Sein launched in 2011, and no side ever met the gender quotas that negotiators included in a 2016 framework for political dialogue, which began that year and continued until 2020.19 Although the Department of Social Welfare began drafting a Protection and Prevention of Violence against Women Law in early 2011, in part to bring Myanmar law into compliance with CEDAW, it was never enacted; instead, the government and parliament, under pressure from nationalist groups, passed four “protection of race and religion laws”, including legislation restricting the right of Buddhist women to marry men of other faiths.20 A proposed Ministry of Youth Affairs never came into being. The government did introduce a National Strategic Plan for the Advancement of Women, along with a National Youth Policy, but both of these initiatives “remained largely on paper and did not lead to tangible results”.21
Hopes that the [National League for Democracy], once in power, would drive efforts to break down gender and age hierarchies were quickly dashed.
Hopes that the NLD, once in power, would drive efforts to break down gender and age hierarchies were quickly dashed. In March 2016, soon after winning the election by a landslide, it named an eighteen-member cabinet including only one woman, party leader Aung San Suu Kyi herself, and with an average age of 65; the three youngest members were, ironically, serving officers appointed by the military.22 It later expanded the cabinet to 51 members, but only one other woman joined, making the government more than 95 per cent male. Nearly all key positions in parliament and other national bodies, such as the Union Election Commission, also went to older men, as did state and regional cabinet posts. Party stalwart Win Htein, who was central in the cabinet selection, said many of the NLD women who wanted to run for office were too “green” and “inexperienced”. “The culture here and the religion mean most women are not naturally confident in political situations”, he added.23
But the NLD also largely ignored and even stifled civil society, which had been an important venue where women and younger people could influence decision-making. The NLD was less open to engaging civil society and seeking policy advice than its predecessor, the Union Solidarity and Development Party; it appeared to view activists in particular as troublemakers. It placed restrictions on its legislators that made it difficult for them to participate in civil society initiatives, and in some cases it forced civil society organisations to seek permission before holding public events.24 Activists were routinely subjected to harassment and intimidation, particularly by the security forces, and the increased application of repressive laws had a chilling effect.25 In the bureaucracy, the Union Civil Service Board regularly advertised men-only positions, on the basis that they were not suitable for women.26
The NLD’s second term, scheduled to begin in March 2021, seemed unlikely to bring much change. The party had fielded more women than in the 2015 election, and as a result 17.3 per cent of lawmakers in the incoming legislature would have been women, up from 14.2 per cent in 2016. The new cohort was also slightly younger, with an average age of 53.5 years, compared to 54 years in 2016 and 58 after the 2012 by-elections.27 But despite these modest improvements, there was little to suggest the party was planning to make its cabinet more inclusive. Similarly, neither gender nor youth concerns appeared to be high on its agenda – its manifesto for the 2020 election was almost the same as the one in 2015, and its posture toward civil society did not shift during the campaign.
III.
A New Post-coup Reality
A.
The Youth Take the Lead
When the military seized power in February 2021, younger generations responded decisively. Filling the void left by the arrest of the NLD leaders and a number of prominent older activists, they devised a series of creative campaigns to challenge the new regime. “You’ve messed with the wrong generation” became both a warning and a rallying cry repeated in newspaper headlines around the world in the first days after the coup.28 Although protests in big cities got the most attention, demonstrations erupted across most of the country, bridging urban-rural, socio-economic, ethnic and religious divides.29
Generation Z and millennials have since remained the driving force behind popular resistance to military rule.30 Most members of these age cohorts entered adulthood shortly before or during the period of political liberalisation after 2011 – for example, an estimated 4.8 million members of Generation Z were able to vote for the first time in the November 2020 election. They had few personal memories of military rule, but they equated it in their minds with poverty, isolation and repression. Not only are they unwilling to return to this dark past, but they have also issued demands that go much further, pushing the political debate in a progressive direction.
Labour leaders, human rights activists and student union members ... initiated street protests.
The first public signs of organised resistance emerged the day after the coup, on 2 February, when junior government medical staff launched the CDM, refusing to work for the new regime. Within days, labour leaders, human rights activists and student union members such as Tayzar San, Ei Thinzar Maung, Esther Ze Naw, Moe Sandar Myint and Wai Moe Naing – all in their twenties and early thirties – initiated street protests. Both the CDM and peaceful street protests swelled quickly: millions of people took part in the demonstrations, and hundreds of thousands of civil servants joined the strike. In the capital Naypyitaw, meanwhile, a group of around 70 MPs-elect from the NLD took an “oath of office” on 4 February, in defiance of the military, and established a rival legislative body, the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, the following day; in April, the Committee formed the NUG.
Strikes, protests and parallel parliaments are all established opposition movement tactics in Myanmar.31 But the tech-savvy younger generations combined them with new techniques as well as knowledge from abroad to create hybrid “repertoires of contention”.32 The internet, and more broadly exposure to the outside world over the past decade, not only helped inspire this innovation but also magnified its impact.33 Examples are many and varied. Protesters adopted the three-finger salute from The Hunger Games film series, which people in Hong Kong and Thailand had popularised earlier, but also learned from their peers in those countries how to counteract the effects of tear gas. Themed protests – such as the massive “five twos” demonstration on 22 February, which mobilised an estimated five million protesters – were organised through Facebook, while Twitter was used to share information about #WhatsHappeningInMyanmar with the world.
The importance of the internet in mobilising anti-military movements was evident from the regime’s many efforts to block access to it. These were, however, largely unsuccessful because many users found ways around the restrictions, often thanks to advice they found (and then shared) online.34 Researchers have highlighted the importance of internet-based expertise that was developed prior to the coup, such as advocacy with Facebook (to get the platform to take down hate speech and pro-military propaganda) and digital security training for activists and journalists.35 The mostly younger people working on these issues had less success in lobbying the NLD government, which largely ignored their campaigns for reforming defamation laws and improving digital rights and security. Nevertheless, after the coup, the experience they gained spread to the broader population, playing a “crucial role in enabling a disruptive and resilient grassroots resistance” to the junta’s attempt at “complete autocratization of Myanmar”.36
The internet was important not only for mobilising protests, but also in enabling more open discussion of revolutionary goals among a wide audience. “What really sets this moment apart from other revolutionary moments [in Myanmar] is that a lot of it is online”, commented a gender expert. “This helped … change ideas around gender and age, and when the crackdown came, that debate could still continue online”.37
Both online and in the streets, the anti-coup movement energised many young people who had previously been uninterested in politics.38 A 21-year-old protest leader from Yangon told Crisis Group that prior to February 2021 he had been working in his mother’s business and playing music. On the morning of the coup, she woke him to break the news. He attended the first rallies more out of curiosity than commitment to the cause, but he grew angry at the increasing violence and the mendacity of regime propaganda. By mid-2021, he had become a protest leader, and has remained in the city despite the military’s crackdown, coordinating flash mob protests in his township.39
B.
Women at the Barricades
Young women were highly visible on the protest front lines; by one estimate, they made up 60 per cent of protesters in the initial days after the coup.40 Their presence alone was a direct challenge to the patriarchal values that the regime embodied. When soldiers and police began using live rounds to disperse the protesters, several women were among the first killed. Mya Thwe Thwe Khine, the first protester to fall under the security forces’ fire, and Kyal Sin, a 19-year-old from Mandalay who was shot dead on 3 March while wearing a T-shirt with the words, “Everything will be ok”, became martyrs for the movement, stoking anger at the regime’s brutality.41 The outrage reflected the widely held idea that men have a duty to protect women, who are cast as vulnerable; that the military killed women protesters was thus seen as particularly egregious. When the crackdown intensified, women were often ushered to the rear for their safety, leaving young men to don homemade protective equipment in front of the makeshift barricades.42
In some cases ... the protests were able to turn the regime’s misogyny against it.
In some cases, though, the protests were able to turn the regime’s misogyny against it. In March 2021, protesters in Yangon strung women’s sarongs, known as htamein, high across the streets in both a symbolic denunciation of patriarchal customs and a way to take advantage of them. They were playing on a traditional Burman belief that a man’s innate masculine power, or hpone, is diminished if he passes below a woman’s undergarments.43 Young male protesters showed their disdain for the taboo by walking freely underneath the htamein. But the garments also slowed the security forces in pursuit, who stopped to take them down.44 In a similar vein, women painted sanitary napkins red to simulate blood, hanging them up in the street or attaching them to photos of junta leader Min Aung Hlaing. Women activists have also formed new groups to challenge gender norms and promote solidarity, such as the Women Advocacy Coalition, which is pushing for gender sensitivity in new democratic institutions, and Sisters2Sisters, which draws attention to the military’s use of excessive force and sexual violence against women.
C.
A Force to Reckon With
While the protesters’ initial demands focused on restoring the NLD administration and respecting the results of the 2020 election, they shifted rapidly, with ethnic, gender and religious equality becoming central themes. Protesters called for abolishing the 2008 constitution (drafted under the previous military regime), creating a more equitable political system and establishing a new military – a “federal army” – under civilian control. The emergence of the NUCC in March 2021 and the NUG the following month lent impetus to these goals, including by enshrining them in a Federal Democracy Charter designed to replace the 2008 constitution.45
The charter marks a break with the policies of not only the military, but also the NLD. It goes much further, for example, than the changes to the 2008 constitution that the NLD government attempted to pass in 2015 and 2020, all of which the military vetoed.46 Part 1 of the charter prohibits discrimination on the basis of gender – as the 2008 constitution nominally does – but also makes numerous other references to gender equality, including instituting a 30 per cent quota for women in “different levels of decision-making mechanisms”.47 Additionally, it stipulates the creation of “independent commissions” for women’s rights and children’s rights, youth affairs and gender equality, as well as gender-based violence and domestic violence.48 The interim provisions also say women’s and youth affairs groups should be included in the NUCC and a People’s Assembly.49
The NUG’s composition embodies some of these aspirations. Although Aung San Suu Kyi and NLD President Win Myint – both in detention since the morning of the coup – remain nominally at the head of the NUG, the parallel administration is far more diverse than the previous NLD administration. At the time of writing, women comprise 20 per cent of its cabinet members, while ethnic and religious minorities make up more than 50 per cent. Based on information available, the cabinet members’ average age is 59 years – compared to 65 for the 2016 NLD administration at the start of its term – although the real figure is likely significantly lower.50 The NUCC also has a diverse membership, including representatives of ethnic armed groups and political parties, human rights groups, civil society organisations, the CDM, strike committees and more.51
By the time of the [National Unity Government’s] formation, the anti-military struggle was already taking on a more revolutionary character.
By the time of the NUG’s formation, the anti-military struggle was already taking on a more revolutionary character. Peaceful protests had largely dissipated in the face of the violent crackdown, with at least 750 civilians killed within three months of the coup.52 Thousands of the most determined activists were secretly travelling to the territory of ethnic armed groups for military training, while new anti-military armed groups were forming in many rural areas. On 5 May, the NUG announced the formation of the People’s Defence Force (PDF), and on 7 September it launched a “people’s defensive war”. Some of the hundreds – if not thousands – of new armed groups called themselves PDF units and aligned publicly with the NUG, but many remained independent.53 Most members of both types of PDFs and other anti-military armed groups are young, often still in their teens or early twenties.
In areas where armed resistance to the coup has been strongest, the state’s administrative structures have disintegrated, and younger people have filled the vacuum, taking on leadership roles. In many parts of Sagaing Region, for example, government services are no longer functioning outside major towns. Although the military can still project power into the countryside by carrying out raids (often by using helicopters), resistance groups, which have set up embryonic administrations for delivering services, are the closest thing rural areas have to the state.
In these areas, people in their late thirties or forties – former lawmakers, teachers, military defectors and others – have emerged as community leaders, and are working together with even younger colleagues, particularly former student union members.54 Some older community members, such as village tract administrators and senior monks, have on the other hand lost authority, either because they have not sided with the resistance or because they simply lack the knowledge necessary to exercise influence in the current circumstances. Many, however, are involved in community mobilisation for the resistance, alongside the new, younger leaders.55
Since the coup, women have joined anti-military armed groups, including long-established ethnic armed groups, in unprecedented numbers – often in defiance of their parents and other relatives.56 They are often pictured in mainstream and social media, undergoing boot camp-style training or holding weapons, flying in the face of longstanding beliefs – in particular, that women are too weak or too timid to be soldiers.57 Women have even taken up senior positions in some of the new anti-military groups – something that previously would have been unthinkable – and in a few locations they have formed women-only groups, the most well-known being the Myaung Women Warriors in Sagaing Region. Initially, this group faced pushback from locals, but eventually it gained more acceptance. “At first, parents did not allow their daughters to participate”, a senior group member told Crisis Group. “But over time we managed to grow to more than 300 members. Now some parents even bring their daughters to us”.58
Younger generations have not only provided the soldiers and support workers for newly formed armed groups, but also generated financial and other backing.
Younger generations have not only provided the soldiers and support workers for newly formed armed groups, but also generated financial and other backing. As with the non-violent resistance they orchestrated in the months after the coup, they have leveraged the internet to great effect. By around May 2021, social media posts had shifted from focusing on protests and the CDM to armed struggle, often with motivational hashtags.59 Most importantly, they have spearheaded online fundraising efforts that have generated tens of millions of dollars, if not more, for the NUG and anti-military resistance forces.60 They are also a valuable source of information and intelligence for organisations such as the NUG.
The post-coup upheaval and the importance of young people to the anti-military struggle has created new avenues for them to take on leadership roles and exert influence. One 23-year-old woman Crisis Group interviewed had been a student union leader prior to the coup, but quickly emerged as a protest leader in her region. She is now a member of a nationwide General Strike Coordination Body that regularly engages with the NUG, and she also leads two teams that raise money for PDFs.
We have more opportunities to show our ability. ... The new political structures are listening to us, because they know young people have more diverse and fresh ideas, and new revolutionary methods. ... Young people nowadays are working closely with the old MPs, old government members and so on, and we exchange ideas. This shows how young people are getting more and more power and influence.61
Indeed, the heads of new bodies such as the NUG and NUCC have followed the younger generations’ lead in a number of ways. In March 2021, Myanmar’s permanent representative to the UN, Kyaw Moe Tun, ended a speech announcing his opposition to the regime with the three-finger salute that had emerged among young protesters in the days after the coup; it has since also been adopted by the NUG. The NUG’s cautious endorsement of armed struggle that May came months after many youths had already fled to the territory of ethnic armed groups for military training. The Federal Democracy Charter also reflects the demands of youth-led protest movements. Youth activists were the first even to acknowledge, let alone apologise for, the historical discrimination and violence against the Rohingya, gestures upon which the NUG built in its Rohingya policy.62 They called out discrimination against the LGBT community; the NUG cabinet later included the country’s first openly LGBT minister, Aung Myo Min.
On the ground, youth activists say their communities view them differently since the coup. They are no longer seen as too inexperienced or too young to take on political leadership, and their demonstrated commitment to the anti-military cause – one supported by the majority of people, across generations – means they are treated with a new level of respect. “Everyone has seen the important roles that young people and women are playing in this revolution. ... This has changed people’s perspectives. Norms have been challenged and women feel more empowered to take part in politics”, a young woman who holds a senior position in a newly formed resistance group, the Bamar People’s Liberation Army, told Crisis Group.63
IV.
The Limits of Change
Despite the historic evolution witnessed since the coup, young people and women still face many constraints in pursuing political participation and leadership. Unlike earlier ruptures, such as independence, the old political elite has not been entirely discredited or swept away. Instead, young and old coexist in newly created institutions; as a result, older men have continued, for the most part, to hold sway. In the armed conflict, gender norms are even more difficult to overturn than age-related ones. Even in areas where younger people have come to dominate political leadership, such as in parts of Sagaing Region, men continue to hold most of the top spots. Socio-economic and educational barriers also mean that the few women who reach senior positions tend to be wealthier, Western-educated urbanites. Those from rural areas and middle and working-class backgrounds have fewer opportunities to take on leadership roles.
A.
Resistance-led Political Institutions
Although the NUG cabinet is a significant improvement on the NLD government from an inclusion perspective, it is still far from representative of the Myanmar population. More progress has been made in including ethnic minorities (seven of twenty ministers and twelve of sixteen deputies) than women (four ministers and three deputies), reflecting the NUG’s imperative to build ties with ethnic minorities, and particularly ethnic armed groups, in order to draw on their military prowess in fighting the junta. The NUG cabinet is younger than that of the NLD, but still features many members in their sixties and seventies. A bigger challenge is that younger members tend to be in positions that afford them less influence, and nearly all women have been assigned to what are traditionally perceived as gendered roles, such as health, education and the Ministry of Women, Youths and Children Affairs. The notable exception is Zin Mar Aung, who holds the important foreign affairs portfolio; as with many women who have managed to rise to prominence, she comes from an educated, urban background.64
Even NUG supporters and partners observe that most of these appointments have the appearance of tokenism. Those Crisis Group spoke to noted that some women deputy ministers who resigned from the NUG were replaced by men, and that women in particular “tend to lose their voice” after being appointed to the parallel administration. “It’s not meaningful participation”, one said. “The NUG should take their opinions seriously”.65 Numerous sources, both male and female, echoed this view. “I feel like the young people who have been appointed to the NUG are facing restrictions and cannot show their performance”, said a young protest leader from Yangon.66
The [National Unity Consultative Council] ... falls well short when it comes to women’s equal representation.
Although it features a diverse range of member organisations, and a high proportion of ethnic minority representatives, the NUCC also falls well short when it comes to women’s equal representation. The body’s exact membership has not been made public, but sources told Crisis Group that the proportion of women members was even lower than in the NUG. One NUCC member observed that none of the positions allocated to ethnic armed groups had gone to women.67 In both the NUG and NUCC, men frequently dismiss women who raise gender-related issues. “The women on the NUCC in particular get overpowered”, one source commented. “The men say they will put gender into the agenda, but it’s always the last issue and, before they get to it, they say, ‘Time’s up’”.68
Those who attempt to draw attention to gender barriers are also routinely told that the issue should only be addressed “after we win the revolution”.69 Unlike other important social challenges, like improving relations with ethnic minorities or addressing historical discrimination against the Rohingya, there is less of an imperative for bodies like the NUG to make gender inclusion a priority because leaders do not see it as contributing to the armed struggle. “Norms and perspectives related to gender discrimination have not changed hugely”, commented a women’s right activist. “It’s an ongoing process, ... but the revolution has created opportunities to move toward gender equality”.70
Those in charge of the institutions that have emerged in opposition to military rule have a strong interest in creating genuine opportunities for younger people, particularly women, to participate in decision-making. Generation Z and Millennials have been at the vanguard of the movement, and their support remains an important asset. Although those interviewed by Crisis Group continue to offer strong backing for the movement, many also evince a degree of frustration that the NUG, the NUCC and other bodies have not gone further in overturning gender and age norms through greater inclusivity.71 The movement could strengthen itself by becoming more inclusive – or at least avert the risk of pushing away some of its most important supporters.
What happens within the post-coup resistance could matter for the longer term too. Its political and armed wings have already become an important part of Myanmar’s political landscape. How Myanmar’s conflict will play out is far from clear; whatever happens, the country will likely have to navigate several poles, including the military itself, and a large part of society will likely remain conservative and religious.72 Still, the institutions created as part of the resistance, particularly their political culture and vision, will in all probability influence future phases of the crisis and beyond. Nurturing a greater role for young people in resistance political institutions in particular could help ensure that in the years ahead Myanmar politics is less patriarchal and more diverse. Benefits of that could be wide-ranging, from better prospects of reaching durable peace settlements to more equitable distribution of state resources.
B.
Armed Groups
The evolution from peaceful resistance – protests, boycotts and civil disobedience – to armed struggle has tended to shunt women aside. The focus, particularly in mainstream and social media, has shifted almost entirely to fighting, which is still perceived primarily as a male act. As the conflict has intensified, spreading across much of the country, other forms of resistance have received less attention, relegating women to the background. Some women have been depicted bearing arms, as noted. But they are more commonly shown as victims or saviours, helping deliver aid or care for the displaced, for example. Meanwhile, few women appear to have taken up leadership roles in newly emergent administrative bodies run by resistance forces, which remain dominated by male fighters. One apparent reason is that while administrative bodies and armed groups are nominally separate, in practice there is often a great deal of overlap in personnel, so that men end up in high positions in administration.
Although women are highly visible in newly formed anti-military groups ... they continue to face significant gender barriers.
Although women are highly visible in newly formed anti-military groups, and many have undergone military training, they continue to face significant gender barriers. These groups, which seek to replace the military regime with more equitable governance structures, have in fact often adopted policies that discriminate against women and reinforce gender norms. “Even though we receive the same training, we usually can’t go to the front line”, said a woman PDF member. “Options are very limited for women, other than support roles and other jobs in the villages, like teaching children who can’t go to school”.73 These reports suggest that if the new armed groups do succeed in their military goals, they are unlikely to overturn barriers to gender equality, and may even undermine those within the revolutionary movement working to achieve that goal.74
Most obviously, women are often not allowed to participate in front-line combat, and are instead confined to administrative or support roles. They can also find it difficult to gain the respect of their male colleagues. A woman who holds a senior position in the Bamar People’s Liberation Army said she was allowed to visit the front lines only for observation, to bring rations or to help injured soldiers. Her male colleagues are “shocked” to see a woman at the front, she said, and often uncooperative. She noted that age was also important, citing the example of a younger woman colleague who she believed faced even greater challenges in interacting with male soldiers. But primarily because of their gender, women feel they have to behave differently toward soldiers relative to their male counterparts.
Some will say things like, “I don’t want to talk to you. I’ll talk to someone else”, because they don’t believe in my ability. ... I have to respond to them carefully. You can’t be too humble or too confident.75
Women soldiers are also held back by self-imposed restrictions, although these often appear to be a product of socialisation. For example, a senior Myaung Women Warriors officer said the group had yet to participate in front-line combat because few weapons were available. When her group has managed to secure arms, its members have so far opted to give them to men in allied units, because they themselves believed that their male colleagues were more “capable” soldiers. They see handing over the guns as a choice, not a constraint. The officer stressed, however, that the mere existence of her women-only armed group was a major step forward in Myanmar. “When people talk about PDFs, men are still the first thing that comes into their mind”, she told Crisis Group.76 Some women soldiers have also cited concerns about the risk of suffering sexual violence at the hands of the regime’s military if they were to be captured.77
Some women who have joined armed groups have also reported instances of sexual harassment from their male colleagues. There seem to be no adequate policies in place to prevent or redress such behaviour, which is in part a product of the groups’ masculinist culture. A woman interviewee recounted being verbally harassed multiple times by a fellow soldier, who did such things as ask her unwanted questions about her marital status. “I felt so sad, scared and helpless”, she said. “Finally, I just had to avoid being in places where I knew that he would be”.78 Another source with knowledge of such incidents said the lack of channels to file a complaint was a major problem. “The perpetrators know that women have no one to report the cases to. It has become a great opportunity for perpetrators to commit more harassment”.79
In comparison to the new national institutions, Myanmar’s ethnic armed groups have undergone little structural change since the coup. It is difficult to generalise about these groups’ inclusivity given their diversity in terms of size, influence and political culture. Nevertheless, all are armies first and foremost – albeit, in most cases, with governance and administrative branches – which has translated into a culture of hierarchical male leadership.80 To some extent, the intensified conflict of the past two years appears to have strengthened this culture.81
C.
The Junta
The military regime has rolled back much of the progress on political inclusivity that was made during Myanmar’s decade of liberalisation. Serving and former military officers dominate the upper echelons of the State Administration Council, as the junta calls itself, as well as its Union Government and state and region administrations; civilian members, who are mainly older men, have little political power.82 The junta is unlikely to change in this respect: it is pressing ahead with plans for an election in mid-2023 that is designed to entrench military control of nominally civilian political structures, such as the national assembly. Under this model, it is clear that power will remain in the hands of the military elite, either directly or indirectly, which implies that any inclusion of women and youth – for example, through election to national or state assemblies – will be token.
The junta has ... increasingly targeted civil society, where women and youth play a prominent role.
The regime has also limited political inclusion in other ways. Although he has not formally abrogated the peace process established under former governments, in early 2022 Min Aung Hlaing launched fresh negotiations with ten ethnic armed groups, aiming to dissuade them from joining forces with the post-coup resistance, as well as to secure their support for allowing the forthcoming election to go ahead in their territory.83 As with the slew of ceasefires negotiated from 1989-1995, under the previous junta, the talks have been limited to top military officers and the leaders of participating ethnic armed groups, nearly all of whom are older men.84 The junta has also increasingly targeted civil society, where women and youth play a prominent role. In October 2022, it introduced a new law, the Organisations Registration Law, that makes it mandatory for all NGOS, civil society groups and community associations to register with the junta (it had been voluntary under the old law from 2014) and introduces prison terms for violations of its many prohibitions.85
More generally, official attitudes toward women and youth have reverted to the pre-2011 era. The regime is once again fashioning itself as the patron of a form of “traditional” culture – that is, a highly patriarchal “Myanmar” culture that is primarily based on Burman Buddhism – which only reinforces gender and age hierarchies. While perpetuating the gender equality narrative developed by his military predecessors, Min Aung Hlaing has simultaneously railed at photos circulating on social media of female protesters wearing “indecent clothes contrary to Myanmar culture” and prosecuted celebrities for allegedly posting sexually explicit material online.86 He has complained of Myanmar culture being “abused and misused” on social media, and claimed that “youths are weak in their capacity to preserve their respective ethnic cultures and customs. Hence, during this short time, we have taken steps to promote and revitalise Myanmar’s traditional cultures as much as we can”.87
Min Aung Hlaing has adopted a patronising attitude toward the country’s younger generations, blaming the NLD and NUG for inciting them to reject military rule so stubbornly. He has complained that, when in power, the NLD amended the school curriculum with material “aimed at undermining Myanmar’s traditions and culture”, meaning that “young people lost respect for teachers”.88 His regime has characterised protesters who became resistance fighters as “misused” by the “terrorist” NUG, accusing it of “exploiting apolitical youths” by sending them for training with ethnic armed groups.89 The senior general’s vision for students is that they be “good citizens” who “serve the interests of their local community, regions and state”. Students “should adore patriotic spirit for the country and the nation as well as their religions for further flourishing”, he said, also warning of the dangers of new technologies that “bring misunderstanding and misinformation”.90
Pro-military social media accounts have openly targeted young people who publicly oppose the regime, often by releasing their personal information – a practice known as “doxing”. Some have also published sexually explicit content, such as revenge porn, doctored pornographic images or unfounded allegations of a sexual nature, in order to discredit individual women. In a highly patriarchal society like Myanmar’s, the sexualised nature of many of these attacks on women has had a silencing effect, with some women now afraid to speak up for fear of attracting the attention of pro-military users.91 “Women are targeted more than men ... not just women leaders, but ordinary women from rural areas”, an activist said.92
The economic decline following the coup has hurt everyone in Myanmar, but disproportionately women and the young.
The economic decline following the coup has hurt everyone in Myanmar, but disproportionately women and the young. Schooling has been heavily disrupted, with millions of children and young adults dropping out of the state system since 2019, first due to COVID-19 and then to a boycott of “military slave education”.93 As a result, many have entered the work force early, and are unlikely to return to school.94 Many women and girls, worried about their families amid the economic crisis, are making sacrifices – such as skipping meals – to make sure their children and parents can eat. As a UN report put it, women “are starting to see their future disappear before their eyes. ... The peace, political and economic rights they enjoyed for a decade are disappearing”.95
Crackdowns and poverty have prompted many people, but primarily young adults, to seek to emigrate, through both formal and informal channels.96 Meanwhile, applications to enter the military’s elite Defence Services Academy have reportedly declined sharply since the coup.97 All this evidence suggests that many young people see little future for themselves under direct or indirect military rule.
V.
Changing the Political Culture
The 2021 coup has been a tragedy for the people of Myanmar, but it has also created an opportunity to chip away at gender and age hierarchies, making power structures more inclusive and equitable. In the months after the coup, young people and women pushed a progressive agenda, aspects of which are now enshrined in the NUG’s Federal Democracy Charter. Two years on, women and youth remain integral to the anti-military movement, but the momentum in challenging age and gender norms appears to have stalled. Opposition forces, both political and military, have much work to do to bring greater inclusion to decision-making and give women and youth a more visible public role.
Inclusivity should be a goal in all resistance-led institutions formed since the coup, notably the NUG, the NUCC and state and regional consultative councils. As the most prominent, however, the NUG has a particularly important role to play in seeing this agenda through. While it is more inclusive than the ousted NLD government, women and youth remain underrepresented, and there is a widespread perception among its supporters that those who are involved have little authority. The NUG should endeavour to appoint more women and younger members, from a diversity of ethnic and socio-economic backgrounds, and elevate them to more senior roles – particularly those that traditionally have been a male domain. The NUCC will need to do even more to address its gender imbalance.
These steps alone will not be enough, though; without more substantive change, the NUG risks perpetuating the belief that appointments of women and youth are mere tokenism. Both it and the NUCC need to adopt internal policies that enable younger people and women to influence decision-making. They could both set age and gender quotas. The NUCC could introduce a regular rotation of leadership positions. The NUG, meanwhile, could ensure that women and younger members are encouraged to contribute at high-level internal meetings. More experienced NUG members could also take on formal mentoring roles for their younger counterparts.
This effort will require dedication, and it would benefit from closer cooperation with civil society and support from international technical advisers. Although senior members of both the NUG and NUCC have shown willingness to meet with women and youth movement figures – an improvement upon the NLD government – they do not appear to be taking the concerns of their interlocutors seriously, seemingly viewing them as a low priority. Unless their attitude visibly changes, there is a risk that these new institutions will end up alienating some of their most important allies in the anti-military movement.
The Ministry of Women, Youth and Children Affairs has been one of the more active NUG institutions, but it could still do more. Most of its public activities have focused on humanitarian aid distribution and awareness campaigns, such as the Sixteen Days of Activism against Gender-Based Violence in late 2022. While such activities are welcome, it has a wider role to play in seeking to develop gender and youth-related policies, such as on sexual harassment, that apply across the NUG. It should also focus on amending discriminatory laws and introducing new legislation, such as the long-delayed law on preventing violence against women.98 The NUG and its affiliates control only small parts of the country, but legislative change remains a powerful tool for changing public perceptions and attitudes.
The junta is continuing to amend and enact laws, including on gender and youth-related issues.
What the military regime is doing on this front should spur the NUG to action: the junta is continuing to amend and enact laws, including on gender and youth-related issues. The regime has, for example, amended the Organisations Registration Law to restrict civil society (see Section IV.C), while recent changes to the National Education Law will make it more difficult to teach or use ethnic minority languages in the classroom. It has also said it will enact the Prevention of Violence against Women Law. The NUG can underscore its credentials by being a more competent law-drafting body that works for the benefit of all.
Women’s involvement in armed conflict is a particularly difficult issue to navigate in Myanmar, as elsewhere, given the deeply ingrained perception that women should not be on the front line. Many women trained as combatants have themselves been socialised to believe that they are unfit for battle. But preventing women from taking on front-line duties in order to protect them, or because they are perceived as weak, perpetuates harmful gender norms. It also puts more pressure on male soldiers to live up to a masculinist warrior ideal, when some may be better suited to support roles. As a result, armed groups are not necessarily using their personnel in the most effective way. Keeping women away from the front lines also robs them of opportunities for advancement, leaving the leadership of armed groups predominantly male. While armed groups may have varying approaches to managing this issue – for example, by giving members more options in job assignments or by keeping the newest recruits off the front lines – they should, for a start, stop assigning combatants to particular roles on the basis of their gender.
Armed resistance groups also need to address the issue of sexual harassment before it becomes a more significant problem. Aside from the imperative to stop unacceptable behaviour toward women, failing to address the issue could cause serious damage to the opposition movement in a range of ways, from tarnishing its image, both domestically and internationally, to undermining support among women. The NUG’s Ministry of Women, Youth and Children Affairs could play an important role in facilitating the development of anti-sexual harassment policies for PDFs that have claimed allegiance to it, conducting virtual or in-person training sessions, and putting in place a complaints mechanism it would administer. Armed groups that are independent of the NUG would not necessarily adhere to such a policy, but they might be open to cooperating with the NUG or civil society organisations on the issue.
Myanmar’s independent media also has a role to play in dispelling gender stereotypes.99 Focusing primarily on front-line fighting, as these media outlets now tend to do, reinforces the idea that men are leading the resistance, because they make up the bulk of soldiers. By broadening the focus of reporting to the many ways in which a range of people can and do contribute to the anti-military cause – as was more common in the early months after the coup – the media could better serve the cause of inclusivity, particularly when it comes to gender.
To help drive an inclusive agenda, international donors can ... in-crease support to women and youth-led movements.
To help drive an inclusive agenda, international donors can, for their part, increase support to women and youth-led movements to strengthen their institutional capacity and expand their work in this area. Those groups have already been important conduits for aid to displaced people from both domestic and international sources, but they require core funding in addition to project-based support, and for activities beyond aid delivery. That may require injecting a dose of flexibility into their normal procedures. As many Myanmar civil society groups and NGOs are unregistered – especially those that have formed since the coup – they should in particular relax rules that require grantees to register, and those that regulate how funds are transferred, such as by allowing the use of informal mechanisms rather than banks.
Civil society organisations, meanwhile, should seek to expand their engagement with newly formed anti-military forces beyond humanitarian aid delivery into new areas, such as gender and human rights. Some of those now running anti-military forces, such as PDFs, have a civil society background and are likely to be open to discussions and training on these issues. Such engagement could have a positive impact not only on the armed groups’ policies, but also on those of the new administrative bodies affiliated with them.
The harassment of women activists on social media, particularly by pro-military accounts, is a concerning development. Although intended to discredit the anti-military movement, it has a much wider chilling effect, largely because of the sexual nature of the attacks; women worry that they will become targets if they speak up against the regime. Telegram, in particular, has taken little action to rein in these pro-military actors, who have also caused real-world harm in other ways.100 If Telegram does not start taking content moderation on its platform seriously, lawmakers and regulators in foreign jurisdictions should pressure it to do so: since the regime was banned from Facebook in February 2021, Telegram has become the primary social media platform through which it spreads disinformation and hate. The NUG, which has so far said little about doxing, could help increase the pressure on Telegram by drawing attention to the problem, and possibly by introducing a policy of its own barring the practice.
VI.
Conclusion
The February 2021 military coup has created new opportunities for women and younger people to wield political power. They have seized on a moment of disruption to push politics and society in a more progressive direction, challenging longstanding age and gender norms. Young people have created new political platforms through which to articulate their demands, and forced more established political leaders to not only engage with them, but also to adopt policies that reflect their wishes and demands.
Yet more needs to be done to consolidate initial gains. Despite widespread recognition of their ability, ingenuity and commitment to the cause, young people and women are still struggling to overcome patriarchal beliefs, even within the resistance, about gender roles and the definition of a capable leader. The NUG, the NUCC and ethnic armed groups need to pay greater attention to inclusion, while foreign actors should do whatever they can to encourage the nascent social changes, including by supporting women- and youth-led organisations.
Myanmar’s present crisis looks set to be protracted and its outcome is uncertain, but changing age and gender norms within the resistance may well, over time, shape those in politics and society more broadly. Newly formed anti-military armed groups and political structures – as well as the country’s long-established ethnic armed groups – have a significant amount of influence. Further, the political vision they are fighting for will continue to be salient in the years ahead; this will likely be the case even if the regime cracks down further. Nurturing a greater role for young people and women at this formative time could thus contribute to making Myanmar a more inclusive society, particularly when it comes to political leadership and opportunities, even amid an environment of deep uncertainty..."
Source/publisher:
International Crisis Group (Belgium)
Date of publication:
2023-02-16
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-16
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Spring Revolution
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Over 40 percent of the Karenni population has been forced to flee their homes since May 2021.
Description:
"For decades, the Myanmar military has waged a violent campaign of terror against civilians. Coordinated attempts have sought to drive ethnic groups from their homelands through systematic and widespread violence that has not spared even the most vulnerable. These same militarized acts continue today, contributing to a worsening sense of insecurity.
Our organizations – the Karenni Human Rights Group, the Kayan Women’s Organization, the Karenni National Women’s Organization, and the Kayah State Peace Monitoring Network – recently released a new report, “How can we survive in the future?”: Atrocity Crimes in Karenni State. In the report, we document extensive evidence of war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by the regime in the Karenni areas between May 2021 and September 2022. The junta’s systemic cycle of violence continues unabated. As recently as January 24, 2023, the military used warplanes to target Karenni civilians seeking refuge in internally displaced persons (IDP) camps in Loikaw, the capital of Karenni State.
Karenni (Kayah) State is a small state situated in eastern Myanmar, with an approximate population of 300,000. Another estimated 120,000 Karenni people live in the Pekhon township area to the northwest of the geographic boundary of Karenni State, in southern Shan State. Since May 2021, more than 40 percent of the Karenni population has been forcibly displaced, mostly women and children. The five townships of Loikaw, Hpruso, Shadaw, Deemaw Soe, and Pekhon have been almost entirely abandoned. Whenever our people see Myanmar army soldiers or airplanes approaching, they flee because they know that attacks are imminent. IDPs we interviewed for the report repeatedly shared the trauma they are experiencing from the relentless mortar shelling, bombs, and gunfire.
Dozens have been killed in these attacks, and thousands more have lost their homes and livelihoods. Among the key findings in our report, at least 1,190 homes in 87 Karenni towns, wards, and villages have been heavily damaged or completely destroyed by junta forces, in addition to 33 religious buildings and four medical clinics.
Neither age nor gender matters to the Burmese military. As long as they have bodies shielding their battalions from attacks, they continue to force our people to be human shields for them in conflict zones. We documented six separate incidents of forced labor and the use of civilians as human shields by the Myanmar military, involving at least 65 Karenni civilians, including women and children. Four people were killed while serving as human shields.
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The Myanmar military consistently fails to adhere to basic human rights norms and principles, terrorizing the Karenni population with no rule of law to hold them accountable. Civilians can be killed anytime, and anywhere by the military. They routinely arrest and punish human rights defenders and activists for resisting the will of the junta. We documented the arbitrary arrests of at least 260 Karenni civilians, including 33 women, by junta forces throughout Karenni areas.
At least 115 civilians have been killed while in regime custody over the reporting period. The arbitrary arrests and murders of Karenni civilians are neither isolated cases nor accidents. These human rights violations are part of a pattern of collective punishment to instill fear into the population.
For too long, our Karenni communities have suffered from targeted violence by junta forces. When we have called for peace, they have turned their weapons on us. Global actors must take concrete steps beyond mere “statement diplomacy” to protect the thousands of civilians who live with the daily threat of being murdered by the military regime.
We welcome the recent decisions by the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand to impose new targeted sanctions on the second anniversary of the attempted coup. The U.K. imposed sanctions on individuals and parts of the Asia Sun group involved in the transfer of aviation fuel to the junta’s air force, while Canada prohibited the export, sale, and supply of aviation fuel to the regime. The new U.S. sanctions focus on the Union Election Commission, military-controlled mining entities, and officials in the energy sector.
But in the wake of two years of atrocity crimes, so much more urgently needs to be done to cut sources of arms, aviation fuel, and revenue to Myanmar’s military regime. It requires a concerted, coordinated global effort. The response from the international community has been painfully slow and inadequate. As a result, the junta is emboldened to commit more atrocity crimes with impunity.
Domestically, our legal system cannot hold Myanmar soldiers accountable for their actions, as impunity is embedded in the system. We urge the international community to acknowledge that the junta is responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity – not only in Karenni State, but across the whole country – and act accordingly. There must be international justice and accountability to end the cycle of impunity. The situation in Myanmar demands a referral to the International Criminal Court, which provides a pathway to justice and reparations for the thousands of victims. We also urge states to exercise universal jurisdiction to investigate any individual from Myanmar who may be responsible for committing war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide.
Without justice and accountability, there can be no lasting peace. Our Karenni communities simply want to live in peace and enjoy basic human rights..."
Source/publisher:
"The Diplomat" (Japan)
Date of publication:
2023-02-16
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-16
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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Sub-title:
Two years since the coup, the rest of the world remains helpless even as the military has entrenched itself
Description:
"Just over two years since Myanmar’s armed forces, the Tatmadaw, overthrew the duly elected National League for Democracy (NLD) government headed by Aung San Suu Kyi, the country is in a perilous state. The UN estimates that 4.5 million people need life-saving humanitarian support, almost half the population are living in poverty, reversing all the development gains made since 2005, and at least 1.5 million have been displaced. The Burmese scholar Win Myo Thu recently wrote: “Myanmar’s military has gone beyond repression or terrorising ethnic minority groups – it is making war on society as a whole.” The entire country, he concluded, “is now a conflict zone”.
Yet, this disastrous ongoing crisis appears to have gone off the international radar. True, the UN Security Council did adopt a resolution on Myanmar – its first for 74 years – at the end of last year, which called for an immediate end to all forms of violence, the release of all arbitrarily detained prisoners, including Suu Kyi, and urged constructive dialogue and reconciliation and the implementation of the peace plan formulated by the Association of South-East Asian Nations (Asean), to which the country belongs.
However, the UN’s own Special Rapporteur for Myanmar, Thomas Andrews, immediately said the wording didn’t go anywhere near far enough. “Demanding that certain actions be taken without any use of the Security Council’s Chapter VII authority, will not stop the illegal Myanmar junta from attacking and destroying the lives of the 54 million people being held hostage,” he said in a statement. “What is required is action.”
Myanmar’s neighbours China and India both abstained in the vote, as did Russia, which has been supportive of coup leader Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, while the Burma Campaign UK’s director, Mark Farmaner, complained that “the supply of arms doesn’t even get a mention in the resolution”, adding that a global arms embargo ought to have been a “no-brainer first step”.
Perhaps a world that is much preoccupied with other matters has looked to Asean to take the lead. The junta did agree to an Asean “five-point consensus” two months after the coup, but then completely ignored its main demands such as ending violence and facilitating dialogue between all parties. In response to the lack of progress, Asean has banned the country’s generals from regional meetings since August 2022. Last week, Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim said that the grouping “should carve Myanmar out for now”, which many took to mean suspending its membership.
A key rationale for allowing Myanmar to join Asean in 1997 was that it might encourage the generals, who were then in charge, to take the path towards democracy and pluralism. Given that all the reforms have been discarded in favour of an even more brutal military dictatorship, suspension would be a just rebuke.
Indonesia, Asean’s current chair, may be taking a different approach, with President Joko Widodo’s right-hand man, former four-star general Luhut Pandjaitan, tipped to be appointed the association’s special envoy for the country. The suggestion is that a fellow member of the top brass might be best-placed to explain the advantages of Indonesia’s move from being a military-led autocracy under Gen Suharto from 1966 to a democracy in 1998. But Myanmar’s generals cannot understand why Indonesia’s army gave up its privileged “dual function” of guarding the country and dominating politics and the economy. “The Tatmadaw regards that decision as an incomprehensible error,” said Aaron Connelly of Singapore’s International Institute for Strategic Studies.
The situation in the two countries is not analogous in any case. In fact, apart from a brief period of democracy from independence in 1948 until 1962, when Gen Ne Win took over in a coup, the military has always held on to the levers of power – as it continued to do under the 2008 constitution, which left the ministries of home, border affairs and defence and one of the two vice president posts under the Tatmadaw’s control.
It is worth remembering that for many of those decades, the West and its allies did not object too strenuously to this arrangement. Gen Ne Win’s “Burmese Way to Socialism” ideology may have impoverished the country and reduced parts of it to a police state, but, crucially, he was not aligned to the Communist bloc during the Cold War. I have never forgotten a Malaysian cabinet minister from the 1970s telling me: “Ne Win was our friend.”
It was because of the Tatmadaw’s centrality to the country that some argued, before the 2008 constitution and the supposed “roadmap to democracy” announced in 2003, that they had to be a part of the solution. Almost certainly because her assassinated father, Myanmar’s independence hero Aung San, was considered to be the founder of the Tatmadaw, his daughter Suu Kyi has often sounded curiously fond of the institution, if not of the officers who have jailed her time and again, talking of it sometimes as if it was a wayward son.
However, after the 2021 coup and the thousands of deaths for which the Tatmadaw are responsible, as well as what most consider to be their genocidal actions against the ethnic minority Rohingya, it would seem even more unpalatable to negotiate a new settlement with them. But what is the alternative?
Mahn Win Khaing Than, prime minister of the National Unity Government that opposes the junta, said in January 2022 that the solution was total revolution. “Everyone understands now that the military has to be eradicated,” he said. All the country’s many ethnic minorities had come together, he said, and “we would have won a long time ago if they [the Tatmadaw] didn’t have an air force”. Victory, he promised, would be “by the end of this year”.
That hasn’t been the outcome, and probably won’t be anytime soon and no outside power has the appetite for military intervention.
“The country will have to suffer for several decades to come if we don’t win this fight,” was Mahn Win Khaing Than’s bleak prediction a little more than a year ago. That may be true, too. But just because the outside world doesn’t know how to help Myanmar avoid that fate – as it really didn’t have a way to overturn military rule before – is not a reason to forget about it. Don’t let this tragedy disappear from our horizons..."
Source/publisher:
"The National"
Date of publication:
2023-02-16
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-16
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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"Despite widespread opposition to the Myanmar junta’s proposed general election, four political parties have re-registered with the junta-appointed Union Election Commission (UEC), as required by the new Political Parties Registration Law.
The military-proxy Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), Federal Democratic Party (FDP), Myanmar People’s Democratic Party (MPD) and Union Democracy Party (UDP) re-registered this month.
The USDP, FDP and MPD were among 34 parties that met military chief Min Aung Hlaing ahead of the 2020 general election.
The party leaders sought the commander-in-chief’s assurance that he would intervene if voting was deemed unfair. They also called for then UEC chairman U Hla Thein to be replaced, saying they do not trust him because he was appointed by the National League for Democracy (NLD).
Min Aung Hlaing’s coup came three months after the NLD’s landslide victory.
FDP leaders Daw Than Than Nu and Daw Cho Cho Kyaw Neyin accepted honorary titles on behalf of their fathers from Min Aung Hlaing in January in Naypyitaw. Daw Than Than Nu was the daughter of U Nu, prime minister under the Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League government after independence from British rule.
Daw Cho Cho Nyein is a daughter of U Kyaw Nyein, U Nu’s deputy.
The United Democratic Party, known as the Rose party because of its logo, was dissolved ahead of the 2020 election after its chairman Michael Kyaw Myint was accused of money laundering, flouting business laws and fleeing an earlier prison sentence handed down under a previous military regime.
The UDP was dissolved after it failed to field three candidates – the legal minimum – in the 2020 general election.
The Political Parties Registration Law, according to observers, favors the USDP, which was formed by ex-generals.
The law requires parties to re-register with the junta’s UEC within 60 days or be disbanded. Under the law, parties running nationally must recruit at least 100,000 members within 90 days of registration and have offices in at least half of Myanmar’s 330 townships within six months. They must also deposit 100 million kyats with a state-owned bank.
Sai Leik, general secretary of the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy, told The Irrawaddy, that the law will ensure the USDP secures power and the military maintains its grip on power.
There are 91 political parties in Myanmar and all are now required to re-register or be dissolved.
The NLD says it will not recognize any junta election but the Shan Nationalities Democratic Party, People’s Pioneer Party led by the junta’s social welfare minister Daw Thet Thet Khine, Arakan Front Party and other parties close to the junta are expected to re-register.
In the 2020 election, 87 of 91 registered parties contested the election and 19 won parliamentary seats.
The civilian National Unity Government, ethnic armed organizations and other pro-democracy forces have called any junta election a sham.
Malaysia has urged fellow ASEAN members to reject any election held by Myanmar’s regime..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2023-01-15
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-15
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Rule of Law - Burma/Myanmar-specific
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Sub-title:
Myanmar’s journalists are rebuilding independent media with one foot in the country, and one foot out, writes Laure Siegel.
Description:
"As Myanmar’s bloody coup ticks over into its third year, local journalists continue to struggle to sustain and build independent media voices in support of democracy both inside the country and in the growing refugee diaspora.
It’s an evolving ecosystem depending on an underground network, including citizen journalists, philanthropic support, experimentation in distribution and voices — and raw courage in the face of a violent oppression by the Tatmadaw military junta.
The military broke the old system.
“I didn’t want to give up this job. But since the coup, journalists can’t report freely and have to worry about their and their relatives’ safety. So I had to flee.” says a young woman print and TV reporter, now in Thailand.
Journalists were among the first to be hunted down after the military coup, led by General Min Aung Hlaing on February 1, 2021, along with opposition politicians, social workers and activists. In the two years since, four journalists — all working in local media or as freelancers — have been killed and 145 arrested. About 60 remain in detention.
It effectively dismantled the network of democratic media that had spread across the country over the previous decade. Instead, the Myanmar junta became the world’s biggest jailer of journalists relative to population. The Committee for the Protection of Journalists listed Myanmar as the eighth worst country worldwide for impunity for crimes against journalists.
An independent media emerges
Still, the military’s attempts to control the media landscape did not stop a surge in independent outlets and content creation. This period also observed a decrease in popularity of state-controlled media.
Two years after the coup, the top media by audience remain the trusted four: BBC Burmese, Mizzima, Democratic Voice of Burma (DVB) and Voice of America (VOA).
All struggle to monetize this audience, especially as digital advertising prices have collapsed in Myanmar. One million online impressions earns media companies $US10, compared to $US570 in Europe and $US130 in Thailand.
Social media distribution has been constrained as Meta’s platforms have been banned in Myanmar.Now, only half of the country’s internet users who have access to VPNs can still access Meta. According to a survey by the News Consulting Group, only a third of Myanmar Meta users actively use Facebook as a main source of news.
“We have problems with Facebook because they don’t understand that we are covering a war so they regularly categorise our account as “Page at risk”. But only local media are punished for community violations when they publish videos of violent acts, not the big media. So when they block our audience, even though we have one million followers, we only reach 1000 people per post”.- founder of local media covering Myanmar central plains
As the usual revenue models of subscriptions, advertisements and events are denied independent media, most have turned to philanthropic grants to remain sustainable.
This has created an imbalance between the mainly English-language national media and the more poorly resourced, mostly local, media in Myanmar’s languages who lack staff dedicated to accounting or human resource management. Delays in transferring funds also disadvantages reporters relying on grants for their income:
We know how to write stories but we don’t know how to write proposals or grant forms. Our English skills are not good enough to fulfill the diverse requirements of international organizations, so we get less financial support than the big national media. — a local editor.
Most independent media have been forced to operate underground or abroad, mainly in Thailand, Bangladesh and India. At least a thousand Burmese journalists are estimated to live in exile since the coup, including a third in Thailand, often without refugee protections or the legal status that would allow them to pursue professional or educational opportunities. Their properties in Myanmar can still be seized and destroyed and their relatives are vulnerable to being taken hostage to impose pressure to keep quiet.
It’s a “one foot in, one foot out” model that brings big challenges. Despite those challenges, Myanmar’s journalists keep performing their duty of keeping their communities informed.
In-country, local media keeps providing a key link.
“Local media have built a very reliable network of sources over the years: they are our friends, relatives, neighbours. Even the media based in exile on the borderlands can still use the Myanmar telecom network to reach sources inside the country,” local editor.
They face greater risks, too, and have a responsibility to protect those sources — including from unwanted exposure by national or international media.
Hundreds of trainers conduct online and in-person capacity-building training sessions in mobile reporting, investigation, digital safety and feature writing. Organizations such as Myanmar Witness or the Center for Law and Democracy teach both citizen journalists and professional journalists to gather evidence of war crimes that could be used in international court cases.
Despite the electricity and Internet cuts, new distribution formats are being tested and developed, such as SMS, newsletters and podcasts. One prominent example is Kaladan media, the first Rohingya News Agency, which has been based in Bangladesh since 2001. They are one of the founders of the Burma News International (BNI), a network of fifteen independent media groups led by exiled Burmese journalists in India, Bangladesh and Thailand that was launched in 2003.
“We have been consistently challenging, monitoring and investigating the Burma Army Islamophobic narrative. During anti-Muslim violence in Myanmar, our website was hacked for six months and we were blocked on Facebook numerous times because of some users abusively reporting us. Our people don’t have easy access to the Internet so we launched a 30 minutes daily news bulletin, which is broadcasted in communal meeting places in refugee camps via loudspeakers.” — Tin Soe, editor-in-chief of the Kaladan Press Network explains.
Frontier Myanmar continues to run Doh Athan (“Our Voice”) program and local media such as Delta News Agency for the Irrawaddy region and Myaelatt Athan for Sagaing and Magway regions launched podcasts and weekly TV shows.
“We have three podcasts, one about news, one about healthcare and one is called ‘Letter from People Defence Forces’. We are reading on-air letters of pro-democracy fighters to their relatives or girlfriends. It’s a nice format that allows us to connect them with the people as they are trying to survive underground and are isolated from everyone”. A representative for Myaelatt Athan.
Dr. Miemie Winn Byrd, Adjunct Fellow at the East-West Center emphasises: “A successful revolution is at least 75% communication. In the context of Myanmar, I see the way forward as systematising the defection of soldiers, focusing on people’s support and keeping up the international interest”.
In the spirit of building bridges between skills and nationalities, the collective Visual Rebellion Myanmar was co-founded after the coup by Burmese media students and international creatives. A newsroom of journalists and artists based inside Myanmar and around the world produces together in-depth features, research reports, photo stories and documentaries about the impact of the coup from a human perspective. Some of the best content is adapted and translated to other languages, such as a series for French investigative outlet Mediapart.
Visual Rebellion is committed to prioritize story angles where people are agents and not only victims of their fates. This includes the unionization of Myanmar migrant workers in Thailand, the founding of a photo-magazine by Rohingya people in Cox’s Bazar refugee camp, women fighting frontline battles and grassroots coping mechanisms for surviving the economic crisis generated by the coup.
After a year-long scorched-earth campaign in the central plains by military troops, one member of the collective who is native to the area, explained: “I can’t write about dead bodies and burned villages anymore because it is repetitive in its horror, it publicises terrorist actions by the junta which has a deep impact on the moral of the people and it has a huge impact on my mental health as I know the areas and people targeted very well since childhood. We need to find other ways to tell the story”.
As it is estimated that 75 percent of the stories published by Burmese media are coup or conflict related, several audience surveys show a phenomenon of “coup-fatigue”. People would rather read about topics such as commodity prices, health, education and agriculture, as well as weather, refugees, business and international affairs.
Local journalists on the front line
As most international and national media pulled out their staff out of Myanmar, they rely for on the ground information on citizen reporters who sent information, pictures and videos from their phones and are poorly paid, or not paid at all.
It’s forcing a division in the Myanmar media community with different treatment between management-level editors who are often safely re-based abroad and on-the-ground, junior reporters survive on their own in precarious situations. National and international media often use content gathered by local media without compensation.
“Relying on non-professional media workers carries big risks: they struggle with emotional distance, take low-resolution pictures, send them to all media houses and then face copyright issues, some share names of sources online and most are not trained enough to check accuracy. Digital, physical, psycho-social and legal safety is a precondition for producing professional journalism and local citizens can’t fill the void without being given the proper tools.” — Toby Mendel, executive director for the Center of Law and Democracy
The pauperization of the information sector post-coup has pushed down media rates and professional reporters still present in the country now get offered citizen reporter wages. Media workers lack the negotiating power and industry body to obtain fair wages and safety measures, as denounced in the Anti-Theft Wage Campaign by the International Federation of Journalists,
The division drives internal mistrust. The founder of a local media in hiding in a Thai-Myanmar border town, says: “We try to identify military propaganda accounts by the terms they use to refer to the junta. We also know that some “journalists” come to border towns in Thailand to spy on real reporters in exile and report to the military back in Myanmar. Some journalists who were working for pro-military newspapers even get hired by independent media houses nowadays because there is no background check and clearance process anymore. Now anyone can apply for a media job via Messenger by sending some pictures and footage and claiming experience after having attended a two-week training for Citizen Reporters.
A group of reporters in exile has started a consultative process with independent media houses with the goal of creating a new MPC and Code of Conduct, freed from business or military chains, be it from the Burmese army or opposition forces. They also lobby the body in charge of drafting a Federal Democracy Charter, to include a clause about press freedom and journalism protection in the future Constitution.
Whichever political situation emerges from the ongoing conflict, the journalistic community is already engaged in healthy debates about implementing policies of self-regulation, rethinking ownership structure and pushing for inclusion as well as gender and ethnic diversity. A balance between external support and internal reflection is the way for Myanmar media to survive the war of information that is raging in the country.
Laure Siegel is a Southeast Asia based reporter for @Mediapart (http://rb.gy/qyvflr) and founder of @VisualRebellion Myanmar // In English (http://bit.ly/2WWnwA2)
This story is supported by the Friedrich Naumann Foundation as part of IPI’s work mapping and sharing the most exciting innovative and local media initiatives globally..."
Source/publisher:
International Press Institute
Date of publication:
2023-02-15
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-15
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
more
Sub-title:
Karenni activist Neineh Plo says cooperation is key to removing Myanmar’s junta and forming a democratic union.
Description:
"Neineh Plo is an ethnic Karenni activist working with the Coordination Team for Emergency Relief (Karenni) in eastern Myanmar’s Kayah state, situated along the country’s border with Thailand. A former spokesperson for the Karenni National Progressive Party who worked with the deposed National League for Democracy government on Myanmar’s peace process, he recently joined four Karenni organizations in publishing a report documenting war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by junta forces in Kayah state and surrounding areas between May 2021 and September 2022.
Earlier this month, Neineh Plo visited Washington, D.C. and met with U.S. officials, lawmakers, NGOs and U.N. agencies to discuss the report’s findings and how the international community can help hold the junta accountable for its rights violations in Myanmar. During his visit, he spoke with Nay Rein Kyaw of RFA’s Burmese Service about promoting cooperation between Myanmar’s resistance groups in the pursuit of removing the country’s military dictatorship and establishing a federal democratic union.
The following interview has been edited for clarity:
RFA: First of all, thank you for visiting RFA. We have three questions. The first question is, what were your first impressions during your trip to the United States?
Neineh Plo: Well, my first impression during this trip is that the U.S. enjoys freedom of expression. It is freedom of expression that makes programming like RFA’s possible. And it is with this freedom that we enable the voices of the oppressed to be heard by the international community. When these voices are heard, the international community can take action to help liberate them within the societies that oppress them, such as Burma. So, I really appreciate the fact that people have the freedom to express themselves … as that is something we don't have in Burma right now. Burma is under a military dictatorship and all kinds of free speech are banned … so you only hear from the military dictatorship what they want to tell the people. I want to tell the world the concerns of the oppressed people.
RFA: The world is watching the situation in Burma every day. Can you discuss the achievements of the resistance movement within the past two years [since the coup]?
Neineh Plo: Since the military coup two years ago … the people have suffered a lot. More than 1.5 million people are currently displaced internally in the country. But at the same time, we have many young people seeing this injustice and joining the resistance movement, whether it is armed resistance or other forms. And also, we see other people from Burma who were not aware of the plight of ethnic people in the country. Now they have become aware of the oppression that ethnic people have been facing at the hands of the military dictatorship – discrimination, lack of rights in the country. So this resistance movement, in a way, has brought people together against a common enemy, which is the military dictatorship, and then to work together and fight against this dictatorship – to remove it once and for all – and then bring about a new system to this country through the establishment of a federal democratic union.
RFA: So you are seeing more unity in Burma, right?
Neineh Plo: Yes. Now it is the kind of unity that we had not seen before the coup. Before the coup, it was mostly the ethnic groups who were fighting for equality, democracy, self-determination and federalism. Since the coup, we and other groups from Burma have had the opportunity to work with ethnic groups on a common principle, which is a federal democratic union.
But there's a lot more work to do. We are not there yet, but at least we have started this conversation and have worked together on this issue. It is not something that we are all in agreement about ... But at least we have a common understanding on the future of the country, which is that unless we can establish a federal democratic union, we won't be able to make progress. So, I think that is a big achievement.
Sadly, the military dictatorship is still in place and we need to remove them and bring people back home [who have fled since the coup]. And the people of Burma cannot do it alone. We need the international community’s help to remove this military dictatorship, to bring about a regime change in the country, so that we can enjoy sustainable peace.
Unity and international support
RFA: The people of Burma and the international community would like to know whether this movement can win and when that might happen. What is your opinion?
Neineh Plo: First, we need to build unity among all these groups … We have a lot of ethnic resistance organizations, the [shadow] National Unity Government, and the [anti-junta] People’s Defense Force [paramilitary groups], as well as many civil society organizations. All of these groups have to be able to come together and have a single vision ... which is the establishment of a federal democratic union for the future of Burma. With that kind of unity, we will be able to address many different things on the ground.
We also need international support. International support can come in many ways. Currently, we need immediate humanitarian support, and then we will also need international support to hold the military accountable [for its atrocities]. We also need international support to cut supplies to the military and disable the whole military apparatus in the country and eventually remove the military from politics. The people of Burma cannot do it alone – we need coordinated international support, otherwise it will not be effective.
RFA: Do you see a timeframe for victory?
Neineh Plo: I don't want to make a prediction, as I'm not in a position to do so, but if there is unity among the people of Burma and the international community, and if we can build momentum, victory will come sooner than we expect..."
Source/publisher:
"RFA" (USA)
Date of publication:
2023-02-15
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-15
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Armed conflict in Burma - attacks on civilians
Language:
more
Sub-title:
Businessman she’s accused of accepting money from testified he donated to educational and healthcare foundation
Description:
"Myanmar’s Supreme Court on Wednesday rejected deposed leader Aung San Suu Kyi’s appeal of two corruption charges, sources close to the court told Radio Free Asia.
Suu Kyi, 77, was sentenced by a military junta court in October to three years in Naypyidaw Prison for two corruption cases that involved charges of accepting money from Maung Weik, a businessman linked to the military.
Maung Weik has testified that that money was not given to Suu Kyi, but donated to be used at the Daw Khin Kyi Foundation, which supports education, healthcare and rural investment.
Suu Kyi’s lawyers have argued that she’s innocent of corruption because the money that Maung Weik gave was found in the foundation’s bank account.
The reason for the Union Supreme Court’s denial of the appeal was unknown.
“The right to appeal is in Article 19 of the Constitution. The right to appeal must be given to anybody,” a court source who has knowledge of the decision said. “It’s ridiculous that the Union Supreme Court did not even grant an appeal.”
The Nobel Peace Prize winner served as Myanmar’s state counselor from 2016 up until the Feb. 1, 2021, coup. She has been sentenced to a total of 33 years in prison in 19 cases.
Suu Kyi's lawyers filed an appeal to the Union Supreme Court on Tuesday for five cases in which Suu Kyi and President Win Myint were accused of buying and leasing a helicopter under the NLD government. They were sentenced on those charges in December..."
Source/publisher:
"RFA" (USA)
Date of publication:
2023-02-15
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-15
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, About Aung San Suu Kyi, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
more
Sub-title:
“They view themselves as the only ones capable of keeping the country together – something that goes back to the military’s foundation as an anti-colonial fighting force.”
Description:
"More than two years after Myanmar’s military seized power in a coup, the country is in a state of generalized armed conflict and economic dysfunction. What began as a loosely coordinated protest movement against the military takeover has since hardened into a broad front of resistance groups that seeks not just to reverse the coup, but to remove the military entirely from its position of centrality in Myanmar’s political, economic – even social – life.
How the Myanmar armed forces got there, and have since sustained their control over Myanmar and its people – even during the country’s decade of supposed reform in the 2010s – is the subject of a new book by the British journalist Oliver Slow, who lived and worked as a journalist in Myanmar between 2012 and 2020, several years of which he spent as an editor at Frontier Myanmar. His book “Return of the Junta: Why Myanmar’s Military Must Go Back to the Barracks” is due for release on February 23. Now based in London, he spoke to The Diplomat about the roots of a seemingly senseless coup, the ethnic and structural tensions bequeathed by British rule, and whether the country’s increasingly united resistance movement can manage to overcome them.
When the military seized power on February 1, 2021, many observers struggled to understand why the military leadership had taken such a disastrous step, after a decade in which Myanmar had opened its economic and political system. What in your view motivated the takeover? How would you describe the worldview of those at the upper echelons of the armed forces, and how is such a view inculcated?
The short answer I think is that the military was worried that the “transition to democracy” it had initiated a decade earlier risked spiraling out of its control. This wasn’t a transition towards any sort of genuine democracy, but rather an attempt by the ruling generals to gain the legitimacy they desired – particularly from Western powers – while also holding onto the main levers of power.
The transition/roadmap – whatever you wish to call it – was to be achieved through its own rules, by adhering to the 2008 Constitution, which it had passed in a sham referendum just months after Cyclone Nargis devastated large parts of the country.
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There were a couple of shortcomings with this approach. The first was that the people didn’t want to play by these rules. Every chance they’ve had the opportunity to do so, the Myanmar people have said loudly that they don’t want to be ruled by the military – in the elections of 1990, 2015 and 2020, not to mention by-elections in 2012 and 2017.
In all of these votes, the people have overwhelmingly voted for non-military parties, in particular Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD). Now of course she remains hugely popular in the country, but I see this as much more an anti-military vote rather than necessarily a pro-NLD one.
And she didn’t want to play by these rules either, displaying a pretty clear desire to amend the constitution, which I think the generals worried could feasibly happen if the NLD were to rule for another term. The January 2017 assassination of constitutional expert U Ko Ni in broad daylight was a clear message by the military to leave their precious charter alone.
So when the military’s proxy – the Union Solidarity and Development Party – performed even worse in the 2020 election than it had in 2015, I think that was a clear signal to the military rulers that they weren’t going to receive the popular mandate they desired, so they put an end to the experiment in the only way they know how – through violence.
The NLD’s unwillingness to look into these claims of voter fraud was the final straw for them.
In terms of the worldview of the Tatmadaw’s top brass, I think they view themselves as the only ones capable of keeping the country together – something that goes back to the military’s foundation as an anti-colonial fighting force, and through the difficult years after independence when the military did play an important role in keeping the country together.
But the people view the military’s role in the exact opposite way, as responsible for the destruction of the country. I think that’s in large part because of the violence the military has meted out to the people for several decades, but also in the way it has destroyed other aspects of life in Myanmar, including education and the economy.
Based on this worldview, I think the military wants complete control, and essentially for the people to bow down at its feet. Clearly, that’s not happening, and at the other end of the scale, you have most of the population now wanting the military completely removed from power. So, between a military that wants total power, and a resistance that wants the army removed from power, there really is this bottleneck that feels completely immovable at this moment in time.
Your book examines in detail the history of military involvement in Myanmar’s politics from independence in 1948 up to the current iteration of military dictatorship. How is the current phase of military rule, which followed a decade of carefully graduated political and economic opening, different from past eras of direct military rule, and do you see any continuities?
I see a lot of similarities, and a fair few differences.
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I think the main similarity is that they all hold onto this belief that the Tatmadaw is the only institution that can hold the country together. As I mentioned, this goes back to its foundations as an anti-colonial fighting force, its efforts to repel the Kuomintang – a foreign occupier – from northern Burma in the mid-20th century, and the important role the military played in keeping the country intact after independence.
You simply don’t get to the top of the Tatmadaw without subscribing to this belief: it’s drilled into you through your education, through your daily life, through your social circle, through everything you do.
The main difference I see in the current leadership – in particular coup leader Min Aung Hlaing, as after all this is a deeply hierarchical institution – is that it’s much more violent, or at least much more willing to resort to violence to hold onto power. Yes, previous juntas were violent, but I don’t think quite on this scale that we’re seeing – although that could be because it feels backed into a corner by the widespread resistance against it.
I don’t want to claim for a second that previous juntas in Myanmar weren’t violent, but I don’t think we’ve ever seen such sustained violence by its forces across the entire country every day. Again, that could be because the resistance has never been as strong as it is now, but I do believe that the military in Myanmar today is a uniquely immoral institution.
Prior to Myanmar’s independence, the country’s territory had never been under the control of a single, unitary state. What role do you think this challenge – the difficulty of consolidating state control in outlying, ethnic minority-dominated areas of the country – has played in justifying and perpetuating military rule? How much is military rule a symptom of Myanmar’s troubles, and to what degree is it a cause?
Not all of Myanmar’s issues today are the fault of the military alone.
Take British colonialism, for example, which had a pretty devastating impact on Burma. In addition to playing these different ethnic groups off against each other in a form of divide-and-conquer – the legacies of which persist today – they also dismantled most of the institutions that existed in the country at the time.
The British also left behind a hugely unequal country in terms of a tiered education system, as well as one scarred by the brutal Burma Campaign of World War II, not to mention the thousands of weapons that were left behind from that fighting and fueled the insecurity of the early years after independence.
The military likes to blame colonial rule for the problems the country is facing. In fact, just this morning I was reading a piece in state-run media to mark Union Day that essentially blamed “capitalist invaders” for the issues the country is facing.
And there is some element of truth to that – a half-truth, if you will – but let’s not forget that it’s been more than 70 years since independence, and the military has had control of the country for the majority of that time. In that time, it has done almost nothing to lift the lives of the people. Instead, it has built up its own capabilities, filled its own pockets and those of its top brass, and done everything it can to hold onto power. Amid all of this, the people have not only been left to fend for themselves, but also subjected to the military’s violence.
Since the coup, many Myanmar people have expressed intense frustration at the outside world’s inaction in the face of the military’s atrocities, right at the time that Western nations are mounting a joint effort to defend Ukraine from Russian aggression. How in your view should foreign governments deal with the growing political and humanitarian crisis in Myanmar?
I think in large part the frustration is completely fair. While some Western governments have placed sanctions against the military’s business interests, there are still massive gaps in terms of what they could target. These gaps need to be closed as quickly as possible to ensure all steps are taken to ensure the military’s finances are cut off. Every day the military can continue making money, and it will continue meting out violence against the people.
But we also need to be realistic and recognize that Myanmar’s future direction will be driven first and foremost by the dynamics inside the country. It will depend on the likes of those involved in the resistance – in those building parallel administrative systems, providing humanitarian assistance, the National Unity Government, and the armed resistance – as well as whether or not the military has the capabilities to cope with the huge resistance against it.
I would say though, it’s clear that something in the world order is not working when a regime as objectionable as this one can cling to power. Of course, these are sovereign countries, and foreign interference in a country’s affairs is a complicated thing, but the “democratic global order” has shown itself to be pretty ineffective.
Some U.N. departments do incredible work, so this isn’t an attack on the U.N. as a whole, but I have some pretty big questions about the role of the U.N. Security Council in its response. It describes itself as having “primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security,” and here we are two years after the military’s coup with one pretty flimsy resolution. Clearly, a drastic reset is needed in its approach, starting with getting rid of the veto for permanent members.
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Speaking in pragmatic terms, what I think we need to see from democratic countries is more support for the democratic resistance in Myanmar. There are so many remarkable groups doing important work, and these need to be highlighted and supported. Supporting justice initiatives against the military is also important, as is providing humanitarian assistance
In terms of the resistance, I think it’s important to try and engage with the few governments who are allies of the military – your Chinas, Indias, Thailands, and Japans (for as long as Putin hangs onto power, Russia is a lost cause). The democratic resistance needs to be able to make a positive case to these countries about their ability to rule – I don’t think these countries particularly want to support the military, they just see no other option right now.
One of the things that have historically benefited the military is the lack of unity between Myanmar’s various ethnic armed organizations and rebel groups on the one hand, and a simmering mistrust between these groups and the Bamar-dominated National League for Democracy (NLD) on the other. Are you at all optimistic that things have changed since the coup?
I am. One of the few upsides of what’s been happening in Myanmar since the coup has been this new-found unity among the ethnic groups.
I was in Myanmar in 2017, when much of the population pushed the military’s narrative that it had committed no wrongdoing against the Rohingya, so to see so many people apologize for that, and to admit they had fallen for the military’s propaganda, has been incredibly powerful.
Now that’s not to say that any post-Tatmadaw existence in Myanmar is going to be straightforward, and in fact, I think it would be extremely messy and challenging. A lot of these grievances go back a long way, so a lot of trust-building has to be done to show that the change is genuine.
But those looking to emerge as the future rulers of Myanmar have generally put together a positive case for the country’s future – one where federalism, justice, and respect for all are at its core. This is a much more positive vision for the country than the military has ever shown..."
Source/publisher:
"The Diplomat" (Japan)
Date of publication:
2023-02-15
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-15
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Armed conflict in Burma - attacks on civilians, Military History
Language:
more
Description:
"Myanmar junta forces including pro-regime militia have burned down more than 55,000 civilian houses nationwide since the 2021 coup, said Data For Myanmar, an independent research group.
In total, 55,484 homes across the country’s 14 states and regions were torched as part of the military regime’s arson campaign between February 1, 2021 and the end of January 2023.
Resistance stronghold Sagaing Region suffered the most arson attacks, with 43,292 houses burned, followed by 8,863 in Magwe Region and 1,484 in Chin State, according to Data For Myanmar’s report.
The research group said that it used reports from the media, rights groups and refugee organizations to calculate the number of homes destroyed.
However, the actual number of houses torched may be higher than the reported figure, as many regime arson attacks have yet to be verified and recent data from Kayah State is currently not available.
Several resistance strongholds have experienced a recent escalation in junta arson attacks, following the regime’s imposition of martial law in 37 townships in Sagaing, Magwe and Bago regions and Chin and Kayah states.
The Myanmar military has ignored calls from the international community to end all violence and release political prisoners.
Instead, it has continued to commit atrocities including burning people alive, the arbitrary torture and killing of civilians, extrajudicial killings of resistance detainees, using civilian detainees as human shields, artillery and airstrikes on residential areas, looting and burning houses and acts of sexual violence.
Since the February 1, 2021 coup, the junta has killed at least 2,989 people and arrested more than 19,000, said the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners, a rights group that monitors deaths and arrests by regime forces..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2023-02-15
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-15
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Military History, Armed conflict in Burma - attacks on civilians
Language:
more
Description:
"Following the second anniversary of Myanmar’s coup and the junta’s extension of emergency rule for six more months, The Irrawaddy’s editor-in-chief Aung Zaw talks to the US State Department Counsellor Derek Chollet about the extension, possible pressure to prevent the regime from using airstrikes against civilians and reasons for optimism.
Q: How do you view the extension of emergency rule by the regime?
Chollet: I think that this extension of the emergency law by another six months is yet another transparent attempt by the SAC [State Administrative Council] to justify its unlawful rule. It is two years ago that the junta took action to undo the November 2020 election. And of course, it’s been trying ever since to find ways to legitimize itself and to find the way for it to justify its rule.
We are, of course, also ready and prepared for an announcement at some point about holding new elections, which we have been very clear about for the last better part of the last year so that any new elections would be illegitimate. They’d be sham elections.
You cannot hold free and fair elections when you are killing and locking up your political opposition, not allowing political parties to operate and you don’t control 50 percent of your territory.
So this is just the news today which is just another step by the junta that we reject.
Instead of finding ways to perpetuate its unjust rule, we call on the SAC to return Myanmar to the path of democracy and engage in meaningful discussions in which Myanmar can get back on that path.
Q: What pressure could prevent the junta from using airstrikes against civilians?
Chollet: Well, we have seen the horrors only multiply over the last two years in terms of what the junta is willing to do against its own people who, by the way, are firing back on the junta because it’s only hardening the resolve of the opposition.
We have taken steps along with our allies and partners over the last several years now to try to make it harder for the junta to generate revenues and also harder for the junta to acquire arms. Unfortunately, because of the views of some members of the UN Security Council, a ban on arms is not going to be achievable anytime soon, if ever.
Nevertheless, the United States feels the country should not be supplying the junta with military hardware. We have seen countries take a step back in their willingness to engage militarily with the junta. Unfortunately, other countries, like Russia, have only doubled down on their relationship with the junta. And the military relationship has only grown stronger between Myanmar and Russia over the last several years, particularly as the circle of friends that both have had gotten smaller because of what Russia has been doing in Ukraine and what Myanmar has been doing against its own people.
So we took some additional steps with the United States along with allies and partners [on January 31] to try to make it harder for the junta to acquire arms. And we’ll continue in the coming weeks and months to augment those steps, to make it harder for the junta to acquire the capabilities and the spare parts that it needs to prosecute this war.
Q: The Burmese people welcome these moves. The people are united against the junta and the support from Russia. How do you respond to the claims that the US is outsourcing responsibility to ASEAN?
Chollet: Our policy has been rooted in three lines of effort. First was to isolate and punish the junta and to make it harder for the junta to generate revenue and acquire resources and weapons. Second has been to help support the pro-democratic opposition within Myanmar.
That’s been principally through our work with the National Unity Government [NUG], but also beyond that, with the NUCC [National Unity Consultative Council], with the EAOs [ethnic armed organizations] with the PDF [People Defense Force]. We have been engaging with them.
I’ve personally been engaging with them over the last several years, either in person or virtually trying to figure out what they need, give them our best advice and also give them, as best we can, the support that they need.
And the United States is not alone in this effort. We’re working with others in the region and beyond in support of the NUG.
And then, third, to help continue to provide humanitarian assistance to the people of Myanmar. The United States is the largest single donor of humanitarian assistance to the people of Myanmar. We are constantly exploring ways to get that assistance into Myanmar more efficiently, more effectively, to the people that need it the most.
And we will redouble those efforts in the time to come.
What I can say is we have been working very hard, and really the foundation of our policy has been to work very hard with our ASEAN partners.
This is not a matter of outsourcing anything to anyone.
ASEAN, of course, has a vested interest in Myanmar’s future, in Myanmar’s stability and Myanmar being a democracy.
Whether you’re a country that borders Myanmar, whether you’re an ASEAN country that is a littoral state, you have an interest in Myanmar’s future, because Southeast Asia matters so much to the United States for our strategic interests. That’s why Myanmar matters to us. Myanmar matters to the stability of Southeast Asia and the ability of ASEAN countries to reach their full potential. And we very strongly value that partnership with ASEAN as you know.
We are very pleased with the strong steps that ASEAN has taken over the last year to try to make it harder for the regime to gain any sense of legitimacy or recognition by the international community.
When it comes to being able to participate at a political level at meetings such as the US-ASEAN Special Summit that we hosted in Washington back in May, all the way up until the high-level meetings at the end of last year and even the informal ASEAN foreign ministerial meeting that Indonesia is hosting now.
Myanmar will not be represented at the political level. We think that it’s important to maintain that isolation of the regime and the inability of the regime to get any legitimacy or recognition.
At the same time, as I said, we’re working closely with our allies and partners to try to give the opposition as much support as we can.
And just yesterday in Washington, Daniel Kritenbrink, who’s my colleague and our assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, visited the NUG office in Washington.
I will be visiting myself very soon and we’re going to continue that constant dialogue with the NUG and other pro-democracy opposition in Myanmar to figure out how best we can provide a way forward or help them find a way forward in this crisis. I should also note we’re working closely with other international organizations, principally the United Nations, and we’ve all been in close touch.
I’ve personally been in close touch with the UN special envoy for Myanmar, as well as the human rights rapporteur for Myanmar, who’s made some very strong statements, including an important report that was just released on the situation.
The UN Security Council, in a historic first, late last year, finally passed a resolution condemning what was going on inside Myanmar. There were very important steps for the Security Council to be heard on this issue formally through a resolution.
It had issued a statement and had briefings in the past. But I think that’s an indication of the seriousness with which the world is taking this crisis, the fact that the Security Council was finally able to overcome its differences and speak to this issue.
Q: Can the US do more to protect civilians?
Chollet: Well again, we will continue to provide that significant support for the people of Myanmar and the humanitarian assistance as well as support to the National Unity Government and other pro-democracy actors in Myanmar to enable them to gain more capability and prepare them for what we hope and believe will be one day a return to democracy inside Myanmar.
And the National Unity Government, as well as other pro-democracy leaders, has really done some very significant work to think about the future of Myanmar’s Constitution and governance to prepare for that day, which we hope will come soon when Myanmar will return to democracy.
And it’s important to note this will be a different country than it was on January 31, 2021. It will be a different democracy.
And I think the opposition and National Unity Government and their colleagues have learned a lot about some of the challenges that the previous democratic government in Myanmar had, as well as, of course, what’s been going on now, and taking that into account for the future democracy of Myanmar.
And we will continue to find ways to support that democratic opposition and the people of Myanmar. The Burma Act, which was passed by the US Congress late last year, was a bipartisan piece of legislation.
We, the Biden administration, worked very closely with our Republican and Democrat colleagues on Capitol Hill to help craft that legislation.
We are fully supportive of that act. And that gives us some important new tools that we plan to use to help the people of Myanmar realize their democratic destiny.
Q: What is the status of the NDAA Burma Act? Has implementation started?
Chollet: We have started to implement the various components of that act. Of course, some of those components are going to take a while to begin implementing.
But one of the things that we believe is so important about it is again, it registered and symbolized the bipartisan commitment in Washington to the support that we believe we need to give to the people of Myanmar, to the democratic opposition inside Myanmar.
And we are going to be working with our allies and partners in the region and beyond to coordinate our efforts because we believe that we are much stronger when we are working together on these issues.
And the people of Myanmar deserve our support, given the tremendous hardship they’ve been facing that you have done such a terrific job covering this crisis from the very beginning. We’re going to continue to do our part so that when we meet again a year from now, we’re talking about the democratic path that Myanmar is on, not the bloody hardships that the junta is perpetrating against its people.
Q: Why are you so optimistic in the face of this brutality?
Chollet: Well, again, part of the job is.
Q: Could Thailand do more?
Chollet: It’s important to be a successful diplomat, you have to have some degree of optimism. You have to be really realistic too. Even when you’re faced with a crisis like Myanmar, which there’s a lot to be pessimistic about, I have gained optimism.
During the [February 1] silent strike the scope is yet another symbol of the tremendous resilience, spirit and strength of Myanmar’s civil society, of its pro-democracy, not just leaders, but everyday citizens who want a better life for themselves and are willing to stand up and push back against this brutal junta.
The resilience and strength of Myanmar’s civil society have surprised the junta.
I don’t think they expected it was going to be this kind of fight when they took the steps they took two years ago. So that gives me hope and optimism.
And the work that the NUG and other pro-democracy groups have done over the last two years gives me hope for a more democratic future.
That said we have to be realistic. This is going to be tough. There are going to be many tough days ahead. Unfortunately, the continued airstrikes mean we have to realistically expect some of that to continue now.
But we need to continue to work hard to put that to an end, to find ways to cut off the regime’s ability to access resources and weapons and strengthen the opposition. That’s something we are committed to.
And the countries of the region are critical parts of that. Thailand is a critical ally of the United States. We’ve been treaty allies now for decades. Thailand has a very long border with Myanmar, and a lot of its core national security interests are at stake.
I can tell you we have a running dialogue with our partners in Thailand in person and over the phone about the way forward there. Thailand is a critical ally with a lot at stake and we are working closely with them.
And the other members of ASEAN, whether it was Cambodia last year as ASEAN chair, Brunei in 2021 or this year, of course, we’re looking forward to working closely, even more closely with our good friends in Jakarta as they are chairing ASEAN through this year.
It’s very important that we are working together, US, ASEAN, but also more broadly, the UK, Canada, Australia, Japan, Korea and other countries with interest and influence in the situation in Myanmar.
Q: Many powerful cronies close to the regime remain unpunished by sanctions.
Chollet: We recently announced a new set of sanctions against individuals and entities, including some of those individuals who are most closely associated with Myanmar’s ability to generate revenues from energy as well as the arms trade.
We will continue to be looking at any individual or entity who’s associated with those efforts, and they should know that more is coming, and they should stop these activities because if they don’t, they will be punished. And again, this is not just the United States doing this, its partners like the UK, Australia, Canada and others. The EU has imposed significant sanctions as well.
What we’re seeing is the world, not just Southeast Asia, but increasingly the balance of the rest of the world, come down against what the junta is doing and be willing to take significant steps to ensure the junta pays the price for what it’s doing..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2023-02-15
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-15
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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Description:
"Documented incidents:
23 January 2023: In Pu Tein Pyin village, Kyauk Hmaw village tract, Yinmabin township and district, Sagaing region, two ambulances along with a religious building and nine civilian houses were torched by the Myanmar military during a raid on the village. Source: Radio Free Asia
24 January 2023: In Monywa town, township, and district, Sagaing region, the Myanmar military seized an ambulance owned by the LNGO Pyi-taw-thar during a raid at Shwe Let Pan monastery.
Three monks and five civilians were arrested and the ambulance was later used for election campaign activities. Sources: Democratic Voice of Burma and The 74 Media
25 January 2023: In Thaketa township, Yangon district, Yangon region, the junta authorities inspected private hospitals and clinics to see if they employed Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM)-affiliated health workers. Source: Mekong News
26 January 2023: In Dagon Myothit township, Yangon district and region, around 100 junta authorities and military and police forces inspected the Grand Yangon Private Hospital. The ward administrators and police forces also inspected two private clinics Kyal-sin-thit and Aye-chan-say reportedly to see whether they employed CDM-affiliated health workers. Source: Mekong News Reported on 26 January 2023: In Yangon district and region, the junta authorities asked for employee lists from private hospitals and clinics, closely monitored local pharmacies, and issued warnings not to employ CDM-affiliated health workers. The police and intelligence forces reportedly impersonated patients to track down CDM-affiliated health workers. Source: Delta News Agency
26 January 2023: In Pa Du village and village tract, Sagaing township, district and region, an armed group entered a station hospital, threatened the guard, and took away a portable X-ray machine, an operating table, an oxygen concentrator, and medicines. The hospital was not functioning at the time of the attack. The junta authorities accused the local resistance forces of this attack. Source: Telegram..."
Source/publisher:
Insecurity Insight
Date of publication:
2023-02-07
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-14
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations, Public Health, Spring Revolution
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Sub-title:
A handwritten letter from inside the prison describes a two-day assault on more than 70 women using metal batons and tasers
Description:
"Several women incarcerated on politically motivated charges in Mandalay’s Obo Prison have been injured in recent physical assaults by guards, according to sources in contact with the inmates.
A Mandalay-based youth activist shared with Myanmar Now parts of a handwritten eyewitness account from inside the prison detailing the beatings and when they occurred. Titled “Oppressed Prisoners,” it was delivered to him through covert channels, and described a crackdown on detainees in two women’s wards that was perpetrated on February 3 and 4.
“[The letter says] that the male prison authorities charged into the ward and beat over 70 female political prisoners. They were also allegedly hit with slingshots,” he explained.
The activist said that the document also included a list of the prisoners who had been beaten and injured.
Among those subjected to the assaults was 20-year-old San Lin May, who was arrested in December 2021 after being accused of funding an urban guerrilla force. On February 3, she was convicted in a junta court of violating Section 50 of the Counterterrorism Law and sentenced to 15 years in prison.
The day after her sentencing, a source close to San Lin May’s family said that guards attacked inmates in her ward following a dispute between detainees and the prison authorities. They were reportedly armed with wooden and iron batons to which tasers had been attached.
During the episode of violence, her ear was at least partially cut off.
“They were all beaten indiscriminately… San Lin May was simply caught in the crossfire of the conflict,” the source said, adding that her wound had required five stitches. “We heard that the injury was serious, and we’re all deathly worried because we have not been able to make direct contact with [the prisoners].”
Another woman identified as having been beaten that day was Po Pyae Thu, a restaurant owner known for her philanthropy work and serving a lengthy sentence after being convicted by the military council of multiple politically motivated charges.
“It worried us a lot to see her name on the list,” a friend of Po Pyae Thu said. “It’s even worse because we have not heard any updates on her condition, nor have we had direct contact with her.”
A woman released from Obo Prison three months ago told Myanmar Now that the facility’s authorities treated political prisoners with “extreme hostility, out of spite” and that other criminal convicts were also encouraged to take part in the abuse.
“The worst thing I saw in prison was that [the guards] appointed several prisoners as administrators to ‘govern’ other prisoners: criminals that were sent to prison for dealing drugs or gambling were ruling over and torturing political prisoners,” she said. “On my first day in prison, I was beaten with a belt by another prisoner for absolutely no reason at all.”
A Mandalay lawyer assisting political prisoners in Obo told Myanmar Now in October last year that the inmates were “losing their rights every day,” noting that after being subjected to violence, they were typically denied medical care.
The All Burma Federation of Student Unions released a statement last August which also revealed that Obo’s political prisoners were being starved, beaten, and even electrocuted.
In June, at least two inmates of the prison were beaten to death with metal batons during a crackdown that also left at least 13 others injured, according to two lawyers.
Similar assaults were reported over the following months by released prisoners, including an attack on August 8—the anniversary of the start of Myanmar’s pro-democracy movement—that resulted in at least one death.
Myanmar Now is unable to independently verify the incidents. The military has used health restrictions associated with the Covid-19 pandemic to deny visits to political prisoners, making it difficult to gather further information on the ongoing rights violations.
Nearly 14,000 people were still in junta prisons at the time of reporting, more than 3,000 of whom were women, according to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners..."
Source/publisher:
"Myanmar Now" (Myanmar)
Date of publication:
2023-02-14
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-14
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Political prisoners and other violations in Burma - reports, Political History
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Sub-title:
Residents say administrators take bribes to look the other way as their livelihoods are destroyed.
Description:
"A rapid expansion in illegal gold mining since the military coup is poisoning the water supply in Myanmar’s Kachin state and destroying the livelihoods of residents who say the ethnic Kachin group that administers the region has failed to police the sector.
Illegal mining of gold, as well as jade and rare earth minerals, is rampant in Kachin state, where successive governments have failed to regulate the industry for generations. However, the number of unsanctioned operations has ballooned since the military’s Feb. 1, 2021, takeover amid conflict between junta troops and armed resistance forces in the region.
Residents of Sumprabum township told RFA Burmese that illegal gold mines had “nearly doubled” in Kachin state since the coup and are devastating the environment, despite local protests.
“They used to dig in areas farther from our village but now they are digging quite close,” said a resident of Hpon Ing Yang village who, like other sources in the area, declined to be named citing fear of reprisal.
“The water in our stream is no longer suitable, even for washing, he said. The miners “have already excavated all around our village ... [and] we might have to move to some other place where there is still good soil for us to farm.”
The Hpon Ing Yang resident said that more than 20 companies using at least 40 machines are currently digging for gold near his village, which he described as “basically destroyed.”
“Even if the political situation becomes more stable, I don’t think there is any hope left for us here,” he said.
Expanding unchecked
A similar situation can be found in nearby Puta-O township’s villages of Tsum Pi Yang, In Loi Yang, Shi Kai Yang, Ah Lang Gar, In Hkar Gar and Hpon Kyan, sources told RFA.
According to laws governing small-scale and private mining, gold mines must be at least 300 feet away from water sources such as rivers, streams and lakes to prevent contamination from mining waste. Furthermore, gold mines are required to operate in a way that limits their environmental and socio-economic impact on local communities.
Nonetheless, illegal gold mining has expanded virtually unchecked in Puta-O since last year, destroying local livelihoods, said a resident of In Loi Yang village.
“In the past, people used to run small home businesses [such as farming] based on the natural shifts in the land and water table,” said the resident. “These days, people are digging with big machinery … and impacting our village and plantations, regardless of how much we ask them not to.”
He said there may be as many as 150 gold mining rigs in Puta-O alone and complained that mines are even operating in areas of cultural significance to the Kachin people.
Looking the other way
Residents and environmental activists told RFA that mining companies pay bribes to both the junta and the rebel Kachin Independence Organization to look the other way as they operate illegally.
Col. Norbu, spokesman for the KIO, said his group has established policies regarding gold mining and does not allow operations in populated areas or places of cultural significance.
“We have provided written instructions regarding this matter at the state level,” he said.
“The activities are scrutinized and allowed only after discussions at the state level. That’s why I think they are working in accordance with the instructions.”
When asked by RFA about mining in areas where residents work for their livelihoods, Norbu said that there “may be a weakness” in oversight for the KIO's determination of permit areas, and noted that many companies do not ask for official permission to mine.
Win Ye Tun, the junta’s social minister and spokesman for Kachin state, told RFA in October that there is “no legal permit for mining” in Kachin state and said the military has taken action against illegal gold mining in Mohnyin township.
However, an environmental activist in Kachin state said that the only thing stopping companies from mining is running out of sites to exploit.
“From an environmental standpoint, the areas designated as nature reserves and their natural resources will all be destroyed, and only land that does not produce gold will be left untouched,” the activist said.
“All other areas will have been excavated,” the activist said. “If it goes on like this, Kachin’s natural resources will soon be gone.”..."
Source/publisher:
"RFA" (USA)
Date of publication:
2023-02-14
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-14
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"Corn, watermelon, ginger and turmeric farmers in Shan State have switched to growing opium as Myanmar’s economy collapses under military rule.
Labor shortages and rising fertilizer and pesticide prices have thrown numerous farmers into economic hardship.
A Shan State farmer told The Irrawaddy: “Yields are not good this year and prices are low. I previously grew corn, turmeric and ginger but it was difficult to sell them because of problems with transport. I switched to poppy which is easier to transport. I can carry several kilograms and I earn no more than 30,000 kyats for selling about 50kg of crops. I would not be able to carry that amount to market but the brokers come to the farms to buy it. Poppy is much more profitable.”
It costs at least 1.3 million kyats (US$450) to grow an acre of corn or ginger and around 1 million kyats to cultivate an acre of poppy, which is far more valuable, he said.
“Food prices have generally increased since the coup but our crops sell for less. We have no option but to grow opium,” said the farmer.
Poppy yields are between 10-13kg per acre and it fetches up to 900,000 kyats per 1.6kg. The poppy season starts in August, according to growers.
Other farmers have left for Thailand, he said.
“Everyone who has stayed is growing poppy. It is difficult to sell other crops with transport disruptions. But the poppy brokers come to us to buy it,” he said.
Myanmar has again become the world’s second-largest producer of opium following the 2021 coup. Cultivation and production dipped and Myanmar in 2019 fell to third under the ousted National League for Democracy government, according to a United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime report last month.
The survey of Shan, Kachin, Chin and Karen states, where Myanmar’s opium production is based, said Shan State accounted for around 84 percent of the area under cultivation.
Myanmar’s poppy cultivation stood at 55,000 hectares in 2015, 41,000 in 2017, 39,300 in 2018 and 39,100 in 2019.
In 2022 the cultivated area was estimated at 40,100 hectares, about 10,000 hectares more than in 2021, according to the UN agency. Production almost doubled in the first year of military rule to 795 tonnes in 2022.
Continued instability, increasing fuel and fertilizer prices, a weak economy, inflation and high opium prices have boosted opium cultivation, said the report..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2023-02-14
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-14
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Drugs and Burma: general links, reports and articles, Burma: drug production and trafficking, Drug bans and poppy crop substitution, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Anti-coup protesters
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Description:
"A Myanmar junta court sentenced jailed former student leader and democracy activist Ko Lin Htet Naing, aka Ko James, to an additional five years in prison on a terrorism charge on Monday.
According to his wife Ma Phyoe Phyoe Aung, who is herself a prominent activist and former political prisoner, Botahtaung District Court handed down the latest sentence under Article 52 (b) of the Counterterrorism Law.
Ko James was earlier sentenced to three years’ imprisonment under incitement charges. With Monday’s sentence, he now faces a total of eight years’ imprisonment.
“It is an unjust and false charge and sentence using repressive laws; it is a terrorism charge against an activist for defending democracy,” Ma Phyoe Phyoe Aung wrote on her Facebook account.
Junta forces arrested Ko James on June 18 in Yangon and he has been detained in Yangon’s notorious Insein Prison since then. His mother was killed on Oct. 19 in a blast at the prison’s parcel drop-off office while delivering food for her detained son. The junta denied his request to attend her funeral.
According to rights group the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners, more than 19,000 people including elected leaders, lawmakers, activists, protesters and striking civil servants have been arrested since the coup, mainly for anti-junta activism. Of those arrested, 15,177 remain behind bars..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2023-02-14
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-14
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Political prisoners and other violations in Burma - reports
Language:
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Sub-title:
Harsh New Measures Would Crush Party Participation in Politics
Description:
"(Sydney) – Myanmar’s new political parties law will prevent key members of the political opposition from running in upcoming elections, Human Rights Watch said today. The law, announced on January 26, 2023, adds to concerns that the vote now slated for August will lack all credibility and be used merely to try to legitimize further military control.
The Political Party Registration Law, which repeals 2010 legislation, prohibits anyone previously convicted of a crime or serving a prison term from joining a political party. This disqualifies many senior members of the National League for Democracy (NLD), including the party leader, Aung San Suu Kyi and President Win Myint, both serving lengthy sentences on fabricated charges. The military overthrew the newly elected NLD-led government on February 1, 2021.
“Myanmar’s junta adopted the Political Party Registration Law not only to rig the planned elections but to try to obtain legitimacy for a military-controlled state,” said Manny Maung, Myanmar researcher at Human Rights Watch. “The junta is creating a system to crush all political opposition and derail any possible return to democratic civilian rule.”
The new law states that existing political parties must reregister within 60 days of the law’s enactment or risk being dissolved, and disqualifies any political group declared as an “unlawful association or terrorist organization under any existing law.” The junta has already declared the opposition National Unity Government (NUG) and its parliamentary body, the Committee Representing the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (the Union Parliament) as “terrorist organizations” for alleged attacks against the military since the coup.
The law requires political groups seeking to put forward electoral candidates to have at least 100,000 members within three months of registering, a huge increase from 1,000 in the previous law, and a prohibitive bar for most parties. It also requires national political parties to have funds of at least 100 million kyat (US$47,000) to qualify for registration, far more than most smaller parties can afford. For regional or state parties, the minimum amount required in the party coffers is 10 million kyat ($4,700). These requirements will make it nearly impossible for smaller ethnic and minority parties to take part in elections, Human Rights Watch said.
The NLD responded that it “steadfastly” objected to any election under the military junta, and that it refused to register. Other smaller parties, such as the Kayah State Democracy and the Kayan National Party, also said they will not register and therefore face dissolution. Some ethnic minority parties such as the Shan Nationalities Democratic Party and the United Democracy Party have indicated they plan to register.
The People’s Defense Forces, which are anti-junta militias, have indicated that they aim to disrupt preparations for the elections and have attacked some junta personnel conducting a population survey that could be used to assemble voter rolls. This raises concerns that members of political parties that register under the new law could also be targeted.
On February 1, 2023, the junta extended the state of emergency in the country for six months. On February 2, the junta imposed new martial law orders in 37 additional townships in Chin, Karen, Karenni, Magway and Mon States, and Bago, Sagaing, and Tanintharyi Regions. The orders impose curfews and curb freedom of association and movement, restricting political parties from organizing.
The military-drafted 2008 Constitution, although designed to perpetuate military control, requires the state to enact laws to allow political parties to organize for the “flourishing of a genuine, disciplined multi-party democratic system.” Under the new law and additional martial law orders, any election would be dominated by junta-backed political parties and the military itself, which already holds 25 percent of seats in the national and local legislatures under the 2008 Constitution.
The Political Parties Registration Law fails to meet international standards in respecting the rights of political parties to organize and stand for election. Under international law, voters should have the right to freely choose their candidates, and any conditions placed on political party and candidate registration should be reasonable and non-discriminatory.
Establishing a credible, pluralistic, and rights respecting electoral system is essential to holding genuine democratic elections in which voters freely choose their representatives. Despite the limitations imposed by the 2008 Constitution, in November 2020, voters exercised their right to choose their government, a right that the military denied by staging a coup.
Concerned governments, including regional partners such as member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Japan, and India, should condemn the political parties law and ensure that they do not lend credibility to the junta’s attempt to legitimize military control through sham elections.
The United Kingdom, the United States, and European Union member states should coordinate with other like-minded governments to strengthen and enforce targeted sanctions against senior junta officials and military entities in Myanmar.
“The 2021 military coup strangled the hopes of the Myanmar people who had voted in credible elections in 2020,” Maung said. “Concerned governments need to put concerted pressure on the junta to return to a democratically elected civilian government.”..."
Source/publisher:
Human Rights Watch (USA)
Date of publication:
2023-02-14
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-14
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
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Sub-title:
National Unity Government’s new shadow embassy comes after Congress passed the Burma Act.
Description:
"Myanmar's opposition National Unity Government officially opened a shadow embassy in Washington on Monday, with a U.S. State Department official at the event using a speech to reject the legitimacy of elections planned by the military junta later this year.
The so-called NUG has set up a government-in-exile after the military took power from a democratically elected government in a February 2021 coup.
The foreign minister of this shadow government, Zin Mar Aung, said at the opening that the passage of the Burma Act as part of last year’s defense spending bill enabled her shadow government to officially open the office.
“The NUG's office was able to be opened after the U.S. government enacted the Burma Act, which includes promises to encourage and support Myanmar's democracy,” Zin Mar Aung said, noting the office would play an important role in the NUG's fight for democracy.
She said the “presence of U.S. government officials at the office opening … signaled the state of official engagement” between the United States and the NUG in the wake of the Burma Act.
Election legitimacy
Uzra Zeya, the U.S. undersecretary of state for civilian security, democracy, and human rights, told the ceremony the United States was committed to the restoration of democracy in Myanmar.
“The U.S. government continues to encourage and support Myanmar's return to the path of inclusive democracy as contained in the Burma Act,” Zeya said. “The deputy foreign minister also said that it is important for the United States and the countries in the region not to accept the fake election that will be held by the military junta.”
The comments reflect those previously made by U.S. State Department counselor Derek Chollet, who had dismissed the legitimacy of any elections held by Myanmar’s junta under current circumstances.
“Any election that the regime might have … will have no chance of being free or fair, given that the regime has imprisoned or intimidated nearly all critical potential contenders, and indeed does not control nearly 50% of Burma's territory,” Chollet told reporters Jan. 31.
Among other things, the Burma Act allows the U.S. State Department to engage directly with Myanmar’s opposition groups, including the NUG, and forces it to develop a coherent program of sanctions against the military junta.
New home base
Monday’s event was also attended by NUG Deputy Foreign Minister Moe Zaw Oo and Myanmar’s U.N. ambassador, Kyaw Moe Tun, who has held onto the post to which he was appointed before the coup.
Moe Zaw Oo said the new office would prove an important home base.
“This office represents the ministry of foreign affairs of the National Unity Government,” Moe Zaw Oo said. “We have opened this office here as we want to build stronger diplomatic relations with the United States. We also have plans to build relations with the Congress, the Senate and the House of Representatives that are all here.”
He said the office would “do anything and everything for the revolution,” including leading relations with international institutions based in the United States that might be able to help the shadow government.
“We are going to interact with them, too,” he said. “Similarly, we are going to engage with the people of Myanmar origin in the United States encouraging and supporting the Myanmar people and the revolution, for their support, financial contributions and donations.”..."
Source/publisher:
"RFA" (USA)
Date of publication:
2023-02-14
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-14
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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Description:
"1.Terrorist SAC has no control over territories2/2/2023.....2. Justice Ministry urges civilians to report atrocitiest5/2/2023.....3. NUG announces serious action taken against labour agencies that violate labour rights5/2/2023.....4. 5.6 million children are in need of humanitarian assistance7/2/2023.....5 . SAC atrocities and arson resulted in 4 deaths, including a monk in Sagaing
03/02/2023..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2023-02-14
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-14
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
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Description:
"National Unity Government Weekly Press Update (7/2023)..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2023-02-14
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-14
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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1.3 MB
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"1. We solemnly salute CDM activists and hold them to the highest regard for the sacrifices they made and their moral stand, for always standing righteously with the people and for fighting together with them.
2. On the other hand, we to a certain extent must understand and empathize with the real life struggles of non-CDM people trying to survive under coercion and repression.
3. What we should and can appeal to all non-CDM public servants is to not politically co-operate with the SAC and to not actively participate in their mechanisms of repression, as well as to not willingly serve the military dictatorship. Moreover, revolutionary forces should continuously impart the non- CDM public servants with knowledge and guidance on how they can confidentially support the revolution and be a part of it.
4. The backbone of the CDM policy should include planning and implementing programs that provide the essential needs for the CDM people for their survival and wellbeing. The CDM policy must include sections that provide full guarantees for the future of CDM activists.
5. The CDM is one of the political movements. We should consider a variety of ways for CDM activists so that they can actively participate in this political process. Every revolutionary force has a major responsibility to organize CDM activists and help them transform from being a vital mass protest force to become part of a united powerful revolutionary coalition. We must organize, build up and transform our revolutionary associates to become our allies, and our allies to become our comrades.
6. Most critically, we should find ways to help CDM activists to learn political thought and ideology, and at the same time help them with details on methods to strengthen their emancipatory struggle and coping mechanisms for their everyday survival. This should include accessing UN mechanisms and programs as well as getting assistance through NGOS, INGOs, and negotiating with Ethnic Revolutionary Organizations (EROS) for CDM activists to seek safe shelter, essential aid, evacuating and relocating CDM activists to liberated areas, and deliberating and discussing political thought and ideology with CDM activists.
7. By all means, we should try to help CDM activists to establish unions such as workers union or Public Servants Union, and help these unions to become active members of the political struggle.
8. We took a position that non-CDM people are not a fundamental alliance force for our struggle. At the same time, they are not the main target we should allocate our resources to stage an attack.
9. We should always let those who want to join the CDM movement know that they are welcome anytime, that it is better late than never. The door should be left wide open for them. Although the CDM and non-CDM people may subscribe to different political values and take different paths when passing through the tumultuous history of our time, we should not forget that each and every one is living under multiple forms of oppression perpetrated by the same military dictatorship.
10. Since oppression by the SAC has become more intense, those who initially refused to join the CDM movement are now joining, such as in Myaing region. In other cases, after the liberated areas gradually expanded, more and more non- CDM people are joining the movement, such as in Sagaing region. We should take notes of such phenomena.
11. In terms of formulating CDM policy, instead of a blanket approach, we should consider a stratified approach, that involves making different policies for different areas considering complex contexts and nuances, such as liberated areas, ERO territories, contested areas where both SAC and revolutionary forces are vying for control, and areas dominated by SAC.
12. We must consult and coordinate with EROS when formulating a CDM policy that concerns their constituencies and those who took shelter in their territory. We believe action speaks louder than words. It is not enough to superficially espouse "equality for all nationalities, and rights of ethnic people for self determination" but rather we must prove our determination with actual actions as suggested above.
13. It is vital to develop and implement an education policy in which rights to education and learning, and provision of essential education services are guaranteed. Absolutely, there is no moral ground for any political faction to interfere or take away these rights.
14. We should not allow our individual emotions and grievances get in the way of making a political policy for everyone. Likewise, we do not make a broad national policy just because "we had made political sacrifices" or "we endure hardships daily as a result of our belief". If we project our own bitter suffering too much over the policies we are making, we may knock the policy items away from the intended results we want to achieve, and the subsequent implementing strategies may go wrong. In fact, what matter most is that we hold together between different political allies, care for each other and pave our own way to the future.
15. It is crystal clear that the journey ahead is a long struggle. We believe that to unify, persuade and organize as much as possible is the most suitable and practical tactics for the revolution to triumph.
16. Judgements and punishments should only be considered when inevitable. Some conundrums might not be suitable to be solved at present. It is wise to postpone or sequence some issues, until the time and space is ripe.
17. Striving in every possible way for the triumph of the people's revolution should be our priority. We believe some questions will become easier to answer after the revolution is victorious. Some issues may shrink or fade away while some may find their own solution instantly. Therefore, we solemnly urge you to focus your precious efforts to the single most important task at our hand that is uprooting the military dictatorship through the means of politics, diplomatic and armed revolution..."
Source/publisher:
All Burma Federation of Student Unions
Date of publication:
2023-02-13
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-13
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Student Groups, Anti-coup protesters
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Sub-title:
The military government in Myanmar does not listen to calls for dialogue. Meanwhile, thousands have died or been arrested, and one million have been displaced.
Description:
"Two years have passed since the military staged a coup d'etat and seized full power in Myanmar. Many Myanmar citizens lost their freedom and their lives. Others were forced to flee the country. Its market economy, which was expected to be the "last frontier in Asia," has also been forced into retreat.
Yet, despite the repression of the military junta, the people continue to resist. And some pro-democracy groups have joined with ethnic minorities in armed struggle. The past two years have shown once again that the military regime has neither legitimacy nor support from the people.
The Japanese government has been emphasizing dialogue. However, instead it should cooperate with the United States and Europe to steer a course toward isolating the military regime.
February marks a milestone for Myanmar. This is because their constitution stipulates that the state of emergency, which is the basis for the military's control of the country, can last up to two years.
On February 1, however, the military announced a six-month extension of the declaration, citing the current security conditions. As a result, general elections, which were supposed to be held by August, are now far from being held.
Needless to say, fairness cannot be expected in an election when democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi has been excluded and instead sentenced to a total of 33 years in prison.....Human Loss and Injury: According to Myanmar human rights groups, 2,940 people have been killed and 13,763 detained as of January 31 in the military junta's crackdown. Moreover, over 1 million are now refugees.
What is frustrating is Japan's response. Japan has called for an immediate cessation of the violence. But it has distanced itself from sanctions, claiming that it provides a channel for dialogue with the military that the West does not have. However, there is no indication that Japan's voice is being heard.
Thomas Andrews, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, has called in his report for a "coalition of Member States to establish and enforce strategic, coordinated sanctions." He points out that the current effort is less effective than sanctions against Russia. His report also calls for Japan to "act immediately" to impose sanctions on the military government.
Chief Cabinet Secretary Hirokazu Matsuno admitted Japan is seriously concerned. "The Myanmar military is not listening to the voices of the international community, and there are no signs of an end to the violence," he remarked in his February 1 press conference.
However, simply being concerned about the current situation will not solve the problem.
Much of the international community's attention has been focused on Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Nevertheless, leaving Myanmar behind would embolden authoritarian leaders such as those of China and Russia. Both countries are also noted as backers of Myanmar's military junta.
As the current chair of the G7, Japan should consider imposing sanctions in line with those of the United States and Europe..."
Source/publisher:
Japan Forward
Date of publication:
2023-02-13
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-13
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
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Description:
"A reshuffle of the regime’s cabinet on the two-year anniversary of the coup earlier this month saw the junta boss offering “jobs for the boys”. Most of the new appointees are ex-generals while some are also friends of Min Aung Hlaing.
Nepotism has been a feature of Min Aung Hlaing’s leadership since he became military chief in 2011, with critics condemning a promotion policy that eschews merit in favor of connections.
He appointed former Brigadier-General Khin Yi as immigration minister following the coup, before installing him late last year as head of the military’s proxy Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), a position critical for Min Aung Hlaing’s planned poll. The junta boss is related to Khin Yi by marriage.
Min Aung Hlaing had also appointed former Colonel Wunna Maung Lwin as foreign minister. The ex-colonel’s wife Daw Lin Lin Tin is cousin to the junta’s chief’s wife Kyu Kyu Hla.
Wunna Maung Lwin was replaced earlier this month after the regime suffered increasing diplomatic isolation since the coup. Normally, he would have been forced to step down after his efforts failed to woo western countries including the US.
But Min Aung Hlaing has reserved a seat for his relative by marriage in the regime’s governing body, the State Administration Council.
Another nepotistic appointment is former Major-General Maung Maung Ohn, who became the Information Minister. His daughter Ei Moh Moh Aung is close friends with the junta chief’s daughter, Khin Thiri Thet Min.
New foreign minister
U Wunna Maung Lwin was replaced by U Than Swe, who was part of the Defense Services Academy (DSA) 16th intake. He retired as a colonel in 2000.
Than Swe was a long-time Myanmar diplomat, serving as ambassador to the United States under the previous regime’s State Peace and Development Council and ex-general Thein Sein’s quasi-civilian government. As ambassador, he arranged for President Thein Sein’s visit to the US in 2012. U Thein Sein was accompanied on the trip by President’s Office minister U Aung Min, U Soe Thane, and immigration minister U Khin Yi. The Burmese delegation visited the Washington D.C. headquarters of Radio Free Asia, where U Aung Min gave an interview stressing the importance of US support.
Observers interpret Than Swe’s appointment as an attempt to rekindle ties with western countries including the US as the regime loses ground on the diplomatic front.
Former military intelligence officer U Aung Ling Htut, who has been living in the US, believes the regime will find it almost impossible to re-engage with the US, partly because it has no intermediaries like the previous military regime did, and partly because the junta has become too close to Russia.
Than Swe was assigned to lead the country’s anti-corruption commission last year before he was made the foreign minister on Feb. 1. As the anti-graft body’s chair, he is believed to have played a role in prosecuting civilian leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi on charges of corruption.
Generals become ministers, chief ministers
Former Brig-Gen Aung Thaw became minister of hotels and tourism in the reshuffle. He was a classmate of Min Aung Hlaing in the 19th intake of the DSA. He retired from the Navy after reaching the rank of Brig-General.
He served as the deputy defense minister in the U Thein Sein government. He contested the 2020 general election in Yangon’s Cocokyun Township on a USDP ticket.
He became Myanmar-Russia Friendship Association chairman following the 2021 coup and has accompanied the junta boss on his Russia trips.
With no known experience in tourism, it will be interesting to see how he attempts to revive an industry devastated by the double impact of COVID-19 and the coup. Perhaps he has just been tasked with wooing Russian tourists to Myanmar.
Four former lieutenant-generals who retired after reaching pensionable age following the coup have been appointed to senior positions in the Feb. 1 reshuffle, with three becoming chief ministers – of Kayah (Karenni) and Shan states and Ayeyarwady Region – and one becoming a Union minister.
The latter is new Agriculture, Livestock and Irrigation Minister U Min Naung. He joined the 66th intake of Officer Training School before serving as chief of Eastern Central Command, chief of Bureau of Special Operations 4, and Military Inspector General.
Following the coup, he was appointed secretary of the junta’s National Solidarity and Peacemaking Negotiation Committee.
The Agriculture and Irrigation Ministry became notorious for ‘fringe benefits’ under the previous junta, the State Law and Order Restoration Council. Since then, its ministers and directors-general have amassed huge wealth, with one director-general rumored to have become as rich as a crony and able to lend money to banks.
The new Shan State chief minister, U Aung Zaw Aye, is a former lieutenant-general who led the Bureau of Special Operations 2. He oversaw military operations in Kayah and Shan state after the coup.
Former Lt-Gen Zaw Myo Tin and former Lt-Gen air defense chief Tin Maung Win became chief ministers of Kayah State and Ayeyarwady Region respectively.
Former Col Htein Lin, who served as Rakhine State security and border affairs minister in the U Thein Sein government, was appointed Rakhine State chief minister in the Feb. 1 reshuffle.
In the two years since the coup, nearly 1,000 military personnel have been transferred to government departments. And more are expected to fill the ministries as military rule continues.
There will also be more generals in the leadership. And there will undoubtedly be more nepotistic appointments and promotions for relatives and friends of Min Aung Hlaing and his family..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2023-02-13
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-13
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Rule of Law - Burma/Myanmar-specific
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Sub-title:
Arming civilians could escalate violence nationwide, possibly leading to widespread civil war, experts warn.
Description:
"Myanmar’s junta has revived a 1977 law that allows civilians it deems “loyal to the state” to own firearms, a move experts worry will escalate violence by arming pro-junta groups fighting armed resistance groups opposed to military rule.
The junta’s Ministry of the Interior issued the order to revive the law on Jan. 31, a day before the second anniversary of the Feb. 1, 2021 coup, according to a leaked junta document and media reports.
The law allows five types of firearms without permits: 9mm pistols and revolvers, 12-gauge or smaller shotguns, hunting rifles, and air guns. Handguns larger than 9mm, assault rifles, and submachine guns can also be owned with a permit.
“This new amendment is designed for a wider range of weapons,” a Yangon-based lawyer told Radio Free Asia’s Burmese Service. “People who want to carry weapons now know what kinds of weapons they are allowed to carry.”
The lawyer, who requested anonymity to speak freely, said that allowing civilians to carry weapons could pose a greater threat to the country's security.
“Now, defense groups such as pro-junta militias … can legally take up arms issued to them by the military,” he said. “This could lead to many other problems related to the misuse of these weapons … and we can’t say it’s enough to simply register the weapons you carry.”
The law says those applying for the right to bear arms must demonstrate “loyalty to the state, a good character, and a need to carry weapons,” with no criminal record or history of mental instability.
Once their application is approved, the law mandates that licensed arms bearers must participate in the “suppression of crime and vice” if directed, and are responsible for “protecting the life and properties of the people” within the framework of the established rules.
The military wants its supporters armed to shore up its fighting forces, said Kaung Thu Win, a leader of the Civil Disobedience Movement, which led widespread protests and strikes in the months following the coup.
“They think that they will get help once they allow their supporters to take up arms. For example, armed pro-junta militias may report the presence of the [resistance] members to the military or fight them on their own,” he said. “By this new policy, the junta has given the pro-junta groups more rights to carry out more forceful attacks on the resistance forces under the law.”
The army has already been arming pro-junta militia groups, said political analyst Than Soe Naing. The law merely legalizes it.
“This new attempt is to arm people … such as members of the [pro-military] Union Solidarity Development Party, low-level civilian administration officials like ward and township administrators and their staff,” he said. “This is because the military junta can no longer guarantee their security and they now have to protect themselves.”
It also means that if ordered, these newly armed people must cooperate in military operations against the resistance.
RFA reached out to Maj. Gen. Zaw Min Tun, the junta spokesman, by phone Monday to inquire about the newly enacted policy, but his phone rang unanswered.
But Zaw Min Tun confirmed to the local “Popular News” media outlet on Monday that the regime will allow those who “adhere to discipline” to own guns.
“There are calls from the people demanding their security,” he said. “We are going to allow the ones who really need to defend themselves, those who are under threat and those who can handle them in a disciplined manner [to bear arms]."
Padoh Man Man, the spokesman of the Karen National Union armed ethnic group’s fifth brigade, said the policy is worrisome because it may lead to unnecessary shootings and killings.
"About 3 years ago, the military adopted a policy for a mandatory military service for citizens 18 years and older, but they could not implement it successfully,” he said. “This new policy is their second attempt to do that. This is really a seriously worrisome situation for our country.”
Organizations on both sides of the political spectrum said that resistance forces are shooting and killing people suspected of being junta informants, while the military is arresting and killing those it accuses of being resistance members.
The military reported that 5,443 government officials, chief administrators, monks, and children were killed across the country between Feb. 1, 2021 and Jan. 25, 2023, and another 4,577 injured.
Thailand’s Assistance Association for Political Prisoners said that, as of Monday, authorities in Myanmar had killed 2,988 civilians throughout the country since the military coup.
Civil war imminent?
Sunday was Union Day in Myanmar, a holiday commemorating the 1947 Panglong agreement which united the various parts of the country prior to its independence from Britain. However, escalating violence means that the country is headed toward a wider civil war, according to a statement by the Peace Process Steering Team, formed by representatives of armed ethnic organizations and tasked with negotiating with the junta for peace.
Junta leader Senior Gen. Min Aung Hlaing said in a Union Day speech that the country is “a long way from peace” due to interference by various local and foreign groups, without providing details.
Saw Mya Raza Lin, the deputy chairman of the Arakan Liberation Party, one of the country’s ethnic armed groups, said that it is time for stakeholders to have an open discussion.
“It’s still necessary to negotiate. We need to have a serious discussion about the constitution, as well as for other sectors,” he said. “The revolution is a protracted feud that will take many years, and those in power may be concerned that the country will be separated into many smaller parts.”
He said ethnic groups want their right to self-determination, so both parties must be transparent in negotiations.
The steering team statement said that the country must solve its current political problems through peaceful means, and suggested that the junta’s power grab had led to a general crisis, including international sanctions.
Last year was supposed to have been the “Year of Peace” after the junta declared a nationwide ceasefire and invited many of the ethnic armed groups for talks. Instead, the junta expanded an offensive against armed resistance groups nationwide, including by ordering airstrikes and artillery strikes.
A meeting of the junta on Jan. 31 revealed that only 198 of Myanmar’s 330 townships are currently “stable,” and that 19,444 battles have been fought since the coup.
According to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 1.5 million people across the country have been forced to flee their homes due to armed conflict and insecurity..."
Source/publisher:
"RFA" (USA)
Date of publication:
2023-02-13
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-13
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Military History
Language:
more
Description:
"Authors: Adam Simpson, University of South Australia, Thomas Kean, International Crisis Group, and Susan Park, University of Sydney
In the two years since the military coup in February 2021, Myanmar’s natural environment has deteriorated as the embryonic legal and regulatory regime that was emerging during the decade of political and economic reforms has unravelled.
Gold mining has significantly increased, particularly in Kachin and Shan States, causing extensive social and environmental problems. The military has issued new mining permits while informal or illegal mining has also proliferated, causing deforestation, erosion and flooding while also damaging fisheries by polluting waterways with toxic sediment.
Kachin State is also emerging as a key site for highly polluting rare earths mining. While the illicit export of rare earth elements across the border to China has been occurring for years, export activity has boomed since the coup. Attempts by previous governments to regulate these polluted areas have failed since the coup due to a lack of effective oversight. Some of the revenue may be helping the military crush dissent.
But just when Myanmar’s environment needs its defenders the most, environmental activists find themselves facing a plethora of new pressures and security concerns.
Myanmar’s environmental activists, and civil society more broadly, are no strangers to political restrictions. During half a century of earlier authoritarian military rule, activism was largely confined to ethnic ‘liberated areas’ or border zones beyond the reach of the military. This situation began to change during Myanmar’s decade of political and economic reforms starting in 2011, when environmental activists could openly challenge infrastructure projects, mines and government decisions for the first time.
Since the 2021 military coup, the increasingly complex situation in Myanmar has severely impacted environmental movements. The safety of activists has become much more perilous under the new and highly restrictive Organisation Registration Law enacted in October 2022. The coup has resulted in three key impacts on Myanmar’s environmental movements — fracturing, fragmentation and transformation.
A process of fracturing has occurred since the collapse of many environmental NGOs, civil society organisations and community-based organisations as a result of the coup and the subsequent societal conflict. Some activists have simply abandoned activism due to security concerns, cutting all communication with networks of former colleagues to avoid scrutiny from the security services.
A similar fracturing process occurred after the 2014 Thai coup, which resulted in a dramatic reduction in environmental activism in Thailand. But the impacts of the coup in Myanmar on environmental activism have been significantly larger in proportion to the level of extreme disruption and repression across the entire society.
Environmental movements have also experienced fragmentation since many activists have been forced to relocate for safety reasons. Activists have gravitated towards more liberal spaces beyond the reach of the military regime by fleeing to ‘liberated’ areas run by sympathetic ethnic armed groups or seeking refuge abroad, usually in Thailand, from where they can continue environmental activities through other means.
Fragmentation has also occurred due to the additional difficulties in communication and transport since the coup. Internet shutdowns in various areas have made it difficult for networks to remain in contact and many activists have changed their phone numbers for security reasons, making it hard to reconnect. Even where the internet and mobile connections operate, new restrictions on major social media platforms have disrupted networks. Travel across Myanmar is also much more difficult due to higher costs, limited connections and regular checkpoints. Environmental activists and groups now often work on their own, or network in very limited ways.
Environmental movements have been transformed in a variety of ways since the coup. Activists have adopted new strategies to continue their work inside nominally state-controlled areas of Myanmar. In regions where the military remains largely in control, activists have shifted their work to rural areas where the military’s reach is weaker.
Some environmental activists have changed their role completely by shifting to the provision of humanitarian aid, while other activists have transitioned from working non-violently to joining the military struggle for democracy under the People’s Defence Forces, part of the armed resistance that emerged after the coup, or pre-existing ethnic armed groups.
The ability of activists to openly challenge environmentally destructive activities has virtually evaporated. Activists can appeal to international actors for support, but the influence of international organisations is much reduced. During the decade of reform, civil society organisations could complain to the International Secretariat of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative if the government failed to consider their concerns. After the coup, Myanmar was suspended from the initiative due to political instability. These types of international actors simply no longer have any leverage over Myanmar.
Two years after the military coup, with the international community’s attention focused on Ukraine, Myanmar’s environment is experiencing serious degradation and the communities that rely on it for their existence are facing threats to their safety and livelihoods. Meanwhile, Myanmar’s environmental activists who once shined light on these issues now face constant repression and threats to their own security. There is no easy solution, but if even a sliver of the world’s attention and resources that have been expended on Ukraine were directed towards Myanmar instead, then a way out of the present quagmire would seem more likely..."
Source/publisher:
East Asia Forum
Date of publication:
2023-02-13
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-13
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Environmentalists of Burma/Myanmar, Human Rights and international relations
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Description:
"UNAIDS has joined a list of United Nations agencies working with Myanmar’s junta while shunning the legitimate civilian National Unity Government (NUG).
The agencies claim they are being pragmatic to address civilian humanitarian needs. But this is disingenuous.
The existing approach leaves large numbers to shelter in camps or forests with insufficient food and healthcare.
Myanmar’s citizens who are most in need are those specifically targeted by the regime’s arson raids and airstrikes. And they are being abandoned by the international community.
UN agencies’ access is restricted to areas where the junta will allow them to deliver aid.
These international bodies have allowed the junta to weaponize aid, blocking off areas where the junta is attacking civilians and cutting aid.
All UN agencies and international NGOs working in Myanmar should do a small moral and efficiency test by making a simple spreadsheet for 2022 showing their total budgets allocated for Myanmar. The next column could show how much was spent outside the country, paying for offices in New York, Geneva or London.
Another column could show the cost of operations in Myanmar, including offices, cars, expat salaries, accommodation for foreign staff and travel to other regional offices set up since the 2021 coup. Additional costs for keeping most of the expat staff outside Myanmar since the 2021 coup should be added here.
One column should show the wages paid to staff from Myanmar and the cost of aid deliveries to territory under junta control.
The most important column should show money spent on delivering aid to liberated territory and territories that are the target of junta scorched-earth operations.
A final column would show income left unspent because access to those in need has been blocked by the regime.
An additional column could show money spent on training, online capacity-building and communication programs.
International agencies often waste budget surpluses on training, online programs, consultancy fees and analytical papers.
Comparing the total budget to the actual money spent on those outside junta control would expose an embarrassing imbalance.
Open disclosure of UN and other NGO budgets would expose how little is being spent on those most in need.
By refusing to engage with the NUG, UN agencies and other NGOs are failing Myanmar.
People in Sagaing and Magwe regions and Chin, Kachin, Shan, Kayah and Karen states tell me that UN agencies are failing to fulfill their briefs.
Instead, they appease the junta in the hope that it will allow them to continue operating in a restricted manner.
Foreign staff claim they are doing their best in a highly complex, restrictive and risky environment. But these are manipulative and self-interested claims.
An alternative is possible and easy to do. Aid money should be divided into two pots: to be distributed by organizations operating with the junta and those delivering aid to non-junta territory.
UN agencies, NGOs and civil society organizations accessing the second “pot”, with funds earmarked for aid deliveries in territories not controlled by the junta, must have offices outside Yangon and must not engage with the regime. They should also sign deals with the NUG and civilian structures allied to the ethnic armed organizations instead.
Aid to regions outside junta control should be greater given the deeper need of people outside regime control.
This alternative approach could provide resources and capacity for Myanmar-driven “humanitarian resistance”, harnessing contributions from Myanmar’s diaspora, which already provides the most aid and takes the highest risks.
A simple division could unlock largely weaponized or paralyzed aid deliveries.
The policy change might force the junta to lift its restrictions on aid because it will want to retain funding to affiliated agencies, like the Myanmar Red Cross.
Igor Blazevic is a senior adviser at the Prague Civil Society Centre. Between 2011 and 2016 he worked in Myanmar as the head lecturer of the Educational Initiatives Program..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2023-02-13
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-13
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
more
Description:
"From the first imposed sanctions against Myanmar in 1997, the United States takes a historical stride by passing the Burma Act 2021 as a law before 2022 ended. President Biden signed the Act into a law on Dec. 23, that has been passed by both the House and Senate. Originally, the bill was a response to the military coup in Myanmar, however, the initial version of it got rejected in the Senate back then.
Myanmar has been listed as a “country of particular concern (CPC)” under US policy. The Southeast Asian nation’s infamous reputation is a result of its history of violating human rights and religious freedom. As Myanmar transitioned gradually to democracy under the leadership of Aung San Suu Kyi, such “concerns” began to see a new beginning. But in February of 2021, the military imprisoned the state counselor Suu Kyi, overthrew the elected government NLD, and seized control of the country, reversing the hard-won progress. The Burma Act is an acknowledgment of the bravery of Myanmar’s people, who have been rebelling against the military’s repression, quitting their jobs, and taking the fight to the streets for nearly two years since then and could prove to be a game changer for them.
Answer to Junta’s intransigence
The United States has traditionally maintained a “democracy first” approach in its involvement with Myanmar, and the newly enacted legislation provides the Biden administration with three prospects for advancing the restoration of democracy in Myanmar. First, the Act permits the United States to provide assistance and communicate directly with anti-junta groups such as NUG, the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, PDF, and EAOs. Potential consultations with EAOs are very necessary, as their altercations with the military and democratic institutions have been superficial at best, and the US has overlooked them all along; without their involvement, the speech for ethnic reconciliation in the Burma Act will remain rhetorical.
Under the Act, $450 million will be provided in financial aid to help with humanitarian needs, sustain the civil disobedience movement, protect the political prisoners, support activists, media, and military defectors along with financial support to the civil society organizations in Myanmar who have been essential in the pro-democracy movement reaching the pleas of people of Myanmar to the international stage.
Second, the law mandates the administration to impose sanctions on senior army officials and entities which operate in the defense sector, state-owned commercial businesses, and individuals linked with the junta’s economic backing within six months. This will place considerable pressure on the Junta, which has repeatedly demonstrated its economic ineptitude in dealing with financial crises.
Lastly, the legislation has also taken into account of the Rohingya issue, the US has to facilitate international justice mechanisms to hold the military accountable for their campaign of 2017 against the Rohingyas. Humanitarian assistance has been ensured for the Rohingya refugees even prior to the Act, as in 2021, $205 million has been provided for the community.
Is it enough?
The Burma Act is packed with optimism and assurances, but whether it will hold water or not, is a discussion that will fuel itself in the coming times. Although an honest attempt, it does have its flaws.
Most sanction measures are discretionary, not mandatory which is a letdown at a moment when the civilians are preparing for a spring revolution against the military. Even the most anticipated sanction measures against Myanmar’s state-owned oil and gas company, MOGE, haven’t also been finalized stating that such action needs reports of cost and benefit, when cutting it out would have been a huge blow to the regime as it’s their main financial asset. The fact that US oil conglomerate Chevron is involved with MOGE’s operations in a particular gas field, Yadana, doesn’t help US cause. Leaving Junta’s dominant hand free, it will be hard for any other measures to free Myanmar from Junta’s claws.
The act also posits to provide “non-lethal” aid to the anti-junta movement meaning no support of arms and weaponry. But when countries like China and Russia are supplying Junta with weapons, a more robust policy to support the training of the anti-Junta forces could have been expected. Although the US has also called for a denunciation of China and Russia’s cooperation with Myanmar through the UN, in light of the current situation in Ukraine, such a demand is unlikely to amount to anything. It’s also frustrating that in comparison with Ukraine, the aid to Myanmar is insignificant.
The US efforts for Myanmar’s freedom ask for more in the existing context where countries like China, Russia, India, Japan, Thailand, and Vietnam are cutting US strategy to isolate the Junta. The US needs a more coherent implementation strategy for Burma Act if it really wants to get above the geopolitics and support the people of Myanmar in their fight to reconstitute democracy..."
Source/publisher:
The Geopolitics
Date of publication:
2023-02-12
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-12
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Rule of Law - global and regional
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"၁။ ယနေ့ အချိန်အခါသမယသည် ပြည်ထောင်စုတိုင်းရင်းသားလူမျိုးအားလုံး၏ စည်းလုံး ညီညွတ်မှုအင်အားဖြင့် ပင်လုံစာချုပ်အား သဘောတူညီချုပ်ဆိုနိုင်ခဲ့သည့် မိမိတို့နိုင်ငံ၏ သမိုင်းဝင်နေ့ထူးနေ့မြတ်ဖြစ်ပြီး ယနေ့ဆိုလျှင် (၇၆)နှစ် တိုင်ခဲ့ပြီ ဖြစ်ပါသည်။ နိုင်ငံတစ်ဝှမ်း တောင်တန်းမြေပြန့်ဒေသများရှိ ပြည်ထောင်စုတိုင်းရင်းသားလူမျိုးအားလုံးက ရည်ရွယ်ကြိုးပမ်း နေသည့် ငြိမ်းချမ်းသာယာဝပြောသော ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီနိုင်ငံတော်သစ် တည်ဆောက်နိုင် ရေး ရည်မှန်းချက်အား စည်းလုံးညီညွတ်သော ပင်လုံစိတ်ဓာတ်ဖြင့် အမြန်ဆုံး အကောင်အထည် ဖော်ဆောင်နိုင်ပါစေကြောင်း ဆန္ဒပြုအပ်ပါသည်။
၂။ ပြည်ထောင်စုအတွင်းရှိ တိုင်းရင်းသားညီအစ်ကိုမောင်နှမများ၏ သွေးစည်းညီညွတ်မှု ဖြင့် သာတူညီမျှမှုရှိပြီး အရောင်အသွေးစုံလင်သည့် ငြိမ်းချမ်းသော နိုင်ငံတော်သစ်ကို တည်ဆောက်သွားရန် မိမိတို့ခေါင်းဆောင်ကြီးများက ယင်းပင်လုံစာချုပ်ကို ချုပ်ဆိုနိုင်ရန် အခက်အခဲများကြားမှပင် ကြိုးပမ်းခဲ့ကြခြင်းဖြစ်ပါသည်။ သို့သော် စစ်အာဏာရှင်များက ၎င်းတို့ အာဏာဆုပ်ကိုင်ထားနိုင်ရေးရှေးရှု၍ တိုင်းပြည်၏ အာဏာကို လက်နက်အားကိုးဖြင့် လက်ဝါး ကြီးအုပ်ထားနိုင်ရန် ကြိုးပမ်းနေခြင်းကြောင့် တန်းတူအခွင့်အရေး၊ ဒီမိုကရေစီအရေးနှင့် ကိုယ်ပိုင်ပြဋ္ဌာန်းခွင့် အပြည့်အဝရရှိရေးတို့သည် ယနေ့အချိန်အထိ အကောင်အထည်ဖော် ဆောင်ရွက်နိုင်ခဲ့ခြင်း မရှိခဲ့ပေ။
၃။ ယနေ့အချိန်တွင်လည်း ဖက်ဆစ်စစ်အာဏာရှင်များက ဒီမိုကရေစီနည်းကျ ရွေးကောက်တင်မြှောက်ခံထားရသည့် နိုင်ငံတော်အစိုးရထံမှ လက်နက်အားကိုးဖြင့် ဥပဒေမဲ့ အာဏာသိမ်းယူပြီး ပြည်သူလူထုအပေါ် လူမဆန်သော အကြမ်းဖက်လုပ်ရပ်များကို ကျူးလွန် လျက် အာဏာဆုပ်ကိုင်ထားနိုင်ရန် ကြိုးပမ်းနေသော်လည်း တိုင်းရင်းသားပြည်သူအားလုံးက အရှုံးမပေးဘဲ ခုခံတွန်းလှန်နေခြင်းကြောင့် ယခု နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေးသည် စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ် ကို မြန်မာ့မြေပေါ်မှ အပြီးတိုင် တိုက်ထုတ်ပြီး တိုင်းရင်းသားလူမျိုးအားလုံးအတွက် ဖက်ဒရယ် ဒီမိုကရေစီနိုင်ငံတော်သစ်အား တည်ဆောက်သွားနိုင်လိမ့်မည်ဟု ယုံကြည်ပါသည်။
၄။ သို့ပါ၍ မိမိတို့ လူငယ်မျိုးဆက်သစ်တို့၏ အမြော်အမြင်ရှိမှု၊ ဆန်းသစ်တီထွင်မှုနှင့် အတူ တော်လှန်ရေးအင်အားစုအားလုံးက ယခုထက် ပိုမို စည်းလုံးညီညွတ်ခြင်းဖြင့် ခိုင်မာသော ယုံကြည်မှုတို့ တည်ဆောက်ကာ တိုင်းရင်းသားပြည်သူအားလုံးအတွက် အေးအတူပူအမျှ ငြိမ်းချမ်းစွာ အတူယှဥ်တွဲနေထိုင်နိုင်မည့် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီပြည်ထောင်စုကြီး အမြန်ဆုံး တည်ဆောက်သွားနိုင်ရေးအတွက် “စည်းလုံးညီညာအောင်ကြောင်းဖြာ” ဟူသော ထုံးကိုနှလုံးမူ လျက် ရေပက်မဝင်စည်းလုံးခြင်းဖြင့် အတူတကွရှေ့ဆက်ကြပါစို့ဟု တိုက်တွန်းရင်း ပင်လုံစာချုပ် ချုပ်ဆိုခြင်း(၇၆)နှစ်မြောက်နေ့တွင် ဤသဝဏ်လွှာအား လေးစားဂုဏ်ယူစွာ ပေးပို့အပ်ပါသည်။
ပြည်ထောင်စုလွှတ်တော်ကိုယ်စားပြုကော်မတီ..."
Source/publisher:
Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw
Date of publication:
2023-02-14
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-12
Grouping:
Individual Documents
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Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Federalism, ethnic conflict and the politics of national reconciliation - general studies and sources
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"Union Minister Dr. Sasa's speech on the 76th anniversary of the signing of the Panglong Treaty..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of International Cooperation Myanmar
Date of publication:
2023-02-12
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-12
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Panglong Peace Conference
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Myanmar is still in the midst of a protracted low-intensity conflict that could stretch on for years without any side being able to assert nation-wide control, possibly leaving in its wake a highly fractured, fragmented and balkanised polity.
Description:
"February 1, 2023 marked the second anniversary of the military ‘coup’ in Myanmar that aborted the return of the National League of Democracy (NLD) for its second term of government after its landslide victory in the November 2020 elections (following the first in 2015) under the military-drafted 2008 constitution.
In the immediate aftermath of the coup, the military detained, arrested and eventually sentenced President Win Myint, State Counsellor and NLD leader, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and other opposition figures to long terms in prison on flimsy charges, declared a one-year state of emergency, and constituted a State Administration Council (SAC) to run the day-to-day affairs of the country. Together with subsequent developments, they have effectively reversed the democratic ‘transition’ initiated by Sr. Gen. Than Shwe, Sr. Gen. Min Aung Hlaing’s politically more astute predecessor, through his seven-stage ‘road map’ towards a ‘discipline-flourishing democracy’ that was supposedly ‘fulfilled’ with elections that brought the reformist, military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) to power in Myanmar in 2010.
Despite the fierce use of force first against peaceful protestors and a widespread Civil Disobedience Movement, started by government doctors in Yangon, and then against spontaneously proliferated new ‘People’s Defence Forces’ (PDFs) in Bamar and ethnic areas and several long-standing ethnic armed organisations (EAOs), the military has not been able to stabilise the situation.
The violence has resulted in close to 3,000 deaths documented by the Association for the Assistance of Political Prisoners (AAPP, and up to 30,000 according to other estimates), thousands if not tens of thousands arrested, four judicial executions (including a member of parliament), and an estimated million and a half displaced in Myanmar and outside (including an estimated 50,000 refugees in India) as a result of brute repression, intimidation by security forces and regime-affiliated vigilante groups, arson, artillery, air power and scorched earth policies on the part of the military that has elicited a widespread armed resistance and retaliation on the part of the citizenry.
It is for all practical purposes, a war by the Tatmadaw (as the Myanmar military as the vanguards of Burma’s independence was respectfully called) on its own people uncluttered by labels of ‘majoritarian’, sectarian, ethnic, religious, minority, ‘left’, ‘right’ or ‘communist’, and conversely, a ‘people’s war’ using largely guerilla tactics against the Tatmadaw. Even those EAOs, which have been kept out of the conflict for tactical or political reasons, have been at odds with the Tatmadaw historically and not responded to peace overtures by the latter.
In response to the coup, the political opposition has formed a National Unity Government (NUG) underpinned by a more broad-based National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC), a committee of ousted elected parliamentarians, the Committee Representing the Pyidaunsu Hluttaw (CRPH), a Charter for a Federal Democratic Union, and a Defence Ministry and military ‘high command’, and announced a ‘defensive war’ against the military (that has at times turned offensive targeting of government officials and collaborators).
The regime has labelled the NUG as a ‘terrorist’ organisation, but the ‘people’s war’ is more than just a struggle for democracy or a federal union, or a civil war. It is more appropriately now a violent struggle for freedom (although not widely understood as one), and arguably a culmination of Burma’s independence movement that remained stunted and appropriated by the Tatmadaw and never really evolved into a mass movement as it did in India.
Though one may not know this from the Indian media, Myanmar is currently in the midst of a protracted low intensity conflict that (like Iraq, Libya, Syria or Afghanistan) could stretch on for years without any side being able to assert nation-wide control or authority, possibly leaving in its wake a highly fractured, fragmented and balkanised polity: a military government operating out of Nay Pyi Taw, Yangon, Mandalay, state capitals and garrison centres using superior force but unable to control the rest and increasingly prone to attacks, sabotage and de-legitimization within; a patchwork of ethnic armed organisations with large areas under their control or contested by the Myanmar Army; and local ‘peoples’ defence forces and governments, or even small ‘de facto’ self-governed enclaves or ‘statelets’ with greater or lesser capacity to provide security or governance in the Bamar heartland (as it has been through much of its history outside its three periods of empire under the Bagan dynasty, the Toungoo and Konbaung) that could take years, if not decades, to merge within a single national authority, whether civilian or military, government or opposition, under the right conditions in the territory that we know today as Myanmar.
Yet, side by side with this breakdown of authority and threat to the unity and integrity of Myanmar, there is a new-found empathy and solidarity among the victims of military rule, the ethnic minorities, the Bamar majority especially youth, and even the hapless Rohingya; and sharpening and clarification of fault-lines that have clouded Myanmar’s journey to nation-hood since the advent of the British, that provides a glimmer of hope that the idea of a federal (or confederal), democratic ‘Union’ of Burma is alive and could, under the right conditions, constitute the basis of a new Myanmar.
Currently, neither side has the power to decisively overpower the other. The opposition has the numbers but not the forces, weapons and unified military leadership to overthrow the Tatmadaw, while the army has the brute force to intimidate civilians, burn villages, and attack, shell and bomb resistance strongholds. On balance, it is the People Defence Forces (PDFs) and EAOs that are gaining ground, not the military, and power is subtly shifting to the more powerful EAOs. According to a leaked State Administrative Committee (SAC) document, 12 of the 14 provinces of Myanmar suffered nearly 18,000 attacks by opposition forces since 2021, 220 out of 330 townships in Myanmar are heavily contested and 132 highly insecure and in need of reinforcement.
Other reports suggest that only 30 of the Myanmar Army’s 230-plus infantry battalions of a 120,000-man army are believed to enjoy effective dominance. Recruitment is falling, and there have been hundreds of defections and desertions (although they are reported to be declining), and none senior enough to reveal any foment or split in the Army itself. Nevertheless, according to various estimates, over 50% of Myanmar territory is under the control of diverse resistance or opposition forces, going up to anywhere between 70-80% in some states like Chin state bordering India.
As if in tacit recognition of the Myanmar Army’s failure to regain control and hold planned elections in August 2023, the military-dominated National Defence and Security Council of Myanmar announced a further six-month extension of emergency (beyond the ‘normal’ two six-month extensions) on January 31 on the eve of the second anniversary of the coup, followed by the declaration of Martial Law in 37 townships in four ‘Regions’ marking largely ethnic Bamar provinces (Sagaing, Magwey, Bago and Thanintharyi), and four ‘States’ inhabited predominantly by ethnic minority groups (Chin, Kayah, Kayin and Mon), in addition to six townships (five in Yangon and one in Chin state) declared earlier.
Of these, Sagaing and Chin state, and Rakhine, which is outside this list but strongly contested by the Arakan Army, are adjacent to India’s North East. Martial law combines all security, administrative, executive and judicial authority in the hands of regional military commanders and empowers them to take summary life and death decisions without legal assistance to the accused or appeal against rulings, with only the death sentence to be approved by the military high command. They set the stage for even more egregious violations of human rights and potential war crimes on the part of the military.
Yet, despite a recent December 2022 United National Security Council Resolution 2669 (its first on Myanmar since 1948 on which Russia, China and India abstained), Myanmar remains in the penumbra of international and domestic media and political attention left largely to the ASEAN of which Myanmar is a member and its April 21, 2021 five-point consensus, to resolve.
This may be partly explained by developments in Afghanistan, Ukraine and East Asia where the US and the West have been more deeply involved or the protagonists have been geo-political rivals like Russia and China, or even a retrenchment in the US and Western commitment to democracy worldwide except in areas of core strategic concern against which Myanmar is so far, a distraction.
But that does not explain the near silence and pro-forma expressions of concern by Indian government representatives and spokespersons to what is happening in Myanmar both in terms of violence, suffering, displacement and lives lost, and the security, stability and future of a country of strategic importance to India in its immediate eastern neighborhood sharing a sensitive 1,600 km border across four North Eastern states and a similar length with Yunnan province of China. It is also a lynchpin of India’s ‘Look East’ and ‘Act East policies’ for which successive Indian governments have taken strategic and development initiatives since the turn of the millennium, including major projects like the Trilateral Highway and Kaladan Multimodal project, to regain its historical and civilisational influence that it lost over centuries especially during the 50-year period of military rule in Burma since the 1960s.
Nor does it explain the lack of sympathy on the part of the Union and concerned state governments other than Mizoram towards Myanmar refugees fleeing violence and persecution who are being rounded up and detained in hastily converted detention camps against local sentiments as ‘illegal migrants’ owing to a lack of a definition of a refugee, or a formal refugee law or being a signatory to the UN Convention on Refugees and its Protocols.
Given conditions in Myanmar, typically, the refugees do not have travel papers or visas and therefore ipso facto liable for immigration violations. Unlike India’s other neighbours, even Pakistan, they are not covered by any police reporting mechanism or a Foreigners Regional Registration Office (FRRO) near their point of entry where they can report on arrival. Nor is there a local office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees where they can apply for refugee status. They remain undocumented and fugitive. Lacking papers, they cannot even travel to state capitals or Delhi to report or register.
In effect, the refugees fall in the cracks between a non-existent refugee law, and the Foreigners and Citizenship Acts where they cannot even count on the most basic human rights (facing anomalies like juveniles under indefinite detention and denial of birth certificates for new-borns) because of lack of immigration, refugee or citizenship status.
Yet, none of these legal obstacles have come in the way in the past in dealing with Tibetan refugees, East Pakistanis (later Bangladeshis) and Sri Lankan Tamils when they faced persecution, indicating, if there is any doubt, that these are essentially political decisions. Fortunately, border security, police, para-military and judicial authorities on the ground have been restrained in their approach to the refugees while watchful of illegal activities like arms or drug smuggling (to which a senior Assam Rifles Commander and family in Manipur tragically lost their lives in an ambush). Nevertheless, concerns about clarity on law, burden sharing by the centre and signs of refugee fatigue remain.
Some of this ‘estrangement’ can be attributed to a reaction to colonial rule in Myanmar in which Indians were an instrument, and psychological amnesia that has afflicted India-Myanmar relations as a result of insular military rule in Myanmar since the 1960s until 2010 when a large Indian community was forced out by xenophobic policies (and since faded away), and the two countries virtually fell off each other’s neighbourhood maps.
But it has also to do with how our priorities and reflexes as a nation have changed from one that valued freedoms that we ourselves fought for, to one that has greater faith in authoritarianism than democratic politics to preserve its ‘national’, security and other interests in the neighbourhood in the name of ‘realism’, justifying ties with the junta but not the NUG.
Ironically, this change can be traced to the failure of pro-freedom policies pursued in the 1980s when India supported both the pro-democratic agitation in Burma and the Tamil cause in Sri Lanka, but has become more marked recently.
Unlike in the 1960s and 1980s, when turmoil in Myanmar was closely reported in the Indian official and private media and sustained by an expatriate Indian community and Burmese exiles, daily news of Myanmar is now the preserve of anxious Myanmar watchers and social media followers. There is little public awareness let alone understanding of events in Myanmar. Even the mainstream strategic observers seem stuck in a post-1990s policy correction when the military was able to reassert its authority against democratic forces by use of force, entering mutually beneficial cease-fires with ethnic armed organisations brokered by the Chinese and appealing to Bamar-Buddhist nationalism, corralling the Indian government to temper its pro-democracy stance to deal with the Generals to address its security needs.
Over time, it also led to a misplaced faith in the Myanmar Army as the best guarantor of India’s security interests vis-à-vis both IIGs and China. This faith is inexplicable. While Myanmar has acted against IIGs from time to time at India’s request, and India and Myanmar also have separate agreements on ‘coordinated patrolling’ on the land and maritime borders, it has more often played ducks and drakes with IIGs in Myanmar, harbouring and maintaining a cozy relationship with them over decades ostensibly on ‘humanitarian’ grounds and using them to settle internal scores when opportune, while objecting to any corresponding gesture to Myanmar refugees or insurgents on India’s part.
Unlike Bhutan and Bangladesh which flushed out Indian insurgents on their soil as friendly gestures, India’s approach to IIGs in Myanmar has been more intelligence-based, and Myanmar’s approach has been to cooperate, acquiesce, leak information or rebuff Indian requests as it has suited them. It is a transactional relationship, not one which India needs to be beholden to the Tatmadaw for, and one that India too could play but apparently does not.
India has used the Indian Armed Forces as a tool of diplomacy to build trust and confidence between the two Armed Forces quite effectively over the last 25 years to the extent that the foreign secretary and chief of army staff could undertake a joint visit to Nay Pyi Taw towards the end of the term of the NLD government. But too much reliance on the military relationship may now be hindering Indian diplomacy from clearly seeing the reality in Myanmar. It can still be used judiciously to steer Myanmar to a more constructive path for which a new approach is needed.
Source/publisher:
"The Wire"
Date of publication:
2023-02-11
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-11
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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Description:
"Free Online Education Institution Myanmar (FOEIM) ဖြစ်စဉ်နှင့် ပတ်သက်၍ ပညာရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာနမှ ဆောင်ရွက်မှုများအား ထုတ်ပြန်ကြေညာခြင်း
၂၀၂၃ ခုနှစ်၊ ဖေဖော်ဝါရီလ (၁၀) ရက်
နှင့်
Free Online Education Institution Myanmar (FOEIM) ဖြစ်စဉ်အတွက် ဖွဲ့စည်းပေးထားသော ကြားနာစုံစမ်းရေးအဖွဲ့၏ အပြီးသတ် အစီရင်ခံစာ ထုတ်ပြန်ကြေညာခြင်း
၂၀၂၃ ခုနှစ်၊ ဇန်နဝါရီလ (၉) ရက်..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Education - National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2023-02-10
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-10
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Education in Burma/Myanmar - general
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1.17 MB
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Source/publisher:
Ministry of Education - National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2023-02-09
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-09
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Education in Burma/Myanmar - general
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"SINGAPORE — In Myanmar’s biggest city, Yangon, soldiers patrol the streets at all hours. Police officers stop pedestrians at random, hauling them to jail if they show signs of sympathy for the opposition. Poverty rates in the city have tripled, according to the United Nations, and crime is rife.
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It has been two years since Myanmar’s military ousted its democratic government in a coup, plunging swaths of the Southeast Asian country, also known as Burma, into violent conflict. The junta has crushed free expression, imprisoning journalists, revoking the licenses of independent news outlets and gone to other lengths to limit visibility into the realities of life under military rule.
To capture the struggles of quotidian life, The Washington Post asked three of Yangon’s residents to share their experiences on a single day late last month, each recounting in a series of voice messages the arc of their day. All three are members of a young generation that came of age as democratic rule arrived in Myanmar in the early 2010s and then saw it snuffed out.
Willion, one of a dwindling number of journalists in the city, tried to avoid a run-in with authorities. Sam, a small-business owner, wrestled with the contempt he felt toward the soldiers swarming his city. South of downtown, power outages left Hannway, a young activist, struggling to connect to the revolutionary movement for which she’d put her education on hold. They are being identified by their English instead of Burmese names to limit the chances of repercussions.
Daybreak
Willion, 30, sat up straighter when he heard his neighbors stir. He’d stayed up in case the police arrived for one of their random checks. Opening his laptop, he blinked at the clock at the bottom right corner: 7:13 a.m. He’d made it through another night.
The authorities had been going after journalists like him since the coup. A few weeks ago, police arrested one of Willion’s co-workers, seizing his phone, which had photos and messages implicating Willion. As a precaution, he’d been moving every few days, he said, traveling with a backpack that had just his laptop, a hard drive and a few sets of clothes.
Willion sat back against the wall, his face lit by the laptop screen. He was preparing a presentation on citizen journalism, showing people in conflict-ridden parts of the country how they could document the military’s atrocities. But he was tired, and there was a lot on his mind.
He hadn’t seen his parents in almost a year, and his mother had recently been hospitalized for a heart condition, he said. He wanted to visit but that meant devising a safe route across town. The military had spies across the city and a new Chinese-built surveillance system equipped with advanced facial recognition technology. As he weighed the risks, Willion felt his head grow heavy.
Farther east, past a river, Sam, 36, was driving to work.
A fire had broken out in his middle-class neighborhood overnight, consuming a house and its residents. On his morning walk, neighbors told him the police never responded. Sam wasn’t surprised. Every day, he read reports of banks being robbed in broad daylight, and people being murdered in their homes. The authorities almost never caught the perpetrators.
He glanced out the window. Traffic had slowed around a government building guarded by a garrison. Sam looked at the soldiers in uniform, most of them young men, and thought the same thing he always did at this point in his commute.
“I hope they get sent to the front line and die.”
As a Buddhist, he knew he shouldn’t think such thoughts, he said. But looking at the soldiers wielding their guns reminded him of the young activists shot dead on the streets of Yangon.
Sam’s office was dark when he arrived. He groaned. He blamed them for this, too.
Energy suppliers pulled out of Myanmar after the coup, and in recent months, rebel armies had started to attack transmission lines to hurt the junta. At Hannway’s family home, the blackout had shut down running water.
At a tea shop for Myanmar exiles, songs from home and resistance in the air
Hannway, in her early 20s, heard her parents in the kitchen figuring out what to do. She rolled over in bed and looked at her phone — 10:30 a.m. Two years ago, she recalled, she’d be in class by this time studying to be a doctor. But when the military seized power, she’d chosen to participate in a civil disobedience movement (CDM) aimed at crippling the health-care system.
She scrolled through messages that came overnight.
“They’re investigating CDM students,” read one from a friend. “Be careful.”
Afternoon
Hannway paced around the kitchen. It’d been four hours, and the power was still out. Her mother tried to calm her down, but the message from her friend had unnerved her.
News had started to spread recently that the military planned to punish boycotting students like her. For her safety, she rarely left her house, she said. She killed time by taking online language classes and working remotely on projects supporting the resistance movement. But without electricity, she couldn’t do even that. How long could she keep on like this?
Hannway checked the time — 2:27 p.m. There was a virtual meeting with some CDM doctors in three minutes. The WiFi was still out.
Sam, too, felt the military had made so many aspects of life harder.
He was at a tea shop north of Hannway’s home, meeting a friend vexed over whether to re-enroll his children in government schools. Sam didn’t know what to say. He had his own frustrations: He’d been forced to spend money on generators and solar-powered batteries because of the blackouts; he was facing surging costs of food and gas; the local currency wouldn’t stop falling in value so his small business had to keep raising its prices.
Passing by soldiers on his way back to the office, he felt bile rising inside him again. Why, he asked, were they everywhere?
A love story, forged in Myanmar’s political strife, ends in execution
At 5:30 p.m., after a few hours of sleep, Willion finally prepared to leave his apartment. On his phone, he logged out of his usual social media accounts and into fake profiles that showed no links to journalism. He scrubbed personal messages and contacts, then scanned the Telegram groups where people shared sightings of soldiers in the city. Nothing too alarming.
He flagged down a cab for the hospital. But minutes after leaving his complex, he saw a congregation of soldiers outside a nearby hotel. He squinted through the window — authorities had cuffed three men, he said. Soldiers were interrogating passersby.
Willion fought the instinct to take out his phone to film what was happening. There were too many of them.
Securing his face mask, he slunk deeper into his seat. He had to get to the hospital.
Nightfall
Before the coup, Sam liked to explore Yangon’s various neighborhoods on foot. But he was wary these days about appearing suspicious so he kept his walks to the public parks. Lined with palm trees and often empty, they were one of the only remaining reprieves from the military’s hold over the city, he said.
Strolling as the sun set, Sam let himself relax.
He didn’t want to keep praying for those soldiers to die. Every time he did, he heard his mother’s voice telling him to “keep kindness in his heart.” But it was hard when he woke up each morning to videos of villages set on fire and accounts of rape and torture. Where was he supposed to find the humanity?
He saw three older men walking briskly in the park. As they drew closer, Sam could hear they were talking loudly about Gen. Min Aung Hlaing, the junta leader. One made a joke, turning the general’s name into a curse word, and the other two guffawed, their pot bellies shaking.
Sam smiled as he listened. It sounded for a moment like old Yangon, he said. He wondered if he should strike up a conversation. But maybe they would think he was an informant. He kept walking.
Back in her bedroom, after dinner, Hannway settled in front of her laptop. The electricity was finally back. She pulled up a “click-to-donate” site, where people could get advertisers to send a few cents per click to a cause. The money raised by this site was going toward rebel groups.
Hannway tapped her index finger repeatedly. She felt deflated, she said. She missed attending lectures and visiting old bookshops; she missed the rigor of having an ambition. She thought, as she often did at night, about a friend — a woman serving 20 years in prison after being caught at a safe house for activists.
Hannway felt something turn inside her. She couldn’t give up, she told herself. She didn’t have the right.
As the world moves on, Myanmar confronts a mounting, hidden toll
It was dark by the time Willion reached the hospital. His mother looked better than he expected, but it still made him sad he couldn’t care for his family. A relative had passed away recently, his mother said. It would probably be safer for everyone, he told her, if he didn’t attend the funeral.
After returning home, Willion logged back into his real social media accounts. There’d been renewed fighting in the country’s central Sagaing region, and citizen journalists had sent him reports earlier in the day that soldiers had set fire to seven houses. Once he compiled more information, he’d distribute it to other outlets. But his sources had suddenly gone dark. Maybe the junta had jammed the signal. He hoped it was that.
Just after midnight, Willion warmed up dinner. He’d have to find another place to stay in a few days, once people in the neighborhood started to recognize his face.
But, for now, he’d spend another night awake, waiting for daybreak.
Diamond reported from Yangon..."
Source/publisher:
"The Washington Post"
Date of publication:
2023-02-09
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-09
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Military History, Human Rights and international relations, Spring Revolution
Language:
more
Description:
"If you’ve followed what’s happened in Myanmar the past two years, the photos of the Assumption Church in Chan Thar village probably won’t shock you. They show its 129-year-old belltower blackened by upward licks of smoke, a mound of grey ash at its entrance, smoke from the remains of a nearby convent rising against a cobalt sky. When soldiers set fire to the compound last month, it was only the latest in a cascade of desperately cruel acts, all with the aim of crushing resistance to the coup of 1 February 2021. They beheaded two men in the same Sagaing village last June.
Beheadings, shootings, beatings, airstrikes: horrors on near daily display for anyone wanting to look, alongside less gruesome strategies of arrest and harassment designed to punish civil disobedience and silence expressions of online and offline dissent. Religious buildings have been key targets: churches but also Buddhist monasteries, notwithstanding the generals’ claim to serve as Buddhism’s protector. Fire has been a key tool, as it was during the 2017 campaign against the Rohingya, which the US last year said constituted a genocide.
Satellite images of scorched villages show the situation most clearly. Some 30,000 structures are thought to have been burned since the coup—from Karen State in the east to Chin State in the west, where airstrikes in January sent hundreds fleeing across the mountainous Indian border. Just as this Christian-majority region has been a stronghold of the resistance, so the Chin diaspora have been key advocates labouring to raise Myanmar’s plight to international consciousness. In the run-up to the recent passage through Congress of the US Burma Act, which promises deepened sanctions and expanded aid, Chin churches across the American heartland showed videos instructing congregants on how to lobby their local representatives.
Catholic doctrine on the Assumption teaches that, at the end of her life, Mary was taken up—assumed—into heaven, her body and soul intact. There were Old Testament precedents; on account of his zeal, the prophet Elijah was taken up in a chariot of fire. Mary’s assumption is said to anticipate the future salvation of humanity. In Myanmar, many have taken salvation into their own hands. In 2021, once the initial waves of protest were met with bullets from the military, or Sit-Tat, and indifference from an international community that some hoped would be their saviour, the Spring Revolution took a guerrilla turn.
Across the country hundreds of People’s Defence Force (PDF) groups have been at war with the Sit-Tat ever since. Sagaing has been a hotbed, east of the Chin Hills and west of Mandalay. Once spared much of the cruelty that the Sit-Tat has for decades inflicted on Myanmar’s borderlands, this central Anya (or “upstream”) region is now also a target for collective punishment.
“They arrived around 8 a.m. on Saturday,” one Chan Thar resident told The Irrawaddy. “They torched houses the whole day. They then stayed in the church compound, and left this morning after torching the church.” It was the soldiers’ fourth arson attack in the village since last May, reducing its houses from 600 to fewer than forty. Its mostly Catholic population descend from Portuguese mercenaries and traders who arrived in the sixteenth century, centuries before the three Anglo-Burmese wars that brought Burma under the Raj.
The most famous of these Portuguese, the Lisbon-born Filipe de Brito, came via Goa and served the King of Arakan with such distinction that he was made Governor of the growing shipping port of Syriam—now Thanlyin, a township across the Bago River from today’s Yangon. Other Portuguese mercenaries joined him, as did Jesuit priests. Conversions followed. In 1602, de Brito went out on his own, coming into conflict not only with his former Arakan master but with the King of Ava, Anaukpetlun.
De Brito’s troops shared something of the Sit-Tat’s approach to religion, looting pagodas, destroying Buddha images, and melting down bells for weapons. When Anaukpetlun captured Syriam in 1613, his men impaled de Brito and marched hundreds of surviving Portuguese prisoners north to Ava. It was their descendants who, after generations of intermarriage, built the Assumption Church in 1894. Also a descendant is Cardinal Charles Bo, the current Archbishop of Yangon. Criticised for his ongoing dealings with the junta, Bo’s hosting of the coup leader Min Aung Hlaing at a recent Christmas Mass, only a month after soldiers burnt houses in the Cardinal’s own home village, came as little surprise.
More surprising perhaps are the findings of a recent report detailing the extent to which the Sit-Tat has become self-sufficient in the domestic production of many of the weapons it uses against its own people, as well as the degree to which this production is relying on raw materials supplied by companies from a dozen foreign countries. “The West, in lieu of arming the resistance,” one analyst wrote of the report’s implications, “could increase pressure on its allies in Taiwan, Ukraine, Israel and Singapore to end all support.”
From Filipe de Brito to Min Aung Hlaing, violence in Myanmar has long had an outside: connections to circuits of capital and commerce—and, occasionally, concern—extending from its Anya heartland to its maritime and mountain borders, and far beyond..."
Source/publisher:
Mekong Review
Date of publication:
2023-02-09
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-09
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Political History
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Description:
"• The junta has killed at least 2,688 civilians and arrested 17,573 as of 31 Jan. Burma now has 1,584,300 IDPs.
• The regime began to compile voter lists in preparations for its sham 2023 ‘election.’ Resistance groups attacked census agents in several locations, killing at least 13.
• The junta adopted a new Political Parties Registration Law that will allow the military-aligned USDP to run unchallenged and lead to the dissolution of the NLD.
• UNHCR reported that over 3,500 Rohingya attempted to flee Bangladesh and Burma by sea in 2022, up from 700 in 2021. At least 348 died or went missing; the highest figure since 2014.
• Australia, Canada, the UK, and the US announced new sanctions, but stopped short of sanctioning the junta's main cash cow..."
Source/publisher:
ALTSEAN-Burma
Date of publication:
2023-02-08
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-08
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations, Political History
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Sub-title:
Malaysia’s former foreign minister speaks to RFA about the crisis in Myanmar
Description:
"Radio Free Asia talked with Malaysia’s former Foreign Minister Saifuddin Abdullah, who was often a strong advocate for ASEAN to take stronger action on the crisis in Myanmar. He spoke about the current geopolitical situation in the country and ASEAN’s reaction to it, as well as where things stand with the shadow National Unity Government that opposes the junta in the last two years since the Feb. 1, 2021, military coup.
RFA: What do you think about the situation in Myanmar currently?
Abdullah: Well, it is now already two years after the coup d’etat and things are getting worse day by day. More than 18,500 clashes, more than 1.2 million people are internally displaced, Many thousands have been killed, Civilians killed, and civilians arrested. Your president [Win Myint] and Aung San Suu Kyi are now behind bars for 12 years and 33 years. These are all very, very unfair. It was a kangaroo court that made the decision.
So things are getting worse for the people. But I salute the people of Myanmar because they have been steadfast in fighting against the junta since two years ago. And even before that, we know the story of the struggle of the Myanmar people.
The confidence-building work done by the NUG and the NUCC seems very fruitful. I understand people are talking to each other more today compared to before. All the stakeholders I have met the NUG, the NUCC and some of the other stakeholders more than once before, and I understand that they are working together very hard, including with the People's Defense Force militias. And the Myanmar diaspora, those who are living as refugees outside, are always in contact with the fighters and activists in the country. I think after two years, they are very resilient. And I think this is something that I really take my hat off to the people of Myanmar.
RFA: What do you think about ASEAN? So far we don’t see any significant response from ASEAN.
Abdullah: ASEAN decided to do the five-point consensus. Unfortunately, the five-point consensus has not shown any real progress, not even on humanitarian assistance.
But this year, the chair of ASEAN is Indonesia. I am very hopeful that President Jokowi and Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi will do more. Both are very passionate. I have spoken to Retno Marsudi many, many times. I think she will put a lot more effort into getting the five-point consensus working.
However, when I met the foreign minister of the NUG, she was very polite in telling me that the five-point consensus is not sufficient. I don't know. I know that for them it is not going to work. It is something that was done without consultation with the NUG, the NUCC and the other stakeholders so they do not have any hope for the five-point consensus. But they were very polite to me saying that it is not enough.
So I think ASEAN has to have more of a sense of urgency, and I had spoken to my colleagues when I was Foreign Minister saying that ASEAN must have a framework with a straightforward end game, that is, to bring back democracy to the people of Myanmar. Until and unless you have a clear framework with a straightforward end game, this will not end. So the people will still suffer. I think ASEAN and the international community must have a higher sense of urgency in helping the people of Myanmar.
RFA: So, do you think Indonesia can persuade the Myanmar junta to go with the ASEAN five-point consensus? Would that be enough?
Abdullah: I'm very hopeful that Indonesia, as chair of ASEAN, can do something. I understand that Jakarta is planning to send generals to speak to the junta. I don't know what the objective is, but perhaps we can try, you know, many ways of talking to the junta. But at the same time, whether we like it or not, ASEAN must engage NUG and the NUCC officially, because this is the only way to do it. We have spoken to the junta many, many times. Nothing happened. So this is the time, two years after the coup d'etat. We must engage the NUG and the NUCC.
RFA: Do you think ASEAN will do it?
Abdullah: I know Retno Marsudi has met, or, if not her, her team has met NUG and the NUCC.That I know for a fact. And that I think is a good beginning.
RFA: So do you think ASEAN is going to officially contact NUG?
Abdullah: There are at least three ASEAN member states who are of the opinion that we should engage openly with the NUG and the NUCC. Malaysia has spoken about it. Indonesia has spoken about it. I'm sorry, I cannot mention the other ASEAN member state. I will let them say it in public themselves.
RFA: And what is the Malaysian government's stance on the Myanmar crisis?
Abdullah: Well, I have not spoken to the current foreign minister, but Malaysia's foreign policy is normally very stable. We normally continue from where we stood in the past. So I am hoping that the current prime minister and foreign minister will continue what we were already doing. But on a personal level, I am still engaging my friends. Of course, as a former foreign minister, It's not official, but I am still talking to them and sending whatever messages that need to be sent to people that need to receive those messages.
RFA: Yeah. Since the coup in Myanmar, a lot of Myanmar people have crossed the border and at least a thousand people arrived in Malaysia from Myanmar, maybe some illegally. There were reports that the Malaysian government deported some of the refugees who were detained. So what should the Malaysian government do about Myanmar migrants who are here?
Abdullah: There are two things here. Number one, we are not a signatory to the International Convention on Refugees, but we have always been very helpful, including to people from Myanmar. We have about 180,000 people from Myanmar in Malaysia. Most of them are Rohingya, but there are non-Rohingya residents too. I think what has happened [the deportation] is regretful, something that I really don't know. It may have happened when I wasn't in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, or maybe when I was there, but it was something that didn't come to my attention because there are many agencies involved in this kind of program.
What Malaysia really needs is a proper and better management system for refugees. What I know is that a new amendment to a directive from Malaysia's National Security Council is now on the table. And I'm very hopeful that we can quickly amend or improve the way we manage refugees and people asking for asylum and continue working with UNHCR so that we can prevent deportation, especially unnecessary deportation from happening again.
RFA: Are you aware that on February 1st, Myanmar's people participated in a silent strike to show their defiance of the junta? What are your thoughts on that?
Abdullah: I really salute them. I think they are being very brave and very bold and very resilient. They are steadfast in showing their opposition to the junta. The silent strike I thought is a very innovative way to demonstrate, you know, that they don't fear the junta and they are continuing with the struggle.
And this is where I keep on saying that ASEAN and the international community must not fail the Myanmar people. They are daring and they are willing. So we from our side must be equally willing, if not so daring, but must be more willing to help them.
RFA: Do you have any suggestions for the NUG government?
Abdullah: No, I think NUG knows what needs to be done. I always believe that the pro-democracy struggle of the people of Myanmar must be led by the people of Myanmar. And for the Myanmar people. I understand that NUG is your elected government.
RFA: Is the United Nations doing enough for Myanmar?
Abdullah: The United Nations Secretary-General has appointed Dr. Noeleen Heyzer as the special envoy. I think she is also trying her best. She is working on a new program to provide better education for Myanmar refugees who are now outside Myanmar but also looking for funding to help the NGOs who are working within Myanmar to provide education.
I understand this is not going to be very easy, but this is one area that I understand she is trying to work on. But the international community, whether it is through the U.N. or other platforms, must do more. For example, sanctioning military assets - We must stop the supply of military assets, and military equipment, including fuel for aviation, especially. Because so long as the junta can fly the plane, they will still bomb people, including children attending school. So we must stop the supply of military assets, equipment, and fuel.
RFA: Any final message to the Myanmar people?
Abdullah: I think the people of Myanmar are a strong people. They are very bold. They're very brave and they're willing and daring. And I am very, very confident that there is light at the end of the tunnel. All I'm hoping for is for the international community, especially ASEAN, to have more urgency to assist the people of Myanmar..."
Source/publisher:
"RFA" (USA)
Date of publication:
2023-02-08
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-08
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
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Description:
"Myanmar’s trade with Thailand has steeply declined since the 2021 coup as the junta imposes restrictions to prevent weapons from reaching resistance forces.
Border trade declined from over US$4 billion in 2019-20 to $3.6 billion in the 2022-23 financial year, which ends on March 31, according to the junta’s Ministry of Commerce.
Goods sold in the Thai border town of Mae Sot are largely out of stock across the frontier in Myawaddy because traders can only import if they also export to Thailand, according to a trader in Myawaddy.
“I have got all the documents needed to import fertilizers. But I can’t import because I am running a trade deficit of about 4 million baht [$119,000]. We haven’t made exports of that value. It is causing delays. Many other traders are facing the same problems,” the trader told The Irrawaddy.
The regime imposed restrictions, including that the value of imports and exports must be equal, and the payments must be made in dollars or baht through a junta-controlled bank. It has also required traders to seek approval from Myanmar’s Food and Drug Administration to import and export.
Meanwhile, trade is often delayed by frequent fighting along the border. Traders also have to pay high taxes along the route.
“This is our living so we continue to do what we have been doing. The risks are high but we continue,” said the trader.
The junta closed the Thai border at Htee Khee in Tanintharyi Region in April last year after a resistance attack on a police station on the Dawei-Htee Khee road.
The border gate was a major trading point and the closest crossing to Bangkok. Myanmar mainly exports fish, coal, lead and food to Thailand via Htee Khee and imports diesel, cooking gas, food and consumer goods.
A Tanintharyi trader said: “The Htee Khee gate has been closed since last year. Some are trading via Mawtaung and Kawthoung.”
Trade through Htee Khee was already in steady decline, falling from $2 billion in 2019-20 to $1.7 billion in 2020-21 and $1 billion in 2021-22, according to the junta’s Commerce Ministry. The ministry claimed that Htee Khee trade totaled $1.7 billion from April 1 to November 30 last year, despite the gate being closed since April.
The trader said: “I think it is the cost of gas imports. Trade through Mawtaung and Kawthoung has also declined. Trade is hopeless. It is unlikely that it will return to pre-coup levels. And we feel unsafe.”
Trade through Mawtaung was $7 million from April 1 to November 30 last year and there are no figures for the Mese border in Kayah State since the coup.
The Thai border crossings are at Myawaddy, Tachilek, Kawthoung, Myeik, Htee Khee, Mawtaung and Mese but only Tachilek, Myawaddy, Kawthoung, Myeik and Mawtaung are now open.
The regime has restricted imports of fertilizer and food and Myawaddy’s trade is currently dominated by construction materials and consumer goods.
The junta-controlled Trade Department this month told exporters to submit a list of their exports and seek online transport approval. The department will then issue a QR code for shipping.
Trucks have to show the QR code at checkpoints. The system is being trialed this month at the borders at Myawaddy and Muse and Chin Shwe Haw in Shan State.
Myawaddy’s exports are mainly rice, rice powder, rubber and crops like pepper, while imports include food, consumer goods, building materials, industrial raw materials and machinery..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2023-02-08
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-08
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Border Trade with Thailand
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Description:
"There are 17 major ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) in Myanmar and the civilian National Unity Government (NUG) says eight of them are cooperating politically or militarily to bring down the junta.
NUG spokesman U Nay Phone Latt told The Irrawaddy: “We are cooperating [with EAOs] in practical terms. I can’t name them for various reasons but you can find them in reports from the frontlines.”
Observers have stressed the importance of interaction between the NUG and EAOs in defeating the regime and we will examine the extent of cooperation since the February 2021 coup.
The EAOs fall into four broad categories: those publicly cooperating with the NUG; groups supporting the NUG behind the scenes; organizations expressing sympathy for the NUG despite holding talks with the regime; and groups that are in talks with the regime and shunning the NUG.
EAOs that cooperate with the NUG
The Kachin Independence Army, Karen National Union (KNU), Karenni National Progressive Party, Chin National Front and All Burma Students Democratic Front all cooperate with the NUG.
They have provided military training for many of the estimated 65,000 resistance fighters that have appeared since the coup.
The Kawthoolei Army led by Major General Saw Nerdah Mya, which has split from the KNU following the coup, also fights alongside resistance forces.
Six EAOs say they cooperate with the NUG and the civilian government has formed three regional commands to ensure military cooperation between the groups.
Region one oversees northern and western Myanmar, region two covers southern areas and region three oversees central and eastern zones.
The NUG’s Central Command and Coordination Committee formed in October 2021 includes leaders from allied EAOs.
The parallel government cooperates on a political level to provide administrative duties in liberated territories.
The Interim Chin National Consultative Council, Kachin Political Interim Coordination Team, Karenni State Consultative Council, Mon State Interim Coordination Committee, Pa-O National Federal Council and Ta’ang Political Consultative Council are all working with the NUG.
They are political coalitions representing ethnic minorities.
EAOs providing hidden support
The powerful Three Brotherhood Alliance of the Arakan Army (AA), Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) is not conducting military operations with the NUG but it provides training and weapons to resistance forces.
MNDAA Brigade 611 that was armed in early January is a combination of at least six resistance groups, including the Bamar People’s Liberation Army, which is allied to the NUG.
The AA has trained resistance fighters in western Magwe Region and the TNLA has trained volunteers from Mandalay Region.
EAOs with sympathy for the NUG
Several EAOs have shown an understanding for the NUG’s armed struggle without making any public statements.
The United Wa State Army, Shan State Progress Party and National Democratic Alliance Army have ceasefires with the regime and have held talks with the junta but not conceded to its demands.
During talks last month in Naypyitaw, the regime demanded the three groups stop supporting the NUG and its allied groups. They rejected the junta’s demand.
A source told The Irrawaddy: “They asked us to sign an agreement not to support and sell arms to the resistance groups. We didn’t accept that. There was a heated argument and we threatened to walk out if they kept insisting that we sign.”
A source said the three groups feared the public would believe the junta’s misleading statements about the discussions.
The three groups clearly share an understanding with resistance forces, analysts have said.
EAOs in talks with the junta
Seven EAOs that are signatories to the 2015 Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement, including the Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS), New Mon State Party (NMSP), Democratic Karen Benevolent Army, Karen National Liberation Army Peace Council, Arakan Liberation Party, Pa-O National Liberation Organization and a Lahu Democratic Union splinter group, only engage with the junta.
Only the RCSS and NMSP have relatively large armies while the others have few or no troops.
They have said they prefer to follow political means to solve problems and need to engage in dialogue with the junta.
Junta chief Min Aung Hlaing has conferred honorary titles like Wunna Kyawhtin on some of their leaders. There is no open hostility towards the NUG from the groups.
The people will decide these groups’ fate, said U Nay Phone Latt.
“If they back Min Aung Hlaing’s terrorist military, they will be considered criminals. Some might be cooperating for their group’s survival. And some may be looking for an alternative path. Ultimately, it is the people who will decide their fate,” said the NUG spokesman.
Will cooperation with the NUG increase?
Only a third of EAOs with an estimated 40,000 troops in total are fully cooperating with the NUG.
Around a third of the groups are only partially involved in the revolution while about 7 percent of EAOs troops are allied with the junta.
There has been more military than political cooperation, ethnic leaders say.
Padoh Mahn Mahn, the KNU spokesman in Papun District, said: “The military cooperation is clear. We fight the dictatorship. We fight to defend the people. But political agreements are yet to develop properly.”
The NUG has reached a general agreement on establishing a federal democracy but is yet to ratify a constitution guaranteeing self-determination and equality.
“We haven’t been able to design an interim constitution that is satisfactory on equality and self-determination for ethnic minorities. Military cooperation has reached a satisfactory level but political cooperation is weak,” Padoh Mahn Mahn said.
U Nay Phone Latt said the NUG will realize the promises made by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s father General Aung San in the 1947 Panglong Agreement. The NUG opposes racial chauvinism and guarantees equality and self-determination within a federation, he said.
“While we can absolutely guarantee these things, there are also other issues that must only be decided through broader consultation with stakeholders in the future. The NUG is an interim government and we are not in a position to guarantee future policies,” said the NUG spokesman.
An observer said it is difficult for NUG and EAOs to reach political agreements because of their differing backgrounds and experiences.
“It is difficult to agree new systems of government. It will also be influenced by which revolutionary groups achieve success,” she said.
Another observer called for greater cooperation with allied EAOs. “The NUG must persuade neutral EAOs to join the fight, presenting overwhelming numbers to guarantee victory over the junta,” he said..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2023-02-07
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-07
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Spring Revolution
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Sub-title:
The 2-day campaign targeted a township hit hard by arson attacks this year.
Description:
"More than 2,000 villagers in Myanmar’s northern Sagaing region fled ahead of two days of junta raids, the Kyunhla-Kanbalu Activists Group told RFA on Tuesday
A spokesman, who didn’t want to be named, said a column of troops entered five villages in Kanbalu township over the weekend.
“Before the troops entered Pon Nar Gyi village, they fired heavy artillery and a man in the village was hit by shell fragments,” he said. “The residents of nearby villages also had to flee because the troops were getting close.”
After raiding Pon Nar Gyi on Saturday troops moved on to nearby Chat Lel. The following day they moved on to three other villages, including Pi Tauk Pin which has more than 100 homes, burning 12 of the houses there, the activists’ group said.
Locals told RFA the military column comprised about 120 troops from junta Infantry Battalion 368 and the junta aligned Pyu Saw Htee militia.
Calls to Sagaing region junta spokesman Aye Hlaing went unanswered Tuesday. In the past he told RFA he is not able to comment on security issues.
Last month troops burned down 274 houses in Kanbalu and Kyunhla townships, according to the Kyunhla-Kanbalu Activists Group. It said seven people were burned to death.
The military has stepped up a scorched earth campaign in Sagaing region this year, torching 4,271 houses in January and killing 17 civilians, Myanmar’s ousted National Unity Government said last week.
In the last five months of 2022, the number of people in Sagaing region fleeing fighting and arson attacks rose 17% to 616,500 the Market Analysis Unit said on Jan. 29. That accounts for half of the newly displaced persons nationwide between August and December, according to the unit of the Myanmar Information Management Unit, which supplies data to the humanitarian and development community..."
Source/publisher:
"RFA" (USA)
Date of publication:
2023-02-07
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-07
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Burma: Internal displacement/forced migration of several ethnic groups., Armed conflict in Burma - attacks on civilians
Language:
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Description:
"1. Acting President’s Facebook account hacked2/2/2023...2. Nearly 3000 civilians died over 2 years of revolution1/02/2023...3. Defence Ministry reports attack against SAC aircraft3/2/2023...4. Human Rights Minister U Aung Myo Min urges French Government to take more measures...5. NUG calls on UN and international community to block all attempts by the SAC to legitimise through sham elections...6. NUG Foreign Minister hopes 2023 will be turning point for foreign support...7. Education Ministry calls for applications for the primary education course (2nd phase)
3/2/2023..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2023-02-07
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-07
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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"On December 23, 2022, President Biden signed into law the James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (NDAA 2023; P.L. 117–263). Included in the NDAA 2023 was a modified version of the Burma Unified through Rigorous Military Accountability Act (BURMA Act; H.R. 5497) that was passed by the House of Representatives on April 6, 2022. A similar companion bill, S. 2937, had been introduced in the Senate and referred to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, but received no further action.
The inclusion of the BURMA Act in the NDAA 2023 was praised by many interested parties in Myanmar and around the world, based on the assumption that it would result in increased U.S. pressure on Myanmar’s military junta, the State Administrative Council (SAC), and provide more aid to the people of Myanmar. A closer examination of the provisions of the BURMA Act, however, reveals that it is unlikely to result in major changes in U.S. policy in Myanmar.
Provisions of the Modified BURMA Act
The version of the BURMA Act that was incorporated into the NDAA 2023 is significantly different from either the version passed by the House of Representatives or the one introduced in the Senate. Virtually all of their respective provisions were modified or altered to reduce the overall scope and impact of the act. According to one source, these changes were made in response to objections from the Biden administration or in order to obtain the support necessary to pass in the Senate.
The NDAA’s BURMA Act contains seven separate elements pertaining to U.S. policy in Myanmar. These sections include a general statement on U.S. policy (section 5569); the authorization of the imposition of new sanctions (section 5570 and 5571); requirements for the coordination of U.S. policy (section 5572); a call for greater efforts at the United Nations (section 5573); the authorization of appropriations for assistance for Burma (section 5575, 5576 and 5577); authorization of assistance for “efforts against human rights abuses” in Myanmar (section 5578); and a limitation on the imposition of sanctions on imports from Myanmar (section 5579).
The statement of U.S. policy is a general statement of “support the people of Burma in their struggle for democracy, freedom, human rights, and justice.” This section calls for support of those opposing the military junta, explicitly mentioning the National Unity Government (NUG), but not the ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) or the People’s Defense Forces (PDFs). In addition, the act says it is U.S. policy to support a “credible process” for the restoration of civilian rule, reform of the Burmese military, and the protection of the rights of minority groups. It also requires accountability for perpetrators of human rights violations in Myanmar, as well as accountability for China and Russia for their alleged “support of the Burmese military.” Another component of U.S. policy, according to the BURMA Act, is the continued provision of humanitarian assistance for victims of violence still within Myanmar, as well as those in the “surrounding region.” Finally, the act calls for the unconditional release of all political prisoners in Myanmar.
The sanctions provisions of the BURMA Act stipulate obligatory sanctions on “senior officials of the Burmese military or security forces of Burma,” the SAC and its military-appointed cabinet, entities “that primarily operate in the defense sector of the Burmese economy,” and certain state-owned commercial enterprises. These obligatory sanctions are to be imposed no later than 180 days after enactment, or by June 21, 2023.
In addition, it authorizes, but does not require, the president to impose sanctions on the Myanma Oil and Gas Enterprise, state-owned enterprises that are not operating in the extractive or industrial sector and financially benefit the Burmese military, spouses, and adult children of persons sanctioned under the BURMA Act, foreign persons who have aided or assisted with the coup and supporting the SAC, and “any Burmese entity that provides materiel in the Burmese military.” The stipulated sanctions are the freezing of assets held in the United States or are held by a U.S. entity, the denial of foreign exchange transactions, and a ban on visas to enter the United States.
In terms of policy coordination, the BURMA Act requires the Department of State’s Office of Sanctions Coordination to “develop a comprehensive strategy for the implementation of the full range of United States diplomatic capabilities to implement Burma-related sanctions . . .” The strategy is to not only cover multiagency coordination within the U.S. government, but also international efforts to impose multilateral sanctions, including pressuring China and Russia to “support multilateral action against the Burmese military.”
Regarding the United Nations, the BURMA Act requires the president to “direct the United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States to spur greater action by the United Nations” regarding Burma. This includes “pushing the United Nations Security Council” to consider a condemnation of the 2021 military coup, the imposition of a “global arms embargo,” a termination of assistance to SAC, and passage of “multilateral sanctions against the Burmese military.”
The BURMA Act also authorizes the appropriation of funds for FY 2023 to 2027 for various forms of assistance, including “programs to strengthen federalism in and among ethnic states in Burma, including for non-lethal assistance for Ethnic Armed Organizations in Burma.” Assistance may also be provided for “efforts to establish an inclusive and representative democracy in Burma;” “technical and non-lethal support” for the EAOs, PDFs, and “pro-democracy movement organizations;” and programs to “investigate and document atrocities in Burma.” The act also stipulates that none of this assistance is to be made available to the SAC, the Burmese military, or any entity controlled by either the SAC or the Burmese military.
The act authorizes the secretary of state to also provide assistance to “appropriate civilian or international entities” to identify suspected “war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide in Burma;” “collect, document and protect evidence” of those suspected crimes; and conduct investigations of the alleged crimes. The act explicitly includes the United Nations’ Independent Investigation Mechanism for Myanmar (IIMM).
The final section of the BURMA Act excludes the imposition of sanctions on the importation of goods under the authority of the act. For purposes of the BURMA Act, “goods” are defined as “any article, natural or man-made substance, material, supply or manufactured product, including inspection and test equipment and excluding technical data.”
Implications for U.S. Policy
The provisions of the BURMA Act in the NDAA 2023 underwent substantial changes from the bills introduced in the House of Representatives and the Senate, reducing their overall impact on U.S. policy. The sanctions provisions, for example, are comparatively limited in scope than those in the original bills. In addition, both the obligatory and discretionary sanctions authorized in the BURMA Act could be imposed using existing authority provided by previous acts, such as the Tom Lantos Block Burmese JADE (Junta's Anti-Democratic Efforts) Act of 2008 (JADE Act; P.L. 110–286). Enforcement of the sanctions provisions of the JADE Act were waived by Executive Order 13742 and Executive Order 14014, but could be reinstated by President Biden at any time.
Another major change was the elimination of the position of special coordinator for Burmese Democracy from the BURMA Act. In both the House and Senate versions, the secretary of state was authorized to “designate an official of the Department of State” to coordinate the multiagency implementation of U.S. policy in Burma. This position was similar to one established in the JADE Act, which was eventually eliminated in response to years of complaints by the State Department. The special coordinator position could have led to the creation of a more effective and realistic policy in Myanmar, after years of drift dating back to the late Obama administration.
The assistance provisions of the BURMA Act were also significantly reduced in scope and specificity. In the bills introduced in each chamber, the assistance provisions listed many forms of assistance to be provided, including aid for refugees in “Bangladesh, Thailand, and the surrounding region;” internally displaced persons; voluntary resettlement; “promotion of ethnic and religious tolerance;” “primary, secondary, and tertiary education for displaced children,” and “political prisoners.”
One potentially important detail is the assistance provisions of the BURMA Act is the authorization of “non-lethal assistance” to Myanmar’s EAOs, PDFs and “pro-democracy movement organizations.” This detail is significant in two ways. First, it explicitly designates the EAOs and PDFs as possible recipients of “non-lethal assistance.” The Biden administration has, in general, refrained from direct mention of relations with the EAOs and PDFs, choosing to focus more on its engagement with the NUG.
Second, the authorization of “non-lethal assistance” provides the Biden administration with the opportunity to adopt a more liberal interpretation of what forms of military aid it can provide to the EAOs and PDFs. In Syria and Ukraine, for example, “non-lethal assistance” allowed the provision of uniforms, protective armor, armored military vehicles, radar equipment and medical equipment and supplies. It remains to be seen as how broadly the Biden administration will interpret this provision of the BURMA Act.
Overall, the BURMA Act requires little change in U.S. policy in Myanmar. However, it does give the Biden administration the discretionary authority to make major changes, if it wishes to do so. In addition, the BURMA Act should also be viewed as an indication that Congress thinks that the Biden administration should take a more active role in supporting the pro-democracy forces in Myanmar in their efforts to overthrow the SAC and establish a democratic government in the country.
Michael F. Martin is an adjunct fellow (non-resident) with the Southeast Asia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C..."
Source/publisher:
Center for Strategic & International Studies
Date of publication:
2023-02-06
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-07
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
more
Description:
"National Unity Government Weekly Press Update (6/2023)..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2023-02-07
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-07
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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Format :
pdf
Size:
2.81 MB
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Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2023-02-07
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-07
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379.56 KB
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"၁။ ယနေ့ကျရောက်သော ရှမ်းတိုင်းရင်းသားတို့၏ (၇၆) နှစ်မြောက် ရှမ်းပြည်နယ်နေ့ အချိန် အခါသမယတွင် ရှမ်းတိုင်းရင်းသားများနှင့်တကွ တိုင်းရင်းသားပြည်သူတစ်ရပ်လုံး စစ်အာဏာရှင် စနစ် ချုပ်ငြိမ်းကွယ်ပျောက်ပြီး ဖက်ဒရယ် ဒီမိုကရေစီနိုင်ငံသစ်ကို အမြန်ဆုံး ပိုင်ဆိုင်နိုင်ကြပါ စေကြောင်း ဆုတောင်း မေတ္တာပို့သအပ်ပါသည်။
၂။ ရှမ်းပြည်နယ်သည် ရေမြေတောတောင်သာယာပြီး ရာသီဥတုမျှတ၍ သဘာဝ အလှများ နှင့် ပြည့်စုံကြွယ်ဝသော ဒေသတစ်ခုဖြစ်ပြီး ပြည်နယ်အတွင်း ရှမ်းလူမျိုးများအပြင် ကချင် ၊ ကရင်၊ ကယား ၊ ပအိုဝ်း ၊ လားဟူ ၊ အခါ ၊ ပလောင် ၊ ဓနု ၊ အင်းသားအစရှိသည့် အခြားလူမျိုးစု တိုင်းရင်းသား များ အတူတကွ ပူးပေါင်းနေထိုင်ကြကာ ထူးခြားသည့် ဝိသေသလက္ခဏာပိုင်ဆိုင်ထားသော ပြည်နယ်တစ်ခုဖြစ်ပါသည်။
၃။ ဒုတိယကမ္ဘာစစ်အပြီးတွင် အမျိုးသားခေါင်းဆောင်ကြီးများ၏ ဦးဆောင်မှုဖြင့် မြန်မာ့ လွတ်လပ်ရေးအတွက် တစ်မျိုးသားလုံး သွေးစည်းညီညွတ်စွာ ကြိုးပမ်းခဲ့ကြပါသည်။ လွတ်လပ်ရေး ပေးရာတွင် တောင်တန်းဒေသများကို ချန်လှပ်ထားရန် ကိုလိုနီနယ်ချဲ့တို့၏ ကြိုးစားမှုများကို လက်မခံဘဲ ဗိုလ်ချုပ်အောင်ဆန်းနှင့် ရှမ်း၊ ကချင်၊ ချင်း တိုင်းရင်းသားခေါင်းဆောင်များသည် ပြည်မနှင့်အတူပူးပေါင်း၍ လွတ်လပ်ရေးရယူမည်ဟူသော သဘောတူဆုံးဖြတ်ချက်ကို ၁၉၄၇ ခုနှစ်၊ ဖေဖော်ဝါရီ လ ၇ ရက်နေ့တွင် ချမှတ်နိုင်ခဲ့ပါသည်။ ထိုသို့ တောင်တန်း၊ ပြည်မ မခွဲခြားဘဲ မြန်မာတစ်နိုင်ငံလုံး လွတ်လပ်ရေးကို အတူတကွ ရယူရန် ဆုံးဖြတ်နိုင်ခဲ့သော ဖေဖော်ဝါရီ လ ၇ ရက် နေ့ကို ဂုဏ်ပြုသောအားဖြင့် ရှမ်းပြည်နယ်နေ့အဖြစ် သတ်မှတ်ခဲ့ပါသည်။ ရှမ်းပြည်နယ်နေ့သည် မြန်မာပြည်လွတ်လပ်ရေးနှင့်တိုင်းရင်းသား စည်းလုံးညီညွတ်ရေး ရရှိစေသော၊ ၁၉၄၇ ခုနှစ် သမိုင်းဝင်ပင်လုံညီလာခံကာလအတွင်း ပေါ်ပေါက်ခဲ့သောနေ့တစ်နေ့ဖြစ်ကြောင်း မှတ်ယူနိုင်ပြီး ရှမ်းပြည်နယ်နေ့ အထိမ်းအမှတ် အခမ်းအနားများ ကျင်းပလာခဲ့သည်မှာ ယနေ့တွင် (၇၆) နှစ် မြောက်တိုင်ခဲ့ပြီ ဖြစ်ပါသည်။
၄။ နှစ်ပေါင်း (၇၀) ကျော်ကြာ စစ်အာဏာရှင်လက်အောက်တွင် မိမိတို့နိုင်ငံသည် တိုင်းရင်းသားပြည်သူများ၏ အခွင့်အရေးများစွာကို လက်လွှတ်ဆုံးရှုံးခဲ့ရပါသည်။ အနာဂတ်တွင် နိုင်ငံသားတိုင်း ကိုယ်ပိုင်ပြဋ္ဌာန်းခွင့်၊ ကိုယ်ပိုင်လွတ်လပ်ခွင့်၊ ကိုယ့်ကံကြမ္မာ ကိုယ်ဖန်တီးနိုင်ခွင့်၊ တန်းတူညီမျှခွင့်၊ မိမိတို့ယုံကြည်ချက်ကို လွတ်လပ်စွာ ထုတ်ဖော်ပြောဆိုခွင့်စသည့် မွေးရာပါ အခွင့်အရေးများ ရရှိစေပြီး အတိတ်စနစ်ဆိုးအောက်၌ ပြည်သူများ၏ အသက်သွေးချွေး ပေးဆပ်ခဲ့ရမှုများအတွက် အကောင်းဆုံးကုစားပေးနိုင်မည့် ခေတ်တစ်ခေတ်ကို ထူထောင် ပေးရန်မှာ မိမိတို့အားလုံး၏ သမိုင်းပေးတာဝန်တစ်ရပ် ဖြစ်ပါသည်။
၅။ စစ်အာဏာရှင်ခေတ်အဆက်ဆက်၊ တိုက်ပွဲအဆက်ဆက်၊ အရေးတော်ပုံ အဆက်ဆက်တွင် တိုင်းပြည်နှင့်လူမျိုးအတွက် စွန့်လွှတ်စွန့်စားကာ ပေးဆပ်အနစ် နာခံခဲ့ကြသည့် ရှမ်းတိုင်းရင်းသား များ၏ ပင်လုံစိတ်ဓာတ်ကို အခြေခံကာ ဖက်ဒရယ် ဒီမိုကရေစီနိုင်ငံသစ်တည်ဆောက်ရေးဟူသည့် ဘုံရည်မှန်းချက်ကို လက်တွေ့ကျကျ အတူတကွ ပုံဖော်တည်ဆောက်၍ ဆက်လက်ကြိုးပမ်း ဆောင်ရွက်သွားမည်ဖြစ်ကြောင်း သန္နိဋ္ဌာန်ပြုလျက် ဤ (၇၆) နှစ်မြောက် ရှမ်းပြည်နယ်နေ့ သဝဏ်လွှာအား လေးစားစွာ ပေးပို့အပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw
Date of publication:
2023-02-07
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-07
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Shan history
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"၁။ ယနေ့ ကျရောက်သော (၇၆) နှစ်မြောက် ရှမ်းအမျိုးသားနေ့(ရှမ်းပြည်နယ်နေ့)တွင် ရှမ်းပြည်နယ် အတွင်းနှင့် ပြည်ထောင်စုတဝှမ်း နေထိုင်ကြသော ရှမ်းပြည်သူလူထုများအားလုံး စိတ်၏ချမ်းသာခြင်း၊ ကိုယ်၏ကျန်းမာခြင်းတို့နှင့် ပြည့်စုံပါလျက် ဘေးကင်းရန်ကွာ ရှိပါစေကြောင်း ဆုမွန်ကောင်း တောင်းအပ် ပါသည်။
၂။ ၁၉၄၇ ခုနှစ် ဖေဖော်ဝါရီလ (၇) ရက်နေ့တွင် ရှမ်းပြည်စော်ဘွားများနှင့် ရှမ်းလူထု၏ စည်းလုံး ညီညွတ်မှုအားကို ဗြိတိသျှအစိုးရမှ မလွန်ဆန်နိုင်ပဲ ရှမ်းပြည်စော်ဘွားများကောင်စီ (ရှမ်းပြည်ကောင်စီ)၏ တောင်းဆိုချက်များကို လိုက်လျောပေးခဲ့ရသည်။ တနည်းအားဖြင့် ဗြိတိသျှ အာဏာပိုင်အစိုးရအား လူထု အားဖြင့် တွန်းလှန်နိုင်ခဲ့ခြင်းပင်ဖြစ်သည်။
၃။ ထိုနေ့တွင် ဗြိတိသျှအစိုးရမှ ရှမ်းလူထု၏ တောင်းဆိုချက်များကို လိုက်လျောပေးခဲ့ရသည့်အပြင် ဆက်လက်ကျင်းပလျက်ရှိသော ၁၉၄၇ ခုနှစ် ဖေဖော်ဝါရီလ (၁၂) နေ့ ပင်လုံညီလာခံတွင် အချက်(၉) ချက်ပါ ပင်လုံစာချုပ်ကို ကချင်၊ချင်း၊ဗမာ၊ရှမ်း လူထုခေါင်းဆောင်များက တညီတညွတ်တည်း သဘောတူ လက်မှတ် ရေးထိုးနိုင်ခဲ့ကြသည်။
၄။ အဆိုပါနေ့ကို အစွဲပြု၍ ၁၉၄၇ ခုနှစ် ဖေဖော်ဝါရီလ (၁၁) ရက်နေ့တွင် ကျင်းပသည့် ပင်လုံညီလာခံမှ ရှမ်းအမျိုးသားအလံ၊ ရှမ်းအမျိုးသားသီချင်းများ အပါအဝင် ဖေဖော်ဝါရီလ (၇) ရက်နေ့ကို ရှမ်းအမျိုးသားနေ့ အဖြစ် သတ်မှတ်နိုင်ခဲ့သည်။ လွတ်လပ်ရေး၏ အစဖြစ်သည့် ပင်လုံစာချုပ်ကို သွေးစည်းညီညွတ်စွာဖြင့် ချုပ်ဆိုနိုင်ခဲ့သည့် လမ်းစဖြစ်သကဲ့သို့ ရှမ်းလူထု၏ သမိုင်းမော်ကွန်းဝင် ကြီးမားသောအောင်မြင်မှုလည်း ဖြစ်သည်။ လွတ်လပ်ရေး ရယူရာတွင် အလွန်ထူးကဲ အရေးပါလှသော သမိုင်းမှတ်တိုင်လည်းဖြစ်သည်။
၅။ ရှမ်းပြည်နယ်နှင့် ရှမ်းလူထုသည် ခေတ်အဆက်ဆက် နိုင်ငံရေးလှိုင်းတံပိုးကြမ်းများကို နှစ်ကာလ များစွာ ဖြတ်သန်းခဲ့ရသည်။ ယနေ့မျက်မှောက် အချိန်အခါတွင်လည်း ရှမ်းပြည်နယ်အပါအဝင် တိုင်းပြည် တဝှမ်းတွင် ဖက်ဆစ်စစ်တပ်၏ ဆိုးသွမ်းယုတ်မာ ရက်စက်မှုများကို ပြည်သူများ ခါးစည်းခံစားနေရဆဲ ဖြစ်သည်။
၆။ တိုင်းပြည်နှင့် လူထုအား လက်ရှိကြုံတွေ့နေရသော ဆင်းရဲဒုက္ခတွင်းမှ လွတ်မြောက်စေရန် ရှမ်းပြည် နယ်အတွင်းရှိ တော်လှန်ရေး အင်အားစုများနှင့် နိုင်ငံရေးအင်အားစုများသည် တညီတညွတ်တည်း ပေါင်းစည်း ညီညာ၍ စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ် အပြီးတိုင်တိုက်ဖျက်ရေး၊ အနာဂတ် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီ ပြည်ထောင်စုသစ် တည်ထောင်ရေးဟူသော ပြည်သူလူထု၏ မျှော်မှန်းတောင့်တချက်များကို ကြိုးစားဖြည့်စွမ်း ပေးကြ လိမ့်မည်ဟု ယုံကြည်လျက် ယနေ့ ကျရောက်သော (၇၆) နှစ်မြောက် ရှမ်းအမျိုးသားနေ့ (ရှမ်းပြည်နယ်နေ့) သဝဏ်လွှာကို လေးစားဂုဏ်ယူစွာဖြင့် ပေးပို့အပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2023-02-07
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-07
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
270.07 KB
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Description:
"၁။ ၁၉၄၇ ခုနှစ် ဖေဖော်ဝါရီ ၆ ရက် မှ ၁၂ ရက် အတွင်း ရှမ်းပြည်နယ်၊ ပင်လုံမြို့၌ကျင်းပခဲ့သော ကျင်းပခဲ့သောပင်လုံညီလာခံတွင် ရှမ်းအမျိုးသားသီချင်း နှင့် ဝါ စိမ်း နီ ရှမ်း အမျိုးသား အလံတော်ကို တရားဝင်သတ်မှတ်ခဲ့ပြီး ဖေဖော်ဝါရီ ၇ ရက်နေ့ကို ရှမ်းအမျိုးသားနေ့ (ရှမ်းပြည်နယ်နေ့) အဖြစ် ပြဋ္ဌာန်းသတ်မှတ် ကျင်းပ ခဲ့သည်မှာ (၇၆)ကြိမ်တိုင်ခဲ့ပြီဖြစ်သည်။
၂။ ထို့ပင်လုံညီလာခံ၌ပင် ကြားဖြတ်ဗမာအစိုးရ (Proper Burma) နှင့် ဖက်ဒရယ်ရှမ်းပြည် ကချင်ပြည်၊ချင်းပြည်အပါအဝင် တိုင်းရင်းသားကိုယ်စားလှယ်တို့အကြား နိုင်ငံရေးဆိုင်ရာ ယုံကြည်မှု များတည်ဆောက်နိုင်ခဲ့ပြီး ပင်လုံစာချုပ်၏နိဒါန်း၌ “ကြားဖြတ်ဗမာအစိုးရနှင့် ချက်ချင်း ပူးပေါင်း လိုက်ခြင်းအားဖြင့် ရှမ်း၊ ကချင်၊ ချင်းတို့သည် လွတ်လပ်ရေးကို ပိုမိုလျင်မြန်စွာ ရရှိလိမ့်မည်” ဟူသော ဖော်ပြချက်၊ ပင်လုံစာချုပ် အပိုဒ် ၅ ၌ “နယ်တွင်းအုပ်ချုပ်ရေးတွင် ယခုရရှိခံစားလျက်ရှိသော ကိုယ်ပိုင်အုပ်ချုပ်ရေး ဆုံးပါးရန် မည်သည့်ဒေသတွင်မဆို လုံးဝပြုလုပ်လိမ့်မည် မဟုတ်ပါ” ဟူ သော ဖော်ပြချက်တို့နှင့် ပင်လုံစာချုပ် အပိုဒ် ၇ ၌ “တောင်တန်းဒေသရှိ ပြည်သူတို့သည် ဒီမိုကရေစီ တိုင်းပြည်များတွင်ရရှိ ခံစားလျက်ရှိသော အခြေခံအခွင့်အရေးများနှင့် ရပိုင်ခွင့်ဟု သတ်မှတ်ထား သည့် အခွင့်အရေးများနှင့် ရပိုင်ခွင့်များ ရရှိခံစားစေရမည်” ဟု ဖော်ပြချက်များအရ အဆိုပါ ရှမ်းအမျိုးသားခေါင်းဆောင်များအပါအဝင် တိုင်းရင်းသားခေါင်းဆောင်တို့၏ ပင်လုံညီလာခံမှ သဘောတူ ဆုံးဖြတ်ချက်များသည် ယနေ့နိုင်ငံတော်၏ နယ်နိမိတ်၊ အကျယ်အဝန်းနှင့်ပုံသဏ္ဍာန်ကို တည်ဆောက်ခဲ့ခြင်းဖြစ်ပြီး ပင်လုံ၏ ကတိကဝတ်သည် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီနိုင်ငံထူထောင်ရေး ရည်မှန်းချက်ပင်ဖြစ်ပါသည်။
၃။ ပင်လုံညီလာခံမှ ရရှိခဲ့သော ဆုံးဖြတ်ချက်များ၊ ကတိကဝတ်များ၊ ကိုယ်ပိုင်ပြဋ္ဌာန်းခွင့်နှင့် တန်းတူညီမျှရေး သန္နိဋ္ဌာန်များသည် ကာလရှည်ကြာမြန်မာ့နိုင်ငံရေးပြဿနာအား အဖြေရှာရေး အဓိကလိုအပ်ချက်ဖြစ်သည့် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီနိုင်ငံတော် တည်ဆောက်နိုင်ရေးအတွက် လွန်စွာ အရေးကြီးသည့် အခြေခံအုတ်မြစ်လည်း ဖြစ်နေပါသည်။
၄။ ထိုအခြေခံအုတ်မြစ် ပင်လုံကတိကဝတ်တို့ဖြင့် တည်ဆောက်သော ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီ နိုင်ငံတော်ကြီးသည် စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ်အပါအဝင် အာဏာရှင်စနစ်မှန်သမျှ မချုပ်ငြိမ်းသရွေ့ ထူထောင်နိုင်မည် မဟုတ်သလို ငြိမ်းချမ်းရေးနှင့်ဖွံ့ဖြိုးတိုးတက်ရေးအစစ်အမှန်သည်လည်း ရရှိနိုင်မည် မဟုတ်ကြောင်း ပင်လုံကတိကဝတ်ဖော်ဆောင်ရန်ပျက်ကွက်ခြင်းကြောင့် ဖြစ်ပေါ်ခဲ့သည့် နှစ်(၇၀)ကျော်ကြာ နိုင်ငံရေးပြသာနာများက မီးမောင်းထိုးပြလျက်ရှိပါသည်။ ထို့ကြောင့် လက်ရှိအချိန်တွင် ပြည်သူလူထုတစ်ရပ်လုံးလက်တွဲလျက် စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ် အပါအဝင် အာဏာရှင် စနစ်မှန်သမျှ အဆုံးသတ်စေရန် နည်းလမ်းမျိုးစုံဖြင့် တော်လှန်တိုက်ပွဲဝင်နေကြခြင်း ဖြစ်ပါသည်။ ထိုသို့တော်လှန်တိုက်ပွဲဝင်ကြရာတွင် ရှမ်းတိုင်းရင်းသားများ၊ ရှမ်းပါတီများ အပါအဝင် ရှမ်းတော်လှန် ရေးအင်အားစုများ၏ အသက်သွေးချွေးစွန့်လွှတ်ကာ တိုက်ပွဲဝင်နေကြသည်မှာ မျက်မှောက်ခေတ် သမိုင်းတွင် အထင်အရှားပင်ဖြစ်ပါသည်။
၅။ သို့ဖြစ်ရာ ယခုရှမ်းအမျိုးသားနေ့ (၇၆) ကြိမ်မြောက်အခါသမယတွင် ရှမ်းတိုင်းရင်းသားတို့ အပါအဝင် ပြည်သူတစ်ရပ်လုံး၏ ဘုံရည်မှန်းချက်ဖြစ်သော ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီနိုင်ငံ ထူထောင်ရေး အခြေခံအုတ်မြစ်ဖြစ်သည့် ကိုယ်ပိုင်ပြဋ္ဌာန်းခွင့်နှင့် တန်းတူညီမျှရေးအတွက် ကျွန်ုပ်တို့ အမျိုးသား ညီညွတ်ရေးအတိုင်ပင်ခံကောင်စီအနေဖြင့် ရှမ်းတိုင်းရင်းသားများနှင့်အတူ တွဲလက်မြဲမြံစွာ တော်လှန် တိုက်ပွဲဝင်သွားမည်ဟု အလေးအနက်ကတိသစ္စာပြုအပ်ပါကြောင်း သဝဏ်လွှာ ပေးပို့ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Consultative Council
Date of publication:
2023-02-07
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-07
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Shan history
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Description:
"(Chiang Mai, Thailand) The Karenni Human Rights Group, the Kayan Women’s Organization, the Karenni National Women’s Organization, and the Kayah State Peace Monitoring Network today released a new report, “How can we survive in the future?”: Atrocity Crimes in Karenni State. The report documents human rights violations amounting to war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by junta forces in Burma’s Karenni State and surrounding areas between May 2021 and September 2022.
The serious violations of international human rights and international humanitarian law committed by junta forces include both indiscriminate and targeted attacks on Karenni civilian populations, murder and mass killings, widespread destruction of civilian property, forced displacement on a massive scale, arbitrary arrest and detention, torture and cruel treatment, sexual violence, and using Karenni civilians as forced labor and human shields.
“The Burmese Army continues to conduct militarized activities, including the use of heavy artillery against civilians in Karenni State. Women and children are the most vulnerable in conflict. Civilians across the country, including Karenni State, have been forced to flee their homes and move to the jungle. The situation has become increasingly unstable due to armed clashes,” said Mie Mie, Chairperson of the Karenni National Women’s Organization.
1,190 homes in 87 Karenni towns, wards and villages have been either heavily damaged or completely destroyed by junta forces. At least 180,000 Karenni people have been forcibly displaced, which is more than 40 percent of the estimated total Karenni population. Up to 70 percent of internally displaced people (IDP) are women and children. Some families have been displaced multiple times, as IDP sites come under attack by junta forces.
An internally displaced woman interviewed for the report whose home was destroyed by the regime’s mortar shelling said, “I lost everything. I don’t know where to take my children to stay and hide. I am really afraid and I don’t know where we can keep running safely.”
The report also documents the arbitrary arrests of at least 260 Karenni civilians including 33 women by junta forces throughout Karenni State and neighboring areas. 115 Karenni civilians were documented to have been unlawfully killed while in Burmese military custody over the reporting period, including in three mass killing events.
Based on legal analysis of the data collected, the report finds that members of the Burmese military have committed the war crimes of attacking civilians, attacking protected objects, pillaging, murder, torture, cruel treatment, and displacing civilians in Karenni State. The conduct likely also amounts to the crimes against humanity of imprisonment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, murder, torture, enslavement, other inhumane acts, and forced displacement.
The four Karenni organizations urged the international community to pursue justice and accountability to end the cycle of impunity for the Burmese military. This should include referral of the situation in Burma to the International Criminal Court, which would provide a pathway to justice and reparations for the thousands of Karenni victims. They also renewed calls for the international community to take concrete steps beyond ‘statement diplomacy’ to protect the thousands of civilians who live with the daily threat of being murdered by the military regime. These steps should include imposing a coordinated global arms embargo on the Burmese military and sanctioning aviation fuel supply in a bid to end deadly air strikes..."
Source/publisher:
Karenni Human Rights Group, Kayan Women’s Organization, Karenni National Women’s Organization, Kayah State Peace Monitoring Network
Date of publication:
2023-02-06
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-06
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Armed conflict in Burma - attacks on civilians
Language:
Format :
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194.25 KB 124.32 KB
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